Genealogy in Early Greek Philosophy

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A Dissertation presented to the Graduate Faculty
Of the University of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Classics

University of Virginia

August, 2020

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Introduction.

A genealogy is a list of names that traces their ancestry. As such, most scholarship on genealogy in the ancient world is anthropological, historical, or mythological in orientation. This dissertation, by contrast, is about Genealogy and Early Greek Philosophy. Of all surviving Presocratic fragments, however, none explicitly include a genealogy. The topic, therefore, requires explanation.

The initial inspiration came from reading an essay by Gemelli-Marciano about the role embryology plays in the cosmology of Empedocles (2005). To summarize the point, Gemelli-Marciano convincingly shows how Empedocles makes the origins of life and the origins of the cosmos resemble one another and follow the same principles. In this study, I show that Parmenides uses the same analogy, but I also show how the analogy is an extension of a tradition of genealogical thinking that begins with epic poets and mythographers. For instance, Parmenides' and Empedocles' use of hexameters, catalogues and mythological names alludes to the tradition of cosmological genealogy as found in Hesiod's *Theogony*. Furthermore, the *Theogony* itself arose from a world where genealogical thinking was already pervasive and had a variety of applications, as we see in the heroic genealogies of Homer and the mythographers.

In addition to Empedocles and Parmenides, embryological analogies can to be found in Anaximander and other predecessors, as well as important connections to Hesiod. Most importantly, the Presocratics explain how the cosmos came into being from one *archê,* and there are many reasons to suspect that the *archê* theories of the Milesians were inspired by genealogical cosmogonies like Hesiod's *Theogony*. Hesiod not only used genealogy to describe the beginnings of the cosmos, but the birth scene of Aphrodite arguably takes a closer look at the

physical processes behind genealogical progress. Like embryology in the Presocratics, genealogy is itself a vitalist analogy. The Milesians, Parmenides, and Empedocles all suggest that their various cosmologies arose out of the tradition of competing genealogies.

About the particulars of their own genealogies, the Greeks were in constant disagreement, but the form of genealogy endured. Before philosophy entered the picture, the many heroic genealogies of mythology and epic suggest that speculation and argument about lineage was ever-present in the ancient Greek world. Genealogical thinking was one way the Greeks could process their relationship to the unknown, and philosophical speculation emerged from this context. Although Greeks like Hecataeus, made genealogies with very personal goals in mind, genealogy nevertheless guaranteed a certain degree of rationalism. Furthermore, the act of genealogizing *oneself* relates directly to the heroic boast in Homer. The form of genealogy, and genealogical thinking, ultimately contributed to the way the Greeks establish their truths, not just in their histories, but in their sciences and philosophies as well.

In my first chapter, I discuss human genealogies in mythography and epic from Hecataeus, Pherecydes of Athens, and Homer. As many scholars demonstrate in different ways, genealogies were continually modified by the Greeks to suit whatever purpose their authors had in mind, whether historical or personal. Nevertheless, the genealogies were all delivered with varying degrees of impartiality, as though there were no fictional elements. I believe every Greek knew that their own distant past was at best a matter of hearsay, but genealogy's structure made their speculations as convincing and logical as possible.

In chapter two, I discuss how the proem to Hesiod's *Theogony* suggests that Hesiod's divine genealogies diverge from traditional accounts. I also discuss details about the initial cosmogony that tie his poem closely with the Presocratic tradition after Hesiod. Chaos raises

many questions, but it also demonstrates the importance of an absolute beginning. The resemblance to later Presocratic *archai* is obvious, but it is also important to notice the lasting affect Chaos has on the cosmos though its descendants and its appearances in Hesiod's underworld.

In my third chapter, I discuss the ways in which Parmenides implicates genealogy in his arguments. My focus is on the cosmogonic scheme in the *Doxa* as well as the evidence for mythological figures and catalogues alluding once again to Hesiod's catalogue of Night. More than Empedocles, Parmenides seems to have an "anti-genealogical" message for his comparatively more genealogical predecessors. Parmenides' use of hexameters, however, brings him much closer to Hesiod, who may have originated genealogical cosmogony.

In my fourth chapter, I discuss how Empedocles establishes authority by opposing his theories about the elements, which involve mixis and separation, to "mortal" views, which he suggests are genealogical. I also discuss the important catalogue fragments and their connection to Hesiod's catalogue of Night.

In my fifth chapter, I discuss how Empedocles transforms Aphrodite into a craftswoman from a goddess of sexual procreation. These features make Empedocles' poem "post-genealogical." I also compare the embryological processes of congealing and separation in medical writers, Anaximander, and Hesiod. The comparison shows that Hesiod may have inspired the Presocratic analogy between cosmogony and embryology.

Ch. 1: Genealogy in Greek Mythography and Epic

I. Introduction

In Book 3 of the *Republic*, Socrates uses genealogy to explain the hierarchy of classes in the ideal city. Citizens are siblings, children of the earth, in each of whom a god implanted precious metals corresponding to their role in the city: Rulers were implanted with gold, guardians with silver, and craftsmen and farmers with iron or bronze. This took place at their conception in the womb of the earth, we are told. At the conclusion of this 'noble lie' (γενναῖον [ψεῦδος], 414b-c), Socrates expresses concern over how they could possibly get the citizens to believe it. "Do you have some means," Socrates asks Glaucon, "to make them believe this myth?" (τοῦτον οὖν τὸν μῦθον ὅπως ἂν πεισθεῖεν, ἔχεις τινὰ μηχανήν;, 415c). "In no way at all," Glaucon replies, "would they themselves believe it. But nevertheless, their sons, and the next generation and the rest coming afterwards might" (415c-d). The "lie" thus becomes believable over time, as generations are raised to believe it, and the moment of its fabrication fades into the past. Then Socrates says, "But even this would steer them to care more for the city and for one another. In any case, this matter will end up wherever Φήμη leads it" (415d).[1]

The noble lie is not some Platonic novelty, but representative of the way in which genealogy is used throughout archaic Greece, the classical period, and beyond.[2] In this chapter, I will discuss examples of genealogy in Greek mythography and epic. There are idiosyncratic,

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[1] The noble lie alludes to Hesiod in two ways: First, to the myth of the races (*WD* 106-201, cf. Adam 1963, *ad* 415a5) and, next, to Φήμη at the end of the *Works and Days* ("…wicked Φήμη is light to raise very easily, but grievous to bear and difficult to get rid of. No Φήμη is entirely lost which many people continue to utter it. And even she is a sort of god," *WD* 761-4). The context of the second passage relates the birth of Φήμη, and in this way both Hesiodic allusions enhance the genealogical thrust of the Platonic noble lie.

[2] Cf. Schofield 2001, 160-61. Especially important is *Resp.* 414c, where Socrates reminds us that poets have convinced people of similar stories in the past.

'fabricated' elements in each. Nevertheless, the authors used various means to establish the authority of their genealogies. The noble lie suggests that, when a genealogy is first composed, it met with resistance if it went against traditional notions. Over time, however, novel contributions could become tradition as the contentious circumstances of its creation fade into the background. In the first section of this chapter, I will show how the genealogies contained in the Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women* followed a trajectory like the one Socrates hoped the noble lie would. The enduring success of the poem's genealogies relied upon the choice of Hellen as the ancestor and Hellas as the territory central to Greek identity. The neutrality of Hellen helps diffuse or disguise the contentious context of the composition, namely the Thessalian Hegemony after the First Sacred War (Fowler 1998, 9-13). A similar point can be made for Pherecydes, the subject of section two, who uses an impersonal style in order to disguise the changes he makes to the Philaid genealogy.[3] Both Pherecydes and the *Catalogue* poet drew attention away from their biases in order to discourage criticism and establish the authority of their genealogies. The genealogies of Hecataeus corroborate this view from another angle. In section three, I show how Herodotus criticized the personal bias that lay at the heart of the genealogies of his predecessor.[4] Neverthless, there is a precedent for the self-agrandisement of Hecataeus' genealogies. For instance, the genealogical boasts of the *Iliad,* discussed in section four, secured the legitimacy and greatness of the heroes who uttered them.[5] All these examples suggest that genealogies are

[3] For Pherecydes' "impersonal style," see Fowler 2006, 39-45. For Ph.'s changes to the Philaid genealogy, see Thomas 1989, 161-73.
[4] My argument relies on Dillery 2018 who argues that some details of Hecataeus' own work can be reconstructed from the story in Herodotus about the mythographer's visit to Egypt. Other scholars view the story in Herodotus as the historian's fabrication (West 1991).
[5] Lang 1994.

never purely objective, even if they are presented as such, but can serve a variety of other *personal* purposes.

II. The Catalogue of Women

Comparing the genealogies of the *Catalogue* with other traditions shows that many of its details were originally idiosyncratic. Nevertheless, despite these novelties the *Catalogue* came to be adopted as tradition.

The original historical context of the *Catalogue of Women* reflects its purpose, namely to unify Ionians, Aiolians, and Dorians by making them descendants of one ancestor, Hellen.[6] We often take for granted that the Greeks called themselves "Hellenes," but it was only over the course of the seventh century and into the sixth that the term grew to encompass these groups. Before the term took hold, Hellas was originally only a small territory in north central Greece. The *Iliad, Odyssey,* and *Works and Days* demonstrate the development and expansion of the term.

To start with the earliest, *Iliad* 2.683-5 mentions *Hellas* and the *Hellenes* as a distinct group, only part of Achilles' forces. Later, in the Odyssey, *Hellas* appears to comprise a larger territory, shown by the formula καθ' Ἑλλάδα καὶ μέσον Ἄργος. This formula appears three times to describe Odysseus' fame, throughout all of Greece (*Od.* 1.344, 4.726, 4.816). There, Hellas seems to refer to northern Greece, while 'mid-Argos' probably refers to the Peloponnese (cf. Fowler 1998, 10). Finally, at *Works and Days* 653, Hesiod recounts how the Achaians gathered an Army from *Hellas* for Troy. There, Hellas signifies *all* of Greece.[7]

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[6] Fowler 1998, 12.

[7] Regarding the compound *Panhellenes,* Fowler mentions *Il.* 2.530 ([Αἴας] ἐγχείῃ δ' ἐκέκαστο Πανέλληνας καὶ Ἀχαιούς), a line "suspected since antiquity" which use *Hellas* to mean

The original meaning of the term *Hellas* raises a question typical of modern scholarly treatment of genealogies: "Now if we ask *whose interest is reflected* when Hellen is said to be a son of Deukalion and father of Aiolos and Doros, the answer is unambiguously 'Thessaly'" (Fowler 1998, 11, my emphasis). [8]

The long-lasting success of the *Catalogue* depends in part on its overtaking, outlasting, or otherwise persisting in the face of competing claims such as the tradition that Deukalion is from Lokris, and not Thessaly. The Lokrian Deukalion is attested by Pindar at *O*. 9.44-50. The *Catalogue* (fr. 6 MW) claims that Deukalion's descendants ruled in Thessaly, and this view was adopted by Hecataeus (*FGrHis*t 1 F 14) and Hellanicus (*FGrHis*t 4 F 6, cf. Fowler 1998, 11). The acceptance of Thessalian Deukalion is a testament to the success of the *Catalogue.* Also relevant is the way Phokis, Thessaly's opponent in the First Sacred War, appears in the *Catalogue*. Phokos, son of Aiakos and the eponymous ancestor of Phokis, is an Asopid descendent of Aigina (fr. 205). He is, therefore, unhellenic, but is "allowed" to "re-establish a low-level Hellenic connection through his wife [Asterodeia]," as Fowler puts it (1998, 14). These competing traditions reinforce the fact that the *Catalogue* showed some biases of its own.

Other features of the *Catalogue* suggest that the poet avoided potential conflicts. For example, using Hellen as the unifying ancestor of the Greeks avoids showing open bias to any

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northern Greece, as in the later examples from the *Odyssey.* The same term is used later at Hes. *WD.* 528 to denote all of Greece (Fowler 1998, 10).

[8] Thessaly was "predominately Aiolian," and the *Catalogue* features a detailed Aiolid stemma. The structure of the stemma, "broad" and "segemented," is presumed to reflect members of the Amphiktyony which Thessaly led during the First Sacred War (Fowler 1998. 9-10). The Thessalian biases of the *Catalogue* are also detected by West 1985, 138-44. The Thessalian background of the Aiakids is also discussed in West 1973, 189-91, cf. West 1985, 162-64. It may be a slight exaggeration to say Hellen is ancestor of "all Greeks," since the *Graikoi* and *Makedones* are excluded from this group. The Aiolians, Ionians, and Dorians, however, are Hellen's descendants.

individual *polis*. As Fowler puts it, "Achilles could not be chosen; quarrels might arise about his true progeny, for instance with the Epirots, and no amount of revisionism could make the son of Peleus ancestor of all the Greeks. Hellen had the great advantage of offering a fresh start. It was very convenient too that as a result of Dark Age movements the original Hellas has been obliterated and existed only in legend" (1998, 12).[9] The success of the *Catalogue* poet's revision, therefore, relies on the fact that "Hellas" was available as a symbol. Although the genealogy reflects a competitive and agonistic context, the impersonal and neutral status of Hellen disguised the Thessalian bias of the *Catalogue's* Deukalionid stemma. The details of the *Catalogue,* therefore, persisted without being challenged too directly by later authors. Hecataeus, for instance, revises the Deukalionid stemma by making Ion a descendant of Marathonios, no longer a descendant of Hellen, whom Hecataeus makes a nephew of Marathonios (Fowler 2003, 8; 2013, 140-47; See *FGrHist* 1 F 13). This change is more likely to reflect Hecataeus' status as an Ionian than any argument against Thessalian hegemony, which would seem out of place for the mythographer.

Although Hecataeus discusses the Deukalionids throughout book one of his *Genealogies,* many fragments suggest he was sympathetic to—or at least not antagonistic towards—Thessaly. For instance, fr. 14 maintains that Deukalion ruled over Thessaly, and fr. 2 refers to the Argo as "the work of Itonian Athena," Itoni being both a town in Thessaly and Itonos a son of Amphiktyon, the eponymous ancestor of the Amphiktyony itself (*BNJ* 1 F 14). Assuming Fowler is correct about the Thessalian bias of the *Catalogue*, Hecataeus either did not see the

[9] The Epirot kings claimed to be descendants of Achilles (Plut. *Pyrrhus* 1).

same bias or was at the very least not concerned with refuting it when constructing his own version of the *Catalogue* stemma.

To conclude my discussion of the *Catalogue of Women,* the juxtaposition of its stemma with variant traditions reveals idiosyncrasies fabricated by the poet, but the poet also ensured that his genealogies would persist as accepted beliefs through the apparent neutrality and impartiality of Hellen as a unifying figure. The antagonism of the arrangement against Phokos is thus tempered to not overstep the interests of other *poleis* in the Amphiktyony.

III. Pherecydes of Athens

Not to be confused with the writer of cosmology from Syros, Pherecydes of Athens was a mythographer active during the early 5th century B.C.E. He authored a handbook referred to as *Historiai.* This large work of 10 books included summaries of myths relating only bare facts in an unadorned style. My discussion of Pherecydes combines two important observations from recent scholarship. The first is Pherecydes' "impersonal style," which influenced later mythography and historiography (Fowler 2006). The second is his probable connection to the Philaidae, an Athenian aristocratic family including the famous general Miltiades and his ancestor of the same name (Thomas 1989, 172-173).

Pherecydes is like the *Catalogue* poet since the authority of his genealogies also depends on affected impartiality, even if it is achieved in a different way. As we saw in the section above, the *Catalogue* poet used Hellen as a unifying figure because at the time the poet composed the Deukalionid stemma, it is unlikely that any group called themselves "Hellenes," nor was there a specific territory, "Hellas," to compete over the legendary figure. Hellen provided a fresh start, and his adoption was unlikely to offend other *poleis*. Pherecydes' authority, on the other hand, depends not on the content of his genealogies, but rather on the style

in which he presents them. Pherecydes uses his style to conceal his role in constructing the genealogy of the Philaidae, in a manner analogous to the *Catalogue* poet's concealment of his *Thessalian* bias through his choice of Hellen as a unifying figure.

In this section, I will first explain Pherecydes' "impersonal style," but then also show how the content of his genealogies and their fabrication reflect not impartiality, but biases which belonged to the author. Again, we see an effort to present a genealogical fabrication as though it were not a matter of the author's creative choices but objective fact; nevertheless, the author does make creative choices in the service of the genealogy's true purpose.

Pherecydes' mythography is known for its "absence of personality" and the "complete self-effacement" of the author from his text (Fowler 2006, 44), as the following fragment shows (*FGrHist* 3 F 105; ed. Fowler 2010, p. 332; trans. Fowler 2006, 39)[10]:

> ἔθυε τῶι Ποσειδῶνι ὁ Πελίης, καὶ προεῖπε πᾶσι παρεῖναι· οἱ δὲ ἤισαν οἵ τε ἄλλοι πολῖται καὶ ὁ ᾽Ιήσων. ἔτυχε δὲ ἀροτρεύων ἐγγὺς τοῦ ᾽Αναύρου ποταμοῦ, ἀσάμβαλος δὲ διέβαινε τὸν ποταμόν, διαβὰς δὲ τὸν μὲν δεξιὸν ὑποδεῖται πόδα, τὸν δὲ ἀριστερὸν ἐπιλήθεται· καὶ ἔρχεται οὕτως ἐπὶ δεῖπνον. ἰδὼν δὲ ὁ Πελίης συμβάλλει τὸ μαντήιον, καὶ τότε μὲν ἡσύχασε, τῆι δ᾽ ὑστεραίαι μεταπεμψάμενος αὐτὸν ἤρετο ὅ τι ποιοίη εἰ αὐτῶι χρησθείη ὑπό του τῶν πολιτῶν ἀποθανεῖν. ὁ δὲ ᾽Ιάσων, πέμψαι ἂν εἰς Αἶαν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὸ κῶας τὸ

[10] The text is found as a scholion to Pindar *P* 4.133a (2.117.7 Drachmann). Jacoby writes (*FGrHist* 3 F 105), "trotz der Dialektreste nicht wörtlich," but the *BNJ* refers to the fragment as "one of the longest verbatim quotes from Pherekydes's work." In the *BNJ, ad loc.,* Morison cites others—in addition to Fowler—who have used this fragment to reconstruct details of early Greek prose style (i.e., P. Dräger, *Stilistische Untersuchungen zu Pherekydes von Athen* (Stuttgart 1995), 1-61; S. Lilja, *On the Style of the Earliest Greek Prose* (Helsinki 1968), 19-22, 58, 84-5, and 104-10; and P. Dolcetti, *Ferecide di Atene. Testimonianze e frammenti* (Alessandria 2004), 216-7).

> χρυσόμαλλον, ἄξοντα ἂν ἀπὸ Αἰήτεω. ταῦτα δὲ τῶι Ἰήσονι Ἥρη ἐς νόον βάλλει, ὡς ἔλθοι ἡ Μήδεια τῶι Πελίηι κακόν.
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> Pelias was sacrificing to Poseidon, and summoned all to attend. Among the citizens who came was Jason. He happened to be ploughing near the river Anauros, which he crossed without his sandals on; once across he tied on the right one, but forgot the left, and thus he came to the feast. Pelias saw him and understood the oracle. For the time being he kept quiet, but the next day he sent for him and asked what he would do if he had an oracle saying that one of the citizens would kill him; Jason replied that he would send him to fetch the golden fleece from Aietes. Hera put this in Jason's mind so that Medea's arrival would spell doom for Pelias.

This fragment relates the beginning of the story of Jason and his quest to obtain the golden fleece. To begin with a general point, this dry, third-person narrative differs sharply from the epic style. Not only is there a lack of ornamental epithets or descriptions, but the author avoids mimesis entirely. The avoidance is especially evident since Pherecydes could have easily related the very brief conversation between Pelias and Jason in direct speech but he does not. Fowler compares other authors' different versions of this same episode: first, an earlier example from the *Catalogue* (fr. 41 MW, cf. Fowler 2006, 40): ἐγὼ δ' ἐξ ἀγρόθεν ἥκω ("I have come from the county"). This short fragment of direct speech was likely uttered by Jason in the *Catalogue* poet's version of the same episode. Fowler's later example comes from Apollodorus, who we should expect to be very similar to Pherecydes in style since he too is a mythographer. Yet, Apollodorus' version also differs (*Library* I.109.1-5, trans. Fowler 2006, 40):

> ὁ δέ, εἴτε ἐπελθὸν ἄλλως, εἴτε διὰ μῆνιν Ἥρας, ἵν' ἔλθοι κακὸν Μήδεια Πελίᾳ (τὴν γὰρ Ἥραν οὐκ ἐτίμα), "τὸ χρυσόμαλλον δέρας" ἔφη "προσέταττον ἂν φέρειν αὐτῷ."

> Whether because of some other inspiration, or because Hera in her anger (Pelias paid her no honour) purposed that Media's arrival should spell doom for Pelias, Jason replied, "I would bid him fetch the golden fleece."

Unlike Pherecydes, but like the *Catalogue* poet, Apollodorus chooses to relate the famous conversation between Pelias and Jason in direct speech, thus allowing for some mimesis in his mythography. Pherecydes' avoidance of dialogue or any first-person statements is a marked feature of his style. Additionally, Pherecydes and mythographers in general frequently employ the phrases "it is said that…" (λέγεται) or "they say…" (φασι) as an alternative to focalization or mimesis (cf. Fowler 2006, 14).[11] There is a sustained effort to maintain a third-person voice throughout the entire work which pretends that the author is objective, uninvolved, and only reporting tradition.

The Apollodorus example throws light on yet another aspect of Pherecydes' style. When Apollodorus considers alternative explanations for why Jason said what he did, rather than merely reporting the facts, he speculates and thus includes his judgment within the text itself, even while maintaining third person voice. Pherecydes' voice and judgment, however, are both completely absent from his own text. For this reason, Fowler suspects that Pherecydes did not preface his work with a proem mentioning himself, unlike, for instance, Hecataeus (2006, 22-23).

Pherecydes' style is a source of authority because of the "gap in which the author can inscribe a critical attude towards his material" (Fowler 1998, 36, cf. Calame 1995, 85). One

[11] Examples from the fragments of Pherecydes (*BNJ* 3): λέγεται, frr. 55, 79a, 82b (x2), 170b, 170c, 176; φασι, frr. 9, 13c, 18b, 27, 47, 51a, 51b, 54, 69b, 90c, 97, 123, 148a, 152, 155, 167, 174 (x2); λέγουσιν, frr. 27, 52, 178.

might think inviting a critical attitude would undermine authority, but it also gives what the author "merely reports" the weight of tradition and superficially acquits the author of meddling. The invitation of criticism shows awareness of the importance of objectivity and justification (Fowler 2001, 102). If Pherecydes intended such an invitation, then it sheds light on the value of the genealogical arrangment of his material, which precluded prolepsis and analepsis, contributing to its utility as a reference work (2006, 42). What is most striking, however, is that Pherecydes is very likely *not* merely reporting tradition: his objectivity is a pose taken to serve more subtle purposes.

The apparent impartiality of Pherecydes secured the authority of the *Historiai* by disguising his choices in fabricating genealogies. In her analysis of the genealogy of the Philaidae, Thomas compares Pherecydes' account with other genealogical information found in Herodotus and shows how Pherecydes distorts and simplifies the lineage (1989, 161-73). Thomas also suggests convincing reasons why Pherecydes would make changes to the genealogy, all of which seem to bolster the status of this family. Jacoby probably correctly suspected that Pherecydes had personal connections to the Philaidae due to his inclusion of a genealogy running from the hero Ajax to the Athenian oikist Miltiades (1947, 32). Morison comments "No other extant Athenian genealogy so precisely connects a heroic ancestor to its historical descendants as Pherekydes did for the Philaids" (*BNJ* 3 F 2).

Pherecydes' version of the Philaid genealogy survives as quoted by Marcellinus in his Life of Thucydides (§2-4). It likely contains the entire genealogy as it appeared in Pherecydes (cf. Thomas 1989, 161-62; ed. Fowler 2010, EGM pp. 277 = FGrHist 3 F 2):

> Φιλαῖος δὲ ὁ Αἴαντος οἰκεῖ ἐν Ἀθήναις. ἐκ τούτου δὲ γίγνεται Αἶκλος· τοῦ δὲ Ἐπίλυκος· τοῦ δὲ Ἀκέστωρ· τοῦ δὲ Ἀγήνωρ· τοῦ δὲ Οὔλιος· τοῦ δὲ Λύκης· τοῦ δὲ †Τοφῶν· τοῦ δὲ

Φιλαῖος· τοῦ δὲ Ἀγαμήστωρ· τοῦ δὲ Τίσανδρος ἐφ’ οὗ ἄρχοντος ἐν Ἀθήναις ⟨ ⟩· τοῦ δὲ Μιλτιάδης· τοῦ δὲ Ἱππoκλείδης, ἐφ’ οὗ ἄρχοντος Παναθήναια ἐτέθη, τοῦ δὲ Μιλτιάδης, ὃς ὤικισε Χερσόνησον.

And Philaios, son of Ajax, lived in Athens, from this man was born Aiklos, whose son was Epilykos, whose son was Akestôr, whose son was Agênor, whose son was Oulios, whose son was Lykês, whose son was Tophôn, whose son was Philaios, whose son was Agamêstôr, whose son was Tisandros, in whose archonship in Athens [….], whose son Miltiadês, whose son was Hippokleidês, in whose archonship the Panathênaia was established, whose son was Miltiadês who founded Chersonêsos.



Figure 1: The names in bold are from Pherecydes account. The italicized names are from Herodotus. This tree represents a step towards reconciling the accounts by including all mentioned names, but does not pretend to have resolved the contradictions.

It is important first to notice that this genealogy is entirely vertical, including no details about collateral relationships. Secondly, there are two Philaioi and two Miltiades, indicating a strategy also employed by Hellanikos who also used duplicate names to lengthen a genealogy (cf. Thomas 1989, 168). Finally, there are important details Pherecydes contributes about certain ancestors: Philaios, the eponymous ancestor and son of the hero Ajax, lived in Athens; Hippokleides was archon when the Panathenaia was established; the youngest Miltiades here founded the Chersonese. The characters of this genealogy are positive examples, and its antiquity also serves to bolster the status of the Philaidae. There are, however, reasons to think the genealogy is not entirely accurate.

Comparison with Herodotus shows that the linear form was probably the result of "flattening" collateral relationships in order to increase the number of generations to 15.[12] In Herodotus, Miltiades the oikist is the son not of Hippokleides, as in Pherecydes, but of Kypselos, the grandson of the Corinthian tyrant (Hdt. 6.35; 6.128.2). Although it is not certain, it is suspected by Thomas that Kypselos was another son of Agamestor, along with Tisandros (1989, 167). If this is true, then Miltiades the oikist, son of Kypselos, would have been born two generations earlier than in Pherecydes' account. By manipulating the genealogy in this way, Pherecydes appears to achieve two goals: 1) lengthening the genealogy to suitably reach back to the heroic period[13] and 2) removing tyrannical associations, via Kypselos, from the Philaid clan (Thomas 1989, 164; 169).

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[12] cf. Jacoby's comments *ad FGrHist* 3 F 2.

[13] Note, for instance, that the genealogy from Zeus to Miltiades counts 16 generations, the same number attested for Hecataeus' genealogy (see below). Consistency of numbers of generations in genealogies extending back to the heroic period has been discussed by Burkert (1995, 139-48).

There are other signs of manipulation by Pherecydes' hand. Thomas notices that the second Philaios, whose generation likely dates to the 6th century, may reflect Athenian arbitration concerning their claim to Salamis during that time (cf. Higbie 1997, 292-93). When Athens was laying claim to Salamis during its conflict with Megara, who also wished to claim the island, Solon not only quoted Homer, but also employed genealogical eponyms, referring to the deme Philaidai, in his argument. The reappearance of this name, approximately in the sixth century according to "genealogical time," recalls the tradition of the eponymous Philaios whom Solon claimed gave the island of Salamis to Athens (Plut. Sol. 10, cf. Thomas 1989, 163).

The most remarkable aspect of Pherecydes' manipulation of this genealogy is that his greatest 'distortions' occur in the most recent generations, precisely where his changes would be likely to encounter disagreement. The expectation of criticism, initially, but success in posterity is precisely what Socrates expressed in the noble lie passage: Socrates and Glaucon suspect their fable would encounter disbelief in the most immediate generation but hoped it would take hold in posterity. Would it be too bold to suggest that Pherecydes of Athens had a similar goal? Perhaps his dissimulation—that is, his presenting a manipulated genealogy as a mere report of what "they say"—was a way of ensuring his text would become authoritative in later generations, since, on the surface, it appears to relay traditional information. Comparison with other traditions, however, reveals that the genealogy was clearly changed. Most importantly, the changes seem motivated by an effort not to represent the legendary past more accurately but to further the interests of those living in the present. By removing himself from his text,

Pherecydes made it more difficult to detect any biases on his part or on the part of the Philaidae, and thus Pherecydes *avoided* the very criticism that was inscribed by his impersonal style.[14]

IV. Hecataeus of Miletus

I turn now to Hecataeus of Miletus, the 6th century logographer known primarily for his innovative treatment of the mythological past while writing geographies and genealogies in prose. Unlike Pherecydes, Hecataeus "stamped his personality on his text," as Fowler puts it (2006, 45). Hecataeus' foregrounds his own judgment and probably included his own genealogy in his work. Nevertheless, his difference from Pherecydes reinforces our ideas about what details in a genealogy could attract criticism.

In what follows, I focus on the proem of Hecataeus' *Genealogies* and the famous fragment 300, in which Herodotus reports that Hecataeus recited his own genealogy to Egyptian priests, which the priests in turn refuted by citing their own genealogy. Dillery (2018, 23) recently and persuasively argued against the view that Hecataeus presented his own genealogy the way it appears in Herodotus.[15] While Dillery (2018) and Fowler (2007, 36) agree that some details from the episode as Herodotus reported it did appear in the text of Hecataeus, it seems Herodotus manipulated the story to make his own methodological point about how history should be written. The proem of Hecataeus suggests that he presented his genealogy proudly and boastfully. His style of presentation thus appears different from – or even the opposite of— Pherecydes' objective style. Furthermore, if Hecataeus did in fact recite his own genealogy to the Egyptian priests, the form it took was likely to resemble the genealogical boasts of the heroes of Homer's *Iliad,* which I discuss in more detail in the final section of this chapter.

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[14] See note 17.

[15] For the opposite view, see Armayor 1987.

The proem of Hecataeus' *Genealogies* displays the author's antagonism towards Greek tradition (*FGrHist* 1 F 1):

> Ἑκαταῖος Μιλήσιος ὧδε μυθεῖται· τάδε γράφω, ὥς μοι δοκεῖ ἀληθέα εἶναι· οἱ γὰρ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι πολλοί τε καὶ γελοῖοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, εἰσίν.
>
> Hecataeus of Miletus speaks in the following way: I write these things, as they seem to me to be true; for the accounts of the Greeks are both many and laughable, as they appear to me.

Hecataeus explains why he writes by pointing out that the *logoi of the Greeks* are both many and laughable. Hecataeus presents his writings, also plural (τάδε), as truth to oppose the many accounts that appear flawed. But unlike Pherecydes, who removes himself from his text, as we saw above, and unlike Hesiod or Homer, who rely on the Muses, Hecataeus places sole responsibility for the truth of his account upon himself. Hecataeus even emphasizes the Muses' absence by alluding to Hesiod's famous encounter.[16] Hecataeus is not quoting Hesiod *verbatim*, but his claim to pronounce the truth, and his assuming responsibility for it confirms the parallel's relevance. Yet another way Hecataeus assumes the posture of authority is in modeling his proem after royal letters, parallels for which can be found in Herodotus (e.g.7.150.2: Ἄνδρες Ἀργεῖοι, βασιλεὺς Ξέρξης τάδε ὑμῖν λέγει· Ἡμεῖς…).[17] This model also explains the shift from the third person to the first.

The emphasis on "truth" in the proem raises the question about the "rationality" behind Hecataeus' attack on Greek tradition. I want to pass over this debate, although some of my later

[16] Jacoby picks out Hes. *Th*. 28 for comparison: ἴδμεν δ' εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι (*FGrHist* 1 F 1).
[17] Fowler 2001, 110; Bertelli 2001, 80, cf. Corcella 1996.

argument will be pertinent to it. It should be enough for now to observe that sometimes he may denounce a "mythological" detail as ridiculous, but at other times he includes paradoxical details of his own. Hecataeus will at one time reject that Heracles ever traveled to the underworld to fetch Cerberus (F 27), but, at another, claim that the grapevine was discovered when a dog gave birth to a root (F15). It is most likely that Hecataeus both rationalizes or invents material to suit whatever purpose he has in mind, and this seems to be the general rule when authors produce genealogies.

The most important details from the proem for the present discussion is the allusion to Homer. Bertelli points out that the only parallel for the phrase ὧδε μυθεῖται can be found at *Iliad* 7.76. I would like to expand briefly on the "agonistic context" to which Bertelli refers (*Il.* 7.76-80; 89-91, my trans.):

ὧδε δὲ μυθέομαι, Ζεὺς δ' ἄμμ' ἐπὶ μάρτυρος ἔστω·
εἰ μέν κεν ἐμὲ κεῖνος ἕλῃ ταναήκεϊ χαλκῷ,
τεύχεα συλήσας φερέτω κοίλας ἐπὶ νῆας,
σῶμα δὲ οἴκαδ' ἐμὸν δόμεναι πάλιν, ὄφρα πυρός με
Τρῶες καὶ Τρώων ἄλοχοι λελάχωσι θανόντα. […]
'ἀνδρὸς μὲν τόδε σῆμα πάλαι κατατεθνηῶτος,
ὅν ποτ' ἀριστεύοντα κατέκτανε φαίδιμος Ἕκτωρ.
ὥς ποτέ τις ἐρέει· τὸ δ' ἐμὸν κλέος οὔ ποτ' ὀλεῖται.

Thus I proclaim and let Zeus be my witness: If that man shall slay me with sharp bronze, let him despoil my armor and take it to the hollow ships, but give my body back to my home, so that the Trojans and their wives can give me my share of fire upon my death.

> […] This is the grave of a man who died long ago, whom once when at his bravest glorious Hector killed. Thus someone will say and my *kleos* will never be lost.

Hector here addresses both Trojans and Greeks about the terms of his duel. Hector's terms allow, if he is slain, that his armor be taken by the victor, but they also require his body be returned for proper burial. After making clear that the same terms apply to a defeated Greek, Hector alludes to a future monument "the grave of a man who died long ago," that will also preserve Hector's *kleos.* The epigrammatic qualities of both Hector's imagined *sema* and Hecataeus' proem have been thoroughly discussed by various scholars.[18] The *deictic* τάδε, from Hecataeus and τόδε from the Homeric passage are both markedly epigrammatic and point to objects that provide fame for their creators. The agonistic and boastful character of the Iliadic passage also matches Hecataeus' purposes. The allusion suggests the importance of *kleos* for Hecataeus and may support other connections between the mythographer and Homer. For instance, Hecataeus' recitation of his own genealogy sixteen generations back to a god provides the author with his own degree of *kleos.*

The proem presents its author, Hecataeus, in a positive light. In the following passage, however, Herodotus tells us that Hecataeus personally met with Egyptian priests at Thebes, who refuted his genealogy. If Herodotus is relating this story as Hecataeus himself reported it, then Hecataeus would have undermined his own critique of Greek tradition (2.143-44 = *FGrHist* 1 F 300):

[18] The epigrammatic qualities of Hecataeus' proem are discussed by Svenbro 1988, 166, cf. Bertelli 2001, 80, n.33. Discussions of the *sema* have recently been published by both Strauss Clay 2016 and Petrovic 2016.

Πρότερον δὲ Ἑκαταίῳ τῷ λογοποιῷ ἐν Θήβῃσι γενεηλογήσαντι ἑωυτὸν ἀναδήσαντί τε τὴν πατριὴν ἐς ἑκκαιδέκατον θεὸν ἐποίησαν οἱ ἱρέες τοῦ Διὸς οἷόν τι καὶ ἐμοὶ οὐ γενεηλογήσαντι ἐμεωυτόν· (2) ἐσαγαγόντες ἐς τὸ μέγαρον ἔσω ἐὸν μέγα ἐξηρίθμεον δεικνύντες κολοσσοὺς ξυλίνους τοσούτους ὅσους περ εἶπον· ἀρχιερεὺς γὰρ ἕκαστος αὐτόθι ἱστᾷ ἐπὶ τῆς ἑωυτοῦ ζόης εἰκόνα ἑωυτοῦ· ἀριθμέοντες ὦν καὶ δεικνύντες οἱ ἱρέες ἐμοὶ ἀπεδείκνυσαν παῖδα †πατρὸς ἑωυτῶν ἕκαστον† ἐόντα, ἐκ τοῦ ἄγχιστα ἀποθανόντος τῆς εἰκόνος διεξιόντες διὰ πασέων, ἐς οὗ ἀπέδεξαν ἁπάσας αὐτάς. Ἑκαταίῳ δὲ γενεηλογήσαντι ἑωυτὸν καὶ ἀναδήσαντι ἐς ἑκκαιδέκατον θεὸν ἀντεγενεηλόγησαν ἐπὶ τῇ ἀριθμήσι, οὐ δεκόμενοι παρ' αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ θεοῦ γενέσθαι ἄνθρωπον· ἀντεγενεηλόγησαν δὲ ὧδε, φάμενοι ἕκαστον τῶν κολοσσῶν πίρωμιν ἐκ πιρώμιος γεγονέναι, ἐς ὃ τοὺς πέντε καὶ τεσσεράκοντα καὶ τριηκοσίους ἀπέδεξαν κολοσσοὺς {πίρωμιν ἐκ πιρώμιος γενόμενον}, καὶ οὔτε ἐς θεὸν οὔτε ἐς ἥρωα ἀνέδησαν αὐτούς. πίρωμις δέ ἐστι κατ' Ἑλλάδα γλῶσσαν καλὸς κἀγαθός. ἤδη ὦν τῶν αἱ εἰκόνες ἦσαν, τοιούτους ἀπεδείκνυσάν σφεας πάντας ἐόντας, θεῶν δὲ πολλὸν ἀπαλλαγμένους.

But earlier, to Hecataeus the prose-writer, who, genealogizing himself in Thebes, and tracing his paternal line to a god in the sixteenth generation, the priests made an account like the one they also made to me, not genealogizing myself. They led me into the large hall within, showing me wooden statues, they counted out the very number that I said. For each high priest sets up a likeness of himself there during his lifetime. So, counting and showing, the priests made it evident to me that each of them was son of a father, from the image of the one who last died going through them all, until they had shown them all. But to Hecataeus genealogizing himself to a god in the sixteenth generation they counter-genealogized in their reckoning, not accepting from him that a man was born from a god.

> And they counter-genealogized in the following way: claiming each of the statues was a *piromis* born from a *piromis*, they pointed out the 345 statues, and they traced them neither to a god nor to a hero. A *piromis* is, in the Greek language, a gentleman. So by now they had shown that all of them whose image they were of such a sort, but they were far from gods.

Herodotus uses the verb γενεαλογέω a total of six times, three of which are featured here. All other uses of this verb and related compounds, like γενεαλογία or γενεάλογος in ancient Greek are to be found only in later authors, with the striking exception of the compound ἀντιγενεαλογέω which only occurs twice here in Herodotus and nowhere else in Greek literature.[19] Despite the rarity of pairing γενεαλογέω with ἀντιγενεαλογέω, I think Herodotus is highlighting what was in fact typical of the recitation of genealogies in that they compete with one another. It is, of course, important that Herodotus mentions Hecataeus by name—who is in fact the only prose predecessor he mentions this way—precisely in this agonistic context, and resonance with the "pugnacious" attitude of the mythographer's own proem is evident (cf. Fowler 2006, 45). Also important is the distance Herodotus creates between himself and his predecessor when the historian tells us that, when the priests *displayed* their genealogy to Herodotus, he had not recited his genealogy to provoke this. Herodotus thus presents himself as less antagonistic than his predecessor, who comes across as proud and boastful though he is ultimately put down and embarrassed.

Just as Herodotus distances himself from his predecessor here, he also identifies the priests' methods with his own. The priests *counter-genealogize* by "counting and showing" 345

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[19] Herodotus passages containing γενεαλογέω: 2.91, 2.143 (x3), 2.146, 3.75, 6.54. These statistics are based on my own search in the TLG.

wooden statues in order, representing a father-son succession of generations in which no gods intervene (cf. Taylor 2000, 225). We find here six *deiknu-* root words amplifying the priests' display: δεικνύντες (x2), ἀπεδείκνυσαν (x2), ἀπέδεξαν (x2). This should remind us of Herodotus' own proem:

> Ἡροδότου Ἁλικαρνησσέος ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις ἥδε, ὡς μήτε τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα γένηται, μήτε ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά, τὰ μὲν Ἕλλησι, τὰ δὲ βαρβάροισι ἀποδεχθέντα, ἀκλεᾶ γένηται, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ <δὴ καὶ> δι' ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι.
>
> This is the display of the inquiry of Herodotus of Halicarnassus, so that neither the events from men would become wiped out by time nor great works and wonders also, some displayed by Greeks, others by Barbarians, would be without fame, and otherwise, moreover, why they fought with one another.

The six *deiknu-* words of the Theban episode of Book Two resonate with the two uses of ἀποδείκνυμι seen here. He even calls his own work an apodexis. Herodotus promises a display by barbarians as well as Greeks. In addition to referring to the war with Persia, a "barbarian" display also looks forward to the Theban episode. The *deictic* ἥδε in both Hecataeus' proem and Hector's epigram reappears here to remind us not only of the physicality of Herodotus' text, but just as the Homeric tomb had done, it also points to the *kleos* of the deeds and works recorded in his book.[20]

[20] See Moles 1999, 45 & 52, connecting Herodotus' and Hecataeus' use of deictics as an "inscriptional inheritance." cf. also Moles 1999, 49-52, on ἐξίτηλα, a reference I gather from Dillery 2018, 22 n. 20.

Herodotus' allusion to his own proem in Book 2 becomes more marked and significant if we consider that, earlier in Book 2, Herodotus has also alluded to Hecataeus' proem numerous times. As Dillery has recently shown, Herodotus alludes often to the Hecataean phrase, οἱ γὰρ Ἑλλήνων λόγοι πολλοί τε καὶ γελοῖοι. While I cannot go into detail for each case here, the various references suggest that Herodotus is positioning himself as surpassing his predecessor in knowledge about Egypt.[21] In 2.143, we can see a representative example of Herodotus' criticism of his predecessor in the historian's choice to call Hecataeus a λογοποιός, a maker of tales. Again, in his proem Hecataeus refers to his account as a *muthos,* while the *logoi* of the Greeks are labeled ridiculous. Following Fowler's reading of fr. 1 (2011, 53-54), which relies on a distinction between *muthoi* and *logoi,* Dillery sums up the matter: "The last thing Hecataeus wanted to be called was a 'maker of logoi', for he was in his own eyes the maker of authoritative *mythos,* in contrast to the *logoi* of the Greeks." (2018, 31). Most importantly, Hecataeus makes himself the subject of the marked verb, μυθεῖται, indicating that his account should stand out above *the rest.*

The more we examine Herodotus 2.143-4, the more it seems redolent with Herodotean artifice in the service of his methodological argument, and the less it seems accurately to reflect Hecataeus' own text. In fact, we could even say that Herodotus is less concerned with accurate

[21] See especially Dillery 2018, 26-27, 30, 39-40, and 46. The four allusions are as follows: Hdt. 2.2.5: Ἕλληνες δὲ λέγουσι ἄλλα τε μάταια πολλὰ καὶ ὡς γυναικῶν τὰς γλώσσας ὁ Ψαμμήτιχος ἐκταμὼν τὴν δίαιταν οὕτως ἐποιήσατο τῶν παιδίων παρὰ ταύτῃσι τῇσι γυναιξί.; Hdt. 2.45.1: Λέγουσι δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα ἀνεπισκέπτως οἱ Ἕλληνες· εὐήθης δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ὅδε ὁ μῦθός ἐστι τὸν περὶ τοῦ Ἡρακλέος λέγουσι; Hdt. 2.70.1: Ἄγραι δέ σφεων πολλαὶ κατεστᾶσι καὶ παντοῖαι· ἣ δ' ὧν ἐμοὶ δοκέει ἀξιωτάτη ἀπηγήσιος εἶναι, ταύτην γράφω.; Hdt. 2.118.1: Εἰρομένου δέ μεο τοὺς ἱρέας εἰ μάταιον λόγον λέγουσι οἱ Ἕλληνες τὰ περὶ Ἴλιον γενέσθαι ἢ οὔ, ἔφασαν πρὸς ταῦτα τάδε, ἱστορίῃσι φάμενοι εἰδέναι παρ' αὐτοῦ Μενέλεω. An important part of Dillery's argument is that Herodotus replaces the Hecataean γελοῖοι with the adjective μάταια in two places (2.2.5; 2.118.1), and perhaps εὐήθης in another (2.70.1).

portrayal of either Hecataeus' or the priests' genealogies as he is with his own purpose: to emphasize the need for visual evidence.[22] Still, I would like to push back against the view, e.g. of West 1991, that the entire passage is a fabrication containing nothing we would find in the text of Hecataeus if it had survived in full. Herodotus knows, for instance, that the specific number of generations in Hecataeus' genealogy is sixteen, and we can take this as a sign that he read the number in Hecataeus. It is therefore likely that Hecataeus did include his own genealogy in his work. As we saw above, the proem of the mythographer, and even Herodotus' characterization of Hecataeus, suggest that he was proud, even boastful, and insisting upon the truth of his claims. It would be uncharacteristic for *that* author to criticize himself in the way Herodotus criticizes his predecessor. Hecataeus did not provide his own refutation, but used his genealogy to bolster his status and *kleos* and to achieve greater authority over his own subject. Herodotus, in turn, attacked his predecessors self-aggrandisement by relating the Egyptian tradition refuting it.

To conclude, Hecataeus emphasizes the very personal role he had in pronouncing his genealogies. By contrast, Pherecydes had fashioned his work as a mere report of tradition. Hecataeus also differs significantly from Herodotus: Herodotus' method of *apodeixis* makes an original point about the contrast between Egypt's long-standing documentary tradition with the younger Greeks' dearth of written sources. Judging from the proem, Hecataeus' work does not represent a *display* or proof, but boldly pronounces what *seems* true to the author. Furthermore, we should also observe how unusual it is for an author to *genealogize himself* in writing to bolster his authority. As far as I know, there are no parallels that would predate Hecataeus. The only earlier precedent would be the self-genealogizing of the heroes of the *Iliad,* who frequently

[22] This is not to say that Herodotus is inaccurate in general, even if at times he is, but that the methodological purpose is his primary motivator here.

boast of their lineage (Lang 1994). In the following section, I will analyze the genealogy of Aeneas, the longest in the *Iliad.* The passage also features programmatic statements uttered by the character Aeneas, and these statements elucidate the nature of genealogical poetry.

V. The Genealogy of Aeneas

Since Hecataeus' adapted an epic motif, the genealogical boasts of Homeric heroes give us insight into the mythographer's intentions. The boast of Aeneas in the *Iliad* has especially attracted a lot of scholarly attention, and has even been suspected as an interpolation.[23] It seemingly interrupts Achilles' *aristeia*, but Adkins (1975) and Smith (1981) show how and why Aeneas' lengthy genealogy fits the context of the poem's narrative. Their arguments are further supported by Edwards' commentary to the *Iliad* (1991) and Olson's work on the *Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite* (2012). Afterwards, I address the surrounding context of the genealogy as metapoetic statements about epic composition and performance, as Nagy has argued (1990, 27-29). I conclude with the suggestion that epic performance was productive of a form of knowledge and relate this to the practice of the later genealogical writers discussed above.

Aeneas recites his genealogy just before he is about to duel with Achilles, and he does so in response to his opponent's insults: "Even if you defeat me," Achilles says, "Priam would never grant you the honor to rule over the Trojans, since he has sons" (*Il.* 20.181-83). Achilles is using genealogy to call into question Aeneas' destiny, a destiny which is only confirmed by Poseidon after their duel (*Il.* 20.302-5). Prompting yet another divine rescue of Aeneas, Poseidon thus contradicts Achilles' earlier threat that, although the gods had rescued Aeneas before, they will not save him this time (*Il.* 20.195-96). Scholars suspect an interweaving of

[23] See Adkins 1975, 240, with citations.

competing epic traditions lying in the background of this passage's formation—one tradition supporting Achilles, and yet another supporting Aeneas (e.g. Nagy 1990, 27). Also relevant here is the controversy over the presumed patrons of this passage, the *Aeneadai*, who are often supposed also to have been patrons of the *Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite*. Smith (1981, 25-41) has shown, however, that evidence for any such *Aeneadai* does not appear until the 2nd century B.C.E. in a fragment of Demetrios of Skepsis. Nevertheless, the 'patrons' view still has its supporters (e.g. Faulkner 2008) and this reflects the overall trend in scholarship to endeavor to discover – or even create – parties in whose interest any particular genealogy was composed.

No matter who is correct in the patrons debate, the controversy speaks to my overall point about genealogy, namely that their creators tailor them to a purpose. But what should we say is the purpose of Aeneas' genealogy? In the scope of the poem's narrative, Aeneas primarily uses genealogy to rebuke Achilles' earlier insults and to prove that he is as equal a match for Achilles as Hector, and perhaps even better! First, the genealogy shows that he does not descend from Laomedon, whose unfair treatment of Apollo and Poseidon spells doom for his descendants. More importantly, Aeneas concludes with a comparison to Hector, central to the entire passage (*Il.* 20.215-40, cf. Edwards 1999, *ad loc.*):

215 Δάρδανον ἄρ πρῶτον τέκετο νεφεληγερέτα Ζεύς· […]

219 Δάρδανος αὖ τέκεθ' υἱὸν Ἐριχθόνιον βασιλῆα, […]

230 Τρῶα δ' Ἐριχθόνιος τέκετο Τρώεσσιν ἄνακτα·

Τρωὸς δ' αὖ τρεῖς παῖδες ἀμύμονες ἐξεγένοντο

Ἶλός τ' Ἀσσάρακός τε καὶ ἀντίθεος Γανυμήδης, […]

236 Ἶλος δ' αὖ τέκεθ' υἱὸν ἀμύμονα Λαομέδοντα·

Λαομέδων δ' ἄρα Τιθωνὸν τέκετο Πρίαμόν τε

Λάμπόν τε Κλυτίον θ' Ἱκετάονά τ' ὄζον Ἄρηος·
Ἀσσάρακος δὲ Κάπυν, ὃ δ' ἄρ' Ἀγχίσην τέκε παῖδα·
αὐτὰρ ἔμ' Ἀγχίσης, Πρίαμος δ' ἔτεχ' Ἕκτορα δῖον.

Well then, cloud-gatherer Zeus begat Dardanos first, […] Dardanos in turn begat his son King Erichthonius, […] and Erichthonius begat Tros, lord over Trojans; and from Tros three faultless sons were born, Ilos, Assarakos, and god-like Ganymedes, […] But Ilos in turn begat faultless Laomedon; and Laomedon then begat Tithonos and Priam and Lampos and Klytios and Hikataon, scion of Ares. And Assarakos begat Kapys, and he then begat a son, Anchises; but Anchises begat me, and Priam begat god-like Hector.

The concluding verse features both Aeneas and Hector, inviting the listener to count the generations that stand between both heroes and Zeus. Both heroes share the four ancestors that run from Zeus to Tros, but after Tros, Aeneas must deal with two collateral lines separately, first the line of Ilos and then the line of Assarakos. Importantly, the fathers of both heroes are mentioned first, and only then does Aeneas mention the sons. The equality of generations, arranged side-by-side, is thus emphasized, and serves to prove Aeneas to be a worthy opponent for Achilles.

Aeneas' not only presents himself as the equal of – if not the superior of – Hector, but elaborates on the nature of genealogical recitation itself (20.203-14):

ἴδμεν δ' ἀλλήλων γενεήν, ἴδμεν δὲ τοκῆας
πρόκλυτ' ἀκούοντες ἔπεα θνητῶν ἀνθρώπων·
ὄψι δ' οὔτ' ἄρ πω σὺ ἐμοὺς ἴδες οὔτ' ἄρ' ἐγὼ σούς.
φᾶσι σὲ μὲν Πηλῆος ἀμύμονος ἔκγονον εἶναι

μητρός δ' ἐκ Θέτιδος καλλιπλοκάμου ἁλοσύδνης·
αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν υἱὸς μεγαλήτορος Ἀγχίσαο
εὔχομαι ἐκγεγάμεν, μήτηρ δέ μοί ἐστ' Ἀφροδίτη. […]
213 εἰ δ' ἐθέλεις καὶ ταῦτα δαήμεναι, ὄφρ' εὖ εἴδηις
ἡμετέρην γενεήν, πολλοὶ δέ μιν ἄνδρες ἴσασιν.

We know each other's lineage and we know each other's parents, hearing the already famous accounts (epea) of mortal men; but by sight neither do you know mine, nor do I know yours. They say that you, on the one hand, are the offspring of Peleus, and mother Thetis, beautiful-haired daughter of the sea. But I boast to have been born a son of great-hearted Anchises, and my mother is Aphrodite […] And if you wish to learn these things so that you may know our lineage well, and many men know it.

Aeneas implies that the recitation of genealogy is a primary means of knowing, since sight is limited to the present. He is thus assuming the posture of the epic poet who borrows the eyewitness of the Muses to relate in words what he cannot see (cf. 2.485-86), but here Aeneas relies not on the Muses but what "men say." Aeneas thus performs his genealogy as a confirmation of human traditions about him, that is, the things many people already know and say, but are not without their opponents. Nagy has used this very passage as evidence for variant traditions which compete in a contest of oral poetics (1990, 27-28), a situation perfectly suited to what we have already seen applies to genealogies, even in early prose works. Those variant traditions need not directly contradict one another to be competing, they only need to suit different purposes—in much the same way Hecataeus' Deukalionid genealogy probably supported his purpose without directly contradicting the Thessalian interests of the genealogies

of the *Catalogue*.[24] But Aeneas does record that the act of performing genealogies was not only competitive, but in some ways created and maintained a form of knowledge.

Further support for this view can be found in what Aeneas says at the conclusion of his recitation (20.246-50):

> ἔστι γὰρ ἀμφοτέροισιν ὀνείδεα μυθήσασθαι
> πολλὰ μάλ', οὐδ' ἂν νηῦς ἑκατόζυγος ἄχθος ἄροιτο.
> στρεπτὴ δὲ γλῶσσ' ἐστὶ βροτῶν, πολέες δ' ἔνι μῦθοι
> παντοῖοι, ἐπέων δὲ πολὺς νομὸς ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα.
> ὁπποῖόν κ' εἴπῃσθα ἔπος, τοῖόν κ' ἐπακούσαις.
>
> It is possible to proclaim very many insults to one another and a hundred-oared ship could not bear their burden. The tongue of mortals is twisted, and the words (*muthoi*) on it are many and of all sorts, the range of their words (*epea*) is great, far and wide. Whatever *epos* you say, thus you shall hear.

Aeneas here makes clear that his genealogy stands as a refutation of Achilles' earlier insult. Aeneas describes the act of pronouncing insults (ὀνείδεα μυθήσασθαι) with gnomic sayings about *muthoi* and *epea.* As Achilles' insults take a genealogical form, they represent traditions with which Aeneas disagrees and even competes by reciting his own genealogy (cf. Nagy 1990,

[24] To reiterate my point above (p.5), Hecataeus makes Ion a descendent of Marathonios, not Hellen (*FGrHist* 1 F 13), but maintains the importance of Thessaly (where Deukalion ruled, *FGrHist* 1 F 14, cf. *FGrHist* 1 F 2 "Itonian Athena"). Assuming Hecataeus' goal is to promote Ionian interests, and to arrange them in counter-distinction to "Hellenic" interests (as he contrasts himself with *the Hellenes* in fr. 1), he need only adapt the *Catalogue* material to suit his own purpose.

28). Aeneas' genealogy is thus designed for the agonistic context in which it is uttered, and even stands as a verbal contest with Achilles before the battle with weapons. Line 250, "whatever you say, so you shall hear," warns Achilles to expect insults in response to his own, *tit for tat*. As Nagy has argued, the repetition of the term *epea* may allude to competing traditions of genealogical poetry. Aeneas asserts the need to perform and re-perform one's own genealogy to compete with variant accounts that would overtake it if such performance were to cease. Genealogical performance, then, strives to make genealogies survive and persist in the face of competing claims, but "accuracy" is not the primary criterion by which they succeed or fail in their purpose. This was also the case both with Pherecydes, who disguised his personal role in order to preserve his genealogies, as well as with Hecataeus, whose strategy I would argue seems remarkably like that of Aeneas. Both Hecataeus and Aeneas pronounce their genealogies proudly and present them as truth, but the "truths" they relate lie far in the past beyond human experience.

VI. Conclusion

In conclusion, genealogies were freely adapted to suit whatever purpose a writer and poet wishes to achieve. Some writers wished to disguise their active role and interest in manipulating genealogies, while others openly expressed it. The latter category is represented by Hecataeus above, confirmed by comparison with Homer and the metapoetic implications of the genealogy of Aeneas. As for the former, Pherecydes and the *Catalogue* poet make efforts to hide their biases, and their dissimulation constitutes an endeavor to make their accounts lasting, to be adopted eventually as truths like Socrates and Glaucon hoped the noble lie would. Each genealogy is designed with a personal or political purpose in mind. More than just a representation of the past, genealogy is a means to an end.

Ch.2: Poetry, Philosophy, and the Priority of Chaos in Hesiod's *Theogony*.

Τὸν ἥλιον τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐ μόνον οἶμαι τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμιν παρέχειν φήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ αὔξην καὶ τροφήν, οὐ γένεσιν αὐτὸν ὄντα.

Πῶς γάρ;

Καὶ τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.

I think you'll say that the sun provides to visible things not only the ability to be seen, but also birth, growth, and nourishment, not being birth itself.

How couldn't I?

Well then also for knowable things, say not only that Knowing is provided by the Good, but also their existence and Being is provided by that thing, although the Good is not itself Being, but beyond it, surpassing Being *in age* and in power.
(Plato, *Resp.* 509b1-9).

πολλαχῶς μὲν οὖν λέγεται τὸ πρῶτον· ὅμως δὲ πάντως ἡ οὐσία πρῶτον, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ γνώσει καὶ χρόνῳ…. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ πάλαι τε καὶ νῦν καὶ ἀεὶ ζητούμενον καὶ ἀεὶ ἀπορούμενον, τί τὸ ὄν, τοῦτό ἐστι τίς ἡ οὐσία…

Well truly "First" is said in many ways, but nevertheless in all ways substance is first, in both definition and in knowledge and in time…moreover long ago and now also, always asked and always left unanswered, what is Being, i.e. what is substance?
(Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Z 1028a31-33; 28b2-4).

ἤτοι μὲν πρώτιστα Χάος γένετ'· αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
Γαῖ' εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ
ἀθανάτων οἳ ἔχουσι κάρη νιφόεντος Ὀλύμπου...

So now truly first of all Chaos was born, but next
broad-chested Gaia, always steady seat of all
immortals who dwell the peaks of snowy Olympus…
(Hesiod, *Theogony* 116-18).

I. Introduction

Hesiod's *Theogony* is a complex genealogical poem, but it is very different from the heroic genealogies discussed last chapter. To start from the obvious, the *Theogony* has genealogies of gods, while the *Catalogue of Women* and heroic genealogies in Homer were about the legendary *human* past, tracing lineages back to eponymous or divine ancestors. Another difference is the *Theogony's* cosmological aspect. We see glimpses of this same aspect in other authors, as when Homer gives primacy to a primordial and "elemental" deity, so to speak, calling Okeanos the θεῶν γένεσις (*Il.* 14.201).[25] Although Hesiod is not the first to give a divine genealogy, nor even the first to apply genealogy to cosmology, the scale and complexity of the *Theogony* outstrips earlier examples. Furthermore, and most importantly, Hesiod adapts the form of genealogy to support his conclusion that Chaos came to be first.

How did Hesiod infer that Chaos came first? I do not believe that Eastern antecedents like the *Song of Kumarbi* or *Enuma Elish* can help us with this question.[26] For instance, Cornford's suggestion that Chaos represents the gap or separation between the sky and the earth cannot satisfactorily parry the objection that Ouranos and Gaia do not yet exist when Chaos first appears (1952, 194-95; cf. Sassi 2018, 35). This leads to the crux of the issue: in the *Theogony*, a genealogical poem, the priority of Chaos suggests the importance of a *non*-genealogical

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[25] Aristotle claims the Homeric example anticipates Thales (*Metaphysics* A 983b27, cf. Burkert 1999, 88-89, see also Strauss Clay 2003, 12.

[26] Cornford 1952, for instance, compares Marduk's splitting of Tiamat with Chaos, a comparison which is arguably tenuous (187-88). This is not to deny the many parallels that do exist between the Song of Kumarbi and the Enuma Elish, for which see West 1997, 276-83, but see also West 1997, 288, which says the initial cosmogony of *Th.* "does not seem to be modelled on any notably oriental pattern." For what it is worth, Damascius' parallel summaries of Hesiod and the *Enuma Elish* also suggests that the two are very different. Damascius says "Hesiod…seems to have called the ungraspable and altogether unified nature of the intelligible Chaos" (*De principiis* 1.319.16-20.2 Ruelle) but that the "Babylonians pass over the one *archê* of the whole in silence" (1.321.10-322.1 Ruelle).

relationship: Chaos comes before Gaia, but does not give birth to Gaia. Why does Hesiod put these two gods in this order? Does Gaia in some way depend on Chaos' prior existence to come into being herself? If she does, what is the nature of her dependence?

My plan for this chapter is to first look at the proem where Hesiod establishes the importance of "firstness," contrasting his approach with the divine genealogies of his predecessors—represented by alternative theogonies sung by the Muses.[27] Following this, I re-evaluate the meaning of Chaos, its relationship to its own progeny, and its place in Hesiod's cosmos. In that section, I argue that Chaos' progeny, in addition to elucidating the meaning of Chaos, also guarantees the relevance of Chaos throughout Hesiod's two major poems. In a concluding section, I compare Hesiod to other early Greek philosophical writers (i.e. Xenophanes and Anaximander), in order to show that Hesiod's *Theogony* shares features characteristic of later philosophical texts (Section 3).[28] Most importantly, Hesiod exploits the form of genealogy to emphasize priority, giving a unified explanation of the cosmos.[29]

II. Section 1: Novelty in Hesiod: Anti-traditionalism in the *proem* of Hesiod's *Theogony***.**

[27] I am arguing against the characterization that Hesiod presents his views "uncritically," as in Curd 2011, 4: "Since Hesiod feels no compunction about asserting his claims without reasons to support them, he seems to think that the proper response to the story is acceptance. The hearer or reader should not subject it to critical scrutiny followed by rational agreement or disagreement. While the Presocratics rejected both the kind of account that Hesiod gave and his attitude toward uncritical belief, we must take care not to overstate the case: In the fragments of the Presocratics we shall find gaps in explanation, appeals to the Muses, apparent invocation of divine warrant, breaks in connection between evidence and assertion." I, furthermore, wish to stress that often the Milesians in particular seem to present their views dogmatically, but, to be fair, not enough of their writing survives for this view to remain secure.

[28] For a recent brief comparison of Hesiod and Anaximander, see Graham 2006, 9-13. For Xenophanes and Hesiod, see Tor 2017, 310-18.

[29] For the last feature as a marker of Hesiod's status as a philosopher, see Gigon 1945, 22.

The priamel form, thanks to Bundy (1962), has strong associations with Pindar, but it also appears throughout Archaic Greek literature.[30] In a priamel, a series of terms serve as "foils" to emphasize one final term of special interest (Bundy 1962, 4-10). William Johnson has argued that Hesiod's proem is a priamel (2008): Hesiod presents a number of traditional cosmogonic ideas only to be surpassed by his idea that Chaos came to be first (Th. 116: ἤτοι μὲν πρώτιστα Χάος γένετ'). This reading confirms the earlier reading of Strauss Clay (2003, 55-75; 67) that the Muses' songs in the proem (*Th.* 11-21; 43-52; 104-115) are not merely 'tables of contents' or rehearsals for what Hesiod is about to sing in his *Theogony,* but serve as foils for his subsequent cosmogony (See also Strauss Clay 1988).

Building on the views of Strauss Clay and Johnson, I wish to add that, unlike Pindar, Hesiod is not simply using a priamel to praise or emphasize his topic. It is the truth, rather, that Hesiod is trying to express. For, the Muses say that they know how to tell lies indistinguishable from truth or the truth, whenever they wish (Hesiod *Th.* 22-34):

αἵ νύ ποθ' Ἡσίοδον καλὴν ἐδίδαξαν ἀοιδήν,
ἄρνας ποιμαίνονθ' Ἑλικῶνος ὕπο ζαθέοιο.
τόνδε δέ με πρώτιστα θεαὶ πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπον,
Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο·
"ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον,
ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,
ἴδμεν δ' εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι."
ὣς ἔφασαν κοῦραι μεγάλου Διὸς ἀρτιέπειαι,

[30] A most common example is Sappho 16, cf. Bundy 1962, 4, and Johnson 2008, 231.

καί μοι σκῆπτρον ἔδον δάφνης ἐριθηλέος ὄζον

δρέψασαι, θηητόν· ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μοι αὐδὴν

θέσπιν, ἵνα κλείοιμι τά τ’ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ’ ἐόντα,

καί μ’ ἐκέλονθ’ ὑμνεῖν μακάρων γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων,

σφᾶς δ’ αὐτὰς πρῶτόν τε καὶ ὕστατον αἰὲν ἀείδειν.

[sc. Muses] who once taught Hesiod beautiful song,

While he tended his sheep at the foot of holy Helicon.

And the goddesses first of all made this address to me,

The Olympian Muses, daughters of aegis-bearing Zeus:

Shepherd bumpkins, basely shameful things, bellies alone,

We know how to tell many lies indistinguishable from reality,

But we also know how to the truth, whenever we wish.”

Thus they spoke, glib daughters of great Zeus,

And they gave to me a scepter, a branch of blooming laurel

Upon plucking it, a marvel; And they breathed in to me a divine

Voice, that I might celebrate future and past,

And they bade me to hymn the race of blessed gods, always existing,

But they bade me always to sing of them first and last.

To be fair, nowhere does Hesiod say that he acquires the Muses’ special abilities to tell Truth or Lies whenever they wish, nor does he say that the Muses tell Hesiod only truth and never falsity

(cf. Tor 2017, 72-73).[31] Even if Hesiod is chosen as one from the group, and given a special staff, this does not exempt him from the human condition of not being able to tell whether the divinely disclosed song is either true or false (*ibid.*, 75-76).[32] Nevertheless, despite the ambiguity of what the Muses disclose, truth is still the aim of the poem, even if not guaranteed.

Hesiod labels the subject of his poem as τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα (*Th.* 32) and τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα (38; cf. *Il.* 1.69-70, Tor 2017, 76).[33] As Tor points out, this is a 'mantic formula': The same phrase occurs in the *Iliad* to describe Calchas, who apparently knows past, present and future (*ibid.*). As Strauss Clay has argued, the phrase, "things that are, shall be, and were before," is not to be understood in a strictly temporal sense, but rather refers to one's ability to transcend one's human limitations to mediate between human and divine realms (2003, 177). This is confirmed by Calchas' role, which is not so much to tell the future as it is "to interpret and mediate divine intentions as they influence human affairs" (*ibid.*). In Hesiod, the formula confirms the poem's orientation towards not simply truth, but a kind of truth typically beyond human experience: we need the Muses to see what we cannot, since, as the invocation to Homer's Catalogue of Ships confirms, they were there (*Il.* 2.484-93).

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[31] See also Tor 2017, 61-94, defending the view that the Muses' address to Hesiod implies that it is ambiguous whether the content of the *Theogony* represents the truth, although it does aim at the truth. Other representatives of this view include Pucci 1977, 8-44; Thalmann 1984, 151-2; Strauss Clay 1988, 328, and 2003, 63. For the vew that Hesiod, implies *his* poem is true, and other poems are "lies indistinguishable from reality," see Sassi 2018, 143-44.

[32] Tor helpfully compares Agamemnon, *deceived* despite his Zeus-given staff (2017, 75; cf. Hom. *Il.* 2.46).

[33] I pass over any detailed discussion of the difference between lines 32 and 38 (for which see Strauss Clay 2003, 175-82). The former line refers to the song the Muses grant Hesiod to sing and is crucially missing τά ἐόντα, "things in the present," from the latter line. The Muses' own song, delighting the mind of Zeus on Olympus and only indirectly reported in the proem, thereby surpasses Hesiod. Another problem is that the future, although a part of the Muses' message, is never divulged in the *Theogony*.

If truth is an aim of the poem, then the "foils" of the proem's priamel fall short of that goal, but nevertheless they mark progress towards the "cap" occurring at line *Th.* 116 ('but truly Chaos was born first of all'). This is not just an emphatic climax, but the "last stage in the human quest for truth."[34]

The "foils" of the *Theogony's* priamel are moments in the proem where Hesiod alludes to prior traditions, the first of which occurs right after the very beginning. Hesiod's song begins "from the Helikonian Muses" (*Th.* 1), who march down the mountain and sing a theogony starting with Zeus and ending with Night. (*Th.* 9-21):

> ἔνθεν ἀπορνύμεναι κεκαλυμμέναι ἠέρι πολλῷ
> ἐννύχιαι στεῖχον περικαλλέα ὄσσαν ἰεῖσαι,
> ὑμνεῦσαι Δία τ' αἰγίοχον καὶ πότνιαν Ἥρην
> Ἀργείην, χρυσέοισι πεδίλοις ἐμβεβαυῖαν,
> κούρην τ' αἰγιόχοιο Διὸς γλαυκῶπιν Ἀθήνην
> Φοῖβόν τ' Ἀπόλλωνα καὶ Ἄρτεμιν ἰοχέαιραν
> ἠδὲ Ποσειδάωνα γαιήοχον ἐννοσίγαιον
> καὶ Θέμιν αἰδοίην ἑλικοβλέφαρόν τ' Ἀφροδίτην
> Ἥβην τε χρυσοστέφανον καλήν τε Διώνην
> Λητώ τ' Ἰαπετόν τε ἰδὲ Κρόνον ἀγκυλομήτην
> Ἠῶ τ' Ἠέλιόν τε μέγαν λαμπράν τε Σελήνην

[34] The phrase is Keyser's, from his review of Zhmud 2008 (*CW* 102.1: 84). Cf. Zhmud 2008, 146: "[Theophrastus' collection] was mainly of historical interest, showing the difficult path to the truth that was finally revealed in Aristotle's and Theophrastus' physical teaching, i.e., outside of the *Physikōn doxai.*" Cf. Strauss Clay 2003, 56, calling the Muses' first theogonic song in the proem *(Th.* 11-21, quoted below) "*doxa,* possibly even *ortha doxa."* A proto-doxographical method is utilized by Hesiod's proem *qua* priamel.

Γαῖάν τ’ Ὠκεανόν τε μέγαν καὶ Νύκτα μέλαιναν
ἄλλων τ’ ἀθανάτων ἱερὸν γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων.

Rising from there, veiled in thick mist
They march at night emitting a very beautiful voice,
hymning aegis-being Zeus and Argive mistress
Hera, who walks in golden sandals,
and daughter of aegis-bearing Zeus, Athena,
and Phoebus Apollo and arrow-shedding Artemis
and Poseidon, earth-shaker who upholds the earth,
and reverend Themis and round-eyed Aphrodite,
and golden-crowned Hebe, and Dione,
and Leto, and Iapetos, and also Cronus of crooked-counsel,
and Dawn, and great Sun, and bright Moon,
and Earth, and Great Ocean, and Black Night,
and the sacred race of other immortals always existing.

Many details in these lines suggest that this list represents a traditional *genos* of immortals from which Hesiod’s own *Theogony* will differ in some respects.[35] Most important, perhaps, is the order in which the gods are presented: this list begins with the most recent king of the gods, Zeus, and moves back in time to Gaia, Ocean and Night, all of whom serve as origins in other cosmogonies.[36] The order, furthermore, is not entirely strict: some children of Zeus occur before

[35] Cf. Strauss Clay 2003, 55; Johnson 2008, 232.
[36] There are some exceptions to this general order, e.g. Poseidon appearing after Athena,

Poseidon, who is their elder. Hesiod's *Theogony*, in contrast, proceeds in a much stricter fashion, beginning with the first god, Chaos, and thereby reversing the order of the Muses' first song. Finally, that first song gives priority to Night, since, going in reverse order, she is named last, but as the first term of the priamel, this catalogue is canceled and subsumed by Hesiod's version. Hesiod includes Night in his *Theogony* and even gives her and her kin a place of prominence, but he also makes her a child of Chaos. This effectively *demotes* Night and illustrates how the "foils" of the proem's priamel are not simply canceled, but subsumed by the *Theogony*.

Immediately following the first item of the priamel is the story about the Muses teaching Hesiod song (*Th.* 22-35, discussed above). Shortly after, the second item of the priamel occurs (*Th.* 43-52, discussed in more detail below). Then, Hesiod tells us the story first of the birth of the Muses (Th. 53-62); then of their house near the Graces and Himeros (Th. 63-65); then of yet another song reported about the "customs and noble dispositions" of the gods (Th. 65-67). Finally, the Muses go, while singing, to Olympus to see their father Zeus, who defeated Cronus and distributed honors to all the gods (Th. 68-74). This whole sequence at first appears to be reported by the narrator, Hesiod, alone, but, surprisingly, he says the Muses sang these things (Th. 75): ταῦτ' ἄρα Μοῦσαι ἄειδον Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι.

We cannot be sure how many of the preceding lines the ταῦτ' of line 75 refers to. Furthermore, in the preceding lines Hesiod refers to himself in the first person singular many times (*Th.*24, 33: με *Th.* 30, 31, 33, 35: μοι), while first person plurals also occur (*Th.* 1:

Apollo, and Artemis, but the general direction holds, especially since the Titans appear just before Gaia, Ocean and Night. For Ocean as an ultimate origin, see Hom. *Il.* 14.200-1; 244-48; 301-3. For Night, see Damascius *de principiis* 124; Philodemus *de Pietate* 14. For Gaia, see *h.Hom*. 30.1: Γαῖαν παμμήτειραν…

Μουσάων Ἑλικωνιάδων ἀρχώμεθ’ ἀείδειν; *Th.* 35: Μουσάων ἀρχώμεθα). Many scholars have pointed out the hymnic qualities of the proem in general (e.g. Friedländer 1914), but Hesiod is not simply speaking to the Muses as in a hymn. The first-person plurals imply something else. As Strauss Clay argues, Hesiod and the Muses collaborate to the point that their voices become ‘indistinguishable’ (2003, 50-52; 69).

Collaboration has important implications for the proem. For instance, collaboration is incompatible with the idea that the poet is a mere vessel for the Muses’ message. Katz and Volk argue the ‘vessel view’ is implied by the Muses’ insult, calling the shepherds γαστέρες (‘mere bellies’ = ‘mere hollow vessels’ for the divine voice [2000, 172]). While it is clear that the Muses’ insult in some ways ‘anonymizes’ Hesiod, addressing him as a group—shepherds, bellies, or reproachful things—Hesiod has named himself, indicating that he was chosen and therefore must be special in some regard: Hesiod’s inspiration is uniquely based on his own personal encounter with them.

The Muses’ intervention guarantees that the second term of the priamel is an improvement upon the first, but it is also Hesiod himself who makes demands of the Muses: he insists that they begin with the first god (*Th.* 43-52, my emphasis)[37]:

αἱ δ’ ἄμβροτον ὄσσαν ἰεῖσαι
θεῶν γένος αἰδοῖον πρῶτον κλείουσιν ἀοιδῇ
ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οὓς Γαῖα καὶ Οὐρανὸς εὐρὺς ἔτικτεν,
οἵ τ’ ἐκ τῶν ἐγένοντο, θεοὶ δωτῆρες ἐάων·
δεύτερον αὖτε Ζῆνα θεῶν πατέρ’ ἠδὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν,

[37] I follow West and remove the bracketed line 48: [ἀρχόμεναί θ’ ὑμνεῦσι θεαὶ † λήγουσαί τ’ ἀοιδῆς,]

ὅσσον φέρτατός ἐστι θεῶν κάρτει τε μέγιστος·

αὖτις δ' ἀνθρώπων τε γένος κρατερῶν τε Γιγάντων

ὑμνεῦσαι τέρπουσι Διὸς νόον ἐντὸς Ὀλύμπου

Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο.

And the Muses, emitting an immortal voice

first celebrate the reverend race of gods in song

from the beginning, whom Gaia and broad Ouranos bore,

and who was born from them, Gods, givers of good things,

Then in turn, they celebrate Zeus, father of Gods and Men,

as much as he is best of gods in strength and greatest

And then they celebrate the race of men and of strong giants

in singing they delight the mind of Zeus in Olympus,

The Olympian Muses, daughters of aegis-bearing Zeus.

The order of this catalogue differs from the first, starting ἐξ ἀρχῆς from Gaia and Ouranos, proceeding through the supremacy of Zeus and even mentioning the race of men and giants.[38] With the inclusion of the last two races, this catalogue might be considered more comprehensive

[38] About the puzzle concerning humans in the *Theogony,* and when they might be said to come into existence, see Strauss Clay 2003, 95-99. The Scholia to *Th.* 187 claims humans came from the union of Giants and Melian Nymphs. The *Theogony* furthermore supports the view that humans are simply an accidental by-product of Ouranos' castration (cf. Strauss Clay 2003, 97-98); a view that differs sharply from the *WD* where humans are *made* four times (the four races golden through heroes are made; the iron race descends genealogically from heroes, *WD* 106-201), and, therefore, *intended* for a purpose. Note also how *WD* 108 promises to tell the shared origin of both gods and men, but only explicitly tells of the latter's origin. We can compare this absence to the absence of any explicit mention of human origins in the *Theogony.*

than the first. The conspicuous absence of Night, however, leaves us wanting an earlier figure—those who thought Night was first can ask where Gaia and Ouranos came from. What we lose in an earlier beginning, we gain in a later addition. Another important difference is the Muses' epithet Ὀλυμπιάδες, changing from the earlier Ἑλικωνιάδες, supporting the view that Hesiod expands his scope from the local to the Panhellenic (cf. Nagy 1990, 45).

The order of this catalogue, ἐξ ἀρχῆς, is amplified by the repeated uses of both πρῶτος, ἀρχή, and related forms throughout the proem (*Th.* 1, 24, 34, 36, 44, 48, 108, 113, and 115). When the poem finally takes off at line 116 with πρώτιστα, a morphologically pleonastic superlative, we see that some aspects of the second catalogue (*Th.* 45-50) are adopted in the poem itself. We should therefore qualify the priamel structure of 1-116 as not just a priamel but a development towards the poem itself. This priamel's "cap," Chaos and the ensuing *Theogony,* do not simply negate the prior catalogues, but gain something from them in a quasi-dialectical fashion. Other priamels, such as Sappho 16, also proceed in this progressive fashion: Although all three *stratoi* are negated by the cap "whatever one loves," Sappho will in turn describe what one loves in a manner evoking those earlier, negated terms. The "lovely step" (ἔρατόν…βᾶμα, 16.17) of Anaktoria and the bright flashing of her face (ἀμάρυχμα λάμπρον…προσώπω, 16.18) respectively recall the step of the army of foot soldiers and the quick movements of the cavalry from line 1 (ο]ἱ μὲν ἱππήων στρότον οἱ δὲ πέσδων, cf. Arist. *Aves* 925: ἵππων ἀμαρυγά).[39] Similarly, the "traditional" catalogues in the *Theogony's* proem never disappear, but undergo a transformation in the service of his point about Chaos: Hesiod's cosmogonic genealogy begins in

[39] I would like to thank Jenny Strauss Clay for pointing out these subtle details from Sappho 16, since I previously thought the earlier terms of Sappho's priamel were simply negated without being reflected in the final term.

the correct order, is more complete than other ones, although incorporating them, and reaches back beyond them.

The development continues with the third term of the priamel, the last before the 'climax' of the poem itself (*Th.* 104-115):

χαίρετε τέκνα Διός, δότε δ' ἱμερόεσσαν ἀοιδήν·
κλείετε δ' ἀθανάτων ἱερὸν γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων,
οἳ Γῆς ἐξεγένοντο καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος,
Νυκτός τε δνοφερῆς, οὓς θ' ἁλμυρὸς ἔτρεφε Πόντος.
εἴπατε δ' ὡς τὰ πρῶτα θεοὶ καὶ γαῖα γένοντο
καὶ ποταμοὶ καὶ πόντος ἀπείριτος οἴδματι θυίων
ἄστρά τε λαμπετόωντα καὶ οὐρανὸς εὐρὺς ὕπερθεν·
οἵ τ' ἐκ τῶν ἐγένοντο, θεοὶ δωτῆρες ἐάων·
ὥς τ' ἄφενος δάσσαντο καὶ ὡς τιμὰς διέλοντο,
ἠδὲ καὶ ὡς τὰ πρῶτα πολύπτυχον ἔσχον Ὄλυμπον.
ταῦτά μοι ἔσπετε Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι
ἐξ ἀρχῆς, καὶ εἴπαθ', ὅτι πρῶτον γένετ' αὐτῶν.

Rejoice, daughters of Zeus, and give desirous song:
and celebrate the sacred race of immortals always existing,
who were born from Gaia and Starry Ouranos,
and from murky Night, and whom the salty Pontos reared.
and tell how first Gods and earth were born
and rivers and boundless sea seething in its swell

and shining stars and broad sky above;
and the ones born from them, gods givers of good things,
and how they divided their abundance and how they distributed honors,
and also how they came to dwell many-cragged Olympus.
Tell me these things, Muses who dwell Olympian halls
from the beginning, and tell which of them was born first.

In some ways this catalogue is a combination of the previous two. From the first, Night has returned, although she has lost her place of prominence, standing now after Gaia and Ouranos. From the second, we are told once again of Zeus' distribution of honors among the immortals. In this third "foil," the order of the second catalogue is chosen over the order of the first: this one also proceeds ἐξ ἀρχῆς. Furthermore, Lines 106-7, where Gaia and Ouranos are mentioned before Night and Pontos, match the way Hesiod organizes the lineages of the *Theogony*: after a brief initial theogony and Night's first children (*Th.* 116-125), the offspring of Gaia and Ouranos are mentioned (*Th.* 126-153), then more from Night (*Th.* 211-232), then Pontos (*Th.* 233-264). Finally, and perhaps most importantly for our purposes, this catalogue also includes rivers and stars, and Pontos and Ouranos are repeated. Editors choose not to capitalize the latter two names this time as they are thought to represent natural phenomena. West, referring to 108 ff., says Hesiod here introduces the "cosmological aspect of the *Theogony"* (1966). To reiterate, then, we can say Hesiod moves from the local through the Panhellenic to the cosmological. The natural phenomena here are reflected in the body of the poem, which also describes the birth of rivers (*Th.* 337-70), mountains (129), and stars (381-82).

Although supposed to foreshadow the *Theogony* itself, in none of the three catalogues from the proem do we find mention of Chaos, Tartaros, or any other feature from the underworld. Associations of Night with figures from the underworld might hint that such things would be discussed, but the mention of Chaos in 116 remains a surprise. I, therefore, agree with Johnson (2008) that the proem + line 116 forms a priamel structure, but I add that both genealogical and temporal priority are given to Chaos to subsume tradition and foreground Hesiod's own theory about the beginnings of the cosmos.

III. Section 2: Chaos' Priority and Hesiod's Cosmos.

In the last section, I argued that Hesiod's proem amplifies the importance of the first figure of his divine genealogy, but in order to understand why Hesiod puts Chaos first, we should also try to understand what Chaos means. The meaning of Chaos in Hesiod's *Theogony* can be understood by appealing to 1) its etymology, 2) its reappearance in the underworld, and 3) its progeny.[40] All three are equally important, since focusing on one at the expense of the other two leads to reductive interpretations (Wacziarg 2001). Previous interpretations, except perhaps for Aristotle's, have not sufficiently explained why Hesiod makes Chaos prior to Gaia and Eros.

2.A: Chaos' Etymology

Determining the meaning of Chaos by appealing to etymology is not as straightforward as sometimes suggested. I argue that the meaning of 'interval' or 'gap' is over-emphasized in scholarship at the expense of other possible meanings. My view of the etymology is closest to

[40] This three-part division resembles Philippson's method (1936), followed by Wacziarg, Weigelt and others, but my approach differs slightly. Philippson focuses on 1) Name, 2) Epithet, and 3) Progeny. Chaos' epithet, ζοφερόν, is given in the underworld passage (*Th.* 814). I have adjusted my method from "epithet" to "appearances in the underworld" so that I may include χάσμα from line 740 in my discussion, without ignoring the important epithet.

that of Mondi 1989: we should question the relationship between χάος and χάσμα since it is possible that the two terms derive from two different roots, *$g^{h}eh_2$- and *$g^{jh}eh_2$- respectively (Beekes s.v. χάος and χάσκω). Although the *Theogony* suggests that Hesiod himself saw a relationship between the two, we should not be forced to equate them on this basis. Instead, the boundless χάος is delimited by the forms coming to be around and within it—namely Gaia and her descendants—and thereby becomes a bounded χάσμα. To understand why χάος is first and a necessary precondition for the entire cosmos, we should also consider its semantic relationship to the cognate χαῦνος and its early uses, as Mondi has also done (1989, 23-26). As we will confirm in section 2.C, the qualities suggested by χαῦνος also describe the progeny of χάος, insofar as many of its descendants resemble formless, insubstantial abstract concepts as opposed to Gaia's progeny, who are substantial forms (cf. Diller 1946, 144).

Let me first show why equating χάος and χάσμα based on etymology is dubious. Chaos is said to derive from the IE root *$g^{h}eh_2$-w- (Tribulato 2013, 169n.26; Beekes 2010, *ad loc.*; Wacziarg 2001, 123; Mondi 1989, 7). The adjective χαῦνος ("porous")[41] is derived from the same root in much the same way as ἐρεμνός is derived from ἔρεβος. Although the terms χάσκω, χανδάνω, and χάσμα are commonly seen as related to χάος (cf. West 1966 *ad* 116)[42], they derive from a different root, *$g^{jh}eh_2$-n- (Chantraine 1968-80, 1239-40, cf. Mondi 1989, 7). We must notice the initial palatal and its difference from the plain velar g- of Chaos' root. The difference

[41] I find it slightly suspicious that the metaphorical uses of this adjective predate any 'concrete' uses, referring to physical objects. According to a *TLG* search, the earliest uses are Solon frr. 11.6, 34.4 West, and Alcaeus 359.2, all of which describe 'empty thoughts.' Perhaps the emptiness of Chaos characterizes the non-physical nature, or even vanity of human concepts *qua* thoughts, for both Solon and Hesiod, and therefore so many abstract concepts relevant specifically to humans are ultimately (via Night) descendants from Chaos.

[42] It is uncertain to me why West includes χανδάνω, as the *LIV* suggests the root for this word is *$g^{h}ed$-.

in the initial syllable is suggested by cognates. For instance, χάος is thought to share a root with Indo-European words for "palate," like *guomo* of Old High German. The cognate from Lithuanian, *gomurỹs,* suggests the initial consonant was the plain velar *g^h. The root of χάσκω, by contrast, results in the Lithuanian cognate *žióti*, "to open (one's mouth)," suggesting the root has an initial palatal *g^{jh}. The relationship between χάος and χάσμα is therefore "para-etymological" (Tribulato 2013, 169n.26), and so West's identification of the two in meaning is incorrect on the basis of etymology (cf. Wacziarg 2001, 132).[43] Nevertheless, the vague semantic similarity between a word for 'palate' and a word for 'open one's mouth' suggests there may be some distant relationship between the two roots.

Cognate with χάος, χαῦνος means "porous, spongy, loose-grained" (LSJ *ad loc.*). Elaborating on the connection between the two, Mondi suggests that χάος is the "actualization" of the quality χαῦνος, and thus represents "an insubstantial formlessness" (Mondi 1989, 25). In light of this observation, we can question the two popular interpretations of Chaos—one as the 'gap' between Sky and Earth (Cornford 1944) and the other as the gap between Earth and Tartaros (Miller 1983; 2001).[44] I also suggest that Aristotle's interpretation, *pace* Mondi (1989, 22), that Chaos is simply 'empty space', remains a fairly close approximation of what Chaos means. In any case, arguments against Aristotle's view, which rely on an erroneous interpretation of Chaos' etymology and assume that 'space' is too abstract a concept for Hesiod (e.g. KRS 36), should now be questioned. Moreover, the very strict interpretation saying that χάος must be an interval between *two* points has no real etymological basis.

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[43] Cf. Frisk 1970, p.1073: [Regarding the connection of χάος to χάσκω, etc,] "es kann sich aber dabei nur um eine entfernte Verwandtschaft handeln."

[44] For a recent summary and critique of Cornford's views on early Greek philosophy and its relationship to Eastern myths, see Sassi 2018, 8-16.

Some ancient etymologies, even if inaccurate by our standards, can lead us to conclude that ancient readers interpreted Chaos as empty space. Aristotle, for instance, seemed to see a relationship between χῶρα and χάος, and this relationship is enough to connote emptiness.[45] Based on this comparison Aristotle interprets Chaos as meaning 'place' (τόπος), as in *Physics* Book 4 (208b25-209a2, my trans.):

> ἔτι οἱ τὸ κενὸν φάσκοντες εἶναι τόπον λέγουσιν· τὸ γὰρ κενὸν τόπος ἂν εἴη ἐστερημένος σώματος. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστί τι ὁ τόπος παρὰ τὰ σώματα, καὶ πᾶν σῶμα αἰσθητὸν ἐν τόπῳ, διὰ τούτων ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι· δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ Ἡσίοδος ὀρθῶς λέγειν ποιήσας πρῶτον τὸ χάος. λέγει γοῦν "πάντων μὲν πρώτιστα χάος γένετ', αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα γαῖ' εὐρύστερνος," ὡς δέον πρῶτον ὑπάρξαι χώραν τοῖς οὖσι, διὰ τὸ νομίζειν, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, πάντα εἶναί που καὶ ἐν τόπῳ. εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτο, θαυμαστή τις ἂν εἴη ἡ τοῦ τόπου δύναμις καὶ προτέρα πάντων· οὗ γὰρ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἐκεῖνο δ' ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀνάγκη πρῶτον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἀπόλλυται ὁ τόπος τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ φθειρομένων.
>
> Still, those believing in void claim place exists, for void would be place deprived of body. So, because of these things, one could suppose that place is something in addition to body, and every perceivable body is in place. And Hesiod would seem to speak correctly when he made Chaos first. So, he says, at any rate, "of all things first of all Chaos came to be, but then broad-chested Gaia," on the grounds that existing things need to have space first, because of the thought, like the majority think, that all things are somewhere and in place. But if it is such a

[45] Note how Hesiod also calls the underworld a χῶρος (*Th.*731; 806). I tentatively suggest the possibility that Hesiod also saw (folk-)etymological connections between χῶρος and χάος.

> thing, the power of place would be something marvelous and prior to all things. For that without which no other thing exists, but which exists without other things, necessarily is first. For place is not destroyed when the things inside it are destroyed.

It is possible that Aristotle saw an etymological link between χάος and χώρα because he only introduces the word χώρα into his discussion of τόπος after quoting the line from Hesiod containing χάος.

One can and should still insist that the real etymology of χάος is less important than how Hesiod himself viewed it. The word χάος occurs again hundreds of lines after its first apperance, during the Titanomachy at line 700. There, curiously, it catches fire. Furthermore, the word χάσμα appears nearby at 740, alongside the 'springs and boundaries' of the earth, Tartaros, sea, and sky (736-38). This 'cosmography' echoes the primordial entities of the 'cosmogony' where χάος first appears (116-22; 126-28). It is, therefore, commonly assumed that Hesiod himself etymologizes χάος from χάσμα and similar terms (Bussanich 1983, 214n.10). I argue that, even if this is true, there can still be a substantial difference between the two terms for Hesiod, and the difference arises from the development whereby the initial χάος transforms into the χάσμα in the Underworld. It is furthermore possible that χάος represents a coinage of Hesiod's. If this is true, it is not immediately clear how such a term would be coined from χάσμα. In a case where the term already existed, we might even suggest that Hesiod etymologizes χάσμα from χάος, reversing the consensus of scholarship. This suggestion fits with the cosmogonic narrative, moving towards increasing differentiation and distinction in the cosmos. A χάσμα, therefore, would be a more distinct and narrower thing in comparison to the broader, less defined entity

which starts the *Theogony*. To show this, we will examine Hesiod's *descriptio tartari* in the next section.

Section 2.B: Chaos in the Underworld.

Scholarly discussion of the etymology of Chaos proceeds naturally to Hesiod's description of the Underworld. Hesiod's Chaos cannot be understood by means of etymology alone, and analysis of the word's use, with three appearances in the *Theogony*, is arguably of equal or even greater importance than the etymologies. In this section, we will look at Chaos' appearances in the *Theogony* and their context and relate these to its etymology. Following this, we will discuss the progeny of Chaos in the next section. The goal is to find a meaning which fairly accommodates each of these factors (i.e. etymology, occurrences, and progeny), and one which will finally explain why Hesiod chose to place Chaos first in his cosmogony. I have chosen to treat both the initial cosmogony and Chaos' later appearances in the underworld together in this section since they mutually inform one another.[46]

We should first consider the initial cosmogony, where Chaos, Gaia, Tartaros, and Eros all appear together (*Th.* 116-22):

ἤτοι μὲν πρώτιστα Χάος γένετ'· αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα

Γαῖ' εὐρύστερνος, πάντων ἕδος ἀσφαλὲς αἰεὶ

ἀθανάτων οἳ ἔχουσι κάρη νιφόεντος Ὀλύμπου,

Τάρταρά τ' ἠερόεντα μυχῷ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης,

[46] There has been a debate among scholars about whether the initial cosmogony and the later 'cosmographic' passages contradict one another, for which see Solmsen 1949, 62; Vlastos 1955, 74; Stokes 1962, 32. I will address this issue below.

ἠδ’ Ἔρος, ὃς κάλλιστος ἐν ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι, (120)

λυσιμελής, πάντων τε θεῶν πάντων τ’ ἀνθρώπων

δάμναται ἐν στήθεσσι νόον καὶ ἐπίφρονα βουλήν.

Well now in truth first of all Chaos was born. But then

Broad-breasted Gaia, an always unshakable seat for all

immortals who dwell the peaks of snowy Olympus

and misty *tartara* in corner of the broad-pathed ground,

and Eros, who is most beautiful among immortal gods,

the limb-loosener, of both all the gods and of all humans

he dominates the understanding in their chests and their thoughtful counsel.

Let me repeat some common but important observations: 1) Chaos *comes to be* or *is born* first. This prompts us to ask whether it came to be *from nothing* or if some parent is implied for it.[47] 2) None of these four entities appears related to one another, yet they are put in a temporal sequence. What is the significance of temporal priority when compared to genealogical priority? Is there a sense in which Chaos’ temporal priority implies parentage of the other entities, as has sometimes been supposed?[48] 3) Hesiod says not Tartaros, but *tartara*. Is there a difference? Is

[47] Miller defends the “implied parentage” view, claiming Tartaros is parent of Chaos (1983, 2001); Solmsen has raised this possibility (1949, 27; 62), but Solmsen discusses the possibility that Earth was born from Chaos, not Chaos from Tartaros. The issue is further complicated by the later ‘cosmographic’ passage known as the *descriptio tartari,* where the ‘sources’ of Earth are said to be in the underworld, thus implying that the Earth *comes from* Chaos or Tartaros (cf. Stokes 1962, 32).

[48] An ancient controversy attends the ‘four entities’ reading, since Plato and Aristotle quote Hesiod *Th.* 116 ff., leaving out lines *Th.* 118-19, where Tartaros appears (Pl. *Symp.* 178b;

the text corrupt? If *tartara* stands for Tartaros, is Tartaros one of the primeval four, or simply a part of earth? Is *tartara* nominative or accusative?[49]

Among the most recent and compelling interpretations of the initial cosmogony, Mitchell Miller's stands out and addresses many of my same concerns, although I take issue with some of his points (1983; 2001). Miller agrees with the etymological interpretation of Chaos as 'gap,' and places Chaos below the earth—the latter view I will confirm below (1983, 132). Yet Miller also sees Chaos as a principle of differentiation, opposite Eros (a principle of attraction). Chaos separates Gaia from Tartaros, thus causing Gaia to come to be. Chaos comes to be first, temporally, because a principle which divides things is necessary to separate Gaia from Tartaros. Miller also argues that the verb γένετ' does imply parentage for Chaos, with Chaos being born, genealogically, from Tartaros, the ultimate parent of the cosmos. Miller furthermore argues that Hesiod uses the neuter nominative plural *tartara* in the initial cosmogony as a reflection of his more indistinct state at this point in the process. Since Tartaros is itself the undifferentiated, ineffable state of the cosmos before anything comes to be, it need not, or indeed cannot be mentioned as coming to be before Chaos. Instead, Tartaros, as 'the undifferentiated' presupposes 'the differentiated,' i.e. Gaia, and so Gaia is before Tartaros. Furthermore, their

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Arist. *Metaph.* 984a27). There is the further issue of whether Tartaros should be considered a primordial entity, or else just a part of Earth, for which see the next note. I call it an entity here because later in the poem it becomes a distinct entity, even if it remains indistinct in the initial cosmogony.

[49] On this issue, see West 1966 *ad* 118-19. West defends the view that Tartaros is one of the primordial four. Miller takes this further and makes Tartaros the ultimate source of all things (1983; 2001). Following the suggestions of Strauss Clay 2003, 16, I am inclined to take Tartara of line 119 as accusative, and thus a part of the Earth, but who eventually emerges as Tartaros, the father of Typhon, in line *Th.* 822. I shall argue below how the progression from Χάος to χάσμα is analogous, but slightly different: it is a movement from 'insubstantial formlessness' to a distinct space in the underworld, rather than from a distinct part of Earth to a distinct figure, Tartaros, with whom Earth can have a child, Typhon.

separation from one another presupposes Chaos—a principle of separation, and thus Chaos is mentioned before the two of them (1983, 141).

Miller's view of Tartaros is idiosyncratic but deserves mention since it confirms that Hesiod was concerned with more than one type of priority. To reiterate, in the initial cosmogony Hesiod establishes relationships between Chaos, Earth, Tartaros and Eros that are not genealogical, but based on a different kind of priority (cf. Philippson 1936, 13). What we need to move forward, however, is an interpretation of Chaos based on etymology that also fits the context of the initial cosmogony as well as later sections of the poem. Based on Mondi's argument, cited above, I submit that Chaos means not 'gap,' but something like 'insubstantial formlessness,' to which we might compare Miller's interpretation of Tartaros as the 'undifferentiated.' I would rather assign that role to Chaos itself, while also maintaining that Chaos is space, not the narrower meaning of "gap" or interval. There cannot be a gap before there are things to form the gap. Furthermore, as a poem and, strictly speaking, not a philosophical treatise, we should expect the *Theogony* to say more and not less than philosophy. While philosophy increasingly comes to avoid equivocation through more technical prose usage, as any of Aristotle's treatises can illustrate, there is nothing preventing Hesiod from speaking equivocally or playfully.[50]

In terms of later Greek philosophy, Chaos seems to evoke the idea of "Becoming," somewhere between existing and not-existing, and therefore Hesiod says Chaos *comes to be* and not merely *is* forever. The verb γένετ' is Hesiod's way of exposing us to the paradox of

[50] On Hesiod's speaking equivocally, as it relates to his status as a precursor to philosophy, see Rowe 1983, 125. Rowe labels the view as 'multiple approaches' to the same object (1983, 127). Cf. Frankfort 1948, 42; Lloyd 1966, 202; Fränkel 1975, 105.

Becoming and its problems; problems to be more fully articulated by Parmenides in his poem. In Hesiod, the dilemma is encapsulated by referring to the gods as "always existing" (*Th.* 105: αἰὲν ἐόντων) as well as continually being born (e.g. *Th.* 116).

Chaos represents Becoming *spatially* in the underworld by hosting both the *sources* (πηγαί) and *boundaries* (πείρατα)—the beginnings and the ends—of all other primordial entities in the cosmos (*Th.* 736-45). Chaos also represents becoming *temporally* through its immediate progeny, Night and Day (*Th.* 123-24; cf. Weigelt 2004, 210). As for tartara/Tartaros, I follow Strauss Clay, in understanding *tartara* as another space within Gaia, separate and distinct from—but also within—the χάσμα μέγα (*Th.* 740). In Tartaros, the Titans are imprisoned (*Th.* 723-31) and Tartaros later emerges as a figure in order to conceive Typhon (*Th.* 822; cf. Strauss Clay 2003, 15-16). According to my interpretation of the initial cosmogony, Tartaros appears as the accusative object of ἔχουσι, indicating a place, like Olympus, where gods dwell (Weigelt 2004, 205, cf. Hesiod *Th.*118-19). We can ask which gods occupy Tartaros. I would argue that Hesiod's statement is proleptic, referring to the eventual imprisonment of the Titans there, where they should still reside today. The re-appearance of many of Chaos' descendants in the underworld suggests to me that they occupy the χάσμα μέγα as a distinct space.

After the cosmogony, each subsequent appearance of Chaos in the underworld echoes that original state, appearing alongside many other primordial entities from that earlier section. In what follows, I will analyze the appearance of the term χάος during the Titanomachy (*Th.* 700). Then, I turn to the so-called *descriptio tartari* (*Th.* 720-819). I agree with Weigelt that

much of this description concerns not Tartaros, but Chaos itself as the space in which the features of the underworld are located (2004, 193n15).[51]

At the end of the Titanomachy, it is said that the divine fire resulting from the battle even occupies Chaos (*Th.* 700): καῦμα δὲ θεσπέσιον κάτεχεν χάος.[52] Just before this we are shown how the scale of the battle is so large that it even affects Gaia and Ouranos (*Th.* 679), as well as Tartaros (682) and Okeanos (695). The final mention of Chaos on fire suggests that the battle can reach no greater intensity, as the deepest reaches of the cosmos are all now affected (cf. West 1966, *ad loc.*). But what can this line tell us about what Chaos is and why it is born first? West has cited this line as evidence against the view that Chaos is empty space, i.e. the Aristotelian view. As West puts it, Chaos has "sufficient substance to catch fire," and so cannot be simply 'space' (1966, *ad* 116). This is far from conclusive. If there were a poetic line that read "the explosions burned so brightly that even the void caught fire," we could easily see this as the very sort of poetic paradox that arises whenever a *cosmos* threatens to unravel. We should furthermore take a closer look at the verb here: κάτεχεν. The LSJ (s.v. "κατέχω") tells us that it not only means to hold back or possess, but also to occupy or even to fill a space. If anything, then, Chaos is at least a place fire can fill, whether it has substance or not.

Some scholars have thought that line 700 also provides clues as to where Chaos is but are themselves divided. One group thinks Chaos is below the Earth (Miller 2001, 7; Vlastos 1955, 74n4), and another thinks it lies above the earth (Cornford 1941, 98; KRS 38). Cornford and KRS, relying on the etymology that Chaos means 'gap,' claim that the fire of the Titanomachy

[51] My view differs slightly from Clay *Forthcoming,* 403, who sees the "great chasm" as the division between Tartaros and Hades. I see χάσμα μέγα of *Th.* 740 as an appositive to the ἔνθα of *Th.* 736. I agree with Clay that the chasm is a tranformed version of chaos.
[52] Vlastos suggests θεσπέσιον may go with χάος and not καῦμα (1955, 74n4)

occupies the space between the sky and the earth. This is not clear in the context of the Titanomachy, nor even from the *Theogony* itself, but relies too heavily on the precedent of Eastern traditions, the etymology of χάσκω, and interpretations of later poets (e.g. Bacch. 5.27). Since, when Chaos appears, Earth, Sky, and Tartaros are all affected by the battle, then Chaos could really be anywhere: the battle's description is not given any specific boundaries. Furthermore, even if we do believe the meaning of Chaos is 'gap,' it could still be located between the Earth and Tartaros. This is the more likely scenario, and the next appearances of Chaos confirm this, all of which suggest Chaos is in the underworld.

After the Titanomachy, Hesiod continues with his description of Tartaros,[53] where the Titans are imprisoned (720-731). The description begins by moving downwards, "as far under the earth as the sky is from earth, it is just as far from earth to misty Tartaros" (*Th.* 720-21). It seems that the Titan's prison lies at the very bottom of the cosmos, above (ὕπερθε) which are "roots" (ῥίζαι) of the earth and sky (*Th.* 727-8). Following this are some details about the prison: its walls built by Poseidon and its guards, the Hundred-handers (*Th.* 732-35). If Tartaros represents the lowest point, the narrative seems to move outward and upward into the "Great Chasm" where we also see the sources and boundaries of the earth, Tartaros, sea and sky (*Th.* 736-45):

> ἔνθα δὲ γῆς δνοφερῆς καὶ ταρτάρου ἠερόεντος
>
> πόντου τ' ἀτρυγέτοιο καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος

[53] Although *Th.* 720-819 is commonly called the *descriptio tartari,* Weigelt 2004, 193n.15, has argued it should rather be called the *descriptio chaeos,* as the underworld is the great chasm (χάσμα μέγ'), i.e. Chaos into which the roots and sources of Earth, Tartaros, Sea, and Sky have been placed, and this reflects the absolute origins of the cosmos, where Chaos is first.

ἐξείης πάντων πηγαὶ καὶ πείρατ’ ἔασιν,

ἀργαλέ’ εὐρώεντα, τά τε στυγέουσι θεοί περ·

χάσμα μέγ’, οὐδέ κε πάντα τελεσφόρον εἰς ἐνιαυτὸν (740)

οὖδας ἵκοιτ’, εἰ πρῶτα πυλέων ἔντοσθε γένοιτο,

ἀλλά κεν ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα φέροι πρὸ θύελλα θυέλλης

ἀργαλέη· δεινὸν δὲ καὶ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι.

And there are in order the sources and boundaries of all

of gloomy earth and misty tartaros

and of barren sea and of starry sky,

dank, loathsome things which the very gods hate;

the great chasm, if someone should first come within the gates,

they would not reach the bottom for a whole entire year,

but here and there loathsome gust after gust would

carry him. Terrible even to the immortal gods.

Within the chasm, which West identifies with Chaos itself (1966, *ad* 116), the sources (πηγαὶ) and the boundaries (πείρατ’) of the other primordial entities, including Earth and Tartaros, seem also to represent the beginning and end of these powers. The fact that these sources are located within Chaos reinforces the importance of Chaos’ priority in the initial cosmogony. But unlike

what Johnson (1999, 16) and Stokes (1962, 11) suggest, I do not think that this means Chaos *is* the sources and ends of these primordial entities. Rather, these sources are arranged in order (ἐξείης) "there" (ἔνθα), and the ἔνθα here should be identified with the χάσμα itself. So, again, this suggests that Chaos is a kind of space as a necessary condition for the origination of other entities (Earth, Sky, etc.), but not itself the source of those entities. It is the location of the sources, suggesting yet again that Aristotle's interpretation was not so far off as is sometimes supposed. Even if not the "too abstract" empty space, Chaos represents an earnest attempt on Hesiod's part to posit an entity as an absolute 'condition of possibility' (to borrow a Kantian phrase, *Bedingung der Möglichkeit*) for all other things, including Tartaros. Such a condition is not a cause: Earth does not *come from* Chaos. Nevertheless, it is entirely necessary: If Chaos did not exist, then where could the sources and limits of the other entities be located?

Since Miller argues that Tartaros is the source of all things, we need to establish Tartaros' relationship to Chaos and reaffirm their distinction from one another. The greatest difficulty with interpreting Hesiod's description of the underworld is understanding how all the things he described relate to one another spatially.[54] The passage began with Tartaros (721) and continued with the great Chasm. But is the chasm above or below Tartaros or are they side-by-side? Is one within the other? There are few moments in the text of Hesiod's underworld passage that would lead to a clear understanding of how things are arranged. The repetition of ἔνθα (δὲ) (*Th.* 729, 734, 736, 758, 767, 775, 807), each time introducing another thing under the Earth, does not seem to follow any strict path, but, as Johnson puts it, "places us vaguely in the other world" (1999, 16). Yet, there is a fairly clear ring-composition to the entire passage: It starts and ends with Tartaros (720-35; 811-14), and nested within the mentions of Tartaros, two descriptions of

[54] See Strauss Clay Forthcoming, 399-403 on sorting out the difficult itinerary.

the sources and boundaries are also repeated at either end of the passage (736-39; 807-10; cf. Johnson 1999, 8). And in the passage quoted below—the next place where Chaos is mentioned—the prison Tartaros lies *beyond* Chaos (*Th.* 814: πέρην χάεος), giving us a clue as to their arrangement. Since in the following lines, Chaos is described as 'gloomy,' there is further evidence that Chaos is not the space above the earth but is now here confined below her (811-14).

> ἔνθα δὲ μαρμάρεαί τε πύλαι καὶ χάλκεος οὐδός,
>
> ἀστεμφὲς ῥίζῃσι διηνεκέεσσιν ἀρηρώς,
>
> αὐτοφυής· πρόσθεν δὲ θεῶν ἔκτοσθεν ἁπάντων
>
> Τιτῆνες ναίουσι, πέρην χάεος ζοφεροῖο.
>
> And there are both marble gates and threshold of bronze,
>
> joined fast to continuous roots,
>
> naturally-grown; Past these, apart from all Gods,
>
> the Titans dwell, beyond gloomy Chaos.

Based on the passages above, Chaos and Tartaros are distinct places, but the entire cosmos grows from roots and springs located within Chaos. Since Tartaros, the prison, is "beyond Chaos" and the underworld passage begins by traveling down into Tartaros, following the path of the anvil (*Th.* 722), I would place Tartaros below Chaos, but also emanating from Chaos, as the sources and boundaries of Tartaros are also located in Chaos. Furthermore, since Chaos and Tartaros are both thought to be within and below Gaia, it is reasonable to locate Chaos approximately at the center of the universe that has emerged in and around it—in the

middle of Earth who stands half-way between Sky and Chaos. The itinerary of the entire underworld journey thus begins at the very bottom, then moves up into the chasm in which all the other features are located, and finally returns to the lower region, Tartaros, where the Titans are imprisoned.[55]

Section 2.C. The Progeny of Chaos.

Philippson's pioneering study on genealogy in Hesiod's *Theogony* made the important suggestion that we can understand the figure of Chaos through its progeny (1936, 14):

> Vor allem aber entfaltet sich das Wesen einer Gottheit in ihrer Nachkommenschaft. Je höher, d.h. je früher die zeugenden und gebärenden göttlichen Gestalten in dem System der Genealogie stehen, desto grösser is die Fülle der in ihnen beschlossenen Wesenheiten, desto vieldeutiger ihre Konzeption. Und ebenso wie in einem logischen System der Oberbegriff qualitativ unverändert und quantitativ unvermindert bleibt, auch nachdem sich aus ihm eine Fülle von Unterbegriffen entwickelt hat, ebenso behalten die elterlichen Wesenheiten in dem genealogischen System des Hesiod ihre unveränderte Seins- und Wesensfülle, auch nachdem ihre Einzelmodifikationen in Gestalt ihrer Kinder sich aus ihnen gelöst haben. Denn diese Kinder stellen in sich – und dies ist von grundsätzlicher Bedeutung für das Verständnis der Genealogie auf dieser ersten Stufe des Weltmythos—die Wesensentfaltung der elterlichen Gottheiten, eben ihre Einzelmodifikationen, dar. So bleibt Chaos als Chaos unverändert bestehen, auch nachdem ihm Erebos und Nacht entstanden sind. Und ebenso bestehen Erebos und Nacht weiter, nachdem sie, sich vereinigend, Aither und Tag erzeugt haben.

[55] Strauss Clay (*Forthcoming*), 400-1.

Philippson here suggests that the essence of Chaos can be understood through its immediate descendants, Night and Darkness, and in turn also Aither and Day. The children are even "modifications" of Chaos, which also suggests that none of the descendants can fully represent the meaning of Chaos in themselves, but exist as particular instantiations of the total form, Chaos, each one a partial glimpse of the full concept in its own way.

One aspect of Philippson's analysis which remains obscure, however, is how the concept of Chaos develops through its children, while also remaining the same. The appearance of the great chasm in the underworld, for instance, shows that Chaos does in fact change over the course of the poem. As I suggested above, following Mondi, as the orderly world—Gaia and her progeny and the rest of the substantial gods—emerges around and within Chaos, it is transformed into a delimited space, the Great Chasm in the underworld. For Chaos to remain the same under this reading, we should slightly modify our early understanding of its meaning. That is, the world of form—Gaia's progeny, etc.—grows up within and is thus superimposed upon the world of formlessness, which is prior to and necessary for this world. The outline of Chaos changes, but the change may be in appearance alone, relative to the well-ordered and formed world imposed in, around, and upon it. If this reading is correct, it can help support the notion that Chaos is indeed an abstract, empty space.

Philippson's analysis of Chaos' progeny is limited in that it stops after treating Night and Day, only to conclude that, judging from Chaos' children—in contrast to Gaia and her Children—Chaos lacks substance (1936, 15-16).[56] For us to continue with the rest of Chaos'

[56] Philippson does list the children of Night and Eris, but does not elaborate or explain how these should in turn affect our understanding of Chaos (1936, 18-19). She does, however, judge that these catalogues contain "no frosty allegory," and with this I agree (*ibid.,* 19)

descendants, it will be helpful to turn to Weigelt's analysis (2004). Using Philippson's strategy, Weigelt has contributed an important observation about Chaos: it should not be understood as merely spatial, as the meaning 'gap' suggests,[57] but also as temporal (2004, 210). This is confirmed immediately by the progeny of Chaos (*Th.* 123-25):

> ἐκ Χάεος δ' Ἔρεβός τε μέλαινά τε Νὺξ ἐγένοντο·
>
> Νυκτὸς δ' αὖτ' Αἰθήρ τε καὶ Ἡμέρη ἐξεγένοντο,
>
> οὓς τέκε κυσαμένη Ἐρέβει φιλότητι μιγεῖσα.
>
> And from Chaos, both black Darkness and Night are born;
>
> and of Night, in turn, Aither also and Day come to be,
>
> whom she gave birth to, since she became pregnant after mingling in love with Erebos.

Chaos gives birth to Darkness and Night, and Night and Erebos 'mingling in love' give birth to Aither and Day—the first act of sexual procreation in the *Theogony* (not including the birth of the Muses in the proem). These pairs of opposites both contain a spatial and a temporal counterpart. According to Weigelt, Darkness and Aither can be understood spatially or even materially, while Night and Day are obviously temporal. It is not, however, immediately obvious why *Erebos* and *Aither* are spatial terms. To explain this, returning to Philippson is helpful, for she uses parallels from Homer to show how *Erebos* and *Aither* connote opposite directions. In the *Hymn to Demeter,* for instance, Zeus sends Hermes *into the Darkness* to bring

[57] On the other hand, if the 'gap' is the space between sky and earth, then chaos giving birth to both night and day makes sense, as this is the space in which night and day are observed.

Persephone back *into the light* (h. *Dem.* 335 f., cf. Philippson 1936, 15). Furthermore, Darkness and Light also seem respectively to correspond to the directions down and up. In the *Odyssey,* the souls of the dead come 'out from under Darkness" (ὑπὲξ Ἐρέβευς) to meet Odysseus (*Od.* 11.36-37, cf. Philippson 1936, 14-15). Darkness and Light thus represent the lowest depth and the highest height, and in this way connote spatial relationships.

The important similarity between the two pairs of opposites—Night/Day and Darkness/Aither—reflect on Chaos as both a spatial and temporal entity. Many scholars have observed how the very early birth of Night and Day reflects not only the birth of Time itself, but also makes Time a necessary condition for the poem's genealogical progress (e.g. Weigelt 2004, 223; Strauss Clay 2003, 16). If this is true, then Night and Day have a kind of priority that is only genealogical insofar as it marks the relative time of their birth in the catalogue (after Chaos, but before the children of Gaia and Ouranos and the rest of Night's children), but Night and Day also have a different sort of conditional priority. Like *Eros,* Night and Day are necessary for the genealogical narrative's progress, but, unlike *Eros,* they are strictly speaking not causes. We can add Chaos to Night, Day, and Eros as figures in Hesiod's cosmogony who do not overlap *genealogically* with Gaia's progeny but still play a role in their development. One could even argue that Gaia's progeny could not exist without Night and Day. To show this, I compare the birth narrative of Aphrodite, which occurs soon after the birth of Night and Day, when Hesiod interrupts the line of Chaos to tell the story of Ouranos' castration.[58] The first expressions for duration occur when Gaia receives the blood from Ouranos' severed genitals to mark gestation after a moment of conception: περιπλομένων ἐνιαυτῶν (*Th.* 184). Then, the Erinyes and Giants are born. A few lines later, after the genitals fall into the sea, another time expression occurs:

[58] Cf. Also when Ouranos "brings on Night" and surrounds Gaia desiring sex in line 176-77.

πουλὺν χρόνον (*Th.* 190). The time expression illustrates the process of gestation, as Aphrodite congeals—her embryo is articulated—from the foam/semen of Ouranos' genitals and the Sea (*Th.* 190-3).[59] No other time expressions occur earlier in the *Theogony,* with the exception of the birth-narrative of the Muses, in particular lines 58-59: ἀλλ' ὅτε δή ῥ' ἐνιαυτὸς ἔην, περὶ δ' ἔτραπον ὧραι | μηνῶν φθινόντων, περὶ δ' ἤματα πόλλ' ἐτελέσθη. For a poem that proceeds genealogically, for the most part, Time is almost as crucial as Eros, as these passages demonstrate. The more we analyze Chaos, the more it and its progeny begins to appear as a necessary and fundamental condition for the cosmos.

The progeny of Chaos seems to exemplify the vanity of human thoughts and endeavors, to which the closely related adjective χαῦνος customarily refers.[60] The catalogue of Chaos' progeny, therefore, reflect not simply upon Chaos' physical qualities, but also upon its conceptual dimension as an imagined beginning (*Th.* 212-32):

> Νὺξ δ' ἔτεκε στυγερόν τε Μόρον καὶ Κῆρα μέλαιναν
>
> καὶ Θάνατον, τέκε δ' Ὕπνον, ἔτικτε δὲ φῦλον Ὀνείρων.
>
> δεύτερον αὖ Μῶμον καὶ Ὀιζὺν ἀλγινόεσσαν (214)
>
> οὔ τινι κοιμηθεῖσα θεῶν τέκε Νὺξ ἐρεβεννή, (213)
>
> Ἑσπερίδας θ', αἳς μῆλα πέρην κλυτοῦ Ὠκεανοῖο (215)
>
> χρύσεα καλὰ μέλουσι φέροντά τε δένδρεα καρπόν·

[59] A fuller treatment of this episode, and its importance for later Presocratic cosmology and embryology, will be the subject of the next chapter.

[60] For which, see my discussion of Chaos' etymology above.

καὶ Μοίρας καὶ Κῆρας ἐγείνατο νηλεοποίνους,

[Κλωθώ τε Λάχεσίν τε καὶ Ἄτροπον, αἵ τε βροτοῖσι

γεινομένοισι διδοῦσιν ἔχειν ἀγαθόν τε κακόν τε,][61]

αἵ τ' ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε παραιβασίας ἐφέπουσιν,

οὐδέ ποτε λήγουσι θεαὶ δεινοῖο χόλοιο,

πρίν γ' ἀπὸ τῷ δώωσι κακὴν ὄπιν, ὅστις ἁμάρτῃ.

τίκτε δὲ καὶ Νέμεσιν πῆμα θνητοῖσι βροτοῖσι

Νὺξ ὀλοή· μετὰ τὴν δ' Ἀπάτην τέκε καὶ Φιλότητα

Γῆράς τ' οὐλόμενον, καὶ Ἔριν τέκε καρτερόθυμον.

αὐτὰρ Ἔρις στυγερὴ τέκε μὲν Πόνον ἀλγινόεντα

Λήθην τε Λιμόν τε καὶ Ἄλγεα δακρυόεντα

Ὑσμίνας τε Μάχας τε Φόνους τ' Ἀνδροκτασίας τε

Νείκεά τε Ψεύδεά τε Λόγους τ' Ἀμφιλλογίας τε

Δυσνομίην τ' Ἄτην τε, συνήθεας ἀλλήλῃσιν,

Ὅρκόν θ', ὃς δὴ πλεῖστον ἐπιχθονίους ἀνθρώπους

πημαίνει, ὅτε κέν τις ἑκὼν ἐπίορκον ὀμόσσῃ·

[61] West brackets these lines, as they are repeated at *Th.* 905-6. I suppose the reason their names should only appear later is because the names belong only to the Moirai, and not the Keres, who do not reappear at *Th.* 904..

And Night gave birth to hateful Doom and black Ruin

and Death, and she bore Sleep and she bore the tribe of

Dreams.

Next in turn Blame and painful Woe

Dark Night bore, lying with not one of the gods,

and the Hesperides, whose concern are the beautiful golden

apples beyond famous ocean, and their fruit-bearing trees

and she bore the Fates and ruthlessly punishing *Keres,*

[Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, who give to Mortals

as they are born both god and evil to have,]

and who pursue the transgressions of both men and gods,

nor ever do the goddesses cease their terrible anger

until they pay back a wretched vengeance upon who ever has erred.

And destructive Night also bore Nemesis as a bane

to mortal men; and afterwards she bore Deceit and Desire,

and destructive Old Age, and she bore stout-hearted Eris.

But hateful Eris bore painful Toil

and Oblivion and Famine and tearful Pains

and Fights and Battles and Murders and Manslaughters

and Quarrels and Lies and Words and Disputes

and Lawlessness and Moral-Blindness, dwelling with one another,

and Oath, who causes the greatest Calamity for earth-dwelling humans,

when anyone willingly swears a false oath.

That this catalogue is comprised of mostly negative forces is self-evident.[62] In addition, Weigelt observes the important distinction between the children of Night and the children of Eris. As he puts it, the Children of Night exemplify the negativity of Nature, while the children of Eris represent the negativity of Culture (2004, 215). To elaborate, the Children of Night are manifestations of Fate, including Death: the *Keres*and the Fates themselves. The children of Eris, on the other hand, represent societal quarrels, wars, and disagreements. The latter group are more "cultural," so to speak, since they represent language, social customs, and institutions. Night's progeny characterizes the 'negativity' that characterizes human life, but is it not also a reflection of the limitations of human nature? The last place Hesiod reminded us of such limitations was through the ambiguous quality of the Muses' revelation to him. Ambiguity,

[62] The apparent exception is Philotes, but consider her counter-part, Deception, and compare the passage describing Aphrodite's birth, where she obtains Deceptions as her lot (*Th.* 205, cf. Weigelt 2004, 215). Although Oath's good side is described in the *Works and Days,* the *Theogony* specifically states it is a πῆμα for mortals who swear falsely, without reporting its good side.

therefore, also colors Night's catalogue: we must remember that in the *Works and Days* there are two *Erides,* one of which is good, showing the duplicitous nature of the human perspective in contrast to the divine (cf. Strauss Clay 2003, 6-8). If the *Theogony* represents the divine perspective, labeling all these human concepts as unequivocally bad,[63] it is telling that in the *Works and Days,* one of Night's children—or perhaps a different 'birth' of Strife altogether—is redeemed in the eyes of humans as 'a good kind of strife' (*WD* 24).

I would therefore replace Weigelt's argument for "negativity" with an argument for the "ambiguity" inherent in Chaos' descendants, but what does it mean to call the figures in Night's catalogue "ambiguous"? Although many are unequivocally bad, many are also causes of the uncertainty that defines the human condition. Not only do gods like Old Age and the Fates illustrate the limitations of mortals, but quarrels, disputes and oaths suggest the ways in which people divide themselves into two groups (or more), leading us naturally to raise the question: "who is right?" The multiple scenes of humans judging cases in Hesiod, sometimes rightly (*Th.* 84-87), other times wrongly (*WD* 37-41), corroborate this view. I will discuss the roles of Oath and Justice in the *Works and Days* in greater detail below, but first let me give a summary of my view. Since a human must interpret these oaths and judgments as either true or false, straight or crooked, it is reasonable to call them ambiguous. To the divine figures of Oath and Justice, however, the effects of false oaths and crooked judgments are immediate. It is evident to both these gods whether an oath is false or true; they are not plagued by the same ambiguity humans are.

[63] Excluding, perhaps, the Hesperides and Philotes.

If I can modify Weigelt's view to accommodate the ambiguity that attends Night's progeny, especially Oath, then his view could harmonize with Strauss Clay's interpretation of Hesiod's two major poems as a diptych: the *Theogony* divulges the divine perspective, while *Works and Days* gives a more human point of view (2003, 6). Weigelt's study of Oath is, for the most part, compatible with Strauss Clay's diptych model, but his focus on 'negativity' rather than 'ambiguity' misses some important, however subtle, details of Hesiod's account.[64] The most important of Weigelt's insights, however, is that Oath deserves our focused attention, since this last child of Eris, and final descendent of Chaos, reappears throughout Hesiod's two major poems. Weigelt writes (2004, 229): "Unlike Hesiod's *Erga,* which gives an account of the human dimension of oath-taking, Hesiod's *Theogony* expresses the divine dimension of Oath. Deified Oath seems to represent a link between the lineage of Chaos and the lineage of Gaia."[65] Through its descendant, Oath, among others, Chaos continues to exert its influence on the cosmos, justifying its priority.

The other appearances of Oath in Hesiod's *Theogony* and *Works and Days attest to* the ambiguous nature of human oath which agrees with Hesiod's other comments on the ambiguous nature of human life, as found in passages about the Muses, Pandora, and Hecate according to Strauss Clay's reading. This, in turn, helps us understand why Oath is the ultimate child of

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[64] Weigelt 2004 primarily argues that Oath from the catalogue of Night and the "great oath of the gods" Styx represent two different types of oath. The former is an assertory, judicial oath, while the latter is a promissory, political oath. This aspect of his argument is beyond the scope of my discussion. Furthermore, the problem with Weigelt's view is that both gods and men appeal to oaths for the same reasons: when quarrel, strife or lies arise (compare *Th.* 226-32 with *Th.* 782-806). As such, it seems a case can still be made for identifying the two oaths as the same type.

[65] Cf. Strauss Clay 2003, 144, on Hesiod's "doubling" or "splitting" of concepts into two. Like Eris, Oath, Hope, Nemesis, Aidos, and the Fates are all treated twice, with important differences between each separate treatment.

Chaos. We must remember that Chaos is not only ambiguous in both form and meaning, but also the Muses' answer to the question, "Which god was first?" According to their famous address to Hesiod, discussed above, it is ambiguous whether the Muses are telling the truth, and so we humans are not meant to be certain about the very beginnings of the cosmos. Oath is also ambiguous, since it is both good and bad and at times it is uncertain whether an oath will be fulfilled. Oath, therefore, mirrors the ambiguity of truths divinely-revealed to humans, and both concepts—Oath and "Truth"—should help characterize Chaos itself. Chaos' character is itself a reflection of the epistemological nature of Hesiod's inquiry into absolute beginnings. In the end, this should help us determine why Hesiod makes Chaos the first to be born in the *Theogony*.

Aside from Oath's initial appearance in the catalogue of Night, there are two other places in the *Theogony* that deserve mention, where Zeus inaugurates Styx as the "great oath of the gods" (*Th.* 397-403) and where the occasion, procedure, and results of the oath-swearing by Styx are described, in addition to her position in the underworld (*Th.* 775-810). For the sake of brevity, I will not go through these in detail, but instead share just a few important observations which I borrow from Weigelt's account. First, Styx, a descendent of Gaia, performs the duties of *Horkos*, a descendent of Chaos—so what is the difference between the two Oaths? Explicitly, Styx is the oath of the gods (*Th.* 400: θεῶν), while *Horkos* is for mortals. But Styx's role as *Horkos* forges a link between the lines of Gaia and Chaos, and reminds us that not all forces at work in the *Theogony* are directly attributable to genealogical ties. In other words, Styx also helps answer why Chaos is first relative to Gaia, an observation reinforced by her location in the *Chasm* of the underworld, near the sources and limits of the other primordial elements (*Th.* 805-10, cf. Weigelt 2004, 222-223).

Oath also appears in many places in the *Works and Days*. For instance, Hesiod describes the Iron Age as a time without shame when there shall be no *charis* for the man who swears a true oath, and a bad man shall harm the better man, even swearing a false oath.[66] Since judges and kings are susceptible to bribes (sc. δωροφάγοι, WD 39, 221, 264), men can swear falsely and still receive a favorable judgment (cf. Weigelt 2004, 219; WD 190-96). Later, Hesiod, comparing the path of *Hubris* to the path of *Dikê,* shows how falsely swearing does harm to Justice (*WD* 216-221, cf. Weigelt 2004, 20):

> ὁδὸς δ' ἑτέρηφι παρελθεῖν
>
> κρείσσων ἐς τὰ δίκαια· δίκη δ' ὑπὲρ ὕβριος ἴσχει
>
> ἐς τέλος ἐξελθοῦσα· παθὼν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω.
>
> αὐτίκα γὰρ τρέχει Ὅρκος ἅμα σκολιῇσι δίκῃσιν·
>
> τῆς δὲ Δίκης ῥόθος ἑλκομένης ᾗ κ' ἄνδρες ἄγωσι
>
> δωροφάγοι, σκολιῇς δὲ δίκῃς κρίνωσι θέμιστας·
>
> …But the path on the other side is better
>
> for approaching just things; and *Dikê* overcomes violence
>
> accomplished in the end; and even a fool learns this by experience.

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[66] *WD* 190-94:
οὐδέ τις εὐόρκου χάρις ἔσσεται οὐδὲ δικαίου (190)
οὐδ' ἀγαθοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ κακῶν ῥεκτῆρα καὶ ὕβριν
ἀνέρα τιμήσουσι· δίκη δ' ἐν χερσί· καὶ αἰδὼς
οὐκ ἔσται, βλάψει δ' ὁ κακὸς τὸν ἀρείονα φῶτα
μύθοισι σκολιοῖς ἐνέπων, ἐπὶ δ' ὅρκον ὀμεῖται.

For at once Oath runs a race together with crooked judgments;

and there is a clamor as Justice is dragged wherever gift-eating

men would lead her, and they decide verdicts with crooked judgements.

Lines 274-85 are also especially important, since they divulge the ambiguity of Oath—as either harmful or beneficial—while also maintaining Oath's important connection to Δίκη, whom Zeus gave to humans:

Ἴ Ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δὲ ταῦτα μετὰ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῇσι

καί νυ δίκης ἐπάκουε, βίης δ' ἐπιλήθεο πάμπαν.

τόνδε γὰρ ἀνθρώποισι νόμον διέταξε Κρονίων,

ἰχθύσι μὲν καὶ θηρσὶ καὶ οἰωνοῖς πετεηνοῖς

ἔσθειν ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶ μετ' αὐτοῖς·

ἀνθρώποισι δ' ἔδωκε δίκην, ἣ πολλὸν ἀρίστη

γίνεται· εἰ γάρ τίς κ' ἐθέλῃ τὰ δίκαι' ἀγορεῦσαι

γινώσκων, τῷ μέν τ' ὄλβον διδοῖ εὐρύοπα Ζεύς·

ὃς δέ κε μαρτυρίῃσιν ἑκὼν ἐπίορκον ὀμόσσας

ψεύσεται, ἐν δὲ δίκην βλάψας νήκεστον ἀασθῇ,

τοῦ δέ τ' ἀμαυροτέρη γενεὴ μετόπισθε λέλειπται·

ἀνδρὸς δ' εὐόρκου γενεὴ μετόπισθεν ἀμείνων.

O Perses, you cast this into your mind,

and now heed justice, and forget violence entirely.

For the son of Cronus ordained this custom for humans,

On the one hand, to eat one another belongs to fish and beasts

and winged birds, since there is no justice among them,

but to humans he gave justice, which is by far

the best; for if anyone wishes to pronounce just things

knowing them, truly far-seeing Zeus would give him happiness,

but he who lies upon willingly swearing a false-oath

in his testimony, and upon injuring justice harms her irreparably,

his family is left more obscure in the future;

but the family of truthfully-swearing man is left better in the future.

Justice is a concept singled-out as relevant to humans, just as Oath was in the *Theogony.* The relationship between the two is not surprising, but there are also significant differences. According to the myth in the *Works and Days,* a falsely sworn oath or a crooked judgment injures Justice (δίκην βλάψας). Oath's role, however, is different from Justice: it is not harmed by falsely sworn oaths in the same way Justice is harmed by crooked judgments. Instead, Oath harms humans who swear falsely. Oath's pursuit of perjurers recalls Oath's own ancestors, the *keres* who pursue and punish men (*Th.* 217). Perhaps Hesiod's audience is meant to remember Oath's lineage, descending from Night and in turn from Chaos. At the end of the *Works and*

Days, while reminding us of Oath's lineage from Eris, Hesiod also makes the connection to the *Erinyes,* whom, I believe, traditionally belonged to the catalogue of Night before Hesiod composed his poems (*WD* 802-3):

> Πέμπτας δ' ἐξαλέασθαι, ἐπεὶ χαλεπαί τε καὶ αἰναί·
>
> ἐν πέμπτῃ γάρ φασιν Ἐρινύας ἀμφιπολεύειν
>
> Ὅρκον γεινόμενον, τὸν Ἔρις τέκε πῆμ' ἐπιόρκοις.
>
> Avoid fifth days, since they are harsh and dreadful;
>
> for in the fifth day they say that the Erinyes tended to
>
> Oath as he was born, whom Eris gave birth to as a bane to perjurers.

It seems that Oath's appearances throughout the *Works and Days* refer Hesiod's audience back to his earlier *Theogony,* explicitly reminding us of his lineage. Are we meant also to remember the more fundamental ancestor Chaos? Is Chaos' priority in the *Theogony* implicated in the on-going importance of Oath in the *Works and Days*? I think it is since oaths, judgments, and chaos itself all show some resemblance to the programmatic statements made by the *Theogony's* Muses, establishing the importance of the theme of ambiguity maintained throughout both of Hesiod's poems.

Regarding the theme of ambiguity, two other passages deserve mention. First is the ambiguity of Hope in the jar of Pandora (*WD* 90-99). Interpreting Hope remaining in Pandora's jar of evils is notoriously difficult, since Hope seems also to be a good to contrast with the evils that were spread about (cf. Strauss Clay 2003, 103; West 1978 *ad* 96). There is no need to tease out the interpretive difficulties here. I just wish to point out the well-known ambiguity attached

to this passage, and how it surely is meant to describe the character of human life. Also, Hesiod uses Hecate to illustrate the ambiguity of the human condition. Strauss Clay has defended the idea that Hesiod saw an etymological connection between Hecate's name and the adverb ἕκητι, "by whose will." (2003, 134-38; 135n24). Strauss Clay directs us to the following passage (*Th.* 440-43, trans. Strauss Clay 2003, 134):

> καὶ τοῖς, οἳ γλαυκὴν δυσπέμφελον ἐργάζονται,
>
> εὔχονται δ' Ἑκάτῃ καὶ ἐρικτύπῳ Ἐννοσιγαίῳ,
>
> ῥηιδίως ἄγρην κυδρὴ θεὸς ὤπασε πολλήν,
>
> ῥεῖα δ' ἀφείλετο φαινομένην, ἐθέλουσά γε θυμῷ.
>
> And for those who work the stormy sea,
>
> and who pray to Hecate and to the Earthshaker,
>
> Easily the splendid goddess grants a big catch,
>
> and easily she takes it away, once it has appeared—if indeed she so wills it.

Throughout the *Hymn to Hecate,* many references are made to the goddess' will (*Th.* 429,430, 432, 439, 443, 446). Like Dike, she also has special relevance for humans, and less concern with gods (*Th.* 416, 432, 435). As a goddess that mediates our prayers to the divine realm, Hecate resembles the Muses. Like the Muses, it depends on her will whether we humans receive a true response. Thus, Hesiod repeatedly brings out the ambiguity of the human condition, and we should keep this in mind when characterizing the apparent "negativity" of Chaos' descendants.

Section 2.D: Conclusion: Why is Chaos first?

The particle combination at the beginning of line 116—ἤτοι μὲν πρώτιστα Χάος γένετ'—assures us that the speaker thinks what they say is true. And yet, the Muses have just warned that what they reveal is at best only potentially true and perhaps a mirage. To complicate matters further, Chaos is spatial, but not merely spatial, temporal, but not merely temporal, and conceptually ambiguous. Chaos even gives birth to the gods who constitute the ambiguity characterizing human life in general. Finally, Chaos' ultimate descendant Oath is representative of these same qualities. Most importantly, however, Chaos may faithfully describe what really did happen first! The firstness of Chaos therefore survives as a cosmological theory in posterity.

IV. Section 3: Archai and Epistemology.

I want to conclude now by demonstrating two things: first, three features of Hesiod's *Theogony* are a) Criticism of Predecessors, b) Raising "second-order" questions about its own contents (i.e. how do we know it is true?), and c) universal scope. Although these three features are not exclusive to philosophy, they nevertheless connect Hesiod to later philosophical writers in important ways. For instance, these features reappear in Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and the Milesians.

For the first feature, criticism of predecessors emerges from Hesiod's proem: our reading of the proem as a priamel showed how Hesiod integrated traditional material in order to subordinate earlier traditions to his new view, e.g. demoting Night from her primacy by making her a child of Chaos. Other early philosophers, most notably Xenophanes and Heraclitus, also criticized their predecessors, including Hesiod. The second feature, raising "second-order" questions, is evident from the proem and its close connection to line 116, where Chaos is first mentioned: the muses themselves raise questions about the limitations of human knowledge, causing us to question even Hesiod's own song. Comparison with Xenophanes shows that he

also raised such questions and encouraged skepticism about whether humans could know anything about the divine world. Furthermore, allusions to Hesiod shape Xenophanes' own epistemological stance. Finally, the third feature, universal scope, was shown by the absolute priority of Chaos, as well as the enduring relevance of Chaos for Hesiod's cosmos, even continuing through the *Works and Days.* The 'firstness' of Chaos, therefore, matches the *archai* of later Milesian *phusiologoi,* such as Anaximander's "apeiron" (Vlastos 1955, 74). I shall, however, conclude with an important difference between Anaximander's *apeiron* and Hesiod's *Chaos* that may suggest that Chaos is perhaps more sophisticated than the later, materialist *archai* of the Presocratics.

3.A: Criticism of Predecessors in Hesiod & Early Greek Philosophers

As argued above, the proem to Hesiod's *Theogony* criticized previous theogonies so that Hesiod could present his own view as surpassing those of his predecessors. In the last chapter, we saw how scholars viewed Hecataeus' criticism of his predecessors as evidence for the author's "rationalism" (e.g. Bertelli 2001, 94). Now I wish to show briefly how early Greek philosophers criticized their predecessors, and to what extent can we say Hesiod is similar in this regard.

We often take for granted that arguments are an essential feature of philosophical writing. We assume that polemical arguments, against views held by others, are frequent in philosophy. Above I suggested that even Hesiod criticized traditional views, which may have represented the views of some predecessors (like Homer, perhaps). We have also seen the 'egotism' evident in the proems of Hecataeus and Alcmaeon can be interpreted as a rationalistic endeavor to criticize anonymous, traditional points of view (cf. Sassi 2018, 70-73). Now I raise the question: how do these egotistic, eristic polemics relate to the development of philosophy?

To begin with, the love of competition, general and wide-spread among the Greeks, provides fertile ground for philosophical discourse. In his *Encomium of Helen*, Gorgias includes philosophy as one of the three types of persuasion, even calling them 'contests' or 'trials': "And third are the contests of philosophical speeches, in which swiftness of thought is demonstrated so as to make belief in an opinion subject to change" (τρίτον δὲ φιλοσόφων λόγων ἁμίλλας, ἐν αἷς δείκνυται καὶ γνώμης τάχος ὡς εὐμετάβολον ποιοῦν τὴν τῆς δόξης πίστιν, fr. 11.13 D-K). And yet, for all the first three Greek philosophers, Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, our understanding of their arguments is limited by their fragmentary state. As a result, many of their views come across as dogmatically expressed. We do get subtle arguments from analogy, such as this fragment of Anaximenes (fr. 2 D-K): "Just as our soul, since it is air, keeps us together, also air and wind surround the whole cosmos." What is lacking, however, is any explicit mention of predecessors in any of the Milesian fragments. This, of course, does not mean that we should not expect to find such criticism if more of Anaximenes' writing was extant, but as it stands, we cannot confidently say one way or the other.

It is, however, safe to say that the views of the Milesians are exclusive of one another and have similar goals: Like Anaximander, Anaximenes posits an *arche*, but his *arche*, air, disagrees with his predecessor's *apeiron.*[67] It is not outside the realm of possibility that more subtle forms of argumentation were at work throughout this project. Moreover, it was of greater importance to state one's own original view than to refute the views of another. Nevertheless, we do find

[67] I use the Aristotelian term *arche* merely for the sake of convenience, but suspend judgment as to whether any of the Milesians used this term. See Cherniss 1935 for the classic account of Aristotle's biases in his treatment of Presocratic philosophers.

some Greek philosophers who mention predecessors by name and argue against them. The earliest fragments are found in what survives of Xenophanes and Heraclitus.

For an early philosopher, Heraclitus stands out for the remarkable number of predecessors he singles-out for criticism. He names Homer (frr. 42, 56, 105), Hesiod (frr. 40, 57, 106), Archilochus (fr. 42), Xenophanes (fr. 40), Hecataeus (fr. 40), and Pythagoras (frr. 40, 81, 129; cf. Moore 2019, 325). Four of these figures are mentioned in the course of one short fragment (fr. 40 D-K): "*Polymathiê* does not teach understanding, for it would have taught Hesiod, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Hecataeus" (πολυμαθίη νόον ἔχειν οὐ διδάσκει· Ἡσίοδον γὰρ ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην αὖτίς τε Ξενοφάνεά τε καὶ Ἑκαταῖον). This fragment is normally taken to mean that Heraclitus accuses his predecessors of failing to see the one unified *logos* in their pursuit of many distinct "pieces" of knowledge that lack unity.[68] Setting aside the other names, we can understand why Heraclitus might accuse Hesiod of *polymathia,* since Hesiod is a poet who revels in catalogues, and it is often a challenge even for modern scholars to find unity in his poems. Yet, it is not my purpose here to explicate the meaning of Heraclitus, but merely to point out the fact that he, an unabashed philosopher in his own right—even if we have reason to believe he would reject the term for himself[69]—frequently criticized his predecessors.

To take another example of an early philosopher who criticized predecessors—and one more relevant to our purpose in this chapter—Xenophanes is a well-known critic of Homer and Hesiod's anthropomorphic depictions of the gods (e.g. fr. 11 D-K):

> πάντα θεοῖσ' ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρός θ' Ἡσίοδός τε,
> ὅσσα παρ' ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν,
> κλέπτειν μοιχεύειν τε καὶ ἀλλήλους ἀπατεύειν.

[68] See Marcovich 2000, 65.

[69] The earliest use of the term *philosophos* occurs in Heraclitus (fr. 40), and may have been a derogatory coinage (see Moore 2019, ch.2).

> Homer and Hesiod attributed all things to the gods,
> As many things among humans that are reproachful and flawed,
> to steal, to commit adultery, and to deceive one another.

Xenophanes is here taking issue with how the poets Homer and Hesiod depict the gods' behavior. In other fragments, he raises the more general issue of the anthropomorphic appearance of epic gods, even taking issue with the notion that gods are born (fr. 14 D-K: οἱ βροτοὶ δοκέουσι γεννᾶσθαι θεούς). This seemingly undermines the entire Hesiodic project: if gods are not born, then how can we write a genealogy of the gods? Yet, in his meteorological fragments, Xenophanes maintains the genealogical metaphor: he also calls the sea the γενέτωρ of clouds, winds and rivers (fr. 30 D-K) and says that all things are born of earth and water (frr. 29; 33 D-K). Xenophanes' views, therefore, continue in a Hesiodic vein despite his critique of his predecessors.

Hesiod himself differs from both Heraclitus and Xenophanes in that he does not explicitly mention any predecessor by name. Yet, as argued above, antecedent views are implied by his proem, catalogues that would make Night the first god as well as theogonies which would make Aphrodite daughter of Dione. Furthermore, both Heraclitus and Xenophanes are criticizing Hesiod and Homer at a time when their names are synonymous with Greek tradition (Xenophanes, fr. 10 D-K: "Since, from the beginning, all have learned according to Homer…" [ἐξ ἀρχῆς καθ' Ὅμηρον ἐπεὶ μεμαθήκασι πάντες]; cf. Sassi 2018, 94-59). If this view is correct, then Hesiod resembles Xenophanes and Heraclitus in his own criticism of tradition, but differs from the Milesian *phusiologoi* in that he implicates his predecessors more. In some ways, Hesiod is *more argumentative* than some other early philosophers.

3.B: "Second-Order" Questions in Hesiod and Xenophanes

Also absent from the Milesian fragments are any "second-order" statements telling us how they could know the theories they propagate. Xenophanes, on the other hand, does qualify his views with an allusion to Hesiod's Muses (fr. 35 D-K): "let these things be presumed as like realities" (ταῦτα δεδοξάσθω μὲν ἐοικότα τοῖς ἐτύμοισι). Xenophanes here alludes to the very phrase which describes the Muses' falsehoods (cf. *Th.* 27: ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα).[70] Like Hesiod, Xenophanes seems to think that conjecture is the best we humans can obtain (fr. 34 D-K):

> καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν οὐδέ τις ἔσται
> εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων·
> εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών,
> αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε· δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.
>
> And so truly not one man has seen clearly nor shall anyone know both about the gods and as many things as I say about everything. For even if he especially should happen to speak perfectly, nevertheless he would not know, but opinion is allotted to all.

We should especially take note that Xenophanes labels his own (λέγω) account unverifiable, and this is also the import of the Muses' address to Hesiod. Furthermore, Xenophanes identifies his views as *doxa,* even describing *doxa* with the Hesiodic phrase ἐοικότα τοῖς ἐτύμοισι (cf. Th. 27), and marks these *doxa* as distinctly human. Thus, Xenophanes is a link between Hesiod and Parmenides, explaining Parmenides' division of his poem into divine truth and mortal *doxa,* a division which fairly claims Hesiodic ancestry. Nevertheless, the evident skepticism does not prevent striving towards the truth, for this befits the human condition. In yet another allusion to Hesiod, Xenophanes bolsters his speculative project with a glimpse of optimism (fr. 18 D-K):

> οὔτοι ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖσ' ὑπέδειξαν,
> ἀλλὰ χρόνωι ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον.
>
> Not from the beginning did Gods show all things to mortals,
> but seeking in time they discover better.

[70] Heitsch 1966, 232-33; cf. Lesher 1992, 172.

Xenophanes' allusions to and criticisms of Hesiod confirm that he viewed his inquiries as a sequel to the earlier poet. Both Xenophanes and Hesiod raise important epistemological questions concerning their own projects. In this way, Hesiod outstrips the Milesians, since, as far as we can tell, it remains possible that they never raised the epistemological question.

3.C: Priority in Hesiod and the Milesian Phusiologoi

The one thing Hesiod does have in common with the Milesians is his attempt to explain 'all things,' his 'comprehensiveness.' As Laks puts it, early Greek 'inquiry into nature' "adopts a genetic perspective" explaining "the existing condition of things by tracing the history of its development from the *origins*" (Laks 2018, 4). The so-called 'Material Monists' from Miletus, Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes are all said to have posited one thing as an Ἀρχη, "beginning," after which all other things came into being. A fragment of Anaximander from Simplicius' *Commentary on Aristotle's Physics* illustrates this (D 6 Laks-Most = Simplicius *in Phys.* 24.13-21):

> Τῶν δὲ ἓν καὶ κινούμενον καὶ ἄπειρον λεγόντων Ἀναξίμανδρος μὲν Πραξιάδου Μιλήσιος Θαλοῦ γενόμενος διάδοχος καὶ μαθητὴς ἀρχήν τε καὶ στοιχεῖον εἴρηκε τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἄπειρον, πρῶτος τοῦτο τοὔνομα κομίσας τῆς ἀρχῆς. λέγει δ' αὐτὴν μήτε ὕδωρ μήτε ἄλλο τι τῶν καλουμένων εἶναι στοιχείων, ἀλλ' ἑτέραν τινὰ φύσιν ἄπειρον, ἐξ ἧς ἅπαντας γίνεσθαι τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτοῖς κόσμους· ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι τοῖς οὖσι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεών. διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν, ποιητικωτέροις οὕτως ὀνόμασιν αὐτὰ λέγων.

> Of those claiming that [the *arche*] was one, in motion and boundless, Anaximander, son of Praxiades, a Milesian, successor and student of Thales, said that the *arche* and element of existing things was *apeiron,* the first one having employed this term "*arche*." And he says that it was neither water nor any of the other so-called elements, but some other boundless *phusis,* from which all the heavens are born and the other *kosmoi* in them; and out of these existing things have their birth, and into these they have their destruction, according to necessity. For they pay the penalty and retribution to one another for their injustice according to the arrangement of time, saying these things thus in very poetic terms.

We might doubt Simplicius testimony about whether Anaximander was first to use the term *archê* in this way, namely as a 'principle.' We might even doubt whether he used it this way at all. Hesiod, of course, did not use the word. Instead, in Hesiod's proem to the *Theogony* we are told what god was born "first," or what happened "in the beginning." Hesiod does not say that the *archê* was Chaos, but that Chaos was born first. Nevertheless, it is still reasonable to see Hesiod as influential on the inquiry of Anaximander, since Hesiod was the first Greek to frame the question: which thing came first? And his repeated use of phrases like *'in the beginning'* surely encouraged the evolution of the term *archê* from "beginning" to "principle."

Yet, there remains an important difference between Hesiod's Chaos and the "material principles" of the Milesians. As I have argued above, Chaos is, for the most part, not a cause in Hesiod's *Theogony*. Rather, it plays the role of a necessary and universal condition for all things. For it to be a cause of all that came after it, it would have given birth to or otherwise be construed as having specific effects on the narrative. Eros, by contrast, is a cause for all

subsequent sexual procreation. Chaos does not have this relationship to the rest of the *Theogony*. Yet, as a necessary condition of possibility for the rest of the poem to occur, and as the absolute first thing, Chaos—for all its ambiguity—might even resemble a more philosophically sophisticated concept than Milesian "material principles." Like Plato's Form of the Good, Chaos surpasses the other gods in age (πρεσβείᾳ), and like Aristotle's Substance, it is prior to all things in time (χρόνῳ). It is up to us to interpret what other types of priority to assign to Chaos, but I hope especially to have shown that Hesiod's initial cosmogony, as short as it is, contains enough of philosophical interest to be considered the beginning of philosophy in Greece. We can at the very least be in a better position to understand the anecdote in Diogenes, telling the story of how Epicurus was "converted" to philosophy (D.L. 10.2.6-10): Apollodorus the Epicurean says in the first book about Epicurus' life that he came to philosophy chastising his school-teachers since they were not able to interpret for him things about Chaos in Hesiod (Ἀπολλόδωρος δ᾽ ὁ Ἐπικούρειος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ τοῦ Ἐπικούρου βίου φησὶν ἐλθεῖν αὐτὸν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν καταγνόντα τῶν γραμματιστῶν, ἐπειδὴ μὴ ἐδυνήθησαν ἑρμηνεῦσαι αὐτῷ τὰ περὶ τοῦ παρ᾽ Ἡσιόδῳ χάους). This anecdote shows, if anything, that Hesiod's *Theogony* is protreptic towards philosophy. So, perhaps it is time that we viewed the things Hesiod says about Chaos as philosophy.

Ch.3: Genealogical Motifs in Parmenides

I. Introduction

Chapters one and two discuss two rather different types of genealogy, human and divine respectively. Despite their difference, both types are expressions of debates about the past. The form of genealogy apparently provided a means to speculate and argue about the past, since we cannot observe it first-hand. Since the beginnings of the cosmos, like the gods or one's own ancestors, are also unobservable, genealogy provided a model for cosmology as well. There are, however, problems with genealogy. For instance, genealogy seems to imply the possibility of emergence, or creation ex nihilo, since something that is born formerly did not exist.

Parmenides' poem, *On Nature*, is, perhaps, most known for its stance against emergence, but, of the poem's three parts—proem, *The Way of Truth*, and *Beliefs of Mortals,* or *Doxa*—the arguments against emergence are confined only to the second, as far as we know. For instance, in fr. 8, the longest and most important fragment of *The Way of Truth*, Parmenides claims that, for something to exist, it must have existed forever, it could not have been born, nor can it perish, nor can it change in any way.

In this chapter, I am not so much concerned with Parmenides' stance against emergence as I am in the way Parmenides implicates genealogy in those arguments. Furthermore, I argue that many genealogical motifs appear in the other two parts of the poem, i.e. the proem and *The Beliefs of Mortals*.

I begin with the *Beliefs of Mortals,* since the cosmogonic scheme described in fr. 12 describes male and female principles that come together to produce the world, arguably the most genealogical portion of the poem. As for the other two sections of the poem—the proem and the

Way of Truth—the connection to genealogy is less obvious. In the second section of this chapter, I show all the ways in which the proem suggests genealogical concerns. In the third section I discuss the *Way of Truth* which I interpret as an explicitly *anti-genealogical* centerpiece to Parmenides' poem.

II. The theme of genealogy in Parmenides' poem

There has not yet been a direct and sustained treatment of the theme of genealogy in Parmenides, but many scholars have touched upon the issue in brief, especially when discussing Hesiod's influence on Parmenides.[71] A good starting point is the view expressed by Daniel Graham (2006, 156, my emphasis):

> The fact that Parmenides finishes his poem with a cosmology shows what his immediate concerns are: a confrontation with the philosophical tradition that produces cosmologies, i.e., the Ionian tradition. The echoes of Hesiod found in the proem indicate that the most philosophical of mythological poets is also on his mind. It may be that *Parmenides sees* the Ionian tradition *as a continuation of mythological thinking:* Hesiod's theogony [sic] is the model for Ionian cosmology. Indeed, one can see many features of philosophical cosmology as continuations of Hesiodic conceptions (some of these in turn expressing Greek cultural inheritances).

[71] On Hesiod's influence on Parmenides, see Jaeger 1936, 90-108; Diller 1946, 140-51; Schwabl 1957, 278-89; Deichgräber 1958, 711; Reinhardt 1916, 17; Morrison 1955, 59, 62-64; Stokes 1962 and 1963; Schwabl 1963; Dolin 1966; Burkert 1969, 2-3, 8, 11-13; Pellikan-Engel 1978, 8-10; Northrup 1980; Miller 2006, 7-8; Mourelatos 2008, 1, 5-7, 15; Palmer 2009, 54-5; Kraus 2013, 454; Tor 2015, 25-26.

Daniel Graham reconstructs Ionian cosmology as subscribing to 'generating substance theory' (GST) meaning that a substance, e.g. water, produces other distinct substances, such as the other elements, and in turn the whole cosmos is created in this fashion.[72] My argument uses Graham's GST to emphasize the continuity that exists between Hesiod and the Presocratics. Hesiod and the Milesians, for instance, all rely on a birth model to explain the beginning of the universe.

Let me elaborate on some similarities between Graham's *GST* and genealogy. Graham 2006, 85-88, describes GST in abstract form, but I wish to emphasize only one aspect of the view described there: that one substance, *x*, undergoes a kind of transformation to produce another substance, y, without being identical to that substance. Graham supplies a schematic outline of how this plays out in Anaximenes: fire ↔ AIR ↔ wind ↔ cloud ↔ water ↔ earth ↔ stones. The scheme illustrates that the primary substance AIR turns into either fire or wind through processes of condensation or rarefaction. Then, through similar physical processes, wind in turn produces clouds, clouds produce water and so on.

How is this different from the material monist view? The material monist view states that the *arche* was an underlying material substrate, and that all subsequent things are forms of that material. GST, however, states that fire, wind, cloud, water, earth and stones are not "forms of air" but distinct substances. The physical process of transformation of elements is productive:

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[72] Graham 2006 opposes the more traditional view that the Ionians were 'Material Monists.' This view states that the *arche* of the Presocratics represented an underlying substance material substrate, and that all subsequent things were transformations of that element. Examples of the latter can be found at Guthrie 1962, 39-145, and Barnes 1982, 14-43. The Material Monist view accepts the history of the Ionians as it is presented in Aristotle (*Metaphysics* 983b6-984a7). Many scholars have accepted Graham's revision of the history of the Presocratics, as it stems from the arguments of Curd 1998 and Cherniss 1935, and finds support among Trepaniér 2008. Sisko 2007 and Sisko and Weiss 2015, 42 n. 7, remain opposed to Graham's view. It is my hope that the arguments in this chapter and those of Graham 2006 will mutually support one another.

something new emerges from it. To use an example from Hesiod's *Theogony*, the "congealing" foam arising around Ouranos' genitals transforms to produce a new goddess, Aphrodite. Furthermore, the GST scheme is not cyclical, but linear, much like traditional genealogies. That is, in Anaximenes' view, air remains a distant ancestor of stones, but this does not mean that stones can undergo a process of transformation to produce air. Rather, the stones must produce something that is more like themselves first, such as earth, and then earth can produce water, going down the line until eventually some air is produced again. This leads to another common feature between GST and genealogy: substances which produce one another resemble one another more closely than their more distant relatives, just as parent and child are supposed to resemble one another in a genealogical model. The reversibility of GST lines is not cyclical in the sense that the stones cannot themselves produce air, but must go through intermediate stages. Furthermore, if air is eventually produced again, it is some new air, call it "Air junior," not the same original air that began the process.

The Milesian interest in the mechanical and physical processes which turn a substance into another substance leads to the subject of embryology, since both topics face the question whether something can come to be from nothing. In the fifth chapter, I will argue that the Ionians' use of biological metaphors, more specifically embryological metaphors, is an extension of the genealogical model they inherited from poets like Hesiod. The Ionians were inspired to take a closer look at the mechanisms of genealogical production found in the Greek understanding of the stages of conception, gestation, and childbirth, but such embryological thinking is already visible in Hesiod's *Theogony* and *Works and Days*. Cosmogonic theories and embryological theories, since they describe the same processes, serve as analogues and paradigms for one another.

Another point from Graham's view that deserves emphasis is that it is *Parmenides'* view that the Ionians are a continuation of Hesiod's mythological thinking: Parmenides uses epic poetry to communicate an important thesis about the history of philosophy before him: Hesiodic genealogy has remained the standard model for cosmological inquiry. Therefore, the theme of genealogy is central to interpreting the whole poem, not only the *Doxa* fragments where the theme of genealogy can be most easily observed. In this section I will review the *Doxa* fragments that establish the relevance of genealogy in Parmenides' poem. In the following section, I will relate these fragments to the proem to suggest that the theme of genealogy is not simply confined to the latter half of Parmenides' poem.

Both Aristotle and Plato compared Parmenides to Hesiod for his choice to make Eros appear early in his cosmology (cf. Arist. *Metaph.* 984b26; Plat. *Symp.* 178b), and they both quote the relevant hexameter fragment (D-K 13): πρώτιστον μὲν ἔρωτα θεῶν μητίσατο πάντων ("Indeed, first of all gods she devised love"). Just as in the *Theogony*, the early appearance of Eros in Parmenides confirms that sexual reproduction was his model for the emergence of the cosmos. But there is a problem, since we do not know who the subject of μητίσατο is. The subject is assumed to be a goddess because of the prominent role given to goddesses in other parts of the poem.

Scholars support different theories about the identity of the goddess. Gomperz followed Plutarch (*Amatorius* 756e10-f1), who identified her as Aphrodite (1924, 20n.72; cf. Tarán 248). Guthrie follows Aëtius (2.7), who identifies the goddess both with *Dike* from the proem (fr. 1.14 D-K) and with *Ananke* (Guthrie 1965, 60n3; cf. Parmenides fr. 8.30; 10.6 D-K). It is also possible that the subject of μητίσατο is the δαίμων mentioned in fr. 12 (quoted below). To complicate matters further, the δαίμων of fr. 12 might also be *Dike* from the proem. The

identification of the δαίμων with *Dike* is tempting since that the goddess's command of light and night (fr. 12.2: νυκτός…φλογός) echoes the fact that *Dike* holds the keys to the gates of the paths of Night and Day (fr. 1.11-14). Such a connection does not, however, eliminate the possibility of equivocation. When the goddess greets the *kouros* and says no "evil fate" (μοῖρα κακή, 1.26) sent him along the path, but *Themis and Dike* (1.28), is the goddess *Dike* using her own name in *hendiadys* with Themis, or is she an anonymous goddess different from *Dike* who guards the gates?

Coxon suggests that fr. 13's context in Plato may have provided the subject of μητίσατο. Plato introduces the quote with the phrase Παρμενίδης δὲ τὴν γένεσιν λέγει πρώτιστον μὲν… (*Symp.* 178b). Nehamas and Woodruff (1997, 463) translate the phrase: "Parmenides tells of *this beginning*: 'The very first god [she] designed was Love.'" In this translation, we are left in the dark as to who does the designing, who is "she?" Coxon, however, argues that τὴν γένεσιν supplies the subject of μητίσατο (see Coxon 2009, 372-73).

Coxon's argument is corroborated by Simplicius who claims the subject of μητίσατο is the *daimon* who appears in fr. 12[73]:

> αἱ γὰρ στεινότεραι [sc. στεφάναι] πλῆντο πυρὸς ἀκρήτοιο,
>
> αἱ δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς νυκτός, μετὰ δὲ φλογὸς ἵεται αἶσα·
>
> ἐν δὲ μέσωι τούτων δαίμων ἣ πάντα κυβερνᾶι·
>
> πάντων γὰρ στυγεροῖο τόκου καὶ μίξιος ἄρχει

[73] Translations are my own unless otherwise noted. Fragment numbers refer to Diels-Kranz. The noun στεφάναι, modified by στεινότεραι, is supplied by Cicero, De Natura Deorum 1.28.

πέμπουσ’ ἄρσενι θῆλυ μιγῆν τό τ’ ἐναντίον αὖτις

ἄρσεν θηλυτέρωι.

For the narrower [rings] were filled with unmixed fire, and the ones beside [next/ to?] them were filled with night, and among them a portion of flame rushes about, and in the middle of these is a Daimon who steers all things. For she rules over the hateful birth and mixture of all things, by sending female to mingle with male and in turn the opposite, male with female.

Since the goddess governs the process of birth and sexual repoduction, the name *Genesis* is appropriate to her. The “garlands” surrounding the goddess recall Hesiod *Th.* 382 (ἄστρά τε λαμπετόωντα, τά τ' οὐρανὸς ἐστεφάνωται), but they also recall Anaximander’s circular arrangement and generation of the stars (D-K A11: τὰ δὲ ἄστρα γίνεσθαι κύκλον πυρός; A18 [= Aëtius 345 Diels] Ἀναξίμανδρος ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλων καὶ τῶν σφαιρῶν, ἐφ' ὧν ἕκαστος [sc. ἀστήρ] βέβηκε, φέρεσθαι, cf. Guthrie 1965, 62).

The presence of fire and night in Parmenides fr. 12 also elaborates upon the role of the two principles of Parmenides’ cosmology—sometimes also called ‘light’ (fr. 9.1: φάος) and night. These principles were introduced at the very beginning of the *Doxa* (fr. 8.53-59). More importantly, light (or fire) and night help connect the *Doxa* with the proem (quoted and discussed in more detail below). For instance, in the proem daughters of the Sun lead the *kouros* to the ‘gates of the paths of Night and Day,’ (1.11). Furthermore, the proem mentions a ‘knowing man’ (1.3: εἰδότα φῶτα) and some scholars suspect paronomasia between φώς, “man,” and φῶς, “light,” also occuring in the proem (1.10: εἰς φάος, cf. Cosgrove 2011, 30; Torgerson 2006, 41-

42). Finally, the goddess of fragment 12 may recall the the δαίμων also mentioned in the proem (1.3).

Another connection to the proem can be found in the reoccurrence of *sending* in the cosmology (fr. 12.5: πέμπουσ'). In the proem, the mares first send the *kouros* along the path of the goddess (1.3), and next the daughters of the sun also send him (1.8). Finally, the goddess of fr. 12 sends male and female principles to unite with one another. Simplicius, furthermore, tells us that this goddess sends souls from the visible realm to the invisible realm and back again (*in Aristotelis physicorum libros commentaria* 39.19-20: τὰς ψυχὰς πέμπειν ποτὲ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἐμφανοῦς εἰς τὸ ἀιδές, ποτὲ δὲ ἀνάπαλίν), a comment which not only invites comparison with Pythagorean and/or Orphic traditions (cf. Tor 2018, 237-40), but makes connections between the *daimon* of fr. 12 and the *katabasis* motif of the proem more explicit. The didactic function of sending and escort is mirrored both by the movement of the soul in birth, life, and death, but also the movement of cosmic principles, light and night, male and female.[74] The connections between fr. 12 and the proem show that Parmenides' cosmogonic fragments should affect our initial interpretation of what occurred in the opening of the poem, awakening the very details that suggest the theme of genealogy.

[74] In the *Odyssey,* the ability to give *pompê,* an escort or send-off, is a marker of male authority (Katz 1991, 151; cf. Gottesman 2014, 44). Gottesman 2014, 44-47, recounts how Telemachus lacked such authority, unable to secure *pompê* for himself (*Od.* 2.319-22), while Athena/Mentor procures it in his guise (*Od.* 2.382-87), suggesting that the Ithacans are ready to recognize his authority even if he still lacks the confidence to wield it. When Telemachus finally procures *pompê,* thereby illustrating his authority, it is cause for concern for Antinous (*Od.* 4.642)—the young Telemachus is growing up and may be able to challenge the suitors. I mention this here to suggest that Telemachus' story-arch, of growing and learning, may serve as a source for the apparently didactic function given to *pompê* in Parmenides' proem, where I also note in passing the female appropriation of a marker of authority which typically belongs to mortal males. Otherwise, it can be given by gods and goddesses (as Calypso and Circe also grant Odysseus *pompê*).

After the mention of fire and night in fr. 12, Parmenides says that the goddess governs *all things*. Then, he explains (γὰρ) her command of all things as rule over birth and mixture, sending male and female principles in the cosmos together to procreate. The goddess causes the rest of the cosmos to come into being. The mixture of fire and night, therefore, serves as a primordial example of male and female principles coming together. The pairs of opposites in the cosmos—light/night, male/female, right/left—have a strict correspondence with one another, a model possibly borrowed from Pythagoreans cosmology (cf. Journée 2012, 291-92).[75]

Parmenides' embryological theories further illustrate the correspondence between the pairs of opposites. Fr. 17, for instance, attests to Parmenides' theory that boys are produced on the right side of the womb, while girls are produced on the left side (δεχιτεροῖσιν μὲν κούρους, λαιοῖσι δὲ κουρας). A testimonium from Aëtius suggests even more correspondences (5.7):

> Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἄρρενα καὶ θήλεα γίνεσθαι παρὰ θερμότητα καὶ ψυχρότητα· ὅθεν ἱστορεῖται τοὺς μὲν πρώτους ἄρρενας πρὸς ἀνατολῇ καὶ μεσημβρίᾳ γεγενῆσθαι μᾶλλον ἐκ τῆς γῆς, τὰς δὲ θηλείας πρὸς ταῖς ἄρκτοις. Παρμενίδης ἀντιστρόφως· τὰ μὲν πρὸς ταῖς ἄρκτοις ἄρρενα βλαστῆσαι, τοῦ γὰρ πυκνοῦ μετέχειν πλείονος· τὰ δὲ πρὸς ταῖς μεσημβρίαις θήλεα παρὰ τὴν ἀραιότητα.
>
> Empedocles says that male and female are produced by warmth and coldness. For this reason, it is explained that the first males were born from the earth more to the east and south, but that the first females were born to the north. Parmenides

[75] Note that Northrup 1980, *passim,* argues that the light/night antithesis in Parmenides is inspired by Hesiod, using the fact that Hesiod's catalogue of Night has no genealogical connection [nor does Eros…] with the lineage of gods descended from Gaia and Ouranos. It is my view that Parmenides is synthesizing the views of his predecessors, and so Northrup's conclusions are compatible with the notion that Parmenides also uses the Pythagoreans.

> claims the opposite: the things to the north sprouted as male, for they had a share of more of the dense, while things to the south sprouted as female on account of rareness.

The passage suggests that heat, fire, left, rare all correspond to the female, while cold, night, right and dense correspond to the male in Parmenides. The goddess of fragment 12, quoted above, seemed to govern many of these same pairs of opposites. The interplay of opposites is, therefore, consistent at all levels, the generation of an embryo resembles the genesis of the cosmos itself (cf. Tor 2018, 238-40).

In *The Way of Opinion*, Parmenides may have also included genealogical catalogues of abstract personifications. The best evidence for this comes from the testimony of Cicero (*De Natura Deorum* 1.28):

> multaque eiusdem [sc. Parmenides] monstra, quippe qui bellum qui discordiam qui cupiditatem ceteraque generis eiusdem ad deum revocet…
>
> And many portentous things are in Parmenides, the very one who deified War and Strife and Desire and others of this same kind…

Although no surviving fragments of Parmenides' poem feature War and Strife, Cicero's *cupiditas* could translate Eros, who is mentioned in fr. 13. Alternatively, *cupiditas* may translate φιλότης. Although there is no other evidence that φιλότης occurred in Parmenides, Cicero's testimony is enough to suggest, however tentatively, that Parmenides' poem contained a version of a catalogue of Night based on Hesiod's *Theogony* (cf. *Th.* 224: Φιλότητα [cf. *cupiditatem*]; *Th.* 225: Ἔριν [cf. *discordiam*]; *Th.* 228: Ὑσμίνας τε Μάχας [cf. bellum]. Furthermore, the phrase *cetera generis eiusdem* suggests Parmenides included more than these three names in a

catalogue of divinities.[76] If true, then Parmenides made use not only of the concept of genealogy, but also the poetic form in which genealogies were traditionally expressed. We also know that, after Parmenides, Empedocles composed catalogues of personified deities (frr. 122-23 D-K). Parmenides' proem also included personified abstractions as characters (Δίκη). Even in the 'Way of Truth,' Parmenides mentions "Strong Necessity" (κρατερή ἀνάγκη) who "holds Being in bonds of a limit" (πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει, 8.30-31).[77] Although there may not be a necessary connection between personification and genealogy, lists of personified abstracts are at the very least evocative of genealogical poetry.

The theme of genealogy is thus an important part of *The Way of Opinion*. Not only did Parmenides make sexual reproduction fundamental to his cosmogony, but in some parts of his poem now lost, Parmenides possibly used the traditional form in which genealogies were expressed: the hexametric catalogue.

III. Genealogy in the proem of Parmenides?

The *Doxa* fragments are enough to establish the importance of genealogy for Parmenides, but how these fragments are supposed to relate to the whole poem is the most famous and intractable problem facing scholars. A division is suggested by a programmatic statement in the proem: the *kouros* must learn "both the unshakable heart of well-rounded truth and the opinions

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[76] Note that, just before the quoted passage, Cicero claims that Parmenides called the στεφάνη a god (*deum*), presumably one of the rings described in Parmenides fr.12 quoted above.

[77] Coxon helpfully points out an allusion to Atlas in Hesiod's *Th.* 517-19: Ἄτλας δ' οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχει κρατερῆς ὑπ' ἀνάγκης, | πείρασιν ἐν γαίης πρόπαρ' Ἑσπερίδων λιγυφώνων | ἑστηώς, κεφαλῇ τε καὶ ἀκαμάτῃσι χέρεσσι. "Bonds," however, appear in other places, e.g., *Th.* 521-22, describing the binding of Prometheus (δῆσε δ' ἀλυκτοπέδῃσι Προμηθέα ποικιλόβουλον, |δεσμοῖς ἀργαλέοισι); *Th.* 618, regarding the hundred-handers (δῆσε κρατερῷ ἐνὶ δεσμῷ); and *Th.* 717-18, the binding of the Titans (καὶ τοὺς μὲν ὑπὸ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης | πέμψαν καὶ δεσμοῖσιν ἐν ἀργαλέοισιν ἔδησαν).

of mortals in which there is no true trust" (1.29-30). This statement has led many to suppose that Parmenides' own views are confined to the 'Way of Truth' part of the poem, while the 'Way of Opinion' remains a facetious exercise reporting false views.[78] The latter view relegates the most genealogical parts of Parmenides' poem to parody and rejection. More recently, however, the trend has been to redeem the *Doxa* to show that they contain "a kind of knowledge" (cf. Tor 2018, 166; See also citations at Tor 2015, 6 n. 13). After all, Parmenides nowhere says that the content of the 'Way of Opinion' is entirely false. Instead, he calls it "deceptive," (fr. 8.51-52).

The opinions contained in the final section of Parmenides' poem belong to mortals (1.30: βροτῶν; cf. 6.4, 8.39, 8.51). This implies that the content of the 'Way of Truth' is divine or belongs to the gods, although Parmenides never explicitly says so. What is most important is that both 'routes of *inquiry'* are revealed to the *kouros* by the goddess, and the *bivalent* quality of the revelation confirms the similarity existing between Parmenides' goddess and Hesiod's Muses. The difference between the two routes of inquiry is predicated upon the difference between gods and mortals.

Now what does all this have to do with genealogy? If the theme of genealogy is as important for Parmenides as I say it is, why does he make no explicit mention of genealogy in his proem? I hope that my first section has already provided a partial answer: there are intra-

[78] There are two prevailing views of the *Doxa*: 1) it is a facetious, polemical parody and 2) it represents theories given in earnest. For a history of the scholarly debate between these two approaches, see Kraus 2013, 481-82. The scholarly divide between these two views is traceable at least back to Diels (who represents the former view, 1897, 63) and Wilamowitz (representing the latter, 1899, 204-5). Examples of the former view can be found at Owen 1960, 84-89; Long 1963, 91; Mansfeld 1964, 122, 210; Guthrie 1965, 65; Tarán 1965, 229-30; Mourelatos 1970, 211, 221; Nehamas 2002; Cordero 2010. Reinhardt 1916 (18-88) remains among the most important arguments in support of the latter view. Others include Untersteiner 1958; Chalmers 1960; Hölscher 1968, 103; Coxon 1986; Curd 1998; Finkelberg 1999 ;Graham 2006, 174; Tor 2015 and 2017. I generally agree with the latter view.

textual connections that exist between the 'non-genealogical' proem and the genealogical *Doxa* that would in retrospect make the proem suggestive of genealogy. I add that the proem makes many allusions to Hesiod's underworld, which I will explain below.[79] Although Hesiod's underworld does not directly invoke the theme of genealogy, I aim to show that Parmenides' allusions to Hesiod's personified abstractions, Night and Day, imply a genealogical scheme, since light and night play a generative role in Parmenides' own *Doxa*. Furthermore, even if not explicitly a part of the programmatic statements of the proem, genealogy is not totally absent since an important patronymic is also mentioned: the *Heliades* (fr. 1.9).[80]

As we have seen in the first two chapters, Greeks used genealogy to establish their own identity in relation not only to their immediate relatives, but also the gods. We need only remind ourselves once again of the genealogical boasts shouted on the Trojan plain mentioned in chapter one. The *kouros* of Parmenides' proem, however, cannot be specifically identified as anyone since he lacks any specific genealogy. One possible genealogy could be: Parmenides *son of Pyres.*[81] Alternatively, the anonymity of the *kouros* could be functional, since it allows anyone to imagine themselves on the same journey.[82] Furthermore, the journey the *kouros* takes might itself invoke the importance of genealogy (fr. 1 D-K; cf. Laks-Most D4):

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[79] Pellikaan-Engel 1978, 8-10, gives a comprehensive list of verbal parallels between Parmenides' proem and Hesiod's underworld.

[80] Tor 2015, 27, recently argued that the proem suggests a very close relationship between the Heliades, also called *kourai* (fr.1.9), with the *kouros* who is also called a φώς, "man" (fr. 1.3) His argument depends upon the pun with φῶς, "light," appearing as a cosmic principle later in the poem (fr. 13), and the affinity between light and the sun, father of the *kourai.* For the pun, see Torgerson 2006, 41-42. Cosgrove 2011, 30, also sees a pun, but thinks the force of the pun is negative: "light" recalls the world of appearance, framed negatively as how "know nothing mortals" see the world.

[81] See also the helpful example given by Fowler 1998, 1: *Il.* 7.128: Nestor recalls when Peleus gets to know his argive guests, asking for their "lineage and descent" (γενεήν τε τόκον τε).

[82] Cf. Mourelatos 2008, 16, my emphasis: "Doubtless Parmenides identifies himself

ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν, ὅσον τ’ ἐπὶ θυμὸς ἱκάνοι,

πέμπον, ἐπεί μ’ ἐς ὁδὸν βῆσαν πολύφημον ἄγουσαι

δαίμονος, ἣ κατὰ πάντ’ ἄστη[83] φέρει εἰδότα φῶτα·

τῆι φερόμην· τῆι γάρ με πολύφραστοι φέρον ἵπποι

ἅρμα τιταίνουσαι, κοῦραι δ’ ὁδὸν ἡγεμόνευον.

ἄξων δ’ ἐν χνοίηισιν ἴει σύριγγος ἀυτήν

αἰθόμενος (δοιοῖς γὰρ ἐπείγετο δινωτοῖσιν

κύκλοις ἀμφοτέρωθεν), ὅτε σπερχοίατο πέμπειν

Ἡλιάδες κοῦραι, προλιποῦσαι δώματα Νυκτός,

εἰς φάος,[84] ὠσάμεναι κράτων ἄπο χερσὶ καλύπτρας.

(poetically and dramatically) with the kouros, but he also expects his readers or hearers to identify with the hero. It is presumably for this reason that he avoids giving any details which might connect the Kouros historically to Parmenides’ own person (contrast Hesiod, Xenophanes, Empedocles). We ought to respect this approach of *self-effacement*.” [Note that the last place where ‘self-effacement’ arose in this dissertation was to discuss Pherecydes of Athens self-effacement strategy in writing mythography (Fowler 2006, 44). Here the effect is the same: universal application is achieved *via* self-effacement, a strategy that is anti-genealogical with respect to the author’s own identity remaining hidden from view]. We should use the same approach to the Orphic lemellae: the genealogy to be recited by the one requiring access to the underworld is a universal one (“I am the child of the earth and starry sky”). Just as anybody could be the *kouros* of Parmenides’ poem, anyone could recite the words of the Orphic tablets.

[83] The reading “ἄστη” was once cited as the reading of our best manuscript (N) by Tarán (1965, 12). Coxon, inspecting the manuscripts himself, concluded that this reading resulted from an error committed by Mutschmann, the editor of Sextus (1968, 75; cf. Coxon 1986, 158). Instead, the manuscript (N) reads πάντ' ἄτη, still in need of emendation. Coxon accepted Heynes’ emendation, πάντ' ἄντην. Despite the lack of manuscript authority, Mutschmann’s “mistake” still has its defenders (e.g. Cosgrove 2011, 41-44).

[84] The phrase “into light” is usually cited as evidence for the *anabasis* reading, along with the “ethereal gates” at which the *kouros* arrives (cf. Deichgräber 1959, 31; Coxon 1986, 162-63;

ἔνθα πύλαι Νυκτός τε καὶ Ἤματός εἰσι κελεύθων,

καί σφας ὑπέρθυρον ἀμφὶς ἔχει καὶ λάινος οὐδός·

αὐταὶ δ’ αἰθέριαι πλῆνται μεγάλοισι θυρέτροις·

τῶν δὲ Δίκη πολύποινος ἔχει κληῖδας ἀμοιβούς.[85]

τὴν δὴ παρφάμεναι κοῦραι μαλακοῖσι λόγοισιν.

πεῖσαν ἐπιφραδέως, ὥς σφιν βαλανωτὸν ὀχῆα

ἀπτερέως ὦσειε πυλέων ἄπο· ταὶ δὲ θυρέτρων

χάσμ’ ἀχανὲς ποίησαν ἀναπταμέναι[86] πολυχάλκους

ἄξονας ἐν σύριγξιν ἀμοιβαδὸν εἰλίξασαι

γόμφοις καὶ περόνησιν ἀρηρότε· τῆι ῥα δι’ αὐτέων

Kahn 2007, 42). *Katabasis* readers (Morrison 1955; Burkert 1969) would remove the comma after Νυκτός and take εἰς φάος with the aorist προλιποῦσαι, claiming that the maidens already left the house of night into the light and are now preparing to take the young man back down into the underworld. Diels-Kranz, Coxon, and Tarán all print the comma after Νυκτός. Coxon, however, prints νυκτός. The new Laks-Most edition removes the comma after Νυκτός. I keep the comma and take εἰς φάος with the earlier πέμπειν. It is clear from the context that the Heliades are sending the kouros, and it makes sense to use εἰς φάος to determine where they are sending him.

[85] Cf. *Theogony* 749: ἀμειβόμεναι (Miller 2006, 9). The allusion is to the *Theogony* passage where Night and Day exchange greetings as they pass one another in the underworld. The meaning of κληῖδας ἀμοιβούς is not immediate clear, however. Coxon asks: Why are there multiple keys, and what does ἀμοιβούς mean in this case, unsatisfied with Diels’ suggestion that it is a mere poetic plural. Without delving into the technical details of ancient locks, I think the adjective suggests symmetry and interchangibility of two keys, corresponding to night and day themselves. In the *Iliad* the term is used for reinforcments, that is soldiers that replace one another, thus I translate ἀμοιβούς as “matching” here, since either key can be used for the same door.

[86] For accentuation, see Mourelatos 1970, 279 n.1.

ἰθὺς ἔχον κοῦραι κατ᾽ ἀμαξιτὸν ἅρμα καὶ ἵππους.

καί με θεὰ πρόφρων ὑπεδέξατο, χεῖρα δὲ χειρί

δεξιτερὴν ἔλεν, ὧδε δ᾽ ἔπος φάτο καί με προσηύδα·

ὦ κοῦρ᾽ ἀθανάτοισι συνάορος ἡνιόχοισιν,

ἵπποις ταί σε φέρουσιν ἱκάνων ἡμέτερον δῶ,

χαῖρ᾽, ἐπεὶ οὔτι σε μοῖρα κακὴ προὔπεμπε νέεσθαι

τήνδ᾽ ὁδόν (ἦ γὰρ ἀπ᾽ ἀνθρώπων ἐκτὸς πάτου ἐστίν),

ἀλλὰ θέμις τε δίκη τε. χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι

ἠμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος[87] ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ

ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής.

ἀλλ᾽ ἔμπης καὶ ταῦτα μαθήσεαι, ὡς τὰ δοκοῦντα

χρῆν δοκίμως εἶναι διὰ παντὸς πάντα περῶντα.[88]

The mares that carry me even as far as my desire might reach,

gave escort, since they sent me, leading me along the famous way

of the goddess, which carries the knowing man throughout all the towns:

[87] Diels-Kranz and Tarán choose "well-rounded," Simplicius' text, over "persuasive" from Sextus. Mourelatos 1970, 154-55, argues for "persuasive." Cf. Granger 2008, 3 n.7. Simplicius is the better text, however, and "well-rounded" both qualifies as a *lex difficilior* as well as having a precedent in Xenophanes' God (cf. Diogenes Laertius *Lives* 9.19), who is also spherical, like Parmenides' perfect Being occuring later in the poem, fr.8.43.

[88] Some MSS. read περ ὄντα, adopted by Mourelatos 2008.

thither I was carried: for thither the very wise mares carried me

straining the chariot, and the maidens were leading the way.

And the chariot sent forth the sound of a syrinx in its naves

burning (for it was driven forward by two round

wheels on either side), when the maiden daughters of the sun

hurried to escort me to the light, leaving behind the halls of Night,

thrusting the veils from their heads with their hands.

There are the gates of the paths of night and day,

and a lintel holds them on both sides and a stone threshold,

and the ethereal gates are filled with great doors,

whose matching keys much-punishing Justice holds.

The one whom now the maidens, coaxing with soft speech,

persuaded gently to quickly thrust the knobbed clasp

from the gates: and they made a yawning gap of a doorway

rolling in turns the bronzed door-posts in their screeching sockets

built with dowels and buckles. Right there, straight through them

the maidens steered chariot and horses down the wagon-road.

And the goddess received me kindly, and took my right

hand with hers, and in this way, she made a speech and addressed me:

O young man, wedded to immortal charioteers,

who carry you with horses, having reached our house,

rejoice, since no base fate sent you forth to travel

this path (for, truly, it is off the foot-path, away from mortals),

but both Themis and Dikê sent you. And it is necessary that you learn all things

both the unshakable heart of well-rounded truth

and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true faith.

But nevertheless, also learn these things, namely how things seeming to

necessarily be acceptable pass through everything completely.

In this proem, Parmenides uses some traditional motifs from mythology and epic to prepare the audience for his message. Some have even compared the journey of the *kouros* to Babylonian texts about the sun god's (Šamaš/Utu) nightly visit to the underworld and his removing the bolt from the gates of heaven.[89] The most frequent comparison, however, is to Hesiod's underworld; so frequent, in fact, that some scholars have resisted it. Mourelatos calls the connection to Hesiod "obvious" and, as a result, focuses his work on Homeric connections.[90] Coxon's commentary often reads as a reactionary effort along these same lines (1986, 9-13). Although it

[89] Palmer 2009, 55, applies Heimpel's 1986 treatment of the primary sources to Parmenides; See also Kingsley 1995, 392-93; Steele 2002.

[90] Mourelatos 1970, 33. Among the scholars who argue for Hesiodic influence are: Diels 1897, esp. 10-11; Morrison 1955, esp. 59-60; Deichgräber 1958; Dolin 1962; Schwabl 1963; Burkert 1969, esp. 8-13; Furley 1973, esp. 3-4; Pellikann-Engel 1974; Miller 2006, esp. 7-9; Graham 2006, esp. 152, 155-56.

is generally accepted that Parmenides is drawing on Hesiod's underworld topography in the construction of his proem, Coxon makes the argument that Parmenides "ignores Hesiod's treatment of Night and Day" because of a Homeric parallel between *Od.* 10.86 (ἐγγὺς γὰρ νυκτός τε καὶ ἤματός εἰσι κέλευθοι) and Parmenides Fr. 1.11 (ἔνθα πύλαι Νυκτός τε καὶ Ἤματός εἰσι κελεύθων), that the δώματα Νυκτός of line 9 cannot be the same house as the νυκτὸς ἐρεμνῆς οἰκία δεινά of *Th.* 744 (Coxon 1986, 160-61). Furthermore, Coxon concludes that "Parmenides makes clear...that he does not personify night and day" (161).[91] Coxon was so committed to saying that Parmenides' house of Night was different from Hesiod's house of Night that he appears to have forgotten that Night has a house at all! Moreover, he never explains why it is that we cannot see Parmenides drawing from both sources and creatively reworking this material for his own ends.[92] Furthermore, since it is probable that personified abstractions appear in other places in Parmenides' poem, there is no reason why we should downplay their appearance in the proem.

While the proem describes the journey of a *kouros* in a chariot, scholars disagree about which direction the *kouros* is going.[93] Can we conclude from Parmenides' allusions to Hesiod's underworld that the *kouros* is traveling downwards (cf. Morrison 1955; Burkert 1969)? Or is it the case that he is traveling up towards the light (Deichgräber 1959, 31; Coxon 1986, 162-63; Kahn 2007, 42)? Or is Parmenides being intentionally ambiguous (Miller 2006, Mansfeld 1995, Mourelatos 1970)? While the third option seems the safest choice, I do not wish to "hedge my bets," so to speak. Instead, I maintain that, regardless of the direction of the *kouros,* the proem is

[91] See Northrup 1980 on personifications in Parmenides.
[92] This is the apparent payoff of those interpretations that see intentional ambiguity in the poem, e.g. Miller 2006, Mansfeld 1995, Mourelatos 1970 (repr. 2008), esp. 15-16 where he says the topography of the proem is intentionally blurred.
[93] The most up-to-date discussion of the various views can be found in Tor 2018, 347-59.

nevertheless evocative of the *katabasis* theme (cf. Tor 2015, 25-26, esp. 25 n. 69). Compare, for instance, the *katabases* described in this archetype of gold Orphic lamellae, on which the genealogy of the traveler typically plays a central role (Janko 2016, 123-24; trans. Janko):[94]

Μνημοσύνης τόδε ἔργ ον· ἐπεὶ ἂν μέλληιcι θανεῖcθαι,

[ἐν χρυcίωι] τόδε γραψ[άcθω μ]εμνημέ⟨ν⟩ος ἥρως,

[μὴ τόν γ' ἐκ]πάγλως ὑπά[γ]ο [ι] cκότος ἀμφικαλύψας.

εὑρήceις Ἀίδαο δόμων ἐπὶ δεξιὰ κρήνην,

πὰρ δ' αὐτῆι λευκὴν ἑcτηκυῖαν κυπάριccον,

ἔνθα κατερχόμεναι ψυχαὶ νεκύων ψύχονται.

ταύτης τῆς κρήνης μηδὲ cχεδὸν ἐμπελάcacθαι.

πρόcθεν δ' εὑρήceις τῆς Μνημοσύνης ἀπὸ λίμνης

ψυχρὸν ὕδωρ προρέον· φυλακοὶ δ' ἐπύπερθεν ἔacιν,

οἳ δή c' εἰρήcονται ἐν⟨ὶ⟩ φρασὶ πευκαλίμηιcιν

11 ὅτ⟨τ⟩ι δὴ ἐξερέeις Ἄϊδος cκότον ὀρφνήεντα.

10a {οἳ δή c' εἰρήcονται ὅ τι χρέος εἰcαφικάνειc·

11a τοῖc δὲ cὺ εὖ μάλα πᾶcαν ἀληθείην καταλέξαι.}

[94] The connection between Parmenides' proem and the Orphic tablets has been explored by Feyerabend 1984. Tor 2015, 29, utilizes the comparison for his argument, that the *kouros,* while not dead, undergoes a process of *divinisation* to access the lessons of the 'Way of Conviction.'

εἰπεῖν· “Γῆc παῖc εἰμι καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀcτερόεντοc,

αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ γένοc οὐράνιον· τὸ δὲ {δ} ἴcτε καὶ αὐτοί.

δίψηι δ’ εἰμ’ αὖοc καὶ ἀπόλλυμαι· ἀλλὰ δότ’ αἶψα

ψυχρὸν ὕδωρ πιέναι τῆc Μνημοcύνηc ἀπὸ λίμνηc.”

καὶ δὴ τοὶ ἐρέουcιν ὑποχθονίωι βαcιλῆι,

καὶ τότε τοι δώcουcι πιεῖν θείηc ἀπὸ λίμνηc.

καὶ δὴ καὶ cὺ πιὼν ὁδὸν ἔρχεα⟨ι⟩, ἣν τε καὶ ἄλλοι

μύcται καὶ βάκχοι ἱερὴν cτείχουcι κλεᾳ [ι]νοί,

καὶ τότ’ ἔπειτ’ ἄ[λλοιcι μεθ’] ἡρώεccιν ἀνάξει[c].

This is the task of Memory. When a hero faces death,

[let him] recall and get this graved [on gold],

[lest] the murk cover [him] and lead [him] down in dread.

On the right you’ll find in Hades’ halls a spring,

and standing by it a white cypress-tree,

where the dead souls descending cool themselves.

Do not even come near to this spring.

Further on you’ll find cool water flowing

from Memory's pool, but over it stand guards.

10 They will ask of you with piercing mind

11 what is your quest in Hades' gloomy murk.

10a {They will ask of you why you have come;

11a recount to them the whole truth well and good.}

12 Tell them: "the child I am of earth and starry sky,

but skyborn is my race; this you know yourselves.

I'm parched with thirst and perishing; but give me fast

15 cool water from the pool of Memory to drink."

So, they will ask the subterranean king;

they then will let you drink out of the pool divine.

So, having drunk go on the sacred way

that other glorious initiates and bacchants tread.

20 Then after that you'll rule [among the other] heroes.

Such tablets, used in Orphic-Bacchic burial rituals, instruct the deceased on what actions they should take upon entering the underworld (Graf and Johnston 2007, 158-63). The very specific directions contained on these tablets mark a strong contrast with Parmenides' proem, where many details remain ambiguous to modern scholars and very likely to ancient listeners as well. Another difference from Parmenides' proem is that many of these tablets suggest that the

recitation of a divine genealogy was a kind of "password" to gain entry to the underworld, as Calame has argued.[95] No such recitation is required by the *kouros* of Parmenides, rather he is warmly welcomed—his destination is simply where his *thumos* aims, where the horses and maidens lead, and where Themis and Dike send him. Although many compare these Orphic tablets to the journey of the *kouros* in Parmenides (e.g. Tor 2018, 237-38), it is important to note that the similarity is limited to only a couple of features: namely 1) the journey to a strange place with unique topographical features and 2) being granted special access to that strange place. It is an initiation of sorts.[96]

Despite the difference in the Orphic and Parmenidean "katabases," there is a similarity in the fact that the *kouros* of Parmenides and the deceased person of the tablet could be anyone: the compositions are universal in scope.[97] The deceased person claims for themselves a genealogy that is universal, applying both to men and gods.[98] There is a problem with reading the *kouros* as anonymous, however, since an anonymous *kouros* effectively has no genealogy.

Nevertheless, the first-person plurals (με, 1, 2, 4, 22, and 23) bring us firmly into Hesiodic territory, since the *kouros* encounters a goddess (θεὰ, 22) and she commands the young

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[95] I reproduce here the "archetype" constructed by Janko 2016, 123-24, along with his translation, simply as a representation of the various gold tablets, though I remain agnostic about the question of an Ur-text to which each tablet refers. For "password" see Calame 2006, 243. Cf. Sassi 2018, 127, and Graf and Johnston 2007, 113-114.

[96] Bowra 1937, 9-10.

[97] See note 9 above.

[98] Lines 12-13 of the archetype (Γῆς παῖς εἰμι καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος, | αὐτὰρ ἐμοὶ γένος οὐράνιον) appear on many individual tablets and are often compared both to lines 105-6 of Hesiod's *Theogony* (κλείετε δ' ἀθανάτων ἱερὸν γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων, | οἳ Γῆς ἐξεγένοντο καὶ Οὐρανοῦ ἀστερόεντος) and to line 108 of the *Works and Days* (ὡς ὁμόθεν γεγάασι θεοὶ θνητοί τ' ἄνθρωποι). See Edmonds 2004, 77, and Graf and Johnston 2007, 113-114, for arguments that descent from Heaven and Earth is universal.

man to learn both the "heart of Truth" and the "opinions of mortals." This dichotomy has led many to compare the Goddess' message with the Muses' address to Hesiod *Th.* 24-28:

> τόνδε δέ με πρώτιστα θεαὶ πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπον,
>
> Μοῦσαι Ὀλυμπιάδες, κοῦραι Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο·
>
> "ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι, κάκ' ἐλέγχεα, γαστέρες οἶον,
>
> ἴδμεν ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα,
>
> ἴδμεν δ' εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι."
>
> And the goddesses made this address to me first of all,
>
> Olympian Muses, daughters of aegis-bearing Zeus:
>
> Bumpkin shepherds, base shameful things, mere bellies,
>
> we know how to speak many lies like realities,
>
> and we know how to utter truth whenever we wish.

Hesiod also uses με, giving the appearance that the poet is relating his own experiences. Unlike Parmenides' proem, this pronoun has a clear antecedent, namely "Hesiod" mentioned just two lines earlier (*Th.* 22). There is also a difference in the way the Muses address Hesiod with insults, while Parmenides' goddess welcomes him warmly (πρόφρων ὑπεδέξατο) and addresses him with a greeting (χαῖρ'). Already it would seem that Parmenides describes for himself a greater and less mediated access to the divine world than his predecessor, Hesiod, had described for himself. But if the *kouros* is anonymous, access to divine knowledge could be granted to anyone.

As discussed in the preceding chapter, Hesiod's Muses communicate with the poet, but it is ambiguous whether the resulting song is the truth or lies seeming like the truth. The Muses' condescending address to Hesiod reinforce the distance that lies between the poet and infallible, divine knowledge. Parmenides' goddess, on the other hand, does not condescend, and in this way, Parmenides seems closer to the divine world than his predecessor. To be sure, there are still problems with Parmenides' message: the goddess will later command the young man to "pay attention to the deceptive order of her words" (fr.8.52: κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων). An element of deception and uncertainty, therefore, is present in both authors. Furthermore, it is Parmenides' goddess' explicit goal to teach the *kouros* both the truth and what is deceptive—i.e. what could be true or false—and, crucially, both routes remain distinguished from one another.[99] This distinction is denied to Hesiod: he cannot tell whether he is getting the divine truth or merely what *appears* true, and what he does receive is arbitrarily decided by the Muses.

In order to surpass his predecessor, Parmenides gives the *kouros* a more perspicuous glimpse into the divine world, but the problem remains: Who is this *kouros?* How are we to determine the antecedent of με, if in fact there is supposed to be one? Coxon has suggested that Parmenides may have mentioned his own name in a lost proem, just as Hecataeus did in the proem to his *Genealogies* (fr.1, cf. Coxon 1986, 156-57).[100] Coxon, furthermore, compares the dichotomy in Hecataeus' proem (between what seems true *to him* and the many and laughable

[99] Cf. Torgerson 2006, 36: Parmenides' goddess provides the *kouros* with "validating criteria" to distinguish the two worlds, unlike Hesiod's Muses.

[100] Mansfield doubts this possibility, claiming the *me* of fr.1.1 *is* the sphragis (1995, 228). I believe some label must have been on the physical documents transmitting the text indicating who the author was, but this is speculative. Although there is no trace of 'divine revelation' in Hecataeus proem, the story in Herodotus, discussed in my first chapter, gives us reason to believe that Hecataeus made connections between humans and gods using genealogy, and his own connection to the gods may have been a source of authority for him.

stories of the Greeks) with the ensuing dichotomy of Parmenides' proem (between divine truth and mortal opinion). Finally, Coxon proposes that Parmenides' poem may have been introduced with something like the phrase: Παρμενίδης Πύρητος Ἐλεάτης ὧδε μυθεῖται (1986, 243).[101] An important difference between Hecataeus and Parmenides, however, is Hecataeus' apparent lack of any divine authority, a difference that also applies to his relationship to other mythographers like Acusilaus, as discussed in our first chapter.[102]

Coxon's comparison between Hecataeus and Parmenides is a fruitful one; it at the very least suggests that an ancient audience might expect a heading to attend the poem's transmission, making the apparent anonymity of με more pronounced without such a heading. The comparison with Hecataeus also suggests that Parmenides' proem continues in the tradition which marks its contents out as special and closer to the truth in relation to the multiple false accounts of the rest of the Greeks. But the proem of Alcmaeon, who may have influenced Parmenides, is arguably even more relevant (fr.1):

> Ἀλκμαίων Κροτωνιήτης τάδε ἔλεξε Πειρίθου υἱὸς Βροτίνωι καὶ Λέοντι καὶ Βαθύλλωι περὶ τῶν ἀφανέων· περὶ τῶν θνητῶν σαφήνειαν μὲν θεοὶ ἔχοντι, ὡς δὲ ἀνθρώποις τεκμαίρεσθαι…

[101] Coxon's suggestion is not unprecedented. In fact, Koenen makes a similar suggestion, arguing that the beginning of Heraclitus' book originally possessed an epigraphic label. Koenen submits grave-inscriptions, the cup of Nestor, and the beginnings of poems by Phocylides of Miletus and Demodocus of Leros as origins of this tradition; a tradition maintained in Herodotus' proem (1993, 95-96).

[102] We must, however, leave open the possibility that his 16-generation genealogy—going back to a god—may have been a way of claiming divine authority for himself to some degree or another (as I mentioned in chapter 1).

> Alcmaeon of Croton, son of Peirithos, said the following things to Brotinus, Leon, and Bathyllos about invisible things; Concerning mortals, the gods have clarity, but as for men, they must judge based on signs.

In the first chapter, I established how differences between divine and human perspectives and knowledge are often described in terms of what can and cannot be seen by humans, while the gods have access to everything.[103] This was the message behind the invocation to the Muses heading the Catalogue of Ships in the *Iliad* 2.484-93. In Alcmaeon's proem, he claims his treatise is about "invisible things," and even tells us that such content normally lies beyond our reach. Just as for Hesiod and Parmenides, Alcmaeon makes use of the difference between gods and mortals not only to make an epistemic point, but to carve out a privileged position for himself. To be sure, he, like other humans, must "estimate" on the basis of signs, but the implication is that his estimation is able to compete with the estimation of others; Alcmaeon presents his account to three other Pythagoreans as though authoritative despite such epistemological limitations.[104] Alcmaeon's divine-mortal dichotomy therefore corresponds to an invisible-visible dichotomy which he, to some extent, might transcend.

There is much in Parmenides to suggest that the dichotomies mortal/divine and visible/invisible would have corresponded in similar manner. Here I should again mention

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[103] Coxon, p. 284, compares the dichotomy mentioned at the end of Parmenides' fr. 1, i.e. the two routes of inquiry, with both Alcmaeon's proem and with Xenophanes fr. 34, which states that humans know nothing certainly, but *dokos* is alloted to them. Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983, 260, draws a comparison between Alcmaeon's theories and Parmenides.

[104] Parmenides, Alcmaeon, Heraclitus, and others seem to share the view that humans are flawed *interpreters* of nature because of their distance from the divine world. See, for instance, Parmenides' uses of the term σῆμα at frr. 8.2, 8.55 and ἐπίσημον at 19.5; Heraclitus fr. 93: ὁ ἄναξ, οὗ τὸ μαντεῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς, οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σημαίνει. Cf. also Hes. *WD* 450, where the crane gives the sign to plow.

Simplicius' comment, quoted above. Simplicius claims that the goddess from Parmenides' cosmology, in the *Doxa,* sends souls from the visible to the invisible realm, and this evokes one's birth and movement from life to death. In addition, Parmenides' poem suggests a division between the 'way of Truth' and the 'way of Opinion,' whereby the latter concerns perceivable objects, while the former concerns something else which cannot be experienced by mortals under normal circumstances, but can only be experienced by the divine part of one's self, the mind or soul (cf. Tor 2015, 22-23).[105]

The comparison between Parmenides and Alcmaeon is made even stronger by other similarities between the two authors. Alcmaeon was a younger contemporary of Pythagoras, and considered the first Pythagorean who wrote anything down (Zhmud 2014, 97). He is especially known for his theory about health being maintained by the balance (ἰσονομία) of opposites, e.g. wet and dry, hot and cold; but sickness results from the "monarchy" (μοναρχία) of one of these opposites (B4 D-K), and he also says more generally that "the majority of human things are two" (A1: δύο τὰ πολλά ἐστι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων). His dualistic theory may have influenced Parmenides, whose cosmology in the Doxa is based around the opposites Night and Light. Alcmaeon seems to apply the dualistic scheme to his theories about conception, since, departing from the traditional view that the father was the only one who provided genetic material, Alcmaeon originated the view that both parents supply semen (Cens. *Die nat*. 5.4; A13 D-K). Parmenides may have borrowed this theory from Alcmaeon as well.

[105] Tor adds, crucially, that "doxastic things" include not only perceptual objects, but judgments and cognitions about those objects (2015, 12-13). Tor furthermore describes the *kouros'* journey as a process of divinisation whereby the *kouros* will be able to experience the 'Truth' as described in the 'Way of Truth' (*ibid,* 22-27).

Even if Parmenides was influenced by Alcmaeon the Pythagorean, we should be cautious in using either author to recover a version of Pythagorean orthodoxy or *dogma,* as it were. In Alcmaeon's proem, quoted above, he addresses three other Pythagoreans by name. Later testimonies highlight disagreements between Alcmaeon and other Pythagorean doctrines, and from this we might conclude that even within the group of Pythagoreans, there was argument and disagreement about their very own doctrines. Dogmatic philosophy was not yet achieved in the 5th century, as it was for some schools of the Hellenistic period. This is rare but convincing evidence that a real conversation, and even debate, was occurring among philosophers at these early stages. I mention this now since some doubt that there was much interaction between Early Greek philosophers, who seem to present their views dogmatically and without argument (Osborne 2006). The similarities between Parmenides and other authors do not provide evidence that his poem has no polemical purpose, even if, unlike Alcmaeon, Parmenides names no names.

In the following section I will finally consider the 'Way of Truth,' where Parmenides describes "Being." In this section I argue that anti-genealogical language used to describe Being serves once again to recall his predecessor Hesiod, but this time to situate the poet—Parmenides—as anti-Hesiodic.

IV. The Way of Truth: Anti-Genealogy.

In fragment 8, Being is described in detail using negative terms, especially alpha-privatives with roots having genealogical connotations (fr. 8.1-49):

μόνος δ' ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο

λείπεται ὡς ἔστιν· ταύτηι δ' ἐπὶ σήματ' ἔασι

πολλὰ μάλ', ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὸν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν,

οὖλον μουνογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμὲς ἠδ' ἀτέλεστον,

οὐδέ ποτ' ἦν οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν,

ἕν, συνεχές· τίνα γὰρ γένναν διζήσεαι αὐτοῦ;

πῇι πόθεν αὐξηθέν; οὐδ' ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐάσσω

φάσθαι σ' οὐδὲ νοεῖν· οὐ γὰρ φατὸν οὐδὲ νοητόν

ἔστιν ὅπως οὐκ ἔστι. τί δ' ἄν μιν καὶ χρέος ὦρσεν

ὕστερον ἢ πρόσθεν, τοῦ μηδενὸς ἀρξάμενον, φῦν;

οὕτως ἢ πάμπαν πελέναι χρεών ἐστιν ἢ οὐχί.

οὐδέ ποτ' ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐφήσει πίστιος ἰσχύς

γίγνεσθαί τι παρ' αὐτό· τοῦ εἵνεκεν οὔτε γενέσθαι

οὔτ' ὄλλυσθαι ἀνῆκε Δίκη χαλάσασα πέδηισιν,

ἀλλ' ἔχει· ἡ δὲ κρίσις περὶ τούτων ἐν τῶιδ' ἔστιν·

ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· κέκριται δ' οὖν, ὥσπερ ἀνάγκη,

τὴν μὲν ἐᾶν ἀνόητον ἀνώνυμον (οὐ γὰρ ἀληθής

ἔστιν ὁδός), τὴν δ' ὥστε πέλειν καὶ ἐτήτυμον εἶναι.

πῶς δ' ἂν ἔπειτ' ἀπόλοιτο ἐόν; πῶς δ' ἄν κε γένοιτο;

εἰ γὰρ ἔγεντ', οὐκ ἔστ(ι), οὐδ' εἴ ποτε μέλλει ἔσεσθαι.

τὼς γένεσις μὲν ἀπέσβεσται καὶ ἄπυστος ὄλεθρος.

οὐδὲ διαιρετόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστιν ὁμοῖον·

οὐδέ τι τῆι μᾶλλον, τό κεν εἴργοι μιν συνέχεσθαι,

οὐδέ τι χειρότερον, πᾶν δ’ ἔμπλεόν ἐστιν ἐόντος.

τῶι ξυνεχὲς πᾶν ἐστιν· ἐὸν γὰρ ἐόντι πελάζει. (25)

αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν

ἔστιν ἄναρχον ἄπαυστον, ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ὄλεθρος

τῆλε μάλ’ ἐπλάχθησαν, ἀπῶσε δὲ πίστις ἀληθής.

ταὐτόν τ’ ἐν ταὐτῶι τε μένον καθ’ ἑαυτό τε κεῖται

χοὔτως ἔμπεδον αὖθι μένει· κρατερὴ γὰρ Ἀνάγκη (30)

πείρατος ἐν δεσμοῖσιν ἔχει, τό μιν ἀμφὶς ἐέργει,

οὕνεκεν οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον τὸ ἐὸν θέμις εἶναι·

ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιδευές· [μὴ] ἐὸν δ’ ἂν παντὸς ἐδεῖτο.

ταὐτὸν δ’ ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ οὕνεκεν ἔστι νόημα.

οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐν ᾧι πεφατισμένον ἐστιν, (35)

εὑρήσεις τὸ νοεῖν· οὐδὲν γὰρ <ἢ> ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται

ἄλλο πάρεξ τοῦ ἐόντος, ἐπεὶ τό γε Μοῖρ’ ἐπέδησεν

οὖλον ἀκίνητόν τ’ ἔμεναι· τῶι πάντ’ ὄνομ(α) ἔσται,

ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ,

γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ὄλλυσθαι, εἶναί τε καὶ οὐχί,

καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν διά τε χρόα φανὸν ἀμείβειν.

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ πεῖρας πύματον, τετελεσμένον ἐστί

πάντοθεν, εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκωι,

μεσσόθεν ἰσοπαλὲς πάντηι· τὸ γὰρ οὔτε τι μεῖζον

οὔτε τι βαιότερον πελέναι χρεόν ἐστι τῆι ἢ τῆι.

οὔτε γὰρ οὐκ ἐὸν ἔστι, τό κεν παύοι μιν ἱκνεῖσθαι

εἰς ὁμόν, οὔτ’ ἐὸν ἔστιν ὅπως εἴη κεν ἐόντος

τῆι μᾶλλον τῆι δ’ ἦσσον, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστιν ἄσυλον·

οἶ γὰρ πάντοθεν ἶσον, ὁμῶς ἐν πείρασι κύρει.

A single statement of a road is left: that it is.

And on this road are very many signs,

that, being ungenerated and indestructible, it is,

for it is both an only child and untrembling and unending:

nor ever was it, nor shall it be, since now it is all at once,

one, continuous: for what birth could you seek for it?

How, from where, could it have grown? I shall not allow you

to say nor to think “from not being,” for it is neither speakable

nor thinkable that it is not. And what need could have roused it

later or before, although beginning from the nothing, to grow?

So, either it must be entirely or not.

Nor ever out of not being shall force of trust allow

something be born alongside it: on account of which

Dike allows it neither to be born nor to be destroyed by loosening fetters,

but she holds it. And the decision about these things depends on this:

is or not is: and so, it is decided, in the very manner it is necessary,

to leave the one unthinkable, unnamable (for it is not a

true road), and but the other, that it is and really is.

but how then while being could it perish? and how could it be born?

For if it were born, it is not nor if at some time it were about to be.

So, genesis is truly extinguished and destruction unheard of.

Nor is it divisible, since it is entirely indistinguishable,

not in any way is it more here, this would keep it from holding together,

nor in anyway is it less, but it is all full of being.

Therefore it is all continuous; for being approaches being.

But motionless in the limits of great bonds

it is without beginning or end, since genesis and destruction

have wandered very far away, and true trust pushed them away.

it lies remaining both the same and in the same and in itself (?)

and thus it remains there steadfast; for powerful necessity

holds it in the bonds of a limit, which hedges it in all around,

therefore, it is not sanctioned that the being be incomplete,

for it is not lacking, but it would be lacking everything.

the same thing it is both to think and that on account of which a thought is.

for not without the being will you find that thinking

in which it is expressed, for nothing either is or shall be

except the being, since Fate has bound that very thing

to be entirely motionless; Therefore, all things shall be a name,

as many as mortals have established, believing they are true,

both to be born and that they “are destroyed,” that they “both are and are not,”

and that they change place and alter their bright color.

But since limit is the outermost, the being is complete

from all sides, like the mass of a well-rounded sphere,

from the middle equally balanced in all directions; for it is

45 necessary that it is neither in anyway greater

nor in any way smaller here or there.

Neither is there a thing, not being, which could stop it from reaching

towards like, neither is there a being so that there would be more

of a being here and less of a being there, since it is all inviolate;

50 for it is equal to itself on all sides, similarly it proves to be in limits.

The Aletheia of the goddess, broadly conceived, appears to be about the failure of γίγνομαι to meet the demands of εἶναι. Scholars have continually debated what Parmenides means by his 'subjectless ἔστιν.' The debate is between three interpretations: 1) a predicative reading (referring generally to any statement that would predicate a quality of something, i.e. that <blank> is 'x' (Curd 1998; Mourelatos 2008; Nehamas 2002); 2) an existential reading, referring to the statement that something exists, resulting in a 'strict monist' interpretation (Guthrie 1965, 4-5); and 3) a veridical reading, referring to a statement that something 'is true' (Kahn 1969) Thankfully, this is not a debate I need to settle here to make my point. I do not wish to seem as if I am hedging my bets, but it seems as if he could very well mean all three. Whatever way we choose to interpret ἔστι, my interpretation emphasizes the negation of generation occuring throughout the Aletheia. Being is "ungenerated" (1.3: ἀγένητον), and this is repeated throughout the fragment (What birth could it have? [1.6: τίνα…γένναν;]; it does not grow [1.10: φῦν]; again, it is not born [1.13: οὔτε γενέσθαι]; how could it be? [1.19: πῶς δ' ἄν κε γένοιτο;]; if it were born, it is not [1.20: εἰ γαρ ἔγεντο, οὐκ ἔστι]; Therefore, genesis is extinguished [1.21: τὼς

γένεσις ἀπέσβεσται]; genesis and destruction have wandered far away [1.27: γένεσις και ὄλεθρος τῆλε μάλ' ἐπλάχθησαν]; Mortals, however, think that things are born and destroyed [1.40: ὅσσα βροτοὶ...πεποιθοτες..γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ ὄλλυσθαι]). In virtue of these statements, Parmenides appears staunchly anti-genealogical, and, furthermore, relies on many negative statements to divulge his divine message. Yet, there is one word that sits rather awkwardly at the beginning of this fragment: μουνογενές.

This is not a common word. μουνογενές occurs only seven times in all archaic Greek literature, three of which come from Hesiod.[106] The text is challenged by a different reading found in Plutarch *Adv. Col.* 1114C: ἔστι γαρ οὐλομελές. This possibility was adopted by Diels-Kranz, but nearly all subsequent editors accept the line as it appears in Simplicius, thanks in part to Owen arguing in its favor, even giving a Platonic parallel: εἷς ὅδε μουνογενὴς οὐρανος γεγονώς (*Tim*. 31b; cf. Owen 1937, 75-76). If the μουνογενές reading is correct, then it could testify to the genealogical milieu in which Parmenides was working. For instance, Parmenides could be alluding to the power Hecate has in Hesiod's *Theogony* (*Th.* 426-28):

> οὐδ', ὅτι μουνογενής, ἧσσον θεὰ ἔμμορε τιμῆς
>
> καὶ γεράων γαίῃ τε καὶ οὐρανῷ ἠδὲ θαλάσσῃ,
>
> ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον, ἐπεὶ Ζεὺς τίεται αὐτήν.
>
> And the goddess did not obtain less honor nor fewer priviledges in earth, sky, and sea, since she is μουνογενές, but she even received more still, since Zeus honors her.

[106] This observation is based on my own *TLG* search.

In the genealogical scheme of the *Theogony,* Hecate remains unique because of her lack of siblings and lack of children. She avoids both partitive inheritance and the expense of child-bearing. In other words, she avoids the pitfalls of genealogical production as much as one could in a genealogical poem. In a similar fashion, Parmenides' Being is supposed to benefit from its very lack of genealogy, but nevertheless Parmenides uses a genealogical term to make this point.

Parmenides reliance on genealogical terms to describe an anti-genealogical Being leads naturally to the theme of the limitations of language. Empedocles, who will be the subject of the next chapter, elaborates upon this problem, continuing Parmenides' project. Both philosophical poets share the goal of reframing natural processes, departing from genealogical models, while struggling to devise a new manner of speaking. Empedocles explicitly expresses this concern (fr.9):

οἱ δ' ὅτε μὲν κατὰ φῶτα μιγέντ' εἰς αἰθέρ' ἵκωνται

ἢ κατὰ θηρῶν ἀγροτέρων γένος ἢ κατὰ θάμνων

ἠὲ κατ' οἰωνῶν, τότε μὲν τὸ λέγουσι γενέσθαι,

εὖτε δ' ἀποκρινθῶσι, τὸ δ' αὖ δυσδαίμονα πότμον· (5)

ἣ θέμις οὐ καλέουσι, νόμωι δ' ἐπίφημι καὶ αὐτός.

And whenever, in the case of men, they are combined and come into the aether,

or in the case of the family of wild beasts and in that of bushes

or in that of birds, then indeed that call it "being born,"

and whenever they separate, this in turn they call "unlucky doom,"

The way in which they call it is not right, but even I assent to the custom.

Here again, as in Parmenides, we see the suggestion that mortal names for birth and death are inaccurate, and this argument must be directed at the use of genealogical motifs to describe natural processes. No one, neither Parmenides nor Empedocles, however, has been able to break away from the use of these sorts of terms in their own philosophical theories. The best Parmenides could do was to negate the terms in order to approximate what exactly he meant by "ὡς ἔστιν." On the other hand, Parmenides invites us to consider the linguistic side of the problem more closely than anyone before, and this I believe is his truly original point, not merely a denial of ontological emergence, which Osborne rightly points out is not new (2006). Nevertheless, Parmenides' poem does make a novel contribution, providing both a summary antithesis of the very idea of a genealogical inquiry into nature, his *Aletheia,* as well as an earnest attempt to redescribe the human and genealogical perspective of all things, the *Doxa*.

V. Conclusion

In conclusion, Parmenides' poem relies on the reappearance of the theme of genealogy throughout the history of early Greek philosophy to position itself as better than his predecessors' views. I submit that Parmenides' most "Hesiodic" and genealogical material is relegated to the poem's mythological proem and deceptive account of the mortal point of view. By doing this, Parmenides criticizes his predecessors, both Hesiod and Alcmaeon, who have suggested that their theories reflect the divine point of view. In my final chapter, I will argue that Ionian philosophers like Anaximander continued in a Hesiodic vein, this time by using embryological metaphors to describe such cosmic beginnings. Parmenides is different in that his divine account denies the possibility of genealogy and replaces genealogy with an eternal, monistic Being that is neither born (unlike Hesiodic gods or Ionian elements) nor destroyed.

Genealogical views like Hesiod's are thereby demoted by Parmenides, but the means by which Parmenides convincingly demotes such views equally rely on his genealogical predecessors: Parmenides' poem is Hesiodic in structure: it relies on the difference between Divine and Mortal perspectives to make its point, just as Hesiod had done with his two poems, the *Theogony* and *Works and Days.*

VI. Appendix to Ch.3: The Erinyes in Parmenides.

In this appendix, I provide a close reading of fragment 18 which remains somewhat neglected by modern scholars. I argue that this fragment both utilizes the theories of Parmenides' near-contemporary, Alcmaeon, and alludes to Hesiod by utilizing the figures known as Erinyes. By alluding both to contemporary and more distant predecessors in his discussion of embryology, Parmenides constructs a synopsis of the history of philosophy as relying on the tradition of genealogy. My plan for this section is first to present the fragment and discuss its context in Caelius Aurelianus. Then I will argue that Caelius chose the Latin term *Dirae* to translate the Parmenides' Greek term *Erinyes.* Finally, I show how Parmenides' possible use of this term suggests many connections to his predecessor Hesiod, both to the Birth of Aphrodite in the *Theogony* and the birth of Strife in the *Works and Days.* In this section I will also mention parallels to be found in another Presocratic who uses Erinyes, namely Heraclitus.

Parmenides fragment 18 only survives in a Latin translation:

> femina virque simul Veneris cum germina miscent,
> venis informans diverso ex sanguine virtus
> temperiem servans bene condita corpora fingit.
> nam si virtutes permixto semine pugnent

nec faciant unam permixto in corpore, Dirae
nascentem gemino vexabunt semine sexum.
When a woman and a man together mix the seeds of Venus,
from the different blood in their veins a formative capacity
fashions a well-constructed body, if it preserves a proper mixture.
For if the capacities should fight once the seed is mixed
and if they should not make one in the mixed body, the Furies
shall persecute the gender with a double seed as it is born.

This fragment appears in the medical writings of Caelius Aurelianus, probably active around 400 C.E. He is known as a translator of Soranus of Ephesus, a Greek medical writer active in the 1st century C.E., and his work shows a great dependence on this author. Caelius calls the fragment an *epigramma*, suggesting the broader context was perhaps not available to him. The translation of Parmenides appears to be his own, and he expresses some concern over accuracy. Caelius explains that he "composed Latin verses in as similar a fashion as he was able so that the quality of the two languages would not be mixed" (Cael. Aurel. *Tard. Pass.* 4.9.134: *latinos enim ut potui composui ne linguarum ratio misceretur*; For *ratio* as "quality" of a language see *OLD* s.v. 15, cf. Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.59). I think that the translator has made a conceptual pun. While happy to use Greek elsewhere, here Caelius opts for Latin so that his text can remain as harmonious as the healthy fetus which the fragment describes as coming from the harmonious union of parents.

Scholars have proposed various interpretations of this fragment. Wilamowitz reasonably argued, based on its context in Caelius, that the Parmenidean original gave an account of homosexual births (1913, 72 n.1). Diels was suspicious of this, and suggested instead that Parmenides described hermaphroditic births or, at the very least, the births of effeminate men or

masculine women, like Amazons.[107] On the basis of this interpretation, Diels attempted a 'retranslation' of this Latin fragment back into Greek, but conspicuously absent from his retranslation was any word corresponding to *Dirae* (1897, 44):

ἀλλ' ὅταν ἀρσεν' ὁμοῦ καὶ θηλεα κύματα μίσγῃ
Κύπριδος, ἔκ τε φλεβῶν δύναμις σὺν ἐναντία πλάσσῃ,
ἢν μὲν κρῆσιν ἔχῃσιν, ἐύκτιτα σώματα τεύχει·
ἢν δὲ δίχα φρονέωσι βροτῶν ἐν σπέρματι μεικτῷ
μηδὲ φύωσιν ὁμὴν δυνάμεις ἐνὶ σώματι μεικτῷ,
γεινομένην διφυεῖ σίνοιντό κε κύματι φύτλην.

Diels tells us: "römische Angst scheint in *dirae* des Caelius nachzuklingen, der ich daher als ungriechisch in der Rückübersetzung keine Stelle gelassen habe" (1897, 116). Diels, like many scholars, thought Caelius was a mere translator of his predecessor Soranus.[108] Furthermore, Diels thought Caelius' use of *Dirae* reflected an anxiety towards homosexuality typical of Romans but unlikely to be found among the Greeks of the 5th century B.C.E. It is telling that Diels' reconstruction attempts to replicate Caelius' "silver line" in line 6, but leaves any Greek term corresponding to *Dirae* out. Why preserve this stylistic feature while freely redacting the content? Diels' reasoning is speculative and inconclusive, since there are many words for *Dirae* that we would not be surprised to see in Parmenides in this context. Furthermore, Parmenides'

[107] See Diels 1897, 115-118. Tarán discusses the issues, focusing on the recovery of the details of the physical processes Parmenides is attempting to describe (1956, 263-67).
[108] This view has been called into question by van der Eijk (1999).

use of personifications in all three parts of his poem, the proem, the *Aletheia*, and the *Doxa*, should not rule out a reference to mythological figures.

Some scholars, like Untersteiner (1958) and Hölscher (1986), have maintained Diels' view. Coxon disagrees and suggests that the original was probably some form of Κήρ, citing a Homeric parallel as evidence. At *Il.* 23.78-79, the ghost of Patroclus speaking to Achilles laments his doom: "But hateful death surrounded me, which presided over me even as I was being born" (ἀλλ᾽ ἐμὲ μὲν κὴρ ἀμφέχανε στυγερή, ἥ περ λάχε γιγνόμενόν περ). In further support, Coxon cites the later tradition in which Achilles and Patroclus were lovers, suggesting that Parmenides alluded to this tradition to embellish his own theory about the origins of homosexuality.

I think the discussion of this fragment would benefit from shifting the focus away from whether the fragment depicts homosexual or hermaphroditic births. As interesting as these possibilities are, we cannot be entirely certain which Parmenides was discussing without more context. Instead, I think it would be fruitful to focus on another detail, namely that the fragment clearly depicts strife in the womb: the two parents seeds fight (*pugnent*), and this affects the moment of conception. Even if Caelius were 'freely translating' his predecessor, it would be difficult to argue that he fabricated this detail.

There are many mythological parallels in which a struggle between parents ends up affecting their children, and in many of these the Erinyes play a prominent role. Aeschylus' *Oresteia* trilogy immediately comes to mind, but I will discuss Hesiodic parallels for the Erinyes' appearance in similar contexts below. But first, I shall argue that a Latin translator like Caelius would translate the Greek term *Erinyes* using the Latin term *Dirae*.

The terms *Erinyes* and *Dirae* were interchangeable in Latin poetry. Consider the line from Propertius (2.20.29): tum me…tragicae vexetis Erinyes.[109] Here the elegaic poet prays that the tragic Erinyes should vex him if he forgets his own gratitude toward his lover. Propertius choice of verb matches the verb Caelius used, and this suggests that the Dirae may represent the Erinyes. Some passages from Vergil's *Aeneid* also suggest that Erinyes and Dirae were interchangeable, since the character Allecto is referred to both as one of the Dirae Deae as well as an Erinys (Aeneid 7.447-55): tot Erinys sibilat hydris | tantaque se facies aperit…

To be fair to Coxon's suggestion, Keres and Erinyes are not only closely related, but they are also sometimes treated as interchangeable in Greek literature. For example, in Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes,* the chorus addresses the Keres-Erinyes (1054-57):

ὦ μεγάλαυχοι καὶ φθερσιγενεῖς

Κῆρες Ἐρινύες, αἵτ' Οἰδιπόδα

γένος ὠλέσατε πρυμνόθεν οὕτως,

τί πάθω; τί δὲ δρῶ; τί δὲ μήσωμαι;

Oh, boastful and destructive

Keres, Erinyes, who destroyed

the family of Oedipus from the root in this way,

Why do I suffer? Why do I act? Why do I make plans?

[109] This was pointed out as a parallel to Parmenides fr. 18 by Schrijvers 1985 commentary to Caelius Aurelianus explanation of homosexuality (*ad* 4.9.134).

But would a Latin translator use *Dirae* for Keres? Our only possible examples for this suggest that they would not. Both Cicero and Hyginus record Latin versions of Catalogues of Night, whose ultimate poetic predecessor must be the catalogue as it stands in Hesiod. Cicero's version reads (*De Natura Deorum* 3.44.3-15):

> …Amor Dolus †momus Labor Invidentia Fatum Senectus Mors Tenebrae Miseria Querella Gratia Fraus Pertinacia Parcae Hesperides Somnia; quos omnis Erebo et Nocte natos ferunt.
>
> …Love, Trickery, Woe, Toil, Envy, Fate, Old Age, Death, Shadows, Sadness, Quarrels, Graces, Fraud, Obstinacy, Parcae, Hesperides, Dreams, and all of whom they say were born from Darkness and Night.

Hyginus' very similar list follows (*Preface*):

> ex Nocte et Erebo Fatum Senectus Mors Letum †Continentia Somnus Somnia <Amor> id est Lysimeles, Epiphron †dumiles Porphyrion Epaphus Discordia Miseria Petulantia Nemesis Euphrosyne Amicitia Misericordia Styx; Parcae tres, id est Clotho Lachesis Atropos; Hesperides, Aegle Hesperie †aerica.
>
> From Night and Darkness, Fate, Old Age, Death, Oblivion, Continence (?), Sleep, Dreams, Love, i.e. The Limb-Loosener, Epiphron, dumiles (?) Porphyrion, Epaphus, Strife, Sadness, Petulance, Nemesis, Kindness, Friendship, Misery, Styx, the three Parcae, i.e. Clotho, Lachesis, Atropos, Hesperides, Aegle, Hesperia, Aerica.

The most likely places where Cicero and Hyginus may have translated Hesiod's *Keres* occur in the respective sequences *Fatum Senectus Mors Tenebrae* and *Fatum Senectus Mors Letum*.

Pease (1968, *ad loc.*) has cited a portion of Hesiod's catalogue of Night from the *Theogony* as a likely parallel (*Th.* 211-12; 217): Νὺξ δ'ἔτικτεν στυγερόν τε Μόρον καὶ Κῆρα μέλαιναν καὶ θάνατον; καὶ Μοίρας καὶ Κῆρας ἐγείνατο νηλεοποίνους. These parallels suggest that perhaps *Tenebrae* or *Letum* may have been translations of *Keres.* More crucially, the term *dirae* does not occur in either catalogue, and therefore, insofar as these can be viewed as translations of Hesiod, even loose ones, it seems unlikely that *dirae* would be chosen for Keres as Coxon had suggested.

Now that I have argued that Caelius' *dirae* was likely to have translated "Erinyes," I would like to point out some possible parallels that would enrich our understanding of Parmenides' Latin fragment. First, there are many reasons to think Parmenides is recalling Hesiod's *Works and Days,* where the birth of Oath, son of Strife, is described (*WD* 802-4):

> Πέμπτας δ' ἐξαλέασθαι, ἐπεὶ χαλεπαί τε καὶ αἰναί·
> ἐν πέμπτῃ γάρ φασιν Ἐρινύας ἀμφιπολεύειν
> Ὅρκον γεινόμενον, τὸν Ἔρις τέκε πῆμ' ἐπιόρκοις.
> Avoid fifth-days, since they are difficult and dreadful.
> For they say that on the fifth day the Erinyes attended
> Oath as he was born, whom Eris gave birth to as a bane to
> those who swear falsely.

The present participle of γεινόμενον matches the *nascentem* of Caelius' translation. Furthermore, the Erinyes here act as mid-wives for Strife's child, a situation Parmenides' adapts by making them afflict the child in the womb. The allusion to Oath enriches Parmenides' adoption of Alcmaeon's notion of *isonomia* in the body.

Parmenides may also have the birth-story of the Erinyes themselves in mind too. The context of the Erinyes' birth—namely the strife between Gaia and Ouranos—is reflected in

Parmenides' account of the strife between the two parents' seeds in the womb. Moreover, the Erinyes' role as avengers of parricide ensure that the strife of the parents is in a sense inherited by their son, Cronus, who castrates his father so that his siblings, the Titans, can be born. Finally, a topic I will revist in my final chapter, the birth scene of Aphrodite, also a result of the strife between parents, provides a vivid glimpse into the Archaic Greek understanding of embryology, namely that the formation of the fetus is a process whereby a liquid seed becomes a solid embryo, a process reflected in Aphrodite's "congealing" in sea foam (*Th.* 193).

I would like to conclude this appendix with yet another parallel found in a fragment of Heraclitus preserved in the Derveni Papyrus (Heraclitus fr. 94 DK = Derveni Papyrus Col. IV.5-9, trans. Kouremenos, adapted)

> κατὰ [...]ᾳ Ἡράκλ̣ειτος μᾳ[.....] τὰ κοινά, κατ[αστρέ]φει τὰ ἴδ[ι]α, ὅσπερ
> ἴκελ̣α [τῶι ἱερο]λόγωι λέγων [
>
> "ἥλ̣ι[ος περιο]δου κατὰ φύσιν ἀνθρω[πηΐου] εὖρος ποδός [ἐστι,
>
> τὸ μ[έγεθο]ς οὐχ ὑπερβάλλων εἰκ̣[ότας οὔ]ρους ε[ὔρους
>
> ἑοῦ· εἰ δὲ μ]ή, Ἐρινύε̣[ς] νιν ἐξευρήσου̣[σι, Δίκης ἐπίκουροι.
>
> Heraclitus…common things…. turns his own views upside down, the one who said, speaking like the Hierologos: The sun, in the nature of a circuit(?) is the breadth of a human foot, not overstepping in size the proper limits of its width, or else the Erinyes, Dike's assistants, will find him out.

Here the Erinyes appear as the assistants of Dike, a character who also appears in Parmenides. Their role in keeping the sun from transgressing its boundaries matches their role in Parmenides

to pursue anything that does not preserve balance and harmony. If these mythological figures had a place in Heraclitus' cosmology, then we should not be surprised if they had a place in Parmenides' as well.

What I hope to have shown in this section is the way in which Parmenides collapses highly traditional content with the most up-to-date intellectual currents of his time. I interpret this choice as a way to show his audience not only that the genealogies of Hesiod are still relevant and serving as the model for early Greek philosophy, but also that his more immediate predecessors, figures like Anaximander and potentially also Alcmaeon and Heraclitus, have not yet surpassed Hesiod, leaving room for Parmenides himself to do so.

Ch.4: Genealogical Motifs in Empedocles

I. Introduction

Keeping Empedocles' genealogical background and context in view are essential to solving the biggest problem in interpreting Empedocles: Did he write one or two poems (*On Nature* or *On Nature* and *Katharmoi*), and, if he wrote two poems, do those two poems correspond to divine and mortal perspectives the same way that Hesiod's two poems do? And if Empedocles wrote one poem, is it structured in a similar fashion as Parmenides' poem?

In my second chapter, I argued that Hesiod was already aware of the problems that attend genealogy, e.g. the impossibility of *ex nihilo* creation. In the third chapter, I argued that Parmenides expresses similar concerns, since he described divine Being in anti-genealogical language but his *Doxa* features genealogy as the human explanation of the cosmos. In this chapter, I argue that Empedocles continues Parmenides' project by criticizing the genealogical approach to cosmology in his poem by adapting traditional motifs to support his novel theories about Nature.

The argument of this chapter is divided into three parts: first I will review the Empedoclean question, regarding whether he wrote one or two poems and whether the content of his work, sometimes cosmological and at other times religious, represents a coherent whole. After this, I review Empedocles' programmatic fragments to show how the mortal-immortal dualism plays out in his poem(s). Many of these programmatic fragments emphasize how genealogy belongs to mortal perspective, while Empedocles' theory of mixture and separation represents the divine viewpoint. I conclude that there are important differences in the way Empedocles utilizes the dichotomy, especially insofar as the structure of his poem(s) does not

divide into two neat halves, as it did for Parmenides and Hesiod. Instead, Empedocles oscillates more rapidly between the two perspectives to illustrate their complementarity. In the conclusion to the first part, I will show how the anti-genealogical agenda described in the programmatic fragments is corroborated in the remainder of the poem(s).

II. Part One The divine-mortal dichotomy in Empedocles and the Empedoclean Question

Part One A: The Empedoclean Question

Before I proceed to the fragments themselves, I should give a brief history of the Empedoclean question to show where scholars stand today on the issue. According to Diogenes Laertius, Empedocles wrote at least two works (DK 31A1.189-90 = LM D1): τὰ μὲν οὖν Περὶ φύσεως αὐτῶι καὶ οἱ Καθαρμοὶ εἰς ἔπη τείνουσι πεντακισχίλια, ὁ δὲ Ἰατρικὸς λόγος εἰς ἔπη ἑξακόσια. On the basis of this testimony, modern editions have divided the fragments of Empedocles, assigning religious and mythological material—the story of Empedocles' own reincarnation and exile—to the *Katharmoi* and the more typically "Presocratic" material—theories about the material constituents of the universe and the forces that manipulate them—to the *Peri Phuseōs*.[110] The two-poem division inspired some scholars to characterize Empedocles as contradictory, denying unity not only to the corpus, but also to the thought of Empedocles.[111] Many scholars viewed the religious, mythical material, as contradicting the scientific, philosophical material, which the *Peri Phuseōs* contained.

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[110] The most influential edition by Diels-Kranz was anticipated by Diels 1901, Stein 1852, Karsten 1838, and Sturz 1805; cf. Trépanier 2004, p. 2 and p. 194 n. 6.

[111] Jaeger famously called Empedocles a "philosophical centaur" (1945, 295). Zeller's *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung* gives a pioneering account of the philosophical incompatibility of Empedocles' two main works (1963, 1001 and 1004-1016; cf. Trépanier 2004, 194 n.6).

The Strasbourg Papyrus seems to confirm the unity of Empedocles thought by discussing both the reincarnation of the *daimon* and the details of the physical elements in the cosmic cycle within one continuous fragment (ensemble d; Martin and Primavesi 1998). Even before the publication of the Strasbourg Papyrus, scholars began to argue that, not only did Empedocles write only one poem, but it was intended to communicate a coherent message—that is, the "religious" material about the exile of his *daimon* and reincarnation is fully compatible with the "philosophical" material about the physical make-up of the universe (Osborne 1987; Obbink 1992; Inwood 2001).

Even granting the unity of Empedocles' thought, many still disagree about the number of poems. The important scholarship of Primavesi (2007; 2008) remains at odds with Trépanier (2004): the former argues that Empedocles wrote two poems, which nevertheless present a unified view using allegory, while the latter argues for one poem which emphasizes the relationship between the religious and philosophical material. Now, in order to proceed with my argument, it will be necessary to situate my own views as they relate to this on-going debate in Empedocles' scholarship.

I have argued for the importance of Hesiod's influence on early Greek philosophy throughout this dissertation to show that the complimentary relationship between Hesiod's two major poems, the *Theogony* and *Works and Days*, has itself exerted influence on the structure of Parmenides' own poem. Just as Hesiod's *Theogony* represents the divine perspective on the cosmos, while the *Works* represents the perspective of mortals, so also does Parmenides' *Aletheia* represent a divine perspective, while the *Doxa* clearly belong to mortals. The major difference is that Parmenides embraces the two perspectives within one poem, innovating upon

his predecessor's two-poem diptych. Furthermore, Parmenides adapts Hesiodic poetic structure to comment on the place of genealogy in cosmological inquiry, as argued in the last chapter.

Since both Hesiod and Parmenides provide important precedents for Empedocles' work, interesting complications arise if we try to use these predecessors as evidence to resolve the Empedoclean question. I submit that Empedocles also structured his work according to the mortal-divine dichotomy as Parmenides and Empedocles have done. There is, however, a dilemma: did Empedocles follow Hesiod, and write two poems, or is he closer to Parmenides, who divided his poem into parts corresponding to divine and mortal worldviews? Although he is closer in time to Parmenides, I can imagine Empedocles trying to present himself as more Hesiodic than Parmenides by writing two poems. The move would itself be Parmenidean, since Parmenides emphasizes Hesiod's (and Homer's) importance by re-introducing hexameters to the cosmogonic inquiry the Milesians had already begun to practice in prose.

The problem, however, is that the one-or-two-poem dilemma cannot be resolved by comparing Empedocles to his predecessors. There are plenty of parallels between them, but we can better tackle the Empedoclean question by looking at Empedocles' fragments themselves. There are many intra-textual references and repetitions that, as Trépanier maintains, make the one-poem view much more likely (2004, 47, 86-88, 179). Although there is not enough evidence to settle the matter conclusively, I find most of Trepaniér's arguments convincing to the point that I am surprised that the single-work hypothesis still represents the minority view.

My argument for the unity of Empedocles' thought is slightly different from previous scholarship, in that I am not attempting to resolve the dichotomy between the "mythical" with the "scientific"; rather I intend to view the fragments through the lens of the more traditional and epistemological dichotomy between divine and mortal perspectives which we have seen at play

in other authors in the previous chapters. This dichotomy is present in the fragments I will review below, but it still allows for unity in Empedocles' thought thanks to the complimentary relationship between the two ways of looking at the cosmos.

Part One B: Programmatic statements and internal references: the divine-mortal dichotomy in Empedocles.

When Empedocles was writing, there was already a long tradition of poets invoking the difference between men and gods at the outset of their work. For fragmentary works, however, it is not always apparent whether the structure of their work reflects that division. For instance, consider Xenophanes fr. 34:

καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν οὐδέ τις ἔσται

εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων·

εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα τύχοι τετελεσμένον εἰπών,

αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε· δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.

And truly not one man has clear knowledge nor shall anyone

Know clearly about the gods and the things I say about all things,

For even if he should happen to say something especially perfect,

Nevertheless, he would not know, but opinion is allotted to all men.

This fragment features the frequently repeated idea that the gods are out of the reach of human understanding, but mortals can freely form opinions about the gods which may or may not be true. In Xenophanes' case, there is no indication that structural or compositional details of his poems reflect this epistemic dichotomy the way the relationship between Hesiod's two major poems does. Here it will be useful to note in passing that Xenophanes also criticizes humans for supposing that the gods *are born*, making an explicit anti-genealogical point which Parmenides and Empedocles reinforce in their own work (Xenophanes fr. 14):

ἀλλ' οἱ βροτοὶ δοκέουσι γεννᾶσθαι θεούς,

τὴν σφετέρην δ' ἐσθῆτα ἔχειν φωνήν τε δέμας τε

But mortals suppose that gods are born,

And have their clothes and voice and frame.

Parmenides makes use of the same epistemological divide between gods and mortals, but, unlike Xenophanes, the dichotomy bears a strict relationship to his poem's structure. The details about the poem's structure are especially apparent at moments of transition, as for instance at the transition between the poem's two parts—from divine Aletheia to mortal opinion—occurring at Parmenides fr. 8.50-53:

ἐν τῶι σοι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόημα

ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης· δόξας δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βροτείας

μάνθανε κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλὸν ἀκούων.

> At this point I end for you a trustworthy account and understanding
>
> About truth, and from this point learn mortal opinions
>
> Hearing the deceitful order of my words.

At this transition, Parmenides maintains a hierarchical relationship between the two parts of his poem. Furthermore, Parmenides uses the two-part structure to surpass his predecessor, Hesiod. By confining the genealogical material, which includes gods, to his deceptive *Doxa*, Parmenides implies that the Hesiodic divine genealogy was a mortal concept after all. Parmenides therefore makes room for his *Aletheia*—an anti-genealogical description of Being—to take the place of what Hesiod had presented as the divine view through his divine genealogies. Furthermore, Parmenides explicitly mentions birth as a name which mortals believe truly describes things at fr.8.38-41:

> τῶι πάντ’ ὄνομ’ ἔσται,
>
> ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ,
>
> γίγνεσθαί τε καὶ ὄλλυσθαι, εἶναί τε καὶ οὐχί,
>
> καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν διά τε χρόα φανὸν ἀμείβειν.

> Therefore, all things that mortals, believe to be true and have established shall be a name: to be born and to be destroyed, to be and not, to change place, and to change their bright color.

Turning now to Empedocles, there are many fragments that show his use of the divine-mortal dichotomy to support his philosophy. Like his immediate predecessor Parmenides, he uses this dichotomy to position himself as superior to those before him. In his opening fragment, Empedocles sings that his audience views him as a god (fr. 112.4: ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητός, discussed in more detail below). In another place, Empedocles guarantees the authority of his poem since Pausanias has heard his *muthos* from a god (fr. 23.11: θεοῦ πάρα μῦθον ἀκούσας). Although Empedocles also relies on a Muse, his self-fashioning as a god suggests a closer relationship to the divine realm than Parmenides' *kouros,* who receives the message of the goddess and embodies a closer relationship to the poem's welcoming goddess than Hesiod had with his condescending Muses. Empedocles, who is godlike himself, therefore continues the same sort of engagement with his predecessors as Parmenides.

There are also many places where Empedocles denigrates mortal opinion, as in fr. 132:

> ὄλβιος, ὃς θείων πραπίδων ἐκτήσατο πλοῦτον,
>
> δειλὸς δ', ᾧι σκοτόεσσα θεῶν πέρι δόξα μέμηλεν.
>
> Happy is the one who has acquired a wealth of divine *prapides,*
>
> And wretched the one who has devised shadowy opinions about gods.

This fragment alludes both to Hesiod and to Parmenides in order to communicate Empedocles' superiority over his most relevant predecessors.[112] The Hesiodic context is relevant to Empedocles' message (*Th.* 954: ὄλβιος, ὃς μέγα ἔργον ἐν ἀθανάτοισιν ἀνύσσας | ναίει

[112] Aside from an occurrence in Theognis (1.934 ed. Young) and one in the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (480), Hesiod's Theogony is the only other earlier occurrence ὄλβιος, ὃς at the beginning of a hexameter line.

ἀπήμαντος καὶ ἀγήραος ἤματα πάντα). Hercules' apotheosis tells a similar tale to the salvation that Empedocles appears to be advertising. In one fragment, he relates how prominent men—prophets, singers, doctors, leaders—"sprout up" as gods (fr.146.3: ἀναβλαστοῦσι θεοὶ). The divine *prapides* is also Hesiodic, alluding to the moment when Kottos, a Hundred-hander, praises the *prapides* of Zeus (*Th.* 656, cf. 655-63). It is by Zeus' divine wisdom that the Hundred-handers have been released from their underworld prison, and now their aid in turn will lead to the imprisonment of the Titans in Tartaros. Again, the Hesiodic context enriches Empedocles' situation, since he describes himself as an exile from the gods (fr. 115.13: φυγὰς θεόθεν).

The contrast between divine *prapides* and dark opinion evokes the "Parmenidean contrast between knowledge and light and doxa and darkness" (Wright 1981, 252). In another place, Empedocles implies that his lessons reach further than any "mortal *metis*." (fr. 2.10: βροτείη μῆτις). Furthermore, Empedocles exhorts his audience to "hear the course of the account as not deceptive" (fr. 17.35), as though redeeming cosmology from the deceptive label Parmenides' gives his *Doxa* (Parmenides fr. 8.53, quoted above; cf. Tor 2017, 319; Hardie 2013, 221). The connection to Parmenides is clear, but now the question is, does Empedocles follow in his predecessors' footsteps by structuring his poem according to the same divine-mortal dichotomy? If he does structure his poem this way, then a better understanding of genealogy's role in the poem will follow. Like Parmenides before him, Empedocles also attributes the genealogical perspective to mortals, while the divine perspective seems to be something else entirely.

One finds Hints about the poem's structure in fragments bearing witness to transitions between topics, but it is still difficult to locate those transitions relative to one another. Trépanier, for instance, attempts to reconstruct the proem of Empedocles' *Physika*, but as a result he separates four fragments (frr. 8, 9, 11, 15) commonly treated as a set thanks to their thematic

links and shared context from Plutarch's *Against Colotes* (cf. Trépanier 2004, 31-72).[113] According to Trépanier the proem included frr. 11 and 15, but excluded frr. 8 and 9 (2004, 45). They all, however, raise a similar issue about mortal terminology for elemental processes and thereby have a programmatic function. Inwood, furthermore, groups these four fragments together, giving 8, 9, 11, and 15 the numbers 21, 22, 23, and 24 in his ordering of the poem (2001). Their proximity in Plutarch's *Against Colotes* suggests they were grouped together in Empedocles' poem as well. The criteria by which Trépanier includes two of these fragments in the proem and not the others are not entirely clear.

A close look at all four of these fragments shows how the theme of genealogy relates to the divine-mortal dichotomy; they show that genealogy is a product of mortal perspectives and thereby imply that the divine view is something else. For instance, fr. 8 denies any *phusis* to mortal things, as well as denying death:

ἄλλο δέ τοι ἐρέω· φύσις οὐδενὸς ἔστιν ἁπάντων

θνητῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλομένου θανάτοιο τελευτή,

ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξίς τε μιγέντων

ἔστι, φύσις δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνομάζεται ἀνθρώποισιν.

And I shall tell you another thing: There is *phusis* of none of all

[113] The close relationship between these fragments has prompted frequent scholarly discussion scholarship, e.g. Journée 2007, 468-520; Boulogne 2004, 97-110; Nilles 1989, 365-79; Owens 1976, 87-101.

The mortals, nor is there any end of destructive death,

But there is only mixture and separation of

mixed things, but *phusis* is applied as a name to these by humans.

Both modern and ancient interpretations of this fragment are divided about the meaning of the term *phusis* here. It should be uncontroversial to say that *Phusis* is the name applied by men to "those things," (τοῖς) referring apparently to mixture and separation.[114] Most modern scholars have followed Plutarch in claiming that Empedocles here uses Phusis as a synonym of genesis.[115] Others follow Aristotle in interpreting Phusis as equivalent to *ousia* (Owens 1976; van der Ben 1978). This latter view strikes me as anachronistic (cf. Cherniss 1964, 244 n. 114), but more importantly I agree with Nilles who argues that the *ousia* reading ignores the connection to Parmenides in Empedocles' statement here (1989, 366-69, 379). Nilles helpfully compares Parmenides fr. 10, as it contains uses of the term γίγνομαι, φύσις, and φύω, highlighting the close relationship between all three terms (1989, 368):

εἴσηι δ' αἰθερίαν τε φύσιν τά τ' ἐν αἰθέρι πάντα

σήματα καὶ καθαρᾶς εὐαγέος ἠελίοιο

λαμπάδος ἔργ' ἀίδηλα καὶ ὀππόθεν ἐξεγένοντο,

[114] This may lead to a puzzle, as how can *phusis* understood either "birth" or "stable nature" (the two prevailing interpretations) be applied to separation? Perhaps Empedocles only meant that phusis applied to mixture, while death applied to separation, but I must also mention that separation is also an important part of embryological processes, since the process often involves a homogenous mixture separating into its parts (i.e. the articulation of the fetus). To say this now, however, is to beg the question as to the meaning of phusis.

[115] See Wright's translation, "birth." Some also translate phusis as "growth." (e.g. Trepanier 2004, 179). Nilles 1989, 379, argues for the "genesis" reading.

ἔργα τε κύκλωπος πεύσηι περίφοιτα σελήνης

καὶ φύσιν, εἰδήσεις δὲ καὶ οὐρανὸν ἀμφὶς ἔχοντα

ἔνθεν ἔφυ τε καὶ ὥς μιν ἄγουσ’ ἐπέδησεν Ἀνάγκη

πείρατ’ ἔχειν ἄστρων.

You shall know the ethereal *phusis* and all the signs in

the ether and the invisible works of the pure torch of

the bright sun and whence they are born,

and you will learn the wandering works of the round moon

and its *phusis,* and you will know the surrounding sky also

from the place it is born and how also Necessity leading

bound it to hold the limits of the stars.

The Parmenides fragment suggests that the term *Phusis* connotes both the function (ἔργα) of the celestial bodies as well as their origins and the process by which they come into existence (ἔνθεν ἔφυ, cf. Nilles 1989, 368 n. 8). This leads Nilles also to compare the fragment to *Odyssey* 10.302-6, where Hermes shows the *Phusis* of moly to Odysseus:

ὣς ἄρα φωνήσας πόρε φάρμακον Ἀργεϊφόντης

ἐκ γαίης ἐρύσας καί μοι φύσιν αὐτοῦ ἔδειξε.

ῥίζῃ μὲν μέλαν ἔσκε, γάλακτι δὲ εἴκελον ἄνθος·

μῶλυ δέ μιν καλέουσι θεοί, χαλεπὸν δέ τ’ ὀρύσσειν

ἀνδράσι γε θνητοῖσι· θεοὶ δέ τε πάντα δύνανται.

Having spoken thus, the slayer of Argos brought the *pharmakon*

After digging it from the earth and he showed its *phusis* to me.

While black in root, its flower was like milk;

And Gods call it moly, but it is difficult to dig up

For mortal men, at least, but the gods are all powerful.

Nilles maintains that the *Odyssey* passage shows the connotation of *phusis* with a thing’s constitution and function, but the *Odyssey* passage also brings out another important aspect of *phusis*.

In his fr. 8, Empedocles says *phusis* does not belong to any mortal, and the *Odyssey* passage is, in effect, saying the same thing from a different angle. Strauss Clay’s reading of the passage emphasizes how the *phusis* of the moly plant, under normal circumstances, lies outside the reach of mortals (1972, 129-31). Odysseus relates how the roots of the Moly plant, a plant for which only the gods have a name, can only be seen by the gods, since Men cannot dig up the plant. This suggests to me that *phusis* not only connotes the whole constitution of the plant, i.e. both its flower and its roots, but also that pride of place is given to the roots, the origins of the plant, since these are what lie beyond Odysseus’ reach, not the flower. Hermes, therefore, is required to show the

roots, the true *phusis* of the plant. If this interpretation is correct, then it is possible to view the *Odyssey* passage as the precedent for Empedocles' use of the term "root" for his four elements.[116]

The problem, however, is that the *Odyssey* passage complicates the Empedoclean passage more than solves it, but the complications are themselves informative. If *phusis* refers to a thing's constitution and origin, then how does it make sense to say that a mortal does not possess *phusis*? Could we not claim that the elements *are* the *phusis* of mortals? This leads to yet another complication: if mortals have no *phusis*, does this imply that the elements—the only immortal beings in Empedocles' universe—do have a *phusis*?

We remain at a loss in answering these questions unless Aristotle's interpretation of Empedoclean *phusis*, as 'stable nature' or '*ousia*,' is correct (cf. Owen 1976, 93-94), but this solution produces its own problems. If Empedocles means that mortals have no stable nature or no *ousia*, then why does he contrast *phusis* with *thanatos*? Birth and death remain a more natural opposition and are better corroborated by Empedocles cosmological theories, according to which things do *come to be*—not absolutely, but apparently so—by the combination of elements. The core of Owen's argument for understanding *Phusis* as Aristotelian *Ousia* is his observation that Empedocles does not deny birth to mortals, but only Phusis. I, however, think Owen is wrong about this. Fr. 9, quoted below, specifically questions the accuracy of the verb γενέσθαι, just as Parmenides had in the fragments quoted above (Owen 1976, 90 and 100). The meanings of these terms are not themselves stable during Empedocles' poem. The discomfort we feel with either

[116] This observation is not at the expense of the relevance to Empedocles of the roots in Tartaros from Hesiod's *Theogony* (727-28: αὐτὰρ ὕπερθε | γῆς ῥίζαι πεφύασι καὶ ἀτρυγέτοιο θαλάσσης).

interpretive angle (*phusis* as *ousia* vs. *phusis* as *genesis*) is perhaps illustrative of Empedocles' main point: the failure of mortal language to faithfully represent reality.

Comparison of fr. 8 with the rest of the fragments in our group (9, 11, 15) reinforce the notion that Empedocles main target are mortal theories about *coming to be.* Like fr. 8, in fr. 9 Empedocles claims it is not *themis* to call mixture and separation birth and death, respectively, but that he himself assents to the convention:

> οἱ δ' ὅτε μὲν κατὰ φῶτα μιγέντ' εἰς αἰθέρ' ἵκωνται
>
> ἢ κατὰ θηρῶν ἀγροτέρων γένος ἢ κατὰ θάμνων
>
> ἠὲ κατ' οἰωνῶν, τότε μὲν τὸ λέγουσι γενέσθαι,
>
> εὖτε δ' ἀποκρινθῶσι, τὸ δ' αὖ δυσδαίμονα πότμον·
>
> ἣ θέμις οὐ καλέουσι, νόμωι δ' ἐπίφημι καὶ αὐτός.
>
> And whenever they arrive into the ether, mixed into men
>
> Or into the breed of wild beasts or the breed of fish
>
> Or of birds, then they call it birth,
>
> But when they are separated, in turn they call this ill-fated death,
>
> What they call it is not right, but even I assent to the convention myself.

In the first line, Empedocles identifies mixture with birth, since once mixed, the creatures "arrive into the air." To explain the phrase "into the air" as a stand in for being born, Wright helpfully relates Empedocles' theory that the fetus takes its first breath at birth (cf. Aetius 4.22.1; 5.15.3).

Empedocles also draws upon the connection between γένος and γενέσθαι, illustrating our constant reliance on genealogical terms while implying their inaccuracy. Nevertheless, Empedocles admits to the use of inaccurate language himself, as it is to a certain extent unavoidable. We can at this point look back at fr. 8, and perhaps use Empedocles' point about the limitations of human language to help resolve some of the issues there. That is, perhaps it is too strict to say that mortals have *no phusis,* but instead we could say that *phusis,* as it is normally understood by mortals needs adjustment. The message of fr. 9 also invites comparison with the role *Doxa* has in Parmenides. As I argued last chapter, the *Doxa* does not represent a facetious exercise amounting to a collection of false theories. Instead, the *Doxa* represent the cosmos within the limits of the epistemic situation of mortals, since mortals are unable to fully achieve a god's eye view of nature. We can also recall Parmenides' own frequent recourse to genealogical terminology when attempting to describe his divine Being.

Empedocles continues his critique of mortal opinions in fr. 11, where he calls those who expect something to be born from nothing "fools":

> νήπιοι· οὐ γάρ σφιν δολιχόφρονές εἰσι μέριμναι,
>
> οἳ δὴ γίγνεσθαι πάρος οὐκ ἐὸν ἐλπίζουσιν
>
> ἤ τι καταθνήισκειν τε καὶ ἐξόλλυσθαι ἀπάντηι.

> Fools! For their thoughts are not far-reaching,
>
> Who expect something not existing before to be born
>
> Or that when something dies it is also completely destroyed.

We can wonder who, exactly, Empedocles is referring to as fools, but whoever they are, their belief in birth is central to their folly. In the last fragment of this series, however, it seems Empedocles ups the ante, claiming that even "life" is an inaccurate term since men exist, in some sense, both before and after what they perceive as their lifetime (fr. 15):

οὐκ ἂν ἀνὴρ τοιαῦτα σοφὸς φρεσὶ μαντεύσαιτο,

ὡς ὄφρα μέν τε βιῶσι, τὸ δὴ βίοτον καλέουσι,

τόφρα μὲν οὖν εἰσίν, καί σφιν πάρα δειλὰ καὶ ἐσθλά,

πρὶν δὲ πάγεν τε βροτοὶ καὶ ἐπεὶ λύθεν, οὐδὲν ἄρ' εἰσιν.

A wise man would not divine such things with this *phrenes*:

That while they live what they indeed call "life,"

Only for that time do they exist, and have a share of good and bad things,

But that before they are formed and after they are dissolved, they do not exist.

A human life, whose limits are usually defined by birth and death—terms Empedocles has already thrown into question—is shown to be insignificant. "Birth" and "death," here described by verbs (πάγεν; λύθεν), are not actual limits to a human's existence, since all the human's parts have a greater duration than the human. The parts prexisted and shall remain afterwards.

All four of these fragments are similar in theme, and their generality gives them a programmatic flavor. Instead of describing *mixis* and separation in detail, each identifies the genealogical perspective with the mortal point of view. More importantly, these fragments argue

for Empedocles' theories at the expense of traditional genealogical models: since humans come into being and dissolve through the combination and dissolution of the four elements, absolute birth and utter destruction are impossible.

I leave open the possibility that Empedocles' poem did not have a neat division like Parmenides' poem; one part leading to a second after an introduction (although it is true that the *Physika* is supposed to have three books). Nevertheless, the mortal views criticized in frr. 8, 9, 11, and 15 are opposed to a divine perspective given elsewhere in the poem.

Empedocles' invocations to Muses attest to the divine status of the poet and contrast his message with view of mortals. For instance, Empedocles fr. 131 reminds us that mortals are the beneficiaries of what is revealed:

> εἰ γὰρ ἐφημερίων ἕνεκέν τινος, ἄμβροτε Μοῦσα,
>
> ἡμετέρας μελέτας <ἅδε τοι> διὰ φροντίδος ἐλθεῖν,[117]
>
> εὐχομένωι νῦν αὖτε παρίστασο, Καλλιόπεια,
>
> ἀμφὶ θεῶν μακάρων ἀγαθὸν λόγον ἐμφαίνοντι.
>
> For if for the sake of the ephemerals, immortal Muse,
>
> It pleased you to have our concerns pass through your *phrontis*,
>
> Be present now again for one praying, Kalliopeia,
>
> Reveal a noble account about blessed gods.

[117] ἅδε τοι is Wilamowitz's conjecture.

Empedocles prays to the Muse hoping she will entertain his mortal concerns again, but this time the subject is an *agathos logos* about the blessed gods. There has been some debate about αὖτε in the third line. Diels argued that the "again" implies that this invocation belongs to his second poem, the *Katharmoi;* Empedocles refers to an earlier time when he invoked the Muse. If the fragment marks two separate occasions and works, then it also seems to differentiate between their contents. That is, the earlier poem was "for the sake of one of the *ephemerioi,"* while the ensuing poem to which this fragment belongs shall be the *"agathos logos* about the blessed gods." I, however, will argue that reading the two-poem view into fragment 131 is overly simple based on other fragments similar in theme. For example, it is not clear that an account "for the sake of *ephemerioi*" could not also be about the gods.

Empedocles' theories, if nothing else, complicate the traditional divide between humans and gods. To show this, it is worthwhile to compare the above fr. 131 with Empedocles' other invocation fragment, fr.3, since the two fragments have much in common:

ἀλλὰ θεοὶ τῶν μὲν μανίην ἀποτρέψατε γλώσσης,

ἐκ δ' ὁσίων στομάτων καθαρὴν ὀχετεύσατε πηγήν

καὶ σέ, πολυμνήστη λευκώλενε παρθένε Μοῦσα,

ἄντομαι, ὧν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐφημερίοισιν ἀκούειν,

πέμπε παρ' Εὐσεβίης ἐλάουσ' εὐήνιον ἅρμα.

μηδέ σέ γ' εὐδόξοιο βιήσεται ἄνθεα τιμῆς

πρὸς θνητῶν ἀνελέσθαι, ἐφ' ὧι θ' ὁσίης πλέον εἰπεῖν

θάρσει—καὶ τότε δὴ σοφίης ἐπ’ ἄκροισι θοάζε.[118]

ἀλλ’ ἄγ’ ἄθρει πάσηι παλάμηι, πῆι δῆλον ἕκαστον,

μήτε τιν’ ὄψιν ἔχων πίστει πλέον ἢ κατ’ ἀκουήν

ἢ ἀκοὴν ἐρίδουπον ὑπὲρ τρανώματα γλώσσης,

μήτε τι τῶν ἄλλων, ὁπόσηι πόρος ἐστὶ νοῆσαι,

γυίων πίστιν ἕρυκε, νόει δ’ ἦι δῆλον ἕκαστον.

But gods turn away the madness of those men from my tongue,

And channel a pure stream from holy mouths,

And you, much-wooed, white-armed maiden Muse,

I beseech you, send things right for ephemerals to hear

Driving a well-built chariot from the house of Reverence.

Don’t be forced to take the flowers of well-reputed honor

From mortals to say more than what is holy.

Take courage! And dispatch these things to the peaks of wisdom.

But come consider by every device by which each thing is clear

Not holding any sight greater in trust than what’s heard in report,

[118] Following Trépanier 2004, 64-65.

Nor hold a resounding report over the clarities of the tongue,

Nor anything greater than others, by however much there is passage to understanding.

And don't curb the trust in your limbs, but understand each thing in the way it is clear.

At the beginning of fragment 3, Empedocles asked the Muse to turn away the madness of "those men", instead hoping for a "pure stream to flow from holy mouths." Empedocles requests that his song be *themis* for mortals to hear, which connects to the other invocation's reference to a song "for the sake of mortals." The religious language is amplified by the occurrence both of *hosios* and *eusebeia* as descriptors of his song. Empedocles seems again to argue for distance from ordinary mortal points of view.

At the end of the fragment, however, Empedocles introduces complications. In the previous invocation, Empedocles asked the Muse to reveal an 'agathos logos' to mortals, a logos one could fairly label as divine, but here Empedocles appears to request that the Muse temper her divine message. Empedocles asks her to not accept the flowers of honor from mortals so that she might say more than what is holy, as if to imply both that something the Muse could reveal is even *too* divine a message for his audience and that mortal honors could possibly elicit such revelations. If this reading is correct, then the lines which discuss the proper use of the senses suggest that the message of the poem has an empirical basis, thereby moving us back into the sphere of mortal perspective, but it is a mortal perspective of a specific kind, different from the 'madness' of other mortals. Furthermore, the negative valence given to 'mortal honors' finds a marked contrast with the fragment traditionally labeled as the proem to the *Katharmoi* (fr. 112).

There Empedocles presents himself as decorated in honors like the ones he requests his Muse to ignore. Empedocles' honors furthermore serve to prove how his audience view him as a god:

ὦ φίλοι, οἳ μέγα ἄστυ κατὰ ξανθοῦ Ἀκράγαντος

ναίετ' ἀν' ἄκρα πόλεος, ἀγαθῶν μελεδήμονες ἔργων,

ξείνων αἰδοῖοι λιμένες, κακότητος ἄπειροι,

χαίρετ'· ἐγὼ δ' ὑμῖν θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητός

πωλεῦμαι μετὰ πᾶσι τετιμένος, ὥσπερ ἔοικα,

ταινίαις τε περίστεπτος στέφεσίν τε θαλείοις.

τοῖσιν ἅμ' ἂν ἵκωμαι ἄστεα τηλεθάοντα,

ἀνδράσιν ἠδὲ γυναιξί, σεβίζομαι· οἱ δ' ἅμ' ἕπονται

μυρίοι ἐξερέοντες, ὅπηι πρὸς κέρδος ἀταρπός,

οἱ μὲν μαντοσυνέων κεχρημένοι, οἱ δ' ἐπὶ νούσων

παντοίων ἐπύθοντο κλυεῖν εὐηκέα βάξιν,

δηρὸν δὴ χαλεπῆισι πεπαρμένοι <ἀμφ' ὀδύνηισιν>.

Oh, friends who dwell in the great town of yellow Akragas

Upon the heights of the city, concerned with good deeds,

Modest harbors of strangers, inexperienced in wickedness,

Hello! I go honored among all, to you an immortal god,

No longer mortal, as it seems,

Crowned with ribbons and blooming garlands,

And as soon as I arrive in blooming towns by all

I am revered, by men and by women. And they follow at once

In ten thousands, asking where is the path to profit,

Some needing divination, others desire

To hear a healing oracle for all sorts of diseases,

For a long time pierced all around by harsh pains.

The tension between the honor in fr. 112 and fr. 3 suggests a change in perspective, or at the very least the crucial difference between two perspectives. In the simplest form, there is a difference between the divine message of the poem, revealed by the Muse, and the mortal view that things are born and die, which Empedocles' theories show to be false. Yet, as suggested above, the honors Empedocles accepts, viewed like a god by other mortals, are honors he requests his Muse to reject. Furthermore, although looked upon as a god, it is not the case that Empedocles is immortal—the way mortals see him is not fully accurate. Nevertheless, there is a faint suggestion that the mortal view is not to be thrown out entirely and even that divine revelations need to be tempered and specially tailored for mortal senses. We are therefore left with the suggestion that, as in Parmenides' poem, mortal *doxai* play an important role, but unlike in Parmenides' poem, they are not neatly partitioned in their own half, but reappear continually throughout Empedocles' work to resolve the formerly vast differences between gods and men.

Conclusion to Part One.

Empedocles' fr. 17 is often considered the most important for its length and its contents, describing in abstract the process of the cosmic cycle. It tells of how the four "roots," earth, air, fire, and water, move about and combine through the workings of "love" (Φιλότης), and separate thanks to strife (Νεῖκος); the elements' combination and separation explains how things are generated and destroyed in the cosmos. At one point in the fragment, Empedocles divulges how we are supposed to *see* the force of love (17.21-29):

> τὴν [sc. φιλότης] σὺ νόωι δέρκευ, μηδ' ὄμμασιν ἦσο τεθηπώς·
>
> ἥτις καὶ θνητοῖσι νομίζεται ἔμφυτος ἄρθροις,
>
> τῆι τε φίλα φρονέουσι καὶ ἄρθμια ἔργα τελοῦσι,
>
> Γηθοσύνην καλέοντες ἐπώνυμον ἠδ' Ἀφροδίτην·
>
> τὴν οὔ τις μετὰ τοῖσιν ἐλισσομένην δεδάηκε
>
> θνητὸς ἀνήρ· σὺ δ' ἄκουε λόγου στόλον οὐκ ἀπατηλόν.
>
> ταῦτα γὰρ ἶσά τε πάντα καὶ ἥλικα γένναν ἔασι,
>
> τιμῆς δ' ἄλλης ἄλλο μέδει, πάρα δ' ἦθος ἑκάστωι,
>
> ἐν δὲ μέρει κρατέουσι περιπλομένοιο χρόνοιο.

> Look at her with your *noos,* and do not sit stunned by the sight
>
> She even is thought to be innate in mortal joints,
>
> And by her they think dear thoughts and accomplish harmonious works,

Calling her by the names “Joy” and “Aphrodite,”

She who not one mortal man has perceived swirling

among them, but hear the not deceitful order of my account.

For these things are all equal and the same age in birth,

And each is mindful of a different honor, and each has a character,

And they rule in turn as time moves around.

In fr. 3, Empedocles commanded that we not hold any of our senses in greater favor than any other, but his instructions here suggest that only by our *noos* can we perceive love. Yet, it is *innate* in mortal bodies, which must mean it is felt in our bodies, and these feelings seem to cause us to think, feel, and do many different activities, all of which have some resemblance to love. To Empedocles, one cosmic force, φιλότης, is responsible for a whole host of phenomena, but mortals give many names to the feelings and activities that result from φιλότης, here Joy and Aphrodite. The mere names, although possibly inaccurate, are products of the same deeper reality Empedocles claims to divulge. At the conclusion of the passage, we are told that all of Empedocles’ cosmic principles are equal in birth, concerned with their own *timê*, and rule in their turn. The concepts birth, *timê*, and ruling are specific borrowings from theogonic poetry. Empedocles is arguably assenting to the use of conventional terms here, as he admitted in fr. 9. Note also that, as it was implied earlier that only these principles had a *Phusis* (cf. 17.22: ἔμφυτος), here it is also implied that they have a birth *even though they are in fact ungenerated* (cf. 134: ἀγένητα).

III. Part Two: Genealogy in Empedocles.

For the conclusion to this chapter, I would like to show a more basic and fundamental aspect of Empedocles' use of genealogical motifs, namely Empedocles' use of catalogues (frr. 121-123). In the previous chapter, we saw how Parmenides also used catalogues according to the testimony of Cicero. Now, Empedocles' adoption of the catalogue form gives explicit confirmation to the continuity of tradition which exists between the divine genealogies of Hesiod, Parmenides' *Doxa,* and Empedocles' *Peri Phuseôs* (fr. 121):

…ἀτερπέα χῶρον,

ἔνθα Φόνος τε Κότος τε καὶ ἄλλων ἔθνεα Κηρῶν

αὐχμηραί τε Νόσοι καὶ Σήψιες ἔργα τε ῥευστά

Ἄτης ἀν λειμῶνα κατὰ σκότος ἠλάσκουσιν.

…a joyless place,

There murder, grudge, and tribes of other dooms

Squalid diseases, rots, and fluctuating works

Wander in darkness on the plain of moral blindness.

The most widely-accepted interpretation of this fragment is that it describes the setting for the exile of Empedocles' *daimon*¸ our world, in terms reminiscent of the Homeric, Hesiodic and Orphic pictures of the underworld (Diels 1901, *ad loc.* cf. KRS, 315-317; Wright 1981, *ad loc.;* Trépanier 2017, 147-48). This interpretation is based on the comments of Hierocles, a Neoplatonist whose own reading of this fragment alludes openly to Plato's *Phaedrus* (*in Carmen Aureum* 24.3). Hierocles, furthermore, calls Empedocles ὁ Πυθαγόρειος and reports that in Empedocles "man" (ὁ ἄνθρωπος), in general, is an exile from the gods who has "shed his wings"

(τῆς πτεροῤῥυήσεως) and desires to leave behind the 'meadow of *Atê*' in order to regain the 'meadow of truth.' Hierocles reading of the fragment seems to be an imprecise mixture of Pythagorean, Orphic, Platonic and Empedoclean motifs. Rather than tease out these details, however, I just want to emphasize what is obvious about Empedocles' fr. 121. First, there does not seem to be any genealogical relationship between these characters in Empedocles, although they are, listed in catalogue form like in a divine genealogy. Furthermore, many also appear in the longer Hesiodic catalogue containing the children of Night and Eris (cf. *Th.* 211: Κῆρα; 217: Κῆρας; 228: Φόνους; 230: Ἄτην, cf. Schwabl 1970, 288-89). *Kotos,* furthermore, may be compared with the earlier appearing Hundred-hander, *Kottos* (*Th.* 149). Empedocles' use of the catalogue form in general, and reference to Hesiod's catalogue of Night in particular, makes a retrospective point about Presocratic cosmological inquiry, synthesizing anti-genealogical perspectives, like those of Parmenides, with traditionally genealogical content, like the Hesiodic catalogue.

The synthesis of genealogical tradition and anti-genealogical cosmology plays out in Empedocles' other catalogue fragments as well. For instance, frr. 122-23 contain lists of pairs of opposites:

> ἔνθ' ἦσαν Χθονίη τε καὶ Ἠλιόπη ταναῶπις,
>
> Δῆρίς θ' αἱματόεσσα καὶ Ἁρμονίη θεμερῶπις,
>
> Καλλιστώ τ' Αἰσχρή τε, Θόωσά τε Δηναίη τε,
>
> Νημερτής τ' ἐρόεσσα μελάγκουρός τ' Ἀσάφεια.
>
> Earth and far-seeing Sun were there,

And bloody Battle and solemn-faced Harmony,

Beauty also and Ugliness, Swiftness and Slowness also,

And lovely Truth and blind Obscurity.

Φυσώ τε Φθιμένη τε, καὶ Εὐναίη καὶ Ἔγερσις,

Κινώ τ’ Ἀστεμφής τε, πολυστέφανός τε Μεγιστώ

καὶ Φορύη, Σωπή τε καὶ Ὀμφαίη

Growth and Destruction also, both Rest and Motion,

Movement and Security too, both many-garlanded Greatness

And Defilement (?), Silence and Prophecy.

As is often noted, this catalogue contains only female figures; given the presence of Νημερτής, Empedocles seems to follow the catalogue of Nereids as a model. Since this list is arranged as pairs of opposites, Empedocles also seems to follow his immediate predecessor Parmenides, whose *Doxa* features a cosmos populated by pairs of opposites. Although presence of opposites suggests the diversity under Strife’s influence, the members remain unified as one gender. Furthermore, the catalogue is supposed to belong to a specific time and place in the movement of the cycle (ἔνθ’). We can therefore ask where these figures appeared in relation to Empedocles’ zoogonies and anthropogony.

Our probing these catalogues would stop short if these fragments simply belonged to the “religious” poem, the *Katharmoi.* In that case, we could assume these are just lists of goddesses,

but there would be no need to explain them in terms of elemental theories in the *Peri phuseos*. Under the one poem view, however, it is necessary to ask how these *dunameis* come to be from the combination of elements. It is telling that Plutarch has singled out only one of these pairs of forces as representing Love and Strife themselves (*de Is. et Os.* 370d), while the rest of the catalogue seems to contain other abstract forces whose existence is difficult for us to fully comprehend in Empedoclean terms. More complicated still, only some of these abstracts could describe physical processes, while some are evaluative terms, such as beauty, ugliness, truth, and obscurity. Some even presuppose speech, such as prophecy. Do such terms presuppose the existence of other humans or gods, or were they necessary predecessors to corresponding linguistic practices? The fragmentary nature of the poem(s) bars us from knowing with certainty. It is, however, clear, that the Empedoclean catalogues bear a resemblance to Hesiod's catalogue of Night from the *Theogony.* Furthermore, like Hesiod's catalogue of Night, many of the concepts mentioned in Empedocles' catalogues are more relevant to humans than the gods.

Some commentators think that figures of frr. 122-23 are also meant to describe what Empedocles' *daimon* sees in exile, the catalogue of dooms quoted above (fr. 121). Inwood, for instance, places these figures not only after the anthropogony and zoogony, but also after the catalogue of dooms, as if they were a continuation the *daimon's* experience. But could they not otherwise be necessary characteristics of human life? In which case, the catalogues might show some relationship to Empedocles' anthropogony. These questions lead us again to the issue of priority and its relationship to genealogy, a problem we raised also in our dealings with Chaos and its relationship to the other divine genealogies of Hesiod's *Theogony.* Notably, in whatever way we resolve *that* issue, it is still not immediately clear how Empedocles' *physical* theories could lead to an explanation of such abstract terms.

We are given no clue as to how these figures came to be. Were they built by Aphrodite out of the elements? Were they born from some other figure and so is this catalogue a genealogy? I do not pretend to know the answers, but these lists very closely resemble earlier genealogical catalogues within the framework of poems that attempt to change the way we think about genealogical production. Both Parmenides and Empedocles are illustrating the connection between the enumeration of genealogical sequences, lists of related terms, and questions of emergence, as in how things come to be and what they are made of. In Empedocles' and Parmenides' poems, the co-presence of divine catalogues as well as theories about the beginnings of the cosmos arguably culminates in the view that one cannot fabricate genealogical lists nor even discern the *archai* of things without also understanding the inner-workings of the processes of procreation, as emerges in their embryological theories.

Ch.5: From Genealogy to Embryology: Zooming in on the problem.

Chapters three and four argued that the poems of Parmenides and Empedocles have an anti-genealogical message, but still make use of many genealogical motifs. Parmenides denied the possibility of birth, but he still gives a cosmogonic theory based on the mixing male and female principles. Empedocles also used a theory of mixture and separation, but he used it to show how birth and death were mere conventional terms for the same processes.

The theories of both Parmenides and Empedocles proceed from the assumption that the macrocosm and microcosm resemble one another.[119] One can see a resemblance, for instance, between Parmenides' cosmogony and his embryology, since corresponding pairs of opposites interact to generate both the cosmos and an embryo in similar ways (as discussed in my third chapter).

The cosmogonies of all early Greek philosophers make frequent use of what Lloyd calls "vitalist analogies."[120] In sum, the vitalist analogy views the cosmos as a living organism and uses biological imagery and theories to describe or even infer what happens on a cosmic scale (cf. Lloyd 1992, 233). To give a brief example, Aristotle attributes this sort of analogical thinking to Thales for the claim that the *archê* was water (*Met.* A3 983b22-27):

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[119] Lincoln called correspondences between macrocosm and microcosm "homologies" (1989) and argued for their Eastern origins (2001). On the macrocosm/microcosm correspondence in the medical writers, see Schluderer 2018; Bartoš 2014, 546 (cf. Hippocratic *De Victu*, 1.10, stating that fire made man an imitation of the whole).

[120] "Vitalist analogy" is terminology borrowed from Lloyd (1992). Lloyd discusses three analogies, Vitalist, Craft, and Political (1992, 172-420). On the history of the vitalist analogy beginning with Anaximander, see 1992, 232-72. For Hesiod, see pp.203-5 (1992). See Osborne 2006 against the view that Parmenides marks any significant turning point in the history of Presocratic philosophy.

> …λαβὼν ἴσως τὴν ὑπόληψιν ταύτην ἐκ τοῦ πάντων ὁρᾶν τὴν τροφὴν ὑγρὰν οὖσαν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸν ἐκ τούτου γιγνόμενον καὶ τούτῳ ζῶν (τὸ δ' ἐξ οὗ γίγνεται, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ πάντων)—διά τε δὴ τοῦτο τὴν ὑπόληψιν λαβὼν ταύτην καὶ διὰ τὸ πάντων τὰ σπέρματα τὴν φύσιν ὑγρὰν ἔχειν, τὸ δ' ὕδωρ ἀρχὴν τῆς φύσεως εἶναι τοῖς ὑγροῖς.

> …making this assumption perhaps from seeing that the nourishment of all things is moist and that the warm itself comes to be from this and lives by this (the thing from which it comes to be is the *archê* of all things), making this assumption both on account of this and on account of seeds of all things having a moist nature, and moist things have water as their *archê.*

According to Aristotle, Thales concludes something about the macrocosm through his observations about living things on a microcosmic scale. If Aristotle is correct, then Thales assumed that what applies to the generation and growth of living things also applied to the generation and growth of the cosmos from its absolute beginnings.

In this chapter, I argue that the interaction between embryology and genealogy we see in Parmenides and Empedocles began with Hesiod and Anaximander and continued throughout early Greek Philosophy. This suggests that the Greeks thought that embryology and genealogy informed one another: a solution to an embryological problem could help solve a genealogical problem, and vice versa. To show this, I focus on the processes of mixture and separation and the role they play in embryological processes as described by medical writers.[121] Then I turn to

[121] See Lesky 1951 on ancient embryology.

similar examples in both Hesiod and Anaximander.[122] With this continuity established, I conclude the chapter with a developmental hypothesis about the progression of Archaic Greek thought. It is my view that the once pervasive use of vitalist analogies, as found in genealogical cosmology, was challenged by Parmenides.[123] Afterwards Empedocles made the opposition between craft analogies and the genealogical model explicit. Scholars have noted Empedocles' frequent use of craft analogies and even suggest that Aphrodite might play the role of divine Demiurge, prefiguring the demiurge of Plato's Timaeus.[124] I argue that Aphrodite is not a fully-fledged demiurge in Empedocles; her demiurge status is precluded by the role played by fortune and chance in Empedoclean zoogony. Nevertheless, Empedocles refigures Aphrodite as a craftsman to illustrate how mixture and separation are central to his embryological and cosmological theories.

I would like to begin with the phenomenon of separation in Anaximander since it has attracted the attention of Baldry (1962) and Kahn (1960). The focus of these discussions has been Anaximander A10 (Diels-Kranz, my trans.):

> μεθ' ὃν Ἀναξίμανδρον Θάλητος ἑταῖρον γενόμενον τὸ ἄπειρον φάναι τὴν πᾶσαν αἰτίαν ἔχειν τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεώς τε καὶ φθορᾶς, ἐξ οὗ δή φησι τούς τε οὐρανοὺς ἀποκεκρίσθαι καὶ καθόλου τοὺς ἅπαντας ἀπείρους ὄντας κόσμους. ἀπεφήνατο δὲ τὴν φθορὰν γίνεσθαι καὶ πολὺ πρότερον τὴν γένεσιν ἐξ ἀπείρου

[122] As far as I know, there is no work addressing embryological assumptions of the Hesiodic corpus, despite the many birth scenes that occur during his genealogical poems. Many scholars, however, discuss embryological analogies in Anaximander and the other Presocratics (See esp. Baldry 1932 and Wilford 1968).

[123] See Osborne 2006 against the view that Parmenides marks any significant turning point in the history of Presocratic philosophy.

[124] For the embryological background of the *Timaeus,* see Wilberding 2015. On the view that Aphrodite anticipates Plato's demiurge, see Andolfi 2016, 3, *pace* Solmsen 1963.

αἰῶνος ἀνακυκλουμένων πάντων αὐτῶν. ὑπάρχειν δέ φησι τῶι μὲν σχήματι τὴν γῆν κυλινδροειδῆ, ἔχειν δὲ τοσοῦτον βάθος ὅσον ἂν εἴη τρίτον πρὸς τὸ πλάτος. φησὶ δὲ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀιδίου γόνιμον θερμοῦ τε καὶ ψυχροῦ κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου ἀποκριθῆναι καί τινα ἐκ τούτου φλογὸς σφαῖραν περιφυῆναι τῶι περὶ τὴν γῆν ἀέρι ὡς τῶι δένδρωι φλοιόν· ἦστινος ἀπορραγείσης καὶ εἴς τινας ἀποκλεισθείσης κύκλους ὑποστῆναι τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας. ἔτι φησίν, ὅτι κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς ἐξ ἀλλοειδῶν ζώιων ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐγεννήθη, ἐκ τοῦ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα δι᾽ ἑαυτῶν ταχὺ νέμεσθαι, μόνον δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον πολυχρονίου δεῖσθαι τιθηνήσεως· διὸ καὶ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς οὐκ ἄν ποτε τοιοῦτον ὄντα διασωθῆναι.

After him [sc. Thales] Anaximander, having been a companion of Thales, said that the unlimited is the absolute cause of the birth and destruction of the whole, from which he says the heavenly bodies separated off and in general all the cosmoi, being unlimited. And he said that destruction and much earlier birth come out of an unlimited age, with all these revolving around. And he says that the earth is cylindrical in shape and has a depth equal to a third of its breadth. And he says that the seed, out of the everlasting, of both hot and cold, at birth separated out of this cosmos and that a sphere of flame from this grew around the air surrounding the earth like bark around a tree. When this was broken off and enclosed into some circles, the sun and the moon and the stars were conceived. Yet he says that in the beginning the human was born from different animals, because the rest of animals swiftly feed themselves of their own accord, but only the human requires protracted nursing. Wherefore even in the beginning such a thing could not have ever survived.

Baldry emphasizes the verb ἀποκριθῆναι and points to parallels in medical writers showing that separation is an embryological analogy (1962, 28-29; cf. Heidel 1913, 688). For example, the Hippocratic treatise Περὶ Γονῆς begins (1.1): "the seed of the man comes from all the moisture in his body separated in the strongest way" (ἡ δὲ γονὴ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἔρχεται ἀπὸ παντὸς τοῦ ὑγροῦ τοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι ἐόντος τὸ ἰσχυρότατον ἀποκριθέν). I would also argue that the term τὸ ἰσχυρότατον shows that somehow the reproductive act of separation has the connotation of violence. The violent connotation is corroborated by fragments of Democritus, describing sexual reproduction as "a small apoplexy" (ἀποπληξίη σμικρή); humans are "torn away" (ἀποσπᾶται) and "separated" (μεριζόμενος) from other humans by a "blow" (πληγῆι, DK 68 B 32). Testimonia suggest that parallels could have been in Parmenides' poem (cf. ὁ γόνος ἀποκριθῇ, Aëtius 4.11). Finally, the role Strife plays in Empedocles is also comparable (cf. [sc. σπέρμα] διέσπασται, fr. 63; Empedocles will be discussed more below).

The question I would like to pose is whether similar embryological views might have shaped the birth scene of Aphrodite in Hesiod's *Theogony*. I think they did for the simple fact that there are violent separations occuring in and around the reproductive scene (*Th*. 178-92):

> ὁ δ' ἐκ λοχέοιο πάις ὠρέξατο χειρὶ
>
> σκαιῇ, δεξιτερῇ δὲ πελώριον ἔλλαβεν ἅρπην,
>
> μακρὴν καρχαρόδοντα, φίλου δ' ἀπὸ μήδεα πατρὸς
>
> ἐσσυμένως ἤμησε, πάλιν δ' ἔρριψε φέρεσθαι
>
> ἐξοπίσω. τὰ μὲν οὔ τι ἐτώσια ἔκφυγε χειρός·
>
> ὅσσαι γὰρ ῥαθάμιγγες ἀπέσσυθεν αἱματόεσσαι,

πάσας δέξατο Γαῖα· περιπλομένων δ’ ἐνιαυτῶν

γείνατ’ Ἐρινῦς τε κρατερὰς μεγάλους τε Γίγαντας,

τεύχεσι λαμπομένους, δολίχ’ ἔγχεα χερσὶν ἔχοντας,

Νύμφας θ’ ἃς Μελίας καλέουσ’ ἐπ’ ἀπείρονα γαῖαν.

μήδεα δ’ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἀποτμήξας ἀδάμαντι

κάββαλ’ ἀπ’ ἠπείροιο πολυκλύστῳ ἐνὶ πόντῳ,

ὣς φέρετ’ ἂμ πέλαγος πουλὺν χρόνον, ἀμφὶ δὲ λευκὸς

ἀφρὸς ἀπ’ ἀθανάτου χροὸς ὥρνυτο· τῷ δ’ ἔνι κούρη

ἐθρέφθη.

And the child reached out from his place of ambush with his left

Hand and he took the mighty sickle in his right,

And impetuously he reaped off the genitals of

His own father, and threw them back to fall

Behind him, truly not to no purpose did they fall from his hand,

For as many as the bloody drops that flew off,

The earth received them all, and with the years revolving

She bore both the strong Erinyes and great Giants,

> Gleaming in their armor, holding long spears in their hands,
>
> And the Nymphs, whom they call Meliai on the boundless earth.
>
> And the genitals when first cut-off by adamant
>
> Fell from the land into the stormy sea,
>
> When the sea carried them along for much time, and around them white
>
> Foam arose from the immortal flesh. And in it a maiden
>
> Was congealed.

In the first place, the scene explains the "separation of sky and earth," a fundamental trope of cosmogonic narratives since before the *Theogony*.[125] In Hesiod, the separation is caused by Ouranos' castration, which results in cosmic births. It is anomalous that castration should be so productive (See Bonnafé 1985, 28-30). Nevertheless, there are similarities to be found between this act of primal violence and relatively more normal procreative processes, such as those mentioned above from Democritus', Parmenides', and Empedocles' theories about procreation. Even without resorting to psychological interpretations, whereby the male subconscious might view sexual reproduction as a sort of castration, there is continuity between vastly different authors in the male experience of reproduction: a part of the male is violently separated off from him.[126]

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[125] For a survey of this fundamental idea across cultures, see Seidenberg 1969, 1979, and 1983. For the influence of this idea on early Greek philosophy, see Cornford 1912, 67, and KRS 31-39. Cf. Seidenberg 1979, 188, and Euripides fr. 484 Nauck^2.

[126] Cf. Gemelli-Marciano 2005, 385. For an example of the psychological interpretation, see Caldwell 1989, 150-51.

The second process of separation in Aphrodite's birth scene is the process of "congealing." It is not immediately obvious why this should be considered separation, but parallels show this to be the case. In the abstract, conception begins with a mixture of a primarily wet substance that is hardened. The process of "hardening" is the separation of the wet from the dry, and it is also the articulation of a homogenous form into parts, seed separated into the distinct shape of an embryo and then into a fetus with limbs.

In the case of Ouranos' castration, mixture happens in two places, once when the genitals fall to the sea and produce foam and another when the blood mixes with the earth to produce the Erinyes, Nymphs, and Giants.

The role of blood and foam (sc. semen) anticipates the hematological theories of the source of semen found throughout many later medical writers (cf. Lesky 1951, 120-93). For instance, Diogenes of Apollonia describes the source of semen (DK 64 A 24):

> τινὲς δὲ καὶ τὸ σπέρμα τοῦ ζώιου ἀφρὸν εἶναι τοῦ αἵματος κατ' οὐσίαν ὑποτίθενται, ὃ δὴ τῆι ἐμφύτωι τοῦ ἄρρενος θέρμηι παρὰ τὰς συμπλοκὰς ἐκταραχθὲν ἐκριπιζόμενον ἐξαφροῦται κἀν ταῖς σπερματίσιν παρατίθεται φλεψίν· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ὁ Ἀπολλ. Δ. τὰ ἀφροδίσια κεκλῆσθαι βούλεται.
>
> And some suppose even that the sperm of the animal is the foam of the blood in its substance, which, stirred up by intercourse, roused by the natural heat of the male becomes foam and is deposited in spermatic vessels. From this, Diogenes of Apollonia wishes to call them 'Sacred to Aphrodite.'

At the very least, the details of Ouranos' castration seem compatible with the hematological theory found in later writers (cf. West 1966, *ad* line 183). It is possible that some version of this view informed the composition of this scene.

The verb ἐθρέφθη is also important. As Demont (1978) has demonstrated, the original meaning of τρέφω was not to 'nourish,' as it is often translated, but to 'thicken' or 'congeal'. The verb frequently describes the curdling of milk to make cheese, as at *Od.* 9.246, and so, along with πήγνυμι and συνίστημι, the verb suggests natural process by which the liquid semen is 'set' and hardened into a baby. We can see both verbs at work in a passage from *On Sterile Women* which graphically describes reasons why a seed (τὴν γονὴν) might fail "to set" or thicken and instead 'becomes serous' (διορρωθεῖσα) (*Sur les femmes steriles* Littre v.8 p.412):

> ἢν μὴ ὑγιηρὰ χωρέῃ τὰ καταμήνια, οἷα τῆς γυναικὸς μὴ ὑγυηρῆς ἐούσης, οὐδὲ οὕτω κυΐσκεται· οὐ γὰρ πήγνυται ὑπὸ τοῦ αἵματος νοσεροῦ ἐόντος, ἀλλὰ διορροῖ τὴν γονὴν τὸ αἷμα τὸ κατιὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος νοσερὸν ἐόν· διορρωθεῖσα δὲ ἡ γονὴ ἐξέρχεται ἔξω τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ ὀλίγῳ ἢ πολλῷ ξὺν ἰχῶρι. δὴλον δέ ἐστι τῷ σώματι τῆς γυναικὸς καὶ τοῖσι καταμηνίοισι· χωρήσει γὰρ τὰ καταμήνια αὐτῇ οἷα εἴρηται, ἤν τε χολώδης ἤν τε φλεγματώδης ἤν τε ὑδρωποειδὴς ἔῃ· ἐν ταχει δὲ μελεδανθεῖσα φορὸς γίνεται· ἢν δὲ μὴ, οὔ. ἢν δὲ γυναικὶ μὴ χωρέῃ τὰ καταμήνια πάμπαν ὑπὸ παθημάτων τῶν εἰρημένων, καὶ οὕτως οὐ ξυλλαμβάνει· αἱ γὰρ φλεβες τοῦ αἵματοςπλήρεις ἐοῦσαι τὴν γονὴν οὐ δέχονται, καὶ ἐν τῇσι μήτρῃσιν αἵματος ἐνεῖναί τι χρονίου πᾶσα μηχανὴ, ὅ τι ἀποκωλύει τὴν γονὴν τρέφεσθαι.
>
> If ever the menses flows unhealthy, like when the woman is not healthy, in this way she will not become pregnant. For the seed is not set by blood when it is sickly, but the blood makes the seed serous, flowing down from the body since it

> is sickly. And the seed, having become serous, flows out in a little time or in much time with a discharge. And it is clear both for the body of a woman and for their menses. For the menses shall turn out in the manner stated if ever it is bile-like and if it is phlegm-like or water-like. And swiftly when looked after, she becomes fertile, but if she is not, she does not. But if the menses does not flow for the woman entirely on account of the above afflictions, in this way also she does not conceive. For the veins being full of blood do not receive the seed, and in the womb there is every means to introduce some of the chronic blood which prevents the seed from congealing.

In this passage, the thickening of the seed is such an essential part of the process, since if it is too "water-like" conception will not occur. As we saw in the birth of Aphrodite, the formation of the embryo occurs through drying out and congealing of a mixture previously containing moisture.

The formation of life from earth and water features essentially the same process of mixture and separation. This idea appears in many places throughout Greek literature (Kahn 1960, 110-11; 155). In Hesiod, Hephaestus mixes earth and water to make Pandora, the first human woman (γαῖαν ὕδει φύρειν, *WD* 61; cf. Semonides fr. 7.21-42). Homer also mentions the idea, when Menelaus insults the Greeks for not wanting to face Hector saying "May you all become water and earth" (*Il*. 7.99: ὑμεῖς μὲν πάντες ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα γένοισθε). Menelaus' insult equates death with dissolution into a human's constituent elements, from which they were originally formed. The concept reappears frequently in Presocratic authors (Xenophanes B33, Anaxagoras A42.12, Democritus A139, and Heraclitus B36). Some of Anaximander's vivid descriptions of the process survive (Censorinus *die nat.* 4.7 = Laks-Most D39, cf. DK A30):

> Anaximander Milesius videri sibi ex aqua terraque calefactis exortos esse sive pisces seu piscibus simillima animalia; in his homines concrevisse fetusque ad pubertatem intus retentos; tunc demum ruptis illis viros mulieresque qui iam se alere possent processisse.
>
> Anaximander the Milesian thought that out of water and earth, once warmed, either fish or animals very similar to fish arose, and humans formed inside these and their embryos were kept within until puberty, only then, when these broke open, men and women emerged who were finally able to nourish themselves.

A Greek version comes from Aëtius (5.19.5 = Laks-Most D38):

> Ἀναξίμανδρος ἐν ὑγρῶι γεννηθῆναι τὰ πρῶτα ζῶια φλοιοῖς περιεχόμενα ἀκανθώδεσι, προβαινούσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας ἀποβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὸ ξηρότερον καὶ περιρρηγνυμένου τοῦ φλοιοῦ ἐπ’ ὀλίγον χρόνον μεταβιῶναι.
>
> Anaximander said that the first animals were born in water surrounded by thorny bark, and when their age increased, they moved out toward the drier and when the bark broke open, they survived for a short time.

Without introducing any controversies regarding the interpretation of these fragments, I only wish to point out the basic scheme of life’s development: it begins with a mixture of water and earth, wet and dry, and through a process of warming (calefactis) and drying out (ἀποβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὸ ξηρότερον), i.e. through a process of separating wet and dry, new life emerges, itself

"separated out" from the initial mixture. It will be discussed below how Strife in Empedocles—a force that always separates things—is responsible for the same embryological processes.[127]

These examples show that mixture and separation play an important role in the Greek understanding of the formation of life from Homer to Empedocles. This observation complicates our understanding of the history of early Greek philosophy, especially regarding the role Parmenides and Empedocles play in its development. The dilemma is this: many historians of philosophy give Parmenides *the* pivotal role. For instance, when Kahn says, "the fundamental difference between the sixth and fifth centuries lies not in the abandonment of monism for plurality, but in the passage from a world of birth and death to one of mixture and separation" (1960, p.155), he is suggesting that the challenges Parmenides makes to Anaximander's birth-model ultimately led to the mechanical mixture and separation model seen in thinkers like Empedocles and Democritus. The pervasive role mixture and separation already play in Anaximander and earlier, however, complicate this development. What we see in the shift from the sixth and fifth centuries is not the replacement of one idea with another, but a shift in emphasis and an analysis of the same ideas into more well-defined categories.

For the remainder of this chapter, I will use Empedocles' fragments to show how the poet-philosopher expresses the definitive boundary between two ways of doing cosmology: the one employing a birth and death model, while the other uses mixture and separation. In the last chapter, I argued that Empedocles' programmatic statements imply that the mortal perspective uses the birth and death model while the divine perspective uses mixture and separation. In another sense, the two pairs of processes can be identified, birth *is* mixture, separation *is* death,

[127] Cf. Wilford 1968.

but the converse is also true: separation often results in birth; mixture can result in death. Most important for this chapter, however, is the way Empedocles uses analogies to bring out the contrast between the two cosmogonic models. The birth and death model naturally relies on a vitalist analogy, pervasive throughout his poem, but the mixture and separation model makes frequent use of the craft analogy, equally or perhaps even more pervasive in Empedocles' poem.

In what follows, I survey Empedocles' use of these two analogies, first the vitalist analogy, looking especially at embryological analogies, and then the craft analogy, by which Aphrodite is portrayed as a cosmic demiurge. Recent scholarship has emphasized the craft analogy in Empedocles as though this were his central concern, but I argue that the tension between the two analogies remains essential to Empedocles' overall point.

Both Wilford (1968) and Gemelli-Marciano (2005) have shown the importance of embryology in Empedocles' cosmology. Both scholars use the same parallel from the Hippocratic *On the Nature of the Child* as an analogue for how Strife operates in Empedocles' universe (*Nat. Puer.* 17.1-8; cf. Wilford 1968, 112, and Gemelli Marciano 2005, 387-88):

> Ἡ δὲ σὰρξ αὐξομένη ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος ἀρθροῦται, καὶ ἔρχεται ἐν αὐτέῃ ἕκαστον τὸ ὅμοιον ὡς τὸ ὅμοιον, τὸ πυκνὸν ὡς τὸ πυκνὸν, τὸ ἀραιὸν ὡς τὸ ἀραιὸν, τὸ ὑγρὸν ὡς τὸ ὑγρόν· καὶ ἕκαστον ἔρχεται ἐς χώρην ἰδίην κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενὲς, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ ἐγένετο, καὶ ὅσ' ἀπὸ πυκνῶν ἐγένετο πυκνά ἐστι, καὶ ὅσα ἀπὸ ὑγρῶν ὑγρά· καὶ τἆλλα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον γίνεται ἐν τῇ αὐξήσει. Καὶ τὰ ὀστέα σκληρύνεται ὑπὸ τῆς θέρμης πηγνύμενα· καὶ δὴ καὶ διοζοῦται ὡς δένδρον·
>
> And the flesh is articulated by growing under the influence of breath, and in it each thing goes like to like, the thick to the thick, the rare to the rare, the wet to the wet. And each thing goes to its own place according to the kinship from which

> it is born, whatever is born from the thick is thick and whatever is born from the wet is wet, and the rest are born according to the same principle in growth. And the bones harden by being set under the of warmth. Moreover, they branch off like a tree.

The movement of "like to like" is a kind of separation. For instance, when Strife separates the four elements from their compounds, strife is also gathering like to like. The passage illustrates the role separation plays in the development of a fetus as breath acts upon the embryo, "congealing" it into its parts. The similarity to Empedocles' anthropogony is easily observed (fr. 62 DK):

> νῦν δ' ἄγ', ὅπως ἀνδρῶν τε πολυκλαύτων τε γυναικῶν
>
> ἐννυχίους ὅρπηκας ἀνήγαγε κρινόμενον πῦρ,
>
> τῶνδε κλύ'· οὐ γὰρ μῦθος ἀπόσκοπος οὐδ' ἀδαήμων.
>
> οὐλοφυεῖς μὲν πρῶτα τύποι χθονὸς ἐξανέτελλον,
>
> ἀμφοτέρων ὕδατός τε καὶ εἴδεος αἶσαν ἔχοντες·
>
> τοὺς μὲν πῦρ ἀνέπεμπε θέλον πρὸς ὁμοῖον ἱκέσθαι,
>
> οὔτε τί πω μελέων ἐρατὸν δέμας ἐμφαίνοντας
>
> οὔτ' ἐνοπὴν οἷόν τ' ἐπιχώριον ἀνδράσι γυῖον.[128]
>
> Come now and hear how fire, being separated,

[128] γύων Mss. | γυῖον Diels | γῆρυν Aldine

sent up the nocturnal shoots of lamenting men

and women: for the story is not off the mark nor ignorant.

First, whole-natured shapes grew up out of the earth,

Having a portion of both water and heat.

Fire, wishing to arrive at its like, was sending them up,

While they did not yet show the lovely frame of limbs,

Nor their voice, nor the limb belonging to men.

Both Empedocles and the Hippocratic author rely upon the principle of like elements gathering in order to form parts out of a once homogenous mixture. Wilford has also argued that the breath in this passage is analogous to how Strife operates on a cosmic scale (1968, 110-11). In Empedocles' cosmic cycle, a physical force which Empedocles calls "Philotes" or "Aphrodite" causes different elements to gradually combine into various mortal life forms until, in the next stage, they ultimately form a unity which Empedocles calls the *sphairos*. Then, the influence of Neikos, or Strife, begins to increase (Wright 1981, 190). Strife in turn separates the elements out from the *sphairos* one at a time until finally the four elements are totally separate, and the cycle repeats itself. Strife causes a separation that is itself the gathering of like to like. The similarity between the cosmic process and the embryological process is more easily granted thanks to the fact that Empedocles call the elements the "limbs" (ἐνὶμμελέεσσιν) of the *sphairos* (fr. 30 DK):

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ μέγα Νεῖκος ἐνὶμμελέεσσιν ἐθρέφθη

ἐς τιμάς τ' ἀνόρουσε τελειομένοιο χρόνοιο,

ὅς σφιν ἀμοιβαῖος πλατέος παρ’ ἐλήλαται ὅρκου

But when great Strife is nourished in its limbs,

and leaps up to honors in the fullness of time

an alternating time driven by broad oath.

Arguably, the *sphairos* itself resembles an embryo. Empedocles here uses ἐθρέφθη, the same verb in the same form that Hesiod used to describe the formation of Aphrodite after Ouranos’ castration. Empedocles’ word choice here is not a coincidence: the poet is himself drawing the parallels between embryological ideas and his own cosmic cycle.

At this point, I would like to discuss the correspondence between embryology and cosmogony. Empedocles exploits a second and different analogy in describing his cosmic processes, often using craftsmanship to explain how the four elements can combine with one another to create the plurality of phenomena we see in the world. Given the pervasive use of the vitalist analogy among his predecessors, one question I think we should ask is what precisely is the scope of the craftsmanship analogy in Empedocles? On the one hand, craftsmanship very effectively illustrates how Philotes manipulates the elements, since Philotes joins the different parts together to build various compound lifeforms. On the other hand, it is not immediately clear if the craft analogy can show how Neikos works, i.e. the separation of the elements. We can also ask whether Aphrodite’s craftsmanship implies that a divine intention or purpose lies behind each combination of elements. Regarding this question, surviving fragments can be interpreted in two ways. Some of Empedocles’ most vivid fragments feature Aphrodite acting as

if she is a cosmic demiurge with a plan, but in others Empedocles suggests that the very same combinations are a product of chance. Is there some way to resolve the contradiction, or is Aphrodite the craftsman just an anthropomorphized metaphor for the faceless cosmic principle "Philotes" that randomly joins disparate elements? Does Empedocles' craftsmanship analogy preclude the possibility of intelligent design?

Leopoldo Iribarren has singled-out the painter simile as among the most important fragments for analyzing the scope of the craft analogy (B23 Diels-Kranz = D60 Laks-Most, cf. Iribarren 2018, 178-98):

ὡς δ' ὁπόταν γραφέες ἀναθήματα ποικίλλωσιν
ἀνέρες ἀμφὶ τέχνης ὑπὸ μήτιος εὖ δεδαῶτε,
οἵτ' ἐπεὶ οὖν μάρψωσι πολύχροα φάρμακα χερσίν,
ἁρμονίηι μείξαντε τὰ μὲν πλέω, ἄλλα δ' ἐλάσσω,
ἐκ τῶν εἴδεα πᾶσιν ἀλίγκια πορσύνουσι, 5
δένδρεά τε κτίζοντε καὶ ἀνέρας ἠδὲ γυναῖκας
θῆράς τ' οἰωνούς τε καὶ ὑδατοθρέμμονας ἰχθῦς
καί τε θεοὺς δολιχαίωνας τιμῆισι φερίστους·
οὕτω μή σ' ἀπάτη φρένα καινύτω ἄλλοθεν εἶναι
θνητῶν, ὅσσα γε δῆλα γεγάκασιν ἄσπετα, πηγήν,
ἀλλὰ τορῶς ταῦτ' ἴσθι, θεοῦ πάρα μῦθον ἀκούσας.

And as whenever painters produce elaborate votive offerings

Two men very learned in their craft because of their cunning,

So, when they grasp pigments of many colors in their hands,

Mixing them in harmony, some more and others less,

Out of these they prepare shapes resembling all things,

Making trees, men, and women,

Beasts, birds, and water-nourished fish

And even the long-lived gods, greatest in honors.

In this way let not the deception overcome your mind that

The source of as many mortal things as have become clear is from any other place,

but know these things clearly, having heard the story from a god.

This is one of three Homeric similes from Empedocles' poem to survive relatively intact. In the simile, painters, preparing votive offerings, illustrate how a limited number of elements can combine to form a plurality of things. Line two is especially important since the painters' *techne* and *metis* are mentioned. According to Iribarren, this corresponds to Aphrodite's *savoir-faire* as a craftswoman (2018, 185, 187-88). If Aphrodite has *techne* and *metis,* then her combinations should follow a plan and have a purpose. Line two also features a dual form: δεδαῶτε. Two more duals occur: μείξαντε in line 4 and κτίζοντε on line 6. There are two painters, but who are

they? Both Sedley and Trépanier have independently suggested that the two painters are Love and Strife (Trépanier 2003, 1-57; Sedley 2007, 57-59, cf. Iribarren 2018, 183). This implies that Strife has a creative function in Empedocles' cosmology, as some scholars have claimed, but this is controversial (Trépanier 2003, 33-36). Nevertheless, if Strife is represented by one of the painters, the scope of the simile expands to illustrate all of Empedocles' most fundamental principles: Love, Strife, and the four elements. Iribarren suggests, however, that the two painters represent the two hands of Philotes or Aphrodite at work making things in the *cosmos* (2018, 189). This is a compelling suggestion, especially since Empedocles mentions the hands of Aphrodite explicitly in two other fragments (B95 Diels-Kranz = D217 Laks-Most, and B75 Diels-Kranz = D200 Laks-Most, cf. Iribarren 2018, 189-90):

> Κύπριδος ἐν παλάμηισιν ὅτε ξὺμ πρῶτ' ἐφύοντο.
>
> When they first grew together in the hands of Kupris.

> τῶν δ' ὅσ' ἔσω μὲν πυκνά, τὰ δ' ἔκτοθι μανὰ πέπηγε,
>
> Κύπριδος ἐν παλάμηισι πλάδης τοιῆσδε τυχόντα
>
> And as many of them as are formed dense within, and rare outside,
>
> Happening upon this softness in the hands of Kupris….

The first of these fragments describes the moment when the eyes first "grew together" in Aphrodite's skilled hands. The subject of the second fragment is unclear, but it seems to describe an animal that is soft on the outside, and hard on the inside, referring perhaps to its flesh

and bones. Empedocles says these animals "happen upon" (τυχόντα) the moistness or softness in the hands of Aphrodite. Within the same fragment, Aphrodite's skilled hands are at work, as well as the presence of Chance or fortune. Is this not a contradiction? Is Aphrodite combining elements randomly? Or is it that the randomness is "focalized" through the eyes of the animals receiving their qualities from the demiurge Aphrodite? Since Chance occurs in many other fragments, I think this latter possibility is unlikely. More on this later.

To return briefly to the painter simile, the verb πορσύνουσι in line 5 is worthy of our attention. In Homer, πορσύνω is used of wives preparing the marriage bed for their husbands, and in the *Iliad* Helen tells Aphrodite that it would be reproachful if Helen did such a thing for Paris (*Il.* 3.411). This could be a subtle reminder of Aphrodite's more traditional role as a love goddess, and thus Empedocles expands the scope of craftsmanship to encompass that role.

If Sedley and Trepanier are correct, if the two painters are Love and Strife, then the scope of the craft analogy expands to include the workings of Strife, but if Iribarren is right, it implies that Aphrodite, as a demiurge, is not just an analogy, but perhaps is a "real" anthropomorphic god working in Empedocles' cosmos. Otherwise, the *comparandum* of the painter simile, Aphrodite's hands, are themselves the *comparans* of Empedocles' more general craft analogy to illustrate elemental mixture. In other words, if the simile is to a metaphor, the audience is further removed from the theory that both are meant to illustrate.

It is still possible, however, that Aphrodite *is* just a metaphor in Empedocles. In my last chapter, I examined fragments 8 and 9 to show that Empedocles makes a distinction between the conventional way of describing phenomena and *his* way of describing them. It is helpful to reiterate that observation to suggest that Aphrodite is a mere name *hoi polloi* use for Philotes. In fragment 17, mentioned last chapter, Empedocles draws out the distinction between the name,

"Aphrodite," and the thing itself, *Philotes* (B17.21-24 Diels-Kranz = D73.252-55 Laks-Most). He says that mortals believe that *Philotes* is innate in their joints and that it is thanks to *Philotes* that they accomplish works of union and *they call* her Joy and Aphrodite. Furthermore, a craft analogy occurs in the phrase ἄρθμια ἔργα, implying that Aphrodite is a joiner or builder of some sort. But the phrase also seems to refer to Aphrodite's more traditional domain, sex, if we consider the fact that ἄρθροις in the line above can mean not only "joints" but genitals (LSJ s.v. ἄρθρον, cf. Iribarren 2018, 176). But the main point of this passage seems to be that the feelings mortals usually attribute to Aphrodite are in fact due to the abstract force, *Philotes.* Furthermore, in yet another fragment, he tells of an earlier time when Aphrodite alone was worshipped with votive offerings, an apparent golden age when no blood sacrifice occurred (B128 Diels-Kranz = D25 Laks-Most):

οὐδέ τις ἦν κείνοισιν Ἄρης θεὸς οὐδὲ Κυδοιμός

οὐδὲ Ζεὺς βασιλεὺς οὐδὲ Κρόνος οὐδὲ Ποσειδῶν,

ἀλλὰ Κύπρις βασίλεια. …

τὴν οἵγ' εὐσεβέεσσιν ἀγάλμασιν ἱλάσκοντο

γραπτοῖς τε ζώιοισι μύροισί τε δαιδαλεόδμοις

σμύρνης τ' ἀκρήτου θυσίαις λιβάνου τε θυώδους,

ξανθῶν τε σπονδὰς μελίτων ῥίπτοντες ἐς οὖδας·

ταύρων δ' ἀκρήτοισι φόνοις οὐ δεύετο βωμός,

ἀλλὰ μύσος τοῦτ' ἔσκεν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι μέγιστον,

θυμὸν ἀπορραίσαντας ἐέδμεναι ἠέα γυῖα.

They had no Ares as a god nor din of battle,

Nor king Zeus nor Cronus nor Poseidon,

But Cypris queen…

Her they worshiped with reverent votives,

With painted animals and with fragrant perfume,

And with sacrifices of pure myrrh and sweet-smelling frankincense,

Throwing libations of yellow honey to the ground,

And they did not wet the altar with the unmixed blood of bulls,

But this was the greatest defilement among men,

Tearing out its life to eat its good limbs.

Porphyry, who quotes this fragment, tells us it is from Empedocles' "discursive account of the birth of the gods," and he says that Aphrodite and Philotes are the same. But it would be difficult to imagine this scene from the cosmic past having the same impact if it had said *Philotes* was worshipped with votive offerings. At the very least, there is reason to suspect that the two figures should not be so closely identified as they usually are (*pace* Iribarren 2018, 186-87).

The ambiguity Empedocles attaches to the figure of Aphrodite may be instructive. We are reminded of the erotic "mingling" she traditionally causes to emphasize her new role as the "assembler" of eternal elements. The trajectory of Aphrodite's transformation is confirmed, furthermore, by frequent allusions to her husband Hephaestus the craftsman. The first allusion

occurs in a fragment describing Aphrodite's creation of flesh (B98 Diels-Kranz = D190 Laks-Most):

ἡ δὲ χθὼν τούτοισιν ἴση συνέκυρσε μάλιστα,

Ἡφαίστωι τ' ὄμβρωι τε καὶ αἰθέρι παμφανόωντι,

Κύπριδος ὁρμισθεῖσα τελείοις ἐν λιμένεσσιν,

εἴτ' ὀλίγον μείζων εἴτε πλεόνεσσιν ἐλάσσων·

ἐκ τῶν αἶμά τε γέντο καὶ ἄλλης εἴδεα σαρκός.

And earth happened to fall in with these most equally,

With Hephaestus, rain, and bright Aither,

Anchored in the perfect harbors of Aphrodite

Either a little greater or less among the more:

And out of these came blood and forms of other flesh.

The only two gods' names in this fragment are Hephaestus and Aphrodite, and they occur at the beginnings of lines 2 and 3 respectively. Although "anchored in the harbors of Aphrodite" is not a craft analogy, *per se,* it still gives greater agency to Aphrodite than it does to Hephaestus, who is just a stand in for the element fire. Also important is the verb συνέκυρσε in the first line, meaning to come together by chance, since this again affects whether these fleshy compounds are random or by some intelligent design.

An even stronger comparison between Aphrodite and Hephaestus is implied by fragment 73 (B73 Diels-Kranz = D199 Laks-Most):

ὡς δὲ τότε χθόνα Κύπρις, ἐπεί τ᾽ ἐδίηνεν ἐν ὄμβρωι,

εἴδεα ποιπνύουσα θοῶι πυρὶ δῶκε κρατῦναι ...

Just as once Kupris wet the earth in rain,

And bustling about gave the forms to fire to strengthen.

Here Empedocles depicts Aphrodite as a potter, mixing earth and water, molding shapes out of them and giving them to fire to strengthen. Many scholars have pointed out the strong connection to the passage in Hesiod where Hephaestus makes Pandora out of the same materials (*WD.* 60-61, cf. Solmsen 1963, 476-77, Andolfi 2016, 7n.21). Since the fragment already alludes to Hephaestus, I see no reason why we cannot also connect the participle ποιπνύουσα here with the passage in the *Iliad* where Hephaestus acts a wine-bearer (*Il.* 1.599-600):

ἄσβεστος δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἐνῶρτο γέλως μακάρεσσι θεοῖσιν

ὡς ἴδον Ἥφαιστον διὰ δώματα ποιπνύοντα.

And unquenchable laughter arose among the blessed gods,

When they saw Hephaestus bustling through the halls.

I think the passage is relevant to the Empedoclean context since in the *Iliad* passage Hephaestus is *not* acting as craftsman. He assumes the role of wine-pourer for the gods, and we are told "unquenchable laughter arose among the blessed gods when they saw Hephaestus bustling about through the halls." Empedocles connects Aphrodite the craftswoman to Hephestus the wine-pourer to emphasize that Aphrodite is not usually a craftswoman, as she is in his poem. More traditionally, Aphrodite is the motive force behind sexual reproduction, and therefore she is essential to genealogy. When Empedocles changes Aphrodite, he does so in a way that shows what is at stake: genealogy falls short of a true understanding of the cosmos.

Nevertheless, Aphrodite remains a vital figure in Empedoclean cosmology, and this is shown by the close connection she has with Chance. As many surviving fragments testify, Chance affects the creation of elemental compounds (B53 Diels-Kranz = D105 Laks-Most, cf. Trépanier 2003b):

> οὕτω γὰρ συνέκυρσε θέων τοτέ, πολλάκι δ' ἄλλως.
>
> For that time, it [sc. air] happened to run in this way, but often in a different way…

The first of these is a quote from Aristotle who tells us the subject of the fragment is air. It refers to the phase in the cosmic cycle after the reign of Philotes. As Strife's influence increases, the elements begin to separate out of the unified *sphairos*. This is important since it shows how chance affects the processes of both mixture and separation. Furthermore, a testimonium from Plato's *Laws* (A48), however, suggests that chance and nature are identical in Empedocles and furthermore that Chance is primary, while *techne* and its products are secondary (Plato *Laws* 889c5-6 [=A48 DK]):

> οὐ δὲ διὰ νοῦν, φασίν [sc. σοφοί ἄνδρες, 888e8], οὐδὲ διά τινα θεὸν οὐδὲ διὰ τέχνην ἀλλά, ὃ λέγομεν, φύσει καὶ τύχῃ.
>
> Not because of mind, they [sc. Empedocles?] say, nor on account of some god, nor because of *techne*, but as we have said, by Nature and by Chance…

If this accurately describes Empedocles' theories, then we could also say that Aphrodite the craftsman is not the same as the more basic principle Philotes. Perhaps the role chance plays in Empedocles' cosmos is evidence for limiting the scope of the craftsmanship analogy. Additionally, fragment 59 also shows that chance is also responsible for the same sort of combinations attributed to Aphrodite (B59 Diels-Kranz = D106, D149 Laks-Most):

> αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ κατὰ μεῖζον ἐμίσγετο δαίμονι δαίμων,
>
> ταῦτά τε συμπίπτεσκον, ὅπηι συνέκυρσεν ἕκαστα,
>
> ἄλλα τε πρὸς τοῖς πολλὰ διηνεκῆ ἐξεγένοντο.
>
> But when daimon (sc. a limb) mixed more with daimon,
>
> And these things fell together, in whatever way they each came together by chance,
>
> And many others in addition to these continually came into being.

The phrase "daimon mixing with daimon" probably refers to heads, arms and legs coming together to form a person or a monster. Many are uncomfortable with this meaning for the term

daimon, but Simplicius who quotes the fragment assures us that the term refers to limbs.[129] Empedocles employs Aphrodite in the context of crafting flesh or organs. It is also a peculiar feature of Empedocles' cosmic cycle that our parts pre-exist us, and can even survive on their own (Trépanier 2014). Otherfragments even refer to wandering limbs and floating eyes.

Chance's role is amplified again in papyrus fragment ensemble d of the Strasbourg Papyrus (Martin and Primavesi 1999, ensemble d10-14= D76 Laks-Most):

. . . . . [ἠ]μεῖς ἐθέλουσι παρέσσε[ται ἄλγ]εα θυμῷ

. . . . . ε δὴ συνετύγχανε φ[λογ]μὸς ἀτειρής 11

. . . . . ς ἀνάγων π[ο]λυπήμ[ον]α κρᾶσιν

. . . . . φυτάλμια τεκνώθ̣[η]σ̣αν 13

. . . . . [ν]υν ἔτι λείψανα δέρκεται ἠώς

….line 19-20:

ὡς δ' [ὁπόταν ....

χαλ[κεὺς ….

The phrase συνετύγχανε φ[λογ]μὸς in line 11, "fire happening to meet…" indicates another instance of a chance combination of elements. Two lines later, in line 13, a phrase occurs, φυτάλμια τεκνώθ̣[η]σ̣αν, meaning something like "procreative things were born." These lines seem to describe how animals capable of procreation came into being. If this is correct, then

[129] See Trépanier 2014, 173. Cf. Simplicius description of fr. 59: ἐν ταύτῃ οὖν τῇ καταστάσει "μουνομελῆ" ἔτι τὰ γυῖα ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ Νείκους διακρίσεως ὄντα ἐπλανᾶτο τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα μίξεως ἐφιέμενα (*In Aristotelis quattuor libros de caelo commentaria* 587, 18-19).

Aphrodite's more traditional domain, sexual reproduction, is also a product of chance in Empedocles.[130]

Recent scholarship on Aphrodite in Empedocles has very comfortably identified Aphrodite and Philotes. Both Andolfi and Iribarren assume that what is said about the one automatically applies to the other. I have tried to suggest an alternative to this common view. While Aphrodite and Philotes appear sometimes to be the same, Empedocles uses the two terms slightly differently. He employs Aphrodite as a craftsman in a vivid metaphor to describe the bonds that result from elemental mixture, while *Philotes,* the more fundamental principle, is comparatively a more elemental and abstract force like gravity. Furthermore, the role of Chance in Empedocles' cosmos limits the scope of the craftsman metaphor. All the intermediate compounds, both animals and their parts, seem to owe their existence to chance. Like most products of erotic activity, we are accidents or, more optimistically, surprises, unintended by-products of Aphrodite's activities. The only inevitable combination would seem to be the ultimate unity, the *sphairos* that stands at one end of Empedocles' cycle. If Aphrodite crafts with purpose, the unity of everything would seem to be her goal.

To conclude, a better understanding of the scope of the craft analogy in Empedocles, and the role Aphrodite plays within it, can help us reconstruct some key passages from the text. The lantern simile, for instance, has been subject to many emendations (B84 Diels-Kranz = D215 Laks-Most = Aristotle *De Sensu* 437b26-438a3):

> ὡς δ' ὅτε τις πρόοδον νοέων ὡπλίσσατο λύχνον
>
> χειμερίην διὰ νύκτα, πυρὸς σέλας αἰθομένοιο,

[130] Another craft simile occurs in line 19 of the ensemble, pending Janko's reconstruction (2004).

ἄψας παντοίων ἀνέμων λαμπτῆρας ἀμοργούς,

οἵ τ’ ἀνέμων μὲν πνεῦμα διασκιδνᾶσιν ἀέντων,

φῶς δ’ ἔξω διαθρῶισκον, ὅσον ταναώτερον ἦεν,

λάμπεσκεν κατὰ βηλὸν ἀτειρέσιν ἀκτίνεσσιν·

ὣς δὲ τότ’ ἐν μήνιγξιν ἐεργμένον ὠγύγιον πῦρ[131]

λεπτῆισίν <τ’> ὀθόνηισι λοχάζετο κύκλοπα κούρην,

αἶ δ’ ὕδατος μὲν βένθος ἀπέστεγον ἀμφιναέντος,

πῦρ δ’ ἔξω διίεσκον, ὅσον ταναώτερον ἦεν.

And just as when someone intending a journey prepares a lamp,

a light of blazing fire through a winter’s night,

having fastened lantern-screens as protection against all sorts of winds,

and they scatter the gust of the blowing winds,

and the light flashes on out, as far as was possible,

it shines on the threshold with stubborn rays,

so also does the primeval fire, protected in membranes

lies in ambush for the round pupil with delicate linens (?),

[131] λοχάζετο a: ἐχεύατο b: λοχεύσατο Förster

and they shelter the maiden from depth of water flowing around.

The *comparans* of the simile is a lantern and its parts, while the *comparandum* is the eye, and its parts. Special attention is given to the fire inside the lantern, since someone (*tis*) encloses the fire inside lantern screens, and this presumably corresponds to the fire inside our eyes that perceives the light out in the world. But the problem is that fire in the comparandum suddenly becomes the apparent subject of the verb of line 8. Two manuscript traditions suggest that the verb is either λοχάζετο, to "set an ambush," or ἐχεύατο, "to embrace," but neither verb can solve the problem of the shifting subject. Burnet was the first to suggest that Aphrodite is the implied subject of the verb (1892). In this case, both verbs will work, but ἐχεύατο stands out because in the *Iliad* Aphrodite occurs as the subject of this same verb form when she embraces Aeneas in her white arms and rescues him from the battlefield (Hom. *Il*. 5.314-17):

ἀμφὶ δ' ἑὸν φίλον υἱὸν ἐχεύατο πήχεε λευκώ,

πρόσθε δέ οἱ πέπλοιο φαεινοῦ πτύγμα κάλυψεν

ἔρκος ἔμεν βελέων, μή τις Δαναῶν ταχυπώλων

χαλκὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι βαλὼν ἐκ θυμὸν ἕλοιτο.

And she put her white arms around her dear son,

And before him she spread a fold of her bright *peplos*

To be a barrier against missiles, so that none of the Greeks with swift horses

Would take away his life by hurling a bronze spear into his chest.

Burnet's suggestion has inspired greater emendations, such as Förster's λοχεύσατο, to bring forth or bear (1939). Also, Rashed has even inserted fragment 87 to help the passage make sense (2007):

> ὣς δὲ τότ' ἐν μήνιγξιν ἐεργμένον ὠγύγιον πῦρ 7
>
> γόμφοις ἀσκήσασα καταστόργοις Ἀφροδίτη (=B87)
>
> λεπτῆισ' εἰν ὀθόνηισι ἐχεύατο κύκλοπα κούρην,
>
> ἀὶ δ' ὕδατος μὲν βένθος ἀπέστεγον ἀμφιναέντος,
>
> πῦρ δ' ἔξω διίεσκον, ὅσον ταναώτερον ἦεν,
>
> ᾗ χοάνηισι δίαντα τετρήατο θεσπεσίηισιν· (Blass 1883)
>
> Thus, after Aphrodite had fitted the ogygian fire enclosed in membranes with pegs of love, she poured round-eyed Korê in filmy veils; these kept off the depth of water flowing round about them, but allowed the fire to pass through to the outside, in that it is finer, where they had been bored through with marvelous funnels (trans. Rashed 2007)

Whatever the solution to this textual problem is, it shows how important a better understanding of Aphrodite in Empedocles can be for the reconstruction of his poem's message. In particular, it is necessary to determine how literally to take her role as craftswoman. If her craftsmanship implies intelligent design, then this, in turn, affects our understanding of natural processes in Empedocles. Do such processes occur randomly or do the elements move according to some sort of plan? Furthermore, if Empedocles' cosmos moves partially by design, and partially by

chance, are we supposed to decide whether one of these causes is more fundamental than the other? Finally, if Aphrodite is just a metaphor for *Philotes*, why, then, is there corresponding metaphor for Strife?

Answering these questions is outside the scope of the current study. It is better now to conclude that Aphrodite's role in Empedocles continues the tradition of cosmological inquiry inspired by genealogy. Many examples from the previous chapters constitute Aphrodite as central to Greek genealogical thought. Her birth-story in the *Theogony* not only testifies to the power of and problems with genealogical progress, but, as I have argued above, it also contains the earliest example of embryological thought. Although she recieves no specific mention in Parmenides, the other goddesses and the importance of Eros nearly suggest that she could have been mentioned in a lost fragment. Furthermore, Parmenides and Empedocles continue to link genealogy with embryology as *eros* remains the most important cause of proliferation in their cosmologies. What Empedocles finally shows is how the mythology of Aphrodite and the Greek scientific understanding of cosmogony and embryology exist in parallel, evolving alongside and even, perhaps, mutually presupposing one another.

Conclusion.

This dissertation argues that tracing the influence of genealogical thinking provides one of the best means to compare the Presocratics with their predecessors. Although it is nearly impossible to disentangle early philosophy from its reception, there are enough important traces and resemblances to show the importance of the epic tradition for these authors, even for the earliest ones who wrote in prose.

I initially undertook this study hoping to learn the essence of genealogical structure, expecting that, once I discovered whatever that was, it might give me insight into the origins of philosophical logic and the types of thinking that characterize Western philosophy. Why did I think this was possible? It is because genealogy assumes that everyone has an ancestor and everything has a cause or origin. Genealogy, therefore, resembles many other *deterministic* philosophical theories about a fixed ground, a principle on which to base everything else we wish to claim: an *archê*, atoms, the Good, a prime mover, a "*cogito ergo sum*," a synthetic *a priori*, pure being, monads and God's sheet music…. The quest for a *ground* finds its own origins in Presocratic inquiries into nature. Furthermore, these inquiries have their own origins in Homer and especially Hesiod. As I argued in my second chapter, Hesiod's chaos represents an attempt to determine the ground and origin of everything, but understanding the true nature of chaos raises many difficulties.

The structure of genealogy may presuppose that we can discover an origin which determines the way things are in the present. There are, however, two obstacles standing between us and our own origins. The first obstacle is summarized in chapter 1, that appeals to genealogy are fluid and freely change to suit various purposes; nevertheless genealogies are

presented as though they were true, as I have shown in my discussion of heroic genealogies in Homer and the mythographers. The second obstacle is that our first beginnings are ultimately unknowable. This is something mythographers and *phusiologoi* share, but with an important difference. The former's speculations are motivated by their own personal interests, while Hesiod and the *phusiologoi* go beyond what is merely personal in order to approach something universal and cosmological, as I argued in chapter 2. But Hesiod also shows an awareness of our human limitations in knowing our absolute beginnings since Chaos is uttered by Muses who make no guarantee as to the truth of their own revelation.

I chose to discuss a sequence of authors to suggest a development, but I make no claims as to the traditional progress from *mythos* to *logos*. Thanks to the influence of Hesiod's *Theogony*, the genealogical model was pervasive in the earliest philosophers, like Anaximander, and although the model was challenged by Parmenides and Empedocles, it nevertheless persisted in their thought in a different form. In my third chapter, I show that Parmenides was anti-genealogical. Nevertheless, his proem and *Way of Opinion* are suffused with genealogical thought, which even creeps into his anti-genealogical *Way of Truth.* Empedocles also maintains a connection to genealogical thought. His cosmology is based on four elements and two forces, Love and Strife, which mix and separate these elements, but he also claims we all must rely on genealogical terms to describe phenomena from our mortal point of view. As I show, both Parmenides and Empedocles make their poems resonate with Hesiod, even re-adopting the hexameter form after the invention of philosophical prose. Although they are reacting against the Milesians, the purpose behind reaching back to epic is to show the connection all philosophy has with its own most distant epic ancestors. There is, however, more work to be done to fill out the picture.

Embryology provides another source of continuity for the history of early Greek philosophy. As I discuss in my fifth chapter, Parmenides and Empedocles both use embryology as a microcosmic analogue to their macrocosm. I argued that this move has antecedents in Milesians and parallels in the medical writers, but it can also be traced back to Hesiod since the birth scene of Aphrodite in Hesiod's *Theogony* can be understood as a form of embryology. Furthermore, I show that Aphrodite is a figure central to both genealogy and embryology for Empedocles. As I argue, he transforms Aphrodite from a goddess of reproduction to a goddess of craftsmanship to show that he is himself re-working genealogical tradition for his theory of mixture and separation.

There is still more to be said about the influence of Homer as well as Hesiod's other poem, the *Works and Days.* There is also more to be said as to how the anti-genealogical message of Parmenides and Empedocles fits into their own philosophical systems. For Parmenides, this would involve more analysis of the *Way of Truth*, especially fragment 8. For instance, I have not yet taken a position on what the meaning of *esti* is in Parmenides—is it veridical, predicative, or existential?—but if anti-genealogy is important to Parmenides, this could affect our interpretation of his use of the subjectless *esti* as it must be opposed to the meaning of *gignomai.* In the case of Empedocles, a better understanding of his cosmic cycle and the role of reincarnation within it could help contextualize what influence genealogy has on his theories.

More work also is necessary to establish the importance of genealogy for the Milesians. Finally, I think there is a lot to be gained from a closer look at the Hippocratic corpus. There are many different types of Hippocratic author. Some distance themselves from philosophers, while others approach medicine as though it were itself an inquiry into *phusis*. A better understanding

of where genealogy and embryology fits into this divide among medical writers might help us better understand genealogy's role in the history of philosophy.

The great divide we place today between figures like Hecataeus the genealogist and Anaximander the *phusiologos* is anachronistic and itself based on the distinctions of later commentators, like Aristotle, and maintained by modern scholars. Like Anaximander, Hecataeus is a Milesian and Herodotus is a Presocratic. Our modern distinctions between them hinder the understanding of early Greek philosophy in its own context. There is need for further comparison between these authors and others like Acusilaus, the medical writers, and other early Greek philosophers.

I hope I have demonstrated that examinations of genealogical thinking in the Presocratics helps us view these figures within their own historical context. Even when they deny genealogy, the denial itself testifies to genealogy's influence. The pervasiveness of genealogy both within the Presocratics, in their forebears and contemporaries, suggests further avenues to investigate the development of early Greek philosophy.

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