

Thinking Federally:
An Experimental Test of How Americans Think about Federalism

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Abstract

The extant literature on federalism and American public opinion suggests two contradictory theories about how individuals may think about intergovernmental relations. The dominant perspective argues that Americans simply do not consider federalism when making policy evaluations; their preferences overwhelm more abstract considerations of governing principles. Recently, however, several scholars have argued that even if Americans do not make legalistic or theoretical references to federalism, they often think “intuitively” about intergovernmental politics. This study presents the results of a survey experiment deliberately designed to adjudicate these two hypotheses by manipulating the level of government proposing a specific policy across treatment groups. In all but two policy domains, individuals do not consider the centralized-decentralized nature of the policy proposal. For education and police policies, individuals do consider the intergovernmental implications of the policy, but these considerations are highly mediated by respondent’s partisan identification. Overall, it appears that individuals can think “intuitively” about American federalism, but that they choose to do so only in limited domains and political contexts. Overwhelmingly, individual preference for government activity obscures concerns for federalism when making policy evaluations.

Who's Thinking About Federalism Anymore?

If a central tenet of liberal democracy is that public opinion should guide policy development and implementation (Dahl, 1956), then the passage of *No Child Left Behind* was a glowing example of the health of America's democratic system. Despite the contentious circumstances surrounding his election, President George W. Bush made good on a major campaign promise and pushed through Congress a major package of reforms that dramatically changed the way that states, localities, and the national government interacted in providing public K-12 education. Governors, teacher's unions, and business leaders joined the President in the summer of 2001 to publicize the proposed requirements that would dramatically alter how individual schools assessed and reported student progress. The House overwhelmingly supported the groundbreaking legislation 384-45 and the Senate followed just days later with a 91-8 vote of confidence in the new federal plan. An August 2002 Gallup poll confirmed the President's aspirations with 57 percent of Americans saying, "that an increase in the federal government's involvement in local public school affairs will be a good thing. The public demanded reform and elected leaders followed with carefully deliberated policy prescriptions.

Alternatively, it is easy to see how the increasing federal role in education, and the public's ambivalence towards an "expansion of prescriptive federal authority," fundamentally challenges those delicate relationships between states, localities, and the national government (Rhodes 2012, 147). Patrick McGuinn had to reckon with the fact that "for much of American history, the principle of federalism exerted a powerful restraining influence on the size and character of the federal role in education - but that time appears to have passed" (2005, 67-68). This one example of policy nationalization is even more surprising given that it originated inside a relatively conservative White House. For public opinion and policy scholars, the question should be - who was thinking about federalism when the public sung the praises of *No Child Left Behind*?

This paper seeks to contribute to our broader understanding of how individuals evaluate policy alternatives with respect to federalism, by exploring whether citizens hold distinct, independent beliefs about the distribution of policy responsibility across multiple levels of government, or whether the desire for certain policy outcomes overwhelm considerations of abstract, theoretical governing principles. Answering this question requires that we compare respondents' preferences for policy implementation at the local, state, and

national levels. It also requires that we isolate the public's preference for a policy outcome from a considered belief about federalism, and other related covariates - namely, partisan identity. I develop and employ an experimental survey design, where respondents are randomly assigned to a local, state, or national "treatment condition. In doing so, I solve this second problem and determine whether an independent preference for intergovernmental policy authority is present. I then use an ordered logistic regression to precisely measure heterogeneous treatment effects to determine whether the public holds varied preferences for local, state, or federal action in a specific policy domain, and whether those federalism considerations vary among Democrats, Independents, and Republicans. Using an ordered logistic regression, I move beyond descriptive analysis and model the associations between preferences and principles. Specifically, by interacting the variations in policy proposals with respondent's partisan identification, I find that respondent's partisan affiliation moderates their propensity to "think federally," in those policy domains where there is some considered support for federal policy responsibility.

For what consensus exists in American political behavior, most would agree that it is highly unlikely that citizens would consider more ideological, theoretical, or legalistic concerns when choosing between policy alternatives. This paper provides a theoretical framework and empirical evidence that comports with the more widespread finding that individuals are not necessarily motivated by more abstract governing values, but instead evaluate potential policies with respect to their overall preferences about government action. Overall, across a range of policy domains, citizens do not consider the level of government implementing a policy when expressing their preference for a particular policy. Rather, Americans are outcome oriented - given a policy whose effects they prefer, individuals want it implemented at any level of government. However, when federalism is an especially salient feature of a political debate, individuals seem willing to consider the capacities and responsibilities of their multiple governments. But, this belief is highly structured by their partisan identification and the political contours of the political debate. In the final analysis, individuals' beliefs about federalism are neither fixed nor "intuitive, but rather highly malleable and context-specific. The findings presented in this paper do not mean to suggest that federalism is an anachronistic notion or that it has little effect on policy development or implementation. Rather the evidence leads us to consider the very specific circumstances in which the public vocalizes their preference for intergovernmental policy

responsibility. Moreover, while liberals and conservatives both bring federalism concerns with them, they do so in drastically different ways. If anything, these findings suggest that the role that partisan elites, institutional safeguards, and policy feedback play are even more important to maintaining the federal system.

The Search for Federalism

The American public's embrace and appreciation of federalism was for most of the 20th Century taken as a given. No one more artfully rooted the safeguards of federalism in the people themselves than Martin Diamond (1973). Responding to the momentous era of centralization that accompanied the Johnson administration and the Warren Court, Diamond remained convinced that "the American people as a whole understand in their bones that decentralist-federalism is the constitutional matrix of the American political way of life" and that they would "not lightly abandon so protean an institution" (152).

Paradoxically, as the balance between national and state governments has grown since Diamond's assertion, survey researchers have become more interested in American's propensity to engage with the complexities of federated government. Over the last two decades, numerous studies have advanced a surprising finding about the public individuals are not only capable of thinking about federalism, but do so often. This new school of "intuitive" federalism stands in contrast to the more traditional accounts of political psychology that stress individuals' limited propensity to think ideologically or bring abstract theoretical principles with them when making policy evaluations.

Stable Partisanship, Elusive Principles

Federalism scholars were relatively late to the behavioral revolution in political science, but quick to explore the popular foundations of federalism's durability. While the American National Election Studies had, on occasion, asked questions about state politics, it was not until the mid-1970s that scholars began to seriously investigate how the American public thought about its multiple governments sharing power. Reeves and Glending's (1976) first survey (and Reeves' own follow-up ten years later) of citizen attitudes

was concerned with how well respondents could correctly identify local, state, and federal responsibilities, how much trust or confidence respondents had in their three governing institutions and leaders, and with how well respondents felt each level of government was currently performing. Finding similarly low levels of political information and sophistication in the federalism-arena, these scholars turned to analyze federalism as if it were a deeply held, principled value.¹ Not only did a values approach remain consistent with the dominant trends in behavioral political science, it related well to how the more traditional schools of American political science discussed federalism and the public's supposed embrace of decentralized governance. For example, Daniel Elazar (1972) argued that principled stands in favor of federalism were highly related to differing levels of moral traditionalism, individualism, and moral universalism.

However, the values approach yielded few robust occurrences of the public taking federalism seriously. Thompson and Elling (1999) found that in the abstract, most respondents supported devolution of governing authority to states and localities, but, "when given a choice that more closely resembles those available to policy makers, however, most respondents prefer that multiple governments provide a range of services" (152). Similarly, Cantril and Cantril (1999) argued that "it can be difficult...to conclude...that the public has strong views one way or the other regarding which level of government is appropriate for a broad area of public policy" (38). More recently, Cutler (2008) found similar evidence for individuals' inability to assign policy responsibility across different levels of government, concluding that "some of voters' vagueness is a reflection of the well-documented rational ignorance of citizens in modern democracies (651). Wlezien and Soroka (2010) extended this logic, writing that federalism, "leads to a public that is limited in its ability to hold governments accountable for policy actions," because citizens have "difficulty knowing which government is doing what" (p. 44). In general, the repeated non-finding of a federalism value comports with well-documented findings that Americans are not only poorly informed about politics, but that their opinions on basic policy questions vary significantly over time (Campbell, et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Converse 2000; Delli Carpini 2005; Lewis-Beck, et al. 2008). In looking for the individual roots of decentralized governance, federalism has remained an elusive governing principle inside

¹It was also around this time that psychologists had also turned their attention to the study of values, seeking to find, as the influential Milton Rokeach (1973) stated, "an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence" (5; also see Feldman 2003).

the minds of most voters.

However, scholars of American political development have long noted the importance of political contingency in how the public and political elites discuss federalism. Emergencies, like war and economic catastrophe have led to sporadic, but intense conversations and redefinitions of the local-state-nation compact (see, for example: Robertson 2012; Milkis 1993; Skowronek 1983). Derthick (2009) explains that majorities have been more willing to cede authority to the national government to the detriment of local and state prerogatives because “historically, danger has driven centralization, and today the country does not feel safe (6). Furthermore, in elucidating how critical parties have been for maintaining the compound Republic, Milkis (1999) recognizes how disruptive Progressive era reforms on political parties were in weakening citizen’s connections and engagement with local and state governments. He writes that, “highly decentralized party structures insured that national campaigns and controversies focused on the partisan activities of townships, wards, and cities, thus cultivating a delicate balance between local and national community” (123). With changes to the once dominant decentralized, party system, it became all the more challenging for citizens to place themselves and their politics in the complicated federal structure. Jessica Bulman-Pozens (2014) recent work on, *Partisan Federalism*, provides the most coherent explanation for this type of context-specific federalism. In her account, “partisanship motivates individuals to identify with and feel loyal to the states as well as the nation in complicated and shifting, but nonetheless significant ways” (1112). Local, state, and federal party organizations all advance partisan agendas and their success in implementing their policy goals is dependent on whether they are the majority party at the local, state, or federal level. When out-of-power at the national level, the partisan federalist framework recognizes that parties, and their partisans, will become more favorable to policy devolution “federalism provides the institutional terrain for disputes that are substantive in nature” (Ibid., 1080). Moreover, since most individual attitudes are dependent on the stated positions of political party elites, changing party positions can alter individuals’ prior attitudes, including beliefs about whether a specific level of government should be active in a policy domain (Carsey and Layman 2006; Cohen 2003; Layman and Carsey 2002). Specific political contexts have determined how federalism enters the public discourse, and the arrangement of governing authority has determined what stances both political parties will take on the federalism issue.

Conlan's (1993) survey research has also suggested that while there exist some historical instances when the public has held distinct views on intergovernmental policy authority, these were likely highly contextualized, temporary responses to the political environment as opposed to enduring opinions. Individual's preferences for policy outcomes, especially as defined by the Republican and Democratic party, are largely responsible for determining individual positions on public policies that have federalism implications. As far as Americans have the capability to think genuinely about federalism, their consideration of it is attenuated by what political groups they affiliate with, what those groups are saying, and how loud that message is (Zaller 1992). Federalism may not be the primary consideration when individuals make policy evaluations, but under certain circumstances, it can have a decided impact on whether individuals favor a specific public policy. As Democrats and Republicans become more ideologically homogeneous and distinct (see especially, Persily 2015), the ability of the average individual to align his or her partisan identification with an abstract consideration of federalism is also likely to increase. Yet, this "partisan sorting" (Levendusky 2009) does not suggest that the majority of Americans are newly formed ideologues, or are more reliant on abstract governing principles. Rather, as the two political parties become increasingly homogeneous and distinct, the partisan message becomes clearer, increasing the likelihood that an attitude might change to match the party's current position (Zaller 1992). Consequently, when there does appear to be a popular foundation for federalism in the American public, it is a) fleeting b) contingent on the nature of elite debate c) attenuated by partisan identification. In other words, the widespread appreciation and durable support for federalism as theorized by Diamond seems utterly lacking in public opinion.

Socialized to Think "Intuitively" about Federalism

The lack of conclusive evidence supporting principled federalism has led some behavioral political scientists to search for more implicit appreciations or understandings of intergovernmental politics. For example, Arceneaux (2005) finds that, "for the most part, individuals attribute solution responsibility to the order of government they believe to be functionally responsible when they think it is doing a good job" (308). This is true even in specific, highly technical policy domains, where citizens are able to consider the scope and size of policy problems when attributing governing authority (Koninsky 2011). Cole and Kincaid's

(2006) surveys of citizen attitudes towards intergovernmental policies confirm that over the past 30 years, while support for the federal government continues to wane, Americans largely remain supportive of their local and state governments (see also: Kincaid and Cole 2008; Cole, Kincaid, and Parkin 2002). These findings have been buttressed with a host of additional scholarship linking citizen conceptions of trust, loyalty, and government capacity to perceptions of intergovernmental responsibility (Shaw and Reinhart 2001; Theiss-Morse 2001; Pettys, 2003; Alm, Buschman, and Sjoquist 2011; Moore and Giovinazzo 2011).

Kam and Mikos (2007) experimental study has done much to advance the possibility that individuals engage with principled federalism, even in highly specific policy debates. Their survey manipulated question wording to measure the effect that elite appeals to federalism had on individual opinions concerning euthanasia. They exposed half their sample to a six-sentence ‘frame’ that explicitly framed the debate over Congress’ 2005 proposed ban on doctor-assisted suicide in arguments over federalism. The frame introduced common federalism-related ideas such as the need to respect state sovereignty, the fear of Congressional encroachment, the need to maintain precedent, and the traditional authority of states, namely Oregon, to decide euthanasia policy. The other group received arguments concerning the “individual rights” frame that often accompanies euthanasia policy debates.² When exposed to the federalism frame, respondents were more likely to oppose a Congressional ban of Oregon’s euthanasia law. Not only were individuals capable of thinking about federalism in meaningful ways, the differences were so substantive that Kam and Mikos claimed that “ordinary citizens play a role in policing the limits of federal power...because they value federalism” (623).

Schneider and Jacoby (2012, 2013) have advanced a unifying theoretical notion that Americans are “intuitive federalists.” They argue that Americans, “appreciate the division of responsibilities across different levels of government, perhaps without taking into account the philosophical underpinnings or institutional rationales for the existing arrangements” (2013, 2). “Intuitive Federalism” allows for the possibility that individuals bring sophisticated political concepts with them when considering the distribution of power in a federated system. Individuals can hold and develop these positions even if they remain unaware of the language, ideology, or history of federalism that surrounds them.

²This frame was just as long as the federalism frame, but focused on patient privacy, doctor-patient relationships, and the pain those with terminal conditions have.

Making this leap, a major finding in the “intuitive federalism” literature is that “public opinion about policy responsibilities shows clear differentiations that closely reflect the actual policy activities within the U.S. federal system” (Schneider, Jacoby, and Lewis 2011, 12). This is significant because individual experience with current distributions of governing authority is a key mechanism by which citizens begin to recognize that one level of government is suited for a specific policy domain. As they write in their most recent paper, “citizens *just recognize* that state and local governments are more suitable for providing such things as education systems...thus, everyday experience helps people to sort out the complexities of the political system, without any need to consider the abstract principles that established the system in the first place” (2013, 12, italics added) This direct experience with federated institutions sharing power exerts a strong socializing force on most individuals. Americans develop their political attitudes witnessing the states directing some policies, and the national government controlling others. For example, *all* individuals, not just Democrats or Republicans, come to understand federalism by attending their locally controlled schools or by reading about the latest immigration debates in Congress.

While Schneider and Jacoby (2011, 2012, 2013) never make the explicit claim, they present “intuitive federalism” as a type of psychological predisposition in how individuals come to evaluate the relative capacities and constitutional responsibilities of their multiple governments. While citizens do not need to be legal experts in order to hold meaningful beliefs about federalism, they do require a level of political sophistication and abstraction that might be at odds with how most people think about politics. To date, there are no longitudinal studies of “intuitive federalism” that would show whether these beliefs are consistent across time. Nor do existing studies, including Schneider and Jacoby’s, demonstrate how much individuals prefer one level of government to the others within specific policy domains. Finally, in order to determine the extent to which an individual’s intuition about federalism is cogent, it is necessary to distinguish individual preference for the policy outcome from the belief about which level of government, if just one, should implement that policy. In short, the intuitive federalism thesis has necessary, but insufficient evidence to claim that this is how Americans really think about federalism.

Empirical Implications and Hypotheses

The extant literature on federalism and public opinion provides two competing hypotheses of how individuals form and express their attitudes about federalism and its relation to public policy.

Hypothesis₁ Partisanship over Principles: An individual's support or opposition to a legislative proposal is a function of the individual's partisan identification. If federalism affects an individual's support for the policy, it will only affect members of one party within a specific policy domain.


Hypothesis₂ Intuitive Federalism: If individuals think intuitively about federalism, then as the implementing governing authority changes from the local, state, and federal governments, the probability that the respondent approves of the policy changes. Preference for the policy is a function of which government proposed the policy and this relationship remains constant across the ideological spectrum.

Across a range of issues, individuals are “thinking federally” when they make clear, substantively large distinctions between local, state, and national implementation of the policy. When individuals, regardless of their partisan identification, age, level of formal education, race, or the like, are making these distinctions, we can say they are “thinking intuitively” about federalism. There might be some demographical nuance, but by and large, the average individual holds a distinct preference for one level of government to implement a policy over others. Alternatively, if and when these distinct preferences for local, state, or national control do not emerge, it is then necessary to take another cut of the data and explore whether preferences change with regards to some important underlying predisposition - namely party identification. It might be the case that only *some* individuals are “thinking federally” and only in a limited number of policy domains. If this is the case, while there might be limited evidence to support the “intuitive federalism” hypothesis, there still exist avenues in which public opinion maintains decentralized policy-making - through the parties. For example, it might be the case that, on average, individuals do not hold clear preferences for local, state, or national implementation of immigration policy. However, partisan differences might be masked by averaging up policy approval; it might very well be the case that Republicans do hold distinct preference for or against implementing immigration policy at one level, while Democrats make no distinction. Such a finding runs counter to the implicit socialization process that undergirds the second hypothesis (“intuitive federalism”), but does suggest that party identification and accompanying elite messages are able

to alter individuals’ preferences for federated policy implementation.

The two graphs within figure one help to illustrate how the competing hypotheses lead to different empirical implications. For hypothetical purposes, consider a proposal to increase spending on mass transit projects, an issue domain that involves localities, the states, and the national government. In considering the two hypotheses, each theory suggests a different potential distribution of aggregate favorability with regards to the level of government proposing the policy and individuals’ partisan identification.

Figure 1: Hypothetical Distributions of Individual Preferences for Proposed Mass Transit Construction



If individuals primarily rely on their partisan identification for “thinking federally,” aggregate respondent preferences would follow a pattern similar to that in the left-side figure. For this hypothetical policy, there are clear partisan divisions in whether and to what extent respondents favor mass transit construction. Democrats seem not to care which level of government takes the lead in new mass transit construction. Republicans, on the other hand, do have clear preferences for local implementation. This is just one potential manifestation of the partisan federalism hypothesis. Democrats, for example could disagree with the proposal at all levels of government implementation, or overall support for the policy could be lower among both parties. The distinction in favorability by government level is what signifies the presence of a considered federalism belief. Moreover, in order for this preference-pattern to support the first hypothesis, two additional features need to be true. First, this particular policy would stand alone, or among few others, in having distinct preferences across the three levels of government; this corresponds to the theory’s insistence

on federalism's infrequent appearance in public discourse. In this case, there would need to be additional evidence that at the time of this survey, political elites were debating mass transit construction spending along partisan lines. Second, the distribution would have to relate to current distributions of governing authority in a logical way; this corresponds to how, parties use the federal framework to advance their different programmatic goals depending on whether they control the national government.³ In 2015, with Democrats in the White House, partisan federalism predicts that Republicans would favor greater devolution of policies to states and localities, if the policy was politically contentious.

If individuals think intuitively about federalism, respondent preferences would follow a pattern similar to that in the right-side figure. One of the distinguishing features of the intuitive federalism hypothesis is that, on average, all Americans distinguish between the local, state, and federal governments when assigning policy authority. Therefore, there is no need to disaggregate survey respondents by party identification, or any other pertinent demographic information. As the histogram shows, this is clearly the case. There are distinct differences across the different levels of government in how much individuals prefer mass transit construction - differences that are solely dependent on whether the Congress, the respondents' state legislatures, or their local governments are implementing the policy. Since the policy itself did not change, attitudinal differences across the three groups is a function of which level of government was proposing the policy. In this hypothetical example, 80 percent of respondents preferred mass transit construction when it would be Congressionally controlled, while only 40 percent of respondents prefer the same policy when implemented by their local government. In the logic of intuitive federalism, respondents thought about the capacity and/or Constitutional arrangement of powers alongside their overall preference for the policy outcome, all without explicitly engaging concerns over federalism.

³Divided government poses a particular challenge to the partisan federalism hypothesis since it is not clear which party controls the national government. Bulman-Pozen (2014) argues that individuals understand their party's success and relative strength primarily through control of the presidency. Therefore, in the above example, it is conceivable that Democrats, having control of the White House, make no federalism distinction, whereas Republicans, lacking relative power, prefer to implement the policy through the states or localities - institutions where they might still exhibit some political control.

Data and Methods

While there are clear empirical predictions that emerge from this set of competing hypotheses, there is no simple test to determine whether individuals are relying on some principled, albeit “intuitive,” consideration in favor of federalism, or whether they are relying on party cues to develop preferences for federated policy implementation. Previous tests have asked respondents to specify which level of government they want to “take the lead” in an abstract policy domain (i.e. “education,” “health care”). While such tests have considerably advanced the possibility of the intuitive federalism hypothesis, it is necessary to determine the degree of preference respondents have between local, state, and national implementation. Additionally, the best test of the intuitive federalism hypothesis is one that taps most cleanly into the “intuitive” considerations individuals bring with them in making distinctions between local, state, and national implementation. It does not allow other considerations (like a principled belief in limited government) or demographics (like party identification) to mask the preference for specific government control of a given policy. Since intuitive federalism depends on individuals recognizing the geo-political implications of a given policy, we can best test this hypothesis by manipulating, and only manipulating, the geo-political nature of a policy proposal. The following test does this by altering the polity-name and implementing government specific to the respondent for each proposed policy.

A survey experiment which randomly assigns respondents to a local, state, and federal treatment will be able to adjudicate each of the theories’ distinct claims. Within each treatment group, respondents evaluated a series of concrete policy proposals that either their *personal and specific* local, state, or federal government could potentially consider. Across the three groups, only the implementing government agent changed in the policy description. One of the most difficult issues faced when studying the public’s preferences for intergovernmental policy responsibility is teasing out considerations over federalism from other related judgments. To test the presence of a distinct value, it is necessary to distinguish the federalism belief from beliefs about the policy’s likely utility for that individual. Most perniciously for federalism research, it is also necessary to distinguish judgments about the policy’s implications for federalism from other related beliefs, like an individual’s preference for the overall size of government or preference for overall amount of

government spending. By randomly assigning individuals to treatment groups that only vary the implementing agent across local, state, and national governments, these related considerations are equally dispersed, thereby isolating federalism's prominence in public opinion. Aggregated preferences from each one of the treatment groups indicates the average level of support for the local, state, or federal implementation of the specific policy and an ordered logistic regression including a measure of individual's partisan identification provides a simultaneous test of the above theories.

Since no existing experimental data exist to test the two hypotheses, I designed a survey experiment that measures public opinion on a number of policy issues. By extending the scope of the survey beyond just one issue, we can assess the extent to which federalism affects broader public opinion. To effectively engage with the substantive implications of federalism and public opinion, I only analyzed issues in which local, state, and federal governments could all conceivably implement policies. Therefore, this survey experiment does not test whether citizens have prior beliefs over what level of government is best suited for national defense or administering Social Security. However, in taking cues from previous research (notably Schneider and Jacoby, 2013), the survey asks participants to evaluate seven issue areas in which there are considerable implications for intergovernmental policy administration. While not the universe of all potential federalism-related policies, the tested policies represent a diverse set of issues that will help determine whether individuals think about intergovernmental relations when making policy evaluations. Table 1 lists the issue areas and corresponding policy proposals used in the survey.

The sample was restricted to individuals living within the United States and respondents did not know that they are taking part in a survey on their beliefs about American federalism. Rather, they were asked to respond to a series of questions meant to measure the public's opinion on a variety of recent policy proposals. The survey automatically assigned respondents to one of the three treatment groups, whereupon they saw a statement informing them that we would like to ask them about policies proposed in either the U.S. Congress, their state legislature, or a nearby local government. The survey treatment concerns the implementing government-agent of the realistic policy proposal.

Subjects randomly assigned to the first treatment group answered policy questions that just related

Table 1: Issue Areas and Corresponding Policy Proposals

Subjects evaluated policies within each of the following domains:

Education:	Law limiting the number of students allowed in any one class
Immigration:	Law requiring schools to check the immigration status of parents and students when enrolling
Police Training:	Increase the amount of training police receive to reduce violent confrontations
Minimum Wage:	Policy to raise the minimum wage in order to improve the economy
Indecency:	Law giving the government power to remove advertisements for “adult clubs” or “sex shops” off public roads
Vaccination:	Stricter requirement for mandatory vaccinations of diseases like the Measles
Corporate Taxes:	Policy to reduce the tax burden on companies employing less than 50 individuals

to the U.S. Congress. Using respondent ZIP codes, those subjects assigned to groups two and three received questions that were “micro-tailored” to their place of residence. For all policy questions in group two, “U.S. Congress” was replaced with the official name of the respondents’ state legislature, like “Virginia General Assembly.” General references to “the federal government” were replaced with a similarly general reference to “the state government.” Words like “nation” or “country” were likewise replaced with a reference to “state.” All other words were kept the same and questions were composed in a way to make these automatic changes seamless. Table 2 presents the actual text of the three treatments concerning a realistic education policy. For purposes of example, the relevant state and city are associated with the ZIP code 22903; a detailed explanation of how ZIP codes relate to treatment groups two and three is available in the Appendix. There is effectively no “control” group, since all policy questions must imply an implementing agent. However, since subjects are randomly distributed into the three groups (federal, state, local), differences in aggregated preference between the three groups are solely a function of differences in question wording.

Similar to group two, those subjects assigned to the local government treatment group also received questions that were specifically worded based on the ZIP code they previously entered. The final question wording in Table 2 shows how the survey replaced the name of the state legislature with a reference to the city council’s proper name, and more general references to the state name with the proper name of the locality. The example in Table 2 also highlights a few important features of the research design. In

Table 2: Experimental Treatments for Education Policy

Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the following conditions:

Federal Government (Group One)	You might remember from your own days in school that the number of students in a classroom can make a big difference in how well students learn. The U.S. Congress is thinking about setting a 20-student cap on the number of students in any one classroom. Are you in favor a federal cap on class size?
State Government (Group Two)	You might remember from your own days in school that the number of students in a classroom can make a big difference in how well students learn. The Virginia General Assembly is thinking about setting a 20-student cap on the number of students in any one classroom. Are you in favor a state cap on class size?
Local Government (Group Three)	You might remember from your own days in school that the number of students in a classroom can make a big difference in how well students learn. The Charlottesville City Council is thinking about setting a 20-student cap on the number of students in any one classroom. Are you in favor a local cap on class size?

order to adequately measure the effect that federalism concerns have on citizen attitudes, the questions only change the implementing government agent for each policy. Additionally, it must be realistic that any level of government could conceivably administer the policy. For example, it would not be worthwhile to ask about a new school building project in an education-related question since the likelihood of the federal government debating a single school construction projection is so improbable. However, it is likely that the U.S. Congress, a state legislature, and a municipal government could develop and implement legislation related to classroom size.

The survey was administered on April 15, 2015 between 1:00 p.m. and 6:30 p.m. using Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). There is some debate in the field on the validity of using MTurk for survey-based research, especially as it relates to claims of external validity - the ability to draw inferences about the survey sample to the broader population. These concerns, however, should not be conflated with the sustained internal validity of the experimental design (see: Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, 2012 and their use of MTurk to replicate findings across a variety of research designs). Table 5 reports the survey sample demographics.

A total of 606 respondents were solicited and paid \$0.45 for a completed survey, which took an average of 5.1 minutes to complete. As is to be expected with a MTurk sample, respondents were younger, whiter, more educated, and identified with the Democratic party at a higher rate than the U.S. adult population.

This will undoubtedly limit the study’s ability to speak to all American’s beliefs about federalism. However, the disproportionately high percentage of young, Democratic respondents can work for the study - if signs of intuitive federalism are present in this cohort, who many would suspect are least likely to hold these considerations, beliefs about intergovernmental relations may be more important than currently understood.

Table 3: Survey Sample Statistics

Sex	Male	Female					
	62.77%	36.90					
Age	18-30	31-45	46-54	54-64	65+		
	54.84%	32.18	5.25	6.57	1.15		
Political Participation	None	Limited	Some	Average	Much	High	
	14.76%	22.38	16.51	19.68	14.13	12.54	
Education	Some HS	HS Diploma	Some College	College Diploma	Some Grad.	Graduate Diploma	
	0.3%	8.3	35.6	40.3	4.7	10.5	
Race/Ethnicity	American Indian	Black	Asian	White	Hispanic	Other/No Answer	
	0.2%	6.4	7.8	74.6	6.7	4.3	
Party ID	Strong GOP	Weak GOP	Lean GOP	Indep.	Lean Dem.	Weak Dem.	Strong Dem.
	11.8%	5.1	7.2	18.2	14.6	19.4	23.7

Note: Row Percentages may not add up to 1.0 due to rounding. Source: List Experiment conducted on an Amazon MTurk Sample April 15, 2015

The order and presentation for the policy areas was randomized across respondents in order to mitigate question-order effects. Respondents only answered policy evaluation questions related to just one of the three levels of government - either the U.S. Congress, their state legislature, or their local government. This was done to ensure that the treatment was adequately received and that only “intuitive” concerns about intergovernmental politics affected their decision making; it would be a weak test of the “intuitive” federalism hypothesis if the intergovernmental nature of the study was transparent. In addition to the treatment battery, each respondent answered a set of demographic questions. Following the survey administration, respondents were debriefed on the purpose and design of the experiment. It was especially important to make subjects aware that the policy proposals were fictitious and that what matters for the study is not their actual opinion on the policy proposal, but the differences across treatment groups, based on what level of government was debating and implementing the policy. All policy questions gauged respondent preference using a 5-point Likert scale with 1 representing strong favorability and 5 representing strong opposition to the proposed

policy. For ease of interpretation, Figure 6 presents the percentage of respondents who “strongly favored” or “slightly favored” the proposed policy; point estimates for the Likert scale are presented in Table five of the Appendix. Additionally, table four presents the point estimates for the percentage of the sample favoring a given policy, along with 95 percent confidence intervals surrounding that estimate.

Table 4: Percent Favoring Proposed Policy

	<u>Congress</u>	<u>States</u>	<u>Locality</u>
Classroom Size	63.00%	72.06	65.87
	[56.25,69.75]	[65.85,78.27]	[59.37,72.36]
<i>N</i>	200	204	208
Immigration Checks	37.62	38.42	35.75
	[30.88,44.36]	[31.68,45.17]	[29.17,42.33]
<i>N</i>	202	203	207
Police Training	74.63	77.07	63.46
	[68.56,80.69]	[71.27,93.88]	[56.86,70.06]
<i>N</i>	201	205	208
Minimum Wage	68.66	70.59	71.15
	[62.19,75.12]	[64.28,76.89]	[64.95,77.36]
<i>N</i>	201	204	208
Indecent Advertisements	30.85	32.51	33.50
	[24.41,37.29]	[26.01,39.01]	[27.00,39.99]
<i>N</i>	201	203	206
Measles Vaccination	65.84	70.59	70.53
	[59.25,72.44]	[64.28,76.89]	[64.27,76.79]
<i>N</i>	202	204	207
Corporate Taxes	54.95	54.41	51.92
	[48.03,61.87]	[47.52,61.30]	[45.08,58.77]
<i>N</i>	202	204	208

Note: Cell entries are point estimates for the percentage of the population that “slightly favors” or “strongly favors” each policy proposal, with 95 percent confidence intervals in brackets. Estimates correspond to a five-point Likert Scale ranging from 1 “Strongly Favoring” to 5 “Strongly Opposed.”

A brief review of the descriptive results in Table 4 suggests little systematic difference in aggregate public opinion across the three treatment groups. However, a generalized linear model enables us to determine the association of each of the variables of interest (the treatment conditions), while also including an

additional covariate that might also moderate and potentially mask the treatment’s effect on the dependent variable. Respondents evaluated each policy on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.” Given the ordered categorical nature of the dependent variable, I specify the following mathematical relationship as follows:

$$\ell(\alpha_1, \beta_1, \beta_2 | y_i, x_i) = \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{m=1}^M \left[I_{i1} \ln \left(\frac{1}{1 + e^{-(C_m - y_i^*)}} - \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(C_{m-1} - y_i^*)}} \right) \right]$$

where the linear function is:

$$y_i^* = \alpha_1 + \beta_1(\textit{PartyIdentification}_i) + \beta_2(\textit{ImplementingGovernment}_i) + \beta_3((\textit{PartyIdentification}_i) * (\textit{ImplementingGovernment}_i))$$

where y_i^* is individual preference for a proposed policy on a 1 to 5 scale.

The goal of this regression analysis is to provide a precise estimate of the treatment effect across different values of self-reported partisan identification. By interacting the treatment with individual’s partisan identification, it is possible to further distinguish between the partisan model and intuitive federalism model. An interactive relationship between the treatment indicators and the party identification variable models the moderating effects that an individual’s party identification has on their federalism beliefs. The goal of the GLM is not to build a perfectly predictive model of policy preference, nor is it to include an array of covariates that might “control” for the outcome of interest, since all these potential confounding variables are equally dispersed between the three treatment groups. Rather, the primary reason a GLM is necessary to analyze these results is the categorical nature of the dependent variable, and the heterogeneous treatment effects, conditioned by respondents’ partisan identification.

Given the interaction term, and in order to fully adjudicate the two theories, it is best to derive the marginal change in probability and the predicted probabilities for different values of individual liberalism (see Methodological Appendix for the two formulas for deriving the marginal changes with respect to partisan identification and the treatment).⁴

The first hypothesis is supported when the marginal change with respect to the treatment variable

⁴Given the specified interaction, there is no was to just analyze odds ratios or β coefficients; marginal changes are necessary to substantively interpret results.

(federalism prime) changes value over different levels of partisan identification (β_3). In effect, the first hypothesis predicts that Democrats and Republicans will respond differently to the experimental treatment in a few issue domains. Furthermore, there is strong evidence for the partisan theory when the association between party identification and the level of government implementing the policy does not change in most of the proposed policies. Essentially, because the first hypothesis stresses the contingent nature of the parties' positions on federalism, a "null" finding across several policy domains is expected; most of the time, individuals are not thinking about the federalism implications of a policy, regardless of partisanship. But, in a few rare instances, partisan identification moderates an individual's federalism preference.

The second hypothesis relates to the estimated value and significance of the marginal changes in probability with respect to X_2 .⁵ This value relates to the estimated size of the "treatment effect," which in this model determines how much an individual's intuitive concerns about federalism alter his or her preferences for the policy. A positive, significant marginal change in the probability of a given category with respect to the treatment condition indicates that by manipulating the implementing agent of the hypothetical policy, an individual's evaluation of that policy changed, with all other variables held constant through random assignment. Furthermore, the "intuitive federalism" hypothesis gains additional leverage if the size of the treatment effect does not drastically change across different levels of political ideology. In effect, a strong finding in favor of intuitive federalism would be that the marginal effect of the treatment is essentially the same for liberals and conservatives, and that the treatment is statistically significant from zero across different policy domains. There is relatively weaker (but not inconclusive) evidence for the second hypothesis if the marginal effect for the treatment are statistically distinguishable from zero, but only among a few political issues.

For those policies in which the marginal effect of the treatment remains statistically significant across partisan identification, we can then look at the slopes of the predicted probabilities for federal, state, and local policies for different values of partisan identification.⁶ I will determine that the treatment is marginally

⁵Since there are three treatments in this experiment, the model actually estimates two β parameters for the treatment effect (in effect, two dichotomous x-variables). The analysis, however, will not depend on interpreting β coefficients, and this discussion is intended to set-up what empirical indications of a given theory would look like.

⁶It is also necessary to consider the marginal changes in probability with respect to each of these two covariates because of the proportional odds assumption. If we were to rely on just the odds ratios to interpret the models' estimates, we would neglect to fully measure the nature of the independent variable, since an odds ratio can only speak to the odds of moving to a higher category, regardless of what that category may be. Accordingly, in the above interpretation, the odds of a respondent

significant across the ideological spectrum if the average marginal effect of the treatment conditions are statistically significant from zero for any outcome of the dependent variable; these are the results reported in Table 3.

Predicted probabilities for the policies that have marginally significant treatment effects more clearly relate to the empirical implications derived from the public opinion literature on partisan and “intuitive” federalism. The first implication in comparing predicted probabilities is the gap in preference for federal, state, and local implementation in a given policy. Large gaps between the three predicted probabilities indicate that there are sizable, enduring differences in how individuals think about federalism across the partisan spectrum - the treatment was “effective” regardless of partisan identification. Similar slopes, but different y-intercepts for predicted probabilities are the primary prediction out of the intuitive federalism literature and indicate that Democrats and Conservatives all think “intuitively” about federalism to the relatively same extent.

If the slopes for the predicted probabilities of a given policy change over different levels of partisan identification, then partisan identity is moderating the effect of the experimental treatment. In effect, the first hypothesis is supported as the predicted probabilities for approving Congressional, state, or local policies converge and diverge at different levels of partisan identification. Different slopes for the federal, state, and local treatments suggest that some individuals bring forth different considerations when primed to think about national policies as opposed to state implementation and local implementation, at least within a certain policy domain. Convergence of predicted probabilities at a specific partisan identifications suggests that only a subset of the population is thinking about federalism in making policy evaluations - a consideration that is attenuated by partisan identification. In effect, convergence is the result of all three treatment conditions becoming increasingly marginally indistinguishable as respondents become more or less Democratic or Republican.

changing their evaluation of a policy from “strongly opposed” to “slightly opposed” is the same as changing the evaluation from “neutral” to “slightly agree.” It is quite possible that the treatment condition exerts a different influence for different levels of the dependent variable. Specifically, the average treatment effect is likely to generate greater consideration moving within the categories of agreement and disagreement than between a “neutral” position and a ‘slightly agree’ or “slightly disagree” position.

Results

Seven separate ordered logistic regressions are run to estimate the effect size of the treatment within each issue domain. Table 3 reports the estimated marginal effects for partisan identification and the three treatment groups.⁷ The treatment variable is constructed as an unordered categorical variable, with the treatment group “federal policies” serving as the baseline reference group for comparisons. Respondents in the federal-policy treatment group are included in the model, but estimated treatment effect sizes are in reference to this group of individuals. Cell entries correspond to the percentage point change in the probability of a respondent selecting that category with a one-unit increase in the variable of interest.

The results in Table 3 provide strong evidence to reject the “intuitive federalism” hypothesis. Across five different proposed policies, changing the level of government proposing a policy had statistically insignificant effects on whether the respondent approved the policy. For immigration checks, increasing the minimum wage, regulating indecency, mandating vaccinations, and lowering corporate taxes, it did not matter whether the respondent’s local, state, or national government proposed the policy. For each of those policies and for every category of the dependent variable, the effect of the treatment is statistically indistinguishable from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance.⁸ The “intuitive federalism” theory suggests that across a range of policy domains, individuals would have distinct preferences for which level of government they would want to “take the lead” in - a prediction that is not supported by the fact that in most of the substantive areas tested, individual preference did not change whether it was the national, state, or local government proposing the policy. While “intuitive federalism” is not specific to just these five issue domains, the relative weakness of the treatment effect challenges the explanatory power of the theory. Since it did not matter which level of government was taking the lead in these major areas, “intuitive” considerations for federalism do not appear to provide a robust foundation of popular support for decentralized governance.

However, it may be that “intuitive” federalism provides only a partial explanation of how most

⁷Given the interaction term in the model, it is impossible to interpret results from just the coefficients or odds ratios of an ordered logistic regression. However, the full results and the odds ratios for each coefficient are presented in the Appendix, Table Six

⁸This is demonstrated by the fact that the 95% confidence interval for “state policies” or “local policies” across the seven issue domains never crosses 0.00. Crossing over 0.00 in the marginal change means that at the level of statistical rigor specified, the association between the independent variable and the dependent variable could be positive or negative.

Table 5: Ordered Logistic Regression - Marginal Changes in Variable Associations for Different Categories

	Classroom Size	Immigration Checks	Police Training	Minimum wage	Indecency	Vaccination	Corporate Taxes
“Strongly Agree”							
Partisan Identification	0.02	-0.05	0.04	0.08	-0.01	0.03	0.01
<i>Treatment</i>	[0.00, 0.03]	[-0.06, -0.04]	[0.02, 0.06]	[0.06, 0.09]	[-0.01, -0.00]	[0.02, 0.04]	[0.00, 0.01]
State Policies	0.10	0.01	-0.06	-0.01	-0.00	0.04	0.01
	[0.03, 0.18]	[-0.05, 0.06]	[-0.14, 0.03]	[-0.10, 0.07]	[-0.04, 0.04]	[-0.05, 0.12]	[-0.01, 0.03]
Local Policies	0.07	0.00	-0.14	0.00	-0.00	0.07	0.01
	[-0.00, 0.15]	[-0.06, 0.06]	[-0.22, -0.06]	[-0.08, 0.08]	[-0.04, 0.04]	[-0.01, 0.16]	[-0.01, 0.03]
“Slightly Agree”							
Partisan Identification	-0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.01
<i>Treatment</i>	[-0.00, 0.00]	[-0.02, -0.01]	[-0.01, -0.00]	[-0.02, -0.01]	[-0.01, -0.01]	[-0.01, -0.00]	[0.00, 0.02]
State Policies	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	-0.00	-0.00	0.00
	[-0.01, 0.02]	[-0.02, 0.02]	[-0.01, 0.05]	[-0.01, 0.02]	[-0.04, 0.04]	[-0.02, 0.02]	[-0.05, 0.04]
Local Policies	0.00	-0.01	0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	0.01
	[-0.01, 0.02]	[-0.03, 0.02]	[-0.02, 0.04]	[-0.02, 0.02]	[-0.04, 0.04]	[-0.03, 0.01]	[-0.03, 0.05]
“Neutral”							
Partisan Identification	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02	-0.00	-0.01	0.01
<i>Treatment</i>	[-0.02, -0.01]	[-0.00, -0.00]	[-0.01, -0.01]	[-0.01, -0.01]	[-0.00, -0.00]	[-0.01, -0.00]	[0.01, 0.01]
State Policies	-0.04	-0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.02
	[-0.07, -0.01]	[-0.00, 0.01]	[-0.01, 0.04]	[-0.01, 0.02]	[-0.01, 0.01]	[-0.02, 0.01]	[-0.04, 0.01]
Local Policies	-0.03	-0.00	0.06	0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00
	[-0.06, 0.00]	[-0.02, 0.01]	[0.03, 0.09]	[-0.02, 0.02]	[-0.01, 0.01]	[-0.03, 0.00]	[-0.03, 0.02]
“Slightly Disagree”							
Partisan Identification	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	-0.01	-0.01
<i>Treatment</i>	[-0.01, 0.00]	[0.01, 0.02]	[-0.02, -0.01]	[-0.02, -0.01]	[0.00, 0.01]	[-0.01, -0.01]	[-0.01, -0.01]
State Policies	-0.04	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.02
	[-0.07, -0.01]	[-0.02, 0.02]	[-0.01, 0.04]	[-0.01, 0.02]	[-0.02, 0.02]	[-0.04, 0.02]	[-0.06, 0.02]
Local Policies	-0.03	-0.00	0.06	-0.00	0.00	-0.03	-0.02
	[-0.06, 0.00]	[-0.02, 0.02]	[0.03, 0.09]	[-0.02, 0.02]	[-0.02, 0.02]	[-0.05, 0.00]	[-0.06, 0.01]
“Strongly Disagree”							
Partisan Identification	-0.01	0.06	-0.01	-0.03	0.02	-0.01	-0.02
<i>Treatment</i>	[-0.01, 0.00]	[0.05, 0.07]	[-0.01, -0.00]	[-0.04, -0.02]	[0.01, 0.02]	[-0.02, -0.01]	[-0.02, -0.01]
State Policies	-0.04	-0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.02	0.03
	[-0.07, -0.01]	[-0.07, 0.06]	[-0.01, 0.02]	[-0.02, 0.02]	[-0.06, 0.07]	[-0.05, 0.02]	[-0.03, 0.09]
Local Policies	-0.03	0.01	0.04	-0.00	0.00	-0.03	0.00
	[-0.06, 0.00]	[-0.06, 0.08]	[0.01, 0.06]	[-0.02, 0.02]	[-0.07, 0.07]	[-0.06, 0.06]	[-0.05, 0.06]

Note: Cell entries are the marginal changes in probability for each indicator, specific to one of the five outcomes of the dependent variable. 95 percent confidence intervals for the point estimate appear in the next column. Estimates correspond to a change in the probability of a respondent choosing the specified option a five-point Likert Scale ranging from 1 “Strongly Favoring” to 5 “Strongly Opposed.” The liberalism variable is a latent measure of each respondent’s revealed ideology constructed from the series of policy evaluations; the scale ranges from 0 to 24. The treatment variable consists as a set of dichotomous indicators for which treatment group respondents were randomly assigned. The baseline category to compare the effects of the treatment to are those who received questions pertaining to federally-implemented policies.

Americans think about federalism. In two policy areas, there are marginally significant treatment effects in at least one category of the dependent variable for at least two policy domains - public safety, or policing, and education. For neither of these two domains does the marginal effect of the treatment remain statistically significant for each outcome of the dependent variable. However, this is more to do with the limited sample size and the overall variation in respondent selection for each of the five categories of the Likert scale.

For classroom size, respondents who saw the policy proposed by their state government tended to favor the policy more than those who saw either the local or national proposal. Compared to those who evaluated a Congressional cap on classroom size, the probability that an individual “strongly approved” of a state cap was, on average, 0.10 percentage points higher. Given the limited sample size, the 95% confidence intervals are somewhat larger, between a 0.03 and 0.18 increase in the probability of choosing “strongly agree.” Nevertheless, the 10 percentage point increase in the likelihood of “strongly agreeing” as a result of a state proposing the policy suggests a substantively strong treatment effect. Just seeing the state government propose the policy increased the probability of favoring an already favorable policy by 10 points. At the other end of the policy evaluation scale, seeing a state proposal decreased the probability of “strongly disagreeing” with the plan. Among those who saw the state-plan, as compared to those who saw the national-plan, the probability that an individual “strongly disagreed” with the proposal decreased by an average 0.04 points. The 95% confidence interval does not cross over 0.00, but the true effects are estimated to be between -0.01 and -0.07, indicating that the marginal effects are statistically significant at conventional levels. These statistically and substantively robust findings for the state classroom size cap suggest that, when thinking about education policies, the average citizen, regardless of their partisan identification, is going to favor state intervention over national or local plans.

For the proposed police training proposal, individual approval for the policy decreased when the respondent’s local government proposed the plan. Essentially, individuals were “thinking federally” when they saw their local government propose a plan for increased police sensitivity training and they responded by disapproving of the plan. Compared to those who saw the training proposal as a national policy, the probability that those who evaluated the local-level plan would “strongly agree” with the need for more training was, on average, 14 points lower. The effect is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence

level, and could be between 0.22 and 0.06 decrease in the probability of strongly approving the plan. Similarly, compared to a Congressionally-enacted policy, the probability of “slightly disagreeing” with the policy among those who saw a locally-oriented policy was about six percentage points higher. The 95 percent confidence interval surrounding this point estimate suggests that the true effect size could be between a 0.03 and 0.09 percentage point decrease in the probability of “slightly disagreeing.”

The results in Table 3 also include the marginal effects of partisan identification on approving the proposed policy. Respondent’s partisan identification remains highly predictive of whether respondents approve or disapprove of a given policy. On it’s own, this is not groundbreaking news, nor does it directly speak to either of the two theories tested in this paper. The marginal changes in probability with respect to partisan identification help to build predicted probabilities, which will better describe the heterogeneity of the treatment. It is only by plotting the predicted probabilities that we are able to explore whether these two instances of federalism-consciousness are because of “intuitive” thinking in the mass public, or whether it is a result of partisan messaging.

Figure 2 plots the predicted probabilities for favoring the classroom size cap and Figure 3 plots the predicted probabilities of favoring the police training proposals.⁹ The predicted probabilities for the other five policies appear in Figure 4 in the Appendix; note the parallel slopes and similar y-intercepts (virtually no gap between the treatment groups and predicted probability), which is a function of statistically insignificant treatment effects. The predicted probabilities help to illustrate the relationship between partisan identification and the treatment conditions, and primarily suggest that the treatment effects (presence of “intuitive federalism” thinking) are contingent on an individual’s partisan affiliation. For the classroom size proposal, the graph only plots the predicted probabilities of approving the national or state-level policy, since there was no marginally significant effect for the local-level treatment. Likewise, for the policy training proposal, the graph only plots the predicted probabilities for the national and local-level policy proposal, since there was no marginally significant effect for the state-level treatment.

For approving the classroom size maximums, the marginal effects already have suggested that it

⁹The predicted probabilities of “strongly agree” and “slightly agree” are added to create this measure. See Appendix for the formulas used to derive the predicted probabilities from marginal effects.

Figure 2: Classroom Size - Predicted Probabilities of Approving, by Treatment





Figure 3: Police Training - Predicted Probabilities of Approving, by Treatment



mattered whether respondents saw the state-level question wording. But does it also matter whether that person was a Democrat or Republican? Figure 2 suggests that it does not. Republicans favor the policy less than Democrats who saw the policy proposal at the same level of government. But the difference between Republicans and Democrats in whether they favor a policy is the same between the two parties for policies proposed at the state or national level. The model predicts, on average, that 56.6 percent of “weak” Republicans will either slightly favor, or strongly favor the classroom cap policy when proposed by the national government. When compared to “weak” Democrats, 62.8 percent of whom are likely to favor the national policy, the partisan difference is about 6.2 percentage points. When evaluating the state-level policy, the model predicts that about 67.5 percent of “weak” Republicans are likely to favor the policy, while 73.3 percent of “weak Democrats” will favor the same state policy. The partisan difference for the state-level implementation is 5.8 percentage points in the predicted probability. There is slight convergence in the predicted probabilities between state and national policy implementation, suggesting that there is a partisan difference in how Republicans and Democrats responded to the treatment. But, substantively speaking, the difference is negligible.

For the proposed policy, both Democrats and Republicans “thought federally,” and thought similarly. Republicans, on average, favor the policy less, but when the policy is proposed at the state-level both Democrats and Republicans responded more favorably to the proposal, and to the same degree – roughly 10 percentage points more than if they were to evaluate a national-level policy.

Partisan identification did alter how Republicans and Democrats thought about the proposal to increase the amount of training police officers received in deescalating potentially violent confrontations. On average, Republicans made greater distinctions between the local and national implementation of the policy, favoring national implementation more, by about 21 percentage points. The difference among average Democrats in favoring the police training proposal was only about eight percentage points between favoring the locally-implemented policy or the nationally-implemented policy. As before, Democrats approved of the policy more than Republicans when both were evaluating local implementation or national implementation. But the predicted probabilities converge as respondents become more Democrat. In effect, Republicans disapproved of the local policy significantly more than they disapproved of the national policy, whereas the

difference among Democrats in approving the local or national policy is substantively insignificant. The change in the treatment effect by partisan identification is a strong indicator that Democrats and Republicans are thinking about federalism differently when it comes to police training. For this policy proposal, Republicans made large distinctions between local and national implementation, whereas the preferences among Democrats were not nearly as distinct.

Partisan Federalism - Discussion

For the proposed education and police training policies, respondents were “thinking federally.” Changes in the question wording produced statistically and substantively significant changes in how both Democrats and Republicans evaluated the policy. The null findings for the other five policy areas are important, however, as the statistically indistinguishable treatment effects suggest that the “intuitive federalism” hypothesis is more limited than the extant literature suggests. In some major policy areas, there was little distinction made between local, state, or national implementation. The degree to which Democrats and Republicans favored the policy aligned with our expectations - Democrats tending to favor greater government involvement in the economy, while disapproving of government restrictions on immigration and social morality (highway indecency). However, while those partisan differences in overall approval are often large, neither Republicans nor Democrats made distinctions across the three levels of potential government implementation.

To the extent that the “intuitive federalism” hypothesis suggests that all Americans are making these types of distinctions across a range of different policies - and that federalism persists because the public has stable and distinct preferences for certain governments to act in certain policy domains - the limited number of geo-political distinctions made seriously challenges how well the theory describes the relationship between federalism and public opinion. It is quite extraordinary that even in immigration policy, neither Democrats nor Republicans preferred, on average, local, state, or national government control over the policy. In effect, the same percentage of respondents favored a policy giving a local bureaucrat the authority to check an individual’s immigration status as giving the U.S. Federal Government that power. Similarly,

even in attributing governing authority to setting the minimum wage, neither Democrats nor Republicans made distinctions, in the aggregate, among the three levels of government, even though policy discussions of regulating minimum wage take place at all three levels of government.

The fact that the public made distinctions, or “thought federally,” when evaluating education and public safety policies, is also significant. The presence of federalism-consciousness in these two areas relate well to the status of modern federalism, developmentally and legally. For example, Derthick (2001, 2009) argues that local and state control of schools and police departments are one of the last vestiges of the 20th Century dual federalism paradigm. The presence of intuitive considerations in these two domains supports the “intuitive federalism” hypothesis considerably more, as these are the two policy areas in which states and localities continue to exert strong influence and maintain policy discretion. Given that individuals in the “intuitive federalism” framework are socialized to think about federalism from their everyday experiences with their multiple governments, sustained local and state government policy-making in these two areas is necessary to create the unconscious support of decentralized governance that scholars like Schneider and Jacoby (2011) hypothesize. The weak findings for the second hypothesis are a function of the realities of modern American governance, rather than incorrect theorizing.

Substantively, if these results hold for the broader issue domain of education policy, there are interesting implications for how Democrats and Republicans think about federalism. In the final analysis, public opinion over education policy-making is the strongest evidence for the “intuitive federalism” hypothesis. Democrats and Republicans both thought federally, and considered the federalism implications of the policy to the relatively same degree. Democrats might have favored the policy more than Republicans across the different levels of proposed implementation, but Democrats favored national implementation to about the same degree as Republicans favored state implementation. Since both Democrats and Republicans assessed state and national government capacity for making education policy in similar ways, the results suggest that public opinion is a potential safeguard for keeping education policy decentralized - at least in 2016. Important to consider is the fact that the distinction made between state and national implementation is only about 10 percentage points difference in approving the policy. So long as Democratic and Republican Members of Congress must respond to the concrete policy proposals put forward in the legislature, the small

number of individuals altering their opinion of the law because of its federalism implication challenges the significance of even these “intuitive federalism” findings. For example, even though Democrats favor state-implementation of education policy more than national implementation, a national proposal is still popular among Democrats. They and their fellow Republicans might want the states to “take the lead” in providing K-12 public education, but given these results, it is unlikely that they would stage an ardent defense of state prerogative if the Congress encroached in this policy area.

Large distinctions and consequentially significant differences are present within the domain of policing and public safety. In comparison to education, the treatment effects within the police training domain are statistically larger and substantively more significant in determining whether an individual will approve of a policy, and how much they will approve or disapprove. In fact, partisan identification exerts such a strong moderating effect on whether a respondent “thinks federally” about the policy, that only Republicans appear to consider the federalism implications of the police-training proposal. The distinctions across different levels of government are so strong as to alter the potential

This finding is somewhat counter-intuitive, given the ideological composition of the two major parties and our *a priori* assumptions of how Republicans and Democrats might line up on questions of decentralization. First, such initial assumptions point to our tendency to conflate decentralization, or federalism, with limited government. We might predict that Republicans would favor local or state level implementation in all cases because the predominant ideological position in the Republican party for the last 30 years has been to reduce the overall size of the national government. However, this too easily conflates principles in favor of limited government with principles in favor of some government at this level, some government at that level. A finding that Republicans prefer national implementation over local implementation in this one area does not contradict these other principled positions. Second, these findings probably make the most sense given the overall research design intended to tap into just the federalism consideration, the question wording for this particular policy, and in light of the contextual nature of federalism considerations.

The “intuitive federalism” hypothesis suggests that experience with decentralized institutions increases the likelihood that individuals will favor continued decentralized governance. It might seem odd,

therefore, that local implementation of police training programs, arguably the level that is most responsibility for day-to-day public safety, leads to less support for these policies across the ideological spectrum. However, for this policy, we can also *speculate* about the larger political context that is driving these differences. It is likely that the different results between Democrats and Republicans are the result of the increased political salience of police violence, especially police violence perpetrated against African-Americans in the Fall of 2014 and Spring of 2015. One of the main reasons why this survey featured this particular question (the domain and specific question wording) was because of the increased political dialogue that followed a fatal police shooting in Ferguson, Missouri and another death of an unarmed African-American in New York City. This was a political debate whose federalism implications were at the heart of the discussion. President Obama's administration took an active interest in using the powers of the federal government to investigate instances of police violence largely confined to specific metropolitan areas, and which implicated local police departments. Self-identified conservatives like Stuart Varney took to the airwaves claiming that Obama's Attorney General, Eric Holder had "thrown some gasoline onto a racial fire" by involving the federal government in the issue. Others, like Lou Dobb's directly implicated Obama and his national call to action in "fomenting an environment," which led to the shooting of two police officers during the weeks of protests in Missouri (Media Matters, 2015). The accuracy of these claims are inconsequential to the current study. What matters is that these arguments were frequently employed, often along explicit ideological and partisan lines. As a consequence, it is possible that at the time of this survey, respondents had thought more deeply about this issue within a specific political context and its much-discussed implications for federalism.

If this is the case, there is a distinct possibility that Republican and Democratic preferences for national and local implementation are in response to this particular political context. Among Democrats, violence in other areas of the country could have temporarily increased their desire for national action in regulating and increasing police training. Democrats desired action among all fronts, but given that many largely blamed the local and state institutions for the widespread discriminatory policing, they preferred federal action first. The model predicts that Democrats do have slight preference for national implementation over local-level implementation, but only by about eight percentage points. Alternatively, recent events might have made respondents more acutely aware of police-citizen relations in their own communities. Given

relative satisfaction with local police forces, Republican respondents assigned to the local treatment group reacted against a proposed call for action in their local community. As the problem was often portrayed as one that was “over there” or in “that” city, Republicans might have reacted against calls to increase the amount of training their police officers received, if there was no problem in their own city or town. Recognizing that a problem did exist, however, they overwhelmingly preferred that it be handled at the national-level. Additionally, since the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the Republican Party has been more willing to embrace centralizing policies if they relate to homeland security concerns (Milkis and Rhodes 2007). The results might also suggest that Republican “preference” for national police-training policies over local implementation reflect this new ambivalence towards central (top-down) control in national security. In either case, locally-controlled or nation-wide implementation primed individuals to consider the nature of the problem (it was perpetuated, in part, by existing local and state control of police forces) and the scope or location of the problem.

Overall, even though there is some evidence that individuals think “intuitively” about federalism, it is clear that this initial examination provides very limited support for the possibility that widespread prior concerns about federalism affect public opinion. Even in issue areas that are traditionally dominated by one level of government, differences in policy attribution fail to arise. The lack of differentiation strongly challenges the notion that Americans think intuitively about federalism, at least as a mass public. Furthermore, when individuals do seem to bring federalism concerns with them, partisan identification remains a powerful predictor of whether or not they will support the policy. When federalism beliefs become consequential enough to alter overall levels of favorability, they arise because of strong differences in how Democrats and Republicans are responding to the current political context.

Conclusion and Further Research

Federalism concerns more than the powers shared between central and sub-national governing authorities. William Livingston wrote that federalism, “lies not in the institutional or constitutional structure, but in [the attitudes of] society itself (1952, 84). Indeed, the entire argument over whether to create a federal

system in the United States resulted, as Martha Derthick summarized, from a “people who [were] unable to decide whether to be one community of many” (Derthick 2001, 9). The federal compact was a consequence of people’s attitudes, attachments, and daily experiences with their decentralized institutions. That relationship has changed in the last 200 years, however, and previous work in American Political Development has emphasized the temporal nature of federalism in public policy discourse (Robertson 2014; Milkis 1999). Federalism largely remains off the agenda, only to resurface vigorously at critical junctures or in response to dramatic events. Those outside of behavioral political science posit that federalism is a dormant issue for most individuals, most of the time. However, when it does enter public discourse, individuals seem capable of holding distinct opinions about intergovernmental relations, outside of their more overarching ideological dispositions. Primed to think about the different responsibilities or capacities of their multiple governing institutions, individuals might adjust their beliefs - but that is a big if.

From within this framework, the public’s opinion on No Child Left Behind takes on a different level of significance. The bill’s initial debates followed from an intense, protracted presidential campaign that, as can be expected, focused the nation’s mind on what problems the national government should solve. The legislation had large bi-partisan support through the summer of 2001 and leaders of both the Democrats and Republicans worked with the Bush administration to hammer out a compromise. Even state legislatures and governors remained ambivalent and silent over the growing federal role as many of them believed (incorrectly) the standards movement would increase state autonomy in currently existing federal programs (Rhodes, 2012, p. 149)

Essentially, public opinion on the national government’s role in education seemed to neglect a principled belief in favor of federalism, not because the public was incapable of holding such a belief, but because the political environment in which the public considered the policy never engaged the federalism question. Individuals’ beliefs about federalism are highly contingent on the political context surrounding policy deliberation. Both of the competing hypothesis seeking to explain how individuals think about federalism recognize this, albeit to different extents. If policy debates did not routinely raise problems of intergovernmental relations, then it is unlikely that individuals would become socialized to think “intuitively about federal politics. Likewise, political parties and other politically relevant groups must form and disseminate messages

to stakeholders in a political environment that defines federalism as politically relevant and significant value.

This paper helps to rectify the incongruities between these two schools of thought. Through the use of a survey experiment intended to deliberately adjudicate on the different empirical implications of these theories, I find that there is much stronger evidence in favor of a partisan model of federalism and public opinion. Across a range of policy issues, respondents made virtually no distinction between local, state, and national implementation. But the contextual nature of federalism debates, and individuals' limited propensity to rely on abstract or ideological governing principles actually predict these null findings. Moreover, in two policy areas, Republicans and Democrats made distinctions among local, state, and national policy implementation. Yet, these two areas, education policy and public safety, also meet the expectations of partisan federalism in that they are two issue domains in which Republicans and Democrats continue to take contrary and publicized positions on the federalism question. In this study, current debates over police violence and discrimination towards African-Americans were especially salient so as to manifest in substantively large distinctions between Democrats and Republicans in whether they preferred national or local implementation of additional training programs. Individuals seldom thought about the federalism implications of a policy proposal and in the rare event that they did, their identification with either Republicans or Democrats highly attenuated their attribution of policy responsibility to their own local, state, or national government.

The prospects of thousands of local communities, engaged in the work of democratic politics, correcting the ills of democratic theory, are no doubt a motivating thought for those of us who think about public opinion and federalism. To be sure, the "intuitive federalism" hypothesis has much to share with those idealized accounts of American localism given to us most eloquently by Alexis de Tocqueville. It was Tocqueville who first identified the source for American's almost emotional reverence for decentralized governance in an almost natural, psychological predisposition of each American citizen. Early in the *Democracy* he writes, "it is in the township, at the center of the ordinary relations of life, that desire for esteem, the need of real interests, the taste for power and for attention, come to be concentrated..."(64). True, Tocqueville lacked the sophisticated tools of political analysis that we have today, but there is perhaps no better known evocation of political opinion that most clearly describes the existence of an innate, or "intuitive", understanding of American federalism. It is no doubt Tocqueville's early observations, however "antiquated"

that have led many to think about a similar mechanism at work in contemporary America. If federalism is truly as intricate a part of our shared political culture, then we should look for those individuals who almost instinctually desire to situate politics closer to themselves, who hold these prior beliefs independent of policy preference, and who bring these concerns about federalism with them to the policy debate. As Tocqueville

firsts notes, and as Schneider and Jacoby (2013) revise, the standard for what constitutes this set of beliefs is pretty low, in terms of modern cognitive science. Intuitive federalists are apt to think about public policy as it relates to their most intimate political associations - their local communities. Something as subtle as the name of their town, county, or state should prime them to think about which level of government is most appropriate to debate and ultimately implement a specific policy.

However, while there exists some empirical evidence that individuals are able to think about federalism in a variety of circumstances, it does not appear that any of these beliefs about intergovernmental authority are preconceived or enduring. This is not to suggest that Tocqueville's 1831 observations, let alone his normative evaluation of federalism were wrong. But, it does help to demonstrate how fundamentally transformed American federalism now is. In the final analysis, it is rare that individuals "think federally," although their relationship with one of the two parties does advance the possibility that, in the right political circumstance, they will hold these more complex considerations, albeit temporarily. Lest this is to suggest federalism's irrelevance to 21st Century American governance - these findings in favor of partisan federalism and against "intuitive federalism" should suggest that the Madisonian logic undergirding federalism is all the more important to understand. Institutions are what keep the "compound republic," and if we are to further understand federalism's enduring effects, scholars should anchor their understanding in the partisan logic of decentralization and contestation, and in how political parties have, and maybe still can, bring federalism to the forefront of the average voter's mind. Finally, these findings should alert scholars to the possibility that, given such dramatic expansion of the administrative state and the federal court's control of representation and voting rights in the states, federalism may no longer principally involve how individuals connect to their multiple levels of government. Rather, 21st century federalism makes the largest difference in our politics in how various governing institutions negotiate or "talk back" to one another in implementing intergovernmental policy.

Methodological Appendix

Formulas for Building the Generalized Linear Model

GLM Family: Categorical Distribution

$$f(y_i) = p_{i1}^{I_{I1}} p_{i2}^{I_{I2}} p_{i3}^{I_{I3}} p_{i4}^{I_{I4}} p_{i5}^{I_{I5}}$$

where I_{iM} are dichotomous variables indicating one of five categories on a 5-point Likert scale.

Linear Model:

$$y_i^* = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{i2} + \beta_3(x_{i1} * x_{i2})$$

where y_i^* is individual preference for a proposed policy on a 1 to 5 scale. α is the estimated intercept of the

linear model, $\beta_1 x_{i1}$ is the estimated effect of a respondent's liberalism, $\beta_2 x_{i2}$ is the average treatment effect, and $\beta_3(x_{i1} * x_{i2})$ models the moderating effect that liberalism has on the effect that policy wording changes has on the dependent variable.

Link Function: Logistic CDF

$$p_{im} = \left(\frac{1}{1 + e^{-(C_m - y_i^*)}} - \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(C_{m-1} - y_i^*)}} \right)$$

Generalized Linear Model Defined as:

$$f(y_i) = \left(\frac{1}{1 + e^{-(C_m - (\alpha_1 + \beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{i2} + \beta_3(x_{i1} * x_{i2})))}} - \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(C_{m-1} - (\alpha_1 + \beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{i2} + \beta_3(x_{i1} * x_{i2})))}} \right)^{I_{I1}} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{1 + e^{-(C_m - (\alpha_1 + \beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{i2} + \beta_3(x_{i1} * x_{i2})))}} - \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(C_{m-1} - (\alpha_1 + \beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{i2} + \beta_3(x_{i1} * x_{i2})))}} \right)^{I_{I2}} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{1 + e^{-(C_m - (\alpha_1 + \beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{i2} + \beta_3(x_{i1} * x_{i2})))}} - \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(C_{m-1} - (\alpha_1 + \beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{i2} + \beta_3(x_{i1} * x_{i2})))}} \right)^{I_{I3}} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{1 + e^{-(C_m - (\alpha_1 + \beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{i2} + \beta_3(x_{i1} * x_{i2})))}} - \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(C_{m-1} - (\alpha_1 + \beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{i2} + \beta_3(x_{i1} * x_{i2})))}} \right)^{I_{I4}} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{1 + e^{-(C_m - (\alpha_1 + \beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{i2} + \beta_3(x_{i1} * x_{i2})))}} - \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(C_{m-1} - (\alpha_1 + \beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{i2} + \beta_3(x_{i1} * x_{i2})))}} \right)^{I_{I5}}$$

Likelihood Function

$$\begin{aligned} L(p_{i1}, p_{i2}, p_{i3}, p_{i4}, p_{i5} | y_i) &= \prod_{i=1}^N p_{i1}^{I_{I1}} p_{i2}^{I_{I2}} p_{i3}^{I_{I3}} p_{i4}^{I_{I4}} p_{i5}^{I_{I5}} \\ &= \prod_{i=1}^N \prod_{m=1}^M p_{im}^{I_{im}} \end{aligned}$$

Log-Likelihood

$$\begin{aligned}\ell(p_{i1}, p_{i2}, p_{i3}, p_{i4}, p_{i5} | y_i) &= \ln \prod_{i=1}^N \prod_{m=1}^M p_{im}^{I_{im}} \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{m=1}^M I_{i1} (\ln(p_{im})) \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{m=1}^M \left[I_{i1} \ln \left(\frac{1}{1 + e^{-(C_m - y_i^*)}} - \frac{1}{1 + e^{-(C_{m-1} - y_i^*)}} \right) \right]\end{aligned}$$

Given the categorical family, the parameter to be estimated from the data is p - the probability that an outcome is within any single category. The linear model and link function specifies that p is a function of the treatment condition (X_1) and a respondent's ideology (X_2). The GLM estimates the size and nature of the relationship between the treatment condition (β_1) and respondent's ideology (β_2), as well as how those relationships are contingent on the values of one another (β_3). Because there are two treatment conditions (counting the federal policies as the "control" group), there are actually two estimated parameters as the unordered categorical variable is run as two separate dichotomous variables. Additionally, the linear model also contains a constant (α_1) to be estimated alongside the substantive coefficients.

With the log-likelihood, computer statistical software can estimate the set of values for each of those parameters that maximizes the likelihood function. The algorithm is search for the set of parameter values that make the observed data the most likely to have emerged from the family specified. Deriving estimates from the data, the computer employs a hill-climbing algorithm that sets the values of the parameters at some initial value. The algorithm proceeds to fit new values to the log-likelihood function, attempting to maximize the overall value of the function. The algorithm progresses by taking the imputing possible values into both the vector of first partial derivatives (score vector) and matrix of second partial derivatives (Hessian). Using these values, and then new values for subsequent iterations, the algorithm converges on a likelihood estimate that makes the coefficients the most likely estimates, given the observed data (in this case, policy preference, respondent ideology, and treatment condition).

Formulas for Marginal Changes in Probability

For general liberalism - first partial derivative with respect to X_1 :

$$\frac{\delta p_{im}}{\delta x_1} = \frac{\beta_3 x_2 + \beta_1 e^{-(C_m - \alpha - \beta_1 x_{i1} - \beta_2 x_{i2} - \beta_3(x_{i1} * x_{i2}))}}{(1 + e^{-(C_m - \alpha - \beta_1 x_{i1} - \beta_2 x_{i2} - \beta_3(x_{i1} * x_{i2}))})^2} - \frac{\beta_3 x_2 + \beta_1 e^{-(C_{m-1} - \alpha - \beta_1 x_{i1} - \beta_2 x_{i2} - \beta_3(x_{i1} * x_{i2}))}}{(1 + e^{-(C_{m-1} - \alpha - \beta_1 x_{i1} - \beta_2 x_{i2} - \beta_3(x_{i1} * x_{i2}))})^2}$$

For “intuitive federalism” (treatment effect) – first partial derivative with respect to X_2 :

$$\frac{\delta p_{im}}{\delta x_2} = \frac{\beta_3 x_1 + \beta_2 e^{-(C_m - \alpha - \beta_1 x_{i1} - \beta_2 x_{i2} - \beta_3(x_{i1} * x_{i2}))}}{(1 + e^{-(C_m - \alpha - \beta_1 x_{i1} - \beta_2 x_{i2} - \beta_3(x_{i1} * x_{i2}))})^2} - \frac{\beta_3 x_1 + \beta_2 e^{-(C_{m-1} - \alpha - \beta_1 x_{i1} - \beta_2 x_{i2} - \beta_3(x_{i1} * x_{i2}))}}{(1 + e^{-(C_{m-1} - \alpha - \beta_1 x_{i1} - \beta_2 x_{i2} - \beta_3(x_{i1} * x_{i2}))})^2}$$

The marginal effects/associations between the treatment conditions and a respondent’s revealed ideology represent the change in the probability of a specified category of the dependent variable for a one unit change in the independent variable. Marginal effects are calculated by taking the first partial derivative with respect to the variable of interest. Furthermore, because of the interaction specified between liberalism and the treatment conditions, the only possible interpretation of the independent variables is through marginal effects. Odds ratios do not convey the relationship between an independent variable and the outcome, since odds ratios (and simple β coefficients) do not account for how the relationship between an x and the dependent variables changes with changes in the values of some other x.

Full Results - Ordered Logistic Regression with Odds Ratios

Table 6: Ordered Logistic Regression - Odds Ratios


	<u>Classroom Size</u>	<u>Immigration Checks</u>	<u>Police Training</u>	<u>Minimum wage</u>	<u>Indecency</u>	<u>Vaccination</u>	<u>Corporate Taxes</u>
State Policies	0.63	0.88	1.29	1.34	1.02	0.91	0.45
	(0.29)	(0.39)	(0.61)	(0.62)	(0.47)	(0.41)	(0.21)
Local Policies	0.79	0.77	0.35	0.70	0.74	1.00	0.61
	(0.29)	(0.36)	(0.16)	(0.36)	(0.33)	(0.46)	(0.27)
Partisan Identification	0.94	1.33	1.21	1.07	-0.00	0.87	1.11
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)
<i>Treatment*Party ID</i>							
State Policies	1.00	1.02	0.90	0.96	0.99	0.99	1.17
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Local Policies	0.98	1.06	1.09	1.05	1.06	0.95	1.12
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Cut 1	-1.27	-0.09	-2.38	-2.04	-1.67	-0.98	-0.95
	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.35)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Cut 2	0.14	0.81	-1.08	-0.75	-0.46	0.03	0.70
	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Cut 3	1.07	1.51	-0.38	-0.12	0.05	0.52	1.83
	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.32)
Cut 4	2.21	2.41	0.99	0.62	1.26	1.50	3.28
	(0.35)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.35)

Note: Cell entries are the odds ratios averaged across all five outcomes of the dependent variable. 95 percent confidence intervals appear below the point estimate. Estimates correspond to a change in the odds of moving from one category to the next on a five-point Likert Scale ranging from 1 “Strongly Favoring” to 5 “Strongly Opposed.” The partisan identification variable is self-reported by respondent. The treatment variable consists as a set of dichotomous indicators for which treatment group respondents were randomly assigned. The baseline category to compare the effects of the treatment to are those who received questions pertaining to federally-implemented policies.


Predicted Probabilities

Figure 4: Predicted Probabilities for Non-Statistically Significant Treatment Effects


Immigration Restriction




Minimum Wage Increase




Indecency Regulations



Mandatory Vaccinations



Corporate Tax Increase



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