‘Textimony’: The Intergenerational Transmission of Holocaust Memory in German Jewish and American Jewish Literature

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Introduction

"The problem with memory is at the heart of the problem with witness."
—Timothy Garton Ash, "On the Frontier" from Witness Literature: Proceedings of the Nobel Centennial Symposium *(Garton Ash 62)*

I. Overview of the Study

Drawing on the methodology of narrative theory, I argue that Holocaust literature written by members of the second and third generation challenges the categories of witnessing and testimony. According to the definitional schemata I employ, the first generation refers to Holocaust survivors, the second generation refers to children of survivors, and the third generation refers to grandchildren of survivors. In the well-established categories of witnessing and testimony in reference to the Holocaust, only Holocaust survivors, or those who were present at the time of the Holocaust, are witnesses to the Holocaust and, thus can provide testimony. The problem is this: if testimony about the Holocaust concerns itself with the transmission of memory, what happens when members of the first generation are no longer alive? The post-Holocaust German Jewish and American Jewish texts of the second and third generation I examine devote significant attention to the processes through which memory about the Holocaust can be transmitted across generations. These texts depict the main process of such intergenerational transmission as a dialogue between the witness and a listener, two interlocutors.

Using the narrative technique of focalization, complicated framing devices, and alternating temporal narrative levels, these post-Holocaust texts actually complicate the transmission of memory about the Holocaust by revealing the complex process of not only a witness providing testimony, but of a listener receiving said testimony. These texts address two main questions that arise in a testimonial encounter for the listener: what does a listener do with

the knowledge about the Holocaust communicated to her by testimony, and how does the listener him- or herself transmit testimony about the Holocaust to future generations? By placing responsibility on the listener to interpret the testimony to which he or she is privy, these post-Holocaust texts challenge preconceived definitions of witness and testimony. By declaring that the next step the listener can take is that of transmission to another interlocutor, these texts reveal that a listener can act as a witness to others, a process that I call re-witnessing. My term re-witnessing is another form of what Marianne Hirsch has called postmemory, a term introduced by Hirsch and which can briefly be understood as memory of the Holocaust by those who did not themselves live through it. These texts investigate the witnessing potential of postmemory. The members of the generations who possess postmemory inherit a cultural traumatic past into which they were born, to whose effects they are witness, and to whose memories they do not have direct access.

The texts I treat reconstruct situations in which generational transmission occurs as re-witnessing, or the listener's re-narration of a witness's testimony to a third party. If instances of re-witnessing do, as I argue, produce viable modes of witnessing the Holocaust, the extension of this argument is that the texts themselves, by engendering witnessing, produce testimony. Seen in this light and from our necessarily mediated perspective about the Holocaust in 2016, the texts of the second and third generation that produce, duplicate, complicate, and challenge instances of witnessing and testimony participate in the development of an extension in the genre of testimony: into what one might call "textimony."

Contrary to current scholarship that strongly distinguishes between memory and postmemory, I argue that postmemory does not stand in mutually exclusive opposition to the categories of witness and testimony. Addressing the relationship between postmemory,

witnessing, and testimony frequently arises from the circumstance that these post-Holocaust texts, which include works of both fiction and non-fiction, themselves often blur and complicate generic distinctions. The selected texts of the second and third generation from which I draw my examples in this study are Esther Dischereit's *Joemis Tisch: Eine jüdische Geschichte* (1988), Maxim Biller's *Harlem Holocaust* (1990), Elizabeth Rosner's *The Speed of Light* (2001), Jonathan Safran Foer's *Everything is Illuminated* (2002), Daniel Mendelsohn's *The Lost: A Search for Six of Six Million* (2006), Benjamin Stein's *Die Leinwand* (2010), and Art Spiegelman's *MetaMaus: A Look Inside a Modern Classic, Maus* (2011).

In Chapter One, "Texts in the Study," I describe and characterize the seven selected texts that will be examined more closely in the following chapters. In Chapter Two, "Narrative Instantiations of Witnessing and Testimony in Generational Texts," I examine scenes of witness and testimony that appear in these texts and argue that the technique of focalization (through whose eyes the narrative is focalized, or who sees versus who narrates) functions as a narrative device to emphasize the witnessing potential of postmemory. In the absence of witnesses or even with the presence of witnesses, elements of the documentary, such as artifacts and photographs, can attempt to function as substitutes for witnesses, and can either support or refute a witness's testimony. In Chapter Three, entitled "The Role of Photography in Generational Texts," I analyze instances in these texts where photography plays a key role. Either photographs punctuate the narrative, appearing as part of the narrative structure of the text, or photographs appear as a thematic or plot point in the narrative. These texts stage the use of photography as a mode of witnessing and testimony and employ photography as a medium for re-witnessing. In Chapter Four, "Instances of Re-Witnessing in Generational Texts," I characterize instances of re-witnessing, i.e. the listener's re-narration of a witness's testimony to

a third party, in which the process of re-witnessing is a means for traversing geographical and temporal distances. Key features that describe these instances of re-witnessing include the idea of choice, in which the witness chooses to become a witness, and the development of the narrator as a detective who chooses to investigate memory and family history. More than a re-narration, these texts approach the concept of re-witnessing as a form of re-writing, a term which denotes its quality as a mediation of a mediation. In such instances of re-witnessing, writing acts as a catalyst for the transmission of memory.

II. Postmemory, Witnessing, and Testimony

This study takes as its starting point three main assumptions. First, Marianne Hirsch's phenomenon of postmemory, an inherited feeling of generational trauma in which members of the second and third generation feel the emotional effects of the Holocaust without having been alive at the time, exists. Although postmemory can assume a myriad of forms, it appears in varying and fascinating ways in selected texts of the second and third generation in German Jewish and American Jewish literature. Second, witnessing and testimony, frequently studied in scholarship, are not generally brought to bear on discussions of postmemory and postmemorial literature. Third, both postmemory, on the one hand, and witnessing and testimony, on the other, have contributions to make to the study of the other field, which will advance the role they each play in other disciplines, and not solely in literary criticism. Building upon these three points as considerations, my approach combines the two fields of study—postmemory, on the one hand, and witnessing and testimony, on the other—to argue that their respective discussions heretofore have acted, counterintuitively, to undermine the goals of each.

Scholars who participate in the study of postmemory or, alternatively, witnessing and testimony do not bring their objects of inquiry into conversation with one another. For example, in his study *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization* (2009), literary scholar Michael Rothberg does address postmemory in the context of memory studies, and witnessing and testimony in the context of Holocaust Studies, but he does not examine them in relation to one another. He discusses postmemory in his chapter on intergenerational transmission of memory, entitled "Hidden Children: The Ethics of Multigenerational Memory After 1961," and discusses witnessing and testimony in his two chapters, "The Work of Testimony in the Age of Decolonization: *Chronicle of a Summer* and the Emergence of the Holocaust Survivor" and "The Counterpublic Witness: Charlotte Delbo's *Les belles lettres*."

Indeed, Rothberg's insightful and clear analysis of multidirectional memory highlights points of intersection and exchange between entities that at first glance appear to be dissimilar, forming, as he puts it, "a new kind of comparative thinking" that "is not afraid to traverse sacrosanct borders of ethnicity and era" (Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory* 18, 17). Despite breaking new ground by productively examining Holocaust Studies and the processes of decolonization, Rothberg discusses postmemory by itself in one chapter, and discusses witnessing and testimony by itself in two chapters; that is, he overlooks examining postmemory in relation to witnessing and testimony. This trend remains a larger one, and Rothberg's book is only one example. Granted, Rothberg's focus is not on the changing forms of witnessing and testimony. Still, I want to show that postmemory, on the one hand, and witnessing and testimony, on the other, have, as evident by Rothberg's use of both of them in his study, albeit in separate chapters, the capacity to be examined in relationship to one another. These changing

forms of witnessing and testimony require a more detailed analysis of how postmemory intersects with witnessing and testimony than has previously been done.

In 2016, we are faced with the inevitability that Holocaust survivors, or members of the first generation, will soon no longer be alive. Bearing witness to the Holocaust and telling others about their experiences was an issue of concern during and after the Holocaust. The first generation reflected on the issue of transmitting their personal experiences to others, and, with the advent of the second generation, survivors found themselves confronted by the problem of what, if anything, they would tell their children, and how they would tell it. This shift from lived history, or history as it is personally experienced by individuals, to what James E. Young has called "received history," or history as it is transmitted to others, began to be particularly relevant with the second generation (Young 25). This transition from lived to received history has continued with the emergence of the third generation, and will presumably continue into the impending emergence of the fourth generation, remaining relevant in the twenty-first century. This issue of transmitting memory about the Holocaust has taken on greater relevance because of the ever-diminishing number of survivors seventy years after the end of World War II.

Advances in technology greatly affect memory and its means of transmission, and the role of technology in transmitting memory about the Holocaust is no different. Sociologist Jeffrey K. Olick identifies this link between technology and memory: "Remembering as the mediation of past and present changes with context, technology, and epoch. Which pasts are remembered is thus only one question next to the more basic one of what remembering is and does" (Olick 99). Advances in technology in the post-Holocaust period, such as the tape recorder and video camera, as well as the increased accessibility of such technology, had a direct

impact on the process of memory transmission about the Holocaust (Hartman, "Darkness Visible" 6).

In the twenty-first century, advances in technology have had a similar impact on the changing processes of remembering the Holocaust. The Shoah Foundation's "New Dimensions in Testimony" initiative at the University of Southern California has partnered with that university's Institute for Creative Technologies (ICT) to design the newest form of testimony: a 3-D hologram of a Holocaust survivor that can participate in a conversation with an individual by answering any question an individual asks ("Holograms add new dimension"). The first prototype, a 3-D hologram based on survivor Pinchas Gutter, debuted in 2015. The "New Dimensions in Testimony" project description directly references the disappearance of survivors as an impetus behind the project: "Years from now, long after the last survivor has passed on, the New Dimensions in Testimony project can provide a path to enable young people to listen to a survivor and ask their own questions directly, encouraging them, each in their own way, to reflect on the deep and meaningful consequences of the Holocaust" ("New Dimensions in Testimony"). In this designed interaction between the 3-D hologram of the Holocaust survivor and a student, the student participates in a conversation with the survivor's hologram and can pose his or her own questions. The project description attributes pedagogical value to this interaction, stating that "learners can have simulated, educational conversations with survivors th[r]ough the fourth dimension of time" ("New Dimensions in Testimony"). Despite its reliance on advanced technology, the description places the project in the context of continuing a long tradition of oral storytelling, which "advances the age-old tradition of passing down lessons through oral storytelling, but with the latest technologies available" ("New Dimensions in Testimony"). By implying continuity between oral storytelling and the technology that produces

3-D holograms, the project suggests that such technology enables rather than disrupts oral storytelling, even when one interlocutor is a simulation of a person that is deceased. Continuity also exists between the account the Holocaust survivor shared with the project at the time of the interview and the hologram that is created since the words the Holocaust survivor used at the time of the interview will be reproduced as words the hologram says.

The "New Dimensions in Testimony" project suggests wider implications for the future of Holocaust testimony, the most obvious of which is that Holocaust testimony does have a future. Of particular importance is the initiative's insistence on students' interactive participation. In the form of a dialogue, in which they have to engage with the hologram of the survivor and formulate questions, students will be able to interact with the survivor's hologram long after he is deceased. To be sure, the initiative, which attempts to counteract the dying out of survivors, is limited by the number of survivors they interview and reproduce as a 3-D hologram. Despite the inability—due to time constraints and funding—to preserve an archive of 3-D holograms that would rival that of the Fortunoff Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, which preserves survivor testimony on video, the "New Dimensions in Testimony" nevertheless simulates a type of conversation between future generations and Holocaust survivors; however, it is an interaction that creates an illusion of conversation, since only the Holocaust survivor's 3-D photograpic image and their words will be preserved in the form of the hologram. Instead of two individuals or groups talking to one another, the conversation between future generations and the 3-D hologram of the Holocaust survivor will remain heavily one-sided. As a result, this possibility complicates issues surrounding postmemory, witnessing, and testimony. The "New Dimensions in Testimony" initiative is one example of the changing forms of witnessing and testimony. In her co-authored study *The Power of Witnessing: Reflections, Reverberations, and*

Traces of the Holocaust: Trauma, Psychoanalysis, and the Living Mind (2012), psychologist Marilyn B. Meyers connects the disappearance of the survivors to new avenues of witnessing in which "both the necessity and the opportunity for new levels and perspectives of witnessing present themselves" (Meyers 41). The use of technology to produce 3-D holograms of survivors demonstrates an alternative interactive means of producing a new perspective on witnessing.

As suggested above in regards to the work of Michael Rothberg, scholars in either the study of postmemory, on the one hand, or the study of witnessing and testimony, on the other hand, do not typically engage with these two fields of study concurrently. The creator of the term postmemory, Marianne Hirsch, also omits any discussion of their relationship to one another. In her discussion of postmemory, Hirsch implicitly engages with witnessing and testimony, but does not fully explicate the intrinsic relationship between the three. For example, although Hirsch does recognize that Art Spiegelman's *Maus I* and *II* focus on "the testimonial structure of listener and witness," thereby implicitly acknowledging postmemory's relationship to witnessing, Hirsch does not draw out the implications of such a testimonial structure, although it undergirds the very notion of postmemory (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 40). That is, although she speaks of postmemory as "*retrospective witnessing by adoption*," thus drawing on Geoffrey Hartman's notion of "witnesses by adoption," Hirsch does not reflect on her diction of witnessing (Hirsch, "Surviving Images" 10; italics in original; Hartman, *The Longest Shadow* 8). Hartman characterizes "witnesses by adoption" as "those…who have adopted themselves into the family of victims" (Hartman, *The Longest Shadow* 8). Hartman's description raises the possibility that such an adoption might imply an unhealthy amount of identification with victims of the Holocaust. Also significant in Hartman's characterization remains the agency of the

"witnesses by adoption" since they, and not others, are the ones who take it upon themselves to identify themselves with the victims.

To return to Hirsch's adaptation of Hartman's term, in her references to his term, Hirsch focuses on the concept of "adoption" and the adjective, "retrospective" (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 97; "Surviving Images" 10). Hirsch remarks that the diction of adoption in Hartman's term connects well to the realm of the family, the sphere in which she initially begins to define her concept of postmemory (Hirsch, "Surviving Images" 10). While Hartman's term "witnesses by adoption" focused on individuals, Hirsch's term seeks not to identify the individual as a witness, but focuses on the *process* of witnessing instead. Hirsch's addition of the word "retrospective" clarifies and emphasizes the belatedness of such a process to a greater extent than does Hartman's term; in turn, it refines his concept. Elsewhere, Hirsch explains the connection she finds between witnessing and retrospection, or hindsight. In their co-authored introduction to *Teaching the Representation of the Holocaust* (2004), Hirsch and Irene Kacandes describe the pedagogical imperative of teaching students "what it means to witness the Holocaust from their own, retrospective vantage point" (Hirsch and Kacandes 17). This description here closely resembles Hirsch's categorization of postmemory as "retrospective witnessing by adoption" (Hirsch, "Surviving Images" 10). To witness the Holocaust retrospectively is something Hirsch and Kacandes hope to stimulate; doing such witnessing involves critically engaging with materials that transmit memory about the Holocaust, whether in the form of a memoir, an eyewitness account, in person or in video testimony, or a photograph.

In her most recent study on postmemory, *The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture After the Holocaust* (2012), Hirsch goes into greater detail about the connections she finds among retrospection, postmemory, and witnessing. Hirsch uses the term "retrospective

witnesses" and "postmemorial witnesses" (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 135, 82). Although, at first glance, Hirsch's use of "retrospective" and "postmemorial" appears to muddle her terms, her concomitant use of both adjectives reveals the relationship Hirsch finds between postmemory and retrospection. According to Hirsch's terminology, "retrospective" is synonymous with "postmemorial." Both terms imply a backwards-looking gaze that focuses on the past. I will return to the issue of terminology later on in this introduction. For now, suffice it to say that the categories of witnessing and testimony at the very least play an important role in Hirsch's discussions of postmemory.

In contrast, the term postmemory is generally absent from the major theoretical or scholarly discussions on witnessing and testimony that appeared after Hirsch first established her term postmemory in the article "Family Pictures: *Maus*, Mourning, and Post-Memory" (1992-93). Eric J. Sundquist's article "Witness Without End?" (2007) mentions Hirsch's term once, as does Young's "The Holocaust as Vicarious Past: Art Spiegelman's *Maus* and the Afterimages of History" (2003), but neither reference the term in relationship to witnessing and testimony specifically (Sundquist 67, Young 25). None of the other main theoretical discussions mention postmemory: Michael Bernard-Donals and Richard Glejzer's *Between Witness and Testimony: The Holocaust and the Limits of Representation* (2001); with the exception of Young's article, the other essays in Bernard-Donals and Glejzer's co-edited collection, *Witnessing the Disaster: Essays on Representation and the Holocaust* (2003); and Froma Zeitlin's "The Vicarious Witness: Belated Memory and Authorial Presence in Recent Holocaust Literature" (1998). Using Hirsch's description of postmemory as effects that have been "evacuated," according to my reading of the major theoretical works on witnessing and testimony that have appeared since Hirsch's introduction of "postmemory" in 1992, scholarship on witnessing and testimony

actually replicates this evacuation (Hirsch, *Family Frames* 22). In other words, those who focus on witnessing and testimony refuse to take postmemory as a further version of witnessing and testimony. Indeed, for many historians, my argument that postmemory is an extension of witnessing and testimony would be met with doubt, aversion, or even ridicule. On the one hand, the reasons behind these strongly demarcated definitions in scholarship on witnessing and testimony—of who a witness is and who a witness can be, what the act of witnessing is, and the definition of testimony as words narrated, either in oral or written form, by a witness—has up to this point in the post-Holocaust world made sense. As historian Annette Wieviorka writes in *The Era of the Witness* (1998), the first step in witnessing and testimony on the Holocaust was to establish a historical record, and to find individuals who acted to document their experiences during the Holocaust. Of the second of these, the Oneg Shabbat archives in the Warsaw Ghetto is only one such example (Wieviorka 1-2, 5-7).[1] On the other hand, by 2016, the large body of work on the Holocaust indicates that this concern over preserving as much as possible for the historical record has to a considerable degree been addressed.

Despite what one might characterize as friction between literary and cultural studies scholars, on the one hand, and historians, on the other, one does find some overlap, e.g., in the texts on which they focus. Paradoxically, even though postmemory is absent from a discussion of witnessing and testimony, scholarship on both subjects frequently refers to the same sample text, Art Spiegelman's graphic narrative *Maus I: My Father Bleeds History* (1986) and *Maus II: And Here My Troubles Began* (1991). A graphic narrative that depicts Jews as mice and Nazis as cats, Spiegelman's combination of image and text interweaves the story his father Vladek tells of survival as a young man with the figure of Vladek as an old man, while also portraying

[1] For more on the genre of audio and video testimony, see Geoffrey Hartman's "Audio and Visual Testimony and Holocaust Studies" in Hirsch and Irene Kacandes's *Teaching the Representation of the Holocaust*. See also Hartman's introduction to *Holocaust Remembrance: The Shapes of Memory* (Hartman, "Introduction: Darkness Visible" 6).

Spiegelman's own fraught relationship with his father. Rather shockingly, no scholars of either postmemory or of witnessing and testimony recognize or comment on the fact that both fields of study often cite *Maus I* and *II*. This lack of commentary on *Maus I* and *II*'s use in both fields of study is surprising given that Spiegelman's *Maus I* and *II* is by and large the most cited text in scholarship on the representation of the Holocaust and the development of second-generation literature. Indeed, the absence of such commentary on *Maus I* and *II* in both fields of study is indicative of a larger problem, that of scholarship which does not cast a more extensive view on multiple disciplines, choosing rather to focus on a more singular approach to a either a text or a theoretical term, such as postmemory. Synthesizing such varying approaches to postmemory, and witnessing and testimony, thereby placing them in context and conversation with one another, thus provides a clearer picture of the larger issues at stake, including, but not limted to, the transmission of Holocaust memory to future generations.

One of the most challenging aspects of combining these two fields is the discipline-specific terminology that at times muddles and even obfuscates terms. Such differences in terminology occur even on a broad scale in scholarship, in which debate occurs on how to classify the kind of literature under analysis. For example, the terms "testimonial literature" and "witness literature" actually refer to the same thing—literary texts, written by witnesses, that function as a form of testimony (Rothberg, *Traumatic Realism* 189; Engdahl ix). The one term—"testimonial literature"—denotes written and oral forms of testimony including video footage of survivor testimonies; "witness literature," the term used in the essay compilation

Witness Literature: Proceedings of the Nobel Centennial Symposium (2002), edited by literary scholar Horace Engdahl, refers to the same various genres (Engdahl ix).[2]

One specific example demonstrates how an approach that combines the study of postmemory with the study of witnessing and testimony can produce a more comprehensive, nuanced analysis of the narrative strategies employed to transmit memory about the Holocaust. Take, for example, Hirsch's use of *MetaMaus*, which she only cites once in a footnote (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 263). Hirsch's cursory reference to *MetaMaus* overlooks the process by which *MetaMaus* generates its own meta-testimony about Spiegelman's comic narrative. By reflecting on and reproducing in *MetaMaus* the historical research he conducted to create *Maus I* and *II*, Spiegelman replicates his own creative process. This meta-narrative actually supports Hirsch's identification of the "cultural work of postmemory" as necessarily that which repeats itself again and again (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 37). I return to this key concept of repetition later in this introduction in the section on re-witnessing. Like the example of Art Spiegelman's *MetaMaus* described above, the texts of the second and third generation in German Jewish and American Jewish literature I analyze in this study are emblematic of the ways in which texts of the second and third generation utilize and transform elements that appear in survivor witnessing and testimony.

In contrast to previous scholarship's stringently defined boundaries between postmemory, on the one hand, and witnessing and testimony, on the other, this study brings the two fields of study together to argue that postmemory operates as a form of witnessing and testimony. As a result, my analysis extends the purview of witnessing and testimony by arguing that texts that

[2] Film is included in both of these two categories. For example, of the oft cited *Shoah*, Claude Lanzmann's film, released in 1985, Shoshanna Felman's article "The Return of the Voice: Claude Lanzmann's *Shoah*" argues that the documentary engenders the viewer's own form of witnessing as Lanzmann interviews witnesses (Felman 211). Meyers repeats Felman's argument about Lanzmann's *Shoah*, which "engages the viewer as a witness to witnessing" (Meyers 38).

contain fictional elements can be considered texts that engender witnessing and help produce testimony. More succinctly, such texts become what one might call "textimony." Psychologist Marilyn B. Meyers argues for new avenues of witnessing once survivors are no longer alive, since "there are few survivors remaining to serve as their own witnesses" (Meyers 42). She contends that "the ongoing task of remembering is left to be honored by others" and asks: "How do we do this?" (Meyers 42). The texts of the second and third generation propose an answer to Meyers's question. By incorporating elements of witnessing and testimony, while also depicting the transmission of Holocaust memory that continues after the listener has either heard or read a survivor's testimony, the listener participates in the ongoing process of intergenerational transmission. I employ the methodology of narrative theory as textual analysis to support my argument that postmemory operates as an extension of witnessing and testimony. In what follows, I will first present an overview of the scholarship on both witnessing and testimony and postmemory and then proceed to explicate what I mean by the term re-witnessing. Thereafter, I will provide summaries and context for the seven selected texts of the second and third generation that I analyze in this study.

III. Witnessing and Testimony: An Overview

The study of witnessing and testimony, although it existed long before the Holocaust, grew significantly in the wake of the Holocaust, which, during its time and in its aftermath, became one of the most documented events in history (Wieviorka xi). Simply put, a witness is a person who has been present at an event, witnessing is the act of narrating said event, and testimony is the product of witnessing. In reference to the Holocaust, a witness is a survivor who was alive at the time of the Holocaust and lived through the Holocaust; witnesses to the

Holocaust provided testimony, oral or written, about the Holocaust. Literary scholar Susan Rubin Suleiman and psychologist Marilyn B. Meyers call into question the category of victim that places one in the position of witness, identifying additional witnesses as survivors, perpetrators, and bystanders (Suleiman, "When the Perpetrator" 15-16; Meyers 32-33). For the purposes of this study, the witnesses I am interested in are survivors since the two literatures I examine are German Jewish and American Jewish literature; of the three—survivors, bystanders, and perpetrators—survivors appear most often. The Adolf Eichmann trial in 1961 generated a renewed interest in gathering documentation, particularly through testimony by survivors, and ushered in, as Annette Wieviorka demonstrates, the figure of the survivor, producing a discourse on the Holocaust, one that had previously been suppressed (Wieviorka 83-85, 88). Geoffrey Hartman identifies the changing status of testimony, comparing the purpose of testimony after the war to its purpose now: "In the years immediately after the war, testimony had the status of an archival document whose primary aim was increase of knowledge; today it is rather a means of transmission that keeps events before our eyes" (Hartman, "Darkness Visible" 6).

One goal of the study of witnessing and testimony is to explicate how the process of witnessing and testimony works to mitigate the concern over the problem of preserving as much documentation about the Holocaust as possible. Post-Holocaust scholarship on witnessing and testimony begins with examining the relationship between the witness and the listener. In their seminal work, *Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History* (1992), Holocaust survivor and psychoanalyst Dori Laub and literary theorist Shoshana Felman outline the mutable process of exchange between the Holocaust survivor and the listener.[3] For Felman and Laub, testimony, or "the narrative's address to hearing" is the action that the

[3] Felman and Laub's *Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History* (1992) was published in the same year as Hirsch's article "Family Pictures: *Maus*, Mourning, and Post-Memory" (1992-93), in which Hirsch first employed her term postmemory.

survivor takes to transform himself into a witness (Laub, "Bearing Witness" 71). As a discursive communicative speech act, the witness relies on the presence of the listener, and the listener's presence elicits the witness's testimony. Felman and Laub approach witnessing and testimony from the point of view of psychoanalysis and focus on the trauma that appears, suddenly and without warning, during the exchange between witness and listener. Indeed, according to Laub, the process of witnessing closely resembles the therapeutic dialogue between psychoanalyst and patient (Laub, "Bearing Witness" 70).

Laub distinguishes between three levels of witnessing, and his description informs my understanding of witnessing and testimony: "I recognize three separate, distinct levels of witnessing in relation to the Holocaust experience: the level of being a witness to oneself within the experience; the level of being a witness to the testimonies of others; and the level of being a witness to the process of witnessing itself" (Laub, "An Event Without a Witness" 75). On the second level, in which the listener listens to the witness's testimony, Laub characterizes the listener, who in his description is also the interviewer, as the "immediate receiver" (Laub, "An Event Without a Witness" 76). At the first level of witnessing, the Holocaust survivor is present; at the second and third levels of witnessing, the Holocaust survivor and a listener are both present. Laub describes a listener to the witness as moving down the "testimonial chain," by which he means the testimonial chain of transmission of the survivor's narrative (Laub, "Bearing Witness" 71). The links in this chain are the witness and listener. This concept of the "testimonial chain" has important implications for the role of postmemory, addressed in the next section.

Laub goes into considerable detail about his conception of the third level of witnessing.

The listener, or addressee of the witness's testimony, fulfills the "function of a witness to the trauma witness" (Laub, "Bearing Witness" 58). This point of Laub's argument is particularly significant because he explicitly asserts here that the listener becomes a witness to the witness. Multiple scholars from various disciplines—Marianne Hirsch, psychologist Nancy R. Goodman, and anthropologist and film producer Nina Shapiro-Perl—make reference to Laub's phrasing of "witness to the…witness." Goodman employs Laub's description of the listener serving the role of "witness to the original witness," although Goodman's insertion of "original" immediately raises the issue of authenticity (Goodman 11). Shapiro-Perl's description of what happens when an addressee, here a viewer, examines a piece of art parallels Laub's description of the listener becoming a witness to the witness: "[B]y externalizing her trauma, she was no longer the only witness. Through art, now others could also bear witness" (Shapiro-Perl 237). Although Hirsch includes the quotation from Laub's article, she does not explicitly describe postmemory as a form of witnessing. She cites "witness for the witness" in quotation marks, but it remains unclear whether she is citing Laub or referring to a quote by James E. Young, who was the last scholar she had cited previously (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 98). Despite this ambiguous citation, Hirsch's use of this phrase suggests that her understanding of postmemory is informed by this phrase, thus implying a deeper connection between witnessing, testimony, and postmemory.

While differences in terminology occur in scholarship on a broad scale between the terms "testimonial literature" and "witness literature," differences in terminology also occur on a smaller scale. In addition to Hirsch's "postmemorial witnesses" and "retrospective witnesses," other scholars use adjectives that modify the word "witness," which refers to an individual, or "witnessing," which refers not to an individual but to an action. In her analysis of Claude

Lanzmann's documentary *Shoah*, Felman refers to the filmmaker Lanzmann and the historian Raul Hilberg as "second-degree witnesses" or "witnesses of witnesses, witnesses of the testimonies" (Felman 213). Caroline Schaumann employs the term "second-hand witnessing" (Schaumann 136); Froma Zeitlin uses the term "vicarious witness" (Zeitlin 5, 15). Hartman's term "witnesses by adoption" can also be viewed as a variant of the adjectival form since it still qualifies "witnesses." Marilyn B. Meyers, who approaches witnessing not from the perspective of a literary critic or historian but, like Goodman, from her background as a psychologist, uses the term "willing witness," or, "someone who would want to know" (Meyers 32, 41). For Meyers, the willing witness is the individual who chooses to receive the survivor's testimony; the willing witness is not the person who chooses to produce testimony about his or her own experience as witness. Meyers defines the willing witness expansively, referring to the ability for individuals and society to serve as willing witnesses to testimony (Meyers 42). All of these adjectives used to describe "witnesses" reveal the distance of these individuals from the historical events of the Holocaust. That is, the very presence of an adjective that qualifies "witnesses" suggests that scholars remain concerned about distinguishing between witnesses of the Holocaust and individuals who later, to use Laub's third level of witnessing, become "witness to the...witness" (Laub, "Bearing Witness" 58).

In contrast, one literary scholar, Gary Weissman, strongly objects to any variation to the noun "witness": "I resist these terms because I believe that such a broadening of the term *witness*…contributes to a wishful blurring of otherwise obvious and meaningful distinctions between the victims and ourselves, and between the Holocaust and our own historical moment" (Weissman 20). Weissman offers the term "nonwitnesses" as an alternative to these variants, arguing that there can and should be no expansion of the definition of witness (Weissman 18-20).

And yet, the breadth of scholarship surrounding the number of terms that refer to the same process, that of the transmission of memory about the Holocaust from the first generation to others at a generational remove from the survivors, demonstrates the necessity of placing these various terms into a coherent framework that can be productively employed to better describe these varying approaches to the transmission of memory. For the purposes of this study, these varying approaches are evident in these selected texts of the second and third generation that engage with witnessing and testimony.

In addition to scholars that focus on types of witnesses and witnessing, other scholars, such as Michael Rothberg, come to the field of witnessing and testimony as a result of their interest in memory. Whereas Felman and Laub take as their starting point psychoanalysis, Michael Rothberg, drawing on his concept of multidirectional memory—briefly defined as an understanding of memory that contains "dynamic transfers that take place between diverse places and times during the act of remembrance"—takes as his starting point the political ramifications of testimony (Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory* 11). That is, he contends that "the testimonial articulation of memory becomes a site of potential political engagement" since "the multifaceted address…defines even the most straightforward forms of documentation and testimony" (Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory* 202, 217). Rothberg's identification of an address that is not solely between two interlocutors calls attention to his main critique of Felman and Laub: their psychoanalytic focus on dialogue. Citing the limitations of Felman and Laub's approach, Rothberg argues: "Whatever the untranscendable necessity of the witness/addressee relationship…public testimony (as opposed to therapy) possesses a wider, more amorphous address that includes strangers and undefined potential addressees" (Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory* 215). Rothberg counts "literary works, films, and video testimonies" as part of what he

calls the "world of public discourse" since they circulate in the realm of the public sphere, and are not limited to a dialogue between two people (Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory* 215). Testimony, according to Rothberg, derives its political function by transitioning from the private realm to the public, thereby engaging with multiple addressees. Rothberg additionally criticizes Felman and Laub for using examples solely from public discourse since Felman and Laub's psychoanalytic conception of dialogue comprises what he refers to as conversation, and not testimony. Yet, one facet of testimony Rothberg overlooks is the potential for testimony to have a dialogue structure without it having to become a *therapeutic* dialogue. The texts I focus on portray acts of dialogue that occur between witness and listener.

For Rothberg, witnessing and testimony serve a political and ethical function by confronting individuals with the past, ideally generating a call to action in the present. The power of testimony resides in its ability to incite action, particularly political action, which is made possible once testimony moves from the private to the public realm. For Felman and Laub, the power of testimony resides in the individual's ability—through the repetitive nature of testimony—to narrate a traumatic experience(s), thus providing some alleviation, if not healing and closure, of psychic pain.

IV. Postmemory: An Overview

First appearing in the context of Holocaust Studies, the goal of the field of postmemory is to identify a strong affective connection to the Holocaust that manifests itself in different forms and outlets, and therefore legitimate the feeling of trauma a person can possess despite the fact that this individual was not even alive at the time of the Holocaust.

For Hirsch, the inability to produce testimony because an individual is not a Holocaust survivor factors into producing a feeling of belatedness, a key trait of postmemory, in that such individuals will have always come after, or been born after, the Holocaust.[4] Therefore, this inability to produce testimony—since such individuals cannot participate as a witness in the process of witnessing, and can only participate as a receiver of the testimony—engenders postmemory. Ironically, Hirsch's most succinct definition of postmemory—"the process of transmission itself, the work of postmemory"—supports rather than contradicts my argument that postmemory, witnessing, and testimony are closely intertwined (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 89). This "process of transmission," in its particular form of transmitting memory about the Holocaust, describes the very process of witnessing survivor testimony. Without witnessing and testimony, whether by survivors or by those to whom survivors give testimony, no transmission of the memory of the Holocaust exists. History, which establishes, ascertains, and analyzes historical facts, events, and larger historical trends, does not necessarily focus on the ways in which ordinary, individual actors in historical events process, remember, and share their experiences with later generations. That is, although historians employ oral history to a certain extent, their discipline frequently proceeds from a distrust of individuals who narrate their stories. Literary studies, on the other hand, since a text is by and large written by a singular individual, begins with the assumption that an individual has a contribution to make through their individualized perception, regardless of whether or not the writer is writing fictional or nonfictional narrative. Therefore, it matters that an individual's memory of events, rather than history, needs to be transmitted to others. Transmission of memory of the Holocaust, while it can supplement the historical record, also crystallizes the complicated process of how that historical record became the historical record, thereby problematizing history as established by

[4] Hirsch does not address the position of individuals not born after the Holocaust, but who were not survivors themselves.

dominant narratives or historical leaders. For this reason, examining what I consider to be inherent intersections between postmemory, witnessing, and testimony is of vital importance.

Hirsch first defines postmemory in relationship to the children of Holocaust survivors, characterized as the second generation, with the first generation being Holocaust survivors themselves. The graphic narrative with which she first explicates her term is Art Spiegelman's *Maus I: My Father Bleeds History* (1986) and *Maus II: And Here My Troubles Began* (1991), a graphic narrative that I will only briefly refer to due to the extensive scholarship done on these two texts.[5] The text of Spiegelman's I consider in this study is his meta-narrative, also in graphic form, about *Maus I* and *II—MetaMaus: A Look Inside a Modern Class, Maus* (2011). Hirsch argues that the second generation, despite not possessing any actual memories of the Holocaust, possesses traumatic aftereffects, transmitted to them by their parents, that take on the affective force of traumatic memory. In other words, the second generation has the traumatic aftereffects of memory about the Holocaust, without having their own stories and narrative to map onto these effects. Hirsch clarifies that postmemory is "*not* an identity position, but a *generational* structure of transmission embedded in multiple forms of mediation" (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 35). Hirsch describes the realm of postmemory as that of "imaginative investment, projection, and creation" and argues that the genre of photography is uniquely suited to expressing the simultaneous process of attempting to bridge the past in the present while always being doomed to fail (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 5). However, despite the bleak outlook such an approach initially suggests, Hirsch views this ongoing process as ultimately productive in terms of attempting to engage with the past instead of repressing it. As her

[5] For the major articles, apart from Hirsch, in the scholarship on *Maus I* and *Maus II*, see James E. Young's "The Holocaust as Vicarious Past: Art Spiegelman's *Maus* and the Afterimages of History" and Richard Glejzer's "*Maus* and the Epistemology of Witness" in *Witnessing the Disaster: Essays on Representation and the Holocaust* (Madison, WI: U of WI P, 2003): 23-45, 125-137 as well as Erin McGlothlin's "'In Auschwitz We Didn't Wear Watches': Marking Time in Art Spiegelman's *Maus*" in *Second-Generation Holocaust Literature: Legacies of Survival and Perpetration* (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2006): 66-90.

example of Spiegelman's Artie, the child of Holocaust survivors talking to his father, Vladek, about his experiences in the Holocaust, demonstrates, Hirsch's starting point occurs within the realm of the family. Even from her term's initial stages, Hirsch recognizes the importance of not only extending the concept of postmemory to outside the family, to encompass what she refers to as "affiliative postmemory," but also broadening her term to include other traumatic occurrences beyond, and before, the Holocaust (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 122).

The second generation was the generation originally characterized by postmemory. Hirsch's position as a member of the second generation greatly informs her conceptualization of postmemory. In characterizing the literature of the second generation, other scholars employ terminology associated with witnessing and testimony. Although Sara Horowitz declares that "second-generation writing is no longer a matter of eyewitnessing," her description of the literature of the second generation continues to include ruminations on witnessing and testimony (Horowitz 278). Horowitz contends: "The second generation, to borrow from the poet Paul Celan, bears witness for the witness. Second generation writers anchor their aesthetic representations in research rather than memory, as they trace a trauma both remembered and not remembered, transmitted and not transmitted" (Horowitz 278). Horowitz does not explicitly refer to postmemory here, but her description resembles the processes at work—of remembering specific memories, and transmitting them to others—in Hirsch's postmemory. James E. Young also uses the language of witnessing and testimony to describe the second generation: "As the survivors testified to *their* experiences of the Holocaust, their children and children's children will now testify to their [referring to the children and grandchildren of survivors] experiences of the Holocaust" (Young 42).

Hirsch focuses on the genre of photography as a medium for postmemory since "the changes images undergo mirror the movement from memory to postmemory" (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 37). As "fragmentary remnants that shape the cultural work of postmemory," photographs act as a catalyst for what Hirsch refers to as the "scene of transfer," or the encounter between the witness and listener (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 37, 111). While arguing that photography is the medium that best simulates the process of postmemory, Hirsch mentions, only cursorily and in a footnote, why she focuses on photography as a genre instead of testimony. Although testimony is "an equally pervasive genre," photography is a "more powerful and a more problematic vehicle for the generations after" (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 256). In Hirsch's view, the underlying technology that constitutes testimony—the tape recorder and the video camera—are only an extension of photography as a medium (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 256). That is, the underlying principle—that a photograph was made in the past, but is being viewed in the present, or that a video camera recorded a witness giving testimony at a past moment but can be viewed in the present—remains identical.

Hirsch's concept of postmemory has been taken up and adapted by other scholars such as Alan Berger, Andreas Huyssen, Leslie Morris, Michael Rothberg, and James E. Young (Berger 150; Huyssen 128, 132; Morris 293; Young 25-26). While not widely known outside of Holocaust Studies, or more particularly Holocaust literature, postmemory is currently an accepted term. Alan Berger extends Hirsch's term to the third generation (Berger 150). Brett Ashley Kaplan merges postmemory with a conception of collective memory, placing postmemory in the context of "multinational landscapes" of Holocaust memory without broadening her use of postmemory beyond the Holocaust (Kaplan 5). In his discussion of Art

Spiegelman and Philip Roth, Rothberg extends Hirsch's concept of postmemory by referring to "collective postmemory" as "[Spiegelman and Roth's] situational self-consciousness [that is] both linked to and distant from the Holocaust" (Rothberg, *Traumatic Realism* 189). Rothberg's term closely resembles Hirsch's term "affiliative postmemory," which she employs in contradistinction to "familial postmemory" (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 36, 40-41, 97, 122). Hirsch's affiliative postmemory, a term which she uses to refer to the broader generation that is born after the Holocaust, allows her to expand the concept of postmemory from one that stems from a personal familial connection to one that can be present in the culture at large. Rothberg's term "collective postmemory," in a move similar to that which Hirsch makes, broadens Hirsch's concept to include not just what parents pass on to their children, but what the larger culture transmits to these individuals as well (Rothberg, *Traumatic Realism* 189, 186). Although he does not acknowledge it, Rothberg's term "collective postmemory" does not appear in definition to have any real distinction from Hirsch's "affiliative postmemory."

Admittedly, Hirsch's concept of postmemory is quite flexible. If postmemory refers to any sort of inherited feeling of trauma, either inside the family or in the context of a culture at large, what prevents postmemory from becoming a nebulous, catch-all category? Indeed, J. J. Long's main criticism of Hirsch's term stems from his view that the term postmemory is too all-encompassing a category (Long 151). As "a radically overdetermined concept," Long asserts, postmemory has a "conceptual mutability" that "threatens to diminish rather than enhance postmemory's explanatory and critical power" (Long 151). Long argues that Hirsch folds two distinctive features of postmemory into her term—"the gap between postmemory as a structure of transmission and postmemory as an ethics of remembering"—without distinguishing between them (Long 160). And yet, postmemory, I would argue, is concomitantly both a "structure of

transmission" and "an ethics of remembering"—these two key features of postmemory interact with each other. Contrary to Long's interpretation, they interact with each other productively in mutual exchange.

While it is true that Hirsch's concept can be at times open-ended, the flexibility of her concept allows for disparate manifestations, which itself is productive since postmemory envelops a wide variety of genres. Other scholars view postmemory's flexibility as an advantage when considering the continuing transmission of historical trauma. Literary scholar Jenni Adams, for example, views postmemory's malleability as a potential strength rather than limitation: "This hybrid constitution of postmemory constructions, comprising imaginative investment as well as documentary material and oral narratives, raises the question of just what sort of knowledge postmemory is and what sort of identifications may legitimately be made in and through it" (Adams 54). Literary scholar Caroline Schaumann also sees postmemory's flexibility in a more positive light since postmemory "does not promote ideological readings and is not limited to a particular traumatic event" (Schaumann 137).

As a continual return to the past—or more accurately, a constantly attempted return to the past—postmemory gestures backwards. My approach to postmemory differs from Hirsch's in terms of my understanding of postmemory's directionality. The texts I examine in this study illustrate postmemory's backwards movement, but the concept of re-witnessing suggests a directionality that is forward-moving as well as backwards. Hirsch's characterization of the reader/viewer as engaged in the "postmemorial act of looking" does not, in my view, always suggest an action-oriented engagement with the past that looks solely backwards (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 119). Hirsch's phrase opens up the potential for a gaze that also looks forward through the transmission of memory into the future.

V. Repetition and Re-Witnessing

As a response to trauma, the idea of repetition in Hirsch's concept of postmemory has to a certain extent always been present. Hirsch further develops the role of repetition in postmemory in her most recent study *The Generation of Postmemory* (2012). There Hirsch asserts that repetition is "a specifically postmemorial response to an inherited trauma" which "point[s] to its specific generational function," since "[r]epetition connects the second generation to the first, in its capacity to produce rather than screen the effect of trauma that was lived so much more directly as compulsive repetition by survivors and contemporary witnesses" (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 108). The first generation experiences repetition of their memories of the Holocaust because of their traumatic experiences; in the second and third generation, although repetition is also operational, it takes the form of a constant attempt to return to the past, which members of the second and third generation can only access through forms of mediation. According to Hirsch, repetition is not always a recuperative process: "repetition is not a homeopathic protective shield that screens out the black hole; it is not an anesthetic, but a traumatic fixation" (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 121). Despite this claim about an unhealthy preoccupation with returning to the past, Hirsch views repetition as also able to engender a productive engagement with the past: "[the postmemorial generation] has been able to make repetition not an instrument of fixity or paralysis or simple retraumatization, as it often is for survivors of trauma, but a mostly helpful vehicle of transmitting an inherited traumatic past in such a way that it can be worked through" (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 108). In the context of postmemory, repetition also occurs through the repeated viewing of a set number of iconic photographs of concentration camp inmates standing behind barbed wire, such as those by Margaret Bourke-White. As the passage above suggests,

employing repeated photographs in new forms and contexts, through displacement and adaptation, as in works of visual art like those serving as Hirsch's primary examples, facilitates a slightly less fraught relationship to the past (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 108).

Re-witnessing, the listener's re-narration of a witness's testimony to a third party, operates as a type of repetition. The third chapter, which focuses on these occurrences of re-witnessing in the selected seven texts, will explore such repetition in greater detail. For now, I provide one specific example from Elizabeth Rosner's novel *The Speed of Light* that demonstrates the process of re-witnessing. After the main character Paula returns to New York City from Budapest, where she has learned of her father's experiences in the camp from survivor Joszef Huber, Paula eventually retells, or re-witnesses, Joszef's story about her father to her brother Julian. This re-telling or re-witnessing amounts to an extension of postmemory. Paula's act of re-narration, of repetition, replicates in turn the testimonial encounter, but moves Paula to a different position in the testimonial chain. Rather than assuming the position of listener, Paula is the one who gives testimony.

In this way, the concept of re-witnessing productively expands the purview of postmemory by demonstrating that the transmission of memory about the Holocaust will be able to continue through encounters between listeners and other individuals who did not hear or receive testimony directly from the survivor. My term re-witnessing signals an action-oriented engagement with the past, one that not only encourages, but necessitates that a listener use what he or she has heard from the survivor and narrate it to others. Re-witnessing then, is a type of re-narration. At stake in such instances of re-witnessing and repetition is the extent to which the narrative changes during these instances of re-witnessing; ultimately, an instance of re-witnessing transforms testimony in some fashion, whether marginally or significantly, since an

instance of re-witnessing is a mediation of a mediation. It is these processes of transformation during re-witnessing that my study of these selected texts of the second and third generation explores—arguing as well that the texts themselves at times undertake such explorations.

Chapter One

Texts in the Study

In this study, I analyze seven post-Holocaust narratives written by American Jews and German-speaking Jews, narratives that include works of both fiction and non-fiction. The texts I focus on are Esther Dischereit's *Joemis Tisch: Eine jüdische Geschichte* (1988), Maxim Biller's *Harlem Holocaust* (1990), Elizabeth Rosner's *The Speed of Light* (2001), Jonathan Safran Foer's *Everything is Illuminated* (2002), Daniel Mendelsohn's *The Lost: A Search for Six of Six Million* (2006), Benjamin Stein's *Die Leinwand* (2010), and Art Spiegelman's *MetaMaus: A Look Inside a Modern Classic, Maus* (2011). Of these seven texts, four are by authors who belong to the second generation: Dischereit's *Joemis Tisch: Eine jüdische Geschichte*, Biller's *Harlem Holocaust*, Rosner's *The Speed of Light*, and Spiegelman's *MetaMaus: A Look Inside a Modern Classic, Maus*. The remaining three—Safran Foer's *Everything is Illuminated*, Mendelsohn's *The Lost: A Search for Six of Six Million*, and Stein's *Die Leinwand*—are texts by authors who belong to the third generation. Mendelsohn's *The Lost: A Search for Six of Six Million* and Spiegelman's *MetaMaus: A Look Inside a Modern Classic, Maus* (2011) are nonfictional narratives; the other five texts are fictional narratives. Before delving into analysis with specific examples from the texts in the ensuing chapters, I will first provide brief summaries of each, identifying the main plot, the protagonists, the narrative structure, and each text's connection to the broader issues at stake in this study, as related to fictional and nonfictional narrative, memory, and the transmission of Holocaust memory.

Esther Dischereit's *Joemis Tisch: Eine jüdische Geschichte* is a fictional narrative that is organized in short scenes and focuses primarily on the characters Hannah and Hannah's daughter, and their life in post-World War II Germany. Hannah's daughter remains

anonymous—her only identifier is linked to her relationship to her mother, Hannah. Hannah, who survived the Holocaust in hiding, has traumatic aftereffects as a result of her experience. Hannah's daughter narrates multiple scenes in the first-person, but *Joemis Tisch* also contains narration by an omniscient third-person narrator. The scenes follow Hannah's daughter from childhood to adulthood and are neither clearly labeled nor coherently organized. The temporal dislocation and narrative fragments in Dischereit's text emphasize the fragments of her mother's story that Hannah's daughter herself has had to piece together. Throughout the narrative, Hannah's daughter narrates events that occur in the present, and without any transition at all, the events turn into events that Hannah experienced, and then immediately return to the present (Dischereit 90, 97-98). The temporal confusion disorients the reader, mimicking Hannah's daughter's own experience.

Dischereit's text also features characters such as another unidentified female narrator who visits her mother-in-law, Marta Elisabeth, with her daughter. This unidentified female narrator is of Jewish heritage; Marta Elisabeth's husband was a Nazi who died in the war, a situation that generates further tensions explored by the narrator. Interspersed throughout the fictional narrative are additional scenes that focus on characters other than Hannah, her daughter, and this second unidentified female narrator. Incorporating scenes with multiple characters, some of whom reappear from time to time, with others who do not, creates the effect of allowing limited access both to the context of these scenes as well to the characters' background, thereby creating a sense of disorientation for the reader. This narrative disorientation resembles the lack of orientation Hannah provides for her daughter about Hannah's own experiences; after Hannah's death, the circumstances of which remain unclear, Hannah's daughter has no

remaining means, no transparent narrative or points of orientation by which to access Hannah's experiences.

Despite Hannah's daughter's inability to contextualize her mother's experiences, Dischereit's text illustrates the extent to which the presence of Hannah's daughter helps recall her mother's experiences as a Holocaust survivor. Hannah's daughter is alive because her mother survived—and Hannah's daughter's mere presence embodies this reminder of the Holocaust, while serving, in her encounters with other Germans, as a living reminder of German guilt. In other words, even though Hannah's daughter cannot retell her mother's story because her mother did not share it with her, her presence metonymically serves as a reminder of her mother's experiences.

In Dischereit's text, markers of contemporary female Jewish identity are inscribed onto the female body, which functions as a site at which the past and present intertwine. Hannah's daughter perceives herself as being marked with visible signs of her Jewish identity that can be easily interpreted by others. As she prepares to cross the German border into France, she becomes fearful that she will be stopped and searched by German soldiers: "wenn sie verlangten, ich solle mich ausziehen, und ich zöge mich aus. Und man sähe den Stern, durch die Kleider hindurch—sieht man ihn nicht—durch die Kleider hindurch auf meine Haut gebrannt—ist nicht gebrannt, bin niemals dort gewesen—auf meine Haut gebrannt, und die Hunde kämen heran" (Dischereit 35). Hannah's daughter's thought process, punctuated by dashes, oscillates between uncontrollable anxiety and her attempts to reassure herself that her fearful thoughts have no basis in current realities. The dashes demarcate her thoughts between her knowledge of the past and of the present, while the interruptions in the clauses set off by dashes demonstrate that the past and present are concurrent. Although Hannah's daughter has an incomplete picture of what her

mother went through, she possesses enough bits and pieces, in addition to overall background knowledge about the Holocaust, to fear discovery as a Jew despite the clear irrationality of this text. Hannah's daughter imagines that a marker of Jewish identity—the yellow star—has been burned onto her skin. Dischereit employs associations that both Hannah's daughter and the post-Holocaust reader have in order to conjure up another key image behind the image of the yellow star. "Dort" refers to Auschwitz, where prisoners were tattooed with numbers. After breathing a sigh of relief at successfully crossing the border, Hannah's daughter reflects, "Immer geht mir das so beim Grenzübertritt" (Dischereit 35). This "Grenzübertritt" becomes more than just that between two countries; indeed, it is the crossing of the border between past and present—and the female protagonist's negotiation of the two—with which she has great difficulty.

As later scenes in Dischereit's text confirm, Hannah's daughter's belief that other Germans will recognize her Jewish identity is not completely unfounded. Her encounters with other Germans suggest that they indeed view her as a living reminder of the Holocaust and treat her as a representative of Jews despite her reluctance to be perceived as such. One man she comes across asks her what Jews look like, mentioning incidentally an educational leave he has recently taken. Afterwards, Hannah's daughter remarks to herself: "Vielleicht kann ich das nächste Mal auch auf den Bildungsurlaub fahren. Dann würden sie mich ganz dicht und echt bei sich haben und könnten mich als Geschichte anfassen" (Dischereit 51). Here, Hannah's daughter feels herself perceived as a piece of history that can be carried along and physically touched or grasped ("anfassen"), as well as comprehended, by others. If her body can be grasped as history, then, she imagines, her body functions as a medium through which one could understand history. At another point, Hannah's daughter declares, "Ich habe es satt, das inkarnierte Leiden im Gesicht zu tragen" (Dischereit 68). The "inkarnierte Leiden" refers to the suffering of the Jewish

people in general, which, according to others, she carries written on her face, and even on her living and breathing body. Once again, the female body becomes a marker of Jewishness, which Hannah's daughter and other Germans perceive. Instead of a specific inscription of Jewish identity on her body, however, the body of Hannah's daughter itself operates as a metaphor for history. Her body testifies, in this way, to her status, not as a witness, but as a marker of the Holocaust.

While Dischereit employs alternating scenes in her work, which—with their shifting first- and third-person narrators and temporal levels—result in a fragmentary narrative, Maxim Biller, on the other hand, integrates the notion of the fragmentary text by framing his fictional narrative *Harlem Holocaust* as a recovered fragment, an unfinished manuscript. First published in his short story collection, *Wenn ich einmal reich und tot bin* (1990), Maxim Biller's fictional narrative *Harlem Holocaust* was published on its own in 1998 (Bashaw 265). Narrated by a character named Efraim Rosenhain, *Harlem Holocaust* describes this non-Jewish German's fraught relationship with Gerhard "Gary" Warszawski, a Jewish-American writer who has become famous in Germany for his provocative writing about Germans and Jews in the post-Holocaust world. Efraim, who is Warszawski's German translator, views himself as closely connected to the history of National Socialism and suffers from headaches and hallucinations arising from his feelings of guilt or, as he refers to it, "meine Gier nach Schuld und Entsühnung" (Biller 9). Part of Efraim's deference to Warszawski involves not wanting to accidentally insult Warszawski with a gaffe that would emphasize what Efraim views as his own culpability.

The story gives us many reasons to distrust Efraim's narrative, including, for example, the suggestion that he frequently suffers from hallucinations. As another example, Efraim consistently relies on negatively connoted Jewish stereotypes to characterize Warszawski, such

as hand gestures and hypersexuality. In Warszawski's explanation of the traditional Jewish sabbath dish known as cholent, Efraim presents Warszawski's movements as emblematic of other associations with Jewishness: "Er warf einen theatralischen chassidischen Blick zur Decke, nach oben, in den Himmel, er hielt sich die gespreizten, offenen Hände vertikal vors Gesicht wie eine Chagall-Figur" (Biller 20). With the terms "einen theatralischen chassidischen Blick" and "eine Chagall-Figur," Efraim draws comparisons between Warszawski and other ostensibly Jewish characteristics or figures with which he is familiar, solely, it appears, because he knows Warszawski is Jewish.

Efraim purposefully and self-consciously places himself directly in relationship to the Third Reich. Upon first meeting Warszawski, he shrinks away from the words Warszawski self-consciously employs—"'Ich bin euer Dybbuk! Ein aschkenasischer Zombie! Die sprechende Seife! Der schreiende, schreibende Lampenschirm!'"—since Efraim knows the weight and association they carry, likening Warszawski's words to stones being placed on his chest (Biller 48).[6] After Efraim wonders whether he should respect or hate Warszawski, the reader begins to sense Efraim's resentment toward the Jewish writer for his deliberate, provocative word choice. Efraim's animosity toward Warszawski becomes ever more apparent as the text increasingly reveals Efraim's mental instability. In addition, Efraim's relationship with Ina Polarker, his former girlfriend who left him for Warszawski, clearly affects Efraim's perceptions. Efraim believes Ina prefers Warszawski because the writer is Jewish. The narrative ends with an editor's note which further calls into question Efraim's reliability as a narrator and his negative observations about Warszawski. The editor's note states that the above manuscript (the text called *Harlem Holocaust*) was sent to Hermann Warschauer at Columbia University from a

[6] These associations are not specific within German Jewish and American Jewish literature but rather are indicative in Holocaust literature as a whole. Take, for example, W. G. Sebald's *Austerlitz* (2001), whose name itself always suggests another name, Auschwitz—as well as a major battle during the Napoleonic wars.

Friedrich Rosenhain, shortly before Rosenhain's suicide. Indeed, the question of who wrote the text called *Harlem Holocaust*—whether it was Friedrich Rosenhain, as the editor's note claims, or Hermann Warschauer—remains unresolved, not least because of the affinity between the names "Warschauer/Warszawski"—which both mean "someone from Warsaw"—and which further prompt the question of whether Rosenhain's narrative might not have some basis in the narrator's "reality," after all. The twist at the end—the realization that everything Efraim has written about Warszawski should be taken with a grain of salt—still shocks the reader since, as Rita Bashaw observes, "Biller's surprise ending in effect implicates readers for failing to perceive Efraim's mental instability and dubious philo-Semitism" (Bashaw 267). By forcing the reader to confront her previous assumption about Warszawski, Biller simulates the danger that lies behind an inability to think critically.

The complexity of Dischereit and Biller's texts does not lead to easy summation and interpretation. On the contrary, both Dischereit and Biller seem to write against the attempt to cursorily paraphrase either the narrative or plot and even appear to thwart such attempts. Both Dischereit and Biller's fictional narratives examine interactions between a Jewish individual—Hannah's daughter in *Joemis Tisch* and Warszawski in *Harlem Holocaust*—and German individuals, such as Efraim or Ina Polarker in *Harlem Holocaust*, or their interactions with German society on a broader scale. A large part of the satire in *Harlem Holocaust* lies with Warszawski's drastic change in his acclaim as a writer among the German public; his literary reputation in America is miniscule—he hardly even registers as a minor writer. Once he begins publishing his writing in Germany, however, Warszawski receives wide acclaim because, according to Efraim, of his position as an American Jew of German heritage, who, although he escaped the Holocaust, can still serve as a representative Jewish voice in post-war Germany;

Biller's satire of Warszawski, however, suggests that Warszawski's seemingly automatic achievement of fame with the German reading public is inherently problematic. By depicting interactions between German and Jewish individuals in contemporary German society that are still fraught and laden with references to the Holocaust and German guilt, Dischereit and Biller portray the confluence of the past in the present day without offering any naïve or simplistic solutions.

Although both Dischereit and Biller's texts were published before Hirsch coined the term postmemory (1992-1993), the emphasis in each text on the transmission of memory about the Holocaust across generations and the ruminations of those texts on the difficulty of memory's transmission indicate the presence of Hirsch's concept before it was identified as such. The other five texts in the study were written after Hirsch published her article identifying and naming the phenomenon of postmemory.

In Elizabeth Rosner's novel *The Speed of Light*, siblings Julian and Paula Perel are the children of a Holocaust survivor. While Paula, an opera singer, travels around Europe, she enlists a housekeeper, Sola, herself a survivor of political violence in Argentina, to watch over her timid brother, Julian, a self-employed scientist. Julian, who has always psychologically felt the weight of his father's past—which their father had refused to talk to them about—prefers to remain in his apartment, where he immerses himself in the field of science and the calming presence of TV screens. Sola and Julian become friends, and Sola eventually shares her experience with Julian and Diego, a former resident of her village who was away at the time of the massacre. While in Budapest, Paula meets a Holocaust survivor, Joszef Huber, who knew her father at Auschwitz. Joszef Huber tells Paula that her father was a member of the *Sonderkommando*, a group of inmates who were in charge of burning bodies after victims were

gassed. The novel alternates between the three different perspectives of Julian, Paula, and Sola, with fonts differentiating among their perspectives. As a selected text in this study, Rosner's novel, which includes the two narrative strands of children of a Holocaust survivor, places the Holocaust in relationship to other political violence and persecution with the narrative strand of Sola, thereby contributing to the ongoing debate surrounding the incommensurability of the Holocaust and its relationship to other genocides. By demonstrating the effect of such political violence and persecution on all three individuals, Rosner's novel foregrounds the futility behind debates that foster competition among victim groups, or what literary scholar Michael Rothberg calls "competitive memory" or "memory competition" (Rothberg 3, 11).

If Rosner's novel depicts encounters between individuals affected by two separate genocides—whether through individual experience, such as Sola, or through a familial connection, such as Paula and Julian—Jonathan Safran Foer's novel *Everything is Illuminated* portrays encounters between individuals who, as members of the third generation, share a similar degree of distance from historical violence. Yet, given their familial history, Safran Foer's characters approach the Holocaust from different national perspectives and shared histories of America and the Ukraine. In Jonathan Safran Foer's novel *Everything is Illuminated*, a character named Jonathan Safran Foer travels to Ukraine to find the woman, Augustine, who saved his grandfather, Safran, from the Nazis. Upon arrival, he enlists the help of a Ukrainian translator, Alex, whose English skills are lacking. Alex's grandfather, Alex senior, but referred to in the novel as Grandfather, serves as their driver and accompanies them on their search for Augustine**.** The narrative structure features alternating letters between Alex and Jonathan as part of their correspondence after their trip. The letters Alex and Jonathan exchange provides commentary and insight into the two narratives they are writing and sending each other and which are

interspersed throughout the novel: Alex's narrative about the story of his, Alex senior, and Jonathan's search, as well as Jonathan's magical realist tale of Trachimbrod, which he writes upon returning to America. Thinking that they have found Augustine, Alex, Alex senior, and Jonathan speak with an elderly woman who tells about Jewish residents of the fictional Ukrainian town of Trachimbrod before they were murdered by the Germans**.** At the end of their meeting with this supposed Augustine, Alex learns that she is not the woman who saved Jonathan's grandfather, but a woman named Lista. Because of a photograph belonging to Augustine/Lista that Jonathan comes across, which depicts a young version of Alex senior and Herschel, Alex senior reveals his friendship with Herschel to Jonathan and Alex. Jonathan and Alex learn that Alex senior, previously called Eli, had identified his friend Herschel as a Jew during the war, thereby sentencing Herschel to his death. Jonathan recognizes Alex senior in the photograph because of Alex junior's close resemblance to him. Alex senior feels great guilt and shame for betraying his friend, and up to this point in the narrative, has never shared this story with anyone else, including his grandson, Alex. *Everything is Illuminated* ends with a letter Grandfather wrote to Jonathan before committing suicide, which Alex has translated and sent to Jonathan.

The alternating letters between Alex and Jonathan reflect on the process of writing that both protagonists undertake after their journey to Trachimbrod: Jonathan writes a fictional narrative about Trachimbrod, and Alex writes about their journey together. Jonathan and Alex enclose their working drafts of their writing with their letters to each other, and part of the conversation in the letters revolves around the process of writing and the choices inherent within recounting their journey, especially since Jonathan and Alex know that Alex's grandfather, Alex senior, is implicated in the murder of his Jewish friend Herschel. For example, both inquire

about the possibility of removing a section from the other's writing that registers as too private to share (Safran Foer 145, 179-180). In this way, Safran Foer's *Everything is Illuminated* explores the potential of writing as a rewriting of memory, raising questions about the role of writing in the transmission of Holocaust memory. Moreover, the novel explores the problem of how people feel about stories told by others (victims' descendants) and by themselves (perpetrators' descendants).

Both Rosner's *The Speed of Light* and Safran Foer's *Everything is Illuminated* depict the transmission of memory between generations, a transmission that has been forestalled for the length of several characters' lives: up until the point in the narrative at which Alex senior shares the story of his friendship with Herschel, Alex has never heard his grandfather speak about the war and about his great-grandparents (Safran Foer 111). Similarly, Paula and Julian in *The Speed of Light* never heard their father speak about his experiences, learning about it only from a fellow inmate (Rosner 175). Previously, silence played a larger role in both families than narration.

In his autobiographical narrative, *The Lost: A Search for Six of Six Million*, Daniel Mendelsohn grew up knowing only that his great-uncle, Shmiel Jäger, Shmiel's wife Ester, and their four daughters—Lorka, Frydka, Ruchele, and Bronia—had been "killed by the Nazis" (Mendelsohn 26). Mendelsohn literally travels the world to uncover specific details about his relatives' lives and deaths. Through a combination of interviews with survivors and historical research, he finds what is still "knowable" and what remains "impossible to know" (Mendelsohn 15, 26). Mendelsohn wants to capture and catalogue all the memories of Shmiel and his family that are still available to him through survivor testimony. Mendelsohn's brother, Matt, a professional photographer, accompanies him to interview the few remaining survivors from

Bolechow, Ukraine, his maternal family's hometown, and Mendelsohn integrates these photographs into his narrative. They journey to Bolechow, Israel, Denmark, and Australia. Mendelsohn meticulously videotapes his conversations with the survivors and Matt, in turn, photographs each one of them. Mendelsohn seeks to uncover information not just about how Shmiel and his family were murdered, but also how they lived. In the process of interviewing survivors, Mendelsohn also hears the survivors' stories: their stories of survival and, in most cases, their families' deaths become in turn part of the narrative he tells about his own family. Mendelsohn gradually pieces together the circumstances of Ester and three of the daughters' deaths: Ester and the youngest daughter Bronia were killed at Belzec, an extermination camp; Lorka and Ruchele were killed in a mass shooting. Determining how Shmiel and Frydka, the second oldest daughter, died proves to be the most difficult part of his search. Eventually, Mendelsohn learns that Shmiel and Frydka had been hidden at the home of local teacher, Hela Szedlakowa. Frydka's non-Jewish boyfriend, Cizsko Syzmanski, would bring food to them each night. Betrayed to the Gestapo by an unknown neighbor not long after they went into hiding, Shmiel and Frydka were shot on sight. The teacher and boyfriend were then taken to the neighboring town of Stryj and hanged. In addition to incorporating photographs, Mendelsohn intersperses his narrative with exegeses on classic and Biblical texts, thereby connecting the Holocaust to questions of human nature, ethics, and religion from the beginning of Western culture. Mendelsohn's autobiographical narrative ends with an "In Memoriam" listing the survivors he had interviewed who had since died at the time of publication, and an author's note that emphasizes the historical veracity of his memoir (Mendelsohn 505, 507). The "In Memoriam" section and author's note once again affirm Mendelsohn's historical research and the interviews he conducted with survivors.

In Benjamin Stein's novel *Die Leinwand*, two parallel narratives combine to render a complex narrative that, within the confines of the paratext,[7] quite literally meets in the middle. Jan Wechsler and Amnon Zichroni are the homodiegetic narrators of each of their corresponding sections. In the paratext, or the extratextual choices the publisher makes to market the book, of *Die Leinwand*, a separate book cover accompanies each narrative strand. One can read the Jan Wechsler strand first, but, in order to read the Amnon Zichroni strand, one must consciously flip the book over to read it. Or, one can read the Amnon Zichroni section first, and decide to read the Jan Wechsler strand next. Either way, the reader must choose which section to begin with, and the paratext even encourages the reader to freely choose which narrative strand to read first (Stein W.4, Z.4). One day a suitcase arrives for Jan Wechsler, and although it resembles the suitcase he lost on a trip years ago, he cannot believe that it belongs to him. Wechsler tries to refuse delivery but, since it is addressed to him, ends up accepting it. While unpacking the suitcase—full of items he has never seen before—Wechsler comes across a book written by none other than Jan Wechsler. The problem is: he has not written it. Wechsler begins reading Jan Wechsler's book, *Maskeraden* (1998). I distinguish here between Jan Wechsler, the author of *Maskeraden*, and Wechsler, the homodiegetic narrator-protagonist. The author Jan Wechsler, the narrator-protagonist Wechsler discovers, wrote an investigative report exposing a character named Minsky, who claimed to be a Holocaust survivor, as an imposter. Minsky had written a memoir, *Aschentage* [*Days of Ashes*] (1995),[8] about his experiences and received many awards

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[7] Preeminent narratologist Gerard Genette defines the paratext as "what enables a text to become a book and to be offered as such to its readers and, more generally, to the public" e.g. the title, name of the author, preface, author's note, etc. (Genette, *Paratexts* 1). According to Genette, "the paratext in all its forms is a discourse that is fundamentally heteronomous, auxiliary, and dedicated to the service of something other than itself that constitutes its raison d'être. This something is the text" (Genette, *Paratexts* 12). In the 2013 German Studies Association annual conference, Katja Garloff presented a paper analyzing Stein's use of the paratext in *Die Leinwand*.

[8] Neither Jan Wechsler's *Maskeraden* nor Minsky's *Aschentage* are actual books published in 1998 and 1995, respectively. The publication dates provide useful specific dates in the timeline of events surrounding both Jan Wechsler and Minsky's publication history and the ensuing (fictional!) scandal, which, however, evokes the real scandal of Binjamin Wilkomirski, who wrote a memoir about the Holocaust, *Fragments* (1995), which was later proven to be a fake memoir.

and accolades. When author Jan Wechsler's evidence of Minksy's fabrication came to light, Minsky endured scathing criticism and public acrimony, for which author Jan Wechsler had been the catalyst. At this point in the narrative, however, the narrator-protagonist Wechsler believes he is only being mistaken for Jan Wechsler the author by accident, and sets out to prove that he is not the Jan Wechsler who published the investigative report about Minsky. Later, however, it turns out that the narrator-protagonist Wechlser and the writer Jan Wechsler are indeed one and the same person. The narrator of the other strand is a character named Amnon Zichroni. A psychiatrist by profession, he also possesses a sixth sense of memory, which I discuss in greater detail in Chapter One. Zichroni becomes close friends with Minsky and holds Jan Wechsler the author in great contempt for ruining Minsky's life.

After finding evidence that he traveled to Israel, the narrator-protagonist Wechsler decides to return to Israel to retrace his steps in the hopes of uncovering his memory. After going through customs upon arrival in Tel Aviv, a detective from the Israeli police, Gavriel Ben-Or, approaches him and leads him away for questioning about his last trip to Israel six months ago on January 1-7, 2008. Attempting to catch the narrator-protagonist Wechsler in a lie, Ben-Or orders him to unpack his carry-on suitcase, which, to recall, is the suitcase that arrived at his home in Munich and which he has never unpacked. After asking the narrator-protagonist Wechsler about the contents of the suitcase, which include the medical study manuscript by Amnon Zichroni, the demantoid, a type of precious stone, and the gloves, Ben-Or informs him that a man by the name of Amnon Zichroni has not been seen since January 5, 2008; Zichroni's house was found broken into on January 6, 2008; a demantoid and Zichroni's manuscript were taken, and his car was found near the town of Motza on January 7, 2008. Zichroni is missing and presumed dead; he was last seen with a German tourist who was staying with him for the

Sabbath. In light of the evidence found in the suitcase, Ben-Or takes the narrator-protagonist Wechsler into custody.

The reader interprets this series of events differently based on which narrative strand she has read first and through whose perspective, whether of Zichroni or Wechsler's, she first began reading. *If the reader has read the Amnon Zichroni strand first*, the reader has no idea that Zichroni has died. *If, on the other hand, the reader has read the Wechsler narrative before the Zichroni narrative*, then the reader knows that Zichroni has disappeared, and is presumed dead, allegedly murdered by Wechsler. The two narrative strands of Zichroni and Wechsler intersect in the final scene of both strands, at the mikvah or ritual bath near Motza. Both strands describe the same event but focalize it through two different characters. The abrupt ending of Zichroni's section suggests that Wechsler, in fighting off what he believes to be lions, is having a hallucination. In actuality, he is fighting Zichroni, whom he killed, but in self-defense. The Wechsler section ends with Wechsler throwing himself into the mikvah only to discover that the mikvah is empty; the ending of his jump into the mikvah remains ambiguous at the end of the narrative.

The supposed Holocaust survivor who is revealed to be an imposter in *Die Leinwand* resonates with actual events—the case of Binjamin Wilkomirski, a pseudonym for Bruno Grosjean (Maechler 263). In 1995, *Fragments*, an ostensible memoir by Wilkomirski depicting his experiences during the Holocaust was published to wide acclaim. On August 27, 1998, writer Daniel Ganzfried wrote an article in which he claimed that Wilkomirski's memoir was a fraud (Maechler vii). In 1999, Swiss historian Stefan Maechler conducted an extensive investigation into the validity of Wilkomirski's story, funded by the literary agency Liepman AG, on behalf of Wilkomirski's publishing house—the Jüdischer Verlag, a division of

Suhrkamp—and proved that Wilkomirski was indeed an imposter (Maechler vii). Maechler published his findings in a report titled *Der Fall Wilkomirski* (2000), later translated into English as *The Wilkomirski Affair: A Study in Biographical Truth* (2001). There are strong parallels to be drawn between the fictional case of Minsky and the actual case of Wilkomirski—even Minsky's name echoes the last two syllables of Wilkomirski. The last names of Wechsler and Maechler also sound similar. Furthermore, the report titled *Die Akte Minsky* that Swiss historian Hans Macht writes in *Die Leinwand*, which Wechsler reads, resembles Maechler's investigative report (Stein W.86). Although partially inspired by actual events in the case of Binjamin Wilkomirski, Stein employs fiction to explore the possibilities of Zichroni's sixth sense of memory, a sense that does not exist in the real world. In doing so, Stein problematizes the potential for taking on another individual's perspective and the avenues for empathy and understanding created by the ability to perceive events through another's perspective.

Art Spiegelman's *MetaMaus: A Look Inside a Modern Classic, Maus* reexamines the production and publication history of *Maus I: A Survivor's Tale: My Father Bleeds History* (1986) and *Maus II: A Survivor's Tale: And Here My Troubles Began* (1991). Containing such section headings as "Why the Holocaust?" "Why Mice?" and "Why Comics?," the overarching narrative structure of *MetaMaus*, which occurs in the form of a "series of taped conversations" between Spiegelman and comics scholar Hillary Chute, mirrors the graphic narrative structure of *Maus I* and *II*—multiple conversations between two people, one of whom records the other's experiences (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 6). In *Maus I* and *II*, Spiegelman interviews his father, Vladek, whose testimony provides the raw material for Spiegelman's creation of that work. In *MetaMaus*, Chute's interviews with Spiegelman provide the raw material. In both, Spiegelman shapes and forms the raw material within the structure of a narrative. Interspersed throughout

MetaMaus, Spiegelman provides many more family photographs than he does in *Maus I* and *II*: of his parents Anja and Vladek, of himself with his parents, and of his own family. This inclusion of photographs in *MetaMaus* highlights the still present gaps in narration found in *Maus I* and *II*. *MetaMaus* also features interviews with Spiegelman's children, Dashiell and Nadja, and his wife, Francoise, the transcription of Vladek and Art's interviews, and in the accompanying DVD, the audio recording of Vladek's testimony (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 83-90, 237-277). Published in 2011, *MetaMaus* is the most recent text that I analyze in this study.

Due to their inability to recall and reference actual memories of experiences that these writers themselves never had, the writers of the selected texts of the second and third generation necessarily have to employ some element of fictionality, or what narratologists Henrik Skov Nielsen, James Phelan, and Richard Walsh, in their article "Ten Theses about Fictionality," describe as fictional elements. Skov Nielsen, Phelan, and Walsh assert a distinction between fictionality and fiction; fictionality, on the one hand, which they regard as a communicative act, is a rhetorical communicative strategy that can exist in both fictional and nonfictional narrative. Fiction, on the other hand, is a "set of conventional genres" (Skov Nielsen, Phelan, Walsh 62). For Skov Nielsen, Phelan, and Walsh, the concept of fictionality bridges what they view as a too rigid divide between fictional and nonfictional narratives.

Skov Nielsen et al. cite Art Spiegelman's *Maus I* and *II* as an example of a nonfictional narrative that incorporates fictionality and connect the element of fictionality in *Maus I* and *II* — the rendering of Jews as mice and Nazis as cats—specifically to the graphic narrative's participation in the genre of testimony: "In testimonies and other texts of cultural memory, fictionality is sometimes an indispensable part of telling about a historical past that involved atrocities that are extremely difficult to represent in standard nonfictive discourse" (Skov

Nielsen, Phelan, Walsh 68). This passage suggests that fictionality can become necessary when representing historical atrocities. In *MetaMaus*, Spiegelman describes the flexibility the animal metaphor gave him while undertaking his project in *Maus I* and *II*: "Paradoxically, while the mice allowed for a distancing from the horrors described, they simultaneously allowed me and others to get further inside the material in a way that would have been difficult with more realistic representation" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 149). Spiegelman's comment shows how employing the animal metaphor helped him to represent his father's testimony about the Holocaust, which therefore supports Skov Nielsen et al.'s claim about a seemingly counterintuitive use of fictionality in nonfictional narrative. In *MetaMaus*, Spiegelman describes the flexibility the animal metaphor provided him: "It gave me a certain degree of wiggle room, a certain kind of slack, about getting a detail wrong despite all my research…I was doing as much research as I could, but having that mask as a prophylactic, I was able to protect myself from inaccuracies" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 149).

And yet, despite the freedom the animal cipher gave him to represent his father's testimony in graphic narrative form, Spiegelman adheres very strongly to the classification of *Maus I* and *II* as nonfiction (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 150). Spiegelman addressed this very question of generic classification when *Maus II* first appeared on *The New York Times* bestseller list under the fiction category in 1991; he wrote a letter to the editor arguing that it should be listed under the non-fiction category. Because the Library of Congress classification system identifies *Maus II* as non-fiction the newspaper obliged. Thus, the reception history of *Maus I* and *II* points toward these questions of generic classification that were present during the initial publication of *Maus I* and *II*, questions that are still relevant today. In *MetaMaus*, Hillary Chute asks Spiegelman about this incident, and Spiegelman recounts his reaction to finding *Maus II*

listed as fiction: "It was unsettling, after having gone to such lengths to get the facts and details right…To have this testimony presented as fiction could only delight some Holocaust denier somewhere" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 150).

Throughout these seven texts, one common feature of note is that writers do not choose to directly represent the Holocaust. Rather, these texts concentrate on portraying encounters of the transmission of memory about the Holocaust since they are concerned with the transmission of Holocaust memory to future generations or at least to the next generation. They are likewise concerned with the problems of this transmission. The tensions at work in these texts in relation to memory revolve around the transmission of memory across generations and across history. At the most basic level, the second generation tells the telling of the first generation; the third generation tells the telling of the first generation and/or the second generation. At the same time, these texts call attention to not only the process of the telling, but also the problems associated with the telling, particularly in the manipulation of the telling. Minsky, as a character in Stein's *Die Leinwand* that references the case of Binjamin Wilkomirski, cautions against taking a character's narrative about the Holocaust at face value.

The common feature of the texts described here relates to the larger issue of the genre of texts of the second and third generation. Strictly speaking, none of the seven texts are autobiographies; that is, no writer traces the trajectory of his or her life, providing an overall narrative of the self.[9] The two nonfictional narratives in this study—Spiegelman's *MetaMaus*

[9] In "The Autobiographical Pact," Philippe Lejeune focuses on the signature, or the use of the proper name, within the context of defining the genre of autobiography: "Autobiography (narrative recounting the life of the author) supposes that there is *identity of name* between the author (such as he figures, by his name, on the cover), the narrator of the story, and the character who is being talked about" (Lejeune 12). This "identity of name" between the author, narrator, and protagonist comprises the characterizing feature of autobiography, that of the autobiographical pact: "The autobiographical pact is the affirmation in the text of this identity, referring back in the final analysis to the *name* of the author on the cover. The autobiographical pact comes in very diverse forms; but all of them demonstrate their intention to honor his/her *signature*" (Lejeune 14). For a discussion of autobiography's generic distinctions, its relationship to fictional and nonfictional narrative, and changing approaches to the expansive field of autobiography, see Timothy Dow Adam's *Telling Lies in Modern American Autobiography* (1990). For a discussion of autobiography's relationship to photography, see Adam's *Light Writing and Life Writing: Photography in*

and Mendelsohn's *The Lost*—can be better described as memoirs since they provide a closer look at an author's life during a specific period of time, but not throughout the course of his life.

The two nonfictional narratives, Mendelsohn's *The Lost* and Spiegelman's *MetaMaus*, are examples of Irene Kacandes's category of Holocaust family memoir. In her article "'When facts are scarce': Authenticating Strategies in Writing by Children of Survivors" (2012), Kacandes analyzes the appearance of "personal texts produced by those who count themselves as familially connected to the Shoah," texts that she refers to as "'Holocaust family memoir'" or as "'autobiography once removed'" (Kacandes, "When Facts are Scarce" 179, 180). Arguing that both of these new terms is one form of a text of the second generation, Kacandes describes these texts as memoirs that "include the story of what happened to family members in the Shoah *and* the story of getting that story" (Kacandes, "When Facts are Scarce" 180). For Kacandes, the term "'autobiography once removed'" suggests that the combination of historical sources and eyewitness testimony these writers rely on to construct their memoirs makes it likely that there will be "numerous…allowances and lapses" (Kacandes, "When Facts are Scarce" 182). Hence, Kacandes argues, these texts employ authenticating strategies to demonstrate the various ways writers substantiate how they came to know what they know: "Sometimes Holocaust family memoirs include the kind of documentary apparatus we expect to see in scholarly histories or biographies, but not necessarily in memoir or autobiography" (Kacandes, "When Facts are Scarce" 183). That is, the personal connection of such memoirists to their family history, together with the fact that they were not alive and cannot personally attest to the events that they are investigating, puts pressure on them to establish their means of finding out information. In

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Autobiography (2000) and Linda Haverty Rugg's *Picturing Ourselves: Photography & Autobiography* (1997). Rugg, for example, argues that "[t]he process of remembering and the subsequent inscription of the memory, both essential to the autobiographical act, find a perfect image in the photograph," stating that autobiography and photography's assertion of "the autobiographical act, whether textual or photographic" demonstrates their complementary relationship (Rugg 23, 14).

referring to Philippe Lejeune's autobiographical pact, which "supposes" that "I" refers to author, narrator, and protagonist, Kacandes argues that the writer of a Holocaust family memoir admits from the very beginning that their memoir will be reconstructed based on their ability to themselves reconstruct the past of their family and its individual members (Lejeune 12; "When Facts are Scarce," 181-182). In other words, writers of Holocaust family memoirs signal the degree to which their knowledge is limited due to constraints of time, place, and at times, language. This limitation, however, though certainly found to considerable extent in Holocaust family memoir, is not altogether foreign to the genre of memoir and autobiography more generally: an individual's recounting of his life is at every point constrained in some way by the individual's personal perceptions and interpretations of his life's trajectory. That is, although Holocaust family memoirs, as described by Kacandes, tend to present their investigative process to the reader to a greater extent than so-called more traditional autobiography, this limitation is itself inherent within the genre of autobiography.

Significantly, Kacandes's description of Holocaust family memoir's "dual structure"—the story of the family member during the Holocaust, and the story of finding out about the family member—does not only apply to the process the two nonfictional narratives depict, but also applies to the process fictional characters undertake, at least in part, in the five fictional narratives in this study (Kacandes, "When Facts are Scarce" 180). Some fictional characters—Paula in Rosner's *The Speed of Light* and Jonathan, Alex, and Alex senior in Safran Foer's *Everything is Illuminated*—set out purposefully to investigate a family member's experiences, with varying degrees of ease and success. In contrast to such investigating relatives, the two narrators of Stein's *Die Leinwand*, Zichroni and Wechsler, investigate a close friend and a rival, respectively. Dischereit's *Joemis Tisch* portrays Hannah's daughter's difficulty in investigating

a family member (her mother) once she has died. Taken as a whole, even in fictional narratives, writers of texts of the second and third generation reflect on the parallel narratives—the story during the Holocaust, and the story in the present day of finding and retrieving that story, if there is one still to be found—that such investigations into the past engender.

Chapter Two

Narrative Instantiations of Witnessing and Testimony in Generational Texts

"I can only tell you what I remember…I don't know what the historian says."
— Survivor Bob Grunschlag (Mendelsohn 223)

Regardless of whether they are fictional or non-fictional narratives, texts of the second and third generation described in the preceding chapter devote considerable attention to instances of witnessing and testimony. These texts, the object of this study, focus especially on intergenerational encounters—between members of the first generation and members of the second and third generations—that stage witnessing and testimony. In doing so, the texts engage with instances of witnessing and testimony thematically while embedding this preponderance of witnessing and testimony within the narrative structure of these texts themselves. As this chapter argues, the narrative form of the texts of the second and third generation considered in this chapter correlates with the texts' thematic reflection on witnessing, testimony, and the transmission of memory about the Holocaust. Those texts in this study that are not autobiographical contain narratologically important framing devices that designate who sees or who perceives.[10] Focalization, a "restriction" of perspective aligned with a character in the diegesis that can either be through the narrator or through another character, and a term coined by Gérard Genette in narrative theory, proves instructive for an analysis of who sees, particularly in the context of who also does not or cannot see (Genette, *Narrative Discourse* 192).[11] Genette

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[10] As discussed in Chapter One, Spiegelman's *MetaMaus* and Mendelsohn's *The Lost* contain elements of the autobiographical, but are not autobiographies.

[11] Genette uses the term "narratology" (coined by Tzvetan Todorov) in both *Narrative Discourse* and *Narrative Discourse Revisited*, beginning with the first page of *Narrative Discourse* (Genette, *Narrative Discourse* 25). The term "narratology" delineates a discipline of "rigorous mechanics" (Genette, *Narrative Discourse Revisited* 8). Genette seeks to present a scientific system of narrative. Today, the term "narratology" refers to the classical, structuralist narratologists and their work, which focused on the specific "mechanisms of the text" (Genette, *Narrative Discourse Revisited* 8) and provided terms to identify these mechanisms. Aside from Genette, other theorists associated with classical narratology are Dorrit Cohn, Franz Stanzel, and the early Roland Barthes. The term "narrative theory," on the other hand, is a larger umbrella term. Suzanne Keen explains: "Narrative theory provides an extremely detailed vocabulary for the description of the component parts and various functions of narrative, but only a few advanced students will go on into the sub-field of narratology" (Keen 6). Different

identifies three types of focalization—zero focalization, internal focalization, and external focalization (Genette, *Narrative Discourse* 189-190). Internal focalization has three subcategories: fixed, variable, and multiple. In fixed internal focalization, the narrative is focalized through one character; in variable internal focalization, the focalization switches between characters, and in multiple internal focalization, focalization occurs between more than one character, but of the same event (Genette, *Narrative Discourse* 189-190).[12] Despite Genette's insistence on employing a term that eliminates the "visual connotations" of perspective, it is precisely these connotations that first drew my attention to focalization's relationship to witnessing, particularly in the context of secondary literature on witnessing, which, as Simone Gigliotti points out in her article on olfactory witness, privileges the act of witness through the primacy of sight, through what a witness saw with his or her own eyes (Genette, *Narrative Discourse* 189; Gigliotti 269, 271). The focus on who has the capacity to see or not see relates in turn closely to the question of whether an individual *provides* or *receives* testimony. In their conflation of the "I" with the focalized "eye," texts of the second and third generation considered here call attention to the unavoidable process of narrating what one has seen with her own eyes with an "I." The extensive and variable use of focalization in these seven texts of the second and third generation illuminate the inherent particularity of an individual's perspective and highlight the danger of reading solely through such a singular

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narratologists/narrative theorists tend to prefer one term over the other. Robyn Warhol, for example, prefers the term "narrative theory" since "the term 'narratology' still connotes for many a theoretical approach cut off from questions of history and context" (Herman et al. 9). At the International Society for the Study of Narrative annual conference, both terms are used interchangeably. When one founds a new narratology, the more popular term tends to be narratology over narrative theory, e.g. unnatural narratology, feminist narratology.

[12] For another definition of the three types of internal focalization, see Gerald Prince's *A Dictionary of Narratology* (45). Focalization has been widely discussed in narrative theory. For more on focalization, see Seymour Chatman's "A New Point of View on 'Point of View'" in *Coming to Terms: The Rhetoric of Narrative in Fiction and Film* (1990): 139-160; Mieke Bal's *Narratology: Introduction to the Theory of Narrative* (1980, English version 1985): 118-100; Gerald Prince's "A Point of View on Point of View or Refocusing Focalization" and James Phelan's "Why Narrators Can Be Focalizers—and Why It Matters," both in *New Perspectives on Narrative Perspective* (2001): 43-50, 51-64; Burkhard Niederhoff's "Focalization" in *Handbook of Narratology* (2009): 115-123; and Jesse Matz's "Perspective" in *Teaching Narrative Theory* (2010): 151-164.

perspective. Although these texts concentrate on parsing and identifying who has seen what, their extensive use of focalization suggests that the processes of seeing, narrating, and remembering are processes fraught with gaps, which, in turn, makes their reconstruction of events all the more inherently convoluted and complex.

Within the seven texts this chapter analyzes, scenes of witnessing and testimony occur between characters that comprise two main configurations, either between members of different generations or between members of the same generation. Generational texts feature the first category most prominently. These encounters between members of differing generations most often occur between a member of the first generation and one or more members of the second or third generation. No less fraught, however, are encounters that occur between members of the same generation. Indeed, at times, these latter encounters are even more laden with difficulty, when their participants seek to articulate emotions and motivations lurking behind the desire to narrate and to listen.

Several texts in this study depict encounters between the bearer and receiver of the testimony—i.e. the witness and the listener, or the two interlocutors—that precede the testimonial relationship or, for that matter, any interaction between witness and listener. In these texts, a relationship develops between witness and listener before any testimony takes place. For example, in Benjamin Stein's *Die Leinwand*, while working in Zurich, Amnon Zichroni, the narrator of one of the work's two narrative strands, brings his deceased uncle's violin to Holocaust survivor Minsky's apartment to receive an estimate for a repair.[13] Minsky invites Zichroni to visit him in the Swiss countryside where he has his workshop tools to repair the violin, and to stay with him during his visit. Zichroni initially declines, stating politely that he cannot stay with him since Minsky is not an observant Jew. Zichroni gauges Minsky's reaction:

[13] Stein's novel never provides Minsky's first name.

> Einen Moment lang schwieg er und schien mit gesenktem Kopf in sich hineinzuhorchen. Als er den Kopf wieder hob, kam es mir vor, als stünden ihm Tränen in den Augen. Das ist eine schwierige Geschichte, sagte er und stand langsam und sehr bemüht aus dem Sessel auf, als würde er plötzlich von Schmerzen heimgesucht. Vielleicht erzähle ich Ihnen ein andermal davon. (Stein Z.166)

Minsky's defeated body language, the tears in his eyes, and pained demeanor signal to Zichroni that there is more to the story than Minsky lets on. Despite his extreme emotional reaction, Minsky says simply, "Das ist eine schwierige Geschichte," and indicates he might tell Zichroni the story another time. Minsky assures Zichroni that he can host him despite Zichroni's strict dietary restrictions, and explains his motivation, "Es ist nicht nur wegen der Geige. Auch die Geschichte…Ich würde Ihnen gern die Geschichte erzählen" (Stein Z.166) (ellipsis in original). Minsky's admission that both the violin and the story propel him to insist on Zichroni visiting him is significant; the ellipsis indicates Minsky's momentary hesitation over telling Zichroni about the story he *has to tell*. He has to tell the story in the sense that he has it to tell—he is in possession of a story and is compelled to tell it, or narrate, although the novel never clarifies why Minsky feels strongly about testifying to Zichroni. Yet, Minsky's insistence that Zichroni visit him demonstrates Minsky's need for a listener. As Irene Kacandes notes in her discussion of "narrative witnessing," i.e. witnessing that occurs in written narrative, "the presence of the analyst/cowitness/reader completes the circuit and allows the story to come into being, like components of electronic circuits that are properly connected so that the current can flow" (Kacandes, "Testimony: Talk as Witnessing" 97, 96). Minsky wants Zichroni to fill the role of "analyst/cowitness/reader."

This crucial scene underscores the burgeoning testimonial relationship that Minsky and Zichroni begin to develop upon their acquaintance.[14] Zichroni agrees to visit Minsky reluctantly, but does not fully understand why he agrees:

> Ich weiß bis heute nicht genau, warum ich zusagte, ihn zu besuchen. Es mag sein, dass ich lediglich das Gespräch beenden wollte. Es ist aber ebenso möglich, dass mich die Geschichte interessierte, die er erwähnt hatte und die er wohl für seinen religiös unentschiedenen Lebensstil verantwortlich machte. Aber vielleicht, auch das ist möglich, folgte ich einfach nur der Bestimmung des Augenblicks. (Stein Z.166)

Zichroni remains uncertain about his reason for relenting and visiting Minsky. The diction of "Es mag sein," "Es ist aber ebenso möglich," and "Aber vielleicht, auch das ist möglich" dramatizes Zichroni's unresolved rationale. The three possible explanations he offers for this relenting—politeness, curiosity, or as an impulsive decision—highlight the variability of his reasoning and, furthermore, draw the reader into the subjectivity of his perspective. The modifier "bis heute" distinguishes between the narrating "I" and the experiencing "I," and in doing so, creates temporal confusion that contradicts the information one receives upon reading the Jan Wechsler strand of the novel, in which the reader comprehends the likelihood of Zichroni's death. The time phrase "bis heute" underscores, that is, this distinction between the two "I's"—an "I" that interacts with Minsky, and an "I" that provides an account of this interaction. Yet, this distinction turns out to be impossible, since Zichroni no longer possesses a current "heute" because he is dead. In addition, the modifier "bis heute" emphasizes Zichroni's divided state of mind and his ambivalence toward his motivations, casting doubt on Zichroni's

[14] For more on the testimonial relationship, see Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub's *Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History* (70-73).

thought process and obliquely suggesting his unreliability as a narrator.[15] After all, he cannot even give a reliable account of his own decision-making process. After Zichroni accepts the invitation, Minsky thanks him, leaving Zichroni perplexed as to why he deserves thanks. Intrigued by this strange offering of gratitude, Zichroni admits that Minsky's behavior piques his curiosity and encourages Zichroni to continue his interactions with Minsky.

Despite Minsky's request that Zichroni visit him to hear his story, Minsky equivocates when Zichroni arrives, oscillating between wanting and not yet being able to produce a narrative. Minsky postpones telling his story to Zichroni, saying rather that Zichroni should return in three weeks to pick up the repaired violin:

> Ach, wissen Sie, sagte Minsky: Da ist ja noch die Geschichte, die ich Ihnen erzählen möchte. Sie liegt mir wirklich auf der Seele, und heute habe ich nicht die Kraft, sie zu erzählen. Und schon gar nicht in Zürich. An dieser Stadt hängen zu viele furchtbare Erinnerungen…Kommen Sie bitte, flüsterte er: Kommen Sie noch einmal her, und dann hören Sie mir zu. Ich bitte Sie. Die letzten Worte hatte er nur noch geflüstert, so dass mich eine unheilvolle Ahnung überkam, die ich aber nicht einzuordnen wusste. (Stein Z.171-172)

Although Minsky delays telling Zichroni his story due to supposed exhaustion, he implores Zichroni to return to his home; he cannot deliver the violin to Zichroni in Zurich because he cannot tell his story in a city that holds too many painful memories. Minsky's repetition of "bitte" and his beseeching tone denote his sense of urgency and emotional appeal to Zichroni. Minsky's hesitation remains unexplained, apart from the difficulty of narrating one's trauma to another, thus placing oneself in a vulnerable position. Another possible explanation for

[15] Although the narrative suggests the unreliability of Zichroni's perspective, this does not mean that Zichroni is an unreliable narrator. According to Wayne Booth's term in *The Rhetoric of Fiction* (1961), an unreliable narrator implies a deviation of the narrator from the implied author, which is what makes the narrator unreliable.

Minsky's hesitation is his understanding that, since Jan Wechsler, an investigative journalist, has convinced the world Minsky is an imposter, Minsky worries that Zichroni might one day come to doubt the veracity of Minsky's testimony.

Although the witness or survivor can seek out an individual to act as a listener, as Minsky does with Zichroni in *Die Leinwand*, the impetus to narrate one's story does not always originate with the witness, but can also stem from the future listener. In contrast to Minsky asking Zichroni to listen to the story Minsky has to narrate, in *The Speed of Light*, Diego, the listener, asks Sola, the witness, to narrate. Diego, a resident of Sola's former village in Argentina, who was working in the mines near the village while his mother and sisters were murdered by government officials two years earlier, appears on Sola's doorstep in New York City and asks her to tell him her story of witnessing the massacre. Likewise in *MetaMaus*, in the same way that Diego prompts Sola to tell her story in *The Speed of Light*, Hillary Chute, a renowned comics scholar, prompts Art Spiegelman to return to *Maus I: A Survivor's Tale: My Father Bleeds History* (1986) and *Maus II: A Survivor's Tale: And Here My Troubles Began* (1991) in *MetaMaus*. In the introduction to this later work, Spiegelman acknowledges Chute's presence as a main impetus for its writing: "(It was hard to revisit *Maus*, the book that both 'made' me and has haunted me ever since; hard to revisit the ghosts of my family, the death-stench of history, and my own past.) Her relentless enthusiasm, diligence, and intelligence allowed this project to happen" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 6). Admitting that he kept "resisting" the process of sifting through his work and papers, this passage clarifies Spiegelman's reasons for his resistance (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 6). Spiegelman's choice of words—"haunted," "ghosts," and "death-stench"—conjures the image of his own creation haunting him, both in terms of what he can see—"ghosts"—and what he can smell—"death-stench." Chute's desire to hear the account of

how he came to write *Maus I* and *II* prompts Spiegelman to talk, just as Spiegelman's desire to hear his father's story acts as a catalyst for Vladek to give his testimony in *Maus I* and *II*. As a comics scholar and friend of Spiegelman's, Chute's role in *MetaMaus* is to act as the interviewer. By recognizing Chute's influence on this commemorative project, Spiegelman underscores the situation of the listener prompting the narrator to narrate. In *The Lost*, Daniel Mendelsohn, too, must persuade the Bolechower survivors—the survivors from the town of Bolechow, now in the Ukraine, whence his father's family comes—to provide their testimony. He persuades Meg Grossbard, a Bolechower survivor living in Australia at the time of his research, to let him and Matt interview her, despite her initial adamant refusal. In doing so, Mendelsohn realizes "suddenly…that she wanted to be convinced" (Mendelsohn 250). Although he convinces Meg to talk to him, she places limits on what Mendelsohn can incorporate into the book she knows he is writing, arguing that she will one day write her own book. To another Bolechow survivor in Australia, one who has not participated as actively in the group conversation, Mendelsohn speaks "in what I hoped was a reassuring tone of voice…wanting to make him feel valuable" (Mendelsohn 246). Mendelsohn's role as witness—initially hearing the story told by a survivor, a necessary step in order to retell the survivor's story—first requires that he persuade the survivor to tell his or her story.

In contrast, if the listener does not appeal to the witness to tell his or her story, then the witness might never be compelled to narrate. In Jonathan Safran Foer's novel *Everything is Illuminated*, after Alex asks the protagonist-narrator Jonathan to describe Jonathan's relationship to his grandmother, Jonathan reveals that he never asked for the meaning of the Yiddish words she would often use when shouting. Alex asks Jonathan why not, and Jonathan replies: "'I was just too afraid. I knew I wasn't supposed to ask, so I didn't.' 'Perhaps she desired for you to

ask.' 'No.' 'Perhaps she needed you to ask, because if you didn't ask, she could not tell you.' 'No.' 'Perhaps she was shouting, Ask me! Ask me what I'm shouting!'" (Safran Foer 159). If, Alex suggests, Jonathan's grandmother was waiting for Jonathan to ask that she tell him the meaning of her words, but Jonathan did not ask, it would seem that she did not feel that she could narrate. This exchange between Alex and Jonathan suggests the necessity of asking to be told as a condition for receiving the narration, a pattern that appears consistently throughout the seven texts of the second and third generation that constitute this study. As another example of the necessity of asking to be told in order to hear the story, Paula, the protagonist and daughter of a Holocaust survivor in *The Speed of Light*, must persuade the survivor, Joszef Huber, whom she meets by chance while in Budapest, and who knew her father as an inmate, to tell her her father's story. Joszef initially refuses to tell Paula about her father, arguing that, if her father had wanted her to know, her father would have told her (Rosner 155). After she convinces Joszef to tell her about her father, Paula asks Joszef about himself, and he tells her a small part of his story (Rosner 155). This exchange likewise suggests, however, that Joszef would not have talked to Paula about his own personal experiences if she had not asked.

Several protagonist-narrators encounter survivor testimony while children, before they understand the full ramifications of these instances of narration. Daniel Mendelsohn, as well as Julian and Paula Perel in *The Speed of Light*, interact with survivors as children when they are not fully cognizant enough to ask the questions that as adults they later realize they would like to ask. As children, a parade of survivors visit and converse with Julian and Paula's father. Suffering from insomnia caused by nightmares over his father's experiences, Julian listens to the stories he can hear: "From my sleepless bedroom I could hear the survivors' voices droning for hours in the dining room, rising and falling. I didn't know how to do anything except listen and

memorize it all. But my father's silence haunted me more" (Rosner 50). This description suggests that the survivors, thinking he was asleep, did not know that Julian was listening. Characterizing these survivors as "passing through on a journey of remembering," Julian does not understand how to interpret their visits to his home (Rosner 47). Although Julian feels ambivalent towards the survivors, he yearns to hear his father's story and, by furtively listening to the stories the survivors tell while visiting his father, attempts to fill the gap left by the absence of stories told by his own father. Yet, even the access Julian does have to survivors' stories is primarily by mistake. Most importantly, Julian both listens to and commits to memory the testimonies he does hear. Hungry for his father's story, he soaks up what he can.

In *The Speed of Light*, survivors occasionally do tell their stories when Julian's father is cognizant of his son's presence: "I remembered a voice at our dinner table, saying, 'They called themselves doctors. But they were not even human beings'" (Rosner 95). In this example, Julian recalls the precise words a survivor used, and he quotes survivors two other times (Rosner 51, 190). Although the reader has already been made aware of Julian's exceptional intelligence, these quotations from survivors, which many years later, Julian remembers word for word, affirms the impact hearing such survivor testimony had on him as a child. In contrast to her brother, as a child Paula has a negative attitude towards hearing survivor testimony:

> What I hated were the endless testimonies, people who came through our house as if we were living inside a permanent funeral, all these visitors relentlessly mourning their own miraculous survival, telling the stories of the ones who had been lost. There was so much crying. I used to make excuses to leave the table, the plates of uneaten food and piles of wadded-up tissue. When my mother and I

> climbed into the hush of the car and drove to my [voice] lessons, I felt like I was being saved from drowning. (Rosner 75)

Paula's use of terms like "endless," "permanent," and "relentlessly" to describe the survivors' testimonies and outpouring of emotions expresses her frustration and despair at being confronted with them. Whereas Julian gravitates toward the survivors' testimonies in the attempt to recuperate his father's story, Paula rejects these testimonies outright and attempts to evade the effects of her father's story, untold though it is. The "plates of uneaten food" indicate that they are not even pausing in their narration to consume food. The voice lessons she takes operate as a means of escape from the incessant process of mourning that is being carried out at home. As a child, Julian embraced the opportunity to hear survivor testimony; in contrast, Paula rejected such opportunities wholeheartedly. As adults, their positions have switched—Paula seeks out survivor testimony, in Budapest no less, whereas Julian remains at home, safely ensconced in his single apartment in New York City, voluntarily shut away from the rest of the world. Paula and Julian's disparate attitudes towards wanting to have access to survivor testimony—as children and as adults—demonstrate the significance of members of the second and third generation, as adults, initiating encounters with survivors.

Generational texts such as these dedicate a significant portion depicting scenes of witnessing and testimony between members of the different generations. One such scene of witnessing and testimony occurs in Maxim Biller's story *Harlem Holocaust*: it takes place in New York during World War II, depicting the encounter between the still youthful protagonist Warszawski and Leo Schneider, his mother's first cousin, a Holocaust survivor who has only recently escaped from a concentration camp in Europe. As a reminder, in *Harlem Holocaust*, Efraim Rosenhain, the non-Jewish German narrator, relates his interactions to Gerhard

Warszawski, who, both in his writings and in person, describes his interactions with Leo. Disingenuously focalized through Efraim, the story recounts Efraim's narrative of Warszawski's narrative of Leo, and Efraim's account is greatly distorted, thus making it difficult to determine the validity of Efraim's statements and observations.

While Efraim's overall narrative is unreliable, this one particular scene, taken on its own, provides a useful example of one kind of encounter between the generations. After his flight from Europe, Leo appears suddenly on his cousin's doorstep, still traumatized by his recent experiences. Having already immigrated to New York City before the outbreak of World War II, Warzawski's parents surround themselves with whatever pieces of German culture they can locate (Biller 14-15). As a young man, Warszawski feels suffocated by the history of the Jewish people to which he is tethered and by his parents' continued dedication to German culture. In an act of rebellion, he has embraced African-American culture in Harlem. Returning home in the middle of the night from dancing in Harlem, Warszawski finds his mother and father gathered around a strange man, his mother's cousin, Leo Schneider. Huddled under a blanket in the stifling kitchen, Leo remarks only: "'Es klirrt vor Kälte'" (Biller 34). His mother introduces them to each other, but Leo reacts neither to Warszawski's mother nor to Warszawski's greeting. Then Warszawski's father intervenes and speaks on Leo's behalf, saying, euphemistically: "'Er hat eine Menge Scherereien gehabt'" (Biller 35). After Warszawski inquires further, his father makes a sarcastic comment about Warszawski not knowing anything about Hitler and the Nazis since they do not discuss them "bei euch in Harlem" (Biller 35). Reacting to his father's accusatory, judgmental tone, Warszawski shouts: "'Was willst du von meinem Leben, Papa?...Soll ich mir die ganze Zeit euren Nazi-Quatsch anhören und unsere tausendjährige

Leidensgeschichte memorieren? Soll ich jeden Tag für mein Volk Kaddisch sagen? Soll ich aufhören zu leben, weil die andere sterben?'" (Biller 35).

Warszawksi's outburst indicates his feelings of resentment at being reminded of the fate of his remaining family in Europe and his desire to live his life without being made to feel guilty. Leo interrupts this confrontation between father and son with the exact same words about the cold as before, and after Warszawski's father responds angrily to Warszawski, Leo mutters, "'Eine klirrende Kälte" (Biller 36). This crucial scene between Warszawski, his parents, and Leo Schneider integrates the concepts of witnessing and testimony by emphasizing the importance of who speaks or who narrates whose stories, an issue that takes on greater significance in the context of being witness to historical traumatic events. In this exchange, Leo only speaks about the cold. Although Warszawski says hello to him, Leo does not react to Warszawski's greeting. Warszawski's father speaks about Leo while Leo remains in the room, but Leo does not speak for himself. In this constellation of four characters, the one passive member is Leo. Leo's lack of agency in this scene is perhaps indicative of his ongoing trauma.

This first interaction between Warszawski and Leo is indicative of their future relationship. Meeting a Holocaust survivor has, within the Warszawski autobiographical narrative in *Harlem Holocaust*, a significant impact on Warszawski: "Warszawski sollte in den kommenden Tagen und Wochen allmählich Leo Schneiders ganze Geschichte erfahren und wie ein Süchtiger aufsaugen und verinnerlichen" (Biller 36). This description of Warszawski craving Leo's narrative "wie ein Süchtiger" becomes quite revealing of this exchange between witness and listener. The verbs "verinnerlichen" and "aufsaugen" support Efraim's interpretation of Warszawski adopting Leo's experience as if Warszawski himself had experienced it. Warszawski soon does more than listen, and begins to record Schneider's testimony: "Der

allwissende, harte Warszawski, der selbsternannte Aufklärer, notierte sich schon bald—zunächst nur mit der Hand, auf einzelne, lose Blätter—Leos Erzählungen, die ihm dieser, nachdem er zu Kräften gekommen war, bereitwillig diktierte: ohne all die Verheimlichungen und Tabusierungen, die solchen Geschichten später immer eigen waren" (Biller 37). This description presents the testimonial encounter between Leo and Warszawski as unencumbered by social codes about the Holocaust that later shape survivor testimony. The characterization of Leo's narration as "bereitwillig" suggests his eagerness to narrate and the use of the verb "diktieren" suggests that Leo knows full well that Warszawski meticulously records his (Leo's) narrative on paper.

In contrast to the gradual development of trust between other witness/listener pairings—real or imagined—Minsky and Zichroni in *Die Leinwand*, Sola and Julian in *The Speed of Light*, or Spiegelman and Chute in *MetaMaus*—Leo does not appear to have any qualms or reservations about narrating his story to Warszawski. In transforming Leo Schneider's oral testimony into Warszawski's own written testimony about his own personal transformation, Warszawski usurps Leo's story; his novels and short stories narrate Leo's story "immer und immer wieder" (Biller 38). Warszawski has based his entire corpus of his fictional writings on Leo's life story. For the German consumers of Warszawski's texts in the fictional world of Biller's *Harlem Holocaust*, Leo's story becomes Warszawski's story, or stories. In appropriating Leo Schneider's story, like the German verb "schneiden" that constitutes Schneider's last name, Warszawski goes so far—in the German reception context—as to supplant Leo by implying his own victim status. Although in some of his fictional writings, Warszawski does feature a protagonist named Leo who is "ohne literarische Bedürfnisse" and who gives testimony to another character named Warszawski, who writes down Leo's story (Biller 40), Warszwaski usurps Schneider's place as witness by using

the pronoun "I" to indicate himself and not the third person pronoun to indicate Schneider. In one text entitled "Die Stimmen der andern," Warszawski writes: 'Es war…ein hinterhältiger Kunstgriff des Schicksals, daß sie [die Nazis] mich nicht entdecken'" (Biller 38). In his account of escaping deportation by hiding in a closet, Warszawski narrates Leo's story, but narrates Leo's story as if it were Warszawski's own story; the personal pronoun of "mich" depicts Warszawski as a witness, when "mich" should designate Schneider and not Warszawski.

Tellingly, of the three protagonists in *Harlem Holocaust*—Efraim, Warszawski, and Leo—on whom I have focused in this scene of witnessing and testimony in *Harlem Holocaust*—the only protagonist whose perspective is not presented in the narrative is Leo's.[16] The focalizing of the narrative precludes insight into Leo's mind, let alone Warszawski's. Indeed, since Efraim is the unreliable narrator of *Harlem Holocaust*, our perception of Warszawski is necessarily dependent on Efraim's negative portrayal of Warszawski. Since the reader does not have access to Leo's thoughts, with the exception of his three statements about the cold, we do not hear from Leo at all. In the fictional world, the Holocaust witness is cut off and Warszawski speaks with the authority of a witness without actually being one. The point of Warszawski narrating Leo's story as if it were his own is that Warszawski appropriates the cultural and moral authority assigned to a Holocaust survivor while consistently acting in a culturally insensitive and inappropriate ways during his stay in Germany.

In contrast to Warszawski's adoption and transformation of Leo's testimony through oral testimony between Warszawski and Leo, Stein's novel *Die Leinwand* presents the process of testimony without narration as a possibility in its fictional world. Though initially counterintuitive, *Die Leinwand* places great emphasis on testimony by investing Zichroni with the power to circumvent it. The narrative strand with Zichroni as the narrator begins with

[16] Each is a protagonist in one level of the narrative in Biller's *Harlem Holocaust*.

Zichroni confessing that he has a sixth sense: “Es war—ein Erinnerungssinn. Ich roch, schmeckte, fühlte, hörte und sah Erinnerungen anderer Menschen; und ich bin unsicher, ob ich es eine Gabe nennen soll” (Stein Z.8). Zichroni employs his other five senses in this sixth sense. Not fully convinced that his sixth sense is a gift rather than a curse—Zichroni suspects that his sixth sense will act as a “poison” (“Gift”) on him—Zichroni eventually decides to attend medical school and concentrate on psychiatry, believing that he can employ his sixth sense to help patients during their medical treatment. As a medical resident in a psychiatric hospital in Portland, Oregon, Zichroni learns how to better control his sixth sense by avoiding any direct physical contact with a patient’s skin (Stein Z.124). Using only his sense of sight by making eye contact with an individual allows Zichroni to become a “reiner Beobachter” of an individual’s memories (Stein Z.124). His tactile sense propels him to engage with the individual’s memories not as an observer, but rather as someone who directly experiences the individual’s memories as if they were his own. In an attempt to avoid accidentally touching a patient and being thrown into his or her memories, which also causes him to forget who he is, Zichroni begins to wear gloves to work.

Zichroni’s sixth sense becomes important when considering how he initially employs it in his treatment of patients, especially a patient named Lauren, but particularly later in the story, when he uses it with the Holocaust survivor, Minsky. Secretly appalled by psychiatry’s focus on regulating body chemistry through medication, Zichroni believes he can use his gift to treat patients more effectively. One of the patients he first treats is Lauren, an anorexic slowly starving herself to death. Observing her reluctance to walk through a doorway, Zichroni approaches her:

> Ich…versuchte, mich ganz auf sie zu konzentrieren, um einen flüchtigen Blick in ihr Inneres werfen zu können, denn ich wollte wissen, was sie daran hinderte, weiterzugehen…Erst als ich, auf ihrer Höhe angekommen, stehen blieb und versuchte, ihr einige Sekunden in die tief umschatteten Augen zu sehen, hörte ich ein kaum wahrnehmendes Wispern. Ich werde stecken bleiben, redete etwas auf sie ein: Ich bin einfach zu fett. Es ist völlig unmöglich, dass ich durch diese Tür gehen kann. Ich werde stecken bleiben. (Stein Z.128)

In this passage, the first "ich" connotes Zichroni. The next three instances of "ich" also refer back to Zichroni. Once he makes eye contact with Lauren, he hears "ein kaum wahrnehmendes Wispern." Immediately following these words, the pronoun "ich" appears once again. This time, however, the "ich" refers not to Zichroni but to Lauren. Only the words "redete etwas auf sie ein" indicate that the personal pronoun attached to "Ich werde stecken bleiben" indicates Lauren and not Zichroni. "Ich" refers to both Lauren and Zichroni; granted, Zichroni uses the pronoun "sie" and "ihr" to refer to Lauren, but the narrative subtly switches from a focalization through Zichroni to one through Lauren. Indeed, the reader might even initially attribute Lauren's first inner thought to Zichroni. Immediately following the second "Ich werde stecken bleiben," the narrative reverts back to Zichroni's narration and the pronoun "sie" appears once more.

Later that same day, Zichroni makes eye contact with Lauren again: "Sie hob den Kopf und sah mich aus mattgrünen Augen erst erschreckt und wie verängstigt, schließlich aber mit großer Dankbarkeit an. Ich sah Lauren inmitten einer großen Menschenmenge im Freien vor einer Art umzäunten Plattform, auf der ein Mikrofon und zwei große Lautsprecherboxen aufgestellt waren" (Stein Z.131). This time, instead of participating in an interior monologue

focalized through Lauren, Zichroni remains an observer and does not become "ich" in the narration as he does in the passage quoted above. Still, Zichroni remains a privileged observer because he can interpret Lauren's inner thoughts, feelings, and memories: "Lauren war vielleicht sieben. Sie zitterte, denn sie war, das spürte ich deutlich, davon überzeugt, dass sie an jenem womöglich nahen Tag unweigerlich in den Feuerschlünden der Verdammnis leiden würde…Deswegen zitterte Lauren. Deswegen verbrachte sie jeden Tag in Angst vor der Wiederkehr des Erlösers der Gerechten" (Stein Z.131). Unlike the previous passage in which the focalization between Zichroni and Lauren mingles, the focalization here continues to be through Zichroni. The phrase "das spürte ich deutlich" illustrates Zichroni's fine-tuned ability to decipher Lauren's emotions even without entering her consciousness and, through the use of the first person pronoun, emphasizes Zichroni's continued distinct presence from Lauren.

Helping her from the hallway back into her room, Zichroni takes her hand as he lays it across his shoulder. This gesture has an immediate effect:

> Nach ein paar Schritten hörte ich das Geräusch kreischender Reifen, gefolgt von einem dumpfen Aufprall. Statt der geschwächten Lauren hielt ich plötzlich ein schreiendes Baby im Arm. Bevor ich überhaupt realisieren konnte, dass ich den Kontakt zu mir selbst verlor, war ich schon zu der zwanzigjährigen Lauren geworden. Mit meinem Sohn auf dem Arm, der aufgeschreckt schrie, lief ich panisch durchs Haus meiner Eltern. (Stein Z.132-133)

In the last sentence preceding this passage, the first person pronoun still indicates Zichroni. In the first sentence of this passage, the words "nach ein paar Schritten" first appear to be referring solely to the previous "ich" (Zichroni), but actually refer also to Lauren. The two "ich's" have merged into one "ich," becoming both Zichroni and Lauren. The sound that "ich" hears in the

first sentence of this passage is heard through Lauren's ears as well as Zichroni's. In the second sentence, "statt der geschwächten Lauren" indicates that "ich" is aware that he was holding Lauren in his arms, but the "ich" here is holding a crying baby. In other words, the "ich" in this second sentence is attached to both Zichroni and Lauren. In the third sentence, however, the individual attached to "ich" switches back to Zichroni once more. Of the four personal pronouns in the third sentence (three in the nominative and one in the dative), the first three clearly indicate Zichroni. The fourth, in the phrase "war ich schon zu der zwanzigjährigen Lauren geworden," although referring to both Lauren and Zichroni, operates more complexly. If the "ich" has already been changed into Lauren, then "ich" should not also refer to Zichroni, but solely to Lauren; however, since the dependent clauses in this sentence use "ich" to refer to Zichroni, the "ich" in the independent clause also must refer to Zichroni as well—even as it also refers to Lauren. In other words, the fourth personal pronoun in the third sentence refers to both Lauren and Zichroni; in this third sentence, "ich" encounters "ich," but they are not the same "ich," or "ich" is also not "ich." As his self appears to meld with Lauren, it also disintegrates, creating for Zichroni a loss of his own self. In the final sentence of the second passage quoted here, the possessive articles and first person pronoun denote Lauren, since the "ich" is holding her son in her arms, and as we learned in the second sentence of this passage, the "ich" as Lauren holds a baby. The form of the narrative imitates this confusion and merging of the two characters into one first person pronoun. Just as Zichroni becomes Lauren without even realizing it at first, the "ich" previously referring to Zichroni becomes Lauren without the reader even realizing it at first.

The narrative is focalized through Lauren for another page and then reverts back to focalization through Zichroni: "Wir standen in Laurens Zimmer vor ihrem Bett. Ich musste ihre

Hand losgelassen haben, denn ihr Arm rutschte schlaff von meiner Schulter und fiel herab" (Stein Z.134). After dropping Lauren's hand, terminating direct contact with her skin, Zichroni becomes himself again. The "ich" in the preceding sentence is Lauren; the "wir" indicates that two distinct individuals are side by side. "In Laurens Zimmer" further specifies that Lauren and Zichroni are no longer identical. The "ich" in the second sentence, since it uses the possessive article of "ihr," connotes Zichroni. Unlike the passage I analyzed in the above paragraph, the first person plural pronoun mitigates any potential confusion and signals a change in focalization to the reader. After returning to himself, Zichroni realizes he has forgotten to put his gloves back on; for this reason, he inadvertently became Lauren. These interactions with Lauren illustrate Zichroni's capacity to meld with the mind of his patients. Using the narrative technique of focalization, the narrative unfolds the process by which Zichroni becomes privy to the private thoughts and actual memories of another autonomous individual. The focalization is neither fixed internal focalization because the focalization does not remain constant, nor variable internal focalization since the focalization, though it does change, does not strictly switch between two characters. Rather, the focalization operates such that it melds Zichroni with Lauren.

Stein's *Die Leinwand* reveals how Zichroni can become a witness to the events in his patients' memories, either as an observer of the scene from his own perspective, or as a participant of the scene when he merges with that of the individual he touches. Most importantly, in terms of discussion about the transmission of memory, Zichroni's sixth sense eliminates the need for narration if he can merely touch his patients or catch their gaze and gain access to their memories in these two ways. His patients unknowingly transmit their memories to Zichroni, and the transmission of their memories still occurs in the absence of telling.

Although, particularly in the case of Lauren, the scenes to which Zichroni becomes a witness are traumatic, especially the scene of Lauren's mother's death, the patients who encounter Zichroni do not feel compelled to bear witness and thereby contribute to the historical record or communicate their experiences to others to perpetuate the memory of a specific event.

Zichroni uses his position as witness to better treat his patients. Zichroni directs and alters his plan of treatment based on the visions and memories to which he has been privy. Referring to the advantages his sixth sense provides him while treating patients, including Lauren, he concludes: "Immerhin hatte ich den Vorteil, dass ich wusste, was vorgefallen war. So konnte ich die Gespräche, die wir schließlich führten, und die Assoziationsübungen, zu denen sie sich bereit erklärte, in die Nähe der Motive lenken, die das Zentrum von Laurens Leiden ausmachten" (Stein Z.135). With the help of his sixth sense, Zichroni successfully treats Lauren and she recovers, leaving the psychriatric ward. Zichroni admits that his motives for helping Lauren heal were not solely altruistic and that he treated her as much for himself as for her, to prove that he could draw on his gift to successfully treat a patient. Zichroni acknowledges that his patients remain largely unaware of his sixth sense during his treatment of them: "Häufig waren den Patienten die Ereignisse, deren Zeuge ich in meinen Visionen wurde, nicht bewusst" (Stein Z.152). Zichroni specifically employs the term "Zeuge" or "witness" to describe what seeing his patients' memories has turned him into. If his patients are often ("häufig") unaware of his unique and unheard of gift, Zichroni's use of the term "haufig" suggests that there are some patients who are in fact aware of it; the narrative, however, does not provide any more context to qualify "häufig."

Zichroni's interactions with Lauren significantly inform him about the features and limits of his sixth sense: "Ich konnte Zeuge längst zurückliegender Ereignisse werden. Ich konnte sie

sogar ganz authentisch im Körper des anderen und mit allen seinen Sinnen so erleben, wie sie im Gedächtnis aufbewahrt worden waren" (Stein Z.134). Granted, Zichroni can only acquire the memories that a patient is thinking about at that specific point in time; he is not in control of what a patient remembers and when. When touching his patients, Zichroni has no need for his patients to narrate their stories; he only asks follow-up questions about the visions and scenes to which he has been privy. Moreover, Zichroni can experience long past events authentically ("authentisch") through the experiencing body of the individual and all the senses he or she employed at the time of the event's occurrence. The remembering of the individual's experiences plays an important role because Zichroni has access to the events only as the individual remembers them. The word choice of "erleben" (to experience, undergo, or witness) highlights Zichroni's ability to become a witness in the absence of narration.

After showing that Zichroni can become a witness to his patients' memories and actually experience their memories, and portraying the numerous encounters between Zichroni and Minsky, *Die Leinwand* chronicles Minsky's oral testimony to Zichroni. Three pages in *Die Leinwand* depict the pivotal scene of witnessing and testimony between Minsky and Zichroni, portraying the intergenerational transmission of memory about the Holocaust through oral testimony (Stein Z.173-Z.175). On his visit to Minsky's home in the Swiss countryside, "ein gebrochener Mann" greets Zichroni at the door (Stein Z.172). Looking exhausted and unkempt, Minsky expresses his relief that Zichroni has returned; presumably, the relief Minsky feels is not over his eagerness for Zichroni to pick up his newly restored violin, but over having someone to share his story with—a listener. Sinking into a chair, Minsky finally tells Zichroni his story:

> Den ganzen Tag über, den ich bei ihm verbrachte, rauchte er ununterbrochen und erzählte mit vielen, langen Pausen von Auschwitz und Majdanek, vom Bild seines

> Vaters, der in einem kleinen Ort bei Minsk, wo er geboren sei, vor seinen und den Augen seiner Mutter von weißrussischen Milizen ermordet wurde. Er erzählte von den Baracken des Lagers, vom allgegenwärtigen Tod und den Ratten, von seiner Rettung und den Jahren im Kinderheim in Polen und schließlich in der Schweiz, in die man ihn, wie er es ausdrückte, verschleppt hatte, um ihn seiner Vergangenheit zu berauben. (Stein Z.173)

This paragraph is the first of two main paragraphs through which we acquire Minsky's story. Focalized through Zichroni, we do not have access to dialogue from Minsky. We do not know exactly what Minsky says; we only receive Zichroni's account of what Minsky tells him. Zichroni cursorily mentions the many different elements of Minsky's story, qualifying them with the phrase, "er…erzählte," which appears twice. The words "wie er es ausdrückte" emphasize again that the account we hear is the narrative of another's narrative. In the second paragraph of Minsky's story, Minsky continues with his oral testimony, this time in his own words:

> Ich durfte mich all die Jahre über nicht einmal erinnern…Ich weiß, dass ich jüdisch bin und aus einem Dorf bei Minsk komme. Ich weiß, dass ich durch die Hölle gegangen bin. Wenn ich einen Ton anspiele auf einer meiner Violinen, höre ich die Stimme meines Vaters. Er spricht Jiddisch mit mir. Aber wissen Sie, niemand wollte das wahrhaben. In meinem Pass steht ein falscher Name. Meine Papiere erzählen eine gefälschte Geschichte. Alle sind tot, und ich bin allein. (Stein Z.173)

Minsky's repetition of the verb "wissen" three times—he begins a sentence twice with "Ich weiß" and directs "wissen Sie" towards his narratee, Zichroni—actually underscores how much he does not truly know. The two sentences about his identity papers pertain to the evidence Jan

Wechsler, the investigative journalist, had already used to disprove Minsky's story of being a Holocaust survivor and further indicates yet another Catch-22: the evidence, e.g. Minsky's passport and legal documentation, cannot be disproved because Minsky claims he has a false name in his passport. If what Minsky says is true—although, again, there is no way of verifying his story if his documentation is false—then the presumably unequivocal evidence is equivocal. In other words, the "hard" evidence Minsky seeks to provide is no evidence at all!

Zichroni does not verbally respond to Minsky's oral testimony, "Ich war unfähig, irgendetwas zu erwidern" (Stein Z.173). After Minsky finishes his story, he asks whether Zichroni would allow him to rest his eyes and take a nap. In answer, Zichroni merely nods silently (Stein Z.173). In both of his responses to Minsky's oral testimony, Zichroni does not actually respond—he remains mute. After Minsky has fallen asleep on the sofa, exhausted from telling Zichroni about his experiences, Zichroni reflects on the meaningful effect Minsky's words had on him: "Denke ich heute an diese halbe Stunde, überkommt mich noch immer der Horror der Bilder, die er mir geschildert hatte…Der lebendigste Eindruck, der mir bis dahin von den Lagern vermittelt worden war, stammte aus Minskys Erzählung. Nicht eine Sekunde zweifelte ich ihn an" (Stein Z.174). In addition to illustrating Zichroni's inward reaction to Minsky's oral testimony—his complete acceptance of its veracity—this passage sheds light on Zichroni's knowledge about the Holocaust and, as he reveals, his hitherto avoidance of the topic. The penultimate sentence emphasizes the pathos ("[d]er lebendigste Eindruck") with which Minsky narrates his experience and the effect his words have on Zichroni.

Although Zichroni has just heard Minsky's oral testimony, listening to Minsky does not satisfy Zichroni's curiosity about Minsky, especially since Zichroni understands what his sixth sense allows him to see. Struck with the knowledge that by touching Minsky he would be privy

to Minsky's own personal memories, Zichroni removes his gloves, thus eliminating the barrier that prevents Zichroni entering Minsky's mind:

> Es war auch kein Zweifel, sondern der Wunsch, Minsky und sein Leid wirklich zu verstehen, der mich nach dieser halben Stunde des stummen Ausharrens dazu trieb, meine Handschuhe abzustreifen und ihn zu berühren. Ich musste mich nicht vergewissern, ob er mir die Wahrheit erzählt hatte. Dessen war ich mir sicher. Ich wollte lediglich für einen Augenblick selbst in den Abgrund seiner Erinnerung hinabsteigen, um mir klarzumachen, dass sich all das, wovon ich bisher nichts hatte wissen wollen, in seiner ganzen unvorstellbaren Grausamkeit tatsächlich ereignet hatte. (Stein Z.174)

Zichroni reiterates for the second and third time that he does not doubt the truth behind Minsky's words ("Es war auch kein Zweifel" and "ich musste mich nicht vergewissern"). Admitting he does so in order to comprehend and better understand ("klarmachen") that which he did not want to have anything to do with before—the unimaginable cruelty of the Holocaust ("unvorstellbar[e] Grausamkeit")—Zichroni touches the reposing Minsky with his bare hands. With his sixth sense, Zichroni knows that he will be able to see into and experience Minsky's memories. The unimaginable ("unvorstellbar") becomes imaginable, and "wirklich" and "tatsächlich" here function literally. Though he says he only wants to briefly immerse himself in Minsky's memories, Zichroni understands, as least abstractly, that he wants to descend into "den Abgrund seiner Erinnerung" to view the "unvorstellbare[-] Grausamkeit." The following passage describes what happens once Zichroni touches Minsky with his bare hands:

> Es war das erste und einzige Mal, dass ich Minsky berührte. Als ich meine Hand auf seine Stirn legte, wurde ich von panischer Angst erfasst. Ich hockte

> zusammengekauert auf einem grob gezimmerten Dielenboden unter einem niedrigen Tisch. Es war dämmerig, und eine Frau stapfte brüllend durch den Raum. Ich sah von ihr nur die Beine, in groben Gummistiefeln, wie Bauern sie tragen. Sie brüllte fortwährend, dass sie mich zerreißen würde, wenn sie mich fände. Dabei schlug sie mit einem Stock oder einer Rute auf den Tisch und gegen die Wände. Die Angst, entdeckt zu werden, war so übermächtig, dass ich aufhörte zu atmen und die Hände auf meine Augen presste, weil ich hoffte zu verschwinden. (Stein Z.174-175)

In the first sentence of this passage, as the narrating "I" reflects on the actions of the experiencing "I," "ich" is Zichroni. In the second sentence, Zichroni's transition to Minsky and his memories becomes complete: the first "ich" is Zichroni immediately before he touches Minsky—the third person possessive article ("seine") indicates Zichroni is about to touch Minsky. In the independent clause of the second sentence, the "ich" cannot be distinguished as solely Zichroni or Minsky. As soon as his hand touches Minsky, Zichroni's thoughts merge with and become one with Minsky's. In other words, once Zichroni touches Minsky, the second "ich" in the sentence is actually both Zichroni and Minsky. In the rest of the passage, all of the remaining "ich's" are both Minsky and Zichroni. In the aftermath of this scene of witnessing and testimony, Zichroni's sixth sense allows him to share an actual memory, although Zichroni does so without Minsky's consent.

Whatever their differences, the scene in which Zichroni merges with Lauren and the once in which Zichroni merges with Minsky both employ focalization as a technique to illustrate witnessing and/or becoming a witness—again, even without having a spoken narrative.[17] With

[17] The differences between the two scenes consist of Minsky testifying to Zichroni, whereas Lauren does not ever narrate her story to Zichroni.

Lauren, at least, accessing her memories was accidental on Zichroni's part since he had forgotten to put his gloves back on. With Minsky in this scene, however, removing his gloves to gain access to Minsky's memories is wholly intentional. Moreover, Zichroni does not ask for Minsky's permission; Zichroni takes advantage of Minsky while Minsky is asleep and vulnerable. Minsky also has just told a very personal story and has made himself emotionally vulnerable—that Zichroni touches Minsky out of curiosity and even empathy does not mitigate Zichroni's voyeuristic, questionable motivations for touching Minsky, since Zichroni admits he does so in order to truly understand Minsky's suffering (Stein Z.174). Most significantly, Zichroni's entry into Minsky's own memories indicates that Minsky is to be believed and provides irrefutable proof that Minsky's biography is real. In addition, Zichroni touching Minsky casts doubt on Jan Wechsler's entire project of disproving Minsky. In some small way, Zichroni learns his lesson; he will not ever touch Minsky again after the first time. Presumably, if Zichroni were to touch Minsky another time without gloves, Zichroni would be privy to more of Minsky's horrific memories, but Zichroni does not want to; Zichroni specifies that this instance is the first and only time he ever touched Minsky (Stein Z.174).

As in the scene between Lauren and Zichroni, the narrative again becomes focalized through Zichroni in the next paragraph: "Als ich wieder zu mir kam, saß ich im Sessel, und Minsky stand, auf den Gehstock gestüzt, vor mir und hielt mir meine Handschuhe hin" (Stein Z.175). Returning to himself, Zichroni sees Minsky standing over him: "Lederstiefel, sagte Minsky, als hätte ich ihn danach gefragt: Die Blockowa trug blank gewichste Lederstiefel, und der Stock war eine Gerte, die bei jedem Schlag wie ein Brenneisen in die Haut fuhr" (Stein Z.175). Without Zichroni ever saying a word, Minsky answers two questions about the memory Zichroni has just become a witness to as Minsky, suggesting that Minsky knows exactly which

memory Zichroni saw. In the final paragraph of this scene, Zichroni remains shaken by the memory he has seen as Minsky and Minsky's preternatural response: "Daran erinnere ich mich, was diesen Tag in L'Abbaye angeht. An nichts sonst. Nicht daran, was wir sonst noch sprachen…An nichts" (Stein Z.175). The repetition of "an nichts" stresses Zichroni's lack of memory on that day aside from his encounter with Minsky, which becomes ironic for someone who possesses a considerable surfeit of memory. Zichroni's experience of Minsky's memory overwhelms him to such an extent that it blocks out all of Zichroni's other memories about the visit.

Zichroni's sixth sense is important for a discussion of the transmission of memory and in the context of encounters of witnessing and testimony since the focalization allows the question of whether or not Minsky is an imposter to remain open. Through the narrative device of focalization, *Die Leinwand* does not definitively answer the question of whether or not Minsky is an imposter. If one reads the Wechsler strand first, one will most likely belive Minsky to be impersonating a Holocaust survivor. Zichroni's strand, however, calls that reading into question. Arguments exist on both sides for the veracity of either account or the other. Although not possible in real life, the merging of Zichroni's thoughts with Minsky's in the novel offers proof that Minsky's memories about his childhood are authentic and that Minsky is a Holocaust survivor. Hence the two narrative strands, taken together, leave the matter unresolved.

Also unresolved is how Minsky knows what Zichroni saw when Zichroni touched him—or even that Zichroni saw anything. In addition, Wechsler's claim at the end of his narrative strand, while he is being held for questioning over the disappearance and presumed murder of Zichroni, that his guilt is named Minsky—"Mein Schuld hat einen Namen: Minsky"—suggests Wechsler's recognition that he wrongly accused Minsky of fabricating his story (Stein W.189).

Despite these ambiguities, however, the fact remains that Minsky was proven to be an imposter in the Wechsler narrative and Minsky's own documents and DNA test further refute his story, although Minsky argues that his documentation is false. These unresolved issues in Benjamin Stein's novel suggest that the question of whether or not memories are authentic becomes secondary to the primary concern, which is how the remembering subject reconstructs his or her memories.

Ultimately, *Die Leinwand* suggests that it does not even really matter whether or not Minsky is a Holocaust survivor or an imposter. This suggestion becomes apparent in the analogy that the novel constructs, an analogy that compares Minsky, a possible imposter, to priceless violins that he counterfeits. Minsky's hobby, which he enthusiastically shows Zichroni, is constructing fake Amati violins by replicating the original, meticulous process of producing them (Stein Z.179, 186). Though the forgeries are perfect—"Der Klang war unvergleichlich" (Stein Z.186)—Minsky's creations are nonetheless exposed as forgeries: "Ebenso hätte eine Carbon-Analyse bewiesen, dass keine von Minskys Violinen, gebaut in wochenlanger Arbeit nach den sorgsam rekonstruierten Proportionen Amatis und mit fünfzehn hauchdünnen Schichten des feinsten Ölllackes versiegelt, eine echte Amati war—wenn sie auch ganz wie eine aussah und klang" (Stein Z.179). The fact that the fake Amati looks and sounds like an original, but is not one, becomes another reference to Minsky's imposture, though its application to the issue of authenticity remains ambiguous. Comparing the fake violins to Minsky's position, the novel seems to suggest that it does not ultimately matter whether or not Minsky is a Holocaust survivor if he looks and sounds like one. At the same time, this suggestion raises troubling questions, particularly in creating an analogy between a Holocaust survivor and a violin.

Like *Harlem Holocaust* and *Die Leinwand*, Jonathan Safran Foer's *Everything is Illuminated* presents scenes of witnessing and testimony between members of different generations. Having traveled to find the woman, Augustine, who saved his grandfather from the Nazis, Jonathan Safran Foer, a fictionalized version of the author by the same name, enlists the help of a Ukrainian translator, Alex, whose English skills are lacking. Alex's grandfather, also named Alex, but referred to in the novel as Grandfather, serves as their driver and accompanies them on their search for Augustine. Thinking that they have found Augustine, this elderly woman tells Alex, Alex senior, and Jonathan about the residents of the Jewish community in the fictional Ukrainian town of Trachimbrod before its members were murdered by the Germans. Since she speaks in Ukrainian, Alex translates Augustine's words into English for Jonathan, although his translation of Augustine's words leaves much to be desired. For example, when they do finally meet Augustine, Jonathan poses questions and Alex serves as interpreter:

> 'Ask her what it [the wedding of Jonathan's grandfather and his first wife] was like,' he [Jonathan] said. 'It was beautiful,' she said. 'My brother held one of the chuppah poles, I remember. It was a spring day. Zosha was such a pretty girl.' 'It was so beautiful,' I told the hero. 'There was white, and flowers, and many children, and the bride in a long dress. Zosha was a beautiful girl, and all of the other men were jealous people.' (Safran Foer 154)

As we can see, a significant gap occurs between what Augustine says and what Alex translates to Jonathan as her having said. Indeed, Alex's questionable translation, which both embellishes and omits details, highlights the complicated process by which testimony itself is transmitted.

Until the point in the narrative in which Alex's grandfather testifies about Herschel, his childhood friend whom he identified to the Nazis as a Jew, thus causing Herschel's death, and

his relationship with Herschel, quotation marks indicate the interlocutors while they converse, although the identity of the speaker is not always directly attached to their words. The use of quotation marks to indicate a shift in speaker changes, however, when Alex's grandfather recounts the story about Herschel and himself to Alex and Jonathan; there, the quotation marks disappear and Grandfather's narrative appears in the form of stream of consciousness (Safran Foer 247). Narratively, since the quotation marks are gone, Grandfather's story gains speed. Likewise, the questions Alex now asks of his grandfather are also not clearly demarcated with quotation marks in the narrative (Safran Foer 247-252). With the above-mentioned stream-of-consciousness mode, Grandfather describes the moment when he, at that time still called Eli, betrayed Herschel:

> he went to the next man in line and that was me who is a Jew he asked and I felt Herschel's hand again and I know that his hand was saying pleaseplease Eli [referring to Grandfather] please I do not want to die please do not point at me you know what is going to happen to me if you point at me do not point at me I am afraid of dying I am so afraid of dying I am soafraidofdying Iamsoafraidofdying who is a Jew the General asked me again and I felt on the other hand the hand of Grandmother and I knew that she was holding your father and that he was holding you and that you were holding your children I am so afraid of dying I am soafraidofdying Iamsoafraidofdying Iamsoafraidofdying and I said he is a Jew. (Safran Foer 250)

Although this event occurred over fifty years ago, as he narrates to Alex, his grandson, and Jonathan, Grandfather reverts to the present tense when recalling his complicity in identifying Herschel as a Jew. The use of the present tense suggests this moment's continued influence until

the present day. The running together of his words on the typed page similarly speeds up the process of Grandfather narrating and depicts both his emotional and thought processes. In addition to emphasizing Alex's grandfather's role as collaborator with the Nazis, the character of Grandfather illustrates how an individual can occupy both positions—of witness, and, when Grandfather listens to Augustine's testimony, of listener—in relationship to one's story and to another individual's story.

In a manner similar to Zichroni's position as a witness to oral testimony, or as a recipient of Minsky's testimony, Daniel Mendelsohn, in his memoir *The Lost*, also becomes first and foremost a witness to oral testimony. He records his interviews with survivors, using either a tape recorder or videotape, and employs these interviews as source materials for the research on his great-uncle, Shmiel, and his family, who died in the Holocaust. In deciding to include specific survivor interviews in his memoir, Mendelsohn incorporates the survivor's story into his own narrative, and thereby transmits the story to the reader. This incorporation in his own memoir of narratives he has listened to bears surface resemblance to that which Warszawski supposedly does in *Harlem Holocaust*. The difference—apart from the obvious satire of *Harlem Holocaust*—is that Mendelsohn is more cognizant of the muddy waters of misappropriation. In retelling other survivors' stories, Mendelsohn does not make them his own stories, but clearly demarcates within his memoir which stories belong to whom. Mendelsohn adapts the genre of written survivor accounts and incorporates it into his own memoir. Both an autobiographical narrative about himself and his relationship to his family, as well as a memoir about his effort to learn about his six "lost" relatives, *The Lost* asks whether or not someone who was not there to witness can nevertheless function as a witness, and demonstrates that someone can. Mendelsohn's *The Lost* becomes a witness narrative: in tracing the story of Shmiel Jäger and his

family, *The Lost* bears witness to a fraction of the victims of the Holocaust, incidentally underscoring the vast number of individual lives and stories that are "lost," while simultaneously narrating Mendelsohn's own experience in uncovering his family's story.

Mendelsohn constructs a balance between witnessing oral testimony and writing a memoir. By layering oral testimony with Mendelsohn's own memories, this memoir functions as a palimpsest, "a parchment or other writing surface on which the original text has been effaced or partially erased, and then overwritten by another" (*Oxford English Dictionary*). Mendelsohn listens to survivors' memories, and because those memories are not his own, they become "partially erased" since he does not have the capacity to remember them himself. This palimpsestic notion of layering—on which the varying layers can be perceived, if not clearly seen—is reflected in the combination of photographs and narrative, which I explore in the second chapter of this study, but also in the temporal narrative levels: the time of writing, Mendelsohn's journeying to interview the Bolechower survivors, Mendelsohn's childhood, and the photographs and letters that most firmly anchor the past in the past. *The Lost* illustrates the extent to which Mendelsohn can act—through his extensive interviews with survivors and historical research—as a witness about the Holocaust and the autobiographical dimension testifies to this position as witness-autobiographer.

Mendelsohn takes on the role of spokesperson for Shmiel and his family, viewing such an attempt to uncover their fates as a recuperative act tied to his grandfather's feelings of guilt at not being able to save Shmiel, his wife, and their four daughters. Mendelsohn takes on this role voluntarily. Other members of the second and third generation whose family history is intertwined with the Holocaust do not adopt the role of spokeperson as readily as Mendelsohn.

Esther Dischereit's *Jöemis Tisch* depicts a protagonist who is perceived as the representative of her Jewish heritage by others, and who does not welcome such a role.

In Esther Dischereit's *Jöemis Tisch*, the daughter of a survivor named Hannah, who remains anonymous and is referred to only as Hannah's daughter, interacts with German citizens of all ages, but her interactions with Germans alive during the war become difficult for her to bear. In an encounter between Hannah's daughter and an unnamed German citizen around the same age as her mother, the German, whose identity and even gender remain unclear, recounts his or her experience of displacement at the end of the war: "'Wir kommen aus Wullachen aus dem Böhmerwald. Alle Deutschen wurden ja sozusagen vertrieben…und dann kamen wir nach Hohenfurt, Kaplitz, Bahnstation und wurden dann in Viehwaggons eingeladen.' Meine Ohren repetieren: Hannah in Viehwaggons eingeladen. 'Ich war damals zwölf Jahre alt, muß ich dazu sagen…' Sie war sechs Jahre alt" (Dischereit 60). In this exchange, each time the German tells Hannah's daughter a piece of information, Hannah's daughter mentally responds with a piece of information of her own, not about herself, but about her mother's experiences. Although this German talks to Hannah's daughter, it is a one-sided conversation. Hannah's daughter does not voice her thoughts out loud, but through interior monologue, the reader is privy to them and receives part of Hannah's story through Hannah's daughter. Hannah, now deceased, is not there to testify. In Hannah's absence, Hannah's daughter is left with what little she does know about Hannah's experiences. In part of the ensuing conversation with this same German, where Hannah's daughter's voice interrupts the words by the German in the quoted passage, only two ellipses are provided. The ellipses indicate Hannah's daughter's forced silence about the rest of her mother's experiences since she does not know the full story. Hannah's daughter does not

possess enough of her mother's story to assemble a coherent narrative about her mother's experiences because her mother did not share them with her.

The concluding words by the German and Hannah's daughter's reaction to them express Hannah's daughter's ambivalence towards not having her mother Hannah's full story: "'Man kann den Kindern von der Heimat viel erzählen. Aber die Beziehung, die fehlt doch.' Sie hat nichts, fast nichts erzählt. Ach—fehlte mir doch die Beziehung! 'Das ist doch irgendwie vorbei.' Irgendwie, das stimmt, es ist vorbei" (Dischereit 61). Hannah's daughter observes again how little her mother did tell her, and through her use of the subjunctive, expresses her desire to not feel connected to her heritage, her mother's traumatic experiences. Hannah's daughter, whose only identifier is linked to her relationship to her mother, appears consistently throughout the fictional narrative, but the scenes that feature her are not clearly labeled and do not offer a readily perceivable coherence. Like Hannah's daughter who attempts to construct a narrative with the little that her mother told her, the reader must also infer what she can from the limited information the scenes reveal. We know, for example, that Hannah's hands would often shake, but from context clues that indicate Hannah's daughter is a child when she narrates this scene, the reader comprehends that Hannah suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder, which, however, Hannah's daughter does not understand (Dischereit 57). The focalizing of the narrative through Hannah's daughter constructs a filter through which the reader feels placed in the position of limited access, one that mirrors the position of limited access Hannah's daughter experiences in relationship to her mother. By focalizing the narrative in this way, Dischereit, like Benjamin Stein in *Die Leinwand*, stresses the positionality of each character's perspective, and indeed, any interlocuter's, and the knowledge, or lack thereof, that accompanies any communicative situation. Although Stein extensively employs focalization to indicate just how

much knowledge an individual might acquire about another if one consciousness could actually merge with another, Dischereit employs focalization to indicate the limitations that come with not being able to see through another's perspective.

The conversation between Hannah's daughter and the German citizen in which Hannah's daughter does not actually verbally participate resembles the construction of a conversation between Art Spiegelman and Hillary Chute in *MetaMaus*. The overarching narrative structure of *MetaMaus*, which occurs in the form of a "series of taped conversations" between Spiegelman and Hillary Chute, mirrors the narrative structure undergirding *Maus I* and *II*—multiple conversations between two people, one of whom records the other's experiences (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 6). In *Maus I* and *II*, Spiegelman interviews his father, Vladek, whose testimony provides the raw material for Spiegelman's creation of that work. In *MetaMaus*, Chute's interviews with Spiegelman provide the raw material. In both, Spiegelman shapes and forms the raw material within the structure of a narrative. It is only, however, in the intimate context of conversation between two people that explanations are provided. This tension in *MetaMaus* between the private atmosphere of a conversation and the public context of a published, structured text parallels the challenge Spiegelman himself undertakes in *Maus I* and *II*. In this encounter in *MetaMaus* between Spiegelman and Chute, who belong to different generations, the second and third respectively, the narrating instance is not provoked by Art posing questions to his father, but by Chute posing questions to Spiegelman. Although the narrating instance—the interview between Spiegelman and Chute—is constructed and artificial, the narrating situation mirrors that of *Maus I* and *II*, but instead of being the listener asking for testimony, Spiegelman now occupies that of witness, and Chute becomes the listener and initiator of the conversation. In constructing a staged conversation between himself and Chute, Spiegelman integrates a

dialogue or conversation into the narrative structure of *MetaMaus*. According to Dori Laub, such dialogue must occur in any testimonial encounter (Laub, "Bearing Witness" 70-71).

In addition to asking Spiegelman questions, Chute makes observations and invites Spiegelman to expand on them. For example, Chute comments: "An important part of the self-awareness of the book as a comics text comes from its inclusion of just a very few photographs. Tell me about your decision to draw some photographs in *Maus*, but to actually include others" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 218). Her use of the words "tell me" to invite Spiegelman to elaborate belies the fact that her request will not remain between him and her. Rather, "tell me" actually functions as a collective "tell us." The artifice of the private conversation between two people, in this case Spiegelman and a well-known comics theorist, distracts from the public nature of their conversation and Spiegelman's public commentary on his public text, *Maus I* and *II*, in a published text, *MetaMaus*.

Spiegelman investigates the process of dialogue by constructing two dialogues within the narrative structure of the text: first, the conversation between Spiegelman and the reader in the introduction to *MetaMaus*, and second, the conversation between Chute and Spiegelman to which the reader is granted access. Given that *Maus I* and *II* has increasingly, due to its complex metaphor of Jews as mice and Nazis as cats, been used as a text in American middle schools and high schools to instruct students about the Holocaust, one supposition is that the reader will most likely not belong to the same generation as Spiegelman. This assumption makes sense if Spiegelman is presumably trying to answer all of the questions he keeps getting asked.[18] *MetaMaus* also features interviews with Spiegelman's children, Dashiell and Nadja, and his wife, Francoise, the transcription of Vladek and Art's interviews, and in the accompanying DVD, the audio recording of Vladek's testimony (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 83-90, 237-277). By

[18] Spiegelman addresses the three questions he is repeatedly asked at the outset of *MetaMaus*.

allowing readers to actually hear Vladek's oral testimony, Spiegelman makes possible seemingly direct access to Vladek's unaltered oral testimony. Instead of Spiegelman shaping Vladek's testimony into *Maus I* and *II*, the reader can now listen to Vladek's unaltered oral testimony and hear Vladek's voice herself. This preponderance of interviews and conversations within the constructed conversation between Spiegelman and Chute only strengthens the mulitiplicity of voices included in *MetaMaus*.

Spiegelman begins *MetaMaus* with two pages of panels (figure 1). In the first panel of the first page, a portion of the Mickey Mouse face, a trademark of Disney, hangs in the background of the top left hand corner, surrounded by a halo of light.[19] In the foreground, an anthropomorphic mouse, wearing a shirt and vest, cups a non-anthropomorphized mouse in his two unmistakably human hands. The two human hands clearly have fingernails, which stands in contrast to the anthropomorphic appendages that are less clearly sketched beginning in the second panel. The more rodent-like mouse also has a tail, which reaches up into the circle of light illuminating Mickey Mouse.

At first glance, the reader sees three mice, each, however, showing a different kind of illustrated mouse. First, the Mickey Mouse, as a trademark of The Walt Disney Company, represents the commercialized use of animal imagery in the entertainment industry, particularly in animated cartoons and movies. Second, the anthropomorphized mouse with human hands and clothes clearly resembles one of Spiegelman's allegorical "mice" from *Maus I* and *II*. Third, the final species of mouse, the most realistic, least anthropomorphic one, stands in juxtaposition to the more cutesy, less rodent-like depictions. All three types of illustrated mice have at least one eye and ear that are portrayed, if not in their entirety (such as the one of Mickey Mouse), then

[19] The drawing that appears as the first panel in *MetaMaus* was not made specifically for the opening two pages of *MetaMaus*. The drawing appears as the first illustration in Michael Rothberg's introduction to *Traumatic Realism: The Demands of Holocaust Representation* and was first published in *Tikkun* magazine (Rothberg, *Traumatic Realism* xii).

enough to distinguish the eyes and ears from the other types of mice. Mickey Mouse's eye stares fixedly forward; the eyes of Spiegelman's allegorical "mouse" gaze at the third mouse, which he holds in his hands, and that third mouse glances down into the bottom left hand corner of the panel. The eyes and ears of the three mice are arranged in a top to bottom downwards configuration, which draws the reader's eyes downward into the word "Intro." Drawing one vertical line down a little to the left of the panel's middle aligns all three mouse ears as well. Thus, the composition of both the eyes and ears of the three mice in the first panel accentuates the differences among the three mice. With this arrangement, the first panel reflects on the use of illustrations and mouse imagery, hence operating markedly as meta-narrative. Instead of just "metamaus" [sic], however, we have metamice. These metamice appear in the context of one frame; yet in this one panel, Spiegelman succinctly depicts the entire process he undertakes throughout *MetaMaus*, that of employing the genre of the animal fable, a fictional genre, to represent a nonfictional narrative about his father's experiences during the Holocaust. Furthermore, the three types of mice demarcate different periods of time. In addition to being three kinds of mice, they are generations of representations of mice.

Before setting up the conversation between himself and Chute, Spiegelman initiates a conversation with the reader. In the second panel of the first page, the mouse artist turns in his chair from his drawing table to partially face his addressee, the reader, and commences with "Y'know, Maus has had a far larger impact in the world than I ever expected!" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 8). The informal beginning address "y'know" immediately invites the reader into a conversation. The exclamation point stresses the surprise the mouse artist, or Art, the autobiographical persona of Spiegelman, has over the success of *Maus I* and *II*. Art's hands are portrayed in less detail and only some fingers on each hand are discernable. He also holds his

trademark cigarette in one hand, while the other hand holds a pen. In the third panel, the perspective has changed to where the audience can see Art sitting at his table, but the perspective is directed from the other side of the table, such that it seems the reader is standing across from Art. Art explains: "25 years ago I'd only hoped it might be discovered sometime after I died" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 8). "Died" is printed in bold for emphasis. In the next (and last) three panels of the first page of the introduction, the focalization has narrowed in on only the mouse artist, Art, and his facial expressions and hand gestures. In the fourth panel, Art continues, "It's swell to get recognition…but it's kinda hard to be seen behind a mouse mask!" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 8). "Hard" printed in bold accentuates the difficulty Art feels, and one hand props his head up while he points to his face with a finger from the other hand. In the fifth panel, Art says, "The book seems to loom over me like my father once did," adding in the sixth that "Journalists and students still want answers to the same few questions" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 8). "Still," printed in bold, stresses Art's impatience over the redundant questions he keeps getting asked. In the accompanying panel, Art holds up three fingers, a gesture that signals that he wants to address three main questions.

The second page of the introduction contains nine panels (three by three) (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 9). In the first panel, three connections of the speech bubble—which asks, "Why comics?,"—appear in the frame, with the posers of the question outside of the frame and thus, invisible (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 9). This question disorients Art, causing him to turn his head upwards and diagonally, in an attempt to "see" the question. In the second panel, the second question—"Why mice?!"—appears, and this time Art scrunches his eyes and raises his hands to either block or prevent the question from being asked (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 9). In the third panel, the question of "Why the Holocaust?!," both literally and metaphorically upends Art from

his artist's chair, and in the bottom left hand corner the upturned chair appears, with Art's feet partially in it while the rest of his body remains stationary on the floor (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 9). Looking up into the speech bubble, Art says simply, "Yikes!" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 9). Dashes surrounding Art's head and body in these three panels indicate physical movement as well. In the fourth panel, with two small yellow stars indicating disorientation and dizziness, Art regains his footing, exclaiming, "…or to quote my forefathers: Oy!" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 9). The fifth panel shows Art once again standing upright, with one hand raised and one finger extended to make a point: "But I thought I'd finally try to answer as fully as I could" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 9). "Finally" appears in italics and this change in font, like the words printed in bold, illustrates the word's importance. In the sixth panel, Art has his eyes closed with one hand raised as if swearing an oath: "That way, when asked in the future, maybe I could just say…never again!" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 9). "Never again," which appears in bold, resonates as one of the slogans and catchphrases that have appeared in the wake of the Holocaust to emphasize that it should never happen again. However, Art does not use it to refer to the Holocaust, but rather, does not ever again want to be asked these same three questions—"Why comics?," "Why mice?," and "Why the Holocaust?" In the seventh panel, Art reaches towards his face and has his two hands over his snout, tugging on it while saying, "And maybe I could even get my damned mask off! I can't breathe in this thing…unff!" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 9). In the eighth panel, the mask has come partially off and the circles for the eyes have been pulled away, but the only part of the head that is visible is where the hair would be, which remains encased in shadow, with Art grunting, "Urk! Oof!" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 9). Onomatopoeia of "Rripp" from the mask coming off also appears in the panel. Finally, in the ninth and last panel on the second page of the introduction, the mask has become fully separated from the head,

but instead of a human face, a human skull is revealed. The human skull, which is attached to a human body and whose human hands are holding the mouse mask, cries only "Aah!" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 9). The mouse mask protrudes from the bottom of the frame, adjacent to the publication date of 2011. These first two pages of *MetaMaus* demarcate—within the frames of the panels themselves—Spiegelman's approach to the overarching goal of *MetaMaus*: to close the book, as it were, on the endless repetition of questions he keeps getting asked. The questions asked by unidentified speakers—"Why comics?", "Why mice?," and "Why the Holocaust?"—are the titles of the three main sections of *MetaMaus*. The interviews between Spiegelman and Chute are organized under these three main sections, the three questions Spiegelman seeks to answer once and for all in *MetaMaus*.

The texts of the second and third generation dealt with here do not typically depict scenes of witnessing and testimony between members of the same generation to the same extent that they portray scenes of witnessing and testimony between members of different generations. In *The Speed of Light*, the scene of witnessing and testimony between members of the same generation occurs between Sola, Julian, and Diego, once Diego has found Sola in New York and has asked her to tell him her story. Sola acquiesces, but does so in large part because of what Julian tells her earlier in the novel: "'When you're a witness, and you tell other people, you make them witnesses too'" (Rosner 121). Sola narrates her story to Diego and Julian; the testimonial encounter is narrated through both Sola and Julian's eyes through multiple internal focalization, whereby we gain access to a testimonial encounter narrated by both the witness and the listener (Rosner 176-178).

Whereas the testimonial encounter between Zichroni and Minsky in Benjamin Stein's *Die Leinwand* is focalized through Zichroni, who, using his sixth sense, takes on Minsky's

perspective, the testimonial encounter in *The Speed of Light* is focalized through both Julian and Sola. Julian watches Sola attentively as she narrates:

> We had made ourselves witnesses, Diego and I, we had listened. It was a story so much like the ones I'd heard from survivors of the camps, but it was unlike them too, because it belonged to Sola. I thought about how my father's story was the only one I could never know, and how it was the only story I truly carried inside my body, the one I had lived so close to, and so far away from. (Rosner 202)

In addition, this multiple internal focalization between Julian and Sola allows access to Julian's comparison between the experiences his father had of genocide and those that Sola had.

In Rosner's *The Speed of Light*, it is not a matter of one eye that sees, but of three; the three sections alternate between variable focalization through Julian, Sola, and Paula. Sola's section is always written in the present tense, whereas Julian and Paula's sections are written in the past tense. The tenses of the three narrative strands also serve as temporal reminders of the presence of (inherited) trauma that all three characters possess to varying extents. Julian and Paula are affected by events that occurred before they were born, although those effects are visible in the present; Sola's trauma, on the other hand, occurred approximately two years ago; it remains present to her and the tense of her narrative section reflects its continued presence.

As these examples of encounters between members of the first generation and members of the second and third generation indicate, regarding the transmission of memory about the Holocaust, intergenerational encounters manifest themselves as encounters that produce witnessing and testimony, between the witness and the listener in an interlocutive narrating instance. As these seven texts reveal, a linear accounting of past events remains deceptively elusive, and gaps and silences impinge on even a seemingly smoothless rendition of the past.

Figure 1

Figure from: Spiegelman, Art. *MetaMaus: A Look Inside a Modern Classic, Maus*. New York: Pantheon, 2011. 8-9.

Chapter Three

The Role of Photography in Generational Texts

"She perished, but her album survived."
— *Survivor Meg Grossbard about her friend Pepi Diamant* (Mendelsohn 180)

In Chapter One, I provided an overview of the types of encounters between witness and listener that appear in selected texts of the second and third generation. In Chapter Two, I focus on what Marianne Hirsch refers to as "testimonial objects," or objects that previously belonged to victims of the Holocaust and later acquire a testimonial role (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 24, 240, 242). In the absence of witnesses or even with the presence of witnesses, elements of the documentary, such as photographs and artifacts, can attempt to function as substitutes for witnesses, and can either support or refute a witness's testimony. Photography plays a pivotal role in these selected texts of the second and third generation. Either photographs punctuate the narrative, appearing as part of the narrative structure of the text, or photographs appear as a thematic or plot point in the narrative. Of the seven texts, Daniel Mendelsohn's *The Lost* and Art Spiegelman's *MetaMaus* embed photographs within the narrative structure. The other five texts frequently devote attention to photographs on the plot and thematic levels. In either case, whether photographs punctuate the narrative or appear as a plot point in the narrative, these texts stage the use of photography as a mode of witnessing and testimony and employ photography as a medium for re-witnessing.

As discussed briefly in the section on postmemory in the introduction, Hirsch privileges photography as the medium which best simultaneously bridges the gap between past and present, functioning as a "ghostly revenant" of who and what was lost in the Holocaust while gesturing towards its utter irrecoverability (Hirsch, *Family Frames* 20-21). Considering photography's referential nature—that the figures in the picture were present at that specific point in time and

that the photograph refers to that presence in the past for the viewer/reader looking at the photograph in whatever present she finds herself in—the medium of photography, as Hirsch explains extensively, establishes this constant link between past and present (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 37).

In addition to Hirsch, other theorists recognize photography as a genre that bridges past and present. In *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography* (1980), Roland Barthes identifies this quality of the photograph as the "photographic referent" that establishes a "superimposition…of reality and of the past," in which the object or person before the camera lens must have at that specific point in time been in front of the camera lens, or what he also calls the "'That-has-been'" ("*ça a été*") (Barthes 76-77). According to Barthes, in addition to announcing its referent, a photograph is comprised of both a "studium," its placement within a specific culture and time, and a "punctum," which "punctuates" the studium, thereby calling the viewer's attention to a small detail in the photograph (Barthes 26-27). This punctum of the photograph has an immediate effect on the viewer; Barthes refers to the punctum as "this wound, this prick, this mark" (Barthes 26). Barthes discusses the punctum he sees in the photograph of his mother, pictured at age five with her brother in the winter garden, that he discovers after her death. From his description, it appears that the punctum of a photograph is specific to each individual, although as Barthes contends, the punctum is comprised both of what is already contained in the photograph and what the individual adds to it (Barthes 73, 55). In other words, the punctum is specific to the individual viewer—what Barthes sees in the Winter Garden Photograph is not necessarily what another viewer would find (Barthes 71, 73).[20]

[20] For a discussion of Barthes's notion of the punctum and a closer analysis of a mistake he makes in confusing a pearl necklace in a photograph pictured in *Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography* with a golden chain from a family photograph he includes in his autobiography *Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes* (1975), see Margaret Olin's "Roland Barthes's 'Mistaken' Identification" in *Touching Photographs* (2012) (Olin 51-69, especially 58-61).

According to Margaret Olin, in *Touching Photographs* (2012), photographs foster relationships among people and create a sense of community (Olin 15, 17). Family photographs available to members of the second generation thereby foster relationships to their lost relatives. Photographs help connect the second generation to the first, forming "a privileged link between memory and postmemory, a vehicle of the productive look that can supplement the active listening of postmemory" (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 90). In connecting memory and postmemory, photographs can also help engender testimony by providing an opportunity for the listener and witness to focus on a single image. Focusing on a single image can, in turn, help alleviate the overwhelming process of narrating one's story by providing an entry point at which survivors may begin to narrate their experiences. While photographs might not automatically engender testimony, they can certainly encourage it. Indeed, Hirsch connects photographs to "words of witnesses," or testimony, and argues that photographs "supplement" testimony since they function as "both instruments and emblems of the process of its [the past's] transmission" (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 61). Barthes, too, assigns an "evidential force" to the photograph whose "testimony" relates to time, since, above all, "every photograph is a certificate of presence" (Barthes 89, 87). Similarly, Olin argues that "photography merges the language of witnessing with the language of the index" (Olin 16). Susan Sontag, in *On Photography* (1977), while acknowledging that photographs can be manipulated, maintains that "a photograph passes for incontrovertible proof that a given thing happened" (Sontag 5).

For Daniel Mendelsohn in *The Lost*, like Hirsch, photographs mediate both postmemory and memory. Unlike Hirsch, who concentrates on pictures taken before or during the Holocaust, Mendelsohn also includes pictures taken during his own investigation of his family history. Whereas Mendelsohn does not have any memories to contextualize the photographs taken before

or during the Holocaust, he does possess memories about the photographs taken during his journey. The two categories of photographs Mendelsohn incorporates, those he has from his family and those for which he was present when they were taken, enact this negotiation between postmemory and memory. For the reader, on the other hand, both categories of photographs serve to highlight her own lack of personal memories about either Mendelsohn's past or that of his family as he constructs it in his autobiographical narrative. The role of the photograph in Mendelsohn's memoir is often, though not always, similar to the role of the photograph in postmemory. Mendelsohn employs photographs as an instrument of postmemory, as Hirsch explains, and uses photographs to represent postmemory (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 110). The reader has read about the photograph and only later is it provided—Mendelsohn, on the other hand, has his own memories about his journeys and the writing of his autobiographical narrative. Mendelsohn enacts a type of postmemory for the reader: postmemory not about the Holocaust, but about his postmemory of the Holocaust.

Mendelsohn also heavily integrates photographs into the narrative structure of his memoir. He either gives the description of the photograph and then provides the photograph, or vice versa, provides the photograph and then gives a description. Two different effects come from alternating this sequence. For the photograph that comes after its description, assuming the reader first reads the narrative, by the time she arrives at the photograph she will have the sense of having already seen it. The photograph represents in visual form the context about which the reader has previously read. Moreover, this sense of the reader seeing what she has not seen before, but about which she has only heard (or, in this case, read), mimics Mendelsohn's own personal experience with postmemory. Mendelsohn grew up hearing (and not hearing) about his family members who perished, gleaning only tidbits of information at a time.

For the photograph that comes before its description, the reader does not have any information at hand to assimilate the photograph into any sort of context. She sees the photograph and might believe that she will be learning more about the photograph through the course of the chapter, but this is not always the case. The reader who does not skip ahead will not know if Mendelsohn eventually provides an explanation of the photograph but reads on despite the interruption of the inserted photograph either at the beginning of the chapter or in the middle of the page. In this way, the photographs disrupt the narrative. This order of first the photograph and then the description evokes times in Mendelsohn's childhood when he had only photographs, but no context surrounding them. Mendelsohn invokes the use of text and image to represent those gaps in time or between image and narrative. He represents this situation in the text by supplying first the photograph and only later the context. This narrative structure—alternating between providing the photograph before its description and vice versa—seeks to reconstruct his experience of postmemory. The description that comes after a photograph sometimes appears only a page or two later, but comes, at other times, significantly after the reader has read about the photograph. The reader must flip back and find the description of the photograph earlier in the narrative to discover what information about the photograph Mendelsohn includes. This reading backwards and forwards becomes all the more necessary since the narrative provides no immediate captions or context with the photograph.

A third category combining narrative and photography occurs in which the photograph is related to but not precisely the same as the photograph Mendelsohn describes in the narrative. For example, Mendelsohn describes the picture Matt took of a survivor after their interview in which the man "turns to us [Mendelsohn and his brother Matt], as he was leading us down the gray steps of his building…who [Matt] at that moment snapped his picture" (Mendelsohn 142).

The photograph that appears on the next page is not of the old man turning to speak to Mendelsohn or his brother, but one of an elderly man walking down the stairs, with the photographer standing on the next flight up, looking down. In other words, Mendelsohn's description in his narrative does not correspond to the photograph that appears on the next page. At the same time, the picture that follows is closely related to the photograph Mendelsohn has described. Embedding a photograph within the narrative structure that corresponds to the description in so far as it is similar, but nevertheless slightly different than the one the narrative characterizes, creates the effect—on the part of the reader—of mimicking the process of postmemory Mendelsohn has experienced. Representing a single moment in time, the photograph is surrounded by moments that come before and after the photograph is taken. To emphasize this constant negotiation between being able to know about the context of a photograph one sees, while understanding that such context can be at times limited, and not fully known, Mendelsohn provides a photograph that approximates the experience of postmemory.

Mendelsohn's intricate interweaving of narrative and photography addresses what he refers to as the "problems of proximity and distance" (Mendelsohn 433). Hirsch phrases this negotiation slightly differently, characterizing the "aesthetics of postmemory" as "a diasporic aesthetics of temporal and spatial exile" (Hirsch, *Family Frames* 245). Mendelsohn's memoir, in its combination of photographs and narrative, illustrates this temporal and spatial exile. Mendelsohn produces a spatial gap in the narrative by surrounding the photographs with blank white space. The placement of the photographs within the narrative illustrates Mendelsohn's ambivalence towards constructing a coherent story. He refuses to cater to the reader's (and his own) desire for an easily consumable story with a clear beginning, middle, and end.

Mendelsohn combines photographs and narrative to address his position as memoirist and as witness. The opening chapter in Part I of *The Lost*, entitled "The Formless Void," immediately calls into question Mendelsohn as witness. Before the chapter begins, we see a picture of Mendelsohn as a young boy (3; figure 1). This first photo of Mendelsohn—which, aside from the chapter title, precedes the narrative text, establishes Mendelsohn as a witness: he is the writer of his memoir, and thus, the witness for/to himself. Four pages later, after Mendelsohn describes how his relatives would exclaim over how much he resembled Shmiel as a young boy, two sets of eyes are juxtaposed horizontally next to each other (7; figure 2). The first set of eyes is taken from the photograph of Mendelsohn at the beginning of the chapter and the second set of eyes comes from a photograph we have not yet seen, Shmiel's. The reader must surmise that this other set of eyes belongs to Shmiel since Mendelsohn talks of his resemblance to Shmiel on the preceding page. Mendelsohn does not directly identify the other set of eyes as belonging to Shmiel. This parallel of the four eyes emphasizes Mendelsohn's position as witness in relationship to Shmiel, who is, in turn, also a witness to the Holocaust, but to whose testimony we do not have access. The two sets of eyes, which are placed on the same plane as one another, function to align Mendelsohn as a witness both for and to Shmiel. Mendelsohn is not the same type of witness as Shmiel because Mendelsohn, who was not even alive at the time, did not himself witness the events of the Holocaust. Though Mendelsohn's position as witness is not equivalent to Shmiel's position as witness, this juxtaposition of the two parts of the photographs assigns Mendelsohn a measure of authority. This authority, the narrative suggests, stems from Mendelsohn's identification with the great-uncle Shmiel whom he resembles; it also stems from his relationship by blood to Shmiel, especially considering that he has taken on this project of investigating what happened to Shmiel and his family. Mendelsohn characterizes himself as the

family historian and his family recognizes him as such. Mendelsohn repeatedly includes references to his sources of information and is actually quite forthcoming in confessing what he does not know and/or cannot know, hence establishing his authority to act as witness for Shmiel and his family while also maintaining his credibility.

Three pages after the two pairs of eyes is the first full portrait of Shmiel (Mendelsohn 10; figure 3).[21] At this point, the reader does not know if this is the photograph from which the pair of eyes is taken; it could be. It is not until five pages later that the reader realizes this is not the portrait, when another close-up, this time of two sets of noses and mouths, are juxtaposed (in the same way as the two sets of eyes presented earlier) (Mendelsohn 16; figure 4). The two sets of mouths, like the eyes, once again place Mendelsohn in relationship to Shmiel: unlike Shmiel, Mendelsohn is, as suggested by the two mouths, able to give voice to Shmiel's experience as witness. It is important to emphasize here, however, that Mendelsohn's voice, in the form of narrative expression, is certainly mediated. A careful reader would realize that the lower half of the face on the right hand side does not have a beard; in the full photograph of Shmiel—*which is still the only one the reader has seen so far*—he does. Mendelsohn delineates these two types of witnessing at the beginning of his text: the separation between the two sets of eyes and mouths in the first chapter explicitly demarcates the act of witnessing an event as it happens and the act of later witnessing an event by testifying, or bearing witness, to that event. This distinction resembles that of Laub's first two levels of witnessing (Laub, "Bearing Witness" 71).

It is only at the end of chapter two that the reader sees the full photograph of Shmiel from which the eyes and lower face are taken, which besides Shmiel shows an as-yet-unidentified man, who is, like Shmiel, in an Austrian army uniform during World War I (Mendelsohn 75;

[21] The question over the identity of the man in the first full portrait is never fully resolved. In either case, whether the man is Shmiel or Abraham, the main point remains: it is not the picture from which the cutouts of the eyes and lower face come.

figure 5). The reader receives a description of this photograph on pages 69-70, which appears between the two sets of lower faces on page 16 and the photograph on page 75. When the reader first reads the description of the photograph, she does not know that she will eventually see the photograph. The page on which she reads the description of the photograph does not refer the reader to the page where it can be found. When she finally does see it, no caption exists to identify it as the photograph about which she has already read and whose pieces of which (eyes and mouth) she has already seen. In each case, whether the description of the photograph of the two soldiers or the photograph itself, no further context is given. Mendelsohn's refusal to provide the entire photograph to the reader until the end of the chapter—though sections of the photograph are provided earlier in the chapter—demonstrates his use of photographs and narrative in the form of delays and diversions. As I explained earlier, the postponement of the complete photograph until the end of Part I of *The Lost* mimics the delayed knowledge Mendelsohn acquires through his process of uncovering information about his great-uncle Shmiel and his family.

The placement of photographs in Mendelsohn's narrative structure draws attention to the important role photographs played in Mendelsohn's own life. During his childhood Mendelsohn sees photographs of Shmiel, his wife, and four daughters. The availability of their photographs encourages Mendelsohn to wonder about their fates: "their faces, looking out from the pictures, solemn, smiling, candid, posed, worried, oblivious, but always silent, and always black, and gray, and white" (Mendelsohn 26). Mendelsohn has access to the photographs, but no context surrounding them. Indeed, this lack of context rouses Mendelsohn's curiosity in the "mute photographs," since "we knew almost nothing about him, about them; their unsmiling, unspeaking faces seemed, as a result, more beguiling" (Mendelsohn 7). The presence of the

photographs, signaling absence in their presence, encourages Mendelsohn to seek out the narrative behind these photographs, and in the writing of his memoir, to narrate the stories of his family, the Bolechowers, and his search for their stories. As a result, the photographs function as a catalyst for re-witnessing.

Like Mendelsohn's *The Lost*, Art Spiegelman's *MetaMaus* embeds photographs in the narrative. Relying primarily on photographs, although he uses other elements of the documentary genre, in *MetaMaus*, Spiegelman essentially testifies to the testimony he depicts in *Maus I* and *II*. A text about the construction of *Maus I* and *II*, *MetaMaus*, as a text that testifies to Spiegelman's necessarily shaped testimony about Vladek and his relationship to Vladek, operates as a form of meta-testimony. This meta-testimony Spiegelman produces is important because Spiegelman once again establishes himself as the person qualified to re-witness Vladek's experiences during the Holocaust to others.

In *MetaMaus*, Spiegelman describes the extensive historical research he conducted in preparing to create *Maus I* and *II*. Spiegelman's focus in *MetaMaus* on the historical research that went in to the making of the *Maus* books provides evidence and operates as a form of proof for his adherence to historical truth, giving him and his *Maus* project greater credibility. As a part of substantiating his historical research, photographs taken during the Holocaust appear in *MetaMaus*, including the iconic photographs he used as inspiration for several of his panels, such as a photograph showing the mistreatment of Jews in Poland and a photograph, taken secretly, of bodies being burned at Auschwitz in 1944 (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 54-55). In *MetaMaus*, Spiegelman answers his interviewer Hillary Chute's question—"Were there any films or specific photographs that became part of your research?" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 54)—and on the same page and facing page, the reader can see both the historical photographs that Spiegelman used as

well as the panels, based on those photographs, that appeared in *Maus I* (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 54-55). Spiegelman, however, does not, in *MetaMaus*, have to go into great detail about the iconic photographs or about the panels because the reader can see and compare them on her own; both the photographs and the panels Spiegelman created using these photographs as a source appear on facing pages. The photographs taken during the Holocaust appear as they would in a history book, adjacent to a column of text. As part of his section in *MetaMaus* about the detailed research he conducted in preparation for his panels, Spiegelman includes reproductions of artwork by concentration camp inmates, images of the covers of the books he read, and other photographs that document the Holocaust (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 31, 42-43, 44-47, 54, 58, 60, 63, 64). Incorporating reproductions of artwork by camp inmates functions as another form of testimony that emphasizes the visual. Spiegelman studied these pieces of artwork very closely while drawing his panels. By providing evidence of his extensive, meticulous research, *MetaMaus* establishes Spiegelman's authority as the narrator of Vladek's oral testimony as re-narrated by Spiegelman in *Maus I* and *II*.

The narrative structure of *MetaMaus* juxtaposes past and present. The placement of the photographs and their corresponding panels on the same pages produce temporal layers in *MetaMaus*. These layers consist of photographs taken during the Holocaust and Spiegelman's panels that he created in the 1980s. The interview of Spiegelman conducted by Chute, whose collaboration began in 2006, is the most recent temporal layer. As in his own earlier works *Maus I* and *II*, Spiegelman structures his narrative in *MetaMaus* around the intersections between text and image. The text of *MetaMaus*, that is, Chute's interview of Spiegelman, complements the diverse images in *MetaMaus*, images that include panel studies (or drafts of panels), notes, final art that appeared in *Maus I* and *II*, excerpts from his sketchbooks, and examples of

Spiegelman's other work, both before and after the publication of *Maus I* and *II*. Additionally, the captions that contextualize the images operate as a form of text.

As noted by scholars such as Hirsch and Andrea Liss, Spiegelman effectively uses three photographs in *Maus I* and *II*. These three photographs are: Anja and Art in the "Prisoner on the Hell Planet" section in *Maus I* (Spiegelman, *Maus I* 100); Richieu, Spiegelman's brother who died in the Holocaust, in the preface of *Maus II*; and Vladek in a camp uniform in *Maus II*, taken as a staged photograph after liberation (Spiegelman, *Maus II* 134).[22] Chute questions Spiegelman about his sparse use of photographs in the *Maus* books, encouraging Spiegelman to elucidate his approach to including these photographs, particularly the motivation behind these three specific photographs (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 218). In his explanation, Spiegelman highlights the necessarily referential nature of the photograph, which lends credence and authenticity to his story.[23] On his decision to include the first photograph of his mother and himself in *Maus I*, Spiegelman clarifies: "it seemed important to find a way to show 'this really happened' as a [visual] phrase" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 218).[24] On two facing pages, and on the next page, the same three photographs Spiegelman includes in *Maus I* and *II* appear in *MetaMaus*, along with panel studies for their pages in *Maus I* and *II* (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 218-220). Whereas the first photograph of Art and his mother is slanted in *Maus I*, the photograph included in *MetaMaus* is straight, partially covering the draft study for the published

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[22] Hirsch, in "Family Pictures: Maus, Mourning, and Post-Memory" (1992) and "Mourning and Postmemory" from *Family Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory* (1997), focuses primarily on the placement and significance of the three photographs in *Maus I* and *II*. Of the two photographs in *Maus II*, Hirsch writes, they "came to focus for me the oscillation between life and death that defines the photograph" (Hirsch, *Family Frames* 20). Andrea Liss, in *Trespassing Through Shadows: Memory, Photography, and the Holocaust* (1998), also analyzes the three photographs in *Maus I* and *II* (Liss 57-69). Other scholars who have referred specifically to the photographs include Irene Kacandes, who describes their role as an authenticating strategy, located in both the paratext and text (Kacandes, "When facts are scarce" 187).

[23] Barthes assigns the quality of authenticity to a photograph, stating that "in the Photograph, the power of authentication exceeds the power of representation" (Barthes 89). He describes this connection between photography and its evidentiary force, maintaining that "[p]hotography…*authenticates* the existence of a certain being" (Barthes 107).

[24] Spiegelman's explanation resembles Irene Kacandes's characterization of an authenticating strategy in the genre she classifies as Holocaust family memoir (Kacandes, "When facts are scarce" 179, 189).

panel. The photograph of Richieu, which is straight in the preface of *Maus II*, is situated somewhat crookedly on the page, and slightly covers part of the draft panel that features him. The captions for the illustrations provide the date of the photographs for the reader (1958 and 1940, respectively), dates which are not provided in *Maus I* and *II* (figure 6). On the continuing page, which also deals with Vladek's photograph, the caption expounds: "The original copy of Vladek's photo…inset onto detail of page draft" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 220). This emphasis on the original calls attention to Spiegelman's meticulous process in *MetaMaus* of documenting his creation of *Maus I* and *II*.

Spiegelman explains why he did not provide a photograph of Vladek until close to the end of *Maus II*: "By the time one nears that point in the narrative one already has a very clear picture of who Vladek is, even though one hasn't a clue as to what he looks like. And what became so interesting to me was the photo—the thing that gives you that 'objective correlative'—tells you so insanely little" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 220). Spiegelman's comment reveals a photograph's ability to obscure; it provides the viewer with a clear mental image, but at the same time, standing on its own, conceals as much, if not more, than it reveals. Spiegelman suggests that providing the reader with the actual photograph seems almost superfluous both because of how little it reveals and because he has already provided the narrative surrounding the photograph. The diction in his explanation, that the reader "already has a very clear picture of who Vladek is," supports this point. And yet, ultimately, he does depict Vladek as a human, not solely as a mouse. Part of Spiegelman's fascination with this photograph of Vladek, he explains, involves the incongruity between the image of the person who appears in the photograph and Spiegelman's own interactions with his father, both during his childhood and during Spiegelman's interviews with him. According to Spiegelman, including this photograph of

Vladek in *Maus II* creates a related imbalance, between the image a photograph creates of an individual, and what one has learned about the individual through narrative: "So to be left with a photo that tells you something, but only in relation to the drawn and written telling around it, informs what you thought you knew by making you re-examine it" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 220, 222).

The three photographs kept stringently separate in *Maus I* and *II*, appear consecutively in *MetaMaus*, and transform this section of *MetaMaus* into a type of family album, a topic I will return to later in this chapter (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 218-220). The photographs' crooked placement on the page—of Art and his mother, and of Richieu—likewise give this section the semblance of an adapted form of family album. The photograph of Richieu—to whom Spiegelman dedicates *Maus II*—which appears in the preface of *Maus II*, carries emotional weight for Spiegelman; it hung in his parents' bedroom throughout his childhood, serving as a constant reminder of the son and brother who had died. In answer to Hillary Chute's question of how he chose the photo, Spiegelman exclaims: "Oh, it's the photo—it chose me!" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 219). This personification of the photograph—the agency Spiegelman attributes, even if in jest, to the photograph of his brother—verifies the strong hold this photograph has on Spiegelman. In answer to Chute's inquiry into if he had always planned to use Richieu's photograph, Spiegelman goes into greater detail about this path towards deciding to incorporate it, saying that he came to realize his "phantom brother" was not only part of his childhood, but continued to "still hover" over his interviews with his father (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 220).

In their re-narration of the survivor testimony they themselves are privy to, Spiegelman and Mendelsohn re-witness what they have received as listeners. In both *The Lost* and *MetaMaus*, photographs stage the use of photography as a mode of witnessing and testimony.

By including photographs in the narrative structure of their texts, Spiegelman and Mendelsohn require that the reader be faced with images from the past. Mendelsohn's refusal to provide captions in *The Lost* and Spiegelman's minimal captions in *MetaMaus* encourage the reader to spend time looking at the photographs to search for clues, either about the context of the photographs or about why they are embedded in the narrative. By including photographs in both *The Lost* and *MetaMaus*, Mendelsohn and Spiegelman address the reader and urge her to examine the photographs, thereby employing photography as a medium for re-witnessing. Mendelsohn includes both prewar photographs and photographs taken during his and his brother's travels. In *The Lost*, the photographs taken by Mendelsohn's brother Matt on their journeys—e.g. of the survivors they interview, of Bolechow, and of other subjects—serve to substantiate Mendelsohn's account. Not least for this reason, the photographs taken during their trips are not to be overlooked in favor of the prewar photographs Mendelsohn includes of his extended family. That is, the photographs taken during Mendelsohn's travels record the initial stages of the process of re-witnessing.

Both Mendelsohn's *The Lost* and Spiegelman's *MetaMaus* clearly reflect what Hirsch describes as the "archival impulse" in postmemory, which concentrates on collecting as many historical documents, particularly photographs, as possible (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 228, 235). Part of this "archival impulse," Hirsch maintains, consists of "the more contemplative urge to peer inside the images and find out more about the particular life stories they indexically call forth" (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 235). The project Mendelsohn and Spiegelman undertake in their nonfictional narratives can be aptly summarized as this process of finding out more about the specific qualities and characteristics of the featured individuals.

Spiegelman additionally incorporates a type of archive into *MetaMaus* by including a DVD called "The Complete *Maus* Files"; the contents of this DVD are explained in two pages preceding the table of contents page. Part one of the DVD, called "The Complete *Maus,*" has a searchable digital edition of *Maus I* and *II* that contains a "rich archive" of sketches, drafts of pages, audio clips of his recordings with Vladek, and video. Part two of the DVD, called "MetaMeta" contains "a deep archive" with additional audio files of Spiegelman's interviews with his father, secondary literature, a family tree, and more sketches and drafts of panels. Part two of the DVD is also described as "supplementary supplements / an exemplary thimbleful from the vast *Maus* midrash." In addition to these two pages, an asterisk in the text directs the reader to the *MetaMaus* supplements (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 33, 79). These DVD supplements are also interactive, adding to the participatory quality on the part of the reader/viewer in perusing the DVD. For example, while viewing a page, the reader/viewer can scroll over the panels, and additional information, such as preliminary sketches of the panels, will appear.

Hirsch connects this propensity to attempt to assemble an archive in postmemory to the genre of the family album, citing the "particular forms of *assembling*, *arranging*, and *display*" that albums include (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 228). Indeed, postmemory's fascination with the past—its constant need to look back—complements "the backward-looking glance of the album" (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 232). The photographs that appear in *MetaMaus* and *The Lost* comprise a type of family album. The book cover of *The Lost* displays the photographs Mendelsohn embeds in the narrative structure. Appearing throughout the narrative, the pre-war photographs Mendelsohn includes of Shmiel and his family, as well as photographs of other family members, taken prior to the Holocaust, of his grandfather's other

siblings, reproduce a type of family album. By the same token, multiple sections in Spiegelman's *MetaMaus* also constitute a family album.

In addition to justifying his inclusion of the three photographs in *Maus I* and *II*, interspersed throughout *MetaMaus*, Spiegelman provides many more family photographs: of Anja and Vladek, of himself with his parents, and of his own family. Although Spiegelman could not include photographs of people that did not fit into the economy of *Maus I* and *II*, he includes them in *MetaMaus*. By including a section entitled "Searching for Memories of Anja," Spiegelman attempts to recover at least part of Anja's missing voice that critics have pointed towards in scholarship on *Maus I* and *II* by interviewing women who knew Anja in the concentration camps and after the war (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 278-289).[25] The "Searching for Memories of Anja" section lists the notes Spiegelman took during the interviews with these women he conducted between 1986 and 1991. A portrait of Anja in 1945 dominates the title page of the section devoted to her, and the section's last page features a color photograph of Anja with the caption: "Photo of Anja, March 1968, with inscription on back" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 289). An image of the inscription on the back of the final picture appears adjacent to the portrait of Anja, which is slanted so that the photograph of Anja partially covers the image of the inscription, adding to the family album quality of *MetaMaus* (figure 7).

Most importantly, although it is not specified in the caption, the inscription on the back of the picture is not even Anja's inscription, but rather Vladek's. The inscription, which reads "Last cruise together with my beloved wife. March, 1968. Died May 21-st 1968," has already begun to impose a narrative on the photograph by placing it in relationship to the day she

[25] As portrayed in *Maus I* and *II*, Vladek burned Anja's diaries after she committed suicide in 1968. "Prisoner on the Hell Planet," first published in 1973, and later included in *Maus I*, depicts Spiegelman's struggle to come to terms with his mother's suicide. Throughout *Maus I*, as Vladek testifies to Artie, Artie mentions he would like to read Anja's diaries to gain another perspective. Vladek puts Artie off, saying that he has misplaced them; only at the end of *Maus I* does Vladek admit to Artie that he burned her diaries, causing Artie to call him a murderer.

committed suicide (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 289). Anja's voice is not attached to the photograph at all while the image of Vladek's inscription complicates Spiegelman's attempt to restore Anja's voice. It provides, that is, an inscription that circumvents Anja's participation. Vladek's voice overrides her's, and Spiegelman unwittingly repeats this process again in *MetaMaus*, despite his dedication of narrative space to Anja in her own section. To be sure, Spiegelman's additional documents about Anja—the interviews with women who knew her, a section included on the DVD of "Anja's Bookshelf" with pictures of the books that she owned, and more photographs, both pre-war and post-war, of Anja—outlines more of Anja's individuality. And yet, Anja's voice is mediated, once again, by others who knew her, as it was in *Maus I* and *II*. In other words, in attempting to recuperate Anja's voice, Spiegelman replicates in *MetaMaus* his inability to do so.

In another attempt to recuperate Anja's voice in *MetaMaus*, Spiegelman features Anja's family photographs, strewn about again as if in a loosely assembled album. Incorporating photographs from Anja's family album into *MetaMaus* provides Spiegelman an alternative way to illustrate his desire for his mother's voice to be represented, although he does not know who the people in the photographs are: "In most of them, I just have no idea who the people were, and never will know. But the accumulation of photos became something" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 222). This page in *MetaMaus* featuring Anja's family photographs mirrors three pages in *Maus II*, in which Vladek as an old man sits on the couch, surrounded by photographs, which are pictured in a box on the first page, and then depicted as spilling onto the floor in the following two pages (Spiegelman, *Maus II* 114-116). Of these three pages that contain images of photographs using Spiegelman's metaphor of mice as Jews, the last page enlarges the image of Vladek sitting on the couch until it comprises six of the eight panels on the page, thus focusing

on his abject posture as he gazes at the photographs. In *MetaMaus*, this page appears on the page adjacent to the photographs of Anja and her family (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 222; figures 8 and 9). Citing his decision to replicate these photographs using mouse characters in *Maus II*, Spiegelman asserts that including the photographs "allow[s] one to see things about Anja's family—not Vladek's family—because those are the photos that survived" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 222).

In addition to including photographs of Anja and her family, Spiegelman includes in *MetaMaus* pictures of Paul Pavel, a close friend and his psychiatrist, and of Mala, Vladek's second wife, also a Holocaust survivor (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 69, 99, 225). In *Maus I* and *II*, he depicts these people as mouse figures; in *MetaMaus*, he restores their human faces to the characters with whom the reader is already familiar. As a result, the reader of *Maus I*, *II*, and *MetaMaus* can put a name to a human face, instead of solely a mouse face. By providing more photographs of Anja, and restoring the human faces of Pavel and Mala, Spiegelman's use of photographs in *MetaMaus* demonstrates how he employs photographs as a medium for re-witnessing.

The preponderance of photographs in *MetaMaus*—of Anja's unidentified family; of Vladek, Anja, and Art; and of Spiegelman, his wife, and two children—draws attention to the multiplicity of voices each photographed figure in the photographs included in *MetaMaus* at one time possessed and, in doing so, also shows the futility behind trying to represent each and every voice. The inclusion of Anja's photographs in *MetaMaus*, which calls attention to all of the individuals from her family who died in the Holocaust, highlights the still present gaps in narration in *Maus I* and *II*: Spiegelman has not narrated their stories. Nor, however, could he be expected to undertake such extensive research about every relative; by necessity, Spiegelman

had to focus on a single individual's story, and since his father was the only one still alive—his mother having committed suicide in 1968—his father's story was the one most accessible to Spiegelman. This inclusion of photographs underscores the impossibility of devoting such a significant amount of attention to every single individual who died in the Holocaust.

Of the many photographs included in *MetaMaus*, one in particular provides an implicit commentary on this meta-text. On the very last page of *MetaMaus*, after the index, a photograph appears of a young boy, approximately two years of age (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 301; figure 10). Spiegelman provides no caption for this last photograph. Careful examination of three previous photographs that do appear with captions—two of himself, Anja, and Vladek (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 277, 288) and one of himself, Anja, and two family friends (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 68)—suggests this last photograph is actually of Art Spiegelman himself, especially since the penultimate page of *MetaMaus* lists "other Pantheon books by this author" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 300). The boy in the photograph closely resembles the boy identified as Art in the captions of the three photographs that appear earlier in *MetaMaus* (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 68, 277, 288). As with *The Lost*, the reader has to page back and forth through the book to determine whether the same boy appears in both photographs. The photograph of Spiegelman on the last page underscores Spiegelman's position as author of *Maus I* and *II*, as the one, that is, who has given voice to his parents', particularly his father's story, and who continues to do so in *MetaMaus*. The photograph of Spiegelman in *MetaMaus* stands in juxtaposition to the depiction of Spiegelman as a human wearing a mouse mask in the note about the author in the paratext of *Maus I* and *II*. Moreover, the unidentified photograph of Spiegelman as a young boy functions as a bookend to the photograph of Richieu as a young boy in the preface to *Maus II*, the brother to whom he felt his parents always compared him and

found him lacking. In this last gesture, Spiegelman asserts his position as creator of *Maus I* and *II*, and as the son who can narrate his family's history. For this reason, it is significant that the last photograph in *MetaMaus* is of Spiegelman.

Transitioning from the two texts in this study—Mendelsohn's *The Lost* and Spiegelman's *MetaMaus*—that embed photographs in their narrative structure, I turn now to those texts that approach photographs as key artifacts, by devoting a significant amount of reflection on the use of photographs on the level of the plot. Using photographs to punctuate the narrative does not preclude using photographs as a plot device—Mendelsohn's *The Lost* employs photographs in both ways. Texts like Mendelsohn's *The Lost* and Jonathan Safran Foer's *Everything is Illuminated* show how non-survivors can make use of photographs to prompt the beginning of the testimonial encounter. Alex and Jonathan in *Everything is Illuminated* use the photograph of Augustine to initiate conversation. Alex senior, Alex, and Jonathan drive around all day, looking for Trachimbrod (also known as Sofiowka), and ask passersby if they have ever heard of it. Jonathan begins to show them a duplicate photograph of Augustine and asks the people they encounter whether or not they have ever seen the woman. After a long day of searching with no results, they come across one lone figure in front of a tiny house. Alex exits the car this time, and the old, decrepit-looking woman denies having ever heard of Trachimbrod or Sofiowka. Faced with growing desperation about their fruitless journey, Alex decides to show the photograph to the woman and asks: "'Have you ever witnessed anyone in this photograph?'" (Safran Foer 117). After asking this question three times, during which he reads her facial expressions very closely and becomes convinced she is concealing the truth, Alex switches to another question, which he asks her a total of seven times: "'Have you ever witnessed anyone in the photograph?'" (Safran Foer 118). The two questions are identical except for "this

photograph" in the first question and "the photograph" in the second question. Each time he asks her a version of the question (either "this" or "the" photograph), Alex makes more progress towards persuading her to admit that she has seen Augustine. Finally, by changing the directionality of the question, of who saw whom, the old lady confirms they are looking for her: "'Has anyone in this photograph ever witnessed you?' Another tear descended. 'I have been waiting for you for so long.' I pointed to the car. 'We are searching for Trachimbrod.' 'Oh,' she said, and she released a river of tears. 'You are here. I am it'" (Safran Foer 118). Armed with the photograph, which Alex employs as a vehicle to elicit a response, the photograph successfully solicits and demands the old woman's response.

Alex, Jonathan, and Alex senior call the woman Augustine, although at the end of their encounter she reveals her name is Lista. Alex has used the photograph of Augustine to confirm her identity (Safran Foer 148, 150-151); Augustine, in turn, employs photographs as a catalyst to discuss Trachimbrod with Alex, Jonathan, and Grandfather (Safran Foer 151-153). To be sure, although Augustine and Alex's grandfather are members of the same generation, the encounter also occurs between her and Alex and Jonathan; thus, this scene depicts a testimonial encounter with a later generation. As they enter her small house and see the vast collection of photographs from different families that cover her walls, Alex observes, "Her life was a book of photographs" (Safran Foer 148). Augustine's small house is crowded with the former possessions of the murdered Jewish community; all boxes are labeled, for example—"Weddings and other celebrations," "Privates: journals/diaries/sketches/underwear," "Silver/perfume/pinwheels"—indicating Augustine's process of sorting and cataloguing all of the items and objects that once belonged to the Jewish population of Trachimbrod (Safran Foer 147).

Augustine has labeled the box that contains photographs "Remains" (Safran Foer 151). She pulls photographs from the box and as she comes across a photograph, she shares a brief piece of information with the others about the person depicted, including his name, how she knew him, and a brief characterization (Safran Foer 151-154). Whereas before Alex used a photograph to solicit information, Augustine here employs photographs as a starting point for telling the grandfather, Alex, and Jonathan more about her vanished world. Alex describes Augustine's rummaging through the box with diction that reflects the process of digging: "She inspected [the box] REMAINS, excavating photographs and putting them on the table" (Safran Foer 153). As they sit in her small kitchen, made even smaller by the stacks of boxes piled throughout her small house, the material possessions—not of the murdered Jewish community's remains, but of what remains of them—surround them. In this way, Augustine's narration, prompted once again by photographs, becomes a type of excavation. As the only survivor, Augustine views herself as the representative of the former Jewish community. Like Mendelsohn and Spiegelman, Augustine exhibits this archival impulse as well; as a result, her position as a witness suggests that the archival impulse does not only pertain to members of the second and third generation. To return briefly to Spiegelman and Mendelsohn's use of photographs embedded in their narratives to address the reader, neither author poses to the reader the question: "'[h]ave you ever witnessed anyone in this photograph?'" (Safran Foer 117). Rather, they implore the reader: "Witness this person in this photograph."

Like Alex and Jonathan in *Everything is Illuminated*, Daniel Mendelsohn employs family photographs in *The Lost* as a vehicle to elicit oral testimony. The photographs that Alex and Jonathan use in *Everything is Illuminated* and the photographs that Daniel Mendelsohn uses in *The Lost* relate to each other to the extent that both sets of photographs are located in the realm

of the family. In both texts, members of the third generation use photographs as a starting point for survivors to begin their testimony, thereby illustrating the affect produced by photographs within a familial sphere (Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory* 39).

Mendelsohn refers to the few family photographs he has collected of his great-uncle Shmiel, Shmiel's wife Ester, and their four daughters (Lorka, Frydka, Ruchele, and Bronia) to urge survivors to talk about their experiences; the photographs function as a catalyst to help initiate conversation. During his interview with four survivors from Bolechow in Australia, the photograph of Shmiel, Ester, and Bronia serves to initiate a conversation: "the picture of Shmiel, Ester, and Bronia started to loosen tongues, and the conversation about my lost great-uncle and his family became, suddenly, boisterous and somewhat disorderly" (Mendelsohn 185-186). The survivors all begin talking at once, causing Mendelsohn to exclaim desperately to his brother Matt: "I'm losing all this" (Mendelsohn 186). "This" refers to the material about his family Mendelsohn intends to glean from his interviews. Mendelsohn's outburst to Matt indicates Mendelsohn's own anxiety over losing any infinitesimal speck of information that might remain forever irretrievable if he fails to capture it at the time of the interview.

Meg Grossbard, one of the five remaining Bolechower survivor and a childhood friend of Frydka, Shmiel's second eldest daughter, initially resists sharing any information with Mendelsohn, suspicious about his motives. Meg Grossbard's reluctance lessens once Mendelsohn shows her the photograph of Shmiel, Ester, and Bronia: "I put the photograph on the table in front of Meg Grossbard, and she picked it up tenderly. For the first time the hardness, the resistance, seemed to dissolve, and Meg Grossbard, nodding softly, said quietly, Yes. That was her parents. And—also for the first time—she smiled" (Mendelsohn 181). Showing the photograph lessens tension between Mendelsohn and Meg Grossbard in this testimonial

encounter. It does so, it seems, because once Meg Grossbard confirms the photograph depicts Shmiel and Ester, the photograph seems to reactivate memories. Although these memories are not hidden from her, Meg Grossbard has not seen the image of Shmiel and Ester's faces since the war; she views an image of their faces in the photograph that is not a mental one. The photograph here also functions as a catalyst for sharing memories.

Mendelsohn does not initially understand the implications of casually showing his family photographs to survivors. Yet, during this tense interview with Meg Grossbard, he recognizes the extent to which his own relationship to his great-uncle's family has relied on photographs; Mendelsohn's own problem—being "rich in keepsakes" but possessing no memories of his own—stands in contrast to the survivors who have no photos but are "rich with memories" about life in Bolechow before the war and during the Holocaust (Mendelsohn 182). Of the photographs in his possession, Mendelsohn has seen them so many times that he has lost count and takes them for granted.[26] Although the exact number of photographs Mendelsohn had access to growing up remains unclear, he does describe them as "the rich store of photographs" (Mendelsohn 182).

At this same meeting in Australia, Meg Grossbard shows Mendelsohn a photograph he has never seen before, that of a studio portrait of his cousin Frydka (Mendelsohn 180). As the survivors begin to share memories about Frydka, Mendelsohn accidentally learns that Frydka

[26] The trope of the photograph as a metonym for the deceased occurs repeatedly. In *Maus I* and *II*, the photograph of Richieu hanging in his parents' bedroom constantly reminds Artie of the grief his parents still feel: "They didn't need photos of me in their room…I was *alive*!…The photo never threw tantrums or got in any kind of trouble...It was an ideal kid and *I* was a pain in the ass. I couldn't compete…They didn't *talk* about Richieu, but that photo was a kind of reproach. *He*'d have become a *doctor*, and married a wealthy Jewish girl…the creep" (Spiegelman, *Maus II* 15 panels 5-7). The first person narrator in Hans-Ulrich Treichel's *Der Verlorene* (1998) also competes with the photograph of his deceased older brother, Arnold. Neither Artie nor the first person narrator have ever met either of their deceased older brothers and feel as if they were born in a futile attempt to replace them. Both sense the absence of their brothers in the real world but their continued presence in the emotional atmosphere of their families. In *Der Verlorene*, the family photo album prominently displays large photographs of Arnold, while only smaller photographs of the first person narrator are incorporated which do not even feature his entire face and body: „Während mein Bruder Arnold schon zu Säuglingszeiten nicht nur wie ein glücklicher, sondern auch wie ein bedeutender Mensch aussah, war ich auf den meisten Photos meiner Kindheit zumeist nur teilweise und manchmal auch so gut wie überhaupt nicht zu sehen" (Treichel 10).

had started seeing a non-Jewish boy during the war. Mendelsohn appreciates this information about Frydka he has stumbled across since it provides him with more details about Frydka: "At that moment, Frydka, who until now had been a child's face on a photograph or two, began to assume an emotional form, to have a story. So she had liked some Polish boy, I thought to myself with a smile, and he had liked her back" (Mendelsohn 193). Interviewing Meg Grossbard about Frydka reanimates Frydka to the extent that the survivor's narration provides insight into his cousin Frydka, which Mendelsohn would otherwise not have found. Whereas Mendelsohn only previously had the photographs to work with, this new piece of information gives greater depth to Frydka as an individual.

Although such photographs can encourage a survivor to narrate his or her experiences, they can also obscure more than they reveal or draw attention to points of contention between accounts. As another Bolechower survivor Bob Grunschlag tells Mendelsohn, "Everybody remembers slightly different, it all depends on what you heard and what you remember" (Mendelsohn 197). In reference to the same photograph that Mendelsohn shows Meg Grossbard, Boris Goldsmith, Shmiel's former neighbor, does not remember that Shmiel had four daughters. Mendelsohn shows Boris a picture of the parents with Bronia—the youngest daughter—whom Boris has forgotten: "Boris looked surprised. He had three girls, he said. I just remember three girls. / Well, I said, there were four, but— / I don't think there were four. I don't think so…" (Mendelsohn 188-189). In this passage, Mendelsohn provides an example of a survivor misremembering. This encounter is one example in which variations in memories among survivors become apparent in the testimonial encounter.

In Benjamin Stein's novel *Die Leinwand*, as in Mendelsohn's *The Lost*, a photograph points toward discrepancies. A case of possibly mistaken identity first arises with a photograph.

Upon combing through the papers that arrived in the strange suitcase, delivered unexpectedly to his doorstep one day, the protagonist-narrator Wechsler's young daughter identifies as her father a man with blond hair in a photograph from a newspaper article (Stein W.71). The caption identifies the man in the photograph as Jan Wechsler, the writer who exposed the fraud perpetrated by the ostensibly fake survivor Minsky. Minsky is featured prominently in the photograph, taken at the Leipzig book fair, and his hand partially obscures Jan Wechsler's face. As the protagonist-narrator Wechsler notes, while pondering how his daughter could identify him as Jan Wechsler, she did so based on the photograph alone since she cannot read. Although a small anecdote in the novel, the fact that his daughter identifies a stranger, and not him, as her father casts doubt on the protagonist-narrator Wechsler's claim not to be the writer Jan Wechsler. In other words, the photograph serves as evidence to call into question the identity of the man looking at the photograph in the newspaper article.

In contrast to the prominent role of photographs in Mendelsohn's *The Lost*, Spiegelman's *MetaMaus*, and Safran Foer's *Everything is Illuminated*, photographs appear only briefly in Maxim Biller's *Harlem Holocaust* (Biller 11, 26). To briefly recall, the first-person narrator of the story is a character named Efraim who recounts his experience meeting and translating into German a minor American Jewish writer named Warszawski whose success, in Efraim's account, depends on his exploitation of German guilt about the Holocaust. As Efraim comments on his relationships with his former girlfriends Eve and Ina, he observes that Eve is a chameleon, and lists five examples from her photographs of the outfits she dons for various occasions. Efraim's narration suggests that he connects her varied photographs—ranging from "eine naturfarbene Israelin" to "eine fleißige Pariser Tweedkostüme-Sozialistin" and on to "eine sehr reiche und sehr geschminkte deutsche Upperclass-Jüdin"—to her ability to easily adapt her

appearance so as to complement the man she is seeing at the time (Biller 11). As a result, Efraim, biased with his skewed perception, interprets Eve's ostensibly disparate photographs as indicators of her personality, conflating outward appearance with character traits. In this instance, photographs take on the role of evidence that, for Efraim, merely confirms the negative perception of Eve he had to begin with.

Photographs can point toward discrepancies either in identity between two people, as with the narrator-protagonist Weschler and the writer Jan Wechlser in *Die Leinwand*, or toward perceived discrepancies in identity between a single person, as with Eve in *Harlem Holocaust*. In Esther Dischereit's *Joemis Tisch*, photographs can reveal information one might prefer to leave hidden. In one scene in Dischereit's *Joemis Tisch*, the unidentified "ich"—not Hannah's daughter but another unnamed female—visits her mother-in-law's house with her daughter. The mother-in-law, Martha Elisabeth, appears in a preceding scene, which recounts her, Martha Elisabeth's, marriage to Franz Steder, a Nazi who died at the front during the war. After Martha Elisabeth proudly displays the family album she has had made, at great financial cost, for her granddaughter, so that her granddaughter will know who her grandfather was, the female narrator is shocked to discover that the photographs contain Nazi insignia:

> Ich erstarre. Was soll das Hakenkreuz in meinem Haus. Natürlich ist es auf der Uniform, natürlich. Daß mir das niemals vorher aufgefallen ist. In meiner Fotokiste gibt es kein solches Bild. Von niemandem. Martha Elisabeth blättert weiter. Auf jeder Seite stehen sie, die verfluchten Kreuze. 'Schau dir das Gesicht mal an,' deutet sie dahin—ich sehe Tressen. 'Bitte,' sag ich zu ihr schließlich, 'laß es aus diesem Album raus—mach doch eines extra, bitte. Da sind die Alten dann alle zusammen.' (Dischereit 110)

Marta Elisabeth does not comprehend why her daughter-in-law wants to keep the photographs separate, and easily assents, remarking that she has not yet adhered the pictures to the pages. Although unclear, the most likely scenario for why the daughter-in-law does not have "solche Fotos" is because of her Jewish heritage as supported by her immediate, visceral reaction against the Nazi insignia in the photographs. The family photographs confront the female narrator with her father-in-law's past, and although she cannot avoid looking at them while sitting with her mother-in-law, she devises a plan to avoid having to look at them again, euphemistically referring to the photographs as "die Alten." These photographs do not trouble Martha Elisabeth at all; indeed, she does not even understand the motivation behind her daughter-in-law's request.

The texts of the second and third generation portray photographs as signifiers that an individual cannot escape from once presented with them. Noted above, in *Everything is Illuminated*, Alex confronts Augustine with a photograph, and later in the novel, the fact that Jonathan and Alex recognize Alex's grandfather in the photograph with Herschel provokes the grandfather's testimony about Herschel. In *Everything is Illuminated*, the photograph that features Alex senior and Herschel, which Jonathan and Alex found in Augustine's box of photographs, reveals that Grandfather has a story he has not yet told. If Jonathan and Alex had not found the photograph, it is likely that the grandfather would not have divulged his complicity in the murder of his Jewish friend, Herschel. As a result, the photograph is partially responsible for revealing grandfather's secret since it instigated the grandfather's narration. As portrayed in *Everything is Illuminated*, the photograph compels Alex's grandfather to narrate (Safran Foer 247). Unlike in Rosner's *The Speed of Light*, where Paula and Julian know not to ask their father any questions about his past, the grandfather cannot easily ignore Jonathan and Alex's questions since they have the photograph right in front of them. In comparison, in Dischereit's *Joemis*

Tisch, presumably, should the daughter of the female narrator come across the photographs that will now be placed in a separate album, she would ask questions about them. By having her mother-in-law place these photographs in a separate album, the female narrator attempts to hide them, and in this way, eliminates questions, thereby circumventing the need for narration. Photographs facilitate the transmission of memory, even if it is a memory that neither the female narrator in *Joemis Tisch* nor the grandfather in *Everything is Illuminated* wants to pass on to the next generation.

Although *The Lost* employs photography as a medium for re-witnessing, Mendelsohn also uses a photograph in *The Lost* to prevent re-witnessing. After successfully convincing Meg Grossbard, one of the last five Bolechower survivors, to narrate her story, Mendelsohn informs the reader that he cannot reveal what Meg Grossbard told him since she stipulated that he not include her story in his book. Mendelsohn abides by the second part of the terms of agreement he made with Meg Grossbard, that is, her insistence that her face also not be included in the book; Mendelsohn represents this proscription by including her photograph at the end of the chapter, but having a black box cover the features of her face: some of her hair and neck is visible, and one can see her hand holding up a photograph of Frydka, Shmiel's second eldest daughter (Mendelsohn 262). The description of this photograph comes two pages earlier (Mendelsohn 260). Mendelsohn uses this photograph to both witness and not witness: he prevents the reader from being able to see Meg's face while simultaneously allowing the reader to see the photo held in the hand of the person she is not allowed to see. Blocking out Meg's face functions as Mendelsohn's own self-censorship in the context of his autobiographical narrative and demonstrates he has stayed true to his word, thus further establishing Mendelsohn's credibility.

In another instance in *The Lost*, the process of re-witnessing revolves around taking photographs instead of narrating about them. Matt, Mendelsohn's brother who is a professional photographer, takes pictures of the witnesses whom they encounter on their travels. Although the photographs themselves are witnesses to witnessing, the process of taking photographs provides an opportunity to re-witness to others. On the beach in Australia, Matt persuades a teenage surfer to walk behind Jack and Bob as he photographs them. The surfer's friends approach Mendelsohn and inquire about the photography session: "Well, I said. It's a long story…OK, I said. How on earth to begin? Well, I began, My grandfather came from this little town in Poland…" (Mendelsohn 259, ellipses in original). In this instance, Mendelsohn narrates to the Australian teenagers an abridged version of the story of his family and the Holocaust. In doing so, he becomes a witness. Though he is not a witness *to* the Holocaust, he acts as a witness *for* the Holocaust. The second ellipsis (which is in the text) serves as a placeholder for the rest of the oral narrative Mendelsohn tells the teenagers. Mendelsohn's written narrative, the book *The Lost*, becomes a way for him to re-witness for the Jäger family and tell their story as he did on the beach—but now reaching a much larger audience.

Unlike Mendelsohn's *The Lost* and Spiegelman's *MetaMaus*, Rosner's novel *The Speed of Light* does not devote any narrative time to photographs, nor does it feature photographs as a plot device to the extent that Safran Foer's *Everything is Illuminated* does. Photographs in *The Speed of Light* appear more subtly. Sola, the protagonist who witnessed the massacre of her village and who sought political asylum in New York City, has a photographic memory and this trait strengthens her position as a witness to the massacre of her village. After Julian asks how she noticed that he moved a table ever so slightly, Sola explains: "'My mother and my grandmother and the mother of my grandmother, all of us have it. We memorize just with

looking…In my language it is called 'painting on the inside of my eyes'" (Rosner 21). Although Sola has not yet shared her story with Julian, the knowledge that she has a photographic memory functions as implicit confirmation that her testimony about what she witnessed is valid. If she has a photographic memory, then she could not have misremembered what she witnessed.

After Julian and Paula's father dies, Paula wants only the photographs (Rosner 37). Paula's family photographs reappear later as a plot point. While cleaning Paula's closet, Sola recognizes Paula's mother's dress from a family photograph (Rosner 82). This moment of recognition Sola feels when she identifies the actual dress based on its referent in the photograph calls to mind the moments of recognition on the part of the survivors—at seeing the image of a face they had not seen since the war—Mendelsohn and Spiegelman induce through their use of photographs. As she cleans a wealthy client's house, the family photographs disturb Sola's quiet, predictable routine: "I cannot help glancing at the pictures, and feel the familiar stab in my heart when I see something in the baby's eyes that reminds me of my own little girl, even though they look nothing alike" (Rosner 100). The photograph of the baby girl nonetheless reminds Sola of her own daughter and of the fact that she has no photographs of her.

In addition to the reliance on photography, either by having photographs punctuate the narrative, or appear as a thematic or plot point in the narrative, the selected texts of the second and third generation integrate other elements of the documentary genre, such as historical documents and artifacts. In doing so, the selected texts attempt to employ these historical documents and artifacts as substitutes for witnesses, and use these historical documents and artifacts to either support or refute a witness's testimony. In Elizabeth Rosner's novel *The Speed of Light*, Paula finds historical documents and records in Budapest about her grandfather, grandmother, and aunt. Characterizing these documents as "[h]istory climbing toward me like a

rope, braided with details that took the breath right out of my chest," Paula discovers that her grandfather was a cantor and her aunt a violinist (Rosner 145). Since Paula herself is a musician, uncovering this previously unknown musical connection to her grandfather and aunt elicits unexpected feelings of identification with her deceased family members, particularly her aunt. Using the information from the deportation records, Paula learns that her grandfather was deported to Auschwitz at age 51 and her aunt at age 14. Paula's investigation into her father's past reveals her family members' names, which are cited in the text as if from the deportation record (Rosner 145).[27] By appearing to cite from this fictional deportation record, Rosner employs what Irene Kacandes has referred to as an "authenticating strategy" (Kacandes, "When facts are scarce" 189). Through these records, Paula gleans information about her father's story: "What I was reading on those pages meant my father went to Auschwitz at the age of seventeen, orphaned on arrival" (Rosner 145). From the records, she has already learned more about her father's experiences than he ever told her.

Similarities exist between Paula's use of historical documents in *The Speed of Light* and Daniel Mendelsohn's use of historical documents in *The Lost*. In both texts, historical documents reveal previously unknown information. Mendelsohn uses historical documents to substantiate what he has gleaned from eyewitness testimony. However, he acknowledges the discrepancies that at times arise between his interviews with survivors and historical research. While historical documents and artifacts can impart knowledge, they do not reveal everything and can even obscure knowledge about the past. Mendelohn recounts the factual errors about Shmiel and his family, which he has come across during his research: "But unless, like me, you

[27] One observation worth noting is that the (fictional) deportation records of Paula's family members—"'Jacob David Perel, age 51, deported to Auschwitz. Sarah Rebecca Perel, age 14, deported to Auschwitz'" (Rosner 145)—actually point out a slight inaccuracy in the text. Paula's father's name was also Jacob and according to Jewish tradition, children are named after deceased relatives, not currently living ones; Paula's grandfather Jacob would not have named his newborn son, Paula's father, after himself. On the other hand, the identical name of father and son could be a sign of assimilation.

had vested interest in the few facts that can still be known about them, you'd never know that the information about these six people that you were so happy to be able to find in the Yad Vashem database was almost completely incorrect, and you'd never be the wiser" (Mendelsohn 225).

In both Benjamin Stein's novel *Die Leinwand* and Elizabeth Rosner's novel *The Speed of Light*, historical documents do not solely reveal previously unknown information; rather, they also contradict information previously thought to be true. In *Die Leinwand*, Minsky, the Holocaust survivor who most people in the novel believe to be an imposter, searches for proof and corroboration of his memories. Attempting to prove that he is the person he remembers himself to be and not the person his identity papers say he is, Minsky concludes that his identity papers and other documentation are false. Since, in his view, these documents are false, they incorrectly establish him as an imposter. Minsky confides in Zichroni about his attempts to discover and locate the people and places that haunt him in his nightmares (Stein Z.176). Just as the narrator-protagonist Wechsler looks for proof that he is not Jan Wechsler, Minsky searches for proof and corroboration of his memories. Zichroni even accompanies Minsky on Minsky's research trips to the archives in Poland, to Majdanek, Auschwitz, and the orphanage in Krakow.[28] This uncanny search for proof his own identity and past inverts the narrator-protagonist Wechsler's own futile search to prove that he is not the reporter Jan Wechsler. In both cases in *Die Leinwand* —of the narrator-protagonist Wechsler seeking to disprove his identity and of Minsky seeking, in turn, to prove his identity—the characters turn to documents to find evidence and proof, but instead find only documents that obscure matters. While searching for proof that he, the narrator-protagonist Wechsler, is not the writer Jan Wechsler, Wechsler repeatedly ignores the evidence that proves he is indeed the same person. After

[28] Minsky's position as a member of the 1.5. generation, Susan Rubin Suleiman's generational category of child survivors who were alive at the time but were not adults, provides one explanation that allows for Minsky to need to conduct research about his life while still allowing him to actually be a Holocaust survivor (Suleiman, "The 1.5 Generation" 277).

confirming his documentation with the registry office, Wechsler finally admits that his story does not add up: “Die Aktenlage ist eindeutig. Was ich erzählt habe, kann nicht stimmen” (Stein W.117).

As in Mendelsohn’s *The Lost* and as suggested but not resolved in Stein’s *Die Leinwand*, Rosner’s *The Speed of Light* also acknowledges that official documentation can obscure and even refute facts by containing false information. At his fifty-fifth birthday celebration, Paula and Julian’s father discloses that they had been celebrating his birthday on the wrong date all these years; instead of November 4, his birthday was actually April 11. Since the placement of the month and date are switched in the European and American notation system, their father’s official birth date according to his naturalization papers lists the incorrect date—something he had never even told his now deceased wife (Rosner 79-80). When Julian and Paula ask why he is telling them now, he admits that he would like the correct birth date engraved on his tombstone, saying “‘I figured it was time already. I want you to get it right on my gravestone’” (Rosner 80).

Similar to the use of photographs and historical documents in Mendelsohn’s *The Lost*, Stein’s *Die Leinwand*, and Rosner’s *The Speed of Light*, these selected texts of the second and third generation feature artifacts, another type of testimonial object. In *Everything is Illuminated*, the two artifacts that Augustine has in her box labeled “Remains”—Rivka’s wedding ring and Miriam’s hair clip—serve as reminders of these two victims of the Holocaust (Safran Foer 152-153). As with the photographs, Augustine uses these artifacts as a starting point to tell the grandfather, Alex, and Jonathan about Rivka and Miriam, two members of the Trachimbrod Jewish community who were murdered. As illustrated in this example, artifacts, like photographs, can encourage narration in the testimonial encounter.

In Chapter Three of this study, re-witnessing could occur as a result of including photographs in these narratives. Either photographs punctuate the narrative, appearing as part of the narrative structure of the text, which occurs most predominantly in Mendelsohn's *The Lost* and Spiegelman's *MetaMaus*, or photographs appear as a thematic or plot point in the narrative. The emphasis on photographs, historical documents, and artifacts in these selected texts of the second and third generation indicate that, regardless of whether or not they are nonfictional or fictional narratives, these texts reflect on the memory and history of the Holocaust, ruminating, especially, on the available sources that can supplement encounters with witnesses. After analyzing the types of testimonial encounters between witness and listener in Chapter Two and examining the questions raised by the incorporation of photography, historical documents, and artifacts into these texts in Chapter Three, I explore instances of re-witnessing in Chapter Four, in which the listener re-narrates what she has heard to a third party.



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THE FORMLESS VOID

Some time ago, when I was six or seven or eight years old, it would occasionally happen that I'd walk into a room and certain people would begin to cry. The rooms in which this happened were located, more often than not, in Miami Beach, Florida, and the people on whom I had this strange effect were, like nearly everyone in Miami Beach in the mid-nineteen-sixties, old. Like nearly everyone else in Miami Beach at that time (or so it seemed to me then), these old people were Jews—Jews of the sort who were likely to lapse, when sharing prized bits of gossip or coming to the long-delayed endings of stories or to the punch lines of jokes, into Yiddish; which of course had the effect of rendering the climaxes, the points, of these stories and jokes incomprehensible to those of us who were young.

Like many elderly residents of Miami Beach in those days, these people lived in apartments or small houses that seemed, to those who didn't live in them, slightly stale; and which were on the whole quiet, except on those evenings when the sound of the Red Skelton or Milton Berle or Lawrence Welk shows blared from the black-and-white television sets. At certain intervals, however, their stale, quiet apartments would grow noisy with the voices of young children who had flown down for a few weeks in the winter or spring from Long Island or the New Jersey suburbs to see these old Jews, and who would be presented to them, squirming with awkwardness and embarrassment, and forced to kiss their papery, cool cheeks.

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Figure 1



Of this Shmiel, of course, I knew something: my grandfather's oldest brother, who with his wife and four beautiful daughters had been killed by the Nazis during the war. *Shmiel. Killed by the Nazis.* The latter was, we all understood, the unwritten caption on the few photographs that we had of him and his family, which now lie stored carefully inside a plastic baggie inside a box inside a carton in my mother's basement. A prosperous-looking businessman of perhaps fifty-five, standing proprietarily in front of a truck next to two uniformed drivers; a family gathered around a table, the parents, four small girls, an unknown stranger; a sleek man in a fur-collared coat, wearing a fedora; two young men in World War I uniforms, one of whom I knew to be the twenty-one-year-old Shmiel while the identity of the other one was impossible to guess, unknown and unknowable. . . . *Unknown and unknowable:* this could be frustrating, but also produced a certain allure. The photographs of Shmiel and his family were, after all, more fascinating than the other family pictures that were so fastidiously preserved in my mother's family archive precisely because we knew almost nothing about him, about them; their unsmiling, unspeaking faces seemed, as a result, more beguiling.

For a long time there were only the mute photographs and, sometimes, the uncomfortable ripple in the air when Shmiel's name was mentioned. This was not often, when my grandfather was still living, because we knew this was the great tragedy of his life, that his brother and sister-in-law and four nieces had been killed by the Nazis. Even I, who when he visited loved to sit at his feet, shod in their soft leather slippers, and to listen to his many stories about "the family," which of course meant *his* family, whose name had once been Jäger (and who, forced to give up that umlaut over the *a* when they came to America, over time became Yaegers and Yagers and Jagers and, like him, Jaegers: all of these spellings appear on the gravestones in Mount Judah), this family who for centuries had had a butcher store and then, later, a meat-shipping business in Bolechow, *a nice town, a bustling little town, a shtetl*, a place that was famous for the timber and meat and leather goods that its merchants shipped all over Europe, *a place where a person could live, a beautiful spot near the mountains;* even I, who was so close to him, who as I grew older would ask him so often about matters of family

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Figure 2



so many stories, who dressed so famously well: with his smoothly shaven oval face, the winking blue eyes and the straight nose that ended in the barest suggestion of a bulb, as if whoever had designed him had decided, at the last minute, to throw in a hint of humor; with his sparse, neatly brushed white hair, his clothes and cologne and manicures, his notorious jokes and his intricate, tragic stories.

My grandfather would come each year in the summer, since in the summer the weather on Long Island was less oppressive than it was in Miami Beach. He would stay for weeks at a time, accompanied by whichever of his four wives he happened to be married to at the time. When he came to stay he (and, sometimes, the wife) would occupy my little brothers' room, with its narrow twin beds. There, on arriving from the airport, he would hang his hat on a lamp shade and neatly fold his sport coat over the back of a chair, and afterward he'd set about taking care of his canary, Schloimele, which is Yiddish for *little Solomon:* settling the cage on a tiny oak child's desk, sprinkling the little bird with a few drops of water *just to refresh a little.* Then, slowly,

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Figure 3



Unknowable.

Every single word of the Five Books of Moses, the core of the Hebrew Bible, has been analyzed, examined, interpreted, and held up to the scrutiny of rigorous scholars over many centuries. It is generally acknowledged that the greatest of all biblical commentators was the eleventh-century French scholar Rabbi Shlomo ben Itzhak, who is better known as Rashi, a name that is nothing more than an acronym formed from the initial letters of his title, name, and patronymic: Ra(bbi) Sh(lomo ben) I(tzhak)—Rashi. Born in Troyes in 1040, Rashi survived the terrible upheavals of his time, which included the slaughters of Jews that were, so to speak, a by-product of the First Crusade. Educated in Mainz, where he was the student of the man who had been the greatest student of the renowned Gershom of Mainz (because I have always had good teachers, I love the idea of these intellectual genealogies), Rashi founded his own academy at the age of twenty-five and lived to see himself recognized as the greatest scholar of his age. His concern for each and every word of the text he was studying was matched only by the cramped terseness of his own style; it is perhaps because of the latter that Rashi's own commentary on the Bible has itself become the object of some two hundred further commentaries. One measure of Rashi's significance is that the first printed Hebrew Bible included his commentary. . . . It is interesting, for me, to note that Rashi, like my great-uncle Shmiel, had only daughters, which was, so far as these things go, more of a liability for a man with a certain kind of ambition in 1040 than it was in 1940. Still, the children of these daughters of Rashi carried on their grandfather's magnificent legacy, and for that reason were known as baalei tosafot, *"Those Who Extended."*

Although Rashi stands as the preeminent commentator on the Torah—and, hence, on the first parashah *in the Torah, the reading with which the Torah begins, and which itself begins with not one but, mysteriously, two accounts of the Creation, and includes the story of Adam and Eve and the Tree of Knowledge, and which is for that reason a story that has attracted particularly rigorous commentary over the millennia—it*

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Figure 4

– 75 –

Figure 5



getting used to my cockeyed notion of drawing mice for people, anyway. Instead I had this kind of vulnerable-looking mouse shown with the scritchiness of line that indicates a drawing of or from a photo.

The next actual photo in the book is the one that starts volume two, the photograph of Richieu as a young boy that hung in my parents' bedroom.

How did you choose this photo?

Oh, it's the photo—it chose me! It's the one that's referred to in the drive to the Catskills; the photo that was hanging up over the bed as a large blow-up from a small picture, so it's a little ghostly.

And at the front of the second book, it forms a kind of grounding, of this real person who was lost. It's useful to see that photo, to have the little simple glyph of the photo that appears elsewhere in the book as a drawing… It does a lot of work by being up front over there.

Did you always know that you wanted to use this photo in the book?

No. The photos came out a bit more organically than that. The photo of Richieu hovered as a presence over my childhood, as said in the book, but I hadn't thought about it one way or another for *Maus*. But we had just had a kid, and by then I knew

FACING PAGE, LEFT: 1958 photo and splash panel study, "*Prisoner on the Hell Planet*," 1972. RIGHT: Panel studies for page 19. ABOVE: Scripting/text formatting ("type spec-ing") for page 175, and photo of Richieu, 1940.

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Figure 6



Figure 7



relation to the drawn and written telling around it, informs what you thought you knew by making you re-examine it.

What about the pages that come before with the drawings of many, many family photos?

After Vladek finally has unearthed this box of photos, it's a way to at least begin to understand the destinies of other people in my immediate family in an encapsulated manner. Going over these photos laid out over the page allows for rather telegraphic, but efficient information about brothers, uncles, whatever. And, very specifically, these photos allow one to see things about Anja's family—not Vladek's family—because those are the photos that survived. What's left are only early postwar photos of Vladek's brother who managed to hide in Russia, and was living in Israel.

But the photos of the Zylberberg family survived because they were part of the possessions put in safekeeping with the Polish governess. She kept their furniture and stuff and wouldn't give that back, but since the photos had no meaning for her, they were passed back to Anja and made it to Queens, where I was able to see them. In most of them, I just have no idea who the people were, and never will know.

But the accumulation of photos becomes something. On page 275 there is a pile-up of photos at the bottom of the page that somehow refers back to the pile of bodies as it bleeds off the page. The pile of anonymous pictures.

Here it's Vladek who's commenting on the pictures that did survive. Some of those photos had the kinds of damage that include faces cut out of a photo . . .

ABOVE: Draft, page 276. LEFT: Study, page 275. RIGHT: Pinek, Sarah, Zev, and Zipora, 1948. FACING PAGE: Prewar photos from Anja's album.

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Figure 8

Figure 9



Figure 10

Figures from:

Mendelsohn, Daniel. *The Lost: A Search for Six of Six Million*. New York: HarperCollins, 2006. 3, 7, 10, 16, 75.

Spiegelman, Art. *MetaMaus: A Look Inside a Modern Classic, Maus*. New York: Pantheon, 2011. 219, 289, 222-223, 301.

Chapter Four

Instances of Re-Witnessing in Generational Texts

"Niemand / zeugt für den / Zeugen"
—Paul Celan, "Aschenglorie"

In Chapter Two, I examined encounters that occur primarily between members of the first generation and members of either the second or third generation in which the survivor narrates his story to the listener. As discussed in Chapter Two, these intergenerational testimonial encounters depict the complicated process of transmitting memory about the Holocaust. In Chapter Three, I focused on the role photography, historical documents, and artifacts play in these testimonial encounters. As markers of the historical event of the Holocaust, witnesses and listeners often employ or refer to photographs, historical documents, and artifacts. At times, photographs initiate conversation. At other times, photographs, historical documents, and artifacts, instead of supporting survivor testimony, point towards contradictions between what a survivor remembers and what a historical document indicates. As employed by Daniel Mendelsohn, Art Spiegelman, and the character Augustine in Jonathan Safran Foer's *Everything is Illuminated*, photographs have the capacity to condense Hirsch's concept of postmemory into single images, as images of the past that are viewed in the present, thus distilling the process of memory and narration surrounding a single photograph or set of photographs. In addition, photographs in these three selected texts enable the process of re-witnessing, in which the listener re-narrates a witness's testimony to a third party. In Chapter Four, I explore instances of re-witnessing. Re-witnessing, the term I have used throughout this study to indicate the next step a listener can undertake after her encounter with a witness, facilitates an ongoing process of transmission, although that process is not without its problems.

The selected texts of the second and third generation I analyze are emblematic of the ways in which texts of the second and third generation in German Jewish and American Jewish literature utilize and transform elements that appear in survivor witnessing and testimony. By incorporating elements of witnessing and testimony, while also depicting the transmission of Holocaust memory that continues after the listener has either heard or read a survivor's testimony, the listener participates in the ongoing process of generational transmission. The concept of re-witnessing productively expands the purview of postmemory by demonstrating that the transmission of memory about the Holocaust will be able to continue through encounters between listeners and other individuals who did not hear or receive testimony directly from the survivor. My term re-witnessing signals an action-oriented engagement with the past, one that not only encourages, but necessitates that a listener use what he or she has heard from the survivor and narrate it to others.

The process of re-witnessing takes place in Rosner's *The Speed of Light*, Mendelsohn's *The Lost*, Spiegelman's *MetaMaus*, Safran Foer's *Everything is Illuminated*, and Biller's *Harlem Holocaust*. In these five texts, re-witnessing occurs either between characters in the narrative, or between the author and reader as a result of the narrative. Re-witnessing functions as a two-step process: initially listening to the survivor, and then adapting what is heard into another narrative, predominantly in the form of written, rather than oral, narrative. In contrast, re-witnessing does not occur in Stein's *Die Leinwand* and Dischereit's *Joemis Tisch* because the listener does not re-narrate what she has heard to a third party.

As presented in these texts, before an instance of re-witnessing can occur, the narrator or character must first decide to search. The narrator or character acts as a detective who chooses to investigate memory and family history. Indeed, these texts suggest that re-witnessing arises as a

result of searching. As part of the narrator and character acting as a detective, the narrator or character chooses to become a witness. Victims and survivors of the Holocaust did not choose to become witnesses; similarly, bystanders did not necessarily choose to become witnesses; perpetrators, however, on some level due to their choice of actions, did choose to become witnesses to acts of atrocity. In contrast, in this new development of post-Holocaust generational texts, the witness to the witness chooses to become a witness; the element of choice has become integrated into the avenue of witnessing and by extension, into re-witnessing.

The narrator acts as a kind of detective, one who searches for the narrative preceding the outcome to which she already knows the ending. For example, in *The Lost*, Mendelsohn already knows the end result—that Shmiel and his family died in the Holocaust—but not of the circumstances of each family member's death. That is, although Mendelsohn does not know exactly what he might find out during his search, he does know that Shmiel and his family died in the Holocaust. In other words, he has the what—the outcome—but not the how. Likewise, Spiegelman, in gathering Vladek's testimony as part of his research for *Maus I* and *II*, knows Vladek and Anja survive the Holocaust, and believes his father's experiences to have shaped his father's behavior in the present. In Rosner's *The Speed of Light*, Paula and Julian Perel understand that, in retrospect, their father's behavior—for example, becoming a vegetarian, suffering nightmares—are effects of the traumatic experiences he experienced as a member of the *Sonderkommando* during the Holocaust. Hannah's daughter, too, in Dischereit's *Jöemis Tisch*, also comprehends that her mother's behavior—her shaking hands, being on disability—are a result of her mother's traumatic experiences. In *Everything is Illuminated*, one character, Jonathan, knows the outcome of one key narrative: that his grandfather survived because of Augustine' s help, that his grandfather emigrated to America, and that, years later, he, Jonathan,

was born. Of course, multiple events happen in between the point when, for instance, his grandfather emigrates to America and Jonathan's birth in New York.

As a result of deciding to search for her family history, the narrator or character travels, usually to a foreign country. The narrative of return, in which a member of the second or third generation travels from America to Europe to discover his family history, operates as a main trope throughout these texts.[29] The individual learns as much as there is still left to discover about his family's past, using eyewitness testimony and historical documents to piece together relatives' lives before the Holocaust and their deaths in the Holocaust, or, in the case of Spiegelman investigating his father, of relatives' survival during the Holocaust. One common theme is the return not just to a geographical location, but a return to the possibility of what might have been. Philosopher and theorist Dorota Glowacka, in her study *Disappearing Traces: Holocaust Testimonials, Ethics, and Aesthetics* (2012), refers to this as "the 'would-have-been' inscribed in witnessing" (Glowacka 56). In the juxtaposition between the places they encounter and in the recognized absence of the world that no longer exists, these individuals are confronted with the realization that such a journey will ultimately end in the inability to restore such a world. As a result of their return journey, these individuals construct a narrative of their familial and personal history.

In contrast to Julian in *The Speed of Light*, who is content to remain at home in New York, primarily in the predictable safety of his own apartment, his sister Paula travels across Europe, auditioning for roles in the hope of becoming a famous opera star. While in Budapest for one audition, Paula walks the streets of old Budapest, imagining her father growing up there (Rosner 144-145). After stumbling across her family name, "Perel," on gravestones in the back

[29] For a discussion of the trope of the narrative of return, especially among members of the second generation, see Arlene Stein's *Reluctant Witnesses: Survivors, Their Children, and the Rise of Holocaust Consciousness* (2014) (A. Stein 141-147).

of the unnamed great synagogue (Rosner 144), Paula decides to investigate her father's family. While talking to Julian, she even refers to her research as an "expedition" (Rosner 213).

As Paula undertakes one kind of investigation in *The Speed of Light*, in Stein's *Die Leinwand*, the narrator-protagonist Wechsler undertakes a different kind when he sets out to prove that he is not the writer Jan Wechsler who revealed Minsky to be a fraud. Minsky, in turn, attempts to prove his own identity. Both Wechsler and Minsky act like detectives and carry out their own investigations, although not of others, but of their own lives.[30] During their investigations into themselves, both Wechsler and Minsky are forced to act in a manner similar to detectives: they conduct background research, visit places, and meet people to interview. The narrator-protagonist Wechsler, for example, conducts an interview with Franz von Dennen, his publisher and supposed confidant, and purposefully meets von Dennen in person so as to gauge von Dennen's reaction. In addition, while seeking refuge in the vacation destination Vallée du Joux once his wife tells him to leave their home, believing him to be the writer Jan Wechsler, the narrator-protagonist Wechsler decides to visit Minsky in person. By visiting Minsky, the narrator-protagonist Wechsler hopes to determine whether or not Minsky recognizes him as the Jan Wechsler who revealed Minsky to be an imposter. The narrator-protagonist Wechsler reasons that seeing Minsky face to face would provide incontrovertible proof of whether or not he is Jan Wechsler: "Wenn ich aber so sehr auf einen Beweis hoffte, war er nun nah…Wenn es jemanden gab, der mir ohne Umschweife und zweifelsfrei bestätigen konnte, dass ich nicht Jan Wechsler, der Autor der <<Maskeraden>>, war, dann Minsky" (Stein W.92). And, of course, Minsky recognizes him as the writer Jan Wechsler and immediately sends him away. In both

[30] Admittedly, the writer Jan Wechsler first investigated Minsky. This time, instead of investigating Minsky, the narrator-protagonist Wechsler investigates himself. In this way, the narrator-protagonist Wechsler undertakes an investigation that is the opposite of writer Jan Wechsler's investigation—instead of Minsky, Jan Wechsler is the person of inquiry. Minsky's investigation into himself replicates the writer Jan Wechsler's investigation into Minsky, but with dissimilar motivations; Minsky looks to prove he is who he believes he is, whereas Jan Wechsler aims to prove Minsky is not who he says he is.

examples, the narrator-protagonist Wechsler conducts a type of interview. Despite the investigation the narrator-protagonist Wechsler chooses to undertake, his search for proof that he is not the writer Jan Wechsler becomes futile. He discovers that he is in fact the writer Jan Wechsler. In this example, the narrator-protagonist Wechsler's motivation for searching—to prove his innocence—is thwarted by the results of his investigation. This example from *Die Leinwand* demonstrates that the decision to search can result in discovering unwelcome information.

This development of the narrator or character as a type of detective indicates these selected texts of the second and third generation's participation in the genre of the detective story. In *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization* (2009), Michael Rothberg also identifies this correspondence between the genre of the detective story and narratives that focus on the transmission of memory, characterizing them as "*narratives of detection* and *narratives of intergenerational conflict and transgenerational transmission*" (Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory* 285). Although one might assume that the reader knowing the outcome of the narrative—for example, that Mendelsohn discovers what has happened to Shmiel and his family—eliminates the production of suspense, the texts of the second and third generation analyzed in this study nevertheless cultivate suspense.

In *Die Leinwand*, Benjamin Stein produces suspense by writing a quasi-detective story.[31] We read to find out how the two divergent narrative strands will intersect, and how reading one strand contradicts with what one has read in the other. The suspense comes from these two narrative strands, narrated by two different narrators. To an engaged reader, the suspense and mystery come from wanting to find out if the narrator-protagonist Wechsler is the writer Jan

[31] For an overview of the genre of the detective story, see John G. Cawelti's "Canonization, Modern Literature, and the Detective Story" in *Theory and Practice of Classic Detective Fiction* (1997): 5-15.

Wechsler who exposed Minsky as a fraud, and if so, how Jan Wechsler came to forget his identity. Additional suspense and mystery stem from the question of where, what, when, why, and how Wechsler and Zichroni met; whether or not Minsky is a Holocaust survivor; and, on a meta-textual level, how this narrative comes to be narrated in the first place. Though stranger things have happened—in this narrative alone, no less—not all of the mysteries in *Die Leinwand* are resolved. If anything, the ending of each of the two different narrative strands prompts more questions than it provides answers. Unlike conventional detective stories in which all is revealed at the end, the form of *Die Leinwand*, in its two distinct, but in the end, intersecting strands, reflects and comments on the content of the novel by refusing to provide answers to multiple questions that arise at the end (regardless of which strand one reads last). By doing so, Stein deviates from the generic convention of providing closure at the end of a detective story (Segal 154).

Mendelsohn's nonfictional narrative *The Lost*, likewise, creates suspense. Despite—or perhaps because of—his realization that he wants a "gripping narrative," Mendelsohn consistently denies the reader of *The Lost* any type of clear linear narrative with a beginning, middle, and end (Mendelsohn 150). For example, the reader learns relatively early on that his search was successful, but must read the entire autobiographical text to learn specifically the information Mendelsohn uncovers about his great-uncle Shmiel and his family (Mendelsohn 81). Rather than eliminating suspense, however, knowing that Mendelsohn's search was successful encourages the reader to continue reading. Mendelsohn does not only defer providing knowledge to the reader about the photographs, but also defers telling the reader about certain details of his investigation. During his first visit to Bolechow, Mendelsohn thought he had found the place where Shmiel had died, only to soon reveal to the reader that the location turned out to

be wrong, without providing any additional information (Mendelsohn 136). Mendelsohn's use of delayed or deferred knowledge contributes to the reader's expectation that she will eventually find out what Mendelsohn discovered. Mendelsohn's delaying of the moment of truth contributes to a build-up of suspense. The refusal to provide answers to the features of his research that he tells the reader are incorrect generates suspense.

Not all of the selected texts that contain instances of re-witnessing create suspense. Whereas Benjamin Stein in *Die Leinwand* and Mendelsohn in *The Lost* produce suspense, Spiegelman's inclusion of Vladek's oral testimony in *MetaMaus*, which Spiegelman claims has not been altered—ultimately dispels suspense. While listening to the audio file of Vladek's oral testimony on the enclosed DVD to *MetaMaus*, the listener/reader recognizes anecdotes included in *Maus I* and *II*, such as Vladek's account of a German soldier disguised as a tree during the German invasion of Poland. Listening to Vladek produces an effect similar to that which Mendelsohn generates in *The Lost* by alternatively providing first a description of the photograph, then the photograph itself, or first the photograph, and only later its description or explanation—a narrative strategy explored above in the second chapter. Although Spiegelman does not provide a photograph of, for example, Vladek's anecdote about the German soldier disguised as a tree, Spiegelman has already provided a visualization of the scene in his panels. As a result, as Vladek recounts this anecdote during the interview provided on the DVD that contains his voice recordings, the listener to Vladek's oral testimony, who, Spiegelman presumes, in all likelihood has already read *Maus I* and *II*, feels as if she has encountered this story before. This dawning familiarity with the anecdote produces the uncanny effect of eliminating suspense; she knows what will happen because she has already read what happened.

Like the narrator or character that chooses to search, the reader too must filter and decipher the information she gleans from the narrative and act as a detective. To return to the parting encounter in Safran Foer's *Everything is Illuminated* between Alex, Augustine/Lista, Grandfather, and Jonathan, Augustine/Lista states at the end of their meeting that she must return to her baby (Safran Foer 193). Since Augustine/Lista lost her baby during the war, her statement indicates that she is experiencing temporal confusion. However, Alex does not comment on Augustine/Lista's observation that her baby is waiting for her; the chapter ends with her statement, and the next chapter that centers on Alex, Jonathan, and Grandfather opens with them having returned to the hotel. To put it another way, neither Grandfather nor Alex—the ones who speak Ukrainian and thus understand Augustine/Lista's parting lines—make note of how her last comment divulges that she, and not her sister, is who she described in her testimony. She, and not her sister, was shot while pregnant, lost the baby, and, after the Germans had moved on to another town, returned to Trachimbrod to gather all of the murdered Jews' belongings. Most significantly, the reader has to comprehend the effect of Augustine/Lista's parting remark on her testimony since this concluding interaction between Augustine/Lista discloses her troubled mental state. It is not pointed out to the reader and explicitly stated.

The portrayal of a character or narrator as a detective, coupled with the portrayal of the reader as a detective, in which both have to decipher clues and signs and assemble the story, despite knowing, on one level, the outcome—whether one of survival or of being killed—corresponds to the notion of searching that appears throughout these selected texts of the second and third generation. Choosing to search becomes the only way to produce what I have called here re-witnessing, since, in expanding the testimonial chain, re-witnessing traverses geographic, cultural, and temporal spaces and distances. To be sure, as portrayed in these selected texts, one

does not choose to search in order to re-witness. That is, re-witnessing is not the main motivating factor. Rather, the curiosity, or the desire to find out what happened, as a result of postmemory, begins the search.

After describing the trope of the search in these texts of the second and third generation, in which the narrator or detective acts as a detective who chooses to investigate memory and family history, thus creating suspense in the narrative, I turn now to examples of re-witnessing that appear in these texts. Rosner's *The Speed of Light* portrays a key instance of re-witnessing in which the listener, Paula, re-narrates the story she has heard from survivor Joszef Huber to her brother, Julian. Paula returns to New York City from her trip to Budapest shaken from her encounter with Joszef Huber, the survivor whom she met in Budapest and whom she convinced to tell her about her father. Her encounter with Joszef Huber disturbs Paula to such a psychological extent that Paula loses her ability to sing, which, as an opera singer, leaves her unable to work (Rosner 146). Upon her return home, Paula debates sharing with Julian what she has learned about their father, that he was a member of the *Sonderkommando*. Worrying about the effect that informing Julian about their father would have on him, Paula only recounts part of what she had learned, namely that their grandfather was a cantor and their aunt a violinist. After Julian inquires as to what else she learned, she evades his question, saying only: "'You can guess the rest…Can't you? Because all the stories ended the same way, pretty much…Auschwitz'" (Rosner 213). This line of reasoning resembles the answer Joszef Huber gave Paula herself when she asked Huber to tell her about her father. Accordingly, the situation between Paula and Joszef Huber replicates itself in the situation between Paula and Julian. During the conversation between Joszef Huber and herself, Paula had insisted that not knowing was worse than actually knowing. Despite personally experiencing the strong desire to possess knowledge about her

father and the desperate manner in which she beseeches Joszef Huber, Paula first refuses to impart her newfound knowledge to Julian. This scene from *The Speed of Light* complicates the assumption that an individual's previous position as listener encourages the same individual to re-narrate the narrative he or she has heard. On the contrary, Paula's own experience and, particularly, that of her recurring nightmares, strengthens her initial reluctance to tell Julian.

Despite not questioning the legitimacy of her request to Joszef Huber to tell her about her father, Paula wonders whether it is her place to tell Julian what she knows: "Did any of us have the right to speak about what my father did when he himself had chosen to keep silent? Was it his silence that was choking me now?" (Rosner 231) In contemplating her obligations—either to tell her brother what she knows about their father, or to honor her father's chosen silence about his experience—Paula reveals a key feature involved in narration and re-witnessing; the receiver of the testimony must desire to re-narrate what she has heard. Indeed, Paula also questions whether or not she should tell Julian because, as she describes it, what she would tell him would be "the things he probably already knew or at least imagined" (Rosner 235). In outlining the two options—that Julian already knows, or that he can imagine, and thus does not really need to know—Paula once again contradicts her own experience.

Despite her initial hesitation, at the end of the novel, Paula tells Julian what she has learned about their father. She stumbles over the best way to phrase it; after admitting that there is "more," she utters one word—"Sonderkommando"; voicing this word aloud enables Paula to begin narrating and mollifies her apprehension over telling Julian. In telling him about her conversation with Joszef Huber, Paula's description of her narration—"I told Julian the way the old man had told it to me. I told him all I knew" (Rosner 236)—implies that she re-witnesses to Julian. The narrative, however, precludes insight into this longer conversation between Paula

and Julian. The fact that Paula re-witnesses to Julian takes prominence over what she specifically says.

Like Rosner's *The Speed of Light*, Mendelsohn's *The Lost* and Spiegelman's *MetaMaus* likewise depict the processes by which listeners re-narrate stories from survivors. In their re-narration of the survivor testimony to which they are privy, Spiegelman and Mendelsohn re-witness what they have received as listeners. In order to expand the testimonial chain through re-witnessing, Mendelsohn shifts his position within it. As a child, Mendelsohn remained solely in the role of listener or asked the questions that were expected of him. Now, Mendelsohn takes a more proactive role: he conducts the interviews and in *The Lost*, he weaves the story.

Spiegelman's *MetaMaus* contributes greatly to an understanding of the use of graphic narrative as a form of testimonial literature, two genres that Spiegelman first combined in *Maus I* and *II*. In *Maus I* and *II*, in his re-narration of the survivor testimony to which he was privy, Spiegelman re-witnesses what he has received as a listener. While *Maus I* and *II* are examples of re-witnessing, *MetaMaus* also contains examples of re-witnessing; in *MetaMaus*, Spiegelman once again re-narrates survivor testimony. *MetaMaus* takes the form of testimony one step further. In *MetaMaus*, using other elements of the documentary genre, but relying primarily on photographs, Spiegelman essentially testifies to the testimony he depicts in *Maus I* and *II*. *MetaMaus*, as a text that testifies to Spiegelman's necessarily shaped testimony about Vladek and his relationship to Vladek, operates as a form of meta-testimony. In *MetaMaus*, Spiegelman now occupies the position of someone who is able to narrate to a listener. As he did in *Maus I* and *II*, in *MetaMaus*, Spiegelman therefore depicts the processes by which listeners re-narrate the stories and fragments of stories that they have heard from survivors.

In *MetaMaus*, Spiegelman employs two family trees—one of Anja's family, the Zylberberg family, and one of the Spiegelman family—as a means of re-witnessing (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 224-225, 228-231). In the Zylberberg family tree, which goes as far back as Anja's grandparents, Spiegelman pairs photographs, where available, with their corresponding names. The Zylberberg family tree features Anja's maternal grandparents; Anja's parents; Anja's four other siblings, their spouses, and children—or in relation to Spiegelman, his aunts, uncles, and cousins—and lastly, Spiegelman's wife Francoise and their children Nadja and Dashiell. Under each name appears years of birth and death; most names are listed with a date of death corresponding to the years of the Holocaust; some appear with only a question mark to indicate an unknown year of death. Of the fourteen photographs that appear in the Zylberberg family tree, photographs include one of Richieu, one of Mala, Vladek's second wife, one of Anja and Vladek, and one of Spiegelman with his wife and children. While photographs of other relatives are also provided in the Zylberberg family tree, Spiegelman does not provide any additional stories about these individuals that appear in the photographs, because, as previously noted in Chapter Two, Spiegelman does not have any additional information; of the photographs of Anja's family he possesses, he sometimes does not even know who is featured in them. This presentation of photographs in the Zylberberg family tree allows the reader to put a name to a face, when possible, thus personalizing the names that appear on the family tree. The use of photographs in the Zylberberg family tree resembles the three photographs Spiegelman first used so economically in *Maus I* and *II*—of Art with Anja, of Richieu, and of Vladek in the concentration camp uniform.

Whereas Spiegelman provides one version of the Zylberberg family tree, he provides two versions of the Spiegelman family tree that appear on consecutive pages: one entitled "At the

start of World War II" and the other "At the end of World World II" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 228-231; figures 1 and 2). On the preceding page, Spiegelman describes these two versions of the Spiegelman family tree as "two key charts that offer a fractal snapshot of the fate of Eastern Europe's Jews" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 226). In contrast to the fourteen photographs that appear in the Zylberberg family tree, the Spiegelman family tree has only two photographs, both featuring Anja and Vladek. One photograph appears at the bottom of the Spiegelman family tree at the beginning of World War II with the caption "Anja, Richieu, and Vladek, c. 1940," and the other photograph appears at the bottom of the family tree at the end of World War II with the caption "Anja and Vladek, 1945" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 229, 231). On the family tree at the start of World War II, in addition to the photograph of Anja, Richieu, and Vladek, the names and dates of birth and death are listed for each family member. On the family tree at the end of World War II, in addition to the photograph of Anja and Vladek, only the names and dates of birth and death are listed for those members of the family who survived the Holocaust. The rest of the boxes are left blank, and appear with no names or dates.

If the reader wants to examine the two Spiegelman family trees and compare them to each other, she must turn the book vertically to read the captions and see the photographs, while also flipping between the two family trees. Both versions of the Spiegelman family tree are vertical; with their dates of birth and death included in the chart, it would be difficult to fit the tree on a single horizontal page. The two photographs, one at the bottom of each family tree, provide a visual depiction that links the older generations of the Spiegelman family tree with Spiegelman's own nuclear family, his parents. The captions for the two photographs serve as incentive for examining the family tree, encouraging the reader to rotate the text so as to read the caption under the photograph. Furthermore, the use of photographs in these two Spiegelman

family trees emphasize the paradox in which Spiegelman finds himself, of knowing more about the family without photographs—the Spiegelman family—than about the family that he does have photographs of, the Zylberberg family.

By juxtaposing the two Spiegelman family trees, and placing them on consecutive pages, Spiegelman provides a distillation, in graphic form, of the significant number of Spiegelman family members who died in the Holocaust. Moreover, the second Spiegelman family tree that appears with only the names and dates of the survivors functions metonymically for the other families in Eastern Europe who died in the Holocaust. With the construction of these two genealogies of the paternal side of his family, Spiegelman produces an instance of re-witnessing that he represents in graphic form. These three family trees—one of the Zylberberg family, and two versions of the Spiegelman family—facilitate an instance of re-witnessing that is not tied explicitly to re-narration. That is, unlike the instance of Paula re-narrating to Julian about what she has learned about their father from Joszef Huber, and of Mendelsohn re-narrating what he has learned from survivors in his autobiographical text, Spiegelman here presents an example of re-witnessing in graphic form. Although Spiegelman does not include his own narrative describing the three family trees, in its ordering of information, the family trees impose a type of narrative. These family trees in *MetaMaus* provide examples of what Hillary Chute, Spiegelman's interviewer in *MetaMaus*, but also a well-known comics scholar, has called a "visual-verbal act of witness" which she describes as "an expanded idiom of witness, a manner of testifying that sets a visual language in motion with and against the verbal in order to embody individual and collective experience" (Chute, "Graphic Narrative as Witness" 162; Chute, "Introduction" 3).

As illustrated in Jonathan Safran Foer's *Everything is Illuminated*, instances of re-witnessing are not always greeted with enthusiasm. Prompted by the photograph of Herschel she retrieves from her box of photographs, Augustine tells Jonathan, Alex, and Alex senior, the grandfather, about Herschel, whose friend, Eli, identified Herschel as a Jew: "'Here is Herschel…He lived in Kolki, which was a shtetl near to Trachimbrod. Herschel and Eli were best friends, and Eli had to shoot Herschel, because if he did not, they would shoot him…Eli did not want to, but he did it'" (Safran Foer 152). Throughout her account, the grandfather constantly interrupts Augustine, and attempts to prevent her from speaking, saying "Shut up " and "She is a liar" and even punching the table (Safran Foer 152, 155). As we learn later, Alex senior is the man referred to as Eli; Augustine narrates a scene where the grandfather was present. At this point in the narrative, however, Jonathan and Alex are unaware that the grandfather is Eli. Shocked by Grandfather's hostility towards Augustine, Alex apologizes to Augustine and urges her to continue. Although Grandfather's interjections have driven her to tears, Augustine continues to narrate.

One characteristic of this scene that remains important to note is that Augustine primarily narrates to Alex, since the grandfather attempts to impede Augustine's narration and since Jonathan does not understand Ukrainian. Augustine addresses Alex because of the three, he is a willing listener and can understand her. While narrating, Augustine only looks directly at Alex, and according to Alex, through whom the narrative is focalized, she attempts to ignore Grandfather and Jonathan (Safran Foer 152). After Grandfather once again challenges the validity of her account, Augustine responds, "'I heard this story…and I believe it is a truth'" (Safran Foer 152). In repeating what she has heard to Jonathan, Alex, and Grandfather, Augutine re-witnesses. Admittedly, Augustine does not name her source, but she presumably

heard the story from a witness who was present at the time. As we later discover once Jonathan recognizes Grandfather in a photograph they find in Augustine's box of photographs, a scene that I discussed in the previous two chapters, thus prompting Grandfather to admit that he is Eli, Augustine's account is partially wrong. Grandfather identified Herschel as a Jew, and although Grandfather did not shoot Herschel, identifying him led directly to his death. As an instance of re-witnessing which turns out to have incorrect information, this scene in *Everything is Illuminated* therefore calls attention to the vagaries not only associated with memory but also with eyewitness and oral testimony. By inserting an inaccuracy into Augustine's narrative, *Everything is Illuminated* illustrates the complicated process of oral testimony.

In addition, this scene of re-witnessing emphasizes another facet of re-witnessing, that *Everything is Illuminated*, because of the narrative's focalization through Alex, highlights. As Augustine begins explaining the photographs and artifacts she has in her box of "Remains," preceding her story about Herschel and Eli, Alex states: "The hero did not ask me once what she was saying, and he never did ask me. I am not certain if he knew what she was saying, or if he knew not to inquire" (Safran Foer 152). Alex's remark raises the issue of a listener having to ask to be told, as also discussed in Chapter One. Although, like Jonathan, Alex is also a listener in this scene, he does not share with Jonathan this story about Herschel and Eli, indicating that his reason behind not telling Jonathan is that Jonathan did not ask. Since Jonathan cannot speak or understand Ukrainian, the likelihood is that Jonathan decides he does not want to hear this part of Augustine's narration, but only the part that pertains to her relationship to his grandfather, Safran. This scene provides an example of an opportunity for re-witnessing on Alex's part that does not take place.

As portrayed in these selected texts, the narrator or character might decide not to re-witness, even though she potentially could. Thus, given the capacity for re-witnessing, these texts also feature examples in which the listener does not re-witness. In *The Lost*, not every survivor gives permission for his or her testimony to be integrated into Mendelsohn's narrative. Mendelsohn refuses to re-witness in certain places in the narrative out of deference to the limits placed on him by survivors, such as Meg Grossbard and Shlomo Adler, survivors from Bolechow whom he visits in Australia. In Chapter Two, I discussed Mendelsohn's compliance with Meg Grossbard's request that her face not be included in the photograph of her holding the picture of Frydka; Mendelsohn provides the photograph in the narrative, but blocks out Meg Grossbard's face.

Like Meg Grossbard, Shlomo Adler places proscriptions on his interview with Mendelsohn. Shlomo refuses to allow Mendelsohn to witness for him in the form of Mendelsohn's book: "Then Shlomo said, I have for you a story, a private story, but this cannot be in your book, you have to turn off the tape recorder. I turned off the tape recorder. He started talking" (Mendelsohn 393). Mendelsohn still is a witness to the witness—he hears Shlomo's story firsthand; he is just not allowed to re-witness Shlomo's story in his autobiographical narrative. Although Mendelsohn could re-narrate Shlomo's story in his memoir by including what he remembers from Shlomo's oral testimony, Mendelsohn remains true to his word. In this instance, although Mendelsohn could re-witness, he does not. Similarly, Meg Grossbard places limits on what Mendelsohn can incorporate into the book she knows he is writing, arguing that one day, she will write her own book. Mendelsohn adheres to the stipulation she outlines: "I understood perfectly what she was afraid of, why she wouldn't let her tales enter my book. She knew that the minute she allowed me to start telling her stories, they would become my stories.

So I can't tell you what she said during our interview" (Mendelsohn 252). Mendelsohn's phrasing suggests an element of appropriation of survivors' stories.

Indeed, Mendelsohn's acceptance of Shlomo Adler and Meg Grossbard's constraints attempts to counteract the potential for misappropriation of survivors' stories in his memoir. In placing survivors' stories in his narrative, their stories become a part of his larger narrative, operating within its framework. He therefore does not retell every survivor's story; he usually reports what happened to the survivor's family and then how he or she survived, sometimes only relating the interaction the survivor had with Shmiel and his family. By incorporating pieces of other survivors' stories as they relate to Shmiel and his family, Mendelohn's memoir emphasizes that his autobiographical narrative uncovering what happened to his relatives is not the "entire" story, whatever that is. Nevertheless, Mendelsohn clarifies his goal of trying to find out what happened to Shmiel and his family. On his first trip to Israel, Mendelsohn explains to Shlomo: "My problem…is that I want to write the story of people who didn't survive. People who had no story, anymore" (Mendelsohn 315). Mendelsohn's comment stresses that his goal is not to appropriate other survivors' stories, but to tell the story for those (his family) who are no longer alive to tell it themselves. The incorporation of other survivors' stories into his narrative is unavoidable if he is going to uncover the story of the Jäger family.

While Mendelsohn's *The Lost* gestures towards the potential for re-witnessing as a type of appropriation, Biller's *Harlem Holocaust* depicts an instance of re-witnessing that is a form of misappropriation. As a reminder, the narrative is focalized through Efraim, Warszawski's German translator who is both fascinated and repelled by Warszawki and whose caricature of Warszawski indubitably suggests Efraim's anti-Semitism. A scene in the narrative identifies American Jewish author Warszawski's disingenuous adaptation of his cousin and Holocaust

survivor Leo Schneider's story into Warszawski's own seemingly autobiographical writings. Efraim depicts Warszawski depicting a version of Leo Schneider's story that would lead the German reader of Warszawski's texts to believe that Warszawski personally experienced these events when Warszawski did not. Within this narrative, focalized through the unreliable Efraim Rosenhain perspective, the writer Warszawski's narrator appears to have appropriated Leo Schneider's story of survival. Efraim uses Warszawski's texts and words to indicate Warszawski's assumption of Schneider's testimony. Biller inserts fragments of Warszawski's texts into Efraim's focalization, allowing small nuggets of information about Warszawski's literary career to be shared with the reader. We only have access to these fragments from Warszawski's published words that appear with attributes to specific texts by Warszawski. For instance, Efraim indicates the source of his knowledge about Leo Schneider with, "So beschrieb es Warszawski in seiner im *Merkur* erschienenen autobiographischen Skizze *It is Mein Leben*" (Biller 15). This dubious example of re-witnessing in *Harlem Holocaust* illustrates that re-witnessing does not necessarily always operate as a positive process; it can also be a negative one. The instance of re-witnessing in Biller's *Harlem Holocaust* complicates my argument about re-witnessing. In the works discussed up to now, it at least appears that instances of re-witnessing enabled a rather responsible approach towards the transmission of a survivor's story.

Although the process of re-witnessing takes place in Rosner's *The Speed of Light*, Mendelsohn's *The Lost*, Spiegelman's *MetaMaus*, Safran Foer's *Everything is Illuminated*, and Biller's *Harlem Holocaust*, re-witnessing does not occur in Stein's *Die Leinwand* and Dischereit's *Joemis Tisch* because the listener does not re-narrate what she has heard to a third party. As a reminder, *Die Leinwand* reveals how Zichroni, a narrator of one strand, can become a witness to the events in his patients' memories, either as an observer of the scene from his own

perspective, or as a participant of the scene when he merges with that of the individual he touches. Zichroni's sixth sense of memory eliminates the need for narration if he can merely touch his patients or catch their gaze and gain access to their memories in these two ways. As I argued in Chapter Two, the technique of focalization used in Stein's *Die Leinwand* to present the testimonial encounter between Minsky and Zichroni eliminates there the process of re-witnessing; Zichroni's sixth sense of memory bypasses the necessity for narration. Although, Minsky narrates his story to Zichroni, Minsky's story is not re-narrated by Zichroni, and thus not transmitted to others. Minsky's biography and story have been revealed as a fraud, and Zichroni cannot reveal that he has touched Minsky without acknowledging his source, i.e., his sixth sense—an acknowledgement that would widely discredit him. Therefore, Minsky's story stops with Zichroni. Moreover, as revealed at the end of the Wechsler narrative strand, since Zichroni is dead at the end of both narrative strands, then the only individual who believed Minsky's testimony is dead. As a result, the novel underscores the necessity of transmission as part of testimony, by providing an example of an instance of transmission that occurs between two individuals, the witness and the listener, but does not go any further. In doing so, *Die Leinwand* suggests that if such a transmission of testimony to others does not occur, it is as if the narration becomes non-existent. Stein's *Die Leinwand*, through the example of Zichroni's inability to re-witness to others, presents another take on the conditions necessary for re-witnessing to occur.

As in *Die Leinwand*, Dischereit's *Joemis Tisch* presents another instance in which the process of re-witnessing does not take place. Hannah, who hid during the war, does not share any of her experiences with her daughter, referred to in the narrative only as Hannah's daughter. Her mother's death precludes the transmission of any of Hannah's experiences to her daughter. Hannah's choice in not narrating her traumatic experiences to her daughter preempts Hannah's

daughter's ability to re-witness. Rather, instead of being able to re-narrate Hannah's story to other individuals, Hannah's daughter, in her interactions with Germans in post-war Germany, serves as a reminder of the Holocaust to others through her very presence. Her encounters with other Germans suggest that they view her as a living reminder of the Holocaust and treat her as a representative of Jews despite her unwillingness and reluctance. One man she comes across asks her what Jews look like and talks of an educational leave he has recently taken. Afterwards, Hannah's daughter remarks to herself: "Vielleicht kann ich das nächste Mal auch auf den Bildungsurlaub fahren. Dann würden sie mich ganz dicht und echt bei sich haben und könnten mich als Geschichte anfassen" (Dischereit 51). Here, Hannah's daughter acts as a piece of history that can be carried along and grasped ("anfassen"), as well as comprehended, by others. In this way, as portrayed in *Joemis Tisch*, the body of Hannah's daughter illustrates her position, not as a witness or one who is able to re-witness, but as a marker of the Holocaust.

The lack of re-witnessing in Stein's *Die Leinwand* and Dischereit's *Joemis Tisch* is tied specifically, in Zichroni's case, to the absence of transmission from the listener to another listener, and, in the case of Hannah's daughter, in the complete absence of narration between the witness and the listener, Hannah and her daughter. If, in Rosner's *The Speed of Light*, Paula had not traveled to Budapest and talked with survivor Joszef Huber, then neither she or her brother Julian would have learned about their father's experiences. Like the character Hannah in Dischereit's *Joemis Tisch*, he had refused to tell his story to his children. In addition to the scene between Paula and Julian, in which Paula re-witnesses to him, Rosner's *The Speed of Light* provides an instance of re-witnessing that suggests the capacity for re-witnessing that Julian and Diego now have as a result of hearing Sola's testimony. In Chapter Two, I included the sentence Julian uses to convince Sola to tell her story about witnessing the massacre of her family and

entire village: "'When you're a witness, and you tell other people, you make them witnesses too'" (Rosner 121). Julian's statement prompts Sola to ask Julian whether or not making people witnesses is "bad," and Julian responds that it is "good" (Rosner 121). Although I will not address here the characterization of narrating as "bad" versus "good," in this exchange, Julian asserts that receiving a witness's testimony transforms the listener into a type of witness.

The Speed of Light explicitly addresses this expansion of the testimonial chain. Once Diego, a man from Sola's former village, who was working outside the village at the time of the massacre, finds Sola in New York City, he implores her to tell him her account. When Julian's words come to mind, Sola agrees to tell Diego her story and asks Julian to attend her conversation with Diego. In doing so, Sola communicates that she wants Julian to become a witness. Once they are seated, Sola mentally expresses ambivalence over whether or not she should transmit her story to others: "I remember Julian saying I can make other people witnesses by telling them, but I still am not sure I am doing the right thing. What I do not yet know are the stories that Julian carries around under his skin and bones, but I know there is something, I can see it every time I look at his face" (Rosner 192-193). Sola's concern for Julian and her intuitive recognition that Julian possesses stories suggest that Sola believes the validity of Julian's statement about hearing testimony turning the listener into a witness. After she has told Diego and Julian and they have listened, Sola repeats Julian's statement back to him: "'It is like you say…Making other people witnesses too'" (Rosner 198). Julian echoes Sola's conclusion after hearing her story: "We had made ourselves witnesses, Diego and I, we had listened" (Rosner 202). Sola's statement to Julian indicates that the knowledge that Diego and Julian now know her story brings Sola great comfort, as does her awareness that if necessary, they can re-witness

on her behalf (Rosner 240). As Sola later reflects: "Telling the story doesn't give it away, just gives it a sound" (Rosner 195).

In Chapter Four, I explored instances of re-witnessing in these selected texts of the second and third generation where the process of re-witnessing connects closely to traversing geographical, cultural, and temporal spaces and distances. These instances of re-witnessing occur when the narrator or character chooses to search for his or her family history. These texts approach the concept of re-witnessing as a form of re-narrating. Re-witnessing functions as a two-step process: initially listening to the survivor, and then adapting what is heard into another narrative. Re-witnessing, the listener's re-narration of a witness's testimony to a third party, operates as a type of repetition.

The concept of re-witnessing as a form of repetition helps to explain the presence of multiple pairs of doubles throughout the seven texts of this study. These pairs of doubles are particularly important because the pairings replicate the pairing between the witness and listener in the testimonial encounter. As texts that ruminate on the transmission of memory across generations, the pairs of doubles within each text thematize such a process and, at times, the absence of such transmission between individuals. The characters who occur in pairs throughout the texts appear as doubles and at times foils, intensifying opposing characteristics in their juxtaposition, as in the case of the pairings of Warszawski and Efraim, of Ina and Eva, and of Warszawski and Leo Schneider in Biller's *Harlem Holocaust*. In Safran Foer's *Everything is Illuminated*, pairing occurs between Jonathan and Alex, Alex senior and Augustine, Lista and Augustine, Alex senior and Herschel; in Stein's *Die Leinwand*, pairing occurs between Zichroni and Wechsler, between Zichroni and Minsky, and implicitly between the fictional Minsky and real life figure Binjamin Wilkomirski; in Dischereit's *Joëmis Tisch*, pairing occurs between

Hannah and her daughter. In the nonfictional narratives, Mendelsohn in *The Lost* fosters comparisons between himself and his great-uncle Shmiel, and contrasts his grandfather Abraham's experience with Shmiel's. In *MetaMaus*, Spiegelman continues the pairing between himself and his father he began in *Maus I* and *II*, but also constructs a pairing between himself and his interviewer Hillary Chute.

Further, the doublings of the characters and narrators serve to suggest a continuation of the past into the present, as is the case in Rosner's *The Speed of Light*, in the similarities the novel draws between Paula's career as an opera singer and her deceased aunt's talent with the violin. Indeed, both Paula and Julian recount their father's reaction to hearing Paula sing as a young girl and his uncharacteristic displays of emotion while listening to her perform, recalling his sister's and his father's—Paula and Julian's aunt and grandfather's—musical ability, both of whom were killed in the Holocaust. Thus, Paula's talent suggests a form of continuity through the family and fosters a connection between herself and her murdered relatives. The prevalent occurrence of doubles in these seven texts connects back to the process of translation: not just between languages, but also between past and present.



Figure 1



Figure 2

Figures from: Spiegelman, Art. *MetaMaus: A Look Inside a Modern Classic, Maus*. New York: Pantheon, 2011. 228-229, 230-231.

Conclusion

"As caretakers of postmemory in a decidedly unredeemed landscape,
no resource, be it fictional, rhetorical, or visual, can be spared."
—Michael Rothberg from Traumatic Realism: The Demands of Holocaust Representation
(Rothberg 263)

When asked about how she became aware of her father's graphic narrative *Maus I* and *II*, Spiegelman's daughter, Nadja, says: "'It's always been a presence'" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 84). She shares that her father never talked about his parents and that she knew his book contained answers to her unasked questions about her grandparents: "My own grandparents are…just characters in a book, but a book that's shaped my life" (Spiegelman, *MetaMaus* 84). The inclusion of Spiegelman's daughter Nadja and son Dashiell's section in *MetaMaus*—in which they are questioned by Hillary Chute, Spiegelman's interviewer, about their relationship to their father's graphic narrative, its influence, and their family history—succinctly condenses the issue surrounding the ever evolving process of transmitting memory. As a member of the second generation, Spiegelman's relationship to his parents' past necessarily differs from his daughter's relationship to her grandparents, as family members she has never met in person, but has only heard about through Spiegelman's text. Like the photograph of Richieu that hung in his parents' bedroom, and Richieu's presence in his absence that hung over Spiegelman's childhood, Spiegelman's graphic narrative hangs over Nadja.

Although Spiegelman and Nadja's positions are not identical, the similarity between their descriptions—of the past hanging over them—emphasizes a key feature of the transmission of memory about the Holocaust that each text in this study has in some form or another addressed: its ongoing process. Both Spiegelman and his daughter have access to the past only by its mediation through other sources. For Spiegelman, one source was through eyewitness testimony, that of his father Vladek, which he supplemented, as previously explained, with

additional sources. Nadja, however, only has access to her grandfather through her father's narrative, and through the recordings her father made of his interviews with Vladek. The intergenerational transmission of memory about the Holocaust continues; however, Nadja's access becomes one step further removed from Spiegelman's access to his father's memories about his experiences.

To return to the example of Holocaust survivor Pinchas Gutter in the "New Dimensions of Testimony" initiative at the University of Southern California's Institute for Creative Technologies, which I described in the introduction: its use of Gutter's testimony to generate a 3-D hologram exemplifies one of the new forms of testimony that are emerging as we approach the end of the natural lifespan of witnesses of the Holocaust. Future students will be able to pose questions and, with the help of a computer algorithm, seemingly have these questions answered by the survivor's 3-D hologram. And yet, despite this interactive dialogue, these future students will, ultimately, be gazing at a screen. Such inherent limitations prompt questions about the value and efficacy of these 3-D holograms. At the same time, however, while acknowledging the limitations that these 3-D holograms have, the question of their authenticity might not trouble each individual to the same extent. After all, the 3-D holograms are not meant to replace other forms of oral testimony, whether written or video, but rather to enhance the active learning experience of future students.

The selected texts of the second and third generation analyzed in this study ruminate on the medium through which an individual's memories are conveyed to another. The technique of focalization used in this study's complex fictional narratives—Esther Dischereit's *Joemis Tisch: Eine jüdische Geschichte*, Maxim Biller's *Harlem Holocaust*, Elizabeth Rosner's *The Speed of Light*, Jonathan Safran Foer's *Everything is Illuminated*, and Benjamin Stein's *Die Leinwand*—

emphasize the importance of the perspective through which one sees. In other words, they, too, focus on the use of focalization as a screen and as a form of mediation. The two nonfictional narratives—Daniel Mendelsohn's *The Lost: A Search for Six of Six Million* and Art Spiegelman's *MetaMaus: A Look Inside a Modern Classic, Maus*—use the lens of photography, and with Spiegelman's supplemental DVD, the computer screen.

These types of screens associated with focalization, photography, and technology are particularly salient given the emphasis on the role of sight in the process of witnessing. The ability to give testimony—to narrate about one's experience—remains tied to this primacy of sight. And yet, in terms of the transmission of Holocaust memory into the future, I want with my term re-witnessing to suggest that the transmission of Holocaust memory can be tied to the ability to re-narrate a story one has heard from the survivor. In this way, one's ability to witness, or to see, becomes secondary to one's ability to narrate. These selected texts of the second and third generation in German Jewish and American Jewish literature—in their focus on the testimonial encounter between witness and listener, and in their depiction of these scenes of re-witnessing—support this argument. These instances of re-witnessing in these seven texts, which are both fictional and nonfictional narratives, suggest that these texts engender witnessing and help produce testimony, forming a category that I call "textimony." If instances of re-witnessing do, as I argue, produce viable modes of witnessing the Holocaust, the extension of this argument is that the texts themselves, by engendering witnessing, produce testimony. Seen in this light and from our necessarily mediated perspective about the Holocaust in 2016, the texts of the second and third generation that produce, duplicate, complicate, and challenge instances of witnessing and testimony participate in the development of an extension in the genre of testimony: into what I call "textimony."

At the same time, however, broader questions about the implications of such a development, particularly in relationship to the transmission of memory surrounding other traumatic historical events apart from the Holocaust, emerge. In their introduction to the edited volume *After Testimony: The Ethics and Aesthetics of Holocaust Narrative for the Future* (2012), Jakob Lothe, Susan Rubin Suleiman, and James Phelan employ the phrase "after testimony" to "suggest that all works dealing with the Holocaust must in some way come to terms with the historical reality that the accounts of survivors have tried to communicate" (Lothe, Suleiman, and Phelan 2). According to Lothe, Suleiman, and Phelan, any text that engages in or addresses the representation of the Holocaust cannot escape the Holocaust's connection to history and owes a debt to the previous testimony provided by the first generation. The category of "textimony" does not seek to replace the vast literature, primary and secondary, on the Holocaust, but rather, to demonstrate the development of the ability to witness through fictional and nonfictional narrative by members of the second and third generation. This study has examined selected texts of the second and third generation from the German Jewish and American Jewish literary spheres. Due to Holocaust literature's transnational nature, other potential areas of exploration for future research include incorporating other texts of the second and third generation from other national literatures such as Israeli and French literature.

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