

Testing the Limits of Realism and Liberalism: Andrei Kozyrev and Russian Foreign Policy,  
1990-1996

Gregory Patrick Lannon  
Lakewood, NJ

Bachelor of Arts, The American University, 1990  
Master of Arts, The University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1995

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Allen C. Lynch — Politics Department

Brantly Womack — Politics Department

John M. Owen — Politics Department

Xiaoyuan Liu — History Department

## Abstract

This dissertation examines the foreign policy of Andrei Kozyrev, who served as the foreign minister of first the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, and then of the Russian Federation, 1990-1996. This dissertation reconsiders the prevailing view of academic scholarship on Kozyrev's foreign policy, with the aid of recently opened archival material in the United States, the Czech Republic, and in Russia. Although my research interest stems primarily from the experience of Russia in the post-Soviet period, the phenomenon of creating a new foreign policy in the context of political transition has far greater applicability than just Russia, as the creation of new states following the Arab Spring has made clear. This work is also important in terms of political science international relations theory, because while it does show that the traditional realist-liberal binary approach does have great explanatory power in describing Russo-Chinese and Russo-Japanese relations, it actually hinders the ability to understand Kozyrev's policy of defending the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in Estonia.

In this dissertation, I argue that the prevailing view in the academic literature on Kozyrev's foreign policy—that Kozyrev was an unqualified liberal, that his policies failed, and that in general his policies failed because he as a liberal—is in serious need of revision. Based on a simple analytical framework based on the failure of Kozyrev's policy in relation to Japan, this dissertation examined Russo-Chinese relations, Kozyrev's policy of defending the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers, and re-visits the question of Russo-Japanese relations based on data derived from the first two case studies. The overall findings of these case studies shows that in relation to China, Kozyrev's foreign policy can only be described as *realist* and pragmatist, and that in relation to defending the rights of Russian speakers and ethnic Russians in Estonia, his policy orientation was actually a *blending* of institutionalist and realist features. In relation to Japan, Kozyrev's policy did not fail because he was overcome by domestic enemies or other institutional actors, but rather because he lacked sufficient counterweights to overcome President Yeltsin's intervention in the diplomatic process.

The three case studies examined in this dissertation were approached using theory-oriented process tracing, allowing me to rigorously trace the causal process in each case study, and identify both the ideational foundation of the policies being examined and the relationship of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin—which emerged as the most important variable in the success of foreign policy outcomes. This dissertation and its findings helps shed light on Russian foreign policy making in the early to mid-1990s, and shows the importance of Kozyrev's ability to “manage” President Yeltsin in the often chaotic Russian political process in order to achieve success. Based largely on recently available documents from both the United States, the Czech Republic, and the Russian Federation, which to my knowledge have yet to be exploited by any scholar, this study seriously challenges existing scholarship on who Andrei Kozyrev was and how he conceived, formulated and implemented foreign policy. After examining each of the case studies, this dissertation shows that while the traditional binary realist-liberal orientation in international relations theory does have explanatory power in relation to both Russo-Chinese and Russo-Japanese relations, it actually *hinders* scholarly efforts to describe Kozyrev's foreign policy in relation to defending the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in the Near Abroad. This work then shows that in relation to Kozyrev's foreign policy, the international theory ideas of British scholar Martin Wight have far

more explanatory power than the traditional binary, realist-liberal approach that characterizes traditional American political science scholarship.

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## **Chapter One:**

### **Introduction**



## **I: The Problem: Introduction and the Scholarly Consensus View**

Scholars of International Relations across the theoretical and political spectrum are in agreement on the importance and uniqueness of the period that followed the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The bipolar world order of the Cold War, which had dominated the world scene since the late 1940s, was suddenly and decisively ended with both the collapse and dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1989, and the subsequent collapse and dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Declared as the end of history by some scholars, and even a brave new world of unipolarity by others, other scholars argued a new order would result from the collapse of the bipolar system of the Cold War, in which broad cooperation among all nations would suddenly replace the Machiavellian and Hobbesian world of anarchy and self-help that had characterized the US-Soviet competition for power at least up to the Gorbachev period. The New Russian Federation was confronted with a cluster of very complicated issues to address and resolve: the bipolar system which had served as the Soviet Union's primary diplomatic "polar light" since the 1920s,<sup>1</sup> was now gone, the break-up of the Soviet Union left the Russian Federation surrounded by fourteen new sovereign states, which had historic grievances against Russia, the Soviet economic collapse had largely been the Russian economic collapse; Soviet military power had been scattered throughout the new Soviet states, and the best units armed with the best equipment were located now outside the borders of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation was also confronted with serious questions of identity. As Kozyrev himself characterized this period of history: "... Shaping relations with the new nations and with the countries of Eastern Europe formally included in the sphere of Soviet

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<sup>1</sup> See Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-67* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1968); John Jacobson, *When the Soviet Union entered World Politics* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1994); William Taubman, *Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982).

domination would in many respects amount to shaping the future of Russia itself. As Russian Foreign Minister, that would be my task ... The stakes were unprecedentedly high.”<sup>2</sup>

In this new world, the newly-established Russian Federation embarked on an ambitious foreign policy agenda. Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and his foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, tried to establish positive relations between Russia and the West based on “shared democratic values,” with the hope that Russia would join the first ranks of the democratic nations of the world, and eliminate the conflict of the Cold War era. As Kozyrev himself characterized his policy:

That was the most typical remnant of the Cold War, a confrontation between the two systems, and we wanted to get rid of it. First of all, we had to be rid of it ideologically. I was the first to say it, then Yeltsin [also] started saying that the United States and NATO were not our potential enemies but allies, and we signed the Charter for American-Russian Partnership and Friendship in Washington in [the] summer 1992, and both sides adopted that statement.<sup>3</sup>

Peter Aven, who had served in Yeltsin’s government as Minister of Foreign Economic Relations for the Yegor Gaidar cabinet, characterized Kozyrev’s foreign policy as follows:

... under Gorbachev the West (as throughout the entire Soviet era) was seen as an enemy, albeit peaceful, but an enemy; the USSR and the Western democracies, by definition, were in different blocs. But under Yeltsin the West was viewed as a real partner; Russia wanted to become a part of the Western world. Thus Kozyrev attempted to radically change the traditional direction of Russian foreign policy. Almost for the first time in our history.<sup>4</sup>

Kozyrev, who had served his entire career in the Soviet Foreign Ministry’s Directorate of International Institutions, from 1974-1990, eventually became the head of this department. At

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<sup>2</sup> Andrei Kozyrev, “Boris Yeltsin, the Soviet Union, the CIS, and Me,” *The Wilson Quarterly*, (Fall 2016) <https://www.wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/the-lasting-legacy-of-the-cold-war/boris-yeltsin-the-soviet-union-the-cis-and-me/> accessed 18 November 2017.

<sup>3</sup> “Andrei Kozyrev: A Bona Fide ‘Kamikaze,’” in Peter Aven and Alfred Kokh, *Gaidar’s Revolution: An Insider Account of the Reforms in 1990s Russia* (New York: The Gaidar Foundation, 2013), p. 259. This book is a series of interviews by Aven and Kokh with several statesmen who served in Yeltsin’s government, and former US Secretary of State, James Baker.

<sup>4</sup> “James Baker: You Still Have not Built a Free Market Economy.” in Aven and Kokh, *Gaidar’s Revolution*, p. 369. Former US Secretary of State, James Baker, who had experience dealing with both the Gorbachev/Shevardnadze and the Yeltsin/Kozyrev foreign policy teams, in response to this statement, replied: “I completely agree.”

the age of 39, he became the foreign minister of the Russian Federation. Kozyrev hoped that by placing Russia firmly within the Western camp, and by joining Western international institutions, the cause of Russian democracy at home and abroad would be strengthened and facilitated.<sup>5</sup>

As Andrei Tsygankov wrote: “In the spirit of liberalism, Kozyrev formulated that national interest ... [and wanted to] transform... Russia into a free, independent state, formalizing democratic institutions, setting up an effective economy, guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of all Russians ...” Through such policies, according to Tsygankov, “Russia was to be brought to the front-rank status of such countries as France, Germany, and the United States within ten to twelve years.”<sup>6</sup>

Kozyrev sought not only to overturn the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, but also aspects of the power-based foreign policy of Tsarist Russia as well. Shortly after becoming the Foreign Minister of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) in October 1990, Kozyrev stated that his policy was based upon the rejection of Moscow as the center of an empire: either ideological (Soviet) or territorial (Tsarist):

... this underlies the difference between our republic and the Russian Empire. The Federation isn't out to restore the imperial centre, the *metropole*. What it wants is to get rid of the totalitarian legacy of the last 70 years.<sup>7</sup>

This point was also frequently made by Russian President Boris Yeltsin. A constant refrain of Yeltsin's during this time was that Russia needed to become a “normal country,” one that

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<sup>5</sup> Andrei Kozyrev, *Preobrazhenie [Transfiguration]* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenie, 1995).

<sup>6</sup> Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2013), p. 60.

<sup>7</sup> Boris Pyadyshev and Andrei Kozyrev, “Russian Diplomacy Reborn,” *International Affairs*, Volume 3 (March), 1991. This article was an interview of Foreign Minister Kozyrev conducted by Boris Pyadyshev. This was a revolutionary concept for many Russians, and one that has been rejected by the Putin Administration. In the 19 January 2004 issue of *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, the Kremlin-supporting political analyst Stanislav Belkovsky wrote: “In 2004-2005 the foundations of the Russian nation must be laid. Our nation has only one destiny—imperial.” Belkovsky, quoted in Yegor Gaidar, *Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. x. Putin has made similar statements in interviews and speeches.

abandoned the idea of empire that had been intrinsic to both the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire that preceded it. He explicitly stated:

I came to the Presidency with the idea of making a clean break with our Soviet [imperial] heritage, not merely through various reforms but geopolitically, through an alteration of Russia's role as a powerful, long-suffering nation.<sup>8</sup>

He made the same point more explicitly in a speech delivered in Kiev, Ukraine in November 1990:

Russia does not strive to become a new empire or to receive any advantages in comparison with the other republics, ... *Our relations will be constructed on the principles of noninterference in each other's affairs ... In the mutual relations of republics, there must be no place for force, blackmail, or pressure.* The history of humanity, especially in the twentieth century, has shown that what, at first sight, appeared to be the strongest levers of influence [i.e., intimidation and coercion] have turned out to be the least effective ones.<sup>9</sup>

This characterization of Russian foreign policy was immediately applied in Russia's relations with the fourteen other new states of the former Soviet Union. Ted Hopf was only partially right when he said that the former Soviet space "was irrelevant ..." to Russian liberal policy-makers.<sup>10</sup> The former Soviet space was actually the first case study for the new Russian state's foreign policy, where rights, norms and peaceful, friendly relations would replace centuries of Russian forceful and oppressive hegemonic relations with its neighbors.

Russia's aggressive embrace of the victorious Western principles of capitalist-liberal ideas has been noted by a number of Western scholars. As historian Alfred J. Rieber wrote: "In the immediate post-Soviet period, the country's leaders eagerly claimed that they had accepted a new system of values based on individual liberties and the free market ... It would further clear

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<sup>8</sup> Boris Yeltsin, *The Struggle for Russia*, p. 36. See also idem, pp. 3-14, 35-36.

<sup>9</sup> Quoted in John B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire*, p. 61.

<sup>10</sup> Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow 1955 & 1999* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 238. Hopf was characterizing the foreign policy of what he called the New Western Russians (NWR), held by Kozyrev, with those of its intellectual rivals, the LE (Liberal Essentialists) and the NSR (New Soviet Russians). "In sum, for the LE, the former Soviet space was Russia's to lose, for the NSR, it was what the United States was trying to dominate, and for the NWR it was irrelevant."

the way for the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe ... with Russian participation, to address the security problems produced by border conflicts around the new state.”<sup>11</sup>

Indeed, many scholars in the West, during the immediate post-Cold War era, were proclaiming that the dissolution of the USSR clearly demonstrated that Western values were superior to Soviet ones, and some scholars even proclaimed the last years of the twentieth century as the “end of history,” in which capitalist liberalism had defeated its only ideological rivals, fascism and communism. As its most prominent advocate, Francis Fukuyama claimed:

The triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident first all in the total exhaustion of viable systemic alternatives to Western liberalism ... What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point in mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.<sup>12</sup>

These views were also expressed by a number of European analysts of world affairs, including the chronicler of the pro-Western democratic revolutions in eastern Europe, Timothy Garton Ash, who argued that the European revolutions “... offer[ed] no fundamentally new ideas on the big questions of politics, economics, law or international relations. The ideas whose time has come are old, familiar well-tested ones.”<sup>13</sup> Tsygankov stated that these ideas were the “liberal ideas about the rule of law, parliamentary government, and an independent judiciary.”<sup>14</sup> With its frequent statements on liberal principles and the need for the new Russia to lessen tensions with the West, and adopt democratic and capitalist norms, Yeltsin’s and Kozyrev’s Russia

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<sup>11</sup> Alfred J. Rieber, “How Persistent are Persistent Factors?” in Robert Legvold (ed.), *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, p. 259.

<sup>12</sup> Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” *That National Interest* (Summer 1989).

<sup>13</sup> Timothy Garton Ash, *The Magic Lantern: The Revolutions of '89 as Witnessed in Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin and Prague* (London: Vintage Books, 1989), p. 154.

<sup>14</sup> Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia’s Foreign Policy*, p. 58.

seemed to enthusiastically embrace Western Wilsonian principles.<sup>15</sup> Andrei Tsygankov correctly stated that “For several years, Russia was to become a laboratory for a pro-Western Liberal experiment.”<sup>16</sup> In this process, Andrei Kozyrev was to become the “poster child”—in both the West and in Russia—for Russian adoption of Western norms in foreign policy, just as Yegor Gaidar became the “poster child” for Russian adoption of Western capitalist principles.<sup>17</sup>

The firmly held scholarly consensus on Kozyrev’s tenure as foreign minister is that he failed in his efforts to facilitate Russia’s joining the West. In reviewing the current literature on Kozyrev, three main arguments can be discerned:

1. Kozyrev was an unqualified, Westernist or institutionalist, liberal
- 2: Kozyrev’s foreign policy failed.
3. Kozyrev’s foreign policy failed because he was a liberal.

There are differences in nuance, and there are some exceptions, but for the most part, this dominant view is largely uncontested in the majority of the existing literature on Kozyrev’s foreign policy.<sup>18</sup> These main ideas will be explored in greater detail below.

### **He was an unqualified liberal**

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<sup>15</sup> The best description of this process is Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Whose World Order? Russia’s Perception of American Ideas after the Cold War*, (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), pp. 61-86.

<sup>16</sup> Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Whose World Order? Russia’s Perception of American Ideas after the Cold War*, p. 75.

<sup>17</sup> See Peter Aven and Alfred Kokh, *Gaidar’s Revolution: An Insider Account of the Reforms in 1990s Russia* (New York: The Gaidar Foundation, 2013), pp. xv-24, 375-414.

<sup>18</sup> See the discussion on the scholarly consensus on Kozyrev’s foreign policy as summarized in Allen C. Lynch, “The Realism of Russia’s Foreign Policy,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, Volume 53, No. 1, 2001, pp. 7-8.

In IR theory, most scholars adhere to a simple shorthand of approaching the world from a binary perspective, which opposes realists with liberals.<sup>19</sup> In this binary discourse, Kozyrev is quite naturally identified as a liberal. In describing Russian foreign policy in the early 1990s, nearly all US scholars identify Kozyrev as a “liberal” a “Westernizer,” an “institutionalist” or an “Atlanticist,” or a combination of these categories, in their taxonomies of Russian foreign policy thought. For example, in a thorough early exploration of Russian foreign policy in the early 1990s, scholars Bruce Parrott and Karen Dawisha wrote that:

One major intellectual current comes from individuals who want Russia to have an activist foreign policy, but not an expansionist one, and to interact with the other former Soviet states on the basis of equality, mutual recognition and respect ... This approach ... emphasizes pragmatism and compromise to secure in Yeltsin’s words, Russia’s “entry into the civilized community.”<sup>20</sup>

A leading constructivist scholar, Ted Hopf, identified Kozyrev as an exemplar of the discourse he described as “the New Western Russian.” He described this school of thought as follows:

The NWR expected that economic reform and democratization alone would restore Russia to its rightful place in the world ... But this outcome presupposed the closest possible relationship with the United States and Europe, a relationship so close it is fairer to regard it not as an alliance, but as a fusion of identity horizons, a sublimation of the Self to the closest Other—becoming the West, not allying with it.<sup>21</sup>

Another scholar, Astrid S. Tuminez, who in 1999 wrote one of the most perceptive articles on Russian foreign policy at that time, identified: “Boris Yeltsin, Andrei Kozyrev, and Yegor Gaidar probably [as] represent[ing] best the ‘Westernizing democrats.’ They define the nation primarily in civic terms—that is, Russia includes all the citizens within Russia’s territorial boundaries (hence Yeltsin’s frequent use of the multiethnic *rossiian* as opposed to the ethnic term, *russskii*) ... Their self-image of Russia is that of a great power whose immense potential can best be

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<sup>19</sup> The literature on this divide is immense, but an even-handed starting point is Robert O. Keohane (ed), *Neo-Realism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

<sup>20</sup> Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, *Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, pp. 199-200.

<sup>21</sup> Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics*, p. 214.

realized through democracy, market reform, and integration and participation in the international community ... As for the West, they see it as a model and partner but as one whose national interest may not always coincide with Russia's."<sup>22</sup>

In a prominent work on the role of identity and foreign policy, Ilya Prizel placed Kozyrev firmly within what he called the "liberal Atlanticist" school of thought. According to Prizel:

Banking on the beliefs that there are no major disputes or political and economic schisms between Russia and the West and that the West would be both willing and able to finance Russia's transformation to a market economy, the foreign policy shaped by Yeltsin, Gennadii Burbulis, Yegor Gaidar, and Kozyrev was one of a unidimensional fixation on the West, particularly the United States.<sup>23</sup>

The constructivist scholar Andrei P. Tsygankov also placed Kozyrev in what he called "Russia's Liberal Westernist" camp. He argued: "The most powerful force that shaped the worldview of new Russia's leadership was the economic and political rise of the West ... the new Westernist coalition consisted of idealistic reformers and pragmatic representatives of the former Communist nomenklatura. The reformers, such as Gennadi Burbulis, Yegor Gaidar, and Andrei Kozyrev, advocated radical policies that they hoped would bring Russia in line with the politico economic standards of Western countries within a limited period of time."<sup>24</sup> As he wrote:

Loyal to the intellectual tradition of Westernism, the new Russia's leaders saw their country as an organic part of Western civilization whose "genuine" Western identity had been hijacked by Bolsheviks and the Soviet system. In the Westernist perspective, during the Cold War Russia had acted against its own national identity and interests, and now it finally had an opportunity to become a "normal" Western country.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>Astrid S. Tuminez, "Nationalism and the Interest in Russian Foreign Policy," in Celeste A. Wallander (ed), *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War*, p. 49. These two words, Rossiikiy and Russkiy have traditionally been used to distinguish ethnic Russians from other peoples who live in Russia and its environs.

<sup>23</sup> Ilya Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 264.

<sup>24</sup> Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers,, Inc., 2013), p. 57, 58-59.

<sup>25</sup> Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy*, p. 59.



The views of scholars such as Dawisha/Parrott, Hopf, Tuminez, Prizel and Tsygankov are not wrong. In fairness, it must also be pointed out that almost all of these scholars do describe instances when Yeltsin's and Kozyrev's foreign policy was neither very Atlanticist, nor Liberal, and strayed into more assertive and sometimes even anti-Western postures.<sup>26</sup> But despite these anomalies it is also abundantly clear that certainly, Andrei Kozyrev should be characterized as a Westernist (or Atlanticist) liberal— especially in comparison with the proponents of other schools of foreign policy thought in the Russian Federation in the 1990s.

### **Kozyrev's policies failed**

There is also a broad consensus among scholars that Kozyrev's Liberal/Westernist foreign policy failed, and was replaced by a more realist, Eurasianist foreign policy implemented by his successor as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Evgeny Primakov, which in turn set the course for future Russian foreign policy.<sup>27</sup> Internal opposition to Kozyrev's policies within the Russian Federation itself, exacerbated by periods of incredible domestic insecurity, combined with a lack of positive response to these policies from the international community (demonstrated most notably the decision to expand NATO eastwards toward Russia's borders), forced both Yeltsin and Kozyrev to retreat from these ideas.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Ilya Prizel also pointed out many instances that Kozyrev acted in a "non-Atlanticist" manner including a meeting with Polish leadership in March 1994, in which "Kozyrev's position prompted President Walesa's National Security Adviser, Jerzy Milewski, to complain that Russia "is returning the imperialist policy once followed by the Tsars and later by the Soviet Union." Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy*, p. 135).

<sup>27</sup> Jeffrey Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return to Great Power Politics* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009), makes a convincing case that liberalism was slowly abandoned under Kozyrev, and by the time that Evgeny Primakov took over the helm of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Eurasianist pragmatism was firmly ensconced as the primary lens through which Russian foreign policymakers viewed the world. See also, Allen C. Lynch, "The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy," pp. 9-12.

<sup>28</sup> This rejection is described in Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy*, pp. 63, 77-79; Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy*, pp. 4-6.

After three and a half years into Kozyrev's tenure as foreign minister, Andranik Migranyan, a foreign policy adviser to Boris Yeltsin, argued that: "Russia after being incomparably weaker than the USSR in economic and politico-military terms, has not acquired new friends and allies. At the same time, it has lost its old allies, partners and clients. Thus, three years after gaining its independence, Russia, in all respects, finds itself far more alone and vulnerable in the world arena than the Soviet Union was ... a continuation of this policy will be ruinous for Russia, and a fundamental reassessment of both the role and priorities of Russian foreign policy, is in order."<sup>29</sup> Views such as this became widespread and by 1993, the Russian liberal experiment appeared to be in trouble, both domestically and internationally. As Ted Hopf noted, Russian liberal westernism "... was discredited by the lack of results. Russia did not become the West, either politically or economically, and the West, whether by NATO expansion or by restrictive trade practices, demonstrated an unwillingness to accept Russia's new Western identity."<sup>30</sup>

Most scholars identify the end of Russia's liberal foreign policy experiment with the cancellation of Boris Yeltsin's visit to Japan in September 1992. According to Andrei Tsygankov: "The first wake-up call came when Yeltsin had to cancel his trip to Japan to settle an old territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands."<sup>31</sup> Similarly, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa wrote: "In fact 'the Kuril question' brought out the sharpest differences between Kozyrev's pro-Western policy and those who criticized it. Yeltsin's decision to cancel his visit to Tokyo marked the turning point of Russian foreign policy

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<sup>29</sup> Andranik Migranyan, "Russia's Foreign Policy: Disastrous Results of Three Years. It's Time to Pause, and Change both Policy and Minister," *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 10 December 1994, cited in *Current Digest of the Russian Press*, 11 January 1995, No. 50, Volume 46, p. 15.

<sup>30</sup> Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics*, p. 215. Hopf further argued that "This discourse was finally done in by the one-two punch of the August 1998 currency crisis, which effectively discredited Russia's pursuit of the Western liberal economic model, and the April 1999 NATO war in Kosovo, which discredited Russia's pursuit of a relationship with the United States and NATO as an equal partner, rather than an acquiescent subordinate. These two events, combined with the continued deterioration of democratic practice since 1993, left the NWR [New Western Russians—such as Gaidar and Kozyrev] in a state of profound crisis and isolation." Hopf, *ibid*, p. 215.

<sup>31</sup> Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy*, p. 77.

that ended the first stage [a pro-Western foreign policy] and ushered in the second [stage, of more pragmatic foreign policy].”<sup>32</sup> According to Hiroshi Kimura, Russian bureaucratic politics was the primary factor that stood in the way of an agreement. He wrote: “Broadly speaking, three primary factors were behind the Russian president’s postponement of his trip—namely, the eruption of nationalism; the resurgence of conservative forces, including opposition from the military; and the weakening of Yeltsin’s leadership.”<sup>33</sup> American scholar Michael Mandelbaum argued that both Yeltsin and Gorbachev “would probably have liked to return the four Kurile Islands to Japan ...” but were unable to do so, which supports Kimura’s thesis that the Russian and Soviet leaders’ preferred policies were blocked by the Soviet and Russian bureaucracies.<sup>34</sup> As argued by Kimura, these factors not only caused Yeltsin to cancel his first scheduled trip to Japan, they also prevented any Russo-Japanese agreement on the Northern Territories issue.<sup>35</sup>

This criticism has opened a new front in the scholarly dismissal of Kozyrev. It adds the angle that not only was he overly liberal in his approach, and essentially out of step with the anarchic, self-help world, he was also *incompetent* in his management of Russian foreign policy. He proved incapable of preventing other institutions from intruding on the making of foreign policy, and ceded his authority to institutions such as the Supreme Soviet, the State Duma, and even

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<sup>32</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations: Volume 2: Neither War nor Peace, 1985-1998*, (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley Press, 1998), p. 414.

<sup>33</sup> Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, p. 129.

<sup>34</sup> Michael Mandelbaum, “Introduction,” in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.) *The Strategic Quadrangle*, pp. 8-9, emphasis added. However, the record shows pretty clearly that Mandelbaum’s contention that both Gorbachev and Yeltsin wanted to give the islands back to the Japanese may be incorrect, though people around both leaders wanted to do so. Both opposed transfer of the islands to Japan until relations had been restored on Soviet, or Russian, terms.

<sup>35</sup> “Ironically, at precisely the times when Gorbachev and Yeltsin intended to strike a bargain with Japan over the territorial knot, both of them found themselves in a political weak position at home. Their political opponents were eager to exploit the issue of ceding the Southern Kuriles to Japan as a convenient political instrument in Russia’s domestic struggle ... faced with this danger, both Gorbachev and Yeltsin decided to adopt a policy of preserving the status quo for their own political survival rather than making a bold initiative.” Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, p. 231.

the Russian military. This view that the Japan policy failed, due primarily to internal opposition, is seen by some analysts as a unique feature of that time. The growth and unprecedented power of certain bureaucratic institutions, such as the Supreme Soviet in the immediate period following the dissolution of the USSR, and Kozyrev's inability to counter this opposition thus became as a primary factor in frustrating and eventually overturning Kozyrev's Japanese policy. For example, according to Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott:

Beginning in January 1992 the Supreme Soviet held several hearings on Russian foreign policy, and Kozyrev and his deputy foreign ministers were regularly called to testify. On the contentious issue of the Kurile Islands, for example, the Supreme Soviet in late July called a closed-door hearing on the matter, ostensibly 'to assist the government and the president to draw up a true package of ideas and decisions,' in Oleg Rumyantsev's words. In reality, the hearings turned into a nationalist warning from the parliament to Yeltsin not to return the islands to Japan ... *Parliamentary opposition played a significant role in Yeltsin's abrupt decisions to postpone both this and a subsequent visit to Japan.*<sup>36</sup>

According to most academics who studied this period, following the cancellation of the Tokyo Summit in September 1992, many Russian foreign policy thinkers began to advocate, and indeed Kozyrev himself began to pursue, a more pragmatic foreign policy which achieved some successes,<sup>37</sup> but he was replaced as foreign minister in January 1996 by Evgeniy Primakov, who pursued a more explicitly pragmatic foreign policy. As Jeffrey Mankoff wrote: "In foreign affairs, the transition from Kozyrev to Primakov as foreign minister symbolized (but did not cause) the shift to a new approach emphasizing Russia's role as a sovereign Great Power in an

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<sup>36</sup> Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, *Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 204-205, emphasis added.

<sup>37</sup> For Russia's pragmatic shift, see Allen C. Lynch, "The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Volume 53, No. 1 (2001), pp. 7-31. Lynch wrote that: "... Kozyrev had presided over a Russian diplomacy that was far more complex and balanced than his critics were prepared to accept." p. 9. For the general shift in Russian foreign policy thinking in the more pragmatic "Eurasianist" direction, see David Kerr, "The New Eurasianism: the Rise of Geopolitics in Russia's Foreign Policy," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 47, No. 6 (September, 1995), and Jeffrey Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2009), pp.27-32.

anarchic, self-help international system where power, rather than international norms or institutions, remained the *ultima ratio* in international relations.”<sup>38</sup>

### **Kozyrev failed because he was a liberal**

A number of critics and scholars have noted that one of the reasons Kozyrev failed as foreign minister was *because* he was a liberal, and that he held Russian foreign policy hostage to a liberal ideational viewpoint that sacrificed Russia’s true national interests for improved relations with the United States and the other leading Western powers. Perhaps one of the most damaging assessments of Kozyrev in this regard was provided by Director of the Nixon Center, Dimitri Simes in his book *After the Collapse: Russia Seeks its Place as a World Power*, in which he described a conversation between former US president Richard Nixon and Kozyrev in the Spring of 1992, which is worth quoting at length:

Nixon asked Kozyrev how his government was defining Russian national interests. Kozyrev, known for his pro-Western orientation, replied that in the past Russia had suffered greatly from focusing too intently on its own interests at the expense of the world. Now was the time, he added, for Russia “to think more in terms of universal human values.” “Well,” Nixon responded wryly, “that is a very commendable sentiment on the Minister’s part. But surely there are some particular interests which Russia considers important as an emerging power.” Kozyrev was not persuaded. Probably there are such uniquely Russian interests, he said, but the Russian government had not yet had the chance to focus on them. “Perhaps, President Nixon, as a friend of Russian democracy you would be willing to help identify them?” Kozyrev inquired with a shy smile. The former president kept his poker face. “I would not presume to tell the minister what Russian national interests should be. I am sure that in due time he will find them on his own.”<sup>39</sup>

When Nixon later asked Simes for his appraisal of Kozyrev, Simes replied that Kozyrev was “well meaning but unimpressive, and that unless he were to grow quickly on the job there would be risk he would make himself vulnerable to public indignation over a blindingly pro-Western

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<sup>38</sup> Jeffrey Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return to Great Power Politics*, (Lanham, Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009), p. 5.

<sup>39</sup> Dimitri K. Simes, *After the Collapse: Russia Seeks its Place as a World Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), p. 19.

policy.” Nixon’s response to this was to state that Kozyrev was “... a nice man. But you need to be a real son of bitch to do this job right, Dimitri. You need to be able to see straight, but also to be ruthless to build a new country on the ruins of an empire. I can’t see the Russian people respecting wimps like that.”<sup>40</sup> Tellingly, Kozyrev’s successor as Foreign Minister, Evgeniy Primakov, wrote in his memoirs that this description would give one a “... better understanding of the frame of mind of the leadership of the MFA at the beginning of the 1990s...” and quoted a version of this conversation to define Kozyrev’s foreign policy.<sup>41</sup> These opinions have had deep resonance with subsequent observers of Kozyrev’s policies: he has been criticized by being overly fixated on Western values, inattentive to Russian national interests, and though possibly well-intentioned, incompetent in his management of Russian foreign policy.<sup>42</sup> Andranik Migranyan characterized Kozyrev’s foreign policy by four main features: “... hectic but fruitless activity, improvisation, incompetence, and as a result of this, abrupt reversals of position.”<sup>43</sup>

One consistent point made by some of his critics, and even some of his supporters, was that he and Yeltsin uncritically continued the foreign policy of his predecessors, Eduard Shevardnadze and Mikhail Gorbachev. In *The Yeltsin Epoch*, which was written by a number of people who had served in Yeltsin’s government, it was argued that while Yeltsin’s domestic policy was a

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<sup>40</sup> Dimitri K. Simes, *After the Collapse*, pp. 19-20

<sup>41</sup> Evgeniy Primakov, *Gody v Bol’shoi Politike [Years in High Politics]* (Moscow: Sovershenno Sekretno, 1999), pp. 210-211

<sup>42</sup> The Japanese scholar Hiroshi Kimura has written in this light that Russia’s failure to reach an agreement over the Kuriles/Northern Territories with Japan was due to his inability to lead the Russian Foreign Ministry: “Because of his lack of authority and prestige in the Russian foreign policymaking community, Kozyrev significantly reduced the role of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) and instead allowed other institutions, organizations and elite groups (such as the Ministry of Defense, the Security Council, and the Presidential apparatus) to meddle in Russian foreign policy making, often bypassing the MID. As a result, Kozyrev became incapable of effectively coordinating Russian foreign policy.” Hiroshi Kimura, *Distant Neighbors: Volume Two: Japanese-Russian Relations Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin* (London: M.S. Sharpe, 2000), pp. 132-133.

<sup>43</sup> Andranik Migranyan, “Russia’s Foreign Policy: Disastrous Results of Three Years. It’s Time to Pause, and Change both Policy and Minister, *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 10 December 1994, in *Current Digest of the Russian Press*, No. 50. Volume 46. 11 January 1995, p. 15.

repudiation of Russia's Soviet past, "... the paradox was that in foreign policy it was different. In the international arena, Boris Yeltsin and Andrei Kozyrev, in fact, continued the course of Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze."<sup>44</sup> More damaging, it is argued by the authors of this book that Kozyrev uncritically replaced one ideology, Marxist-Leninism, with another ideology, Western liberalism:

Instead of de-ideologizing foreign policy, one ideology had replaced the other. Instead of Communist ideology and claims to world leadership in foreign policy, the country's complexes began to manifest themselves more and more by surrendering to the mercy to the victors of the Cold War, and not making claims to anything.<sup>45</sup>

Peter Aven and Alfred Kokh, who had been part of Yeltsin's government during the same period as Kozyrev, asked him directly if he had continued Gorbachev's and Shevardnadze's foreign policies, due to the fact that both seemed to be based on a non-confrontational approach based on shared universal values. In answer to this question, Kozyrev characterized his foreign policy as follows: "Democratic Russia should be and will be as natural an ally of democratic countries of the West as the totalitarian Soviet Union was a natural enemy of the West ... We wanted (and Yeltsin fully supported that) to shift from *detente* between adversaries to a partnership of allies."<sup>46</sup>

Kozyrev's opponents said that this desire to be an ally of the West resulted in a subservient foreign policy, where he failed to defend the national interests of the Russian Federation.<sup>47</sup> This

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<sup>44</sup> Iu. M. Baturin et al, *Epokha El'tsina: Ocherki politicheskoi Istorii* [The Epoch of Yeltsin: Political historical essays] (Moscow: Vagaris, 2001), p. 467.

<sup>45</sup> Baturin, et al, *Epokha El'tsina*, p. 469.

<sup>46</sup> "Andrei Kozyrev: A Bona Fide Kamikaze," in Aven and Kokh, *Gaidar's Revolution*, p. 256, 258. Kozyrev said that "I've always stuck to that formula for the rest of my life." (p. 256).

<sup>47</sup> Noted by Ilya Prizel in his excellent study *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 247-252. One source Prizel cited was Aleksei Bogaturov who noted "... Russia cannot blindly follow the West, if only because for the United States and Germany conflicts in the nearby foreign countries are humanitarian and political, while for us they mean bloodshed, economic ruin and humiliation for our citizens." Aleksei Bogaturov, "Post Elections Russia and the West," *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 29 December 1993, translated and quoted by Prizel, p. 252.

view that Kozyrev's foreign policy did not defend Russian interests was shared by Mikhail Gorbachev, who may have called Kozyrev's Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR, "... a branch of the [United States] Department of State."<sup>48</sup> This critical view of Kozyrev's foreign policy was also held by President Yeltsin's more nationalist critics once the Soviet Union had left the world stage, and indeed came to be adopted by even some of Yeltsin's supporters. In the book *The Yeltsin Epoch*, this view is advanced in strongly worded terms: "Russian diplomacy [under Kozyrev], followed in lockstep [after] the Americans, as the leader, trying through its complaisance to earn an entrance ticket to the Western world."<sup>49</sup> According to Andranik Migranyan, Kozyrev's foreign policy brought "disastrous results," based on what he called its "Americanocentric" focus. He said that "Russia must once again acknowledge the axiom, long known but forgotten through the light-mindedness of Gorbachev, Shevardnadze and Kozyrev, that a state doesn't have permanent allies and friends, only permanent interests."<sup>50</sup> Critics such as Migranyan and the authors of the *Epoch of Yeltsin* argue that under Kozyrev's tenure as foreign minister, Russia's national interests were held hostage to a liberal ideology, that was as firmly held as the Marxist-Leninist worldview that had guided the foreign policy of the Soviet Union from 1917 to the early Gorbachev period.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> "Andrei Kozyrev: A Bona Fide Kamikaze," in Aven and Kokh, *Gaidar's Revolution*, p. 260. Kozyrev stated in response that Gorbachev's basic point in making this comparison was that "... we could never take positions as part of the West or as allies." (p. 260). He also claimed that Gorbachev, Bessmertnykh and Shevardnadze "... had no such goal." (p. 258). Despite the fact that some Western analysts might disagree with Kozyrev on this point, both Gorbachev's and Shevardnadze's memoirs support this view, and former US Secretary of State James Baker—who dealt extensively with both Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's governments—agreed with Kozyrev's characterization.

<sup>49</sup> Iu. M. Baturin et al, *Epokha El'tsina: Ocherki politicheskoi Istorii* [The Epoch of Yeltsin: Political historical essays] (Moscow, Vagris, 2001), p. 473.

<sup>50</sup> Andranik Migranyan, "Russia's Foreign Policy: Disastrous Results of Three Years. It's Time to Pause, and Change both Policy and Minister, *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 10 December 1994, in *Current Digest of the Russian Press*, No. 50. Volume 46. 11 January 1995.

<sup>51</sup> The chapter on Russian foreign policy in the book *Epokha El'tsina*, was entitled "De-ideologization or another ideology" ("Deideologizatsiia ili drugaia ideologiia?"), Baturin et al, *Epokha El'tsina: Ocherki politicheskoi Istorii*, p. 467.



Similarly, American scholar Jack Snyder argued that “Yeltsin’s foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, spent 1992 and 1993 touting the values of democratic norms in domestic and international affairs, yet by the beginning of 1994, he was forced to jump aboard the nationalist, pro-Serb, neo-imperial bandwagon like virtually everyone else in Russian politics.”<sup>52</sup> Andrei Tsygankov argued that Russia’s pragmatic shift in late 1992-93 should not be seen as a reorientation in Russian foreign policy, but was simply a tactical concession:

... some Western observers argue that Russia had in mind to use the West in order to restore its weakened power capabilities, and rebuild its empire. To argue this is to confuse the post-1993 tactical concessions and politically driven opportunism of Russia’s leaders with their strategic beliefs. It is also to ascribe one’s one realist viewpoint to policymakers who make sense of the world in liberal categories of cooperation and integration.<sup>53</sup>

## II. Russia is a Major Case Study for IR

Throughout European history, since the reign of Tsar Peter the Great (1682-1725), Russia has been an integral element of the European and world international system. As George Vernadsky argued “The subsequent Europeanization of Russia made it a member of the European concert of powers.”<sup>54</sup> It can be argued with great legitimacy that Russia saved Europe

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<sup>52</sup> Jack Snyder, “Democratization, War and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Communist States,” in Celeste A. Wallander (ed.), *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), p. 35. Stephen Sestanovich’s article in the *New Republic*, Andrei the Giant, *The New Republic* (New York: 1 April 1994), has another explanation of Kozyrev’s varied approaches to foreign policy issues.

<sup>53</sup> Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia’s Foreign Policy*, p. 88.

<sup>54</sup> George Vernadsky, “Foreward,” in Ivo J. Lederer, *Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p.vii. See also the useful overview provided in Barbara Jelavich, *St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814-1974* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974); and the discussion on Russia’s historic relationship with Europe in Ted Hopf (ed.), *Russia’s European Choice* (New York: Palsgrave Macmillan, 2008), especially Iver B. Neumann, “Russia’s Standing as a Great Power, 1494-1815,” pp. 13-34; and Hiski Haukkala, “A Norm Maker of a Norm Taker? The Changing Normative Parameters of Russia’s Place in Europe,” pp. 35-56.

twice from destruction, during the Napoleonic Wars, and again during the Second World War. As Ivo J. Lederer argued in 1962: “Ever since the days of Catherine the Great—certainly since 1814 when Alexander I, victor of Napoleon, appeared in Paris heading the mightiest army in Europe—Russia has been near the center of the world diplomatic stage. The superpower of today has for two centuries been a leading arbiter of the peace and war.”<sup>55</sup> Russia is a very important element in the world system and the failure of liberalism to take hold in post-Cold War Russia is one of the most important issues in this era. Russia’s open rejection of the Western-led international system, made most clearly by the “Five-Day War” with Georgia in August 2008, and the seizure of Crimea in the Winter of 2014, makes study of the failure of Western liberalism to take hold in Russia an academic imperative.<sup>56</sup>

### **Kozyrev’s “Failure” Serves as Important Element in President Putin’s Restoration of Russian Power Narrative**

Another factor that demands that scholars re-examine Kozyrev’s management of Russian foreign policy is that a highly negative view of Andrei Kozyrev has been adopted by current Russian President Vladimir Putin and his supporters, within and outside his government, as a major element in the narrative that justifies Putin’s foreign policy. An article written on 14 October 2003 in the government-supporting newspaper *Trud*, entitled “Cured of the Kozyrev Syndrome,” made this point very explicitly:

Thus we have seen the emergence of two features of Putin’s “new course”—a “political-economic” approach to our relations with the rest of the world, and our full and final

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<sup>55</sup> Ivo J. Lederer, “Introduction,” in Ivo J. Lederer, *Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. xvii.

<sup>56</sup> See Robert Legvold, “Introduction” in Robert Legvold (ed.), *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century & the Shadow of the Past*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 3-34.

recovery, as it were, from the “Kozyrev syndrome,” in which Russia for some reason pursued an incoherent and anemic foreign policy.<sup>57</sup>

Another prominent spokesman for the view that Putin saved Russia from the “aimless and difficult 1990s” is current Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, who stated:

What were the 2000s then? Through a miracle of God with the active participation of the country’s leadership, we managed to exit this horrible systemic crisis [of the 1990s].<sup>58</sup>

According to Arkady Ostrovsky, a Russian-born journalist for *The Economist*, “The narrative of avenging the humiliation of the 1990s, ‘imposed on Russia by the West,’ would become the centerpiece of the restoration ideology of Vladimir Putin. In fact, this ‘humiliation’ was imposed not by the West but by those who cultivated the idea of *Sovok* and by Putin himself.”<sup>59</sup> An intrinsic part of this narrative is that Andrei Kozyrev, as foreign minister, simply followed the direction of the West “in lockstep” and did not stand up for Russian national interests. Galina Sidorova, a journalist who served as a political adviser to Kozyrev from 1992-1995, wrote that “The main assessment [of Kozyrev’s critics] is: ‘They gave everything away! They betrayed everything!’ What exactly, was given away or betrayed nobody, however, seems able to say.”<sup>60</sup> This use of Kozyrev also demands a re-assessment of his foreign policy.

Another important factor that hinders a realistic appraisal of Russian foreign policy in 1990s

Russia is that the Russian Federation’s state education system places such limited attention to

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<sup>57</sup> Gennady Charodeyev, “Cured of the Kozyrev Syndrome,” *Trud*, 14 October 2003, p. 4, in *Current Digest of the Russian Press*, No. 41, Volume 55, 12 November 2003, p. 16.

<sup>58</sup> Gleb Bryansk, “Russian Patriarch calls Putin era a “miracle of God,” 8 February 2012, Reuters News Service. <https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-russia-putin-religion/russian-patriarch-calls-putin-era-miracle-of-god-idUKTRE81722Y20120208>

<sup>59</sup> Arkady Ostrovsky, *The Invention of Russia: From Gorbachev’s Freedom of Putin’s War* (New York: Viking, 2015), p. 93. According to Ostrovsky, the word ‘*Soviet*’ morphed into *Sovok*, which means “dustpan.” This word “sovok” was then used as “... an antonym to *normal* or *civilized*.” *ibid*.

<sup>60</sup> Galina Sidorova, “Under the Aegis of the Foreign Ministry,” Radio Free Europe/Russia Studies Center at the Henry Jackson Society at the University of Washington, 11 January 2017, p. 8. <http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2017/01/11/under-the-aegis-of-the-foreign-ministry/> Accessed 2 May 2018.

this period that most Russians, even those who were alive during the 1990s, lack a knowledge of what happened during that time. According to Russian scholars Valeriia Kasamara and Anna Sorokina of the Higher School of Economics, the 1990s have received such little attention in the Russian education system that “...the closer historical events are to us and the simpler they are presented, the less any individual knows about them.”<sup>61</sup> According to Kasamara and Sorokina: “... young people may not know anything about Yeltsin...”<sup>62</sup> In discussing this study, U.S. analyst Paul Goble claimed that “As for Yeltsin, the Russian young remember little but associate him in the first instance with alcohol rather than any reforms. There is no social consensus on this period, they say, and often teachers rush over it at the very end of classes. As a result, Russians do not have ‘the founding myth’ that other countries rely on.”<sup>63</sup> Thus, Russians today know little to nothing about the collapse of the USSR, the reformist efforts of Gorbachev or Yeltsin, and Russian conditions during this era outside of the official narrative provided by the Putin Administration and a largely supportive media. According to Yegor Gaidar:

This is the picture that dominates Russian public opinion: (1) twenty years ago there existed a stable, developing, and powerful country, the Soviet Union; (2) strange people (perhaps agents of foreign intelligence services) started political and economic reforms within it; (3) the results of these reforms were catastrophic; (4) in 1999-2000 people came to power who were concerned with the country’s state interests; (5) life became better after that.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> «У многих сразу после Сталина чудесным образом появляется Путин, Что знает поколение Путина об эпохе Ельцина — итоги свежих исследований ВШЭ, [https://www.znak.com/2018-05-14/chto\\_znaet\\_pokolenie\\_putina\\_ob\\_epohe\\_elcina\\_itogi\\_svezhih\\_issledovaniy\\_vshe](https://www.znak.com/2018-05-14/chto_znaet_pokolenie_putina_ob_epohe_elcina_itogi_svezhih_issledovaniy_vshe). Accessed on 14 June 2018.

<sup>62</sup> У многих сразу после Сталина чудесным образом появляется Путин, Что знает поколение Путина об эпохе Ельцина — итоги свежих исследований ВШЭ.

<sup>63</sup> Paul Goble, “Young Russians Know Little of 1990s and View Putin as Stalin’s Immediate Successor, New Research Shows” Window on Eurasia blogspot, 14 May 2018. <http://windowoneurasia2.blogspot.com/2018/05/young-russians-know-little-of-1990s-and.html> Accessed 14 June 2018.

<sup>64</sup> Yegor Gaidar, *Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2007), p. xviii.

## Western Scholarship: Case Closed?

Ironically, some American political scientists have advanced arguments that are remarkably similar to those of Kozyrev's Russian critics. James Richter, after correctly stating that Russian "... liberals [such as Andrei Kozyrev and Yegor Gaidar] organized their image of Russia's identity around a claim to a shared identity with the United States and the countries of Western Europe,"<sup>65</sup> went on to argue that:

To establish this identity they favored accommodating the demands of the United States and Western Europe. During his first year in office, Yeltsin accepted arms agreements with the West most Russians believed to give a one-sided advantage to NATO, and he frequently supported, albeit reluctantly, Western positions on Yugoslavia and Iraq in the United Nations.<sup>66</sup>

In the 1990s, there was a consensus among a number of scholars that Western liberalism and capitalist democracy had triumphed over all ideological rivals. However, this has not proved to be the case. Even this view's most fervent advocate, Francis Fukuyama, recanted this view in later years.<sup>67</sup> Under President Vladimir Putin, Russia, along with China, has led the world in opposing the US-led democratic-capitalist order, and it arguable that he has made a few converts to his position such as Viktor Orban of Hungary. Understanding of what happened in Russia during the 1990s would contribute to an understanding of why Russian adoption of Western values failed and why Russia became a leading opponent of a United States-led world order.

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<sup>65</sup> James Richter, "Russian Foreign Policy and the Politics of National Identity," in Celeste A. Wallander (ed.) *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War*, (Boulder, CO and Oxford, UK: Westview Press, 1996), p. 77.

<sup>66</sup> James Richter, "Russian Foreign Policy and the Politics of National Identity," p. 77.

<sup>67</sup> See, for example, Francis Fukuyama, *America at the Crossroads* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).

### III: Why now? New materials are available

The current consensus on Kozyrev's foreign policy, which stresses Yeltsin's and Kozyrev's accommodating the demands of the West in violation of "Russia's true national interests" is an oversimplification. Contrary to Richter's claims, Kozyrev actually *led* the Russian foreign ministry in criticizing U.S. airstrikes in Iraq, and though in general, the Kozyrev foreign ministry did try to work with the West, at times it could oppose US policies that were seen as detrimental to Russian interests.<sup>68</sup> Counter to Snyder's claims, Kozyrev spoke of using other, *non-institutional* power-based levers, such as political, economic, or even military pressure, to defend ethnic Russians and other Russian speakers in the Estonia states, if the Estonian government failed to respond to the CSCE's recommendations. As early as December 1992, and in January 1994, Kozyrev directly raised the specter of possible military action against the Estonian government.<sup>69</sup> The account of Russian Balkan policy provided by Allen C. Lynch shows that Snyder's periodization may be inaccurate, and that Kozyrev may actually have "jumped on the pro-Serbian bandwagon" as early as 1992.<sup>70</sup> Thus, the views of scholars such as Richter's and Snyder's, while possibly true in certain discrete circumstances, may actually obscure a realistic understanding of Russia's true foreign policy if applied universally to describe Kozyrev's foreign policy as a whole.

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<sup>68</sup> See Peter Shearman and Matthew Sussex, "Foreign Policy-making and Institutions," in Neil Robinson, *Institutions and Political Change in Russia* (New York: St. Martins Press, 2000), p. 160. They cited the Russian newspaper *Izvestiia*, 19 January 1993.

<sup>69</sup> John Lloyd, "Russians to Stay in Baltics, Says Kozyrev," *Financial Times*, 19 January 1994 cited in M. Merrick Yamamoto, *OSCE Principles in Practice: Testing Their Effect on Security Through the Work of Max Van der Stoep, First High Commissioner on National Minorities 1993–2001* (College Park, MD: Center for International & Security Studies at Maryland, September 2017, <http://www.cissm.umd.edu/publications/osce-principles-practice-testing-their-effect-security-through-work-max-van-der-stoel> Accessed 20 May 2018.

<sup>70</sup> Allen C. Lynch, "The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Volume 53, No. 1 2001, p. 14.

It is also clear from the work of many scholars who looked at specific policy areas during the 1990s that characterizing Kozyrev strictly as a Westernist liberal is problematic, and may actually obscure a reasoned analysis of his foreign policy. Allen Lynch, in his article cited above, argued that: "... Kozyrev had presided over a Russian diplomacy that was far more complex and balanced than his critics were prepared to accept."<sup>71</sup> Lynch argued that Kozyrev's foreign policy:

... proved relatively successful in maintaining two important policy objectives that are in potential tension with each other: establishing Russian diplomatic and security hegemony throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union as well as Russia's 'great power' status in international councils while at the same time avoiding a rupture with the G-7 states, in the first place, the United States.<sup>72</sup>

Lynch, who based these conclusions on four case studies: Russian policies in the ex-Soviet territory of Moldova, Russian Balkans diplomacy, calculations on NATO expansion, and Russia's response to NATO's war against Serbia, argued further that from 1993 on, Kozyrev pursued a foreign policy that any eventual NATO expansion "had to be rooted in a broader concept and framework of European security" and that Russia's status as a nuclear power should be acknowledged. As Lynch concluded "That such a framework was codified under Primakov should not obscure *the strong lines of continuity between these putatively 'liberal' and 'realist' foreign ministers...*"<sup>73</sup>

Similarly, Jeanne Wilson's *Strategic Partners: Russian-Chinese relations in the Post-Soviet Era*, probably the best available study in English on Russo-Chinese relations during this period, clearly shows the strong continuity between Kozyrev's and Primakov's China policy, and acknowledged that in relation to China, Kozyrev's policy was based more on pragmatism than

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<sup>71</sup> Allen C. Lynch, "The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Volume 53, No. 1 (2001), p. 9.

<sup>72</sup> Allen C. Lynch, "The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy," p.8.

<sup>73</sup> Allen C. Lynch, "The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy," p. 11, emphasis added.

ideology.<sup>74</sup> Lowell Dittmer has argued that the period of 1989 to 1992, "... was one of considerable bilateral turbulence amid the repercussions of Tiananmen and the collapse of the European Communist Part-states; *only skilled diplomacy was able to salvage the relationship*."<sup>75</sup> Peter Shearman and Matthew Sussex noted in 2000 that "... even though Primakov was championed as a pragmatic defender of Russian state interests when he took over the ministry, *the substance of policy did not change*. Rather, the style changed as a more assertive type of realism gained sway, *although this was already emerging under Kozyrev*."<sup>76</sup> In response to those scholars that drew a sharp line between the "old, pro-Western" Kozyrev, and the "new, more nationalist" Kozyrev, American political scientist Stephen Sestanovich wrote:

The Russian foreign minister's new tack has led many to speak of two Kozyrevs: the old and the new; the good and the bad; the soft-spoken liberal and the tub-thumping nationalist. *The shorthand can be useful, but in fact the differences aren't all that great. There have always been two Kozyrevs, and if anything they may fit together better now than they used to.* The fit--though it may be temporarily confusing--is good news for those who hope Russia will be a constructive international actor.<sup>77</sup>

These dissenting views of Kozyrev's foreign policy that challenge the existing consensus on Kozyrev's foreign policy were unable to overturn the dominant Western and Russian narratives on Kozyrev's role in history as a failed liberal. However, recently uncovered evidence does challenge the consensus view. This is extremely important because Russia is a great power

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<sup>74</sup> Jeanne Lorraine Wilson, *Strategic Partners: Russian-Chinese relations in the Post-Soviet Era* (New York and London: Routledge, 2004), p. 193.

<sup>75</sup> Lowell Dittmer, "The Sino-Japanese-Russian Triangle," *The Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Volume 10, no. 1 (April 2005), p. 12, emphasis added.

<sup>76</sup> Peter Shearman and Matthew Sussex, "Foreign Policy-making and Institutions," in Neil Robinson (ed.), *Institutions and Political Change in Russia* (New York: Saint Martins, Press, 2000), p. 170, emphasis added. In making this argument, Sherman and Sussex departed from most mainstream scholarship that divided Russians in the 1990s into Westernist liberals who were opposed by liberals and more moderate statist.

<sup>77</sup> Stephen Sestanovich, "Andrei the Giant," *The New Republic* (New York: 1 April 1994). This position can be seen as an opposing viewpoint to that expressed by Andranik Migranyan in his "Russia's Foreign Policy: Disastrous Results of Three Years. It's Time to Pause, and Change both Policy and Minister," *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 10 December 1994.



which has tremendous influence on the world community. Failing to understand Russia's role in the international system could lead to a skewed view of international relations in general. A Russian journalist, Leonid Mlechin, who is well connected with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the Russian Federation and has written extensively about Russian foreign policy, stated that, "Andrei Kozyrev was always misunderstood,"<sup>78</sup> and argued that Kozyrev was an effective foreign minister and a good ambassador of the new democratic Russia, and that it is a great pity that few know of the actual role in played in the 1990s:

Boris Yeltsin, as is probably true of any politician, easily parted with anyone he did not need. It's a pity that it seems that the events of the previous period which were carried out by Kozyrev have been crossed out. For many years he was the face of the new Russia, and it was a positive, smiling face.<sup>79</sup>

Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, new materials available to scholars give researchers an unprecedented opportunity to re-examine Kozyrev's foreign policy. For example, recently declassified US documents held by the National Security Archive at George Washington University in Washington, DC have shown that Kozyrev was not the blind hostage of liberal interests that many scholars have described. One of the key areas where Kozyrev supposedly refused to defend Russian interests was in relation to the expansion of NATO.<sup>80</sup> Migranyan argued that Russia had suffered a "crushing defeat" when in November 1993, NATO published the Brussels Communiqué, which announced the forthcoming enlargement of NATO. Migranyan noted "Why did Kozyrev go to Brussels? Can it possibly be that he didn't know a

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<sup>78</sup> Mlechin's exact phrase in Russian was: "Андрея Козырева постоянно недооценивали." Leonid Mlechin, *MID*, p. 645.

<sup>79</sup> Leonid Mlechin, *MID*, p. 627

<sup>80</sup> Kozyrev frequently stated that he accepted the idea of the expansion of NATO in principle, but he opposed its rapid expansion and believed that its expansion should ideally go hand-in-hand with the development of positive US-Russian relations. He opposed the Clinton Administration's expansion of NATO primarily due to the manner in which it was accomplished, not in terms of the overall idea of the policy. See "Andrei Kozyrev: A Bona Fide Kamikaze."

decision to expand NATO would be adopted there?”<sup>81</sup> At this conference, when the communique was released, President Yeltsin was angered and claimed that he had been led to believe that the United States had abandoned the idea of NATO expansion in favor of the Partnership for Peace.<sup>82</sup>

Incidentally, advancing a view similar to Migranyan’s, former American statesmen Strobe Talbott and Warren Christopher claimed in their memoirs that they were shocked by Yeltsin’s and Kozyrev’s actions in relation to the Brussels Communique because they claim that they made it clear to both Russian statesman that NATO expansion was going to be a reality. Christopher records in his memoirs, *Chances of a Lifetime: A Memoir*, that he was surprised after Yeltsin told him that he considered Partnership for Peace to be a “brilliant stroke,” and asked in his memoirs: “Had Kozyrev, Russia’s foreign minister, *deliberately failed to alert Yeltsin to the full scope of Clinton’s decision*, or was Yeltsin simply relieved that NATO’s expansion would not be immediate?”<sup>83</sup> In another memoir, which was based upon his speeches and statements while Secretary of State, *In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era*, Christopher wrote: “In retrospect, it is clear that his [Yeltsin’s] enthusiasm was *based on his mistaken assumption that the Partnership for Peace would not lead to eventual NATO expansion*.”<sup>84</sup> This view, which has been accepted by many scholars up to now, such as James M. Goldgeier and

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<sup>81</sup> Andranik Migranyan, “Russia’s Foreign Policy; Disastrous Results of Three Years,” pp. 15-16.

<sup>82</sup> See James M. Goldgeier, *Not Whether but When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1999), pp. 84-91. Goldgeier noted that Kozyrev claimed in the Spring of 1994 that “The greatest achievement of Russian foreign policy in 1993 was to prevent NATO’s expansion eastwards to our borders.” p. 85. Goldgeier also notes that the US Department of Defense was as surprised by the announcement to expand NATO eastwards as the Russians were, pp. 95-96.

<sup>83</sup> Warren Christopher, *Chances of a Lifetime: A Memoir* (New York: Scribner’s “A Lisa Drew Book,” 2001) p. 280; Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy*, p. 101, emphasis added. See also The National Security Archive, “NATO Expansion: What Yeltsin Heard,” compiled and edited by Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blanton, 16 March 2018. [https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2018-03-16/nato-expansion-what-yeltsin-heard#\\_edn1](https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs/2018-03-16/nato-expansion-what-yeltsin-heard#_edn1) Accessed 2 May 2018.

<sup>84</sup> Warren Christopher, *In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 93-94, emphasis added.

Ronald Asmus, who have written two of the best known, and comprehensive, studies of NATO expansion, is well established in the historical and political science literature.<sup>85</sup>

The authors of *The Epoch of Yeltsin* argue that Kozyrev had been derelict in his duties as foreign minister, and had even held nefarious “secret negotiations” in English with his Western interlocutors, in which he betrayed Russia’s national interests. They wrote:

Kozyrev, who spoke English fluently, frequently conducted negotiations with Western colleagues one-on-one, even without a translator. And what they discussed remained only conjecture. This had lamentable consequences. Later, when the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Evgeniy Primakov expressed objections to NATO expansion, the Secretary of State of the United States, Warren Christopher, said that the expansion of NATO actually “... originated from the fact that Russia, first of all, wanted NATO expansion to be accomplished in stages, and secondly, that it was necessary to find some form that connected Russia with NATO. This is how Washington understood the signals from Moscow.”<sup>86</sup>

However, a recently declassified document from the Clinton Library and the United States Department of State<sup>87</sup> casts doubts on Migranyan’s, Christopher’s and Talbott’s accounts, and shows that the concern expressed by the authors of *The Epoch of Yeltsin*—that behind closed doors, Kozyrev betrayed Russia’s national interests—is unfounded. A memorandum from the US Delegation of the Secretary of State to the State Department headquarters in Washington, DC, dated 25 October 1993, reported the contents of a discussion between Christopher and Kozyrev on this subject of NATO expansion. It has recently been declassified and is worth quoting in detail:

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<sup>85</sup> See James M. Goldgeier, *Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1999), pp. 59. See also Ronald Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door: How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

<sup>86</sup> Iu, M, Baturin et al, *Epokha El'tsina: Ocherki politicheskoi istorii* (Moscow: Vagrius, 2001), pp. 476-477. This passage was a loose interpretation of a passage written by Kozyrev’s successor as foreign minister, Evgeniy Primakov in his memoirs, *Gody v Bol'shoi Politike* [Years in High Politics] (Moscow: Sovershenno Sekretno, 1991), p. 242. Primakov wrote that Secretary of State Warren Christopher had told him that “At the beginning of 1993 ... President Clinton clearly explained that NATO would be enlarged.” (p. 242)

<sup>87</sup> This document was declassified under a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request made by the National Security Archive.

Opening the meeting, Secretary Christopher said he wanted to review briefly where we were now in NATO expansion. He would, of course, be talking with President Yeltsin about this and he wanted Kozyrev to know that we were sensitive to the Russian position and that we had developed a proposal that balanced various objectives and interests. *There would be no immediate provision for new memberships and no associate memberships; no one would be excluded, and the Partnership for Peace would be open to all on an equal basis.* He believed that this met Russia's requirements.

4. *Kozyrev asked, pointedly, whether there would not be two or three new members now? Secretary Christopher said no, that we were emphasizing a Partnership for Peace which would involve training and exercises in dealing with security questions and that the Partnership would help develop a habit of interoperability and cooperation.*<sup>88</sup>

This then-classified *American* document clearly shows that Kozyrev was not derelict in his duties, nor did he misunderstand Christopher, he was in fact told by the United States Secretary of State in response to a direct question on whether or not NATO would expand to include two new members (a clear allusion to Poland, and either the Czech Republic or Hungary) that the US was not considering NATO expansion, but was instead "... emphasizing the Partnership for Peace."<sup>89</sup> When Kozyrev discovered the true intentions of the United States relating to the Partnership for Peace and NATO expansion, according to the Clinton Administration's primary Russia specialist, Strobe Talbott: *"Rather than trying to extinguish the flames, Kozyrev stoked them.* He told Yeltsin that he, too, had been misled about what to expect. 'I've been invited here

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<sup>88</sup> Memorandum; "Secretary Christopher's Meeting with Foreign Minister Kozyrev; NATO, Elections, Regional Issues," FM USDEL SECRETARY IN UKRAINE TO SECSTATE WASHDC, 25 October 1993, declassified 11 March 2003. National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC, emphasis added. Declassified in February 2018.

<sup>89</sup> Memorandum; "Secretary Christopher's Meeting with Foreign Minister Kozyrev; NATO, Elections, Regional Issues," FM USDEL SECRETARY IN UKRAINE TO SECSTATE WASHDC, 25 October 1993, declassified 11 March 2003. National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, DC. Christopher could argue, in his defense, that the first paragraph made it clear that they were discussing NATO expansion, but the second paragraph indicates that, if Christopher's intent was to tell Kozyrev that the United States intended to expand NATO, he was unclear. Any logical interpretation of this statement indicates that in the available literature, Kozyrev's description of what was said is more correct than what Secretary Christopher claimed.

for breakfast,' said Kozyrev, 'but I got served dinner instead, Maybe it was a fine meal, but it was different from the one I'd been invited for. Now all partnership is subsidiary to enlargement.'<sup>90</sup>

Even more damaging to the traditional negative assessment of Kozyrev is another recently declassified document written by Strobe Talbott to Secretary of State Warren Christopher some time after the December 1993 elections to the Duma. It is worth extensive quotation because it provides more specificity than Talbott provided in his unclassified memoirs. Talbott wrote to Christopher:

Kozyrev has suggested that you and he use your one-hour meeting on Thursday morning to concentrate on the future and the big picture. That's probably a good idea. It will give you a chance to engage with him on some problems looming not just between our governments *but with Kozyrev's own apparent attitude and role.*

*Quite simply and bluntly, he's become part of the problem rather than part of the solution ... Basically, Kozyrev seems to have concluded that both his own interests and Russia's require a tougher, more nationalistic line — one that could translate into policies that will require a stern response from us and that will certainly make it harder for us to carry to our strategy of fostering Russia's integration into the West ...*

In any event, beyond the psychodrama that is playing out here, there are very real, and quite disturbing, implications for policy, *since Kozyrev still has a lot of influence on Yeltsin.* When the Vice President [Al Gore] was in Moscow, *we saw a vivid example of how Kozyrev can obstruct desirable developments and spin Yeltsin in the wrong direction. Kozyrev tried his best to block my suggestion of taking Mamedov to Kiev for what turned out to be a key trilateral meeting* (fortunately, Chernomyrdin overruled him on the spot); and he then got to Yeltsin just before the VP came to the Kremlin. *Kozyrev got Yeltsin to open the meeting with a blast — in from of the TV cameras — at the Ukrainians for perfidy and at the Americans for their naivete* (that word again!). It was hardly a helpful prelude to the Kiev expedition. *We've got some reason to believe that*

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<sup>90</sup> Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy*, p. 140, 101. It can be argued that Talbott would have a far better vantage point to judge Kozyrev's response to this event than either Migranyan or the multiple authors of *The Epoch of Yeltsin*.

*Kozyrev has not been helpful this week as we've moved to closure on the trilateral deal.*<sup>91</sup>

This passage is an interesting vantage point from which to observe the views of Kozyrev's critics—from Snyder to Migranyan to Tsygankov. First of all, these recently declassified reports indicate, that while it is incontestable that Kozyrev was a liberal who wanted to work with the West, he was also capable of expressing his opposition to policies that he believed were damaging to Russia's national interests. This was true to such an extent that Kozyrev was considered “part of the problem” in US-Russian relations, and that he could use his influence with the Russian President to “spin Yeltsin in the wrong direction.”<sup>92</sup>

Another good reason to take a second look at Kozyrev's foreign policy is that there are now important new primary, *Russian-language*, source documents available that enable scholars to re-examine Kozyrev's foreign policy. In relation to Russo-Chinese and even Russo-Japanese relations, in 1995 the Chinese historian Shen Zhihua “... committed some 1.4 million yuan of his

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<sup>91</sup> Memo from Strobe Talbott to U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, entitled: “Your Meeting with FM Kozyrev, undated. Formerly Top Secret document, declassified per. Executive Order (E.O.) 13526, 2014-0905-M (1.45) 27 February 2017. National Security Archive, George Washington University. Acquired on 30 January 2018, emphases added. In *The Russia Hand*, Talbott later admitted that while the prospect of Evgeny Primakov replacing Kozyrev as foreign minister caused apprehension to American policy makers, he still considered Kozyrev a complicating factor in US foreign policy: “Kozyrev, *for all the annoyance he caused us*, really was, just as he said, a personification of Russia's radical break with its past.” The Moscow Meeting referenced in this document is probably the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission meeting held on 14-16 December 1994 in Moscow (see “Records pertaining to the Fourth Meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission held December 14-16, 1994 in Moscow, Russia,” National Archives of the United States government, Presidential Materials Division <https://www.archives.gov/files/research/vice-presidential-records/pdfs/2014-0048-F%20finding-aid.pdf> Accessed on 13 August 2018; the Kiev meeting probably references Vice-President Albert Gore's visit to Kiev in August 1994, see Mary Mycio, “Gore Woos Ukraine With Promises of Aid in Return for Disarmament Steps,” Los Angeles Times, 03 August 1994 [http://articles.latimes.com/1994-08-03/news/mn-23005\\_1\\_independent-ukraine](http://articles.latimes.com/1994-08-03/news/mn-23005_1_independent-ukraine) Accessed on 13 August 2018.

<sup>92</sup> Memo from Strobe Talbott to U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, entitled: “Your Meeting with FM Kozyrev, undated. Formerly Top Secret document, declassified per. Executive Order (E.O.) 13526, 2014-0905-M (1.45) 27 February 2017. National Security Archive, George Washington University. Acquired on 30 January 2018,

own money to buy declassified [historical documents from] historical archives from Russia.”<sup>93</sup>

Shen Zhihua used these documents to assemble a large archive at East Normal Chinese University in Shanghai, which contains a very large number of primary documents from a number of the Russian State archives on Russian relations with Asian states, most prominently China, but also including a number of documents on Russia’s relations with other Asian nations as well, including Japan, South Korea and Mongolia. These documents provide scholars a great opportunity to reexamine Kozyrev’s foreign policy towards Asian states in general, and the People’s Republic of China (and to a lesser extent, Japan) in particular.<sup>94</sup>

Furthermore, the National Security Archive at George Washington University in Washington, DC has been able to get a large number of important US government documents on Russo-American relations unclassified through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, and have also been able to collect a large number of useful documents from archives within the Russian Federation.<sup>95</sup> According to the Archive’s Russian Program website: “For the last 15 years the archive has assembled a significant collection of documents from Russian and Eastern European archives, including important documents on Russian foreign and domestic policies

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<sup>93</sup> “Thinking China, Key Intellectuals: Shen Zhihua,” The China Story, Australian Centre on China in the World, No date, <https://www.thechinastory.org/key-intellectual/shen-zhihua-沈志华/> Accessed 29 July 2018.

<sup>94</sup> Jiayun Feng, “Historian Gripes About Access and Quality of Archives in China,” 14 November 2017 <https://supchina.com/2017/11/14/historian-gripes-access-quality-archives-china/> Accessed 29 July 2018. For more on Shen Zhihua, Jane Perlez, “The Saturday Profile: Shining a Cleansing Light on China’s Dark Secret,” The New York Times, 23 March 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/23/world/asia/shen-zhihua-china-history-north-korea.html> Accessed 29 July 2018. See also “Thinking China, Key Intellectuals: Shen Zhihua,” The China Story, Australian Centre on China in the World, No date, <https://www.thechinastory.org/key-intellectual/shen-zhihua-沈志华/> Accessed 29 July 2018.

<sup>95</sup> The Archive’s website states: “Founded in 1985 by journalists and scholars to check rising government secrecy, the National Security Archive combines a unique range of functions: investigative journalism center, research institute on international affairs, library and archive of declassified U.S. documents (“the world’s largest nongovernmental collection” according to the Los Angeles Times), leading non-profit user of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, public interest law firm defending and expanding public access to government information, global advocate of open government, and indexer and publisher of former secrets.” National Security Archive, Washington, DC <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/about> Accessed 4 August 2018.

from significant Russian archives, such as the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF).<sup>96</sup> While performing research at the National Security Archive, this scholar was able to access several important Russian archival documents on Russia's relations with both China and Japan that help to better explain Russia's relations with these two powers during Kozyrev's tenure as foreign minister.

Additionally, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the successor organization of the Commission for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has a large archive containing documents relating not only to its primary missions, but also containing the reports from the CSCE's Mission Offices in Estonia and Latvia. The Prague Office of the OSCE Secretariat, CSCE/OSCE Archives and Centre for Documentation has the officially stated goal of "... supporting, preserving, and improving access and availability of CSCE/OSCE's institutional memory by various means (through intranet, public website, and regular dissemination to depository libraries and subscribers," and maintains the "Researcher in Residence Programme, "... which support representatives of academic and international community conducting research on CSCE/OSCE-related matters in the Prague archives."<sup>97</sup> I was fortunate enough to receive an appointment as a researcher in residence in the summer of 2017, which enabled me to conduct research there. The holdings at the CSCE/OSCE Archives and Centre for Documentation are very important for helping scholars to evaluate and reconsider the role of the CSCE in the efforts of the Kozyrev Foreign Ministry to defend the rights of both Russian speakers and ethnic Russians in the Baltic states.

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<sup>96</sup> Russkie Programmy, National Security Archive, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//rus/Index.html> Accessed on 4 August 2018.

<sup>97</sup> OSCE Factsheet, Prague Office of the OSCE Secretariat, CSCE/OSCE Archives and Centre of Documentation, No date, [www.osce.org/secretariat/prague](http://www.osce.org/secretariat/prague)



These newly available documents from the United States archives, from Russian sources and from the OSCE provide a new, *unprecedented* opportunity to develop a Russian-centric, *inside* view, of the formulation and execution of foreign policy within the Russian Federation during Kozyrev's tenure as foreign minister which has previously been inaccessible to scholars. This new material actually corroborates the views of scholars such as Sestanovich, Wilson, Lynch and Dittmer, who challenged the scholarly consensus. These documents may thus force scholars to re-evaluate this period and even re-think what Western academics think they know about 1990s Russia.

Thus, this study will seek to answer the essential question raised by the contradictory opinions of Kozyrev held by Russian writers, policy-makers and Western academics. Was he a realist, as Kissinger, Shearman and Sussex, claimed, and if he was a realist, was he the more traditional realist described by Kissinger or the "soft" realist described by Shearman or Sussex? Were Snyder and Tsygankov more correct when they identified Kozyrev primarily as a Westernist liberal who had strong institutionalist leanings? If he did moderate his policies, was Snyder correct in his belief that Kozyrev become more conservative due to internal pressures, or was Lynch more correct in arguing that Kozyrev moderated his policy as it became clear that the West was not responding as he and Yeltsin thought it would? Was Tsygankov more correct when he argued—in opposition to both Snyder and Lynch—that a strong liberal orientation defined Kozyrev's entire tenure as foreign minister? Or, as Sestanovich argued, were there always "two Kozyrevs," who were capable of praising Western institutions on one hand, and issuing threats on the other? Are these almost dizzying competing views even testable? I believe that they are.

#### IV: Methodology

This study will seek to address the question of how Andrei Kozyrev conceived, formulated and executed Russian foreign policy, from his accession to the post of foreign minister of the RSFSR in June 1990 to his retirement from the post of foreign minister of the Russian Federation in January 1996, using the most prominent foreign policy failure of this effort, Yeltsin's cancelled visit to Japan in September 1992 as the fulcrum of analysis.

As was described above, the cancellation of President Yeltsin's visit to Japan in September 1992 has been acknowledged by many scholars as the "beginning of the end" of Russia's liberal experiment in Russian foreign policy. No study of Kozyrev's diplomacy can avoid this issue. However, I seek to shed light on this issue by a thorough examination of two other case studies. I hope to approach two other case studies based largely upon a theoretical framework drawn from historical studies of the failure of Kozyrev's Japan policy. In his exhaustive study of the territorial issue, Hiroshi Kimura noted that Russia's failure to resolve the issue was due, at least in part, to Kozyrev himself. His comments are worth quoting in full:

Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev was supposed to help transform Kunadze's<sup>98</sup> ideas into practical policy. But being himself a bureaucrat-turned-minister, Kozyrev was unable to do so ... His allegedly pro-Western diplomatic orientation undoubtedly invited bitter criticism from nationalist and conservative forces in Russia. But the criticism against Kozyrev went beyond his policy orientation to a more general critique of his handling of Russian foreign policy. Because of his lack of authority and prestige in the Russian foreign policymaking community, Kozyrev significantly reduced the role of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) and instead allowed other institutions, organizations and elite groups ... to meddle in Russian foreign policy making, often bypassing the MID. As a result, Kozyrev became incapable of effectively coordinating Russian foreign policy.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>98</sup> Georgii Fredrikhovich Kunadze was a leading Soviet and later Russian Japanologist, and Asian affairs specialist, who had started his career at the Russian Academy of Sciences, and subsequently served as an adviser to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, and later as Deputy Foreign Minister for the MFA of the Russian Federation.

<sup>99</sup> Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, pp. 132-133.

Kimura made this conclusion based on his detailed examination of the territorial dispute between the Soviet Union, and later, the Russian Federation and Japan. It would be worthwhile to examine other policy areas to see if this criticism of Kozyrev is valid as a description of his management of Russian foreign policy as a whole. This view will serve as the basis for the fundamental research question of this dissertation.

### **Managing Yeltsin: The Primary Variable**

In examining Russian foreign policy it is essential to understand the relationship between the foreign ministry (and foreign minister) with the government and its leader. As Robert M. Slusser noted, in terms of Russia the most important element in the Foreign Ministry's success "... has been the relationship between the Ministry and the political executive of the Russian state, whether it be a tsar ruling as autocrat, or semi-constitutional monarch, a coalition government extending power on a provisional basis, a small body of political leaders claiming the right to rule on ideological grounds, or a dictator."<sup>100</sup> Slusser argued that historically agreement between the head of state and the foreign minister facilitated the implementation of an effective foreign policy in Russia.

Alexander II and Alexander III had each been fortunate enough, to select as foreign minister a man with whom they could work effectively, and whose life span was to approximate their own. Under each tsar a standard course of action and policy formulation has been successfully pursued. The tsar retained full power to determine the broad lines of Russian foreign policy and to intervene decisively whenever he considered it necessary to do so; for the day-to-day direction and execution of policy, however, he depended on his foreign minister, backed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<sup>101</sup>

This kind of broad agreement and trust between leader and foreign minister characterized the relationship between Mikhail Gorbachev and his foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze. When

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<sup>100</sup> Robert M. Slusser, "The Role of the Foreign Ministry," in Ivo J. Lederer, *Russian Foreign Policy: Essays in Historical Perspective* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 197.

<sup>101</sup> Robert M. Slusser, "The Role of the Foreign Ministry." p. 206.

Gorbachev first became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 10 March 1985, his foreign minister was the conservative Andrei Gromyko. Gromyko had held this post since 15 February 1957, and according to Anatoliy Dobrynin, Gorbachev "... did not hide his displeasure at Gromyko's conservative, dogmatic approach."<sup>102</sup> That Gorbachev quickly moved to replace Gromyko was not surprising. Gromyko was moved from the foreign ministry to the largely ceremonial post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. However, Gorbachev's choice of Eduard Shevardnadze to replace him surprised everyone, including Shevardnadze himself! Gorbachev's biographer William Taubman quotes Gorbachev's reasons for his appointment of Shevardnadze as follows: "Shevardnadze was a 'major political figure,' he was 'capable of deliberation and persuasion,' and he was 'graced with Eastern affability.' Most important, Shevardnadze's appointment 'assured [me] of a free hand in foreign policy by bringing in a close friend and associate.'"<sup>103</sup> Thus, Gorbachev could rely on Shevardnadze to articulate and defend the same foreign policy he believed in, and this relationship for the most part served Gorbachev well, particularly when things got difficult. However, Shevardnadze resigned from the post in December 1990 due to the growth of conservatism in the Soviet government following the defection of many liberals from the CPSU in the Summer of 1990, and Gorbachev's appointment of conservatives to key government posts. Many of these people tried to overthrow Gorbachev's rule in August of 1991. He returned briefly to the post of Soviet foreign minister from November to December 1991, after the brief tenures as Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and Boris Pankin.<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> Quoted in William Taubman, *Gorbachev: His Life and Times* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2017), p. 257.

<sup>103</sup> William Taubman, *Gorbachev: His Life and Times*, pp. 258-259. See also Mikhail Gorbachev, *Memoirs*, pp. 179-183, 261-262.

<sup>104</sup> For his own views on his tenure as Soviet foreign minister, see Eduard Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom* (New York: The Free Press, 1991). See also by Carolyn Ekedahl and Melvin A. Goodman, *The Wars of Eduard Shevardnadze* (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).

Though hand-selected by Yeltsin to be his foreign minister,<sup>105</sup> Kozyrev never had this kind of relationship with Yeltsin. According to existing accounts by participants and scholarly studies on Yeltsin's approach to governing, no Russian politician did. Galina Sidorova, a journalist who served in Kozyrev's foreign ministry, stated that Kozyrev was able to achieve diplomatic successes primarily due to "... his ability to get round Yeltsin."<sup>106</sup> Whereas Gorbachev was deliberate and fairly consistent in his approach to political issues, Yeltsin was not. He had been throughout his political career, an opportunist who made decisions quickly, sometimes with little reflection and sometimes at the expense of consistency.<sup>107</sup>

The most comprehensive studies of President Yeltsin, and the accounts of those who worked for him, as a leader provide a remarkably consistent view on his manner of governance and his political philosophy. Yegor Gaidar stated that Yeltsin "... was a complicated person, with whims, hard to work with, *and inclined to sudden decisions and disregard of everyone's opinion*. He sometimes went ballistic in our discussions."<sup>108</sup> One of Yeltsin's biographers, Timothy Colton, identified this approach to governing with Yeltsin's time as CPSU *Obkom* (Oblast' committee) leader in Sverdlovsk:

Like the provincial party prefect of yore, Yeltsin as president felt qualified, when the spirit moved him, to intervene in any issue. His onetime economic adviser Aleksandr Livshits

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<sup>105</sup> See Leonid Mlechin, *MID*, p. 628.

<sup>106</sup> Galina Sidorova, Under the Aegis of the Foreign "Under the Aegis of the Foreign Ministry," Radio Free Europe/Russia Studies Center at the Henry Jackson Society at the University of Washington, 11 January 2017, p. 8. <http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2017/01/11/under-the-aegis-of-the-foreign-ministry/> Accessed 2 May 2018.

<sup>107</sup> See the descriptions of Boris Yeltsin's governance style in Timothy C. Colton, *Yeltsin: A Life* (New York: Basic Books, 2008); Lilia Shevtsova, *Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Realities* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999); Leon Aron, *Yeltsin: A Revolutionary Life* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), and the accounts of his governing style presented by those who served in his government in Aven and Kokh, *Gaidar's Revolution*; see also the relevant chapters in Baturin et al, *Epokha El'tsina*.

<sup>108</sup> Peter Aven and Alfred Kokh, "Yegor Gaidar: I made a Bad Public Politician," in *Gaidar's Revolution*, p. 387, emphasis added.

testifies that he had “the mentality of the *obkom* first secretary” in assuming “the right and the duty to make decisions about urgent questions then and there.”<sup>109</sup>

Another fact almost all Yeltsin scholars have noted is that structurally, the Russian Federation under Yeltsin’s rule lacked formal units or clearly demarcated areas of responsibility.

Furthermore, the government itself had a varied composition—which included liberals, conservatives, and everything in between. To further complicate reformist policies, despite the state’s commitment to democratic reform and a new foreign policy, the bureaucracy underneath the president’s administration was largely the same *nomenklatura* which had functioned under the Soviet government. As Lilia Shevtsova stated: “While the old state had been destroyed, its backbone, the bureaucracy has been preserved as revitalized.”<sup>110</sup> Peter Aven characterized the Yeltsin government as “... a motley crew: there was the Gaidar team but there was also Poltaranin,<sup>111</sup> Lobov<sup>112</sup> and others.”<sup>113</sup> But this situation was actually due to *Yeltsin’s design and preference*. As Shevtsova argued:

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<sup>109</sup> Timothy J. Colton, *Yeltsin: A Life* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), p. 325. This information came from an interview Colton had with Livshits on 19 January 2001. Livshits had served as the Presidential Administrations analytical center deputy head in April 1992, working group leader for operative analytical support to constitutional reform in 1993, the Russian president’s expert team leader, economic adviser to the president from 1994-1996, finance minister from 1996 to 1997, presidential administrations deputy head 1997 to 1998, and presidential special representative to the Group of Eight (G8) in 1999. Dr. Yuri Urbanovich told me that Yeltsin’s methods as OKBKOM actually violated standard Soviet governing procedures which were based on “democratic centralism.”

<sup>110</sup> Lilia Shevtsova, *Yeltsin’s Russia: Myths and Realities* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999), p. 280.

<sup>111</sup> Mikhail Nikiforovich Poltaranin was the editor of *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, from 1986 to 1988. He was a founding member of the Interregional Group of Deputies, and he served in Yeltsin’s cabinet as the Russian Minister of Press and Information from July 1990 to November 1992, and First Deputy Prime Minister from February to November 1992. Poltaranin was a liberal in political outlook.

<sup>112</sup> Oleg Ivanovich Lobov was identified as an arch-conservative in Yeltsin’s immediate circle. Lobov had been a colleague of Yeltsin’s since his time leading the Party Oblast Committee in Sverdlovsk, where he had served as the Secretary of the Sverdlovsk Region Party Committee (1982-1985). In Yeltsin’s cabinet, he served as Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Economics, and the Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council.

<sup>113</sup> Peter Aven and Alfred Kokh, *Gaidar’s Revolution*, p. 313.

One characteristic feature of Yeltsin's government was its lack of unity, and Yeltsin's inability—or even lack of desire—to force a cohesive team and to create a sense of mutual obligation and responsibility among the individual members ... The president himself ... encouraged mutual antagonisms and played the role of judge and conciliator—with apparent relish.<sup>114</sup>

These factors in combination made the pursuit of a consistent policy in any issue—domestic or foreign—difficult. In such a political environment, in which, as Sergei Shakhrai stated, “Ninety percent of the [political] situation was Boris Nikolaevich's character,”<sup>115</sup> the ability to restrain President Yeltsin's whimsical interventions in the political process was an absolute necessity. Yeltsin's personal qualities—and his style of governing—were a constant impediment to the conduct of a consistent, *normal* foreign policy. Russian politicians were aware of the fact that governing under Yeltsin meant sometimes enlisting others to put pressure on him. As Lilia Shevtsova noted:

Yeltsin's increasing passivity led his close associates Burbulis, Mikhail Poltaranin, Chubais and Kozyrev to hold a press conference for foreign journalists on October 16, 1992, at which they warned again of the threat of a communist coup d'état. Their hope was that they could prompt Western leaders to wake up Yeltsin and force him to act decisively.<sup>116</sup>

Because of this reality of Russian political life under Yeltsin, the key to a successful foreign policy, as Galina Sidorova stated, was the ability to manage Yeltsin, and even to contain him to some extent, to limit his ability to intervene in the conduct of Russian diplomacy. This will be the primary research question this dissertation seeks to address:

**Q1: Was Andrei Kozyrev able to manage Yeltsin, and to contain his interventions in the conduct of Russian diplomacy?**

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<sup>114</sup> Lilia Shevtsova, *Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Realities*, p. 19.

<sup>115</sup> “Sergei Shakhrai: Those Events Made Yeltsin More Isolated, Angry and Vindictive,” *Gaidar's Revolution*, p. 314.

<sup>116</sup> Lilia Shevtsova, *Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Realities*, p. 51.

This primary research question is the key variable in determining whether Kozyrev was a successful foreign minister or not. For this reason, each of the case studies examined in this dissertation contains an example of Yeltsin's "intervention" in the political or diplomatic process that contradicted, or had the power to overturn, previously agreed upon policy. This study will focus on three case studies, examining how they were formulated and executed and identify domestic constraints that worked to limit the success or failure of its implementation. The failure of Kozyrev's foreign policy in relation to Japan will be reconsidered in light of the findings of the first two case studies.

***Case Study Number One: Russian Foreign Policy Towards China: June 1990-January 1996:***

The focus of previous studies of Russian foreign policy towards China during this period, including Jeanne Wilson's excellent study, was on the conduct of Russian foreign policy towards China as a whole. The focus in this study will be on Andrei Kozyrev as a policy initiator and implementer of the China policy of the RSFSR and then the Russian Federation. This is possible today because of the existence of a Chinese archive of collected materials from Russian archives that are unfortunately still largely closed to Western scholars. The Chinese archive, collected by Chinese historian Shen Zhihua, has a rich collection of documents from the Russian state archives that sheds important new light on Russian foreign policy towards China under Kozyrev that has not been used by any Western scholar to date. The importance of this information to understanding Russian foreign policy is difficult to overestimate. Because the Foreign Ministry of the RSFSR was not the successor of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, but was in fact a separate entity, Russian foreign policy towards China was formulated and executed based on its own terms without the internal impact of a previously existing



bureaucracy when it was infused with Soviet personnel in December 1991, it had already been conducting an independent China policy for over a year. It actually began the process described by Shearman and Sussex that impacted Kozyrev's successors as foreign minister, and actually laid the foundations of subsequent Russian foreign policy.<sup>117</sup>

The availability of Russo-Chinese materials from Russian archives at Shen Zhihua's archive at East China Normal University may provide additional insights into the conduct of the new liberal Russia's relations with the "Communist giant" along its eastern border. This will enable scholars to examine to what extent Russian diplomacy under Kozyrev were conditioned by a liberal ideational outlook.

***Case Study Number 2: The Use of Western Institutions to Defend the Rights of Russian Speakers in Estonia:***

There is no greater case that can be made for Kozyrev as an institutionalist than one based on his policy on defending the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in the former Union Republics of the USSR. When the Soviet Union was dissolved, 25 million ethnic Russians found themselves as minorities in fourteen new countries, that now bordered the new Russian Federation.<sup>118</sup> Andrei Kozyrev believed that the best way to secure these ethnic Russians' rights was to use international institutions with their norms, legal standards and means of arbitration. In an interview with the Polish journalist, Zdzisław Kaczynski in the Polish journal *Polityka*, conducted on 8 October 1993, Kozyrev explained that the foundation of his policy towards the Baltics and the other states in the CIS, was to embrace Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) norms and practices and to encourage other states do so as

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<sup>117</sup> Peter Shearman and Matthew Sussex, "Foreign Policy-making and Institutions," in Neil Robinson, *Institutions and Political Change in Russia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), p. 154.

<sup>118</sup> Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky, *New Nations Rising: The Fall of the Soviets and the Challenge of Independence* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1993),

well.<sup>119</sup> This was an essential element of liberal Russian foreign policy.<sup>120</sup> However, there is controversy even in this. Some scholars claimed that Russian foreign policy, even under Kozyrev, pursued a traditional power-based foreign policy towards the Near Abroad that was actually indistinguishable from the policies pursued by Tsarist and Soviet Russia.<sup>121</sup>

This issue has been understudied in current scholarship but is essential to understanding Russian foreign policy at that time. The OSCE archive in Prague has the most comprehensive holdings on this topic in the world, and while there I was able to read the full correspondence of the CSCE/OSCE Mission Offices in Latvia and Estonia, with the other departments within the OCSE. Though the OSCE has posted a number of important documents on their website, the ability to use their archival holdings was essential to examine this issue in a comprehensive manner to see how the CSCE operated at the local, the state and the international levels. This was a great opportunity because to my knowledge, no other scholar has examined this issue utilizing the potentially rich archival holdings at the OSCE.

### ***Case Study Number Three: Russian Foreign Policy Towards Japan: June 1990-January 1996:***

After these two case studies have been explored, this dissertation will then return to the study's fulcrum: Russo-Japanese relations, ascertaining whether the other two case studies shed any additional light as to why Kozyrev's Japan policy failed. Though the extensively researched,

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<sup>119</sup> He stated: Russia's role is to *establish civilized CSCE principles in the post-Soviet territory, because this fully conforms to our interests.*" Zdzislaw Raczynski, Andrei Kozyrev, "Kozyrev on Ties with Eastern Europe, Baltics" [Interview with Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev by Zdzislaw Raczynski], "We do not want to alter geography," *Polityka*, 8 September 1993, translated from the Polish by the Foreign Broadcast and Information Service, FBIS-SOV-93-172.

<sup>120</sup> Glenn Chafetz, "The Struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia," *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 111, Number 4, 1996-97, p. 675. This view corresponds nicely with Martin Wight's views of Rationalism and diplomacy. See Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*.

<sup>121</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 815,

well-documented studies of the Japanese scholar Hiroshi Kimura and Japanese-American scholar Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, with their strong foundations in both Japanese and Soviet/Russian sources, and interviews conducted with both Japanese and Russian participants in the diplomatic relations, are unlikely to be replaced. These two studies make it abundantly clear that Andrei Kozyrev was not able to manage Yeltsin in the conduct of Russo-Japanese relations. Due to Kozyrev's successful management of Yeltsin in relation to the other two case studies, however, it is possible that additional insights can be gained by putting the thorny question of Russo-Japanese relations within the context of other contemporary diplomatic issues. Additionally, both Shen Zhihua's archive and the National Security Archive contain previously unreleased documents from the Russian state archives on Soviet/Russo-Japanese relations. These newly accessible documents may provide additional insight into the difficult parameters of the Russo-Japanese relationship.

These case studies are unique in the sense that they deal with Russian foreign policy towards two Asian states, and one of the new states that had been a constituent Soviet Federative Socialist Republic of the USSR. For the most part, these regions have not received much attention in Western scholarship, but they are exceptionally important. First of all, Kozyrev was criticized, by both Western and Russian critics, of being almost exclusively focused on the United States and Europe. These case studies show that this criticism is unwarranted, and may actually reflect the biases of Western and Russian scholarship more than the reflect Kozyrev's actual priorities. For the most part these examples have not played a large role in the development of the scholarly consensus on Kozyrev's foreign policy, possibly because these issues are seen as peripheral to Western scholars. Anyone familiar with the historical trends in Russian foreign policy would see Russia's role in Asia and Russia's role in the Near Abroad as

central to Russian historical identity in the conduct of foreign policy. This was as true of Kozyrev's period as foreign minister as they were before and after this time.

### **Selection of Independent Variables for the Case Studies**

Based on existing scholarship of Kozyrev in general, each of the case studies will examine the following five independent variables:

1. **Continuity:** 1) Was the policy a continuation of, or a radical departure from previous Soviet policy? 2) Was the policy continued by Kozyrev's successors?
2. **Consistency:** How consistent was the policy? Did it remain consistent, or did it become more realist-oriented over time due to either domestic opposition, or lack of a positive response from the other side?
3. **Opposition from the Supreme Soviet and/or State Duma:** Was the policy supported or opposed by majority in the newly enfranchised democratic legislative institutions?
4. **Opposition from the Russian Military:** Was the policy supported or opposed by elements of the Russian military?
5. **Foreign influence:** Were foreign governments able to influence Russian foreign policy in the case of this particular policy?

Once these five variables have been examined, we can return to examining, the dependent variable, **The Yeltsin Factor:** How did Kozyrev contain Yeltsin's interventions that differed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' previously agreed upon policy? By examining these five independent variables, a framework will be constructed that will be used to analyze Kozyrev's management of Russian foreign policy. This approach is informed by the work of Alexander

George's method of "structured focused comparison."<sup>122</sup> As Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba characterized this process:

Case studies are essential for description, and are, therefore, fundamental to social science. It is impossible to seek to explain what we have not described with a reasonable degree of precision.<sup>123</sup>

In describing George's work, King, Keohane and Verba wrote: "George and his collaborators stress the need for a systematic collection of the same information—the same variables—across carefully selected units."<sup>124</sup> This study will collect data on the five variables described above, and how they impacted each of the three case studies to arrive at a better understanding of Andrei Kozyrev's foreign policy.

Did these factors, which clearly constrained Russo-Japanese relations, impact the other policy areas? How was Kozyrev able to contain Yeltsin's interventions in the case of his policies towards China and Estonia, yet not able to do so in relation to his policy towards Japan? Using a simple framework based on these five variables that have been identified in existing scholarship on Russo-Japanese relations under Kozyrev's administration, this study will examine the diplomatic correspondence, written statements, and joint statements, produced by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its interlocutors during this period, on each of the three foreign policy issues. Once this is accomplished, an attempt will be made to draw broad

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<sup>122</sup> For Alexander George's approach, see Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision-Making," in Robert C. Colam and Richard A. Smith (eds.), *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, Volume 2*, (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1985), pp. 21-58; Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison" in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.), *Diplomacy: New Approaches in Theory, History and Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 3-68; and Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Studies, 1991). I am indebted to UVA Politics Department graduate Kenneth Joshua Cheatham for pointing out to me the value of George's work in this area.

<sup>123</sup> Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 44.

<sup>124</sup> King, Keohane and Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, p. 45.

conclusions on Russian foreign policy under Kozyrev. The initial research question was “Which of these five variables contributed to the success and/or failure of Russian foreign policy during this early period, 1990-1996?” This comparison will be shown graphically (see table below).

	China	Estonia	Japan
Continuity	yes/no/indeterminate	yes/no/indeterminate	yes/no/indeterminate
Consistency	yes/no/indeterminate	yes/no/indeterminate	yes/no/indeterminate
Opposition from Supreme Soviet	yes/no/indeterminate	yes/no/indeterminate	yes/no/indeterminate
Opposition from Russian Military	yes/no/indeterminate	yes/no/indeterminate	yes/no/indeterminate
Foreign Influence	yes/no/indeterminate	yes/no/indeterminate	yes/no/indeterminate
Managing Yeltsin	yes/no/indeterminate	yes/no/indeterminate	yes/no/indeterminate

However, the historical nature of the case studies, we will also enable us to examine a number of other important issues as well. Additionally, this study will address a number of sub-questions which will help address questions that remain concerning the conduct of Russian diplomacy during Kozyrev’s tenure. As data was collected for each case study, information was collected that could help answer the following additional questions:

1. How was foreign policy “made” during Kozyrev’s tenure as foreign minister?
2. Did foreign policy under Kozyrev proceed from an exclusively Westernist or Liberal policy orientation?
3. Did Russian foreign policy decision-making conform to Western institutionalist or democratic orientations?
4. How would Kozyrev’s foreign policy preferences best be described?.
5. Was his foreign policy successful? If it was continued by his successors, it can be understood as successful

Due to the political nature of the existing descriptions of the 1990s it is very difficult to answer these questions based on models or on theory. These questions can only be answered through a structured, chronologically organized, historical study, now made possible by recently available archival materials from Moscow and the OSCE.

In each case study, the issue will be examined chronologically, based on existing diplomatic correspondence, examining how Kozyrev formulated, executed and implemented his preferred policies. The historical approach to this question follows similar methodologies used by two prominent historians who studied another historically controversial figure. Dumas Malone in his monumental biography of Thomas Jefferson, and Robert A. Caro, in his biography of Lyndon Johnson, used a historical method to detail the evolution in thought and policies of their subjects. Malone wrote that Jefferson lost "... none of his fascination but he does lose much of his elusiveness, when one follows him through life the way he himself went through it, that is, chronologically."<sup>125</sup> Robert A. Caro cited this quote in describing his approach to former US President Lyndon Johnson.<sup>126</sup> By approaching these issues chronologically one can test the views of scholars such as Jack Snyder that Kozyrev became more realist in orientation as time went on, due to both external and internal factors, or refute or verify Stephen Sestanovich's claim "That there ha[d] always been two Kozyrevs."

As these issues are examined, careful note will be made in relation to the role of other bureaucratic institutions, such as the Supreme Soviet, the Russian military, and the regional governments to see what role they played in the policy process. In this way, a new analytic

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<sup>125</sup> Dumas Malone, *Jefferson and his Time, Volume I* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1948). p. xi.

<sup>126</sup> Robert A. Caro, *The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982), p. xix.

framework will be constructed that should make sense of the difficult foreign policy conditions under which Yeltsin and Kozyrev had to work.

As these issues are compared, an attempt will also be made to identify the particular policies in terms of standard and newer theoretical descriptions, such as realism and liberal institutionalism, based largely on the categories first formulated by British scholar Martin Wight. Wight's theories provided a foundation for what is called the English School (ES) in international relations scholarship.<sup>127</sup> Its approach actually has great explanatory power, and enable the analyst to form a deeper and more accurate description of Kozyrev's foreign policy. As Barry Buzan argued, the ES:

...agrees with [Alexander] Wendt in admitting the possibility of friends [in an anarchic system] and adding belief to then logics of coercion and calculation. It also gives *raison de system* equal billing alongside *raison d'etat* ... And because it emphasizes shared values as the basis of primary institutions, the ES shares ground with the constructivist and post-structuralist interest in identity ... The ES approach puts into systematic form the general proposition that there is not just one logic of anarchy, as realism suggests, but many.<sup>128</sup>

Alexander Wendt claimed in his *Social Theory of International Politics* that approaching constitutive questions through based on historical studies has great explanatory power. He argued:

Showing through historical or conceptual analysis that social kinds like sovereignty or the state can take different forms may open up desirable political possibilities that would otherwise be closed. For both reasons the bias of mainstream social science against "mere" description is unfortunate. Recognizing the distinctiveness and significance of constitutive questions will make for better all-round social science.<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>127</sup> Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966); Martin Wight, *International Theory: the Three Traditions* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1992).

<sup>128</sup> Barry Buzan, "The English School: A neglected approach to International Security Studies," *Security Dialogue*, Volume 46 (2), 2015, p. 129.

<sup>129</sup> Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 87. It should also be pointed out that Charles Darwin did not develop his theory of evolution of species based upon natural selection until after he had spent decades cataloguing the differences in flora and fauna.



## **The Chosen Case Studies and International Relations Theory**

Due to the historically-based foundation of the model, these case studies can also be used to address the current dissonance in the available political science and historical literature on Kozyrev's foreign policy. This study will use historical analysis to examine constitutive questions on how best to describe Russian foreign policy as it was conceived, formulated and executed by Andrei Kozyrev. In these three policy areas did Kozyrev proceed from Westernist, liberal and institutional ideas or were they better described as proceeding from a realist framework? The results of this examination will address the discrepancies in how Kozyrev has been described in the existing scholarly literature. Once Kozyrev's basic policy orientation is determined, this work will then address the strengths and weaknesses of the current realist-liberal/institutionalist categories of political science literature to accurately describe Kozyrev as a diplomat. It will then use Martin Wight's three traditions of international relations theory to describe Kozyrev's foreign policy in theoretical terms. This description, and subsequent taxonomy of his foreign policy, will enable the development of a more reasonable approach to his foreign policy than current theoretical categories allow.

An accurate characterization of Kozyrev as a realist, an institutionalist, a liberal, or a combination of these is possible only through historical analysis. British political scientist and historian Martin Wight believed that "... the quality of international politics, the preoccupations of diplomacy, are embodied and communicated less in works of political and international theory than in historical writings."<sup>130</sup> This work thus seeks to present a descriptive study on Kozyrev's foreign policy, which will be based on a new analytical approach to describing a state's foreign policy behavior. This study will focus on what Kenneth Waltz called the "second image:

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<sup>130</sup> Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966), p. 32, cited by Hedley Bull, "Martin Wight and the theory of international relations (1976)," in Martin Wight, *International Theory: the Three Traditions* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1992), p. xxi.

international conflict and the internal structure of states,” by focusing on the foreign policy of the Russian Federation, but it will also show how this “second image” was impacted by what Waltz called the “third image: international conflict and international anarchy.”<sup>131</sup>

### **International Relations Theory and Andrei Kozyrev**

We can thus see that while International Relations (IR) theoretical approaches to Kozyrev can have great explanatory value as tools, they also have their limitations: IR theory is at best an imprecise science. None of the major proponents of the American international relations theories of realism or liberalism predicted the impending collapse of the USSR in 1991, though realism was the primary school that was criticized and amended in the post-Cold War era.<sup>132</sup> Political scientist Charles E. Ziegler noted: “I suggest that the underlying premises of American foreign policy, *based on the realist school of international relations*, hindered timely recognition of the revolutionary changes that were taking place in both Soviet foreign and domestic policies.”<sup>133</sup> In the post-Cold War period, several students of international relations began combining realist and other theories to offset what some scholars identified as deficiencies

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<sup>131</sup> For Waltz’s descriptions of these “images,” see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War, with a new preface* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), pp. 80-158, 159-223.

<sup>132</sup> The noted Cold War diplomatic historian and Kennan biographer, John Lewis Gaddis made this point stridently, and in my opinion with great validity in John Lewis Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” *International Security*, Volume 17, No. 3 (Winter 1992/93), pp. pp. 5-58. Diplomatic historians have tended to view international relations theory with skepticism. See for example, Paul Schroeder, “Historical Reality vs. Neo-realist Theory,” *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 108-148.

<sup>133</sup> Charles E. Ziegler, *Foreign Policy and East Asia: Learning and Adaptation in the Gorbachev Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 2, emphasis added.

within realism.<sup>134</sup> This body of scholarship sought to address the failure of international relations theory to predict the end of the Cold War,<sup>135</sup> and attempted to “enhance” traditional realist frameworks by adding aspects of other theoretical approaches, a trend that was criticized by political scientists Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik in 1999. They wrote that this new “realist light” scholarship demonstrated that “... the realist paradigm is degenerating. Its conceptual foundations are being stretched beyond all recognition or utility.”<sup>136</sup> Despite this valid criticism, these categories are still widely used by political scientists to describe and make sense of the world.<sup>137</sup> A recent edition of the Council on Foreign Relations-produced journal *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2018, entitled “Which World are We Living in?” begins with a chapter written by Stephen Kotkin entitled “The Realist World: The Players Change but the Game Remains,” and another article written by Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry entitled

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<sup>134</sup> See in particular, John Vasquez, “The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative vs. Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz’s Balancing Proposition,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 889-912. See also Waltz’s response to criticism of his theory as it applied to end of the Cold War, in Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” *International Security*, Volume 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 5-41.

<sup>135</sup> This scholarship was quite extensive, but representational examples include: Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help,” *International Security*, Volume 19, Number 3, Winter 1994/95, pp. 50-90; Charles L. Glaser, “The Security Dilemma Revisited,” *World Politics*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997); Andrew Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other,” *Security Studies*, September 1997, Vol. 7, Issue 1, pp. 114-155; Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Joseph Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” in David A. Baldwin (ed.), *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1993).

<sup>136</sup> Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist,” *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999), p. 53. Legro and Moravcsik, while admitting that recent work that combined realist theory and other approaches, did in fact “... make innovative and valuable contributions to scholarly understanding of world politics ... [and that] ... They belong among the most fruitful advances in recent international relations scholarship. [But that] The concept of “realism” has thus been stretched to include assumptions and causal mechanisms within alternative paradigms, albeit with no effort to reconcile the resulting contradictions.” (pp. 45, 7).

<sup>137</sup> Martin Wight, *International Relations Theory: The Three Traditions*, pp. 266-267.

“The Liberal World: The Resilient Order.”<sup>138</sup> This shows that the binary realist-liberal approach still holds tremendous sway in political science literature on international relations.

### **Dueling Realists: Kissinger vs. Kennan on NATO Expansion**

A good example of fragmentation within the realist paradigm is the strong disagreement between two leading realists on the question of NATO expansion in the immediate post-Cold war era. Henry Kissinger, one of the most prominent realists in the American academic community, who also worked as a policy-maker, both as National Security Adviser and Secretary of State under Presidents Nixon and Ford, argued in his exhaustive work *Diplomacy*, published in 1994, in traditional realist fashion, that in relation to Russia’s policy in the Near Abroad, there was little that separated foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev from his Soviet—or even his Tsarist—predecessors. Kissinger wrote:

A realistic policy would recognize that even the reformist Russian government of Boris Yeltsin has maintained Russian armies on the territory of most of the former Soviet republics—all members of the United Nations—often against the express wish of the host government ... *The foreign minister of Russia [Kozyrev] has repeatedly put forward a concept of a Russian monopoly of peacekeeping in the “near abroad,” indistinguishable from an attempt to re-establish Moscow’s domination.*<sup>139</sup>

It is interesting to note that Kissinger was as early as 1994 identifying Kozyrev as a statesman who based his foreign policy on realist, geopolitical concerns, a perspective that was not shared

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<sup>138</sup> Stephen Kotkin, “The Realist World: The Players Change but the Game Remains,” and Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry entitled “The Liberal World: The Resilient Order.” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2018 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations).

<sup>139</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 815, emphasis added.

by most political scientists at that time.<sup>140</sup> However, while accurate up to a point, this view fails to acknowledge that Kozyrev's statements on Russia's peacekeeping policies in the Near Abroad were in fact qualified, that he frequently stated that these policies must be conducted within the purview of international organizations, such as the CSCE, the Congress of Europe and the European Union, and that the eventual goal of these policies was actually to result in the Russians gradually disengaging from these conflicts, as has certainly occurred in relation to Estonian treatment of its Russian-speaking minority.<sup>141</sup>

Kissinger's realist orientation led him to view Kozyrev's policies as a mere continuation of traditional Russian foreign policy principles that had been articulated by Russia's Tsarist or

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<sup>140</sup> Kozyrev made clear reference to Russia's privileged need to police the "near abroad" in his manifesto to the West, "Russia: A Chance for Survival," *Foreign Affairs*, 71:2 (Spring 1992), pp. 1-16. However, the article makes it very clear that the new Russian state saw these issues in a much different way than its Soviet—and Imperial Russian, predecessors. This same apparent dichotomy can be seen in Boris Pyadyshev and Andrei Kozyrev, "Russian Diplomacy Reborn," *International Affairs*, No. 3, March 1991 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1991). It is interesting to compare Kissinger's realist characterization of Kozyrev with that of Jack Snyder's institutionalist characterization of him in "Democracy, War, and Nationalism in the Post-Communist States," in Celeste A. Wallander (ed.), *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 21-40; Astrid S. Tuminez's article in this same volume "Nationalism and Interest in Russian Foreign Policy, showed a better understanding of the Russian position here: "Russian leaders have recently articulated priorities that favor Russian regional hegemony ... In February and March 1993, Yeltsin and the Russian ambassador to the UN referred to Russia's "special responsibility" in the FSU [former Soviet Union] and asked the UN to grant Russia special powers for peacekeeping in the region." She also noted that "Kozyrev noted as well that UN and OSCE participation would be welcome, but that the tone of his statement connotes a new Russian assertiveness on issues in the "near abroad." (Tuminez, pp. 59, 67).

<sup>141</sup> For an excellent contemporary overview of Russian foreign policy that describes Russia's liberal foreign policy towards the Near Abroad, see Bruce D. Porter, "Russia and Europe after the Cold War: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policies," in Celeste A. Wallander (ed.), *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996). Porter noted: "There was only one issue on which a harder line continued to prevail—that of Russia's relations with the near abroad. The Russian leadership made clear its commitment to an economic—and partially political—reintegration of the former Soviet states and pressed for strengthened economic and political ties within the CIS ... But even here the Russian leadership attempted to address Western concerns by insisting that any reintegration of the Russian empire would take place only voluntarily and primarily on the basis of an economic union of some kind." (p.140).

Communist leaders such as Alexander I or Joseph Stalin.<sup>142</sup> Kissinger saw this drive as endemic to Russian foreign policy, regardless of type of government that directed the Russian state, which is consistent with a traditional realist perspective:

The Soviet army no longer exists, and the Russian army stands hundreds of miles to the east. For the immediate future, Russia's domestic turmoil renders an attack on Western Europe improbable. At the same time, Russian tendencies to re-establish the former empire have reawakened historic fears of Russian expansionism, especially in the former satellite states of Eastern Europe.<sup>143</sup>

Kissinger saw the debates between those who favored NATO expansion and those who opposed it in terms of what he identified as the perennial debate in IR theory between the “realist” views of Cardinal Richelieu and the “utopian” liberal ideals of Woodrow Wilson: “Intellectually, the dispute repeats the conflict between the concepts of Richelieu and the ideas of Woodrow Wilson—between foreign policy as a balancing of interests and diplomacy as an

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<sup>142</sup> One of the best short surveys of Tsarist and Soviet foreign policies remains Barbara Jelavich, *St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy, 1814-1974* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1993). An excellent recent article on the continuity in Imperial Russian, Soviet and Russian Federation foreign policy is Alfred J. Rieber, “How Persistent are Persistent Factors?” in Robert Legvold (ed.), *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*; See also the excellent article by Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen, “Past and Future Meet: Aleksandr Gorchakov and Russian Foreign Policy,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 54, No. 3, 2002, 377–396. The foreign policy of Tsar Alexander I is judiciously and comprehensively described in Alan Palmer, *Alexander I: Tsar of War and Peace* (London: Phoenix Giant Paperback, 1997). This book was first published by Weidenfeld and Nicholson in 1974. For Soviet foreign policy, the best overview may still be Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-67* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968).

<sup>143</sup> Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 820-821. This view strongly conformed to the view of Hans Morgenthau, who wrote: “It is a characteristic aspect of all politics, domestic as well as international, that frequently its basic manifestations do not appear as they actually are—manifestations of a struggle for power ... that is to say: the true nature of policy is concealed by ideological justifications and rationalizations.” Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Sixth Edition)*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 101. Kennan, in contrast, argued that the essential difference between the US and the USSR was ideological.

affirmation of an underlying harmony.”<sup>144</sup> Based on Russia’s traditional views on the near abroad, Kissinger strongly supported the expansion of NATO.

Interestingly, George F. Kennan, another leading realist thinker, who like Kissinger had also been a policy maker, but unlike Kissinger had deep governmental—and deeply personal—experience in Russian and Soviet affairs, was a staunch opponent of NATO expansion, and he warned that NATO expansion would, if implemented as policy, be a “fateful error.” On 5 February 1997, Kennan wrote:

And perhaps it is not too late to advance a view that, I believe is not only mine alone but is shared by a number of others with extensive and in most instances more recent experience in Russian matters. The view, bluntly stated, is that expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post cold-war era.

Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.<sup>145</sup>

How could two such recognized and prominent realists have such radically divergent views on the best way to deal with a post-Communist Russia and the question of NATO expansion?

Realism as a theoretical paradigm, in fact, cannot resolve internal inconsistencies within itself.

British historian and political theorist Martin Wight constructed a more nuanced theory that could

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<sup>144</sup> Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 822. This also strongly conforms to principles articulated by Hans Morgenthau: “The history of modern political thought is the story of a contest between two schools that differ fundamentally in their conceptions of the nature of man, society, and politics. One believes that a rational and moral political order, derived from universally valid abstract principles ... the other school believed that the world, imperfect as it is from the rationale point of view, is the result of focus inherent in human nature ... This being inherently a world of opposing interests and of conflict among them, moral principles can never be fully realized, but must at best be approximated through the ever temporary balancing of interests and the ever precarious settlement of conflicts ... It appeals of historic precedent rather than to abstract principles, which have been frequently misunderstood.” Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, pp. 3-4.

<sup>145</sup> George F. Kennan, “A Fateful Error,” *The New York Times*, 5 February 1997. Kennan noted that “Russians are little impressed with American assurances that it reflects no hostile intentions. They would see their prestige (always uppermost in the Russian mind) and their security interests as adversely affected.” Wight would have considered this sensitivity to the likely Russian response as a classic application of rationalist thinking.

provide a possible way out of this problem.<sup>146</sup> Wight had always been critical of E.H. Carr's and Hans Morgenthau's binary approach to International Relations theory, and developed a middle point between the Machiavelli/Richelieu paradigm and the Kant/Wilson paradigm, offering a third category, based largely upon the ideas and conduct of Marcus Grotius, which he called Rationalism.<sup>147</sup> In *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, which is based on Wight's lecture notes, Wight stated:

In this course of lectures ... I have had only two conscious aims. One has been to show that the two-schools analysis of international theory is not adequate. It was in fact the reflection of a diseased situation. The diseased situation in Britain in the 1930s inspired E.H. Carr to write. Another diseased situation in the United States during convalescence from isolationism inspired Kennan and Morgenthau to write.

... my second aim has been to try to bear to Tocqueville's point which I made at the outset that there is very little, if anything, new in political theory, that the great moral debates of the past are in essence our debates.<sup>148</sup>

Political scientists Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik agreed with Wight in criticizing the traditional American binary approach to international relations theory, characterized as a struggle between realists and idealists:

Whether this dichotomy was a useful guide fifty years ago remains an open question. Its unsuitability today should be obvious to all. These two categories are too vague, too broad, too open-ended, too normative, and too dismissive to contemporary nonrealist theory to be of much use as a guide to social scientific theory and research.<sup>149</sup>

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<sup>146</sup> See Robert Jackson, "Martin Wight's Thought on Diplomacy," *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Volume 13, No. 4 (December 2002), pp. 1-28 and Ian Hall, *The International Thought of Martin Wight* (London: Palgrave/MacMillan: 2006).

<sup>147</sup> Martin Wight, *International Theory: the Three Traditions* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1992), p. 128. As a devout Anglican, Wight was well aware of this phrase as a description of Anglicanism, as summarized by Dr. Winfield Bevins, in his *Treatise on the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, Richard Hooker (1544-1600) argued that Anglicanism retains the best of Roman Catholicism (liturgy and tradition) and Protestantism (authority of scripture and justification). Theologian Alister McGrath argued that Anglicanism at its best avoids both fundamentalism and liberalism, the first of which restricts culture, and the latter of which adopts too much culture." Winfield Bevins, "Whatever Happened to the Anglican Via Media?" Anglican Pastor blog, 30 January 2018, <http://anglicanpastor.com/whatever-happened-to-the-anglican-via-media/> accessed 31 May 2018.

<sup>148</sup> Martin Wight, *International Theory: the Three Traditions*, p. 267, 268.

<sup>149</sup> Legro and Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist," p. 54.



Wight saw the inability of the two rival schools to serve as adequate explanatory tools to analyze state behavior as early as the 1950s. Though Wight's third category, Rationalism, was based primarily on the thought of Hugo Grotius, it also owed its origins, at least in part, to Wight's reading of George F. Kennan. Wight identified both Kennan and Hans Morgenthau as realists who were actually closer to the Wilsonian spectrum than most "realist" political scientists would allow, due to their adoption of several principles which essentially aimed to make an effort to understand the national interests of other countries. Wight wrote: "There is an infinite series of gradations [between Realism and Liberalism], and it may be true to say that the majority of statesmen who posterity remembers and finds worth arguing about lie between the extremes. They represent self-interest with varying degrees of consideration for the interests of other powers."<sup>150</sup> This is an almost perfect description of Kozyrev's actual approach to foreign policy.

Wight argues that "... not only ascertaining the other nation's interests but respect for them ... [is] not only an intellectual but a moral task. Morgenthau, like Kennan, has one foot planted to Rationalist territory."<sup>151</sup> This concern for another nation's national interests was at the heart of Kennan's opposition to NATO expansion. As he related to Thomas Friedman, a journalist for *The New York Times*:

What bothers me is how superficial and ill informed the whole Senate debate was ... I was particularly bothered by the references to Russia as a country dying to attack Western Europe. Don't people understand? Our differences in the cold war were with the

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<sup>150</sup> Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, p. 125. To defend his point here, he cited Hans Morgenthau, who in his *In Defense of the National Interest*, had written: "The task of ascertaining what one's own nation needs and wants in order to be secure, and what the other nation needs and wants in order to be secure, and whether there is inescapable conflict or the possibility of accommodation between these needs and wants — this task is an intellectual one, the highest of those constructive tasks which the Hamiltons, the Pitts, the Cannings, the Disraelis, and the Churchills face and solve, and whose existence is ignored by the amateurs." Morgenthau, *In Defense of the National Interest* (New York: Knopf, 1951), p. 149.

<sup>151</sup> Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, pp. 125-126.

Soviet Communist regime. And now we are turning our backs on the very people who mounted the greatest bloodless revolution in history to remove that Soviet regime.<sup>152</sup>

Incidentally, in criticizing Kozyrev's foreign policy, Migranyan seized upon the last point made here by Kennan: "And so, Russia's reward for destroying the totalitarian Soviet empire is not a return to civilization as a respected and equal partner, but the isolation and serious weakening of the country."<sup>153</sup> Kennan knew how this policy would be perceived by Russians of all political complexions and made efforts to inform members of the American government at that time how this policy would adversely impact US-Russian relations.

The differences between the realists Kissinger and Kennan on the question of NATO expansion are clearly a result of the fact that Kennan based his views on the likely reaction of the Russian side to NATO expansion, while Kissinger dismissed the probable Russian response. As Wight wrote in relation to Kennan: "The journey from Realism to Rationalism can be seen by a critical consideration of George Kennan. He made the realistic and skeptical assertion that one is really only capable of knowing one's own national interest ... However, in *Realities of American Foreign Policy* he says, 'I do not wish ever to see the conduct of this nation in ... its foreign

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<sup>152</sup> George F. Kennan quoted in Thomas L. Friedman, "Foreign Affairs; Now a Word From X," *New York Times*, 2 May 1988. For a fuller discussion on Kennan's opposition to NATO expansion, see John Lewis Gaddis, *George F. Kennan: An American Life* (New York: Penguin Books, 2011), pp. 680-681. Gaddis shows that Kennan's opposition to NATO expansion actually rattled Clinton's confidence in this policy. According to Gaddis, Strobe Talbott assured Clinton that: "The Russians will go along with expansion, whatever he [Kennan] thought." p. 681. History has shown that Kennan was actually right and Talbott was wrong in their assessments of how the Russians would respond to this policy.

<sup>153</sup> Andranik Migranyan, "Russia's Foreign Policy; Disastrous Results of Three Years: It's Time to Pause, and Change both Policy and Minister," p. 16. This clearly upset both Yeltsin and Kozyrev, and indeed most Russian statesmen associated with the reformist, liberal wing of the Russian government at this time, as can be shown clearly in Strobe Talbott's complaints of Kozyrev from both his memoirs and the recently released classified documents he wrote to his superiors!

relations animated by anything else than decency, generosity, moderation, and consideration for others.’”<sup>154</sup> Wight’s description of Kennan as Rationalist is worthy quoting at length:

Kennan stands out in the public life of the West as a foreign policy publicist who was most scrupulous and respectful in considering the interests of Russia. He tried to see each situation through Soviet eyes, condemning and discarding elements of doctrinal imperialism, and isolating and emphasizing a core of Soviet national interest which he urged the United States to respect.<sup>155</sup>

By placing a new category between realism and utopianism/liberalism, rationalism, Wight provided an approach to international theory that had greater explanatory power.

In short, IR theory has traditionally lacked an explanatory mechanism that can adequately describe the foreign policy orientation and activity of most of its practitioners historically. This has not changed since the 1950s. Indeed, the Manichean dualism that characterizes American political science scholarship between realism and liberalism/utopianism problematizes an explanatory overarching approach to other historical figures as well. For example, Kissinger characterized Woodrow Wilson’s approach to world affairs as follows:

For Wilson, the justification of America’s international role was messianic: America had an obligation, not to the balance of power, but to spread its principles throughout the world ... These principles held that peace depends on the spread of democracy, that states should be judged by the same ethical criteria as individuals, and that the national interest consists of adhering to a universal system of law.<sup>156</sup>

This characterization is certainly true and accurate with regard to Wilson’s overall approach to world politics, and corresponds well with Wight’s Kantian (or Revolutionary) paradigm, but it

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<sup>154</sup> Martin Wight, *International Theory: the Three Traditions*, p. 120. He is quoting Kennan from his *Realities of American Foreign Policy* (London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 61.

<sup>155</sup> Martin Wight, *International Theory: the Three Traditions*, p. 120. Wight argues that “Kennan is really a Rationalist because he maintains that national interest should be guided by justice: he advocates non-interventionist policy against the Soviet Union, and he argues that war is the breakdown of policy.” p. 267.

<sup>156</sup> Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 30.

cannot easily account for Wilson's views on naval expansion.<sup>157</sup> As Wilson was crossing the United States by train to build support for US membership in the League of Nations, he was also advocating the construction of a navy that would be second-to-none in the world, surpassing even the Royal Navy of Great Britain, and was serious enough about this that his biographer August Heckscher wrote that it "... caused considerable alarm in British government circles."<sup>158</sup> According to historian David Kaiser, who spent many years teaching at the US Naval War College: "In the latter stages of the First World War, President Wilson had decided that the United States should have the world's largest Navy so as to be able to enforce its beneficent principles on more selfish states, including Britain, and had authorized the construction of forty-eight battleships, one for every state."<sup>159</sup> This would seem more consistent with the figure Kissinger used as a counter-poise to Wilson, Theodore Roosevelt.

Reinhold Niebuhr's explanation of apparent dichotomies such as this is typically cynical: "The nations which pretended to fight against the principle of militarism have increased their military power, and the momentary peace which their power maintains is certain to be destroyed by the resentments which their power creates."<sup>160</sup> Woodrow Wilson, the man, actually had very *non-*

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<sup>157</sup> For other studies that have noted the difficulty in using simple approaches to Wilson's foreign policy, see John Kane, "Democracy and World Peace: The Kantian Dilemma of United States Foreign Policy," *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, June 2012, Vol. 66 Issue 3, pp. 292-312; and Kristofer Allfeldt, "Wilsonian Pragmatism? Woodrow Wilson, Japanese Immigration, and the Paris Peace Conference," *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, September 2004, Vol. 15 Issue 3, pp. 545-572.

<sup>158</sup> August Heckscher, *Woodrow Wilson: A Biography* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1991), p. 378. According to Heckscher, Wilson's plans for massive naval expansion "... embodied in the naval appropriations bill of 1916, included a five-year plan of major construction of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines." p. 378.

<sup>159</sup> David Kaiser, *No End Save Victory: How FDR Led the Nation into War*, (New York: Basic Books, 2014), p. 36. According to Kaiser, these ambitious naval construction plans were abandoned by the Harding Administration. These plans would later be partly revised by Wilson's former Under-Secretary of the Navy, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, in an effort to build a navy that could hold its own against the possible combined navies of Japan, Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain. Kaiser, op. cit., pp. 19-56.

<sup>160</sup> Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, p. 232. This Wilsonian paradox may have contributed to the formation of this aspect of Niebuhr's thought.

*Wilsonian* views on his international environment. In discussing the idea of “divide and rule,” which is sometimes labelled as Machiavellian, Martin Wight argued that the real Machiavelli held more sophisticated views, noting: “Here we have a good illustration of how far Machiavelli was from cheap Machiavellianism, and how his recommendations are more penetrating. and one jump ahead of his self-appointed disciples.”<sup>161</sup> This can also be said of U.S. President and historian, Woodrow Wilson, the simultaneous proponent of both the League of Nations, which had a clear Kantian basis, and naval expansion, which had a clear basis in the thought and practice of Cardinal Richelieu.

Wight’s second solution to the problem of international theory is to argue that the three paradigms he described are not polarized opposites, but actually form a spectrum. To Wight, the three categories, Machiavellian, Grotian, and Kantian, are useful in political taxonomy, but they could not define all the views of even their most prominent exemplars. As his former student, Hedley Bull, stated, to Wight “... not even Machiavelli, for example, was in the strict sense a Machiavellian.”<sup>162</sup> In the same way, when it came to naval expansion, Wilson was not in the strict sense a Wilsonian. Thus, even with a third category, international theory cannot be applied in a doctrinaire manner. According to Wight, there are endless taxonomies based on hybrids of the three main streams of thought. Perhaps Adam Roberts best summarized Wight’s thought when he wrote: “... it becomes increasingly apparent that the three traditions should be seen, not as pigeon-holes or labels, but rather as strands, or primary colours, which are intermixed in endless different ways by different practitioners and writers.”<sup>163</sup>

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<sup>161</sup> Martin Wight, *International Theory: the Three Traditions*, (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1992), p. 151.

<sup>162</sup> Hedley Bull, “Martin Wight and the theory of international relations,” in Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1992), p. xiii.

<sup>163</sup> Adam Roberts, “Forward,” in Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1992), p. xxv.

## Wight and Kozyrev

Based on analysis of the three policy areas, it seems that the best overall characterization of Kozyrev's foreign policy in terms of international relations theory is that provided by Peter Shearman and Matthew Sussex in 2000. They argue that while some analysts divided the competing schools of thought in the Russian Federation as a struggle between "Westernizers and Eurasianists," or "Liberals and Slavophiles,"

A more useful distinction can be made between two separate stands of realism: Kozyrev representing a more liberal, soft or accommodating realism compared to the more conservative, hard or assertive realism of his opponents.<sup>164</sup>

A soft—or accommodating—realism as described by Shearman and Sussex squares quite nicely with Wight's Rationalist (or Grotian) construct, and places Kozyrev clearly in the Realist/Rationalist quadrant of Wight's International Theory paradigm. Thus, in explaining Andrei Kozyrev's foreign policy as seen in these three case studies, the most accurate label is not "Western Institutional," or "Realist," or "Liberal," but rather Rationalist, with some blending of this strain with the other two Wightian categories, Realism and Revolutionism, and if forced into a corner, the analyst can describe Kozyrev as a "soft" or "qualified" realist. Actually, using Wight's framework as a tool of analysis, Kozyrev can best be described overall as a Realist with some Rationalist tendencies in relation to China; a Rationalist with Realist tendencies in regards to defending the rights of Russian-speakers in Estonia; and lastly, a Rationalist with some Revolutionist overtones in relation to Japan. The case studies that follow will use Wight's categories to provide a taxonomy of Andrei Kozyrev's foreign policy that challenges existing

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<sup>164</sup> Peter Shearman and Matthew Sussex, "Foreign Policy-making and Institutions," in Neil Robinson, *Institutions and Political Change in Russia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), p. 154. Their characterization of Russian foreign policy thought in the 1990s is actually quite effective because it can more easily account for, and better describe, the fact that even within Yeltsin's government, foreign policy practitioners soon split into what have been identified as "liberals" and "statists," the latter category including such people as Vladimir Lukin and Sergei Stankevich, though in comparison to other players in the political landscape of 1990s Russia, the Statists were quite liberal, and differed from the liberals in actual policy terms only in terms of degree.

political science literature by going beyond binary stereotypes and examine the day-to-day conduct of Russian foreign policy in relation to three policy areas from 1990 to 1996.

It is hoped that this new theoretical framework and historical analysis can provide a more nuanced and accurate description of Kozyrev's foreign policy, and then demonstrate the inadequacy of International Relations Theory's binary approach of realism vs. liberalism, as described by Morgenthau, Carr, and Kissinger, as explanatory tools, because in this case, these binary categories lack real explanatory power and actually hinder and accurate description of the foreign policy of Russian foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev from 1990 to 1996. Due to the importance of the "failure of Russia's liberal experiment" in Russia's current foreign policy narrative, this is unfortunate.

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## **Chapter Two:**

**Andrei Kozyrev the Realist and Successful Pragmatist:**

**Russo-Chinese Relations, 1990-1996**



This first case study, Russian foreign policy towards China, 1990-1996, shows Kozyrev primarily pursuing a realist foreign policy course, as “realism” has been described by Martin Wight, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz among others.<sup>165</sup> If in the case of defending Russians in the Baltic states Kozyrev was guided primarily by Westernist and institutionalist concerns, his diplomacy towards China during the same period demonstrates that he was also quite capable of pursuing policies based on primarily on pragmatic, *realpolitik*, concerns that eschewed ideology. As early as April 1991, while he was still Foreign Minister of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR), Kozyrev was asked what he thought of the upcoming visit of Chinese Premier Jiang Zemin to Moscow. His response is worth quoting in full because it demonstrates a realist orientation that proved to be the true foundation of Russo-Chinese relations during his tenure as foreign minister:

I understand where your question is leading. Some people might see a certain delicate position here. I will explain our approach. *We are dealing in realities. And today's reality is such that the General Secretary of the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] Central Committee is the highest state leader, since the Party and the State are indivisible in China.* That country is our most important partner. I think that the Russian Federation leadership will proceed from precisely this basis. As regards my personal attitude, then

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<sup>165</sup> Martin Wight, *International Theory in Three Traditions* (edited by Gabriele Wight and Brian Potter) (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1992). pp. 15-24, 25-27; Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson), (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), pp. 3-17; Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979).

of course my position is closer to everything that meets international standards of human rights and democratic processes in any country.<sup>166</sup>

This is not the way Kozyrev has traditionally been described in Western academic literature, but the story of Russo-Chinese relations under Kozyrev provides further support for Allen Lynch's argument that: "... Kozyrev had presided over a Russian diplomacy that was far more complex and balanced than his critics were prepared to accept."<sup>167</sup> Similarly, Peter Shearman and Matthew Sussex in their study on Russian foreign policy making and institutions, warn us that:

... one should not exaggerate the extent to which [policy under Kozyrev's successors] diverged in substance from the policy earlier pursued by the MFA when Kozyrev was at the helm ... Primakov's and Ivanov's tenures demonstrate that policy did not alter in its fundamentals *due to the reality of power* and the *continuing institutional interests* of the ministry. <sup>168</sup>

This chapter will argue that under Kozyrev's tenure as Foreign Minister, Russo-Chinese relations were governed by a strict adherence to policies that can only be defined as realist. During this period, Russo-Chinese relations greatly improved, and far from ignoring China, as some scholars have argued, Kozyrev showed China consistent and sustained attention, and as he himself expressed it, China had a "priority precedence" in Russian foreign policy. Kozyrev's deliberate and realist foreign policy toward China in fact laid the foundation for the strategic partnership that was formalized in 1996 after he had resigned as Foreign Minister.

It has been argued by some that both Boris Yeltsin's and Andrei Kozyrev's preferred partner in the Asian-Pacific region was liberal Japan and not the People's Republic of China, which if true was a radical break in of a pro-China tilt to Russia's past diplomacy since the seventeenth

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<sup>166</sup> Interview with Andrei Kozyrev, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Foreign Minister by A. Platkovskiy, 10 April 1991, place of interview not given, FBIS-SOV-91-069, emphasis added.

<sup>167</sup> Allen C. Lynch, "The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Volume 53, No. 1 (2001), p. 9.

<sup>168</sup> Peter Shearman and Matthew Sussex, "Foreign Policy-making and Institutions," in Neil Robinson (ed.), *Institutions and Political Change in Russia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), p. 160, emphasis added.

century.<sup>169</sup> As Robert Legvold wrote: “Had Russia continued as it began in fall 1991, Japan would have emerged as the first priority of policy, China, historically the centerpiece of Soviet policy in post-war East Asia, would have fallen to a lesser rank.”<sup>170</sup> Some scholars have gone much farther than this, and have argued that a real improvement in Russo-Chinese relations had to wait until Kozyrev was replaced as Foreign Minister by Evgeniy Primakov in January 1996. As Jeffrey Mankoff notes, “The establishment of the Russo-Chinese strategic partnership in 1996 coincided with the downfall of Kozyrev and the emergence of a new, more assertive approach to diplomacy on the part of Evgeniy Primakov and his associates.”<sup>171</sup> Taiwanese scholars Hsu Jing-Yun and Soong Jenn-Jaw advance a more extreme version of this view. They wrote: “Sino-Soviet relations have rapidly strengthened since the end of the cold war, but it was not until 1996 that China and Russia developed friendly relations, becoming diplomatically united in a so-called strategic partnership.”<sup>172</sup> Similarly, Andrei P. Tsygankov argues that: “Although Gorbachev laid out preconditions for improving relations with China by signing two important joint communiques and the border treaty, the progress in the relationship between the two sides was *stalled by their growing ideological differences*. In February 1992, the border treaty was ratified by Russia’s Supreme Soviet, but Yeltsin and Kozyrev remained wary of China

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<sup>169</sup> See for example, Mark Mancall, *Russia and China: their diplomatic relations to 1728* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971) and O. Edmund Clubb, *China and Russia: The Great Game* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

<sup>170</sup> Legvold, “Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle,” in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), *The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan and the United States in East Asia* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1995), pp. 42-43. While he was still foreign minister of the RSFSR, Kozyrev answered a question as to what the RSFSR’s foreign policy priorities were as follows: “The group we regard as a priority is our republics ... Our next priority is Russia’s neighbors in the Northern hemisphere, that is the highly developed pluralist market-economy democracies in Western Europe. Japan as the No. 1 country in the East, America, and needless to say China.” “Russian Diplomacy Reborn,” *International Affairs*, p. 128.

<sup>171</sup> Jeffrey Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return to Great Power Politics*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009), p. 199.

<sup>172</sup> Jing-Yun Hsu and Jenn-Jaw Soong, “Development of China-Russian Relations (1949-2011): Limits, Opportunities and Economic Ties,” *The Chinese Economy*, Volume 47, no. 3, May-June 2014, p. 70.

as anti-Western and critical of Russia's democratic development. The relations were on hold until late 1992."<sup>173</sup>

This line of thought was picked up by a number of Russian critics, including then-Director of the Institute for the Far East at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Mikhail Titarenko, who wrote in 2000:

There are people in Russia who believe that our country should look to the West, mainly to the United States. This one-sided approach practiced by Andrei Kozyrev as Foreign Minister had crippled Russia's positions in Asia and caused a lot of trouble before the situation was remedied ... Luckily, Mr. Kozyrev's attempts to lecture China on the human rights issue and democracy were checked on time. Russia managed to preserve good-neighborly relationships and cooperation which allowed both countries to reach a nearly full agreement on the frontier issue.<sup>174</sup>

Other critics have pointed out that Kozyrev's foreign policy was aimed at idealistic liberal ideas that ignored Russia's national interests, and that he had little idea what Russia's true national interests were. Perhaps one of the most damaging assessments of Kozyrev in this vein was provided by Director of the Nixon Center, Dimitri Simes, in his book *After the Collapse: Russia Seeks its Place as a World Power*, which is quoted in the introduction, where Kozyrev said that he was too focused on universal human values to consider Russian national interests.<sup>175</sup>

It is notable that Kozyrev's successor as Foreign Ministry, Evgeniy Primakov, argued that this interview between Nixon and Kozyrev would give one a "... better understanding of the frame of mind of the leadership of the MFA at the beginning of the 1990s..." and quoted a version of this

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<sup>173</sup> Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity* (Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2013), p. 76, emphasis added. It should be noted, however, that December 1992 was only one year into Kozyrev's tenure as the Russian Federation's foreign minister.

<sup>174</sup> M. Titarenko, "Russia in Asia," *International Affairs*, No. 2, Volume 46, 2000, p. 127. Titarenko headed the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IFES RAS) from 1985 until 2015. He probably was well aware of the true state of Russo-Chinese relations during Kozyrev's tenure as Foreign Minister, but in this article he promoted a stereotyped view of Kozyrev, most likely for political reasons. Titarenko died on 25 February 2016.

<sup>175</sup> Dimitri Simes, *After the Collapse*, p. 19.

conversation in his memoirs to define the foreign policy of his predecessor.<sup>176</sup> These opinions have had deep resonance with subsequent observers of Kozyrev's policies: he has been criticized by being overly fixated on Western values, inattentive to Russian national interests, and though possibly well-intentioned, incompetent in his management of Russian foreign policy. Other critics have argued that in his pursuit of alliances with Western states, such as the United States and Japan, Kozyrev failed to cultivate positive relations with its traditional allies.<sup>177</sup> Thus, Kozyrev's foreign policy is criticized for not building on the successful China policy of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who normalized relations with China in June 1989. It is generally recognized that one of Mikhail Gorbachev's greatest achievements in diplomacy was the restoration of relations with the Peoples Republic of China achieved in May 1989,<sup>178</sup> though at least one analyst has argued that his plans for development of the Soviet Far East failed.<sup>179</sup> Unfortunately, Gorbachev's achievement was overshadowed politically by the student demonstrations that took place during his visit to Beijing and the brutal crack-down on them on 6

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<sup>176</sup> Evgeniy Primakov, *Gody v Bol'shoi Politike [Years in Big Politics]* (Moscow: Sovershenno Sekretno, 1999), pp. 210-211.

<sup>177</sup> Andranik Migranyan, "Alternative: Russia's Foreign Policy: Disastrous Results of Three Years. It's time to Pause and Change policy and Minister," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 10 December 1995, in *Current Digest of the Russian Press*, No. 50, Volume 46, 11 January 1995.

<sup>178</sup> For three comprehensive studies on this topic, see Elizabeth Wishnick, *Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow's China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin*, (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2001); Sergey Radchenko, *Unwanted Visionaries* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); and Charles E. Ziegler, *Foreign Policy and East Asia: Learning and Adaptation in the Gorbachev Era* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). The Chinese foreign Minister at the time, Qian Qichen, provides a detailed, first-hand, account of the restoration of Sino-Soviet relations in his book *Ten Episodes in China's Diplomacy* (New York: Harper Collins, 2005), pp. 1-32. See also Ezra Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 612-615.

<sup>179</sup> This is one of the main points made by Sergey Radchenko in his book *Unwanted Visionaries*. See especially pp. 8-9, 301-303. Gilbert Rozman, "Russia in Northeast Asia: In Search of a Strategy," in Robert Legvold, *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, p. 354.

June 1989.<sup>180</sup> Despite the almost unanimous praise for Gorbachev's achievements in relation to China held by Kozyrev's critics, Vladislav Zubok argued that Gorbachev's success in this endeavor owed as much to the foundations laid by his predecessors and to the pragmatism of the Chinese as it did to his own efforts.<sup>181</sup> However, it cannot be denied that Soviet-Chinese rapprochement in the Summer of 1989 was an achievement of historic proportions.

While it may be true that the China policy of Kozyrev's successor, Evgeny Primakov may have been both more consistent and deliberate than Kozyrev's, it is equally true that the foundations for the strategic partnership, consummated by Primakov in April 1996, were in fact laid during Kozyrev's tenure as Foreign Minister. If China had not been Kozyrev's preferred ally in Northeast Asia, and if the Kozyrev Foreign Ministry had a strong preference for the West as a partner in its international relations, these factors played little role in the formulation of and execution of Russian foreign policy towards China. The available evidence from both Chinese and Russian sources shows that from the very beginning of Kozyrev's tenure as foreign minister, first of the RSFSR and then of the Russian Federation, he deliberately, albeit quietly, sought to build on the positive results of Gorbachev's China policy. These efforts resulted in good working relations with the PRC that laid the basis for a strategic partnership achieved in

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<sup>180</sup> As William Taubman noted in his comprehensive biography of Mikhail Gorbachev, "Gorbachev hadn't come to China to lead the demonstrations, of course, but to heal the Sino-Soviet breach that had waxed and waned since the 1960s. His talks with Deng succeeded in doing just that." William Taubman, *Gorbachev: His Life and Times* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2017), p. 478.

<sup>181</sup> As Vladislav Zubok has noted: "The normalization of Sino-Soviet relations was a lasting achievement of Gorbachev's foreign policy, the outcome of many years of painstaking diplomatic efforts that had begun in 1981-82 under Brezhnev. The roles of Gorbachev's leadership and his "new thinking" were important, *but more crucial were the end of the power struggle in the Chinese leadership and the consolidation of power in the hand of Deng [Xiaoping], who decided to embark on pragmatic economic reforms and on an equally pragmatic foreign policy.* Both sides negotiated from a position of state interests, but with the political will to settle the existing disputes." Vladislav Zubok, "Gorbachev's foreign policy toward East Asia, 1985-1991," in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa (ed.), *The Cold War in East Asia, 1945-1991* (Washington, DC and Stanford, CA: the Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2011, p.278.

1996.<sup>182</sup> In fact, according to Russian journalist, Leonid Mlechin: “Kozyrev considered good neighborly relations with China to be his great achievement”<sup>183</sup>

The basic parameters of Russia’s China policy that are still intact today were in fact laid out in a series of documents that were produced during President Boris Yeltsin’s visit to Beijing in December 1992. There is a widespread consensus among many scholars that the Beijing summit resulted from a reevaluation of Russian foreign policy in November 1992, and following this re-evaluation, Kozyrev adjusted his China policy, and began giving it more priority. This re-evaluation was caused by the perceived lack of a positive response from the West towards Russia’s pro-Western foreign policy, and increasing domestic pressure on the Russian Government from the Supreme Soviet, elements of the Russian military, Russia’s military industrial complex, and other Russian foreign policy thinkers (including Primakov) to re-orient Russia’s foreign policy from its focus on the West and restore a more pragmatic balance between East and West. On a visit to the Chinese Association of People’s Diplomacy on 27 January 1994, Kozyrev stated:

The realization of Russian interests not through confrontation but through cooperation with the outside world allowed us in many respects to rediscover for ourselves a whole number of Asian states. This relates to China, our great Eastern neighbor.<sup>184</sup>

However, there is strong evidence that while it is certainly true that in the Fall of 1992 Russian foreign policy was re-oriented away from a focus on the West, Russian policy towards China

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<sup>182</sup> Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation], *Vneshniaia Politika Rossii: Sbornik Dokumentov 1990-1992* [*The Foreign Policy of Russia: A Collection of Documents, 1990-1992*], [hereafter *MID RF VP*] documents number 262, 263, pp. 575-579.

<sup>183</sup> Leonid Mlechin, *MID: Ministry inostannykh del: Tainaia diplomatiia Kremliia* [*MFA: The Ministers of Foreign Affairs: The Secret Diplomacy of the Kremlin*] (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 2011), p. 642. Mlechin has good contacts within the Russian MFA, and this book contains information he acquired from interviews with key participants in the Russian MFA, including Kozyrev himself.

<sup>184</sup> A. Krasil’nikova, “Natsional’nye interesy Rossii i Kitaia v tret’em mire” [Russian and Chinese National interests in the Third World,” *Problemy Dal’nogo Vostoka*, Number 5 (1995), p. 11, quoted in Lukin, “Russia’s Image of China,” p. 32.

had developed progressively since the even before the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991, and was not suddenly, or abruptly, shifted towards China in December 1992.

Several scholars have acknowledged that Kozyrev's China policy was sound and made progress of advancing Russo-Chinese relations. For example, Lowell Dittmer has argued the period of 1989 to 1992, "... was one of considerable bilateral turbulence amid the repercussions of Tiananmen and the collapse of the European Communist Part-states; *only skilled diplomacy was able to salvage the relationship*."<sup>185</sup> Unfortunately, Dittmer did not provide a detailed analysis to support this statement. Finnish scholar Matti Nojonen argued that: "The Sino-Russian political relationship that has existed since the beginning of the 1990s can be regarded as a success if we confine observations to the political top-level relations and recognize how the countries eventually resolved their political disputes, settled land-border issues, minimized the risk of armed conflict and eventually formed a strategic partnership that relationship in 1996."<sup>186</sup> Jeanne Wilson's *Strategic Partners: Russian-Chinese relations in the Post-Soviet Era* is probably the best available study in English on Russo-Chinese relations during this period in which she clearly showed the strong continuity between Kozyrev's and Primakov's China policy, and acknowledged that in relation to China, Kozyrev's policy was based more on pragmatism than ideology.<sup>187</sup> However, views of this type are rare in the existing scholarship, and even Wilson's comprehensive study erroneously argues that initially Kozyrev's foreign policy towards China was based on a Westernist perspective, and argued that "After the first few months of

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<sup>185</sup> Lowell Dittmer, "The Sino-Japanese-Russian Triangle," *The Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Volume 10, no. 1 (April 2005), p. 12, emphasis added.

<sup>186</sup> Matti Najonen, "Introduction; Adjusting to the Great Power Transition," in Arkady Moshes and Matti Najonen (editors), *Russia-China Relations: Current State, Alternate Futures and Implications for the West* (Helsinki, the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2011). [www.fiia.fi/assets/publications/FIIA\\_Report\\_30\\_web.pdf](http://www.fiia.fi/assets/publications/FIIA_Report_30_web.pdf) Accessed on 8 February 2017.

<sup>187</sup> Jeanne Lorraine Wilson, *Strategic Partners: Russian-Chinese relations in the Post-Soviet Era* (New York and London: Routledge, 2004), p. 193.



1992, Kozyrev suppressed his tendencies to criticize the Chinese for their errant ways, presiding over the strengthening of the relationship.”<sup>188</sup>

The diplomatic record strongly supports the contention that as Foreign Minister Kozyrev pursued a deliberate *realist* foreign policy towards China, aimed at resolving existing difficulties and in achieving good relations with China from the very beginning of his tenure as foreign minister of the RSFSR. Russia’s China policy under Kozyrev can be characterized by four periods: The first period, what I call “Quiet Partnership,” which ran from roughly the summer of 1991 to November 1992, was characterized by quiet, but essentially friendly, pragmatic relations. It can also be characterized as a period in which parallel policies were pursued: on one hand, a public policy focused almost exclusively on the West, which downplayed relations with China, and on the other hand, a quiet, but consistent and deliberate policy of attaining and maintaining friendship towards China. This initial period laid a solid foundation for good relations between the two countries; the second period, which I call “Balanced Partnership,” from December 1992 through August 1994, was characterized by deepening of relations brought on by both a re-evaluation and partial rejection of Kozyrev’s Atlanticist foreign policy already in mid to late 1992. This early period was exemplified by the December 1992 summit which produced pivotal documents that set the future course of Russo-Chinese relations.<sup>189</sup>

The third period, which I call “Constructive Partnership,” which ran from September 1994 through October 1995, saw a deepening of Russo-Chinese relations and resulted, at least in

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<sup>188</sup> Jeanne L. Wilson, *Strategic Partners*, p. 193.

<sup>189</sup> Many scholars attribute the success of the meeting was a direct result of the re-orientation of Russian foreign policy that took place in November 1992. However, the diplomatic record convincingly shows that the December summit would probably have occurred anyway, and in fact the documents signed at this summit were the culmination of the foundations the Kozyrev Foreign Ministry had laid with the Chinese since the period that preceded the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991. Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation], *Vneshniaia Politika Rossii: Sbornik Dokumentov 1990-1992* [*The Foreign Policy of Russia: A Collection of Documents, 1990-1992*], [hereafter *MID RF VP*] documents number 262, 263, pp. 575-579.

part, from increased Russian and Chinese sensitivity to perceived U.S. anti-Russian and anti-Chinese policies; and the fourth period, November 1995 through January 1996, which I call “Preparing for Strategic Partnership,” laid the foundations for the policy direction that was consummated by Kozyrev’s successor, Evgeny Primakov at the Beijing Summit of 24-26 April 1996.

The Chinese scholar Li Jingjie has argued that the Strategic Partnership is characterized by what he calls the seven pillars of Sino-Russian partnership. These are:

1. Mutual respect and equality;
2. A new security outlook and model;
3. Mutual benefit, joint development;
4. Global multipolarity and a new world order;
5. Regular summit meetings;
6. Stable partnership for the long-term;
7. No alliance targeting a third country.<sup>190</sup>

These seven elements were consistent features of Russo-Chinese relations and can be found in the joint statements and declarations made throughout Kozyrev’s tenure as Foreign Minister. In fact, most of them can be traced formally back to the Joint Declaration published on 18 December 1992 (see footnote 8 above), and some were formulated, at least in germinal form, even before this.

### **Russian Liberals and China: Divided Loyalties and Foreign Policy?**

It is generally believed that Kozyrev initially had little interest in developing close relations with the PRC. In April 1992, Kozyrev himself declared:

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<sup>190</sup> Li Jingjie, “Pillars of “Sino-Russian Partnership,” *Orbis*, Fall 2000, pp. 528-531.

As can easily be seen, Russia should step into the ranks of the most developed democratic states, to make it easy for us to occupy the position that history as well as geography gives us ... our neighbors are the United States (across the Bering Straits), Japan and the countries of Western Europe. With these countries we do not have any existing differences and conflicts of interest that cannot be overcome, while on the contrary there exists various possibilities with these countries to establish friendly relations and in the future to establish alliance relations ... the second emphasis, identical with the first in many respects, is to establish *with bordering countries* good neighborly relations. These are also the United States, Japan, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and of course, the Commonwealth of Independent States ... South Korea is perhaps also such a neighbor.<sup>191</sup>

Conspicuously missing from this list of neighbors was the PRC, which is odd considering the enormous border (over 4,000 kilometers long) Russia shares with China. This oversight may have been deliberate, and intended to indicate to the world where liberal Russia hoped to go in ideational terms. As Li Jingjie noted: "Among the emphases of Russian foreign policy at that time, there was no place for China at all."<sup>192</sup> However, despite this *apparent* oversight and lack of focus, undoubtedly intended for public consumption to demonstrate the new Foreign Ministry's Westernist course, in actual fact this statement did not reflect the true course of Russian foreign policy at that time towards China.

Many scholars assume that because Kozyrev was a *Zapadinik* (or Westernizer) he was inclined to view China as an illiberal danger to Russian international interests. The Russian scholar, Alexander Lukin, identified Kozyrev, the Moscow Institute for Foreign Relations, a university of the Russian MFA, and the scholars Andrei Zagorskiy, Anatoliy Zlobin, Sergei Solodovnik and Mark Khrustalav as leading Westernizers who held fairly negative views of China.<sup>193</sup> Yegor Gaidar, Prime Minister from January-December 1992, was also a proponent of this view. In 1995 Gaidar wrote that Russia "must depart from its Oriental past and its Asiatic mode of

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<sup>191</sup> Quoted in Li Jingjie, "Pillars of Sino-Russian Partnership," p. 534, emphasis added.

<sup>192</sup> Li Jingjie, "Pillars of Sino-Russian Partnership," p. 534.

<sup>193</sup> Alexander Lukin, "Russia's Image of China and Russian-Chinese Relations," *East Asia*, Spring 1999, volume 17, Issue 1, p. 26.

production and join the civilized Western world.”<sup>194</sup> Another leading *Zapadnik*, Aleksei Arbatov, wrote: “... in the future China will be a serious threat to Russia since its undemocratic political structure makes its development unpredictable as opposed to ‘Japan—a democratic country and an integral part of the West.’”<sup>195</sup> Many people within Yeltsin’s circle, such as the mercurial, and very conservative, Oleg Lobov, and Yeltsin’s *Zapadnik*, liberal ally, the Mayor of Moscow, Gavriil Popov, also favored deepening relations with Taiwan at China’s expense.<sup>196</sup> Had these ideas been acted upon, Russo-Chinese relations would have been irreparably damaged. However, as will be shown below, if such views were held by Russian Westernists in Kozyrev’s Foreign Ministry, they had little, if any, impact on the course of Russian foreign policy towards China. In actual fact, Kozyrev skillfully and consistently guided the Russian MFA and at least once, even the Russian President, in the direction of pragmatic and friendly relations with China.

#### **Phase I: The “Quiet” Partnership, June 1990 - November 1992:**

Upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the Russian Federation’s small Foreign Ministry, which numbered between 100 and 200 personnel, was infused with about three thousand personnel from the former Soviet Union’s Foreign Ministry, which could have transformed the Foreign Ministry into a virtual battleground for competing schools of thought on foreign policy.<sup>197</sup> But this did not happen. On 3 January 1992, the newspaper *Diplomatic*

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<sup>194</sup> Alexander Lukin, “Russia’s Image of China,” p. 28.

<sup>195</sup> Alexander Lukin, “Russia’s Image of China,” p. 29.

<sup>196</sup> For a description of *Zapadniki*, such as liberal Moscow mayor, Gavriil Popov, who advocated friendly relations with Taiwan, possibly at the expense of the PRC, see Radchenko, *Unwanted Visionaries*, pp. 191-195.

<sup>197</sup> Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, *Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval*, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 202. See also Andrei A. Kovalev, *Russia’s Dead End: An Insider’s Testimony from Gorbachev to Putin* (translated by Steven I. Levine) (Lincoln, Nebraska: Potomac Books an imprint of University of Nebraska Press, 2017), p. 152. According to Kovalev: “When the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs absorbed the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it felt like an occupation.” Kovalev, *op cit.*, p. 152.

*Panorama* reported that "...the foreign ministries of Russia and the former USSR ... [were] ... working jointly for common purposes. He [Kozyrev] said that the staff of the former Union ministry were experienced professionals who should stay in their jobs. He admitted that at first the USSR Foreign Ministry staff were demoralized by the 'collapse of the center.' But at the moment their spirits were going up. They had acquired a specific purpose to secure a proper place in the world for democratic Russia."<sup>198</sup> Even with the infusion of personnel from the former USSR's MFA, Kozyrev maintained control over Russian foreign policy.<sup>199</sup> The infusion of Soviet MFA personnel would also facilitate building on the foundations of Gorbachev's normalization of relations with China.

Even in the period preceding the dissolution of the USSR, when RSFSR and then Russian MFA advocacy of the liberal, pro-Western foreign policy was at its height, Russian foreign policy towards China was based on pragmatic considerations. China was too important to be ignored. As Robert Legvold noted in 1995: "Given its size and proximity, Russian leaders could scarcely have disregarded China or failed to pursue the normalization of relations advanced by Gorbachev."<sup>200</sup> This is true and this realization on the part of the Russian MFA lead Kozyrev to seek good relations with the PRC despite serious ideological differences.

A careful examination of the record of Russo-Chinese relations during the period preceding the collapse of the USSR shows that despite Kozyrev's strong pro-Western (and even strong pro-

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<sup>198</sup> "Kozyrev discusses CIS, Diplomatic Relations," *Diplomatic Panorama*, 2 January 1992, FBIS-SOV-92-002.

<sup>199</sup> According to Galina Sidorova, who worked in both Kozyrev's and Primakov's MFA: "Kozyrev himself believes that while he was foreign minister the institution was not particularly polarized by ideology. He estimates that about 15 per cent of the MFA staff fully supported him, the same proportion were 'ideological enemies,' while the remaining 60 per cent were purely technocratic professionals." Galina Sidorova (translated by Arch Tait), *Under the Aegis of the Foreign Ministry*, (Henry Jackson Russia Studies Center, 11 January 2017). <http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Under-the-Aegis-of-the-Foreign-Ministry-.pdf> Accessed on 4 March 2017.

<sup>200</sup> Robert Legvold, "Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle," p. 43.

Japanese) proclivities, the Russian Foreign Ministry continued to build on the foundations laid by the both the Soviet and the Russian Federation MFAs in the late Gorbachev period, albeit quietly, and signed a number of agreements that stressed Russo-Chinese cooperation and friendship. This is because at this time, the views held by both Russia's Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, and China's Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, who was a career diplomat with extensive experience in Soviet and Russian affairs, on the subject of Sino-Russian relations largely coincided.<sup>201</sup> This similarity of views guided Russo-Chinese relations for the entirety of Kozyrev's tenure as Foreign Minister.

### **The foreign policy of the RSFSR towards China**

The MFA of the Russian Federation became revitalized in early 1990, as the MFAs of the various Soviet Republics began asserting more active policies against the Soviet "center." On 30 November 1989, Russian Foreign Minister Vladimir Vinogradov reported that activity of the Russian MFA had increased greatly in recent years, but argued that "...these activities were in complete accord within supported the goals of All-Union [Soviet] foreign policy."<sup>202</sup> Vladimir Lukin<sup>203</sup> sharply disagreed with Vinogradov and argued for the RSFSR MFA to pursue an assertive Russian foreign policy in relation to *both* Europe and Asia. He called for the revitalization of the Russian MFA, so it could pursue:

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<sup>201</sup> See John W. Garver, *China's Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 488-490.

<sup>202</sup> James P. Nichol, *Diplomacy in the Former Soviet Republics* (Westport, CT: Praeger, Publishers 1995) p. 68.

<sup>203</sup> Vladimir Lukin had been a leading proponent in reestablishing Soviet-Chinese relations in the 1980s. He had been involved in the drafting of Gorbachev's famous Vladivostok speech of 1986, had been a scholar at the Institute of USA and Canada Studies with Georgii Arbatov. Lukin had worked briefly in the Soviet Foreign Ministry before joining Boris Yeltsin's circle. See Radchenko, *Unwanted Visionaries*, p. 189. Initially identified as a Westernizer and a liberal, he was also a strong proponent of a non-ideological relationship between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China. He later became one of the leading statist critics of liberalism in the Russian Federation.

Russian-specific interests and requirements within the framework of the All-Union foreign policy process. This means, in my views, primarily the particular political interest in Europe and the *particular economic interest of adjacent countries of the Asia-Pacific Region*.<sup>204</sup>

Lukin's suggested focus on both West and East was been a consistent feature of Russian foreign policy conducted by the RSFSR's MFA before the dissolution of the USSR, and it continued through to the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991. According to Mark Webber, "June 1990 ... marked the adoption of a declaration on 'State Sovereignty' conceived as a 'natural and necessary condition for the existence of the statehood of Russia.' ... the government of the RSFSR thereafter engaged in a range of ostensible foreign policy activities including the articulation of policy priorities, the creation of an institutional apparatus, exchange of visits and the conclusion of agreements with foreign states."<sup>205</sup> Hannes Adomeit concurred, writing: "In June 1990, a year and a half before the official collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation, (then the RSFSR, one of the fifteen Union republics) declared state sovereignty and began to develop domestic and foreign policy agendas distinct from those of the Soviet Union."<sup>206</sup> However, at this point RSFSR foreign policy still surrendered certain prerogatives to the USSR Foreign Ministry.

Kozyrev became Foreign Minister of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) in October 1990 and immediately began asserting the independence of the RSFSR's MFA from the Soviet MFA in marked contrast to his predecessor, Vladimir Vinogradov. Under Kozyrev's leadership, an independent Russian Federation foreign policy was pursued, one that

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<sup>204</sup> James P. Nichol, *Diplomacy in the Former Soviet Republics* (Westport, CT: Praeger, Publishers 1995) p. 68, emphasis added. Later, in a report to the Russian MFA collegium, Vinogradov reported that the Russian MFA had established ties with about a dozen foreign territorial units, which included provinces of China. (Nichol, p. 69). Andrei Kozyrev replaced Vinogradov as Russian Foreign Minister in October 1990.

<sup>205</sup> Mark Webber, "The Emergence of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (September, 1993), p. 245

<sup>206</sup> Hannes Adomeit, "Russia as a Great Power in World Affairs: Images and Reality," *International Affairs*, 71. 1 (1995), p.43.

increasingly sought to diminish the influence of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs in favor of the Republic MFAs.

Most scholars who have produced otherwise excellent studies on the positive development of Russo-Chinese relations under Kozyrev, argue that this discovery of China came later, after the extreme Westernist policy was rejected and then modified in November 1992. For example, Jeanne L. Wilson claimed “After the first few months of 1992, Kozyrev suppressed his tendencies to criticize the Chinese for their errant ways, presiding over the strengthening of the relationship.”<sup>207</sup> However, the diplomatic record clearly shows that the diplomacy of the RSFSR towards the PRC, from the very beginning of its semi-independent existence, was characterized by a desire for friendship between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, and was never infected by a Westernist antipathy toward China. Thus, as early as March 1991, Kozyrev asserted that China was a priority in RSFSR foreign policy.<sup>208</sup> A month later on 10 April 1991, Kozyrev was asked what he thought of the upcoming visit of Chinese Premier Jiang Zemin to Moscow, and he responded by saying that even though he personally believed in international standards of human rights and democratic principles, Russia’s foreign policy had to be based on realities, and the reality that the head of the Chinese state was also the General Secretary of China’s Communist Party.<sup>209</sup>

The RSFSR’s Foreign Ministry’s head of Asian policy, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Georgii Kunadze, stressed that the Russian Federation supported building a strong relationship with China in discussions with the Chinese Ambassador to the USSR, Wei Khunlian, on 8 October

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<sup>207</sup> Jeanne L. Wilson, *Strategic Partners*, p. 193. See also Gilbert Rozman, “Russia in Northeast Asia: In Search of a Strategy,” in Robert Legvold (ed.), *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century & the Shadow of the Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 355.

<sup>208</sup> Pyadyshev, Boris and Andrei Kozyrev, “Russian Diplomacy Reborn,” *International Affairs*, Volume 3 (March), 1991.

<sup>209</sup> Interview with Andrei Kozyrev, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Foreign Minister by A. Platkovskiy, 10 April 1991, place of interview not given, FBIS-SOV-91-069.



1991. According to Kunadze, the Chinese ambassador identified two issues as being very important to Chinese interests: the first of these was China's traditional position on the Taiwan issue, which considered Taiwan a part of China, and the second was stability on the Korean peninsula. Kunadze responded to this first issue by assuring the Chinese ambassador: "Concerning the question of political ties with Taiwan, the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR is the same [as that of China]: we do not intend to sanction official contacts between the representatives of the government of Russia and Taiwan."<sup>210</sup>

From 6-13 December 1991, shortly before the dissolution of the USSR, President Yeltsin sent a delegation headed by Vladimir Lukin, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Russian Duma, to Beijing to deliver a letter from Yeltsin to Chinese President Yang Shangkung which stated that "... the political upheaval in the former Soviet Union would not affect Sino Russian relations and promis[ed] that Russia would abide by all the previous treaties and agreements signed between China and the former Soviet Union."<sup>211</sup> This indicates quite clearly that the Russian Federation intended to build its China policy on the foundations that had been laid by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1989-1991. The Russian delegates also met with Wan Li, the President of the Standing Committee of the People's National Congress. The Chinese stressed to Lukin and his associates their interest in continuing the development of Russo-Chinese relations according to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The Chinese leaders indicated that they had two concerns about Yeltsin's Russia: first of all, Yeltsin's interest in focusing on human rights, and secondly, the possible establishment of Russian relations with Taiwan.<sup>212</sup> Wan Li told Lukin

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<sup>210</sup> Ministerstvo inostrannykh del RSFSR [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR], SD25917, No. 2045, 11 October 1991. Iz dnevnika Kunadze, G.F. [From the Diary of G.F. Kunadze].

<sup>211</sup> Hung P. Nguyen, "Russia and China: The Genesis of an Eastern Rapallo, *Asian Survey*, Vol. 33 (March 1993), p. 297. This article was cited in Radchenko, *Unwanted Visionaries*, p. 189.

<sup>212</sup> Hung P. Nguyen, "Russia and China: The Genesis of an Eastern Rapallo, p. 189.

that "... he hoped Russia and China would increase economic, trade and cultural ties, and that his visit would help promote their development."<sup>213</sup>

The official report on this visit, written in both Chinese and Russian, concluded that "As a whole, ... the visit of the delegation of the RSFSR to the PRC may be considered as a successful beginning of a direct Russian-Chinese dialogue."<sup>214</sup> Nguyen correctly noted that "The fact that Yeltsin took the initiative in starting to restore relations with China to the level before the August coup indicates that *the move was motivated by profound geopolitical reasons*. The timing of the initiative—just before the birth of the Slavic Commonwealth—*suggest that Russia feels itself in greater need than the former Soviet Union for a geo-strategic counterbalance in the East ...*"<sup>215</sup>

This was a quiet, but progressive, effort to reassure China of the Russian Federation's good intentions in a tumultuous period, where Russia needed Chinese support.

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<sup>213</sup> Xinhua News Agency reported in *AFP*, Hong Kong newspaper, 13 December 2013.

<sup>214</sup> "O vizite delegatsii Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR v KNR, 6-13 Dekabria 1991 goda," [Concerning the visit of the Delegation from the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, 6-13 December 1991], GARF: Fond 10026, opis' 5, dela 1253, listy 55-17. Shen's Archive.

<sup>215</sup> Nguyen "Eastern Rapallo," p. 298, emphasis added. This event shows that while Russia was making openly public declarations about Russia being a Western power, Yeltsin was also pragmatically (albeit quietly) attempting to reassure Beijing that Russia's intentions towards China were friendly. Nguyen's description here corresponds well with realist theories of international relations advanced by realist scholars, such as Hans Morgenthau's conception of structural changes to the balance of power, *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 220-221; Kenneth Waltz's similar views on the balance of power, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 116-128; and world balance concepts advanced by John Mearsheimer in his classic study, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), pp. 360-402. In fact the growing and increasing Russo-Chinese cooperation that took place under Kozyrev's direction (and later Evgeny Primakov's) demonstrate quite convincingly that critics of realism's prognoses for the post-Cold War order were misguided. As characterized by Mearsheimer: "A large body of opinion in the West holds that international politics underwent a fundamental transformation with the end of the Cold War. Cooperation, not security competition and conflict, is now the defining feature of relations among the great powers. Not surprisingly, the optimists who hold this view claim that realism no longer has much explanatory power. It is old thinking and is largely irrelevant to the new realities of world politics." (Mearsheimer, p. 360). It is ironic that one of the diplomats usually singled out as a representative of the new liberal ascendancy in foreign policy actually implemented one of the most realist-oriented international relationships in the post-Cold War era, between two countries that could not have been more ideationally different.

In reporting these findings to the Russian leadership upon his return to Moscow, Lukin stressed to every audience he encountered that Russian policy should be based on pragmatism, not Westernist liberal ideology. In an interview with the newspaper *Izvestia* on 27 December 1991, Lukin stated: "I am all together opposed to an ideologized approach to a neighbor. How can we call conservatives those who have accomplished one of the highest achievements in the history of mankind, a doubling of the wealth of a people more than 1 billion strong in ten years?"<sup>216</sup> Lukin stressed this point to officials in both the Russian Foreign Ministry, and to the Russian government in general.

The official report on the visit stated that the Chinese government stressed their readiness to develop comprehensive ties with the RSFSR, and that Wan Li had stated that "Russia is our largest neighbor, and the establishment of cooperation with her is one the important investments in the work of peace in the entire world."<sup>217</sup> The document stressed pragmatism over ideology. In words that were probably written by Lukin, the report stated that "... the strategic interests of Russia are answered by pragmatism, free of a highly ideologized approach to relations with China."<sup>218</sup> This non-ideologized approach to Russo-Chinese relations corresponded with Kozyrev's comments on China made in April 1991. This approach was actually to define the Kozyrev's future orientation and management of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Foreign Affairs' policies towards China from the summer of 1991 to Kozyrev's resignation from the office of Foreign Minister in January 1996. In this case at least, pragmatism won out over ideology. These official statements, taken together, indicate that there was actually no "Westernist"-based

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<sup>216</sup> "Interview of *Izvestiia* correspondent, Iu. Savenkov with Vladimir Lukin," *Izvestiia*, 27 December 1991.

<sup>217</sup> "O vizite delegatsii Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR v KNR, 6-13 Dekabria 1991 goda," [Concerning the visit of the Delegation from the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, 6-13 December 1991], GARF: Fond 10026, opis' 5, dela 1253, listy 55-17. Shen's archive.

<sup>218</sup> "O vizite delegatsii Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR v KNR, 6-13 Dekabria 1991 goda," [Concerning the visit of the Delegation from the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, 6-13 December 1991], GARF: Fond 10026, opis' 5, dela 1253, listy 55-17. Shen's archive.

China policy, despite the assumptions of several scholars that some sort of anti-China policy existed prior to November 1992.

For its part, the Peoples' Republic of China had a strong incentives to establish and maintain good relations with the new Russian Federation, regardless of its form of government. As described by Andrea Ghiselli: "Chinese diplomacy in the 1990s was characterized by efforts to boost the country's international standing after the fall of the Soviet Union and the events of Tiananmen seriously undermined China's relations with other countries, especially the West. China's most immediate diplomatic goal after the end of the Cold War was thus to reinvigorate the country's international standing, especially in its neighborhood."<sup>219</sup>

There is evidence that members of the Chinese government considered Boris Yeltsin a "dangerous scum" and a "reactionary,"<sup>220</sup> but that for pragmatic reasons, the Chinese state needed Russian support and even friendship in the difficult international climate of the early 1990s. Pragmatism had been a hallmark of Chinese foreign policy since Deng Xiaoping established his authority in 1978.<sup>221</sup> At a meeting of the Chinese Politburo in 1992 a member of the Chinese leadership reportedly stated: "Even if Yeltsin is very reactionary, we can internally curse him and pray for his downfall, *but we still have to maintain normal state to state relations*

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<sup>219</sup> Andrea Ghiselli, "Diplomatic Opportunities and Rising Threats: The Expanding Role of Non-Traditional Security in Chinese Foreign and Security Policy," *Journal of Contemporary China*, 15 February 2018, p. 8. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1433584>

<sup>220</sup> Radchenko, *Unwanted Visionaries*, p. 195, Wishnick, *Mending Fences*, p. 257.

<sup>221</sup> Christensen, op cit. See also Qian Qichen, *Ten Episodes in Chinese Diplomacy*, and H. Lyman Miller and Liu Xiaohung's excellent article, "The Foreign Policy Outlook of China's "Third Generation" Elite," in David M. Lampton (ed.), *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform* (Stanford, CA; Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 137-143.

*with him and have to endeavor to maintain good-neighborly ties with the Soviet Union. This is for the sake of our country's peace, stability, and social development."*<sup>222</sup>

### **China's Precarious Post-Tiananmen Square International Situation**

Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, following in Deng's tradition, believed that good relations with Russia were a necessity due to China's relative diplomatic isolation in the early 1990s.<sup>223</sup>

The hostile Western reaction to the Tiananmen Square Incident of 4 June 1989 had made China's international position extremely difficult. As Qian Qichen wrote: "In a little more than a month—from June 5 to July 15, 1989—the United States, Japan, the European Community, and the G7 Economic Summit announced one after another that they would stop all bilateral high-level visits, stop exporting arms for military and commercial purposes, and defer new loans to China provided by international financial organs. For a while the pressure of isolation was very

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<sup>222</sup> Radchenko, *Unwanted Visionaries*, p. 195, emphasis added. *He Po Shih, Tangtai* (Hong Kong) no. 10 (15 January 1992), pp. 41-52, cited in Wishnick, *Mending Fences*, p. 257. According to his son, Deng Zhifang, Deng Xiaoping thought Gorbachev was "an idiot." Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping*, p. 423.

<sup>223</sup> Qian Qichen favored a pragmatic foreign policy, which was a hallmark of Chinese foreign policy since Deng Xiaoping had consolidated his power in the late 1970s. Writing in 1996 while Qian was still Chinese Foreign Minister, U.S. analyst of Chinese foreign policy, Thomas J. Christensen wrote: "China may well be the high church of *realpolitik* in the post-Cold War world. Its analysts certainly think more like traditional balance-of-power theorists than do most contemporary Western leaders and policy analysts ... They are also much less likely than their Western counterparts to emphasize political, cultural, or ideological differences with foreign countries," Thomas J. Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik," *Foreign Affairs*, 9/1/1996 Volume 75, Issue 5. pp. 37-52. This adherence to *realpolitik* and pragmatic concerns on the part of China is no surprise, but it may be surprising to some analysts that the supposed liberalized Westernist, Andrei Kozyrev, was also guided by these principles, at least in relation to China.

great.”<sup>224</sup> As John W. Gardner noted: “Deng Xiaoping, China’s paramount leader, reportedly told his comrades in April 1990 that they should expect an ‘extremely critical’ three to five years of ‘extreme difficulties’ which once past, would open the way for renewed rapid development. What was needed now, Deng said was ‘stability, stability, and more stability.’”<sup>225</sup> Samuel S. Kim identified this post-Tiananmen period as one of the most challenging diplomatic periods in the PRC’s history:

After the Tiananmen Square massacre, Chinese foreign policy is once again being challenged — and haunted — by the return of *neiluan* and *waihuan* (internal disorder and external calamity), under whose twin blows most dynasties collapsed. Never before in the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (with the exception of the high-tide phase of the cultural revolution of 1966-1968) has Beijing so isolated itself from its own people as well as from the peoples of the world.<sup>226</sup>

This environment made Russian support an absolute necessity for a restoration of China’s international position, and this need for Russian support impacted China’s response to the dissolution of the USSR in late December 1991. At the time Qian delivered a report on the international situation to the Twenty-Third Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People’s Congress of China, in which he stated:

The collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of the Soviet-U.S. confrontation, the east-west cold war and polarization that had lasted nearly half a century after World

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<sup>224</sup> Qian Qichen, *Ten Episodes*, p. 127.

<sup>225</sup> John W. Garver, “Chinese Foreign Policy: The Diplomacy of Damage Control,” *Current History*, 1 September 1991, p.242. For more on the difficulties of foreign policy after Tiananmen Square from Garver’s perspective, see John W. Garver, *China’s Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 485-504.

<sup>226</sup> Samuel S. Kim, “Chinese Foreign Policy After Tiananmen,” *Current History*, 1 September 1990, p. 245. One of the West’s leading scholars of Chinese foreign policy, David Lampton, noted in 1995 that China’s foreign policy following the Tiananmen Square incident continued the main lines of Deng’s foreign policy since 1982: “The Tiananmen tragedy of June 1989 and the collapse of the European Communist world in the period from 1989 to 1991 presented Beijing’s strategy with uncertainties, to be sure. But the strategy has not been modified significantly because the post-1982 approach has been successful and no competing or compelling alternative foreign policy vision has been advanced by any potent leadership group.” David Lampton, “China and the Strategic Quadrangle,” in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.) *The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan and the United States in East Asia* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1995), p. 65.

War II. The people of China and all the republics of the former Soviet Union have a long tradition of friendship and contacts. Following the collapse of the the Soviet Union, *the Chinese government will continue to develop friendly relations and cooperation with these republics on the principle of noninterference in each other's internal affairs and respect for the choice of the people of every state.*<sup>227</sup>

## **The MFA of the Russian Federation and China**

On 27 December 1991, the PRC officially recognized the government of the Russian Federation, and the governments of the other Soviet successor states. On 29 December 1991, the Russian Federation and the PRC signed a written summary of the results of talks which confirmed the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence<sup>228</sup> as the basis for Sino-Russian relations, and the basic principles agreed to in the Sino-Soviet Joint Communiques of 1989 and 1991 as the working guidelines for Sino-Russian relations. These documents simply codified the conclusions of earlier meetings between representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the PRC. As Qian stated “This summary of talks was the first guiding document for developing Sino-Russian relations in the new context.”<sup>229</sup> Thus, from the very beginning of the post-Cold War Russo-Chinese relationship, PRC-RF relations were based upon the foundations that had been laid by Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet foreign ministry. These principles that undergirded the burgeoning relationship can only be described as realist. If there was any hostility between two states based on ideational differences, these hostile attitudes had little impact on the conduct of their relations.

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<sup>227</sup> Qian Qichen, *Ten Episodes*, pp. 174-175. Emphasis added.

<sup>228</sup> These are: respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual non-aggression; non-interference in each other's internal, domestic affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence. Gorbachev had also acknowledged that he adhered to these principles in his relations with China. See Mikhail S. Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (New York: Doubleday, 1996), pp. 488-495.

<sup>229</sup> Qian Qichen, *Ten Episodes*, p. 176. Interestingly, few documents of these discussions were published in either the MFA's magazine, *Diplomatshekiy Vestnik* [*Diplomatic Herald*] or *Vneshniaia Politika Rossii: Sbornik Dokumentov* [*The Foreign Policy of Russia: Collection of Documents*] which published Russian official diplomatic papers on Russian foreign relations during this period. The Chinese Foreign Minister, however, includes quotes from these in his memoirs *Ten Episodes in China's Diplomacy*.

The first official meeting between the leaders of the Russian Federation with those of the PRC was the Summit Meeting of the United Nations Security Council, held at the end of January 1992. When Russian President Boris Yeltsin met with Chinese Premier Li Peng, he assured him that "... Russia would faithfully abide by the two Sino-Soviet joint communiques and would approve the agreement on the eastern section of the China-Russia boundary as soon as possible, saying that *he hoped to raise Russo-Chinese relations to a new level*."<sup>230</sup> As Qian noted: "Both sides felt satisfied with the meeting, and regarded it a good start."<sup>231</sup> It was a good start that provided the basis for a good relationship between the Russian Federation and the PRC, despite strongly divergent views on human rights, economic development and government in this initial period of relations. An official declaration by President Yeltsin to the General Secretary of the United Nations Security Council was published on 31 January 1992. In this early official proclamation of the new Russian Federation government, Yeltsin declared:

Located at the junction of Europe and Asia, on territory that is the ancestral home of many peoples of several continents, Russia must finally fulfill its unique historical mission to become the connecting link between East and West.<sup>232</sup>

In this statement, Yeltsin was articulating a view which has been described by several scholars as Eurasianism. As David Kerr wrote "... consciousness of Russia's singular position between Europe and Asia, and the implications of this for its social development and external orientation, has also been a constant element in Russian political culture."<sup>233</sup> Though mostly associated with

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<sup>230</sup> Qian Qichen, *Ten Episodes*, p. 178, emphasis added.

<sup>231</sup> Qian Qichen, *Ten Episodes*, p. 178. This initial meeting between Yeltsin and Li Peng was subsequently referred to by both Russian and Chinese diplomats and statesmen in meetings and summits. I was, unfortunately unable to acquire a copy. I was told by a Chinese colleague that the Chinese document on this meeting was still classified.

<sup>232</sup> "Poslanie prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii B.N. Yeltsina General'nomy Sekretariu OON, B. Butros Gali," Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 31 January 1992 in Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Vneshniaia Politika Rossii, Sbornik Dokumentov, 1990-1992* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1996), p. 201.

<sup>233</sup> David Kerr, "The New Eurasianism: The Rise of Geopolitics in Russia's Foreign Policy," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Volume 47, Number 6 (September 1995), p. 978.



Yeltsin's foreign policy under Kozyrev's successor in office, Yevgeny Primakov, this statement, and subsequent foreign policy initiatives towards China, shows that even under Kozyrev, Eurasianism at least in some form, guided Russian foreign policy towards China.<sup>234</sup> Prominent Russian Asian Analyst, Sergei Goncharov, wrote a month later, in February 1992, that:

Russian foreign policy must achieve the realization of the fundamental interests of the country in two more vitally important directions besides the Western—Islam and China. *Both these directions already play a principal role now*, above all in the sphere of security, directly influencing our side not only purely military, but also the internal stability in our state.<sup>235</sup>

These documents and opinions by leading Russian foreign policy analysts, taken together, clearly demonstrate that Russia undertook an active policy towards China at the very beginning of the Russian Federation's history. The diplomatic record makes it abundantly clear that there was no ideationally liberal-based Kozyrev-directed foreign policy towards China in the initial stages of the Russian Federation's foreign policy towards the PRC.

### ***March 1992 Kozyrev Visits China: Human Rights, Taiwan and Pragmatism***

Kozyrev's first official visit to China occurred in March 1992. At the time it was reported that during this visit Kozyrev lectured the Chinese on human rights abuses and Taiwan issues.

Legvold stated that the Chinese saw this rebuke as "nearly unbearable."<sup>236</sup> However, if there

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<sup>234</sup> Sergei Goncharov and Andrew Kuchins noted the emerging differences between Russian Atlanticists/Westernizers and Eurasianists in the Russian bureaucratic structures in 1993: "Differences over an Atlanticist or a Eurasianist foreign policy course in 1992 became delineated along institutional lines with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), led by Kozyrev supporting a Westernizing course, and the Russian Parliament ... led by Lukin's old friend Evgeny Ambartsumov supporting more Eurasian positions." Sergei Goncharov and Andrew Kuchins, "Domestic Sources of Russian Foreign Policy," in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Jonathan Haslam, and Andrew Kuchins (editors), *Russia and Japan: An Unresolved Dilemma Between Distant Neighbors* (Berkeley, CA: University of California and Berkeley Press, 1993), p. 391. The conduct of Russian foreign policy as it was pursued in relation to China up to that time shows a clear adherence to Eurasianism by Kozyrev's MFA.

<sup>235</sup> S. Goncharov, "Osobyie interesy Rossii," *Izvestiia*, 25 February 1992, p. 6 cited in David Kerr, "The New Eurasianism," p. 981.

<sup>236</sup> Legvold, *Russia and Strategic Quadrangle*, p. 41. Titarenko also cited this meeting, where Kozyrev supposedly lectured the Chinese on human rights, as the defining principle of Kozyrev's views of China. Titarenko, op. cit.

were tensions caused by the liberal orientation of the Russian Foreign Ministry and the issue of human rights, the meeting was more accurately and holistically characterized by the many areas of agreement between the Russian and Chinese delegations on a host of issues both foreign and domestic. It was also one of the first foreign trips for Kozyrev in the capacity of Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation.<sup>237</sup> Kozyrev had discussions with Li Peng, the Premier of the State Council, and Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen. While in China, Kozyrev declared:

*Relations between Russia and China are assuming priority precedence in our country's foreign relations ... [and that the talks between him and his Chinese counterparts were] ... marked by the contacts which have taken place previously, and primarily by the brief but extremely full meeting between Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin and PRC State Council Premier Li Peng in New York this past January [have] set the tone for good neighborly, smooth and normal relations between the two powers.*"<sup>238</sup>

Foreign Minister Kozyrev's entourage included the leaders from the Russian provinces that bordered China, and industrial and business personnel as well.<sup>239</sup>

In contrast to the views of some Western analysts, including Legvold and Wilson, Chinese foreign minister Qian Qichen characterized this visit as a very positive step towards better relations between the two countries, writing: "During this *successful meeting* of the leaders of the two countries in January this year, *China and Russia achieved a greater common*

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<sup>237</sup> In his memoirs, Kozyrev wrote: "I had satisfaction from the thought that one of my first foreign trips in the capacity of the Foreign Minister of Russia was a visit to Beijing in March 1992." Andrei V. Kozyrev, *Preobrazhenie [Transformation]* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1994) p. 240. This demonstrated the importance of China to the Russian Foreign Minister, a fact that has not been appreciated by some of his critics.

<sup>238</sup> Vladimir Kashirov and Georgiy Shmelev, "Kozyrev Visits China, Meets with Qian Qichen," ITAR TASS, 18 March 1992 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-SOV-92-053. Italics added. Kozyrev's comments that relations between Russia and China were assuming a "priority precedence" in Russia's foreign policy are of note because this declaration preceded the re-evaluation of Russian foreign policy that took place in November 1992 by eight months.

<sup>239</sup> This fully coincided with Kozyrev's position that the regions should play a positive, constructive role in a democratic Russia's foreign policy.

*understanding on developing the Sino-Russian partnership of good-neighborliness and friendship.*"<sup>240</sup> Kozyrev's response stressed the continuity of Russian relations with China, which nicely corresponded with Lukin's recommendations in December 1991:

Russo-Chinese relations did not start from nothing. They have a foundation. In the past, the Russian Federation supported the normalization of Soviet-Chinese relations. Russia's foreign policies are aimed at balancing Russia's foreign relations by developing friendly relations with the Western countries and Russia's neighboring countries, especially China. As for its relations with China, Russia values the past and stresses the future. Russia is more than willing to further develop economic and trade relations with China.<sup>241</sup>

These were more than just words. Russian actions provided a solid foundation for Kozyrev's statement that relations with China were now of "priority precedence" in Russian foreign policy thinking. The official Russian publication *Diplomaticheskii Vestnik*, echoing the statement earlier made by President Yeltsin, noted that this visit "... demonstrated the balance of Russia's foreign policy both in the West and East."<sup>242</sup>

The Russian diplomatic press reported that:

... the exchange of views on international themes *underlined the concurrence or closeness of the positions of Russia and China on many issues, such as the appraisal of the role of the United Nations, tendencies in the Asia-Pacific region, the Cambodian settlement, the Korean peninsula, and other issues.*<sup>243</sup>

This episode clearly shows that while Russia's pro-Western orientation was capable of hindering Russo-Chinese relations to some extent, it was better described as a minor irritant, and not a hinderance, to the development of friendly Russo-Chinese relations. This was because

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<sup>240</sup> Qian Qichen, *Ten Episodes*, p. 179, emphasis added.

<sup>241</sup> Qian Qichen, *Ten Episodes*, p. 179. Again no Russian record of this meeting's discussions were included in either Diplomatic Herald or the Collection of Foreign Policy documents from this period.

<sup>242</sup> ROSSIIA - KITAI: "Vizit A.V. Kozyreva v Kitaiskuiu Narodnuiu Respubliku" [Visit of A.V. Kozyrev to the Chinese People's Republic], *Diplomaticheskii Vestnik*, No. 7. 15 April 1992, p. 19.

<sup>243</sup> "ROSSIIA - KITAI: Vizit A.V. Kozyreva v Kitaiskuiu Narodnuiu Respubliku [RUSSIA-CHINA: The visit of A.V. Kozyrev to the People's Republic of China] *Diplomaticheskii Vestnik*, No. 7. 15 April 1992, pp. 19-20. Emphasis added.

pragmatic concerns and common interests influenced and shaped both countries' policies and contributed to better relations. As Kozyrev noted at the same meeting:

*Russia's relations with Taiwan are an example of its pragmatic approach. They should develop on a nongovernmental basis, and the character of these relations with the island as maintained by the majority of other states. They should not cause 'political damage' to ties with China.*<sup>244</sup>

Kozyrev's comments on Russian and Chinese disagreement on human rights, which some journalists and scholars have stressed in describing this meeting, are worth quoting in full:

... human rights and democratic institutions are part and parcel of our reforms. That is why we, out of our own considerations for the building of democracy, are interested in developing international cooperation. China ... maintains the concept of noninterference in internal affairs with which we are familiar from previous years, *and human rights issues are subordinate to this concept*. The sides, however, uphold a single view that interstate relations between the two powers should develop, first and foremost, in the interests of political and economic security. Elements of essential accord are combined here with a difference in approaches to certain quite significant issues, but this is done without excessive dramatization or confrontation.<sup>245</sup>

Chinese sources also stressed the positive aspects of this meeting. On March 16, the Chinese newspaper *Xinhua* reported that: "Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said today in Beijing that China attaches importance to its ties with the Russian Federation and hopes to promote cooperative relations in line with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence." He also stated that at the meeting between President Yeltsin and Premier Li Peng at the United Nations the previous January, both sides has signed minutes of the talks which stressed that adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the basic principles of the two Sino-Soviet

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<sup>244</sup> Vladimir Kashirov and Georgiy Shmelev, "Kozyrev Visits China, Meets with Qian Qichen," ITAR-TASS. 18 March 1992, emphasis added.

<sup>245</sup> Vladimir Kashirov and Georgiy Shmelev, "Kozyrev Visits China, Meets with Qian Qichen," ITAR-TASS. 18 March 1992.

communiques “... *provided and will continue to provide a solid foundation for promoting relations between China and the Russian Federation.*”<sup>246</sup>

### ***“Taiwan Troubles” September 1992: Kozyrev to the Rescue***

As Russo-Chinese relations progressed, there were still occasional problems caused by Russia’s western orientation. One of the most serious incidents involved Russo-Taiwanese relations. First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Lobov, one of Yeltsin’s long-time associates from his Sverdlovsk days, managed to persuade Yeltsin to sign a decree on the establishment of a Moscow-Taipei commission on 2 September 1992.<sup>247</sup> The fact that Yeltsin could support such a proposal, which contradicted the foundations of Russian and Soviet relations since the Gorbachev-Deng summit of 1989, and had been affirmed by diplomatic officials of the new Russian Federation, including Kozyrev, Kunadze and Lukin, and had also been affirmed by President Yeltsin himself, provides an example of a common feature of Boris Yeltsin’s method of rule. Throughout his career he had frequently improvised policy on the spot, ignoring previously agreed upon ideas, and philosophies, according to most scholars who have analyzed his style of governance, and more importantly, to those who worked for and with him.

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<sup>246</sup> “Qian Qichen Meets with Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev,” *Beijing Xinhua in English*, March 17, 1992, emphasis added. It is highly significant that neither the Russians nor the Chinese characterized these talks as some journalists and academics have as a forum for Russian disagreements with China over human rights issues. On the contrary, both Russian and Chinese sources note the many areas of cooperation and agreement between the two powers. There is no evidence I have seen of Kozyrev “lecturing” the Chinese on human rights. Incidentally, neither of the two scholars who made these claims, Legvold and Titarenko, provided sources for these comments.

<sup>247</sup> Oleg Ivanovich Lobov has served as Secretary of the Sverdlovsk Regional Party Committee, and served in President Yeltsin’s government as First Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Economics, and the Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council. Lobov was also associated in facilitating the establishment of a Japanese religious cult, Aum Shinrikyo, which had committed acts of terrorism in Japan, in the Russian Federation. See Alessandra Stanley, “Russians Shut Down Branch of Japanese Sect,” *The New York Times*, 30 March 1995, <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/30/world/russians-shut-down-branch-of-japanese-sect.html> accessed on 15 March 2018. His motivations here could hardly be described as ideational, as he was extremely conservative (which in the Russian context of that time meant Communist leaning) in his political views!

This sudden reversal of policy was a classic case of Yeltsin's ruling style<sup>248</sup> and threatened to overturn all the progress that had been made in establishing good relations between the Russian Federation and the Peoples Republic of China. Oleg Lobov was a strange engine for improved relations with Taiwan. He was identified as an arch-conservative in Yeltsin's immediate circle, who had been a colleague of Yeltsin's since his time leading the Party Oblast Committee in Sverdlovsk. According to Radchenko, Lobov, who frequently traveled to Taiwan to meet with high-ranking Taiwanese officials, may have been provided with "generous financial inducements" from the Taiwanese to make this decree happen.<sup>249</sup>

A week later, this story was leaked to the media. The Chinese response was immediate. Chinese ambassador to Russia, Wang Jinqing, immediately demanded an explanation from Kozyrev. This put the Russians, who were preparing for Yeltsin's visit to China in December, in a difficult situation, and they acted quickly in response to the Chinese protest. According to one Russian journalist, "Yeltsin's original decree was torn to pieces in front of the Chinese Ambassador."<sup>250</sup>

It was in fact "the Westernizer" Andrei Kozyrev who first advised Yeltsin to correct this error, and maintain the traditional "One China" policy.<sup>251</sup> In opposing Yeltsin's sudden intervention in the course of Russo-Chinese relations, Kozyrev had the support of most of the other bureaucratic

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<sup>248</sup> Timothy J. Colton, *Yeltsin: A Life* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), p. 325. This information came from an interview Colton had with Livshits on 19 January 2001. Livshits had served as the Presidential Administrations analytical center deputy head in April 1992, working group leader for operative analytical support to constitutional reform in 1993, the Russian president's expert team leader, economic adviser to the president from 1994-1996, finance minister from 1996 to 1997, presidential administrations deputy head 1997 to 1998, and presidential special representative to the Group of Eight (G8) in 1999.

<sup>249</sup> Radchenko, *Unwanted Visionaries*, p. 353.

<sup>250</sup> Ivan Shomov, "Vostok vsegda manil Olega Lobova," [The East Always Beckons Oleg Lobov] *Segodnya*, 26 April 1997 quoted in Radchenko, *Unwanted Visionaries*, p. 353.

<sup>251</sup> Eugene Bazhanov, "Russian Foreign Policy Toward China," in Peter Shearman (ed), *Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995, p. 177.

entities that had some responsibility and influence in the development of Russian foreign policy. This episode alarmed many Russian officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the Ministry of Defense and in the Foreign Intelligence Service. Due to both external and internal pressure, Yeltsin abandoned any trace of a pro-Taiwanese policy, repudiating both the commission itself and Lobov's pro-Taiwanese views. Sergey Radchenko noted that: "Yeltsin's decree [on Taiwan] prompted serious objections not only from the Russian Foreign Ministry but from other ministries and agencies, including the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign Intelligence Service ... if [Yeltsin] was influenced in his decision by the likes of Lobov, he also listened to people like Lukin and to the Foreign Ministry and the intelligence chiefs."<sup>252</sup>

On 15 September, Yeltsin released a new decree which stated that Russia adhered to the "One China" policy. As Radchenko noted, with this event "The honeymoon between Russia and Taiwan was over,"<sup>253</sup> and Russia was drawn closer to the People's Republic of China. In this case, Foreign Minister Kozyrev took the lead in correcting Yeltsin's pro-Taiwan policy. In doing so, Kozyrev was articulating a well-established policy that enjoyed broad support from the other foreign policy making institutions.<sup>254</sup> The supposed Westernist liberal, Andrei Kozyrev, acted to protect a well-developed relationship with the People's Republic of China from interference from a close colleague of the Russian President, who at times was able to influence his boss.

Events like this clearly demonstrated that Russo-Chinese relations had a momentum of their own that transcended the views of Yeltsin and his immediate circle. Russian bureaucratic institutions such as the Foreign Ministry, the military and the National Intelligence Council, were quick to defend Russian support for the traditional Chinese position on Taiwan, which was one

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<sup>252</sup> Sergey Radchenko, *Unwanted Visionaries*, pp. 194-195.

<sup>253</sup> Sergey Radchenko, *Unwanted Visionaries*, p. 194.

<sup>254</sup> Eugene Bazhanov, "Russian Foreign Policy Toward China," p. 177.

China, and exerted pressure on Yeltsin to back down in relation to Taiwan which he promptly did. As Radchenko noted: "...the story with the Taiwan decree showed Yeltsin's policy making at its most erratic and inconsistent. However, as the Taiwan episode suggests, there were strict limits to Yeltsin's unpredictability, defined by a fairly traditional interpretation of Russia's 'national interests,' which through all the changes between 1982 and 1992, remained essentially unchanged."<sup>255</sup> But it should also be stressed there that this was also the consistent policy of Kozyrev's supposedly Westernist-dominated Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and it was in fact Kozyrev who first alerted Yeltsin to the fact that Lobov's policy needed to be repudiated as quickly as possible. This occurred and it led to Russian re-affirming its commitment to the "one China policy," and to good relations between the two countries. Kozyrev's correction of Yeltsin on this point is a clear demonstration that even the "poster child" of Russia's adoption of Western liberal values,<sup>256</sup> could actually be guided by realist principles in terms of policy.

## **Phase II: Balanced Relations: December 1992- August 1994:**

### ***Yeltsin's Visit to Beijing in December 1992:***

Yeltsin's visit to Beijing in December 1992 was the pivotal event in the Sino-Russian relations in the 1990s, because it was largely seen by some analysts as marking a direct departure from the pro-Western orientation of Kozyrev's Foreign Ministry. More importantly, almost all analysts agree that it laid the foundation and groundwork for the strategic partnership that was achieved in April 1996. However, what some scholars fail to note is that this summit also built on the

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<sup>255</sup> Sergey Radchenko, *Unwanted Visionaries*, p.194-195.

<sup>256</sup> Andrei P. Tsygankov in his study of Russian reactions to US foreign policy ideas, such as Francis Fukuyama's and Samuel P. Huntington's, *Whose World Order? Russia's Perception of American Ideas after the Cold War*, wrote that in this initial post-Cold War period, "For several years, Russia was to become a laboratory for a pro-Western Liberal experiment." p. 75. Tsygankov identified Andrei Kozyrev, Yegor Gaidar and early Boris Yeltsin as exemplars of Russian Westernist liberal thought.



previous relations between the Russian Federation and the PRC, carefully and mutually laid by Kozyrev and Qian Qichen in the twelve months prior to the summit.<sup>257</sup>

### ***A New Approach: A Revision of Westernism in November 1992***

In the fall of 1992 other aspects of Yeltsin's and Kozyrev's pro-Western foreign policy were under attack in the State Duma, and the Westernist course was being officially reappraised by some of the Yeltsin Administration's key thinkers. Russia's continued, and growing, frustrations with the lack of the anticipated positive Western response to this policy led to pressures, as Wishnick reported "... within the Yeltsin camp—by figures such as State Councillor Sergei Stankevich and Vladimir Lukin, then Russia's ambassador to Washington—to formulate a 'Eurasian' alternative to Kozyrev's 'Atlanticist' foreign policy."<sup>258</sup> This was particularly true of policy towards the states of the Commonwealth of Independent States and in relation to policy towards Japan, but there was little to no criticism of Kozyrev's foreign policy towards China.<sup>259</sup> This reassessment did not lead to a change in the substance of Russo-Chinese relations, but it did lead to a greater emphasis and stress on Russo-Chinese relations in public statements than had previously been the case. In terms of actual policy toward China, however, what actually occurred was that the "quiet diplomatic" course was dropped in favor of a louder one.

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<sup>257</sup> See for example the venerable Soviet Far Eastern specialist and diplomat Mikhail S. Kapitsa's memoirs, M.S. Kapitsa, *Na Raznykh Parallelyakh: Zapiski Diplomata*, [On different parallels: Notes of a Diplomat] (Moscow, Kniga i Biznes, 1996), p. 119-120, he stated: Contacts widened at the highest level. In December 1992 with the official visit to the PRC by the Russian Federation's first president, B.N. Yeltsin. The duration of the visit was shortened due to internal problems in Moscow, but nonetheless, the visit was successful. More than 20 documents were signed the most important among these was the Joint Declaration ... These comments, from the Soviet Union's most venerable Asian specialist at that time provide an interesting contrast to those of Titarenko.

<sup>258</sup> Elizabeth Wishnick, *Mending Fences*, p. 123

<sup>259</sup> See "Russia: Kozyrev and Foreign Ministry Under Fire," Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FB PN 93-048 (3 February 1993). This compilation of Russian press reports critical of Kozyrev's direction and management of foreign policy does not include any attacks on his foreign policy towards China.

Changes in Russian policy due to internal opposition and reappraisal of the previous pro-Western direction impacted Yeltsin's visit to China in December 1992, and opened the door to *increased* Russo-Chinese cooperation that went well beyond the terms of the "quiet partnership." Hereafter, Russo-Chinese relations would be more open and better publicized, but there was actually no re-orientation of policy, as some scholars have assumed or even claimed. The Chinese were also growing closer to Russia in their foreign policy thinking. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated just before the summit that progress made in Russo-Chinese relations "... rules out confrontation and at the same time *does not rule out an alliance*."<sup>260</sup>

Many scholars argue that the Russians waited until late 1992 to embrace the Chinese. Jeanne Wilson, who has probably written the best study of Russo-Chinese relations under Kozyrev, wrote: "After the first few months of 1992, Kozyrev suppressed his tendencies to criticize the Chinese for their errant ways, presiding over the strengthening of the relationship."<sup>261</sup> Another prominent and well-informed American scholar, Gilbert Rozman echoed this view, writing: "In September 1992 President Yeltsin abruptly shifted direction, canceling a visit to Japan at the last moment and turning towards China instead."<sup>262</sup> While the re-evaluation of Russia's Westernist course in November 1992 undoubtedly played a role in Yeltsin's priorities, it can also be argued that the December 1992 summit was simply the consummation, and a louder proclamation, of Kozyrev's earlier policies towards China, and not the "abrupt shift" in policy Rozman notes.

There was an abrupt shift in relation to the West, but not in relation to China. The achievements

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<sup>260</sup> *South China Morning Post Weekly*, 5-6 December 1992, p. 7 quoted in Hung P. Nguyen, "Russia and China : The Genesis of an Eastern Rapallo," *Asian Survey*, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3, March 1993, p. 301, emphasis added. Considering the traditional Chinese aversion to alliances, such as statement, if actually made, was quite surprising and indicated the very close nature of Russo-Chinese relations at that time.

<sup>261</sup> Jeanne L. Wilson, *Strategic Partners*, p. 193.

<sup>262</sup> Gilbert Rozman, "Russia in Northeast Asia: In Search of a Strategy," in Robert Legvold (ed.), *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century & the Shadow of the Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 355.

of the December 1992 would have been impossible without the foundations laid from the summer of 1990 up to the time of the summit, and could not suddenly arise out of an abrupt shift in policy in November to December 1992.

Furthermore, it must also be noted that for Kozyrev, there was nothing inconsistent about simultaneously building ties with both the Western powers and strengthening Russo-Chinese relations. Months before the November 1992 re-appraisal, Kozyrev wrote in the prestigious American foreign policy journal *Foreign Affairs*, a statement on Russian foreign policy in Asia which is worth quoting in full:

The geopolitical location and historical role of Russia as a bridge between West and East predetermine its active “Eastern policy.” Here I would limit myself to mentioning the Asian and Pacific region, and area characterized by a uniquely dynamic development. Among our priorities is to finalize the normalization of relations with Japan on the basis of a peace treaty, including a solution to the territorial issue. *We see good prospects in our relations with China as well. It is in our interests to have an economically strong China, posing no threat to Russia. On a broader scale all this should help achieve a balanced interrelationship in the “rectangle” comprising Russia, the United States, Japan and China, thus contributing to greater stability and cooperation in Asia and the Pacific.*<sup>263</sup>

Rozman was absolutely correct to note the importance of the cancellation of Yeltsin’s visit to Japan in September 1992 on subsequent Russian foreign policy. But even the plans for the aborted mission to Japan demonstrate that the course of Russian foreign policy would have focused on Russo-Chinese relations even if Russian foreign policy had not been re-evaluated and the so-called “extreme” Westernist path not been rejected. The diplomatic record prior to this reappraisal of Russia’s foreign policy was in fact focused on both West and East. To

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<sup>263</sup> Andrei Kozyrev, “Russia: A Chance for Survival,” *Foreign Affairs*, 71. 2 (Spring 1992), p. 15. The idea of balance between East and West can clearly be seen in the *conduct* of Russo-Chinese relations under Kozyrev’s tenure. In 1996, he said: “A long history proves that any attempts by Russian leaders to play the “Chinese card” against the West, or the “Western card” against China, is damaging to our national interests. Russia’s attraction, its power and its independence, its very weight in international affairs arises from its geopolitical position as a Eurasian power with one foot in both East and West. To tilt too far one way or the other undermines that, and Russia loses on both fronts.” Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, “Playing Russia’s China Card (the Russian Elections)-Interview, *New Perspectives Quarterly*, 1 June 1996, Volume 13, No. 3.

Kozyrev and the liberal Russian MFA, good relations with the United States did not preclude good relations with China. According to historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, a Russian source told a reporter for the Japanese newspaper *Yomiuri Shimbun* that:

Had Yeltsin come to Tokyo as scheduled, he would have proposed a new framework for Asian security based on collaboration among the United States, Russia, Japan, and China. He would have made a commitment to the total demilitarization of the Northern Territories, while proposing denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. He would have advocated closer economic cooperation between Russia and the Asia-Pacific community and asked other nations to accept Russia as a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Such a statement would have ushered in a new age in the Asia-Pacific security environment.<sup>264</sup>

Even if these objectives would have been difficult to accomplish, the fact that such a speech was prepared for the Russian President *before* Yeltsin's visit to Japan *solidly refutes any idea that Russian foreign policy before the reevaluation in November 1992 lacked an emphasis on Asian affairs*, or as some, such as Mikhail Titarenko have argued, ignored Asia altogether.

In October 1992, Deputy Foreign Minister, and head of Asian policy, Georgii Kunadze, visited China to prepare for the December summit. While in China, Kunadze also discussed border issues with Chinese diplomats and brought representatives of the foreign ministries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to discuss border issues. This indicates an important, and pragmatic concern to prevent clashes with China over the issues of Chinese economic expansion into Central Asia. Qian Qichen's statement to Kunadze over the course of Russian and Chinese diplomacy is worth quoting at length:

I said to Kunadze: "After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China and Russia carried over the achievements made by China and the Soviet Union since the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, and discarded the negative elements. *Therefore, Sino-Russian relations keep progressing on the basis of complete equality, peaceful coexistence,*

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<sup>264</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations: Volume 2, Neither War nor Peace, 1985-1998* (Berkeley, University of California at Berkeley Press, 1998), p. 466. Professor Hasegawa was referencing an article in *Yomiuri Shimbun* from 2 September 1992.

*and mutual benefit. We believe that Sino-Russian relations will be healthier and more normal than Sino-Soviet relations.”*<sup>265</sup>

This statement, made by the Chinese Foreign Minister, who was also a specialist in Chinese-Russian relations, shows that criticisms of Kozyrev’s foreign policy towards China such as those leveled by Russian academics such as Migranian and Titarenko (and indeed claims made by Kozyrev’s successor as foreign minister, Evgeny Primakov, and today’s defenders of Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy) are unfair and mischaracterize Russo-Chinese relations during Kozyrev’s tenure as Foreign Minister.

The Russo-Chinese summit took place from 17 to 18 December 1992. Almost all scholars of Russian relations with China stress that the Russo-Chinese summit of 1992 set the future course for relations between the two countries. At this meeting Yeltsin declared: “We want balanced relations in Europe and Asia alike.”<sup>266</sup> Though this sentiment had been reflected in earlier Sino-Russian meetings and declarations since the collapse of the USSR, the fact that it came from the President himself made the declaration more important. Chinese President Yang Shangkung reciprocated these comments, stating:

We have every reason to promote friendly relations. Since both China and Russia are now facing the task of developing their national economies, establishing stable relations of good-neighborliness, friendly cooperation, and mutual benefit seems all the more imperative. *The present trade volume between China and Russia has already surpassed the Sino-Soviet record, and this is a good beginning.*<sup>267</sup>

At this meeting Russia and China also exchanged instruments for the ratification of the eastern border agreement, which was an important step forward in bilateral relations. Despite disagreements over Taiwan and human rights, which were of great interest to journalists, the

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<sup>265</sup> Qian Qichen, *Ten Episodes*, p. 181.

<sup>266</sup> Elizabeth Wishnick, *Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow’s China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2001), p. 123. See also M.S. Kapitsa, *Na Raznykh Parallelyakh*, p. 119-120.

<sup>267</sup> Qian Qichen, *Ten Episodes*, pp. 185-186, emphasis added.

foundations for improved relations based on mutual pragmatic interests were strengthened. As Sergey Radchenko wrote, in December 1992 Yeltsin "... was already in Beijing on a journey that would take the Sino-Russian relationship on a new path toward 'strategic partnership.'"<sup>268</sup> US analyst of Chinese foreign policy, John W. Garver noted that "Yeltsin's December 1992 visit to Beijing began the process of building a new strategic partnership, the Joint Communiqué signed by Jiang Zemin and Yeltsin during the visit provided that China and Russia were 'friendly countries,' that 'neither party would join a 'military or political alliance' against the other, 'sign any treaty or agreement with a third country prejudicing the sovereignty and security interests of the other party, or allow its territory to be used by third country to infringe on the sovereignty or security interests of the other party.'"<sup>269</sup>

Most importantly, at this summit, the Russians and the Chinese concluded a series of agreements, including the "Memorandum Concerning Mutual Understanding Between the Governments of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China Concerning the Issue of Mutual Reductions of the Armed Forces and Strengthening of Trust in the Military Areas in the Border Region," and the "Joint Declaration of the Conditions of Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and the Chinese People's Republic."<sup>270</sup> These documents laid out the following issues:

1. Acceleration of work on border force reduction and confidence building measures, aiming to sign a document within two years that would reduce troops in the border zone region to a minimum by the year 2000;
2. Russian assistance with the construction of two nuclear power plants in China;

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<sup>268</sup> Sergey Radchenko, *Unwanted Visionaries: The Soviet Failure in Asia at the End of the Cold War* (London: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 189.

<sup>269</sup> John W. Garver, *China's Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*, pp. 542-543.

<sup>270</sup> Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation], *Vneshniaia Politika Rossii: Sbornik Dokumentov 1990-1992* [*The Foreign Policy of Russia: A Collection of Documents, 1990-1992*], [hereafter *MID RF VP*] documents number 262, 263, pp. 575-579.

3. Renovation of Chinese arms industries built by the Soviet Union in the 1950s; and
4. Chinese credits for the delivery of corn to Russia over a two year period.
5. Russia would provide China with uranium-enrichment technology for its nuclear program.<sup>271</sup>

More importantly, the joint declaration established the future framework for Russo-Chinese relations, and declared that Russia and China "... regard each other as friends."<sup>272</sup> The two sides also agreed not to enter into any alliances against at each other with third parties.

Possibly in response to Yeltsin's mishandling of the declaration on Taiwan the preceding September, the Joint Statement unambiguously declared that:

The Russian Federation proceeds from the understanding that the government of the Chinese Peoples Republic is one legal government, representing all of China, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. Russia does not maintain official inter-governmental relations and contacts with Taiwan. Economic, scientific-technical, cultural and other connections between Russia and Taiwan are carried out on an unofficial basis.<sup>273</sup>

Chinese scholar Li Jingjie stated that because Yeltsin's first trip to China "occurred before the post-Cold War honeymoon between Russia and America had ended, the summit and joint communique issued by Chinese and Russian leaders did not touch on international questions."<sup>274</sup> However, the statement did reflect several general international principles which served as a basis for Russo-Chinese agreement. For example, in a clear reference to United States foreign policy, the two sides both affirmed the importance of the United Nations in the international arena:

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<sup>271</sup> *MID RF VP, 1990-1992*, documents 262, 263, pp. 575-579. Elizabeth Wishnick, *Mending Fences*, p. 124. The numbered summaries used here are taken from Wishnick's account.

<sup>272</sup> *MID RF VP, 1990-1992*, documents 262, 263, pp. 575-579.

<sup>273</sup> *MID RF VP, 1990-1992*, document 262, p. 576. Again, this statement may have been the result of the MFA to reign in Yeltsin's earlier missteps in relation to Taiwan. It is quite possible that this statement was an effort by the MFA to restrain future governmental interference in the conduct of Russo-Chinese relations.

<sup>274</sup> Li Jingjie, "Pillars of Sino-Russian Partnership," *Orbis*, Fall 2000, p. 535.

The sides support increasing the role and authority of the United Nations, and the effective realization of the goals and principles of the UN's statutes, strict observance of the norms of international law, the maintenance of international law and security, and the prevention of armed conflicts. The sides will implement active mutual consultations within the framework of the United Nations. They attach great significance to the consultations and cooperation within the frameworks of the UN Security Council, between its permanent members.<sup>275</sup>

Russia and China also denounced hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and in the world at large

The sides emphasize that Russia and China are not striving for hegemony in the Asia-Pacific Region and the other regions of the world and come out against other forms of hegemony and political force.<sup>276</sup>

This renunciation of hegemony was highly significant, because it represented a clear and unambiguous Russian Federation renunciation of what was seen in China as traditional Soviet policy in the Pacific region, and an embracing of a long-held Chinese policy of opposition to hegemony in the Asian-Pacific region. In essence, Yeltsin and Kozyrev were embracing a norm of Chinese foreign policy which had been held since the 1950s. The Treaty of Friendship and Peace between Japan and the Peoples' Republic of China, signed on 29 September 1978, had contained an anti-hegemony statement directed against the USSR.<sup>277</sup> This Russian-Chinese agreement was not directed against a third country, and the diplomatic importance of Russian support for an anti-hegemony clause represented a revolution in Russian foreign policy thought, one that Gorbachev had been unable to articulate, let alone translate into policy. As Garver noted "By including an anti-hegemony clause in the 1992 joint communique, Beijing universalized anti-hegemony, thereby draining it of its anti-Soviet essence. It pointed, in fact,

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<sup>275</sup> *MID RF VP, 1990-1992*, document 263, p. 576.

<sup>276</sup> *MID RF VP, 1990-1992*, document 262, p. 576.

<sup>277</sup> "Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People's Republic of China," 29 September 1972, Wikisource, [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Treaty\\_of\\_Peace\\_and\\_Friendship\\_between\\_Japan\\_and\\_the\\_People%27s\\_Republic\\_of\\_China](http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Peace_and_Friendship_between_Japan_and_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China). Accessed on 1 June 2015. Section II of the Treaty declared: "The Contracting Parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony." For an account of Chinese insistence upon an anti-hegemony clause, directed at the Soviet Union, in the negotiations leading to the Sino-Japanese treaty of 1978, see Ezra Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping*, p. 295.



toward a PRC-Russian coalition against US unipolar domination, implicitly targeting such US moves as linkages of China's MFN to human rights status, acceptance of the East European states into NATO, ballistic missile defense, and so on."<sup>278</sup>

The two agreements that were produced at the December 1992 summit were pivotal for the future of Russo-Chinese relations because they solidified the gains in the two states' relations, and laid the foundation for further agreements. Following this summit, Russo-Chinese relations continued to broaden and deepen in some significant areas. For instance, in April 1993 ten Russian nuclear scientists arrived in China to assist Chinese scientists in developing nuclear reactor technology.<sup>279</sup> Bilateral ties rapidly increased in economic, business, industry and military connections. These connections only grew stronger with time, and they came to undergird positive Russo-Chinese relations. As Lowell Dittmer claimed: "The recent but painstakingly institutionalized network of bilateral ties has proved remarkably durable."<sup>280</sup> Veteran Soviet diplomat, Mikhail Kapitsa, who has spent almost his entire career dealing with Soviet relations with Asia, characterized this summit as follows:

Contacts widened at the highest level. In December 1992 with the official visit to the PRC by the Russian Federation's first president, B.N. Yeltsin. The duration of the visit was shortened due to internal problems in Moscow, but nonetheless, the visit was successful. More than 20 documents were signed the most important among these was the Joint Declaration ..."<sup>281</sup>

Kapitsa's impressions of the summit are shared by almost all scholars on Sino-Russian relations who have examined this issue. The December 1992 summit set the general course for the future trajectory of Sino-Russian relations that has endured to the present day.

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<sup>278</sup> John W. Garver, *China's Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China*, p. 543.

<sup>279</sup> Elizabeth Wishnick, *Mending Fences*, p. 125.

<sup>280</sup> Lowell Dittmer, "The Sino-Japanese-Russian Triangle," p. 13.

<sup>281</sup> Mikhail Kapitsa, *Na Raznykh Parallelakh*, pp. 119-120.

Frustrations and disappointments in Russian relations with the United States and the West drove the Russian Foreign Ministry closer to China. In 1994 Clinton Administration policies towards Russia alienated even many Western-leaning Russian policy-makers, let alone those who favored a more independent, less Western-friendly, foreign policy. By mid 1994, NATO, due to American pressure, formally announced an intention to expand eastwards to include former Warsaw Pact members into the alliance system.<sup>282</sup> As Li Jingjie wrote “Moscow perceived this as a plot to drive Russia out of Europe. The US also announced that it opposed any special rights for Russia in relation to the Commonwealth of Independent States, and began establishing better relations with several of these countries.<sup>283</sup> A Russian journalist at the time wrote: “The significance of China ... for Russia’s future is not easy to doubt. *Under circumstances where it has to lose its illusions towards the West and competition with the United States will very possibly grow more intense, Russia must forge contacts with China.*”<sup>284</sup>

More importantly, many Russian officials and journalists were becoming openly critical of Russia’s pro-Western foreign policy. As Evgenii Bazhanov noted: “It became a common belief among Russians that the West had failed to become a reliable ally, instead treating Moscow as a potential adversary which should be checked and isolated through expansion of NATO to the

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<sup>282</sup> See James M. Goldgeier, *Not Whether but When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1999). On January 12, 1994 President Clinton declared to the heads of the Visegrad leaders in Prague: “Let me be absolutely clear: The security of your states is important to the security of the United States ... while the Partnership is not NATO membership, neither is it a permanent holding room. It changes the entire NAP dialog so that now the question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members but when and how.”

<sup>283</sup> Li Jingjie, “Sino-Russian Partnership,” p. 535.

<sup>284</sup> E. Zanegin, “Trump Card,” *Pravda*, No. 22 (1994), p. 3 cited in Li Jingjie, “Sino-Russian Partnership,” p. 535. Emphasis added.

East and other methods.”<sup>285</sup> Other institutions which had a role in the formulation and execution of Russian foreign policy strongly supported the course of pursuing good relations with China.

This growing disenchantment with American policies was paralleled by an almost identical process in China. Public polling in China, conducted by the Chinese Youth Party in May 1995 indicated at 87.5 % of Chinese respondents believed that the United States was the “least friendly” country towards China, even more so than Japan.<sup>286</sup> A book published in 1996 called *China Can Say No*, that became a best seller in China, and was even considered by one survey to be the most influential book in the period after 1993, characterized the US as follows:

Far from championing ideals in the world, the United States was an arrogant, narcissistic, hegemonic power that acted as the world’s policeman; now it was doing everything in its power to keep China from emerging as a powerful and wealthy country.<sup>287</sup>

Thus, public opinion in both China and in Russia concerning the United States was converging. This convergence was reflected in official diplomacy of both countries and helped to deepen and strengthen Russo-Chinese ties. As John W. Garver noted: “Both Beijing and Moscow felt the United States was using its vast, historically unprecedented position of unipolarity to trample

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<sup>285</sup> Evgenii Bazhanov, “Russian Perspectives on China’s Foreign Policy and Military Development,” in Jonathan D. Pollack and Richard H. Yang (editors). *In China’s Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1998. [http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf\\_proceedings/CF137](http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF137). Accessed 21 April 2015.

<sup>286</sup> Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen, “The Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign Policy: Does ‘Public Opinion’ Matter?” in David M. Lampton (ed.), *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 161.

<sup>287</sup> Joseph Fewsmith and Stanley Rosen, “The Domestic Context of Chinese Foreign Policy: Does ‘Public Opinion’ Matter?” pp. 163-164. This opinion sounds almost identical to a number of Russian opinion pieces on the United States and the West in general during this time, and this view has continued up to the present. It can be noted that Vladimir Putin has made many similar comments about the United States’ intentions towards Russia since Russian seizure of the Crimea in 2014, most notably in his address to the Federal Assembly in 2018.

on their interests. They joined together to counter perceived US moves that injured their mutual interests.”<sup>288</sup>

Russian relations with the Japanese, a prominent plank of Russian Westernist foreign policy, had also reached an impasse. The planned Russo-Japanese summit, scheduled for 9 September 1992 was cancelled at the last minute, four days before it was supposed to begin, due to Russian internal opposition to Yeltsin’s foreign policy in the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. This greatly offended the Japanese, and also surprised the world.<sup>289</sup> The summit actually occurred from 11 to 13 October 1993, but it failed to resolve the existing territorial dispute between Russia and Japan, and thus was seen by many as a failure. As Tsuyoshi Hasegawa wrote:

There are two fundamental problems that prevented Russia and Japan from finding common ground on the territorial question during this period. The first, the most important cause, was Japan’s intransigent position on what the Japanese call the ‘Northern Territories problem ... The second important cause, not as important as the first, was of Russian political development since the August coup [of August 1991]. The Russian domestic situation made any resolution of the territorial question exceedingly difficult, since Yeltsin and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) had to face nationalistic opposition within Russia to any territorial concessions.<sup>290</sup>

Yeltsin’s and Kozyrev’s hopes for improved relations with the Japanese thus foundered on both unrealistic Russian expectations in relation to the Japanese, and equally important, strong domestic opposition within Russia’s nascent democratic institutions and from Russian bureaucratic bodies that dealt with foreign and defense policies. This was in marked contrast to Russian policies toward China, which enjoyed broad support among Russian institutions that played a role in the formulation of foreign policy. This incident also served to sharply

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<sup>288</sup> John W. Garver, *China’s Quest: The History of the Foreign Relations of the People’s Republic of China*, pp. 544-545.

<sup>289</sup> Kimi Hara, *Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945: A Difficult Peace*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998) p. 204. See also Radchenko, *Unwanted Visionaries*, pp. 270-303.

<sup>290</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, “Why Did Russia and Japan Fail to Achieve Rapprochement in 1991-1996?” in Gilbert Rozman (ed.), *Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path of Normalization*, pp. 168-169.

underscore the domestic fragility of the liberal-democratic position in Russian politics and foreign policy. This failure in relation to the Japanese made agreement with China more necessary and compelling. This process was greatly facilitated by the fact that Kozyrev's foreign policy towards China was largely uncontested within the Russian bureaucracy and public opinion.

### **Phase III: Constructive Partnership: Jiang Zemin's visit to Moscow in September 1994**

Jiang Zemin's trip to Moscow in September 1994 was highly significant because it was the first time a Chinese president had visited Russia since 1957. At this summit, the Chinese agreed to Yeltsin's suggestion to upgrade their relationship to a "constructive partnership"<sup>291</sup> and the two countries agreed that cooperation between Russia and China would "without doubt be a top priority."<sup>292</sup> As Wishnick noted, while Beijing had previously been committed to an independent foreign policy since 1982, "... concern about growing American unilateralism inclined the Chinese leadership to favor a closer relationship with Moscow. Beijing agreed to this new formulation because the partnership would be sufficiently limited to preserve China's freedom of maneuver."<sup>293</sup> This nicely corresponds to the realist view of balancing in the international system. As Kenneth Waltz wrote: "Externally, states work harder to increase their own strength, or they combine with others, if they are falling behind. In a competition for the position of leader,

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<sup>291</sup> Wishnick, *Mending Fences*, p. 126. The Russians also believed that the expansion of NATO eastwards was a direct contradiction of promises the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany had given the Soviet Union that if the USSR removed its 380,000 troops from East Germany, NATO would not advance one inch further east. See Mary Elise Sarotte, *1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 204-209.

<sup>292</sup> Legvold, *Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle*, p. 50.

<sup>293</sup> Wishnick, *Mending Fences*, p. 126.

balancing is sensible behavior where the victory of one coalition over another leaves weaker members of the winning coalition at the mercy of the stronger ones.”<sup>294</sup>

At the summit meeting, Yeltsin and Jiang signed an agreement on the demarcation of their Western border, and agreed not to target each other with nuclear weapons, declaring a no first-use policy in relation to nuclear arms.<sup>295</sup> Yeltsin stated that the two countries had “... a need to build these relations on the basis of the national interests of the two countries, to resolve complex questions and to find the opportunity to combine two great world civilizations—western and eastern.”<sup>296</sup> The meeting resulted in two important documents, a Joint Russian-Chinese Declaration, and a Joint Announcement. In the Joint Russian-Chinese Declaration, published after the meeting, the Russian and Chinese Ministries of Foreign Affairs declared:

The sides steadfastly affirm adherence to the principles outlined in the Joint Russian-Chinese Declaration from 18 December 1992, and with full determination, turning to the Twenty-First Century, to raise the relations of the two countries to a qualitatively new level ... to fully discover and exploit the significant potential of Russo- Chinese cooperation, to create favorable conditions for assistance in resolving large-scale issues for the conduct of internal transformation and economic development in both countries, and for the formation of a firm peace in the Asian-Pacific Region and on a global level.<sup>297</sup>

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<sup>294</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 126. This description perfectly captures the Russo-Chinese rapprochement under Qian Qichen and Andrei Kozyrev if it is remembered that China was actually part of the winning coalition that defeated the Soviet Union in the Cold War. For other realists on balancing, see Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 187-197; John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pp. 138-140, 267-272.

<sup>295</sup> A Chinese source told a Japanese journalist that “This is the first time China will sign a document with a nuclear state on pledging a no-first use of nuclear strikes.” “PRC President Jiang Zemin Visits Moscow, 2-6 September 1994, Tokyo Kyodo in English, 21 September 1994, JPRS-JAC-94-012.

<sup>296</sup> ITAR TASS, 3 September 1994, in *FBIS (PRC)*, 6 September 1994, cited in Wishnick, *Mending Fences*, p. 126.

<sup>297</sup> *MID RF VP, 1994, Kniga [Book] 2*, document 168. Sovmestnaia Rossissko-Kitaiskaia Deklaratsiia [Joint Russian-Chinese Declaration], 3 September, 1994, p. 275.

This meeting expanded upon the December 1992 summit because the Chinese and Russians went beyond declarations of mutual support, and agreed to cooperate both in Asia and on the world stage to further the causes of stability and security:

The signatories confirm the intention to strengthen multifaceted constructive cooperation in regional and world affairs, considering this cooperation an important factor for the maintenance of stability and security in Asia, and in general it helps facilitate a more healthy situation in the world.<sup>298</sup>

The Constructive Partnership was thus intended, at least in part, to signal a Russian-Chinese intention to actively work together on the world stage for stability and security, in cooperation with the United Nations, though the two sides declared that the Partnership was not directed against any third country.<sup>299</sup> Ambassador of China, Igor Rogachev stated in an interview that was broadcast in China:

It is hard to overestimate the significance of President Jiang Zemin's visit to the Russian Federation ... the visit is very timely ... It will lay the beginning of a new stage in the development of relations between Russia and China and for a qualitatively new level of these relations. We are now talking about a constructive partnership between China and Russia, a partnership which is being projected into the 21st Century.<sup>300</sup>

For both domestic and international reasons, Russian relations with China became an important and central element of the foreign policies of both countries on the world stage.

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<sup>298</sup> *MID RF VP, 1994, Kniga [Book] 2*, document 167, Soobshchenie Vizite Predsedatelia Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respubliki Tzian Tseminia v Rossiui [Report of the Visit of the President of the People's Republic of China, Jian Zemin to Russia], p. 274.

<sup>299</sup> *MID RF VP, 1994, Kniga [Book] 2*, document 168, pp. 277, 275. A similar clause had also been a prominent feature of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1978. Interestingly enough, despite this clause, for the Chinese the treaty had definitely been directed against the USSR. See Vogel, *Deng Xiaoping*, pp. 295-297. To extend this historical analogy further, it can be argued that the anti-hegemony clause of the Constructive Partnership was in fact directed against the unilateralist trend in US foreign policy which had been an integral part of US diplomacy since the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991.

<sup>300</sup> TAKE ALL-Rogachev on Jiang Zemin's Moscow Visit, "Main Parts of a recorded interview with Igor Rogachev, Russian ambassador to the PRC by an unidentified China Radio correspondent from the "Current Affairs" rubric. *Beijing China Radio International* (in Russian). 30 August 1994.

### ***June 1995: Li Peng's Official Visit to Russia***

The Constructive Partnership was reaffirmed during Premier Li Peng's state visit to Moscow in June 1995. What is important to note in this period is that this strengthening and further development of Russo-Chinese relations was occurring *before* the Russian Federation had abandoned its liberal premises in its policies towards the West.

From 25-28 June 1995 China's Premier Li Peng visited Moscow on an official visit. Li Peng held conversations with Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, and also the President of the State Duma, I.P. Rybkin. The Joint Russian-Chinese Communique, signed by both Li Peng and Viktor Chernomyrdin on 26 March 1995, stated that these conversations were "... conducted in a friendly, constructive atmosphere, in the spirit of mutual respect and trust." The discussions were notable for their "...wide and deep exchange of views in relation to Russo-Chinese relations and international problems ... [and] the visit was crowned with great success."<sup>301</sup>

The document proposed several Russo-Chinese joint projects, including a bridge over the Amur River, but also touched on larger diplomatic issues. In probable response to tensions with the United States over the Taiwan question,<sup>302</sup> the document stated that Russia firmly supported the Chinese position of One China that was acknowledged in the Russo-Chinese Joint Declaration of December 1982:

The representative of the Russian government and the Premier of the State Council of the PRC exchanged information on the internal situation in both countries. From the

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<sup>301</sup> *MID RF VP, 1995*, Sovmestnoe Rossiisko-Kitaiskoe kommunike [Joint Russian-Chinese Communique] document 85, p. 289.

<sup>302</sup> On 22 May 1995 President Clinton gave permission to Lee Teng-hui, who Qian Qichen characterized as the "Head of Taiwan authorities," but whose actual title was President of Taiwan, to pay an unofficial visit to the United States. This invitation elicited an immediate response from the Chinese, who claimed that by issuing this invitation, the United States had broken a promise they had made to China. This created a firestorm in US-Chinese relations. See Qian Qichen, *Ten Episodes*, pp. 243-251.



Russian side it was confirmed that their position on the Taiwan issue is unchanged from the Joint Declaration of general relations from 1992. The Chinese side expressed its full understanding of the activity of the Russian side in the maintenance of one country, supporting social-political stability.<sup>303</sup>

In terms of general policy the Joint Communiqué reaffirmed the Russo-Chinese Joint Partnership, and noted:

The signatories highly value the active and mutually beneficial cooperation of the two countries in different areas in conformity with the principles affirmed in the two Russo-Chinese declarations, in the spirit of the appeal of the Constructive Partnership for the twenty-first century. The signatories are greatly certain that this development of Russo-Chinese relations not only answers the core interests of the two countries and peoples, but is also an important factor for strengthening stability and cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region and the entire world. <sup>304</sup>

The communiqué further declared that the Russo-Chinese Constructive Partnership was an important factor in world peace and stability:

... the exchange of opinions concerning international issues revealed the concurrence or similarities of the positions of the two countries concerning the general situation in the world. The signatories declared their support for the stepping up of consultations and dialogues concerning actual contemporary problems, for the strengthening of multi-faceted constructive cooperation and mutual support of Russia and China in regional and global affairs...<sup>305</sup>

At this meeting, Russo-Chinese relations were deepened and extended. This process was leading towards the Strategic Partnership.

#### **Phase IV: September 1995 - January 1996: Preparing for the Strategic Partnership**

In September 1995 Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visited Moscow to make arrangements for Yeltsin's upcoming visit to Beijing, scheduled for November 1995. The Russians and Chinese prepared a number of documents, including a new document on confidence building measures in the border area, which built on the confidence building document signed on 18 December

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<sup>303</sup> *MID RF, VP, 1995*, Document 85, p. 291.

<sup>304</sup> *MID RF VP, 1995*, Document 85, p. 290.

<sup>305</sup> *MID RF VP, 1995*, Document 85, p. 291.

1992, but this time expanded the dialogue to include Russia's and China's Central Asian neighbors as well. This would pave the way for the formation of the Shanghai Five in 1996.<sup>306</sup> The two countries also noted their similar views on the international situation at that time, and called for "... a common vision for a multipolar world order" and advocated a stronger role for an independent and balanced United Nations,<sup>307</sup> which amplified a similar statement made in the Russo-Chinese Joint Statement of 18 December 1992. What differed was that this declaration reflected Moscow's and Beijing's mutual and increasing disillusionment with American unilateralism.

Due to President Yeltsin's health problems, the anticipated Russo-Chinese summit had to be postponed, and was not held until 24-26 April 1996, three months after Kozyrev's resignation as Foreign Minister. At this summit, the two sides upgraded their relationship to "Strategic Partnership," in which Yeltsin and Jiang affirmed that Russia and China "... were entering into a new stage of partnership, based on equality and trust, and directed toward strategic cooperation in the 21st century."<sup>308</sup>

The well informed scholars of East Asian international relations, Gilbert Rozman, Koji Watanabe, and Mikhail Nosov argued:

In the second half of 1992, Yeltsin began to rethink Russia's lean toward the West, and by 1994 Russia had committed itself to an Eastern strategy in pursuit of its national interests. Yeltsin began to pursue a partnership with China as the centerpiece of Russia's Eastern diplomacy. With the appointment of Evgenii Primakov as foreign

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<sup>306</sup> See Benjamin Thomas Flake, *The Silk Road Initiative and Sino-Russian Relations in Central Asia: Demolishing the Condominium?* Thesis presented to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of Master of Arts, University of Virginia, May 2017.

<sup>307</sup> Quoted by Elizabeth Wishnick, *Mending Fences*, p. 128.

<sup>308</sup> Rossiia-KNR, Vizit B.N. Yeltsina v KNR, *Diplomaticheskii Vestnik*, No. 5 (May 1996), p. 16, cited in Wishnick, *Mending Fences*, p. 129

minister, these ties were upgraded to a “strategic partnership,” with stress on a multipolar world.<sup>309</sup>

However, this survey of events challenges this characterization of Russian eastern policy in the early 1990s on two important points. First of all, Russia did not suddenly reorient its policy in a more pro-Eastern (and pro-Chinese) direction in late 1992. While Rozman, Watanabe and Nosov are absolutely correct that at this time, the Yeltsin administration began to question and re-think its pro-Western policy, no such rethinking occurred in relation to China. The foundations for Yeltsin’s visit to Beijing in December 1992 merely continued the trends that had characterized Russo-Chinese relations since the summer of 1990. Secondly, the strategic partnership between the two countries was not the work of Evgeniy Primakov. It is clear based on all evidence that the foundation for this partnership had been laid by Kozyrev’s Foreign Ministry, and the strategic partnership *was largely Kozyrev’s achievement*, despite the fact that it was consummated by Kozyrev’s successor Primakov. Had Yeltsin not been sick in November of 1995, the strategic partnership would probably have been declared then, while Kozyrev was still Foreign Minister, and the true origin of the strategic partnership would not be in doubt.

### **Other Factors in Strengthening Russo-Chinese Relations**

Russo-Chinese relations were bolstered during this period by a burgeoning economic cooperation. Mikhail Titarenko claimed that:

By the time the relations with China recovered the trade turnover was negligible, and we had to recapture it. Our institute spared no effort to awaken the government and other structures to the problem. We wrote piles of reports and published volumes of research papers and books only to hear *from Mr. Gaidar* “China is a totalitarian state, and we are a democratic country. We have nothing to learn from China; we have no common business with a totalitarian regime.”<sup>310</sup>

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<sup>309</sup> Gilbert Rozman, Koji Watanabe, and Mikhail Nosov, “Introduction,” in Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail Nosov, and Koji Watanabe (editors), *Russia and East Asia: the 21st Century Security Environment*, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 5.

<sup>310</sup> Mikhail Titarenko, “Russia in Asia,” p. 130, emphasis added. It should be pointed out that Gaidar had no role in the formation and execution of foreign policy.

This anecdote, if true, shows that Mr. Gaidar had no idea what was then going on economically between Russia and China, which is unlikely, though Titarenko did accurately report Gaidar's general view of the PRC. According to Russian Asian specialist Evgeny Bazhanov, trade and economic cooperation during this time was "... the most dynamic element of Russo-Chinese relations."<sup>311</sup> In the last year of the Soviet Union's existence, trade volume had decreased by 37% in comparison to 1990. However, in 1992, according to Bazhanov it "... shot back up and broke the record for Russo-Chinese trade. The two sides exchanged goods worth \$US 5.5 billion dollars. Two-way trade again rose sharply, to more than \$US 7 billion in 1993."<sup>312</sup> Thus, counter to Titarenko's claims, the fact is that during the height of Westernist influence in Russian foreign policy-making, Russo-Chinese economic ties reached an all-time high historically.

This upsurge in trade was accompanied by an uptick in economic cooperation. Western analyst Lowell Dittmer confirmed Bazhanov's statistics, and claimed that: "Trade (much of it informal border trade) expanded vigorously in the wake of the collapse of the USSR in 1990-1993m reaching \$5.8 billion in 1992 and \$7.8 in 1993 as inhabitants of Siberia and the Russian Far East turned to Chinese traders amid the collapse of Soviet commercial infrastructure." In February 1994 "... Russia enacted new import duties and visa requirements (with PRC concurrence) to regulate the uncontrolled influx of both commodities and people. This caused Russo-Chinese trade to plunge by nearly 40 percent in the first half of 1994."<sup>313</sup> Increased regulation led to initial declines, but by the late 1990s and early 2000s began to recover and grew again. The point here is that under Kozyrev's tenure as Foreign Minister, Russo-Chinese trade actually soared, and decreased in 1994 due to Russian and Chinese cooperative efforts to regulate it in some way.

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<sup>311</sup> Eugene Bazhanov, "Russian Policy Toward China," p. 172.

<sup>312</sup> Eugene Bazhanov, "Russian Policy Towards China," p. 173.

<sup>313</sup> Lowell Dittmer, "The Sino-Japanese-Russian Triangle," p. 15.

## Other Institutions and Kozyrev's China Policy

One essential factor in the Kozyrev MFA's success in building stronger ties with the Peoples' Republic of China was the general lack of opposition from other bureaucratic and political entities. Russo-Chinese relations under Kozyrev demonstrate that at least in this one policy area both the Foreign Minister and the MFA maintained effective control and management of foreign policy. This point is made very clear by Kozyrev's ability to contain and repudiate Yeltsin's support for Oleg Lobov's efforts to establish official relations with Taiwan, which if not repudiated, would have destroyed the burgeoning Russo-Chinese relationship.<sup>314</sup> This was made possible by the almost universal support for strengthening Russo-Chinese relations among Russian bureaucratic institutions that were involved in the conceptualization, implementation and maintenance of Russian Foreign Policy.<sup>315</sup>

This is also true for those institutions that reflected Russian public opinion. Similarly, most of the regional governments in the Russian Far East enthusiastically supported Kozyrev's policies towards the People's Republic of China, even if some had reservations concerning the expansion of Chinese influence in the region. The rapidly expanding, and non-government sanctioned, economic ties between the two countries augured well for improved relations, even if some Russians in the Far East worried about the presence of millions of ethnic Chinese in the region, and feared the rapidly expanding Chinese military presence in the region.

There was some opposition to improving ties with China expressed by members of the Russian military establishment. This was made abundantly clear, when Pavel Grachev's successor as Minister of Defense, Igor Rodionov referred to China as a potential military threat to China in

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<sup>314</sup> Sergey Radchenko, *Unwanted Visionaries*, pp. 194-195.

<sup>315</sup> See Eugene Bazhanov, "Russian Foreign Policy Toward China."

December 1996.<sup>316</sup> Though this statement was made a year after Kozyrev had left the Foreign Ministry, it indicated that there was apprehension among at least some members of the Russian General Staff concerning Russia's increasing reliance on China as a diplomatic counterweight to the United States.<sup>317</sup> Rodionov was forced to clarify his comments, and he was removed as Minister of Defense shortly after making these comments, but for the most part, Russian military opposition to China was and is not universal, nor is it advanced by military institutions against Russian foreign policy. Furthermore, increasing ties with China's military was strongly supported by Russia's politically and economically powerful military-industrial complex, who had much to gain in establishing strong military ties with China. In the post Cold War era, both the collapse of the Russian economy and the loss of the Warsaw Pact allies, meant that China suddenly became a welcome partner to Russian military industrialists, who needed Chinese money to keep research and development efforts going.

This is in marked contrast to Kozyrev's policies towards both Russians in the Near Abroad, and policy towards Japan, where some regional governments strongly contested Kozyrev's policy. As Evgeny Bazhanov wrote in 1995: "The positive policy toward China enjoys a solid base of support within Russia. Indeed, it is probably the only issue upon which there is a consensus within the turbulence of Russian society."<sup>318</sup>

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<sup>316</sup> Jeanne L. Wilson, *Strategic Partners*, p. 193.

<sup>317</sup> Russian desire to use China as a counterweight to the United States is offset somewhat by concerns that China could use Russian-provided military technology against the Russians someday in the future, that Chinese penetration into Central Asia could threaten Russia's national interests, and that the massive influx of Chinese nationals into the Russian Far East could destabilize Russian control over this region. Thus, Russia has both strong incentives and disincentives in establishing good relations with China, and there are similar limits on China's relationship with Russia. This dissonance is best described in Bobo Lo's excellent *Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008).

<sup>318</sup> Eugene Bazhanov, "Russian Policy Toward China," p. 166.

## Conclusion:

In reviewing Russian foreign policy towards the People's Republic of China during Andrei Kozyrev's tenure as Foreign Minister, it is abundantly clear that claims that Kozyrev abandoned an effective China policy in favor of a more Western orientation are demonstrably false. It can be seen in existing Chinese and Russian diplomatic sources that Kozyrev's foreign policy successfully established and maintained good relations with the PRC at a very difficult period for both countries,<sup>319</sup> despite ideological differences, thus providing convincing evidence for the argument that Kozyrev's diplomacy was not held hostage to unrealistic pro-Western views. It furthermore shows that Kozyrev was in fact capable of making pragmatic adjustments to his foreign policy in order to further Russian interests. This view of Kozyrev seriously challenges most existing scholarship on Kozyrev's tenure as foreign minister, including the work of both Simes and Primakov,<sup>320</sup> and would demonstrate that even some of the general studies that have covered Kozyrev's foreign policy, such as Tsygankov's,<sup>321</sup> and even Mankoff's,<sup>322</sup> have lacked nuance, and may be in need of revision.

Even at the height of Westernist hegemony within the Russian Foreign Ministry, in December 1991, Yeltsin sent envoy Vladimir Lukin to China to assure the Chinese leadership that the Russian Federation had good intentions towards China despite the new leadership's claims

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<sup>319</sup> For the difficulties facing Chinese foreign policy during this time, see Samuel S. Kim, "Chinese Foreign Policy After Tiananmen," *Current History*, September 1, 1990, pp. 245-282. See also John W. Garver, "Chinese Foreign Policy: the Diplomacy of Damage Control," *Current History*, September 1, 1991, pp. 241-246. The difficulties faced by the Russians are attested to by nearly every publication on Russian foreign policy that deals with this period.

<sup>320</sup> Dimitri K. Simes, *After the Collapse: Russia Seeks its Place as a World Power* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), Evgeniy Primakov, *Gody v Bol'shoi Politike [Years in Big Politics]* (Moscow: Sovershenno Sekretno, 1999), pp. 210-211.

<sup>321</sup> Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity* (Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2013).

<sup>322</sup> Jeffrey Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return to Great Power Politics*, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009).

concerning human rights and its Westernist course in foreign policy. This actually was simply the consummation of the foreign policy that the Kozyrev-led MFA of the RSFSR had conducted before the dissolution of the USSR in late December 1991. Once the Russian Federation's MFA had succeeded and replaced the Soviet Union's MFA, Russia continued to build on this foundation and progressively advanced Russo-Chinese friendship in a series of summits and meetings. Interestingly, this happened concurrently when the Russian MFA was guided by strong Westernist impulses. It is also true that in this case both the RSFSR MFA and the members of the former USSR MFA agreed on the broad terms of the policy and successfully built on the foundations that had been laid by the Soviet MFA under Gorbachev.

In effect, in this early period, Kozyrev pursued parallel policies towards China: an open and public policy which seemed to put less emphasis on China than the Soviet Union had, in favor of good relations with the West and Japan, and a second, less publicized, policy which quietly sought to ensure open communication and quiet cooperation between the PRC and the Russian Federation. Later, as the failure of Kozyrev's Westernist liberal foreign policy became more evident, Kozyrev and Yeltsin altered course towards the West (but only slightly towards China), and strived for a more even-handed, balanced foreign policy towards East and West. This was clearly demonstrated during Yeltsin's state visit to Beijing in December 1992, the same month the liberal Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar was fired by Yeltsin. Both domestic and foreign policy shifted to the right, and this new stated policy of "balance" set the future course of Russian foreign policy towards China, and prepared the foundations for the Strategic Partnership that was achieved a few months after Kozyrev's resignation as Foreign Minister.<sup>323</sup>

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<sup>323</sup> As has been pointed out above, the Strategic Partnership could have been concluded while Kozyrev was still Foreign Minister. The Yeltsin-Zemin meeting was scheduled for November 1995, but had to be cancelled due to Yeltsin's poor health.



In explaining the achievement of the strategic partnership, a number of trends seem prominent, and are worth reviewing. The first of these is the importance of pragmatism in the foreign policies of both countries, the traditional Chinese focus on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in its foreign policy conduct, and the role of the United States in facilitating Russo-Chinese partnership. They will each be addressed below in turn:

### ***Pragmatism***

Pragmatism on the part of both the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China impacted the relationship from the very beginning. Chinese diplomats and officials may have identified Yeltsin as a “dangerous scum” and a “reactionary,” yet they did not let this prevent them from working with the Russian Federation to establish positive relations.<sup>324</sup> Indeed, pragmatism had guided Chinese foreign policy since Deng Xiaoping had consolidated his power in 1978. In the tumultuous period following the Tiananmen Square massacre, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen skillfully guided Chinese foreign policy according to this principle in regard to relations with Russia throughout his tenure as Foreign Minister. In the case of China, therefore, the fact that it was guided by pragmatism in its relations with the Russian Federation is no surprise.

What may be a surprise is the fact that Kozyrev's foreign policy towards China was also guided by pragmatism. Despite its liberal ideological orientation, the Russian Foreign Ministry, even during the apogee of liberal, Westernist dominance, from June 1990 to the period just prior to the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991, reached out to the PRC to assure its leadership that the Russian Federation would adhere to the agreements established in the late Gorbachev

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<sup>324</sup> Radchenko, *Unwanted Visionaries*, p. 195, Wishnick, *Mending Fences*, p. 257.

period and that it favored building on these achievements. Kozyrev openly declared that the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and not a Russian-derived ideological principle, would form the basis of future Russo-Chinese relations. Once the RSFSR MFA became the Russian Federation MFA, Kozyrev quickly followed up on these promises in both words and deeds. Lukin's recommendation to avoid an overly ideologized approach to China was followed for the most part. This occurred despite the fact that many Russian Westernizers had very negative views of the Chinese. It is remarkable how the two foreign ministers, Qian Qichen and Andrei Kozyrev, subordinated ideological convictions to pragmatic concerns—despite widely different ideologies and policy orientations, yet the record shows clearly that Qian and Kozyrev were essentially in full agreement when it came to the importance of maintaining stable and friendly Russo-Chinese relations.

### ***The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence***

One strength of Chinese foreign policy in relation to both the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation was its adherence to the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” first enunciated by both China and India at the Bandung Conference in 1954. These principles have been a foundation of Chinese foreign policy since that time.<sup>325</sup> These principles were enunciated in most of the agreements signed between China and the Soviet Union, the RSFSR, and later the Russian Federation, and they served as both a justification for the continuation and further deepening of Russo-Chinese relations, and later, a means of criticizing the United States' diplomatic and military efforts to promote and strengthen democracy worldwide. This point is made clear from several of the documents that were issued by the Russian and Chinese

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<sup>325</sup> These five principles are: 1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. *Xinhuanet*, “Backgrounder: Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” [www.chinanews.cn](http://www.chinanews.cn) 2005-04-08. Accessed on 11 April 2015. These Five Principles had also been emphasized in the normalization of Sino-Russian relations in 1989. See also Qian Qichen, *Ten Episodes*, p. 30.

governments during Kozyrev's tenure as Foreign Minister. The joint Russo-Chinese documents produced at Russo-Chinese meetings and summits from December 1991 to November 1995 all affirmed the Five Principles against those who would interfere in others' internal affairs. After 1994, the Russians feared possible western intervention in relation to Chechnya and the Chinese feared possible Western interference and/or intervention in relation to Taiwan and Tibet. The two countries have consistently upheld this principle against Western interventionist concepts and policies from December 1992 to the present time, and as the Clinton and later George W.Bush administrations embarked on openly interventionist foreign policies, this conviction has actually strengthened and deepened over time, which is related to the next variable, the role of the United States in the Russo-Chinese relationship.

### ***The Role of the United States in Facilitating Russo-Chinese Partnership***

Another important causal factor in the strengthening of Russo-Chinese relations was the impact of the United States on the Russo-Chinese relationship. This had been the case historically. The anti-Chinese and anti-Soviet policies of the Reagan Administration in the early 1980s had exerted a similar direct influence on the Soviet Union's foreign policy thinking. This led the Soviets to send out diplomatic feelers to the Chinese in General Secretary Brezhnev's Tashkent Speech of 24 March 1982, and Reagan's anti-Chinese policies led the Chinese to respond favorably to these overtures. Qian Qichen, who lead the Chinese response to this speech noted that after the United States resumed arms sales to Taiwan, "A new framework of relations between China and the United States could be said to have been, by and large, established. The time was ripe to begin to improve relations between China and the Soviet Union."<sup>326</sup>

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<sup>326</sup> Qian Qichen, *Ten Episodes*, p. 2.

This same process can be seen in the 1990s. Hostile US actions in response to the Tiananmen Square crackdown in June 1989 also directly led to improvements in Sino-Soviet relations. According to Radchenko, “The Chinese were taken aback by the extent of the hostility in the West following the crackdown in suppression of student demonstrations. Gorbachev, for his part, sought to exploit China’s insecurity to build up relations with Beijing at US expense. Thus, Washington’s fear of a renewed Sino-Soviet alliance were partially borne out by events, although only because of the policies the Bush Administration itself adopted.”<sup>327</sup> As we have seen Chinese isolation due to the West’s response to the Tiananmen Square crackdown also led the Chinese government to seek positive relations with both the RSFSR, and later the new government of the Russian Federation after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991.

Similarly, the Clinton Administration’s policies in relation to both NATO expansion and the Taiwan question, caused the Chinese and Russians to deepen their relationship and extend it into the conduct of foreign policy. For example, in early 1995 Taiwan’s President, Lee Teng-hui, applied for entry to the United States to attend a reunion at Cornell University, his alma mater. The US granted entry to President Lee, but he delivered a very political speech at Cornell which angered the Chinese. According to US Secretary of State at that time, Warren Christopher, “... Lee’s ‘private’ visit to Cornell that summer went out of bounds, assumed a very political tone, and sent our relations with China into a tailspin ... The Chinese were enraged, claiming that the visit and speech signified a fundamental shift in our one-China approach”<sup>328</sup>

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<sup>327</sup> Sergey Radchenko, *Unwanted Visionaries*, pp. 196-197.

<sup>328</sup> Warren Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, p. 287. Chinese officials had great concerns about President Clinton based on his anti-Chinese rhetoric during the for president against George H.W. Bush. Although Clinton reversed himself on the question of Most Favored Nation Status for China, relations with China remained difficult during the course of his presidency, and perhaps were most difficult during the “Taiwan Strait” conflict in 1995-1996. In early March 1996, President Clinton ordered a carrier battle group to join another one in the region, escalating the crisis. These difficult relations with the U.S. helped provide greater incentive to deepen relations with Russia.

This trajectory eventually set the stage for the Strategic Partnership concluded in April 1996. This need for outside support not only impacted Russian and Chinese diplomatic relations, it exerted great influence Russo-Chinese military relations. In fact, Russian analyst Andranik Migranyan claimed that hostile US policies towards both the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China could lead to a strategic alliance between the two powers. He wrote: "... it is entirely possible that increasing U.S. sanctions on Russia and attempts to contain China will push the two sides into a full-blown alliance."<sup>329</sup> While an open anti-Western alliance between the PRC and the Russian Federation is highly unlikely due to the PRC's consistent renunciation of alliances, and both countries' need for at least some Western support, US policy-makers would be wise to heed the basic point in Migranyan's warning.

In summary, it can be argued that Kozyrev's foreign policy towards China showed a pragmatism marked by consistent trends towards friendship, stable relations, and cooperation, which can best be described by Realist theory. These policy directions were later deepened, strengthened and eventually extended due to both Russian and Chinese responses to Western (largely American) actions. Despite the supposed ideological mistrust between Kozyrev's Westernist allies within the Russian Federation and the government of the Peoples Republic of Chinese, both sides worked to establish mutually beneficial relations that were intended to enhance the international security of both countries, and as time went on evolved into a common cause against an American hegemon that was perceived to be unresponsive to both Russian and Chinese international concerns.

Under Kozyrev's tenure as Foreign Minister, Russo-Chinese relations were stabilized, strengthened and maintained. These improved relations led to a successful defusing of

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<sup>329</sup> Andranik Migranyan, "Washington's Creation: A Russia-China Alliance? The National Interest, 10 July 2014. <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/washingtons-creation-russia-china-alliance-10843> Accessed 21 April 2015.

contending issues between the two powers in Central Asia, best exemplified by the establishment of the Shanghai Five (also consummated after Kozyrev's resignation), composed of China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, which was later to evolved into both the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the CSTO. These institutions helped defuse Russo-Chinese tensions in Central Asia and fostered a peaceful resolution of a potentially destabilizing issue between the two countries. This was a successful policy that resulted from the deliberate actions of Kozyrev as Russian Foreign Minister, but it also succeeded because it was a policy that enjoyed a broad consensus among Russian foreign policy-making institutions.

While Kozyrev did not achieve his overall goal of Russian integration with the West, he did develop, strengthen, and deepen Russo-Chinese relations, setting Russia on the course that resulted in both the Strategic Partnership achieved in 1996 and the current state of Russo-Chinese relations today. As Radchenko argued "... Beijing and Moscow jointly set out on a road towards strategic partnership informed by a shared sense of resentment of the United States, which, in Gorbachev's words, had wished them both ill."<sup>330</sup> This may or not have been the intention of United States policymakers, but their actions towards both Russia and China were perceived as largely hostile, and the result was a stronger Russo-Chinese relationship that has continued to develop and endures today, though it also has its limits, under Kozyrev's and Yeltsin's successors in office.

### **International Relations Theory and Russo-Chinese Relations under Kozyrev**

Jeffrey Mankoff in his survey of Russian foreign policy, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return to Great Power Politics*, argued that the failure of the West to respond to Kozyrev's pro-Western initiatives led to a disillusionment among Yeltsin's cabinet that encouraged the Russian government to form a more realist perspective on Russia's place in the world: "In foreign affairs,

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<sup>330</sup> Sergey Radchenko, *Unwanted Visionaries*, p. 197.

the transition from Kozyrev to Primakov as foreign minister symbolized (but did not cause) the shift to a new approach emphasizing Russia's role as a sovereign Great Power in an anarchic, self-help international system where power, rather than international norms or institutions, remained the *ultima ratio* in international relations."<sup>331</sup> However, the conduct of Kozyrev's foreign policy towards China provides a solid basis to reject this timeline.

As the record of Russo-Chinese relations under Kozyrev's direction from the Fall of 1990 to the beginning of 1996 clearly demonstrate, Russia's shift towards pragmatism, at least in this case, did not occur in 1996, nor was it a response to the failure of the Westernist foreign policy perceived by the Russian leadership in November 1992. It was in fact an ever-present element in Russo-Chinese relations since the fall of 1990 when Kozyrev became foreign minister, and was reflected in the joint statements of Kozyrev and Qian Qichen, official statements from both countries that summarized Russo-Chinese meetings, and especially the official documents that were produced at the Russo-Chinese bilateral meetings at Beijing in December 1992,<sup>332</sup> Jiang Zemin's visit to Moscow in September 1994,<sup>333</sup> and Li Peng's visit to Moscow in June 1995.<sup>334</sup>

If Kozyrev was a pro-Western institutionalist, it would naturally follow that his foreign policy in East Asia would be characterized by an adherence to a democratically-oriented United States-dominated Asian order, and a rejection of what some Russian liberals, such as Egor Gaidar,

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<sup>331</sup> Jeffrey Mankoff, *Russian Foreign Policy: The Return to Great Power Politics*, (Lanham, Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009), p. 5.

<sup>332</sup> "O vizite delegatsii Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR v KNR, 6-13 Dekabria 1991 goda," [Concerning the visit of the Delegation from the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, 6-13 December 1991], GARF: Fond 10026, opis' 5, dela 1253, listy 55-17.

<sup>333</sup> *MID RF VP, 1994, Kniga [Book] 2*, document 168. Sovmestnaia Rossissko-Kitaiskaia Deklaratsiia [Joint Russian-Chinese Declaration], 3 September, 1994.

<sup>334</sup> *MID RF VP, 1995*, Sovmestnoe Rossiisko-Kitaiskoe kommunikatsiia [Joint Russian-Chinese Communique] document 85.

considered a “totalitarian China” as the basis of its policy.<sup>335</sup> Due to the fact that the U.S. during this period enjoyed unprecedented global reach and the ability to apply all sorts of pressure—military, economic, cultural and political—wherever it wanted, a pro-Western Russian Federation, weakened militarily, economically and politically, may be assumed to bandwagon with the United States. Yet this was not the case. If Kozyrev was primarily motivated by a desire to integrate the Russian Federation with the West, bandwagoning with Washington would have been the more reasonable policy for a liberal Russia to pursue.<sup>336</sup> Seen from this perspective, Kozyrev’s policy towards China, which seems to be based upon realpolitik concerns, would seem to be an anomaly.

If, however, the case of Russian-Chinese relations under Kozyrev is considered within the framework of structural (and defensive) realism, and a concern for the balance of power, the policy consistently pursued by Kozyrev from 1991 to 1996 becomes more clear and logical. Russia lacked the relative power of the USSR and, as a result of this, in the East sought to build a strong, multi-faceted, relationship with the PRC, despite the fact that the nascent democratic Russia, at least in its earlier manifestations, from 1991 to 1993, had far more in common with the United States and Japan politically and ideationally. David Hume’s views on the balance of power may provide a clearer insight to the conduct of Russian foreign policy towards China than Immanuel Kant’s ideas of a “pacific union” established among liberal societies.<sup>337</sup> As Kenneth

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<sup>335</sup> Alexander Lukin, “Russia’s Image of China and Russian-Chinese Relations,” *East Asia*, Spring 1999, volume 17, Issue 1.

<sup>336</sup> See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), pp.125-126.

<sup>337</sup> See David Hume, “On the Balance of Power,” XVII (1742), in Charles W. Hendel (ed.), *David Hume’s Political Essays* (New York, The Liberal Arts Press, 1953), p. 142; Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch* (1795), translated with Introduction and Notes by M. Campbell Smith, with a Preface by L. Latta (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1917); Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” *American Political Science Review*, Volume 80, No. 4, December 1986), pp. 1156-1158.



Waltz wrote: “Balance of power politics prevail wherever two and only two requirements are met: that the order be anarchic and that it be populated by units wishing to survive.”<sup>338</sup>

Kozyrev’s foreign policy towards China can best be seen by a desire to maintain Russia’s position in the Far East that cannot be adequately explained by either institutionalist or liberal, Kantian-derived, theories. This also conforms to Waltz’s claim that “...the first concern of states is not to maximize power, but to maintain their positions in the system.”<sup>339</sup> Bandwagoning with the United States probably would have been more consistent with a liberal, Westernist world view, but it would also have greatly limited Russia’s options in the Far East. Indeed, Kozyrev believed that good relations with the United States strengthened Russia’s bargaining power with the PRC, and good relations with China strengthened Russia’s position vis-a-vis the United States. When he was no longer foreign minister in June 1996, Kozyrev was asked about the utility of Russia playing the “China card” against the United States. His reply is worth quoting in full:

A long history proves that any attempts by Russian leaders to play the “Chinese card” against the West, or the “Western card” against China, is damaging to our national interests. Russia’s attraction, its power and its independence, its very weight in international affairs arises from its geopolitical position as a Eurasian power with one foot in both East and West. To tilt too far one way or the other undermines that, and Russia loses on both fronts.<sup>340</sup>

Thus, Kozyrev’s policy towards China conforms to Martin Wight’s first principle of the balance of power, which is that “Power should be distributed throughout the community of states, in such a way that no single state should ever become strong enough to dominate all the rest.”<sup>341</sup> This argument conforms nicely to Lord Palmerston’s argument in favor of the balance of power in 1884:

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<sup>338</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), p. 121.

<sup>339</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 126

<sup>340</sup> Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, “Playing Russia’s China Card (the Russian Elections)-Interview, *New Perspectives Quarterly*, 1 June 1996, Volume 13, No. 3. This can be seen as a far more sophisticated, and diplomatically sustainable, position on Russo-Chinese relations what that held by Vladimir Putin and Sergei Lavrov following the Ukraine crisis in February 2014.

<sup>341</sup> Martin Wight, “The Balance of Power and International Order,” in Alan James (editor), *The Bases of International Order: Essays in Honor of C.A.W. Manning* (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 100.

Balance of power means only this—that a number of weaker states may unite to prevent a strong power from acquiring a power which would seem dangerous to them, and which should overthrow their independence, their liberty, and their freedom of action. This is the doctrine of self-preservation.<sup>342</sup>

The policy that Kozyrev pursued in relation to China from 1990 to 1996 strengthened Russia's freedom to maneuver, and this has been the historical legacy of Kozyrev's foreign policy towards China. By pursuing a consistent policy of friendship and good-neighborliness towards the PRC despite ideological differences, Kozyrev put pragmatism and state interests above ideology.

Kozyrev's foreign policy towards China also shows that counter to the views of some political scientists, the end of the Cold War did not mean the end of realism as a guiding principle to a state's foreign policy. As characterized by John Mearsheimer: "A large body of opinion in the West holds that international politics underwent a fundamental transformation with the end of the Cold War. Cooperation, not security competition and conflict, is now the defining feature of relations among the great powers. Not surprisingly, the optimists who hold this view claim that realism no longer has much explanatory power. It is old thinking and is largely irrelevant to the new realities of world politics."<sup>343</sup> It is perhaps an irony of history that one of the diplomats usually singled out as a representative of the new liberal ascendancy in foreign policy, Andrei Kozyrev, actually formulated and implemented one of the most realist-oriented international relationships in the post-Cold War era, between two countries that could not have been more ideationally different, but this is the only conclusion that can be derived from the existing diplomatic record. Russia's subsequent relations with China have continued along this trajectory. However, one aspect of Kozyrev's Western liberal orientation remained a constant: Kozyrev never put Russia's relationship with China in opposition to Russia's relationship with

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<sup>342</sup> Lord Palmerston, House of Commons, 31 March 1854, *Parliamentary Debates*, 3rd ser., Vol. cxxxii, col. 279, cited in Martin Wight, "The Balance of Power and International Order," p. 101.

<sup>343</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, p. 360.

the United States. In Kozyrev's calculation, good relations with one of these powers strengthened Russia's position with the other.

### Findings:

The findings for this case study based on the five variables identified in the introduction, presented graphically, are as follows.

Variable	China
Continuity	1) Yes. Kozyrev's policy conformed in all particulars to that of his predecessors, Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze 2) Yes. Kozyrev's successor, Evgeniy Primakov continued Kozyrev's foreign policy towards China
Consistency	Throughout Kozyrev advocated strong Russo-Chinese relations based on pragmatism
Opposition from Supreme Soviet	Limited. Some opposition from regional deputies to border treaty agreement
Opposition from Russian Military	Limited
The Yeltsin Factor	Contained. Yeltsin crony, Oleg Lobov, got Yeltsin to support pro-Taiwanese policy, but this was contained due to almost universal support for MFA's policy within Russian bureaucracy and Yeltsin repudiated Lobov's plan

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## **Chapter Three:**

**Kozyrev the Successful Western Institutionalizer and Realist:**

**The CSCE, Russian Pressure, and the Rights of Ethnic Russians and**

**Russian-Speakers in Estonia, 1990-1996**

Of all the foreign policy issues that Andrei Kozyrev dealt with, none best exemplifies the view of him as a Westernist-institutionalist than his policy of defending the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in the Near Abroad. This was one of the most perplexing issues for the new Russian Foreign Ministry following the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. in December 1991, and it was potentially the most explosive. At this time, approximately 25 million ethnic Russians and/or Russian speakers found themselves living as minorities within the non-Russian former republics of the U.S.S.R., which were now independent countries. As Dimitri Simes noted at the time: "... literally overnight 25 million Russians found themselves in foreign countries. In quite a few of those countries, Russians [were] ... either treated as second-class citizens (e.g. in Estonia and Latvia) or [were] ... subject to outright violence (e.g. in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan)."<sup>344</sup> This was an urgent issue that could not be ignored, because for many reasons this diaspora had an important place in the new Russian state's foreign policy, and indeed Russia's developing national identity in the post-Cold War world.<sup>345</sup>

The numbers of ethnic Russians in the non-Russian newly independent states were quite large, and this issue had the potential to destabilize the entire region. According to Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky: "In Kazakhstan Russians made up 38 percent of the population, in Latvia 33 percent, in Estonia 30, in Kyrgyzstan 26, in Ukraine 21 and in Moldova and Turkmenistan 13 percent."<sup>346</sup> The problem was especially acute in relation to the Baltic state of Estonia, whose

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<sup>344</sup> Dimitri Simes, "Reform Reaffirmed: Eurasia at the Crossroads," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1993 Issue 90, p. 43.

<sup>345</sup> See for example, the importance of the identity issue to both post-Cold War Russia's foreign policy and sense of position in the world in Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity, Third Edition* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2013), pp. 1-22. See also Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of Foreign Policy: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow, 1955 and 1999* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002). See also the discussion of this topic in Ilya Prizel, *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 12-37, 153-299.

<sup>346</sup> Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky, *New Nations Rising: The Fall of the Soviets and the Challenge of Independence* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1993), p. 253.

new, post-Soviet government was built on the foundation of a strong ethnic national identity and its newly-established government sought to resurrect the state as it had existed prior to the Second World War.<sup>347</sup> As President Boris Yeltsin wrote in 1993:

After the formation of the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States], various ethnic problems began to make themselves felt. There was the issue of the Volga German autonomy, for example; the Baltic demand for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops; the efforts of the oppressed peoples in the Caucasus for historical retribution and a return of their autonomy—immediately and unconditionally; and so on.<sup>348</sup>

How the new Russian state responded to this issue would have immense impact on the nature of the Russian state and the course of its future foreign policy.<sup>349</sup> Andrei Kozyrev, who had become Foreign Minister of the Russian Soviet Socialist Federated Republic (RSFSR) in October 1990, and Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation after the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. in December 1991, wrote that during this period “The Russian Federation emerged as an independent state with fourteen new sovereign nations on its borders ... Shaping relations with the new nations and with the countries of Eastern Europe formally included in the sphere of Soviet domination would in many respects amount to shaping the future of Russia itself. As Russian Foreign Minister, that would be my task ... The stakes were unprecedentedly high.”<sup>350</sup>

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<sup>347</sup> For an excellent overview of the nationalist basis of the new Baltic states see Nils Muiznieks, Juris Rozenvalds and Ieva Birka, “Ethnicity and Social Cohesion in the post-Soviet Baltic States,” *Patterns of Prejudice*, Volume 47, No. 3 (2013), pp. 288-308. See also, Ted Hopf, “Russian Identity and Foreign Policy in Estonia and Uzbekistan,” in Celeste A. Wallander, *The Sources of Russian Foreign Foreign policy after the Cold War* (Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1996).

<sup>348</sup> Boris Yeltsin, *The Struggle for Russia*, p. 153.

<sup>349</sup> For an insightful article on the relationship between the formation of a Russian national identity in the context of foreign policy making in the early 1990s, see Glenn Chafetz, “The Struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia,” in *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 111, Number 4, 1996-97, pp. 661-688. See also Andrei Tsygankov, *Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*, Third Edition, pp. 1-22.

<sup>350</sup> Andrei Kozyrev, “Boris Yeltsin, the Soviet Union, the CIS, and Me,” *The Wilson Quarterly*, (Fall 2016) <https://www.wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/the-lasting-legacy-of-the-cold-war/boris-yeltsin-the-soviet-union-the-cis-and-me/> accessed 18 November 2017.

Kozyrev believed that the best method to protect the rights of these ethnic Russians was primarily through the use of pre-existing Western norms and standards embodied in Western institutions, such as the Council of Europe, the United Nations, and most importantly, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).<sup>351</sup> In an interview with the Polish journalist, Zdzislaw Kaczynski in the Polish journal *Polityka*, Kozyrev explained that the foundation of his policy towards the Baltics and the other states in the CIS, was to embrace CSCE norms and to encourage other states do so as well:

Russia's role is to *establish civilized CSCE principles in the post-Soviet territory, because this fully conforms to our interests*. Let us take the Baltic countries as an example. Respect for human rights in these countries is important to us not only because of the Russian population there, but also because any ethnic tension could create hotbeds of conflict.<sup>352</sup>

Analyst Glenn Chafetz characterized this view as being central to the Russian liberal conception of foreign policy. He wrote that Russian liberals were "... convinced that a high degree of compliance with norms and rules governs the international behavior of most states. Finally, they place[d] great faith in the ability of diplomacy, *especially involving international organizations and institutions*, to resolve the conflicts that do arise between states, and to enforce international order."<sup>353</sup> Political scientist James Richter noted that this was a characteristic feature of liberal foreign policy in the early Russian Federation:

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<sup>351</sup> In this case, Russia was adopting Western values and principles, in effect a "norm taker" and not a "norm maker." See Hiski Haukkala, "A Norm-Maker to a Norm-Taker? The Changing Normative Parameters of Russia's Place in Europe," in Ted Hopf (ed.) *Russia's European Choice* (New York, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 35-56.

<sup>352</sup> Zdzislaw Raczynski, Andrei Kozyrev, "Kozyrev on Ties with Eastern Europe, Baltics" [Interview with Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev by Zdzislaw Raczynski], "We do not want to alter geography," *Polityka*, 8 September 1993, translated from the Polish by the Foreign Broadcast and Information Service, FBIS-SOV-93-172.

<sup>353</sup> Glenn Chafetz, "The Struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia," *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 111, Number 4, 1996-97, p. 675, emphasis added. This view corresponds nicely with Martin Wight's views of Rationalism and diplomacy. See Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*.

The liberals argued that differences between reasonable individuals can be mediated through the institutions and laws of the state whereas differences between governments can be mediated through such formal international institutions as the OSCE and the United Nations ... the liberals did not relinquish all claims of influence within the territory of the former Soviet Union.<sup>354</sup>

Thus, Kozyrev's policy towards Estonia in relation to the country's Russian-speaking population, was a key test for Russia's new liberal, democratically-oriented, foreign policy. Kozyrev's foreign policy orientation on this issue also demonstrates the impact of system-level factors on the state level. In this case, an existing systemic features of the international system would be used to forward the foreign policy interests of an individual state, the Russian Federation.<sup>355</sup>

In relation to these issues, Kozyrev was guided by his experience as the former head of the Department of International Organizations of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, where he had served from 1974 to 1990.<sup>356</sup> In direct opposition to the historical practice of both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, he strongly advocated the promotion of Western international norms and common membership in Western international institutions as the best solution to these

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<sup>354</sup> James Richter, "Russian Foreign Policy and the Politics of National Identity," in Celeste A. Wallander (ed), *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War*, pp. 78-79. As an overarching description of Russian liberal foreign policy, Richter noted that liberals like Kozyrev: "... appealed to international organizations such as the UN and the ... CSCE to protect Russian speakers accordance with international norms on minority rights, and they asked these institutions to recognize Russia's unique capacity to at as a stabilizing power in Eurasia." (p. 79).

<sup>355</sup> See Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War, with a new preface* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), pp. 80-158, 159-223.

<sup>356</sup> Kozyrev, Andrei Vladimirovich, *Nauchno-Isslovatel'skii Institut Sotsial'nykh sistem* [Scientific Research Institute of Social Systems], Moscow State University named for M. V. Lomonosov, [http://www.niiss.ru/d\\_kozireva.shtml](http://www.niiss.ru/d_kozireva.shtml), accessed 19 September 2017. See also Peter Aven and Alfred Kokh, *Gaidar's Revolution: An Insider Account pf the Reforms in 1990s Russia* (New York: The Gaidar Foundation, 2013), pp. 247-283.



problems.<sup>357</sup> Kozyrev's adherence to Western norms and institutions in the conduct of Russian foreign policy greatly impacted the content of his policy towards the Baltic states, and, in fact, formed the basis of it.<sup>358</sup> This use of the CSCE to work within countries to ensure that they adhered to certain principles of human rights was a remarkable departure from Soviet foreign policy related to the CSCE. According to Dov Lynch, "During the Cold War, Soviet diplomacy

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<sup>357</sup> It is interesting to compare Kozyrev's views on this issue with the Soviet diplomat, Yuri Vladimirovich Dubinin, who was the Soviet diplomat most associated with the establishment of the CSCE, in Alice Nemcova (ed.), *CSCE Testimonies: Causes and Consequences of the Helsinki Final Act, 1972-1989* (Prague: Prague Office of the OSCE Secretariat, 2013), pp. 185-222. Dubinin, who was instrumental in the foundation of the CSCE, had opposed what he considered international interference in a nation's "internal affairs," but greatly promoted the CSCE process as a means of defending a state's borders and territorial inviolability. This dichotomy continued to plague Soviet diplomacy, as Western governments and dissident movements within the Soviet bloc cited the CSCE's principles in opposition to Soviet diplomacy. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1985), Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam Books, 1983), and James Baker, *The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 1989-1992* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995). Brzezinski perhaps best captured the US use of the Helsinki process as a means of applying pressure on the Soviet Union: "I pushed hard and I believe effectively for a more assertive U.S. posture on CSCE ... Through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, we maintained public pressure on the Soviets and their satellites to comply with the provisions of the Helsinki Accords (Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, pp. 297, 300). Carter stated: "In discussing the matter with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in Washington, I clearly stated that we would not interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union but would expect all existing agreements to be carried out, including those relating to human rights. The United Nations Charter; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved by all nations in 1948; and more recently, the Helsinki Agreements were binding on us and on the Soviet Union. When the Soviets signed these documents, they had placed the subject of human rights firmly on the agenda of legitimate discussions between our two nations. Dobrynin responded with something of a smile, that our two nations had different standards." (Carter, *Keeping Faith*, p. 146). Kissinger's one sentence dealing with the Helsinki Accords in his memoirs *Years of Upheaval*, was typical for his realist view of international institutions: "And the remaining issues in what later became the Helsinki Final Act were too abstruse — they were mostly pedantic drafting problems in a collective document — to lend themselves of top-level solutions, though they were discussed inconclusively at considerable length." Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), p. 1165.

<sup>358</sup> Raczynski and Kozyrev, "Kozyrev on Ties with Eastern Europe, Baltics."

contested the use of the CSCE process as a mechanism to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states.”<sup>359</sup>

Kozyrev argued that using the CSCE and other international institutions would be superior to other methods, especially the use of military force, stating: “I believe they will prove far more effective than special militia or troop detachments and other components of an armory which so far has failed to safeguard anyone in our unitary state against persecution on ethnic grounds.”<sup>360</sup>

On 2 August 1992, Kozyrev underlined this point by stating: “The road our opponents propose ... [military intervention, leads]... to an imperial state, a state threatening others, including our CIS neighbors ... [and] is a *dead end, a road leading nowhere, an anti-patriotic road.*”<sup>361</sup> Yeltsin himself also affirmed this view in a speech delivered in Kyiv, Ukraine in November 1990:

Russia does not strive to become a new empire or to receive any advantages in comparison with the other republics, ... *Our relations will be constructed on the principles of noninterference in each other's affairs ... In the mutual relations of republics, there must be no place for force, blackmail, or pressure.* The history of humanity, especially in the twentieth century, has shown that what, at first sight,

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<sup>359</sup> Dov Lynch, “The State of the OSCE,” in the EU-Russian Centre, Russia, the OSCE and European Security, Issue 12 (November 2009), [http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/Review\\_XII.pdf](http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/Review_XII.pdf) Accessed 29 September 2017. Though Kozyrev’s policy was in fact new, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev had acknowledged the primacy of Western, European values. As Hiski Haukkala wrote: “By signing the Paris Charter, Gorbachev signaled the end of a competing Soviet normative agenda for the future development of the European international society. Once again it was Europe’s turn to condition Russia’s place in Europe.” Hiski Haukkala, “A Norm-Maker to a Norm-Taker? The Changing Normative Parameters of Russia’s Place in Europe” in Ted Hopf (ed), *Russia’s European Choice* (New York, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2008), p. 52.

<sup>360</sup> Kozyrev, Padyshev, “Russian Diplomacy Reborn,” p. 126. Hiski Haukkala, “A Norm-Maker to a Norm-Taker? The Changing Normative Parameters of Russia’s Place in Europe,” in Ted Hopf (ed.) *Russia’s European Choice* (New York, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 35-56.

<sup>361</sup> Kozyrev, quoted in Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky, *New Nations Rising: The Fall of the Soviets and the Challenge of Independence* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1993), p. 251, emphasis added. In a similar vein, on 16 July 1992 Kozyrev was quoted in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, the official daily newspaper of the Russian Armed Forces, as follows: “The might of the Russian state will grow as a result of successes in democratic and economic reforms, and not as a result of the flexing of military muscle. Russia is foreordained to be a great power, on the strength of her economic, scientific, technical and cultural potential. But there is only one path to achieve this—the democratic path.”

appeared to be the strongest levers of influence [i.e., intimidation and coercion] have turned out to be the least effective ones.<sup>362</sup>

American political scientist Ted Hopf noted another advantage to this approach, which shows a good understanding of Kozyrev's overall policy: "Russian foreign minister Kozyrev pointed out an extremely important function of international institutions: *They may persuade another country to adopt a position it would never adopt if it had to do so at the hands of a great power like Russia*. In an interview, Kozyrev asserted that the issues separating Estonia and Russia "will be settled only with the opinions of the CE (Council of Europe) and CSCE being taken into account. My hope is that if Estonian leaders consider this criticism calmly—not as some dictatorial instruction from Moscow—then they can start to put the situation to rights with the help of international experts."<sup>363</sup>

The use of Western institutions in this regard was important because the desire to join Western institutions was common among all the former Union Republics of the U.S.S.R., and this was one goal shared by the Russian Federation and the three Baltic Republics. As James P. Nicholl noted: "Admission to the United Nations was an immediate objective for all the new states. They also pursued admission to regional organizations such as the CSCE ... These ties were seen as providing validation of independence and the easiest and least expensive means of establishing diplomatic contacts with important world and regional powers."<sup>364</sup> Kozyrev's

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<sup>362</sup> John B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire*, p. 61. A constant refrain of Yeltsin during this time was that Russia needed to become a normal country, one that abandoned the idea of empire that had been intrinsic to both the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire that preceded it. He explicitly stated "I came to the Presidency with the idea of making a clean break with our Soviet [imperial] heritage, not merely through various reforms but geopolitically, through an alteration of Russia's role as a powerful, long-suffering nation." Boris Yeltsin, *The Struggle for Russia*, p. 36. See also idem, pp. 3-14, 35-36.

<sup>363</sup> Ted Hopf, "Russian Identity and Policy in Estonia and Uzbekistan," p. 166, emphasis added. The Kozyrev quote is from a statement he made on 6 July 1993. David J. Smith noted that the CSCE set the standards in Europe at that time: "... in the sphere of minority rights. Here the EU has relied on mechanisms developed under the auspices of the OSCE and the CoE." David J. Smith, *op. cit.*, 82.

<sup>364</sup> James P. Nichol, *Diplomacy in the Former Soviet Republics* (Westport, CT and London: Praeger Publishers: 1995), p. 172.

preferred policy thus conformed to the political realities of the time, the shared values of the West, and the shared desire of all the post-Soviet states to be integrated into Western institutions. Most importantly, in the confused political situation of Russian politics, both domestic and foreign, of that time, Kozyrev's policy had the full support of President Boris Yeltsin, who declared: "We must, of course, rise out in defense of the rights of Russians. But we must do so through political means only."<sup>365</sup>

### **Kozyrev's "Qualified" Institutional Policy**

Scholars who have characterized Kozyrev as an institutionalist would seem to be justified based on these factors, however, this characterization fails to capture the nuances of Kozyrev's actual policy. Some scholars have cited the views of Eurasianists, statistes, and others who favored a more militarily-oriented solution, as an alternative to Kozyrev's institutionalist approach.<sup>366</sup> This option—as a sole basis of policy—was rejected by both President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev, even though it was shared by a large number of officials and military officers. What many political scientists—and Kozyrev's Russian critics—have failed to appreciate is that Kozyrev made it clear that his preferred policy of using international institutions to defend the rights of ethnic Russians in the CIS was *qualified* by the possible recourse to Russian use of

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<sup>365</sup> Diuk and Karatnycky, *New Nations Rising*, p. 254. Kozyrev made similar statements throughout this period. Interestingly, on the basis of these statements, American scholar and former diplomat, the realist Henry Kissinger claimed in 1994: "The foreign minister of Russia has repeatedly put forward a concept of a Russian monopoly on peacekeeping in the 'near abroad,' indistinguishable from an attempt to re-establish Moscow's domination." Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 815.

<sup>366</sup> See Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russian Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*, Third Edition (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp 1-31; John B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 67-185; Glenn Chafetz, "The Struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia," in *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 111, Number 4, 1996-97, pp. 661-688.

economic pressure, and even military force, if these institutions failed, as early into his tenure as foreign minister as December 1992.<sup>367</sup>

Kozyrev's advocacy of the military option corresponds to Martin Wight's rationalist theory, which he juxtaposes with traditional realism: "On the Rationalist view, the role of force would be simply to remedy the insufficiencies of custom; where the Realist says that custom gives a coating to acts of force, the Rationalist says that forces steps in where custom breaks down."<sup>368</sup> Kozyrev's advocacy of force—as a last resort—has not received the proper attention it deserves in existing literature, but provides further evidence for Allen Lynch's argument that: "... Kozyrev had presided over a Russian diplomacy that was far more complex and balanced than his critics were prepared to accept."<sup>369</sup>

Some scholars have argued that his advocacy of force came later, as a response to internal opposition to his policies,<sup>370</sup> but the diplomatic record clearly shows that in this case at least, his

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<sup>367</sup> Andrei Kozyrev, "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Proposes and Defends a Foreign Policy for Russia: In the Republic's Best Interests, *Rossiiskie Vesti*, (3 December 1992, p. 2) as translated in *The Current Digest of the Russian Press*, No. 48 Volume 44 (30 December 1992), pp. 14-16, emphasis added. This shows fairly clearly that Kozyrev's policy had been based on both his commitment to institutionalist principles and the use of levers of Russian state power to facilitate Russian aims in the region. At that same time, opponents of the Kozyrev line belonging to the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy wrote a report that proposed an alternative foreign policy to the one being pursued by Kozyrev. In relation to the states of the Former Soviet Union the authors of this document, according to Suzanne Crow, advocated an "... enlightened post imperialist integrationist course with the former Soviet republics, countries the authors characterize as enjoying only weak historical legitimacy in terms of territorial delineation, ethnicity, and socioeconomic development. This policy would include 'efforts to preserve and develop intergovernmental structures and an active (if possible internationally sanctioned) participation in preventing and ending conflicts, if necessary even with the help of military forces and preventing any mass and gross violation of humans rights and freedoms,'" Suzanne Crow, *Competing Blueprints for Russian Foreign Policy*, RFE/RL Research Report, 18 December 1992, p. 48. This "alternative" policy actually conforms very closely to the policy that Kozyrev pursued. This report, called "A Strategy for Russia," was published in the newspaper *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* on 19 August 1992.

<sup>368</sup> Martin Wight, *International Theory; the Three Traditions*, p. 39.

<sup>369</sup> Allen C. Lynch, "The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Volume 53, No. 1 (2001), p. 9.

<sup>370</sup> Jack Snyder, "Democratization, War and Nationalism in the Post-Communist States," in Celeste Wallander (ed.), *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (Boulder, CO and Cambridge, MA: Westview Press and the Harvard Russian Research Center, 1996).

advocacy of both international institutions and force, if necessary, as *complementary* means to defend the rights of Russians living in the Baltic states, were both consistent features of his actual position from almost the very beginning of his tenure as foreign minister of the Russian Federation.<sup>371</sup> It is thus, inaccurate—and even misleading—to define Kozyrev’s policy as strictly “institutionalist.” His institutionalism was firmly bracketed within a *realist* framework, where Russian interests were backed by the state’s political, economic, and military power, all power levers which feature prominently in Realist literature on international relations. This view of Kozyrev as an institutionalist within a larger realist framework, corresponds with Wight’s view of Rationalism as a “Via Media” between Realism and Revolutionism.<sup>372</sup>

Failure to appreciate this point leads to the unwarranted comparison of an “early” liberal Kozyrev to a “later,” more conservative Kozyrev. As Jack Snyder wrote: “Yelstin’s foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, spent 1992 and 1993 touting the value of democratic norms in domestic and international affairs, yet by the beginning of 1994 he was forced to jump aboard the nationalist, pro-Serb, neo-imperial bandwagon like virtually everyone else in Russian politics.”<sup>373</sup> This may possibly be true in certain policy areas, such as Russian policy in Yugoslavia, but as has been shown, Kozyrev’s advocacy of the possible use of military force to defend the rights of Russian speakers in the Baltic States could be traced back to December

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<sup>371</sup> This is the point made at the time by Stephen Sestanovich, “Andrei the Giant,” *The New Republic*, 1 April 1994. His argument is even more compelling today, when one reviews the diplomatic record.

<sup>372</sup> This blending of institutionalism and realism could be seen as further support for Martin Wight’s views that international theories are not opposing poles, but actually a spectrum, where any given policy or individual can be placed at various places within the three broad categories depending on the particular issue, that he described in his book *International Theory: The Three Traditions*. It is also consonant with the position of Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, who argued that both realism and institutionalism are thoroughly grounded on the idea of international anarchy. See Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutional Theory,” *International Security*, Volume 20, Number 1 (Summer 1995).

<sup>373</sup> Jack Snyder, “Democratization, War and Nationalism in the Post-Communist States,” in Celeste Wallander (ed.), *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (Boulder, CO and Cambridge, MA: Westview Press and the Harvard Russian Research Center, 1996), p. 35.

1992, which casts great doubt on the accuracy of Snyder's characterization of Kozyrev's foreign policy in general during 1992 and 1993.<sup>374</sup>

The "two Kozyrevs" position was criticized at the time by both Kozyrev himself,<sup>375</sup> and American political scientist Stephen Sestanovich, as being misleading. Sestanovich wrote:

The Russian foreign minister's new tack has led many to speak of two Kozyrevs: the old and the new; the good and the bad; the soft-spoken liberal and the tub-thumping nationalist. *The shorthand can be useful, but in fact the differences aren't all that great. There have always been two Kozyrevs, and if anything they may fit together better now than they used to.* The fit--though it may be temporarily confusing--is good news for those who hope Russia will be a constructive international actor.<sup>376</sup>

In very nuanced and excellent study on identity formation in Russia's Near Abroad, David D.

Laitan correctly noted that while Kozyrev favored the use of Western institutions to defend the rights of ethnic Russians, this essentially institutionalist policy *rested on levers of Russian state power, in this case, economic sanctions*:

Kozyrev ... strongly advocated negotiated political solutions to problems faced by Russians in the near abroad ... He appealed first to international organizations to address issues of protection of rights of Russians living in these republics; and when this failed to put sufficient pressure on states that were violating, in the Foreign Ministry's judgment, human rights, he threatened economic sanctions. Yet increasingly, these policies were seen, from the standpoint of nationalist Russians, as weak.<sup>377</sup>

Laitan failed to mention Kozyrev's support for possible military action, but was entirely correct to note that first of all, Kozyrev's overall policy was actually a hybrid of *institutionalist* and *realist* policies, and secondly, his efforts were seen by the opposition as weak. The opposition, however, did not understand Kozyrev's actual policy, or perhaps equally likely, understood the policy perfectly well but intentionally distorted it to attack the Foreign Minister and hopefully gain

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<sup>374</sup> Jack Snyder, "Democratization, War and Nationalism in the Post-Communist States," p. 35.

<sup>375</sup> Andrei Kozyrev, *Preobrazhenie* [Transfiguration] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnoshenie, 1995), p. 52.

<sup>376</sup> Stephen Sestanovich, "Andrei the Giant," *The New Republic* (New York: 1 April 1994).

<sup>377</sup> David Laitan, *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Population in the Near Abroad* (Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 103.

influence or leverage over it in Russian politics by appealing to nationalism.<sup>378</sup> In characterizing opposition to Kozyrev's institutionalist approach, Glenn Chafetz noted: "Other officials have made ... claims about the inability of liberals to understand the role and need to of military power in defending the Russian diaspora."<sup>379</sup> However, this case at least shows that these criticisms were unfounded and unfair.

### **Kozyrev's Policy was Successful**

It is also important to note that the available evidence shows that Koyrev's policies were actually quite successful in defending the rights of Russians in Estonia from 1991 to 1996, and beyond. First of all, the CSCE clearly helped to dampen and ameliorate a possible ethnic clash between the ethnic Russians and the governments of both Estonia and Latvia. Jack Snyder noted in 1996 that "Elected parliaments in Estonia and Latvia stubbornly insist on restrictive citizenship laws that risk conflict with Russian nationalists and democrats."<sup>380</sup> As Michael Ignatieff wrote in 2001: "Threatened ethno-national conflicts in the Baltic States, *which seemed imminent in 1993 and 1994*, have receded."<sup>381</sup> As John Packer, then Director of the OSCE High Commission on National Minorities noted: "Because of the nature of his work, the High Commissioner's success lies in what did not happen: tensions resolved were crises averted."<sup>382</sup>

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<sup>378</sup> See the introduction to the chapter on Kozyrev by Peter Aven, "Andrei Kozyrev: a Bona Fide Kamikaze," in Peter Aven and Alfred Kokh, *Gaidar's Revolution: An Insider Account of the Reforms in 1990s Russia* (New York: Gaidar Foundation, 2013), pp. 247-248.

<sup>379</sup> Glenn Chafetz, "The Struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia," p. 681. As can be seen from the available record of Kozyrev's statements on this issue, this characterization is inaccurate.

<sup>380</sup> Jack Snyder, "Democratization, War and Nationalism in the Post-Communist States," p. 21.

<sup>381</sup> Michael Ignatieff, "Forward" in Walter A. Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities* (The Hague, London: Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. xiv, emphasis added.

<sup>382</sup> John Packer, "Preface" in Walter A. Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities* (The Hague, London: Kluwer Law International, 2001), xi.



There is a factual basis for the serious possibility of ethnic violence in Estonia in the 1991-1993 period.<sup>383</sup> As Estonian scholar Andrus Park noted: "... many tangible factors seemed to push Estonia in 1991-93 towards ethnic violence. Among these factors were: an ethnically mixed population; the high social cost of economic transition; the sudden drop in the status of certain ethnically identifiable social groups like the Russian-speaking Soviet bureaucracy, the Soviet Army and KGB veterans; [and] the proximity of Russia, which made it very easy to encourage and supply all types of pro-Russian separatist groups."<sup>384</sup> Yet violence did not occur, and in fact, by the late 1990s many of the ethnic Russians had become reconciled with the Estonian government and vice-versa.<sup>385</sup>

Secondly, from the period starting with establishment of CSCE mission in Estonia, the CSCE achieved positive results in defending the human rights of the Russian-speaking population there. As Ted Hopf noted:

... Russians in Estonia ... felt aggrieved by Estonian laws on citizenship appealed to help to the UN, the OSCE and the CE [the Council of Europe] and other organizations, and these appeals got results. In July 1993, after the Estonia parliament passed a 'Law on Foreigners' that more or less made every non-Estonian a noncitizen, the OSCE High Commissioner on Ethnic Minorities, Max Van der Stoep, met with Estonian prime minister Mart Laar. They ultimately agreed that the law was causing apprehension among Russians and the Russian population had not been adequately consulted. Several days

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<sup>383</sup> John Packer, "Preface" in Walter A. Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities* (The Hague, London: Kluwer Law International, 2001), xi. The phrase "dog that didn't bark" is a reference to A. Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes story, "Silver Blaze," in idem, *The Complete Sherlock Holmes By Sir Arthur Conan Doyle* (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1992), pp. 335-349. According to the psychology blog, Psychology, Laws History, "Holmes famously solves the case by focusing on a critical piece of evidence, a guard dog that doesn't bark during the commission of the crime. He concludes "the midnight visitor was someone the dog knew well", ultimately leading to the determination that the horse's trainer was the guilty party. The story is often used as an example of the importance of expanding the search for clues beyond the obvious and visible." <http://www.dangreller.com/the-dog-that-didnt-bark-2/> accessed 1 December 2017.

<sup>384</sup> Andrus Park, "Ethnicity and Independence: The Case of Estonia in Comparative Perspective," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Volume 46, No. 1 1994, p. 69.

<sup>385</sup> It was largely due to this reason that the OSCE Mission in Estonia was closed in 2001.

later, the Estonian president, Lennart Meri, refused to sign the law because OSCE and CE legal experts agreed that it did not conform with the 'European legal system.'<sup>386</sup>

David J. Smith also acknowledged the progressive role of the CSCE in this process. He wrote that in 1997 the Estonian parliament, the *Riigikogu*, considered passing laws that all candidates standing for election and local and national governmental posts must demonstrate proficiency in the Estonian language, and also considered passing discriminatory laws concerning entrepreneurs and employees working in the private sector. Smith wrote: "The former proposal was eventually scrapped, and the latter substantially diluted, after both had elicited criticism from local Russian-speaking political actors *as well as the representatives of the OCSE, the Council of Europe and the EU.*"<sup>387</sup> Smith also wrote that the role of the CSCE and the Council of Europe in 1992 "... doubtless helped to reinforce trends towards pragmatism" in Estonian politics.<sup>388</sup>

The policy of adopting CSCE standards was successful for the Estonians as well, and furthered and facilitated the Estonian goal of becoming integrated with European and world-wide institutions. This conformed to Kozyrev's "good neighbor" policy.<sup>389</sup> As Andrus Park argued:

[C]ompared with many other post-Communist states (Moldova, former Yugoslavia, the Transcaucasian states, even former Czecho-Slovakia) the minorities and citizenship policy of Estonia in 1991-93 appeared to be quite successful: the visible signs of ethnic tensions diminished; violence and active separatism on ethnic ground was avoided;

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<sup>386</sup> Ted Hopf, "Russian Identity and Foreign Policy in Estonia and Uzbekistan," in Celeste A. Wallander, *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War* (Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), p. 166.

<sup>387</sup> David J. Smith, "Minority Rights, Multiculturalism, and EU Enlargements: The Case of Estonia," p.102.

<sup>388</sup> David J. Smith, "Minority Rights, Multiculturalism, and EU Enlargements: The Case of Estonia," p. 96, emphasis added.

<sup>389</sup> At one point, Kozyrev stated that his policy towards the Near Abroad could be characterized by the phrase, "... the better off my neighbor is, the better off I am." See Nicholls, *Russian Diplomacy Reborn*, p. 120.

Estonia's integration into European and other international organizations was generally successful.<sup>390</sup>

Thus, in short, though Kozyrev's overall policy of making the OSCE the central pillar of the post-Cold War era European order was unsuccessful, his policy of defending the rights of ethnic Russians, or as they came to be identified as, the "*Russian-speaking* population" in Estonia was in fact a great success story that has not been adequately acknowledged by scholars of history, Kozyrev's successors in the Russian foreign ministry, or scholars of international relations or international institutions.<sup>391</sup> Due to the success of this policy, which has largely gone unrecognized in almost all the existing literature on Kozyrev's foreign policy, it provides an excellent case study to test institutionalist theory in International Relations scholarship.

### **International Institutional Theory and Kozyrev's Policy**

The successful outcome of Kozyrev's policy for defending the rights of the Russian-speaking populations of Estonia (and Latvia) not only strengthens the case for his foreign policy, it also provides a richly nuanced case study to examine a historical example in light of the academic utility of "Institutionalist theory" within the academic field of international relations. Sara McLaughlin-Mitchell and Paul R. Hensel have identified three prominent views in academic literature on the influence of international institutions on interstate interactions: these three

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<sup>390</sup> Andrus Park, "Ethnicity and Independence: the Case of Estonia in Comparative Perspective," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Volume 46, Number 2, 1994, p. 69.

<sup>391</sup> One study on this question, M. Merrick Yamamoto's *OSCE Principles in Practice: Testing Their Effect on Security Through the Work of Max Van der Stoep, First High Commissioner on National Minorities 1993–2001*, admits that the CSCE's work in Estonia was successful, but does not go into much detail about the key role played by Andrei Kozyrev and the Russian Federation in this process, and is furthermore, based largely on the primary sources on the OSCE's website and secondary sources, but she did not perform research at the OSCE Documents Center. M. Merrick Yamamoto, *OSCE Principles in Practice: Testing Their Effect on Security Through the Work of Max Van der Stoep, First High Commissioner on National Minorities 1993–2001*, (College Park, MD: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, September 2017).

prominent views identify "... a *positive, negative, or null* relationship between international institutions and interstate cooperation.<sup>392</sup>

The positive view is held by institutionalists, including McLaughlin-Mitchell and Hensel themselves, and other scholars, including Robert O. Keohane, Lisa Martin, Beth A. Simmons, and others, who argue that institutions or regimes with their associated norms and procedures do in fact mitigate the effects of anarchy and enhance the prospects for cooperation among states. Proponents of this view are sometimes called "neo-liberals."<sup>393</sup> Proponents of the negative view identify situations in which institutions "may even increase the chances for militarized conflict, such as alliance members attacking members of opposing alliances," a case argued by realist scholars, such as Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and James Lee Ray.<sup>394</sup> Lastly, realist scholars, such as John Mearsheimer and Joseph Grieco, view international institutions as epiphenomenal. Mitchell and Hensel characterize their views as : "... states join IOs [international organizations] and comply with their edicts only when it suits their interests."<sup>395</sup> As Mearsheimer claimed: "My central conclusion is that institutions have minimal influence on state behavior, and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world."<sup>396</sup> Due to these different perspectives on this debate within international relations theory, the case of

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<sup>392</sup> Sara McLaughlin-Mitchell and Paul R. Hensel, "International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 51, No. 4, October 2007, p. 721.

<sup>393</sup> Mitchell and Hensel, p. 721. Robert O. Keohane does not like this label for his views, and according to Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, prefers the terms 'institutionalism' or 'rational institutionalism.' See Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Second Edition)*, (New York: Longmans, 1999), p. 65, footnote 49.

<sup>394</sup> Mitchell and Hensel, p. 721; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981) ; James Lee Ray, "Friends as Foes: International Conflict and Wars between Formal Allies," in Charles Gochman and Alan Sabrosky (eds.), *Prisoners of War? Nation-States in the Modern Era* (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1990), pp. 73-92.

<sup>395</sup> Mitchell and Hensel, p. 721.

<sup>396</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, Volume 19, Number 3, Winter 1994/95, p. 7.

Kozyrev's successful attempt to use international institutions, the CSCE/OSCE in particular, is an interesting case study to examine the promise, or lack thereof, of international institutions in defusing potential conflict in the post Cold War era.

First of all, as noted above, it is a fact that there was no actual armed conflict that arose due to this issue, which is highly significant, and ethnic conflict did erupt elsewhere, such as in Abkhazia or in the Dneister region. Secondly, Russian options for defending the Russians in the former Soviet Union were very constrained: the newly independent states enjoyed the diplomatic and military support of the Western nations, especially the United States. As related by Andrus Park:

In September 1992 the [U.S.] Secretary of State, Lawrence Eagleburger, advised the Estonian Foreign Minister, Jaan Manitski, that the US Administration had no objections to Estonia's handling of citizenship and human rights issues. In January 1993 David Atkinson, the Chairman of a Committee of the Council of Europe, declared that Estonia would be recommended for European Council membership.<sup>397</sup>

In light of this strong support Estonia had from the Western community, especially the United States, Russia could not have successfully employed a military option in these circumstances, as their attempted linkage of the treatment of Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia with the pull-out of Russian troops from both countries (described in detail below) proves. Any military advantage Russia enjoyed on the regional level could be easily mitigated by Western military advantages worldwide.<sup>398</sup> In light of this strong Western support, and concurrent Russian military weakness, Kozyrev could only complain in the prestigious American journal *Foreign Affairs*: "It took Russia a lot of effort to ensure the establishment of the CSCE post of High Commissioner for National Minorities. However, his recommendations to the Latvian and

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<sup>397</sup> Andrus Park, "Ethnicity and Independence in Estonia," p. 83.

<sup>398</sup> For the general inability of the Russian military to deal adequately with Russia's ethnic problems, see William E. Odom. *The Collapse of the Soviet Military*. See also Dimitri Simes, "Reform Reaffirmed: Eurasia at the Crossroads," pp. 43-44.

Estonian authorities are not being implemented, which the West stands idle. Here we also have the right to expect understanding and support”<sup>399</sup>

One problem with studying the utility of international institutions, according to McLaughlin and Hensel, is that “Scholars often examine historical cases to find support for their arguments, with realists typically focusing on situations where states’ interests are extremely divergent (e.g., U.S.-Soviet relations in the Cold War) and institutionalist focusing on situations where states’ interests are fairly similar (e.g., cooperation within the European Union).”<sup>400</sup> This case study however, deals with a case that was hotly contested by all parties involved: the Estonian government, the Russian government, and Estonia’s Russian speaking population,<sup>401</sup> and still resulted in a positive result for all sides.

### **The Problem Described**

The Estonian government tried to establish its new state on the basis of Estonian ethnic identity, and its leadership saw the large ethnic Russian populations as a possible threat to the continued viability and health of its nascent polity.<sup>402</sup> Estonia’s adoption of its 1938 citizenship law and other policies towards the state’s ethnic minorities passed by Estonia’s parliament in 1993, were seen by the Russian-speaking populations and by officials of the Russian Federation as highly discriminatory, so much so that at times the Russian President Boris

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<sup>399</sup> Andrei Kozyrev, “The Lagging Partnership,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 73, No. 3, May/June 1994, p. 70. This article can be seen as a proactive effort on Kozyrev’s part to put pressure on the Estonian state through increased Western awareness of the issue.

<sup>400</sup> McLaughlin and Hensel, p. 722.

<sup>401</sup> The complaints by all sides to the CSCE Mission in Estonia from 1992 to 1996 demonstrate this point quite convincingly! See Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action*, pp. 39-41.

<sup>402</sup> See Anatol Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), and Andrei Kozyrev, “The Lagging Partnership,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 73, No. 3, May/June 1994, p. 70. This article can be seen as a proactive effort on Kozyrev’s part to put pressure on the Estonian state through increased Western awareness of the issue.

Yeltsin raised this issue with the American President, Bill Clinton.<sup>403</sup> Yet, in the end, the CSCE/OCSE was able, through patient, gentle and consistent prodding, to persuade the Estonian government to gradually pass laws that treated their Russian populations as actual citizens, and to encourage restraint among Estonia's Russian-speaking population. As Walter Kemp noted:

The High Commissioner was therefore persistent in following through on his recommendations by making repeat visits to countries in which he was engaged. Indeed, in some countries he was infamous for his perseverance. But his view was that this engagement was essential for long-term security. As he once observed, 'building confidence between communities as ensuring legal and political frameworks for protecting minority rights cannot be achieved overnight. It requires steady, continuous and constructive engagement' ... The High Commissioner's persistence increased the credibility of his recommendations and ensured that appropriate follow-up was taken by the Government in the states that he was dealing with, and the OSCE as a whole.<sup>404</sup>

In international relations theory, international institutionalists argue that institutions provide several important mechanisms that can help lessen conflict and facilitate peaceful solutions to potential conflict situations. Among these are the use of pre-existing, neutral norms, regimes and standards to which all sides can agree, the role of information provided by the institution in helping to lessen tensions between conflicting sides, and the role of institutions as coordinating mechanisms between the conflicted sides that can stress and promote the commonality of interests between the conflicting sides.<sup>405</sup> The role of the CSCE in defending the rights of Russian-speakers in the Baltic states provides strong evidence for all of these factors.<sup>406</sup>

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<sup>403</sup> Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand*, p. 128.

<sup>404</sup> Walter Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action*, pp. 44-45.

<sup>405</sup> Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (October 1985), p. 227; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," *International Security*, Volume 20, Number 1 (Summer 1995), p. 43; McLaughlin and Hensel, op. cit.

<sup>406</sup> Urban Gibson and Jan Niessen, *The CSCE and the Protection of the Rights of Migrants, refugees and Minorities* (Brussels, Belgium: Churches Committee for Migrants in Europe, March 1993), pp. 2-3. See also Human rights.ch, "The OCSE in Brief," 30 September 2015. <https://www.humanrights.ch/en/standards/europe/osce/overview/> accessed 18 November 2017.

## ***Norms and Standards***

Institutionalist scholars argue that one of the most important roles institutions play in ameliorating potential conflicts in international relations is to provide pre-existing norms and standards of behavior that can provide a basis for agreement between competing sides. According to Stephen Krasner, regimes can be defined as "... sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms rules, and decision-making procedures around which the actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations."<sup>407</sup> Such pre-existing norms and standards were a central element in Kozyrev's policy to defend the rights of ethnic Russians in the Baltic states. As he wrote in his memoirs, *Preobrazhenie*: "The general interest of Russia and the world community is facilitated by the propagation in the new independent states of the former U.S.S.R. of the *general European standards of civilized and responsible behavior by placing them within the framework of the CSCE*."<sup>408</sup>

This adoption of *European*, as opposed to *Russian*, standards made his policy congruent with that of the new Estonian government. Despite their growing differences, both states were attempting to become accepted in the international community as European democratic states, and in order to be seen as such, and to be admitted to the most important European institutions, they needed to adhere to European standards and practices in relation to human rights. The use of these institutions lowered what institutionalist scholars call "transaction costs," because it is easier for a government to defend its adoption of pro-minority rights by saying that they are

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<sup>407</sup> Stephen D. Krasner (ed), *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). See also Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy," p. 249.

<sup>408</sup> Andrei Kozyrev, *Preobrazhenie*, p. 114, emphasis added



adopting universal rights recommended by the particular institution, than by saying they are responding to the threats of a foreign government.<sup>409</sup>

Thus, Kozyrev's foreign policy towards the Baltic states was based on the idea of embracing and adhering to commonly shared Western political and legal norms, in this case embodied in the principles of the CSCE. The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was signed by the representatives of 35 European and North American states. They were embraced by all 57 members of the CSCE, and this gave them considerable weight in international relations.<sup>410</sup> The Final Act of the OSCE grouped areas of common concern in three "baskets," or policy areas. The first basket was defined as the security in Europe dimension, the second basket was the economic and environmental dimension, and the last basket was the human dimension. It was this last basket that dealt with the rights of national minorities.<sup>411</sup>

Furthermore, the CSCE had a firm commitment to the rights of national minorities and made the protection of national minorities a central aspect of its mission. In October 1991, at the Moscow meeting of the conference on the human dimension, CSCE participating states concluded that "... in spite of the significant progress made, serious threats and violations of CSCE principles and provisions continue to exist and have a sobering effect on the assessment of the overall situation in Europe."<sup>412</sup> The resulting conclusion of this conference, published as the Moscow

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<sup>409</sup> For a detailed description of the role of intergovernmental institutions lowering transaction costs, see Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

<sup>410</sup> The CSCE enjoyed the full support of the Council of Europe and the United Nations, among many other European and international institutions.

<sup>411</sup> Urban Gibson and Jan Niessen, *The CSCE and the Protection of the Rights of Migrants, refugees and Minorities* (Brussels, Belgium: Churches Committee for Migrants in Europe, March 1993), pp. 2-3. See also Human [rights.ch](https://www.humanrights.ch/en/standards/europe/osce/overview/) "The OCSE in Brief," 30 September 2015. <https://www.humanrights.ch/en/standards/europe/osce/overview/> accessed 18 November 2017.

<sup>412</sup> Walter Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action*, p. 6.

Document, declared that: "... *commitments undertaken in the field of the human dimension of the CSCE are matters of direct and legitimate concern to all participating states, and do not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the State concerned.*"<sup>413</sup>

In April 1992 at the Helsinki Follow-up Meeting, Hans van den Broek, Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, proposed that the office of High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) be created within the CSCE. On 9-10 July 1992, this office was officially created within the CSCE, despite some states' reservations considering the role of the HCNM in relation to national sovereignty. The Russian Federation, in marked contrast to the traditional policy of the U.S.S.R., strongly endorsed and advocated the creation of this position.<sup>414</sup> Former Netherlands Foreign Minister, Max Van der Stoep was appointed to this position at the Ministerial Council in Stockholm, Sweden on 15 December 1992.<sup>415</sup>

Kozyrev believed that through membership in the CSCE, these readily available norms and principles of the conduct of international relations would benefit all of the new countries of the CIS. His perspective corresponded with that of U.S. President George H. W. Bush, who stated that the freedoms won by the Eastern European nations in 1989 were partially the result of the CSCE's firm commitment to enumerated human rights and freedoms:

CSCE shares in this monumental triumph of the human spirit. Our challenge now is to keep pace with the tremendous political transformations that have changed the face of Europe, to create a CSCE that consolidates these great gains for freedom, and bring East and West together. In Eastern and Central Europe, a CSCE capable to helping

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<sup>413</sup> Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (Moscow, 1991), cited in Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy*, p. 7, emphasis added.

<sup>414</sup> See Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action*, pp. 9-20. Kozyrev, "The Lagging Partnership," p. 70.

<sup>415</sup> Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action*, p. 19.

hard-won democratic principles take root and draw strength; a CSCE that can help secure a firm foundation for freedom in the new Europe now emerging.<sup>416</sup>

Similarly, President Clinton's first Secretary of State Warren Christopher, during his confirmation hearing before the U.S. Senate's Foreign Relations Committee on 13 January 1993, noted:

Our Administration will support efforts by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to promote human rights, democracy, free elections, and the historic re-integration of the nations of Eastern and Western Europe.<sup>417</sup>

However, both the Bush and Clinton Administrations, though they supported the strengthening of the CSCE, strongly disagreed with Kozyrev's view that the CSCE could serve as the basis of a new European order that did not include NATO. In Brussels, Belgium, on 1 December 1994, Christopher stated that he believed that an enhanced CSCE would not be the basis of a new European order, but would go hand-in-hand with his Administration's plan to expand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), stating:

Central to building a comprehensive security architecture for Europe is a measured process of NATO expansion, along with continued European integration and a determination to strengthen the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Yesterday's NATO helped to reconcile old adversaries, to embed free countries in strong and solid institutions, and to create an enduring sense of shared purpose in one another's security. Today's NATO must do the same.<sup>418</sup>

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<sup>416</sup> U.S. President George H. W. Bush, *CSCE: The Power of Principle*, 1 October 1990, United States Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs (Washington, DC, 1990), WILS GOVU S 1.71/4:1305, Current Policy No, 1305.

<sup>417</sup> Warren Christopher, "Statement at Senate Confirmation Hearing," 13 January 1993, in Warren Christopher, *In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy in a New Era* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 31.

<sup>418</sup> Warren Christopher, "A Time of Historic Challenge for NATO," Beginning the Process of NATO Expansion: Opening statement at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, 1 December 1994, in Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, pp. 232-233. Later in a speech entitled "Principles and Opportunities for American Foreign Policy, delivered at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University on 20 January 1995, he stated: "The third principles of our strategy is that if the historic movement toward open societies and open markets is to endure, we must adapt and revitalize the institutions of global and regional cooperation ... Our challenge now is to modernize and to revitalize those great institutions—NATO, the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank, and the OECD, among others." Conspicuously missing from this list was the CSCE/OSCE. Warren Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, p. 249.

## The Mixed Results of the Russian Federation's OSCE Policy

Due to Russia's inability to convince the West that the CSCE could become the basis for a new security cooperation in the post-Cold War world, and its inability to prevent NATO expansion, the overall Russian policy on the CSCE/OSCE failed. It did not become the center of a new European security system. This is logical as it is highly unlikely that the United States would deliberately weaken its own position in the successful conclusion of the Cold War. In this sense, the overall point made by John J. Mearsheimer is correct: "... institutions have minimal influence on state behavior, and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world."<sup>419</sup> This point was also made by the Russian authors of *The Yeltsin Epoch*, who noted: "As is known, Russia advocated the creation of a system of European security on the basis of the OSCE. Already by the middle of the 1990s it had become clear that this policy was a fiasco."<sup>420</sup> This overall failure, however, should not obscure the fact, however, that in relation to the protection of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Estonia, the policy was a great success.

Whatever the case, these differences with the United States on the final form of the European security system were not apparent in 1991-1992 when Kozyrev was developing these principles. By embracing these principles, Kozyrev was reversing traditional Soviet foreign policy towards the CSCE, which had rejected the CSCE's role in promoting universal values. As historian Alfred J. Rieber noted: "In the immediate post-Soviet period, the country's leaders eagerly claimed that they had accepted a new system of values based on individual liberties and the free market ... It would further clear the way for the Conference of Security and

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<sup>419</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, Volume 19, Number 3, Winter 1994/95, p. 7.

<sup>420</sup> Iu. M. Baturin et al, *Epokha El'tsina: Ocherki politicheskoi Istorii* [The Epoch of Yeltsin: Political historical essays] (Moscow, Vagaris, 2001), p. 482.

Cooperation in Europe ... with Russian participation, to address the security problems produced by border conflicts around the new state.”<sup>421</sup>

Most importantly, these norms and values were also accepted by the democrats in Estonia that had come to power in the immediate post-Soviet period. According to Andrus Park, “The whole anti-communist revolution [in Estonia] was very much induced from the outside; it was motivated not by some romantic grand vision of the future (like many revolutions) but by the quite prosaic and often unrealistic wish of the people to return quickly to the ‘normal’ mainstream of civilization and to live like the citizens of the rich Western nations.”<sup>422</sup> An integral aspect of this return to the “normal mainstream of civilization” was the adoption of Western norms and standards.

HCNM Max Van der Stoel considered these international norms and standards the basis of his work. He once stated that “... my blueprints are OCSE principles and commitments and international legal norms and standards.”<sup>423</sup> His work continuously stressed the need for all parties involved to adhere to these international norms and standards, and these standards

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<sup>421</sup> Alfred J. Rieber, “How Persistent are Persistent Factors?” in Robert Legvold (ed.), *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, p. 259.

<sup>422</sup> Andrus Park, “Ethnicity and Independence: The Case of Estonia in Comparative Perspective,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol, 46, No. 1 (1994), p. 82.

<sup>423</sup> Max Van der Stoel, “Reflections on the Role of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities as an instrument of conflict prevention,” *CSZE Jahrbuch*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 429-442, quoted in Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy*, p. 25.

enabled the participants to essentially engage in this issue with a third-party mediator that made compromise more possible for both sides.<sup>424</sup>

However, Kozyrev's adoption of CSCE norms and values went beyond his Westernist and institutionalist leanings. For Kozyrev, these principles had practical, pragmatic application. Not only were these principles essential to the development of Russia as a nascent democratic nation, they were also essential to the conduct of a healthy Russian foreign policy towards its neighbors. Kozyrev had argued that the issues separating Estonia and Russia would "... be settled only with the opinions of the CE and CSCE being taken into account. My hope is that if Estonian leaders consider this criticism calmly—not as some dictatorial instruction from Moscow—then they can start to put the situation to rights with the help of international experts."<sup>425</sup>

This is precisely what occurred, and this experience provides excellent support for an argument made by neo-liberal scholars Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane that: "Regimes do not enforce rules in a hierarchical sense, but they do change patterns of transaction costs and provide information to participants, so that uncertainty is reduced."<sup>426</sup> This point was also made by McLaughlin-Mitchell and Hensel: "IOs may be convenient scapegoats and allow leaders to save face ... especially when the settlements is politically unpopular at home ..."<sup>427</sup> Submission to the OSCE was far more palatable and "politically correct" for Estonian officials than

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<sup>424</sup> Max Van der Stoel, "Reflections on the Role of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities as an instrument of conflict prevention," *CSZE Jahrbuch*, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 429-442; Max Van der Stoel, "Address by Mr. Max Van der Stoel CSCE High Commissioner of Nation Minorities to the Rome Meeting of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the CSCE, 30 November 1993 - 1 December 1993. <http://www.osce.org/hcnm/37961> Accessed 18 November 2017; Max Van der Stoel, Address by Mr. Max Van der Stoel CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to the Rome Meeting on the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the CSCE, Rome, Italy, 30 November-1 December 1993. <http://www.osce.org/hcnm/37961?download=true> Accessed 13 October 2017.

<sup>425</sup> Ted Hopf, "Russian Identity and Policy in Estonia and Uzbekistan," p. 166. The Kozyrev quote is from a statement he made on 6 July 1993.

<sup>426</sup> Axelrod and Keohane, 'Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy,' p. 250.

<sup>427</sup> McLaughlin-Mitchell and Hensel, "International Institutions and Compliance with Agreements," p. 724.

submitting to Russian pressure, a point that the Putin Administration would do well to consider.<sup>428</sup>

### ***The Role of Information***

Nearly all institutionalist scholars cite the importance of international institutions in providing information to the conflictual parties. Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin have argued that:

Institutional theory should be highly applicable to security issues because its argument revolves around the role of institutions in providing information ... But if one can secure more information, it may be possible to follow policies that more nearly maximize utility. Realist writers from Kautilya on have stressed the significance of information (intelligence); if institutions can provide useful information, realists should see them as significant.<sup>429</sup>

Information was a central aspect of the CSCE's approach to defending the rights of national minorities within member states. As HCNM Max Van der Stoel himself stated on numerous occasions, the CSCE's national minority policy was based upon providing objective information to all sides involved, and to encourage the exchange of information within the target nation.<sup>430</sup>

In providing information, Van der Stoel and other CSCE officials stressed that the great strength of the CSCE was that it was both *impartial* and *confidential* in how it handled information. At the Rome Meeting of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the CSCE, held from 30 November to 1 December 1993, Van der Stoel stated: "As far as the nature of my actual

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<sup>428</sup> See President Putin's comments on why he decided to seize Crimea from Ukraine in Unattributed, "Russia Did What it had to do Regarding Crimea," Moscow Interfax in English 1145 GMT 10 March 2015. The quote was taken from an interview with Russian President Vladimir Putin shown in the film "Crimea — Return to the Motherland" shown on Rossiya-1 television on 10 March 2015.

<sup>429</sup> Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," *International Security*, Volume 20, Number 1 (Summer 1995), p. 43.

<sup>430</sup> Max Van der Stoel, "Address by Mr. Max Van der Stoel CSCE High Commissioner of Nation Minorities to the Rome Meeting of the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the CSCE, 30 November 1993 - 1 December 1993. <http://www.osce.org/hcnm/37961> Accessed 18 November 2017. As Walter Kemp noted: "Information gathering and analysis are ... fundamental to [the work of] the High Commissioner." *Quiet Diplomacy in Action*, p. 47.

involvement in a particular situation is concerned and basing myself on my experience in 1993, I would describe it in three words: impartiality, confidentiality, and cooperation.”<sup>431</sup>

His mandate enabled him to speak with whomever he wanted to in relation to human rights in Estonia, and under the aegis of this mandate, he spoke with members of the Estonian Cabinet, the Parliament, informal institutions, academics, and representatives of the Russian-speaking minorities as well. Related to this issue was confidentiality. Van der Stoel considered the principle of confidentiality essential to his work:

... confidentiality ... serves more than one purpose. Confidentiality is important since often parties directly involved feel they can be more cooperative and forthcoming if they know the discussions will not be revealed to the outside world. Conversely parties may make much stronger statements in public than in confidential conversations, feeling that they should be seen to maintain strong demands or trying to exploit outside attention. The rise of escalation of the conflict which is inherent in this can be considerably reduced if a low profile is adopted.<sup>432</sup>

The impartiality of the HCNM and the mission in Estonia can clearly be seen by the fact that all sides in the conflict criticized the CSCE and accused it of being an advocate for the other side. Andrei Kozyrev once joked with Max Van der Stoel on the issue of his impartiality. On 22 June 2001, Van der Stoel delivered an address to the OSCE’s Permanent Council, entitled “Staying the Path to Peace,” in which he said:

I will not hide from you the fact that this job has not always been easy. I recall that former Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev said to me once (I believe it was the first time that my term was renewed): “My condolences on this decision. You will be criticized on one side by governments who see you as being too sympathetic to minorities, and you will be

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<sup>431</sup> Max Van der Stoel, Address by Mr. Max Van der Stoel CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to the Rome Meeting on the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the CSCE, Rome, Italy, 30 November-1 December 1993. <http://www.osce.org/hcnm/37961?download=true> Accessed 13 October 2017.

<sup>432</sup> Max Van der Stoel, “Address by Mr. Max Van der Stoel CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to the Rome Meeting on the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the CSCE,” Rome, Italy, 30 November-1 December 1993. Due to this confidentiality, researchers such as myself can use the materials held at the OSCE Document Centre in Prague, Czech Republic, but the materials from the holdings cannot be quoted directly, but must be paraphrased, and these paraphrases must be approved by the Director of the Document Centre to ensure that individuals are not compromised.



criticized by minorities for not fully supporting their views.” Kozyrev was right. I have been vilified by extreme nationalists from majority communities for being a foreign agent, insensitive to majority concerns, or a catalyst for the destruction of a state.<sup>433</sup>

As Kemp noted, Van der Stoel “... was accused, particularly in the context of his involvement in Latvia and Estonia, as being a puppet of the State (against the minorities) by one side, or an ill-informed agent of a foreign power interested in ‘bashing’ the Government by the other.”<sup>434</sup> For example, from 21-23 February 1994 Max Van der Stoel visited Estonia to meet with the representatives of the Russian-speaking population in Narva. A member of the Estonian Parliament said he considered this visit “interference in the internal life of Estonia,” but Van der Stoel responded by citing his mandate, which stated that he “may collect and receive information ... from any source.”<sup>435</sup> According to Walter Kemp, in Estonia:

... regardless of which party was in Government, there was a growing weariness of what was perceived as ‘Estonia bashing.’ The Government argued that as soon as one issue was addressed, another was raised and that Estonia was being singled out for violations that were significantly worse in other countries. Estonian officials argued that conditions of minorities in Russia (or even in the Netherlands [where Van der Stoel was from!]) were not being investigated while Van der Stoel paid so much attention to the Russian minority in Estonia. They once politely suggested that he should concentrate instead on the situation in Chechnya.<sup>436</sup>

Russian officials and members of the Russian minority also complained that the CSCE seemed to be on the other side in this dispute. As the CSCE Mission to Estonia, Tallinn reported to the CSCE Chairman in Office Stockholm:

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<sup>433</sup> Max Van der Stoel, *Staying on the Path to Peace*, Address to the Permanent Council of the OSCE, Vienna, Austria, 22 June 2001, <http://www.osce.org/hcnm/42333?download=true> Accessed: 10 February 2018.

<sup>434</sup> Walter Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action*, p. 39.

<sup>435</sup> OSCE, Activity Report # 53, From: CSCE Mission to Estonia, Tallin, To: Chairman in Office, Rome 28 February 1994.

<sup>436</sup> Walter Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action; the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities* (The Hague, London: Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 148.

... In Estonia, some Russian demonstrators in Narva considered the CSCE as the 'servant of Tallinn,' while some ethnic Estonians considered the CSCE 'Russian-oriented and not sufficiently responsive to Estonian expectations.'<sup>437</sup>

Despite any misgivings some ethnic Estonians had concerning the CSCE, the government of Estonia welcomed the fact that the CSCE's mandate was extended for another six months by the Vienna Group of the Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE in July 1993.<sup>438</sup>

Significantly, all of the sides involved in this conflict praised the CSCE for its work on their behalf, and consistently chose the CSCE Mission in Estonia to be involved with other issues, due to the objective nature of the information it provided and the work it performed. For example on 28 August 1994, the CSCE Mission in Estonia reported to the Chairman in Office in Stockholm that despite the differences that arose between the Estonian Republic and Russian Federation representatives concerning ethnic Russians residing in Estonia since 1992, both countries believed that the CSCE Mission in Estonia was the most suitable choice for CSCE involvement in working with an Estonian government commission which was to make recommendations for the granting of residence permits, as stipulated in the "Agreement between the Estonian Republic and the Russian Federation on questions of social guarantees for pensioners of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the territory of the Estonian Republic."<sup>439</sup> This indicates the high regard the both sides had for the impartiality of the CSCE Mission in Estonia, despite their differing perspectives.

### **The Case Study—Kozyrev's Qualified Use of the OSCE to Defend the Rights of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in Estonia, October 1990-January 1996**

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<sup>437</sup> OSCE, CSCE Mission to Estonia, Tallinn to Chairman in Office, Stockholm, "Political Report # 17: Tension over Community Relations in Estonia," 2 July 1993.

<sup>438</sup> OSCE, CSCE Mission to Estonia, Tallinn to Chairman in Office, Stockholm, "Political Report # 17: Tension over Community Relations in Estonia," 2 July 1993.

<sup>439</sup> OSCE, OSCE Mission in Estonia to Chairman in Office, Stockholm, Activity Report #71, 28 August 1994.

Analytically, the best way to examine the success or failure of Kozyrev's policies relating to ethnic Russians in Estonia is to look at the issue chronologically, from the beginning of Kozyrev's tenure as Foreign Minister of the RSFSR in October 1990, to the end of his tenure as the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation in January 1996. In this way, we can test the competing theories of Jack Snyder, who argued that Kozyrev became more right-wing and assertive as the failure of Westernism became more apparent, and that of Sestanovich, who claimed that "there were always two Kozyrevs," and that he advocated both accommodating and threatening policies at the same time, and that of Henry Kissinger, who argued that Kozyrev followed in a traditional, power-based foreign policy in the Near Abroad indistinguishable from previous Russian governments. In this description, the role of the CSCE/OSCE will be described in light of international institutional theory in the academic field of international relations. This method of analysis will also enable the tracking of Kozyrev's policy over time to see how consistent it was and to what extent it changed based on internal and external opposition.

### ***Early Russian Foreign Policy and the Baltic States:***

Many contemporary accounts of Russian-Baltic relations stress the opposition of these states to each other, but mutual hostility has not always characterized the state of Russian-Baltic relations. Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, and his foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, were in fact two of the world's most active proponents of Baltic independence from the U.S.S.R., and Kozyrev strongly identified the former union republics of the U.S.S.R. as priority nations in the RSFSR's foreign policy. In an interview with Boris Pyadyshev conducted in March 1991 in the Russian journal *International Relations*, he argued that all of the U.S.S.R.'s republics, including the Russian Federation, had suffered under Soviet rule, and thus they had a common cause against the U.S.S.R. He stated: "We may be said to have had two predecessors: the Russian

Empire, which existed until 1917, and the totalitarian regime. *Russia and the other republics were the victims of that regime.*"<sup>440</sup> Based on this perception of the U.S.S.R. as a common oppressor of all the nationalities under Soviet rule, he took the side of the Baltic states and strongly supported their independence from the Soviet "center." In this same interview he stated:

You know what worries me most in the Lithuanian developments is a linkage of the protection structures of the Centre [the U.S.S.R.] and those of the "National Salvation Committee" on the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] Platform locally. The danger of what was inside and outside prior to 1985 is great as long as there are men in uniform ready to open fire if so ordered by those who have power against the will of the lawfully elected authorities.<sup>441</sup>

In developing this argument further, Kozyrev made a direct appeal to the common liberal democratic outlooks held by liberals in both the Russian Soviet Federative Republic and the Baltic states against the totalitarian authorities of the U.S.S.R.: "I should remind [people] here that the Supreme Soviets of both the Baltic Republics and the RSFSR spoke out against the use of force and for troops withdrawal."<sup>442</sup>

From the very beginning of his tenure as Foreign Minister of the RSFSR in October 1990, Kozyrev made it clear that the former Union Republics of the U.S.S.R. and the Baltic states in particular, had great priority in Russian foreign policy. From October 1990 onwards, the Russian President and the Russian Foreign Ministry aggressively pursued supportive and

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<sup>440</sup> Boris Pyadyshev and Andrei Kozyrev, "Russian Diplomacy Reborn," *International Affairs*, No. 3, March 1991 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1991), p. 120, emphasis added. Due to this common heritage of suffering under Soviet rule, the Baltic states and the other republics of the U.S.S.R. were identified as the first priorities in the foreign policy of the RSFSR. As Kozyrev stated: "The group we regard as a priority is our republics. We mentioned this earlier. Our next priority is Russia's neighbors in the Northern Hemisphere, that is, highly developed pluralist market-economy democracies in Western Europe, Japan as the No. 1 country in the East, America, and needless to say, China." Pyadyshev and Kozyrev, "Russian Diplomacy Reborn," p. 128.

<sup>441</sup> Nicholls, *Russian Diplomacy Reborn*, p. 120.

<sup>442</sup> Nicholls, *Russian Diplomacy Reborn*, p. 120. This clearly demonstrates the congruence between Kozyrev's liberal outlook and the similar orientations of the leaders of the Baltic states.

amicable relations with CIS states, and strongly supported their efforts to be independent from both the U.S.S.R. and from Russia. Kozyrev had once described his policy towards the CIS by stating "... the better off my neighbor is, the better off I am."<sup>443</sup> It can be clearly seen that a common cause against the center, the U.S.S.R., served to unify the foreign ministries of many of the constituent republics of the Soviet Union.<sup>444</sup> Kozyrev believed that by pursuing such a foreign policy, he was establishing the basis for a new trust between Russia and the other former Union Republics, including the Baltic Republics.<sup>445</sup>

When the Soviet authorities placed an "economic blockade" against Lithuania as an attempt to punish this republic for its clearly expressed successionist goals, the RSFSR and other republics supported Lithuania against the Soviet government, and ensured that the economic blockade existed only on paper. At the beginning of 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who was then chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, joined with the chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of the Baltic Republics, Anatolijs Gorbunovs, Vytautas Landsbergis and Arnold Ruutel, in issuing an appeal to the "... United Nations and other international institutions and also to the parliaments and governments of the world's states," requesting that they condemn the Soviet crackdown in Lithuania and support the full political independence of the Baltic States.<sup>446</sup> In

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<sup>443</sup> *Izvestiia*, 2 October 1991, quoted in Dawisha and Parrott, p. 199.

<sup>444</sup> Kozyrev and Padyshev, *Russian Diplomacy Reborn*, p. 120.

<sup>445</sup> Dimitri Simes, *Reform Reaffirmed: Eurasia at the Crossroads*, p. 45. Kozyrev and Padyshev, *Russian Diplomacy Reborn*; Kozyrev *Preobrazenie*. "Furthermore, because one of the primary goals of Russian foreign policy was to limit the power and influence of the Soviet Union, the RSFSR made common cause with any of the union republics which resisted the Soviet center. This was especially true of the Baltic states, which were, in the words of James Nicholl, "... the boldest and most successful of the union republics in establishing quasi-diplomatic ties with foreign states," and actively worked against the "Soviet center." This common hostility to the Soviet center proved a very potent glue linking the foreign ministries of the RSFSR and the Baltic states. Nicholl *Diplomacy*, p. 3. See also John B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire*, pp. 59-61, 142.

<sup>446</sup> Nicholl, *Diplomacy*, p. 23.

January 1991 President Yeltsin delivered by radio an appeal to Soviet soldiers in Lithuania, which implored them not to use violence against the people there:

Many of you think you are a Rambo—a hero who defends law and order. No! You are a pawn in a dirty game, a grain of sand in the Kremlin's building of an imperial sand castle. This year you will take off your uniform, demobilize, and tell your girlfriend, 'We bashed those Lithuanians. Those memories will be the only security you can give her—neither freedom, nor good life—for you have blocked that path with your tanks.'<sup>447</sup>

In the Lithuanian-Russian Federation Treaty concluded on 30 July 1991, Russian Federation President Yeltsin recognized Lithuania's declared independence and agreed to "... broad areas of economic cooperation," effectively making Gorbachev's economic blockade a dead letter.<sup>448</sup>

William Odom claimed that Russian Federation support for the Lithuanian cause had been essential to its success: "Heretofore, political leaders against whom the interventions took place stood alone with no significant support from political figures in Moscow. Not so in the case of the Lithuanian independence movement ... No one of his stature in Moscow was saying such things to Soviet soldiers in Tbilisi or Baku."<sup>449</sup> Alfred Erich Senn noted that as the fight against the Soviet "center" continued "... the Lithuanians expressed growing sympathy for Boris Yeltsin. Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimira Prunskiene wrote that she first met Yeltsin when the [Soviet] deputies 'goosestepped' to vote for Gorbachev as congress chairman; he assured her that he supported the Baltic republics' claim to sovereignty."<sup>450</sup>

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<sup>447</sup> William Odom, *Collapse of the Soviet Military*, p. 270.

<sup>448</sup> Will Englund, "Bypassing Gorbachev, Yeltsin signs pact recognizing Lithuania," *The Baltimore Sun*, 30 July 1991. [http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-07-30/news/1991211023\\_1\\_lithuania-gorbachev-soviet-union](http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-07-30/news/1991211023_1_lithuania-gorbachev-soviet-union)

See also James P. Nicholl, *Diplomacy in the Former Soviet Republics* (Westport, CT and London: Praeger Publishing, 1995), p. 2.

<sup>449</sup> William Odom, *Collapse of the Soviet Military*, p. 270.

<sup>450</sup> Alfred Erich Senn, *Gorbachev's Failure in Lithuania* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 64. Senn noted the symbiotic relationship between Yeltsin and the Lithuanian liberation movement throughout his book, pp. 8, 9, 57, 108-109, 136, 150.

By pursuing a new more equitable and less imperialistic foreign policy, Kozyrev thought that he had shown the leaders of the Baltic states that the new Russian Federation differed substantially from both the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire that preceded it. As Dimitri Simes noted:

By treating the other states with patience and generosity, he hoped that Russia's neighbors would come to understand how much the new Russia differed from the old Soviet empire and how interdependent were all the post-Soviet states, making friendly cooperation the code of conduct in the former Soviet region.<sup>451</sup>

These policies did elicit such responses from some Baltic leaders. For example, on 30 July 1991, Vytautas Landsbergis, the chairman of the Lithuanian legislature, in a session on the conclusion of a Treaty with the Russian Federation declared:

Russia's stand which has been adhered to by Boris Yeltsin from last year, from the first meeting [about the treaty] and to which he has adhered in the very menacing [1991] days ... *he did not hesitate then to assume a very categorial stand by supporting the Baltic states and their right to choose their way and choose their independence.* Thus the document signed yesterday is ensuring a certain sincere, and I would say, moral stand in international politics.<sup>452</sup>

Lithuanian officials continued to hold Yeltsin in high esteem due to these policies. On August 27, 2012, Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė presented the Grand Cross of the Order of the Cross of Vytis, one of Lithuania's highest state honors, posthumously to Yeltsin's widow Naina Yeltsina. Boris Yeltsin was awarded this honor "... for his personal contribution to strengthening Lithuanian statehood and promoting bilateral relations between Lithuania and Russia."<sup>453</sup>

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<sup>451</sup> Dimitri Simes, "Reform Reaffirmed: Eurasia at the Crossroads," p. 45. This is consistent with Wight's view of Grotian or Rationalist foreign policy.

<sup>452</sup> Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian, 0914 GMT, 30 July 1991, cited in Nicholl, *Diplomacy*, p. 82, emphasis added.

<sup>453</sup> Official Website, Office of the President of the Republic of Lithuania, "Highest Lithuanian state decoration for Boris Yeltsin," (27 August 2012) <https://www.lrp.lt/en/press-centre/press-releases/highest-lithuanian-state-decoration-for-boris-yeltsin/14324> accessed 29 September 2017.

However, Kozyrev was wrong to assume that this held true for all Baltic leaders. As Simes noted, despite Russia's best efforts to act in a non-imperial manner, "... things have not worked out as [Kozyrev] hoped. The other successor states had their own interests and political processes that often put them on a collision course with Russia. Standing up to the weakened Russian bear had considerable appeal to many of those new states' political elites. After all, they had suffered for centuries under Russian and then under Soviet control: they were not easily impressed with Moscow's new, anti-imperial credentials."<sup>454</sup> To cite just one Baltic leader as an example, Lennert Meri, who had served as both Foreign Minister, and later, President of Estonia, saw Yeltsin's and Kozyrev's liberal policies as temporary phenomena, and wanted to be included in Western military structures, such as NATO, as an insurance policy against future Russian aggression, which he saw as inevitable. According to the well informed observer, Strobe Talbott, who served initially as Ambassador at Large to the CIS states and later as a Deputy Secretary of State for the Clinton Administration:

After becoming president of Estonia, Meri elicited from Yeltsin—an early proponent of Baltic independence—a promise that all Russian troops would be out of his country by August 1994. When I called on Meri in May 1993, I assured him that the Clinton Administration fully supported him on that score. That was all well and good, he replied, *but the only way to keep Russian troops from reoccupying his country when Yeltsin gave way to a more traditional Russian leader was for Estonia to be in NATO and protected by the American nuclear umbrella.* Meri couldn't have been more forthright: Russia was a malignancy in remission: The Yeltsin era was at best a fleeting opportunity to be seized before Russia relapsed into authoritarianism at home and expansion abroad.<sup>455</sup>

This exchange between Talbot and Meri demonstrates an underlying problem with one of the premises with Yeltsin's and Kozyrev's foreign policy: as liberal and as anti-expansionist and anti-imperialist as it was, it could overcome neither the historical legacy of centuries of Soviet and

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<sup>454</sup> Dimitri Simes, "Reform Reaffirmed: Eurasia at the Crossroads," p. 45.

<sup>455</sup> Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy* (New York: Random House, 2003), p. 94, emphasis added.



Russian imperialism, nor the historical memory of the people who had suffered under Soviet occupation and rule in the Baltic states since 1944.<sup>456</sup>

### **The Lithuanian “Exception”**

Lithuania was never singled out by Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, or any Russian statesman or politician for infringing on the rights of its Russian speaking population because the Lithuanian Constitution, adopted on 25 October 1992, guaranteed basic civil rights to all its citizens regardless of nationality. Under the Lithuanian Constitution all citizens, including its Russian-speaking population, according to Tamara Resler, had the right to “...foster their native languages, customs and cultures, and national communities may independently administer their cultural, educational and charitable associations.”<sup>457</sup> Lithuania had, in fact, been steadily and progressively pursuing tolerant policies towards its national minorities since before the Soviet Union was dissolved in December 1991. As scholars Nils Muiznieks, Juris Rozenvalds and Ieva Birka noted: “In Lithuania, early inclusion of minorities into the polity has had a beneficial long-term impact in terms of their identification with their country of residence, demonstrated by the fact that Russian speakers express a greater sense of belonging to Lithuania ... Less salient threat perceptions have permitted Lithuania to opt for an early inclusion of minorities in the polity, a decision that has positively contributed to that country’s efforts to instill among minorities a sense of belonging to the Lithuanian state.”<sup>458</sup>

It is worth pointing out that Lithuania had a much smaller Russian-speaking population than either Estonia or Latvia, and so it was not in such a difficult situation. In 1989, a poll of

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<sup>456</sup> David J. Smith, “Minority Rights, Multiculturalism and EU Enlargement: the Case of Estonia,” p. 88.

<sup>457</sup> Tamara Resler, “Dilemmas of Democratisation: Safeguarding Minorities in Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (January 1997), p.101.

<sup>458</sup> Nils Muiznieks, Juris Rozenvalds and Ieva Birka, “Ethnicity and Social Cohesion in the Post-Soviet Baltic States,” *Patterns of Prejudice*, Volume 47, Number 3, 2013, p. 288 289.

nationalities within Lithuania identified the following seven nationalities as the most numerous in Lithuania:

Numbers and Percentages of Ethnic Groups in Lithuania in 1989

Nationality/Ethnicity	Numbers of that nationality in the population	Percentage of Population
Lithuanians	2,924,251	79
Russians	344,455	9
Poles	257,994	7
Belorusians	63,169	1.7
Ukrainians	44,789	1.2
Jews	12,314	0.3

Table based on information in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, Department of Nationalities of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, *National Minorities in Lithuania*, (Vilnius: Center of National Researches in Lithuania).

As can be seen, only about 9 percent of the Lithuanian population identified as Russian. This can be compared to the population of the Russian-speaking populations in Estonia and Latvia, where they comprised about 30% and 40% respectively.<sup>459</sup>

On 23 November 1989 Lithuania adopted a Law on National Minorities, and a Nationalities Committee was established in the Council of Ministers. These steps were unprecedented in the Soviet Union at that time. On 18 April 1990 the Nationalities Committee was reorganized as the Department of Nationalities. A Council of Nationalities was organized within the Department of Nationalities, and in 1990 the Center for Nationalities was established in the city of Sneieckus. In 1991 ethnic associations were given offices in Vilnius to promote their interests.<sup>460</sup>

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<sup>459</sup> Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action*, pp. 141, 153,

<sup>460</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania, Department of Nationalities of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, *National Minorities in Lithuania*, (Vilnius: Center of National Researches in Lithuania), p. 6.

These measures had been a response to lobbying within the country by Lithuania's minority groups, primarily its Jewish population.<sup>461</sup> The lawmakers had intended these laws and measures to prevent minority unrest, particularly among its Polish—and Russian—speaking populations.<sup>462</sup> In the 30 July 1991 treaty between Lithuania and the Russian Federation, Russia promised not to use its armed forces against Lithuania, and according to journalist Will Englund, "In return, Lithuania relented on its earlier insistence on ethnic purity and granted rights of citizenship to Russians and others who were living in the republic before 1989."<sup>463</sup>

In 1992, The Lithuanian government announced that its policies towards its national minorities were based upon the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. This statement is worth quoting in full:

The government of the Republic of Lithuania attaches great importance to the problems of national minorities residing in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania. From the very first days of the restoration of independence, the establishment of a legal basis for the fullest possible protection of national minorities was considered as of prime significance. The main guidelines for the proceedings in that dimension were laid down in the Helsinki Final Act, and the Lithuanian government accepts them fully.<sup>464</sup>

The CSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max Van der Stoep, visited Lithuania from 21-23 January 1993 as part of his January visit to the Baltic States. In a letter to Lithuania's Foreign Minister, Povilas Gylys, from 5 March 1993, Van der Stoep characterized the situation among Lithuania's various minorities as "harmonious," which contrasted with the recommendations he issued to the Estonian and Latvian governments on the question of

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<sup>461</sup> Resler, "Dilemmas of Democratisation," p.101.

<sup>462</sup> Resler, "Dilemmas of Democratisation," p.101.

<sup>463</sup> Will Englund, "Bypassing Gorbachev, Yeltsin signs pact recognizing Lithuania," *Baltimore Sun*, 30 July 1991, [http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-07-30/news/1991211023\\_1\\_lithuania-gorbachev-soviet-union](http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1991-07-30/news/1991211023_1_lithuania-gorbachev-soviet-union) accessed 29 September 2017. This shows a strong commitment to what Martin Wight called rationalist (or Grotian) thinking in international relations thought. Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, pp. 180-205.

<sup>464</sup> *National Minorities in Lithuania*, (Vilnius: Center of National Researches in Lithuania, 1992), p. 7.

minority rights. According to Walter A. Kemp, “The few complaints that he heard (mostly from the Polish minority) concerned registration procedures for regional elections.”<sup>465</sup>

These efforts were noted by Russian Federation officials, who pursued a policy of distinguishing Lithuanian treatment of its Russian-speaking minority from the national minority policies pursued by both Estonia and Latvia, in essence trying to drive a wedge between Lithuania and the two other Baltic states. On 9 September 1992 the Russian and Lithuanian defense ministries agreed that Russian troops would be withdrawn from Lithuanian territory on 31 August 1993.<sup>466</sup> In a speech delivered following Yelstin’s first meeting with United States President William J. Clinton on 4 April 1993, the Russian President noted this dichotomy and raised a threat towards both Estonia and Latvia:

... we are completing the withdrawal of troops from Lithuania, as Lithuania does not violate human rights and treats the Russian-speaking population with respect. As Latvia and Estonia violate human rights, since according to their national legislation national minorities, mostly Russians, are persecuted, and that involves basically Russians, we *will link the withdrawal schedule with the human rights situation* there although we have adopted a political decision to pull the troops out of the republics.<sup>467</sup>

Thus, the liberal naturalization policies of the Lithuanian government led to positive results. According to legal scholar Annelies Lottmann, “About ninety percent of those to whom Lithuania’s extension of nationality applied took advantage of this option and gained citizenship before the law changed in December 1991 ... Lithuania ha[d] distinguished itself further from

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<sup>465</sup> Walter A. Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities* (The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 167.

<sup>466</sup> Fred Hiatt, “Russia to Speed Troop Pullout from Lithuania,” *The New York Times*, 9 September 1992 [https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/09/09/russia-to-speed-troop-pullout-from-lithuania/3f3c47b7-e41a-4abc-82eb-0767234c55fa/?utm\\_term=.ebc811720ec5](https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/09/09/russia-to-speed-troop-pullout-from-lithuania/3f3c47b7-e41a-4abc-82eb-0767234c55fa/?utm_term=.ebc811720ec5) Accessed 8 September 2017.

<sup>467</sup> ITAR TASS, 5 April 1993, cited in John R. Boyle, *Case Study: The Withdrawal of Russian Military Forces from the Baltic States* National Defense University/National War College, (The National War College: 1996), p. 9. This shows a qualified realism, or rationalism, as identified by Martin Wight.

Latvia and Estonia by providing the limited possibility for the naturalization of Soviet military veterans.”<sup>468</sup>

Because of the progressive policies of the Lithuanian government, which had in fact been based on the Helsinki Final Act, and perhaps the equally important fact that Russian speakers made up less than ten percent of the Lithuanian population, neither President Boris Yeltsin, nor his Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, or any other Russian official, raised any objections concerning Lithuanian policies towards its Russian-speaking minority. CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max Van der Stoel openly declared that the situation between the ethnic Lithuanians and the minority population there was “harmonious,” and the CSCE did not establish fact-finding missions there as it did in both Estonia and Latvia.<sup>469</sup>

In January 1992, at the request of the Russian Federation and the three Baltic Republics, the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Van der Stoel made inspections of the three Baltic states. On the basis of the commission’s findings, as discussed above, there was no need to open a mission office in Lithuania, but the national minority policies of both Estonia and Latvia led the CSCE to establish mission offices in both countries. The CSCE Mission in Estonia was fully operational by mid-April 1993, with six personnel working out of three offices,

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<sup>468</sup> Annalies Lottmann, “No Direction Home: Nationalism and Statelessness in the Baltics,” *Texas International Law Journal*, 1 June 2008, p. 510.

<sup>469</sup> Similarly, Russian perceptions of Uzbek treatment of its Russian-speaking minority evoked support and praise from Moscow. In November 1993 after a visit to the Central Asian states, Kozyrev stated that it would be wrong to compare the “state level discrimination in Latvia and Estonia” to the more tolerant policies of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, in which civic identity did not, in the words of Ted Hopf “entail discriminatory government policy.” For this reason, again to quote Hopf “... the Uzbek state choice of a civic identity has obviated the need for international involvement in the construction of Russian identity in Uzbekistan.” Ted Hopf, “Russian Identity and Foreign Policy in Estonia and Uzbekistan,” in Celeste Wallander (ed.), *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (Boulder, Co and Oxford, UK: Westview Press, 1996), p. 164.

and a Mission office was established in Latvia, with initially four workers, in late November 1993.

At the beginning of 1994 the Latvian mission was increased from four workers to six.<sup>470</sup>

### **The Situation of the Russian-Speaking Population in Estonia**

The situation of Russian speakers was very different in Estonia than it was in Lithuania. It is worth beginning this section by noting that the difference in Estonia was due to the comparatively large percentage of its Russian population compared to that of Lithuania (see chart below).

**Numbers and Percentages of Ethnic Groups in Estonia in 1989**

Nationality/Ethnicity	Numbers of that nationality in the population	Percentage
Estonian	963,000	61.5
Russian	475,000	30.3
Ukrainian	48,000	3.1
Belorussian	23,000	1.5
Finn	17,000	1.1
Other	35,000	2.5

Table based on information in ODCP, ODIHR Mission, Report of the CSCE ODIHR Mission on the Study of Estonian Legislation invited by the Republic of Estonia, CSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (Warsaw, Poland, January 1993).

The relatively low percentage of Russians in Lithuania compared to the relatively high percentage of ethnic Russians in Estonia, can provide some context for the problems faced by the newly-independent Estonia. Granting full citizenship to the entire Russian-speaking population in Lithuania would not undermine the essential Lithuanian “core integrity” of the new

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<sup>470</sup> CSCE Mission to Estonia, Tallinn to Chairman in Office, Stockholm, Political Report # 8, “The Mission at half term,” 18 May 1993; Doc 788/94, Post Report, CSCE Mission in Latvia to all CSCE delegations in Vienna, 27 September 1994.

state. Another important factor was that the great majority of the Russian speakers in Estonia were concentrated in cities. This was seen as a destabilizing factor by many Estonians. Many Estonians believed that granting full citizenship rights to groups that comprised up to 35-45% of the population could possibly destabilize the new Estonian government, and potentially undermine the intentionally Estonian ethnic character of the new nation. The issue of Russian residents in the region was also highly colored by the fact that most of these Russians had arrived there after the annexation by force of Estonia by the Soviet Union in 1944, and for the most part these Russians were associated, quite rightly, with Soviet imperialism, which very quickly was equated with “Russian imperialism” in the post-Soviet period, even if this association was unfair and historically inaccurate to Russians, such as President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev, who had actively opposed Soviet domination of the union republics of the USSR.<sup>471</sup>

### **Estonian Nationality and Citizenship Laws**

Furthermore, and most importantly, the new Estonian state was built on the foundation of an ethnic Estonian national identity, and essentially sought to reestablish the Estonian state that had existed prior to the Second World War. Under *perestroika*, Estonian ethnic identity flourished and soon formed the basis of its nationalist, anti-Soviet movement. On 24 February 1989 the Estonian National Independence Party and other groups “... launched a campaign to register all citizens of pre-1940 Estonia and their descendants through a network of citizens’s committee, to establish a Congress of Estonia that would be the only authentic representative body empowered to decide the fate of Estonia.”<sup>472</sup> This group was well represented in the

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<sup>471</sup> Max Van der Stoep, “Minorities, Human Rights and the International Community,” Speech delivered at Strausberg, Federal Republic of Germany, 7 July 1995. OSCE official website, [www.osce.org/hcnm/36591?download=true](http://www.osce.org/hcnm/36591?download=true) Accessed 28 October 2017.

<sup>472</sup> Diuk and Karatnycky, *New Nations Rising*, p. 122.

elections held in February 1990, and it formed the basis of the independent Estonian government that came to power once the Soviet Union had been dissolved. The strongly nationalist Estonian influence of this movement had a great impact on the new country's citizenship laws.<sup>473</sup> According to David J. Smith: "When Estonia restored its independence in 1991, Soviet-era settlers and their descendants (around 30 per cent of the total population) were denied any automatic right to Estonian citizenship."<sup>474</sup> The prevailing view among many Estonian nationalists was to induce the Russian population to leave Estonia through discriminatory legislation.<sup>475</sup>

As Andrus Park has noted: "Estonia's independence was gained in 1991 on the restorationist model, i.e., from the point of view of the mainstream Estonian political forces 1991 saw not the creation of a new state, but the restoration of the pre-1940 Republic of Estonia. Estonia's citizenship policy followed this restorationist line and produced quick and deep changes in the ethnic composition of the electorate."<sup>476</sup> In this light, Estonia's citizenship law from 1938 was re-established on 26 February 1992, and this changed radically the situation that had existed prior to the law being reinstated. According to this law, in the words of Park "... all those who were citizens of the Republic of Estonia on 16 June 1940, as well as their descendants, were granted citizenship; the others were considered to be foreign nationals or stateless persons."<sup>477</sup> Park

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<sup>473</sup> Jack Snyder, 'Democratization, War and Nationalism,' p. 35.

<sup>474</sup> David J. Smith, "Minority Rights, Multiculturalism and EU Enlargement: The Case of Estonia," *Journal on Ethno-politics* and Minority Issues in Europe, Vol. 14, No. 4. 2015, p. 79.

<sup>475</sup> David J. Smith, "Minority Rights, Multiculturalism and EU Enlargement: The Case of Estonia," pp. 91-92.

<sup>476</sup> Andrus Park, "Ethnicity and Independence: the Case of Estonia in Comparative Perspective," *Europe-Asia Studies*, Volume 46. No. 1, 1994, p.72. I purposefully use this article by an ethnic, patriotic, Estonian to describe the discriminatory policies of the new Estonian state towards its Russian-speaking population to show that these were real problems and not just the creation of Russian propaganda, though Russian propaganda did magnify the problems there for political purposes.

<sup>477</sup> Andrus Park, "Ethnicity and Independence," p. 72.



considered these laws actually quite liberal by comparative standards, and noted that “about 90,000 to 100,000 non-Estonians in Estonia qualif[ied] as citizens, which means the majority of non-Estonians may get Estonian citizenship through nationalization.”<sup>478</sup> However, American political scientist Ted Hopf disagreed, noting:

The Estonian state has chosen to impose an exclusive ethno-national Estonian identity. It has provided plenty of political and civil space for Russians to construct a Russian identity at both the community and institutional level. The Estonian state’s discriminatory policies with respect to Russians living there have evoked a conflictual identity that has resonated in Russian domestic politics.<sup>479</sup>

OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max Van der Stoel also disagreed with the Park’s position on this issue.<sup>480</sup> In a speech entitled “Minorities, Human Rights and the International Community,” delivered at Strausberg, Federal Republic of Germany, on 7 July 1995 he said:

As a consequence of long years of Soviet occupation, major changes have occurred in the demographic situation especially of Estonia and Latvia. About 40 per cent of the population of Estonia is now Russian. In Latvia, that percentage is 47 per cent. The constant fear of Estonians and Latvians is that, even though they have now again acquired independence, they finally will find themselves in a minority in their own country, not sufficiently able to ensure their ethnic identity. In order to cope with this risk, the governments and parliaments of Estonia and Latvia decided not to give citizenship to the Russian-speakers in their countries, those who lived in these countries before 1939 and their descendants being an exception. For hundreds of thousands of Russians this creates problems.<sup>481</sup>

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<sup>478</sup> Andrus Park, “Ethnicity and Independence,” p.72.

<sup>479</sup> Ted Hopf, “Russian Identity and Foreign Policy in Estonia and Uzbekistan,” in Celeste A. Wallander, *The Sources of Russian Foreign Foreign policy after the Cold War* (Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1996).

<sup>480</sup> On 1 January 1995, the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) changed its name to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). See OSCE Secretariat,, Vienna, Austria, “CSCE becomes OSCE,” 3 January 1995. <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/52527> Accessed 10 November 2017.

<sup>481</sup> Max Van der Stoel, “Minorities, Human Rights and the International Community,” Speech delivered at Strausberg, Federal Republic of Germany, 7 July 1995. OSCE official website, [www.osce.org/hcnm/36591?download=true](http://www.osce.org/hcnm/36591?download=true) Accessed 28 October 2017.

Russian representatives, including Kozyrev, noted that Estonia's new citizenship policies violated a treaty that had been signed between the RSFSR and the Republic of Estonia prior to the dissolution of the U.S.S.R.. According to the Treaty on Fundamentals of Interstate Relations between the Republic of Estonia and the RSFSR, signed in Moscow on 12 January 1991, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Estonia agreed to the following:

Article III:

The Republic of Estonia and the Russian Socialist Republic commit themselves mutually *to guarantee to persons who are at the moment of signing the present treaty live in the territories of the Republic of Estonia and the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic and who are presently citizens of the U.S.S.R. the right to preserve or acquire the citizenship of the Republic of Estonia or of the RSFSR in accordance with their own free will ...*

Article IV:

Each High Contracting Party grants to the citizens of the other Contracting Party as well as to persons without citizenship who live on their territories, independently of their national affiliation:

- 1) Civil and political rights and freedoms as well as social, economic and cultural rights in accordance with generally recognized international legal norms of human rights;
- 2) Free national and cultural development;
- 3) Choice of citizenship in accordance with the legislation of the country of residence and the treaty concluded between the Republic of Estonia and the RSFSR.

For the defense of the rights of their citizens living on the territory of the other Party the Parties will conclude a separate bilateral agreement.<sup>482</sup>

As noted by Andrus Park, "... the fact that most residents were not granted automatic citizenship in Estonia as they had in Lithuania ... was a major irritant for Russian political circles in 1992-93," and in response to this, on "... 17 July 1992 the Supreme Soviet of the Russian

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<sup>482</sup> Treaty on Fundamentals of Interstate Relations between the Republic of Estonia and the Russian Federation, 12 January 1991, quoted in OSCE, CSCE Mission to Estonia, Tallinn to CSCE Chairman in Office, Stockholm, Political Report # 2: Arguments about the citizenship issue in Estonia." 23 March 1993, emphasis added.

Federation passed a resolution accusing Estonia of ‘flagrant violations’ of human rights and of the Estonian-Russian Treaty.”<sup>483</sup> This statement had the full support of the Andrei Kozyrev and the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Another important feature of the new Estonian government was its democratic nature, and its leaders’ commitment to Western democratic ideals and values.<sup>484</sup> Because of this essential democratic nature, the perceived harshness of its citizenship laws were to some extent ameliorated by the fact that ethnic Russians and other minorities were not oppressed in any real political sense, and that under the Estonian constitution and Estonian law they were allowed to form political and social associations.

Furthermore, Estonia’s first independence party, the Popular Front of Estonia (PFE) was quite moderate and conciliatory in its minorities policies. Though it was later supplanted by less moderate parties, its existence demonstrated that not all Estonian parties believed in the complete alienation of the Russian-speaking population and undertook efforts to help non-ethnic Estonians become naturalized citizens.<sup>485</sup> Most important, however, was the fact that even less moderate individuals, such as Foreign Minister and later President, Lennart Meri, demonstrated a spirit of compromise when it was necessary to do so. It was this essential good faith and commitment to democratic values and human rights that enabled the Estonian government to make necessary adjustments to its citizenship laws that enabled the CSCE to achieve success there. As HCNM Van der Stoel stated:

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<sup>483</sup> Andrus Park, “Ethnicity and Independence in Estonia,” p. 83.

<sup>484</sup> Though Jack Snyder noted that this was a contradiction in his article, “Democratization, War and Nationalism,” it actually served to ameliorate the conditions of ethnic Russians living in Estonia at that time. Polling data taken during that time by an objective source, the CSCE, indicated that the vast majority of the Russians living there did not consider themselves as members of a national minority, whereas the majority of Ukrainians living in Estonia did.

<sup>485</sup> David J. Smith, “Minority Rights, Multiculturalism and EU Enlargement; The Case of Estonia,” pp. 88-89.

In the first place, I have become more and more convinced that it is completely wrong to consider conflicts around minorities in Europe as phenomena which cannot be prevented, just as we are not able to prevent natural disasters. Conflict can be avoided if there is the will to have dialogue and to seek compromises. It might sometimes be quite complicated to reach an agreement, but with good will on all sides solutions can be found.<sup>486</sup>

It was this essentially democratic nature of Estonia's political leadership, and this leadership's positive response to prodding by the CSCE and other international institutions that led to a liberalization of its citizenship laws.

This can also be said of the leaders of Estonia's Russian-language minority. Despite their claims that they were persecuted, and the support they enjoyed in this regard from Russian Federation diplomats, they positively responded to the recommendations of the CSCE, and engaged in dialogue with their ethnic Estonian counterparts.<sup>487</sup> Furthermore, Kozyrev greatly strengthened the weight of the CSCE's recommendations by not giving the Russian minority any encouragement to protest. According to Dominic Lieven: "One reason for the Russian diaspora's quiescence was that they received no encouragement to intransigence from Yeltsin's Moscow."<sup>488</sup>

The contending sides positively responded to the CSCE's call for a Round Table and actively participated in this forum which enabled the different groups to openly discuss citizenship issues. This is especially true in the difficult situation in the summer of 1993, where the Estonian parliament passed a citizen act that the Russian-speaking population perceived as

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<sup>486</sup> Max Van der Stoep, "Minorities, Human Rights and the International Community," Speech given by HCNM Van der Stoep in Strausberg, Federal Republic of Germany, 7 July 1995. OSCE official website. [www.osce.org/hcnm/36591?download=true](http://www.osce.org/hcnm/36591?download=true) Accessed 28 October 2017.

<sup>487</sup> See ODCPEF: CSCE Mission in Estonia to CSCE Chairman in Office, Stockholm, "Activity Report #68, 13 July 1994. OSCSE Mission in Estonia to Chairman in Office, Stockholm, Activity Report #53, 28 February 1994. See also David J. Smith, "Narva Region within the Estonian Republic: From Autocomism to Accommodation?" in J. Batt and J. Wolczuk (eds.) *Region, State, and Identity in Central and Eastern Europe* (London: Frank Cass and Co, 2002).

<sup>488</sup> Dominic Lieven, *Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 380.

violating their civil rights, and in response some of the Russian-speaking groups threatened to form an autonomous Russian region within Estonia. Due to Van der Stoel's direct intervention, they quickly backed down and claimed that their threat to form an autonomous region was simply a diplomatic maneuver to form the basis of a "constructive conversation" between the two sides.<sup>489</sup>

Throughout the eight year period of the CSCE/OSCE Mission of Estonia's efforts to mitigate the ethnic tensions between Estonia and its Russian-speaking minority, all sides needed to show flexibility and for the most part, they did. As Michael Ignatieff noted:

Even when he (Van der Stoel) was successful, it isn't always clear that he can claim the credit. Success in the Baltic States depended not just on him, but on the political imagination of the Baltic leaders, the restraint of the Russians, and the important political support of his initiatives from Nordic countries and other OSCE members.<sup>490</sup>

In the field of International Relations scholarship, International Institutionalists argue that one of the most important contributions international organizations provide in conflict resolution is that they provide coordinating mechanisms between conflicting states or parties.<sup>491</sup> Max Van der Stoel claimed that his office provided such a mechanism that would further the cause of reconciliation. In a speech delivered in late January 1994, he said:

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<sup>489</sup> ODCPEF, CSCE Mission in Estonia, Tallinn to CSCE Chairman in Office Stockholm. Political Report # 20: referenda in northeastern Estonia, 20 July 1993. This attitude of compromise again provides strong evidence against the claim that this national group served as a "fifth column" against the Estonian state. It also shows that the Putin Administration's current claims that this population is estranged and isolated from the Estonian government are hollow.

<sup>490</sup> Michael Ignatieff, "Forward" in Walter A. Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities* (The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. xiv. This corresponds nicely with Martin Wight's ideas on rational (or Grotian) diplomacy. As he wrote: "The Rationalists are those who concentrate on, and believe in the value of, the element of international intercourse in a condition of international anarchy." Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, p. 13.

<sup>491</sup> As Robert O. Keohane and Lisa Martin wrote: "Institutions do not provide the only possible coordinating mechanism. However, in complex situations involving many states, international institutions can step in to provide "constructed focal points" that make particular cooperative outcomes prominent."

<sup>491</sup> Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory," *International Security*, Volume 20, Number 1 (Summer 1995), p. 45.

Opportunities for peaceful resolution do often exist, especially the earliest stages of tension, but reconciliation often requires the appropriate engagement of outsiders in promoting dialogue. The international community has essentially two choices in this regard: conflict prevention at the early stages, or if a conflict is allowed to develop, crisis management under often difficult circumstances.<sup>492</sup>

The CSCE provided a solid basis for future progress on resolving this crisis through the production and publication of a report on Estonian legislation, the “Report of the CSCE ODIHR Mission on the Study of Estonian Legislation invited by the Republic of Estonia,” which was issued in January 1993. This document served as the foundation and the baseline for improving the conditions of the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia.<sup>493</sup> This report detailed the observations of a CSCE mission that visited Estonia from 2-5 December 1992. This document served as a baseline to all parties in the dispute in ameliorating the condition of ethnic Russians and other Russian speakers in Estonia. The CSCE mission examined the status of minorities in Estonia through visits to “...representatives of central and local authorities as well as spokesmen for different groups and communities” on both sides of the issue in Tallinn, Tartu, Narva and Kohtla-Jareve.”<sup>494</sup> The mission’s report praised the Estonian government for its full cooperation with the CSCE in the process of collecting data:

The members of the mission ... had full and unimpeded access to all relevant sources of information. The government of Estonia facilitated their efforts in a spirit of total openness and frankness. The members of the mission therefore wish to record their

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<sup>492</sup> Max Van der Stoep, “Preventative Diplomacy in Situations of Ethnic Tensions: the Role of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities,” Speech delivered at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany, 27-28 January 1994.

<sup>493</sup> ODCP, Estonia File. Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) Mission, Report of the CSCE ODIHR Mission on the Study of Estonian Legislation invited by the Republic of Estonia, CSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (Warsaw, Poland, January 1993), p. 1.

<sup>494</sup> ODCP, Estonia File ODIHR Mission, Report of the CSCE ODIHR Mission on the Study of Estonian Legislation invited by the Republic of Estonia, CSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (Warsaw, Poland, January 1993), p. 1.

satisfaction with the unfettered cooperation which they received during their state in Estonia.”<sup>495</sup>

The Mission identified the most important issues as follows:

- The principal issue concerning the implementation of the human rights in Estonia has to do with the presence of a large number of individuals in the territory of the country who are not citizens of Estonia and who are not ethnic Estonians.<sup>496</sup>
- It should be emphasized at the outset that the mission *found no evidence of deliberate discrimination among individuals on the basis of membership in ethnic, religious or ethnic groups*. Relations between individuals belonging to different groups in daily life were described as good by many spokesmen (emphasis added).<sup>497</sup>

Regarding the citizenship issue, the Mission reported:

It became clear that the current citizenship legislation is perceived as discriminatory by most representatives of the Russian-speaking population. According to this view, the conditions set forth for the acquisition of Estonian citizenship would create a segregated society and impose permanent restrictions on the civil rights of nearly 40% of Estonia’s current residents.<sup>498</sup>

In its first foray into Estonian politics and its citizenship policy, the CSCE noted that Russian Federation and Russian-speaking minority complaints concerning ethnic discrimination were exaggerated, but they also noted that Estonian citizenship laws did not yet entirely conform to European standards that were embodied in the guiding principles of the CSCE and the Council of Europe.<sup>499</sup> This early effort demonstrated the CSCE’s objective nature and its commitment to

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<sup>495</sup> ODCP, ODIHR Mission, Report of the CSCE ODIHR Mission on the Study of Estonian Legislation invited by the Republic of Estonia, CSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (Warsaw, Poland, January 1993).

<sup>496</sup> ODCP, ODIHR Mission, Report of the CSCE ODIHR Mission on the Study of Estonian Legislation invited by the Republic of Estonia, CSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (Warsaw, Poland, January 1993).

<sup>497</sup> ODCP, ODIHR Mission, Report of the CSCE ODIHR Mission on the Study of Estonian Legislation invited by the Republic of Estonia, CSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (Warsaw, Poland, January 1993).

<sup>498</sup> ODCP, ODIHR Mission, Report of the CSCE ODIHR Mission on the Study of Estonian Legislation invited by the Republic of Estonia, CSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (Warsaw, Poland, January 1993).

<sup>499</sup> Speech by OSCE Secretary General Wilhelm Höynck, “From CSCE to OSCE: Twenty years of the Helsinki Final Act – Towards a new European Security Model” Moscow, 17 July 1995, Secretariat, OSCE, <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/15666?download=true> Accessed 10 February 2018.

seeing European norms adopted by all three parties in the conflict. The CSCE also noted optimistically that despite the differences in opinion concerning the status of the Russian-speaking minority, the situation there was fairly harmonious. As the CSCE Mission to Estonia reported to the CSCE Chairman in Office in Stockholm on 1 April 1993:

... the division between the ethnic Estonians and Russians in Estonia is mitigated by the following factors: 1) few people in either community perceive any tension in their individual lives, and in general, personal relations are good; 2) Estonia has almost no history of violence between the two communities; 3) About 100,000 people who are not ethnically Estonian are already Estonian citizens; and 4) Even those people who feel alienated from Estonian society do not necessarily identify with Russia.<sup>500</sup>

Therefore, though the CSCE Mission noted concerns with Estonia's citizenship laws, the Mission concluded that relations between ethnic Estonians and the Russian-speaking population in Estonia were relatively good. The CSCE Mission in Estonia also reported on 8 April 1993, that the majority of the Russian-speakers there did not consider themselves part of a national minority. In 1993, 38% of the Russians in Estonia believed that they belonged to a national minority, whereas in the same year 59% of the country's Ukrainian population believed that they belonged to a national minority.<sup>501</sup> In essence, the majority of Estonian Russians organically rejected the "compatriot" identity that some Russian nationalist politicians wanted to impose on them.<sup>502</sup>

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<sup>500</sup> ODCP, Estonia File, CSCE Mission to Estonia, Tallinn to CSCE Chairman in Office, Stockholm, "Political Report # 3: Articulating problems and mobilizing the Russian-language population of Estonia," 1 April 1993.

<sup>501</sup> ODCP, Estonia File, OSCE, OSCE, CSCE Mission to Estonia, Tallinn to CSCE Chairman in Office, Stockholm, "Political Report # 6: Attitudes of the Russian language population in Estonia," 8 April 1993.

<sup>502</sup> For the difficulty in defining just who are Russia's "compatriots" in the former Soviet states, see Sven Gunnar Simonsen, "Compatriot Games: Explaining the 'Diaspora Linkage' in Russia's Military Withdrawal from the Baltic States, *Europe-Asia Studies*, Volume 53, Number 5, 2001, p. 773. See also Katja Koort, "The Russians of Estonia: Twenty Years After," *World Affairs Journal*, July-August 2014 <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/russians-estonia-twenty-years-after> Accessed 21 November 2017.



### ***The CSCE in Action: Intervention on all Sides in the Summer of 1993***

In the Summer of 1993 the CSCE mobilized its resources to avert a possible clash between the opposing sides in Estonia. The Estonian parliament formulated and passed a citizenship law on 21 June 1993 that applied restrictive conditions on its Russian-speaking residents that did not conform to the CSCE recommendations. Possibly in response, the Russian representatives in Sillimae and Narva threatened to form an autonomous region within Estonia. As Kemp wrote: "... when a crisis was imminent the High Commissioner could not afford to wait ... in July 1993 he went to Estonia to undertake shuttle diplomacy between the Government and the Russian speaking minority over a crisis sparked by the call for a referendum on 'national-territorial autonomy' by the Russophone-dominated city councils of Narva and Sillimae."<sup>503</sup> Throughout the crisis, Van der Stoel maintained constant contact Russian foreign minister Kozyrev. To avoid misunderstandings (and accusations that he was taking sides) the High Commissioner was careful to inform the Estonian authorities, on this and subsequent occasions about his consultations with his Russian interlocutors."<sup>504</sup>

On 21 June 1993, the Estonian Parliament "... voted overwhelmingly in favor of a Law on Aliens that was designed to formalize the 'Alien' status of approximately 400,000 (mostly ethnic Russian) long-time residents of Estonia."<sup>505</sup> This law provoked great opposition from the Russian speaking population in northeast of Estonia, and alarmingly, Estonian President Lennart Meri stated that he supported this legislation. This vote strained Estonian relations with the Russian Federation, which were already in tension over the question of the troop withdrawal from Estonia. Both President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev continued to argue in public

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<sup>503</sup> Walter Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action*, p. 51.

<sup>504</sup> Walter Kemp. *Quiet Diplomacy in Action*, p. 144.

<sup>505</sup> Walter Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action*, p. 142.

forums that Estonia's nationalities policies were discriminatory, and that troop withdrawal could possibly be delayed due to Estonian abuse of its Russian-speaking citizens.<sup>506</sup> According to a report from the CSCE Mission in Estonia to the CSCE Chairman in Office in Stockholm dated 2 July 1993:

On 2 March 1993 President Lennart Meri issued a statement that he would sign the law passed by the Estonian parliament. He said that the decision of the parliament was strongly impacted by two factors: 1) in an April referendum, the majority of Estonia's Russian-speaking population that voted against Russia's democratic reforms, and 2) the slow pace of negotiations between the Russian Federation and the Estonian government on the withdrawal of Russian military forces from Estonian territory, which in Meri's words served to "... deepen the doubts among the citizens of Estonia as to the possibility of seeing in the Russian Federation a partner worthy of trust."<sup>507</sup>

This intention was seen as possibly dangerous by the CSCE mission in Estonia, and the CSCE applied pressure, through HCNM Van der Stoep, on President Meri to reject the law as it currently stood. Van der Stoep suggested to President Meri that he should not sign this legislation into law, but "... submit it instead for scrutiny by the Council of Europe and the OSCE. He said it was necessary not only to consider the law on its legal merits, but also its psychological effect on the Russian-speaking population in Estonia."<sup>508</sup> Because President Meri was under less political pressure from the nationalist sentiment of the population than the members of the Riigikogu, he positively responded to the CSCE's pressure and issued a statement on 25 June 1993 that "... he would not promulgate this legislation into law until it had

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<sup>506</sup> As Anatol Lieven correctly noted: 'Western diplomacy was very slow to get to grips with the dangers of the ethnic situation in the Baltic. When it finally began to do so, during the summer of 1992, it was only under pressure for increasingly bitter complaints from Moscow—complaints which, under Foreign Minister Kozyrev, were directed through the proper channels of the CSCE, UN and Council of Europe.' Anatoly Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the path to Independence*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 378.

<sup>507</sup> ODCP, Estonia File, CSCE Mission in Estonia, Tallinn to Chairman in Office, Stockholm, "Political Report # 17: Tension over Community Relations in Estonia," 2 July 1993.

<sup>508</sup> Walter Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action*, p. 143.

been submitted to the CSCE, the Council of Europe, and other international institutions for their evaluation.”<sup>509</sup>

On 7 June 1993 President Meri made a televised speech to the Estonian people in order to explain the need to send the Legislation on Aliens back to the Riigikogu for reconsideration. He stated that the law needed to be considered by “expert opinion” and the comments given by other western governments. He emphasized that the “Republic of Estonia is abiding by the rule of law,” and that by eliciting foreign opinion on the *Riigikogu*’s legislation, “... Estonia has created a precedent in Europe which adds impetus to the integration of Europe.”<sup>510</sup>

Of almost equally great importance was that President Meri, following the advice of the CSCE, established the Round Table of Non-Citizens and Ethnic Minorities headed by the Presidential Plenipotentiary in Estonia that became a regular forum for discussion of citizenship issues among all concerned parties. As a result of this resubmission of the law back to the parliament, three very important recommendations of the CSCE were in fact implemented. These recommendations, in addition to the establishment of a Round Table, were that the language requirements of the original law be lessened to enable more people to be able to pass the test, and secondly that exceptions should be provided for invalids and pensioners. The implementation of these recommendations made the law more palatable to both the Russian-speaking population and to the government of the Russian Federation.<sup>511</sup> This direct action on the part of the CSCE also defused a potentially dangerous situation because the legislation in its original form was strongly contested by Estonia’s Russian-speaking population. Not only did

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<sup>509</sup> ODCP, Estonian File, CSCE Mission to Estonia, Tallinn to Chairman in Office, Stockholm, “Political Report # 17: Tension over Community Relations in Estonia,” 2 July 1993.

<sup>510</sup> ODCP, Estonia File, CSCE Mission to Estonia, Tallinn to Chairman in Office, Stockholm, “Political Report # 18: Continuing Tension,” 8 July 1993.

<sup>511</sup> ODCP, Estonia File, CSCE Mission to Estonia, Tallinn to Chairman in Office, Stockholm, “Political Report # 18: Continuing Tension,” 8 July 1993.

the CSCE improve the Estonian state's laws on citizenship, it also helped dampen ethnic Russian hostility towards the Estonian government as well. As a response to the proposed Law on Aliens passed in the Estonian parliament, the majority Russian-speaking cities of Narva and Sillimae threatened to declare these cities as semi-autonomous regions within Estonia.<sup>512</sup>

HCNM Van der Stoel personally visited the two Russian-majority cities in July 1993. On 12 July 1993 the CCSE made a public declaration of the assurances that Van de Stoel had received from both parties in this conflict. According to Walter Kemp, this public declaration was "... instrumental in spelling out commitments that had been made and steps that would be taken to normalize relations."<sup>513</sup> Also during this visit, the chairmen of the Narva and Sillamae councils promised Van der Stoel that if their proposals for semi-autonomous states were submitted to Estonia's National Court, they would abide by its ruling. It was the stated opinion of CSCE personnel in Estonia that these proposals were not intended by the ethnic Russian population to be politically implemented, they were only intended to begin a serious political dialogue between the Estonian government and the Russian speaking populations in these cities.<sup>514</sup> In any case, Western institutions such as the CSCE, the Council of Europe, and others all opposed the establishment of autonomous regions for national minorities within a country's national boundaries, and Van der Stoel's personal intervention clearly demonstrated the CSCE's, and the European community of nations' opposition to separate ethnic Russian enclaves within

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<sup>512</sup> ODCP, Estonia File, CSCE Mission to Estonia, Tallinn to Chairman in Office, Stockholm, "Political Report # 18: Continuing Tension," 8 July 1993.

<sup>513</sup> Walter Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action*, p. 80.

<sup>514</sup> ODCP, Estonian File, CSCE Mission in Estonia, Tallinn to CSCE Chairman in Office Stockholm. Political Report # 20: referenda in northeastern Estonia, 20 July 1993. This was very likely a comment made to de-escalate the situation by stating something that was not entirely true. Some Russians probably favored the establishment of a separate Russian-controlled enclave in Estonia, but such an institution was strongly against CSCE policy, and the establishment of such an autonomous region had the potential to lead to armed clashes between representatives of the Estonian and ethnic Russian populations.

Estonia. These proposals were never raised by Russian-speaking representatives again, and a potentially very unstable situation was avoided.<sup>515</sup>

Interestingly, in the middle of this crisis, on 2 July 1993 a member of the CSCE Mission in Estonia expressed his concerns that the office might have failed in its mission. The individual sadly admitted that tensions had grown between the majority population and the Russian minority due to a series of decisions made by the Estonian Parliament since May 1993, lamenting that the effects of the office's efforts had been marginal and had not sufficiently influenced the conduct of Estonia's parliament.<sup>516</sup> However, the fact that Estonian President Meri had refused to sign the Parliament's new Law on Aliens until it had been evaluated by personnel of several international institutions, including the CSCE, and that improvements were made to the law, showed that the organization did exert some influence on the President and his cabinet, which was a very positive development. In the absence of CSCE influence, President Meri would have signed into law the legislation originally passed by the parliament which the Russian-speaking population in Estonia saw as highly discriminatory. Also the direct intervention of Van der Stoep may have been a decisive factor in getting the Russian-speaking representatives in Sillimäe and Narva to end any attempt to form a Russian-language autonomous region within Estonia.<sup>517</sup>

The CSCE's immediate intervention in this case, combined with the public declaration that spelled out the commitments both parties had made to Van der Stoep to normalize the situation,

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<sup>515</sup> ODCP, Estonian File, CSCE Mission in Estonia, Tallinn to CSCE Chairman in Office Stockholm. Political Report # 20: referenda in northeastern Estonia, 20 July 1993.

<sup>516</sup> ODCP, Estonian File, CSCE Mission to Estonia, Tallinn to Chairman in Office, Stockholm, "Political Report # 17 Tension over Community Relations in Estonia, 2 July 1993. The individual is identified in the document, but rules for the use of such documents require that individual members of missions not be mentioned by name, unless the document is one that can be released to the public.

<sup>517</sup> ODCP, Estonian File, CSCE Mission in Estonia, Tallinn to CSCE Chairman in Office Stockholm. Political Report # 20: referenda in northeastern Estonia, 20 July 1993.

worked to head off two potentially very damaging events. Outside observers were in agreement that in this case, CSCE intervention in restraining both sides—the Estonian government, and the representatives of the Russian-speaking minorities in Narva and Sillimae—was likely the decisive factor in lessening ethnic tensions, and even preventing armed conflict. These achievements were subsequently noted by several outside observers, among them the academics Michael Ignatieff and Ted Hopf.<sup>518</sup>

Foreign Minister Kozyrev was an active participant in these events, raising the issue of the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia in a number of international fora. For example on 6 September 1993, he addressed the forty-fifth session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights on this issue. According to the official report on this session:

The Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev recently drew attention to “a Russian cry of despair” in Estonia and elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. “At issue is the status of national minorities in the newly independent states.” Referring to the mostly Russian-speaking inhabitants of the Estonian town of Narva, Mr. Kozyrev expressed the view that “this town symbolizes one of the most serious challenges to European stability ... We have seen too many occasions in recent years that whenever interethnic conflict bring bloodshed, reconciling the rival becomes nearly impossible. This is why events in Narva should become the touchstone of the ability of Europe to effectively prevent and extinguish conflicts.”

...

Nonetheless, the International Fellowship of Reconciliation welcomes the appeal of Mr. Kozyrev and also stressed: “*We are making every effort ... to resolve the problem of the Russian minority and call upon Europe to give is a hand in achieving this goal.*” We have also noted with satisfaction in particular the Estonian President’s efforts to find common ground with the help of European institutions. *Encouragingly, the related work and recommendations of the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max Van der Stoel, has already been welcomed by the Russian government as “constructive” and to “represent a good basis for dealing*

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<sup>518</sup> Michael Ignatieff, “Forward” to Walter A. Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities* (The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. xiv; Ted Hopf, “Russian Identity and Foreign Policy in Estonia and Uzbekistan,” in Celeste A. Wallander, *The Sources of Russian Foreign Foreign policy after the Cold War* (Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, 1996), p. 166. Kozyrev, *Preobrazhenie*, and Park, op. cit. This collection of sources show outside observers, members of the Russian minority, and equally important, Russian and Estonian government officials in agreement that the CSCE’s role in ameliorating this crisis may have been critically important.

*with problems affecting the interests of the Russian-speaking part of population of Estonia and Latvia.*<sup>519</sup>

On 8 September Kozyrev told a Polish journalist in a popular Polish journal on international affairs that this discriminatory Estonian legislation could possibly lead to violence:

If ... the Estonian authorities do not stop discriminating against the Russians and continue treating them as foreigners, these people will behave like foreigners and sooner or later they might create an autonomous region or even want to secede from Estonia. There could be a repetition of the situation in Abkhazia or the Dneister region.<sup>520</sup>

Kozyrev's efforts to propagate the Russian position in the defense of the Russian speaking population at a United Nations session and in a Polish foreign affairs journal were part of a method of applying both direct and indirect pressure on the Estonian government. It also showed a congruence of the Russian position with CSCE policy, which strongly opposed the creation of such semi-independent enclaves, arguing that in almost all cases they led to ethnic conflict and occasionally armed clashes between different ethnic groups.<sup>521</sup>

In November 1993 Kozyrev positively noted the role of the CSCE in this process. ITAR-TASS stated: "Kozyrev and [Finnish Parliament Chairman Ilka] Suominen also discussed the situation in the Baltics, including that of the Russian speaking population in the three Baltic states.

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<sup>519</sup> "Protection of Minorities: Written statement submitted by the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, a non-governmental organization in consultative status (category II), Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention and Protection of Minorities, Forty-fifth session, Agenda item 17, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/NGO/27, 6 September 1993, emphasis added, [https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/172910/files/E\\_CN.4\\_Sub.2\\_1993\\_NGO\\_27-EN.pdf](https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/172910/files/E_CN.4_Sub.2_1993_NGO_27-EN.pdf) accessed 9 February 2018.

<sup>520</sup> Zdzislaw Raczynski, Andrei Kozyrev, "Kozyrev on Ties with Eastern Europe, Baltics" [Interview with Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev by Zdzislaw Raczynski], "We do not want to alter geography," *Polityka*, 8 September 1993, translated from the Polish by the Foreign Broadcast and Information Service, FBIS-SOV-93-172.

<sup>521</sup> Van de Stoel stated on 5 July 1995 that "What I always try to emphasize is the fact that within the context of a state there are many ways to ensure the interest of the national minority: the option of territorial autonomy and the option of special legislation in the interest of the minority are discussed frequently. I must say, however, that I know of quite a number of situations in which governments totally reject the concept of territorial autonomy. That is especially the case in those situations where the minority is living near the borders of what we usually call the "instate." Territorial autonomy, or even the demand for territorial autonomy, is often seen by the government concerned as constituting a first step in a secret agenda which would eventually lead to secession." Max Van der Stoel, "Minorities, Human Rights, and the International Community," Speech given in Strausberg, Federal Republic of Germany, 7 July 1995.

According to the Russian minister of foreign affairs ‘certain positive shifts’ are becoming visible in this respect. The Russian minister stressed the positive role played by the CSCE High Commissioner Van der Stoel in handling these problems and solving them.”<sup>522</sup> Similar to his interview in a Polish political journal, by raising this issue with the Finnish government, Kozyrev was trying to solicit support for the liberal position of the Russian government from a traditional ally of the Baltic Republics.

As mentioned above, the establishment of the Round Table proved to be a very important factor in ameliorating tensions between the Estonian government and Estonia’s Russian-speaking population. This forum was a central aspect of the CSCE’s strategy. Van der Stoel stated: “In some cases, an effective solution is a council or roundtable at which the authorities and the representatives of the minorities can discuss specific problems together.”<sup>523</sup> David J. Smith testified to the importance of this institution when he noted: “*Intervention by the OSCE was important of initiating a dialogue between the government and the main ‘Russian-speaking’ political organizations*, not least through the creation of a Round Table of Nationalities under presidential auspices.”<sup>524</sup>

Due to this recommendation, a Presidential Round Table—which included representatives of the Estonian Government, the Estonian Parliament and various groups representing the Russian-speaking population—met for the third time on 12 August 1993. Personnel from the CSCE Mission in Estonia participated in these meetings as observers. Though there was some skepticism on the part of both Estonians and ethnic Russians as to the long-term prospects of

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<sup>522</sup> Georgy Shmelev, “Kozyrev-Finnish Official Preview CSCE meeting,” *ITAR-TASS*, 15 November 1993.

<sup>523</sup> Max Van der Stoel, “Controlling Ethnic Tensions: The Experience of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities,” remarks by Mr. Van der Stoel at the annual Conference of the European Research Center on Migration and Ethnic Relations (ERCOMER), Utrecht University, Utrecht, 19 September 1994.

<sup>524</sup> David J. Smith, “Minority Rights, Multiculturalism and EU Enlargement: The Case of Estonia,” *Journal on Ethno-politics and Minority Issues in Europe*, Vol. 14, No. 4. 2015, p. 101, emphasis added.



the Round Table, it proved to be a useful forum for facilitating communication between the two sides. The establishment of this Round Table met Van der Stoel's requirements of providing avenues for communication between opposing sides which he considered a key aspect of his mission as the CSCE HCNM. This Round Table became a permanent feature of the Estonian political landscape and it served as a forum for both sides to present new ideas and work out effective solutions to minority rights in Estonia.<sup>525</sup>

So successful was this policy that Kozyrev and the Russian Foreign Ministry raised the issue of strengthening the position of the HCNM in discussions with the United States in preparation for the CSCE Budapest Conference in December 1994. The United States responded favorably to Kozyrev's proposals. On 17 August 1994 Secretary of State Warren Christopher wrote the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on this subject. He drafted the following response to Kozyrev's proposal on the HCNM: "We support your proposals to protect human rights and ethnic minorities, and to strengthen the institution of the CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities."<sup>526</sup> The final report of the Conference affirmed Kozyrev's proposed language:

6. They [the member states of the OSCE] encourage the Chairman-in-Office to inform the Permanent Council of serious cases of alleged non-implementation of human dimension commitments, including on the basis of information from the ODIHR, reports and recommendations of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), or reports of the head of a CSCE mission and information from the State concerned.

7. The participating States reconfirm their appreciation for the HCNM, who has, fully in line with his mandate, been able to focus on, and to successfully address a number of national minority issues, taking also into account specific situations of participating States and of parties directly concerned.

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<sup>525</sup> ODCP, Estonia File, CSCE Mission in Estonia, Tallinn to CSCE Chairman in Office, Stockholm, "Activity Report # 28," 23 August 1993; CSCE Mission in Estonia, Tallinn to CSCE Chairman in Office, Stockholm, "Activity Report # 30, 6 September 1994; CSCE Mission in Estonia, Tallinn to CSCE Chairman in Office, Stockholm, "Activity Report # 51, 14 February 1994; CSCE Mission in Estonia, Tallinn to CSCE Chairman in Office, Stockholm, "Activity Report # 52, 21 February 1994.

<sup>526</sup> Secretary of State Warren Christopher to American Embassy in Moscow, "Response to Russian Ideas on CSCE Summit," 17 August 1994. Confidential document downgraded to Unclassified on 29 April 2004. Accessed at the National Security Archive, File—U.S.-Russia 1990s—Not NATO, Washington DC.

They encourage the HCNM to continue his present activities, and support him on taking up new and further ones, including those related to his recommendations. They will increase their efforts to implement these recommendations.<sup>527</sup>

Kozyrev's advocacy of the office of the HCNM and his mission was rewarded by recognition of Van der Stoel throughout the organization's membership, among the important member states' leaders, and enhanced both the prestige and the future authority of the office of the HCNM.<sup>528</sup>

This same type of intervention occurred again in April 1996 when the Riigikogu passed a law on local elections on 17 April which restricted candidates based on their proficiency in the Estonian language. Van der Stoel wrote a personal letter to President Meri, urging him not to sign this legislation into law because it violated the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Estonia adhered. Van der Stoel urged President Meri to return the draft law to the Riigikogu for reconsideration. Meri complied with Van der Stoel's recommendation.<sup>529</sup> This showed that Kozyrev's policy continued to bear fruit even after he had left the office of foreign minister.<sup>530</sup>

### ***Continued Pressure on Behalf of the Children of Stateless Persons***

One of the most important recommendations of the CSCE to the Government of Estonia related to enabling the children born in Estonia to former Russian nationals of the U.S.S.R. to become citizens automatically under law. The recommendation stated:

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<sup>527</sup> CSCE, Budapest Document 1994, "Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era," 21 December 1994, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe website. <https://www.osce.org/mc/39554> Accessed on 11 February 2018, pp. 28-29

<sup>528</sup> CSCE, Budapest Document 1994, "Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era," 21 December 1994, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe website. <https://www.osce.org/mc/39554> Accessed on 11 February 2018, pp. 28-29

<sup>529</sup> Letter from HCNM Van der Stoel to President Lennart Meri, President of the Republic of Estonia, 22 April 1996, ref. no, 636/96, cited in Walter Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action*, p. 147.

<sup>530</sup> M. Merrick Yamamoto, *OSCE Principles in Practice: Testing Their Effect on Security Through the Work of Max Van der Stoel, First High Commissioner on National Minorities 1993–2001*, (College Park, MD: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, September 2017).

In full conformity with the Citizenship Act (Article 3, paragraph 6), it should be ensured that children born from former nationals of the U.S.S.R., who would otherwise be stateless, are registered as Estonian citizens.<sup>531</sup>

Despite CSCE pressure on the Estonian Government and Parliament, this recommendation was not implemented in Estonia's early citizenship laws. In its official response to this document, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia argued that these people were not stateless, but were in fact, citizens of the Russian Federation:

We recommend that in lieu of the word "STATELESS," the term "FOREIGN CITIZENS" be used, as these persons cannot be considered as stateless persons ... Estonia considers these persons as "citizens of the former Soviet Union." Also, in accordance with Russian law former Soviet citizens cannot be considered as stateless persons for at least two years.<sup>532</sup>

The CSCE Mission to Estonia noted that these arguments were used as a basis to reject CSCE recommendations in this policy area, but clearly stated that this redefinition of these people by the Estonian government was "... *hardly tenable under international law*."<sup>533</sup>

This was an issue that the CSCE/OSCE continued to raise with both the Estonian President and his Cabinet, and the Estonian parliament. In this effort, the persistence of the OSCE and other international institutions paid off. According to David J. Galbreath: "The Estonian Government *was unable to deny efforts by the OCSE and the EU to change the citizenship law*. Furthermore, there was growing desire within the Estonian population for a more liberal stance on citizenship,

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<sup>531</sup> ODCP, Report of the CSCE ODIHR Mission on the Study of Estonian Legislation, invited by the Republic of Estonia (Warsaw, Poland: CSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, January 1993), p. 19.

<sup>532</sup> ODCP, Estonia File,, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia, Tallinn to CSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Warsaw, Poland. 15 January 1993.

<sup>533</sup> OCCP, Estonia File, CSCE Mission to Estonia, Tallinn to Chairman in Office, Stockholm, "Political Report # 25: Implementation of the CSCE recommendations in Estonia, 5 August 1993, emphasis added.

especially dealing with children.”<sup>534</sup> The growing population of these “stateless” persons, who were being born in Estonia, was a potentially destabilizing situation, as David J. Smith noted:

With over a thousand children being born to non-citizen parents in Estonia and Latvia, there were fears that this would serve to perpetuate the citizen/non-citizen divide. Experts also noted that this amendment would bring Estonia in line with other OSCE members and with UN provisions relating to the rights of the child.<sup>535</sup>

Finally, on 9 December 1998, the Estonian parliament, the Riikikogu, voted 55 to 20 to change the citizenship law to conform to the original OSCE recommendation from the January 1993 Report.<sup>536</sup> On 9 December 1998, HCNM Van der Stoep issued a press release praising the Estonian Parliament for passing a law extending citizenship to children of Stateless Persons.<sup>537</sup> This happened almost three years after Kozyrev’s resignation as foreign minister in January 1996, but it showed that the foundation of Kozyrev’s policy had been sound. His policy continued to bear fruit and improved the conditions of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia even after he had left office.<sup>538</sup>

### ***Russians co-opted as “Baltic-Russians”***

The work of the CSCE can be seen as successful due to the assimilation of a large proportion of the ethnic Russian, or Russian-speaking, population in Estonia. There were many good

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<sup>534</sup> David J. Galbreath, *Nation-Building and Minority Politics in Post-Socialist States: Interests, Influence and Identities in Estonia and Latvia* (Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2005), p. 267, emphasis added.

<sup>535</sup> David J. Smith, “Minority Rights, Multiculturalism and EU Enlargement: The Case of Estonia,” *Journal on Ethno-politics and Minority Issues in Europe*, Vol. 14, No. 4. 2015, p. 102. Smith cited the scholar Vello Pettai to show that one of the most important reasons for this law was the fact that Estonia’s prospects for a rapid accession to the EU improved significantly during this period. He quoted Pettai as writing “More than any other single mechanism of influence ... the EU made most Estonian and Latvian politicians realize that improving the citizenship issue was crucially important.”

<sup>536</sup> David J. Galbreath, *Nation-Building and Minority Politics in Post-Socialist States*, page 267, footnote 555.

<sup>537</sup> Walter Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action*, p. 81.

<sup>538</sup> Walter A. Kemp (ed.), *Quiet Diplomacy in Action; The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities* (The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 61.

reasons for ethnic Russians in Estonia to desire to become citizens. First, as pointed out by the CSCE missions there, Estonia was the only home many of the Russians living there had ever known.<sup>539</sup> Secondly, and possibly more importantly, as it became clear that the political and economic situations in the Baltic states were greatly superior to those of the Russian Federation, more ethnic Russians wanted to remain where they were and become Estonian citizens. As noted by Lottmann:

However by the late 1990s it was become clear that the Baltics would remain independent and relatively stable for the foreseeable future. As the Baltics stabilized over the decade following independence, it appears likely that many individuals who had initially hesitated then chose to seek citizenship in their place of residence. When it was evident that Latvia and the other Baltic states were likely to join the European Union, the nations became an even more attractive alternative to the struggling Russian Federation in the eyes of non-native residents.<sup>540</sup>

Estonian policy makers were greatly concerned that the large populations of Russian-speakers in their territories could become active agents of Russian imperialism. Some Estonians characterized the Russian speaking minority in highly charged terms, calling them "... 'colonists,' 'civil occupants,' a 'civil garrison of the empire' and 'an ominous tumour in the body of the Estonian nation.'"<sup>541</sup> HCNM Van der Stoel sympathized with Estonian reservations concerning its Russian-speaking population, but he stressed that co-optation of these groups through progressive legislation was always preferable to conflict with them, because any unresolved conflict within a state, if not checked, could possibly become another Kosovo.

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<sup>539</sup> Report of the CSCE ODIHR Mission on the Study of Estonian Legislation, invited by the Republic of Estonia (Warsaw, Poland: CSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, January 1993), pp. 2-3.

<sup>540</sup> Lottmann, p. 511. Dominic Lieven also noted this phenomenon, writing: "In the Baltic republics, where this clearly was the case, much of the Russian population believed it would benefit from the economic prosperity to be expected from independence; for furthermore, before the Union's collapse, the Baltic popular fronts needed Russian support and at that time never advocated the exclusion from citizenship of most of the Russian community." Dominic Lieven, *Empire: The Russian Empire and its Rivals*, p. 383.

<sup>541</sup> David J. Smith, "Minority Rights, Multiculturalism and EU Enlargement: The Case of Estonia," *Journal on Ethno-politics and Minority Issues in Europe*, Vol. 14, No. 4. 2015, p. 88.

This conceptualization of the ethnic Russian population as simply an extension of the Russians in either the Soviet Union, or the Russian Federation, in Estonia was (and is) flawed. Even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ethnic Russians in Estonia proved their independence from the Soviet “center.” John B. Dunlop noted that the majority of the Russian populations in both Latvia and Estonia had actually supported the cause of these republics’ independence from the Soviet Union:

... in February, 1991, a key plebiscite was conducted in the republic of Latvia on the issue of Latvian independence. A total of 73.6 percent of the those who cast their ballots voted for Latvian independence. Because only 54 percent of Latvia’s populace was ethnic Latvian, this meant that hundreds of thousands of Russians had also supported the republic in its bid for secession. A similar result obtained in the Estonian referendum, in which 77.8 percent of those voting opted by full independence. Russians comprised 34 percent of the population in Latvia and 30.3 percent of that of Estonia.<sup>542</sup>

This had certainly been true of President Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Kozyrev during this period, both of whom had actively supported the Baltic cause against the Soviet center from the moment he was appointed as Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic’s Foreign Minister.<sup>543</sup> Even when he was no longer foreign minister, Kozyrev defended the Baltic states. When Russian former Deputy Chairman of the State Property Committee, Alfred Kokh complained to him in 2010 that the West unfairly treated the Baltic states better than it treated Russia, Kozyrev did not agree and stated that the Baltic states received Western support because they “... met their obligations.”<sup>544</sup>

Furthermore, David J. Smith noted: “Contrary to the impression put out by the all-union Soviet media, Estonia’s putative ‘Russian-speaking population’ was in fact deeply heterogeneous in

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<sup>542</sup> John B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire*, p. 142.

<sup>543</sup> One of the best accounts of this can be found in James P. Nicholl, *Diplomacy in the Former Soviet Republics*, but see also Kozyrev’s account in *Preobrazhenie*.

<sup>544</sup> Aven and Kokh, *Gaidar’s Revolution*, p. 265.

terms of ethnic origin, political outlook, and degree of integration into Estonian society.”<sup>545</sup> The CSCE noted that in relation to the fears of some Estonians that the Russian-speaking minority might prove to be a fifth column of the Russian Federation, present trends could help lead to the partial assimilation of the ethnic Russians:

... if current positive trends continued in Estonia they would result in a situation in the late 1990s where though Estonia would still have a population of several thousand ethnic Russians, these people would have a reasonable ability to communicate in Estonian, would maintain some contact with the Russian Federation, but would still be distinct from Russians the Russian Federation. They would in fact develop their own unique “Baltic Russian” identity.<sup>546</sup>

This support by ethnic Russians for Estonian independence was noted by the moderate Popular Front of Estonia (PFE), led by Edgar Savisaar, who had, in the words of David J. Smith, pursued a ‘... pragmatic strategy predicated on mobilizing all residents of the Estonian SSR — regardless of cultural nationality — behind the campaign for independence.’<sup>547</sup> However, from 1989 to 1991 the pragmatic course of the PFE was “supplanted by a growing emphasis on legal restorationism ...” Smith argued that restorationism “... provided a rationale for denying political influence to a putative ‘fifth column’ of Soviet-era settlers.”<sup>548</sup> However, the existence of the PFE showed that there were reasonable and pragmatic elements in the Estonian nationalist movement, and this augured well for a pragmatic, conciliatory policy.

Furthermore, the CSCE Mission’s prediction actually proved to be true in the long run.

According to several scholars to have examined the formation of identity among Russians in the

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<sup>545</sup> David J. Smith, “Minority Rights, Multiculturalism and EU Enlargement: The Case of Estonia,” *Journal on Ethno-politics* and Minority Issues in Europe, Vol. 14, No. 4. 2015, pp. 89-90.

<sup>546</sup> ODCP, Estonian File, “Political Report # 26: Assimilation on integration in Estonia,” CSCE Mission in Estonia, Tallinn, to CSCE Chairman in Office, 6 August 1993.

<sup>547</sup> David J. Smith, “Minority Rights, Multiculturalism and EU Enlargement: The Case of Estonia,” *Journal on Ethno-politics* and Minority Issues in Europe, Vol. 14, No. 4. 2015, p. 89.

<sup>548</sup> David J. Smith, “Minority Rights, Multiculturalism and EU Enlargement: The Case of Estonia,” *Journal on Ethno-Politics* and Minority Issues in Europe, Vol. 14, No. 4. 2015, p. 90.

Near Abroad since the early 1990s, this is exactly what happened among the Russian-speaking population in Estonia. Russian identity for these people did not necessarily translate into a strong identification with the Russian Federation. David Laitin, who did extensive research among the Russian-speaking community in Estonia throughout the 1990s, characterized the Russian community in Estonia by 1998 as follows:

Despite a free rhetorical market in post-Soviet Estonia, Russian nationalist symbology is not being liberally produced. Residents in Estonia tracing their roots to Russia almost never rely on symbols of Russia's historical past. To be sure, veterans and schoolteachers refer regularly to the "Great Fatherland War" (World War II), but the fatherland referred to is Soviet, not Russian. In a systematic review of the Russian-language press in Estonia (mostly in Narva) from 1988-94, I came across practically no examples of Russian chauvinism.<sup>549</sup>

Furthermore, Laitin argues that the term "Russian-speaking" had become a reified term in Estonia by "... Russians, titulars and members of other nationalities ... And so, by rhetorical consensus, a 'Russian-speaking' social identity is in an early stage of formation in post-Soviet Estonia."<sup>550</sup> This finding shows an organic rejection by the Russian-speaking population of the preferred term among Russian nationalists for them, "compatriots." This emergence of a strong Russian identity in Estonia that does not necessarily identify with the Russian Federation provides strong evidence that the CSCE/OSCE's advice in this area was sound. It also confirms Kozyrev's prediction that the CSCE would be able to resolve this issue in a way that would

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<sup>549</sup> David Laitin, *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Population in the Near Abroad* (Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1998), p. 274.

<sup>550</sup> Laitin, p. 274.



lessen, and not heighten, tensions between the governments of Estonia and the Russian Federation.<sup>551</sup>

Today, the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia, while certainly Russian, and possibly even Soviet, does not necessarily identify itself with the Russian Federation or the government of the Russian Federation, or its policies. This result also provides support for Kozyrev's policy goals in the region, which were conceptualized and implemented by the CSCE/OSCE, and maintained by Estonia's membership in the OSCE, and its commitment to European democratic values. The Russian-speaking population of Estonia has continued to be heterogeneous, but according to a study conducted among this population by the Estonian Ministry of Culture in 2011, the majority of the Russian speaking population is integrated to some extent with the Estonian state.

In 2008, the results of extensive survey data were as follows

No integration:	7.5 %
Weak integration:	31%
Average integration:	34 %
Strong integration:	27.5 % <sup>552</sup>

The same report showed that these trends were even stronger in 2011:

No integration:	13.2 %
Little integration:	25.5 %

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<sup>551</sup> Though the Russian-speaking population as a whole has not been entirely reconciled with the Estonian government, there are many positive trends in this direction, and today there is basis for hope that a growing majority of Russian-speakers in Estonia do not necessarily identify with the government of the Russian Federation, and are seeking integration with the Estonian population to some extent. See an exhaustive study on the Russian-speaking population in Estonia conducted by the Estonian Ministry of Culture in 2011: Marju Lauristan, Esta Kaal, Laura Kirss, Tanja Kriger, Anu Masso, Kirsti Nurmela, Kulliki Seppel, Tilt Tamara, Malu Uus, Peeter Vihaelemm, Triin Vihaelemm, Estonian Integration Monitoring 2011 (Summary), Estonian Ministry of Culture, Tallinn, 2011. <http://www.praxis.ee/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2011-Estonian-integration-monitoring.pdf> accessed 21 October 2017.

<sup>552</sup> Estonian Ministry of Culture, "Progress and Effectiveness of the Integration Process Across Target Groups," p. 9.

Moderate integration: 29.3 %

Strong integration: 24.3 %

Full integration: 7.7 %<sup>553</sup>

Thus, survey data provides a solid basis for hope that Estonia's Russia-speaking population are on a whole being integrated with the Estonian state and its government. The ethnically Russian Estonian university professor Katja Koort reported in 2014 that Estonia's Russian-speaking population can be roughly divided into the following groups:

- |   |                     |
|---|---------------------|
| 1. Successfully integrated:               | 27 %                |
| 2. Russian-speaking patriots of Estonia:  | 16 %                |
| 3. Estonian-speaking active and critical: | 13 %                |
| 4. Little integrated:                     | 29 %                |
| 5. Unintegrated passive:                  | 22 % <sup>554</sup> |

Koort summarizes this data as follows: "The study clearly shows that command of Estonian and loyalty to the Estonian state, as well as desire to affiliate with it, are not proportionally connected among the local Russian-speaking population, as one might have thought ... The small country's particularly small ethnic minority is divided into two categories: pro-Estonian, or at times more broadly, pro-Western and pro-Russian."<sup>555</sup> The pro-Russian elements are largely among the elderly who have little ability to integrate. Long time Soviet and Russian affairs analyst Paul Goble, who has taught at Estonia's Tartu University, sees the current trends as strongly supporting the Estonian government's integrationist policies. In an article written on 16

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<sup>553</sup> Estonian Ministry of Culture, "Progress and Effectiveness of the Integration Process Across Target Groups," p. 9.

<sup>554</sup> Katja Koort, "The Russians of Estonia: Twenty Years After," *World Affairs Journal*, July-August 2014 <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/russians-estonia-twenty-years-after> Accessed 21 November 2017.

<sup>555</sup> Katja Koort, "The Russians of Estonia: Twenty Years After," *World Affairs Journal*, July-August 2014 <http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/russians-estonia-twenty-years-after> Accessed 21 November 2017.

March 2017 he reported that: “Four thousand ethnic Russians and more than 2,000 ethnic Finns who live in Estonia tell officials they consider Estonian to be their native language while 24,000 ethnic Estonians say they don’t speak Estonian,” and that officials in Tallinn report that “... more than 220,000 ethnic Russian say they now speak Estonian, and more than 8,000 people from all nationalities, who are not citizens, say they consider Estonian their native language.” Goble claims that these facts point to the creation of a new category of people: “non-Russian speaking Russians.”<sup>556</sup> This conclusion strongly resembles predictions made by the OSCE in 1992. It also provides convincing evidence that Kozyrev’s arguments relating to how to best defend the rights of Russian speakers in Estonia were correct.

The Estonian state has some unresolved issues related to its Russian-speaking minority, but for the most part, the majority of the Russian-speaking population there is now at least moderately integrated. As Paul Goble recently wrote:

In the wake of the Russian annexation of Crimea, with President Putin claiming to do so in the interests of the Russian community there, concerns have been raised of similar designs on the Baltic states. But when it comes to Estonia, it seems Putin won’t have much Russian-nationalist fervor to lean on. Quite the contrary: it seems the Russian-Estonian community is not just appreciative of the comforts and liberties Estonia has to offer, but perhaps proud, even protective of them.<sup>557</sup>

Thus, while it is clear that the Russian-speaking minority in Estonia has not been fully integrated into Estonian society, it is also clear that the majority of the Russian-speaking minority is at least partially assimilated, and that the CSCE’s efforts helped ensure that this outcome occurred. It could also be argued that the situation would be even better had the various Estonian governments that followed independence in December 1991 implemented all of the OSCE’s

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<sup>556</sup> Paul Goble, “Four thousand ethnic Russians in Estonia now Consider Estonian their native language.” Window on Eurasia blog, 16 March 2017. Accessed 21 November 2017.

<sup>557</sup> Paul Goble, “Nice Try Vlad: In Estonia, life is good, maybe too good, for ethnic Russians” Window on Eurasia Blog, 16 February 2015, <https://qz.com/344521/in-estonia-life-is-good-maybe-too-good-for-ethnic-russians/> accessed 21 November 2017.

recommendations at that time. The fact that ethnic violence was avoided, and that both sides in the conflict showed restraint and backed down from extreme political decisions and continued to have dialogue through institutions such as the Round Table, all testify to the success of the OSCE's efforts to protect the rights of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia. This provides a good case for Kozyrev's policy and for a number of points made by proponents of international institutional theory in the scholarly field of international relations.

The Russian Government continued to develop strong relations with the OSCE to defend the rights of Russian speakers in the Near Abroad. In July 1995 an OCSE Conference was held in Moscow. In a speech delivered at this conference, OSCE Secretary General Wilhelm Höynck noted the important role played by Foreign Minister Kozyrev in the work of the OSCE:

We are all grateful to Foreign Minister Kozyrev for his initiative in convening this conference. Russia has a crucial role in the OSCE and is a strong supporter of this organization. Therefore, Moscow is an excellent place to discuss the important questions relating to a security model for the 21st century.<sup>558</sup>

The conference dealt largely with the issue of how the OSCE would need to adapt to change in the international situation that resulted from the end of the Cold War. Höynck concluded:

Twenty years after the Helsinki Final Act, we are facing fundamentally different challenges. In the 1970s the task was to build bridges and introduce dynamic elements into an icy and, for that matter, stable confrontation. The OSCE's task today is to develop stability and avoid new divisions. Surprisingly, the responses to the new challenges are not very different from those that helped us to deal successfully with the old ones: we have to build and increase confidence, and we must develop all elements of a truly comprehensive security structure in which all States of the OSCE have their place. Such a structure must allow all participating States to work for their legitimate interests. At the same time, however, everyone must make their contribution to stability by accepting the principles and commitments of the OSCE as the binding rules of the game.<sup>559</sup>

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<sup>558</sup> Speech by OSCE Secretary General Wilhelm Höynck, "From CSCE to OSCE: Twenty years of the Helsinki Final Act – Towards a new European Security Model" Moscow, 17 July 1995, Secretariat, OSCE, <http://www.osce.org/secretariat/15666?download=true> Accessed 10 February 2018.

<sup>559</sup> Speech by OSCE Secretary General Wilhelm Höynck, "From CSCE to OSCE: Twenty years of the Helsinki Final Act – Towards a new European Security Model."

Kozyrev's sponsorship of this meeting helped Russia to have a role in directing the organization in directions that would help serve the interests of Russian foreign policy, while at the same time ensuring that the interests of Russia's neighbors would also be considered.

### **“Opposition” to Kozyrev’s Policy from the Russian Military and Supreme Soviet**

Many scholars have noted that there was strong opposition to Kozyrev's institutionalist policy from elements in the Russian military and in the Supreme Soviet and the State Duma from the so-called “statists.” The problem with these alternatives is that there was never really an attempt by either the military or Russia's legislative bodies to wrest control of this policy area from the government and adopt an alternative policy.

#### ***Opposition in the Russian Military***

This is especially true in the case of the Russian military. Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch noted in 1996 that: “The Russian military appears to be in basic accord with the Russian Government as far as the broad outlines of policy towards the three Baltic states are concerned.”<sup>560</sup> They argued further that the reason the disagreements between the Russian Federation and the governments of both Estonia and Latvia never reached the armed conflict level, as they had in Moldova, was due to a “special status” the Baltic States had in Western political opinion:

The Russian and Baltic governments have understood that, due to the legacy of Western non-recognition of Soviet rule over the region, the Baltic states have a claim upon Western political, diplomatic and possibly security attention that no other former Soviet republics have. And while the Baltic leaders suffer no illusion that, *in extremis*, the West would go to war to defend Baltic sovereignty ... both they and Russia understand that a violent denouement in Russia's relations with the Baltic states would lead to the

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<sup>560</sup> Lukic and Lynch, *Europe from the Balkans to the Urals*, p. 363.

political collapse of Russia's relations with the West, a step which the present Russian government cannot afford.<sup>561</sup>

General William Odom provided support for this "special status" of the Baltic states in terms of Western support in his seminal work, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military*. After reviewing the fact that the Soviet government was able to use violence in Kazakhstan, Georgia, and Azerbaijan in the 1990-1991 period without receiving any negative consequences from the West, Odom noted that this was not the case in regard to Soviet violence against Lithuanian and Latvian protesters during the same period:

Behind the scenes, President Bush and his aides exerted influence on both sides to avoid a showdown because negotiations for German reunification were in progress ... Bush feared that a bloody affair in a Baltic republic might provoke a U.S. domestic backlash against Moscow that would ruin his delicate relationship with Gorbachev; U.S. diplomats worked to prevent or at least postpone such a confrontation. This episode of diplomacy contrasts with the United States' inattention to the repressions in Georgia or Azerbaijan. The U.S. media, the Congress, and the president implicitly drew a line between the Baltic republics and all the others when it came to Gorbachev's domestic use of force, a point that could not have been lost on him.<sup>562</sup>

Both the Soviet government and the Russian Federation were very well aware of this Western support for the Baltic states, and this impacted Russian policy accordingly.

Another important fact that opponents of Kozyrev's policy fail to understand is that the Russian military was in no position to enforce any policy orientation in the Baltic states, which enjoyed the political and military support of the West. As Dimitri Simes noted in 1993:

The Russian military also faces many major problems. Since the Soviet Union is no more, the successor states have expropriated its huge armed forces. Russia retained the largest military machine by far, but most of the best armed and staffed units are outside its borders. Thus, before August 1991 most first category divisions, the most combat-ready divisions, were located in the border military regions — such as the Kiev military district, the Byelorussian military district, the Baltic military district, and so forth — or were in Germany. Most of these regions are outside Russia. To transfer the troops

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<sup>561</sup> Lukic and Lynch, *Europe from the Balkans to the Urals*, p. 364.

<sup>562</sup> William E. Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 251-268. US support for the Baltic states had been reinforced at the Bush-Gorbachev Malta Summit.

back home is not easy, or is outright impossible, and will take time because facilities are lacking.<sup>563</sup>

Some scholars try to argue that pressure from the military caused Kozyrev and Yeltsin to “shift right” and tie the withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia to Estonia’s treatment of its ethnic Russians. This is actually not true. In fact the first Russian policy-maker to tie troop withdrawal to Estonian treatment of its ethnic Russians was actually President Yeltsin himself, and Kozyrev in fact made reference to this linkage before Defense Minister General Pavel Grachev did. According to Sven Gunnar Simonsen, who conducted an exhaustive study of the “diaspora linkage” in Russian official announcements and publications, President Yeltsin first made this linkage directly on 20 October 1992:

No longer referring to the housing issue, the President said he was ‘profoundly concerned over numerous infringements of the rights of Russian speakers,’ and that the pull-out would be suspended until treaties had been signed between Russia and the Baltic states regulating the withdrawal and guaranteeing ‘measures of social protection’ for the servicemen and their families.”<sup>564</sup>

A week later, in October 1993, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under Kozyrev’s direction, made these same points in a letter to the UN General Secretary, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. According to Simonsen: “From this writer’s material, it appears that [Defense Minister] Grachev personally is on record linking the withdrawal to the diaspora issue *no earlier than autumn 1993*.”<sup>565</sup> It should also be pointed out that the policy of linking troop withdrawal with the treatment of Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia proved to be a failure.

In a press conference after President Clinton’s meeting with President Yeltsin in Naples, Italy in December 1994, the journalist Helen Thomas asked Yeltsin if the Russian Federation would

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<sup>563</sup> Dimitri Simes, “Reform Reaffirmed: Eurasia at the Crossroads,” pp. 43-44.

<sup>564</sup> Sven Gunnar Simonsen, “Compatriot Games: Explaining the ‘Diaspora Linkage’ in Russia’s Military Withdrawal from the Baltic States,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, Volume 53, No. 5 (2001), p. 775.

<sup>565</sup> Sven Gunnar Simonsen, “Compatriot Games: Explaining the ‘Diaspora Linkage’ in Russia’s Military Withdrawal from the Baltic States,” p. 779, emphasis added.

have all Russian troops out of the Baltics by 31 August. Yeltsin replied to the question twice, each time with a long, accentuated no. According to Strobe Talbott, in making this negative reply:

Yeltsin had given our critics in the U.S. Congress red meat. Within days the Senate passed legislation to suspend all U.S. assistance to Russia other than humanitarian aid if Moscow failed to meet the August 31 deadline.<sup>566</sup>

President Yeltsin went as far as to issue a decree suspending troop withdrawal from the area, however, the Russian hand had been countered by the much stronger hand played by the West. Kozyrev's foreign ministry followed suit. As Parrott and Dawisha noted: "The Russian Foreign Ministry stated that Russia would not link withdrawals to ethnic issues, and indeed despite a hardening of rhetoric, troop withdrawals did continue."<sup>567</sup> All of the Russian troops were pulled out of both Estonia and Latvia by 31 August 1994, except for the Skrunda radar facility in Latvia and the Paldiski nuclear reactor facility in Estonia, which were liquidated later in 1998 under agreements that were actually fostered by the CSCE.<sup>568</sup> The linkage between troop withdrawal and better treatment of Estonia's Russian-speaking population *had no causal impact at all*. Strong Western support from the CSCE and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and pressure from individual countries such as the United States and the Scandinavian countries, made this an unviable option. There is no evidence to be found in any source this researcher has seen that Russian military force induced the Estonians to change their policies.

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<sup>566</sup> Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy*, p. 128.

<sup>567</sup> Bruce Parrott and Karen Dawisha, *Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval*, p. 216. See the statistics they provide on the steady withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia and Latvia throughout the period, despite Yeltsin's and even at some points, Kozyrev's rhetoric on the issue. Ibid, p. 242. Baltic political leaders were nervous that the presence of Russian troops on their territories would enable them to exercise permanent control over their countries. Kozyrev, in true Rationalist fashion, did his best to address these concerns through both words and deeds.

<sup>568</sup> Arie Bloed. *The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: basic documents, 1993-1995*. (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997). pp. 390–398.



### ***Statist “Opposition” in the Supreme Soviet and the Duma***

Many scholars identify statistas as opponents to both President Yeltsin’s and Foreign Minister Kozyrev’s policy to defend Russian-speakers in the Baltic states. As John C. Dunlop noted: “In early 1987, the statistas or *gosudarstvenniki* (from the Russian word for state, *gosudarstvo*) began to coalesce as a major political force in opposition to the Westernizing path being pursued by the Gorbachev coalition of reform communists, Western-style liberals and liberal Russian nationalists.”<sup>569</sup> These statistas continued to challenge government policy after the Soviet Union had been dissolved in December 1991. Despite voiced opposition to Kozyrev’s policies from certain quarters, Kozyrev’s policies in fact officially prevailed, at one point being endorsed by a majority of delegates in the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. The supposedly “alternative” blueprint for a new post-Kozyrev foreign policy, in which several statistas played a key role, actually reaffirmed his policy course!<sup>570</sup> Furthermore, this policy was continued, albeit quietly, by Kozyrev’s more pragmatic, and supposedly anti-institutionalist, successor as foreign minister, Evgeny Primakov.<sup>571</sup> In describing Primakov’s views in the early 1990s, Chafetz noted that statistas believe that “... international institutions cannot protect ethnic Russians from discrimination in the former Soviet republics. Only self-help primarily through the

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<sup>569</sup> John C. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire*, p. 123.

<sup>570</sup> Suzanne Crow, “Competing Blueprints for Russian Foreign Policy,” *RFE/RL Research Report*, 18 December 1992, p. 48.

<sup>571</sup> Walter A. Kemp (ed.), *Quiet Diplomacy in Action; The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities* (The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 61. Despite his avowed repudiation of aspects of Kozyrev’s overly too Western leaning policies, Primakov continued to utilize the offices of the OSCE to advance the political rights of Russians in the Baltic states. In the Spring of 1998, Primakov explicitly tied normalization of relations between the Russian Federation and Latvia with Latvia’s implementation of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max Van der Stoel’s recommendations on a language law in the Latvian Parliament. Van der Stoel lightly rebuked Primakov in a personal letter to the Russian Foreign Minister, dated 2 April 1998: “I am afraid that any statement of your Government linking normalization of relations between Russia and Latvia to the implementation of my recommendations might not promote the chances of their acceptance. It is my firm conviction that, if such a policy is adopted, a considerable group of members of the Latvian Parliament, who are now in favor of their implementation, would then consider it a matter of pride to oppose them.” *Ibid*, p. 61, footnote 33.

use of military force, can protect the Russian diaspora.”<sup>572</sup> However, once he was in the post of Foreign Minister, Primakov quietly continued to pursue Kozyrev’s “flawed” policy to protect the Russian diaspora. As pointed out by Walter Kemp, who knows the OSCE archival materials as well as any scholar:

On 2 April 1998 the High Commissioner [on National Minorities Van de Stoel] wrote to Minister of Foreign Affairs Yevgeniy Primakov calling for moderation of Moscow’s views regarding the debates over the Citizenship Law and the Language Law in Latvia. He said that ‘I am afraid that any statement of your Government linking normalisation of relations between Russia and Latvia to the implementation of my Recommendations might not promote the chances for their acceptance. It is my firm conviction that, if such a policy is adopted, a considerable group of members of the Latvian Parliament, who are now in favor of their implementation, would then consider it a matter of pride to oppose them.’<sup>573</sup>

This quiet continuation of Kozyrev’s policy method to defend the rights of Russian-speakers in Latvia, clearly demonstrates that despite voiced opposition to these policies when Kozyrev was foreign minister, “statists” actually followed the same policy course once in power. Despite comments to the press by both “statists” and “nationalists,” there was no alternative policy to the one pursued by Kozyrev on this issue until President Putin discarded it in the winter of 2014 and seized the Crimea, declaring that this invasion (or “liberation”) was the only true method to defend the political and human rights of the Russian-speaking population there. As Putin stated on 10 March 2015:

The end goal was to enable people to express their opinion of how they want to live ... I thought to myself: If the people want it, it means it should happen. It means they will have more autonomy, some rights, but as part of the Ukrainian state. Let it be this way then. But if they want something different, then we can’t abandon them. We know the outcome of the referendum, and we did what we had to do.<sup>574</sup>

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<sup>572</sup> Glenn Chafetz, “The Struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 111, Number 4, 1996-97, pp. 677.

<sup>573</sup> Walter Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action*, p. 61. Though this dealt with Latvia and not Estonia, Russia’s policy line in both countries had traditionally been the same.

<sup>574</sup> “Russia did what it had to do in regarding Crimea,” Moscow Interfax in English. 10 March 2015. The quote from Putin is in an interview shown in the film “Crimea—Return to the Motherland,” shown on Rossiya-1 television.

This was the kind of attitude that Kozyrev was trying to forestall and prevent. Statements like this have aroused much uncertainty and a sense of panic among Russia's neighbors, for obvious reasons.

## **Conclusions**

Andrei Kozyrev began his tenure as Foreign Minister by claiming that the new Russia would not behave towards its neighbors as an imperial power. Central to this idea was his support for the use of international institutions to defend the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in the Near Abroad. Nowhere was this policy more challenged than in the Baltic states, where Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania built their new states on an ethnic-national basis, and sought to restore the states that had existed before the Second World War.

Based on the case study of Estonia, the Russian Foreign Ministry's policies aimed at defending the rights of Russians living in neighboring states using international institutions, such as the CSCE and the EU, proved largely successful. What is more, this policy achieved not only Russia's political goals, but also those of Estonia as well, within a highly complex and contentious cluster of issues, involving such difficult issues of national identity and the legacy of post-colonialism. As political scientist Celeste Wallander has noted, because "... Europe is an institution-rich environment," institutional theory would predict that Russian cooperation with the Western allies where there were common interests, and where "institutions provide the resources necessary for overcoming specific obstacles."<sup>575</sup> This case study proves Wallander's contention is correct at least in this case, and that Mearsheimer's claimed: "... that institutions have minimal influence on state behavior, and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in

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<sup>575</sup> Celeste A. Wallander, *Mortal Friends, Best Enemies: German-Russian Cooperation after the Cold War*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 6

the post-Cold War world,”<sup>576</sup> while perhaps correct in relation to the Russian Federation’s attempt to build a new post-Cold War order in Europe based on the CSCE/OSCE is correct in this sense, but the use of the CSCE/OSCE’s norms, structure and mandate to protect the rights of Russian-speakers in Estonia, is incorrect.

This case study provides strong support for the arguments made by the neo-liberal scholars Charles Boehmer, Erik Gartzke and Timothy Nordstrom in their article “Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace?” in which they argued that some IGOs do promote peace while others do not. They stated: “We argue that IGOs will have the greatest impact on dispute behavior in a limited number of ways related to mandate, member cohesion, and institutional structure.”<sup>577</sup> The OSCE clearly meets all of these conditions.

### ***The First Condition: A Clear Mandate:***

The mandate of the OSCE in the area of defending the rights of minority populations was clearly defined and it had the support of all the 57-member states of the CSCE, two parties involved in this dispute: Russia had been a member since 1975 because it inherited the Soviet Union’s seat, and Estonia became member of the CSCE on 10 September 1991. Because all policy positions and decisions of the CSCE were based on consensus, the mandate had the support of all members of the organization. Furthermore, the mandate was well defined and clearly supported by legislation that was made available to all members. Related to this fact, there was a clear consensus on a Mandate of the OSCE and on the norms and standards relating to minority rights among its members, and its members included all the nations of the Euro-Atlantic world. As the OSCE literature states:

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<sup>576</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security*, Volume 19, Number 3, Winter 1994/95, p. 7.

<sup>577</sup> Charles Boehmer, Erik Gartzke and Timothy Nordstrom, “Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace?” *World Politics*, 57 October 2004), p. 7.

With 57 participating states in North America, Europe and Asia, the OSCE is the world's largest regional security organization. The OSCE works for stability, peace and democracy for more than a billion people, through political dialogue about shared values and through practical work that makes a difference.<sup>578</sup>

### ***The Second Condition: Member Cohesion***

The OSCE's mandate had the approval and support of all of the OSCE's members, including the most powerful nations in the Euro-Atlantic community: the United States, France, Great Britain, Germany and the Russian Federation due to the fact that all the policies of the CSCE were based on the consensus rule.<sup>579</sup> This degree of membership cohesion meant that the CSCE's norms and standards mattered and could be enforced, if necessary. As HCNM Van der Stoel stated in 1995:

You might wonder, what the weight is of the recommendations of the Commissioner is making. The fact is that quite often governments do back up my recommendations and make it quite clear to the governments to which the recommendations have been addressed that they would like to see these recommendations implemented. And this of course gives considerably more weight to these recommendations.<sup>580</sup>

As has been shown in this study, these important facts had a great impact on the dispute: For example, when Estonia resisted a criticism made against their citizenship law of 1990, they did so by trying to re-define the status of its Russian-speaking minority, not to oppose the criticism outright.<sup>581</sup> The Russian-speaking minority was deliberate in making its complaints through using the established language and conceptions that had been articulated by the CSCE for decades. When the Russian Federation advocated the rights of the Russian-speaking minority,

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<sup>578</sup> OSCE, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe factsheet, "What is the OCSE: Who are We?" not dated. <https://www.osce.org/whatistheosce/factsheet?download=true> Accessed 21 November 2017.

<sup>579</sup> Alice Nemcova (ed.), *CSCE Testimonies: Causes and Consequences of the Helsinki Final Act, 1972-1989* (Prague: Prague Office of the OSCE Secretariat, 2013), pp. 195-196.

<sup>580</sup> Max Van der Stoel, "Minorities, Human Rights and the International Community," Speech given by HCNM Van der Stoel in Strausberg, Federal Republic of Germany, 7 July 1995. OSCE official website. [www.osce.org/hcnm/36591?download=true](http://www.osce.org/hcnm/36591?download=true) Accessed 28 October 2017.

<sup>581</sup> Letter of Estonian Foreign Ministry to the CSCE.

and directed criticism at Estonia or Latvia, its representatives framed these issues in terms of the CSCE's stated policies, procedures and principles. This made agreement more possible by confining the language, principles and conceptual frameworks to a common dialogue and a common playing field that favored reconciliation.

### ***The Third Condition: A Well-developed, Extensive Institutional Structure***

Lastly, the CSCE/OSCE had a well-developed, sophisticated institutional structure and membership. This provided it with the necessary resources, and intelligence and information gathering structures to successfully perform arbitrage among the disputants in this issue. It also had well defined governance structures that had clear authority and the necessary resources to deal with associated issues. Its decision-making bodies, executive structures, related bodies and field offices or missions shared a common purpose and a clearly defined delineation of duties. The personnel performing all of these tasks spanned the OSCE's membership, which was diverse and multi-ethnic. This multinational membership ensured a more equitable approach that limited bias. All of these things provided the OSCE and its recommendations with greater authority and weight than they would have enjoyed otherwise.<sup>582</sup> As Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom argued: "To function as an arbitrageur, a third party must have information that is not available to at least one of the competing states. In practical terms, the best way to achieve this it to have access to sophisticated administrative and intelligence-gathering capabilities. This implies that IGOs with extensive institutional structures or support from member countries (particularly major powers) will be more effective at promoting peace."<sup>583</sup> In terms of structure and composition the OCSE fell under two essential characteristics identified by Boehmer,

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<sup>582</sup> OSCE, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe factsheet, "What is the OCSE: Who are We?" not dated. <https://www.osce.org/whatistheosce/factsheet?download=true> Accessed 21 November 2017. See also Alice Nemcova (ed.) *CSCE Testimonies: Causes and Consequences of the Helsinki Final Act, 1972-1989* (Prague: Prague Office of the OSCE Secretariat, 2013).

<sup>583</sup> Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom, "Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace?" p. 12.

Gartzke and Nordstrom: the OCSE was both what these scholars characterized as a *structured organization*, which contained "... structures of assembly, executive (non ceremonial) and/or bureaucracy to implement policy, as well as formal procedures and rules," and was what they classified as an *interventionalist organization*, which contained "... mechanisms for mediation, arbitration and adjudication, and/or other means to coerce state decisions (such as withholding loans or aid) as well as means to enforce organizational decisions and norms."<sup>584</sup>

### ***A Key Non-Institutional Factor: Active Russian Agency***

Throughout Kozyrev's tenure as Foreign Minister, he stressed the issue of defending the rights of Russian speakers through the use of the CSCE in speaking with traditional allies of the Baltic states, such as Poland and Finland, and also raised the issue with United States representatives and at one point wrote an article in the prestigious journal *Foreign Affairs*.

Anatoly Lieven argued that complaints made by Kozyrev forced the West to confront this issue: "Western diplomacy was very slow to get to grips with the dangers of the ethnic situation in the Baltic. When it finally began to do so, during the summer of 1992, it was only under pressure from increasingly bitter complaints from Moscow — complaints which, under Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, were directed through the proper channels ..."<sup>585</sup> Additionally, Kozyrev held regular meetings with HCNM Van der Stoel, where he was able to ensure that Van der Stoel understood the Russian Federation's views on this issue.<sup>586</sup> These continued efforts to influence both Western public opinion and the CSCE itself paid off handsomely and achieved

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<sup>584</sup> Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom, "Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace?" p. 18.

<sup>585</sup> Anatol Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence*, p. 378.

<sup>586</sup> "During the crisis [of the summer of 1993] the High Commissioner maintained informal contacts with Russian officials, including Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev," in Walter Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action*, p. 144.

Russia's goals while also enabling the Estonian state to achieve its goal of becoming a part of the Western political system.

Thus, even though Russian diplomacy adapted to Western standards, and based at least aspects of its policy on these standards, and this adoption and use of Western standards in defending the rights of ethnic Russians impacted subsequent Russian diplomatic efforts, *Russia was never completely socialized into these methods*, as some constructivists claim should happen, though it must also be noted that NATO and the European Union both de facto exclude Russia.<sup>587</sup> This point was clearly made by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, at the Primakov Readings International Forum, in Moscow, on 30 June 2017, when he argued that Russia essentially had no choice but to intervene in Crimea on behalf of the Russian-speaking population.<sup>588</sup> In looking at Russian policies related to the Russian response to European efforts to secure the abolition of the death penalty in the Russian Federation, Sinikukka Saari concluded that:

It thus seems that Russia has been socialized to the practice of cooperation with European organizations, but it clearly has not been socialized to the norms and values of the organizations. Russia is willing to cooperate with European organizations and has many times called for even closed ties with them. However, it is only willing to do it on its own terms, which are based on its interests and not on shared values and identities.<sup>589</sup>

This statement can also help explain both the success and the failure of Kozyrev's internationalist policy to take root: On one hand, the Russian Federation, and the activity of

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<sup>587</sup> See Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, "The Socialization of international human rights norms into domestic practices," in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). One suspects that the failure of Russian foreign policy decision-makers to be socialized into these norms and standards was lamented most notably by Kozyrev himself.

<sup>588</sup> Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's remarks and answers to media questions at the Primakov Readings International Forum, Moscow, June 30, 2017, [http://www.mid.ru/en/meropriyatiya\\_s\\_uchastiem\\_ministra/-/asset\\_publisher/xK1BhB2bUjd3/content/id/2804842](http://www.mid.ru/en/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/-/asset_publisher/xK1BhB2bUjd3/content/id/2804842) Accessed 13 March 2018.

<sup>589</sup> Sinikukka Saari, "Russia's Creeping Challenge to European Norms: European Promotion of Abolition of the Death Penalty in Russia," in Ted Hopf (editor), *Russia's European Choice*, (New York, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), p. 120.



several regions of the Russian Federation negotiating with international organizations such as the EU and the CSCE, was successful in using international organizations to help resolve some difficult issues (and it continues to do so), but the country was never sufficiently socialized into the common values and identities that Kozyrev hoped would be fostered and encouraged by Russia's participation in these organizations so that they would become permanent features of Russian policy *and* Russian policy-makers. Though Primakov continued this policy, he did so quietly, and engaged neither the international community nor domestic actors in defending the use of this policy as Kozyrev had. As Henry Kissinger noted: "The acid test of a policy, however, is its ability to gain domestic support. This has two aspects: the problem of legitimizing a policy within the governmental apparatus, which is a problem of bureaucratic rationality; and that of harmonizing it with the national experience, which is a problem of historical development."<sup>590</sup>

### Findings:

The findings for this case study based on the five variables identified in the introduction , presented graphically, are as follows.

Variable	Estonia
Continuity	Partial, his institutionalist policy overturned principles of Soviet foreign policy in the region, but he also advocated traditional Soviet and Russian primacy in the near abroad
Consistency	Throughout Kozyrev advocated mix of Institutional and Realist policies
Opposition from Supreme Soviet	Yes- but limited. Some parties in Duma showed support for Kozyrev's policy
Opposition from Russian Military	Limited. Despite some statements to contrary Minister of Defense Grachev supported Kozyrev's policy
International Pressure	Important. US Pressure deprived Russia of military leverage
The Yeltsin Factor	Contained. Yeltsin abruptly said he would not withdraw Russian troops from Estonia as promised until Estonia implemented CSCE recommendations, but Russian military supported MFA's policy and international pressure forced Yeltsin to back down on his intentions to suspend military withdrawal

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<sup>590</sup> Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored; Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problem of Peace* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), p. 326.

#### **Chapter Four:**

### **Kozyrev: The Failed Westernizer: Russian Foreign Policy Towards Japan, 1990-1996**

Scholars of Russian Foreign Policy are in agreement that the cancellation of Boris Yeltsin's visit to Japan in September 1992 signaled that Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev's foreign policy orientation towards the West was at its end, or at the very least, in serious trouble. Representative of this view is Andrei Tsygankov who wrote: "The first wake-up call came when Yeltsin had to cancel his trip to Japan to settle an old territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands."<sup>591</sup> Similarly, Tsuyoshi Hasegawa wrote: "In fact 'the Kuril question' brought out the sharpest differences between Kozyrev's pro-Western policy and those who criticized it. Yeltsin's decision to cancel his visit to Tokyo marked the turning point of Russian foreign policy that ended the first stage [a pro-Western foreign policy] and ushered in the second [stage, of a more pragmatic foreign policy]."<sup>592</sup>

This setback in foreign policy corresponded with a period when Yeltsin's reformist domestic policies had reached a dead-end as well, with widespread societal and political opposition to the policy of "shock therapy" of radical economic reforms, associated chiefly with his chief privatization economic adviser, and at-times-acting-Prime-Minister, Yegor Gaidar.<sup>593</sup> Opposition to Yeltsin's domestic policies had crystallized in several bureaucratic institutions by June 1992, and this opposition only grew as time went on. Due to strong opposition to Gaidar's candidacy for the office of Prime Minister in the Congress of Peoples Deputies, he was replaced by Viktor Chernomyrdin on 14 December 1992, and Yeltsin's government began backtracking on the

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<sup>591</sup> Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change in National Identity, Third Edition*, (London and Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2013), p. 77.

<sup>592</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations: Volume 2: Neither War nor Peace, 1985-1998*, (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley Press, 1998), p. 414.

<sup>593</sup> For Gaidar's account of his fall, see Aven and Kokh, *Gaidar's Revolution: An Insider Account of the Reforms in 1990s Russia* (New York: the Gaidar Foundation, 2013), Yegor Gaidar, "I Made a Bad Public Politician," pp. 375-403.

economic reforms.<sup>594</sup> This political defeat spilled over into the conduct of Yeltsin's foreign policy as well.

The official reason given for the cancellation of Yeltsin's visit to Japan was that Russia objected to Japan's intransigent diplomatic position on the issue, but some scholars argue that internal opposition to this meeting may have played an even greater role.<sup>595</sup> The political fallout from Yeltsin's cancellation of his trip put the issue on hold for almost a year, and even when the summit was finally held in October 1993, though certain progress was made, there was no breakthrough in Russo-Japanese relations, and any positive results of the summit were not followed up upon. The relationship was essentially put on hold until 1997, when Kozyrev was no longer foreign minister, and even then the territorial dispute was not resolved.<sup>596</sup>

The previous case studies, Russo-Chinese relations from 1990 to 1996, and Russian efforts to defend the political rights of Russian speakers in Estonia through the use of international institutions during this same period, were largely successful. Despite opposition from several domestic bureaucratic rivals, including the Supreme Soviet, the regional governments of the Russian Federation, and elements within the Russian military, the intended policies of Kozyrev's Ministry of Foreign Affairs prevailed. However, despite a similar formulation and process to that pursued in relation to China, the policy towards Japan ended in failure. Because of this, and due to the apparent priority this issue was assigned in early Russian foreign policy, it is an

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<sup>594</sup> For Yeltsin's perspective on this issue, see Boris Yeltsin, *The Struggle for Russia* (New York: Times Books, 1994), pp. 145-181. See also, Peter Aven and Alfred Kokh, *Gaidar's Revolution: An Insider Account of the Reforms in 1990s Russia* (New York: the Gaidar Foundation, 2013), pp. ix-xiii, 375-403.

<sup>595</sup> This is an issue of dispute between Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Hiroshi Kimura, among others. While both scholars advance a multi-faceted and multi-variable study, Kimura places more of the blame for the failure on Russian domestic politics, while Hasegawa argues that Japanese diplomatic intransigence played the most significant role.

<sup>596</sup> For this process, see Konstantin Sarsikov, "Russo-Japanese Relations after Yeltsin's Reelection in 1996," in Gilbert Rozman (ed.), *Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1949-1999* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000); and Shigeki Hakamada, "Japanese-Russian Relations in 1997-1999," in Rozman, *Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path*.

extremely important issue that needs to be examined whenever Kozyrev is considered and evaluated as a diplomat.<sup>597</sup>

This study will attempt to examine this issue from a largely bureaucratic politics model, comparing the process on this issue with the two issues previously examined, which were successfully conceived and implemented according to Kozyrev's design, Russo-Chinese relations and the Russian attempt to defend the rights of the Russian minority in Estonia despite opposition from other bureaucratic entities. In all three cases, the preferred policy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was contested, and in all three cases the President, Boris Yeltsin, intervened in the diplomatic process with a policy option that contradicted previously stated views of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but in only in this case was the MFA's preferred policy abandoned, and not successfully implemented. By comparing the factors that ensured the first two policies' success with the factors that led to the abandonment of the third policy, a framework for determining how foreign policy outcomes were actually achieved during Kozyrev's tenure as foreign minister will be constructed.

As described in the introduction, this study will approach Kozyrev's foreign policy in relation to the following six independent variables:

1. **Continuity:** Was the policy a continuation of, or a radical departure from previous Soviet policy?
2. **Consistency:** How consistent was the policy? Did it remain consistent, or did it become more realist-oriented over time due to either domestic opposition, or lack of a positive response from the other side.

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<sup>597</sup> See Hiroshi Kimura's negative assessment of Kozyrev's role as foreign minister as a causal factor in the failure to reach an agreement in his *Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, pp. 132-133, 174-175, 191.

3. **Opposition from the Supreme Soviet and/or State Duma:** Was the policy supported or opposed by majority in the newly enfranchised democratic legislative institutions?
4. **Opposition from the Russian Military:** Was the policy supported or opposed by elements of the Russian military?
5. **Foreign influence:** Were foreign governments able to influence Russian foreign policy in the case of this particular policy?

Once these five variables have been examined, we can return to examining, the dependent variable, **The Yeltsin Factor:** How did Kozyrev contain Yeltsin's interventions that differed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' previously agreed upon policy? By examining these five independent variables, a framework will be constructed that will be used to analyze Kozyrev's management of Russian foreign policy. This approach is informed by the work of Alexander George's method of "structured focused comparison."<sup>598</sup>

**Domestic Factors:** It has been pointed out by several scholars that President Yeltsin's ability to conduct diplomacy towards Japan was severely constrained by Russian internal conditions and his government's weaknesses, which allowed opponents outside the executive branch of the Russian government to prevent Yeltsin from implementing his intended foreign policy goals in relation to this issue.<sup>599</sup> This had also happened to General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev during his visit to Tokyo in April 1991: internal events and a tenuous political situation at home

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<sup>598</sup> For Alexander George's approach, see Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision-Making," in Robert C. Colam and Richard A. Smith (eds.), *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, Volume 2*, (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1985), pp. 21-58; Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison" in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.), *Diplomacy: New Approaches in Theory, History and Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 3-68; and Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Studies, 1991). I am indebted to UVA Politics Department graduate Kenneth Joshua Cheatham for pointing out to me the value of George's work in this area.

<sup>599</sup> Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, pp. 129-149. Russian scholar and diplomat Georgii Kunadze attributes the failure to reach agreement, at least in part, on "... limitations brought about by the domestic politics of the two countries, and the mentalities of both sides." George Kunadze, "A Russian View of Russo-Japanese Relations," p. 165.

constrained his ability to act authoritatively in international relations, and his goals were frustrated.<sup>600</sup> Ironically, one of the principal opponents of Gorbachev's negotiations with the Japanese had been the RSFSR, headed by its President Boris Yeltsin.<sup>601</sup> As Hiroshi Kimura noted: "Boris Yeltsin, a supposed leader of the democratic reformers but also an arch-rival of Gorbachev, also made full use of the territorial issue with Japan as a useful instrument for discrediting Gorbachev."<sup>602</sup>

Soviet, and later, Russian relations with Japan had been stymied since the end of the Second World War due to what the Soviets and Russians called the "Kurile (or sometimes Southern Kurile) Island Dispute," and the Japanese referred to as the "Northern Territories Dispute." Four islands—Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomais group—were seized by Soviet military forces in the last days of the Second World War, and indeed the last of them, the Habomais group of islets, was invaded on 2 September, the very day the peace treaty between Japan and the victorious allies was signed on board the battleship *USS Missouri* in Tokyo Bay,<sup>603</sup> and the islands were not fully—and formally—occupied until 4 September.<sup>604</sup> The Soviets had seized these islands based on their understanding of the agreements signed at the Yalta Conference by President Franklin Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and General Secretary Joseph Stalin, on 11 February 1945. They agreed that in the "two or three months after

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<sup>600</sup> Kimi Hara, *Japanese-Soviet Relations since 1945*, pp. 151-191, provides a comparative analysis, as do the two-volume studies by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and Hiroshi Kimura.

<sup>601</sup> See, for example: Georgii Kunadze, "Gorubachofu ni wa mo genmetsushita," *Sekai shuho*, 26 February 1991, pp. 6-7, cited and summarized in Gilbert Rozman, *Japan's Response to the Gorbachev Era* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p. 170, which was a very blatant attempt on the part of the RSFSR to complicate Soviet-Japanese relations.

<sup>602</sup> Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, p. 50.

<sup>603</sup> See Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman and the Surrender of Japan* (Cambridge, MA, London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 280-289.

<sup>604</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations, Volume 1: Between War and Peace, 1697-1985* (Berkeley, CA: University of California at Berkeley Press, 1998), p. 68.

Germany has surrendered,” the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan. In relation to the Kuriles, this agreement stated;

3. The Kuril islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union. The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has surrendered.<sup>605</sup>

The agreement did not specify an exact definition of what constituted the Kuriles, and this became an important element in the debates that followed. Various efforts to resolve this dispute proved unfruitful during the entire subsequent history of Japanese-Soviet relations.<sup>606</sup> If

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<sup>605</sup> Hasegawa: *Between War and Peace*, pp. 45-50). See also Kazuhiko Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy: The Quest for a Proactive Policy* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2005), p. 228; Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War they Waged and the Peace They Sought* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 246-257, 511.

<sup>606</sup> The literature on this issue is immense in several languages. One of the best overviews of the Japanese-Soviet relationship from the end of the Second World War to the period following the collapse of the USSR, see Kimie Hara, *Japanese-Soviet Relations since 1945: A Difficult Peace* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989). See also Joseph P. Ferguson, *Japanese-Russian Relations, 1907-2007* (London, New York: Routledge Contemporary Japan Press, 2008). For more comprehensive studies on the territorial issue itself, see Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations: Volume 1: Between War and Peace, 1697-1985*, and *Volume 2: Neither War Nor Peace, 1985-1998* (Berkeley, CA: University of California at Berkeley Press, 1998); Hiroshi Kimura, *Distant Neighbors: Volume One: Japanese-Russian Relations Under Brezhnev and Andropov*, and *Volume Two: Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000). See also Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Jonathan Haslam, and Andrew Kuchins (editors), *Russia and Japan: an Unresolved Dilemma Between Distant Neighbors* (Berkeley, CA: University of California at Berkeley Press, 1993); Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, Joseph P. Ferguson (editors), *Russian Strategic Thought Towards Asia* (New York, London: Palgrave/MacMillan, 2007), and idem, *Japanese Strategic Thought Towards Asia*, (New York, London: Palgrave/MacMillan, 2007). Tsuyoshi Hasegawa (ed.), *The Cold War in East Asia, 1945-1991* (Stanford, CA and Washington, DC: Stanford University Press and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011); Gilbert Rozman (editor), *Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1949-1999* (New York: St. Martins Press, 2000). See also prominent Russian studies of this and related issues, B.N. Slavinskiy, *Sovetskaia Okkupatsiia Kuril'skikh Ostrovov, Avgust-Sentia br' 1945 Goda: Dokumental'noe Issledovanie* [*The Soviet Occupation of the Kurile Islands, August-September 1945: Documentary Research*] (Moscow, TOO "Lotos", 1993); idem, *Vneshnaia Politika SSSR Na Dal'nem Vostoke, 1945-1986* [*The Foreign Policy of the USSR in the Far East, 1945-1986*] (Moscow : Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia, 1988); idem, *Pakt o Neitralitete Mezhdru SSSR I Iaponiei Diplomaticheskaia Istoriia 1941-1945 Gg* [*The Neutrality Pact Between The USSR and Japan, a Diplomatic History, 1941-1945*] (Moscow: TOO "Novina", 1995). The last work has been translated by Geoffrey Jukes, as Boris Slavinsky, *The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact: A Diplomatic History, 1941-1945* (London ; New York : Routledge Curzon, 2004). Professor Jukes added a most valuable chapter of his own to this book which addressed some recent scholarship on this issue which had been published after Slavinsky's work was published in Russia. See also V.P. Safronov, *SSSR, SShA i Iaponskaia agressiia na dal'nem vostoke i Tikhom Okeane, 1931-1945* [*The USSR, the USA and Japanese Aggression in the Far East and the Pacific Ocean, 1931-1945*] (Moscow: Rossiiskaia Akademiia Nauk: Institut Rossiiskoi Istorii, 2001) and idem, *SSSR, SShA i Iaponiia v god "kholodnoi voine," 1945-1960 gg.* (Moscow: Rossiiskaia Akademiia Nauk: Institut Rossiiskoi Istorii, 2003).



the Yalta Conference defined the post-Cold War order in Europe, the basis for the postwar order in the Pacific was provided by the Treaty of San Francisco, which was officially released by the Great Britain and the United States on 12 July 1951. It largely reflected Western interests. Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko refused to sign it, arguing that it was "... not a peace treaty but a treaty for the preparation of a new war in East Asia."<sup>607</sup> Kimie Hara noted that in contrast to the agreed-upon Yalta system that ended the war in Europe, "... whose blueprint was jointly drawn by the Big Three in 1945, the foundation of the new postwar regional structure in the Asia-Pacific came to be legitimized in San Francisco in September 1951 without Soviet participation."<sup>608</sup> According to Russian scholar V.P. Safronov: "The San Francisco Conference was held only to formalize a preliminary agreement of the American and the Japanese official circles, achieved during Dulles' visit to Japan."<sup>609</sup> Furthermore, U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had created a situation that if the Soviet Union did not sign the treaty, according to Hasegawa, it would not gain "... the sovereignty over the Kuriles that Japan had renounced ..."<sup>610</sup> Dulles told Prime Minister Yoshida the United States considered the peace treaty as a "preparatory step for the conclusion of a bilateral Japanese-American security agreement."<sup>611</sup> At the time, Prime Minister Yoshida declared:

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<sup>607</sup> Kimie Hara, *Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific: Divided Territories in the San Francisco System* (London and New York: Rutledge, 2007), p. 5.

<sup>608</sup> Kimie Hara, *Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific*, p. 5.

<sup>609</sup> V.P. Safronov, *SSSR — SShA — Iaponiia v gody "Kholodnoi Voiny" 1945-1960 gg* [*The USSR, the USA and Japan in the Years of the "Cold War," 1945-1960*] (Moscow: Rossiikaia Akademiia Nauk: Institut Rossiiskoi Istorii [The Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Russian History], p. 209. This shows that Soviet diplomats had correctly characterized the San Francisco Treaty.

<sup>610</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Between War and Peace, 1697-1985*, pp. 93-94.

<sup>611</sup> V.P. Safronov, *SSSR — SShA — Iaponiia v gody "Kholodnoi Voiny" 1945-1960 gg* [*The USSR, the USA and Japan in the Years of the "Cold War," 1945-1960*] (Moscow: Rossiikaia Akademiia Nauk: Institut Rossiiskoi Istorii [The Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Russian History], p. 209. This shows that Soviet diplomats had correctly characterized the San Francisco Treaty.

With respect to the Kuriles and South Sakhalin, I cannot yield to the claim of the Soviet Delegate that Japan had grabbed them by aggression.

At the time of the opening of Japan, her ownership of two islands of Etorofu and of the South Kuriles was not questioned at all by the Czarist government. But the North Kuriles north of Uruppu and the southern half of Sakhalin were areas open to both Japanese and Russian settlers.

Both the Kuriles and South Sakhalin were taken unilaterally by the Soviet Union, as of September 2, 1945, shortly after Japan's surrender. Even the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, constituting part of Hokkaido, one of Japan's four main islands, are still being occupied by Soviet forces simply because they happened to be garrisoned by Japanese troops at the time when the war ended.<sup>612</sup>

Furthermore, the provisions of the San Francisco Treaty made it impossible for Japan to refer the issue to an international court, as long as the Soviets refused ratify the Treaty. As Hasegawa noted: "All these provisions were designed by Dulles to keep the conflict over the Kurils between Japan and the Soviet Union unresolved. Far from a benevolent peace, the San Francisco Treaty was an exceedingly punitive peace to Japan as far as the Kuriles were concerned."<sup>613</sup>

This remained the consistent policy of Japan's Foreign Ministry, the *Gaimusho*, from that point onwards. The fact that the Soviet Union failed to sign the treaty left a gaping wound in Soviet-Japanese relations. As Kazuhiko Togo noted: "Because the Soviet Union did not sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the question of the restoration of peace and resolution of all related problems, including the territorial problem, was left open to bilateral negotiations between the

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<sup>612</sup> Joint Compendium, Prime Minister Yoshida's Statement at the San Francisco Peace Conference, English translation from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs homepage, cited in Kazuhiro Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy, 1945-2003: The Search for a Proactive Policy* (Boston, Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 231-232.

<sup>613</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Between War and Peace, 1697-1985*, pp. 93-94.

two countries.”<sup>614</sup> Scholars Kimie Hara and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa agree that essentially it was the United States that created the Northern Territories dispute between Japan and the Soviet Union. As Hasegawa argued:

*The Northern Territories question was the creation of the United States. In order to pursue its strategy against communism, the United States wished to turn its erstwhile enemy into a reliable ally and secure military bases for its own purpose without provoking anti-American nationalism. Dulles used the territorial dispute between the Soviet Union and Japan over the Kurils to channel Japan’s irredentism against the Soviet Union.*<sup>615</sup>

As Kazuhiko Togo noted: “While the San Francisco Treaty was, for the Soviet Union, an unacceptable product of the adversarial camp under American leadership, for Japan it meant an acceptance of the reality of war.”<sup>616</sup>

In relation to Kozyrev’s foreign policy, it has traditionally been argued that because no real progress was made on the territorial dispute, and Yeltsin seemed to change course due to internal opposition to any form of returning the islands, this policy was a failure for President Yeltsin, and for Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev as well. This is largely due to the fact that reaching an agreement with Japan had been seen a priority of the Foreign Ministry of both the RSFSR and the early Russian Federation. Shortly after becoming foreign minister of the RSFSR, Kozyrev had stated: “Now that the point is to return Russia [to the world stage] from diplomatic non-existence, this republic could inspire more realistic international positions on the

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<sup>614</sup> Kazuhiko Togo, *Japan’s Foreign Policy: The Quest for a Proactive Policy* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2005), p. 232. This point was also later made to President Yeltsin by Colonel-General Dmitrii Volkogonov. See Colonel-General Dmitry Volkogonov, “Tezisy lektsii i diskussii na temu: “Budushee byshchi Sovetskoi Armii i problema sovetsko-iaponskikh otnoshenii” [Theses of a lecture and discussion on the theme “the Future of the Former Soviet Army and the Problem of Soviet-Japanese Relations], *Tokyo Asakhi*, 19 March, 1992, in Folder 1: US-Russia, 1990s—not NATO) at National Security Archive, Washington, DC.

<sup>615</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Between War and Peace, 1697-1985*, p. 105.also

<sup>616</sup> Kazuhiko Togo, *Japan’s Foreign Policy: The Quest for a Proactive Policy*, p. 231.

part of the USSR, upholding the specific requirements of citizens of Russia.”<sup>617</sup> Later in this interview, he directly addressed Russo-Japanese relations:

Today Japan is the *main stumbling block for Russia's diplomacy*. I would like the RSFSR parliament to weigh once again all the pros and cons of relations with Japan. The territorial dispute must be resolved—and soon.<sup>618</sup>

Despite this desire, the territorial dispute was not settled under Kozyrev's tenure as foreign minister, and in fact has not been resolved to the present time. It remains a clear stumbling block to friendly Russo-Japanese relations today.<sup>619</sup>

On 16 January 1990 President Yeltsin, during a ten-day visit to Japan, delivered a speech at the Asian Affairs Research Council in which he made a proposal to resolve the territorial dispute with Japan in five steps. These steps were as follows:

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<sup>617</sup> Interview with Andrei Kozyrev by Aleksandr Mukhin, *Moscow News Service* (in English), 16 October 1990, pp. 60-61.

<sup>618</sup> Interview with Andrei Kozyrev by Aleksandr Mukhin, *Moscow News Service*, pp. 60-61, emphasis added. Kozyrev's views on quick resolution of the Russo-Japanese impasse were clearly influenced by his adoption of what British political scientist, Martin Wight called the Revolutionary approach to international relations. What Wight characterized this school of thought as follows: “The Revolutionists can be defined more precisely as those who believe so passionately in the moral unity of the society of states or international society, that they identify themselves with it, and therefore they both claim to speak in the name of this unity, and experience an overriding obligation to give effect to it, as the first aim of their international policies.” Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1992), p.8. Wight considered Immanuel Kant, John Calvin, Vladimir Lenin and Woodrow Wilson revolutionists, though he also pointed out significant differences between a number of exemplars of revolutionary foreign policy. Kozyrev can be considered to be a semi-revolutionist due to his acceptance of certain features of a Woodrow Wilson approach to world politics, though his support for Wilsonianism was qualified by a strong realist framework, as has been demonstrated in the two previous case studies.

<sup>619</sup> See, for example, Akahiro Iwashita, “The Hidden Side of the Japanese-Russian summit,” *The Japan Times*, 29 May 2017, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/05/29/commentary/japan-commentary/hidden-side-japanese-russian-summit/> accessed on 21 February 2018. See also the important short article from one of Japan's leading Russia scholars, Kazuhiko Togo, “Japan's Relations with Russia and China, and the Implications for the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” *The National Bureau for Asian Research*, 16 May 2018. <http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=864> Accessed on 14 June 2018. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has made great efforts to improve Japanese relations with both Russia and China. A series of bilateral meetings culminated in a Putin-Abe meeting in Abe's hometown of Yamaguchi in December 2016, where according to Togo “... the two leaders shared a determination to conclude a peace treaty but ... Despite continued negotiations, to achieve these clearly defined objectives, 2017 passes without tangible outcomes.” (p. 3)

1. Soviet official recognition of the dispute;
2. The four islands were to be made a free enterprise zone;
3. Demilitarization of the four islands;
4. Conclusion of a peace treaty between the USSR and Japan;
5. The final resolution of the territorial dispute was to be left to the next generation.<sup>620</sup>

Though this proposal was never given official status, according to former Japanese Ambassador to Russia, Sumio Edamura, "... it was often referred to in meetings between Yeltsin and Japanese officials, and Yeltsin used it frequently as a point of reference to measure the progress in the negotiations on the territorial issue."<sup>621</sup> According to Sergei Radchenko, during this visit, "Yeltsin played his cards well, for he emerged from his visit to Japan as a statesman with a solution to the territorial dispute, upstaging Gorbachev, who had not offered any solution at all. Even [Gorbachev's chief foreign policy adviser] Chernyaev remarked, in grudging acknowledgment, that Yeltsin, for once, 'has advanced a reasonable plan.' "<sup>622</sup> This proposal should be seen in light of Yeltsin's political conflict with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, but the issue soon gained a momentum of its own, which made it an important issue in its own right.

In conformity with the Yeltsin-Kozyrev Westernist foreign policy course, the Russian Federation sought better relations with Japan, which was identified as a central Western power, despite its

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<sup>620</sup> Sumio Edamura, "A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations between the August 1991 Coup D'état and President Yeltsin's State Visit to Japan in October 1993," in Gilbert Rozman (ed.), *Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization*, p. 139.

<sup>621</sup> Sumio Edamura, "A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations," p. 140.

<sup>622</sup> Sergey Radchenko, *Unwanted Visionaries: The Soviet Failure in East Asia at the End of the Cold War*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 274.

location in Asia, for both ideational and economic reasons.<sup>623</sup> The well informed American analyst of Russian foreign policy, Robert Legvold, claimed that Kozyrev's foreign policy agenda would have led to a very different political alignment for Russia in Asia than had ever been the case:

*To be aligned with the West meant alignment with Japan, and that could scarcely have happened had the relationship remained as it was ... the Soviet Union of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, while no longer preoccupied with the U.S.-Japanese security partnership, and no longer interested in bullying the Japanese with its military power, nonetheless was scarcely ready to make common cause with Japan or to treat the U.S.-Japanese security tie as a necessary and constructive feature of east Asian politics ... The Russia of Yeltsin and Kozyrev was.*<sup>624</sup>

Russo-Japanese relations thus became an early priority for the foreign ministry of the RSFSR, and similar to the issue of Russian-Baltic relations, Russian policy, as articulated by President Yeltsin, clearly clashed with that of the Soviet Union. One month after becoming the foreign minister of the Russian Federation, Kozyrev declared on 19 November 1990:

The so-called problem of the Northern Territories cannot be solved without the involvement of the Russian Federation, because the islands of the Kurile chain belong both to the Soviet Union and Russia.<sup>625</sup>

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<sup>623</sup> Andrei P. Kozyrev, *Preobrazhenie* [Transfiguration], (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1995), pp. 237-246, especially, pp. 242-244. What distinguished Russian liberals such as Kozyrev from their Soviet and later statist opponents, was that they not only coveted Japanese economic support and assistance in developing Siberia and the Russian Far East, they also saw Japan ideationally as an ally, and the issue of Russo-Japanese relations as a vehicle to demonstrate the new Russian Federation's commitments to such Western principles of law and justice. Nearly everyone in the Russian decision-making universe argued that agreement with the Japanese was a necessary and positive goal (and this demonstrates a commitment to Wight's category of realism) but only the Russian Atlanticists, such as Kozyrev, saw Japan as a worthy ideational partner (which shows a commitment to aspects of Wight's category of revolutionism).

<sup>624</sup> Robert Legvold, "Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle," in Michael Mandelbaum (ed), *The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan and the United States in East Asia* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1995), p. 41, emphasis added.

<sup>625</sup> RSFSR Minister Discusses 'Northern Territories,' FBIS-SOV-90-222. 16 November 1990.

Yeltsin had publicly declared that the RSFSR, as a sovereign nation, could conclude a peace treaty with Japan independent of the U.S.S.R. due to recent changes in the Russian SFSR Constitution.<sup>626</sup>

President Yeltsin made it clear that Japan was supremely important to him because he saw Japanese economic assistance as essential for reforming the Russian economy. It was hoped that resolving this issue would result in Japanese economic support for the development of Siberia and the Russian Far East.<sup>627</sup> In discussing the RSFSR's diplomatic priorities in March 1991, Foreign Minister Kozyrev once identified Japan as the "... No. 1 country in the East," ahead of China.<sup>628</sup> Similarly, in the Spring 1992 edition of the influential American journal *Foreign Affairs*, which was in essence, Kozyrev's foreign policy "liberal manifesto to the West," he declared: "Among our priorities is to finalize the normalization of relations with Japan on the basis of a peace treaty, including a solution to the territorial issue."<sup>629</sup> In the words of Tsuyoshi Hasegawa:

On the Russian side, an emerging democracy has finally freed itself from the ideological fetters that bound the Soviet regime to the legacy of Stalin's Japanese policy. The rejection of the cold war foreign policy, coupled with incentives to lure Japanese economic cooperation for radical economic reform, might have provided the impetus that would finally break the logjam of the territorial dispute.<sup>630</sup>

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<sup>626</sup> Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, p. 88.

<sup>627</sup> Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, p. 126. See also Michael Mandelbaum, "Introduction," in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.) *The Strategic Quadrangle*, pp. 8-9.

<sup>628</sup> Boris Pyadyshev and Andrei Kozyrev, "Russian Diplomacy Reborn," *International Affairs*, No. 3, March 1991 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1991), p. 128. Kozyrev demonstrated that he was a good diplomat by arguing in other circumstances and venues at that same time that China was Russia's most important partner in Asia. In his memoir *Preobrazhenie*, he lists Japan last in relation to Russian interests in the Asia-Pacific Region, after China, South Korea and ASEAN. Andrei Kozyrev, *Preobrazhenie* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenie, 1995), p. 240.

<sup>629</sup> Andrei Kozyrev, "Russia: A Chance for Survival," *Foreign Affairs*, 71-2 Spring 1992, p. 15.

<sup>630</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Neither War nor Peace, 1985-1998*, p. 411.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgii Kunadze, a specialist on Japan, left the Soviet Foreign Ministry in January 1991 in protest of Soviet oppression of the Baltic Republics, and was one of Russia's leading proponents of establishing good relations between Russia and Japan. He was to become the architect of the Russian Federation's MFA's Japan policy. Prior to this, as a scholar at Moscow's Institute of World Economy and International Relations, he had been an adviser to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and later joined the Soviet Foreign Ministry as a Japanese specialist.<sup>631</sup> After leaving Soviet service, he became actively involved in the Russian Federation's Foreign Ministry, and brought to it a level of expertise and professionalism that boded well for the future of the Russo-Japanese relationship. Japanese diplomat Sumio Edamura noted: "Kunadze's appointment was well received by the Japanese side, which saw him as a conscientious scholar and consistent advocate of the early conclusion of a peace treaty."<sup>632</sup> Though the Russian Foreign Ministry was not responsible for the formulation and execution of the U.S.S.R.'s foreign policy, it did play an adjunct role to the USSR's MFA, and it was later to supersede it in world politics.<sup>633</sup> At the time Kozyrev stated that the RSFSR's participation in the Soviet Union's diplomatic activity was a positive sign of the growth of

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<sup>631</sup> For a good short biography of Kunadze up to that point, see Gilbert Rozman, *Japan's Response to the Gorbachev Era* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 121.

<sup>632</sup> Sumio Edamura, "A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations between the August 1991 Coup d'etat and President Yeltsin's State Visit to Japan in October 1993," p. 140. As Kunadze noted about his role: As he said about his early role: "The main task of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as I saw it, was to provide the Russian government with expertise, to educate it about the outside world, and gradually involve it in the foreign policy decision making of the USSR government." Georgii Kunadze, "A Russian View of Russo-Japanese Relations, 1991-1993," in Gilbert Rozman, *Japan and Russia: The Torturous Path to Normalization*, p. 155.

<sup>633</sup> One of the best studies of this conflict between Gorbachev's "Center" and Yeltsin's Russia is John B. Dunlop, *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993). See also Yeltsin's view of this conflict in Boris Yeltsin, *The Struggle for Russia* (translated by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick) (New York: New York Times Books, 1994), pp. 15-39. See Gorbachev's views in Mikhail Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (London, New York: Doubleday, 1996), pp. 584, 596-597, 646. On Gorbachev's views on Yeltsin, see also William Taubman's view in his magisterial *Gorbachev: His Life and Times*, pp. 579.



democratic principles in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and in the Soviet Union:

We need to go in for “unusual practice” [of RSFSR participation in Soviet diplomacy] more often. And this is not easy, of course. A few years ago, when I was working at the central Foreign Ministry, it did not occur to me to coordinate various positions with the republics. At that time we lived in a unitary state. The process of transforming this state is under way. In my view, this is a concrete expression of the democratization of society.<sup>634</sup>

During these discussions, Kunadze quickly formulated the MFA’s policy towards Japan, which was based on Russian recognition of the 1956 Joint Declaration.<sup>635</sup>

This early period was characterized, as Hiroshi Kimura put it, as a kind of “euphoria” over the prospect of improving relations which was held by both sides.<sup>636</sup> This euphoria resulted from the recognition of both sides that the Russian Federation was guided by a Westernized democratic, free-market, capitalist ideology, similar to that of Japan. Several foreign policy practitioners in both countries assumed that a resolution of the territorial issue would be relatively easy. Of the three case studies examined in this study, this one seems best to conform to Kozyrev’s embrace of “Western universal foreign affairs principles,” which Francis Fukuyama (and others) had claimed had “won” the Cold War, and “ended history.”<sup>637</sup>

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<sup>634</sup> “Interview with Andrei Kozyrev, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic foreign minister,” *Izvestiia*, 10 April 1991 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-SOV-91-069.

<sup>635</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Neither War nor Peace*, 1985-1998, p. 421. See also Georgii Kunadze, “A Russian View of Russo-Japanese Relations, 1991-1993,” in Gilbert Rozman, *Japan and Russia: The Torturous Path to Normalization*.

<sup>636</sup> Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, pp. 107-108.

<sup>637</sup> Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (reissued version), (New York: The Free Press, Free Press, 1 March 2006). The first edition of this book was published in 1992.

In essence, Yeltsin's and Kozyrev's Russia seemed to be enthusiastically embracing Western Wilsonian principles.<sup>638</sup> Andrei Tsygankov correctly stated that, "For several years, Russia was to become a laboratory for a pro-Western Liberal experiment."<sup>639</sup> Martin Wight characterized Wilsonian thought as revolutionary, in the same category as Leninist foreign policy: "The Revolutionists can be defined more precisely as those who believe so passionately in the moral unity of the society of states or international society, that they identify themselves with it, and therefore they both claim to speak in the name of this unity, and experience an overriding obligation to give effect to it, as the first aim of their international policies."<sup>640</sup> In both words and deeds, Yeltsin's and Kozyrev's Russia enthusiastically embraced these principles, and this can most clearly be seen in comments made in relation to Russo-Japanese relations.

Statements on the commonality of Western values, now shared by both Japan and the Russian Federation, were made by both sides throughout Kozyrev's tenure as foreign minister and were, at least in part, officially enshrined in the two documents that resulted from President Yeltsin's visit to Japan in October 1993, the Tokyo Declaration and the Agreement on Economic Principles.<sup>641</sup>

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<sup>638</sup> The best description of this process is Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Whose World Order? Russia's Perception of American Ideas after the Cold War*, (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004), pp. 61-86.

<sup>639</sup> Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Whose World Order? Russia's Perception of American Ideas after the Cold War*, p. 75.

<sup>640</sup> Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions* (edited by Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter), (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1992), p. 8.

<sup>641</sup> Joachim Glaubitz, *Between Tokyo and Moscow*, p. 231. See also Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Document 262. Tokiiskaia Deklaratsiia o Rossiisko-Iaponskikh otnosheniakh [Tokyo Declaration on Russian-Japanese Relations], in *Vneshniaia Politika Rossii: Sbornik Dokumentov, 1993 Kniga 2, liun' - Dekabr'* [The Foreign Policy of Russia, Anthology of Documents, 1993, Book 2: June to December] (Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otmosheniia, 2000), p. 371.

However, despite this early euphoria—on the part of both sides— the territorial issue was not resolved during Kozyrev’s tenure as foreign minister, and this prevented the establishment of normal relations between the two countries. As Kunadze himself lamented in 2000:

Looking back on the first years of the Yeltsin administration, I cannot help feeling that never before or after have we been so close to a settlement of the territorial issue in terms of standard conditions for a diplomatic formula, *yet so far from it in terms of limitations brought about by the domestic politics of the two countries and the mentality of both societies.*<sup>642</sup>

The relationship has received increasing academic attention since the early 1990s, with detailed studies provided by scholars who had Russian, Japanese and English/American linguistic and country knowledge, to examine the reasons why the two sides were unable to reach an acceptable agreement.<sup>643</sup>

### **Opposition to the “Westernist” Japan Policy**

Some analysts have stressed the unique, and important role played by the Supreme Soviet in the immediate period following the dissolution of the USSR as a primary factor in frustrating and eventually overturning Kozyrev’s Japanese policy. For example, according to Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott:

Beginning in January 1992 the Supreme Soviet held several hearings on Russian foreign policy, and Kozyrev and his deputy foreign ministers were regularly called to testify. On the contentious issue of the Kuril Islands, for example, the Supreme Soviet in late July called a closed-door hearing on the matter, ostensibly ‘to assist the government and the president to draw up a true package of ideas and decisions,’ in Oleg Rummyantsev’s words. In reality, the hearings turned into a nationalist warning from the parliament to Yeltsin not to return the islands to Japan ... Parliamentary opposition played a significant role in Yeltsin’s abrupt decisions to postpone both this and a subsequent visit to Japan.<sup>644</sup>

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<sup>642</sup> Georgii Kunadze, “A Russian View,” p. 165.

<sup>643</sup> See footnote 4 above for the most prominent studies in English and Russian on this topic.

<sup>644</sup> Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, *Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 204-205.

This policy was also contested very strongly by Russian politicians from the regions, such as Sakhalin Oblast, something that had not been a factor until Gorbachev had granted the regions greater autonomy in Soviet politics.<sup>645</sup> Similarly to Russian relations with CIS states, this phenomenon was a new variable in Soviet and the Russian diplomatic conduct, and it clearly played an important role in helping to stymie Russian efforts to even partially accommodate Japanese territorial demands.<sup>646</sup> Furthermore, there was nearly universal opposition to this policy from the Russian military establishment.<sup>647</sup>

Yeltsin's first visit to Japan was initially scheduled for 9 September 1992 but was cancelled at the last minute, four days before it was scheduled to start. This greatly offended the Japanese, and also surprised the world.<sup>648</sup> As Kimie Hara noted, "The major reason [given for the cancellation of Yeltsin's visit] was Japanese rigidity on the territorial principle and its linkage with economic policy. However, it is certain that the decision also largely depended on the domestic situation."<sup>649</sup> American political scientist Michael Mandelbaum supported Hara's position, when he noted:

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<sup>645</sup> See, for example, Eugene Huskey, "The Rebirth of the Russian State," in Eugene Huskey (ed.), *Executive Power and Soviet Politics: The Rise and Decline of the Soviet State* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), pp. 251-256; Stephen Kotkin, *Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970-2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 105-108; William Taubman, *Gorbachev: His Life and Times* (London, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2017), pp. 428-429, 444, 512; Mikhail Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (London, New York: Doubleday, 1996), pp. 326-347.

<sup>646</sup> Gilbert Rozman, "Cross-Border Relations and Russo-Japanese Bilateral Ties in the 1990s," in Gilbert Rozman (ed.), *Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path*, pp. 199-213.. While similar regional opposition to Moscow's China policies existed, this opposition never played as prominent a role as it played in the Japanese case. It is likely that it played a role because it corresponded to Yeltsin's personal views on the issue, and it could be cited against those who held a more accommodationist policy.

<sup>647</sup> See, for example, Joachim Glaubitz, *Between Tokyo and Moscow*, p. 245. and General-Major V.P. Zalomin, "Theses, speeches in the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, 9 July 1992," The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, GARF: Fond 10026, Opis' 4, Delo 2614, list 62-74, from the National Security Archives, George Washington University. Accessed 29 January 2018.

<sup>648</sup> Jeff Berliner, "Japanese ambassador still upset over Yeltsin's canceled trip," 27, January 1993, United Press International, <https://www.upi.com/Archives/1993/01/27/Japanese-ambassador-still-upset-over-Yeltsins-canceled-trip/8473728110800/>

<sup>649</sup> Kimi Hara, *Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945*, pp. 203-204.

*Yeltsin and Gorbachev would probably have liked to return the four Kurile Islands to Japan, if only so that Japan, out of gratitude, would be generous with economic assistance to Russia.* But the trauma of losing first the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and then, after 1991, territories that had been Russian for centuries created a backlash that prevented Yeltsin from ceding more territory—even small, rocky, more or less insignificant specks of land far from Europe.<sup>650</sup>

Japanese scholar Hiroshi Kimura's massive, well-researched, two-volume study of this issue essentially argued that Russian bureaucratic politics was the primary factor that stood in the way of an agreement. He wrote: "Broadly speaking, three primary factors were behind the Russian president's postponement of his trip—namely, the eruption of nationalism; the resurgence of conservative forces, including opposition from the military; and the weakening of Yeltsin's leadership."<sup>651</sup> As discussed by Kimura, these factors not only caused Yeltsin to cancel his first scheduled trip to Japan, they also prevented any Russo-Japanese agreement on the Northern Territories issue.<sup>652</sup>

Several scholars, however, attribute the failure to resolve this question primarily to the intransigent policy of the Japanese government, and some combine the two explanations, and show how the failure on the part of the Japanese side to accept significant Russian concessions, combined with domestic opposition to ceding any Russian territory to Japan, worked together to stymie any agreement. Japanese-American scholar Tsuyoshi Hasegawa,

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<sup>650</sup> Michael Mandelbaum, "Introduction," in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.) *The Strategic Quadrangle*, pp. 8-9, emphasis added.

<sup>651</sup> Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, p. 129. However, the record shows pretty clearly that Mandelbaum's contention that both Gorbachev and Yeltsin wanted to give the islands back to the Japanese is probably incorrect, though people around both leaders wanted to do so. Both opposed transfer of the islands to Japan until relations had been restored on Soviet, or Russian, terms.

<sup>652</sup> "Ironically, at precisely the times when Gorbachev and Yeltsin intended to strike a bargain with Japan over the territorial knot, both of them found themselves in a political weak position at home. Their political opponents were eager to exploit the issue of ceding the Southern Kuriles to Japan as a convenient political instrument in Russia's domestic struggle ... faced with this danger, both Gorbachev and Yeltsin decided to adopt a policy of preserving the status quo for their own political survival rather than making a bold initiative." Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, p. 231.

who like Kimura, also wrote an extensive two-volume study of this issue, is representative of such a view:

There are two fundamental problems that prevented Russia and Japan from finding common ground on the territorial question during this period. *The first, the most important cause*, was Japan's intransigent position on what the Japanese call the 'Northern Territories problem.' ... *The second important cause, not as important as the first, was of Russian political development since the August coup [of August 1991]. The Russian domestic situation made any resolution of the territorial question exceedingly difficult, since Yeltsin and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MID) had to face nationalistic opposition within Russia to any territorial concessions.*<sup>653</sup>

This judgment is supported by a number of other scholars, and also significantly, participants on both sides such as Aleksandr Panov and Georgii Kunadze on the Russian side, and then-Japanese ambassador to the Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation, Sumio Edamura, and diplomat and scholar Kazuhiro Togo, who had also been personally involved in these negotiations, on the Japanese side.<sup>654</sup>

However, in assigning the primary causal factor in preventing an agreement on this issue to Russian bureaucratic politics, it must be noted that some, if not all, of these same factors were also present in relation to Russo-Chinese relations and to Kozyrev's institutionalist course in relation to the defense of Russian speakers in Estonia, yet in these two cases, Kozyrev's policies prevailed.<sup>655</sup> What factors led to the ability to overcome opposition of delegates in the Supreme Soviet, the Russian military, and from the Russian autonomous regions in the case of

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<sup>653</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "Why did Russia and Japan Fail of Achieve Rapprochement in 1991-1996?" in Gilbert Rozman (ed.), *Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path*, pp. 168-169 (emphasis added). Sumio Edamura, "A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations," pp. 146-147.

<sup>654</sup> Georgii Kunadze, "A Russian View," and Kazuhiko Togo, "The Inside Story of the Negotiations on the Northern Territories: Five Lost Windows of Opportunity," *Japan Forum*, 23 (1), 2011, p. 130-131. See also Alexander Panov, "The Policy of Russia Toward Japan, 1992-2005;" Ambassador Sumio Edamura, "A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations between the August 1991 Coup d'Etat and President Yeltsin's State Visit to Japan in October 1993."

<sup>655</sup> See the conclusions of the previous case studies.

Russo-Chinese relations and the policy of defending the rights of Russians in Estonia, but not in the case of Russo-Japanese relations?

This study will try to answer this puzzle by beginning with a detailed diplomatic history of Russo-Japanese relations from the summer of 1990 to the publication of the Tokyo Declaration in October 1993, which will follow the trajectory of the previous two case studies, but based primarily on work done by other scholars, who have examined this issue by using sources in the English, Russian and Japanese languages and who also conducted interviews with key policy-makers on both sides. This survey will then be followed by a comparative analysis of why the policies covered in the previous two chapters were successfully implemented and why the third failed, using the constraints on the three policies as an analytical framework to provide a model to determine how successful foreign policy outcomes were achieved during Kozyrev's tenure as foreign minister.

## **The Problem**

Michael Mandelbaum's description of the Northern territories as "... small, rocky, more or less insignificant specks of land far from Europe" raises an important point.<sup>656</sup> According to Tsuyoshi Hasegawa:

All together, they comprise 4,996 square kilometers or 1,929 square miles—much bigger than Okinawa or Tottori Prefecture, and smaller than Chiba Prefecture. They are approximately the same size as the state of Delaware.<sup>657</sup>

Considering their small size, and seeming non-importance, why was this issue so important?

How could the question of sovereignty over such small, rocky islands and islets prevent Japan and the Russian Federation from reaching an agreement that both sides seemed to want?

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<sup>656</sup> Michael Mandelbaum, "Introduction," in Mandelbaum (ed.), *The Strategic Quadrangle*, pp. 8-9.

<sup>657</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations: Volume 1 Between War and Peace, 1697-1985* (Berkeley, CA: University of California at Berkeley Press, 1998), p. 5.

Several scholars point out that the issue of a divided Germany seemed much more intractable in 1989 than the Northern Territories dispute, yet German unification became a reality and a resolution of the islands dispute has yet to see resolution.<sup>658</sup> Kimie Hara noted that this geopolitical climate raised hopes in Japan that the four islands would be returned:

Fundamental changes indicating the collapse of the Yalta System were taking place in Europe. Germany was reunified, the Baltic states declared their independence (formally approved on 6 September 1991), the Eastern European countries were freed from Soviet interference and moved towards democratization. Viewing territorial problems in the context of the Cold War, those changes seemed to be offering positive influences for resolution of the territorial problem between Japan and the USSR.<sup>659</sup>

Japanese scholar and diplomat Kazuhiko Togo has noted that for the Japanese, this issue had far greater psychological and identity-related significance than most non-Japanese people can appreciate. He described this problem as follows:

The territorial issue is a reminder of the pain in the hearts of the Japanese people, which is directly related to how Japan fought the Pacific War and how it faced defeat. It has its origin in the unfortunate events that took place from the spring to the autumn of 1945 between Japan and the Soviet Union. Japan was deeply scared psychologically by the Soviet participation in the Pacific War. It was a breach of the Neutrality pact, which was still effectively binding on the Soviet Union, and it entailed hardships to those Japanese who fell under Soviet occupation, including about 600,000 detainees, more than 60,000 of whom perished in the Soviet Union. Soviet participation in the war developed into the occupation of the four islands, Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu, which had come under Japanese sovereignty through the 1855 Treaty of Shimoda between Russia and Japan and which had subsequently been uncontestedly under Japanese rule. Japan accepted the post-war reality in signing the San Francisco Treaty and the 1956 Joint

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<sup>658</sup> Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, pp. 251-263. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Neither War nor Peace, 1985-1998*, pp. 328-331. Hasegawa argued that accepting German reunification cost Gorbachev political leverage and compromised his ability to implement a similar policy towards Japan: "When Gorbachev accepted that results of the East European revolutions and rammed through an acceptance of German reunification, a conservative reaction suddenly emerged against his foreign policy. Until then, Gorbachev had used his foreign policy successes to buttress his sagging popularity on the domestic front. In 1990 his magic wand of foreign policy turned into a liability. By the time German reunification was settled, he had lost the political leverage necessary to make territorial concessions to Japan." Hasegawa, *Neither War nor Peace*, p. 331.

<sup>659</sup> Kimie Hara, *Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945*, p. 159. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Between War and Peace*, p. 2. Jonathan Haslam, "Soviet Policy towards Japan and Western Europe: What the Differences Reveal," *Acta Slavica Iaponica*, 8 1990, pp. 109-115.



Declaration with the Soviet Union, but the issue of the four islands remained as the last vestige of unresolved pain from the Pacific War.<sup>660</sup>

Likewise, for the new Russian government, this issue had great importance because it was seen as an opportunity to show both the Japanese people and the world community the great difference between the Soviet Union and the new Russian democratic nation,<sup>661</sup> which was guided by a strong desire to “become the West.”<sup>662</sup> It was hoped that by following a pro-Western policy, the new Russian state would be infused with a new identity that would guide its future foreign policy course, even as its adoption of these policies strengthened this new identity and buttressed it through a more positive world environment. In essence, “New Soviet Man,” who according to Kozyrev had been infused with the worst imperialist features of Tsarist Russia, would be transformed into a “New Western Russian Man.”<sup>663</sup>

As Kozyrev had stated when outlining the foreign policy of the RSFSR in November of 1990, the territorial dispute with Japan “... must be resolved—and soon.”<sup>664</sup> The attention this issue received from President Yeltsin also testifies to its importance. As Polish scholar Leszek Buszynski noted: “For the sake of balanced relations in Northeast Asia it is imperative for Russia to improve relations with Japan which have been blocked by the territorial dispute ... Over 1990-91 democrats and liberals amongst the Russians called for the return of the four islands to

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<sup>660</sup> Kazuhiko Togo, “The Inside Story,” p. 124. In this passage he quoted his earlier work in Japanese, “Nichi-Ro Kankei o siakochiki sure tame no,” *Sekai*, 783, pp. 53-62.

<sup>661</sup> Kozyrev, *Preobrazhenie*, pp. 243, and Legvold, “Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle,” p. 41.

<sup>662</sup> For more on this concept, see Ted Hopf, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow 1955 & 1999* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 214.

<sup>663</sup> Andrei Kozyrev, “Russia: A Chance for Survival,” *Foreign Affairs*, 71-2 (Spring 1992), pp. 1-16; Andrei Kozyrev, “Boris Yeltsin, The Soviet Union, the CIS, and me” *The Wilson Quarterly*, 28 October 2016; See also the important article by Glenn Chafetz, “The Struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia,” *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 111, Number 4 (1996-1997). These categories can be seen in Russo-Japanese relations during Kozyrev’s tenure as foreign minister. Ted Hopf deals with similar issues, but examines a later period, 1999, in his important study, *Social Construction of International Politics: Identities and Foreign Policies, Moscow 1955 & 1999* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2002).

<sup>664</sup> Interview with Andrei Kozyrev by Aleksandr Mukhin, *Moscow News Service*, pp. 60-61.

Japan in the hope of stimulating Japanese economic assistance for Russia on a vast scale. They also proposed that Russia repudiate its Stalinist past and demonstrate respect for legality by returning territory acquired by force to its rightful owners.”<sup>665</sup>

From examining these statements, it is abundantly clear that Martin Wight’s theories on international theory have explanatory power here. Wight acknowledged that in real-world situations, there was a good deal of overlap between his three broad categories of Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism. Aspects of all three of these categories, and their blending, can be seen in Russo-Japanese relations during Kozyrev’s tenure as foreign minister.

## **Historical Background**

The four islands had been seized by Soviet forces in the last days of the Second World War. Joseph Stalin had always defended this seizure of what had previously been acknowledged as Japanese territory by citing his agreement with the British and American governments at the Yalta Conference.<sup>666</sup> These principles were later strengthened and solidified in subsequent meetings among the Big Three, as the price for Soviet entry into the war against the

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<sup>665</sup> Leszek Buszynski, “Russia and Northeast Asia: aspirations and reality,” *The Pacific Review*, Volume 13, No. 3 (2000), p. 407. Buszynski’s short article probably best captures the essence of the liberal assumptions that undergirded Kozyrev’s, and thus the Russian MFA’s, foreign policy towards Japan.

<sup>666</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa provides a very detailed comprehensive study of Yalta and subsequent Big Three meetings during the Second World War in his *Racing the Enemy*, pp. 34-37, 71-80, 130-176.

Japanese.<sup>667</sup> As Kazuhiko Togo noted: “Perhaps from the Soviet point of view, the attack was a reflection of the reality of the war, and legitimate because it was based on the Yalta Agreement signed by Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin.”<sup>668</sup> This served as the basis for the Soviet position on this issue from Stalin to early Gorbachev: there was no territorial dispute because the results of the war could not be revised.<sup>669</sup> Kimie Hara correctly noted that “Roosevelt and Churchill promised Stalin a “reward” that violated the Atlantic Charter and Cairo Declaration principle of ‘no territorial expansion’ for Soviet entry into the war against Japan.”<sup>670</sup>

From a Japanese perspective, the seizure of the islands was a breach of international law. As explained by Kazuhiko Togo:

For Japan the Yalta Agreement could not become the basis of its territorial demarcation, because Japan was not a signatory, nor even knew of its existence when it was signed. For Japan the Potsdam Declaration was the most relevant document. It prescribed that “The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we determine.” The Cairo Declaration stated that Japan should be

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<sup>667</sup> See the dated, but meticulously detailed, diplomatic history of these meetings in Herbert Feis, *A Diplomatic History of World War II: Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought, 2nd Edition*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 441-458 (pre-Yalta), 489-560 (Yalta) and 638-641 (post-Yalta). The traditional Soviet view is well argued by Viktor Levonovich Israelian in his *Diplomacy of Aggression: Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis, its Rise and Fall* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970) and *The Anti-Hitler Coalition: Diplomatic Co-operation Between the USSR, USA and Britain During the Second World War, 1941-1945* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971). The Soviet case for their legal seizure of the Northern Territories is ably made by the Soviet diplomat and scholar L.N. Kutakov, *Rossiia i Iaponiia [Russia and Japan]* (Moscow: Vostochnoi Literatury, 1988), and his more detailed *Moskva-Tokio: Ocherki Diplomaticheskikh Otnoshenii, 1956-1986 [Moscow-Tokyo: Essays on Diplomatic Relations, 1956-1986]*, (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnaia otnosheniia, 1988).

<sup>668</sup> Kazuhiko Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy, 1945-2003: The Quest for a Proactive Policy* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2005), p. 299.

<sup>669</sup> Kazuhiko Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy, 1945-2003: The Quest for a Proactive Policy* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2005), p. 228-229. Gorbachev repeated this position several times in his discussions with Japanese officials. See also Jonathan Haslam, “Soviet Policy toward Japan and Western Europe: What the Differences Reveal,” *Acta Slavica Iaponica*, 8 (109-115), 1990. This was also future Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's position on this territorial dispute. *Japan Times*, 18 August 1993, cited in Kimie Hara, *Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945*, p. 208.

<sup>670</sup> Kimie Hara, *Cold War Frontiers in the Asian Pacific: Divided Territories in the San Francisco System* (London, New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 98.

punished and expelled from 'territories which she has taken by violence and greed,' but the three allies 'have no thought of territorial expansion.'<sup>671</sup>

Thus, in the post-war period, the Japanese government argued its case on a legal basis founded upon the series of agreements concluded by the Allied powers during the Second World War concerning Japan. Prominent among these was the Cairo Declaration, signed by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on 1 December 1943. It stated:

The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.<sup>672</sup>

Later, when Churchill asked Stalin if he had read the Cairo Declaration, Stalin replied that "... although he could make no commitments, he thoroughly approved of it, and of all its contents."<sup>673</sup>

Japanese diplomats and scholars argued against the traditional Soviet position by declaring that Japan had not been a party at the Yalta Conference, and by pointing out that the treaties signed between Japan and Tsarist Russia that demarcated the border between Japan and Russia in the Pacific Ocean had explicitly excluded the Northern Territories from the Kurile Island chain.

The first treaty between Russia and Japan was the Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation Between Japan and Russia, also known as the Treaty of Shimoda, signed in 26

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<sup>671</sup> Kazuhiko Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy*, p. 229. The quotations are from the Potsdam Declaration translated from the Japanese by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Principal Treaties*, p. 1825. The actual quotations are from the Potsdam Declaration, Paragraph 8. The Soviet Union adopted the Cairo Declaration on 8 August 1945.

<sup>672</sup> The Cairo Declaration, quoted in Herbert Feis, *A Diplomatic History of World War II*, p. 252.

<sup>673</sup> Herbert Feis, *A Diplomatic History of World War II*, p. 254.

January 1855 between Russian Admiral Evfimii Putiatin and the Tokugawa Shogunate. The document stated explicitly:

Henceforth the frontier between Japan and Russia will run between the islands of Iturup and Urup. The entire island of Iturup belongs to Japan and the entire island of Urup, as well as the other Kuril islands to the north of that island belong to Russia. As for the island of Karafuto (Sakhalin), it remains as heretofore undivided between Japan and Russia.<sup>674</sup>

In an article in *Izvestiia*, published on 4 October 1991, the Russian scholars Konstantin Sarsikov and Kirill Cherevko published part of a document from the Russian archives, the “Draft of the Additional Instruction to Admiral Putiatin, number 730,” which was produced by the Tsarist Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They noted that Tsar Nicholas I added the following notation to the document’s front page: “Be it so enacted. February 24, 1853.” The Tsar’s addition, was more than approval, noted Sarsikov and Cherevko, “... it was an order.” In relation to the border, the document stated:

On the subject of borders, we should make concessions (without, however, damaging our interests), but considering that the attainment of the other goal, namely trade benefits is essential. The southernmost Kuril island, belonging to Russia, is Urup, and therefore, the southern tip of that island will be our border with Japan, while the end of the Japanese territory will be the Northern tip of Iturup island. If by chance the Japanese government should try to claim this island, you might explain to it, that on all our maps the island of Urup is shown as Russian and that the best proof of it being ours is the Russian-American company, which manages Russian property in America and in different seas, not only manages Urup in the same manner as or other Kurils, but even has a settlement there, and in general that island is considered to be the border of our territories in the Kuril islands.<sup>675</sup>

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<sup>674</sup> Graham Allison, Hiroshi Kimura, and Konstantin Sarsikov, *Beyond Cold War to Trilateral Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region: Scenarios for New Relationships Between Japan, Russia and the United States*, (Cambridge, MA: Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, 1992), Appendix, Document 1 (translated by the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project).

<sup>675</sup> Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Draft of the Additional Instruction to Admiral Putiatin, number 730” cited in Konstantin Sarsikov and K. Cherevko, “It was Easier for Putiatin to Draw the Border Between Russia and Japan: Previously Unknown Historical Documents Regarding the Disputed Kurile Islands,” *Izvestia*, 4 October 1991, in Allison, Kimura and Sarsikov (editors) *Beyond Cold War*, p. 78-79 (translated by the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project).

After citing this document, Sarsikov and Cherevko noted: “It seems we have discovered the truth! According to a major historical document, sovereignty over the Southern Kurils, which is a current issue in dispute, was never questioned by Russia. *Russia always acknowledged Japan’s right to it voluntarily, without any pressure from outside.* Moreover, the government tried to figure out how to keep it in case the Japanese presented claims to it.”<sup>676</sup>

The fact that Russian academics were starting to acknowledge that Japanese resistance to traditional Soviet claims was, in fact, historically valid was highly significant because it challenged previous Soviet scholarship on the issue which had simply defended the political positions of the U.S.S.R. For example, the Soviet scholar and diplomat, L.N. Kutakov, after accurately describing the contents of the 1855 Shimoda Treaty about the demarcation line between Russian and Japanese territory being the islands of Iturup and Urup, added this qualifier:

Occupied with the war against England, France and Turkey, Russia did not have the ability of defend its domain in the Pacific Ocean and was forced to concede to Japan the southern part of the Kurile islands, and which from time immemorial [had been a part of Russia].<sup>677</sup>

This historical position was clearly false, as is shown by the content of the instructions given to Admiral Putiatin by Tsar Nicholas I. The historical record actually supported Japan’s case, and Russian academics, such as Sarsikov and Cherevko, and diplomats, such as Georgii Kunadze, began to acknowledge this fact in the early 1990s. This provided a more congenial atmosphere for resolving the territorial issue between the two countries, now that a growing body of Russian

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<sup>676</sup> Konstantin Sarsikov and K. Cherevko, “It was Easier for Putiatin to Draw the Border Between Russia and Japan: Previously Unknown Historical Documents Regarding the Disputed Kurils Islands,” *Izvestia*, 4 October 1991, in Allison, Kimura and Sarsikov (editors) *Beyond Cold War*, p. 79 (translated by the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project).

<sup>677</sup> L.N. Kutakov, *Rossiia i Iaponiia*, (Moscow: Glavnaia Redaktsiia vostochnoi literatury, 1988) p. 124. Significantly, this book was written during the development and promotion of Gorbachev’s “New Thinking” in foreign policy. It can be seen as an attempt by an old Soviet Japanese hand to counter the arguments being made by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze in general and Soviet Japanologists such as Georgii Kunadze, Boris Slavinsky, Konstantin Sarsikov, Kirill Cherevko and others in particular.

scholarship on the issue was starting to converge with Japanese scholarship. This may also have led to unrealistic hopes on the Japanese side because, unfortunately for the Japanese, neither Soviet nor Russian Federation diplomacy was directed or run by Russian scholars or academics!

The next historical document of significance to this issue was the Treaty of St. Petersburg, concluded between Alexander II's Russia and the fairly new Meiji regime on April 25 (May 7), 1875.<sup>678</sup> In this treaty, the Japanese gave the Tsarist government the southern half of Sakhalin (what the Japanese called Karafuto) Island in exchange for the entire Kurile island chain. This document left no doubt that in the late 19th century, Japanese and Russian diplomats were in agreement that the Northern Territories (or Southern Kuriles) were NOT a part of the Kurile chain, because the treaty listed by name all the Kurile islands, and they ended at Urup.<sup>679</sup> Japanese diplomats, using the treaties of 1855 and 1875 as their legal foundation, argued that the Northern Territories had never been part of the Kurile island chain, and that these documents proved that Tsarist Russia has agreed with the Japanese government. The official Japanese position on the issue was built upon a legal foundation, which had been laid at the Cairo and Potsdam declarations and codified by the Treaty of San Francisco.<sup>680</sup> As Kimi Hara noted: "Roosevelt and Churchill promised Stalin a 'reward' that violated the Atlantic Charter and

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<sup>678</sup> Prior to the Bolshevik seizure of power, Imperial Russia followed the Julian, as opposed to the Gregorian calendar. The Bolshevik government adopted the Gregorian calendar on 1/14 February 1918. This meant that Russian dates differed from those of the major Western nations by 13 days.

<sup>679</sup> Treaty Concluded between Russia and Japan, April 25 (May 7), 1875 with an additional article signed in Tokyo on August 10 (August 22), 1875 (extract), translated by the Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project in Allison, Kimura, Sarsikov (editors), *Beyond Cold War to Trilateral Cooperation*, pp. 80-81.

<sup>680</sup> Kazuhiko Togo's *Japanese Foreign Policy*, provides an excellent overview of this period based on Japanese diplomatic documents. See also Kimie Hara, *Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945*, pp. 20-23.

Cairo Declaration principles of ‘no territorial expansion’ for Soviet entry into the war against Japan.”<sup>681</sup>

### **The 1956 Joint Declaration**

In Japanese-Russian discussions, the 1956 Joint Declaration had great significance. From 12 to 19 October 1956, Japanese Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama visited Moscow, the first visit of a Japanese Prime Minister to Moscow in the history of Japanese-Russian relations.<sup>682</sup> As Japanese scholar and diplomat Kazuhiro Togo noted, at this summit “The two sides resolved all issues related to the Second World War except the territorial issue.”<sup>683</sup> Prior to and during these negotiations, the Soviets proposed to Japanese diplomats that they were ready to resolve this issue by transferring the islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan as a first step in resolving the territorial issue. They maintained this position throughout the 1956 negotiations.<sup>684</sup> Clause Nine of the Joint Declaration stated that negotiations would continue between the two parties and that the other two islands would be transferred to Japan after the two countries officially signed a peace treaty.<sup>685</sup>

This offer had seemed at first quite reasonable to many Japanese diplomats and officials, and it has been argued by a number of scholars that they were in fact willing to accept the Soviet offer. However, the United States intervened in the process. U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles informed Japanese foreign minister Mamoru Shigemitsu, who was in fact about to accept the offer, that “Japan’s residual sovereignty over Okinawa could be endangered if it were to

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<sup>681</sup> Kimie Hara, *Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific*, p. 98.

<sup>682</sup> Kimie Hara, *Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945*, p. 32.

<sup>683</sup> Kazuhiko Togo, “The Inside Story of the Negotiations on the Northern Territories,” p. 125.

<sup>684</sup> V.P. Safronov, *SSSR—SShA—Iaponiia v gody “Kholodnoi Voiny” 1945-1960 gg*, pp. 324-351.

<sup>685</sup> Kazuhiko Togo, “The Inside Story of the Negotiations on the Northern Territories,” p. 125.



make concessions to the USSR.”<sup>686</sup> Kimie Hara noted that “The primary objectives of the U.S. Cold War policy in the Asia-Pacific were to secure Japan for the Western bloc, and to prevent it from achieving a rapprochement with the communist bloc.”<sup>687</sup> U.S. intervention in Soviet-Japanese negotiations prevented a resolution of the crisis, and from this point on, return of all four islands became the official and consistent policy of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

## **The Foreign Policy of the RSFSR toward Japan**

### ***RSFSR officials attend Gorbachev summit with Japan in April 1991***

The Yeltsin Administration’s Japan policy cannot be disentangled from that of Yeltsin’s predecessor, Mikhail Gorbachev. In January 1986 Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze visited Japan half a year after his appointment as foreign minister. According to Kimie Hara, Gorbachev’s interest in Japan had followed an evolutionary course: “In hindsight it is evident that the Soviet approach to the region and to Japan gradually changed its nature from ideologically coloured to politically motivated to more pragmatic and economically inspired.”<sup>688</sup> In the 1980s Japan had become what many recognized as an economic superpower, and in 1985 the Japanese economy surpassed the Soviet economy to become the world’s second largest economy. Prior to Gorbachev, Soviet leaders had viewed Japan as a loyal supporter of the United States, to which it was linked by a comprehensive security treaty.<sup>689</sup> Thus,

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<sup>686</sup> Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1955-57, Volume XXIII, Part I, Japan, pp. 202-203, cited in Kimie Hara, *Cold War Frontiers*, p. 96.

<sup>687</sup> Kimie Hara, *Cold War Frontiers*, p. 97.

<sup>688</sup> Kimie Hara, *Japanese-Soviet Relations since 1945*, p. 155. Gorbachev identified Japan as an intrinsic element of the important Western economic and political structures.

<sup>689</sup> See Jonathan Haslam, “Soviet Policy toward Japan and Western Europe: What the Differences Reveal,” pp. 110-111. Shevardnadze’s historic visit to Japan indicated that aspects of “New Thinking” were starting to impact Soviet thought on foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region as well.

Gorbachev's emerging Japan policy was another breach with the USSR's standard behavior.

As Tsuyoshi Hasegawa argued:

Throughout this postwar period the Soviet Union had no comprehensive Japan policy, treating Soviet-Japanese relations as a mere function of US-Soviet relations. The clumsiness, inflexibility, insensitivity, bad timing and arrogance with which the Soviet government approached Japan understood the low importance it accorded to it.<sup>690</sup>

At the Soviet-Japanese joint ministerial meeting on 3 May 1989, Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze stated that a peace treaty could be concluded with Japan, despite the existence of the security treaty with the US, which Hara identified as "... a clear change in the Soviet approach to the issue."<sup>691</sup>

Not only did Yeltsin's political conflict with Gorbachev demand RSFSR interest in Japanese-Russian relations, but newly aroused activism on the part of the regions in Russian foreign policy also played a role in the activation of RSFSR interest on this issue, and actually helped entangle President Yeltsin in this issue. It is also likely that Yeltsin formed the ideas that would form the basis of his opinion on the Northern Territories issue during this period. One of the most important early drivers for the RSFSR's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Northern Territories issue was a request from the regional government to foreign minister of the RSFSR Andrei Kozyrev to ensure that the interests of the islands' Russian population were not violated by the Soviet Union. On 23 October 1990 Foreign Minister Kozyrev received a letter forwarded by Viktor Iliushin, a Yeltsin adviser, from the Sakhalin Oblast Council. The letter began with an appeal for help:

These issues are not new, and flow from what is lawful. But to ignore our thoughts and interests, I think results from the general position of the Center in relation to us. For the people of Sakhalin these are very important issues...

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<sup>690</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Between War and Peace, 1698-1985*, p. 172.

<sup>691</sup> Kimie Hara, *Japanese-Soviet Relations since 1945*, p. 157.

This is a request to help the people of Sakhalin.<sup>692</sup>

The forwarded letter was written by A.P. Aksenov, the representative of the Sakhalin Oblast Council of Peoples Deputies, who wrote:

We direct to you a request from the Presidium of the Sakhalin Oblast Council of Peoples Deputies in relation to several issues which relate to the inter-governmental activity of the U.S.S.R.

This decision was made, above all, due to the concern of the population of the Oblast that the question of the so-called "Northern Territories" (and for us the ownership of the territories of Sakhalin and the Kuriles) is being made without the participation of Oblast representatives. A concrete example is the last trip of Comrade Shevardnadze to Japan.

Our telegram concerning this issue to the Foreign Minister was not answered.<sup>693</sup>

The letter made is clear that the Oblast government sought the assistance of the RSFSR in ensuring that the opinions of the Oblast's representatives on this issue were not ignored by the Soviet government. Though the Russian MFA's Asian affairs analysts, such as Kunadze, did not agree with the opinions of the representatives from the regional governments, these requests underscored the importance of these issues, and Yeltsin fully exploited these sentiments in order to damage his rival Gorbachev's political and domestic standing, declaring his full support

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<sup>692</sup> "Letter from the Assistant President of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation V. Iliushin to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Andrei Kozyrev." 23 October 1990. SD 25992, GARF, for, 10026, opis' 1, deli 2422, list 62-67, National Security Archive at George Washington University. Use of the politically colored term "center" was not accidental. Both Yeltsin and Kozyrev frequently referred derisively to the Soviet government as "the center," and frequently used the concept of "the center" as the fulcrum with which to compare the new, more enlightened, foreign policy of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

<sup>693</sup> "Letter from the Assistant President of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation V. Iliushin to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Andrei Kozyrev." 23 October 1990. SD 25992, GARF, for, 10026, opis' 1, deli 2422, list 62-67 from National Security Archive.

for the islands' Russian population and his opposition to any attempt by Gorbachev to give "Russian territory" back to the Japanese.<sup>694</sup>

The Japanese responded positively to the Soviet overtures by softening their position as well. Japanese policy at this time was governed by two underlying principles: the inseparability of politics and economics (*seikei fukabun*), and the principle that the return of all four islands was a prerequisite for improved relations (*ryodo iriguchi-ron*). Despite these principles, Japanese leaders began to speak about a new foreign policy approach called 'balanced equilibrium' (*kakudai kinko*). Under balanced equilibrium, the general idea was to promote an overall improvement in a number of different areas in a balanced manner, which would create conditions that could lead to the resolution of the territorial issue. These ideas were actually quite similar to Yeltsin's 5-point plan. However, despite this softening, the Japanese foreign ministry (*Gaimusho*) remained committed to the idea that return of the Northern Territories in toto (i.e. all four islands) was a pre-requisite for the establishment of amicable Japanese relations with the Soviet Union, and the conclusion of a peace treaty.<sup>695</sup> As the *Gaimusho*'s Director-General of the Asia and European Department, Nagao Hyodo, stated in the Diet, Japan's parliament on 12 April 1991:

... in order to carry out serious and large-scale economic cooperation, that is, centering financial assistance, there has to be a stable political foundation between Japan and the USSR. Such a political stable foundation can never be considered without signing a peace treaty, and the signing of a peace treaty can never be considered without the solution of the "Northern Territories." We see it his way.<sup>696</sup>

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<sup>694</sup> Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, p. 88. This may have been the first indication that there was a policy cleavage between President Yeltsin and his Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>695</sup> This fact has been noted by nearly all analysts of Japanese foreign policy examined in this study, including American, Japanese, German and Russian scholars.

<sup>696</sup> Kokkai (Diet), *Sangiin Gaimuiinkai Giroku* (12 April 1991), p. 23 cited in Kimie Hara, *Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945*, p. 172.

Based on this intractable position, a solution to the problem between the two countries was highly unlikely. But this issue became a point of tenuous cooperation (at first) and conflict (as the issue developed) between the foreign ministries of the USSR and the RSFSR. Interestingly enough, the USSR's foreign minister, Boris D. Pankin stated on 13 September 1991 "Over the Northern Territories issue, *there is no difference in the positions of President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union and President Yeltsin of the Russian Republic.*"<sup>697</sup>

Both Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev and Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgii Kunadze, accompanied Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh to Tokyo for working group meetings with Japanese officials in September 1991, which clearly demonstrated the rising importance of the RSFSR to Soviet Diplomacy. Kunadze and Kozyrev did an effective job in advancing the issues of the local population of the islands, as demonstrated by Bessmertnykh's position that "... the realistic acceptance that problems with the nationalities within the USSR would further complicate the territorial question with Japan as well."<sup>698</sup> In the new, more open, political atmosphere that resulted from both *perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost*' (openness), the islands' population could openly express their opinion on this issue, and the overwhelming majority of the Russia population there opposed any transfer of even two of the islands to the Japanese.<sup>699</sup> This comment dampened hopes for better Soviet-Japanese relations.

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<sup>697</sup> *Izvestiia*, 13 September 1991, cited in Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, p. 300, emphasis added. This was actually true in essence because both Gorbachev and Yeltsin categorically refused to transfer any of the disputed islands to Japan, though the position of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was by far more liberal than the MFA of the USSR.

<sup>698</sup> Joachim Glaubitz, *Between Tokyo and Moscow: A History of an Uneasy Relationship, 1972 to the 1990s* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), p. 216 (emphasis added). The words quoted here are not Bessmertnykh's, they are Glaubitz's characterization of Bessmertnykh's position at that time.

<sup>699</sup> Joachim Glaubitz, *Between Tokyo and Moscow*, p. 224. This was also noted by Kimura and Hasegawa.

According to Mikhail Gorbachev, he had been admonished by U.S. President George H.W. Bush to come to an agreement with Tokyo on this issue. As he wrote in his memoirs:

If you, the Soviet Union, were to establish economic co-operation with the Japanese,' he [Bush] said, 'that would promote stability.' In this connection, Bush mentioned we would do well to look for a way of resolving the territorial dispute.<sup>700</sup>

However, the summit failed to produce any real improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations.<sup>701</sup>

Though Gorbachev's diplomatic philosophy and efforts went beyond traditional Soviet policies, they did not go far enough to meet Japanese expectations. Gorbachev's efforts failed because in the Japanese, he had a dogmatic and uncompromising negotiating partner, and due to his weak domestic position he had little diplomatic flexibility with which to meet any of the Japanese demands. It was made even weaker when Artem Tarasov, a businessman and supporter of Yeltsin, disclosed what he identified as a Soviet plan to sell the Northern Territories to Japan in exchange for cash.<sup>702</sup> Gorbachev's opponents, including Boris Yeltsin, used this incident to attack Gorbachev for betraying the territorial integrity of both Soviet Union and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. As Sergey Radchenko and Lisbeth Tarlow noted:

The fallout from the Tarasov incident was a clear indication of the public outrage Gorbachev would have had to endure if he has agreed to return the islands. Retaining the Kuriles, in Gorbachev's view, was indispensable for his own political survival, much as Japanese credits were indispensable for the economic survival of the USSR.<sup>703</sup>

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<sup>700</sup> Mikhail Gorbachev, *Memoirs* (London, New York: Doubleday, 1996), p. 621.

<sup>701</sup> Kimi Hara, *Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945*, pp. 151-152; Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, pp. 97-103; Hasegawa, *Neither War nor Peace, 1985-1998*, pp. 401-407.

<sup>702</sup> For an excellent summary of this incident, see Sergey Radchenko and Lisbeth Tarlow, "Gorbachev, Ozawa, and the Failed Back-Channel Negotiations of 1989-1990," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Volume 15, No. 2 (Spring, 2013), p. 123-124.

<sup>703</sup> Sergey Radchenko and Lisbeth Tarlow, "Gorbachev, Ozawa, and the Failed Back-Channel Negotiations of 1989-1990," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Volume 15, No. 2 (Spring, 2013), p. 128-129.

Furthermore, the MFA of the RSFSR openly worked to subvert Soviet-Japanese relations, and to prevent a resolution on this issue. On 26 February 1991, after Georgii Kunadze had defected to Yeltsin's side in the struggle for power between the USSR and the RSFSR, he urged the Japanese not to make a deal with Gorbachev. According to Gilbert Rozman:

... Kunadze wrote in a Japanese weekly that Gorbachev had lost the remaining trust of the Soviet people. He warned that Tokyo should now resist aiding Moscow if a Soviet dictatorship would agree to Japanese terms. Such aid might finance the dictatorship for a few years, but later Japan would have lost the friendship of the Soviet people. Helping Soviet dictatorship in return for the islands would lead to a crisis in future Soviet-Japanese relations.<sup>704</sup>

Additionally, even if his domestic situation been more amenable to territorial concessions, on a personal level, Gorbachev was unwilling to give the intransigent Japanese negotiating position serious consideration. Georgii Kunadze, who had excellent first-hand experience in Gorbachev's Japanese policy, both as an adviser to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and later as Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation, stated: "President Gorbachev finally went to Tokyo well versed on the issues, but poorly prepared to make a deal, *with neither genuine conviction nor a pragmatic goal*. His hosts were even less prepared for genuine progress, let alone a breakthrough."<sup>705</sup> For Kunadze, the problem was not simply Gorbachev's political weakness that prevented a deal, it was his position on the issue, which was ultimately as intractable as the Japanese position.<sup>706</sup> Gorbachev's usual diplomatic approach, based on "New Thinking," was to utilize multinational organizations to help achieve his foreign policy goals

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<sup>704</sup> Georgii Kunadze, "Gorubachofu ni wa mo genmetsushita," *Sekai shuho*, 26 February 1991, pp. 6-7, cited and summarized in Gilbert Rozman, *Japan's Response to the Gorbachev Era* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 170.

<sup>705</sup> Georgii Kunadze, "A Russian View," p. 154, emphasis added.

<sup>706</sup> For this reason, Japanese scholar Hiroshi Kimura argues that Gorbachev and Yeltsin essentially pursued the same policy towards Japan. Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, pp. 231-233.

and reach agreements with other countries.<sup>707</sup> This method did not work with the Japanese. As Joachim Glaubitz noted, “The familiar attempt, repeated by Gorbachev, to apply European models to Asia was not supported by Japan ... The constant rejection of Soviet multilaterally based initiatives indicated that European models of organization would fare no better with the region’s other main powers...”<sup>708</sup> At the end of 1986, Kazuhiko Togo, one of the *Gaimusho*’s most experienced and informed Russia hands had briefed Foreign Minister Tadashi Kuranari on the difficulties Gorbachev faced in negotiating with the Soviet Union:

Gorbachev gave a higher priority to foreign policy regarding relations with the US after the failure at the Reykjavik summit meeting with President Reagan; he was also absorbed by domestic issues, which were becoming increasingly difficult; relations deteriorated because of Japan’s accession to SDI and the Toshiba incident, and lastly, Gorbachev was not interested in addressing the territorial issue seriously.<sup>709</sup>

On 20 May 1991 the Foreign Relations Committee of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR held an open hearing on the results of Gorbachev’s visit to Japan. Japanese Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Sumio Edamura, who served as ambassador from 1990 to 1994, noted a difference between the U.S.S.R. and the RSFSR on this issue, writing: “... the reigning mood at the hearing was generally amicable. No similar move was seen in the Soviet parliament.”<sup>710</sup> Edamura and other Japanese observers continued to note the differences between the Soviet and Russian positions on this issue. According to Japanese diplomat Kazuhiko Togo:

The new leadership in Russia under President Yeltsin, his Foreign Minister Kozyrev and Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Kunadze began to send messages to Tokyo that they were willing to substantially improve relations with Japan. Responding to this historic

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<sup>707</sup> See Andrei Grachev, *Gorbachev’s Gamble: Soviet Foreign Policy & the End of the Cold War* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008), pp. 58-61, 75-77, 163-168; William Taubman, *Gorbachev: His Life and Times* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017), pp. 253-305.

<sup>708</sup> Joachim Glaubitz, *Between Tokyo and Moscow*, p. 219. This idea is also explained in Haslam, “Soviet Policy towards Japan: What the Differences Reveal.”

<sup>709</sup> Kazuhiko Togo, “The inside story of the negotiations on the Northern Territories: five lost windows of opportunity,” *Japan Forum*, 32 (1), 2011, p. 126.

<sup>710</sup> Sumio Edamura, “A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations,” p. 140.



opportunity, a Japanese Foreign Ministry team worked enthusiastically and by October signaled their willingness to negotiate seriously with Russia and create an entirely new relationship.<sup>711</sup>

This continued up to the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. in December 1991. In an interview published in the April 1992 issue of the Russian journal, *Problemy Dal'nogo Vostoka*, Edamura said:

The position of the Russian government on this question is significantly different from the position that was adopted by the Soviet Union. After the democratic revolution in August 1991, Mr. Yeltsin repeatedly said that this problem must be resolved on the basis of legality and justice, and from this follows the necessity of fully complying to all the provisions of the Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration of 1956. Likewise, the Russian-Japanese Treaty of 1855 should also be respected, according to which the state borders, established through a peace treaty, passed through the islands of Urup and Iturup.<sup>712</sup>

The Russian Federation continued to show initiative in relation to Russian-Japanese relations that outpaced Soviet efforts. In discussions with Japanese diplomats, the RSFSR position on the issue quickly emerged. The position was formulated by Georgii Kunadze, and became known as the “Kunadze Option,” what Hasegawa characterized as the “two islands plus alpha formula.”<sup>713</sup> It fit in well with Foreign Minister Kozyrev’s liberal outlook. According to Hasegawa:

Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev basically supported the position of his deputy, who, unlike his self-effacing boss, asserted himself with a strong personality and energetic leadership. As far as Kozyrev was concerned, the Kunadze option fit well with his overall foreign policy goals, which rejected past Soviet policy and aimed at “partnership and alliance” with the West.<sup>714</sup>

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<sup>711</sup> Kazuhiko Togo, “The inside story of the negotiations on the Northern Territories: five lost windows of opportunity,” p. 129.

<sup>712</sup> “Nashi Gosti: TOKIO — MOSKVA: Vozmozhno li Proryv v otnosheniakh? Interv’iu posla Iapanii Sumio Edamura,” [Our Guests: Tokyo-Moscow: Is a Breakthrough in Relations Possible?] An Interview with the Ambassador of Japan Sumio Edamura], *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka: Nauchnyi i obshchestvenno-politicheskii zhurnal* [Problems of the Far East: a Scientific and Socio-Political Journal], 4/92 (Moscow: Nauka, 1992), p. 4.

<sup>713</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Neither War Nor Peace, 1985-1998*, p. 421.

<sup>714</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Neither War nor Peace, 1985-1998*, p. 421.

Similar to a move made to the government of the PRC in early September 1991, when Yeltsin dispatched Vladimir Lukin to Beijing to ensure the Chinese leadership of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic's good intentions towards China, Yeltsin dispatched his then-ally Ruslan Khasbulatov to Tokyo on 9 September 1991. While there Khasbulatov met with Japanese officials and delivered a personal letter from President Yeltsin to the Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu.<sup>715</sup> According to Russian diplomat, Alexander Panov, this visit was intended to show the Japanese that the Russian RSFSR was eager to conclude a peace treaty with Japan, the absence "... of which interferes with the development of Russo-Japanese relations, not permitting the new democratic Russia to overcome the legacy of its past."<sup>716</sup>

Khasbulatov made the following points in his meetings with Liberal Democratic Party members:

1. Yeltsin's five stage proposal has been revised, with the proposed steps shortened and the process of change accelerated;
2. A settlement of the territorial dispute should be reached on the basis of "law and justice," with no distinction between the victorious (*pobeditel'*) and the vanquished (*pobezhdennyi*) in the Second World War;
3. The Russian leadership regretted that the Russian people had been misinformed and was prepared to help "the long cherished dream" (*zavetnaia mecha*) of the Japanese people become a reality;
4. With due respect to the Japanese view regarding the "inseparability of politics and economics," Russia requested a Japanese version of the Marshall Plan for the Soviet Union, amounting to \$8 to 15 billion.<sup>717</sup>

Khasbulatov further said that: "We may even abandon the previous approach [Yeltsin's 5-Stage proposal] altogether."<sup>718</sup> He also met with top business and political leaders in Japan and

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<sup>715</sup> Kazuhiko Togo, *Japanese Foreign Policy*, p. 249.

<sup>716</sup> Alexander Panov, "The Policy of Russia Towards Japan, 1992-2005" in Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo and Joseph Ferguson (editors), *Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia* (New York, London: Palgrave/MacMillan: 2006), p. 168.

<sup>717</sup> Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, p. 112.

<sup>718</sup> TASS, 13 September 1991, cited in Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, p. 300.

presented several proposals intended to break the deadlock between Russia and Japan on the territorial issue.

About a year prior to this visit, Soviet diplomat Vladen Martynov, who had deep experience in Far Eastern affairs, sent a background letter to Khasbulatov on Japanese-Soviet relations. Due to the importance of the issues discussed, this letter is worth quoting at length. Martynov wrote that: “The expressed opinions of the majority of experts, participating in the discussion of this problem, may be shortly summarized as follows:

The indisputable conditions for the development of full-blooded (*polnokrovnyi*) mutually advantageous relations with Japan including economic cooperation, is the conclusion with them of a peace treaty, *which is impossible without the settling of the territorial issue.*

The “freezing” of the territorial question does not correspond to the national interests of Russia and its new foreign policy course, neither in the strategic nor the tactical sense.

The resolution of the territorial issue must be based on the principles of justice (*spravedlivost*) and legality (*zakonnost*). *The starting point of the negotiations must be the Declaration of 1956, in accordance with which Japan was promised the return of two islands (Habomai and Shikotan).* The fate of the two other islands (Kunashiri and Iturup), which are also objects of Japanese grievances, must be decided in the course of a negotiating process. This process would result in the working out of a mutually acceptable formula (condominium, the acknowledgment of Japanese sovereignty over all four of the islands with the postponement of its practical realization in the near future, etc.).

The international-legal aspect the territorial settlement with Japan indicates a resolution of the issue [based on] “Russo-Japanese territorial demarcation,” and not the abandonment of indigenous Russian land for the benefit of a foreign government.” Consequently, the occasionally expressed danger that the transfer of the islands to Japan serves as a precedent for new territorial claims with Russia from a judicial point of view is unconvincing.

*The existing views on the significance of the damage to the defensibility of Russia, which would be applied to the transfer of the islands, is exaggerated.* At the same time the skillful conduct of negotiations might be calculated on this or that compensation from the Japanese side as our loss in the geostrategic situation.

In the preparation of the resolution of the territorial question there must be purposeful work with public opinion, *which is characterized as not only negative in relation to the transfer of the islands in principle, but also ignorant of the objective facts and the history*

*of the question.* A great role in this plan might be played by a weighted declaration, issued in the name of the political leadership of the country.<sup>719</sup>

According to Kunadze, Khasbulatov's proposals to the Japanese "... introduced some new ideas that could have been instrumental in breaking the idea of dropping the distinction between 'the victor' and 'the vanquished' " between Russia and Japan.<sup>720</sup> But, significantly, no mention was made either in Yeltsin's letter or by Khasbulatov himself of the Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration of 1956.<sup>721</sup> Lastly, and as a direct assault on Gorbachev's Soviet Union, Khasbulatov claimed that the Russian Federation "... was becoming a subject of international law and the issue of the peace treaty and the territorial dispute 'now rests on the Russian Federation.'"<sup>722</sup>

A few days later, in a move that stressed the difference between what Kozyrev considered the "totalitarian" Soviet Union and the democratic Russian Federation, Kozyrev "... indicated that Russia would honor the 1956 Joint Declaration and suggested that one way to resolve the territorial dispute might be to bring it to the International Court of Justice."<sup>723</sup> This proposal fit within Kozyrev's basic orientation towards Western institutions that formed the basis of his policy towards Russians in the Near Abroad. Though this was an interesting proposal, there is no evidence that it was seriously considered as a policy option by the Russian Ministry of

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<sup>719</sup> V.A. Martynov to R.I. Khasbulatov, SD25992, emphasis added. Excerpt from the minutes of meeting No. 112 of the CPSU Secretariat: Plans for carrying out communications in 1990 with the Soviet Union Council for Chinese Communist Party, the Workers' Party for Korea, the Cuban Revolutionary Party, and the Laotian Revolutionary Party. RGANI, fod. 89, ops. 8. delo 79, listy 1-2, emphasis added. It is interesting to note how different elements of this draft became central aspects of both the MFA's and Yeltsin's positions on this issue.

<sup>720</sup> Georgii Kunadze, "A Russian View of Russo-Japanese Relations," p. 159.

<sup>721</sup> Georgii Kunadze, "A Russian View of Russo-Japanese Relations," p. 158.

<sup>722</sup> James P. Nichol, *Diplomacy in the Former Soviet Republics* (Wesport, CT, London: Praeger, 1995), p. 77. This was apparently not only a difference between the MFA of the Soviet Union and the MFA of the RSFSR, but also a difference between the President and the MFA of the RSFSR.

<sup>723</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations; Volume 2: Neither War nor Peace, 1985-1998*, p. 421.

Foreign Affairs or any other Russian governmental institution. Regardless, a statement on the validity of the 1956 Joint Declaration, made by the Russian Foreign Minister, addressed a key Japanese condition of positive relations between Japan and Russia, and must have been seen as a step in the right direction by Japanese diplomats.<sup>724</sup>

Around this same time, Foreign Minister Kozyrev approved a trip by Georgii Kunadze, and Russian parliamentarians Oleg Kalugin (a former KGB General) and Vladen Sirotkin (a human rights specialist) to the Southern Kuriles. This was an attempt by the Russian MFA to enlist public support for its position on the issue.<sup>725</sup> As Kunadze wrote about this visit:

Upon arrival at the only operational airfield on the South Kurils (a former kamikaze airbase) the three of us became absolutely fascinated with the natural beauty and wilderness of the islands, but gradually we became depressed and finally shocked by the picture of neglect and misery we saw everywhere we went. To all practical purposes the local residents have become hostages of the old economic system and bankrupt policy. Understandably all of them were angry with the authorities. As virtually the first officials from Moscow to visit the islands, for several days, not just several hours, we had to listen to outbursts of human anger that had accumulated over many years.<sup>726</sup>

This delegation was met with protests from the local population, some of it fanned by Valentin Fedorov, the nationalist Governor of Sakhalin Oblast. While there, Kunadze hoped to speak with the local inhabitants of the existence of the "... Joint Declaration of 1956 and to advise the inhabitants that Habomai and Shikotan might be transferred to Japan in accordance with the legal obligations of the Russian state."<sup>727</sup> However, Kunadze's view that explaining the issue to

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<sup>724</sup> Sumio Edamura, "A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations," p. 145. As has been noted, veteran Russia hand in the *Gaimusho*, Kazuhiko Togo, reported that the Japanese Foreign Ministry set up a team to work on how relations with Russia could be improved based on the positive statements of President Yeltsin, Foreign Minister Kozyrev, and Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Kunadze. Kazuhiko Togo, "The inside story of the negotiations on the Northern Territories: five lost windows of opportunity," p. 129.

<sup>725</sup> See Robert B. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization*, 42 (3) Summer 1988, p. 432.

<sup>726</sup> Georgii Kunadze, "A Russian View of Russo-Japanese Relations," p. 159.

<sup>727</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations: Volume 2: Neither War nor Peace, 1985-1998*, p. 427.

the local inhabitants could improve the position of those who favored compromise with Japan based on the 1956 Treaty backfired. According to Hasegawa:

If Kunadze believed that he could persuade the uninformed residents in the far-off islands with his erudition, he was totally mistaken. It turned out that he charged into a veritable hornet's nest. Because of the Soviet government's conscious policy of concealing history, few of the islanders even knew of the existence of the 1956 Joint Declaration, let alone the Shimoda Treaty ... The initial reaction to Kunadze's revelation of historical truths was anger. At one meeting on Shikotan, he was almost clobbered by the people.<sup>728</sup>

Following this visit, President Yeltsin distanced himself publicly from Kunadze's visit, "... saying that he understood there was opposition on the disputed islands to Kunadze."<sup>729</sup> If little headway was made in preparing the local population for the transfer of even two of the islands, intergovernmental relations on the issue continued to be deepened by efforts on both sides.

On 11-17 October 1991, Japanese foreign minister, Taro Nakayama, came to Moscow, where the Soviets and Japanese agreed to create two subgroups within a bilateral group that was dedicated to achieving peace treaty between the two countries. According to James Nichol, the Soviet Union acceded "... to demands of the Russian Republic ..." and gave the leading role to Kunadze in the subgroup dealing with the resolution of the Northern Territories dispute.<sup>730</sup> Later that month, President Yeltsin sent Vladimir Lukin to Tokyo as his personal representative to explain Yeltsin's plans for radical economic reforms in the RSFSR. Lukin also discussed the Northern Territories issue with his Japanese interlocutors, and both sides agreed that "... a

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<sup>728</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations: Volume 2: Neither War nor Peace, 1985-1998*, p. 427. According to Joachim Glaubitz: "The mood of the islands' population was described on Soviet television as tense. The correspondent's words were, 'The people are living in tense anticipation of their fate. They are extremely outraged that their views are ignored and that somewhere up there decisions are made affecting their future without them being informed.'" Soviet television in Russian, 13 October 1991), quoted in Joachim Glaubitz, *Between Tokyo and Moscow*, p. 236.

<sup>729</sup> *Yomiuri Shinbun*, 15 November 1991, cited by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations: Volume 2: Neither War nor Peace, 1985-1998*, p. 600.

<sup>730</sup> Nichol, *Diplomacy in the Former Soviet Republics*, p. 78.

settlement [of the Northern Territories issue] was necessary for improved Russian-Japanese relations.”<sup>731</sup> It was reported in the Japanese press that sometime during Nakayama’s visit, Kozyrev had told him: “Let us cooperate together in tackling our common issue of influencing public opinion in the Russian Republic, which is against the return of the islands to Japan.”<sup>732</sup>

About a month later, on 14 November 1991, President Yeltsin, apparently ignoring Lukin’s report of Japanese sentiments on the issue, published a direct appeal to the Russian people, which listed five principles that would guide future Russian policy in this area. These principles were:

- 1) Respect for the interests of the residents living on the islands, while attaining justice and fulfilling humanitarian concerns;
- 2) Prevention of damage to the lives of residents on the islands;
- 3) Considerations for the social and economic interests as well as the property rights of the residents;
- 4) Sufficient attention to the concept of a “united great Russian fatherland” when concluding a treaty with Japan;
- 5) Provision of information about the negotiations to the Russian people.<sup>733</sup>

Though intended for the consumption of his Russian audience, this appeal was reported in the Japanese press.<sup>734</sup> If the Russian government based its negotiations with the Japanese on these principles, the resolution of the territorial dispute would be highly unlikely.

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<sup>731</sup> Nichol, *Diplomacy in the Former Soviet Republics*, p. 78.

<sup>732</sup> *Sankei Shinbun*, 11 October 1991 and *Asahi Shinbun*, 16 November 1991, cited in Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, p. 142. This collusion between the “pro reconciliation” factions in both the Russian Federation and Japan is an example of what political scientist Robert Putnam has identified as a “two-level game.”

<sup>733</sup> *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 15 November 1991, cited in Hasegawa, *Neither War nor Peace, 1985-1998*, p. 425.

<sup>734</sup> *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 15 November 1991.

With President Yeltsin's announcement, if there had been any doubt on this score previously, it should have become clear to the Japanese side that there were actually two Russian positions: that of the Russian Foreign Ministry, based on the Kunadze Option, which seemed quite capable of meeting the Japanese requirements of the resolution of this issue because it was based upon Russian acknowledgment of the validity of the 1956 Joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration,<sup>735</sup> and that of President Yeltsin, who seemed fully committed to supporting the Russian population on the disputed islands, and left the resolution of the dispute to "a future generation."<sup>736</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa noted that this "... discrepancy between Yeltsin's position and the Kunadze option ..." was one of the factors that made rapprochement between the two countries difficult.<sup>737</sup> Sumio Edamura, Japanese ambassador to Russia from 1990 to 1994, provides support for Hasegawa's view, stating: "Indeed, the lack of communication between the Presidency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was a perennial problem throughout my tenure as ambassador."<sup>738</sup>

Governor of Sakhalin Oblast, Valentin Fedorov, also visited Japan in early December 1991. While there, he proposed turning certain areas within the Northern Territories as an international nature preserve. He also stated: "I proceed on the basis that these islands are ours and will remain ours ... There can be no question of territorial concessions ... We [in Sakhalin Oblast]

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<sup>735</sup> This shows an approach that would be characterized by Martin Wight as "rationalist," the desire to reach an agreement by meeting a key requirement of the opposing side in the hope that this would lead to reconciliation. As Wight wrote: "... the opposite number must prove his readiness to negotiate; he must create confidence on the other side, It may exist already (if the two parties are friends) and then the need does not arise, but if it does not exist something must be done to inspire it." Martin Wight, *International Theory: the Three Traditions*, p. 185.

<sup>736</sup> Sumio Edamura, "A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations between the August 1991 Coup D'Etat and President Yeltsin's State Visit to Japan in October 1993," pp. 139-140.

<sup>737</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Neither War nor Peace, 1985-1998*, p. 425.

<sup>738</sup> Sumio Edamura, "A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations," p. 145.



regard ourselves as the bulwark of resistance to Japanese encroachments on the Kuriles.”<sup>739</sup>

Thus was the stage set on the eve of the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. The Russian Federation’s MFA had deepened its experience in dealing with the Japanese and had acclimated President Yeltsin to the complexities of the issue, but they failed to persuade him that the establishment of a good relationship with the Japanese depended on a resolution of the territorial issue, and strong elements of opposition to the Kunadze option remained throughout the Russian government and its bureaucratic entities. In the confused post-Soviet political environment, the issues that confronted the new government of the Russian Federation were complicated indeed.

### **The End of the USSR and Early Russian Federation-Japan Relations**

On 27 December 1991 Ambassador Sumio Edamura visited Foreign Minister Kozyrev , who was newly installed in the office of the former Soviet Foreign Minister, to deliver Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa’s formal letter of recognition of the Russian Federation to President Yeltsin. The letter recognized the Russian Federation as the successor state to the Soviet Union, and confirmed that all treaties and agreements concluded between the USSR and Japan were still valid. According to Edamura, this included the fact that “... the Japan-Soviet Union Joint Declaration of 1956 remained valid.” Edamura said that Foreign Minister “... Kozyrev thanked Japan for its recognition and verbally agreed to the Japanese understanding.”<sup>740</sup>

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<sup>739</sup> Nichol, *Diplomacy in the Former Soviet Republics*, p. 78.

<sup>740</sup> Sumio Edamura, “A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations,” p. 141. This exchange also has a Wightian Rationalist nature. As Wight noted: “Harmony, after all, is a combination of songs at different pitch, not a reduction of all sounds to the same pitch .... This is much closer to the rationalist conception of the relation between national interests, It is not a conflict of interests, nor a solidarity of interests but a partially resolvable tension of interests open to reconciliation ... a self interest intelligence enough to recognize that reactions of other states are among the complexities of the situation within which national self interest must be pursued. Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, pp. 127, 125.

Despite the many centers of opposition to the Kunadze Option in Russian bureaucratic politics, there was a strong sense of purpose and optimism among the personnel of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation that the Russian-Japanese impasse on the territorial issue could be quickly resolved. As Georgii Kunadze characterized it:

The prevailing mood in Moscow was that of pride, exultation, and absolute conviction that the era of cooperation and shared values with the outside world had finally arrived. In this spirit it was considered of primary importance to get beyond the foreign policy issues that might stand in the way of a general opening to the world. Needless to say, relations with Japan figured high on the list of issues to be tackled without delay.<sup>741</sup>

In the case of Russo-Chinese relations, the new Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the newly established Russian Federation had inherited a stable and developing positive relationship from Gorbachev's government. This was not the case in relation to Russo-Japanese relations. As Vladislav Zubok wrote: "Japan's intransigence made it impossible for Gorbachev (and later Yeltsin) to come up with a gradual demilitarization and opening of the disputed islands for the Japanese, an indispensable precondition for later territorial concessions ... the territorial dispute was passed on to Gorbachev's successors, who never gained the power and freedom of action that he has possessed as the last general secretary of the Soviet Union's Communist Party ... Gorbachev's procrastination contributed to Russia's lasting tension with Japan."<sup>742</sup>

Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa and President Yeltsin met for the first time on 31 January 1992 in New York City at a summit-level meeting of the UN Security Council. They reportedly had a positive meeting, though no record of the meeting has been published in official Russian Foreign Ministry publications or Kozyrev's memoirs. Two months later, on 27 February 1992,

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<sup>741</sup> Georgii Kunadze, "A Russian View," p. 158. This opinion expresses Russian MFA adherence to what Wight called a "revolutionary" diplomacy of shared universal values. Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, p. 40-48.

<sup>742</sup> Vladislav Zubok, "Gorbachev's Policy toward East Asia, 1985-1991" in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa (ed.), *The Cold War in East Asia, 1945-1991*, (Stanford, CA and Washington, DC: Stanford University Press, and Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011), pp. 284-285.

Russian ambassador to Japan, Liudvig Chizhov, delivered the following message from President Yeltsin to Prime Minister Miyazawa:

*Russia as a sovereign state now regards Japan as a partner and potential ally bound by common human values.*

Respecting consistently law and justice, we are determined to continue the search together for a solution to the problem of the conclusion of a peace treaty, including the issue of the demarcation of the frontier.<sup>743</sup>

Russo-Japanese relations were developing in a positive direction, and the two governments held a number of meetings in both countries that were aimed at building mutually beneficial relations that could serve as a basis for resolving the territorial issue. In an interview published in the Russian journal, *Problemy Dal'nogo Vostoka*, Ambassador Edamura noted:

Because at the present time the leadership of the Russian Federation, headed by President Boris Yeltsin, has adopted an active and correct policy on the search for a way to resolve the territorial question and the conclusion of a peace treaty, Japan, in its response to these steps of the Russian leadership, in September 1991 proclaimed in the United Nations five principles to improve relations with Russia. Then the Japanese government declared its readiness to provide as much as 2.5 billion dollars in credit to Russia.<sup>744</sup>

As has been noted by a number of scholars this financial aid indicated unprecedented flexibility on the part of the Japanese because it convincingly demonstrated that the Japanese Foreign Ministry was willing to set aside in this case the principle of the “inseparability of economics and politics” (*seikei fukabun*), which had been a consistent principle of Japanese foreign policy since

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<sup>743</sup> Letter from President Boris Yeltsin to Japanese Prime Minister Kichii Miyazawa, quoted in Sumio Edamura, “A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations,” p. 143, emphasis added. Thus, very early on in the process the MFA made the point with its Japanese interlocutors that unlike the communist Soviet MFA, the new Russian Federation’s MFA shared the same ideational values of the Japanese government.

<sup>744</sup> *Nashi Gosti: Tokio-Moskva: Vozmozhen li proryv v otnoshenii? Inter'viu posla Iapanii Sumio Edamura*, [Our Guests: Tokyo-Moscow: Is a Breakthrough in Relations Possible?] An Interview with the Ambassador of Japan Sumio Edamura], p. 6.

the 1970s.<sup>745</sup> As Hasegawa noted: “Following Nakayama’s new principles, however, Japan made a major decision that fundamentally departed from its previous policy of the inseparability of politics and economics.”<sup>746</sup>

In April 1992 Foreign Minister Watanabe announced his government’s official position on the Northern Territories, which was also a compromise of sorts. He said that Japan would accept Russia’s “right of administration” over the Northern Territories, if the Russian government accepted Japan’s “residual sovereignty” over the four islands. Though not a large concession, it was an indication that maybe the *Gaimusho* was moving towards a less intransigent policy than it had pursued in the past.<sup>747</sup>

### ***Kozyrev’s Visit to Tokyo and his Potentially Radical Proposal***

Foreign Minister Kozyrev’s first official state visit to Tokyo was in March 1992. Though there were no formal reports issued about his talks with the Japanese in either *Diplomaticheskii Vestnik* (*Diplomatic Herald*), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Collected Diplomatic Documents, or Kozyrev’s memoirs, several Russian and Japanese sources agree that Kozyrev, in his meeting with Japanese foreign minister, Michio Watanabe “... apparently proposed to continue the negotiations based on the 1956 Joint Declaration.”<sup>748</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, who has conducted

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<sup>745</sup> In a break with previous policy, Japan had agreed to provide the Russian Federation government 2.5 billion US dollars in assistance, and in April 1993 agreed to provide another 1.82 billion US dollars. See Kazuhiro Togo, “The inside story of the negotiations on the Northern Territories: five lost windows of opportunity,” pp. 130, 131.

<sup>746</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Between War and Peace, 1697-1985*, pp. 170-171. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Neither War Nor Peace*, pp. 234, 361-362, 422-423.

<sup>747</sup> Asahi Shimbun, 18 April 1992, SUPAR report, no. 13 (July 1992), p. 56 cited in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, “Conclusion: Russo-Japanese Relations in the New Environment—Implications of Continuing Stalemate,” in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Jonathan Haslam, and Andrew Kuchins (editors), *Russia and Japan: An Unresolved Dilemma Between Distant Neighbors* (Berkeley, CA: University of California at Berkeley Press, 1993), p. 430/

<sup>748</sup> Kazuhiko Togo, “Negotiations on the Northern Territories: Five Lost Windows of Opportunities,” p. 130.

extensive interviews with participants on both sides, claims that the Russian side had made this offer to the Japanese with the hope that the Japanese would act as if the proposal came from them, so that the "... Russian negotiators *would be able to force Yeltsin to commit to this solution*. In other words, the Russian side was interested in forcing the proposal it preferred, pretending that it came from the Japanese side."<sup>749</sup>

This incident shows clearly that the Russian MFA hoped to "convert" President Yeltsin to its position on the Northern Territories issue, though this effort ultimately failed. Kunadze wrote a number of articles in the Russian press using the pseudonym "Sergei Smolenskii" (the Russian MFA's headquarters were located on Smolenskii Square in Moscow) that advocated the Kunadze option. The first article was a response to the nationalist Russian politician Oleg Rumyatsev's articles which argued that the Russian Federation government favored "cession of Russian territories." Another article published by "Smolenskii," entitled "Progress in Russo-Japanese Relations Now Depends on the Russian Leadership—Diplomatic Steps for the solution of the Kurile Problem have already been exhausted," in *Nezavisimaia Gazeta* on 25 April on the eve of Watanabe's visit to Moscow. According to Hasegawa this article "... was intended to urge Yeltsin to accept a compromise solution along the lines of the Kunadze option."<sup>750</sup> Ambassador Edamura claimed that the "true purpose of the article ... appeared to be

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<sup>749</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "Why did Russia and Japan Fail to Achieve Rapprochement?" p. 175, emphasis added.

<sup>750</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Neither War Nor Peace*, 1985-1998, p. 440. Hasegawa also noted: "The fact that Kunadze had to use the news media to state his case revealed that he and the Russian MID were encountering increasing difficulties in getting access to the President. It also indicated that an ultimate resolution of the territorial dispute had moved from the realm of diplomatic negotiations to presidential decision." (p. 440). This also provides support for the idea that this issue was a Robert B. Putnam-type two-level game. See also Sumio Edamura, "A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations between the August 1991 Coup D'état and President Yeltsin's State Visit to Japan in October 1993," p. 143.

to urge the president to make a political decision for an early resolution of the territorial issue.”<sup>751</sup>

Whatever the motivations that produced it, this Russian offer was highly significant, and it was *the key proposal on Russo-Japanese relations made by the Russian Foreign Ministry during Kozyrev’s tenure as foreign minister*. Although the actual content of the conversations have never been published, almost every participant and scholar—both Japanese and Russian—who has studied this issue acknowledges that some offer of this type was made by the Russian side during Kozyrev’s visit to Moscow in March 1992. The proposal can be seen as the result of the Russian MFA’s accumulated knowledge based on its experience in dealing with the thorny issue since the summer of 1990. Japanese scholar and diplomat, Kazuhiko Togo, who had extensive experience in Soviet and Russian affairs, stated that this proposal was in fact revolutionary:

I did not know anything about this proposal, because I had already been transferred to Washington when it was made. But several years later, I became convinced that a decisive compromise proposal was then made by the Russian side. But as it turned out, that proposal never bore fruit. I think that the greatest reason for that failure is due to the fact that the Japanese side did not accept it as the basis for the negotiations. The Japanese side might have thought that the proposal ran the risk of damaging Japan’s traditional position of returning ‘the four islands in a bunch.’ They might have failed to recognize that they were negotiating at the unprecedented historical occasion of the demise of the Soviet Union, when the possibility of a breakthrough was so real.<sup>752</sup>

As Togo noted, the Japanese response to this proposal was tepid. A key Russian participant in this meeting, Georgii Kunadze, reported that the Russian delegation “... received a very cautious and, in fact, cool reception. Apparently, our Japanese counterparts were prepared to discuss nothing but the conditions and timetable for the transfer of all four islands, which in their

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<sup>751</sup> Sumio Edamura, “A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations between the August 1991 Coup d’etat and President Yeltsin’s State Visit to Japan in October 1993,” p. 143.

<sup>752</sup> Kazuhiko Togo, “Negotiations on the Northern Territories: Five Lost Windows of Opportunities,” p. 130. Kunadze, “A Russian View,” pp. 163-164. Hasegawa, “Why Did Russia and Japan Fail to Achieve Rapprochement?” p. 175. Kimi Hara, *Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations*, p. 207. Hara noted: “Foreign Minister Kozyrev was said to have conveyed the Russian government’s readiness to make a settlement on the basis of the 1956 Declaration, but Watanabe’s response showed no sign of flexibility.” (p. 207).

view (which we found simply not true) was fully stipulated by international law.”<sup>753</sup> Another Russian participant, the diplomat Alexander Panov, claimed that “... the Japanese side declared that if in the future there would be no guarantee of the transfer of Kunashir and Iturup, then it would not be possible to sign a peace treaty.”<sup>754</sup> However, Ambassador Sumio Edamura, who would have been well informed about diplomatic progress on the territorial issue, stated that, “Although the Japanese traditional position has been a comprehensive solution with the simultaneous transfer of all four islands, the possibility of departure from this traditional position may have been explored.”<sup>755</sup> Edamura also noted that in these discussions the two sides’ views began to converge: “In this favorable mood the Japanese and Russian negotiators apparently achieved through their contacts in February and March a considerable degree of meeting of minds for further progress.”<sup>756</sup> However, whatever meeting of the minds occurred among the negotiating parties, the proposal was rejected out of hand by the *Gaimusho*’s upper echelons. The frustration relating to this action was palpable in the Russian delegation, and was apparently even shared by some of the Japanese participants. A great opportunity to potentially resolve the Northern Territories Issue was missed. Again to quote Kazuhiko Togo:

What really happened in this crucial period of negotiations from January to early September 1992 is still unknown. However, these primary source statements and

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<sup>753</sup> Georgii Kunadze, “A Russian View,” p. 164. Kazuhiko Togo quotes this section of Kunadze’s article in his “Negotiations on the Northern Territories,” p. 130.

<sup>754</sup> Alexander Panov, “The Policy of Russia Toward Japan, 1992-2005,” in Gilbert Rozman (ed.), *Japanese-Russian Relations: The Tortuous Path*, p. 170. Panov cited the Japanese journal *Asahi Shimbun*, 21 May 2002 in support of his assertion, showing that the Japanese received this proposal but rejected it. He also said that both sides “did not reveal” the contents of the meeting, which supports Kazuhiro Togo’s contention that the meetings proceedings were kept secret on both sides.

<sup>755</sup> Sumio Edamura, “A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations between the August 1991 Coup d’etta and President Yeltsin’s State Visit to Japan in October 1993,” p. 143. Due to the level of Edamura’s involvement, the conditional “may have been” could be intended to convey in fact that this possibility was in fact discussed by the two sides. If so, it was as significant a concession as was Kozyrev’s offer to base any territorial settlement on the 1956 Joint Declaration.

<sup>756</sup> Sumio Edamura, “A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations between the August 1991 Coup d’etta and President Yeltsin’s State Visit to Japan in October 1993,” p. 143.

information collected by journalists and researchers are compatible with my description that a decisive concessionary proposal from the Russian side was not accepted by the Japanese side. In *Hopporyodo*, I avoided direct criticism of the Tokyo leadership that failed to grasp this historic opportunity to reach a breakthrough in the relationship, but reading between the lines, my anger and regret should be clear to the reader.<sup>757</sup>

Such an admission from as high a ranking diplomat as Kazuhiro Togo is highly important. It shows that there was internal opposition to Japan's traditional policy—even, or maybe especially, among members of the *Gaimusho* who had the most to do with Japan's Russia policy. This process can be seen as a diplomatic two-level game, first described by Robert B. Putnam in 1988.<sup>758</sup>

The phenomena Putnam identified with the Bonn Accord of 1978 was true of this situation as well: "Within each country, one faction supported the policy shift being demanded of its country internationally, but that faction was initially outnumbered."<sup>759</sup> Putnam concluded that in the case of the Bonn Accord of 1978, that international pressure, combined with domestic resonance for the policy change, enabled the Bonn Accords to be successfully implemented. In the Northern Territories issue, however, international pressure was not exerted in a way that the common policy goals of the minorities within the Russian MFA and the *Gaimusho* could overcome internal opposition and become actual policy.<sup>760</sup> History is full of might-have-been moments, but it is clear that Japanese acceptance of this proposal would have strengthened Russian advocates of compromise and this may have led to a settlement of the issue, which could have

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<sup>757</sup> Kazuhiko Togo, "The inside story of the negotiations on the Northern Territories: five lost windows of opportunity," p. 131.

<sup>758</sup> Robert B. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: the Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization*, 42 (3) Summer 1988, p. 432.

<sup>759</sup> Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics," p. 430.

<sup>760</sup> Kazuhiko Togo, "The inside story of the negotiations on the Northern Territories: five lost windows of opportunity," p. 142.



had explosive results in terms of Russo-Japanese bilateral relations and in terms of regional dynamics.

These statements by participants on both sides also clearly show that both parties were operating under two possible solutions to the crisis, as has been noted by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa. In Russia, Foreign Minister Kozyrev and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were, for the most part, committed to the Kunadze option, which was based upon the essentially *rationalist* Russian recognition of the historic validity of the 1956 Joint Declaration. President Yeltsin, based on this statements on the issue to date, seemed to be more committed to a more *realist* conception founded on his own Five Principles, which he had issued in 1990, and further refined in 1991. The last of these principles left resolution of the territorial dispute to a future generation.<sup>761</sup>

The Japanese side was also operating under two competing lines of policy. On one hand, there was what Hasegawa identified as the “Edamura line.” This view, held by Sumio Edamura, the Japanese ambassador to the Russian Federation, himself and other Japanese diplomats who favored reconciliation with the Russians “... placed the achievement of rapprochement with Russia at the center of Japan’s Russian policy, which should be pursued by itself for Japan’s national interests in the post-cold war geopolitical reality ... As for Japan’s economic aid, Edamura took the position that Japan’s economic aid would help stabilize Russia, which in turn would serve Japan’s national interests in the long run.”<sup>762</sup> Though not a *Gaimusho* Russian specialist, Edamura proved to be an excellent ambassador who impressed his Russian counterparts. He was also a highly sensitive observer of Russian Federation internal conditions.

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<sup>761</sup> Yeltsin’s proposal to resolve the territorial dispute with Japan is included in Sumio Edamura, “A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations,” p. 139.

<sup>762</sup> Hasegawa, “Why did Russia and Japan Fail to Achieve Rapprochement,” p. 177.

In opposition to this “Edamura line” was the traditional policy that was still held by the majority of the diplomats in higher echelons of Japan’s Foreign Ministry, or *Gaimusho*, including Owada Hisashi, a *Gaimusho* councilor, and Hyodo Nagao, the Director-General of the *Gaimusho*’s Asia and European Department. Hasegawa called this position the “Owada-Hyodo line.” This group held strongly to Japan’s established and traditional policy on this issue. Adherents of the Owada-Hyodo line opposed and concessions to the Russian side until the Russians returned all four of the disputed islands. Owada held strongly to this line throughout his career, and he constantly argued against accepting any Soviet, and later, Russian concessions.<sup>763</sup>

Hasegawa argues that this traditional intransigent position was based upon two motivations: “The first was their deep-seated suspicion that once Japan made a concession on the territorial issue, either by detaching the linkage between economics and the territorial issue or concluding a peace treaty on the basis of the 1956 Joint Declaration, the Russians would lose the incentive to return the two other islands. This was the fear that the ‘Russians might eat and run’ (*kuinige suru*).”<sup>764</sup> In Wightian terms, this seemed to be a more “realist” perspective that contested the Edamura line’s more “rationalist” course.

Under these circumstances, where there were essentially two negotiating positions held by both sides, agreement between the two sides depended on the “Kunadze Option” winning the upper hand within the Russian bureaucracy at the same time that the “Edamura Line” gained the upper hand within the Japanese bureaucracy. What happened in March 1992 was that the Kunadze Option won the upper hand on the Russian side, due to Kozyrev’s adoption of it, but in

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<sup>763</sup> In September 1989, Owada Hisashi, then *Gaimusho* councilor, told Igor Rogachev, who was then Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, “... in no uncertain terms that Japan had no intention of concluding a peace treaty if the territorial settlement were felt ambiguous and that any such settlement should be based on the principle of non expansion of territory that had been agreed upon by the allied nations.” Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Neither War nor Peace, 1985-1998*, p. 328.

<sup>764</sup> Hasegawa, “Why did Russia and Japan Fail to Achieve Rapprochement?” p. 177.

Japanese circles, the Owada-Hoyoda line prevailed. As Hasegawa argued: “In the end, the cancellation of Yeltsin’s trip revealed the unmitigated failure of the Owada-Hyodo line. Setting an unattainable goal—four islands—it failed to gain any of the islands back, although two islands, if not a guaranteed success, might have been achievable.”<sup>765</sup> As Lowell Dittmer noted: “From this perspective the good became the enemy of the perfect, as the expected return of two islands was opposed lest the Russians not return the other two.”<sup>766</sup> In contrast, the Estonians made enough concessions to allow the Kozyrev/Yeltsin line to prevail in the Baltic region.

In a post-summit interview with *Izvestia*, Kozyrev did not mention his revolutionary proposal, but stressed that the Russo-Japanese relationship had changed. The interviewer stated:

The Kremlin’s attitude toward the territorial problem has changed. The difference from yesterday, as A. Kozyrev repeatedly stressed, is that Russian and Japanese diplomats now consider themselves partners on the same side of the table, rather than opponents.<sup>767</sup>

However, this common ideology was not enough to overcome the traditional Japanese position, and the Russian government soon found itself having to justify its policy within the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, where the government, especially the MFA, faced a hostile audience.<sup>768</sup>

In April 1992, Japanese ambassador Sumio Edamura was interviewed in the Russian journal, *Problemy Dal’nogo Vostoka* [*Problems of the Far East*]. After giving a fairly detailed description of how Russo-Japanese relations positively differed from Soviet-Japanese relations, Edamura

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<sup>765</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, “Why Did Russia and Japan Fail to Achieve Rapprochement?” in Gilbert Rozman (ed.), *Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path*, p. 178.

<sup>766</sup> Lowell Dittmer, “The Sino-Japanese-Russian Triangle,” *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (April 2005), p. 5.

<sup>767</sup> N. Tsvetkov in Tokyo and A. Platkovskiy in Beijing, “Yes we are Asiatics: Postscript of A. Kozyrev’s visits [to Tokyo and Beijing],” *Izvestiia*, 26 March 1992 in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, FBIS-SOV-92-059.

<sup>768</sup> Dawisha and Parrott, *Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval*, pp. 204-205.

addressed the issue of economic ties of the regional Japanese governments with their Russian equivalents:

The idea of economic cooperation in the Japanese Sea basin deserves attention, which is especially actively supported by the local governments in those areas of Japan which are located on the coast of the Sea of Japan. At the same time, it speaks of a combination of great potential of Russian natural resources and the high technical level and capital of Japan ...

But it seems to me that in the future cooperation in this region should be based on principles of the transition from a vertical to a horizontal system, as has already occurred in the wider region of the Asian Pacific Region.<sup>769</sup>

The development of economic ties between the local government of the Russian Federation's eastern republics and the Chinese provinces bordering Russia which, despite some political differences, had undergirded the development of positive diplomatic and political relations.

Similar ties between the regional governments in both the Russian Federation and Japan could have possibly played an important role in bolstering positive relations between the two states.<sup>770</sup>

However, efforts to deepen these cross-border economic and political ties by Japanese programs and initiatives were stymied by rampant corruption in the region on both sides.

According to Gilbert Rozman: "But all such proposals have confronted both the ugly reality of the power brokers in the Russian Far East, who have not trusted foreign encroachments and have not found a common language with Japanese authorities or business leaders, and the idealism or cynicism of Japanese administrators along the Japan and Okhotsk seas, who have been prepared to brush aside the true barriers to trust."<sup>771</sup>

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<sup>769</sup> "Nashi Gosti: TOKIO — MOSKVA: Vozmozhen li Proryv v otnosheniakh? Interv'iu posla Iapanii Sumio Edamura," [Our Guests: Tokyo-Moscow: Is a Breakthrough in Relations Possible?] An Interview with the Ambassador of Japan Sumio Edamura], *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka: Nauchnyi i obshchestvenno-politicheskii zhurnal* [Problems of the Far East: a Scientific and Socio-Political Journal], 4/92 (Moscow: Nauka, 1992), p. 9.

<sup>770</sup> Gilbert Rozman, "Cross-Border Relations and Russo-Japanese Bilateral Ties in the 1990s," in Gilbert Rozman (ed.), *Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1949-1999*, pp. 199-213.

<sup>771</sup> Gilbert Rozman, "Cross-Border Relations and Russo-Japanese Bilateral Ties in the 1990s," p. 201.

Russian cancellation of the summit at the last minute irritated the Japanese and led to a period of pause in high-level Russo-Japanese relations, and as noted by Joachim Glaubitz, "... the affair was blown up into a full-scale diplomatic insult when the President's press secretary had the audacity to blame Japan for the cancellation."<sup>772</sup> To be sure, Yeltsin's Russia at that time had many important issues to deal with on the domestic level, most importantly, a constitutional crisis that some observers thought could lead to civil war, but it is also possible that Russia's Japan hands in the MFA were tired and dispirited. As Sumio Edamura wrote:

I may be wrong, but I have the feeling that a kind of fatigue prevailed after the sudden postponement of Yeltsin's visit in 1992 among those Russian negotiators and opinion leaders who had worked hard with the aim of bringing about an early resolution of the territorial issue ... some of them even confided that they had been too naive and romantic at the start of the Yeltsin administration.<sup>773</sup>

### **Opposition to the Kundaze Option in Russia**

Over the next few years, various individuals and institutions in the Russian Federation weighed in on the prospect of returning either two or four islands to Japan. On 25 March 1992, V.V. Fediushkin, Head of the Local Administration of the Village of Preobrazhenskiy, and Iu. V. Il'in, People's Deputy of the Preobrazhenskiy Council wrote a letter to Ruslan Khasbulatov concerning the "Southern Kuriles" Issue:

At the present time, the press, radio, television and even Minister Kozyrev are conducting conversations in favor of Japan concerning four islands of the lesser Southern Kuriles chain.

No handouts and promises to Japan will cover those moral and material losses which would bear with the transfer of this area of the Kurile Islands.

The development of new lands by Russians has always happened with the blessing of the Orthodox Church and under the banner of God.

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<sup>772</sup> Joachim Glaubitz, *Between Tokyo and Moscow*, p. 243. Yeltsin's former press secretary, Viacheslav Kostikov, was one of the author's of the extremely anti-Kozyrev *Epokha El'tsina*.

<sup>773</sup> Sumio Edamura, "A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations," p. 147.

You should be aware that in 1941 the Russian authorities turned to the Orthodox Church and God so that they were helped in defeating the adversary in the Great Patriotic War from 1941-1945.

Therefore, we cannot understand, the Church cannot bless, and God cannot forgive the transfer of these four islands of the South Kuriles to Japan.<sup>774</sup>

On 9 July 1992, General-Major V.P. Zalomin, a member of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, gave a speech to the People's Deputies of the Russian Federation, in which he said:

... on behalf of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, allow me to report the position of the military and territorial issues of Russian-Japanese relations.

The Ministry of Defense and the General Staff adheres to and clearly ascribes to the proposal of President of Russia, B.N. Yeltsin, the five-stage plan, to resolve the issue of a peace treaty with Japan, including the issue of the "Northern Territories" on the basis of legality, fairness and at the same time not forgetting the importance of the military-strategic aspect for Russia's Far Eastern borders.

*The Russian Ministry of Defense believes that at the moment that the issue of the transfer of islands, Itutup, Kunashir, Shikotan and Habomai to Japan is inappropriate based on the security interests of the Russian Federation.*<sup>775</sup>

He elaborated that the General Staff's position was based on four points:

- 1) the transfer of these islands to Japan would set a bad precedent in relation to other states which might have territorial pretensions to Russian territory;
- 2) The transfer of these islands to Japan would cause a great anti-governmental movement among the population of the islands, and this would strengthen the position of separatist forces in the Far East of Russian and in the Far Eastern republics;
- 3) From a military point of view since the transfer of the southern Kuriles disunites the forces of the Pacific Fleet into two isolated sections, denies the Pacific Fleet access to the open ocean through the non-freezing Kurile straits, which provides free access of the Navy and the Air Force of a likely enemy to the waters of the Sea of Okhotsk, and [possibly] widens the sphere of use by the enemy of radio-technical reconnaissance, and

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<sup>774</sup> Letter from V.V. Fediushkin, Head of the Local Administration of the Village, and Iu. V. Il'in, People's Deputy of the Preobrazhenskiy Council, to President of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, I. A. Khasbulatov, 25 March 1992, GARF: fond. 10026, Opis' 4, Delo 2614, Listy 75-76, from the National Security Archives, George Washington University. Accessed 29 January 2018.

<sup>775</sup> General-Major V.P. Zalomin, "Theses, speeches in the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, 9 July 1992," The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, GARF: Fond 10026, Opis' 4, Delo 2614, list 62-74, from the National Security Archives, George Washington University. Accessed 29 January 2018.

generally threatens the territorial integrity and the military defense of the Russian Far East.

4) In the economic sphere, the Kuriles are extremely rich in fish and other natural resources.<sup>776</sup>

In the military sphere, General-Major Zalomin stressed that in relation to their operational and strategic significance, the Kurile Islands "... from a geographical situation are a natural border for the defense of the Far East and play a major role in the facilitation of the deployment of forces of the Pacific Fleet into the Sea of Okhotsk and the Pacific Ocean."<sup>777</sup>

Perhaps most importantly, Zalomin noted that the Kurile Islands played an essential role in the use of the Sea of Okhotsk as a "maritime bastion" for missile-launching nuclear powered submarines.<sup>778</sup> This had been an essential element of Soviet and later Russian maritime strategy. As Western Soviet naval analyst Michael MccGwire noted in 1987:

In the naval mission structure, there is an overriding requirement to secure the physical integrity of the Sea of Okhotsk as a maritime bastion. The Soviets already control the Kurile Island chain, and all of the surrounding shoreline except for about 150 nautical miles of Japanese coast. The natural barrier of the Kuriles can be augmented by the use of fixed detection systems, mines and diesel submarines ... Meanwhile the islands need strong defenses to cover the threat of an American amphibious assault designed to breach this physical barrier.<sup>779</sup>

Though this was written in 1987, the importance of maintaining the Kurile Islands to help secure the maritime bastion in the Sea of Okhotsk, has remained a constant goal for the Russian Navy from the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991 to the present, as is made clear by

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<sup>776</sup> General-Major V.P. Zalomin, "Theses, speeches in the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, 9 July 1992," The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, GARF: Fond 10026, Opis' 4, Delo 2614, list 62-74, emphasis added, from the National Security Archives, George Washington University. Accessed 29 January 2018.

<sup>777</sup> General-Major V.P. Zalomin, "Theses, speeches in the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, 9 July 1992."

<sup>778</sup> General-Major V.P. Zalomin, "Theses, speeches in the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, 9 July 1992."

<sup>779</sup> Michael MccGwire, *Military Objectives in Soviet Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1987), p. 172.

countless editorials from retired and current naval personnel in Russian military journals such as *Krasnaya Zvezda* on the need to maintain the entire Kurile chain for the sake of Russian national security.<sup>780</sup>

Unlike the situations regarding military opposition to Kozyrev's initiatives towards China and the defense of Russian speakers in Estonia, the military opposition to the Kunadze Option was deeply and widely held by military personnel *across the political spectrum*. Defense Minister of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Marshall Evgenii Shaposhnikov, who was known to be a liberal in Russian political circles,<sup>781</sup> had submitted a report to the Russian Supreme Soviet in November 1991 that "... warned that if Russia returned Kunashiri and Etorofu to Japan, the Ekaterina Strait between the islands would fall completely into Japan's control, and in that case Japanese and U.S. submarines would be able to penetrate into the Sea of Okhotsk without trouble."<sup>782</sup> According to Hiroshi Kimura, "The Russian military ... feared that prior to his departure to Tokyo, Yeltsin would be persuaded by the Russian Foreign Ministry (MID) and by pro-Japanese officials, such as Andrei Kozyrev and Georgii Kunadze to make concessions to Japan."<sup>783</sup> Yasuhide Yamanouchi of the Tokyo International Institute for Global Peace, acknowledged that the Soviet Union's and Russia's "... sea fortification program cannot be carried out safely over a long time without secure ties between Vladivostok and the other Soviet coastal bases. The sea lane linking Vladivostok and the Soviet coastal bases in the Okhotsk

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<sup>780</sup> Joachim Glaubitz, *Between Tokyo and Moscow*, p. 245.

<sup>781</sup> Indeed, he had been accused by some conservatives of destroying the Soviet Armed Forces! See William Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military*, p. 76. On his role as a military reformer see, Odom, pp. 322, 324, 363-364.

<sup>782</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "Conclusion: Russo-Japanese Relations in the New Environment—Implications of Continuing Stalemate," p. 422.

<sup>783</sup> Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, p. 137.



Sea are the lifelines of the Soviet Union's Sea Bastion strategy."<sup>784</sup> All of the islands that had been recognized as the Kurile Island chain since 1945 were seen as essential to this submarine bastion.

However, President Yeltsin also received advice that urged him to enter into relations with the Japanese on the basis of the 1956 declaration, and possibly the return of some, if not all, of the "Southern Kurile" islands to Japan. According to Kimura, the Russian General Staff was "... disturbed by Yeltsin's meeting with Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, during the Russian President's trip to the United States ... Solzhenitsyn reportedly had attempted to persuade the President to return all four islands to Japan. The Nobel Laureate reportedly told the Russian president: 'After thoroughly studying the whole history of the islands from the twelfth century until now, I have reached the conclusion that the Kurile islands are not ours. Give [them] away, but make it pay!'"<sup>785</sup>

The former counter-intelligence official turned liberal historian, General-Colonel Dmitrii Volkogonov, believed at that time the new Russian democratic regime was faced with three extremely serious existential threats. These real threats were an economic collapse, the growth of neo-fascism, and the growth of military nationalism in the country. In light of these looming problems, Volkogonov thought that an agreement with Japan based on return of at least two of

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<sup>784</sup> Quoted in Alexei Zagorskii, "Russian Security Policy toward the Asia-Pacific Region," in Hasegawa, Haslam, and Kuchins (editors), *Russia and Japan: An Unresolved Dilemma Between Distant Neighbors* (Berkeley, CA: University of California at Berkeley Press, 1993), p. 413. This historically held strong position on the part of the Russian military contrasted sharply with the uneven military opposition to the rapprochement with China, or the use of the CSCE to defend the rights of Russian speakers in Estonia. In both of these cases, military opposition was divided, and in the final analysis the Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev ended up supporting the government's policy. In contrast to these cases, the military opposition to the Kunadze option was unanimous and held by military officials of all political complexions, across the political spectrum from Shaposhnikov to Zalomin.

<sup>785</sup> Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, p. 137.

the islands was a necessity.<sup>786</sup> On 21 August 1992, Volkogonov wrote Yeltsin a personal confidential letter on this topic. He argued:

The radical solution (the transfer of the islands) is depicted [by some as] impossible by virtue of the strategic national interests of Russia and the complicated internal political situation in the country. And chiefly that Iturup and Kunashir belong to the Kurile Islands, which Japan gave up at the San Francisco Treaty. The conservative forces ... in Russia exploit to the maximum level your five principles to advance the false thesis of the "sale of the fatherland" which, however, is a shrewd response. Nonetheless, it is necessary to consider the ratification of an agreement in the Russian parliament.

We must return to the confirmation of the Soviet-Japanese Declaration of 1956 (Point 9 concerning the transfer to Japan of the islands of Habomai and Shikotan — the least valuable and smallest part of the territory). Without this step, if we want to be a law-governed state, the negotiations lose their meaning.<sup>787</sup>

The near-unanimous opinion among the Russian military establishment opposing the transfer of any of the islands to Japan stands in direct contrast to any sporadic military opposition to the two other policies addressed in this study. While there was some military opposition to establishing friendly relations with China, and military opposition to the use of the CSCE to defend the rights of Russian speakers in Estonia, this opposition was not universal and there was enough pluralism within the military to prevent a full institutional assault on these policies. In contrast, military opposition to the Kunadze Option was held across the political spectrum in the Russian military establishment from the extreme conservative forces to the so-called liberals, such as Shaposhnikov. Proponents of the Kunadze Option had no military figures they could appeal to, except for perhaps the retired Colonel-General Volkogonov, who at this time had no official position within the government, and who was greatly distrusted by Russian conservatives anyway.

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<sup>786</sup> General Colonel Dmitry Volkogonov, "Tezisy lektsii i diskussii na temu: "Budushee byshchi Sovetskoi Armii i problema sovetsko-iaponskikh otnoshenii" [Theses of a lecture and discussion on the theme "the Future of the Former Soviet Army and the Problem of Soviet-Japanese Relations], *Tokyo Asakhi*, 19 March, 1992, in Folder 1: US-Russia, 1990s—not NATO) at National Security Archive, Washington, DC.

<sup>787</sup> Dmitrii Volkogonov to President Boris Yeltsin, 21 August 1992 in Folder 1: US-Russia, 1990s—Not NATO, National Security Archives, Washington, DC.

The cancellation of Yeltsin's trip to Tokyo, and the comments from his press secretary, Viacheslav Kostikov, had caused great consternation and anger in Tokyo. However, at the end of September 1992, Kozyrev was able to salvage the situation at the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City. According to Joachim Glaubitz: "The most vital step towards calming the situation was the meeting of the two foreign ministers on the fringes of the UN General Assembly ... [where] ... Both politicians agreed that talks at the vice-ministerial level and Foreign Ministerial visits would be resumed."<sup>788</sup>

The Japanese continued to receive incontrovertible evidence that Russian "official opinion" on the issue differed depending on to whom one was talking. During the summer of 1993, Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin declared that in his understanding (which was identical to the traditional Soviet policy on this question), the issue had already been resolved, and therefore did not exist.<sup>789</sup> Japanese diplomats must have had a difficult time keeping track of the differing views given by different Russian political entities. Thus, a divided Russian government prepared to meet the Japanese. It was clear that the Russian MFA was going to continue to press for a resolution based on the Kunadze Option. Which direction President Yeltsin would take was an open question, though both his statements and those of his Prime Minister seemed to favor shelving the territorial question, indicating that he would probably oppose the Kunadze Option. However, the results of the summit show that he had been influenced, to some extent, by the positions of the MFA.

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<sup>788</sup> Joachim Glaubitz, *Between Tokyo and Moscow*, p. 246. This shows that Kozyrev was in fact able to intervene in the diplomatic process in order to advance the position of his MFA when necessary.

<sup>789</sup> *Japan Times*, 18 August 1993, cited in Kimie Hara, *Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945*, p. 208. This had been the traditional Soviet position. It was based on the fact that the results of World War Two had resolved this issue in Russia's favor, and the results of the war were not open to revision by the Japanese through diplomacy.

### Yeltsin's Visit to Japan, 11-13 October 1993

Yeltsin visited Tokyo from 11 to 13 October 1993, less than a fortnight after the dramatic shelling of the Russian Government (or White) House, which housed the Russian parliament.<sup>790</sup> While most scholars correctly note this domestic factor in evaluating Russian foreign policy, some do not focus attention on equally momentous domestic developments within Japan. Just prior to Yeltsin's visit to Tokyo a new government came to power in Japan. One year after the dissolution of the USSR, as Hasegawa noted "... the political system that had lasted since 1955—the system that had ensured political stability by establishing the LDP [Liberal Democratic Party] as the sole ruling party—collapsed, throwing Japanese politics into unprecedented turmoil."<sup>791</sup> For the first time since the 1950s Japan had a non-LDP government. The new party was headed by Hosokawa Morihiro, the head of the Nihon Shinto, a small party which had been founded as recently as May 1992.<sup>792</sup> According to Hiroshi Kimura, the new coalition government, "... declared its support for Russian President Boris Yeltsin," and favored a policy toward Russia based on gradual improvement in economic, cultural, and other ties that would "... pave the way for a breakthrough in the territorial deadlock."<sup>793</sup> Despite this sentiment, however, the Hosokawa government's primary concerns were domestically based, and it essentially left foreign policy decisions to the *Gaimusho* leadership. Kimie Hara pointed out that in Japan:

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<sup>790</sup> For Yeltsin's account of these events, see Boris Yeltsin, *The Struggle for Russia* (New York: Times Books), pp. 217-283.

<sup>791</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Neither War nor Peace, 1985-1998*, pp. 415-416.

<sup>792</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Neither War nor Peace, 1985-1998*, p. 473.

<sup>793</sup> Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, p. 162.

Due to its organizational continuity, the bureaucracy in the long run tends to predominate over politicians as individuals. Hosokawa's diplomacy was no exception ... since the initiative in policy making towards the USSR and Russia was always taken by the *Gaimusho*, there was actually no change. As far as foreign policies were concerned, Hosokawa in fact had no intention of attempting radical changes or challenges. The newly inaugurated coalition government was to succeed to foreign and defense policies of the previous regime.<sup>794</sup>

Hasegawa also noted the power of the *Gaimusho*, vis-a-vis the new coalition government in relation to foreign policy:

Neither Hosokawa nor [his foreign minister] Hata had any new ideas about Japan's policy toward Russia, and all the preparations for the forthcoming summit were made by the *Gaimusho* with little input from the government. The *Gaimusho* judged that the main purpose of Yeltsin's visit would be to put bilateral relations back on the right track. Thus it did not even insist upon the Russian reaffirmation of the 1956 Joint Declaration.<sup>795</sup>

This deference to the *Gaimusho* essentially disenfranchised the Japanese embassy in Russia under Edamura, which had worked so hard to reach a compromise position. The possibility of a successful two-level game was closed tight.<sup>796</sup>

At the very beginning of his October visit to Tokyo, President Yeltsin directly addressed an issue that improved on the achievements of his predecessor, Mikhail Gorbachev. In relation to the suffering of 600,000 Japanese prisoners of war captured in August 1945, of which between 40,000 to 60,000 had died, President Yeltsin offered an apology (*izvenenie*) whereas, President Gorbachev had offered only a condolence (*soboleznovanie*). Yeltsin repeated this apology several times during his visit: during his audience with Emperor, in his talks with Prime Minister

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<sup>794</sup> Kimie Hara, *Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945: A Difficult Peace* (New York and London: Routledge, 1998), p. 199.

<sup>795</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Neither War nor Peace, 1985-1998*, p. 483.

<sup>796</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Neither War nor Peace*, p. 473. Hasegawa wrote that the Hosokawa government came to power because the "... opposition parties coalesced and for the first time since 1955, forming a genuine coalition government..." but foreign policy mattered little to the new government, which left the management of foreign policy to the *Gaimusho*: "Above all [for the Hosokawa government] foreign policy mattered little. In such a situation, Japan's Russian policy was basically left in the exclusive domain of the *Gaimusho*, which was still shaken by the fiasco of the previous September and unable to formulate anything constructive." (Hasegawa, *Neither War nor Peace*, p. 473.)

Hosokawa, and in a statement given to the leaders of Japanese business organizations.<sup>797</sup>

According to Joachim Glaubitz: “This gesture achieved its psychological aim and provided a sound basis for the political talks that were to follow.” President Yeltsin was also the first Russian leader in history to admit that Japan had not initiated hostilities with the Soviet Union in World War Two.<sup>798</sup>

The Tokyo Declaration, signed on 13 October by President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Hosokawa, as it was written, was a truly remarkable and important document. Its second paragraph is worth quoting in full:

2. The Prime Minister of Japan and the President of the Russian Federation, sharing the recognition that the difficult legacies of the past in the relations between the two countries must be overcome, have undertaken serious negotiations on the issue of where Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomai Islands belong. They agree that negotiations towards an early conclusion of a Peace Treaty through the solution of this issue on the basis of historical and legal facts and based on documents produced with the two countries' agreement, as well as on the principles of law and justice should continue, and that the relations between the two countries should be thus fully normalized. In this regard, the Government of Japan and the Government of the Russian Federation confirm that the Russian Federation is the State retaining continuing identity with the Soviet Union and all treaties and other international agreements between Japan and the Soviet Union continue to be applied between Japan and the Russian Federation.<sup>799</sup>

The most significant part of this section was the agreed upon framework that both sides intended to accept all the documents and international agreements concluded between the former U.S.S.R. and Japan. Hiroshi Kimura agreed that this was a great improvement over

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<sup>797</sup> Kimie Hara, *Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945*, p. 206.

<sup>798</sup> Joachim Glaubitz, *Between Tokyo and Moscow*, p. 250.

<sup>799</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Document 262. “Tokiiskaia Deklaratsiia o Rossiisko-Iaponskikh otnosheniakh” [The Tokyo Declaration on Russian-Japanese Relations], in *Vneshniaia Politika Rossii: Sbornik Dokumentov, 1993 Kniga 2, Iiun' - Dekabr'* [The Foreign Policy of Russia, Anthology of Documents, 1993, Book 2: June to December] (Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otmosheniia, 2000), p. 371. This translation is taken from the English translation from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that appears in Kazuhiko Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy, 1945-2003, the Search for a Proactive Policy*, p. 251. Kimie Hara also provides a translation of section 2 in her *Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations since 1945*, p. 192.

Gorbachev's position which was that the basis for negotiations would be the "positive elements" of the previous Russo-Japanese agreements, but what was positive would be defined by the Soviet side. Kimura's comments on this issue are worth quoting in full:

Fortunately for the Japanese, however, unlike his predecessor, Yeltsin showed his stature by eschewing anything so nefarious. The phrase "positive elements" did not appear in the 1993 Tokyo Declaration. Everything that had been agreed on and signed in the past, regardless of whether it was "positive" or "negative" was included ... it was an all-inclusive approach, in contrast to the selective approach previously adopted.<sup>800</sup>

Also of great significance, and another victory for the Russian MFA, was that the Declaration referred positively to the joint Russian-Japanese publication of historical documents related to the territorial question:

The government of the Russian Federation and the government of Japan note also that within the framework of the working group for a peace treaty between the two countries until now has been the constructive dialogue and that one of these results in the joint publication by the Russian and Japanese sides in September 1992 of the "Joint Anthology of Documents of the History of the Territorial Demarcation between Russia and Japan."<sup>801</sup>

Though the 1956 Declaration was not noted specifically in the Tokyo Declaration, both quoted sections made it clear that the two sides agreed on the historical basis of the dispute, and though the 1956 Joint Declaration was not specifically mentioned by name, this was clarified at a press conference held that same day, 13 October, when "President Yeltsin confirmed that this

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<sup>800</sup> Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, p. 167.

<sup>801</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Document 262. Tokiiskaia Deklaratsiia o Rossiisko-Iaponskikh otnosheniiakh [Tokyo Declaration on Russian-Japanese Relations], in *Vneshniaia Politika Rossii: Sbornik Dokumentov, 1993 Kniga 2, liun' - Dekabr'* [*The Foreign Policy of Russia, Anthology of Documents, 1993, Book 2: June to December*] (Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otmosheniia, 2000), p. 371. This joint publication was a joint project of the Russian Federation and Japanese Ministries of Foreign Affairs, and the publication of these documents supported the validity of both the 1855 Treaty of Shimoda and the 1956 Joint Declaration.

[understanding] included the 1956 Declaration.”<sup>802</sup> Igor Latyshev, an opponent of the Kunadze option, noted that “The Russian President, although reluctantly and not stating it clearly, did acknowledge his devotion to the 1956 Declaration.”<sup>803</sup> This was a major step in the right direction, and it was noted by the Japanese and the time and several scholars since. As Hiroshi Kimura noted:

The elimination of the 1956 time limit in the Tokyo Declaration was considered a big step. It represented a confirmation and a concrete example of a position previously announced by the Yeltsin leadership, which stated that international conflicts must be resolved through appreciation of the universal diplomatic principles of “law and justice.”<sup>804</sup>

As Glaubitz noted, this was “... probably the most important political achievement of the Russian President’s visit to Japan.”<sup>805</sup> It also shows that Kozyrev’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs had exerted influence on President Yeltsin despite the many voices advising him that there was no territorial dispute because the issue had been settled by the results of the Second World War.

## **Conclusion:**

According to Hiroshi Kimura, Yeltsin had two major objectives in coming to Tokyo. “Yeltsin’s primary objective was to give himself a chance to demonstrate to the Russian people and the world that he had weathered the political crisis on Moscow that began on September 21 and to show his own political viability and legitimacy after the violent clash with the Russian parliament.

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<sup>802</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, “Soobshchenie o visite Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii B.N. Yeltsin v Iaponiiu” [Report of the Visit of President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin to Japan, Document 259, 13 October 1993, in *Vneshniaia Politika Rossii: Sbornik Dokumentov, 1993 Kniga 2, Iiun’ - Dekabr’* [The Foreign Policy of Russia, Anthology of Documents, 1993, Book 2: June to December] (Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2000), p. 368.

<sup>803</sup> Igor Latyshev, *Kto i kak prodaet Rossiiu*, quoted in Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, p. 186.

<sup>804</sup> Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, p. 168.

<sup>805</sup> Joachim Glaubitz, *Between Tokyo and Moscow*, p. 251.



Yeltsin's second objective was to make up, in one few swoop, for his cancellation of two previously scheduled visits and dispel the negative image of his country as one that violated diplomatic protocol. *Both objectives, one can safely conclude, were admirably achieved.*"<sup>806</sup>

Sumio Edamura, Japanese ambassador to the Russian Federation at that time, claimed that the Tokyo Declaration was a great success: "... the Tokyo Declaration laid down quite a positive foundation for solving the territorial issue, but its significance has not been fully appreciated by the mass media and opinion leaders of Japan."<sup>807</sup>

Another positive step in the right direction in the Tokyo Declaration, pointed out by Hiroshi Kimura, was that it adopted a Japanese perspective on the order of the islands' return to Japan. In the 1991 Joint Communiqué, they were listed as "Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir, and Etorofu, starting with the islands that were closest to Japan. In the 1993 Tokyo Declaration, they were listed in a different order. Kimura quoted the stalwart opponent of the Kunadze Option, Viacheslav K. Zilanov, Chairman of the Russian State Committee of Fisheries:

The order of their mentioning, in the text is completely different from previous documents, now starting with the large islands, Etorofu and Kunashir, followed by the smaller ones, Shikotan and Habomai. This is neither accidental nor an alphabetical order. This is the priority of the Japanese request, and in my opinion, a hint of a possible step toward a transfer.<sup>808</sup>

Additionally, the document provided some support for Robert Legvold's claim that Yeltsin's Russian Federation, unlike Gorbachev's Soviet Union, was "... ready to make ready to make common cause with Japan or to treat the U.S.-Japanese security tie as a necessary and

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<sup>806</sup> Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, p. 162.

<sup>807</sup> Sumio Edamura, "A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations between the August 1991 Cop d'etta and President Yeltsin's State Visit to Japan in October 1993," p. 147.

<sup>808</sup> *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 12 May 1994 quoted in Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, p. 167.

constructive feature of east Asian politics,<sup>809</sup> thus showing Russian support for what Martin Wight identified as a “revolutionary” Wilsonian foreign policy. The Joint Declaration stated:

5. The President of the Russian Federation and the Prime Minister of Japan adhere to the general opinion of the existence of possibilities for dynamic development, *which may demonstrate to the Asian-Pacific region in the world of the 21st Century, the foundation of the general principles of freedom and openness.* The sides affirm the importance of the Russian Federation through transformation into reality of the principles of legality and equality will become an active and constructive partner in this region and will make a further contribution in the development of political and economic links between the states located in Asia, and also in agreement on the significant importance of the realization of these issues, *resulting in a full normalization of relations between the Russian Federation and Japan playing an important role in this region in that connection that it will make this region a zone of peace and stability, and also a region for the development of economic cooperation on the foundation of a free-market system, open to all countries and regions, including the Russian Federation.*<sup>810</sup>

Thus, as an event, the summit was a success in furthering the cause of friendly Russo-Japanese relations, and should be seen as a success for both Russian and Japanese foreign policy. It also affirms both sides’ commitment to a Wightian “Revolutionary” foreign policy, where universal Western principles served, at least in part, as the basis for good relations between the two countries, and also a Wightian “Rationalist” foreign policy, where both sides negotiated in good faith based on a recognition that both sides needed to make pragmatic concessions to reach a mutually beneficial agreement.<sup>811</sup>

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<sup>809</sup> Robert Legvold, “Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle,” in Michael Mandelbaum (ed), *The Strategic Quadrangle: Russia, China, Japan and the United States in East Asia* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1995), p. 41, emphasis added.

<sup>810</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Document 262. “Tokiiskaia Deklaratsiia o Rossiisko-Iaponskikh otnosheniakh” [The Tokyo Declaration on Russian-Japanese Relations], in *Vneshniaia Politika Rossii: Sbornik Dokumentov, 1993 Kniga 2, Iiun’ - Dekabr’* [The Foreign Policy of Russia, Anthology of Documents, 1993, Book 2: June to December] (Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2000), p. 374. This corresponds nicely to the “revolutionary” Westernist, foreign policy principles of Adam Smith and Richard Cobden, and also supported, to some extent by Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, pp. 46-47, 114-115, 263.

<sup>811</sup> Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, pp. 180-188. The need to make pragmatic concessions to the other side was seen clearly in Russia by proponents of the Kunadze Option, and in Japan by adherents of the Edamura line, but not the President of Russia or the Prime Minister of Japan.

A number of scholars argue that while the summit itself may have been successful, the political climate in the Russian Federation that culminated in the assault on the White House in October 1993, and strengthened by the success of the right-wing Vladimir Zhirinovskii's Liberal Democratic party and the Communist Party in subsequent elections in December 1993, weakened President Yeltsin's ability to follow up on the success of the October 1993 Russian-Japanese summit. For example, Kazuhiko Togo noted:

On the whole Yeltsin's visit in October 1993 brought Japan-Russia relations back to the level they were in the autumn of the previous year. But in December 1993, a Duma election was held, where former communist and nationalist forces gained an unexpected victory. President Yeltsin's reform policy was again doomed.<sup>812</sup>

Tsuyoshi Hasegawa agrees, noting:

The Zhirinovskiy phenomenon was a symbolic expression of the frustrations and anger of Russian voters since the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as an expression of their aspirations for the restoration of order in their society ... Shocked by the defeat of the reform parties and the victory of the ultranationalists and Communists, Yeltsin quickly began to steer his foreign and domestic policies in a more conservative direction. He began to stress Russian national interests, distancing himself from the West.<sup>813</sup>

Thus, the new complexion of the Duma preoccupied the time and effort of the Yeltsin Administration for some time. Under these strained domestic conditions, foreign policy receded into the background, and the issue of Russo-Japanese relations was put on the back burner.<sup>814</sup> The issue of Russo-Japanese relations was dealt with again in 1997 over a year after Kozyrev had resigned as foreign minister.<sup>815</sup>

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<sup>812</sup> Kazuhiko Togo, *Japan's Foreign Policy, 1945-2003: The Quest for a Proactive Policy*, p. 252.

<sup>813</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Neither War nor Peace, 1985-1998*, p. 486.

<sup>814</sup> Boris Yeltsin, *The Struggle for Russia* (New York: Times Books, 1994), pp. 285-293.

<sup>815</sup> Konstantin Sarsikov, "Russo-Japanese Relations after Yeltsin's Reelection in 1996," in Gilbert Rozman (ed.), *Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1949-1999* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000); and Shigeki Hakamada, "Japanese-Russian Relations in 1997-1999," in Rozman, *Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path*.

Interestingly, the well informed and subtle Japanese ambassador to the Russian Federation at that time, Sumio Edamura, argued that the political events of October 1993 and their aftermath *actually strengthened* Yeltsin's immediate political position:

The large number of votes garnered by the Communists and rightists was interpreted as a sign of continued political instability in Russia, which would not allow Yeltsin at that time to take positive steps in relations with Japan. *In reality, Yeltsin at the time of his visit was at the peak of his power, following the liquidation of the undemocratic and reactionary forces. He was in a position to be able to carry to foreign policy based on the principles of law and justice in relations with Japan. Even after the parliamentary election reverses, he maintained wide freedom of action in foreign policy thanks to the strong and almost exclusive powers granted to the presidency by the new constitution.*<sup>816</sup>

This view has received some support from one of the best-informed members of the Yeltsin government on Russian politics during that time, Sergei Shakhrai, who was the co-author of the new 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation, and Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation at various times during Yeltsin's presidency. Shakhrai stated in 2010 that: "I think the Government House events made him more isolated and angry, *but his power strengthened. He used force and he became stronger.*"<sup>817</sup> Furthermore, despite its actual violent and apparent anti-constitutional character, the bombardment of Government House was supported by the democratic Western powers. For example, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher saw it exactly as Shakhrai did. In a speech delivered at the Academy of National Economy in Moscow on 23 October 1993, Christopher declared:

On October 3-4, the world witnessed what we all hope was the last gasp of the old order in Russia. The political crisis was a struggle of the sort well known to students of Russian history—a battle between reform and reaction. As the crisis unfolded, we in

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<sup>816</sup> Sumio Edamura, "A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations," p. 147, emphasis added.

<sup>817</sup> Sergei Shakhrai: "Those Events Made Yeltsin More Isolated, Angry and Vindictive," in Peter Aven and Alfred Kokh, *Gaidar's Revolution: An Insider Account of the Reforms in 1990s Russia* (New York: The Gaidar Foundation, 2013), p. 320. Similarly, Anatoly Chubais, former Deputy Prime Minister for Economic and Financial Policy, and Yeltsin's chief proponent of privatization, said that what Alfred Kokh had called the "Bombardment of the Government House" in October 1993 was actually "...the suppression of the armed revolt of communists supported by fascists and bandits ... That was demanded by the logic of the political process, not by his advisers." "Anatoly Chubais: We Destroyed the People's Idea of Justice with Voucher Privatization," in Aven and Kokh, *Gaidar's Revolution*, p. 95.

America knew what we had to do: We stood firmly behind reform. Let me be clear about our decision to support your President during the crisis. The United States does not easily support the suspension of parliaments. But these are extraordinary times ... *The parliament and constitution were vestiges of the Soviet communist past, blocking movement to democratic reform.*<sup>818</sup>

Considering the utter defeat of the communists and reactionaries in their attempt to stage a coup against the government in October 1993, together with the overwhelming support this action received from the Western nations, in particular, the United States, it is difficult to argue with Edamura's contention that Yeltsin's shelling of the Government House actually *increased* his power. Additionally, the military was further subordinated to the office of the President at that time as well. As a Western specialist on civil-military relations in Russia, Zoltan Barany noted: "A January 1994 presidential decree subordinated all "force organs" [including the military] to the president."<sup>819</sup>

In other words, during the post-October 1993 showdown between President Yeltsin and the parliament, the president's powers were *greatly increased* at the expense of the Russian parliamentary organs *and* the military. In one movement, he essentially cut off this opposition from having any impact on policy. Despite strong opposition to the transfer of either two or all four of the Northern Territories to the Japan in both the Supreme Soviet and the military, neither institution had any real power to contest any decision made by the president on this issue.

A number of Western analysts, such as Michael Mandelbaum believe that Yeltsin, "... would probably have liked to return the four Kurile Islands to Japan ..." <sup>820</sup> but considering the broad political power Yeltsin had at that time, and the content of his statements on the territorial

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<sup>818</sup> Warren Christopher, *In the Stream of History: Shaping Foreign Policy for a New Era* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 96, emphasis added.

<sup>819</sup> Zoltan Barany, "Politics and the Russian Armed Forces," in Zoltan Barany and Robert G. Moser (editors), *Russian Politics: Challenges of Democratization* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 182.

<sup>820</sup> Michael Mandelbaum, "Introduction," in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.) *The Strategic Quadrangle*, pp. 8-9.

question from 1990 to 1997, it may be even more likely that *he had no intention of returning the islands to Japan at all*, and his decision to hold onto them had nothing to do with questions of his supposed political weakness. The simple fact is that “President Yeltsin’s political weakness” in late 1993 is a myth. Yeltsin was not politically weak in the summer and fall of 1993. Quite the contrary, according to Russia’s leading constitutional expert at that time, Sergei Shakhrai, he was actually near the height of his political power.<sup>821</sup> The well connected Japanese ambassador to the Russian Federation at that time agreed with this characterization.<sup>822</sup>

However, despite these achievements, following the summit, interest on both sides waned. China increasingly became more of a priority in Russia’s eastern policy, and interest in Japan waned save for continued security meetings and negotiations over fishing issues. It was clearly not a priority for President Yeltsin, and Kozyrev reflected these general trends as well. As Hasegawa noted:

In the meantime, Kozyrev’s zeal to improve relations with Japan had waned considerably as he became the target of attacks from the right wing. In fact, he found it convenient to engage in a little Japan-bashing to prop up his sagging popularity.<sup>823</sup>

## **Findings:**

The findings for this case study based on the six variables identified in the introduction, presented graphically, are as follows.

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<sup>821</sup> Sergei Shakhrai: “Those Events Made Yeltsin More Isolated, Angry and Vindictive,” in Peter Aven and Alfred Kokh, *Gaidar’s Revolution: An Insider Account of the Reforms in 1990s Russia* (New York: The Gaidar Foundation, 2013), p. 320.

<sup>822</sup> Sumio Edamura, “A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations,” p. 147.

<sup>823</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Neither War nor Peace*, p. 494.

Variable	Japan
Continuity	<p>1) Yes—Yeltsin essentially continued Gorbachev's policy which was not to return any of the islands, and the RF MFA , similar to the USSR's MFA, continued to push a more liberal and accommodating policy .</p> <p>2) Yes— Yeltsin and Primakov built on the foundations laid by the Tokyo Declaration in subsequent Russo-Japanese relations.</p>
Consistency	Kozyrev emained committed to Kunadze option from 1990-1993. Following October 1993 Tokyo Summit he became more nationalist
Opposition from Supreme Soviet	Yes—hearings held specifically on this issue, which opposed any transfer of any Russian territory to Japan
Opposition from Russian Military	Universal—opposition across political spectrum in Russia, from liberal Shaposhnikov to conservative Zalomin
International Pressure	None
The Yeltsin Factor	Not Contained

## **Chapter Five:**

### **Findings and Conclusion**



## Findings

The findings of this study seriously challenge the existing consensus view of Andrei Kozyrev's foreign policy. From the case studies examined in this study, we not only gain a better understanding of why Kozyrev's policy "failed" in relation to Japan, we also gain a better understanding of how Andrei Kozyrev conceptualized, conceived, and implemented foreign policy in other areas. The first thing these three case studies do is challenge the consensus view that Andrei Kozyrev was unable to manage or direct Russian foreign policy. Secondly, these studies provide serious grounds to challenge scholarly consensus that Kozyrev's foreign policy was a failure, or that it had a fixation on Western liberal values. Indeed, this study has shown variation in Kozyrev's foreign policy that many scholars had neither seen nor explored.

The case studies, taken together, provide a major empirical advance in how Kozyrev's foreign policy should be seen. By going deep into historical detail in relation to the diplomatic process, the arguments made are more credible, and promising avenues of approach are opened for further research. This study has not sought to exonerate Kozyrev, so much as to normalize him, and to free him from stereotypical approaches that view him solely as an unqualified liberal. The Kozyrev that emerges from this study is neither the blind ideologue, nor the inexperienced neophyte of the prevailing academic literature, but rather a skilled diplomat who successfully carried out the duties in fulfilling the foreign policy goals of his president Boris Yeltsin.

Contrary to the consensus view in the academic literature on his tenure as foreign minister, in the case of both non-Japan policy case studies examined here, his policies can be seen as almost unqualified success stories, in which a liberal outlook either had no impact (in the case of Russo-Chinese relations) or was balanced by a healthy dose of pragmatism and even realism (in the case of defending the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Estonia). Even

in the case of the “failed” policy towards Japan, the policy did not fail because Kozyrev was a liberal, or that he failed to manage internal Russian politics, but rather, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ policy failed due to Kozyrev’s inability to contest the will of the Russian President, who by 1993 constitutionally held almost all of the political power in the Russian government. In fact, it can even be argued that in this case the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation seemed to matter only because their positions corresponded with those of President Yeltsin, and their sessions were used to discredit an alternative policy being pursued by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The China and the Estonia case studies in particular provide hitherto unsuspected evidence that Kozyrev did not hold Russian foreign policy hostage to a liberal, pro-Western orientation, and that in certain cases, he could even accurately be characterized as a *realist* in terms of IR theory. While not a prevailing view in the existing scholarship, the image of Kozyrev provided here supports scholars, such as Wilson, Dittmer, Lynch, Shearman/Sussex, and Mlechin who had contested the prevailing scholarly view of Kozyrev as both an unqualified liberal and a failure. Thus, these findings are significant not only for students of Russian foreign policy and Russian domestic politics, but they are also significant for all students of foreign policy and international relations more generally, and for students of International Relations theory in particular.

This conclusion will begin by explaining the results derived from the framework or model that was developed in the introduction, and show how the five variables examined contributed to a better understanding of how foreign policy was conceived, formulated, and executed in the early Yeltsin years, under Kozyrev’s direction. Following an analysis of the five variables in relation to

each of the three case studies, the findings of each of the three case study will be described in terms of existing literature and international relations theory.

### **Findings based upon the model:**

Historians and scholars who have examined the specific issue of Russo-Japanese relations at the time identified both Kozyrev's philosophy and methodology as being primary reasons why his foreign policy failed. For example, in his exhaustive study of the territorial issue, Hiroshi Kimura noted that Russia's failure to resolve the issue was due, at least in part, to Kozyrev himself. Kimura stated that Kozyrev's "... allegedly pro-Western diplomatic orientation *undoubtedly invited bitter criticism from nationalist and conservative forces in Russia,*" but that this criticism also, perhaps more seriously, included "... *a more general critique of his handling of Russian foreign policy. Because of his lack of authority and prestige in the Russian foreign policymaking community, Kozyrev significantly reduced the role of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs...*"<sup>824</sup> Kimura made this conclusion based on his detailed examination of the territorial dispute between the Soviet Union, later, the Russian Federation, and Japan. As described in the introduction, this seemed to be a promising frame of reference for the study of other foreign policy issues at that time to see if this criticism of Kozyrev is valid as a description of his management of Russian foreign policy as a whole. Based on existing scholarship on Kozyrev in general, and in the case of the failure of the Japan policy, each of the case studies examined the following five independent variables, with the dependent variable being Kozyrev's ability to manage Yeltsin in implementing foreign policies in each of the case studies:

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<sup>824</sup> Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, pp. 132-133, emphasis added.

1. **Continuity:** Was the policy a continuation of, or a radical departure from previous Soviet policy? Was the policy continued by Kozyrev's successors?
2. **Consistency:** How consistent was the policy? Did it remain consistent, or did it become more realist-oriented over time due to either domestic opposition, or lack of a positive response from the other side? This examination will be a fruitful place to analyze the view of "two Kozyrevs"—the early liberal who became more nationalist as the liberal orientation failed to achieve the desired results.
3. **Opposition from the Supreme Soviet and/or State Duma:** Was the policy supported or opposed by majority in the newly enfranchised democratic legislative institutions?
4. **Opposition from the Russian Military:** Was the policy supported or opposed by elements of the Russian military?
5. **Foreign influence:** Did any foreign nation apply pressure on the Russian MFA or government in general in favor of one policy or another?

Once these five variables have been examined, we can return to examining, the dependent variable, **The Yeltsin Factor:** How did Kozyrev contain Yeltsin's interventions that differed from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' previously agreed upon policy? By examining these five independent variables, a framework will be constructed that will be used to analyze Kozyrev's management of Russian foreign policy. This approach is informed by the work of Alexander George's method of "structured focused comparison."<sup>825</sup>

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<sup>825</sup> For Alexander George's approach, see Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories of Organizational Decision-Making," in Robert C. Colam and Richard A. Smith (eds.), *Advances in Information Processing in Organizations, Volume 2*, (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1985), pp. 21-58; Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison" in Paul Gordon Lauren (ed.), *Diplomacy: New Approaches in Theory, History and Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 3-68; and Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Studies, 1991). I am indebted to UVA Politics Department graduate Kenneth Joshua Cheatham for pointing out to me the value of George's work in this area.

By examining these six variables across three case studies, a framework was constructed that was used to analyze Kozyrev's management of foreign policy. The basic research question was: "did these factors, which clearly constrained the MFA's ability to direct Russo-Japanese impact the other policy areas?" As I did more research and collected more data, I revised my research question further to: "which of the first five variables were essential to Kozyrev's success in containing the Yeltsin factor, the sixth variable?" How was Kozyrev able to contain Yeltsin's interventions in the case of his policies towards China and Estonia, yet not able to do so in relation to his policy towards Japan?<sup>826</sup>

The refining of the research question led to a new theory which guided the further collection of data and the analysis performed on this data. The new theory that guided this study was as follows:

Kozyrev was able to contain President Yelstin's interventions in the diplomatic process only when there was, *endogenously*, clear support for his policies—or at least not a united opposition to his policies—held by other departments and institutions with the potential to impact foreign policy decision-making, or *exogenously* when foreign states or institutions were able to intervene in the Russian political process, in such a way that Russian policy-makers options were reduced.

Built upon a framework based on these five variables that have been identified in existing scholarship on Russo-Japanese relations under Kozyrev's administration, this study examined the diplomatic correspondence, written statements, and joint statements, produced by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its interlocutors during this period, on each of the three foreign policy issues. The results of this study are displayed in the table below.

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<sup>826</sup> See Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry*, p. 21. These authors argue that it is a reasonable course of action of revise a research question, and the theory underlying the study when the collected data reveals weaknesses in the original approach.

	China	Estonia	Japan
Continuity: 1) with previous Soviet policy 2) was Kozyrev's policy continued by his successor, Evgeny Primakov	1) Yes. Kozyrev's policy conformed in all particulars to that of his predecessors, Eduard Shevardnadze and Mikhail Gorbachev.  2) Yes. The foundations laid by Kozyrev served as the basis of subsequent Russo-Chinese relations	1) Partial, Kozyrev's institutionalist policy overturned principles of Soviet foreign policy in the region, but he also advocated traditional Soviet and Russian primacy in the near abroad.  2) Yes. The policy of using the CSCE (now OSCE) was continued by Evgeny Primakov, Kozyrev's successor	1) Yes. Yeltsin continued Gorbachev's policy which was not to return any of the islands, and the MFA continued to push a more liberal and accommodating policy  2) Yes. The documents written at the Tokyo summit laid foundation for future Russo-Japanese relations
Consistency	Throughout Kozyrev advocated strong Russo-Chinese relations base on pragmatism	Throughout Kozyrev advocated mix of Institutional and Realist policies	Remained committed to Kunadze option from 1990-1993. Following October 1993 Summit became more nationalist
Opposition from Supreme Soviet	Limited. Some opposition from regional deputies to border treaty agreement	Yes- but limited. Some parties in Duma showed support for Kozyrev's policy	Yes—In hearings held specifically on this issue, the majority opposed any transfer of any Russian territory to Japan
Opposition from Russian Military	Limited	Limited. Despite some statements to contrary Minister of Defense Grachev supported Kozyrev's policy	Universal and decisive —opposition across political spectrum in Russian military institutions
Opposition or Pressure applied by foreign states	As Russo-American and Sino-American relations declined, both Russia and China desired a closer relationship with each other	Decisive. United States Congress passed law that if the Russians did not withdraw their troops from Estonia by the determined date, the US would withdraw foreign aid to the Russian Federation.	Limited. Japanese efforts to enlist G-7 nations to support the transfer of the islands back to Japan actually backfired

	China	Estonia	Japan
The Yeltsin Factor	Contained. Yeltsin crony, Oleg Lobov, got Yeltsin to support pro-Taiwanese policy, but this was contained due to almost universal support for MFA's policy within Russian bureaucracy and Yeltsin repudiated Lobov's plan	Contained. Yeltsin abruptly said he would not withdraw Russian troops from Estonia as promised until Estonia implemented CSCE recommendations, but Russian military supported MFA's policy and international pressure forced Yeltsin to back down on his intentions to suspend military withdrawal	Not Contained. Strong opposition to turning over the islands in the across the political spectrum in the military, gave Kozyrev no leverage; no international pressure on Russia to return islands, as there was in relation to Russo-Estonian relations

#### Description of variables and the findings of each case study based on these variables.

**1. Continuity**—is 1) the whether the policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation followed a similar trajectory to the policy pursued by the Foreign Ministry of the USSR, and 2) whether the policy pursued by Kozyrev was continued by his successor as foreign minister, Evgeny Primakov.

**1.A. Continuity—China:** In relation to China, the continuity was very clear. Despite the claims of several critics and even some scholars, Kozyrev's policy—from its every beginning—built upon the success achieved by the Gorbachev administration's 1989 meeting with Deng Xiaoping. Early agreements between first, the RSFSR and later, the Russian Federation, *explicitly built upon the foundations laid by the Soviet government.* Despite Kozyrev's liberal orientation, and the claims of critics such as Mikhail Titarenko, *there was no departure from the*

*previous policy of the USSR.*<sup>827</sup> The initial agreements of first the MFA of the RSFSR and later the Russian Federation referenced both the five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and the two agreements negotiated in 1989 at the Gorbachev-Deng Summit.<sup>828</sup> These principles were reaffirmed during Yetlsin's summit in December 1992, and were enshrined in the documents produced at that summit, which were entitled the "Memorandum Concerning Mutual Understanding Between the Governments of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China Concerning the Issue of Mutual Reductions of the Armed Forces and Strengthening of Trust in the Military Areas in the Border Region," and the "Joint Declaration of the Conditions of Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and the Chinese People's Republic."<sup>829</sup>

These documents have provided the foundation for Russo-Chinese relations in the post-Cold War era, and Kozyrev's successor aggressively built upon these foundations to form the basis of a Russo-Chinese strategic partnership.

**1.B. Continuity—Estonia:** There had been no diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, but Kozyrev's policy of enthusiastically supporting the role of the CSCE to criticize a state's internal human rights policy was a great departure

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<sup>827</sup> M. Titarenko, "Russia in Asia," *International Affairs*, No. 2, Volume 46, 2000, p. 127.

<sup>828</sup> See Ministerstvo inostrannykh del RSFSR [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RSFSR], SD25917, No. 2045, 11 October 1991. Iz dnevnika Kunadze, G.F. [From the Diary of G.F. Kunadze]; "O vizite delegatsii Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR v KNR, 6-13 Dekabria 1991 goda," [Concerning the visit of the Delegation from the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, 6-13 December 1991], GARF: Fond 10026, opis' 5, dela 1253, listy 55-17; ROSSIIA - KITAI: "Vizit A.V. Kozyreva v Kitaiskuiu Narodnuiu Respubliku" [Visit of A.V. Kozyrev to the Chinese People's Republic], *Diplomaticheskii Vestnik*, No. 7. 15 April 1992,

<sup>829</sup> Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation], *Vneshniaia Politika Rossii: Sbornik Dokumentov 1990-1992* [*The Foreign Policy of Russia: A Collection of Documents, 1990-1992*], [hereafter *MID RF VP*] documents number 262, 263, pp. 575-579.



from past Soviet diplomacy, which had always vigorously opposed this intrusive role of international institutions in general, and that of the CSCE in particular.<sup>830</sup>

Though Kozyrev's policy was in fact new, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev had acknowledged the primacy of Western, European values, in developing the post-Cold War European community. As Hiski Haukkala wrote: "By signing the Paris Charter, Gorbachev signaled the end of a competing Soviet normative agenda for the future development of the European international society. Once again it was Europe's turn to condition Russia's place in Europe."<sup>831</sup> Kozyrev's policy continued in this trajectory, but certainly went well beyond Gorbachev's ideas of cooperation, in which Soviet and Western values would meet. Kozyrev abandoned the Soviet notion of a shared European home and eagerly embraced Western norms and values, in effect, making the CSCE's established norms the most prominent feature of his foreign policy.<sup>832</sup>

Thus, there was a great difference between Soviet and post-Soviet Russian policy in this area.

Kozyrev simultaneously *embraced a more restrained application of the traditional Soviet policy*

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<sup>830</sup> Dov Lynch, "The State of the OSCE," in the EU-Russian Centre, Russia, the OSCE and European Security, Issue 12 (November 2009), [http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/Review\\_XII.pdf](http://www.eu-russiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/Review_XII.pdf) Accessed 29 September 2017. For Soviet views on the CSCE, see the chapter written by former Soviet diplomat Yuri Vladimirovich Dubinin in Alice Nemcova (ed.), *CSCE Testimonies: Causes and Consequences of the Helsinki Final Act, 1972-1989* (Prague: Prague Office of the OSCE Secretariat, 2013), pp. 185-222.

<sup>831</sup> Hiski Haukkala, "A Norm-Maker to a Norm-Taker? The Changing Normative Parameters of Russia's Place in Europe" in Ted Hopf (ed), *Russia's European Choice* (New York, Hampshire, UK: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2008), p. 52.

<sup>832</sup> See Kozyrev, *Preobrazhnie*, p. 52., Kozyrev, Padyshev, "Russian Diplomacy Reborn," p. 126, and especially, *Raczynski and Kozyrev, "Kozyrev on Ties with Eastern Europe, Baltics."* A useful frame of reference is to compare Kozyrev's views on this issue with the Soviet diplomat, Yuri Vladimirovich Dubinin, who was the Soviet diplomat most associated with the establishment of the CSCE, in Alice Nemcova (ed.), *CSCE Testimonies: Causes and Consequences of the Helsinki Final Act, 1972-1989* (Prague: Prague Office of the OSCE Secretariat, 2013), pp. 185-222. Dubinin, who was instrumental in the foundation of the CSCE, had opposed what he considered international interference in a nation's "internal affairs," but greatly promoted the CSCE process as a means of defending a state's borders and territorial inviolability. This dichotomy continued to plague Soviet diplomacy, as Western governments and dissident movements within the Soviet bloc cited the CSCE's principles in opposition to Soviet diplomacy and internal policies toward dissidents. Kozyrev, by aggressively adopting the CSCE's role in promoting human rights, defused one of the thornier questions of Russia's relations with the West.

*of dominating these states through economic, political and military pressure, and of defending Russia's primacy in the Near Abroad*, which showed clear continuity with the policies of both the Soviet Union and even Tsarist Russia, a fact that was noted by Henry Kissinger, who in describing Kozyrev's policies argued that there was little that separated foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev from his Soviet and even Tsarist predecessors, and that Kozyrev "...repeatedly put forward a concept of a Russian monopoly of peacekeeping in the "near abroad," indistinguishable from an attempt to re-establish Moscow's domination.<sup>833</sup>

Kozyrev's successor, Evgeniy Primakov, continued Kozyrev's policy in this area, though he was not as vocal about Russian Federation's cooperation with the OSCE. This policy served as the bedrock of Russian efforts to ameliorate the conditions of Russian speakers and ethnic Russians in Estonia.

**1.C. Continuity—Japan:** The USSR's foreign minister, Boris D. Pankin, stated on 13 September 1991 "Over the Northern Territories issue, there is no difference in the positions of President Gorbachev of the Soviet Union and President Yeltsin of the Russian Republic."<sup>834</sup> This was essentially true because both Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin opposed the transfer of any of the islands to the Japanese,<sup>835</sup> though under both leaders the foreign ministries seemed to have more liberal policies towards Japan. The last Japanese ambassador to the USSR noted differences between the foreign ministries of the USSR and the Russian Federation, but

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<sup>833</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 815, emphasis added.

<sup>834</sup> *Izvestiia*, 13 September 1991, cited in Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, p. 300, emphasis added. This was actually true in essence because both Gorbachev and Yeltsin categorically refused to transfer any of the disputed islands to Japan, though the position of the Russian Federation's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was by far more liberal than the MFA of the USSR.

<sup>835</sup> Sumio Edamura, "A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations between the August 1991 Coup D'état and President Yeltsin's State Visit to Japan in October 1993," in Gilbert Rozman, *Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization*, p. 139.

in the end, this did not matter because in both cases, the executive held decision-making power over the issue and opposed the transfer of any of the islands. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Sumio Edamura and Kazuhiko Togo all described the fact that there were essentially two Russian policies concerning Japan: that of Boris Yeltsin, which was actually quite similar to Mikhail Gorbachev's opinion, and that of Kozyrev and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which aimed at accommodation based upon the Japanese-Soviet joint declaration of 1956.<sup>836</sup> A recently available document from the Russian archives, written by veteran Soviet Asian hand, Vladen Martynov in 1990, provides a strong basis to argue that this dichotomy between leader and Japanologists in the Foreign Ministry plagued Soviet-Japanese relations as well.<sup>837</sup>

Kozyrev's successor as foreign minister, Evgeniy Primakov, continued Kozyrev's policies towards the Japanese. The documents produced at the Tokyo Summit of 1993 provided the basis of subsequent Russo-Japanese relations.

**2. Consistency.** Consistency refers to whether the policy position remained constant across the period under consideration, 1990-1996, or if it appreciably changed over time due to internal or external pressures.

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<sup>836</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Neither War Nor Peace*, 1985-1998, p. 440. Hasegawa also noted: "The fact that Kunadze had to use the news media to state his case revealed that he and the Russian MID were encountering increasing difficulties in getting access to the President. It also indicated that an ultimate resolution of the territorial dispute had moved from the realm of diplomatic negotiations to presidential decision." (p. 440). This also provides support for the idea that this issue was a Robert B. Putnam-type two-level game. See also Sumio Edamura, "A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations between the August 1991 Coup d'etat and President Yeltsin's State Visit to Japan in October 1993," p. 143.

<sup>837</sup> V.A. Martynov to R.I. Khasbulatov, SD25992, emphasis added. Excerpt from the minutes of meeting No. 112 of the CPSU Secretariat: Plans for carrying out communications in 1990 with the Soviet Union Council for Chinese Communist Party, the Workers' Party for Korea, the Cuban Revolutionary Party, and the Laotian Revolutionary Party. RGANI, fod. 89, ops. 8. delo 79, listy 1-2, emphasis added. It is interesting to note how different elements of this draft became central aspects of both the MFA's and Yeltsin's positions on this issue.

**2.A. Consistency-China:** In relation to Russo-Chinese relations, Russian policy remained consistent throughout the period under investigation. Kozyrev's comment, made on 10 April 1991, months before the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1992, remained consistent throughout Kozyrev's tenure as foreign minister:

I understand where your question is leading. Some people might see a certain delicate position here. I will explain our approach. *We are dealing in realities. And today's reality is such that the General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee is the highest state leader, since the Party and the State are indivisible in China.* That country is our most important partner. I think that the Russian Federation leadership will proceed from precisely this basis. As regards my personal attitude, then of course my position is closer to everything that meets international standards of human rights and democratic processes in any country.<sup>838</sup>

Though some scholars argue that Kozyrev initially pursued an ideologically-based policy towards China,<sup>839</sup> there is no documentary evidence for this that I was able to find in the resources I consulted. Kozyrev's statement quoted above proved to be the consistent guide to Russian policy towards China throughout his tenure as foreign minister. This study thus confirms the argument advanced by Peter Shearman and Matthew Sussex in their study on Russian foreign policy making and institutions, that:

... one should not exaggerate the extent to which [policy under Kozyrev's successors] diverged in substance from the policy earlier pursued by the MFA when Kozyrev was at the helm ... Primakov's and Ivanov's tenures demonstrate that policy did not alter in its fundamentals due to the reality of power and the continuing institutional interests of the ministry.<sup>840</sup>

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<sup>838</sup> Interview with Andrei Kozyrev, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Foreign Minister by A. Platkovskiy, 10 April 1991, place of interview not given, FBIS-SOV-91-069, emphasis added.

<sup>839</sup> See Jeanne L. Wilson, *Strategic Partners*, p. 193; Robert Legvold, "Russia and the Strategic Quadrangle," pp. 42-43; and Gilbert Rozman, "Russia in Northeast Asia: In Search of a Strategy," in Robert Legvold (ed.), *Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century & the Shadow of the Past* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 355 for examples of this idea.

<sup>840</sup> Peter Shearman and Matthew Sussex, "Foreign Policy-making and Institutions," in Neil Robinson (ed.), *Institutions and Political Change in Russia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), p. 160.

**2.B. Consistency-Estonia:** Though some analysts, such as Jack Snyder, claim that Kozyrev initially championed the use of institutions, but later became more realist—and threatening—as the institutional policy failed to bear fruit (or was challenged by internal opposition)<sup>841</sup> Kozyrev’s simultaneous advocacy of both international institutions *and* realist levers of power in concert remained consistent on the Estonian issue throughout the period under investigation. Thus, the research performed on this issue conforms more closely to Stephen Sestanovich’s view that “there have always been two Kozyrevs.”<sup>842</sup> One of Kozyrev’s first statements on his policy in this area fully conforms to Sestanovich’s analysis:

We propose to protect the rights, lives and dignity of Russians in the states of the former U.S.S.R. above all by political and diplomatic methods, using the mechanisms of international organizations. *But if these means fail to put an end to encroachments on the lives and safety of our fellow citizens, the conception calls for the carefully considered application of economic and military force, not the Yugoslav version, needless to say, but in within the framework of the law.*<sup>843</sup>

There is no better summation of Kozyrev’s policy in defending the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in the Near Abroad than this.

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<sup>841</sup> Jack Snyder, “Democratization, War and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Communist States,” in Celeste A. Wallander (ed.), *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), p. 35.

<sup>842</sup> Stephen Sestanovich, “Andrei the Giant, *The New Republic* (New York: 1 April 1994).

<sup>843</sup> Andrei Kozyrev, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Proposes and Defends a Foreign Policy for Russia: In the Republic’s Best Interests, *Rossiiskiiye Vesti*, (3 December 1992), p. 2 as translated in *The Current Digest of the Russian Press*, No. 48 Volume 44 (30 December 1992), pp. 14-16, emphasis added. This shows fairly clearly that Kozyrev’s policy had been based on both his commitment to institutionalist principles *and* the use of levers of Russian state power to facilitate Russian aims in the region. At that same time, opponents of the Kozyrev line belonging to the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy wrote a report that proposed an alternative foreign policy to the one being pursued by Kozyrev. In relation to the states of the Former Soviet Union the authors of this document, according to Suzanne Crow, advocated an “... enlightened post imperialist integrationist course with the formed Soviet republics, countries the authors characterize as enjoying only weak historical legitimacy in terms of territorial delineation, ethnicity, and socioeconomic development. This policy would include ‘efforts to preserve and develop intergovernmental structures and an active (if possible internationally sanctioned) participation in preventing and ending conflicts, if necessary even with the help of military forces and preventing any mass and gross violation of humans rights and freedoms,” Suzanne Crow, *Competing Blueprints for Russian Foreign Policy*, RFE/RL Research Report, 18 December 1992, p. 48. This “alternative” policy actually conforms very closely to the policy that Kozyrev pursued. This report, called “A Strategy for Russia,” was published in the newspaper *Nezavisimaia Gazeta* on 19 August 1992.

At that same time, opponents of Kozyrev's policy who belonged to the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy published a report that proposed an alternative foreign policy. In relation to the states of the Former Soviet Union the authors of this document, according to Suzanne Crow, advocated an "... enlightened post imperialist integrationist course with the former Soviet republics, countries the authors characterize as enjoying only weak historical legitimacy in terms of territorial delineation, ethnicity, and socioeconomic development. This policy would include 'efforts to preserve and develop intergovernmental structures and an active (if possible internationally sanctioned) participation in preventing and ending conflicts, if necessary even with the help of military forces and preventing any mass and gross violation of human rights and freedoms,'<sup>844</sup> This "alternative" policy actually conforms very closely to the policy that Kozyrev actually pursued.<sup>845</sup> This shows clear continuity between Kozyrev's policy and that of his statist opponents. Furthermore, this policy was pursued, albeit quietly, by Kozyrev's supposedly more statist successor, Evgeniy Primakov,<sup>846</sup> and the policy continued to bear fruit throughout the period examined in this study, and beyond, up until the OSCE Mission to Estonia was officially closed on 31 December 2001.<sup>847</sup>

**2.C. Consistency-Japan:** Throughout the period under consideration, Kozyrev's policy of upholding the Kunadze Option was consistently maintained. It was only after the Yeltsin-

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<sup>844</sup> Suzanne Crow, *Competing Blueprints for Russian Foreign Policy*, RFE/RL Research Report, 18 December 1992, p. 48.

<sup>845</sup> This report, called "A Strategy for Russia," was published in the newspaper *Nezavisimaia Gazeta* on 19 August 1992.

<sup>846</sup> Walter A. Kemp (ed.), *Quiet Diplomacy in Action; The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities* (The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 61. Despite his avowed repudiation of aspects of Kozyrev's overly too Western leaning policies, Primakov continued to utilize the offices of the OSCE to advance the political rights of Russians in the Baltic states.

<sup>847</sup> OSCE Mission to Estonia (closed), OSCE Official Website, <https://www.osce.org/estonia-closed> Accessed on 20 July 2018. See also M. Merrick Yamamoto, *OSCE Principles in Practice: Testing Their Effect on Security Through the Work of Max Van der Stoep, First High Commissioner on National Minorities 1993–2001*, (College Park, MD: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, September 2017).

Hosokawa summit of October 1993, that Kozyrev changed his tune, and, as Tsuyoshi Hasegawa noted and "... found it convenient to engage in a little Japan-bashing [of his own] to prop up his sagging popularity."<sup>848</sup> It can also be argued that Yeltsin's Japan policy remained consistent throughout the period under investigation as well, though the final form of the Russo-Japanese joint declaration issued during the Russo-Japanese Tokyo Summit in October 1993, show that the MFA had successfully converted Yeltsin to some of their principles, though not in the one that really mattered, which was the issue of being willing to turn over at least two of the islands to the Japanese.<sup>849</sup>

**3. Opposition from the Supreme Soviet:** Analysts such as Bruce Parrott and Karen Dawisha, Hiroshi Kimura and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa all noted that opposition in the Supreme Soviet played a great role in limiting the flexibility of the Russian negotiating position in relation to Japanese demands regarding the Northern Territories.<sup>850</sup> However, the three case studies, taken together, show that this opposition only proved to be significant in relation to Russian foreign policy towards Japan. Scholars are in broad agreement that Russia's nascent parliamentary institutions lacked actual political power, and that even when they were in strong opposition, the

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<sup>848</sup> Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *Neither War nor Peace*, p. 494.

<sup>849</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Document 262. Tokiiskaia Deklaratsiia o Rossiisko-Iaponskikh otnosheniakh [Tokyo Declaration on Russian-Japanese Relations], in *Vneshniaia Politika Rossii: Sbornik Dokumentov, 1993 Kniga 2, liun' - Dekabr'* [The Foreign Policy of Russia, Anthology of Documents, 1993, Book 2: June to December] (Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2000), p. 371. This joint publication was a joint project of the Russian Federation and Japanese Ministries of Foreign Affairs, and the publication of these documents supported the validity of both the 1855 Treaty of Shimoda and the 1956 Joint Declaration.

<sup>850</sup> See Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott, *Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval*, pp. 204-205.

President of Russia could essentially ignore them at will, which he did in relation to both his China policy and the policy of defending ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Estonia.<sup>851</sup>

**4. Opposition from the Russian Military:** Several scholars, such as Glaubitz, Kimura and Hasegawa, have noted that strong opposition from the Russian military played a large role in preventing giving any of the islands to the Japanese.<sup>852</sup> The growth of the military's political powers was noted by several scholars, but as the 1990s progressed the political powers of the military actually diminished.<sup>853</sup> The findings of the research performed on these case studies confirmed that military opposition played a great role in frustrating the MFA's policy in relation to Japan, but that what military opposition existed to the pursuit of friendly relations with the PRC, or in opposing the institutional aspects of Kozyrev's policy to defend the rights of Russian speakers in Estonia was weak, not well coordinated, and was internally contested.

**4.A. Opposition from the Russian Military-China:** There was certainly opposition in certain military quarters to Kozyrev's policy towards China. Throughout the post-Cold War era, several Russian military officials, most notably, the second Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, Igor Rodionov, explicitly stated that China posed an existential threat to the Russian Federation. However, he was forced to walk back these views, and military opposition to

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<sup>851</sup> See Paul Chaisty and Jeffrey Gleisner, "The Consolidation of Russian Parliamentarism: The State Duma, 1993-8," in Neil Robinson (ed.), *Institutions and Political Change in Russia* (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 2000), and M. Steven Fish, "Conclusion: Democracy and Russian Politics," in Zoltan Barany and Robert G. Moser (editors), *Russian Politics: Challenges of Democratization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

<sup>852</sup> Joachim Glaubitz, *Between Tokyo and Moscow*, p. 245, Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, p. 129. and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "Conclusion: Russo-Japanese Relations in the New Environment—Implications of Continuing Stalemate," p. 422.

<sup>853</sup> Zoltan Barany, "Politics and the Russian Armed Forces," in Zoltan Barany and Robert G. Moser (editors), *Russian Politics: Challenges of Democratization* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).



Kozyrev's China policy was not universal.<sup>854</sup> The pro-Chinese foreign policy received warm and firm support from the Russian military industrial complex, which argued that it needed the Chinese market to make up for losing all the former Warsaw Pact nations as consistent consumers of Russian-made military equipment, despite reservations from some Russian military leaders. Several analysts note that Russian sales of various weapons systems to China under Kozyrev kept the Russian defense industries afloat during a very difficult time. These military-industrial complex ties increased and were strengthened in time.<sup>855</sup>

**4.B. Opposition from the Russian Military-Estonia:** There was voiced military opposition to the use of institutions to defend the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in the Baltic states, even from such a high ranking individual as the Russian Minister of Defense, Pavel Grachev. However, this opposition was not universal, and in fact even Defense Minister Grachev—if not overly enthusiastically— supported the government's policy. The research done on this case study strongly supports the position advanced by Reneo Lukic and Allen Lynch, who noted in 1996 that: "The Russian military appears to be in basic accord with the Russian Government as far as the broad outlines of policy towards the three Baltic states are concerned."<sup>856</sup> The record also shows that throughout this period, Russian Minister of Defense,

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<sup>854</sup> See Igor Korotchenko, "Igor Rodionov Advocates Creation of Defense Alliance of CIS Countries, *Nezavisimaia Gazeta*, 26 December 1996, p. 1 in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Number 52, 22 January 1997, p. 16, cited in Ming-Yeng Tsai, *From Adversaries to Partners: Chinese and Russian Military Cooperation after the Cold War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003). See also Jeanne L. Wilson, *Strategic Partners: Russian-Chinese relations in the Post-Soviet Era* (New York and London: Routledge, 2004), p. 110. In 2009, Lieutenant-General Sergei Skokov, the Chief of the Russian Federation Main Staff Directorate, acknowledged that China presented a threat to Russia in its eastern direction. See Aleksandr A. Khramchikhin, "A Total of 85 Permanent Readiness Brigades for Everything, *Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie* [Independent Military Review] 16 October 2009.

<sup>855</sup> See Rajan Menon, "The Strategic Convergence Between Russia and China," *Survival* Vol. 39, No. 2, Summer 1997. As Menon noted: "Russia needs money and has an ailing defense industry, while China is serious about modernizing its own forces." p. 113. See also Hugo Meijer, Lucie Beraud-Sudreau, Paul Haltom and Matthew Uttley, "Arming China: Major Powers' Arms Transfers to the People's Republic of China," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 6 (2018), pp. 870-875.

<sup>856</sup> Lukic and Lynch, *Europe from the Balkans to the Urals*, p. 363.

Pavel Grachev essentially supported the broad outlines of Yeltsin's and Kozyrev's "good neighbor" policy goals of becoming a "normal" and not an "imperial" power in relation to the former states of the Soviet Union.<sup>857</sup>

**4.C. Opposition from the Russian Military-Japan:** This historically-held strong position on the part of the Russian military contrasted sharply with the military opposition to the rapprochement with China, or the use of the CSCE to defend the rights of Russian speakers in Estonia. In both of these other cases, military opposition was divided, and in both cases, the Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev ended up supporting the government's policy. In contrast to these cases, the military opposition to the Kunadze option was unanimously held by military officials of all political complexions, across the political spectrum, from extreme nationalists such as General-Major V.P. Zalomin to Westernized liberals such as Marshall Evgenii Shaposhnikov.<sup>858</sup> This universal military opposition made it difficult for Kozyrev and other officials within the MFA, and even such a prominent liberal military figure such as Volkogonov, or so eminent a Russian public intellectual as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, to persuade President Yeltsin to dismiss the military opposition's concerns on this issue.

**5. International Pressure:** The interaction with other states and these state's policies on the issues examined in this study greatly varied.

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<sup>857</sup> See "Pavel Grachev: I, as the Defense Minister Did not Allow the Army to Break Up," *Gaidar's Revolution*, pp. 324-361.

<sup>858</sup> Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, p. 137; Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "Conclusion: Russo-Japanese Relations in the New Environment—Implications of Continuing Stalemate," p. 422; Joachim Glaubitz, *Between Tokyo and Moscow*, p. 245; General-Major V.P. Zalomin, "Theses, speeches in the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, 9 July 1992," The Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, GARF: Fond 10026, Opis' 4, Delo 2614, list 62-74, from the National Security Archives, George Washington University. Accessed 29 January 2018.

**5A. International Pressure: China:** There was no strong international pressure on Russia's policy toward China. Though some IR scholars would argue that Russia's desire to join the West would impel the Russian state to bandwagon with the West and support Western efforts to isolate and boycott China following the Tiananmen Square incident in the Summer of 1989, Russia pursued a different policy, and drew closer to China, essentially *balancing* the United States in the Pacific. Later, international pressure on both Russia and China due to Western opposition to Russian and Chinese foreign policy efforts led both sides to decide to strengthen Russo-Chinese relations.

**5B. International Pressure: Defending the Rights of Ethnic Russians and Russian-Speakers in Estonia:** US opposition to any efforts made by the Russian Federation to postpone the withdrawal of its military forces from Estonian soil—expressed most forcefully in a bill passed by the US Senate that tied US foreign aid to the Russian Federation to their adherence to the promise to withdraw their troops on time—made it clear to President Yeltsin that he had no choice but to withdraw the troops as scheduled.

**5B. International Pressure: Russo-Japanese Relations:** International pressure played no role in Russo-Japanese relations from 1990 to January 1996. Japan had tried in the summer of 1992 to get the G-7 to support the return of all four islands to Japan from the Russian Federation, but this effort failed to elicit a positive response from the other G-7 members. The US strongly encouraged both sides to resolve the issue, but did not apply any noticeable pressure on either country to do so.

**Further Study.** Although the systematic study of these variables in the context of the three case studies examined here do reveal important results, it would greatly improve our

understanding of Russian foreign policy during this period, to add other variables, and to examine other case studies under the framework developed here. For example, by examining Russian foreign policy in the former Yugoslavia, for example, we could place these findings alongside the findings presented here to gain a more nuanced, detailed understanding.

## 6. The Yeltsin Factor

The analysis performed for this study shows that *the ability to manage President Yeltsin was the most important variable in the conduct of Russian foreign policy during this period*. The nature of Yeltsin's approach to governing, which was erratic, irregular and frequently improvised, made this an absolute requirement for success in the maintenance of any policy course in Russia at this time—domestic and foreign. According to Japanese scholar Hiroshi Kimura, Kozyrev's lack of authority limited his effectiveness as foreign minister, and let other institutions intrude on foreign policy decision-making.<sup>859</sup>

Yeltsin's policy toward Japan greatly differed from that of Kozyrev's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in the end, Kozyrev was unable to change Yeltsin's position. Some other scholars and critics, echoing Kimura, have argued that under these circumstances, Kozyrev could not effectively function as Yeltsin's foreign minister. However, Russian journalist Leonid Mlechin has argued that in several cases, Kozyrev proved to be quite effective at navigating Russia's difficult political shoals and was able to get certain policies implemented despite internal opposition.<sup>860</sup> This was also true in the other two cases studies examined, Russo-Chinese relations and his efforts to defend ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Estonia, in which Kozyrev had been

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<sup>859</sup> Hiroshi Kimura, *Japanese-Russian Relations Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin*, pp. 132-133.

<sup>860</sup> Leonid Mlechin, *MID: Ministry Inostrannykh Del*, pp. 628-630.

able to overturn Yeltsin's departure from the MFA's preferred policies, and this provides further support for Mlechin's claims.

In this case, Russia under Yeltsin was not unlike other world powers. Foreign policy is never entirely the product of one individual and institution. As Graham Allison and Morton Halperin wrote:

The "maker" of government policy is not a single calculating decision-maker, but rather a conglomerate of large organizations and political actors who differ substantially about what their government should do on any particular issue and who compete in attempting to affect both governmental decisions and the actions of their governments.

Each government consists of numerous individuals, many of them working in large organizations. Constrained, to be sure, by the shared images of their society, these individuals nevertheless have very different interests, very different priorities, and are concerned with very different questions.<sup>861</sup>

Foreign policy, like any state policy, domestic or foreign, is the result of the struggle between these competing institutions and individuals.

**6.A. The Yeltsin Factor—China:** The most significant challenge the Yeltsin factor presented to the MFA's policy was when Yeltsin's colleague from his days as Communist Party Chief of Sverdlovsk, Oleg Lobov, who was at that time First Deputy Prime Minister, managed to persuade Yeltsin to sign a decree on the establishment of a Moscow-Taipei official commission on 2 September 1992.<sup>862</sup> The Chinese were greatly offended by this breach of the "One China policy," which had been consistently held by both the Soviet Union and the early Russian Federation government up to this time. Chinese ambassador to Russia, Wang Jinqing,

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<sup>861</sup> Graham T. Allison and Morton Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A paradigm and Some Policy Implications," in Raymond Taner and Richard H. Ullman, (editors), *Theory and Policy in International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972) quoted and cited in Jerel A. Rosati, "Research Note: Developing a Systematic Framework; Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective," *World Politics*, Volume 33, Issue 2, January 1981, p. 237.

<sup>862</sup> Sergey Radchenko, *Unwanted Visionaries*, p. 353.

immediately demanded an explanation from Kozyrev, whose response was both immediate and decisive. In the end, Kozyrev got Yeltsin to repudiate Lobov's proposal and quickly mended relations with the Chinese. He was able to do so because in this area, *he had broad domestic and institutional support*, and used this support to constrain the President's possible overturning of the previously agreed-upon policy.<sup>863</sup>

**6.B. The Yeltsin Factor—Estonia:** The most important “intervention” of President Yeltsin in the area of defending the rights of Russian speakers in Estonia was his deviation from previous agreements made on this issue, when he publicly declared that he would suspend troop withdrawals from both Estonia and Latvia until both countries implemented the CSCE's recommendations. On 20 October 1992, in a sudden departure from promises he had made to the Estonians—and the world community—that all Russian troops would be withdrawn from Estonia by 31 August 1994, he openly declared that he would suspend the withdrawal of Russian troops until Estonia and Latvia fully implemented the CSCE's recommendations.<sup>864</sup> This caused great problems with the world community, especially the United States, but rather than oppose it, Kozyrev coopted it. A week later, in October 1993, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under Kozyrev's direction, made these same points in a letter to the UN General Secretary, Boutros Boutros-Ghali.<sup>865</sup> This was actually consistent with Kozyrev's two-track, *institutionalist—and realist—policy* on this issue.<sup>866</sup>

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<sup>863</sup> Eugene Bazhanov, “Russian Foreign Policy Toward China,” in Peter Shearman (ed), *Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990*. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995, p. 177. See also Sergey Radchenko, *Unwanted Visionaries*, pp. 194-195.

<sup>864</sup> Sven Gunnar Simonsen, “Compatriot Games: Explaining the ‘Diaspora Linkage’ in Russia's Military Withdrawal from the Baltic States,” *Europe-Asia Studies*, Volume 53, No. 5 (2001), p. 775.

<sup>865</sup> Sven Gunnar Simonsen, “Compatriot Games: Explaining the ‘Diaspora Linkage’ in Russia's Military Withdrawal from the Baltic States,” p. 779.

<sup>866</sup> Andrei Kozyrev, “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Proposes and Defends a Foreign Policy for Russia: In the Republic's Best Interests, *Rossiiskiy Vesti*, (3 December 1992, p. 2) as translated in *The Current Digest of the Russian Press*, No. 48 Volume 44 (30 December 1992), pp. 14-16,

At the same time, the Foreign Ministry quietly continued to pursue troop withdrawal as it had been previously scheduled. As Parrott and Dawisha noted: “The Russian Foreign Ministry stated that Russia would not link withdrawals to ethnic issues, and indeed despite a hardening of rhetoric, troop withdrawals did continue.”<sup>867</sup> All of the Russian troops were pulled out of both Estonia and Latvia by 31 August 1994, and all military bases were cleared of Russian personnel, except for the Skrunda radar facility in Latvia and the Paldiski nuclear reactor facility in Estonia, which were liquidated later in 1998 under agreements that were actually fostered by the CSCE.<sup>868</sup> The decisive factor in inducing Yeltsin to back down in this case was actually provided by the United States Congress. In a press conference after President Clinton’s meeting with President Yeltsin in Naples, Italy in December 1994, the journalist Helen Thomas asked Yeltsin if the Russian Federation would have all Russian troops out of the Baltics by 31 August. Yeltsin replied to the question twice, each time with a long, accentuated no. According to Strobe Talbott, in making this negative reply:

Yeltsin had given our critics in the U.S. Congress red meat. Within days the Senate passed legislation to suspend all U.S. assistance to Russia other than humanitarian aid if Moscow failed to meet the August 31 deadline.<sup>869</sup>

Actually, President Yeltsin went as far as to issue a decree suspending troop withdrawal from the area, but the Russian hand had been countered by the much stronger hand played by the

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<sup>867</sup> Bruce Parrott and Karen Dawisha, *Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval*, p. 216. See the statistics they provide on the steady withdrawal of Russian troops from Estonia and Latvia throughout the period, despite Yeltsin’s and even at some points, Kozyrev’s rhetoric on the issue. Ibid, p. 242. Baltic political leaders were nervous that the presence of Russian troops on their territories would enable them to exercise permanent control over their countries. Kozyrev, in true Rationalist fashion, did his best to address these concerns through both words and deeds.

<sup>868</sup> Arie Bloed. *The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: basic documents, 1993-1995*. (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1997). pp. 390–398.

<sup>869</sup> Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy*, p. 128.

West. Kozyrev's foreign ministry followed suit. Western action forced Yeltsin to back down and the troops were withdrawn as scheduled.<sup>870</sup>

**6.C. The Yeltsin Factor—Japan:** As was noted in the chapter on Russo-Japanese relations, President Yeltsin had always favored a different policy than that of the Russian Federation MFA. Indeed, the content of Kozyrev's foreign policy was *directed as much at changing Yeltsin's position on this issue as it was at working with the Japanese*.<sup>871</sup> In contrast with Yeltsin's occasional disagreements—or even interventions—with Kozyrev and the Russian MFA concerning Russo-Chinese relations or defending the rights of Russian speakers in Estonia using international institutions, there were in the case of foreign policy towards Japan insufficient endogenous counterweights that Kozyrev could use to restrain Yeltsin's interventions in the policy-making process, and there were no exogenous counterweights present either. Improved Russian relations with China were favored by almost all of the Russian Federation's institutions involved in the formation and execution of foreign policy, and the originator of the proposal to officially recognize Taiwan, Oleg Lobov, was fairly isolated within Yeltsin's "power vertical," and was not powerful or popular enough to resist the forces that Kozyrev employed against him.<sup>872</sup> There was no similar consensus within the Russian bureaucracy that Kozyrev could have played against the rivals to the MFA's policy course towards Japan, and he proved unable to overturn Yeltsin's committed position of maintaining all four islands under the rule of the Russian Federation.

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<sup>870</sup> Strobe Talbott, *The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy*, p. 128.

<sup>871</sup> Sumio Edamura, "A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations," p. 145. Kazuhiko Togo, "The inside story of the negotiations on the Norther Territories: five lost windows of opportunity," p. 129.

<sup>872</sup> Russian Defense Minister at that time Pavel Grachev, when asked by Petr Aven if Oleg Lobov had a close relationship with Yeltsin, responded by saying "No, who was Lobov?" "Pavel Grachev: I, as the Defense Minister Did not Allow the Army to Break Up," *Gaidar's Revolution*, pp. 338-339.



### **Findings Based upon the Case Studies:**

The focus will now be shifted towards the case studies themselves. The importance of the findings of each of the three case studies will be analyzed. This analysis will be followed by a description of international relations theory and how the findings of this study provide support for the dominant categories used in international relations theory, and may challenge its ability to adequately describe certain aspects of Andrei Kozyrev's foreign policy.

### ***Findings: Kozyrev's foreign policy towards China:***

In relation to China, Kozyrev showed great ideological flexibility, and worked consistently from his appointment as the foreign minister of the RSFSR for an improvement in Russo-Chinese relations that was quite successful. As analyst of Asian affairs Lowell Dittmer argued the period from 1989 to 1992 was a very difficult period for both countries and "... only skilled diplomacy was able to salvage the relationship."<sup>873</sup> Both nations conducted skillful diplomacy—China's foreign policy was ably guided by Qian Qichen, and Russia's policy was equally ably guided by Andrei Kozyrev. Kozyrev's China policy not only led to the strategic partnership, which several scholars have erroneously attributed to Kozyrev's successor, Evgeniy Primakov,<sup>874</sup> but set the future course of Russo-Chinese relations up to present time. The principles outlined during

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<sup>873</sup> Lowell Dittmer, "The Sino-Japanese-Russian Triangle," *The Journal of Chinese Political Science*, Volume 10, no. 1 (April 2005), p. 12, emphasis added.

<sup>874</sup> See for example, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, "How Yevgeny Primakov's Legacy Lives On: The Ufa 2015 summit is a testament to the late Yevgeny Primakov's lasting geopolitical vision," *The National Interest*, 30 June 2015 <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-yevgeny-primakovs-legacy-lives-13220> Accessed 3 August 2018. Gvosdev wrote: "The initial Atlanticist push westward under Boris Yeltsin's first foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, was guided by the hope that Russia would be admitted to the councils of the Western world with real opportunities to shape the agenda—and by shaping the agenda, this was understood not to simply mean a presence at meetings (like the G-8), but the ability to alter U.S. and EU behavior when it touched on matters of importance to Russia or Russian clients." He attributed the improvement of Russo-Chinese relations to Primakov, but paid little attention the China policy of Kozyrev, which while maybe not as deliberately aimed at balancing Western power as Primakov's, certainly acknowledged that Russia's best interests were advanced when Russia build good relations with both countries.

Yeltsin's visit to Beijing in December 1992 continue to be echoed in Russo-Chinese joint statements in the present period.

One charge that has been made by many scholars is that Kozyrev shifted his foreign policy orientation towards China only in late 1992 when relations with the West seemed to be stymied over lack of Western concern for Russian interests. For example, Andrei Tsygankov argued: "In February 1992, the border treaty was ratified by Russia's Supreme Soviet, but Yeltsin and Kozyrev remained wary of China as anti-Western and critical of Russia's democratic development. The relationships were on hold until late 1992.<sup>875</sup> Similarly, American political scientist Robert Legvold wrote: "Had Russia continued as it began in fall 1991, Japan would have emerged as the first priority of policy, China, historically the centerpiece of Soviet policy in post-war East Asia, would have fallen to a lesser rank."<sup>876</sup> Taiwanese scholars Hsu Jing-Yun and Soong Jenn-Jaw advanced a more extreme version of this view. They wrote: "Sino-Soviet relations have rapidly strengthened since the end of the cold war, but it was not until 1996 that China and Russia developed friendly relations, becoming diplomatically united in a so-called strategic partnership."<sup>877</sup>

This line of thought was picked up by a number of Russian critics, including then-Director of the Institute for the Far East at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Mikhail Titarenko, who wrote in 2000:

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<sup>875</sup> Andrei Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*, p. 76.

<sup>876</sup> Legvold, pp. 42-43. While he was still foreign minister of the RSFSR, Kozyrev answered a question as to what the RSFSR's foreign policy priorities were as follows: "The group we regard as a priority is our republics ... Our next priority is Russia's neighbors in the Northern hemisphere, that is the highly developed pluralist market-economy democracies in Western Europe. Japan as the No. 1 country in the East, America, and needless to say China." "Russian Diplomacy Reborn," *International Affairs*, p. 128.

<sup>877</sup> Jing-Yun Hsu and Jenn-Jaw Soong, "Development of China-Russian Relations (1949-2011): Limits, Opportunities and Economic Ties," *The Chinese Economy*, Volume 47, no. 3, May-June 2014, p. 70.

There are people in Russia who believe that our country should look to the West, mainly to the United States. This one-sided approach practiced by Andrei Kozyrev as Foreign Minister had crippled Russia's positions in Asia and caused a lot of trouble before the situation was remedied ... Luckily, Mr. Kozyrev's attempts to lecture China on the human rights issue and democracy were checked on time. Russia managed to preserve good-neighborly relationships and cooperation which allowed both countries to reach a nearly full agreement on the frontier issue.<sup>878</sup>

Two other long-time Russian observers of Russo-Chinese relations disagreed with Titarenko. A prominent Russian Asian Analyst, Sergei Goncharov, wrote in February 1992, that:

Russian foreign policy must achieve the realization of the fundamental interests of the country in two more vitally important directions besides the Western—Islam and China. *Both these directions already play a principal role now*, above all in the sphere of security, directly influencing our side not only purely military, but also the internal stability in our state.<sup>879</sup>

Veteran Soviet diplomat, Mikhail Kapitsa, who has spent almost his entire career dealing with Soviet relations with Asia, characterized the summit that was the consummation of groundwork previously laid by Kozyrev, as follows:

Contacts [between Russia and China] widened at the highest level. In December 1992 with the official visit to the PRC by the Russian Federation's first president, B.N. Yeltsin. The duration of the visit was shortened due to internal problems in Moscow, but nonetheless, the visit was successful. More than 20 documents were signed the most important among these was the Joint Declaration ...<sup>880</sup>

The recently available sources from the Chinese archives used in this study show that Goncharov and Kapitsa were correct and Titarenko was wrong: the charge that Yeltsin and Kozyrev initially ignored China, due to ideological dictates, and that good Russo-Chinese relations had to wait until the appointment of Evgeny Primakov as foreign minister in January

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<sup>878</sup> M. Titarenko, "Russia in Asia," *International Affairs*, No. 2, Volume 46, 2000, p. 127. Titarenko headed the Institute of Far Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IFES RAS) from 1985 until 2015. He probably was well aware of the true state of Russo-Chinese relations during Kozyrev's tenure as Foreign Minister, but in this article he promoted a stereotyped view of Kozyrev, most likely for political reasons. Titarenko died on 25 February 2016.

<sup>879</sup> S. Goncharov, "Osobyie interesy Rossii," *Izvestiia*, 25 February 1992, p. 6 cited in David Kerr, "The New Eurasianism," p. 981.

<sup>880</sup> Mikhail Kapitsa, *Na Raznykh Parallelakh*, pp. 119-120.

1996, are clearly false. Documentary evidence shows that from the very beginning of Kozyrev's tenure as foreign minister of the RSFSR, he aggressively pursued good relations with China, and that the December 1992 Summit between China and the Russian Federation only formally ratified the good relations that had characterized the Russo-Chinese relationship since the fall of 1990. What this study adds to current scholarship is that there never was a pro-Western period of Russo-Chinese relations, where the Russian MFA's approach to China was conditioned by a hostility based on ideological preferences.

In examining Kozyrev's views of Russo-Chinese relations from the beginning of his tenure as foreign minister of the RSFSR to his retirement from the Foreign Ministry in January 1996, one fact becomes clear: His policy—from the very beginning—was based on *pragmatism* and not *ideology* and actually conform closely to realist theories of International Relations scholarship. As he himself stated in April 1991, while he was still Foreign Minister of the RSFSR, Russian foreign policy towards China would be based on pragmatism due to the realities of the situation and that ideology would play little to no role in Russian foreign policy towards China.<sup>881</sup> This policy, which was followed throughout Kozyrev's tenure as foreign minister, can only be defined as *realist*, according to definitions provided by Martin Wight, Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, and John J. Mearsheimer.<sup>882</sup>

In fact, throughout Kozyrev's tenure as Foreign Minister, the conduct of Russo-Chinese relations provided strong evidence that Kozyrev did not hold Russian foreign policy hostage to a

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<sup>881</sup> Interview with Andrei Kozyrev, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Foreign Minister by A. Platkovskiy, 10 April 1991, place of interview not given, FBIS-SOV-91-069.

<sup>882</sup> See for example, Martin Wight, *International Theory: the Three Traditions*, pp. 15-24; Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 3-17; and Kenneth Waltz, *A Theory of International Politics*, pp. 102-128; John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, pp. 17-22.

Westernized liberal world view. During this period, Russo-Chinese relations greatly improved, and far from ignoring China, as some scholars have argued, Kozyrev showed China consistent and sustained attention, and as he himself expressed it, China had a “priority precedence” in Russian foreign policy throughout Kozyrev’s tenure as foreign minister.<sup>883</sup> Kozyrev’s deliberate and realist foreign policy toward China in fact laid the foundation for the strategic partnership, which was formalized in 1996 after he had resigned as Foreign Minister. In fact, without the important ground work that Kozyrev laid in stabilizing and progressively strengthening Russo-Chinese relations since 1990, the achievement of the strategic partnership with China in April 1996 would have been impossible. It should also be noted that while Kozyrev saw nothing contradictory in simultaneously pursuing good relations with both the West and the post-Tiananmen Square PRC, in some ways his policies frustrated the China policy of his Western partners. Under Kozyrev, military cooperation accelerated, which resulted in several arms agreements which enabled the Chinese to greatly increase their military capabilities despite a Western boycott of military technology to China. Paul Schroeder argued in his article “Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory” that “... the more one examines Waltz’s historical generalizations about the conduct of international politics throughout history with the aid of the historian’s knowledge of the actual course of history, the more doubtful—in fact, strange—these generalizations become.”<sup>884</sup> However, the case of Russo-Chinese relations during Kozyrev’s tenure as foreign minister may provide some historical evidence for the policy of balancing in the international system—a balancing that was not affected by the ideological beliefs of the statesmen who implemented the policy on either side.<sup>885</sup> The findings of the study of Russo-

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<sup>883</sup> Vladimir Kashirov and Georgiy Shmelev, “Kozyrev Visits China, Meets with Qian Qichen,” ITAR TASS, 18 March 1992 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBIS-SOV-92-053.

<sup>884</sup> Paul Schroeder, “Historical Realist vs. Neo-Realist Theory,” *International Security*, Volume 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), p. 115. I do believe, however, that Schroeder makes a strong case against Waltz’s theory based on diplomatic conduct throughout the 19th and 20th centuries.

<sup>885</sup> Kenneth Waltz, *A Theory of International Politics*, pp. 126-128, 163-170.

Chinese relations under Kozyrev are thus highly significant and contribute to a better understanding of Russian foreign policy during this period.

***Findings: Kozyrev's Efforts to defend the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in Estonia:***

In relation to defending the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Estonia, Kozyrev's policy can only be described as a great success. Not only did the CSCE—and Russian diplomatic pressure—induce the Estonian government to enact more inclusive and moderate citizenship policies towards its Russian population, the policy enabled Russia to influence events in the Baltic states that was much greater than its declining military, economic and political power could have achieved in the immediate post-Cold War era. The less aggressive policy conformed to Russian President Boris Yeltsin's stated policy of making Russia a more "normal" power that would not bully its neighbors—as its Soviet and Tsarist predecessors had. The policy survived Kozyrev's tenure as Foreign Minister and was continued by his more pragmatic successor, Evgeniy Primakov, despite the fact that it was more liberal-institutionalist than his policy towards China.<sup>886</sup>

On the surface, there is no greater case that can be made for Kozyrev as an institutionalist than his policy of defending the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in the former Union Republics of the USSR through international institutions such as the CSCE. When the Soviet Union was dissolved, 25 million ethnic Russians found themselves as minorities in fourteen new countries, that now bordered the new Russian Federation.<sup>887</sup> Andrei Kozyrev believed that the

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<sup>886</sup> Walter Kemp, *Quiet Diplomacy in Action*, p. 61. Though this dealt with Latvia and not Estonia, Russia's policy line in both countries had traditionally been the same.

<sup>887</sup> Nadia Diuk and Adrian Karatnycky, *New Nations Rising: The Fall of the Soviets and the Challenge of Independence* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1993),

best way to secure these ethnic Russians' rights was to use international institutions with their norms, legal standards and means of arbitration. In an interview with the Polish journalist, Zdzislaw Kaczynski in the Polish journal *Polityka*, conducted on 8 October 1993, Kozyrev explained that the foundation of his policy towards the Baltics and the other states in the CIS, was to establish the Council on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)'s principles in the post-Soviet territory. norms and to encourage other states do so as well.<sup>888</sup> Analyst Glenn Chafetz characterized this view as being central to the Russian liberal conception of foreign policy. He wrote that Russian liberals were "... convinced that a high degree of compliance with norms and rules governs the international behavior of most states. Finally, they place[d] great faith in the ability of diplomacy, especially involving international organizations and institutions, to resolve the conflicts that do arise between states, and to enforce international order."<sup>889</sup>

Many political scientists seized upon such statement to characterize Kozyrev's foreign policy in this area as strictly institutionalist. Among these scholars are Jack Snyder, and a number of Kozyrev's Russian critics. However, these views fail to take into consideration the fact that Yeltsin's and Kozyrev's policy was more nuanced, and did support a recourse to more coercive methods if the international institutions were not successful in achieving Russia's preferred outcomes. Kozyrev made it clear that his preferred policy of using international institutions to defend the rights of ethnic Russians in the CIS was *qualified by the possible recourse to Russian use of economic pressure, and even military force*, if these institutions failed. As early

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<sup>888</sup> Zdzislaw Raczynski, Andrei Kozyrev, "Kozyrev on Ties with Eastern Europe, Baltics" [Interview with Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev by Zdzislaw Raczynski], "We do not want to alter geography," *Polityka*, 8 September 1993, translated from the Polish by the Foreign Broadcast and Information Service, FBIS-SOV-93-172.

<sup>889</sup> Glenn Chafetz, "The Struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia," *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 111, Number 4, 1996-97, p. 675. This view corresponds nicely with Martin Wight's views of Rationalism and diplomacy. See Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*.

as 3 December 1992 he stated that if these norms failed to advance Russian interests, Russia could employ economic pressure or even military force to ensure the safety of Russians in Estonia.<sup>890</sup>

These other mechanisms acknowledge the levers of state power that are traditionally cited by realist scholars, such as Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer. Thus, *even in his most Westernist/Atlanticist-institutionalist policy area*, Kozyrev cannot be accurately described as a liberal institutionalist. This is an important and significant advance from previous scholarship. In relation to his advocacy of the use of the CSCE to defend the rights of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia, he also showed some clear-sighted *realist* (or what have been described by some scholars in the Russian context as *statist*) inclinations. Kozyrev's policy towards Russian-speakers in the Near Abroad conforms nicely to a point made by theologian Reinhold Niebuhr: "Politics will, to the end of history, be an area where conscience and power meet, where ethical and coercive factors of human life will interpenetrate and work out their tentative and uneasy compromises."<sup>891</sup> In both words and deeds throughout his tenure

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<sup>890</sup> Andrei Kozyrev, "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Proposes and Defends a Foreign Policy for Russia: In the Republic's Best Interests, *Rossiiskie Vesti*, (3 December 1992, p. 2) as translated in *The Current Digest of the Russian Press*, No. 48 Volume 44 (30 December 1992), pp. 14-16, emphasis added. This shows fairly clearly that Kozyrev's policy had been based on both his commitment to institutionalist principles *and* the use of levers of Russian state power to facilitate Russian aims in the region. At that same time, opponents of the Kozyrev line belonging to the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy wrote a report that proposed an alternative foreign policy to the one being pursued by Kozyrev. In relation to the states of the Former Soviet Union the authors of this document, according to Suzanne Crow, advocated an "... enlightened post imperialist integrationist course with the former Soviet republics, countries the authors characterize as enjoying only weak historical legitimacy in terms of territorial delineation, ethnicity, and socioeconomic development. This policy would include 'efforts to preserve and develop intergovernmental structures and an active (if possible internationally sanctioned) participation in preventing and ending conflicts, if necessary even with the help of military forces and preventing any mass and gross violation of humans rights and freedoms,'" Suzanne Crow, *Competing Blueprints for Russian Foreign Policy*, RFE/RL Research Report, 18 December 1992, p. 48. This "alternative" policy actually conforms very closely to the policy that Kozyrev pursued. This report, called "A Strategy for Russia," was published in the newspaper *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* on 19 August 1992.

<sup>891</sup> Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study of Ethics and Politics* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001) p. 4. This book was first published by Charles Scribner's Sons in 1932, I am indebted to Linton "Buz" Bishop for the use of this quote to characterize Kozyrev's policies to defend the rights of Russian speakers and ethnic Russians in the Baltic states.



as foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev both facilitated, advocated for, and supported the work of the CSCE, but he also made comments and even veiled threats to possible Russian recourse to economic, political, or even military countermeasures if Estonia did not adopt a more moderate policy towards its Russian-speaking population, providing empirical support for Sestanovich's assertion that there had always been two Kozyrevs.<sup>892</sup>

Thus, to describe Kozyrev's policies as either unqualified realist, as Kissinger does, or as an unqualified institutionalist, as Snyder does, is an incomplete description that fails to accurately describe his actual policy. In relation to his advocacy of using Western institutions to defend the rights of Russian speaker, he was in fact a "qualified" institutionalist, who bracketed his institutionalist policy within an openly *realist* framework. Simply stated, International Relations theory has not created an adequate category or label to describe Kozyrev's actual foreign policy orientation, and this deficiency can (and arguably has) led to incorrect conclusions being drawn about his tenure as foreign minister.

So while findings based upon Kozyrev's China policy can certainly be used to support the Realist paradigm of international relations theory, this study shows clearly that binary realist-liberal approach of international relations theory is insufficient to explain Kozyrev's foreign policy towards ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in Estonia. Indeed, an adherence to the traditional, binary approach may even make a good understanding of his policies impossible. For example, the realist Henry Kissinger has described Kozyrev in strictly realist terms. In his exhaustive work *Diplomacy*, Kissinger wrote:

A realistic policy would recognize that even the reformist Russian government of Boris Yeltsin has maintained Russian armies on the territory of most of the former Soviet republics—all members of the United Nations—often against the express wish of the host government ... *The foreign minister of Russia [Kozyrev] has repeatedly put forward*

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<sup>892</sup> Andrei Kozyrev, "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Proposes and Defends a Foreign Policy for Russia: In the Republic's Best Interests, *Rossiiskiy Vestnik*, (3 December 1992, p. 2) as translated in *The Current Digest of the Russian Press*, No. 48 Volume 44 (30 December 1992)

*a concept of a Russian monopoly of peacekeeping in the “near abroad,” indistinguishable from an attempt to re-establish Moscow’s domination.*<sup>893</sup>

To some extent this is true, Kozyrev always argued that it was Russia’s right and responsibility to play a large role in the near abroad, but to describe Kozyrev exclusively as a realist misses much. Kozyrev’s statements on Russia’s peacekeeping policies in the Near Abroad were in fact qualified, and that he frequently stated that these policies must be conducted within the purview of international organizations, such as the CSCE, the Congress of Europe and the European Union, and that the eventual goal of these policies was actually to result in the Russians gradually disengaging from these conflicts, as has certainly occurred in relation to Estonian treatment of its Russian-speaking minority.<sup>894</sup>

Opposing Kissinger’s view is Jack Snyder, who argued that Kozyrev “spent 1992 and 1993” advocating the value of democratic norms in international relations, but became more nationalist in outlook after this time.<sup>895</sup> However, the diplomatic record shows that this is clearly wrong. Kozyrev had always placed his most institutionally-based policy, the defense of Russian speakers in the Near Abroad within a realist framework. As he stated:

We propose to protect the rights, lives and dignity of Russians in the states of the former U.S.S.R. *above all by political and diplomatic methods, using the mechanisms of international organizations. But if these means fail to put an end to encroachments on*

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<sup>893</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 815, emphasis added.

<sup>894</sup> For an excellent contemporary overview of Russian foreign policy that describes Russia’s liberal foreign policy towards the Near Abroad, see Bruce D. Porter, “Russia and Europe after the Cold War: The Interaction of Domestic and Foreign Policies,” in Celeste A. Wallander (ed.), *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996). Porter noted: “There was only one issue on which a harder line continued to prevail—that of Russia’s relations with the near abroad. The Russian leadership made clear its commitment to an economic—and partially political—reintegration of the former Soviet states and pressed for strengthened economic and political ties within the CIS ... But even here the Russian leadership attempted to address Western concerns by insisting that any reintegration of the Russian empire would take place only voluntarily and primarily on the basis of an economic union of some kind.” (p.140).

<sup>895</sup> Jack Snyder, “Democratization, War and Nationalism in the Post-Soviet Communist States,” in Celeste A. Wallander (ed.), *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), p. 35. Stephen Sestanovich’s article “Andrei the Giant,” *The New Republic* (New York: 1 April 1994), does a much better job of accounting for Kozyrev’s varied approaches to foreign policy issues.

*the lives and safety of our fellow citizens, the conception calls for the carefully considered application of economic and military force, not the Yugoslav version, needless to say, but in within the framework of the law.*<sup>896</sup>

This shows fairly clearly that Kozyrev's policy had been based on both his commitment to institutionalist principles *and* the use of levers of Russian state power to facilitate Russian aims in the region. What this clearly shows is that political science theory, with its binary realist-liberal approach, though useful to an extent, actually complicates our ability to accurately understand and describe Kozyrev's foreign policy. Both Kissinger and Snyder are in fact, correct. But it is equally true that both are equally wrong. By accepting either explanation, the true nature of Kozyrev's policy—which successfully combined elements of realism with elements of institutionalism—is obscured and even possibly inaccessible.

### ***Findings: Kozyrev's foreign policy towards Japan***

The diplomatic record shows that Russia pursued *two* policies towards Japan during Kozyrev's tenure as foreign minister. One of those policies was an accommodationist view based upon the 1956 Joint Statement. Deputy Foreign Minister Georgii Kunadze strongly advocated this position, and it was quickly adopted by Kozyrev as the official policy of the Russian MFA. However, President Yeltsin consistently held to a position that was essentially identical with the position of his predecessor, Mikhail Gorbachev: the islands were Russian territory and this issue has been resolved by the results of the Great Patriotic War. So if Yeltsin was opposed to returning any of the islands to Japan and the MFA supported the transfer of at least two of these islands, what was Russia's official Japan policy? As Kozyrev has been often quoted as saying, the primary agent of Russian foreign policy during this period was President Yeltsin himself.<sup>897</sup>

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<sup>896</sup> Andrei Kozyrev, "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Proposes and Defends a Foreign Policy for Russia: In the Republic's Best Interests, *Rossiiskiy Vestnik*, (3 December 1992, p. 2) as translated in *The Current Digest of the Russian Press*, No. 48 Volume 44 (30 December 1992), pp. 14-16, emphasis added.

<sup>897</sup> This idea was widely held in Russian bureaucratic circles, and even Kozyrev's opponents agreed with him on this issue. See *Epokha El'tsina*, p. 479.

Possessed with extreme self-confidence and an occasionally mercurial manner, he proved to be a difficult person to manage or manipulate.<sup>898</sup> Yeltsin has been characterized as a populist, and indeed he characterized himself this way. Kozyrev described Yeltsin as follows:

That man, a regional party committee secretary, came to America and saw a supermarket; and then people came to him from Democratic Russia, people such as Sakharov, Burbulis, Gaidar, Kozyrev, and so on, and that democratic riffraff told him all this stuff. He honestly believed it at that moment. Certainly it was an instrument of struggle against Gorbachev.<sup>899</sup>

When interviewer Alfred Kokh asked Kozyrev whether Yeltsin actually believed in it or if it was simply a political instrument, Kozyrev answered:

It was both. There was an element of honesty; and then he became a Tsar and fought the Supreme Soviet. He also needed it because democracy was a banner, though Gaidar irritated him, and I—though we were very close for a long time—irritated him.<sup>900</sup>

According to Sergei Shakhrai, Yeltsin had not been guided by a clear ideology or plan for the future, and that political ideology was “situational” for him.<sup>901</sup> Petr Aven, who had been Minister of Foreign Economic Relations for the Russian Federation from 1991 to 1992, responded to this view by stating:

There is one more reasonable point of view, in my opinion. Yeltsin had no considered ideological preferences (neither in the economy nor in foreign policy), but he believed in democracy. Despite his authoritarian urges, he had profound democratic instincts. That’s why he didn’t limit media criticism of the regime and of himself; that’s why he listened so intently to the Congress of People’s Deputies. It was *vox populi* for him. The people didn’t want Gaidar, and he was ready to dismiss Gaidar even if he disagreed. When the people didn’t want him, he listened less attentively—but in everything except personal power he was prepared to listen to the opinion of the people.<sup>902</sup>

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<sup>898</sup> This seems to be a consistent view of anyone who worked for Yeltsin in the early to mid-1990s. See Aven and Kokh, *Gaidar’s Revolution: An Insider Account of the Reforms in 1990s Russia*.

<sup>899</sup> Petr Aven and Alfred Kokh, *Gaidar’s Revolution*, p. 272. The authors conducted extensive interviews with former Russian officials from the 1990. The interviews were posted on Russian Forbes website between 2010 and 2012.

<sup>900</sup> Aven and Kokh, *Gaidar’s Revolution*, “Andrei Kozyrev: A Bona Fide Kamikaze,” p. 272.

<sup>901</sup> Aven and Kokh, *Gaidar’s Revolution*, “These Events Made Yeltsin More Isolated, Angry and Vindictive,” p. 317.

<sup>902</sup> Aven and Kokh, *Gaidar’s Revolution*, “Andrei Kozyrev: A Bona Fide Kamikaze,” p. 274.

Yeltsin essentially liked and embraced the view of himself as a defender the weak, the powerless and the voiceless. Thus, during his trip to Sakhalin Island and Kunashiri in June 1990, Yeltsin declared himself to be the islanders' champion in Russian political life, and a firm opponent of Mikhail Gorbachev who he regularly accused of wanted to sell out the Russian people. On 8 February 1991, he declared:

The Russian Federation will not make any deals on our territories. We will never give up either Kaliningrad or the Kuril islands.<sup>903</sup>

The diplomatic record shows that he remained true to this vision throughout the period under investigation, despite the efforts of his Foreign Ministry to get him to endorse a policy based on the Kunadze option. While Kozyrev and Kunadze were talking to the Japanese about the 1956 Joint Declaration, Yeltsin seemed to be committed to his five principles.<sup>904</sup> The bottom line of this diplomatic cleavage was that due to President Yeltsin's political power, Russia's foreign policy was determined by President Yeltsin, and he preferred to leave an actual resolution of the territorial issue to the next generation, whereas his Foreign Ministry and the Edamura faction among the Japanese were eager to resolve the issue as soon as possible.

In light of this, the opposition the transfer of any of islands received from the Supreme Soviet, the Russian Military, and the local governmental organs all corresponded to Yeltsin's own policy, whereas the ideas of Kunadze and Kozyrev did not. Yeltsin's principles on this issue were consistently held and the remained true to Yeltsin's view of himself as a protector and advocate for the islands' beleaguered population. Discussions with both his own Foreign Ministry, Russian supporters of a quick resolution of this issue for political and economic reasons such as Andrei Kozyrev, Georgii Kunadze, or even more powerful individuals such as Dmitrii Volkogonov,

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<sup>903</sup> *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 23 August 1990, A. Vasil'ev, "Pochemu Gorbachev ne odtal ostova," *Komsomolskaia Pravda*, 25 April 1991, cited by Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, *The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations: Volume 2: Neither War nor Peace, 1985-1998*, p. 376.

<sup>904</sup> Sumio Edamura, "A Japanese View of Japanese-Russian Relations between the August 1991 Coup D'état and President Yeltsin's State Visit to Japan in October 1993," in Gilbert Rozman, *Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization*, p. 139.

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and his numerous discussions with the Japanese themselves failed to convey to President Yeltsin the fact that a treaty with Japan, and thus, the expanded relations he wanted, were impossible without reaching some accommodation with the Japanese side on the territorial issue.

In contrast with Yeltsin's occasional disagreements with Kozyrev and the Russian MFA concerning Russo-Chinese relations or defending the rights of Russian speakers in Estonia using international institutions, there was in the case of foreign policy towards Japan insufficient counterweights—internal (endogenous) and external (exogenous)—that Kozyrev could leverage to restrain Yeltsin's interventions in the policy-making process. Improved Russian relations with China were favored by almost all of the Russian Federation's institutions involved in the formation and execution of foreign policy. Furthermore, the originator of the proposal to officially recognize Taiwan, Oleg Lobov, was fairly isolated within Yeltsin's "power vertical," and was not powerful—or popular—enough to resist the forces that Kozyrev employed against him. Similarly, opposition to Kozyrev's policy of defending the rights of Russian speakers in Estonia, was fragmented, and the military essentially supported this policy on a political level, despite occasional complaints. Furthermore, the United States made it clear that they would support Estonia against any military pressure Russia tried to apply against the Baltic states, a fact that almost all Russian politicians acknowledged. Kozyrev was able to co-opt the more aggressive ideas of the opposition, jumping on the policy bandwagon of threatening to suspend withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states until they implemented the CSCE's recommendations, while simultaneously working assiduously to ensure that Russia made its withdrawal deadline. Indeed, Kozyrev officially supported this threat before Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev did. As described in the second case study, the threat to suspend military withdrawal from Estonia became one element of the "stick" Kozyrev frequently employed, even as he continuously

offered the CSCE/OSCE “carrot.” Thus, the failure of Kozyrev’s MFA to swing President Yeltsin to their position on Russo-Japanese relations contrasts sharply with Kozyrev’s success in bypassing Yeltsin’s opposition to the policies pursued in relation to both China and defending the rights of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia.

### **Implications of Findings on International Relations Theory**

Though the binary liberal-realist frame of reference does hinder an accurate understanding of Kozyrev’s foreign policy, these three case studies also show that these two categories still do have great explanatory power in describing the conduct of international relations. The case of Russo-Japanese relations under Kozyrev provides an excellent support for many realist theories. Though Russia and Japan, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, were now linked by a common ideology of democratic capitalism and liberalism, this did not enable either side to change its policy course in relation to the Northern Territories/Southern Kuriles. This is compatible with the views of many realists that ideology has little to do with the actual conduct of a state’s foreign policy. For example, Hans J. Morgenthau famously claimed:

It is a characteristic aspect of all politics, domestic as well as international, that frequently, its basic manifestations do not appear as what they actually are—manifestations of a struggle for power. Rather, the element of power as the immediate goal of the policy pursued is explained and justified in ethical, legal, or biological terms.<sup>905</sup>

Similarly, John J. Mearsheimer wrote:

Whether China is democratic and deeply enmeshed in the global economy or autocratic and autarkic will have little effect on its behavior, because democracies care about

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<sup>905</sup> Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (Sixth Edition, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson) (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1985), p.101.

security as much as non-democracies do, and hegemony is the best way for any state to guarantee its own survival.<sup>906</sup>

Kozyrev's foreign policy towards China also provides strong support for John Mearsheimer's argument that the end of the Cold War did not mean the end of realism as a guiding principle of a state's foreign policy. As characterized by Mearsheimer: "A large body of opinion in the West holds that international politics underwent a fundamental transformation with the end of the Cold War. Cooperation, not security competition and conflict, is now the defining feature of relations among the great powers. Not surprisingly, the optimists who hold this view claim that realism no longer has much explanatory power. It is old thinking and is largely irrelevant to the new realities of world politics."<sup>907</sup>

It is perhaps an irony of history that one of the diplomats most frequently singled out as a representative of the new liberal ascendancy in foreign policy in Russia, Andrei Kozyrev, actually formulated, executed and established one of the most realist-oriented international relationships in the post-Cold War era, between two countries that could not have been more ideationally different. Russia's subsequent relations with China have continued along this trajectory, as the ideational chasm has largely disappeared. As Jeanne Wilson correctly noted "... the incremental development of Russian foreign policy ties with China makes it difficult to draw a clear-cut line of differentiation between the personal foreign policy agendas of these two foreign ministers [Kozyrev and Primakov]."<sup>908</sup>

Many Russians have claimed that the United States took advantage of Russia's weakened position in the 1990s to achieve a superior position in the world security system, and this provides a basis for a more confrontational foreign policy towards the West. However, American

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<sup>906</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, p. 4.

<sup>907</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, p. 360.

<sup>908</sup> Jeanne Lorraine Wilson, *Strategic Partners: Russian-Chinese relations in the Post-Soviet Era* (New York and London: Routledge, 2004), p. 193.



and Western analysts of Russian foreign policy in the 1990s could claim, with equal merit, that Kozyrev's Russia took advantage of the United States' diplomatic weaknesses vis-a-vis China in the 1990s due to economic sanctions and arms embargoes, and used this as an engine to strengthen Russia's position in the East at the West's expense. In this process, Russia actually *worked against* Western military sanctions and arms embargoes, by selling China sophisticated weapons systems such as the Kilo-class submarine,<sup>909</sup> IL-76 transports, and Su-27 series fighter aircraft, that in some cases, allowed the Chinese to build their own versions of these weapons systems under license. For those systems the Chinese did not have a license to build, the Chinese had a well earned reputation for reverse-engineering foreign military systems that enabled them to exploit Russian technologies even without licenses. It must be pointed out that these sales and agreements had their origins under Kozyrev's tenure as foreign minister. For example, China bought its first two Kilo-class submarines from Russia in 1994.<sup>910</sup> In this case, the need for Russia to acquire new customers for its declining military industrial complex, and China's need for sophisticated military technology under conditions of Western boycott of exporting military technology to China following the Tiananmen Square incident seemed to override ideological concerns of both sides, and this is made clear from the available diplomatic record. Kozyrev's China policy thus fulfilled the economic needs of the Russian state, despite

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<sup>909</sup> The sale of four Kilo-class submarines to China was carried out in 1994, and it was a major factor in enabling China to narrow the gap in naval weaponry with Western nations during the Western ban of sales of military hardware to China. See John Pike, "Kilo-class submarine - People's Liberation Army Navy," 7 November 2011 <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/kilo.htm> Accessed 3 August 2018. As Pike noted: "China negotiated with Russia to transfer the technology to permit Chinese construction of submarines of this class. The acquisition of Kilo attack submarines from Russia provided the PLAN with access to technology in quieting and sonar development, as well as weapons systems. China incorporated some aspects of these technologies into its new domestic Yuan-class submarine construction programs." See also Franz-Stefan Gady, "How Russia is Helping China Develop its Naval Power," *The Diplomat* 4 September 2015. <http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/how-russia-is-helping-china-develop-its-naval-power/>

<sup>910</sup> Rajan Menon, "The Strategic Convergences Between Russia and China," *Survival*, Volume 39, Issue 2 (Summer 1997), p. 116, and John Pike, "Kilo-class submarine—People's Liberation Army Navy," 7 November 2011, *Global Security* <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/kilo.htm>

being opposed to his personal ideological orientation. As Henry Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston (1784-1865) famously remarked: “We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”<sup>911</sup> At the same time, this study provides an interesting counter-point to realist theory in one area. According to realist scholars such as Morgenthau and Mearsheimer, it should not matter who the individual foreign minister is. Regardless of his political orientation or his personal preferences, he will uphold his state’s national interests to the fullest extent of his ability. While Kozyrev was able to do so, especially in relation to China, his personal aversion to unilateral action and his view that the level of military power should only be used in extreme circumstances, his overall foreign policy was relatively benign towards Russia’s neighbors and with other powers as well. This difference in temperament and policy orientation can clearly be seen by comparing Kozyrev’s conduct to foreign policy to that of his successors, primarily Evgeniy Primakov and Sergei Lavrov. This study shows that the personality and the general orientations of the foreign minister actually matters. Kozyrev did work to uphold Russian national interests, but he did so in a Wightian or a “Kennanian” manner that sought to address the other country’s perceived national interests that enabled both sides to meet their security requirements. This accommodationist attitude is the hallmark of Wight’s Grotian rationalism—but it is also the hallmark of a good and effective diplomat according to both Morgenthau and Kennan. Exploration of this concept on both a practical and theoretical level would probably be quite fruitful in examining foreign policy.

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<sup>911</sup> Henry Temple, 3rd Viscount Palmerston, Speech of the House of Commons, 1 March 1848, <https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1848/mar/01/treaty-of-adrianople-charges-against> Accessed 4 July 2018

## Defending the Rights of Russian Speakers in Estonia: Institutionalism and Realism

In the question of the efficacy of international institutions, Mearsheimer stated: “My central conclusion is that institutions have minimal influence on state behavior, and thus hold little promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world.”<sup>912</sup> In terms of the OSCE, he proved to be correct overall. The United States had no intention of letting the OCSE supersede US and Western-dominated organizations, most notably NATO, as the primary structures of European security in the post-war era. As the authors of the *Epoch of Yeltsin* noted: “As is known, Russia advocated the creation of a system of European security on the basis of the OSCE. Already by the middle of the 1990s it had become clear that this policy was a fiasco.”<sup>913</sup>

No state will or can willingly surrender a superior position in the world to a rival country or organization, though some of Mikhail Gorbachev’s critics claimed he did so.<sup>914</sup> Seen from this perspective, it is highly unlikely that US statesmen would have agreed with the Russian position on the OSCE becoming the basis of a new European security system. In speech entitled: “Principles and Opportunities for American Foreign Policy, delivered at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University on 20 January 1995, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher declared: “The third principle of our strategy is that if the historic movement toward open societies and open markets is to endure, we must adapt and revitalize the institutions of global and regional cooperation ... Our challenge now is to modernize and to revitalize those great institutions—NATO, the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank, and the OECD, among

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<sup>912</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” *International Security*, Volume 19, Number 3, Winter 1994/95, p. 7.

<sup>913</sup> Iu. M. Baturin et al, *Epokha El'tsina: Ocherki politicheskoi Istorii* [The Epoch of Yeltsin: Political historical essays] (Moscow, Vagaris, 2001), p. 482.

<sup>914</sup> Yegor Gaidar, in contrast to these views, argued that economic and political realities in the late Soviet period made it an imperative that Gorbachev attempt to reform the economically and politically doomed USSR. See Yegor Gaidar, *Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2007).

others.”<sup>915</sup> Conspicuously missing from this list was the CSCE/OSCE. To this day, NATO remains the main engine of European security, though it is increasingly challenged by a Russia that seeks to overturn this order. Russia’s intentions to do so have been most strongly demonstrated by the Five-Day War with Georgia in August 2008 and the seizure of the Crimea from Ukraine in February 2014.

However, this overall failure in relation to replacing the Western-dominant institutions, such as NATO or the EU as the main engines of European cooperation and integration should not obscure the fact that at least one aspect of Kozyrev’s institutionalist policy, the use of the CSCE to defend the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in Estonia, bore fruit. The more anti-Russian citizenship policies of the newly established Estonian government were effectively opposed, contained, and in some cases, overturned by the CSCE. The CSCE’s advocacy of the rights of Estonia’s Russian speakers bore important fruit that enabled many Russian-speakers to become citizens of Estonia. Thus, Kozyrev’s policy—which was essentially a blending of elements of *realism* and *liberal institutionalism*—was a resounding success story, even if it cannot be accurately described within the current realist-liberal divide in political science theory. Though this binary system of classification has been criticized since the 1950s—its very inception—these categories are still widely used by political scientists today, as the July/August 2018 issue of *Foreign Affairs* clearly demonstrates.<sup>916</sup>

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<sup>915</sup> Warren Christopher, *In the Stream of History*, p. 249.

<sup>916</sup>The most recent edition of the Council on Foreign Relations-produced journal *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2018 is entitled “Which World are We Living in?” The volume contains an article written by Stephen Kotkin entitled “The Realist World: The Players Change but the Game Remains,” and another article written by Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry entitled “The Liberal World: The Resilient Order.” *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2018 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations).

The British scholar of international relations, Martin Wight (26 November 1913 – 15 July 1972), saw that this binary approach was flawed and throughout his life he continuously developed a more explanatory theory that allowed for a fruitful synthesis of *three*—not two— categories, which he identified as Realist, Rationalist, and Revolutionary/liberal.<sup>917</sup> This study has shown that Wight's categories and approach have greater explanatory power in describing Andrei Kozyrev's foreign policy. Using Wight's categories as a frame of reference, this study reveals the following about Kozyrev's foreign policy in relation to the three case studies examined:

- 1) Russian foreign policy towards China—Unqualified Realist
- 2) Russian policy to defend the rights of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in Estonia—Rationalist with Realist tendencies
- 3) Russian foreign policy towards Japan—Rationalist with Revolutionary tendencies

Overall Evaluation of Kozyrev's foreign policy—Rationalist/Realist

Though Martin Wight formulated these categories from the period ranging from the 1950s to the 1970s, they did not have much impact on United States political science approaches to the study of international relations, though they did provide the foundations of what has been identified as the “English School.” As one of the English School's most prominent scholars, Barry Buzan, argued, the ES:

...agrees with [Alexander] Wendt in admitting the possibility of friends [in an anarchic system] and adding belief to the logics of coercion and calculation. It also gives *raison de system* equal billing alongside *raison d'etat* ... And because it emphasizes shared values as the basis of primary institutions, the ES shares ground with the constructivist and post-structuralist interest in identity ... The ES approach puts into systematic form the general proposition that there is not just one logic of anarchy, as realism suggests, but many.<sup>918</sup>

The study of Andrei Kozyrev's foreign policy is a fruitful region to revisit ES principles. As this study has shown these principles have great explanatory power that is superior to the binary

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<sup>917</sup> Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*.

<sup>918</sup> Barry Buzan, “The English School: A neglected approach to International Security Studies,” *Security Dialogue*, Volume 46 (2), 2015, p. 129.

realist-liberal approach that has traditionally characterized American approaches to the study of international relations. If forced into a corner, based on the three case studies examined in this study, an analyst could very accurately describe Kozyrev as a realist, though a qualified one. In the existing international relations literature, the best description of him is probably that of Peter Shearman and Matthew Sussex, who argued in 2000 that while some analysts divided the competing schools of thought in the Russian Federation as a struggle between “Westernizers and Eurasianists,” or “Liberals and Slavophiles.”

A more useful distinction can be made between two separate stands of realism: Kozyrev representing a more liberal, soft or accommodating realism compared to the more conservative, hard or assertive realism of his opponents.<sup>919</sup>

Kozyrev would best be labelled as a “soft realist” which essentially falls within Wight’s category of Rationalism. Kozyrev’s rationalist foreign policy was far more successful than many scholars—or current Russian policy-makers—are likely to admit, yet these principles could be resurrected to govern Russian foreign policy in the future. Looking at the current state of international relations in the world today, it is difficult not to agree with Russian journalist Yulia Latynina that currently, Putin’s foreign policy is based more on bark than bite, and in the long run, it is probably unsustainable.<sup>920</sup> Putin’s policy towards China, which has departed from the Kozyrev formula—that good relations with the West are essential to maintain good relations with

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<sup>919</sup> Peter Shearman and Matthew Sussex, “Foreign Policy-making and Institutions,” in Neil Robinson, *Institutions and Political Change in Russia* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 154. Their characterization of Russian foreign policy thought in the 1990s is actually quite effective because it can more easily account for, and better describe, the fact that even within Yeltsin’s government foreign policy practitioners soon split into what have been identified as “liberals” and “statists,” such as Vladimir Lukin and Sergei Stankevich, though in comparison to other players in the political landscape of 1990s Russia, the Statists were quite liberal, and differed from the liberals only in terms of degree.

<sup>920</sup> Yulia Latynina, “Putin’s Threats: More Bark Than Bite,” *The New York Times*, 27 June 2018 [https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/opinion/putin-russia-west-war.html?utm\\_source=Sailthru&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_campaign=EBB%206.27.18&utm\\_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/opinion/putin-russia-west-war.html?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%206.27.18&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief) Accessed 30 June 2018.

China and vice-versa—has clearly run into its limits,<sup>921</sup> as China continues to broaden and deepen its relations with Ukraine—Putin’s most prominent international enemy. This process does not seem to be declining.<sup>922</sup> The simple fact acknowledged by Kozyrev, his successor Ivanov, and even probably, current Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, is that China needs the West more than it needs Russia, due to the West’s role as a huge economic market and a source for high technology, so any attempt by Russia to play a “China card” against the West is destined to fail.<sup>923</sup> Kozyrev’s “good neighbor” policy in the Near Abroad, while ridiculed by Kozyrev’s critics, is a far superior foreign policy to one based on threatening its neighbors. Putin’s seizure of Crimea, his invasion of eastern Ukraine, and his growing propagandistic bragging about Russian power in the region has achieved the impossible—it has brought a sense of mission and cooperation back to NATO.<sup>924</sup>

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<sup>921</sup> Maximilian Hess, “Argument: China Has Decided Russia is too Risky an Investment,” *Foreign Policy*, 16 May 2018. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/05/16/china-has-decided-russia-is-too-risky-an-investment/> Accessed on 10 August 2018.

<sup>922</sup> James Brooke, “With Russia on the Sidelines, China moves Aggressively into Ukraine,” *Atlantic Council*, 5 January 2018. <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/with-russia-on-the-sidelines-china-moves-aggressively-into-ukraine> Accessed 10 August 2018; Nolan Peterson, “U.S. Weapons and Chinese Cash Compete for Influence in Ukraine,” *The Daily Signal*, 8 July 2018. <https://www.dailysignal.com/2018/01/08/us-weapons-chinese-cash-compete-influence-ukraine/> Accessed on 10 August 2018.

<sup>923</sup> Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, “Playing Russia’s China Card (the Russian Elections)-Interview,” *New Perspectives Quarterly*, 1 June 1996, Volume 13, No. 3. This can be seen as a far more sophisticated, and diplomatically sustainable, position on Russo-Chinese relations what that held by Vladimir Putin and Sergei Lavrov following the Ukraine crisis in February 2014. See also Leonid Mlechin’s descriptions of Evgeny Primakov’s, Igor Ivanov’s and Sergei Lavrov’s tenures as foreign minister, in Leonid Mlechin, *MID*, pp. 661-728, 729-790, 790-845.

<sup>924</sup> Richard Sokolsky, “The New NATO-Russia Military Balance: Implications for European Security,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 13 March 2017; Steven Pifer, “Putin’s NATO fears are Groundless,” Brookings Institution, 2 July 2014 <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/putins-nato-fears-are-groundless/> Accessed on 10 August 2018; Mark Mardell, “NATO Muscle-Flexing Sends Putin Firm Message,” BBC News, 12 March 2015 <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31830197> Accessed on 10 August 2018; Lorne Cook and Robert Burns, “NATO Trumpets Resolve over Russia, Plays Down Divisions,” *US News and World Report*, 7 June 2018.

In relation to Japan, though Shinzo Abe and Vladimir Putin have accelerated their meetings together and have concluded some agreements, a solution to the Northern Territories dispute is as remote as ever, and in the final analysis (unless either side suddenly and unexpectedly abandons the policy it is held on this issue since the late 1940s), Abe's Japan will remain a loyal and faithful ally of the United States, despite its efforts to improve relations with the Russian Federation.<sup>925</sup> Once again, Kozyrev's policy direction—based on commonly-held Western values and a non-confrontational approach to the West—was a far superior approach to that of the Putin administration, which has consistently alienated Russia from the leading Western nations, and which forces Japan into a situation where improving relations with Russia can only occur in opposition to its policies related to the major Western powers, the United States in particular. Ironically, for all the criticism Kozyrev has received from Russian critics, the foreign policy he implemented and pursued actually achieved positive results and advanced Russian state interests. This is shown conclusively through the case studies examined here: in each case, even in the “failed” one, Kozyrev's foreign policy laid the foundation for subsequent Russian foreign policy, one that the Russian state is still building on today. Though unable to prevent NATO expansion or to restore Russian influence to the same level as Soviet influence after the Second World War, it achieved its goals to the best it could considering the Russian Federation's many great and serious weaknesses at that time. In recent years, analysts have started to rethink Kozyrev's liberal colleague Yegor Gaidar as a statesman. Some have

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<sup>925</sup> See, for example, Akahiro Iwashita, “The Hidden Side of the Japanese-Russian summit,” *The Japan Times*, 29 May 2017, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/05/29/commentary/japan-commentary/hidden-side-japanese-russian-summit/> accessed on 21 February 2018. See also the important short article from one of Japan's leading Russia scholars, Kazuhiko Togo, “Japan's Relations with Russia and China, and the Implications for the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” *The National Bureau for Asian Research*, 16 May 2018, <http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=864> Accessed on 14 June 2018. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has made great efforts to improve Japanese relations with both Russia and China. A series of bilateral meetings culminated in a Putin-Abe meeting in Abe's hometown of Yamaguchi in December 2016, where according to Togo “... the two leaders shared a determination of conclude a peace treaty but ... Despite continued negotiations, to achieve these clearly defined objectives, 2017 passes without tangible outcomes.” (p.3).



acknowledged that the improvement of the Russian economy and the boom it had in the early 2000s, something Putin was quick to claim credit for, was actually due—at least in part—to Gaidar’s policies.<sup>926</sup> As Russian foreign policy continues to lose friends and influence people—in a negative direction—to unite nations against a perceived Russian menace,<sup>927</sup> maybe a similar reappraisal will be made of Andrei Kozyrev’s foreign policy in time. As analysts revisit Kozyrev’s foreign policy, they will need better descriptions than the realist-liberal divide, which is useful up to a certain extent, but prevents an accurate description of a nuanced foreign policy, as Martin Wight had warned his students it would since the 1950s.

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<sup>926</sup> See, for example, the *Economist*’s obituary for Gaidar, “Yegor Timurovich Gaidar, a Russian reformer, died on December 16th, aged 53,” 17 December 2009 <https://www.economist.com/obituary/2009/12/17/yegor-gaidar> Accessed on 30 June 2018. See also Dmitri Travin, “Yegor Gaidar: the reformer who died of neglect,” Open Democracy, 17 December 2009. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/dmitri-travin/yegor-gaidar-reformer-who-died-of-neglect>; See also Aven and Kokh, *Gaidar’s Revolution*, and Yegor Gaidar, *Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia* (Washington, DC; Brookings Institution Press, 2007).

<sup>927</sup> See, for example, Harrys Puusepp (compiler), *The Estonian Internal Security Service, Annual Review, 2016*, p. 3. <https://www.kapo.ee/en/content/annual-reviews.html>, Accessed on 4 July 2018. Bettina Renz and Hanna Smith, *Russia and Hybrid Warfare: Going Beyond the Label*, Aleksanteri Paper, Report 01/2016, [www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/english/publications/aleksanteri\\_papers.html](http://www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/english/publications/aleksanteri_papers.html) See also John M. Owen IV and William Inboden, “Putin, Ukraine, and the Question of Realism,” *The Hedgehog Review*, Spring 2015, p. 87-88.

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