A City of Rivals: Civic Notables and the Creation of the Hellenistic World

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Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used, in accordance with the SEG:

CID = (1978-) Corpus des Inscriptions de Delphes. Paris.

F.Delphes = Fouilles de Delphes. Paris.

IG = (1873-) Inscriptiones Graecae. Berlin.

I.Byzantion = Łajtar, A. (2000) Die Inschriften von Byzantion. I. Die Inschriften. Bonn.

I.Cret. = Guarducci, M. (1935-50) Inscriptiones Creticae. Rome.

I.Ilion = Frisch, P. (1975) Die Inschriften von Ilion. Bonn.

I.Magnesia = Kern, O. (1900) Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Maeander. Berlin.

I.Mylasa = Blümel, W. (1987-8) *Die Inschriften von Mylasa*. Bonn.

I.Priene = Hiller von Gaertringen, W. (1906) *Inschriften von Priene*. Berlin.

I.Stratonikeia = Şahin, M.Ç. (1981-90) Die Inschriften von Stratonikeia. Bonn.

Milet VI 1 = Herrmann, P. (1997) *Inschriften von Milet*, Vol. 1. Berlin.

OGIS = Dittenberger, W. (1903-5) Orientis Graeci Inscriptions Selectae. Leipzig.

SEG = (1923-) Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum. Leiden.

SGDI = Collitz, H. (1884-1915) Sammlung der griechischen Dialekt-Inschriften. Göttingen.

Syll.³ = Dittenberger, W. (1915-24) Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum, 3rd ed. Leipzig.

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Abstract

The goal of this dissertation is to consider how local competition and changes in elite self-representation led to the decline of city-state democracy in the Hellenistic period. It argues that the desire of local notables to succeed within city-state democracies created patterns of behavior that undermined the unarticulated norms upon which those democracies were based.

The first chapter of the dissertation examines the seizure of tyrannical power, arguably the most "anti-democratic" behavior a notable could exhibit. The second and third chapters examine another well-attested type of seemingly anti-democratic behavior: the display of *tryphē*, or luxury, especially as it was exhibited in domestic architecture (Chapter 2), as well as clothing, jewelry, and perfume (Chapter 3). Both autocracy and ostentation, it is argued, are the products of competition within the city, rather than imports from royal courts. Politically ambitious men used their clout with the assembly to marginalize or exile their opponents (and thus were labelled tyrants by those opponents), and used their wealth to show themselves as ideal benefactors and representatives of the city abroad.

The next two chapters examine the ways in which local notables co-opted or fostered connections between *poleis* in order to increase their own prestige. Chapter four examines the role that elite competition played in the formation of Hellenistic federations, while the fifth chapter considers Hellenistic inter-*polis* diplomacy more generally, looking at how certain notables used embassies to further their political ambitions. The creation of these international connections fostered a sense of communal identity among the men forging them, creating a unified Hellenic elite, whose members saw they had more in common with each other than with their fellow citizens.

Introduction

Hellenistic streets always had two crowds, one of flesh and one of bronze. The one crowd ebbed and flowed, following the rhythms of agora and assembly. The other did not move at all, unless it was to make room for some new member. But additions to the crowd were frequent. First statues were arranged in neat, tightly-packed rows. Occasionally a base was built between, and on top of, two existing bases, wedging one more stern bronze man into the crowd. Sometimes new statues were simply put in front of the old ones. To avoid this ignominy, one had to build up. And so statues were placed first on plinths, then pilasters, and finally outright on columns. At Paros, a benefactor was specifically warned that he could place his statue in the conspicuous *agoranomion* only if he did it without damaging the statues already there. One suspects that this injunction was the fruit of past experience.¹

The statues of Hellenistic cities attest to the keen competition between wealthy and politically ambitious men for public honors and prestige. This dissertation will suggest that in their eagerness to compete within (mostly democratic) cities, local notables irrevocably altered the unstated social norms upon which *polis* democracies depended. This, in turn, paved the way for the more explicit movement towards oligarchy of most Greek cities in the Aegean Basin beginning in the latter half of the second century BC, first *de facto* and eventually *de jure*. Shifts in mentality and habit among the politically ambitious and wealthy men in each city-state (δυνατοί, πρῶτοι πολῖται)—whom I, after Paul Veyne, call local notables—preceded any changes in constitution. This group of men might be broadly

¹ Paros: *IG* XII 5.129. On statues and the techniques employed to increase their prominence, see Ma (2013), 4; 74-5.

defined, following Aristotle, as the men in the city who possessed wealth ($\pi\lambda$ οῦτος), goodbirth (εὐγένεια), education (π αιδεία), and the nebulous but vital quality of excellence (ἀρετή) (Arist. *Pol.* 1291B 14-30). Peter Scholz provides a workable modern categorization of this same group, whom he sees as defined by six shared traits, namely the possession of land and wealth, high social prestige, an interest in city politics, an intense competition with one another for dominance in said politics, important connections abroad, and an individualistic interest in their own preeminence, rather than a more communal desire to see their class as a whole in charge of the city.²

Before any argument about how and when this group of men came to assert their control over their cities, a word must be said about previous scholarship on the topic.³ The role of the local elite in the political life of Greek cities in the Hellenistic period has been of interest to scholars for as long as the cities of that period have been studied. In his magisterial *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World*, Michael Rostovtzeff argued that economic changes (mostly for the bad) and general political insecurity led to the development of a bourgeois class in Greek cities. This bourgeoisie dominated the local economy and acted as intermediaries between kings and the masses. Because of their political and economic clout, they assumed a position of increasing importance in their cities, especially after Roman intervention in the eastern Mediterranean began in earnest in the midto late-second century BC.⁴ There are two related but separable assertions here: first, that the Hellenistic period saw a significant increase in the power of rich men in cities, and second, that this change was caused by economic conditions and Roman intervention.

² Scholz (2008) 97-8.

³ Cf. the recent overview of similar scholarship at Domingo-Gygax (2016) 1-18, Forster (2018) 16-31.

⁴ Rostovtzeff (1941) esp. 603-32 on economic conditions, and 1026-7, 1334 on the general argument.

A similar view of the situation is espoused by G.E.M. de Ste. Croix in his 1981 The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World.⁵ Given the title of the book, it is perhaps unsurprising that de Ste. Croix views the decline of democracy in economic terms, as the victory of the wealthy few over the impoverished many. In good Marxist fashion, the enmity between the haves and have-nots de Ste. Croix assumed to be eternal and unchanging. In the fourth century, the bad reputation of oligarchy forced the wealthy men of most cities to acquiesce to democratic rule. The triumph of Alexander, the subsequent imposition of monarchy over much of the Greek-speaking world, and finally, the arrival of the reactionary Romans, allowed the upper class to rally. The combination of royal (or Roman) control over citizen assemblies, the linking of liturgies and benefactions with office holding, and the dissolution of popular law courts with their large panels of jurors led to the dismantling of democracy everywhere. De Ste. Croix saw this entire process as the deliberate action of one economic class against another. "The Greek propertied classes, with the assistance first of their Macedonian overlords and then of their Roman masters, gradually undermined and in the end entirely destroyed Greek democracy."6

These ideas found approval among later scholars, perhaps because they tied so neatly into ideas about the importance of public benefactions in ancient political culture.⁷ The seminal work in this regard was Paul Veyne's *Le pain et le cirque* of 1976. Although the term "euergetism" (from the Greek, *euergetēs*, a "doer of good deeds") was coined by A. Boulanger decades before, it is Veyne's book that arguably did more than any other work to

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⁵ De Ste. Croix (1981) 300-26.

⁶ De Ste. Croix (1981) 309.

⁷ Other notable early scholars who make use of similar models of elite domination in the Hellenistic include Jones (1940) 170; Ehrenberg (1969) 190-204; Green (1990) 196-8.

make it a prominent concept in modern scholarship. Veyne moved away from economic explanations of euergetism (e.g. that rich men gave goods to the poor in order to quell a potential uprising of the working class), towards social ones, arguing that a combination of civic pride, personal ambition, and a universal belief that the prestige of a wealthy man was determined by his munificence, drove the practice of public giving. And such was the importance of these public gifts to the fiscal and political welfare of the city that their givers came, in Veyne's view, to dominate city politics. "More or less everywhere, the council or the executive (*synarchiai*) gradually grew stronger at the expense of the assembly." 9

In 1985, Philippe Gauthier published *Les cités greques et leurs bienfaiteurs*. Whereas Veyne had extended his study of euergetism into the Roman West to consider the role of benefaction among senators and governors, Gauthier's work was much more narrowly focused upon the Hellenic East. Gauthier's argument is, on the one hand, one for broad continuity between Classical and Hellenistic practice. He argues strongly against the notion that the proliferation of honors known to us in the Hellenistic period is indicative of a cheapening or decline in civic identity. On the other hand, he does think that as the Romans dissolved or neutered the various Hellenistic monarchies, royal benefactions declined precipitously, and that this slack was picked up by a handful of extremely wealthy local benefactors. Thus, the later second century BC saw the emergence of a class of great benefactors whose unstinting generosity bought unprecedented political control. ¹⁰ Their rise can be charted in the ever-lengthening honorific inscriptions granted to them, in the granting of honors to the sons of magistrates and benefactors purely because of their august parentage.

⁸ Boulanger (1923) 25.

⁹ Veyne (1990) 84. The original French publication of Veyne's work was in 1976.

¹⁰ Gauthier (1985) 72-5.

and, of course, in the proliferation of the number and kinds of honors granted benefactors, including those ubiquitous bronze statues with which we began.

As a result, it is not the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC that is the watershed moment of the period for Gauthier, but rather a more nebulous period ca. 150 BC, when Roman pressure had led to elite domination of cities, and brought the Eastern Mediterranean into the *basse époque hellénistique*. Gauthier's position largely agrees with the thinking of the eminent French epigraphist L. Robert. Like Gauthier, Robert had argued stridently for the continued importance of civic life in the Hellenistic period, famously declaring that "la cité grecque n'est pas morte à Chéronée." And Robert also saw the later second century as a time of important transition, when benefactors began to undertake duties previously held by kings. Between Veyne, Gauthier, and Robert, there was a powerful francophone movement towards seeing euergetism as a social phenomenon that was, on the one hand, representative of the continued vitality of *polis* life, and, on the other hand, the means through which local notables would eventually take control of *polis* politics.

On the German side, *Die Honoratiorenschicht in den Städten des griechischen Ostens* by Friedemann Quaß is perhaps the strongest advocate in modern scholarship for the notion of elite domination over civic life. Quaß follows Max Weber in arguing that in any representative democracy, the wealthy with leisure and inclination for political pursuits will run for office, and, over time, monopolize public office, turning a notional democracy into a practical oligarchy. Quaß thought that the preconditions for this had existed from the fourth century onwards, so that the existence of an oligarchical elite was a constant in the entire

¹¹ Robert (1969) 42.

¹² Cf. Robert (1960) 298.

Hellenistic period. The primary driver of elite domination for Quaß was the economy.

Unstable municipal finances (attested to by numerous inscriptions thanking donors for gifts of grain and money) clearly placed the givers of those gifts in control of the city.

But the idea of a democratic collapse spurred by either economic woes or Roman wishes has not been universally accepted. In the fifty years between Rostovtzeff and Quaß, scholars had made great strides in understanding the Hellenistic economy, and the idea of widespread recession has been replaced by a more nuanced view that sees different regions and cities as having radically different economic fates. 13 This makes arguments of political change predicated upon universal economic conditions more difficult to sustain. And then there is the question of whether democratic decline ever actually occurred at all. In an influential 1995 article, Christian Habicht argued that evidence for the erosion of Hellenistic democracy is, in fact, rather scanty. Even Classical democracies were often run by a handful of major actors (one thinks especially of Periclean Athens, a city "in name a democracy, but in fact a government of the first man" [Thuc. 2.65]). The chief innovations of the later Hellenistic period—the proliferation of lengthy, career-documenting, inscriptions, the introduction of more and greater honors for benefactors, and the use of posthumous heroic or divine honors for the greatest of them—did not, Habicht argues, upset the fundamental political relations of the city. The assembly was still sovereign, and local notables were, in fact, competing for its favor, rather than competing against it for control of the city. 14

Much of the subsequent scholarship on the question of democracy and elite control can be seen as falling into one of two camps: those who follow the traditional view that there

¹³ A fact noted even in contemporary reviews of Quaß (e.g. Strubbe [1996] 705-6).

¹⁴ Habicht (1995) 90-1. Habicht has published extensively on Hellenistic history in general, and on honors in particular. See especially Habicht (1970) on divine honors, and Habicht (2002) on honors for *proxenoi*.

was significant change towards oligarchy beginning in the second century, and those who deny such changes occurred, or insist that they were limited and superficial. Ivana Savalli-Lestrade, for example, rejects the idea of Quaß' unchanging elite as too static, seeing instead in the early Hellenistic period a permeable upper class, which men with luck or the appropriate talents (especially oratory) could join. Somewhat perversely, she takes from Habicht's work not that Hellenistic cities were truly democracies on the Classical model, but that Classical democracies were really oligarchies, too, so that Greek cities had always been ruled by the few and that the key difference of the Hellenistic period is that this select group must now manage their city's relationship with kings. While she acknowledges the changes in honorific inscriptions in the second century, she does not think they signify a sweeping social change. Her sympathies might therefore be said to lie with Habicht over Gauthier or Quaß, though with the important reservation that she questions the 'democratic' nature of the *poleis*.

In a similar vein, Peter Scholz argues that Hellenistic cities retained formal democracies while being *de facto* ruled by their wealthiest citizens. He places the crucial period of transition in the early third century, when the rise of the Hellenistic monarchies made city-states dependent upon great men who could win them favor in royal courts. ¹⁶ Kings (and, later, the Romans) are therefore responsible for the undermining of democracy, albeit only indirectly. And, like many others, Scholz sees in the second half of the second century BC as a blossoming of honors for notables which is symptomatic of their dominance over city politics. ¹⁷

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¹⁵ Savalli-Lestrade (2003) 55.

¹⁶ Scholz (2008) 76-7.

¹⁷ Scholz (2008) 83-7.

An alternative view finds expression in the works of Patrice Hamon. Hamon argues against the idea of Roman interference as the driver for elite change. Actual Roman constitutional interventions, he observes, were few and far between, and while the senate may have liked oligarchies, this preference was rarely inducement enough for cities to abandon their ancestral customs. More important, in Hamon's view, there are cultural changes in the latter second century and early first century that cannot have possibly been brought about by the Romans. In a pair of articles in the mid-2000's, Hamon investigated these changes, which included the establishment of the *boulē* (council) members and their families as a distinct social class at public feasts funded by great benefactors, the increasing emphasis laid upon inborn qualities in funerary honors, and the honoring of young men and children because of the deeds of their fathers. These factors, Hamon argues, make the midsecond century boundary between high and late Hellenistic a meaningful tool of periodization. Like Gauthier, Hamon sees the latter of these periods as a time of transition to oligarchy.

Cedric Brélaz, by contrast, has fought against the narrative of elite domination. In a 2009 article he questions the two fundamental assertions that underpin such narratives, namely, that democracy declines as the importance of benefactors increased, and that Hellenistic city finances were inherently weak. First, he argues that euergetism, far from a sign of democratic decline, is actually a sign of democratic vitality: the rich care about the city and find honors bestowed by the assembly meaningful. Even so, Brélaz is forced to admit that the expectation that magistrates would practice euergetism limited the pool of

¹⁸ Hamon (2005) 130-44, (2007) 98.

 $^{^{19}}$ Hamon (2005) and (2007). Hamon (2009) is worth noting as a summary of the debate on Hellenistic democracy up to that point.

possible magistrates to the wealthy, and that the eventual monopolization of public office by local notables is "incontestable." Rather than place this monopolization in the later second century, however, Brélaz argues that change in the democracies took place over centuries, and followed various paths. He concludes with an argument (aimed more or less at Quaß, even if this is never explicitly stated) against seeing economic woes as the impetus for euergetism. Cities, Brélaz asserts, had multiple revenue streams and were typically financially stable, needing the intervention of benefactors only in infrequent times of crisis. Prélaz's position can therefore be seen as modified version of Habicht's, admitting that changes in the direction of oligarchy occurred, but minimizing their significance within the context of broad institutional continuity and municipal economic strength.

The basic framework of the debate had therefore been set by the late 2000's. The principal questions were whether democratic decline occurred, and, if it did, when and why. Among those who thought that decline occurred, there was little dispute about the later second-century date first proposed by Gauthier. And two (not necessarily exclusive theories) about economic change and Roman involvement were offered to explain why this period was significant. The problem for both sides was that they lacked the evidence that might settle the question.

In his 2008 book, *Hellenistische Demokratie*, Volker Grieb pioneered a potential solution to this evidentiary problem. He selected four cities as case studies (Athens, Cos, Miletus, and Rhodes) to test the vitality of democratic systems in the Hellenistic period (vitality here being measure by how closely they modeled the democracy of Classical

²⁰ Brélaz (2009) 46.

²¹ Brélaz (2009) 52-6.

Athens).²² Grieb acknowledged that epigraphical evidence only shows formal procedures, and not necessarily the real politics of a city. Yet, by necessity, he depended largely upon inscriptional evidence, and took it as axiomatic that democratic procedures recorded on stone signify the actual occurrence of democratic practices in the city. At Athens, he finds that the much vaunted democracy succumbs to "Timorakatisierung" ("movement towards rule by those with prestige") in the second half of the second century BC.²³ At Rhodes, increasing social inequality is present from the second century onwards as well. At Cos, the replacement of the multi-polar world of Hellenistic kingdoms by the uni-polar Roman world led to the collapse of the competition between elites (each associated with different super-powers) that had made democracy possible. Miletus seems to have had a happier fate, retaining her democracy throughout the period.²⁴ But if this outlier is set aside, the overarching conclusions of Grieb largely follow the standard decline narrative, especially with their emphasis on the role of the Romans and the significance of the latter second century BC.

Grieb's work was followed shortly by Susanne Carlsson's similarly titled *Hellenistic Democracies* in 2010. Grieb's litmus test for whether a city was democratic or not was how closely it mirrored Classical Athens. By contrast, Carlsson argued that democratic government in a given city was attested by the existence of named proposers or movers for decrees, the presence of certain enactment and motion formulae in inscribed decrees, and the ability of the *polis* to decide important matters—including its own foreign policy— without

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²² For further defense of the use of Athens as a paradigm, for democratic government, see Mann (2012). A more cautious appraisal of the similarity of Classical Athenian and later Hellenistic democracy is provided by Canevaro and Gray (2018).

²³ Grieb (2008) 133.

²⁴ Many other scholars of Miletus have been less sanguine about the city's democracy. These are collected at van der Vliet (2012) 777.

interference from kings or other outside powers.²⁵ Like Grieb, Carlsson uses four case studies (Iasos, Calymna, Cos, and Miletus). Across the board, she finds strong evidence for the continuing strength of democracy. She thus argues the Hellenistic period was the acme of democracy, at least in the region she studied.

The core logic of both Grieb's and Carlsson's studies is similar. Each assumes that close reading of epigraphical sources from a set of cities will allow a scholar to gauge how democratic these cities were. The common assumption then is that democratic procedure on stone equates to the reality of democratic government. But in his review of Grieb and Carlsson's works, Edward Ch.L. van der Vliet rightly notes that there is often a discrepancy in political systems between how actions are presented and how business actually gets done.²⁶ It is a truth universally acknowledged today that the more emphasis a nation places, through its name on being "Democratic," or "the People's," the less likely it is actually to be democratic in the modern sense. The same disjunction between appearances and reality was common in antiquity. One thinks of barracks emperors in Roman times proudly proclaiming on their coins that they had "restored the republic," or, in the Hellenistic period, of kings issuing proclamations of freedom for Greek cities while happily squashing any actual independent action among their subjects.²⁷ Thus, while detailed studies of the epigraphical evidence for democracy are useful for gaining an idea of how cities presented their political life to themselves and visitors, they cannot, by themselves, settle the perennial question of whether such cities were truly governed by the will of their democratic assemblies.

²⁵ Carlsson (2010) 22.

²⁶ Van der Vliet (2012) 784. A similar view is espoused by Chaniotis (2010), who emphasizes the role of democratic 'theatricality' in disguising what was actually rule by the few.

²⁷ On the subject of freedom in royal rhetoric, see Dmitriev (2011) 67-145.

Modern scholarly arguments about Hellenistic democracy could therefore continue unabated. In a 2013 article, Hans-Ulrich Wiemer lays out anew the case for the existence of Hellenistic democracies. He argues that most cities in the 'old-world' (e.g. the established Greek world of the Aegean) were moderate democracies, with monthly assembly meetings, pay for office holders (but not jurors), and elected offices. He rejects the idea of using the proposers of decrees to gauge how democratic a city government was. Like many others, Wiemar sees a decline in democracies beginning in the later second century. He follows Gauthier in ascribing this decline chiefly to intervention of Rome. Although he acknowledges that direct Roman intervention in constitutional matters was rare, the Roman preference for dealing with oligarchs, combined with the (presumably innate) desire of local notables to be oligarchs, undid democracies. He leads out the content of the existence of the

Two more recent monographs ought also be mentioned here. First, on the subject of euergetism and elite munificence, the most recent book-length treatment is M. Domingo Gygax's 2016 *Benefaction and Rewards in the Ancient Greek City*. Domingo Gygax focuses on the origins of euergetism in the Classical Period, but many of his conclusions remain relevant for the Hellenistic period as well. His core argument is that democracy breeds euergetism by encouraging competition in service among wealthy men. In order to induce even further benefactions, assemblies can provide what Domingo Gygax calls 'proleptic honors,' or honors given in anticipation of services yet to be rendered. Such proleptic honors are a feature of euergetism from the fourth century onwards; this tradition, incidentally, ought to be taken into account when considering the honors bestowed in the late Hellenistic

²⁸ Wiemar (2013) 56-9.

²⁹ Wiemar (2013) 66-7.

Period upon the sons of major benefactors—such honors seem less divergent from prior practice when understood in this proleptic context. Despite the role of democratic assemblies in encouraging benefactions, Domingo Gygax ultimately concludes that the practice of euergetism was integral to the dissolution of democracy in later eras. As he put it, "although civic euergetism was invented by a democratic regime, its natural environment was a *polis* ruled by the elite." Second, on the subject of one of the most important rewards for such munificence, honorary decrees, there is now Florian Forster's 2018 *Die Polis im Wandel*. Forster argues that, generally speaking, cities were able to satisfy the desire of benefactors for prestige without sacrificing their own autonomy into the late Hellenistic period. The decisive shift towards more oligarchic regimes occurs with the arrival of the Romans.

Because the influence of Rome was felt at different times in different places, Forster cautions against over-generalizing periodizations of the era, preferring a region-by-region and, where the evidence permits it, a city-by-city approach. 31

Considering this entire arc of scholarship, I find the arguments for significant change in the inscriptional evidence of the late second century BC to be persuasive. It seems to me (as it did to Gauthier, Hamon, and many others) that there was a turn towards lengthier honorific inscriptions, an increase in the quantity of honors bestowed, and an increase in honors for the sons or relatives of great benefactors on the basis of blood, rather than achievement. This seems to be reflective of a broader change in civic mentality, at least among local notables. Even the most stalwart defenders of democratic continuity typically concede that there does, in fact, seem to be a monopolization of office by local notables by

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³⁰ Domingo Gygax (2016) 250.

³¹ Forster (2018) 480-4.

the Late Hellenistic period, even if these scholars do not think that this monopolization (or the proliferation of honors that accompanied it) rendered assemblies powerless. But rather than pursue the two traditional explanations of democratic decline (economic change and Roman influence), I will go in a different direction. By examining instances of seeming anti-democratic behavior that extend back into the early Hellenistic period, I hope to show that local notables in the Aegean basin began to adopt habits of action and thought conducive to oligarchy in the third century, long before those habits were manifested in the language of honorific inscriptions in the second. Ironically, the impetus for these changes was not the conservative Romans, nor the uncaring hand of the free market, but the desire of the local notables to compete within the democratic framework of their cities.

Given the importance of "competition" in this process, a word ought to be said here about its role in Greek life. The theme of competition in antiquity has been a major scholarly concern since the nineteenth century. Much of this discussion has been treated at length elsewhere, and ought not detain us here.³² Of note for our purposes is the 2011 publication of *Competition in the Ancient World*. In the introductory chapter to that work, Hans van Wees argued that competition was a basic component of the human condition, and a major driver of historical change in every society, from the Greeks to the Pygmies to the neolithic builders of Göbekli Tepe. Competition for van Wees is predicated upon social concerns (i.e. a desire for superiority), rather than economic or political necessities.³³

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³² See Ulf (2011) for discussion. Damon and Pieper (2019) 3-4 track more recent developments.

³³ van Wees (2011) 24.

The universality of this claim, and the seeming implication that competition was a biological imperative, was provocative from the start.³⁴ Indeed, in a later article within the very same book, Christoph Ulf follows the course of scholarship on ancient competition through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, showing how economic theory and the rise of the middle class made classicists more receptive to the notion of individualistic competition as an important (and generally positive) agent of change. Ulf concludes his study by questioning whether modern conceptions of competition in antiquity are not similarly influenced by contemporary concerns.³⁵ He is almost certainly correct in thinking this to be the case, though one wonders how such modern concerns can be disentangled without the benefit of hindsight.

Perhaps more immediately applicable is Ulf's emphasis on the fact that 'competition' is a catch-all term that can refer to a wide variety of potentially quite disparate phenomena. For Ulf, this largely has to do with distinguishing various types of real competition (e.g. competition in athletics vs. competition in politics). This theme of differentiation of competition is taken up by editors Cynthia Damon and Christoph Pieper in the introduction to their recent volume *Eris vs. Aemulatio*. Damon and Pieper add a further distinction between real competition and 'representational' competition in plays, poetry, and other literature. For them, competition, real or representational, is defined by the presence of competitors, a prize, an activity in which the competition occurs, and the presence of

³⁴ Thus one reviewer (Sells [2013]) found the chapter "bold and stimulating," while another (Van Nuffelen [2012]) thought it "not without its problems."

³⁵ Ulf (2011) 102.

judges.³⁶ Their broad view of competition allows them to see it in almost every aspect of Greco-Roman life.³⁷

Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a human society in which there was not competition of some sort or another. Even the Christian hermits of Late Antiquity vied with one another in the display of zeal, and they lived as far removed from the common life of mankind as it was possible to get. In this sense, then, competition is a constant of Greek society, from the time when the Achaeans marshalled their host on the windswept plain of Troy.³⁸ In keeping with the rightful emphasis in recent works on distinguishing between types of competition, the competition which we are concerned with here is primarily a political one for superiority within the *polis*. The Greeks, quite obviously, competed as communities against one another, city vying with city for prestige. Our study, however, will focus on individual competition within the city. And while representations of competition will often be used for the insight they can provide into historical competition, it is the latter which is the object of investigation here.

Even if the desire to compete politically inhered in the breasts of Greeks from the time of Homer onwards, the terms of the competition, as it were, were subject to change. Indeed, elite competition in the Hellenistic period is worth studying precisely because certain changes gave local notables more clout than they had experienced before. As stated above, Scholz has argued that the rise of the great Hellenistic kingdoms placed wealthy men who

³⁶ Damon and Pieper (2019) 6-11.

³⁷ Damon and Pieper (2019) 1.

³⁸ On competition in Homer see Allan and Cairns (2011), van Wees and Fisher (2015) 17-25, Bierl (2019).

had connections at a court in an advantageous position, as cities could scarcely disregard men capable of doing them great good or great harm because they had the ear of a king.³⁹

In a broader sense, the early Hellenistic period was a time of war and tumult. In such circumstances, the norms that facilitated democracy in happier times were perhaps more susceptible to breaking down. David Whitehead has observed this sort of process in Classical Athens. According to his argument, Athenians of the later fifth century were well aware of the dangers that over-weening ambition might pose to their democracy. Yet the straitened circumstances of Athens in the latter half of the fourth century left the Athenians in no position to turn away potential benefactors. *Philotimia* was embraced as a virtue, its presence honored in citizen and foreigner alike. Whitehead sees in this an elision of the traditional divide between citizens and non-citizens in favor of the universal welcoming of a broad benefactorial class. Not every city, of course, was Athens. And the economic and political fates of different *poleis* varied considerably. But the Hellenistic period does, in general, seem to be a time in which the competition between local notables (omnipresent throughout Greek history) was given even more weight because cities needed such men even more than they had in earlier times.

The dissertation is divided into two parts. The first part looks at two examples of anti-democratic behavior inside the *polis* for which Hellenistic evidence is especially plentiful: the assumption of tyrannical power, and the conspicuous display of wealth through ostentatious housing and personal adornment. The second section turns to the foreign affairs

³⁹ Scholz (2008) 76-7.

⁴⁰ Whitehead (1983) 67-8.

⁴¹ As Thomas (2019) 391, 394-5, has recently observed, the continued vitality of the polis which seems apparent to us in hindsight was probably not taken for granted by the Greeks of the period.

of the city and looks at how the personal motivations of local notables helped shape the foreign policy of their respective cities. Once more, two aspects of inter-polis relations for which Hellenistic evidence abounds are examined, in this case the formation of city-state leagues and the general uptick in other forms of formal inter-city contact (proxeny, *theoria*, foreign judgeships, etc.).

We begin with tyranny because, as the triumph of one notable over his peers (and the subsequent quashing of elite competition), tyranny was arguably the least democratic form of notable behavior. In the Hellenistic period, tyranny is frequently seen by scholars as the byproduct of meddling kings.⁴² Even if it is occasionally acknowledged that not every tyrant can be linked to a king, this acknowledgement seems to have little effect on the overall course of the scholarship.⁴³ This chapter will argue that the usual impetus for tyranny was competition between local notables. The tyrant, it is argued, was defined neither by his monarchical associations, nor by his cruelty, but rather by his enormous influence which allowed him to rule the state extra-constitutionally. This inspired ill will among his fellow notables, who found it convenient to characterize their opponent as a 'tyrant.' Thus tyranny was not an un-civic seizure of power, but rather the domination of the city largely through the same civic means (influence in the assembly, the ability to marshal outside connections) used by all notables. The chapter is organized around a series of case studies, each of which

⁴² A sentiment espoused by all three major works treating Hellenistic tyranny generally (Berve [1967], Mossé [1970], and Lewis [2009]).

⁴³ Thus for the Peloponnese, we find reservations about the association of every third-century tyrant with Macedon going back to Tarn (1913). But most subsequent work has assumed a strong link between tyrants and kings. Urban's (1979) discussion of the Peloponnese at this time is wholly predicated upon the assumption that the Antigonids are actively aiding most tyrants. J. Davies (2002) lists the Antigonid tyrants in the Peloponnese among various methods of "hard-edged" techniques employed by Hellenistic monarchs to rule their kingdoms (6). And as recently as 2013 Mackil has written that "The Achaian *koinon* was effectively dismantled by the imposition of a series of tyrants by the early Macedonian rulers" (342).

⁴⁴ Cf. Ober (2003). On the ability of tyrants to rule outside the constitution, see Lewis (2009) 110-11.

is used to highlight a specific element of tyrannical rule. Late fourth-century Euboea and the third-century Peloponnese serve as examples for kings interacting (or refraining from interacting) with tyrants; the various tyrants of Athens are used to examine the means of exerting influence that tyrants had at their disposal; and an examination of first-century BC Asia Minor shows how oratory could be used by a politician to achieve a position of dominance that his peers labelled tyrannical.

Just as tyranny is often thought to have been imposed by kings, it is frequently assumed that the love of luxury, or $tryph\bar{e}$, displayed by Hellenistic notables, was merely imitative of the ostentatious display of the court. In the second chapter, I argue that the relationship between kings and notables was bi-directional, with kings taking their behavioral cues from local elites, who in turn modified their own behavior based upon what they saw at royal courts. The first section of the chapter considers changes in domestic architecture. Kings, it is argued, adopted the basic form of their palaces from the grand Greek peristyle house of the late fourth century. They modified this basic plan to meet their particular needs, especially to entertain large numbers of guests, and these changes were subsequently picked up by local notables and incorporated into their own houses. The third chapter looks at luxurious display in personal adornment. Jewelry, clothing, and perfumes are examined in turn. Because of the paucity of surviving evidence when compared to residences, it is more difficult to determine degrees and directions of influence in this area of luxurious living. What is observable, however, is an uptick in the ostentation (and cost) of the most expensive

⁴⁵ Examples of this at Nielsen (1997) 160, Winter (2006) 158, Lapatin (2015) 3.

⁴⁶ Discussions of royal palaces at Nielsen (1994), Hoepfner and Brands (1996), Kutbay (1998), Winter (2006) 157-80, Morgan (2017).

adornments available. Thus, the gap between what the wealthiest could afford, and what others wore, increased.

Conspicuous display and consumption at the city level was spurred on, not by a reflexive desire to imitate royal behavior, but rather by the local political ambitions of its practitioners. Luxury had uses for local notables that extended beyond the mere attempt to keep up with monarchs in decadence (a task surely beyond the means of most). Notables found in personal extravagance not only a field in which they could compete with their peers, but also a means by which they could demonstrate their wealth (and thus their capacity for benefaction) to others. In an age when many wealthy men sought to improve their prospects by migrating to a royal court or great city, investment in spectacular houses was also proof of a commitment to continue residing in one's home city. At the same time, demonstrating refinement in manners and dress announced that one had the social capital to be a suitable representative of one's city abroad. In sum, luxury was neither passively adopted nor a sign of a retreat towards private life, but rather an active choice made by ambitious notables to advance their political careers.

The first three chapters, then, examine the way in which competition between local notables spurred key developments in the domestic political culture of their *poleis*, making new forms of rule and the display of power acceptable. In the next two chapters, which turn towards the foreign affairs of the *polis*, the question is how competition between notables influenced the ways in which their cities made their way into the wider Aegean world. One of the key developments of this wider Aegean world in the Hellenistic period was unquestionably the creation and expansion of federations of *poleis*, or leagues. Although such leagues had already existed in the Classical period, the Hellenistic era was their true heyday.

This chapter argues that it was local notables who brought their cities into leagues, often for their own private gain. Leagues provided an opportunity to gain prestige on a regional level and exercise power on a scale unimaginable for a single *polis*.

The proliferation of leagues in the Hellenistic period makes systematic discussion of every league impossible. Instead, we will focus only upon the two largest and most politically powerful leagues in mainland Greece (the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues), using them as examples of the ways in which private motivation might have spurred league growth in the Hellenistic period. A comparison of these leagues shows that the Aetolian League was more successful in using minor offices, positions on the League council, and its own prestige as a federation to entice notables in smaller cities and to keep them loyal to the League. In Achaea, by contrast, the imbalance between the relatively low prestige of Achaea and the great and ancient honor of new League members such as Argos and Corinth led to discontent and vicious competition for the top magistracies. In other words, rivalry between local notables can explain both why the Aetolian League succeeded, and why the Achaean League nearly broke apart within fifty years of its initial expansion outside of Achaea.

The final chapter expands the concept of local competition leading to new forms of interstate interaction by applying it to Hellenistic interstate diplomacy more generally. The growth in Hellenistic times of various kinds of diplomatic interaction (*theoria*, *proxenia*, foreign judgeships, interstate arbitration) has frequently been remarked upon in the past, but almost invariably from the perspective of what the cities involved hoped to gain as a whole from the transaction. This chapter will suggest that more attention needs to be paid to the personal reasons why certain local notables found the effort and expense of making these interstate connections to be worthwhile. The chapter begins with a brief overview of various

types of interstate contact, and argues that the increase in such connections in the Hellenistic period cannot be explained solely by changes in the epigraphic habit.⁴⁷ Forming such connections became part of the way in which cities competed with one another, and the prestige the city as a whole stood to gain from foreign ties probably explains why the *demos* was interested in fostering them. But the connectivity of the Hellenistic world ought to be seen also as at least partially the creation of competing notables, who saw, in foreign service, means of gaining and passing on prestige in an inherently unstable world.⁴⁸

Two important conclusions emerge from this study of elite rivalry. First is the degree to which local notables in the cities of the Greek-speaking world, and not outside forces such as kings, act as agents of change. If kings installed most tyrants, if their courts were the sole arbiters of fashion, if their very presence as a political force was what goaded the independence-loving Greeks into federations, then the monarchs were the actors of the Hellenistic stage, and the local notables their audience. But the truth is, in fact, much more nuanced and interesting. Tyrants often had no more connection to kings than their non-tyrannical peers. Kings patterned their own habits of conspicuous consumption upon those of the wider Greek world, creating a reciprocity of luxury between monarch and subject. And local notables could derive substantial benefits from league membership without being coerced by the specter of royal domination. They were, in other words, actors in their own right.

Second, if local notables were so integral to the political developments of their cities, then this is important for the broader scholarly discussion about city-state democracy in the

⁴⁷ Cf. Giovannini (2003) 284-5.

⁴⁸ See below, pp. 246-57.

Hellenistic period. A tyrant may have wielded power without altering a letter of the ancestral laws of his city, but his overwhelming influence over the city's political life certainly violated the spirit of those laws. And in acting thus, the tyrant set a precedent for future rule by one man or a small clique. More broadly speaking, the conspicuous display and consumption of the period, driven in part by the desire of notables to advertise their suitability as benefactors, magistrates, and diplomats, widened the gap between the lifestyle of the common citizens, and that of the beautiful and good. It is a small leap from this to the situation we find in the later Hellenistic and the Roman periods, in which it was assumed by all that *only* the wealthy should hold positions of power. And so, too, did the vast diplomatic networks created by cities also create an 'ambassadorial class' of well-connected men, who were indispensable long-distance experts upon whom their cities came gradually to depend. Many of these cultural changes predate the constitutional changes towards oligarchy found from the later second century BC. Thus, our study will show not only how competition between notables spurred many great developments in Hellenistic political life, but also how it created the conditions for their ultimate control over their cities.

Chapter 1: The Hellenistic Tyrant

Nigel Kennell has rightly called the Hellenistic period "the great age of tyrants." In this period, dozens of cities, both great and small, fell under direct autocratic rule. The Hellenistic sun dawned upon an Athens tyrannized by Demetrius of Phalerum, and its twilight rays fell upon that same city in the clutches of Aristion. The Peloponnese had perhaps the greatest concentration of tyrants it had ever known. Across the Aegean, the Greeks of Asia Minor were just as familiar with the tyrant's lash as their forefathers had been in the days of Darius. To the West, the tyrants of Sicily continued to oppress that island as they had for centuries.

The scholars who have studied these many tyrants have found themselves vexed by an insoluble problem of nomenclature.² The ancients seem to have been inconsistent in their employment of the term 'tyrant,' sometimes using it to denote governments we would consider oligarchies or monarchies,³ while sometimes not using it to describe governments that seem (to us) the very definition of tyrannical. Modern attempts to create a more cohesive definition of tyranny have largely attempted to define the tyrant by the source of his power. Most have asserted that the Hellenistic tyrant derived his power from violent coercion or from royal connections.⁴ In so doing, they follow a tradition that dates back to the Hellenistic period itself.

¹ Kennell (1997) 351.

² The important surveys of Hellenistic tyranny are: Berve (1967) 383-475; Mossé (1979) 147-201; Lewis (2009), 98-121.

³ E.g., Alexander the Great (Ael. VH 9.3), Philip V (Plut. Arat. 51.3) or Ptolemy V (Diod. Sic. 28.14.1).

⁴ Force: see, above all, Berve (1967), whose entire work depends upon a definition of tyranny as rule by coercive force. Of the other two major works on Hellenistic tyranny, Mossé declines to give a general definition, citing lack of evidence (148). Lewis (2009) has proposed that those whose power was located in a *polis* were tyrants, while those who ruled through control of an army were kings, and those who ruled on account of their connection to a monarch were royal officials (104-5). This definition of tyranny is more

An exhaustive discussion of every known Hellenistic tyrant is beyond the scope of this chapter. But, by examining a set of case studies from different times and different parts of the Aegean Basin, we will be able to demonstrate that the roles of violence and outside interference in the establishment of tyranny have been overstated. Tyrants were no more likely to make use of this than their non-tyrannical peers. What truly distinguished the tyrant was not the sources of his power, but rather the degree of it. The tyrant was set apart by the overwhelming influence he wielded over the political life of his city, influence that made other notables despair of competing against him.⁵ Thinking of tyranny in terms of such influence helps explain certain features of post-classical tyranny (such as the continuation of the practice into the Roman imperial period, or the existence of tyrannical juntas) that have received little scholarly attention. And while the precise means by which individual tyrants achieved their influential position varied, central to the success of all them was their ability to persuade the *demos*, which acted as an arbiter between competing notables. We should, therefore, see tyranny not as something imposed upon the *polis* by outside powers, but as something that resulted from its own vibrant political life. Both the reality of near-autocratic domination, and the interpretation of such domination as tyranny, were the products of local notables and their interactions with the demos.

The Puppet Tyrant

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helpful than Berve's. As we shall see, however, many men made use of multiple means of control (that is to say, their rule depended in part upon royal connections and military force or some other means). Attempting to delineate types of ruler by their source of power provides an overly-simplified view of how Hellenistic tyranny operated. For the sake of clarity, this study will not consider as 'tyrants' men from cities with strong traditions of one-man rule in the form of kingship (such as Sparta) even if some of those rulers were labelled as tyrants by later authors. Cf. Di Libero (1996) and Welwei (2000a) 95-6 for further discussion on the relationship of tyranny and monarchy.

⁵ Thus conforming to the view of Scholz (2008) 97-8 of Hellenistic notables as in constant competition with one another to be the most powerful in their cities.

Despite their varying definitions of Hellenistic tyranny, scholars have largely agreed on an explanation for its occurrence. The great kings were the ones, it is argued, who were responsible for the tyrants. Kings distrusted *polis* democracies because such democracies were too volatile. Today's demagogues were all too frequently tomorrow's exiles, and then all the money that the king had spent bribing the (former) leading men of the city was for naught. Better by far to establish relations with a single family, and give it the gold and soldiers needed to control the city for the king. In acting thus, Hellenistic kings were following venerable precedent. Long ago, the Great Kings of Persia had learned that Greek freedom was hard to take, but easy to buy. Many a tyrannical regime in old Ionia had depended ultimately upon Persian gold and the threat of Persian arms for its continued existence. "It is owing to Darius that each of us is sovereign of his city; if Darius' power is overthrown, we shall no longer be able to rule" (Hdt. 4.137.2). So, according to Herodotus, spoke Histiaeus, tyrant of Miletus, who thereby convinced his fellow tyrants not to abandon Darius to the Scythian wastes.

The Peloponnesian War left the Aegean basin awash in minted money and underemployed soldiers, and this made it even easier to convert capital into force. By the end of the fourth century, not just Persia, but Macedon, the tyrants of Syracuse, and even some of the greater Thracian dynasts were able to topple local governments by supporting their favorites with large gifts of cash.⁷ Many fourth-century tyrants employed mercenaries to attain power, and the money to buy those mercenaries often came from yet greater powers.⁸

⁶ Berve (1967) 384; Mossé (1970) 150; Shipley and Hansen (2006) 58; Lewis (2009) 112-13; Chaniotis (2010) 3.1.

⁷ Trundle (2006) 65-69.

⁸ See Trundle (2006) 69-70 for a complete list.

In the closing years of the fifth century, Cyrus the Younger gave money to his Greek friends to hire mercenaries for his upcoming campaign against his brother, king Artaxerxes II. One of these friends, being "hard pressed by political opponents at home," used his Persian-bought mercenary army to start a civil war, while another used his army to win the favor of the Hellespontine Greeks by waging war against the Thracians (Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.9-10). Well then could Jugurtha's judgment of Rome be applied to every Greek city: all were for sale, and woe unto them when they found a buyer (Sal. *Jug.* 35.10).

It is in this context that the machinations of Philip II belong. Philip frequently used money and mercenaries to topple those regimes he felt were insufficiently accommodating to his interests. It is worth considering his actions in some detail, since they set a pattern followed by later Hellenistic kings. At Elis, it is said, Philip bribed the leading men and triggered *stasis*. At Megara, two prominent citizens and guest-friends of Philip, Ptoeodorus and Perillus, attempted to overthrow the government with mercenaries (Dem. 19.295). But it was on Euboea that Philip went furthest in aiding and abetting tyranny. At Chalcis, the tyrant Callias (who was a Companion of Philip) may have requested mercenaries from Philip to combat an Athenian expedition to Euboea led by Phocion in 349 (Aeschin. 3.86-9). In 342 or 341, Philip certainly sent several mercenary forces to Euboea. One of these forces succeeded in installing the Eretrians Clitarchus, Hipparchus, and Automedon as tyrants in

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⁹ The friends are Aristippus the Thessalian and Clearchus the Lacedaemonian, respectively.

¹⁰ Dem. 9.27, 16.63, 18.295, 19.260, 19.294; Paus. 4.28.5, 5.4.9.

¹¹ On Philip's actions in Euboea, see Brunt (1969), Cawkwell (1978), and Tritle (1993).

¹² Brunt (1969) argues that the mercenaries never arrived (250). Aeschines was no friend of Callias, and it is possible that this unheeded call for mercenaries was merely a malicious rumor.

¹³ For the dating of these interventions, see Brunt (1969) 251-3 (arguing for 342), and Cawkwell (1978) (arguing for 341).

their home city, while another was admitted into the city of Oreus and installed Philistides as tyrant there. 14

Yet even here, on the cusp of the Hellenistic period, the relationship between king and tyrants begins to break down. In the first place, Philip was hardly the man who introduced the notion of tyranny to Euboea. Already by the 360's, a certain Themison was tyrant in Eretria. Together with his ally Mnesarchus of Chalcis, Themison expelled the Thebans and their Euboean supporters from the island. After Themison, the pro-Athenian Menestratus took over the Eretrian tyranny. He was followed in turn by another pro-Athenian tyrant, Plutarchus. In 349, stasis broke out in Eretria between factions loyal to the tyrant Plutarchus and those loyal to another prominent Eretrian, Clitarchus. An Athenian force under Phocion intervened on behalf of Plutarchus, and many Euboeans rallied against them (this was when Callias—who was the son of Mnesarchus of Chalcis—may have sought mercenaries from Philip). In the years after this war, Callias distanced himself from Macedon. By the time Philip intervened in Euboea in 342 or 341, Callias was his enemy and an ally of Athens. Indeed, in the following year, he worked with his old nemesis Phocion to expel Philistides from Oreus and Clitarchus from Eretria.

It would seem, then, that the prominent men of Euboea already had a rich native tradition of tyrannizing over their fellow Euboeans, one that Philip may have briefly (and ineffectively) harnessed, but did not invent. Out of the six Euboean tyrants of the 350's and

¹⁴ Eretria: Dem. 9.58; Oreus: Dem. 9.33.

¹⁵ Themision: Diod. 15.76.1. Mnesarchus and the *stasis*: Diod. Sic. 16.7.2; Aeschin. 3.85; Dem. 18.99.

¹⁶ Menestratus: Dem. 23.124. Plutarchus: Dem. 9.57, 21.110, 21.200; Plut. *Phoc.* 12.1-14.1.

¹⁷ Plut. *Phoc.* 12.1-14.1. Both Brunt and Cawkwell reject Plutarch's statement that Philip was involved in this war, arguing that Plutarch has conflated the events of 349 with Philip's later involvement in Euboean affairs in 342/1. Phocion prevailed in this war, although Plutarchus disgraced himself in battle and was exiled anyway. ¹⁸ *FGrH* 328 (Philochorus) F159-61.

340's, only three may have had ties to Philip. The connection between one of these three (Callias) and Philip is somewhat tenuous. The other two (Clitarchus and Philistides) were already well on their way to seizing power by themselves when Philip intervened. Clitarchus had already exiled his opponents from Eretria, and Philistides had already succeeded in imprisoning his chief rival in Oreus, the pro-Athenian Euphraeus, before Philip's mercenaries arrived. And while Philip's mercenaries were certainly useful in solidifying the power of both men, they were not a long-term source of support: the mercenaries were nowhere to be found when Callias and the Athenians went on the counter-offensive the following year. 19 In other words, Philip had nothing to do with half or more of the Euboean tyrants. His support for the rest was minimal, and only offered when their success already seemed assured.

It is also difficult to find a larger strategy of support for tyrants in Philip's actions. Philip was interested above all in his own advantage, and supported any government that might further it. In Euboea, this meant supporting 'tyrants,' but in Thessaly, it meant expelling tyrants and pleasing the masses $(\pi\lambda\tilde{\eta}\theta\circ\varsigma)$ (Dem. 8.65). Despite Demosthenes' claim that Philip and his supporters were lovers of oligarchy and tyranny, Philip shows no more interest in supporting tyrannies in Euboea than the Athenians did (Dem. 10.4). It was the Athenians, after all, who considered Menestratus their ally; intervened in an Eretrian stasis on behalf of the tyrant Plutarchus; and handed over Oreus and Eretria to the tyrant Callias of Chalcis. Philip had no more particular fondness for 'tyrants' than any other Great Power. He certainly never seems to have intended to rule through them. Nor did Philip's

¹⁹ Cf. Brunt (1969) 263.

later League of Corinth attempt to use tyrants to control *poleis*. Philip demonstrated perfect ideological flexibility when it came to the governments he supported.

Later Hellenistic kings share this flexibility with Philip. The chief aim of these monarchs was to keep the Greek cities they controlled acquiescent and profitable. Unless a city was of immense strategic value or on the cusp of stasis, most monarchs were inclined to let it tend to its own internal affairs. 20 This accorded well with the notion of the king as the guarantor of freedom for the Greeks, which was an important component of royal selfpresentation from the late fourth century onwards.²¹ The case of the city of Eresus, on the island of Lesbos, shows how Hellenistic rulers preferred to allow their cities a degree of autonomy, rather than imposing tyrants upon them. In the days of Alexander the Great, Eresus had a law that legalized tyrannicide and banished the children of tyrants forever.²² But those who harbor tyrannical ambitions have little fear of the law, and two men, Agonippus and Eurysilaus, attempted to become tyrants of Eresus. They were quickly expelled, and appealed to Alexander to reinstate them. It was undoubtedly within Alexander's power to provide these men with the means to retake their city. He would have gained a government in Eresus dependent upon him, just as the tyrants of old Ionia were once dependent upon the Great King. Instead, Alexander referred the case to the city (which naturally ruled against the would-be tyrants and executed them).

This deference to local law set a precedent for tyrants and Macedonians alike. Soon thereafter, the sons of a *previous* would-be tyrant of Eresus came to Alexander, seeking an

²⁰ Billows (2003) 209; Dmitriev (2011) 107; Ellis-Evans (2012) 190-1.

²¹ Seager (1981), Dmitriev (2011) 67-144.

 $^{^{22}}$ Welles *RC* 2=*OGIS* 8. Cf. Ellis-Evans (2012) and Teegarden (2014) 115-141 for recent reviews of scholarship on the inscription.

end to their exile. Alexander again referred the case to Eresus. Later, even more tyrannical offspring came to Philip Arrhidaeus seeking the same boon, and received the same reply (the tyrants of Eresus must have been either remarkably numerous or remarkably prolific). Finally, around 306, the sons of Agonippus came to Antigonus Monophthalmos with the (by now traditional) request and received, perhaps to the surprise of everyone, a favorable response. But the citizens of Eresus sent an envoy to Antigonus complaining stiffly of this breach of precedent, and he replied by reversing his initial decision and acting in accordance with the city law. Three separate monarchs, operating across a space of decades, consistently deferred to the tiny city of Eresus, and turned down repeated opportunities to install a government pleasing to them, but hateful to the Eresians.

One might argue that Philip, Alexander, and the early Successors were gentler in their treatment of the Greeks because their ascendency was new and fragile. Surely once every man who had lifted a spear in defense of Greek freedom at Chaeronea had passed into the grave or into graying senility, then the kings would sit more firmly on their thrones and rule with a heavier hand. Indeed, the great era of Macedonian-sponsored tyranny is usually said to be the reign of Antigonus Monophthalmus' grandson, Antigonus II Gonatas (r. 277-274, 272-239). This notion stems first and foremost from Polybius, who says of the cities of the Peloponnese "some of them were garrisoned by Demetrius and Cassander and afterwards by Antigonus Gonatas, and some even had tyrants imposed on them by the latter, who planted more monarchs in Greece than any other king." (Polyb. 2.41.10). And the evidence might appear to bear out Polybius' assertion. Antigonus ruled during a period in which the

²³ The frequency of these appeals and the attempted collegial tyranny of Agonippus and Eurysilaus lead one to suspect that, as in Euboea, 'tyranny' in Eresus was really rule by a small clique of wealthy men.

Peloponnese veritably teemed with tyrants. Sicyon had the most. The city had long been a breeding ground for tyrants, but now, instead of smugly putting their opponents into tribes of "ass-men" and "swine-men" as one of their Archaic predecessors had done, these Hellenistic tyrants simply killed them. Endless rounds of civil strife followed, and the rate of tyrannical turnover was quite high, with somewhere between four and seven tyrants holding power in Sicyon during Antigonus' reign.²⁴

Grateful, then, was Megalopolis that she merely suffered two tyrants: first, the harsh Aristodemus, who perished by an assassin's blade, and, then, the mild-mannered Lydiades, who honorably retired and later achieved great fame as a politician in the Achaean League.²⁵ Proud Argos submitted to a whole dynasty of tyrants, with power passing between four related men between 272 and 229.²⁶ The just men of Elis found the tyrant's yoke harder to bear: the would-be tyrant Aristotimus did not last even a single year before he was killed by disgruntled exiles.²⁷ Other lesser cities had tyrants whom we can perceive only dimly. A certain Nearchus may have been tyrant in Arcadian Orchomenos. Tyrants controlled both

²⁴ Changing tribe names: Hdt. 5.68.1. Four men, Cleon, Abantidas, Paseas, and Nicocles, were incontrovertibly tyrants to later writers. According to Pausanias, there were also two co-tyrants, Euthydemus and Timocleidas (Paus. 2.8.1-2). But Plutarch's otherwise more detailed account nowhere mentions Euthydemus, and has Timocleidas as a restorer of democracy alongside Cleinias, the father of Aratus (Plut. *Arat.* 2.1-2). Griffin (1982) argues that we should prefer Plutarch's account because its source was probably Aratus' own memoirs (79). This would rid us of Euthydemus. But Aratus might have portrayed his father and his father's colleagues as "supporters of democracy" when in reality they were little different from the tyrants who came before and after them (Cf. Lewis (2009) 155-6). Thus Pausanias may be right about the existence of two co-tyrants, even if he is wrong about their names.

²⁵ Aristodemus (c.265-c.251): Polyb. 10.22.2-3; Paus. 8.27.11. Berve (1967) 400-1; Gabbert (1997) 42. Lydiades (245-235/4): Paus. 8.27.12; Plut. *Arat.* 30.1-5.

²⁶ The tyrants are Aristippus I (272/1-c.250), his son Aristomachus I (c.250-c.241), Aristomachus' elder son Aristippus II (c.241-235/4), and finally Aristomachus' younger son Aristomachus II (235/4-229). Berve (1967) 395-400, Tomlinson (1972) 151-9, Mandel (1979), Gabbert (1997) 40-42, Paschidis (2008) 209-24.

²⁷ Aristotimus, tyrant in 271/0. On his rule: Paus. 5.5.1; Plut. *Mor.* 251A-253F; Just. 26.1. Berve (1967) 406-7; Gabbert (1997) 42. On the justice of the Eleans: Paus. 4.28.4; Plut. *Mor.* 215F.

Hermione and Phlius in about 235, although whether any of these tyrannies extended back to the rule of Antigonus is impossible to say.²⁸

Even so, there are between 11 and 17 tyrants in four to seven cities, the greatest concentration of tyrants of which we know in the region in any period of Greek history. The problem is directly connecting any of them back to Antigonus. A century ago, Tarn imagined a network of tyrants checking Antigonus' foes, with Megalopolis and Argos countering Sparta and Elis preventing further Aetolian-League expansion. And within the past year, Graham Shipley has argued that many of the 'tyrants' of the Peloponnese were, in fact, governors installed by Macedon. The problem is linking tyrants to kings. Although at least some of the families of Sicyon had connections to Macedon (the anti-tyrannical Sicyonian Aratus had famously inherited a family friendship to the Antigonids), it is impossible to show that any of the Sicyonian tyrants were appointed, or even aided, by Antigonus. And as it was with Sicyon, so it was with smaller cities such as Phlius and Hermione: no evidence exists for Macedonian interference. Ultimately, Tarn concludes that "much of the Greek world [under Antigonus]... was as independent as if Macedonia did not exist."

²⁸ Nearchus: Berve (1967) 403. Xenon of Hermione and Cleonymus of Phlius abdicate along with Aristomachus of Argos soon after Lydiades (Polyb. 2.44.6).

²⁹ This is a conservative number reflecting only the more certain tyrants from the time of Antigonus II. In his discussion of Peloponnesian tyranny, Shipley (2018) expands the time range to 338-229 BC and counts possible tyrants from cities where, strictly speaking, we do not know tyrants ever existed (e.g. Patrai, Dyme, Tritaia, Pharai, and Achaean Leonton). He thus arrives at 21-26 men in 11-16 cities (107-15). For further discussion of the the role of tyrants in securing Macedonian interests in the Peloponnese, see Will (1966) 193-6, Welwei (2000b) 335-7.

³⁰ Tarn (1913) 281.

³¹ Shipley (2018) 122.

³² Aratus' friendships: Plut. *Arat.* 4.2-3. Cf. Buraselis (2003), who claims (without much justification) that Nicocles' position was predicated upon Macedonian support (47).

³³ Tarn (1913), 297. Berve (1967) also concludes that the number of tyrants who can be conclusively linked to Antigonus "ist nicht eben groß" (404).

It is possible to whittle away the connection between Antigonus and the Peloponnesian tyrants even further. Gabbert, for instance, observes that the only "proof" that the Megalopolitan tyrants were aligned with Macedon was their opposition to Sparta, an opposition that could just as easily arise from their location and Arcadian roots as from their loyalty to putative Macedonian masters.³⁴ At Elis, the connection between Macedon and the tyrant Aristotimus is more secure, but the degree to which Aristotimus' tyranny was part of a larger Macedonian strategy to control the Peloponnese remains doubtful. On the one hand, Aristotimus was said to be a friend of Antigonus, and when the Elean exiles formed an army and marched upon Elis, Craterus, the Macedonian garrison commander at Corinth, did march to Aristotimus' aid. On the other hand, when Craterus arrived at Elis and discovered that he was too late to save Aristotimus, he made no attempt to install a new tyrant or even a garrison. Indeed, he and the Eleans parted on amicable terms.³⁵ Rather than depending upon tyrants in key cities, Antigonus might merely have supported friends who happened to come into power of their own accord, much as Philip was inclined to back Euboeans who seemed to be gaining the upper hand in their cities. This was probably also the case at Argos, where, in 272, two feuding Argive aristocrats, Aristeas and Aristippus, sided with Pyrrhus of Epirus and Antigonus (respectively) as the two kings vied for control of the city (Plut. Pyrrh. 30.1). Pyrrhus died attempting to capture Argos, and it is probable that a grateful Antigonus helped Aristippus secure his power over the city.³⁶ Here, finally, is a tyrannical dynasty that most likely was installed by Antigonus at swordpoint.

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³⁴ Gabbert (1997) 42.

³⁵ Friendship with Antigonus: Paus. 5.5.1; Plut. Mor. 251A. Craterus: Gabbert (1997) 63-64.

³⁶ It is possible that this Aristippus was related to the later tyrannical family who share his name. Berve (1967), acknowledges the possibility but does not commit to it himself (396). Tarn (1913) thinks Aristomachus cannot have been in power before 265 (280 n. 18) (for his reasoning see his note 13). By contrast, Gabbert (1997)

Yet if Antigonus had expected his tame tyrants in Argos to act as loyal lackeys, he was very much disappointed. During the Chremonidean War, Argos, under her pro-Macedonian tyrants, did nothing to stop the Spartan king Areus from campaigning against Macedonian allies in the Peloponnese.³⁷ Gabbert is reduced to suggesting that the Argive tyrants denied Ptolemy landing places and made Areus' march "a little more difficult." ³⁸ In other words, their chief contribution to the Macedonian cause was that they did not actively aid Macedon's enemies. For their own part, the Argive tyrants seemed perfectly capable of taking care of themselves. Time and time again, their arch-enemy Aratus plotted to assassinate or depose them, and time and time again he was foiled. When Aristomachus I was killed by his slaves, Aratus rushed with an Achaean army to Argos, assuming that he would be welcomed with open arms. But not one Argive came over to his side, and the only thing Aratus gained was a fine of thirty minae when an independent tribunal determined that he had started a war unprovoked (Plut. Arat. 24.4).³⁹ Later Aratus led a night-assault against the walls of the city. The Argives sat impassively and watched the proceedings, "as though it were not a battle to secure their liberties, but a contest in the Nemean games of which they were the judges" (Plut. Arat. 27.2).

The Argives were not so impassive when Aratus then led a full field army against Aristippus II. Then they fought and died for their tyrant, and, after he fell in battle, they

thinks Aristippus is tyrant "well before 272 BC" although she gives no explanation for why this should be so (41).

³⁷ Indeed, Tarn (1913) concludes that since Argos did nothing to stop Areus, it cannot have been ruled by tyrants before 265 (280 n. 18). This does not, however, explain Argive inaction during the Chremonidean War. ³⁸ Gabbert (1997) 41. The Argive tyrant Aristomachus I did participate in the war against the rebel garrison commander and would-be king Alexander of Corinth, although even here we only know of his participation because an inscription survives recording the separate peace he made for himself and Athens (*IG* II² 774). ³⁹ Plutarch concludes that the Argives were "by this time habituated to slavery and willing to endure it" (*Arat*. 25.4). Mandel (1979) 296-7 accepts Plutarch's account of Argive antipathy towards the cruel tyrannical dynasty, but has difficulty reconciling this with the actions of the Argives.

allowed his brother Aristomachus II to take control of the city (Plut. *Arat.* 29.4). Plutarch claims that royal troops present at the battle helped Aristomachus II take power. It seems likely that these were mercenaries paid for by the tyrants with Macedonian gold, since if there had been an actual Macedonian force in Argos, Plutarch almost certainly would have seized upon it as an excuse for Aratus' failures.⁴⁰ Aristomachus II eventually retired from his tyranny, but he continued to play a prominent role in Argive and Peloponnesian politics, first as a *stratēgos* for the Achaean League, and later as a supporter of the Spartan king Cleomenes.⁴¹

Our sources (vehemently hostile to Antigonids and Aristomachoi alike) mutter about the seizure of weapons, about bodyguards and royal troops, and about the torture of innocents. ⁴² But despite all the calumny, the inescapable conclusion seems to be that the Aristomachoi stayed in power because the Argives themselves largely wished it so. It is hard to see how the distant king of Macedon propped up the despotic dynasty of the Aristomachoi, or how the Aristomachoi helped Antigonus fight his foes in the Peloponnese. It is rather more likely that Antigonus aided his friend Aristippus I in 272 when he was at close at hand with an army. Afterwards, the tyrants at Argos had to rely largely on their own devices to stay in power. Royal support, such as it was, was merely one small ingredient of their

⁴⁰ So Paschidis (2008) 220.

⁴¹ Plut. *Arat.* 35, 44.1-4; Polyb. 2.59-60. Aristomachus' continued preeminence in Argos is a source of puzzlement to Berve, who thinks that Aristomachus' position was entirely dependent upon Macedonian power, and that he only retired when Antigonus III Doson was unable to support him (399).

⁴² Law preventing the ownership of swords under Aristomachus I: Plut. *Arat.* 25.2. Bodyguards (Aristippus II): Plut. *Arat.* 26.1-3. Royal troops (Aristomachus II): Plut. *Arat.* 29.4. Exile and torture: Polyb. 2.59. Our main sources on these tyrants are Plutarch and Polybius. Plutarch's *Life of Aratus* is widely considered to have been based upon Aratus' own memoirs (see above, n. 24), and so the information he includes about the Argive tyrants (inveterate foes of Aratus that they were) is likely to be biased. Aristomachus II betrayed the Achaean League, and one need do no more than read Polyb. 2.59-60 to see how thoroughly that crime damned him and his entire line in the eyes of an otherwise sober historian.

successful rule. For their part, the kings of Macedon did not expect much out of their friends the Argive tyrants beyond not actively opposing Macedonian interests.

Antigonus III Doson's (r. 229-221) decision to re-erect the destroyed statues of the Argive tyrants perfectly characterizes this relationship (Plut. *Arat.* 45.3). That Antigonus chose to do this shows that he was satisfied with the behavior of most of the Argive tyrants (the recent defection of Aristomachus II to the side of Nabis notwithstanding). At the same time, it is unlikely that he would have re-erected the statues against the wishes of both Aratus (who by this point was an advisor of Antigonus and was vehemently opposed to the restoration of the statues) *and* the Argives. Someone in Argos must have wanted the statues put back in place, and their re-erection suggests both how little the Macedonian kings expected of their puppet tyrants, and that those puppet tyrants could establish a significant and persistent body of local supporters.

Even, then, in the third-century Peloponnese, where the evidence for the royal establishment and support of tyrannies is the strongest, most tyrannies seem to have sprung up independently of royal support, and those that did have royal support did not depend solely upon it. The kings of Macedon were willing to work with anyone who was willing to work with them, regardless of whether he was a 'tyrant' of Argos or a 'democratic' *stratēgos* of the Achaean League. In these respects, the situation in the third-century Peloponnese strongly resembles the situation in fourth-century Euboea. The relationship between tyranny and royal power in both cases is much weaker than one might expect. Elsewhere, the connection between king and tyrant is even more tenuous. Which Successor supported the many tyrants of Syracuse, or of any other Sicilian city for that matter? Kings, no doubt, were willing to help their "friends" take power in cities when it was possible and convenient, but it

is difficult to see any consistent pattern of tyrannical support, or even a decided preference for working with tyrants.

The Wicked Tyrant

For the ancients, a reliance upon royal power was the least in a long litany of tyrannical evils. Polybius wrote that "the very word 'tyrant' alone conveys to us the height of impiety and comprises in itself the sum of all human defiance of law and justice." (2.59.6). Our ancient sources harp incessantly on the brutality and repression of tyrannical regimes. Tyrants had bodyguards, incited slaves and the poor, murdered or exiled their rivals, confiscated property, outraged women and freeborn youths, and generally acted with shameless profligacy.

⁴³ To be sure, the earliest references to *turannoi* do not have negative connotations (on which see Anderson [2005]). The *topoi* discussed here are developed by the Classical period and persist through the Hellenistic and into later centuries.

⁴⁴ Aristion of Athens (App. *Mith.* 38-9); Aristippus I of Argos (Plut. *Arat.* 26.1); Aristotimus of Elis (Plut. *Mor.* 251A); Athenion of Athens (Poseidonios=*FGrH* 87 F36); Leander of Cyrene (Plut. *Mor.* 257B-C); Moagetes II of Pisidia (Diod. Sic. 33.5); Nabis of Sparta (Livy 35.35).

⁴⁵ Apollodorus of Cassandreia (Polyaenus *Strat.* 6.7.2); Archinos (Polyaenus *Strat.* 3.8; cf. Berve (1967), 389 for the dating); Aristion of Athens (Paus. 1.20.5); Chairon of Pellene (Ath. 11.509A-B); Demetrius of Phalerum (Athens) (Phaedrus *Fab.* 5.1); Lysias of Tarsus (Ath. 5.215B-C); Molpagoras of Cius (Polyb. 15.21.1-2); Nabis of Sparta (Diod. Sic. 27.1; Polyb. 13.6.3-4).

⁴⁶ Abantidas of Sicyon (Plut. *Arat*. 2.2); Apollodorus of Cassandreia (Polyaen. 6.7.1); Aristion of Athens (App. *Mith*. 28); Aristotimus of Elis (Just. 26.1; Plut. *Mor*. 251C); Athenion of Athens (Poseidonios *FGrH* 87 F36); Chairon of Pellene (Ath. 11.509A-B); Dionysius of Heraclea Pontica (Memnon *FGrH* 434 F4.1); Hieron of Priene (*I Priene* 11, 37-8; Berve (1967) 423); Lysias of Tarsus (Ath. 5.215B-C); Molpagoras of Cius (Polyb. 15.21.1-2); Nabis of Sparta (Diod. Sic. 27.1; Polyb. 13.6.3-10); Nicocles of Sicyon (Plut. *Arat*. 9.3); Nicocreon of Cyprus (Cic. *Nat. Deor*. 3.33); Nicocrates of Cyrene (Plut. *Mor*. 255F); Phintias of Acragas (Diod. Sic. 22.2.4).

⁴⁷ Apollodorus of Cassandreia (Diod. Sic. 22.5.1-2); Aristotimus of Elis (Justin 26.1; Plut. *Mor.* 251D-E); Athenion of Athens (Poseidonios = *FGrH* 87 F36); Chairon of Pellene (Ath. 11.509A-B); Lachares of Athens (Paus. 1.25.7, 1.29.16); Lysias of Tarsus (Ath. 5.215B-C); Molpagoras of Cius (Polyb. 15.21.1-2); Nabis of Sparta (Polyb. 13.7.3-11).

⁴⁸ Aristomelidas of Orchomenos (Paus. 8.47.6, cf. Berve (1967) 403 for the dating); Aristotimus of Elis (Justin 26.1; Plut. *Mor.* 251A-D); Chairon of Pellene (Ath. 11.509A-B); Demetrius of Phalerum (Ael. *VH* 9.9); Nabis of Sparta (Polyb. 13.6.3); Nicocrates of Cyrene (Plut. *Mor.* 256A-257E).

⁴⁹ Apollodorus of Cassandreia (Ael. *VH* 14.41); Athenion of Athens (Poseidonios *FGrH* 87 F36); Demetrius of Athens (Ael. *VH* 9.9; Duris=Ath. 12.542B-543A); Dionysias of Heraclea Pontica (Memnon *FGrH* 434 4.7); Lysias of Tarsus (Ath. 5.215B-C); Machanidas of Sparta (Cartledge and Spawforth [1989] 69). Other connections between tyranny and luxury in a non-Hellenistic context: Dio Chrys. *Or.* 47.18, 23-5; Plut. *Alc.* 16.2.

Hellenistic tyranny for most of the twentieth century, although more recent scholarship has begun to revise it.⁵⁰

It is, however, difficult to tell how much of what we find in our ancient sources regarding tyrannical violence is simply calumny, part of a long literary tradition that assumes tyrants acted in certain despicable ways. By the fourth century BC, philosophers had already developed a set of tyrannical *topoi* that look suspiciously similar to the purported acts of later Hellenistic tyrants.⁵¹ Thus, when Polybius claims that "a tyranny, the more ambitious its aims, requires all the more mercenaries," or Plutarch defines tyrants as the sort of men "who seize citadels, maintain spearmen, and depend upon arms and gates," it is difficult to discern the degree to which such statements accord with reality, or are rather the result of a long-standing literary tradition.⁵²

One indication that the violence of tyrants was more than a mere *topos* is the fact that many non-tyrants behaved in much the same way. If many tyrants had bodyguards, so too did the anti-tyrannical Aratus.⁵³ If tyrants exiled their enemies, so too did many other non-tyrants. Exile was an extremely common outcome of intra-*polis* strife in the Hellenistic

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⁵⁰ For the integral role of force in Berve's thinking, see above, n. 4. Force and illegality were important components of tyranny for other scholars as well. Thus when discussing the Athenian Medeius, MacKendrick (1969) calls him a dictator (53-61), while Badian (1976) openly labels him a tyrant (105-10) on the basis of no evidence except the fact that he held two sequential (and thus illegal) eponymous archonships (on Medeius, see below, pp. 52-3). Lewis (2004), (2006), (2009), has rightly challenged the centrality of violence to tyranny.

⁵¹ The major discussions are at Pl. *Resp.* 565c-569c; Xen. *Hier.* 1.32-5.3; Arist. *Pol.* 5.

⁵² Polyb. 11.13.7; Plut. *Arat*. 26.4.

⁵³ Plut. *Arat.* 26.1, 41.1. Plutarch clearly means to differentiate Aratus by noting that his bodyguard was of Sicyonian citizens. Nevertheless, while the stereotypical tyrant's bodyguard was usually of foreign mercenaries, it did not have to be: Plato has it (*Laws* 566b, 567D-E) that the first bodyguard of a tyrant is given to him by the assembly because he seems to be a friend of democracy. Only when his rule becomes more openly oppressive does the tyrant switch to employing mercenaries and slaves as guards. The whiff of tyranny seems to cling to all bodyguards.

period, and it was typical for exiles to forfeit their property.⁵⁴ The losing faction in such cases had little compunction about using violence to force its way back into power. Aratus' initial plan to take his native Sicyon from the tyrant Nicocles was to seize an outlying fortification in Sicyonian territory, and, from there, wage war against the city (Plut. *Arat.* 5.3). This was the standard operating procedure for many disgruntled exiles. Those exiled by Aristotimus of Elis, for example, seized the fortress of Amymone in the city's territory (Plur. *Mor.* 252A). Those exiled by Hieron, a tyrant of Priene in the early third century, seized the fortress of Karion and used it as a base of operations against their own city.⁵⁵ In 324 BC, a group of exiles from Cyrene invited the Spartan mercenary commander Thibron to invade their homeland. While Thibron was besieging the city, a second faction of exiles fled to King Ptolemy I in Egypt and convinced him to send another foreign army (Diod. Sic. 18.21.6-9). Even in the age of Rome, whenever the shadow of war fell upon the Greek East, the cycle of exile and *stasis* began anew.⁵⁶

The desire to send one's opponents into miserable exile burned brightly in the breasts of Greek notables in every era. The struggle between members of the elite in Archaic *poleis* regularly resulted in exile.⁵⁷ The Athenian *demos* of the Classical Period tried to ameliorate this competition somewhat through the practice of ostracism. But even this minor check

 $^{^{54}}$ See Chapter 1 as well as Gray (2015) 116-19 on the commonness of exile, even in democratic *poleis*. On the confiscation of property, see Lonis (1991). Examples of the practice include: Diod. Sic. 18.56.4, 18.57.1 (Polyperchon orders that property be restored to returning exiles, and that the property of those he orders to be exiled be confiscated); Plut. *Arat.* 9.3 (the return of property to the 580 exiles Aratus restores to Sicyon is a major cause for concern); Memnon = FGrH 434 F7.2-4 (the exiles of Heracleia Pontica regained their citizenship after agreeing to waive their rights to confiscated property).

⁵⁵ I.Priene 37-8=Syll.³ 599.

⁵⁶ Thus during the Mithridatic war we find two or three tyrants in Athens (Medeius, Athenion, Aristion), a brief outbreak of *stasis*-like violence in Chaeronea (Plut. *Cim.* 1.2-6), and *stasis* or tyranny in many cities in Asia Minor (Magie [1950] 199-231; McGing [1986]). During the later Roman Civil Wars we find tyrannies or evidence of civil strife in a number of cities in Asia Minor as well (Magie [1950] 379-427).

⁵⁷ Forsdyke (2005) 30-79.

barely lasted more than half a century, and even while it existed, many Athenians were exiled. Beyond Athens, exile for notables remained the norm. Centuries later, Plutarch assumed that most citizens, finding themselves in a position of superiority, would try to exile their opponents (*Mor.* 815A). Hellenistic exile (and the subsequent confiscation of property) is a product of this long-standing tradition. There is nothing especially tyrannical about exile, nor is there anything especially tyrannical in a willingness to use force against one's fellow citizens.

Accusations of tyrannical luxury provide an analogy for this. On the one hand, a desire for luxury and debauchery is part of the philosophical stereotype of the tyrant. See Certainly, many Hellenistic tyrants are depicted as partaking in it. The Athenian tyrant Demetrius of Phalerum is said to have spared no expense when it came to pampering himself. He dyed his hair and caked his face in rouge. His house reeked of expensive perfumes, and his feasts were so prodigious that his household chef was able to buy his own freedom within two years just by selling the leftovers (Ael. VH 9.9; Ath. 12.542B-543A). In a slightly more surreal example of excess, we are also told that he commissioned a great mechanical snail, capable of spitting out water, to lead the procession during the City Dionysia. See Centuries later, the tyrant Athenion was carried about the streets of Athens upon a silver chair, bedecked in purple (Poseidonios F36=Ath. 5.212). Similarly, the tyrant Lysias donned a purple tunic, military cloak, and golden crown when he seized control of Tarsus.

⁵⁸ Pl. *Grg.* 492C, *Resp.* 573A-D; Xen. *Hier*. 1.17-25, 2.2, 4.

⁵⁹ Polyb. 12.13.11. Discussion (and relevant bibliography) to be found at O'Sullivan (2009) 182.

⁶⁰ Ath. 5.215B-C.

king), wore purple clothes.⁶¹ Dionysius, a late-fourth-century tyrant of Heraclea Pontica, grew so fat and indolent that his courtiers could only rouse him by poking him with long sharp needles (Memnon=*FGrH* 434 4.7).⁶²

On the other hand, $tryph\bar{e}$ was not confined only to the tyrants and the tyrannically inclined. All wealthy men were fond of luxurious displays. One may suspect that hostile sources have embellished certain accounts of tyrannical luxury, but there is no reason to doubt that tyrants as a group were just as addicted to conspicuous consumption as their peers, not least because such behavior emphasized their capacity for benefaction. The fact that a broad spectrum of the local elite participated in this behavior indicates that it is not only a tyrannical topos. In a similar fashion, the fact that we find men, who are not named tyrants, acting in this manner, suggests that the use of force is not a mere topos that occurs only in association with tyranny.

While any attempt to claim that a specific tyrant made use of force or fear must be rooted in the particulars of the evidence for that tyrant, it seems generally safe to say that some tyrants probably did use force as a component of their rule. Many of the tyrants we find in Strabo's discussion of Asia Minor appear to have employed force. According to him, the hilly country of Cilicia and Pisidia practically swarmed with tyrants, each of whom led his own gang of bandits (Strabo 12.7.3).⁶³ Alas, most of these tyrants are unnamed, and we know nothing about them beyond their plundering tendencies. There are two exceptions to this rule: Zenophanes of Cilicia Tracheia and Cleon of Gordium in Mysia.⁶⁴ Like his

⁶¹ Polyb. 11.18.1. Cf. Cartledge and Spawforth (1989) 69.

⁶² Magas, the Hellenistic king of Cyrene, was said to have been equally corpulent (Ath. 12.55B).

⁶³ The people of the region are said to "practice piracy" (ληστρικῶς ἤσκηνται).

⁶⁴ Zenophanes: Strabo 14.5.10. Cleon: Strabo. 12.8.9.

tyrannical peers, Zenophanes was the ruler of a band of brigands. He apparently parlayed this fact into influence in the nearby city of Olbê. Zenophanes managed to marry his daughter Aba into the priestly clan who ruled the city. Cleon, too, was a robber-captain, whose band of rogues stalked the leafy slopes of Mt. Olympus in Mysia. Cleon was distinguished by his ability to make his plundering useful to the right Romans, allying himself first to Antony, and then Octavian. His Roman benefactors awarded him a series of priesthoods, and he made enough money that he was able to enlarge his native village and secure recognition of it as a city, which he named Juliopolis. That these tyrants used coercion to retain their power seems plausible. Whatever benefactions Cleon performed for Gordium, the fact that he could swoop down from his mountain fastness and plunder any farm he wished must have also been a consideration for local landowners. However Zenophanes charmed or bought his way into the priestly clan of Olbê, the fact that a band of thieves was at his command certainly did not hurt his bargaining position.

But there are two matters worth observing about these men. The first is that such coercive force is not only associated with tyrants. "Mercenary adventurers" who attempted to parlay their commands into positions of political dominance were also, obviously, practitioners of coercion. The Spartan Thibron is a good example of such a man, since he initially came to Cyrene at the behest of Cyrenean exiles, but ultimately attempted to rule over portions of Cyrenaica. Likewise, the citizens of Acragas invited the Spartan Acrotatus to help them fend off the Syracusan tyrant Agathocles. But once Acrotatus arrived he lived in luxury ("more like a Persian than a Spartan" according to Diodorus), and executed

⁶⁵ Diod. Sic. 17.108.8, 18.19.2-21.9; Berve (1967) 417-18. In the end, another group of Cyrenean exiles called upon King Ptolemy for assistance, and Ptolemy's troops crushed Thibron and brought Cyrene into the Ptolemaic empire.

those he feared might oppose him. This apparently did little to dissuade the Western Greeks from seeking Spartan aid, for, a little later, the people of Tarentum asked Cleonymus (king Areus' uncle) to help them with their war against the Romans and Lucanians. Cleonymus gathered thousands of mercenaries and set out for Italy. When peace unexpectedly broke out, Cleonymus decided to use his mercenaries to conquer Corcyra and install a garrison there. 66

The second matter worth noting about Cleon and Zenophanes is that neither seems to have relied upon brute force alone to support his rule. Cleon made use of his friendship with various Romans to procure priestly titles for himself and the status of *polis* for his city. Zenophanes allied himself with a prestigious local family. These men may have begun as bandit captains, but they aspired to loftier status. To achieve their wider ambitions, they made use of foreign connections, benefactions, and marital alliances, in addition to the force their men provided.

As another case study will make clear, reliance upon various means of gaining and keeping influence was normal for all tyrants who made use of force. Because of her immense strategic and cultural importance, Athens was closely monitored by the kings of Macedon.⁶⁷ Very often, this meant Macedonian support for tyrants. The first (and most famous) of these was Demetrius of Phalerum.⁶⁸ In 317, Cassander gave Demetrius control of Athens. While there was a Macedonian garrison present in the Piraeus during Demetrius' ten years in power, Demetrius was more than a trumped-up garrison commander.⁶⁹ Demetrius worked to

⁶⁶ Diod. Sic. 20.104-5; Livy 10.2; Berve (1967) 390, 405; Cartledge and Spawforth (1989) 30.

⁶⁷ For Hellenistic Athens generally, see MacKenderick (1969), Mossé (1970), Habicht (1997).

⁶⁸ Fortenbaugh and Schütrumpf (2000) collect the ancient evidence for Demetrius' literary output. For modern scholarly discussion, see the essays in that volume as well as Bayer (1969), Williams (1982), Tracy (1995) 36-54 and O'Sullivan (2009).

⁶⁹ The garrison was in the Munychia in Piraeus. The commander was a man named Dionysius (Diod. Sic. 20.45.2).

reform the Athenian government. The precise scope of his reforms is still a matter for scholarly debate, but certainly they included a census, the expansion of juries for cases involving *eisangelia* (impeachment), and sumptuary laws limiting spending on funerary monuments. He probably also expanded the powers of the *nomophylakes* (a board of eleven men tasked with ensuring the legality of proposed decrees), and may have abolished the liturgical system that distributed the largest expenses of the state among her richest citizens.⁷⁰

Demetrius also oversaw the rehabilitation of the Athenian economy in the wake of the catastrophic Lamian War, and the reinstitution of the *ephebeia* (which appears to have been abolished—perhaps by Macedonian fiat—after Athens' initial surrender to Cassander). There is no indication that meetings of the assembly were curtailed during Demetrius' tenure, or that jury pay and the selection of magistrates by sortition ceased. It is possible that Demetrius was not wholly insincere when he wrote that he "restored the democracy" of Athens, as long as one understands that democracy to be of the more moderate sort, that fifth-and-fourth-century gentlemen thought Solon had first instituted (Strabo 9.1.20). The comparison to Solon would not have been lost on Demetrius, who wrote several books on Athenian history. Demetrius probably saw himself not as a tyrant, but as a lawgiver.

⁷⁰ Nomophylakes: Gagarin (2000) 349-51. No ancient source credits Demetrius with the abolition of the liturgies, but they do disappear around the time he is in power. See Gottschalk (2000) 371.

⁷¹ Economy: Polyb. 12.13.9-10. *Ephebeia*: Tracy (2000) 339-40.

⁷² Jury pay: Gagarin (2000), 353. Assembly meetings and sortition: Tracy (2000) 338.

⁷³ Such was the ambiguity surrounding tyranny based on influence that it was also possible for Plutarch to see Demetrius as essentially a monarch (Plut. *Demetr.* 10.2). Cf. Plut. *Arist*. 7.1, wherein Themistocles rouses popular ire against Aristides by saying that Aristides' habit of acting as an arbiter undermined the public courts and made him a monarch.

⁷⁴ Gottschalk (2000) 376-7.

⁷⁵ Cicero gives some evidence for this in his discussion of Attic funerary custom (*Leg.* 2.63-66). There, he explicitly cites "the man of Phalerum" as one of his sources on Solon's sumptuary laws. A little later, he discusses Demetrius' own sumptuary laws. This rather suggests that Demetrius framed his own discussion of his funerary reforms within the context of Solonic reform, and strengthens the idea that Demetrius saw his overall role as similar to that of Solon.

own self-presentation as a restorer of democracy and creator of economic prosperity suggests that he did not think only of the needs of the elite, but stood between the few and the many, and sheltered them both with his shield.⁷⁶ If there is anything approaching truth behind Strabo's statement that 300 statues of Demetrius once existed in Athens, the tyrant possessed a broad basis of support (9.1.20).

Demetrius Poliorcetes expelled Demetrius of Phalerum from Athens in 307. By about 300, the wily Cassander had again convinced an Athenian to become tyrant. This time the tyrant was named Lachares.⁷⁷ According to Pausanias, "no other tyrant proved so cruel to man and so impious to the gods" (Paus. 1.25.7). Lachares earned this unsavory reputation first by pushing the city of Athens to the point of famine rather than negotiate with Demetrius Poliorcetes (who returned in 296/5 to Athens to 'liberate' the city once more). Then, when it became clear that Demetrius would win, Lachares supposedly despoiled the temples of their sacred treasures and slipped off into the night.⁷⁸

Whatever his later misdeeds, Lachares began as a "popular champion" according to Pausanias (1.25.7). During his reign, the secretaryship of the council continued in its usual rotation, generals continued to be elected, and the assembly continued to meet.⁷⁹ It is not

⁷⁶ According to Polybius, "Demochares in his history brings accusations by no means trivial against Demetrius, telling us that the statesmanship on which he prided himself was such as a vulgar farmer of taxes would pride himself on, his boast having been that the market in the town was plentifully supplied and cheap, and that there was abundance of all the necessities of life for everybody" (12.13.9-10). Despite the condescension of later historians, the economic successes of which Demetrius boasted would have been a source of appeal to poorer Athenians.

⁷⁷ Paus. 1.25.7-8, 1.29.10, 1.29.16; Plut. *Demetr*. 33-34, *Mor*. 379C; Polyaenus *Strat*. 3.7.1-3, 4.7.5, 6.7.2. ⁷⁸ Temple despoliation is a tyrannical *topos*, and Lachares' plundering of the acropolis certainly has a fable-like quality to it. On the one hand, he was supposed to have taken a great quantity of gold, including the golden garments from the statue of Athena in the Parthenon (Paus. 1.25.8, 1.29.16; Plut. *Mor*. 379C). On the other hand, there was a tradition that he also slipped quietly away dressed as a slave, throwing gold coins behind him to distract pursuers like an escaping leprechaun (Polyaenus *Strat*. 3.7.1-4). These two traditions are not obviously reconcilable, and one ought to be suspicious of both of them. ⁷⁹ Habicht (1997) 84.

clear if Lachares had any outside forces at all with which to coerce the Athenians. Cassander does not seem to have installed a garrison in Athens. The mercenaries listed in *IG* II² 1956 have been taken by Habicht as troops in Lachares' employ. But Rosivach has recently observed that many of the names on the list are common slave names, and has speculated that the men bearing them may have been recently freed Athenian slaves. The inscription may not be a list of mercenaries brought in to oppress the Athenians, but rather a group of slaves or freedmen metics levied during the desperate days of Demetrius' siege. The resolve that Athens showed in the face of Demetrius' siege (which extended to passing a resolution condemning to death anyone who mentioned peace and reconciliation with Demetrius) was probably as a consequence of the persuasiveness of Lachares himself, and not of any ability he had to coerce the city by force. As with Philip II in Euboea or Antigonus II in the Peloponnese, Cassander picked as his 'tyrant' a man who already had support in the city. See the city by force in the city.

After taking the city, Demetrius Poliorcetes installed garrisons in the Piraeus and on the Mouseion Hill near the Acropolis. He also "established the magistrates who were most acceptable to the people" (Plut. *Demetr.* 34.4). One of these magistrates was probably Olympiodorus, a close friend of Demetrius who held two sequential eponymous archonships in 294/3 and 293/2.⁸³ This double archonship was illegal, and it is likely that Olympiodorus' connection to Demetrius allowed him to flout the law. Nevertheless, Olympiodorus' influence in Athens could not have depended upon this friendship with Demetrius alone,

⁸⁰ Habicht (1997) 84-5.

⁸¹ Rosivach (2000) 380-1.

⁸² Not that this support was wholehearted. A conspiracy against Lachares was uncovered and the conspirators put to death (Paus. 1.29.10). The men of Piraeus provided Demetrius Poliorcetes with weapons (although by this point it was clear that Demetrius was likely to be the victor) (Polyaenus *Strat.* 6.7.2).

⁸³ Osborne (2006) 69-70.

since in 287 he led a successful revolt from Macedon.⁸⁴ Like Aristomachus of Argos, Olympiodorus was able to remain a powerful politician, even when his royal friendship ceased to be politically useful.

Athenian independence lasted until the end of the Chremonidean War in 262 BC. The victorious Antigonus II placed garrisons in all the Attic forts and the Mouseion. The fragmentary historian Philodemus claimed that Antigonus also abolished all public offices and made everything "subject to the will of one man" (*FGrH* 244 F44). What exactly Philodemus meant by this is unclear. Tarn thought that Philodemus was referring to the Mouseion garrison commander, an Athenian named Hierokles. Gabbert, by contrast, has argued that the "one man" is Antigonus and that no royal governor was present, while Habicht claims that Antigonus appointed as his overseer yet another Demetrius, the grandson of Demetrius of Phalerum.⁸⁵

According to Athenaeus, Antigonus made this Demetrius an Athenian *thesmothetes* (4.167E-F). Habicht takes this to mean that Demetrius was Philodemus' "one man" appointed to rule the city, although even he admits it is possible that Antigonus merely arranged for Demetrius to be one of the six thesmothete archons. Demetrius' rule over Athens is, therefore, anything but assured. Even if Demetrius had received what amounted to tyrannical power from Antigonus, the support for his rule would not have depended on Antigonus' approval alone. Antigonus allegedly chose Demetrius because the man had given an elegant speech in his own defense when brought before the Aeropagus on account of his licentious personal lifestyle. The whole anecdote depends upon the idea that Demetrius was

⁸⁴ Habicht (1997) 90-6.

⁸⁵ Tarn (1913) 307-8; Gabbert (1997) 51, n.52; Habicht (1997) 151-4. On Demetrius the grandson, see Tracy (1994).

extremely wealthy, had enough clout to be called before the Aeropagus, and, most important, was influential and persuasive enough to clear himself of wrongdoing. In short, he was already an influential man before Antigonus granted him any additional power.

After Demetrius the grandson, our next potential Athenian tyrant is Medeius, who in the late 90's BC held three sequential eponymous archonships. As with Olympodorus, these successive archonships constituted a violation of the law, and this has caused several modern scholars to label him a tyrant. 86 Medeius' 'tyranny' seems to have been entirely the result of infighting between Athenian notables. By the beginning of the first century BC, twenty-three leading families played a disproportionate role in Athenian political life.⁸⁷ Medeius came from one of these families. During his political career he was eponymous archon four times (101/100 BC, 91/0-89/8 BC), hoplite general, trierarch, gymnasiarch, agonothete, mintmagistrate twice, head of the state bank on Delos, priest of Poseidon Erechthus, twice an emissary to Delphi, and the sponsor of both Panathenaic and Delian games.⁸⁸ His chief rival seems to have been one Sarapion son of Sarapion, who was also a great benefactor of the city. 89 Badian is probably correct in seeing this competition as the goad that compelled Medeius to take illegal action to secure his dominance. Holding three sequential archonships was, therefore, not the source of Medeius' power, but rather a sign of it. If Medeius had any connections to an outside power, they were probably of lesser importance.⁹⁰

⁸⁶ FGrH 87 F36= Ath. 5.213D; *IG*² II 1713. Badian (1976), 105-110; Habicht (1997), 301-3; MacKenderick (1969), 53-61; Mossé (1979) 143, 145.

⁸⁷ MacKenderick (1969) 59.

⁸⁸ On Medeius' career, see MacKendrick (1969) 55; Badian (1976) 106.

⁸⁹ Sarapion was hoplite general twice, and gave at least four games (two in Delphi and two in Athens) in the year 98/7 alone (Badian [1976] 106-7).

⁹⁰ Medeius is usually assumed to have been pro-Roman (McGing [1986] 118) but the evidence for this is circumstantial.

Medeius disappears from the historical record in the fatal year 88 BC, halfway through his last archonship. In that same year, Athenion, a friend of Mithridates, came to power in the city. 91 The story of Athenion comes down to us only from Poseidonios (via Athenaeus), and Poseidonios' account is, as Benjamin Gray observes, "highly satirical and exaggerated."92 In his account, Athenion is a "freak of fortune," a minor sophist who is sent by the Athenians to the court of Mithridates as an ambassador. He returned to Athens, his purse heavy with silver and his tongue even heavier with lies. Warships accompany him at sea, and a throng of attendants bears him about in a silver-footed litter on land. He is escorted to the house of Dies, one of the richest citizens. Leaving that abode clad in purple, he speaks to the assembly, promising that Mithridates will abolish debts and free the city from Rome. The mob spontaneously elects him general, and he appoints his own colleagues. Athenion slowly tightens his control over the city. He surrounds himself with bodyguards, and executes those who he thinks are conspiring against him, or attempting to flee to the Romans. Then, suddenly, he disappears from the historical record. Perhaps his botched expedition to Delos (the last event in the Poseidonios fragment) forced him out of power.

For Poseidonios, Athenion was both parasite and demagogue, a man who gorged himself on the wealth of the East, then returned home and won fleeting popularity by making absurd promises. Much of Poseidonios' account must be slander. It is inconceivable that the Athenians would have entrusted an important diplomatic mission to a two-bit sophist. 93

Athenion must have been a person of some importance before he departed for the court of

⁹¹ FGrH 87 (Poseidonios) F36=Ath. 5.211D-215B. On Athenion, see Berve (1967) 412-414; MacKendrick (1969) 61-2; Badian (1976) 110-117; Mossé (1979) 148-50; McGing (1986) 118-121; Bugh (1992); Bringmann (1997); Habicht (1997) 300-5; Antela-Bernárdez (2009).

⁹² Gray (2018) 140.

⁹³ Badian (1976) 113.

Mithridates. That the Athenians sent an honor guard of warships to escort Athenion home is, if true, testimony to the importance of the embassy, and this also implies the importance of Athenion. Similarly, the fact that, upon his arrival, Athenion retires to the house of the wealthy Dies suggests that Athenion had prior connections among the great and powerful. The archon list from 88/7 survives, and a number of important notables are on it. This, too, indicates that Athenion's government had the backing of at least some of the upper class. Sectionally Athenion's connection to Mithridates was a decisive factor in his rise to power. But it makes more sense to see in Athenion and Medeius yet another pair of feuding notables drawing upon foreign connections in an attempt to secure a final victory over one another. It was not Mithridates who took the initiative and installed a tyrant, but rather an internal competition between Athenians that enmeshed Mithridates and the Romans.

After Athenion's disappearance c. 88 BC, a certain Aristion represented Pontic power in Athens. 97 Mithridates' general Archelaus sent Aristion with 2,000 soldiers, along with the sacred treasure of Delos with which to pay them (App. *Mith.* 28). Aristion is said to have used these men to take power by force. But the Athenians may very well have been just as receptive to him as they apparently had been to Athenion. Aristion was clearly connected to Mithridates, and the Delian gold he brought with him was a certain sign of Mithridates' favor. Unfortunately, we know almost nothing Aristion's life prior to his part in the

⁹⁴ Fleets usually met kings at sea, but the honor could be conferred upon other high-ranking men and emissaries (Cf. Plut. *Luc.* 2.5).

⁹⁵ McGing (1986) 119 n.143.

⁹⁶ Habicht (1997) 303.

⁹⁷ Some scholars suspect that Athenion (who is only found in one source) and Aristion (who is comparatively well attested) are the same person, although the majority of scholars are willing to keep them separate. See Badian (1976) 114-5, Kidd (1988-89) 884-6, McGing (1989) 120, n. 152, and now Gray (2018) 143 for bibliography on the controversy. Aristion: App. *Mith.* 28, 30, 38-9; Cic. *Brut.* 306; Paus. 1.20.4; Plut. *Sull.* 12, 13-14.23, 39; *Mor.* 558C; Strabo 9.398; Vell. Pat. 2.23.4-5.

Mithridatic war, and very little about how he governed in Athens during his brief tenure as tyrant. 98 This makes it hard to say very much about the nature of his power. Later historians censured his conduct during the war: he is said to have feasted on the Acropolis while the city starved, to have scattered groups of important men by firing volleys of arrows at them, and to have burned the Odeum in order to deprive Sulla of wood for siege engines. 99

But these later historians had strong cause to abuse Aristion. For the halcyon days in which it seemed as if Mithridates might break the power of Rome were brief, and the period of Roman domination over Athens extremely long. The oppressive weight of hindsight seemed to have warped how later authors told the story of Athens' disastrous flirtation with the Pontic king. Pausanias argues that only the lower classes were taken in by Mithridates' chicanery; the better sorts fled to Rome (Paus. 1.20.5). Plutarch has the gods pass judgment on Aristion by sending rain mere moments after thirst drove him to hand over the Acropolis to the Romans (Plut. *Sull.* 14.7). Many emphasize that the suffering of the city was great, but that Sulla ultimately reconciled the Athenians and Romans (Strabo 9.1.20; App. *Mith.* 38-9; Plut. *Sull.* 14.3-5).¹⁰⁰ Velleius Paterculus perhaps expresses the common sentiment most openly: "held in subjugation by their enemies and besieged by their friends, although in obedience to necessity they kept their bodies within the walls, their hearts were outside their fortifications" (2.23.5). This was altogether an easier way for both the Romans and the

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⁹⁸ Appian's comment that Aristion was an Epicurean constitutes our sole piece of background information (App. *Mith.* 28).

⁹⁹ Feasting and shooting: Plut. Sull. 13-14. Odeum: App. Mith. 38.

¹⁰⁰ On Sulla's actions, see Thein (2014).

Athenians to think about the war. The only one who suffered was Aristion, and he was in no position to rescue his reputation.¹⁰¹

For most of the Athenian tyrants, then, it is possible to see how other means of maintaining power operated alongside coercive means. Aristion appears to constitute the sole exception to this principle, but perhaps this is because our sources are more interested in finding a scapegoat for the worst Athenian decision since the Syracusan Expedition, than they are in providing a truthful account of the relation between Aristion and the city. To claim that these tyrants ruled by force would be a bit like claiming that the power of the Roman emperor rested only upon his legions, and not also upon his ability to influence the Senate, his reputation among his subjects in Rome and the provinces, and his empire-wide benefactions. As with the emperor, force may have been an important component in the rule of some tyrants, but it was by no means the only component.

The Influential Tyrant

Neither royal backing nor the use of coercion satisfactorily explains Hellenistic tyranny. Tyrants made use of violence and outside connections, to be sure, but not more so than other notables. Perhaps it is best not to define a tyrant by the source of his power (since this could vary), but rather by the extent of it. In other words, the tyrant is a man who possesses overwhelming power in his city, to the point that other notables cannot gain prestige and influence without his consent. Such power need not be illegal. Herodotus writes that the Athenian tyrant Peisistratus "neither disrupted the existing political offices nor

¹⁰¹ Other cities also pleaded that they were forced to fight the Romans against their will. Thus the pro-Roman exiles from lasos pleaded in the 190's for their city to be spared, since it was being held hostage by the forces of Antiochus (Livy 37.17.5-6).

changed the laws. He managed the city in accordance with its existing legal and political institutions, and he provided it with moderate and good government" (Hdt. 1.59.5). There are suggestions that tyranny in the third-century Peloponnese operated similarly. Somewhere between ten to twenty decrees come down to us from Argos dating from the reign of the Aristomachid tyrants (272-224 BC). None of these inscriptions mentions the tyrants, and the city's constitution seems to have undergone only minor, almost cosmetic, changes. While those historians who work primarily from literary sources see Argos as a city ruled by autocrats, those who work largely with inscriptions see a vibrant democracy that continues to 146 BC. The easiest way to reconcile these two discordant bodies of evidence is to assume that the Aristomachoi, like the Peisistratids long before them, relied upon their extraconstitutional influence to see their wishes carried out. Indeed, this has increasingly become the way in which scholars view other tyrants as well. 103

How precisely this domination by influence worked undoubtedly varied from tyrant to tyrant. The ancient stereotype of the tyrant has it that he 'wins' the competition between local notables by killing or exiling all the other players. Given our earlier discussion of violence and exile, it is probably safe to assume that many tyrants *did* exile their opponents. But this does not need to mean that tyrants gutted the local elite. Pericles succeeded in dominating fifth-century Athens not by expelling every other wealthy man, but by encouraging the Athenians to ostracize his most able opponents, such as Cimon and Thucydides, son of Melesias. The Peisistratids were most certainly tyrants, but even they

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¹⁰² So, for example, a board of *polemarchoi* replaced the board of *stratēgoi*. See Paschidis (2008) 218, n. 1 for the inscriptions and bibliography.

¹⁰³ Lewis (2009) 110-11.

¹⁰⁴ Pl. Resp. 566C, 567A-C, [Pl.] Epistolae 7.351B; Xen. Hier. 5.2; Arist. Pol. 1284A-B, 1311A, 1314A.

allowed members of other notable families to hold offices. The eponymous archonship of Athens, for example, was held in 526/5 by Hippias, son of Peisistratus, then by Cleisthenes son of Megacles of the Alcmeonidae in 525/4, Miltiades the younger of the powerful Philiad clan in 524/3, and finally Hippias' son Peisistratus in 522/1. Far from suppressing all other notable houses, the Peisistratids allowed them a share of prestige, albeit one that was subsidiary to their own. One might think once more of the Roman emperors, who never stopped competition among the senators, even as they occasionally took consulships for themselves.

Regardless of how the domination of the tyrant was achieved, the possession of tyrannical power made the man undeniably different from his peers. Tyranny was a tangible thing, almost an unofficial office of sorts that could be taken up or put down. Indeed, several tyrants are said to have voluntarily renounced their tyranny as the Achaean League became ever more powerful under Aratus. Aristomachus II is prominent among this group, as is Lydiades of Megalopolis, whom Polybius lauds for abdicating without compulsion (Polyb. 2.44.5). Polybius is clearly proud of Lydiades, and one might assume that, if it were possible, he would make of him a democratic hero on the model of Aratus, rather than a reformed tyrant. 107

Why must Polybius have Lydiades a tyrant at all? The most plausible answer is that tyrannical influence amounted to absolute domination in the competition between local notables. If Lydiades' candidates for magistracies always won the office, if his verdict was

 $^{^{105}}$ IG I^3 1031 = GHI 6.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Paus. 8.7.12; Plut. *Arat.* 30.1-5.

¹⁰⁷ Not was Polybius alone in his positive assessment of Lydiades. Lydiades' family continued to play an important role in Megalopolitan politics after his death, and a base for statues commemorating him and his father has been found (cf. Stavrianopoulou [2002]).

final on any proposal in the assembly, if his approval was always necessary for a man to be commissioned as an ambassador, then to any elite Megalopolitan, Lydiades was a tyrant. There was no way any other notable could compete against him, short of violence. Lydiades, in other words, might have won the perennial contest for prestige in his city without actually changing the city's constitution at all. If this was the case, then Lydiades did have a sort of power he could meaningfully renounce, even if it came with no particular office. ¹⁰⁸

Because of the inherently informal nature of such arrangements, it difficult to find explicit discussions of them in our epigraphic sources. Decrees were purposefully written in a way that emphasized the consensus of the city and its unity in action. They may allow us to see the *formal* structure of a *polis* government but they can never really show how power operated *in practice*, because they do not record the various unofficial ways in which people may have influenced that government. On the other hand, our literary sources are often all too eager to emphasize the violence of tyrants rather than to provide a more nuanced view of how tyranny might have functioned.

We do, however, occasionally find suggestions in literary sources of how a man might achieve tyrannical power by influence. For example, after Aratus gained control of Sicyon, he recalled almost 600 exiles. The property of these exiles had long since been sold off, but Aratus procured 150 talents for the city from Ptolemy II with which to compensate

¹⁰⁸ Such power would also explain why the Achaeans required tyrants to renounce their positions before joining the League. For if one of the goals of the League was to provide a larger arena of competition for regional notables, the notable who had such absolute control over his hometown possessed an obvious and intolerable advantage over notables who had to deal with domestic competition. On leagues as communities of competition, see Chapter 4.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Schuler (2015): "[inscriptions] usually present us with a one-sided and much too positive picture of prevailing social conditions" (252).

¹¹⁰ A point raised by Van der Vliet (2012).

the former exiles, without harming the current owners of their property. The exiles were naturally overjoyed (they erected a bronze statue in Aratus' honor), and the Sicyonian assembly appointed Aratus as absolute arbiter of the city's finances, so that he might better oversee the distribution of this wealth (Plut. *Arat.* 14.2). In the event, Aratus ordered a board of 15 Sicyonians appointed alongside him to oversee the city's finances. Even if he had taken the sole office offered to him, Aratus would have had some justification in claiming that he was simply restoring Sicyonian democracy. His power would have come from his ability to persuade the assembly, and from offices that the assembly legally bestowed upon him. Yet at the same time, the combination of an unrivaled capacity for bribery, along with the favors owed him by the enthusiastic support of six hundred freshly returned exiles, would have made Aratus' control over Sicyon more or less unassailable. While doing no harm to the democracy *de jure*, he could have become a tyrant *de facto*.

Even if the details of such tyrannical arrangements are rarely disclosed, it is clear that our sources still recognize tyranny by means other than force. Strabo reports that in first-century BC Mylasa, two men, Hybreas and Euthydemus, vied for dominance in the city (Strabo 14.2.24). Hybreas was an able orator whose silver tongue impressed even Mark Antony. But his family was of modest means (his entire inheritance had consisted of a slave and a mule). Euthydemus was a clever speaker in his own right. He also came from a distinguished family and possessed great wealth. "So long as Euthydemus lived," Strabo wrote, "he strongly prevailed, being at once powerful and useful to the city, so that there was

¹¹¹ Aratus's father Cleinias is portrayed in our sources as a similarly democratic figure, a man who was the people's champion and a rightfully appointed magistrate (Paus. 2.8.2; Plut. *Arat.* 2.1-2). Given the pro-Aratus slant of our surviving literary evidence, one might legitimately question how greatly Cleinias differed in reality from the other Sicyonian tyrants.

even something tyrannical about him." Unlike the hill-fort tyrants of Cilicia, there was no element of violent coercion to Euthydemus' power. Even so, his wealth, lineage, and rhetorical skill made his sway over the city practically incontestable. As Hybreas once put it, "Euthydemus: you are an evil necessary to the city, for we can live neither with you nor without you." This overweening influence, capable of overwhelming even a worthy opponent like Hybreas, must be why Strabo saw "something tyrannical" in Euthydemus.¹¹²

Inordinate influence was interpreted as tyranny in other instances as well. Many centuries later, Dio Chrysostom was accused of being a tyrant in his native Prusa (*Or.* 47.18, 23-5). Dio's rebuttal of this accusation is revealing. Tyrants, he argues, are the sort of men who outrage women and torture men. He implies that the 'true' reason the charge was brought against him was that he wore purple and lived in a fine house. But no one was accusing Dio of dropping his foes into seething cauldrons, nor was he likely to have been the only notable who lived stylishly. The other accusations levelled against Dio included charges that his embassy to Rome had not gained enough concessions, that he was destroying sacred structures to build a grand colonnade down Prusa's main street, and that his attempt to expand the *boulē* was part of a plot to stuff it with his friends and allies. Within this broader context, it is clear that Dio's threat to the local notables of Prusa has nothing to do with force or prodigality at all. Dio was a renowned orator who counted the reigning emperor among his friends. His ambitious building project promised to enhance the beauty and prestige of Prusa. The possibility that Dio could capitalize on his rhetorical skill, wealth, and

¹¹² The tension between 'tyrant as lawless ruler' and 'tyrant as dominator' is expressed in the religious sphere as well. *I.Kyme* 41, for example, speaks approvingly of Isis as a 'tyrant of every land' while also claiming she is the destroyer of tyrannical governments. Cf. Versnel (1990) 66 n. 94, 70-1, 87.

¹¹³ Bekker-Nielsen (2008) 119-46.

outside connections to achieve a position of overwhelming dominance was the real reason why his opponents accused him of being a tyrant. Dio used the stock figure of the wicked tyrant as a foil to draw attention away from this accusation, one that had considerably more merit.

The local elite of Athens harbored similar grudges against the second-century AD orator and magnate Herodes Atticus, whom they accused in speeches to Roman magistrates of acting as a tyrant (Philostr. *VS* 559). Such tyrannical aspirations were apparently something of a family tradition for Herodes: his grandfather Hipparchus had also been accused of aspiring to tyranny, and the Athenians had ordered his vast estate be confiscated (Philostr. *VS* 547). Kennell argues that Herodes may have been trying to stuff the Areopagus with his freedmen. Perhaps so, although this does not explain the charge against Hipparchus. Probably everyone who could wished to put friends and allies onto the city council. Like Dio, Herodes was deemed tyrannical by his peers, not simply because he aspired to this common form of corruption, but because he had the capacity to dominate the political life of the city to the detriment of other notables. Hipparchus' wealth was possibly so great that it became proverbial, and Herodes' wealth exceeded it by far. When this wealth was combined with his close connections to Rome and his extensive benefactions, it is little wonder that other notables felt threatened by Herodes.

It is clear that there were other men with similarly overwhelming influence who were never actually—so far as we know—labelled tyrants. An excellent case in point here is the

¹¹⁴ Thus Dio, while deny that *he* had plotted to place friends on Prusa's expanded *boule*, accused other notables of attempting this same thing (45.7). Kennell (2013) 354.

¹¹⁵ Assuming Suet. *Vesp.* 13.1 refers this Hipparchus ("Salvius Liberalis ventured to say while defending a rich client, 'What is it to Caesar if Hipparchus had a hundred millions?'"). On Herodes' wealth: Philostr. *VS* 547.

second-century BC notable Protogenes of Olbia. Protogenes paid out thousands of gold pieces to buy grain, restore the city walls, and bribe local barbarians, all at a time when the city government defaulted on a loan of 100 gold pieces and a group of other notables defaulted on a loan of 300 gold pieces they had taken out to procure wine for a festival. Modern scholars are probably right to think that "Olbia was in practice in his dependence."

We learn of Protogenes exclusively through honorific decrees, a genre not given to articulating any dissent, opposition, or fear its subject might have aroused. But literary sources do show such feelings expressed towards great benefactors. Eurycles of Sparta, for example, was a friend of Octavian and fought at the Battle of Actium. His friendship with the new emperor seems to have greatly enhanced his own prestige. Strabo called him the "leader (ἡγεμόν) of the Lacedaemonians in our times" (Strabo 8.5.1) and he was the founder of the imperial cult in Sparta. His influence in Sparta no doubt came from his ability to procure benefactions from Augustus, most notably the return of the island of Cythera. Eurycles was also fabulously wealthy. He built a gymnasium and a theater in Sparta, and hosted shows. Like any good Spartan, he seems to have been obsessed with the idea of revival and restoration, particularly in the realm of religion. Many of the priests of Sparta were his kinsmen, and this is probably a testament to his ability to influence Spartan public life indirectly. Eurycles also had interests much further abroad. He built an especially beautiful bathhouse in Corinth whose fame persisted even to the time of Pausanias (Paus. 2.3.5). He

¹¹⁶ Syll³ 495=Austin (2006) 115.

¹¹⁷ Austin (2006) 218, with a similar conclusion reached by Veyne (1990) 108. On the fiscal crisis Protogenes resolved, see Müller (2011).

¹¹⁸ Cass. Dio 54.7.2. Strabo 8.5.1 claims Eurycles took the island as his own personal possession.

also travelled to Judaea, where he struck up friendships with Herod and other Hasmoneans.¹¹⁹

Eurycles was ultimately exiled. The case was serious enough to warrant Caesar's intervention, and the prosecution involved members of the Spartan elite, including the last living descendent of Brasidas (Plut. Mor. 207F). Josephus, who blamed Eurycles for causing dissension within the Hasmonean dynasty, claimed that Eurycles was exiled from Sparta for stirring up sedition in Achaea and plundering cities. Strabo stated that "Eurycles has stirred up trouble among them [the Spartans], having apparently abused the friendship of Caesar unduly in order to maintain his authority over his subjects."120 Much more recently, Cartledge and Spawforth have followed Bowersock in claiming that Eurycles got too close to Tiberius while Tiberius was in Rhodes. This, they argue, would explain both Augustus' alarm and why Eurycles' son Lacon was rehabilitated in AD 15.¹²¹ This Tiberian connection seems superfluous. Cartledge and Spawforth themselves assert that Eurycles "exercised more or less arbitrary power behind a screen of constitutionalism." Eurycles' control over the imperial cult and his many kinsmen in other priestly positions would have limited the opportunities for opposing notables to use religious office to enhance their prestige. Eurycles' connections to Corinth, Herod, and above all Caesar must have ensured that any public body listened to his opinions. In short, even our relatively limited evidence shows how overweening Eurycles might have been, and this fits neatly with Strabo's

¹¹⁹ Joseph. *AJ* 16.301-10, *BJ* 1.513-31.

 $^{^{120}}$ Strabo 8.5.5: νεωστὶ δ' Εὐρυκλῆς αὐτοὺς ἐτάραξε δόξας ἀποχρήσασθαι τῇ Καίσαρος φιλία πέρα τοῦ μετρίου πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστασίαν αὐτῶν.

¹²¹ Cartledge and Spawforth (1989) 100.

¹²² Cartledge and Spawforth (1989) 98.

characterization of his exile, as well as the fact that the prosecution included aggrieved Spartan notables. 123

It seems clear, then, that certain men were able to gain overwhelming influence in their cities, and some of these men were considered tyrants for this reason. Understanding tyranny as this sort of unofficial domination allows us to explain features of post-Classical tyranny that are often ignored in modern scholarship. First, there is the persistence of tyranny into the Roman imperial period. While Nigel Kennell argued in general terms for the existence of such tyrants, they have rarely been acknowledged by later scholars. Sian Lewis, for example, argued that tyranny ended with the coming of Rome and the simplification of all autocratic power into monarchy. And even Kennell did not attempt to provide a general explanation for why tyranny—or at least charges of it—continued to exist. By seeing tyranny as domination by influence, we are able to appreciate not only that tyranny persisted, but how it persisted despite the efforts of the Roman authorities to prevent the sort of *stasis* by which many earlier Hellenistic tyrannies had been born.

To think of tyranny in terms of influence also helps to explain how and why tyrants sometimes ruled in *juntas*. This situation was common in fourth-century Euboea. In Oreus, for instance, Philistides conspired with his fellow Oreans Menippus, Socrates, Thoas, and Agapaeus to imprison Euphraeus and invite Philip's mercenaries into the city (Dem. 9.59). In a single speech, Demosthenes alternately mentions Philistides alone as tyrant of Oreus, and

¹²³ Eurcyles' son Lacon might have been rehabilitated simply in acknowledgement of his family's past services to the Julio-Claudians. Tiberius in particular had cause to be thankful to the Spartans, since they took in Livia and him during the Civil Wars (Cass. Dio 54.7.2; Suet. *Tib.* 6).

¹²⁴ Kennell (1997).

¹²⁵ Lewis (2009) 120-1.

speaks of an entire pro-Philip party that is tyrannizing (τυραννεῖν) the city. ¹²⁶ So, too, is Clitarchus occasionally singled out as the tyrant of Eretria, and occasionally made part of a group of tyrants alongside Hipparchus and Automedon. ¹²⁷ At Eresus in the late fourth century, Agonippos and Eurysilaos seem to have ruled as tyrants together. At some point around the same time, the brothers Apollodoros, Hermon, and Hiraios all ruled as tyrants in Eresus as well. ¹²⁸ In Sicyon, at least one pair of tyrants may have shared power at one point during the third century BC. ¹²⁹ Plutarch has Philip V describe the generals of Messenia as tyrants to the Messenian assembly (Plut. *Arat.* 49.9).

What are we to make of this tyranny by committee? If we see tyranny as being largely a matter of overwhelming influence, then it makes sense that ancient authorities might consider the members of small cliques as tyrants. Tyranny was the possession of inordinate power. This usually, but not always, entailed rule by a single man. Disentangling tyranny from autocracy allows us to make better sense of how the ancients thought about tyranny as a concept.

The People's Tyrant

It seems clear, then, that certain men were able to gain overwhelming influence in their cities, and that some of these men were considered tyrants because of this influence.

Recent scholarship has argued convincingly for the importance of the assembly in civic life, even into the Roman imperial period. 130 It therefore seems unlikely that tyrants could have

¹²⁶ Philistides alone: Dem. 9.33. Philistides et al.: Dem. 9.65.

¹²⁷ Clitarchus alone: Aeschin. 3.103; Dem. 18.71; Diod. Sic. 16.74.1. Clitarchus et al.: Dem. 9.58.

¹²⁸ OGIS 8=IG 12.2.526. On the relations between these tyrants, see Ellis-Evans (2012) 183-4 (with further references).

¹²⁹ Paus. 2.8.1-2; Plut. Arat. 2.1-2. Cf. above, n. 24, on the difficulties surrounding this pair of tyrants.

¹³⁰ Contra de Ste Croix (1981) 300-26. See Mack (2015) 272-3, for more recent literature.

attained their power without having the means to persuade the assembly, especially when they presumably faced stiff opposition from other notables. The relationship between the *demos* and the tyrant was therefore an important one, as Sian Lewis has recently emphasized. Lewis sees the *demos* as a collective collaborator with the tyrant, agreeing to support his bid for power in an effort to stop destructive infighting among the local elite. She asserts that the *demos* was willing to make this Faustian bargain because it lacked a political consciousness, and so did not perceive the tyrant as usurping power that rightly belonged to it.

But it seems slightly paradoxical to argue that the *demos* makes collective political bargains and lacks political self-awareness. Better, perhaps, to see the *demos* in assembly not as a collaborator with the tyrant, but as an arbiter in the contest between notables. The assembly-going citizens of a *polis* undoubtedly had clear ideas about *what* sorts of things they desired for their city: security, fiscal stability, festivals that honored the gods in a suitable manner, as well as the buildings, institutions, and connections that made the city a *polis* and increased her prestige. *Who*, precisely, secured these benefits was probably of less moment. It was typical for a group of notables to take on magistracies and perform benefactions. But if one man could do more for the assembly than his fellows, then the assembly might increasingly defer to him. Other notables still had a role to play: as the Argive inscriptions show, even during tyrannies magistracies were filled and measures proposed by non-tyrants. Nevertheless, the tyrant, because of his ability to persuade the assembly, was the one who had ultimate power in the city.

¹³¹ Lewis (2009) 125-7. Cf. Domingo Gygax (2016) 91-5 on the importance of the demos to Archaic tyrants.

Strabo once more provides us with a window into how this might have worked. Boethus of Tarsus was a poet and a friend of Mark Antony. After Boethus wrote a poem celebrating Antony's role in the Battle of Philippi, Antony pressured the citizens of Tarsus to appoint the poet gymnasiarch. When Octavian's former tutor Athenodorus retired to his native Tarsus, he used the power of an unspecified "office" (ἐξουσία) to drive Boethus and his allies into exile. The outside connections of both Boethus and Athenodorus were undoubtedly important, but did not constitute the sole basis for their power. Boethus had certainly benefitted from his connection to Mark Antony, but continued to be a powerful figure in Tarsian politics even after Antony's defeat at Actium. Strabo wrote that Boethus shared in the Tarsian ability "to speak instantly offhand and unceasingly on any given subject," and it is likely that his rhetorical abilities were at least as much a driver of his success as his Roman connections were.

Despite the fact that Athenodorus possessed authority granted by Caesar, his banishment of Boethus and his partisans was a close-run thing. During the struggle between these men, anti-Athenodorian graffiti appeared in the streets. On one occasion, someone "profusely bespattered" Athenodorus' house with fecal matter. Strabo has Athenodorus make light of these demonstrations when he comes before the assembly to bring charges against Boethus. But the fact that Athenodorus ran into such vigorous opposition in the first place is a sign, both that his connection to Augustus alone could not force the Tarsians into submission, and that the citizens of Tarsus were still passionately interested in the

¹³² Cf. Strabo 14.1.41 on Anaxenor the citharoede, whom Antony made a tribute-collector and to whom he appointed a bodyguard. Anaxenor's city awarded him a purple robe, but how far beyond this award his favor with Antony translated into clout at home is unknown.

¹³³ On Boethus and Athenodorus, see Berve (1967) 438-40; Magie (1950) 429, 473.

political life of their city. It was ultimately Athenodorous' ability to persuade the assembly that allowed him to send his opponents into exile.

The widespread importance of oratory in first-century BC Asia Minor provides further proof of the importance of the assembly. Besides Boethus and Athenodorus of Tarsus, we have already encountered the poor orator Hybreas of Mylasa and his rich opponent Euthydemus. After Euthydemus died, Hybreas became (despite his humble background) "master" (κύριος) of the city, and was instrumental in convincing his city to go to war against Labienus (Strabo. 14.2.24; Plut. *Ant.* 24). Zeno of Laodiceia was another rhetorician whose power over his city was such that he was able to persuade it to fight Labienus (Strabo 12.8.16). At Sardis, the orator Diodorus Zonas seems to have been so influential that at least one modern scholar has seen him as a tyrant (Strabo 13.4.9). ¹³⁴ By the end of the second century BC, local politics were the business of a narrow class of well-heeled notables. ¹³⁵ If persuasiveness in the assembly was still so vital to the successful politician even in the first century BC, then surely it must have been vital in the earlier Hellenistic period as well.

Oratory was merely the most obvious means by which a man might gain power over the assembly. Wealth, past benefactions, and a family history of serving the *polis* could also make the assembly heed a notable. Before Zeno, the leading luminary of Phrygian Laodiceia was Hieron, a man renowned, not for his speaking skills, but for his many benefactions (Strabo 12.8.16). In Mylasa, Euthydemus "strongly prevailed" over Hybreas because his oratorical abilities were augmented by his wealth and lineage. After Athenodorus, another

¹³⁴ Strabo 13.4.9. Cf. Sarikakas (1976). McGing (1986) argues convincingly that there is little reason to see him as anything more than an orator (117).

¹³⁵ Notable here is Quaß (1993). See Carlsson (2010) 15 n. 10 for more literature on the subject.

tutor of the imperial house by the name of Nestor came to power in Tarsus (Strabo 14.5.14). He most likely did have some oratorical ability, but Strabo's statement that he "directed the government after receiving it from Athenodorus" suggests that this ability was augmented by some sort of official power from Augustus as Athenodorus had before him. 136

We also learn from Strabo that Nestor was "held in honor both by the governors (ἡγεμόσι) and in the city." It may be that connections to outside powers were useful not because they sometimes allowed a man to hold the threat of death and destruction over his fellow citizens, but because they increased his ability to perform benefactions for the city, and thereby increased his clout in the assembly. Kings were the most prodigious of all Hellenistic benefactors, but they almost never volunteered gifts of their own accord. Only six times in 303 instances of royal benefaction recorded by K. Bringmann, does a king spontaneously offer a gift. 137 In every other instance, someone asks him first. The political benefits of facilitating such benefactions could be significant. It is not an exaggeration to say that Aratus' ability to draw upon the patronage of either the Ptolemies or the Antigonids, as the situation demanded, was a major reason for his decades-long prominence. The possible benefits Tarsus stood to gain from a connection to Caesar may be the real reason Athenodorus was able to prevail over Boethus and why the Tarsians later honored Athenodorus' successor Nestor. The citizens of a city or league would not wish to alienate a man who could procure lucrative benefactions for them, and so those with royal connections could probably always translate those connections into some degree of local influence. 138

¹³⁶ Strabo 14.5.14: οὖτος δὲ προέστη τῆς πολιτείας διαδεξάμενος τὸν Ἀθηνόδωρον.

¹³⁷ Bringmann (1993) 10-15.

¹³⁸ Naturally, this influence was lessened if the monarch in question was not in a practical position to benefit the city.

But this influence came from their ability to offer an especially splendid carrot, rather than the threat of a royal stick.

Conclusion

The model of the Periclean autocrat, wielding overwhelming—yet legal—influence, better accords with our evidence for Hellenistic tyranny than traditional views that emphasize the use of force and royal connections. Perhaps more important, such a conception of tyranny places the initiative for autocracy back with the *poleis* rather than with kings or other greater powers. The centrality of the *demos* means that post-classical tyranny was, paradoxically, a sign of the continued vitality of *polis* politics. For if there had been no widespread interest in politics, and if the assembly had not been a meaningful deliberative body, then it would have been difficult for any one man to gather the influence necessary to overcome the ossified clout of the rest of the city's notables.

The sort of domination our sources refer to when they speak of "tyranny" was a historical reality, and we can find men—like Protogenes of Olbia or Eurycles of Sparta—who probably possessed it, even if no one we know of called them tyrants. But "tyranny" also existed as a mental construct, a particular way of interpreting such domination. This did not have to be the case: Hellenistic Greek was not lacking in ways to describe great and powerful men. Tyranny persisted as a concept because it was useful to both the winners and losers of local competition. Political winners found in tyranny a paradigm that allowed them to reinterpret ambiguous *stasis* as a righteous fight for the freedom of the city. ¹³⁹ In 298/7, a group of Prienian exiles succeeded in recapturing their city from the tyrant Hieron. ¹⁴⁰

¹³⁹ Ober (2003); Gray (2015) 262.

¹⁴⁰ On Hieron, see Berve (1967) 423, Magie (1950) 919-20. Paus. 7.2.10; *I.Priene* 11, 37, 38.

Afterwards they instituted a festival celebrating their victory. In the festival decree, the victors presented the fight against Hieron as one undertaken by all the citizens against a tyrant. "Since all the citizens acted as good men and were worthy of the glory [of their ancestors]... it happened that the [tyrant and his soldiers] were forced to leave the city."¹⁴¹

A century later, a delegation from Rhodes reviewed these same events while arbitrating between Priene and Samos. ¹⁴² The Rhodians mention in passing that the Prienian exiles had ravaged "the property of Hieron and the men supporting him." ¹⁴³ In other words, Hieron was not supported only by a mercenary force, but by land-owning citizens, and the war between him and the exiles was probably a much more ambiguous sort of factional *stasis* than the victorious exiles had let on. But, by universalizing their victory and framing their struggle as a contest for freedom against a tyrant, the victors placed themselves firmly on the right side of history.

The losers of *polis* strife could also put themselves on the right side of history by thinking in tyrannical terms. The stereotypical tyrant always took care to exile the best men from the city.¹⁴⁴ How tempting it must have been for exiles to see their opponents as tyrants, and thereby soothe the bitter wound of exile with the balm of self-righteousness. On a more practical level, framing the victors as tyrants justified continued struggle against them.

Outside powers too might have been more willing to help if the struggle was against a tyrant,

¹⁴¹ *I.Priene* 11 *II.* 8-11. Similar universalizing language can be found in the tyrant dossier of Eresus (*OGIS* 8= *IG* XII 2.526), wherein the tyrant Agonippos is said to have seized the arms of the citizens and expelled them from the city *en masse* ("[$\pi\alpha$]vδαμι" *I.* 8). Cf. Ellis-Evans (2012) 198-9, Gray (2015) 265.

¹⁴² *I.Priene* 37-8=*Syll.* ³ 599. The Prienian exiles had captured a Samian fortress during their war against Hieron, and the city had neglected to return it after their victory.

 $^{^{143}}$ L. 111 τόν τε Ἱέ[ρωνα καὶ τοὺς τὰ αὐ]τὰ τῶι Ἱέρωνι αἰρε[υμένους].

¹⁴⁴ See above, n. 46.

since this framed their own intervention as one on behalf of freedom. 145 The issue was probably exacerbated by the fact that some exiled notables took up teaching philosophy as a way to earn a living. 146 The philosopher is the natural foe of the tyrant, as the mongoose is the natural foe of the cobra. By taking on the mantle of philosophy, exiles made the perception of their foes as tyrants ever easier. The philosophers Ekdemos (sometimes known as Ekdelus) and Demophanes (sometimes known as Megalophanes) are examples of this type. Both men were Megalopolitans whom the tyrant Aristodemus had exiled. During their exile, they were associates of the Academic Arcesilaüs. They were the ones who set into motion the plot that resulted in Aristodemus' murder. Later they acted as co-conspirators with Aratus in the coup that overthrew Nicocles, the tyrant of Sicyon, and were invited to Cyrene to arbitrate a political crisis there. 147 These two men seem to have made a career out of being the philosophical opponents of tyranny. But it is possible that Ekdemos is the same person as the Eudamos who was the father of the Megalopolitan tyrant Lydiades. 148 If so, then he is not a principled tyrannicide, but a member of the Megalopolitan elite who framed his own opponent as a tyrant, but had seemingly little qualm about his own son taking up the same sort of power.

Hellenistic tyranny as both a reality and a mental concept was a creation of the competition of elites in the cities. As complete (or near-complete) domination over the city, tyranny represented the victory of one notable over his peers. This victory, however, was not

¹⁴⁵ This was an especially potent justification for kings, who portrayed themselves as the defenders of Greek freedom (Dmitriev [2011] 135-41). Thus, Antiochus II claims to restore 'freedom' and 'democracy' when he expels the tyrant Timarchos from Miletus in the mid-third century (*OGIS* 226 *II*. 5-6).

¹⁴⁶ Gray (2015) 377-9.

¹⁴⁷ Plut. *Arat.* 5.1-6.7, *Phil.* 1.2-3; Polyb. 10.22.2-3.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. *SEG* LII 447-449. On the possible connection between Eudamos and Ekdemos, see Stavrianopoulou (2002).

achieved by any special ends that distinguished the tyrant from other notables, nor did it typically involve radical shifts in the city's constitution. The stigma of tyranny was created in part by the losers in internal struggles, who naturally found useful the ability to castigate the winners of said struggles and justify their own counter-coups and assassinations. Thus, the very real political struggles of the Hellenistic period contributed to the mythos of the tyrant as a violent and unrestrained ruler that had already begun to form in centuries prior.

And those very real struggles also demonstrate a paradox. On the hand, the great power of tyrants in their cities seems to be a sign of the relative weakness of the *dēmos* in those cities. But on the other hand, tyrants and their elite enemies often seem to have been competing for the ability to influence that very same *dēmos*. In many cases, Hellenistic tyranny seems to have been both a result of intense competition between local notables to win prestige and power in democratic cities and, at the same time, a means by which democratic norms were challenged and loosened. For, regardless of whether the laws of the city change, if the city is *de facto* in the hands of the few or the one for extended periods of time, then belief in the necessity and rightness of rule by the many must decline.

Chapter 2: Royal *Tryphē* and Civic Ostentation: Palaces and Private Residences

If it is true that the gods first exalt those they intend to cast down, then by 63 BC some implacable deity already had in mind the butchery of Pompey's legions at Pharsalus, and Pompey's own ignominious death in the brackish waters of Egypt's Delta. For, in that year, Pompey had buried his archenemy Mithridates with his own hand. As he no doubt expected, his final victory over Mithridates caused all the kings of the East to gather around the great Roman commander in a bejeweled flock, each eager to fly away with some new juicy morsel of land, or at least an assurance that what was already theirs would stay theirs. Less expected was his discovery in that same year of the vast treasure stores Mithridates had left in the small city of Talauri. Two thousand cups of onyx and gold were found, as well as "many other cups, wine-coolers, and drinking-horns, and also ornamental couches and chairs, bridles for horses, and trappings for their breasts and shoulders, all ornamented in like manner with precious stones and gold." So great was this hoard that it took thirty days merely to inventory it. Part of this treasure was Mithridates' inheritance, part a gift from Cos, and part Mithridates' own collection, acquired or commissioned by him because "he was a lover of the beautiful in furniture as well as in other things" (App. Mith. 17.115).

For Appian (from whom we hear this story), no further explanation is necessary. That a king's collection of dishware and golden bridles would be so vast that a month was needed to count it was taken as a matter of course. The collection of such expensive and ostentatiously useless goods was an integral part of the royal virtue of luxury, or $tryph\bar{e}$ ($\tau\rho\nu\phi\dot{\eta}$). The later Greek writer Athenaeus too was drawn to stories of royal $tryph\bar{e}$. From him we learn of dining halls strewn knee-deep in rose petals, of palatial ships, of kings in purple shoes and robes embroidered with golden stars, of a great golden phallus 120 cubits

long, and many other wonders and oddities besides.¹ The material evidence suggests that royal luxury was no mere literary *topos*. The fourth-century Macedonian palace at Aigai (modern Vergina) was some 9,000 m². After the renovations of Philip V, the palace at Pella was 60,000 m². The tombs of the Macedonian royal family were filled to the threshold with glittering treasure.² All this was despite the fact that Macedon was always the poorest of the three great Hellenistic kingdoms. Later authors may have exaggerated royal excesses, but they did not invent them wholesale.³

For kings, *tryphē* was not an idle indulgence, but a necessity.⁴ Even in the days of Philip II, royal luxury had been "a vital element of the prestige of the state itself."⁵ For Alexander and his successors, luxurious living became a means by which they might demonstrate their kingly majesty, or *semnotēs* (σεμνότης), their capacity for benefaction, and their connection to Dionysus, lord of revels and patron deity of many Hellenistic dynasties.⁶ This all had real strategic import. When the Sicyonian politician Aratus was deciding whether to ally his city with Macedon or Egypt, the Macedonian king Antigonus II claimed that Aratus "admired the wealth of Egypt, hearing tales of its elephants, and fleets, and palaces; but now that he has been behind the scenes [at Alexandria] and seen that everything in Egypt is play-acting and painted scenery, he has come over entirely to us" (Plut. *Arat*.

¹ Rose-petals (Cleopatra VII): Ath. 4.148B. Ships (Ptolemy III and Hiero II): Ath. 5.203A-209E. Shoes and robe (Demetrius Poliorcetes): Ath. 12.535E-F. Golden phallus (Ptolemy II): Ath. 5.201D-E.

² Palace sizes: Nielsen (1994) 262-5. Vergina grave finds: Andronikos (1984) 55-218.

³ Cf. Carney (2015b) 245.

⁴ On the study of royal *tryphē*, Passerini (1934) and Schubart (1937) are seminal. See Cozzoli (1980), Weber (1997) 61-4, Strootman (2014) 54-90, 254-63, and Müller (2016) for more recent discussions. For a general overview of the philosophical debate about luxury, see Bernhardt (2003) 190-99, Bollansee (2008), and Gorman and Gorman (2014). Klementa (2001) and Saliou (2011) discuss the later reception of *tryphē*, a term whose positive connotations in non-philosophical contexts is perhaps best revealed by the presence of personified *tryphē* in Roman-era mosaics.

⁵ Kottaridi (2011a) 174.

⁶ Nielsen (1994) 16; Vössing (2004) 140-1, 175; Stewart (2006) 160.

15.2). This turned out to be an overly optimistic assessment. Aratus ultimately allied with Egypt: far from being mere play-acting, the $tryph\bar{e}$ of the Ptolemaic court demonstrated to Aratus (and other men like him) that Egypt had the fiscal strength to make good on her promises.⁷

But it does not follow from this that *tryphē* was good for the citizens of Greek cities. Plato, after all, claimed that luxury (τρυφή) and softness (μαλθακία) led to cowardice (*Resp.* 590B). His Socrates considered even dining couches to be an indulgence (*Resp.* 373A). Aristotle too thought of *tryphē* as a form of reprehensible softness (*Eth. Nic.* 7.7.5=1150B).

**Tryphē*, as we have seen, was also strongly associated with tyranny. The subsequent embrace of *tryphē* by kings only increased the association between luxury and one-man rule.

Thus, when the late first century AD orator Dio Chrysostom was accused of trying to become a tyrant, he asked rhetorically "is this because I build my house in costly style instead of letting it tumble down? Or because I myself wear purple instead of a miserable rag or cloak?" (*Or.* 47.25). And when Duris of Samos wished to castigate Demetrius of Phalerum as a tyrant, he harped upon Demetrius' "innate love of debauchery" manifested in splendid banquets, exquisite homes, and costly perfumes (Ath. 12.542B-543A=Duris *FGrH* 76 F10).

It would seem, then, that luxury was something that both philosophers and politicians would wish to avoid. Yet it is undeniable that, from the end of the fifth century onwards, many wealthy men do begin to live more ostentatious lifestyles. Plato's Socrates may have wished to do away with dining couches, but Xenophon's Socrates was perfectly happy

⁷ The Ptolemies were perhaps the dynasty most assiduous in the pursuit of luxury. On the matter, see Tondriau (1948), Heinen (1983), and Rice (1983) (esp. 141). For an overview of the broader strategic considerations, see Paschidis (2008) 523-32.

⁸ On the philosophical critique of luxury, see Bernhardt (2003).

⁹ Hoepfner (1996) 1-8; Walter-Karydi (1996) 56-7.

attending a dinner at which flutists, citharode players, and acrobats performed (*Symp.* 2.1-11, 7.2-3).¹⁰ In the fourth century, Demosthenes was upset by politicians who "reared private houses more stately than our public buildings" (3.29). According to the orator, Miltiades, Aristeides, and the great men of the past lived in houses indistinguishable from those of any other citizen.¹¹ But a century or so later, the traveler Heracleides Criticus had the opposite problem: Athens, for all her fame and glory, had surprisingly few grand houses (1.1). What struck Demosthenes as ostentatious was, for Heracleides, so normal that its absence was worthy of remark.

Archeological evidence suggests that houses did grow both in size and opulence in the Hellenistic period. This was part of a broader shift towards a more conspicuous display of wealth. Luxurious materials such as purple dye, ivory, and cloth of gold became more widespread. New (and expensive) art forms, such as tessellated mosaics and cameo jewelry, were developed. Despite the admonitions of the philosophers, it seems that many men may have agreed with the writer of the *Letter of Aristeas* that "all men are inclined to a life of enjoyment, for everyone has a natural tendency towards the pursuit of pleasure" (108). Perhaps Demetrius of Athens (grandson of the tyrant Demetrius of Phalerum) summed up this view best. When brought before the Areopagus and ordered to live more decorously [βέλτιον ζῆν] he responded, "even now, I live like a gentleman [ἐλευθερίως], for I have a

¹⁰ Socrates did, however, find the performer juggling while whirling about on a potter's wheel to be a bit much (9.2-7).

 $^{^{11}}$ Dem. 3.25-9. The statement obviously served the rhetorical purpose of castigating Demosthenes' enemies, but it also reflected a genuine trend in fourth-century Athenian home building. Cf. Walter-Karydi (1998) 1-4. 12 30 of the 32 houses greater than 400 m² catalogued by Kiderlen (1995) are from the late Classical or early Hellenistic eras.

¹³ Materials: Lapatin (2015) 174-90. Tessellated mosaics: Dunbabin (1999) 18-38. Cameos: Stewart (2006) 123.

most beautiful mistress, and I do no wrong to any one, and I drink Chian wine, and I have a sufficiency of everything, as my own revenues suffice for all these expenses" (Ath. 4.167E).

In her discussion of the Late Classical house, Walter-Karydi has suggested that the growth of luxury was a part of a larger '*Poliskrise*' that led an increasing number of wealthy men to detach themselves from the public life of the city. Such men emphasized contemplative leisure (*scholē*), as the defining feature of the ideal life. *Scholē*, in turn, required a house of a certain grandeur in which the wealthy man might pursue excellence with his friends, away from the public eye. ¹⁴ A similar conclusion is reached by Zanker in his study of the Hellenistic funerary *stelai* of Smyrna. Noting the scrolls, jewelry boxes, and perfume bottles that multiply in these monuments, Zanker writes that "a shift in values toward the private sphere and the life of pleasure seems to me unmistakable." ¹⁵

The alternative view is that luxury had less to do with a turn towards the private, and more to do with the imitation of kings. In this model, the Hellenistic world was one of trickle-down flamboyance, in which kings provided a model of *tryphē* eagerly and assiduously copied by the civic elite. This is perhaps the more popular view. Lapatin, for example, has recently argued that the positive royal ideology of *tryphē* "naturally" influenced the behavior of lesser men. Writing on palatial architecture, Nielsen has asserted that "the monarch through his palaces...set the fashion for an ambitious elite." Winter has seen in the same palaces "a return to 'oriental' magnificence," and argues that royal palaces inspired the design of houses for royal *philoi* and other extremely wealthy men. ¹⁶ Other scholars have also argued that royal palaces provided a trendsetting example that made the display of

¹⁴ Walter-Karydi (1998) 84-95.

¹⁵ Zanker (1992) 230.

¹⁶ Lapatin (2015) 3; Nielsen (1997) 160; Winter (2006) 158.

wealth in a domestic context more acceptable.¹⁷ Westgate sees palaces as the engines of the Hellenistic luxury economy, spurring innovations in expensive décor that are then imitated by private citizens.¹⁸ In a similar vein, Andrianou has argued that the goal of luxurious consumption was to confirm one's social status as a wealthy man and thereby show oneself to be worthy of the king's *eunoia*.¹⁹

Civic *tryphē* was, however, neither an escape from political life, nor a whole-hearted embrace of royal behavior. In addition to being enjoyable in and of itself, *tryphē* served a practical, and ultimately political, purpose. In a world with no public land registry or state inspection of banks, it was impossible for the public to know the true extent of any rich man's wealth.²⁰ But it would be hard for a man dressed in purple and gold, his fingers flashing with gems, to refuse to contribute when a call for a public collection was made in the assembly. And, as Alcibiades already observed in the fifth century, the luxurious lifestyle of private citizens increased the glory of the whole city by making it appear to be prosperous to outsiders (Thuc. 6.16).²¹ Ostentation was, therefore, part and parcel of the larger competition between notables to present themselves as good and useful to the city.

In their pursuit of the conspicuous life, the citizens of many Greek cities across the Aegean certainly borrowed aspects of royal *tryphē*. But the interaction between kings and subjects was not unidirectional. Kings, too, looked to their wealthiest Greek subjects for a model of how wealthy men should behave. The lifestyle of civic notables was therefore the result of a collaboration between city and court, in which each side confirmed and spurred

¹⁷ Kutbay (1998) 82, 102-3; Brecoulaki (2016) 674.

¹⁸ Westgate (2010) 514. Hardiman (2017) espouses a similar view with regard to Pergamon specifically.

¹⁹ Andrianou (2009) 128.

²⁰ Domingo Gygax (2016) 83.

²¹ Cf. Seager (1967).

the luxurious developments of the other. And as royal and civic *tryphē* grew ever more entangled, the gulf between how rich and poor citizens were expected to act widened. Thus, the turn towards a more luxurious mode of life is intimately connected with the decline of democracy in cities in the Late Hellenistic and Early Imperial periods.

Any discussion of Hellenistic luxury requires an examination of archeological evidence.²² We will therefore begin by setting out precisely what we mean by 'royal palace,' arguing that the gap between royal and non-royal residence was much more ambiguous than the word 'palace' might imply. We will then turn to the houses themselves, examining changes in domestic architecture from the Late Classical period to the Late Hellenistic. We will adopt a holistic approach, examining not only the layout of houses, but also their decoration (mural painting, mosaics, sculpture) and furniture. This will demonstrate that the builders of royal palaces adopted (and modified) features of larger Classical Greek homes, and that later Hellenistic houses in turn incorporated certain architectural features pioneered in royal palaces. Thus, Hellenistic domestic architecture provides evidence of a sort of positive feedback loop between kings and citizens, in which each borrowed from the other ideas of how houses should be built. These shared developments in home design suggest the possibility of broader shared patterns of behavior. The subsequent chapter will expand this discussion of luxury further by considering personal adornment in the form of jewelry, clothing, and aromatics, all important components of conspicuous display. In each of these instances, royal and civic behavior seem clearly to depend mutually upon one another.

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²² Athenaeus (writing in the late second century AD) includes much valuable evidence, albeit in a slightly haphazard manner. Vitruvius (6.7-15) describes the luxurious Greek house of his day, but modern archaeologists have rightly questioned whether this idealized house ever actually existed (Cf. Callebat [2004], Hellman [2010] 20-9). In general, one is left with scattered anecdotes from Polybius, Ps.-Aristeas, Josephus, Plutarch, and other authors whose interests chiefly lie elsewhere.

A Note on Palaces

Before we turn to the architectural and decorative elements of Hellenistic houses, it is necessary to say something about the ambiguity of royal and non-royal residences, and to establish that, despite their great geographical disparity, royal palaces can be meaningfully discussed as a group. The similarity between palaces and private residences began with terminology. There was no special word in Greek for a royal palace. The actual private residence of the king, the palace proper, is simply an oikos. At times, a part of the palace (aule, andron) is used metonymically to refer to the whole. Often it is distinguished only by the adjective "royal" (basilikos). Sometimes the term basileia was used to refer to a royal palace, but this more properly means a royal district.²³ The *basileia* of Alexandria, for example, took up between a quarter to a third of the city by Strabo's day, and included the Library, the Museum, Alexander's tomb, and other public spaces.²⁴ At Pergamon, the entire acropolis might have been a basileia, containing barracks and other administrative structures in addition to the royal residence. 25 Kings sometimes split the typical functions of domestic space (receiving and entertaining guests, working, sleeping) between multiple buildings scattered around the basileia. Some scholars, for example, have suggested that the Macedonian palace at Aigai was used solely for dining.²⁶ At Pergamon, the Attalids may have resided in one acropolis palace and entertained guests in another.²⁷ The designer of the Seleucid palace at Mt. Karasis in Cilicia also seems to have split entertainment and residence between two separate structures, although in this case the steepness of the terrain left few

²³ Hoepfner (1996) 1-2. Cf. Lauter (1987). For parallel metonymy, see Downey (1937).

²⁴ Strabo 17.1.8. Cf. McKenzie (2007) 49-50, 68-71.

²⁵ Cf. Zimmer (2012).

²⁶ Cf. Kottaridi (2011b) 328, Morgan (2017) 41.

²⁷ Hardiman (2017) 273-4, with earlier scholarship on the question.

other options.²⁸ In recent decades, extremely fine mosaics have been found in the Alexandrian *basileia* far from where our literary sources tell us the palace proper was.²⁹ Do these indicate royal dining halls sprinkled throughout the royal district?

There are also substantial differences between the palace building patterns of the major Hellenistic kingdoms.³⁰ The Macedonians largely confined themselves to three sites, Aigai (modern Vergina), Pella, and Demetrias.³¹ The oldest of these palaces was the one at Aigai, where Philip II (r. 359-336 BC) was probably the builder of the surviving structure (Fig. 1).³² The royal palace at Pella was a vast structure (some 60,000 m²), constantly expanded and renovated, right down to the collapse of the kingdom (Fig. 2).³³ The original palace at Demetrias was probably established by Demetrius Poliorcetes himself when he founded the city in the early third century. It, too, was expanded (and heavily fortified), so that the surviving complex probably dates from around 200 BC (Fig. 3).³⁴

In Macedon, the kings built their palaces at the kingdom's symbolic center (Aigai), its political center (Pella), and its most strategically vital city (Demetrias). In Egypt, by contrast, the kings lavished their attention almost entirely upon the palace and royal district of Alexandria. Because the Ptolemies were working with a blank slate and had the more-orless infinite wealth of Egypt at their command, the palace at Alexandria must have been

²⁸ Radt (2016) 267-8.

²⁹ McKenzie (2007) 66-71.

³⁰ Recent general overviews of Hellenistic palaces at Weber (2007), Strootman (2014) 54-92, Miller (2016), and Morgan (2017). Nielsen (1999) provides a more detailed survey, while the articles collected in Hoepfner and Brands (1996) discuss individual palaces or aspects of palatial buildings. Thompson (1982) considers the importance of architecture to royal self-depiction in non-palatial contexts.

³¹ For overviews of Macedonian palaces, see Heerman (1986) and Hatzopoulos (2001). Heerman (1986) 325-35 considered three other possible Macedonian palaces. Because these sites are not as well published and their designation as royal residences remains hypothetical, they are excluded from the present study.

³² Andronikos (1984) 38-46, Kottaridi (2011b) and (2013) 211-358.

³³ Siganidou (1996), Akamatis (2011) 398-401, Chrysostomou (2011).

³⁴ Marzolff (1996), Batziou Efstathiou (2002).

exceptionally grand. Unfortunately, the modern day city and its harbor now cover most of the old palace district.³⁵ We have literary testimony for two Alexandrian palaces (the principal one on the Lochias peninsula jutting into the harbor, and a smaller one on the island of Antirrhodos in the harbor itself), and for two other Ptolemaic palatial structures, the majestic feasting pavilion of Ptolemy II (r. 285-246) and the pleasure barge of Ptolemy IV (r. 221-204).³⁶ In addition to the palace at Alexandria, the Ptolemies maintained the pharaonic Palace of Apries and possibly other sites in Egypt.³⁷ Honorable mention ought also to be made of Nea Paphos on Cyprus, the seat of so many Ptolemaic pretenders that it was practically an Alexandria-in-exile.³⁸

The Seleucid kings were, generally speaking, a peripatetic group of monarchs.³⁹

They therefore did not build up one immense palace complex such as the Ptolemies did at Alexandria, but rather a dense network of residences that included Cilician hill-forts,

Babylonian palaces, and Bactrian satrapal estates, in addition to more traditional palaces on the Greco-Macedonian model.⁴⁰ The most important palace was at Antioch by Daphne, where a sprawling *basileia* located on the Orontes River (or perhaps on an island in it) may have rivalled the palace of Alexandria in size and splendor. This palace has not yet been rediscovered, and our only surviving evidence for it is literary. Seleucus II (r. 246-225) or

³⁵ See McKenzie (2007) 37-71 for a recent overview. Hoepfner (1999) 464-6 tentatively reconstructs the great peristyle of the palace, but his reconstruction rests upon a single mosaic and must remain hypothetical.

³⁶ See Calandra (2011) for the pavilion and Thompson (2013) for the barge.

³⁷ Dunbabin (1999) 25-6, for example, speculates that some of the mosaics from Thumis (on the Nile Delta) might have come from a royal residence.

³⁸ Mlynarczyk (1996). Nea Paphos was the residence of the Ptolemaic *stratēgos* of Cyrpus from c. 200 BC onwards, and regularly played host to exiled Ptolemies from then on. Very little remains from the cities palace(s?).

³⁹ Cf. Kosmin (2014) 129-182.

⁴⁰ Recent overview of the palace system at Kosmin (2014) 222-30. One should add to the sites listed there the palace at Sardis (Strootman [2014] 72).

Antiochus III (r. 222-187) perhaps built the Orontes Island palace.⁴¹ Demetrius I (r. 161-150) built a second fortified palace in the city (Jos. *AJ* 13.36). Surviving Seleucid palaces have been found at Aï-Khanoum in Bactria (third century, but significantly altered and expanded in the second century by Greco-Bactrian rulers) (Fig. 4); Dura-Europos (both the Citadel Palace built in the third century and rebuilt in first century, and the *Strategeion*, built in the mid-third century) (Fig. 5); Jebel Khalid in Syria (third century) (Fig. 6); and the fortified residence on Mt. Karysis in Cilicia (late third or early second century) (Fig. 7).⁴²

The Attalids of Pergamum thankfully had less complicated living arrangements. The major palaces lie atop the acropolis of Pergamum, with Palaces IV and V being either the sequential dwellings of Attalus I (r. 241-197) and Eumenes II (r. 197-159), or one large complex created by the latter (Fig. 8).⁴³ These are some of the most complete palaces surviving from the smaller Hellenistic kingdoms. The palaces of the other lesser Hellenistic kingdoms are of less interest to us. In the Hasmonean and Herodian palaces of Judaea, Greek (and later Roman) building practices are heavily modified to suit Jewish custom and ritual.⁴⁴ So, too, was the Commagene palace at Samosata a syncretic mix of Hellenic and non-Hellenic practices.⁴⁵ While interesting in their own right, evidence from these palaces cannot be used by itself to discuss larger Greek norms.

Because of the wide variety of palace traditions, Janet Morgan has suggested that we no longer use the term 'palace' at all when referring to Hellenistic royal homes, lest we

⁴¹ Hoepfner (1999) 482-3. De Giorgi (2016) 56.

⁴² Aï-Khanoum: Cohen (2013) 225-41. Dura Europos: Nielsen (1994) 117-28. Jebel Khalid: Clarke (2002). Mt. Karysis: Radt (2016).

⁴³ Kawerau and Wiegand (1930), Hoepfner (1996) 17-26, Radt (1999) 63-78, Biefeld (2010), Zimmer (2012), Hardiman (2017).

⁴⁴ Netzer (1996), Nielsen (1994) 155-212.

⁴⁵ Kopsacheili (2011) 27.

anachronistically impose a set type of building on what was, in actuality, a diverse group of structures. Homeone is right to draw our attention to the differences between royal buildings, especially those from different kingdoms. But even our surviving evidence, fractured as it is, shows a great deal of commonality between royal palaces, so it is legitimate to consider them as a group. This should come as no surprise. All of the Successor kingdoms shared a common Macedonian heritage. They also shared a common interest in presenting themselves as legitimate monarchs to Greek subjects, even if (in the case of the Seleucids and Ptolemies at least) non-Greek subjects made up the bulk of their kingdom. And, finally, the courts of the different kingdoms were aware of each other's actions, and competed with one another in the prodigality of their displays. We have already seen an example of this competition in Antigonus II's acerbic comment about the vulgarity of the Ptolemaic court (Plut. *Arat.* 15.2). Such competition increased the homogeneity of the courts, as each tried to outdo the other in specific types of display.

There is no neat divide between the royal palace and the normal house. In the modern scholarship, there exists a middling category of sorts, the so-called governors' palaces. Archaeologists who find an especially grand home, or one in an especially conspicuous location, frequently associate it with a king or his officers. The "palazzo delle colonne," a lavish, first-century BC residence in Ptolemais in Cyrenaica, is a good example

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⁴⁶ Morgan (2017) 32-8.

⁴⁷ The term 'palace' still seems to me to be the best word to describe royal residences. Morgan's proposed terms ('royal buildings' and 'court buildings') are very broad (38, 42-3). Surely municipal and cultic structures such as the Stoa of Eumenes or the Great Altar at Pergamum are 'royal buildings,' although they are clearly qualitatively different from the king's house. The concept of 'court building' seems just as likely to introduce anachronistic interpretations derived from later courts as the term 'palace' does. I take a royal palace to be a structure used by a king for dining, entertaining, or living. I distinguish between royal palaces and the luxurious structures of non-royals (which are sometimes also called 'palaces' in modern scholarship).

⁴⁸ Strootman (2014) 9-15.

⁴⁹ Vössing (2004) 136, Strootman (2014) 15.

of this (Fig. 9).⁵⁰ In a similar vein, the lavishness and prominent location of a grand home on the Kastro Hill at Samos has led to suspicion that a king may have built it.⁵¹

In other cases, the designation as an official residence is more secure. The residences at Aï-Khanoum, Dura Europos, and Jebel Khalid that Kosmin suggests are Seleucid palaces are all either very large or on an acropolis. ⁵² It is therefore reasonable to suspect that they did have some sort of official function. Even so, the king would have been present at any one of these palaces only occasionally. The vast majority of the time, they were the residences of non-royals. Since royal governors were frequently locals, the 'governor's palace' must have often been merely the house of the city's first citizen. ⁵³ In other words, the semantic ambiguity surrounding royal residences in Greek reflects reality. While some royal palaces were so grand as to have been unmistakably kingly, many others were modest enough that it can be hard to distinguish them from other types of official residence, or even luxurious private homes. Palaces and other large residences shared a basic register of common luxurious features, while still differing in a few key regards.

Outside Space: Exteriors and Courtyards

Location and Exterior Decoration

⁵⁰ Pesce (1950). More recent scholarship has concluded that the palace's date was a later than Pesce first postulated (first c. BC rather than second), and that it was not particularly spectacular when compared to other (Roman era) houses in the same city (Kenrick [2013] 82).

⁵¹ Tölle-Kastenbein (1974) 65-9. Kutbay (1998) 45 posits it to be Attalid, but acknowledges that evidence for Attalid control over Samos is otherwise lacking. Winter (2006) 166 suggests that Antony, Cleopatra, Augustus, Tiberius, Claudius, Trajan, and Hadrian all may have, at some point or another, taken up residence there.

⁵² For point of comparison, the Samian house is on the old acropolis of Samos (abandoned since the time of the tyrant Polycrates), while the *palazzo delle colonne* is in the city center, far removed from the acropolis and old theater.

⁵³ Strootman (2011) 146-8. This would perhaps explain the variety in the Seleucid royal palaces. In each case, the local tastes of the governors and satraps who were their primary residents shaped the buildings far more than the desires of the visiting kings.

Perhaps the easiest way to organize the various elements of domestic architecture, and to get a sense of the impression they would have made upon guests, is to approach each part of the house in turn, in roughly the order a guest would have seen them. We will therefore start outside the home, enter into the courtyard, then turn to the public face of the house, the dining rooms (*andrones*), and finally consider decorative elements such as mosaics, painting, sculpture, furniture, and textiles.

Greek houses were, as a rule, undecorated on the outside. There were both ideological reasons for this (the homogeneity of the houses helped maintain the ideal of equality) and aesthetic ones (Greeks in the Classical period rarely decorated the outside of any building, other than temples).⁵⁴ The entrances to houses were also unadorned and frequently placed near the corners of the house. The well-to-do homeowner who wished to impress his guests thus began his decorating with the courtyard.

Kings were distinguished from other homebuilders first and foremost by their ability to build upon the most prestigious and conspicuous parcels of land. In practice, this typically meant building on a hill. The Macedonian palaces at Vergina, Pella, and Demetrias were all located on hills. The *basileia* of the Attalids was on the Pergamene acropolis. In a later period, Herod the Great elegantly draped his Northern Palace at Masada across a series of cliffside terraces. His Jerusalem palace was also built upon a hill. When nature failed to

⁵⁴ Cf. Hoepfner and Schwander (1986) 256-7; Walter-Karydi (1998)

⁵⁵ Hatzopoulos (2001).

⁵⁶ Kawerau and Wiegand (1930).

provide him with a suitable promontory at Herodium, he created a vast artificial mound and built his palace upon it.⁵⁷

Other means of emphasizing the specialness of the king's residence could also be employed. At Alexandria, the main palace (located on a relatively flat stretch of land) was separated from the rest of the city by a *propylaea* (Polyb. 15.31.2-3).⁵⁸ The palace-complex at Antioch by Daphne was separated from the main city by a canal and (from the reign of Antiochus III onwards) a wall (Lib. 11.119). Kosmin may be right to suggest that the Seleucids preferred this 'forbidden city' model of distinguishing their palaces.⁵⁹ But at other Seleucid sites, such as Mt. Karysis in Cilicia, the royal residence is constructed on a hill and particular attention was paid to how distinguished it would look to the viewer approaching it.⁶⁰ The true commonality underlying every palace, Seleucid and non-Seleucid alike, was a desire to make the palace obvious to the observer.

When wealthy men had the ability, they often followed the pattern set by kings of building symmetrical houses in conspicuous locations. This is particularly evident in the case of governor's residences, perhaps because these men could commandeer the best land. At Nea Paphos, it was probably the *stratēgos* Mnasiades of Argos who built the large residence on the city's acropolis.⁶¹ It must remain an open question how many of the shared

7 Nielsen (1994) 155 Hasmonear

⁵⁷ Nielsen (1994) 155. Hasmonean Palace III (built in the late second century) was also constructed upon an artificial mound. The practice was a long-lasting Near Eastern tradition (Netzer [1996] 205).

⁵⁸ Morgan (2017) 46-7. An extremely elaborate propylaea separates the palace at Aï-Khanoum from the city proper as well, though in this case the palace is also on a hill (Kosmin [2014]).
⁵⁹ Kosmin (2014) 227.

⁶⁰ At Mt. Karysis, better-quality masonry was used on the side of the building approaching visitors could see (Radt [2016] 269). In addition to Mt. Karysis, the palace at Aï-Khanoum was placed on a hill, a decision that must have been made by a Seleucid monarch early on in the city's history. The (unexcavated) palace at Apameia on the Orontes was perhaps also on the city acropolis (Strootman [2014] 72).

⁶¹ Mlynarczyk (1996) 193. By contrast, the *palazzo delle colonne* in Ptolemais is centrally located and very large (occupying almost an entire *insula*), but not on the high or conspicuous terrain one might expect if it was built by a royal governor. Perhaps the builder was confined in his options, or valued centrality over visibility.

royal/gubernatorial palaces of the Seleucids were in sites selected by non-royals. Men outside the court also displayed similar tastes. At Samos, a magnificent estate sat on the city's old acropolis (Kastro Hill) (Fig. 10). At Rhodes, a large late Hellenistic residence occupied an entire city *insula* at the base of the acropolis (an area that seems to have become posher following the Great Earthquake of 227/6).⁶² At Delos, the houses of the New Quarter tend to be more regular than those in the Old Quarter, where homeowners were more confined by the geography of the area and preexisting structures.⁶³

Perhaps because of the particularly conspicuous location of their palaces, kings took a greater interest in exterior decoration than the owners of private homes did. As early as the palace at Aigai, we find a centered entrance and an elaborate exterior façade (Fig. 11).⁶⁴

Visitors to the palace at Pella entered through a centered portico some 16m wide. On the exterior was an impressive façade of Ionic and Doric columns.⁶⁵ The exterior of such palaces differed sharply from that of private homes, which typically were unadorned and had offcenter doors. Palaces more closely resemble temples.⁶⁶ And indeed, a temple-like, centered entrance, flanked with columns and surmounted by a pediment, was such a common feature of palatial architecture, that even the pleasure barge of Ptolemy IV had a columned entrance on the boat itself (Ath. 5.205B).⁶⁷

By contrast, like their Classical counterparts, Hellenistic houses tended to be unadorned on the outside. At Delos, some houses had a temple-like entrance with columns

62 Dreliossi-Herakleidou (1996) 184.

⁶³ Wurmser (2010) 15.

⁶⁴ See Kottaridi (2011b) for a reconstruction of the façade based on the most recent excavations of the site.

⁶⁵ Akamatis (2011) 400.

⁶⁶ Lawrence (1996) 182; Nielsen (1994) 74.

⁶⁷ Further examples at Kutbay (1998) 94.

and pediments.⁶⁸ As the reconstruction of the entrance to the House of Comedians shows, however, the effect is nowhere near as impressive as the temple-inspired façades of royal palaces (Fig. 12).⁶⁹ The cramped nature of city streets prevented much in the way of exterior display. It also prevented most homeowners from having a central entrance to the courtyard.⁷⁰ In any event, it is hard to see any direct correlation between the modest exterior décor of houses, such as the House of the Comedians, and royal palaces. Both draw upon temple architecture for their inspiration, and it is perfectly possible that this is an instance in which private decoration continued to borrow from public monumental architecture, as it had in the fourth century.⁷¹

Another strategy for ennobling the exterior of a palace was the use of fortification. By the time of Philip V, the view of the Demetrias palace from the city proper was dominated by the *anaktoron*, the four-towered fortification surrounding one of the peristyles. This form of fortification (also known as a *tetrapyrgion*, after its towers) was the pattern of a palace constructed by the Seleucid king Demetrius I at Antioch by Daphne. Herod's palace in Jerusalem was fortified with towers, one of which, the "Tower of David," survives to this day. In all likelihood, the palace at Alexandria had towers, too. While such fortifications could clearly serve a practical function, they may not always have been designed with the actual defense of the palace in mind. Timm Radt has recently observed that the tallest tower

⁶⁸ Lawrence (1996) 189, Hellmann (2010) 66-7.

⁶⁹ Bezerra de Meneses, Bruneau, and Vatin (1970) 11-19.

⁷⁰ One finds an example of the role topography played in limiting the possibilities of homeowners at Pergamum, where Peristyle House I has a central entrance to its courtyard but the nearby Peristyle Houses II and III do not (Winters [2006] 418).

 $^{^{71}}$ Other such borrowings can be found Delos: in House V in the $\hat{I}lot\ de\ Bijoux$, a hall has semi-circular marble inlays by the door, imitating the rollers needed for (much larger) temple doors (Westgate [2010] 509-10).

⁷² Kosmin (2014) 227-8.

⁷³ Nielsen (1994) 182.

at Mt. Karysis was useless from a defensive standpoint, and seems to have been constructed purely to look imposing. He collects other examples of similar fortifications at other sites.⁷⁴ Monarchs, therefore, had at their disposal different means of decorating the exteriors of their palaces, just as they had different strategies of palace location.

Unlike other forms of exterior decoration, fortifications and towers offer a surprising area of overlap between royal and non-royal residences. Tower-houses are surprisingly common from the third century onward. Some were extremely impressive fortifications. The third-century Pyrgos of Chimarrou on Naxos, for example, once stood fifteen meters high and had walls over a meter thick at their base (Fig. 13). The Samian house on Kastro Hill may have had a tower directly to its southeast as well. The problem is that the distribution of such private fortifications (in the countryside, and especially prevalent on islands) suggests that they had a practical function in deterring bandits and pirates. It would therefore be premature to suggest that the desire to live in such towers stemmed from royal imitation. One also finds tall buildings, such as the "tower with pediments" from the Insula of the Comedians in Delos, in cities (Fig. 14). The balconies and open colonnades on the upper stories of such residences showed a newfound appreciation of views that these homeowners shared with kings. But the cost of land, rather than a desire to achieve a vista fit for a king, may have driven these homeowners to build up, rather than out.

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⁷⁴ Radt (2016) 271-4.

⁷⁵ For overviews, see Nowicka (1975), Hoepfner (1999) 451-3. Other towers, presumably follies, have been found in Alexandrian and Italian villas (Nielsen [1994] 182, 216).

⁷⁶ Hoepfner (1999) 452.

⁷⁷ Tölle-Kastenbein (1974) 30 (a medieval tower currently stands on the spot).

⁷⁸ Bezzera de Meneses, Bruneau, and Vatin. (1970) 43-70.

Such vistas, were, however, one of the innovations of the age. Herod the Great was especially fond of them: dining rooms and courtyards in his Caesarea and (Northern) Masada palaces were left with open sides in order to see outside. ⁷⁹ His great-grandson, Herod Agrippa II, built a dining room on his Jerusalem palace from which he and his guests could look down and observe what was happening on the Temple Mount. This was, of course, a great blasphemy, and the Jews responded by building a wall to block his view. Herod demanded they tear down the wall, and so fervently were the Jews committed to their God, and Herod committed to his vista, that first the Roman governor, and finally the emperor, were forced to intervene. ⁸⁰ The pavilion of Ptolemy II had a pi-shaped arrangement of couches that allowed the dinner guests to look out the front of it, and this arrangement was probably a reflection of dining rooms within the royal palace itself. ⁸¹

Lesser men were more constrained by the limits of geography and preexisting property, and as a result could not guarantee that their houses had the same stunning vistas that many royal residences had. But there is some evidence to suggest that, when circumstances allowed it, wealthy men were equally interested in having spectacular views. At Pergamon, the House of Attalos and several other larger homes all have open colonnades along their downhill side, allowing their owners to see over the city wall into the countryside beyond. The Samian villa on Kastro Hill may also have had a similar open courtyard facing the sea. Samian villa on Kastro Hill may also have had a similar open courtyard

⁷⁹ Nielsen (1994) 117.

⁸⁰ Jos. *AJ* 11.190. The emperor Nero allowed the wall to remain.

⁸¹ Nielsen (1998) 117.

⁸² Winter (2006) 166.

⁸³ Tölle-Kastenbein (1974) 31.

The Courtyard

The clemency of Mediterranean weather and the need for natural light made houses built around courtyards the norm for Greek domestic architecture in the Classical period. 84 The courtyards in earlier Greek homes were somewhat haphazard affairs. Often asymmetrical, and typically entered through an off-center hallway, the courtyards of private homes were utilitarian light wells and communal gathering spaces (Fig. 15). The courtyards of public buildings, by contrast, tended to be larger and more regularly shaped. Some, such as the Pompeion in Athens (constructed c. 400 BC), were adorned with a continuous row of columns around each side, known as a peristyle (Fig. 16).

From the late fifth century onwards, well-to-do men began to incorporate peristyles into the courtyards of their homes. ⁸⁵ The peristyle ennobled the house through its association with public monumental architecture. It also forced the homeowner to create a regular quadrilateral courtyard, one whose symmetry was pleasing to the eye and which let in more light. ⁸⁶ Gone then, were the awkwardly protruding walls and gloomy crannies that had characterized the courtyards of earlier houses. The adoption of the peristyle pattern appears to have been widespread. The opulent House of Mosaics in Eretria (built in the early fourth century) is an early example of the type. ⁸⁷ Olynthus contained several peristyle houses. ⁸⁸ Multiple peristyle houses were built in the late fourth century in Athens, sometimes over the

⁸⁴ For overviews, see Hoepfner and Schwander (1986) 268-75, Kiderlen (1995), Walter-Karydi (1998), Hoepfner (1999) 317-440, Hellmann (2010) 42-62, Morgan (2010).

⁸⁵ Walter-Karydi (1998) 4-11.

⁸⁶ Kutbay (1998) 69-70, Hellmann (2010) 58.

⁸⁷ Ducrey, Metzger, and Reber (1993) 38-9.

⁸⁸ Cahill (2002) 79.

sites of earlier, non-peristyle, homes. 89 Other examples have been found throughout the Aegean. 90

The courtyards of royal palaces tended to look very much like their counterparts in private residences, albeit on a much grander scale. The peristyle courtyard was nearly universal. Aigai, Pella, and Demetrias all had at least one. Though the palace at Alexandria is now lost, but we know from Polybius' account of the regency of Agathocles that it contained a *megiston peristylon* capable of holding a large crowd (15.25.3-7). Period The pleasure barge of Ptolemy IV had a peristyle as well (Ath. 5.205A). We cannot be certain that the palaces of Antioch by Daphne had peristyles, but the Seleucids certainly used the form. Indeed, at some point in the late fourth or early third century, they modified the ancient Palace of Nabopolasser in Babylon to have a Greek peristyle courtyard. The palaces at Aï-Khanoum, Jebel Khalid, and the Citadel Palace at Dura Europos all had peristyles. Only Mt. Karysis and the Strategeion at Dura Europos stand out as exceptions. Both Palace IV and Palace V at Pergamum are centered on peristyle courts. Thus, the preeminent form of late Classical private home became the basis for practically every Hellenistic palace.

The peristyle courtyard was almost ubiquitous for non-royal houses throughout the Hellenistic world as well, a result, perhaps, of both fourth-century predecessors and the

89 Walter-Karydi (1998) 24.

⁹⁰ Hellmann (2010) 61-2.

⁹¹ Kutbay (1998) 101-4. On relations between early Macedonian palaces and Greek architecture, see Tomlinson (1983).

⁹² Morgan (2017) 48-9 cautions that Polybius may have fit some other type of structure into a Greek mold here. But the omnipresence of peristyle courtyards makes it likely that Polybius is accurate in this instance.

⁹³ Kosmin (2014) 227. Babylon was then the *de facto* capital of the Seleucid Empire.

⁹⁴ Evidence for these conveniently collected at Kopsacheili (2011) 21-4.

⁹⁵ See Nielsen (1994) 117-28 for the *Strategeion*, and Radt (2016) 267.

⁹⁶ Radt (1988) 67-8.

influence of royal palaces. At Pella, the early Hellenistic (late fourth century) Houses of the Rape of Helen and Dionysius both have peristyle courtyards (Figs. 17 and 18).⁹⁷ The wealthy of practically every Greek city followed suit.⁹⁸ Even the dead in the rock-cut tombs of Alexandria waited out eternity in peristyle courts.⁹⁹ Truly, then, did the early third-century poet Leonidas of Tarentum capture the spirit of his age when he wrote that, "a house without columns is ugly" (*Anth. Pal.* 7.648 *l.* 5).

In Hellenistic Pergamum, peristyles were rare in the cramped confines of the old, third-century city. But when Eumenes II extended the city walls in the early second century, homebuilders used the cleared land to construct lavish peristyles that rivaled the acropolis palaces in size, if not in quality. It was lack of space, then, not style, that prevented more wealthy Pergamenes from building peristyles houses. Perhaps nowhere is widespread obsession with peristyles more evident than at Delos. In House VI I in the Theater Quarter, for example, the peristyle barely leaves room for someone to move between the columns and the walls (Fig. 19). Some houses had grand colonnades of two or even three stories, but placed around courtyards so small, that they amounted to peristyle light wells. In the

⁹⁷ On these houses, see Makaronas and Giouri (1989), Etienne (2006) 106-11.

⁹⁸ For an overview, see Hellmann (2010) 78-90. Thasos, where only two peristyle houses have been so far discovered, is a notable exception. Cf. Wurmser (2010) 15

⁹⁹ Winter (2006) 174, McKenzie (2007) 71-4.

¹⁰⁰ Wulf-Rheidt (1998) 306-7. All five houses found in the area have been large peristyles.

¹⁰¹ Hardiman (2017) 280 has suggested that the "L-shape" form of some of these peristyle houses (in which the rooms are spread along two sides of the peristyle, rather than three as in the "U-shape" form) is reminiscent of the royal palaces on the acropolis. But the "L" and "U" shaped typology (developed by Pinkwart and Stammnitz [1984] 36-42) has been rejected by other scholars (cf. Wulf [1999] 149-90), and, in any event, it seems unlikely that homeowners deliberately copied the entire layout of the palace in microcosm. Wulf-Rheidt's (1998) 314-5 argument that homeowners tried to create certain types of rooms or suites (the square peristyle, the three dining hall suite) with limited money and space seems closer to the mark. Certainly modern house buyers tend to think in terms of prestigious elements (the 'open floor plan,' the walk-in closet, granite countertops) rather than in terms of specific layouts.

¹⁰² Westgate (2010) 510.

¹⁰³ Trümper (1998) 50-2.

maison à seule colonne, the eponymous column stands alone in the courtyard. It serves no apparent structural function, but, in its own modest way, tries to bring something of the mystique of the peristyle to the house. 104 These ersatz peristyles are interesting because they show the degree to which this form of courtyard, rare and luxurious at the outset of the Hellenistic period, had become almost a necessity by that period's end.

The fourth century also saw the appearance of houses with multiple courtyards. The House of Mosaics at Eretria is the earliest example we have of the practice (Fig. 20). 105

Kitchens, larders, and other utilitarian rooms were banished to this second courtyard, leaving only more opulent spaces, such as dining rooms, in the public portion of the house. 106

The aesthetic advantages of such a floorplan are obvious, but the expense and the space required seem to have been prohibitive for most owners. At any rate, there are relatively few

Classical-period examples of it. Indeed, domestic housing was an area in which what was culturally appealing (peristyles, multiple courtyards) frequently had to give way to realities of confined space and preexisting structures. 107

Thus, we find in Thrace a double courtyard home made by combining two preexisting houses, rather than building a new large house from scratch. 108

In early fourth-century Athens, the owners of the so-called "House of Menander" and at least one other peristyle home had opted to build their houses away from the center of town, by the northern wall of the city, presumably because this was where there

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¹⁰⁴ Westgate (2010) 504-5.

¹⁰⁵ Ducrey, Metzger, and Reber (1993) 47. Westgate (2010) 498.

¹⁰⁶ This is part of a broader shift towards removing evidence of industrial or agricultural occupations from the rich man's home. Cf. Kiderlen (1995) 102-4.

¹⁰⁷ A point raised by Wurmser (2010) 16.

¹⁰⁸ Hellmann (2010) 61.

was the space to build them. The prestige of a large house in the new style seemed to have mattered more than a prime central location. 109

Like the most luxurious private homes of the fourth century, Hellenistic palaces frequently contained multiple courtyards. The fourth-century palace at Vergina had one grand peristyle courtyard when it was first built, with a second smaller courtyard with a wooden peristyle added later. The early third-century palace at Pella had two courtyards at first, although later expansions increased that number to at least four. Units I and II at the front of the palace were peristyles surrounded by public spaces designed for reception and entertainment. The poorly preserved Unit IV and its peristyle are thought to have been the king's private residence, while the adjacent Unit V was a massive palaestra with a wooden peristyle. Kitchens and service rooms were located to the west of the main palace complex. At Alexandria, Polybius' choice to label the central courtyard the "megiston peristylon" may imply the existence of other, smaller peristyle courtyards in the complex. Most known Seleucid palaces do not have multiple courtyards, though this may be a reflection of their size rather than an indication of Seleucid preference. A notable exception to this rule is the palace on Mt. Karysis, which had separate banqueting and residential courtyards.

Palaces IV and V at Pergamon each have only one courtyard. If, however, the widespread interpretation of Palace IV as the king's private domicile and Palace V as a public reception area is correct, the kings of Pergamon in essence lived in a multi-courtyard house, even if their perch on the Pergamene acropolis forced them to divide the courtyards

¹⁰⁹ Walter-Karydi (1992) 59.

¹¹⁰ Kottaridi (2011b) 327, with Miller (2016) 289 for the dating.

¹¹¹ Winter (2006) 162-5, Miller (2016) 292-4.

¹¹² Thus McKenzie (2007) 67 n. 204.

¹¹³ Radt (2016) 268.

between two structures. The royal practice of splitting reception hall and domestic residence is not a point of difference between kingly and civic custom. Both kings and private citizens evince a desire to sequester the more utilitarian rooms of their homes away from the eyes of guests. But kings alone had the wealth and power to create wholly different buildings for these purposes.

In the Hellenistic period, private homeowners with the requisite land and money also had multiple courtyards. At Pella, the House of Dionysius had two impressive peristyle courtyards. At Rhodes, the late Hellenistic 'palatial' estate at the bottom of the acropolis had three courtyards: a large peristyle one with the largest and most lavish rooms around it; a second smaller one with smaller, but still fine, rooms; and a third, utilitarian one, clearly meant for service rooms. The grand home on the Kastro Hill at Samos also had two courtyards. No examples of multi-courtyard homes survive from Delos or Pergamum, but one suspects that this is primarily the consequence of limitations of space. We have already seen how hard it was for rich Delians to build even one cramped peristyle in their homes. As a result, we find in many houses a suite of rooms separated from the courtyard by another larger room. The same arrangement is present in many Pergamene peristyles as well. In these instances, the sequestered rooms are undoubtedly for utilitarian uses. This pattern is therefore a different solution to the same basic problem of separating public and private

¹¹⁴ Walter-Karydi (1998) 18-19.

¹¹⁵ Dreliossi-Herakleidou (1996) 192. Westgate (2010) 515 wonders if this is not a public building. Without further evidence one way or another, this cannot be disproven. But the layout seems to me so reminiscent of the tripartite division of the palace at Demetrias and other opulent residential buildings that a domestic function seems more likely.

¹¹⁶ Samos: Tölle-Kastenbein (1974) 28-31.

¹¹⁷ Delos (with representative examples in the House of the Comedians and the House of the Trident), Bezerra de Meneses, Bruneau, and Vatin (1970) 37-9, 98-100. Pergamum (with representative examples in Peristyle Houses I and II west of the Lower Agora), Wulf-Rheidt (1998) 312-13.

functions within the home that multiple courtyards also solved. The desire for such separation was already present in the fourth century, and no royal influence need be supplied to explain its presence in later times (though the magnificent multi-peristyle houses of kings undoubtedly made the possibilities of the layout appreciable to a wide audience).

Where royal courtyards tended to differ from their earlier, non-royal counterparts was in their scale and grandeur. The courtyards of palaces tended to be larger than those of other homes, both absolutely and proportionally. Often the colonnades are two stories tall. The style of two-story colonnade in one of the public peristyles at Pella, with Doric columns in the first course and Ionic columns in the second, was particularly widespread. At Demetrius, one of the peristyles had taller columns on one side in order to allow in more light, a feature known to Vitruvius as a "Rhodian peristyle" (6.7.3) (Fig. 21). Gardens, too, helped increase the grandeur of the royal palace. Classical Greek homes did not have gardens. The Persian *paradeisos*, equal parts game preserve, supply hub, and expression of royal dominance over the earth, was the ancestor of the Hellenistic palatial garden. In some instances, such as the *basileia* at Alexandria, the gardens were probably outside the palace proper. In others, they were probably inside one or more of the courtyards.

Some Hellenistic homeowners took special steps to ornament further the courtyards or outside areas of the home intended to receive guests. Planting a garden was one way to do

¹¹⁸ Kutbay (1998) 69-70, 132.

¹¹⁹ Nielsen (1994) 96.

¹²⁰ Marzolff (1996) 154.

¹²¹ Walter-Karydi (1998) 11.

¹²² On the Near Eastern antecedents for Hellenistic gardens, see Dalby (2000a). One indication that Persian custom underlies later Hellenistic practice is the fact the Aigai palace, built before Alexander's conquest, does not have a garden (Morgan [2016] 290).

¹²³ See Sonne (1996) for an overview.

this. We have already seen that kings were likely the originators of the domestic garden in the Greek world, having inherited it from the Near Eastern predecessors. Gardens do begin to appear in Late Hellenistic private houses, but their use remains rare and sporadic, especially compared to the more enthusiastic Roman adoption of the garden. The Rhodian acropolis house had a large garden, and the Rhodians in general may have been fond of naturalistic displays, placing sculptures of satyrs, nymphs, and the like in artificial groves and grottos. But there is no evidence for the same practice at Delos, despite the late date of the structures and the large number of excavated residences.

Several Delian homes, did, however, possess Rhodian peristyles, the especially splendid higher colonnade along one side of a peristyle court found in the palace at Demetrias. Other examples of Rhodian peristyles come from Priene and the *palazzo delle colonne* at Ptolemais in Cyrenaica. ¹²⁵ Winter believes that the Rhodian peristyle was originally a feature of the palace at Alexandria that took time to disseminate across the Aegean (hence its absence in the two earlier Macedonian palaces). ¹²⁶ Because of the loss of the palace at Alexandria, this must remain a hypothesis, one largely based on the *a priori* assumption that innovation trickles down from royal palaces. It is perfectly possible that the Rhodian peristyle was an invention of city Greeks, perhaps even, one might suggest, of the Rhodians. ¹²⁷

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¹²⁴ Dreliossi-Herakleidou (1996) 191. On the Rhodian tradition of naturalistic displays, see Lauter (1972).

¹²⁵ Winter (2006) 172-3. The House of the Rape of Helen at Pella had a two-story peristyle along one side as well (Walter-Karydi [1998] 13-14).

¹²⁶ Winter (2006) 173.

¹²⁷ In addition to its fondness for gardens, Rhodes has the largest concentration of surviving Hellenistic mosaics outside Delos (Westgate [2012] 196). The city was both wealthy and prestigious during the third century, and it takes no great leap of the imagination to envision its citizens inventing new forms of ostentation or outsiders being willing to emulate them.

Inside Space: The Dining Rooms and Public Entertainment

Within the house, the dining room (andron) was the chief space for the entertainment of guests. Like many other aspects of Hellenic residential architecture, the andron of the Greek house had a certain homogeneity about it. In the fifth and fourth centuries, "a Greek could go from Olynthus to Eretria, from Athens to Kassope, and find himself in familiar surroundings when invited to a symposion."128 The Platonic form of the andron was square, with an off-center door so that the dining couches would fit. An ornamented trottoir, or kline-band, ran around the other three sides of the floor, delineating where the couches belonged. 129 The size of the rooms naturally varied, though proportions remained remarkably consistent.¹³⁰ In fourth-century Priene, three couches (each couch holding 1-2 guests) seems to have been typical. ¹³¹ In Olynthus, the average *andron* had seven couches. ¹³² The grandest homes might have room for up to eleven couches. Such is the case with the House of Good Fortune at Olynthus and with the House of Mosaics in Eretria (Fig. 22). Multiple andrones seem to have been rare, although the House of Mosaics, with its three dining rooms, is a notable exception to this rule. 133 Andrones were typically located directly off the courtyard and entered through a door. But the later Classical Period saw some exceptions to this norm. In the House of Mosaics, the one dining room had columns instead of a wall on the courtyard

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¹²⁸ Dunbabin (1998) 82.

¹²⁹ On the general forms of *andrones*, see Bergquist (1990), Dunbabin (1998).

¹³⁰ Dunbabin (1998) gives the dimensions of the seven couch *andron* as 4.5-4.8m² and the dimensions of the eleven-couch *andron* as 6.5-6.8m² (83). Bergquist (1990) observes that practically no *andrones* are ever wider than 6.5 m., the length needed to place three couches (44-5).

¹³¹ Ferla (2005) 194.

¹³² Cahill (2002) 180.

¹³³ Olynthus: Cahilll (2002) 180. Eretria: Ducrey, Metzger, and Reber (1993) 39-41. As Knoepfler (1991) 195 n.64 observes, the custom of Menedemus (an Eretrian philosopher and politician of the early third century) to invite a small group of friends for breakfast and larger groups later in the day would be well-facilitated by a house such as this (Cf. Diog. Laert. 2.17.139).

side, in order to admit more light and air (Fig. 23).¹³⁴ In one of the early fourth-century Athenian peristyle homes, two of the dining rooms may have been accessed through a central exedra rather than from the courtyard.¹³⁵

As in Classical homes, the public face of the Hellenistic palace and private residence was the dining room, which remained the most impressive and elaborately decorated space. Banqueting was an integral part of Hellenistic kingship, and no king could hope to entertain in a suitably royal manner if he was forced to funnel his guests through an eleven-couch *andron*, twenty-two at a time. Thus, kings followed the precedent set by the Eretrian House of Mosaics and other opulent Classical homes in having multiple *andrones* of various sizes. But being kings, they were able to expand upon the basic principle in a way other men could not. At Aigai, Philip II had 16 dining rooms at his disposal, with a total seating capacity of around 224 couches. The largest of these rooms (M₁-M₃) held at least thirty couches each. These cavernous halls were largest interior spaces without roof supports built in the Classical Period. The smallest *andrones* at the palace held at least 11

¹³⁴ Ducrey, Metzger, and Reber (1993) 58-61.

¹³⁵ Walter-Karydi (1998) 24.

¹³⁶ On dining in a royal context, see Murray (1994), Nielsen (1998), and Vössing (2004). For a brief overview of royal dining halls, see Vössing (2004) 100-14.

¹³⁷ Hoefner (1996) 11-13. Each couch is traditionally considered to hold 1-2 guests. While the number of couches per room is relatively standardized for Classical period homes, the great variation in room size (and later shape) in Hellenistic palaces means that the estimate of number of couches per room can vary between scholars. If the king was willing to have guests sit rather than recline at table, then he could fit many more people into a given space (Kottaridi [2011b] 325 suggests, for example, that Room M₂ at Aigai might have held 500 guests sitting at table). The very largest parties would have used the courtyard as well, giving kings a truly astonishing capacity for entertainment. Couch numbers are perhaps better thought of as a way of comparing relative room size rather than as an absolute measurement of guest capacity.

¹³⁸ Kottaridi (2011a) 176 (30 couches); Nielsen (1998) 107 (35 couches).

¹³⁹ Kottaridi (2011a) 176-7.

couches.¹⁴⁰ In other words, they were at least as large as the largest *andrones* in typical Greek homes.

Later kings continued to build houses with astounding numbers of *andrones*. The comparatively modest Palace V of the Attalids had space for 99 couches. ¹⁴¹ We cannot speak with certainty about the dining facilities of the Ptolemies at Alexandria, or of the Seleucids at Antioch. ¹⁴² Indirect evidence and common sense both suggest that the palaces of these dynasties could hold great numbers of guests. The writer of the *Letter of Aristeas* assumed that the Ptolemaic palace at Alexandria could hold feasts for the king, 72 Jewish scholars, and other guests besides. The pavilion of Ptolemy II had room for 130 couches, while the pleasure barge of Ptolemy IV had five dining rooms, with a total seating capacity of more than 47 couches. ¹⁴³ According to Josephus, Herod the Great had multiple dining halls capable of holding a hundred guests each (Joseph. *BJ* 5.4.4). ¹⁴⁴ If the king of Judaea dined in such splendor, then the lords of Egypt and Asia almost certainly did so even more grandly.

In the Classical period, *andrones* were universally square with off-center doors. At Vergina, the oldest of the royal palaces, all the dining rooms follow this model, albeit with dining rooms on a very large scale.¹⁴⁵ In later palaces, however, we find rectangular dining

¹⁴⁰ Tomlinson (1970) 314. Bergquist (1999) 52 thinks it may have held more.

¹⁴¹ Hoepfner (1996) 24-5. The number 99 may be significant, as that was the number of couches in Alexander's tent at Susa (Vössing [2004]).

¹⁴² The condition of the Macedonian palaces at Pella and Demetrias does not permit estimates of their total seating capacity. See, however, the reconstruction of the northern side of peristyle II at Pella (with at least 52 couches across three *andrones*) in Hoepfner (1996) 29-31.

¹⁴³ Ath. 5.196B, 5.204E-206D. Cf. Kutbay (1998) 120.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Nielsen (1997) 156-8. Josephus also comments on the vast span of the roof beams in these rooms: it would appear that having the ability to procure the prime timber necessary for such a structure was a generally recognized sign of royal grandeur.

¹⁴⁵ Of the fifteen known square dining rooms larger than three couches per side in the Greek world, nine are in the palace at Vergina (Bergquist [1999] 49-51).

rooms, of the type known to modern scholars as the broad room, or *oecus maior*. ¹⁴⁶ These rooms have centered doorways along one of the longer walls, and are typically located in a prominent position on one side of the peristyle courtyard. The original inspiration for such a room may have been the palaces of Babylon. ¹⁴⁷ It certainly presented multiple advantages to kings who wished to entertain large numbers of guests. It created less 'dead space' in the center of the room between couches alongside opposite walls, and it lent itself well to the informal subgrouping of couches. It also avoided the problem of acoustic resonance that can turn conversations in larger square rooms into cacophony. ¹⁴⁸

It is therefore unsurprising to see such a room adopted in a number of palaces far removed from Babylon. An early example comes from the palace at Jebel Khalid (built in the third century BC). Pergamon Palace V also contains such a room, and the palace at Pella had one alongside the northern edge of Peristyle II. 149 The elaborate broad rooms of Hellenistic palaces were probably the origins of certain styles of Roman *oeci*. The pleasure-barge of Ptolemy IV, for example, had a dining hall with a double peristyle with a clerestory. This, or another Ptolemaic hall like it, was almost certainly the inspiration for the later Roman period "Egyptian *oecus*," a grand two-story room with windows between its upper columns. 150

¹⁴⁶ Bergquist (1999) 47-8.

¹⁴⁷ Nielsen (1996), Kopsacheili (2011) 21.

¹⁴⁸ Bergquist (1999) 45-8. The alternative style of dining hall, the 'long room' with a door on one of the shorter walls, is well attested in public architecture from the Archaic period onwards, but much less prevalent in domestic architecture. One of Herod's winter palaces at Jericho had one, as did the 'governor's' palace at Ptolemais. No other Hellenistic domestic examples, from palaces or private homes, are known. Cf. Dunbabin (1998) 86-8, Bergquist (1999) 47-8.

¹⁴⁹ Hoepfner (1996) 29-31.

¹⁵⁰ Ath. 5.205A; Vitruv. 6.3.9; McKenzie (2007) 62.

With so many *andrones*, it should come as little surprise that kings and their architects modified the arrangement of dining rooms in the home, so that they all did not need to face a central courtyard. At Aigai, the palace architect made extensive use of "Flügeldreiraumgruppen" or suites of three rooms, in which the center is an exedra opening onto the larger courtyard. The most recent reconstruction of the Aigai palace has three such suites. Later palaces also made use of this form. Palace V at Pergamon has an example (Rooms BCD), and the palace at Demetrias may have had one as well. Just for what such a complex was used remains something of a mystery. Perhaps the middle room, with its excellent lighting, was used as a reception hall. Or perhaps it acted as a waiting room of sorts, where petitioners idled while waiting to see the king in one of the adjacent andrones. Perhaps at royal banquets the king sat in the center room, or perhaps it was seating for lesser guests, or a sort of staging area where the royal dishes might be kept and displayed to arriving guests.

Kottaridi sees this style of suite as an innovation of the Aigai palace architect.¹⁵⁶ But we have already observed a possible earlier example of a similar arrangement in a private home at Athens.¹⁵⁷ Hoepfner has also drawn our attention to the similarities between Room F at Aigai (the best preserved of the exedrae there) and the earlier entrances to dining halls at the Limestone Temple of Athena at Delphi and the House of Mosaics in Eretria (Figs. 24 and

¹⁵¹ A phenomenon first described by Heermann (1982), 345-62. Nielsen (1994) 86-8 disputes this typology, and he is largely followed by Vössing (2004) 102 n. 2, who sees it only at Aigai. But it has found general acceptance among other scholars (see especially Hoepfner [1996] 29-31, Hellmann [2010] 27, Miller [2016] 289-91).

¹⁵² Kottaridi (2011b) 325. The suites are Rooms EFG, Rooms N₁N₂N₃, and Rooms M₁M₂M₃.

¹⁵³ Hoepfner (1996) 24-5 (Pergamum), Kutbay (1998) 121 (Demetrias).

¹⁵⁴ Reception hall: Kottaridi (2011b) 325. Waiting room: Hoepfner (1996) 13-15.

¹⁵⁵ Kingly seating: Vössing (2004) 102. Lesser seating: Kottaridi (2011b) 325. Dish display: Hoepfner (1996) 13-

¹⁵⁶ Kottaridi (2011b) 325-6.

¹⁵⁷ Walter-Karydi (1998) 24.

25).¹⁵⁸ At the very least, public architecture served as a shared prestigious model that both kings and private citizens imitated. But it is also possible that kings were imitating private homes in building these suites, just as they were in building peristyle courts more generally.

Very shortly after the *Flügeldreiraumgruppe* appears for the first time in royal structures (at Aigai), it begins to appear in a variety of domestic contexts. The House of Dionysius in Pella has such an arrangement, and it is perhaps unsurprising that a house so close to the center of Macedonian power should resemble an important Macedonian palace. More interesting, then, are the examples from private homes in Sicily, at Iaitas and Morgantina. The Iaitas house was built c. 300 BC, so if one wishes to see in it an example of royal imitation, one must assume that knowledge about the layout of palaces spread very widely and very rapidly. The form proved popular, for even the first century BC *palazzo delle colonne* in Ptolemais had such a suite. At Delos, the House of the Comedians, the House of the Dolphin, and the House of Hermes have suites of three dining rooms, but their arrangement and relative size differ from the model set by palaces and found in other private homes. In the suite of the palaces and found in other private homes.

Andrones formed the centerpiece of non-royal residences as well. Those who could afford it had multiple dining rooms of various sizes. The House of Dionysius in Pella, for instance, had three, while the House of the Rape of Helen perhaps had five. Multiple

¹⁵⁸ Hoepfner (1996) 13.

¹⁵⁹ Iaitas: Isler (1996). Morganita: Hellmann (2010) 73.

¹⁶⁰ Pergamum: Winters (2006) 168, Hardiman (2017) 280. Ptolemais: Kutbay (1998) 121-2.

¹⁶¹ Bezerra de Meneses, Bruneau, and Vatin (1970) 36.

¹⁶² Nielsen (1994) 87

dining rooms were absolutely standard in the finer Pergamene homes. 163 At Delos, many houses have multiple dining halls of different sizes. The House of the Comedians, for example, has two small dining rooms on its western side, one great hall on the northern side, and two more medium-size dining rooms on the eastern side. The adjacent House of the Trident has three dining rooms, seating differing numbers of couches as well (Fig. 26). 164 Square andrones on the classical model do not disappear in the Hellenistic period, but they are increasingly replaced with rectangular broad rooms like those found in palaces. ¹⁶⁵ By the second century BC, the wealthy citizens of Delos had almost totally abandoned the classical style of andron, and instead ate in rectangular rooms with central entrances, just like those found in royal palaces. 166 Even on Thasos, where peristyle courtyards are rare, the old square andron is entirely absent. 167 In humbler houses, these broad rooms functioned as general living spaces. But in larger homes, they tended to be distinguished both by the quality of their decoration and by their axial position in relation to the entrance to the house, so that the first impression arriving guests received was of the most impressive room in the house. 168 The broad room, therefore, seems to be a royal innovation that found widespread adoption.

Given these differences, it is perhaps wisest not to posit any correlation between the Delian examples and these other homes. At Pergamum, however, so many houses have a recognizable *Flügeldreiraumgruppe* on the palatial model that Ulrike Wulf-Rheidt includes

¹⁶³ An early example can be found in the small third-century peristyle house under the later Hellenistic Heroon. The large second-century houses (the House of Attalos, Peristyle Houses I and II on the Lower Agora, Building Z) all have multiple dining halls of various sizes. Cf. Wulf-Rheidt (1998), Hardiman (2017) 281.

¹⁶⁴ Bezerra de Meneses, Bruneau, and Vatin (1970) 34-7, 94-8.

¹⁶⁵ Dunbabin (1998) 83-5. Long rooms are unattested in Hellenistic domestic contexts, with exception of the *palazzo delle colonne* at Ptolemais.

¹⁶⁶ Chamonard (1922) 169-74; Hoepfner and Schwander (1986) 295-7.

¹⁶⁷ Wurmser (2010) 15 n. 10.

¹⁶⁸ Lawrence (1996) 187-188, Nielsen (1998) 109.

the suite as one of the three types of room in a Pergamene peristyle house. ¹⁶⁹ The feature seems to be a clear sign of imitation between larger homes and royal palaces. Palaces certainly must have played a role in disseminating the model. Yet, because of the potential Attic example that predates Aigai, and the Sicilian examples that come very soon after that palace, it may well be that influence in this case was bi-directional.

Decorative Techniques: Mosaics, Painting, Sculpture, Furniture, and Textiles

Mosaics

Turning now to the decoration kings and homeowners used to set apart their residences, the type of embellishment for which we have the most evidence is mosaic, perhaps little surprise given the sturdiness of the medium and its location on floors.

Regardless of size or arrangement, *andrones* were almost invariably the most richly decorated spaces in the house. By the late fifth century, wealthier Greeks had begun to decorate their homes with pebble mosaics. To Courtyards, entranceways, and, above all, *andrones* were the most common locations for mosaics, since these areas tended to be the most trafficked (and thus the places where mosaics could be best admired and where their durability and water resistance was of the most use). These early mosaics usually featured geometric or floral designs; those that were figurative tended to be relatively two-dimensional. They were also expensive. Only a small proportion of houses at Olynthus had

¹⁶⁹ Wulf-Rheidt (1998). The other two types of room are the broad room (often with adjoining service rooms) and the unconnected square *andron*. Examples of the three-room suite can be found in Peristyle House I west of the Lower Agora, the House of Attalos, and Peristyle House II from the City excavation.

¹⁷⁰ For overviews of pebble mosaics, see Robertson (1982), Salzmann (1982), Dunbabin (1999) 5-18, Westgate (2012) 186-191.

mosaics at all. Houses with multiple mosaics, such as the House of Good Fortune at Olynthus or the House of Mosaics at Eretria, were rare throughout the Greek world.¹⁷¹

Like other wealthy men, kings made extensive use of mosaic to decorate their dining rooms. The mosaics of the palace at Aigai are pebble mosaics, like those of late Classical homes. 172 Many of these mosaics bear a strong resemblance to those found in earlier private residences, and it is possible that they took as their inspiration the floral mosaics popular in the fourth century, such as those evidenced by discoveries at Sicyon (Figs. 27 and 28). 173 Such mosaics would continue to be avant garde for non-royals in the Hellenistic period as well. We learn from Duris of Samos that Demetrius of Phalerum had "flowery floors" inlaid in his home, probably a reference to mosaics of this type (Ath. 12.542B-543A=Duris (FGrH 76) F10). 174 At roughly the same time, the owners of the House of Dionysius and the House of the Rape of Helen in Pella adorned their homes with the most elaborate pebble mosaics that survive to us. The mosaics in these houses are far more painterly than any that proceeded them. Densely set stones of various colors are used to create shading. Small strips of lead or terracotta are used to sharpen the edges of faces and other key features. The eyes of all the figures are now missing, presumably because they were made of precious stones. These are not floors, but works of art that happen to sit in the floor, and it is little wonder that one of them, the Hunt Mosaic in the House of the Rape of Helen, is the earliest known mosaic with an artist's signature (Fig. 29). 175

¹⁷¹ Dunbabin (1999) 6.

¹⁷² On these mosaics, see Salzmann (1982) 14-20, Andronikos (1984) 42-4.

¹⁷³ Robertson (1982) 244-6.

¹⁷⁴ Thus Brecoulaki (2016) 676.

¹⁷⁵ On these mosaics, see Petsas (1965), Salzmann (1982) 28-30, 104-6, Dunbabin (1999) 12-16.

In their technical skill and in the opulence of their materials, these mosaics clearly outshine anything that came before them, even the royal mosaics of Aigai. The motifs of the mosaics (a hunt, Dionysius on a panther, mythological scenes) are of the sort any Macedonian might find appealing, and one need not posit any (now lost) mosaics from the palace above to serve as a precedent. At Aigai, the palace designer took inspiration from the floors of private citizens. Perhaps the owners of the Pella houses were innovators in their own right, collaborators with the king in the development of new ways to fritter away the spear-won gold of Alexander. Certainly, there was a widespread interest in the more painterly style embodied in the Pella mosaics. In the later third century, some Rhodian homeowners commissioned pebble mosaics making use of some of the same techniques employed at Pella. 177

It was probably the pursuit of painting-like mosaics that led to the development of figural tessellation in addition to the use of *tesserae* for geometric form. During the course of the third century, pebble mosaics gave way to tessellated mosaics made of small glass *tesserae* that allowed for more detail and color. Some extremely fine examples of this form of mosaic survive from palaces IV and V in Pergamon (Fig. 30). According to Pliny, the one of the most renowned mosaicists of all time was a Pergamene named Soso (*HN* 36.184). Soso's 'unswept room' (*asarotos oikos*) mosaic of a debris-laden floor and his mosaic of doves bathing spawned so many imitations that they became sub-genres in their own right. It is possible that the originals of these famous works were also in the Pergamene

¹⁷⁶ Pollitt (2006) 213-14.

¹⁷⁷ Dunbabin (1999) 16.

¹⁷⁸ For the transition from pebbles to *tesserae*, see Dunbabin (1999) 18-37, and Westgate (2012) 191-5.

palaces.¹⁷⁹ Alexandria, too, was probably a center of mosaic production. A mosaic from Thumis, depicting either a personified Alexandria or Arsinoe II, is of such astonishing quality that Dunbabin has speculated that it must have belonged in a royal residence.¹⁸⁰ In 1993, excavations for the modern Library of Alexandria uncovered more high quality mosaics in what was once the *basileia* of the ancient city (Fig. 31).¹⁸¹

Who among the Greeks was the first to create such mosaics is still a hotly debated question. Some have (unsurprisingly) argued for Alexandria. Others have pointed to Sicily, or to mainland Greece. In her recent discussion of the question, Westgate concludes that tessellated mosaics may have had multiple points of origin, with royal courts being at the forefront. The existence of early "transitional" forms (using tesserae and pebbles or marble chips) in private houses in both Sicily and mainland Greece suggest that, even if kings were the source of innovation in this instance, they were pursued very closely by non-royal notables. It is also worth noting that high quality, figural pebble mosaics like those at Pella were enormously expensive. 184 It may be that tesserae were originally developed as an alternative method to gain the detail of such mosaics at less expense. In that case, one would expect exactly what we find, which is a variety of early and transitional mosaics in non-palatial contexts. Kings and the very wealthy would have been comparative latecomers,

¹⁷⁹ On the Pergamene mosaics, see Pollitt (1986) 222, Hardiman (2017).

¹⁸⁰ Dunbabin (1999) 25-6.

¹⁸¹ Guimer-Sorbets (2004), McKenzie (2007) 66-71.

¹⁸² Stewart (2006) 177-8, Westgate (2012) 194. The Carthaginians were the first to use *tesserae*, but they confined themselves to simple geometric designs.

¹⁸³ For the various parties in the controversy, see Westgate (2012) 191-5. Dunbabin (1999) 18-23 likewise concludes that there is no satisfactory single origin point for the practice.

¹⁸⁴ Dunbabin (1999) 16. Such mosaics were labor intensive, requiring as they did the careful selection of natural stones and the creation of lead and ceramic strips to outline figures.

using *tesserae* only when it became apparent that they could surpass pebbles in detail and vibrancy.

examples have been found at Delos alone. Like peristyle courtyards, mosaics were *sine qua non* for fine homes, so that even men who could not afford the highest caliber of work tried to have at least something. Of the hundreds of mosaics at Delos, only twenty-five are figural, and these are clustered in a few opulent homes. He for the mosaics on the island rival in quality the work found in Alexandria and Pergamum. He many others fall short of that lofty standard. Although large, the mosaics in the House of the Masks are of relatively lower quality. The *tesserae* used throughout the house are coarse. In one mosaic they are made from recycled glass bottles. The only figural mosaic (of the eponymous masks) is poorly executed. All of this has led Ruth Westgate to conclude that owner of the House of Masks was attempting to "keep up with the Joneses" by commissioning mosaics, despite the fact he could not afford to have them done well. The multitude of other simple geometric mosaics at Delos testifies to the fact that, by the Late Hellenistic period, many other homeowners felt the need to include at least some modest mosaics in their homes.

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¹⁸⁵ On these mosaics, see Bruneau (1972). Wurmser (2010) 16 rightly observes that, while the absolute number of mosaics at Delos is large, proportionately the number of floors that have mosaics is small. Not including smaller units (which were possibly apartments), approximately 40% of Delian homes had mosaics of some sort (Westgate [2010] 517 n. 143).

¹⁸⁶ Dunbabin (1999) 30.

¹⁸⁷ Bruneau (1972) 32-5.

¹⁸⁸ Westgate (2010) 508. Cf. Bruneau (1972) 232-60. Dunbabin (1999) 35 also notes the low quality of these mosaics.

¹⁸⁹ During the third and second centuries, pebble mosaics decline in quality. These coarser pebble mosaics may have been a low cost alternative to tessellated mosaics (Dunbabin [1999] 16-17).

What role did opulent royal palaces play in creating this mosaic fever? In the midsecond century, the Ptolemaic courtier Zenon ordered the mosaicists working on a bathhouse in Philadelphia in the Fayum to follow a model (paradeigma) sent from the royal court. 190 This, then, is indisputable evidence that non-royals did directly copy royal mosaics. Yet one wonders whether such assiduous imitation occurred in areas where the mosaicist's art was better established, or among people less closely connected to a royal court. Royal palaces saw more visitors than private homes did, so the mosaics in them were likely to be seen (and imitated) by greater numbers of people. Kings also had the money to create the most opulent of mosaics, and were probably either the creators or early adopters of innovations like opus vermiculatum (the use of extremely small tesserae to outline figures) that furthered the painterliness of mosaics. In this sense, then, kings were critical to the development of mosaics. 191 But they were not the sole drivers of the art. The finest pebble mosaics of the fourth century and earliest tessellated mosaics of the third are not linked to royal palaces. Mosaics represent an area of mutual innovation between kings and subjects, wherein each strove for a common goal of trompe-l'æil mosaics and shared a common repertoire of motifs. 192

It was the Romans who began to ship marble and other costly building stones on a truly great scale. Hellenistic buildings, be they ever so grand, were more often than not

¹⁹⁰ P. Cairo Zen. 59665. Cf. Daszewski (1985) 6-14, Dunbabin (1999) 23, 278.

¹⁹¹ Thus the examples discussed above (p. 111-12) of probable royal originals at Alexandria (Thumis) and Pergamum seem likely.

¹⁹² On the shared motifs of royal and non-royal mosaics, see Westgate (2010) 514. Non-royals did not reflexively copy royal motifs. Zanker (1993) has seen in the grave *stelai* of Smyrna a conscious rejection of the royal imagery prevalent in nearby Pergamum, while Smith (1993) sees a similar deliberate distinction between royal and non-royal portraiture. The similarity in mosaic motifs means that kings are commissioning art in a style their Greek subjects find acceptable.

constructed of locally available stone and brick.¹⁹³ Kings, however, did use rare stones and precious metal for embellishment. Pliny the Elder has it that King Mausolus of Halicarnassus was the first to cover the brick walls of his palace with marble slabs (Plin. *HN* 36.6). The Macedonian kings at Aigai followed his example by incorporating some marble decorative elements.¹⁹⁴ Greater ostentation followed after Alexander's conquests. Alexander himself made use of columns decorated with gems in his pavilion at Susa (Ath. 12.538c-d).

Of his Successors, we know the most about the habits of the Ptolemies. The pleasure-barge *Thalamegos* had columns covered in gold and ivory in its main dining hall, and columns of imported Indian stone in a smaller hall (Ath. 5.205B-E). Lucan describes gilded roof-beams, agate columns, and emerald-studded doors in the palace at Alexandria (10.111-16). His account may very well be exaggerated. But excavations at the *Horti Lamiani* in Rome have revealed over 400 gems that may have once adorned walls and columns, and images of gem-encrusted columns (*columnae caelatae*) survive in Italian villas. ¹⁹⁵ It is therefore not inconceivable that the palace of the richest of the Hellenistic kingdoms contained similar wonders. Our knowledge of such practices in other palaces is limited. The Commagenian palace at Samosata had gilded column capitals, while Herod's Jerusalem palace made use of many different types of (presumably imported) stone (Joseph. *BJ* 5.4.4). Once more, one suspects that the palaces of greater kingdoms were even more ornate.

Painting

¹⁹³ Russell (2013); Ward-Perkins (1992).

¹⁹⁴ Stewart (2006) 160.

¹⁹⁵ Lapatin (2015) 119-21.

A simple coat of plaster offered a less costly way to decorate a room, and thus one that was practiced at an earlier date, and by a much broader swath of the population. We find in Classical Olynthus several houses with rooms where the walls were coated in monochromatic plaster. Those who could afford to do so often opted to paint the walls of important rooms to resemble ashlar masonry. This Masonry Style combined paint and plaster molding to imitate the architectural forms of public architecture (Fig. 32). Like the peristyle courtyard, Masonry Style appears to have begun in the later fifth century and grown steadily in popularity during the fourth. Examples can be found at Olynthus, Eretria, and elsewhere. 198

Even if kings did occasionally make use of expensive stonework in their décor, very often they followed the practice of other wealthy men and use paint and stucco to imitate expensive stonework. Evidence for the practice comes from Pergamum Palaces IV and V, as well as the Samosata palace. ¹⁹⁹ Given the absolute ubiquity of the practice in both the Classical and the Hellenistic periods, it is certain that other palaces had similarly decorated walls as well. Figurative painting also may have played a larger role in palatial décor. Already at the close of the fifth century, the Macedonian king Archelaos (r. 413-399) had lured the most famous Greek painter of his day, Zeuxis, to Macedon, in order to paint his palace (Ael. *VH* 19.17). The walls of fourth-century tombs in Macedon were adorned both with traditional Masonry Style painting and with figurative works. ²⁰⁰ Kings also undoubtedly made use of *pinakes* as well. We know that Ptolemy II, for example, displayed a hundred

¹⁹⁶ Brecoulaki (2016) 673.

¹⁹⁷ For an overview, see Walter-Karydi (1998) 33-56.

¹⁹⁸ Olynthus: Brecoulaki (2016) 379. Eretria: Westgate (2010) 498. Other sites (including as far afield as Panticapaeum in Crimea): Walter-Karydi (1998) 51-5.

¹⁹⁹ Pergamum: Lawrence (1996) 187. Samosata: Kopsacheili (2011) 24-5.

²⁰⁰ Andronikos (1984) 86-96, 106-119. Brecoulaki (2011).

paintings by masters of the Sicyonian school, in addition to other portraits, in his famous banqueting pavilion (Ath. 5.196E).

Hellenistic homeowners shared with their Classical predecessors and their royal contemporaries a fondness for the Masonry Style. Examples have been found from Sicily to Olbia, from the rock-cut tombs of Alexandria to the lofty homes of Pella.²⁰¹ Given its wide geographic spread, the style maintained remarkable coherence, with little change from the fourth century to the end of the second. Towards the end of the second or the beginning of the first century, figural elements became more commonplace, especially in the frieze band in the middle of the wall. This is the beginning of the so-called Second Pompeian Style, multiple examples of which can be found in the finer Delian homes. ²⁰² In more modest Delian residences, Masonry Style was imitated by simple lines sketched on white walls, yet another indication of widespread interest in luxurious modes of life, even from those who could not afford them.²⁰³ But one should not press the role of palaces in setting the standard for mural artwork too far. The Masonry style, after all, predated Hellenistic kings and outlasted them. And even during the Hellenistic period, homeowners could adopt patterns that imitated non-palatial buildings, just as they could make the entrances of their homes echo temples. 204 Best, perhaps, to see this style of wall-painting as a shared expression of tryphē, defined more by its ubiquity and consistency than any imitative shifts.

Sculpture

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²⁰¹ For overviews, see Andreou (1989), Brecoulaki (2016) 679-83.

²⁰² Alabe and Bezerra de Meneses (2005) 119-20. Cf. Bezerra de Meneses (1984), Tang (2005) 44-9.

²⁰³ Alabe and Bezerra de Meneses (2005) 116.

²⁰⁴ The molded stucco entablature of Room K in the House of the Trident in Delos, for example, seems to be a specific imitation of the portico of Antigonus Gonatas at the Delian shrine to Apollo (Westgate [2010] 506).

Sculpture, by contrast, played a more limited role in the domestic décor of the Classical period. Unlike painting, mosaics, and textiles, sculpture was rarely considered to be part of *tryphē*. ²⁰⁵ Perhaps this is because, in the Late Classical home, sculpture almost invariably served a religious purpose. ²⁰⁶ It also tended to be rather modest. Marble was in use, but not as common as terracotta. No domestic sculpture was larger than life size. Wall art, such as board paintings (*pinakes*) or terracotta reliefs, might also have served a religious purpose. ²⁰⁷ This did not, however, prevent such objects from also being decorative. At the House of the Mosaics in Eretria, at least one *andron* was decorated with terracotta reliefs, and the courtyard featured an elaborate (and non-functioning) set of terracotta spigots fashioned to resemble animals. The courtyard was also decorated with faux Panathenaic amphorae. ²⁰⁸

Like other wealthy men, kings used sculpture to decorate their homes. Christian Kunze has already discussed the subject of palatial sculptures in some detail, and this work need not be repeated here.²⁰⁹ For our purposes, it is important to note that sculptural decoration was widespread (fragments of sculpture have been found at Aigai, Pella, Demetrias, Pergamon, Alexandria, and Samosata).²¹⁰ As with earlier domestic sculpture, these sculptures frequently had cultic significance. At Aigai, sculptural fragments were found in a tholos room that almost certainly had a religious purpose.²¹¹ Other sculptures were more

²⁰⁵ Harward (1982) 57-79.

²⁰⁶ Harward (1982) 80-102, Walter-Karydi (1998) 68-70.

²⁰⁷ Walter-Karydi (1998) 50-2.

²⁰⁸ Ducrey, Metzger, and Reber (1993) 118-24 (terracottas), 104-5 (amphorae). On the latter, see Westgate (2010) 504.

²⁰⁹ Kunze (1996). Cf. Barr-Sharrar (1987).

²¹⁰ Aigai, Pella, Pergamum: Kunze (1996) 116-23. Demetrias: Batziou-Efstathiou (2002) 28. Alexandria: Stewart (2006) 181. Samosata: Kopsacheili (2011) 24-5.

²¹¹ On this room, see Nielsen (1994) 22-3, Saatsoglou-Paliadeli (2001) 202-4.

obviously in the public eye. At Pella, statues might have lined the northern wall of Peristyle II in niches. At Pergamum, they probably decorated the *andrones* of the royal palaces. ²¹² In addition to the more traditional motifs of statuary, kings had statues of themselves and their ancestors in their palaces. Thus we find in the palatial ship of Ptolemy IV not only a shrine with a marble statue of the goddess Aphrodite, but also a bejeweled nook in one of the dining cabins, containing portrait statues of the royal family in Parian marble (Ath. 5.205D-F). The central courtyard of the Demetrias palace had the base of a naval monument, perhaps representing Demetrius Poliorcetes as both naval commander and *oikistes* of the city below. ²¹³ At Samosata, a limestone bust of Antiochus I of Commagene has been uncovered. ²¹⁴ Such domestic portraiture seems to have been a royal innovation.

The relationship between palatial and private sculptural decoration is difficult to prove. Examples of domestic sculpture have been found throughout the Hellenistic world, at Priene, Rhodes, Eretria, and Pella. And some of these finds are suggestive: at Priene, the fragments of thirteen marble statues were found in four houses, alongside fragments of many terracotta figures. Some of these terracottas were perhaps painted to imitate bronze, and one, a female bust, may have been a portrait. But the wide geographic and temporal scope of this evidence limits the conclusions that can be drawn from it (the Priene evidence alone can only be approximately dated to c.350- c. 125 BC).

²¹² Kunze (1996) 116-17, 122-3.

²¹³ Batziou-Efstathiou (2002) 28.

²¹⁴ Kosacheili (2011) 24-5.

²¹⁵ For an overview, see Hardiman (2005) 60-134.

²¹⁶ Harward (1982) 203-9, Uhlenbrock (1990) 78, Sanders (2001) 8-9.

A much larger and more focused set of domestic sculptures comes from Delos. Some 260 statues, portraits and reliefs survive from Delian houses. ²¹⁷ Many of these statues are small, and of middling quality. Many also have obvious religious significance. In these respects, little has changed from late Classical domestic sculpture. In other houses, however, we find evidence of change. For example, there is unequivocal evidence at Delos of domestic portraiture. The most famous example comes from the House of Cleopatra and Dioscourides, where two full-sized marble statues of the homeowners greeted guests as they entered the courtyard (Fig. 33). The House of Diadoumenos counted among its sculptures five portrait heads and a greater than life-size nude portrait, the so called "Pseudo-Athlete." The House of Diadoumenos got its modern name from a copy of the Diadoumenos of Polyclitus (a fifth-century sculptor) found within it. An interest in such classical imitations appears to have been widespread on Delos, and copies of other famous works have been found in other houses. ²¹⁹

The number and placement of sculptures in some houses also suggests that their purpose may have gone beyond the purely votive. Some 36 sculptures were found in the House of the Herm alone. Careful consideration seems to have been given to their placement, so that statues of especially fine quality or large size were easily visible. Something similar occurred at the House of Cleopatra and Dioscourides. According to Chammonard, the courtyard of the house is a "plan confus," wherein the awkward location of

²¹⁷ On these statues, see Michalowski (1932), Kreeb (1988), Marcadé (1996), and Sanders (2001).

²¹⁸ The status of the House of Diadoumenos as a domestic residences has been disputed, not least because of the quality of the sculpture found within it. See Sanders (2001) 57-60 for an overview of the debate. The arguments for non-domestic use seem to me unpersuasive, and, as Sanders observes, it is hard to see how and why such large statues would be removed from other contexts after the destruction of Delos and placed here.

²¹⁹ Bruneau (2005) 104.

²²⁰ Brecoulaki (2016) 685.

²²¹ Kreeb (1988) 47-50.

the entrance ruins the impressive effect of the peristyle (fig. 34).²²² By placing portraits of themselves at the end of the entrance hall, the homeowners drew the eye of visitors to an impressive display, despite the ungainly layout of the house.²²³ Certainly cultic statues, too, could function as such eye-catching displays. The figure of Artemis in House Th. III S was centrally located on the northern edge of the courtyard, where it was the first thing entering visitors saw.²²⁴ Piety and aesthetic beauty thus worked in cooperation with one another. Even mundane votive sculptures could be used to convey information about their owner's status. There are 37 marble herms and 36 terracotta herms from domestic contexts of Delos. Of these, approximately half of the marble herms are of a youthful, beardless divinity, while only three of the humbler terracotta ones are. The marble herms probably imitate those found in gymnasia. Their use in homes was a way for homeowners to express their association with the gymnasium, and thus their membership in the upper, gymnasial, class.²²⁵

The Delian homes exhibit uses of domestic sculpture that are strikingly different from those of houses from late Classical sites, such as Olynthus. Life-size or larger than life marble statues, sizable numbers of statues, an emphasis on collecting imitations of famous works, and the incorporation of portraiture are all Hellenistic innovations. Yet the late context of the Delian homes raises the possibility that it is Roman, and not kingly, sensibilities that have changed how homeowners use sculpture. Rome, after all, had a

²²² Chammonard (1922-4) 39-41. The problem may have arisen from the fact that the house was initially multiple residences later combined together.

²²³ Kreeb (1988) 17-18.

²²⁴ Kreeb (1988) 34-5.

²²⁵ Sanders (2001) 90-3. Athletic symbolism was already part of the decoration of Classical homes (recall the fake Panathenaic amphorae in the House of Mosaics at Eretria [above, p. 118). At Delos, the House of the Trident, with its mosaic of a Panathenaic amphorae and an exedra modelled upon those of gymnasia, is a testament to the continuation of this interest in the Hellenistic period (Westgate [2010] 506-7). The mosaic amphorae commemorate a chariot racing victory, a contest probably too expensive for the homeowner and one dominated in the Hellenistic period by kings.

developed tradition of domestic portraiture, and wealthy Romans had long been interested in collecting Greek art.²²⁶ It seems likely that homeowners in a cosmopolitan city such as Delos would be receptive to a variety of different traditions, and there is no reason to think that both Roman and royal precedents did not inspire them. The heroically nude Pseudo-Athlete of the House of Diadoumenos looks remarkably similar to earlier royal portraits, and it is at least possible that the tradition of domestic portraits in the Greek world began with Hellenistic kings.²²⁷ More generally, Delian homeowners and kings used sculpture in similar ways, placing it carefully in courtyards to direct the eye and adorning their finest rooms with it.²²⁸ The increased use of sculpture to adorn residences and convey the status of the owner seems to be a broader development of the Hellenistic period, one shared by royals and non-royals alike.

Furniture

About furniture and textiles we can say very little because of the lack of surviving evidence. On the one hand, there are some indications that furniture was rather plain. When the household goods of Alcibiades and his friends were auctioned off in the wake of the scandal of the herms, the most expensive furnishings (Milesian couches) went for a mere 8 drachmas each.²²⁹ On the other hand, there is literary evidence for the use of ivory inlays in couches (Demosthenes' father, for instance, owned a furniture workshop that used about two *minai* worth of ivory a month).²³⁰ Textiles were a sign of oriental pomp and luxury (Cf.

²²⁶ On Hellenistic art collecting, see Miles (2014).

²²⁷ Thus Hallett (1993) 145-7.

²²⁸ A point raised by Kreeb (1988) for Delos and more generally by Hardiman (2005), who argues that sculpture in the Hellenistic period was largely intended to show the wealth and taste of the homeowner.

²²⁹ Pritchett (1956) presents the original stelai. More recent discussions at Braund (1994), Davidson (2012).

²³⁰ Dem. 27.1.9-10. Aelian (*VH* 3.2) claims that the citizens of Acragas in Sicily made couches of solid ivory. Macedonian tombs from the fourth century frequently contained couches with gold and ivory inlays

Aesch. *Ag.* 783-974), but no examples survive outside of the tombs of Vergina. For the southern Greek world, the best one can say is that rugs, tapestries, couch covers, and pillows were all used to add to the luxuriousness of *andrones*.²³¹ The dishware, too, might add to the *tryphē* of the *andron*. Metal dishes were frequently displayed in an open wooden cabinet (*kylikeion*). So essential was such an object to the Macedonian nobleman that in the fourth-century tomb of Agios Athanasios we find a fresco of one fully burdened with sympotic ware.²³²

It was probably in furniture and textiles that royal *tryphē* found its fullest expression. As in private homes, little survives of royal textiles in palaces. But the luxurious purple and gold fabrics found in Macedonian tombs are likely to echo the types of goods found in royal palaces. At his wedding feast at Susa, Alexander the Great dined in a pavilion with purple carpets and tapestries shot through with spun gold (Ath. 12.238D). The pavilion of Ptolemy II was decorated somewhat eclectically with Phoenician curtains, the pelts of exotic animals, and cloaks bearing images of the king. His guest walked upon Persian carpets, and their couches were draped with purple coverlets (Ath. 5.196B-197B). In one of Theocritus' *Idylls*, two chatty Alexandrian women go to the royal palace during the Festival of Adonis, and comment on the high quality of the tapestries (15.78-86). Their immediate fixation upon a

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⁽Andrianou [2009] 127). But the funerary context of these finds and possibility of differing habits between Macedon and Greece prevent these finds from being used as evidence for Greek custom.

²³¹ Cf. Walter-Karydi (1998) 72-9, Andrianou (2009) 90-100, Brecoulaki (2016) 688-9.

²³² Tsimbidou-Avloniti (2006). Cf. Lapatin (2015) 6-7.

'feminine' art form is, no doubt, intended to be part of the humor of the piece.²³³ But it probably does reflect an actual form of palatial decoration, now almost wholly lost to us.²³⁴

Similarly, while no royal furniture survives *in situ*, the Macedonian tombs of the fourth century and our literary evidence give a sense of how such furniture must have looked. Couches inlaid with ivory or plated with precious metals have been found in no fewer than twelve Macedonian tombs.²³⁵ The (alleged) Tomb of Philip II has revealed an especially resplendent example painted with costly pigments and inlaid with gold, ivory, and glass.²³⁶ The funerary context of these finds might make one hesitant to infer that similar luxury was employed in the feasts of the living. But from the days of Alexander onwards, our literary sources provide evidence for furniture of the same or greater opulence being used in royal courts.²³⁷ Alexander dined at Susa on a couch with gold feet (Ath. 12.238C). The pavilion of Ptolemy II had 100 couches with golden feet, each of which was accompanied by two golden tables. Another couch served as a platform for the display of golden dishware needed for the feast (Ath. 5.197B-C).

A lack of surviving material evidence limits what can be said about Hellenistic domestic furnishings. Plutarch reports that the Peloponnesians of the second century were in the habit of using purple couch covers (Phil. 3). Presumably Hellenistic homeowners followed in the footsteps of the Classical predecessors in incorporating at least some fine materials (ivory, silver, gold) into their furniture. But the effect royal $tryph\bar{e}$ had upon

²³³ In a like manner, Timaeus criticized Dionysius I of Syracuse for his 'effeminate' interest in tapestries and woven goods (Polyb. 12.24.3). Such interests were also used by Greek authors to feminize eastern monarchs (Gambato [2000]).

²³⁴ Lapatin (2015) 187-90.

²³⁵ Andrianou (2009) 127.

²³⁶ Becoulaki (2016) 689.

²³⁷ For an overview, see Vössing (2004) 114-29.

domestic display in this instance must remain unknown. Certainly, the use and display of costly dishware was a habit shared by both king and subject. The tombs of early Hellenistic Macedon abound with silver plate, much of it showing wear marks indicating prior use by the living. Alexis, a young man tries to impress his beloved by displaying his silver dishes (Ath. 6.230B-D). When he wished to characterize his political opponent Theocritus as an undeserving parvenu, the fourth century historian Theompompus of Chios wrote that Theocritus now drank from gold and silver vessels, though before he had possessed "only earthenware, and that sometimes chipped" (Ath. 6.230e-f). Dishes, in cabinets or on the table, were a critical component of the display of luxury. The difference between royal displays of dishware and other luxury goods, and their private analogues, was largely one of scale.

Conclusion

Indeed, by way of conclusion it ought to be said that royal palaces differ more generally from earlier non-royal residences in degree, not in kind. The grand peristyle courtyards of palaces were no doubt awe-inspiring, but they were ultimately a form of residence that kings had borrowed from other wealthy men and replicated on a vast scale. At Aigai, the square *andrones* capable of holding thirty couches do not differ fundamentally from their counter-parts in other houses capable of holding only eleven couches. The

²³⁸ Zimi (2011) 13.

²³⁹ On dishware (little of which survives outside of the context of Macedonian tombs), see Strong (1966). On the importance of metal dishware as status symbol, see Vikers (1986), Vickers and Gill (1994).

²⁴⁰ An excellent example of fine Hellenistic silverware comes from Morgantina in Sicily, where a horde of some 16 pieces of silver dishware (the Morgantina Treasure) dating from the mid- to late-third century BC was discovered. Cf. Stone (2015) 458-62.

mosaics on the floors, the Masonry Style painting on the walls, the sculpture in the courtyard, the textiles, fine furniture, and metal dishware: all of these have Classical precedents in private homes. Kings exhibited *tryphē* to an unprecedented degree, but they did so largely through forms of display already established by non-royals.

There are differences between palaces and other residences, to be sure. Even as early as Aigai, the royal palace possessed a degree of symmetry and exterior decoration unprecedented in domestic architecture. Such decoration, along with the conspicuous location of the royal palace, was meant to separate and distinguish the royal house from other structures. Later palaces contain features and rooms not found in later Classical period homes. Chief among these are the broad room and the garden, two innovations with clear Near Eastern antecedents. Royal palaces also do not abide by certain rules that seem to have curtailed luxurious decoration in Classical period homes. If Archelaus' hiring of Zeuxis is any indication, figural painting may have played a larger role in palatial wall decoration. Kings also had larger statues, and statues in types not found in earlier homes. As one would expect, they also seem to have been eager adopters of the new and more refined form of tessellated mosaics that arose in the Hellenistic period. Taken as a whole, however, the differences between Hellenistic palaces and earlier homes do not outweigh the similarities.

This did not need to be the case. The Greek house may have been the natural choice for Philip II to copy when building his palace at Aigai, but after Alexander brought the world under Macedon's spear, nothing prevented the later Successors from copying the infinitely more grandiose palaces of the Near East. And in the more distant domains of the Seleucids, one certainly finds palaces that do not look Greek. The palace at Aï-Khanoum and the

strategeion at Dura Europos both borrow heavily from non-Greek traditions.²⁴¹ But one cannot be sure of the degree to which local governors (the usual residents of such palaces) influenced the design of these residences.²⁴² Much more striking is the use of standard Greek peristyle architecture at Jebel Khalid in Syria, and at the Citadel Palace of Dura Europos, both of which seem to combine a Greek-peristyle southern half with a more traditionally Near-Eastern northern half. Even in lands far removed from Greece, Greek architectural norms dictated to a surprising degree how royals built their palaces.²⁴³ Later kings may have borrowed features, such as the broad room or the garden, from these ancient palaces, but they incorporated them into more traditional Greek peristyle houses.²⁴⁴ That kings largely continued to live in houses built in the Greek style is a testimony to the profound influence the culture of Greek elites continued to exert on Hellenistic kings.

Generally speaking, Hellenistic houses follow the pattern set by their Classical predecessors and royal contemporaries. Some features, such as rectangular dining rooms, tripartite room arrangements, or gardens, were likely adopted from palaces. Other features, such as the use of tessellated mosaics, develop almost simultaneously in royal and non-royal residences, so that no sure direction of imitation is certain. The only area in which private residences differed from their royal counterparts qualitatively (rather than in size and

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²⁴¹ Nielsen (1994) 117-28; Kopsacheili (2011) 22, 28.

²⁴² On this doubling, see Kosmin (2014) 223, Strootman (2014) 72.

²⁴³ According to Winter (2006) 168, palaces and other large residences in Seleucid domains retained more Greek forms and ideas than smaller residences did.

²⁴⁴ It is perhaps worth noting in this context that the palaces of Pergamum are entirely Hellenic in design, despite the model of a nearby Persian palace at Sardis (Kopsacheili [2011] 30). Some scholars (Nielsen [1996], Vössing [2004] 102-3, 113, Morgan [2017] 46-7) have suggested that the palaces of Antioch and Alexandria were heavily influenced by non-Hellenic designs. Unless further excavations reveal otherwise, this must remain speculation. But it seems to me more likely that the structures there were essentially Greek, with the occasional local appropriation, much in the way that Ptolemy IV's pleasure barge had an Egyptian-themed dining room with lotus columns tucked among its many more traditionally Hellenic halls (Ath. 205A-206B).

opulence), was in exterior decoration. There were pragmatic problems limiting private exterior décor. Oddly-shaped lots, closely buttressed by adjacent buildings, limited the space available to homeowners for such decoration, and must have made such decoration look absurd. In any event, exterior ornamentation was perhaps not that important as a display of wealth. If a man owned a 1200 m² house, no one believed he was poor just because the outside of the house was plain. Demosthenes' comparison of the indolent housing of his own era with the austere dignity of the early fifth century only works rhetorically if the great houses of Demosthenes' day were distinguishable from the outside (Dem. 3.25-9).

Finally, a word must be said about why wealthy men, particularly those with political ambitions, would want an opulent house. At first glance, it would seem that such a private extravagance would be antithetical to the model of the citizen-benefactor so prevalent in our inscriptional evidence. As Musonius Rufus wrote, "how much nobler than spending money for sticks and stones to spend it on men. How much more profitable than surrounding oneself with a great house to make many friends, the natural result of cheerfully doing good. What would one gain from a large and beautiful house comparable to what he would gain by conferring the benefits of his wealth upon the city and his fellow-citizens?" (Muson. Lecture 19 [Lutz ed.]). So, too, did Dio Chrysostom argue in a speech that "the decorating of the roofs, walls, and floor of houses, now with paints, now with precious stones, here with gold and there with ivory, and, again, with carving of the walls themselves — that as for these occupations, the best thing would be that cities should admit none of them at all" (Dio Chrys. *Or.* 17.117-18).

In reality, a fine house conferred substantial benefits upon its owner beyond the obvious ones of comfort and aesthetic pleasure. By publicly demonstrating his wealth, it

demonstrated his ability to act as a potential benefactor or magistrate. It also showed his commitment to the city as his residence: no small thing in a peripatetic age, in which wealthy men often migrated to courts and capital cities. It also provided a node for his political endeavors. When the soon-to-be-tyrant Athenion returned to Athens from the court of Mithridates VI, he went immediately to the house of Dies, a rich Athenian, to confer with his allies before addressing the assembly (Poseidonius F36=Ath. 5.212C). As we shall see in a subsequent chapter, inter-city diplomacy was a crucial component of elite benefaction. A man who acted as host for the various embassies that came to his city could forge important connections with his peers abroad. But to be a host required a large, elegant house, lest a man give his foreign guests the impression that he was a boor and his city was impoverished. Far from being a sign of a retreat to a 'private' life, a well-appointed home was an integral part of a rich man's public persona, a place where he could meet and entertain other notables; and it was a promise to the city at large of his commitment to the polis, capacity for benefaction, and ability to act as a representative of the community. Little wonder, then, that Theophrastus' Boastful Man attempts to pass off his rented house as the family mansion, and tells his guests that he means to sell it "as he finds it too small for his entertainments" (Char. 23 [7]). If anything, the politically ambitious notable wished to over-emphasize the luxuriousness of his house, even in the most democratic of cities.

Chapter 3: Royal *Tryphē* and Civic Ostentation: Jewelry, Clothes, and Aromatics

The complicated correlation between royal and civic housing leads one to suspect that a similar sort of reciprocity between king and subject may have existed in other areas of elite life. $Tryph\bar{e}$ was also associated with lavishness in dress, i.e., in the use of costly fabrics and dyes, jewelry, and perfume. If conspicuous ostentation was important to Hellenistic notables, one would expect to find evidence for this in the way that they (and their wives) dressed. Hellenistic notables did, in fact, make use of new materials, motifs, and techniques in their jewelry and garb. Not since the rich men of Ionia had gone about with golden grasshoppers in their hair had it been so easy to distinguish the wealthy man from his fellow citizens (Thuc. 1.6.3). By virtue of their near-limitless wealth, kings were naturally at the forefront of many of these flamboyant developments. But Indian gems, Phoenician purple, and Syrian perfume had long enchanted the wealthy men of Greece. Rather than seeing Hellenistic notables following in the footsteps of kings, we ought to see both kings and subjects making use of the increased abundance of certain types of luxury goods following Alexander's conquests. In so doing, they legitimized the use of such goods for one another in the face of philosophical claims that luxury led to softness and emasculation.

A palatial home and lavish parties allowed a man to show off to a relatively small group of guests. A purple cloak and an emerald ring, by contrast, told everyone he met that he was wealthy. Costume was, therefore, a critical means of displaying $tryph\bar{e}$, and it is little wonder that it was one of the most frequent targets of sumptuary laws in antiquity. Unfortunately, the material evidence for luxury in this area is limited. Ancient textiles do not

¹ Mills (1984), Bernhardt (2003) 249-51.

survive in any quantity, while perfumes and unguents were, by their very nature, ephemeral (although for these we do have the proxy evidence in the form of perfume and ointment jars). Jewelry is the one area of opulent dress where some quantity of material evidence does survive. It therefore seems best to start our discussion there, and then turn towards those areas that rely more heavily on literary evidence. This chapter will then conclude with a more general discussion of the role (and value) of luxurious display in civic life.

Jewelry and Gemstones

Both men and women wore jewelry.² Men wore finger rings: of gold if they could afford it, of bronze if not. Typically, the rings were of plain metal, often decorated with figural work. Some might incorporate semi-precious stones, carved so that they might serve as seals. The art of crafting such gems (known as intaglios) was heavily indebted to Eastern and especially Egyptian antecedents. Even into the late Classical period, Greek men flaunted scaraboid gems that differed little from their Pharaonic antecedents.³ Such rings were an obvious sign of luxury. Aristophanes mocked young men with onyx-laden fingers, and Plato was said to have criticized Aristotle for wearing multiple rings (Ar. *Nub.* 371-2; Ael. *VH* 3.19). Extremely wealthy men may have also worn golden wreaths on special occasions. A large number of such wreaths have been found in tombs across the Greek world, and especially in Macedon (Fig. 35).⁴ Many of these funerary wreaths are too fragile to have been worn by the living. But literary sources attest to the use of gold wreaths at festivals

² Overviews at Richter (1968), Coarelli (1970) 66-84, Higgins (1980) 121-35, Deppert-Lippitz (1985) 161-199, Williams and Ogden (1994), Boardman and Wagner (2012) 201-6, Lee (2015) 140-54.

³ Boardman (2001) 191-3, 206.

⁴ See Deppert-Lippitz (1985) 196 for discussion of Classical period Greek examples. The various Macedonian wreathes are discussed at Grammenos (2008) 117, 119, 128, 138, 151, 160, 174, 179, 204, 209, 223, 260, and 293. Blech (1982) discusses the use of gold wreaths in funerary, votive, and athletic settings (91-2, 298, 143).

(Demosthenes, for instance, once equipped a chorus with them).⁵ In the Hellenistic period, kings gave golden wreaths to their dinner guests, and it is possible that the wealthy were wearing them on similar occasions well before this time (Just. 18.2).

In contrast to the relatively limited jewelry options for men, wealthy women of the mid-to-late fourth century might wear a veritable golden panoply. Tomb finds from Macedon include diadems, necklaces, earrings, armbands and bracelets (often matching the diadem and necklace to form a set), finger rings, thigh bands, hairnets, brooches, and belts. Women, too, had to adhere to certain conventions when wearing jewelry (these are often lumped by our sources with restrictions on clothing, so they will be discussed below in conjunction with that topic). The variety and quantity of female jewelry shows that jewelry was, generally, the province of women. Like the finger rings worn by men, female jewelry was heavily indebted in its forms and motifs to Eastern antecedents. Many bracelets and earrings, for example, end in animal head terminals like those of Persian jewelry. 8 The custom of wearing matching sets of jewelry may have been a Persian borrowing as well.⁹ It is perhaps unsurprising that this most luxurious of art forms should borrow from an empire long considered by the Greeks to be the most luxurious in the world. In one key area of opulence, however, Greek and Persian custom differed. For, while Persian women had long worn jewelry glittering with gems and colorful enamel, the resplendent ensemble of a wealthy Greek woman was almost entirely monochrome. The Greeks of the fourth century used

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⁵ Dem. 21.16. Hellenistic laws establishing appropriate sacerdotal attire for priests often specify that priests may wear golden wreaths (Reinhold [1970] 36 n.3).

⁶ Hoffmann and Davidson (1965) 4-10. Cf. Grammenos (2008), Kottaridi (2011c) for more recent discussions of jewelry finds.

⁷ Lee (2015) 140.

⁸ Deppert-Lippitz (1985) 208-9.

⁹ Hoffmann and Davidson (1965) 2-3.

gems and colored glass only in finger rings, relying upon figural decoration (and the natural luster of the metal) to ennoble other pieces of jewelry.¹⁰

Alexander's conquest changed jewelry in three ways. First, by releasing the treasury of the Persian king into the Mediterranean economy, Alexander vastly increased the amount of gold available for making into jewelry. Macedonian jewelry finds exhibit a late fourth/early third century spike that coincides with a spike in the amount of silver dishware deposited in tombs. Both spikes can probably be attributed to the return of veterans from Alexander's wars. Returning Greek veterans probably also counted jewelry among their portable wealth. A horde discovered near Corinth, for instance, containing coins from Philip II and Alexander and a golden necklace, might have been the treasure cache of a returning veteran. Alexander's conquests also increased the quantity and variety of precious stones available to Mediterranean buyers. New gemstones, such as emeralds and sapphires, glittered upon Greek fingers for the first time. And stones once exceedingly rare, such as amethyst, garnet, beryl, topaz, and zircon, now entered the agoras of the Greek world in some quantity. Alexander is conquested in some

At first, this influx of gold and precious stones had little effect on the form of jewelry. Early Hellenistic jewelry looks much like the jewelry of the Late Classical period. ¹⁵ The greatest difference is an increased interest in Eastern motifs. The already popular animal head terminals increase in their number and variety, so that now ibex, lynx, and antelope

¹⁰ Deppert-Lippitz (1985) 209.

¹¹ Higgins (1980) 153-4.

¹² Miller (1996) 38, Touratsoglou (1998) 35-6. On the dishes, see Drougou (2011) 185, Zimi (2011) 1-13.

¹³ Williams (2003) 234-5.

¹⁴ Higgins (1980) 155, Boardman and Wagner (2012) 215, Lapatin (2015), 110. On the use of particular stones, see the entries in Ogden (1982) and, where relevant, the commentary of Caley and Richards (1956).

¹⁵ Deppert-Lippitz (1985) 206-7.

heads, among others, stare out from Greek bracelets and earrings (Fig. 36). And new motifs enter the Greek world for the first time. The Herakles knot, long known to Egyptian jewelers and rumored to have apotropaic properties, becomes almost ubiquitous in Greek jewelry from the time of Alexander onwards, serving as the centerpiece for diadems, necklaces, and bracelets. Crescent moon pendants, of a type long fashionable in Asia, become a popular motif in Greek jewelry as well. In the post-Alexander world, Eastern motifs were clearly in vogue among the well-to-do. One thinks of Theophrastus' Boastful Man, who went about "contending that the Asiatic artists are superior to those of Europe" despite never having left Attica (*Char.* 23[7]).

Other major developments occurred in the realm of gem-cutting. In the Classical period, engravers cut images into the flat side of the scaraboid-shaped stones. In the Early Hellenistic period, they began carving on the round side of the stone, allowing for deeper cuts, better detail, and the creation of crisper seals.¹⁹ Eventually the scaraboid form was dropped entirely in favor of a variety of different (usually rounded) styles that "have more in common with what follows than what went before."²⁰ In the third century, an entirely new form of gem carving arose to complement these intaglios. These were the cameos, or gems with the image in relief, i.e., extending out from the stone (Fig. 37).²¹ Such gems were purely ornamental (unlike intaglios, which could be used as a seal). The image and the background were done in contrasting colors. In the best examples, this meant using a banded

¹⁶ Deppert-Lippitz (1985) 208-9. Lion head terminals had predominated in the Classical Period (Lee [2015] 150).

¹⁷ Deppert-Lippitz (1985) 201, Pfrommer (2001) 20-3, Lee (2015) 135-6.

¹⁸ Higgins (1980) 154.

¹⁹ Boardman (2001) 360-1.

²⁰ Boardman (2001) 359.

²¹ Boardman and Wagner (2012) 217, Lapatin (2015) 115.

stone, such as agate or onyx. Less costly variations might use colored glass to achieve much the same effect.

The late third and early second centuries also saw the introduction of other types of polychromy to jewelry beyond cameos. It was only a century after Alexander introduced new precious stones to the Greeks that Greek jewelers began placing such stones into jewelry other than finger rings.²² Once the experiment was made, it proved highly successful. The remaining centuries of the Hellenistic period feature what Stewart has labelled "chromatic extravagance." Gems and enamels gradually crowd out metallic decoration, to the point that the gold component of many later pieces serves mostly as a filigree holding the chromatic components together. Garnet was especially popular (Fig. 38). Already at the end of the fourth century, Theophrastus called garnet "the most valuable of stones" (*De Lapidibus* 18). The many surviving gold and garnet pieces of the subsequent centuries bear out the truth of his statement. Those who could afford to do so often paired emeralds with garnet, though the costliness of emeralds made this too expensive for many. Cornelian, amethyst, and clear quartz were also popular.

The polychromatic turn was merely one way in which later Hellenistic jewelry became more opulent. In the second century, jewelers begin to produce small (c. 3-4 cm) gold medallions with a bust of a divinity in the center. Some of these may have gone on necklaces, but others, with holes punched in all four corners, belonged in the center of a new

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²² Deppert-Lippitz (1985) 245.

²³ Stewart (2006) 179.

²⁴ Hoffman and Davidson (1965) 10, Deppert-Lippitz (1985) 280.

²⁵ Ogden (1982) 98.

²⁶ Cf. Caley and Richards (1956) 90 on the identification of the stone.

²⁷ Deppert-Lippitz (1985) 280.

²⁸ Cf. Higgins (1980) 155, Lapatin (2015) 108-11 for an overview.

type of elaborate hair net, often itself made of gold (Fig. 39).²⁹ Pearls, too, make their appearance in Greek jewelry for the first time in the second century.³⁰ Although late to be adopted, they quickly establish themselves as one of the most valuable of gems. Cleopatra VII allegedly dissolved a pearl worth ten million sesterces in vinegar and drank it (Macrob. *Sat.* 3.17.14-17; cf. Plin. *HN* 9.59). The author of the Gospel of Matthew thought that a merchant might sell all his possessions to acquire an especially valuable pearl (Matt. 13:45-6).

There were, then, two major transitional periods in Hellenistic jewelry. The first, in the late fourth and early third centuries, was marked by an uptick in gold jewelry production, and by the adoption of oriental motifs (the Heracles knot, the crescent moon pendent) that would retain their popularity for centuries. The second, in the late third and early second centuries, was marked by the introduction of cameos, polychrome jewelry, and new (expensive) styles.³¹ As in so many other areas of Hellenistic life, there existed a certain *koine* in jewelry, so that jewelry finds from Italy to Crimea have much in common.³² There was also a widespread imitation of expensive forms of jewelry in cheaper materials. For those who could not afford elaborately carved intaglios, more modest gems with simple, easily produced emblems were available. Glass could substitute for agate in cameos, and glass paste could add a touch of color even to inexpensive jewelry.³³ The vast quantity of imitative jewelry shows that a broad segment of the population wanted to participate in the

²⁹ Deppert-Lippitz (1985) 276-7, Boardman and Wagner (2012) 206. Gold hair nets are a Hellenistic innovation (Lee [2015] 145).

³⁰ Pfrommer (2001) 31-2.

³¹ Higgins (1980) 154, Deppert-Lippitz (1985) 245.

³² Coarelli (1970) 97, Higgins (1980) 153, Miller (1996) 39.

³³ Simple intaglios: Lapatin (2015) 113. Glass paste: Higgins (1980) 155.

cachet of fine jewelry, just as the lopsided peristyles and rough-cut tesserae of certain Delian homes show an interest across society in maintaining a fine house.

All of this imitation was necessary, of course, because both intaglios and cameos could be tremendously expensive. Dimitris Plantzos has estimated that a single high-quality intaglio could take a jeweler months to cut, adding a substantial labor charge over and above the cost of the stone itself.³⁴ Cameos required as much, if not more, skilled labor.³⁵ While it is difficult to gauge how much gemstones cost in antiquity, gem-studded jewelry almost certainly cost more than its pure precious metal equivalent. The polychrome profusion of the Hellenistic period must have therefore increased the difference between the highest and lowest grades of jewelry. The all-metal jewelry that represented the height of fashion in the Classical period was obtainable by a broader segment of the community than the bejeweled pieces that were de rigueur in the Hellenistic world. And polychrome jewelry is, by intention, highly noticeable. The magistrate's wife wearing a gold and garnet Heracles knot diadem will stand out more from her peers than one wearing a thin golden diadem of the type fashionable in centuries before. The Hellenistic period may have seen an increase in the quantity of jewelry, but it certainly saw an increase in the expense and vividness of jewelry, with the result that the highest caliber of jewelry did a better job of advertising its wearer's wealth than that of the Classical period.³⁷

What role did kings play in fostering all of this bejeweled magnificence? The royal tombs at Aigai testify to the long-standing interest of kings and queens in displaying their

³⁴ Plantzos (1999) 40.

³⁵ Lapatin (2015) 115.

³⁶ See Plantzos (1999) 105-8 for discussion.

³⁷ Thus Higgins (1980) 153-4, Deppert-Lippitz (1985) 205.

wealth through jewelry.³⁸ Later royals maintained this interest in jewelry. Gems, above all, were a subject worthy of a monarch's attention. Kings commissioned engraved gems, and frequently gave them to their philoi. The gem carver Pyrgoteles was one of the three artists Alexander the Great allowed to make portraits of him (Apul. Flor. 7; Plin. HN 37.4). A gift of a gem bearing the king's portrait seem to have been a token of especially high esteem. Thus Mithridates VI is said to have given the soon-to-be-tyrant of Athens Athenion just such a portrait gem (Ath. 5.212D-E). Ptolemy IX Euergetes II gave Lucullus an emerald bearing his royal visage, a gift Lucullus found especially awkward to refuse (Plut. Luc. 3.1). If the quantity of Ptolemaic portrait gems that survive is any indicator, the Ptolemies may have been especially fond of these types of gifts.³⁹ Kings also collected gems. Pyrrhus of Epirus possessed an agate whose natural veins supposedly formed a picture of Apollo and the nine muses. Pliny thought the stone so wondrous that he ranked it alongside the famed ring of Polycrates of Samos (Plin. HN 37.3). 40 The dactyliotheca (gem cabinet) of Mithridates VI graced the triumph of Pompey, and may have spurred on the later Roman craze for gem collecting (Plin. HN 37.5). Kings read about gems and occasionally wrote about them as well. One of the courtiers of Mithridates VI, Zachalias of Babylon, wrote a book on the magic properties of gems (Plin. HN 37.169). The late first-century BC kings Juba II of Mauretania and Archelaos of Cappadocia both wrote works on gemstones cited by Pliny the Elder.41

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³⁸ Higgins (1982).

³⁹ Plantzos (1999) 62-3. The emperor Claudius would similarly give rings bearing his image to favored courtiers (Plin. *HN* 33.41).

⁴⁰ On Polycrates, see Hdt. 3.41-2. It is interesting that such a gem is associated with Pyrrhus, a king who, because of his martial temper, was typically not associated with luxury (cf. Plut. *Pyrrh*. 8.1-3).

⁴¹ Plin. *N.H.* 37.24, 37, 46, 95. The Mithridates quoted by Pliny on amber (*HN* 37.39) need not be the famous king. The epigrams composed by either king Polemon I or II of Pontus on gems (*Anth. Pal.* 9.746, 11.38)

Queens also played an important royal in the collection and display of jewelry. Like other wealthy women, the women of the royal house could make use of a greater variety of jewelry in their costume than men could. A mural from Room H of the Villa of P. Fannius Synistor at Boscoreale shows what this costume might have entailed (Fig. 40). The mural portrays a seated cithara player with a younger girl standing behind her. It, and the other murals in the room, are thought to be copies of Hellenistic palatial originals, and the two women are thought to be members of a royal family (although which royal family precisely is a matter of debate). Both women wear diadems and earrings. The younger girl wears a plain metal ring, while the citharode wears a gemmed ring and matching bracelets. More elaborate jewelry might also be used by royal women. Stratonike, daughter of Demetrius I Poliorcetes and wife of Seleucus I, gave to Artemis, Apollo, and Leto at Delos three gold rings with carved gems and a necklace with forty-eight pendants. At 33 drachmae, one of the rings is the heaviest ring listed in the surviving Delian inventories.

Queens could also act as patrons of both the trade in physical gemstones and of poets writing about gemstones. Good evidence for this sort of behavior comes from the court of the Ptolemies. There, the Ptolemaic *philos* Philo won great favor with queen Berenike I when he brought her green stones (probably green peridot) from the island of Topazios in the Red Sea (Plin. *HN* 37.105-9). In the later second century, Ptolemy VIII Physcon sponsored a voyage to India that returned with gems and other goods. A second voyage was subsequently

merely use the stones as a starting point for larger poetic considerations and are not about gems in the manner of the works of Juba or Archelaos. See Plantzos (1999) 10, Prioux (2015) 69 for discussion.

⁴² Smith (1994) provides a good overview on the murals. He believes the women to be Antigonids. Pfrommer (2001) 122 takes the cithara player to be a young Berenike II.

⁴³ IG XI 2.287B, II. 69-70; IDélos 442 II. 184-5. Cf. Plantzos (1999) 17, Prêtre (2012) 133-4.

⁴⁴ Plantzos (1999) 108. Like the treasurers of other temples, the Delian treasurers weighed the jewelry under their care (as if it were bullion) and only very infrequently assigned it a value based upon the size of gems or the quality of the craftsmanship.

sponsored by his wife Cleopatra III after Physcon's death (Strabo 2.3.4). Queenly patronage might also lie behind the *Lithica* of Posidippus, a collection of epigrams about precious stones written during the reign of Ptolemy II. 45 In the first century BC, Cleopatra II Selene, wife of Juba II of Mauretania, may have commissioned another collection of lithic epigrams. 46

The Ptolemies may have been especially interested in precious stones, perhaps because their interests in East Africa and the Red Sea gave them an unmatchable advantage when it came to procuring them. But it is probable that all monarchs had at least some interest in such items. And this interest is one they shared with their wealthiest subjects, one that grew out of earlier Greek custom. Gem collecting was most assuredly a royal custom. But it was not confined to royals. From Pliny, for example, we hear of a fourth-century Theban gem collector and flute player, Ismenias, who sent his agents as far afield as Cyprus to procure gems (*HN* 37.6). So it goes with other types of royal jewelry display. The women of the Boscoreale mural are not dressed so ornately that one automatically assumes they are royal. Stratonike may have given the heaviest ring recorded in the Delian temple inventory, but she certainly did not give the only one. ⁴⁷ Royal habit, in other words, was not qualitatively different from the practice of others.

Hellenistic jewelry use provides a template that is broadly applicable to other aspects of luxurious dress. First, its use is contextualized in a way that allows for the display of wealth, while minimizing the possible dangers of acting luxuriously. For jewelry, this meant

 45 Bing (2005) 140, Kuttner (2005). On the *Lithica* more generally, see the relevant articles in Acosta-Hughes, Kosmetatou, and Baumbach (eds.) (2004) and Gutzwiller (ed.) 2005, along with Rush (2012) 26-60.

⁴⁶ Prioux (2015) 66.

⁴⁷ See Prêtre (2012) for a discussion of Delian jewelry donations, and Plantzos (1999) 12-17 for a general discussion of Hellenistic gems in temple inventories.

having the women of the household wear the most luxurious and expensive items. Second, jewelry in the Hellenistic period does seem to become more ostentatious over time. This is caused both by the availability of new materials (exotic stones), and also by the appropriation and development of new techniques (polychromy, cameos). This does not necessarily reflect a sea change in how Greeks regarded luxury: the debate over where, precisely, the line between moderation and excess lay, continued as it had in the Classical period and would in the Roman Empire. What has changed, however, is the gulf between what is available (and acceptable) for the very rich, and what others can afford. Finally, royals play an important role as consumers and displayers of luxury goods. Their patronage may, at times, have even been instrumental in the development of new technologies, or the importation of new products. But this patronage always occurs within a framework of what is mutually acceptable to both the king and his wealthy subjects. In other words, kings have great resources at their disposal, but take their cues about how to spend those resources from others.

Royal Regalia and Civic Clothing

While both kings and their subjects made extensive use of jewelry, clothing seems at first glance to be an area of divergence between the two groups. Even if they dwelt by the shores of the Nile or the Euphrates, kings wore the ancient costume of the Macedonians.⁴⁸ The three essential components of this were the *kausia*, a special sort of leather or felt hat, the *chlamys*, or military cloak, and the stout style of sandals known as *krepides*.⁴⁹ These three items, accompanied by a *chitōn*, or tunic, were what Alexander the Great wore, and

⁴⁸ Strootman (2014) 203-8.

⁴⁹ Saatsoglou-Paliadeli (1993).

Ptolemy the son of Mark Antony wore the same three items at the Donations of Alexandria when he became king of Syria, Cilicia, and Phoenicia. The outfit was simple enough to be worn by men of almost any station. Kings distinguished themselves further through a diadem of white wool (the only part of the royal costume to remain the exclusive province of kings) and through especially luxurious versions of the standard Macedonian gear. Thus, among the early Successors, the 'sea-wrought' (ἀλουργεῖς) kausia, so called because it was dyed with expensive Tyrian purple derived from sea snails, was a favorite. Indeed, after the diadem, purple cloth was probably the most important part of the royal costume. Cloth of gold was also strongly associated with monarchs. Demetrius Poliorcetes once wore a *chlamys* with golden stars woven into it (Ath. 12.535F-536A). Pliny the Elder knew such fabric as "Attalid cloth" (*attalicus*) (*HN* 8.74.96). Our evidence for later royal dress is poor, and it is possible that elements of the traditional Macedonian garb (such as the *kausia*) were dropped by certain dynasties. If this was the case, sumptuousness may have been the most important distinguishing characteristic of later royal clothing.

The Greek statesman, in his public face, took no part in any of this.⁵⁴ Instead of the *chlamys*, he wore a *himation*, a longer cloak that was elegantly draped over the body. No

⁵⁰ Alexander: Ephippos *FGrH* 126 F5. Ptolemy: Plut. *Ant.* 54.5-6.

⁵¹ On the importance of the diadem, see Ritter (1955), Smith (1988) 34-8. The diadem could be worn with a *kausia* (thus Ptolemy at the Donations wears a *kausia diadematophoros*).

⁵² Saatsoglou-Paliadeli (1993) 123-6. On purple dye, see below, pp. 151-5.

⁵³ See Ritter (1965) 61, Blum (1998) 234-7 for arguments that the *kausia* was dropped by monarchs outside of Macedon and Bactria. Such arguments are based on coins and other iconographic evidence, and therefore show only that the *kausia* may have lost its importance in one area of royal self-representation. Certainly the Donations of Alexandria show that the cap (and Macedonian garb generally) retained their symbolic charge even to the very end of the Hellenistic era. Kings also did not wear the same outfit everywhere: it is possible that distinctive Macedonian gear remained a critical part of the king's hunting or battlefield regalia, even in those kingdoms where it was not part of royal iconography. Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 184D-E.

⁵⁴ A book on Hellenistic clothing remains a *desideratum*. On Greek clothing more generally, the standard surveys are Evans (1893), Abrahams (1908), Åström and Gullberg (1970), Pekridou-Gorecki (1989), Losfeld (1991), and now Lee (2015).

other garment was strictly necessary. Those wishing to gain a reputation for old-fashioned austerity might go about in only a *himation*, as Demosthenes does in a famous Hellenistic portrait (Fig. 41). More frequently, however, men wore an under-tunic (*chitōn*) beneath the *himation*. This is the outfit worn by Dioscorides in his courtyard sculpture on Delos, and it is echoed in countless honorific statues from across the Hellenistic Mediterranean.⁵⁵

There were therefore significant distinctions between royal and civic ideals in public dress. The wealth would be a mistake to think that this difference resulted from a basic distinction between a courtly world governed by *tryphē* and conspicuous consumption, and a *polis* world governed by *sōphrosynē* and modesty. The wealth of a city Greek was made obvious by his attire, as surely as the royal status of a king was made known by his diadem. Those who had to work for their living wore only a short woolen *chitōn*, typically sleeveless in order to facilitate movement. The *chitōn* of the wealthy man was longer, sleeved, and made from white linen. The *chitōn* of the wealthy man was longer, sleeved, and made from white linen. As a draped cloth held on only by its convolutions around the body, the *himation* too was a confining garment unsuitable for the worker. Other types and styles of garment could also give away one's wealth. Another type of cloak, the *chlanis*, was strongly associated with the rich. Milesian' cloaks were also a sign of wealth. The pressmarks from folding clothes (faithfully reproduced in some statues) and

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⁵⁵ Cf. Smith (1991) 33-51, Ma (2013) 267-9.

⁵⁶ On which, see above all Smith (1993).

⁵⁷ Lee (2015) 110-13.

⁵⁸ Geddes (1987) 311.

⁵⁹ Men. *Dyskolos* 257; Dem. 21.133; c.f. Davidson (2012) 37.

⁶⁰ Plut. *Mor.* 583E; Diod. Sic. 12.21. Miletus seems to have been associated with luxurious living more generally. The Milesian couches belonging to Alcibiades and his co-conspirators, for example, were their most valuable (and presumably most luxurious) pieces of furniture (above, p. 122).

the light scent of the aromatics used to ward off insects from stored garments also gave away a man's wealth: in a world where most owned few clothes, he owned a wardrobe.⁶¹

All of this takes into account only how men dressed in one especially common type of portrait statue. But self-presentation in this particular context need not reflect how men dressed in other times and places. Kings, after all, were frequently nude in their sculptures, a situation that (presumably) did not reflect the day-to-day realities of royal attire. The literary and iconographic evidence proves that the *chitōn* and *himation* were, in fact, the everyday costume for men of a certain class. Wearing clothes more luxurious than this ensemble in public opened a man up to the charge of being an adulterer (*moichos*). As Aristotle bluntly put it: "if a man is dolled up and wanders about at night he is a *moichos*" (*Rh.* 2.24.7). Phylarchus records a Syracusian law that forbade men from wearing luxurious clothes (ἐσθῆτι περιέργωι καὶ διαλλαττούσηι) unless they were adulterers (F45=Ath. 12.521B). Locris Epizephyrii allegedly had a similar law preventing men from wearing gold rings or Milesian cloaks (Diod. Sic. 12.21). The historicity of these laws is less important than the fact that they reflect continued anxiety about luxuriously dressed men, even outside of the confines of democratic Athens. ⁶⁴

It is therefore likely that wealthy men relied on certain special occasions to wear their most luxurious garb. At a festival, for example, extravagant dress could be justified as an act of piety.⁶⁵ This held true even in Classical Athens. Demosthenes, that paragon of civic *sōphrosynē*, wore a golden wreath and *himation* woven with gold for a festival procession

⁶¹ Lee (2015) 96.

⁶² Smith (1988) 32.

⁶³ Davidson (2012) 38.

⁶⁴ Ogden (2002) 208-9.

⁶⁵ Davidson (2012) 41.

(21.22). When he was acting as *choregos*, Alcibiades wore a purple cloak (Ath. 12.534c; Plut. Alc. 16.1). A number of Hellenistic laws allow certain participants (typically priests) to wear more elaborate garb in the context of festivals. In the second century, the winner of the auction for the priesthood of Dionysus at Priene gained the right to wear a golden ivy crown and "whatever clothes he wishes." 66 A contemporaneous law at Skepsis in the Troad gave the priest of Dionysus the right to wear a golden crown and a purple chiton.⁶⁷ One should not see these laws as providing exemptions from (unknown) laws banning extravagant display in other contexts. Rather, they legitimize a form of ostentation that might otherwise carry overtones of hedonism. That such legitimization was considered an appropriate reward for a would-be benefactor indicates that wealthy men were, in fact, interested in elaborate public costume.

And then there was the knowledge of *how* to wear clothes. ⁶⁸ The crassness of the fifth-century Athenian demagogue Cleon was revealed by the fact that he wore his himation hitched up when addressing the assembly, instead of in the more formal style expected of orators (Ath. pol. 28.3). Theophrastus' Boor likewise wears his himation hitched above the knee (Char. 4.7). Demosthenes mocked his fellow orator Aeschines (who supposedly grew up in poverty) for wearing his *himation* too long (19.314). His criticism is especially interesting because it was delivered in the context of a speech, implying that such critiques were not just the grousing of the established elite. Many men, even those who were themselves not rich, expected civic leaders to look and act in a certain way. If this held true

⁶⁶ Sokolowski (1955) 37 = Austin (2006) 149, *II*. 13-15.

⁶⁷ SEG XXVI 1334 II. 7-12. Cf. Reinhold (1970) 36 n. 3 for other examples of laws allowing for sacral purple (typically paired with a golden crown).

⁶⁸ Lee (2015) 116.

in a city as comparatively egalitarian as Athens, it must certainly have held true in other cities with weaker democratic traditions. In other words, both kings and their wealthy subjects wore clothes that demonstrated their suitability for their particular arenas of competition. Kings in their Macedonian garb displayed their martial prowess. Citizens in the confining *himation* displayed the social and economic capital necessary to speak before the assembly and represent the city abroad.

Like jewelry, textiles and textile production were typically gendered feminine throughout antiquity. Therefore, as was the case with jewelry, women frequently wore more expensive and extravagant garments than men did.⁶⁹ Their public dress, especially on festival occasions, might incorporate more Eastern appropriations than male costume. Many garments and accessories that were considered male in Persia, or even Ionia, were gendered female in Classical Greece.⁷⁰ Women might also wear more colorful garments. *Poikilos* ("colorful, patterned") or *anthinos* ("flowery") are typically used to describe women's clothing.⁷¹ Purple stripes and borders seem to have been a popular form of decoration among those who could afford it.⁷² For example, in a letter from the late third or early second century, Tetos, a young woman in Ptolemaic Egypt requested that her father bring home both a purple-dyed *chitōn mesoleukos* [a purple tunic with a central white stripe] and a stater of 'sea-purple' dye.⁷³ Polychrome statues reveal clothes dyed red, white, beige, black, green, yellow, and blue as well.⁷⁴ Women also made use of different (and expensive) types of

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⁶⁹ Lee (2015) 126.

⁷⁰ Miller (1997) 158-83, Lee (2015) 122-6.

⁷¹ Cleland, Davies, and Llewellyn Jones (2007) 7, 150.

⁷² Blum (1998) 123-43, Spantidaki (2014) 38-9. Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 583E, where a purple-bordered garment is assumed to be the female equivalent of the luxurious "Milesian" cloak worn by men.

⁷³ Bagnall and Cribiore no. 106. Cf. the discussion by Blum (1999) 241-2.

⁷⁴ Lee (2015) 93.

fabric. Diaphanous cloth is well attested in both literary and artistic evidence. The debate as to whether such garments were made from true Chinese silk (*serica*) or 'wild' silk (*bombycina*) from other locales is fast approaching its centennial with no clear resolution in sight.⁷⁵ But even if true silk was first imported in the days of the Roman Empire, Hellenistic women still had access to luxurious substitutes, made either from the cocoons of moths from Cos (Coan or Armogan cloth), or from the byssus (anchor fibers) of certain mollusks (*tarantinon* in antiquity, sea-silk in the modern era).⁷⁶ The use of such fabrics in diaphanous outer garments appears to be a Hellenistic innovation.⁷⁷

But there was a risk in all of this finery. Just as the dandified man might be taken to be an adulterer or prostitute, so too might a women in too much (or too little) clothing be taken to be a *hetaira*. The corollary to the statutes on male dress in the Locrian and Syracusan laws was prohibitions on certain forms of female adornment: gold jewelry or bordered garments made a woman a *hetaira* in Locris, gold jewelry, a 'flowery' dress, or purple borders did the same at Syracuse. Clement of Alexandria likewise noted with approval the alleged custom of ancient Sparta to allow only *hetairai* gold ornaments and 'flowery dresses' (*Paedagogus* 2.10). Transparent clothing too was a potential mark of the prostitute or female entertainer.⁷⁸ According to Dio Chrysostom, a law in force in his day in Tarsus prescribed that "women should be so arrayed and should so deport themselves when

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⁷⁵ Richter (1929) is the origin of the debate. See Sudzuki (1975), Good (1995), van Damme (2012), Jørgenson (2013), and Lee (2015) 91 for more recent overviews.

⁷⁶ Dalby (2002) 116-17.

⁷⁷ Smith (1991) 85. Åström and Gullberg (1970) 39-43, Cleland, Davies, and Llewellyn-Jones (2007) 90 also argue that the Hellenistic period witnessed a proliferation in the types of high-quality fabrics available to wealthy consumers.

⁷⁸ Dalby (2002) 115-22.

in the street that nobody could see any part of them, neither of the face nor of the rest of the body" (33.48).⁷⁹

It is worth noting that most of this moralizing occurs within the framework of longdead laws and customs. Even the Tarsian law supposedly still in effect Dio takes as a sign of an old-fashioned austerity, now gone from the rest of the city's life. One suspects that many of the contemporaries of Phylarchus, Clement, and Dio were, in fact, comfortable with a degree of ostentation or sensuality in feminine dress. Hellenistic portrait statues of upperclass women, for example, show an attempt to balance modesty with allure. 80 On the one hand, the women typically wear multiple layers of garments that cover their bodies completely. Their hair might also be caught up in a veil, as with the so-called Large Herculaneum Woman (Fig. 42).⁸¹ The pose is typically modest: especially popular was the "pudicitia" pose, in which the woman's arms go under her breasts, with one hand to her face. The statue of Cleopatra in the House of Cleopatra and Dioscourides is thus arrayed. The statue is also typical of Hellenistic female portraiture in other respects. Her outer garment is sheer, allowing the viewer to see her *chitōn*. Her modest pose, meanwhile, causes her draped clothing to hang tightly across her upper body, emphasizing the curve of her hips and breasts. Cleopatra's clothes thus both conceal and reveal, creating a carefully constructed mixture of propriety and eroticism. They also announce her wealth. Her diaphanous outer garment

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⁷⁹ Heraclides Criticus 1.18 reports that women in Boeotia also covered their faces in public. Women in Asia Minor and Egypt throughout the Hellenistic period wore the *tegidion*, a face-veil with eyeholes (Llewellyn-Jones [2003] 62-4).

⁸⁰ For an overview, see Smith (1991) 82-5.

⁸¹ The originals for both the Large and Small Herculaneum Women were probably Hellenistic. Copies of the statues became popular in the Roman period. Cf. G. Davies (2002).

would have been tremendously expensive. And she, like many other Hellenistic female portraits, wears more drapery than her Classical predecessors.⁸²

An inscription from 92/1 BC regulating mysteries celebrated at Andania in Arcadia sheds further light on ostentation in women's clothes and potential anxieties about it.

Though lengthy, the section governing female dress ought to be quoted in full (there is no section on male dress):

Those being initiated in the Mysteries must be barefoot and wear white clothes, the women wearing neither transparent clothes nor stripes on their himation more than half a daktylos wide. And the free adult women must wear a linen *chitōn* and *himation* worth in total no more than 100 drachmas, the girls a kalasiris or a sindonites and a himation worth in total no more than one mina, and the female slaves a kalasiris or a sindonites and a himation worth in total no more than 50 drachmas. Of the sacred women, the adults must wear a kalasiris or hupoduma without decorations and a himation worth in total no more than two minas, and the girls a *kalasiris* and himation worth in total no more than 100 drachmas. In the procession the sacred women must wear a hupodutas and a wool woman's himation with stripes no more than half a daktylos wide, and the girls must wear a kalasiris and a himation that is not transparent. No woman is to have gold, rouge, white lead make-up, a hair band, plaited hair, or shoes unless of felt or sacrificial leather. The sacred women must have round wicker stools with white pillows or a round cushion on them, having neither a decoration nor purple color (trans. Gawlinski).⁸³

Many of these prohibitions, such as the prohibitions against footwear, non-white clothing, or the wearing of gold, are common in religious contexts.⁸⁴ Prohibitions against transparent outer garments and broad stripes imply that such things were part of women's garb in other

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⁸² In the Hellenistic period, mortal women and 'modern' goddesses such as Tyche wear more and more elaborate garments than the older Olympian goddesses (who tend to wear what they wore in Classical depictions). This is presumably an indication of an actual change in style (Smith [1991] 84).

⁸³ Sokolowski (1969) 65 = Gawlinski (2012) *II.* 15-26, pg. 69. The *kalarsis* is a fringed tunic of Egyptian origin, while the *sindonites* is a *chiton* of especially fine linen (perhaps muslin). *Hypoduma* is a generic word for undergarment. Whether *hypoduta* here also refers to undergarments generally or means a specific type of garment is unknown. See Gawlinski (2012) 123-5 for discussion.

⁸⁴ See Mills (1984).

contexts. Also interesting is the amount of money allowed for garments. Even slaves could wear up to fifty drachmas worth of clothing, or five times what Plutarch thought of as the going rate for a workman's *chitōn* (*Mor.* 470F). Other women get much larger allotments, 100 drachmas for initiates and girls, or 200 drachmas (2 minas) for "sacred" women. These quantities rival the limit of 300 drachmas placed on a festival tent and its tableware, though they still fall short of the 3 minas Plutarch thought a purple cloak might cost (*Mor.* 470F). The law is designed to create a cohesive religious community whose hierarchy is based not purely on wealth, but on the position of the women in the cult. It does not attempt to do away with competitive display. Nor are certain kinds of sumptuousness that do not detract from the overall homogeneity of the group barred. The *kalarasis* was a fringed tunic, more elaborate than a *chitōn*. The *sindonites* was distinguished by the especially fine quality of its fabric. The anything, the law confirms the importance of clothing as a means of status display, especially for women.

James Davidson has observed that there was, in fifth- and fourth-century Athens, a certain reluctance to display wealth through 'semi-perishables' such as furniture and clothing.⁸⁸ This is probably more an indication of the peculiarities of Athens than of general Greek norms. Strong democratic traditions no doubt curtailed the ostentation of some people, while others showed their opposition to the democracy through the emulation of Spartan austerity rather than display of luxury.⁸⁹ The Old Oligarch's sour observation that Athenian citizens "are no better dressed than the slaves and metics" implies that the differences in

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⁸⁵ Ll. 37-9.

⁸⁶ As Gawlinski (2012) 109-10 puts it, "the goal of such clothing regulations was an outward display of conformity which served to create a sense of community."

⁸⁷ Cleland, Davies, and Llewellyn-Jones (2007) 101, 171.

⁸⁸ Davidson (2012) 41.

⁸⁹ Cf. Plut. *Cim.* 16.1-3.

costume between various social classes were more pronounced elsewhere (Xen. [Ath. pol.] 1.10). And, even for Athens, there is some evidence of conspicuous display through clothes. Theophrastus' Boastful Man, for example, selects two talents' worth of goods from the clothiers at the agora, then pretends that his slave forgot the funds necessary to make the purchase (*Char.* 23[7]).

There is little reason to doubt that clothing in the Hellenistic period was a key marker of wealth. Innovations in clothing are harder to track than innovations in jewelry, simply because of the lack of material evidence. At least in the case of women, it seems certain that clothing experienced the same sort of increasing gap between average and superwealthy seen in jewelry. Wealthy women wore more clothes, and clothes made from more expensive fabrics, than their Classical predecessors did. And even if male clothing did not change much from the *chitōn* and *himation* worn in the Classical period, these garments alone were sufficient to distinguish the wealthy *aponos* man from one who performed manual labor. On certain occasions, such as festivals and banquets, wealthy men appear to have worn even more extravagant garments.

What, then, was the role of the interaction between civic habits and kingly luxury? Perhaps the most obvious point of commonality in this regard was the use of purple dye. Tyrrhenian purple, derived from a certain type of Phoenician sea snail, had long been a status symbol in the Near East. The Great King wore a sleeved purple cloak (*kandys*) over a purple tunic with a central white stripe (*chitōn mesoleukos*) (Xen. *Cyr.* 8.3.13). Wealthy Greeks also coveted purple cloth. We have already observed Alcibiades' purple cloak. The pre-Socratic

⁹⁰ For an overview, see Reinhold (1970) 22-9, Blum (1998) 143-191, and Stulz (1990). For the use of purple beyond textiles, see Bélis (1998). For the biological and technical details of the production of the dye, see Longo (1998).

philosopher Empedocles, the sophists Hippias and Gorgias, and the painter Parrhasius all also supposedly wore purple. ⁹¹ The color was used by kings and autocrats from Sicily to Thrace. ⁹² In the Hellenistic period, purple became the color of royalty, not least because its desirability had already been established by centuries of Greco-Macedonian custom.

Non-royal use of purple in the Hellenistic period is the subject of some controversy. The two major treatments of the subject have reached opposite conclusions about the use of the dye, with Reinhold arguing for its ubiquity among the wealthy, and Blum arguing that its use was circumscribed by law, so that only kings could dispense purple garments. Part of the problem lies in a difference in subject: Blum is interested only in the use of purple in male garments in non-sacral contexts by men outside of royal courts. He is quite right to observe that evidence for such use is lacking. But this is also a rather heavily qualified *desideratum* that excludes precisely those contexts in which families were most likely to use purple. Disqualified, for instance, would be the purple garments of the priest of Dionysius at Skepsis mentioned above. Disqualified, too, are the purple coverlets of the Peloponnesians, since these are not clothes *per se*. Hus disqualified also is evidence for the use of purple garments requested by Tetos of Egypt. Thus disqualified also is evidence for the use of purple

Moreover, the only direct evidence for legal limitations on the use of purple in the Hellenistic world comes from I and II Maccabees. When Alexander I Balas and Demetrius I

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⁹¹ Ael VH 12.32; Apul. Flor. 9; Ath. 12.543C-F, 15.687B.

⁹² Reinhold (1970) 28-9.

⁹³ Blum (1998) 266-7.

⁹⁴ Since Greek garments were unsewn rectangles of fabric draped on the body, the border between cloak, couch cover, and wall hanging was blurry. The same piece of cloth could serve multiple functions, even in royal contexts. The pavilion of Ptolemy II counted among its wall-hangings cloaks with the king's face upon them (Ath. 5.196B-197B).

⁹⁵ See above, p. 146.

Soter contended for the Seleucid throne (152-150 BC), they each tried to lure Jonathan Maccabeus to their side. Alexander appointed Jonathan high priest, made him a *philos*, and sent him a purple robe and golden crown (I Macc. 10:20). Demetrius responded by confirming the priesthood and granting a sweeping set of military and economic concessions, but to no avail. Jonathan remained loyal to Alexander, and at Alexander's wedding feast the king "gave orders to take off Jonathan's garments and to clothe him in purple" (I Macc. 10:62). When Alexander died, his son Antiochus VI Dionysius took the throne and confirmed Jonathan in his priesthood and *philos* status. "He granted him the right to drink from gold cups and dress in purple and wear a gold buckle (ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ ἐξουσίαν πίνειν ἐν γρυσώμασιν καὶ εἶναι ἐν πορφύρα καὶ ἔγειν πόρπην γρυσῆν)" (I Macc. 11:57-8).

By 141 BC, Jonathan's brother Simon was high priest. Notionally an official of Demetrius II Nicator, Simon was *de facto* an independent ruler. According to First Maccabees, the people of Jerusalem granted Simon sweeping powers: he controlled both the sanctuary and the surrounding strongholds, could appoint officials over Judea, and was the only man who could call an assembly. Honors went with these powers, the most important of which for our purposes was that he should be clothed in purple and gold, while "none of the people or priests shall be permitted...to be clothed in purple or put on a gold buckle" (I Macc. 14:41-4).

Alexander I's gifts ought to be understood as part of a larger tradition of kings giving purple clothes to their *philoi* that will be discussed below. The purple robe and gold crown, no doubt, seemed an especially appropriate gift for a priest, given the number of priests similarly garbed in Greek cities. The later re-confirmation of Jonathan by Antiochus VI and the decree regarding Simon are more interesting. They do not, however, necessarily prove

that any kingdom-wide laws limited the use of purple to courtiers. The Jerusalem decree, after all, seems to imply that the city has the power to decide such a matter. Nor can the relationship between the Seleucid kings and the Maccabean high priests be taken as axiomatic for how the Seleucids (or any other monarchs) interacted with Greek citizens and cities. Jonathan and Simon, after all, were more like client kings than courtiers, and it would be understandable if the Seleucids were particularly cautious about their use of a color with royal overtones. In short, even if the text is not simply wrong, the evidence it provides for rules regulating purple is too closely tied to one particular time and place to argue that the regulations might have had broader applicability.⁹⁶

Purple use was more probably governed by implicit norms than by explicit laws.

Without some exculpatory reason, such as a priesthood, the wearing of purple by an average citizen may have had tyrannical overtones. Already in the Classical period, the kings and tyrants of the stage were arrayed in purple. The fascination with the color exhibited by Hellenistic monarchs would have done little to weaken the link between purple and autocracy. Typically, purple use was made more acceptable by a sacred or sympotic context, or by its presence in women's clothes. But perhaps one of the benefits of *philos*

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⁹⁶ This is the position taken by Reinhold (1970) 35-6. Such limited restrictions would bring Hellenistic purple usage into line with later Roman practice. Roman-period papyri attest to broad interest (and use) of the dye among wealthy consumers (see Martelli [2014] for a recent overview, with particular emphasis on the importance of purple to alchemists).

⁹⁷ Reinhold (1970) 24. See Blum (1998) 156-8 on tyrannical uses of purple more generally. Just as stage backgrounds told audiences how tyrants lived, so too did their stage costume tell audiences how they dressed. Perhaps this lies behind the purported decision of the tyrant Clearchus of Heraclea to don a purple robe, golden crown, and buskins "like the kings in tragedies" (Justin *Ep.* 16.5, cf. Lewis [2009] 108-9). On the "Theaterkönig," see Alföldi (1955). On the role of theatricality in Hellenistic kingship, see Chaniotis (1997).

⁹⁸ This might explain why the Rhodian admiral Damophilus sent along the captured wardrobe of Demetrius Poliorcetes as a gift for Ptolemy I. The garments, "purple and proper for a king" could not be worn by any citizen without arousing suspicion that he might be about to seize tyrannical power (Diod. Sic. 20.93.4).

status (and the purple garments that came along with it) was that it gave its holder a reason to wear purple in public contexts.

Certainly royal *philoi* dressed like kings, not least because kings and other powerful men were almost as fond of distributing clothes as they were of distributing dishes. Quite often, these clothes were purple. Alexander supposedly requisitioned purple garments from the indolent Ionians to give to his *philoi* (Ath. 12.539F). Eumenes was able to win the (temporary) loyalty of his Macedonian bodyguard by distributing purple caps and royal cloaks to them, the "special gift of royalty among the Macedonians" (Plut. Eum. 8.7). Ptolemy II tucked ten purple robes in among the precious tableware he shipped to the high priest Eleazar (Ps.-Aristeas 319-20).⁹⁹ So important were purple clothes to the image of the royal friend that Greek phrase "philos tou basileōs" was occasionally rendered in Latin as purpuratus. 100 Other gifts beyond purple clothes were possible. As we have already seen, kings might also bestow gifts of signet rings. Equestrian equipment was another suitable royal gift. Indeed, it seems that the tack of royal friends was so ostentatiously distinctive that it was possible to speak of a horse "caparisoned like those of the royal *philoi*" (Plut. *Pomp*. 36.4-5). It is possible that by the end of the second century certain combinations of gifts (such as the purple cloth and golden buckle awarded to Jonathan) betokened specific ranks within the growing profusion of court titles. 101

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⁹⁹ Further examples collected at Blum (1998) 191-268.

¹⁰⁰ Reinhold (1970) 34-5, Blum (1998) 218-45, Strootman (2014) 208 n. 92.

¹⁰¹ Reinhold (1970) 34-5, Blum (1998) 266 both consider this likely. In the Seleucid and Ptolemaic courts, the later second century saw a growth in the number of courtly titles, so that one now encountered not only 'friends,' but also 'first friends,' 'honored friends,' and 'first and very honored friends.' For a recent discussion of this development (with relevant bibliography), see Strootman (2014) 121, 165-75.

There was a great overlap between the royal *philoi* and the greatest men in many cities. Did such men wear courtly garb when not at court (and did they dress their children in this manner to show their status)? The question is difficult to answer, not least because while the *kausia*, *krepides*, and *chlamys together* were a distinctly royal/Macedonian costume, *individually*, the garments lost this symbolism, much in the same way that blue jeans today signify a cowboy when worn with boots and a 10-gallon hat, but when worn alone lose that meaning. Seventh-century Athenians wore *krepides* on the hunt, while fifth-century cavalrymen wore the *chalmys* on patrol. ¹⁰²

A series of widely distributed terracotta figurines may hint that *philoi* were accustomed to dress in a courtly manner even outside the court. The figurines, found across the Hellenistic world from Babylon to Athens, show children wearing the traditional Macedonian *kausia*, *chlamys*, and *krepides* (Fig. 43). Who, precisely, the figures are meant to represent is something of a mystery. They might be royal pages (*basilikoi paides*), aristocratic youths who attended the king. In Macedon, at least, the pages wore the traditional Macedonian attire down to the time of Philip V. Yet the figures look a bit too young to be royal pages. Are they the sons of royal *philoi*? Or perhaps part of that broader category of

¹⁰² The precise identification of these garments is a vexed issue. The Macedonian *chlamys* may have had a rounded, oval shape, and been slightly shorter than its Greek equivalent (Saatsogolou-Paliadeli (1993), Strootman (2014) 203). But this is far from certain, and the matter is further complicated by the fact that (for the Greeks at least) the term *'chlamys'* might have been interchangeable with *'chlaina'* a similar sort of cloak long associated with wealth (Davidson [2012] 37). For the Athenian use of such garments, see Lee (2015) 116-17, Dem. 21.133. The precise shape of the *kausia* is also something of an open question (Saatsogolou-Paliadeli [1993] 129-37).

¹⁰³ Rotroff (2003) 217-21. Bobou (2015) curiously does not mention these figures specifically in her study of Hellenistic representations of children, but does observe that the *chlamys* is a common garment for boys in both terracottas and other representations (92).

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 760a. On the institution more generally, see Hammond (1990), Carney (2015a), Sawada (2010) 404-8, Strootman (2014) 137-41.

¹⁰⁵ Rotroff (2003) 220.

Hellenistic terracotta figurines that showed children dressing and acting as adults?¹⁰⁶ Certainty cannot be obtained without further evidence.

It is more certain that royal costume was influenced by the desires of non-royals.

After his defeat of Darius III, Alexander adopted certain aspects of Persian royal dress. 107

Chief among these was the diadem, which he wore with the old Macedonian *kausia*. 108 He also donned the Persian belt (*zonē*) and a purple *chitōn* with a white stripe down the center (the *chitōn mesoleukos*). Some of the later Successors occasionally wore Eastern garb as well. Thus, the famously flamboyant Demetrius Poliorcetes once wore a purple *kausia* bound with a golden *mitra*, purple boots embroidered with gold in place of the practical *krepides*, and a *chlamys* emblazoned with the stars of the zodiac, picked out in gold (Ath. 12.535F-536A). 109

But these changes did not take root. Of all of Alexander's Persian adoptions, only the relatively simple diadem had any lasting popularity among his Successors. Part of the problem may have been the nexus between femininity, Eastern kings, and oriental attire. Alexander himself had encountered this problem: he did not take up the tiara, sleeved coat (*kandys*), or baggy pants (*anaxyrides*) of the Great King precisely because he felt they were too foreign for his Greek and Macedonian subjects. The Persian *zonē* he maintained

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¹⁰⁶ On the terracottas, see Bobou (2015) 97.

¹⁰⁷ Ath. 12.539B-C; Just. 12.3.8; Val. Max. 9.5; Arrian Anab. 4.7.4; Curt. 6.6.1-2. Cf. Collins (2012).

¹⁰⁸ The diadem was presumably worn as a band on the *kausia*. Such a *kausia diadematophoros* was worn by Ptolemy at the Donations of Alexandria as part of his Macedonian garb (Plut. *Ant*. 54.5).

¹⁰⁹ In addition to the eastern associations of the *mitra*, the star-spangled cloak is reminiscent of the *ouraniskos* (a golden or purple canopy spangled with stars, under which the Great King sat). On the *ouraniskos* (and Alexander's use of it, see Wallace [2017] 7, Collins [2017]).

¹¹⁰ Smith (1988) 35. Indeed, the diadem is so simple that several scholars over the years have proposed Greek origins for it. For a review of these arguments (and a reconfirmation of the Persian origin asserted by Ritter [1965]), see Collins (2012) 377-85.

¹¹¹ Plut. *Alex.* 45.2, *Mor.* 329F-30A.

because of its immense symbolic importance to the Persians: to Greek eyes, it made him appear effeminate. High Kings might wear purple and gold, but they did so within the context of an outfit (*kausia*, *chamlys*, *krepides*) that was appealing to their Macedonian and Greek subjects. So too with Hellenistic queens. Unless the person depicted is named, it is almost impossible to tell whether a given sculpture is of a queen or a commoner. Royal attire was therefore conditioned by the expectations of Greco-Macedonian subjects. At the same time, royal ostentation, and especially lavish gifts of purple clothing, legitimized ostentation among non-royals. The distinction between royal garb (Macedonian, martial, purple) and civic garb (Greek, confining, modest) is less clearly defined than public statuary might suggest.

Perfumes and Aromatics

Finally, perfumes and aromatics. All thought it fitting that the gods should enjoy the sweet smell of incense. But when men filled their private homes with such aromas, or anointed their bodies with costly unguents, it was a sign of *tryphē*. The philosophers were adamant that free men should have nothing to do with such frivolity. When a fellow dinnerguest suggested to Xenophon's Socrates that they all anoint themselves with perfume at a banquet, the sage rejects the notion out of hand: the only thing a man should anoint himself with is olive oil at the *gymnasium* (Xen. *Symp.* 2.3-4). When a man wearing perfume

¹¹² Plut. *Alex.* 51.5; Curt. 3.3.18. On the *zonē*, see Collins (2012) 385-6.

¹¹³ Smith (1991) 83-4.

¹¹⁴ Thus, at the Donations of Alexandria little Ptolemy was arrayed in Macedonian garb because he was going to rule over 'Macedonian' Syria and adjacent territories. His brother Alexander was slated to receive Armenia, Media and Persia (just as soon as Antony got around to conquering them). He was accordingly arrayed in 'Median' garb, including a tiara (Plut. *Ant.* 54.4). The ability of Antony and Cleopatra to dress their sons in accordance with the expectations of their notional subjects shows how important such expectations were in informing royal self-representation.

¹¹⁵ Bernhardt (2003) 217-21, Bodiou and Mehls (2008b) 32-4 and (2011), Lee (2015) 63-5.

approached the curmudgeonly Zenon of Citium, he asked "who smells of a woman?" (Diog. Laert. 7.1.23). The Cynic Diogenes bluntly called a perfumed man a prostitute (Ath. 13565B-C). Aristippus of Cyrene (c. 435-350 BC) wished to wear unguents, but lamented that the excesses of 'effeminate men' had ruined such products. The only man more harmed by this than himself, he added, was the Great King (Diog. Laert. 2.8.76).

Naturally, not everyone lived up to the strict standards of the philosophers. But wealthy Greeks used aromatics, because of their Eastern and feminine connotations, only within a certain set of contexts in which greater license for luxurious display was tolerated. Religious ritual was one such context. The gods had long welcomed the burning of frankincense and myrrh upon their altars. 116 By the time of Alexander, most banquets probably began with the burning of such incense on the family altar in the courtyard. 117 Their rich scent was the first thing that greeted guests, the olfactory equivalent of the visual impressiveness of a peristyle or courtyard sculpture. The pious intent of such offerings did not exclude an element of competition. Incense was expensive, and burning great quantities of it was accordingly a sign of great wealth. When Alexander the Great was a child, his tutor Leonidas chided him for throwing too much incense onto the altar. After his conquests, Alexander sent Leonidas 500 talents of frankincense and 100 talents of myrrh with a note advising his former tutor not to be parsimonious with the gods (Plut. Alex. 25.7-8). Such liberality impressed gods and mortals alike, and it is likely that other men emulated in accordance with their means. 118

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¹¹⁶ See Proust (2008) for an overview.

¹¹⁷ Paszthory (1990) 46.

 $^{^{118}}$ Certainly later kings continued the practice of sacrificing lavish amounts of aromatics. In 288/7, Seleucus I gave the temple of Apollo Didymus at Miletus large quantities of myrrh, incense, and cinnamon (RC 5). Cf. Faure (1987) 197-8.

At a banquet, the sweet smell of incense on the altar soon intermingled with numerous other pleasant fragrances. From the Archaic period onwards, it was the custom of men at a *symposion* to wear garlands (often of fragrant plants such myrtle) and to have slaves anoint them with perfume at regular intervals. ¹¹⁹ The fifth-century poet Xenophanes of Colophon paints the scene well: "one boy puts woven wreaths about our heads, another brings round a jug of fragrant perfume... In the midst frankincense gives forth its sacred odor" (F1[Diels and Kranz]= Ath. 11.462C). Most male use of perfumes and aromatics occurred within the context of such banquets. In addition to wreaths and unguents, fresh-cut flowers might be strewn on the floor. Powdered perfumes (and occasionally scented wine) were sprinkled onto the couches (Theophr. *De Odoribus* 12.58). Powdered perfumes might also be added by the banqueters to the wine before drinking, a practice Theophrastus thought made the wine taste sweeter, but which filled Pliny the Elder with revulsion. ¹²⁰ The Athenian statesman Phocion once grew angry with a host who wished to have his guests' feet bathed in perfumed wine (Plut. *Phoc.* 20.2).

Scented footbaths seem to have been a step too far, at least for philosophically inclined authors. ¹²¹ But even Athenaeus, no friend to luxurious displays, thought that some perfume at a banquet was acceptable. In book 15 of the *Deipnosophists*, the Cynic Cynulcus becomes irritated when slaves come out and anoint the guests with perfume from gold and alabaster jars. His fellow banqueter Masurius responded by saying: "you strange man—you seem unaware that the sensations in our brains are soothed and even cared for by pleasant

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¹¹⁹ Paszthory (1990) 46-7, Nadeau (2010) 373-9.

¹²⁰ Theophr. *De Odoribus* 14.67, Plin. *HN* 13.5.

¹²¹ Criticism of the practice at Plin. *HN* 13.4, Ath. 12.553A. Continued critiques imply, of course, that the practice never truly ceased.

smells" (Ath. 15.687D). If even philosophers received dispensation to use some scents, then less austere diners must have found perfumes and aromatics in a banqueting context to be perfectly acceptable. Such, at least, seems to have been the case with many Hellenistic notables. Perfumes in alabaster jars were among the gifts Caranus distributed at his wedding (Ath. 4.128-130). Lycon, head of the Peripatetic School at Athens from c. 269 BC, was wont to give monthly banquets for which the nine-obol fee collected from each new student every month could not cover the cost of perfume and garlands (Ath. 12.547D-F).

As was the case with jewelry and clothing, women had greater leeway than men did when it came to displaying wealth through perfumes. Perfume vials (*alabastra*) were an important part of the *toilette* that newly married women brought into their husbands' homes. ¹²² In Aristophanes' *Clouds*, a character bemoans the fact that his luxury-loving wife came to the marriage bed redolent of perfume and saffron (51). It was also acceptable for women to wear more and heavier scents. A woman in a comedy by Antiphanes: "anoints her feet and legs with Egyptian scent, her cheeks and nipples with palm-oil, one arm with mint, her eyebrows and hair with sweet marjoram, her knee and neck with tufted thyme" (Ath. 12.553C). Clearly comic exaggeration is at work here. But Theophrastus, too, noted that many scents, such as myrrh and marjoram, were too heavy for men (*De Odoribus* 10.42). ¹²³ The Egyptian woman Tetos requested that her father bring her five staters of myrrh, 3 staters of nard oil, myrrh oil, and oil for a girl's head, in addition to the purple products discussed above. It is possible that the small amphorae that frequently dangle from Hellenistic necklaces were filled with perfume by their wearer (Fig. 44). ¹²⁴ In Hellenistic funerary

¹²² Faure (1987) 166, Badinou (2003).

¹²³ Theophrastus thought that lighter floral scents, such as rose and lily, were appropriate for men.

¹²⁴ Lee (2015) 148.

iconography, *alabastra* frequently accompany jewelry boxes on female gravestones as a sign of wealth. 125

There is, therefore, a fundamental continuity between Classical and Hellenistic use of fragrance. In both cases, religious rites and banquets provide an important venue for display, and women remain the more conspicuous consumers. The Hellenistic period probably saw an increase in the quantity and variety of aromatics used. As Alexander's gift to his tutor Leonidas showed, the conquest of the Near East facilitated the importation of exotic aromatics to the Eastern Mediterranean. ¹²⁶ In addition to traditional luxury items such as myrrh and frankincense, certain new scents managed to make their way west. The citron fruit, for example, was rejected as a new edible, but found its place in Greek (and later Roman) homes as an aromatic. ¹²⁷ The third century also saw the use of animal products, such as castor, musk, or ambergris, in perfumes for the first time. ¹²⁸ By the end of the first century BC, the medical writer Hicesius could assume that his readers might have a dozen or so different perfumes at their disposal for use at drinking parties (Ath. 15.689C-D).

While we know from literary evidence (and common sense) that perfumeries existed in the Classical period, it is only in the Hellenistic period that they can be identified archaeologically. Large perfumeries allowed for the production of greater quantities of mixed scents. Often these mixed scents were known by the name of their place of production (as with "the Egyptian" used by the fragrant woman in Antiphanes' play). This meant that,

¹²⁵ Zanker (1993) 230.

¹²⁶ Faure (1987) 189-90. Cf. Massar (2008) 217.

¹²⁷ Dalby (1996b) 83.

¹²⁸ The Greeks of the Classical Period assigned purely medicinal functions to such products. Their increasing reputation as aphrodisiacs may have led to more widespread use. Cf. Faure (1987) 194-6. ¹²⁹ Brun (2000).

like fine wines, perfumes could be ranked by region, so that it was possible to sing the virtues of Illyrian irises, or praise the "panathenaicon" (a type of mixed perfume) of Athens over, say, the work of the perfumers of Argos. According to Pliny, in the time of Menander, a mixed perfume known as *telinum* (after the $t\bar{e}lis$, or fenugreek, in it) was in vogue. Then came *megalium*, a pricier mixture incorporating balsam, cassia, and other exotic imports. In Pliny's own day, the 'regal' (*regale*) was fashionable. This was a perfume made almost exclusively of eastern aromatics and purportedly mixed according to the recipe used by the Parthian king's own perfumers (Plin. *HN* 13.18).

Pliny's teleological presentation of ever-increasing luxury need not accord with historical reality. After all, the Greeks of the Classical period made use of exotic aromatics and mixed perfumes as well. Yet the Hellenistic period probably did see an increase in the quantity of exotic aromatic available for Mediterranean consumers, and this made the use of such products in non-religious contexts more widespread. There was probably also an increase in the gulf between the habits of the very wealthy and the more modest. Local flowers probably provided perfume for most. But imported aromatics and valuable mixed perfumes (often themselves imports from another city) gave the rich of the Hellenistic world an opportunity to spend on fragrances greater than that enjoyed by their ancestors.

Kings certainly shared an interest in perfumes and aromatics with their subjects.

Exotic scents had an association both with kingship (because of their ancient association with the courts of the Near East), and with divinity. Thus, when Alexander first entered the tent of Darius after the Battle of Issus, he marveled at the scent of the apartment, "marvelously

¹³⁰ Good examples of such ranking can be found at Plin. HN 13.2, Ath. 15.688e-689b.

¹³¹ Faure (1987) 196-7.

¹³² Bodiou and Mehl (2008b) 30.

fragrant with spices and unguents." Turning to his companions, he remarked "This, it seems, is what it means to be a king" (Plut. *Alex*. 20.13). As an *isotheos* king, Alexander allegedly exuded the same sweet smell the incorruptible gods did. According to the fourth-century peripatetic Aristoxenus, "a very pleasant odor exhaled from his skin and there was a fragrance about his mouth and all his flesh, so that his garments were filled with it" (Plut. *Alex*. 4.4). Alexander's body never lost this sweet smell, even when his corpse lay in state in the sweltering heat of Babylon (Plut. *Alex*. 77.5). 133 A close association with perfumes not only reinforced the typical positive associations of royal *tryphē* (prosperity, power, munificence), but also the divinizing claims of royal cult.

The royal use of perfumes and aromatics tend to follow the patterns observed by other wealthy households. Thus, the primary use of fragrances for kings was at the banquet. Poseidonius tells us that it was the tradition of the Seleucid kings to have slaves sprinkle Babylonian perfume upon the garlands of their guests (Poseidonius F20 = Ath. 15.692C-D). He also relates that Antiochus VII Sidetes (r. 138-129) distributed garlands of myrrh and frankincense, tightly bound with ribbons of gold (Poseidonius F9a=Ath. 12.540B-C). It may be that the Seleucids were especially fond of this form of luxurious display. They benefitted, after all, from proximity to the sources of many Eastern aromatics, and the scents of frankincense and myrrh were strongly associated with lordship over Asia. ¹³⁴ But the evidence is far from conclusive. Other dynasties also made use of fragrances. When Cleopatra VII desired to impress Mark Antony and his friends, for example, she buried the floor of the

¹³³ Cf. Bodiou and Mehl (2008a) 146-50.

¹³⁴ Poseidonius thought the Syrians in general were addicted to luxury, and that this addiction manifested itself not least in the habit of bathing in myrrh and expensive olive oil (F10=Ath. 12.527E-F).

dining room under a cubit of roses (Ath. 4.147F-148B). The consumption and distribution of aromatics had a symbolic value that extended well beyond a single court.

Queens played an especially important role in the patronage (and presumably use) of perfume. In his book *On Perfumes*, the late first-century BC doctor Apollonius discussed the various cities reputed to make the best aromatics. Egypt, Syria, and Cyprus figure prominently, as is to be expected. But many other smaller cities had areas of specialty as well. Elis and Cyzicus, for instance, excelled at iris perfumes, while Rhodes and Cilicia produced the finest rose ones. The impression one gets is of the same sort of cosmopolitan interest in local specialties that governs Hellenistic food choices. Especially interesting is the role Apollonius assigns to queens, in the spurring on the production of perfumes.

At one time, too, the unguents made in Alexandria were brought to high perfection, on account of the wealth of the city, and the attention that Arsinoe [II, 316-c. 260] and Berenice [I, c. 340-268] paid to such matters; and the finest extract of roses in the world was made at Cyrene while the great Berenice [II c. 267-221] was alive. Again, in ancient times, the extract of vine-leaves made at Adramyttium was but poor; but afterwards it became first-rate, owing to Stratonice, the wife of Eumenes [II, r. 197-159 BC]. 135

Perfume production would therefore follow the pattern alleged for engraved gems, mosaics, and other forms of luxurious consumption. As was the case with these other goods, we should see royals as powerful consumers, but not necessarily the sole trendsetters of their kingdoms. Royals were spurred onwards in their pursuit of *tryphē* by the wealthy elite of their own court and capital city. It was the centralization of so many potential consumers that drove artisans to royal capitals. Many other factors beyond royal patronage determined

¹³⁵ Ath. 15.688E-689B.

what that collection of consumers found attractive. Cyzicus owed the excellence of her irises to no king but Zeus.

On the Value of Luxury

There are two interrelated contexts in which a turn towards luxury proved useful for wealthy men in the Hellenistic world. The first was at court. As Ruth Westgate has observed, luxury goods can become important signifiers of status in socially fluid situations, or places where people are strangers. ¹³⁶ It hard to think of a more socially fluid zone than a Hellenistic court, especially in the late fourth and third centuries, before small cliques of leading families had become well established. ¹³⁷ A man who left home looking to make his fortune in Alexandria, Antioch, or Pella could not rely on many of the status markers that identified him as noteworthy at home. Who in the purple-cloaked crowd surrounding the king knew his father? Who could even verify that he was a freeborn citizen of his birthplace? The surest way to prove his worth was to display it.

The truth of this is borne out by an anecdote from Josephus. In it, a young Jewish man of good birth, Joseph, wishes to gain an audience at the Ptolemaic court.

Joseph sent to his friends at Samaria, and borrowed money of them, and got ready what was necessary for his journey, garments and cups, and beasts for burden, which amounted to about twenty thousand drachmae, and went to Alexandria. Now it happened that at this time all the principal men and rulers went up out of the cities of Syria and Phoenicia, to bid for their taxes; for every year the king sold them to the men of the greatest power in every city. So these men saw Joseph journeying on the way, and laughed at him for his poverty and meanness. ¹³⁸

¹³⁶ Westgate (2010) 511.

¹³⁷ Hamon (2007) 80-1. On the desire of Greeks to enter royal service, see Habicht (2006) 31-3.

¹³⁸ Joseph. *AJ* 12.168-9.

Even with all of his new garments and cups, Joseph only gains his audience with the king because a royal *philos* whom he had once entertained at Jerusalem intercedes on his behalf. The Syrian grandees, we are told, "were much offended" when they arrived and saw Joseph eating with the king (12.179).

Like his namesake before him, Joseph grew rich and mighty in the land of Egypt. Years later, when the king's son was born, Joseph sent his own son Hyrcanus to Alexandria to congratulate his monarch. Hyrcanus took a mere 10,000 drachmai for the journey and was applauded by his father for his *sōphrosynē* (Joseph. *AJ* 12.198-9). Yet when Hyrcanus arrived at court, his spending became more prodigal. All of the *philoi* had to give the king and queen gifts to celebrate the new prince. Five talents was far too low, ten was about right, twenty the amount spent by the highest *philoi*. Hyrcanus gave two hundred slaves, each worth a talent, and each carrying a talent to the royal couple. The king praised Hyrcanus for his magnanimity (*megalopsuchia*) and loaded him down with gifts in return (*AJ* 12.215-19).

Even if embellished, the stories of Joseph and Hyrcanus reveal the assumption that lavishness was necessary for success at court. Conspicuous display and consumption proved one's wealth, even (or especially) to absolute strangers. Wealth, in turn, implied independence. Acting in service of the king came uncomfortably close to working for wages, something upper-class Greeks found distasteful. Taking the king's largess without offering anything in return would make one a parasite, a class of men loathed by all Greeks,

¹³⁹ Hyrcanus took a thousand talents from his father's steward in Alexandria. In addition to the 400 talents spent on the royal gift, he spent an additional undisclosed amount on gifts for the other *philoi* to soften the blow of upstaging them so grandly.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. Herman (1980/1).

rich and poor alike. Ostentation was part of the way a man proved he was the king's friend, not his lackey. Before Hyrcanus gave his grand gift, the other *philoi* seem to have regarded him as a parasite. When he was at table with the king, the guests near him piled their leftover bones before him, perhaps to suggest that he was devouring the king's wealth without offering anything in return (Joseph. *AJ* 12.211-13). Hyrcanus' gift, by contrast, shows the right way for the wealthy man to gain the favor of the king: by giving the king a great gift, he obliged the king to respond in kind, couching what was (or at least could be) an unequal exchange in reciprocal terms. One could circumvent the requirement for wealth and *tryphē* by taking up the part of the philosopher, because philosophers were supposed to despise wealth and luxury. When the Epicurean Diogenes from Seleucia-on-the-Tigris asked Alexander I Balas for a purple cloak and golden crown it was considered a request "strange for a philosopher" (Ath. 5.211A-D).

The gifts kings gave fostered further *tryphē* among their *philoi*. The golden goblets and dishware in Telauri that brought forth such unexpected wealth for Pompey was therefore not a half-forgotten treasure trove, hoarded by a king whose love for beautiful things exceeded the size of his palace, but rather a cache of precisely those sorts of luxury goods (dishes, furniture, equestrian gear) that kings were most likely to distribute to their *philoi*. The recipients of such gifts were not only bound to the royal giver, but also to a certain style of life. A gift of money might be spent more or less as the recipient saw fit; the proceeds from a plot of land could have funded any number of prosperous lifestyles. But gifts of

¹⁴¹ Ath. 6.244B-D presents a more obscure example of the same theme. At a banquet of Ptolemy I, the parasite Archephon avoided eating goby (a fish that supposedly carried a gem in its belly) because he had not "paid his share" while the fish had.

¹⁴² Strootman (2014) 147-8.

golden tableware and purple robes encouraged a certain *kind* of prosperous lifestyle, one very much like that of a king in its conspicuous display of $tryph\bar{e}$. ¹⁴³

At the same time, kings represented themselves to their Greco-Macedonian subjects in accordance with Greco-Macedonian expectations. Kings dwelt in peristyle houses derived from Greek forms, reclined at table like Greeks, dressed in a manner appealing to Greeks, and even smelled like Greeks. There is no qualitative difference between royal and non-royal luxury, only a quantitative one. Kings lived on a grand scale that reflected their superhuman capacity for action. The means by which they demonstrated this capacity—from purple robes to silver-laden tables—were dictated by the norms of their subjects. Conspicuous consumption therefore allowed elites to be accepted at court, and that very acceptance promoted the reciprocity of ideas about wealth and its display between king and subject that we have examined in this chapter.

Luxury was important to the politically inclined in the civic context as well. The world of the court and the world of the city were not closed circuits. Royal *philoi* often maintained contact with their home cities, and cities frequently sent emissaries to royal courts. The selection of such emissaries mattered. A good emissary could gain unforeseen benefits for his city, and might be praised by the king in the official royal reply. ¹⁴⁴ One wanted a man like Aratus, one who ideally had prior connections to the king, and had demonstrated that he possessed the *savoir-faire* needed for the task. The estate a man kept at home was the best indicator his fellow-citizens had for how successful he might be as their

¹⁴³ Tryphē therefore became part of the broader interaction between the king and his *philoi*, who in turn maintained contacts with their old home cities and acted as a transmitter for luxurious norms. On the *philoi* and their interactions with court and city, see Weber (1997) 38-52.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Welles (1934) nos. 15 and 26.

representative at court. The early third-century Eretrian philosopher Menedemus lived frugally and dined in a moderate manner befitting his profession. His guests reclined on rush mats or sheepskins, drank from small cups, and contented themselves with pears or dried figs for dessert. Menedemus' fellow Eretrians despised (*kataphronein*) the philosopher for his cheapness, calling him a Cynic and humbug (*lēros*) (2.17.139). It was only after he was able to prove that he was a philosopher and not a miser that Menedemus was entrusted with envoyships to Lysimachus, Ptolemy I, and other monarchs (Diog. Laert. 2.17-139-40). Once at court, such diplomats had an opportunity to observe royal luxury firsthand. Philosopher that he was, Menedemus was probably unmoved by such royal display: but other diplomats likely were impressed, and incorporated lessons learned from their time at court into their own mode of life. They thus formed an important conduit between city and court for the transmission of knowledge about the good life and how it ought to be lived.

The display of wealth also marked a man as a suitable envoy to other cities. ¹⁴⁵ It did so partially because travel was expensive. While cities typically reimbursed envoys, there does not seem to have been any objection to those who wished to pay their own way as a sort of voluntary liturgy. By the later second century, this became the normal practice. A man who showed he was wealthy demonstrated that he had the means to go abroad on the city's behalf. He also demonstrated he had the cultural capital necessary to avoid embarrassment. A notable's flashy living also made his city appear prosperous to outsiders, and guaranteed that he had knowledge of 'luxurious' behavior needed to interact with the elite of a foreign city. ¹⁴⁶ Thus, even if there was no direct requirement that an envoy sent to another city had to

¹⁴⁵ The Hellenistic period witnessed a spectacular growth in inter-city diplomacy. See below, Chapter 5.

¹⁴⁶ This is an argument made by Alcibiades in Thucydides (6.16).

be wealthy, or even pay for his own trip, there was a great deal of indirect pressure that favored the privileged.

Conspicuous display was also useful in domestic politics. In a world with no public land registry or state inspection of banks, it was impossible for the public to know the true extent of any rich man's wealth. Thus, as Davidson has put it, "how wealthy one seemed played a very important role in arguments about how wealthy one really was." On the one hand, this allowed the wealthy effectively to hide their wealth and avoid costly liturgies. On the other hand, attempting to hide too much wealth would quickly earn a man a reputation as a miser. The assembly-going public was unlikely to bestow honors on a man they thought was holding out on them, and the wealthy men who were contributing to the city were likely to resent him for not taking up his share of the burden.

Conspicuous consumption therefore acted as a sort of guarantee that its practitioner was not hoarding wealth. The man who attended assembly in a purple cloak, his fingers glittering with rings, could not very well refuse when a call for donations was made. A degree of ostentation was acceptable, as long as it was tempered by an implicit acknowledgement that the wealth it represented was at the service of the state. This was already the case in Classical Athens. Cimon famously turned his great wealth into a political boon by using it to provide benefactions to his fellow citizens. He passed out money and garments in the agora, kept his table open for all of his demesmen, and allowed anyone who wished to pick fruit from his orchard. It was therefore said of him that "Cimon made money

¹⁴⁷ Domingo Gygax (2016) 83.

¹⁴⁸ Davidson (2012) 40.

¹⁴⁹ Christ (2006) 143-204.

that he might spend it, and spent it that he might be honored for it" (Plut. *Cim.* 10.1-5).¹⁵⁰ A good Hellenistic example of the same sort of phenomenon can be found in Aratus, who used his wife's jewelry and a portion of his dishware as security for a sixty-talent loan he took out to facilitate the Achaean League's capture of Corinth (Plut. *Arat.* 19.1).

Another early Hellenistic example of how luxury related to politics is found in Theophrastus' Boastful Man (23[7]). We have already had cause to observe some of his ostentatious habits: his very public interest in expensive dishes, clothes, and houses. Theophrastus' sketch makes it clear that this preening is integral to the (inflated) political aspirations of the character. He never misses an opportunity to discuss his imagined campaigning with Alexander, or to feign that Antipater sends him letters. He confides to perfect strangers that he gave ten talents to starving citizens during the last famine, "adding that he does not count any of the trierarchies or public services which has performed." For Theophrastus' character, this is all talk. For actual men of means, luxurious display was a means of signaling that they had the social capital needed to hobnob in courts, and the fiscal capital needed to perform benefactions for the city.

Conspicuous consumption was therefore fostered by democracy. Paradoxically, it must also have contributed to the decline in democracy in the later Hellenistic period. In many of the signifiers of luxury (housing, dining, jewelry, clothing), the gap between the richest segment of the community and everyone else became noticeably larger in the Hellenistic period. The variety of emulations of true luxury, from single-column peristyles to glass intaglios, show that Hellenistic consumers perceived this gap and sought to close it as

 $^{^{150}}$ On the role of luxury in the Athenian democracy, see Braund (1994), Schmitt-Pantel (1999), and Davidson (2012).

best they could. Nevertheless, the fact that the rich lived in such a starkly different fashion must have contributed to the sense that they were different from the rest of the citizenry. This difference becomes reified in the later second century, when the language of inscribed honorifics begins to make it clear that wealthy men were conceived of as a distinct bouletic class. Many changes in conspicuous consumption, however, were already well under way in the third and even the fourth century. In prefiguring our inscriptional evidence, they suggest that changes in how wealthy Greeks thought of themselves and their relation to their *poleis* had begun well before the coming of the Romans.

They also suggest that the relationship between kingly decadence and civic luxury is more nuanced than is often thought to be the case. Kings took cues about how their vast wealth should be displayed from their subjects, who in turn took on board some of the changed or new forms of ostentation employed by kings. The royal *philoi* and civic ambassadors to the courts were part of the link between these two worlds, creating a shared world of ostentation that was itself part of the much larger Hellenistic cultural *koine*.

Chapter 4: Competition and the League

The Greek league (or *koinon*) is an object of perennial interest to modern scholars, perhaps not least because it seems to defy the typical *polis* orientation of Greek politics.
Recent research on leagues has rightly emphasized the role of cult and a shared (frequently fictitious) ethnic identity in the formation of leagues.
Mackil's (2013) work on league formation, which posits that cities were attracted to leagues by a basket of economic, social, and religious links, is a good example of the sort of group-centric explanations of league integration that currently predominate in scholarly discussion.
By emphasizing the potential benefits of league membership—material, political, and spiritual—for new members, such work nicely augments more traditional narratives that see the geopolitical interests of the league itself as the primary driver for expansion.

Our discussion in previous chapters has emphasized the way in which local notables set themselves apart from the other citizens of the city through conspicuous consumption, and the ways in which their influence over the political life of the city could easily escalate into tyranny. The goal of this chapter is to look at the role local notables played in the expansion of leagues. It will argue that, for some men, participation in a league brought with it the possibility of gaining more personal prestige, through involvement in regional politics,

¹ The Greek vocabulary for leagues was loose. In addition to *koinon, sympoliteia* and *ethne* were also used. Modern scholars writing in English have generally use federation, confederation, or league to describe these groupings. For a discussion of the terminology, see Beck and Funke (2015) 14.

² See Beck (2003), Buraselis (2003), Doukellis (2005), Shipley and Hansen (2006), McInerney (2013), and Beck and Funke (2015) for recent overviews. For the importance of religion in particular, see the essays collected in Funke and Haake (2013).

³ One should note that a variety of differently constituted groups (cities, tribes, villages) could belong to leagues (Beck and Funke [2015] 17-18). Of these various groups, it is the cities, and especially the local notables of the cities, which are of interest to us.

⁴ Such expansion occurred occasionally during the fourth century, but became much more frequent during the Hellenistic period. Cf. Beck and Funke (2015) 20.

than could be won at a purely local level. On the one hand, the motivations of local notables ought therefore to play a more central role in our understanding of league development. On the other hand, leagues, which were by necessity dominated by those with the money and leisure for regional travel and office-holding, played a central role in the development of a shared elite-identity, and reinforced the idea that the wealthy were the most capable of rule, thereby contributing to the erosion of democratic norms.

Because a detailed study of every league in the Hellenistic period is beyond the purview of this chapter, we will use two case studies to examine the ways in which competition among local notables might have spurred league growth. We will begin with the leagues and cities of the Spercheios River Valley in central Greece. The Spercheios region was first integrated into the Aetolian League—the second most prominent of the Hellenistic leagues—in ca. 280-250 BC, and then into the Thessalian League ca. 146-27 BC. Traditionally, these integrations have been discussed from the point of view of the larger leagues, as part of their own histories of expansion.⁵ Our goal is to focus instead on the local notables from the newly integrated region. While the 'core' elites of Aetolia and Thessaly had an advantage when it came to occupying chief magistracies, new members whose cities had entered the league under favorable circumstances might also achieve high office. Even for those who could not gain the generalship—the highest office—a variety of other positions remained. In the case of Aitolia, older leagues may have been coopted into the broader federal structure rather than being dissolved, with the result that membership in the Aetolian League offered new opportunities for prestige at relatively little cost to local traditions.⁶

⁵ See Grainger (1999) 87-130 and Scholten (2000) for the Aetolian League, and Graninger (2011) for the Thessalians.

⁶ On districts, see below, p. 189.

Our second case study deals with the formation of the Achaean League—historically, the most important of the Greek leagues—in the third-century Peloponnese. The growth of the Achaean League is uniquely well attested in our surviving literary sources, and because of this it is possible to see how certain men (Aratus of Sicyon, Lydiades of Megalopolis, Aristomachus of Argos) used the League as a vehicle for their own aggrandizement (often at the expense of each other). In the case of the Achaean League, it is possible to see how the failure of certain men and cities to achieve an important role in League politics led to increasing dissatisfaction, and paved the way for the startling success against the League of the Spartan king Cleomenes III. Since both of the case studies focus on mainland Greece in the third century BC, our conclusions will obviously only apply directly to that time and place. Nonetheless, it seems likely that the same sort of competition occurred in other leagues as well. At the very least, the investigation here will provide a template against which other leagues might be compared.

Micro-Federalism in the Spercheios River Valley

The Spercheios Valley in the Aetolian League

The Spercheios River flows eastward from the Pindus Mountains down to the Malian Gulf and the Aegean.⁸ By the headwaters of the Spercheios was Dolopia, a mountainous and sparsely populated region. Further east was Ainis, dominated by her largest city, Hypata.

Then came Oitaia, where the Spartans had founded their colony of Heraclea Trachinia.

⁷ Older discussions of this period tend to see a titanic struggle between pro- and anti-Macedonians in the Peloponnese rather than as a contest between essentially self-interested local notables. Urban (1979) provides a good example of this venerable approach.

⁸ Rousset (2015) provides a good recent overview. For the valley in the Classical period, see Béquignon (1937), Decourt, Nielsen, and Helly (2004). Events from the second century onwards are treated in Martin (1975), Graninger (2011) 7-42. For the third century, the best accounts are to be found in studies of Aitolia, especially Grainger (1999) and Scholten (2000).

Finally, by the coast was Malis, whose chief city Lamia dominated the easiest route from Thessaly into Greece (Thermopylae was a few miles to the south). The valley formed an uneasy border region between Boeotia in the south, Thessaly in the North, and Aetolia in the West.

As with most of the Greek world, this region fell under the shadow of Macedon in the days of Philip and Alexander. But when the Gauls invaded in 280, the power of Macedon was (briefly) shattered. Into the vacuum stepped the Aetolian League. From at least the fifth century, the various tribes of the Aetolians had worked together in a loose alliance (*symmachia*). At some point during the later fourth century, they joined together more formally as a league. After the death of Alexander, the Aetolians threw off the Macedonian yoke, and managed to maintain their independence throughout the many wars of the Successors. At some point after 301, the Aetolians took over Delphi, and held it against successive Sacred Wars directed against them, first by Demetrius Poliorcetes (289), and later by the Spartan king Areus (281).

The Aetolian League's first move in the Spercheios region was the annexation of Heraclea. We are told by Pausanias that the Aetolians "forced" (ἀναγκάζειν) Heraclea into their League. ¹¹ In the next year, the Gauls marched southward into Greece. ¹² Among the many valorous deeds the Aetolians performed in the war against them was the salvation of Heraclea, whose territory was ravaged but not captured thanks to the presence of an Aetolian

⁹ On the earlier history of the League, see Beck (1997) 43-54, Scholten (2000) 9-25, Funke (1997) and (2015) 86-93.

¹⁰ For this period of the League's history, see Flacelière (1937), Scholten (2000) 18-21.

 $^{^{11}}$ Paus. 10.20.9: ἔτει γὰρ πρότερον τούτων οἱ Αἰτωλοὶ συντελεῖν τοὺς Ἡρακλεώτας ἠνάγκασαν ἐς τὸ Αἰτωλικόν.

¹² The struggle against them has been discussed in detail by other scholars, and need not detain us here. See Nachtergael (1977) 137-74, Champion (1996), Scholten (2000) 29-38.

garrison. The Gauls did, however, establish a fort in Heraclean territory (Paus. 10.22.13). As Pausanias has it, the Heracleans (and Ainians) also served as guides for the Gauls, supposedly in order to lead the Gauls away from their native land (Paus. 10.22.9). This was a useful explanation in a later age, when collusion with the Gauls was considered as un-Hellenic as Medizing during the Persian Wars.

The recent history of Heraclea, however, leads one to suspect that the Heraclean guides were less selfless in their motives. In 314, Heraclea was one of five cities specifically excluded from the diadoch Polyperchon's decree allowing exiles throughout the Greek world to return to their homes (Diod. 18.56.5). The obvious inference is that the exiles were (recent) opponents of Polyperchon, and that men allied to him were in power in Heraclea. In 304, Heraclea willingly came over to the side of Demetrius Poliorcetes after his victory over Cassander (Plut. *Demetr.* 23.2). Once more, those who had the most sway in Heraclea were men friendly to Macedon. But in 289, a peace treaty between Aetolia and Demetrius required that "the exiles from Heraclea are to enjoy [...ca. 50...] living wherever they should wish." Lefèvre argues that these are exiles living in Aetolia (perhaps the losers of 304 or even 314) now being allowed to return home. Heraclea are to enjoy [...ca. 50...] There was probably little love lost between these returning exiles and the notables in the city who had been friendly towards Demetrius. The Spartan king Areus' attempt to wage a sacred war against Aetolia in 283 probably further destabilized the situation. Heraclea was, after all, a Spartan colony, and it is quite

¹⁴ Lefèvre (1998a) 126-7. His (admittedly speculative) restoration of the lacuna is καρπεύ[ειν τα αυτών οίκοΰντας έν τῆι Ἡρακλείαι ή έν τῆι χώραι ταύτ]ηι.

possible that dissatisfied notables contacted the Spartan king when he was in the region.¹⁵ This may have even been the reason why the Aetolians garrisoned the city.¹⁶

Heraclea therefore presents us with a tale as old as the Greeks: a city subject to a great deal of internal infighting between local notables who sought out whatever outside power (Macedon, Aetolia, perhaps Sparta) they thought might be of service. The Aetolians may not have taken Heraclea by force, but were rather invited by certain Heracleans. If this is the case, then perhaps the Heraclean cooperation with the Gauls—if true—actually represents the attempts of certain notables to rope yet another foreign power into their internal competition. The loyalty of the pro-Aetolian Heracleans during the struggle, on the other hand, proved that they were worthy of League office.

Indeed, the idea of a pro-Aetolian faction of proven loyalty in Heraclea makes better sense of the following decades. By 273/2, we find a Heraclean, Polycharmos, serving as *grammateus* to the League, an office that, at that time, might have been the most prestigious in the League. This Polycharmos is probably the same Polycharmos who served as an Aetolian *hieromnemon* (representative to the Amphictyonic Council at Delphi) in 273/2 and 272/1. The position of general probably still remained elusive. Though many scholars have Trichas of Heraclea as League general in 262/1, it is more likely that the homonymous

 $^{^{\}rm 15}$ On Areus' campaign, see Cartledge and Spawforth (1989) 32.

¹⁶ Grainger (1999) 98 and Scholten (2000) 29-30 both think the Gauls were the immediate cause for the garrisoning. It is also possible that nascent *stasis* within the city led to the garrisoning. The Achaean League also sent garrisons to support the pro-Achaean party in cities suffering from *stasis* (Mantineia: Polyb. 2.57-8; Plut. *Arat.* 36.2-3, *Cleom.* 5.1. Kynaitha: Polyb. 4.17.4-5). Cf. Mackil (2013) 356-8.

 $^{^{17}}$ IG IX 1^2 1.10-12. On the prestige of the office see Scholten (2003) 74. Later the generalship would be the most prestigious office.

¹⁸ Lefévre (1995) nos. 23-6. Cf. Grainger (2000) 284 (Polycharmos [I]). Though note Rzepka (2011) 94, who wonders whether Polycharmos could be both secretary and *hieromnemon* in the same year.

Trichas the Eotian (e.g., an 'old' Aetolian) was general in that year. ¹⁹ Yet in the twenty years after the city's incorporation into the League, Heraclea produced as many League officials as any of the 'true' Aetolian cities. Over the course of her time in the League, her citizens held at least three generalships, served at least five times as either *hipparchos* or *grammateus*, and acted at least nine times as *hieromnemones*. ²⁰

The number of Heraclean generals was still low when compared to the seven generals from Naupaktos, eight from Kallios, or thirteen from Trichonion down to 200. But it is comparable with other 'core' Aetolian cities (Pleuron, for example, provided five generals). In regards to other offices, only Trichonion had more *hieromnemones* (10), and no city had more known secretaries or hipparchs. Our records for offices outside of the generalship are patchy at best, but it does appear as if Heracleans served in league magistracies almost as frequently as some of the cities of old Aetolia itself. Certainly if the Aetolians were invited into Heraclea as part of an internal dispute, it is reasonable to suppose that the assembly of the *koinon* would look with favor upon those Heracleans who had brought an important city into their League at a moment of crisis in central Greece.

That the cities of old Aetolia continued to dominate the generalship is not especially surprising. Offices like secretary and general were won by election at the League's annual assembly at Thermon, at which any citizen of a League city could vote. Since Thermon was firmly in the Aetolian heartland, however, native Aetolians presumably dominated the

¹⁹ Thus Rzepka (2011) 95-7. For earlier discussions supporting the Heraclean generalship, see Granger (2000) 98, Scholten (2000) 94.

²⁰ Grainger (2000) 48-54. See Lefèvre (2000), Rousset (2000), *SEG* L 518, and Bertrand (2002) for revisions to Grainger's generalship list, none of which affect the argument here, though on the basis of Rzepka (2011) a fourth Heraclean generalship in 262/1 accepted by Grainger is dropped. List of Heraclean *hieromnemones* at Lefèvre (1998b) 93.

assembly. 21 The five-to-ten year gap between Heraclean incorporation and the granting of League offices to Heracleans most likely represents the time it took for Heraclean notables to accrue sufficient goodwill with their new federal colleagues. As we shall see, Aratus of Sicyon also needed several years to make connections within the Achaean League before he was elected general. Scholten's notion, that the Aetolian League used offices to enhance the stability of their "buffer zone" with Macedon when it became apparent that Antigonus Gonatas would be able to re-forge that kingdom, requires that Aetolian notables had both a high degree of control over elections, and a fine sense of their collective geopolitical best interests.²² This is possible; but better perhaps to see the elections for magistracies as a competition, one often won by 'old' Aetolians (who had the advantages of custom and geography), but one that some Heracleans, by virtue of their services to the League, could also win. Once the League assembly got into the habit of electing Heracleans to high office, and once certain Heraclean families had established a reputation for competent service, then the threshold for Heraclean election was lowered, so that over time the number of Heraclean office holders approached that of some of the old Aetolian cities.

Such wholesale adoption of an outside city was more or less unparalleled. Nor was it the only means by which the Aetolians could control territory beyond their traditional homeland. In this same period, Amphissa in West Locris was part of the *koinon*, but the Amphissans held no Aetolian magistracies, and indeed, were so far removed from the government of the federation that they might have been notionally independent.²³ The

²¹ On the dominance of Aetolia, see O'Neil (1984-6) 45-51, Scholten (2000) 44-5, Rzepka (2011). On the assembly more generally, see Larsen (1952).

²² Scholten (2000) 44-51.

²³ Scholten (2000) 44.

position of the other Spercheios peoples also contrasts strongly with that of the Heracleans. At some point between 278 and 276, Dolopia became part of the Aetolian League.²⁴ This has been seen either as an attempt to spite Antigonus Gonatas, or as the result of a grand bargain with him that exchanged Aetolian military support for control of the region.²⁵ Considering that the Aetolians might have been allied with Antigonus as early as 281, and that Aetolian troops played an important role in his capture of Cassandreia, the latter of these two options is probably to be preferred.²⁶ But in neither scenario did the Dolopians themselves have much say in the matter. As a result, it is not terribly surprising to find that the Dolopians played almost no role in the administration of the League.²⁷ The poverty and sparse population of the region probably also limited the influence of its notables in League politics. The region's geography also worked against it, since it was both distant from old Aetolia (which made it more difficult to attend League assemblies there), and formed the northeastern border of the League (which presumably meant that in times of war the Dolopians had more pressing matters on their mind than federal office). In other words, a combination of factors, including geography, demographics, and the circumstances in which Dolopia entered the League, led to a lack of Dolopians in high office.

Ainis was the next of the Spercheios Valley regions to join the League, probably in 273/2.²⁸ We have no evidence that she was forced to join, and indeed soon after, one of her

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²⁴ See Grainger (1995) 321-2 for the dating.

²⁵ Opposed to Antigonus: Scholten (2000) 47. Allied with Antigonus: Grainger (1999) 112-13. See Grainger (1995) 324-5 for the strategic value of the area to Aitolia.

²⁶ Alliance: Just. 24.1.2-3. Cassandreia: Polyaenus, *Strat.* 4.6.18.

²⁷ Grainger (2000) suggested that Syragos, the Aetolian *stratēgos* in 226/5, was a Dolopian (10). But the evidence for this is extremely circumstantial, and Graninger (2011) is right to reject it (25-6). Grainger records no other potential Dolopian magistrates in his prosopography.

²⁸ On the dating, see Grainger (1999) 114, Scholten (2000) 51.

citizens appears as a treasurer witnessing an important Aetolian League treaty.²⁹ But the Ainians were slower to achieve high office, and did so with less frequency than the Heracleans, holding the secretaryship in 194/3, and the generalship in 189/8 and 176/5.³⁰ This is not terribly surprising, given the dramatic events of the intervening decade. While Heraclea was the first city in the Spercheios Valley to join the League, by the time Ainis joined, she was surrounded on three sides by the cities of the League. The Aetolian League had also covered itself in glory in the war against the Gauls. Statues of Aetolian generals adorned the temple of Apollo at Delphi; alongside them was a statue of personified Aetolia, sitting atop a pile of Gallic arms. Gallic shields were hung from the western and southern sides of the temple, to match the Persian shields from Marathon hanging on the northern and eastern sides.³¹ It was probably the prestige of the League (alongside nervousness about a resurgent Macedon) that convinced the Ainians to join it.³² But Ainis' bargaining position was a good deal worse that Heraclea's had been, and as a result the Aetolian assembly had no compelling reason to elect Ainian notables to high office. The status of the individuals involved must have mattered as well. The elite of Heraclea were likely to have been richer and better connected than their colleagues in tiny Ainis, and therefore more capable of gaining the attention and respect of other wealthy men in the League—or the voters at Thermon.

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 $^{^{29}}$ IG IX 12 1.3A. The dating of this decree is controversial. Funke, Gehrke, and Kolonas (1993) 134 n. 11 persuasively date the decree to 263/2, but Grainger (1999) argues for 271/0 (118-120) and dates down to the 240's have been suggested. See Graninger (2011) 26.

 $^{^{30}}$ Secretary: Grainger (2000) 71. General: IG IX 1^2 4b (194/3); IG IX 1^2 672 (176/5). The same man (Eupolemos) held both generalships.

³¹ On the decorations, see Champion (1995), Grainger (1999) 104, Scholten (2000) 39-40. Aetolian prestige was also boosted by the Delphic *Soteria* celebrating the saving of the shrine from the Gallic horde and by the granting of two Amphictionic votes to Aetolia (on which see Nachtergael [1977] 295-382). For the general importance of the victory over the Gauls to Aetolian prestige, see Funke (2000) 505, (2007) 84.

³² Grainger (1995) 326-7.

Other later joiners follow a similar pattern. Doris was, like Ainis, surrounded by the Aetolian League on three sides by the time she joined the League in the late 270's.³³ And like the Ainianes, the Dorians supplied a minor League official (a treasurer) very soon after their integration.³⁴ But no further magistrates from Doris are known. The Malians probably joined the Aetolian League between 262/1 and 260/59.³⁵ Soon thereafter, a Malian served as *grammateus* of the Delphic Amphictyony in 260/59. But Malis provides few other magistrates (only three *hieromnemones*) thereafter.³⁶ Heraclea therefore constitutes an important exception to how the Aetolians had been treating non-Aetolian territory. The Heracleans were both the first to be fully integrated into the League, and the first to gain high offices in it.³⁷

Although our focus here is on the Spercheios River Valley, it is worth noting that cities in other parts of Greater Aetolia followed paths similar to those discussed here. A good analogous example is the city of Stratos. Stratos was an Akarnanian city of some importance. Following the partition of the Akarnanian League between Alexander II of Epirus and the Aetolians, Stratos was in the portion that fell to Aetolia in the mid-third century. Stratos and the absorbed Akarnanian area were placed in their own *tele*, or district,

³³ Specifically between 273 (the last Metropolitan Dorian *hieromnemon*) and 271/70 (the first Dorian holding an Aetolian League office). Cf. Grainger (1995) 323.

³⁴ IG IX 1² 1.3A, I. 21 (Timandros being from Erinea in Doris).

³⁵ This depends on the identification of Melanthios of Lamia, honored at Delphi in 262/1 (*CID* IV 39), with Melanthios of Aetolia, the secretary of Amphictyony in 260/59 (*CID* IV 41-4). This is the position of Grainger (1995) 334 and Lefèvre (1998b) 93.

³⁶ Grainger (2000) 53.

³⁷ Mackil (2013) 360-1 suggests that only some Heracleans may have received federal citizenship, and that these men were subsequently the ones who attained League office. But, given the later prevalence of Heraclean office-holders, it seems more likely that citizenship was more widely offered, since federal citizenship was required for federal office (Larsen [1968] 204-5).

³⁸ Dany (1999) 87-98, Freitag (2015) 76.

and seem to have suffered little inference in their domestic affairs.³⁹ Nonetheless, the region had entered the League in a position of relative weakness, and like the Spercheios cities in such circumstances, it did not have any (known) early magistrates. The size of Stratos and its strategic location on the western border of the League, however, meant that it eventually did produce League generals.⁴⁰ Indeed, in the period between 180 and 161, it produced four generals, the most from any one city in that period.⁴¹ In total, Stratos produced seven generals and four *hieromnemones*, making it arguably one of the more successful cities within the League. Thus, although the success Heraclea found in federal integration was not matched by other Spercheios Valley regions, it was not an isolated instance within the context of the League as a whole. It also shows that relative prestige and the circumstances under which a city or region entered the League were important factors in determining its future success, but not the only such factors. Important regions that entered under disadvantageous circumstances might eventually achieve high League office.

The possibility of holding League office may have been one of the factors that kept Heraclean notables content with their membership in the League. 42 And we should hesitate before concluding that the possibility of holding League office did not influence the thinking of other notables in the regions that became Greater Aetolia. For while we know 73% of the League's generals, our knowledge of lesser office holders is considerably smaller. Only 20% of hipparchs and secretaries are known to us, and perhaps only 13% of *hieromnemones*. 43 The majority of the known League treasurers and *epilektarchontes* (a mysterious office,

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³⁹ Funke (2015) 95.

⁴⁰ On the strategic value of the area, see Scholten (2000) 90.

⁴¹ Grainger (2000) 49.

⁴² No future sign of discontent from Heraclea, Grainger (1995) 316.

⁴³ For the proportions and spread of offices, see Grainger (2000) 47-55.

perhaps with military duties) come from a single inscription.⁴⁴ But despite knowing relatively few of these minor magistrates, a surprising proportion come from beyond Old Aetolia, including 40% of the *hieromnemones*.⁴⁵ It is therefore probable that men from a wide variety of cities in Greater Aetolia held these less well-attested offices with some frequency.

In addition to its annual mass assemblies, the Aetolian League had a *synedrion* (sometimes referred to as a *boulā*). This was a proportionally representative body, in which cities were allotted more councilors the larger they were. This guaranteed the notables of every city at least one councilor every year. On the one hand, the *boulā* was quite large (perhaps up to 1500 members at the League's height), and its probouleutic functions probably very light. On the other hand, re-election to the *boulā* was probably very common, allowing men to hold office year after year. He *boulā* had important responsibilities. Besides its expected function of setting the agenda for assembly meetings, it was also responsible for selecting the location of extraordinary assemblies. Since most assemblies were presumably dominated by men from near the assembly site, careful selection of meeting places gave the *boulā* a degree of indirect influence over the assembly itself. The *boulā* was also responsible for selecting the judges sent to arbitrate between member states.

There were also certain offices attached to the *boulā*. Until the end of the third century, a board of *boularchoi* presided over the *boulā*. Afterwards two *prostatai* and a

⁴⁴ IG IX 1² 1.3a. On the *epiktarchontes*, see Scholten (2003) 74-5.

⁴⁵ Antonetti (2000) 178.

⁴⁶ On the League's constitution, see Larsen (1968) 197-203, Scholten (2003), Funke (2015) 102-17.

⁴⁷ On the size of the *boulā*, see Larsen (1968) 199-200, Funke (2015) 112.

⁴⁸ Thus Funke (2015) 112.

⁴⁹ Scholten (2003) 71.

⁵⁰ As at *IG* IX 1² 1.177+188. Cf. Larsen (1968) 210.

secretary carried out the same task.⁵¹ The duties of the *boularchoi* extended well beyond the management of council meetings: Lasagni has recently argued that they acted as important assistants to the League general and could even act independently in his stead.⁵² Even wider ranging were the powers of the secretive board of the *apoklētoi*—selectmen—who oversaw the day-to-day administration of the League. There were at least thirty *apoklētoi*, and they were likely drawn from the ranks of the boulā.⁵³ Although the extent of their power is difficult to determine, it appears to have been wide-ranging. During the war between Antiochus III and the Romans, members of this inner council acted as liaisons to the allied king (Polyb. 20.1.1). According to Livy, the council was also responsible for the plot to subvert Chalcis, Demetrias, and Sparta (35.34). As the League expanded, it became harder for the assembly to keep up with the pace of decision making, and the *boulā* and the apoklētoi accordingly became increasingly more important.⁵⁴ By belonging to these groups, local notables could therefore wield a significant amount of power without attaining the generalship.⁵⁵ Over the course of the third century, the number of *boularchontes* rose steadily from two to six. 56 Other minor officials such as treasurers and epilektarchontes served in boards. It may be that the desires of a burgeoning class of notables, all hungry for the prestige of federal office, played a role alongside bureaucratic necessity in spurring the

⁵¹ Funke (2007) 94.

⁵² Lasagni (2012) 175-8.

⁵³ Thus Sowoboda and Hermann (1913) 361-4, followed by Larsen (1968) 200-2 and Funke (2015) 113-14. Scholten (2003) 72 identifies them as the *boularchontes*. But we know from Polyb. 20.1.1 that the *apoklētoi* numbered at least thirty, while there never seemed to have been more than six *boularchontes* (for which, see Funke [2015] 116).

⁵⁴ Funke (2007) 96.

⁵⁵ O'Neil's (1984-6) focus on the League's supreme office may have led him to overemphasize the domination of the League by Old Aetolia (45-54).

⁵⁶ Funke (2015) 116-17.

growth of federal positions. And because the $boul\bar{a}$, at least, was representational, men from the cities of 'new' Aetolia were guaranteed a seat at the table.

Then there is the possibility that the prestige of membership in the League could be used by notables to further their own formal connections (via ties such as proxeny) with places beyond the League's borders. The next chapter will deal in more detail with the way in which such connections benefitted notables. For now, it suffices to observe that such connections were desirable, and it seems at least possible that men who belonged to prestigious leagues had an easier time securing them than they would have had, had they been forced to rely solely upon their personal reputation and the renown of their home towns. Grainger has observed, for example, that proxeny connections that minor Aetolian settlements such as Mystakos, Chasilios, and Dexios had with Athens were formed, not because the actual traffic between these villages and Attica required them, but rather because the villages were members of the League and a formal relationship between the League and Athens was important to both parties.⁵⁷ Perhaps the prestige of League membership can also explain why the men of Heraclea were able to achieve thirty such proxeny agreements with cities from Italy to the Propontis.⁵⁸ Cities frequently carried out their own politics of proxenia even while in leagues. ⁵⁹ And, presumably, men from more important cities needed to rely less upon the prestige that league membership might bring. But many of the member states of the Aetolian League were small, and League membership presumably did help their notables forge outside connections.

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⁵⁷ Grainger (2000) 65.

⁵⁸ Grainger (2000) 64.

⁵⁹ See Mack (2015) 208-13.

Nor did such notables necessarily have to sacrifice their local positions in order to gain this broader authority. The boards of seven treasurers and epilektarchontes have led some scholars to speculate that Aetolia was divided into seven administrative regions. ⁶⁰ But the evidence for such districting in Aetolia is slim, with certain proof for districts (telē) existing only for Akarnania and West Lokris. 61 Corsten has argued that the entire League was divided into districts of roughly equal size, so that the districts functioned as a level of regional government between city and federation. ⁶² Funke is, however, probably right to observe that the absence of evidence for $tel\bar{e}$ from old Aetolia suggests that the districts were likely originally small independent *koina*, later absorbed into the larger Aetolian League.⁶³ Within the League, they retained a surprising degree of internal autonomy. They had their own magistrates, and their central temples continued to play an important role in unifying their respective regions, both religiously and politically. ⁶⁴ In the case of the Ainianes and the Oitaians, they produced their own bronze coinage that circulated alongside federal coinage. 65 And when diplomats from Kytenion, a city in Doris, wished to go abroad and raise funds, they first sought approval from both the Aetolian League and the Dorian koinon.⁶⁶ In other words, for notables in a micro-federation, the risks to their standing of joining the Aetolian League were minimal. At worst, they would continue to hold the same sorts of magistracies

⁶⁰ Thus Scholten (2003) 75, following Funke (1985). Districting in some form or another is supported by Larsen (1968) 197, Corsten (1999) 133-59, Rzepka (2006), Mackil (2013) 382-4, Funke (2015) 94-6.

⁶¹ Stratos: *IG* IX 1² 1.3b. Lokrikon: *SGDI* 2070, *II*. 1-2; *IG* IX 1² 3.618+625A.

⁶² Corsten (1999) 133-59.

⁶³ Funke (1997) 158-9, (2007) 84, (2015) 95-6.

⁶⁴ Funke (2012) 65-6.

⁶⁵ Rousset (2015) 228, Funke (2016).

 $^{^{66}}$ SEG XXXVIII 1476 II. 9-10 (ψήφισμά τε παρ' Αἰτωλῶν φέροντες καὶ ἐπιστολὴν παρὰ Δωριέων). Cf. Bousquet (1988).

they currently held. But by joining the League, they added to this the prestige of belonging to one of the greatest powers in Greece, and the possibility of attaining even higher offices.

Heraclea was captured by the Romans in 191, and probably left independent in 189.⁶⁷
But by 184 the city is once more dating its decrees by the Aetolian League general.⁶⁸
Heraclea remained in the League until at least 175, and probably until 167.⁶⁹ In 167, the Romans forced the Aetolians to relinquish many of their territorial possessions, Oitaia, Ainis, Malis, and Doris among them.⁷⁰ The unfortunate Malians disappear thereafter as an independent entity. Their territory was perhaps divided between the Thessalians and the Oitaians.⁷¹ The other three groups, however, went on to operate as independent federations. In 165, they are all listed in a decree along with the Aetolian League.⁷² There is some degree of similarity between the constitutions of the three leagues: all, for example, were governed by boards of archons—Ainiarchs, Doriarchs, Boularchs—rather than a general.⁷³ Perhaps the form of these leagues became more homogenous under the influence of Aetolian districts.⁷⁴
At the very least, the continued or revived existence of *koina* (albeit at a smaller level) suggests a continued interest in the pursuit of honors beyond the *polis*.

The Spercheios Valley in the Thessalian League

⁶⁷ Capture: Livy 36.22-5. Independence: Livy 38.11.9; Polyb. 21.32.13 (the Romans ban the Aetolians from reclaiming any land the Romans conquered). Cf. Will (1967) 330, Martin (1975) 343-5 for discussion. ⁶⁸ SGDI 1959.

⁶⁹ A Heracleian inscription dated by the Aetolian *stratēgos* is the *terminus ante quem* (Daux [1934] 157).

⁷⁰ Martin (1975) 344.

⁷¹ Martin (1975) 345 argues for the division of Malis c. 167 BC. Graninger (2011) 36-7 argues that Malis was given to Thessaly by the Romans at the conclusion of the Syrian War. In either event, Malis alone fails to achieve a post-Aetolian period of independence.

⁷² SIG³ 653A. Cf. Graninger (2011) 34.

⁷³ Ainiarch: *IG* IX 2.5a+5b. Doriarch: *Syll*. ³ 770. Boularch (Oitaia): *IG* IX 1 226-30.

⁷⁴ See Martin (1975) 521-58, Funke (2007) 85.

By the outbreak of the Achaean War in 147/6, the Oitaian League had been absorbed into the Achaean League (Paus. 7.14.1). The reasons behind this integration are somewhat obscure, and it is entirely unknown how willingly the local notables of the area acquiesced to their incorporation into this greater power. Certainly by the time of the Achaean War, they were discontented with their lot. 75 At some point after that war's conclusion, Oitaia joined the Thessalian League. Precisely when this occurred is a vexed question, with dates ranging from soon after the conclusion of the Achaean War in 146, to the territorial reorganization of Augustus in the region in 27 BC.⁷⁶ It has recently been suggested that the archaeological evidence from Heraclea shows widespread destruction (and possibly the subsequent abandonment of the site) during the First Mithridatic War (c. 86 BC).⁷⁷ If this is the case, then an earlier date for Thessalian integration is probably preferable. A fragmentary secondcentury decree (IG IX 2.103) from Phthiotic Achaea orders that an honorific inscription for three Thessalian League generals be set up in Heraclea, among other places. This implies that one of the three generals was a Heraclean, and thus that at least one man from Heraclea attained high office in the Thessalian League.⁷⁸ But a lack of precise dates for either Heraclean integration, or the honorific decree itself, prevents us from knowing how soon after integration his rise to prominence was.⁷⁹

⁷⁵ Thus the Achaeans besiege Heraclea during the war (the city having apparently left the Achaean League in the previous year, in obedience to Roman orders) (Paus. 7.15.2).

⁷⁶ 146 BC: Helly (2001). 27 BC: Martin (1975) 352-3. Scholars have overwhelmingly opted to associate the various acquisitions of the Thessalian League with Roman interventions in the area. But Bouchon and Helly (2015) 246 are right to observe that "the various steps of this process of integration remain obscure, and…we need to acknowledge that the political mechanism behind it is unknown."

⁷⁷ Bouvia (2010) 190. Cf. Plut. Sull. 20.1 for evidence of fighting in the region.

⁷⁸ Martin (1975) 352.

⁷⁹ See Helly (2001) on the difficulties of dating the inscription.

The Thessalian League differed from the Aetolian League in its unwillingness to allow the residents of non-tetradic Thessaly to hold high office. Among the various *perioikoi* who were traditionally subservient to the Thessalians, the Phthiotic Achaeans never contributed a general, and the Perrhaibians provided their first (and perhaps only) League general about a century and a half after their initial absorption. The League priesthoods for Zeus Eleutherios in Larisa and Athena Itonia at Phila were so utterly dominated by men from tetradic Thessaly that it is possible that non-Thessalians were excluded from their rites entirely. The potential Heraclean general, therefore, represents a potential departure from typical Thessalian policy.

The Ainians may have been even more atypical in this regard. During the imperial period, Ainis became, in many ways, the center of the Thessalian League. Her chief city, Hypata, rivaled (and perhaps surpassed) the old League center of Larisa in prestige. Some wealthy Ainians (the Eubiotoi and Kylloi of Hypata) came to hold the office of League stratēgos several times between the first and third centuries AD, along with many other prestigious regional and provincial positions. To argue that Ainian notables were rewarded with office for bringing their koinon into the Thessalian League requires us to determine both the date of Thessalian integration and the earliest offices held by Ainians. Neither is an easy

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⁸⁰ On the Thessalian League, see Stählin (1924), Larsen (1968) 282-94, Bouchon (2005), Graninger (2011), Bouchon and Helly (2015).

⁸¹ Graninger (2011) 39. Cf. Kramolisch (1978). The Magnesians were traditionally also Thessalian 'perioikoi,' but established their own koinon in 196 BC. This koinon would persist (with a brief hiatus in the mid-second century BC) into the imperial period. Cf. Larsen (1968) 295, Martin (1975) 77-116, Graninger (2011) 14-15.

⁸² Graninger (2011) 153-4.

⁸³ Larsen (1968) 294, Sekunda (1997) 208.

⁸⁴ On this family see Larsen (1953), Sekunda (1997), Helly (1998).

matter. The *terminus post quem* for Thessalian integration must be between 87 and 62 BC. 85 The earliest direct confirmation of Ainian involvement in the League comes from the AD 30's, in the form of a manumission list dated by the Thessalian *stratēgos*. 86 Most scholars are willing to accept an earlier date for integration. Larsen and Martin, for instance, argue for 27 BC (the year when Augustus included the Ainians as Thessalians in the Delphic Amphictiony). 87 Sekunda would prefer an earlier date, perhaps after the Battle of Pharsalus in 48 BC. 88 Graninger and Bouchon and Helly are more cautious about dating, but see the integration of the Spercheios River valley into the Thessalian League as a first-century BC phenomenon. 89

Then comes the question of the first Ainian general. A certain Eubiotus was general of the Thessalian League in 28/7 BC. 90 No demonym is given, but the name suggests that he may have been a member of the Hypatan Eubiotoi. If this is the case, then there may be a rather close connection between the integration of Ainis and the earliest Ainian generalship. 91 But we also know of a Eubiotus son of Eukolos who was prominent at the same time and almost certainly came from Larisa. 92 A manumission list from Hypata is dated by the generalship of a Eubiotus. A second portion of the inscription names one Polycritus as

⁸⁵ 87 BC (an Ainian League decree honoring Lucullus [*IG* IX 2.38]) is preferred by Martin (1975) 363. 62 BC (the approximate date of the last verifiable Ainian League inscription according to Pomtow [1921]) is the date preferred by Sekunda (1997) 208.

⁸⁶ IG IX 2.15.

⁸⁷ Larsen (1953) 87, Martin (1975) 363-4.

⁸⁸ Sekunda (1997) 208. The dating depends upon a Hypatan inscription (*IG* IX 2.12) dated by a Thessalian League *stratēgos* Italos. A man by that name served as general in 46/5 BC, but Kramolisch (1978) 114-15 thinks he is a different person from the one mentioned in the Hypatan inscription.

⁸⁹ Graninger (2011) 38. Bouchon and Helly (2015) 246.

⁹⁰ IG IX 2.415A *l.* 38.

⁹¹ Larsen (1953) 87 and Sekunda (1997) 209-10. Both put him in the Hypatan Eubiotoi family.

⁹² Larsen (1953) 87 rightly distinguishes between these men. Sekunda (1997) 211-12 argues that he was a member of the Hypata Eubiotoi, on the specious grounds that all Thessalian League officials by that name must be related. See Helly's (1998) criticism of this point.

general.⁹³ If Sekunda is right in arguing that this Polycritus is the same as the first-century BC Larisan by the same name, then this, too, would be evidence for a quick Ainian ascension to office.⁹⁴

Unfortunately, our first certain evidence for an Ainian as League general comes only from AD 10.95 While it is therefore possible that the integration of Ainis and the holding of the League's highest office were closely correlated, it is also possible that a substantial gap existed between the two events. That said, circumstantial evidence rather suggests that there was a close correlation. Regardless of how long it took, the essential fact remains that Ainians did achieve office, whereas most other *perioikoi* did not. Graninger is right to observe that "it is striking how quickly the Ainianes find themselves in positions of great political power within Thessaly." As with Heraclea and the Aetolians, the simplest explanation is to posit that because the Ainians had brought their territory into the League voluntarily, they found it easier to gain goodwill (and therefore high office) than other non-Thessalian members of the League had found it. The Hypatan Eubiotoi were also important magistrates in the Ainian League, precisely the sort of big fish in a small pond who might have been amenable to the opportunities joining the most powerful League in the region might provide. 97

Finally, it is worth noting that even if there was a gap between joining and generalship, this does not prove that the Ainians failed to hold office on the federal level. The

⁹³ *IG* IX 2.19.

⁹⁴ Sekunda (1997) 209. The argument for the first century BC rests largely upon letter forms, since generals named Eubiotos and Polycritus are attested for the Flavian period as well.

⁹⁵ Graninger (2011) 38.

⁹⁶ Graninger (2011) 39.

⁹⁷ A Eubiotus appears on an Ainian League coin, presumably as Ainarch (Sekunda [1997] 210).

Thessalian League was governed by a proportionately representative *synedrion* (in which larger cities were represented by more councilors). While the number of members (334 in the time of Tiberius) paled in comparison to the 1500-member Aetolian *boulā*, the political class of Thessaly was probably a good deal smaller as well. 99 So, as with the Aetolian League, many local notables who wanted to participate in federal politics probably could. Taken as a whole, the evidence suggests that at least some Ainian notables were eager to participate in Thessalian politics almost from the moment of their integration into that League.

This possibility that it was the desires of local notables, and not just the strategic machinations of greater powers, that shaped the history of the Spercheios region has never been properly appreciated. Graninger, for example, sees in the second and first centuries a return to "traditional patterns of dominance and subordination," that is to say, as a story of Aetolian hegemony giving way to Thessalian hegemony. ¹⁰⁰ Rousset, too, sees in the Dorian and Oitaian Leagues fragile micro-federations absorbed by larger powers. ¹⁰¹ Even as Aetolian scholarship has moved away from seeing the Aetolian League as a rapacious band of pirates, many scholars still view the expansion of the League from an Aetolia-centric perspective. ¹⁰² At best, scholars like Grainger posit a mutually beneficial strategic relationship that made joining the Aetolian League an appealing prospect for many minor powers. ¹⁰³ But perhaps we ought also to consider League integration as something actively

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⁹⁸ For the constitution of the Thessalian League, see Larsen (1968) 283-9, Bouchon and Helly (2015) 242-5.

⁹⁹ The Tiberian *synedrion: IG* IX 2.261. Thessaly had always been an oligarchic region, and the reformed Thessalian League had a steep property qualification for office holding (Cf. Livy 34.51.4-6; Larsen [1968] 284-5)

¹⁰⁰ Graninger (2011) 8.

¹⁰¹ Rousset (2015) 230.

¹⁰² Thus in the treatments of Grainger (1999) and Scholten (2000).

¹⁰³ See especially Grainger (1995).

sought by some local notables to enhance their own status. There were many losers in this contest, to be sure. Possession of high office, and above all the generalship, was not something that the notables of the League's core territories relinquished lightly.

In conclusion, when notables brought over their homelands voluntarily (and thus did the League a great service), league assemblies would reciprocate by electing them to higher office. Other factors beyond the way in which a newly integrated region entered the League also influenced the future success of its notables in achieving high office: its relative size and prestige, its distance from the League assembly site, the presence of a distracting outside border with bellicose neighbors. In the case of the Spercheios Valley, many incorporated peoples suffered from one or more disadvantage that made it difficult to capture the generalship. But the Aetolians League offered other opportunities for to exercise power and to accrue honor beyond high magistracies.

Indeed, it is only our belief that *poleis* required complete and perfect autonomy in every matter that makes membership in the Aetolian League seem onerous. But this belief in the fundamentality of autonomy to polishood is rooted in the experience of Athens, Sparta, and other great cities, not the smaller settlements of the fringes of the Greek world. The people of the Spercheios Valley had always been accustomed to larger encroaching neighbors. For its notables, the loss of autonomy in foreign affairs did not equate to a loss of political identity, especially if the loss was compensated by the possibility of achieving renown on a much larger stage than their own homelands. The fact that no major city seems to have ever voluntarily defected from the League, reinforces the notion that the benefits the League was able to offer to members outweighed any costs in autonomy. In sum, the ability

of the Aetolian League to integrate at least some elites, combined with the looming threats of Macedon and other hostile neighbors, gave the League a great degree of internal stability.

Achaean League

The Aetolian League was, at its core, a rural koinon, one composed of villages, ethnē, and small and scattered cities. The mountainous region it dominated "lay," as P. Funke put it, "in the lee of historical events." There was, to be sure, no shortage of similar regions in the Peloponnese. The Achaean heartland itself was composed of twelve cities that were little more than villages. Yet at the same time, the Peloponnese had many more cities than northwestern Greece, and many of these Peloponnesian cities were long accustomed to occupying the center stage of Greek history. There was wealthy Corinth, mother of more colonies than any other city. Proud Argos, who had sacrificed generation after generation of her sons in order to joust with Sparta for hegemony of the Peloponnese. Elis, to whose judgement all Greeks were accustomed to submit themselves every four years at the Olympic games. Megalopolis, whose vast walls—encircling far more land than the city actually occupied—were a testament to hegemonic ambitions as yet unfulfilled. And, of course, Sparta, who even in her dotage would not be led along by another. In the north, the valor of the Aetolians during the Gallic War—eternally proclaimed by monument and festival at holy Delphi—made the Aetolian heartland more prestigious than late-comers such as Dolopia. The Achaeans had performed no similar service for all of Greece. Unlike in the land of the Aetolians, the heartland of the Achaean federation was significantly less important than many of the cities of its periphery.

¹⁰⁴ Funke (2001) 189.

For notables from smaller cities that had little history of major independent action, membership in the League was probably more palatable. The Achaean League possessed a federal *boulē* that was most likely representational, and thus offered to Achaean notables the same sort of council-participation that the Aetolian *boulā* offered. Although its size is unknown, it was probably at least as large as its Aetolian equivalent. And in the case of such smaller communities, the balance of prestige between League and member state also favored the League, especially once the League had begun to show itself capable of defying Macedon.

Thus, although our evidence for the Achaean League is hampered by a comparative dearth of relevant inscriptions (the Peloponnese only having picked up the epigraphic habit fairly late, at the end of the third century), we can still find evidence of how the League was useful to men from smaller towns, particularly in old Achaea. ¹⁰⁶ Families from these towns might have generations of League service, much like the Eubiotoi and Kylloi of Hypata in the Thessalian League. Euryleon of Aigion, for instance, was League general in 211/10 (Polyb. 10.21.1). ¹⁰⁷ His son Xenophon was a representative of League to the meeting of Philip V and Titus Flamininus in 198, and later to the Roman Senate. ¹⁰⁸ Xenophon's son Alkithos was, in turn, a League representative to Ptolemy VI Philometer in 169, and his son Cleogenes was a *proxenos* of Chaleion in West Locris. ¹⁰⁹ One suspects that it was this long history of service through the League that gave each successive generation easier access to the world of embassies and foreign connections. Indeed, at times League office seems

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¹⁰⁵ Rizakis (2015) 127-8.

¹⁰⁶ On Peloponnesian epigraphy, see Kralli (2017) 400-2, Shipley (2018) 263. On the world of proxenies and embassies more generally, see the following chapter.

¹⁰⁷ Euryleon and his family are discussed at Habicht (1994) 223.

¹⁰⁸ Polyb. 18.1.4, Livy 32.32.12.

¹⁰⁹ Xenophon: Polyb. 28.12.9. Cleogenes: *IG* IX I² 3.721B = Rizakis (1995) no. 677.

directly correlated to personal success abroad, as in the case of Teison of Patras, who was probably only able to become *proxenos* of Aptera thanks to his status as navarch for the League in 193/2, and the League's involvement in Cretan affairs around that time. In most cases, the lack of inscriptional evidence leaves the local importance of the League open to question. It is impossible to ascertain, for instance, how important membership in the freshly re-formed Achaean League made several men from Aigion and Boura, considered suitable for the grant of Aetolian proxeny they received ca. 272-260. While not disregarding the importance of personal connections, and the ability of cities to create networks of foreign contacts without the presence of a League, it still seems safe to say that the boost in prestige and efficaciousness brought by League membership helped Achaeans, just as it helped Aetolians.

Epigraphy can, however, show that small cities beyond the Achaean heartland could also benefit from League membership, especially when they were in an adversarial relationship with a much larger city, or when their status as a polis was itself in question. Thus, the tiny community of Aigosthena in the Megarid benefitted from belonging to the Achaean and (later) the Boeotian Leagues, since membership reaffirmed its polishood in the face of Megarian claims that it was a village belonging to Megara. And polis-status under a League in turn allowed the Aigosthenians to form *proxenia* relations with other cities. As we shall see, other small towns, such as Epidauros and Cleonai, also benefitted from a League membership that put them on more equal footing with larger League members, such

 $^{^{110}}$ ICret. II 3.6E = Rizakis (1995) no. 683. Cf. Livy 35.26.7.

¹¹¹ IG IX I² 1.12D II. 14-33 = Rizakis (1995) no. 667.

¹¹² Exemplified in *IG* VII 1, wherein the Megarians assert their right to grant proxeny requests on behalf of the Aigosthenitans (e.g., as if Aigosthena was one of the Megarian *komai*).

¹¹³ E.g. *IG* VII 207, 208, 213, 219, 223. Cf. *SEG* XLIX 500, Mack (2015) 216-17.

as Corinth or Argos. The problem, of course, is that all of these benefits tended to accrue only to smaller cities. It is unlikely that a notable from Corinth or Argos would be willing to follow a general from an Achaean village wheresoever he might lead for the sake of councillorship in the League assembly. Nor did men from such cities need the prestige boost of League membership to further their connections abroad.

Within the context of the Achaean League, it therefore makes more sense to focus upon the chief magistracy, the generalship, since this was likely the only prize powerful notables from prestigious cities considered worth having. Generals and other magistrates were elected at the annual assembly of the League, the *synodos*, in Aegium in Achaea. Until 217, the *synodos* was the primary assembly, open (probably) to all men of military age. Little surprise, then, that the generalship was dominated by men from old Achaean cities. As we have seen, even the Aetolians tended to dominate the generalship of their League. It took exceptional circumstances for a man from outside old Achaea to attain the generalship, and in many ways both the growth and the near-collapse of the Achaean League in the third century can be seen as the result of the contest for this coveted position.

The western Achaean cities of Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, and Pharae reestablished the Achaean League in 281/0.¹¹⁶ Five years later, the city of Aegium expelled its Macedonian garrison and joined the League, followed soon thereafter by the city of Bura (Polyb. 2.41.13).

Larsen (1972), and the recent overview at Kralli (2017) 148-56.

¹¹⁴ Whether the *synodos* became a representational body at some point between 220-200 BC is a vexed issue and one that, fortunately, falls outside of the period under consideration here (from the formation of the League in 281/0 to the Battle of Sellasia in 222). For more discussion, see Aymard (1938), Giovannini (1969),

¹¹⁵ O'Neil (1984-6) 40-3.

¹¹⁶ Polyb. 2.41.11-12. Cf. Rizakis (1995) 259-62. The dating follows Larsen (1968) 216. An earlier fifth-century Achaean League had dissolved by the end of the fourth century, perhaps because of the chaos introduced by Philip, Alexander, and the earliest Successors (Polyb. 2.41.9-10). Cf. Rizakis (1995) 26-30, Beck (1997) 55-66, Kralli (2017) 156.

A tyrant had ruled in Bura, but either his fellow citizens, or the Achaeans under their general Margus, killed him.¹¹⁷ Margus himself was a citizen of Caryneia, an Achaean city as yet unaffiliated with the League. Caryneia, too, possessed a tyrant, a man by the name of Iseas. The Achaean League was preparing to make war upon Caryneia when Iseas voluntarily abdicated and allowed his city to join the League (Polyb. 2.41.14-15). He thereby saved his life, but apparently not his political career, for no more is heard of him. Margus, on the other hand, went on to further distinguished service in the League. In 255, the Achaeans replaced their board of two generals with a single generalship.¹¹⁸ Margus was the first man elected to this illustrious office (Polyb. 2.43.2). He remained an important figure right up to his death in battle against the Illyrians (Polyb. 2.10.5).

Polybius portrays the reestablishment of the Achaean League as a straightforward struggle between democracy-loving Achaeans and the despotic cronies of Macedon. We have already seen in a previous chapter that this is an oversimplification. Rather than a war between patriotic democrats and self-serving tyrants, the early years of the re-formed Achaean League were actually a battle between local notables, some of whom derived prestige (and, at least at Aegium, martial support) from Macedon, and others who did not. It is probably not a coincidence that the restoration of the League occurred at a moment of Macedonian weakness. At around the same time, Ptolemy Ceraunus won a naval victory against Antigonus Gonatas and began to make a serious bid for the throne of Macedon. In the

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¹¹⁷ Polybius alternately states that the Burians killed the tyrant (Βούριοι, τὸν τύραννον ἀποκτείναντες, 2.41.13) and that he died "on account of Margus and the Achaeans" (διὰ Μάργου καὶ τῶν Ἁχαιῶν, 2.41.14).

¹¹⁸ Polyb. 2.43.1-2. For discussion of the transition, see Aymard (1938) 390, Walbank (1957) 235, Larsen (1968) 217

¹¹⁹ See especially Polyb. 2.41.6-10.

Peloponnese, King Areus of Sparta was rousing his country from its long slumber. Friends of Macedon in Achaea found themselves suddenly vulnerable to their local rivals. Margus' later prominence in League politics showed that participation in the League could lead not only to success at home, but also to prestige and power at a regional level. This lesson would not go unnoticed.

In 251, the twenty-year-old Aratus of Sicyon 'liberated' his city from the tyrant Nicocles and joined it to the Achaean League. ¹²¹ Aratus' decision has been variously interpreted. Many have proposed an argument from expediency. Walbank, for example, argued that Aratus' decision to recall several hundred exiles inadvertently triggered a fiscal and political crisis, and that the union with Achaea was accordingly "a practical step dictated by emergency." ¹²² By joining the League, the argument goes, Aratus gained friends beyond Sicyon, and this, in turn, gave him the clout he needed to stabilize the newly freed city. This view has been endorsed by a number of later scholars. ¹²³ Alternatively, Urban has argued that Aratus had planned to join the Achaean League even before he undertook his coup. By exiling Nicocles and his followers and reintroducing hundreds of former exiles, Aratus created a ruling class antagonistic to Macedon. Such men were more than willing to forfeit some of their sovereignty and join the anti-Macedonian Achaeans. For Aratus, the benefit of

¹²⁰ On Ptolemy Ceraunus, see Memnon *FGrH* 434 F 8.4-6. Buraselis (1982) 152-4, Hammond and Walbank (1988) 245. On the early reign of Areus, see Cartledge and Spawforth (1989) 32-3. The importance of these events to the rise of Achaea was suggested by Walbank (1957) 233. Cf. Kralli (2017) 119, Shipley (2018) 57. ¹²¹ Plut. *Arat.* 4-9; Polyb. 2.43.3. On Aratus, see Walbank (1933), Will (1966) 287-9, Griffin (1982) 80-7, Paschidis (2008) 232-51, Börm (2017) 60-5.

¹²² Walbank (1933) 36-9 (quote at 38). According to Plutarch, "the city was plotted against by outsiders and eyed with jealousy by Antigonus because it had regained its freedom, while it was full of internal disturbances and faction" (*Aratus* 9.3).

¹²³ For example, Griffin (1982) 81, Kralli (2017) 158-60, and Shipley (2018) 63.

all of this was that the Achaeans were allies of Ptolemy II, and so could mediate in his own attempts to convince Ptolemy to send him funds. 124

Urban's theory grants Aratus a great deal of foresight. It also requires that the Achaeans acted as a liaison between Ptolemy and Aratus, despite a lack of any ancient evidence that they did so. ¹²⁵ The entire scenario also hinges upon strongly committed "pro-" and "anti-" Macedonian factions in Sicyon. The actual situation in Sicyon was probably much more fluid and complex. There is no real reason to assume (as Urban does) that Nicocles was a puppet of Macedon. ¹²⁶ Aratus, meanwhile, did inherit familial ties to the Antigonids. ¹²⁷ The loyalties of the Sicyonian upper class were probably dictated largely by expediency, and so were neither as clear-cut, nor as consistent, as Urban imagines them.

Walbank's theory is probably closer to the mark. In the wake of his successful coup, Aratus seems to have made overtures to anyone (Antigonus, Ptolemy, the Achaeans) who might be able to help him remain in power. The example of Margus and his success at Caryneia may have convinced Aratus that the League was capable of backing the interests of

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¹²⁴ Urban (1979) 33-7. Golan's (1973) argument that Aratus joined the Achaean League "in order to implement a policy promising long-standing unity in Greece" perhaps takes the rhetoric of liberation found in Polybius and Plutarch too literally (59). In 251 there was little reason to suspect that the League would amount to much beyond a regional power in the Northern Peloponnese. The weakness of early Achaea also seems to rule out Lolos' (2007) argument that Aratus joined the League to "challenge Macedonian supremacy."

¹²⁵ Urban (1979) 37 argues that Aratus in his autobiography deliberately downplayed the role of the Achaeans. But there is no particular reason why Aratus should have chosen to do this. More to the point, the evidence for a link between Ptolemy and the (pre-Aratus) Achaean League is circumstantial at best. The Achaeans may not have been Ptolemy's allies at all. On the potential alliance, see Urban (1979) 11-13. On broader Ptolemaic concerns in the region, see Buraselis (1993).

¹²⁶ The presence of a royal Macedonian stud in Sicyon (Plut. *Arat.* 6.2) and the fact that the Corinthians (then allies of Macedon by virtue of the Macedonian garrison on the Acrocorinth) almost went to aid Nicocles during Aratus' coup (*Arat.* 9.1) are the chief pieces of evidence for tying Nicocles to Macedon (Urban [1979] 21-2 n.87). But Hammond and Walbank (1988) 298 rightly observe that this merely means that Nicocles was not Antigonus' enemy. Much the same could be said (initially) for Aratus. Cf. above, Chapter 1, for more on the Sicyonian tyrants.

¹²⁷ Cf. Holleaux (1942), 43-6, Urban (1979) 25-9, Paschidis (2008) 523-32.

¹²⁸ Cf. Walbank (1933) 33-40; Paschidis (2008) 235.

those notables who had allied themselves with it. That said, the Achaean League of 251 consisted only of the twelve traditional cities of the Achaean heartland, places so small that "though counted all together, had not the power of a single considerable city" (Plut. *Arat*. 9.5). Sicyon was larger than these cities, and it is not clear how the Achaeans alone could have raised either the money Aratus needed to resolve the exile crisis peacefully or the arms Aratus would have needed to hold the city by force. 129

Perhaps the lure of the Achaean League for Aratus was not that it could provide him with aid, but rather that it provided him with a further arena in which to enlarge his own personal renown. Sicyon may have been more powerful than the Achaean cities, but it was not a city of the first (or perhaps even the second) rank in Greece at large. It would not, in other words, be beneath her dignity to join a small League, and the federal magistracies of such a League would have been actual honors worth having for her notables. Walbank argues that Aratus cannot have been swayed by such considerations, since he was only twenty when Sicyon joined the Achaeans, and thus far too young for the generalship or other high office. But youth did not deter Aratus from taking his hometown from his political rival Nicocles. And he may have led Sicyonian forces in a battle against Sparta soon

¹²⁹ It took 175 talents from Ptolemy to resolve Sicyon's financial difficulties (Plut. *Arat.* 11.2, 13.4). Polybius, meanwhile, considered that the value of all the property of Peloponnese in his (much more prosperous) time came to well under 6000 talents (Polyb. 2.62.1-4). The comparison is imprecise, but does suggest that the twelve towns of Achaea would have difficulty raising the funds Aratus required.

¹³⁰ In keeping with the observation of Shipley (2018) 291 that "if elite members of different *poleis* were willing to cooperate with one another in military and diplomatic dealings at a level above that of a single territory, their motive—especially in an unstable world—was surely not merely geopolitical security but also the securing—as individuals or as groups—of their own participation in certain cultural roles and of their social standing."

¹³¹ This in contrast to extremely prestigious cities such as Athens or Rhodes, who did manage their foreign affairs differently from other cities.

¹³² Walbank (1933) 39.

¹³³ An endeavor that, it should be noted, Aratus thought would entail a prolonged and bitter war between his partisans in a local fort and Nicocles in the city (Plut. *Arat.* 5.3).

thereafter.¹³⁴ The impression our sources give us is of a young man supremely confident in his own abilities, exactly the sort of person who might consider himself a suitable candidate for supreme command, regardless of his age.

Furthermore, when it came to taking office, the relative size of the Achaean cities and Sicyon played to Aratus' advantage. On a practical level, Achaean generals were elected by direct assembly at the League's annual autumn meeting at Aegium. Aegium was closer to the other Achaean towns than it was to Sicyon, to be sure, but it was not so far removed that Aratus would not be able to rely on a sizable Sicyonian contingent at every assembly. And there was also the prestige Aratus derived from being the first man in the first city of the League. Plutarch tells us that Aratus "had made great contributions to the [Achaean] commonwealth by his own reputation and the power of his native city," and that he won the admiration of his commanders while serving in the cavalry because "he gave his services like those of any ordinary person to the one who from time to time was general of the Achaeans, whether he was a man of Dyme or of Tritaea, or of a meaner city" (Plut. Arat. 11.1).

In the event, Aratus served with the Achaean cavalry for several years. We are told by Plutarch that he found favor with the Achaean elite with whom he served, and this undoubtedly helped him achieve his first generalship in 245/4. He then served as general every other year (in accordance with a League law preventing a man from holding two

¹³⁴ Paus. 8.10.6-10. Pausanias' account contains factual inaccuracies that have caused some scholars to reject its historicity entirely (on which see Tarn [1925], Urban [1979] 28-34). Walbank (1933) 36 places the battle in 251, on the argument that Aratus and his Sicyonian troops seem to be operating alongside the Achaean League contingent rather than as part of it. Thus the battle occurred during the brief interval between the coup in Sicyon and Sicyon's integration into the Achaean League. But no other Achaean commander is named, and Pausanias is not writing with a great deal of care nor was his knowledge always beyond reproach. The date of 251 therefore must be taken as extremely provisional.

¹³⁵ Plut. Arat. 11.1. The dating of the generalship depends on Polyb. 2.43.3. Cf. Walbank (1957) 236.

sequential generalships). Aratus used the military power League office gave him to undertake a series of campaigns against Macedon and her allies at Corinth, Athens, Argos, and Arcadia. His successes (most notably the capture of the Acrocorinth in 243/2 and the subsequent entrance of Corinth into the Achaean League) ensured his re-election as general. In other words, participation in the League allowed Aratus to act on a broader stage than he could have if commanding merely Sicyonian troops, and his actions on that broader stage brought him the prestige he needed to continue to be elected to high League office.

Other newcomers were not as fortunate. Whereas Sicyon joined the League voluntarily from a position of strength, Corinth was brought in because of Aratus' successful seizure of the Acrocorinth. According to Plutarch, the Corinthians were initially overjoyed to be rid of external garrisons. They cheered Aratus in the theater the day after his surprise attack, and set up statues of the liberators of Acrocorinth (*Arat.* 23.3). But no important Corinthians had played a role in Aratus' coup. And therefore there was no Corinthian politician who stood to benefit immediately from League membership. In the next year (242/1), Aigialeos of Aigion (from old Achaea) was general. Indeed, in the period between Corinth's initial enrollment in the League and its secession from the League in 225, no Corinthian attained the position of general, despite the prominence of the city. 138

To add insult to injury, as part of their induction into the League, the Corinthians had to submit a territorial dispute with the League city of Epidauros for arbitration ($IG IV^2 1.71$).

¹³⁶ Corinth: Plut. *Arat.* 16.2. Athens: Plut. *Arat.* 33.2-34. Argos: Plut. *Arat.* 25-29. Arcadia: Plut. *Arat.* 34.1 (placing the Battle of Phylacia near Tegea, for which see Walbank (1957) 237). For the Demetrian War (239-29 BC) more generally, see Urban (1979) 63-96, Marasco (1980), Hammond and Walbank (1988) 324-32.

¹³⁷ Acrocorinth: Plut. *Arat.* 18-24. Cf. Urban (1979) 48-54.

¹³⁸ Dixon (2014) 146-7.

The League appointed judges from Megara to resolve the dispute. The choice of Megarian judges seems to have upset the Corinthians (Megara being a neighbor and occasional rival of Corinth), and when the case went against them, the Corinthians appealed. The League appointed 31 of the original Megarian judges to arbitrate the appeal, and these men naturally found no fault with their own prior judgment. Corinthian participation in Delphic affairs also ceased after they were enrolled in the League, probably because the League was usually at odds with the Aetolian masters of that shrine. In short, the Corinthians accrued little in the way of advantage from League membership. The city had not joined the League of its own free will, and so none of her notables could expect much in the way of gratitude from League voters. The city was forced into embarrassing arbitrations with minor powers, and cut off from her old prestigious connections to Macedon, Delphi, and the larger Greek world.

Michael Dixon probably does not exaggerate when he writes that "the 19 years of Corinth's membership within the Achaian *koinon* must be counted among the Corinthians' most disagreeable years within the early Hellenistic period."

By contrast, a smaller city such as Epidauros stood to gain more than it lost from League membership. Epidauros probably joined the League voluntarily around the same time as Corinth. She was to be autonomous, ungarrisoned, and ruled by her ancestral constitution (*IA Epid.* 25). ¹⁴¹ In other words, her internal politics continued as before. And unlike Corinth, she had no great ancestral prestige that might be tarnished by submitting to Achaean generals, nor did League membership cut apart her web of connections beyond the

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¹³⁹ Dixon (2014) 147 raises the possible objections Corinth may have had to Megarian judges. Kralli (2017) 166-7 argues that the choice of a neighboring state as judge was a mistake and a sign of the Achaean League's inexperience.

¹⁴⁰ Dixon (2014) 143.

¹⁴¹ Kralli (2017) 163.

Peloponnese. For Epidauros as a city, membership in the Achaean League meant that claims that might have otherwise gone unredressed could be brought to arbitration. 142

In 235, the Megalopolitan tyrant Lydiades voluntarily brought his city into the Achaean League. 143 As with Aratus' decision to integrate Sicyon into the League, Lydiades' motives have been variously interpreted. Both Plutarch and Polybius claim that Lydiades abdicated in order to avoid falling prey to the resurgent Achaean League and its zealously anti-tyrannical general, Aratus. But Urban has argued convincingly that Achaea in the 230's was not a threat to Lydiades. His own theory is that Aetolian control over portions of Arcadia pressured the pro-Macedonian Lydiades into joining the Achaean League. 144 The Aetolians certainly had a presence in Northern Arcadia from the mid-third century, but their presence elsewhere in the region is more difficult to date. Polybius tells us that areas of Arcadia once belonged to the Achaean League, and were then transferred to the Aetolians, who held them until 229, when the Spartan king Cleomenes took control of Mantinea, Tegea, and Arcadian Orchomenus (Polyb. 2.46.2). Scholten argues that the region was brought into the Achaean League shortly after the integration of Megalopolis in 235, then thrown into tumult by the Achaean loss to the Macedonians at the battle of Phylacia c. 233 and, subsequently, absorbed into the Aetolian League, perhaps with Achaean acquiescence. 146 This would make

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 $^{^{142}}$ Ca. 236-225 BC Epidauros entered into another arbitration, this time with Methana/Arsinoe (*IG* IV 2 1.72). The inscription is fragmentary, but since it was found at Epidauros it is likely the Epidaurians won the dispute. Dixon (2000) 266 has gone so far as to argue that territorial aggrandizement through arbitration was a major motivating factor in League membership for certain cities.

¹⁴³ Plut. Arat. 30.1-2; Polyb. 2.44.5. On the dating, see Walbank (1957) 238.

¹⁴⁴ Urban (1979) 71-87.

¹⁴⁵ See Scholten (2000) 116-130.

¹⁴⁶ Scholten (2000) 158-61, followed by Mackil (2013) 107. Urban's (1979) theory has the transfer of Arcadia c. 241 (78-85). Walbank (1933) 67 sees the transfer as a means of compensating Aetolia for losses elsewhere during the Demetrian War, but Scholten rightly observes that compensating an ally in this manner is otherwise unattested in the Hellenistic Period. Nor does Shipley's (2018) 66 argument that the transfer was part of a "security measure" against Demetrius II convince. Tarn (1925) has suggested that an Arcadian League

the Aetolian domination of Arcadia much less total, and accordingly make the pressure on Lydiades less severe.

There is, indeed, no reason to think Lydiades was compelled by outside events to relinquish his power. Nor do his actions correspond well with those of a man forced to relinquish power. Iseas of Caryneia, the deposed tyrant, had escaped with nothing more than his skin. In the years after Lydiades' volte-face, Polybius reports that Xenon, tyrant of Hermione, and Cleonymus, tyrant of Phlius, also abdicated (Polyb. 2.44.6). They do not seem to have played any role in later Achaean politics. In a similar manner, the decree outlining the terms under which the city of Orchomenus joined the Achaean League contains a specific clause preventing any legal action against a certain Nearchus or his descendants. 147 Nearchus has been plausibly identified as an abdicated 'tyrant' of Orchomenus. His need for legal immunity suggests that his opponents had been the ones eager to bring the city into the League, and that this had destabilized his rule. Lydiades, by contrast, not only retained a position of some influence in Megalopolis, but became *stratēgos* of the League in the year after he joined (Plut. Arat. 30.3-5). His quick rise to broader power makes him less like Iseas and the other 'tyrants' who were forced out of power, and more like Aratus who voluntarily joined the League. 149 In other words, Lydiades does not act like a man compelled to give up

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persisted down to 235, but the evidence for this is scant, and the theory is supported neither by Larsen (1968) 180-95 nor Nielsen (2015). Walbank (1957) 243 and Scholten (2000) 161 are probably correct in arguing that these cities are loosely associated with Aetolia (perhaps by means of *isopoliteia*) rather than full members of that federation. Kralli (2017) 184 follows Scholten (2000) in its basic outlines, but notes that the cities of Eastern Arcadia (Mantinea, Tegea, Orchomenos, and Kaphyai) disliked Megalopolis, and were spurred in their movement towards the Aetolian League by the prominence the Megalopolitan Lydiades came to play in the League's politics.

¹⁴⁷ Syll.³ 490=Rigsby (1996) no. 43 //. 13-17.

¹⁴⁸ Berve (1967) 403, Larsen (1968) 310.

¹⁴⁹ It certainly helped Lydiades that Megalopolis was (at the time of its integration) one of the most important cities to have joined the League (cf. Walbank [1933] 63). Like Aratus, Lydiades could therefore count upon a

power, but one who has attempted to gain more power, exchanging the 'tyranny' of a single city for the chance to gain power and glory at a regional level.

Lydiades' actions as a League politician further confirm his desire for wider renown. Plutarch tells us that from the moment he became general, Lydiades "was at once ambitious to surpass Aratus in reputation" (Plut. *Arat.* 30.3). Unsurprisingly, the two men were frequently at odds. When Lydiades proposed an expedition against Sparta during his first generalship, Aratus unsuccessfully opposed it. When Lydiades was running for his second generalship (for 232/1), Aratus unsuccessfully campaigned for another man (Plut. *Arat.* 30.3). If Aratus brought the Macedonians to battle at Phylace in order to keep them from entering Laconia (and thus strengthening Lydiades' case for war against Sparta), then that Achaean defeat may also have been the indirect result of this feud. ¹⁵⁰

The uneasy duumvirate of Aratus and Lydiades lasted until 229. In May of that year, Demetrius II of Macedon died, and most of Macedon's Greek allies were thrown into confusion. Several pro-Macedonian 'tyrants' in the Peloponnese abdicated in the wake of Demetrius' death, of whom the most important by far was Aristomachus of Argos. Like Lydiades, however, Aristomachus retained much influence within his city, and was able to

sizable voting bloc in League assemblies as well as the prestige that came from bringing an important city into the League.

¹⁵⁰ Thus Walbank (1937) 64-5. The theory must remain extremely provisional: both Urban (1979) 65 and Scholten (2000) 158-9 think that the Macedonian army had entered the Peloponnese as a response to the defection of Megalopolis and in order to support Argos.

¹⁵¹ Hammond and Walbank (1988) 337-42. The most notable defector was Athens, who bribed its Macedonian garrison commander with 150 talents (Plut. *Arat.* 34.4, Cf. Habicht (1997) 173-94). Despite the role Aratus played in facilitating this withdrawal (in addition to acting as a negotiator, he personally contributed twenty talents to the bribe), the Athenians did not decide to join the Achaean League. Urban (1979) is probably right to say that the Athenians had no desire to join a League "still reeking of provincialism (immer noch mit dem Geruch des Provinziellen behafteten)" (91). Athens then provides a counter-example to Sicyon, Megalopolis, and Argos; for here we find a city whose notables did not see a path towards greater prestige in league membership. Given the inherited glory of Athens, this is hardly surprising.

¹⁵² Polyb. 2.44.6. For further discussion, see Chapter 1.

gain several concessions in return for joining the League. For he was able to assume the League generalship in the year after Argos joined, and was given fifty talents with which to pay off his mercenaries (Plut. *Arat.* 35.2-3). The seeming dissolution of Macedonian power in Greece did not fatally undermine Aristomachus' domestic position (if it had, he would scarcely have been able to become *stratēgos* of the League). Rather, it convinced him that friendship with Macedon was now profitless, and that the path to increased power and prestige lay through the League. ¹⁵³ Indeed, we are even told by Plutarch that one of the arguments Aratus used to persuade Aristomachus to join the League was that he would have the opportunity to become "general of so great a nation with praise and honor, rather than tyrant of a single city with peril and hatred" (Plut. *Arat.* 35.1).

Argos' integration into the Achaean League triggered the final battle between

Lydiades and Aratus. For the League's rules about generalship allowed two great men to
hold the office on alternating years. But if there were three great men, then one of them had
to give way. This was the crux of the seemingly foolish dispute between Aratus and
Lydiades about when Aristomachus' Argos could enter the League. According to Plutarch, it
was Aratus who convinced Aristomachus to give up his tyranny. But Lydiades (who was
then general) wished to claim credit for this deed, and secretly convinced the ever-malleable
Aristomachus to allow him to bring the matter to the Achaean council. Aratus then angrily
denounced the measure, and the council heeded him and denied Argos entry into the League.
In the following year Aratus was general. He introduced the same measure he had
denounced mere months before, and it passed (Plut. Arat. 35.1-3). One suspects that, in

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¹⁵³ The example of Lydiades, who had by now held three generalships, would have made Aristomachus' prospects look particularly bright.

reality, Aristomachus came to Lydiades first, and that Aratus fabricated his own early involvement when writing his *Memoirs*. 154

Although Aristomachus was joining the Achaean League voluntarily, as was the case with Corinth, the enrollment of Argos in the League soon saw the city involved in arbitration with a minor neighbor (Kleonai). The inscription detailing the final judgment is fragmentary, but a portion of the arbitration revolved around a territorial dispute. Kralli is probably correct to assert that it was Kleonai that initiated this part of the dispute (the fragments were found at Nemea). We do not know whether Kleonai won, but the fact that a settlement that was once a dependent of Argos was involved as an independent *polis* in arbitration with its former ruler shows that, for smaller towns, membership in the League brought a significant boost to power and prestige, even if their notables were unlikely to win high federal office.

The arbitration also seems to have dealt with the issue of the Nemean games, which, during the period of enmity between Argos and Achaea, had been held in both Argos and Kleonai (Plut. *Arat.* 28.3). Even if Kleonai had won the battle for territory, Argos appears to have won the war for the games, since the next Nemean Games were held in Argos in 225. The family of Aristomachus appears to have played a role in the proceedings as well, since an Agias son of Aristomachus is mentioned in the inscription (he was perhaps the son or brother of the tyrant). In other words, because the Aristomachoi are negotiating from a

¹⁵⁴ Thus also Mandel (1979) 303.

¹⁵⁵ SEG XXIII 178 = Bradeen (1966) no. 6. 323-6. Cf. Buraselis (2013), Kralli (2017) 432-3.

¹⁵⁶ Bradeen (1966) 324-6. Cf. Shipley (2018) 114.

position of strength, they are able to secure more favorable terms of admission for Argos than Corinth had, and a generalship for Aristomachus himself.

Unfortunately for Aristomachus, 228/227 proved a bad year to be general of the Achaean League. For it was at either the spring assembly of 228, or the autumn assembly of 229, that the Achaeans voted for open war against Cleomenes III of Sparta. ¹⁵⁷ Aristomachus led forth an army to meet Cleomenes at Pallantium, and summoned Aratus (who was then at Athens) to join him. ¹⁵⁸ Although the Achaeans outnumbered their foes by a considerable margin, Aratus was opposed to giving battle. Aristomachus was forced (by the weight of Aratus' considerable influence among the Achaeans, even when he held no office) to follow Aratus' wishes and withdraw the Achaean force (Plut. *Arat.* 35.4-5, *Cleom.* 4.4-5). Larsen labelled this "the worst Achaean mistake in the war." ¹⁵⁹ The ancients attributed it to Aratus' proverbial fear of battle. ¹⁶⁰ Yet it is also possible that Aratus, thinking the defeat of Sparta to be imminent, hoped by preventing a battle at Pallantium to finish the war himself during his own generalship the following year. ¹⁶¹ Indeed, despite Lydiades' denunciation of his conduct

¹⁵⁷ According to Polybius, the immediate cause for the war was the transfer of Mantinea, Tegea, Orchomenus, and Caphyae from Aetolia to Cleomenes, and Cleomenes' subsequent fortification of the Athenaeum on the border of Megalopolis (Polyb. 2.46). Plutarch adds that Aratus had begun raiding Sparta's Arcadian allies, a fact that both explains the fortification of the Athenaeum and puts the onus for the war on Aratus (*Cleom*. 4.5). For the outbreak of the war, see Shimron (1972) 34-5. For the war more generally, the primary ancient sources are Plut. *Arat.* 35.4-46.1, *Cleom. passim*; Polyb. 2.46-70. Scholarly discussions at Walbank (1933) 71-110, Larsen (1968) 314-25, Urban (1979) 97-213, Cartledge and Spawforth (1987) 50-6, Hammond and Walbank (1988) 343-62.

¹⁵⁸ Plut. *Arat.* 35.4-5, *Cleom.* 4.3-5.

¹⁵⁹ Larsen (1968) 315.

¹⁶⁰ Plut. Cleom. 4.5. Cf. Plut. Arat. 29.5-6.

¹⁶¹ As Tomlinson (1972) 159 rightly surmises. Gruen (1972) 615 argues that Aratus prevented the battle in order to keep the possibility of peace between Spartan and Achaea alive. But Gruen perhaps overemphasizes the anti-Macedonian quality of Aratus' previous wars, and thus mistakenly sees Aratus as desiring a peaceful, Macedonian-free, Peloponnese. In reality success in war was in itself a critical goal of Aratus, and he had already shown himself willing to make war upon cities and regions whose connections to Macedon were either hypothetical (Calydon in 245/4) or impossible (Corinth when it was ruled by Alexander) (Plut. *Arat.* 16.1, 18.1).

at Pallantium, Aratus was able to win yet another generalship in the following year (Plut. *Arat.* 35.5). For Lydiades and Aristomachus, this must have been a bitter lesson in the realities of their own political position.

It is therefore not surprising to see signs of conflict between the Achaean leaders in the following year. In 227, Cleomenes went on the offensive once more, just as he had during the previous year. He defeated Aratus in battle at Mt. Lycaeum (Plut. Arat. 36.1). But Aratus was able subsequently to take Mantinea in a surprise assault, thereby negating much of the odium of this defeat. 162 Cleomenes next attempted to attack Megalopolis. 163 Aratus met him near Leuctra, at a place called Laodicea, with Lydiades (probably) as *hipparch*. ¹⁶⁴ Aratus was his usual cautious self: after the Achaeans initially routed the Spartans, he drew up his men on the edge of a ravine and ordered a halt. But Lydiades, after "loading Aratus with reproaches," led the cavalry onwards in pursuit of Cleomenes (Plut. Arat. 37.1). When Lydiades and his force were sufficiently separated from the main Achaean army, Cleomenes turned and attacked them. The Achaeans were routed, and Lydiades himself was slain (Plut. Cleom. 6.3). Lydiades' impetuosity in this battle was perhaps partly inspired by his resentment of Aratus. There was general public outrage at Aratus' failure to help Lydiades, and a League assembly voted to stop funding Aratus' force: if he wished to field an army as stratēgos, he would have to pay for it himself. 165 Aratus was so mortified that he nearly

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¹⁶² Polyb. 2.57.2-8; Plut. Arat. 36.2, Cleom. 5.1.

¹⁶³ Polyb. 2.51.3; Plut. Arat. 36.3-37.3, Cleom. 6.1-3.

¹⁶⁴ That Lydiades was *hipparch* is a modern assumption both widespread and plausible, based upon his command of the Achaean cavalry during the battle. Cf. Walbank (1933) 80 n.2, Larsen (1968) 316, Gruen (1972) 615.

¹⁶⁵ Plut. *Arat.* 37.3. Cleomenes had Lydiades' corpse crowned and arrayed in purple before returning it to the Megalopolitans (Plut. *Cleom.* 6.4). In so doing, he conformed to the expectation that Hellenistic kings treat fallen enemy commanders with honor (Cf. Plut. *Dem.* 53.1-2, *Pyrrh.* 34.4-5) while also increasing the pathos of Lydiades' death (and thus the anger of the Achaeans with Aratus) (Marasco [1981] 409-10). On the high regard

resigned, but managed to salvage his reputation by capturing Arcadian Orchomenus (then defended by Cleomenes' father-in-law Megistonous) later in the year (Plut. *Arat.* 38.1).

That same autumn, the Achaean assembly granted the Megalopolitians permission to send ambassadors to Antigonus III Doson. 166 Polybius identifies Aratus as the architect of this embassy. The Megalopolitans returned to the next Achaean assembly in the subsequent spring, and announced that Antigonus was willing to help if he were invited by the entire Achaean League. But Aratus now stridently opposed asking Macedon for help. And his view (as usual) ultimately carried the day (Polyb. 2.50.3-11). Gruen is almost certainly correct in arguing that Aratus had nothing to do with the initial embassy at all: in 227/6 he was still firmly against Macedonian involvement in the Peloponnese. 167 But the willingness of the Megalopolitans and other League members to turn to Macedon, in the wake of their defeat at Ladoceia, must have been a warning sign for Aratus. For if the League should ally with Doson, then those Achaean notables who were friends of the royal house might be able to eclipse Aratus, who had spent the last two decades in enmity with Macedon. ¹⁶⁸ The following summer proved to be the beginning of many evils for Aratus and the Achaeans alike. Cleomenes won a great victory over the Achaean League at the Battle of Hecatombeum and soon thereafter retook Mantinea. 169 That winter, Ptolemy III renounced his alliance with the

in which Lydiades was held by the Megalopolitans (expressed both through public monuments and the later prominence of his son) see Taeuber (1986), Stavrianopoulou (2002).

¹⁶⁶ Polyb. 2.47.4-48.7; Plut. *Arat*. 38.7-8. On the alliance between Achaea and Macedon, see Gruen (1972), Urban (1979) 117-35, Orsi (1991). Scherberich (2009) 62-3 and Kralli (2017) 225 argue that Megalopolis was on the verge of withdrawing from the League after Lydiades' death. Only permission to send emissaries to Macedon (with whom Megalopolis had long been friendly) prevented the rupture of the League.

¹⁶⁷ Gruen (1972). Plutarch too was skeptical of the story, but accepted it on Polybius' authority (*Arat.* 38.7-8). ¹⁶⁸ The Megalopolitan emissary Cercidas is a good example of the sort of person Aratus had to fear. Probably a descendant of the Megalopolitan Cercidas who was a friend of Philip II (cf. Dem. 28.295, Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 119), he would later be the commander of the Megalopolitan contingent at Sellasia (Polyb. 2.65.3). Cf. Walbank (1957) 247-8, Urban (1979) 127-8.

¹⁶⁹ Polyb. 2.51.3, 58.4; Plut. *Arat.* 39.1.

Achaean League, and began to fund Cleomenes.¹⁷⁰ The dejected Achaean League sued for terms.¹⁷¹

An initial meeting between Cleomenes and the League had to be postponed because Cleomenes fell ill (Plut. *Cleom.* 15.2). This meant that the final treaty would need to be concluded in 225/4, the year that should have been Aratus' eleventh generalship. But for the first time in over twenty-five years of League service, Aratus declined the office. ¹⁷² The cause for this is not hard to find. By spring of 225 (when the elections were held) it must have been apparent that the League would need to capitulate either to Sparta or to Macedon. Aratus did not wish to suffer the ignominy of being the eponymous magistrate during such an inglorious year. Cleomenes, for his part, wished to restore the traditional Spartan hegemony over the Peloponnese. In return, he promised to restore the captives and strongholds he had taken to the Achaeans (Plut. Cleom. 15.1). Many Achaeans were willing to accede to these demands.¹⁷³ But Aratus was far more willing to work with Macedon than Sparta. When talks between Cleomenes and the League were set to resume at Argos, Aratus imposed new limits on how many men Cleomenes could bring with him to the parley. Cleomenes balked and wrote a letter to the Achaean assembly castigating Aratus, to which Aratus responded with an equally abusive reply. Their mutual hatred reached such a fever pitch that they openly insulted one another's marriages and wives. 174

¹⁷⁰ Polyb. 2.51.2. Polybius places this before the Battle of Mt. Lycaeum in 227, but Walbank (1957) 250 argues that Polybius has rearranged the events of these years for rhetorical reasons. Hecatombeum indeed makes more sense as the moment of transfer. In 228-227 the contest between Cleomenes and the League still stood in doubt. Only with the defeat at Hecatombeum did the Achaeans appear utterly beaten.

¹⁷¹ Plut. *Arat.* 39.1-3, *Cleom.* 15.1-2, 17.1-2. Polybius says nothing about the episode.

¹⁷² His ally Timoxenus was elected general in his stead (Plut. *Arat.* 38.2).

¹⁷³ Plut. *Cleom.* 15.1, 17.1.

¹⁷⁴ Plut. *Arat.* 39.3, *Cleom.* 17.1-2

The negotiations fell through, and Cleomenes renewed the war in the summer of 224. Plutarch strongly censured Aratus for preferring Antigonus over Cleomenes. The ought to have yielded to Cleomenes, and not to have made Peloponnesus quite barbarous again under Macedonian garrisons... the meanest citizen of [Sparta] was more worthy than the foremost Macedonian to be made their leader" (Plut. *Arat.* 38.4-5). But, for Aratus, the choice was not between Greek and Macedonian, but between acknowledging a superior in the Peloponnese or working with a distant king. And it was best for him if the notional hegemon of the League was as far away from the Peloponnese as possible. To lie prostrate before the throne of Macedon was scarcely Aratus' wish, but it was preferable to the alternative. This was perhaps what Aratus meant when he wrote to Cleomenes "that he [i.e. Aratus] did not control affairs, but rather affairs controlled him" (Plut. *Cleom.* 19.2). Thus, the same desire for personal prestige that drove Aratus' involvement in the League now led him to try to ally the League with Macedon.

Cleomenes met with a great deal of success in his subsequent campaigning. Pellene, Pheneus, and Pentelium in Achaea all fell to him (Polyb. 2.52.1). Then, during the Nemean games, he was able to take Argos by surprise, becoming the first king in the history of Sparta to capture that city (Plut. *Cleom.* 17-18). Now Cleonae, Phlius, Troezen, Epidaurus, and Hermione came over to him (Plut. *Cleom.* 19.1-3). The Corinthians abandoned the League,

¹⁷⁵ Plut. *Arat.* 38.4-6, *Cleom.* 16.1-6.

¹⁷⁶ Prior to his support of Cleomenes, Ptolemy III had been the hegemon of the League (Polyb. 2.51.1; Plut. *Arat.* 24.4).

¹⁷⁷ Plutarch places this letter after the fall of Corinth to Sparta, some months after the breakdown of negotiations. Gruen (1972) 622 takes it to mean that Aratus desired to make peace with Cleomenes, but was prevented from doing so by anti-Spartan elements within the League. There is no disproving this: Aratus' statement is so vague as to accept almost any meaning. But Gruen consistently overestimates Aratus' commitment to peace with Sparta (see above n. 161) and it is possible that he has done so here as well.

and Aratus himself was nearly captured by them when he fled.¹⁷⁸ After taking Corinth,
Cleomenes moved upon Sicyon, ravaging the countryside and laying siege to the city. All of
this happened within a period of two to three months, with the resumption of hostilities
occurring in June or July, and Corinth going over to the Spartans by August.¹⁷⁹ On the one
hand, it was quite typical for Hellenistic campaigns to exhibit this rapid cascading effect, so
that a king who won some signal victory could expect all the towns in the area to surrender to
him.¹⁸⁰ This, no doubt, explains why so many smaller settlements went over to Cleomenes.
But Argos and Corinth were important cities that should have been able to hold out against
the Spartans for some time. Indeed the Corinthians switched sides despite the presence of an
Achaean garrison on the Acrocorinth, thereby proving that their decision was not foisted
upon them by fear of Cleomenes actually taking the city.¹⁸¹

Plutarch claims that it was the enthusiasm of the mob for Cleomenes' social reforms that drove the cities of Peloponnese into the Spartan fold. But modern scholars have been more skeptical of Cleomenes' plans for reform outside Sparta. It is possible, of course, that the lower classes of the Peloponnese merely misunderstood the Spartan king's intentions. But it is also possible that it was not the poor who wanted to see Spartan hegemony, but the rich who had been excluded from full participation in the Achaean League. Corinth, for example, never supplied the League with a general, despite her great

¹⁷⁸ Polyb. 2.52.3; Plut. Arat. 40, Cleom. 19.1-2.

¹⁷⁹ Dating as per Walbank (1957) 252.

¹⁸⁰ Ma (1999) 108-9. Antigonus' subsequent campaign in the Peloponnese would also be very rapid (Cf. Polybius 2.54).

¹⁸¹ In the event, Cleomenes was unable to expel those Achaeans even *with* Corinthian aid (Plut. *Cleom.* 19.3). Should the Corinthians have opposed him, it is doubtful he could have done much harm to their city.

¹⁸² Plut. *Arat.* 39.4. *Cleom.* 17.3.

¹⁸³ Shimron (1972) 46-50, Cartledge and Spawforth (1989) 53. Shipley (2018) 65 probably overestimates Achaean fears of Peloponnese-wide reform. Cf. Börm (2017) 76-80.

dignity and antiquity.¹⁸⁴ Plutarch claims that, among the Corinthians, there were men whose "desire for private domination" made them allies with Cleomenes (*Arat.* 40.1). In his recent survey of Hellenistic Corinth, Dixon suggests that the Corinthians had received numerous benefactions from the Macedonian kings over the years, and that the Corinthian elite had actually preferred being one of the fetters of Greece under Antigonus to being a bastion of democracy under Aratus.¹⁸⁵ Corinthian notables were not only denied a lucrative and prestigious connection to a royal court, but stood to gain no glory from participation in the League, because a Sicyonian upstart achieved generalship after generalship.¹⁸⁶

This would explain not only the Corinthian abandonment of the Achaean League, but also the seeming personal hatred that the Corinthians bore towards Aratus. For not only did they almost lynch Aratus during a stormy assembly meeting, but later they also voted to give Aratus' property at Corinth to Cleomenes as a gift. Cleomenes himself had placed the property of Aratus in the care of Aratus' friends: that it was made a gift to the king was a sign of the Corinthians' anger with Aratus, not Cleomenes' (Plut. *Cleom.* 19.3). Even Sicyon, Aratus' hometown, seethed with discontent, to the point that Aratus was empowered to execute those Sicyonians and Corinthians he found to be Spartan sympathizers. Perhaps Aratus' relentless political success was a common source of anger that made men in both cities willing to entertain a betrayal of the Achaean League. Unlike the Aetolians, then, the

¹⁸⁴ O'Neil (1984-6) 40.

¹⁸⁵ Dixon (2014) 199-200. Tomlinson (1970) also discusses buildings possibly funded by Macedonian largesse at Corinth.

¹⁸⁶ After the breakdown of negotiations with Sparta in 224, Aratus was elected *stratēgos autocrator*, thus taking control of the campaign despite the fact that he was not the League *stratēgos* (Polyb. 2.52.3; Plut. *Arat.* 41.1). This high-handed subversion of the League's normal procedures would have bred even more resentment towards Aratus.

¹⁸⁷ Assembly: Plut. Arat. 40.2-4. Property: Plut. Cleom. 19.4.

¹⁸⁸ Plut. Arat. 40.1. Cf. Walbank (1957) 252-3.

Achaeans failed to provide important latecomers with higher offices, and this can help explain why Cleomenes was able to gain so much ground within a relatively brief period of time.

The defection of Argos may also have been brought about by elite dissatisfaction. Cleomenes took the city without any real struggle. Showing up unexpectedly with an army during the Nemean games, he "so terrified the inhabitants that not a man of them thought of defense" and the city accepted a garrison at once (Plut. Cleom. 17.2). Shimron is probably right to suspect that the ease with which Cleomenes took the city implies the support of Argive collaborators. 189 What specific role Aristomachus played in his city's capture is unknown, although he was most certainly an active supporter of Cleomenes. Polybius writes that "the moment it seemed to him [Aristomachus] that his prospects would be somewhat more brilliant if he sided with Cleomenes, he broke away from the Achaeans, transferring from them to the enemy at a most critical time his personal support and that of his country" (2.60.6). Aristomachus also had some connection to the Spartan ruling class, for his niece Apia was married to the later Spartan king Nabis. 190 Later, when he was captured by the Macedonians, Aristomachus was tortured and then drowned in the sea at Cenchreae (Polyb. 2.59.1). The severity of this punishment suggests that Aristomachus had played an active role in the war against Macedon and Achaea; for, if he had not, one would have expected the

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¹⁸⁹ Shimron (1972) 50. Le Bohec (1993) 376 and Kralli (2017) 235 argue that an obscure massacre of Argives mentioned by Aratus at Polyb. 5.16.6 probably refers to the killing of Argive supporters of Cleomenes and Aristomachus when the Macedonian/Achaean forces recaptured the city. This too would suggest that the defection of Argos had broad support.

 $^{^{190}}$ Polyb. 13.7.6; *IG* IV 2 1.621. Cf. Mandel (1979) 301, Cartledge and Spawforth (1989) 69. The precise circumstances surrounding this marriage remain unknown.

past friendliness between his house and the kings of Macedon to have led either to his forgiveness or, at the very least, to a better death. 191

When Aristomachus had first joined the League, it seemed as if the League offered an easy path to prestige and regional power. Lydiades had succeeded in gaining alternating generalships with Aratus. Why should Aristomachus, who brought with him a city far greater than either Sicyon or Megalopolis, not gain at least as much? Then came the embarrassment of Pallantium where, despite not being general, Aratus was able to prevent Aristomachus from committing to battle against Cleomenes. The final straw was probably Aristomachus' failure to win a second generalship in 226/5 (Hyperbatas, an ally of Aratus, was elected instead). Only now was it apparent that the League provided no glory to anyone who was not in league with Aratus. Thus, although Aristomachus has been criticized by ancient and modern writers alike for his supposed fickleness, he was actually acting entirely rationally when he defected. From his perspective, it was the League that had betrayed him by failing to give him the honor and power it had promised.

Despite the setbacks of 225, the Achaean League was destined to remain the great power of the Peloponnese. By spring 224, the Achaeans under Aratus had accepted Antigonus' terms. Soon thereafter, the Macedonian king swept into the Peloponnese like the chill north wind, and the cities and armies of the fledgling Spartan hegemony scattered

¹⁹¹ Cf. Paschidis (2008) 223. Certainly Antigonus had not forgotten the other Argive tyrants. After Argos was taken by the Achaeans, he had the statues of these past tyrants re-erected (Plut. *Arat*. 45.3).

¹⁹² Cf. Tomlinson (1972) 160 n. 10, Mandel (1979) 304.

¹⁹³ Ancient criticism: Polyb. 2.60.3-6. Modern criticism: Walbank (1933) 96, 103. Paschidis (2008) 223 rightly sees Aristomachus as acting consistently in his own interests and those of his city.

¹⁹⁴ As Kralli (2017) 238 puts it, "In the long run it became crystal clear how far the Achaian Confederacy had failed to integrate two of the biggest cities in the Peloponnese."

¹⁹⁵ Antigonus is appointed hegemon of the League in 224, replacing Ptolemy (Polyb. 2.54.4). Cf. Will (1966) 345-51.

before him. 196 For our purposes, what is interesting is how a desire for prestige and high office among local notables influenced the course of the League's development at every stage between its foundation and the end of the Cleomenian War. The great general of the League's early years, Margus, succeeded in using the League to depose a political rival in his hometown. Aratus was very likely drawn to the League by the possibility that it could provide him with a similar safety net, as well as an opportunity to win renown greater than merely being the greatest man of Sicyon would afford him. Certainly he made efficacious use of the League's generalship to expand the League and his own reputation simultaneously. It is likely that a desire to emulate Aratus' success was the true reason why the greatest men of other important cities, Lydiades of Megalopolis and Aristomachus of Argos, joined the League. That power and prestige were the true draws for such men is shown by their anger when they were prevented by Aratus from gaining them. For Lydiades, this manifested itself in public opposition to Aratus and the fateful defiance of his orders at the Battle of Laodicea. For Aristomachus, this entailed withdrawing his city from the League entirely. Aratus' absolute refusal to share power, either with his fellow League notables or Cleomenes, suggests that for him as well, the purpose of the League was to expand his own renown.

Conclusion

In both the Aetolian and Achaean examples, local notables acted as the driving force for the integration of their *poleis* into leagues and as important political actors on the regional level. In the Spercheios River Valley, the correlation between the time of League integration and the first offices held by local notables suggests that in some cases (Heraclea in the 270's,

 $^{^{196}}$ For the conclusion of the war, see Polyb. 2.52.5-55.8, 64.1-71.10; Plut. *Arat.* 43.1-46.1, *Cleom.* 20.1-28.5. Cf. Urban (1979) 135-58.

Hypata at the end of the first century BC) men who brought their cities into Leagues found it easier to attain high office. For the Aetolian League in particular, we have enough epigraphic evidence to see how lesser offices and the number of representatives on the federal *boulā* increased over time, allowing more local notables to participate in (and therefore acquiesce to) a supra-polis organization and helping to account for its stability and strength.

In Achaea, the lure of high League office seems to have enticed men who were already important politicians at the local level—Aratus of Sicyon, Lydiades of Megalopolis, Aristomachus of Argos—to join their cities to the Achaean League. The office of general provided its holder with a capacity for political and military action that could not be matched by a man who led, but was compelled to rely upon, the clout and power of only a single city. When, after all, in the past had a mere Sicyonian ever been able to challenge the kings of Macedon or Sparta? The struggle for supremacy between the greatest of the Achaeans was directly responsible for many of the League's successes and setbacks during this period: the integration and seccession of Argos, the failure to destroy Cleomenes at Pallantium, the death of Lydiades at Mt. Lycaeum, and, arguably, the fateful decision to ally with Macedon rather than make peace with Cleomenes.

The stories of the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues are, in one sense, the stories of one League that was able to integrate successfully at least some of its elites, and one that was not. As a result, the former held up remarkably well when faced with outside pressure from invaders, while the latter almost entirely unraveled when faced with its first real opposition. The difference in the prestige of the League versus that of its new members, and in the way in which meaningful power was shared between men and cities, played an important role in

this divergence. But underlying these differences was core common interest—shared by local notables in both regions—in participating in politics beyond the polis level. It is worth considering how this interest in league integration (with its prestige-earning possibilities) may also have driven the other forms of diplomatic interaction, and thus, it is to that subject that we now must turn.

Chapter 5: Diplomacy and Self-Representation

Although the great monarchs of the period tend to dominate discussions (both ancient and modern) of Hellenistic politics, the Hellenistic period was every bit as much an age of embassies as it was an age of kings. This, after all, was an age when more *proxenoi* lived than at any other time in history.¹ An age when over a dozen Panhellenic game were added to the four celebrated by the classical Greeks, and the number of sacred embassies sent to observe such foreign rites doubled or tripled.² Third-party arbitration between cities blossomed, and cities even invited foreign judges to resolve their domestic disputes.

The benefits that cities stood to accrue from such zealous networking were often obvious and pragmatic. A well-developed system of *proxenoi* could give aid to citizens abroad, while interstate arbiters and foreign judges could peacefully resolve disputes that might otherwise devolve into war or *stasis*. And there were other, less tangible benefits a city might derive from foreign connections.³ But what of the men who actually went on the embassies that built these connections? What did they hope to gain from the time and money they invested? Honors, of course, were in the offing, potentially from both their home city and the foreign cities to which they travelled. But we should not be satisfied with such a simple and general answer. The thousands of Hellenistic honorific texts makes it seem axiomatic that the notables of that age were reflexively and instinctively drawn to honors, as sharks are to blood. A city need only chum the waters with crowns and promises of *proedria*, and wait for inquisitive benefactors to emerge from the depths.

¹ Mack (2015) 236-8.

² Games: Parker (2004) 18-22. *Theoroi*: Rutherford (2013) 46.

³ See Ma (2003) for a general discussion of how foreign networks could bolster city prestige.

The reality seems to have been more complicated. Take, for example, the inscription honoring Moschion of Priene (Inschriften von Priene [I.Priene] 108). Moschion's career spanned at least twenty years (150-129 BC), and included many diplomatic missions alongside domestic magistracies and various benefactions.⁴ At nearly 400 lines, the inscription itself is too long to make a full translation here practical. The benefactions and offices of Moschion recorded in the inscription are therefore summarized in a table below. The inscription itself is part of an honorific package including a gilded and a marble statue, free meals in the *prytaneion*, freedom from taxes, and privileged seating at games, all voted to Moschion at the end of his service as *stephanophoros* (eponymous magistrate).

Table 1: Benefactions of Moschion of Priene

Lines	Stephanophoros	Benefaction	Notes
	(i.e. date)		
25-8	?	Theoros	With his brother,
			performed sacrifices
			with own resources,
			released people
			from the prescribed
			allowance.
33-4	Telon	1,000 drachmae (advanced)	Made with brother.
40-50	?	3,000 drachmae (given?), 206 medimnoi of	Funds for the
		corn (worth 824 <i>drachmae</i>)	construction of a
			gymnasion. Both
			benefactions made
			with brother.
53-4	Hippothon	1,000 drachmae (advanced)	Made with brother.
58-60	Herakleitos	grain (unknown quantity)	Made with brother.
64-7	The god with	1,000 Alexandrian drachmae (distributed)	Made with brother
	Demetrius?		on behalf of their
			mother.

Discussion at Gauthier (1985) 73-4, Fröhlich (2005), Hamon (2007) 95-6, Grandinetti (2010) 82-90, Forster (2018) 287-99. The inscription is one of a set of lengthy Prienian honorific decrees from around the same time, the others of which are in honor of Herodes (I. Priene 129) ca. 110 BC, Krates (I. Priene 111) and Heracleitus

(I.Priene 117) ca. late 2nd/early 1st century BC, and Aulus Aemilius Zosimos (I.Priene 112-114) ca. 80 BC. Of these, the Moschion inscription is the best preserved, and so the most useful example here.

68-79	Herodotos	Grain (unknown quantity), subsidized corn prices for citizens for months, 1,000 drachmae (advanced)	Money for the repair of the temple of Alexander, and advanced with his brother.
79-88	Aias	Alexandrian <i>drachmae</i> (unknown quantity, given), grain (unknown quantity), subsidized price to city for public store	Grain subsidy with brother.
89-101	Kekrops	1,000 Alexandrian <i>drachmae</i> (contributed), 550 <i>medimnoi</i> of grain (subsidized), silver plate worth 4,000 Alexandrian <i>drachmae</i> (for use as collateral)	Money and grain provided with brother.
102-17	Sotes	2,158 Alexandrian <i>drachmae</i> , 4 obols (given), 1,200 Alexandrian <i>drachmae</i> (lent), unspecified benefactions to complete a gymnasium	
140-52	?	Ambassador to Roman authorities in Asia Minor? Payments to (Roman?) soldiers for two months.	An extremely fragmentary section
152-5	?	Theoros to King Demetrius I Soter	Did not take public funds
155-9	?	Ambassador to King Demetrius II Nikator	Did not take public funds
159-63	?	Theoros to Magnesia, Tralleis, and Kibyra	Did not take public funds on these occasions.
163-6	?	Various embassies to unspecified kings and cities	Did not take public funds on these occasions.
166-74	?	Embassies to Ptolemy (VIII Physcon?) in Alexandria and to Petra in Arabia	These embassies lasted longer than expected. Moschion paid the necessary excess funds himself.
210-12	?	Captain of the acropolis guard?	Fragmentary.
213-17	Nausikrates	Antigrapheus (checking-clerk)	
217-19	?	Antigrapheus (second appointment)	Election is attributed to his diligence during his first tenure in the office.
219-23	Dionysokles	Antigrapheus (third appointment)	
223-31	?	Envoy and <i>theoros</i> to the games given by Marcus Perperna celebrating defeat of pretender Aristonicus (129 BC).	"along with the others who were appointed he made his visit notable."
251-87	Moschion	Stephanophoros.	During his tenure in the eponymous

	office, Moschion
	performed sacrifices
	and gave public
	banquets. These are
	discussed in detail.

On the one hand, foreign embassies seem to play a minor role in the inscription. Only lines 25-8, 152-74, and 223-31 discuss Moschion's role in such embassies, for a total of 37 lines, or just under 10% of the inscription. It is likely that sections pertaining to foreign service have been lost: lines 140-52, for example, are extremely fragmentary, but seem to involve an embassy to Romans magistrates in Asia Minor, and some of the eighteen lost lines following the section on Moschion's role in an embassy to Marcus Perperna (lines 223-31) may have also pertained to that embassy. But even with these additions, service abroad receives far less attention in the inscription than Moschion's various benefactions at home. These domestic benefactions are also catalogued in some detail. The description of one of Moschion's gifts of grain concludes with the phrase "just as the documents in the public archive say," implying that some research went into ensuring that every last bushel and obol given to the city was acknowledged. Diplomatic services, on the other hand, are elided. After listing a handful of specific embassies, we are told "later he went frequently on embassies on behalf of the people, to both kings and cities."

Yet Moschion's diplomatic activities must have caused him much more hassle than his domestic benefactions. The quantities of cash and corn involved, while sizable, are not extraordinarily so. Moschion's benefactions top out at around 5,000 drachmae. It is

⁵ The same pattern holds true for the other Priene inscriptions. For example, a lengthy surviving fragment from the inscription honoring Krates (*I.Priene* 111, lines 110-151) discusses Krates' service as an envoy, but this is a small portion of the ca. 315 lines of the entire inscription.

⁶ Lines 59-60: καθότι [περιέχ]ει τὰ περὶ τοῦ μ [έ]ρους τούτου γράμματα ἐν τοῖς δημοσίοις ὑπάρχοντ[α].

⁷ Lines 163-5: ὕ[στερον δ' ἐπ]ρ[έσβ]ξυσεν ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου πλεονάκ[ις καὶ] [πρός] τε [β]α[σι]λεῖς κ[αὶ] πόλεις.

impossible, of course, to tell the state of Moschion's personal finances, but his brother Athenopolis (with whom Moschion made many of his earlier benefactions) once paid over 12,000 drachmae for the priesthood of Dionysus Phleos.⁸ Thus, one suspects that none of Moschion's gifts were personally ruinous. These fiscal benefactions also required no real investment of time. Moschion could promise corn at the afternoon assembly, and recline at his own table that same evening.

Trips to royal courts, or distant cities such as Alexandria and Petra (lines 166-74), were, at least in a temporal sense, considerably more costly. They also exposed Moschion to considerably more danger than the average assembly meeting. Around 192, two *theoroi* announcing the Isthmian games had to be ransomed by the city of Chersonesus from unknown captors. This was an age of piracy, and if not even the emissaries of far-seeing Apollo were safe, what risk must those who went abroad on merely mortal business must have run? All the hazards of road and sea were just as present for the diplomat as they were for any other traveler. At least one group of foreign judges invited to Cos fell dangerously ill. Fortunately, they were cured by a Coan doctor (who was thanked with an honorific decree for his efforts). Other diplomats were less fortunate. The Mylasan judge Iatroclus died in Byzantium at some point in the second or fist century BC. The Byzantines gave him a funeral at public expense, but he never again saw his native land, or the day of his return. So too did Pyrrhakos, a mid-second century BC emissary from Alabanda die at or *en route* to an unspecified royal court. And even if a diplomat remained safe, travel was still an arduous

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⁸ *I.Priene* 174, *II.* 34-6.

⁹ Syll.³ 604, ll. 4-5. Cf. SEG LX 804. On further dangers to theoroi, see Rutherford (2013) 185-7.

¹⁰ *IG* XII 6.1 12, *II*. 21-5.

¹¹ I.Byzantion 316.

¹² SEG LX 1073, *II.* 32-4. Errington (2010) 127 suggests the king was Eumenes II. Habicht (2001) collects similar examples of ambassadors and judges dying abroad.

and time-consuming affair. One thinks of the Coan judges, who, because of the multitude of cases with which they were presented at Naxos, longed to return to their own affairs.

Moschion himself was delayed abroad at least twice, during his embassies to Alexandria and Petra.

There seems, then, to be an imbalance between the effort Moschion put into his ambassadorships and the amount of honor he received from them at the summit of his civic career. Presumably even the most honor-hungry notables did not perform difficult or expensive benefactions if easier or cheaper ones could be found that provided the same prestige. The perks of diplomatic service for men such as Moschion therefore require some further explanation. The goal of this chapter is to suggest some of the reasons why notables found diplomatic activity appealing. It begins with an overview of the various types of Hellenistic embassies and foreign missions available to such men. It uses Moschion's honorific inscription as a way to frame this discussion, not because Priene is representative of every Hellenistic city, or because the late second century is exactly like the periods that preceded and followed it, but because a concrete example (properly buttressed with other inscriptions from other places) serves as a way to contextualize an otherwise general survey. It will accordingly start, as Moschion did, with sacred emissaries (theoroi) and those in charge of tending to them (theorodokoi); then move to secular emissaries and their representatives (proxenoi); and finally to men sent abroad as judges, either for disputes between two cities or for domestic cases within one city. The section will argue that the

 $^{^{13}}$ /G XII 4.135, /l. 12-14: [πλεί]ονος δὲ αὐτοῖς τοῦ χρόνου γινομένου[διὰ τὸ πλῆθο]ς τῶν κρίσεων καὶ βουλομένων τῶν δ[ικαστῶν πάλιν ἀναχωρῆ]σαι πρὸς τὰ ἴδια. Discussion of other examples of judges who wished to return home after lengthy delays abroad at Hamon (2012) 201, Scafuro (2013) 366-7. Many other judges presumably had similar feelings, but lacked an opportunity to commit them to stone.

Hellenistic period saw a significant uptick in all forms of diplomatic missions when compared to earlier periods, that cities were eager to engage in such missions not only for practical benefits, but also for the honor they stood to gain from them, and that cities found no shortage of men willing to travel abroad on their behalf.

The subsequent section examines the benefits foreign service gave to its participants. It argues that such service was worthwhile because it gave men the opportunity to accrue honors from other cities, gave them greater leverage when seeking to gain honors from their own cities, acted as a safeguard against exile or irrelevance by making them indispensable 'long-distance experts,' and provided heritable honors that could separate (and distinguish) older families. Interest in foreign missions was therefore fostered by local competition between notables within individual cities. But the constant contact between notables that such missions created further widened the gulf between average citizens and members of the wealthy ambassadorial class.

Sacred Embassies and their Hosts

Both Moschion's first and last recorded embassies are as a *theoros*, or sacred emissary, an office whose functions could vary widely according to time and place. ¹⁴ All six times he served as *theoros*, Moschion acted as representative from his city to a foreign festival. *Theoroi* could be sent to any festival, great or small, that occurred outside a city's territory. ¹⁵ Of Moschion's six sacred embassies, one is to an unknown destination, one to the games of king Demetrius I, three to regional festivals (Magnesia, Tralleis, and Kibyra), and

¹⁴ On *theoria*, see Boesch (1908), Perlman (2000), Rutherford (2013). On the origins of the term, see Koller (1957-58) esp. 285-6. On its various uses in official contexts, see Dimitrova (2008) 9-14, Rutherford (2013) 4. ¹⁵ Cf. Rutherford (2013) 51-63.

one to the games of the Roman general M. Perperna. Cities or monarchs holding a festival that they wished outsiders to attend would send out sacred emissaries to announce the festival. Such emissaries were, confusingly enough, also called *theoroi* (we will distinguish the two types by calling the ones sent out to announce festivals messenger-*theoroi* and the ones sent to foreign festivals delegate-*theoroi*). Both messenger- and delegate-*theoroi* required aid on their journeys. This was given by *theorodokoi* in the cities they visited, who acted on behalf of *theoroi*, just as *proxenoi* acted on behalf of foreign citizens more generally (indeed, many men held both positions for a given sanctuary and its city). ¹⁶

The institution of the *theoria* was not a Hellenistic invention, but it was one that thrived during the Hellenistic period. Two fragments of catalogues of *theorodokoi* from fourth-and-third-century Epidauros, and one catalogue of *theorodokoi* from Argos from ca. 330-324, testify that the festivals of these cities (the *Asklepieia* and *Heraia*, respectively) had well-established theoric networks in the Classical period. There is also epigraphical evidence for similar networks serving Olympia and Delphi, and one suspects that the number of sacred embassies whose existence was never commemorated in stone was high. In the Hellenistic period, references to such embassies and their hosts blossom. Of the 150 inscriptions listing *theorodokia* collected by Perlman, 141 are from the Hellenistic period.

One naturally wonders if this is a result not of an increase in the use of *theoroi*, but of an increase in the recording of that use in inscriptions. Yet as Boesch realized long ago, the

¹⁶ Perlman (2000) 28, Mack (2015) 128.

¹⁷ Epidauros: $IG \ IV^2$.1 94=Perlman (2000) E.1; $IG \ IV^2$.1 95=Perlman (2000) E.2. Argos: $SEG \ XXIII \ 189$ =Perlman (2000) A.1.

¹⁸ Olympia: *IvO* 36=Perlman (2000) O.1. Delphi: *Syll*. ³ 90; *SEG* XXIV 379; *F.Delphes* 3: 1.396; *F.Delphes* 3: 4.4; *F.Delphes* 3: 4.385.

¹⁹ Perlman (2000) 22-6 Fig. 2.

number of new games in the Hellenistic period, and especially those new games with Panhellenic aspirations, must have increased the overall number of *theoroi* in fact.²⁰ There are at least four new Panhellenic games that asked cities for recognition and an acknowledgement of *asylia*, or inviolability, for the celebrating city and shrine.²¹ These new festivals needed a special round of *theoroi* to announce their existence. We know that the games of Artemis Leukophryene at Magnesia on the Maeander were widely acknowledged because no fewer than 71 inscriptions from Magnesia record the answers of kings, leagues, and *poleis* to Magnesia's *theoroi*.²² Cos inscribed at least 40 responses from foreign states and monarchs who had recognized her Asklepieion as sacrosanct and the games performed there as Panhellenic.²³

Each Panhellenic festival potentially linked dozens of cities together in *theoroi/theorodokoi* relationships that could last for decades and involve a great number of men passing back and forth.²⁴ These are theoric networks that simply did not exist before the Hellenistic period. While it is possible that cities recognizing a new festival did not intend to send delegate-*theoroi* to it on a regular basis, the frequent honorific inscriptions for delegate-*theoroi*, and the large crowds that frequently accompanied *theoroi* in an unofficial capacity, suggest that festival attendance was widespread.²⁵

²⁰ Boesch (1908) 101-2.

²¹ The four games are the Megala Asklepieia in Cos (242-1 BC), the Leukophryeneia in Magnesia on the Maeander (208-7 BC), the Koreia/Soteria in Cyzicus (c. 200 BC), and the Nikephoria in Pergamon (c. 181 BC). See Rutherford (2013) 77. This *asylia* is to be distinguished from the truce (*spondai*) protecting those going to and from the festival (Rigsby [1996] 11).

²² Rigsby (1996) A66-126.

²³ IG XII 4.207-45. Cf. Rigsby (2004), Buraselis (2004).

²⁴ Over 300 *theorodokoi* are known from the Peloponnese alone (Perlman [2000] 26-7).

²⁵ Rutherford (2013) 157-65.

And then there are new shrines without important festivals that established similar foreign networks. The Great Gods of Samothrace, for instance, only developed an Aegean-wide following in the Hellenistic period, and thus the 250 known *theoroi* recorded in Samothracian inscriptions are all from the second century BC or later. ²⁶ It is difficult to tell whether older local and regional festivals saw a true increase in sacred embassies, on par with those of new festivals and shrines. Moschion's theoric activity, which includes three visits to local festivals, suggests that such connections were also thriving. And the general impetus of Hellenistic cities to imitate the institutional norms of their neighbors makes one suspect that smaller festivals also became more active in establishing theoric networks. To such civic festivals, one must add an entirely new category of festivals put on by kings and, later, Romans. These might be permanent affairs (such as the *Ptolemaia* in Alexandria), or *ad hoc* festivals celebrating some particular occasion. Moschion is a *theoros* to at least two such festivals, one for Demetrius I Soter (lines 152-5), and then for one given by Marcus Perperna after the defeat of the Attalid pretender Aristonicus in 129 (lines 223-31).

Cities that cultivated such theoric networks for their own games obviously gained prestige from the exercise. The idea that foreign visitors to a festival would spread good repute about a people and shrine is as old as Homer.²⁷ And the prominent placement of inscriptions at Cos and Magnesia documenting the recognition of their festivals by outsiders shows that such recognition carried weight. But cities that sent delegate-*theoroi* gained prestige as well. As a *theoros* to the games of Perperna, Moschion, "along with the others who were appointed, made his visit notable."²⁸ Through decorous action, the delegate-*theoroi*

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²⁶ Dimitrova (2008) 4.

²⁷ E.g. *Od.* 8.273-89.

 $^{^{28}}$ *I.Priene* lines 230-2: θεωρὸς ἐπιφανῆ μετὰ τῶν συναποδειχθέντων τὴν ἀποδημίαν [ἐποιήσατο -].

could increase the prestige of their own city. They were there both to see, and to be seen.

Thus all participants stood to gain in prestige from the practice of sending and receiving sacred embassies, to say nothing of the divine favor they might hope to earn through their piety.

For their part, the delegate-theoroi got to see the spectacle of the festival, make connections in another city, and potentially received honors for their service. The men who participated in such embassies accordingly seem to have been eager to do so. *Theoriai* were occasionally a liturgical obligation of their head, the architheoros. ²⁹ But, like many other embassies in the Hellenistic period, there were often public funds earmarked for the theoros' use. 30 That Moschion is explicitly praised for using his own funds while carrying out his theoric duties suggests that there were (at least in theory) public funds he could have used. And while it is typical to think that later Hellenistic benefactors such as Moschion were more likely to use their own funds for such purposes than their predecessors, one can find instances of private theoric spending throughout the Hellenistic period. In an inscription from 270/69 BC, the Athenians honor Callias of Sphettus for, among many other things, spending 5,000 drachmae on the Athenian theoria to the first Ptolemaia.31 An inscription from the mid-third century honors Boulagoras of Samos, who spent 6,000 drachmae in similar pursuits.³² Men from the highest echelons of the city participated in theoric networks. Some 61 of the 300 or so theorodokoi for Peloponnesian festivals are known from other evidence to have either held political office, or to have been closely related to men who had.³³ Occasionally men were

²⁹ Rutherford (2013) 215-17.

³⁰ Quaß (1993) 109.

³¹ SEG XXVIII 60 *II*. 61-2.

³² *IG* XII 6.11 *II*. 25-36.

³³ Perlman (2000) 40 Fig. 4.

even named 'Theoros.'³⁴ Predictably, we can occasionally find such men going on *theoria* themselves.³⁵

Secular Embassies and their Hosts

In addition to his services as *theoros*, Moschion went on at least four secular embassies: to Demetrius II Nikator (lines 155-9), Ptolemy (VIII Physcon?), and the city of Petra (lines 166-74), and Marcus Perperna (this embassy doubling as a *theoria* [lines 223-31]). The fragmentary lines 140-52 may involve another embassy to Romans, and lines 163-6 mention multiple other unspecified embassies, both sacred and secular. Embassies on non-sacred matters were, of course, not new to the Hellenistic period. But their overall number (and therefore the overall number of men participating in them) assuredly increased during this time. The growth of new *poleis* in the Hellenistic period from Thessaly to Afghanistan was spectacular. Just as new festivals and shrines begat new theoric networks, so, too, did each of these new cities send out its own embassies, and receive embassies from older cities in turn.

The importance and frequency of embassies to royal courts also drastically increased during the Hellenistic period. The number of classical *poleis* that needed to communicate with backwater Macedon or distant Persia was relatively small. But in the Hellenistic period, practically every city found it necessary to remain in contact with the rulers of one or more of the Successor kingdoms. Embassies to royal courts seem to have been a regular occurrence. When the Seleucid king Antiochus IV invaded Egypt in 169, Ptolemy VI Philometor

³⁴ 22 instances of the name in the Hellenistic Period (out of 45 total). See Mack (2015) 258-9, esp. fig. 5.8.

³⁵ Rutherford (2013) 164 discusses examples from Athenian embassies to Delphi.

³⁶ Cf. Cohen (1995), (2006), and (2013).

marshalled the Greek envoys already at his court to use as emissaries to the invader. We learn from Polybius that seven embassies, consisting of at least fourteen men in total from four different cities or leagues, happened to be in Alexandria at that moment (12.19.1-7). And this was at a time in which Ptolemaic power was in decline. One suspects that, in the halcyon days of Ptolemy I or II, the number of ambassadors was even greater, and that, generally speaking, the seven embassies that were at Alexandria in 169 are indicative of the high level of diplomatic contact between kings and cities.

All of this new diplomatic contact may have led to an increase in the number of *proxenoi* during the Hellenistic period.³⁷ Although the institution of proxeny goes back to at least the fifth century, of the 2,470 proxenies comprising Mack's database, over 1,300 come from the third century BC, while fewer than 400 come from the fourth. Eighty or more communities inscribed proxeny decrees in the second half of the third century and the first half of the second. It is difficult to tell how much of this output represents an actual increase in *proxenia*, especially given how widespread and well-established the custom was in earlier centuries. In the late Classical period, one can find even small communities with substantial numbers of *proxenoi*. For instance, Karthia, a small community on the island of Keos, had 86 *proxenoi* representing her in various cities in the first half of the fourth century.³⁸ But in absolute terms, there were without doubt a large number of Hellenistic *proxenoi*. In the late second century, the tiny town of Astypalaia in the Dodecanese had six *proxenoi* from most

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³⁷ Or of offices of a similar nature, e.g., the *xenodokoi* of Thessaly, who begin appearing in inscriptions in the Hellenistic period and who, according to Zelnick-Abramovitz (2000) 109-10, acted as receivers of foreigners and as guarantors of contracts involving foreigners. The *xenodokos* was also a liturgy in Cos in the first century AD (Hamon [2012] 205).

³⁸ IG XII 5 542; Marek (1984) 135, Mack (2011), Mack (2015) 320-4.

cities, and between 11-17 *proxenoi* from the more important ones.³⁹ It is therefore possible that many Hellenistic local notables served as *proxenos* for at least one city.

Many cities displayed lists of *proxenoi*. We know of Astypalaia's extensive *proxenoi* web through just such a list. In total, there are 5-7 surviving proxeny catalogues (from Astypalaia, Chios, Eresus, Karthaia, Kleitor, and perhaps Tenos and Kalchedon) documenting all the *proxenoi* a city possessed at a particular moment; nine examples of chronological lists (in which all the *proxenoi* made within a set space of time—often the past 6-12 months—were recorded together); and six further catalogues no longer surviving, but referred to in other inscriptions in the city. It was certainly convenient for travelers to have the *proxenoi* of the city listed publicly, and it was probably more cost-effective to inscribe *proxenoi* in lengthy lists after a set period rather than creating a new inscription for each decree. But the (expensive) choice to inscribe at all, rather than merely keep the records in an archive, suggests that cities derived some sort of prestige from monumentalizing their connections to the wider Greek world.

Certainly many men within cities were eager to go forth on embassies or act as *proxenoi*. Gauthier has called attention to an inscription of Magnesia from the first half of the second-century BC.⁴¹ The inscription contains a set of honors for a Magnesian citizen (Glaucus, son of Admetus) bestowed by the *demos* of Teos. Rather than beginning, in the traditional Tean manner, with the phrase "the decision of the *timouchoi* and generals" (τιμούχων καὶ στρατηγῶν γνώμη), it begins "...Melanippus son of Apollonius proposed:

³⁹ The three portions of the inscription are conveniently collected now at Mack (2015) no. 3 (293-300). Recent discussion at Mack (2015) 170-1, Hitchman and Mack (2016).

⁴⁰ Mack (2015) 153-5.

⁴¹ I.Magnesia 97. For the dating, see Lewis and Rhodes (1997) 372.

coming to the archons and the assembly, Melanippus son of Apollonius believed it necessary that an embassy be sent to Magnesia that will confer the honors that have been awarded Glaucus by the people." Gauthier has inferred from this that the Tean *boulē* denied Melanippus' original request (perhaps because of an ongoing war). Melanippus then took his request for the embassy directly to the assembly, where it was approved. Indeed, Melanippus is appointed one of the two ambassadors to Magnesia, the other being Apollonius, son of Melanippus (presumably his son or father). At the very least, then, we have an instance of a man proposing an embassy, upon which he and his kin then go. And if Gauthier's assumptions are correct, then Melanippus was not only willing to go on an embassy to Magnesia, but potentially willing to defy the will of the *boulē* and risk travel in wartime.

Melanippus was not alone in his desire to forge connections with outsiders. As with sacred embassies, there was often a fund to defray the expenses (ἐφόδιον, σιτηρέσιον, ὀψώνιον) of travelling ambassadors. Even in the late fourth century, however, benefactors were providing interest-free loans to the city in order to pay for embassies on which they themselves served.⁴⁵ And over the course of the next hundred years, these loans were replaced by outright gifts. The possibility that the city would pay for an embassy never disappeared, but the expectation certainly became that the ambassador would normally return these funds (or decline to accept them). ⁴⁶ Moschion, for instance, paid his own way for every

⁴² Lines 2-7: [Μελά]γιππος Ἀπολλωνίου ε[ί]πεν' ἐπειδἡ [Μελά]νιππος Ἀπολλωνίου ἐπελθὼν ἐπ[ὶ τοὺ]ς ἄρχοντας καὶ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν οἴεται δεῖγ [ἀπ]οσταλῆναι πρεσβείαν εἰς Μαγνησίαν ἢ [ἀνο]ίσει τὰς τιμὰς αἷς τετίμηται ὑπὸ το[ῦ δήμου Γ]λαῦκος. The traditional Tean "timouchoi and generals" beginning is present at the start of the honorific decree voted by the Teans to Glaucus (line 29).

⁴³ Gauthier (2005) 81-5.

⁴⁴ Line 28.

⁴⁵ Cf. *I.Ilion* $1 = Syll.^3$ 330.

⁴⁶ Quaß (1993) 109-11; Dmitriev (2005) 43.

embassy, bar two (to Alexandria and Petra) where he was excessively delayed. Even then he paid the extra expenses that resulted from the delays. Some notables erected in their cities "Ehrentafeln," or public monuments displaying honors received from multiple foreign cities.⁴⁷ The late fourth-century monument of Nicomedes of Cos, which reproduced thirty honorific decrees from various *poleis*, provides an example of this phenomenon that is both impressive and early.⁴⁸ In a similar manner, the Thasian brothers Dionysodoros and Hestiaios surrounded their statues in the agora of Thasos with inscriptions recording honors from four other cities celebrating their goodness and usefulness.⁴⁹ Yet other examples include Eudemos of Seleukeia (172 BC), Cassander of Alexandria Troas (c. 165), and Sosos of Rhodes (post 88 BC).⁵⁰ Pyrrhakos of Alabanda, who, after one successful embassy to Rome, offered his services for a return visit "without being asked" (ἀπαράκλητον ἑαυτ[ὸν παρε]σκεύασεν) is emblematic of the type.⁵¹

International Arbiters and Foreign Judges

The only major form of foreign service on which Moschion's memorial is silent is acting as a judge either in an international arbitration or in domestic cases in another city.

Our ignorance on this matter is no surprise: only one known career documenting honorific inscription mentions service as a foreign judge among the various benefactions of the honorand. Both functions are, however, frequently referred to in other types of inscriptions. The custom of inviting a panel of third-party arbitrators to settle a dispute between two *poleis*

⁴⁷ On the *Ehrentafeln*, see Mack (2015) 107.

⁴⁸ *IG* XII 4 129-30.

⁴⁹ Pouilloux and Dunant (1954) nos. 169-72.

⁵⁰ Eudemos: *Svll.* ³ 644-5. Cassander: *Svll.* ³ 653A. Sosos: Majuri (1925) no. 18.

⁵¹ SEG XL 1073, lines 27-8.

⁵² SEG XXXIX 1286, lines 4-9 (Heliodorus of Samos, mid-second century BC). Hamon (2012) 213.

had long been known to the Greeks. But there appears to have been an increase in the use of such arbitration during the Hellenistic period: between 740-337 BC there are 61 known cases of arbitration, but between 337-90 BC there are 171.⁵³ Because most of the Hellenistic evidence for the custom is epigraphic, it is possible that this increase is a consequence of a change in epigraphic habits rather than in the conventions of international diplomacy. Shiela Ager, however, has argued convincingly that this Hellenistic uptick is not the result of changing epigraphic practices, but of changing judicial ones, and that an actual increase in international arbitration during this period is reflected not only in numbers, but also in the increasingly refined provisions present in later inscriptions.⁵⁴

Certainly an increase in international arbitration would make sense, given that Hellenistic cities were also willing to allow foreign judges to arbitrate their internal affairs, something no classical *polis* did.⁵⁵ There are approximately 280 inscriptions involving foreign judges, from all across the Aegean Basin and the Black Sea.⁵⁶ The use of such judges is a Hellenistic innovation. They first appear in the late fourth century in Asia Minor, spread in the third century, and are in evidence in mainland Greece by the second.⁵⁷ While international arbitrations often involved panels of hundreds of judges, panels of foreign

⁵³ Classical and Archaic arbitration: Tod (1913), Magnetto (1997), Roebuck (2001). Hellenistic arbitration: Ager (1996). On the unstated norms that governed arbitrations in both periods: Chaniotis (2004), Ager (2013). ⁵⁴ Ager (1996) 19-20.

⁵⁵ Foreign judges being men brought in to settle the internal affairs of a city, while interstate arbitrators were brought in to settle a dispute between two cities.

⁵⁶ Crowther (2007) 53. There is no single collection of all of these inscriptions, although most are listed in the table at Cassayre (2010) 131-54. Mack (2015) 266-9 does further statistical analysis on the basis of Crowther's catalogue.

⁵⁷ Scafuro (2013) 365-6.

judges tended to be much smaller, between three to five judges, or in some cases even just a single judge.⁵⁸

Foreign judges were probably first employed in genuine social emergencies, instances in which tensions within a city were so high that the alternatives were essentially stasis or decision by an outside party.⁵⁹ Even then, so great was the typical *polis*' desire for internal autonomy that it often took the intervention of kings to jumpstart the custom. Twelve of the twenty-four decrees involving foreign judges from before 220 BC explicitly acknowledge such royal intervention. ⁶⁰ But by the second century, the foreign judges who were once imposed upon cities by necessity and royal will were now freely invited in. Typical in this regard was the island of Kalymna. She first used judges from Iasos in Caria at the behest of a monarch, but from the beginning of the third century regularly invited judges from Iasos of her own accord. 61 Sometimes foreign judges still handled delicate issues. A decree of Alexandria Troas, for instance, honors Prienian judges who "judged fairly and justly all the cases of disorder and violence."62 But they no longer seem to have been so much an emergency measure as they were a regular part of the judicial system. ⁶³ A decree from Iasos for a judge from Priene praises the judge so that "those who come to the city to act as judges may seek to make their judgments in a manner worthy of praise and honors," a wording that

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⁵⁸ Hamon (2012) 197.

⁵⁹ Both Crowther (1992) 27, and Robert (1973) 775 describe the institution as a "safety valve." Gauthier (1993a) also thinks that foreign judges were brought in only in times of genuine crisis (224).

⁶⁰ Crowther (1992) 24.

⁶¹ Serge (1952) test. xvi (initial judgement of lasians brought about by the decree of a monarch). Serge (1952) nos. 9, 31, and 61 are further decrees in honor of later lasian judges. On the dating, and the development of foreign courts at Kalymna more generally, see Crowther (1994).

⁶² *I.Priene* 44, lines 17-18. διότι τὰς δίκας ἴσως καὶ δικαίως ἀπάσας ἔκριναν τάς τε τῶμ παρανόμων καὶ τὰς τῶμ βιαίων.

⁶³ Cassayre (2010) 168 has argued that judgeships remained ad hoc, a view persuasively refuted by Fröhlich (2011).

suggests that the city expected to receive more judges in the future.⁶⁴ Meanwhile, a decree from Magnesia on the Meander may suggest that foreign judges arrived regularly every six months.⁶⁵ At Sparta, a building was apparently set aside for "lodging the Romans and judges."⁶⁶ By Cicero's day, the Cilician Greeks thought the ability to entertain foreign judges was a critical component of their autonomy (*Att.* 6.1.15). Surely none of these cities had their civil strife so well planned that they regularly required, expected, and even scheduled emergency intervention?

Better, perhaps, to think that cities saw, in the use and sending of foreign judges, a way to foster connections with one another and gain prestige. When a city wished to receive foreign judges, it sent an embassy to another city and asked that city for men. Which men, precisely, were sent, was up to the city sending them. At the conclusion of the judging, the requesting city thanked both the judges themselves and their home city. Thus the men of Bargylia sent an honorific decree to Priene that began, "since the demos of Priene is friendly and well-disposed and enjoys reciprocal political rights and is magnanimous in other matters, it continued to be asked by the people to send judges." The men of Erythrai informed the Prienians that the judge from Priene had "judged in a manner worthy of his homeland and our city." As part of her thanks to judges from Oropos, Eretria erected a statue of the *demos* of Oropos at Eretria. She gave the same honor to Miletus and Sparta as well, and perhaps

 $^{^{64}}$ I. Priene 53 lines 14-15: οἱ παραγινόμενοι δικάζειν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ζητῶσιν ἀξίως ἐπαίνου καὶ τιμῶν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς κρίσεις.

⁶⁵ I.Magnesia 99, lines 14-16 (early second century). Cf. Crowther (1992) 28 for dating.

⁶⁶ /G V 1 869: κατάλυμα τῶν Ῥωμαίων καὶ δικαστᾶν. Walser (2012) 102, n. 12; Hamon (2012) 205.

⁶⁷ Hamon (2012) 196.

 $^{^{68}}$ I.Priene 47 II. 3-6: ἐπειδὴ ὁ δῆμος ὁ Πριηνέων φίλος ὢ[ν] καὶ εὔνους καὶ ἰσοπολίτης τοῦ δήμου ἔν τε τοῖς ἄλλοις φι $\{\lambda\}$ λανθρώπως $\{\phi$ ιλανθρώπως $\}$ χρώμενος διατελεῖ παρακληθείς τε ὑπὸ τ[οῦ] δήμου δικαστὰς ἀποστεῖλαι.

 $^{^{69}}$ I.Priene 50 II. 6-7: ἐδίκασεν ἀξίως τῆς τε ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδος καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας πόλεως.

⁷⁰ Petrakos (1997) nos. 330+331=SEG XLIII 209+210 (ca. 167-156 BC).

Messene and Cos.⁷¹ Nor was she alone in rewarding the home cities of successful judges in this fashion.⁷²

Cities therefore stood to gain honor from the work of their citizens as foreign judges. They thus tended to place the decrees from other cities honoring those judges (and, by proxy, themselves) in conspicuous locations. At Cos, the decrees from other cities honoring Coans who had served as judges were displayed in the city's Asclepieion, alongside foreign honors given to Coan doctors.⁷³ At Messenia, they were placed at the temple of Zeus.⁷⁴ As Hamon observes, "chaque décret gravé témoignait d'un succès diplomatique et illustrait la politique (αἵρεσις) qui était celle de la cité envers les autres communautés grecques."⁷⁵

Similar honor-seeking behavior seems to have guided some interstate arbitration as well. When Magnesia and Miletus ended their war in the 180's, thirteen separate states (including Rhodes, Athens, Samos, Megalopolis, and the Achaean League) sent thirty-two envoys to broker the peace. The combined clout of multiple arbitrators probably helped keep compel the disputing parties to agree, and later to abide by the terms of that agreement. But the number of envoys and states involved here in what was ultimately a regional conflict seems excessive. Nor is it entirely clear why an inland city like Megalopolis would have any interest in events far across the Aegean. The most likely explanation for the involvement of the Megalopolitans is that they wished to participate in this sort of interstate diplomacy for its own sake. The propensity for cities to ask to be called in as arbitrators indicates that this was

⁷¹ Gauthier (1993b), Ma (2007) 93.

⁷² Ma (2007) 92 n. 14 adduces one other confirmed case (Larba for the *demos* of Magnesia on the Meander) and two probable ones (Akraiphia for Larisa and Peparethos for Larisa).

⁷³ Interdonato (2004) 270. For Cos' diplomatic activity, see Crowther (1999) 306-8.

⁷⁴ SEG LII 381.

⁷⁵ Hamon (2012) 213.

⁷⁶ Milet VI 1 3.148. Cf. Errington (1989), Ma (2003) 29, Wörrle (2004).

a widespread wish. Pergamum, for example, may have initiated its arbitration between Mitylene and Pitane.⁷⁷ In a similar manner, the Athenians seem to have been the ones who initiated their mediation between Rome and Aetolia in 190 (although later the Aetolians requested Athenian and Rhodian aid).⁷⁸ Rhodes in particular seems to have built up a reputation as an arbitrating city, being involved in at least a dozen interstate arbitrations.⁷⁹ The desire of the Rhodians to play the distinguished role of arbitrator no doubt contributed to their fateful decision to acquiesce to Perseus' request that they arbitrate between him and Rome.⁸⁰

And just as with other types of foreign service, we can find evidence of men within the city eagerly pursuing participation in these judicial services abroad. An early second-century BC inscription concerning Rhodian arbitration of a territorial dispute between Samos and Priene provides a good example of this.⁸¹ There were probably five Rhodian judges and five representatives from each disputing state, although the names of one Rhodian and of all five Samians have been lost. Two of the four remaining Rhodians were involved in other interstate arbitrations settled by Rhodes, while three of the Prienians served as foreign judges or interstate arbitrations.⁸² In other words, over half of the identifiable men involved in the case also performed other forms of judicial service abroad. Similar men can be found elsewhere. Pandokos, son of Alkotas, for instance, was one of the five judges sent by Larisa in 109/8 to

⁷⁷ Ager (1996) no. 146.

⁷⁸ Ager (1996) no. 94. Livy 37.6.4-5, 38.3.7; Polyb. 21.4.1-2, 29.1-2.

⁷⁹ Ager (1991), (1996) 11.

⁸⁰ Polyb. 29.10-11.

⁸¹ I.Priene 37+38 = Syll. ³ 599 = Ager (1996) no. 74. Cf. Crowther (1996), Magnetto (2008).

⁸² Rhodians: Nicostratus, a Rhodian arbiter between Miletus and Magnesia (Ager no. 109); Euphaniskos, a Delphian *proxenos* and arbiter between Delphi and Amphissa (Ager no. 117). Prienians: Metodoros, a foreign judge in Bargylia (*I.Priene* 47); Kallikrates, a foreign judge in Iasos (*I.Priene* 54); Apollodoros, arbiter between Phokaia and Smyrna (Ager no. 91). Cf. Ager (1996) 207.

settle disputes between Athens and Sicyon, and one of two judges sent by Larisa to Peparethos.⁸³

Indeed, some men made something of a career out of being a foreign judge, serving on several such missions and presumably developing a reputation for fair dealing, or at the very least a thick portfolio of honorific decrees.⁸⁴ A decree in honor of Lanthes of Assos, for example, honors that man for his services as a judge in Alabanda and Mylasa. There are at least four wreaths carved on this inscription, implying at least two more occasions (and perhaps two more cities) in which Lanthes acted as a foreign judge.⁸⁵ Four separate inscriptions from the second or first century honor Theodoros, son of Theodoros, of Mylasa for his service as a foreign judge.⁸⁶ All of this suggests that men who had the aptitude, inclination, and resources for such tasks sought them out and were regularly appointed to them.

Foreign Honors, Domestic Pressure

Thus, while the epigraphic habit of Hellenistic cities allows us to see more connections between them than we can see between their archaic and classical predecessors, it is likely that this uptick in diplomatic activity is not a mere accident of evidence. The rise of the successor kingdoms and the penchant of their kings to found cities increased the number of diplomatic actors. It is, therefore, not surprising that institutions such as *proxenia*, theoria, and international arbitrations flourish at this time, and that entirely new forms of

⁸³ Athens: Gauthier (1999), 165-7, with the identification of Pandokos at 172, n. 55. Peparethos: Giovannini (1976) 205-13.

⁸⁴ Robert (1973) 772, Crowther (1992) 40-41, Scafuro (2013) 376.

⁸⁵ Merkelbach (1976) no. 9.

⁸⁶ I.Mylasa 632-635.

connection, such as foreign judgeships, also arise. We have seen how cities as an aggregate can derive prestige from such connections, in addition to other, more pragmatic benefits.

And we have also seen that many notables within the city were willing to go on diplomatic missions on the city's behalf.

What remains to be seen is why these notables took on the expense, burden, and risk of such missions. Why did so many men devote so much time and effort to cultivating outside connections, even when the primary focus of their competition was internal to the cities in which they lived? Why not directly shower one's fellow citizens with money, rather than helping indirectly by performing diplomatic services at one's own expense? Part of the answer may lie in the inherent instability of city politics. As a group, the benefactor-class in a given city was probably fairly stable. Indeed, towards the end of the second century BC, men from this social stratum probably came to appreciate themselves as a discrete group. But for *individual* notables, continued preeminence was far from certain. For one thing, scholarship has come increasingly to appreciate the importance of the popular assembly in Hellenistic, and even Roman, city politics. The local notables of a city did not exercise absolute power, and we should not see them as oligarchs dressed in benefactors' clothing, but as a group of powerful men trying to harness the power of the assembly for their own ends. The situation was not wholly dissimilar to that in Classical Athens. The realways remained

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⁸⁷ Hamon (2005), (2007), Van der Vliet (2011).

⁸⁸ Thus Habicht (1995), Brélaz (2009), Salmeri (2011).

⁸⁹ Habicht (1995) 92.

a very real possibility that a notable might be outmaneuvered or upstaged by his peers. 90 Failure certainly meant political irrelevance, and could mean exile or even death. 91

Within this context, foreign connections provided a notable with the ability to outflank local competition by gaining honors from outsiders. Cities were much less stingy when it came to honoring foreign benefactors. No assembly needed to fear that a foreign emissary or judge would seize tyrannical power, and local notables were more likely to see the wealthy stranger as a potential ally to be courted, rather than a possible rival to be crushed. Thus, of the surviving honorific inscriptions at Iasos, four or five are for citizens of the city, and around 90 are for foreigners. 92 Cities usually had a set of honors and privileges they granted to *proxenoi*, including the right to own property (enktesis), front-row seating at festivals (proedria), tax-exemption (ateleia), and citizenship rights (politeia). 93 Those who served as foreign judges could expect a eulogy, crowns (gold for the judges, laurel for their secretary), and perhaps even a statue.⁹⁴ Establishing a relationship with a foreign city often provided a springboard to yet further honors. Thus it was extremely common for theoroi to receive appointments as *proxenoi* from the cities they visited. The Samothracians, in fact, granted proxeny to visiting theoroi almost exclusively. ⁹⁵ Theorodokoi, too, were frequently honored with proxenia (indeed, Athens even preemptively promised proxenia to those foreigners who hosted the *theoroi* for Athens' games). Over time, the number of honors

⁹⁰ Thus Hamon (2007): "la prééminence était le résultat toujours incertain d'une competition féroce entre membres de l'élite" (83).

⁹¹ On exile in Hellenistic period, see Gray (2015) 117-19.

⁹² Fabiani and Nafissi (2013) 37.

⁹³ The precise combination of honors could vary widely between cities. See Habicht (2002), with further discussion at Mack (2015) 105-6.

⁹⁴ Robert (1973) 772-3.

⁹⁵ Mack (2015) 168. Cf. Dimitrova (2008) 16-20.

⁹⁶ Perlman (2000), 60.

granted to local benefactors increased.⁹⁷ Even so, certain distinctions, like the title *euergetes*, remained almost the exclusive province of foreigners. 98

Local notables were also less likely to contest honors granted to foreigners than they were to contest honors granted to their fellow citizens. Thus, out of ca. 2500 known proxeny grants, Mack counts only five with entrenchment clauses (forbidding anyone from proposing the revocation of honors). 99 The only Hellenistic example of which we are aware of a proxenos who had his position revoked is the unfortunate Euandros of Larissa, who was a proxenos to Priene in the early third century. It seems that during the tyranny of Hieron over that city, Euandros lost his proxeny, and that, after Hieron was expelled, the new government re-confirmed him in his own role (and tried to make sure he stayed in it by including one of the five *proxenos*-entrenchment clauses mentioned above). ¹⁰⁰

Foreign service could therefore be a way in which a man might gain honors hard or impossible to gain at home. It also provided a means by which a man might pressure his city into displaying honors granted to him. Cities that had received a benefit from the citizen of another city would send emissaries to that foreign city to express their gratitude. Honorific inscriptions thanking a judge for his service were erected because a representative from the city whose cases had been judged had gone to the judge's hometown and requested that they

⁹⁷ Domingo Gygax (2016) 180-200.

⁹⁸ Gauthier (1985) 16-24.

⁹⁹ Mack (2015) 96, with further discussion at 97 n. 27. Most of the entrenchment clauses seem to have been proposed because further, more contentious, honors such as citizenship were granted in the same decree. The five examples are IG XII 8 267; IG XII suppl. 358 + add. P. 217; I.Ilion 24; IG II² 17; I.Priene 12.

¹⁰⁰ I.Priene 12. On Hieron, see above, chapter 1, pp. 71-2. Further discussion of Euandros episode at Robert (1944) 9-10, Crowther (1996) 205-16, Mack (2015) 95.

be erected. 101 Those who served as interstate arbiters could also expect a copy of the final arbitration to be sent to their hometown. 102

To reject such a request insulted both the honorand and the requesting city. How could one ignore the request of another city and then expect them to accede to your own requests? The logic of *eunoia* and reciprocity that undergirds interstate relations practically demanded that such requests be granted. Moreover, the praise for the individual benefactor in such cases was often intertwined with praise for his city. Decrees for foreign judges, after all, often thank the judges' hometown for its generosity in selecting such a worthwhile persons to serve as judges. 103 While honors for domestic benefactions might be contested by other notables, or withheld by a demos leery of overly powerful magnates, foreign benefactions operated in a different register. They enhanced the prestige not only of their granter, but of his entire *polis*. The threshold for granting public space to honors that demonstrated the city's success as an international actor must have been a good deal lower than that for domestic honors. The sparing mention of diplomatic service in Moschion's decree might seem to suggest that such service got a lower return of honors for a given investment of time and money than domestic benefaction. But in circumstances of extreme competition between notables, it is possible that foreign benefactions did more "euergetic work," as it were, than their domestic analogues, because they tied the city's honor and reputation in with the individual honorand's in a way that lowered the threshold for public honoring.

¹⁰¹ Robert (1973) 772-3.

¹⁰² Ager (1996) 19.

¹⁰³ See above, p. 243.

Indispensability

city. Successful ambassadorships allowed a man to make himself indispensable to his own city. Successful ambassadorships allowed a notable to separate himself from the mass of other benefactors by demonstrating his special, individual usefulness. Anyone with cash could presumably buy oil, or pay for a new building for the city. But men who had developed a rapport with a particular community or king were a much rarer commodity. When Attalus of Pergamum told the city of Amlada that he was releasing hostages and remitting payments on a loan as a favor to both the city and her emissary Oprasates, this obviously demonstrated Oprasates' particular ability to gain favors from Attalus. ¹⁰⁴
Similarly, the utility of the Coan ambassador Diogitus was confirmed when Seleucus II praised him in his letter acknowledging the inviolability of the Coan Asclepieion c. 240 BC. ¹⁰⁵ In a similar manner, in the early second century, Hermophantos son of Lichas of Miletus was a *theoros* to Eleusis and later the head (*architheoros*) of another Milesian *theoria* to Attica. ¹⁰⁶ And after Pyrrhakos of Alabanda made one successful embassy to Rome, he was a natural candidate when Alabanda needed a second embassy to that city. ¹⁰⁷

Another path towards indispensability was followed by developing an expertise in a certain field or type of diplomatic action. We have already discussed instances in which men went out repeatedly as arbiters or foreign judges. One should add to such men those who developed a reputation not for judging, but for speaking in arbitrations on the city's behalf.

At Priene, the early first century benefactor Krates appears to have been just this sort of

¹⁰⁴ Welles (1934) no. 54.

¹⁰⁵ Welles (1934) no. 26. For Roman examples, see Lendon (1997) 148.

¹⁰⁶ *IG* II² 992; *SEG* XLII 1072.

¹⁰⁷ SEG XL 1073, lines 16-31.

¹⁰⁸ See above, p. 246.

expert. Most of the surviving material on foreign embassies in his honorific inscription relates to his role in various legal disputes. On two occasions, Krates went before the Roman governor to defend the city's ownership of a set of salt-pans from encroaching *publicani*. He also represented the city in a dispute with Miletus arbitrated by Erythrai. Priene won the arbitration, but Miletus appealed the decision to the Roman governor, and Krates once more went and spoke before him on the city's behalf.¹⁰⁹

Moschion of Priene certainly developed relations with certain sets of foreigners. He acts first as a theoros to Demetrius I Soter (lines 152-5), and so is a natural choice as ambassador to Demetrius' son Demetrius II Nikator (lines 155-9). And if lines 140-52 involved participation in an embassy to Romans, this may have helped to make Moschion a suitable candidate to be a representative to Marcus Perperna. Moschion also has some claim to being a theoric expert, with at least six sacred embassies on his CV, more than any of the other (admittedly incomplete) Priene honorific inscription from this period. But Moschion was more than a specialist in a particular region or type of embassy. As we have seen, he went on a wide variety of journeys, from local sacred embassies to distant secular ones. He is what anthropologist Mary Helms calls a "long distance expert," someone who seems to be one of the community's representatives abroad in a wide variety of circumstances. 110 There were many notables who acted in a similar fashion. The Prienian Herodes, for example, also participated in numerous embassies, including two to king Ariarathes VI Epiphanes Philopator of Cappadocia. 111 Such a repetition of diplomatic missions was, moreover, by no means an eccentricity of the Prienian civic elite. Timesiphon of Paros also held multiple

¹⁰⁹ I.Priene 111, lines 110-151. On the legal case involving the publicani, see Wallace (2014).

¹¹⁰ Helms (1988). Cf. Rutherford (2013) 164-5 for the use of Helms' work specifically for theoroi.

¹¹¹ Moschion: *I.Priene* 108 = *PEP (Priene)* 66. Herodes: *I.Priene* 109.

theoros and proxenos positions. ¹¹² In the early second century, Hermophantos son of Lichas of Miletus was a *theoros* to Eleusis and later the head (*architheoros*) of another Milesian theoria to Attica. ¹¹³ While Hermophantos concentrated upon Attica, another Milesian by the name of Irenias specialized in matters closer to home, serving twice as an ambassador to Eumenes II, and as a member of the ten-man delegation that made peace with Heraclea-under-Latmus in the 170s. ¹¹⁴ Among the *hieromnemones* of the Delphic Amphictyony, the Achaean Lampromachus, son of Politas, was also an ambassador to Rome, while the Malian Phyros, son of Melantas, was also a foreign judge at Demetrias. ¹¹⁵

Many of the super-benefactors of the late Hellenistic period derived a great deal of prestige from their diplomatic services. Chief among the many benefactions of the Pergamene Diodoros Pasparos, for example, was his embassy to Rome in the wake of the First Mithridatic War. Diodoros won important concessions for Pergamon, despite the city's defection to Mithridates during the war. Potamon of Mytilene was declared savior and "founder" of his city for his successful embassy to the Senate and Caesar. The usefulness of foreign connections to a political career continued into the Roman period. The enemies of Dio Chrysostom realized that their efforts to oust the orator from Prusa could only succeed if they undermined his supposed value as an interlocutor with the imperial court. Therefore, alongside arguments that Dio was destroying sacred structures and plotting to stuff the *boule*

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¹¹² *IG* XII 130, 7-8.

¹¹³ IG II² 992; SEG XLII 1072.

¹¹⁴ Milet VI 1 307, Welles (1934) no. 52, Milet VI 1. 150.

Lampromachos: CID IV 114 (hieromnemon), Syll.³ 674, line 15 (ambassador). Phyros: CID IV 114 (hieromnemon), Helly (1971) 555 (judge). Cf. Lefèvre (2005) 20-23 for further examples, most of which involve either Macedon (where royal philoi acted as hieromnemones) or Aetolia (whose proximity to Delphi both geographically and politically made the role of hieromnemon more akin to a league office than a diplomatic service)

¹¹⁶ On Diodoros' embassy and honors, see Radt (1988) 113-26, Brennan (2009) 172-4.

¹¹⁷ IG XII 2, 163c. Cf. Quaß (1993) 143.

with his puppets, they insinuated that his embassies to Rome had failed to achieve enough concessions for the city. 118

Inheritable Connections

Another benefit certain foreign honors conferred was their heritability. *Proxenia* had always been a heritable office. Its sacred equivalent *theorodokia* was heritable as well. Of nine known renewals of *theorodokia* (all from Delphi), five explicitly refer to the renewed grant as 'ancestral' (π άτριον). In one of these five (*SGDI* 2600), Telesius, son of Straton renews his ancestral proxeny and *theorodokia* with Delphi. We later find his son Epigethes acting as a *theorodokos* for Delphi, for a total of three successive generations holding the same office. 121

There was a financial benefit to inheriting such connections. Bonds such as proxeny needed to be renewed by every generation. But this was not an overly onerous procedure. When Charmion of Kydonia (on Crete) wished to follow in his father Eumaridas' footsteps and become a *proxenos* of Athens, he relied mostly upon his 'inherited goodwill' (τήν τε πατρικὴν εὕνοιαν) for the city to persuade the Athenians to grant him proxeny. The Athenians found this argument convincing. In addition to making Charmion their *proxenos*, they re-inscribed two honorific decrees for his father and set them above Charmion's *proxenia* decree. A Cretan notable freshly come up in the world who wished to receive honors from Athens would have to perform some service to merit that city's attention, and

¹¹⁸ On Dio's Prusian enemies, see Bekker-Nielsen (2008) 119-46.

¹¹⁹ Perlman (2000) 58-9 (fig. 6) lists seventeen examples of *theorokia* grants explicitly said to pass to the honorand's ancestors.

¹²⁰ F.Delphes III 1 86; SEG XVIII 187; F.Delphes III 4 406; SGDI 2600; F.Delphes III 2 193; Perlman (2000) 61-2. See Bousquet (1958) 85-90 for discussion of Delphic renewals of proxeny.

¹²¹ Plassart (1921) 18 col. III *l.* 81.

¹²² *IG* II³ 1137 *I.* 56.

this would cost him both money and time. But Charmion was honored for essentially nothing, and was free to invest his time and efforts in domestic politics, or in forging connections with still more cities.

But no less important than this tangible economic incentive was the intangible natural prestige associated with inherited proxeny. Everyone recognized the *proxenos*' son as his successor to his office. In Plato's *Laws*, the Athenian *proxenos* at Sparta, Megillos, says that boyhood companions had chided or complimented him based on the actions of the Athenians (642B-C). The ancestral connections of the scores of men named 'Proxenos' or the countless others with ethnicity-based names (e.g. Lacedaemonius) were made manifest in their very names.¹²³ Inherited relationships with the outside world testified to the long service of the family in public affairs.

This was important because—like most upper classes in antiquity—the notables of the Hellenistic city did not constitute an aristocracy in the strict sense of the word. ¹²⁴ The sole qualifier for a citizen to gain admission into the upper echelons of society was wealth, not blood. If nothing else, the ease with which Romano-Italians integrated themselves into Greek *poleis* is evidence for how permeable the barrier to the upper class might be for those with money. ¹²⁵ Even in the deeply class-conscious imperial period, athletic trainers, goldsmiths, dyers, and bakers might serve on a city *boule* if they could afford to do so. ¹²⁶ At the same time, prestigious ancestry was no guarantee of future power. The result was a permeable upper class with a high degree of demographic turnover. For families fortunate

123 134 known men named "Proxenos." Cf. Mack (2015) 110-11.

¹²⁴ On aristocracy (or the lack thereof) in antiquity, see Van Wees and Fisher (2015).

¹²⁵ Hamon (2007) 84.

¹²⁶ Zuiderhoek (2011) 191.

enough to remain in the upper echelons of society for multiple generations, outside connections were one of the few ways available to distinguish themselves from the *nouveaux riches*.

Because of this, even non-heritable diplomatic roles often became a family affair. We have already mentioned Melanippus of Teos, who advocated for an embassy to Magnesia on which he and either his son or his father were the ambassadors. ¹²⁷ Moschion, for instance, went for the first time as a *theoros* along with his brother, and it seems to have been common for siblings, or fathers and sons to go as *theoroi* together. ¹²⁸ Embassies could provide an opportunity to introduce younger members of the family to outside connections that would benefit them later in life. Philonides of Laodikeia-on-Sea had used his connections in the Seleucid court to help the Athenian embassy sent to the king. ¹²⁹ The Athenians honored him for this, and he subsequently came in person with the elder son, where all three received more honors. ¹³⁰ Of the two sons, the homonymous Philonides became a philosopher and resided for a time in Athens, before becoming an influential member of the Seleucid court. ¹³¹ The other son Dikaiarchos was honored by Delphi for helping their ambassadors at court. ¹³² Both brothers served as *theorodokoi* for Delphi in Laodikeia-on-Sea. ¹³³ It seems then that the connections Philonides personally cultivated at Athens were used by one of his sons, and that

¹²⁷ *I.Magnesia* 97, see above, p. 238-40.

¹²⁸ *I.Priene* 108 *I.* 26. Rutherford (2013) 158. On familial traditions of acting as *hieromnemon* of the Delphic Amphictiony, see Lefèvre (2005) 24-5.

¹²⁹ IG II² 1236, II. 3-4 (ca. 209-187 BC). Dating as per SEG XLIX 555.

¹³⁰ Lines 8-9 ([...ἐλθόντος] αὐτοῦ εἰς τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου τῶν ὑῶν Φιλω[νίδου). On the age of the sons, see Gera (1999) 77. On the inscription more generally, see Robert (1960a).

¹³¹ Sonnabend (1996) 288-90; Gera (1999) 77-8.

¹³² OGIS 241.

¹³³ Plassart (1921) 24 col. IV *II*. 78-80.

both of his sons continued in the family business of using their political clout to cultivate foreign friendships.

In a similar manner, Akrisios, son of Iason, was a judge from Priene who died while judging in Mylasa. His son (also named Akrisios) was the secretary for the Prienian judges, and when his father died, took up the role of judge in his place. ¹³⁴ Akrisios presumably brought along his son as secretary in order to groom him for precisely this sort of responsibility, even if he did not expect his son to assume it quite so soon. The deliberate cultivating of a family tradition of foreign judgeships in this manner required either that a notable have enough clout over the assembly to get his son appointed secretary, or that the assembly had become accustomed to entrusting such matters to a small coterie of families. It was therefore a practice that developed rather late (the example of Akrisios is from the 1st c. BC/ 1st c. AD, while other examples of sons acting as secretaries for their fathers come from the 1st c. AD). ¹³⁵ But the impetus behind it, to create a family history of involvement in international affairs that separated one from other wealthy men, was present throughout the Hellenistic Period.

Foreign Affairs and Elite Self-Conception

There was good reason, then, that men such as Moschion were willing to undertake diplomatic service. Embassies abroad provided unique benefits that made them worthwhile for many notables, even if they were not as direct a route to domestic honors as fiscal benefactions or the holding of magistracies. Many of the benefits for notables came from the

¹³⁴ *IG* XII 5.305, lines 7-10.

¹³⁵ For the dating (on the basis of the script), see Hamon (2012) 215. For first century AD examples of sons as secretaries, see Fournier (2010) 226-8.

ways in which foreign service could be used to outmaneuver political rivals, either by gaining honors from cities where those rivals had no clout, or by adding to a notable's clout at home, or distinguishing his family from others. And because cities received benefits—both pragmatic and honorific—from cultivating networks of foreign connections, they seem to have been as eager to send their notables off into the wider world as those notables were to go. A posthumous decree from the second or first century BC for Philomelos of Silandos states that "his missions on behalf of his fatherland and the public services undertaken for it constantly made him a source of something good." Here embassies abroad are balanced against benefaction at home as the two ways in which a man might serve his *polis*.

Because local notables and the city both benefitted from foreign connections, we ought to credit the development of such connections to both the city as a whole, and especially to the notables who stood to gain (potentially) the most as individuals from them. Take the use of foreign judges as an example. Why did cities come to rely on foreign judges, for seemingly more than strictly emergency functions? In his highly influential 1973 article on foreign judges, Robert ascribed the popularity of foreign courts to their incorruptibility. Yet it does not seem intrinsically likely that such courts (composed as they were of five, or three, or even one man) were less corrupt than courts made up of locals. Of course, we are told time and again how just and incorruptible such judges were, but most of our evidence comes from honorific decrees, where one could hardly write "he was delightfully amenable to bribes." At Gonnoi in Thessaly, a local did try to bribe foreign judges. We know of the affair because the judges denounced him and were honored for doing so in an inscription. But

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¹³⁶ Malay and Petzl (2003) 19 *II*. 9-11. Cf. *SEG* LIII 1357.

¹³⁷ Robert (1973) 776.

¹³⁸ Helly (1973) no. 91, *II.* 20-6.

the fact that the attempt was made at all suggests that such probity was not universal. Perhaps the reference in Mylasan inscription to a decree "against those who corrupted the foreign judges" is more in keeping with the reality of the institution than are the idealizing honorific documents sent back home with the judges. ¹³⁹ Nor can the benefit of foreign judges be that they were legal experts. As we have already noted, judges were selected by the sending community; the requesting community had no ability to select who they thought was most suited for the task, only the city from which the judges would come.

One might therefore posit that the institution's popularity was driven, in part, by prominent citizens who stood to gain more from the practice. Once the assembly had decided that foreign judges should be requested, someone needed to be appointed as *dikastagogos*, who was the man in charge of presenting the request to the solicited city, fetching the judges, and then seeing to their needs during their stay. This bothersome task was made worthwhile by the chance to make an impression upon a foreign city through one's rhetorical prowess, and to meet and place under an obligation important men from a foreign city. It also came with its own share of honors. The same benefit would have applied to whomever was chosen to accompany a foreign judge back home and announce the honors bestowed upon him. Many, if not all, of the men of quality could expect to meet the judge at some point or another during his residence. Unlike ambassadors, judges were expected to stay for an extended period of time. A set of regulations from Tegea specifies that foreign judges should remain for sixty days, while the lodging reserved for judges and Romans at

¹³⁹ *I.Mylasa* 134, *I.* 4: κατὰ τῶν Φθειράντων τὰ ξενικὰ δικαστήρια.

¹⁴⁰ Crowther, Habicht, Hallof, and Hallof (1998), Hamon (2012) 217-18.

¹⁴¹ Indeed, by the imperial period honors for foreign judges largely cease, while honors for *dikastagogoi* remain prevalent (Mack (2015) 269 n. 85). Cf. *IG* V 1 39; *SEG* XI 491, 493, 496; *TAM* II 420, 583, 915; *I.Stratonikeia* 229. On the decline of foreign judgeships in Asia Minor, see Crowther (2007), Kantor (2016).

nearby Sparta also suggests that judges were expected to be in the city for a lengthy period. And during their stay the judges were wined and dined by the local elite. At the very least, departure entailed a banquet with the chief magistrates, and it is likely that the *dikastagogos* arranged other similar meals during the judges' tenure in the city. In other words, the whole institution provided an excellent opportunity for the men at the top of society to become known to their peers in other cities.

Yet even if judges were not chosen for their legal expertise, they came to exert a profound influence on how cities thought about the law. In the first place, the transfer of judges on a regular (if not regularized) basis led to a sharing of ideas. If a man spent sixty days judging cases in Tegea, surely every Tegean notable who cared would come to know that man's opinions. Invited judges acted as an elite conduit for the sharing of ideas about jurisprudence (and politics more generally) between cities. More significant, their use led to a general favoring of small courts manned by elite judges over the large courts of hundreds of jurors typically used in democracies. An arbitration from ca. 110 BC (CID 4 121+122) shows the changing temper of the times. In it, the city of Hypata was tasked by the Delphic Amphictyony with resolving a dispute between Chalkis on the one hand, and Eretria and Carystos on the other, over Euboean participation in the Amphictyony. The Hypatians empaneled a jury of 31 men selected by lot, and the jury decided in favor of Chalkis. Eretria and Carystos appealed to the Amphictyony, arguing that "the judgement from Hypata had not

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¹⁴² Tegea: *Syll.* ³ 306 *ll.* 24-5. Sparta: see above, p. 243.

¹⁴³ Crowther, Habicht, Hallof and Hallof (1998) no. 1 *ll*. 27-30 praises a Coan *dikastagogos* for providing meat for the judges at a public festival. See Hamon (2012) 204-10 for further discussion.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. Scafuro (2013) 376.

¹⁴⁵ Argued persuasively by Crowther (1992) esp. 23-4. For the use of large courts in Hellenistic democracies, see Walser (2012) 74-96.

been the most excellent."¹⁴⁶ The Amphictyony, in turn, wrote to Hypata, asking "whether the judgement in Hypata had been made in the best fashion, or whether it was necessary to annul the judgment of 31 men selected by lot."¹⁴⁷ The Hypatians took the hint and elected judges "according to excellence" for a re-trial. ¹⁴⁸ As Walser has argued in his recent discussion of the episode, the 'excellence' of the new judges could only have been their wealth or birth, and the entire incident is a sign of how radically the norms of judging had been altered so that international arbitration (a field in which panels of hundreds of judges traditionally dominated) was now done by select committees. ¹⁴⁹

Changes in judicial systems are part of a broader change in how local notables thought of themselves and their relationship to the city, as a result of their foreign involvements. The Prienian decrees for Moschion and his elite contemporaries have been extensively studied by past scholars not for the role of diplomacy in shaping elite careers, but rather because they constitute important early evidence for the creation of an ossified magisterial class. ¹⁵⁰ Thus, at a banquet provided by Moschion, the sons of the magistrates are set apart as a category different from the citizens, resident aliens, foreigners, and slaves. ¹⁵¹ Elsewhere in the same group of inscriptions, we frequently find the magistrates as a body separated out from everyone else. Another Prienian notable, Krates, gave a public banquet, during which the city magistrates may have been invited to dine at his own house. ¹⁵² Another

 $^{^{146}}$ CID 4 122 II. 3-4: οὐ φαμένων γε[γονέναι ἑαυτοῖς τὴν κρίσιν ἀπ]ὸ παντὸς τοῦ βελτίστου ἐν τῇ Ὑπάτῃ.

 $^{^{147}}$ CID 4 122 //. 5-6: πότερον γέγονεν ἡ κρίσις ἐν τῇ Ὑπάτῃ κ̞[ατ]ὰ τὸ βέλ[τιστον ἢ δεῖ ἄκυρον γίγνεσθαι] τὴν κρίσιν ἐν ἀνδράσιν τριάκοντα ἐνὶ κλήρου γενομένου.

¹⁴⁸ CID 4 122 I. 7: [ἄλλων δικαστῶν ἐν τῆ Ὑπάτη χειρο]τονηθέντων ἀριστίνδην.

¹⁴⁹ Walser (2012) 103-4.

¹⁵⁰ For bibliography see above, n. 4, esp. Fröhlich (2005) and Hamon (2007).

¹⁵¹ *I.Priene* 108 *II.* 253-90, following the restoration at Hamon (2007) 95-6.

¹⁵² I.Priene 111 II. 191-4: το[ὑς δὲ διετησί]ους ἄ[ρχοντας] εἰς τὴν α[ὑτοῦ[οἰκίαν ἐκάλεσε πάντας καὶ] τοὺς ἐπιμη[νίο]υς τῶν [στ]ρατη[γ]ῶν καὶ τὸν γυμ[ν]ασί[α]ρχον τῶν νέων [κ]αὶ τὸ[ννεωποίην καὶ τὸν γραμμ]ατέα

notable of Priene, Aulus Aemilius Zosimos, provided a sacrifice of oxen at the Panathenaia in which the meat was shared out with athletes, magistrates, and councilors.¹⁵³

Interactions with elite foreigners was a key component of upper-class Prienian self-differentiation. As *agonothete*, Krates distributed meat to visiting *theoroi*, and gave a banquet for both the *theoroi* and their local *theorodokoi*. ¹⁵⁴ In the inscriptions, we often find an express desire to impress foreigners as the impetus behind benefactions. So well did Moschion discharge the office of *stephanophoros* that "he received the greatest approbation from [foreigners] residing in the city." ¹⁵⁵ "Wishing his gymnasiarchy and the city to be seen as remarkable by the foreigners dwelling there," Zosimos provided oil to all present at a festival. ¹⁵⁶

One ought to see this interest as part of a broader interest in the opinions of outsiders about the worth of men. The implicit logic of inscribing decrees from other cities that honor one's own citizens is that the judgement of men from, say Larissa, or Delphi, or Iasos is meaningful. Take for example, a dedication from Rhodes, from the mid-second century (ca. 169 BC):¹⁵⁷

Timarchus son of Ariston was honored by the Aetolian League with praise, a golden crown, a statue, and citizenship, on account of his excellence and justice. He was honored by the Argives with praise, golden crown, and statue on account of his excellence. He was honored by the Delphians with a laurel crown from the god and a golden crown on account of his excellence and piety. Holding office during the priesthood (of Athena) of Philodemus son of

τῆς βουλῆς καὶ τοῦ [δ]ή[μ]ου καὶ τὸν ἀντιγραφέα καὶ τὸν γυμνασίαρ[χο]ν τῶ[ν ἐφήβων καὶ τοὺς παι]δονόμους καὶ τὸν ἀναγνώστην καὶ τὸν κήρυκα τῆς πόλεως.

¹⁵³ I.Priene 113 II. 109-111.

¹⁵⁴ I.Priene 111 II. 170, 188-90.

¹⁵⁵ I.Priene 108 II. 286-7: ὤστε καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἐπιδεδ[ημηκόσι τῶν ξένων ἀποδοχῆς τῆς] μεγίστης τετευχέναι 156 I.Priene 112 II. 84-6: βουληθεὶς δὲ τήν τε γυμνασιαρ[χίαν αὐτοῦ κ]αὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐπίσημον παρὰ τοῖς εἰς [αὐτὴν ἐπιδημοῦ]σιν φαίνεσθαι ξένοις.

¹⁵⁷ Blinkenberg (1941) no. 195.

Aristobulus, on behalf of himself and his fellow generals, to Athena Lindia, Zeus Polieus, and Apollo. 158

Timarchus demonstrates his excellence not through appeals to domestic benefaction, but to the esteem in which he is held by foreigners. The inscription assumes that its Rhodian readers will think that the opinions of the Aetolians, Argives, and Delphians about the virtues of Timarchus are valid. The same logic undergirds the display of *Ehrentafeln*, those private monuments celebrating honors received abroad, and it undergirds the interest at Priene in impressing foreigners as well. It is sign that the effects of Hellenistic diplomacy on Hellenistic civic life extend beyond mere changes in jurisprudence. Instead, there is a growing gulf between the 'ambassadorial class' of men who go forth to receive honors from other cities and fraternize with similarly wealthy foreigners who come to their own city, and everyone else.

In his important work on Hellenistic connectivity, J. Ma writes that "cities collaborated in creating a context of civic culture and locally meaningful honors, within which they could locate the identities of individual big men, and hopefully constrain them." In reality, big men were not constrained by honors but expanded by them. Active participation in interstate diplomacy allowed a local notable to use outside powers in his pursuit of domestic honor, while at the same time demonstrating to the *demos* his utility as their representative. In the event his family should retain its importance for multiple

¹⁵⁸ Τίμαρχος Ἀρίστωνος τιμαθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ἐπαίνωι, χρυσέωι στεφάνωι, εἰκόνι, πολιτείαι ἀρετᾶς ἔνεκα καὶ δικαιοσύνας, καὶ ὑπ΄ Ἀργείων ἐπαίνωι, χρυσέωι στεφάνωι, εἰκόνι ἀρετᾶς ἔνεκα, καὶ ὑπὸ Δελφῶν δάφνας στεφάνωι τῶι παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ χρυσέωι ἀρετᾶς ἔνεκα καὶ εὐσεβείας, καὶ ἐπιστατήσας ἐπ΄ ἰερέως τᾶς Ἀθάνας Φιλοδάμου τοῦ Ἀριστοβούλου, [ὑ]πὲρ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν συνστρατευσαμένων [Ἀ]θάναι Λινδίαι, Διὶ Πολιεῖ, Ἀπόλλωνι.

¹⁵⁹ Ma (2003) 33.

generations, interstate connections provided one of the earliest and best means of creating an inherited body of honors that distinguished old blood from new. "Competition among *poleis* stimulated competition within *poleis*," as Van der Vliet recently put it. 160 But Van der Vliet is wrong when he goes on to say that external honors "confirmed and strengthened the selfesteem [benefactors] already had of themselves." External competition was, in fact, vital to the self-presentation of many local notables. Embassies gave these men the chance to flatter assemblies with their encomia, woo kings with their eulogies, and in general make connections that would allow them to reap future honors. And while this certainly gave them an advantage in domestic competition in the ways outlined above, it also provided them with a playing field beyond their own city in which to be honored. This desire to be honored on a wider level was also an important impetus spurring notables to take on diplomatic roles.

¹⁶⁰ van der Vliet (2011) 181.

¹⁶¹ van der Vliet (2011) 181.

Conclusion

This study has examined the ways in which local competition shaped broader political patterns in the Hellenistic period, moving away from rule by the many and towards rule by the few. It seems fitting that we ought to conclude by examining how the cultural patterns we examined fared in later centuries under the dominion of Rome. As this task could very well occupy us for another several hundred pages, our object here ought not to be exhaustive discussion, but rather a brief sketch that helps contextualize what was unique to the Hellenistic period, and what came to be an enduring part of the elite competition.

We began our study by examining the seizure of autocratic control, a form of political behavior unlikely to win a man many statues (indeed, it was often enough his murderers who were so honored). Yet while many tyrants made use of their relationships with kings to further advance their political careers, so too did many of their non-tyrannical peers. There seems to have been no consistent relationship between tyranny and the meddling of kings: tyrants were the domestic products of the cities over which they ruled. Said rule was not invariably either draconian or coercive: tyrants, it was argued, usually ruled extraconstitutionally through their great political capital, using their influence over the city's (often democratic) political organs to achieve their ends. And this, of course, inspired much resentment among their peers, with the result that 'tyranny' and its stereotypically cruel excesses became a useful way of characterizing any disliked regime. What would at first appear to be a non-euergetic and anti-democratic forms of behavior actually turned out to be fostered by a desire to compete within the democratic framework of cities. Tyranny was, in

¹ The subject of the Greek East in the Roman period has, of course, been extensively written on in the past. Bernhardt (1998) is a valuable resource for bibliography up to 1995. Millar (1993), Pleket (1998), Sartre (2003) Gleason (2006), Zuiderhoek (2008), and Salmeri (2011) provide good article length overviews.

some sense, the ultimate reward for the hyper-successful notable. Tyranny may be the reward of an extremely influential man, but it is also a sign that the voice of the *demos* has been overridden, even if in spirit rather than in law. Each successive tyrant makes notables more comfortable with idea that they should gain such complete control, while each successive tyrannicide lowers the threshold for political violence. There is, in other words, a corrosion of democratic norms.

We have already seen how tyranny as a concept remained relevant in the Roman era. The orators Dio Chrysostom and Herodes Atticus fended off very real charges of tyranny in the first and second centuries AD, respectively. Herodes' grandfather had been less successful at defending himself against such charges, and was fined heavily as a result.² It should come as no surprise that tyranny persisted into the Roman era. On the one hand, this was a period in which great "super-benefactors," men who held property (and often citizenship) in several cities and performed benefactions in each of them.³ If tyranny was a state of extra-constitutional domination, then it is easy to see how such magnates could wield so much clout that other notables in the same city would be eclipsed. The Spartan Eurycles, discussed above, was one such sort super-benefactor, with holdings across the Peloponnese. He inspired so much resentment that his fellow notables connived to get him sent into exile.⁴ In Eurycles' case, we do not know whether accusations of tyranny were made. But Herodes, his grandfather, and (to a lesser extent) Dio who all were accused of tyranny occupied analogous positions in their respective cities: men better-connected to the imperial center and wealthier than the local notables competing against them for prestige.

² See above, p. 62.

³ I adapt the term 'supra-benefactor' from Rizakis (2007).

⁴ Above, pp. 63-4.

One might also assume that display of *tryphē*, or luxury, was unlikely to endear a man to his fellow citizens. The second and third chapters of the dissertation argued that the form of such luxurious display in the Hellenistic period was not passively copied from the customs of kings, but was rather negotiated between kings and local notables. A positive feedback loop developed in which kings imitated wealthy Greeks, modified certain elements of their conspicuous display to fit royal ends, and then saw these royal elements picked up by local notables and integrated into their own homes and lifestyles. As with tyranny, the local elites themselves were the primary drivers of this cycle of conspicuous display. Over the course of the Hellenistic period, innovations such as tessellated mosaics, cameo portraiture, and the introduction of new luxury goods from the East increased the gap between the lifestyle of the wealthiest citizens and the lifestyle of everyone else. Yet far from creating resentment, the display of fabulous wealth seems to have become a signifier that a man was committed to his *polis*, that he was a potential benefactor, a suitable candidate for magistracies, and possessed the social graces needed for a diplomat to either city or court.

As in the case of tyranny, *tryphē* was as at one and the same time inspired by democratic competition, and corrosive to democratic norms. Conspicuous display, far from denoting a turn towards the private, actually signified a man's further engagement with the public life of the city through his demonstration of his obvious capacity as a benefactor. Yet wealth as a signifier of fitness for office is a short step from wealth as requirement for office. Such a requirement need not be written into the law. In even the most democratic of cities, men will vote for the most ideal candidates: if conspicuous display is ideal, then wealth is the *sine qua non* for political power. The growing gulf between the ostentatious lifestyles of the very rich and everyone else would have contributed to this a-constitutional stratification.

Unsurprisingly, the wealthy men of Greek cities continued to be interested in luxury even after Actium. The growing scarcity of kings made the reciprocal connection between monarchs and subjects increasingly rare. But wealthy Romans were, on the whole, more than willing to take on the role of the kings they had deposed. Engagement with the Greek East (and appropriation of Greek wealth) redefined Roman conceptions of luxury. "Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit," in the words of the poet. Although our study has focused on the Hellenistic East, we have already seen some of the ramifications of this. The painting of the diademed cithara player, convincingly argued to be a copy of a Hellenistic palatial original, is found in a room of a Roman villa in Italy (Fig. 40). It is scarcely an isolated example. The ash of Vesuvius buried a great many similar residences, whose walls painted in variations of Masonry Style and floors covered in tessellated mosaics testify to a great cultural transfer. And like their Greek counterparts, many Romans were fond of brightly dyed clothing, ⁶ of gemstones and polychrome jewelry, ⁷ and of expensive perfumes and unguents. ⁸ Much of the Latin vocabulary for such finery was directly borrowed from Greek, a sign of how indebted the Romans were to their Hellenistic predecessors, the true pioneers in indulgence.⁹

At the same time, Greek tastes in the east were modified by Roman custom. In the Hellenistic period, for example, dining rooms in fine houses became large and more

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⁵ Smith (1994). See above, p. 139.

⁶ On colors and textiles in Roman clothing, see Sebesta (1994). See the other articles in Sebesta and Bonfane (eds.) (1994), as well as Croom (2002) and Edmondson and Keith (eds.) (2008) for a broader overview of Roman clothing customs.

⁷ Higgins (1980) 173-86, and Oliver (1996) provide brief overviews of Roman jewelry. Speir (1992) 93-164 and Henig and MacGregor (2004) discuss Roman gems in the collections of the J. Paul Getty Museum and the Ashmolean Museum, respectively.

⁸ See Dalby (2000b) 244-7, and Dubois-Pelerin (2008) for brief overviews of the subject. Brun (2000) discusses the more technical aspects of perfume production in the Late Hellenistic and Early Roman periods.

⁹ Thus Dalby (2000b) 122: "in a literary Latin text Greek words, or words that sound Greek, are not emotionally neutral. A Greek accent gives a hint of luxury, a whiff of conspicuous consumption..." See also Vössing (2004) 244-53.

rectangular, their size and layout probably imitating changes that had begun in palaces. But by the second century AD, dining rooms in large houses at Antioch, Ephesus, and elsewhere had adopted the distinctive Pi-shaped look of a Roman *triclinium*. There is, then, a broad continuity between the *tryphē* of the Hellenistic periods, and Greek habits in later centuries. The reciprocal interchange between center and periphery remains, albeit with a new center. This continuity makes sense given that the basic parameters that encouraged conspicuous display in the Hellenistic period have also persisted. Notables still achieved status through their benefactions to their cities, and demonstrated their capacity for benefaction, as well as their ability to serve as genteel ambassadors to the senate or emperor through their conspicuous display.

We next examined the foreign diplomacy of *poleis* to examine the role that competition between notables played in forming and maintaining connections abroad. One of the key developments of the Hellenistic period was unquestionably the creation and expansion of federations of *poleis*, or leagues. The two largest leagues of the period, the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues, served as case studies, allowing us to examine the ways in which league growth was spurred by the private motivations of the local notables of cities joining federations. In the case of the Aetolian League, the low prestige of most member states, the high prestige of the League following the Gallic War, the high number of League magistracies, and the willingness to share them with notables from beyond the borders of old Aetolia combined to make the League an attractive and stable federal body. Ambitious men from nearby cities and regions saw the League as a useful means to gain more power and prestige than they otherwise could when isolated in their native countries. In the case of the

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¹⁰ Dunbabin (1998) 95-6.

Achaean League, however, the (initially) low prestige of the League, the august and ancient dignity of many of her later members, and a decided unwillingness on the part of Aratus of Sicyon to share the generalship worked together to bring the League to the brink of collapse, saved only by the direct intervention of Macedon.

The Aetolian League was ultimately neutered by the Romans in the wake of its disastrous alliance with Antiochus III in 191 BC. The history of the independent Achaean League ended in fire soon thereafter, with the razing of Corinth by the Romans in 146 BC. But though the Romans found these leagues to be too free-spirited as allies, they recognized the utility of the league as an administrative structure. Accordingly, under Roman rule much of the Greek world was divided into various *koina*. ¹¹ Some of these leagues were based on preexisting federations, while others, such as the Macedonian koinon (headed by a Macedoniarch), were new creations. Each league, traditional or novel, had its own magistrates, with the chief magistrate of the league sometimes being the chief imperial priest for the region. 12 There is a significant change here, insomuch as the power of commanding armies, so coveted by Aratus and his peers, was forever lost to the officers of these latter-day leagues. But prestige did not have to be spear-won. Men such as Opramoas of Rhodiopolis, a first century AD super-benefactor of the Lycian League who gained honors throughout Lycia and from Roman governors and emperors because of his services to the League attest to the ability that leagues still had to give individuals a larger stage than their home cities upon which to compete.¹³

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¹¹ See Larsen (1955) 106-26, Deininger (1965), and Edelmann-Singer (2015) for overviews.

¹² Gleason (2006) 232. For the relationship between imperial cult and provincial *koinon*, see Burrell (2004) 343-58.

¹³ For the Opramoas dossier, see Kokkinia (2000). For the important roles provincial councils played in the administration of the provinces, see Edelmann-Singer (2015) 193-309.

The final chapter turned to the question of broader diplomatic connections outside the framework of leagues. It argued that institutions such as *theoria*, *proxenia*, foreign judgeships, and interstate arbitrations thrived in the Hellenistic period, because of the ways in which they complemented the ambitions of the diplomats whose money and time maintained them. Foreign service provided a way to get honors that were displayed in one's own city, made one indispensable in local politics, and provided heritable honors that could increase family prestige over generations. At the same time, diplomatic service led to the creation of an ambassadorial class of wealthy men with foreign connections. Reliance upon this narrow group changed perceptions about how municipal affairs ought to be managed, and further deepened the divide between the city elite and the rest of the citizenry.

The field of diplomacy is perhaps where we see the biggest change in the period of the empire. As William Mack has recently shown, the various forms of inter-city connection discussed in Chapter Five seem to decline in use in the first century BC, or at least are thought less worthy of commemorating in stone. ¹⁴ Mack argues that provinces substituted for polis-networks as the primary ground for competition and self-aggrandizement between cities. Certainly each city in a given province conceived of itself as being ranked against other cities in the same province. Ephesus, for example was titled "First and Greatest Metropolis of Asia, Warden of Two Temples of the Emperor by decree of the Sacred Senate, Temple-Warden of Artemis, Friend of Augustus, the City of the Ephesians," while Smyrna was titled "First in Asia in Beauty and Size, The Most Famous, the Metropolis, Warden of Three Temples of the Emperor by decree of the Sacred Senate, Ornament of Ionia, the City

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¹⁴ Mack (2015) 233-81.

of the Smyrnians."¹⁵ The desire to be preeminent among the innumerable city-states did not change, but the means by which preeminence was achieved did. Communal recognition by other Greek cities was less important than recognition by governors, the senate, and the emperor, who had it in their power to bestow lofty titles and the prestige that came with them. ¹⁶ The need for wealthy and well-spoken men capable of interceding with greater powers on the city's behalf therefore marks a point of continuity between the Hellenistic period and the time of the Roman Empire. ¹⁷

There has been, then, a general pattern observable across all five chapters.

Competition among local elites was a primary driver of the changing political culture of the Hellenistic period, and this competition was, in turn, driven by a desire to succeed within the democratic framework widespread among cities of the era. But this competition within democracies ironically led to behaviors that were ultimately destructive of democracy. The significant shifts towards oligarchy in Greek cities, visible in the epigraphic record from the mid-second century BC onwards, are presaged by cultural shifts with a much longer history. Tyrants, of course, were a feature of Greek political history from the very beginning. The turn towards tryphē began in the later fourth century. Local competition spurred League development from the early third century onwards, which was also the period in which the great uptick in Hellenistic diplomatic activity begins to become observable. The decline of democracy in the Hellenistic period may be difficult to observe constitutionally, but there is a

¹⁵ Gleason (2006) 246.

¹⁶ On privileges and titles for cities, see Guerber (2010). On the internal diplomatic system that the desire for such privileges and titles fostered, see Millar (1988) 352-6, Hauken (1998) 296-325. Eck (2009).

¹⁷ On such men, see Eck (2009) 196-8, Hurlet (2012).

preponderance of evidence in the political culture of the period for the dissolution of democratic norms, in existence long before any constitutional changes.

In the introduction we said that, while competition between local notables was a constant of Greek political life for all of recorded history, the widespread instability and the pressing need for cities to have good relations with one or more of Alexander's successors gave such competition a particular importance in the late fourth and early third centuries BC. The need for men who had the social and material capital necessary to intercede with a great power continued to exist in the time of the Roman Empire. And while the *Pax Romana* of the first two centuries AD was certainly more stable politically than the Early Hellenistic period, this stability protected elite domination over city state government, a in a form that would continue down to Late Antiquity.

Appendix A: Moschion of Priene is Honored by his City (I.Priene 108)

Text:

II.1 [ἐπὶ στεφανηφό]ρου Μοσχίωνος [μηνὸς Μεταγε]ιτνιῶνος πέμπτη [ἐτίμησεν ἡ βο]υλὴ καὶ ὁ δῆμος [Μοσχίωνα Κυδί]μου στεφάνωι 5 [χρυσέωι ἀριστε]ίωι καὶ εἰκόνι χρυσῆι [καὶ μαρμαρίνηι, κ]αὶ ἐμ πρυτανείωι [καὶ ἐμ Πανιωνίωι] καὶ ὅταν ἡ βουλὴ [συνηι σιτήσει, καί] τοῦ σώματος ἀτε-[λείαι καὶ προεδρίαι έ]μ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγῶ-10 [σιν.] $<[M] o \sigma[\chi] i[\omega v \alpha] >$ <[Κ]υδίμου.> [ἔ]δοξε τῆ βουλῆ κ[α]ὶ τῶι δήμωι. Ζωτίων Ζωτίωνο[ς] [εἶπεν: έ]πειδή Μοσχίων Κυδίμου γεγονώς ἀπὸ τῆς πρ[ώ]-[της ήλικίας ά]νήρ κα[λ]ὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ βεβιωκώς εὐσ[ε]-15 [βῶς μὲ]ν πρὸς θεούς, ὁ[σ]ίως δὲ πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺ[ς] [συμ]β[ι]οῦντας ἐν οἰκ[ε]ιότηιτι καὶ χρήσει καὶ τοὺς λοιπο[ὺς] πολίτας πάντας, δικαίως δὲ καὶ φιλοδόξως προσε[νη]-[ν]εγμένος τῆι πατρίδι καὶ καταξίως τῆς τῶν πρ[ογόνων] 20 άρετῆς τε καὶ δόξης, διαμαρ[τ]υρουμένην ἐσχηκ[ὼς διὰ παν]τὸς τοῦ βίου τὴν παρὰ τῶν θεῶν εὐμένεια[ν] κα[ὶ τὴν παρὰ] [τ]ῶν [σ]υμπολιτευομένων καὶ τῶν κατοικού[ντων εὔνοι]-[α]ν ἐπὶ τοῖς κατὰ τὸ κάλλιστον πρασσο[μένοις .c.6..] [.c.3.]βο[.]λρ[.c.4.]λα[...c.10...]δημο[....c.14....] 25 [.c.6..] θεούς .α[— επὶ δὲ στεφανηφόρου—] χειροτονηθείς ύπὸ τοῦ δήμου θεω[ρὸς μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ]

τάς τε θυσίας ἐπετέλεσεν μετ'αὐτοῦ ἐκ τῶν ἰδί[ων καὶ] τοῦ σιτηρεσίου τοῦ ταγέντος παρέλυσε τὸν δῆμον: ἦ[ν γὰρ] π[ρο]ελόμενος <ἀπ'> ἀρχῆς ὑποστήσασθαι καλὸν ἀπόδειγμα τῆς 30 τε πρός θεούς όσιότητος καὶ τῆς πρός τὴν πόλιν α<ί>ρέσεως: γενομένης τε χρείας ἐπὶ στεφανηφόρου Τήλωνος τῶι δήμωι διαφόρων είς τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ πλειόνων, βουλόμενος έμ παντί καιρῶι μὴ προλείπειν τὸ τῆς πατρίδος ἐπεῖγον, προεισήνεγκεν μετά τοῦ άδελφοῦ δραχμάς χιλίας: τῆς τε κα-35 [τ]ὰ τὸ [γυμ]νάσιον κατασκευῆς μὴ μόνον προ[..c.7..]ον καὶ [.....c.16..... τ]ην μὲν σ[τέγηνc.15.....] [....c.15.....τ]ον τόπον περιποιούσης π?[....c.13.....][—] τὸ [προσ]τε[τ]αγμένον: στεφανηφορο[ῦντος δὲ — εἰς τὴν σύν]-40 [τέλ]ειαν το [ῦ προδε]δηλωμένου κατασκευάσ[ματος ἔδωκε με]-[τὰ τάδελφ]οῦ δραχμὰς τρισχιλίας: κα[τ]ὰ δὲ τ[ὴν αὐτὴν στεφανη]-[φορί]αν ἐνλειπούσης τῆς σιτικῆς παρ[αθ]έσεως, συν[ιδὼν] τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀναγκαῖον, ἀπαράκλητον σχών τὴν [πρὸς] τὸν δῆμον εὕνοιαν, αὐθαιρέτως προελθών εἰς τὴν ἐκλησ[ίαν] 45 III.45 έδωκ[εν τῆι πόλει πυρῶν] ὑ[πὲρ ἑαυτο]ῦ [τε] καὶ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ μεδίμνους δ[ιακ]οσ[ί]ο[υς εξ] δ[ρα]χμῶν τεσσάρων τὸν μέδιμνο[ν, ἀπ'] ἀρ[χ]ῆς ἐν ἀσε[.5-6..] ὑφεσταμένος τὸ μὴ καθυστερεῖν τ[ῶν ἄλλ]ων ἐν τοῖς ἐπ[ε]ίγουσιν τῶν καιρῶν, ἐν εὐβο-[σί]α δὲ πάντα[ς] τούς τε πο[λί]τας καὶ τοὺς κατοικοῦντας 50 παρ' ἡμ[ῖν ὑ]πάρχειν προαιρούμενος: χρείας τε γενομέ-[ν]ης κατὰ στεφανηφόρον Ἱπ[π]οθῶντα διαφόρων ἐκ προ-[ει]σφορῶν, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο [φιλ]ότιμος γενηθεὶς προελθὼν

[εί]ς τούς πολίτας προεισ[ήν]εγκε[ν] μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ

τῆι πρὸς τὸ πλῆθο[ς εὐνοίαι] καὶ κατὰ μηδὲν ἐνλείπειν,

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δ[ρ]αγμάς χιλίας: [βουλόμενος δ]ὲ παντὶ τρόπωι σπεύδ<ει>ν

	οὐ μόνον ἐ[ν τ]ο[ῖς? κ]α[τ]ὰ τὰς προεισφορὰς ἑαυτὸν παρίστα-
	το πρόθυμον, ἀλλὰ κα[ὶ κα]θ' Ή[ρ]άκλειτον στεφανηφόρον
	ἀναπόδοτον ἔδωκεν τῆι [π]όλει σῖτον μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ,
	καθότι [περιέχ]ει τὰ περὶ τοῦ μ[έ]ρους τούτου γράμματα
60	έν τοῖς δημοσίοις ὑπάρχοντ[α,] τήν τε πρὸς τοὺς γονεῖς
	εὔνοιαν προαιρούμενος [πᾶσι φανερὰν καθι]στάναι διὰ
	[]
	[c.10]ε[.]σικῶν χρημάτων [ἐπὶ στεφα]νηφόρου δ[ὲ τοῦ]
	[θεοῦ τοῦ μετὰ Δη]μητρίο[υ] ἄμα μὲν τὸ τῆι πόλει συμφ[έ]ρο[ν]
65	[λαμβάνων] πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶ[ν,] ἄμα δὲ τιμήν τιν[α] καὶ ἐμβ[ρίθει]-
	[αν τῆς μητρὸς π]ρο[α]ιρούμενος μετὰ τοῦ ἀδ[ελ]φοῦ [Ἀθηνοπόλι]-
	[δος διέν]ει[μ]εν ύπὲρ αὐτῆς δραχ[μ]ὰς Ἀλε[ξ]ανδρε[ὶ]ᾳς [χιλίας·]
	[ἐπὶ Ἡρο]δότου δὲ στεφανηφόρου [τ]ῆς [σιτικ]ῆς παραθέ[σεως ἐν]-
	λ[ειπ]ούσης [Μ]οσχ[ί]ων στοιχεῖν ἑαυτῶι προαι[ρ]ούμενο[ς, συνι]-
70	δὼν τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀναγκαῖον, παραδώ[σειν τὸ ἐνδέον ὑπέσ]-
	[τη,] προσεπαγγειλάμενος ἐπὶ μῆνας [— μετρήσειν τοῖς]
	πολίταις τιμ[ῆ]ς ἐλάσσονος [ἕ]νε[κ]α το[ῦ μετὰ γυναικῶν καὶ]
	τέκνων διασωθῆναι τὸν πάν[τ]α δῇ[μονc.14]
	καὶ διὰ τοῦ μέρους τούτου π[εριεποήσατο ἐκ πάντων δόξαν]
75	καὶ εὐφημίαν· τάλεξανδρείου τε πονο[ῦντος καὶ —ον]-
	τος τῆι πόλει κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον, οὐ[δ' ἐν τούτωι τῶι]
	μέρει παρεῖδεν τὸ συμφέρον τῆς πατ[ρ]ίδος, [ἀλλὰ μετὰ]
	τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ προείσφορος ἐγένετο δραχμῶν ἀλ[εξαν]-
	δρείων χιλίων: ἐπ' Αἴαντος δὲ πάλιν ἐνλειπου[σῶ]ν [— δρα]-
80	[χμῶν] Ἀλεξανδρείων εἰς χρείας ἀναγκαίας ἔδωκε[ν]
	[c.29]ταις μετὰ τὰς [.c.4.]
	[
	[μετρc.14 καὶ] παρακαλοῦ<ν>τος καθ' ἕνα τὸν
	[βουλόμενον μετρῆσαι ὑπὲρ τ]ῆς κοινῆς παραθέσεως [δι'] ἦς
85	αὐτὸς ἠβο[ύ]λετο τιμῆς, [π]αραστησάμενος καὶ τὸν ἀδελφόν,

ἐμέτρησεν τῆι πόλει πυρ[ῶν] μεδίμνους ὅσου[ς α]ὐ[τὸς προ]ηρεῖτο, τοῦ μὲν λυσιτελοῦς ἀφρόντιστον, τῆι δὲ πρὸς τὰ κοινὰ φιλοτιμία διὰ παντ[ὸ]ς ἀκούλουθον ἑα[υ]τὸν παρασκευάζων έπὶ δὲ στεφα[ν]ηφόρου Κέκροπος οὐ μόνον 90 διαφόρων γενομένης τῆι [π]όλει χρείας, ἀ[λλὰ] καὶ παραστάσεως ἐνεχύρων, διαλαβ[ών κ]οινὴν εἶναι τὴ[ν] οὐσίαν πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τ[ῶν καθηκουσῶν δι]ανομῷ[ν? .]ω[.] o[.c.2.]? [— τὸν ἀδελφὸν —] [οὐδενὸς ὑστ]ε[ρ]οῦντα καὶ τοῦτον ἐν ταῖς εἰς τὰ κοινὰ 95 [χρείαις,] εἰσήνεγκε διαφόρου μὲν δραχμὰς Ἀλε[ξ]α[ν]δρε[ίας] [χιλίας, εί]ς δὲ χρῆσιν ἐνεχύρων ἀργυρώματα δραχμῶν [Ἀλεξαν]-[δρεί]ων τετρακισχιλίων· παρεμέτρησεν δὲ τῆι πόλει [με]-[τὰ τἀ]δελφοῦ πυρῶν μεδίμνους πεντακοσίους πεντήκο[ντ]α [τ]ιμῆς ἦς οἱ πολῖται προείλαντο, βουλόμενος διὰ παντὸς [ἐν] 100 εὐδαιμονίαι καθεστάναι τοὺς πολίτας, καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτο[ῦ]

IV.101 πρόθεσιν [τα]ῖς εἰς [τ]ὴν [π]όλ[ιν] εὐεργεσίαις ο[.4-5.] νειν' στεφανηφοροῦντος δὲ Σώτου [κ]αὶ μὴ ἐ[νόν]των ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς λόγοις διαφόρων, [έ]π[ει]γού[σης] δὲ τόκων ἀποδόσεως τοῖς Ἰωσιν, οὐδὲ [τότε] το[ῦ] 105 τῆς πόλεως ἠφροντίστησεν ἐνδόξου, δικαιο[πρα]γοῦντα προαιρούμενος φαίνεσθαι τὸν δῆμον, [καὶ] προήκατο είς ταῦτα μετὰ τάδελφοῦ δραχμὰς Α[λε]ξανδρείας δισχιλίας [ἑκ]ατὸν πεντήκοντα ὀκ[τὼ] όβολούς τέσσαρας, εύχρήστησεν δὲ καὶ εἰς ἀπό[δο]-110 σιν τιμῆς σίτου δραχμὰς Άλεξανδρείας χιλίας [δια]κοσίας: ψηφισαμένου τε τοῦ δήμου κατὰ τοὺς [πρό]τερον χρόνους κατασ[κε]υὴν [γ]υμνασίου κατὰ πό[λιν] καὶ ταύτης μὴ δυναμένης λαβ[εῖν σ]υντέλειαν [διὰ τὰ]ς μεταπτώσεις τῶν εἰς τὸ προδεδηλωμένον ἀν[άλω]-

115	μα ποησαμένων ἐπαγγελίαν βασιλέων, θεωρῶν [μέγα]
	τι καὶ ἔνδοξον τῆι πόλει περιεσόμενον εἰς [ἀεί, εἰ]
	ἀναλάβοι τα[ῦτα] καὶ τοῖς παραβάλλουσι[v .c.6]
137	[αὖ]-
	τῷι τὴν προγονικ[ὴν εὔν]οι[αν?c.10 ὁμολογη]-
	σάντων τοῖς τῶν ἡγουμένων δόγμασιν καὶ .Γ[—]
140	ε[.c.5.]ων[c.14]μένους δήμους [—]
	[.c.4. προ]θεσμι[αc.9]ω[.c.4.] οὔτοι πε[ρι]-
	όντος [.c.6]λοις [τὸν περι]εστῶτα κίνδυνο[ν ἐκ]
	πάντων [πολιτ]ῶν [πρε]σβείαν καὶ ἀ[.c.3.]ν ὑπάρχο[ν]-
	τας [
145	[.c.3.]ε[$\pi\alpha$]ρὰ Ῥωμαίω[ν]
	[.c.3.] ΛΛΙΠαρ [c.15] καὶ τὴν πόλ[ιν]
	[πρ]οθ[ύμ]ως [έ]πιδόν[τ]ος εἰς [τὰ παρ]ακαλούμενα τ[—]
	λ[
	[c.35]
150	[c.10] Μοσχίων μετὰ τῶν συν[υ]ποστάντ[ω]ν [π]ολ[ιτῶν]
	το[ὺς σ]τρατιώτας εἰς μῆνας δύο, τὴν εἰς αὐτοὺς μισθοφορὰν
	[έ]κ [τῶ]ν ἰδίων χορηγῶν· [π]ροελομένου τε τοῦ δήμου θεω-
	ροὺ[ς π]ρὸς βασιλέα Δημή[τ]ρ[ι]ο[ν,] ἀποδειχθεὶς καὶ Μοσχίων
	θεω[ρὸς] τὸ ταγὲν ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως αὐτῶ[ι σ]ιτηρέσιον οὐκ ἔ-
155	λαβ[εν·] χειροτονηθεὶς δὲ καὶ πρεσβευτής πρὸς βασιλέα
	[Δημή]τριον τὸν ἐκγ βασιλέως Δημητρίου τὴν αὐτὴν ἔ-
	[χων πρ]όθεσιν τοῖς προϋπηργμένοις πρὸς φιλοδοξίαν
¥4.450	
v.158	[c.9] ϵ [—]
	[τὴ]ν δὲ πρ[ε]σβεία[ν ἐ]κ τῷ[ν ἰ]δίω[ν ἐτέ]λεσεν θεω[ρός]
160	[τε γε]νό[μεν]ος εἰς Μαγνη[σίαν] καὶ [Τρ]άλλεις καὶ Κί[βυραν]

να [ἐφόδια,] βουλόμενο[ς] ἐ[ν πᾶσιν στ]οιχεῖν ἑα[υτῶι,]

- [δωρεὰν δὲ] τὰς ἀποδ[ημία]ς ἐ[πε]τ[έ]λ[ε]σεν· ὕ[στε]-[ρον δ' ἐπ]ρ[έσβ]ευσεν ὑπὲρ τοῦ δήμου πλεονάκ[ις καὶ]
- [πρός] τε [β]α[σι]λεῖς κ[αὶ] πόλεις ἐπετέ[λε]σεν ἀπάσ[ας]
 [τὰς π]ρεσ[βε]ίας συμφερόντως τῶι δήμωι, τὰς πρ[οτέρας]
 [μὲν] δωρεάν, εἰς [Ἀλεξάν]δρε[ιαν] δὲ πρὸς βασιλέ[α Πτο] [λ]εμαῖον [κ]αὶ τῆς Ἀραβίας εἰς Πέτραν κατὰ τὴν χρ[είαν]
 [ἀ]ποσταλεὶς ὑπὸ τῆς πατρίδος, πλέω διατρ[ίψα]ς
- 170 χρόνον τοῦ ταγέντος ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν, κ[αὶ δα]πάνας
 [έ]τέρας [ποήσα]ς? ἕ[νε]κα τῶν κοινῆ [τῆ]ι πό[λει συγκα]τασσκ[ε]υαζομ[έν]ων χρησίμων, ἐπιδ[ε]ξάμ[ενος αὐτ]ὸς
 [τ]ὸ πλεονάζον τοῦ ταγέντος ε[ί]ς [τὴν ἀ][ποδημί]αν ἐφοδίου, παρακε[λευσάμε]ν[ος δὲ —]
- 205 [— κα] ταλι[π συναρ] χίαις [— ἀνεγ] κλητ[.c.3.].ας τη[— ἐαυ] τὸν [π]αρέσχετο το[ῖς φρουροῖς —]
- 210 φ[ι]λόδοξος δ' ε<i>ς αὐτο[ὑ]ς γε[νόμενος ἔτυχε πασῶν τῶν]
 τιμῶν παρὰ τῶν συνδιατριψάντ[ων αὐτῶι κατὰ τὴν τῆς]
 ἄκρας φυλακήν· ἀντιγραφεύς τε γε[νόμενος εἰ]ς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν τὸν
 ἐπὶ στεφανηφόρου Ναυσικράτου τὴν πᾶ[σαν] προ<σ>[ε]δρείαν
- VI.214 [ἐποή]σατο περί τε το[ὺς ἐ]γλογισμοὺς καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ
 215 [πρὸς τ]ὴν πόλιν ἀνήκοντα ἕνεκα τοῦ πάντα ἀσφαλῶς
 [διοικεῖσ]θαι καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐν τούτοις ἐπιμέλειαν ἰκανὰ τὸν
 - [διοικεῖσ]θαι, καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐν τούτοις ἐπιμέλειαν ἱκανὰ τὸν [δῆμον ἀφέ]λησεν, διὸ καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα στεφανηφοροῦντος [..c.8...] πάλιν ὁ δῆμος αὐτὸν ἐχειροτόνησεν ἀντιγρα- [φέα εἰς τὸν ἐπὶ] Διονυσικλείους ἐνιαυτόν, εἰδὼς τὴν πᾶσαν
- 220 [ἐπιμέλειαν πρ]οσφερόμενον τὸν ἄνδρα τοῖς κοινοῖς πράγμα-[σιν: οὖτος δὲ τὴ]ν ἀκόλουθον φιλοτιμίαν προσενεγκάμενος

	[ἐν πᾶσιν τοῖς κατὰ] τὴν ἀντιγραφίαν τῆι πόλε<ι> συμφερόντως
	ἀνεστράφη: [ἔπειτ]α τοῦ τ[ε σ]τρατηγοῦ Ῥωμαίων παραγενη-
	θέντος είς τὴν Ἀσίαν μετὰ δυνάμεων ἱππικῶν τε καὶ πεζι-
225	κῶν Μαάρκου Περπέρνα Μαάρκου υἱοῦ κατὰ τῶν ἐναντία
	τῆι συγκλήτῳ προ[ε]λομένων ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ νικήσαν-
	τος ἐνδόξως καὶ κυ[ρι]εύσαντος τῶν πολεμίων, ἀποδιδόν-
	τος δὲ χαριστήρια ἐν [τ]ῆι Περγαμηνῶν πόλει καὶ γράψαντος
	πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ὑπὲρ ὧν ἤμελλε συντελεῖν ἀγώνων τε καὶ
230	θυσιῶν, αἰρεθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου πρεσβευτὴς καὶ θεωρὸς
	έπιφανῆ μετὰ τῶν συναποδειχθέντων τὴν ἀποδημίαν
	[ἐποιήσατο —]
	[c.10]y[
	[c.9]ωι κατα[]
235	[c.10] α[i]ρούμενος [c.25]
	[.c.6] βουλόμενος πα[c.25]
	$[\ldots.c.14\ldots]$ $\epsilon[.]\alpha[\ldots.c.26\ldots]$
	$[c.12]\alpha[c.30]$
	$[c.13]$ $\rho[c.29]$
240	$[c.14]\lambda[c.28]$
	[c.14]v[c.28]
	[c.9] ἀπὸ [c.31]
	[c.11] καὶ φυλα[κὴνc.22]
	[c.14]τασε[
245	$[c.15]$ $\pi \rho o [c.25]$
	[c.16]οσ[c.25]
	[c.43]
	[c.43]
	[c.43]
250	[c.43]
	[c.16]ας, εὐσεβῶς μὲν πρὸς θεοὺς διακείμενον,

	[ὸσίως δὲ πρ]ὸς γονείς προσενηνεγμένον, δικαίως δὲ πρὸς
	[τὸν δ]ῆμον ἀεί ποτε καὶ φιλαγάθως ἔχοντα· [ἀν]αλαβόντος
	[δὲ τὸ]ν τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ Ὀλυμπίου στέφανον καὶ τὴν στεφανη-
255	[φορία]ν ἐπιδεξάμενος καὶ πάντα τὰ πρὸ πόλεως ἱερὰ κοσμήσας
	[στεφ]ανώμασιν καὶ τοὺς βωμοὺς τῶν θεῶν θυμιάμασιν γερά-
	[ρας με]τὰ κηρύγματος ἐκάλεσεν ἐπὶ γλυκισμὸν τούς τε τῶν
	[πεσόν]των υίοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολίτας πάντας καὶ παροίκους καὶ
	[ξένο]υς καὶ ἐξελευθέρους καὶ οἰκέτας, βουθυτήσας δὲ τῶι
260	[Διὶ τ]ῶι Ὀλυμπίωι καὶ τῆι ή Ἡραι καὶ τῆι Ἀθηνᾶι τῆι Πολιάδι καὶ
	[τῶι Πα]νὶ τῶι Ἀρωγῷ ἐν τῆι νουμηνίᾳ, τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν θυσιῶν κηρύ-
	[γματα] ποησάμενος τῆι δευτέραι διένιμε τοῖς πολίταις καθ' ἕ-
	[καστον] μῆνα τῆς ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ [σ]τε[φανη]φορί[ας,] ἐπ[ί] τε [τ]ὸν
	[
265	[
	[o[c.35]o[c.10]
	[
	[c.34] <u>\tau</u> [c.10]
	[c.29]ο[υ]σία τῷν [c.9]α
270	[παρα]καλῶν δὲ [καὶ τοὺς ξέν]ους
	[καὶ τοὺς] θεωρούς τε κα[ὶ .c.6]ας
VII.27	72 [.c.5. κ]ατὰ τ[c.9 κ]αὶ σύμ[πανταςc.11 ἐπὶ δια]-
	[νομήν] οἴνου [κ]αὶ γλυκισμούς, κα[ὶ παρεμέτρησεν τῶν πολιτῶν]
	έκάστωι πυρῶν τεταρτέως [ἥ]μ[ισυ· μή βουλόμενος δὲ στέρεσθαι]
275	τῶν τῆς προγεγραμμένης εὐωχί[ας ἡδονῶν τούς τε ξένους καὶ]
	παροίκου[ς] καὶ [ύ]στερῆσαι τῆς τῶν [διανομῶν φιλανθρωπίας, καὶ]
	τούτους ύποδέδε[κ]ται· όμοίως δὲ [καὶ τοὺςc.10 οἶς ὁ δῆ]-
	μος μετουσίαν δίδωσι καθότι καὶ [c.22]
	μων τοὺς ἐν τῆι πατρίδι [
280	τῆς τῶν καιρῶν περιστάσε[ωςc.15 μηδενὸς ὑσ]-

	τερείν φιλανθρώπου. προεπ[όμπευσεν δὲ καὶ έν τῆι τῶν Πανα]-
	θηναίων ἑορτῆι βοῒ τῆς Ἀθηνᾶ[ς ἀξίαι, ἀπόδειγμα δοὺς τῆς κατὰ πάν]
	τα πρὸς θεοὺς ὁσιότητος: πε[ποίηται δὲ καὶ διὰ παντὸς τὴν πρέ]-
	πουσαν ἀναστροφὴν ἐν τῆι σ[τεφανηφορίαι αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ]
285	άξίαν, ἐπιφανῆι τὴν πρὸς π[άντας εὔνοιαν ἀποδειξάμενος,]
	ὥστε καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἐπιδεδ[ημηκόσι τῶν ξένων ἀποδοχῆς τῆς]
	μεγίστης τετευχέναι δ[ιὰ δὲ τῶν
	ρισμένων τάς τε τιμὰς π[άσας
	δῆμον διαπεφυλα[
309	σα.τινα [c.7]λι[.c.2.].ησα[.c.2.]σ[c.16] πρὸς
310	τὸν δῆμο[ν] εὐερ[γετικ]ῶς καὶ [τὴ]ν ἰδίαν κ[αλοκαγαθί]α[ν, .c.3. ἀεί]
	τινος ἀγαθοῦ παραίτιον γινόμενον ἵνα [κ]αὶ οἱ μετὰ ταῦτα θεω-
	ροῦντες ἐν ἀποδοχῆι τῆι μεγίστηι γινομένους το[ὺς τοιού]τους
	ἄνδρας προθύμους ἑαυτοὺς παρασκευάζ[ω]σιν εἰς τὰ τῆ[ι πόλει]
	συμφέροντα, δεδόχθαι τῆ βουλῆ καὶ τῷ δήμῳ· ἐπηνῆσθαί τε
315	Μοσχίωνα Κυδίμου ἐπὶ τοῖς προγεγραμμένοις πᾶσιν καὶ στεφανῶ-
	σαι αὐτὸν στεφάνωι χρυσέωι ἀριστείωι· τετιμῆσθαι δὲ αὐτὸν
	καὶ εἰκόνι χρυσῆ τε καὶ μαρμαρίνηι ὡς καλλίσταις καὶ σταθῆναι
	τὰς εἰκόνας ἐν τῶι ἐπιφανεστάτωι τόπωι τῆς πόλεως: εἶναι δὲ
	αὐτὸν καὶ ἐν ἐπιμελείαι παρά τε τῆι βο[υλῆι κ]αὶ τῶι [δ]ήμωι· ὑπάρ-
320	χειν δὲ Μοσχίωνι καὶ προεδρίαν ἐν τοῖ[ς ἀγ]ῷ[σι πᾶσιν οὓς] ἡ πόλις
	$[\tau i\theta \eta \sigma \iota \c. 8] \iota [c. 8] Q [$
	καὶ σίτησιν ἐμ πρυτανείωι καὶ ἐμ Πανιωνίωι καὶ μετουσίαν τὧν
	έν τῆι βουλῆ συντελουμένων θυσιῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων φιλανθρώ-
	πων πάντων ὧν καὶ τῆι βουλῆ μέτεστιν καὶ ἀτέλεαν τοῦ σώμα-
325	τος: ἐπιγράψαι δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν βημάτων τῶν σταθησομένων εἰκό-
	νων ἐφ' ἑκατέρου τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν τήνδε. "ὁ δῆμος Μοσχίωνα Κυδίμου
	άρετῆς ἕνεκεν καὶ εὐνοίας καὶ καλοκάγαθίας καὶ φιλοδοξίας τῆς
	εἰς ἑαυτὸν καὶ εὐσεβείας τῆς εἰς τοὺς θεούς"· τὸν δὲ ἀγωνοθέτην τὸ[ν
	ἀποδειχθησόμενον εἰς τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν τὸν ἐπὶ Ἀπολλοδώρου καὶ τὸν

375

VIII.330 γραμματέα [τ]ῆς βο[υλῆς καὶ τοῦ δήμου] τή[ν τ]ε τοῦ στεφάνο[υ ἀναγγελίαν ποιή]σασθαι έν τῶι θεάτρωι Δ[ιονυσίων αὐλητῶν] τῶι ἀγῶνι τῶι παιδικῶ[ι, ὅταν ὁ δῆμος τὰς] πατρίους σπονδάς συντ[ελῆι, ἀκολούθως] 335 τοῖς γεγραμμένοις καὶ μετὰ [τὴν ἀναγό]ρευσιν τοῦ στεφάνου γενέσθα[ι τὴν —] ΛΛΤ[.c.2.]ΑΝ, ὅτ̞ι "ὁ δῆμος ἐτίμησεν Μοσχίωνα] Κ[υδ]ίμο[υ εί]κόνι χρυσῆι τε καὶ μαρ[μαρίνηι, ἄνδρα] καλὸν κα[ὶ ἀγα]θὸν γενόμενον πε[ρὶ τὴν σωτηρί]αν καὶ εὐ[εργεσί]αν τοῦ δήμου": κ[ατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ] 340 καὶ οἱ γινόμενοι καθ' ἕκαστον ἔτ[ος ἀγωνοθέται] τε καὶ γραμματεῖς ποιείσθωσα[ν τήν τε τοῦ στε]-[φ]άνου ἀναγγελίαν καὶ τῶν εἰκό[νων, καθότι] προδεδήλωται ίνα δὲ μὴ μόν[ο]ν ζῶντα φαί-345 νηται τιμῶν ὁ δῆμος Μοσχίωνα, [ά]λλὰ καὶ τῆς εἰς τὸ χρεὼ μεταστάσεως τυχόντ[α τ]ῶν καθηκ[όν]των άξιῶν δικαίως, τὸν οἰκ[ονόμον τῆς πόλε]- $[\omega \varsigma -]$ 366 [.....c.14..... συνακολουθῆσαι δὲ] [τῆι ἐκφορᾶι τού]ς [τε π]αι[δο]νόμους [μετὰ τῶν] παίδων [καὶ] τὸγ γυμνασίαρχον ἔχο[ντα τούς] τε έφήβους καὶ τοὺς νέους καὶ τοὺ[ς στρατηγοὺς] 370 μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν, ὅπ[ως ἐ]πιφανοῦ[ς] γενομένης τῆς ἐκφορᾶς εἰδότες καὶ [οί] λοιποὶ τὴ[ν] πόλιν εὐχάριστον καὶ κατὰ τοῦτ[ο τὸ μέρος οὐσαν] καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας μὴ μόνον [ζῶ]ντας, ἀλλ[ὰ] καὶ μεταλλαγέντας τιμῶσαν πολ[λ]ῶι μᾶλλον

έαυτοὺς ἐκτενεῖς παρασκευάζωσ[ι πρό]ς τὸν δῆμον.

τὸν δὲ μέλλοντα οἰκονομεῖν Θρασύβ[ουλον ποιή]σασθαι ἔγδοσιν τοῦδε τοῦ ψηφίσματ[ος, ὅπως ἀναγρα]φῆι τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἐν τῶι ἐπιφανεστάτ[ω]ι τόπωι [εἰς ὃν]
ἀν [σ]υ[νκρίνηι ὁ] ἀρχιτέκτων, ἵνα [γενομένης τῆς τῶν]

380 [τιμῶν ἀναγ]ραφῆς ἥ τε Μοσχίωνος μεγα[λοψ]υχία
[καὶ δόξα] καὶ ἡ τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τοὺς εὐεργετοῦντας
[αὐτὸν ἐ]κτένεια δι' αἰῶνος ἐπίσημον ἔχῃ τὴν
χά[ριν.]

Translation

(trans. Andrew Smith)

[When] Moschion was stephanephoros, on the fifth day [of the month] of Metageitnion, the council and the people [honoured Moschion] son of Kydimos with a [golden] crown for valour, with a gilded [and a marble] statue, [with meals] in the prytaneion [and in the Panionion] and whenever the council [meets], with freedom from taxes on his person, [and with privileged seating] at all games.

10 The people crowns Moschion son of Kydimos.

It was resolved by the council and the people, [as proposed by] Zotion son of Zotion: since Moschion son of Kydimos has been a good and noble man since his earliest [youth], and has lived devoutly towards the gods and piously towards his parents and those who live with him in kinship and intimacy and towards all the other citizens, and behaves justly and gloriously towards his fatherland, in a manner worthy of the virtue and glory of his ancestors; 20 and throughout his life he has had the evident favour of the gods and the [goodwill] of his fellow citizens and residents for what he has done with the best intent . . .

... [and when in the year of ... as stephanephoros] he was elected as theoros by the people [along with his brother], he performed the sacrifices with his brother from his own resources, and he released the people from paying the prescribed allowance; for he chose from the beginning to provide a fine display of his piety towards the gods 30 and his good attitude towards the city; and when in the year of Telon as stephanephoros the people required a large amount of money for its support, as he wished at every opportunity not to overlook the needs of his fatherland, with his brother he contributed a thousand drachmas; and as for the construction work on the gymnasium, not only . . .

... the instruction; and when ... was stephanephoros, 40 [with his brother he gave] three thousand drachmas [for the completion] of the aforesaid building; and in the year [of the same stephanephoros], as the store of corn was deficient, observing the urgency of the matter and having a spontaneous goodwill towards the people, he willingly came forward to the assembly and on behalf of [himself] and his brother he gave [to the city] two hundred [and six] medimnoi [of wheat], at a cost of four drachmas per medimnos, from the beginning . . . he promised not to neglect [other requirement] on critical occasions, and intended that all the citizens and those residing with us should have plenty to eat; 50 and when, in the year of Hippothon as stephanephoros, there was a requirement for money arising from advances, in this matter also he acted honourably, as he came forward to the citizens and with his brother he advanced a thousand drachmas; and because [he wished] to act on his [goodwill] towards the populace in every way and not to be found lacking in anything, he not only showed himself eager to help in [? the matter of] the advances, but also, in the year of Herakleitos as stephanephoros, with his brother he gave corn to the city as a free gift, as [is recorded] in the documents about this matter in the public archives; 60 and wishing to make his goodwill

towards his parents [clear to everyone] . . . and when [? the god] was stephanephoros [? after] Demetrios, because he both [held] the interests of the city before his eyes and wished to ensure the honour and dignity [of his mother], with his brother [Athenopolis] he distributed on behalf of their mother [a thousand] Alexandrian drachmas; and when [in the year] of Herodotos as stephanephoros the store of [corn] was deficient, Moschion, wishing to act in a manner typical of himself and realising the urgency of the matter, 70 [undertook] to donate [what was lacking], and offered besides for . . . months [to measure it out] to the citizens at a lower price so that the people might be preserved [along with their wives and] children . . . and through this matter [he obtained glory] and good repute [from everyone]; and when the temple of Alexandros was in disrepair, and the people had . . . at the same time, [in this] matter also he did not neglect the interests of his fatherland, [but with] his brother he contributed an advance of a thousand drachmas; and in the year of Aias as stephanephoros, when again . . . Alexandrian [drachmas] were lacking 80 for urgent requirements, he gave [when] the people asked for [volunteers] individually [to measure out corn for] the public store at whatever price they wished, coming forward with his brother he measured out for the city the medimnoi of wheat as he proposed, in which he took no account of his own profit, and as always he acted in keeping with his honourable conduct towards the state; and in the year of Kekrops as stephanephoros, when the city required not only money 90 but also the provision of pledges, considering that his property should be shared with all the citizens, and the [appropriate] distributions . . . [? his brother], who himself also missed [no opportunity] in his [services] to the state, he contributed [a thousand] Alexandrian drachmas of money, and for use in pledges he contributed silver plate worth four thousand [Alexandrian] drachmas; and [with his] brother he measured out in addition for the city five hundred and

fifty medimnoi of wheat, at the price that the citizens prescribed, wishing throughout to keep the citizens in prosperity, 100 and in accordance with his own purpose in his benefactions towards the city. . . and in the year of Sotes as stephanephoros, when there was no money in the public accounts and a payment of interest needed to be made to the Ionians, [then] also he did not ignore the reputation of the city, as he wanted the people to be seen to act justly, and with his brother he provided for this purpose 2,158 Alexandrian drachmas and 4 obols; and to pay the price of corn 110 he lent 1,200 Alexandrian drachmas; and after the people voted previously for the building of a gymnasium close to the city, and this could not be completed [because] of the changes that occurred to the kings who had offered to assist with the aforesaid expenditure, he observed that this would remain [forever] as a [great] and glorious ornament for the city, [if] he took on these matters and . . .

- 130 . . . in [agreement] with the edicts of the Roman leaders . . .
- 140 . . . the surrounding danger, an embassy from all the [? citizens], and . . .
- ... from the Romans ...
- . . . and observing that the city was eagerly . . . to the requests . . .
- 150 . . . Moschion, along with the other citizens who undertook it . . . the soldiers for two months, supplying their pay from his own resources; and when the people had previously chosen theoroi to go to King Demetrios, and Moschion also was appointed to be a theoros, he did not accept the allowance that was assigned to him by the city; and when he was elected to go as envoy to king Demetrios the son of king Demetrios, he showed the same excellent attitude as in his previous actions . . .

... and performed the embassy using his own resources; and when he was appointed as theoros 160 to Magnesia and Tralleis and Kibyra, again he did not accept the travelling allowances that were assigned for these journeys, as he wished in [all] matters to behave in a manner typical of himself, and he performed the journeys [as a free gift]; and afterwards he acted as an envoy on behalf of the people on many occasions, both to kings and to cities, and he performed all these embassies to the advantage of the people; the previous embassies he performed as a free gift, but when he was sent by his fatherland on official business to king Ptolemaios in Alexandria and to Petra in Arabia, as he stayed there for a longer time than had been anticipated by the people, 170 and [? incurred] extra expenses in order to help in achieving what was useful for the whole city, he took on himself the expenditure in excess of the allowance assigned for [the journey] . . .

200 . . . he showed himself to be . . . [to the guards] . . . and because of his excellent conduct towards them, 210 [he received every] honour from those who served [with him in the] guarding of the citadel; and when he became checking-clerk {antigrapheus} for the year when Nausikrates was stephanephoros, he applied close attention to the keeping of the accounts and to the other matters related to the city, so that everything might be safely [managed], and due to his carefulness in these matters he was of considerable benefit to the [people]; and consequently later, when . . . was stephanephoros, the people again elected him to be checking-clerk [for the] year when Dionysokles was stephanephoros, knowing that this man would apply the greatest [care] 220 to public business; [and he] showed consistently honourable conduct, acting to the advantage of the city [in all matters relating to] his service as checking-clerk; [then], when Marcus Perperna son of Marcus, who arrived in Asia with infantry and cavalry forces to fight against those who chose to take action in opposition to the

senate, won gloriously and overcame the enemy, and Perperna gave thank-offerings in the city of Pergamon and wrote to the people of Priene about the games and sacrifices that he intended to perform, 230 Moschion was chosen as envoy and theoros by the people, and along with the others who were appointed [he made] his visit notable . . .

... devoutly disposed towards the gods, and treating his parents [piously], and forever behaving justly and benevolently towards the people; and when he assumed the crown of Olympian Zeus and took on the office of stephanephoros, he adorned all the temples in front of the city with wreaths, and honoured the altars of the gods with incense; and by a proclamation he invited the sons of those [? who fell in battle] and all the citizens and resident aliens and [foreigners] and freedmen and household slaves to share in sweetmeats; and after sacrificing oxen to Olympian [Zeus] 260 and Hera and Athena Polias and Pan Arogos on the first day of the month, on the second day he made a proclamation and distributed the meat from the sacrifices to the citizens, in every month of the year when he was stephanephoros, . . .

... [to a distribution] of wine and sweetmeats, and [he measured out] half a tetarteus of wheat for each [of the citizens; and because he did not wish the foreigners and] resident aliens [to be deprived of the pleasure] of the aforesaid feasting, or to miss [the generosity of the distributions], he welcomed them as well; and similarly . . . to whom the people gives participation, as also . . . the critical occasion 280 . . . to miss [no opportunity] for generosity; and he led a [procession in the] festival of Panathenaia with a cow [worthy] of Athena, [giving a demonstration of his] absolute devoutness towards the gods; and he conducted himself fittingly, in a manner worthy [? of the god], [throughout his time as] stephanephoros,

[showing his goodwill] towards everyone conspicuously, so that he received the greatest [approbation] from [the foreigners] who were staying in the city . . .

... as a benefactor to the people, 310 and his own [nobleness] ... [always] being the cause of some good for the city; therefore, in order that future generations, seeing that such men receive the greatest approbation, may offer themselves eagerly to serve the interests of the [city], it is resolved by the council and the people to praise Moschion son of Kydimos for all the reasons stated above, and to crown him with a golden crown for valour; and he shall be honoured with a gilded and a marble statue, both as fine as possible, and the statues shall be placed in the most prominent place in the city; both the council and the people shall take due care of him; and Moschion shall be given privileged seating 320 at [all] the games that the city [holds] . . . and meals in the prytaneion and the Panionion and participating in the sacrifices that are performed in the council and a share of all the other privileges that are shared by the council, and freedom from taxes on his person, and this inscription shall be carved on the base of each of the statues that are set up: "The people honours Moschion son of Kydimos on account of his virtue and goodwill and nobleness and his excellent conduct towards the people and his piety towards the gods." The agonothete who is appointed for the year when Apollodoros is stephanephoros and the secretary 330 of the council [and the people] shall [announce] the award of the crown in the theatre at the Dionysia, during the contest of the boy [flute-players, when the people] performs the ancestral libations, [in accordance] with what has been written; and after the proclamation of the award of the crown there shall be . . . that "The people honoured Moschion son of Kydimos with a gilded and a marble statue, because he is a fine and noble man concerning the [safety] and well-being of the people." 340 In the [same] way the [agonothetes] and the secretaries who are in office

each year shall announce the award of the crown and the statues [in the manner] described above; and in order that the people may be seen not only to honour Moschion while he is alive, but also rightly to deem him worthy of the appropriate honours after he meets his fate, the steward {oikonomos} [of the city shall]...

... [and the funeral procession shall be followed] by the paidonomoi [with the] boys and the gymnasiarch bringing the ephebes and the youths and the [generals] with the other citizens, 370 so that, with the funeral procession being so splendid, the others, because they recognise that the city shows gratitude in this [matter] also, and honours the best of men not only while they are alive, but also after they pass away, may offer themselves much more eagerly to the service of the people; and the incoming steward, Thrasyboulos, shall publish this decree, ensuring that it is inscribed in the most prominent place in the agora, [wherever the] architect [decides], in order that, when [the honours] are recorded in an inscription, 380 the magnanimity [and glory] of Moschion and the zeal of the people towards [its] benefactors may receive conspicuous gratitude for evermore.

Figures




Fig. 1 Plan of the Palace at Aigai (later fourth century). Kottaridi (2011b) p. 675 fig. 32b.




Fig. 2 Plan of the palace at Pella (mid-second century). Akamatis (2011) p. 681 fig. 39.




Fig. 3 Plan of the palace at Demetrias (mid-second century). Adapted from Radt (2016) p. 268 fig. 4.




Fig. 4 The palace at Aï-Khanoum. Adapted from a map by Claude Rapin (claude.rapin.free.fr/4LAKhPlanGen.jpg). Accessed November 6, 2018.




Fig. 5 The Strategeion at Dura Europos (mid-third century). Kopsacheili (2011) p. 26 fig. 12.




Fig. 6 The palace at Jebel Khalid (third century). Kopsacheili (2011) p. 21 fig. 5.




Fig. 7 The palace at Mt. Karysis (late third or early second century). Radt (2016) p. 267 fig. 3.




Fig. 8 The palaces of Pergamon (late third to mid. second century). Hoepfner (1996) p. 21 fig. 16.




Fig. 9 The *palazzo delle colonne*, Ptolemais in Cyrenaica, 1st c. BC- 1st c. AD. Kenrick (2013) p. 83 fig. 53.




Fig. 10 The Villa on Kastro Hill, Samos, 2^{nd} c. BC. Adapted from Tölle-Kastenbein (1974) plan 1.





Fig. 11 Reconstruction of the entrance façade at Aigai. Kottaridi (2011b) p. 677 fig. 34.

Fig. 12 Façade of the House of the Comedians, Delos, 2nd c. BC. Hellmann (2010) p. 67 fig. 80.






Fig. 13 Pyrgos of Chimarrou, Naxos, 3rd c. BC. Hoepfner (1999) p. 452.




Fig. 14 "Tower with Pediments" in the Insula of the Comedians, Delos, 2nd c. BC. Hoepfner (1999) p. 453.




Fig. 15 Plan of typical Olynthus house (House A VIII 1, early-mid fourth century). Hellmann (2010) p. 25 Fig. 11.




Fig. 16 Reconstruction of the Pompeion (Athens, c. 400 BC). Walter-Karydi (1998) p. 6 fig. 3.




Fig. 17 House of the Rape of Helen, Pella, Late 4th-early 3rd c. BC. Walter-Karyidi (1998) p. 16 fig. 11.




Fig. 18 House of Dionysius, Pella, Late 4th-early 3rd c. BC. After Hoepfner (1996) p. 3 fig. 1.





Fig. 19 Peristyle of House VI I, Theater Quarter, Delos, 2nd c. BC. Trümper (1998) p. 344 fig. 77.

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Fig. 20 Plan of the House of the Mosaics (Eretria, earlymid fourth century). Ducrey, Metzger, and Reber (1993) p. 32 fig. 25.



ig. 25. Plan de la Maison aux mosaïques




Fig. 21 Reconstruction of the Rhodian peristyle at Demetrias.




Fig. 22 Plan of the House of Good Fortune (Olynthus, early-mid fourth century). Hellmann (2010) p. 59 fig. 68.




Fig. 23 Reconstruction of Dining Rooms 8 and 9 at the House of Mosaics. Ducrey, Metzger, and Reber (1993) p. 60 fig. 65.




Fig. 24 Reconstruction of the entrance to a dining hall, Limestone Temple of Athena, Delphi (late fourth century). Hoepfner (1996) p. 13 fig. 9.





Fig. 25 Reconstruction of Room F at Aigai. Hoepfner (1996) p. 12 fig. 8.

Fig. 26 House of the Trident, Delos, 2nd c. BC. Bruneau (2005) p. 302 fig. 102.






Fig. 27 Floral mosaic from Sicyon (mid. fourth century). Dunbabin (1999) p. 11 fig. 8.



Fig. 28 Floral mosaic from Aigai. Kottaridi (2011b) p. 678 fig. 36.



Fig. 29 Stag Hunt Mosaic from the House of the Rape of Helen, Late 4th c. BC. Dunbabin (1999) p. 14 fig. 12.

Fig. 30
Mosaic from
Place V at
Pergamon.
Dunbabin
(1999) p. 29
fig. 28.





Fig. 31 Mosaic from the royal district of Alexandria. McKenzie (2007) p. 69 fig. 100.




Fig. 32 Masonry Style in the House of the Colored Stuccos (Pella, late third century). Walter-Karydi (1998) p. 49 fig. 39.




Fig. 33 Statues of Cleopatra and Dioscourides. Late second century. Smith (1991) p. 97 fig. 113.

Fig. 34 The House of Cleopatra and Dioscourides (statues at circle in courtyard). Late second century BC. Adapted from Hellmann (2010) p. 65 fig. 78.






Fig. 35. Gold wreath from the so-called tomb of Philip II. Late fourth century. Kottaridi (ed.) (2011) p. 21 fig 23.

Fig. 36. Pair of bracelets with antelope head terminals. Late fourth century. Deppert-Lippitz (1985) pl. 19.






Fig. 37. Cameo of Ptolemy II and Arsinoe II (The Gonzaga Cameo). Third Century. The Hermitage Museum (hermitagemuseum.org/wps/portal/hermitage/digital-collection/18.+Carved+Stones/885521). Accessed July 25, 2018.



Fig. 38. Gold and garnet Herakles Knot diadem. First half of the second century. Deppert-Lippitz (1985) pl. 38-9.



Fig. 39. Medallion of hairnet (above), and side view of hairnet (right). Late Hellenistic. Pfrommer (2010) pgs. 2-3, figs. 3a and 3c.







Fig. 41. Bronze statue of Demosthenes. Roman copy of a Hellenistic original c. 282 BC. Harvard Art Museum. (harvardartmuseums.org/art/4842). Accessed July 25, 2018.






Fig. 42. Large Herculaneum Woman. Roman copy of a Hellenistic original (late fourth century). Smith (1991) p. 88, fig. 88.



Fig. 43. Terracotta of a boy in *kausia* and *chlamys*. Unknown date. Rotroff (2003) p. 219 fig. 9.

Fig. 44. Pendant necklace. Second century. Higgins (1980) pl. 49b.



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