A Wall of the Faithful: Spatial Analysis of Military Order Architecture on Medieval Iberia's Religious Frontier

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A Dissertation presented to the Graduate Faculty Of the University of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

McIntire Department of Art

University of Virginia October 2015

### Abstract

In 1170, the military-religious Order of Santiago identified themselves as "a wall of the faithful" in their foundational Rule. As the premier Christian institutions residing on the fortified border between Christian and Muslim territory, Iberia's military orders may have formed a metaphorical wall, but their architecture existed in a much more complex spatial system. These orders were so pervasive in Iberia that until now, scholars have considered a comprehensive survey of their architecture to be 'impossible.' This dissertation argues that regimented, data-driven methods make it possible to study patterns in the distribution and intention of military order architecture in Iberia in the mid 12<sup>th</sup> through 14<sup>th</sup> centuries. When combined with historical context, these patterns reveal strategies that have gone unnoticed in past scholarship.

Four patterns governing the manifestation of the wall of the faithful are represented at multiple spatial scales in this work. First, the Iberian military orders were founded at fortified sites that lie near the "edges" of Christian-controlled territory. Second, these sites were chosen based on their ability to surveil and influence the landscape. Third, the wall of the faithful was closer to a shifting, intervisible and/or spatially connected network than a linear wall. Finally, two architectural case studies reveal that the military orders were capable of and motivated to manifest their identity on the frontier through the construction of large-scale, fortress-monastery headquarters. By combining peninsula-wide patterns with in-depth studies of two sites – the fortressmonastery of Calatrava la Nueva and the Castillo-Convento de Montesa – this study reveals that the meager and isolated appearance of the hilltop fortresses of the military orders conceals the central role they played in the formation of a vast religious frontier.

#### Acknowledgements

There are many people that I want to thank for providing guidance and support throughout the research and writing process of this dissertation. I have to begin by thanking my advisor, Lisa Reilly for being my advocate in the department since I came to UVa in 2007. Her notes on this dissertation were often delivered via skype while she was doing her own research in York, and I can't thank her enough for her patience and guidance. I also want to thank the other members of my committee, Professors Louis Nelson, Tyler Jo Smith, and Bethany Nowviskie for their interest in my work. Their enthusiasm for the digital techniques I brought to bear in my research gave me confidence when I needed it. I also want to thank what became my second and third homes at UVa: The Institute for Advanced Technology in the Humanities, (IATH) and the Scholars' Lab. They each provided intellectual sparks, guidance, and financial support that were incredibly significant for me. My concept of what it means to work in the digital humanities was born and nurtured in these institutions, and I will take lessons I learned there with me wherever I go. Finally, I want to thank Prof. Daniel Callaghan at the University of Delaware for getting me hooked on the middle ages when I was 18, and for bringing me back to the Masters' program in History.

Of all of my peers, Jessica Aberle has offered the most guidance through this process. She taught the first survey on the history of architecture that I ever took at UVa when I came in as a masters' student. After that, I was able to watch her go through each stage of her dissertation, and we have stayed in close contact while I worked through it myself. She has helped me laugh when I thought that part of my brain had been replaced by military orders and maps. I also want to thank Jared Benton, Dan Weiss, Kevin Cole, Rob Wanner and Pat Watts for introducing me to 'Winter Kamping.'

No one has been as important to me finishing this dissertation than my wife Jocelyn. I am simply at a loss for words thinking about how many times she has propped me up, empathized when this project felt insurmountable, and pulled me out of a myopic hole so I could see the big picture. None of this dissertation would exist without her help, but I am especially indebted to her for traveling to Spain with me and helping me shoot over 30 thousand photographs of my two case studies. I have no idea why she agreed to do it, but I am glad she did. I could not be luckier.

My parents have been incredibly patient with me as I worked through what must have seemed like an endless education. I credit the fact that they are both lifelong learners for my ability to strive for a PhD. As with Jocelyn, their contributions are too numerous to count. My dad should probably get an editor's credit on this work, as he has worked with me through every step. He often knew what I was doing when I didn't know myself. My mom showed me what it meant to be a doctor. She is still my model for how to work hard, and the kindest, most determined person I have ever met.

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# Introduction: Medieval Iberia's Wall of the Faithful

With the kings in such disagreement a multitude of Saracens came from beyond the seas to lay waste the lands of the Christians and to destroy the Church of God. The aforesaid knights, inspired by the grace of the Holy Spirit and seeing the great peril that threatened the Christians – unless it could be checked – imprinted on their chests the cross in the shape of a sword with the ensign and invocation of the Blessed James to stop the hostile advance of the enemies of Christ, defend the Church, and expose themselves as **a wall of the faithful** to the fury of the infidels. -Rule of the Order of Santiago<sup>1</sup>

No institution better represented the ideology of the Christian conquest of Muslim Al-Andalus than the Iberian military orders that grew out of this conflict. Similarly, there is no better material reflection of this ideology than the frontier fortress-monasteries that were constructed by these orders. Just as the Templars and Hospitallers embodied the crusading ideal in the Holy Land, Iberia's military orders were perfectly suited to the task of forming and reforming ideological and territorial boundaries between Iberia's two largest religions. Relying first on the "international" orders as a model, the native Iberian military orders quickly developed unique identities that were defined geographically and materially by their frontier fortresses. When linked together into a network, these fortresses became the manifestation of the military Order of Santiago's self-describing metaphor of a "*wall of the faithful.*"

In 1984, one of the most prominent historians of Iberia's military orders, Prof. Alan Forey concluded that it was "impossible" to create a survey of all of the frontier

fortresses that had come into the possession of Iberia's military orders.<sup>2</sup> Given the numbers of sites, their range of survival, and the complexity of their place-names, Prof. Forey's conclusion is not surprising, but it must be qualified: a comprehensive survey of the fortified architecture associated with Iberia's military orders was an impossible endeavor in 1984, but it is not impossible in 2015. Using satellite imagery and GIS technologies that were not available to Prof. Forey in 1984, I have reassessed the problem of locating the military orders in time and space. On a finer level, I have also applied 3D spatial and historical techniques to bring the military orders' fortress-monastery headquarters closer to the forefront in the history of the Christian Reconquest of Iberia. The wide view of the military orders' frontier architecture, combined with the case studies of two outstanding military-monastic complexes reveals that the military orders were more than auxiliary troops within royal armies as they have often been described in histories of the Reconquest. Instead, military order architecture emerges as a premier influence on the cultural landscape of Iberia's contentious frontier throughout the 12th through 14<sup>th</sup> centuries.

The title of this dissertation is intended to point out the origins of the impression that the military orders occupied a linear space between the Christian kingdoms and Al-Andalus. While it is understandable why a military order would describe itself as a "wall," given that they were the most common recipients of frontier castles after Christian victories, this image creates a false impression that they formed an impermeable, or static layer on the frontier. The "*wall of the faithful*" was not Hadrian's Wall transported to the Peninsula. In truth, the frontier was a wide, constantly shifting zone where Muslim and Christian influence overlapped, and fortresses changed hands regularly. Nonetheless, up to now, the most common way to visualize the "progression" of the *Reconquista*<sup>3</sup> – including the phases before the creation of the military orders in the mid-12<sup>th</sup> century – has been to draw a solid, wavy line between Christian and Muslim territory that jumps south with each major Christian victory. (Figs. 1.1, 1.2) Never mind that these snapshots of territorial change make the Reconquest appear inevitable, or that there were majority-Muslim and Christian communities on either side of this line at any time. What is most surprising about these maps is that while they successfully evoke centuries of territorial change, they bear little resemblance to the secondary texts they were designed to illustrate. Rather than creating a visual impression of complex cultural and spatial permeability between rival religions that has dominated recent scholarship on medieval Iberia, these maps continue to project a simplistic, outdated binary.

The narrative that the Christian Reconquest pitched two monolithic, homogenous societies against each other over centuries is no longer supported in modern scholarship. The binary narrative has been thoughtfully replaced by historical works that emphasize the cultural and territorial complexities that emerged out of a constantly shifting frontier-zone. Even so, static historical maps with sharply demarcated Christian and Muslim territory continue to be the norm. More importantly for this dissertation, the same surveys that have successfully argued that Iberia's Christian-Muslim frontier was a wide, culturally permeable space only give brief notice of the role played by fortresses – choosing instead to spatially represent the Reconquest through a narrative list of conquered urban centers and the territorial outcome of major battles.<sup>4</sup> Further still, many region or order-specific histories of the military orders only vaguely account for the effects of frontier architecture on their development. By striving to construct a holistic

survey of the military orders' fortified possessions, this dissertation wrests the history of the Reconquest from a list of conquered cities or a thin wavy line separating religions, and places it within a much wider spatial context containing hundreds of fortresses deliberately sited between major cities.

Adding to studies that have correctly identified the religious frontier as the crucible of cultural change in 12<sup>th</sup>-14<sup>th</sup> century Iberia, I argue that the military orders were chosen by Christian kings to secure and project Christian authority over wide expanses of newly conquered territory, and that this goal was advanced through architecture. This "wall of the faithful" was built in the following manner:

- **1.** The native Iberian military orders were founded at fortified sites that lie near the "edges" of Christian-controlled territory.
- 2. Pre-existing Muslim-built fortresses, as well as new fortress-locations, were captured and re-occupied according to their ability to observe and influence the surrounding landscape.
- **3.** These fortresses formed a strategic network of intervisible and/or spatially connected nodes that could control vast areas of territory.
- 4. The military orders built large-scale, iconic fortress-monasteries that were designed to cater to and project the composite military-monastic identity of its residents.

# **Dissertation Organization**

The first chapter explains how and why the fortresses have (largely) been ignored by textual historians and art historians alike, and summarize the historiography of works with historical, art-historical and archaeological approaches to the influence of the military orders on the frontier. This chapter also defines the terms that surround the highly complex, category-defying identities of the military-religious orders. Finally, I summarize the internal composition of Iberia's largest military orders, and outline the particulars of their military-monastic lives.

Chapter 2 discusses the discoveries that have emerged from the first of two digital projects created as part of this dissertation. This project began as a simple attempt to locate as many fortresses, monasteries, churches and villages that were associated with the military orders in Iberia as possible. Eventually, I built a custom, geospatial database called ADIMO - the Architectural Database of Iberian Military Orders. With data entered for over 700 sites and 1100 occupation events, this geo-spatial database for the first time locates each of Iberia's military orders in space and time from their inception in the mid-12<sup>th</sup> century until the completion of their transition into secular confederacies in the late 14<sup>th</sup> century. By visually representing which military orders occupied which structures, and when they were there, my Geographic Information System or GIS database offers an opportunity to trace the location, width, and even the turbulence of the frontier. Taken further, by applying several powerful GIS analysis tools to a Digital Elevation Model (DEM) of the peninsula, this project also visualizes what portions of the surrounding landscape the military orders, their Muslim rivals, and Christian nobles could see from their fortresses, and what portions of the landscape they could travel to within a single day's ride on horseback. These analytical tools, called viewshed and cost-distance analysis, reveal how even the most poorly surviving fortresses could observe and influence the surrounding landscape.

The second half of the dissertation takes a more local, architectural and historical approach to the subject through in-depth research on two exceptional examples of fortress-monasteries built as headquarters for two military orders. These case studies

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reveal how the military orders added to their "wall of the faithful" through large-scale projects that projected Christian authority while catering to a composite militarymonastic identity. The first site, named "Calatrava la Nueva" was a rare example of large-scale new construction for Iberia's first native military order: the Order of Calatrava. This hilltop complex of religious and military structures was built shortly after the critical Christian victory at the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212. It was an identity affirming structure that remained a relevant center of power in La Mancha even after the frontier had moved deep into Andalucía a few decades later. As a unique, extant structure that was built at a moment of resurrection for the order, Calatrava la Nueva offers an opportunity to discover how an Iberian military order chose to represent its identity architecturally when it had newly captured resources at its disposal.

The fourth chapter looks closely at the 14<sup>th</sup> century fortress-monastery headquarters for the Order of Montesa. With the possible exception of Calatrava la Nueva, no surviving structure built or occupied by the military orders better represents the heterogeneous merging of monastery and fortress than the Castillo-Convento de Montesa. This case study reveals how a second example of a rare, newly constructed frontier headquarters looked to Calatrava la Nueva as a model, yet manifested itself in a different architectural style. Like Calatrava la Nueva, Montesa was constructed as a symbol and namesake of the military order it housed, but it was built under very different historical circumstances that made the choice of Calatrava la Nueva a symbolically appropriate, yet anachronistic model.

### **Obstacles for Close Reading of Military order Fortresses**

There is no shortage of reasons why historians of the *Reconquista*, or those examining the part played by the military orders on the frontier, tend to ignore architectural evidence. An obvious, though critical reason is the wide ranging quality of survival for structures whose remote, yet strategic locations caused them to be either razed and rebuilt in successive border conflicts, or left to ruin after the frontier shifted deeper into Muslim-held territory. There are more than a few impressive survivals – two of which will be discussed in great detail in chapters 3 & 4 – yet most village residences have long-since been replaced by the modern fabrics of former frontier towns, and most of the hilltop and spur castles of the frontier are little more than crumbling stacks of wall foundations with place names. Set against the remarkably well archived collection of court documents, Papal bulls, rules of life, and economic data gathered in the *Archivo Historico Nacional* in Madrid (and elsewhere) which do not address the creative building plan for the "wall of the faithful", it is understandable that the ubiquitous, though crumbling remains of fortresses have been set aside in favor of other sources.<sup>5</sup>

A second reason for the tendency to separate the military orders from their fortresses is the fact that the orders are far more accurately described as occupiers of Muslim-built architecture, than as builders of new structures on the frontier. Historians such as Thomas Glick who have focused on the "maze of archaeological results" from the period of the Christian Reconquest, stress adaptation as the architectural mode of operation for each transitional phase between Muslim dynasties, or between Christian and Muslim occupations.<sup>6</sup> Through this lens, the military orders were anything but unique in their preference to occupy and adapt rather than build new fortresses. This problem of interpreting purpose or identity from architecture that is occupied, rather than newly built is further complicated by the daunting number of times that fortresses changed hands on the frontier. The question then becomes, can the fortress occupations by the military orders reveal an intentional Christian frontier strategy, or should this strategy be wholly ascribed to the Muslims who originally chose most of the sites? This question is further obfuscated by the evidence that the most prodigious Muslim military architects in Iberian history were the Almoravid and Almohad dynasties that invaded from northern Africa in the 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> centuries. Thus, the military orders occupied fortresses that were very often originally built by the Islamic forces whose invasion prompted their foundation in the first place. This dissertation does not suggest that the Almohad builders deserve anything less than their due credit for the initiation of a network of frontier fortresses. The focus of this work, however, is on the Christian military orders' ability to adapt this inherited fortress-network according to a different religious and strategic/geographical orientation.

Another factor that may have caused military order, or Reconquest historians to overlook so many fortresses is the relatively small number of members that were believed to have garrisoned them. With the exception of several unreliable accounts of knights and lay brothers in documents describing the composition of large armies on campaign, the composition and total population numbers for the military orders is not well documented. Still, given the orders' regular appeals to local leaders and even the Pope for help to garrison their castles, it is likely that they were spread thinner than their contemporaries residing nearer the interior of Christian territory.<sup>7</sup> Without site-specific evidence for percentages of monks, secular knights, military-monastic brothers, lay brothers, and laborers, it is more difficult to interpret the surviving masonry as having specific identity affirming qualities, especially given that in most cases, the garrison numbers appear to be very small.

The vast majority of fortresses that were donated to the military orders are therefore fraught with obstacles to their interpretation. By nature of being on a constantly shifting frontier, these fortified sites are better at revealing the long story of their adaptive use, as opposed to their purpose at the moment they were built. Generally speaking, fortresses also existed at a lower, more utilitarian tier of value than other forms of monumental architecture, such as churches, mosques and palaces. One reason for this is because a fortresses' ability to use "raw" unarticulated scale to signal power, security and influence was diminished once the surrounding landscape ceased to be a contested space. After the frontier shifted, it became easier to allow all but the most monumental, or identity-laden structures to fall into ruin. The complex history of patronage, construction and occupation caused frontier fortresses to be painted as broadly "in flux" by textual historians, or hand-picked for more site-specific analysis by art and architectural historians. This dissertation blends both of these methods in order to allow the fortressmonasteries of Calatrava la Nueva and Montesa to exist within more complex local, supralocal, and even peninsula-wide patterns and networks.

#### Defining Terms: the Military Orders, their Architecture & the Reconquest

Before moving on to a brief historiography of the very large subject of Iberian military order fortifications, it is useful to define some of the principal terms and protagonists in this study. The subjects of the military orders, the Reconquest, and military-religious architecture are by their nature, difficult to define. In each case, they are most commonly represented as a merging of two or more theoretically homogenous units. The term "military orders" is an excellent example of an agreed-upon historical category – religious orders who are linked by a spiritual way of life that required sacrifice through vows of chastity, obedience, poverty (and others) – becoming partitioned and changed through the addition of a key difference: "military." The combination of seemingly separate identities creates an image of the military orders as "warrior monks."<sup>8</sup> Conversely, San Zeno Conedera's 2015 book "Ecclesiastical Knights," argues that the idea of the "warrior monk" is a bit misleading, partially because it was only the elite category of the military orders – the knight-brothers – that lived according to the combined rules of monastic orders as well as those of the warrior class.<sup>9</sup> In addition to the knight-brothers (here simply referred to as "knights") the international orders such as the Templars and Hospitallers contained Sergeants: the more numerous, non-noble combatants who bore arms and took similar vows. The native Iberian orders that grew directly out of the frontier landscape of the Reconquest did not have Sergeants per se, but the orders that followed the Cistercian Rule, such as Calatrava and Alcántara, did have 'Conversi' who were lay brothers living under a less rigorous system of discipline that aided all members of the orders in non-spiritual matters.<sup>10</sup> The Cistercian Order, a powerful, ubiquitous monastic reform order that began in France in the 12<sup>th</sup> century was closely associated with the military orders from the outset when the order's spiritual leader, Bernard of Clairvaux wrote his famous treatise "In Praise of the New Knighthood" as a reaction to the foundation of the Templars in the Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem.<sup>11</sup> This Cistercian tie would become even closer in Iberia through the

foundation of the Order of Calatrava, whose clerics doubled as full members of the Cistercian Order.<sup>12</sup>

The other main category within all military orders was the clerics, whose purpose was to perform the sacraments for the entire community because even though the military brethren made the same vows, and had to join the clerics for mass and the canonical hours when they were residing in the priory-headquarters, their military action made them unworthy of performing the sacraments.<sup>13</sup> The bullariums and Rules of the various orders practically ignore the existence of the clerics, who were quickly given a subordinate role to the knights.

The evidence for percentages of knights, lay laborers and clergy is just as sparse as the evidence of the total populations for each order, but there is evidence that all divisions of members either lived in separate spaces of a single fortress-monastery, or in different sites nucleated around a castle. One element that complicates our understanding of the daily contact between lay and clerical brothers is that even in spaces that were true "hybrids" with fortified spaces as well as monastic spaces, the two groups were broken into different jurisdictions. Clerics lived in a *priory*, and knights were lived within a *commandery* or *encomienda* but these were not spatial or architectural terms. Thus a single priory could contain a valley structure full of clerics, as well as clergy living in a hilltop fortress-monastery, and commanderies could contain several fortresses around a central hub, or a single large-scale fortress-monastery. The priory sphere and the commandery sphere could coincide, or overlap unevenly at different spatial scales.

Confusing the situation even further is that the military and spiritual head of every order was combined into a single person: the *Master*. The Master of the Order of

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Santiago was responsible to the Pope, whereas the Master of Calatrava and of Alcántara answered to the Cistercian Abbot of Morimond in northern France. Iberia's Hospitaller and Templar commanderies were subject first to regional or provincial Masters, then to the Grand Master who was originally based in Jerusalem. The Master was responsible for leading the military on expeditions, governing in cases of violations of their Rule, and overseeing management of all the order's property.<sup>14</sup> According to Joseph O'Callaghan, just as the Prior was lieutenant to the Abbot in a traditional Benedictine monastery, so was the Prior subordinate to the Master in the Iberian military orders. The Prior judged in all but the most serious cases of religious discipline but he was not to interfere in the temporal affairs of the order.<sup>15</sup> The final office that will be referred to in the present work is the commander. Commanders were the heads of the *encomiendas* that lay outside the principal headquarters for the order. They could reside in lightly fortified houses, but on the frontier, their center of power was nearly always a large hilltop fortress. The commanders would be summoned into the central chapter at the headquarters for their order to choose new masters, and for other order-wide decisions.

### • The names and origins of Iberia's military orders.

In order to orient the reader with regard to the names and locations of the different orders, a brief description of them begins here. After 1350, the war against Granada became a slow siege, the religious frontier attained a harder edge, and the orders began to lose their monastic character due to increased interference from the monarchy. Even by 1330, King Alfonso XI of Castile managed to turn the masterships of the various orders into gifts for his supporters, rather than the chapter-elected rulers they had been over the previous two centuries. Before this, however, the military orders were dominant frontier institutions whose territory often bled across the borders of their royal patrons. In Castile and Leon, the main native Iberian military orders were the Order of Calatrava (founded at a fortress south of Toledo in 1157) the Order of Alcántara (founded at a fortress/town by the same name in Extremadura near the border of Portugal in 1213) (Fig. 1.3) and the Order of Santiago (founded in Caceres in Extremadura, but whose headquarters was later split between the fortress of Uclés in Castile, (Fig. 1.4) and the monastery of San Marcos in Leon). (Fig. 1.5) Castile also contained a large commandery for the Hospitallers centered on the fortress of Consuegra, (Fig. 1.6) and a smaller commandery for the Templars centered on the fortress of Montalban to the west of Toledo. (Fig. 1.7) The international orders of the Templars and Hospitallers dominated in Aragon, and to a lesser extent in Portugal. After the dissolution of the Templars in 1309, the kingdom of Portugal replaced the Templars with a new native order called the Order of Christ, or Cristo, with their headquarters in the former Templar fortress of Tomar. (Fig. 1.8) Portugal also had its own branch of the Order of Santiago, as well as the native Order of Avis/Aviz (an order founded in 1166 that was originally centered on the fortress of Evora before changing its name and headquarters to Avis in 1211). The 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> century landscape of the wall of the faithful was profoundly shaken up by the dissolution and trial of the Templars in 1307-1313. In the Kingdom of Aragon, after a great deal of negotiation with the Pope, King James II agreed to allow all former Templar fortresses in the northern, Aragonese portion of the kingdom to be given to the Knights Hospitaller. The king's main stipulation was that the southern Templar fortresses in the former Taifa of Valencia must go to a new military Order of his creation. That military order was founded as the Order of Montesa, and warranted the construction of a new headquarters

in 1319.

#### • The 'Reconquest'

The *Reconquista* itself, as alluded to earlier, is a problematic term as well. The narrative popularized by early 20<sup>th</sup> century nationalist historians like Américo Castro was that the drive to force all Muslims off of the peninsula began in the isolated Christian enclave of the Cantabrian Mountains in the 8<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>16</sup> Central to the idea of *Reconquest*, rather than Christian *conquest* is the fiction that the remnants of the Visigothic Kingdom that survived in the northern, mountainous fringes of the peninsula were the inspiration for the next 800 years of religious warfare. In reality, the idea of Reconquest was anything but static. It was picked up, cast aside, altered and eventually forgotten over time by various rulers whose goals varied from righteous warfare to simple territorial greed. I use the term "Reconquest" in this work, mostly because the military orders themselves cloaked themselves in the language of expulsion from the outset:

...for the defense of the western Church which is in the Spains, for the suppression, conquest and expulsion of the nation of the moors and the exaltation of the faith and religion of holy Christiandom...<sup>17</sup>

I agree with Joseph O'Callaghan and others that the Reconquest was not a myth created by modern historians, nor was it a constant idea that began with the Visigoths and ran unbroken through the middle ages. Instead, I argue that in the hands of the military orders, the Reconquest was an aspiration that shored up their identities under interior and exterior pressures.

### • "Fortresses, Castles, Priories & Fortress-Monastery Headquarters."

On the architectural side, I primarily use "fortress" as the general term for

defensive frontier architecture occupied or built by the military orders. The structure and size of the buildings that fit within this type were as varied as those that fit under a category such as "church" with even fewer prerequisite parts. Given the breadth of time and territory covered in this dissertation – more than 200 years across the entire peninsula - and the fact that most fortresses were built with an adaptive approach, forming a morphological typology of fortresses is particularly difficult. At the same time, now that modern technology has been applied to the inquiry, site topography has been revealed to be one of, if not the most important factor in the design of fortresses. Consequently, this uses and adapts the typological categories set up by Adrian Boas in his book Archaeology of the Military Orders: A Survey of the Urban Centers, Rural Settlement and Castles of the Military Orders in the Latin East.<sup>18</sup> Boas successfully argued that the two main factors that govern the form of any castle in the Latin East were the intended function of the castle, and the constraints of the nature of the terrain at its chosen site.<sup>19</sup> As this was also the case in Iberia during the same period, the fortresses in the current work includes large enclosure castles, towers, and quadrangular castles, that all fit into topology-related categories such as spur-castles, hilltop castles, or valley complexes. Another category that was more specific to Iberia is the *Alcazaba*: a large hilltop fortress whose outer walls formed a circuit around an entire town.<sup>20</sup> In this sub-category of the hilltop fortress, the castle walls and town walls were thoroughly integrated into a single complex defended by strong gates, and the size of the hill often determined the shape of the town below. All of these fortresses fit within the hierarchy of priories and commanderies or encomiendas, but there is one final category that stood out for all others: the fortress-monastery or castle-convent headquarters. These complexes were the nucleus and ideological beacon

for the entire order, and were peerless as architectural projects. It is because of this exclusivity that two such fortress-monasteries are covered in such detail in the third and fourth calpters.

As Boas succinctly pointed out in his analysis of the military orders in the near east, the orders had different needs from other garrisons because their castles "...needed to furnish both the spiritual and communal requirements of their occupants."<sup>21</sup> In other words, they needed to include components that were not always necessary in lay Christian castles, and certainly not in those built for Muslim communities. Chapels, chapter-houses, cloisters, and single-room refectories all fall within this group, yet very few complexes contain surviving evidence of all of these features. It is more accurate to point out that enclosure castles were especially attractive to the military orders because the space within the ring of walls could be adapted for a form of "cloistered" or communal life – even if they did not feel the need to build an arcaded cloister attached to a chapter house and full-scale church. As a result, the present work does not describe all fortresses with a garrison from one of the military orders as "fortress-monasteries" or "castle-convents" unless a cloister, chapel and chapter house is identifiable in the extant masonry. The fortress-monastery category also does not have exclusive rights to the "military-monastic" lifestyle either.

#### **Chapter 1:**

## Intersecting Historiographies Contributing to a Wall of the Faithful

# Introduction

The fortified architecture that was developed by the military orders on Iberia's religious frontier is a subject that defies easy categorization. A sample of the sub-fields that intersect this dissertation include frontier studies, cultural and material "hybridity," castle studies, crusade history, and historical mapping. In addition, by taking a spatial approach to the subject at both landscape and intra-site architectural scales, this work applies modern visibility studies, network theory, embodiment, landscape studies, and agent-based modeling. In this section I place "A Wall of the Faithful" within the relevant historiography by selecting sources that fit within two categories; *histories of Iberia's military orders*, and *histories of the Christian Reconquest of Iberia*. A third, smaller category – architectural histories of the military orders in Iberia – exists within the center of a Venn diagram of these two categories.<sup>22</sup> The larger category by far is the history of the Reconquest, but I begin with the histories of the military orders so as to also help introduce the reader to the protagonists of this dissertation.

### 1.1 Histories of Iberia's Military Orders

Historians of the military orders have continued to take a limited number of approaches to their subject. One of the most popular topics is the degree to which either the religious or the military/secular character of the military orders has been overemphasized or understated by previous scholars. Another thread has been the role of the orders in the Reconquest, as evidenced by their locations on the frontier and their participation in battles. The most prolific trends have either dissected the economic power displayed by the military orders, or focused on ever smaller local topics. Very few of these studies, especially before the turn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, have considered why the military orders held so many castles, or discussed the landscape-scale influence the fortresses had on the frontier. Fortunately, many of these studies that had different primary goals, also made advances that increased our understanding of the role played by architecture on the frontier. The few 21<sup>st</sup> century architectural historians who have approached military order fortresses as a discrete topic have stood on the foundation of a large corpus of history that has made incremental, tangential advances to the subject.

### • Rades y Andrada

For many historians of the military orders in Spain, the foundational source is the three-volume history by Francisco de Rades y Andrada, a 16<sup>th</sup> century priest of the Order of Calatrava. His history, titled *Cronica de las Tres Ordenes de Santiago, Calatrava y Alcántara* was first published in 1572 in Toledo.<sup>23</sup> There is not much known about the author, other than that he entered the Order of Calatrava as a knight, but was later ordained as a priest of that order. It is also known that he wrote the *Cronica* at Calatrava la Nueva while serving as the head of the archives for the order, where he had access to many of the excellent sources that are currently held in the Bibliotheca Nacional in Madrid. He was appointed Prior of the monastery of San Benito in Jaen in 1577, and was buried there in 1599.<sup>24</sup>

Rades y Andrada made the majority of his relatively sparse references to architectural sites at the beginning of each chronicle. Just as a foundational monastery was the locus of identity for most religious orders, the same appears true for Iberia's military orders. In the chronicle of Calatrava, Rades related the central role played by the fortress of Calatrava (later called Calatrava la Vieja after the construction of the new headquarters in 1217) for the military order that was founded to occupy it in 1158.<sup>25</sup> Rades repeated this model of discussing the site-specific foundations for the orders of Santiago and Alcántara as well.<sup>26</sup> For all of his description of the foundational circumstances, and locations, as well as the noble sacrifices of the original members of each order, Rades did not care to describe the architectural heritage of the orders. For Rades, a report on the location and circumstances of the foundational structures for Santiago and Alcántara, and a list of encomiendas possessed by each order was sufficient description of their architectural assets. As Derek Lomax succinctly explained in his prologue to Rades y Andrada's chronicle, "Rades does not seem to have much interest in strategic, architectural, or aesthetic aspects of the convents, castles and other buildings, except of course (in) his own convent of Calatrava, describing the shrines, relics, some graves and even indulgences. Instead, he captures the literary resonances."<sup>27</sup> Unfortunately, this lack of interest in architecture became a common theme for future historians building upon Rades y Andrada. Until the 20<sup>th</sup> century there was very little scholarly work of note that veered from Rades' reading of the military orders, and there was especially little discussion of their architecture, but there continued to be a great deal of interest in their foundational locations. This interest eventually lead to the first attempts to acknowledge Iberia's military orders as architectural patrons who were capable of shaping their environment to their specific needs.

# • King & the Trio of O'Callaghan, Forey & Lomax

The first history of Iberia's military orders written in English came from an

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unexpected source. Georgiana Goddard King, an architectural historian who founded the History of Art department at Bryn Mawr College, wrote A Brief Account of the Military Orders in Spain in 1921.<sup>28</sup> It is surprising that this subject was first broached by an architectural historian because for decades after this work, histories of the military orders were written almost exclusively by textual historians drawing upon the well preserved chronicles of the military orders that were consolidated in the Archivo Historico Nacional in Madrid. King also made good use of these resources, and she certainly was familiar with Rades y Andrada, but as an architectural historian, she lingered just a bit longer than later historians on the iconic structures attached to the major Iberian military orders. As influential as King was on the history of medieval Iberian architecture, her history of the military orders is one of her least known works. It seems likely that if King's book had been more popular, it would have at least inspired a few historians to consider Iberia's military order architecture as a valuable source, but that did not happen in the  $20^{\text{th}}$ century. As of 2015, no other scholar has attempted a survey of Iberia's military order architecture. King's contribution was more history than architectural history, but the fact that her interest in military order architecture was followed by decades of works that ignored buildings makes it all the more significant.

In the 2<sup>nd</sup> half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, a trio of scholars wrote multiple histories of Iberia's military orders while only giving short-hand accounts of their architecture: Joseph O'Callaghan, Alan Forey and Derek Lomax. Of the three, Joseph O'Callaghan's work has straddled the categories of "military order histories" and "Reconquest history" the most evenly. As illustrated in Figure 1.9, these categories are far from exclusive from one another, and it can be argued that any history of the Reconquest cannot be told without some reference to the military orders and vice-versa. In terms of interest in architectural evidence of the military orders on the frontier, O'Callaghan is much like his contemporary historians. The foundational sites were important for their geographical context at the time when they were built because these locations revealed that the orders were the premier institutions in advancing and defending the border of Christianity at the expense of Islam. For these kinds of histories, place names and dots on the map have been deemed sufficient for arguing this point, but surviving masonry, visibility, and the the physical landscape have been only tangentially referenced. That said, few works have been more influential on the development of this dissertation topic than Prof. O'Callaghan's histories of the military Order of Calatrava. In particular, O'Callaghan's extremely detailed, step-by-step narrative of the Order of Calatrava's accordion-like expansion and contraction of power and influence on the frontier painted a more convincing image of frontier volatility than anything else I have read about the subject to date.<sup>29</sup>

O'Callaghan is probably best known as the writer of the successful volume "A History of Medieval Spain," but it is his 1956 dissertation "The Affiliation of the Order of Calatrava with the Order of Cîteaux," that best reflects a new "beginning" for the history of the Iberian military orders, and thus is most applicable here. As Theresa M Vann wrote in 1998,

The Spanish military religious orders were not obscure, and previous histories of the crusades had mentioned them, usually as an afterthought to the better-known Orders of Hospital and the Temple. But when O'Callaghan began his work, no modern monograph of comparable critical scope focused on the native Iberian religious orders.<sup>30</sup>

O'Callaghan did not discuss architecture in any analytical way in this dissertation, yet he

did locate the place where the idea for all native Iberian military orders began: the fortress of *Calatrava* (Later) *la Vieja*. His dissertation was also the first modern work to identify the divisions of the Iberian order as knights, lay brothers, and clergy, and the first to list both monasteries and fortresses as among their architectural possessions.

Derek Lomax, Alan Forey, and Joseph O'Callaghan helped set the pattern for scholarship on Iberia's military orders in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Each historian wrote a monograph on one specific order, while also writing a shorter, macroscopic survey focusing on each order's origins and listing the names of the commanderies that appeared prominently in the bullariums of the different orders. Unlike O'Callaghan and Forey, Lomax wrote mostly in Spanish, and selected the Order of Santiago as the subject for his monograph.<sup>31</sup> Lomax' monograph looked at this order in near isolation, although it did make greater use of hermandades documents - pacts of friendship between different orders. O'Callaghan, Lomax and others acknowledged that these agreements fostered important cooperation in joint military efforts, yet spatially, the zones of overlapping territory and spatial contact were still limited to Forey's vague description of "... regions (where) particular orders tended to predominate."<sup>32</sup> The fortresses that held this territory, and the landscape-scale effects of these fortresses received even less attention in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, although some site-specific articles on early modern military order architecture did emerge.

## • The military vs monastic character of the military orders

In the preface to a 1975 reprint that included his 1959 dissertation, O'Callaghan quickly informed the reader of an important distinction in his approach to the Order of Calatrava, and its relationship with broader historical subjects:

My studies (those compiled with the dissertation in the reprint) deal only incidentally with the military role of the Orders, a theme that is largely bound up with the general history of the Reconquest. The monastic character of the orders is the chief concern of these studies.<sup>33</sup>

Having also written a book titled "Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain," O'Callaghan is more than qualified to make this distinction between the military/Reconquest role and the monastic character of the orders, and it is one that continues to spark historical debate into the present. Still, this purposeful separation begins to question whether it is possible to pay equal attention to both "sides" of the military orders' identities. The historical construct that is best represented by the work of Georges Duby, where two out of three divisions of medieval society were "those who fight" and "those who pray" is less popular than it once was, but it remains the primary hurdle for historians of the military orders.<sup>34</sup> This impression – that the orders were equal parts monk and knight – is the main reason why it is so common for historians to claim that a previous phase or group of authors has overlooked the "raison d'être" of the military orders by focusing on one side or the other. It also explains why O'Callaghan felt compelled in 1978 to state very clearly that he acknowledged the military character of the orders, but was purposefully focusing on their monastic side.

On the other side of the spectrum from the monastic emphasis of O'Callaghan's dissertation was Alan Forey's early work on the Military Orders. Forey is best known for writing the definitive work on the Templars in the kingdom of Aragon, including the consequences of their trial in the 14<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>35</sup> In doing so, Forey concluded that the Templars in Aragon survived the harsh punishment doled out to their continental brethren because they remained an important defensive frontier institution against the Muslims at

the time of their trial. The military portion of their identity became their saving grace, and the reason that the order was replaced in Valencia by the new Order of Montesa.<sup>36</sup> The specific context of the foundation of the Order of Montesa is described in more detail in chapter 4, but the author's process his still revealing. Within the context of other histories of the military orders, Forey's work has most clearly represented the distribution of military order fortresses as a specific strategy, rather than a random, reactive process. Forey recognized the Templars' unique pattern of expansion in Aragon, especially in comparison to the native Castilian orders, yet the work was constrained by linear prose and static mapping.<sup>37</sup> His work may also lean closer to the military rather than the monastic side of the identities of the military orders, but his meticulous efforts in extracting occupation changes on the frontier has been invaluable for this current work.

Forey avoided blanket statements about how successful the orders were at creating a "wall of the faithful" through cautious interpretation of a corpus of evidence that he described as limited.<sup>38</sup> The author's caution lead to a near dismissal of the religious side of the military orders identity in favor of a more nuanced discussion of their tactical value. Forey explained that while the military orders' religious dedication helped motivate them to pursue a dangerous occupation on the frontier, he also attempted to dispel the myth that military order fortresses were full of fanatical "warrior monks"<sup>39</sup> In addition to slimming down the volume of military orders were more valuable as cautious frontier, Forey also argued that the military orders were more valuable as cautious frontier advisors than as fanatical arms of militant Christianity.<sup>40</sup> Citing instances in which the orders fought alongside Muslim forces (admittedly against other Muslims in Granada) and examples of them opposing risky assaults on Muslim fortresses, Forey

argued that the orders were most useful for their discipline. This is not a unique approach, as the overall trend in medieval Spanish history since Americo Castro has been to dull the ideological edges of the Reconquest in favor of cultural blending and appropriation.

The most recent book covering the history of the military orders in Iberia is Sam Zeno Conedera's Ecclesiastical Knights: The Military Orders in Castile, 1150-1330.41 The title is particularly well chosen, as the debate over the fusion of the military and monastic characters of the military orders is the focus of this work and continues to be the central historiographical issue surrounding the military orders. Conedera's book, which grew out of his 2009 dissertation, is particularly concerned with the improper use of the moniker "warrior monks" that has been used to describe the military orders for decades. While I do not agree with the outright removal of monastic vocabulary in favor of "ecclesiastic" to describe the military orders, Conedera does successfully point out that the military orders were not monks who chose to pick up swords. Rather, it is more accurate to view their lives as a grafting of religious ideals and spirituality onto a warrior class that had its own growing system of chivalry in place. The specific combination of war and spirituality that was embodied by the military orders separated itself from churchmen and crusaders who bore arms by forming a specific way of life that made the combination permanent. As others have done in the past, Conedera points out that in his response to the foundation of the Templars in the 12<sup>th</sup> century, St. Bernard of Clairvaux defended the idea of a *new knighthood*; not a *new monasticism*.<sup>42</sup> Conedera's new entry into the monastic / knighthood debate does not account for architecture directly, but it has been extremely beneficial for understanding the emphasis the orders placed on partitioning knights and clerics from each other on an institutional level. The second half

of this dissertation reveals that this separation was reinforced architecturally as well.

### • Forey and the "impossible" survey

As useful as Alan Forey's research has been for the content of this dissertation,

the spatial processes outlined in Chapter 2 of the current work were chosen as a reaction

against what appears a first glance to be one of Forey's most innocuous statements. In his

1984 article titled "The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest in the Twelfth and

Thirteenth Centuries," Forey reflected on the seemingly overwhelming numbers of

fortresses attached to the military orders:

One of the main tasks allotted to them (the military orders) was the defense and sometimes also the construction of strongholds in the frontier region. When Alfonso II of Portugal granted Avis to the master and brethren of Evora in 1211, he did so on condition that 'in loco supradicto de Avis castrum edificetis' and a similar obligation was imposed on the Hospitallers in Portugal by Sacho II when he assigned Crato to them. But in most instances the orders appear to have taken over existing fortifications. *It is impossible to undertake a comprehensive survey of all the castles in frontier districts which passed into the hands of the military orders*, partly because of inadequacies of evidence and difficulties of placename identification, and partly because of the incompleteness of research; but it is clear that *in some frontier regions particular orders tended to predominate*.<sup>43</sup>

Forey's statement that a survey of frontier fortresses held by Iberia's military orders would be "impossible" has had an inverse effect on this dissertation. While I cannot argue that the combination of Arabic, Castilian, Portuguese, Catalan and other place names co-mingling at the same sites is daunting, Forey's statement was only true within the context of 1984 technology. Forey draws several conclusions that are very well supported in this same paragraph, including the critical problem that "in most instances" the orders took over existing fortifications. He also vaguely identifies that the orders at least "predominated" in some frontier areas, but he can only describe these locations with other territorial place names later in the article. What is clearly missing from this article is that while it is extremely well researched, the evidence of frontier fortress locations, affiliations and dates lack granularity. Forey's statement that a survey would be "impossible" is certainly a challenge, and I immediately began using satellite imagery, crowd-sourced & georeferenced photos, and other GIS technologies to begin specifically locating frontier fortresses in Spain and Portugal. The results of this project are discussed in detail in Chapter 2, but the genesis of the idea should be sited to a close reading of Forey's article.

While Forey is dismissive of the idea of a comprehensive survey of military order fortresses, his 1984 Taditio article represented an ambitious effort to discuss all of the military orders in every shifting frontier region on the peninsula over three hundred years. Not unlike this dissertation, Forey sought to describe the spatial patterns of fortress occupation for the international and the native Iberian military orders without constraining his effort to a single kingdom, a single order, or a short time period as he and many others have done in monographs about the military orders. In contrast to his order and kingdom-specific monograph on the Templars in Aragon, Forey cut a section through what I believe was the *raison d'être* of all of the military orders in Iberia: to secure, surveil and advance the frontier between Christianity and Islam during the Reconquest. Forey is the first historian to use the locations of fortresses to interrogate the idea that the international orders (especially compared to the native Castilian orders of Calatrava, Santiago and Alcántara) were initially disinterested in fighting on a second front against Islam in Iberia. Through a meticulous cataloging of the locations of Templar and Hospitaller strongholds over several generations, Forey was able to make the case

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that their first foundations in Iberia were further from the border than the native Iberian orders that were founded after their arrival. He was also able to successfully argue that while the Templars agreed to fight against Muslims in the south in 1143, they did not immediately switch to a frontier focus for their expansion.<sup>44</sup>

### • The benefits of castle building

Forey had begun to consider how a more nuanced interrogation of where military order fortresses were could help reveal a strategy behind their distribution in 1984, but he lacked the means to approach them in anything other than an episodic way. Six years after his *Traditio* article, Forey began to dig deeper into the question of why the fortresses were built, rather than simply where they were. His best discovery in this regard was a quotation from a work that was reputed to be a 1240 commentary on the construction of the Templar castle of Safed in northern Israel, in which the medieval author claimed this new castle...:

...would provide defense and security against the Saracens and be like a shield for the Christians as far as Acre; it would also be a strong and formidable point of attack... and through the construction of the said castle the sultan would lose a lot of money and much support and service from the men who would be subject to the stronghold and from their lands. He would also in his own territories lose villages, agricultural land, pasture and other rights, because his men would not dare to work the land for fear of the castle.<sup>45</sup>

Forey correctly pointed out that the key benefits of castle building on a Christian-Muslim frontier were all present within this single quotation. Castles were a strategic base to monitor and defend territory from future attack, they could be an offensive weapon for future incursions, and most interestingly, they dominated the landscape by frightening Muslims who wished to work any land that was within a castles' sphere of control.<sup>46</sup> It is

difficult to argue against such clearly defined roles for frontier castles occupied by the military orders, especially when they are spelled out so succinctly in a primary source. Almost two decades later, Adrian Boas summarized the uses for crusader and military order fortresses in much the same way, but with an added element of surveillance, and minus their psychological effect:

Frontier castles were generally no more than isolated, fortified, forward positions which could house large garrisons, contain stores of weapons, food and equipment, and serve as lookout positions and as refuges if necessary. None the less, these were significant roles which could be decisive in the success or failure of the field army.<sup>47</sup>

Neither Forey, nor Boas were wrong in focusing on these uses for frontier fortifications, yet what has been particularly difficult to define has been the shape and size of each fortress' sphere of influence, and how this sphere changed as a result of being emitted from a site that was occupied by a military-monastic order. It is my view that the size and shape of a castle's sphere of influence can be visualized, but only through the GIS tools that are outlined in chapter 2 of this dissertation.

Derek Lomax's short survey of Iberia's military orders is perhaps more useful for its comprehensive bibliography than for its 70 page summary of the origins, encomiendas and histories of each order. As Luis Garcia-Guijarro Ramos pointed out in a 2008 contribution to volume III of *The Military Orders: History and Heritage*, Lomax was able to assemble over 900 publications that covered the military orders throughout Europe and the Near East, and just ten years later, several scholars created a volume edited by Carlos de Ayala that updated Lomax's list to include a thousand more titles.<sup>48</sup> There can be no doubt that the production of scholarship on the military orders has exploded, especially since the turn of the century. The number of articles discussing even the most minor orders, or even specific sites occupied or built by the military orders makes their historiography particularly challenging. Thus far, I have described the most prolific and influential scholars that have published full-length monographs on single orders, as well as bound summaries of the orders in Iberia, and additional works on the history of the Reconquest. After the turn of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, scholarship on the military orders became more specific as authors built upon the more comprehensive works of historians like O'Callaghan, Forey and Lomax, and architectural histories of the military orders began to emerge.

# • The predominance of socio-economic & micro-histories

In his 2008 historiography, Luis Garcia-Guijarro Ramos argued that despite the wealth of publications on Iberia's military orders since the turn of the millennium, much of the work written by Spanish historians left significant gaps in the scholarship. Ramos summarized those gaps in the following:

... publications are regarded as entities in themselves, with more or less intrinsic value, but with hardly any interrelation with one another or connection to Spanish intellectual history in the past decades. There is a wide common ground though, that most of them share at least in part: a complete disregard for the two basic pillars of the military orders, the crusade and ecclesiastical reform; a predominance of socio-economic studies: the local or regional scope of the research; a purely descriptive approach to the sources, or, at the other extreme, employing the sources to support preconceived theories or models; unproblematic reasoning; a lack of comparative approach to the different orders in Spain and their development outside the peninsula; studies with nationalist overtones in some regions; little concern for the understanding of such complex institutions which are regarded as instrumental to other fields of inquiry, like, for example, the phenomenon of repopulation.<sup>49</sup>

Of this long list of criticisms, the tendency to ignore the religious and crusader character

of the military orders, the preponderance of socio-economic studies, the purely

descriptive approach, and the disregard of the sub-field of frontier studies and repopulation have been some of the primary reasons why architecture has been so rarely utilized as evidence of military order history. There are two other common problems with these works: an overall lack of spatial and temporal granularity, and a failure to account for the military orders as signalers on the cultural landscape. These issues are not exclusive to Spanish historians, and they are not present in all histories of the military orders, but they inspired aspects for this dissertation.

An article by Clara Estow in 1982 is an early example of the socio-economic works that have dominated since the turn of the century. In "The Economic Development of the Order of Calatrava, 1158-1366" Estow mentioned that her method represents a "...departure from the traditional approach to the investigation of the order (of Calatrava)" because it does not focus on the "...heroic deeds of the knights and their military involvement in the Reconquest."<sup>50</sup> Estow successfully began to map "areas of Calatravan predominance," on the peninsula, but the author's purpose was to reconstruct the principal economic activities of the Order of Calatrava, not to better understand how their physical and architectural presence affected the religious frontier.

While works such as Estow's have derived a great deal from documents that had previously been ignored by historians focusing on the political, spiritual and territorial concerns of the military orders, the cumulative effect of so many economic histories is a false impression that the military orders were primarily an economic influence on the frontier. In other words, a summary of these economic histories could reveal them to be excellent settlers, herdsmen, ransomers, and toll-collectors, but less as projections of earthly and religious authority on a newly conquered rural landscape. One might imagine that works accounting for the material consequences of the military orders' participation in the Reconquest might lead directly to increased interest in their architecture in the 21st century, but economic histories of the military orders have remained separate from descriptive works on their architecture. As Ramos pointed out, these works represent a "historical materialism" type that places the military orders within the "manorial world" of rents, toll collection, and the rural economy, but in the process they separate the orders from the military-religious purpose that made them different from all other frontier institutions.<sup>51</sup>

Histories of the military orders have also been in lock-step with wider trends toward ever more local and regional "micro" histories in modern scholarship. On one hand, this has been beneficial for architectural historians, as it allows for increased attention to individual castles belonging to the military orders. On the other hand, most of these works are content to describe, rather than interpret their subjects, and there seems to be even less interest in connecting these sites to the larger network of frontier fortifications.<sup>52</sup> Simply by glancing at the titles of the thousands of publications on lberia's military orders since 1975, it appears that most historians agree with Alan Forey's assessment that a peninsula-wide survey of military order fortifications would be "impossible."<sup>53</sup> Consequently, scholars' work has focused on ever-smaller geographic divisions, and even smaller, less established orders to fill in the gaps of what appears at first glance to be well-trodden territory. Shorter, specific works certainly have their value, especially when they are cited by a community of historians to reassess their connection to larger historical systems, but there are very few macroscopic works being written.

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#### • Lists of place-names disguised as architectural history

In the past decade, a handful of mostly descriptive histories specifically devoted to the architectural heritage of Iberia's military orders has finally emerged. One of the most representative examples of this type is Amador Ruibal Rodriguez' "Las Órdenes Militares En España: Fortificaciones y Encomiendas" that was published as part of the 4<sup>th</sup> congress of castle studies in Madrid in 2012.<sup>54</sup> While this was a meticulously researched paper, it cannot be confused with a work of architectural history. The author's intent was not to draw conclusions about the military orders directly from their remaining architecture. Instead, the paper reads as an aggregated gazetteer of place-names donated to, or built by the military orders with just the briefest nod to interpreting them.<sup>55</sup> Ruibal and others have remained overwhelmingly descriptive, making only the slightest attempt to interpret the historical influence of military order fortresses, or why they were built. An example of this kind of flat listing of sites is translated from a section of Ruibal's article on the Order of Calatrava below:

The Castilian lands were taking shape at this time, (and there were) three large spaces or territories where most fortified possessions of the order developed: The first and largest is "Campo de Calatrava" mainly in the modern province of Ciudad Real, where we find, in the twelfth century, the fortresses of Calatrava la Vieja, the oldest documented by Rades in 1169, Caracuel and Benavente, dating from 1180, Malagon, 1182, and Salvatierra, 1198, all fortified, and in the 13<sup>th</sup> century, after the battle of Las Navas, Calatrava la Nueva, 1217, Piedrabuena, 1245, Puertollano, 1280, Manzanares, 1284, Almodovar, 1285, Bolaños and Daimiel, both of 1299, also fortified, as was Mudela, later entrusted as it was created in 1300, while Almagro, dating from 1284, Villagutierre, Membrilla and Fuente del Moral, all of 1285, or Torroba and Villarrubia, both of 1229, were not (fortified).<sup>56</sup>

Ruibal was not atypical in taking such a light interpretive stance. It is not until the very end of the 40-page paper that the author concluded that the fortresses were more

important economically than militarily.<sup>57</sup> This conclusion was likely the result of a predefined preference for economic evidence rather than an interpretation of the fortresses themselves. It should also be noted that while Ruibal accounted for the larger, more wellpreserved fortresses in his lists of important donations, his approach makes it difficult to give sufficient attention to the more ruined structures that dotted the landscape. In the end, the more nuanced work on the architectural side of the military orders' identities has not come from historians of the military orders. Rather, the most valuable work has come from historians of the Reconquest that eventually took an environmental, frontier approach to their subject. This material is summarized in the final portion of this historiography.

### • Archaeology & Iberia's military orders

More impressive contributions to the architectural history of the military orders have come from the field of Archaeology, but a number of coverage imbalances still remain. Geographically, Iberia has drawn far less attention than Syria, the Baltic region, or even Templar and Hospitaller architecture in France. For example, in a 2014 publication of collected essays on the archaeology of the military orders that emerged from the 2009 Military Orders Conference in Cardifff, none of the ten articles covered Iberian structures.<sup>58</sup> As is often the case with archaeological fieldwork, the lack of recent excavations in Iberia's military order sites may have more to do with economy, opportunity and politics than choice. In addition, the same challenges faced by architectural histories of Iberia's military orders are at play for archaeology as well. The regular fluctuations of frontier fortress ownership, and the tendency to adapt rather than build new makes an effort to develop an archaeological impression of Iberian military order contributions particularly difficult. Even within the peninsula, more work has been done on Templar and Hospitaller structures in Aragon than on structures of the native orders that were closer to the frontier.<sup>59</sup> Frontier structures were more likely to be lost, regained and adapted than built new, and their locations made it important to build quickly. Consequently these fortresses were less refined than their counterparts in the north – which places them closer to the "vernacular" side of the spectrum of architectural history that has generally drawn less attention from scholars. Finally, surveys of rural settlement patterns, irrigation and transhumance over wide swaths of territory held by the military orders (and other groups) have a longer history than excavations devoted to specific military order structures in Iberia.

Archaeologists have also demonstrated a clear preference for the religious structures of the military orders over fortified commanderies. As Damian Carraz recently noted in his article "Templar and Hospitaller Establishments in Southern France: The State of Research and New Perspectives" the material remains left by the military orders was first approached in terms of their transmission of styles of religious architecture.<sup>60</sup> For instance, works by Viollet-le-Duc in the 19<sup>th</sup> century began the myth that the Templars had an exclusive preference for round, or centrally-planned churches.<sup>61</sup> These stylistic observations have also led to some interesting conclusions, such as the part played by the military orders in transplanting architectural styles from the Ile-de-France to Provence, or the dissemination of a so-called "Toledo-style" of brick vaulting that was discovered after rescue archaeology at Calatrava la Nueva and the Order of Santiago's fortress of Segura de la Sierra.<sup>62</sup> Still, as Carraz points out, the preference for religious structures has resulted in a de-contextualization where churches are studied with little to no reference to their topographical setting, or their place within a larger commandery complex.<sup>63</sup>

### 1.2 Histories of the Christian Reconquest of Iberia & the Frontier Paradigm

The inspiration to consider the interdependency between frontier fortresses and their surrounding landscape in chapters 2-4 did not come from histories of the military orders, or the handful of site-specific archaeological studies that have been published in recent years. Instead, the works that have most influenced the macroscopic approach to this subject have been histories of the Reconquest that align themselves with "frontier history." Frontier theory has found particularly fertile ground in medieval Iberia, with varying results. In the end, the most useful branches of frontier theory for this dissertation have applied it as a spatial, environmental process. The following section begins with the origins of the frontier as a ubiquitous, yet often imprecise historical theory, and ends with an analysis of military order histories that successfully apply a landscape perspective that is used in the remainder of this dissertation.

## • Turner and the origins of the frontier paradigm

Alan Forey's use of the qualifier "frontier" to describe a category of castles occupied by the military orders in his 1991 book *The Military Orders* reflects the consistent popularity of a historical paradigm that was first used by Fredrick Jackson Turner to describe the 19<sup>th</sup> century American West.<sup>64</sup> In simple terms, Turner theorized that the unique American "being" or "character" developed as it did because of the constant presence of an "empty" zone of available land in the West. Moreover, he believed that at the time he was writing in the 1890s, the frontier had ceased to exist, and thus America would develop according to a different driving force in the future. As medieval Iberian historian Robert Burns wrote in 1992, "Turner has become a kind of Vampire, killed on many a day with a stake through his Thesis, yet ever undead and stalking abroad."<sup>65</sup> Despite the amount of material devoted to dismantling Turner's thesis, the term "frontier" has shown remarkable staying power for histories of the Christian Reconquest. Given that the frontier marked the birthplace of the military orders, it is useful to better define what this term has meant for historians, and what it meant for medieval Iberians.

Robert I. Burns helpfully summarized the aspects of Turner's thesis that became attractive for historians of Medieval Spain in the following:

Turner's own West became a more slippery concept, not only a place, or at times a condition, but especially a 'process' – at once a physical movement of settlement into vacant land, an evolution through specific stages toward full civilization within each successive zone, and a psychological or imaginative transformation affecting the protagonists.<sup>66</sup>

As a historian who regularly drew inspiration from Turner, Burns was careful to separate the specifics of Turner's theory from the general "vision and tone" of the work.<sup>67</sup> Citing Laurence McCrank, Burns argued that there are two models for the application of Turner's thesis among historians of medieval Iberia: An "evolutionary" model that derives from the spatial transplanting of people into a new region where they were changed by their new environment,<sup>68</sup> and a "more anthropological focus" where the frontier was created out of cultural exchange after a violent conquest.<sup>69</sup> Burns placed his own work, in the latter category. While this dissertation applies a spatial approach, its goals are closer to that of Burns in that it analyzes the way the military orders defined the frontier landscape, yet were shaped by their roles as occupiers.<sup>70</sup>

Even though he was more concerned with tracing ecclesiastical reactions to the frontier than the military orders specifically, Burns' definition of the 'frontier church' is particularly applicable to the subjects of this dissertation:

How then was it a 'frontier' Church? ... First it was consciously the custodian here of the Europe-wide crusade spirit, deliberately transforming its material surroundings to make little atolls in the sea of Muslims. Secondly, it was itself dominated by reactive acculturation. An environment can be acculturated as much by reacting as by conforming. A community in reactive acculturation hardens its cultural patterns until the effect is stressful and absurd; a 'golden ghetto' of an affluent society's citizens abroad, whether as invited garrison or colonial administrators in a poor land, is a modern example. To stand in a sea of Muslims belonging to a high culture, in a territory still conformed to their socio-theological needs and purposes, and to refuse their presence or their products any notice as the Valencian Church did, is to bear intense silent witness. To refrain from action, where action is nearly unavoidable, is to act.<sup>71</sup>

The fortress-monastery for the Valencian Order of Montesa that is the subject of chapter 4 is an excellent example of "crusade spirit" as well as reactive acculturation. Through its overt, 'exterior' use of gothic / French style and cut ashlar masonry within a built environment that was otherwise dominated by tapial mud brick and the stacked-stone Alcazar at the then-still Muslim-majority town of Xàtiva, Montesa seems to be designed in a reactive mode. (Fig. 1.10) Compared to other modes of acculturation that are constantly being put forward by scholars looking at Iberia's religious frontier – whether it be Americo Castro's '*Convivencia*' or the various biological metaphors that inevitably lead to "hybridity," – Burns's concepts seem more appropriate for the military orders. As with all aspects of the military orders, their architecture cannot be pinned down to one mode of acculturation; especially when a lack of resources made it difficult for the orders to greatly alter their inherited environment. Ideologically, the orders existed to create Burns' "atolls in a sea of Muslims" out of their frontier fortresses, and they did

occasionally reject their rival culture, but far more often, they had to make do with specific architectural adaptations that expressed a change of religious orientation, rather than a wholly new monument to their identity. The exceptions to this mode were their decisions to build immense fortress-monastery headquarters.

### • Linguistic Defense for the Concept of 'Frontier' and Incastellamento

It has also been common for historians to use linguistics to support their application of frontier theory to medieval Spain. The most obvious linguistic connection between the modern and medieval concepts of frontier was the use of the Latin term "Frontera" to specifically refer to a demarcation between religious groups in Spain. According to Lucy Pick, "The notion of the medieval frontier was literally invented in Spain and then exported to describe similar phenomena on other European frontiers."<sup>72</sup> Ummayyad Muslims also had a term for the edges of their territory, which they called the *'thugûr.*' In the introduction to his 1979 book *Islamic and Christian Spain in the Early Middle Ages*, Thomas Glick wrote that in the centuries before the advent of the military orders, the *thugûr* were "...simply empty zone(s) separating Muslims from Christians, defended by a line of castles, and lacking a full civil administration."<sup>73</sup> While Turner was not referred to directly, his thesis lies just below the surface of Glick's stated position about Spain's religious frontier.

There are also linguistic factors that support the idea that the frontier was a particularly "castled" landscape. Latin word roots like "castrum," (castle) and "turrem" (tower) are everywhere in the place-names of Spain and Portugal, most notably in the name of the Christian kingdom that gained the most from expansion through Reconquest: Castile. On the Arabic side, place-names derived from "qasr" (castle) and "qual'at

(Fortress) can be seen in Alcázar, Alcalá, and most revealingly, Calatrava.<sup>74</sup> Glick is one of a number of historians who made this linguistic connection, but he also took the ideas of a "castled" frontier even further in his 1995 book *From Muslim Fortress to Christian Castle: Social and Cultural Change in Medieval Spain.*<sup>75</sup> Glick was more interested in the 8<sup>th</sup>-11<sup>th</sup> centuries than the mid-12<sup>th</sup> through mid-14<sup>th</sup> centuries – when the military orders were most active – but his development of the concept of *incastellamento* proved to be a valuable, and lasting construct that had continued relevance for the later period. The concept was first put forward by Pierre Toubert to describe a change in settlement pattern near Rome around 1000 CE, where dispersed habitats were replaced by what Glick translated as a "nucleation" around castles.<sup>76</sup> Glick saw this same pattern at the very beginning of the Reconquest in the 10<sup>th</sup> and especially 11<sup>th</sup> centuries, and his description of this transition seems to be a pattern that was repeated on the frontier for centuries afterward:

Early castles were built on uninhabited, elevated sites, chosen for their defensive positions and typically called *Rocca*, rock in the documents. The purpose of these castles was not to bring security to the countryside, as historians had generally assumed, but to dominate it, to enforce the feudal 'ban' on the now servile populations it held, and to defend against neighboring castles.<sup>77</sup>

Glick did not take the stance that the "uninhabited" quality of the frontier remained into the 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> century. Instead he pointed out that "The cultural landscape of Spain was founded in the High Middle Ages, as result of the Islamic conquest and the early modalities of Christian settlement." The image this should conjure is one of dispersed settlements in high places, physically attached to the base of fortifications that were sited at the highest topographical point in the surrounding area. This was the cultural landscape that the kings of Aragon, Castile, Portugal and Leon envisioned as the perfect environment for the military-religious orders.

## • Post-1990: Redefinition of the 'Frontier' as a Landscape

Given the popularity and evidence supporting the frontier concept, it should not be surprising that O'Callaghan, Forey and Lomax all used this term as a way to describe the space occupied by the military orders. Given that each of them also wrote histories of the Reconquest in addition to their works on the military orders, these authors represent the most prolific contributors to both the military orders and frontier history categories discussed here. On the flip side, 'frontier historians' such as Glick, Bishko and Burns did not especially value military order contributions to the development of the Christian-Muslim frontier. The military orders were always referenced as important frontier institutions, but their presence in the landscape was often undervalued in these works up until the 1990s. Since then, the landscape approach has evolved into an environmental interpretation of earlier work by Glick, Bishko and Burns. These landscape-centric works apply ecological and anthropological methods to describe the human "niche construction" on the frontier through the combination of written sources, archaeology and environmental data.<sup>78</sup>

At the tail end of the 1980s, Manuel Gonzalez Jimenez reassessed the Christian Reconquest with a sharp focus on fortification and militancy in the frontier landscape via a well-researched article.<sup>79</sup> Rather than apply osmotic acculturation, or an evolutionary model, Jimenez returned to an older concept posed by Elena Lourie in her 1966 article *A Society Organized for War* and updated it using evidence from the built environment.<sup>80</sup> Put simply, Lourie and Jimenez argued that the rulers of the Christian kingdoms developed formal frontier systems that would prepare and inspire frontier settlers for war against their Muslim enemies, and thereby protect and expand their territory. While Lourie focused more on the promotion of a crusading mentality, and a hardening of Christian and Muslim identities during the Reconquest, Jimenez took a more practical, military approach. The most influential aspect of Jimenez' process - in what is otherwise a very traditional military reading of the Reconquest – was not merely that he referred to the frontier fortresses of the Reconquest as a 'network.' Jimenez combined specific spatial vocabulary with historical developments to describe strengths, vulnerabilities and strategies that changed in different regions during each phase of the Reconquest. For example, in his description of the frontier landscape immediately after the conquest of Toledo in 1085, Jimenez referred to the settlement of Extremadura to the west and south as a *rearguard* for new Castile.<sup>81</sup> He also used simple topographic cross-sections of the fortress sites of Sepúlveda and the fortified towns of Segovia, Avila and Salamanca to demonstrate that most of the new Externaduran settlements were established in easily defended places during this phase of the Reconquest. (Fig. 1.11) Jimenez' conclusions may not have been revolutionary - that frontier towns were chosen for their ability to dominate the landscape via beneficial siting and their connection to each other in a network strategy – but his use of visual and spatial data to argue this point was new in 1989. The author maintained that the "society organized for war," possessed a consistent mentality despite its diverse manifestations, and while the military orders may not have been a focus for the article, they were represented as the direct offspring of the frontier environment.<sup>82</sup> Jimenez, like Bishko, oversold the image of the frontier as a depopulated desert, but unlike Bishko, Jimenez was very interested in the influence of this

depopulated landscape on architecture. His approach to the architecture of the military orders is best summed up in the following:

... The lands to the south of the Tagus were those of the great castles. Only a few centres close to the river had surrounding walls. The reason for this is simple: when the Christians took these lands they found no important towns, but only rural settlements. But, in addition, when the huge region to the north and south of the Guadiana river was properly repopulated, which was not to happen until well into the thirteenth century, the frontier had moved decisively into Andalusia, and it was no longer necessary to invest in such costly fortifications. Thus, what predominated in this area were the large castles, such as those of Calatrava (La Nueva), Consuegra, and Uclés, and small fortresses and defensive towers where the population could find refuge in times of danger.<sup>83</sup>

Each of the structures cited above – Calatrava La Nueva, Consuegra and Uclés, were fortress-monastery headquarters for the military Order of Calatrava, the Hospitallers, and the Order of Santiago respectively. Again, the image Jimenez created above came close to ecological determinism – where giant fortresses were a natural growth pattern for this region of the frontier – and by proxy, the military orders that built them were too.

## • Christopher Gerrard and the Ecological Approach to Frontier Landscape

The development in Iberian frontier history that bears the closest resemblance to the methods used in this dissertation is the ecological approach to landscape exemplified by Christopher Gerrard. The earlier work of Glick, Bishko, Burns and Jimenez pointed to sparse populations, ranching economies, deforestation and near perpetual war as the raw materials that were processed into frontier institutions. Whether this processing was directed by royal authority, or grew "naturally" from the cultural landscape has not been debated as much as it has been inconsistently stated and abandoned – sometimes within the same article.<sup>84</sup> For the next generation, the environmental impact of large historical movements, such as monasticism, or the Crusades has been assessed from a very wide

range of archaeological data, including standing architecture. This process clearly owes a great deal to Braudel, but does not strive for the same scale as that historian's *Mediterranean*.<sup>85</sup> The work of Christopher Gerrard uniquely applies this methodology to the architecture of the military orders in Iberia.

Gerrard's first article in this vein was titled "Opposing Identity: Muslims, Christians and the Military Orders in Rural Aragon."<sup>86</sup> While it is perhaps most remarkable for its surprising proof that the rural frontier of Aragon was more ethnically and racially segregated than previously thought, it also reveals the role played by the Templars and Hospitallers in enforcing this settlement pattern. At the risk of ascribing an anachronistic interpretation to this material, it is worth noting that a segregated impression of the Iberian frontier was particularly rare immediately after this article was written due to the events of September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001. Generally, Iberian medieval history of the early 2000's became much more interested in the unique "blending" of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism in (especially) Andalusian medieval cities than in the separation of religious groups in relatively isolated settlements. For art historians, titles such as *The* Arts of Intimacy signaled interest in the borrowing of Islamic and Jewish forms by Christian patrons – and vice-versa.<sup>87</sup> By contrast, Gerrard cited Braudel, who saw the religious and social groupings of the medieval Mediterranean as 'a maelstrom of competing civilizations whose troubled waters refused to mingle.<sup>88</sup> What was most appropriate about Gerrard's process, and what causes it to align so well with this dissertation is that it was interested in the expression of ethnic and religious boundaries, rather than coexistence; because time after time, the military orders have been described as the impervious expressions of Christian religion, or as a 'wall of the faithful.'

The subject of Gerrard's case study was the small, fortified settlement of Ambel and its surrounding rural area in the foothills to the west of Zaragoza in Aragon. This area was conquered early on in the Reconquest, in 1118, and was later donated to the Templars and Hospitallers in 1139. Interestingly, Gerrard's first explanation for this donation to the military orders referred to less material benefits such as fostering "Christian morale" and "maintain(ing) a positive public image in order to secure recruits."<sup>89</sup> This interpretive stance was a relief after such a proliferation of purely descriptive works on the military orders.

Gerrard's methodology has been distinctly archaeological – imagining the social and ideological barriers of a reconstructed site based on material remains. Early on in the article, Gerrard pointed out that Ambel, and other frontier settlements were anything but consistent in their development. Over four hundred years of the Reconquest the landscape around Ambel was substantially reorganized through the nucleation of dispersed farmsteads and hamlets into larger communities.<sup>90</sup> Not unlike the concept of incastellamento offered by Glick to describe the early middle ages, this nucleation is taken in a slightly different direction by Gerrard to describe a processes that led to the segregation of the cultural landscape into a topographic pattern. According to Gerrard's archeological data, by the second half of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, Christian communities were perched on higher ground in the foothills, leaving the lower, fertile floodplains of the Ebro River for the Muslim communities. Moreover, Gerrard interpreted this pattern as a purposeful attempt by the Christians to dominate the skyline for Muslims residing at a lower viewpoint. Christian communities clustered their shrines, hermitages and chapels in boundary areas - thereby visually "signposting" their religion in the landscape with a

clear message of power.<sup>91</sup> One of the chief arguments of the current work is that overtly Christian visual dominance of the skyline has been an underappreciated reason for the choice of the military orders as frontier fortress garrisons. This idea is tested more precisely through the use of viewshed technology in Chapter 2, but it has been encouraging to see Gerrard come to similar conclusions using a sophisticated archaeological process.

More than a decade later, Gerrard teamed up with two other archaeologists to publish a long article on the ecological consequences of crusading in the three main "fronts" of the middle ages: the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, the Baltic region and the Iberian Reconquest.<sup>92</sup> Gerrard contributed an ecological reading of the Reconquest through an analysis of urbanization, fortifications, irrigation, agriculture, livestock and even diet. Building off of his earlier work on the fortified town of Ambel, the author concluded that the key changes to fortifications brought about by the Reconquest (and particularly by the military orders) involved the conversion of an Islamic '*hisn*' – the basic unit of rural settlement composed of a tower, and a walled-in refuge space with cistern – into feudal castles. At Ambel, the Templars did this by adding two new twostory halls that they abutted to the original three-story Islamic tower to create a central space that was enclosed by structures rather than simple palisades. According to Gerrard, the symbolism of adapting a pre-existing Islamic tower that had likely been the tallest, and most conspicuous structure in the landscape "... would not be lost on the local (Muslim) population."93

Gerrard again used "nucleation" to describe the "…fundamental shift in the overall pattern of rural settlement." In this later article however, Gerrard offered more

concrete numbers to describe the process by which seven small settlements were "merged and enclosed" into fortifications after the Christian conquest of Ambel. While he acknowledged that the long history of renovation at these structures makes the "moment of Reconquest" difficult to discover in the archaeological record, Gerrard argued that even small adaptations can mark a much greater change in the distribution of settlements. In some cases, the frontier fortresses grew into large new bases for future incursions into Muslim-held territory, while in others, as at the Templar fortress of Encinacorba (Aragon), the new Christian settlers complained of the castle's "terrible and vast solitude."<sup>94</sup> In Chapter 2, the level of remoteness or connectedness for a given fortress is much more easily visualized than described, and can help to build a hierarchy of sites that is not readily apparent in their physical remains.

Finally, Gerrard developed an argument about the military orders' mode of architectural adaptation in urban areas that was particularly novel. Citing Ambel, where the Templars placed their new church, tower and monastic complex at the "hinge" between the Muslim and Christian populations of the town, Gerrard argued that "... the military orders 'imported their rural identity and created self-sufficient 'islands' of settlement..." Moreover, Gerrard offered that this 'island' proved that the military orders considered it their job to create physical and symbolic barriers between Christianity and Islam at the landscape scale, as well as within a single settlement. This method of forging an identity through architecture reflects the central argument of this dissertation, as reflected by the title: "The Wall of the Faithful."

## **1.3 Conclusions**

The purpose of this historiography has been to impart the many complex, and well documented problems that surround an architectural history of Iberia's military orders. As the Venn diagram in Figure 1.9 illustrates, the topic of the "Wall of the Faithful" lies at the intersection of two very large historiographies: histories of the military orders, and histories of the frontier during the Reconquest. Both sub-fields have a set of debates that are consistently churned up in scholarship.

The most common criticism of any history of the military orders is that either the military or the religious sides of the orders' identities are overvalued at the expense of the other. This position is understandable given that after the foundation of the Templars, no less famous a figure than Bernard of Clairvaux was asked to help theologically separate them from lay knights and other forms of monasticism. Sam Zeno Conedera's 2015 book, which proposes that the term "ecclesiastical knights" replace the misleading "warrior monks" proves that this is still a contentious issue in the scholarship.<sup>95</sup> By contrast, many works of architectural history that have focused specifically on the military orders fail to acknowledge the military/religious debate due to a near universal preference for religious structures. Surveys of Iberia's military order fortresses are generally rare, and they tend to follow a frustrating pattern where lists of sites take the place of analysis. These works are especially conservative with their interpretations, they fail to link the fortresses together organizationally, spatially, or temporally, and they are drawn more from legal documents of donation than architectural data. Another issue that has appeared in the scholarship is the tendency to focus on increasingly smaller geographic regions, or studies that exclusively consider smaller military orders. This pattern of increasing

specificity may also be a reflection of the uneven emphasis on the economic roles of the military orders in recent scholarship. The main critique with these economic histories is that while they are impeccably researched, they can create what I argue is a false impression that the military orders were more valuable as toll and rent collectors than as symbolic and practical barriers between Christianity and Islam.

Histories of the Reconquest have evolved in more directions than histories of the military orders. Where historians of the military orders have benefited greatly from surviving documents on the military orders – especially those that were aggregated from the headquarters of various orders in the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries and held in large collections at the national and provincial archives in Madrid, Lisbon, or Barcelona historians of the Reconquest have confronted a seemingly endless supply of data with equally diverse methods for interpretation. One could argue that there isn't a square mile of the Iberian Peninsula or the Balearic Islands that was not affected by the Christian Reconquest over nearly 800 years. It should not be a revelation therefore that major branches have formed in Reconquest history. Frontier history is one such branch; a branch that has been influenced by landscape history, neo-Turnerism, survey archaeology, economic history, ecological & agricultural history, and geospatial methodologies. Despite the increase in spatial methods devoted to the topic, depictions of the frontier as a thin line have not disappeared, and the architectural nodes that were most responsible for maintaining control over vast amounts of rural territory – frontier fortresses – have not as yet been holistically located in time and space.

The pivotal role played by the military orders in the Christian Reconquest of Iberia has been agreed upon for some time. Devotion to fighting the infidel in "their" land of Iberia was written in many of the founding documents for the military orders. They have also been nearly universally described as the vanguard of the Reconquest. Historians have employed a host of methods to argue that they succeeded on the edges of Christian territory through some combination of economic dominance, military prowess, organizational readiness, or religious fervor. In addition, their frontier fortresses have been described as a wall, or more recently, as a network – yet in both cases these terms have been used metaphorically. With a few exceptions, little effort has thus far been made to visualize this fortress-network that many agree was the premier physical and symbolic barrier between Christian and Muslim spheres of influence. In the next chapter, I employ a geospatial database to visualize three of the four ways that the military orders built their "wall of the faithful" – through a network of intervisible or spatially connected nodes, through the choice of sites that could observe and visually dominate the landscape, and through foundational principles (and sites) that indelibly attached them to the edges of Christian controlled territory. The remaining two chapters forgo the earlier macroscopic view of the Reconquest in favor of a nuanced historical and morphological analysis of two fortress-monastery headquarters. Calatrava la Nueva and the Castillo-Convento de Montesa represent rare manifestations of what Christopher Gerrard called "...the forging of self-conscious identities..." through the substantial construction of new architecture.96

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Enrique Gallego Blanco, trans., *Rule of the Spanish Military Order of St. James 1170-1493,* 79; Bullarium Santiago, 2. (*emphasis added*)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Alan J. Forey, "The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries," *Traditio* 40 (1984): 202.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The term "reconquest" or "*Reconquista*" is historically problematic because it implies that nearly eight centuries of Muslim occupation on the Iberian Peninsula (711-1492) was an ellipsis with a Christian monoculture on either end. I will continue to use "reconquest" in this dissertation partially because the military orders actively promoted the idea that Muslim presence and

authority was illegitimate and thus deserving of active replacement by a rightful Christian authority. The history of the idea of reconquest is succinctly summarized by Joseph O'Callaghan who first cites Derek Lomax's argument that the reconquest was "... not an artificial construct created by modern historians" and finishes by stating that it also was an idea that was "...shaped by the influence of successive generations." Joseph F. O'Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 3.

<sup>4</sup> For example, Joseph O'Callaghan's "History of Medieval Spain" and "Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain" are extremely thorough volumes that name fortresses that played key roles in the reconquest, but these histories offer more in terms of the ideological currents of the reconquest, as opposed to a nuanced geographic, or spatial analysis. The same can be said for other English language surveys of Medieval Spain, including several by Peter Linehan, Bernard Reilly, and others. On the other end of the spectrum, Thomas Glick – who led an archaeological approach to the history of the reconquest by focusing on settlement patterns and an application of Pierre Toubert's concept of "Incastellamento" to the reconquest – has been a strong influence on the approach taken by this dissertation. A more complete historiographical summary of these works will follow in this chapter.

<sup>5</sup> By far, the largest repository of primary sources on the military orders in Iberia is organized into a single section at the *Archivo Historico Nacional* in Madrid. Other collections of bulls or *bullaria*, tax documents, *Hermandades* (Contractual agreements between military orders to cooperate or share assets) are held in similar repositories in Barcelona and Lisbon at the *Archivo de la Corona de Aragon* and the *Arquivo da Torre do Tombo* respectively. The Rule of the military Order of Santiago, and the Bullarium of the Order of Calatrava have both been reprinted into modern additions available at the University of Virginia library.

<sup>6</sup> Thomas F. Glick, *From Muslim Fortress to Christian Castle: Social and Cultural Change in Medieval Spain* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), xii.

<sup>7</sup> Alan Forey concluded succinctly that "... if references to recruitment are often insufficiently explicit, it is clear that the orders established garrisons of brethren in only a limited number of the fortified places assigned to them near the Muslim frontier. Convents were set up in only the more important strongholds." Forey, Alan "The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest." 209 <sup>8</sup> The popular attraction of this term is well reflected in the titles of two popular surveys of the military orders. See: Desmond Seward, *The Monks of War: The Military Religious Orders* (Arkana) (New York: Penguin (Non-Classics), 1996) & *Los Monjes Soldados: Los Templarios Y Otras Órdenes Militares* (Aguilar De Campoo: Fundación Santa María La Real, Centro De Estudios Del Románico, 1997)

<sup>9</sup> Sam Zeno Conedera, Ecclesiastical Knights: The Military Orders in Castile, 1150-1330 (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015), 1-18.

<sup>10</sup> Joseph F. O'Callaghan, "The Interior Llfe of the Military Religious Orders of Medieval Spain" (lecture, Malta Study Center Lecture Series, St. John's University, Collegeville, MN, October 2001), accessed June 4, 2015, <u>http://www.hmml.org/centers/malta/publications/lecture2.html</u>. 8-9
 <sup>11</sup> Bernard Clairvaux, St., *In Praise of the New Knighthood: A Treatise on the Knights Templar and the Holy Places of Jerusalem* (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 2000)
 <sup>12</sup> This relationship is covered in detail in chapter 3.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. 11

<sup>14</sup> Ayala Martínez Carlos De, *Las Órdenes Militares Hispánicas En La Edad Media: Siglos XII-XV* (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2007), 193-99.

<sup>15</sup> O'Callaghan "The Interior Life." 10

<sup>16</sup> Américo Castro, *The Spaniards; an Introduction to Their History.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971)

<sup>17</sup> Quotation is from the "Colleccion de docementos ineditos de la Corona de Aragon." Transcribed by Joseph O'Callaghan. Joseph F. O'Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 52. This was an agreement by the Templars to form a Spanish militia patterned from their Jerusalem branch. <sup>18</sup> Adrian J. Boas, Archaeology of the Military Orders: A Survey of the Urban Centres, Rural Settlement and Castles of the Military Orders in the Latin East (c. 1120-1291) (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006)

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. 106

<sup>20</sup> Peter Burton, "Islamic Castles in Iberia," *The Castle Studies Group Journal*, no. 21 (2007-8):
 236, http://www.castlestudiesgroup.org.uk/Iberian%20Castles%20-%20Peter%20Burton.pdf.
 <sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> For a more complex diagram of the sub-fields that intersect this dissertation see Fig. 1.9
 <sup>23</sup> Francisco De Rades Y Andrada, *Crónica De Las Tres Órdenes De Santiago, Calatrava Y Alcántara*, comp. Derek Lomax (Barcelona: "El Albir," 1980)

<sup>24</sup> Rades' three-part chronicle made use of the rich resources available to him on the orders of Calatrava and Santiago, with a much more cursory account of the history of the Order of Alcántara. This imbalance was either due to a lack of interest and effort, or a problem of distance, as the archives for Santiago at the monastery of Uclés in La Mancha, were much closer than those for Alcántara in Extremadura. The three orders covered in the chronicle were by far the largest in Castile & Leon in the mid-12<sup>th</sup> through mid-14<sup>th</sup> centuries. There were many other military orders that had extensive possessions in Iberia, including both of the "international orders" of the Templars and Hospitallers, the Orders of Montesa and Cristo that took over the Valencian and Portuguese possessions of the Templars after their famous trial and dissolution in 1312, and the Portuguese orders of Avis and Sao Tiago. Rades broke the three chronicles into two parts each: the first part covering the foundation of each order, and the second tracing a narrative of the most critical events of their history.

<sup>25</sup> Rades also mentioned that the first Christian occupants at Calatrava had been the Templars who had abandoned the castle after hearing that a large Almohad force was soon to emerge from Andalucía. The new, and first native Iberian Order of Calatrava was founded by monks from the Cistercian monastery of Fitero in Navarre in northern Spain when they answered King Sancho III of Castile's call for a new garrison at Calatrava to protect Toledo from imminent attack. Rades purpose for this story, and that of the medieval authors on whom he based it, was to communicate that the order was born as a response to emergency, and that without the noble sacrifice of the monks of Fitero and their Abbot Raimundo, the southern Castilian capital of Toledo could have been lost to Muslim forces. Thus, the former Islamic fortress that had been named "Qal'at Rabāħ" became the namesake and headquarters for the Order of Calatrava that blended a Cistercian rule with military responsibilities.

<sup>26</sup> Rades explained that the Order of Santiago had two sites vying for the right to be called its birthplace, (The Monastery of San Marcos in Leon, and the fortress-monastery of Uclés in Castile) but he clearly favored the rights of Uclés as headquarters of the Order. As mentioned before, Rades work on Alcántara was much shorter and less well researched, but he did describe the fortified town and Roman bridge in Extremadura that served as its foundational site and namesake. The Calatravan priest and archivist's goal was to explain to a 16<sup>th</sup> century Spanish audience where the orders originated, the site-specific purpose of their foundation, who led them in the following four centuries, and the role of the monarchy in their development. He also described specific major events of the reconquest in which the military orders played a key role, such as the battles of Alarcos (1195) and Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) and the siege of Granada (1490-92).

<sup>27</sup> Lomax, Derek (Editor) *La Obra Historica de Rades Y Andada* pg. VIII (translated by author)
 <sup>28</sup> Georgiana Goddard. King, *A Brief Account of the Military Orders in Spain* (New York: Hispanic Society of America, 1921)

<sup>29</sup> Joseph F. O'Callaghan, "The Order of Calatrava: Years of Crisis and Survival, 1158-1212," in *Meeting of Two Worlds Cultural Exchange Between East and West During the Period of the Crusades* (Kalamazoo, Mich: Medieval Institute Publications, Western Michigan University, 1986)
 <sup>30</sup> Theresa M. Vann, "A New Look at the Foundation of the Order of Calatrava," in *On the Social Origins of Medieval Institutions Essays in Honor of Joseph F. O'Callaghan* (Leiden [Netherlands]: Brill, 1998), 93

<sup>31</sup> Derek W. Lomax, La Orden De Santiago, 1170-1275 (Madrid: Consejo Superior De Investigaciones Científicas, Escuela De Estudios Medievales, (1965)

<sup>32</sup> Alan J. Forey, "The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest." 202

<sup>33</sup> O'Callaghan, "The Spanish Military Order of Calatrava and its Affiliates" Preface Pg. 1

<sup>34</sup> Georges Duby "The Three Orders" pp. 226

<sup>35</sup> Alan J. Forey, Templars in the Corona De Aragón (London: Oxford University Press, 1973) also Forey, The Military Orders (New Studies in Mediaeval History) (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991)

<sup>36</sup> Forey did not simply ignore the religious peculiarities of the Templars so as to exaggerate their practical/military contributions to the reconquest. Much like O'Callaghan in his dissertation and in his 2001 article on the "interior life" of Iberia's military orders, Forey devoted chapters of his book to the Templars' ecclesiastical rights and privileges, and the 'Organization and Life" within Templar convents. Still, Forey's survey understandably relies on the much larger corpus of information regarding the Templars' expansion into new territory, than on their religious life. <sup>37</sup> Forey. *The Templars in the Corona de Aragon* pp. 87-109

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. "The surviving sources provide more direct information about rights and privileges than about the orders' role in the struggle against Islam. But, as the function of the military orders was to fight against the infidel, their contribution to the Reconquista is a subject that merits investigation, despite limitations of the evidence." 197

<sup>39</sup> The concept of the "warrior monk" is a topic that has been very recently exposed as flawed in the following: Sam Zeno Conedera, *Ecclesiastical Knights: The Military Orders in Castile, 1150-1330* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015) – this book will be discussed in detail at the end of this section.

<sup>40</sup> Forey mentioned that evidence of Templar garrisons is better than it is for other orders in Iberia, but the sparse numbers for the Templars in Aragon may be a reflection of similar circumstances in other frontier fortresses:

"The largest number of Templars stationed at the castle of Castellote at any one time is ten, and when the Templars stationed in the orders' castles in southern Aragon were arrested in 1308, the number of brethren taken into custody ranged from three from the convent of Villel to fifteen from that of Cantavieja. And it should be remembered that not all members of the military orders were warriors: their communities usually included not only chaplains but also sergeants who normally undertook domestic and agricultural tasks." Forey. *The Military Orders*. 210

<sup>41</sup> Sam Zeno Conedera, *Ecclesiastical Knights* 

<sup>42</sup> Bernard of Clairvaux, St., In Praise of the New Knighthood: A Treatise on the Knights Templar and the Holy Places of Jerusalem (Kalamazoo, MI: Cistercian Publications, 2000)

<sup>43</sup> Alan J. Forey, "The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest." 202. *Emphasis added*<sup>44</sup> Geographically, the Templars and Hospitallers still remained mostly in the interior of Christian Spain until after the creation of the Order of Calatrava in 1158. Over time, the handful of Templar and Hospitaller fortresses (such as the original Christian occupation of the fortress of Calatrava la Vieja in 1148-1157) that resided very close to the border with Islam grew into a larger percentage of their possessions, but it is safe to say that they were less directly in the path of invasion than the native orders. Given Forey's earlier monograph on the Templars in Aragon, it is not surprising that he was able to recognize this pattern. In Chapter 2, I reveal many other such patterns of fortress occupations that emerge through a combination of Forey's data and GIS technology.<sup>45</sup> R. B. C. Huygens, De Constructione Castri Saphet: Construction et Fonctions d'un Château Fort Franc en Terre Sainte (Amsterdam, 1981): 36

<sup>46</sup> Alan J. Forey, *The Military Orders* (New Studies in Mediaeval History) (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1991), 59.

<sup>47</sup> Boas, Archaeology of the Military Orders. 103

<sup>48</sup> Luis Garcia-Guijarro Ramos. "Historiography and History: Medieval Studies on the Military Orders in Spain since 1975." In *Military Orders, Volume 3 History and Heritage*, 23-43. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. 30-31.

<sup>50</sup> Clara Estow, "The Economic Development of the Order of Calatrava, 1158-1366," *Speculum* 57, no. 2 (1982): 296

<sup>51</sup> Ramos "Historiography" 34

<sup>52</sup> The journal *Castillos de España* has been particularly prolific in its publication of short works on individual, or small, regional groups of fortresses. It has changed very little since 1968 in its principal purpose of disseminating knowledge of a variety of fortified structures in Spain. As it is published by a national Spanish organization, Portuguese fortresses are omitted.

<sup>53</sup> This assessment is based on a general viewing of publications listed in the most up-to-date journal in Spain on this subject: *Revisita de las Ordenes Militares* with an ongoing bibliography from 2001-2013.

<sup>54</sup> Amador Ruibal Rodriguez, "Las Órdenes Militares En España: Fortificaciones Y Encomiendas," *Congreso De Castellologia*, 2012, 63, accessed June 2, 2015,

http://www.castillosdeespana.es/sites/castillosdeespana.es/files/pdf/pon2.pdf.

<sup>55</sup> Like Alan Forey's 1992 summary volume on the military orders, and Carlos de Ayala's 1998 survey, Ruibal chose to organize his article by institution, and followed a common schema discussing origins, geographic extents, expansion, and eventual demise for each order. What set the paper apart was the foregrounding of frontier fortresses as the nuclei of the military orders' power in the frontier. Ruibal made a well-supported claim that fortresses had a gravitational pull for settlers, who saw their fortified walls as essential to survival in a volatile landscape. He also categorized these frontier nodes, describing how raising a fortress such as Consuegra to the level of a priory caused it to become a target for rare, but substantial construction, and signaled it as a new headquarters for the Hospitallers in La Mancha. (Fig 1.6)

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. 63 Despite failing to diverge from the unimpressive precedent of compressing the spatial occupation of frontier fortresses into a list, Ruibal did include dates of occupation. In another encouraging, and relatively new contribution, Ruibal also included images of the most well preserved and significant fortresses in the paper. However, that does not make up for the surprising omission of any maps in the published form of the paper. Without a geographical orientation for these fortresses, their proximity to Muslim-held fortresses and cities on the frontier, and when they were there, it is hard to know what, if anything is communicated by these lists. Ruibal's work was critical to the creation of the initial database for this dissertation, but it still highlights the need for a spatial approach to the subject.

57 Ibid. 82

<sup>58</sup> Mathias Piana and Christer Carlsson, eds., *Archaeology and Architecture of the Military Orders: New Studies* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014)

<sup>59</sup> An excellent example of this kind of work that will be cited later is Christopher Gerrard's "Opposing Identity: Muslims, Christians and the Military Orders in Rural Aragon," *Medieval Archaeology* 43 (2000)

<sup>60</sup> Damien Carraz, "Templar and Hospitaller Establishments in Southern France: The State of Research and New Perspectives," in *Archaeology and Architecture of the Military Orders: New Studies*, ed. Mathias Piana and Christer Carlsson (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014), 107-108.
<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Francisco Pons-Sorolla and Rafael Manzano Martos, "The Restoration of the Castle of Segura De La Sierra (Jaen)," An Opperation Carried out by the General Directorate of Architecture, through the Department for Towns of Artistic Interest to the Nation, 1973, accessed June 9, 2015, http://www.international.icomos.org/monumentum/vol10/vol10\_9.pdf.

<sup>63</sup> An excellent example of this kind of decontextualized, and "church-focused" work is Antonio E. Momplet Miguez's article "La Iglesia Del Sacro-Convento De Calatrava La Nueva," *Anales De Historia Del Arte* 4 (1994): 182-190

<sup>64</sup> Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Significance of the Frontier in American History* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1966)

<sup>65</sup> Robert I. Burns, "The Significance of the Frontier in the Middle Ages," in *Medieval Frontier Societies*, by Robert Bartlett and Angus MacKay (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 307.

<sup>66</sup> Burns. "The Significance of the Frontier in the Middle Ages". 308

67 Ibid. 309

<sup>68</sup> The best example of this approach is stated very directly by Charles Julian Bishko in his anthology *Studies in Medieval Spanish Frontier History*. Bishko identifies with "The North American sense" of frontier (i.e. Turner) for his interpretation of frontier Monasticism: "It should be observed moreover, that the term 'frontier' is here used in the authentic North American sense of transplantation from and evolution beyond an older expanding metropolis, rather than with the meaning (so fashionable today among anthropologically-minded students of confronting civilizations) of inter-ethnic 'acculturation'."

Charles Julian. Bishko, *Studies in Medieval Spanish Frontier History* (London: Variorum Reprints, 1980), ii.

<sup>69</sup> Burns clearly explains where his work falls in relation to Turner in the following:

"There is the frontier as spatial transplantation of population and culture with resulting evolutionary modification, as favored for example by Bishko....(and)... A contrary approach is the more anthropological focus among those who are fascinated by the interaction of cultures, both by osmotic interchange and in the wake of violent conquest, an approach exemplified by Thomas Glick and myself."

Robert I. Burns, "The Significance of the Frontier in the Middle Ages," 315.

<sup>70</sup> As O.H Creighton described this connection in his book *Castles and Landscapes*, the two ways to understand the interrelationship of a castle and its surroundings is the impact of the landscape on the castle, and the impact of the castle on the landscape. More precisely, Creighton's work is closely aligned with a new generation of historians who have stressed topographic, visual, and ideological context at the landscape scale when looking at the impact of fortress "colonies" on the frontier. O. H. Creighton, *Castles and Landscapes* (London: Continuum, 2002), 3. <sup>71</sup>Burns "The Significance of the Frontier." 326

<sup>72</sup> Lucy K. Pick, *Conflict and Coexistence Archbishop Rodrigo and the Muslims and Jews of Medieval Spain* (History, Languages, and Cultures of the Spanish and Portuguese Worlds) (New York: University of Michigan Press, 2004), 25.

<sup>73</sup> Thomas F. Glick, *Islamic and Christian Spain in the Early Middle Ages* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 52.

74 Ibid., 54.

<sup>75</sup> Thomas F. Glick, From Muslim Fortress to Christian Castle. 105-113

<sup>76</sup> Pierre Toubert and Ottorino Bertolini, *Les Structures Du Latium Médiéval: Le Latium Méridional Et La Sabine Du IXe Siècle À La Fin Du XIIe Siècle* (Roma: Ecole Française De Rome, 1973)
 <sup>77</sup> Thomas F. Glick, *From Muslim Fortress to Christian Castle*, 105

<sup>78</sup> For the most relevant and recent example of this new method applied to the subject of this

dissertation is see: Aleksander Pluskowski, Adrian J. Boas, and Christopher Gerrard, "The Ecology of Crusading: Investigating the Environmental Impact of Holy War and Colonisation at the Frontiers of Medieval Europe," *Medieval Archaeology* 55, no. 1 (2011): 192-193,

<sup>79</sup> Manuel González Jiménez, "Frontier and Settlement in the Kingdom of Castile (1085–1350)," *Medieval Frontier Societies*, 1992,

<sup>80</sup> Elena Lourie, "A Society Organized For War: Medieval Spain," Past and Present 35, no. 1 (1966)

<sup>81</sup> Jimenez. 53.

<sup>82</sup> Jimenez states this position clearly in the following: "...nothing illustrates the harsh nature of the frontier better than the birth of the military orders of Calatrava (1158) Santiago (1170) and Alcantara (1176) in this region during the second half of the twelfth century." Jimenez. 61. <sup>83</sup> Jimenez. 63

<sup>84</sup> For example, Jimenez takes both stances simultaneously in the article cited above.

<sup>85</sup> Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972)

<sup>86</sup> Christopher Gerrard, "Opposing Identity: Muslims, Christians and the Military Orders in Rural Aragon," *Medieval Archaeology* 43 (2000)

<sup>87</sup> Jerrilynn Dodds, Maria Rosa. Menocal, and Abigail Krasner. Balbale, *The Arts of Intimacy: Christians, Jews, and Muslims in the Making of Castilian Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008)

<sup>88</sup> Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 780-97.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid. Gerrard makes a seemingly offhand remark that one of these shrines was dedicated to "St. Sebastian (a military saint)." The implication is that this was not an arbitrary choice, but one intended to instill confidence & readiness in the Christian communities, and make a specifically militant-religious threat to the Muslim communities that these shrines looked down upon. I will argue that the military orders had a similar purpose on the frontier.

<sup>92</sup> Aleksander Pluskowski, Adrian J. Boas, and Christopher Gerrard, "The Ecology of Crusading: Investigating the Environmental Impact of Holy War and Colonisation at the Frontiers of Medieval Europe," *Medieval Archaeology* 55, no. 1 (2011): 211-219.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> Gerrard. "Opposing Identity". 146

<sup>90</sup> Ibid. 147

<sup>93</sup> Ibid. 212

<sup>94</sup> Ibid. 213

<sup>95</sup> Conedera. 11-14

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> Pluskowski et al. 214

# **Chapter Two** Architecture and Power in the Wide Space of the Christian-Muslim Frontier

## **2.1 Introduction**

In 1240, Pope Gregory IX issued a papal bull granting indulgences to any soldiers who came to the aid of the Order of Calatrava. According to Pope Gregory, this order was in particular need of assistance from the Catholic faithful, and those that helped them were particularly deserving of remission of their sins because:

[The Calatravans]... are placed so near to the Saracens, (that) you may be seen as a target for an arrow.<sup>97</sup>

References to the close proximity of the military orders to enemy Muslims were common in papal bulls and the orders' foundational documents. The sense of "nearness" to the enemy was particularly essential to the self-identification of the native military orders. Their foundational fortress-monasteries were sited in areas where they were often a religious minority, or in partially depopulated regions that were in sight of fortified settlements and castles that were still under Almohad or Muslim Taifa control. As the frontier moved south, a foundational complex could remain the seat of government for an order, but new, large-scale frontier commanderies had to be built or occupied that were closer to the enemy. As pointed out in Chapter 1, the location of the frontier – where Christian and Muslim territorial influence was contested – was not a thin line as most historical maps have depicted it. The Iberia's religious frontier was a wide, fluctuating space that is not easily drawn for any period between the mid-12<sup>th</sup> and mid-14<sup>th</sup> centuries. Perhaps because of this difficulty, historians have tended to avoid taking a spatial approach to the Reconquest, and continue to use sharply drawn lines to map the separation of Christian and Muslim territory. Taken further, historians of Iberia's military orders – who acknowledge that they were premier frontier institutions during the final three centuries of the Reconquest – have failed to make a systematic effort to aggregate knowledge of their fortress locations and dates of occupation across the peninsula.

This chapter argues that the Christian Reconquest was a near-constant, flickering accumulation of fortresses with the military orders at the vanguard. Thanks to advances in GIS technology, a peninsula-wide survey of military order fortresses on the frontier is no longer "impossible" as Prof. Forey suggested in his 1984 article.<sup>98</sup> To prove this, I have aggregated as much spatial and temporal knowledge about the military orders in Iberia as possible into a custom-built database that identifies each fortress occupation into a single event with a beginning and end. This database, called the Architectural Database of Iberian Military Orders or ADIMO re-maps the Christian Reconquest by performing several GIS analyses that allow the simple point-data of a fortress location to interact with the landscape that surrounded it. The ADIMO project also uses quantifiable processes to create a more precise image of what many historians have only rhetorically described as a "network" of military order fortresses on the frontier. The integration of fine-grain temporal data with the spatial methods outlined in this chapter will reveal three of the four ways that the military orders manifested the idea of the "wall of the faithful": (1) via foundational sites that lie near the edges of Christian-controlled territory, (2) by occupying preexisting and new fortress-sites with heightened ability to observe the surrounding landscape, and (3) by forming a strategic network of intervisible and/or spatially connected sites that could control vast territorial space.

The current chapter is broken into four sections. First, I define terms relating to GIS technology used in the current work, and explain why a spatial approach is needed to form a fresh perspective on the subject. Second, I present a short spatial narrative of the military orders in Iberia during the mid-12<sup>th</sup> through mid-14<sup>th</sup> centuries that goes beyond the common, vague assertion that the orders "tended to predominate" in particular areas. Third, I identify patterns that emerge between individual fortresses and their surrounding landscape. Finally, I discuss why there is an evidentiary basis behind the popular rhetorical description of frontier fortresses as a "network."

### 2.2 GIS Terminology & the Spatial Approach

In his book *Space and Power: Politics, War and Architecture* Paul Hirst wrote that space was a resource for power, and that different scales of space are influenced by and reflect power in different ways.<sup>99</sup> Unlike the architectural spaces (which Hirst called "micro spaces of power") discussed in Chapters 3 & 4 of the current work, this chapter analyzes landscape and peninsula-wide spaces. Just as historians of the Christian Reconquest found their subject to be fertile ground for frontier theory, Hirst identified that space and spatial theory also was well suited to this subject. As a non-specialist, his book may have adopted a few outdated concepts – such as his description of the military orders as "warrior monks" – but his description of the Reconquest in spatial terms has been influential for this chapter. I agree with Hirst that space was a contested commodity in the struggle for power in medieval Iberia, but I believe that this space has to be visualized and quantified in order to avoid becoming just another rhetorical device.<sup>100</sup> Given that

these methods hinge on recognizing and describing visual patterns in the data, it is necessary to explain what is meant by a "spatial" method and the GIS-specific toolsets that produced many of the images in this chapter.

In much the same way that *frontier* has become a malleable concept, *space* has become increasingly difficult to define. The chief reason why space has elicited such a large volume of written theory is because it exists at so many scales. Despite Paul Hirst's failure to apply spatial *methods* in his discussion of the Christian Reconquest, the author's division of spatial scales and his spatial *theories* are very similar to those applied in this dissertation. This chapter is concerned with Hirst's first two scales: the scale of the state and its "patterns of conflict with other states" and the scale of the city "as a selfgoverning but subsidiary part of territorial states."<sup>101</sup> The third, architectural scale, and its connection to power relationships at higher scales is covered in Chapters 3 and 4 via the case studies of Calatrava la Nueva and Montesa. At the scale of the entire Iberian Peninsula, Henri Lefebvre's concept of space as a combination of mental, physical and social spheres is also a useful lens through which to view the frontier.<sup>102</sup> Borrowing further from Lefebvre, I adopt the view that the wall of the faithful was *produced* through architecture as a way to ensure that the 'ideal space' of a Christianized Iberia and the 'real space' of the frontier landscape overlapped. This act of production did not necessarily require substantially new architecture so much as it required an overtly Christian presence in the built environment. From this perspective, the military orders were a logical choice to produce this frontier space.

Unlike Lefebvre, this chapter relies on geography and Cartesian methods to discover connections between the objects of architecture and the subject of the military

orders' role in the Reconquest. At the same time, I will not claim (as Lefebvre believes Descartes would) that my GIS project has captured an *absolute* space for the wall of the faithful by locating fortresses in coordinate space. One of the chief goals of this dissertation is to mitigate the image of a hard, linear frontier and replace it with a more appropriate image of permeable, fluctuating space. Questions of geographical "accuracy" or "absolute" are not always appropriate given that this project focuses on spatial and temporal overlap – thereby breaking the image of the frontier as a "wall" of fortresses.

The ADIMO database (which is "flattened" into a single spreadsheet in (Appendix A) captured each change of occupation/affiliation in the fortresses and cities of Iberia's wide frontier from the first appearance of the Templars in 1120 until the beginning of the orders' "decline" into an aristocratic, rather than monastic order around 1350.<sup>103</sup> Each of these occupation events contains either specific days for initiation and expulsion of either a military order, Muslim group or Christian nobility, or a range of dates at the beginning or end of occupation. These events are attached to 621 fortresses, towers, cities, villages, churches and monasteries with a single latitude and longitude marking the highest location within the footprint of each site. Given that all of my analyses were based on this data, a great deal of effort was made to locate these sites as precisely as possible. This was accomplished most successfully via Google Earth's satellite imagery, but also through a crowd sourcing technique involving geotagged photos. In one way, Alan Forey's claim that a comprehensive survey was "impossible" is correct.<sup>104</sup> I cannot claim to have located *every* frontier site that was associated with the military orders on the frontier, but I also do not claim to have located 621 sites without assistance.<sup>105</sup> The current study owes a debt to hikers and castle enthusiasts who managed to geotag, label and upload photographs of surviving bits of castle masonry or extant cisterns that are invisible even for someone looking directly at satellite imagery of these sites in google earth. An example of the technological advantage I had over Alan Forey's 1984 article is shown in Figure. 2.1.

ADIMO contains 1158 occupation events in total, including a handful of battles and siege events. In terms of site typology, the data does not conform to a metadata standard such as Dublin Core or VRA Core in its current form, partially because the base unit was events rather than buildings, and partially because the degree of survival for most fortresses is so slight that many of the structures would have had null values in most fields relating to specific features in a standard metadata schema. As a result, ADIMO deliberately focused on data that was enterable for the entire set, regardless of the degree of survival or the certainty of the entry. The key fields were the location, occupation dates and affiliation. ADIMO is therefore the closest example of an immutable or absolute "Cartesian" spatial set in this GIS project, despite the use of "fuzzy" date fields. All of the queries and analyses that make up the larger GIS project were run so that the new data – whether it be viewshed or cost-distance analyses described in the following paragraphs – preserved the affiliation, location and dates of the original sites.

Fortresses were the key nodes of the Reconquest, especially in sparsely populated areas, but locating them as points in geographic space is not a sufficient illustration of their influence. This chapter chiefly applies three digital tools for analyzing both sides of the fortress-landscape relationship as well as inter-site networks. The first (GIS) tool is called viewshed analysis. This GIS tool produces a visual representation of all units of land that are visible for an agent standing at a chosen location. (Fig. 2.2) In this study, the

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agent-viewers stand 15 meters above the surface of the landscape at the location of a fortress, town, or church built by the military orders, Christian Nobles, or Muslim occupants. In Figure 2.2 the blue areas represent each 30m<sup>2</sup> unit of land that answered "yes" to the question: "Can I be seen by a figure standing at the top of the Fortress-Monastery of Montesa?" This kind of analysis can be infinitely refined to account for atmospheric hindrances to visibility, weather, or forestation, but by far the most important variable for landscape visibility is topography. The viewsheds you will see in this dissertation were calculated through a spatial query of a 2D representation of the 3D landscape called a Digital Elevation Model or DEM. A more technical discussion of the DEM and the process of iterating these viewsheds and other analyses across the entire survey of fortified frontier sites can be found in Appendix B.<sup>106</sup>

The second GIS tool that was used to study the site-landscape relationship is called *cost-distance analysis*. Like viewshed analysis, cost-distance analysis is a form of *agent based modeling* – a category of analysis that employs hypothetical agents who act upon the dataset according to rules set up by the scholar. Unlike viewshed analysis, the agents are not static features. The cost-distance analysis used in the current study asks an agent – specifically a rider on horseback – to walk 32km (roughly a day's travel) in all possible directions from the starting point of each of the 621 sites in ADIMO. Without taking into account the cost of traveling up increasingly steep slopes, the cost-distance would appear a perfect circle with a radius of 32km and a center at one of the sites in ADIMO. However, by reclassifying the DEM so that each degree of slope larger than 8 degrees costs an increasing number of available 32 cost-kilometers, the shape of the

limits that a person on horseback can travel in 32 cost-kilometers tends to take the shape of valleys that are closest to the frontier settlement of castle.

Figure 2.3 shows the cost-distance polygon estimating which areas of the landscape could be reached within one day's travel on horseback from the fortressmonastery of Montesa. As with all agent-based modeling, the results of cost-distance analysis are highly dependent on the number and weight of variables added to the model. Vegetation, rivers, roads, political boundaries, tolls, seasons and weather can all influence the route taken to reach a particular destination, or prevent travel entirely. Adding these variables is beyond the scope of this work, and would require an entire team of researchers to build a model that would be useful at the scale of the Iberian Peninsula.<sup>107</sup> Nonetheless, the current model – which again uses the slope of the landscape as the primary determinant for accessibility – suggests which parts of the surrounding landscape were most likely to be under the influence of a given fortress or city garrison. In more concrete terms, the shape of the cost-distance polygon shows where a fortress garrison would be able to send a mounted soldier if a local insurrection, tax collection, or some other immediate (one day's notice) policing need arose. Metaphorically, the cost-distance polygon maps the extents of a castle's immediate ability to physically exert its influence over others.

Even without additional variables affecting travel cost, the cost-distance model in Figure 2.3 can, at the very least eliminate those parts of the landscape that were simply impossible to access in a single day's ride. Moreover, when combined with viewshed analysis, we can see how the direction of greatest visibility may not have necessarily been the direction or extent of greatest influence on the surrounding landscape. In other cases, when a fortress was sited against the side of a large mountain chain, cost-distance offers a relatively clear, visual impression of a site's "orientation." (Fig. 2.4) In simple terms, the hundreds of time-stamped, fuzzy-edged polygons that surround all the ADIMO sites are impressionistic visualizations of each site's *possible* religious/military influence on the landscape, rather than an image of land ownership for each site. (Fig. 2.5)

Compared to visibility, landscape accessibility is a much more difficult motivation to measure. The ability to ride out from a fortress and reach a specific location within a single day's travel is reflective of that fortress's ability to enforce its power through the threat of violence. It is especially useful in the case of the ADIMO database because so little is known about the locations of smaller, agrarian frontier settlements across the peninsula. Christopher Gerrard's survey of Christian and Muslim hamlets and farmsteads around the fortified town of Ambel in north-west Aragon is a rare archaeological study, but it does suggest that Christian and Muslim frontier space could have been organized topographically.<sup>108</sup> Put simply, Gerrard's observation that Christian settlements tended to be sited in the foothills with Muslim hamlets below them enforces the idea that the major fortified settlements were designed to exert power over irrigated valleys.<sup>109</sup> One way to express this power was via visual dominance of the landscape. Another, more concrete method was to demonstrate an armed presence in the area through regular reconnaissance on horseback. By visualizing the spatial extents of daylong movements that begin at each fortress the cost-distance polygons reveal the shape of the valleys that were under the fortress' influence. Christian, and sometimes Muslim settlers within the polygon could reach the castle if an external threat appeared in the area, and the fortress could regularly send armed soldiers to these areas to collect taxes.

The third digital tool is known as network analysis. This illustration of connectivity contains two elements: nodes and edges. In this study, each occupation event, including the location, date, architecture type, and affiliation is represented as a node. Edges – the lines between nodes – are formed by querying the viewshed and costdistance analyses to determine if a relationship exists between nodes. Unlike many forms of network analysis, the nodes in this study do not have gravitational pull based on the number of edges connected to them, or the size of the garrisons at each site. Because the networks are governed by a GIS (Geographic Information System) the nodes are locked in a coordinate system that does not easily sort into a hierarchy where important sites with a high degree of centrality stand out from more isolated neighbors. For the purpose of this study, geographically static nodes clearly reveal where bottlenecks in visibility or accessibility occurred in the frontier landscape. In addition, the static nodes allow the networks to remain intelligible as they change over time. In Figure 2.6, the lines with alternating colors reflect sites with different affiliations that were visible to each other. Dashed lines of a single color reflect sites with the same affiliation that were intervisible. Finally, the solid white lines reveal sites that could (potentially) travel to each other within a single day on horseback.

Performing a network analysis on ADIMO is a direct, empirical test of the popular description of the frontier as a network of fortresses. Visualizations of the degree and variety of frontier connectivity at a specific time can reveal how fortresses altered the landscape to form new spatial regions that were not enclosed by the natural topography. More so than the viewshed or cost-distance analyses which "paint" the landscape with potential influence or surveillance, the network analyses expose pressure-points in the territorial expansion of the military orders. While the network analyses may not reveal the impact of the frontier landscape on site choice and utility as overtly as the viewshed or cost-distance analyses, it is important to remember that all of the straight edges between sites were governed by the digital elevation model. As critiqued previously, 'proximity' in two-dimensional, Cartesian space is insufficient as a criteria to form edges between nodes, or to locate areas of banal "cultural contact." In the following spatial narrative, I show how viewshed, cost-distance, and network analysis reveal how the military orders and their patrons applied limited resources to maximize their militarypolitical and religious influence on the frontier.

### 2.3 A Spatial Narrative of Iberia's Military Orders

This section will progress from the first arrival of the "international orders" of the Templars and Hospitallers in the Iberian Peninsula in the 1120s up to 1350 when even new military orders such as the Order of Montesa became little more than aristocratic confraternities. In many ways, the decline of the military orders was a consequence of the success of the Christian Reconquest in the mid-13<sup>th</sup> century. For more than a century after the conquest of Seville in November of 1248, the frontier contracted into an ever thinner space along the north side of the Sierra Nevada that cradled the kingdom of Granada. With less space for expansion, and a general stalling of the Reconquest, the military orders suffered a slow crisis of identity that never brought them back to their previously ascetic, military focus. Thus, the period in which the military orders' identity was honed was not coincidentally the period of greatest volatility and Christian expansion during the mid-12<sup>th</sup> to mid-13<sup>th</sup> centuries. This narrative has been covered very well in previous scholarship, most recently (and succinctly) by Sam Zeno Conedera in his book *Ecclesiastical Knights: The Military Orders in Castile, 1150-1330.* In contrast to these works, rather than listing the capture of fortresses as a consequence of historical developments, this section describes the expansion (and contraction) of Christian territory as a historical force on its own. Given the scale of ADIMO, the number of possible topics that can emerge from any query of the database is only limited by a viewer's ability to identify and pursue temporal and spatial patterns. For the sake of brevity, a handful of dramatic changes and long periods of inactivity in the spatial distribution of the military orders will be outlined, as well as a short account of the foundational sites for the major orders.

The Templars, along with the Hospitallers, were the first two military orders to occupy fortresses in Iberia. These orders are often anachronistically, but understandably called "international orders" by historians to distinguish them from orders developed in areas of religious conflict other than the Holy Land. According to William of Tyre, the Templars were founded in 1118 and their Rule was drawn up at the Council of Troyes in 1128.<sup>110</sup> Later that same year, the Templars were granted the castle of Soure, in Portugal which was very close to the frontier at the time. In Catalonia in north-eastern Spain – where the Templars established a firm foothold that lasted until their dissolution in 1309 – the order first received the castle of Grañena in 1131. Even in the 1130s this northern region was still well under the sway of the Almoravids based in the fortified town of Lleida. In Figure 2.7 – which depicts the entire peninsula at the beginning of 1131 – the spatial database reveals the first handful of sites that were occupied by the Templars,

while illustrating a handful of other notable spatial distributions at the start of the era of the military orders. First, the absence of sites in the east and center of La Mancha is only partially a consequence of an incomplete survey. This area became the main battleground of the Reconquest and the cradle of the orders of Calatrava and Santiago in the 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> centuries, but it continued to be a sparsely populated region even after the orders arrived. Following the capture of Toledo in 1085 by Alfonso VI of Castile, this city became that kingdom's frontier headquarters, and the symbolic vanguard of the Reconquest. For the first half of the 12<sup>th</sup> century, Toledo was harassed by the Almoravid, and later Almohad garrisons from the castles of Oreja and Huete to the East, and from the castles of Mora and Calatrava (la Vieja) from the south. The Templars gradually added castles and villages in Portugal and Aragon with little attachment to the kingdom of Castile until they received a fortress that stands out as an obvious outlier on a map of their territories in 1148. In Figure 2.8, the fortress of Calatrava (la Vieja) is identified far to the south of Toledo on the south bank of the Guadiana River. Especially in comparison to all of the other fortresses the order held in Iberia, this first Templar possession in Castile is better described as being within Muslim territory than merely on the frontier. This fortress had been a base for attacks against Christian Toledo for years before its capture and donation to the Templars, and in the nine years that it was in the hands of that Order, it was vital to the security of Toledo. Chapter 3 describes in detail how Calatrava (la Vieja) became the foundation-site for Iberia's first native military order two years after the Templars reacted to the Almohad invasion of Iberia by abandoning the fortress in 1157. (Fig. 2.9)<sup>111</sup>

In the years leading up to their eventual abandonment of Calatrava (la Vieja) in 1157, the Templars gained the fortresses and towns that became the heart of their territory along the Ebro River in Aragon. Compared to Calatrava (la Vieja), these possessions in Aragon presented less risk for the Templars. They occupied a space that was north of a buffer zone of more contested frontier space, yet their new castles were at least partially vulnerable to attack by virtue of being sited directly on tributaries of the Ebro River. These locations were preferable for the Templars and Hospitallers because – especially during this early phase – the international orders viewed their European possessions almost exclusively as sources of economic support for warfare in the East. Despite the proximity of Muslim enemies in Iberia, the Templars did not engage in military action in the Reconquest outside of defense. This lack of dedication to the Reconquest cause prevented the order from developing a substantial network in Catalonia until 1143. In that year, the will of Alfonso I of Aragon was reinterpreted so that rather than gaining full controll of the Kingdom of Aragon as Alfonso had dictated in 1134, the Templars received a number of important fortresses in exchange for a pledge to include the Iberian Peninsula as a target for their military action against *Saracens*.

In 1144, the Castle of Monzon (Fig. 2.10) became the first *preceptory* or headquarters of the Templars in Aragon. This hilltop castle site overlooking the Cinca river (a tributary of the Ebro) was upriver from the Muslim held town of Fraga, and near to the city of Lleida (or Lerida) which had been a common base for attacks by Almoravid forces in previous decades. In keeping with a long trend by the international orders to site their preceptories near, but not aggressively within enemy territory, the Templars created a buffer between Fraga and Monzon through their occupation of the hilltop castle of Chalamera. This site – which receives far less attention than better surviving Aragonese Templar fortresses such as Monzon, Granyena, Pedris, and (later) Miravet - was an extremely strategic location given the context of the Ebro river valley in 1144. The order specifically requested this site as part of their concession for allowing Alfonso I's kingdom to fall to his brother, rather than the Templars, along with the castles of Monzon, Corbins and Barbará. Chalamera may appear as just another fortress on the list, but the viewshed analysis for this fortress reveals it was critical to the Templars frontier strategy. In Figure 2.10, Chalamera is linked to Fraga with a red and orange dashed line signaling that a person standing at the top of Chalamera (in red for the Templars) could see Fraga and vice-versa. Looking at Chalamera's viewshed over the landscape reveals even further that this fortress had a very specific orientation, and that it was extremely well placed to observe traffic moving up the river from Fraga. (Fig. 2.11) Chalamera is an excellent example of a fortress that must be studied within the context of other donations to the military orders, not just in terms of its proximity to rival towns and castles. In this early episode in the history of the military orders in Iberia, the pattern of preceptory (Monzon), target for surveillance (Fraga), and watchtower/buffer (Chalamera) is particularly clear. Over the next two centuries, each new military order in Iberia followed a similar pattern of choosing foundational sites that were even more boldly sited on the frontier than Monzon or Chalamera. Each foundational site was always supported by a network of fortresses with either specific or landscape-scale targets for surveillance.

Maps of the ADIMO data in La Mancha immediately following the foundation of the Order of Calatrava in 1158 reveal that this order was quickly tasked with security and surveillance of a wide space, rather than a specific target. Figure 2.14 can be considered an example of what is termed "deep mapping" – an approach to spatial visualization that enhances understanding of a place through the simultaneous, semi-transparent display of multiple layers of overlapping data.<sup>112</sup> In truth, a proper "deep map" would include many more layers that would reconstruct the physical and cultural landscape of the frontier. Even without this data, the combination of elevation data, fortress and settlement pointdata, cost-distance and viewshed analysis and intervisibility networks in Figure 2.14 come very close to information overload. Nonetheless, as Roger Staley states in his book *Computers, Visualization and History*, "…visualization is aesthetically pleasing not when it is eye catching but when it is useful..."<sup>113</sup> Consequently, these images require translation before they can reveal the story of the Order of Calatrava's changing purpose.

The castle of Calatrava la Vieja and the medieval city of Toledo were not intervisible, but these sites were indelibly connected during most phases of their history. (Fig. 2.12, 2.13) Under Almohad control, the castle had an antagonistic relationship with Christian Toledo, and became a replacement for the castle of Mora as the southern base for future raids around that city. Before the capture of Mora castle by Christian forces in 1137, Toledo was essentially on the furthest southern edge of the frontier. (Fig 2.15) The fact that this city was never reconquered by the Almoravid, or Almohad dynasties in the 12<sup>th</sup> century is even more surprising considering that by itself, the city was almost completely incapable of gaining advanced visual confirmation that a military threat was marching toward it. Toledo was a Roman foundation that became the center of Visigothic Spain until the Arab and Berber Muslim invasion of the 8<sup>th</sup> century, and the city owed its long, unbroken occupation to the natural defenses of its hilltop location within a deep canyon cut by the Tajo River on three sides. (Fig. 2.16) It was also protected by the Montes de Toledo in the south. Nonetheless, the black-colored viewshed in Figure 2.17 illustrates that one undesirable effect of these insulating topographic features was that Toledo was blind to most of its surrounding landscape. Toledo's "blindness" made the city particularly dependent on frontier fortresses for security and surveillance. By capturing the Almohad fortress of Qal'at Raba (latinized to Calatrava) and offering it to the Templars as their first major donation in Castile in 1148, King Alfonso VII protected Toledo in three ways. First, he eliminated an aggressive Almohad base that had been responsible for many raids into Toledo. Second, after the precedent set in Aragon, the Templars were bound to fight against Saracens in Castile and not make truces with other groups against Castile or any other Christian kingdom. Third, Toledo finally obtained a buffer that could warn Toledo of future attacks from the south.

Unfortunately for Castile, the Templars initially appeared to consider Calatrava (la Vieja) a long-term base for expansion in Castile due to their architectural additions to the site, but the order fled the castle in 1158. Having received news that a large Almohad force had crossed into Iberia from North Africa and was specifically heading for La Mancha, the Templars believed that their architectural enhancements to the site were insufficient to survive a direct attack. The events that followed – including the foundation of the Order of Calatrava by monks from the Cistercian monastery of Fitero near the junction of the kingdoms of Navarre, Aragon and Castile – reveal how important this region below Toledo was to the security of the kingdom. Much of this episode is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, but the importance of this site to the overall spatial distribution of the military orders cannot be overstated. The Templars expanded their territory in Aragon and Portugal throughout the 1150s and 1160s, but they never

obtained substantial possessions in Castile, and were permanently blocked out of the frontier in La Mancha by the native military orders. The Order of Calatrava meanwhile, having been spared the Almohad attack that the Templars fled from, was able to expand into three new fortresses that were further south from their founding fortress and headquarters. Unlike Calatrava (la Vieja), which was atypically sited in a low area on the south bank of the Guadiana River, the castles of Alarcos, Miraflores and Almodovar del Campo were hilltop fortresses with expansive viewsheds. Seen within the context of the entire peninsula (Fig. 2.18) the Order of Calatrava appears to be a spearhead for the Reconquest pointing toward Andalucia, but hemmed in by Muslim forces in Valencia to the east and Extremadura to the west.

As is the case with most broadly drawn historical patterns, there is an outlier which complicates the story of the Order of Calatrava as the vanguard of the Reconquest in Castile. The fortress of Santa Eufemia, or "Miramontes" had one of the most panoramic, widely distributed viewsheds of the landscape in the ADIMO dataset. It was located even closer to Andalucia on top of a ridge of the Sierra Morena, but was not occupied by the Order of Calatrava until sometime in 1190. (Figs 2.19 & 2.20) Instead, this castle – which appropriately translates as "mountain view" – was owned by the King of Castile beginning in 1155. The history of this site, including who resided there, is nearly silent up until a document from Toledo dated September 22, 1189 stated that Alfonso VIII of Castile donated Miramontes to the Order of Calatrava.<sup>114</sup> The Order of Calatrava was therefore not precisely the tip of the spear during their first three decades on the frontier, but it is revealing that this site was eventually given to the Order, thereby making Calatrava the most visibly dominant Christian institution in southern La Mancha.

The region known as the "Campo de Calatrava" (due to the predominance of the military order of Calatrava there) between the Montes de Toledo and the Sierra Morena was an extremely contested landscape during the late twelfth and early 13<sup>th</sup> centuries. Unlike most of the Reconquest, which I have described as a near-constant, flickering accumulation of fortresses with the military orders at the vanguard, the Campo de Calatrava from 1194 to 1213 was defined by two massive pendulum swings of change. Consequently, this phase can be summed up with just a handful of maps of this space at different times. First, Figure 2.21 illustrates La Mancha in 1194 – after almost 40 years of unchecked expansion by the Order of Calatrava in the south. This map also shows a highly connected set of settlements and a few fortresses occupied by the Hospitallers and the Order of Santiago closer to Toledo. The first Iberian military order could be described as a huge success at this point, but it did not last. Figure 2.22 reveals an almost total reset of this region immediately after the decisive Almohad victory over Alfonso VIII and the military orders at the battle of Alarcos on July 16<sup>th</sup>, 1195. The Order of Calatrava was almost completely wiped out, and Toledo's surveillance system of hilltop fortresses was now under Almohad control.

Proving even further that the military orders considered proximity to the enemy essential to their identity, the remnants of the Order of Calatrava unexpectedly selected and conquered the fortress of Salvatierra for their new frontier base of operations in 1198. (Fig. 2.23) This fortress became so essential to the Order's renewed purpose that they chose it as their new namesake – calling themselves the Order of Salvatierra while harassing the Almohads from this location. (Fig. 2.24) Their effectiveness in this regard is supported by the fact that the Almohad Caliph al-Nāsir again invaded from Morocco

with the specific purpose of removing the order from this castle in 1210. The Order of Salvatierra eventually caved under the pressure of a 51 day long siege, but they were allowed to leave with their possessions and march to Toledo as part of their surrender. <sup>115</sup> One of the most important aspects of the siege of Salvatierra, besides eliciting a call to crusade in Iberia by the pope, was the reaction of the Caliph to the surrender. Despite failing to destroy the garrison itself, the Caliph relished the victory over Salvatierra and remarked that he had "Cut off the right hand of the King of Castile."<sup>116</sup> The Caliph's reaction demonstrates a way of viewing the frontier that is not dissimilar from the GIS maps in this chapter. Fortresses were essential nodes of influence and defense on the frontier that had landscape-scale consequences when they changed hands, and both sides of the religious conflict understood this.

The final pendulum swing in the Campo de Calatrava that quickly elicited the Reconquest of Andalucía can be seen in Figure 2.25. In July of 1212, a combination of forces from Iberia's Christian Kingdoms, French crusaders, and the military orders gained a decisive victory over an Almohad army at the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa. The battlefield lay at the southern entrance to Despeñaperros– the pass through the Sierra Morena that had been the route for nearly every Muslim invasion of La Mancha over the past three centuries. This victory finally opened Andalucia to expansion from Castile, but the greatest beneficiaries were the military orders – especially the Order of Calatrava.

As can be seen in Figure 2.25, the Campo de Calatrava did not simply revert back to its pre-Alarcos state – Salvatierra remained in Almohad control until 1226, the Order of Calatrava built a new headquarters on the larger hill opposite their former namesake, and even as early as 1213, they received a key fortress near the center of the Despeñaperros pass. This now ruined fortress - which was appropriately named Almuradiel – was probably a simple watchtower sited over a stretch of the pass, but its immediate neighbor, the castle of Ferral, was intervisible with six sites in Andalucia. (Fig. 2.26, 2.27) This tower, in addition to the fortress of Mesnera, and the previously discussed castle of Miramontes, are all examples of largely ruined structures that have hardly elicited more than footnotes in the written record, but display high levels of centrality in the ADIMO network. The orientation for a castle like Ferral could not be more clearly expressed in the network analysis. Although Ferral was originally an Almohad construction, this castle was perfectly sited as a central hub for observing targets for the next phase of the Christian Reconquest. The castle of Mesnera reveals a slightly different purpose. (Fig. 2.27) There are no physical remains of this structure to offer definitive proof, but given its high centrality, it may have been a communication hub that was capable of visually signaling many of the sites belonging to the Order of Calatrava that were not intervisible with each other. For example, though these sites were a great distance apart, Calatrava la Nueva could conceivably communicate a limited message to its original fortress at Calatrava la Vieja or Alarcos via the "conduit" of Mesnera thanks to Mesnera's siting on top of a volcanic hill in an otherwise flat area. (Fig. 2.28)

After the battle of Las Navas, Castile and the military orders seemed poised to take over Andalucía, but the Reconquest stalled due to political factors such as the deaths of King Alfonso VIII of Castile and King Pedro II of Aragon in 1213-14, and due to a famine that hit the region after a severe winter in 1214. These factors led to a truce with the Almohads, whose Caliph had fled back to Marrakech and died shortly after the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa. Consequently, the decade following Las Navas was not a full assault on Andalucía, southern Portugal and Valencia by the Christian Kingdoms. Instead the military orders gradually accumulated more fortresses despite the truce that was arranged between the Almohads and the Christian Kingdoms.

In 1213, a new branch of the Order of Calatrava was founded in Extremadura at the castle of Alcantara on the border with Portugal. By 1219 however, these fortresses were deemed to be too far from the center of Calatrava's power in La Mancha to manage, so a new order was founded at Alcantara based on the Calatrava Rule and model. (Fig. 2.29) In what seems to be a repeated pattern, the Order of Alcantara was placed in several additional fortified positions that were closer to the frontier to support their new headquarters – in this case the fortified Almohad cities of Caceres and Trujillo to the east. As with Calatrava la Vieja, Calatrava la Nueva, Monzon and even Ucles (the Castilian headquarters for the Order of Santiago) – the castle of Alcantara was a military order headquarters that did not have an intervisible connection with its satellite network. Its satellites, such as Brozas and Portezuelo were highly intervisible not only with each other, but also with specific Almohad possessions. This is clearly illustrated by the alternating orange and white dashed lines in Figure 2.29.

Extremadura saw the greatest expansion of military order possessions of any region during the second decade of the 13<sup>th</sup> century, largely due to the singularly military orientation of the Order of Alcantara at this time. Another order that aggressively expanded in these years was the Order of Santiago. (Fig. 2.30) This military order, whose rule inspired the title of this dissertation, eventually became the largest and wealthiest order in Iberia, but along with the Templars, it was also one of the most widely dispersed.

This dispersal was at least partially due to the fact that two sites claimed to be the seat and foundational nucleus for the order: The monastery of San Marcos in Leon, and the fortress of Uclés in Castile. (Fig. 1.4, 1.5) These sites, which were near the centers of power for two different kingdoms during most of the order's history, could not have been oriented more differently. Leon, in the northwest of the peninsula was the capital of the kingdom of Leon and lay close to the pilgrimage road to Santiago de Compostela. From this location the order could fulfill one of its initial purposes, to protect pilgrims on the road to Galicia. Uclés was located nearer the frontier with the Islamic kingdom of Valencia to the east of Toledo. It was not until King Ferdinand III of Castile finally united the kingdoms of Castile and Leon in 1230 that the order was unified under one seat. (Fig. 2.31) After this date, Uclés was the undisputed headquarters for the Order of Santiago.

Before and after the union of the order under a single seat in Castile, the order tended to expand from isolated pockets. The order had a commandery in Aragon named Montalban, where they built a unique and well preserved fortified church below their hilltop castle. (Fig. 1.7) In Portugal, the order was heavily involved in the crusade to take Alcacer do Sal in 1217, and by this date had taken control of a ring of coastal fortresses and settlements with the castle of Palmela as the central node of the network. (Fig. 2.32) In Extremadura, the order was better connected to the Templars and the Order of Alcantara than to its own fortresses until the 1230s when the order began to accumulate fortresses in the southern frontier of that region. None of these regions displayed a comparable density of possessions to the eastern half of La Mancha. (Fig. 2.33) Beginning with King Alfonso VIII's donation of the castle of Uclés in 1174, the Order of Santiago was already well behind the Order of Calatrava in its expansion into the frontier. Ironically, one of the benefits of this slow start was that the Order of Santiago merely lost 14 knights at the battle of Alarcos in 1195, rather than most of their fortresses. Much like the Order of Calatrava, the period between the battles of Alarcos and Las Navas de Tolosa was more of a landscape scale siege than a time of expansion for the Order of Santiago. The order added two fortresses near Uclés at this time, (Carabanchel in 1203 and Cabezamesada in 1208) but none of their possessions could be considered exposed positions that pushed the frontier because Alfonso VIII of Castile had already installed a dense pocket of settlements around the Hospitaller commandery of Consuegra between what had been the Order of Calatrava's fortresses and the Order of Santiago's sites. As a result of this buffer-zone of Hospitallers, after Las Navas de Tolosa, the Order of Santiago had to expand in a region that was largely detached from its headquarters in Uclés. (Fig. 2.34)

In the first decade after Las Navas, the order of Santiago quickly absorbed fortresses in the arid table land that bordered the more depopulated region of Albacete, but this appears to have been a means to reach for a target that was closer to the frontier. The Segura Mountains on the eastern end of the Sierra Morena are among the most dramatic in Spain, and the Almohad fortresses that were built there were mostly watchtowers. The valleys in Segura were rich agriculturally, but they were so narrow that viewsheds in this region were extremely limited. In order to counteract the limited vision from the valley floor, the castles in this area were dramatically sited at higher elevations than nearly any other in the peninsula. The quintessential example of these fortresses was the frontier commandery of Segura de la Sierra. This fortress was substantially rebuilt by the Order of Santiago after its capture in 1214. (Figs. 2.35-2.37) This site eventually contained a full-scale church that was built in a very similar brick style to that of Calatrava la Nueva, as well as one of the largest towers ever built by the military orders anywhere. (Fig. 2.38) This building phase, and its similarity to Calatrava la Nueva is particularly noteworthy because while Uclés remained the principal seat of power and the location of the chapter for the order in Castile, Segura de Sierra offered the Order of Santiago its first opportunity to build a properly exposed, frontier headquarters. As has been shown in several instances, large-scale building projects on the frontier were essential to the construction of the wall of the faithful for many of the orders. The definition of an advanced, or exposed frontier location is subject to interpretation, and changed quickly, but with Segura de la Sierra and Calatrava (la Vieja and la Nueva), there is little doubt that these structures were built to be bold assertions of the orders' dedication to the Reconquest.

The Christian Reconquest took on unprecedented urgency during the reigns of King Fernando III of Leon-Castile (1217-1252) and King James I of Aragon (1213-1276), and the military orders were among the primary beneficiaries in both kingdoms. Fernando in particular considered the military orders to be essential to his aspirations to conquer Andalucía. According to the Latin Chronicle of the Kings of Castile – translated by Joseph O'Callaghan – Fernando III gathered the grandmasters of the military orders and all of his magnates to his court near Burgos in 1224 and stated that he wished to break the truce with the Almohads and reinvigorate the Reconquest. The anonymous author of the Chronicle quoted the king as he pleaded with his mother Queen Berenguela to grant her blessing to attack his perceived Muslim enemies: ... Behold, the time is revealed by almighty God, in which, unless I want to pretend otherwise like a weak and deficient man, I am able to serve the Lord Jesus Christ, by whom kings reign, against the enemies of the Christian faith, to the honor and glory of his name. *The door is open* indeed and the way is clear. Peace has been restored to us in our kingdom; discord and deadly enemies exist among the Moors; factions and quarrels have broken out anew. Christ, God and Man, is on our side; on that of the Moors, the infidel and damned apostate Muhammad. What is to be done? Most kind mother, from whom, after God, I hold whatever I have, I beg that it may please you that I wage war against the Moors.<sup>117</sup>

Whether the king used these exact words or not, the author was correct to refer to an invasion of Andalucía as an open door. The Despeñaperros pass was firmly in Castilian control at this time, and the King had made sure to retain possession of several key fortresses that had wide viewsheds over the pass and the southern slope of the sierra Morena. (Fig. 2.39) The first two castles near the pass that were taken immediately after the battle of Las Navas were the castle of Ferral, (mentioned on pages 19-20) and the castle of Vilches. One of the first castles that was captured in King Fernando's initial invasion through Despeñaperros was the castle of Baños de la Encina. (Fig. 2.40) This castle was originally a 9<sup>th</sup> century, tapial construction by the Ummyyad Caliphate that was immediately bestowed on the Order of Santiago. The lines of intervisibility in Figure 2.39 demonstrate that visibility and influence funneled toward the Despeñaperros pass. This map also reveals that during this early phase of Fernando III's conquests, control over the landscape was extremely muddled, with rival viewsheds overlapping all over the east end of the Guadalquivir river valley. A map of the cost-distance polygons in this same area reveals that the Guadalquivir River divided the region into a Christian northbank, and Muslim south bank, but there was also a great deal of contact between

Christian Nobles, the Order of Santiago and the Muslim population centered around Jaen, Martos and Cordoba. (Fig. 2.41)

By the end of the 1230s, after Fernando III definitively captured the former Umayyad capital of Cordoba, a new pattern emerged in the distribution of the military orders in Andalucía. (Fig. 2.42) At the castles of La Iruela (Fig. 2.43) and Peña de Martos, (Fig. 2.44) Fernando installed the Templars and the Order of Calatrava in castles with extremely wide viewsheds that were intervisible with most of the key Islamic settlements and fortresses in the region. Following the model of Santiago at Baños de la Encina, these sites monitored the entire valley from the north slope of the Sierra Nevada that protected the kingdom of Granada. Between the three military orders at these sites, the valley became a crisscrossing web of surveillance that was well suited to assert Christian control over the fertile valley.

This policy of placing the military orders at the most highly visible, largest fortresses with the widest viewsheds continued after Fernando III completed his attacks down the river toward Seville. In 1253, Fernando's son Alfonso X donated Castillo de la Luna in Cazalla, and the castle of Matrera to the Order of Calatrava. (Fig 2.45, 2.46) Both of these fortresses were sited on natural outcroppings that were nearly as dramatic as the conical hill of Martos where the order had its Andalusian base. (Fig. 2.44) Large portions of the Guadalquivir delta were visible from these sites, including the city of Seville. It is important to note that despite the impression in Figure 2.45 that the entire Guadalquivir valley was "painted" with the viewsheds of Christian nobles and the military orders in hilltop fortresses, the concentration of Iberia's Muslim population in the kingdom of Granada had not completely occurred at this point. There were many Muslim settlements in this area, and based on the continuing donations of fortresses to the military orders, security was still a concern for the Christian conquerors. At the close of the 13<sup>th</sup> century, the assignment of the fortress of Cote to the Order of Alcantara, and the assignment of Setefilla and Almenara to the Hospitallers revealed that surveillance of this former Almohad heartland was still a concern even half a century after the conquest of the city of Seville. (Fig. 2.47)

The coastal regions of southern Aragon and Valencia were largely conquered between 1233 and 1248 by James I of Aragon. This intense period of expansion had been preceded by more than 80 years of consolidation of Christian gains in the Ebro River valley and south-western Aragon. Before 1233, the Templars gained nearly all of their frontier possessions in the final year of the reign of Alfonso II of Aragon in 1196 when they received the castles of Albentosa, Alfambra and Villel in the southern province of Teruel, and the castle of Castellote in the mountainous region south of the Ebro River Valley. (Fig. 2.48) Before and after the expansion of the Templars into the mountainous areas to the west of northern Valencia, the Hospitaller castles of Ulldecona and Amposta near the Ebro River Delta marked an important frontier-zone between Christian and Muslim forces on the coast. Ulldecona had a particularly long-lasting status as a frontier fortress as evidenced by this castle's sixty years of intervisibility with the Muslim-held fortress of Peñiscola. (Fig. 2.49) This is the longest lasting period of Christian-Muslim intervisibility between any of the fortresses in the ADIMO database. Two conclusions that can be drawn from this long relationship is that the fortress of Peñiscola was deemed to be particularly defensible, (King James I of Aragon unsuccessfully attacked the fortress in 1225) and that the Kingdom of Aragon followed a long-term strategy of

surrounding the coast by installing the Templars in hilltop fortresses on higher ground to the west.

As with many other phases of the Reconquest, the long, gradual accumulation of fortresses by the military orders was followed by a rush of activity and the conquest of major cities in Valencia. Between 1233 and 1248 the Templars gained three new coastal fortresses in northern Valencia, but within a few years of their donation, none of them were as close to rival Muslim fortresses and towns as those held by the Hospitallers, the crown and other Christian vassals in the south. (Fig. 2.50) During the long siege of Xàtiva – the last fortified Islamic enclave in Valencia – King James I even brought in the Order of Santiago to occupy the nearby castle of Enguera rather than rely on the Templars in this important frontier location. (Fig. 2.51) The Templars would later "fillin" some of the newly captured Valencian territory, but their base of power never moved from their initial donations in the Ebro River valley. The central position this region held for the identity of Aragon's Templars was further revealed by the Order's choice of Monzon and Miravet as the locations of their final, 3-year resistance against James II of Aragon (r. 1291-1327) when that monarch had ordered the seizure of all their property and possessions as part of their papal dissolution in 1307.

What marked this final conquest of southern Valencia apart from virtually all other phases of the Reconquest was James II's reliance on noble vassals, rather than military orders as garrisons for the majority of Valencia's captured castles. Rather than hold fortresses for a year before donating the largest hilltop castles with the widest viewsheds to the military orders – as Fernando III of Castile was doing at this same time in the Guadalquivir River valley – James I built his buffer zone using Christian vassals. (Fig. 2.52) One simple explanation for this change was the fact that Fernando III had already conquered the Islamic Kingdom of Murcia by 1243 – thereby eliminating the south as a direction for Aragonese growth, while creating a new fortified border between the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon. Religious zeal and dedication to the Reconquest held less interest under the new circumstances of the frontier. The primary goal for the kingdom of Aragon during the remainder of the 13<sup>th</sup> and early 14<sup>th</sup> century was to suppress internal *Mudéjar* insurrections – rather than expand their territory at the expense of Islam.<sup>118</sup>

By 1255, Aragon and Castile had defined the border between their kingdoms with an especially vertical line of fortresses – only two of which were occupied by the military orders. (Fig. 2.52) The viewsheds from these fortresses formed a vertical corridor of space that correlates to the valley that naturally separated Valencia from the vast, flat, and unpopulated region of Albacete. This corridor exists as a spatial illustration of the 1179 treaty of Cazola that predetermined which regions of Muslim Iberia would go to Castile, and which would go to the crown of Aragon.<sup>119</sup> The monarchs agreed that Aragon-Catalonia would conquer and control Valencia, Xàtiva, Denia, Calpe and Biar, while Castile had the right to conquer anything to the south and west, including Murcia.<sup>120</sup> Based on the language of this treaty, it was up to the Kingdom of Aragon to create a firm border that defined the treaty in real space. Also, given the number of times that fortresses along this line changed hands between Aragon and Castile, the interpretation of the treaty of Cazola must have been a contentious subject.<sup>121</sup> This was not a job for the military orders, whose role - at least theoretically - was never to take sides with one Christian ruler against another.

The maps produced by the ADIMO database for the beginning of the 14<sup>th</sup> century in Valencia (Fig. 2.53) appear very similar to maps of the region during the middle of the 13<sup>th</sup> century. (Fig. 2.50) Given the lack of change, it would appear that King James II of Aragon (r. 1291-1327) no longer needed the military orders in southern Valencia. On the contrary, a later development reveals that despite the apparently static quality of the ADIMO database during this time, the Muslim kingdom of Valencia – which had long been resistant to outside influence from the Almoravid and Almohad dynasties – was still considered a threat from within. The inability of the ADIMO database to reveal threats of insurrection, and the distribution of small Muslim and Mudéjar communities in conquered regions is by far its biggest blind-spot. Nonetheless, the arrival of the Order of Montesa is observable as a spatial as well as a historical phenomenon in the database. The distribution and viewshed of the Order of Montesa in Valencia after 1319 compared to any of the previous seventy years since the conquest of Xàtiva identifies this order as another anomaly in the database. (Fig. 2.54) Unlike any of the previous orders or phases of the Reconquest, the Order of Montesa was not born in recently conquered territory with a clear spatial proximity to Muslim-controlled fortresses and towns. Nonetheless, the foundational castle-monastery of Montesa is one of the order's southernmost possessions, it is very near to the last Muslim stronghold to fall in the conquest of Valencia, and it has a comprehensive viewshed of a valley linking Xàtiva to Murcia and beyond to the kingdom of Granada.

Much of the Order of Montesa's spatial distribution can be attributed to the fact that the order was born out of the dissolution of the Templars in 1307-1310. Montesa's concentration within the extents of the modern province of Valencia is a mirror image of the concentration of Hospitaller possessions in Aragon and Catalonia. The distribution of the order of Montesa is covered in greater detail in the final chapter of this dissertation but – like the foundation of the Order of Calatrava – it corresponds to a remarkable moment in the spatial history of the Reconquest. In summary, after nearly a decade of debate with the Pope – who had decided that all previous Templar houses should be given to the Hospitallers – James II arranged to form a new military order that would take both the Templar and Hospitaller possessions in Valencia, in exchange for donating all former Templar holdings in Aragon and Catalonia to the Hospitallers. (1317) James' belief that a religious fighting force was still an essential institution in his kingdom was evidenced in the previous decade by his steadfast opposition to the Pope's decisions concerning the redistribution of Templar assets, as well as his initial support of that order in the immediate wake of their dissolution.

Writing to Phillip of France – normally considered the orchestrator of the dissolution of the Templars – James II of Aragon wrote:

They have lived indeed in a praiseworthy manner as religious men up till now in these parts according to common opinion, nor has any accusation of error in belief yet arisen against them here; on the contrary, during our reign they have faithfully given us very great service, in whatever we required of them, in repressing the enemies of the faith.<sup>122</sup>

James II was no different from many of the other monarchs of Europe in wanting to curb some of the Templars' power in his kingdom, but according to Alan Forey, the King understood that the Templars still had value in his kingdom.<sup>123</sup> This value was clear: they were capable of remaining dedicated to the suppression of Muslim forces on the frontier while avoiding the risk of defection to other Christian interests. This alone suggests that even though James and his predecessors had conquered the largest fortified urban centers of Burriana, Valencia, and Xàtiva in the previous decades, the king still considered southern Valencia as part of the religious frontier. Naval attacks from Granada, and *Mudéjar* insurrections centered in Xàtiva prove that the region was more unstable than it appears in visualizations of the ADIMO data. Even without the image of "orange" Islamic space in Valencia after 1244, the fact that the new headquarters of Montesa follows a familiar pattern of the *wall of the faithful* from previous generations helps to express that this region was still considered a frontier in 1320. The wide viewshed held by the Castillo-Convento de Montesa, the connectivity between sites and the fortress' placement along a major route connecting two former Islamic kingdoms all follow a similar pattern to a site like Calatrava la Nueva. (Fig. 2.2, 2.55-2.56) Chapter 4 reveals that even this image of the Valencian frontier was more fiction than reality in subsequent years, but it does accurately express the original intent of Montesa's foundation.

## • Spatial narrative - Conclusion

Spatial change does not translate easily into linear narrative, especially when these changes do not occur in stages. The tension between what is best expressed in text, and what is observable in more complex spatial structures helps to explain why many of the histories of the military orders, or histories of the Reconquest have tended to rely on just a handful of map types to illustrate their works. (Figs. 1.1-1.2) These maps are just that: illustrations. They did not drive any historical discoveries or inform the prose they illustrated. As mentioned in chapter 1, these kinds of maps actually fail to express themes of cultural overlap or frontier permeability that are typically prominent in the text of these secondary sources. In this chapter, I have summarized visual patterns in fortressoccupations that emerge from a close reading of the ADIMO database in its visual form. Certainly, more thorough accounts of the major events, figures, and cultural interactions during the Reconquest exist. Forey, Lomax and O'Callaghan are just three of many authors who have written well informed intellectual, military and cultural histories of the Reconquest that feature the military orders prominently. There are certainly gaps in the spatial narrative outlined above as well, but this narrative has also pointed to spatial patterns and sites that have previously been relegated to the background in histories of the Reconquest, or left as a list of place names. Fortunately, the ADIMO database is not limited to the temporal and spatial queries outlined above, nor my ability to communicate visual discoveries in written form. As a conclusion to this section, I recommend that the reader view an animation of the ADIMO database with every month from 1120-1350 represented in the following endnote.<sup>124</sup>

## 2.4 The Landscape-Site Relationship

The strengths of ADIMO, and all other forms of what David Stalley called "Visual History" are in communicating synthesis, analogy, network, and holistic structure, as opposed to the chains, causation, and events communicated by linear prose.<sup>125</sup> The GIS analyses of cost-distance and viewshed go farther than mere sitepattern recognition by testing frontier fortresses and settlements against the landscape – thereby applying quantitative methods to subjects whose spatial scale has required more qualitative approaches in the past. That said, the images produced by these processes should not fool the reader into imagining that they "capture" history. GIS analyses are no different from other means of disseminating historical information – they are abstractions of the past. Viewshed and cost-distance analysis layer abstract, ideal spaces of influence or surveillance on top of "real," geographic space. In this section, I further explain what landscape visibility and accessibility meant for the military orders, how these meanings were exaggerated through the choice of site, and how residents in the landscape received the messages the orders wished to project from their fortresses.

For a vast majority of the fortresses identified in ADIMO, the most engaging aspect of their remains is their dramatic silhouette against the sky. This impression was purposefully maximized by the siting of many fortresses at the crown of hilltops above broad planes, or the crests of ridges. In other cases, if a fortress had rounded towers, if the masonry was quarried directly from the hillside, or if the site is particularly ruined, it can be indistinguishable from the natural environment. This connection between the built and natural landscape is further revealed by the fact that photographers of Iberia's hilltop fortresses often make the landscape the more dominant subject of their images. Amateurs and professionals alike have consistently been driven to use the extant remains of these fortresses as frames for sublime views of the valley below, rather than capture some quality of the architecture itself. The juxtaposition of a crumbling, unidentified bit of medieval construction with a seemingly ageless Iberian landscape has proven to be too romantic an image for modern photographers to resist. (Fig. 2.57) One question these images bring to mind is: is the desire to look out away from Iberia's frontier fortresses a universal instinct that can instruct our understanding of their purpose? Also, are the dramatic silhouettes of crenelated towers against the sky in Spain and Portugal a byproduct of a medieval desire to increase visibility of the landscape from these sites, or were these silhouettes a desired architectural impression?

The decision to apply viewshed analysis to the ADIMO database was inspired by my belief that the landscape had an even more magnetic pull for the eyes of Iberia's military orders and other frontier groups than it does for modern castle visitors. In addition, I argue that this fortress-to-landscape relationship is one of several lacunae in the scholarship of Iberia's fortresses. In this section, I first align with Lefebvre and other "humanistic geographers" who argued that space was produced and constructed, rather than later theories that applied a reciprocal definition of landscape as both generator and "informer" of human activities.<sup>126</sup> The spatial processes outlined in this chapter seek to understand *why* the military orders chose pre-existing Muslim-built structures and built new sites according to their ability to observe and access the frontier on horseback. One short answer to this question is security.

A secure frontier during the 200+ years covered in this dissertation can be qualified as a combination of several factors; including population density, economic and agricultural dominance, natural defensive barriers and obviously, fortress occupation. In order to increase population density via new Christian / Muslim migration or economic dominance, large rural areas had to achieve some level of confidence that settlers would receive warning in case of attack, as well as a secure place to go if frontier intelligence was insufficient to allow an evacuation. Alleviating these needs was key to the development of what Thomas Glick and Pierre Toubert described as *incastellamento* – a feudal settlement pattern nucleated around structures with fortified walls. The trade-off for security among Christian settlers that had enjoyed a great deal of freedom at the beginning of their migration to the frontier, was a feudal dependence on castles – especially after the frontier advanced.<sup>127</sup> Architecturally, the fortified nodes of the frontier needed large curtain walls to surround and protect large numbers of people and goods. Fortress sites also had to increase the speed and accuracy of intelligence, should a threat to the dependent community present itself. For these reasons, visibility in an uncertain environment was critical to survival and a primary factor in the choice of fortress sites.

One of the dangers of GIS technology is the ease with which it can illustrate ideas that may be anachronistic for historical subjects. The connection between viewshed and power in medieval Iberia should not be seen as this kind of projection. The proliferation of hilltop castles with high towers in Spain and Portugal during the medieval period is testament alone to the value that frontier groups placed on line of sight, but it was also overtly stated by medieval rulers themselves. The clearest example of a medieval ruler specifically attributing vision and surveillance as the main source of a military order's power on the frontier was the Almohad Caliph Muhammad Al-Nasir's description of the castle of Salvatierra immediately after he forced the remnants of the Order of Calatrava to vacate it in 1211. (Fig. 2.24) To recall the previous spatial narrative on pg. 75, it was after capturing this castle that the Caliph proclaimed "I have cut off the right hand of the king of Castile." This event is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3, but Caliph Muhammad Al-Nasir's (Miramamolin's) specific complaints about the fortress of Salvatierra are particularly illustrative of the vision-power relationship covered in this chapter:

Salvatierra had fallen into the traps of the adorers of the cross and the presence of a bell on its church-tower was an insult to the Muslims, who, to the four points of the compass around this place, heard the muezzins glorify God and call them to prayer; it was a watch-tower rising against the sky in the bare plain,... an observatory which spied on us. This castle gave the Muslims no peace because the Christians made it the base for all

their raids and organized it so that it was a sort of key guaranteeing the security of their strongholds and towns.<sup>128</sup>

Many of this chapter's themes are covered by this short passage. First, the Almohad Caliph believes that the castle of Salvatierra was a signpost for the Christian religion that also radiated the rival religion through the use of a church bell. Second, Al-Nasir responds to the form of Salvatierra in much the same way that modern photographers have – noting the way it stands out against the sky when seen from below. Third, the geographic location, physical site, and form of the castle were all in the service of surveillance for the Christians. He described Salvatierra as a "watch-tower" and "an observatory which spied on us." At the end, the Caliph Al-Nasir calls Salvatierra a base for sorties into Muslim territory. There can be no doubt that frontier fortresses like Salvatierra that were garrisoned by dedicated, military-religious knights were both the practical and symbolic material of the wall of the faithful. Moreover, the ability to view the landscape – and be seen doing so from an imposing position above it – was clearly understood as central to physical and psychological warfare on the frontier. In this context, it is not surprising that the Caliph considered the capture of this largely ruined and meager fortress a major victory, or that a crusade was called to protect western Christendom after its surrender.

Occupying a castle and looking out toward the landscape was not merely a practical necessity for frontier security. The production of a frontier space required the ability to expand, as well as hold what had already been gained. In a frontier zone, the psychological effect of being able to see a landscape from a position in which one felt secure lent a measure of at least influence, if not ownership of that landscape. The phrase

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"king of the mountain" seems an apt description of the experience of standing at the top of a tower at a hilltop site. Realistically, the medieval viewer was not ruler of all they could perceive by virtue of being able to see it, yet the Reconquest of Iberia was partially driven by this phenomenological experience. Economic, political and religious dominance of the frontier meant control of fertile valleys in lower elevations. By observing the mills, cultivated land, animal herds, fences and other forms of infrastructure before them, the occupant of a hilltop castle was able to understand the value of the land, and target it as a future possession.

Because visibility is reciprocal, it also operates as a tool for identity formation. The military orders' preoccupation with visibility can be partially explained by their desire to symbolically express change in religious affiliation on a previously Muslimcontrolled landscape. In cases where they occupied, but did not make visible changes to the exterior walls of a castle, flags, crosses and other symbols would have been essential to communicate their connectedness to the Christian religion, and other fortresses held by their order. Their assertion of a composite religious and military identity was a perfectly efficient message to send to "others" on the frontier during the Reconquest. By assigning advanced positions to the military orders, the Christian kingdoms clearly stated that non-Christians could, if necessary, be violently suppressed by groups that were dedicated to just that endeavor. Put another way, vision allowed the ideal Christian space to overlap with the real space of the landscape. Seen this way, viewshed analysis of the military orders versus rival Muslim groups can reveal the real locations of ideal religious spaces.

The military benefits of hilltop fortress construction and reoccupation by the military orders should be clear at this point. The practical consequences of landscape

visibility should also be easily understood. Where historians have continued to struggle, is the joining of multiple symbolic and practical purposes for the construction of hilltop fortresses. Architectural historians working on the castles of England have identified this as the "war or status" debate – which still exists despite a number of works accurately stating that this is a false dichotomy.<sup>129</sup> For Reconquest Iberia, this debate is more accurately translated as: frontier necessity or assertion of power? The danger with this – also false – dichotomy is that it can lead to an anachronistic projection where different sides of the conflict are driven to either side of the debate. To begin, because the Reconquest is often viewed as a slow and steady advance of northern Christian kingdoms into Muslim lands, Muslim builders are assigned a defensive posture. Even scholarship on the Nasrid construction of the Alhambra has been described as a self-conscious "last-gasp" of Muslim culture in Iberia.<sup>130</sup> Conversely, Christian occupiers are said to have translated Muslim fortresses to communicate power over the landscape.

The question of "posture" in the architectural history of the military orders is a very complex one. The typical narrative of the Reconquest tends to attribute an aggressive posture to whichever side of the conflict had gained the most recent victory. Momentum is revealed as evidence of a grasping, forward-looking policy of territorial expansion. Architecturally, the two sides of the spectrum for aggressive versus defensive fortifications can be demonstrated by two examples. On the defensive side is Great Wall of China – which was designed with crenellations only on the north side facing the Mongolian threat. The Great Wall was designed strictly to create a static, impermeable border that would never advance. On the "aggressive" end of the spectrum were siege, or "counter-castles" which were built next to fortified targets specifically to offer a strategic

advantage in an attack.<sup>131</sup> In essence, all fortresses are "defensive" structures, but their orientation could change dramatically with new occupants, or if landscape-scale factors changed around them. Given that the military orders more closely resembled a metaphorical "wall of the faithful" rather than a defensive line of castles, spatial context is essential to understanding the 'posture' of particular fortresses at different times. While it is difficult to define the posture of military order fortresses across the peninsula over two hundred years, ADIMO's ability to visually demonstrate that they tended to occupy the most advanced positions on the frontier helps to make the case that formerly Muslimheld fortresses shifted toward an aggressive posture after they were occupied by a military order. Still, rather than anachronistically argue that either side built with an exclusively offensive or defensive posture based on their eventual success or failure in the Reconquest, it is easier to focus on the universal meanings that fortresses can project to viewers in the landscape.

Tadahiko Higuchi wrote one of the most influential theoretical works on the combination of architecture, landscape and vision. His book *The Visual and Spatial Structure of Landscapes* used the subject of Japanese temples and landscapes to analyze how structures change when they are sited differently, or seen from different vantage points.<sup>132</sup> His work considered how buildings become more striking to the eye, and thus more "present" in the landscape. Higuchi used the term "isovista" to define the amount of a person's view that is taken up by a particular structure. One easy way to increase the isovista for viewers in many parts of a landscape is to site a structure at a high elevation. Taken further, if the change is particularly dramatic, where large zones of low territory surround a steep, conical hill capped by a fortress, that structure will require viewers at

middle and even long distances to tilt their head up to view it. (Fig. 2.36) The simple act of tilting one's head up, - which Higuchi termed the angle of incidence – is less natural for most viewers, who are inclined to look down while moving through space.<sup>133</sup>

Structures occupying the crown of a hill are also clearly defined as part of the built, rather than natural environment. Again, the effect is a more "striking" structure, as well as one that appears capable of "controlling" the lower altitude viewer by virtue of requiring a change in their most comfortable, normal angle of incidence. A viewer at the base of a hilltop will normally look down and away when moving – which Higuchi called the angle of depression – but they will know that a viewer in the structure above can still see them easily.<sup>134</sup> It is important to keep this in mind, as the viewshed analyses cited in this chapter are static, and always from the perspective of the fortress-occupant. The settler, traveling through the low portions of the landscape engaging in trade or agriculture, would be in constant motion by comparison – all while under the watchful eye of the fortress above.

High, hilltop structures are/were also perceived as more permanent than buildings nestled into the landscape. This is partially because buildings that are consistently visible at long and medium distances change less as the viewer moves through the landscape than structures that are primarily visible at short distances. Hilltop structures also appear more permanent in comparison to valley sites. Inaccessible hilltops are natural, ageless monuments in any landscape, whereas valleys – due to their accessibility as well as their fertility – are 'tamed' by residues of human cultivation and construction. In summary, there were countless tactical, symbolic and psychological reasons for the consistent choice of hilltop sites for the 600+ fortresses and towns identified in ADIMO, but this

diversity does not make the decisions any less purposeful. The site-landscape relationship was specific for each site, but each hilltop fortress was able to capitalize on a number of meanings projected by their choice of site – the most common of which included permanence, power, defensibility, and above all, surveillance.

Without the threat that a garrison could travel to, and physically enforce its influence over a given settlement within a day, visibility was only a partially effective communicator of power. Put another way, the fortress that could be seen, but whose garrison would need to travel for more than a day to reach the viewer, was obviously a less influential structure than one that could back up its dominating visual presence. The combination of viewshed with cost-distance analysis can reveal a great deal about the purpose of specific fortresses, and the strategy of site-choice in different regions of the peninsula. For instance, in the Segura Mountains in north-east Andalucía, the fortresses of Segura de la Sierra and Siles – both possessed by the Order of Santiago within two decades after Las Navas de Tolosa – had inverse visibility-accessibility relationships. (Fig. 2.58, 2.59) Segura de la Sierra is one of the most inaccessible fortresses in the ADIMO database but has one of the most expansive viewsheds. (Fig. 2.35, 2.36) As the regional frontier headquarters for the order following the Christian victory at Las Navas, Segura de la Sierra needed to fulfill a symbolic, visual role.<sup>135</sup> From its perch above the midpoint of a valley connecting La Mancha and Andalucia, this castle could monitor traffic moving between Christian la Mancha, and Muslim-held Andalucia with relative ease, but it was hardly in a position to act swiftly. Traveling to this site today requires careful driving up a steep road with dozens of switchbacks. (Fig. 2.35) The rapid changes in slope and the 30m<sup>2</sup> real-world size of each cell in the DEM caused the cost-distance

model to break down when it was run for this location. In other words, without the resolution to account for the switchback roads that make the site even reasonably accessible, the cost-distance model produced a polygon that is hardly larger than the site itself. The castle garrison is "trapped" by the fact that the site is so steep that a person on horseback would fall to their death if they attempted to descend down what the DEM visualizes to be a sheer drop in all directions. The garrison at Segura de la Sierra certainly could travel to the valley below in a single day, but the difficulty in doing so reveals that this site needed additional support structures to physically impose the presence of the Order of Santiago on the landscape. It was a very large watchtower that strove to create a self-sufficient and defensible presence in the region with little to no regard for the isolating consequences of the choice of site.

At Siles, the Order of Santiago added a site with a shallow viewshed, but one that could access most of the valley to the north of Segura de la Sierra. (Fig. 2.59) The closest, low-lying area to Segura de la Sierra that a garrison from that fortress could see, but not access, was covered by the cost-distance polygon at Siles. This meager settlement (Fig. 2.60) had a very different purpose – to exert a more physical, but less visually dominating presence on the landscape. Both fortresses combined to cover the needs of surveillance and accessibility in the region that neither site could accomplish on its own. Moreover, if the dates of occupation are taken into account, Segura asserted itself as an advance "scout" position at a time when the military orders had only just begun to enter Andalucía. (Fig. 2.58) When Siles was occupied nearly two decades later, the order was finally able to exert a more physical influence on the fertile valley. (Fig. 2.59) By 1240, the tower of Albanchez created a triangle of intervisibility across both sides of the sliver-

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like Guadalimar valley, connecting the equally inaccessible Hornos de Segura, to Segura de la Sierra and Siles. (Fig. 2.61) With the possible exception of the Sierra Nevada that protected the kingdom of Granada, the Segura region contained the largest number of highly-visible, but inaccessible fortresses associated with the Reconquest. The topography was such that if the occupants of any fortress wished to exert economic influence on the region, they would have to employ satellite structures that could both travel to, and watch over more limited valley areas. Fortunately, several Muslim-built farmstead towers remain from this period in this region, such as the Torre de Orcera in the valley below Segura de la Sierra. (Fig. 2.62) These farmhouse-towers were more concentrated in the Segura region, but it seems likely that they would have existed in a region like eastern Aragon that had similarly inaccessible fortress survivals. (Fig. 2.63) These finer-grain patterns of settlement drawn from archaeological excavations are currently beyond the scope of this dissertation, but it appears that surveys could yield profitable results in areas with similarly dense collections of military order fortresses.

## 2.5 Inter-site relationships

The direct lines of inter-site relationships on the frontier in ADIMO create more easily recognized patterns than the viewshed polygons or cost-distance analyses. Their meaning can also be more clearly defined. The ability of two fortified sites with the same affiliation to see each other meant that they could form two nodes in a visibility network that would form a stronger edge in the "wall of the faithful". If two fortresses with different affiliations, especially rival religions were intervisible, the edge between them

(marked in the ADIMO maps with alternating colors) identifies an area of contention that is different from the common intervisibility between Christian and Muslim districts in many frontier cities. In the context of frontier fortresses, intervisibility between rivals should be viewed as the most contentious spaces of the frontier, rather than mere proximity or intimacy.

As evidenced by Caliph Al-Nasir's angry description of the fortress of Salvatierra in 1211, the ability to see a rival fortress from another settlement could easily escalate tensions.<sup>136</sup> More so than landscape visibility, where people working or traveling on the land would shift between visible and invisible as they moved through the landscape, inter-site visibility was a permanent relationship. In terms of patterns in the ADIMO data, it is undeniable that Christian-Muslim or Military Order-Muslim intervisibility tended to be a short-lived condition between fortresses. There were exceptions, such as the Christian-held castle of Vilches that was intervisible with many towns and fortresses in the Islamic Jaen province for several decades after Las Navas de Tolosa, or the castle of Salvatierra that stood out as a visible symbol of defiance for both sides at different times. (Fig. 2.39, 2.23, 2.25) On the whole however, intervisibility between religious rivals appears to have been a tension that forced a rapid readjustment – either by the consolidation of intervisible sites by a military order by force, or the migration of Muslim and Christian groups behind natural strategic barriers to vision and movement.<sup>137</sup> Put another way, the arable land in the valleys often lay in overlapping Christian and Muslim viewsheds, but when two rival sites could see each other, the tension became greater and the Muslim occupants often left, were quickly replaced or converted.

The meaning expressed by a visible rival structure for a viewer within their own fortress or walled town was wholly dependent on the viewer's comprehension of momentum, or - more specifically - advantage. Any judgement concerning which site was perceived to have the advantage must account for a host of variables on an individual basis. Spatial patterns in ADIMO can reveal where the areas of tension existed, and suggest the immediate historical context before rivals became intervisible. Nonetheless, patterns of fortress occupation cannot be directly equated with mental maps of perceived advantage – where fortress occupiers drew their confidence from an awareness of where and how recently nearby fortresses had been captured, or resisted attack. The negotiation of which side of a fortress-to-fortress visible relationship had an advantage over the other was not unlike what political theorist Robert Jervis termed "The Security Dilemma" of the cold war.<sup>138</sup> Intervisible, rival fortresses were similar to the Cuban missile crisis under Jervis' paradigm. More so than any spatial context, intervisibility offered certain evidence that either defense, or offense had the advantage. The fortress occupants that determined that they had more to gain by attacking than hunkering down with additional defensive construction changed the "meaning" of their own fortress into a menacing structure. At the same time, if the fortress with a defensive posture visibly increased its physical defenses through construction, the perception of advantage would become more ambiguous. Jervis described this kind of "non-menacing" fortress construction "the great equalizer" in the security dilemma. It also helps explain why the military orders chose to construct large headquarters on the frontier at times when large gains had occurred at the expense of their rivals, and in places where they would likely be seen by Muslim populations. The headquarters of Calatrava la Nueva is an excellent example of this kind

of decision-making: it was built after the Christian victory at Las Navas de Tolosa, and it was intervisible with the fortress of Salvatierra which had remained in Muslim control.

According to Jervis, fear and uncertainty are the main motivating factors that explain why actual military advantage does not immediately result in the destruction of a rival. Unlike the current work, which can acquire a visual representation of frontier fortress occupation, along with an estimate of visibility and accessibility for each site at a given year, medieval fortress occupants had to live with a great deal of uncertainty. This uncertainty partially explains the siting of fortresses in high locations with wide viewsheds, and the combination of fortresses into networks. Fortress construction can also be viewed as a manifestation of "loss aversion" – a well-known economic theory arguing that people are more motivated to avoid loss than acquire gain.<sup>139</sup> However, as the flickering fortress occupations of ADIMO demonstrate, any given structure could quickly switch from a menacing/offensive posture to non-threatening/defensive posture if landscape-scale changes in territorial control happened around them. I believe that two reasons why intervisibility between rival fortresses only tends to be an intermittent flash in the ADIMO database are because offensive posture was easily distinguishable from defensive posture when rival sites could see each other, and because most changes in occupation occurred in small-scale waves – when offensive action was known to have the advantage. In this context, each intervisible, rival fortress had a clear offensive or defensive posture during a wave of occupational change, but settled into longer periods when defense was thought to have the advantage, and when the offensive or defensive posture of different structures (and religious groups) was generally indistinguishable.<sup>140</sup> Vision and intelligence gathering were especially important at these times, and a network

of spatially connected nodes across the frontier was a logical mechanism for decreasing spatial uncertainty. Finally, the idea that there were cycles of defensive and offensive postures during the Reconquest helps to diminish the outdated, teleological narrative of the Christian Reconquest where aggression was always preferable to enforcing the status quo.

#### **2.6 Conclusion**

At its base level, the ADIMO project is an aggregate of regional, temporal, or military order-specific works that had diligently located the military orders in limited contexts, but had not placed this research within a larger system. When combined and appended using modern methods and technologies, the lists of place-names associated with the military orders that previously revealed so little about their role on the frontier finally provide a holistic impression that has been missing until now. As stated several times in this chapter, the greatest utility of this project is its ability to reveal patterns in Iberia's frontier fortresses and towns that are impossible to comprehend from static maps or a listing of place names. These patterns are visible at multiple scales specifically because the data was entered at a fine-grained geographic and temporal resolution. Consequently, this chapter has demonstrated the ability to query the site locations and affiliations of the military orders, Christian monarchs and their Muslim rivals from a peninsula-wide scale down to a single site during any month between 1120 and 1350.

As much effort as it took to build and populate the ADIMO database, the flattened structure in Appendix A, only represents the first stage of the project. What sets this

project apart from previous approaches to the military orders and the history of the Reconquest has been the ability to allow this simple collection of places, affiliations, architecture types and dates to connect to each other via network analyses, while also visualizing their potential influence on the surrounding landscape. The spatial narrative offered in section 2.4 is thus only one chain that can emerge from a seemingly infinite set of spatial patterns that can emerge when additional analyses are driven by the underlying data. On a peninsula-wide scale, the data has revealed that the historical image of the Reconquest as line jumping south with each Christian victory is inaccurate and misleading. It has also demonstrated that the military orders did more than "predominate" in different regions of the peninsula. The orders developed a repeated strategy for the formation of the wall of the faithful that was highly dependent on viewshed and landscape accessibility. This strategy required close proximity to the frontier, a buffer of satellite fortresses and watchtowers in "front" of their frontier headquarters, and the ability to communicate a change in religious orientation at the landscape scale.

The GIS analyses detailed in this chapter were intended to visualize the layering of 'ideal' spaces, such as 'Christian territory' or 'Islamic territory' over 'real' Cartesian space. As a result, this chapter has outlined what it meant to be able to see a castle on the horizon from below, or know that the space where you lived and worked was accessible within a single day's ride from a nearby castle. Viewshed and cost-distance analyses also replace pervious historians' broadly drawn, metaphorical 'network' of frontier fortresses with a more precise, evidence-driven model that looks at actual measurements of connectivity. The combination of these analyses has accomplished more than an

aggregation of previous knowledge; it has revealed that the wall of the faithful had

ideological consequences as well as a geographic shape.

#### http://www.montesa.es/.

Finally, many of the studies listed in the historiography of Chapter 1 were used to enter data into the ADIMO database, especially Amador Ruibal Rodriguez, "Las Órdenes Militares En España: Fortificaciones Y Encomiendas," *Congreso De Castellologia*, 2012.

Derek W. Lomax, La Orden De Santiago, 1170-1275 (Madrid: Consejo Superior De Investigaciones Científicas, Escuela De Estudios Medievales, 1965).

Los Monjes Soldados: Los Templarios Y Otras Órdenes Militares (Águilar De Campoo: Fundación Santa María La Real, Centro De Estudios Del Románico, 1997)

Olga Perez Monzon, "El Arte Y Las Ordenes Militares," Lux Hispaniarum; Estudios Sobre Las Ordenes Militares, 1999, 205-33.

Amador Ruibal Rodriguez, "Las Órdenes Militares En España: Fortificaciones Y Encomiendas," Congreso De Castellologia, 2012, accessed June 2, 2015,

http://www.castillosdeespana.es/sites/castillosdeespana.es/files/pdf/pon2.pdf.

<sup>106</sup> For the purposes of this study, all viewsheds were clipped at a maximum distance of 100km. This distance was chosen as a conservative compromise to the maximum visible distance of 160-200 miles for a large signal fire on a clear night as cited by D.L Woolliscroft in his book *Roman Military Signaling*. Maximum visible distance is a very complicated concept with almost countless variables. One popular way to qualify this distance is to say that a healthy human eye can detect a candle flame on a clear night from 48km away. Of the 621 sites for which viewshed was

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> Order of. CALATRAVA et al., Bullarium Ordinis Militiæ De Calatrava... Opus D. Ignatij Josephi
 De Ortega Et Cotes ... Directione, D. Joannis Francisci Alvarez De Baquedano ... Diligentia, Et D.
 Petri De Ortega Zuñiga Et Aranda ... Labore Completum. Cui Accessit Catalogus Summorum
 Pontificum Ac Bullarum, Seu Indultorum, Quæ Ab Eisdem Emanarunt, Etc (Matriti, 1761), 73.
 <sup>98</sup> Alan Forey Alan Forey "The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries." 202

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup> Paul Q. Hirst, *Space and Power: Politics, War, and Architecture* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), 3. <sup>100</sup> Ibid. 82-91

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> Ibid. 3. Hirst's scales are defined as follows: "This study operates at three spatial scales: that of the state in relations of cooperation and patterns of conflict with other states, that of the city as both an autonomous political entity and as a self-governing but subsidiary part of territorial states, and that of the building as an instrument of power."

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space* (Oxford, OX, UK: Blackwell, 1991), 11-12.
 <sup>103</sup> For occupations / site ownership that ended after 1350, or if no date could be located for abandonment, the date was set at 1/1/1500 for the purposes of the timeline in ArcGIS.
 <sup>104</sup> Alan Forey "The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest". 202

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup> The data for the ADIMO database came from more sources than it is possible to identify individually, especially in the aggregation of dates of occupation for over 600 structures. The principal online source was the website Castillos De España. <u>http://www.castillosnet.org</u> This site began as a searchable, digital form of a three-volume encyclopedia written by a group known as *Los Amigos de Castillos de España.* Javier Bernad, Amador Ruibal, and Pere Català I Roca, Castillos De España Vol 1-3 (Leon: Everest, 1997) Other important sources include Spanish and Portuguese Wikipedia pages for individual fortresses and towns, but the most reliable & efficient online sources of dates were the city council pages for individual towns and tourist organizations. An example of a very complete municipality page was designed for the town of Montesa: "Montesa," *Ayuntamiento De Montesa*, section goes here, accessed September 01, 2015,

Also, maps of military-order possessions from other secondary sources were georeferenced as well as possible over a satellite dataset to help locate additional sites. Several sources with excellent maps include:

calculated for this study, only 20 display a telltale round shape at the edge of the viewshed that marks it as substantially "clipped" by the 100km distance. In addition, more than 50% of the viewsheds had a maximum distance from the viewpoint of 30km.

<sup>107</sup> An excellent example of such a project is the Orbis project created at Stanford University. This project allows a researcher to begin a hypothetical journey from any site in the Roman Empire and end at any other comparable site by ship, horseback, foot, or ox-cart via a network of linear paths identified by roads, sea or river. The model is far more complex than the one proposed here, and also presupposes that there is a set destination, but it is an excellent introduction to cost-distance analysis. In the introduction to the project, the authors succinctly point out that "Cost, not distance is the principal determinant of connectivity."

Walter Scheidel, Elijah Meeks, and Carl Grossner, "ORBIS: The Stanford Geospatial Network Model of the Roman World," June 01, 2012, accessed July 03, 2015, http://orbis.stanford.edu/. <sup>108</sup> Gerrard. "Opposing Identity." 147

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Forey. The Templars in the Corona de Aragón. 1

<sup>111</sup> See pages 13-15 for a longer description of the historical context of the Templars abandoning Calatrava.

<sup>112</sup> David J. Bodenhamer, "The Potential of Spatial Humanities," in *The Spatial Humanities: GIS and the Future of Humanities Scholarship*, ed. David J. Bodenhamer, John Corrigan, and Trevor M. Harris (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 26-27.

<sup>113</sup> David J. Staley, *Computers, Visualization, and History: How New Technology Will Transform Our Understanding of the past* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003),10

<sup>114</sup> "IAPH. Instituto Andaluz Del Patrimonio Historico," Base De Datos Patrimonio Inmueble De Andalucía, section goes here, accessed July 08, 2015, http://www.iaph.es/patrimonio-inmueble-andalucia/resumen.do?id=i2364.

<sup>115</sup> Joseph F. O'Callaghan, *Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 97.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid. 67

<sup>117</sup> Joseph F. O'Callaghan, trans., *Latin Chronicle of the Kings of Castile* (Tempe, Ariz: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2002), 88. *Emphasis added* 

<sup>118</sup> The term *Mudejar* is still used to describe Muslims living under Christian rule that had not chosen to convert. It is a modern historical construct rather than a term used by medieval Iberians, but it will continue to be used here to describe this particular group.

<sup>119</sup> Wikipedia - *Treaty of Cazola*, accessed September 02, 2015,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty\_of\_Cazola.

<sup>120</sup> Josep-David Garrido I Valls, "Enemies and Allies: The Crown of Aragon and Al-Andalus in the Twelfth Century," in Crusaders, Condottieri, and Cannon: Medieval Warfare in Societies around the Mediterranean, by Donald J. Kagay and L. J. Andrew. Villalon (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 188.
 <sup>121</sup> For example, the Castle of Atalaya at Villena was initially attacked by Aragonese forces in 1138, given to the Order of Calatrava in 1240, taken back by Castile in 1244, taken in a Muslim revolt in 1264, then finally taken back by Aragon in December of that year.

<sup>122</sup> Alan J. Forey, Trans. *Templars in the Corona De Aragón* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), 356.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

#### 124 https://youtu.be/P7Z7Ik6\_bJU

This video animates the fortress and town occupations as well as the viewsheds for all of the military orders in Iberia by compressing the period from 1120 40 1350 into two minutes. <sup>125</sup> David J. Staley, *Computers, Visualization, and History: How New Technology Will Transform Our Understanding of the past* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 54-55.

<sup>126</sup> For an excellent explanation of these categories of spatial approaches, see: Katherine Ellenberger, "Scales of Visibility at a Chacoan Outlier: The Visual World of People at Kin Klizhin" (Master's thesis, Binghamton University - State University of New York, 2012), pg. 6,

<sup>127</sup> Glick, From Muslim Fortress. xi

<sup>128</sup> Lomax. *The Reconquest of Spain*. 122

<sup>129</sup> Oliver Creighton and Robert Liddiard, "Fighting Yesterday's Battle: Beyond War or Status in Castle Studies," *Medieval Archaeology* 52, no. 1 (2008): 161

<sup>130</sup> A succinct example of this idea can be read in the Metropolitan Museum's webpage on Art of the Nasrid Period. The entry reads: "The creation of a succession of Nasrid rulers, in particular Ismacil I (r. 1314–25), Yusuf I (r. 1333–54), and Muhammad V (r. 1354–59, 1362–91), the Alhambra was a powerful image for a waning monarchy, a vast stage set for the diminishing power of the last Muslim rule on the peninsula."

"Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History," The Art of the Nasrid Period (1232-1492), accessed July 24, 2015, http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/nasr/hd\_nasr.htm.

<sup>131</sup> O. H. Creighton, Castles and Landscapes (London: Continuum, 2002), 57.

<sup>132</sup> Tadahiko Higuchi, *The Visual and Spatial Structure of Landscapes* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983), 41-56.

<sup>133</sup> Ellenberger, "Scales of Visibility." 13-14.

<sup>134</sup> Higuchi. 41-46

<sup>135</sup> María Ballesteros Linares, "Establecimiento De La Orden Militar De Santiago En La Sierra De Segura La Encomienda De Segura De La Sierra," *Boletín Del Instituto De Estudios Giennenses* 201 (2010): 99, accessed August 5, 2015,

http://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=3252943.

<sup>136</sup> See page 94

<sup>137</sup> The conquest of the Guadalquivir valley is an excellent example of consolidation of intervisible sites. By the end of the reign of Fernando III in 1252, the orders of Calatrava and Santiago and other Christian groups had achieved a near monopoly on intervisibility between the largest fortresses in the region.(fig \*) In the following decade, the Kingdom of Granada contained remarkably few sites that remained intervisible with Christian-held sites. The Sierra Nevada acted as a curtain separating Christian and Muslim visual, as well as territorial space for more than two centuries.

<sup>138</sup> Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, no. 02 (1978): 169-170

<sup>139</sup> "Loss Aversion," Wikipedia, accessed August 07, 2015,

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Loss\_aversion.

<sup>140</sup> For an explanation of what Jervis called the "four worlds" of the security dilemma – identifying the consequences of the combination of offensive or defensive advantage with the either distinguishable or indistinguishable offensive-defensive posture – see Appendix C.

# **CHAPTER 3:**

#### **Resurrection of the Order of Calatrava through the Construction of a New Capital**

Taking pity on your poverty because of the unhappy affair of Alarcos (where you were with me, and where, because of our sins, it did not please the divine power to grant us victory), you lost your chief house of Calatrava, and almost all your possessions...<sup>1</sup>

-Alfonso VIII of Castile, c. 1195

#### **3.1 Introduction**

The subject of this chapter is an anomaly in the architectural record of Iberia's military orders, yet it is also the quintessential example of a fortress-monastery. (Fig. 3.1A) Calatrava la Nueva was not a wholly new complex, but it was so substantially changed by the Order of Calatrava in 1213-1217, that the shape of the new fortress would have been unrecognizable for its original Muslim garrison. (Fig. 3.1B) The current structure is the best preserved example of a 13<sup>th</sup> century military order headquarters or 'preceptory' in Iberia, as well as one of the most unique combinations of monastery and fortress in the world. What is most provocative about this structure, however, is that it was created to be a monumental symbol of rebirth following what Joseph O'Callaghan articulated as the Order of Calatrava's "years of crisis and survival."<sup>2</sup>

The following analysis of Calatrava la Nueva begins a shift in focus from macroscopic views of military order architecture across the Iberian Peninsula to site-specific studies of two of the most identity-laden structures that the military orders ever produced in the 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> centuries. I begin with Calatrava la Nueva because the second case study, the Castillo-Convento de Montesa, looked to Calatrava la Nueva as a model a century later. Calatrava la Nueva also has the added value of being built at the

beginning of the most powerful, expansive phase in the history of Iberia's military orders. Looking back from the vantage point of the 14<sup>th</sup> century when the new Order of Montesa was constructing its version of Calatrava la Nueva in Valencia, the Order of Calatrava's 13<sup>th</sup> century headquarters becomes something more than a prototype. The composite fortress-monastery that the Order of Calatrava built after the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa was perfectly suited for its time and place, but it was so closely wedded to its historical context that it could not be appropriately transplanted to Valencia a century later. Chapter 4 reveals that this did not stop the Order of Montesa from trying. In order to discover how Calatrava la Nueva came to define an essential component of the wall of the faithful, this chapter analyzes the immediate spatial and historical context that

The Order of Calatrava's "years of crisis and survival" were defined by four major events. The battle of Alarcos (1195) – where the order was nearly completely annihilated by an Almohad army – shocked the order into a desperate state that bore little resemblance to their previous years of modest expansion. The second major event was the capture of the fortress of Salvatierra – a strong, but small castle that was deep in Muslim territory at an even more advanced position than the headquarters they had lost after the battle of Alarcos (Calatrava la Vieja). The order's loss of their new namesake fortress of Salvatierra after a 51-day siege by the Almohads in 1211, and Pope Innocent III's call for a crusade in Castile immediately after hearing of the loss represents the third major event. The final event was the combined victory of Iberia's Christian kingdoms over the Almohad Caliph in 1212 at the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa. Remembering the courage of the Order of Calatrava – especially after it had been reformed as the Order of Salvatierra – Alfonso VIII returned every castle the order had lost after Alarcos, and added a number of additional fortresses as well. By August of 1212, the cultural landscape in southern La Mancha had been reset to something similar to a pre-Alarcos state, and it was up to the Order of Calatrava to learn the lessons of its past, and build a lasting presence in the region. The solution they chose in 1213-1217 was to create the aptly-named Calatrava la Nueva – a new headquarters that was built on a hilltop directly across from Salvatierra.

I argue that the construction of the largest military-monastic complex in Iberia was not a foregone conclusion in 1213, and that the Order's decision to recall their past by retaking their original name of Calatrava is both significant, and deeply imbedded in the architecture of their new headquarters. While an immense new fortification such as Calatrava la Nueva would certainly have primarily affected the region geopolitically, I argue it was more than a dot marking the southernmost Christian possession on a historical map of the Reconquest. (Fig. 3.2) This shallow reading of medieval fortifications lumps a unique castle/monastery into a category of purely military structures and ignores its ability to speak directly for its equally unique inhabitants. Calatrava la Nueva was an active agent in the Christian Reconquest; one that can help historians to better understand how the most polemical and combative actors on the Christian/Muslim frontier manifested their ideology. Taken further, this case study of the Order of Calatrava's clearest architectural expression of identity further maps the ideological composition of the wall of the faithful.

In this chapter, I describe three viewpoints that collectively reveal why Calatrava la Nueva was built, and identify the spatial and historical relationship between this unique military-monastic complex and the wider Reconquest. In the first section, I summarize the historical context in the years leading up to the rebirth of the Order of Calatrava after the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212. The second section focuses on the effect of the physical, political and cultural geography of southern La Mancha on the choice of site for the order's new headquarters. In the final section, I delve into the extant architecture at Calatrava and hypothesize why such great effort was made to graft a full-scale monastery onto a fortress at an irregular hilltop site in 1213-1217. This chapter will introduce the final component of *the wall of the faithful*: the construction of large-scale, iconic headquarters that reinforced a composite, military-monastic identity and projected Christian authority on the landscape.

# 3.2 The Effect of the Order of Calatrava's Long History versus the Immediate Impact of the Christian Victory at Las Navas de Tolosa

As essential as sequence and chronology are to the study of the *Reconquista* writ large, Calatrava la Nueva's construction was equally defined by a sequence of specific decisions. The timing for the castle/monastery's construction was the most critical factor in determining the choice of site, and that the choices of plan and style were in turn, highly influenced by the choice of site. As a result, the first question that emerges is whether the choice of site for Calatrava la Nueva was affected more by the immediate relief after the Christian victory at las Navas de Tolosa, or by the long period of "Crisis and Survival" following the devastating Christian loss at Alarcos seventeen years earlier.

#### • Calatrava's Origins (1147-1164)

The Order of Calatrava was initially named after a fortress 55 miles south of the Castilian capital of Toledo. (Fig. 3.3) The fortress, now known as Calatrava la Vieja, was originally built by the Muslim conquerors of Iberia in the ninth century. From the ninth to the mid twelfth century, the fortress – then named *Qal'at Rabah* – acted as a strategic focal point in the Guadiana River basin. After the fall of the Umayyad Caliphate in the eleventh century, the fortress regularly changed hands between the Taifa kingdoms of Seville, Toledo, and Cordoba. Its location upon a low hilltop next to the Guadiana River, and on the road between Toledo and Cordoba made it a strategic site throughout its history. When the Almoravids invaded from Morocco in 1086, this new Muslim dynasty made the fortress a spearhead for attacks against the Castilian capital of Toledo – which had been recaptured by King Alfonso VI (r. 1072-1109) the year before (1085).

In 1147, Alfonso VII of Castile (r. 1126-1157) captured the fortress of Calatrava La Vieja and quickly realized that he could not maintain a garrison to occupy the fortress through his feudal power alone. The surrounding marshland around the river caused illness and its advanced position on the Christian/Muslim frontier was constantly under threat of attack. According to the bishop of Toledo, Rodrigo Jimenez de Rada – who wrote the only narrative of the foundation of the Order of Calatrava in the early thirteenth century – Alfonso VII quickly sought the assistance of the Order of the Temple to garrison the castle.<sup>3</sup> The Templars' success in the year-round protection of the Holy Land after the first crusade made them the only pre-existing model for a standing army in the 12<sup>th</sup> century. The Templars made several important alterations to the castle to better suit their religious and secular needs – including the construction of a 'signature' centrally

planned church on the site. The Templars held the castle and defended the southern route to Toledo until 1157, when the rumor of an imminent attack from a new, even more militant North African dynasty, (the Almohads) reached the Templars at Calatrava la Vieja. According to Derek Lomax and others, the death of King Alfonso VII in 1157 convinced the Templars that they would be left without support in their frontier outpost, and would therefore bear the brunt of the Almohad advance.<sup>4</sup> Consequently, the Templars returned the castle to the new King Sancho III (r. 1157-58) claiming that they did not wish to be needlessly diverted from their "true" purpose – to defend Jerusalem.

It is not the purpose of this chapter to debate whether or not the Templars fled their responsibility due to their lack of emotional investment in the Reconquest as Lomax and his source – Archbishop Rodrigo Jimenez de Rada – believed. However, there is no doubt that the group that answered Sancho III's call to re-garrison the castle had much stronger local connections to the Christian Reconquest.<sup>5</sup> The monks of Fitero, the first Cistercian monastery in Spain, abandoned their own construction project in southern Navarre to garrison Calatrava la Vieja with lay brothers in tow. According to the Bullarium Ordinis Militiae de Calatrava, the Abbot of Fitero, Reymond, took on the responsibility "to defend (Calatrava la Vieja) against the pagans, the enemies of the cross of Christ."<sup>6</sup> As already mentioned in Chapter 1, a majority of those who became militant defenders of Calatrava and other military orders were not converted monks. Historian Alan Forey suggested that the defenders were mostly composed of the lay brethren of Fitero and crusaders who had responded to the archbishop of Toledo's offer of indulgences to anyone who chose to defend the fortress at La Mancha.<sup>7</sup> Nonetheless, Archbishop Rodrigo Jimenez de Rada's thirteenth century account states that the mixture of lay brothers, Cistercian monks, and Iberian crusaders quickly took on some form of monastic identity: "...then many who had been inspired by devotion received their order having modified the habit as military activity demanded."<sup>8</sup>

According to Joseph O'Callaghan, the conversion from monk to "knight of Christ" did not occur without debate. O'Callaghan noted Toledo's Archbishop Rodrigo Jimenez de Rada's claim that Abbot Reymond believed military action was "foreign to his character as a monk and ought not to be undertaken rashly."<sup>9</sup> Nonetheless, O'Callaghan's translation of the *Bullarium Ordinis Militiae de Calatrava* describes a group that eventually joined their new role with their old identities. "… with swords in hand, wearing rough woolen garments and eating a meager diet, they (the new Order) gave themselves up to a life of prayer, vigils, silence, discipline and war for the defense of their country and faith."<sup>10</sup> Joseph O'Callaghan's earliest work argued that the Order of Calatrava was guided by an unprecedentedly close relationship with the Cistercian Order, and that this close relationship was fundamental to the new order's formation of a military-monastic Rule of life.<sup>11</sup>

# • Royal Patronage during the Order's Years of Success: (1164-1195)

It is impossible to know if the presence of the monks, knights and lay brothers at Calatrava la Vieja acted as a deterrent for the Almohads in 1158, yet it is clear that no attack on Calatrava la Vieja occurred in the first thirty years after their arrival. Instead of the defensive posture that the first members of the order expected, Calatrava la Vieja quickly became the headquarters for a network of castles that protected the southern road to Toledo and harassed the 'border' with Islam. With the exception of Calatrava la Vieja, little remains of the castles that firmly established the Order's indispensable presence in Castile such as Alarcos, Piedrabuena, Caracuel, and Benavente. (Fig. 3.4) However, it is important to note that much like their future headquarters at Calatrava la Nueva, each of these castles had previously been garrisoned by Almohad forces.

Modern scholars of 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> century Castilian political and religious history have heavily relied on the account of the Archbishop of Toledo, Rodrigo Ximenez de Rada (r. 1209-1247). The Archbishop stood at the center of key events in Castile, and recorded them in his nine-book account titled *Historia de los Hechos de Espana*.<sup>12</sup> Sancho III (r. 1157-58) may have initiated the foundation of the Order of Calatrava, but it was his son, Alfonso VIII (r. 1158-1214) who became the Order's chief benefactor. Unfortunately for Castile, Alfonso was only 2 years old when his father died in 1158. Throughout his minority, Castile was governed by two camps, one headed by his tutor, Gutierre Fernandez de Castro, and the other by his Regent, Manrique de Lara. While these two Castilian courtiers fought over control of the young king, the neighboring kingdom of Navarre exploited the political strife in Castile by invading the Rioja region in the Ebro River valley. When Alfonso's uncle, Fernando II of Leon intervened by taking control of Toledo in 1162, Alfonso became a fugitive in his own kingdom.<sup>13</sup> In 1166, at the age of eleven, Alfonso sided with the Lara faction and re-took Toledo. On November 11<sup>th</sup>, 1169, 14-year-old Alfonso VIII was declared by his supporters to have reached majority and took over the throne of Castile. This period of instability and combativeness between the Christian kingdoms was matched in Muslim Iberia at the time, and the power vacuum on all sides led to a stalling of religious warfare on the peninsula. Upon Alfonso VIII's ascendency, the new king made the renewal of the Reconquest a top priority, yet his approach was subtly different from the type of religious

warfare practiced by his predecessors. Rather than approach the Reconquest as an annual season of raids into Muslim territory, Alfonso VIII used the military orders to hold his incremental advances, and turned military action against the Muslim south into a crusade.

Alfonso VIII was quick to apply the lessons he had learned during his contested minority. The instability of his minority was directly related to the influence of a powerful aristocracy, who vied for power and nearly split his kingdom. His exile after his uncle Frederick II of Leon had captured Toledo also reinforced the fact that the Castilian crown's power was irrevocably tied to its control of this frontier capital. In addition, the aggressive actions of the King of Navarre and others proved that the spirit of consolidated Christian effort against the Muslims had waned. Alfonso also must have been aware of the ephemeral nature of independent Castilian efforts against targets in the Muslim South. His grandfather's short occupation of Cordoba was a prime example of this. The most successful Christian incursions into Muslim Iberia were international crusades supported by the Pope and French knights – many of whom had already been on crusades to the Holy Land. Most importantly, Alfonso learned that his kingdom's presence in the arid, battered region south of Toledo was too sparse to maintain any successful attacks against the wealthier targets beyond the Sierra Morena. (Fig. 3.5) Alfonso needed to populate this area with soldiers who were directly loyal to the Castilian Crown, and not the local aristocracy. This frontier would have to act as a buffer between the relatively new, more militant and religiously severe Almohad Islamic dynasty, and Alfonso's prized possession: Toledo.

Fortunately for Alfonso VIII, he also inherited the answer to his problem: the Order of Calatrava. During Alfonso's minority, the knights of Calatrava were successful,

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but underutilized. Initially, Alfonso VIII wanted Calatrava to protect his "back door" while he struck back against the kingdom of Navarre on his northern border in 1169. In the years immediately after he shored up his northern border via treaty and combat with Leon and Navarre, Alfonso VIII turned his full attention toward the south. In an abrupt change in the use of the military Orders, Alfonso VIII made the Order of Calatrava the "core military forces" in his campaigns against the Almohads.<sup>14</sup> In addition, in 1173, Alfonso VIII granted the order future possession of every castle they captured from the Muslims between Toledo and the Sierra Morena. The following year, he granted the Order of Calatrava one-fifth of Castile's future conquests, and a tenth of all Royal revenues.<sup>15</sup> In 1177, the order acted as the bulk of Alfonso's force that captured the Islamic city of Cuença near the Aragonese border.

Calatrava's success in capturing this notoriously inaccessible site influenced the king of Aragon, (Alfonso II, (1162-1196) – who was present at the siege – to give the Order of Calatrava the prominent fortress of Alcañiz, which stood on his kingdom's equally contested border with the Almohads. (Fig. 3.6) This fortress deferred to the Castilian capital of Calatrava la Vieja as well as the abbey of Morimond like all other *encomiendas*<sup>16</sup> of the Calatravan order. However, geographical distance between Alcañiz and Calatrava la Vieja, and the fact that the new site's chief benefactor was the King of Aragon – not Alfonso VIII of Castile – gave Alcañiz a form of independence. In the years leading up to the battle of Alarcos in 1195, Alcañiz became a headquarters for the Aragonese branch of the Order of Calatrava, and made similar advances on the Aragonese border with Islam as the Castilian branch had made in the Campo de Calatrava. During this same period, the order of Calatrava spanned the horizontal length

of Iberia from Portugal to Valencia through its affiliation with other new military orders. The Order of San Julian de Pereiro (later known as Alcántara) in Leon and the Portuguese Order of Evora (later called Avis) both became satellite orders of Calatrava, with similar Cistercian ties and deference to the Master of Calatrava at his headquarters (Calatrava la Vieja).

The Order of Calatrava and its affiliates were exactly what Alfonso VIII and his Aragonese counterpart Alfonso II needed. They were the first true standing armies of the Reconquista. Calatrava's garrisons did not leave the frontier when their feudal obligations were up as Alfonso's vassals did; nor did they pose a political threat to Alfonso's power when they captured a new fortress since the knights were bound to Benedictine vows of obedience. In the hope of curbing a potential Calatravan monopoly of the frontier, Alfonso also supported the Order of Santiago. Santiago's Augustinian Rule and way of life brought them closer to the model of the Hospitalers in the same way that the Order of Calatrava's *Forma Vivendi* followed the Cistercian and Templar model. While there was economic competition in the area East of Toledo, the two orders generally coexisted well, and Alfonso was able to increase the power of each without decreasing his own.

Alfonso VIII gave the Order of Calatrava more than fortifications; he gave them the autonomy to push the frontier of Castile further south as well as the right to control the repopulation of the region. They were able to support themselves through the labor of the frontier colonists from the north who supplied the various commanderies just as they would a secular local lord in return for protection. Throughout their existence, Alfonso never abandoned the Order of Calatrava, and remained grateful for their presence on the frontier. According to the oft-mentioned chronicler Archbishop Rodrigo Jimenez de Rada, "King Alfonso reared them (the Order of Calatrava) and endowed them with many possessions... He relieved the burden of their poverty, and bestowed additional riches upon them. Their growth was the prince's crown."<sup>17</sup>

# • The Years of "Crisis and Survival"

Were it not for this unwavering support, the Order of Calatrava would have clearly ended after the tremendous Christian defeat at the fortress of Alarcos in 1195. Up until that point, Alfonso had proved to be a savvy and patient ruler. Ever since the Castilian capture of Cuenca in 1177, Alfonso's campaigns on the southern Castilian border harassed the Almohads without engaging in a pitched battle. In anticipation of a retaliation for his aggressive frontier policy in 1194, Alfonso concentrated his forces at the newly begun site of Alarcos castle on a rocky spur 13 miles south-east from Calatrava la Vieja, which he intended to give to the Order of Calatrava. (Fig. 3.7) A retaliation did come – in the form of a combined force of cavalry that crossed from North Africa and Andalusians led by the Almohad Caliph Yaqub ben Yusef I (1184-1199). Alfonso requested aid from the kings of Leon and Navarre, but the other Iberian Rulers were either too slow to react, or Alfonso failed to call them in time because they did not arrive at Alarcos until the battle was over.

According to the *Latin Chronicle of the Kings of Castile*, after a brief pause in Cordoba, the Muslim army advanced through the "Puerto de Muradal" and camped on the plain of Salvatierra below where Calatrava la Nueva was later built.<sup>18</sup> According to an Islamic chronicler Ibn Idari writing in the 13<sup>th</sup> century, "… a squad of Christian Cavalry advanced against Calatrava; but (the garrison) came to meet those, who follow the steps of the enemies of God, and were made for them as food for the hungry and drink to the thirsty and stopped at that plain as pastures for the eagles."<sup>19</sup> Another Muslim Chronicler, al-Srifa Garnati claimed that before the Almohads reached the bridge and fortress of Alarcos, the Christian knights of Calatrava and its surrounding castles attacked the Muslim army and were completely annihilated.<sup>20</sup>

Simply based on the geography of the area, and a mistake by Ibn Idari in naming the fortress of "Calatrava," O'Callaghan was able to better decipher the role of the order at the battle of Alarcos which was confused by the various sources. First, O'Callaghan believes that the castle referred to as "Calatrava" by Ibn Idhari is actually the Muslim fortress of Dueñas, upon whose foundation the headquarters of Calatrava la Nueva would be built seventeen years later. Calatrava la Nueva is south of the fortress and battlefield of Alarcos. (Fig. 3.8). The mistake in naming Dueñas "Calatrava" was likely due to the confusion caused by Ibn Idahri's thirteenth century memory of this site's new name. In addition, the Latin Chronicle confirms the location of the destruction of the Christian cavalry as the Plain of Salvatierra. The plain was named after the castle of Salvatierra, which stood only 3km from Dueñas/Calatrava la Nueva. The military Order of Calatrava's well defined role as the front line of defense in this region leads to the assumption they were indeed the cavalry force which was killed before the battle of Alarcos.

Regardless of whether it occurred before or after the battle of Alarcos on July 19<sup>th</sup> 1195, the Order of Calatrava clearly suffered the most of any of the Christian participants at Alarcos. The Latin Chronicle stated that Alfonso VIII refused to wait for his reinforcements from Leon and Aragon, and ordered his army out onto the field in front of the Almohads. The Caliph was more patient, and waited the entire day for the Christian

army to tire under the weight of their armor before he attacked. Alfonso's overheated army – which included nearly every available knight of Calatrava from the surrounding fortresses – was decimated at Alarcos, and the King was forced to retreat back to Toledo. The Latin Chronicle recounted the aftermath in the following passage:

"The King of the Moors seized the spoils and took certain castles, namely the tower of Guadalerzas, Malagón, Benavente, Calatrava, Alarcos, and Caracuel, and then returned to his own realm."<sup>21</sup>

Each of the castles mentioned above had been possessions of the Order of Calatrava. Since the battle of Alarcos occurred in in the center of their territory, the Order of Calatrava was the first to be defeated, and the hardest hit by the result. Despite their successful raids throughout the Campo de Calatrava in the forty years since the monks of Fitero first took possession of Calatrava la Vieja, the order was utterly defeated when they were tested by the Caliph's massive force. After Alarcos, there were not enough Calatravan knights remaining to protect their holdings, and each one was abandoned without a siege. Most importantly, the headquarters and priory of the Order, Calatrava la Vieja, once again became an advanced Muslim position for attacks against Toledo.<sup>22</sup>

The effect of the loss at Alarcos on the identity of the Order of Calatrava cannot be overstated. Were it not for the continued support of Alfonso VIII, the Order of Calatrava would have been eliminated from the history of Castile. Their role in the protection of Toledo from the Almohad threat could easily have been written off as a failed experiment. Alfonso's faith in the power of the military orders (specifically, the Order of Calatrava) led him to believe rashly that he could succeed without the consolidated effort of pan-Iberian forces, or his neighboring kings. To Alfonso's credit, he did not place the blame on the Order of Calatrava. His support of the order was unwavering. Alfonso VIII made new grants which formed the new southern border of Castile and in a letter to Nuño (1183-97) the surviving master of the Order of Calatrava, wrote:

... taking pity on your poverty because of the unhappy affair of Alarcos (where you were with me, and where, because of your sins, it did not please the divine power to grant us victory), you lost your chief house of Calatrava, and almost all your possessions.<sup>23</sup>

Master Nuño resigned from the nearly hollow title of Master of Calatrava in 1197, perhaps due to the humiliation of his Order's losses. The new Master – who had also been Nuño's predecessor, Martin Perez de Siones (1182-1199) – moved the Order's headquarters to a very bold and surprising location: the Castle of Salvatierra (Fig. 3.9). This meager fortress was much deeper into Muslim territory than any fortress that the order possessed prior to the battle of Alarcos (Fig. 2.23). With their former possessions in Muslim hands to the north and the "open door" through the Puerto de Muradal to the south-east, the knights at Salvatierra were nearly surrounded by Almohad forces. Strategically, this fortress made little sense as a new capital for the Order, since it was essentially cut off from most of Calatrava's remaining possessions.<sup>24</sup> Its scale alone made it hardly ideal for their needs. Symbolically however, Salvatierra, – which tranlaters as "salvation ground" – represented an intense will to resist the Muslim forces in Iberia. The order's investment in this castle is further evidenced by their decision to rename the Order of Calatrava "The Order of Salvatierra" in 1198.

The seventeen years between the battle of Alarcos (1195) and the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa were very lean for the Order of Calatrava/Salvatierra. Master Martin Pérez de Siones, who was responsible for the capture of Salvatierra, and reformation of the order into the new Order of Salvatierra, either resigned or was deposed in 1199.<sup>25</sup> The new Master, Martin Martinez struggled under Alfonso VIII's truce with the Almohads following Alarcos. The Order's mission of Reconquest, and their advanced location in Muslim territory put the order in an awkward position. However meager their numbers were after Alarcos, the order could not support itself solely on herding sheep in the devastated lands of La Mancha. In 1203, Master Martin accepted Maella castle from Pedro II of Aragon (1196-1213). More importantly, the Master of Salvatierra decided to transfer the headquarters of the order to their old possession of Alcañiz. This moment signified at least a splintering of the former Order, if not its outright suspension. The fortress of Salvatierra remained as it was, under its own Master Roy Diaz (1205-1212), while Martin Martinez was Master of Alcañiz: a true crusading headquarters in Aragon. King Pedro II of Aragon's patronage paled in comparison to the earlier relationship between the Master of Calatrava and Alfonso VIII of Castile. The Templars firm foothold in Aragon also made the indigenous Order of Salvatierra/Alcañiz less important to the Aragonese Reconquest.

In Castile, the order was composed of the isolated, yet determined defenders of the tiny fortress of Salvatierra, and a few other possessions near Toledo that ensured survival, yet served little strategic purpose. In 1211, Alfonso VIII renewed hostilities with the Almohads following the end of a decade-long truce. The king's actions provoked a massive response from the Almohads, which left the fortress of Salvatierra standing like a sandcastle before the tide. In clear repetition of Alarcos, the Almohad Caliph al-Nasir – known as Miramamolin to the Christians – led his Muslim army through the Puerto de Muradal and again camped on the plain of Salvatierra. Yet again, the Muslim and Latin sources both claim that a detachment of knights attempted to attack the Almohads encampment, but they were quickly killed.<sup>26</sup>

### • The Siege of Salvatierra and the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (1211-1212)

The siege of Salvatierra in 1211 defined the future and identity of the Order of Calatrava more than any other event. The castle stands on a rocky spur at the end of a line of high hills overlooking the north-south road to Toledo. (Fig. 3.10) The remains of this castle consist of a single tower, and what look like two concentric walls that follow the contours of the outcropping.<sup>27</sup> (Fig. 3.9) Immediately opposite Salvatierra, Dueñas castle stood on a higher, broader hill, yet nothing is known of this castle's shape since it was leveled by the builders of Calatrava la Nueva. Due to their extremely close proximity, Miramamolin must have besieged both castles simultaneously, with Dueñas falling very quickly. The knights of Salvatierra however, defended their headquarters with unexpected determination. The Almohads burned everything that surrounded the walls of Salvatierra, and used siege engines to break down the walls, but the order held out for 51 days. In the end, the fortress' design withstood the assault, yet it was too small, and contained too few cisterns to survive a summer siege.<sup>28</sup> The knights were allowed to leave the castle unharmed, yet they were forced to watch their second headquarters fall to the Almohads, and its church transformed into a mosque. Still, Salvatierra had delayed Miramamolin long enough to prevent the Caliph from taking his entire force into Castile. As mentioned on page 75, the Caliph proclaimed his triumph in a letter dated the 13<sup>th</sup> of September claiming that "he had cut off the right hand of the King of Castile."29

The immediate consequence of the Siege of Salvatierra was a renewal of the anxiety felt after the battle of Alarcos. The monastic knights of Salvatierra had

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represented the stubborn determination to reconstruct the frontier as it had been before the Castilian loss at Alarcos. Where Calatrava la Vieja had been a line in the sand, Salvatierra was an oasis of Christianity deep in Muslim territory. When Salvatierra was captured, anxious European leaders believed that the continent's "back door," – which had been hastily shut by Alfonso's truce with Cordoba and Salvatierra's bold resistance in the following years – was now blown open again. The Order's continued Cistercian connection helped to spread the story to monasteries throughout Europe.<sup>30</sup> Pope Innocent III granted crusading indulgences to all knights who traveled to fight against the Almohads the following spring (1212). Alfonso VIII, learning his lesson from Alarcos, waited for his fellow Iberian kings of Navarre, and Aragon, as well as the French crusaders to assemble at Toledo before heading south to attack the frontier castles once owned by the Order of Calatrava.

After taking the fortress of Malagon on June 24<sup>th</sup> 1212, the composite army of surviving military Orders, Iberians, and French crusaders set upon the old headquarters and namesake of the Order of Calatrava which would soon be called Calatrava la Vieja. In his letter to Pope Innocent III following his victory at Las Navas de Tolosa, Alfonso VIII claimed that his decision to preserve Calatrava la Vieja for the surviving monastic knights of Salvatierra angered the French crusaders, who believed they had been tricked into the campaign with false promises of spoils.<sup>31</sup>

Without the French – who, according to Lomax actually attempted to sack Toledo on their way back north – Alfonso and the Kings of Navarre and Aragon managed to recapture four more castles for the Order of Calatrava: Alarcos, Caracuel, Benavente and Piedrabuena<sup>32</sup> The Christian army was forced to pass by the castle of Salvatierra when they learned that Miramamolin had assembled his force again in Cordoba and was beginning to move toward the Puerto Muradal. Rather than wait for the Muslim army to pass through the Muradal mountains and meet him on the familiar battleground on the plain of Salvatierra, Alfonso took the initiative and passed through the mountain on an alternate route which he later claimed was revealed to him by a local Christian shepherd.<sup>33</sup> The battle of Las Navas de Tolosa commenced on the south side of the mountains near the Despeñaperros Pass on July 14<sup>th</sup>, 1212. (Fig. 3.11) Alfonso VIII engaged the Almohads on very uneven terrain and according to his letter to Innocent III, after three days of skirmishes, his outnumbered army crushed the Almohads and forced the Caliph to flee south to the city of Jaen.

Our Lord slew a great multitude of them with the sword of the Cross. Then the Sultan with a few of his men turned in flight. Others of the enemy for a time bore the thrust of our attacks, but soon, after heavy loss of life, the rest turned and fled. We followed up the pursuit till nightfall, and killed more in the rout then we had in the battle... On their side there fell in the battle 100,000 armed men, perhaps more, according to the estimates of Saracens we captured later – only some twenty or thirty Christians in our whole host fell.<sup>34</sup>

Alfonso did not stop at Las Navas de Tolosa. His army pursued the retreating Muslims to two towns in Andalucía: Baeza, and Úbeda. When the Christians found Baeza all but abandoned, "He burnt its houses and destroyed its largest Mosque."<sup>35</sup> At Úbeda, they found a large host of the Muslims who had fled from Las Navas de Tolosa. The Muslim Chronicler al-Marrakushi al-Mu'jib wrote in 1224 that Alfonso besieged the town

... for thirteen days, and then took it by force, killing and capturing and plundering. He and his men set aside as prisoners enough women and children to fill all the Christian territories. This was a greater blow to the Muslims than their defeat in battle.<sup>36</sup>

Alfonso's description of the siege of Úbeda to Innocent III generally matches the Muslim Chronicler's account, yet he explains his reasons for taking captives.

By God's grace we captured Úbeda in a short time, and, since we did not have enough people to settle it, we raze it to the ground. Some 60,000 Saracens perished there: some were killed, others were taken as captives into the service of the Christians and of the monasteries which needed to be repaired in the border regions.<sup>37</sup>

It is my belief that the 'monasteries of the border regions' referred to by Alfonso VIII were very likely the newly reacquired fortresses of the Order of Calatrava. The Muslim chronicler al-Marrakushi al-Mu'jib may not mention male captives, yet Alfonso VIII's letter suggests their fate. Large numbers of unskilled laborers would have been required for the construction of Calatrava la Nueva and other fortresses in the region, and there is sufficient evidence to assume that some of the captives Alfonso VIII mentions in his letter were male prisoners of war. The composite labor force that reconstructed the southernmost region of Castile would have been composed of skilled and unskilled captives from Muslim territory, free Muslim masons from the north, and the frontier Christians themselves. Each of these groups combined to create structures that reflected the complex heritage of the region. The "catch-all" term that is often used to describe the style is *Mudéjar*.<sup>38</sup>

## • Memory and the Aftermath of Las Navas de Tolosa

In the year between the loss of Salvatierra, and the battle of las Navas de Tolosa, the Order of Calatrava/Salvatierra hardly existed except in the memories and imaginations of a handful of former members. It is impossible to know how many of the knights survived at the end of Las Navas de Tolosa, yet it is fair to estimate that the bulk of them were in Aragon, living in and around the surviving capital of Alcañiz. In Castile, the order retained some possessions surrounding Toledo, but with the exception of Salvatierra, Calatrava had no presence in the area between the Sierra Morena and the Guadiana River. This region – which has often been referred to in this dissertation as the *Campo de Calatrava* – was the entire reason for the Order's existence, and its loss after Alarcos forced the order to reinvent itself; drawing its identity and name from the meager fortress of Salvatierra (Fig. 3.9). For fourteen years, the monastic knights of Salvatierra remained holed up in their keep, looking out over the valley in which most of their knights had been killed by the Almohads. In 1211, the loss of Salvatierra must have seemed like an execution after a long prison sentence. The order had lost its second headquarters in sixteen years and while the small garrison was allowed to leave with their lives after the siege, many of their members had already been killed in the field in a disturbing parallel to their disastrous reconnaissance attempt at Alarcos.

One can imagine however, that once the surviving knights of Salvatierra arrived in Toledo in 1211, they were greeted as heroes. Their determined defense of the wellsupplied, yet insufficient fortress of Salvatierra prevented Miramamolin from completing his attack on Castile in 1211. Alfonso VIII, whose support of the order had never wavered, clearly wished to reward the order for its defense of the road leading to Toledo. Consequently, the Christian force methodically re-took each of the castles lost by the order after Alarcos, and by demanding their preservation, Alfonso risked his alliance with the French troops. In the course of a year, the order transformed from a memory into a material reality again. Still, what historians have failed to explain is how this new skeleton crew of remaining knights of Calatrava managed to repopulate their suddenly returned fortresses. The order was given a "blank-check" by Alfonso VII, although they would have to address a lot of questions before they could move forward. Did the Order of Calatrava believe that their fortunes had been "reset," or did they wish to alter their order to better suit their future as well as their past? Which point in the history of the Order of Calatrava did they wish to recall? Did they still hold as much reverence for their initial headquarters, Calatrava la Vieja as they did for Salvatierra? After all, Salvatierra had sustained them for fourteen years, (1197-1211) and engineered their "comeback" via its proximity to the Muslim enemy. Most importantly, did the builders of Calatrava la Nueva construct their new headquarters as a triumphant monument to their sudden return to prominence, or is it anachronistic to assume that they somehow knew that their victory at Las Navas de Tolosa marked the end of Muslim advancement in Iberia?

After Las Navas de Tolosa, the first mention of the Knights of Calatrava at Dueñas castle came from Archbishop Rodrigo de Rada, who claimed to have spent Christmas there in 1214.<sup>39</sup> The castle of Dueñas was captured and restored to the order in 1213 by Alfonso's forces, but at that time it bore no resemblance to the huge complex that stands there today. It is likely however that Dueñas became an construction site very quickly, given that Pope Honorius III granted the archbishop of Toledo jurisdiction over the new church at Dueñas in 1217.<sup>40</sup> According to 16<sup>th</sup> century historian Rades y Andrada, 1217 also marked the official move of the headquarters from Calatrava la Vieja to the new castle-monastery at Dueñas.<sup>41</sup> O'Callaghan claims that no such document indicating the transfer of 1217 has been located, and that he is suspicious of the date because the castle is still referred to as Dueñas in the beginning of 1217.<sup>42</sup> The first surviving reference to the name *Calatrava la Nueva* occurred in 1221, when the Masters of Calatrava and Santiago met there to complete a "mutual aid agreement.<sup>43</sup>

Despite some of the confusion over dates, it can still be concluded that the castle was built quite rapidly, and that it was conceived as a full castle-monastery from the moment it was recaptured by the Order. It is also apparent that the castle became the headquarters of the order between 1217 and 1221, and that it could have been occupied as the new headquarters long before the entire complex was finished. In short, the construction of Calatrava la Nueva over the site of Dueñas was on the Order's agenda very shortly after the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa. Still, this sense of urgency to build the new headquarters seems incongruous with the most common narrative of the Reconquest – which claims that Las Navas de Tolosa marked the end of anxiety for Christian Iberia, and the beginning of the confident, inevitable advance toward Granada and 1492.

More realistically, Calatrava la Nueva reflected an effort to learn from the mistakes of the past by building a much larger, more defensible castle on the frontier in order to disrupt the ease with which the Almohads marched into La Mancha in the previous decades. In this scenario, the Order of Calatrava did not benefit from a historian's hindsight, and therefore they continued to be driven by the following list of negative events in their recent history: their loss at Alarcos in 1195, the Christians' loss of Jerusalem in 1187, their seventeen years of exile from their true headquarters, their valiant but unsuccessful defense of Salvatierra in 1211, and the destruction of their reconnaissance forces in 1195 and 1211. By contrast, the short term euphoria of Castile's

success at las Navas de Tolosa would not wipe clean the effects of the Order's years of "crisis and survival."

# **3.3** The Effects of Geography, Topography and Memory on the Choice of Site for the New Headquarters

Upon Alfonso's return from the sack of Ubeda in 1212, the Order of Calatrava received five of its former possessions south of Toledo, the full financial support and gratitude of the King of Castile, and tens of thousands of Muslim prisoners from Ubeda to rebuild what they had lost since Alarcos. If the order had wanted to turn back the clock to 1194, before their devastating loss at Alarcos, they could have done so. Calatrava la Vieja, with all of its preserved stores of food and supplies – thanks to Alfonso VIII – would have been an understandable choice for the Order's post-1212 headquarters. Indeed, while Calatrava la Nueva was being built, the order did reoccupy Calatrava la Vieja, making it their temporary capital. Regardless of the drawing power of the Order's namesake fortress, the Calatravan knights were not governed by nostalgia for a castle which they had never successfully defended, and which they themselves had not built. In addition, the territorial center of the Order's identity had shifted south to the plain of Salvatierra even though in 1213, the order did not hold a castle which could serve as a headquarters in the area. From this perspective, using their newfound wealth and resources to build a new military-monastic complex on top of one of their most advanced possessions in the frontier (Dueñas) seems an obvious choice.

In terms of owned fortresses, 1213 differed very little from 1194 for the Order of Calatrava. Salvatierra remained in Muslim hands until the end of Castile's truce with the Almohads in 1226. The only "new" Castilian fortress that the friars of Calatrava possessed in 1213 that they did not already have before Alarcos, was the seldom mentioned fortress of Dueñas. Judging by what is known of Salvatierra, it is unlikely that Dueñas was anything more than a watchtower on the hill opposite Salvatierra. If Salvatierra was regarded as compact, yet defendable, Dueñas must have been even smaller. The Muslim foundations of Dueñas are still unknown, yet it is doubtful that the keep that stands on the site today occupies a larger footprint than the original small castle (Fig. 3.12). Regardless, the site was not "ready-made" for a huge complex of military and monastic buildings. In the end, the Order's choice of the hill opposite Salvatierra as the location for their new headquarters was inspired by the new political geography of the frontier, the topography of the hill, the view from the summit, and the site's proximity to Salvatierra.

# • The New Geography of the Frontier

At the start of the 12<sup>th</sup> century, the key geographical boundaries between Muslim and Christian Iberia were the Tajo River and the Montes de Toledo that sheltered that city to the south. The Almoravid power vacuum of the first years of the 12<sup>th</sup> century allowed Alfonso VII and his grandson Alfonso VIII to push that frontier to a different geographical boundary: the Sierra Morena. Before Alarcos in 1195, the broad, open area of the Tajo and Guadiana River valleys became known as the Campo de Calatrava, due to the Order's many fortresses and the towns under their jurisdiction. After Alarcos, the frontier had been reset to a much narrower cushion of territory near the Tajo. For seventeen years, Alfonso VIII's capital at Toledo was regularly attacked from the south. When the Campo de Calatrava was recovered after Las Navas de Tolosa, the frontier did not merely move south to the Sierra Morena again; it widened to encompass all of this space in a permeable, sparsely populated, and war-torn landscape (Fig. 3.11). The area was highly militarized in that the local militias of frontier settlements, the church and the military orders acted as the dominant governing forces of a tumultuous society.<sup>44</sup>

The military orders were originally placed in this area by Alfonso to combat the permeability of this border, and in essence, to stabilize it until the Castilians were strong enough to push it farther south. The Almohads, and the Almoravids before them represented an increase in Muslim fundamentalism in the South. In the North, the religious-military ideals of the Crusades charged the frontier with equally aggressive force. Had Alfonso VIII populated this area with Castilian nobles, he would have placed power over an unconsolidated area in the hands of potential rivals. Secular rulers would also have continued the long Iberian tradition of making independent deals with Muslims, further "softening" the frontier. By contrast, the military Orders represented the pinnacle of Crusader ideology. The Orders of Calatrava and Santiago were forbidden to attack fellow Christians, or make independent deals with Muslims. By 1213, the military orders had proven to be the logical choice for frontier vigilance, yet they had also proven unsuccessful against full-scale Almohad armies. The nature of the open territory they were trying to defend was not conducive to sharp borders, yet Alfonso and the Order of Calatrava were still determined to create an immovable Christian presence – a wall of the faithful – as far south as possible. It was with this concern in mind that the order chose the site of Dueñas castle for their new headquarters. The new generation of Calatravan

monastic knights wanted the central administration of the order to be as close to the Sierra Morena as possible. Considering Calatrava la Nueva's unprecedented scale, this new headquarters projected permanence on the landscape more than any previous architectural possession. (Fig. 3.13).

Calatrava la Vieja was a critical castle for Alfonso VII in the mid twelfth-century primarily because of its location. In the early years of the Order, Calatrava la Vieja was sited next to one of only three bridges or ferries across the Tajo River. In addition, in 1158, when the monks of Fitero and their laymen took over the castle, it was the most exposed and advanced Christian fortress in Castile. It also guarded the principal road between Cordoba and Toledo.<sup>45</sup> In this sense, the location for Calatrava la Nueva followed a very similar model. The fortresses of Salvatierra and Dueñas sat on hills flanking this same road to Toledo, 30 miles south of Calatrava la Vieja. (Fig. 3.14) It is likely the Order of Calatrava was aware of the similarities between the two sites on a strategic level, but it is impossible to say that this similarity helped to create a symbolic connection between the old and new headquarters. Still, the similarity of purpose for both fortresses, and the way each site relates to its geographic location cannot be overlooked as a source of common identity between the founders of the Order of Calatrava and their early thirteenth-century counterparts.

# • Topography

Historical geographer Enrique Rodriguez-Picavea Matilla described the region of La Mancha in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries as:

A large area organized around fortresses and repopulated towns, joined via communication links that clearly represent the political space... From a

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historical and geographical viewpoint, at its widest, the Castilian frontier zone would appear to be a more or less homogeneous unit.<sup>46</sup>

This topographical "homogeneity" likely presented the biggest challenge to the military Orders who were charged with its defense. The Guadiana River is the only physical barrier between the Montesa de Toledo and the Sierra Morena. Driving through the area today, it appears that nearly every rocky outcropping emerging from the floor of the mesa has a ruined, stone fortress on it. The simple fact that nearly all of the Order of Calatrava's castles either rested on Muslim foundations or were outright occupations of earlier Muslim fortresses leads to the conclusion that there had always been a premium on suitable castle sites in this region.

Calatrava la Nueva is in some ways very typical of the rest of the fortresses in the area. Alarcos, Caracuel, Salvatierra, and Miraflores/Piedrabuena, were all possessions of the Order of Calatrava la Nueva at one time, and each of them stood on a rocky outcropping with views of the broad plain (Fig. 3.15, 3.9, 3.16). In his book *Archaeology of the Military Orders*, Adrian Boas attempted to categorize the type of castles occupied by military orders in the Latin East according to either their plan, or the topography of their site. Two of his categories, "spur castles" and "hilltop castles," could be used to describe Calatrava la Nueva.<sup>47</sup> Boas' definition of a spur castle is fairly self-explanatory: "… a castle constructed on the end of a mountain spur… protected by steep cliffs on two of its three sides."<sup>48</sup> Calatrava's site was not nearly high enough to be described as a "mountain" since it was only (roughly) 220m higher in altitude from the valley "floor" that ran between it and Salvatierra. (Fig. 3.8) Still, the castle-monastery caps the east end of a line of rocky hills that extend for five miles to the south-west. (Fig. 3.17) The spur

dips before rising to the castle-site, making the West the most likely approach by an attacker. Even so, the terrain still provides a strong deterrent from a western approach to the castle. The remaining circumference of the hilltop/spur at Calatrava la Nueva was often cut down in places to increase the slope, and guide the approach along a specific corkscrew path. (Fig. 3.18)

Calatrava la Nueva also resembles Boas' category of a "hilltop castle." Boas describes the value of hilltop castles in the following quotation:

The steep slope (of the hilltop castle) on all sides provided the castle with natural defenses which, if steep enough, could effectively prevent the approach of siege machines and even make approach on foot difficult and sometimes impossible... A well-positioned hilltop castle constructed on an isolated hill with particularly steep slopes could be even more easily defended than a spur castle.<sup>49</sup>

Calatrava la Nueva resembles both a spur, and a hilltop castle, but it does not display an ideal example of either category. The neighboring hill to the north, and the spur to the west make the site slightly more vulnerable than it would have been had the site been a truly isolated hilltop. Still, the site possesses some of the best qualities of hilltop castles. The castle follows the contours of the hilltop very closely, with its walls jutting out of natural rock formations along the way. The irregularity of the castle plan exposes the influence the natural topography had on the design. The hill is a conical shape with a rough diameter of 1000m at its base. It is also large enough that the curtain walls only encompass the final quarter of its height. The site therefore provided much more space than was available at Salvatierra, whose rocky outcropping severely limited the castle's footprint.

By 1213, the castle of Dueñas had changed hands at least three times, and twice in the final two years. Within sight of Dueñas, Salvatierra had been stormed and taken by the Order of Calatrava in the chaos after Alarcos in 1195-6, then was retaken following a 51 day siege by Miramamolin and his Almohad army. The area within sight of these two castles had been a nearly constant battleground. As a result, it is very unlikely that this area was thought to be fertile ground for agriculture. Even if the land had not been scorched, the nearly constant threat of attack would have made growing crops extremely risky. Consequently, the frontier population which included the Order of Calatrava, would have been almost an entirely pastoral culture. Sheep and cattle could be moved into fortresses or behind town walls when enemies were spotted, but there had to be space to keep them. The top of the hill-site at Calatrava la Nueva was far from flat, yet it was broad enough to allow for a large open space for training on horseback, or protection of animals. (Fig. 3.19)

#### • Intervisibility

The viewshed analyses discussed in Chapter 2 demonstrate that landscape visibility was one of the four guiding principles for the wall of the faithful. As a critical node within the frontier network, Calatrava la Nueva displayed one of the most directional viewsheds of any site in the ADIMO database. The view from the top of the keep at Calatrava la Nueva to the north was somewhat blocked by a slightly higher hilltop (Fig. 3.20).<sup>50</sup> When photographic evidence is combined with a viewshed from the same standing position at Calatrava la Nueva, the hill to the north of Calatrava la Nueva seems to be placed in a particularly unfortunate location. While the view to the north was not nearly as important as the view to the south for the Order of Calatrava in 1213-17. It seems likely that the

order altered the hill to the north to provide a more panoramic view. The quarry for Calatrava la Nueva, like most hilltop fortresses, was the site itself – as evidenced by the sharp cuts in the rocky outcropping with walls placed at the edges. (Fig. 3.21) Given the northern blind-spot, and the unnaturally flattened shape of the hilltop to the north, I hypothesize that this hilltop was cut down to increase the viewshed from the keep at Calatrava la Nueva, and that an excavation on this site could reveal evidence of a small watchtower.

Toward the south the plain opens up in front of the site and ends abruptly at the Sierra Morena. The "Calatravan Pass" that offered an alternative to the Puerto Muradal for armies trying to pass through the Sierra Morena is due south of Calatrava la Nueva. (Fig. 3.22A) The viewshed from Calatrava la Nueva, (Fig. 3.22B) when combined with photographic evidence (Fig. 3.21, 3.22A, 3.24) reveals that the order's new headquarters had a particularly clear view into the Calatravan pass, and fanned out to the south, but the view to the north was blocked by the very close hilltop. The clear cleft that formed the entry to the Calatravan pass was cut by the Ojailen River – which offered lower terrain and much needed water for a marching army<sup>51</sup> (Fig. 3.23). While Calatrava la Nueva does not appear to be dominated by a single, directional orientation, this pass must have been a primary focal point. A likely second point of focus was to the southeast, around the back side of the hill formation which supports Salvatierra (Fig. 3.24). This was the direction of the pass known as the Puerto Muradal that led to the battlefield of Las Navas de Tolosa in Andalusia.<sup>52</sup>

As important as it was for the order to be able to scrutinize the valley of Salvatierra below them, the order was equally concerned with being seen. At 900 meters

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of elevation, Calatrava la Nueva stands roughly 100 meters higher than Salvatierra. Even without the fortress that caps it, Calatrava's hill stands out from its surroundings. From the village of Calzada de Calatrava to the north, the hill silhouettes the castle dramatically against the sky. From this direction, Salvatierra is the more prominent of the two castles, despite its ruined state. On the other hand, from the South, Salvatierra is nearly invisible, and Calatrava strikes a much more imposing profile (Fig. 3.25). The southern façade of Calatrava dramatically displays sheer cliffs along the inside of the spiraling approach to the castle above. Set against the green shrubs that are there today, this road accentuates the height of the hill, and reminds the viewer that a direct approach is nearly impossible.

#### • Salvatierra: Land of Salvation

On a more symbolic level, Calatrava la Nueva was in the perfect position to survey the anvil on which the order had been shaped since the battle of Alarcos. There was no land in Iberia that was more integrally tied to the Order of Calatrava than the valley of Salvatierra at the time Calatrava la Nueva was built. Throughout the construction of Calatrava la Nueva, the order was forced to stare across the road at their old headquarters and recall their past. Salvatierra remained in Muslim hands until 1226, more than nine years after the order had officially moved their headquarters to Calatrava la Nueva.<sup>53</sup> In an ironic reversal of fortune, after 1212, Salvatierra became the northernmost Muslim fortress in Castile, just 2km from Calatrava's new headquarters. This must have grated on the order, given their role as the "spearhead" of the Christian frontier, yet they were bound by a treaty between Alfonso VIII and the infant son of Miramamolin not to attack Almohad fortresses in 1213. This same treaty was critical to the construction of Calatrava la Nueva, as it allowed for large-scale construction with relative security against Muslim

attack. For their part, the garrison of Salvatierra was forced to become eyewitnesses to the construction of an imposing Christian fortress. When it was completed, Calatrava la Nueva literally cast its shadow over the fortress of Salvatierra (Fig. 3.26).

In the trying years between Alarcos (1195) and Las Navas de Tolosa (1212) the Order of Calatrava was in possession of Salvatierra, and the neighboring Dueñas castle. Given the superior site of Dueñas' site, one might wonder why the order did not begin construction on the site earlier than 1213, when a larger fortress on the scale of Calatrava la Nueva might have better withstood an Almohad siege. The simple answer is that the military and territorial context during this time made construction of a new castle deep in Muslim territory impossible. Still, one can imagine that the years of Calatravan occupation of Dueñas between 1195 and 1211 allowed the order to fully assess the strategic value of this site. When the Order's means, including 60,000 Muslim prisoners, caught up to their aspirations, they wasted very little time in choosing the site for their new headquarters.

It is important at this juncture to note the change in the name of the order from the Order of Salvatierra, back to the Order of Calatrava. When Alfonso VIII recaptured Calatrava la Vieja in 1212, he referred to its previous owners – for whom he was attempting to preserve the castle – as "the (brothers) of Salvatierra."<sup>54</sup> It is difficult to discern when the name was changed back to Calatrava, but it appears that at least initially, the order was still using the name of the castle that they had lost in 1211. In light of the Order's reoccupation of Calatrava la Vieja and the construction of their new headquarters, it is doubtful that the order kept the name "Salvatierra" after 1213. Still, the fortress of Salvatierra must have had a strong influence over the order's identity for them

to have kept the name during their year of exile. By contrast, the name Calatrava was quickly replaced following the loss of Calatrava la Vieja, and the capture of Salvatierra in 1195-6.

Very little can be deduced from the fortress of Salvatierra in its current, ruined state, yet it is clear that the Christian survivors of the siege of Salvatierra were proud of the 14 years they spent as an oasis of Christianity on the frontier, and they were reluctant to abandon the aspects of their identity that were firmly attached to this fortress. Despite the "blank check" offered by Alfonso VIII, the order was still too weak after Las Navas de Tolosa to retake Salvatierra themselves, even if the peace agreement hadn't prevented them from trying. In addition, considering the scale the order had in mind for their new headquarters, Salvaterra's rock outcropping would have been entirely insufficient. From this perspective, the decision to build the new headquarters around Dueñas castle may have been the closest feasible alternative to reoccupying Salvatierra. The new fortress of Calatrava la Nueva visually dominated most of the same landscape that the Order of Salvatierra had looked out upon with anxiety a few years before.<sup>55</sup>

# **3.4. Extant Architecture at Calatrava la Nueva as Evidence of a Reformation of the Order's Frontier Identity.**

The castle-monastery of Calatrava la Nueva is a material reflection of the Military Order of Calatrava itself. Just as the order was a composite community of knight-brothers, clerics (or "conventual brothers"), and lay brothers, their headquarters was a mixture of the architectural traditions associated with each group. The architectural plan strove to serve the needs of constituencies within the fortified monastery, as well as bind the entire community into a self-reliant, spiritually consistent whole. (Fig. 3.1A&B) As a result, many of its architectural spaces reveal the prototypical characteristics of a castle or monastery, yet in its entirety, the site reveals a series of concessions made by each of the Order's constituencies.

Other than the constraints of the site and the desire to build quickly, the construction of Calatrava la Nueva faced few obstacles. Alfonso VIII had been a very generous patron throughout the history of the order, and although there are no written accounts outlining his contribution, he is the most likely candidate. If he did not pay to construct the castle-monastery directly, he likely did so indirectly thorough his effort to "reset" the order back to its pre-Alarcos wealth and position following the victory at Las Navas de Tolosa. Moreover, Alfonso was likely the only person with the means to construct a fortress of Calatrava la Nueva's scale in the southern Castilian frontier. The order also had full use of the Muslim captives from Ubeda "...for the service of the Christians and the monasteries which needed to be repaired in the border regions."<sup>56</sup> Finally, while the entire complex bears some evidence of hurried construction, the order did have the benefit of relative security during construction. The peace treaty signed after Las Navas de Tolosa allowed work to continue without the risk of Muslim attack from Salvatierra, or from Muslim outposts further south. In summary, the Order of Calatrava not only had a need to redefine themselves architecturally, they also had the financial means, the labor, and the security to build a headquarters exactly as they pleased. Up until this point, the order had always had to occupy previously constructed castles and alter them to their needs. Just as its name suggests, Calatrava la Nueva was meant to

reflect the new, reborn version of the Order of Calatrava which had survived many trials since its foundation and was finally able to express itself under "ideal" conditions.

It is important to note that despite these ideal conditions, the architectural plan of Calatrava la Nueva displays a great deal of compromise and improvisation. Just as the order had to consider the inherent contradictions of a marriage between Monasticism and Frontier warfare in their *Forma Vivendi*, their architecture at Calatrava la Nueva had to strive to accommodate a composite community. The Church, which was integrated into the innermost ring of the concentric plan, was not a "perfect" example of Cistercian architecture, just as the spacing between the bastions on the innermost curtain wall was far from defensively ideal.<sup>57</sup> (Fig. 3.27 3.28) In its entirety however, the architectural compromises were intended to nurture better monks, and better knights. In the hope of illustrating this dynamic between the parts and the whole, the various buildings at Calatrava la Nueva will be discussed individually, then treated as a composite whole.

## • The Large Enclosure Castle

Calatrava la Nueva resembled two of Adrian Boas' castle types: the spur castle, and the hilltop castle. Still, the complex best fits into yet another type which was popular with military Orders of the Latin East: the "large enclosure castle."<sup>58</sup> According to Boas, this plan was the best suited to fulfill the three main functions of castles built for military orders:

(a) To serve as a military base where soldiers could be housed and their supplies stored;

(b) As a protected place for soldiers to train

(c) As a fortified convent (monastery) in which the brothers could carry out all the requirements of their communal conventual rule.<sup>59</sup>

In this context, the outer curtain wall of Calatrava la Nueva was defined by the need for a vast amount of "training space." Just like their secular counterparts, the power of the knight-brothers was intrinsically linked to their ability to fight on horseback. This form of fighting required a substantial financial commitment, time, and of course, space to train. Calatrava la Vieja also had a vast enclosed space for this purpose, and Calatrava la Nueva may have repeated this model. (Figs. 3.29, 3.3)

There are three surviving curtain-walls at the site. The first is located along the eastern side of the complex, and provides the main entrance to the site. The "Puerto de los Arcos" faces north, is the first gate into the complex and opens into a thin inner ward with access to the ruined latrine and "bath-house" foundations. This area contained the gate to the heart of the fortress and monastic complex called the "Puerto de Hierro" [Iron Door] (Fig. 3.21, 3.31) and a second door that allowed access to the broad, enclosed field where the monastic knights trained (Fig. 3.30). It is worth noting that both of these gates were large enough for a mounted knight to pass through.

The second curtain wall encloses a large triangle-shaped area with the third and final enclosure in the south-east corner. Like the first curtain wall, this wall is of similar thickness (3-4m) and is extremely irregular (Fig. 3.32). This is mostly due to the topography of the hill, which greatly influenced the location of the walls. By contrast, the innermost wall - which encloses all of the major military and monastic buildings on the site – has straight walls that follow the contours of the buildings within, and several round bastions protruding from the corners (Fig. 3.33). The open space enclosed by the second curtain wall is roughly twice as large as that of the innermost section. Considering the compact nature of the innermost portion of the castle, this outer enclosure is the chief

reason that the entire complex reveals such a large exterior profile. The outer curatin wall had the effect of providing an additional buffer between attacking siege engines and the complex's vital core. The final purpose of the large outer bailey was to collect water. The complex's largest cistern lies in the lowest point of the outer bailey, and would have proven very useful in a siege – such as the one experienced by the order at Salvatierra just a few years before. (Fig. 3.19)

#### • The Fortress/Keep of Dueñas Reconsidered

Continuing the discussion of the fortified elements of the castle-monastery complex, the only space that was exclusively occupied by the knights was the fortress. Judging by the curtain walls, the entire complex could be called a fortress, yet the structure which most accurately deserves this title is a much smaller entity. The keep is also unique because its footprint was built before the order came to occupy it. In a basic sense, the keep that stands on the highest rock outcropping on the site was the entire castle of Dueñas, but after the construction of the structures and walls that surrounded it, this castle became a keep. This keep was the innermost and most impenetrable defense against attackers. It is hard to imagine the garrison surviving long in the keep if the walls of the innermost curtain-wall were breached, yet it had had other uses than defense.

The fortress was greatly damaged by the earthquake that struck Lisbon in 1755, and according to signs posted on the site today, the damage to the top floors initiated the slow abandonment of the entire complex a century later. The surviving keep is composed of a ring of towers enclosing a courtyard, (Fig. 3.34) that join to form a shared space on the top two levels (Fig 3.35, 3.36). There is also evidence of a ruined stair at the top of the highest platform that would have led to the roof and battlements of the keep. The

verticality of the entire structure can be attributed to the lack of space on the rocky summit, but it also had the effect of further increasing the degree of vision from the top of the structure. Dueñas had been no different from other small hilltop fortresses in that its primary function was to serve as a watchtower. Once the Order of Calatrava took over, they may have increased the height of the keep to see over the hills described on pages 138-39, or they may have been satisfied with the fortress they inherited. Unfortunately, the identical construction techniques and materials used by the order and their Muslim predecessors make it very difficult to separate the different phases of construction.

Below the combined spaces, the towers contain the quarters for the Grand Master, long store-rooms, and spiral stairs. These rooms are invariably barrel-vaulted, with low ceilings and single arrow loops (Fig. 3.37). The courtyard contains a large stair that rises five feet to a platform leading to two of the single rooms and a second flight of stairs that leads to the 3<sup>rd</sup> story platform of the keep (Fig. 3.34). Like nearly every other element of the fortress, this stair was constructed from flattened rubble stone and mortar quarried directly from the site.

In general, there are very few surviving battlements at the keep. This is most likely due to the destruction of the top level, which might have had a crenellated wallwalk, and arrow loops below. On the curtain walls, and on the roof of the church, the crenellations seem to be entirely fabricated by a modern reconstruction. In the case of the curtain walls, the reconstructed crenellations were built at the highest extant point, regardless of the true height of the walls, which may have been much higher (Fig. 3.38). The crenellations on the church repeat the split, cube-like forms on the curtain walls (Fig. 3.39). The height of the fortress is also difficult to discern, yet it is clear that the extant

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walls are significantly lower than they had been originally. The ruined bases of the windows in the fortress confirm this. (Fig. 3.40) The ruined state of the fortress walls, and the observer's ability to view them from a close distance may have prevented the modern reconstructors from adding the false crenellations to this structure.

The main entrance to the fortress contains the highest concentration of surviving defensive details. The gatehouse consists of a double thick block of walls supporting a large, round-arched doorway which was carefully built of large, red-orange, basalt blocks. (Fig. 3.41) This stone, which is used in doorways and windows throughout the complex, contrasts sharply with the lighter, irregular, multi-colored volcanic stone that was used for the massing of the walls. Passing through the first arched doorway, an attacker would have been met by a second, brick doorway at the bottom of a wide flight of stairs, with [currently filled in] murder-holes above. To the right of the stairs, the natural rock formation provides a sheer support for the fortress that seamlessly rises above it. At the crest of the stairs, an immense masonry block measuring four cubic meters juts out from the right, forcing the attacker to pass single file around it to get to yet another large doorway in the keep. (Fig. 3.42, 3.43) This masonry block also makes it impossible for an attacker to get a battering ram in front of the door. In addition, there are also two arrow loops above and to the left of this door.

Passing through this archway of pink basalt stone, one enters a very rough, cavelike vaulted space with extremely thick rubble and mortar walls and yet another ashlar doorway. This doorway leads to another barrel-vaulted, grotto-like space with wide arches that meet the ground on the right, and arrow slits to the left. Six feet above the floor, there are square holes which provide evidence of a wooden platform from which the garrison could reach the arrow slits, or attack invaders from above. This space also acts as a covered extension of the courtyard to the right, and may have been the inspiration for the grotto-like entry to the castle-monastery complex which was constructed later (Fig. 3.44, 3.45).

It is difficult to know how this fortress was adapted for the monastic knights' use; either when they first occupied it in 1195-6, or when they reoccupied it in 1213 with the intention of integrating it into a much larger complex of buildings. There is very little about the design of this fortress that is particularly noteworthy, other than its ability to use the natural topography of the rocky outcropping to its advantage. The site's irregular footprint was likely the primary influence on the fortress' design, yet it was still a very functional plan. Having been originally built by the Muslims, this fortress bears little evidence of the Order's architectural identity, yet as the only pre-existing structure, the surrounding complex was forced to work around it. In general, the fortress appears as though it could have been built at the same moment as the rest of the complex, due to the identical materials and masonry techniques used to build the walls and archways throughout the castle-monastery complex. As such, there seems to have been no ideological conflict for the Christian builders to build in a style that was identical to their Muslim predecessors in the "secular" areas. However, as I will be demonstrate below, the church deviated from this functional construction technique in order to distinguish itself as a spiritual space.

#### Cistercian Austerity and Camouflage of the Church

The church at Calatrava la Nueva is by far the most carefully articulated building on the site (Fig. 3.27, 3.28, 3.46, 3.47). While it is difficult to extract a sense of the Order of

Calatrava's architectural identity from the individual secular buildings, the Church appears to assert itself distinctly. However, despite the clear effort to create a spiritual threshold when one enters the church, the exterior often blends in seamlessly with the surrounding fortifications (Fig. 3.48, 3.49). The combined result was a fortified church that had no delusions about its role within a complex devoted to the reality of frontier defense. Thus, the church served as an architectural manifestation of the needs and identity of the composite military-monastic community of Calatrava. The exterior of the church – like a knight of Calatrava – was clad plainly and defensively. On the interior, both the church and the knights of Calatrava attempted to embrace the Cistercian ideal as close as their circumstances would allow.

In her book *Fortress-Churches of Languedoc: Architecture, Religion and Conflict in the High Middle Ages*, Sheila Bonde defined the process of *ecclesiae incastellantae* in medieval Europe. Through her focus on the churches of Languedoc in southern France, Bonde explained that medieval audiences found the combination of church and fortress less paradoxical than modern audiences do.<sup>60</sup> The church at Calatrava la Nueva displays many unique differences from the urban, machicolated churches that Bonde explores, yet it shares a category of scholarship with these churches.<sup>61</sup> Like Languedoc, central Spain has failed to find a place in the narrative of regional schools of Church design. Both regions have been considered "backwaters" and frontiers where "hybrid" forms predominate at the expense of more "pure" examples of Gothic or Romanesque architecture. Calatrava la Nueva's church reflects the same adaptation and improvisation that characterized Bonde's fortress-churches. For all of its similarities however, the key difference between Calatrava la Nueva's church and other fortress-churches is that it was never intended to communicate as a singular entity. The church at Calatrava la Nueva placed integration with the surrounding curtain walls of the complex as one of its primary architectural considerations. (Fig. 3.48)

From inside the narrow strip of ground between the Puerto de los Arcos, and the Puerto de Hierro (Fig. 3.21) a viewer who was uninformed about the layout of the monastery would never know that the façade in front of him was the outer wall of a church (Fig. 3.49). The three arrow loops, high above the viewer's head were actually windows for the three semi-circular apses of the church. Above this wall, the castle defenders would have been poised on the roof of the church, ready to shoot arrows or hurl rocks at the invaders below before they could storm the Puerto de Hierro (Fig. 3.20).<sup>62</sup> Even on the inside of the complex, the exterior of the Church never revealed its contents until a viewer passed through or around the cloister and saw the Church's imposing west facade (Fig. 3.50). The enormous rose window on the west facade was paid for by Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain in the late-fifteenth century after they visited the monks of Calatrava and decided that the original rose window was not nearly grand enough for the Order's headquarters.<sup>63</sup> The rest of the façade remains the same as it was when it was first built in 1213-21. The new Rose window, which was perfectly suited for the monastery's role in the final days of the *Reconquista*, would have been tragically illsuited for a frontier fortress-monastery. The fact that the window is is off-center from the exterior, and thus cuts through the round strip-buttresses that support the structure of the church further illustrates that this feature was a late addition. (Fig. 3.50, 3.51) The buttresses further exaggerate the Church's military aesthetic because they so closely resemble the bastions on the nearby third curtain-wall (Fig. 3.28).

The church at Calatrava la Nueva was far from the first fortified frontier church associated with the Christian Reconquest of Iberia. Surprisingly however, Calatrava la Nueva's most similar precedent did not come from another priory or headquarters built by one of Iberia's military orders. Instead it came from a fortress-monastery that was built before the first Crusade or the advent of the military orders. Beginning n 1070, Sancho Ramirez, of Aragon (r. 1063-1094) built Loarre castle on top of a rocky promontory on the south side of the Pyrenees Mountains. Like Calatrava la Nueva, Loarre was a bold outpost on the southern border between Christianity and Islam. (Fig 3.52) It was also built with a full-scale church (as opposed to a chapel which was very common in medieval castles) inside it, which was intended to help serve the needs of a new community of Augustinian Canons who chose to live alongside and administer the sacraments to the soldiers who garrisoned the fortress. Just like Calatrava la Nueva, Loarre was within sight of another Muslim fortress called Bolea, sited far below in the wide open Ebro River valley. Finally, like Calatrava, the church at Loarre was placed very near the entrance to the castle, in a significant defensive location.

However, unlike Calatrava la Nueva's church, the church at Loarre is immediately readable as a church from the exterior. (Fig. 3.53) The clearly readable, Romanesque façade was connected to the fortress walls, yet its design was intended to stand out from these walls, and boldly state the Christian faith of its inhabitants to the Muslim-controlled plain below.<sup>64</sup> By contrast, Calatrava la Nueva did not assert its Christian identity on its exterior walls. Calatrava's knights may have hung banners from its walls, or flown flags with the crest of the Order of Calatrava, (Fig. 3.54) but the recognizable vocabulary of Church facades was not used to proclaim the Christianity of Calatrava la Nueva's inhabitants to the valley below. At Calatrava la Nueva, the architects decided to cloak the location of the church, revealing the paramount concern for integration of religious and defensive structures. This decision would not have been perceived as an acknowledgement of weakness or fear on the part of the knights of Calatrava, yet it was clearly motivated by caution and prudence. At the time of Calatrava la Nueva's construction, the order's losses and struggles were not distant memories, nor was the order sufficiently clairvoyant to know that their new headquarters would never be attacked, and that the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa marked the end of Muslim advances in Spain. With the future possibility of invasion clear in their memory, the designers of Calatrava la Nueva could not afford to make extroverted architectural statements that might jeopardize the defense of the castle-monastery complex.

In order to reconstruct how the west façade looked before the intervention of Ferdinand and Isabella, one only needs to look at the church attached to the monastery of Fitero in Navarre. (Fig. 3.55) Nearly sixty years had passed since the Order of Calatrava was founded by the Navarrese monks who left this monastery, and since then, Fitero had built a new monastery church that was roughly contemporary with the construction of Calatrava la Nueva – Fitero was built between 1187 and 1247.<sup>65</sup> While the materials used for the two monasteries were vastly different, the massing and proportion of the two façades was quite similar. Fitero's simple, small rose window was very typical of Cistercian architecture, and came to be one of the only unifying features of Cistercian architecture throughout Europe.<sup>66</sup> In plan, Fitero revealed little of the restraint required of the frontier monastery at Calatrava la Nueva (Fig. 3.56). The radiating chapels, large cloister and prototypical location of the monastic buildings at Fitero are evidence of a monastery that was not forced to make any concessions due to topography or defense. However, the interior of the nave and aisles at Fitero expressed a similar sense of austerity found at Calatrava la Nueva (Fig. 3.57, 3.58, 3.59). Of particular note is the use of rectilinear ribs in the vaulting of the nave and aisles at Fitero, and its compliment in red, volcanic stone at Calatrava la Nueva. The lack of elaborate sculptural details that is often recognized as typical of Cistercian churches is found in both of these churches.

The western portal into the church at Calatrava la Nueva was known as the *Door* of Stars, after the poly-lobed pattern across outermost arch of the entrance. (Fig. 3.60) Once inside the church, it is immediately apparent that a great deal more effort went into its construction than any other building in the complex. The quickly – and sometimes sloppily – made walls of the exterior of the church give way to increased use of ashlar masonry, high composite piers with simple colonets, and simple stone cross vaults with intricate brick fills. (Fig 3.61) The piers, arches and ribs were all cut from the red volcanic stone found on windows and doorways in the complex and attached with thin strips of mortar. (Fig. 3.62, 3.63)

For all of the unique considerations and obstacles at Calatrava la Nueva, the Church is not entirely resistant to art-historical categorization. If a single style were to be attributed to the Church, the closest option would be "Cistercian." Even this category is problematic, since according to Terryl Kinder, Cistercian architecture was open to many different influences and did not promote a definitive model or style that was repeated in the hundreds of houses affiliated with the Order.<sup>67</sup> Nonetheless, Kinder and others have managed to extract the defining principles of simplicity and austerity in the Cistercian rule that helps to explain the forms chosen in many of the Order's monasteries. In Bernard of Clairvaux's *Apologia*, he discussed art in a way that historians and art historians of the middle ages have found greatly influential to their study of medieval perceptions of the function of art.<sup>68</sup> The most influential aspect of the treatise was St. Bernard's view that excessive ornament and color were antithetical to a contemplative life. While the treatise was certainly more complicated than this simple statement, in essence, the supreme emphasis on contemplation was critical to the creation of an aesthetic which has been characterized by "…simplicity, harmonious proportions, and meticulous craftsmanship."<sup>69</sup> Calatrava la Nueva's church interior displayed these characteristics through its overall lack of elaboration on the ribs, its characteristically plain capitals, (Fig. 3.64) the simple geometric form of the three apse plan, and the repeated rosettes on the window sills (Fig. 3.65).

The Church's architectural plan divides the Church into four bays, with a wide central nave, and two side aisles which are half the width of the center (Fig. 3.1). The hexagonal central apse is flanked by two more semi-circular apses with three windows each (Fig. 3.66, 3.67) The Church is oriented along the east-west axis, with the apse in the east, yet there is very little attempt to capture particular qualities of light. The majority of the light is now supplied by the large, later rose window, and the clerestory windows at the highest point of the central nave on the north and south sides. It is easy to imagine that the church was much darker before the expansion of the rose window by the Catholic monarchs in the 15<sup>th</sup> century. The two exterior windows in the central apse, and the corresponding windows in the north and south apses appear to be arrow-slits from the exterior of the church, and while they are generously articulated on the interior, they still provide no more light than any other arrow-loop. The contrast between the interior and

exterior of the windows on the east end of the church further reveal a desire to camouflage the location of the church. Had the exterior windows been the same size on the exterior as the interior, an attacker may have been able to distinguish this area as a weak point in the castle's exterior defenses. More than any other feature in the complex, these features reveal the overall defensive, insular posture at Calatrava la Nueva.

Around the same time that the rose window was enlarged in the late 15<sup>th</sup> Century, two interior windows connecting the three apses were added to help light the central apse. (Fig. 3.68, 3.69) It is also likely that the remaining windows of the two appears were rebuilt to correspond with the new interior windows. (Fig. 3.70) What is most striking about all of these new windows is the highly decorative geometric tile work that is normally associated with Nasrid architecture from the kingdom of Granada. These forms seem particularly out of place in the otherwise austere church interior.<sup>70</sup> It is important to note however, that the design of Calatrava la Nueva was never immune to Islamic influence. The concentric brick vaulting technique is patently *Mudéjar* in its style, and while it is certainly unique in its juxtaposition with the plain ashlar stonework that supports it, the vaulting style still seems appropriate for a Cistercian church. (Fig. 3.63) The repetition of the concentric brickwork may have been seen as beneficial to the Cistercian ideals of contemplation and meditation. In short, elements which art historians have labeled 'Islamic' were not taboo – even for a community whose identity was as integrally tied to warfare against Muslims as the Order of Calatrava was.

The apparent dedication to the Cistercian style displayed in the church, and its overall scale in relation to the rest of the complex reveals that the Order of Calatrava wished to be taken seriously as a true monastic order. Chapels had been included within the walls of fortresses since the early Middle Ages, yet the church at Calatrava, for all of its concessions to defense and austerity, is expressive of a much more intimate relationship between religion and militancy than that found in the simple chapels of earlier fortresses. While secular knights could fulfill the requirements of worship within a simple chapel designed to house a fraction of the garrison at a time, Calatrava's community required full communal participation by all members in the Christian ceremony. The church was more than a location for prayer, it was the space in which the knights and monks engaged in "spiritual warfare." As Kinder pointed out, cathedrals were intended to express "the stability and longevity of the church."<sup>71</sup> By contrast, the message of an abbey church was much more private; valuing prayer, contemplation and liturgy. Moreover, the universal and easily recognizable form of the basilica served as a reminder of the greater Christian world beyond the frontier, and its support of the Order's efforts against the "infidels." All of the other monastic buildings which surrounded the complex, including the cloister, the refectory, and the chapter house were meaningfully placed in relation to their association with the church. Without it, these buildings would have been as hollow as a curtain-wall without a keep.

Beyond its mere inclusion in the overall plan of the complex, the interior aesthetic of the church, [which has thus far been described as "Cistercian"] reveals a very particular posture for the order in 1213-1221. The austere, meager sculpture, thick masonry, and cave like qualities of the interior help to express an overall sense of permanence and insularity that fits the defensive posture of the order at the time the structure was built. Even the masonry walls, which match most walls of the fortress, would have acted as a constant reminder of the church's location on the frontier, where seriousness of purpose eclipsed desire for material comfort. The church occupied the symbolic role of the keep for the Cistercian monks at Calatrava la Nueva – it would protect them from the very real threat of Muslim attack, and it was the battleground for their monastic occupation. The knights would have viewed the church similarly: as the spiritual equivalent of the adjacent fortress where instead of directing their view out toward the *Puerto Muradal* or the Calatravan pass, the monastic knight's thoughts were directed inward to the spiritual fight against his own temptation and sin, and Christianity's greater battle against Islam.

# • The cloister as the key partition at Calatrava la Nueva

The scant remains of the brick cloister at Calatrava la Nueva date from the 15<sup>th</sup> century, and thus reveal little about the order's formal tastes when the castle resided on the frontier with Islam. (Fig. 3.71) However, much can be deduced from the fact that this ruined cloister was built over top of another 13<sup>th</sup> century cloister.<sup>72</sup> Its mere inclusion in the original plan supports the idea that the complex was conceived as a "full" monastery from the beginning. In general, the military Orders rarely included cloisters in even their largest castle-monasteries. It was relatively common for Military Orders to choose a plan with a central courtyard, such as the Hospitaller headquarters of Krak de Chevaliers in Syria, (Fig. 3.72) yet this space was at best a symbolic representative of the monastic cloister.<sup>73</sup> With the inclusion of a cloister at Calatrava la Nueva, the order further asserted that it was not willing to rely on a symbolic nod to the monastic side of its identity. Instead, the order asserted that in all possible ways, Calatrava la Nueva would be as much a monastery as it was a fortress.

If the church was the centerpiece of a monastery, the cloister was its heart.<sup>74</sup> On a purely practical level, the cloister served as the connecting space between the church and the other monastic buildings – including the chapter house, the refectory, and the dormitory. The cloister had ancient origins, and it is impossible to pinpoint the exact moment that it became irrevocably associated with monastic architecture, yet by the twelfth century, monastic theologians began to impress very specific allegorical meanings on the cloister space.<sup>75</sup> The most important of these theologians to a discussion of Calatrava la Nueva's cloister was Bernard of Clairvaux. St. Bernard believed that the cloister prefigured the Holy Jerusalem.<sup>76</sup> From within the square garth or open green space of the cloister, or in the covered walks, a monk was capable of spiritual pilgrimage to the Holy Jerusalem. The fact that the cloister was completely surrounded by the buildings of the monastery provided more than security; it deprived the senses and insulated against thoughts of the sinful, material outside world. Given his strong emphasis on contemplation, it not surprising that Bernard of Clairvaux promoted the cloister as an appropriate space for meditative study.

The cloister at Calatrava la Nueva did have one divergent quality from the norm which may have provided a visual reminder of the slightly "skewed" comparison between military Orders and 'traditional' monastic orders: it was not square. It is difficult to know how this may have affected the order's perception of the space, but in the end, the slightly off-center quality of the cloister serves as a reminder that the remaining monastic buildings were lower in hierarchical scale than the church. Because the church was built on a perfect east-west axis on the site, all of the other buildings, and in particular the cloister, had to improvise in order to abut the church properly and still fit in with the uneven topography of the site. Judging by scars on the exterior of the south wall of the church, the cloister was certainly covered, and fit snugly against the Church, but it had to angle itself on the south wall-walk in order to allow the refectory and the Kitchens to follow the contours of the hill. (Fig. 3.71, 3.73, 3.74)

The monastic knights may have been bound by the same vows of poverty, silence, chastity and obedience as the "traditional" Cistercian monks at Calatrava la Nueva, but the hours required for training and military activity likely left very little time for contemplative prayer in the cloister. Based on the overall plan of the monastery complex, it would have been impossible for the knights to enter essential buildings such as the refectory and the chapter house without entering the cloister, so it must have at least partially been their domain as well, but in other ways the plan of Calatrava la Nueva was designed to partition military and monastic spaces from each other. (Fig. 3.1) The plan also provided a separate door for the monks – and possibly knights who were in the chapter house when called to prayer – to enter the church directly into the south aisle, (Fig. 3.75) while making a clear path for the knights and soldiers to exit the fortress and enter through the west portal – the traditional entrance for laymen.<sup>77</sup> Inside the church, the choir screens section off the eastern-most bay – partitioning that space for those who entered via the 'monk's door.' Entering through the main west portal, the knights likely occupied the second and third bay, with the laymen entering last and therefore furthest from the altar.<sup>78</sup>

The 'conventual brothers' at Calatrava la Nueva likely perceived the cloister as a welcome haven from the bustle and distraction of the rest of the castle complex. By giving them their own entrance into the church, the architects of Calatrava la Nueva

completed a closed circuit of monastic buildings that very closely resembled that of other Cistercian monasteries. While inside the church, the conventual brothers would act as instructors in proper Cistercian observance. While in the cloister, they were provided with the means to practice it themselves.

#### • Surrounding the cloister

Of the remaining monastic buildings at Calatrava la Nueva, only the chapter house rises above its foundations today. The chapter house was the seat of government for the Order of Calatrava as a whole, and had very specific ceremonies attached to it, such as the swearing in of new members, to the administration of judgement in violations of their rule. Sometime after 2008, an excavation discovered the tombs of several Grand Masters under the floor of the Chapter house from the early modern period. These discoveries have prevented visitors from entering or photographing the Chapter House, and after a very brief view of the inside in 2013, the most I can say about the space is that it was likely vaulted at one time, and that it contained a monolithic, carved stone bench that wrapped around the rectangular room.

Like the cloister, the surviving walls of the refectory and the kitchens barely rise more than four feet above the ground. The dormitory was rebuilt in brick in the early eighteenth century, but the stone outer walls still frame the original location of the twostoried dormitory. This area may have served as the sleeping quarters for the conventual brothers, rather than the knights, and it is the only building which drastically differs from the "typical" Cistercian monastery plan. Ordinarily, the dormitory would open directly into the cloister in order to ease the movement of the monks into the church for daily prayer. Still, at Calatrava la Nueva, the dormitory entrance is down a short corridor from the cloister, and was likely placed where it was due to site concerns rather than any purposeful divergence from the traditional plan. (Fig. 3.1) By contrast, the refectory and kitchens were placed in their more traditional locations: perpendicular to the southern cloister walk. In general, the entire monastic complex of buildings likely operated very smoothly. It prevented laymen from entering the cloister, discouraged the knights from mingling too closely with the conventual brothers, and allowed for a way of life that offered more than a "simulation" of the Cistercian Rule. The plan was an imaginative adaptation of a Cistercian monastery that strove to make as few concessions as possible.

### • Historical memory and the field of martyrs

The cemetery at Calatrava la Nueva was located immediately south of the western entrance to the church. (Fig. 3.76) It was called the *Field of Martyrs*, since it contained the translated remains of the knights who had died at Calatrava la Vieja in the aftermath of the battle of Alarcos. It later became the location for the burial of several of the grand masters of the order including Martin Fernandez de Quintana (r. 1216-1218). Little remains of the arcade and gallery that once surrounded it, or the iron gate that once controlled access to it, but there is no doubt that the area was an integral part of the castle-monastery plan from the beginning. Its location and size were quite remarkable – roughly the same size as the cloister – considering the tight ordering of the rest of the buildings, and the rarity of flat ground on the rocky site.

The cemetery's location inside the innermost complex of buildings, rather than in the more spacious outer ward further reveals the importance the order placed on its past. On their way from the fortress into the western portal of the Church, the friars would have passed by the bodies of their fallen brothers every day, and been reminded of their sacrifice, and the hardship the order had faced for so many years before they were given the opportunity to build their new headquarters. In this sense, the *Field of Martyrs*, like the outer ward, and the Cistercian cloister, was a training ground for the new brothers – many of whom had not shared in the experiences of the survivors from Salvatierra, or the lean years after the battle of Alarcos. Where the outer ward was devoted to the teaching of the knight's militant occupation, and the church and cloister were devoted to the spiritual teachings of the Cistercian monks, the *Field of Martyrs* taught the new brothers about their historical identity, and the order's intimate connection to the land on which they stood.

#### • Lay buildings of the west range

The lower area to the west of the fortress was partitioned for the daily realities of life in the castle-monastery complex. This included the mills, ovens, foundry and cistern. The laymen who worked in these areas lived in the "old village" north of the church in the outer ward. They entered the castle through a gate which gave them easy access between their homes and their occupations, as well as kept them separate from the rest of the community.

On the south side, another archway was built abutting the 16<sup>th</sup> century library which was wide enough for a horse or other pack animal to get through with grain or fuel for the mills and ovens below. Among the remains of the mill area, an excavation dug up several mill stones. (Fig. 3.77) The ovens were one of the few areas that were built with thick enough walls and vaulting that the ceiling remains intact, as does the hollowed-out shape of the brick ovens themselves. With the outer ward as its only boundary, this area was also one of the most vulnerable to attack. Consequently, it appears that there was a

considerable effort to make use of the upper floors of these buildings to serve as battlements. (Fig. 3.78)

The lay buildings reveal that despite several clear attempts at partitioning the space, the three major spheres of influence - militant, spiritual and domestic - were thoroughly interconnected at Calatrava la Nueva. For all of the need to label buildings as being "solely" occupied by knights, conventual brothers, or laymen, the entire complex was never intended to support three separate communities. The true intention for the plan of Calatrava la Nueva was not necessarily to create an ideal model for use by future houses of the Order, but rather to create an efficient and symbolic training ground for future military-monastic soldiers. Just a year before Calatrava la Nueva was conceived, the order was nearly extinct. In order for the order to fill out their newly reacquired castles with garrisons who understood their composite identity, they would need a training ground that allowed the "recruits" to witness the perfect combination of knighthood and monasticism. The order had to invest architectural space for every aspect of their identity in their new headquarters, and prove that these elements did not contradict each other when put into practice. As Chapter 4 demonstrates, this model could be alluded to, or even 'copied' by another order – especially one that had similar needs to quickly train recruits into a new military-monastic community like the Order of Montesa did a century later. Nonetheless, Calatrava la Nueva was designed to alleviate a very specific set of needs that simply could not transfer into a new context with the same results. This unique fortress-monastery was as much a product of its specific time and place as the Castillo-Convento de Montesa was not.

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## **3.5 Conclusion**

Calatrava la Nueva represented more than the crowning architectural achievement of a military Order. Despite the attempt to integrate all definable groups within the order on a grand scale, the fortress/monastery that was constructed after the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa should not be interpreted as a "quintessential" architectural model for military Orders in general, or even the Order of Calatrava itself. To do so would ignore the unique historical context that shaped the choices of site, plan and style at Calatrava la Nueva.

Above all other factors, the historical memory of the surviving members of the order influenced the design of their new headquarters. Given the chaotic nature of those memories, and the obvious concessions to the reality of life on an uncertain and violent frontier, the castle would not have been conceived as a trophy of their most recent victory, or as a perfected model to be repeated throughout their "inevitable" advance into Muslim territory. The Order's new headquarters was a reflection of their identity at a very specific moment; an identity that actually changed after the structure was completed.

With a firm foothold on the north side of the Sierra Morena Mountains to act as their geopolitical center, the order no longer resembled the meager survivors of Alarcos and Salvatierra – whose memories of past invasions from the south caused them to build a headquarters with a clear defensive posture. Once the headquarters was completed, the circumstances in the region allowed for a more offensive posture than the order had ever had before. This reversal is best illustrated when Fernando III (r. 1217-52) grandson of Alfonso VIII assembled his army for the conquest of Cordoba in 1224. According to the Latin Chronicle of the Kings of Castile, Fernando III exclaimed to his mother, Queen Berengaria (r. 1217) "The door (to Andalucía) is open!"<sup>79</sup> As Chapter 2 has shown,

Calatrava la Nueva was at the foot of that door. From their perch above the landscape, the order could monitor the Calatravan pass and offer a strategic waypoint before a Castilian army could pass through the Puerto Muradal. Calatrava la Nueva survived as the symbolic and organizational center of the order long after the frontier shifted south because it was built at a funnel-point for incursions into Andalucía, and because it was built on land that was sacred to the order's identity. More so than any other site identified in this dissertation, Calatrava la Nueva reveals how critical frontier headquarters were to the construction of the *wall of the faithful*. After the resurrection of the Order of Calatrava, it became a requirement to build large-scale, composite fortress-monasteries at places like Alcántara, Uclés and Montesa. The following chapter will reveal that there

were some aspects of Calatrava la Nueva that could not be transferred to a new context.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

- <sup>4</sup> Derek W. Lomax, *Reconquest of Spain.* 281.
- <sup>5</sup> Theresa M. Vann, "A New Look at the Foundation of the Order of Calatrava," *On the social origins of medieval institutions essays in honor of Joseph F. O'Callaghan* (Leiden [Netherlands]: Brill, 1998) 103.
- <sup>6</sup> Catholic Church. Pope., *Bulario de la Orden Militar de Calatrava*. (Barcelona: El Albir, 1981) 2.
   <sup>7</sup> Alan Forey, The Military Orders. 27.
   <sup>8</sup> Ibid
- <sup>9</sup> Joseph F. O'Callaghan, "The Affiliation of the Order of Calatrava with the Order of Citeaux," in *The Spanish Military Order of Calatrava and Its Affiliates* (London [England]: Variorum Reprints, 1975). 182.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Joseph F. O'Callaghan, "The Order of Calatrava: Years of Crisis and Survival, 1158-1212," in *Meeting of Two Worlds: Cultural Exchange Between East and West During the Period of the Crusades* (Kalamazoo, Mich: Medieval Institute Publications, Western Michigan University, 1986), 422.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Rodrigo Jiménez De Rada, *Historia De Los Hechos De España* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1989) 280.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Ibid. 183.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> A more thorough description of the order's relationship with the Cistercians has been added to Appendix D.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada, *Historia de los hechos de España* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1989)
 <sup>13</sup> Ibid. 284

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Meldon J. Preusser, "The Role of the Church and the Military Orders on the Southern Castilian Frontier from 1170 to 1214," diss., University of Denver, 1972, 6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Joseph F. O'Callaghan, "The Order of Calatrava: Years of Crisis and Survival, 1158-1212," *Meeting of Two Worlds Cultural Exchange Between East and West During the Period of the* 

Crusades (Kalamazoo, Mich: Medieval Institute Publications, Western Michigan University, 1986)

<sup>16</sup> *Encomienda* translates directly as "to entrust." In this case, it is used to describe fortresses that were entrusted to the Order of Calatrava by the Kings of Castile or Aragon for the protection of the borders with Islam in Iberia. These satellite fortresses answered to the capital fortress/monastery of Calatrava as well as the Cistercian hierarchy.

<sup>17</sup> O'Callaghan. "Years of Crisis and Survival..." 420. Translation from Rodrigo Jimenez de Rada. <sup>18</sup> Joseph F. O'Callaghan, "The Order of Calatrava: Years of Crisis and Survival, 1158-1212," *Meeting of Two Worlds Cultural Exchange Between East and West During the Period of the Crusades* (Kalamazoo, Mich: Medieval Institute Publications, Western Michigan University, 1986) 36-37.

<sup>19</sup> Joseph F. O'Callaghan, "Sobre los origines de Calatrava la Nueva," *The Spanish Military Order of Calatrava and its Affiliates* (London [England]: Variorum Reprints, 1975) 5.
 <sup>20</sup> Ibid

<sup>21</sup> Joseph F. O'Callaghan, trans., *Latin chronicle of the kings of Castile* (Tempe, Ariz: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2002) 27.

<sup>22</sup> O'Callaghan "Years of Crisis and Survival..." 422.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> O'Callaghan believes that the Muslim castle of Dueñas was captured near the same time as Salvatierra, since the latter Castle was within eyesight of the former. However, Duenas was clearly even more insignificant of a fortress than Salvatierra, since it is not mentioned as being in Christian hands until after it was lost again to the Almohads just before the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1211. Ibid. 42

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. 424

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. This group of knights is not specifically identified by the sources or by O'Callaghan as the knights of Salvatierra. Still, Alfonso VIII and his troops were no-where near the Almohad camp at this time. Also, it has also been mentioned that the castle of Salvatierra was deep in Muslim territory at this time, and thus would likely have been the only possible source of Christian "knights."

<sup>27</sup> Salvatierra is on private land. Consequently, the site has not received the attention it deserves. <sup>28</sup> The Latin Chronicle describes the siege in the following quotation: "He (Miramamolin) made the journey through Seville and Cordoba, passing through the Puerto del Muradal, and besieged the castle called Salvatierra, then the seat of the Knighthood of friars of Calatrava. It was fortified with many different kinds of arms, with grain and barley and many kinds of vegetables, meats, and vigorous men, the friars, namely, and other nobles and distinguished men. The siege was established and with machines of awesome size they began to assault the castle, which otherwise seemed impregnable."

O'Callaghan, trans., Latin chronicle. pp 38

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. 39

<sup>30</sup> Derek W. Lomax, *Reconquest of Spain* (London: Longman, 1978) 124.

<sup>31</sup> Alfonso VIII of Castile. "Letter to Pope Innocent III" (1212)

www.deremilitari.org/resources/sources/tolosa.htm

"The King of Aragon and the French held a council about it (Calatrava la Vieja), and knew that the place was strongly fortified with walls and outer defenses, deep ditches and lofty towers, so that it could not be taken unless the walls were undermined and made to collapse; but this would be much to the detriment of the Friars of Salvatierra, to whom it had earlier belonged, and by whom it would not be tenavle (the walls bing razed) in case of need. For this reason they most earnestly urged that the place should be handed over, to us whole and undamaged with the weapons and great stores of food that were in it, and that the Saracens should be allowed to leave empty handed and without weapons... The French – still keen on going home... even though we were willing to go on providing them with necessities in a generous way... all together abandoned the Cross..."

<sup>32</sup> Lomax, *Reconquest of Spain* 124.

<sup>33</sup> Alfonso VIII of Castile. "Letter to Pope Innocent III" (1212)

www.deremilitari.org/resources/sources/tolosa.htm

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

<sup>35</sup> al-Marrakushi, al-Mu'jib. "A 1224 Account of the aftermath of the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa." <u>http://www.deremilitari.org/RESOURCES/SOURCES/tolosa.htm</u>

<sup>36</sup> Joseph F. O'Callaghan, trans., *Latin chronicle of the kings of Castile* 49-50.
 <sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Gonzago M. B. Gualis, "Mudejar: An Alternative Architectural System in the Castilian Urban Repopulation Model," *Medieval Encounters* 12 (2006): 329.

<sup>39</sup> Luis Monreal Y Tejada, *Medieval Castles of Spain* (Germany: Konemann, 1999) 94.

<sup>40</sup> O'Callaghan "Sobre los Origenes..." 9.

<sup>41</sup> Francisco Rades y Andrada, "Chronica de las tres Ordenes Militares y Cavallerias de Santiago, Calatrava, y Alcantara (facsimile of 1572)," *El Abrir* (1980): 33.

<sup>42</sup> O'Callaghan "Sobre los Origenes..." 9.

43 Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Enrique Rodriguez-Picavea Matilla, "The Kingdom of Castile (1157-1212): Towards a Geography of the Southern Frontier," *Mirator* (2005): 3-4, 7 Jan. 2009

<http://www.glossa.fi/mirator/pdf/frontiersofcastile.pdf>.

<sup>45</sup> Meldon J Preusser The Role of the Church. 12

<sup>46</sup> Enrique Rodriguez-Picavea Matilla "The Kingdom of Castile..." 5.

<sup>47</sup> Adrian J. Boas, Archaeology of the Military Orders: a Survey of the Urban Centres, Rural Settlement and Castles of the Military Orders in the Latin East (c. 1120-1291) (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006) 126-148.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. 126

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. 136

<sup>50</sup> The hill in Fig. 13 appears to have been flattened by quarry work. It is possible that Calatrava la Nueva was partially built by rock quarried from this hill. The quarrying would have had the additional benefit of lowering the hill, allowing for a less obstructed view to the north. It is also probable that a watchtower could have been built on this hill.

<sup>51</sup> The Latin Chronicle of the Kings of Castile mentions the *Puerto Muradal* several times. While O'Callaghan, Lomax, and others have repeated the term, they fail to mention its exact location, or place it on their historical maps. The location described here is the most likely position for the *Puerto Muradal* based on the evidence which describes the straight road that ran from Cordoba to Toledo, and passed between Salvatierra and Calatrava la Nueva. The modern road likely follows this same route, and leads straight to a mountain pass that matches the description of the *Puerto Muradal*.

<sup>52</sup> This pass is now called the *Despeñaperros* pass, [which translates roughly to "the place where the dogs fall off of the rocks"]. It is currently the main route through the Sierra Morena, and leads directly to the battlefield of Las Navas de Tolosa.

<sup>53</sup> O'Callaghan, trans., *Latin chronicle*. 97-98.

<sup>54</sup> Alfonso VIII "Letter to Pope Innocent III"

www.deremilitari.org/RESOURCES/SOURCES/tolosa.htm

<sup>55</sup> Unfortunately, the fortress of Salvatierra is on private land, and thus far there have only been minimal efforts to survey or protect the remnants of a structure. Given that a crusade was called as a result of the loss of this fortress in1211, I can only hope that there will be a serious effort to protect it in the future.

<sup>56</sup> Alfonso VIII "Letter to Pope Innocent III" <u>www.deremilitari.org/resources/sources/tolosa.htm</u>

<sup>57</sup> Terryl N. Kinder, *Cistercian Europe: Architecture of Contemplation* (Boston: Wm. B. Eerdmans Company, 2002)

In her thorough study of Cistercian Architecture, Kinder explains that while there was a coherent purpose for Cistercian Architecture, there was no singular model or Ideal. The word "perfect" here is used in reference to the architecture's ability to foster contemplation and proper adherence to the Benedictine Rule.

<sup>58</sup> Boas. 113

59 Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Sheila Bonde, *Fortress-Churches of Languedoc Architecture, Religion and Conflict in the High Middle Ages* (New York: Cambridge UP, 2009) 1-4.

<sup>61</sup> Bonde Describes fortress churches in the following quotation: "...churches may be fortified by the addition of a number of elements, including precinct walls, towers, or other protective devices. The fortress church, by contrast, fuses military elements with the church so that it forms a single unit. The fortress-churches that are the subject of this study are single-naved buildings wrapped with machicolated arches."

<sup>62</sup> The modern reconstruction effort at Calatrava la Nueva has completed the battlements on the east side of the church. However, since this wall is fully integrated into the second curtain wall, it seems likely that the crenellations which appear elsewhere on the curtain walls would have been repeated in this area. Examples of the crenellations on the south side of the church can be seen in figure 33.

<sup>63</sup> Monreal y Tejada 94-95.

<sup>64</sup> Peter Harrison, *Castles of God: Fortified Religious Buildings of the World* (Woodbridge: Boydell P, 2007) 48-49.

<sup>65</sup> <u>http://www.fcpatrimoniodenavarra.com/externos/fitero/</u>

66 Kinder. 218

67 Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Conrad Rudolph, *The "Things of Greater Importance" Bernard of Clairvaux's Apologia and the medieval attitude toward art* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania P, 1990) 6.

69 Kinder. 25

<sup>70</sup> Monreal y Tejada. 95.

<sup>71</sup> Kinder. 142-143

72 Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Boas. 113

74 Kinder. 141

<sup>75</sup> Christiana Whitehead, "Making a Cloister of the Soul in Medieval Religious Treatises," *Medium Aevum* 67 (1998): 3-6.

<sup>76</sup> Dee Dyas, "Medieval Patterns of Pilgrimage: A Mirror for Today?" *Explorations in a Christian Theology of Pilgrimage* (Grand Rapids: Ashgate, 2004) 96.

<sup>77</sup> This door was curiously painted with red and white voussoirs, which may or may not have been a visual reference to the great mosque of Cordoba.

<sup>78</sup> O'Callaghan "The Interior life..." 8.

<sup>79</sup> O'Callaghan. The Latin Chronicle. 88

# CHAPTER 4: The Castillo-Convento de Montesa – A Symbolic Addition to the Wall of the Faithful in 14<sup>th</sup> Century Valencia

#### **4.1 Introduction**

Other than Calatrava la Nueva, no structure in Iberia represents the composite form of a "fortress-monastery" as well as the *Castillo-Convento de Montesa*. (Fig. 2.56, 4.1) The representative parts of a Cistercian monastery – including cloister, chapter house, dormitory, church, and refectory – were densely consolidated into a monastic complex at the center of an irregular footprint at a flattened hilltop site in Valencia. (Fig. 4.2A, 4.2B) These essential features identify Montesa as a uniquely appropriate formal comparison with Calatrava la Nueva, but this chapter will demonstrate that historical and spatial factors mark it as more of an appropriation the fortress-monastery model than a practical continuation of the *wall of the faithful*. The eventual failure by the military-monastic complex to act as a proper preceptory-headquarters is directly related to the site's failure to prescribe to several tenets of the *wall of the faithful*: Montesa was not built within a network of supportive fortress, it was not located on the same kind of frontier as Calatrava la Nueva, and it was not the administrative center of the order. This chapter argues that Montesa looked to Calatrava la Nueva and other fortress-monastery headquarters as a model, but in doing so, the new order followed a schema that was inappropriate for its time and place. As the second of two case studies in this dissertation, Montesa acts as a bookend with Calatrava la Nueva – it represents the end of the militarymonastic headquarters as a key component in the wall of the faithful.

At first glance, King James II of Aragon's (r. 1291-1327) decision to found a new military order on the southern border of his kingdom was logical, and historically consistent. Through Montesa, the king purposefully supplanted an old institution with a new one. According to Robert I. Burns, this had been the primary mode of Christian resettlement in Valencia since Aragon first encroached on the kingdom in the 1240s.<sup>1</sup> In Montesa's case, instead of replacing a Muslim institution, it replaced the Templars and absorbed most Hospitaller assets in Valencia. Also, unlike in Leon/Castile and Andalucía – where native Iberian orders like Santiago, Calatrava and Alcántara had been the primary occupants of frontier fortresses since the late 12<sup>th</sup> century – Aragon's frontier was originally split between the Templars and Hospitallers. Distributing the military orders on the frontier so that one order could never become powerful enough to rival the crown was a shared policy across the Peninsula, so when James II was presented with the dilemma of deciding how to replace the Templars in Aragon, he made a logical decision to create a new military order that was primarily loyal to himself.

The newly constituted Order of Montesa needed all of the trappings of legitimacy in order to appear wholly different from the Templars they were replacing. One timetested way to accomplish this was to build a new, namesake headquarters in a frontier location with supporting fortresses that were visually or spatially connected to it. The Order of Montesa partially followed this model, but the definition of "frontier" in 14<sup>th</sup> Century Valencia was very different than it was in 13<sup>th</sup> century La Mancha, and the spatial distribution of the Order of Montesa's fortress-network was also very different from that of Calatrava la Nueva. These differences assured that the *Castillo-Convento de Montesa* would become a symbolically charged, yet ineffectual backwater, and the order quickly struggled with a lack of central authority. In 1348 and 1352, King Peter IV of Aragon (r. 1336-1387) attempted to abolish the order that his grandfather had created. His main grievances were that the order had relaxed its monastic rule, that everything it possessed had been originally captured by the Hospitallers, and – most importantly – that the order "probably would be unable to hold back an invasion of the kingdom."<sup>2</sup> This chapter analyzes the Castillo-Convento de Montesa (here-on referred to simply as "Montesa" or "the fortress-monastery of Montesa" to separate it from the Order of Montesa) from multiple perspectives in order to understand the intentions of its creators, and why it contributed to the failure of the order in the eyes of Peter IV. First, I use GIS to analyze the physical and political geography around the fortress when the order was founded in 1319. Second, I describe the power vacuum that the Order of Montesa was intended to fill, the *Mudéjar* insurgency that characterized the frontier where Montesa was sited, and the case made against the order in 1352. Finally, I use 3D modeling and a customized 3D viewshed technique to gain new perspectives on the architectural decisions made at Montesa. The final 3D model captured dense 3D data of the extant site via photogrammetry so that the hypothetical (and literally transparent) model could be "snapped" directly to this foundation. In this way, the model visually separated evidence from hypothesis.

#### 4.2 The Geography of Aragon's Southern Frontier

By the end of 1244, the kingdom of Aragon extended from the northeast tip of Catalonia to the southern edges of Valencia on the border with Murcia. (Fig. 4.3) Just one year

earlier, Muslim-held Murcia had submitted to King Fernando III of Castile (r. 1217-1252) and was absorbed into that kingdom. Consequently, once King James I (r. 1213-1276) of Aragon finished negotiating with the last Muslim holdout in southern Valencia – a wellfortified town named Xàtiva with a nearly impenetrable alcazar on a crest above it – Aragon no longer had a landed border with an autonomous Muslim kingdom. Theoretically, the Reconquest was complete for Aragon, given that the only way for that kingdom to expand any further at the expense of Iberia's Muslims would be to attack through Castile. Instead, Aragon concentrated its expansion on the Mediterranean, and by the death of King James II, (d. 5 Nov. 1327) the King of Aragon was also the King of Valencia, Sardinia, Corsica and Sicily. Perhaps because so much energy was spent elsewhere, and because Castile had already won the 'race' to Murcia, southern Valencia lingered in a quasi-reconquered state for decades after the treaty at Xàtiva. That city became the epicenter for all *Mudéjar* (Muslims living under Christian rule, or only nominally converted Muslims) revolts in Valencia – of which there were several in the decades leading up to the foundation of Montesa in 1317-19.

The *taifa* / [Muslim] kingdom of Valencia had borders which correspond very closely to the modern province of Valencia. The extents of the kingdom remained relatively consistent in the 12<sup>th</sup> century for the same reasons that the kingdom of Granada managed to hold out as long as it did against the Christian kingdom of Castile in the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> centuries. Like Granada, Valencia was contained by a curving mountain chain that formed a pocket of protection. Unlike Granada, the space beyond its protective chain of mountains was not as deeply cut by additional, high mountain ranges. Valencia's coastal area was a flat, broad valley cut horizontally through the middle by the Túria

River that flows by the capital city, and the parallel Júcar River roughly 31km further south. The natural protection of the region, combined with the easy irrigation of the broad area surrounding these two rivers made Valencia some of the most fertile land in Spain, as well as the wealthiest. According to Robert I Burns, this region was "more complicated and wealthy than England of that period."<sup>3</sup> Burns' statement was based on the strong reactions by contemporary Christians and Muslims upon hearing the news that Valencia had fallen.<sup>4</sup> The hydraulic engineering in Valencia alone was famous throughout the Muslim world, so much so that the kingdom was often regarded as an Islamic paradise. (Fig. 4.38) Perhaps the chief economic prize that James I absorbed was the coastal ports that continued to be the primary destination in the circle of Mediterranean trade with North Africa.

As lush as Valencia's valleys were (and still are) the hills were as bleak as any other in the central portion of Spain. The rivers were extremely well utilized, and irrigation helped support crops that would grow nowhere else, but rainfall was only marginally better in Valencia than it was in the drier provinces to the west. As already mentioned, the mountains to the north, west, and south offered protection for the deltas of the Jucar and Turia rivers, but they were nowhere near as high or difficult to traverse as the Sierra Nevada that protected Granada. In the northernmost and southernmost regions, some mountain ranges cut Valencia into cross-sections all the way to the Mediterranean. In the region south of the Jucar River, tributaries cut through the defensive western range known as the *Sierra de Las Cabrillas*, forming natural alleys that would have required surveillance and protection from outsiders. (Fig. 4.4) The fortress-monastery of Montesa was sited in the center of one of these natural alleys that led directly past Xàtiva into the flat, fertile depression of Valencia. (Fig. 4.5)

The fortress-monastery of Montesa has an enigmatic viewshed of the landscape. On the one hand, Montesa has an extremely cohesive viewshed of the valley cut by the Albaida River with a clear view northeast toward Xàtiva and southwest to the castle of Moixent. (Fig. 4.6) On the other hand, Montesa was not actually intervisible with the castle of Xàtiva – the center of Mudéjar insurgency in the region. What makes this surprising is how close the site of Montesa was to being able to have a clear view of Xàtiva, without completing the connection. On a clear day, a viewer can see the outskirts of the modern town of Xàtiva. In the 14<sup>th</sup> Century, Xàtiva was a walled town that hugged the base of a ridge that was/is capped by a double-castle Alcazar. (Fig 4.7) Due to a slightly higher peak to the west of the larger of Xàtiva's two fortresses, the Alcazar is shielded from Montesa, and vice-versa. (Fig. 4.8) A combination of the viewsheds from Xàtiva and Montesa reveals that the two sites had the Albaida river valley very well covered, with Montesa "filling-in" Xàtiva's substantial blind spot to the west and south.

While the lack of true intervisibility between the sites decreases the tactical value of Montesa in terms of signaling and surveillance of Xàtiva, it was perfectly placed for a panoramic view of the valley on its own. Rather than occupying the summit of a ridge like Xàtiva's Alcazar, Montesa was built on a hill that projects perpendicularly out from the valley's northern ridge. (Fig. 4.9) This site was originally chosen by Almohad forces, but it was not until the first Mudéjar revolt in 1245 that Montesa became a significant site. The revolts are discussed in greater detail in the next section, but in terms of geography, it is important to note that after a frustrated James I ordered the expulsion of

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Muslims in the kingdom of Valencia in 1247, Montesa became the gathering place for "sixty-thousand (Mudéjar) men of arms, except women and children…" who resisted the king. This incident – which did not in fact lead to actual fighting between the King's troops that had gathered at Xàtiva, and the Mudéjar host below Montesa – clearly stayed in James I's memory. In 1276, during a second, more significant Mudéjar revolt, James I ordered the bailiff of the southern (below the Jucar river) portion of Valencia "…to forbid Mudéjars from going up to any fortress or castle, but to remain in the lowlands."<sup>5</sup> Just as in Christopher Gerrard's archaeological study of Christian and Muslim settlement around the Templar-held town of Ambel in Aragon, James I sought to realign the cultural geography of Valencia's frontier by forcing the Muslim population into the lower, more easily surveilled valleys.<sup>6</sup>

Between 1244 and 1278, Montesa was the capital of a miniature Islamic principality ruled by a dynasty called the Banu Isa. The territory that the Banu Isa controlled was exclusive to the Albaida River valley, and essentially contained two architectural possessions: Montesa and the town and castle of Vallada. Montesa, as evidenced by the 1247 gathering of Mudéjars in revolt – was the capital of the Banu Isa, and a primary refuge for rebels. Montesa essentially *was* the Valencian frontier during the first three decades after the conquest of Xàtiva, and the Banu Isa were both an external and an internal threat. As this dissertation has reiterated several times, the definition of "frontier" is extremely flexible, and dependent on historical change for a given geography. The Banu Isa were surrounded and land-locked by Christian forces in all directions. (Fig. 4.10) To the north, perched on the opposite side of the ridge that supported Montesa, the fortress and town of Enguera was held by the Order of Santiago. (Fig. 2.51) Down the valley from Montesa and Vallada, the Castle of Mogente stood guard over the southwest entrance to the valley from Murcia and the open tableland of Albacete. To the south was a succession of steep ridges running parallel to the Albaida valley with several Christian-held fortresses monitoring the landscape below. Due to the conquest of Murcia by Castile to the Southwest, there was no safe path to the Nasrid [Muslim] Kingdom of Granada from the Albaida valley. All movement between Murcia and the capital of Valencia by a Montesa-based uprising would have had to pass by Xàtiva. The kings of Aragon understood the threat that Xàtiva posed if it were to participate actively in a Muslim revolt. Consequently, in 1247 and 1276, James I made Xàtiva his base of operations during the Mudéjar revolts. During these years, Xàtiva defined hybridity and religious tension, as the Christian garrison and the Mudéjar population were on opposite sides of religious conflicts happening all around them.

Montesa and the Banu Isa fell to James I's son King Peter III (r. 1276-1285) on September 29, 1277. As a result, the political/religious geography of the region, and the definition of the Valencian frontier was permanently changed. With the ruling class of Muslim "holdouts" from Xàtiva (the Banu Isa) removed from their base at Montesa, Xàtiva's Mudéjar population became the new, weaker, and well monitored center of the Valencian "frontier." The transfer of Montesa to Aragon marked another wave of mass Mudéjar migrations from Valencia to Granada and North Africa.<sup>7</sup> In this new environment, the threat from "within" Aragon's Valencian territory was replaced by a more external threat from the Nasrid kingdom of Granada. The 'genet' attacks from Granada began in 1287, and became a consistent threat in the early 14<sup>th</sup> century in the southernmost regions of Valencia.<sup>8</sup> Thus despite the fact that the kingdom of Aragon no longer shared a border with an autonomous Muslim kingdom – in the way Castile did with Granada – the king of Aragon still perceived of Southern Valencia as unstable. Isabel O'Connor summarized the complex problem of aligning Valencia's geography with the insecurity felt by the Christian community:

"Even though there had been no major Mudéjar revolts after 1276, and the Christian population had increased, the king and the Christians of the kingdom of Valencia still believed that an uprising could happen if the Mudéjars had the assistance of the Granadans and North Africans."<sup>9</sup>

This sense of insecurity had architectural consequences leading up to the foundation of the Order of Montesa. The city walls of Xàtiva were strengthened in 1287 following the Genet invasion and King James II built up the fortress of Xàtiva just a few months before Granadan forces crossed into Valencia through Murcia in 1303.<sup>10</sup> This pattern of fortress repair in the region south of the Jucar River became the norm from the first Genet invasion through the foundation of the Order of Montesa.

Spatially speaking, Xàtiva and Montesa were within a pocket of surrounded Mudéjar populations in the mid to late 13<sup>th</sup> Century. (Fig. 4.10) In the late 13<sup>th</sup> Century, the two sites became a final line of defense against the much more volatile, southernmost region of Valencia. By 1291, before the trial of the Templars, the mountainous, jagged interior of Valencia's south-eastern tip was surrounded by a chain of evenly spaced, highly visible fortresses to the west and south. (Fig. 4.14) These sites – as pointed out in the spatial narrative in Chapter 2 – were occupied by Christian nobles, rather than military orders, and they lined up on both sides of the Aragonese-Castilian border. The lack of military orders in this chain does not fit with the 12<sup>th</sup> and early 13<sup>th</sup> Century patterns of the Reconquest, but even by the mid-13<sup>th</sup> Century, the border between Aragon and Castile was nearly as contentious as the border between Christian and Muslim forces. Aragonese or Castilian nobles became a logical choice for the enforcement of strict lines between the Christian kingdoms because the military orders were forbidden by their papacy-approved Rules from participating in wars between Christian monarchs. In the case of Sax and Villena – two important fortresses sited near the 'bend' in the fortress chain separating Aragon and Castile – the Order of Calatrava was originally given the sites as part of the traditional 'wall of the faithful' frontier pattern. These sites were deep in Muslim territory in 1243, but by March of 1244, Castile and Aragon signed the treaty of Almizra that specifically carved up reconquered territory for either side. The conquest of Murcia and southern Valencia was completed almost immediately after the treaty, and most military order sites that lie along the lines between Christian kingdoms had their garrison's replaced by Christian nobles. There were exceptions, such as Biar – held by the Order of Calatrava from 1253-1276 – and Almansa – held by the Templars from 1244-1257, but curiously, both of these Orders had a more lasting impact further away from the border.

The castles of Perputuxent, (Fig. 4.12) and Castell de Castells (Fig 4.13) were likely the only possessions of the Orders of Templars and Calatrava (respectively) below the Albaida valley by the 1190s. (Fig. 4.14) Both of these sites were located nearly as far from the coast as they were from the Castilian-Aragonese border, where attacks from Granada could gain momentum by adding Valencian Mudéjars to their numbers within the safety of the mountains. After the foundation of the Order of Montesa, Perputuxent was one of the first commanderies of the new order, and remained the most isolated, southernmost position for the Order. Castell de Castells was even more remote, and remained in the hands of the Order of Calatrava throughout the 14<sup>th</sup> Century. These sites were only two of many, much smaller military sites in the area that have not yet been added to the database. Nonetheless preliminary survey research on this region reveals that Perputuxent and Castell de Castells were the only military order occupations that appear to have lasted more than a few years. Future work on the ADIMO database will strive to locate more sites in this area, but it should nonetheless be noted how sparse the military orders were in the far south of Valencia during the late 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> centuries, and how poorly their few sites matched previous patterns for the *'wall of the faithful.'* It seems likely that Perputuxent was intended to be a jumping-off point for future expansion of the Order of Montesa in this region, but the site remained even more remote and detached than the fortress-monastery of Montesa itself during the 14<sup>th</sup> Century.

The following section will describe the difficulties faced by the Order of Montesa in forming a network of commanderies in the first decades after its foundation in greater detail, but their distribution is easier to communicate in a visual form. Figure 4.15 shows all of the sites occupied by the Order of Montesa in 1340 with cost-distance polygons representing each site's immediate area of influence, as well as white lines representing which sites could travel to each other within a single day on horseback. To begin, it is obvious that the vast majority of the Order's possessions were clustered in the northernmost portion of Valencia. This area had been the center of Hospitaller and Templar power before most of these sites were transferred to Montesa. The concentration of military order sites in this area reflects how long the Aragon-Valencia border had been a frontier-zone in the 13<sup>th</sup> Century. By the time the Order of Montesa took over these sites, the Mudéjar populations in this region was minimal, and the threat from Granada was virtually nonexistent. The remaining two "clusters" of fortresses and walled towns in the Order of Montesa's possession were around the capital city of Valencia, and to a much lesser extent, the region south of the Jucar River that included Montesa, Vallada and the isolated, former Templar fortress of Perputuxent. In comparison to the linear chain of interconnected fortresses hemming in the western and southern borders of Valencia, the Order of Montesa's possessions were scattered over a wider area, with poorer connectivity.

Another spatial pattern revealed in Figure 4.15 is the coastal character of the Order of Montesa's possessions. The fortress-monastery of Montesa was a notable exception that was not only far from the coast, but also disconnected from other sites with coastal access. Over the course of the 14<sup>th</sup> Century, Granada was more of a threat from the sea than it was a threat from the south, through Murcia. It made sense that James II would have wanted to secure the landing spots for troops, but with the exception of the enormous Templar fortress of Peñiscola and the small tower of Burriana, the military orders had not been heavily employed as coastal guards in Valencia. When the Order of Montesa was founded, it needed to focus on an eastern frontier, as well as the south. Despite this apparent emphasis on coastal protection at their foundation, the Order of Montesa never fulfilled this intention. In 1388 – more than 30 years after the order had survived a trial to dissolve the order on (among other) grounds that they were inactive defenders of the frontier – a royal court was still complaining that the Order of Montesa had misused funds that were intended for ship provisioning to reinforce their castles.<sup>11</sup> Montesa's humorous defense to the charges was that there was no specific notification that the "galley" they were fortifying had to float. The fact that the Order of Montesa was

poorly positioned to become a naval power, and the disrepair of the former Templar and Hospitaller fortresses it gained in its first years helps explain the order's motivation to divert funding toward their fortifications.

In summary, the location of the headquarters for the Order of Montesa followed the pattern of the *wall of the faithful* in that it was nearer to the landed frontier than its other possessions, and because it was sited to maximize visibility of the landscape. It essentially failed to act as a headquarters because (1) it was isolated from the true center of the Order's power in the north, (2) it was unable to expand to the south at the expense of the Mudéjar population, and (3) it was incapable of defending the kingdom from its greatest (hypothetical) threat: a naval landing from Granada that would gather support from the internal Mudéjar population. As this dissertation has established, a military order headquarters needed to act as an administrative center on the frontier, as well as a symbolic construction that could reaffirm the military-monastic identity of the order it represented. The final section of this chapter explains how the architects of the fortressmonastery of Montesa accomplished the latter requirement at a grand scale, but its geographic location and the historical context in which it was built ensured that it could never become a practical spearhead for future advancement.

## 4.3 The Historical Context of Montesa's Foundation and Failure

The following section briefly sketches three historical, rather than geographic reasons for the fortress-monastery of Montesa's construction and eventual failure. First, I outline James II's push to replace the Templars with a new military order in Valencia, rather than donating all Templar assets to the Hospitallers. Second, I explain how Mudéjar Xàtiva and Montesa were used to define the "frontier" when Montesa was founded in 1317-19. Finally I outline how Peter IV made the claim that the Order of Montesa had failed to achieve its intended purpose during two trials in 1348 and 1352.

#### • The aftermath of the trial of the Templars in Aragon

As an international order whose purpose was – above all else – defined by their ability to defend the Holy Land from Muslim 'infidels,' the Templars mostly used their continental possessions to funnel financial support toward the east. Two centuries of donations to the Order by the early 14<sup>th</sup> Century had also fattened up the Templars' continental houses as well. Meanwhile, disastrous crusades and the Muslim Reconquest of Jerusalem stood out as evidence that the Templars had failed to achieve their intended purpose. For many reasons in addition to the stark contrast between their continental wealth, and the loss of their final Syrian foothold of Tortosa in 1302, the King of France and others decided that the dissolution of the Templars was an opportunity to absorb the wealth that the order had accumulated on their lands. As mentioned in the spatial narrative in Chapter 2, the Kingdom of Aragon and the Templars had a very long history of cooperation, and the Order's participation in the Christian Reconquest of Iberia – while not as aggressive as the native military orders – was more significant in Aragon than in any other kingdom. Small, native military orders, such as the Order of Mountjoy (founded 11180, absorbed by Calatrava in 1221) were briefly started in Aragon, along with a scattering of commanderies from Castilian orders such as Alcañiz for the Order of Montesa, and Montalban for the Order of Santiago, but the Templars and Hospitallers were by far the largest orders in the Kingdom of Aragon. More importantly, Aragon had

constructed its wall of the faithful in the 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> centuries by placing the Templars and Hospitallers near the border with Islam, in castles like Ulldecona and Alcala de Xivert at the beginning of the conquest of Valencia in the mid-1230s. After the conquest of Xàtiva in 1244 however, the Templars and Hospitallers were slow to move into the new frontier of southern Valencia. Despite some "reshuffling" of the Templars to form a continuous belt in the northern part of Valencia, their base of power was still very much centered on the commanderies of Miravet and Monzon in Aragon, and certainly not in the south of Valencia.<sup>12</sup> (Fig. 4.15) The Templars only held the isolated castle of Perputuxent below the Jucar river when King Phillip IV of France ordered all members of the Order of Templars in France arrested and imprisoned on Sept. 14, 1307.<sup>13</sup> Nonetheless, Iberia's monarchs – especially James II of Aragon – still considered the Templars to be essential frontier institutions in their realms.

For the next ten years, James II and his contemporary, King Dinis of Portugal (r. 1279-1325) argued with Pope Clement V (r. 1305-1314) over the dissolution of the Templars in their lands. In 1312, Pope Clement V assigned all Templar holdings to the Hospitallers across Christendom – except in the Iberian Peninsula. James II and King Dinis successfully argued that because their realms still contained a religious frontier with Islam, new orders should be founded to protect their borders.<sup>14</sup> Montesa, in Aragon, and the Knights of Christ in Portugal became clever variations on the idea of a native military order. They would appear very similar to the Order of Calatrava, or Avis in Portugal, and would even use these orders as a source of foundational members, but the new orders would never have the same level of independence from the crown as their 13<sup>th</sup> Century models. James II wanted the look and feel of the Order of Calatrava for Montesa,

but he wanted the new order to be dependent on the monarchy. The Order of Montesa would have its sole focus on Aragon's needs rather than the holy land, and they would also be dependent on the King for all their possessions. Luis Garcia-Guijarro Ramos explained the change from the Templars to Montesa succinctly in the following:

... a new order, which was under royal control at the beginning and continued to be so in the future, had emerged. The universalism of the Temple had given way to the 'Aragonesism' or rather to the monarchism of Montesa.<sup>15</sup>

There is a great deal of debate about why James II eventually chose to arrest the Templars in Valencia, but allowed them to entrench themselves in Aragon on Dec. 1<sup>st</sup>, 1307. Alan Forey argued in his extensive study on the trial of the Templars that James II's hand was forced by the confession of the Templars in France.<sup>16</sup> Ramos argues that the king arrested the Templars in Valencia first in order to secure the belt of Templar property that he had personally given to that order just before the trial.<sup>17</sup> Strategically, the Templar fortresses in northern Valencia would have cut the kingdom of Aragon in half if the order had entrenched themselves there as they did at Miravet and Monzon in Aragon. Another factor at play was the king's desire to prevent the Hospitallers from taking control of the Templars' northern Valencia fortresses before he was able to negotiate their surrender. Ramos' geographic argument is convincing – especially given James II's great efforts in the following decade to reassign all of Valencia's military order fortresses to his new Order of Montesa.

James II correctly concluded that in order to justify creating a new military order that would be subject to him, he would have to convince the Avignon papacy that the military orders were generally essential to frontier defense. By securing the Templar castles in Valencia quickly, James II was able to argue that he was only holding them because they were critical to the defense of his kingdom while the negotiations dragged on for ten more years. By 1313, when the king chose Montesa as the site for the headquarters and namesake of his new military order, he claimed that it was "on the frontier," but most historians believe this was more propaganda than reality.<sup>18</sup> Montesa had not been a Templar property before, so the symbolic center of the new order would not be tainted by association. As mentioned above, the fortress of Montesa had once been the capital of a Muslim rival, but the site had been in Christian hands since 1277 when the Banu Isa were finally evicted from the castle. From the vantage point of the Avignon Papacy, the location of Valencia's frontier could be wherever James II said it was.

## • Montesa, Xàtiva and Valencia's 'frontier'

The Order of Montesa's Bull of Foundation referenced the Order's proximity to

the frontier in its first line:

The godly care of Mother Church, worried about the salvation of the faithful, at the same time, enflamed by charity - is delighted by outbreaks of Catholic expansion, (it) monitors closely and insists on the fruitful continuation of his work, and also explores the ways and means to oppose the intentions of the enemies of the faith, to reduce their forces and, above all, (watches) those practitioners of the Catholic faith (who) *by virtue of the proximity of their residence are neighbors of the enemies of the faith*... (They should be) provided the opportunity to repair their fortresses, to defend themselves, with the help of God, from the incursions of these enemies.<sup>19</sup>

This Bull represents a more dramatic departure from the 'wall of the faithful' rhetoric of the Order of Santiago's 12<sup>th</sup> Century Rule than it appears at first glance. There is barely a hint of crusade rhetoric in Montesa's Bull of Foundation. The sense of urgency is gone, and the spatial description of their purpose appears to be more of a case-by-case defense than a unified effort. Rather than protecting all of Christendom, as the Order of Santiago

claimed in their Rule, the papacy offers more localized goals for the Order of Montesa. The Bull claims that Valencia's Christian population was at risk simply because it shared space with Muslims, not because they were in the path of an advancing threat to the entire Christian religion. More than anything else, despite the early reference to Catholic expansion, the Order of Montesa appears to be a stationary security force – one that was sent to repair and maintain rather than advance and "expose themselves."

James II could point to insurrections and threats from Granada as evidence that all of Valencia required the protection of a military order. However, according to Miriam Benito, in 1320, all of the Order of Montesa's combined property contained around a 5% Muslim population. Meanwhile, Xàtiva's Mudéjar population shrank with each supralocal uprising and reactionary suppression by Christian forces.<sup>20</sup> The future headquarters of Montesa was "closer" to the frontier than the majority of the commanderies it absorbed from the Templars and Knights Hospital during the Order's first decade, but its location was not nearly as advanced as previous priory-headquarters like Calatrava la Vieja & Nueva, Alcántara, Uclés (Order of Santiago), Evora (Later became the Order of Avis in Portugal). Even the regional priory-headquarters of Alcañiz and Montalban for the Orders of Calatrava and Santiago (respectively) in Aragon were placed closer to a true frontier in the 12<sup>th</sup> & 13<sup>th</sup> Centuries than the fortress-monastery of Montesa in 1319. A number of questions emerge when trying to align James I's claims that Montesa was a frontier institution with the spatial and historical realities of its foundation. First, why was such great effort made to build Montesa's symbolic headquarters in the south when it seems that the true center of power was always intended to be in the former Templar castles of

the north? Second, did any of the frontier character from the late 13<sup>th</sup> Century remain in the area around Montesa when the order built its headquarters in the 14<sup>th</sup> Century?

Xàtiva maintained at least a semblance of a 'frontier' Mudéjar population throughout the late 13<sup>th</sup> and early 14<sup>th</sup> Centuries, but this population was anything but stable. By the time Montesa was founded in 1317-19, the Christian rulers of towns throughout southern Valencia were more concerned with attracting Mudéjar settlers back, than preventing them from rising in revolt. With each revolt or attack from Granada, Christian populations renewed attacks on the Muslim quarter of their towns. Consequently, many Muslims fled these areas and returned with the Granadan invaders. Before he died in 1276, James I ordered his son Peter III to allow the Mudéjars that had recently gathered at Montesa to leave Valencia if they paid their taxes. <sup>21</sup> Simply allowing the Muslim population to leave was likely a last resort, as their loss to the region had great economic consequences. Peter III repeatedly attempted to attract new Mudéjar settlers to Montesa after the original population had been allowed to leave, but by 1289, the king had already given up on attracting Muslim settlers to the area and opted to bring in Christian settlers instead.<sup>22</sup>

After the fall of the Banu Isa in 1277, there were no more internal Mudéjar revolts in southern Valencia, and the lack of military leadership in the Mudéjar community was likely the primary reason. Nonetheless, the fact that there *were* no more revolts did not mean that the kings of Aragon were no longer concerned that they could occur, even in the early 14<sup>th</sup> Century. While James II was arguing with Avignon over the foundation of Montesa in 1316, he was also dealing with the rumors of another *genet* (Granadan) invasion of the fortress and town of Elche that was south of what O'Connor called the Biar-Busot line. (Fig. 4.17) The Christian population of Elche reacted to the rumored attack on their town by immediately attacking the Muslim quarter of the town. James II's reaction to this, and other rumors – no matter how far to the south they originated, was often to refortify Xàtiva.<sup>23</sup> The foundation of Montesa in 1319 coincided with James II's investment of 3000 sous to rebuild the walls of Xàtiva's castle. This pattern of investment in this area reveals that James II still considered the "alley" leading up the Albaida River valley, past Vallada, Montesa and Xàtiva, and into the flat area around Valencia city, to be the most important bottleneck to defend in his southern kingdom. James II's definition of "frontier" as it related to the location he wished to place his new military order was partially propagandistic in that it yielded results in Avignon at a time when all military orders still required some semblance of a frontier identity. At the same time, the king had real concerns that even the diminished Muslim populations of Xàtiva could tip the balance in favor of an invading army from Granada. Thus, while the majority of the real power of the Order of Montesa was nowhere near the frontier, the headquarters itself was at least placed in a location that was believed to be on the "second line" of defense, behind the vanguard of castles like Biar, Villena, and Busot, and near to a potential threat from the (diminished) Mudéjar population of Xàtiva.

# • The Order of Montesa on trial 1348-52

At the tail end of the time period covered in this dissertation, Peter IV of Aragon twice attempted to abolish the Order of Montesa and incorporate it into the Order of Hospital in 1346 and 1352. The most extensive work on this subject, Elena Lourie's long article "Conspiracy and Cover-up: The Order of Montesa on Trial (1352)" thoroughly mined the Bulls and other court documents related to the King's accusations against the Order.<sup>24</sup> The crux of Lourie's argument was that Peter IV was particularly devious in his attempts to disband the Order of Montesa, and that the king was willing to use a variety of methods to achieve his true goal of absorbing the assets of the order as Phillip IV of France had done to the Templars in 1307. The main accusation the king laid against the Order of Montesa – and the only tactic that remained consistent in the 1346 and 1353 bulls outlining the king's argument – was that the order had "…never served the purpose for which it had been established: defense of the frontier against attack."<sup>25</sup> In the 1346 Bull, Peter IV also accused the Order of relaxing its Rule so that the order had become secular rather than religious, but the more vicious attacks on their lifestyle were dropped in the second Bull of 1353. The king clearly believed that the best case he had against the order was their inability to defend his kingdom. This accusation still had currency in the mid-14<sup>th</sup> Century at Avignon, and it lent urgency to the King's grievances against Montesa.

Even against such determined and powerful opposition, the Order of Montesa was eventually able to survive several legal attacks and ecclesiastical inquisitions. Nonetheless, the king's central argument against the order in 1352 was likely true: the order had from the start been too poor to maintain the frontier. This contradicted the Bull of 1346 that claimed that the order had squandered what had been a perfectly adequate foundation.<sup>26</sup> The truth was likely somewhere in between – a lack of central authority, infighting, and meager numbers of members made replacing the Templars and Hospitallers in Valencia a difficult task, and the order was never set up to act as a proper frontier institution due to the northern location of the majority of its fortresses and other property. Members of the order were interrogated at the fortress-monastery of Montesa, at the abbey of Valldinga, and in the city of Valencia in 1352, and some members of the Order, including the Prior actually echoed the king's accusations against them.<sup>27</sup> Lourie correctly pointed out that this is less surprising in the context of the division between the clerical brothers – who were never criticized directly in any of the king's accusations – and "the brothers outside who hold commanderies."<sup>28</sup> The Prior – who lived at the headquarters of Montesa, rather than in the commanderies in the north – was unafraid to clearly state that there was a rift between the military and religious members of the Order. In the final section of this chapter, I will demonstrate how this division was also reflected in the architecture at the fortress-monastery of Montesa through the careful partitioning between military and monastic spaces.

There were several members who did defend the order against the king's accusations that they had *never* fulfilled their purpose of holding the frontier. Fray Berenguer de Erill, one of the first members of the Order, claimed that the order had in fact sent troops to the frontier when requested by past kings, but that they had simply not been asked to do so in the past 12 years.<sup>29</sup> Even the afore-mentioned Jaume de Molins admitted that the order sent troops to Elche when it was under attack by Granadans in 1332.<sup>30</sup> This evidence was enough to defeat the king's claim that the order had never served its purpose, but it still illustrates that the Order: (1), rarely acted as a frontier institution, and (2), that the order had declined in this regard over the past decade. This should not be surprising, given the geographic and historical context that the order had been inserted into, but this does not explain why the order was constantly investing in the architecture of the fortress-monastery of Montesa during these same years.

The Order's most notable military action in the region around its headquarters was somewhat ironically on the side of Peter IV against Valencia's nobles in the Union War of 1348. For the Master of the Order of Montesa, Pere de Tous, the conflict with the Union was an opportunity – shortly after the King's first, and most vicious legal attack on the order – to prove the Order's loyalty to the crown. It was also an opportunity to use the Order's assets against one of the Master's rivals, Dalmau de Cruilles – the former treasurer of the order who had recently deserted to become the military commander for the Union. The Union had gained a major coup by attracting the service of the capable, Montesa-trained Dalmau de Cruïlles, and Pere de Tous was placed in command of the Monarch's forces against him after *Union* forces had daringly captured the city and fortress of Xàtiva. Unfortunately for Pere de Tous, he was defeated twice by his rival on the battlefield, and while he proved his loyalty to the crown by taking up arms against the *Union*, he simultaneously demonstrated the Order's lack of ability to protect the king's interests in the south.<sup>31</sup> In terms of the trial, the failures of Pere de Tous on the battlefield resulted in Peter IV's rededication to dissolving the Order, albeit with less personal attacks against specific members of the Order.

#### 4.4 Vision, Partitioning, and Identity in the Physical Structure of Montesa

Having established the complexity of Montesa's geographical and historical context, I now look to the architectural decisions made at the fortress-monastery of Montesa as evidence that the order desired to reflect an earlier military order identity that had already begun to disappear before construction began in 1319. The central question this section is designed to answer is: why was such great effort made to construct such a rare example of a composite fortress-monastery at this time, and in this location? This question is particularly difficult to answer because the structure itself seems to fight against its historical and geographic context. The fortress-monastery of Montesa was not the central, governing node within the system of commanderies it accumulated through the dissolution of the Templars in 1317, but it deliberately attempted to mimic a fortressmonastery that had been a proper headquarters a century earlier – Calatrava la Nueva. The Order of Montesa also was not a true frontier institution as other military orders had been before it, but the fortress-monastery was sited so that it still held an important frontier function – surveillance of the Albaida River valley. Montesa will always stand out as an anomaly in the architecture of the military orders; paradoxically because it succeeded at reflecting an equally anomalous structure that was built a century earlier.

This section is divided into three sections. I first describe how the militarymonastic complex and its immediate topographical site reveal the identity that the new military Order of Montesa wished to convey at the moment of its foundation, and how this identity was intensified with additional construction over time. Second, I compare Montesa to Calatrava la Nueva in order to affirm that the new structure wished to co-opt meanings associated with this earlier model for a military order headquarters. Finally, I discuss how Montesa's architecture reveals a tension between landscape surveillance and monastic introspection. Throughout this section, I will refer to a 3D graphic reconstruction of the ruined fortress-monastery that I have created to virtually raise the walls that were destroyed by an earthquake in 1748. This model is designed to preserve transparently which portions of the site were extant, and which sites were reconstructed. Consequently, the walls are left as simple transparent masses that were extruded directly out of the extant wall foundations. The cloister vaulting comes closer to a high-resolution reconstruction of the site than the rest because one arch was physically reconstructed in 2005, and because a great number of the voussoirs, ribs, column capitals and drums were preserved and stacked inside the cloister area, or on the side of the physically reconstructed chapter house. (Fig. 4.18, 4.19, 4,20, 4.21)

## • The overtly composite identity of the Castillo-Convento de Montesa

Montesa's new headquarters was an irregularly-shaped fortress with an extremely rectilinear Cistercian monastery uncompromisingly inserted into the center. (Fig. 4.2A, 4.2B) Nearly all concessions to the unstructured, natural shape of the site were absorbed by the "military" or "non-monastic" portions of the building on either end of the monastic core. The fortress' greatest patron, Master Pere de Tous (r. 1328-1374) built a wall surrounding the castle-proper, but these walls would not have affected the view of the fortress-monastery on its rocky outcropping. (Fig. 4.1) Based on the dates for specific parts of the monastic core, the first phase of Christian construction quarried the hill so that the outer edges of the curtain wall descended seamlessly into the sharp-cut natural stone of the site's outcropping. (Fig. 4.22) The only medieval entrance to the castle proper is via a long ramp ending in a drawbridge more than 24 feet above the ground level at the beginning of the ramp. From further away, in the valley below the projecting hilltop site, Montesa's massing and cut ashlar masonry would have communicated great financial investment, monumentality, and above all, an imported, non-native style that was more common in Christian, rather than Islamic structures. (Fig. 4.23) The gothic style of the pointed arches and rib-vaults of Montesa's finely carved cloister (likely a

later 14<sup>th</sup> Century addition) would obviously have been invisible from the exterior, yet the tall, compact, flat, and yellow-toned ashlar cladding around the structure would have stood out in a built environment that was better represented by Xàtiva's dark stone, and its ridge-hugging, lower-profile. (Fig. 4.24) The effect of cutting down the natural outcropping with the shining, man-made cut ashlar on top would have increased Montesa's monumentality despite not being cast against the sky from as long a distance as Xàtiva or Calatrava la Nueva.

Before proceeding to a description of individual features, it is important to point out that like most of Iberia's fortresses, Montesa was not the manifestation of a single moment in time - and neither is my 3D reconstruction of the site. A combination of excavations in 1949 and written documents attributing the reconstruction of specific spaces to different Masters of the Order of Montesa give at least a rough picture of the evolution of the site.<sup>32</sup> The level of destruction at Montesa after the 1748 earthquake was such that only a rough 3d model could be reliably reconstructed from the foundations. The phase of the fortress-monastery that the model reconstructs is (in places) later than the scope of this dissertation due to additional work on the cloister during the Mastership of Albert de Tous (1375-1382) as well as the wide range of construction dates for the church, refectory and the poorly surviving outer concentric walls and ramp built during the mastership of Pere de Tous (1328-1374). (Fig. 4.25) <sup>33</sup> Fortunately, the shape of the rocky outcropping, when combined with the earlier dates for structures that surrounded the cloister – like the chapter house and church – offer an impression that while the footprint of the cloister and dormitories may have swelled slightly over time, their locations were constrained by earlier structures. In summary, creating a holistic model of a single phase in the life-cycle for a complex as complicated as Montesa is impossible without a great deal of additional archaeological fieldwork beyond the 1949 excavation. Consequently, my purpose has been to analyze how spaces were partitioned and organized at Montesa rather than imagining how the site looked at a particular time.

It is easy to focus on the monastic structures at Montesa, but it was no less a fortress for these atypical features. As with most of the structures that formed the *wall of* the faithful, Montesa was built to withstand a siege. The fortress' tall and thick walls, towers, two large cisterns, wide viewshed and rocky site reflected centuries of tradition. In terms of extant masonry, nothing suggests that the architects attempted to express the site's monastic quality on the exterior. There was very likely a bell placed in one of the towers at the site, but this was not specific to fortress-monasteries. Many frontier fortresses – especially ones occupied by the military orders – doubled as places of worship and protection for Christian settlers, and many fortresses contained chapels. It is impossible to know whether the church at Montesa signaled itself as such on the exterior walls because only rough foundations remain of that structure.<sup>34</sup> On one hand, the appearance of what appear to be several large windows on a contiguous exterior wall with the church suggests that the Order's embrace of the gothic style may have manifested itself on the exterior fenestration as well. (Fig. 4.26). On the other hand, there does not appear to be a great deal of effort to bring light into the church from the partially extant interior wall of the nave. (Fig. 4.27) The most likely scenario is that Montesa was very similar to Calatrava la Nueva in the way it made the location of the church indistinguishable on the exterior from other more fortified spaces. Therefore, it appears that the primary audiences for the high level of gothic articulation and expense were the

composite community of clerics and knights of the order and visiting Christians – rather than potential Mudéjar insurgents moving in the valley below. The flip side of the argument that Montesa's gothic articulation was reserved for the interior is that the builders considered the site close enough to the frontier that they could not afford a relaxed approach to exterior fortification. This suggests that throughout the 14<sup>th</sup> Century, the changes made at Montesa maintained at least the impression that the order remained committed to frontier defense.

Another aspect of the site that has been overlooked by past scholars is the symbolic value of demolishing all signs of the previous Islamic structure at Montesa. Montesa simultaneously projected change and permanence through its location and its form. While it is true that the Banu Isa – the semi-independent Islamic dynasty and magnetic center of Mudéjar resistance in southern Valencia – had been removed from Montesa and Vallada in 1277, it was not until the foundation of the Order of Montesa that the Islamic fortress was completely flattened. Replacing an Islamic structure that had been the center of Mudéjar resistance during the previous generation with a distinctly Christian fortress-monastery was a political-religious act that recalls Christopher Gerrard's description of Christian shrines as signposts for Christianity on the frontier.<sup>35</sup> It is also important to note that the fortress-monastery of Montesa was a unique architectural effort within the Order of Montesa itself. Unlike the military orders that began in the 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> Centuries, all of Montesa's initial commanderies had already been built or adapted for Christian use by the Templars or Hospitallers in Valencia. These Orders, especially the Templars, had developed subtle methods for transforming their fortresses into Christian structures – such as the construction of a chapel, or the use of

one-sided galleries facing an open ward that would gesture toward the form of a cloister without functioning as one.<sup>36</sup> One of the best preserved examples of such a gallery can be found at the 12<sup>th</sup> Century fortress-monastery of Miravet (Fig. 4.28). The Order of Montesa was apparently content to maintain these alterations in most of their inherited fortresses, as there are no examples of aggressive changes to new commanderies by the Order of Montesa outside of their new headquarters. Their financial struggles during their first years obviously influenced their decision to maintain a diverse architectural inheritance rather than attempt to unify their properties, but this reinforces the idea that Montesa was an especially meaningful architectural effort for the new Order.

As monumental and "imported" as Montesa would have appeared from the exterior, the Order's determination to shape the site to its military-monastic identity is even more apparent on the interior. After passing through the partially reconstructed, round-arched gate, the site immediately appears to have been aggressively flattened. Over time, there has been a fair amount of infill inside the fortress, but the excavation of a large, 14 x 28 x 12 foot (deep) stone-lined cistern reveals that most of the infill has already been excavated to the original surface of the roughly trapezoidal open ward or "patio de armas." (Fig. 4.29) Around this open ward were ten small cells flattened against the curtain wall to the south, four more cells to the north, the ovens to the far west and adjacent to the entrance, and a larger unspecified room in the southeast corner that may have been the kitchen or stables. The area around the ward, which is generally referred to as the "fortress" section of the complex, was clearly partitioned from the tight monastic core by a wall to the east that cuts off the remaining 2/3 or the site. The monumental flatness of this wall was strangely broken up by a series of thick, trapezoidal, parallel

walls that each taper toward the cloister area to the east. (Fig. 4.30) These pylon-like, freestanding walls likely supported a second story that was added in the mid-14<sup>th</sup> Century.<sup>37</sup> These pillars form a portico-like corridor of space that seems to have little use other than to support the overhanging story while breaking up the flat exterior wall of the cloister. The fact that there is only a single entrance into the cloister, and the rest of the monastic complex beyond it, reveals that the well-trodden modern path through the ward likely reflects a similar movement pattern for Montesa's community of clerics as they entered the site. (Fig 4.29) The ward does incline from the castle entrance to the doorway of the cloister by roughly 9 vertical feet, but the ward is still long enough that this does not diminish the overall impression that the site was aggressively flattened.

The cloister was the heart of any Cistercian monastery, and it was at Montesa as well. The cloister was not built during the earliest, or even the growth years of the order in the mid-14<sup>th</sup> century, but as mentioned earlier, the new construction was likely a gothic reform of an original cloister rather than an altogether new feature that had not been there before. On three sides, several requisite parts of the monastery, including the church, chapter house, and one of the dormitories wrapped around what was a very large cloister – especially given the amount of space available at the irregular site. The cloister was rectangular, with six bays to the east and west, and four bays to the north and south. The walk was rib-vaulted, ending in corbels on the outside. (Fig. 4.31) The height for the vaults was reconstructed using the distance between the extant piers and the corbels along the extant wall shared by the church. According to a monastic visitor named Friar Joan Borja, who wrote the only surviving description of the monastery before the earthquake, the cloister garden or garth contained two orange trees at that time, and the author made

note of the radial division of the garth space.<sup>38</sup> At roughly 90 x 74 feet, the footprint of the cloister – including the 11' wide walk – was substantially larger than that of the church, which was the next largest monastic structure in the complex. The investment made in this space in terms of the available space, the obvious flattening of the site, and the degree of sculptural articulation cannot be overstated. The fact that this cloister was inside of a fortress, at an inaccessible site that was at least ostensibly on the "frontier" could not have been better hidden for a viewer inside of it. With the exception of the modest stone material – which was quarried on site – the cloister did not make any concessions to its circumstances, or display any sense of military-monastic "hybridity" on its own. Far less can be said about the other monastic spaces, such as the reconstructed chapter house or the Church – they were rebuilt or left as piles of rocks marking the outline of their walls respectively – but in plan, both of these buildings were built on a similarly "full" scale as the cloister.

Despite the degree of ruin within Montesa's monastic core, and the limited size and shape of the hilltop site, the plan appears to follow an adapted Cistercian model. (Fig. 4.2A) The idea that a monastery could be read as flexible, but clearly Cistercian in orientation is no longer a contested theory for architectural historians. The concept of the 'ideal' Cistercian plan has been thoroughly replaced by a more "adaptive" model in recent scholarship.<sup>39</sup> As with Calatrava la Nueva, Montesa reveals a hierarchy of organizing principals for the flexible planning of a Cistercian structure. I mentioned above that Montesa's monastic core was "uncompromisingly placed" in the center of the fortress, but this is partially hyperbole. Structurally speaking, creating such axially specific, rectilinear lines in the center of such an irregularly shaped site reveals that these qualities were very important to Montesa's architects. The decision to force all of Montesa's monastic buildings into a parallel, adjacent or perpendicular relationship with the cloister is particularly illustrative of the rigidity of the monastic plan. Nonetheless, the structures that radiate around the cloister are nearly all in atypical positions. The church – whose nave was normally placed against the northern cloister walk in most Benedictine structures going back to the 9<sup>th</sup> century plan of St. Gall – was placed to the south at Montesa. (Fig. 4.2A & 4.32)<sup>40</sup> This location allowed the church to retain its essential east-west orientation, while also giving it a more prominent position facing the village and valley below. (Fig. 4.33) Placing the church on the south side of the cloister forced several monastic buildings like the refectory off of the cloister into a diagonally oriented space that was accessed by a barrel-vaulted corridor along the north-east end of the church. (Fig. 4.34) The sacristy and refectory were both placed against the outer edge of the inner military-monastic core at Montesa. Adding a dormitory to the north side was another atypical or adaptive position for this structure, but it did allow the essential monastic rhythms of worship to occur at the site – whereby monks could wake up for matins in the dormitory and walk to the church through the cloister without passing through a "non-monastic" or secular space. The lack of any monastic buildings along the west walk may appear at first glance to be another departure, but looking at the plans for so-called "prototypical" Cistercian abbeys of Fontenay (Fig. 4.35) near Dijon, France, or the afore-mentioned abbey of Fitero in Navarre (Fig. 3.56) it appears that additional buildings were not assigned to the west walk.

The Order of Montesa's relationship with Cistercian monasticism was likely as close as that of the order Calatrava. The obvious reason for this is because Montesa was first populated by ten knights from the Castilian Order of Calatrava in 1319. James II envisioned that Montesa would be an Aragonese branch of the Order of Calatrava that was subject to visitation from the Master of that Order, but in reality Montesa was far more dependent on the monarchy than Calatrava. Like Calatrava, the Order of Montesa was also subject to visitation from an Abbey in the Cistercian hierarchy. Unlike Calatrava however, Montesa did not answer to the "foreign" French abbey of Morimond, but the Catalonian Abbey of Santes Crus. By all accounts, the Order of Calatrava had very little interest in Montesa from the beginning, as visitation had very little economic value – especially such a long distance from its center of power in Castile. In 1318, after requests from James II to the Master of Calatrava to arm and clothe the new Order of Montesa had been repeatedly ignored, papal pressure forced Calatrava to send a token ambassador to Valencia to help guide the new order. Beyond this initial connection, there was very little organizational contact between Montesa and Calatrava.<sup>41</sup> The combination of the common Cistercian influence, the initial population of ten Calatravan knights, and the unenthusiastic support from Calatrava creates the impression that the older Castilian order was little more than a muse for the new Order of Montesa. Architecturally however, Montesa must have looked to Calatrava la Nueva as a model – a model that Montesa would surpass in its commitment to a composite military-monastic form.

#### • Montesa and the model of Calatrava la Nueva

Several of the similarities between Montesa and Calatrava have already been mentioned. Especially when the two sites are viewed within the context of more than 800 other military order sites in the ADIMO database, Calatrava la Nueva and Montesa seem to be more similar than dissimilar. Out of this entire collection of structures associated with the military orders, the only fortress-monastery sites with surviving cloisters that were built in the 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> Centuries are Calatrava la Nueva, Alcañiz, and Montesa. It is impossible to know if the Order of Santiago's Castilian headquarters of Uclés was a similarly composite fortress-monastery at this time because nearly all medieval remnants of the old fortress were replaced by a Baroque monastery, but it is certainly possible. Alcañiz could have been a model for Montesa – the mostly 13<sup>th</sup> Century complex not only contained a cloister and attached chapel on the north side, but it had also been the de-facto headquarters for the Order of Calatrava in the kingdom of Aragon since the years of crisis and survival after the battle of Alarcos in 1195. The Order of Calatrava's Aragonese headquarters was closer, and thus may have been better known, but descriptions of the Order's first recruits refer to them as coming from Castile. In addition, the cloister at Alcañiz is believed to have been built in the 14<sup>th</sup> Century at the same time the famous murals depicting the conquest of Valencia were painted in that castle's Tower of Homage.<sup>42</sup> (Figs. 4.36, 4.37) It is possible therefore that the construction of the cloister at Alcañiz occurred near the same time that Montesa was being built. In this scenario, both Montesa and Alcañiz would have had one logical model to look to for this rare inclusion of linked monastic spaces inside a hilltop fortress: Calatrava la Nueva. The fact that the Order of Montesa was affiliated at the outset with Calatrava, makes the extremely rare inclusion of a monastic core of buildings at Montesa's new headquarters appear to be anything but a coincidence.

The connection between Montesa's siting, and that of Calatrava la Nueva is more subtle and referential than physical or practical. Calatrava la Nueva was by all definitions, a frontier headquarters. After the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, the "border" between Christian and Muslim forces in Castile was drawn across the Sierra Morena, and one pass through this mountain chain was directly visible from the order's choice of site for their new headquarters. As this chapter has shown, if the Order of Montesa's new headquarters had been placed exactly where it was in 1277, immediately after the fall of the Banu Isa, the parallels with the siting of Calatrava la Nueva would have been very clear. Montesa, in this scenario would have been located on a true frontier that had just come under Christian dominion in a moment of triumph just like Calatrava la Nueva. Of course, Montesa was not founded in 1277. In 1317-19, the portion of Christian Valencia that was in the most danger from attack by the kingdom of Granada was far to the south of Montesa, in the modern province of Alicante. Even the city of Xàtiva had lost a great portion of its Mudéjar population by this point. Nonetheless, James II claimed that he needed his new military order to defend his kingdom from attack, and thus he needed to give the order some sense of frontier legitimacy by at least locating it in a place that had been a center of Mudéjar resistance a generation before. Compared to Calatrava la Nueva, Montesa was a fictional frontier headquarters, but it was a fiction that the new order and the kings of Aragon invested in heavily.

Just because Montesa's new headquarters was on a symbolic, or pseudo-frontier did not cause its architects to construct a pseudo fortress-monastery. All of the trappings of legitimacy that would promote the new order as a new expansion of the *wall of the faithful* were present at Montesa. Like Calatrava, it was built on top of a rocky outcropping at a site that had previously been a Muslim stronghold. The site had sweeping views of a valley that at least two decades earlier came *close* to guiding a combined *Genet* and Mudéjar army from the hinterland of Murcia toward the rich coastal depression of Valencia (Fig. 4.38, 4.6). Montesa was built with high, meticulously flattened exterior walls, a complex elbow-bend ramp and a drawbridge 24 feet above the base of its rocky outcropping. Just as at Calatrava la Nueva and many other hilltop fortresses, the natural defenses of the site were enhanced by shaving down its rocky site and building the curtain walls on the edge. (Fig. 4.26, 4.22) The addition of two very large cisterns inside the walls further reveals that Montesa's architects were still very much concerned with the site's ability to protect the community of Montesa over a long siege. Nonetheless, Montesa was smaller and more compact than Calatrava la Nueva, and Montesa's architects went to less effort to make the site a self-reliant, large enclosure castle. Specifically, the more utilitarian, but essential structures such as the mill and foundry at Calatrava la Nueva are not present within the innermost curtain-wall at Montesa. The most likely cause for this is that Montesa was not an isolated outpost of Christianity in 1319 as Calatrava la Nueva had been a century earlier. The modern village of Montesa is much larger than it would have been in the 13<sup>th</sup> Century, but it would have held most of the support industries within an additional curtain wall that connected to the castle, but has long since been destroyed.<sup>43</sup>

Montesa and Calatrava la Nueva checked off all of the same boxes for a composite fortress-monastery: cloister, chapter house, church, dormitories, refectory, and castle keep all contained within a curtain wall. However, the two complexes differed in their placement of these elements. (Figs. 3.1, 4.2A, 4.2B) The first difference was that Calatrava la Nueva placed its three-apse church along the more canonical northern side of the cloister, rather than the south side, as at Montesa. The chapter house was placed on the east side of the cloister at both sites, but whereas Calatrava la Nueva placed the

refectory and kitchens perpendicularly to the walk opposite the church, Montesa instead placed dormitories opposite the church. There are many possible reasons for the change in placement at Montesa, but the strict orientation around the cloister is an important commonality between the two complexes. The cloister itself is much more significant, and central to the plan at Montesa. This is true of its scale, and in the fact that, unlike at Calatrava la Nueva, Montesa's cloister was not skewed by the positions of the buildings that surrounded it. (Fig. 4.2A, 4.2B, 3.71) Interestingly, both sites allowed the west side of the cloister to be the "military side." At Calatrava la Nueva there was no choice, the rocky outcropping with what was likely the inherited castle of Dueñas butted up against this side of the cloister. The lack of flattened space at Calatrava la Nueva meant that there were few areas around the castle's rocky outcropping that could accommodate the monastic core, but the location of the cloister in the north-east corner seems to have been a very deliberate solution to the problem. Conversely, Montesa took the approach of aggressively demolishing its inherited Islamic fortress and flattening the hilltop so that it would not have to make as many concessions to the physical site. The fact that Montesa placed the church on the south side of the cloister, despite this flexibility, could mean that the order intended for the church to be an external expression of Christian dominance over the landscape because it would have been nearly invisible to the surrounding area on the north side of the cloister facing the ridge. Unfortunately, as already mentioned, the church is almost entirely demolished by the 1748 earthquake and its position along the southern curtain wall would have required it to signal religiosity without the benefit of large windows. The only method for signaling the location of the church on the exterior

of Montesa that there is evidence for is that portions of the extant buttressing on the interior suggest that it was strong enough to hold a dome.<sup>44</sup>

According to Sam Zeno Conedera and other historians of the military orders, the orders began to decline in religious observance and central authority in the late 13th Century. Increasing identification with the landed nobility, the passing of offices to illegitimate children, and increasing royal interference in internal affairs have all been offered as evidence of the decline of Iberia's military orders.<sup>45</sup> The transformation of fortresses into increasingly palatial forms of architecture has also been offered as evidence of this decline, but this did not truly develop until the late 14<sup>th</sup> Century.<sup>46</sup> As an order, Montesa was founded with qualities associated with decline: the order lacked central authority, it was almost wholly dependent on the monarch, and its offices quickly became dominated by the noble family of Tous. While it was no doubt a practical fortress, the headquarters of Montesa could also be considered a preemptive measure to accusations of illegitimacy and secularization. By invoking Calatrava la Nueva as a model, and intensifying its military-religious identity through increasing articulation to the monastic spaces, the fortress of Montesa was responsible for promoting the idea that the new military order was more than a secular militia under the crown.

# • Partitioning military-religious needs at Montesa

Imagining the fortress-monastery of Montesa as a shallow billboard for the Order's military-religious identity would ignore the barrage of complex factors that shaped it. To begin, the Order of Montesa was at a disadvantage from the moment of its foundation. First, the order was seeded by a Castilian order (Calatrava) that took little interest in it. Second, the Order of Montesa had to define itself as different from the Templars it

replaced, and whose fortresses were its first commanderies. Third, the independence from royal intervention that was essential to the identity of all of the other military orders that preceded Montesa was foundationally absent from the new order. Fourth, the kings of Aragon treated the order as little more than a source of income while accusing the order in 1348-1352 of being too poor to fulfill its intended purpose to protect the kingdom from Islamic attacks. Finally, Montesa was not only founded in a kingdom that no longer held a border with an autonomous Islamic kingdom, but also its power was concentrated in the north – far from even any recent threats of insurrection. Because of these disadvantages, the order had few opportunities to define its identity. The fortress-monastery and namesake of the Order of Montesa was without doubt a concentrated symbol of what the order aspired to be. Consequently, it had to both merge and divide the many practical and religious needs of a composite community of clerics (monks), knights, and laborers.

The fortress-monastery of Montesa was the priory for the entire Order. It was intended to be both the residence of the Master, as well as the Prior who lead the Cistercian, non-military, monastic members of the Order. Thus, more than any other fortress in the order's possession, Montesa leaned very heavily toward the religious needs of the composite order. The same could be said of Calatrava la Nueva for the Order of Calatrava, Tomar for the Order of Christ in Portugal, Uclés for the Order of Santiago in La Mancha, or the fortress-monastery of Alcántara for that order in Extremadura. Montesa's solution to the problem of suiting its dual personality was to create semipermeable, but clearly partitioned spaces that allowed some level of interaction between knights, monks and laborers, while allowing the rhythms of their lifestyle to coexist. Just as at Calatrava, the monastic spaces are all concentrated around the cloister, and kept separate from the castle and other utilitarian structures such as the ovens. However, where Calatrava's monastery, and its castle were two different buildings with different entrances, on two very different levels, Montesa flattened the site and placed the monastery in the middle – creating different spaces, but not different buildings. As a result, the hierarchy of religious to military is also flattened to a degree, with dormitories for monks and cells for soldiers on roughly the same topographical level.

With the site flattened, Montesa's architects had to create some sense of Cistercian interplay between interior and exterior that would still suit the introspective needs of the monastic community. One of the more useful perspectives regarding the partitioning of space in Cistercian monasteries was recently put forth by Maximilian Sternberg in his book Cistercian Architecture and Medieval Society. The author explains his definition of permeability in Cistercian architecture in the following quotation:

I argue that monastic boundaries were marked by varying degrees of permeability. They needed to serve a twofold function, that of both differentiating and establishing continuity with other spheres of medieval society. While our knowledge of the scope of the Cistercians' social relationships has steadily grown, we have generally neglected not only to ask where these interactions actually took place, but also how monastic settings were tailored to accommodate these relationships and their related events. I therefore accord special importance to the communicative role of boundaries, bearing in mind that establishing both physical and spiritual distance between the monastery and the more secular world in and around the enclosure would always have been of paramount importance to Cistercian monasticism.<sup>47</sup>

The boundaries between military and monastic space are not difficult to identify in plan at Montesa. The site itself is nearly bisected by the west wall of the cloister, and there is only one portal leading from the western fortress area, containing the ovens, gatehouse and first ward, to the monastic core via a door on the northwest corner of the cloister. The monotony of this wall was eventually broken up by the series of trapezoidal pillars in front of it that were likely built in the early 15<sup>th</sup> Century. It is difficult to be certain about the purpose of the isolated pillars but I hypothesize that the surviving 15<sup>th</sup> Century pillars may have replaced a similar line of supports that existed when the cloister was vaulted in the later 14<sup>th</sup> Century. This conclusion is strictly based on the observation that the foundations of the west wall of the cloister are too thin to support the cloister vaults, and that some additional support structure had to have been in this location in the 14<sup>th</sup> century as well as the 15<sup>th</sup>. The trapezoidal pillars possess a strange uniformity that remains a mystery, but whatever form the supports took, they would have broken up the monotony of the western wall, and created semi-permeable spaces just as the extant pillars do.

The question of permeability has been essential to this dissertation for several reasons. Primarily, I have argued that the "wall of the faithful" was itself a permeable space that could expand and contract throughout the Christian Reconquest. The fortress-monastery of Montesa – more specifically my 3D reconstruction of it – is an opportunity to understand how a military order created permeable boundaries at an architectural scale. Taken further, there *appears* to be a crisis of orientation at Montesa, where practical surveillance of the exterior landscape would have to compete with a monastic plan that was designed to promote internal contemplation. It is with these concerns in mind that the Montesa modeling project attempted to test how well the architectural spaces, and therefore the communities of knights and clerics or conventual brothers were partitioned from one another. In some ways, this kind of consideration can be accomplished with a simple 2D plan. Counting the portals between transitional spaces and gauging their size, or forming a rudimentary network analysis of connected spaces can be accomplished in

short order without the help of technology. Conversely, the impacts of terrain changes in the lower ward or the size of the ruined cloister doorway on a laborer's ability to see into the cloister is much more difficult to comprehend without viewshed technology. Even more difficult to visualize is the "translucent" quality of the interior volume of the cloister for a person walking past an arcade.

There are many techniques that architectural historians and archaeologists have used to test permeability, exclusivity, and connectivity at a ruined site. The most popular solution called network analysis identifies all the rooms in a site as a node, then creates edges between nodes if there was a doorway between the two rooms. The data can be massaged to account for the width of doorways, or the appearance of screens or windows, but in essence, a room is either accessible, or inaccessible. This form of analysis could be a useful direction for my future research on Montesa, but the current work was more interested in the negotiation of vision at a site that historians have described as being strictly broken into "Fortress" and "Monastery." The solution that I came up with to test the relative permeability at Montesa was to create a custom-made volumetric viewshed analysis tool within the Autodesk 3D Studio Max modeling program. A technical description of how this tool was made can be read in Appendix E, but there are several qualities of the experiment that must be explained in order to understand the visualizations it produced. The volumetric viewshed analysis proposed here is based on metaphorically reversing the active-passive relationship between light and viewer. If we imagine that a viewer could cast out their vision from a single point in all directions, and that only areas which are "struck" by this emanation of vision are "visible," then we can use a point-light as a stand-in for a viewer, and an array of gridded, light sensitive nodes

as the measure of that visibility. (Fig. 4.39)<sup>48</sup> For this experiment, I created a string of point-lights to simulate a 5'8" person walking from the entrance of the fortress, through the solitary door to the cloister, down the north and east walks of the cloister, and into the corridor connecting to the church. A new light was added every 2 feet in the string so that two lights could never be located between the nodes, which were also in a 2' x 2' 3D grid. This resolution was used under the premise that a person could not compact themselves into a space smaller than a 2' x 2' x 2' cube and thus avoid "detection" by the grid. Consequently, the volumetric viewshed tool essentially tests whether a person standing or sitting in different parts of the cloister or bailey could be seen by the actor who physically breaks the boundary between the fortress and the monastery by walking from the fortress gate to the Church.

The data that is exported from the volumetric viewshed tool is only useful once it is re-imported into the scene and colorized according to the relative visibility or invisibility of the unit of space. Figure 4.40 shows a view of the cloister with colorized cubic voxels designating how many of the point lights struck each light sensitive node in the 2' cubic grid. The effect of moving through a cloister has often been thought to create a staccato effect – where the columns of the arcade make the garth space alternate between visible and invisible in a regular rhythm. With the possible exception of a choir screen, there is no space that reflects permeability in a monastery more clearly than the cloister. The width of the cloister walk, the typical lack of seating, its central position in the monastic core, and the rituals that required movement through it all point to the cloister as a transitional space. The cloister garth, as well as the walks opposite a person moving through the cloister tended to exist in varying degrees of transparency, creating a pseudo-privacy for the residents of the monastery. Figures 4.41 and 4.42 render the cloud-like quality of spatial visibility inside of a cloister, as well as the much different effect that is created when the large open space of the fortress-ward is only permeated by a single doorway leading to the cloister. In terms of military tactics, the cloister was a terribly inferior space – full of blind spots and occlusions. It is also clear that the cloister at Montesa was well suited for introspection, and that the "outside world" of the valley below was entirely invisible.

Like many data visualizations, this project has only begun to hint at its possible utility, and it is only constrained by the available data. The current system of exporting light-meter CSVs from 3DS Max and re-importing the aggregates is only a three-step process, but it is labor and memory intensive – mostly due to the simple issue that the light meters are only sensitive on one side. A more holistic data capture of visibility at Montesa would give a greater sense of the degree to which its architects expressed a desire to foster privacy for the clerics by separating them visually from the rest of the community. One could equally identify ways in which the architects strategically designed the fortress so that particular spaces were highly visible for defenders on the walls, or tripped a "visual alarm." The combination of these ideas could begin to re-map the military-monastic spaces at Montesa, and more deeply interrogate the idea of "hybrid" architecture, but as of this publication, this is beyond the scope of the project. In the end, I must be content to conclude that the cloister was an essential, permeable junction point between the military and monastic sides of the new order's identity, and that there was not a crisis of orientation at Montesa because views of the landscape below rarely if ever entered the introspectively oriented spaces of the monastic core.

The 3D reconstruction of Montesa and the subsequent volumetric viewshed analysis are most useful for their ability to reveal degrees of enclosure and partitioning that are not apparent at the extant site. With most of the existing walls less than two feet high, the landscape below Montesa is visible from nearly every vantage point in the fortress. (Fig. 4.43) Even with the reconstructed walls left translucent, the same view in the 3D model reveals that the site was anything but open and airy. (Fig. 4.44) It was bounded by walls and enclosed so that the landscape below would only have been visible for those purposefully chose to view it. Again, this is knowable by looking at a 2D plan. One can see in a plan that the outer ramparts and towers on the exterior curtain walls were the only spaces that were likely responsible for landscape surveillance, and the doorways leading to the cloister all show that this core had an insular orientation. Nonetheless, the experience of being enclosed is a phenomenological experience that 2D plans fail to capture. The volumetric viewshed experiment was conceived as a way to quantify visibility, but it was wholly dependent on the 3D reconstruction, which formed occlusions and openings for the point-lights/viewers while offering a much more embodied experience. Finally, the act of modeling in itself forces its creator to interrogate the extant foundations and other sources in a way that is difficult to simulate with other means.

## **4.5 Conclusion**

As I have demonstrated, calling the fortress of Montesa a "hybrid" would be, at best, an uninspired description of an extremely complex structure with equally complicated influences. It also may appear anachronistic to describe the site as inappropriate for its time and place. After all, Montesa was a unique and extensive architectural investment in the history of the order that merged military and monastic influences at a level never before achieved by any of the military orders. Nonetheless, as successful as the architects of Montesa were in expressing the Order's identity as a frontier institution with equally religious and military motivations, the new headquarters was an instant relic. The site appeared to follow a formula where inclusion in the "wall of the faithful" required a military-monastic headquarters on the frontier, but by the 14<sup>th</sup> Century, the Castilian military orders had new "frontier" headquarters closer to the border with Granada, and Aragon and Portugal were both cut off from the only autonomous Islamic kingdom remaining in Iberia. Rather than suffering a decline, where formerly independent military orders came more under the influence of their respective kings, the Order of Montesa was founded as a royal dependency from the beginning.

There are two scenarios that explain why the Order of Montesa failed, and why its fortress-monastery was constructed with such an emphatically military-monastic identity. On the one hand the initial plan for the fortress-monastery of Montesa may have been to make it proper frontier headquarters on par with Calatrava la Nueva but the order struggled too long with the consolidation of its northern possessions to ever concentrate on frontier interests in the south. On the other hand, Montesa may have been located where it was, and with such investment to offer a kind of religious, Reconquest gloss to an increasingly secular order that was no different than most of its predecessors in the 14<sup>th</sup> Century. The fact that the Order of Montesa was deemed a failure by Peter IV in the mid-14<sup>th</sup> Century should not lead to the conclusion that the Order's sole architectural

rather than the military side of Montesa, it is too cynical to argue that the site was built "for show." Surveillance of the Albaida river valley, and the Mudéjar population of Xàtiva was still an important consideration in the 14<sup>th</sup> Century, and the siting of Montesa and its intervisible fortress of Vallada were perfectly suited to this purpose. The reality was that the Order of Montesa did not have the benefit of hindsight that historians have. As a result, the fortress-monastery of Montesa became a successfully executed impression of a frontier headquarters that signaled legitimacy and dedication to physical and spiritual warfare, but because it failed to serve the practical purposes set by its 13<sup>th</sup> century model, [Calatrava la Nueva] the site quickly became more monastery than

achievement was also a failure. While there was a distinct emphasis on the monastic,

fortress.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Robert Ignatius Burns, "Journey from Islam: Incipient Cultural Transition in the Conquered Kingdom of Valencia (1240-1280)," *Speculum* 35, no. 3 (1960): 338

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Elena Lourie, "Conspiracy and Coverup: The Order of Montesa on Trial (1352)," in *Iberia and the Mediterranean World of the Middle Ages: Studies in Honor of Robert I. Burns*, by Larry J. Simon and Robert Ignatius. Burns (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), 253 3 Durne, "The Significance of the Exerciser" 220

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Burns, "The Significance of the Frontier." 320

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Joseph O'Callaghan quoted the Valencian Muslim poet Abu-I-Mutarrif ibn 'Amira's reaction when he heard about the conquest of his home city: "Like a bird of prey the enemy seized the city – elegant, beautiful, brilliant Valencia – by the throat. The call to prayer in the mosque was quickly reduced to silence. The life of the Muslim faith was ripped from its body... The infidel has destroyed the Muslim faith there and the bell has replaced the call of the muezzin." Joseph F. O'Callaghan, *A History of Medieval Spain* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), 347. <sup>5</sup> Isabel A. O'Connor, *A Forgotten Community: The Mudejar Aljama of Xàtiva, 1240-1327* (Boston, MA: Brill, 2003), 140.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Christopher Gerrard, "Opposing Identity." 147

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> O'Connor, 146-148

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Ibid. 151-169

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Ibid. 161

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Ibid. 161-162

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Myriam Navarro Benito, "Los Castillos De La Orden De Montesa En El Contexto Del Siglo XIV," ed. Marc Bonnín Femenías, *Medieval Anales De La Universidad De Alicante. Historia Medieval* 13 (2002-2003): 17,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Luis Garcia-Guijarro Ramos, "The Extinction of the Order of the Temple in the Kingdom of Valencia and Early Montesa, 1307-1330: A Case of Transition from Universalist to Territorialized Military Orders," in *The Debate on the Trial of the Templars*, 1307-1314, by Jochen Burgtorf, Paul Crawford, and Helen J. Nicholson (Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2010), 204 <sup>13</sup> Ibid. 199

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. 200

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. 209

<sup>16</sup> Alan J. Forey, *The Fall of the Templars in the Crown of Aragon* (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2001), 39-40.

<sup>17</sup> Ramos. 206-7

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. 209

<sup>19</sup> Hippolyto De. Samper, *Montesa Illustrada; Origen, Fondacion, Principios, Etc. De La Religion Militar De N.S. Santa Maria De Montesa Y San George De Alfama* (Valencia: G. Vilagrasa, 1669), 17. (Translated from Spanish by author). *emphasis added* 

<sup>20</sup> Benito. 18

<sup>21</sup> O'Connor. 148

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. 156

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. 163

<sup>24</sup> Elena Lourie, "Conspiracy and Coverup: The Order of Montesa on Trial (1352)," in *Iberia and the Mediterranean World of the Middle Ages: Studies in Honor of Robert I. Burns*, by Larry J. Simon and Robert Ignatius. Burns (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), 253-317.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. 255

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. 256

27 Ibid. 274

<sup>28</sup> Lourie quoted the testimony of Jaume de Molins – identified as a "citizen of Valencia" who was acquainted with the order – to make the point that all of the attacks were directed against the knights within the order, and not the clerical brothers. Ibid. 270

<sup>29</sup> Ibid. 275

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. 276

<sup>31</sup> Ibid. 261-262

<sup>32</sup> The website for the museum of Montesa has scanned copies of most of the histories and archaeological reports on the fortress and town of Montesa. See: "Otras Publicaciones." *Museu Parroquial De Montesa*. Accessed August 25, 2015.

http://www.museumontesa.com/castellano/archivo/otras.htm.

Laboratorio De Arqueologia Facultad De Filosofia Y Letras, Montesa: Trabajos Arqueologicos (Valencia: Universidad De Valencia, 1949)

The most thorough architectural survey of the fortress of Montesa with architectural drawings and images of the different phases of the structure is the 2011 thesis project by Dolores Borao Moreno. "Proyecto Final De Grado: El Castillo-Convento De Montesa" (Master's thesis, Universidad De Valencia, 2011) 16, 38

<sup>33</sup> Colorized plan after Dolores Moreno. "El Castillo-Convento de Montesa." 41.

<sup>34</sup> One of the few medieval, frontier fortress-monasteries in Spain to expose the location of the church on the curtain walls was the 11<sup>th</sup> Century castle of Loarre. This site, which predated the formation of the formation of the military orders by more than a century, contained a church with a rounded apse and rounded strip-buttressing on the exterior that projected prominently south in the direction of a landscape that was almost entirely populated by Muslims at the time. (Fig. 3.56) <sup>35</sup> Gerrard, "Opposing Identity." 147

<sup>36</sup> Benito. 23

<sup>37</sup> Dolores Borao Moreno, "Proyecto Final De Grado: El Castillo-Convento De Montesa" (Master's thesis, Universidad De Valencia, 2011) 16, 38

<sup>38</sup> Juan De Borja, Fernando Andrés Robres, and Josep Cerdà I Ballester, *Breve Resolución De Todas Las Cosas Generales Y Particulares De La Orden Y Cavallería De Montesa (1624): Manuscrito De Frey Joan Borja, Religioso Montesiano* (Valencia: Institució Alfons El Magnànim, 2004), 182-184.

<sup>39</sup> Maximilian Sternberg discusses the surprising promotion of the 'ideal' Cistercian plan in his book *Cistercian architecture and Medieval Society*. "In the more popular literature, one occasionally still comes across the image of 'the ideal plan' of a Cistercian abbey (first advanced by Dimier)... This plan is so generic that it was never taken up in a serious way in subsequent scholarship." Maximilian Sternberg, Cistercian Architecture and Medieval Society (Brill, 2013), 113.

<sup>40</sup> It was common to have east facing "up" in medieval maps and plans.

<sup>44</sup> Vincente Fernan Y Salvador, El Castillo De Montesa: Historia Y Descripción Del Mismo, Precedida De Un Bosquejo Histórico De La Orden Militar De Santa María De Montesa Y San Jorge De Alfama (Valencia: Vives Mora, 1926), 123.

<sup>45</sup> Conedera. *Ecclesiastical Knights*. 79-81

<sup>46</sup> Enrique Rodriguez-Picavea, "The Military Orders in Medieval Iberia," *Mirator* 13 (2012): 19-22, accessed August 26, 2015, http://www.glossa.fi/mirator/pdf/i-

2012/imagepropagandaandlegitimacy.pdf.

<sup>47</sup> Maximilian Sternberg, *Cistercian Architecture and Medieval Society* (Brill, 2013), 114.

<sup>48</sup> This image shows the array of "light meter helper" 2D grids inside the model. Where each line in the grids crossed, a light-sensitive node was able to detect how many point-lights could "strike it" without being occluded by the reconstructed walls.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Alan J. Forey, *Templars in the Corona De Aragón*. 361.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Cristóbal Guitart Aparicio, Castillos De Aragón, vol. II (Zaragoza: Librería General, 1986), 187.
 <sup>43</sup> Dolores Borao Moreno, "Proyecto Final De Grado: El Castillo-Convento De Montesa" (Master's thesis, Universidad De Valencia, 2011), 38.

## Conclusion

Iberia's religious frontier remains a historiographical paradox. It was always shifting and chaotic, yet it was occupied by institutions whose primary goal was to define the space as sharply as possible. The *wall of the faithful* was an articulation of this desire for sharp definition on the frontier, but in reality, it bore little resemblance to an impermeable barrier. The orders themselves - neither monastic nor secular but a composite of different spheres – were the perfect occupants for the complex interplay of intention and reality on the frontier. More so than any other frontier institution, their purpose was to distribute themselves in such a way that they could sharply define and make permanent what was primarily a transitional space. This kind of spatial complexity is as much a strength of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) as it is a weakness of linear prose, but these systems are only as strong as their underlying data. Consequently, my research has striven to account for discrete data about the military orders that are singularly inconsequential, but contribute to vast observable patterns when placed in a spatial system. Rather than dig deep into a small discrete moment in the history of one military order on the frontier, this dissertation has reassessed the problem of locating Iberia's military orders in time and space. Through a combination of a wide-scale view of the entire peninsula and in-depth research on two exceptional examples of their architecture, this dissertation indentified four patterns that defined the strategy for constructing the *wall of the faithful*:

- 1. The native Iberian military orders were founded at fortified sites that lie near the "edges" of Christian-controlled territory.
- 2. Pre-existing Muslim-built fortresses, as well as new fortress-locations, were captured and re-occupied according to their ability to observe and influence

the surrounding landscape.

- 3. These fortresses formed a strategic network of intervisible and/or spatially connected nodes that could control vast areas of territory.
- 4. The military orders built large-scale, iconic fortress-monasteries that were designed to cater to and project the composite military-monastic identity of its residents.

This dissertation has demonstrated several times that the military orders had an inverse relationship with the frontier to that of the Christian kingdoms. For these orders, the frontier was their center, and the interior of the Christian kingdoms was their periphery. Consequently, any study of their architecture should strive to comprehend where that frontier was at any time, and what role the military orders had in defining it. Rigorous spatial analysis cannot rely on earlier gestures that the military orders "tended to predominate" in certain areas of the Iberian Peninsula.<sup>1</sup> The speed at which we can pan and zoom through satellite images of our world has made locating even the most modest of architectural remains possible at ever larger scales. The data that informed Chapter 2 and is reproduced as a simple table in Appendix A was gathered at a scale that was deemed impossible by Alan Forey in 1984 thanks to these technological advances. ADIMO is by no means complete, but because the data was captured in a regimented way, it can be comfortably argued that the static maps of the Christian Reconquest that have been produced and reproduced since the 19<sup>th</sup> century are incorrect and misleading. I have also demonstrated that GIS tools, particularly viewshed analysis, cost-distance analysis and network analysis, allow histories of the Christian Reconquest to look beyond the listing of battles and the conquest of cities and castles, and focus instead on the

impact of these occupation changes on the large, rural landscape where the military orders were most influential.

This study was not content to rely strictly on extant masonry to test hypotheses about how a fortress-monastery was organized or functioned. The dense photogrammetry data captured at the sites of Calatrava la Nueva and Montesa assisted in close reading of these complex structures with less abstraction than traditional forms of architectural representation.<sup>2</sup> The digital reconstruction of Montesa was able to take this close reading a step further by allowing the model to act as a laboratory for specific experiments – in particular, volumetric viewshed analysis.<sup>3</sup> At its conclusion, the Montesa modeling project accomplished something very similar to that of the GIS project in that it began with a hypothesis of something that is believed to be true -i.e. that the cloister was a volumetrically "translucent" space that the military orders used to create a partition and transition between secular and sacred spaces – and then detected patterns in the hundreds of nodes that emerged from the experiment. While this study may not have revealed as many firm patterns as the ADIMO project, the act of building the model was a constructive intellectual process on its own. At no point was this project intended to illustrate what the building looked like at a given moment in its history. The fact that the reconstructed walls were left translucent was a slightly tongue-in-cheek way to express that I consider transparency of visualization-based research to be critical to the process. In the future, a more thorough reconstruction of Montesa – with further intellectual "leaps" than the mere extrusion of walls that would block light from entering a particular space – is possible with additional effort toward that goal. Nonetheless, I will strive to make those leaps as transparent as possible.

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While I have used spatial theories and digital techniques as the springboard for much of this study, these techniques were never – and should never be – used in isolation. To determine the interdependence of spatial and historical developments, I surrounded the digital projects with historical context and tested historical narratives against the spatial data. For instance, the foundational documents for the Order of Montesa tell us that James II of Aragon founded the order with the clear purpose of protecting his southern 'frontier,' but the spatial evidence shows that the Order of Montesa was mostly concentrated in the north. Conversely, their lone architectural achievement, the Castillo-Convento de Montesa, bore all of the trappings of a frontier fortress with distinct military-monastic partitioning, but the historical context tells us that it was not sited on a contested frontier that shared a border with independent Islamic forces. Montesa may have mimicked Calatrava la Nueva, but because it lacked a spatial proximity to an expansive frontier, it became more of a figurehead than a functional headquarters.

Finally, one of the first goals of this dissertation was to tackle a subject that was previously deemed too large or too daunting due to its spatial and temporal scale. At the same time, I also devoted half of this work to the more intimate scale of individual case studies. The juxtaposition of these two scales was intended to press the point that the subject is incredibly vast, and that military order fortresses were subject to seemingly limitless influences on the frontier. I also used the varying spatial scales to demonstrate that Iberia's military orders were as concerned with high-scale factors in their fortress network as they were with individual problems of siting, viewshed, and identity at each site. The ADIMO project should not be confused with a 'deep map.' It simply lacks the layers of data that are required for such a designation. At the same time, this study can be a beginning for a thorough reconsideration of how historians have visualized the Christian Reconquest of Iberia. The future goals for ADIMO are to remove it from the specific context of the military orders, and add it to a larger set of data that identifies the thousands of additional fortresses and fortified towns in Iberia that existed on the frontier at some time. (Fig. 5.1) I would also like to reconsider ways of representing diversity within the categories of "Christian Nobles" or "Islamic" occupation that would still retain the essential quality of expressing where religious boundaries existed at different times. In the end, the new threshold for a single scholar lies somewhere between the ADIMO database, and a database of all of Iberia's thousands of fortresses.<sup>4</sup> The best way to solve this problem is through linked open data. Collaboration with other scholars and interoperability between databases will be the key to pushing through the next ceiling of "impossible" scale projects.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Alan Forey "The Military Orders and the Spanish Reconquest." 202

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> An interactive point-cloud with 14 million points of data captured at Calatrava la nueva can be navigated here: <u>https://skfb.ly/GMVs</u> As with all 3D graphics, a mouse is recommended to navigate through the model. At the moment this file is too large for mobile devices, but that is likely not a permanent problem.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The 3D model of Montesa can be navigated here: <u>https://skfb.ly/GN7B</u>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> For an example of the number of sites that would be involved in such a database see the 1956 map created by the Architectural Conservator of Spanish Castles in Figure 5.1. Federico Bordejé, Castles Itinerary in Castile: Guide to the More Interesting Castilian Castles (Madrid: Dirección General De Bellas Artes, Ministerio De Educación Nacional, 1965) Map 1

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## Appendix A

A flattened table of the Architectural Database of Iberian Military Orders (ADIMO)

Site Name	Building Name	Order name	Building Type	Topography	Single Begin Date	Earliest Begin Date	Latest Begin Date	Single End Date	Earliest End Date	Latest End Date	Latitude	Longitude
	Monasterio de											
Abadía	Sotofermoso	Hospitallers	Monastery	Valley		1311-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.260834	-5.974046
	Monasterio de											
Abadía	Sotofermoso	Templars	Monastery	Valley		1167-12-31	1168-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.260834	-5.974046
Abanilla	Castillo de Abanilla	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1265-12-31	1266-12-30		1280-12-31	1281-12-30	38.207363	-1.038326
Abaran	Castillo de Abaran	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1284-12-31	1285-12-30	1499-12-31			38.204049	-1.39281
Aboim	Aboim	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1145-12-31	1146-12-30	1499-12-31			41.749055	-8.391937
Aceuchal	Torre de Iglesia de San Pedro (Aceuchal)	Santiago	Church	Valley		1229-12-31	1230-12-30	1499-12-31			38.646912	-6.48743
Aceuchal	Torre de Iglesia de San Pedro (Aceuchal)	Templars	Church	Valley		1187-12-31	1199-12-30		1229-12-31	1230-12-30	38.646912	-6.48743
Ademuz	Castillo de Santa Barbara	Montesa	Fortress	Spur		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.070076	-1.295346
	Castillo de Santa			~F								
Ademuz	Barbara	Templars	Fortress	Spur		1258-12-31	1259-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.070076	-1.295346
1 domail	Durbuu	Christian	1 offices	opu		1250 12 51	1207 12 50		1000 12 01	1517 12 50	10.070070	1.270010
Ademuz	Ademuz	Occupation	Fortress			1210-12-31	1211-12-30	1258-12-31			40.070076	-1.295346
Adzaneta	Adzaneta	Montesa	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.217084	-0.170578
Adzaneta	Adzaneta	Templars	City	Valley		1302-12-31	1303-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.217084	-0.170578
Alange	Castillo de Alange	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1242-12-31	1243-12-30	1499-12-31			38.786285	-6.259051
, mange	Custino de Filange	Christian	ronness	Timop		12121251	1210 12 00	11,77 12 51			50.700205	0.207001
Alange	Alange	Victory	Battle		1229-12-31			1230-12-30			38.78625	-6.25901
	g-	Muslim										0
Alange	Alange	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1229-12-31	1230-12-30	38.78625	-6.25901
	g-	Christian										
Alange	Alange	Occupation	Fortress			1229-12-31	1230-12-30		1242-12-31	1243-12-30	38.78625	-6.25901
	Alarcon Pilgrim											
Alarcon	Hospital	Santiago	Monastery	Hilltop		1193-12-31	1194-12-30	1499-12-31			39.545829	-2.089461
Alarcon	Alarcon	Muslim Siege	City		1197-05-31			1197-08-30			39,960693	-4.832647
Alarcos	Castillo de Alarcos	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1212-07-15	1212-12-30	1499-12-31			38.955448	-4.014477
Alarcos	Castillo de Alarcos	Almohad	Fortress	Hilltop		1195-07-17	1195-07-30		1212-06-30	1212-07-15	38,955448	-4.014477
Alarcos	Castillo de Alarcos	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1157-12-31	1158-12-30		1194-12-31	1195-12-30	38.955448	-4.014477
Albaladejo	Castillo de Albaladejo	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1242-12-31	1243-12-30	1499-12-31			38.6194	-2.804744
Albalat	Castillo de Albalat	Alcantara	Fortress	Valley		1194-12-31	1195-12-30		1195-12-31	1196-12-30	39.774261	-5.719985
Albalat	Castillo de Albalat	Alcantara	Fortress	Valley		1229-12-31	1230-12-30		1234-12-31	1235-12-30	39.774261	-5.719985
mount	Castillo de Albanchez	Thoundard	1011000	( une j		1227 12 51	1250 12 50		123 1 12 31	1200 12 00	57.17.1201	5.777705
Albanchez	de Magina	Santiago	Fortress	Spur		1308-12-31	1309-12-30	1499-12-31			37.790216	-3.467983
Albentosa	Castillo de Albentosa	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1195-12-31	1196-12-30		1250-12-31	1251-12-30	40,10169	-0.771176
moontoba	Castillo de Alberite de	Tempharo	1 offices	Timop		11/0 12 01	11,0 12 50		1200 12 01	1201 12 00	10.1010)	0
Alberite	San Juan	Hospitallers	Fortress	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			42,406433	-2.440844
	Castillo de Alberite de							,,				
Alberite	San Juan	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1138-12-31	1139-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	42.406433	-2.440844
Albocacer	Albocacer (villa)	Montesa	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.356548	0.024492
Albocacer	Albocacer (villa)	Calatrava	City	Valley	1	1242-12-31	1243-12-30		1275-12-31	1276-12-30	40.356548	0.024492
Albocacer	Albocacer (villa)	Templars	City	Valley	ł	1293-12-31	1294-12-30	ł	1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.356548	0.024492
	Castillo de		2.0								101220210	0.021772
	Alburquerque /		1									
Alburquerque	Castillo de Luna	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop	1	1165-12-31	1166-12-30	1	1183-12-31	1184-12-30	39.217425	-7.002685
querque	Castillo de	Sannago	1011035			1105 12 51	1100 12 50		1105 12 51	1107 12 50	57.2117423	1.002005
	Alburguerque /		1									
	· ···· urquerque /	1	1	1	1	1216-12-31	1	1	1	1		

		Muslim										
Alcacer do Sal	Alcacer do Sal	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31			1147-10-16			38.372392	-8.513494
		Christian										
Alcacer do Sal	Alcacer do Sal	Occupation	Fortress		1147-10-16				1185-12-31	1186-12-30	38.372392	-8.513494
Alcacer do Sal	Alcacer do Sal	Santiago	Fortress			1216-12-31	1217-12-30	1499-12-31			38.372392	-8.513494
Alcacer do Sal	Alcacer do Sal	Santiago	Fortress			1185-12-31	1186-12-30		1190-12-31	1191-12-30	38.372392	-8.513494
		Mulsim										
Alcacer do Sal		Occupation	Fortress			1190-12-31	1190-12-31		1216-12-31	1217-12-30	38.372392	-8.513494
		Muslim										
Alcal? del J?car?	Alcal? del J?car?	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1212-12-31	1213-12-30	39.190814	-1.42984
		Christian										
Alcal? del J?car?	Alcal? del J?car?	Occupation	Fortress			1212-12-31	1213-12-30	1499-12-31			39.190814	-1.4298
	Castillo de Alcala de	Alcala de la										
Alcala	la Selva	Selva	Fortress	Valley		1173-12-31	1174-12-30		1239-12-31	1246-12-30	40.371822	-0.721390
		Christian										
Alcala	Alcala	Occupation	City		1119-12-31			1499-12-31			40.482109	-3.372041
Alcala	Alcala	Muslim Siege	City		1197-05-31	-		1197-08-30	-		40.482109	-3.372041
Alcala de	Ticulu	Muslim	City		1197 05 51			11)/ 00 50			40.402109	5.57204
Guadaira	Alcala de Guadaira	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1246-08-31	1246-09-29	37.335557	-5.85534
Alcala de	ricala uc Guadalla	Christian	City		1117-12-31	+			1240-00-51	1240-07-27	51.555551	-5.05554
Guadaira	Alcala de Guadaira	Occupation	City			1246-08-31	1246-09-30	1499-12-31	1		37.335557	-5.85534
Alcala de los	Castillo de Alcala de	Santa Maria de	City	1		1240-06-31	1240-09-30	1499-12-31	+		51.555551	-3.63334
Gazules	los Gazules	Espana	Fortress	Hilltop		1271-12-31	1272-12-30	1499-12-31	1		36.46337	-5.722502
Gazules		Espana	Fortress	Hiitop		12/1-12-31	1272-12-30	1499-12-31			30.40337	-5.722502
AL 18 1 377 .	Castillo de Chivert -		<b>F</b> .			1016 10 01	1210 12 20	1400 10 01			10 207700	0.05500
Alcalà de Xivert	Xivert	Montesa	Fortress	Hilltop		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.307708	0.255085
	Castillo de Chivert -								1000 10 01	1010 10 00	10.000000	
Alcalà de Xivert	Xivert	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1233-12-31	1234-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.307708	0.255085
		Muslim										
Alcala del Rio	Alcala del Rio	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1245-12-31	1247-12-30	37.518657	-5.979124
		Christian										
Alcala del Rio	Alcala del Rio	Occupation	City			1245-12-31	1247-12-30	1499-12-31			37.518657	-5.979124
	Alcazaba de Alcala la											
Alcala la Real	Real / La Mota	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1310-12-31	1311-12-30	1499-12-31			37.460231	-3.929467
		Muslim										
Alcala la Real	Alcala la Real	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31			1341-08-14			37.460021	-3.929676
Alcala la Real	Alcala la Real	Christian Siege	Fortress		1244-12-31			1245-12-30			37.460021	-3.929676
		Christian										
Alcala la Real	Alcala la Real	Occupation	Fortress		1341-08-14			1499-12-31			37.460021	-3.929676
Alcanede	Castelo de Alcanede	Avis	Fortress	Hilltop		1222-12-31	1223-12-30	1499-12-31			39.417036	-8.821378
Alcanede	Castelo de Alcanede	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1172-12-31	1173-12-30		1186-12-31	1187-12-30	39.417036	-8.82137
Alcanede	Castelo de Alcanede	Evora	Fortress	Hilltop		1186-12-31	1187-12-30		1222-12-31	1223-12-30	39.417036	-8.821378
	Castillo-Convento de											
Alcaniz	Alcaniz	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1178-12-31	1179-12-30	1499-12-31			41.048933	-0.13069
	Castillo-Convento de		200						1	1 1		
Alcaniz	Alcaniz	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1178-12-31	1179-12-30	1499-12-31	1		41.048933	-0.130697
Alcantara	Castillo de Alcantara	Alcantara	Fortress	Hilltop	-	1217-12-31	1218-12-30	1499-12-31	+	1	39.720679	-6.887492
Alcantara	Castillo de Alcantara	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1217-12-31	1218-12-30	1477-12-31	1217-12-31	1218-12-30	39.720679	-6.887492
Alcaria Ruiva	Castelo Alcaria Ruiva	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1213-12-31	1238-12-30	1499-12-31	1217-12-31	1210-12-30	37.700522	-7.762223
		U U		пшор	1004 10 01	1237-12-31	1230-12-30		+			
Alcaudete	Alcaudete	Christian Siege	Fortress		1224-12-31	+		1225-12-30	+		37.590448	-4.088464
Alcaudete	Alcaudete	Christian Siege	Fortress		1239-12-31	+		1240-12-30	+		37.590448	-4.088464
		Muslim	<b>F</b> .		1110 12 21	1			1010 07 01	1010 00 00	0.0	1 000
Alcaudete	Alcaudete	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31	1010	1010		1212-07-31	1212-08-30	37.590448	-4.088464
Alcaudete	Alcaudete	Calatrava	Fortress			1212-07-31	1212-08-30		1213-12-31	1214-12-30	37.590448	-4.08846
		Muslim				1			1			
Alcaudete	Alcaudete	Occupation	Fortress			1213-12-31	1214-12-30		1244-12-31	1245-12-30	37.590448	-4.088464
Alcaudete	Alcaudete	Calatrava	Fortress			1244-12-31	1245-12-30		1298-12-31	1300-12-30	37.590448	-4.088464
		Muslim										
Alcaudete	Alcaudete	Occupation	Fortress	1	1	1298-12-31	1300-12-30		1339-12-31	1340-12-30	37.590448	-4.088464

	-	1		-				-				
	Torreon de don Juan											
Alcazar de San	de Austria / Torreon		_									
Juan	del Gran*	Hospitallers	Fortress	Valley		1291-12-31	1292-12-30	1499-12-31	_		39.387708	-3.2134
Alcolea	Alcolea (Villa)	Calatrava	Fortress	Valley		1212-07-15	1212-12-30	1499-12-31			38.988077	-4.114619
Alcolea	Alcolea (Villa)	Almohad	City	Valley		1195-07-17	1195-07-30		1212-06-30	1212-07-15	38.988077	-4.114619
Alcolea	Alcolea (Villa)	Calatrava	City	Valley		1172-12-31	1173-12-30		1195-07-17	1195-12-30	38.988077	-4.114619
	Castillo de Alconchel /											
Alconchel	Castillo Miraflores	Alcantara	Fortress	Hilltop		1415-12-31	1416-12-30	1499-12-31			38.52236	-7.067863
	Castillo de Alconchel /											
Alconchel	Castillo Miraflores	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1263-12-31	1264-12-30		1212-12-31	1213-12-30	38.52236	-7.067863
Alcoutim	Castelo Alcoutim	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1303-12-31	1304-12-30	1499-12-31			37.470535	-7.472075
Alcuadete	Alcazar de Alcuadete	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1212-07-15	1299-12-30		1300-12-31	1340-12-30	37.590655	-4.087981
Alcuadete	Alcuadete	Christian Siege	Fortress		1243-12-31			1244-12-30			37.590448	-4.088464
		Christian										
Alcuadete	Alcuadete	Occupation	Fortress			1339-12-31	1340-12-30	1499-12-31			37.590448	-4.088464
Alcubillas	Castillo de Alcubillas	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1212-12-31	1213-12-30	1499-12-31			38.748828	-3.123516
Aldeia Rica	Aldeia Rica (villa)	Santiago	City	Valley		1170-12-31	1184-12-31	1499-12-31			40.649245	-7.323541
Alfambra	Castillo de Alfambra	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1316-12-31	1316-12-31	1499-12-31			40.549751	-1.034622
Alfambra	Castillo de Alfambra	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1195-12-31	1196-12-30		1316-12-31	1317-12-30	40.549751	-1.034622
Alfocea	Castillo de Alfocea	Templars	Fortress	Spur		1131-12-31	1132-12-30		1314-12-31	1315-12-30	41.724801	-0.952598
Algars	Castillo de Algars	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			41.092886	0.227504
Algars	Castillo de Algars	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1152-12-31	1153-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	41.092886	0.227504
		Muslim										
Algeciras	Algeciras	Occupation	City		1119-12-31			1344-03-24			36.129805	-5.447822
Algeciras	Algeciras	Christian Siege	City		1277-12-31			1278-12-30			36.129805	-5.447822
Algeciras	Algeciras	Christian Siege	City		1308-12-31			1309-12-30			36.129805	-5.447822
		Christian										
Algeciras	Algeciras	Occupation	City		1344-03-24			1499-12-31			36.129805	-5.447822
Algeciras	Algeciras	Christian Siege	City		1309-06-30			1309-07-30			36.129805	-5.447822
Algeciras	Algeciras	Christian Siege	City			1342-07-31	1342-08-30	1344-03-24			36.129805	-5.447822
Algoso	Castelo de Algoso	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1223-12-31	1224-12-30	1499-12-31			41.461288	-6.579286
Alguaire	Castillo de Alguaire	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1158-12-31	1159-12-30	1499-12-31			41.737705	0.579665
Alhama de	The second se	Muslim		<u> </u>								
Granada	Alhama de granada	Occupation	City		1119-12-31			1499-12-31			37.004066	-3.98911
Alhama de												
Granada	Alhama de granada	Christian Siege	City		1225-07-31			1225-08-30			37.004066	-3.98911
Alhambra	Castillo de Alhambra	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1213-12-31	1214-12-30	1499-12-31			38.897505	-3.047679
Alhondiga	Alhondiga (villa)	Calatrava	City	Valley		1182-12-31	1183-12-30	1499-12-31			40.52671	-2.823853
Aliaga	Castillo de Aliaga	Hospitallers	Fortress	Spur		1162-12-31	1163-12-30	1499-12-31			40.672098	-0.698003
		Muslim										
Alicante	Alcazar de Alicante	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1242-12-31	1243-12-30	38.348385	-0.479264
		Christian										
Alicante	Alcazar de Alicante	Occupation	Fortress			1265-12-31	1266-12-30	1499-12-31			38.348385	-0.479264
		Muslim										
Alicante	Alcazar de Alicante	Occupation	Fortress			1264-05-31	1264-06-30		1265-12-31	1266-12-30	38.348385	-0.479264
		Christian										
Alicante	Alcazar de Alicante	Occupation	Fortress			1242-12-31	1243-12-30		1264-05-31	1264-06-30	38.348385	-0.479264
Aljezur	Castelo de Aljezur	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1241-12-31	1246-12-30	1499-12-31			37.31412	-8.805587
	Almaden - Retemar											
Almaden	(villa)	Calatrava	City	Hilltop		1167-12-31	1168-12-30	1499-12-31			38.775549	-4.839698
Almaguer	Castillo de Almaguer	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1311-12-31	1312-12-30	1499-12-31			39.738703	-3.202933
		Muslim				1						
Almansa	Almansa	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1243-12-31	1244-12-30	38.871545	-1.093221
		Christian										
Almansa	Almansa	Occupation	Fortress			1256-12-31	1257-12-30	1499-12-31			38.871545	-1.093221
Almansa	Almansa	Templars	Fortress			1243-12-31	1244-12-30		1256-12-31	1257-12-30	38.871545	-1.093221
Almaz?n	Almaz?n	Calatrava	City			1157-12-31	1258-12-30		1288-12-31	1289-12-30	41.487436	-2.533859
Alliaz II												
Almedíjar	Castillo de Almedíjar	Montesa	Fortress	Spur		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			39.875915	-0.417802

Almenara	Castillo de Almenara	Contingo	Fortress	Hilltop	-	1170-12-31	1171-12-30	1340-12-31	-		39,791204	-2.842157
Almenara -	Castillo de Almenara -	Santiago	Fortress	ншюр	-	11/0-12-31	11/1-12-30	1340-12-31			39.791204	-2.642137
Penaflor	Penaflor	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1240-12-31	1241-12-30	1499-12-31			37.759908	-5.375354
		Muslim	<i>a</i> .									
Almer?a	Almer?a	Occupation	City	_	1119-12-31			1147-10-16			36.83672	-2.456443
Almer?a	Almer?a	Christian Occupation	City		1147-10-16				1156-12-31	1157-12-30	36.83672	-2.456443
		Muslim										
Almer?a	Almer?a	Occupation	City			1488-12-31	1489-12-30	1499-12-31			36.83672	-2.456443
		Muslim										
Almer?a	Almer?a	Occupation	City			1156-12-31	1157-12-30		1488-12-31	1489-12-30	36.83672	-2.456443
Almer?a	Almer?a	Christian Siege	City			1308-12-31	1309-05-31		1310-05-31	1310-12-30	36.83672	-2.456443
Almodovar del												
Campo	Castillo de Almodovar	Almohad	Fortress	Valley	1195-07-17				1212-06-30	1212-07-15	38.708857	-4.172376
Almodovar del												
Campo	Castillo de Almodovar	Calatrava	Fortress	Valley		1157-12-31	1158-12-30	1195-07-17			38.708857	-4.172376
Almodovar del												
Campo	Castillo de Almodovar	Calatrava	Fortress	Valley		1212-07-15	1212-12-30	1499-12-31			38.708857	-4.172376
Almodovar del												
Rio	Castillo de Almodovar	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1368-12-31	1379-12-30	1499-12-31			37.807288	-5.023633
Almodovar del												
Rio	Castillo de Almodovar	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1349-12-31	1369-12-30		1369-12-31	1379-12-30	37.807288	-5.023633
Almoguera	Castillo de Almoguera	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1343-12-31	1344-12-30	1499-12-31			40.297938	-2.981234
Almoguera	Castillo de Almoguera	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1174-12-31	1175-12-30		1256-12-31	1257-12-29	40.297938	-2.981234
Almorchon	Castillo de Almorchon	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop	1236-12-15				1308-12-31	1312-12-30	38.694983	-5.314956
Almorchon	Castillo de Almorchon	Alcantara	Fortress	Hilltop		1311-12-31	1312-12-30	1499-12-31			38.694983	-5.314956
Ambel	Castillo de Ambel	Hospitallers	Fortress	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			41.796048	-1.6169
Ambel	Castillo de Ambel	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1150-12-31	1151-12-30	1477 12 51	1316-12-31	1319-12-30	41.796048	-1.6169
7 tinoer	Castelo Amieira do	rempturs	1011033	vancy		1150 12 51	1151 12 50		1510 12 51	1517 12 50	41.790040	1.0107
Amieira do Tejo	Teio	Hospitallers	Fortress	Valley		1231-12-31	1232-12-30		1439-12-31	1440-12-30	39.508126	-7.81606
Annena do Tejo	Castelo Amieira do	riospitaliers	Fortiess	vaney		1231-12-31	1232-12-30	-	1437-12-31	1440-12-30	39.308120	-7.81000
Amieira do Tejo	Tejo	Hospitallers	Fortress	Valley		1335-12-31	1336-12-30		1439-12-31	1440-12-30	39.508126	-7.81606
Amposta	Castillo de Amposta	Hospitallers	Fortress	Valley		1149-12-31	1150-12-30	1499-12-31	1437-12-31	1440-12-30	40.714489	0.579745
				vaney	1211-05-31	1149-12-31	1130-12-30	1211-08-30				-4.05192
And?jar	And?jar	Christian Siege	City		1211-05-51			1211-08-30			38.03836	-4.05192
A 101	A 19'	Muslim	Cite		1110 12 21				1154 10 21	1155 12 20	29.02926	4.05102
And?jar	And?jar	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1154-12-31	1155-12-30	38.03836	-4.05192
A 101	A 19'	Christian	Cite			1005 07 01	1225 08 20	1400 12 21			29.02926	4.05102
And?jar	And?jar	Occupation	City			1225-07-31	1225-08-30	1499-12-31			38.03836	-4.05192
4 10	4 10	Christian	<i>a</i> .			1154 12 21	1155 12 20		1150 10 01	1160 12 20	20.02027	4.05100
And?jar	And?jar	Occupation	City			1154-12-31	1155-12-30		1159-12-31	1160-12-30	38.03836	-4.05192
4 10	4 10	Muslim	<i>a</i> .			1150 12 21	11/0 12 20		1005 07 01	1005 00 00	20.02027	1.05102
And?jar	And?jar	Occupation	City	0		1159-12-31	1160-12-30		1225-07-31	1225-08-30	38.03836	-4.05192
Anguix	Castillo de Anguix	Calatrava	Fortress	Spur		1173-12-31	1174-12-30	-	1299-12-31	1399-12-30	40.429173	-2.791036
Aracena	Castillo de Aracena	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1230-12-31	1250-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	37.889703	-6.56246
Archena	Castillo de Achena	Hospitallers	Fortress	Valley	_	1243-12-31	1243-12-31	1499-12-31			38.115571	-1.288152
Arcos de la	I	Muslim			1					1		
Frontera	Arcos de la Frontera	Occupation	City		1119-12-31			1	1255-12-31	1256-12-30	36.748329	-5.807231
Arcos de la	l	Christian										
Frontera	Arcos de la Frontera	Occupation	City			1264-07-31	1264-08-30	1499-12-31			36.748329	-5.807231
Arcos de la		Christian						1				
Frontera	Arcos de la Frontera	Occupation	City			1255-12-31	1256-12-30		1264-05-31	1264-06-30	36.748329	-5.807231
Arcos de la		Muslim	1									
Frontera	Arcos de la Frontera	Occupation	City			1264-05-31	1264-12-30		1264-07-31	1264-08-30	36.748329	-5.807231
Arenas de San	Iglesia fortificada de											
Juan	Arenas de San Juan	Hospitallers	Church	Valley		1231-12-31	1232-12-30	1499-12-31			39.21904	-3.504548
	Castillo de Ares del											
			E	Spur	1	1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31	1		40.455494	-0.131222
Ares del Maestre	Maestre	Montesa	Fortress	Spui		1310-12-31	1319-12-30	1477-12-31			40.433494	-0.131222
Ares del Maestre	Maestre Castillo de Ares del	Montesa	Fortress	Spur		1310-12-31	1319-12-30	1477-12-51			40.433494	-0.131222

		Muslim	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
Arjona	Arjona	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1243-12-31	1244-12-30	37.936497	-4.058048
Aijolia	Aijolia	Christian	Chy		1117-12-51				1245-12-51	1244-12-30	31.750471	-4.050048
Arjona	Arjona	Occupation	City			1243-12-31	1244-12-30	1499-12-31			37.936497	-4.058048
Aroche	Castillo de Aroche	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1250-08-31	1250-12-30	1477 12 51	1266-12-31	1267-12-30	37.94608	-6.954487
Arroyo de San	Arroyo de San Servan	Hospitaliers	Toluciss	minop		1250-08-51	1250-12-50		1200-12-51	1207-12-30	57.74008	-0.754487
Servan	(villa)	Santiago	City	Valley		1229-12-31	1230-12-30	1499-12-31			38.854913	-6.453978
Arruda dos	Arruda dos Vinhos	Sunnago	Chy	vancy		1227 12 51	1250 12 50	1477 12 51			50.054715	0.455770
Vinhos	(Villa)	Santiago	City	Valley		1171-12-31	1172-12-30	1499-12-31			38.985006	-9.077024
1 111103	(11111)	Muslim	Chy	vancy		11/1 12 51	1172 12 50	1477 12 51			50.705000	2.011024
Artana	Artana	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1238-01-31	1238-04-29	39.862278	-0.188063
7 In tunkt		Christian	10111055		1117 12 51				1250 01 51	1250 01 27	571002270	011000000
Artana	Artana	Occupation	Fortress			1238-01-31	1238-04-30	1499-12-31			39.862278	-0.188063
Artesa	Artesa (Villa)	Montesa	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			39.958296	-0.287678
Artieda	Artieda (villa)	Templars	City	Valley		1165-12-31	1166-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	42.584525	-0.984611
Asco	Castillo de Asco	Hospitallers	Fortress	Spur	-	1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31	1510 12 51	1517 12 50	41.179727	0.56584
Asco	Castillo de Asco	Templars	Fortress	Spur		1209-12-31	1210-12-30	1477 12 51	1308-12-31	1319-12-30	41.179727	0.56584
Asiento de	Asiento de Frarrapo	rempiars	Tolucas	Spur		1207-12-51	1210-12-50		1508-12-51	1517-12-50	41.177727	0.50584
Frarrapo	(Villa)	Alcantara	City	Unknown		1219-12-31	1220-12-30	1499-12-31			39.422496	-7.063812
Asiento de	(vina)	Alcantara	City	UIKIOWII		1217-12-51	1220-12-30	1477-12-51			37.422470	-7.005012
Topete	Asiento de Topete	Alcantara	Fortress	Hilltop		1219-12-31	1220-12-30	1499-12-31			39.386857	-7.21789
Topete	Castillo de Atalaya /	Theannara	10111035	minop		1217 12 51	1220 12 50	1477 12 51			57.500057	7.2170)
Atalaya	Villena	Calatrava	Fortress	Valley		1239-12-31	1240-12-30		1241-12-31	1243-12-30	38.631882	-0.860889
Atalaya	Castillo de Atalaya	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1229-12-31	1230-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	38.333111	-6.473334
Aunon	Castillo Aunon	Calatrava	City	Valley		1177-12-31	1178-12-30	1499-12-31	1510-12-51	1319-12-30	40.516826	-2.790873
Aution	Castilio Aulioli	Christian	City	valley	-	11//-12-31	11/6-12-30	1499-12-31			40.310820	-2.190815
Avila	Avila	Occupation	City		1119-12-31			1499-12-31			40.656766	-4.701281
Avila	Castelo de Avis	Avis	Fortress	Hilltop	1119-12-31	1210-12-31	1211-12-30	1499-12-31			39.05604	-7.889007
Avis												
Ayamonte	Castillo de Carastas	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1238-12-31	1239-12-30	1499-12-31			36.942627	-5.193037
A	A	Muslim	E. days		1119-12-31				1242-12-31	1243-12-30	39.058339	-1.055429
Ayora	Ayora	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1242-12-31	1245-12-50	39.058339	-1.055429
A	A	Christian	Fortress			1242 12 21	1242 12 20	1400 12 21			20.059220	1.055420
Ayora	Ayora	Occupation		TT-11.		1242-12-31	1243-12-30	1499-12-31			39.058339	-1.055429
Azagala	Castillo de Azagala	Alcantara	Fortress	Hilltop	_	1460-12-31	1461-12-30	1499-12-31			39.222629	-6.854402
A	Castillo de Azuaga /	0	E	TPH		1025 10 21	1006 10 00		1200 12 21	1400 12 20	29.254001	5 ((7004
Azuaga	Miramontes	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1235-12-31	1236-12-30		1399-12-31	1400-12-30	38.254001	-5.667224
Badajoz	Badajoz	Christian Siege	City		1224-12-31		_	1225-12-30			38.882568	-6.967617
D 1 '	D 1 '	Christian	<i>C</i> .		1220 00 22			1400 10 01			20.002540	6.077617
Badajoz	Badajoz	Occupation	City		1230-09-23		_	1499-12-31			38.882568	-6.967617
D 1 '	D 1 '	Muslim	<i>C</i> .		1110 10 01				1000 10 01	1000 00 00	20.0025.00	6.077617
Badajoz	Badajoz	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1229-12-31	1230-09-23	38.882568	-6.967617
D	Deves	Muslim	Char		1110 12 21			1010 07 19			27.0901.62	2 460754
Baeza	Baeza	Occupation	City		1119-12-31			1212-07-18			37.989163	-3.468754
Baeza	Baeza	Christian Siege	City		1210-12-31			1212-08-31			37.989163	-3.468754
D	P	Christian	<i>C</i> .		1010 07 10			1400 10 01			27.0001.62	2 4 60 7 5 4
Baeza	Baeza	Occupation	City		1212-07-18		_	1499-12-31			37.989163	-3.468754
D	D	Christian	<i>C</i> .		1046 10 01				1056 10 01	1057 10 00	27.0001/22	2 4 60 7 5 4
Baeza	Baeza	Occupation	City		1246-12-31		_		1256-12-31	1257-12-30	37.989163	-3.468754
D	D	Muslim	Cite		1	1056 10 21	1057 10 20	1010 07 10			27.090172	2 4 6 9 7 5 4
Baeza	Baeza	Occupation	City	X7 H	_	1256-12-31	1257-12-30	1212-07-18	1016 10 01	1010 10 00	37.989163	-3.468754
Baguena	Castillo de Baguena	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1128-12-31	1134-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	41.040378	-1.354928
Banos de la	Burgalimar - Castillo	a .:	<b>P</b> .		1	1004 10 01	1005 10 00	1400 10 01			20.170575	0.0000
Encina	de Banos de la Encina	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1224-12-31	1225-12-30	1499-12-31			38.170577	-3.775285
Barbens	Barbens (Villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1317-12-30	1499-12-31			41.67871	1.018239
Barbens	Barbens (Villa)	Templars	City	Valley		1167-12-31	1168-12-30		1316-12-31	1317-12-30	41.67871	1.018239
Barberà de la		1			1							
Conca	Castell de Barbera	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			41.411496	1.226766
Barberà de la												
Conca	Castell de Barbera	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop	1	1130-12-31	1161-12-31	1	1316-12-31	1318-12-31	41.411496	1.226766

-	0.1		1	1	-1	1	T	T	T	<u>т т</u>	r	
Barcelona	Sant Joan de Jerusalem	Hospitallers	Monasterv	Valley		1201-12-31	1208-12-30	1499-12-31			41.385878	2.176632
Barrô	Barrô	Hospitallers	City	Hilltop		1201-12-31	1208-12-30	1499-12-31			41.128509	-7.887435
Battle of Alarcos	Battle of Alarcos	Muslim Victory	Battle	ншюр	1195-06-30	1207-12-51	1208-12-30	1195-07-18			38.951561	-4.013879
Battle of Salado	Battle of Alarcos	Christian	Dattie		1195-00-50			1193-07-18	+		58.951501	-4.013879
River	Battle of Salado River	Victory	Battle		1340-09-30			1340-10-29			36.034468	-5.603624
River	Dattle of Salado River	Muslim	Dattic		1540-07-50			1540-10-27			50.054408	-5.005024
Bedmar	Castillo de El Mirador	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1225-12-31	1231-12-30	37.823236	-3.409951
Bedmar	Castillo de El Mirador	Santiago	Fortress		1117 12 51	1308-12-31	1309-12-30	1499-12-31	1225 12 51	1251 12 50	37.823236	-3.409951
Bedinar	Custino de El Millador	Christian	10111035			1500 12 51	1507 12 50	1477 12 51			51.025250	5.407751
Bedmar	Castillo de El Mirador	Occupation	Fortress			1225-12-31	1231-12-30		1301-12-31	1302-12-30	37.823236	-3.409951
		Muslim										
Bedmar	Castillo de El Mirador	Occupation	Fortress			1301-12-31	1302-12-30		1308-12-31	1309-12-30	37.823236	-3.409951
		Christian										
Begijar	Begijar	Occupation	City			1243-12-31	1244-12-30	1499-12-31			37.982318	-3.534012
		Christian										
Bejar	Bejar	Occupation	City			1208-12-31	1209-12-30	1499-12-31			40.386919	-5.766592
	Castillo de Salinas de											
Belinchon	Belinchon	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1230-12-31	1231-01-30	1499-12-31			40.04687	-3.059917
Belmez	Castillo de Belmez	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1244-12-31	1245-12-30	1499-12-31			38.274064	-5.212245
Belver	Castelo de Belver	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1209-12-31	1210-12-30	1499-12-31			39.494026	-7.960828
Belver de Cinca	Belver (Villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1317-12-30	1499-12-31			41.692104	0.179587
Belver de Cinca	Belver (Villa)	Templars	City	Valley		1239-12-31	1240-12-30		1316-12-31	1317-12-30	41.692104	0.179587
Belvis de	Castillo de Belvis de											
Monroy	Monroy	Alcantara	Fortress	Hilltop		1308-12-31	1309-12-30	1499-12-31			39.819823	-5.611961
Benafigos	Benafigos	Montesa	Fortress	Hilltop		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.276752	-0.209275
Benafigos	Benafigos	Templars	City	Hilltop		1302-12-31	1303-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.276752	-0.209275
	Castillo de Gormez	a					1000 10 00					
Benameji	Arias	Santiago	Fortress	Spur		1199-12-31	1299-12-30	1499-12-31	_		37.244425	-4.538547
Benasal	Benasal	Montesa	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31	1000 10 01	1010 10 00	40.379808	-0.142347
Benasal	Benasal	Templars	City	Valley		1302-12-31	1303-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.379808	-0.142347
Benavente	Castillo Benavente	Calatrava	Fortress	Valley		1212-07-15	1214-03-19	1499-12-31	1010 01 00		38.997277	-4.067018
Benavente	Castillo Benavente	Almohad	Fortress	Valley		1195-07-17	1195-07-30		1212-06-30	1212-07-15	38.997277	-4.067018
Benavente	Castillo Benavente	Calatrava	Fortress	Valley		1181-12-31	1182-12-30	1400 12 21	1195-07-17	1195-07-30	38.997277	-4.067018
Benicarlo	Benicarlo (Villa)	Montesa	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31	1200 12 21	1210 12 20	40.419149	0.42322
Benicarlo	Benicarlo (Villa)	Templars	City	Valley		1293-12-31	1294-12-30	1400 12 21	1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.419149	0.42322
Benifaraig	Benifaraig (villa)	Montesa	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1318-12-31	1499-12-31	101110	1010 10 00	39.529451	-0.385589
Benifaraig	Benifaraig (villa)	Templars	City	Valley		1250-12-31	1251-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	39.529451	-0.385589
Benquerencia de la Serena	Castillo de Benquerencia	Alcantara	Fortress	Spur		1235-12-31	1236-12-30	1499-12-31			38.699706	-5.492166
Bernardo	Castillo de Bernardo	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1165-12-31	1166-12-30	1499-12-31	1195-12-31	1195-12-31	39,995986	-6.864626
Bernardo	Castillo de Bernardo	Alcantara	Fortress	Hilltop		1212-07-31	1212-12-30		1239-12-31	1249-12-31	39.995986	-6.864626
Berninches	Berninches	Calatrava	City	Hilltop		1187-11-03	1187-11-30	1450-04-13	1239-12-31	1249-12-31	40.570713	-2.800238
Betera	Castillo de Betera	Calatrava	Fortress	Valley	1237-03-31	1187-11-03	110/-11-30	1430-04-13	1363-12-31	1364-12-29	39,592495	-0.462974
Biar	Castillo de Biar	Muslim Siege	Fortress	vancy	1264-12-31			1265-12-30	1303-12-31	1304-12-29	38.63116	-0.764902
Did	Custino de Diai	Muslim	1 0111035		1204-12-31	+	1	1205-12-50	1	+	56.05110	-0.704702
Biar	Castillo de Biar	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1244-12-31	1253-12-30	38.63116	-0.764902
Dia	Castilio de Diai	Christian	10111033		1117-12-51				1244-12-51	1255-12-50	58.05110	-0.704702
Biar	Castillo de Biar	Occupation	Fortress			1279-12-31	1280-12-30	1499-12-31			38.63116	-0.764902
Biar	Castillo de Biar	Calatrava	Fortress	1		1244-12-31	1253-12-30	17/7 12 51	1275-12-31	1278-12-30	38.63116	-0.764902
	callino de Dia	Muslim	- 5111055	1		-211 12 31	.200 12 00	1	.2.0 .2.01	-2.0 12 00	55.05110	0.101902
Biar	Castillo de Biar	Occupation	Fortress			1275-12-31	1278-12-30	1	1279-12-31	1280-12-30	38.63116	-0.764902
Biure	Castillo de Biure	Hospitallers	Fortress	Spur		1150-12-31	1151-12-30	1499-12-31			41.490289	1.351506
Blanca	Castillo de Blanca	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop	1	1284-12-31	1285-12-30	1499-12-31	1	1	38.181547	-1.377434
Bogas	Bogas (Villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley	1	1149-12-31	1150-12-30	1499-12-31	1	1	39,723806	-3.657182
0	Castillo de San								1			22
Bolanos de	Fernando / Castillo de					1	1	1	1			
Calatrava	Dona Beren*	Calatrava	Fortress	Valley		1228-12-31	1229-12-30	1499-12-31			38.90771	-3.667949
Borja	La Zuda - Borja	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1133-12-31	1151-12-30	1	1287-12-31	1288-12-30	41.838179	-1.536827

Braga	Braga (Casa)	Templars	City	Valley		1144-12-31	1145-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	41.5541	-8.419946
Brazatortas	Castillo de Brazatortas	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1212-07-15	1212-12-30	1499-12-31			38.649528	-4.282885
Brazatortas	Castillo de Brazatortas	Almohad	Fortress	Hilltop		1195-07-17	1195-07-30		1212-06-30	1212-07-15	38.649528	-4.282885
Brazatortas	Castillo de Brazatortas	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1188-12-31	1189-12-30		1195-07-17	1195-12-30	38.649528	-4.282885
Brozas	Castillo de Brozas	Alcantara	Fortress	Valley		1217-12-31	1218-12-12	1499-12-31			39.611472	-6.780677
Brozas	Castillo de Brozas	Calatrava	Fortress	Valley		1212-12-31	1213-12-30		1217-12-31	1217-12-31	39.611472	-6.780677
Bujalame	Castillo de Bujalame	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1234-12-31	1235-12-30	1499-12-31			38.358047	-2.767406
Bullas	Bullas (Villa)	Santiago	City	Valley		1343-12-31	1344-12-30	1499-12-31			38.050374	-1.671945
Bullas	Bullas (Villa)	Templars	City	Valley		1303-12-31	1304-12-30		1313-12-31	1314-12-30	38.050374	-1.671945
		Muslim										
Bunol	Bunol	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1240-12-31	1241-12-30	39.419365	-0.790229
		Christian	<i>a</i> :			1000 10 01	1010 10 00					
Bunol	Bunol	Occupation	City			1299-12-31	1310-12-30	1499-12-31			39.419365	-0.790229
Bunol	Bunol	Hospitaler	City			1240-12-31	1241-12-30		1299-12-31	1310-12-30	39.419365	-0.790229
Burgos	Las Huelgas	Hospitallers	Monastery	Valley		1179-12-31	1180-12-30	1499-12-31			42.336661	-3.719671
Burguillos del Cerro	Castillo de Burguillos	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1237-12-31	1238-12-30		1311-12-31	1319-12-30	38.386344	-6.59108
Burguillos del	San Juan Bautista de											
Cerro	Burguillos	Templars	Church	Vallev		1237-12-31	1238-12-30		1311-12-31	1319-12-30	38.382762	-6.595592
Burriana	Torre de Burriana	Templars	Fortress	Valley	1233-06-16				1308-12-31	1319-12-30	39.878624	-0.053623
Burriana	Torre de Burriana	Montesa	Fortress	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			39.878624	-0.053623
Durrhand	Tonte de Burnand	Muslim	ronness	valley		1510 12 51	1517 12 50	11,77 12 51			571070021	0.0000020
Burriana	Burriana	Occupation	City		1119-12-31			1232-12-31			39.889592	-0.08483
Durrhand	Buirmin	Christian	Chy		1117 12 51		-	1252 12 51			57.007572	0.00105
Burriana	Burriana	Occupation	City			1232-12-31	1233-12-30	1499-12-31			39.889592	-0.08483
Cabanas del												
Castillo	Castillo de Cabanas	Alcantara	Fortress	Spur		1219-12-31	1220-12-30	1499-12-31			39.547559	-5.510388
Cabeza de	Castillo de Cabeza de	San Julian del	ronness	opu		1217 12 51	1220 12 50	11// 12 51			5710 (1007	5.510500
Esparragal	Esparragal	Pereiro	Fortress	Hilltop		1212-12-31	1213-12-30	1217-12-31			39.583783	-7.225664
Cabeza de	Castillo de Cabeza de											
Esparragal	Esparragal	Alcantara	Fortress	Hilltop		1217-12-31	1218-12-30	1499-12-31			39.583783	-7.225664
1 0	Castillo de											
Cabezamesada	Cabezamesada	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1208-05-28	1208-12-30	1499-12-31			39.816762	-3.104459
Cabrela	Cabrela (Villa)	Santiago	City	Valley		1185-12-31	1186-12-30	1499-12-31			38.598679	-8.463424
		Muslim										
Caceres	Caceres	Occupation	City		1119-12-31			1229-04-22			39.475469	-6.37126
		Christian										
Caceres	Caceres	Occupation	City		1229-04-22			1499-12-31			39.475469	-6.37126
Caceres	Caceres	Christian Siege	City		1220-05-31			1220-08-30			39.475469	-6.37126
Caceres	Caceres	Christian Siege	City		1221-05-31			1221-08-30			39.475469	-6.37126
Caceres	Caceres	Christian Siege	City		1222-05-31			1222-08-30			39.475469	-6.37126
Caceres	Caceres	Christian Siege	City		1223-05-31			1223-08-30			39.475469	-6.37126
Caceres	Caceres	Christian Siege	City		1218-10-31			1218-12-30			39.475469	-6.37126
Cadiz	Cadiz	Christian Siege	City	İ	1233-12-31	İ	1	1234-12-30			36.527061	-6.288596
		Muslim		1		1	1		1		20.02/001	
Cadiz	Cadiz	Occupation	City		1119-12-31		1		1247-12-31	1248-12-30	36.527061	-6.288596
		Christian			,							
Cadiz	Cadiz	Occupation	City			1247-12-31	1248-12-30	1499-12-31			36.527061	-6.288596
Calasparra	Castillo de Calasparra	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1288-12-31	1289-12-30	1499-12-31			38.232178	-1.692918
Calatrava La												
Nueva	Calatrava la Nueva	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1212-07-15	1212-12-30	1499-12-31			38.6664	-3.845256
Calatrava la												
Vieja	Calatrava la Vieja	Calatrava	Fortress	Valley		1157-12-31	1158-12-30	1195-07-17			39.07409	-3.833206
Calatrava la					1		1	1				
Vieja	Calatrava la Vieja	Almohad	Fortress	Valley		1195-07-17	1195-07-30		1212-06-30	1212-07-15	39.07409	-3.833206
Calatrava la	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,							1				
Vieja	Calatrava la Vieja	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1146-12-31	1147-12-30		1156-12-31	1157-12-30	39.07409	-3.833206
Calatrava la	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,							1				
Vieja	Calatrava la Vieja	Calatrava	Fortress	Valley		1212-07-15	1212-12-30		1399-12-31	1410-12-30	39.07409	-3.833206
Calatrava la		, î		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,								

Calera de Leon	Convento de Calera de Leon	Santiago	Monastery	Valley		1247-12-31	1248-12-30	1499-12-31			38.10591	-6.337654
Calig	Calig (villa)	Montesa	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.461936	0.353816
Calig	Calig (villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1233-12-31	1234-11-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	40.461936	0.353816
Campo de	Campo de Criptana											
Criptana	(Encomienda)	Santiago	City	Valley		1173-12-31	1174-12-30	1499-12-31			39.402287	-3.12215
Camunas	Camunas (villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1182-12-31	1183-12-30	1499-12-31			39.426793	-3.457661
		Muslim										
Canamero	Canamero	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1219-12-31	1220-12-30	39.375934	-5.380161
		Christian										
Canamero	Canamero	Occupation	Fortress			1219-12-31	1220-12-30	1499-12-31			39.375934	-5.380161
Canena	Castillo de Canena	Calatrava	Fortress	Valley		1219-12-31	1227-12-30	1499-12-31			38.048825	-3.48128
Canena	Castillo de Canena	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1219-12-31	1227-12-30	1499-12-31			38.048825	-3.48128
	Iglesia-Fortificada de											
Canet lo Roig	Canet lo Roig	Hospitallers	Church	Hilltop		1287-12-31	1288-12-30	1499-12-31			40.531259	0.258641
Canet lo Roig	Canet lo Roig (villa)	Montesa	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.551237	0.243817
Canet lo Roig	Canet lo Roig (villa)	Hospitallers	Fortress	Valley		1234-12-31	1235-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	40.551237	0.243817
Canet lo Roig	Canet lo Roig	Hospitallers	Fortress		1287-12-31			1499-12-31			40.531259	0.258641
Cantavieja	Cantavieja (villa)	Hospitallers	City	Spur		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.530203	-0.404594
Cantavieja	Cantavieja (villa)	Templars	City	Spur		1197-07-31	1197-12-30		1212-12-30	1319-12-30	40.530203	-0.404594
		Muslim										
Cantillana	Cantillana	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1246-12-31	1247-12-30	37.605667	-5.825905
		Christian										
Cantillana	Cantillana	Occupation	Fortress			1246-12-31	1247-12-30	1499-12-31			37.605667	-5.825905
Capilla	Castillo de Capilla	Alcantara	Fortress	Hilltop		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			38.821477	-5.085833
Capilla	Castillo de Capilla	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1235-12-31	1236-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	38.821477	-5.085833
Caracuel	Castillo de Caracuel	Calatrava	Fortress	Spur		1212-07-15	1212-12-30	1499-12-31			38.842854	-4.071343
Caracuel	Castillo de Caracuel	Almohad	Fortress	Spur		1195-07-17	1195-07-30		1212-06-30	1212-07-15	38.842854	-4.071343
Caracuel	Castillo de Caracuel	Calatrava	Fortress	Spur		1177-12-31	1178-12-30		1195-07-17	1195-12-30	38.842854	-4.071343
Caravaca de la Cruz	Castillo de Caravaca de la Cruz	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1311-12-31	1314-12-30	1499-12-31			38.107776	-1.858345
Caravaca de la	Castillo de Caravaca											
Cruz	de la Cruz	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1263-12-31	1264-12-30		1308-12-31	1312-12-30	38.107776	-1.858345
Carcabuey	Castillo de Carcabuey	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1245-01-30	1256-05-05		1332-12-31	1333-12-30	37.444331	-4.270428
		Muslim										
Carcelen	Carcelen	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1259-12-31	1260-12-30	39.102098	-1.308699
		Christian										
Carcelen	Carcelen	Occupation	City			1259-12-31	1260-12-30	1499-12-31			39.102098	-1.308699
		Muslim										
Carmona	Carmona	Occupation	City		1119-12-31			1247-09-20			37.472995	-5.632794
		Christian										
Carmona	Carmona	Occupation	City		1247-09-20			1499-12-31			37.472995	-5.632794
		Muslim										
Cartagena	Cartagena	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1243-07-04	1243-07-30	37.60103	-0.97356
		Christian										
Cartagena	Cartagena	Occupation	City			1243-07-04	1243-07-30	1499-12-31			37.60103	-0.97356
	Caspe / Castillo de											
_	Compromiso / Castillo		_									
Caspe	de Bail*	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1168-12-31	1196-12-30	1499-12-31			41.238194	-0.038504
		Muslim										
Castalla	Castalla	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1244-12-31	1245-12-30	38.597623	-0.673203
a		Christian	-			101110.01	1015 10 0-				00 F0F (0-	0 1800-5
Castalla	Castalla	Occupation	Fortress			1244-12-31	1245-12-30	1499-12-31			38.597623	-0.673203
Castell de	a					1000 10 0	1000 10 0-				20 <b>2</b> 0 44 5	0.0005
Castells	Castillo de Serrella	Calatrava	Fortress	Spur		1289-12-31	1290-12-30	1499-12-31			38.70666	-0.203538
Castellar de		Muslim	<i>a</i> :-		1110 10 01	1		1010.04.00			20 525065	0.075010
Santiago	Castellar de Santiago	Occupation	City		1119-12-31			1213-04-30			38.537805	-3.275918
Castellar de	Contalling In Conti	Christian	Cite			1010 04 20	1010.05.00	1400 12 21			29 527905	2 275010
Santiago	Castellar de Santiago	Occupation	City			1213-04-30	1213-05-30	1499-12-31			38.537805	-3.275918

a	a		1		1	1						
Castellar de Santisteban	Castellar de Santisteban	Muslim Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1236-05-31	1236-12-30	38.25267	-3.131489
Castellar de	Castellar de	Christian	City		1119-12-31				1230-03-31	1230-12-30	38.23207	-3.131469
Santisteban	Santisteban	Occupation	City			1236-05-31	1236-12-30	1499-12-31			38.25267	-3.131489
Santisteban	Castillo de	Occupation	City			1250-05-51	1250-12-50	1477-12-51			38.23207	-5.151467
Castellnovo	Castellnovo	Montesa	Fortress	Hilltop		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			39.859965	-0.457173
Custerinio to	Castillo de	montosu	ronness	Timop		1010 12 01	1017 12 00	1.00 12 01			57.057705	0.107175
Castellnovo	Castellnovo	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1260-12-31	1261-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	39.859965	-0.457173
Custerinio to	Customiovo	Knights of	10111005	Timop		1200 12 51	1201 12 50		1010 12 01	1517 12 50	57.057705	0.107175
Castelo Branco	Castelo Branco	Christ	Fortress	Hilltop		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			39.82546	-7.496861
Castelo Branco	Castelo Branco	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1211-12-31	1212-12-30		1229-12-31	1230-12-30	39.82546	-7,496861
Castelo Branco	Castelo Branco	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1181-12-31	1213-12-30		1316-12-31	1318-12-31	39.82546	-7.496861
		Christian										
Castielfabib	Castielfabib	Occupation	Fortress			1210-12-31	1211-12-30	1258-12-31			40.130531	-1.307452
	Castillo de	<u> </u>										
Castiellfabib	Castielfabib	Hospitallers	Fortress	Spur		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1500-09-30			40.130548	-1.307465
	Castillo de											
Castiellfabib	Castielfabib	Templars	Fortress	Spur		1258-12-31	1259-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	40.130548	-1.307465
Castillejo del	Castillo de Castillejo											
Robledo	del Robledo	Hospitallers	Fortress	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			41.557562	-3.496322
Castillejo del	Castillo de Castillejo											
Robledo	del Robledo	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1157-12-31	1188-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	41.557562	-3.496322
	Castillo de											
G	Encomienda /		<b>F</b> .			1001 10 01	1000 10 00	1400 10 01			20.022555	5 771 420
Castillnovo	Castillnovo	Alcantara	Fortress	Hilltop		1231-12-31	1232-12-30	1499-12-31			39.023656	-5.771429
Castillo de												
Almuradiel / Castillo de	Castillo de Almuradiel											
Pajaron	/ Castillo de Pajaron	Calatrava	Fortress	Unknown		1212-07-15	1212-12-30	1499-12-31			38.416192	-3.505177
Castillo de	/ Castillo de l'ajaroli	Calatiava	10111035	UIKIOWI		1212-07-15	1212-12-50	1477-12-51			30.410172	-5.505177
Castellote	Castellote	Hospitallers	Fortress	Spur		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.800904	-0.31961
Castillo de		Order of the		~F								
Castellote	Castellote	Holy Redeemer	Fortress	Spur		1187-12-31	1188-12-30		1195-12-31	1196-12-30	40.800904	-0.31961
Castillo de												
Castellote	Castellote	Templars	Fortress	Spur		1195-12-31	1196-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	40.800904	-0.31961
Castillo de		Muslim										
Chinchilla	Castillo de Chinchilla	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1240-12-31	1241-12-30	38.918796	-1.728644
Castillo de		Christian										
Chinchilla	Castillo de Chinchilla	Occupation	Fortress			1240-12-31	1241-12-30	1499-12-31			38.918796	-1.728644
Castillo de		Muslim										
Locubin	Castillo de Locubin	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1340-12-31	1341-12-30	37.528896	-3.943022
Castillo de		Christian										
Locubin	Castillo de Locubin	Occupation	City			1340-12-31	1341-12-30	1499-12-31			37.528896	-3.943022
Castillo de		Muslim								1000 10 00	00.454404	
Ricote	Castillo de Ricote	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31		_		1227-12-31	1228-12-30	38.154131	-1.35696
Castillo de		Christian					1000 10 00			1005 10 00	00.454404	
Ricote	Castillo de Ricote	Occupation	Fortress			1227-12-31	1228-12-30		1284-12-31	1285-12-30	38.154131	-1.35696
Castillo de	Contillo de Coldina	Muslim	E. days		1110 12 21				1005 10 01	1021 10 20	29.071201	2 202805
Sabiote Costillo do	Castillo de Sabiote	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1225-12-31	1231-12-30	38.071291	-3.302895
Castillo de Sabiote	Castillo de Sabiote	Christian Occupation	Fortress			1225-12-31	1231-12-30		1256-12-31	1257-12-30	38.071291	-3.302895
Castillo de	Castino de Sabiote	Muslim	Fortress	+	+	1223-12-31	1231-12-30	+	1230-12-31	1257-12-30	30.0/1291	-3.302693
Sanfiro	Castillo de Sanfiro	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31		1	1	1215-12-31	1217-12-30	38.729042	-2.000869
Castillo de	Castillo de Sallillo	Christian	1011035		1117 12 31				1213 12 31	1217 12 50	50.127042	2.00000
Sanfiro	Castillo de Sanfiro	Occupation	Fortress			1241-12-31	1242-12-30	1499-12-31			38.729042	-2.000869
Castillo de	2tino de banno	Christian	- 011000			.2.1 12.51	.2.2.12.50		1		50.727072	2.00000
			<b>.</b> .			1215-12-31	1217-12-30		1227-12-31	1228-12-30	38.729042	-2.000869
Sanfiro	Castillo de Sanfiro	Occupation	Fortress									
Sanfiro	Castillo de Sanfiro	Occupation Muslim	Fortress			1215-12-51	1217 12 50					
	Castillo de Sanfiro Castillo de Sanfiro	Occupation Muslim Occupation	Fortress			1227-12-31	1228-12-30		1241-12-31	1242-12-30	38.729042	-2.000869

Certilerer /	Certileren /								1			
Castilseras / Almendeios	Castilseras / Almendeios	Calatrava	Fortress	Spur		1212-07-15	1212-12-30	1499-12-31			38,718737	-4.694874
Castilseras /	Castilseras /	Calalrava	Fortress	Spur		1212-07-13	1212-12-30	1499-12-31			36./16/3/	-4.0948/4
Almendejos	Almendejos	Calatrava	Fortress	Spur		1182-12-31	1189-12-30		1195-07-17	1195-12-30	38.718737	-4.694874
Amendejos	Castelo de Castro	Knights of	Fortiess	Spur	-	1162-12-31	1189-12-30	+	1195-07-17	1195-12-50	30./10/3/	-4.094874
Castro Marim	Marim	Christ	Fortress	Valley		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			37.218765	-7.441687
Castro Marini	Castelo de Castro	Chirist	Fortiess	vancy	-	1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			57.218705	-7.441087
Castro Marim	Marim	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1241-12-31	1242-12-30		1316-12-31	1219-12-30	37.218765	-7.441687
Castro Verde	Castro Verde	Santiago	City	Valley		1237-12-31	1238-12-30	1499-12-31	1310-12-31	1219-12-30	37.69773	-8.082212
Castro verde	Castillo de	Santiago	City	v anc y		1237-12-31	1250-12-50	1477-12-51			51.07115	-0.002212
Castrotorafe	Castrotorafe	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1178-12-31	1179-12-30		1492-12-31	1493-12-30	41.723219	-5.796866
Castrotorate	Castrotorate	Muslim	10111035	v anc y		1170-12-51	1177-12-50		1472-12-51	1475-12-50	41.725217	-5.770800
Caudete	Caudete	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1243-12-31	1244-12-30	38,702983	-0.989997
Cuudoto	Cuducto	Christian	Chy		1117 12 51				1213 12 31	121112.50	30.102703	0.707777
Caudete	Caudete	Occupation	City			1243-12-31	1244-12-30	1499-12-31			38.702983	-0.989997
Cazalla - Castillo	Cazalla - Castillo de	occupation	Chy			1210 12 01	121112.50	11// 12 51			50.102705	0.707777
de Luna	Luna	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1252-12-31	1253-12-30	1499-12-31			37.168809	-5.285335
Cehegin	Castillo de Cehegin	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1343-12-31	1344-12-30	1499-12-31			38.096472	-1.798183
Cehegin	Castillo de Cehegin	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1265-12-31	1266-12-30	1477 12 51	1311-12-31	1313-12-30	38.096472	-1.798183
Ceras	Castelo de Cera	Templars	Fortress	Valley	1	1146-12-31	1147-12-30	1	1316-12-31	1319-12-30	39.691403	-8.358358
Cercal	Castelo de Cera Cercal do Alentejo	Santiago	City	Valley	+	1234-12-31	1235-12-30	1499-12-31	1510-12-51	1517-12-50	37.802153	-8.674612
Cervera	Cercal do Alentejo Cervera	Hospitallers	Monastery	Spur		1234-12-31	1172-12-11	1499-12-31	1261-12-31	1262-12-11	41.665345	-8.674612 1.270826
Cervera	Cervera del Maestre /	Hospitaliers	Monastery	Spur		11/1-12-31	11/2-12-11		1201-12-31	1202-12-11	41.005345	1.270826
Communication	Cervera del Maestre / Castillo de la											
Cervera del		Mantan	Perturn	TELL		1216 12 21	1210 12 20	1400 12 21			40 452965	0.274200
Maestre	Maestranza d*	Montesa	Fortress	Hilltop		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.453865	0.274399
a 11	Cervera del Maestre /											
Cervera del	Castillo de la									1010 10 00	10.1500.15	
Maestre	Maestranza d*	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1234-12-31	1235-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	40.453865	0.274399
Chalamera	Castillo de Chalamera	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			41.666727	0.160225
	Ermita de Santa María											
Chalamera	de Chalamera	Templars	Church	Valley		1161-12-31	1162-12-30		1195-12-31	1196-12-30	41.678823	0.150026
Chalamera	Castillo de Chalamera	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1142-12-31	1143-12-30		1308-12-31	1309-12-30	41.666727	0.160225
Chavão	Chavão (villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1215-12-31	1216-12-30	1499-12-31			41.452094	-8.602611
Cheles	Castillo de Cheles	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1276-12-31	1277-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	38.514036	-7.282312
Chiclana de	Castillo de Chiclana											
Segura	de Segura	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1238-12-31	1239-12-30	1499-12-31			38.311192	-3.045178
Cieza	Castillo de Cieza	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1284-12-31	1285-12-30		1456-12-31	1457-12-30	38.226235	-1.425293
Cilleros	Cilleros (villa)	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1167-12-31	1168-12-30		1173-12-31	1174-12-30	40.111485	-6.792639
	Monasterio de											
Ciruelos	Ciruelos	Calatrava	Monastery	Valley		1162-12-31	1163-12-30	1499-12-31			39.936771	-3.615341
		Muslim										
Cofrentes	Castillo de Cofrentes	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1244-12-30	1244-12-30	39.230832	-1.06313
		Christian										
Cofrentes	Castillo de Cofrentes	Occupation	Fortress			1243-12-31	1244-12-30	1499-12-31			39.230832	-1.06313
		Muslim										
Constantina	Constantina	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1245-12-31	1246-12-30	37.873391	-5.622816
		Christian										
Constantina	Constantina	Occupation	Fortress			1245-12-31	1246-12-30	1499-12-31			37.873391	-5.622816
Consuegra	Castillo de Consuegra	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1182-12-31	1183-12-30	1499-12-31	1		39,453199	-3,608154
Corbins	Castillo de Corbins	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop	1143-11-26				1316-12-31	1319-12-30	41.692118	0.696617
Corbins	Castillo de Corbins	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			41.692118	0.696617
		Muslim		F	1				1	1 1		
Cordoba	Cordoba	Occupation	City	1	1119-12-31	1		1236-06-28			37.885939	-4.778105
Cordoba	Cordoba	Christian Siege	City	-	1150-12-31		1	1151-12-30			37.885939	-4.778105
Cordoba	Cordoba	Christian Siege	City	+	1235-12-31	+	1	1236-06-28	1	1 1	37.885939	-4.778105
Coruoba	Coruoba	Christian	City	+	1255-12-51	+		1230-00-28	1	1 1	51.003739	-4.770105
Cordoba	Cordoba	Occupatoin	City	1	1236-06-28	1		1499-12-31			37.885939	-4.778105
Coria	Coria	Alcantara	City	Valley	1250-00-28	1217-12-31	1218-12-30	1499-12-31		┨────┤	39.984461	-6.536576
	Coria		City	Valley		1217-12-31	1218-12-30	1499-12-31	1173-12-31	1174-12-30	39.984461	-6.536576
Coria	Coria	Templars	City	vaney		110/-12-31	1108-12-50	1	11/3-12-31	11/4-12-30	39.984401	-0.3303/6

		San Julian del	1			T	1	1	T	1		
Coria	Coria	Pereiro	City	Valley		1212-12-31	1213-12-30		1217-12-31	1218-12-30	39.984461	-6.536576
		Muslim										
Coria	Coria	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1141-12-31	1142-12-30	39.984601	-6.536288
Coria	Coria	Christian Occupation	City			1141-12-31	1142-12-30	1499-12-31			39.984601	-6.536288
Coruche	Castelo de Coruche	Avis	Fortress	Valley		1210-12-31	1211-12-30	1499-12-31			38.958621	-8.527981
Coruche	Castelo de Coruche	Evora	Fortress	Valley		1175-12-31	1176-12-30	1477-12-51	1210-12-31	1211-12-30	38.958621	-8.527981
Cote	Castillo de Coracile	Alcantara	Fortress	Hilltop		1296-12-31	1297-12-30	1499-12-31	1210-12-51	1211-12-50	36,996969	-5.527265
Covilhã	Covilhã (villa)	Avis	City	Hilltop		1329-12-31	1330-12-30	1499-12-31			40.280507	-7.504651
Covilhã	Covilhã (villa)	Hospitallers	City	Hilltop		1191-12-31	1195-12-30	14// 12 51	1329-12-31	1330-12-30	40.280507	-7.504651
Crato	Castillo de crato	Hospitallers	Fortress	Valley		1231-12-31	1232-12-30	1499-12-31	1527 12 51	1550 12 50	39.284495	-7.642893
Cruto	Hopital de Santiago de	Hospitaliers	10111035	vancy		1251 12 51	1252 12 50	1477 12 51			57.204475	7.042075
Cuenca	Cuenca	Santiago	Church	Hilltop		1181-12-31	1182-12-30	1499-12-31			40.076773	-2.137574
		Muslim										
Cuenca	Cuenca	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1176-12-31	1177-12-30	40.077174	-2.130754
C	Course	Christian	Cite			1176 12 21	1177 12 20	1400 12 21			40.077174	0 120754
Cuenca	Cuenca	Occupation	City			1176-12-31	1177-12-30	1499-12-31			40.077174	-2.130754
C	Course	Christian	Cha			1197-05-31	1107.06.20		1197-07-31	1197-08-30	40.077174	0 120754
Cuenca Cuerno	Cuenca Castillo del Cuerno	Occupation Templars	City Fortress	Hilltop		1249-12-31	1197-06-30 1259-12-30		1311-12-31	1313-12-30	40.077174 38.030825	-2.130754 -6.484271
	Castino del Cuerno	Muslim	Fortress	ншор		1249-12-51	1239-12-50		1511-12-51	1515-12-50	38.030823	-0.464271
Cuevas de Vinrom?	Cuevas de Vinrom?	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1239-12-31	1240-12-30	40.303025	0.122795
Cuevas de	Cuevas de Villioni?	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1239-12-31	1240-12-30	40.303023	0.122795
Vinrom?	Cuevas de Vinrom?	Montesa	Fortress			1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40,303025	0.122795
Cuevas de	Cuevas de Vintonii:	Woncesa	10111035			1510-12-51	1517-12-50	1477-12-51			40.303025	0.122795
Vinrom?	Cuevas de Vinrom?	Calatrava	Fortress			1234-12-31	1235-12-30		1274-12-31	1275-12-30	40.303025	0.122795
Cuevas de		Christian										
Vinrom?	Cuevas de Vinrom?	Occupation	Fortress			1274-12-31	1275-12-30		1293-12-31	1294-12-30	40.303025	0.122795
Cuevas de												
Vinrom?	Cuevas de Vinrom?	Templars	Fortress			1293-12-31	1294-12-30		1308-12-31	1312-12-30	40.303025	0.122795
Cuevas de		Christian										
Vinrom?	Cuevas de Vinrom?	Occupation	Fortress			1311-12-31	1312-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	40.303025	0.122795
Cuevas de			_									
Vinroma	Cuevas de Vinroma	Montesa	Fortress	Unknown		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.303025	0.122795
Cuevas de		<b>C</b> 1.		<b>T</b> T 1		1000 10 01	1075 10 00		1074 10 01	1075 10 00	10 202025	0 100705
Vinroma	Cuevas de Vinroma	Calatrava	Fortress	Unknown		1239-12-31	1275-12-30		1274-12-31	1275-12-30	40.303025	0.122795
Cuevas de	Course to Mission	T	To star as	Unknown		1293-12-31	1294-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.303025	0.122795
Vinroma Culla	Cuevas de Vinroma Castillo de Culla	Templars Montesa	Fortress	Hilltop		1316-12-31	1294-12-30	1499-12-31	1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.303025	-0.166484
Culla	Castillo de Culla	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1302-12-31	1303-12-30	1499-12-51	1308-12-31	1318-12-31	40.337722	-0.166484
Culla	Destriana	Templars	Fortress	пшор		1302-12-51	1505-12-50		1506-12-51	1516-12-51	40.557722	-0.100484
Destriana	(Encomienda)	Santiago	City	Valley		1180-12-31	1181-12-30		1299-12-31	1399-12-30	42.327756	-6.097073
Destriana	(Enconnenda)	Knights of	City	v anc y		1100-12-51	1101-12-50		1277-12-51	1377-12-30	42.321130	-0.077075
Dornes	Torre de Dornes	Christ	Fortress	Valley		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			39.771499	-8.269301
Dornes	Torre de Dornes	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1159-12-31	1185-12-30	11// 12 51	1316-12-31	1318-12-31	39.771499	-8.269301
Dornes	Tone de Bonnes	Muslim	1011000	( uno j		1107 12 01	1100 12 00		1010 12 01	1910 12 91	37.111.77	0.207001
Duenas	Duenas	Occupation	Fortress			1211-06-15	1211-06-30		1212-07-15	1213-07-17	38.666507	-3.84525
Ega	Castillo de Ega	Templars	Fortress	Vallev	1186-01-28				1316-12-31	1319-12-30	40.095615	-8.537642
6		Knights of										
Ega	Castillo de Ega	Christ	Fortress	Valley		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.095615	-8.537642
	Iglesia fortificada del											
Ejea de los	Salvador / Iglesia de								1			
Caballeros	los*	Templars	Church	Valley		1174-12-31	1175-12-30		1198-12-31	1199-12-30	42.126123	-1.14193
Ejea de los												
Caballeros	Ejea de los Caballeros	Templars	City	Valley		1156-12-31	1157-12-30		1316-12-31	1318-12-31	42.129092	-1.138056
El Toboso	El Toboso	Santiago	City	Valley		1467-12-31	1468-12-30	1499-12-31			39.512315	-2.996264
		Muslim										
Elche	Elche	Occupation	City		1119-12-31	1		1	1239-12-31	1240-12-30	38.270221	-0.710876

		Christian						1	1			
Elche	Elche	Occupation	City			1265-12-31	1266-12-30	1499-12-31			38.270221	-0.710876
Liene	Liene	Muslim	City			1205 12 51	1200 12 50	1477 12 51			50.270221	0.710070
Elche	Elche	Occupation	City			1263-12-31	1264-12-30		1265-12-31	1266-12-30	38.270221	-0.710876
		Christian										
Elche	Elche	Occupation	City			1239-12-31	1240-12-30		1264-05-31	1264-12-30	38.270221	-0.710876
Eljas	Castillo de Eljas	Alcantara	Fortress	Spur		1301-12-31	1302-12-30	1499-12-31			40.217055	-6.84772
		Muslim										
Elvas	Elvas	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1165-12-31	1166-12-30	38.880774	-7.16352
		Christian										
Elvas	Elvas	Occupation	City			1165-12-31	1166-12-30		1166-12-31	1170-12-30	38.880774	-7.16352
		Muslim										
Elvas	Elvas	Occupation	City			1166-12-31	1170-12-30		1225-12-31	1226-12-30	38.880774	-7.16352
Elvas	Elvas	Templars	City			1225-12-31	1226-12-30		1307-12-31	1317-12-30	38.880774	-7.16352
	Castillo de											
Encinacorba	Encinacorba	Hospitallers	Fortress	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			41.285136	-1.278077
	Castillo de											
Encinacorba	Encinacorba	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1124-12-31	1125-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	41.285136	-1.278077
Enguera	Castillo Enguera	Santiago	Fortress	Spur	1244-03-25				1335-12-31	1336-12-30	38.976512	-0.678833
		Christian						1				
Escalona	Escalona	Occupation	City		1119-12-31			1499-12-31			40.165851	-4.40358
Escalona	Escalona	Muslim Siege	City		1196-06-30			1196-08-30			40.165851	-4.40358
Esparragosa de												
Lares	Castillo de Lares	Alcantara	Fortress	Spur		1308-12-31	1309-12-30	1499-12-31			38.981064	-5.26805
Esparragosa de												
Lares	Castillo de Lares	Templars	Fortress	Spur		1236-08-31	1236-09-29		1308-12-31	1309-12-30	38.981064	-5.26805
Espluga de												
Calba	Espluga de Calba	Hospitallers	Fortress	Spur		1404-12-31	1405-12-30	1499-12-31			41.494946	1.004688
Estepa	Castillo de Estepa	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1266-12-31	1267-12-30	1499-12-31			37.288063	-4.877643
	Estremera											
Estremera	(Encomienda)	Santiago	City	Valley		1170-12-31	1171-12-30	1499-12-31			40.184699	-3.107675
Evora	Castelo de Evora	Avis	Fortress	Valley		1210-12-31	1211-12-30	1499-12-31			38.570592	-7.907666
Evora	Castelo de Evora	Calatrava	Fortress	Valley		1164-12-31	1165-12-30		1175-12-31	1176-12-30	38.570592	-7.907666
Evora	Castelo de Evora	Evora	Fortress	Valley		1175-12-31	1176-12-30	_	1210-12-31	1211-12-30	38.570592	-7.907666
	Castillo de Eznavejor /		_									
Eznavejor	Eznavexore	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1212-12-31	1213-12-30		1242-12-31	1243-12-30	38.564668	-3.034094
		Muslim	<i>a</i> .									
Faro	Faro	Occupation	City		1119-12-31			1499-12-31			37.018551	-7.931049
Faro	Faro	Christian Siege	City		1248-12-31	1000 10 01	100110	1250-12-30			37.018551	-7.931049
Feria	Castillo de Feria	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1393-12-31	1394-12-30	1499-12-31			38.515113	-6.567912
		Christian			1010 00 10							
Ferral	Ferral	Occupation Muslim	Fortress		1212-07-17			1499-12-31			38.392606	-3.545832
Ermal	Ferral		Fortress		1119-12-31				1169-05-31	1169-08-30	38,392606	-3.545832
Ferral	Ferral	Occupation Muslim	Fortress		1119-12-31				1109-05-31	1109-08-30	38.392000	-3.343832
Formal	Ferral	Occupation	Fortress			1169-08-31	1169-12-30	1212-07-17			38.392606	-3.545832
Ferral	Fellai	Christian	Fortress			1109-08-31	1109-12-30	1212-07-17			38.392000	-3.343632
Ferral	Ferral	Occupation	Fortress			1169-05-31	1169-08-30	1	1169-08-31	1169-12-30	38.392606	-3.545832
Ferreira do	Tural	Knights of	1 0111055	+		1107-03-31	1107-08-30	+	1107-06-51	1107-12-30	36.372000	-3.343032
Zêzere	Ferreira do Zêzere	Christ	City	Valley		1320-12-31	1321-12-30	1499-12-31			39.694017	-8.290988
Ferreira do	. chena do Zezele	Chillion	Cuy	, and y		1520 12-51	1521 12-50	1777 12-31	1	+ +	57.074017	0.270700
Zêzere	Ferreira do Zêzere	Templars	City	Valley		1305-12-31	1306-12-30	1	1308-12-31	1319-12-30	39.694017	-8.290988
	Mosteiro de Flor da		Sky	. uno y			1000 12 00	1	1000 12 01		571071017	0.270700
	Rosa	Hospitallers	Monastery	Valley		1355-12-31	1356-12-30	1499-12-31			39,306669	-7.647867
Flor da Rosa		Hospitallers	City	Valley		1193-12-31	1194-12-30	1499-12-31		+ +	41.119592	-7.729671
Flor da Rosa Fontelo	Fontelo											
Fontelo	Fontelo Fortuna (Villa)											
	Fontelo Fortuna (Villa)	Santiago Muslim	City	Valley		1303-12-31	1304-12-30	1499-12-31			38.179474	-1.122907

		Christian										
Fraga	Fraga	Occupation	City			1148-12-31	1149-12-30	1499-12-31			41.522674	0.350644
Fraga	Fraga	Muslim Victory	Battle			1142-12-31	1143-05-31		1143-08-30	1143-12-30	41.522674	0.350644
Fregenal de la												
Sierra	Fregenal de la Sierra	Templars	City	Valley		1282-12-31	1283-12-30		1311-12-31	1312-12-30	38.170582	-6.653533
Frescano	Frescano	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1281-12-31	1282-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	41.874301	-1.450038
	Iglesia San Juan											
Fresno el Viejo	Fresno el Viejo	Hospitallers	Church	Valley		1115-12-31	1116-12-30	1499-12-31			41.196622	-5.146496
Fuenllana	Castillo de Fuenllana	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1212-07-15	1213-12-30	1499-12-31			38.754814	-2.960234
Fuente del	Fuente del Maestre	E .										
Maestre	(city walls)	Santiago	City	Valley		1187-12-31	1230-12-30	1499-12-31			38.532893	-6.447735
Fuentiduena de	Castillo Fuentiduena											
Tajo	de Tajo	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1229-12-31	1230-12-30	1499-12-31			40.121602	-3.163193
Galera	Galera (Encomienda)	Santiago	City	Valley		1242-12-31	1243-12-30	1499-12-31			37.742611	-2.551225
		Muslim										
Galisteo	Galisteo	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1212-12-31	1213-12-30	39.976332	-6.267334
		Christian										
Galisteo	Galisteo	Occupation	City			1212-12-31	1213-12-30	1499-12-31			39.976332	-6.267334
Gandesa	Gandesa (Villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			41.053042	0.436476
Gandesa	Gandesa (Villa)	Templars	City	Valley		1152-12-31	1153-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	41.053042	0.436476
		Muslim						1				
Garciez	Garciez	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1230-12-31	1231-12-30	37.871934	-3.457439
		Christian										
Garciez	Garciez	Occupation	Fortress			1230-12-31	1231-12-30	1499-12-31			37.871934	-3.457439
Gargantiel	Gargantiel (villa)	Calatrava	City	Valley		1188-12-31	1189-12-30	1499-12-31			38.808484	-4.70549
	Floripes / Rocafrida /											
Garrovillas de	Garrovillas de		_									
Alconetar	Alconetar	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1166-12-31	1167-12-30		1257-12-31	1258-12-30	39.702749	-6.467019
Garvão	Garvão (Villa)	Santiago	City	Valley		1266-12-31	1267-12-30	1499-12-31			37.708435	-8.343944
~		Muslim	<b>D</b> 11									
Gerena	Gerena	Occupation	Bridge		1119-12-31			_	1245-12-31	1247-12-30	37.528864	-6.152323
a	6	Christian	D 11			1045 10 01	1247 12 20	1400 12 21			27.520064	6 1 5 9 9 9 9
Gerena	Gerena	Occupation	Bridge		1000 10 01	1245-12-31	1247-12-30	1499-12-31			37.528864	-6.152323
Gibraltar	Gibraltar	Christian Siege	Fortress		1308-12-31			1309-12-30			36.133481	-5.345693
Gibraltar	Gibraltar	Christian Siege	Fortress		1348-12-31			1349-12-30			36.133481	-5.345693
Cibertee	Ciberthee	Muslim	Enderse		1110 12 21				1461 12 21	1462 12 20	26 122401	5 245(02
Gibraltar	Gibraltar	Occupation Christian	Fortress		1119-12-31			-	1461-12-31	1462-12-30	36.133481	-5.345693
Gibraltar	Gibraltar	Occupation	Fortress			1461-12-31	1462-12-30	1499-12-31			36.133481	-5.345693
Glorieta	Castillo de Glorieta	Hospitallers	Fortress	Spur		1260-12-31	1266-12-30	1499-12-31			41.519871	1.205049
Giorieta	Castilio de Giorieta	Muslim	Forness	Spui		1200-12-31	1200-12-30	1477-12-31			41.3196/1	1.203049
Granada	Alhambra	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31			1492-01-01			37.176753	-3.589998
Granada	Alhambra	Christian Siege	Fortress		1319-05-31			1319-06-24			37.176753	-3.589998
Granada	7 tillatilora	Muslim	10111033		1517 05 51			1517 00 24			51.110155	5.507770
Granadilla	Granadilla	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1159-12-31	1160-12-30	40.268155	-6.106244
Granadilla	Granadilla	Santiago	Fortress	1	1191-08-30		1	1	1281-12-31	1282-12-30	40.268155	-6.106244
Oranadina	Granadina	Christian	10111033		1171 00 50				1201 12 51	1202 12 50	40.200155	0.100244
Granadilla	Granadilla	Occupation	Fortress			1159-12-31	1160-12-30	1191-08-30			40.268155	-6.106244
		Christian	- 011000	1			.100 12 00		1	1	101200100	0.100211
Granadilla	Granadilla	Occupation	Fortress			1281-12-31	1282-12-30	1499-12-31	1		40.268155	-6.106244
Granyena	Castillo de Granvena	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1316-12-31	1318-12-31	1499-12-31	1	1	41.624017	1.245115
Granyena	Castillo de Granyena	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1129-12-31	1130-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	41.624017	1.245115
<i>, .</i>	same 25 oranjena	Christian						1				
Guadalajara	Guadalajara	Occupation	City		1119-12-31			1499-12-31			40.633439	-3.163767
Guadalajara	Guadalajara	Muslim Siege	City	1	1197-05-31			1197-08-30	1	1	40.633439	-3.163767
	Guadalcanal					1						
Guadalcanal	(Encomienda)	Santiago	City	Valley		1241-12-31	1242-12-30	1499-12-31	1		38.093522	-5.818376
	Castillo de								1			
								1499-12-31				

		Muslim							1	1		
Guadix	Guadix	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1487-12-31	1489-12-30	37.298674	-3.137285
Ouduix	Ouauix	Christian	City		1119-12-31		1	1	1467-12-31	1489-12-30	37.298074	-3.137283
Guadix	Guadix	Occupation	City			1487-12-31	1489-12-30	1499-12-31			37.298674	-3.137285
		Muslim										
Guillena	Guillena	Occupation	Bridge		1119-12-31				1245-12-31	1247-12-30	37.549081	-6.05313
		Christian										
Guillena	Guillena	Occupation	Bridge			1245-12-31	1247-12-30	1499-12-31			37.549081	-6.05313
Herencia	Herencia	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1182-12-31	1183-12-30	1499-12-31			39.367149	-3.355312
Herrera de	Herrera de Alcantara											
Alcantara	(villa)	Alcantara	City	Valley		1219-12-31	1220-12-30	1499-12-31			39.636783	-7.405076
Herrera del	Castillo Herrera del											
Duque	Duque	Alcantara	Fortress	Hilltop		1445-12-31	1446-12-30	1499-12-31			39.160692	-5.033418
	Hervas / Iglesia de											
	Santa María de Aguas											
Hervas	Vivas	Templars	Church	Valley		1189-12-31	1190-12-30		1209-12-31	1210-12-30	40.274658	-5.8583
Higuera de												
Calatrava	Higuera de Calatrava	Calatrava	City	Valley		1227-12-31	1228-12-30	1471-09-28			37.798965	-4.157227
Higuera de	Contillo del Cont	T	Forday	X7.11		1100 12 21	1020 10 00	1	1200 12 21	1210 12 21	20 446402	6 0765 10
Vargas	Castillo del Coso	Templars	Fortress	Valley Valley		1199-12-31	1230-12-29	+	1308-12-31	1318-12-31	38.446483	-6.976542 -6.364094
Hinojal	Ermita de San Berto	Templars	Fortress			1251-12-31	1252-12-30		1298-12-31	1299-12-30	39.710446	
Hornachos	Castillo de Hornachos	Santiago	Fortress	Spur		1234-12-31	1235-12-30	1499-12-31			38.55654	-6.061785
Hornos de	Castillo de Hornos	Contingo	Eastrace	Hilltop		1238-12-31	1239-12-30	1499-12-31			38.216477	-2.718348
Segura	Castilio de Hornos	Santiago	Fortress	Hiitop		1238-12-31	1239-12-30	1499-12-31			38.210477	-2./18548
Horta de Sant Joan	Horta de Sant Joan	Hospitallers	City	Hilltop		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.954073	0.316672
Horta de Sant	Horta de Sant Joan	Hospitaliers	City	ншор		1510-12-51	1319-12-30	1499-12-51			40.934075	0.310072
Joan	Horta de Sant Joan	Templars	City	Hilltop		1173-12-31	1174-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.954073	0.316672
Joan	Horta de Sant Joan	Muslim	City	mitop	-	1175-12-51	1174-12-30	-	1500-12-51	1517-12-50	40.754075	0.510072
Hu?scar	Hu?scar	Occupation	City		1119-12-31			1243-07-04			37.810265	-2.537949
110.5cm	Huisea	Christian	City		111/ 12 51			1245 07 04			57.010205	2.551747
Hu?scar	Hu?scar	Occupation	City		1243-07-04				1323-12-31	1324-12-30	37.810265	-2.537949
Hansell	Thurson	Christian	Chy		1215 07 01				1020 12 01	1521 12 50	571010205	2.001717
Hu?scar	Hu?scar	Occupation	City			1487-12-31	1488-12-30	1499-12-31			37.810265	-2.537949
		Muslim										
Hu?scar	Hu?scar	Occupation	City			1323-12-31	1324-12-30		1433-12-31	1434-12-30	37.810265	-2.537949
		Christian	, in the second s									
Hu?scar	Hu?scar	Occupation	City			1433-12-31	1434-12-30		1446-12-31	1447-12-30	37.810265	-2.537949
		Muslim										
Hu?scar	Hu?scar	Occupation	City			1446-12-31	1447-12-30		1487-12-31	1488-12-30	37.810265	-2.537949
Huesa del												
Común	Castillo de Penaflor	Templars	Fortress	Spur		1153-12-31	1154-12-30		1208-12-31	1209-12-30	41.009101	-0.921238
Huete	Huete	Muslim Siege	Fortress		1197-05-31			1197-08-30			40.147567	-2.694217
Huete	Huete	Muslim Siege	Fortress		1172-06-10			1172-06-22			40.147567	-2.694217
		Christian										
Huete	Huete	Occupation	Fortress			1149-12-31	1150-12-30	1499-12-31			40.147567	-2.694217
		Muslim	_									
Huete	Huete	Occupation	Fortress			1119-12-31	1120-12-30	1100.10.01	1149-12-31	1150-12-30	40.147567	-2.694217
Hueva	Castillo de Hueva	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1174-12-31	1175-12-30	1499-12-31			40.462352	-2.959903
<b>X 1 1 X</b> Y	Castelo de Idanha a		<b>F</b> .			1010 10 01	1010 10 01	1400 10 01			20.010025	7.00/51
Idanha a Nova	Nova	None	Fortress	Spur		1318-12-31	1318-12-31	1499-12-31			39.919937	-7.23656
Idanha a Nava	Castelo de Idanha a	Tamalana	Fostness	Carro		1196 12 21	1107 10 20	1	1208 12 21	1210 12 20	20.010027	7 22656
Idanha a Nova	Nova	Templars Knights of	Fortress	Spur		1186-12-31	1187-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	39.919937	-7.23656
Idanha-a-Velha	Idanha-a-Velha	Knights of Christ	Fortress	Valley		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			39.995758	-7.143763
Idanha-a-Velha Idanha-a-Velha	Idanha-a-Velha Idanha-a-Velha		Fortress	Valley Valley		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31	1308-12-31	1319-12-30	39.995758	-7.143763
	Idanha-a-Velha Iglesia de Santa Mar?a	Templars	FOLUESS	vaney		1100-12-31	110/-12-30	-	1306-12-31	1519-12-30	37.993/38	-/.143/03
Iglesia de Santa Mar?a de Eunate	Iglesia de Santa Mar?a de Eunate	Templars	Church			1169-12-31	1170-12-30	1	1306-12-31	1316-12-31	42.672222	-1.761511
Iglesia de Santa	Iglesia de Santa María	rempiais	Church	+		1107-12-31	11/0-12-30	+	1300-12-31	1310-12-31	42.072222	-1./01511
María de Eunate	de Eunate	Templars	Church	Valley		1169-12-31	1170-12-30	1	1308-12-31	1319-12-30	42.672222	-1.761511
waita ue Eullate	ue Eullaie	rempiats	Church	v ancy		1107-12-31	11/0-12-30	1	1300-12-31	1317-12-30	42.072222	-1./01311

Illora	Illora	Christian Siege	City	1	1245-01-09	1	1	1245-12-30	1	1 1	37.286246	-3.880205
				_		-						-3.880205
Illora	Illora	Christian Siege	City	_	1319-05-31	-		1319-06-30			37.286246	-3.880205
Illow	Illows	Muslim	City		1119-12-31				1485-12-31	1486-12-30	37.286246	-3.880205
Illora	Illora	Occupation Christian	City	-	1119-12-31	-			1465-12-51	1480-12-30	57.280240	-5.880205
Illora	Illora	Occupation	City			1485-12-31	1486-12-30	1499-12-31			37.286246	-3.880205
mora	mora	Christian	City	-	-	1403-12-31	1460-12-30	1477-12-31	-		37.280240	-3.880203
Iznatoraf	Iznatoraf	Occupation	Fortress			1235-12-31	1236-12-30	1499-12-31			38.157666	-3.032167
Jaen	Jaen	Christian Siege	City		1150-12-31	1233-12-31	1230-12-30	1151-12-30	1		37.767582	-3.79937
Jaen	Jaen	Christian Siege	City		1225-07-31			1225-08-30			37.767582	-3.79937
Jaen	Jaen	Christian Siege	City		1230-08-31	+		1223-08-30	1		37.767582	-3.79937
Jacii	Jaen	Muslim	City	-	1250-08-51	-		1230-09-30	-		51.101582	-3.19931
Jaen	Jaen	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1245-12-31	1246-01-30	37.767582	-3.79937
Jacii	Jaen	Christian	City		1119-12-31	+			1243-12-31	1240-01-30	51.101582	-3.19931
Jaen	Jaen	Occupation	City			1245-12-31	1246-12-30	1499-12-31			37.767582	-3.79937
Jacii	Jaen	Muslim	City			1245-12-51	1240-12-30	1477-12-31			51.101582	-3.19931
Jalance	Jalance	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1244-03-31	1244-12-30	39.192478	-1.079381
Jaiance	Jalance	Christian	Fortiess		1119-12-31				1244-03-31	1244-12-30	37.172478	-1.079381
Jalance	Jalance	Occupation	Fortress			1244-03-31	1244-12-30	1499-12-31			39.192478	-1.079381
Jamilena	Castillo Jamilena	Calatrava	Fortress	Unknown		1227-12-31	1228-12-30	1499-12-31			37.746408	-3.914838
Janniena	Iglesia fortificada de	Calattava	Fortiess	UIKIIOWII		1227-12-31	1220-12-30	1477-12-31			37.740408	-3.714636
Jarandilla de la	Nuestra Senora de la											
Vera	Torre	Templars	Church	Valley		1188-12-31	1199-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-12	40.12581	-5.660444
Vera	Tone	Christian	Church	vancy		1100 12 51	1177 12 50		1500 12 51	1517 12 12	40.12501	5.000444
Jerez	Jerez	Victory	Battle		1230-12-31			1231-12-30			36.683745	-6.138558
Jerez	Jerez	Muslim Siege	City		1290-12-31			1291-12-30			36.683745	-6.138558
Jerez	Jerez	Christian Siege	City		1246-08-31	-		1246-09-29	-		36.683745	-6.138558
56162	JCICL	Muslim	City		1240 00 51	-		1240 07 27	-		50.005745	0.150550
Jerez	Jerez	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1247-12-31	1248-12-30	36.683745	-6.138558
beren	Perez	Christian	Chy		1117 12 51				1217 12 51	1210 12 30	50.0057 15	0.120220
Jerez	Jerez	Occupation	City			1264-07-31	1264-08-30	1499-12-31			36.683745	-6.138558
		Christian										
Jerez	Jerez	Occupation	City			1247-12-31	1248-12-30		1264-05-31	1264-06-30	36.683745	-6.138558
		Muslim	~)									
Jerez	Jerez	Occupation	City			1264-05-31	1264-06-30		1264-07-31	1264-08-30	36.683745	-6.138558
Jerez de los	Alcazaba de Jerez de											
Caballeros	los Caballeros	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1311-12-31	1312-12-30	1499-12-31			38.318385	-6.771039
Jerez de los	Alcazaba de Jerez de			1 A								
Caballeros	los Caballeros	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1231-12-31	1232-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	38.318385	-6.771039
		Muslim										
Jodar	Jodar	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1225-12-31	1231-12-30	37.838749	-3.352255
		Christian										
Jodar	Jodar	Occupation	City			1225-12-31	1231-12-30	1499-12-31			37.838749	-3.352255
		Muslim										
Jorquera	Jorquera	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1212-03-31	1212-05-29	39.175467	-1.521513
		Christian										
Jorquera	Jorquera	Occupation	Fortress			1212-03-31	1212-05-30	1499-12-31			39.175467	-1.521513
Juromenha	Castelo de Juromenha	Avis	Fortress	Valley		1241-12-31	1242-12-30	1499-12-31			38.738144	-7.2397
La Almunia de	La Almunia de Dona											
Dona Godina	Godina	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1175-12-31	1176-12-30	1499-12-31			41.476756	-1.374529
	Castillo de La											
La Codosera	Codosera	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1216-12-31	1217-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	39.203928	-7.173953
La Iglesuela del						1			1			
Cid	La Iglesuela del Cid	Templars	City	Valley		1241-12-31	1242-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.481718	-0.319012
La Iruela	Castillo de La Iruela	Templars	Fortress	Spur		1231-12-31	1232-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	37.920668	-2.990171
La Jana	La Jana (villa)	Montesa	Fortress	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.512882	0.252791
La Jana	La Jana (villa)	Montesa	City	Valley		1232-12-31	1233-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	40.512882	0.252791
		1					1					
	La Mola	Muslim			1119-12-31				1242-12-31	1252-12-30	38.408544	-0.792988

r	T	<b>GL</b> 1.1	-	-1		T	Т	1	T	1		
La Mola	La Mola	Christian Occupation	Fortress			1242-12-31	1252-12-30	1499-12-31			38,408544	-0.792988
La Niola La Salzadella	La Moia La Salzadella (villa)	Montesa	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31	-		40.418309	0.174878
La Salzadella	La Salzadella (villa)	Calatrava	City	Valley		1237-12-31	1240-12-30	1499-12-31	1274-12-31	1275-12-30	40.418309	0.174878
La Villa de Don	La Villa de Don	Calatiava	City	vancy		1237-12-31	1240-12-30		12/4-12-31	1275-12-50	40.418509	0.174676
Fadrique	Fadrique	Santiago	City	Valley		1242-12-31	1243-12-30	1499-12-31			39.615762	-3.217415
L'Ametlla	L'Ametlla (villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1214-12-31	1215-12-30	1499-12-31			41.575916	1.239918
Las Labores	Las Labores (villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1182-12-31	1183-12-30	1499-12-31			39.274121	-3.519284
Las Labores	Mosteiro de Leca do	Hospitaliers	City	v anc y		1102-12-51	1105-12-50	1477-12-51			37.274121	-5.517204
Leca do Balio	Balio	Hospitallers	Monasterv	Valley		1191-12-31	1192-12-30	1499-12-31			41.210021	-8.623353
Leça do Bano	Convento San Marcos	riospitations	monustery	, and j		11)1 12 51	1172 12 50	11,77 12 51	-		11.210021	0.020000
Leon	de Leon	Santiago	Monastery	Valley		1184-12-31	1185-12-30	1499-12-31			42.601842	-5.581801
L'Espluga de	Hospital de L'Espluga	bunnigo	monustery	, and j		1101 12 51	1100 12 00	11// 12 51			121001012	51501001
Francolí	de Francolí	Hospitallers	Monastery	Unknown		1265-12-31	1266-12-30	1499-12-31			41.395889	1.103238
Trancon	Iglesia Vella de Sant	nospitanets	monustery	Childhown		1200 12 01	1200 12 50	11// 12 51			11.575007	11105250
L'Espluga de	Miquel / L'Espulga de											
Francolí	Franc*	Hospitallers	Church	Spur		1293-12-31	1203-12-30	1499-12-31			41.396323	1.102369
L'Espluga de	Castillo de L'Espluga											
Francolí	de Francolí	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1316-12-31	1317-12-30	1499-12-31			41.39729	1.105141
L'Espluga de	Castillo de L'Espluga			<sup>^</sup>								
Francolí	de Francolí	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1253-12-31	1254-12-30		1316-12-31	1317-12-30	41.39729	1.105141
Letur	Castillo de Letur	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1241-12-31	1242-12-30	1499-12-31			38.365607	-2.100514
		Order of										
Libros	Libros (villa)	Monfrague	City	Valley		1186-12-31	1187-12-30		1195-12-31	1196-12-30	40.162139	-1.234993
Libros	Libros (villa)	Templars	City	Valley		1195-12-31	1196-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.162139	-1.234993
	Castillo de Linares de											
Linares de Mora	Mora	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1141-12-31	1181-12-30		1201-12-31	1202-12-30	40.322243	-0.57546
		Muslim										
Lisbon	Lisbon	Occupation	City		1119-12-31			1147-10-24			38.71383	-9.133182
Lisbon	Lisbon	Christian Siege	City		1147-05-31			1147-10-24			38.71383	-9.133182
		Christian										
Lisbon	Lisbon	Occupation	City		1147-10-24			1499-12-31			38.71383	-9.133182
Lleida	Castillo de Gardeny	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1313-12-31	1314-12-30	1499-12-31			41.60869	0.615097
Lleida	Castillo de Gardeny	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1148-12-31	1149-12-30		1308-12-31	1314-12-30	41.60869	0.615097
		Muslim										
Lleida	Castel de la Suda	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31			1149-10-23			41.617603	0.625897
		Christian										
Lleida	Castel de la Suda	Occupation	Fortress		1149-10-23			1499-12-31			41.617603	0.625897
Llerena	Llerena (Villa)	Santiago	City	Valley		1242-12-31	1243-12-30	1493-12-30			38.238353	-6.015768
Loja	Loja	Christian Siege	Fortress		1225-07-31			1225-08-30			37.166863	-4.152391
		Muslim										
Loja	Loja	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1225-07-31	1225-08-30	37.166863	-4.152391
		Knights of										
Longrovia	Castelo de Longrovia	Christ	Fortress	Hilltop		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.963822	-7.20859
Longrovia	Castelo de Longrovia	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1144-12-31	1145-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.963822	-7.20859
Lopera	Castillo de Lopera	Calatrava	Fortress	Valley		1241-12-31	1242-12-30	1499-12-31			37.943694	-4.213742
Lora	Lora (Villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1246-12-31	1247-12-30	1499-12-31			37.655033	-5.526868
		Muslim										
Lorca	Castillo de Lorca	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31			l	1243-07-04	1243-07-30	37.677444	-1.705684
		Christian										
Lorca	Castillo de Lorca	Occupation	Fortress			1243-07-04	1243-07-30	1499-12-31			37.677444	-1.705684
Lorqui	Lorqui (Villa)	Santiago	City	Valley		1303-12-31	1304-12-30	1499-12-31			38.081938	-1.25393
	Castillo de											
Los Yebenes	Guadalerzas	Calatrava	Fortress	Spur		1177-12-31	1178-12-30	1499-12-31			39.457524	-3.808827
	Castillo de											
Los Yebenes	Guadalerzas	Calatrava	Fortress	Spur		1177-12-31	1178-01-01		1178-01-29	1178-12-30	39.457524	-3.808827
Luna	San Gill de Luna	Templars	Church	Valley		1169-12-31	1170-06-14		1170-06-14	1170-12-30	42.17171	-0.933523
Luna	Castillo de Luna	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1166-12-31	1167-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	42.168	-0.93144

	1				-	1	1		1			
Macastre	Macastre	Muslim Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1237-12-31	1238-12-30	39,379487	-0.788793
Macastre	Macastre	Hospitallers	Fortress		1117 12 51	1240-12-31	1241-12-30	1499-12-31	1237 12 31	1250 12 50	39.379487	-0.788793
		Christian										
Macastre	Macastre	Occupation	Fortress			1237-12-31	1238-12-30		1240-12-31	1241-12-30	39.379487	-0.788793
		Christian										
Madrid	Madrid	Occupation	City		1119-12-31			1499-12-31			40.415264	-3.707567
Madrid	Madrid	Muslim Siege	City		1197-03-31			1197-04-29			40.415264	-3.707567
Madridejos	Madridejos (villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1182-12-31	1183-12-30	1499-12-31			39.469416	-3.532587
		Muslim	<i>a</i> .									
Malaga	Malaga	Occupation Almohad	City	X7 11	1119-12-31				1486-12-31 1212-06-30	1487-12-30	36.721402	-4.421141 -3.852909
Malagon	Castillo de Malagon Castillo de Malagon	Calatrava	Fortress Fortress	Valley Valley	1195-07-17	1179-12-31	1180-12-30	1195-07-17	1212-06-30	1212-07-15	39.168172 39.168172	-3.852909
Malagon Mallen	Mallen	Hospitallers	City	Valley		11/9-12-31	1180-12-30	1499-12-31			41.899795	-3.852909
Mallen	Mallen		City	Valley		1143-12-31	1132-12-30	1499-12-31	1150-12-31	1151 12 20	41.899795	-1.418794
Mallen	Castillo de Penas	Templars	City	valley		1151-12-51	1132-12-30		1150-12-31	1151-12-30	41.899795	-1.418/94
Manzanares	Borras	Calatrava	Fortress	Valley		1197-12-31	1198-12-30	1499-12-31			38.994168	-3.369151
Walizalia CS	Castillo de Penas	Calatiava	Fortiess	vancy		1197-12-31	1196-12-30	1477-12-31			36.774108	-3.309131
Manzanares	Borras	Calatrava	Fortress	Valley		1198-12-31	1199-12-30		1206-12-31	1207-12-30	38,994168	-3.369151
Maqueda	Castillo de Maqueda	Calatrava	Fortress	Valley		1176-12-31	1177-12-30		1464-12-31	1465-12-30	40.064665	-4.368965
Maqueda	Custillo de Maqueda	Christian	1011035	vancy		11/0 12 51	11// 12 50		1404 12 51	1405 12 50	40.004005	4.500705
Maqueda	Maqueda	Occupation	City		1119-12-31			1176-12-31			40.064587	-4.369082
Maqueda	Maqueda	Muslim Siege	City		1197-03-31			1197-04-29			40.064587	-4.369082
Maqueda	Maqueda	Muslim Siege	City		1196-05-31			1196-08-30			40.064587	-4.369082
1		Muslim										
Marchena	Marchena	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1243-12-31	1244-12-30	37.326736	-5.416107
		Christian	, in the second s									
Marchena	Marchena	Occupation	City			1243-12-31	1244-12-30	1499-12-31			37.326736	-5.416107
	Castillo de la Pena de											
Martos	Martos	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1227-12-31	1228-12-30	1499-12-31			37.718252	-3.961195
Martos	Martos	Muslim Siege	City		1243-12-31			1244-12-30			37.723352	-3.967955
Martos	Martos	Muslim Siege	City		1314-12-31			1315-12-30			37.723352	-3.967955
Martos	Martos	Muslim Siege	City		1324-12-31			1325-12-30			37.723352	-3.967955
		Muslim										
Martos	Martos	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1225-12-31	1226-12-30	37.723352	-3.967955
		Christian										
Martos	Martos	Occupation	City			1225-12-31	1228-12-30	1227-12-31			37.723352	-3.967955
Masdeu	Masdeu (House?)	Templars	Monastery	Valley		1137-12-31	1138-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	42.607199	2.83709
Massarrojos	Massarrojos	Montesa	Fortress	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			39.539655	-0.403417
Massarrojos	Massarrojos	Templars	City	Valley		1250-12-31	1251-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	39.539655	-0.403417
Matrera	Castillo de Matrera	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1252-12-31	1253-12-30	1499-12-31			36.806982	-5.565762
Mayorga	Castillo de Mayorga	Alcantara	Fortress	Spur		1219-12-31	1220-12-30	1499-12-31			39.268761	-7.156895
Medellin	Castillo de Medellin	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop	_	1233-12-31	1234-12-30	1499-12-31			38.966925	-5.956107
Medellin	Castillo de Medellin	Alcantara	Fortress	Hilltop	_	1233-12-31	1234-12-30	1499-12-31			38.966925	-5.956107
Medina de las	Castillo de Medina de	a .:	<b>T</b> .	X7 11		1045 10 01	1046 10 00	1400 12 21			20.22/1/7	6 400050
Torres	las Torres	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1245-12-31	1246-12-30	1499-12-31			38.336167	-6.428352
Maller Charle	Castillo de	Santa Maria de	Enderse	TTILL		1070 10 21	1070 10 20	1000 07 00			26 456175	5 02 17
Medina Sidonia	Torrestrella	Espana	Fortress	Hilltop		1278-12-31	1279-12-30	1280-07-22		-	36.456175	-5.9247
	1	Christian Occupation	Fortress	1	1264-09-21				1278-12-31	1279-01-30	38.157666	-3.032167
Madian Cidenta	Madian Oldersia		Fortress		1264-09-21				12/8-12-31	1279-01-30	38.157000	-3.032107
Medina Sidonia	Medina Sidonia						1	1	1			
		Muslim			1110 12 21				1225 12 21	1226 12 20	28 157666	2 022167
Medina Sidonia Medina Sidonia	Medina Sidonia Medina Sidonia	Muslim Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1235-12-31	1236-12-30	38.157666	-3.032167
Medina Sidonia	Medina Sidonia	Muslim Occupation Muslim	Fortress		1119-12-31	1264-05-31	1264-06-30	1264-09-21	1235-12-31	1236-12-30		
		Muslim Occupation Muslim Occupation			1119-12-31	1264-05-31	1264-06-30	1264-09-21	1235-12-31	1236-12-30	38.157666 38.157666	-3.032167 -3.032167
Medina Sidonia Medina Sidonia	Medina Sidonia Medina Sidonia	Muslim Occupation Muslim Occupation Christian	Fortress Fortress		1119-12-31			1264-09-21			38.157666	-3.032167
Medina Sidonia Medina Sidonia Medina Sidonia	Medina Sidonia Medina Sidonia Medina Sidonia	Muslim Occupation Muslim Occupation Christian Occupation	Fortress Fortress Fortress	Valley	1119-12-31	1249-12-31	1250-12-30	1264-09-21	1264-05-31	1264-06-30	38.157666 38.157666	-3.032167 -3.032167
Medina Sidonia Medina Sidonia	Medina Sidonia Medina Sidonia	Muslim Occupation Muslim Occupation Christian	Fortress Fortress	Valley	1119-12-31			1264-09-21			38.157666	-3.032167

	1		1	1	1	1		1		1		
Mandana	Mandalan	Christian	Enderse			1149 10 21	1140 12 20	1400 12 21			41.264922	0.20725
Mequinenza	Mequinenza	Occupation	Fortress	37-11		1148-12-31	1149-12-30	1499-12-31			41.364823	0.29625
Merida	Alcazaba de Merida	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1229-12-31	1230-12-30	1499-12-31			38.914758	-6.346614 -7.664042
Mertola	Castillo de Mertola	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1237-12-31	1238-12-30	1499-12-31			37.638854 38.849061	-7.664042
Mesnera	Castillo de Mesnera	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1212-07-15	1212-12-30	1499-12-31			38.849001	-3.521139
Mesones de Isuela	Castillo de los Luna	Templars	Fortress	Spur		1174-12-31	1175-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	41.550928	-1.536643
	Castelo de Messajana	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1287-12-31	1288-12-30	1499-12-31	1310-12-31	1319-12-30	37.836439	-1.536643 -8.246379
Messejana Mestanza	Mestanza (Villa)	Calatrava		Valley		1287-12-31	1288-12-30	1499-12-31			38.575508	-4.071536
Miguel Esteban	Miguel Esteban (villa)	Hospitallers	Fortress City	Valley		1161-12-31	1162-12-30	1499-12-31			39,527949	-4.071338
Miguelturra	Miguel Esteban (Villa) Miguelturra	Calatrava	City	Valley		1212-07-15	1212-12-30	1499-12-31			39.527949	-3.890349
U U	Milagro			valley	1213-04-30	1212-07-13	1212-12-30	1213-05-12			39.368116	-4.257732
Milagro	Milagio	Muslim Siege Christian	Fortress		1213-04-30			1215-05-12			39.308110	-4.237752
Milagro	Milagro	Occupation	Fortress			1213-02-28	1213-05-30	1499-12-31			39,368116	-4.257732
Milana	Castillo de Milana	Alcantara	Fortress	Spur	-	1213-02-28	1219-12-30	1499-12-31			40.004337	-6.692781
Miraflores	Castillo Miraflores	Almohad	Fortress	Hilltop	1195-07-17	1216-12-51	1219-12-30	1499-12-51	1212-06-30	1212-07-15	39.05363	-4.201421
Miraflores	Castillo Miraflores	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop	1195-07-17	1156-12-31	1158-12-30	1195-07-17	1212-06-30	1212-07-15	39.05363	-4.201421
	Mirambel (villa)					1311-12-31					40,586933	-0.341884
Mirambel Mirambel	Mirambel (villa) Mirambel (villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley			1319-12-30	1499-12-31	1208 12 21	1210 12 20	40.586933	-0.341884
Mirambel Miravet		Templars	City	Valley	1153-08-23	1242-12-31	1243-12-30		1308-12-31 1307-12-31	1319-12-30 1308-12-30	40.586933 41.03545	-0.341884 0.594277
	Castillo de Miravet	Templars	Fortress	Spur	1153-08-23	1207 12 21	1208 12 20	1499-12-31	1307-12-31	1508-12-30		
Miravet	Castillo de Miravet Moclin	Hospitallers Muslim Victory	Fortress Battle	Spur	1280-05-31	1307-12-31	1308-12-30	1499-12-31 1280-06-22			41.03545 37.342021	0.594277 -3.786681
Moclin	Moclin	· · · ·	Battle		1280-05-31	-		1280-06-22			37.342021	-3./80081
Moclin	Moclin	Muslim Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1485-12-31	1486-01-30	37.342021	-3.786681
MOCIIII	Mocilii	Muslim	Fortress		1119-12-31				1463-12-51	1480-01-50	57.542021	-3./80081
Moclin	Torre de la Solana	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1485-12-31	1486-01-30	37.346151	-3.803645
MOCIIII	Torre de la Solalia	Knights of	Fortress		1119-12-31	1			1463-12-51	1480-01-50	57.540151	-3.803043
Mogadouro	Castelo de Mogadouro	Christ	Fortress	Hilltop		1310-12-31	1311-12-30	1499-12-31			41.338309	-6.720216
Mogadouro	Castelo de Mogadouro Castelo de Mogadouro	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1144-12-31	1145-12-30	1477-12-31	1310-12-31	1311-12-30	41.338309	-6.720216
Moigadouro Moixent /	Castelo de Mogadouro	Muslim	Forness	mitop		1144-12-31	1145-12-50		1310-12-31	1311-12-30	41.558509	-0.720210
Mogente	Moixent / Mogente	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1243-12-31	1244-12-30	38.873103	-0.749737
Moixent /	Molxent / Mogente	Christian	Forness		1117-12-31				1243-12-31	1244-12-30	38.873103	-0.749737
Mogente	Moixent / Mogente	Occupation	Fortress			1243-12-31	1244-12-30	1499-12-31			38.873103	-0.749737
Mogente	Castillo de	occupation	10111033			1245 12 51	1244 12 50	1477 12 51			50.075105	0.147151
Monfrag?ue	Monfrag?ue	Calatrava	Fortress	Spur		1220-12-31	1221-12-30	1499-12-31			39.828095	-6.051417
Moninag.ue	Monnug.ue	Order of Monte	10111033	opui		1220 12 51	1221 12 50	14// 12 51			57.020075	0.051417
Monfrague	Castillo de Monfrague	Gaudio	Fortress	Spur		1170-12-31	1180-12-30		1195-12-31	1196-12-30	39.828095	-6.051417
monnugue	custino de Honnugue	Order of	1011000	opu		11/0 12 51	1100 12 50		1170 12 51	11)0 12 50	571020075	0.001117
Monfrague	Castillo de Monfrague	Monfrague	Fortress	Spur		1195-12-31	1196-12-30		1220-12-31	1221-12-30	39.828095	-6.051417
	Castillo de			~r								
Monreal	Carabanchel / Monreal	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1202-12-31	1203-12-30	1499-12-31			39.827893	-3.545718
Monroyo	Castillo de Monroyo	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1208-12-31	1209-12-30	1499-12-31			40.788537	-0.03336
Monsanto	Castillo de Monsanto	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop	1165-11-29				1171-12-31	1172-12-30	40.036189	-7.113664
Monsanto	Castillo de Monsanto	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop	1165-11-29				1171-12-31	1172-12-30	40.036189	-7.113664
Monsanto	Castillo de Monsanto	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1171-12-31	1172-12-30	1499-12-31			40.036189	-7.113664
Monsanto	Castillo de Monsanto	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1171-12-31	1172-12-30	1499-12-31			40.036189	-7.113664
		Knights of								1		
Monsaraz	Castelo de Monsaraz	Christ	Fortress	Hilltop		1318-12-31	1323-12-30	1499-12-31			38.442316	-7.38169
Monsaraz	Castelo de Monsaraz	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1231-12-31	1232-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	38.442316	-7.38169
	1	Muslim						1				
Monsaraz	Monsaraz	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31	1			1231-12-31	1232-12-30	38.442316	-7.38169
Monsaraz	Monsaraz	Cristo	Fortress			1318-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			38.442316	-7.38169
Monsaraz	Monsaraz	Templars	Fortress	1		1231-12-31	1232-12-30		1307-12-31	1316-12-31	38.442316	-7.38169
		Christian										
	Monsaraz	Occupation	Fortress			1316-12-31	1317-12-30		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	38.442316	-7.38169
Monsaraz	Monsaraz					1	1		1	1		0.00.000
Monsaraz Montalban	Castillo de Montalban	Santiago	Fortress	Spur		1209-12-31	1210-12-30	1499-12-31			40.831609	-0.796739
	1 1.00 10		Fortress	Spur		1209-12-31	1210-12-30	1499-12-31			40.831609	-0.796739
	Castillo de Montalban		Fortress Church	Spur Valley		1209-12-31	1210-12-30 1299-12-30	1499-12-31	1299-12-31	1399-12-30	40.831609 40.832918	-0.796739

Montanchez	Montanchez	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1229-12-31	1230-12-30	1499-12-31			39.22514	-6.154941
Wolltahenez	Castillo de	Muslim	Fortress	minop		1229-12-31	1230-12-30	1499-12-31			39.22314	-0.134941
Montanchez	Montanchez	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1165-12-31	1166-12-30	39.225185	-6.155077
Woldanenez	Castillo de	Muslim	10111033		1117 12 51				1105 12 51	1100 12 50	57.225105	0.155077
Montanchez	Montanchez	Occupation	Fortress			1196-05-31	1196-06-14		1229-12-31	1230-12-30	39.225185	-6.155077
Woldanenez	Castillo de	Christian	10111033			1190 05 51	1170 00 14		1227 12 51	1250 12 50	57.225105	0.155077
Montanchez	Montanchez	Occupation	Fortress			1165-12-31	1166-12-30		1196-05-31	1196-06-14	39.225185	-6.155077
Wolldanchez	Castillo de	Occupation	10111035			1105-12-51	1100-12-50		1170-05-51	11)0-00-14	37.223103	-0.155077
Montemolín	Montemolín	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1247-12-31	1248-12-30	1499-12-31			38.156938	-6.219299
Woltenoin	Castillo-Convento de	Santiago	10111035	minop		1247-12-51	1240-12-50	1477-12-51			38.130738	-0.21/2//
Montesa	Montesa	Montesa	Fortress	Hilltop		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			38.951507	-0.651942
Montiel	Castillo de Estrella	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1226-12-31	1227-12-30	1499-12-31			38.699394	-2.861178
Montizon	Castillo de Montizon	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1212-12-31	1213-12-30	1499-12-31			38.523142	-3.06915
MOIIUZOII	Castilio de Montizon	Muslim	Fortress	ншюр		1212-12-31	1213-12-30	1499-12-31			36.323142	-3.00913
Montrov	Torre de Montrov	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1237-12-31	1238-12-30	39.336558	-0.616915
Montroy	Torre de Montroy	Montesa	Fortress	-	1119-12-31	1309-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31	1237-12-31	1238-12-30	39.336558	-0.616915
Montroy	Tone de Monuoy		Fortress			1309-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			39.330338	-0.010913
Montrov	Torre de Montroy	Christian Occupation	Fortress			1237-12-31	1238-12-30	1	1306-12-31	1307-12-30	39.336558	-0.616915
Montroy	Torre de Montroy	Templars	Fortress			1237-12-31	1238-12-30		1309-12-31	1310-12-30	39.336558	-0.616915
				IEllion				1200.05.22	1309-12-31	1310-12-30		
Monzon	Castillo de Monzon	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop	-	1142-12-31	1143-12-30	1309-05-23			41.908747	0.191656
Mora	Mora (Villa)	Santiago	City	Valley		1170-12-31	1171-12-30	1499-12-31			39.684372	-3.112383
	Castillo de Penas	<b>a</b>	<b>F</b> .			1177 00 16	1170 10 20	1 400 10 01			20 (02020	2 72004
Mora	Negras	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1177-09-16	1178-12-30	1499-12-31			39.682839	-3.73094
Moraleja	Castillo de Moraleja	Alcantara	Fortress	Valley		1225-12-31	1226-12-30	1499-12-31		1015 10 00	40.066616	-6.657038
Moras	Moras (Villa)	Calatrava	City	Valley		1236-12-31	1237-12-30		1244-12-31	1245-12-30	38.369055	-5.002582
		Christian	<i>a</i> .				1015 10 00					
Moras	Moras	Occupation	City	-		1244-12-31	1245-12-30	1499-12-31			38.369055	-5.002582
Moras	Moras	Calatrava	City			1236-12-31	1237-12-30		1244-12-31	1245-12-30	38.369055	-5.002582
Moratilla de los												
Meleros	Encomienda	Calatrava	City	Valley		1173-12-31	1174-12-30	1499-12-31			40.50254	-2.942594
Moratilla de los	La Iglesia Parroquial											
Meleros	de la Asuncion	Calatrava	Church	Valley		1511-12-31	1512-12-30	1499-12-31			40.502229	-2.944167
		Muslim	_									
Morella	Morella	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1231-12-31	1232-12-30	40.619584	-0.101702
		Christian	_									
Morella	Morella	Occupation	Fortress			1231-12-31	1232-12-30	1499-12-31			40.619584	-0.101702
	Castillo de Moron de		_									
Moron	la Frontera	Alcantara	Fortress	Hilltop		1296-12-31	1297-12-30	1499-12-31			37.120256	-5.448996
Moura	Castelo de Moura	Avis	Fortress	Valley		1294-12-31	1295-12-30	1499-12-31			38.143596	-7.450729
		Knights of										
Moura Morta	Moura Morta	Christ	City	Valley		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			41.196812	-7.834433
Moura Morta	Moura Morta	Templars	City	Valley		1204-12-31	1205-12-30		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	41.196812	-7.834433
Mourão	Castelo Mourão	Avis	Fortress	Valley		1382-12-31	1383-12-30	1499-12-31			38.385183	-7.346427
Moya	Castillo de Moya	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1214-12-31	1215-12-30		1474-12-31	1475-12-30	39.948778	-1.368079
		Christian										
Moya	Moya	Occupation	Fortress			1209-12-31	1210-12-30	1499-12-31			39.948503	-1.368158
Mudela	Mudela (villa)	Calatrava	City	Valley		1212-07-15	1212-12-30	1499-12-31			38.615053	-3.585032
Mula	Castillo de Mula	Christian Siege	Fortress		1240-12-31			1241-12-30			38.044304	-1.492154
		Muslim										
Mula	Castillo de Mula	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1243-07-04	1243-07-30	38.044304	-1.492154
		Christian										
Mula	Castillo de Mula	Occupation	Fortress			1243-07-04	1243-07-30	1499-12-31			38.044304	-1.492154
		Muslim										
Murcia	Murcia	Occupation	City		1119-12-31	<u> </u>		1243-07-04			37.979518	-1.13052
		Christian										
Murcia	Murcia	Occupation	City		1266-01-30			1499-12-31			37.979518	-1.13052
		Christian										
Murcia	Murcia	Occupation	City		1243-07-04		1		1264-05-31	1264-06-29	37,979518	-1.13052

		Muslim										
Murcia	Murcia	Occupation	City			1264-05-31	1264-06-30	1266-01-30			37.979518	-1.13052
		Muslim										
Museros	Museros	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1234-12-31	1235-12-30	39.56431	-0.340983
Museros	Museros	Santiago	City			1234-12-31	1235-12-30	1234-12-31			39.56431	-0.340983
Navalrromo	Navalrromo	Calatrava	Fortress	Spur		1212-07-15	1212-12-30	1499-12-31			38.695176	-4.252124
Navalrromo	Navalrromo	Almohad	Fortress	Spur		1195-07-17	1195-07-30		1212-06-30	1212-07-15	38.695176	-4.252124
Navalrromo	Navalrromo	Calatrava	Fortress	Spur		1167-12-31	1168-12-30		1195-07-17	1195-12-30	38.695176	-4.252124
Navasfrias	Navasfrias	Alcantara	City	Valley		1218-12-31	1219-12-30	1499-12-31			40.296166	-6.820696
		Muslim										
Niebla	Niebla	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1262-01-31	1262-02-27	37.362478	-6.678188
		Christian										
Niebla	Niebla	Occupation	City			1262-01-31	1262-03-02	1499-12-31			37.362478	-6.678188
		Knights of										
Nisa	Nisa (Villa)	Christ	City	Valley		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			39.517706	-7.649769
Nisa	Nisa (Villa)	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1289-12-31	1290-12-30		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	39.517706	-7.649769
Noudar	Castelo de Noudar	Avis	Fortress	Hilltop		1302-12-31	1303-12-30	1499-12-31			38.178082	-7.063105
Novallas	Castillo de Novallas	Hospitallers	Fortress	Valley		1309-12-31	1310-12-30	1499-12-31			41.946275	-1.69349
Novallas	Castillo de Novallas	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1133-12-31	1134-12-30		1309-12-31	1310-12-30	41.946275	-1.69349
Novillas	Castillo de Novillas	Hospitallers	Fortress	Valley		1316-12-31	1318-12-31	1499-12-31			41.932942	-1.393461
Novillas	Castillo de Novillas	Hospitallers	Fortress	Valley		1134-12-31	1135-12-30		1150-12-31	1151-12-30	41.932942	-1.393461
Novillas	Castillo de Novillas	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1134-12-31	1135-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	41.932942	-1.393461
	Castillo de Obano /											
Obano	Luna	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1166-12-31	1167-12-30		1288-12-31	1289-12-30	42.189499	-0.917732
Ocana	Ocana (Villa)	Santiago	City	Valley		1173-12-31	1174-12-11	1499-12-31			39.961458	-3.500716
Oliveira do												
Hospital	Oliveira do Hospital	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1119-12-31	1120-12-30	1499-12-31			40.359132	-7.86153
Olivenza	Castillo de Olivenza	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1258-12-31	1259-12-30		1277-12-31	1278-12-30	38.685151	-7.098914
Onda	Castillo de Onda	Montesa	Fortress	Hilltop		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			39.962034	-0.259172
Onda	Castillo de Onda	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1248-12-31	1249-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	39.962034	-0.259172
		Muslim										
Orcheta	Orcheta	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1269-12-31	1270-12-30	38.563869	-0.261998
Orcheta	Orcheta	Santiago	City			1321-12-31	1322-12-30	1499-12-31			38.563869	-0.261998
		Christian										
Orcheta	Orcheta	Occupation	City			1269-12-31	1270-12-30		1321-12-31	1321-12-31	38.563869	-0.261998
Oreja	Castillo de Oreja	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1173-12-31	1174-12-30	1499-12-31			40.039094	-3.498246
		Muslim										
Oreja	Oreja	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31			1138-12-31			40.039093	-3.498216
Oreja	Oreja	Muslim Siege	Fortress		1197-05-31			1197-08-30			40.039093	-3.498216
		Christian										
Oreja	Oreja	Occupation	Fortress			1138-12-31	1139-12-30	1499-12-31			40.039093	-3.498216
		Muslim	_									
Orihuela	Orihuela	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31			1243-07-26			38.091232	-0.945941
Orihuela	Orihuela	Muslim Siege	Fortress		1263-12-31	_		1264-12-30	_	_	38.091232	-0.945941
0 1 1	0.1.1	Christian	<b>P</b> .		1010.07.07			1400 10 01			20.001222	0.0450.11
Orihuela	Orihuela	Occupation	Fortress	X7 - 11 -	1243-07-26	1216 12 21	1210 12 20	1499-12-31			38.091232	-0.945941
Orrios	Orrios (Villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31	1200 12 25	1210 12 20	40.586461	-0.985163
Orrios	Orrios (Villa)	Templars	City	Valley		1195-12-31	1198-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.586461	-0.985163
Quality	Castelo Ourique /	Continue	E. day of	TT:lls		1024 10 21	1005 10 00	1400 12 21	1		27 (542)	0.000445
Ourique	Castro da Cola	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1234-12-31	1235-12-30	1499-12-31	+	+ +	37.65426	-8.226445
Ourieur	Ourieur	Christian	To start a			1120 12 21	1120 12 20	1400 12 21			27 (54100	8 22(221
Ourique	Ourique	Occupation	Fortress	TT:IL.		1138-12-31	1139-12-30	1499-12-31			37.654109	-8.226231
Palmela	Castelo de Palmela	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1185-12-31	1185-12-31	1499-12-31			38.566072	-8.899676
Pedris	Castillo de Pedris	Hospitallers	Fortress	Valley		1311-12-31	1312-12-30	1499-12-31	1000 10 01	1010 10 00	41.765654	0.862405
Pedris	Castillo de Pedris	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1142-12-31	1143-12-30		1308-12-31	1312-12-30	41.765654	0.862405
D 1.	D 1	Muslim	<i>a</i> :-		1110 10 01	1		1	1010 10 01	10/1/ 10:00	0.0.000	0.000000
Pegalajar	Pegalajar	Occupation	City	+	1119-12-31		-		1243-12-31	1244-12-30	37.740132	-3.647503
Decel.	Develoine	Christian	Cite			1042 10 21	1044 10 00	1400 12 21	1		27 7 101 22	2 6 17 600
Pegalajar	Pegalajar	Occupation	City	1	1	1243-12-31	1244-12-30	1499-12-31	1		37.740132	-3.647503

Pena de Frey	Fortaleza de Pena de	1	1	1		1	1	1	1			
Domingo	Fray Domingo	Alcantara	Fortress	Hilltop		1217-12-31	1218-12-30	1499-12-31			40.132674	-6.727407
Pena de Frey	Fortaleza de Pena de	San Julian del Pereiro	Esteres	TT:llt		1187-12-31	1199-12-30		1217-12-31	1218-12-30	40 122674	-6.727407
Domingo	Fray Domingo Castillo de la Pena de	Pereiro	Fortress	Hilltop	_	116/-12-31	1199-12-30		1217-12-31	1218-12-30	40.132674	-0.727407
Pena de Martos	Martos	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1227-12-31	1228-12-30	1499-12-31			37.718252	-3.961195
	Castillo de Penafiel /											
Penafiel	Racha Rachel	Alcantara	Fortress	Hilltop		1212-07-31	1212-12-30	1499-12-31			39.880553	-6.901103
Penaflor	Castillo de Penaflor	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1185-12-31	1186-12-30	1195-07-17			38.842297	-2.966425
Penaflor	Castillo de Penaflor	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1212-07-16	1212-12-30	1499-12-31			38.842297	-2.966425
Penahora	Penahora	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1187-12-31	1188-12-30		1327-12-31	1328-12-30	40.849721	-3.137818
Penarroya	Castillo de Penarroya	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1197-12-31	1198-12-30	1499-12-31			39.058437	-3.006639
Penarroya	Castillo de Penarroya	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1197-12-31	1198-12-30		1214-12-31	1215-12-30	39.058437	-3.006639
Penas Roias	Castelo de Penas Roias	Knights of	Easterna	Hilltop		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			41.392339	-6.654051
Penas Kolas	Castelo de Penas	Christ	Fortress	Hiitop		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			41.392339	-0.054051
Penas Roias	Roias	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1144-12-31	1145-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	41.392339	-6.654051
I chas Rolas	Castelo do Penha	Knights of	Torucas	mitop		1144-12-51	1145-12-50		1506-12-51	1517-12-50	41.372337	-0.054051
Penha Garcia	Garcia	Christ	Fortress	Hilltop		1306-12-31	1309-12-30	1499-12-31			40.042603	-7.014644
	Castelo do Penha											
Penha Garcia	Garcia	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1219-12-31	1220-12-30		1302-12-31	1303-12-30	40.042603	-7.014644
	Castelo do Penha											
Penha Garcia	Garcia	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1302-12-31	1303-12-30		1306-12-31	1309-12-30	40.042603	-7.014644
Peniscola	Castillo de Peniscola	Templars	Fortress	Spur		1293-12-31	1294-12-30		1316-12-31	1317-12-30	40.358734	0.407775
Peniscola	Castillo de Peniscola	Montesa	Fortress	Spur		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	1005 10 00	1410-12-31	1411-12-30	40.358734	0.407775
Peniscola	Peniscola	Christian Siege	Fortress		1224-12-31	-		1225-12-30	-		40.358704	0.407761
Peniscola	Peniscola	Muslim Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1232-12-31	1233-12-30	40.358704	0.407761
I chiscola	Castillo de	Occupation	Toluess		111)-12-51				1252-12-51	1255-12-50	40.338704	0.407701
Perputuxent	Perputuxent	Montesa	Fortress	Hilltop		1318-12-31	1318-12-31	1499-12-31			38.852547	-0.322948
	Castillo de											010-11/10
Perputuxent	Perputuxent	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1253-12-31	1254-12-30		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	38.852547	-0.322948
	Castillo de											
Piedrabuena	Piedrabuena	Alcantara	Fortress	Valley		1256-12-31	1257-12-30	1499-12-31			39.319876	-6.976232
Pliego	Castillo de Pleigo	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1304-12-31	1305-12-30	1499-12-31			37.991061	-1.498024
		Knights of					1050 10 00					0.404800
Pombal	Castelo de Pombal	Christ	Fortress	Hilltop		1352-12-31	1353-12-30	1499-12-31	1209 12 21	1211 12 21	39.913933	-8.624729
Pombal Ponferrada	Castelo de Pombal Castillo de Ponferrada	Templars Templars	Fortress	Hilltop Valley		1127-12-31 1177-12-31	1128-12-30 1178-12-30	-	1308-12-31 1308-12-31	1311-12-31 1319-12-30	39.913933 42.54401	-8.624729 -6.593602
Ponterrada Porcuna	Castillo de Porcuna	Calatrava	Fortress	Valley	_	1240-12-31	1241-12-30		1241-12-31	1242-12-30	37.869159	-6.593602
Porculia	Castilio de Porculia	Muslim	Fortuess	valley		1240-12-31	1241-12-50	1	1241-12-51	1242-12-30	57.809139	-4.164192
Porcuna	Porcuna	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1240-12-31	1241-12-30	37.823236	-3.409951
Toround	Torouna	Christian	1 offices		1117 12 51				1210 12 51	1211 12 50	571025250	5.107751
Porcuna	Porcuna	Occupation	Fortress			1241-12-31	1242-12-30		1401-12-31	1402-12-30	37.823236	-3.409951
	Castillo de	Î.	1						1	1		
Portezuelo /	Marmionda /											
Marmionda	Portezuelo	Alcantara	Fortress	Spur		1212-12-31	1213-12-30	1499-12-31			39.807686	-6.475006
D . 1 /	Castillo de					1	1	1	1			
Portezuelo / Marmionda	Marmionda / Portezuelo	Templars	Fortress	Sour		1184-12-31	1188-12-30	1	1195-12-31	1196-12-30	39.807686	-6.475006
Priego de	ronezuelo	remptars	romess	Spur	+	1104-12-31	1100-12-30		1193-12-31	1190-12-30	39.007000	-0.473000
Cordoba	Priego de Cordoba	Calatrava	Fortress	Valley		1340-12-31	1341-12-30	1499-12-31	1		37.435489	-4.19719
Priego de	- mgo do cordood	_ and a va	- 011000	. une y	1				1	1 1	571135107	,,,1)
Cordoba	Castillo de Tinosa	Calatrava	Fortress	Spur		1276-12-31	1277-12-30	1	1279-12-31	1280-12-30	37.390399	-4.232621
Priego de				1				1	1			
Cordoba	Priego de Cordoba	Calatrava	City	Valley		1224-12-31	1225-12-30		1326-12-31	1327-12-30	37.435489	-4.19719
Priego de												
Cordoba	Priego de Cordoba	Christian Siege	City		1225-05-31			1225-08-30			37.435363	-4.197166
Priego de	Driver de Condata	Muslim	Cite		1110 12 21	1	1	1	1240 12 21	1241 12 20	27 425262	4 107165
Cordoba	Priego de Cordoba	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1340-12-31	1341-12-30	37.435363	-4.197166

D: 1	r	al i i	1	1		1	1	1		1	г – г	
Priego de	Directory de Conduite	Christian	Cite			1240 12 21	1241 12 20	1400 12 21			37.435363	4 107166
Cordoba	Priego de Cordoba	Occupation	City		_	1340-12-31	1341-12-30	1499-12-31			37.435363	-4.197166
		Knights of	<i>a</i> .								10.005000	
Proença a Velha	Proença a Velha	Christ	City	Valley		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.025387	-7.238679
Proença a Velha	Proença a Velha	Templars	City	Valley		1217-12-31	1218-12-30		1310-12-31	1311-12-30	40.025387	-7.238679
Puebla de												
Alcocer	Castillo de Alcocer	Templars	Fortress	Spur		1236-08-31	1236-09-30	1310-05-13			38.978367	-5.255756
Puebla de	Puebla de Almoradiel											
Almoradiel	(villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1242-12-31	1243-12-30	1499-12-31			39.597722	-3.121201
Puebla del	Puebla del Principe											
Principe	(Villa)	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1242-12-31	1243-12-30	1499-12-31			38.567378	-2.926773
Puente de												
Alconetar	Puente de Alconetar	Templars	Bridge	Valley		1230-12-31	1231-12-30		1256-12-31	1257-12-30	39.754084	-6.437302
	Iglesia del Crucifijo -											
Puente la Reina	Puente la Reina	Templars	Church	Valley		1146-12-31	1147-12-30		1308-12-31	1317-12-30	42.673142	-1.810662
Puerto Lapice	Puerto Lapice (villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1182-12-31	1183-12-30	1499-12-31			39.323848	-3.48076
Puigreig	Castillo de Puigreig	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1311-12-31	1312-12-30	1499-12-31			41.971356	1.88235
Puigreig	Castillo de Puigreig	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1230-12-31	1231-12-30	11,77 12 51	1311-12-31	1312-12-30	41.971356	1.88235
Tuigicig	Castillo de Pulpis /	rempiars	Torucas	minop		1250-12-51	1251-12-50		1511-12-51	1512-12-50	41.971350	1.00255
	Santa Magdalena de											
Dulmia	Pulpis	Mantaaa	Eastman	Sama		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.352065	0.322656
Pulpis	Castillo de Pulpis /	Montesa	Fortress	Spur		1310-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.352065	0.322636
Delais	Santa Magdalena de	T	Protoco	S		1232-12-31	1000 10 00		1200 12 21	1210 12 20	40.252075	0.322656
Pulpis	Pulpis	Templars	Fortress	Spur	_		1233-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.352065	
Quero	Quero (Villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1161-12-31	1162-12-30	1499-12-31			39.510177	-3.247271
		Muslim										
Quesada	Quesada	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1224-08-31	1224-09-29	37.844606	-3.066385
		Christian										
Quesada	Quesada	Occupation	City			1294-12-31	1295-12-30	1499-12-31			37.844606	-3.066385
		Christian										
Quesada	Quesada	Occupation	City			1224-08-31	1224-09-30		1229-12-31	1230-12-30	37.844606	-3.066385
		Christian										
Quesada	Quesada	Occupation	City			1231-03-31	1231-04-29		1294-12-31	1295-12-30	37.844606	-3.066385
		Muslim										
Quesada	Quesada	Occupation	City			1229-12-31	1230-12-30		1231-03-31	1231-04-29	37.844606	-3.066385
Quinta da		Knights of										
Cardiga	Quinta da Cardiga	Christ	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			39.444994	-8.450404
Quinta da												
Cardiga	Quinta da Cardiga	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1164-12-31	1165-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	39.444994	-8.450404
Ouintanar de la	Ouintanar de la Orden											
Orden	(villa)	Santiago	City	Vallev		1352-12-31	1353-12-30	1499-12-31			39,591437	-3.040779
Redinha	Redinha	Montesa	City	Valley		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.006067	-8.585743
Redinha	Redinha	Templars	City	Valley		1158-12-31	1159-12-30	1477-12-51	1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.006067	-8.585743
Reina	Alcazaba de Reina		Fortress		-	1245-12-31	1246-12-30	1499-12-31	1308-12-31	1319-12-30	38.189755	-5.956336
Keina	Alcazaba de Reina	Santiago	Fortress	Spur		1245-12-31	1240-12-30	1499-12-31			38.189/55	-3.930330
D	5	Muslim	<b>D</b> .		1110 10 01				1007 10 01	1000 10 00	20 407245	1 100252
Requena	Requena	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1237-12-31	1238-12-30	39.487245	-1.100252
_	_	Christian	_									
Requena	Requena	Occupation	Fortress			1237-12-31	1238-12-30	1499-12-31			39.487245	-1.100252
Riba-roja	Riba-roja	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			41.251046	0.484175
Riba-roja	Riba-roja	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1152-12-31	1153-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	41.251046	0.484175
Ricla con												
Calatayud	Ricla con Calatayud	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1184-03-31	1184-04-30		1308-12-31	1309-12-30	41.505751	-1.406941
Ricote	Castillo de Ricote	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1284-12-31	1285-12-30	1499-12-31			38.15413	-1.356961
Rio Meão	Rio Meão (villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1191-12-31	1192-12-30	1499-12-31			40.960358	-8.585684
Riodeva	Riodeva (villa)	Hospitallers	Fortress	Valley	1	1311-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31	1		40.116167	-1.14839
		Order of Monte	- 511055	. uno j							.0.110107	
Riodeva	Riodeva (villa)	Gaudio	Fortress	Valley		1172-12-31	1173-12-30	1	1195-12-31	1196-12-30	40,116167	-1.14839
Riodeva	Riodeva (villa)	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1195-12-31	1196-12-30	+	1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.116167	-1.14839
Riopar						1242-12-31		1400 12 21	1500-12-51	1317-12-30	38.504142	-2.448056
	Riopar	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop	1	1242-12-31	1243-12-30	1499-12-31	1		38.304142	-2.448056

	Dagaa da Vanaa		1	1	1	1		1	1	1		
Rocas do Vouga	Rocas do Vouga (villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1281-12-31	1282-12-30	1499-12-31			40,759689	-8.343922
Rocas do Vouga	Castillo de Rochafrida	mospitaliers	City	vancy		1201-12-31	1262-12-30	1477-12-31			40.739089	-0.343722
	/ Castillo de San											
Rochafrida	Felices	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1216-12-31	1219-12-30	1499-12-31			38.931583	-2.801796
Kochairida	rences	Muslim	Fortress	valley		1210-12-31	1219-12-30	1499-12-51			38.931383	-2.801790
Ronda	Ronda	Occupation	City		1119-12-31			1484-12-31			36.738336	-5.165507
Rossell	Rossell (villa)	Montesa	Fortress	Valley	1119-12-31	1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.617651	0.220458
Rossell	Rossell (villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1236-12-31	1237-12-30	1499-12-51	1316-12-31	1219-12-30	40.617651	0.220438
	Rota			valley	1263-12-31	1230-12-31	1257-12-50	1264-12-30	1510-12-51	1219-12-50	36.616912	-6.358194
Rota	Rota	Muslim Siege	City		1203-12-31			1204-12-30			30.010912	-0.358194
Dete	Dete	Muslim	Char		1110 12 21				1250 12 21	1051 10 20	26 (1(012	6 259104
Rota	Rota	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1250-12-31	1251-12-30	36.616912	-6.358194
Data	Data	Christian	Citra			1250 12 21	1251 12 20	1499-12-31			26 616012	6 259104
Rota	Rota	Occupation	City			1250-12-31	1251-12-30	1499-12-31			36.616912	-6.358194
Rubielos de		TT 5.11	<i>a</i> :-	X7 11		1011 10 01	1010 10 00	1400 12 01			10 100126	0.650004
Mora	Rubielos de Mora	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1311-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.189136	-0.650884
Rubielos de		<b>T</b> 1	<b>F</b> .	X7 11		1000 10 01	1202 12 20		1000 10 01	1210 12 20	10 100126	0.65000.4
Mora	Rubielos de Mora	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1202-12-31	1203-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.189136	-0.650884
Derte	Derte	Muslim	Char	1	1110 12 21				1240 12 21	1241 12 20	27.225521	4 271055
Rute	Rute	Occupation	City	+	1119-12-31	+		+	1340-12-31	1341-12-30	37.325521	-4.371055
		Christian		1		1040 10 01	1041 10 00	1400 12 21			07.005505	1 071055
Rute	Rute	Occupation	City			1340-12-31	1341-12-30	1499-12-31			37.325521	-4.371055
S. Vicente da	S. Vicente da Beira		<i>a</i> :				1000 10 00				10.00000	
Beira	(villa)	Avis	City	Valley		1329-12-31	1330-12-30	1499-12-31			40.03759	-7.560194
Sabiote	Castillo de Sabiote	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1256-12-31	1257-12-30	1499-12-31			38.07129	-3.302901
Salvaleon	Salvaleon	Alcantara	Fortress	Hilltop		1220-12-31	1221-12-30	1499-12-31			40.106866	-6.937296
Salvaleon	Salvaleon	Alcantara	Fortress	Valley		1256-12-31	1257-12-30	1499-12-31			38.513086	-6.787166
Salvatierra	Salvatierra	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1225-12-31	1226-12-30	1499-12-31			38.669131	-3.821882
Salvatierra	Salvatierra	Almohad	Fortress	Hilltop		1179-12-31	1180-12-30		1197-12-31	1198-12-30	38.669131	-3.821882
Salvatierra	Salvatierra	Almohad	Fortress	Hilltop		1210-12-31	1211-12-30		1225-12-31	1226-12-30	38.669131	-3.821882
Salvatierra	Salvatierra	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop		1197-12-31	1198-12-30		1210-12-31	1211-12-30	38.669131	-3.821882
Salvatierra	Salvatierra	Almohad	Fortress	Hilltop		1210-12-31	1211-12-30		1225-12-31	1226-12-30	38.669131	-3.821882
Salvatierra	Salvatierra	Almohad	Fortress	Hilltop		1179-12-31	1180-12-30		1179-12-31	1180-12-30	38.669131	-3.821882
Salvatierra de los	Castillo de Salvatierra											
Barros	de los Barros	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1229-12-31	1252-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	38,486744	-6.693726
	Castillo de Samora							1				010701-0
Samora Correia	Correia	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1206-12-31	1207-12-30	1499-12-31			38.937646	-8.871363
San Jordi	Torre de San Jordi	Montesa	Fortress	Valley		1399-12-31	1400-12-30	1499-12-31			40.911371	0.832078
San Jordi	Torre de San Jordi	Hospitallers	Fortress	Valley		1228-12-31	1229-12-30	11// 12 51	1362-12-31	1363-12-30	40.911371	0.832078
		Sant Jordi										0100-010
San Jordi	Torre de San Jordi	d'Alfama	Fortress	Valley		1362-12-31	1363-12-30		1399-12-31	1400-12-30	40.911371	0.832078
San Juan de												0100-010
Moro	San Juan de Moro	Montesa	Fortress	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.060018	-0.137568
San Juan de	Buil Puul de Moro	momeou	ronness	, and y		1510 12 51	1517 12 50	11// 12 51			10.000010	0.127200
Moro	San Juan de Moro	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1237-12-31	1238-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	40.060018	-0.137568
San Mateo	San Mateo (villa)	Montesa	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31	1510 12 51	1517 12 50	40.465025	0.179115
San Mateo	San Mateo (villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1236-12-31	1237-12-30	1477-12-51	1316-12-31	1319-12-30	40.465025	0.179115
San Pedro	Castillo de San Pedro	riospitaliers	City	v anc y	+	1230-12-31	1257-12-30	+	1510-12-51	1517-12-50	TU.TUJU2J	0.1/7113
Manrique	Manrique	Templare	Fortress	Spur		1223-12-31	1224-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	42.033979	-2.232716
San Pedro	mainique	Templars	1.010055	spur		1223-12-31	1224-12-30	+	1500-12-51	1517-12-50	42.033719	-2.232/10
Manrique	San Pedro el Viejo	Templars	Monastery	Hilltop		1223-12-31	1224-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	42.013827	-2.220703
San Polo				Hilltop		1223-12-31	1224-12-30	1499-12-31	1306-12-31	1519-12-30	42.013827 38.693701	-2.220703
	Castillo de San Polo	Santiago	Fortress		_							
Sant Celoni	Sant Celoni (villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley	-	1153-12-31	1154-12-30	1499-12-31			41.692646	2.497435
Sant Valenti Les	Monasterio de Sant	II it . I	Mana	X7 - 11		11(1.10.01	11/2 12 22	1400 12 21			41.252027	1 (0000)
Cabanyes	Valenti Les Cabanyes	Hospitallers	Monastery	Valley		1161-12-31	1162-12-30	1499-12-31			41.373926	1.693296
Santa Cruz	Santa Cruz	Muslim Siege	City		1196-06-14			1196-06-30			39.334349	-5.845995
Santa Cruz		Muslim	1	1								
	Santa Cruz	Occupation	City	1	1	1119-12-31	1120-12-30	1	1164-12-31	1165-12-30	39.334349	-5.845995

	-	Christian	-	1	1	1	1		1	1		
Santa Cruz	Santa Cruz	Occupation	City			1164-12-31	1165-12-30		1196-06-14	1196-06-30	39.334349	-5.845995
Santa Cruz de la	Santa Cruz de la Zarza											
Zarza	(Villa)	Santiago	City	Valley		1174-12-31	1175-12-30	1499-12-31			39.981171	-3.188888
Santa Eufemia de	Santa Eufemia de											
Cozuelos	Cozuelos	Santiago	Church	Valley		1185-12-31	1186-12-30	1499-12-31			42.75375	-4.397545
Santa Euffemia /	Santa Euffemia /											
Castillo de Miramontes	Castillo de Miramontes	Muslim	Fortuges		1119-12-31				1154-12-31	1155 12 20	29 605726	-4.914413
Santa Euffemia /	Santa Euffemia /	Occupation	Fortress	-	1119-12-51				1134-12-31	1155-12-30	38.605736	-4.914413
Castillo de	Castillo de											
Miramontes	Miramontes	Calatrava	Fortress			1212-07-15	1212-07-31	1499-12-31			38.605736	-4.914413
Santa Euffemia /	Santa Euffemia /											
Castillo de	Castillo de	Muslim										
Miramontes	Miramontes	Occupation	Fortress			1195-07-17	1195-12-30	1212-07-15			38.605736	-4.914413
Santa Euffemia /	Santa Euffemia /											
Castillo de Miramontes	Castillo de Miramontes	Calatrava	Fortress			1188-12-31	1189-12-30	1195-07-17			38.605736	-4.914413
Santa Euffemia /	Santa Euffemia /	Calatrava	Fortress			1100-12-31	1189-12-30	1193-07-17			38.003730	-4.914415
Castillo de	Castillo de	Christian										
Miramontes	Miramontes	Occupation	Fortress			1154-12-31	1155-12-30	1188-12-31			38.605736	-4.914413
Santa María de	Monasterio de Santa	, î										
Sígena	María de Sígena	Hospitallers	Monastery	Valley		1187-12-31	1188-12-30	1499-12-31			41.709268	-0.0187
Santa Maria de	Iglesia de Santa Maria											
Siones	de Siones	Hospitallers	Church	Valley		1311-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			43.067388	-3.318947
Santa Maria de	Iglesia de Santa Maria		<i>a</i> 1	X7 11		1170 12 21	1100 10 20		1200 12 21	1210 12 20	12.057200	2 2100 17
Siones Santarem	de Siones Castillo de Santarem	Templars Templars	Church Fortress	Valley Hilltop	1147-03-14	1179-12-31	1199-12-30		1308-12-31 1308-12-31	1319-12-30 1319-12-30	43.067388 39.233669	-3.318947 -8.675949
Santarem	Castino de Santareni	Knights of	Fortress	ншор	1147-05-14				1506-12-51	1319-12-30	39.233009	-8.073949
Santarem	Castillo de Santarem	Christ	Fortress	Hilltop		1318-12-31	1319-12-30		1323-12-31	1324-12-30	39.233669	-8.675949
Santarem	Santarem	Muslim Siege	City	Timop	1183-12-31	1010 12 01	1017 12 00	1184-12-30	1020 12 01	102112.00	39.234105	-8.676513
		Muslim	j									
Santarem	Santarem	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1146-12-31	1147-12-30	39.234105	-8.676513
		Christian										
Santarem	Santarem	Occupation	City			1146-12-31	1147-12-30	1499-12-31			39.234105	-8.676513
Santiago do	Castelo do Santiago do Cacem	Continue	P. days	TTUL		1105 12 21	1196 12 20	1499-12-31			29.014471	-8.698515
Cacem Santibanez el	Castillo de Santibanez	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop	1	1185-12-31	1186-12-30	1499-12-31			38.014471	-8.098313
Alto	el Alto	Alcantara	Fortress	Hilltop		1217-12-31	1218-12-30	1499-12-31			40.186567	-6.548428
Santibanez el	Castillo de Santibanez	. nountaru	1 officios	Timtop		1217 12 31	1210 12 30	11,77 12 51			101100207	0.5 10 120
Alto	el Alto	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1166-12-31	1167-12-30		1195-12-31	1196-12-30	40.186567	-6.548428
Santibanez el	Castillo de Santibanez	San Julian del										
Alto	el Alto	Pereiro	Fortress	Hilltop		1212-07-31	1212-12-30		1217-12-31	1218-12-30	40.186567	-6.548428
	Monasterio Santos-o-											0.151151
Santos-o-Velho	Velho	Santiago	Monastery	Valley		1193-12-31	1194-12-30	1499-12-31			38.707037	-9.156471
Sax	Castillo de Sax	Christian Occupation	Fortress		1244-03-25			1499-12-31			38.540301	-0.817198
Sax	Castino de Sax	Muslim	Forness		1244-03-23			1499-12-31			58.540501	-0.817198
Sax	Castillo de Sax	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1238-12-31	1239-12-30	38,540301	-0.817198
Sax	Castillo de Sax	Calatrava	Fortress		1117 12 51	1238-12-31	1239-12-30	1244-03-25	1250 12 51	1207 12 00	38.540301	-0.817198
Seda	Castelo de Seda	Avis	Fortress	Hilltop		1270-12-31	1271-12-30	1499-12-31			39.19375	-7.787359
	Monasterio de Segura	Hospitallers	Monastery	Hilltop		1250-12-31	1251-12-30	1499-12-31			41.544451	1.265276
Segura	Monasterio de Segura											
Segura	Castiillo de Segura de											
Segura Segura de Leon	Castiillo de Segura de Leon	Santiago	Fortress	Spur		1247-12-31	1248-12-30	1499-12-31			38.122624	-6.531791
	Castiillo de Segura de Leon Iglesia fortificada de	Santiago	Fortress	Spur		1247-12-31	1248-12-30	1499-12-31			38.122624	-6.531791
Segura de Leon	Castiillo de Segura de Leon Iglesia fortificada de Nuestra Senora de la											
	Castiillo de Segura de Leon Iglesia fortificada de Nuestra Senora de la Asunc*	Santiago Santiago	Fortress Church	Spur Spur		1247-12-31 1298-12-31	1248-12-30 1299-12-30	1499-12-31 1499-12-31			38.122624 38.120195	-6.531791 -6.52907
Segura de Leon	Castiillo de Segura de Leon Iglesia fortificada de Nuestra Senora de la											

									•			
Selma	Castillo de Selma	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1359-12-31	1360-12-30	1499-12-31			41.366829	1.462454
Selma	Castillo de Selma	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1141-12-31	1142-12-30		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	41.366829	1.462454
Serpa	Castelo de Serpa	Avis	Fortress	Hilltop		1319-12-31	1320-12-30	1499-12-31			37.944693	-7.597459
Sertã	Sertã (villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1173-12-31	1174-12-30	1499-12-31			39.804843	-8.098679
Sertã	Sertã (villa)	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1164-12-31	1165-12-30		1173-12-31	1174-12-30	39.804843	-8.098679
Sertella / Castell	Sertella / Castell de	Muslim										
de Castells	Castells	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31			1210-12-31			38.706236	-0.201844
Sertella / Castell	Sertella / Castell de	Christian										
de Castells	Castells	Occupation	Fortress			1210-12-31	1211-12-30		1289-12-31	1290-12-30	38.706236	-0.201844
Setefilla	Castillo de Setefilla	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1258-12-31	1259-12-30	1499-12-31			37.736028	-5.480701
		Muslim										
Seville	Seville	Occupation	City		1119-12-31			1248-11-22			37.386208	-5.992417
Seville	Seville	Christian Siege	City		1226-01-31			1226-02-27			37.386208	-5.992417
		Christian										
Seville	Seville	Occupation	City		1248-11-22			1499-12-31			37.386208	-5.992417
Siles	Castillo de Siles	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1229-12-31	1230-12-30	1499-12-31			38.386164	-2.58163
Silla	Silla (villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley	1233-01-14				1316-12-31	1317-12-30	39.363012	-0.410013
Silla	Silla (villa)	Montesa	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1317-12-30	1499-12-31			39.363012	-0.410013
		Muslim							1	1 1		
Silves	Silves	Occupation	City		1119-12-31			1189-09-02			37.188218	-8.439889
		Christian										
Silves	Silves	Occupation	City	1	1189-09-02		1	1499-12-31	1		37.188218	-8.439889
Sintra	Sintra (House)	Templars	City	Valley		1146-12-31	1147-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	38,803635	-9.382376
Socovos	Castillo de Socovos	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1241-12-31	1242-12-30	1499-12-31	1000 12 01	1517 12 50	38.328958	-1.984919
Soria	San Juan de Duero	Hospitallers	Monastery	Valley		1242-12-31	1242-12-30	1499-12-31	-		41.767175	-2.453286
bonu	Monasterio de San	Hospitaliers	Wondstery	vancy		1242 12 51	1245 12 50	1477 12 51			41.707175	2.455200
Soria	Polo	Hospitallers	Monasterv	Valley		1311-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			41.759538	-2.453074
Soria	Ermita de San Saturio	Templars	Church	Spur		1139-12-31	1150-12-30	1477-12-51	1150-12-31	1162-12-30	41.753276	-2.457011
Soria	San Juan de Duero	Templars	Monastery	Valley		1133-12-31	1134-12-30		1242-12-31	1243-12-30	41.767175	-2.453286
3011a	Monasterio de San	Tempiais	wonastery	vaney		1155-12-51	1134-12-30		1242-12-31	1243-12-30	41./0/1/5	-2.433280
Soria	Polo	Templars	Monastery	Valley		1103-12-31	1134-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	41.759538	-2.453074
3011a		Tempiars	wonastery	valley		1105-12-51	1154-12-50		1506-12-51	1519-12-50	41./39338	-2.435074
Soria	Iglesia de San Salvador	Calatrava	Church	Valley		1168-12-31	1169-12-30		1321-12-31	1322-12-30	41.765352	-2.468882
Soure	Castelo de Soure	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1128-03-18	1109-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-03-13	40.056816	-8.625817
	Sudanell (villa)					1202-12-31	1203-12-30	1499-12-31	1308-12-31	1519-05-15	41.556945	0.56685
Sudanell		Hospitallers	City	Valley				1499-12-31	1000 10 01	1000 10 00		
Sudanell	Sudanell (villa)	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1175-12-31	1176-12-30	1400 10 01	1202-12-31	1203-12-30	41.556945	0.56685
Sueca	Sueca (Villa)	Montesa	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1317-12-30	1499-12-31		1015 10 00	39.200355	-0.310471
Sueca	Sueca (Villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1244-12-31	1245-12-30		1316-12-31	1317-12-30	39.200355	-0.310471
Susterris	Susterris	Hospitallers	Church	Unknown		1145-12-31	1146-12-30	1499-12-31			42.179898	0.914049
	Castillo Taibilla /											
Taibilla, Nerpio	Nerpio	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1241-12-31	1242-12-30	1499-12-31			38.140123	-2.374013
Talamanca	Talamanca	Muslim Siege	City		1197-03-31			1197-04-29			40.744095	-3.510965
Talamantes	Castillo de Talamantes	Hospitallers	Fortress	Spur		1311-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			41.731763	-1.677639
Talamantes	Castillo de Talamantes	Hospitallers	Fortress	Spur		1176-12-31	1177-12-30		1208-12-31	1209-12-30	41.731763	-1.677639
Talamantes	Castillo de Talamantes	Templars	Fortress	Spur		1208-12-31	1209-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	41.731763	-1.677639
Talavan	Talavan	Muslim Siege	Bridge		1173-12-31			1174-12-30			39.715786	-6.281767
Talavan	Talavan	Muslim Siege	Bridge		1190-12-31			1191-12-30			39.715786	-6.281767
Talavan	Talavan	Muslim Siege	Bridge		1256-12-31			1257-12-30			39.715786	-6.281767
Talavan	Talavan	Templars	Bridge			1166-12-31	1167-12-30		1267-12-31	1268-12-30	39.715786	-6.281767
	1	Christian	Ť			1			1	1		
Talavera	Talavera	Occupation	City	1	1119-12-31		1	1499-12-31	1	1	39.960693	-4.832647
Talavera	Talavera	Muslim Siege	City		1197-03-31			1197-04-30		1	39.960693	-4.832647
Talavera	Talavera	Muslim Siege	City		1196-05-31	1		1196-07-30	1	1	39.960693	-4.832647
Tales	Tales	Montesa	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31	1	1 1	39,948241	-0.307374
Tarifa	Tarifa	Muslim Siege	City		1340-09-09	1		1340-10-29	1	1 1	36.011347	-5.603624
		Muslim	2,		10.000000	1		-0.01029	1		201011217	51005024
			a.	1	1110 10 01	1		1	1291-12-31	1292-12-30	26.0112.47	-5.603624
Tarifa	Tarifa	Occupation	City		1119-12-31						10 01 1 14 /	
Tarifa	Tarifa	Occupation Christian	City		1119-12-31				1291-12-31	1292-12-30	36.011347	-5.005024

Tembleque	Tembleque	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1182-12-31	1183-12-30	1499-12-31	1	<u>т</u>	39,695807	-3.504136
Tentudia (Las	Santa Maria de	Hospitaliers	City	vancy		1102-12-51	1105-12-50	1477-12-51			57.075807	-5.504150
Lapas)	Tentudia	Santiago	Monasterv	Hilltop		1251-12-31	1252-12-30	1499-12-31			38.054159	-6.338084
Termens	Castell de Termens	Hospitallers	Fortress	Valley		1174-12-31	1175-12-30	1499-12-31			41.719032	0.758732
Terrinches	Torre de Terrinches	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1242-12-31	1243-12-30	1499-12-31			38.610929	-2.843394
Tírig	Tírig (villa)	Montesa	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.423367	0.077778
Tírig	Tírig (villa)	Calatrava	City	Valley		1239-12-31	1239-12-31	11// 12 51	1274-12-31	1275-12-30	40.423367	0.077778
Tírig	Tírig (villa)	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1293-12-31	1294-12-30	-	1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.423367	0.077778
Tocina	Tocina (villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1241-12-31	1242-12-30	1499-12-31	1500 12 51	1517 12 50	37.61099	-5.734083
Toenia	Toenia (vina)	Christian	Chy	vancy		1241 12 51	1242 12 50	1477 12 51			57.01077	5.754005
Toldeo	Toledo	Occupation	City		1119-12-31			1499-12-31			39.857588	-4.020883
	Convento de Cristo -											
Tomar	Tomar	None	Monastery	Hilltop		1316-12-31	1323-12-30	1499-12-31			39.603564	-8.418084
	Convento de Cristo -											
Tomar	Tomar	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1159-12-31	1160-12-30		1311-12-31	1312-12-30	39.603564	-8.418084
Torralba	Torralba (Villa)	Calatrava	City	Valley		1212-07-15	1212-12-30	1499-12-31			39.0163	-3.749744
Torre de Juan												
Abad	Torre de Juan Abad	Santiago	Church	Valley		1216-12-31	1217-12-30	1499-12-31			38.584331	-3.059908
Torre Embesora	Torre Embesora (villa)	Montesa	Fortress	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.326883	-0.079219
Torre Embesora	Torre Embesora (villa)	Templars	City	Valley		1302-12-31	1303-12-30		1309-12-30	1319-12-30	40.326883	-0.079219
Torre	Torre Endomenech	Mantan	Cite	¥7-11		1216 12 21	1210 12 20	1400 12 21			10.26262	0.00005
Endomenech	(villa)	Montesa	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.26363	0.06995
Torre	Torre Endomenech	T	Cite	Valley		1293-12-31	1204 12 20		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.26363	0.06995
Endomenech	(villa) Castillo de Torres de	Templars	City	valley		1295-12-51	1294-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.20303	0.06995
Torres de Albanchez	Albanchez	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1234-12-31	1235-12-30	1499-12-31			38.414521	-2.677012
				Valley		1316-12-31	1317-12-30	1499-12-31			41.534574	0.51158
Torres de Sangre	Torres de Segre	Hospitallers	City					1499-12-31	1200 12 21	1017 10 00		
Torres de Sangre	Torres de Segre La Zuda / Castillo de	Templars	City	Valley		1288-12-31	1289-12-30	-	1308-12-31	1317-12-30	41.534574	0.51158
Toutooo	La Zuda / Castillo de Tortosa	Hospitallers	Eastance	Hilltop		1316-12-31	1317-12-30	1499-12-31			40.816476	0.528584
Tortosa	La Zuda / Castillo de	Hospitaliers	Fortress	Hiitop		1310-12-31	131/-12-30	1499-12-31			40.810470	0.528584
Tortosa	Tortosa	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1173-12-31	1174-12-30		1316-12-31	1316-12-31	40.816476	0.528584
Tonosa	Tonosa	Muslim	Fortress	ншор		11/5-12-51	11/4-12-30		1310-12-31	1310-12-31	40.810470	0.328384
Tortosa	Tortosa	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1147-12-31	1148-12-30	40.815023	0.523526
Tonosa	Castelo de vila do	Occupation	Formess		1119-12-31			+	114/-12-31	1146-12-30	40.813023	0.323320
Touro	Touro	None	Fortress	Hilltop		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.418074	-7.106703
10010	Castelo de vila do	None	10111033	mitop		1510-12-51	1517-12-50	1477-12-51			40.410074	-7.100705
Touro	Touro	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1220-11-30	1220-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.418074	-7.106703
Traiguera	Traiguera (Villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1232-12-31	1233-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	40.525688	0.290788
Taiguera	Taiguera (Villa)	Knights of	City	vancy		1252-12-51	1255-12-50	-	1510-12-51	1517-12-50	40.525000	0.270700
Trancoso	Trancoso	Christ	Fortress	Hilltop		1316-12-31	1323-12-30	1499-12-31			40,779483	-7.347406
Trancoso	Trancoso	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1172-12-31	1173-12-30	1477 12 51	1309-12-30	1319-12-12	40.779483	-7.347406
Trevejo	Castillo de Trevejo	Hospitallers	Fortress	Spur		1156-12-31	1157-12-30	1499-12-31	1507-12-50	1517-12-12	40.172031	-6.780823
Triana	Triana	Christian Siege	City	Spui	1246-12-31	1150-12-51	1137-12-30	1247-12-30			37.380645	-6.004816
Tronchon	Tronchon (Villa)	Hospitallers	City	Hilltop	1240-12-31	1318-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31		-	40.621592	-0.397811
Tronchon	Tronchon (Villa)	Templars	City	Hilltop	+	1211-12-31	1212-12-30	1499-12-31	1318-12-31	1319-12-30	40.621592	-0.397811
TIONCHOIL	rionenon (vina)	Christian	City	пшор		1211-12-31	1212-12-30		1310-12-31	1319-12-30	40.021392	-0.397611
						1	1	1				
Truiillo	Trujillo		City		1232 01 24			1221-12 21			30 167122	_5 007005
Trujilllo	Trujillo	Occupation	City		1232-01-24			1231-12-31			39.462433	-5.882895
2	· · ·	Occupation Muslim	, in the second s		1232-01-24	1186-12-31	1187-12-30					
Trujilllo Trujilllo	Trujillo Trujillo	Occupation Muslim Occupation	City City		1232-01-24	1186-12-31	1187-12-30	1231-12-31 1232-01-24			39.462433 39.462433	-5.882895
Trujilllo	Trujillo	Occupation Muslim Occupation Christian	City		1232-01-24				1186-12-31	1187-12-30	39.462433	-5.882895
2	· · ·	Occupation Muslim Occupation Christian Occupation	, in the second s		1232-01-24	1186-12-31 1165-03-31	1187-12-30 1165-05-30		1186-12-31	1187-12-30		
Trujilllo Trujilllo	Trujillo Trujillo	Occupation Muslim Occupation Christian Occupation Muslim	City City		1232-01-24	1165-03-31	1165-05-30				39.462433 39.462433	-5.882895 -5.882895
Trujilllo	Trujillo	Occupation Muslim Occupation Christian Occupation Muslim Occupation	City		1232-01-24				1186-12-31 1165-03-31	1187-12-30 1165-05-30	39.462433	-5.882895
Trujillo Trujillo Trujillo	Trujillo Trujillo Trujillo	Occupation Muslim Occupation Christian Occupation Muslim Occupation San Julian del	City City City City	Hillton	1232-01-24	1165-03-31 1119-12-31	1165-05-30 1120-12-30		1165-03-31	1165-05-30	39.462433 39.462433 39.462433	-5.882895 -5.882895 -5.882895
Trujilllo Trujilllo	Trujillo Trujillo	Occupation Muslim Occupation Christian Occupation Muslim Occupation	City City	Hilltop Hilltop	1232-01-24	1165-03-31	1165-05-30				39.462433 39.462433	-5.882895 -5.882895

	T	<b>a</b>	1	1	T		T	T		<del>т т</del>		
Ubeda	Ubeda	Christian Occupation	City		1212-07-19			1499-12-31			38.011499	-3.371754
obdu	Coold	Muslim	City		1212 07 17			11,77 12 51			50.011177	5.571751
Ubeda	Ubeda	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1146-12-31	1147-12-30	38.011499	-3.371754
		Muslim										
Ubeda	Ubeda	Occupation	City			1156-12-31	1157-12-30	1212-07-19			38.011499	-3.371754
Ubeda	Ubeda	Christian Occupation	City			1146-12-31	1147-12-30		1156-12-31	1157-12-30	38.011499	-3.371754
Ubeda	Ubeda	Christian Siege	City			1211-05-31	1211-06-30		1211-07-31	1211-08-30	38.011499	-3.371754
Ucero	Castillo de Ucero	Templars	Fortress	Spur		1169-12-31	1170-12-30	-	1280-12-31	1281-12-30	41.719121	-3.0456
Ucles	Ucles	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1173-12-31	1174-12-30	1499-12-31	1200 12 51	1201 12 50	39,980498	-2.862719
Ucles	Ucles	Muslim Siege	Fortress	mitop	1197-05-31	1175-12-51	11/4-12-50	1197-08-30			39.979907	-2.863224
Ulea	Castillo de Ulea	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop	1197-05-51	1284-12-31	1285-12-30	1499-12-31			38.142325	-1.333037
Ulldecona	Castell d'Ulldecona	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1172-12-31	1173-12-30	1499-12-31			40.59494	0.430871
Undecona	San Lorenzo de	riospitaliers	Fortiess	mitop		1172-12-31	1175-12-50	1477-12-31			40.39494	0.430871
Uncastillo	Uncastillo	Templars	Church	Valley		1128-12-31	1129-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	42.36541	-1.131589
Urda	Urda (villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1182-12-31	1183-12-30	1499-12-31	1500 12 51	1517 12 50	39.411704	-3.715674
Usagre	Usagre	Santiago	City	Valley		1240-12-31	1241-12-30	1499-12-31			38.358846	-6.163273
Utrera	Utrera	Muslim Siege	City	vaney	1264-05-31	1240-12-31	1241-12-30	1264-06-30			37.181271	-5.782782
Utiera	Oliela	Muslim	City		1204-05-51			1204-00-30			57.101271	-5.782782
Utrera	Utrera		City		1119-12-31				1252-12-31	1253-12-30	37.181271	-5.782782
Utiera	Ottera	Occupation Christian	City		1119-12-31				1232-12-51	1255-12-50	57.1612/1	-3.162162
There	Utrera		City			1050 10 01	1253-12-30	1499-12-31			27 101271	5 700700
Utrera		Occupation		¥7 - 11		1252-12-31					37.181271	-5.782782 -3.384773
Valdepenas	Valdepenas (villa)	Calatrava	City	Valley		1212-07-15	1212-12-30	1499-12-31			38.760224	-3.384773
X7.1 .	37.1	Muslim	<i>C</i> '-		1110 12 21			1220 00 27			20 170212	0.075044
Valencia	Valencia	Occupation	City		1119-12-31			1238-09-27			39.479343	-0.375944
Malana'a	M-loss de	Christian	Cite		1029 00 07			1400 12 21			39.479343	-0.375944
Valencia	Valencia	Occupation	City		1238-09-27	1235-12-31	1236-05-31	1499-12-31	1236-08-30	1236-12-30	39.479343	-0.375944
Valencia	Valencia	Christian Siege	City			1255-12-51	1230-05-31		1230-08-30	1230-12-30	39.479343	-0.375944
Valencia de	Castillo de Valencia	A1	Enderse	37 - 11		1000 10 01	1221 12 20	1400 12 21			20 412001	7 2 4 0 1 4 2
Alcantara	de Alcantara	Alcantara	Fortress	Valley		1220-12-31	1221-12-30	1499-12-31			39.413091	-7.240142
Valencia de	Castillo de Valencia	a .:	<b>F</b> .	X7 11		1006 10 01	1227 12 20	1 400 10 01			20.265021	6 17 (70.1
Ventoso	de Ventoso	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1326-12-31	1327-12-30	1499-12-31			38.265821	-6.476704
Valencia de	Castillo de Valencia	77 I	<b>F</b> .	X7 11		1005 10 01	1006 10 00		1311-12-31	1010 10 00	20.265021	6 17 (70.1
Ventoso	de Ventoso	Templars	Fortress	Valley Valley		1235-12-31	1236-12-30	1400 12 21	1311-12-31	1313-12-30	38.265821 40.175439	-6.476704 -0.03493
Vall D'Alba	Vall D'Alba	Montesa	Fortress			1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31		1010 10 00		
Vall D'Alba	Vall D'Alba	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1263-12-31	1264-12-30		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	40.175439	-0.03493
		Muslim										0 100 101
Vallada	Castillo de Umbr?a	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31	1010 10 01	1010 10 00		1243-12-31	1244-12-30	38.8878	-0.690691
Vallada	Castillo de Umbr?a	Montesa	Fortress	_		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			38.8878	-0.690691
		Christian					101110		1010 10 01	1010 10 01		0.000.001
Vallada	Castillo de Umbr?a	Occupation	Fortress			1243-12-31	1244-12-30		1318-12-31	1318-12-31	38.8878	-0.690691
	Monasterio de San										10.001.000	
Vallejo	Lorenzo de Vallejo	Hospitallers	Monastery	Valley		1186-12-31	1187-12-30	1499-12-31			43.084655	-3.301731
Vallfogona de	Vallfogona de Riucorb											
Riucorb	(villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			41.563222	1.236001
Vallfogona de	Vallfogona de Riucorb											
Riucorb	(villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1318-12-31	1318-12-31	1499-12-31			41.563222	1.236001
Vallfogona de	Vallfogona de Riucorb											
Riucorb	(villa)	Templars	City	Valley		1190-12-31	1191-12-30		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	41.563222	1.236001
Vallfogona de	Vallfogona de Riucorb			1			1	1				
Riucorb	(villa)	Templars	City	Valley		1190-12-31	1191-12-30		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	41.563222	1.236001
Vallmoll	Castillo de Vallmoll	Hospitallers	Fortress	Valley		1316-12-31	1317-12-30	1499-12-31			41.243667	1.248146
Vallmoll	Castillo de Vallmoll	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			41.243667	1.248146
Vallmoll	Castillo de Vallmoll	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1175-12-31	1176-12-30		1308-12-31	1317-12-30	41.243667	1.248146
Vallmoll	Castillo de Vallmoll	Templars	Fortress	Hilltop		1175-12-31	1176-12-30		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	41.243667	1.248146
	Castilo de Vegallera /											
Vegallera Veiros	El Santo Castelo de Veiros	Santiago Avis	Fortress Fortress	Hilltop Valley		1213-05-14 1216-12-31	1213-05-30 1217-12-30	1499-12-31 1499-12-31			38.540749 38.953115	-2.338323 -7.508321

	Castelo de Rodão /	Knights of	1					1	T			
Velha de Rodão	Rey Wamba	Christ	Fortress	Spur		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			39.647402	-7.68995
	Castelo de Rodão /											
Velha de Rodão	Rey Wamba	Templars	Fortress	Spur		1188-12-31	1189-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	39.647402	-7.68995
Vana	Vera	Muslim	Citra		1119-12-31				1330-12-31	1331-12-30	37.247608	-1.867811
Vera	vera	Occupation Christian	City		1119-12-31			1	1550-12-51	1551-12-50	37.247008	-1.80/811
Vera	Vera	Occupation	City			1330-12-31	1331-12-30	1499-12-31			37.247608	-1.867811
, ora	Igreja-Fortaleza de	occupation	Chy			1000 12 01	1001 12 00	11// 12 51			571217000	1.007011
Vera Cruz	Vera Cruz	Hospitallers	Church	Valley		1263-12-31	1264-12-30	1499-12-31			38.229301	-7.680625
Vic	Vic (villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1176-12-31	1197-12-30		1377-12-31	1378-12-30	41.929622	2.255396
	Vilalba dels Arcs		_									
Vilalba dels Arcs	(Villa)	Hospitallers	Fortress	Valley		1318-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			41.121854	0.410823
Vilalba dels Arcs	Vilalba dels Arcs (Villa)	Templars	City	Valley		1223-12-31	1224-12-30		1308-12-31	1318-12-31	41.121854	0.410823
Vilar de Canes	Vilar de Canes	Montesa	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31	1506-12-51	1516-12-51	40.357983	-0.06595
Vilar de Canes	Vilar de Canes	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1302-12-31	1303-12-30	1499-12-31	1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.357983	-0.06595
r har de canes	Priorato de San	Tempharo	rondess	vanoj		1002 12 01	1505 12 50		1000 12 01	1515 12 50	10.557705	0.00075
	Salvador de Vilar de											
Vilar de Donas	Donas	Santiago	Church	Valley		1193-12-31	1194-12-30	1499-12-31			42.892515	-7.809548
		Muslim										
Vilavella	VilaVella	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1238-01-31	1238-04-29	39.862278	-0.188063
Vilavalla	Vilovello	Christian	Fostmass			1228 01 21	1228 04 20	1499-12-31			20.962279	0 199062
Vilavella	Vilavella	Occupation Christian	Fortress			1238-01-31	1238-04-30	1499-12-31			39.862278	-0.188063
Vilches	Vilches	Occupation	Fortress		1212-07-18				1277-12-31	1278-12-30	38.206762	-3.506622
Vilches	Vilches	Calatrava	Fortress		1212 07 10	1277-12-31	1278-12-30	1499-12-31	12// 12 51	12/012:50	38.206762	-3.506622
		Muslim										
Vilches	Vilches	Occupation	Fortress			1209-05-31	1209-12-30	1212-07-18			38.206762	-3.506622
		Muslim										
Vilches	Vilches	Occupation	Fortress			1169-12-31	1170-12-30		1208-12-31	1209-05-31	38.206762	-3.506622
Vilches	Vilches	Christian	Fortress			1209-05-31	1209-06-30		1209-11-30	1209-12-30	38.206762	-3.506622
Villacanas	Villacanas (villa)	Occupation Hospitallers	City	Valley		1161-12-31	1162-12-30	1499-12-31	1209-11-50	1209-12-30	39.624064	-3.33719
Villafames	Castillo de Villafames	Montesa	Fortress	Hilltop		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.11234	-0.055078
Villafames	Castillo de Villafames	Hospitallers	Fortress	Hilltop		1263-12-31	1264-12-30	1477 12 51	1316-12-31	1319-12-30	40.11234	-0.055078
Villafranca de los	Villafranca de los	nosphaners	1 or de os	Timop		1200 12 01	1201 12 50		1010 12 01	1010 12 00	10111201	0.000070
Caballeros	Caballeros	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1182-12-31	1183-12-30	1499-12-31			39.427365	-3.359223
Villagarcía de la	Castillo de Villagarcía											
Torre	de la Torre	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1263-12-31	1270-12-30	1499-12-31			38.295692	-6.078349
	Santa Maria de											
Villalba de los Alcores	Templarios - Villalba de los Alcor*	Templars	Church	Valley		1158-12-31	1159-12-30		1160-12-31	1161-12-30	41.864303	-4.85813
Villalba de los	Castillo de Villalba de	Tempiars	Church	vaney		1136-12-31	1139-12-30		1100-12-31	1101-12-30	41.804303	-4.85815
Alcores	los Alcores	Hospitallers	Fortress	Vallev		1158-12-31	1159-12-30		1192-12-31	1193-12-30	41.863084	-4.86169
Villamayor de	Villamayor de											
Santiago	Santiago (Villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1182-12-31	1183-12-30	1499-12-31			39.729419	-2.926007
VillaNueva de	VillaNueva de Alcolea											
Alcolea	(Villa)	Calatrava	City	Valley	1244-02-11				1292-12-31	1293-12-30	40.230965	0.072391
VillaNueva de Alcolea	VillaNueva de Alcolea	Montesa	Citra	Vallari		1216 12 21	1210 12 20	1499-12-31			40.220065	0.072201
Alcolea VillaNueva de	(Villa) VillaNueva de Alcolea	Montesa	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.230965	0.072391
Alcolea	(Villa)	Templars	City	Valley		1292-12-31	1293-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.230965	0.072391
VillaNueva de la	Castillo de VillaNueva	rempiaro	City	, and y		1272 12-31	1275 12-50	1	1500 12-51	1517 12-50	+0.230705	0.012371
Fuente	de la Fuente	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1231-12-31	1232-12-30	1499-12-31	1		38.691298	-2.69436
VillaNueva de la	VillaNueva de la	Ŭ										
Serena	Serena	Alcantara	City	Valley		1302-12-31	1303-12-30	1499-12-31			38.974188	-5.797318
VillaNueva de la	VillaNueva de la											
Serena	Serena (Villa)	Alcantara	Fortress	Valley		1302-12-31	1303-12-30	1499-12-31			38.974188	-5.797318

VillaNueva del	1	1	1			1		1	1	1		
Duque	Castillo de Mora	Calatrava	Fortress	Unknown		1236-12-31	1237-12-30		1244-12-31	1245-12-30	38.369055	-5.002582
VillaNueva del	Castillo de VillaNueva	Culatiava	Toruess	Chikhowh		1250 12 51	1257 12 50		1244 12 51	1245 12 50	50.507055	5.002502
Fresno	del Fresno	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1251-12-31	1252-12-30		1262-12-31	1263-12-30	38.374085	-7.172789
Villar del Pozo	Villar del Pozo	Hospitallers	Fortress	Valley		1225-12-31	1226-12-30	1499-12-31	1202 12 51	1205 12 50	38.850432	-3.963489
Villarejo de	Torre de Villarejo de	Hospitaliers	Torress	, and j		1220 12 01	1220 12 50	11// 12 51			50.050.052	51705107
Salvanes	Salvanes	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1202-12-31	1203-12-30	1499-12-31			40.167832	-3.274332
Villarluengo	Villarluengo (villa)	Hospitallers	City	Spur		1311-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.648712	-0.529774
		Order of the	<i>,</i>	~r								
Villarluengo	Villarluengo (villa)	Holy Redeemer	City	Spur		1193-12-31	1194-12-30		1195-12-31	1196-12-30	40.648712	-0.529774
Villarluengo	Villarluengo (villa)	Templars	City	Spur		1195-12-31	1196-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.648712	-0.529774
Villarrubia de los	Villarrubia de los Ojos		ý	,								
Ojos	(villa)	Calatrava	City	Valley		1220-12-31	1232-12-30	1499-12-31			39.219553	-3.607604
Villarrubia de	Villarrubia de											
Santiago	Santiago (Villa)	Santiago	City	Valley		1203-12-31	1204-12-30	1499-12-31			39.987145	-3.368532
Villarta de S.	Villarta de S. Juan											
Juan	(villa)	Hospitallers	City	Valley		1182-12-31	1183-12-30	1499-12-31			39.239242	-3.422191
Villastar	Torre de Villastar	Hospitallers	Fortress	Valley		1311-12-31	1312-12-30	1499-12-31			40.279214	-1.153656
Villastar	Torre de Villastar	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1263-12-31	1264-12-30		1308-12-31	1312-12-30	40.279214	-1.153656
Villel	Castillo de Villel	Hospitallers	Fortress	Valley		1311-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.234474	-1.187906
Villel	Castillo de Villel	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1195-12-31	1196-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.234474	-1.187906
		Christian										
Villena	Castillo de Atalaya	Occupation	Fortress		1264-12-30			1499-12-31			38.631882	-0.860889
		Christian										
Villena	Castillo de Atalaya	Occupation	Fortress		1244-03-25				1264-05-31	1264-06-29	38.631882	-0.860889
	a	Muslim								1010 10 00		0.0.00000
Villena	Castillo de Atalaya	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31	1000 10 01	1240 12 20	1044 02 05	1239-12-31	1240-12-30	38.631882	-0.860889
Villena	Castillo de Atalaya	Calatrava	Fortress			1239-12-31	1240-12-30	1244-03-25	-		38.631882	-0.860889
Villena	Contille de Atoloni	Muslim	E. days			1264-05-31	1264-06-30		1264-11-30	1264-12-30	38.631882	-0.860889
Vinaroz	Castillo de Atalaya Vinaroz (Villa)	Occupation Montesa	Fortress City	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31	1204-11-30	1204-12-30	40.471092	0.475287
Vinaroz	Vinaroz (Villa)	Templars	City	Valley		1232-12-31	1233-12-30	1499-12-51	1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.471092	0.475287
VIIIaroz	Viso del Marques	Tempiars	City	valley		1252-12-51	1255-12-50		1506-12-51	1319-12-30	40.471092	0.473287
Viso del Marques	(villa)	Calatrava	City	Valley		1212-07-15	1212-12-30	1499-12-31			38.523149	-3.563128
Vistabella	Vistabella (Villa)	Montesa	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.293733	-0.293142
Vistabella	Vistabella (Villa)	Templars	City	Valley		1302-12-31	1303-12-30	1477-12-51	1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.293733	-0.293142
Xàtiva / Jativa	Xàtiva / Jativa	Christian Siege	Fortress	vancy	1242-12-31	1502 12 51	1505 12 50	1243-12-30	1500 12 51	1517 12 50	38.982705	-0.52071
Zutiva / Sutiva	Yutivu / Jutivu	Muslim	10111033		1242 12 51			1245 12 50			50.702705	0.52071
Xàtiva / Jativa	Xàtiva / Jativa	Occupation	Fortress		1119-12-31				1247-12-31	1248-12-30	38.982705	-0.52071
		Christian										010-01-5
Xàtiva / Jativa	Xàtiva / Jativa	Occupation	Fortress			1247-12-31	1248-12-30	1499-12-31			38.982705	-0.52071
Xert / Chert	Xert / Chert (villa)	Montesa	City	Valley		1316-12-31	1319-12-30	1499-12-31			40.52101	0.156069
Xert / Chert	Xert / Chert (villa)	Templars	City	Valley		1234-12-31	1235-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	40.52101	0.156069
Xetar	Torre de Xetar	Calatrava	Fortress	Valley		1220-12-31	1221-12-30	1499-12-31			39.185028	-3.745867
Xixona	Xixona	Muslim Siege	City		1338-12-31			1339-12-30			38.53936	-0.506117
		Muslim										
Xixona	Xixona	Occupation	City		1119-12-31				1243-12-31	1244-12-30	38.53936	-0.506117
		Christian										
Xixona	Xixona	Occupation	City			1243-12-31	1244-12-30	1499-12-31			38.53936	-0.506117
Yanguas	Yanguas (villa)	Templars	Fortress	Valley		1169-12-31	1220-12-30		1308-12-31	1319-12-30	42.101586	-2.340179
Yechar	Yechar (Villa)	Santiago	City	Valley		1303-12-31	1304-12-30	1499-12-31			38.072253	-1.441023
Yeste	Castillo de Yeste	Santiago	Fortress	Hilltop		1241-12-31	1242-03-31	1499-12-31			38.366991	-2.318156
Zafra	Castillo de Zafra	Santiago	Fortress	Valley		1393-12-31	1394-12-30	1499-12-31			38.423962	-6.416519
Zalamea	Castillo de Zalamea	Alcantara	Fortress	Valley		1231-12-31	1232-12-30	1499-12-31			38.649645	-5.659947
Zorita de los	Castillo de Zorita de											
Canes	los Canes	Calatrava	Fortress	Hilltop	1	1173-12-31	1174-12-30	1499-12-31	1	1	40.331561	-2.887246

#### **Appendix B**


# Technical description of the Digital Elevation model (DEM), Viewshed Analysis, Cost-Distance Analysis, and Network Analysis

### **Viewshed Analysis – Methodology**

By itself, the ADIMO point data – which marks the locations of over 1100 time-stamped occupation changes, only begins the process of re-mapping the Christian Reconquest. Once this data was entered it became possible to begin modeling the relationship between fortresses and their surrounding landscape, as well as the network of spatial and visual relationships between sites. The first example of remote sensing applied to this data was a thorough, iterated viewshed analysis for every site, during every occupation event. GIS viewshed analysis is defined as a visualization of all units of land surface that are visible for an avatar standing in a single point location, at a predetermined height above the map's surface. The relevant variables for this analysis can include architectural obstructions, landscape elevation, layers of forest cover, atmospheric visibility distances, or even weather. At its very basic level however, GIS viewshed analysis requires an observer point with a set distance above the surface, and a digital elevation model (DEM) whose individual pixels of raster data will be asked a binary question: Can this square of physical space be seen by the observer? The DEM used for the ADIMO project was downloaded from ASTER, (Advanced Spaceborn Thermal Emission and Reflection Radiometer) – a partnership between NASA and Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. This open data is likely very familiar to GIS specialists and scholars interested in remote sensing. According to the ASTER website, the 2011 version of the

DEM has a 30 square meter posting/cell size, with a standard deviation of height between 7-14m. ("ASTER Global Digital Elevation Map") While there will always be a desire to increase spatial accuracy and resolution of the DEM variable in spatial analysis projects – this resolution was more than sufficient for the scale of this project. This is partially the case because all sites were identified using satellite data rather than on-site GPS, but also because the analysis was more concerned with the impression of iterated, and later aggregated viewsheds from many sites, rather than testing specific, local instances of inter-site visibility.

In the ADIMO project, these viewshed analyses "painted" the landscape of Iberia with faction-specific colors based on the affiliation of the observer during a particular occupation event. For example, when the fortress of Salvatierra switched from Almohad control to the Order of Calatrava in 1197, returned to the Almohads after a siege in 1211, and was finally reconquered and given back to the Order of Calatrava in 1226, the color of the visible landscape for an observer standing at the highest point of this fortress changed from orange (Almohad) to green (Calatrava) to orange, and finally back to green. Individually, these viewsheds fall unremarkably in line with previous uses of this technology. What eventually sets the ADIMO project apart is the ability to dynamically represent changes in landscape visibility as a result of iterating these viewshed analyses across the entire dataset of occupation events. This was accomplished with a relatively simple macro built with ArcGIS Model Builder.



The image above illustrates how the model breaks the viewshed process down into 7

stages:

*1. Iterate the point data for each occupation event* 

2. Execute the viewshed analysis tool using a buffer to clip the processing extents to 100km and an offset height of 15m

*3. Extract the positive values of the binary raster* 

4. Convert this positive "visible" area into a scattering of polygons

5. *Re-attach the time-enabled data and affiliation to the new viewshed polygon with a spatial join* 

6. Dissolve all the polygons into one feature

7. Merge all the polygon viewsheds into one table that matches the original point table

There are sacrifices that come with any translation from rasterized to vector data,

such as an inability to represent cumulative viewsheds, yet if efforts are made to flatten

the dataset so that it fits in a single table, the polygonal data can make use of transparency

values to simulate the layering of viewsheds. In the case of ADIMO, the existence of

many types of time fields made it necessary to break the data into sub-sets, so

transparency is unfortunately affected by the stacking of layers in ArcGIS. This effect is

undesirable, so a future stage of the project will flatten the data with a re-interpretation of


the time fields.

### Intervisibility and Cost-distance/Accessibility Networks – Methodology

Viewshed analysis of the surrounding landscape is a useful measure of the tactical

viability of a particular fortress site, but it partially obscures the importance of inter-site

visibility networks on the frontier. Fig. 6 reveals lines of intervisibility between Christian and Muslim fortresses and towns on both sides of the Sierra Morena mountain chain following the Christian victory at the battle of Las Navas de Tolosa in 1212 CE. The alternating dashed lines are used to signify sites that can see each other, but at the specified time, they are occupied by groups with different religious or military order affiliations. For example, the alternating orange and black lines in Fig. 6 show that there was a high degree of intervisibility between Christian nobles (Black) and Almohad Muslims (Orange) in frontier fortresses in September of 1213 CE. The technique used to build this network is essentially a spatial query of the previously iterated viewshed analyses. The figure below illustrates a five step modeling process:



1. Iterate a viewshed to select the polygon data of a single occupation event at a fortress

2. Use this polygon to select any point-occupations that fall within the viewshed – (these points are determined to be places/events that can be seen from a particular site)

3. Merge the time, latitude & longitude, and affiliation of the original observation point with the same information for each point that this observer can see into a single table

4. Use the "XY to Line" function to draw a line between each set of latitudes & longitudes

5. *Re-join fields from the original tables that get stripped by the XY to line tool.* 

## Appendix C

	Offense has advantage	Defense has advantage
Offensive/defensive postures are indistinguishable	Doubly Dangerous No way to avoid security dilemma	Security dilemma, but security requirements may not be compatible. This is the most common case in history.
Offensive/defensive postures are distinguishable	No security dilemma, but aggression and possible spirals of tension and conflict	Doubly stable/safe States have no reason to acquire offensive weapons and aggressors will always signal their intentions by the posture they adopt.

## Robert Jervis' "Four Worlds" and the Security Dilemma<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jervis. 211-214

### **Appendix D:**

### The Adaptation of the Cistercian Rule to Suit the Military Order of Calatrava

Although Sancho III only lived to see the first year of the experiment at Calatrava, the king was able to see the new order flourish quickly. With the help of the King of France (Louis VII) and the Duke of Burgundy, Sancho III and Abbot Raymond managed to secure the confirmation of the order by Cîteaux in 1158. By 1164, the military Order of Calatrava was granted a Forma Vivendi or official rule of life by Citeaux, and acknowledged as a legitimate monastic order by the Pope. In 1187 the knights of Calatrava were acknowledged as full Cistercian monks and placed under the authority of the Burgundian house of Morimond.<sup>1</sup> However, the first *Forma Vivendi* of 1164 only applied to the converted knights of varying monastic and lay origins who had picked up weapons and remained at Calatrava after the departure of Abbot Raymond (c. 1161). According to O'Callaghan, there were Cistercian monks at Calatrava who had translated from Fitero but had not taken up arms. These monks decided to leave Calatrava to the knight-brothers under the authority of their new Master, Don Garcia (1164-69) and follow Abbot Raymond to the monastery of Ciruelos (where he died in 1161-1164). Before they were recognized as full Cistercian monks in 1187, the order had to select members of the secular clergy to serve as their chaplains.<sup>2</sup> O'Callaghan noted that after 1187, the Cistercian General Chapter ordered that "two monks from that same monastery [Morimond] after its construction, should live, for as long as may be necessary, with the friars" of Calatrava.<sup>3</sup> These monks ensured that the new militant branch of the Cistercian

order would not shirk its monastic identity, and educated the Calatravan knights in the proper Cistercian life.

Despite the earlier precedents set by the Templars and Hospitalers, the Order of Calatrava was still confronted with the paradox inherent in all military orders. How could a monk, whose life's purpose was to withdraw from the world and focus on his spiritual journey, also reside in a castle, wield weapons, and defend the frontier of Christian Iberia? Given what is known about the Cistercian Order's strict brand of "reform monasticism," they seem an unlikely model for a 'hybrid' order such as Calatrava. Yet one only needs to look at the career and writings of the Cistercian Order's principal theologian, Bernard of Clairvaux to discover the chief proponent of militant monasticism.

In the centuries leading up to the crusades, the phrase "knights of Christ" was used to describe monks who lived in self-imposed confinement behind the walls of a monastery and fought spiritual battles against temptation and sin. After the advent of the Crusades, and more importantly, the foundation of the military orders in Jerusalem, "spiritual combat" became less metaphorical, and more temporal. Bernard of Clairvaux, in his *Liber de Laude Nove Militie*, made a strict distinction between the brutal and secular *militia secularis* and the new *Ordio militie* of the Knights Templar.<sup>4</sup> Taking up St. Bernard's rhetoric, the Cistercian General Chapter of 1164 "praised the intention of Master Garcia and the brethren of Calatrava to convert from the *militia mundi* to the *militia Dei*." Later, the General Chapter of 1187 referred to a change from the *militia mundi* to the *Militia Christi* at Calatrava. The clear support from the Cistercians was based upon their view that the Order of Calatrava represented the extension of Bernard of Clairvaux's proposed "new knighthood" that began with the Templars and culminated in an order with even closer adherence to the Cistercian Rule.<sup>5</sup> Whether it was intended or not, by supporting the Order of Calatrava, the Cistercian order gained a seat at the table of the most important political and military affairs of the Iberian Peninsula in the 12<sup>th</sup> century.

As secure as Bernard of Clairvaux and the Cistercians may have been in their definition of the new knighthood, in practice, the new military order had to maintain as strict an adherence to traditional Cistercian monasticism as possible. The monastic knights of Calatrava took the same vows of poverty, obedience, and chastity to which all Benedictine monks adhered. One of the only exceptions to the customs of Cîteaux practiced by the monastic knights was a greater allowance of meat, due to the necessities of military life on the frontier. They wore the same plain, "uncolored" habits worn by traditional Cistercian monks, only with shorter length when they were riding. Just as the traditional Cistercian monks gave up all of their worldly possessions when they entered the Order, the monastic knights submitted to the same requirements. The Forma Vivendi described severe penalties for breaking the vow of celibacy, including the most severe punishment of being deprived of one's horse and armor for a year. Just as the horse and armor were the keys to the power and survival of secular knights, they were equally important to the Calatravan knight, since without them, he was essentially no different than another Cistercian.<sup>6</sup> Unlike several other military orders, members of the Order of Calatrava also followed the Cistercian custom of a novitiate year – in which new members had to practice and learn the daily routine of the community before they were given the military responsibilities of the dominant class of knights with horses.

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The premier group of knights was the most numerous element of the Order, yet there is substantial evidence to suggest that there was also a substantial community of Cistercian monks and Chaplains in the various Calatravan commanderies. The Prior was the superior of this traditional monastic community, and was always chosen from among the two required monks from Morimond Abbey.<sup>7</sup> During their consideration by the Cistercian Order, and leading up to the Battle of Alarcos in 1195, the Order of Calatrava could be described as a heterogeneous mixture of Cistercian monks and monastic knights. Based on the literary evidence, it would appear that, when not in the field, the knights were almost identical to Cistercian monks in appearance and custom. However, as a preface to the later discussion of the plan of Calatrava la Nueva, the two groups were perhaps more segregated than the ideal relationship proposed in their *forma vivendi*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Ibid. 188. "…Pope Alexander III, in a bull of September 26 of that year (1164) addressed 'to his beloved sons, Garcia, master, and the brethren of Calatrava, both present and future, living according to the Order of Citeaux', extended to them the protection of the Holy See, confirmed their possessions and sanctioned the regulations set down by the general chapter." <sup>2</sup> Ibid. 187.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Joseph F. O'Callaghan, "The Interior Life of the Military Religious Orders of Medieval Spain," Malta Study Center Lecture Series, St. John's University, Collegeville, MN, Oct. 2001, 8 Jan. 2009 <a href="http://www.hmml.org/centers/malta/publications/lecture2.html">http://www.http:/

O'Callaghan mentions in the above article that "...the documents speak simply of fraters, or brothers or friars." Due to some confusion concerning the translation, I have substituted "monastic knights" for O'Callaghan's "friars" except when he is translating directly from a source. <sup>4</sup> http://www.the-orb.net/encyclop/religion/monastic/bernard.html

And: Aryeh Grabois, "Militia and Malitia: The Bernardine Vision of Chivalry," *The Second Crusade and the Cistercians* (New York: St. Martin's P, 1992)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> O'Callaghan "The Affiliation..." pp. 164-190

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> O'Callaghan "Interior Life..." 10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> O'Callaghan "The Affiliation..." 17.




Figure 1.1 "Stages of the Reconquest." Lomax. *The Reconquest of Spain*. Map 3




Fig. 1.2 Map of the Reconquest of Spain Historical Atlas by William R. Shepherd, 1926 edition, pp. 82-83 http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/shepherd/spain\_910\_1492.jpg



Fig. 1.3 La Hospedería Conventual de Alcántara. 15th century. Site of the original headquarters of the order Photo Author



Fig. 1.4 Monasterio de Uclés. 16th century. On top of the former fortress-monastery headquarters of the Order of Santiago. Photo Author



Fig. 1.5 San Marcos de León. 16th century Photo Wikimedia Commons



Fig. 1.6 Castillo de Consuegra 12th-13th century headquarters for the Hospitallers in the kingdom of Castile Photo Author



Fig. 1.7 Fortified Church of Montalban from the site of the ruined castle. 12th century. A commandery of the Order of Santoago in Aragon. Photo Author



Fig. 1.8 Fortress & Monastery of Tomar, Portugal. Headquarters of the Order of Christ. 14th-16th century Photo Author




Fig. 1.9 Venn diagram of the historiography covered in Chapter 1. Image Author




Fig. 1.10 Castillo-Convento de Montesa. 14th-15th century. View of the chapter house and cloister with stacked remains of gothic vaults. Photo Author








Fig. 2.1 Eznavexore/Eznavejor castle. 12th century. Site identified via geotaged photo uploaded to Panoramio. Screenshot. Google Earth. © 2015 DigitalGlobe




Fig. 2.2 Viewshed from the Castillo-Convento de Montesa GIS, Author




Fig. 2.3 Cost-distance overlay for the Castillo-Convento de Montesa GIS Author




Fig. 2.4 Cost-distance polygons of the city of Cordoba and the surrounding area in 1235 GIS Author




Fig. 2.5 Cost-distance polygons layered over Digital Elevation Model. (DEM) GIS Author




Fig. 2.6 Viewshed, intervisibility, and accessibility lines on both sides of the Sierra Morena Mountains. GIS Author




Fig. 2.7 The first sites occupied by the Templars and Hospitallers in Iberia in 1131. Viewshed added. GIS Author




Fig. 2.8 Toledo and Calatrava la Vieja in 1148 GIS Author



Fig. 2.9 Calatrava la Vieja Photo by "Spain Is Culture," Calatrava La Vieja Castle: Monuments in Carrión De Calatrava, Ciudad Real at., accessed September 09, 2015, http://www.spainisculture.com/en/monumentos/ciudad\_real/castillo\_de\_calatrava\_la\_vieja.html.



Fig. 2.10 Castle of Monzon, Aragon Photo Wikimedia Commons




Fig. 2.11 Viewsheds and intervisibility lines. Fraga, Monzon and its buffer fortress of Chalamera GIS Author




Fig. 2.12 Viewsheds. Map of the Campo de Calatrava within the context of protecting Toledo. This image also reveals the sheltering effect of the Sierra Morena mountain chain in the south.




Fig. 2.13 Viewsheds. Campo de Calatrava. None of the order of Calatrava's initial sites were intervisible with each other. GIS Author




Fig. 2.14 Campo de Calatrava. Viewsheds, cost-distance polygons, intervisibility lines, and acceessibility lines. GIS Author




Fig. 2.15 Viewshed analysis. Toledo region in 1136 GIS Author



Fig. 2.16 Toledo, Spain. On Tagus River.

Photo. "Cities on Rivers - #1 Southern Europe - Travels with Gary," Travels with Gary, October 22, 2012, http://www.garystravels.com/2012/10/22/cities-on-rivers-1-southern-europe/.




Fig. 2.17 Toledo. Individual Viewshed. GIS Author




Fig. 2.18 Iberian Peninsula. Cost-distance polygons, viewsheds and intervisibility lines. GIS Author




Fig. 2.19 Viewshed of the castle of Miramontes, south of the Campo de Calatrava. GIS Author



Fig. 2.20 Castle of Miramontes. South-east view of Andalucia below. Photo. Panoramio. http://www.panoramio.com/photo/256454




Fig. 2.21 The Campo de Calatrava immediately before the battle of Alarcos GIS Author




Fig. 2.22 The Campo de Calatrava immediately after the battle of Alarcos GIS Author




Fig. 2.23 The Campo de Calatrava after the conquest of the fortress of Salvatierra GIS Author



Fig. 2.24 Fortress of Salvatierra. Photographed from Calatrava la Nueva. Northeast view. Photo Author




Fig. 2.25 The Campo de Calatrava after the conquest of the fortress of Salvatierra GIS Author



Fig. 2.26 Ruins of the Castle of Ferral. View looking south toward Andalucia. Photo "El Rincón De Kina," : Castillo El Ferral, Despeñaperros, accessed September 09, 2015, http://elrincondekina.blogspot.com/2012/11/castillo-el-ferral-despenaperros.html.




Fig. 2.27 Viewsheds and intervisibility lines on both sides of the Sierra Morena in 1213 GIS Author



Fig. 2.28 Flattened hilltop of Mesnera Photo Wikipemedia Commons




Fig. 2.29 Extremadura-Portugal border after the foundation of the order of Alcantara. (White) GIS Author




Fig. 2.30 Viewshed and cost-distance. The order of Santiago (Yellow) was one of the most widely distributed military orders in Iberia. Photo Author




Fig. 2.31 The Order of Santiago's possessions (yellow) around their Castilian headquarters of Ucles. GIS Author




Fig. 2.32 The Portuguese branch of the Order of Santiago. Viewshed and intervisibility lines. GIS Author




Fig. 2.33 Order of Santiago's fortresses in La Mancha when Uclés became the unified seat for the order. GIS Author





Fig. 2.34 Viewsheds, intervisibility and accessibility lines in the order of Santiago's (yellow) new region for expansion following Las Navas de Tolosa. The order's Segura fortresses were seperated from their Castilian headquarters (Uclés) by a zone of Hospitaller fortresses. (Including Penarroya, above) GIS Author








Fig. 2.36 Segura de la Suierra. Frontier headquarters for the Order of Santiago. Photo Author




Fig. 2.37 Church interior at Segura de la Sierra. Photo Author



Fig. 2.38 "Tower of Homage" at Segura de la Sierra. Photo Author




Fig. 2.39 Key fortresses with wide viewsheds taken near the Despeñaperros pass after Las Navas de Tolosa. Viewsheds in the Jaen province of Andalucia just before the conquests of Fernando III. GIS Author



Fig. 2.40 Baños de la Encina. Orginally built in the 9th century. Occupied by the Order of Santiago in 1226, who built the "Tower of Homage" in the mid 13th century. Photo Author




Fig. 41 Cost-distance and intervisibility in the Guadalquivir River valley on the eve of the Castilian invasions of Fernando III GIS Author




Fig. 2.42 Viewshed and intervisibility on the east end of the Guadalquivir River valley in 1240. GIS Author



Fig. 2.43 Templar Castile of La Iruela. 13th century. Northwest view. Photo by Juan Antonio García Cuevas, "Situación," CastillosNet 2.0, http://www.castillosnet.org/espana/informacion.php?ref=J-CAS-029.




Fig. 2.44 The city of Martos with the Calatravan castle of Peña de Martos perched above it. The tower of homage from a second castle build during the same period (13th century) can be seen at the left. Photo by Juan Carlos Fernández López, "Castillo De La Peña De Martos," CastillosNet 2.0, http://www.castillosnet.org/espana/informacion.php?ref=J-CAS-062.




Fig. 2.45 Viewshed and Intervisibility in the Guadalquivir River valley in 1254. The siting of Matrera and Castillo de Luna maximized the order of Calatrava's ability to surveil the landscape. GIS Author



Fig. 2.46 Hilltop sites for the Castillo de Luna, (left) and Matrera. (Right) 13th century. North views. Screenshots. Google Earth. © 2015 DigitalGlobe




Fig. 2.47 Viewshed and Intervisibility in the Guadalquivir River valley in 1299. The siting of Cote, Moron, Setefilla, and Almenara increased the ability of military orders to monitor the valley. GIS Author




Fig. 2.48 Cost-distance, viewshed, intervisibility and accessibility lines in northern Valencia and southern Aragon in 1198. GIS Author




Fig. 2.49 Fortress of Peñiscola. 12th-13th century Photo by Ramón Sobrino Torrens, "Castillo De Peñíscola," CastillosNet 2.0, http://www.castillosnet.org/espana/visor.php?ref=CS-CAS-002&num=14.




Fig. 2.50 Cost-distance, intervisibility and accessibility lines in Valencia in 1248 GIS Author




Fig. 2.51 Top: Isolated viewshed and intervisibility lines in southern Valencia in 1248 GIS Author

Photo Author Bottom: North view from the top of the ruined fortress of Enguera




Fig. 2.52 Viewshed, intervisibility and accessibility lines in southern Valencia in 1255




Fig. 2.53 Viewshed, intervisibility and accessibility lines in Valencia at the turn of the 14th century. GIS Author




Fig. 2.54 Viewshed, intervisibility and accessibility lines in Valencia after the newly-founded Order of Montesa took control of the Templar and Hospitaller fortresses in Valencia. GIS Author




Fig. 2.55 Viewshed, intervisibility and accessibility lines in Southern Valencia in 1320. GIS Author



Fig. 2.56 Castillo-Convento de Montesa. West view. Photo Author



Fig. 2.57 Wall remnant at the fortress of Eznavexore Photo Author.




Fig. 2.58 Individual viewshed of Segura de Sierra (yellow) and Siles (green). GIS Author




Fig. 2.59 Cost distance polygons in the Segura mountains in 1231. Segura de la Sierra's is invisible due to the extreme slope, and the lack of DEM resolution allowing for switchback roads. GIS Author



Fig. 2.60 Castle of Siles. 13th century. Photo by Luis Puey Vílchez, "Castillo De Siles / El Cubo," CastillosNet 2.0 http://www.castillosnet.org/espana/visor.php?ref=J-CAS-050&num=5.




Fig. 2.61 Viewshed, intervisibility and accessibility lines in the Segura mountains in 1240. GIS Author



Fig. 2.62 Torre de Orcera. Islamic farmhouse tower. 12th century. Photo Author




Fig. 2.63 Cost-distance, intervisibility, and accessibility lines on the northern border between Aragon and Velaencia. GIS Author





Fig. 3.1A Calatrava la Nueva. 13th century.

Screenshot of 14 million-point subsample of 3D point cloud processed from 16,023 photos via VisualSFM Photogrammetry software. The original point cloud contains 97 million points.

A navigable 3D view of this point cloud is hosted at the following link: https://skfb.ly/GMVs



Translated from a printed guide made avilable to visitors to the site. Fig. 3.1B Plan of Calatrava la Nueva.




Fig. 3.2 Map of sites associated with the military orders, Christian nobles, and Muslim dynasties. Calatrava la Nueva is located in the center of the frame, very close to the frontier. GIS Author



Fig. 3.3 Calatrava la Vieja. 12th century. La Mancha, Spain. Photo Author




Fig. 3.4 Viewshed and intervisibility lines in the Campo de Calatrava in 1188. GIS Author




Fig. 3.5 Cost-distance analysis in southern La Mancha, and Andalucia in 1170 GIS Author



Fig. 3.6 Castle of Alcañiz. 12th-143th century. Aragon, Spain Photo Wikimedia Commons.



Fig. 3.7 Remains of a curtain wall of the Castle of Alarcos. Photo Author




Fig. 3.8 Calatrava la Nueva. West view (East side of the castle). Photo Author



Fig. 3.9 Fortress of Salvatierra. Northeast View Photo Author




Fig. 3.10 Individual Viewshed for the fortress of Salvatierra GIS Author




Fig. 3.11 Viewshed and intervisibility lines on both sides of the Sierra Morena immediately after the Christian victory at Las Navas de Tolosa. The Despeñaperros Pass is identified in red. GIS Author



Fig. 3.12 Calatrava la Nueva. Riocky outcropping supporting the keep. Photo Author



Fig. 3.13 Calatrava la Nueva seen from the ruined fortress of Salvatierra Photo "II Subida Al Castillo De Calatrava La Nueva, Aldea Del Rey," https://rutasporalcazar.wordpress.com/2013/10/21/ii-subida-al-castillo-de-calatrava-la-nueva-aldea-del-rey/.



Fig. 3.14 Fortress of Salvatierra (Left) and the Fortress-monastery of Calatrava la Nueva (Right). South View Photo Author



Fig. 3.15 Caracuel Castle Photo by Juan Antonio García Cuevas, "Castillo De Caracuel De Calatrava," CastillosNet 2.0 http://www.castillosnet.org/espana/visor.php?ref=CR-CAS-014&num=22.



Fig. 3.16 Castle of Miraflores/Piedrabuena

Photo by Juan Antonio García Cuevas Antonio García Cuevas, "Castillo De Miraflores," CastillosNet 2.0 http://www.castillosnet.org/espana/visor.php?ref=CR-CAS-013&num=2.




Fig. 3.17 3D topography around Calatrava la Nueva. Southwest view. Screenshot. Google Earth. © 2015 DigitalGlobe



Fig. 3.18 Satellite view of Calatrava la Nueva. Screenshot. Google Earth. © 2015 DigitalGlobe



Fig. 3.19 Calatrava la Nueva. Large enclosure area between the outermost curatin wall and the central core of the fortress-monastery. North View. Photo Author



Fig. 3.20. Calatrava la Nueva. View of the church roof and flatttened hill to the north (Top-right) from the top of the keep. Photo Author



Fig. 3.21 Calatrava la Nueva. Rock outcropping with walls built on the edge and the "Iron Door" South view. Photo Author



Fig. 3.22A "Calatravan Pass" seen from the top of the keep at Calatrava la Nueva. South View Photo Author.




Fig. 3.22B Individual viewshed for Calatrava la Nueva & visibility and accessibility lines in the southern end of the Campo de Calatrava in 1217. GIS Author



Fig. 3.23 Ojailen River that forms the "Calatravan Pass." 15 miles south of Calatrava la Nueva.



Fig. 3.24 Southeast view from Calatrava la Nueva. Salvatierra is left of the frame. Photo Author



Fig. 3.25 Calatrava la Nueva. North view from the road south of the Fortress. Photo Author



Fig. 3.26. Shadow cast by Calatrava la Nueva toward the fortress of Salvatierra. Photo Author




Fig. 3.27 Calatrava la Nueva. Church interior. West view. Photo Author



Fig. 3.28 Calatrava la Nueva. Exterior of church with buttressing mimicking the bastions of the curtaain walls. Photo Author



Fig. 3.29 Calatrava la Vieja. Satellite view. Screenshot. Google Earth. © 2015 DigitalGlobe




Fig. 3.30 Calatrava la Nueva. Door to the outer ward. West view. Photo Author



Fig. 3.31 Calatrava la Nueva. Puerto de los Arcos (Left) and Puerto de Hierro (right-distance) South view. Photo Author.



Fig. 3.32 Calatrava la Nueva. Jagged edge of the second curtatin wall. Photo Author



Fig. 3.33 Calatrava la Nueva. Third curtain wall, keep (right) and church (left) exterior. Photo Author



Fig. 3.34 Calatrava la Nueva. Courtyard inside keep Photo Author




Fig. 3.35 Calatrava la Nueva. Keep. Plan by Luis Monreal y Tejada. Medieval Castles of Spain. (Koneman: 1999)



Fig. 3.36 Calatrava la Nueva Highest level of the keep. Photo Author



Photo Author Fig. 3.37 Calatrava la Nueva. Re-plastered interior of the Grand master's quarters.



Fig. 3.38 Calatrava la Nueva. Reconstructed crenelations on the second curtain wall. Photo Author



Fig. 3.39 Calatrava la Nueva. Crenelations on the roof of the church. Photo Author



Fig. 3.40 Calatrava la Nueva. Cut-off windows at the top of the keep. Photo Author



Fig. 3.41 Calatrava la Nueva. Entrance to the Church. Photo Author



Photo Author block on the right side prevents a battering ram from getting in front of this door. Fig. 3.42 Calatrava la Nueva. The second doorway into the fortress. Masonry



Photo author Fig. 3.43 Calatrava la Nueva. View of masonry block from inside the keep.



Fig. 3.44 Calatrava la Nueva. Grotto-like entry into the keep. Courtyard to the right. Photo Author



Hierro. Fig. 3.45 Calatrava la Nueva. Entry into the castle-monastery complex via the Peurto de






Fig. 3.46 Calatrava la Nueva. Church interior. Photo Author




Fig. 3.47 Calatrava la nueva. Western facade of the church from below. 2nd curtain wall on the right. Photo Author



Fig. 3.48 Calatrava la Nueva. Exterior wall of the church with three arrow slits in the central apse, and windows at the east end of each aisle. Photo Author



3.49 Calatrava la Nueva. The south wall of the church, in the background is unrecognizable from the Keep walls (left). Photo Author



3.50. Calatrava la Nueva. West façade Photo Author



Fig. 3.51 Calatrava la Nueva. Church interior. Photo Author.



Fig. 3.52 Loarre Castle. 11th century. Huesca, Spain Photo Author



Fig. 3.53 Loarre Castle. 11th century. Huesca, Spain. The apse of the church at the left edge is expressed on the exterior with Romanesque articulation. Photo Author




Fig. 3.54 Crest of the Order of Calatrava. Graphic. Wikimedia Commons.



Fig. 3.55 Fitero Monastery (1187-1247). Navarre, Spain. Photo Author





Fig. 3.56 Fitero Monastery. (1187-1247) Navarre, Spain. Plan. Wikimedia Commons. http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Monasterio\_de\_Fitero



Fig. 3.57 Fitero Monastery interior. (1187-1247) Navarre, Spain. Photo Author



Figs. 3.58, 3.59 Fitero Monastery interior. (1187-1247) Navarre, Spain. Photos by Serafín Olcoz Yanguas, Memorias Del Monasterio De Fitero: Del Padre Calatayud (Pamplona [Spain]: Gobierno De Navarra, 2005)



Image Author Fig. 3.60 Calatrava la Nueva. The Door of Stars. Western portal to the church.



Fig. 3.61 Calatrava la Nueva. Church interior Photo Author




Fig. 3.62, Calatrava la Nueva. Nave rib-vault in the church. Photo Author



Fig. 3.63 Calatrava la Nueva. South apse vaulting. Image Author



Photo Author Fig. 3.64 Calatrava la Nueva. Plain, undecorated apital and corbels in the north aisle.



the west end of the church. Photo Author Fig. 3.65 Calatrava la Nueva. Repeated rosettes on the window tracery of



Fig. 3.66 Calatrava la Nueva. Central apse. Photo Author



Fig. 3.67 Calatrava la Nueva. South aisle and apse. Photo Author



Figs. 3.68 & 3.69 Calatrava la Nueva. Horseshoe and poly-lobed arches in widows between aisle apses and the central apse. Photos Author



Photo Author Fig. 3.70 Calatrava la Nueva. Pointed horseshoe arch window in south apse.



Fig. 3.71 Calatrava la Nueva. Aerial view of the cloister from teh top of the keep. Photo Author




Fig. 3.72 Krak de Chevaliers. Syria Artist rendering. Enrique G. Blanco, ed., The Rule of the Spanish Military Order of St. James 1170-1493 (Leiden [Netherlands]: E.J. Brill, 1971).



Fig. 3.73 Calatrava la Nueva. Northwest corner of the cloister. Scars in the wall reveal that it was coverd. Photo Author



Fig. 3.74 Calatrava la Nueva. Cloister interior. South view. Photo Author



Fig. 3.75 Calatrava la Nueva. "The Monk's Door." into the south aisle of the church from the cloister. Photo Author



Fig. 3.76 Calatrava la Nueva. "The Field of Martyrs." Cemetery of the order. Photo Author



Photo Author Fig. 3.77 Calatrava la Nueva. Mill stone excavated from the site.



Fig. 3.78 Calatrava la Nueva. South view from the top of the ovens. Photo Author.



Fig. 4.1 Castillo-convento de Montesa. South view. Exterior Photo Author



Tower of Homage
 Access Ramp
 Drawbridge
 Cloister
 Cloister
 Cloirch
 Sacristy
 Chapter House
 Fortress Ward
 Refectory
 Cells
 Master's Quarters
 Oven
 Prior's Quarters
 Novices' Cells
 Prison tower
 Great Ward

12 5 10n

Fig. 4.2A Montesa. Annotated Plan by Dolores Borao Moreno. "Proyecto Final" Pg. 45



Fig. 4.2B Castillo-Convento de Montesa.

Screenshot of 3D model composed of a combination of photogrammetric model of the extant foundations with a transparent layer of reconstructed walls snapped to the dense, textured 3D data. An interactive model can be seen here: https://skfb.ly/GN7B




Fig. 4.3 Map of the Kingdom of Aragon in 1245 with major castles identified. GIS Author.




Fig. 4.4. Topography of southern Valencia. GIS Author




Fig. 4.5 Viewsheds and intervisibility lines in the region surrounding Montesa in 1245. GIS Author




Fig. 4.6 Inidividual viewshed for Montesa. GIS Author




Fig. 4.7 Castle of Xativa. Northwest view.

Photo "Consellería De Cultura Y Deporte - XÀTIVA," digital image, Dirección General De Patrimonio Cultural. http://www.cult.gva.es/dgpa/bics/detalles\_bics.asp?IdInmueble=288.



Fig. 4.8 Castle of Xativa. Southwest view toward Montesa blocked by western peak. Screenshot. Google Earth. © 2015 DigitalGlobe



Fig. 4.9 Montesa. Valencia, Spain. Aerial north view of topographic site. ASTER Digital Elevation Model (DEM) 3D GIS Rendered with 3D Studio Max. Author




Fig. 4.10 Viewshed, intervisibility and accessibility lines in the Albaida River valley (orange viewshed). GIS Author.



Fig. 4.12 Castle of Perputuxent. Occupied by the Templars in 1254. Taken over by the order of Montesa in 1319. Photo by Juan Antonio García Cuevas, "Castillo De Perputxent," CastillosNet 2.0, http://www.castillosnet.org/espana/visor.php?ref=A-CAS-054&num=8.



Fig. 4.13 Castle of Sertella / Castel de Castells. Photo. "Penya Del Castellet." Panoramio. http://www.panoramio.com/photo/92992153?source=wapi&referrer=kh.google.com.




Fig. 4.14 Viewshed, intervisibility and accessibility lines in southern Valencia in 1291. GIS Author




Fig. 4.15 Cost-distance polygons and accessibility lines in Valencia and Murcia in 1340. The Order of Montesa's fortresses are clustered in the north, with an isolated headquarters/preceptory in the south. GIS Author




Fig. 4.16 Cost-distance and accessibility lines in Catalonia, Aragon and Valencia in 1244. GIS Author




Fig. 4.17 Viewshed, intervisibility and accessibility lines in southern Valencia prior to the foundation of the Order of Montesa. GIS Author



Fig. 4.18 Castillo-Convento de Montesa. Physically reconstructed arch and partial columns in the cloister. Photo Author



Fig. 4.19 Montesa. 3D reconstructed model (translucent) snapped to photo-textured dense mesh captured at the site via photogrammetry. Similar view to Fig. 4.18. Digital Image. Rendered in 3D Studio Max by Author.



Fig. 4.20 Montesa. Extant voussoir (right) and springer (center) lined up on the edge of the cloister. Photo Author



Fig. 4.21 Montesa. Extant voussoirs stacked against the south wall of the cloister Photo Author



Fig. 4.22 Montesa. East view of exterior and rocky outcropping. Photo Author



Fig. 4.23 Montesa. North view of fortress-monastery and town. Photo "Near Montesa," Panoramio, http://www.panoramio.com/photo/20430311?source=wapi&referrer=kh.google.com.



Fig. 4.24 Xativa Castle. Photo Author




Fig. 4.25 Montesa. Color-coded to express phases of construction. Plan by Dolores Borao Moreno. "Proyecto Final" Pg. 38



Fig. 4.26 Montesa. Exterior view of the Master's quarters. Photo Author.



Fig. 4.27 Montesa. Partially extant north wall of the church. (left) Photo Author




Fig. 4.28 Miravet Castle. Aragon, Spain. East view of gallery overlooking inner ward. Photo Author.



Fig. 4.29 Montesa. Kite-aerial, south-view of the "Patio de Armas." Photo Author



Fig. 4.30 Montesa. Montesa. 3D reconstructed model (translucent) extruded from photo-textured dense mesh captured at the site via photogrammetry. East view of parallel walls from inside the *Patio de Armas*. Digital Image. Rendered in 3D Studio Max by Author.



Photo Author Fig. 4.31 Montesa. Extant corbel on south walk of the cloister.




Fig. 4.32 Plan of St. Gall. 9th century monastery plan. Photo. Wikipedia via www.stgallplan.org



Fig. 4.33 Montesa Pole-aerial view of the church with the town of Montesa below. West view. Photo Author



Fig. 4.34 Montesa. Barrel vaulted corridor leading to the church, sacristy and refectory. East view. Digital rendering. 3D Studio Max. Author.




Fig. 3.35 Fontenay. 1139-46. Cistercian monastery plan Plan. Aubert, M. *L'architecture Cistercienne en France*. (Paris, 1947); p. 114, fig. 28.



Fig. 4.36 Fortress-monastery of Alcañiz. Aragon, Spain. 13th century. Cloister. Photo Author



Fig. 4.37 Fortress of Alcañiz. Murals depicting the conquest of Valencia by James I of Aragon in 1238. Interior of the Tower of Homage. Photo Author



Fig. 4.38. Montesa. North view of landscape below. Xativa is located behind the ridge at the far left. Photo Author




Fig. 4.39 Montesa. Array of light meter planes placed into the scene. (Blue) Screenshot. 3D Studio Max. Author.



Fig. 4.40 Montesa. Visualizatoin of light sensitive nodes in the north-west corner of the cloister facing south-east. Each voxel (cube) reveals how many times a simulated avatar could see aunit of space while walking down the north and east cloister walks from the military ward entrace. In order to collect consistent data, the 3D viewshed experiment asumes that every two feet, the viewer would "stop" and look in all directions. Digital rendering. 3D Studio Max. Author




Fig. 4.41 Montesa. Volumetric viewshed rendering. Screenshot. Paraview software. Author.




Fig. 4.42 Montesa. 3D viewshed analysis of the cloister. The simulated path of travel is marked by the arrow. North view. Digital rendering. 3D Studio Max. Author.



Fig. 4.43 Montesa. East view inside the church. Photo Author



Fig. 4.44 Montesa. Rendering of translucent reconstructed walls snapped to dense photogrammetric mesh. (textured) Digital rendering. 3D Studio Max. Author.



Fig. 5.1 Mapa de Los Castillos de España

Federico Bordejé, Castles Itinerary in Castile: Guide to the More Interesting Castilian Castles (Madrid: Dirección General De Bellas Artes, Ministerio De Educación Nacional, 1965) Map 1