Revolutionary Space: Cordon Industrial Vicuna Mackenna and the Chilean Road to Socialism, 1972-1973

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List of Images

List of Acronyms

CCM: Cordón Cerrillos-Maipú

CUT: Central Única de Trabajadores (National Labor Confederation)

CVM: Cordón Vicuña Mackenna

IC: Izquierda Cristiana (Christian Left)

JAP: Junta de Abastecimiento y Control de Precios (Supply and Price Control Authority)

MAPU: Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria (United Popular Action Movement)

MIR: Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionaria (Revolutionary Left Movement)

PC: Partido Comunista (Communist Party)

PDC: Partido Demócrata Cristiano (Christian Democrat Party)

PN: Partido Nacional (National Party)

PS: Partido Socialista (Socialist Party)

UP: Unidad Popular (Popular Unity)

On July 12, 1973, Carlos Altamirano, the secretary-general of the Socialist Party, delivered a speech entitled "The Rights and Responsibilities of the Chilean People" in the union office of Elecmetal. "No one can deny the Chilean people the right to defend themselves," declared Altamirano, "the workers have exercised this right, and responsibility, by organizing themselves in the Cordones Industriales." Altamirano argued that these Cordones "constituted the seeds of an incipient, yet already powerful, *poder popular* [popular power]," and that they "form[ed] an impregnable barricade against any attempted insurrection by the bourgeois." Near the end of his speech Altamirano, under the name of the Socialist Party, called on the workers "to increase and strengthen their mass organizations, consolidate their positions within their seized factories and farms, and to prepare themselves to launch a great offensive of the masses." Only such an offensive organized and directed by popular organizations such as the Cordones Industriales, could pull Chile back from "the brink" of a civil war, which threatened to "build a regime on the backs of thousands of dead Chileans" through "the most brutal of repressions and a relentless dictatorship."[1]

Delivered only twelve days after an attempted coup by a rogue regiment of the Chilean army, Altamirano's speech called upon the Chilean people who had organized themselves in the Cordones Industriales to exercise their right to self-defense in the hopes of creating a revolutionary breakthrough. What were these "popular organizations" that Altamirano referred to? Furthermore, why did the secretary general of the Socialist Party travel all the way to the southern periphery of Santiago to deliver his speech in the offices of Elecmetal?

Beginning at the end of the nineteenth century and throughout most of the twentieth, the twin processes of industrialization and rural migration combined to produce highly concentrated

[1] "*La Intervencion De Altamirano En La Asamblea De Los Dirigentes De Los Cordones Industriales*," *Clarín*, July 13, 1973

sectors of manufacturing and heavy industry along the peripheries of Santiago. These industrial belts grew up alongside key transportation routes in and out of the city, whose origins were tied to the railroads of the nineteenth century. This outgrowth did not occur by chance. The 1939 Santiago Official Urbanization Plan and a concerted effort to zone the city's periphery for industrial production had enabled the growth and development of these corridors.[2] Beginning in June 1972 and continuing until the military coup of September 1973, the workers of the Santiago industrial corridors struggled to actualize their own vision of the Chilean road to socialism. They seized their workplaces and demanded their incorporation into the Social Property Area (APS). According to the vision of then president Salvador Allende, the APS was to be a state managed area of the economy, which would open the doors to a socialist society. In doing so, they pioneered a new form of worker organization that prioritized the place one worked over the work one did. The industrial belts of the Santiago became the Cordones Industriales of the revolution.

The history of these Cordones is a history of fits and starts; one full of mobilizations followed by demobilizations, advances followed by retreats, victories and defeats. In a sense, theirs is an effervescent history, highly visible at moments of crisis in the revolution, but relatively opaque during day-to-day struggles. With this understanding in mind, it is possible to periodize the history of the Cordones into three cycles, each rooted in a particular theme of their historical development: Creation (June-August 1972), Consolidation (October 1972-February 1973), and Coordination (March-September 1973).[3]

[2] See appendix one for a map of the *Cordones* in the Greater Santiago area. For excellent introductions to the history and legacy of the 1939 Urbanization Plan, see, José Rosas et al., "El Plano Oficial de Urbanización de La Comuna de Santiago de 1939: Trazas Comunes Entre La Ciudad Moderna Y La Ciudad Preexistente," ARQ (Santiago), no. 91 (December 2015): 82–93, Patricio Gross, "Santiago de Chile (1925-1990): planificación urbana y modelos políticos," Revista EURE - Revista de Estudios Urbano Regionales 17, no. 52–53 (October 7, 1991), Francisco Sabatini and Fernando Soler, "Paradoja de la planificación urbana en Chile," Revista EURE - Revista de Estudios Urbano Regionales 21, no. 62 (April 7, 1995).

[3] For a study of the Cordones that argues their history is the key to understanding the dynamics of the entirety of the Chilean Revolution, see Franck Gaudichaud, *Chile 1970-1973, mil dias que estremecieron al mundo: Poder popular,*

Within the historiography, the period of consolidation has often been referred to as the "hour of the Cordones Industriales."[4] During the so-called October Crisis of 1972, the number of Cordones active in Santiago increased dramatically. Of these new organizations, Cordon Vicuña Mackenna (CVM) is widely recognized as "one of the most dynamic" at work during the revolution.[5] The simple fact that Altamirano chose Elecmetal (the command center and symbolic heart of Vicuña Mackenna) to deliver his speech highlights the importance that the Chilean left placed on CVM in particular. The description of CVM as "dynamic" has been reproduced numerous times over by the historiography, which argues the highly politicized climate of October 1972 explains the Cordon's dynamism.[6] This temporal emphasis is certainly supported by the source material; for example, Altamirano's invocation of an "insurrection of the bourgeois" deployed a recognizable phrase that had circulated through the Chilean press in reference to the events of October.[7] For all its strengths, however, this perspective has failed to understand Cordon Vicuña Mackenna beyond a description of its achievements. Is there a way that we can lift the descriptive veil and understand *why* and *how* Cordon Vicuña Mackenna became so powerful?

This paper argues that the geographic location of Cordon Vicuña Mackenna within the city of Santiago best explains its strength as a new form of revolutionary organization. To draw

cordones industriales y socialismo durante el gobierno de Salvador Allende, Primera edicíón, Historia (Santiago: Lom ediciones, 2016).

4 Peter Winn, *Weavers of Revolution: The Yarur Workers and Chile's Road to Socialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 238.

5 "*Comités Coordinadores Ruta del Poder Obrero*" *Punto Final*, November 21, 1972.

6 See, Gaudichaud, *Chile 1970-1973, mil dias que estremecieron al mundo*; Franck Gaudichaud, *Poder popular y cordones industriales: testimonios sobre el movimiento popular urbano, 1970-1973* (Lom Ediciones, 2004); Sandra Castillo Soto, *Cordones industriales: nuevas formas de sociabilidad obrera y organización política popular (Chile, 1970-1973)* (Concepción: Ediciones Escaparate, 2009); Jorge Rojas Flores, Cinthia Rodríguez Toledo, and Moisés Fernández Torres, *Cristaleros: Recuerdos de Un Siglo: Los Trabajadores de Cristalerías de Chile* (Padre Hurtado, Chile: Sindicato No 2 de Cristalerías de Chile : Programa de Economía del Trabajo, 1998).

7 *Punto Final* October 24, 1972 and *Chile, Hoy* October 27, 1972 both ran various articles with the phrase in them. *Punto Final* also displayed the phrase on the cover of its October 24 issue.

attention to place is not to diminish the actions of the "workers and *pobladores* [urban poor][8]," who participated in this new organization.[9] Their actions transformed a place of industrial production into a revolutionary space for creating socialism.

My reference to space is deliberate and forms the methodological approach that I have adopted in order to make Vicuña Mackenna intelligible as an object of study. By this I mean that as a geographic entities the industrial belts of Santiago long pre-dated their existence as a revolutionary space. Thus, the social relations that existed within the territory of Vicuña Mackenna are not reducible to the history of the Cordones Industriales as new forms of organization. The dominant interpretation of the Cordones, however, has argued the opposite by emphasizing a distinction between the Cordones as space and as forms of organization. For example, Franck Gaudichaud has suggested that we apply Marx's analytic of a class in itself versus a class for itself to the Cordones: Cordones in themselves refer to their spatial dimensions, while Cordones for themselves refer to their organizational manifestation. This approach has proven incredibly fruitful in explaining the relationship between the Cordones, Allende's governing coalition, and the overall revolutionary process.[10] Yet for all its strengths, it is unable to analyze the particularities of a specific Cordon because it relies on an artificial distinction between space and practice as if the two do not condition, reinforce, and transform each other.[11]

[8] The typical translation of *poblador* would be 'squatter' or 'shantytown dweller,' but these words connote a non-working class substrate of the proletariat. *Pobladores*, however, actively worked and viewed themselves as capable of elevating their class status. For an excellent overview the categories of the Chilean working class, see Peter Winn, "Loosing the Chains Labor and the Chilean Revolutionary Process, 1970-1973," *Latin American Perspectives* 3, no. 1 (1976): 70–84.When necessary I have elected to follow the lead of Mario Garces, the preeminent historian of the *pobladores*, and translate the term as 'urban poor.' See, Mario Garcés, *Tomando su sitio: el movimiento de pobladores de Santiago, 1957-1970* (Lom Ediciones, 2002); Julio Pinto Vallejos et al., eds., *Fiesta Y Drama: Nuevas Historias de La Unidad Popular*, Primera edición, Historia (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2014).
[9] *Clarín*, July 13, 1973.
[10] Gaudichaud, *Chile 1970-1973, mil dias que estremecieron al mundo*.
[11] Henri Lefebvre was the first to theorize the relationship between space and social actions, which led him to declare: "(social) space is a (social) product." According to Lefebvre, "social space 'incorporates' social actions, the actions of subjects both individual and collective who are born and who die, who suffer and who act...social space

This paper widens the analytic aperture and analyzes the Cordon Vicuña Mackenna in its spatial dimensions. By spatial dimensions I mean two things: (1) the geographic place of Vicuña Mackenna Avenue within the city of Santiago and (2) the specific industries that lined the avenue itself. The available source material supports adopting this orientation. Altamirano's description of the Cordones as an "impregnable barricade" invokes a spatial understanding of the Cordones' capabilities. Alternatively, consider the testimony of Pablo Munoz, a Socialist Party militant active in Cordon Vicuña Mackenna; to him the Cordones were born:

> As close knit *territorial organizations*, very much of [the surrounding] neighborhood [...] at the time [when the revolution required] a more agile, *territorial organization*, [that could] take care of problems in the street […] [the Cordones existed] in the street, in a very defined geographical area.[12]

This paper takes Munoz at his word and seeks to understand how the street and its surrounding neighborhoods determined the organization of Cordon Vicuña Mackenna.

Before going any further it is important to do away with the myths and misrepresentations that surround the Cordones Industriales. For starters, they were certainly not the "Cordones of death" described by Pinochet and the military.[13] Despite the military's repeated interventions and searches of factories leading up to the coup on September 11, the workers of the Cordones were not hoarding arms, nor were they engaging in military training. While the workers did practice, prepare for, and frequently engage in street battles with rightist civilian shock troops such as *Patria y Libertad* (Fatherland and Freedom), they were never a regimented force capable of "stifling or putting down opposition" to their cause.[14]

works (along with its concept) as a tool for the analysis of society." Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Oxford, OX, UK ; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell, 1991), 26, 33-4.

[12] Quoted in Gaudichaud, *Poder popular y cordones industriales*, 2004, 306. Emphasis mine.

[13] Augusto. Pinochet Ugarte, *El día decisivo: 11 de septiembre de 1973*, 4. ed.. (Santiago: Editorial ABello, 1980), 219.

[14] Ibid, 221.

The Cordones also did not constitute a Soviet in miniature as many leftist propaganda outlets portrayed them. Indeed, central to the revolutionary vision of the left wing of the Socialist Party (PS) and the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) was the creation of *Consejos Communales de Trabajadores* (Municipal Worker's Councils) modeled on the design of the Bolsheviks.[15] Despite great gains by the workers of the Cordones in creating new forms of organization and consolidating their strength within them, they never reached the level of functioning as a parallel form of governance. At best they remained seeds, which represented the potential for the creation of such structures.

If the Cordones did not constitute a workers' army or a Soviet, then what exactly were they? At their heart, the Cordones were councils of local union leaders who coordinated the actions of the workers and *pobladores* within a given territory. Strategically their goal was to fulfill of the spirit of the Popular Unity's Basic Program.[16] Tactically their actions drew from the much longer history of the Chilean popular classes, which since the 1950's had perfected the art of the *toma* (seizure) as the way to achieve its demands.[17] The success of these councils, however, depended on the willingness of others to help workers maintain their *tomas*. In the case of Vicuña Mackenna, the participation of *pobladores* from the nearby centers of La Legua and Nueva La Habana proved indispensable for the successes of Vicuña Mackenna. Jose Moya, a worker at the IRT factory along Vicuña Mackenna who lived in Nueva La Habana remembers

[15] According to internal MIR party documents the label of '*consejo communal de trabajadores'* originated with the Socialist Party and in an effort to distance themselves from the Socialists the MIR decided to use the different label of *Commando Comunales.* See, "*Informe de la Comision Politica al Comite Central Restringido sobre la crisis de octubre y nuestra politica elector. Documento Confidencial Interno del 3 de Noviembre de 1972*" reproduced in Víctor Farías, ed., *La Izquierda Chilena (1969-1973): Documentos Para El Estudio de Su Línea Estratégica,* 1. ed (Berlin : Santiago de Chile: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Berlin ; Centro de Estudios Publicos, 2000), 3447–93.
[16] During the 1969 election campaign the parties of left formed a coalition under the heading of *Unidad Popular* (Popular Unity, UP) and placed Salvador Allende as the head of their ticket. As part of their campaign, the UP composed a Basic Program, which outlined an anti-imperial, anti-monopolistic, and thoroughly pro-institutional democracy vision of change.
[17] See, Mario Garces, "El Movimiento Popular, La Unidad Popular, Y El Golpe," *Punto Final,* no. 552 (September 2003).

"the factory seizures had great success; but that was because of the support from the *pobladores*. *Campamentos* such as Nueva La Habana or Lo Hermida mobilized many people" in those days.[18] Not only did these individuals provide key support during important mobilizations, marches, and/or *tomas*, but they also provided ideological support. One of the key traits associated with the *poblador* movement was the creation of a new ideology of social justice that grew out of their movement and places of residence. If the place of Vicuña Mackenna became a space of revolutionary organization, then the places of La Legua and Nueva La Habana should be seen as spaces of a nascent "social justice."[19]

This paper analyzes the Cordon from two angles: that of direct actions and that of its programmatic vision for the revolution. It begins by putting Vicuña Mackenna in its proper place within the history of the revolution followed by its geographic place in the city of Santiago. Historically speaking, the Cordones emerged midway through the revolution in response to deadlock between the political arms of the revolution. Spatially, CVM constituted meeting point between workers of factories along the avenue and the *pobladores* who lived along its periphery. This is a new approach to the histories of workers and pobladores. Instead of arguing that the *pobladores* were merely a subset of the working class, I argue that the *pobladores*, as a distinct social movement and unique "social actor,"[20] were one of the most important determinants of Cordon Vicuña Mackenna's strength. This runs counter to the dominant interpretation, which argues the Cordones were solely a product of, and organization for, workers.[21]

[18] Jose Moya, quoted in Gaudichaud, *Poder popular y cordones industriales*, 128.
[19] Equipo de Estudios Poblacionales Cidu, "Reivindicación urbana y lucha política: los campamentos de pobladores en Santiago de Chile," *Revista EURE - Revista de Estudios Urbano Regionales* 2, no. 6 (November 7, 1972).
[20] Mario Garces "Los Anso de la Unidad Popular: Cuando Los Pobladores recreaban la cuidades chilenas" Pinto Vallejos et al., *Fiesta Y Drama*, 51–73.
[21] This interpretation reproduces the propaganda and sectarian debates of its source material. For example, when the *pobladores* do appear in such narratives they are associated with the *Comando Communales* (municipal commands) instead of the Cordones. This distinction never existed in reality. While there were certainly forms of local popular organization that went by the name of a *Comando Comunal* between 1970 and 1973, they never existed as uniquely

The focus then scopes inward to the heated days of October, which many at the time referred to as "the insurrection of the Bourgeois"[22] just like Altamirano did in his speech. I argue that the temporal frame of the October Crisis combined with the spatial composition of Vicuña Mackenna Avenue to produce the Cordon Industrial. After detailing the events of October, my focus shifts to a document that emerged during the crisis entitled the Manifesto of Cordon Vicuña Mackenna. I argue that the manifesto is anchored in the discourse of popular justice that had been associated with the *poblador* movement, especially as it existed within Nueva La Habana just to the east of Vicuña Mackenna Avenue. By paying close attention to the rhetorical devices deployed in the document we can uncover the influence of the *pobladores* and their movement on the workers of the Cordon. This in turn suggests that analytic boundaries that have separated the labor movement from that of *poblador* movement are far less rigid than previously articulated. Indeed, the presence of the rhetoric of criminality within Vicuña Mackenna's manifesto evidences the importance of the discourse of social justice developed by the *pobladores* that had previously participated in the Cordon during the October Crisis. The paper concludes by addressing potential counterarguments to the spatial frame of analysis while also considering the future avenues of research opened up by the paper itself. The remainder of this introduction surveys the relevant literature and points out the contributions of the present work.

Navigating the Historiographical Ocean of the Chilean Revolution

poblador form of organization beyond their appearance on paper in the propaganda of the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR). Indeed, internal communiqués from the MIR's central committee reveal that they consciously chose to use the phrase *Commando Comunal* to differentiate from the Cordones, which they believed to be beholden to the left wing of the Socialist Party. For the internal MIR documents see, Farías, *La Izquierda Chilena (1969-1973)*, 3447–93.

[22] *Punto Final* October 24, 1972. Patricio Guzman also used the phrase as the title for the first part of his documentary *La Batalla de Chile*, which remains one of the best windows into the slogans, marches, and general atmosphere of Chile between 1970 and 1973. See, Guzman, *La Batalla*.

When it comes to the events of the Popular Unity years in Chile, there exists a veritable "bibliographic ocean."[23] Despite the massive amount of studies of the Popular Unity years, relatively few have focused on the history of the Cordones. Bolstered by the rise of social history and aided by the methods of oral history and memory studies these works have gone to great lengths toward uncovering the voices and actors who struggled to actualize their understanding of the revolution.

The pioneering work that enabled the study of such subjects remains Peter Winn's *Weavers of Revolution*. Winn's work upended the interpretative landscape through a micro-history of the Yarur textile factory. The previous emphasis on the "revolution from above" had obscured a veritable "revolution from below," which had been detonated by the seizure and subsequent socialization of the Yarur mill.[24] This process soon "escaped" Allende's ability to control it and in doing so "pushed anxious small business and farm owners into" an "alliance" with the country's capitalist elites.[25]

Winn's work initiated a similar revolution within the historiography of the UP, which in turn transformed topics such as the Cordones Industriales into legitimate subjects of study.[26] The pioneering, and still indispensable, histories of the Cordones were written by Hugo Cancino and Miguel Silva. Cancino's filters his analysis through the lens of discourse and in doing so

[23] Franck Gaudichaud, "A 40 años del golpe. Historiografía crítica pistas de investigación para (re)pensar la Unidad Popular," 2013, 65. Indeed, in the forty years since the destruction of the Chilean Revolution so many works have been published that the study of them has become a virtual sub-field unto itself. For the landmark historiographical interventions on this subject, in their order of publication, see, Luis Vitale, ed., *Para Recuperar La Memoria Histórica: Frei, Allende Y Pinochet*, 1. ed (Santiago [Chile]: Ediciones ChileAmérica--CESOC, 1999); María Angélica Illanes O., *La Batalla de La Memoria: Ensayos Históricos de Nuestro Siglo: Chile, 1900-2000*, 1. ed, Ariel, v. 21 (Santiago, Chile: Planeta, 2002); Mario Garces and Sebastian Leiva, "Perspectivas de Analisis de La Unidad Popular: Opciones Y Omisiones" n.d.; Gaudichaud, "A 40 años del golpe. Historiografía crítica pistas de investigación para (re)pensar la Unidad Popular."

[24] Winn, *Weavers of Revolution*, 209–45.

[25] Winn, 230–31.

[26] Recent works have continued to deepen our understanding of the lived experiences of the revolution by focusing on areas beyond political-economic struggles of the popular classes. For two excellent volumes stand out from the rest Julio Pinto Vallejos and Tomás Moulian, eds., *Cuando Hicimos Historia: La Experiencia de La Unidad Popular*, 1. ed, Historia (Santiago [Chile]: LOM Ediciones, 2005); Pinto Vallejos et al., *Fiesta Y Drama*.

produces an apologia for the Allende's vision insofar as he concludes that the third way proposed by the UP remained incompatible within the Chilean left's reliance on the discourse of Marxism-Leninism.[27] Miguel Silva's *Los Cordones Industriales y El Socialismo Desde Abajo* remains one of the most important works on the Cordones to date.[28] The book itself remained unedited in its original edition and as a result its presentation remained chaotic resulting from its reproduction of numerous primary sources, which tend to blur the lines between source material and Silva's commentary.[29] Now in its second edition, Silva argues that while the previous edition focused on *narrating* the history of the Cordones, the new edition had arrived at the "hour of analysis."[30] For him the Cordones constitute the high point of the Chilean labor movement dating all the way back to the *mancomunales* of the early twentieth century.

Much as Winn's study opened the doors for Cancino and Silva, their studies ushered in a new wave of works dedicated to the Cordones and the issue of *poder popular* (poplar power). The work of Sandra Castillo and Ana Lopez Dietz have both deepened our understanding of the Cordones through extensive interviews with the workers of the Cordones (Dietz) and an analysis of the social and cultural meaning of the Cordones (Soto). Renzo Henriquez Guaico has established himself as the foremost expert on the history of Cordón Cerrillos-Maipú and the surrounding rural mobilizations.[31]

The most comprehensive examination of the Cordones, and all the other forms of *poder popular* that emerged during the revolution, comes from Franck Gaudichaud. According to

[27] Hugo Cancino Troncoso, *Chile: la problemática del poder popular en el proceso de la vía chilena al socialismo, 1970-1973* (Aarhus, Denmark: Aarhus University Press, 1988).
[28] According to Maria Angelica Illanes, "Miguel Silva" is actually a pseudonym for an English social scientist, see Illanes O., *La Batalla de La Memoria*, 177.
[29] Illanes also takes Silva to task for his "chaotic" presentation arguing that it reproduces the myth of the UP years being defined by chaos and as a result supports interpretations, such as Gonzalo Vial's, which argue that the military had to intervene to restore "order."
[30] Miguel Silva, *Los Cordones Industriales Y El Socialism Desde Abajo*, second edition, 2013, 11–81.
[31] Henríquez Guaico, *El poder del campo*; Renzo Henríquez Guaico, "Industria Perlak 'Dirigida y Controlada por los Trabajadores'. Desalienación obrera en los tiempos de la Unidad Popular, 1970-1973," *Revista Izquierdas*, 2014.

Gaudichaud, the topic of *poder popular*, and by extension the Cordones, is the key for understanding the entire process of the revolution itself. Gaudichaud thus opposes interpretations that seek to separate the revolution into one from above and one from below, instead opting to holding the two processes together in order to analyze their properly dialectical unfolding. For Gaudichaud, the actions of the Allende and political parties influenced the actions of the workers organized in the Cordones, who in turn forced the government to adjust course at various points in the revolution.[32]

While all of these works have filled in different missing pieces from our understanding of the Chilean Revolution, none of them have considered the Cordones in their spatial dimension. By paying close attention to the geographic location of Vicuña Mackenna, this study fills in the gaps in our knowledge about the particularities of Vicuña Mackenna as a Cordon Industrial.[33] Instead of a study of change over time, this paper is more concerned with understanding the subjective experiences of a given moment in time. Through a close reading of the memories of Vicuña Mackenna's participants, descriptions from the press at the time, the documents produced by the Cordon, and a series of sociological investigations into the status of the *poblador* movement[34]; this study reveals that the dynamism and strength of Vicuña Mackenna resulted

[32] Gaudichaud, *Chile 1970-1973, mil dias que estremecieron al mundo*; Franck Gaudichaud, *Poder popular y cordones industriales: testimonios sobre el movimiento popular urbano, 1970-1973* (Lom Ediciones, 2004).
[33] We have a wealth of information about the original Cordon founded in June 1972 along the southwestern periphery of Santiago. Yet we lack similar studies for Vicuña Mackenna. This is due in a large part to the available source materials, which are much better for Cerrillos-Maipú than for Vicuña Mackenna. For example, the key primary source that all studies of the Cordones rely on is the investigation of the CIDU team on Cordon Cerillos-Maipú. Given the abrupt end to the revolution, no other studies were conducted in different Cordones. See, M. Cristina Cordero, Eder Sader, and Mónica Threlfall, *Consejo Comunal de trabajadores y cordón Cerrillos-Maipú: 1972: balance y perspectivas de un embrión de poder popular* (Santiago de Chile: Universidad Católica de Chile, 1973).
[34] In terms of press sources I have conducted an exhaustive review of *Chile, Hoy, Clarín, Punto Final*, and *Las Noticias de Ultima Hora, El Mercurio, La Aurora de Chile, Tarea Urgente*, and *Trinchera* between 1972 and 1973. It is no secret that the press became highly politicized during the UP years and frequently engaged in propaganda efforts. In order to control for such embellishments, I have crosschecked press reports with the oral histories and testimonies of the workers and political activists who were active in the Cordones. I have given higher weigh to the testimonies collected and published by Franck Gaudichaud because they include the full transcript (question and

from its proximity to two key centers of the *poblador* movement. This means that even if the pobladores constituted a "social actor" independent of the working class and labor movement, the barriers between these two social movements were much more porous than previously accounted for. In order to reach this conclusion, however, it is necessary to begin with the election of Salvador Allende in 1970 and the resulting political climate that conditioned the actions and worldviews of these movements during the revolution.

Putting Vicuña Mackenna in its proper place I: Competing Visions of Revolution

The Cordones emerged within, and in response to, an increasingly polarized political landscape. Indeed, the euphoria of the Chilean left that surrounded Allende's election quickly gave way to conflicts with the political opposition and sectarian divides within the left itself. This section sketches this landscape on two levels: the confrontation between the governing coalition and the Christian Democrats and that confrontation's impact on the coalition's fracturing along sectarian lines.

Allende's electoral victory in 1970 represented the culmination of decades' long struggle on the part of the popular classes, and as such represented a joyous occasion.[35] For Guillermo Orrego, a worker at Standard Electric and participant in Cordón Vicuña Mackenna, Allende's victory brought him "an immense joy" and represented "the crystallization of his dreams."[36] The workers wasted little time in using the UP's electoral victory to leverage their own demands for

answer format), which is the closest that I can get without conducting the interviews myself. The final set of sources is a series of investigations into the *pobladores* and *poblaciones* carried out during the late nineteen-sixties and early seventies by a team of sociologists from CIDU at the Catholic University. The team and their resulting research emerged in opposition to a previous round of investigations carried out by DESAL, which had argued that the pobladores existed in a marginal capacity both spatially (i.e. living at the margins of the city) but also functionally (i.e. they were unnecessary, or at best redundant to the functioning of Chilean society and its economic output). The CIDU team's findings have formed a key repository of materials about the *poblador* movement that historians have drawn on for some time. I focus a subset of their studies that focused on the development of a new form of justice developed within the spaces of the poblador movement.

[35] See, Winn, Weavers, chapter 3 for an overview of the "long march of the Chilean left."

[36] Quoted in Soto, *Cordones industriales*, 52.

"the rights and opportunities" they had been denied for much of their history.[37] Hugo Valenzuela, the president of the SUMAR-Polyester union remembers that Allende's election "opened great possibilities…I believed that I was part of a historic movement, that I was going to change society."[38] The workers of the Cordones interpreted Allende's victory as a green light to press their demands on the State without fear of the reprisals, repressions, or massacres that had previously defined the history of the Chilean labor movement.[39] For the workers of the Vicuña Mackenna, the work of creating socialism began in 1970.

Allende and the Popular Unity coalition (UP), however, did not view their mission as the creation of socialism in Chile. Instead, the UP's Basic Program outlined a vision of structural changes such as the nationalization of the country's mineral wealth and banking sector in conjunction with the expropriation of the great monopolies of both foreign and domestic capital. In order to achieve such lofty goals, the UP devised a strategy of institutional change anchored in the rights of the Chilean constitution, which required a slow, but steady, strategy of isolating different demographics and wooing sectors middle classes to go along with their proposed changes. In Allende's eyes, his government had six years to create the conditions for his successor to win on a platform of instituting socialism.

The UP's Basic Program proposed restructuring the Chilean economy into three economic spheres: a social property area (owned by the state), a mixed property area (majority owned by the state), and a private property area in which the state would maintain the "conditions necessary for its [economic] development."[40] The UP viewed the Social Property

[37] Testimony of Graciela Valdes, quoted in Henriquez, *El Poder del Campo*, 43.
[38] Quoted in Soto, *Cordones Industriales*, 53.
[39] Such acts of repression were not distant memories. For example, in March 1969, during the twilight of Eduardo Frei's presidency, the Chilean *Carabiñeros* forcefully removed a group of *pobladores* and killing ten in the process. The events came to be known as "The Massacre of Puerto Montt" and were immortalized in a song by Victor Jara.
[40] This new economic structure had been first articulated as part of the UP's Basic Program during its election campaign in 1969. In the section entitled "the construction of a new economy," the plan argued that a "central

Area (APS) as the embryo out of which a socialist economy would emerge through state ownership. His proposal, however, ran into immediate problems and produced the defining political conflict of the Chilean Revolution: the confrontation between the Christian Democrats and the Popular Unity Coalition. The same day that Allende submitted his proposal to Congress, Christian Democrat senators Juan Hamilton and Renan Fuentealba submitted a package of amendments designed to "end the expropriations and state ownership" of companies approved by the "executive without consulting the legislature."[41] The amendments stripped the executive's ability to intervene in companies that had failed to resolve local labor disputes.[42] The amendments passed with an overwhelming majority.[43] Allende immediately vetoed the measures. Congress voted to override the vetoes, but only managed a simple majority. Allende countered by arguing that the constitution required a two-thirds majority to overturn a presidential veto; the Christian Democrats argued that because it was constitutional amendment a simple majority would suffice. Both sides dug in and a stalemate ensued. The only option was to

objective" of the UP's politics was "to replace the existing economic structure by putting an end to the powers of the domestic and foreign monopolies and eliminating the *latifundio* (landed estate)." Allende and the UP viewed abolishing these structures as the prerequisite to anything that could be considered "the construction of socialism." The program provided six criteria that would be used to establish incorporation into the APS. The first five were fairly specific and included the country's mineral wealth, banking sector, and both foreign and domestic monopolies. In other words, larger, more important, industries would be incorporated. The sixth criteria, however, left the door open for a much wider range of interpretations by arguing that "in general, those [economic] activities that condition the economic and social development of the country" would also be socialized. The inclusion of a "social development" standard, however, allowed for the workers of smaller, less strategic, industries to make a case for their inclusion based on high levels of worker participation. The workers of Perlak and El Mono cited this clause as justification for their demands to be incorporated into the Social Property Area. The government proposed an initial list of 91 industries that fit the given criteria that would be slated for incorporation into the social property area. For an overview of these industries, composed by a Party of the Popular Unity coalition, see Movimiento Accion Popular Unitario, *El Libro de Las 91 [I.e. Noventa Y Uno] Las Empresas Monopolicas Y El Area Social de La Economia Chilena.* (Santiago: Ediciones Barco de Papel, 1972). See, *Programma Basica de la Unidad Popular*, "La Construccion de la Nueva Economia" 1969, 19-21.

[41] El Mercurio, October 22, 1971

[42] This tactic had become one of the leading methods used by the Allende government to incorporate companies into the Social Property Area. Allende and the UP relied on a 1932 law left on the boks from the brief Socialist Republic of Marmaduke Grove. The law allowed for the State to intervene and requisition factories whose production had dropped to due financial strain and/or "business practices." See, Winn, *Weavers*, 151.

[43] The final vote was 101 in favor, 27 opposed, and 8 abstentions. The package also included language that rendered "null and void" any "interventions, requisitions, or state ownership" of enterprises that had taken place after October 14, 1971.

remand the dispute to a constitutional tribunal, where the issue languished until the military coup in September 1973.

Political considerations magnified the ideological differences on display in the competing proposals. In the wake of Allende's pluralist victory in 1970, the UP focused its efforts on upcoming municipal elections in April 1971. The parties of the UP, most notably the Communist and Socialist, won a majority.[44] Buoyed by the electoral returns, UP officials eschewed any sort of "alliance" with the Christian Democrats. The 1971 election cut both ways: members of the conservative wing of the Christian Democrats viewed the UP's success with trepidation and worried that engaging with the government would be interpreted by their base as a moved towards to the left.[45] Thus instead of negotiating with the UP, the PDC allied with the National Party (PN) in support of their candidate for an upcoming by-election. The opposition's candidate successfully defeated the UP's. In the wake of this alliance, the left wing of the Christian Democrats split from the party to form *Izquierda Christiana*, (Christian Left, IC). This exodus in turn allowed the moderate and conservative wings of the PDC to consolidate control within the party as whole, which in turn pushed it further to the right and into the arms of the Nationals.[46] Things worsened for the UP as 1972 dawned: they lost another by-election in January, followed by a shock defeat in the election for the rector of the University of Chile. These political setbacks not only emboldened the Christian Democrats in their efforts to subvert Allende's agenda

[44] In terms of total numbers the parties of the UP won 48.6% of the vote with the parties of the opposition winning 48.2%. Within the overall totals, however, the Socialists won 22.3%, which marked a 95% increase over the 1967 municipal elections. Meanwhile, within the opposition, the Christian Democrats lost nearly 10% of the vote compared to their 1967 showing, while the National Party increased it shares by nearly 4%. Arturo Valenzuela interprets these results as evidence that the political climate had already begun to polarize, with parties representing the two extremes gaining the biggest increase in their turnouts. See, Arturo Valenzuela, *Chile*, Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 53–54.

[45] The left wing of the PDC, represented by Radomiro Tomic, proposed an "alliance of the all the left" to the UP following the election, however, buoyed by their electoral returns and the economic successes thus far Allende rejected such overtures. Winn, *Weavers of Revolution*, 232.

[46] A similar process unfolded within the Radical Party (a member of the UP coalition) as its left wing split off to form the Radical Left Party.

through the constitutional amendments, but it also produced factures within the UP itself. It is to these growing sectarian divides that we now turn.

Just as the struggle to legalize the Social Property Area was being driven by ideological and political concerns, so too were the UP's internal dialogues. While the coalition included numerous parties, the Communists and the Socialists remained its dominant actors. Each party had struggled for years to consolidate their power amongst the workers of Chile, and their longstanding ideological differences began pulling the governing coalition in opposite directions.[47] If the economic successes of 1971, which remained rooted in the Keynesian policies of Economy Minister Pedro Vuskovic, had papered over the differences between the Communists and the Socialists, then the recent electoral defeats pushed those tensions to the surface.[48] The political jockey between the two parties, motivated in party by the upcoming (and first ever) national union elections, revolved around the struggle for power within the coalition. Faced with the external confrontation with the Christian Democrats, while also attempting to hold the coalition together, the UP held two meetings to discuss, debate, and strategize the revolution's future.

The first meeting took place in February 1972 in Arrayan. At stake were two political strategies: creating an alliance with sectors of the middle class (represented by the Christian Democrats) or creating a worker-peasant alliance capable of propelling the revolution forward. In the end, the participants failed to chose either strategy. In the months following the meeting, the UP lost "valuable time" in terms of correcting the emerging "economic imbalances" and

[47] Prior to the 1960s the Socialists had adhered to a more reformist line of social change. The failures of the Eduardo Frei (Christian Democrat) presidency (1964-1970) produced a shift in the Socialist's platform. During the party's national congress in 1967, the PS adopted a line of revolutionary struggle that placed it to the left of the Communist.
[48] The "successes" of 1971 can be briefly summarized as rise in wages and purchasing power, which in turn produced a "carnival of consumption" on the part of sectors of the population that had never participated in such practices. There were also symbolic successes such as the nationalization of the copper industry and large swathes of the banking sector. For a more detailed description of the "masterful" execution of Allende's program during 1971 see Winn, *Weavers of Revolution* 227-231.

healing the "divisions within" its coalition.[49] These unresolved tensions erupted into the national spotlight in May 1972, when competing demonstrations between the left and the Christian democrats resulted in the death of a local student.[50] In response to these events, members of the Chilean left drafted the "Manifesto of Concepcíon," which directly challenged the Hamilton-Fuentealba amendments. The manifesto criticized the legislature for circumventing Allende's proposals. The denunciations did not end there and the document went on to criticize the UP's actions at Arrayan. To the Manifesto's authors, the meeting in Arrayan revealed that the UP had forgotten the centrality of "class struggle" to the revolutionary process because it emphasized a "politics of conciliation" with the "enemy." The document concluded by calling for the government to support the "strength and organization" of the "masses."[51] The time had come for Allende's revolution to go on the offense. The UP coalition, however, decided to hold a second meeting of introspection instead.

Leading up this second meeting to be held in Lo Curro, the divide between the Communists and the Socialists continued to widen. Orlando Millas, leading member of the PC and then housing minister, condemned "the errors" of the Socialists for aligning themselves with elements of the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR). Millas published his condemnations in an open letter in the leading Communist weekly *El Siglo*. He specifically cited the events in Concepcion as evidence of the "crisis within the Popular Unity" coalition and criticized the Manifesto as "antisocialist" and "pure anarchy." To Millas and the Communist the only path

[49] Winn, La Revolucion, 101.
[50] On May 9, 1972, the parties of the UP, in addition to representatives from the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), held a meeting in the city of Concepción to plan an upcoming street march that had been scheduled for May 12. The Christian Democrats had also scheduled a march for the same day. The meeting's participants decided that their demonstration should take precedence and that the Christian Democrats should not be allowed to conduct their mobilization. In an effort to avoid any conflicts between the two groups, local Communist leadership called in the *Carabiñeros* (the militarized police force of Chile). The plan backfired. Street battles erupted, the *Carabiñeros* intervened, and during the conflict Eladio Caamaño, a local student, was killed. Cancino, *Chile*, 256–58.
[51] "A los trabjadores de Chile: Extracto del 'manifiesto de concepcion' Las noticias de Ultima Hora, May 28, 1972.

forward for the revolution was to "close ranks around the Popular Unity's Basic Program" and negotiate with sectors of the Christian Democrats because "not everyone who opposes the government are fascists."[52] In response to Millas and the PC, the Socialist party published an editorial entitled "The Chilean Revolution Must Advance." While the Socialists shared Millas' desire to complete the Basic Program they differed over the correct tactics. In the eyes of the PS, Millas' calls for negotiations with sectors of the "national bourgeoisie" ignored the fact that those same sectors had deep ties to North American "imperialism," which remained determined to subvert the UP's agenda.[53]

By June this polemic reached a fever pitch with an almost daily back and forth between the PC and the PS over the appropriate way to move forward. Each side began using the contrasting rhetoric of "advancing" or "consolidating" to represent their strategies. These two competing discourses quickly became the watchwords of each party: the Communists were seen as the party of "*avanzar consolidando*" (advance by consolidating) and the Socialists represented the idea of "*consolidar avanzando*" (consolidate by advancing).[54] Something had to give and so in early June the parties of the UP retired to Lo Curro to hold its second meeting of self-critique. The discussions at Lo Curro revolved around the best way to resolve the conflict with the Christian Democrats. The Communists and the *Allendistas* (Allende loyalists)[55] proposed a strategy of negotiation. The left wing of the Socialists, under the guidance of the party's secretary general Carlos Altamirano, argued for a revolutionary advance independent of the PDC. The meeting concluded with an apparent victory for the Communists and the forces of

[52] *El Siglo* May 30, 1972. Millas' article became the intellectual anchor of the PC's call for consolidation and negotiation with the Christian Democrats. Millas himself would become an outspoken proponent of such actions during the meeting in Lo Curro where his strategic line replaced that of then economy minister Vuskovic.
[53] "La revolucion chilena debe avanzar' las noticias de ultima hora, june 5, 1972.
[54] "avanzar para conslidar o consolidar para avanzar" las noticias de ultima hora, June 30, 1972. The phrase *avanzar sin transar* (forward without compromise) emerged as a variant of the Socialists position by November 1972.
[55] The designation *Allendista* emerged to signal someone who adhered to Allende's vision of revolution regardless of their political affiliation.

consolidation through compromise as the UP opened a dialogue with the Christian Democrats. Despite the political and ideological differences between the UP and the PDC, the talks nearly succeeded.[56] Unfortunately, the two weeks that had been allotted for the negotiations expired before an agreement could be reached. The negotiators requested more time; the conservative wing of the Christian Democrats refused.[57] Following the breakdown in talks, Allende tried to go it alone and personally entered into negotiations with the Christian Democrats. Allende's negotiating had always served him well in the past and had earned him the nickname of *la muneca* (a wheeler-dealer).[58] In a concession to the Christian Democrats, Allende agreed to freeze any and all interventions and/or requisitions into privately owned industries while the talks were ongoing. Before these talks could even get off the ground, however, a group of workers along the southwestern periphery of Santiago erected barricades effectively paralyzing transportation along a major artery in and out of the city. The worker's declared that they were part of a new organization, which they referred to as Cordon Industrial Cerillos-Maipú. Their actions paid off and the government was forced to intervene in their local conflicts.[59] What originated, as an explicitly localized organizational structure capable of addressing the problems of Cerrillos-Maipú became a national symbol of, and model for, the construction of *poder*

[56] Over the course of two weeks, negotiators had successfully resolved the bulk of disputes between the two economic visions. Each side granted concessions and the participants remained confident in their ability to resolve the outstanding differences, which revolved around three banks and a forestry and paper company known as *La Papelera*.

[57] Former president Eduardo Frei personally reached out the party leadership while he was away in Europe to personally dissuade them from returning to the bargaining table. See, Peter Winn, *La revolución chilena*, Primera edición, Historia (Santiago de Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2013).

[58] Winn, *Weavers*, 73. Winn argues that the closest north American polticial figure would be Lyndon Johnson insofar as both figures had spent their life in politics at various levels and had earned reputations for their abilities to reach compromises.

[59] As one Socialist minister, speaking on a condition of anonymity, told reporters in the wake of the seizure of Maipú "the workers were in the streets, paralyzing transportation…we had to act quickly." Sepulveda, Lucia "Maipú: Recado con Barricadas" Punto Final 162, 6-7

popular (popular power).[60] In doing so, this model underwent modifications based on the unique geographies of Santiago. Thus, Cordon Vicuña Mackenna looked much different than its predecessor in Cerrillos-Maipú due the particular spatial dimensions of Vicuña Mackenna Avenue.

Putting Vicuña Mackenna in its proper place II: Spatial Dimensions

Vicuña Mackenna Avenue, a relatively straight shot corridor connecting the city center to the periphery, formed the backbone of the Cordon (see appendix). This may appear as a minor, or even self-evident point, yet it is important in the context of the Cordones. For example, the original Cordon that emerged in Cerillos-Maipú covered a much wider geography that included two major transportation arteries.[61] The single avenue of Vicuña Mackenna allowed the participants of CVM to effectively demarcate its boundaries through the use of barricades and to defend it during the attempted coup in 1973 and again a month later during the final mobilizations of the Cordon before the military coup on September 11.

The density of industries along the avenue was much higher than in Cerrillos-Maipú. This is not to say that there were simply more factories in Vicuña Mackenna as compared to Cerrillos-Maipú, but rather the proximity of those along Vicuña Mackenna were much more compact and thus day to day interactions were more common amongst the workers of different factories.[62] This density produced two networks of cooperation existed amongst the workers of these industries, which in turn formed the historical antecedents to Vicuña Mackenna as a Cordon

[60] Within the ideology of the Chilean left during this period the concept of *poder popular* was understood as the source of democratic governance opposed to the form of the democratic state. The emergence of organizations such as the Cordones, however, provoked a debate both within the Chilean left and between the left wing of the Socialist Party, the MIR, and the Allende government. These debates took place in the public sphere with a series of forums taking place hosted by the union of the socialist daily *Clarín* and reproduced by the far-left weekly *Punto Final*.
[61] In this sense the name alone, which combined the official municipality of Maipú and the unofficial area referred to as Los Cerillos, highlights this Cordon's spatial fluidity compared Vicuña Mackenna.
[62] Once again the story of Cerrillos-Maipú's birth is instructive here. The two factories that took part in the seizure of the labor ministry, which in turn sparked the confrontation at the Perlak plant, which existed on opposite ends of the Cordon's territory.

Industrial. These networks linked together the grand industries of the avenue such as Cristalerias Chile, Sumar, and Textil Progreso, which had already been incorporated within the social property area, with smaller industries such as Luchetti, Elecmetal, Fabrilana, and GEKA. One of the key features of these networks was the system of barter between the different industries that developed in response to the rise of shortages and skyrocketing prices on the black market for raw materials.[63]

The second feature of Vicuña Mackenna's spatial dimensions is its proximity to two key strongholds of the *poblador* movement: La Legua and Nueva La Habana. This is indicative of a larger trend flagged by previous historians who have identified the southern periphery of Santiago as the "epicenter of urban struggle."[64] La Legua was much older and first emerged in the early twentieth century as a result of migration from the nitrate workers of the north following the economic crisis of the nineteen-thirties. The political result of La Legua's age is that a majority of its inhabitants belonged to the Communist Party.[65]

What is referred to, as *poblacion* La Legua is actually three different zones. The original was founded in the thirties by the migrants from the north following the economic crisis of the nitrate sector. These workers brought with them the experiences and militancy of the earliest forms of the Chilean labor movement. The second sector emerged in 1947 after a series of evictions from *conventillos*, which culminated with Nueva La Legua. The third and final emerged in 1951 Legua de Emergencia. Taken together, the space of La Legua combined the militancy of the northern labor force with the orientation of the urban movement for a "place" in

[63] Soto, *Cordones industriales*.
[64] Mario Garcés, *Tomando su sitio: el movimiento de pobladores de Santiago, 1957-1970* (Santiago, Chile: LOM, 2002), 14.
[65] The figure of Juan Alacron is illustrative of this trend. Alacron lived in La Legua, worked in the SUMAR factory, and belonged to the Communist Party. See, Gaudichaud, *Poder popular y cordones industriales*, 2004.

the city.[66] The legacy of labor militancy from La Legua's early days continued to manifest itself in important ways during the life of Cordon Vicuña Mackenna. For example, during the military coup of September 11, 1973, the most sustained and direct confrontation between forces loyal to Allende and the military took place in La Legua. Workers from the nearby SUMAR industry sought refuge in the *poblacion* and participated in one most important acts of resistance during the so-called battle of Santiago.[67]

Nueva La Habana on the other hand was of much more recent provenance, founded in the late sixties through the efforts of the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR). It emerged in 1970 through an agreement with the housing ministry and three previous land seizures that had since become *campamentos*. Politically, Nueva La Habana contained a much higher presence of MIR militants and *pobladores* sympathetic to the MIR's vision of revolution. In the wake of the MIR's inability to gain a position of strength within the labor movement, the party switched its focus to the *poblador* movement, with Nueva La Habana as one of its most visible and symbolic power centers. Even the name, a reference to the Cuban Revolution, highlighted the MIR's commitment to armed insurrection.

The proximity to the centers of the *poblador* movement meant more to the history of Cordon Vicuña Mackenna than a simple increase in numbers, by which I mean that the Cordon benefitted from having two centers of politicized populations along its periphery. Those *pobladores* brought more to the Cordon's assemblies and/or direct actions than just their physical bodies. They also brought their memories of struggle, beliefs, and repertoires of actions. In the case of this paper, I am focusing on a singular aspect of this contribution: the development of a

[66] Garces "Los Anos" Pinto Vallejos et al., *Fiesta Y Drama*, 67.
[67] For an excellent history of these events, which also included important mediations on the role of memory as a historical source seeMario Garcés and Sebastián Leiva, *El Golpe En La Legua: Los Caminos de La Historia Y La Memoria*, 1. ed, Historia (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2005).

popular form of justice. During the Popular Unity years a team of investigators from the Catholic University conducted a series of sociological studies about the *poblador* movement. Their findings reveal that the pobladores had begun experimenting with, for a lack of a better phrase, we can refer to as popular justice. This new justice marked both a revision of the form and content of justice. Formally speaking the studies found that the *poblador* movement distrusted preexisting institutional avenues, such as the courts, because they saw such institutions as beholden to what they referred to as bourgeois justice.[68] In terms of content, the studies noted that the popular justice had redefined the meaning of *delito,* or crime, to extend beyond its normative bounds. This expanded version reflected the *pobladore's* own history by including social elements such as housing, rationing of basic supplies, transportation, and gender equality. In short, we can say that based on the findings of these researchers, the *poblacion* was a space defined by a heightened sense of social justice, anchored in the really existing conditions of the revolution. It is these exigencies of the revolution that were responsible for the emergence of the Cordones as an alternative form of organization designed to produce a revolutionary breakthrough.

"From Yellow September to a Red October"

By October 1972, Chile found itself in increasingly dire economic and political straits. Allende's vision of legislating a revolution *towards* Socialism appeared to be evaporating as the executive had become increasingly isolated by the opposition who controlled both the congress and the courts. The economic successes of 1971 had vanished. In their place inflation, combined with increasing levels of debt, and the inability to access foreign lines of credit had forced the executive into a direct confrontation with the opposition over the constitutional reforms designed

[68] Cidu, "Reivindicación urbana y lucha política."

to grant the governing coalition control over the "commanding heights of the economy."[69] As the struggle over the economic reforms stalled in the constitutional tribunal, the opposition shifted its strategy away from engaging in parliamentary fights to leveraging their strength within civil society. The most radicalized sectors of the opposition aimed to create the conditions for the military to intervene and topple the UP government.[70]

On October 8, 1972, the truckers of Aysen, a southern region of Chile, rejected a government plan to nationalize the region's transportation networks. The following day, the truckers declared an indefinite strike. Within days, the country's transportation union joined in the strike, effectively crippling the country's ability to maintain its industrial output. On October 10, Leon Vilarin, the president of National Confederation of Truckers, announced that the two thousand members of the confederation would join the strikers.[71] Not only did they refuse to work, but they also used their trucks to block key transportation routes between Santiago and other major cities. Between October 12 and 16, the strike transformed from a sector of truckers to a generalized "bosses strike."[72] These events became known as the *paro patronal* (bosses strike) and represented the most coordinated and effective offensive against the Popular Unity government to date.

Allende responded with the full force of executive power. He declared a state of emergency across thirteen provinces, including the city centers of Santiago and Valparaiso. The declaration allowed Allende two strategic advantages: (1) he could requisition the paralyzed

[69] Unidad Popular, *Programa Basico de Gobierno de La Unidad Popular: Candidatura Presidencial de Salvador Allende*, 1969.
[70] Sergio Jarpa, president of the National Party is the figurehead of this sector of the opposition. His efforts to topple the government through the strike were aided by the actions of far-right paramilitary groups such as *Patria y Libertad* (Fatherland and Freedom) and *Comando Rolando Matus*.
[71] "*Doce Mil Duenos de Camiones incian un paro indefinido*", *La Prensa*, October 10, 1972. Vilarin's confederation is not be confused with the National Transportation Confederation.
[72] Hugo Cancino argues that the evolution of the strike from the truckers of Aysen to a national strike, which included a wide range of supporters, represents a move from a strictly anti-socialist to an anti-Popular Unity agenda. See, Cancino, *Chile*, 292-3

vehicles, and (2) he could deploy the military to support the *carabiñeros* in keeping the peace and maintaining order. The government also used its powers to requisition any stores that had locked their doors and created a crisis of distribution.[73] Most importantly, Allende won pledges from Carlos Prats, the head of the Chilean military that it would "maintain public order" and remain politically neutral.[74]

Despite the best efforts of the UP to offset the crisis, Allende's legal maneuvers were unable to correct the damages.[75] Its actions remained reactive, stuck one step behind the opposition. Allende tacked left and began mobilizing his base. The actions of the Chilean working class kept the country running against all odds and enabled Allende to do what he had always done best: negotiate a compromise. Allende dissolved his cabinet and on November 2, he formed new one, which included members of the military (General Carlos Prats and General Claudio Sepulveda) and the CUT (Luis Figueroa). Allende's gamble paid off, and on November 7 the opposition announced the end of the strike.

Allende's decision to resolve the crisis through negotiations and integration of the military signaled his preference for returning to a legal and constitutional revolutionary road. Allende chose not to throw the weight of the executive behind the new forms of popular organization that had developed during October.[76] Allende's decision is unsurprising given his lifelong commitment to creating change through electoral democracy, which is exactly what the

[73] Cancino, *Chile*, 295

[74] "Palabras del Presidente de la Republica, companero Salvador Allende Gossens, ante dirigentes de la Central Unica de Trabajadores, en el edificio Gabriela Mistral, Santiago 21 de Octubre, 1972" *Discursos de Allende 1972,* p. 832.

[75] Allende's actions also drew the ire of the political opposition. The National Party initiated a constitutional accusation against him, which alleged that his actions had exceeded the limits of executive authority. While the accusation did not have any legal authority to remove Allende its symbolism proved significant to wooing sector of the middle class to support the strike.

[76] It remains impossible to say if such a strategy could have produced a different outcome for the revolution. It very well may have accelerated the opposition's plans for military intervention. Furthermore, while the workers made great strides in keeping their factories running and aiding in the work of distribution, their efforts did not translate into a capacity (let alone a structure) for governance.

"truce" represented. Even if sectors of the military did not agree with Allende or the UP, the vertical hierarchy of the Chilean military ensured Prats' ability to maintain control. The truce of November represented the "exhaustion" of the Popular Unity's vision.[77] The necessity of incorporating the military into the government revealed that the UP remained unable to overcome the legislative and judicial opposition. At its heart, the strategy of November attempted to freeze the revolution in place until after an upcoming congressional election in which the Popular Unity hoped to be in a better negotiating position.

Allende and the UP's ability to negotiate a political solution to the crisis should by no means diminish the actions and achievements of the popular classes during the October crisis. The response of the workers to the threat of the bosses strike allowed the government to weather the storm and created the conditions to negotiate the truce. As a militant of the Revolutionary Left Movement put it in an internal party memo, "the actions of the workers turned a yellow September into a red October."[78] The workers transformed a crisis into a "pressure cooker" of consciousness.[79] While the degrees of radicalization differed across individuals, the experience of successfully operating their factories without input from bosses, engineers, or professionals proved to the workers that they were capable of so much more than they had imagined.[80] "We had a rich experience as revolutionaries," remembers Mario Olivares, "we learned how to build a

[77] Winn, *Weavers of Revolution*, 239

[78] Farias, 3843. The designation of red October as a way to shift the emphasis from the actions of the opposition and the government's response to the achievements of the workers has been reproduced by the historiography on the subject. See, Augusto Samaniego, "Octubre Al Rojo: Fulgor Y Agonía de La Unidad de Los Trabajadores," *Contribuciones Científicas Y Tecnológicas, Área Ciencias Sociales Y Humanidades*, no. 130 (2002): 1–22; Winn, *Weavers of Revolution*; Peter Winn, *La revolución chilena*, Primera edición, Historia (Santiago de Chile: LOM Ediciones, 2013)..

[79] Winn, *Weavers of Revolution*, 235.

[80] Marco Viaux summarized the experience best: "Those people, men and women, who worked and who put on their shirts as Chilean and as workers, as patriots, as men, and as women to demonstrate that it is possible to organize and work without the boss" Quoted in Dietz et al., *Testimonios de Los Cordones Industriales*, 86

socialist society."[81] A worker from the Alusa factory remembers the experience with pride: "people worked with joy in those days, we all realized that we were defending something that went beyond ourselves."[82] Indeed, having to overcome all of the difficulties and impediments introduced by the strike led one worker from Fabrilana to exclaim, "*los momios* [the mummies] have no idea of the favor they gave us!"[83]

The remainder of this section surveys the "rich experiences" of Red October.[84] It focuses specifically on the key actions undertaken by the Coordinating Committee of Cordon Vicuña Mackenna: factory seizures and forms of popular production, innovating new forms of transportation, seizing locked markets and creating new forms of distribution, and finally the formation of surveillance and self defense brigades. Workers from the factories along Vicuña Mackenna Avenue called on their neighbors in nearby *poblaciones* for assistance and in doing so they transformed an avenue into a space of revolutionary fervor and creativity.

While Cordon Vicuña Mackenna achieved the greatest levels of dynamism and creativity through its actions outside the factory walls, the heart of Cordon remained the *toma,* or factory seizure. Mario Olivares remembers, "companies that had not already been seized were taken by their workers in response to the strike."[85] Carlos Mujica remembers seizing Alusa "in support of

[81] Quoted in Silva, *Los Cordones Industriales*, 218. Olivares, a dedicated militant of the Revolutionary Left Movement, interpreted the events a decidedly revolutionary fashion. Even if workers such as Olivares moved in a decidedly more revolutionary direction, the consciousness that emerged during October remained more "workerist" than revolutionary. Such a worldview remained anchored in solidarity with *companero* workers who had their factories running without bosses, professionals, and/or engineers.
[82] "La Actitud Ejemplar de la Clase Obrera" op cit.
[83] "La Fuerza del Pueblo," op cit. The designation of "mummy" became the primary rhetorical device to reference the opposition. The term was meant to evoke the differences of the youthful revolutionaries compared to the older, parasitic, members of the opposition.
[84] Mario Olivares, Quoted in Silva, *Los Cordones Industriales*, 218.
[85] Quote in silva, 218

the government."[86] Other factories such as Calzados ALYS, Licores Mitjans, and Luchetti were all seized during the strike with support from the workers of Vicuña Mackenna.

The most iconic seizure, and the event that officially birthed Cordon Vicuña Mackenna, took place on October 19 in the factory of Elecmetal. The plant's owners had been strong-arming the workers since the strike began by threatening to not run their machinery at full capacity, stop paying their wages, or worse, locking the factory doors. On the night of October 19, nearly 185 workers successfully seized the factory and demanded its incorporation into the Social Property Area.[87] The worker's anchored their claim to the company's "strategic" nature. Elecmetal produced goods necessary for the extraction and refining of copper, which remained Chile's most important economic sector. It also produced parts necessary for the Chilean railroads.[88] Cruces, president of the local blue-collar union, declared, "we want to continue working for Chile."[89] The Ossa brothers, however, did not give up so easily. On the morning of October 27, a contingent of *carabiñeros* evicted the workers based on the Ossa's claim of an illegal and destructive seizure.[90] The *carabineros* arrived to find everything in "perfect condition," yet they still arrested Cruces and three other union leaders. Later that day the government issued a "decree" declaring that it had "intervened" in Elecmetal.[91] News of the government's decision

[86] Ibid, 220
[87] See, "Reportaje a Elecmetal," *La Aurora de Chile*, October 25, 1972, p. 5, "Elecmetal: Expresion de Fortaleza de la clase obrera," *Posición*, October 31, 1972, p. 15, and "La Burguesía promulgó la Ley de Moraga," *Punto Final*, supplement, November 7, 1972, p. 7.
[88] "Reportaje a Elecmetal," *La Aurora de Chile*, October 25, 1972.
[89] "La Burgesía" *Punto Final*, supplement, November 7, 1972.
[90] As always with the specifics of events relating to the birth of the Cordones, there is a slight disagreement with dates. *Aurora* dates the eviction to the 23; however, *Posición*, Miguel Silva, and the testimony of Guillermo Rodriguez date the events to the 27th. See, Silva, *Los Cordones Industriales Y El Socialismo Desde Abajo*, p. 223 and Guillermo Rodríguez, *De la brigada secundaria al Cordón Cerrillos* (Santiago, Chile: UB, 2007), 103–4.
[91] The term 'intervention' is used here in a very specific context. Allende and the Popular Unity coalition used legal precedents that had remained on the book since the Socialist Republic of Marmaduke Grove in the interwar years to justify the State's ability to manage private industries. The law stipulated that the government could 'intervene' into unresolved labor conflicts and appoint an *interventor* (administrator) to manage and direct the company on behalf of the State. For an overview of the legal precedents used by Allende and the UP government see, Winn, *Weavers of Revolution* chapters 3 and 10.

finally reached the workers around midnight, where it was greeted with resounding applause from all those present in the union office. Cruces declared, that the incident had given him "more strength to continue fighting for the interests of the workers." "We must continue our struggle," Cruces continued, "to manage and direct the company for the benefit of all Chileans."[92]

The events surrounding Elecmetal drew the attention of workers from nearby industries such as Ismael Ulloa from Cristalerias Chile. The workers of Cristalerias had just recently won their own government intervention in August after a month of strike activity.[93] During the strike a loose knit group of unionized workers from nearby companies helped the workers of Cristalerias maintain their actions. When Cruces and his coworkers announced their intention to seize Elecmetal, Ulloa returned the favor and the workers of Cristalerias helped their "*companeros"* (comrades) from Elecmetal maintain the seizure. Cruces and Ulloa consolidated and reorganized a pre-existing network of local unions within the territory into a unified body capable of confronting the strike. According to Carlos Mujica, worker at Alusa located within the territory of CVM, Cruces and Ulloa integrated a previously existing "confederation" of local unions from Alusa, Luchetti, Textil Progreso, IRT, Cincino, and Standard Electric. Mujica remembers that this confederation pre-dated the events at Elecmetal and had originally been formed to "support the government" in its completion of the "forty measures."[94] The leaders of Cordón Vicuña Mackenna referred to their organization as the Worker's Coordinating Committee of Vicuña Mackenna.[95]

[92] Ibid.
[93] For an excellent history of the Cristalerias factory written by two historians and a local union leader, see Rojas Flores, Rodríguez Toledo, and Fernández Torres, *Cristaleros*.
[94] Quoted in Silva, 215. A report in *Punto Final* also confirms the existence of group "of unions in the territory" created prior to the events of October to support "strikes and factory seizures" toward the goal of "requisitions." See, "Vigorosa Respuesta de las Clase Obrera" *Punto Final* 170, 4-5.
[95] According to Miguel Silva's history of the Cordones, CCM also experimented with a coordinating committee in lieu of the previously established workers command during October. Unlike CVM, however, CCM had difficulty maintaining "coordination between the workers" and the *pobladores* and as a result proved much less successful in

On October 24, the Committee held a general assembly during which those present drew up a platform of struggle to disseminate to the "workers and *pobladores*" within the territory.[96] Mario Olivares, a worker from Muebles Easton in the territory of CVM remembers that "approximately 30 to 40 local unions" attended those early meetings.[97] The political affiliations of those in attendance varied. For example, Olivares remembers a strong collaboration between the "Revolutionary Left Movement [MIR] and sectors of the Socialists [PS]," while Carlos Mujica, from the Alusa factory, remembers a strategic alliance between the "MAPU and the MIR."[98] In short, the space of Cordon Vicuña Mackenna maintained a political heterogeneity. The work of the Coordinating Committee of Vicuña Mackenna during October quickly became recognized as "one of the most dynamic" Coordinators at work during the crisis.[99]

Shortly after the meeting of October 24, the Committee published its six-point platform in an open letter to the Socialist weekly *La Aurora de Chile*. The platform opened with a fierce denunciation of the opposition's "seditious" actions and a declaration that the workers would "struggle until the final consequences in order to defeat the bosses' offensive."[100] The workers of Vicuña Mackenna vowed to "reinforce the struggle against the strike through a union with the *pobladores* of the sector in order to guarantee normal levels of supply to the population and to guarantee the safety of the *pobladores* and workers of the sector." The platform called for a

coordinating works of distribution. See, Silva, *Los Cordones*, 215. While this may have been true at the level of CCM as a Cordón Industrial, specific companies within the territory made great strides in reorienting their production towards the ends of products that its local population needed the most. For example, the workers of Perlak enjoyed great success at manufacturing a line of soups designed for children. For an in depth analysis of Perlak's production of "proletarian soups" see, Henriquez, *Los Obreros de Perlak.*

96 *La Aurora de Chile*, 1.3, November 2, 1972.
97 Quote in Silva, *Los Cordones Industriales*, 213.
98 Quote in Silva, *Los Cordones Industriales* 212-14.
99 *Punto Final*, 171, November 21, 1972, 27.
100 *La Aurora de Chile*, November 2, 1972.

"permanent offensive" towards "integrating more industries to the Social Property Area and the struggle for worker [*obrero*] control."[101]

While coordination and strength in numbers allowed the workers to gain control of their factories, the Committee still had to devise ways to gain access to the necessary materials to industrial output. A worker from Alusa remembers opening "local shops to obtain raw materials so that production would not stop, not even for a second."[102] German Tapia, the government administrator of SUMAR Sedes, recalls that during the strike the workers doubled as "truck drivers" who would regularly use the company trucks to "go looking for supplies."[103]

While the work of the Coordinating Committee achieved great success in assisting workers in seizing factories and maintain production, its members quickly realized that with the majority of the city's public transportation on strike it needed to devise ways to guarantee workers could travel to and from their factories. Using tractors, company trucks, and allying with sectors of public transportation that refused to join the strike, the workers ensured that the factories maintained an appropriate level of staffing to ensure its production levels did not diminish.

Trucks and tractors are only as reliable as their next tank of gas, and so the workers of Vicuña Mackenna improvised new methods for rationing fuel. Marco Viaux remembers an incident in which the workers seized a local gas station. After gaining access to the fuel, the workers invented "a voucher system," which "indicated the amount of fuel to be delivered to

[101] Ibid. The usage of the narrow term *obrero* instead of the generic label of *trabajador* signals a very specific understanding of "worker control" in which the manual laborers of the factories should control, manage, and direct their plant's production.
[102] "La Actitud ejemplar de la clases obrera" *Punto Final*, supplement, November 7, 1972.
[103] Quoted in Dietz et al., *Testimonios de Los Cordones Industriales,* 83. Even though one of the SUMAR factories (SUMAR-Nylon) would later go on to participate in Cordon San Joaquin during June 1973, all of the factories collaborated with the Committee of Vicuña Mackenna during the October Crisis.

each factory in need…for example one hundred liters of oil for Dona Margarita of the Luchetti factory."

In addition to seizing factories and innovating methods of transportation, the workers had to ensure that their products reached consumers and did not end up in locked warehouse or, worse, resold on the black market. The workers of Vicuña Mackenna began holding "*ferias populares*" (popular fairs) where a rotating group of industries from the Cordón would sell their products directly to consumers. The fairs of CVM were held at 10 am on Sunday mornings. Not only did this deepen forms of solidarity by increasing communication between the workers and residents of their territories, but also it effectively cut out the risk of speculation and threat of the black market. Guillermo Orrego remembers the work of the popular fairs well. According to him, the workers of Vicuña Mackenna "activated through the trade unions a system of exchange, or popular sales of products," which were "sold at cost."[104]

The "popular fairs" were the logical outgrowth of another process underway in the territory: reorienting production to suit the needs of the local community. "Of course the workers themselves who made the furniture did not own their own furniture," explains Mario Olivares, "we decided that, with the company in our power, we could define a process from the economic point of view, and also because we, as revolutionaries, wanted to build socialism."[105] Toward this end, the workers of Muebles Easton reoriented their production away from producing "beautiful, elegant, and very expensive" furniture "for the bourgeoisie" and instead opted to produce "nice, decent, inexpensive furniture for the workers."[106] At bottom, the Cordon

[104] Quoted in Dietz et al., *Testimonios de Los Cordones Industriales,* 82
[105] Quoted in Silva, *Los Cordones Industriales,* 218
[106] Ibid. Bed sheets also became a symbol of the Chilean revolution. Prior to Allende the vast majority of Chilean workers did not sleep with sheets. Following the interventions into multiple textile factories across Santiago the workers began to produce sheets for the workers themselves. See, Winn, *Weavers of Revolution* for an overview of the symbolic importance of bed sheets during the revolution.

attempted to build a community beyond the spatial boundaries of the avenue by serving the needs of its residents.

Finally, some of the most important work organized by the Coordinating Committee during October centered around acts of self-defense and surveillance. Throughout the crisis, groups of rightist militias and oppositional youth sought to offset the gains of the workers by attacking their factories and buses. Indeed, many workers and *pobladores* from Vicuña Mackenna remember that street battles were a common occurrence during this time. The symbol of the *miguelito*, spikes designed to pop tires and disrupt transportation, came to dominate this action.[107] In response to the threat of *miguelitos*, the Coordinating Committee began organizing "caravans" that would travel with trucks delivering supplies and/or raw materials to ensure the roads were cleared of any hazards.[108] In addition to defending the improvised transportation networks, the coordinating committee of CVM began establishing "surveillance commissions" that would monitor sectors of the territory and protect its factories and workers. Ismael Ulloa recalls

> we appointed surveillance committees in the evenings. Of course, these commissions were formed by workers who were on another shift, that is, those who worked on the day shift, kept watch on the night shift, and so on.[109]

[107] The *miguelito* remained the primary tactic of rightist shock troops such as *Patria y Libertad* to interrupt the systems of transportation that the workers of Chile had created during the strike. Indeed, the usage of these spikes were well known at the time, even Allende referenced them during his address to the nation on October 18, when he claimed that the *carabiñeros* had confiscated upwards of 1,500 *miguelitos* during the first nine days of the strike. The opposition named the spikes "*Miguelitos"* after Miguel Enriquez the leader of the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) in an effort to frame the MIR as the instigators of violence and chaos.

[108] Once again this phenomenon was not limited to the workers of Vicuña Mackenna. For example, the workers of MADECO established a "transportation brigade" that operated between Santiago and Valparaiso. See, "La Actitud Ejemplar de la Clase Obrera," *Punto Final* supplement, November 7, 1972, 6.

[109] Quoted in Dietz et al., *Testimonios de Los Cordones Industriales*, 98. The creation of these surveillance commissions was enabled by the creation of similar committees internally within different factories. As part of the CUT/UP's Basic Norms of Participation small and medium sized industries that remained in the private sector were encouraged to establish such committees as a way to ensure their factories maintained optimum levels of output.

Some factories transformed their internal surveillance committees into surveillance brigades that would monitor the streets just outside their factories in order to alert those inside of any coming threats.[110]

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The experiences of October were important to the actions of Cordon Vicuña Mackenna and as such they support the temporal emphasis within the historiography. Time, however, is only half the story. The October crisis did not in itself produce all the experiences and actions that this section has described. Instead, the crisis provoked by the trucker's strike combined with Vicuña Mackenna's spatial composition to produce the Coordinating Committee. This of course begs the question, how did the Cordon's leaders such as Armando Cruces and Ismael Ulloa intend to harness the dynamism at play during the crisis within the new conditions of the truce? How how did they plan to maintain the unity in practice between the *pobladores* and workers? The next section provides a close reading of the Manifesto of Vicuña Mackenna, which marked an attempt to "integrate" the "pobladores" and their movement within the space of Cordon Vicuña Mackenna.[111] My analysis reveals both the influence of the *poblador* movement on the Cordon and the rhetorical strategies that Cruces and Ulloa deployed to maintain the participation that had taken place during the crisis.

Practice into Theory: The Manifesto of Cordon Vicuña Mackenna

In the final days of October, the Political Commission of the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) drafted a document entitled *Pliego del Pueblo* (The People's Demands). The MIR published the document in response to the *Pliego del Chile* (Chile's Demands), which had been composed and distributed by the leaders of the October Strike. In order to ensure the

[110] Some factories even built watchtowers within the walls of their compounds to monitor activities in the streets. See, *La Batalla de Chile*, disc 3
[111] Ibid.

highest possible circulation and reception for the document, the MIR's central committee distanced itself from the *Pliego del Pueblo* and decided instead to disseminate it though their various "fronts."[112] Edgardo Enriquez (a former MIR militant) echoed the commission's desire to maintain distance from the document, "The MIR refused to sign the *pliego* in order to make it more accessible to a wider audience."[113] Enriquez argues the lack of an explicit link to the MIR as a political party explains the document's enthusiastic reception in the "Cordones" and references the Socialist press reprints as evidence of its wide appeal. *La Aurora de Chile*, a semi-regular publication of the Metropolitan Regional Office of the Socialist Party, featured one of these reprints under the title "The Manifesto of Cordon Vicuña Mackenna."[114] The changes extended well beyond the document's title and as such challenge Enriquez's assertions that the Socialists simply reprinted the *pliego*.[115] What can these changes tell us about the "workers territory" of Vicuña Mackenna?[116]

The following is a new approach to preexisting source material. While scholars have not ignored the Manifesto, their emphasis has been on showing the links between the MIR and the

[112] MIR: Informe de la Comision Politica al Comite Central Restringido sobre la crisi de Octubre y nuestra politica electoral. These would be the Revolutionary Workers Front (FTR) and the Revolutionary Poblador Movement (MPR).

[113] Quoted in Gaudichaud, 228. While MIR leadership may have been keen to avoid explicit association with the document, anyone with even the slightest familiarity with the political slogans of the day would recognize the MIR's authorship in the documents reference to the "*los pobres del campo y cuidad*" (the urban and rural poor) in its second line. See, *Pliego del Pueblo*, Farías, *La Izquierda Chilena (1969-1973)*, 3272.

[114] *La Aurora de Chile*, November 9, 1972. The official publication of the Socialist Party, *Posicion*, also reprinted the document but under the title of "The People's Manifesto" and described the document as: "being approved by Cordon Vicuña Mackenna - which groups together over 100 unions, neighborhood councils, price and supply control committees, mother's centers, students – with help from the Coordinators of Cordon Maipú-Cerrillos, Macul, provincial and national labor leaders." The paper also "invited journalists on the left to" reprint "it, modify it, and enrich it" See, Posicion, November 7, 1972. The non-partisan, yet decidedly *Allendista* weekly Chile, Hoy also reprinted the Manifesto under the title "The People's Manifesto" on November 17, 1972.

[115] Enriquez's memories highlight one of the key pitfalls facing scholars interested in using oral histories as source materials for the Chilean Revolution: the sectarianism of the seventies continues to exert pressure on how things are remembered. Enriquez's testimony argues that the Socialists piggybacked on the work of the MIR, which was a variation of much larger debate between the MIR and the Socialists that dated back to the birth of the original cordon in Cerillos-Maipú. For example, Guillermo Rodriguez remembers the Socialists as simply "parachuting" into Cerrillos-Maipú and coopting the networks that the MIR had already established in the area. See Gaudichaud, *Poder popular y cordones industriales*, 2004; Rodríguez, *De la brigada secundaria al Cordón Cerrillos*.

[116] *La Aurora de Chile*, November 9, 1972

Cordones.[117] No one has analyzed the differences between the *Pliego* and the Manifesto. These differences are more than semantic squabbles. The leadership of Vicuña Mackenna appropriated the rhetoric of criminality present in the *Pliego*, while simultaneously substituting the economic content of the original with the broader category of "*la vida digna*" (a dignified life) for "all Chileans."[118] This should be understood as a concerted strategy to appeal to the *poblador* movement who had not only been engaged in the development of its own form of social justice, but had also used tropes such as the "a dignified life" to anchor their demands for a "place" of their own.[119]

I begin by fleshing out the macro historical context of the Manifesto's production, specifically the *poblador* movement and the development of a new sense of justice. It then zooms in on the original version produced by the MIR in order to establish the baseline for evaluating the differences present in the Manifesto. The analysis then shifts to the Manifesto itself and pays particular attention to the section entitled the "crimes of the bosses."

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The status of the *poblador* movement as a widely recognized "social actor" within Chilean society did not emerge until the election of Salvador Allende in 1970.[120] During the preceding twenty years, the south of Santiago had become the "epicenter" of "urban" struggle on the part of populations who were demanding a right to their own "place" within the city.[121] Just as the *toma* formed the core tactic of the workers in Cordon Vicuña Mackenna, it remained defining feature of the *poblador* movement. Groups of un-housed peoples would gather together,

[117] See, Soto, *Cordones industriales*; Silva, *Los Cordones Industriales Y El Socialism Desde Abajo*.. For the most sustained engagement with the manifesto see Gaudichaud, *Chile 1970-1973, mil dias que estremecieron al mundo*.
[118] *La Aurora de Chile*, November 9, 1972
[119] Garcés, *Tomando su sitio*, 2002.
[120] Ibid.
[121] Garcés, *Tomando su sitio*, 2002, 14.

most commonly at night, and seize a section of vacant land within the city and begin erecting structures as a claim to it. These new places went by various names: *callampas, campamentos, poblaciones, operaciones sitios,* yet they all shared a similar origin. By 1972, officials estimated that approximately "half a million" people lived in one of these types of communities, with at least "one in six inhabitants of the greater Santiago area being a *poblador*".[122]

The movement has typically been described as a demand for housing or in its later incarnations as a protest against the dictatorship.[123] The invocation of a "place" that these individuals could call their own, however, is the most accurate depiction of *what* the movement saw as its goals. Consider the testimony of Manuel Diaz who lived in Nueva La Habana:

> arriving at the *campamento,* we began to see the organization that existed and how it had been organized to demand a definitive place [*sitio*], we did not talk about a home, we did not even consider that, but where to live and make your home.[124]

The emphasis on a place should be understood as a demand for an equal right to the city, which challenged the much longer history of Chile's urban development. In the context of Vicuña Mackenna avenue this took on added layers of meaning given the avenue's namesake, Benjamin Vicuña Mackenna, had proposed an urban plan that viewed anything beyond the city center as being the domain of uncultured and barbarous individuals. Santiago elites maintained this view through their reference to the populations along the periphery as *los rotos* (the broken ones). Seen in this light, the actions of *pobladores* such as Diaz were successful; *campamentos* such as Nueva La Habana "extended the radius" of Santiago through the "creation of popular municipalities."[125]

[122] Pinto Vallejos et al., *Fiesta Y Drama,* 56, 65.
[123] See, Edward Murphy, *For a Proper Home : Housing Rights in the Margins of Urban Chile, 1960-2010* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015 and Cathy Lisa Schneider, *Shantytown Protest in Pinochet's Chile* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995).
[124] Quoted in Pinto Vallejos et al., *Fiesta Y Drama,* 67.
[125] Pinto Vallejos et al., *Fiesta Y Drama,* 65

If we move from the level of describing the impacts the *poblador* movement, such as the proliferation of "*barrios populares*," (popular neighborhoods), towards the interior of those *barrios* then we can begin to understand how the movement conditioned the lived experiences and worldviews of Cordon Vicuña Mackenna.[126] Based on a series of investigations carried out by a team of sociologists from the Interdisciplinary Center for Urban Studies (CIDU) at the Catholic University, one of the most novel developments within the *poblador* movement during the Allende years was the production of a theory of "social justice,"[127] which stood in contrast the perception that the justice as it was previously understood remained limited to "bourgeois justice."[128] As one *poblador* surveyed during the studies argued, "the problem of justice should arise when a child dies of hunger."[129] According to CIDU team's findings, the *pobladores* exhibited a "clear sense that the poor could not obtain justice."[130] These findings led one member of the team to declare that the development of this newfound sense of justice constituted a form of *poder popular* (popular power).[131] The team's preliminary report concluded that

> The experience of popular justice not only translates into new forms of administrative jurisdiction, but into new *types of justice*, *which represent a true affirmation of new social values*, in particular in the definition of faults that society does not consider as such, while at the same time the values of collective type and those individual relegated by bourgeois law to the private sphere are protected.[132]

[126] Pinto Vallejos et al., *Fiesta Y Drama*, 56. This section focuses on simply one aspect of this history, specifically justice, however, as even the most cursory survey of the literature reveals there were many other areas such as culture, public health, gender. For an excellent overview of these other themes in the context of Nueva La Habana see Boris Cofré Schmeisser, *Campamento Nueva La Habana: el MIR y el movimiento de pobladores, 1970-1973* (Concepción: Ediciones Escaparate, 2007).
[127] Equipo de Estudios Poblacionales Cidu, "Pobladores y administración de justicia (un informe preliminar de una encuesta)," *Revista EURE - Revista de Estudios Urbano Regionales* 2, no. 5 (July 7, 1972): 162.
[128] Ibid.
[129] Santiago Quevedo and Eder Sader, "Algunas consideraciones en relación a las nuevas formas de poder popular en poblaciones," *Revista EURE - Revista de Estudios Urbano Regionales* 3, no. 7 (April 7, 1973): 78.
[130] Cidu, "Pobladores y administración de justicia (un informe preliminar de una encuesta)." In terms of quantitative data, the study found that 75% of those surveyed agreed that "workers [*obreros*] would loose" if they sought redress through the court system.
[131] Quevedo and Sader, "Algunas consideraciones en relación a las nuevas formas de poder popular en poblaciones," 78.
[132] Cidu, "Reivindicación urbana y lucha política," 61, emphasis mine.

While the bulk of the CIDU studies surveyed as many *pobladores* from as many different *poblaciones* as possible, one member pursued a local study of justice within the *campamento* of Nueva La Habana. According to his findings, the experiences of Nueva La Habana marked some of the "most advanced" theorizations and practices of this newfound sense of social justice. The study pointed specifically to the "expansion of the meaning of *delito* [crime]" away from individual crimes towards a more "collective," or social crimes. In other words, the experiences of the *pobladores* between 1950 and 1970 through their struggle to acquire their own "place" in the city produced a heightened sense of "social justice" that predisposed individuals such as Jose Moya and Abraham Perez[133] to assist the direct actions mobilized by the Coordinating Committee of Vicuña Mackenna during October.

To be clear, this is more than a simple argument that *pobladores* participated within the space of Vicuña Mackenna as such assertions are widely accepted in the historiography. Where this paper differs from previous studies is that it seeks to understand how such physical participation transmitted and informed the revolutionary program of Vicuña Mackenna detailed in its Manifesto. It is to that document, in its original incarnation as the *Pliego,* that we now turn.

The *Pliego del Pueblo* went far beyond a rebuttal of the opposition's *Pliego de Chile*. The document reads as a programmatic vision for the revolution, instead of a list of demands to be fulfilled by the State. This vision, however, stood in marked contrast that of Allende's and his governing coalition. While the "truce of November"[134] emphasized Allende's commitment to legislating the revolution, elements of the far left used the heightened politicization of October to call for a change in strategy. Thus the *Pliego* should be read as an attempt by the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR) to agitate the masses and produce the conditions for the revolutionary

[133] See, Gaudichaud, *Poder popular y cordones industriales*, 2004 for each individual's testimony.
[134] Winn, *Weavers*, 240.

breakthrough forestalled by the military cabinet. The document indicted the logic of "normality," which argued that the military's presence in the government would pull the country back from the all out class warfare that had defined October. The government's appeals to normality reflected its prioritization of the middle classes as the deciding factor in its success and thus the MIR's rejection of "normality," should be understood as a rejection of the middle classes to the revolutions success. In their place, the document outlined the MIR's vision for stagiest approach toward the goals of creating a system of "dual power" based on the Soviet model.

The spectre of the Russian Revolution determined the MIR's vision for socialist revolution. The MIR viewed the emergence of new forms of *poder popular*, such as the Coordinating Committee of Vicuña Mackenna, as evidence of the possibility for creating *Consejos Comunales de Trabajadores* [municipal workers councils], or simply, a Chilean Soviet.[135] From the end of the October Crisis through the coup in September 1973, the MIR engaged in a sustained polemic with the Socialists over the proper forms of organization.[136] While the left wing of the Socialist Party had thrown its weight behind the Cordones and advocated vociferously that others follow suit, the MIR argued that the Cordones were insufficient because they did not include the participation of the *pobladores*. The MIR argued for the creation of *Comando Comunales* [municipal commands] as the inheritor of the coordinating committees that emerged during October and as the only organizational form that could

[135] Internal Party Documents reproduced in Farías, *La Izquierda Chilena (1969-1973)*, 3480.This process was to unfold in three stages per the *Pliego*: "Form coordinating committees where they do not exist. In a second phase, the Coordinating Committee directive should promote a broad discussion in the grassroots assemblies, elect a council of delegates and build a program of struggle that will mobilize the entire municipality. In a third phase, uniting and mobilizing the broadest sectors, developing direct democracy through the grassroots assemblies and the popular assembly of the commune, it will be possible to establish definitively the Municipal Council of Workers." See, *Pliego de Chile*, Farias, 3287. To be clear the Socialist party also advocated for the creation of *Consejos Comunales* as the ultimate form of *poder popular*, thus this was not limited to only the MIR. This inability to think past the "discourse of Marxism-Leninism" is seen as one of the primary causes behind the downfall of Allende and the UP. For an analysis on these lines, see Hugo Cancino, La Problematica

[136] This debate played out in the pages of the leftist press with each side offering rebuttals through its associated publications. The polemic also was carried out in person in a series of forums on the question of *poder popular* and organization.

transition into a *Consejo*. The MIR's insistence on the *Comandos Comunales* reveals the party's inability to gain a position of strength within the labor movement.[137] Even if the MIR were correct in their critiques of the Cordones, their sustained criticism served more to disorient and confuse than it did to unite and organize.[138] Arguing that the Cordones were the only really existing form of *poder popular* during the revolution is not an argument that they were capable of becoming anything close to a Soviet. Despite the incredible gains made within the space of Vicuña Mackenna during (and after) October, the Cordon never achieved a level of organization capable of governing its territory.

On November 3, 1972, Armando Cruces, Ismael Ulloa, and the leadership of Vicuña Mackenna voted to revise the *Pliego* into their own manifesto.[139] Shortly thereafter a modified version appeared in the socialist paper *La Aurora de Chile*. Gone were the slogans of the MIR, which had been replaced by ones associated with the left wing of the Socialist Party.[140] Also gone were the denunciations of normality and the outright rejection of the Popular Unity's government. Instead, the Manifesto chose to articulate its criticism in a more subtle way:

> We demand that the government should place their support with us, in the Workers Coordinating Committees, by consulting us about the way forward. It [the government] cannot rely solely on institutional bodies, which have always served to defend the interests of the bosses and imperialism. We must reject a civilian-military cabinet; we do not need it. Only socialism can solve the problems of the working class: the workers and the people [el pueblo], because socialism is the power for the people, it is the people made powerful.[141]

[137] The MIR's central committee was well aware of this weakness. Internal party documents reveal that their decision to focus on organizing the pobladores in campamentos was a direct consequence of their inability to overcome socialist and communist inertia amongst the unionized sectors of the working class.
[138] The testimonies of Jose Moya and Abraham Perez, both MIRistas who lived in the campamento Nueva La Habana emphasize that the Cordones were the only really existing forms of *poder popular* to emerge during the revolution. They both point out that the *Comandos* existed more on paper than in reality. See, Gaudichaud, *Poder popular y cordones industriales*, 2004.
[139] Chile, Hoy, October 27, 1972.
[140] The document's signature of '*avanzar sin transar*' (forward without compromise) is the most recognizable of these changes.
[141] La Aurora de Chile, November 5, 1972. Close attention to the grammatical differences between the original document and the manifesto reveals an important shift here: Cruces and Ulloa changed a comma to a colon and in

Instead of arguing that the logic of normality served to benefit the bosses and imperialism, the manifesto's emphasis on "institutions" highlights the importance of popular organizations such as the Cordones ability to maintain a level of autonomy. Yet, they did not want to remain so autonomous that the government would not consult them. Finally, the invocation of socialism as the solution to the problems facing "the working class" reflect the belief that the events of Red October had demonstrated that the working class could carry out the transition to socialism without middle class support.[142]

The next section of the Manifesto reprinted the *Pliego's* denunciations of "the crimes of the bosses." On face it seems like a simple one to one equivalency between the crimes discussed by the *Pliego* and those mentioned in the Manifesto. A close and comparative reading, however, reveals that while the Manifesto maintained the parallel structure of "*es delito*" (it's a crime), the content of each "crime" had undergone significant revisions. Compare the text of the first crime discussed by each document:

Pliego	Manifesto
"It is a crime to exploit the workers with impunity, subject them to starvation wages, arbitrary dismissals, unemployment; *it is a breach of law*"	"It is a crime to exploit the workers with impunity, subject them to harassment, starvation wages; *it is a rejection of their social and economic achievements*."

While the *Pliego* cites illegality of the bosses through references to the laws of the State, the Manifesto switches the institutional focus toward one of "social and economic conquest," or simply put, the history of struggle on the part of workers and *pobladores*. In other words, the focus in the *Pliego* is institutional, whereas in the Manifesto the emphasis is struggles from

doing so provided a far more inclusive vision of the working class as including both "the workers" (*trabajadores*) and "the people," which should be understood as a stand in for the *pobladores*.

[142] The ultimate irony of this passage is that it ignores the role played by the military in the successes of October. Without the military guaranteeing public order during the strike it's hard to say if the forces of *poder popular* would have been enough to offset the effects of the strike.

below. We should understand this as a specific rhetorical move by the Cordon's leadership during a moment in its history when attendance had begun to dwindle as a result of the military cabinet.

The most striking difference between the two versions occurs in their final denunciations. The crime in the *Pliego* is the "exploitation" and "subjugation of peoples" by international capital towards the end of "maintaining their economic control." The Manifesto, however, is much more precise in its denunciation: "it is a crime that a minority intends to continue using the basic riches of Chile to maintain their privileges and not give a dignified life to the majority of Chileans."[143] There is certainly an implication that the bosses had become wedded to foreign sources of capital at the expense of everyday Chileans, and in that sense the differences could be seen as rhetorical rather than substantial. The inclusion of "a dignified life for the majority of Chileans," however, signals that there is more at stake in the differences between the two versions. Using the rhetoric of criminality to call for a "*vida digna*" evidences the importance of the *pobladores* and the *poblador* movement to the formation and functioning of Cordon Vicuña Mackenna. The connections run much deeper. The combination of these two elements reflects an expansion of justice beyond its purely institutional frame, towards a more general view of social justice studied by the sociologists at CIDU. At bottom, the Cordon's leadership appropriated the rhetoric of criminality from the *Pliego* and injected it with meanings and associations that were much closer to the discourse of social justice associated with the *poblador* movement.

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The preceding analysis has focused solely on the production of the Manifesto, but what of its reception? Unfortunately there are no sources that speak to the directly to how individuals read, understood, and/or acted on the Manifesto. There is, however, a way in which we can read

[143] La Aurora de Chile, November 5, 1972 and Farias, *La Izquierda Chilena*, 3274-5.

the Manifesto's influence within the actions undertaken during the Cordon in 1973. By May of 1973, Chile found itself in a full-blown crisis of shortage of basic necessities; the workers of the Cordones began linking together the battle for production with the issues of shortages and the threat of the black market. While the following example centers on another instance of a factory seizure, the motivation and reason for that seizure evidence a shift from that of Elecmetal's seizure. In the case of Elecmetal, the logic behind its seizure remained increasing industrial output, or to use the language of the time, to win "the battle of production." The impact of the social justice ideology at work in the Manifesto shifted the *toma's* usage away from the singular focus on national economic output, toward serving the needs of the community.

On May 24, the GEKA's blue-collar union voted to begin an "indefinite" strike in order to demand wage parity and to investigate the discrepancies in the lab's output. According to Maria Eugenia Farias, the president of GEKA's industrial union, the "bosses" had tried to convince the workers that the lab's under-production was caused by a lack of raw materials.[144] The workers, however, had carried out their own investigation and discovered that not only did the plant have ample access to raw materials, but that the bosses had refused to fix and properly operate the company's machinery. Shortly after the workers declared their strike, their bosses attempted to reclaim the lab and lock out the workers. On June 5, a group of *carabiñeros* was dispatched to the plant and ordered, "to clear the access routes of the laboratory." The police "forced the workers to dismantle the tents that had been raised in front of the main door," which they had erected to prevent their products from being stolen and sold on the black market. Later that night members of an armed opposition shock troop arrived to terrorize the workers, who were forced to seek shelter inside the plant. On the following day, "support brigades from the

[144] "Sobre el Conflicto de GEKA" *Tarea Urgente*, June 15, 1973.

industries in Cordón Vicuña Mackenna" arrived and began to rebuild the tents and set up surveillance committees "protect the workers on strike."[145]

Seizure of GEKA Labs June 1973

Source: *La Batalla de Chile*

The Workers' Command of Vicuña Mackenna held a meeting to discuss the situation at GEKA. The Command decided to send even more support to the strikers, including workers from Cristalerias and Elecmetal, which remained the most organized companies in the territory. The Cordón's presence allowed GEKA to maintain its seizure and in turn win the government's intervention into the company as Farias claimed the workers "great help at all times. Thanks to these comrades, we did not lose faith."[146]

A statement released by the Workers Command of CVM about the GEKA conflict declared, "in order for GEKA to complete its social function [it] must pass to the Social Property Area."[147] GEKA's social function was the production of public health products such as Odontine toothpaste, which the workers alleged had been hoarded by their bosses to be resold on the black market. The declaration thus concluded with a resounding call "for a distribution for the people, GEKA to the Social Property Area!"[148] The worker's believed that only state ownership of industries would allow the workers to gain control of "their revolution."[149]

[145] Ibid.
[146] Ibid.
[147] "El Cordón Vicuña Mackenna Ante El Conflicto en Laboratorio GEKA" *Tarea Urgente,* June 15 1973
[148] Ibid
[149] "Recado con Barricades" *Punto Final,* op cit.

Demands for Popular Distribution June 1973

Source: *La Batalla de Chile*

The conflict over the GEKA Company highlights a shift in the strategy of the Cordones in response to the growing economic dislocations and the government's inability to resolve them. Not only that, but it also evidences the continued influence of the social justice ideology at work in the Manifesto. While the speeches and interviews with members of Vicuña Mackenna did not articulate their actions within the rhetoric of social justice like the Manifesto, the underlying logic remained consistent. CVM's call for GEKA to be incorporated within the Social Property Area demonstrates a clear break with the government's economic vision. GEKA did not meet any of the requirements for inclusion; it was a small and relatively unstrategic company. Nevertheless, the Worker's Command argued that public health constituted a strategic concern that impacted economic production and, thus, were able to gain the government's intervention. Compared to the Armando Cruces' statements regarding the seizure of Elecmetal, the reasons behind the GEKA seizure were different and as such highlight the continued influence of the *poblador* movement and its vision of social justice.

Conclusion

While I have been more concerned with the subjective experiences of Cordon Vicuña Mackenna, the preceding discussion of the GEKA conflict points to a subtle, yet important, change in the Cordon's tactics. While all the factory seizures that have been discussed in this

paper were anchored in the demand for inclusion into the Social Property Area, the underlying justifications for *why* they should be included changed. The seizures of Elecmetal and Calzados ALYS were coded within an economic understanding of the revolution. To use the language of the day, the goal was to win "the battle of production," which would increase Chile's economic output. This economic grow would in turn prove that State managed industries were just as successful as privately owned ones and thus persuade sectors of the middle classes to support the transition to socialism. The seizure of GEKA, however, swapped the economic rhetoric for a social understanding. This new understanding evidenced and emphasized the importance of the social justice ideology at work in the Manifesto of Vicuña Mackenna.

This paper has revealed the high degree of influence that the *pobladores* of La Legua and Nueva La Habana had on the actions and worldviews of Cordon Vicuña Mackenna. This influence played out on two levels: physical collaboration during the October crisis and ideological influence in the language of the Manifesto. I have utilized a spatial frame of analysis as the best way to understand the particularities of the different Cordones to emerge during the revolution. This is a new approach to the history of both the Cordones and the revolution more broadly. Not only does it allow us to pierce the opacity that has surrounded Vicuña Mackenna, but it also suggests that the historiographical boundaries that have divided the Chilean labor and *poblador* movements into separate spheres have perhaps over emphasized the distinctions between the two. The history of Vicuña Mackenna shows that the transmission of ideas, strategies, and tactics between the two movements were much more fluid than the existing literature portrays them. Not only that, but it also problematizes the directionality of this influence insofar as this study points to the transmission of an idea from the *poblador* to the labor movement instead of the other way around. This high level of *poblador* participation also

means that we need to rethink our periodization of the Chilean Revolution. The sociological studies used by this paper repeatedly reference the *pobladores* frustrations with the preceding administration of Eduardo Frei and the Christian Democrats. Instead of seeing the revolution as reducible to Allende and the Popular Unity coalition, extending the temporal frame to include the Frei years would provide a greater understanding of how the *poblador* and workers movement transformed the industrial belts into the Cordones Industriales.

This paper also highlights an important and fruitful method for studying urban social movements. A spatial frame of analysis shifts our focus to the relationship between the geography of the city and the forms of urban protest. One could argue that such an approach risks homogenizing the diversity of ideas and tensions within a given space. In short, spatial analysis it risks emptying history of its internal contradictions. My analysis of the Manifesto and its differences from the *Pliego* demonstrates that a spatial method does not inherently imply such a flattening effect.[150]

Finally, the history of Cordon Vicuña Mackenna raises important questions that warrant further research. While I have argued for the importance of the *poblador* movement to the strength of Vicuña Mackenna I have not traced the development of the movement itself or its conception of social justice. Moreover, I have not claimed to unpack the history of the two networks that existed amongst the local unions along Vicuña Mackenna Avenue. These are two of the most pressing and potentially fruitful avenues for further research, which would not only continue filling the holes in our knowledge about Cordon Vicuña Mackenna, but also about the formation of the Chilean working class more broadly.

[150] The history of Vicuña Mackenna during the final months of its existence also highlights the heterogeneity of political and social strategies at work within its space. For example, following the attempted coup in late June 1973, the Communist Party finally relented and threw its weight behind *the idea* of the Cordones Industriales. Within Vicuña Mackenna this took the form of a "phantom" cordon that the Communist party tried to create within the factory of Textil Progresso.

Appendix 1: The *Cordones Industriales* of the Greater Santiago Area



Fuente: archivo personal de René Urbina (director del Departamento de Planificación Urbana y Regional de la Universidad de Chile entre 1970 y 1973), documento facilitado por el historiador Boris Cofré S.

Printed In: Franck Gaudichaud, *Chile 1970-1973, Mil Dias que Estremecieron al Mundo: Poder Popular, Cordones Industriales y Socialismo Durante el Gobierno de Salvador Allende*, Primera edición, Historia (Santiago: Lom ediciones, 2016), 463.

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Scholars interested in researching the history of the Cordones are confronted with a massive amount of primary source material. The following is brief summary of some of the more important resources.

Great strides have been made in digitizing some of the rare and previously inaccessible press materials such as *La Aurora de Chile*, *Tarea Urgente*, and *Trinchera*. The Clodomiro Almeyda Library of the Socialist Party have made these and many other publications freely available on their website (http://www.socialismo-chileno.org/PS/).

Beyond online resources, the two-volume collection *Los Mil Dias de Allende* contains press materials from both left and right outlets arranged chronologically between 1970 and 1973. The collection also includes images from the newspapers in question as well as reproductions of key documents such as the UP' Basic Program.

La Izquierda Chilena edited by Victor Farias is a seven-volume collection of documents related to the "strategic line" of the Chilean left between 1969 and 1973. It includes everything from public declarations of government officials, to press materials, to internal/confidential party documents from both the Socialists and the Revolutionary Left Movement.

In addition to press materials and party documents, there is an increasing amount of oral histories by the workers and militants who participated in the Cordones. The collections published by Franck Gaudichaud and Anna Lopez remain indispensable for anyone interested in letting the workers narrate their own history.

The Interdisciplinary Center for Urban Studies (CIDU), part of the Catholic University, commissioned a series of investigations into the different forms of *poder popular* that had emerged during the revolution. The research teams were composed primarily of sociologists and their analysis is filtered through the lenses of sociological methods. Nevertheless, any study of *poder popular* must engage with the studies that were conducted in the moment.

Finally one of the richest sources for any study of the revolution, especially for those interested in the Cordones, remains the three-part documentary *La Batalla de Chile* directed by Patricio Guzman. Not only does the film contain numerous interviews with workers who participated in the Cordones, but it also contains footage of the key factories and industries that constituted the protagonists of the Cordones' history.

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