

AN INTRODUCTION AND TRANSLATION OF VINITADEVA'S EXPLANATION  
OF THE FIRST TEN VERSES OF (VASUBANDHU'S) COMMENTARY ON HIS  
"TWENTY STANZAS" WITH APPENDED GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS

Gregory Alexander Hillis  
Palo Alto, California

B.A., University of California, Santa Cruz, 1979

A Thesis Presented to the Graduate  
Faculty of the University of Virginia  
in Candidacy for the Degree of  
Master of Arts

Department of Religious Studies

University of Virginia  
May, 1993

P. Jeffrey Hopkins  
Karen C. Lang

## ABSTRACT

In this thesis I argue that Vasubandhu categorically rejects the position that objects exist external to the mind. To support this interpretation, I engage in a close reading of Vasubandhu's *Twenty Stanzas* (*viṃśatikā, nyi shu pa*), his autocommentary (*viṃśatikā-vṛtti, nyi shu pa'i 'grel pa*), and Vinītadeva's sub-commentary (*prakaraṇa-viṃśaka-ṭikā, rab tu byed pa nyi shu pa'i 'grel bshad*). I endeavor to show how unambiguous statements in Vasubandhu's root text and autocommentary refuting the existence of external objects are further supported by Vinītadeva's explanation. I examine two major streams of recent non-traditional scholarship on this topic, one that interprets Vasubandhu to be a realist, and one that interprets him to be an idealist. I argue strenuously against the former position, citing what I consider to be the questionable methodology of reading the thought of later thinkers such as Dignāga and Dharmakīrti into the works of Vasubandhu, and argue in favor of the latter position with the stipulation that Vasubandhu *does* accept a plurality of separate minds, and he does *not* assert the existence of an Absolute Mind.

Next, I summarize the content of the first ten of the *Twenty Stanzas* and their commentaries. In so doing I demonstrate how each sub-argument within the overall argument of the work is concerned precisely with the refutation of external objects. Furthermore, my synopsis illustrates the fact that Vasubandhu chooses to employ a dialectical format in defense of his position, a fact that clearly mitigates the claim of certain scholars that "mind-only" is only to be understood in a meditative context.

In the second section of the thesis I enclose a translation of large portions of the relevant texts. The main body of the translation is comprised of Vinītadeva's sub-commentary, the appropriate passages of Vasubandhu's root text and autocommentary embedded within that. I invite the reader to pursue the translations so that she may reach her own conclusions.

Finally, I include detailed glossaries of the technical terms and vocabulary used in Vasubandhu's *Twenty Stanzas* and his autocommentary. It is my hope that these may be of some small use to students of these texts in the future.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction .....	1
The Author and His Text .....	2
Emptiness of External Objects .....	6
Synopsis of the First Ten Stanzas and Accompanying Commentaries .....	17
First Stanza .....	19
Second Stanza .....	20
Third Stanza .....	21
Fourth Stanza .....	21
Fifth Stanza .....	24
Sixth Stanza .....	25
Seventh Stanza .....	26
Eighth Stanza .....	27
Ninth Stanza .....	29
Tenth Stanza .....	29
Conclusion .....	31
Translation .....	34
Appendices .....	87
Sanskrit-Tibetan-English Glossary .....	88
Tibetan-Sanskrit-English Glossary .....	98
English-Sanskrit-Tibetan Glossary .....	108
Bibliography .....	118

## INTRODUCTION

## THE AUTHOR AND HIS TEXT

Vinītadeva (*dul ba'i lha*, c. 7th-8th centuries) was a reasonably productive Indian Buddhist commentator who flourished during and after the time of Dharmakīrti (600-660).<sup>1</sup> Vinītadeva is said to have lived at Nālandā<sup>2</sup> and to have been “a lion of speakers confounding the brains of the Tīrthika elephants.”<sup>3</sup> In his works, Vinītadeva comments on topics such as mind-only (*citta-mātra*, *sems tsam*), monastic discipline (*vinaya*, *'dul ba*), the schools of Nikāya Buddhism, and logic and epistemology (*pramāṇa*, *tshad ma*). The following is a list of his works found in the Peking Tibetan Tripiṭika:

(1) *prakaraṇa-viṃśaka-ṭīkā*, *rab tu byed pa nyi shu pa'i 'grel bshad*.

(Commentary on Vasubandhu's *viṃśatika-vṛtti*) P5566.

(2) *triṃśikā-ṭīkā*, *sum cu pa'i 'grel bshad*. (Commentary on Vasubandhu's *triṃśikā-kārikā*) P5571.

<sup>1</sup> As with most Indian figures of this period, precise dating is problematic. Lamotte places Vinītadeva in the late 8th to early 9th centuries; Winternitz places him in the 8th century; Potter says he flourished c. 750; Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya along with Mishra suggest c. 700; and Das Gupta mentions 7th century. Only Dreyfus offers specific dates (630-700), which are also the earliest mentioned by any of the sources I have consulted. He does not, however, cite his source for these dates. See M. Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature Vol 2*, (New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint, 1972), p. 226, note; Étienne Lamotte, *History of Indian Buddhism*, (Louvain-Paris: Peeters Press, 1988), p. 545; Karl Potter, comp., *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol. 1: Bibliography*, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970), p. 185; Chimpa and Chattopadhyaya, trans., *Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in India*, (Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1970), p. 414; Umesha Mishra, *History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1*, (Allahabad: Tirabhukti Publications, 1957), p. 487; S.N. Das Gupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), pp. 152, note, 163, note; Georges Dreyfus, “Knowledge and Reality” (Vol. 1), (Ph.D dissertation, University of Virginia, 1991), p. v.

<sup>2</sup> See Sati Chandra Vidyabhusana, *A History of Indian Logic*, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971), p. 320.

<sup>3</sup> This expression is found in the colophon to Vinītadeva's commentary on Dignāga's *ālambana-parīkṣā*. See Sati Chandra Vidyabhusana, *A History of Indian Logic*, p. 322; Mishra, *History of Indian Philosophy*, p. 487.

(3) *vinaya-stotra-pada-vyākhyāna*, 'dul ba la bstod pa'i tshig gi rnam par bshad pa. (Commentary on Dharmasreṣṭhi's *vinaya-stotra*) P5613, P5638.

(4) *vinaya-vibhaṅga-pada-vyākhyāna*, 'dul ba rnam par 'byed pa'i tshig gi rnam par bshad pa. (Commentary on *vinaya* in 5000 ślokas) P5616.

(5) *triśata-kārikā-vyākhyāna*, tshig le'ur byas pa sum brgya pa'i rnam par bshad pa. P5628.

(6) *samaya-bhedoparacana-cakre nikāya-bhedodeśana-saṃgraha*, gzhung tha dad pa rim par klag pa'i 'khor lo las sde pa tha dad pa bstan pa bsdus pa. (Commentary on Vasumitra's *samaya-bheda-uparacana-cakra*) P5641.

(7) *santānāntara-siddhi-ṭikā*, rgyud gzhan grub pa'i 'grel bshad. (Commentary on Dharmakīrti's *santānāntara-siddhi*) P5724.

(8) *nyāya-bindu-ṭikā*, rigs pa'i thigs pa'i rgya cher 'grel pa. (Commentary on Dharmakīrti's *nyāya-bindu*) P5729.

(9) *hetu-bindu-ṭikā*, gtan tshigs kyi thigs pa'i rgya cher 'grel pa. (Commentary on Dharmakīrti's *hetu-bindu*) P5733.

(10) *sambandha-parikṣā-ṭikā*, 'brel pa brtag pa'i 'grel pa. (Commentary on Dharmakīrti's *sambandha-parikṣā-prakaraṇa*) P5735.

(11) *vāda-nyāya-ṭikā*, rtsod pa'i rigs pa'i 'grel pa. (Commentary on Dharmakīrti's *vāda-nyāya-prakaraṇa*) P5737.

(12) *ālambana-parikṣā-ṭikā*, dmigs pa brtag pa'i 'grel bshad. (Commentary on Dignāga's *ālambana-parikṣā*) P5739.

In addition to these, both Potter and Stcherbatsky mention that Vinītadeva is thought to have composed a commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa-viniścaya*, although the work does not appear to be available in Tibetan.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> See Karl Potter, *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol. 1: Bibliography*, p. 186; Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic Vol. 1*, (Leningrad, 1930; Reprint, New York: Dover Publications, 1962), p. 40.

Among contemporary non-traditional scholars, Vinītadeva is known primarily as a source for the study of the schisms of Nikāya Buddhism, and as a commentator on the logico-epistemological tradition of Dignāga (480-540) and Dharmakīrti.<sup>5</sup> It may be useful to keep Vinītadeva's connection with this latter tradition in mind inasmuch as Dignāga is traditionally viewed as the direct spiritual descendant of Vasubandhu. In other words, it may be fruitful to read his works on cognition-only (*viññapti-mātra*, *rnam par rig pa tsam*) in light of his interest in epistemology, and vice-versa.

The text being considered here, *Explanation of (Vasubandhu's) Commentary on his "Twenty Stanzas,"*<sup>6</sup> is a line by line commentary to Vasubandhu's *Twenty Stanzas* (*viṃśatikā*, *nyi shu pa*) and their autocommentary (*viṃśatikā-vṛtti*, *nyi shu pa'i 'grel pa*). Basically Vinītadeva's *Explanation* is an elaboration of the *Twenty Stanzas'* dialectical format in which Vasubandhu articulates hypothetical objections to his assertions (*pūrvapakṣa*, *phyogs snga ma*) and his responses to such objections. The interpretations

<sup>5</sup> For discussions of Vinītadeva's role as chronicler of various Buddhist schools from the Mūla-sarvāstivādin position, see Lamotte, *History*, pp. 520, 522, 545, 548, 594; Hirakawa, *A History of Indian Buddhism: From Śākyamuni to Early Mahāyāna*, trans. Paul Groner, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), pp. 117, 331-332; W.W. Rockhill, *The Life of the Buddha*, (London: Kegan Paul, 1884; reprint San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, 1976), pp. 181-193. Vinītadeva's *Samaya-bhedoparacana-cakre nikāya-bhedopa-deśana-saṃgraha* has been translated into French by André Bareau, in the articles "Trois traités sur les sectes bouddhiques attribués à Vasumitra, Bhavya, et Vinītadeva," *Journal Asiatique* 242 (1954): 229-266; 244 (1956): 167-200.

For a discussion of Vinītadeva's role as a commentator on the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, see Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic Vol. 1*, pp. 39-40; Bu-ston, *The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet*, trans. E. Obermiller (Heidelberg, 1932; reprint Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1986), p. 155.

<sup>6</sup> *prakaraṇa-viṃśaka-ṭīkā*, *rab tu byed pa nyi shu pa'i 'grel bshad*. The translation included in the present essay is from the Tibetan version of the Sanskrit translated by Jinamitra, Śīlendraboḍhi, Dānaśīla, and Ye-shes sde. The primary edition relied upon is found in the Peking Tibetan Tripiṭika, Vol.. 113, P5566, with frequent corrections made in accordance with the *sde dge* Tibetan Tripiṭika *stan 'gyur sems tsam*, Vol.. 14, 4065, Tokyo, 1981. All variations in these two editions have been noted. The embedded passages from Vasubandhu's *Twenty Stanzas* and his autocommentary are drawn from N.A. Sastrin's Sanskrit and Tibetan edition of *Viṃśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ*, *rnam par rig pa tsam du grub pa nyi shu pa*, (Gangtok, Sikkim: Namgyal Institute of Tibetology, 1964).



offered by Vinītadeva, while not particularly creative or innovative, do appear to be based on a literal and faithful reading of Vasubandhu.

This tendency simply to rephrase or restate the words of the master is both the strength and weakness of the text. It is the text's strength insofar as it patiently explains and re-explains material that is obscure even when read in light of the autocommentary—Vinītadeva forces the reader to slow down and review the content of Vasubandhu's assertions again and again, the result being a clearer notion of what is being said, what the drift of the argument is. His rather pedestrian reading is also the *Explanation's* weakness in that it says nothing particularly new or interesting. Commentarial literature of this type is, by definition, derivative "second order" discourse. The difference, however, between the work of Vinītadeva and that of Vasubandhu is that whereas Vinītadeva often seems to do little more than paraphrase, Vasubandhu manages to do something new and creative even within the rather narrow constraints of the genre of commentaries on specific texts.<sup>7</sup>

Stcherbatsky has also discerned the tendency of Vinītadeva simply to rehearse the material content of the works upon which he comments. Concerning his commentaries on the works of Dharmakīrti, Stcherbatsky states that Vinītadeva's style follows a "...method of simplicity and literalism."<sup>8</sup> Similarly, Lamotte suggests that Vinītadeva cultivates a "...literary style which could be entitled sectarian dogmatics."<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>7</sup> In the vocabulary of Harold Bloom, Vasubandhu is a "strong poet" or "strong critic" and Vinītadeva is a "weak poet" or "weak critic." Bloom's basic argument is that all authors rest and rely upon the work of authors who precede them, but only "strong" authors appropriate their predecessors' material and make it their own. This appropriation is achieved through the willful "mis-prision" (misreading) of the text which is metaphorically likened to killing the father (i.e., one's precursor) in a Freudian sense. Hence it may be argued that Vasubandhu, even within the sub-genre of Buddhist commentary, creates radically new interpretations through a deliberate misreading of Buddhist scriptures, whereas Vinītadeva is content to slavishly restate the positions of Vasubandhu, Dharmakīrti, etc. See Harold Bloom, *The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 5 *et passim*.

<sup>8</sup> Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic Vol. 1*, p. 40.

<sup>9</sup> Lamotte, *History*, p. 522.

Vinītadeva may have intended his works to serve as monastic textbooks, and this intention could partially account for the absence of significant original thought in his corpus. The “simplicity” of the works could justifiably be perceived as clarity by beginning students; I myself have benefitted from this quality of Vinītadeva’s writing. Moreover, Vinītadeva’s *Explanation* is extremely useful in identifying the positions of the opponents who raise (rhetorical) objections to Vasubandhu’s assertions. Nevertheless, it is clear that Vinītadeva’s contribution to the development of Buddhist thought is negligible when compared with major figures such as Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti.

### **EMPTINESS OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS**

A central doctrine of Vasubandhu’s *Twenty Stanzas* and Vinītadeva’s commentary upon them is that of mind-only<sup>10</sup> or cognition-only.<sup>11</sup> These very terms entail the refutation of external objects, for, as Vasubandhu says in his autocommentary on *The Twenty Stanzas*:

In the Great Vehicle, all three realms are presented as cognition-only since the sūtra says, “O Conqueror’s Children, it is thus: these three realms are mind only.” Mind (*sems*, *citta*), mentality (*vid*, *manas*), consciousness (*rnam par shes pa*, *viñāna*), and cognition (*rnam par rig pa*, *viñapti*) are synonyms. Mind, furthermore, is intended as including [the mental factors] that are associated with it. The mention of “only” is for the sake of refuting [external] objects.<sup>12</sup>

Thus, in the introductory commentary to the first verse of his own root text, Vasubandhu explicitly shows how the “only” in the term “mind-only”—that all three realms are mind-

---

<sup>10</sup> *sems tsam*, *cittamātra*.

<sup>11</sup> *rnam par rig pa tsam*, *viñaptimātra*.

<sup>12</sup> See Vasubandhu, *Establishing Cognition Only: Commentary on “The Twenty,”* Jeffrey Hopkins, trans., (Unpublished Translation, 1989), p. 1.

only—refutes external objects. Furthermore, in the first verse of the root text and following line of commentary he states:

These are just cognition-only  
 Because of the appearance of non-existent [external] objects,  
 Like, for example, the perception of non-existent hairs,  
 Moons, and so forth by those with an eye disease.

[External] objects do not exist at all.<sup>13</sup>

Vasubandhu completely denies the existence of objects, and likens ordinary beings' perceptions of "real" external objects to the perceptions of non-existent hairs seen only by those with an eye disease.

Although the word "external" is included only in brackets here, there is evidence that the sense of externality was understood by Vasubandhu's Indian sub-commentators. For example, Vinītadeva states the following in his commentary to the first passage from Vasubandhu, given above:

"For the sake of refuting [external] objects" is another way of saying "for the sake of refuting objects that have the character of apprehended object and apprehending subject that are not included within consciousness." This indicates that, "there are not any apprehended objects that are not included within consciousness," and that, "there is also no apprehending apprehender in that consciousness."<sup>14</sup>

And again, Vinītadeva rephrases Vasubandhu's statement just above that, "[External] objects do not exist at all," as:

---

<sup>13</sup> Vasubandhu, *Establishing Cognition Only*, p. 1.

<sup>14</sup> Vinītadeva's *Explanation of (Vasubandhu's) Commentary on his "Twenty Stanzas,"* Peking Tibetan Tripiṭika (P5566, vol. 113, 314.2.3-5.)

Objects such as blue, etc., do not exist at all *separately*.<sup>15</sup>

Vinītadeva also does not here mention the term “external” explicitly in these citations (although he does later and throughout his text), but his glosses of these statements by Vasubandhu do indeed convey the sense that objects which are external to, or “not included within” consciousness, are being refuted.

The question of whether or not Vasubandhu and others associated with the Yogācāra school are actually and explicitly refuting the existence of external objects is an issue of much debate and widely diverging opinions among contemporary non-traditional scholars. Generally speaking, these thinkers fall into two categories: (1) those who take the doctrine of cognition-only to refer to a consciousness only being able to cognize a “mere representation” (*rnam par rig pa tsam*, *viñaptimātra*) of the external world, and (2) those who take it to refer to full-blown idealism. Of those in the former category, Wayman is probably the most forceful in his assertions:

...this aggregation (of atoms) is a representation-only (*viñapti-mātra*) of a consciousness support (*ālambana*) and makes up a picture in the mind, which the mind attributes to the external world. It is impossible that this picture or aggregation could exist in the external world, since it is representation-only. *The vulgar interpretation—that this denies external objects—is nonsense.*<sup>16</sup>

Wayman emphatically denies that the doctrine of *viñaptimātra* refutes external objects; but is this not precisely what Vasubandhu indicates that it does? Anacker also argues refutation of external objects is not at all what Vasubandhu had in mind, and it is a mistake to attribute to him the opinion that external objects do not exist. He says about the *Twenty Stanzas*:

---

<sup>15</sup> Vinītadeva, *Explanation*, 314.3.5-6.

<sup>16</sup> See Alex Wayman, “Yogācāra and the Buddhist Logicians,” *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, vol. 2, no. 1, 1979: 70. (*Italics mine*)

Perhaps no work of Vasubandhu's has been more consistently misunderstood than the *Twenty Verses*. It has frequently been used as an authoritative source for opinions that in fact are not there. The main point here is not that consciousness unilaterally creates all forms in the universe, as has been supposed by Dharmapāla and Hsüan-tsang, but rather that an object-of-consciousness is "internal," and the "external" stimuli are only inferrable.<sup>17</sup>

From these quotations, we may characterize the position of Wayman and Anacker as being that, although we do not cognize the external world directly, we can infer its existence through our internal mental image of it. Hattori identifies this type of reasoning as that of the Proponets of , the position of whom, as we know from Vinitadeva's *Explanation*, Vasubandhu takes apart in the *Twenty Stanzas*. Hattori discusses the weakness of what he calls "representationalist realism" of the Proponents of Sūtra:

The recognition of the existence of the external object as the factor limiting cognition spatially and temporally is not only unnecessary; there is clearly a weakness in the Sautrāntika logic, which infers the external object on the basis of a perceptual image. Though the object is considered external, its essence is not determined objectively, but is said by the Sautrāntika to exist as it is perceived. This, however, leads to the contradiction that one entity possesses a multiplicity of essences.<sup>18</sup>

For example, if a hungry ghost and a human being look at the same river, one will have an image of pus and blood, while the other will have an image of water. If the essence of the external object is inferred from the image, then the single object will have multiple

---

<sup>17</sup> See Stefan Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), p. 159.

<sup>18</sup> See Masaaki Hattori, "Realism and the Philosophy of Consciousness-Only," *Eastern Buddhist* 21/1 (1988): 55-56.

essences.<sup>19</sup> When taken from this point of view, it seems Wayman and Anacker are forced to hold the position that Vinītadeva identifies as that of Vasubandhu's opponent, although they assert themselves to be holding his true stance.<sup>20</sup>

Some scholars who argue in favor of “representation only” hold that the idea of mind-only is taught not as a philosophical doctrine, but as an expedient device in the context of meditation. For example, Janice Willis states:

There is perhaps no term more misunderstood and misinterpreted in the whole of Yogācāra scholarship than *cittamātra* ... *Cittamātra*, throughout the early Yogācāra, should be more properly rendered as “just thought” or “merely thought” and seen more appropriately as functioning within the realm of discourse about spiritual *practice* as opposed to strictly philosophical theory.<sup>21</sup>

Willis appears to believe that the realm of practice is to be kept separate from the realm of philosophical theorizing. Schmithausen, however, argues convincingly that the philosophical doctrine of mind-only itself arose out of the context of meditative practice. He shows how the *Sūtra Unravelling the Thought*<sup>22</sup> applies the doctrine of cognition-only, at first discussed in a meditative context, to the realm of all phenomena:

---

<sup>19</sup> This is precisely the point Asaṅga makes in his *Grounds of Bodhisattvas* (*bodhisattvabhūmi*, *byang sa*), *Compendium of Ascertainments* (*vinīścayasaṃgraha*, *gtan la dbab pa sdu pa*), and *Compendium of the Great Vehicle* (*mahāyānaśaṃgraha*, *theg bsdus*) i.e., that if a single entity were established by way of its own nature as the referent of many names, then it would absurdly have multiple essences, and hence would not be a single entity at all. See appropriate passages of the above works cited in Jeffrey Hopkins, “Reflections on Reality,” (Unpublished Manuscript, 1993), pp. 559, 562, 572.

<sup>20</sup> See Vinītadeva, *Explanation*, 317.2.7, 318.3.7, 318.5.1.

<sup>21</sup> See Janice D. Willis, *On Knowing Reality: The Tattvārtha Chapter of Asaṅga's Bodhisattvabhūmi*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp. 24-25.

<sup>22</sup> *saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra*, *dgongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo*; P774, Vol. 29. For Tibetan edition and French Translation, see Étienne Lamotte, ed. and trans., *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra: Explication des Mystères*, (Louvain and Paris: Université de Louvain, 1935); for English translation, see C. John Powers, “The Concept of the Ultimate (*don dam*, *paramārtha*) in the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra: Analysis, Translation and Notes,” (Ph.D Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1991).

...the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra starts from the ideality of meditation-objects ...and then simply extends this fact to ordinary objects, without justifying this procedure by any rational argument. Thus, the result of our examination of the oldest materials of the Yogācāra school clearly speaks in favor of the theory that Yogācāra idealism primarily resulted from a *generalization* of a fact observed in the case of meditation-objects, i.e., in the context of *spiritual practice*.<sup>23</sup>

Schmithausen's conclusion, together with the fact that Asaṅga and Vasubandhu both use philosophical argumentation to establish the doctrine of cognition-only, are strong refutations of the assertion that *viññaptimātra* was only taught in terms of spiritual practice.<sup>24</sup>

On the other side of this debate are scholars who assert that Vasubandhu, etc., propound the mind to be the ultimate. Concerning this view, Willis complains:

...scholars have consistently maintained that this school propounds idealism; that its central teaching is that "mind (*citta*) or consciousness (*viññāna*) is the sole, or only (*mātra*) reality."<sup>25</sup>

These are in fact exactly the type of statement made by scholars such as Tripathi and Chatterjee. For example Chatterjee states: "The Yogācāra holds that consciousness is the sole reality."<sup>26</sup>

Sangharakshita agrees that the "Absolute Mind" is the "sole reality," and goes on to compare the system of Vasubandhu to that of the English philosopher Berkeley (1685-

---

<sup>23</sup> See Lambert Schmithausen, "On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism," *German Scholars in India. Contributions to Indian Studies*, vol.II. (Bombay: Nachiketa Publications, 1976): 241.

<sup>24</sup> For Vasubandhu's usage of philosophical argumentation, see my synopsis of the first ten of the *Twenty Stanzas* below.

<sup>25</sup> See Janice D. Willis, *On Knowing Reality*, p. 21.

<sup>26</sup> See Ashok Chatterjee, *The Yogācāra Idealism*, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975), p. 45.

1753). To Sangharakshita, then, Vasubandhu propounds a type of immaterialism. He states:

One of the best ways of demonstrating the sole reality of the Absolute Mind is disproving the existence of matter ...this line of argument appealed to Vasubandhu, whose best known work, the *Triṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā*, is mainly an attempt to show that there is no such thing as a material substance, whether atomic or non-atomic, and that only ideas exist. ...For what Vasubandhu, like Berkeley, denies, is not the existence of sensible qualities, of which solidity is one, but of the independent material substratum in which they are supposed to inhere.<sup>27</sup>

Sangharakshita rightly suggests that the views of Berkeley and Vasubandhu are similar in both completely denying the existence of external objects, relegating reality instead to the level of feelings, sensations, "sensible qualities."<sup>28</sup> For Berkeley, "colors, shapes, and sounds that are naturally taken to belong to independently existing material objects are in fact sensible qualities that cannot exist apart from being perceived."<sup>29</sup> Acton elaborates on Berkeley's views:

---

<sup>27</sup> See Bhikku Sangharakshita, *Survey of Buddhism*, (Bangalore: Indian Institute of World Culture, 1966), p. 400.

<sup>28</sup> Sangharakshita's comparison of Vasubandhu and Berkeley is useful in that it demonstrates their refutations of external objects to be very similar. On the other hand, Vasubandhu's frequent and consistent reference to a plurality of beings vitiates the claim, made by Sangharakshita, Chatterjee, and others, that he asserts an Absolute Mind to be the sole reality. Furthermore, Vasubandhu et al., "unlike other idealists, could not say that the world is mind-only in the sense that it exists in God's mind, since as Buddhists they did not accept the doctrine of a supreme being. Consequently, they could not appeal to the notion of an omniscient intelligence (as Berkeley did, for example)." See Thomas E. Wood, *Mind Only: A Philosophical and Doctrinal Analysis of the Vijñānavāda*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), p. 163.

<sup>29</sup> H.B. Acton, "Idealism," in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1965), p. 112.



His basic argument is that what we immediately perceive are sensations or ideas, that sensations or ideas are necessarily objects of perception (their *esse*, as he puts it, is *percipi*, their essence is to be perceived), and that what we call physical things, such as trees and rocks and tables, are orderly groups or collections of sensations or ideas and are hence mind-dependent like the sensations or ideas which compose them.<sup>30</sup>

These positions certainly resonate with statements such as, "In the Great Vehicle, all three realms are presented as cognition-only," and so on.

It is interesting to note that, just as Wayman, Willis, et al., interpret Vasubandhu's position not as a negation of external objects but as a form of representationalism, the contemporary western philosopher Bertrand Russell finds Berkeley's arguments a weak refutation of materiality, but strong in asserting a position similar to the notion of "representation-only." He states:

...Berkeley advances valid arguments in favour of a certain important conclusion, though not quite in favour of the conclusion that he thinks he is proving. He thinks he is proving that all reality is mental; what he is proving is that we perceive qualities, not things, and that qualities are relative to the percipient.<sup>31</sup>

Russell can accept and appreciate Berkeley's reasonings to indicate that all we can know directly are sensible qualities, but stops short of endorsing them as valid proofs for the non-existence of external objects. All we can know are qualities, but these qualities *must* have

---

<sup>30</sup> See H.B. Acton, "Idealism," p. 112.

<sup>31</sup> See Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy*, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1961), p. 624.

an existent, external referent. Is this not the position of those scholars who take *viññaptimātra* to mean “representation-only”?

It is very difficult for some scholars simply to accept that great thinkers such as Asaṅga and Vasubandhu could be such simpletons to assert the non-existence of external objects. However, there is very strong evidence that they did precisely that.<sup>32</sup> With respect to Vasubandhu’s *Twenty Stanzas*, we have specifically seen that:

—The lead-in sentence of Vasubandhu’s autocommentary—which precedes even his first root verse—states: “In the Great Vehicle, all three realms are presented as cognition-only.” It is significant that Vasubandhu chooses this unambiguous expression as the first sentence of his work, and the burden of proof rests with those who would deny that such a statement refutes external objects.

—Vasubandhu himself glosses the word “cognition” (*viññapti*, *rnam par rig pa*) as “mind” (*citta*, *sems*), “mentality” (*manas*, *vid*), and “consciousness” (*viññāna*, *rnam par shes pa*) in his discussion of the term “cognition-only” (*viññaptimātra*, *rnam par rig pa tsam*). This explicit identification of *viññapti* with other terms that mean mind, consciousness, etc., militates against the interpretation of *viññaptimātra* as “representation-only.” It is clear that Vasubandhu himself interprets the expression as “mind-only.”

—Vasubandhu goes to some lengths to show how the “only” of the expression “cognition-only” refutes the existence of [external] objects. In addition, Vinītadeva explains that this

---

<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, later traditional scholars such as Ḍzong-ka-bā (*tsong kha pa*, 1357-1419) identify the view of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu as idealist; Still it is conceivable that Ḍzong-ka-bā could have inherited from Candrakīrti a reductionist agenda for turning the view of Yogācāra school into one of Mind-Only. See *Tsong Khapa’s Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence*, trans. Robert Thurman, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 224-226, *et passim*; Jeffrey Hopkins, “A Tibetan Contribution on the Question of Mind-Only in the Early Yogic Practice School,” *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 20 (1992): 275-343.

refutation entails that “there are not any apprehended objects that are not included within consciousness.”<sup>33</sup>

—Vinītadeva, in his *Explanation*, frequently glosses the term “object” (*don*) with “external object” (*phyi rol gyi don*) and explicitly identifies several of the objections being raised as those of “Proponents of External Objects” (*phyi rol gyi don du smra ba*).<sup>34</sup>

—Finally, to interpret Vasubandhu’s position as one of “representation-only” is, according to Hattori, to assign to him the Sautrāntika view. However, we know from Vinītadeva’s *Explanation* that the Sautrāntika view is precisely the view Vasubandhu defends his position *against*.

On the other hand, to identify Vasubandhu’s form of idealism in the manner that Chatterjee et al. have done—i.e., as propounding Absolute Mind—is also problematical. This was not a view Vasubandhu, et al., could have endorsed explicitly, since the view that the whole world exists in a single mind is that of the Vedāntists, and hence heretical.<sup>35</sup> In addition, Vasubandhu is very interested in refuting the existence of objects within preseving a plurality of minds, and hence terms like “Absolute Mind” seem inappropriate. In his autocommentary to the fourth stanza, for example, Vasubandhu does not reject the Buddhsit doctrine that there are beings that suffer in hell due to their karma, although he goes to some trouble to refute the existence of the hell-guardians who, he explains, appear due to the hell-beings’ karma. Hell-beings really *are* tormented by the hell-guardians, dogs, crows, etc., even though these “objects” do not exist external to the mind. Hence, Vasubandhu clearly holds that there are a plurality of beings’ mind-streams which share common experiences through the power of previous karma, *not* due to the existence of an external world.

---

<sup>33</sup> Vinītadeva, *Explanation*, 314.2.3-5.

<sup>34</sup> See, for example, Vinītadeva, *Explanation*, 314.3.7, 319.4.5, 320.1.3-4.

<sup>35</sup> See Thomas Wood, *Mind Only*, p. 94.

Another reason why one might think that Vasubandhu is *not* propounding a type of idealism is that his student Dignāga and Dignāga's subsequent commentator Dharmakīrti founded a logico-epistemological tradition that contains within it elements that do posit external objects.<sup>36</sup> This tradition, while considered "Yogācārin" by some, asserts the reality of external objects in its discussions of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*, *mngon sum*), a position which would appear to contradict the idealist interpretation of the so-called "Mind-Only" school.<sup>37</sup> Alex Wayman has stated that it is "...intriguing, to say the least, that the Buddhist logicians should be classified as 'Yogācārins' if these Yogācārins [i.e., Asaṅga and Vasubandhu] deny an external object and those logicians [i.e., Dignāga and Dharmakīrti] affirm it, insisting on the reality of the momentary object of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*)."<sup>38</sup> I find Wayman's methodology of reading Vasubandhu's thought backwards from Dignāga and Dharmakīrti questionable when there are clear statements in the *Twenty Stanzas* themselves explicitly refuting the existence of external objects. Wayman even suggests that Vinītadeva may have composed his commentaries on the *Twenty Stanzas* and the *Thirty Stanzas* of Vasubandhu as a preparation for his logic commentaries on the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, thus indicating that even Vinītadeva may have

---

<sup>36</sup> Both Dreyfus and Stcherbatsky argue that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti adapt their idealist positions to respond to the realism of the Nyāya School. Note 38 elaborates on Dreyfus' opinion. See Georges Dreyfus, "Knowledge and Reality" (Vol.1), p. v; Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic Vol. 1*, p. 31.

<sup>37</sup> We know this from their discussion of the observed object condition (*ālambana-pratyaya*, *dmigs rkyen*). Once you have an observed object that is the cause of the consciousness, the object must be a different entity from the consciousness. This is because the cause (i.e., the object) precedes the effect (i.e., the consciousness), and hence they are different entities.

<sup>38</sup> See Wayman, "Yogācāra and the Buddhist Logicians": 77. Dreyfus, on the other hand, asserts that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti propound a doctrine which does not necessarily correspond to their own opinion. Although they assert the reality of external objects, on a deeper level they do not retain these objects, but follow a view that negates the reality of external objects. Ge-luk-ḥa scholars explain that Dharmakīrti himself is a Yogācārin who propounds the views of lower tenet systems (i.e., Sautrāntika) for the sake of helping certain trainees. Dreyfus himself argues that Dharmakīrti is forced to hold contradictory views to defend Buddhist epistemology against Nyāya adversaries. See Georges Dreyfus, "Knowledge and Reality," 17-19.

understood Vasubandhu to be articulating a view which asserts the reality of external objects.<sup>39</sup>

Despite a strong tendency among certain contemporary non-traditional scholars such as Wayman, Anacker, and others to characterize Vasubandhu's view as that of a realist, Vinītadeva indicates this to be the very position that Vasubandhu rejects. Vinītadeva explicitly identifies the objects refuted by Vasubandhu in his *Twenty Stanzas* as *external* objects, and this interpretation flies in the face of interpretations of scholars such as Wayman, Anacker, etc. Furthermore, to read the *Twenty Stanzas* themselves as something other than a refutation of external objects is to render their arguments incoherent; indeed, one need only read the work to discern that the force of the reasoning in each section is focused on precisely such a refutation. With that in mind, then, let us turn to a consideration of the stanzas together with Vasubandhu's autocommentary and Vinītadeva's *Explanation*.

### ***SYNOPSIS OF THE FIRST TEN STANZAS AND ACCOMPANYING COMMENTARIES***

In his introductory remarks, Vasubandhu states quite plainly that, in the context of Great Vehicle teachings, all three realms are presented as mere cognition. He then cites the famous passage from the *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds* (*mdo sde sa bcu pa, daśabhūmikasūtra*), namely, "O Conqueror's Children, it is thus: these three realms are mind only" as justification for his assertion.

Vinītadeva takes this brief introduction as the basis for a lengthy discussion. Initially, he demonstrates how the expression "In the Great Vehicle, the three realms are presented as mere cognition" explicitly indicates the scope of Vasubandhu's project in the *Twenty Stanzas*, i.e., the purpose of the work (*dgos pa*), the entity of the topic (*brjod par bya ba'i*

---

<sup>39</sup> See Wayman, "Yogācāra and the Buddhist Logicians": 66. Moreover, Vinītadeva is identified by Stcherbatsky (*Buddhist Logic Vol. 1*, pp. 39-40) as a member of the "Philological School" of commentators on the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

*rang gi ngo bo*), and the final purpose of the work (*dgos pa'i yang dgos pa*). These can be understood respectively as the rationale for the composition, its subject matter, and its underlying rationale. Vinītadeva asserts that the term “Great Vehicle” indicates the underlying rationale for the composition of the text—i.e., to further the project of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the liberation of all sentient beings. “The three realms are presented as mere cognition” indicates both the subject matter of the text and its purpose—i.e., the topic being discussed is that the three realms are nothing but cognition, and *teaching* that such is the case is the purpose or rationale for the composition of the text. Because the teaching is also the work (i.e., this text by Vinītadeva), the work is the means to bring about the purpose. Therefore, the work and the purpose abide in a relationship (*'brel ba*). This relationship has the character of being the method—i.e., the teaching leading to enlightenment—and that which arises from method—i.e., the fruit, enlightenment itself.

Next, Vinītadeva explains the meaning of the term “Great Vehicle.” The Great Vehicle is known as a vehicle since one either progresses by means of it or toward it, and it is great since it is superior to the Vehicles of Hearers (*nyan thos, śrāvaka*) and Solitary Realizers (*rang sangs rgyas, pratyekabuddha*). Vinītadeva offers the interesting interpretation of the utterance “in the Great Vehicle” as having either a reason or a locative sense. The Sanskrit term *mahāyāne* conveys the sense of cause when it is translated as “for the sake of attaining” or “as a cause of” the Great Vehicle, and conveys a sense of place when translated as “in” the Great Vehicle. Hence one can either understand the teaching that the three realms are mere cognition as a means to attain the final goal of the Great Vehicle, i.e., enlightenment or the *dharmadhātu*, or as a teaching that is peculiar to Great Vehicle scriptures.

Vinītadeva continues his commentary with brief discussion of the distinction between followers of the Lesser Vehicle and the Great Vehicle. This is done in terms of beings who are tamed by the teachings on the selflessness of persons (*gang zag gi bdag med, pudgala-*

*nairātmya*) and the teachings on the selflessness of phenomena (*chos kyi bdag med*, *dharma-nairātmya*) respectively. The key teaching for those tamed by the teaching of selflessness with respect to phenomena is, according to Vinītadeva, that of mere cognition which is free from apprehended object and apprehending subject. He also enumerates the three realms and demonstrates how they are nothing other than mind and mental factors.

In order to address the possible qualm that Vasubandhu's claim that the three realms are mere *cognition* and the *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds*' assertion that they are *mind-only* are contradictory, Vasubandhu asserts that these terms, in addition to the terms "mentality" (*yiḍ*, *manas*) and "consciousness" (*rnam par shes pa*, *viññāna*), are synonymous. This is to eliminate confusion with respect to scriptural conventions. Moreover, these are to be understood as including the eight collections of consciousness as they are posited by the Yogācāra School.

Next, in order to address the concern that the "mere" or "only" in "mere cognition" or "mind-only" will exclude mental factors, Vasubandhu indicates that the terms "mind" and "cognition" are meant to include their accompanying mental factors. The terms "mere" and "only" are solely for the sake of refuting the existence of external objects that are not included within consciousness, and are *not* intended to exclude related mental factors.

#### FIRST STANZA

Vinītadeva glosses the phrase "for the sake of refuting objects" as "for the sake of refuting objects that have the character of apprehended object and apprehending subject that are not included within consciousness." This leads to the question that, if there are no apprehended objects and apprehending subjects, then what is it that appears, and by what is it perceived?

Vasubandhu addresses this concern by stating in his first root verse: "Just this consciousness arises within appearing as objects." Vinītadeva elaborates on this statement by explaining how the appearance of consciousness as objects and the consciousness

perceiving it arise through the force of predispositions (*bag chags, vāsanā*). Living beings generate the pride that thinks, “I see external objects” in dependence on objects such as the color blue appearing *as if* they are separate from consciousness. Vasubandhu compares our normal mistaken mode of perception to cognition of non-existent things such as hairs and moons by someone with an optical disorder, and then forcefully asserts that, like these hallucinations, objects do not exist at all. Vinītadeva refines this by saying that objects do not exist at all *separate from consciousness*.

## SECOND STANZA

In the second stanza, Vasubandhu’s position that just consciousness arises within appearing as objects and that objects external to consciousness do not exist at all provokes from the Proponents of External Objects (*phyi rol gyi don du smra ba*) the following complaint: If there is cognition without external objects, then the following common sense observations about the perceptions of objects would not be plausible: (1) restriction of the perception of an object to a single place, (2) restriction of the perception of an object with respect to a single location, (3) non-restriction of the perception of an object with respect to the minds of those present—i.e., the shared experience of an object by more than one person in a given place and time, and (4) performance of function. In other words, if there is cognition without objects, why is it that particular objects appear only at certain times and places and not anywhere or anytime that beings imagine them to exist? Why is it that a group of beings agree that a particular object is present at a given time and place? Finally, how can objects that only exist in the imaginations of beings be said to perform the functions peculiar to them?

According to those who assert that cognitions depend upon external objects, cognitions of particular objects arise when and where such objects are present, and this fact accounts for the perception of a given object’s restriction with respect to place and time. Proponents of External Objects feel that if cognition did *not* depend on external objects, since there



would be no means of restriction, everything would either have to appear everywhere at all times, nowhere and at no time, or randomly. Similarly, they feel that it is the presence of the external object that allows for consensual reality—the shared experience of objects in a certain place and time. The reason a group of individuals can simultaneously perceive an object is that the object is actually present. Finally, if objects have the same ontological status as the hairs, etc., seen by those with an optical disorder or as food, drink, clothes, or weapons in a dream, then they would not be able to perform their respective functions. For example, food or drink in a dream can never satisfy one's hunger or thirst. For these reasons, the Proponents of External Objects claim the existence of external objects must be accepted.

### THIRD STANZA

In the third stanza, Vasubandhu answers this criticism by saying that, even without external objects, these four conditions *are* feasible. For instance, restriction in terms of time and place are established the same way they are in a dream. That is to say, although a dream has no external objects, there is still the appearance of cities, gardens, men, women, and so forth, and these are seen only at certain times and places. Similarly, non-restriction with respect to the minds of those present is established as in the case of hungry ghosts seeing pus in a river. All hungry ghosts—not just some—who are assembled at a certain place and time see pus, urine, vomit, ashes, mucous, and so forth in a river through the force of having similar fruition of karma, and hence non-restriction with respect to the minds of those present is established, even without external objects.

### FOURTH STANZA

In the fourth stanza, Vasubandhu explains how absence of external objects and performance of function are not mutually exclusive with the example of a wet dream—even though a couple has not actually met and had intercourse, there is emission of semen exactly as if they had. Vinitadeva makes a short comment here indicating that other dream-

phenomena such as food, drink, towns, poison, weapons, and so on, also perform their respective functions within the context of the dream.

Vasubandhu continues his discussion by demonstrating that the single example of beings in the hells illustrates how all four of these issues, namely, (1) restriction of perceptions with respect to place, (2) restriction of perceptions with respect to time, (3) non-restriction of perceptions with respect to the minds of those present, and (4) performance of function are established without external objects. Here, Vinītadeva nicely summarizes the discussion in the following way:

The condensed meaning is: Although there are no hell-guardians, no clay vessels, no huge copper kettles, etc. [in the hells], they are seen by the hell-beings in the context of being restricted with respect to place and time. All those who are present at that place and time see [those things] without exception.

Even without [hell-guardians, etc.] they bring about various types of harm.<sup>40</sup>

Thus Vinītadeva clarifies how, even in the system of the Proponents of External Objects, Vasubandhu's single example satisfies all four conditions.

Vasubandhu suggests that, rather than attribute restriction of perceptions in terms of place and time, non-restriction of perception in terms of the minds of those present, and performance of function to existent external objects as realists do, we should attribute these conditions instead to a similar fruition of karma of sentient beings. The reason all hell beings see hell-guardians at certain times and places, and the reason that those hell-guardians are able to harm the hell-beings is due to their similar fruition of karma. Due to previously performed actions that result in the experience of suffering, the fruition of those actions becomes manifest, and *consciousness itself* arises in the aspect of hell-guardians, dogs, crows, iron mountains, and so forth, whereupon hell-beings generate feelings of fear

---

<sup>40</sup> Vinītadeva, *Explanation*, 316.1.4-6.

and pain. Vinītadeva argues that this is not a matter of mere conjecture since even we can perceive a similar process taking place in our own dreams, when, through the power of karma, consciousness arises in the aspect of lions, tigers, thieves, robbers, etc., and suffering, fear, and trembling are generated thereby.<sup>41</sup>

An objection, attributed to the Proponents of the Great Exposition (*bye brag tu smra ba, vaibhāṣika*) by Vinītadeva, is then raised: “Why are the guardians, crows, dogs, etc., of the hells not asserted to be sentient beings?” Vinītadeva elaborates on the opponent’s position by saying these entities look like sentient beings, move like sentient beings, and appear to have physical and verbal expressions that suggest the presence of mental activities.<sup>42</sup> The objection continues that if one did not have these signs from which to infer to existence of minds, then it would be impossible to do so for any other sentient beings.<sup>43</sup>

Vasubandhū responds that it is not reasonable to assert that hell-guardians and so forth are sentient beings since they do not experience suffering similar to that of the hell-beings. Vinītadeva adds that it is impossible to harm hell-guardians, and that the physical movement from which the Proponents of the Great Exposition wish to infer the existence of a mind is not self-willed, but arises only through the power of hell-beings’ karma. Furthermore, even statues and paintings can appear to be sentient beings.

---

<sup>41</sup> Vinītadeva, *Explanation*, 316.2.8-316.3.1.

<sup>42</sup> This appears to be an elegant way of saying, “If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, then it must be a duck.”

<sup>43</sup> This criticism seems to be of particular concern to Vinītadeva since it becomes necessary for Dharmakīrti et al., to prove the existence of other continua in order to avoid the charge of solipsism. Indeed, as we have seen above, Dharmakīrti composed a text called *Establishing Other Continua* (*santānāntara-siddhi, rgyud gzhān grub pa*) upon which Vinītadeva has commented in his *santānāntara-siddhi-ṭīkā, (rgyud gzhān grub pa'i 'grel bshad)*. This issue presents difficulties in Yogācāra thought since, if objects are internal, then sentient beings must be as well. Similarly, if it is permissible to infer the existence of beings on the basis of physical and verbal expressions, then why is it not likewise permissible to infer the existence of external objects on the basis of similar signs? For a discussion of these texts and their content, see Alexander Piatigorsky, “Some Remarks on ‘Other-Stream,’” in *Buddhist Studies: Ancient and Modern*, ed. Phillip Denwood and Alexander Piatigorsky, (London: Curzon Press, 1983), 124-152; Sicherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. 1, pp. 521-524.

Vasubandhu then attempts to head off the qualm that hell-beings and hell-guardians harm each other by arguing that if they did, it would be impossible to differentiate between hell-beings and hell-guardians. Also, if hell-beings possessed bodies of shapes, sizes, and power similar to those of the hell-guardians, then the former would not be particularly afraid of the latter. However, among Buddhists it is generally considered that hell-beings shrink in fear and trembling upon seeing huge, furious, and powerful hell-guardians. Vasubandhu also mentions that hell-guardians do not appear to experience the pain of the burning iron ground, and if they did, they would be in no position to torment others.

One might think that, although hell-guardians are indeed not hell-beings, maybe they are animals or hungry ghosts. In order to address that qualm, Vasubandhu asks the rhetorical question, "How could non-hell-beings arise in a hell?" In other words, if hell-guardians such as dogs and crows are not accepted as hell-beings, then why would other animals or hungry ghosts who are included within the six transmigrations be considered hell-beings? The opponent, identified as a Proponent of the Great Exposition by Vinītadeva, answers that, since certain animals are born in the human and god-realms, it is plausible that certain other animals or hungry ghosts may arise in a hell.

#### FIFTH STANZA

In the fifth stanza, Vasubandhu refutes this objection of the Proponent of the Great Exposition. He asserts that animals do not arise in the hells in the same way they arise in higher realms, and hungry ghosts simply do not arise in the hells since neither experience the suffering of those hells. Unlike hell-guardians who appear as dogs, crows, and so forth, in the hells, animals who are born in areas of high status *do* experience the sensations normally associated with those higher realms through the force of their previous karma.

Here Vinītadeva inserts the hypothetical objection, "How is it that those animals experience the pleasures of the gods?" He then supplies his own answer, namely that there is no contradiction since such animals attain a transmigration as an animal due to bad ethics,

and attain the resources of a god due to giving. Such statements, however, lead to the qualm that something similar may happen in the hells. Once again, Vinītadeva rejects this, saying that hell-guardians do not experience the sufferings of the hells in the same way elephants, and so forth enjoy the pleasures in areas of high status.

Next, an objection, identified by Vinītadeva as that of the Proponents of Sūtra (*mdo sde pa, sautrāntika*), is raised. Ceding to Vasubandhu the point that hell-guardians are not sentient beings, they assert instead that such are particular physical elements transformed into horrifying phenomena such as mountains shaped like sheep and groves of iron trees (which often do appear and act as though they possessed mind) through the power of the hell-beings' karma, and it is not the case that such transformations do not exist. In other words, they retrench their position and take up the question of external objects once again. Vinītadeva elaborates on the position of the Proponenets of Sūtra, stating "It is not the case that those mountains [shaped] like sheep and so forth do not exist for, 'Those are apprehended by the eyes and so forth equally.'"<sup>44</sup> Thus the opponent appeals to our common sense: If mountains shaped like sheep are apprehended by the eyes of hell-beings, then such mountains *must* exist.

#### SIXTH STANZA

In the sixth stanza, Vasubandhu responds to this objection. He asks: If it is accepted that elements arise and transform through the force of hell-beings' karma, then why not simply assert such arisings and transformations as consciousness? Vasubandhu has persuaded the opponent that elements having various colors, shapes and sizes arise in hell through the power of hell-being's karma, and similarly that such elements transform into the aspects of hell-guardians and so forth. He now inquires why we must think of these arisings and transformations as elements—why not think of them as transformations of consciousness?

---

<sup>44</sup> Vinītadeva, *Explanantion*, 317.4.2-3.

Here Vinītadeva adds that to assert these arisings and transformations as elements lends no special strength to the Proponents' of Sūtra argument—fear and so on are not produced by the mere existence of these transformations, etc., but rather are generated upon *observing* them, observation being an arising of consciousness. Vinītadeva reminds us that it is commonly accepted that consciousness transforms into various aspects such as words, bodies, and movement in dream states, but it is not commonly accepted that such dream-phenomena are physical elements.

#### SEVENTH STANZA

In the seventh stanza, Vasubandhu continues his response to the Proponents' of Sūtra assertion that elements external to beings' consciousness arise and transform through the power of their previous karma. He characterizes the position of his opponent as being that the karmic predispositions are present in one place (i.e., the mind), and their effects are present in another (i.e., external to the mind). Does it not make more sense, he asks, simply to assert that the effect of a karmic action exists in the continuum of consciousness where its predisposition resides? Vinītadeva offers the following illustration: "In the world, fruits arise where their seeds are planted; there is no case of planting a seed in a field and the fruit arising on top of a mountain."<sup>45</sup> The opponent accepts that the karmic predisposition exists within the mental continuum—what is his or her reason for conceiving of the effects of such predispositions to exist elsewhere?

The opponent retorts, "Scripture is a reason." That is, if Buddha had meant that consciousness appears as forms and so forth, and that external objects such as forms do not exist, then why did he speak of the sense spheres of form and so forth in the scriptures? Vinītadeva elaborates on the Proponents' of Sūtraposition by delineating a typology of karmic effects. According to Vinītadeva, Proponents of Sūtra posit three types of effects:

---

<sup>45</sup> Vinītadeva, *Explanation*, 318.1.2-3.

(1) fruitional effects (*rnam par smin pa'i 'bras bu*), (2) causally concordant effects (*rgyu mthun pa'i 'bras bu*), and (3) proprietary effects (*dbang gi 'bras bu*). Fruitional effects refer, for example, to the five contaminated, appropriated aggregates; causally concordant effects refer, for instance, to having a short life even if one is born into a happy transmigration; proprietary effects refer, for instance, to the impure worldly environment. In other words, the first two types of effects take place within the continuum of the sentient being, whereas the third takes place *outside* the continuum of the sentient being.<sup>46</sup> Hence, from the Proponents' of Sūtra point of view, karmic effects that are transformations of elements could occur in places other than one's own mental continuum since they are proprietary effects.

#### EIGHTH STANZA

In the eighth stanza, however, Vasubandhu rejects this reason. He indicates that Buddha said that the sense spheres of form and so forth exist as external objects “through the force of an intention with regard to beings tamed by that.” For instance, Buddha has been known to say through the force of an intention such patently non-Buddhist things as that there are [substantially established or permanent] spontaneously arisen sentient beings.<sup>47</sup> Most Buddhists would agree that Buddha could not possibly mean that there actually *are* such things as spontaneously arisen beings—but he said it nevertheless. Hence, he had to have had something in mind. Vasubandhu asserts that Buddha was thinking of the continuity of the mind to the next life when he made this utterance, and Vinītadeva identifies the specific

<sup>46</sup> For a discussion of this typology, see Pur-bu-jok (*phur bu lcok*, 1825-1901), *rigs lam 'bring skor*, 20.a.1-2.

<sup>47</sup> This passage presents difficulties because it suggests the unlikely situation that Vasubandhu did not accept the existence of intermediate-state beings, traditionally said to be spontaneously born. Certain Tibetan scholars insert the bracketed material (i.e., “substantially established or permanent”) to show how this is an incorrect teaching that requires interpretation. It is difficult to understand why this teaching should require interpretation since all these scholars (i.e., Proponents of Sūtra, etc.) do accept the existence of intermediate-state beings.

spontaneously born beings Buddha had in mind as intermediate-state beings, a clear reference to the process of rebirth. Vinītadeva explains this in the following way: Certain sentient beings have a nihilistic view of life—i.e., that there is no life beyond the present one—and thus they deny virtue, non-virtue, and their results, doing whatever they want. For this reason, thinking of such beings' future lives, Buddha spoke of spontaneously born beings.

Now someone asks how Buddha can make such seemingly contradictory statements as “there are sentient beings who are spontaneously born” and “there is no self.” How are we to distinguish between those teachings that require interpretation and those that do not? Vasubandhu argues that when one has taken the teachings on selflessness and dependent arising as valid or definitive, then one will understand that the teaching that “There are sentient beings who are spontaneously born” has a thought behind it, i.e., that it requires interpretation.

At this point Vinītadeva, articulating the opponent's position, poses a critical question: Why does the former sūtra have a thought behind it—i.e., a hidden intention—whereas the latter does not? One anticipates that he will here set forth the criteria by which one may judge whether a teaching is definitive or interpretable. Unfortunately, his answer focuses only on the first part of the question before us, and is obscure and nearly unintelligible. Basically he argues that a self that is spontaneously born is impossible since the self is permanent and things that are spontaneously born are produced, and hence impermanent. Therefore, when one hears the teaching on spontaneously born beings, one should recognize that this teaching requires interpretation.

After this somewhat lengthy digression, Vasubandhu attempts to connect this discussion to the actual argument being made. Just as Buddha, with a hidden intention, taught that there are sentient beings who are spontaneously born, he also taught that sense spheres of form and so forth exist for the sake of beings who are tamed by that teaching.



According to Vinītadeva, Proponents of Sūtra here pose the question: What was the thought behind what was literally said? What was Buddha thinking about when he said, “Sense spheres of form and so forth exist”?

#### NINTH STANZA

The ninth stanza is Vasubandhu’s reply to this question. He states that Buddha spoke of the seeds from which cognitions arise and the appearances of forms and so forth in a dualistic way as internal and external sense spheres of cognitions, and Vinītadeva adds that this was done in order to posit the ten sense spheres for the time being. Moreover, although the Buddha said that sense spheres such as form and so forth exist, he did not say that they exist separately from consciousness.

Proponents of Sūtra wish to know that, if such is the case, why did Buddha bother to teach that sense spheres of form and so forth exist at all; what value is there in such a teaching?

#### TENTH STANZA

In the tenth stanza, Vasubandhu replies that it is through this teaching that trainees enter into the selflessness of persons. Vinītadeva explains that, “When the twelve sense spheres are explained in that way, there will be the realization of persons as insubstantial, that is to say, as selfless.”<sup>48</sup>

Vasubandhu and Vinītadeva explain that one enters into the selflessness of persons through realizing that the six consciousnesses such as the eye consciousness arise from the internal and external sense spheres, and that there is ultimately no unitary substantially existent seer, hearer, smeller, taster, toucher, and no substantially existent thinker. This lack of substantiality is itself the selflessness of persons.

---

<sup>48</sup> Vinītadeva, *Explanation*, 318.5.3-4.

Here the qualm may arise: “If the attainment of nirvāṇa is achieved through just understanding the selflessness of persons, then what is the purpose of teaching mind-only?”<sup>49</sup> Vasubandhu replies that it is through the teaching of mind-only that one enters into selflessness with respect to phenomena. The opponent doubts that such is the case and wants to know how it is that one comes to understand the selflessness of phenomena through the teaching of mind-only. Vasubandhu argues that one enters the selflessness with respect to phenomena when one understands that mere cognition itself arises as the appearance of the phenomena of forms and so forth and that there are no phenomena whatsoever that have the character of forms and so forth. One enters (i.e., understands) the selflessness of phenomena when one realizes that mere cognition arises in the guise of phenomena and that there are no phenomena that are naturally separate from the mind. Bodhisattvas gradually attain the level of a Tathāgata upon having entered into the selflessness of phenomena in this way.

Those who misunderstand the selflessness of phenomena to mean the complete absence of phenomena argue that, in that case, cognition-only itself would not exist. Vasubandhu, however, rejects this interpretation of the selflessness of phenomena. The complete lack of phenomena does not constitute entry into the selflessness of phenomena. Rather, one enters into the selflessness of phenomena by way of the non-existence of *imputational* factors (*kun brtags pa, parikalpita*).

Vinītadeva explains this in the following way: Ordinary beings superimpose a non-existent entity which has the character of apprehended object and apprehending subject onto phenomena. Phenomena are selfless in the sense that they are devoid of this entity which is superimposed in the character of apprehended object and apprehending subject. It is not the case, however, that the other-powered natures (*gzhan dbang, paratantra*) and thoroughly established natures (*yongs su grub pa, pariniṣpanna*) of those phenomena are non-existent.

---

<sup>49</sup> Vinītadeva, *Explanation*, 319.1.1.

The selflessness of phenomena is another way of saying “the non-existence of apprehended objects and apprehending subjects in other-powered and thoroughly established phenomena.” Therefore, minds and mental factors which are devoid of apprehended objects and apprehending subjects are taught as being “selfless,” but they are not taught as being merely non-existent.<sup>50</sup>

According to Vasubandhu, the problem with not asserting that minds and mental factors are devoid of apprehended objects and apprehending subjects is that otherwise a cognition would have as its object another cognition that is external to it, and hence one could not posit cognition-only. A cognition having an external object, even if that object is another cognition, could not be established as cognition-only.

## CONCLUSION

Thus ends the first ten stanzas of the *Twenty Stanzas* together with Vasubandhu’s autocommentary and Vinītadeva’s *Explanation*. These stanzas and the ones that follow are all directed toward either a critique of realist theories of knowledge, or responding to realist objections to the admittedly radical assertion that all three realms are “mind-only.” In stanzas one through ten we have seen the following refutations of external objects:

- The claim by Vasubandhu that consciousness itself appears as objects, and the sense that these objects are separate from consciousness arises through the force of karmic predispositions. He compares these objects to the non-existent hairs and moons seen by people with optical disorders.
- The argument that restriction of the perception of an object with respect to place and time, non-restriction of the perception of an object with respect to those present, and performance of function do not require the existence of external objects, as in the case of dreams or the hells.

---

<sup>50</sup> Vinītadeva, *Explanation*, 319.2.8-319.3.1.

—Vasubandhu's rejection of the notion of karmic effects taking place outside of the mind. The horrifying phenomena in the hells are not transformations of elements, but transformations of *consciousness*.

—Vasubandhu's assertion that such teachings as the existence of sense spheres of form, etc. external to consciousness are provisional and require interpretation. Vasubandhu holds that such teachings are for the sake of trainees who enter the selflessness of persons, but not the selflessness of phenomena.

—The claim that through the teaching of mind-only, one enters into the selflessness of phenomena, and thereby attains the fruit of the Great Vehicle, i.e., enlightenment.

In stanzas eleven through fifteen, Vasubandhu continues his argument with a strenuous criticism of atomic notions of materiality, successively refuting the positions that objects are unitary, plural, or aggregations of particles. Furthermore, in the following portion of the text he goes on to defend his position against critics who maintain that valid cognition depends on objects external to consciousness. Vasubandhu provides many unambiguous statements to the effect that all three realms are indeed nothing but mere cognition, and Vinītadeva's close and literal reading of Vasubandhu tends to support this interpretation.

Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that there are passages in the *Twenty Stanzas* that provide opportunities for divergent interpretations. The references in Vasubandhu's autocommentary to stanzas ten and twenty one, for example, to the "inexpressible objects of operation of Buddhas," suggests the existence of objects beyond the ken of ordinary beings, known only to the Buddhas. This terminology is, from my point of view, indeed ambiguous, and may in fact be interpreted to indicate that the so-called state of "mind-only" refers to the mental condition of deluded beings. However, the arguments refuting the existence of external objects that precede these references are, in my opinion, too clear to be brushed aside. With these issues and difficulties in mind, then, I now invite the reader to

read Vasubandhu and Vinītadeva, and decide for him or herself whether they truly reject external objects.

## TRANSLATION

## *Explanation of (Vasubandhu's) Commentary on his "Twenty Stanzas"*

In Sanskrit, *Prakaraṇaviṃśakaṭikā*. In Tibetan, *Explanation of (Vasubandhu's) Commentary on his "Twenty Stanzas."*<sup>51</sup>

[313.1]

Homage to the youthful Mañjushrī.

Having paid homage to the one victorious over ignorance

Whose mind, because of depending on compassion,

Always rejoices in the purposes of others,

I will unravel the aspects of the *Twenty Stanzas*.

[Vasubandhu's autocommentary states:]<sup>52</sup>

**In the Great Vehicle, the three realms are presented as mere cognition, because the *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds*<sup>53</sup> says: O Conqueror's Children, it is thus: these three realms are mind-only.<sup>54</sup>**

<sup>51</sup> *rab tu byed pa nyi shu pa'i 'grel bshad.*

<sup>52</sup> *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ viṃśtikāvyūṭṭhiḥ, nyi shu pa'i 'grel pa*, N. Aiyaswami Sastrin, ed. (Gangtok, Namgyal Institute of Tibetology, 1964). The translation of Vasubandhu's *Twenty Stanzas* and his autocommentary embedded in my translation of Vinītadeva follows closely an unpublished translation prepared by Jeffrey Hopkins.

<sup>53</sup> *mdo sde sa bcu pa, daśabhūmikasūtra.*

<sup>54</sup> The material in **bold face** represents the text of Vasubandhu's autocommentary upon which Vinītadeva is commenting.

These first words where it is said, “In the Great Vehicle, the three realms are presented as mere cognition” explicitly indicate the purpose of this work, the entity of the topic, and the further purpose of the purpose. The “relationship” (*'brel ba*) is to be examined implicitly.

The relationship, topic, and purposes of a work should definitely be expressed. Otherwise, a work without a relationship, topic, purpose, and an essential purpose, is not accepted by [discriminating] listeners who first examine [something before accepting it].

With respect to that, the term “Great Vehicle” indicates the further purpose of the purpose. The phrase “the three realms are presented as mere cognition” indicates the topic and the purpose. Here, the three realms are shown to be just mere cognition by the two, scripture and reasoning. [That the three realms are just mere cognition] will be expressed. *Teaching* the three realms as just mere cognition is the purpose. Because that teaching is also the work, the work is the means [to bring about] this purpose. Therefore, the two, the work and the purpose, abide in a relationship that has the character of the method and that which arises from the method.

Thus, should somebody perchance come to dispute, saying, “What is accomplished by this teaching that the three realms are mere cognition?” [313.2] This is why [Vasubandhu] said “Great Vehicle.” This means “the teaching that the three realms are just mere cognition is for the sake of attaining the Great Vehicle.”<sup>55</sup> This is respectively<sup>56</sup> the general meaning [of the term “Great Vehicle.”]

---

<sup>55</sup> This meaning, i.e., “for the sake of attaining the Great Vehicle,” is made explicit by Vinītadeva in this passage. The expression “in the Great Vehicle” that we see repeatedly throughout the text can be interpreted in a number of ways. In Tibetan the phrase in question is *theg pa chen po la*, which, due to the indeterminate nature of the particle “la,” can be understood variously as “in the Great Vehicle,” “with respect to the Great Vehicle,” or “for [the sake of attaining] the Great Vehicle.” The first two of these possibilities are locative uses, of place where and respect, respectively. The third possibility is more a dative usage of purpose or cause than a locative. Later in the text, Vinītadeva asserts that, “la’ should be viewed as having the meaning ‘reason.’” Dr. Irach J.S. Taraporewala states in his book *Sanskrit Syntax* (Delhi: Munishriram Manoharlal, 1967), p. 60., that the locative is used to indicate “for the sake of” or “for the purpose of.” This is known as the *nimitta saptaṃī* or the “locative of reason.”



Now] I will express the meaning of the components [of the term “Great Vehicle”]. Because one progresses by means of it, the “Great Vehicle” is a vehicle, or, because one progresses toward it, it is a vehicle.<sup>57</sup> Due to being such a vehicle, as well as being great, it is a great vehicle. Therefore, the Bodhisattva path along with its fruit is indicated by the term “Great Vehicle.”

Great is to be understood as referring to something that is superior to vehicles that are not [paths and fruits of Bodhisattvas]. It is as follows: In that [Lesser Vehicle], by understanding the selflessness of persons, merely the afflictive obstructions are abandoned. Here [in this vehicle], by understanding the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena, the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience are abandoned.

Or, in another way, due to having seven types of greatness, [the Great Vehicle] is great. The seven types of greatness are said to be: (1) “an observed object; (2) means of achieving; (3) exalted wisdom; (4) effort; (5) skill in means; (6) achieving; and (7) activities.”

The locative particle should here be viewed as having a sense of “reason.”<sup>58</sup> [It] means the reason for the Great Vehicle and the means of attaining the Great Vehicle. Accordingly,

---

Speyer, in his *Sanskrit Syntax* (Leiden: Brill, 1886; reprint Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973), pp. 111-112, also explicitly mentions a dative type usage of the locative case. (Thanks to Prof. Karen C. Lang for this reference).

<sup>56</sup> The word “respectively” here indicates that there is more than one explanation, the first being the general meaning of Mahāyāna, and the second being the explanation of its “branches,” i.e., the meaning of Mahā and yāna.

<sup>57</sup> Vinītadeva is taking the term “vehicle” in two ways: (1) Vehicle as the means by which one progresses to one's goal; and (2) Vehicle as the goal itself. In other words, one proceeds to the goal of Buddhahood by means of the practices of the Great Vehicle, and when one has achieved Buddhahood, one has truly attained the Great Vehicle. In what sense is Buddhahood a vehicle? With Buddhahood one can carry others' welfare. See Jeffrey Hopkins, *Kālachakra Tantra, Rite of Initiation* (London: Wisdom Publications, 1989), p. 24. This distinction came to be emphasized in Tibet by Ḍzong-ka-ba in his *ngag rim chen mo*. See Tsong-ka-pa in *Tantra in Tibet* (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1987), p.106.

<sup>58</sup> *Mahāyāne* (Great Vehicle in the locative case) conveys the sense of reason when it is translated as “for the sake of” or “as a cause of” the Great Vehicle, and conveys a sense of place when translated as “in” the Great Vehicle.

there are two types of trainees: (1) those tamed by the teaching of selflessness with respect to persons; and (2) those tamed by the teaching of selflessness with respect to phenomena.

Concerning that, those tamed by the teaching of selflessness with respect to persons, having understood—in dependence on the teaching—the mere aggregates that have the qualities of arising and disintegrating, and are devoid of “I” and “mine,” enter into selflessness with respect to persons through<sup>59</sup> the stages of hearing, thinking, etc. [313.3] Those who have entered into selflessness, having been freed from the afflictive obstructions, attain a final state. The teaching of the method of that [reaching a final state for those trainees] is just expressed elsewhere.

Those who are tamed by the teaching of selflessness with respect to phenomena apply themselves—in dependence on the teaching—in order to eliminate apprehended object and apprehending subject through the stages of hearing, thinking, etc. about the treatises that accord with the thorough realization of the *dharmadhātu*. This work teaches the method itself of eliminating the apprehended object and the apprehending subject. Having eliminated [those], one enters into just mere cognition which is free from apprehended object and apprehending subject. Then, having entirely removed the apprehended object and the apprehending subject by achieving the grounds and the perfections, one realizes the *dharmadhātu*, whereupon one attains the unsurpassed level of a tathāgata. Therefore, thinking of that, [Vasubandhu] said that “one should attain the Great Vehicle.”

The “Three Realms” are the “Desire,” the “Form,” and the “Formless,” and since just these three are realms, they are the three realms. Regarding that, those minds and mental factors which are not separated from desire pertaining to the desirous attributes are the Desire Realm, those [minds and mental factors] which have separated from desire pertaining to the Desire [Realm], but not separated from desire pertaining to form are the

---

<sup>59</sup> In the Peking Edition (P5566, vol. 113, 313.3.1), read *gyis* for *gyi* according to *sde dge* 4065 Tibetan Tripitika *stan 'gyur sems tsam*, Vol. 14. 86.4.4, Tokyo, 1981.

Form Realm, and those [minds and mental factors] which have separated from desire pertaining to form, but not separated from desire pertaining to the formless are the Formless Realm.

“Mere cognition” is mere cognition due to being solitary, being devoid of observed objects, [313.4] and means “minds and mental factors devoid of apprehended object and apprehending subject.” [In Vasubandhu's statement] “are presented” means “are taught.” “The three realms are presented as mere cognition” teaches that “the three realms are presented within just minds and mental factors.” For instance it is taught that, although there is no form, there is a presentation of the spheres of limitless space,<sup>60</sup> etc., as different.

Or, in another way, “in the Great Vehicle” uses the “la” (locative particle) as having the sense of place. Therefore, the statement teaches that in the scriptures of the “Great Vehicle,” it is taught that [the three realms are] “mere cognition.” The explanation of the rest is similar to the earlier [explanation]. Another way of saying it is “In the scriptures of the Great Vehicle, the three realms are posited (*dam 'cha*) or designated<sup>61</sup> as mere cognition.” Concerning this explanation, it should be understood that the elimination of the apprehended object and the apprehending subject, etc., is the further purpose of the purpose.

With respect to the proposition that, “for the sake of attaining the Great Vehicle, it is indicated through the two, scripture and reasoning, that the three realms are just mere cognition,” in order, respectively, to teach this first in scripture, [Vasubandhu] cites [the

---

<sup>60</sup> These are the four levels of the formless realm, i.e., the spheres of (1) limitless space, (2) limitless consciousness, (3) nothingness, and (4) the peak of cyclic existence.

<sup>61</sup> In the Peking Edition (P5566, vol 113, 313.4.4), read *dam 'cha'o zhe'am 'dogs* for *dam 'cha'o zhes ma 'dogs* according to *sde dge* 4065 Tibetan Tripitika *stan 'gyur sems tsam*, Vol. 14., 87.1.4, Tokyo, 1981. (Hereafter referred to as “Tokyo”).

*Sūtra on the Ten Grounds*], “O Conqueror's Children, it is thus, these three realms are mind-only.”<sup>62</sup>

Or, in terms of the second explanation, because someone objects: How does one ascertain [the truth of] the statement, “In the Great Vehicle, [the three realms] are taught as mere cognition,”<sup>63</sup> [Vasubandhu] cites: “O Conqueror's Children, it is thus, these three realms are mind-only.” In the *Sūtra [on the Ten Grounds]* it is said “All three realms are mind-only,” and it is the thought [of the sūtra that] form, non-associated compositional factors,<sup>64</sup> and uncompounded phenomena do not exist separately from consciousness, [313.5] and also there is no apprehended object and apprehending subject.

Respectively, this is scripture for the followers of our own [Buddhist] schools; reasoning is stated for those who abide in other [non-Buddhist] systems. Since citing this scripture is an act of worship and since it has few words, it is fitting [for Vasubandhu] to put it just first. Although, in the position of just mere cognition, collections of sounds and names are non-existent, just consciousnesses of words, etc., are scriptures. Since it arises through the force of the guru of transmigrators who is endowed with good qualities of seeing the fact just as it is, etc., it comes from another and hence is called “*āgama*” (scripture).<sup>65</sup> Others<sup>66</sup> also should definitely accept this [position that scriptures are just consciousnesses of words]. It is as follows: just generalities [superimposed over] sounds are words, but instances of sounds are not [words]. Furthermore, a generality

---

<sup>62</sup> The author's abridged citation has been here given in full, and will be given in full throughout the translation wherever he gives abridged citations.

<sup>63</sup> In P5566, vol. 113, 313.4.7 (hereafter referred to as “Peking”), read *rnam par rig pa tsam* for *gnas par rig pa tsam* according to Tokyo, 87.1.7.

<sup>64</sup> I am interpreting *mi ldan pa* as *ldan min 'du byed* due to the fact that this group of three creates an exhaustive division of phenomena when interpreted as such.

<sup>65</sup> Vinītadeva is presenting an etymology of the Sanskrit term *āgama* which is built from *ā*+ the verbal root, *gam*.

<sup>66</sup> That is, non-proponents of Mind Only.

[superimposed over] sounds is an apprehended factor [composed] of consciousness,<sup>67</sup> and there is no separate actuality. Therefore, it is taught that just the consciousness of a generality of sounds is “scripture.”

Here [in Vasubandhu's own commentary, he posits] the thesis that the three realms are mere *cognition*, but the *Sūtra [on the Ten Grounds]* speaks of “mind-only.” With respect to the qualm about how the *Sūtra [on the Ten Grounds]* is suitable as a source [for his thesis, Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**Mind,<sup>68</sup> mentality,<sup>69</sup> consciousness,<sup>70</sup> and cognition<sup>71</sup> are synonyms.**

These [statements, i.e., the three realms are presented as mere cognition *here* in Vasubandhu's commentary, and as mind-only in the *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds*] are not mutually unrelated in the sense that [the terms] “mind,” “mentality,” “consciousness,” and “cognition” are classified as synonyms. Terms that do not have different objects (*rgyu*) are “classified<sup>72</sup> as synonyms.” It is as follows: It indicates the meaning of synonym which is called “stages.”<sup>73</sup> The stating of these four which are classified as synonyms is for the sake of eliminating obscurations with respect to scriptural conventions. [314.1]

---

<sup>67</sup> The expression, “an apprehended factor [composed] of consciousness,” (*shes pa'i gzung ba'i cha*) could also be rendered “a factor apprehended by consciousness.” In our view the former is preferable since the agentive genitive is an uncommon usage, and there is no import in the context of this work in asserting that sound is a factor apprehended by consciousness, since such is held even by lower tenet systems. Vinītadeva seems to be positing a consciousness (*shes pa*) that is appearing as apprehended object and apprehending subject (*gzung ba dang 'dzin pa*).

<sup>68</sup> *sems, citta*.

<sup>69</sup> *yid, manas*.

<sup>70</sup> *rnam par shes pa, vijñāna*.

<sup>71</sup> *rnam par rig pa, vijñapti*.

<sup>72</sup> In Peking 313.5.8, read *glogs* for *gtegs* according to Tokyo 87.2.6.

<sup>73</sup> Tib. *rim, san, krama*. Normally translated stages, order, or succession, the meaning here is more precise. In M. Monier-Williams, *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986), p. 319, a secondary meaning for *krama* is listed as follows: “(in rhet.) a kind of simile (in which the comparisons exhibited correspond to each other in regular succession).”

The two terms—"cognition" which is stated in this work [by Vasubandhu] and "mind" in the *Sūtra [on the Ten Grounds]*—include the eight collections of consciousness. Even the occurrence of the statement "Just this consciousness arises within appearing as objects" later [in the text] does not contradict this [inclusion of eight types of consciousness] in the sense that those collections of consciousnesses are asserted to appear as objects.

With respect to the qualm that if the three realms are mere mind alone, then even mental factors will consequently not exist, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**Furthermore, mind here is intended as including the [mental factors] that are associated with it. The mention of "mere" [in the statement 'these three realms are mere cognition'] is for the sake of refuting [external] objects.**

In the *Sūtra [on the Ten Grounds]* the cause of the imputation of the three realms, i.e., mind, is intended as including [mental factors] that are associated with it. Or the statement "mind" in the *Sūtra [on the Ten Grounds]* is viewed in this work [by Vasubandhu] as including the [mental factors] that are associated with it.

"Furthermore, mind" is the cause of the imputation of the three realms, or [that which] occurs in the *Sūtra [on the Ten Grounds]*. "Here" refers to the *Sūtra [on the Ten Grounds]* or this work [by Vasubandhu]. Regarding the phrase "including the [mental factors] that are associated with it," since they and the mind possess similar association, they are [mental factors] that are associated with [mind], and refer to feelings, etc. Since [mind] operates together with those [mental factors] associated with it, [the term "mind" in the *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds*] includes the [mental factors] associated with it. "Intended" means "asserted" or "accepted." Regarding that, it is teaching that these three realms are mere minds *and mental factors*, and not mere mind alone. In the scriptures "mind" also refers to mental factors, as is the case with the statement that, "It is good if one tames the mind"; it is not that mental factors are not tamed also. [314.2] [This is also the case with the

statement that], “The world is guided by mind”; it is also guided by mental factors such as feelings, attachment, etc.

With respect to the qualm that, if even mental factors are asserted, why did [Vasubandhu] say “mere” [when he says, “These three realms are mere cognition”]? “‘Mere’ is for the sake of refuting [external] objects.” Hence the “mere” that was mentioned [by Vasubandhu] was for the sake of refuting [external] objects not included within consciousness, but not to refute mental factors. “For the sake of refuting [external] objects” is another way of saying “for the sake of refuting objects that have the character of apprehended object and apprehending subject that are not included within consciousness.” This indicates that, “there are not any apprehended objects that are not included within consciousness,” and that, “there is also no apprehending apprehender in that consciousness.”

With respect to the qualm that, if there are no objects that have the character of apprehended object and apprehending subject, then what is this appearance as blue, etc., and by what is it perceived, [Vasubandhu, in the root text] says,

# **1 Just this consciousness arises within appearing as objects,**

Due to the force of fully ripened predispositions of elaboration,<sup>74</sup> consciousness itself arises in the aspect of the objects such as blue, etc. With respect to such an arising, living

<sup>74</sup> *spros pa'i bag chags, prayāṇca-vāsanā or sarga-vāsanā*. Bu-ḍōn lists the following synonyms: latencies of verbalization, latencies of dualistic conception, of elaboration, and concordant with cause. Latencies of verbalization are deposited only by the mental consciousness and its companions, and are the seeds for:

- (1) cognition of the body (the five sense powers),
- (2) cognition of the embodied (the afflicted mentality),
- (3) cognition of the enjoyer (the mental constituent, i.e., the mental consciousness),
- (4) cognition of what is used by those (the six object constituents),
- (5) cognition making use of those (the six consciousness constituents),
- (6) cognition of time (the continuity of cyclic existence),
- (7) cognition of enumeration (numbering),
- (8) cognition of location (the environment world),

beings have a manifest pride thinking, “I see an object that is separate.” It is like this: when<sup>75</sup> the aspects of blue,<sup>76</sup> etc., appear, they do so together with the constituent of space. When the constituent of space appears, the aspects of blue, etc., [of various objects] appear as distinct from consciousness and from space. For example, when the image of the moon is reflected in the surface of a mirror, [314.3] it is reflected together with the image of the constituent of space. When that constituent of space is reflected in that [mirror], the orb of the moon appears as distinct from the surface of the mirror, like [something] that has fallen into a well. Similarly, even when the constituent of space appears in consciousness, [consciousness] appears in the aspects of blue, etc., as if they are distinct. In dependence on blue, etc., [appearing] as distinct, living beings generate the manifest pride thinking, “I see external objects.”

Here, in order to indicate an example, [Vasubandhu, in the root text and his autocommentary] says,

like, for example, perception of non-existent hairs, moons, etc.,  
by those with an eye disease.

[External] objects do not exist at all.

For example, for those having eyes impaired by an eye disease, consciousness arises in the aspect of hair, flesh-flies, bees, etc., and without there being any hair, etc., they generate the manifest pride thinking, “I see [actual] hair, etc.” Moreover, in a similar way,

(9) cognition of conventions (the four conventions: the seen [*dr̥ṣṭa*], the heard [*śruta*] the known [*viññāta*], and the understood [*mata*]).

See Joe B. Wilson, “Meaning of Mind in the Mahāyāna,” (Ph.D Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1984), pp. 380-394.

<sup>75</sup> In Peking 314.2.7, read *snang ba na nam mkha'* for *snang ba nam mkha'* according to Tokyo 87.4.3.

<sup>76</sup> This is referring not to the blueness of space or sky, but to blue objects.



consciousness itself arises in the aspects of blue, etc. [Therefore Vasubandhu] summed up his argument by saying, “Objects such as blue, etc., do not exist at all separately.”<sup>77</sup>

Possessing an eye disease is [the meaning of] “with an eye disease.”

In that way, apprehended objects are respectively refuted. When apprehended objects are refuted, then by just that it is established that apprehending subjects are refuted also. It is like this: If there are no apprehended objects, there are also no apprehending subjects.<sup>78</sup>

In that way [Vasubandhu] has refuted apprehended objects, and in order to<sup>79</sup> indicate the harm of renown by the Proponents of External Objects [Vasubandhu, in the root text] says,

**Here it is objected:**

- 2 If there is cognition without [external] objects,**
- Restriction [of the perception of an object] with respect to place**
- and time would not be feasible;**
- Non-restriction [of the perception of an object] with respect to**
- the continuums [of those present] would not be feasible;**
- And performance of function would not be feasible.**

The condensed meaning is: Someone objects: “If cognition does not arise from external objects, then<sup>80</sup> restriction with respect to place of those<sup>81</sup> cognitions would not be established. Also restriction with respect to time, non-restriction with respect to minds, and

<sup>77</sup> This is Vinītadeva's rephrasing of Vasubandhu's statement, “Objects do not exist at all.”

<sup>78</sup> In Peking 314.3.7, read *'dzin pa yang med do* for *'dzin pa med pa yang med do* according to Tokyo 88.1.1.

<sup>79</sup> In Peking 314.3.7 I am reading *bstan pa'i phyir/ 'dir'di skad* etc., for *bstan pa'i phyir ro/ 'dir'di skad* etc., based on the fact that the meaning is clearer, and this construction recurs throughout the text, for example just above at 313.3.3-4 : *'dir dpe bstan pa'i phyir/ dper na rab rib can rnams kyis zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos so/* (Here, in order to indicate an example, [Vasubandhu] says, “For example, [perception] by one with an eye disease...”).

<sup>80</sup> In Peking 314.3.8 and Tokyo 88.1.1, read *de'i tshé nram par rig pa* for *de'i nram par rig pa* according to Tokyo 88.1.2

<sup>81</sup> In Peking 314.3.8, read *rnams kyi* for *rnams par gyi* according to Tokyo 88.1.2.

performance of function<sup>82</sup> would not be established.” [314.4] “Here” [means] here in the opponent's position. “It is objected” [means] that having set the below-mentioned restriction of place, etc., in [his] mind, [the objector] has this qualm. Restriction in the phrase, “Restriction [of the perception of an object] with respect to place and time would not be feasible” [means] confinement. “Appearing in some places but not in all [places]” refers to restriction with respect to place. “Appearing sometimes but not at all [times]” refers to restriction with respect to time. “Appearing without differentiation to all present at that time and place, but not to [just] one or some” refers to non-restriction with respect to minds. Performance of function [means] performing a function.

In order to clarify the meaning of the root text [i.e., *The Twenty Stanzas*], the composer of this treatise [i.e., Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**What is being indicated? If, without [external] objects such as forms, cognitions of forms, etc., arise without this being due to [external] objects such as forms, why does [cognition of forms, etc.] arise in some places and not in all? And even in just that place why does it arise sometimes and not always?**

“If, without [external] objects such as forms, cognition of forms, etc., arises, that is to say, if it is not related with forms. etc., then why do [cognitions of forms, etc.] arise in some places and not in all? And even in just that place why does it arise sometimes and not always?” If, without [external] objects such as forms, etc., cognition that perceives forms, etc., arises without being related to forms, etc., then why does cognition that appears as [external] objects such as forms, etc., arise in some places, but not in all [places]? Similarly, why does it arise at some times in just that place where the manifest pride seeing external objects arises, but not at all times? In accordance with those who propound that cognitions

---

<sup>82</sup> In Peking 314.3.8 and Tokyo 88.1.2, read *bya ba byed pa* for *bya ba med pa* according to the argument as it is found in Vasubandhu's autocommentary, and just below in Vinītadeva's work.

depend upon external objects, cognitions arise at those times and at those places where and when there are external objects, in which case it is suitable for place and time to be restricted. In accordance with those whose position it is that cognition does *not* depend on external objects, since there is no means of restriction, either everything would have to arise everywhere, or it would not arise anywhere nor at any time. It would not be the case that [cognitions] would arise in some places and not in others, and would arise sometimes and not arise other times. This indicates that [if there are no external objects] restriction with respect to place and time is not feasible.

In order to indicate that [if there are no external objects] non-restriction with respect to minds is not feasible, [Vasubandhu, in presenting the opponent's position] says [in his autocommentary],

**Why does it arise without restriction in the minds of all those  
present at that place and at that time and not just in some?**

*Objection:* If you do not accept external objects as existing, then why is cognition non-restricted for those minds of all the beings present at a certain place and time, and why does [cognition] not occur in just some?

Here, in order to indicate an example, [Vasubandhu, in presenting the opponent's position] says [in his autocommentary],

**just as hairs, etc., appear to the mind of one with an eye disease  
and not to others?**

*[Continuation of the objection:]* For example, just as perception of hairs, etc., that appear to one with an eye disease arise in just the mind of one with an eye disease, and do not [arise] in others without an eye disease, so if cognitions arise without external objects, then the manifest pride thinking, "I see objects such as blue, etc.," would arise in those for whom the cognition of objects such as blue, etc., arose, but not in others [even though they are present]. Concerning that, it is taught that, "The arising of the pride seeing apprehended

factors as [external] objects is for just those that have that apprehended factor, and not for others." It is like this: an apprehended factor of another is not experienced by another.

Also, in order to indicate that performance of function would not be feasible, [Vasubandhu, in presenting the opponent's position] says [in his autocommentary],

**Why do the hairs, bees, etc., seen by one with an eye disease not perform the function of hair, etc., whereas others that are not that [i.e., actual hair, bees, etc.] do perform [their respective] functions? Why do food, drink, clothing, poison, weapons, etc., seen in dreams not perform the functions of food, drink, etc., whereas others do? Why is it that a city of Fragrance Eaters, because it does not exist, does not perform the functions of a city whereas others do?**

*Objection:* If cognition does not depend on [external] objects, then why is it taught that hair, bees, flesh-flies, etc., seen by one with an eye disease [315.1] do not perform the functions of binding, eating, stinging, vomiting, etc., but others such as hair, etc., which are observed by an unimpaired eye that are not [hair, etc., seen by one with an eye disease] do perform all those [functions]? Similarly, why do the food, drink, etc., seen in a dream not fulfill, satisfy, etc., one's hunger, thirst, etc., whereas others seen at the time of not being overcome by sleep that are not [food, drink, etc., seen in a dream] do perform [their functions]? Furthermore, why does a non-existent city of Fragrance Eaters not perform the functions of a city<sup>83</sup> such as thoroughly protecting, etc., whereas others such as kings, ministers, Brahmins, and city-dwellers do? Therefore, if all [objects] were similar in being non-existent, they would all perform the functions of objects such as hair, etc., or none of them would perform [any function].

---

<sup>83</sup> This probably refers to the inhabitants of a city.

This indicates that, if the functions of objects such as hair, etc., were related with merely the apprehended factor [of a consciousness], then since the apprehended factors are similarly exist in all, even everything would perform [any] function.

It is feasible that: (1) according to those who assert that external objects exist, hair, etc., eating, drinking, etc., and cities, etc., exist and also perform their respective functions, and (2) “those externally non-existent [objects] such as hair, etc., [perceived] by one with an eye disease, and such as food, drink, etc., in a dream, as well as a city of Fragrance Eaters<sup>84</sup> do not perform any of the functions of [their respective] objects.” These three examples are indicated to be three types of mistakes; [315.2] the first [is] the mistake of an eye disease, the second [is the mistake of] sleep, and the third [is the mistake of] distance.

Therefore, having indicated [according to the opponent's argument] that [if there were no external objects] there would be no restriction with respect to place, etc., in that way, [Vasubandhu,] in order to sum up [the opponent's argument] says [in his autocommentary],

**Therefore, if these were similar in there being no [external] objects, restriction [of the cognition of objects] with respect to place and time, non-restriction [of the cognition of objects with respect to those who are present], and performance of function would not be feasible.**

If there were no external objects in the manner indicated [in the previous section], then the four<sup>85</sup> [restriction with respect to] place [and time, non-restriction with respect to those present, and performance of function]<sup>86</sup> would not be feasible. Therefore, that external objects should definitely be asserted is the position of the opponent.

<sup>84</sup> In Peking 315.1.8 read *dri za'i grong khyer la sogs pa* for *dri za'i grong khyer la sogs pa dang dri za'i grong khyer la sogs pa* according to Tokyo 88.3.3.

<sup>85</sup> In Peking 315.2.2 read *bzhi* for *bzhin* according to Tokyo 88.3.6.

<sup>86</sup> Peking 315.2.2 reads *yul la sogs pa* which means [with respect to] place, et cetera. I have filled out what I believe to be Vinītadeva's intended meaning here.

Concerning this, the Master [Vasubandhu] having formed<sup>87</sup> his answer without depending on any (*ci la*) [of the above reasonings], says [in the autocommentary],<sup>88</sup>

**It is not that those are not feasible,**

The four aspects of restriction with respect to place [and time, non-restriction with respect to those present, and performance of function], etc., are not non-feasible without external objects. That these are just feasible is [Vasubandhu's] thought. Here, two negatives<sup>89</sup> indicate the [actual] condition (*skabs, daśā*).<sup>90</sup>

In order [to answer the question, "If there are no external objects, then] how are [restriction with respect to place and time, non-restriction with respect to those present, and performance of function] feasible?," [Vasubandhu, in the root text] says,

for:

**3        Restriction with respect to place, etc., [i.e., time] is established  
          As in a dream.**

It is like this: restriction with respect to place and time is established as with dreams.

In order to indicate the meaning of the term "as," [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**Because of being similar to a dream, [the root text] says "as in  
a dream."**

Therefore, "as in a dream" indicates "similar to a dream."

---

<sup>87</sup> In Peking 315.2.3 read *chags* for *chas* according to Tokyo 88.3.6.

<sup>88</sup> Without depending on any [of the above reasonings]" we understand to mean that Vasubandhu does not indicate that he has been affected in the least by any of these challenges.

<sup>89</sup> In Peking 315.2.4 read *kyis* for *kyi* according to Tokyo 88.3.7

<sup>90</sup> Vinītadeva's meaning seems to be "two negatives indicate a positive."

In order<sup>91</sup> to unravel the meaning of this example, [Vasubandhu] says,

**How? Even in a dream—without [external] objects—cities, gardens, men, women, etc., appear in a certain place and not in all places, and even at that place they are seen at certain times and not at all times.**

If, without [external] objects, restriction of cognitions with respect to place and time were not established, then, even in a dream, without external objects, why do cities, gardens, etc., appear in certain places and not in all places? Similarly, even in just a certain place,<sup>92</sup> why do those cities, gardens, etc., [315.3] appear sometimes, but not at all times?

Having indicated that even without [external] objects, there is restriction with respect to place, etc., [i.e., time], [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] in order to sum up his argument, says,

**Therefore, even without [external] objects, restriction [of cognitions of objects] with respect to place, etc., [i.e., time] is established.**

This passage establishes restriction with respect to place and time, even without external objects.

In order to establish the non-restriction [of the cognitions of objects] with respect to the minds [of those present] and to indicate [such] by means of another example, [Vasubandhu, in the root text] says,

**Non-restriction [of the cognition of objects] with respect to the minds [of those present]**

---

<sup>91</sup> In Peking 315.2.7 and Tokyo 88.4.1-2 read *dgrol ba'i phyir* for *dgrol pa'i phyir ro* as per reasons given in note 29.

<sup>92</sup> In Peking 315.2.8 read *yul de nyid* for *de nyid* according to Tokyo 88.4.3.

**[Is also established] as in the case of hungry ghosts.**

The condensed meaning is: For example, just as non-restriction with respect to the minds [of those present] is established for hungry ghosts [in that all hungry ghosts perceive pus in a river], so it is also for others.

Because he did not say it in the root text [i.e., *The Twenty Stanzas*], in order to bring out the verb that is implicit, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**“Established” is to be affixed.**

Vasubandhu's thought is that “established” is to be affixed<sup>93</sup> in accordance with the prior mention of “established” in the root text.<sup>94</sup>

Also here, in order to indicate<sup>95</sup> the meaning of “as in the case of,” [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**Because of being similar to hungry ghosts' [perceptions, the root text says] “as in the case of hungry ghosts.”**

In this case, the genitive ending (*kyi*)<sup>96</sup> is contained within the phrase “as in the case of.”

Since how non-restriction with respect to the minds of those hungry ghosts has not been indicated, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary, asks] the question,

**How is this established?**

and in order to indicate the means of establishment, the composer of the treatise [i.e., Vasubandhu, in the root text] says,

**Just as [all hungry ghosts] see pus in a river, etc.**

<sup>93</sup> In Peking 315.3.5 read *bsnyeg* for *brnyag* according to Tokyo 88.4.5.

<sup>94</sup> In Tokyo 88.4.3 read *mdor byas pa* for *mdor zhes bya ba* according to Peking 315.3.4.

<sup>95</sup> In Peking 315.3.5 read *bstan pa'i phyir* for *bstan pa'i* according to Tokyo 88.4.6.

<sup>96</sup> The Sanskrit of Vasubandhu's root text reads *pretānāmiva pretavat*. The *-vat* (tib. *bzhin*) suggests the genitive particle. The genitive ending, *-nām*, has been elided in the compound.



It is like this: All hungry ghosts who are present at that place and time<sup>97</sup> see pus in a river, etc., and therefore even without [external] objects, non-restriction with respect to the minds [of those present] is established.

Since entry into the meaning of the words precedes entry into the meaning of a statement, in order initially to unravel the meaning of the words [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**A river filled with pus is a pus-river, [315.4]**

He indicates that in “pus-river,” the term “filled” is implicit.

Here, in order to indicate an example [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**just as [a pot filled with butter is called] a butter-pot.**

For example, just as a pot filled with<sup>98</sup> butter is called a butter-pot, so too is a river filled with pus called a pus-river.

[In order to answer the question] how do all [hungry ghosts] see non-existent pus as pus, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**Even all hungry ghosts, having similar fruition of karma,  
similarly see a river filled with pus, not just one [of them].**

It is like this: A river filled with pus is seen by all whatsoever hungry ghosts, who have similar fruition [of karma], and not by just one [of them]. If there is not even a drop of pus in that river, then how could there be a river filled with pus? They see that through the force of the fruitition of karma.

In order to indicate the meanings included in the term “etc.,” [in the root text, Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

<sup>97</sup> In Peking 215.3.7 read *dus* for *des* according to Tokyo 88.4.7.

<sup>98</sup> In Peking 315.4.2 read *gyis* for *gyi* according to Tokyo 89.1.2.

**Just as [they see the river] filled with pus, so [they see it] filled with urine, vomit, ashes, saliva, and mucous, and also guarded by persons holding clubs and swords. These are included within the term “etc.” [in the root text].**

For example, just as some see [the river] filled with<sup>99</sup> pus, some see [the river] filled with urine, some see [the river] filled with vomit, some see [the river] guarded by persons holding clubs, and some see [the river] guarded by those holding swords.<sup>100</sup> It is not feasible that humans brandishing clubs and swords<sup>101</sup> arise due to the force of the karma of hungry ghosts; [it would involve the absurd consequence that] others would arise due to others' karma. Therefore, having indicated the non-restriction with respect to the minds [of those present] in that way, in order to sum up [his argument, Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**In that way, even without the existence of [external] objects, non-restriction of cognitions with respect to the minds [of those present] is established.**

This passage establishes non-restriction [due to the fact that all these] cognitions with respect to the minds of<sup>102</sup> those [present], even without the existence of [external] objects. [315.5]

In order to indicate the absence of [external] objects and performance of function, [Vasubandhu, in the root text] says,

**4 Performance of function is [established] like harm in a dream.**

---

<sup>99</sup> In Peking 315.4.5 read *gis* for *gi* according to Tokyo 89.1.4.

<sup>100</sup> In Peking 315.4.7 read *ral gri* for *ral gyi* according to Tokyo 89.1.5.

<sup>101</sup> In Peking 315.4.7 read *ral gri* for *ral gyi* according to Tokyo 89.1.5-6.

<sup>102</sup> In Peking 315.5.1 and Tokyo 89.1.7 read *rnams kyī* for *rnams kyis*.

The condensed meaning is: For example, just as harm in a dream is established even without [external] objects, performance of function is also established without [external] objects.

In order to bring out the verb that is implicit, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**“Established” is to be understood.**

Here again the term “established” as found earlier in the root text is affixed, or, in other words, “conjoined.”

In order to unravel the meaning of this example, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,<sup>103</sup>

**For example, in a dream even though a couple does not come together, semen is emitted. That is a case of harm in a dream.**

For example, just as in a dream semen is emitted without a man and woman meeting, harm occurs in a dream.<sup>104</sup> The performance of functions to be performed by hair, flesh-flies, food, drink, towns, cities, poison, swords, and thunderbolts occur<sup>105</sup> even without hair, etc. “Even though a couple does not come together”<sup>106</sup> is another way of saying “without the two [organs of] a man and woman meeting.”

Therefore, having given answers to the four types of objections mentioned earlier [in the text] in that way, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] in order to sum up [his argument] says,<sup>107</sup>

<sup>103</sup> In Peking 315.5.4 read ...*phyir/ dper na rmi lam na zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos so/ dper...* according to Tokyo 89.2.1.

<sup>104</sup> It is harmful since the retention of semen is considered advantageous to one's health.

<sup>105</sup> In Tokyo 89.2.2 read *don bya ba* for *don* according to Peking 315.5.5.

<sup>106</sup> In Peking 315.5.5 read *yang zhes bya ba* for *yang bya ba* according to Tokyo 89.2.3.

<sup>107</sup> In Peking 315.5.4 read *smos so* for *smos te* according to Tokyo 89.2.3.

**In that way, respectively through various other examples the four—restriction [of the perception of an object] with respect to place and time, etc.—are established.**

This passage respectively establishes the four consisting of restriction [of perceptions] with respect to place and time, non-restriction with respect to minds, and performance of function,<sup>108</sup> by means of<sup>109</sup> various other examples. The term “respectively” is to be conjoined<sup>110</sup> to “are established” that occurs below.

Also, in order to give answers to all four objections with one example, [Vasubandhu, in the root text] says,

**All [four are established] as in the hells.**

The condensed meaning is: For example, just as sentient beings in the hells [316.1] have restriction [of the perception of an object] with respect to place and time, etc., even without [external] objects, all those four aspects are established without [external] objects in other circumstances also.

In order to bring out the verb that is implicit, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**“Established” is to be understood.**

That meaning has already been exhaustively explained [in Vasubandhu's exegesis].

In order to indicate the similarity, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**Because of being similar to what occurs in hells, [the root text] says, “as in the hells.”**

<sup>108</sup> Peking 316.1.1 reads *yul nges la sogs pa* (“restriction with respect to place, etc.”). I have filled out the the citation to include all four types of restriction for the sake of clarity.

<sup>109</sup> In Peking 315.5.7 read *gzhan dang gzhan dag gis* for *gzhan dang gzhan dag gi* according to Tokyo 89.2.4.

<sup>110</sup> I am reading *bslan* as “conjoined.”

The meaning of that has already been exhaustively expained.

Since the root text has not indicated the four, restriction [of perceptions] with respect to place and time, non-restriction with respect to the minds of those present, and performance of function, in the hells, the composer of the treatise [i.e., Vasubandhu] in order to [answer the] question,

**How are they established?**

and to indicate the establishment itself, [in the root text] says,

**In that hell-guardians, etc., are seen**

**And there is harm by them.**

It is like this: The condensed meaning is: Although there are no hell-guardians, no clay vessels, no huge copper kettles, etc. [in the hells], they are seen by hell-beings in the context of being restricted with respect to place and time. All those who are present at that place and time see [those things] without distinction. Even without [hell-guardians, etc.] they bring about various types of harm.

In order to indicate the condensed meaning more extensively, the composer of the treatise [i.e., Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**For example, in the hells the perceptions of hell-guardians, etc.,  
by hell-beings is established as restricted with respect to place  
and time.**

It is like, for example, in the hells [the perceptions of] hell guardians, etc., are established as being restricted with respect to place and time.

In order to indicate the meanings included within the term “et cetera,” [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**“Et cetera” includes the perception also of dogs, crows, iron  
mountains, etc., coming together and going apart.**

[Vasubandhu] affixes the words, “dogs, crows, iron mountains, etc.” Here also the expression “et cetera” includes clay pots and huge copper kettles. [316.2]

In order to indicate non-restriction with respect to minds, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**All beings see these, and not just one.**

The meaning of that has already been exhaustively explained [in Vasubandhu's exegesis].

In order to indicate performance of function, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**It is also established that those harm them,**

It is established that various kinds of instances of harm are brought about. This [statement] leads to the objection that, if hell-guardians, etc., do not exist, then how could the four types of restriction [of perceptions] with respect to place and time, non-restriction with respect to the minds of those present, and performance of function arise? With respect to this qualm, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**for even though the hell-guardians, etc., do not exist in fact,**

Even without those [hell-guardians, etc.] the four types [of restriction] are established.

With respect to the qualm [of one who wonders] how [the four types of restriction] are established without [hell-guardians, etc., Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**[their being similarly harmed] is due to similar fruition of their  
karma.**

When, due to their<sup>111</sup> previously performed actions which result in the experience of suffering, the fruition of those [actions] become manifest, the consciousness itself [that appears as] hell-guardians, dogs, crows, iron mountains, clay pots, huge copper kettles,

---

<sup>111</sup> In Tokyo 89.3.6 read *gi* for *gis* according to Peking 316.2.3.

etc., occurs, whereupon<sup>112</sup> those hell beings generate feelings of suffering by way of<sup>113</sup> hell-guardians, etc. The consciousnesses themselves of all those who performed those actions that result in the experience of suffering arise in the aspect of hell-guardians, etc. whereupon feelings of suffering are generated, and not<sup>114</sup> for just one person.

Moreover, such is not impossible because of being perceived also in a dream-state. For example, in the dream of one who possesses defilements, when, through the power of karma,<sup>115</sup> the consciousness arises in the aspect of lions, tigers, thieves, robbers, etc., [316.3] suffering, fear, trembling, etc., are generated. Similarly, these are possible in the hells.

Therefore, having indicated the four types of restriction with respect to place, etc., through examples in that way,<sup>116</sup> in order to indicate [the four types of restriction] with respect to that which is to be exemplified [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**Moreover, it is likewise to be understood that all four of these—  
restriction [of the perception of an object] with respect to place  
and time, etc.—are established.**

Again, the meaning of that has already been explained.

Proponents of the Great Exposition<sup>117</sup> assert that hell-guardians are sentient beings, and here, in order to [indicate] such an objection, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**Question: Why are the guardians, crows, dogs, etc., of the hells  
not asserted as sentient beings?**

<sup>112</sup> In Tokyo 89.3.7 read *na* for *nas* according to Peking 316.2.6.

<sup>113</sup> In Peking 316.2.6 read *kyis* for *kyi* according to Tokyo 89.3.7.

<sup>114</sup> Peking 316.2.7 reads *ma yin te*. Tokyo 89.4.1 reads *ma yin no*. (The Tokyo reading seems preferable).

<sup>115</sup> In Peking 316.2.8 read *las kyi dbang gis* for *las kyi dbang gi* according to Tokyo 89.4.1.

<sup>116</sup> In Peking 316.3.1 and Tokyo 89.4., read *de ltar* for *da ltar*.

<sup>117</sup> *bye brag tu smra ba, vaibahāṣika*.

[The opponent's position:] Why do you not assert that the hell-guardians, dogs, and crows [in the hells] are sentient beings?<sup>118</sup> It is like this: they appear in the manner of sentient beings, and they have movement which is similar to that of sentient beings in that they also appear to have physical and verbal expressions which are mental activities. It is suitable to infer the existence of another's mind through those two [i.e., movement and appearance in the manner of sentient beings]. If those did not have those two ways of inferring that [hell-guardians] have minds, then one could not infer the existence of minds for other living beings,<sup>119</sup> since these two [reasons] would be fallible [according to you].

In order to indicate [that to assert hell-guardians and so forth] as living beings is not feasible, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**Answer: Because such would not be reasonable.**

In order to indicate just that lack of feasibility, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**For, it is not feasible for them to be hell-beings**

It is like this: It is not feasible for hell-guardians to be hell-beings. If one were to ask why this is not feasible, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] answers,

**since they do not experience similar suffering.**

The reason is that those [hell-guardians] do not experience [suffering] in the same way other hell-beings individually experience the suffering of the hells. [316.4] The hell-guardians do not experience suffering in the way that harm is inflicted [on hell-beings], and there is not any such thing as harming hell-guardians. Moreover, this movement in the manner of a sentient being is not independent [self-willed], but [arises] through the power of hell-beings' karma. With respect to [appearing] in the manner of sentient beings, such also exists in statues and paintings.

<sup>118</sup> In Peking 316.3.4 read *sems can rnams* for *sems rnams* according to Tokyo 89.4.4.

<sup>119</sup> In Peking 316.3.5 read *srog chags gzhan* for *srog gzhan* according to Tokyo 89.4.5.



That leads to the qualm that [hell-guardians and hell-beings] harm each other.<sup>120</sup> With respect to that qualm, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**If they [i.e., the hell-beings and the guardians] harmed each other, it could not be posited that “These are hell-beings, and those are the guardians of hell-beings.”**

*Answer:* If hell-beings and hell-guardians harmed each other, then it could not be exclusively posited that “These are hell-beings, those are hell-guardians.” It is like this: If those who are harmed are asserted to be hell-beings and those who bring about harm are asserted to be hell-guardians, if it were the case that they both are similarly harmed or similarly harmers, then you should say who are the “hell-beings” and who are the “hell-guardians.”

Here, for the sake of [giving] an additional reason, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**If those of similar shape, size, and power harmed each other, they would not be afraid in that way.**

If even hell-guardians were hell-beings, then they both would be similar in shape, similar in size, similar in power. Therefore, although hell-guardians and hell-beings who have similar shape, size, [316.5] and power would harm each other, they would not be afraid<sup>121</sup> [of each other] in terms of the aspects that they are renowned to have.<sup>122</sup> That renown is as follows: hell-beings see those very powerful furious hell-guardians having huge bodies whereupon

---

<sup>120</sup> The opponent seems to be refining his qualm by accepting that hell-beings and hell-guardians may in fact harm each other without this affecting the position that hell-guardians are sentient beings.

<sup>121</sup> In Tokyo 90.1.6 and Peking 316.5.1 read '*jigs* for '*jig* according to Vasubandhu's autocommentary.

<sup>122</sup> Vinitadeva's explanation appears to differ from that of Vasubandhu, who seems to be saying if among the hell-beings and hell-guardians, those of similar size and so forth harmed each other, how could hell-guardians be called “sentient beings”? Vinitadeva, on the other hand seems to say, if hell-guardians were hell-beings, then they *would* be similar. In other words he is saying they are *not* similar.

all the directions become dark, their bodies shrink, and their heads become confused. Shape<sup>123</sup> is a feature of the status of legs and arms. Size is a feature of breadth. Power is the force of the body.

Here again, in order to indicate another reason, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**Also, if the pain of heat on the ground of strongly burning iron  
is unbearable, how could [the hell-guardians] torment others?**

Even if<sup>124</sup> hell-guardians experienced suffering in the way that hell-beings do, if even the pain of heat is unbearable, then how could [hell-guardians] torment hell-beings there? If, rolling<sup>125</sup> in pain on that strongly burning ground those [hell-guardians] are unable to hold up even their own bodies, then how much less could they torment others?

In order to address the qualm of one who thinks, “Although [hell-guardians] are indeed not hell-beings, they are hungry ghosts or animals,” [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**How could non-hell-beings arise in a hell?**

If hell-guardians such as dogs and crows are not asserted to be hell-beings, then how could instances of animals and hungry ghosts, which are included within the transmigrations of animals and hungry ghosts, arise in the hell-transmigrations?

In order to give the answer to that by the Proponents of the Great Exposition, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**Objection: Then, how could animals arise in [areas of] high  
status [i.e., in lands of humans, demi-gods, and gods]?**

---

<sup>123</sup> In Peking 316.5.3 read *byad gzugs ni* for *byad gzugs kyi* according to Tokyo 90.1.7.

<sup>124</sup> In Peking 316.5.4 read *myong ba na* for *myong ba ni* according to Tokyo 90.2.1.

<sup>125</sup> In Peking 316.5.5 read *'gre ldog* for *'dre ldog* according to Tokyo 90.2.2.

**Similarly, even in the hells certain animals and hungry ghosts  
may arise as hell-guardians and so forth. [317.1]**

[The opponent's position:] If [beings] included within other transmigrations do not arise in other transmigrations, then how is it that elephants—the children of the earth-protector—geese, storks, parrots, myna birds, and so forth<sup>126</sup> arise in areas of high status? Just as they arise there,<sup>127</sup> similarly even animals in the hells such as dogs, crows, and so forth and certain hungry ghosts could appear as hell-guardians.

In order to refute that, [Vasubandhu, in the root text] says,

**5           Animals do not arise in the hells  
              In the way that they arise in areas of high status.  
              Nor do hungry ghosts, for they do not experience  
              The suffering existent there.**

It is not suitable for animals to arise in the hells the way in which they arise in areas of high status. Also, hungry ghosts do not [arise in that way]. It is like this: The condensed meaning is: “Animals and hungry ghosts do not experience the suffering existing in those hells.”

In order to indicate the condensed meaning by means of<sup>128</sup> indicating that this is different from the example given,<sup>129</sup> the composer of the treatise [i.e., Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**Those animals that arise in areas of high status do so due to  
              karma for experiencing pleasures of the environment of that**

<sup>126</sup> In Peking 317.1.1 read *ri skegs la sogs pa ji ltar* for *ri skegs pa ji ltar* according to Tokyo 90.2.5.

<sup>127</sup> In Peking 317.1.1-2 read *ji ltar 'byung stel der ji ltar 'byung ba* for *ji ltar 'byung stel der ji ltar 'byung stel der ji ltar 'byung ba* according to Tokyo 90.2.5.

<sup>128</sup> In Peking 317.1.5 read *thabs kyis* for *thabs kyi* according to Tokyo 90.2.7.

<sup>129</sup> That is, the example of hell-guardians is not parallel to the example of animals arising in areas of high status.

**world, and they individually experience the pleasures existent there.**

Those [hell-guardians] are not similar to [animals] born in areas of high status. It is like this: Those animals who arise in areas of high status possess the pleasures of the worldly environment of the areas of high status, and individually experience the pleasures that exist in the worldly environment of the areas of high status through the force of karma<sup>130</sup> that creates those pleasures.

*Objection:* How do those animals experience the pleasures of the gods?

*Answer:* It is said that due to bad ethics they attain transmigration as an animal, and due to giving they attain the resources of a god; there is no contradiction. It is like this: Actions done in the Desire Realm ripen in other transmigrations due to other<sup>131</sup> conditions.

*Tadbhājanalokasukhasaṃvartaniyena* (“...for experiencing the pleasures of the environment of the world”) is to be put together as “pleasure *in* the environment of the world.”<sup>132</sup> [317.2] [Vasubandhu] refers to this establishment of the pleasures in the worldly environment by means of that karma as “would experience the pleasures of the environment of the world.” In the quote, “...the pleasures existent there,” “there” means the worldly environment of the areas of high status. Therefore, “...existent in the worldly environment of the areas of high status” is indicated.

These [statements] lead to the qualm that such would be the case even in the hells.<sup>133</sup> In order to address that qualm<sup>134</sup> [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

<sup>130</sup> In Peking 317.1.6 read *yod pa de las* for *yod pa de de las* according to Tokyo 90.3.1.

<sup>131</sup> In Peking 317.1.8 re *gzhan la yang* for *gzhan pa yang* according to Tokyo 90.3.3.

<sup>132</sup> Here Vinitadeva is providing us with the case endings omitted in the Sanskrit compound *tadbhājanalokasukhasaṃvartaniyena*; there is no significance in the second expression being shorter than the first.

<sup>133</sup> Vasubandhu’s argument that animals can arise in areas of high status such as god realms, etc., leads the opponent to the qualm that, if such were the case, then sentient beings such as animals could also arise in the hells.

<sup>134</sup> In Peking 317.2.3 read *snyam pa la de’i phyir* for *snyam pa de’i phyir* according to Tokyo 90.3.5.

**However, the guardians of the hells and so forth do not similarly experience the sufferings of the hells.**

Hell-guardians and so forth do *not* experience the sufferings existent in the worldly environment of the hells in the way that the great elephants—the children of the earth protector—and so forth experience the pleasures in the areas of high status.

Therefore, having indicated that such an example is different [from the situation of animals born in areas of high status], in order to sum up his argument [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**Hence, it is not reasonable for animals to arise there, nor also for certain hungry ghosts.**

For the reason that hell-guardians and so forth do not experience the sufferings of the hells, it is not feasible for animals to arise in those hells, nor [is it feasible] for hungry ghosts.

Having rendered the objection of the Great Exposition School moot in that way, in order to give an objection by the Proponents of Sūtra,<sup>135</sup> [Vasubandhu, in presenting the opponent's position, in his autocommentary] says,

**Objection:** Through the karmas of those hell-beings certain [physical] elements arise there—having certain colors, shapes, sizes, and powers—which [even though they are merely material] obtain the name hell-guardians,

[The opponent's position:] Even if it is not feasible for those hell-guardians and so forth to be [included] in the enumeration of sentient beings, certain<sup>136</sup> elements such as earth and so forth arise in those hells due to the power<sup>137</sup> of the thoroughly ripened karma of those hell-

<sup>135</sup> *mdo sde pa, sautrāntika.*

<sup>136</sup> In Peking 317.3.1 read *bye brag* for *bya brag* according to Tokyo 90.4.1.

<sup>137</sup> In Peking 317.2.8 read *rnam par smin pa'i dbang gis* for *rnam par smin pa'i dbang gi* according to Tokyo 90.4.1.

beings.<sup>138</sup> [317.3] [These elements] obtain the name “hell-guardian” and so forth due to certain features such as being blacker, yellower and so forth than the hell-beings in color, having more frightful shapes such as arms, legs and so forth, bigger sizes such as bodily measures and so forth, and the power of overwhelming hell-beings.<sup>139</sup>

[Someone might wonder:] If they have no minds, then why do they move like sentient beings? Therefore [Vasubandhu, continuing the opponent’s position, in his autocommentary] says,

**and so it is with those which transform such that they are  
perceived to perform various activities—extending their arms  
and so forth—**

[Continuation of the opponent’s position:] Although it is established that [these elements] are without minds, they transform such that they appear as if they were brandishing swords, exposing their fangs,<sup>140</sup> bulging<sup>141</sup> their eyes, wrinkling their eye-brows, and performing various other fearsome activities through the power of hell-beings’ [karma].<sup>142</sup>

[In order to answer the question] “Why do those appear?,” [Vasubandhu, continuing the opponent’s position, in his autocommentary] says,

**for the sake of generating fear.**

[Continuation of the opponent’s position:] Those [elements] transform in such a way in order to generate the suffering of fear in hell-beings; these [elements] are fruitions of deeds done previously by those hell-beings that will cause the experience of the suffering of fear.

<sup>138</sup> In Peking 312.8 and Tokyo 90.4.1 read *sems can dmyal ba pa de dag* for *sems can dmyal ba de dag*.

<sup>139</sup> In Peking 317.3.2 and Tokyo 90.4.2 read *sems can dmyal ba pa zil* for *sems can dmyal ba zil*.

<sup>140</sup> In Peking 317.3.4 read *so gtsigs pa* for *so gtsig pa* according to Tokyo 90.4.4.

<sup>141</sup> In Peking 317.3.4 read *mig bgrad* for *mig dgrad* according to Tokyo 90.4.4.

<sup>142</sup> In Peking 317.3.4 read *sems can rnams kyi dbang gis de dag gang gi phyir* for *sems can rnams kyi dbang gi de dag gi phyir* according to Tokyo 90.4.3.

Here, [in order to indicate] examples of how certain elements, having transformed in that way, cause fear and harm to hell-beings, [Vasubandhu, continuing the opponent's position, in his autocommentary] says,

**These are like, for example, the transformations of mountains  
[shaped] like sheep that come together and go apart and the  
thorns of groves of iron trees that [turn] to face downwards  
and to face upwards;**

[Continuation of the opponent's position:] It is like the case, for example, that although they are not included within the enumeration of sentient beings, through the force of karma mountains which are [shaped] like sheep come together and go apart, whereby hell-beings are harmed. Also it is like, for example, in the grove of iron hell trees, [317.4] when hell-beings climb up [the trees], the thorns face downwards, and again when they descend, [the thorns] face upwards; although those [elements] cause harm to those [hell-beings], it is not the case that they possess minds. They do appear to perform activities *as if* they possessed minds however.

One might think that there are no such things as mountains [shaped] like sheep and so forth. With respect to that qualm [Vasubandhu, continuing the opponent's position, in his autocommentary] says,

**these are not non-existent.**

The opponent's position is: Those mountains [shaped] like sheep and so forth should be understood as not non-existent, for, "Those are apprehended [by] the eyes and so forth equally."<sup>143</sup>

Here the author of the treatise [i.e., Vasubandhu, in the root text] responds,

---

<sup>143</sup> This appears to be an appeal to common sense on the part of the opponent: Mountains shaped like sheep and so forth are apprehended by the eyes of hell beings, and therefore must exist.

- 6      **If it is asserted that through the karma of those [hell-beings]  
          **There is the arising of elements there in that way  
          **And likewise also transformations,  
          **Why not assert [those] as consciousness?********

The condensed meaning is: If,<sup>144</sup> due to the force of those hell-beings' karma, such elements having colors, shapes, sizes, and power are asserted to arise in the hells and also if [those elements] are asserted as transformations into those who perform activities such as raising up the arms and so forth, then why not assert that just consciousness arises and transforms into the aspects of hell-guardians and so forth, and into the performance of activities of raising the arms and so forth?

[These] being consciousness is difficult to understand fully, so in order to unravel<sup>145</sup> just that, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**Why not assert that through<sup>146</sup> the karmas of those [hell-  
 beings] just consciousness transforms in those ways? Why  
 think of them as elements?**

For example, if, through<sup>147</sup> the power of hell-beings' karma, [elements] are asserted to arise and transform, then why not likewise assert [those] as just consciousness? Why conceive of them as elements? No additional<sup>148</sup> strength appears in them at all. It is like this: Fear and so forth is not produced by their mere existence, [317.5] but fear is generated upon *observing* them, and observation is an arising of consciousness in them. Therefore, it is suitable to analyze whether a consciousness that is shared [*grub*] with multiple beings

<sup>144</sup> In Peking 317.4.5 read 'byung bar 'dod na for 'byung bar 'dod la according to Tokyo 91.1.3.

<sup>145</sup> In Peking 317.4.7 read *rnam par grol ba'i phir* for *rnam par dgrol ba'i phyir* according to Tokyo 91.1.4.

<sup>146</sup> In Peking 317.4.7 read *de'i las rnam kyis* for *de'i las rnam kyi* according to Tokyo 91.1.4.

<sup>147</sup> In Peking 317.4.7 read *las kyi dbang gis* for *las kyi dbang gi* according to Tokyo 91.1.5.

<sup>148</sup> In Peking 317.4.8 read *mthu lhag pa* for *mthu lhag ma* according to Tokyo 91.1.5.



transforms [itself into these things], but it is not [suitable to analyze whether these are] elements, because of not being established for multiple beings. Also, in states of dreaming and so forth, just consciousness is renowned as having transformed into various aspects such as words, bodies, movement, etc., but it is not renowned at all that these are elements; it is suitable that [these] are transformations of karmic consciousness.

Here again, [in order to give] an additional reason, [Vasubandhu, in the root text] says,

**7        You conceive that the predisposition of the action is in one  
                 place**

**And that the effect is in another.**

**Why is the effect not asserted**

**Just where the predisposition exists?**

The condensed meaning is: If it conceived that the predispositions produced by actions abide in one place but their effects are external elements in another place, then you must express here the reason why you do not assert that the effect of an action is in just that continuum of consciousness where the predisposition abides.

In order to expand upon that condensed meaning, the author of the treatise, [i.e., Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**If the predispositions of the karmas of hell-beings—which  
[you] conceive as that due to which elements arise there in that  
way and change—abide in the continuums of their  
consciousnesses and not otherwise, why not assert that the  
effects of those predispositions are such transformations in  
consciousness? What reason is there for this conception that  
the effects of those predispositions are just where the  
predispositions are not?**

**Objection:** Scripture is a reason. If just consciousness appeared as form and so forth and the [external] objects of form and so forth did not exist, the Supramundane Victor would not have said that the sense spheres of form and so forth exist.

The predispositions of the karma of hell-beings—which [you] conceive as that due to which the features of color, shape, etc., arise from elements and have transformed into the characteristics of lifting up the arms, etc.—abide in the continuums of the consciousnesses of those sentient beings, and do *not* abide elsewhere in places such as elements and so forth. This is because at the time [of performing] an action, there are no elements of hell. [318.1] When a predisposition abides in the continuum of consciousness, it would be feasible that the consciousness transforms into such [features such as colors, shapes and so forth] in just that place where it [i.e., the predisposition] abides, but you do not assert it<sup>149</sup> [i.e., the predisposition, as abiding] there. If so, then what is the cause for this realization that the effects exist in elements and so forth, this being where the predispositions do not exist? In the world, fruits arise where their seeds are planted; there is no case of planting a seed in a field and the fruit arising on top of a mountain.

Here a Proponent of Sūtra objects that, “Scripture is a reason.” [Opponent's position:] As for that, the reason why the statement that, “if predispositions exist in one place, their effects exist<sup>150</sup> in another” is *scripture*.<sup>151</sup> It is like this: If consciousness itself appears as

<sup>149</sup> In Peking 318.1.1 read *khyod* for *khong* according to Tokyo 91.2.5.

<sup>150</sup> In Peking 318.1.3 and Tokyo 91.2.6 I am reading *gzhan na yod* for *gzhan na med* in accordance with the opponent's position, and in order to mirror the language of Vasubandhu's statement in Verse 7, viz. “You conceive that the predisposition of the action is in one place, and the effect is in another.” (*gzhan na las kyi bag chags lal 'bras bu dag ni gzhan du rtog*).

<sup>151</sup> In Peking 318.1.3-4 read *'bras bu gzhan na med na zhes bya ba'i gtan tshig* for *'bras bu gzhan na med bya ba'i gtan tshig* according to Tokyo 91.2.6.

objects such as form, etc., and objects such as form, etc., do not exist as separate<sup>152</sup> [from consciousness], then the Supramundane Victor would not have spoken of the existence of the ten sense spheres of form and so forth.<sup>153</sup> Therefore, we<sup>154</sup> [i.e., Proponents of Sūtra] take the sayings of the Supramundane Victor to be valid here; just as causes such as form and so forth are understood to exist separately from consciousness [since the Supramundane Victor stated such], even in the hell-realms the features of the elements which are the causes of hell-beings' eye consciousnesses, etc., are realized to exist separately; these are proprietary effects (*dbang gi 'bras bu*)<sup>155</sup> but not fruitional or causally concordant effects. Fruitional and causally concordant effects are asserted to have the same place as their seeds. As for proprietary effects, whether or not they have the same place as their seeds, there is no contradiction.<sup>156</sup> For example, cognitions in one continuum occur due to the force<sup>157</sup> of cognitions of another continuum.<sup>158</sup> [318.2] These are cases of both

---

<sup>152</sup> In Peking 318.1.4 read *don gu na med na* for *dod gun na med na* according to Tokyo 91.2.7.

<sup>153</sup> Here the opponent, perhaps because he/she wishes to emphasize the existence of *external* objects such as form, refers to the *ten* sense spheres rather than to the traditional presentation of twelve sense spheres, thus excluding the mental sense power (*yid kyi dbang po*) and its objects (*chos*). The following pairs comprise the ten sense spheres:

- (1) Form (*gzugs*) and the eye sense power (*mig gi dbang po*).
- (2) Sound (*sgra*) and the ear sense power (*rna ba'i dbang po*).
- (3) Odor (*dri*) and the nose sense power (*sna'i dbang po*).
- (4) Taste (*ro*) and the tongue sense power (*lce'i dbang po*).
- (5) Tangible objects (*reg bya*) and the body sense power (*lus kyi dbang po*).

<sup>154</sup> In Tokyo 91.2.7 read *kho bo cag gis* for *kha cig gis* according to Peking 318.1.5.

<sup>155</sup> In the 2nd chapter of *Kośa*, *dbang gi 'bras bu* = *bdag po'i 'bras bu*.

<sup>156</sup> Pur-bu-jok (*phur bu lcok*, 1825-1901), in presenting the Sautrāntika view, states that fruitional effects "refer to, for instance, the five contaminated, appropriated aggregates," that causally concordant effects "refer to, for instance, having a short life, although one is born into a happy transmigration," or "taking delight in killing, although one is born into a happy transmigration," and that proprietary effects (*bdag po'i 'bras bu*) "refer to, for instance, the impure worldly environment." In other words, the first two types of effects take place in the continuum of the sentient being, whereas the third takes place *outside* the continuum of the sentient being. (See *phur bu lcok*, *rigs lam 'bring gi skor*, 20.a.1-2.)

<sup>157</sup> In Peking 318.1.8 read *dbang gis* for *dbang gi* according to Tokyo 91.3.3.

being proprietary effects and also [occurring in] different places. Similarly, transformations of elements also [could] arise in different places,<sup>159</sup> because of being proprietary effects.

Thus, the author of the treatise [i.e., Vasubandhu, in refuting the opponent's position, in his autocommentary and roots verses] says,

**That is not a reason, for:**

- 8        That form sense spheres and so forth exist [as external objects]  
           Was said through the force of an intention  
           With regard to beings tamed by that,  
           Like [the teaching of substantially established or permanent]  
           spontaneously arisen sentient beings.**

This scripture is not a reason that thoroughly proves that external [objects] such as form and so forth exist.<sup>160</sup> It is like this: The condensed meaning is:<sup>161</sup> The statement, “Form sense spheres and so forth exist [as external objects]” is made through the force of an intention for the sake of beings to be tamed by the teaching on form, etc. This is like [the teaching that] “spontaneously arisen sentient beings exist [substantially or permanently].”<sup>162</sup>

In order to unravel the example, the author of the treatise [i.e., Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

---

<sup>158</sup> From the opponent's point of view, the assertion by the Proponents of Mind Only that the mental continuums of other beings (*gzhan rgyud*) exist is tantamount to accepting the existence of external objects.

<sup>159</sup> In Tokyo 91.3.3 read *'byung ba gyur pa yul tha dad pa* for *'byung ba gyur pa tha dad pa* according to Peking 318.2.1.

<sup>160</sup> Peking 318.2.2 reads *gzugs la sogs pa'i*; Tokyo 91.3.4 reads *gzugs la sogs pa*.

<sup>161</sup> In Peking 318.2.4 read *zhes mdor byas pa'i don* for *zhes bya ba'i don* according to Tokyo 91.3.5.

<sup>162</sup> One would expect that in a book making so many distinctions, given its great clarity on other points, Vinitadeva would himself make this qualification—i.e., that spontaneously born sentient beings exist *substantially or permanently*. This is, however, a decidedly Ge-luk-ba reading of this passage, and there is some question whether or not this is an appropriate interpretation, given that the text is an Indian work.

**For example, the Supramundane Victor said, “There are [substantially established or permanent] sentient beings who are spontaneously born,” through the force of an intention—**

Also, the statement by the Supramundane Victor that, “There are sentient beings who are spontaneously born,” was spoken through the force of an intention.

In order to indicate just that intention, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**thinking of the uninterrupted continuity of the mind to the next life.**

Certain sentient beings might say the following: “This self is a finite continuum just here; there is no world beyond.” Through that view of annihilation, they deny virtue, non-virtue, and their results, and do whatever they want. Therefore, in order to cleanse<sup>163</sup> the defilements of [that] bad view, thinking of the “intermediate state<sup>164</sup> following death”—i.e., the uninterrupted continuity of the mental continuum—the Supramundane Victor said, “There are sentient beings who are spontaneously born.” “To the next life” means “to the world beyond.” “Thinking of” means “hidden intention.”<sup>165</sup>

<sup>163</sup> In Peking 318.2.7 read *brkud ba'i* for *dkru ba'i* according to Tokyo 91.3.7.

<sup>164</sup> In Peking 318.2.7 read *bar ma do'i srid pa* for *bar ma di'i srid pa* according to Tokyo 91.3.7.

<sup>165</sup> There are said to be four kinds of hidden intention (*ldem por dgongs pa rnam bzhi*):

- (1) Hidden intention with respect to entry [into the teaching] (*gzhus pa la ldem por dgongs pa, avatārābhisaṃdhi*).
- (2) Hidden intention with respect to characteristics (*mtshan nyid la ldem por dgongs pa, lakṣanābhisaṃdhi*).
- (3) Hidden intention with respect to antidotes (*gnyen po la ldem por dgongs pa, pratipakṣābhisaṃdhi*).
- (4) Hidden intention with respect to translation/interpretation (*bsgyur pa la ldem por dgongs pa, pariṇāmanābhisaṃdhi*).

See Bdud-'joms 'Jigs-bral ye-shes-rdo-rje (Dudjom Rinpoche), *The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism Vol. 1*, (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1991), pp. 220-222.

Someone wonders: What makes it evident that, although the Supramundane Victor<sup>166</sup> said with an intention, “There are sentient beings who are spontaneously born,” [318.3] in fact there is no self? Therefore, with respect to this qualm [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**For Buddha said:**

**Here there is no [substantially existent or permanent] self or  
sentient being.**

**These phenomena arise from causes.**

Elsewhere, having taken that sūtra—this being other than [where Buddha said, “There are sentient beings who are spontaneously born”]—in which the Supramundane Victor says, “These existent phenomena have causes; there is no self or sentient being among them” as valid, it is ascertained that the teaching that, “There are sentient beings who are spontaneously born” has a thought behind it.

*Question:* Why does the former sūtra have a thought behind it, whereas the latter does not?

*Answer:* It is like this: The self is not spontaneously born since it is permanent, for, if only those things which are suitable to be produced are called “spontaneously born,” the self is not [spontaneously born] since it is permanent. If<sup>167</sup> that is the case, then how could suitability [to be produced] exist in it [i.e., the self]?<sup>168</sup> How could this<sup>169</sup> [self] be spontaneously born?

Having explained the example in that way, in order to connect it to the actual [argument being considered, Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

---

<sup>166</sup> In Peking 318.2.8 read *bcom ldan 'das kyis* for *bcom ldan 'das kyi* according to Tokyo 91.4.1.

<sup>167</sup> In Peking 318.3.4 read *bdag ni rtag pa'i phyir ma yin na* for *bdag ni rtag pa'i phyir ma yin* according to Tokyo 91.4.3.

<sup>168</sup> In Tokyo 91.4.3 read *de la* for *de las* according to Peking 318.3.4.

<sup>169</sup> In Tokyo 91.4.3 read *de gang gis na* for *de dag gis na* according to Peking 318.3.4.

**Similarly, the Supramundane Victor's saying that the sense spheres of forms and so forth exist is for beings who are tamed by that teaching; that word is one having a thought behind it.**

For example, just as for the sake of beings who are proponents of nihilism [Buddha] said, “There are sentient beings who are spontaneously born,” similarly, for the sake of beings who are tamed by the teaching on form and so forth [Buddha] said that, “Form sense spheres and so forth exist”; those words have thoughts behind them. Regarding that, these words spoken in that way become teachings that are of “interpretable meaning” but<sup>170</sup> not of “definitive meaning.” “For”<sup>171</sup> [in the passage “...for the beings tamed by that teaching”] means “for the benefit of.”<sup>172</sup>

In order to present a question posed by the Proponents of Sūtra as to the thought behind this sūtra, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**What here is the thought behind [what was literally said]?**

*Objection:* Just as thinking of the uninterrupted continuity of the mental continuum [the Supramundane Victor] said, “There are sentient beings who are spontaneously born,” similarly, here, you should say of what<sup>173</sup> [Buddha was thinking when he said] “Sense spheres of form and so forth exist.” [318.4]

The author of the treatise [i.e., Vasubandhu], in order to indicate the thought of [Buddha, in his root verses] says,

**9 The Subduer spoke about these—**

**The seeds from which cognitions respectively arise**

**And the appearances [of forms and so forth]—**

<sup>170</sup> In Peking 318.3.7 read *drang pa'i don yin gyi* for *drang pa'i don gyi* according to Tokyo 91.4.5.

<sup>171</sup> *ched du, adhikṛtya.*

<sup>172</sup> *don du.* In Tokyo 91.4.5 read *don du'o* for *don no* according to Peking 318.3.7.

<sup>173</sup> Tokyo 91.4.6 reads *ci las*; Peking 318.4.4 reads *ci la.*

**In a dualistic way as [internal and external] sense spheres of those [cognitions].**

The condensed meaning is: Concerning (1) the seeds—the respective seeds, the “fruitional predispositions”<sup>174</sup>—from which cognitions such as the eye consciousness arise, and (2) the appearances [of forms and so forth], the Supramundane Victor spoke of those as internal and external sense spheres of those cognitions. Such is taught in order<sup>175</sup> to posit the ten sense spheres for the time being.<sup>176</sup>

Now, in order to indicate [the seeds and appearances] individually, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**What is being indicated? Concerning (1) the seeds—the respective seeds that have undergone a type of transformation [i.e., have thoroughly ripened]—from which the cognitions that perceive forms arise, and (2) those appearances, the Supramundane Victor respectively spoke of an eye sense sphere and a form sense sphere of that [cognition]. Similarly, concerning (1) the seeds—the respective seeds that have undergone a specific type of transformation—from which cognitions upto the cognitions that perceive tangible objects arise, and (2) those appearances, the Supramundane Victor respectively spoke of the sense spheres of the body and of tangible objects of those [cognitions].**

---

<sup>174</sup> In Tokyo 91.4.7 read *rnam par smin pa'i bag chags* for *rnam par shes pa'i bag chags* according to Peking 318.4.2. This reading mirrors a parallel passage below (318.4.4) in which Vinītadeva glosses *rang gi sa bon* with *rnam par smin pa'i sa bon*.

<sup>175</sup> In Peking 318.4.3 read *gzhaḡ pa'i phyir* for *gzhaḡ pa'i spyir* according to Tokyo 92.1.1

<sup>176</sup> In Peking 318.4.3 read *de ltar re zhig* for *de ltar zhig* according to Tokyo 92.1.1



As for the seeds—the respective seeds, the “fruitional predispositions,” that are thoroughly ripened—from which a visual cognition perceiving form arises, the Supramundane Victor spoke of an eye sense sphere<sup>177</sup> of that cognition. As for the occurrence of appearances, he spoke of the form sense sphere of that [cognition]. Similarly, as for the cognitions of the ear, nose, tongue, and body, he also spoke of the respective seeds and appearances as external sense spheres.

*Question:* If appearances are not other<sup>178</sup> than consciousness, how are they posited as different sense spheres?

*Answer:* It is like, for example, although the mental sphere<sup>179</sup> does not exist separately from the collections of the six consciousnesses, it is *posited* as separate from the point of view of the result. Here it is also like that.

Therefore, having indicated [that the teaching of external sense spheres] has a thought behind, in order to sum up his argument, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**This was his thought.**

Thinking of seeds and appearances [the Supramundane Victor] said that the sense spheres such as form and so forth exist, [318.5] but did not say that they exist separately from<sup>180</sup> consciousness.

In order to ask a question posed by Proponents of Sūtra concerning the intention of teaching with a thought behind it, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

***Question:* What value is there in teaching in that way through the force of an intention?**

<sup>177</sup> In Peking 318.4.5 read *mig gi skye mched* for *mig gis skye mched* according to Tokyo 92.1.2.

<sup>178</sup> In Tokyo 92.1.3 read *snang ba gzhan* for *snang ba bzhin* according to Peking 318.4.6.

<sup>179</sup> In Peking 318.4.7 read *las yid kyi khams* for *las kyi khams* according to Tokyo 92.1.3.

<sup>180</sup> In Peking 318.5.1 read *rnam par shes pa las* for *rnam par shes pa la* according to Tokyo 92.1.5.

[The opponent's position:] Just as you have explained the result of the teaching—with a thought behind it—that there are sentient beings who are spontaneously born, similarly you should also explain what the result is of the teaching—with a thought behind it—that the sense spheres of form and so forth exist.

In order to indicate the result [of the thought behind the teaching that sense spheres of form and so forth exist], the author of the treatise [i.e., Vasubandhu, in the root text] says,

**10            For, in that way, there is entry into the selflessness  
              Of persons.**

In order to unravel just that, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**For when taught in that way, they enter into the selflessness of  
persons.**

Therefore, when the twelve sense spheres are explained in that way, there will be the realization of persons as insubstantial. Insubstantial means selfless.

Someone wonders: “How [does one enter into the selflessness of persons in that way]?”

With respect to this qualm [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**Having understood that the six consciousnesses arise from the  
two sets of six [the six objects and the six sense organs] and  
that there is no unitary [substantially existent] seer through to  
no [substantially existent] toucher, those who are tamed by the  
teaching of selflessness with respect to persons enter into the  
selflessness of persons.**

It is like this: The six consciousnesses such as the eye consciousness and so forth, arise from the six internal [sense spheres] such as the eye [sense power] and so forth, and the six external [sense spheres] such as form and so forth, but ultimately there is no unitary

substantially existent seer whatsoever, through to no substantially existent thinker.<sup>181</sup> It is like this: The Proponents of Self assert that the agent is the “self,” and, when it is taught that those seeings and so forth are created by internal and external sense spheres,<sup>182</sup> they realize that persons are insubstantial. This indicates the following:

They, being taught the twelve sense spheres, realize the non-existence of a self which is other than compositional phenomena—eyes and so forth. Upon having realized that compositional phenomena are selfless, the mind wearies of those, and they [i.e., the Proponents of Self] attain the final state.

Here, with respect to that, [319.1] someone wonders: “If the attainment of nirvāṇa is achieved through just understanding the selflessness of persons, then what is the purpose of teaching of mind-only?” Therefore, with respect to that qualm [Vasubandhu, in the root text] says,

**In another way**

**Through the teaching [of mind only] they enter into the  
selflessness with respect to phenomena ...**

Through the teaching of mind-only one enters into the selflessness of phenomena. Therefore, it is explained that “the teaching of mind-only is for the sake of entry into selflessness of phenomena.” Here, entry<sup>183</sup> is so-called because it has the sense of causing entry into [the selflessness of phenomena]; it is another way of saying “understanding [the selflessness of phenomena].”

---

<sup>181</sup> In Peking 318.5.6 and Tokyo 92.2.1 and in the Tibetan translation of Vasubandhu 23.4 read *rig pa po'i bar* for *reg pa po'i ba* according to the Sanskrit of Vasubandhu [22.4] which reads *yāvanmanta* (“...up to a thinker”).

<sup>182</sup> In Peking 318.5.6-7 read *nang dang phyi'i skye mched rnams kyis byed* for *nang dang phyi'i skye mched rnams kyi byed* according to Tokyo 92.2.2.

<sup>183</sup> *jug pa, praveśa.*

In order<sup>184</sup> to indicate the meaning of the words, “In another way,” [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**“In another way” [refers to] the teaching of cognition-only.**

This is easy to understand and hence will not be explained [here].

[The opponent,] not believing that one enters into the selflessness of phenomena through the teaching of mind-only, asks a question about how there is entry into the selflessness of phenomena, viz.:

**How does one enter into the selflessness of phenomena by means of this teaching?<sup>185</sup>**

In order to indicate how one enters [into the selflessness of phenomena] the author of the treatise [i.e., Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**Having understood that just this mere-cognition arises as the appearance of the phenomena of forms and so forth and that there are no phenomena having the character of forms and so forth, one enters [into the selflessness of phenomena].**

With respect to just this mere cognition, when one realizes that it arises in the guise of form and so forth—i.e., that there are no phenomena at all that have the nature of form and so forth existing separately from the mind—then one enters into the selflessness of phenomena. Upon having entered into the selflessness of phenomena, Bodhisattvas gradually attain the level of a Tathāgata. Therefore, saying, “This meaning is called the principal one,” the Supramundane Victor taught mind-only with such meaning.

<sup>184</sup> In Peking 319.1.3 read *bstan pa'i phyir* for *bstan pa'i phyir ro* according to Tokyo 92.2.5.

<sup>185</sup> *bstan pa 'dis* not found in Vasubandhu.

Having [wrongly] understood,<sup>186</sup> for instance, that just as the selflessness of persons means the insubstantiality of persons in all respects, similarly the selflessness of phenomena also [must] mean the complete absence of phenomena, there comes to be an objection by another [opponent]. In order to present this objection [Vasubandhu, in presenting the opponent's position, in his autocommentary] says, [319.2]

**Objection:** If phenomena did not exist in any way, then this called cognition-only also would not exist.

[The opponent's position:] If the absence of phenomena is the selflessness of phenomena, then there would not be any phenomena at all. Accordingly, even that<sup>187</sup> mind-only would not exist. Therefore [Vasubandhu, continuing the opponent's objection, in his autocommentary] says,

Hence, how could that [cognition-only] be posited?

To this the Master [i.e., Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary and root text] replies,

**Answer:** Since it not that phenomena do not exist in all ways, there is entry into the selflessness of phenomena in that way [i.e., through the teaching of cognition-only]. Also:  
... in terms of an imputed entity.

It is not the case that such<sup>188</sup> a complete lack of any phenomena whatsoever [constitutes] entry into the selflessness of phenomena, but rather that one enters into the selflessness of phenomena by way of the non-existence of *imputational*<sup>189</sup> phenomena.

---

<sup>186</sup> In Tokyo 92.3.2 read *rig nas* for *rīgs nas* according to Peking 319.1.8.

<sup>187</sup> In Peking 319.2.1 read *sems tsam de yang* for *sems tsam da yang* according to Tokyo 92.3.2.

<sup>188</sup> In Peking 319.2.2 read *gang yang med pa de lta bu* for *gang yang med pa lta bu* according to Tokyo 92.3.3.

<sup>189</sup> *kun brtags pa, parikalpita*.

With respect to that imputed entity, someone wonders: “What is it?” With respect to that qualm [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**Those [phenomena] are selfless in terms of the entity that is the imputed nature of phenomena as apprehended object and apprehending subject and so forth<sup>190</sup> which is imputed by childish beings. They are not non-existent in terms of the entity of the inexpressible objects of operation of Buddhas.**

Ordinary beings superimpose on phenomena the entityness which has the character of apprehended object and apprehending subject. As for that, those [phenomena] are selfless in terms of the entity which is superimposed in the character of apprehended object and apprehending subject. However, it is not the case that the inexpressible objects of Buddhas are also non-existent. This indicates the following:

The [imputed entity] of those superimpositions—on phenomena by [beings] who do not see suchness<sup>191</sup>—as the entity of apprehended object and apprehending subject does not exist. However, it is not the case that the other-powered and thoroughly established natures of those [phenomena]—i.e., the objects of a Tathāgata's exalted wisdom—are non-existent.

It is like this: The term “the selflessness of phenomena” does not refer to mere non-existence, but refers instead to a particular kind of condition. It is like this: The words [“selflessness of phenomena”] apply to just that in this way. The voidness of the self which has the character of apprehended object and apprehending subject in other-powered and thoroughly established phenomena is selflessness; such phenomena are without self.

<sup>190</sup> The phrase, “...as appended object and apprehending subject and so forth” accords with the Sanskrit which reads, ...*yo bālair dharmāṇaṃ svabhāvo grāhya-grāhakādīḥ* ...etc.

<sup>191</sup> In Peking 319.2.5 read *de kho na ma mthong ba* for *de kho na mthong ba* according to Tokyo 92.3.5.

The selflessness of phenomena is another way of saying “non-existence of apprehended objects and apprehending subjects in other-powered and thoroughly established phenomena.” Therefore minds and mental factors which are devoid of apprehended objects and apprehending subjects [319.3] are taught as “selfless,” but<sup>192</sup> they are not taught as merely<sup>193</sup> non-existent. Also, the selflessness of persons is not just the mere non-existence of persons, but is the absence of a person thoroughly imputed to exist in compositional phenomena by others [i.e., non-Buddhists]. “In terms of the entity of the inexpressible”<sup>194</sup> is another way of saying, “In terms of its own entity which cannot be expressed.”<sup>195</sup>

In order to indicate the value of thoroughly apprehending such a type of the selflessness of phenomena [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**Since, in that way, even cognition-only is realized as selfless in terms of the entity imputed by another cognition [i.e., a consciousness conceiving subject and object to be different entities], it is posited as cognition-only; through that, there is entry into the selflessness of phenomena with respect to all phenomena. However, it is not through denying existence with respect to those in all ways.**

When the non-existence of apprehended object and apprehending subject is thoroughly apprehended as the selflessness of phenomena, then even minds and mental factors are understood to be devoid of the entity which has the character<sup>196</sup> of apprehended object and apprehending subject imputed by other minds and mental factors which are not those

<sup>192</sup> In Peking 319.3.1 read *bstan pa yin gyi* for *bstan pa yin gyis* according to Tokyo 92.4.1.

<sup>193</sup> In Tokyo 92.4.1 read *med pa tsam* for *med pa can* according to Peking 319.3.1.

<sup>194</sup> *brjod du med pa'i bdag nyid kyis, anabhilāpyenātmanā.*

<sup>195</sup> *brjod par mi nus par rang gi ngo bos.*

<sup>196</sup> In Peking 319.3.4 read *mishan nyid kyi bdag nyid* for *mishan kyis bdag nyid* according to Tokyo 92.4.3.

[minds and mental factors]. Hence, the voidness of apprehended object and apprehending subject is posited<sup>197</sup> just with respect to minds and mental factors. Through positing minds and mental factors as being devoid of apprehended object and apprehending subject, there is entry into the selflessness with respect to all phenomena, but there is *not* [entry into the selflessness of phenomena] through complete denial even of existent phenomena.

Nevertheless, someone wonders: “What is the fault in not asserting such [i.e., that minds and mental factors are devoid of apprehended object and apprehending subject]?” Therefore, with respect to this qualm [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**Otherwise, a cognition would have as its object another cognition [i.e., a consciousness would have as its object another consciousness that is an external object] and, therefore, would not be established as just cognition-only...**

If minds and mental factors were not devoid of the entity which has the character<sup>198</sup> of apprehended object and apprehending subject imputed by other<sup>199</sup> minds and mental factors which are not those<sup>200</sup> [minds and mental factors], then they would be asserted to be [external] objects of other cognitions and, therefore, would not be established as cognition-only.

Someone wonders: “Why is that?” With respect to that qualm, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

**... since cognitions would have [external] objects. [319.4]**

---

<sup>197</sup> In Tokyo 92.4.4 read *rnam par gzhaḡ pa yin no* for *rnam par gzhaḡ pa med pa yin no* according to Peking 319.3.5.

<sup>198</sup> In Tokyo 92.4.5 read *mtshan nyid kyi* for *mtshan nyid kyis* according to Peking 319.3.7-8.

<sup>199</sup> In Peking 319.3.7 read *sems las byung ba gzhan gyis* for *sems las byung gyis* according to Tokyo 92.4.5.

<sup>200</sup> In Tokyo 92.4.5 read *sems las byung ba de ma yin pa* for *sems las byung ba gzhan gyis* according to Peking 319.3.7.



It is like this: [A cognition] having an [external] object would then not be [mere] cognition. In that case,<sup>201</sup> how could [all three realms] be established as cognition-only? It is like this: If the term “cognition-only” refers to<sup>202</sup> minds and mental factors that are devoid of apprehended object and apprehending subject, then if some apprehend those, or if others apprehend those, then how could cognition-only be established?<sup>203</sup> It is like this: Apprehended object and apprehending subject are not refuted with respect to just the form aggregate, but [are refuted] with respect to all phenomena. Therefore, even minds and mental factors are devoid of apprehended object and apprehending subject. Accordingly, selflessness is established with respect to *all* phenomena.

Since up until now no reasonings [showing that] apprehended object and apprehending subject are insubstantial have been expressed, here, in order to banish the Proponents of External Objects, [Vasubandhu, in his autocommentary] says,

***Question: How is it realized that the Supramundane Victor, with this thought, said that the sense spheres of form and so forth exist and said that those forms and so forth which exist do not serve as objects of individual cognitions?***

---

<sup>201</sup> In Peking 319.4.1 read *de ltar na* for *da ltar na* according to Tokyo 92.4.6.

<sup>202</sup> In Peking 319.4.2 read *sems les byung ba dag la bya na* for *sems las byung ba ga la bya na* according to Tokyo 92.4.7.

<sup>203</sup> I read the preceding passage in the following way: It is like this:

If the term “cognition-only” refers to minds and mental factors that are devoid of apprehended object and apprehending subject, then if some [of these minds and mental factors that *lack* apprehended object and apprehending subject] apprehend those [minds and mental factors that *lack* apprehended object and apprehending subject] or if others [i.e., minds and mental factors that *have* apprehended object and apprehending subject] apprehend those [minds and mental factors that *lack* apprehended object and apprehending subject], then how could cognition-only be established?

*Question:* How is it evident that, “The Supramundane Victor,<sup>204</sup> thinking of respective seeds and appearances, said that the sense spheres of forms and so forth exist and said that it is not the case that forms and so forth which exist as real objects serve as the things which are the objects of cognitions”? This indicates the following:

If something in its literal reading is contradictory with reasoning, then it is suitable to designate it as having a thought behind it. Since that is the case, why<sup>205</sup> is this [teaching of forms and so forth existing as external objects] designated as having a thought behind it when there is no contradiction with reasoning with regard to the literal reading of this?

---

<sup>204</sup> In Peking 319.4.5 read *bcom ldan 'das kyis* for *bcom ldan 'das kyi* according to Tokyo 93.1.2.

<sup>205</sup> In Tokyo 93.1.4 read *ci'i phyir dgongs pa can* for *ci'i phyir ro zhes dgongs pa can* according to Peking 319.4.8.

## APPENDICES

## SANSKRIT-TIBETAN-ENGLISH GLOSSARY

<i>aṃśa</i>	<i>cha</i>	part; portion
<i>a-kuśala</i>	<i>mi dge ba</i>	non-virtuous
<i>adhi-ṣṭāna</i>	<i>dbang</i>	power; force
<i>adhi-ṣṭhita</i>	<i>bsrungs ba</i>	guarded
<i>an-anubhūtam</i>	<i>myong ba med pa</i>	unexperienced
<i>a-nāraka</i>	<i>sems can dmyal ba pa ma</i> <i>yin pa</i>	non-hell-being
<i>a-niyama</i>	<i>nges pa med</i>	non-restriction
<i>anubhūtam; anubhava</i>	<i>myong ba</i>	experienced; experience
<i>an-ekam</i>	<i>du ma</i>	plurality; multitude
<i>antar-āla</i>	<i>bar</i>	intermediate space
<i>anna</i>	<i>bza' ba</i>	food
<i>abhiprāya</i>	<i>dgongs</i>	intention; thought
<i>abhipreta</i>	<i>dgongs pa</i>	intended
<i>abyāsa</i>	<i>goms pa</i>	cultivate
<i>a-manuṣa</i>	<i>mi ma yin pa</i>	non-human
<i>ayas-parvata</i>	<i>lcags kyi ri</i>	iron mountains
<i>ayaḥ-śālmali</i>	<i>lcags kyi shal ma la</i>	iron hell-trees
<i>artha</i>	<i>don</i>	object
<i>arvāg</i>	<i>tshur rol</i>	near; close
<i>arvāg-bhāga</i>	<i>tshur rol gyi cha</i>	near/close part
<i>avadya</i>	<i>kha na ma tho ba</i>	blame; fault
<i>avabhāsa</i>	<i>snang ba</i>	appearance
<i>avayava</i>	<i>cha shas</i>	parts
<i>avayavin</i>	<i>cha shas can</i>	whole; possessing parts

<i>aśva</i>	<i>rta</i>	horse
<i>asat-dharma</i>	<i>dam pa ma yin pa' i chos</i>	false doctrine
<i>asat-artha</i>	<i>don med</i>	non-existent object
<i>asat-keśa-candra-ādi</i>	<i>skra zla la sogs pa med pa</i>	non-existent hairs, moons, and so forth
<i>asi</i>	<i>ral gri</i>	sword(s)
<i>a-supta</i>	<i>gnyid kyis ma log pa</i>	not sleeping
<i>asti-tvam</i>	<i>yod pa</i>	existence
<i>ākṛti</i>	<i>byad gzugs</i>	shape
<i>āgama</i>	<i>lung</i>	scripture
<i>ātman</i>	<i>bdag; bdag nyid</i>	self; entity
<i>ābhāsā</i>	<i>snang ba</i>	appearance
<i>āyudha-ādi</i>	<i>mtshon la sogs pa</i>	weapons and so forth
<i>āyatana</i>	<i>skye mched</i>	sense sphere
<i>ārāma</i>	<i>kun dga' ra ba</i>	(pleasure) grove
<i>āvaraṇam; āvṛti</i>	<i>sgrib pa</i>	obstruction
<i>āveśa</i>	<i>phab par gyur pa</i>	possession [by demons]
<i>upaghāta</i>	<i>gnod pa</i>	harm
<i>upapāduka</i>	<i>rdzus te byung ba</i>	spontaneously born
<i>upapāduka-sattva</i>	<i>rdzus te byung ba' i sems can</i>	spontaneously born being(s)
<i>urabhra</i>	<i>lug</i>	sheep
<i>ūdaka-jantu</i>	<i>chu' i skye bo</i>	water creature
<i>ṛddhi</i>	<i>rdzu ' phrul</i>	magical power
<i>ṛddhi-vat</i>	<i>rdzu ' phrul dang ldan pa</i>	possessing magical power
<i>ṛṣi</i>	<i>drang srong</i>	sage
<i>ekam</i>	<i>gcig bu</i>	unitary

<i>aurabhrika</i>	<i>shan pa</i>	shepherd; butcher
<i>kaḍācit</i>	<i>res 'ga'</i>	sometimes
<i>kaṇḍaka</i>	<i>tsher ma</i>	thorn
<i>kāya</i>	<i>lus</i>	body
<i>kalpita</i>	<i>brtags pa</i>	imputed; imaginary
<i>kalpita-ātman</i>	<i>brtags pa'i bdag nyid</i>	imputed entity
<i>kalyāṇa-mitra</i>	<i>dge ba'i bshes gnyen</i>	virtuous friend
<i>kāraṇam</i>	<i>gtan tshigs</i>	reason
<i>kāla</i>	<i>dus</i>	time
<i>kuśala</i>	<i>dge ba</i>	virtuous; wholesome
<i>kr̥tya-</i>	<i>bya ba</i>	function
<i>kr̥tya-kriyā</i>	<i>bya ba byed pa</i>	performance of function
<i>keśa</i>	<i>skra</i>	hair
<i>keśa-bhramara-ādi</i>	<i>skra dang sbrang bu la</i>	hair, bees, and so forth
	<i>sogs pa</i>	
<i>kopa</i>	<i>khros pa</i>	anger
<i>krameṇa</i>	<i>rim gyis</i>	gradually
<i>kvacit-deśa</i>	<i>yul la lar</i>	in some places
<i>gandharva</i>	<i>dri za'</i>	Fragrance Eater
<i>gandharva-nagara</i>	<i>dri za'i grong khyer</i>	city of Fragrance Eaters
<i>guṇa</i>	<i>yon gtan</i>	value; quality
<i>gocara</i>	<i>spyod yul</i>	sphere of activity
<i>grahaṇa</i>	<i>zin pa</i>	apprehension
<i>grāhaka</i>	<i>'dzin pa</i>	apprehending subject
<i>grāhya</i>	<i>gzung pa</i>	apprehended object
<i>ghaṭa</i>	<i>bum pa</i>	pot
<i>ghṛta</i>	<i>mar</i>	ghee

<i>ghṛta-ghaṭa</i>	<i>mar gyi bum pa</i>	ghee-pot
<i>cakṣur</i>	<i>mig</i>	eye
<i>cakṣur-vijñāna</i>	<i>mig gi rnam par shes pa</i>	eye-consciousness
<i>citta</i>	<i>sems</i>	mind
<i>citta-mātra</i>	<i>sems tsam</i>	mind-only
<i>chāyā</i>	<i>grib pa</i>	shade
<i>jāgrat</i>	<i>gnyid kyis ma log pa</i>	awake
<i>jīvita</i>	<i>srog</i>	life
<i>jīvita-indriya</i>	<i>srog gi dbang po</i>	life-force
<i>jñāna</i>	<i>ye shes</i>	wisdom; knowledge
<i>jñāpita</i>	<i>bstan pa</i>	taught
<i>tarka</i>	<i>rtog ge</i>	reasoning; logic
<i>tiryak</i>	<i>dud 'gro</i>	animal
<i>tulya-</i>	<i>mtshungs pa</i>	similar
<i>tulya-karma-vipāka</i>	<i>las kyī rnam par smin pa</i>	similar fruition of karma
	<i>mtshungs pa</i>	
<i>tulya-ākṛti-pramāṇa-bala</i>	<i>byad gzugs dangbong tshod</i>	similar shape, size, and
	<i>dang stobs mtshungs pa</i>	power
<i>taimirika</i>	<i>rab rib can</i>	one with an eye disease
<i>traiḍhātuka</i>	<i>khamṣ gsum po</i>	all three realms
<i>daṇḍa</i>	<i>dbyig pa</i>	clubs
<i>darśanam</i>	<i>mthong ba</i>	perception; seeing
<i>dāha</i>	<i>tsha ba</i>	heat
<i>digbhāga</i>	<i>phyogs</i>	direction
<i>digbhāga-bheda</i>	<i>phyogs cha</i>	directional parts
<i>duḥkha</i>	<i>sdus bsngal</i>	suffering
<i>deśa</i>	<i>yul</i>	place

<i>doṣa</i>	<i>nyes pa</i>	fault; deficiency
<i>dravyam</i>	<i>rdzas</i>	substantial entity
<i>dhara</i>	<i>thogs pa</i>	holding
<i>dharmā</i>	<i>chos</i>	phenomena
<i>dharmā-nairātmya</i>	<i>chos kyi bdag med</i>	selflessness of phenomena
<i>nagara</i>	<i>grong khyer</i>	city
<i>nadī</i>	<i>klung</i>	river
<i>naraka</i>	<i>dmyal ba; sems can dmyal ba</i>	hells
<i>naraka-pāla</i>	<i>sems can dmyal ba'i srung ma</i>	hell-guardians
<i>nāraka</i>	<i>sems can dmyal ba'i sems can</i>	hell-beings
<i>nidrā</i>	<i>gnyid</i>	sleep
<i>niyama</i>	<i>nges pa</i>	restriction
<i>nir-abhilāpya</i>	<i>brjod du med pa</i>	inexpressible
<i>nir-avayava</i>	<i>cha shas med pa</i>	partless
<i>niruddha</i>	<i>'gags pa</i>	stopped; ceased
<i>nir-vikalpa</i>	<i>rnam par mi rtog pa</i>	non-conceptual
<i>nir-vikalpa-jñāna</i>	<i>rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye shes</i>	non-conceptual wisdom
<i>nīla</i>	<i>sngon po</i>	blue
<i>nairātmya</i>	<i>bdag med</i>	selflessness
<i>para-bhāga</i>	<i>pha rol gyi cha</i>	far part
<i>para-vijñapti</i>	<i>gzhan gyi rnam par rig pa</i>	other-cognition
<i>paramāṇu</i>	<i>phra rab rdul; rdul phran</i>	particle; subtle particle
<i>parikalpita</i>	<i>kun brtags pa</i>	imputed/imaginary nature



<i>pariṇāma</i>	<i>'gyur ba</i>	transformation
<i>pariṇāma-viśeṣa</i>	<i>'gyur ba' i bye brag</i>	type of transformation
<i>paryāya</i>	<i>rnam grangs</i>	synonym
<i>parvata</i>	<i>ri</i>	mountain
<i>pāna</i>	<i>btung ba</i>	drink
<i>pāpa-mitra</i>	<i>sdig pa' i grogs po</i>	evil friend
<i>piṇḍa</i>	<i>gong bu</i>	mass
<i>piśāca</i>	<i>'dre</i>	[flesh eating] demon(s)
<i>pīta</i>	<i>ser po</i>	yellow
<i>pudgala-</i>	<i>gang zag</i>	persons
<i>pudgala-nairātmya</i>	<i>gang zag gi bdag med</i>	selflessness of persons
<i>purīṣa</i>	<i>ngan pa</i>	excrement
<i>puruṣa</i>	<i>skyes pa; mi</i>	men; person
<i>pūya</i>	<i>rnag</i>	pus
<i>pūya-nadi</i>	<i>klung la rnag; rnag gi klung</i>	pus-river
<i>pūya-pūrṇa</i>	<i>rnag gis gang ba</i>	filled with pus
<i>pratighāta</i>	<i>thogs pa</i>	contact; bump; resistance
<i>pratipakṣa</i>	<i>gnyen po</i>	antidote
<i>pratibhāsā</i>	<i>snang ba</i>	appearance
<i>pratyakṣa</i>	<i>mngon sum</i>	direct perception
<i>pradīpta</i>	<i>rab tu 'bar ba</i>	strongly burning
<i>prabuddha</i>	<i>sad pa</i>	one who is awake
<i>pramāṇa</i>	<i>bong tshod</i>	size
<i>pramāṇa</i>	<i>tshad ma</i>	valid cognition
<i>praveśa</i>	<i>'jug pa</i>	entrance
<i>prāṇātipāta</i>	<i>srog gcod</i>	killing; slaughter
<i>preta</i>	<i>yi dvags</i>	hungry ghost

<i>phala</i>	<i>'bras bu</i>	effect
<i>bala</i>	<i>stobs</i>	power; force
<i>bādhana</i>	<i>gnod pa</i>	harm; molestation
<i>bāla</i>	<i>byis pa</i>	childish beings
<i>bīja</i>	<i>sa bon</i>	seed
<i>buddha</i>	<i>sangs rgyas</i>	Buddha
<i>buddhi</i>	<i>blo</i>	awareness
<i>bhagavān</i>	<i>bcom ldan 'das</i>	Supramudane Victor
<i>bhājana-loka</i>	<i>snod kyi 'jig rten</i>	worldly environment
<i>bhūta-graha</i>	<i>'byung po'i gdon</i>	demon(s)
<i>bhūta</i>	<i>'byung ba</i>	element
<i>bhūta-viśeṣa</i>	<i>'byung ba'i bye brag</i>	certain [physical] elements
<i>bhūmi</i>	<i>sa gzhi</i>	ground
<i>bheda</i>	<i>tha dad</i>	different
<i>bhramara</i>	<i>sbrang bu</i>	bees
<i>manah-pradoṣa</i>	<i>yid 'khrugs pa</i>	mental corruption
<i>manas</i>	<i>yid</i>	mentality
<i>mano-daṇḍa</i>	<i>yid nyes</i>	mental violence/fault
<i>mano-vaśa</i>	<i>yid dbang</i>	mental power
<i>mano-vijñāna</i>	<i>yid kyi rnam par shes pa</i>	mental consciousness
<i>marāṇa</i>	<i>'chi ba</i>	death
<i>mahāyāna</i>	<i>theg pa chen po</i>	Great Vehicle
<i>middha</i>	<i>gnyid</i>	sloth; sleep
<i>mūtra</i>	<i>gcin</i>	urine
<i>meṣa</i>	<i>lug</i>	sheep
<i>yathātram</i>	<i>go rim bzhin du</i>	respectively
<i>yathāvat</i>	<i>ji lta ba bzhin du</i>	exactly; in that way

<i>yuktā</i>	<i>rigs</i>	feasible; suitable
<i>yugapad</i>	<i>cig car</i>	simultaneously
<i>yoga</i>	<i>sbyar ba; ldan pa</i>	conjunction; association
<i>rūpa</i>	<i>gzugs</i>	(visible) form(s)
<i>rūpa-ādi</i>	<i>gzugs la sogs pa</i>	forms and so forth
<i>lakṣaṇa</i>	<i>mtshan nyid</i>	case; sign; characteristic
<i>loka</i>	<i>'jig rten</i>	world; people
<i>lokottara</i>	<i>'jig rten las 'das pa</i>	supramundane
<i>laukika-jñāna</i>	<i>'jig rten pa'i ye shes</i>	worldly wisdom
<i>vana</i>	<i>nags tshal</i>	grove; forest
<i>varṇa</i>	<i>mdog</i>	color
<i>vaśa</i>	<i>dbang</i>	force; power
<i>vastra</i>	<i>bgo ba</i>	clothing
<i>vāk</i>	<i>ngag</i>	speech
<i>vāyasa</i>	<i>bya rog</i>	crow; bird
<i>vāsana</i>	<i>bag chags</i>	predisposition
<i>vikalpa</i>	<i>rnam par rtog pa</i>	conceptual
<i>vikriyā</i>	<i>'gyur ba</i>	transformation
<i>vicchinna</i>	<i>ris chad; ris su chad pa</i>	separate
<i>viññapti</i>	<i>rnam par rig pa</i>	cognition
<i>viññapti-mātra</i>	<i>rnam par rig pa tsam</i>	cognition-only
<i>viññāna</i>	<i>rnam par shes pa</i>	consciousness
<i>vitatha-</i>	<i>log pa</i>	mistaken
<i>vitatha-vikalpa</i>	<i>log pa'i rtog pa</i>	mistaken conceptions
<i>vinā-</i>	<i>med pa</i>	without
<i>vinā-arthena</i>	<i>don med pa</i>	without [external] objects
<i>vineya</i>	<i>'dul ba</i>	to be tamed/trained

<i>vineya-jana</i>	<i>'dul ba'i skye bo</i>	beings to be tamed/trained
<i>vipāka</i>	<i>rnam par smin pa</i>	fruition; maturation
<i>virodhinī</i>	<i>mi mthun pa</i>	incompatible
<i>viṣa</i>	<i>dug</i>	poison
<i>viṣaya</i>	<i>spyod yul; yul</i>	objects of operation; sense objects
<i>vaiśeṣika</i>	<i>bye brag pa</i>	Vaiśeṣika
<i>śukra</i>	<i>khu ba</i>	semen
<i>śuddha</i>	<i>dag pa</i>	pure; clear; correct
<i>śūnya(tā)</i>	<i>stong pa (nyid)</i>	empty (emptiness)
<i>śva; śvān</i>	<i>khyi</i>	dog(s)
<i>saṃjñā</i>	<i>ming</i>	name
<i>saṃtāna; santāna</i>	<i>sems; rgyud</i>	continuum
<i>saṃyoga</i>	<i>sbyor ba</i>	conjunction
<i>saṃhata; saṃghata</i>	<i>'dus pa</i>	aggregation; composite
<i>sakṛta-pāda-kṣepeṇa</i>	<i>gom pa gcig bor bas</i>	with a single step
<i>sattva</i>	<i>sems can</i>	sentient being(s)
<i>sat-dharma</i>	<i>dam pa'i chos</i>	true doctrine
<i>samāna-deśa</i>	<i>go gcig</i>	same place
<i>samāpatti</i>	<i>phrad pa</i>	come together
<i>sarvatra</i>	<i>thams cad</i>	all places (everywhere)
<i>sarvadā</i>	<i>thams cad du</i>	at all times
<i>sukha</i>	<i>bde ba</i>	pleasure
<i>supta</i>	<i>gnyid kyis log pa</i>	[those who are] sleeping
<i>sūkṣma</i>	<i>phra mo</i>	subtle; minute
<i>sūtra</i>	<i>mdo</i>	sūtra; scripture
<i>stri</i>	<i>bud med</i>	women

<i>smaraṇa</i>	<i>dran pa</i>	recollection
<i>smṛti</i>	<i>dran pa</i>	memory
<i>smṛti-lopa</i>	<i>dran nyams</i>	forgetfulness; (memory- loss)
<i>sva-</i>	<i>rang gi</i>	own-
<i>svapna</i>	<i>rmi lam</i>	dream
<i>svapna-iva</i>	<i>rmis pa dang mtshung pa</i>	similar to a dream
<i>svapna-darśana</i>	<i>rmi ltas su mthong ba</i>	dream seeing
<i>svapna-vat</i>	<i>rmi 'dra</i>	as in a dream
<i>sva-bīja</i>	<i>rang gi sa bon</i>	own-seeds
<i>sva-bhāva</i>	<i>rang bzhin</i>	nature; own being
<i>svarga</i>	<i>mtho ris</i>	areas of high status
<i>hastin</i>	<i>glang po che</i>	elephant

## TIBETAN-SANSKRIT-ENGLISH GLOSSARY

<i>kun dga' ra ba</i>	<i>ārāma</i>	(pleasure) grove
<i>kun brtags pa</i>	<i>parikalpita</i>	imputed/imaginary nature
<i>skye mched</i>	<i>āyatana</i>	sense sphere
<i>skyes pa; mi</i>	<i>puruṣa</i>	men; persons
<i>skra</i>	<i>keśa</i>	hair
<i>skra dang sbrang bu la</i>	<i>keśa-bhramara-ādi</i>	hair, bees, and so forth
<i>sogs pa</i>		
<i>skra zla la sogs pa med pa</i>	<i>asat-keśa-candra-ādi</i>	non-existent hairs, moons, and so forth
<i>klung</i>	<i>nadi</i>	river
<i>klung la rnag; rnag gi klung</i>	<i>pūya-nadi</i>	pus-river
<i>kha na ma tho ba</i>	<i>avadya</i>	blame; fault
<i>khams gsum po</i>	<i>traidhātuka</i>	all three realms
<i>khu ba</i>	<i>śukra</i>	semen
<i>khyi</i>	<i>śva; śvān</i>	dog(s)
<i>khros pa</i>	<i>kopa</i>	anger; hatred
<i>gang zag</i>	<i>pudgala-</i>	persons
<i>gang zag gi bdag med</i>	<i>pudgala-nairātmya</i>	selflessness of persons
<i>go gcig</i>	<i>saṁāna-deśa</i>	same place
<i>go rim bzhin du</i>	<i>yathā-atram</i>	respectively
<i>gong bu</i>	<i>piṇḍa</i>	mass
<i>gom pa gcig bor bas</i>	<i>sakṛta-pāda-kṣepeṇa</i>	with a single step
<i>goms pa</i>	<i>abyāsa</i>	cultivate
<i>grang srong</i>	<i>ṛṣi</i>	sage; seer
<i>grib pa</i>	<i>chāyā</i>	shade

<i>grong khyer</i>	<i>nagara</i>	city
<i>glang po che</i>	<i>hastin</i>	elephant
<i>dge ba</i>	<i>kuśala</i>	virtuous; wholesome
<i>dge ba' i bshes gnyen</i>	<i>kalyāṇa-mitra</i>	virtuous friend
<i>dgongs</i>	<i>abhiprāya</i>	intention; thought
<i>dgongs pa</i>	<i>abhipreta</i>	intended
<i>bgo ba</i>	<i>vastra</i>	clothing
<i>'gags pa</i>	<i>niruddha</i>	stopped; ceased
<i>'gyur ba</i>	<i>pariṇāma; vikriyā</i>	transformation
<i>'gyur ba' i bye brag</i>	<i>pariṇāma-viśeṣa</i>	type of transformation
<i>rgyud; sems</i>	<i>saṃtāna; santāna</i>	continuum
<i>sgrib pa</i>	<i>āvaraṇam; āvṛti</i>	obstruction
<i>ngag</i>	<i>vāk</i>	speech
<i>ngan pa</i>	<i>puriṣa</i>	excrement
<i>nges pa</i>	<i>niyama</i>	restriction
<i>nges pa med</i>	<i>a-niyama</i>	non-restriction
<i>mngon sum</i>	<i>pratyakṣa</i>	direct perception
<i>sngon po</i>	<i>nila</i>	blue
<i>cig car</i>	<i>yugapad</i>	simultaneously
<i>gcig bu</i>	<i>ekam</i>	unitary
<i>gcin</i>	<i>mūtra</i>	urine
<i>bcom ldan 'das</i>	<i>bhāgavān</i>	Supramudane Victor
<i>lcags kyi ri</i>	<i>ayas-parvata</i>	iron mountains
<i>lcags kyi shal ma la</i>	<i>ayaḥ-śālmali</i>	iron hell-trees
<i>cha</i>	<i>aṃśa</i>	part; portion
<i>cha shas</i>	<i>avayava</i>	parts
<i>cha shas can</i>	<i>avayavin</i>	whole; possessing parts

<i>cha shas med pa</i>	<i>nir-avayava</i>	partless
<i>chu'i skye bo</i>	<i>ūdaka-jantu</i>	water creature
<i>chos</i>	<i>dharma</i>	phenomena
<i>chos kyi bdag med</i>	<i>dharma-nairātmya</i>	selflessness of phenomena
<i>'chi ba</i>	<i>marāṇa</i>	death
<i>ji lta ba bzhin du</i>	<i>yathāvat</i>	exactly; in that way
<i>'jig rten</i>	<i>loka</i>	world; people
<i>'jig rten las 'das pa</i>	<i>lokottara</i>	supramundane
<i>'jig rten pa'i ye shes</i>	<i>laukika-jñāna</i>	worldly wisdom
<i>'jug pa</i>	<i>praveśa</i>	entrance
<i>brjod du med pa</i>	<i>nir-abhilāpya</i>	inexpressible
<i>nyes pa</i>	<i>doṣa</i>	fault; deficiency
<i>gnyid</i>	<i>nidrā; middha; supta</i>	sleep; sloth
<i>gnyid kyis ma log pa</i>	<i>a-supta; jāgrat</i>	not sleeping; awake
<i>gnyid kyis log pa</i>	<i>supta</i>	[those who are] sleeping
<i>gnyen po</i>	<i>pratipakṣa</i>	antidote
<i>gtan tshigs</i>	<i>kāraṇa</i>	reason
<i>btung ba</i>	<i>pāna</i>	drink
<i>rta</i>	<i>aśva</i>	horse
<i>rtog ge</i>	<i>tarka</i>	reasoning; logic
<i>stong pa (nyid)</i>	<i>śūnya(tā)</i>	empty (emptiness)
<i>stobs</i>	<i>bālā</i>	power; force
<i>brtags pa</i>	<i>kalpita</i>	imputed; imaginary
<i>brtags pa'i bdag nyid</i>	<i>kalpita-ātman</i>	imputed entity
<i>bstan pa</i>	<i>jñāpita</i>	taught
<i>tha dad</i>	<i>bheda</i>	different
<i>thams cad</i>	<i>sarvatra</i>	all places (everywhere)



<i>thams cad du</i>	<i>sarvadā</i>	at all times
<i>theg pa chen po</i>	<i>mahāyāna</i>	Great Vehicle
<i>thogs pa</i>	<i>dhara</i>	holding
<i>thogs pa</i>	<i>pratighāta</i>	contact; bump; resistance
<i>ntho ris</i>	<i>svarga</i>	areas of high status
<i>nthong ba</i>	<i>darśana</i>	perception; seeing
<i>dag pa</i>	<i>śuddha</i>	pure; clear; correct
<i>dam pa ma yin pa'i chos</i>	<i>asat-dharma</i>	false doctrine
<i>dam pa'i chos</i>	<i>sat-dharma</i>	true doctrine
<i>du ma</i>	<i>an-ekam</i>	plurality; multitude
<i>dug</i>	<i>viṣa</i>	poison
<i>dud 'gro</i>	<i>tiryak</i>	animal
<i>dus</i>	<i>kāla</i>	time
<i>don</i>	<i>artha</i>	object
<i>don med</i>	<i>asat-artha</i>	non-existent object
<i>don med pa</i>	<i>vinā-arthena</i>	without [external] objects
<i>dran pa</i>	<i>smaraṇa</i>	recollection
<i>dran pa</i>	<i>smṛti</i>	memory
<i>dran nyams</i>	<i>smṛti-lopa</i>	forgetfulness; (memory-loss)
<i>dri za'</i>	<i>gandharva</i>	Fragrance Eater
<i>dri za'i grong khyer</i>	<i>gandharva-nagara</i>	city of Fragrance Eaters
<i>bdag; bdag nyid</i>	<i>ātman</i>	self; entity
<i>bdag med pa</i>	<i>nairātmya</i>	selflessness
<i>bde ba</i>	<i>sukha</i>	pleasure
<i>mdo</i>	<i>sūtra</i>	sūtra; scripture
<i>mdog</i>	<i>varṇa</i>	color

'dul ba	vineya	to be tamed/trained
'dul ba'i skye bo	vineya-jana	beings to be tamed/trained
'dus pa	saṃhata; saṃghata	aggregation; composite
'dre	piśāca	[flesh eating] demon(s)
rdul phran	paramanu	particle; subtle particle
ldan pa	yoga	conjunction; association
sdig pa'i grogs po	pāpa-mitra	evil friend
sdus bsngal	duḥkha	suffering
nags tshal	vana	grove; forest
gnod pa	upaghāta; bādhana	harm
rnag	pūya	pus
rnag gis gang ba	pūya-pūrṇa	filled with pus
rnām grangs	paryāya	synonym
rnām par rtog pa	vikalpa	conceptual
rnām par mi rtog pa	nir-vikalpa	non-conceptual
rnām par mi rtog pa'i ye	nir-vikalpa-jñāna	non-conceptual wisdom
shes		
rnām par smin pa	vipāka	fruition; maturation
rnām par rig pa	vijñapti	cognition
rnām par rig pa tsam	vijñapti-mātra	cognition-only
rnām par shes pa	vijñāna	consciousness
snang ba	avabhāsa; ābhāsa; pratibhāsa	appearance
snod kyi 'jig rten	bhājana-loka	worldly environment
spyod yul; yul	viṣaya	objects of operation; sense objects
spyod yul	gocara	sphere of activity

<i>pha rol gyi cha</i>	<i>para-bhāga</i>	far part
<i>phab par gyur pa</i>	<i>āveśa</i>	possession [by demons]
<i>phyogs</i>	<i>digbhāga</i>	direction
<i>phyogs cha</i>	<i>digbhāga-bheda</i>	directional parts
<i>phra mo</i>	<i>sūkṣma</i>	subtle; minute
<i>phra rab rdul; rdul phran</i>	<i>paramanu</i>	particle/subtle particle
<i>phrad pa</i>	<i>samāpatti</i>	come together
<i>bag chags</i>	<i>vāsana</i>	predisposition
<i>bar</i>	<i>antar-āla</i>	intermediate space
<i>bud med</i>	<i>stri</i>	women
<i>bum pa</i>	<i>ghaṭa</i>	pot
<i>bong tshod</i>	<i>pramāṇa</i>	size
<i>bya ba</i>	<i>kṛtya-</i>	function
<i>bya ba byed pa</i>	<i>kṛtya-kriyā</i>	performance of function
<i>bya rog</i>	<i>vāyasa</i>	crow; bird
<i>byad gzugs</i>	<i>ākṛti</i>	shape
<i>byad gzugs dangbong tshod</i>	<i>tulya-ākṛti-pramāṇa-bala</i>	similar shape, size, and
<i>dang stobs mtshungs pa</i>		power
<i>byis pa</i>	<i>bāla</i>	childish beings
<i>bye brag pa</i>	<i>vaiśeṣika</i>	Vaiśeṣika
<i>blo</i>	<i>buddhi</i>	awareness
<i>dbang</i>	<i>vaśa</i>	force; power
<i>dbyig pa</i>	<i>daṇḍa</i>	clubs
<i>'byung ba</i>	<i>bhūta</i>	element
<i>'byung ba'i bye brag</i>	<i>bhūta-viśeṣa</i>	certain [physical] elements
<i>'byung po'i gdon</i>	<i>bhūta-graha</i>	demon(s)
<i>'bras bu</i>	<i>phalam</i>	effect; fruit

<i>sbyar ba; ldan pa</i>	<i>yoga</i>	conjunction; association
<i>sbyor ba</i>	<i>saṃyoga</i>	conjunction
<i>sbrang bu</i>	<i>bhramara</i>	bees
<i>mar</i>	<i>ghṛta</i>	ghee
<i>mar gyi bum pa</i>	<i>ghṛta-ghaṭa</i>	ghee-pot; butter-pot
<i>mi dge ba</i>	<i>a-kuśala</i>	non-virtuous
<i>mi mthun pa</i>	<i>virodhinī</i>	incompatible
<i>mi ma yin pa</i>	<i>a-manuṣa</i>	non-human
<i>mig</i>	<i>cakṣur</i>	eye
<i>mig gi rnam par shes pa</i>	<i>cakṣur-vijñāna</i>	eye-consciousness
<i>ming</i>	<i>saṃjñā</i>	name
<i>med pa</i>	<i>vinā-</i>	without
<i>myong ba</i>	<i>anubhūta; anubhava</i>	experienced; experience
<i>myong ba med pa</i>	<i>an-anubhūta</i>	unexperienced
<i>dmyal ba; sems can dmyal ba</i>	<i>naraka</i>	hells
<i>rmi 'dra</i>	<i>svapna-vat</i>	as in a dream
<i>rmi lam</i>	<i>svapna</i>	dream
<i>rmis pa dang mtshung pa</i>	<i>svapna-iva</i>	similar to a dream
<i>tsha ba</i>	<i>dāha</i>	heat
<i>tshad ma</i>	<i>pramāṇa</i>	valid cognition
<i>tshur rol</i>	<i>arvāg</i>	near; close
<i>tshur rol gyi cha</i>	<i>arvāg-bhāga</i>	near/close part
<i>tsher ma</i>	<i>kaṇḍaka</i>	thorn
<i>mtshan nyid</i>	<i>lakṣaṇa</i>	case; sign; characteristic
<i>mtshungs pa</i>	<i>tulya-</i>	similar
<i>mtshon la sogs pa</i>	<i>āyudha-ādi</i>	weapons and so forth

<i>'dzin pa</i>	<i>grāhaka</i>	apprehending subject
<i>rdzas</i>	<i>dravyam</i>	substantial entity
<i>rdzu 'phrul</i>	<i>ṛddhi</i>	magical power
<i>rdzu 'phrul dang ldan pa</i>	<i>ṛddhi-vat</i>	possessing magical power
<i>rdzus te byung ba</i>	<i>upapāduka</i>	spontaneously born
<i>rdzus te byung ba'i sems</i>	<i>upapāduka-sattva</i>	spontaneously born beings
<i>can</i>		
<i>zin pa</i>	<i>grahana</i>	apprehension
<i>gzugs</i>	<i>rūpa</i>	(visible) form(s)
<i>gzugs la sogs pa</i>	<i>rūpa-ādi</i>	forms and so forth
<i>gzung pa</i>	<i>grāhya</i>	apprehended object
<i>bza' ba</i>	<i>anna</i>	food
<i>yi dvags</i>	<i>preta</i>	hungry ghost
<i>yid</i>	<i>manas</i>	mentality
<i>yid kyi rnam par shes pa</i>	<i>mano-vijñāna</i>	mental consciousness
<i>yid 'khrugs pa</i>	<i>manaḥ-pradośa</i>	mental corruption
<i>yid nyes</i>	<i>mano-daṇḍa</i>	mental violence/fault
<i>yid dbang</i>	<i>mano-vaśa</i>	mental power
<i>yul</i>	<i>deśa</i>	place
<i>yul la lar</i>	<i>kvacit-deśa</i>	in some places
<i>ye shes</i>	<i>jñāna</i>	wisdom; knowledge
<i>yod pa</i>	<i>asti-tvam</i>	existence
<i>yon gtan</i>	<i>guṇa</i>	value; quality
<i>rang gi</i>	<i>sva-</i>	own-
<i>rang gi sa bon</i>	<i>sva-bīja</i>	own-seeds
<i>rang bzhin</i>	<i>sva-bhāva</i>	nature; own being
<i>rab tu 'bar ba</i>	<i>pradipta</i>	strongly burning

<i>rab rib can</i>	<i>taimirika</i>	one with an eye disease
<i>ral gri</i>	<i>asi</i>	sword(s)
<i>ri</i>	<i>parvata</i>	mountain
<i>rigs</i>	<i>yuktā</i>	feasible; suitable
<i>rim gyis</i>	<i>kramaṇa</i>	gradually
<i>ris chad; ris su chad pa</i>	<i>vicchinna</i>	separate
<i>res 'ga'</i>	<i>kadācit</i>	sometimes
<i>las kyi rnam par smin pa</i>	<i>tulya-karma-vipāka</i>	similar fruition of karma
<i>mtshungs pa</i>		
<i>lug</i>	<i>urabhra; meṣa</i>	sheep
<i>lung</i>	<i>āgama</i>	scripture
<i>lus</i>	<i>kāya</i>	body
<i>log pa</i>	<i>vitatha-</i>	mistaken
<i>log pa'i rtog pa</i>	<i>vitatha-vikalpa</i>	mistaken conceptions
<i>shan pa</i>	<i>aurabhrika</i>	shepherd; butcher
<i>sa bon</i>	<i>bijam</i>	seed
<i>sa gzhi</i>	<i>bhūmi</i>	ground
<i>sangs rgyas</i>	<i>buddha</i>	Buddha
<i>sad pa</i>	<i>prabuddha</i>	one who is awake
<i>sems</i>	<i>cittam</i>	mind
<i>sems can</i>	<i>sattva</i>	sentient being(s)
<i>sems can dmyal ba pa ma</i>	<i>a-nāraka</i>	non-hell-being
<i>yin pa</i>		
<i>sems can dmyal ba'i sems</i>	<i>nāraka</i>	hell-beings
<i>can</i>		
<i>sems can dmyal ba'i srung</i>	<i>naraka-pāla</i>	hell-guardians
<i>ma</i>		

<i>sems tsam</i>	<i>citta-mātra</i>	mind-only
<i>ser po</i>	<i>pīta</i>	yellow
<i>srog</i>	<i>jīvita</i>	life
<i>srog gi dbang po</i>	<i>jīvita-indriya</i>	life-force
<i>srog gcod</i>	<i>prāṇātipāta</i>	killing; slaughter
<i>bsrungs ba</i>	<i>adhi-ṣṭhita</i>	guarded

**ENGLISH-SANSKRIT-TIBETAN GLOSSARY**

aggregation; composite	<i>saṃhata; saṃghata</i>	<i>'dus pa</i>
all places (everywhere)	<i>sarvatra</i>	<i>thams cad</i>
all three realms	<i>traidhātukam</i>	<i>khams gsum po</i>
anger	<i>kopa</i>	<i>khros pa</i>
animal	<i>tiryak</i>	<i>dud 'gro</i>
antidote	<i>pratipakṣa</i>	<i>gnyen po</i>
appearance	<i>ābhāsā; pratibhāsā; avabhāsana</i>	<i>snang ba</i>
apprehended object	<i>grāhya</i>	<i>gzung pa</i>
apprehending subject	<i>grāhaka</i>	<i>'dzin pa</i>
apprehension	<i>grahaṇa</i>	<i>zin pa</i>
areas of high status; heaven	<i>svarga</i>	<i>mtho ris</i>
as in a dream	<i>svapna-vat</i>	<i>rmi 'dra</i>
at all times	<i>sarvadā</i>	<i>thams cad du</i>
awake	<i>jāgrat</i>	<i>gnyid kyis ma log pa</i>
awareness	<i>buddhi</i>	<i>blo</i>
bees	<i>bhramara</i>	<i>sbrang bu</i>
beings to be tamed/trained	<i>vineya-jana</i>	<i>'dul ba'i skye bo</i>
blame; fault	<i>avadya</i>	<i>kha na ma tho ba</i>
blue	<i>nila</i>	<i>sngon po</i>
body	<i>kāya</i>	<i>lus</i>
Buddha	<i>buddha</i>	<i>sangs rgyas</i>
butcher; shepherd	<i>aurabhrika</i>	<i>shan pa</i>
case; sign; characteristic	<i>lakṣaṇa</i>	<i>mtshan nyid</i>
ceased; stopped	<i>niruddha</i>	<i>'gags pa</i>



certain [physical] elements	<i>bhūta-viśeṣa</i>	<i>'byung ba'i bye brag</i>
childish beings	<i>bāla</i>	<i>byis pa</i>
city	<i>nagara</i>	<i>grong khyer</i>
city of Fragrance Eaters	<i>gandharva-nagara</i>	<i>dri za'i grong khyer</i>
clear; pure; correct	<i>śuddha</i>	<i>dag pa</i>
clothing	<i>vastra</i>	<i>bgo ba</i>
clubs	<i>daṇḍa</i>	<i>dbyig pa</i>
cognition	<i>viñapti</i>	<i>rnam par rig pa</i>
cognition-only	<i>viñapti-mātra</i>	<i>rnam par rig pa tsam</i>
color	<i>varṇa</i>	<i>mdog</i>
come together	<i>samāpatti</i>	<i>phrad pa</i>
conceptual	<i>vikalpa</i>	<i>rnam par rtog pa</i>
conjunction	<i>saṃyoga</i>	<i>sbyor ba</i>
conjunction; association	<i>yoga</i>	<i>sbyar ba; ldan pa</i>
consciousness	<i>viñāna</i>	<i>rnam par shes pa</i>
contact; bump; resistance	<i>pratighāta</i>	<i>thogs pa</i>
continuum	<i>saṃtāna; santāna</i>	<i>sems; rgyud</i>
correct; clear; pure	<i>śuddha</i>	<i>dag pa</i>
crow; bird	<i>vāyasa</i>	<i>bya rog</i>
cultivate	<i>abyāsa</i>	<i>goms pa</i>
death	<i>marāṇa</i>	<i>'chi ba</i>
demon(s)	<i>bhūta-graha</i>	<i>'byung po'i gdon</i>
[flesh eating] demon(s)	<i>piśāca</i>	<i>'dre</i>
different	<i>bheda</i>	<i>tha dad</i>
direction	<i>digbhāga</i>	<i>phyogs</i>
directional parts	<i>digbhāga-bheda</i>	<i>phyogs cha</i>
direct perception	<i>pratyakṣa</i>	<i>mngon sum</i>

dog(s)	<i>śva; śvān</i>	<i>khyi</i>
dream	<i>svapna</i>	<i>rmi lam</i>
dream seeing	<i>svapna-darśana</i>	<i>rmi ltas su mthong ba</i>
drink	<i>pāna</i>	<i>btung ba</i>
effect	<i>phala</i>	<i>'bras bu</i>
element	<i>bhūta</i>	<i>'byung ba</i>
elephant	<i>hastin</i>	<i>glang po che</i>
empty (emptiness)	<i>śūnya(tā)</i>	<i>stong pa (nyid)</i>
entity; self	<i>ātman</i>	<i>bdag; bdag nyid</i>
entrance	<i>praveśa</i>	<i>'jug pa</i>
evil friend	<i>pāpa-mitra</i>	<i>sdig pa' i grogs po</i>
exactly; in that way	<i>yathāvat</i>	<i>ji lta ba bzhin du</i>
excrement	<i>purīṣa</i>	<i>ngan pa</i>
existence	<i>asti-tvam</i>	<i>yod pa</i>
experienced; experience	<i>anubhūta; anubhava</i>	<i>myong ba</i>
eye	<i>cakṣur</i>	<i>mig</i>
eye-consciousness	<i>cakṣur-vijñāna</i>	<i>mig gi rnam par shes pa</i>
false doctrine	<i>asat-dharma</i>	<i>dam pa ma yin pa' i chos</i>
far part	<i>para-bhāga</i>	<i>pha rol gyi cha</i>
fault; deficiency	<i>doṣa</i>	<i>nyes pa</i>
feasible; suitable	<i>yuktā</i>	<i>rigs</i>
filled with pus	<i>pūya-pūrṇa</i>	<i>rnag gis gang ba</i>
food	<i>anna</i>	<i>bza' ba</i>
force; power	<i>vaśa; adhi-ṣṭāna</i>	<i>dbang</i>
force; power	<i>bala</i>	<i>stobs</i>
forgetfulness; (memory-loss)	<i>smṛti-lopa</i>	<i>dran nyams</i>

(visible) form(s)	<i>rūpa</i>	<i>gzugs</i>
forms and so forth	<i>rūpa-ādi</i>	<i>gzugs la sogs pa</i>
Fragrance Eater	<i>gandharva</i>	<i>dri za'</i>
fruition; maturation	<i>vipāka</i>	<i>rnam par smin pa</i>
function	<i>krtya-</i>	<i>bya ba</i>
ghee	<i>ghṛta</i>	<i>mar</i>
ghee-pot	<i>ghṛta-ghaṭa</i>	<i>mar gyi bum pa</i>
gradually	<i>kramaṇa</i>	<i>rim gyis</i>
Great Vehicle	<i>mahāyāna</i>	<i>theg pa chen po</i>
ground	<i>bhūmi</i>	<i>sa gzhi</i>
grove; forest	<i>vana</i>	<i>nags tshal</i>
(pleasure) grove	<i>ārāma</i>	<i>kun dga' ra ba</i>
guarded	<i>adhi-ṣṭhita</i>	<i>bsrungs ba</i>
hair	<i>keśa</i>	<i>skra</i>
hair, bees, and so forth	<i>keśa-bhramara-ādi</i>	<i>skra dang sbrang bu la</i>
		<i>sogs pa</i>
harm	<i>upaghāta</i>	<i>gnod pa</i>
harm; molestation	<i>bādhana</i>	<i>gnod pa</i>
heat	<i>dāha</i>	<i>tsha ba</i>
hells	<i>naraka</i>	<i>dmyal ba; sems can dmyal</i>
		<i>ba</i>
hell-beings	<i>nāraka</i>	<i>sems can dmyal ba'i sems</i>
		<i>can</i>
hell-guardians	<i>naraka-pāla</i>	<i>sems can dmyal ba'i srung</i>
		<i>ma</i>
holding	<i>dhara</i>	<i>thogs pa</i>
horse	<i>aśva</i>	<i>rta</i>

hungry ghost	<i>preta</i>	<i>yi dvags</i>
imputed; imaginary	<i>kalpita</i>	<i>brtags pa</i>
imputed entity	<i>kalpita-ātman</i>	<i>brtags pa' i bdag nyid</i>
imputed/imaginary nature	<i>parikalpita</i>	<i>kun brtags pa</i>
incompatible	<i>virodhinī</i>	<i>mi mthun pa</i>
inexpressible	<i>nir-abhilāpya</i>	<i>brjod du med pa</i>
in some places	<i>kvacit-deśa</i>	<i>yul la lar</i>
intended	<i>abhipreta</i>	<i>dgongs pa</i>
intention; thought	<i>abhiprāya</i>	<i>dgongs</i>
intermediate space	<i>antar-āla</i>	<i>bar</i>
iron mountains	<i>ayas-parvata</i>	<i>lcags kyi ri</i>
iron hell-trees	<i>ayaḥ-sālmali</i>	<i>lcags kyi shal ma la</i>
killing; slaughter	<i>prāṇātipāta</i>	<i>srog gcod</i>
knowledge; wisdom	<i>jñāna</i>	<i>ye shes</i>
life	<i>jivita</i>	<i>srog</i>
life-force	<i>jīvita-indriya</i>	<i>srog gi dbang po</i>
logic; reasoning	<i>tarka</i>	<i>rtog ge</i>
magical power	<i>ṛddhi</i>	<i>rdzu 'phrul</i>
man; person	<i>puruṣa</i>	<i>skyes pa; mi</i>
mass	<i>piṇḍa</i>	<i>gong bu</i>
memory	<i>smṛti</i>	<i>dran pa</i>
mental consciousness	<i>mano-vijñāna</i>	<i>yid kyi rnam par shes pa</i>
mental corruption	<i>manah-pradoṣa</i>	<i>yid 'khrugs pa</i>
mentality	<i>manas</i>	<i>yid</i>
mental power	<i>mano-vaśa</i>	<i>yid dbang</i>
mental violence/fault	<i>mano-daṇḍa</i>	<i>yid nyes</i>
mind	<i>citta</i>	<i>sems</i>

mind-only	<i>citta-mātra</i>	<i>sems tsam</i>
mistaken	<i>vitatha-</i>	<i>log pa</i>
mistaken conceptions	<i>vitatha-vikalpa</i>	<i>log pa'i rtog pa</i>
mountain	<i>parvata</i>	<i>ri</i>
multitude; plurality	<i>an-ekam</i>	<i>du ma</i>
name	<i>saṃjñā</i>	<i>ming</i>
nature; own being	<i>sva-bhāva</i>	<i>rang bzhin</i>
near; close	<i>arvāg</i>	<i>tshur rol</i>
near/close part	<i>arvāg-bhāga</i>	<i>tshur rol gyi cha</i>
non-conceptual	<i>nir-vikalpa</i>	<i>rnam par mi rtog pa</i>
non-conceptual wisdom	<i>nir-vikalpa-jñāna</i>	<i>rnam par mi rtog pa'i ye</i>
		<i>shes</i>
non-existent object	<i>asat-artha</i>	<i>don med</i>
non-existent hairs, moons, and so forth	<i>asat-keśa-candra-ādi</i>	<i>skra zla la sogs pa med pa</i>
non-hell-being	<i>a-nāraka</i>	<i>sems can dmyal ba pa ma</i>
		<i>yin pa</i>
non-human	<i>a-manuṣa</i>	<i>mi ma yin pa</i>
non-restriction	<i>a-niyama</i>	<i>nges pa med</i>
non-virtuous	<i>a-kuśala</i>	<i>mi dge ba</i>
not sleeping	<i>a-supta</i>	<i>gnyid kyis ma log pa</i>
object	<i>artha</i>	<i>don</i>
objects of operation; sense objects	<i>viśaya</i>	<i>spyod yul; yul</i>
obstruction	<i>āvaraṇam; āvṛti</i>	<i>sgrib pa</i>
one who is awake	<i>prabuddha</i>	<i>sad pa</i>
one with an eye disease	<i>taimirika</i>	<i>rab rib can</i>

other-cognition	<i>para-vijñapti</i>	<i>gzhan gyi rnam par rig pa</i>
own-	<i>sva-</i>	<i>rang gi</i>
own being; nature	<i>sva-bhāva</i>	<i>rang bzhin</i>
own-seeds	<i>sva-bīja</i>	<i>rang gi sa bon</i>
part; portion	<i>aṃśa</i>	<i>cha</i>
part	<i>avayava</i>	<i>cha shas</i>
particle; subtle particle	<i>paramanu</i>	<i>phra rab rdul; rdul phran</i>
partless	<i>nir-avayava</i>	<i>cha shas med pa</i>
people; world	<i>loka</i>	<i>'jig rten</i>
perception; seeing	<i>darśanam</i>	<i>mthong ba</i>
performance of function	<i>kr̥tya-kriyā</i>	<i>bya ba byed pa</i>
person	<i>pudgala</i>	<i>gang zag</i>
phenomena	<i>dharma</i>	<i>chos</i>
place	<i>deśa</i>	<i>yul</i>
poison	<i>viṣa</i>	<i>dug</i>
possessing magical power	<i>ṛddhi-vat</i>	<i>rdzu 'phrul dang ldan pa</i>
possession [by demons]	<i>āveśa</i>	<i>phab par gyur pa</i>
pot	<i>ghaṭa</i>	<i>bum pa</i>
power; force	<i>adhi-ṣṭāna; vaśa</i>	<i>dbang</i>
power; force	<i>bala</i>	<i>stobs</i>
pleasure	<i>sukha</i>	<i>bde ba</i>
plurality; multitude	<i>aṇ-ekam</i>	<i>du ma</i>
predisposition	<i>vāśana</i>	<i>bag chags</i>
pure; clear; correct	<i>śuddha</i>	<i>dag pa</i>
pus	<i>pūya</i>	<i>rnag</i>
pus-river	<i>pūya-nadi</i>	<i>klung la rnag; rnag gi klung</i>
quality; value	<i>guṇa</i>	<i>yon gtan</i>

reason	<i>kāraṇam</i>	<i>gtan tshigs</i>
reasoning; logic	<i>tarka</i>	<i>rtog ge</i>
recollection	<i>smaraṇa</i>	<i>dran pa</i>
respectively	<i>yathā-atram</i>	<i>go rim bzhin du</i>
restriction	<i>niyama</i>	<i>nges pa</i>
river	<i>nadī</i>	<i>klung</i>
sage	<i>ṛṣi</i>	<i>drang srong</i>
same place	<i>samāna-deśa</i>	<i>go gcig</i>
scripture	<i>āgama</i>	<i>lung</i>
seed	<i>bīja</i>	<i>sa bon</i>
self; entity	<i>ātman</i>	<i>bdag; bdag nyid</i>
selflessness	<i>nairātmya</i>	<i>bdag med pa</i>
selflessness of persons	<i>pudgala-nairātmya</i>	<i>gang zag gi bdag med</i>
selflessness of phenomena	<i>dharma-nairātmya</i>	<i>chos kyi bdag med</i>
semen	<i>śukra</i>	<i>khu ba</i>
sense sphere	<i>āyatana</i>	<i>skye mched</i>
sentient being(s)	<i>sattva</i>	<i>sems can</i>
separate	<i>vicchinna</i>	<i>ris chad; ris su chad pa</i>
shade	<i>chāyā</i>	<i>grib pa</i>
shape	<i>ākṛti</i>	<i>byad gzugs</i>
sheep	<i>urabhra; meṣa</i>	<i>lug</i>
shepherd; butcher	<i>aurabhrika</i>	<i>shan pa</i>
similar	<i>tulya-</i>	<i>mtshungs pa</i>
similar fruition of karma	<i>tulya-karma-vipāka</i>	<i>las kyi rnam par smin pa</i>
		<i>mtshungs pa</i>
similar shape, size, and power	<i>tulya-ākṛti-pramāṇa-bala</i>	<i>byad gzugs dangbong tshod dang stobs mtshungs pa</i>

similar to a dream	<i>svapna-iva</i>	<i>rmis pa dang mtshung pa</i>
simultaneously	<i>yugapad</i>	<i>cig car</i>
size	<i>pramāṇa</i>	<i>bong tshod</i>
sleep	<i>nidrā</i>	<i>gnyid</i>
[those who are] sleeping	<i>supta</i>	<i>gnyid kyis log pa</i>
sloth; sleep	<i>middha</i>	<i>gnyid</i>
sometimes	<i>kadācit</i>	<i>res 'ga'</i>
speech	<i>vāk</i>	<i>ngag</i>
sphere of activity	<i>gocara</i>	<i>spyod yul</i>
spontaneously born	<i>upapāduka</i>	<i>rdzus te byung ba</i>
spontaneously born beings	<i>upapāduka-sattva</i>	<i>rdzus te byung ba'i sems</i> <i>can</i>
stopped; ceased	<i>niruddha</i>	<i>'gags pa</i>
strongly burning	<i>pradipta</i>	<i>rab tu 'bar ba</i>
substantial entity	<i>dravyam</i>	<i>rdzas</i>
subtle; minute	<i>sūkṣma</i>	<i>phra mo</i>
suffering	<i>duḥkha</i>	<i>sdus bsngal</i>
supramundane	<i>lokottara</i>	<i>'jig rten las 'das pa</i>
Supramundane Victor	<i>bhagavān</i>	<i>bcom ldan 'das</i>
sūtra; scripture	<i>sūtra</i>	<i>mdo</i>
sword(s)	<i>asi</i>	<i>ral gri</i>
synonym	<i>paryāya</i>	<i>rnam grangs</i>
taught	<i>jñāpita</i>	<i>bstan pa</i>
thorn	<i>kaṇḍaka</i>	<i>tsher ma</i>
time	<i>kāla</i>	<i>dus</i>
to be tamed/trained	<i>vineya</i>	<i>'dul ba</i>
transformation	<i>pariṇāma; vikriyā</i>	<i>'gyur ba</i>



true doctrine	<i>sat-dharma</i>	<i>dam pa'i chos</i>
type of transformation	<i>pariṇāma-viśeṣa</i>	<i>'gyur ba'i bye brag</i>
unexperienced	<i>an-anubhūtam</i>	<i>myong ba med pa</i>
unitary	<i>ekam</i>	<i>gcig bu</i>
urine	<i>mūtra</i>	<i>gcin</i>
Vaiśeṣika	<i>vaiśeṣika</i>	<i>bye brag pa</i>
valid cognition	<i>pramāṇa</i>	<i>tshad ma</i>
value; quality	<i>guṇa</i>	<i>yon gtan</i>
virtuous; wholesome	<i>kuśala</i>	<i>dge ba</i>
virtuous friend	<i>kalyāṇa-mitra</i>	<i>dge ba'i bshes gnyen</i>
water creature	<i>ūdaka-jantu</i>	<i>chu'i skye bo</i>
weapons and so forth	<i>āyudha-ādi</i>	<i>mtshon la sogs pa</i>
whole; possessing parts	<i>avayavin</i>	<i>cha shas can</i>
wholesome; virtuous	<i>kuśala</i>	<i>dge ba</i>
wisdom; knowledge	<i>jñāna</i>	<i>ye shes</i>
with a single step	<i>sakṛta-pāda-kṣepeṇa</i>	<i>gom pa gcig bor bas</i>
without	<i>vinā-</i>	<i>med pa</i>
without [external] objects	<i>vinā-arthena</i>	<i>don med pa</i>
women	<i>stri</i>	<i>bud med</i>
world; people	<i>loka</i>	<i>'jig rten</i>
worldly environment	<i>bhājana-loka</i>	<i>snod kyi 'jig rten</i>
worldly wisdom	<i>laukika-jñāna</i>	<i>'jig rten pa'i ye shes</i>
yellow	<i>pīta</i>	<i>ser po</i>

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Acton, H.B. "Idealism." In *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1965.
- Anacker, Stefan. *Seven Works of Vasubandhu*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984.
- Bureau, André. "Trois traités sur les sectes bouddhiques attribués à Vasumitra, Bhavya, et Vinitadeva." *Journal Asiatique* 242 (1954): 229-266; 244 (1956): 167-200.
- Bloom, Harold. *The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry*. London: Oxford University Press, 1973.
- Bu-ston, *The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet*. Translated by E. Obermiller. Heidelberg, 1932; reprint Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1986.
- Chatterjee, Ashok Kumar. *The Yogācāra Idealism*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975.
- Chattopadhyaya, A. and Lama Chimpa, trans., *Tāranātha's History of Buddhism in India*. Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1970.
- Das Gupta, Surendranath. *A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922.
- Dreyfus, Georges B.J. "Ontology, Philosophy of Language and Epistemology in the Buddhist Tradition: A Study of Dharmakīrti's Philosophy in the Light of its Reception in the Later Indo-Tibetan Tradition." Ph.D Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1991.
- Bdud-'joms 'Jigs-bral ye-shes-rdo-rje (Dudjom Rinpoche). *The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism Vol. I*. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1991.
- Hall, Bruce Cameron. "The Meaning of *Vijñapti* in Vasubandhu's Concept of Mind." *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 9/1, 1986: 7-23.
- Hattori, Masaaki. "Realism and the Philosophy of Consciousness-Only," *Eastern Buddhist* 21/1 (1988): 23-60.
- Hirakawa, Akira. *A History of Indian Buddhism: From Śākyamuni to Early Mahāyāna*. Translated by Paul Groner. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991.
- Hopkins, Jeffrey. *Kālachakra Tantra, Rite of Initiation*. London: Wisdom Publications, 1989.

- \_\_\_\_\_. "A Tibetan Contribution on the Question of Mind-Only in the Early Yogic Practice School." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 20 (1992): 275-343.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Reflections on Reality." Unpublished Manuscript, 1993.
- Kuchumuttom, Thomas. *The Buddhist Doctrine of Experience*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982.
- Lamotte, Étienne ed. and trans. *Samdhinirmocana-sūtra: Explication des Mystères*, Louvain and Paris: Université de Louvain, 1935.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *History of Indian Buddhism*. Louvain-Paris: Peeters Press, 1988.
- Mishra, Umesha. *History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 1*. Allahabad: Tirabhukti Publications, 1957.
- Monier-Williams, Sir Monier. *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986.
- Piatigorsky, Alexander. "Some Remarks on 'Other-Stream.'" in *Buddhist Studies: Ancient and Modern*, eds. Phillip Denwood and Alexander Piatigorsky, 124-152. London: Curzon Press, 1983.
- Potter, Karl, comp. *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol. 1: Bibliography*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970.
- Powers, C. John. "The Concept of the Ultimate (*don dam, paramārtha*) in the Samdhinirmocana-sūtra: Analysis, Translation and Notes." Ph.D Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1991.
- Pur-bu-jok (*phur bu lcok*). "The Middling Path of Reasoning" (*rigs lam 'bring gi skor*) in *The Presentation of Collected Topics Revealing the Meaning of the Texts on Valid Cognition, The Magical Key to the Path of Reasoning* (*tshad ma'i gzhung don'byed pa'i bsdus grva'i rnam bzhag rigs lam 'phrul gyi lde mig*). Buxa, India: N.P., 1965.
- Rockhill, W.W. *The Life of the Buddha*. London: Kegan Paul, 1884; reprint San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, 1976.
- Russell, Bertrand. *History of Western Philosophy*. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1961.

- Sangharakshita, Bhikku. *Survey of Buddhism*, Bangalore: Indian Institute of World Culture, 1966.
- Sastrin, N. Aiyaswami. ed. *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ vimśtikāvṛttiḥ, nyi shu pa'i 'grel pa*. Gangtok, Namgyal Institute of Tibetology, 1964.
- Schmithausen, Lambert. "On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism," in *German Scholars in India*. Contributions to Indian Studies, vol.II. Bombay: Nachiketa Publications, 1976.
- Speyer, Jacob Samuel. *Sanskrit Syntax*. Leiden: Brill, 1886; reprint Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973.
- Stcherbatsky, Th.. *Buddhist Logic Vol. 1*. Leningrad: Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., 1930; reprint, New York: Dover Publications, 1962.
- Taraporewala, Irach J.S. *Sanskrit Syntax*. Delhi: Munishriram Manoharlal, 1967.
- Thurman, Robert, trans. *Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Tripathi, C.L. *The Problems of Knowledge in Yogācāra Buddhism*. Varanasi: Bharat-Bharati, 1972.
- Tsong-ka-pa. *Tantra in Tibet*. Translated by Jeffrey Hopkins Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1987.
- Vasubandhu. *Establishing Cognition Only: Commentary on "The Twenty."* Translated by Jeffrey Hopkins. Unpublished Translation, 1989.
- Vidyabhusana, Sati Chandra. *A History of Indian Logic*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971.
- Vinītadeva. *Explanation of (Vasubandhu's) Commentary on his "Twenty Stanzas."* (*prakaraṇa-vimśaka-ṭikā, rab tu byed pa nyi shu pa'i 'grel bshad*). Peking Tibetan Tripiṭika, Vol.. 113, P5566; *sde dge Tibetan Tripitika stan 'gyur sems tsam*, Vol.. 14, 4065. Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 1981.
- Wayman, Alex. "Yogācāra and the Buddhist Logicians," *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, vol. 2, no. 1, 1979: 65-78.
- Willis, Janice D. *On Knowing Reality: The Tattvārtha Chapter of Asaṅga's Bodhisattvabhūmi*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979.

Wilson, Joe B. "Meaning of Mind in the Mahāyāna." Ph.D Dissertation, University of Virginia, 1984.

Winternitz, Moriz. *A History of Indian Literature Vol 2*. New Delhi: Oriental Books Reprint, 1972.

Wood, Thomas E. *Mind Only: A Philosophical and Doctrinal Analysis of the Vijñānavāda*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991.