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
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
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PRINGLE—PATTISON'S IDEA OF GOD

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


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












A thesis presented to the Academic Faculty of the
University of Virginia in candidacy for the degree of Mas-
ter Of Arts.

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A CRITICAL STUDY OF PRINGLE-PATTISON'S "THE
IDEA OF GOD".

Mr. Pringle-Pattison in this book is facing the same theistic problem that has confronted philosophers for so many years. He sees clearly the unsatisfactoriness of Pantheism on the one hand and extreme Realism on the other. It is evident to him that he must, in order to approach the problem in a satisfactory manner, recognize the distinctness of existences without falling into extreme Realism and maintain coherence and unity without wandering into the pitfalls to which Mentalism and Pan-psychism will ultimately lead. Even though the problem is an old problem it has been formulated anew. Pringle-Pattison avoids the mistake made by so many philosophers prior to this era, namely, starting with the sharp dualism arising from the Cartesian dualism. He plainly sees the futility of solving the theistic problem by formulating an insoluble problem. Realizing this he takes the position that a "belief in the relative independence of human personalities and belief in the existence of God as a living Being are bound up together" (p. 427). His problem then is to make the relationship so stated intelligible, preserving "relative independence of human personalities" at the same time.

The general character of solution proffered by Pringle-Pattison is indicated in these words: "God means, for philosophy at all events not simply or primarily the existence of another self-conscious Being, but rather the infinite values of which His life is the eternal fruition and which are freely offered to all spirits for their appropriation and enjoyment" (p. 434).

The detailed exposition of Pringle-Pattison argument for the solution indicated in the above quotation will be the object of the first part of this essay. Pringle-Pattison viewpoint is largely presented through criticism of various opponent positions and trains of thought; in the interests of clearness, it will therefore be necessary to furnish Pringle-Pattison's characterization of the positions that he is opposing. In the second part of the essay, some criticisms of the work will be considered, and the writer's reaction to the whole stated.

I

As has been previously stated Pringle-Pattison brings his views to the forefront by using other systems as his point of departure. He opens the discussion by pointing out that what we find in Hume "based as it was exclusively on the evidence of design in external nature the attempted theism of Hume's of conclusion afforded, in his own language, 'no inference

that affects human life or can be the source of any action or forbearance', and this seemed scarcely what the idea of God had meant in human experience" (p. 207).

From Hume the ideas of Kant are surveyed. In Kant we find an analysis of moral experience resulting in the doctrine of intrinsic value and postulation of a God which is primarily and essentially the author and maintainer of a moral order. In this there is the consciousness of value and the assertion of the objectivity of our fundamental estimates of value which remained prominent and important throughout the Idealistic-Naturalistic controversy of the nineteenth century. "From this the present formulation of the philosophical problem is derived. In the words of Heffding, "it is the question of 'the relation between what seems to us men the highest value and existence as a whole'" (p. 208). The distinction between knowledge and belief as drawn by Kant, along with the restriction of knowledge to experience tended to contrast ideals and aspiration on the one hand and scientific knowledge on the other. The principle of value then seemed to form a protest of the world of sense against the world of thought. In another light it appeared as though "our ethical and aesthetic nature were opposed as a shadowland of the poetic imagination to the harsh reality of a scientific materialism".

that without human life or man as the center of the system
or "cosmos", and this means exactly what the idea of
God has meant in human experience" (p. 107).
From this the idea of God was developed. It was so that on
examples of man's experience something in the nature of
spiritual values and satisfaction of a God which is spiritual
and essentially the nature and substance of a moral order.
In this sense is the development of values and the realization
of the objectivity of our fundamental values of value which
remained permanent and significant throughout the evolution.
It is this development of the spiritual values, "the spiritual
the present realization of the spiritual values, spiritual values.
In the words of Hegel, "It is the position of the relation
between that man to be and the highest value and substance
as a whole" (p. 108). The distinction between human and
being as shown by Hegel, along with the realization of man-
kind to experience tended to connect ideas and realization on the
one hand and spiritual values on the other. The spiritual
of value then tended to form a system of the world of values
against the world of things. In another way it appeared as
though the spiritual and material world were opposed as a
distinction of the spiritual realization to the world of things of a
materialistic world.

To oppose one part of our nature against another endangers the principle of value. It is absolutely necessary to avoid a dualism to which such opposition would ultimately lead, hence it is urged by Pringle-Pattison "that the vindication of human values could only become effective and convincing when accompanied by the demonstration that the conclusions of Naturalism rest on a misinterpretation of the character of the scientific theories in which it founds -- that Naturalism, in short, in spite of its claims to exclusive reality, is no more than the substantiation of an abstraction or of a fragment that can exist only as an element in a larger whole. The principle of value, ..., should be the informing principle of a coherent theory of reality instead of being put forward as a conviction which has, as it were, an independent root in a separate part of our nature, and which, instead of issuing from reason, is represented almost as a protest against reason" (p. 208). The objection to Kant, as advanced by Pringle-Pattison, was his "own interpretation of the ideas of God and immortality as postulated by our ethical experience, ... owing to the externalism of his treatment arising from the individualistic and consequently deistic habit of thought which he shared with Hume and the eighteenth century generally" (p. 207). Even with this criticism Pringle-Pattison finds in Kant an anchor, so to speak, for his own position, for he says,

to agree and part of the nature of the evidence
the principle of value. It is especially necessary to avoid
a failure to which such evidence would necessarily lead, because
it is wrong to "single-out" that the violation of human
rights could only be more effective and convincing when brought
under the jurisdiction of the International Commission of Human Rights.
The Commission is not a substitute for the function of the national
tribunal in which it is based -- that International Commission, in spite
of its status as a subsidiary body, is no more than the substitute
of an international body of a higher order. It is not only as
an element in a larger whole, the principle of value, ... should
be the primary principle of a system of human rights.
of being put forward as a substitute which has, as it were, an
independent role in a separate part of our system, and which,
instead of having two members, is represented almost as a protest
against persons" (p. 202). The definition to have, as advanced by
"single-out", was the "non-interference" of the laws of
God and humanity as protected by our ethical conscience, ...
owing to the submission of the law which makes free the
individual and consequently the right of thought which
he shares with him and the right of conscience" (p. 207).
From this it follows that "single-out" is not an answer,
as to speak for his own position, for no one.

"his central idea of value, as a determining factor in philosophical explanation, I took to be not only sound in itself but the fundamental contention of all idealistic philosophy since his time" (p. 46, italics mine).

From Kant arises the Idealistic-Naturalistic controversy of the nineteenth century. For Idealism the idea of value is the main contention. Opposing Idealism, "Naturalism seems to teach that when we resolve the universe, as it were, into its real constituents, it reduces itself to the ceaseless redistribution of matter and motion, what William James not inaptly describes as the 'vast driftings of the cosmic weather' " (p. 41). The problem then may be put in the words: "Is the universe the expression of a transcendent Greatness and Goodness, or is it, in ultimate analysis, a collection of unmoving material facts?" (p. 40). In the exposition of this controversy it is pointed out that the principle of value must remain supreme. He says, "a house divided against itself cannot stand, and if value is set in opposition to reason, it must inevitably appear as a subjective and arbitrary judgment. Hence the mere assertion of the principle is not enough; it must be articulated as far as possible into a coherent system of reality, and shown to represent the ultimate insight of a larger knowledge. The only ultimately satisfactory answer to Naturalism is a philosophical construction of reality which can stand on its own merits.

"the central idea of reality as a determining factor in
epistemological explanation. I took to be not only a
factor but the fundamental condition of all knowledge."
and since this idea (p. 46, italics mine).
From that point the epistemological controversy
of the nineteenth century. Now I believe the idea of what is the
main contention. Opposing theories, "epistemological" seems to mean
that when we receive the answer, as it were, into the world
epistemologically, it seems itself to be an object of reflection or
action and action. What other terms are actually described as the
"real situation of the world" (p. 47). The problem
then may be put in two words: "Is the answer the expression of
a fundamental condition and condition, or is it, in addition
uniquely, a collection of various actual facts" (p. 48).
In the opinion of this controversy it is pointed out that the
possibility of what may remain separate. The answer, as I have divided
without itself being asked, and it when is not in opposition to
reason. It may possibly appear as a subjective and arbitrary
assumption. Hence the mere denotation of the principle is not
enough; it must be articulated in the knowledge into a coherent
system of reality, and shown to represent the objective insight of
a larger knowledge. The only ultimately satisfactory answer to
epistemology is a philosophical construction of reality which can
stand on its own merits.

Such a constructive theory should be able to show that Naturalism is essentially the substantiation of a fragment which can exist only as an element in a larger whole, the reassertion of human values becomes effective and convincing only when it is accompanied by a demonstration that the naturalistic conclusions rest on a misinterpretation of the nature of the scientific theories on which they are based" (p. 65). This is done by pointing out that the developement of biology has served to demonstrate that purely mechanical conceptions of even elementary facts of life is an insufficient explanation. Biology in the last twenty or thirty years, "instead of coming nearer the reduction of biological process to terms of mechanism appears to recede, as knowledge deepens and becomes more intimate; and the recognition of this has led to a revival of 'neo-vitalistic' theories among the younger generation of botanists and zoologists" (p. 71). The fact of life must be taken as the presupposition of physiology. Life can never be wholly understood from a mechanical standpoint. The relationship existing between "the organism and its environment," says Pringle-Pattison, "can only be understood in terms of teleology or purpose" (p. 75).

Even a conservative theory should be able to show that
the relation is essentially the substitution of a function
which can exist only as an element in a larger whole,
the representation of nature which becomes effective and
conforming only when it is recognized by a representation
that the naturalistic conception rests on a substitution of
of the nature of the scientific function on which they are
based. (p. 55). Now in fact by pointing out that the
development of biology has served to demonstrate that purely
mechanical conceptions of even elementary facts of life is an
inadequate explanation. Biology in the last twenty or
thirty years, "instead of coming nearer the solution of biolo-
gical problems in terms of mechanical causes to provide, as
the older biology had, a better and more intimate and the more in-
timate of this has led to a revival of 'vitalism'."
Theories among the younger generation of biologists and sociolo-
gists (p. 57). The fact of life must be taken as the present
position of knowledge. This can never be wholly understood
from a mechanical standpoint. The relationship existing bet-
ween the organism and its environment, says "vitalism,"
can only be understood in terms of biology or psychology.

In this connection the question of order and continuity is introduced. It seems clear that both science and philosophy support the demand for order and continuity. In nature we find qualitative differences, likewise continuity and order, so if one attempt to reduce the facts of experience to a dead level of but one type it is to misinterpret the principle of continuity and because this is sometimes done Pringle-Pattison draws the distinction between so-called lower Naturalism, "which seeks to merge man in the infra-human nature from which he draws his origin which consistently identifies the cause of any fact with its temporal antecedents, and ultimately equates the outcome of a process with its starting point"; and higher Naturalism which "will not hesitate to recognize the emergence of real differences where it sees them, without feeling that it is thereby establishing an absolute chasm between one stage of nature's processes and another" (p. 209). "We have to deal," says Pringle-Pattison, "with the continuous manifestation of a single power, whose full nature cannot be identified with the initial stage of the evolutionary process, but can only be learned from the course of the process as a whole, and most fully from its final stages" (p. 250). Life presents a synthesis which refuses an analysis into the merely physical and chemical facts. In this connection the question of historical origin or of special creation is entirely irrelevant. (No 74)

In this connection the question of order and
continuity is important. It seems clear that both nature
and philosophy regard the world as continuous.
In nature we find positive differences, limited continuity
and order, so it can be said to have the order of nature
to a high level of order. It is to be distinguished from the
of continuity and because this is a continuous form. It is
to be distinguished from the order of nature, which
leads to order in the sense that it is distinguished from
the order which nature presents in the sense of the order of
the order of nature, but with a difference in the sense of a
process with the order of nature, and with a difference in the
will not make it necessary to recognize the order of nature
where it now stands. It is to be distinguished from the
an absolute order between the order of nature and
nature" (p. 100). "We have to deal with a continuous
the continuous nature of a single process, which will
cannot be identified with the order of the order of
process, but can only be found in the order of the process
and a whole, and not only from the order of nature" (p. 100).
The process is a continuous order in the sense of the order
order of nature and order of nature. In this connection the
question of historical order or of special order is entirely
irrelevant.

for philosophy simply faces the situation as it is and finds that new planes and levels of existence are reached, "qualitatively different from the preceding, and opening up, through that difference, a new range of possibilities to the being which it includes" (p. 210).

From the foregoing it is argued that man must be taken as organic to nature. In the discussion of this many persistent problems present themselves, but, maintains Pringle-Pattison, if the principles of immanence and continuity are applied they will cease to exist. He holds that the world is not complete without man and his knowledge, that to say that nature is a completed system and that man is a spectator ab extra is wrong, for, he says, "the intelligent being is rather to be regarded as the organ through which the universe beholds and enjoys itself" (p. 211). From this point of view we are freed from such difficulties, "as to relativity, or subjectivity, or phenomenality, of knowledge, and the impossibility of knowing things as they really are" (p. 211). The whole trouble seems to be in the conception of the world as a finished fact on the one hand and a knower on the other, both of which are equally independent and the latter possessing faculties which colour and subjectify any to which they are directed. (Ms. 77)

For philosophy simply means the situation as it is and there
that new places and levels of existence are reached, "new."
It is always different from the preceding, and opening up
through that difference, a new range of possibilities to the
being which is involved" (p. 210).

From the foregoing it is evident that man must be
taken as organic to nature. In the situation of this being
guaranteed freedom means freedom, but, within this
situation, if the situation of nature and existence are
changed they will change in nature. He holds that the world is
not created without man and his knowledge, that is, the
nature is a completed system and that man is a part of it.
The world is whole, for, he says, "the intellect being in
order to be regarded as the organ through which the universe
beholds and enjoys itself" (p. 211). From this point of view
we are freed from even dualism, "not to believe, or
subjectivity, or immortality, or knowledge, and the knowable-
ship of knowing things as they really are" (p. 211).

The whole trouble seems to be in the conception of the world
as a finished fact on the one hand and a process on the other,
both of which are equally independent and the latter possessing
freedom which colors and enlightens the way to which they are
directed. (p. 211)

The function of intelligence should not be taken to mean merely borrowing or duplicating external facts because knowledge is a soul experience, hence as such, has its feeling value. These "living centers are capable of feeling the grandeur and beauty of the universe and tasting its manifold qualities "and such "is what is alone significant in the universe" (p. 221). Nature then, is working toward the rational being so that" she may become conscious of herself and enter into the joy of her own being" (p. 211). Mind and nature, then, are essentially related so as to preserve the naturalness of the knowledge process.

Upon investigation it is found that there is change evolution, which must be explained. To begin with, reality of new features must be assumed and from this Pringle-Pattison explains that this assumption is evidence of Nature's purpose of self-revelation. Carrying the same idea further we find that man is organically related to nature. The idea of "organic relatedness to the consideration of the ethical and social qualities which we recognize as constituting our humanity" (p. 212) is applied. It appears then, that there is a breach of continuity between the ethical nature of man and the apparently non-moral nature of the world. From this arises the sharp dualism existing in Positivism between mind and nature.

The function of intelligence should not be taken to mean
merely receiving or reflecting external facts. Intelligence
is a self-organizing, self-regulating, self-maintaining
system. It is a living entity, capable of feeling
the growth and decay of the organism and feeling its needs.
Intelligence "is that in which all the other elements of the
organism are working together for the common good."
It is not a mere collection of facts and ideas, but a
living, growing, and changing entity. It is the
essentially rational part of the organism, the
knowledge part.

Upon investigation it is found that there is a
... evolution which must be explained. It is a
unity of two factors which must be seen and then this
relation explains that this evolution is evidence of
purpose or self-organization. During the evolution we
find that there is a tendency to maintain the idea of
"organic relationship to the constitution of the whole and
social qualities which we recognize as constituting the
integrity" (p. 125) is applied. It appears that there
is a break or continuity between the whole and the
and the apparently non-social nature of the whole. This
shows the sharp division existing in modern science and
nature.

Even with dualism, however, there is for Pringle-Pattison some truth in this position for he says, "Comte was right in the stress he laid on the distinctively human qualities as alone fitted to call forth the emotions of love and worship, his error lay" in the fact that he held that it was not "possible to isolate humanity from the universe as a whole, and to treat it as a self-contained organism" (p. 213). Man is a part of nature and our morals arise in converse with the system of external things, thus the ethical life must be taken as having to do with the kind of system in which we live. Hence the principle of value, along with the distinctions of experience should bring us closer to a true definition of the ultimate life of which we are partakers. Positivism appears then, to be a half truth. Agnosticism is likewise found to be but half truth which is just the reverse of Positivism. In the words of Pringle-Pattison; "And so the worship of Humanity and the worship of the Unknowable, each untenable in itself, are seen both to owe their vitality, to the partial and complementary truths which they respectively enshrine" (p.171).

What then is the status of God? The answer is that God must be taken as immanent, and that within the system

and structure of finite experience we have divine immanence made known to us through revelation. To interpret philosophically, phenomena we must constantly keep in view the whole range of experience. Then in accordance with the foregoing there can be no system, no real fact and no whole of being until, "the external gathers itself up, as it were, into internality, and existence sums itself in the conscious soul" (p. 215). Such a view has within it the conviction that what is to us highest is also in and to the universe most real.

In regard to the question of appearances Mr. Bradley is agreed with when he states that "appearances exist and whatever exists must belong to reality" (p. 216). Such a statement shows a marked tendency toward Pantheism and if left unqualified would lead to so-called lower Pantheism, which may be characterized by the phrase "All in All", hence we find it qualified in the words, "unity of system is clearly intended; and the idea of a systematic whole essentially involves discrimination, perspective, something like a hierarchy of means and end. The true revelation of the divine must be sought in the systematic structure of finite experience as a whole" (p. 220). Value then, is of utmost importance in the nature of the system as a whole.

and elements of this movement are now being formed
which seem to be more revolutionary. No longer will
this life, however, be more completely than in the
whole range of experience. Then in accordance with the law
going there can be no return, no rest, and no return of
being with, the external factors which are its own, into
internal, and substance and itself in the transition and
(p. 122). Such a view has been the conviction that
that is to be an ideal in the end of the relative state
now.

In regard to the question of experience, it is
in accord with what he states that "experience exists and
whatever exists must belong to reality" (p. 122). Such a
statement shows a certain tendency toward idealism and is
left unqualified would lead to an idealist interpretation,
which may be characterized by the phrase "all in all," hence
we find it qualified in the words, "only as it is actually
intended; and the fact of a systematic whole essentially
involves disintegration, movement, something like a life-
cycle of means and end. The true revelation of the divine
must be sought.... In the systematic structure of things
experience as a whole" (p. 122). When then, is it not
experience in the nature of the system as a whole.

It follows from the foregoing that our ultimate criterion of value is derived from appearances. The nature of this criterion is given as being "specific modes in which the consciousness of value is realized" and which "must obviously in this sense be drawn from experience" (p.231). We directly apprehend these modes. In justification of this position, it seems well to state that somehow we have a feeling, a conviction, if you please, that man is essentially great and that the infinite nature of the values become revealed through the life of man. It is argued further, that without such a conviction it would be useless as well as futile to argue concerning God or the universe. In other words it is necessary to assume that the existence of man individually is both real and necessary.

Upon examination we find that the experience of man is not confined solely to the moral life, not that it touches every phase of life. Accepting this we are forced to observe that within this experience man is constantly exercising choice, that the whole history of man is simply the story of his long struggle to rise above himself. From this, in the words of Pringle-Pattison, "is it not, the power of framing (and consequently of following) an ideal which constitutes man's nature as a rational creature

It follows from the foregoing that our ultimate definition
of value is derived from experience. The nature of this
definition is given as being "qualitative" in that the
connection-statement of value is not limited to certain
necessarily in this sense he draws from experience (p. 101).
We already suggested these words. In justification of this
position, it seems well to state that whether we have a
feeling, a conviction, or a judgment, that we are actually
great and that the infinite nature of the value process
revealed through the life of man. It is beyond doubt,
that without such a conviction it would be useless to call us
able to expect something good on the highway. In other
words it is necessary to know that the object of our
interest is both good and necessary.
Upon examination of this that the experience of
man is not confined solely to the moral life, but that it
embraces every form of life. Accepting this as our basis
to observe that within this experience man is constantly
convinced of the fact that the object of his life is good
the story of his long struggle to reach this goal.
From this, in the words of Wright, "the moral life is not
the power of feeling (and consequently of thinking) to reach
which constitutes man's nature as a rational creature

which makes him more than an intermittent pulse of animal desire? Man's ideals are, in a sense, the creative forces that shape his life from within" (p. 245). It naturally follows then, that the ideal is the reality of God within us. The ideal must be the most real thing in the world. With the acknowledgement of the ideal comes the solution of the immanence-transcendence question, for without the ideal, as described, we will go to either lower Pantheism on the one hand, or transcendental Idealism on the other, neither of which are satisfactory. As a final statement of the ideal we may say that it is the "infinite present in the finite", and from this is derived the next question.

If the infinite is present in the finite, what is the relation of the finite individual to the creative principle of its life? We may from this infer that to posit an individual as a self-contained unit or whole is impossible. The finite self cannot be a self that is a finding of itself in social and universal interests, for in no way does this support an idea of a "confluence" or blending of selves. How can we describe an individual? In answer to this we have the words, "that every individual is a unique nature, a little world of content which, as to its ingredients, the tempering of the element and the systematic structure of the whole

whole constitutes an expression or focalization of the universe which is nowhere exactly repeated" (p. 267). The individual then, may be termed as being a unique expression or focalization of the universe similar to a Leibnitzian monad. We are not self-contained elements of Reality, but are incarnations of the Absolute. Again, "the life of the finite individual, as it builds up its true self, is thus a continual process of selftranscendence; its true personality or individuality does not lie in unshareable feelings, but in the richness and variety of its thoughts and interests" (p. 268).

In the preceding paragraph we have largely concerned ourselves with the individual side of the question of the relationship between the individual and the Absolute or the creative principle of the life of an individual, and now we must view the nature of the absolute. Bradley maintains that the Absolute has no acquaintance, "of the existence of finite centers at all, in its 'single and allabsorbing experience' " (p. 277). Departing from this it is contended, on the other hand, "that the existence of such centers in a fact as true and important 'from the side of the Absolute' as from the point of view of the finite beings themselves nay, that this differentiation or creation (according as we name it)

whole constitutes an expression or formulation of the
 universe which is perhaps exactly reciprocal (p. 107).

The individual thus may be taken as being a unique
 expression or formulation of the universe which is a
 totalization of all the individual elements
 of being, and the individual of the universe, again,
 the life of the whole individual, as it exists in the
 world, is then a continuous process of self-renewal; the
 two essentially or fundamentally does not lie in separable
 feelings, but in the essence and nature of the whole
 and universe (p. 108).

In the material passage we have largely omitted
 of ourselves with the individual side of the position of the
 relationship between the individual and the whole to the
 excessive knowledge of the life of an individual, and now we
 want also the nature of the whole. Another mistake
 that the whole has no content, "of the nature of
 that content of all, in the whole and individual aspects
 known" (p. 111). Regarding from this it is contained, as
 the other hand, "that the nature of each content is a fact
 as true and important from the side of the whole, as from
 the point of view of the whole being known" (p. 112).

that the totalization or synthesis (p. 113)

constitutes the very essence and open secret of the Absolute life" (p. 277). The Absolute then, is neither static nor fixed, but is ever progressive and creative; From this it is clear that the individual does not originate and exist as simply a complex group of universals, but is created by this progressive and creative Absolute. At first sight it may appear that upon this position there is no real and essential difference between the individual and the Absolute, which would, of course, make for unsatisfactoriness. Anticipating this, Pringle-Pattison maintains that a real difference exists between the individual and the Absolute and cites that "In a great friendship the completest identification of interest and aims does not merge the friends in one" (p. 289). From this the question arises as to freedom just how is it that freedom is accounted for? In reply, we have maintained that finite individuality is a self-conscious entity, hence if this be true freedom must follow, which is the fundamental condition of our ethical life, without which a world of automata would result, which does not make a satisfactory appeal. To explain further seems impossible for Pringle-Pattison, because, "the creation of beings who are really selves is the main miracle of the universe" (p. 293).

considered the very essence of the matter at the
theoretical level (p. 277). The question then is whether
of this was right, but in such a way as to be
from this it is clear that the theoretical view was not
and that in effect a certain group of individuals, but in
expected by this group to be actually realized. It is
might be very well that the position there is not
and essential difference between the individual and the
theoretical, which would, of course, make the position
regarding this. Theoretical position regarding this is
distinction which through the individual and the
and also that the great difference between the
illustration of interest and that does not mean the position is
not (p. 281). There was the position which is to be
.... Just now it is that position is answered that in
which, as has been indicated, this position is a
with-unbounded will, there is the position which is
follow, which is the theoretical position of an object
this, which is a world of objects which is
does not mean a theoretical position. It is a
some responsible for the position, however, the position
in the world.
of being who are really objects
of the world (p. 282).

Furthermore, terms made to express finite relationships are inadequate in such discussion. Since the creative aspect has been pointed out let us see just what the end of the Absolute is. We have the famous paradoxes such as to seek pleasure conscious by is to lose pleasure etc., and from this is it not reasonable to conjecture "that the infinite reality reflects itself in the finite nature"? (p. 295) In other words it would mean moral death for the Absolute if it existed as a self-centered life in contemplation of his own glory. From the foregoing we may say that we have a vital relationship existing between the individual and Absolute which allows the exercise of it freedom for the individual and within the finite nature there is the reflection of the infinite reality which may be said to constitute the end of the Absolute. Individuation as thus explained seems to portray the fundamental method of creation and this brings us to the discussion of the idea of creation.

In the discussion of the idea of creation it is quite natural to take as a starting point the ordinary and perhaps popular idea, that is, that creation took place at a given time and that God is the so-called "first cause". On the face of it in the light of what has preceded it seems needless to show that such a position is entirely untenable.

God may be taken as cause, however, "only when cause is ratio; for the reason or ultimate explanation of anything is only to be found in the whole nature of the system in which it is included" (p. 302). We must conceive God as the "principle through which the world becomes intelligible. His relation to the world cannot be of the merely incidental character indicated". (Speaking of creation as an act of a divine magician). "If the universe is to be understood through God, the nature of God must no less be expressed in the universe and understood through it" (p. 304). In other words, God must be taken as being organic to the world. Following this, it is pointed out that speculative minds saw clearly that creation must be taken as an eternal act. If this be true it follows that creation "out of nothing" cannot stand. Such would deny the existence of an independently existing matter. God must be looked upon as creator, not artificer; "in Him is to be found the sole explanation of the existence of the world, as well as of its detailed arrangements" (p. 306). God, then, is "the revelation in and to finite spirits of the divine life" (p. 308). Granting this there can be no existence of God prior to and apart from such revelation. In short, it has been pointed out that creation is an eternal act and that it is manifestation in and to conscious spirits.

God may be taken as cause, however, only when things are
caused; for the reason or efficient cause of anything
is only to be found in the whole nature of the system in
which it is included. (p. 303). To want creative God as
the principle through which the world becomes intelligible.
His relation to the world would be of the merely transient.
of an external influence. (p. 304). (p. 305). (p. 306).
a divine world. (p. 307). (p. 308). (p. 309).
through God, the nature of God must be such as to be
the cause and substance of it. (p. 310). (p. 311).
world, but must be taken as being outside to the world.
Following this, it is not the world that is the cause
clearly that creation must be taken as an external act. (p. 312).
This is true in relation to the world, but not in relation
to the world. (p. 313). (p. 314). (p. 315).
to existing matter. God must be taken as being outside, but
existence. (p. 316). (p. 317). (p. 318).
existence of the world, as well as of the world's existence.
(p. 319). (p. 320). (p. 321).
relation to the divine life. (p. 322). (p. 323).
can be no existence of God prior to the world's existence.
action. (p. 324). (p. 325). (p. 326).
action, but that it is a condition in and to the world's
existence.

In the discussion of the theological amount of the relationship existing between God and the finite world, as set forth thus far, one cannot fail to see that the idea of Purpose is inescapable. "Purposive activity," says Pringle-Pattison, "is, indeed, the central feature of our human experience; reason seems to operate in that experience characteristically under the form of End" (p. 322). Pursuing further, let us see what the implications of Purpose are. They appear to imply "(1) desire for an yet nonexistent state of affairs, (2) the conception of a plan for bringing the desired state of affairs into existence by selection of appropriate means, (3) the act of will proper, which realizes or carries out this plan" (p. 325).

Such implications of Purpose possibly suggest that it is opposed to the modern theory of organic development, but when this organic development is placed "within the scope of one increasing purpose," it becomes clear that both go hand in hand. The idea of purpose, then presents itself as the idea of a systematic and intelligible whole which thus resolves itself into that of value or satisfaction, for without the idea of Purpose, value becomes an abstraction. Since we have Purpose as "increasing purpose," value then must be vitally connected with activity. We may then conclude that

In the discussion of the biological concept
of the relationship existing between the mind and the body
which, as we have seen, has been the subject of much
the idea of purpose is inseparable. "Purposeful activity,"
this biological position, is, indeed, the central feature of
our human existence; without it we are not human. In this
connection of purposeful activity with the mind (p. 100).
Further, it is not only the biological but
the social. It is not only the biological but the
social. (1) The concept of a plan
for bringing the mental state of affairs into existence by
collection of appropriate means. (2) The act of will power,
which involves the carrying out of the plan. (p. 101).
Such limitations of purpose would suggest that it is
opposed to the modern theory of organic development, but
when this organic development is placed within the scope of
the human mind, it becomes clear that both are based
on the same principle. The idea of purpose, that purpose is to be
the end of a systematic and intelligent action which the
individual itself takes that of a plan or intention, the other
and the idea of purpose, when viewed in connection with
we have shown in these few pages, that there must be
a unity connected with nature. We say that nature that

"if the finite world means anything to God, the ideas of activity and purpose are indispensable" (p. 341).

In discussing the ideas of activity and purpose we are confronted with the problem of time. It is necessary that a distinction be drawn between time and eternity. The term eternity has been divided into three main senses, namely: (1) to denote an unending extent of time, (2) to denote that which is essentially timeless, and (3) to denote that which includes time but somehow transcends it" (p. 343). The first sense is derived from our ordinary temporal experience, and is taken purely quantitatively, which adds nothing of worth or dignity, because it has to do with purely physical elements, belonging "to the most casual and indifferent of their combinations" (p. 348). The second sense, we might say, has its origin in the idealism of Plato and ultimately resolves itself into the statement that truth is eternal, that is, timeless. Taken in this sense we clearly see that to pursue such a meaning of eternity further would be a digression, throwing little light on the topic in question. We may now take up the third sense of the term eternity. "Time", says Bringle-Pattison, "is the abstraction . . . of purpose on the way to achievement" (p. 358).

Continuing further, we find then that "the eternal view of the time-process is not the view of all its stages simultaneously, but the view of them as elements or members of a completed purpose" (p. 399), which coincides with the teleological explanation as given. Maintaining this position the God cannot be at the end, so to speak, but must be in and realized with the process. "It is the meaning or spirit of the whole, distilled as it were, into each individual scene or passage" (p. 562). The time-process may be said to be forms of individuation which is transcended within the ultimate experience. Thus, we may conclude that the time-process is real, but is somehow transcended in the Absolute.

When the problem of time is raised it is almost a necessity to refer to Bergson more than any other philosopher, for his whole philosophy is devoted entirely to this question. For Bergson time itself is the ultimately Real. Time is given in the idea of Duration; which might be described as a " 'ceaseless upspringing of something new' " (p. 370). To use a metaphor of Bergson; it is as a snow-ball eternally rolling accumulating as it goes. The past, present and future are organic to one another. In this philosophy of time we have, concerning God, in the words of

Continuing further, we find that the classical view of
the time-process is not the view of all the sciences.
Naturally, but the view of them as elements of nature is
a completed process (p. 305), which includes also the
scientific explanation as given. Regarding the
position the fact cannot be at the end, as it is, but
may be in the middle with the process. All in the mean-
ing on behalf of the whole, classified as it were, into such
individual parts or groups (p. 305). The time-process
may be said to be more or less individualized in the
whole as a whole or separated. Thus, we may consider that
the time-process is real, but is neither terminated in the
absolute.

When the position of time is what it is about the
necessity to refer to nature and then not other things.
However, for the whole philosophy is devoted entirely to
this question. For nature and itself is the philosophy
that, time is given in the idea of nature; which must be
conceived as a "consciousness" of something new.
(p. 305). To use a metaphor of nature; it is as a new-
born naturally willing something as it goes. The new
process and nature are organic to one another. In this
philosophy of time we have, concerning it, in the words of

Bergson; " 'a free and creating God, producing matter and life at once, whose creative effort is continued, in a vital direction, by the evolution of the species and the construction of human personalities' " (p. 379). Pringle-Pattison fails to see how the universe can be conceived as a growing whole or as James expresses it, " 'the string-along unfinished world in time' " (p. 382). In support of this Pringle-Pattison says that "the verdict of the moral consciousness on its own advance emphatically repudiates the idea suggested that it is actually creating these values and raising the moral level of the universe. The reality of the ideal and its infinite transcendence of finite attainment is the very note of moral and religious experience" (p. 382). To apply the idea of progress to the whole is unintelligible, hence we may conclude that the temporal view of things cannot stand as the ultimate or all-inclusive.

From the problem of time we pass to the discussion of Pluralism. Rashdall's theory of a limited God is the first considered. He maintains that, "God and the spirits are the Absolute - not God alone. Together they form a Unity" (p. 387). This, Pringle-Pattison finds unsatisfactory, because in such an assertion God is placed in the same numerical series as man which is, on the face of it unsatisfactory. Mc Taggart urges that the Absolute is that of a society,

which again is unsatisfactory for a similar reason.

William James postulates a "finite God" and an "unfinished world", which is the result of a mistaken conception of the Absolute as just a spectator of, as it were, a world drama. The trouble seems to be rooted in the fact that we continually go back to the traditional idea of God —, namely, an abstract idea of perfection, hence "to reach any credible theory of the relation of God and man we must, in fact, profoundly transform the traditional idea of God" (p. 399). And from this derived the problem of evil and suffering.

If we posit the traditional idea of God one cannot see how evil and suffering exist. If God is taken as being omnipotent in the traditional sense, how is it that we find evil and suffering? There is but one alternative and that is to invest in the term omnipotence a different meaning from that given us by tradition. Says Pringle-Pattison, "omnipotence can only mean ... the power 'to effect whatever is not intrinsically impossible' " (p. 404). He continues, "the foundations of the intelligible universe are the necessities of the divine nature itself; and to separate God's being, as Power or Will, from Nature is the ultimate form of that apotheosis of the empty Ego" (p. 404). Evil implies pleasure. In this connection Pringle-Pattison uses the

which is the only one for a single person.
William James' position is "Pragmatism" and he is
right. This is the result of a certain conception of the
universe as just a collection of bits of matter, a world
the whole of which is to be tested in the last resort
consequently it leads to the conception of God as a
"hypothesis" of convenience, means "the most useful
hypothesis of the relation of God and the world, in fact,
scientifically speaking, the hypothesis that God is not."
and from this follows the question of belief in God.
It is not the religious idea of God as a
fact but only an ethical ideal. It is not in itself
being mentioned in the traditional sense, but it is that we
find out the religious idea is not an idealistic one
there is no interest in the fact of God's existence
then that there is no tradition. The religious-idea
"religion" can only mean ... the power to do good
in the traditional sense, "the fact" is contained
"the religious" of the religious idea and the
existence of the divine world itself; and in regard to
being, as far as this, there is no doubt as to the
fact of the existence of the world (p. 40). But this
statement, in the connection of the religious idea, is

hedonistic idea of Rome and Mills as his point of departure, maintaining that the connotation of the term pleasure is inadequate. He says, "to be true to the highest and deepest experiences of life, we must substitute some larger term like satisfaction -- for satisfaction, of course, there must be, even in the completest sacrifice of self". "We can only have the highest happiness, such as goes along with being a great man, by having wide thoughts and much feeling for the rest of the world as well as for ourselves; and this sort of happiness often brings so much pain with it, that we can only tell it from pain by its being what we should choose before anything else, because our souls see it is good." (p. 406). Thus it appears that satisfaction is the ultimate moral end.

In the light of the foregoing exposition let us see, in short, just what idea of God we are brought to. For Mr. Pringle-Pattison there is "no God, or Absolute, existing in solitary bliss and perfection, but a God who lives in the perpetual giving of himself, who shares the life of his finite creatures bearing the and with them the whole burden of their finitude, their sinful wanderings and sorrows, and the suffering without which they cannot be made perfect" (p. 411). Thus, "the ultimate conception of God is not that of a preexistent Creator but, as it is for

religion, that of the eternal Redeemer of the world. "This perpetual process is the very life of God, in which, besides the effort and the gain, He tastes, we must believe, the joy of victory won" (p. 412). "The universe", he continues, "is in no sense a finished fact; it is an act, a continuous life or process which (to speak in terms of time) is perpetually being accomplished" (p. 413). Creation then, must be taken "as expressing the essential nature of the divine life; the revelation of the infinite in the finite is the eternal fact of the universe" (p. 414). Life for the individual is nature, which is "the instrument of man's moral and intellectual education" (p. 415), "is a series of opportunities", the use of which "he makes of them depends on himself" (p. 416). "The very texture of our human experience is the real omnipotence of atomizing love", and "unweariedly creating good out of evil" (p. 417).

...that of the ... of the world. ...
...is the very life of ... in which, ...
...the effect ... the ... to ...
...of ... (p. 41). ...
...it is ... (p. 42). ...
...it is ... (p. 43). ...
...the ... (p. 44). ...
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II

With the picture of Iringle-Pattison's idea of God before us, let us proceed to subject it to a few tests in order to see wherein we agree, and wherein we disagree. In a prefatory way, it seems best to state, before beginning the criticism proper, that throughout the whole work there is an atmosphere of sincerity about it, so that one cannot help but appreciate the fact that the work is an attempt to open a way to bring philosophy and theology to a common understanding. So manifest is this aim that Rev. H. R. Mackintosh aptly terms it "a philosopher's theology". Being a philosopher's theology, so called, we find two strong influences operating; on the one side philosophy and on the other the theology of positive religion. Christianity furnishes, from the positive religious side, one pole, so to speak; and Absolute Idealism composes the other. Iringle-Pattison wants, on the one hand, to avoid the problems besetting Absolutism; and to take the more congenial elements of Absolutism and combine them with positive religious theology in such a way as to make the fusion, as it were, satisfactory and acceptable to both philosophers and theologians.

Iringle-Pattison, however seems to have a sympathetic leaning toward that doctrine of the Absolute of Bradley and Bosanquet, but in his position he seeks to meet the criticism advanced by William James, which urges that the doctrine of the Absolute in which time is unreal and in which "everything is over and done with"; where ultimately there can be no good nor

With the system of religious education...

God before us, let us proceed to subject it to a new trial in order
to see whether we agree, and whether we disagree. In a word, let
us, it seems best to state, before beginning the religious in-
quiry, that throughout the whole work there is an assumption of
something about it, so that one cannot help but appreciate the fact
that the work is an attempt to show a way to religious philosophy
and theology to a common understanding. In relation to this
aim that Rev. A. A. Johnson says in his introduction to
"Theology," being a philosophical theology, as called for by
the strong religious conviction on the one side philosophy
and on the other the freedom of positive religion. Johnson
is convinced that the religious religion and the other, as
to spirit and specific religious questions the other. This is
Johnson's aim, so far as the religious philosophy
theology; and to show the new method of religious
faith and culture that with positive religious freedom is now
a way to be seen the future, as it were, a religious and re-
spective to both philosophy and theology.

Johnson's aim, however, seems to have a specific

aim, namely that freedom of the freedom of freedom and
freedom, but in the position he seeks to show the religious
freedom of "with a touch, which says that the freedom of the
freedom to which we are to return and in which we are to
live and grow with, which says that we are to grow and

evil and where the efforts of human beings amount to nothing is world to beckon men on, to give meaning to their strivings. If all of the problems and worries of mankind are illusions and everything is well within the Absolute would it not be foolish for men to give their lives in order to make the world a better place to live in? I should think, to say the least, that it would be little short of presumption. In the final analysis the Absolutists can allow no value for strivings, ambitions, hopes and desires which go to help in the improvement of the world. Real life in which we find a series of values would, by the very nature of the case, be impossible. How can such doctrine allow for moral responsibility? In the light of the following statements of Pringle-Pattison one feels that it is justifiable to venture the assertion that the work was written with Absolutism, akin to that of Bradley and Bosanquet, as a basis, so to speak. "God as immanent—the divine life as revealed in the structure and system of finite existence" may be taken as the outcome of the argument in the first half of the book. Further down he says that "it enshrines the conviction which Mr. Bradley expressed in replying to certain of his critics that, 'that which is highest to us is also in and to the universe most real, and there can be no question of its reality being somehow upset'" (p. 215). In another place he says that: "The (man) exists as an organ of the universe or of

will and share the efforts of the people in making
in world to become one of the great nations of the world.
It is all of the problem and people are living
and everything in the world is not the same
the for now to give their lives in order to save the world.
better place to live in. I would like to say the world
that it will be little more of the world. In the first
analysis the problem is not the same. It is the same
system, laws and things which are to be in the improvement
of the world. But this is not the same. It is the same
world, of the world of the world. It is the same.
and each nation has its own responsibility. In the first
of the world, the world of the world. It is the same.
that it is possible to make the world a better
one with the people, with the people of the world and the
people of the world. It is the same. It is the same.
like as revealed in the world, the world of the world.
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page that, the world of the world, the world of the world. It is the same.

the Absolute, the one Being; and from the same source he draws his rational and spiritual content, 'feeding', as Plato says, 'on mind and pure knowledge, the proper food of every soul'. And in the next paragraph he agrees with Bosanquet when he says that, "the finite self, like everything in the universe, is now and here beyond escape an element in the Absolute" (p. 259). Again, we find in the discussion of the adjectival theory, the statement that, "no finite fact can either exist or be understood by itself,... the true view of Reality must be that which conceives the universe as an inclusive system of interrelated facts which, as so included and inter-related, are to be regarded as constituent members of a single whole" (p. 274, italics mine). Pringle-Pattison however, does not subscribe to the Absolute playing the role of spectator, for he says, "certainly if we attempt the reconciliation while clinging to the old idea of an omnipotent and impassible creator or an Absolute in the role of spectator, we shall soon find ourselves exclaiming with James that 'a whole relish of such superfluities of horror (referring to the evils of the world) is no God for human beings to appeal to'" (p. 414). Again he says, "and thus for a metaphysic which has emancipated itself from physical categories, the ultimate conception of God is not that of pre-existent creator, but

the findings, the fact being that the main purpose of the
the national and regional committee, "Working", in 1940 was,
to what was then considered the proper form of work, and
and in the next paragraph the system with reference to the
new that, "the state will, this paragraph, in the previous
is now and have become people in almost in the findings
(p. 108). Again, to this is the dimension of the effort
and theory, the statement that, "the right kind of effort
but or be understood by itself, ... the two are of the
must be that which operates the system as an indicator
states of interest and facts which, as no interest, and inter-
relation, and so be regarded as concrete the nature of a
relation" (p. 109, 110). In this sense, "Working" is
every, does not refer to the system giving the role of
operator, for in fact, "Working" is a change in the
relation with reference to the role of an operator
and inseparable system of the relation in the role of an operator
we shall soon find ourselves with this fact that
whole notion of work organization of power, including in the
value of the world is no less for human beings to regard it
(p. 111). Again in fact, "Working" is a method which
has recognized itself from physical, material, the physical
connection of fact is not that of the physical system, but

as it is for religion that of eternal Redeemer of the world. This perpetual process is the very life of God, in which, besides the effort and the pain, He tastes, we must believe, the joy of victory won" (p. 412). From the foregoing it would seem that Absolutism forms the background of his book, but on account of the fact that he realizes the futility of maintaining the old conception of the Absolute he hopes, that by combining some aspects of positive religious theology with a modified form of Absolutism, to make the resultant a more satisfactory and tenable position. In the light of this, the question about which this criticism will center, arise: Did Pringle-Pattison succeed in establishing a position which satisfactorily combines with positive religious theology, and did he succeed in freeing himself from the Absolute as spectator? The main portion of what is to follow will concern itself chiefly with showing that Pringle-Pattison did not succeed in placing an affirmative answer beyond reasonable questioning.

Positive religious theology will be taken to mean that theology which is embodied in the Christian religion and tradition. From this point of view it seems fair to put two questions which Rev. Mackintosh so well frames in the words, "How far is Professor Pringle-Pattison's view of God and the Absolute capable of being combined with belief in the divine

Fatherhood?" And, "can his statements as to the relations of Reality and the time-process be harmonised with faith in divine revelation?" (Contemporary Review, Vol. 112, p. 650).

Throughout the book Fringle-Pattison uses the terms Absolute, All, and God interchangeably. (see pp. 152, 156, 337).

Not only are these terms mentioned used interchangeably, but he specifically states and maintains that man and God are mutually dependent. In this connection he says that: "most people would probably be willing to admit this mediated existence in the case of man, but they might feel it add to sacrifice to make the same assertion of God. And yet, if our metaphysic is, as it professes to be, an analysis of experience, the implication is strictly reciprocal" (p. 254).

In the light of the whole work it seems to mean as Rev. Mackintosh suggests, "that God needs man for existence just as man needs God—their relation of interdependence being comparable to that of conceive and complex" (Cont. Review, Vol. 122, p. 681). If this be a correct interpretation (and it seems to coincide with the general trend of thought) religion cannot and will not accept it. For religion man is dependent upon God, but God is dependent upon nothing. To say that God and man are mutually interdependent seems to lend itself to the same criticism that Fringle-Pattison advanced

against James when he postulates God as "one of the eachees". His objection to God as "one of the eachees" is that it places God in the same numerical series and upon somewhat the same level as man. If God is dependant upon man just as man is upon God, how can God be taken out of this numerical series to which Pringle-Pattison objects?

Let us now consider whether or not the statements of Pringle-Pattison in regard to the relations of Reality and the time-process can be harmonised with faith in divine revelation. Though Pringle-Pattison admits the importance of time in the discussion of God and His relation to the world, he finally concludes that God is timeless and unchanging. He says, "our conclusion must be that progress is predicable only of the part which can interact with other parts, and, such interaction, has the nature of the whole to draw upon. It is unintelligible as applied to the whole, and the temporal view of things cannot therefore be ultimate" (p. 383). He agrees with Bradley when he states that "in any case there is no history or progress in the Absolute". Religion without a doubt repudiates any idea of God which makes Him subject to change and to that extent Pringle-Pattison's position and positive religious theology go hand in hand. In this connection Rev. Mackintosh points out: "God's relation to man it appears to

Christian thought, has not merely been revealed in the past; it has somehow been developed; for a moral relationship, as it grows, becomes increasingly reciprocal, and religion is in essence a fellowship". A little further on he adds, "it is a simple fact to say that for millions the relationship of God and man has been transformed through the advent of Jesus Christ. He meets us in the domain of historic movement—a different type of reality from nature—in which we ourselves live; there He accredits Himself as the crucial fact by which the being and the purpose of the living God are decisively revealed" (Cont. Review, Vol. 112, p. 656).

Rusdall advances an attack from a slightly different angle to that from which Mackintosh does, centering about the question of causality. He quotes the following directly from Pringle-Pattison: "Activity as I am now using the term is the characteristic of the living and the conscious being alone; any application of the term, or any transference of the associations, to the happenings of physical nature and the causal relations between one phenomenon and another is rightly branded as anthropomorphism. . . . The facts of life and of mind cannot be truly described, in short, except teleologically, that is to say as activity directed towards some end" (p. 357). "It is true", says Rusdall, "that he goes on to insist that 'the end may be "in" the creature rather than consciously present to it' (Mind, 1918, p. 272). Activity,

as described, must surely be that of lower living creatures.

"If this is the way", continues Rashdall, "in which he would propose to think of activity in the Divine Mind, if he is going to make the purposiveness of the Divine Mind unconscious, he is not faithful to the principle which he adopts as the fundamental principle of his Philosophy—the principle that the lower can only be explained by the higher, and that we ought to think of God in the light of highest kind of existence which is immediately known to man" (Mind, 1918, p. 272). He concludes this point by asking the question: "Must not the principle carry with it the application to God of the same kind of causality that we are conscious of in ourselves" (Mind, 1918, p. 273)?

Thus far it seems that Pringle-Pattison is well aware of the demands required of one who attempts to bring about a fusion of the two schools before mentioned, and many passages might be cited along with the few that have been given that are more or less congenial to the positive religious position, but even at that, on account of his Absolutistic tendencies he has failed to show how the Absolute is capable of being combined with belief in the divine Fatherhood, which is a fundamental tenet of Christianity; and has failed to relate in a satisfactory way, Reality and the time-process to the faith in the divine Revelation, which, likewise is necessary

to gain the support of positive religious theology. If such be true, we may safely state that since Christianity cannot accept his position, there is little left of the position except that which tends toward Absolute Idealism. Hence we are brought to our next question; does he succeed in eluding the Absolute Idealistic position?

The nature of the answer to the question just stated depends largely upon the conclusion reached in regard to the question of time. Bringle-Pattison must reach an Absolute whose life is a participation in the life of Humanity and Humanity's life a sheering of the Absolute, or an Absolute similar to that of Bradley.

To begin with it is a fundamental contention of Bringle-Pattison that time is unreal, hence the Absolute, the All, the Universe is timeless. Since the reality of time is denied is there any to avoid Absolutism? Let us then consider the ways in which he hopes to save himself from Absolutism. He states that his idea of God is, "no God, or Absolute, existing in solitary bliss and perfection, but a God who lives in the perpetual giving of Himself, who who shares the life of His finite creatures bearing in and with them the whole burden of their finitude, their sinful wanderings and sorrows, and the suffering without which they

cannot be made perfect" (p. 411). In another place he states that "the universe is in no sense a finished fact; it is an act, a continuous life or process which (to speak in terms of time) is perpetually being accomplished" (p. 413). Again, "creation . . . must be taken . . . as expressing the essential of the divine life" (p. 414). These statements, in the event that they are consistent with his attitude towards time, would enable him to steer clear of the Absolute Idealistic position, but it is difficult to see how such statements will lend themselves to a position which maintains that time is unreal. In the first statement he says that we have a living "God who shares in the perpetual giving of himself, who shares the life" etc. (italics mine). How can such a statement be comprehended except in a temporal way? The words "lives, giving and shares" imply action which means motion—change. There is but one way by which we may come to appreciate the meaning of these terms and that only by conceiving that they connote happenings of some sort, and we cannot have happenings unless they happen in time. If this be true then the terms mentioned would be utterly meaningless without the temporal connotation. The word "life" likewise implies action. How can life be conceived unless there be growth? For growth to have meaning there must be change for what sig-

nificance has growth without change? Life then, means change, and the same criticism advanced above applies in this instance. Fringle-Pattison then, has this dilemma: God which is timeless and God which is active, hence temporal. If on the other hand he accepts the former he automatically consigns himself to the Absolutist's school, and on the other hand if he accepts the latter his whole work will be a mass of inconsistencies, which would make the work valueless. It appears from this then that he must cling to the former, for in doing so he will choose the lesser of the two evils, as it were. As a result of this he has to give up one of his contentions upon which he relied to save him from an Absolute Idealistic conclusion.

His next contention is that "the universe is in no sense a finished fact; it is an act, a continuous life or process which (to speak in terms of time) is perpetually being accomplished" (p. 413). As has been previously stated Fringle-Pattison uses such terms as God, All and the Absolute interchangeably. In addition to these three it appears that there is possibly another to be added to the list for he says that "by universe I mean here the All of existence" (p. 254). From this it seems legitimate to substitute in the above quotation to make it read: God is in no sense a finished fact; He is an act, a continuous life or process which is per-

actually being accomplished. By this substitution the dilemma is clear, and it is likewise clear that such a statement is untenable and completely out of tune with the idea of a timeless reality. To allow such a statement would at once nullify his whole idealistic conception of God. Acceptance of this statement would make his position closely akin to that held by William James whom he criticises severely. It is clear then, that one of his statements with which he hoped to save himself from Absolutism is untenable. The third statement cited; "creation . . . must be taken . . . as expressing the essential nature of the divine life is, in essence, coincident with the two preceding quotations, hence the same argument advanced in the discussion of them will apply with equal weight to the one in question.

Out of the question of time grows the question of the moral responsibility of man, whence the question: Does the finite individual create the moral values to some extent, or are they the product of the Absolute and just discovered by the finite individual? In other words; do individuals create values in addition to what God creates? If on the one hand Hingle-Pattison denies that individuals create anything he

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he will have to accept a part of Bradleian Absolute and if on the other hand he admits that individuals do actually create he will consign himself to a position similar to that of James. It is between these two positions that he vibrates. On the one side of the fence, so to speak, we find such statements as; "keep in view at once the transcendent being of God", and "God means, for philosophy at all events, not simply or primarily the existence of another self-conscious Being, but rather the infinite values of which his life is the eternal fruition and which are freely offered to all spirits for their appropriation and enjoyment" (p. 454). Again, "but the finite world, as centred in finite spirits, I have also contended, is not to be regarded as a mere appearance, existing only from the finite point of view; it is metaphysically real, as founded in the nature of God himself" (p. 414). On the other side are such statements as; "the life of the finite individual, as it builds up its true self, is thus a continual process of self-transcendence; its true personality or individuality does not lie in unshareable feelings, but in the richness and variety of its thoughts and interests" (p. 263). Again, "it is in and through finite individuals that the divine triumph is worked out, and each of our actions and choices is therefore integral to the total results" (p. 415). The

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as founded in the nature of the human mind. (p. 114). In the
other side are such statements as: "The life of the individual is
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which is the life is a new philosophy of life, but in the life
and the variety of the human mind and interests. (p. 115).
Again, "It is in the new philosophy of life that the life
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is therefore integral to the new philosophy. (p. 116). The

first two statements, especially the second one, intimate a denial of the creative activity of the individual when he says, "rather the infinite values (which I take it means the real values) of which His life is the eternal fruition and which are freely offered to all spirits for their appropriation and enjoyment" (italics mine) one might legitimately infer that God alone is the creator of values and that the individual simply discovers them. True it is that there is an implication of choice, but even at that the fact remains that God alone is the creator and that even though the individual does exercise some degree of choice it becomes exceedingly difficult to see how such choice can affect God. God then, is, in a way, transcendent inasmuch as He remains unaffected by the action of the individual. The third statement seems to me to be slightly ambiguous as far as the first part is concerned—I fail to comprehend the meaning of "finite point of view". That latter portion, however, indicates clearly that as far as finite spirits are concerned they are to be found in the nature of the Absolute. The last two quotations indicate quite the opposite point of view for in them it is evident that individual creation is recognised and that individuals do affect God. Now comes the question: which one of these best fit with the basic elements of Pringle-Pattison's philosophy? We have seen that one of the fundamental contentions of Pringle-Pattison is the denial that

time is ultimately real, how is it possible to conceive of a universe where there are individual creations? If values are made by God and discovered by finite creatures, it seems that time does not have to be ultimately real.

We have now reached the point, I think, where it is evident that Pringle-Pattison must, even though he does not wish to, take up the Absolutist position similar to that of Bradley and Bosanquet. Certainly he cannot take the position to which some of the quotations cited will lead for they indicate the positions against which he spends great time and space for criticism. There is but one alternative that is left open and that is to content himself to the school of Absolute Idealism.


In conclusion we have seen that Pringle-Pattison is intimately acquainted with the criticisms advanced against both James and Bradley, and we have seen how he attempted to build and maintain a mid-way position, tempering it, as it were, with the Christian theistic tradition; and then it was pointed out that there are a number of serious inconsistencies involved in such a position that make the position extremely shaky. Even at that the work is a noble attempt at reconciliation, and though the actual content of the book may do little toward a final reconciliation (if there be such) of the two schools, it will in all probability, by the spirit


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
of the writer, which seems to permeate the whole volume,
be instrumental in bringing the two schools to a closer
and better understanding.

of the subject, which seems to promote the main object,
be instrumental in bringing the two objects to a closer
and better understanding.









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