Supererogation in Organizations: Going Beyond Duty in a Morally Praiseworthy Way

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Abstract

Consisting of empirical and conceptual parts, the dissertation explains how supererogation – going beyond duty in a morally praiseworthy way – takes place in organizational settings. The empirical part is based on a qualitative study conducted with faculty and staff in three major business schools in the South-East of the United States. The study findings have provided the basis for the development of affectual theory of supererogation. The theory postulates that the process of supererogation is largely emotion-laden and it consists of five stages: learning about supererogatory opportunities (agent-based vs. request-based), triggers of attendance (interest, similar experience, affinity by values), drivers of action (enjoyment, compassion, extended duty), supererogatory act (dependent on agent's preferences and beneficiary's consent), and reaction to supererogatory behaviors (positive vs. mixed). The theory also posits that the relationship between agent's affectual response to a supererogatory opportunity and her actual supererogatory behavior is moderated by agent's capacities (bandwidth, capability fit, emotional fit, and interpersonal fit). Affectual theory of supererogation contributes not only to a better understanding of the phenomenon of supererogation in organizations, but also to the literature on moral decision making showing that moral behavior is often driven by positive emotions (enjoyment, compassion, and extended duty) in contrast to the perspectives of cognitive reasoning and negative emotions that have been prevailing in the literature. The conceptual part of the dissertation explores the role of supererogation in bridging major ethical theories based on deontic and aretaic doctrines. It shows that by separating in time aretaic and deontic judgments (depending on the development stage of agent's particular virtues), supererogation enables a shift from deontic to aretaic values in the agent's mind.

Keywords: supererogation, going beyond duty, motives, reaction, aretaic values, deontic values

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Introduction

A person's life is saturated with duties regulating a large part of her daily behavior. Duties take on different forms such as state laws, social norms, public expectations, moral principles, cultural traditions, religious requirements, organizational procedures, job responsibilities, family obligations, and the list goes on. These duties are to be taken seriously because a number of enacting mechanisms, ranging from legal enforcement to social pressure, regulate compliance to duties. Living up to one's duties is not always pleasant, but oftentimes is hard. People are tempted to do what is more enjoyable, rather than follow what duties require, and personal struggles to comply with duties are commonplace.

Despite the challenges, or even hardships, inherent in following duties, some people at a certain time do far more than their duties oblige them to do. This remarkable phenomenon – supererogation – deserves admiration and exploration and it is the central subject of this dissertation. Supererogation, once called "the higher flights of morality" (Urmson, 1958) stands for acts of going above and beyond the call of duty, which are morally praiseworthy, whose omission is not blameworthy, and which benefit others.

There has been a growing body of literature on supererogation in moral philosophy which can be grouped under four main themes: developing the definition of supererogation (Heyd, 1982, Mellema, 1991a, Urmson, 1958), investigating its scope (Cowley, 2015b; Hamilton, 2015; Heyd, 1982; Stout, 2015), providing justification for supererogation and delineating its demarcation with duties (Baron, 1997; Brinkman, 2015; Rawls, 1971; Urmson, 1958), and

examining place for supererogation in major moral theories (Ferry, 2015; Heyd, 1982; Stangl, 2016).

However, the study of supererogation in moral philosophy is largely decontextualized. There are few, if any works that consider supererogation in the context of an organization. Recently, business ethicists have started filling in this void. Some of them examined the relationship between supererogation and corporate social responsibilities (Mazutis, 2014; Wokutch & Spencer, 1987) as well as studied corporate activities that go beyond government regulations (Cavazos, Rutherford & Berman, 2017). Other business ethics scholars explored supererogation under the concept of good works linking it to employees' character and virtues (Pritchard, 1992) and meaningful work (Martin, 2000), often seeing it as a positive counterpart to unethical behaviors (Stransbury & Sonenshein, 2012).

Yet, even within business ethics there has been a scarcity of empirical studies on supererogation. At the same time, the phenomenon of going beyond duty in organizations has received attention in the organizational behavior (OB) literature. Organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) (Organ, Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2006) and job crafting (Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001) constructs all involve the concept of going beyond duty in one way or another. However, none of the OB constructs captures the notion of supererogation in full as they either ignore or put at the periphery moral aspects of going beyond duty. In addition, OCB is designed in a very instrumental way since the definition of the construct requires that going beyond duty should necessarily lead to an improved company performance. However, supererogatory behaviors in organizations may not necessarily result in an increased bottom line because supererogation primarily deals with ethical aspects of human interactions rather than with improving company's

performance. To illustrate the point, we may think about an individual who constantly attempts to behave morally, however, his behavior does not necessarily imply that he will receive a better car or a bigger house – it is not what morality is about. Thus, the OB literature does not provide an appropriate explanation for the phenomenon of supererogation in organizations.

This dissertation aims to explore supererogation in the context of organizations and, therefore, show that it is more than just a pure philosophical abstraction. Rather, supererogation is a real-life organizational phenomenon entangled in several controversies and is worthy of theoretical and empirical exploration. The exploration of supererogation is needed to understand what makes people behave in a morally outstanding way in organizational settings and whether more supererogatory behavior could be performed in organizations.

Another reason to explore supererogation in organizations comes from the fact that current management literature has focused on examining ethical issues in business (Beauchamp, Bowie, & Arnold, 2008; Shaw & Barry, 2015) and the dark side of organizational behaviors (Deery, Rayton, Walsh, & Kinnie, 2016; Bolino, Klotz, Turnley, & Harvey, 2013), whereas positive organizational behaviors comprise a small share of academic scholarship (Cameron, Dutton, & Quinn, 2003; Luthans & Youssef, 2007). Thus, exploring the incredible phenomenon of going beyond duty in morally-salient organizational settings can help balance the view on organizational practices both in the management scholarship and among practitioners.

Understanding of supererogation in organizations becomes especially much needed in view of its high relevance to the new story of business that a number of business ethics scholars wrote on over the last decade (Freeman, Martin & Parmar, 2007; Freeman, Parmer, & Martin, 2016).

The overview of philosophy, business ethics and OB bodies of literature identified three unexplored areas that did not receive proper attention. First, in view of the fact that there are thousands of **motives** – both virtuous and non-virtuous – that could lead to going beyond duty in organizations, scholars avoided exploring the nature of motives due to the perceived difficulty of the subject (Heyd, 1982: 132; Organ, Podsakoff, and MacKenzie, 2006: 7). However, while acknowledging the abundance of numerous different motives leading to supererogatory behaviors, one can nevertheless group all these motives under a few common categories, which can help us better understand the origins of supererogatory acts. Second, little attention has been given to how supererogatory acts are **perceived** by agents, beneficiaries and observers of supererogation. Even though going beyond duty is a positive phenomenon, reactions can range from positive to mixed, or even negative (Bolino, Klotz, Turnley, & Harvey, 2013; Deery, Rayton, Walsh, & Kinnie, 2016). Third, though there were attempts to classify supererogatory acts in general (Cowley, 2015a; Heyd, 1982), those classifications do not reflect the specifics of organizational life. The creation of the **taxonomy** of supererogation in organizations can open up possibilities for new research on positive behavior in organizations.

Finally, supererogation is part of the moral domain and its existence is intuitively acknowledged by most people (Aldag, 2008). However, moral philosophers failed to accommodate it within the boundaries of traditional ethical theories (Heyd, 1982; Roberts, 2014) and, rather, explore supererogation on its own, without necessarily grounding it in any major moral theory (Mellema, 1991a). However, the **relationship** between supererogation and the rest of the moral domain is worthy further exploration.

Thus, the dissertation explores four main research questions: 1) What leads people to exhibiting supererogation in organizations? 2) How are supererogatory behaviors perceived in organizational settings? 3) What is the taxonomy of supererogatory acts in organizations? and 4) What is the relationship between supererogation and traditional major moral theories?

To answer the first three research questions, the researcher conducted an empirical study in organizations, whose findings allowed to develop affectual theory of supererogation. The theory postulates that the process of supererogation is largely emotion-laden and it consists of five stages: learning about supererogatory opportunities (agent-based vs. request-based), triggers of attendance (interest, similar experience, affinity by values), drivers of action (enjoyment, compassion, extended duty), supererogatory act (dependent on agent's preferences and beneficiary's consent), and reaction to supererogatory behaviors (positive vs. mixed). The theory also posits that the relationship between agent's affectual response to a supererogatory opportunity and her actual supererogatory behavior is moderated by agent's capacities (bandwidth, capability fit, emotional fit, and interpersonal fit). Affectual theory of supererogation contributes not only to a better understanding of the phenomenon of supererogation in organizations, but also to the literature on moral decision making showing that moral behavior is often driven by positive emotions (enjoyment, compassion, and extended duty) in contrast to the perspectives of cognitive reasoning (Kohlberg, 1976; Piaget, 1932) and negative emotions (Haidt & Morris, 2009) that have been prevailing in the literature.

The last research question has been addressed in the conceptual analysis in the last part of the dissertation. The conceptual analysis posits that the separation in time of aretaic and deontic judgments toward an agent (depending on the development stage of her particular

virtues) provides a necessary link between the moral doctrines, which enables a shift from deontic to aretaic values in the agent's mind.

The dissertation consists of three parts: literature review, empirical study, and conceptual part. In particular, Part I provides a review of the literature on supererogation in philosophy (Chapter 1) and business ethics (Chapter 2), as well as an analysis of the concepts, that are related to supererogation, that have been developed in the organizational behavior literature (Chapter 3). Part I also summarizing the gaps in the literature on supererogation and outlines the research questions to address the identified gaps.

Part II is devoted to exploring the research questions through a qualitative study on supererogation. In particular, this part of the dissertation starts with explaining the study methodology, including the study design, sample, data collection and analysis (Chapter 4). Then, it outlines key study findings, followed by their analysis and discussion (Chapter 5). In particular, it develops the taxonomy of supererogatory acts in academia and delineates the process of supererogation. Part II ends with developing Affectual Theory of Supererogation as well as outlining its contribution to scholarship and practice (Chapter 6).

Part III conceptually explores supererogation as a bridge between deontic and aretaic moral doctrines (Chapter 7). The dissertation ends with conclusion that summarizes the key findings of the dissertation, mentions limitations, and provides areas for future research avenues.

PART I. OVERVIEW OF LITERATURE ON SUPEREROGATION

Chapter 1. Review of Philosophy Literature

All the discussion on supererogation in philosophy can be grouped under four major themes: definition of supererogation, scope of supererogation, justification for supererogation and its demarcation with duty, and place for supererogation in major moral theories. In what follows, I will briefly review the key ideas in each of these theme and outline what is still lacking in the discussion on supererogation in philosophy.

§1.1   Definition of Supererogation

The first mentioning of the term supererogation is traced back to the well-known Biblical story about the Good Samaritan (Heyd, 1982). The Good Samaritan saved the robbed Jew who was left lying in the middle of the road and brought him to a nearest inn paying for his immediate care (see Case 2 in Appendix 1 for the original story). What the Good Samaritan did so far could arguably be considered as duty of helping others who are in emergency. However, the Good Samaritan clearly went beyond duty in his further action when he told the hotelkeeper that in case the latter spent on the Jew over and above of what the Good Samaritan had already paid him, the Samaritan would repay all that amount. The word supererogation comes from the Latin version of the Biblical story where the verb *supererogare* translates 'to spend or pay out over and above' (Latin Dictionary, 2018).

Yet, it also has to be mentioned that "the Latin verb *supererogare,* to overspend or spend in addition, does not nearly capture the meaning of the term 'supererogation' in modern discourse" (Mellema, 1991a: 16). Over the years, the meaning of the word *supererogation* has extended to denote the behaviors of going above and beyond the call of duty in any situation rather than only in the context of payment.

THE LOOSE AND STRICT PERSPECTIVES ON SUPEREROGATION. The notion of supererogation has been much more nuanced in philosophy than the meaning given to it by a layman. Though different philosophers in their writings used somewhat different definitions of the term supererogation, the analysis of the philosophy literature shows that most of the definitions of supererogation fall under two accounts: the loose account and the strict account.

The loose[1] account of supererogation has been summarized by Mellema (1991a: 17) who stated that "[t]he performance of an act qualifies supererogatory if an only if"

(1) The agent has no moral duty or obligation to perform it;
(2) The performance of the act is morally praiseworthy; and
(3) The omission of the act is not morally blameworthy.

Some less elaborated definitions of supererogation such as "non-obligatory well-doing" (Chisholm's, 1963) and the definition of heroic and saintly deeds of the hero and saint (Urmson, 1958: 324) fall within this loose account.

The strict account of supererogation puts two additional requirements on the loose one: good intentions and other-regarding. The strict account is well represented by the following definition:

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[1] Mellema called it the *standard* account of supererogation based on the reading of Peterfreund (1978: 54) and Attfield (1979: 486; 1987: 115).

An act is supererogatory if and only if
1) It is neither obligatory nor forbidden.
2) Its omission is not wrong, and does not deserve sanction or criticism – either formal or informal.
3) It is morally good, both by virtue of its (intended) consequences and by virtue of its intrinsic value (being beyond duty).
4) It is done voluntarily for the sake of someone else's good and is thus meritorious.

(Heyd, 1982: 115)

Both loose and strict accounts acknowledge that in order to be considered supererogatory, the acts should be morally praiseworthy and their fulfillment should be optional which means that the acts are conducted voluntarily and their omission does not warrant blame. We will refer to this as the core meaning of supererogation. Yet, the strict account is more demanding in that it restricts supererogation only to acts which had *intended* morally good consequences, and which are done for the *benefit of others*. Thus, in the strict account actions that had morally praiseworthy consequences but were done without such an intention are excluded from supererogation. Furthermore, in the strict account actual consequences do not matter for defining the action as supererogatory as long as the intentions were morally good, thus "success is not essential to supererogatory action" (Heyd, 1982: 133). So, in the case with the soldier jumping on a live grenade (see Case 4 in Appendix 1), his behavior would still be considered supererogatory even if his act did not save the lives of his comrades due to, say, the subsequent detonation of other explosives nearby.

Mellema (1991a) argued against the strict account of supererogation by bringing up the case with a prisoner captured by political terrorists (Case 3 in Appendix 1) where the intended consequences of the prisoner's unwillingness to renounce his high principles were perhaps bad as the prisoner's death unknown to anyone else and no one benefited from that action.

Nevertheless, in the illustration with the prisoner, "one might well judge that the man performs an act of supererogation by refusing to cooperate" (Mellema, 1991a: 20).

The difference between the loose and strict accounts of supererogation appears to be in an approach one takes to morality. Supererogation is part of the moral domain and, as such, philosophers tend to define supererogation based on their views on morality. The adherents of the loose account seem to include self-regarding situations into the realm of morality, while the advocates of the strict account primarily see morality as other-regarding. In particular, the latter mention that "only other-regarding duties can be surpassed supererogatorily" (Heyd, 1982: 137), and "the pursuit of non-obligatory (and non-moral) personal ideals or aesthetic value is not supererogatory, even if it is good and praiseworthy" since "acts of supererogation ... carry a moral value usually in terms of other people's happiness or welfare." (Heyd, 1982: 6)

In addition, according to the strict account, agent's intended consequences are a necessary component of morally-salient situations. The advocates of the strict account make sure to include intention in the definition of supererogation arguing that "the agent must have the intention of promoting good by his action" and "the act *may* be supererogatory even if the good consequences in fact fail to ensue – as long as they were sincerely intended" (Heyd, 1982: 115). Since the view on morality of the strict account advocates resonates with the perspective on the morality of the author of the dissertation, the rest of the dissertation will use the definition of supererogation in accordance with the strict account.

Though the majority of philosophers define supererogation through its relationship to duty, some others do so in terms of the involved sacrifice: "[s]upererogatory acts are not

required, though normally they would be were it not for the loss or risk involved for the agent himself" (Rawls, 1971: 117).

AGENT-BASED VS. ACT-BASED VIEWS ON SUPEREROGATION. When it first appeared in philosophical works, supererogation was *primarily* defined through the agent who conducted the act. In other words, supererogatory behaviors were linked to the specifics of the agent's character. Originally, the meaning of supererogation was defined in terms of the attributes of the agent, while the definition of supererogation through an act was derived from the agent's attributes and, hence, appeared as secondary. For instance, Urmson, in his seminal work *Saints and Heroes* (1958) that started the contemporary philosophical work on supererogation, first defined two types of people behaving supererogatorily – saints and heroes – through their personal qualities, and only then he provided a derivative definition in terms of the actions conducted by saints and heroes:

> *[W]e may also call a person a saint (3) if he does actions that are far beyond the limits of his duty, whether by control of contrary inclination and interest or without effort; parallel to this we may call a person a hero (3) if he does actions that are far beyond the bounds of his duty, whether by control of natural fear or without effort. Such actions are saintly (3) or heroic (3). Here, as it seems to me, we have the hero or saint, heroic or saintly deed.*
> (Urmson, 1958: 324)

However, later philosophical works narrowed down the area to which supererogation can relate by removing the agent and his character from the definition of supererogation. Consequently, supererogation became solely defined in terms of an act:

> [S]upererogation is primarily an attribute of acts or action (rather than persons, traits of character, emotions, intentions, or states of affairs). It is, therefore, natural to define the concept in relation to acts, and to treat other uses of the term … as derivative.
> (Heyd, 1982: 115)

The shift from supererogation understood as agent-based to the definition focused on an act is quite a dramatic change in the exploration of the phenomenon of supererogation. Unfortunately, the advocates of the act-based view on supererogation (Heyd, 1982) are not very explicit in why supererogation cannot be an attribute of persons (e.g. traits of character). We may assume that their thinking is stipulated by the features of correlativity and continuity with respect to duty - since duty relates to acts, it becomes logical to define supererogation solely in terms of an action. However, what lacks in this understanding is that duty is not only act-related since compliance with duty is much dependent on agent's predispositions of character and not only on a dutiful act itself.

There has recently been a growing criticism of exploring supererogation solely in terms of an act from the philosophers writing on supererogation. The critique is given "for focusing too much on *actions* and not enough on *attitudes*" (Cowley, 2015b: 1), the latter relating to an agent-based view on supererogation. Furthermore, the empirical study on supererogation that has been conducted as part of the Dissertation (see Part II of the Dissertation for the study findings and discussion) shows that supererogation should primarily be regarded as agent-related since it is affectual inclinations of the agent that determine whether a supererogatory act takes or does not take place.

§1.2   Scope of Supererogation

CLASSIFICATION OF SUPEREROGATORY ACTS. The interest in supererogation started with the consideration of two types of supererogatory people – saints and heroes, and subsequently with two corresponding types of supererogatory acts - saintly and heroic actions

(Urmson, 1958). Later on, saintliness and heroism were combined into one category and five more "paradigm" categories of supererogatory acts were added to the realm of supererogation: beneficence, favors, forgiveness, volunteering, and supererogatory forbearances (Heyd, 1982).

Beneficence comprises doing charity, giving gifts, and expressing generosity, which for some is considered inseparable from life (Ansell-Pearson, 2015). Favors consists of the acts of kindness and consideration and they are included in supererogatory acts since "a refusal to do a favor cannot be criticized morally wrong since one can ask for a favor but never claim it" (Baron, 1997: 615). Forgiveness covers the acts of pardon and mercy and is considered an integral component of humanity (Hamilton, 2015). Some scholars argued that forgiveness is often a function of love and counts as supererogatory only if the agent does not love the forgiven person (Stout, 2015). Volunteering is typically about proactively stepping up to do required work when it cannot be equally distributed – only a few people from a larger population are needed to carry out a task. And forbearance becomes supererogatory when a person does not execute her right for what she is entitled to not by negligence, but intentionally.

However, not everyone agrees with the idea of placing different categories of going beyond duty under the umbrella term 'supererogation' due to a large variance across categories. According to this view, supererogation is "an unnecessary blanket-term used to cover a number of types of moral actions which are as worthy of distinction from each other as they all are from duties and obligations" (Urmson, 1988: 168-169). At the same time, even the critics of using one umbrella term 'supererogation' also offer several categories of acts which could potentially be subsumed by supererogation:

> There are various types of action which we might call kind, considerate, chivalrous, charitable, neighbourly, sporting, decent, or acts of self-denial and self-abnegation;

actions so described are in many circumstances neither duties nor obligations; to fail to do them would not be positively wrong (though, perhaps, unneighbourly, unkind, etc.), nor are they dictated by what I call principle. (Urmson, 1988: 168)

All aforementioned categories of supererogatory acts were developed from an act-based perspective on supererogation. To equally account for agent-based aspects of supererogation, some scholars argue to add to the scope of supererogation "supererogatory attitudes" given that "[i]n the supererogation literature the emphasis has been very much on supererogatory acts rather than attitudes, and the latter deserve equal attention." (Cowley, 2015b: 14). These supererogatory attitudes can potentially include trust, hope, and love. Specifically, trust and hope are supererogatory in "drawing positive conclusions about the future that are not rationally warranted by available evidence"; and love is in "a whole long-term orientation toward" "individual people, groups, institutions, geographical areas, and even ideas and ideals." (Cowley, 2015b: 15-16)

Other advocates of an agent-based perspective on supererogation argue to examine "supporting traits" of a fully virtuous person who "is willing to do both what morality requires and what it only recommends" (Trianovsky, 1986: 31) where the latter accounts for supererogatory acts. These supporting traits can potentially include self-discipline, strength of will, optimism in the face of difficulties, and resilience in the face of failure.

ALTRUISM is yet another lens to look at the scope of supererogation. As a concept, supererogation is inextricably connected with altruism. In fact, altruism is even defined in terms of supererogation as "[a]n action, Φ, is altruistic in the ethical sense if and only if Φ fulfils the criteria for psychological altruism, and Φ is supererogatory" (Schefchyk & Peacock, 2010: 181). However, certain features in the two concepts set them apart.

According to the strict account of supererogation, supererogatory acts are preceded by altruistic intentions, i.e. intentions benefiting other people. However, one should distinguish between intentions (which are part of the act) and motives (feelings that lead us to act) and the latter are not necessarily altruistic when it comes to supererogation. Thus, supererogation always includes altruistic intentions since supererogatory acts are other-regarding, but "the motives for acting supererogatorily are diverse in character, and are not always virtuous." (Heyd, 1982: 137). Therefore, we can claim that supererogation includes acts with both virtuous and non-virtuous motives. The first group of acts constitutes what is known as altruism while the second one falls outside of altruism and can be attributed to a calculative mindset (Wang, Zhong, & Murnighan, 2014) when an agent's behavior is driven by an instrumental (self-oriented) motivation.

To put it another way, an act is altruistic if it "is motivated purely out of concern for the other, and for no benefit to the actor" (Keevil, 2014: 68); while not only the loose account of supererogation, but also the strict account does not exclude instrumental motives in supererogation, even though it is conducted for the sake of someone else. The possibility of calculative motives in supererogation has also been admitted in Rawls's theory of justice:

> *For the theory of right and justice is founded on the notion of reciprocity which reconciles the points of view of the self and of others as equal moral persons. This reciprocity has the consequence that both perspectives characterize moral thought and feeling, usually in roughly even measure. Neither concern for others nor for self has priority, for all are equal; and the balance between persons is given by the principles of justice. And where this balance moves to one side, as with the moralities of supererogation, it does so from the election of self, which freely takes on the larger part.* (Rawls, 1971: 485)

For an action to be qualified supererogatory, it should be conducted with an intention to benefit others. Yet, the definition of supererogation does not require that benefitting others is done solely from an altruistic motivation, and both the balance in motivation between the self

and the others, as well as skewedness in motivation toward the self or the others is possible in supererogation. It is important to realize that supererogation requires from the agent to have other-regarding intentions in her action, but supererogation "does not rely on value judgements" on the motivation of the actor (Keevil, 2014: 68).

§1.3   Justification for Supererogation and its Demarcation with Duty.

Before we proceed with exploring supererogation further, it would make sense to answer whether the concept of supererogation is essential to ethical theory in the first place. Why would anyone who explores morality bother about going beyond duty if individuals' moral behavior could be regulated solely by duties?

In fact, the extension of duties to the whole universe of morally good actions is undesirable and counter-productive to the pursuit of ethical behavior. There are several reasons that justify the need to put a cap on moral duties: (i) they would be vague while precision is preferred, (ii) the imperative of duty cannot be limitless as people's willingness to abide by duties will start diminishing, (iii) duties cannot be set at a universal level that is "high and unattainable" for an average person of "the like of us", and (iv) placing boundaries on duties provides an opportunity for freedom (Urmson, 1958: 329). Though the justification for the demarcation between duty and supererogation could be contested by the defenders of traditional moral theories (more on this in §2.4), the latter argument about opportunity for freedom "has found favor with many philosophers" (Baron, 1997: 616):

> *Generally, supererogation provides moral agents with the opportunity of exercising virtuous traits of character, of acting altruistically, and of fulfilling their individual ideals, opportunities which are denied to them in the sphere of the morality of duty and*

obligation. And this is itself is one of the justifications for the distinction between supererogation and duty. (Heyd, 1982: 9-10)

The fact that the concept of supererogation is not of marginal importance but it is worth of our attention is due to 1) its intrinsic value and 2) its essential role in how our social institutions are built and function:

This intrinsic value attached independently of its utility to the act's being non-obligatory may help us to understand why some of our social organizations and institutions are built so as both to enable and to encourage supererogatory behaviour. It is felt by many people that a system of blood donation based on voluntary giving is morally superior to a system based on commercial exchange and economic utility (or, alternatively, it is superior to a system which legally requires the donation of blood). The same point is made by the habit of asking for volunteers where no clear procedure of selecting a person to perform a dangerous job can be applied. This habit is usually preferred to arbitrary choice, e.g. by a military commander. (Heyd, 1982: 9-10)

Once we agree with the need for the existence of the concept of supererogation, we should answer the next question: where do we draw a line of the demarcation between duty and supererogation? Some philosophers suggest that the limit of duties should be placed at the level of basic moral requirements that provide "tolerable basis of social life" (Urmson, 1958: 331). Thus, duties are needed to make sure that our society can function in a tolerable way, but anything beyond – the quality of societal functioning – should be given to an individual's discretion. Some consider a slightly higher cut-off point a bit higher by seeing "the desirability of keeping moral requirements from 'limiting our autonomy' " (Baron, 1997: 616); while some others argue for a much higher demarcation line in which the obligation of the affluent would extend to fighting famine and poverty on an international scale (Singer, 1972).

The relationship between duty and supererogation is also regulated by introducing the features of correlativity and continuity to supererogation. Correlativity implies that

supererogation is related to duty, since supererogatory acts are about doing more than duty requires, and as such supererogation does not exist in the absence of duty. Continuity stands for "the logical interdependence of the concepts of supererogation and duty" (Heyd, 1982: 5) where supererogatory act realizes "more of the same kind of value than is realized in the fulfillment of duty" (Mellema, 1991a: 13). "That is to say: there is common and continuous scale of values shared by supererogation and duty" (Heyd, 1982: 5).

§1.4   Place for Supererogation in Major Moral Theories

Though the concept of supererogation was known to philosophers for over a thousand years, it had quite a thorny road in how it was treated in philosophical thoughts. For centuries, philosophers did not see any room for supererogation in major moral theories. Their rejection of supererogation was based on different premises, but the conclusion was the same – no room for supererogation in traditional ethical doctrines.

Supererogation got back into the spotlight in the middle of the XX century when James Urmson (1958) revived philosophic interest to supererogation by arguing that the then canonic trichotomous classification of actions into morally permissible, neutral, and impermissible (Kant, 1785) was incomplete. He came forward with and argued his case for a fourth category of individual's "actions that are far beyond the limits of his duty" (Urmson, 1958: 201).

For the past 60 years, it has become a tradition for philosophers writing on supererogation to begin their manuscripts by referencing Urmson. However, he hardly even used

the word supererogation[2] in his work – instead, Urmson used *saints* and *heroes* to describe the phenomenon of interest. As a matter of fact, which is not typically mentioned in the philosophical works on supererogation, Urmson (1988) later regretted using the term 'supererogation' in *Saints and Heroes* as he believed the term belonged to theology and he deplored its introduction to moral philosophy.

However, we need to give proper credit to Urmson for being the first to systematically challenge the classification of moral actions in traditional moral theories that are not being able to accommodate supererogatory acts in their doctrines. After Urmson's publication, there was a surge of interest in the topic of supererogation. In what follows, we will analyze major philosophical views on the possibility of accommodating supererogation in major moral theories.

THEOLOGY. Theologians were the first scholars who started exploring the phenomenon of supererogation. Supererogation served as subject of interest for theologians, such as Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, and others (Heyd, 1982), in the context of its connection to the institution of indulgences practiced by the Catholic Church. In the Middle Ages, it was believed that outstanding works of saints, that went beyond duty in their service to God, could be stored in a special bank and the Church would redistribute the merits of exceeding-duty-deeds to others through indulgences. However, with the growing critique over indulgences from the Protestants, who believed that it was impossible to exceed duties to God, indulgences were abolished by the Church in the XVI century. Consequently, for many centuries ahead, the concept of supererogation lost its glamor and significance for the mainstream theological inquiry.

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[2] Urmson (1958) used the word 'supererogation' only once on page 330; instead, he preferred to use the words saints and heroes to denote the notion of supererogation. Some authors mistakenly mentioned that Urmson did not use the term at all (Heyd, 1982; Aldag, 2008).

Yet, some philosophers nowadays explore the usefulness of the concept of supererogation for understanding the relationship between religious and secular ethics and argue that "the notion of supererogation turns out to be key for an appreciation of the distinctive character of a religious vision of human life" (Wynn, 2015: 163).

Acknowledging that theology lost interest in supererogation, some scholars claimed that "[i]n fact, the concept [of supererogation] did not appear in nonreligious ethical theory until Urmson's seminal (1958) article" (Aldag, 2008: 2025) which revived supererogation "from astonishingly long post-Reformation slumber" (Heyd, 2015: 25). However, the review of philosophy literature shows that the term 'supererogation' has been used in philosophical discussions for centuries (Rashdall, 1924; Roberts, 2014). Thus, to be more precise, Urmson was not the first one to explore the concept of supererogation outside of theology, however, his seminal publication (Urmson, 1958) was instrumental in inspiring many philosophers to devote their entire works to exploring supererogation as the primary subject of interest, and not just referring to supererogation in peripheral discussions in philosophical works devoted to another topic.

UTILITARIANISM. When the proponents of supererogation criticized traditional moral theories for "having no obvious theoretical niche for the saint and hero" (Urmson, 1958: 327), they initially thought that utilitarianism "can be most easily modified to accommodate" the phenomenon of supererogation (Urmson, 1958).

However, utilitarians do not seem to share that initial belief. In their view, "we appear to have a duty not merely to make civilized life *possible*, but also to make it as *good* as we can" (New, 1974: 183). As a result, philosophers standing on a utilitarian ground, criticized the

advocates of supererogation for stopping the structure of duties at basic duties because "a house does not stop at its foundations" (New, 1974: 180-181). Utilitarians also address the pro-supererogation argument, that duties cannot be set at a level unattainable to an average man, by accounting individuals' specifics in stating that people have a duty to be as good as they *possibly* can and to do the best they *possibly* can to produce the most good (New, 1974). A utilitarian response to the challenge posed by the advocates of supererogation could be seen in their reaction to the supererogatory case with the doctor (see Case 1 in Appendix 1),

> *[I]f the doctor from the next province knew that going to the plagued town would produce more good than any other action, he had a duty to go. No doubt one that was harder to perform than that of the doctor already there, but a duty nevertheless.* (New, 1974: 180)

Other adherents of utilitarianism (Pybus, 1982) also saw no place for supererogation in a utilitarian ethical theory, but differently from those (cf. New, 1974) who built their account of individual's duties to produce maximum good in terms of *actions*, they constructed their narrative in terms of *individual's character* that accomplishes dutiful, hard acts and deserves the highest praise:

> *To be moral, we must not only perform certain specifiable actions, or refrain from others, we must also be people of a certain sort. When, therefore, I praise the doctor or the soldier for his heroic act, and the praise is moral, I am praising him for being the sort of person who does that sort of thing.* (Pybus, 1982: 198)

Another approach taken by utilitarians to resolving the problem with supererogation lies in considering it a duty of vocation. By admitting that "[a] theory of duty requires a theory of Vocation as its necessary complement" (Rashdall, 1924: 132), those utilitarians pose absolute duties on doing things that benefit the general well-being and consider good deeds beyond the call of duty a specific case of an individual's vocation whose execution is nevertheless dutiful:

Acts of omissions which the general good only requires under certain internal circumstances or subjective conditions may be termed duties of Vocation. … [W]ith the Catholic it [doctrine] will encourage and find room for any amount of self-devotion – of self-devotion of a kind which really conduces to social Well-being – in those who find within themselves the capacity and the call for such sacrifices. (Rashdall, 124: 137-138).

Others believe that supererogation can be best accommodated in a particular form of utilitarianism – rule-utilitarianism where the greatest good is believed to be achieved through following rules (Brandt, 1968; Hooker, 2002). They postulate that "utility is maximized not by requiring individuals to do all they can to maximize utility – since the burden would generate unhappiness for each of them – but rather by requiring something less onerous" (Baron, 1997: 616). Yet, though rule-utilitarians have room for the concept of going beyond, supererogation for them is still something undesirable because it is duty that produces the most good and it would be unreasonable to exceed duty. This account of supererogation does not hold to the definition of supererogation which stipulates a supererogatory act as not forbidden – which seems to be the case when treating it as undesirable according to a rule-utilitarian perspective.

DEONTOLOGY. Since supererogation stands "in a specific relationship (of transcendence, excellence or over-subscription) to obligatory action" (Heyd, 1982: 1), one would assume that supererogation can comfortably reside in deontological moral theories because duty is a central point of deontology. In addition, Urmson's (1958) seminal work seems to be primarily written as a response to Kantian ethics because it criticizes the trichotomous classification of all acts as obligatory, permissible, and forbidden.

However, Kantian ethics does not have room for supererogation either since it rules out the very possibility of drawing a line that would specify the maximum of a duty. The whole universe of morally good acts in deontology falls under perfect and imperfect duties and the

latter is the closest that deontology can offer to the adherents of supererogation. Kant's imperfect duties are duties to attain certain ends but there is no specific route specified on how to achieve these ends. However, imperfect duties do not have much in common with supererogation because they are still duties that need to be performed anyway, while supererogation characterizes the phenomenon of going beyond duty.

VIRTUE ETHICS seems not to be fit to provide room supererogation either. First, it is centered on the concept of virtue which is quite different from the idea of duty where the former is about an individual's predispositions and inclinations of the character, while the latter is about socially agreed upon norms and expectations (see the discussion on incompatibility of aretaic and deontic moral doctrines in section §7.1). Since the definition of supererogation is derived from the term 'duty', it is hard to reconcile supererogation with aretaic ethical theories based on virtues. Some scholars may argue that virtue ethics also has duties, i.e. "duties of virtue" that correspond to Kant's imperfect imperative (Heyd, 2017: 32). However, even in this case it is still problematic to see room for supererogation in virtue ethics because it does not make sense to do more than a virtuous person would do according to duties of virtue.

Second, virtue ethics is grounded in Aristotle' doctrine of the mean (Aristotle, 1999) where a virtuous person should avoid two extremes – at one end it is deficiency and at the other it is excess – and always target the behavior corresponding to the mean (cf. pursue generosity and avoid stinginess and extravagance). However, supererogation cannot be reconciled with the doctrine of the mean because the entire idea of supererogatory behaviors is in exceeding what one *ought to* do (in this case – targeting the mean), which makes supererogation incompatible with virtue ethics (Crisp, 2013; Kawall, 2009).

However, there were some attempts by virtue ethicists to find room for supererogation by arguing that there is a scale of virtuous acts (Stangl, 2016), where some virtuous acts are more virtuous than others. For instance, tipping 20% or 25% in a restaurant where below 15% would be considered vicious, and over 25% would be considered unwise. According to this account, the definition of supererogation in virtue ethics is:

> *An action is supererogatory if and only if it is overall virtuous and either (a) the omission of an overall virtuous action in that situation would not be overall vicious or (b) there is some overall virtuous action that is less virtuous than it and whose performance in its place would not be overall vicious.* (Stangl, 2016: 349)

This account implies that the application of supererogation in virtue ethics lies within the golden mean that has some leeway for the agent (e.g., tipping 20% or 25%). This leeway comes from recognizing in virtue ethics the presence of two aspects of morality: moral duty and moral recommendation. Thus,

> *The fully virtuous person is willing to do both what morality requires and what it only recommends. ... Now, on this characterization, there is a straightforward connection between supererogation and virtue, since the fully virtuous person is always willing to do more than just what's required.* (Trianovsky, 1986: 31)

EXPLORING SUPEREROGATION ON ITS OWN. Though the concept of supererogation cannot be easily accommodated in traditional major ethical theories, "[t]o most people, the idea of actions that are "above and beyond the call of duty" seems intuitively reasonable" (Aldag, 2008: 226). Due to a paradox inherited in the nature of supererogation – being different from duty but at the same time becoming meaningful only in the presence of duty – many contemporary philosophers started exploring supererogation as is, without necessarily grounding it in any major moral theory (Heyd, 1982).

§1.5   Underexplored Aspects of Supererogation

Since Urmson's publication, the body of philosophic works on supererogation has grown tremendously. However, scholars working on supererogation in philosophy have been mainly preoccupied with the four themes discussed above (§1.1-1.4), while several important aspects of supererogation have not been addressed fully.

MOTIVES OF SUPEREROGATORY BEHAVIORS. Not much consideration in the philosophy literature has been given to what actually leads to supererogatory behaviors. Most philosophical works on supererogation avoided examining the origins of going beyond duty due to high complexity of the topic,

> *The motives for acting supererogatorily are diverse in character, and are not always virtuous. One may act heroically in order to gain fame, to soothe one's conscience (haunted by guilt feelings), or out of moral self-indulgence. High-minded motives are not a necessary condition for supererogatory action.* (Heyd, 1982: 137)

Another reason for excluding motives from the discussion on supererogation is a prevailing perspective on supererogation in which supererogation is considered as primarily an attribute of an act (Heyd, 1982). In case one strictly adheres to an act-based view on supererogation, then there is simply no need to examine personal characteristics of agents performing supererogatory acts. As a result, the requirement of virtuous motives is excluded from the definition of supererogation both in loose and strict accounts of supererogation. This provides a stark contrast to the literature that links supererogation to virtues:

> *There is also an important disanalogy between supererogation and virtue, in that the latter involves a much more complex account of correct motivation, … whereas supererogation is usually only concerned with the act.* (Cowley, 2015b: 3)

To justify the exclusion of motives in their discussion on supererogation, philosophers also refer to limited empirical findings that could shed light on the subject since "[a] systematic psychology of supererogation is in any case not yet at hand and I prefer not to add to the highly speculative suggestions found in the literature on the subject." (Heyd, 1982: 137). In this regard, the empirical part of the Dissertation (Part II) addresses philosopher's concern on the lack of empirical findings on the concept of supererogation, especially in the area of individuals' motives in displaying supererogatory behaviors.

INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS. When exploring any human activity, it is apparent that people differ in their capabilities and inclinations. Thus, it would make sense to account for person's capabilities and emotional inclinations when considering supererogation as well. Even those who see moral laws as universal, also need to attempt to account for different individual characteristics, as the founder of the ideal utilitarianism theory mentioned:

> *Moreover, it is an essential characteristic of the moral law that, it should be (in the Kantian phrase) 'fit to serve for law universal', i.e. that what is right for one must be right for every one else in the same circumstances – when they are really the same. But it is perfectly consistent with this principle to include a man's character, moral, emotional, and intellectual, among the 'circumstances' or conditions upon which his duty in the particular case depends. … The development of the moral consciousness in different men being unequal, the same actions do not always suggest themselves to all men; acts of extraordinary heroism, ideals of extraordinary self-devotion, present themselves only to rare and exceptionally endowed natures.* (Rashdall, 124: 133)

Thus, any comprehensive account of supererogation should account for the fact that people differ not only in their physical capabilities, but also in their emotional and virtuous predispositions to different types of supererogatory acts. This will be addressed in Part II, specifically see section §5.5 for findings and discussion on individuals' capacities that moderate

the relationship between agent's affectual response to supererogatory opportunities and her actual supererogatory behavior.

REACTION TO SUPEREROGATION. Finally, philosophers do not spend any time on discussing possible reaction to supererogatory acts. Given that supererogation is defined as morally praiseworthy, it is assumed by default that stakeholders' reaction (that of agents, beneficiaries and observers of supererogatory acts) is positive. However, the study showed (see section §5.7) that feedback to supererogation can be a mixture of positive, neutral, and negative reactions. The variation in reaction to supererogatory behaviors is of interest not only in an attempt to learn more about the phenomenon of supererogation, but is also important to understand considering that reaction to a supererogatory act shapes agent's willingness or unwillingness to perform supererogation when another supererogatory opportunity opens up next time.

Chapter 2.   Review of Business Ethics Literature

§2.1   Discretional Responsibility as an Initial Proxy for Supererogation.

Compared to philosophy, where supererogation has been analyzed in much detail, management scholars, and business ethicists in particular, have paid relatively limited attention to the phenomenon of supererogation. The start of the management scholarship on concepts contiguous to supererogation could be traced back to Carroll (1979) whose work on corporate social responsibilities (CSR) distinguished economic, legal, and ethical responsibilities, as well as discretional responsibility. The latter, that included pure voluntarily acts such as philanthropy, could be considered, to some degree, as a proxy to supererogation.

The notion of discretionary responsibility in business gave a surge to active discussions in management literature, some of which were laudable of Carroll's ideas, while others were criticizing discretionary responsibility (L'Etang, 1994; Clarkson, 1995; Shaw & Post 1993; Wood, 1991). Later, Carroll himself reconsidered his original ideas about CSR and proposed to integrate discretionary responsibilities into economic and ethical ones (Schwartz & Carroll, 2003).

§2.2   Growing Interest in Supererogation in Business Ethics

Until now there has been only a handful of publications on supererogation in business ethics and management journals, and those authors often had varying views on supererogation. Some scholars linked supererogatory behavior to corporate philanthropic activity (Wokutch & Spencer, 1987), while others distinguished supererogation from corporate social responsibility (CSR) and positive deviance (Mazutis, 2014). Going back to Carroll's original work, supererogation has been regarded as going beyond the four types of responsibilities (Mazutis, 2014), including the discretional (philanthropic) one, because none of Carroll's responsibilities fully meets the four conditions of a supererogatory act defined by Heyd (see earlier discussion in §1.1).

Until now there has been only one empirical study on supererogation, that has been done on a macro level and in the context of going beyond government regulations (Cavazos, Rutherford & Berman, 2017). The study showed that an increase in government surveillance positively affected corporate supererogatory acts – car-makers were more likely to voluntary recalling cars for fixing product defects not covered in existing government regulation; while the implementation of standards-based government regulations had a negative effect on corporate supererogation.

Some scholars brought the notion of supererogation into the literature on stakeholder theory. Building on the premises that stakeholder relationships are to be grounded in fairness and reciprocity (Phillips, 2003), they went further and introduced the idea of supererogatory fairness (Keevil, 2014). According to this concept, "stakeholder will tend to go out of their way for firms that exceed their expectations" (Keevil, 2014: 16), thus, stakeholders' positive reciprocity toward a firm can be expected only if the firm behaves toward them supererogatorily.

Demonstrating a natural connection between moral philosophy and business ethics, philosophers significantly contributed to generating interest in supererogation in the business ethics literature. Mellema, known for his profound works on supererogation in philosophy (1987, 1991a, 1991c, 1994a, 1996), also examined supererogation in business (Mellema 1991b) and published his work in business ethics outlets (Mellema, 1994b).

Positive signs that speak in favor of growing interest in supererogation in business is that the concept has found its way to business ethics vocabulary and entries of the term became part of business ethics dictionaries (Werhane & Freeman, 1997[3]; Kolb, 2008). Yet, apart from philosophers and business ethicists, the term supererogation has not been used much in management and organizational literatures (Aldag, 2008), and it has not yet become, with some exceptions (Hooper, 2006), part of the lexicon used by business practitioners in their work. However, as scholarly as it may sound, the term supererogation could be useful for practicing managers as it emphasizes the moral aspects of going beyond duty which are often neglected in the pursuit of profit maximization.

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[3] Though the term supererogation had been removed from the second edition of the dictionary (Werhane & Freeman, 2005).

Supererogation has also been analyzed in business ethics and positive organizational scholarship's (POS) literature under the term 'good works'. In particular, good works in professional settings were linked to character and virtues (Pritchard, 1992), examined in the relation to meaningful work (Martin, 2000), and theorized on good works as a positive deviance in organizations, a sort of "a positive counterpart to unethical behavior" (Stansbury & Sonenshein, 2012: 340) where the latter exemplifies a negative deviance.

There are also publications in the business ethics literature on the 'logic of gift' which relates to one of the supererogatory categories – benevolence. Business ethicists distinguish among three types of logics of human action when it comes to giving in organizations – the logic of exchange, the logic of duty, and the logic of gift (Baviera, English, & Guillén, 2016). While the former two are based on either the pursuit of self-interest or a sense of duty, the latter stands for free, unconditional giving, without expectation of return. The logic of gift is based not on a calculative mindset or the feeling of responsibility, but on agent's benevolence in willing to do some good beyond oneself.

Yet, the review of the business ethics literature shows that the same underexplored aspects of supererogation, that have been identified in philosophy, are also quite relevant for the business ethics scholarship: unclear motives of supererogatory behavior, undefined characteristics of individuals behaving supererogatory, and varying reaction to supererogatory acts. The need for future research in these areas has been mentioned by a number of business ethicists who, for instance, questioned the definition of supererogation that excludes virtuous motives (De George, 2010).

Chapter 3.   Review of Organizational Behavior Literature

The review of the organizational behavior (OB) literature shows that the term *supererogation* has not been used in the OB scholarship. However, OB scholars developed a couple of constructs that capture important aspects of going beyond duty in organizational settings: organizational citizenship behavior and job crafting. Though none of these OB constructs fully captures the notion of supererogation, it is nevertheless important to briefly review them and delineate how they are similar and different from supererogation, because their findings can, to a large extent, inform the exploration of supererogation in organizations.

§3.1   Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB).

The first ideas of the theory of OCB were formulated in late 70s – early 80s (Organ, 1977; Bateman & Organ, 1983; Smith, Organ, & Near, 1983) and they further evolved in scholarly works over the next three decades. The recent definition of OCB describes it as "[i]ndividual behavior that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and in the aggregate promotes the efficient and effective functioning of the organization" (Organ, Podsakoff & MacKenzie, 2006: 3). OCB, also known as extra-role performance, occurs when an employee does at work more than her in-role responsibilities require by getting involved in extra-role behaviors.

Supererogation and OCB could be seen as distinct, but largely related concepts whose relatedness reveals itself in the overlap area of behaviors that both concepts cover. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between supererogation and OCB in a simplified form.

Figure 1. A simplified relationship between supererogation and OCB.

Supererogation   **OCB**

Going beyond duty in **morally-salient** situations that does **not improve** overall organizational performance

Going beyond duty (extra-role behavior) in **morally-salient** situations that **improves** overall organizational performance

Extra-role behavior in **non-morally-salient** situations that **improves** overall organizational performance

There is a large number of acts of going beyond duty that falls under both supererogation and OCB (the overlap area in Figure 1). In particular, these are extra-role behaviors in work settings that take place in a morally-salient context, which are morally praiseworthy, and in aggregate they positively contribute to overall organizational functioning. For example, during the study, conducted by the author in organizations, many collected supererogatory cases also qualify for OCB, e.g., such cases as *Coffee Corner, Extraordinary Service, Mentoring Junior Colleague*, and *Substituting Class* (see Part II for more details, in particular, §5.1 for the developed taxonomy of supererogatory acts; and Appendices 3 and 4 for specific cases)

However, there is also a wide range of acts pertaining to either supererogation or OCB, but not to both. For instance, such supererogatory cases as *Meeting with Students from Another School, Concert Tickets & Babysitting,* and *Hospital Visit* do not qualify as OCB since they do not contribute in the aggregate to better functioning of the organization where they took place. In

each of these cases, a faculty member spent time (an hour, half a day, and two full days respectively) helping either their colleagues or people from outside their organization. However, according to OCB, the agents', as well as beneficiaries' time would have been better spent by working instead on organizational tasks rather than getting involved in supererogatory behaviors.

To better understand how supererogation and OCB relate to each other (their similarities and differences), we need to compare them across six dimensions whose notion is important for one of the concepts or for both of them: Terminology, Nature of Value, Moral Salience, Scope, Magnitude and Motives.

Terminology. The concept of *supererogation* came in the management literature from philosophy and its terminology is inseparable from the term *duty*; while OCB has been developed by organizational behavior scholars and the term *duty* has not been used in the OB literature. The notion of duty in the OB literature has been conveyed by the idea of *in-role* behaviors, that makes OCB being defined through *extra-role* behaviors. Despite these semantic differences in the definitional terminology of supererogation and OCB, both concepts refer to the same idea of exceeding expectations in organizational settings which makes a comparative analysis of the two concepts possible.

Nature of Value. The main difference between supererogation and OCB lies in the nature of what makes each concept valuable. A supererogatory act is valuable due to its inherent moral goodness that comes from benefiting another person; while OCB is primarily valuable due to contributing to overall organizational performance. OCB requires that extra-role behaviors be beneficial for organizations, and this crucial premise of OCB – focusing only on those extra-role behaviors that are beneficial for organizations – makes OCB very instrumental. The instrumental

nature of OCB makes it valuable only in view of its contribution to overall company performance. Differently from OCB, supererogation's intrinsic value lies in morally praiseworthy behavior that is valuable per se, without linking it to company performance.

On the one hand, the premise of being instrumental makes OCB useful for companies because it provides a practical tool for helping managers make their organizations more efficient. On the other hand, focusing too much on organizational benefits significantly narrows the phenomenon of going beyond duty in organizations. Not every morally praiseworthy act of going beyond duty is necessarily beneficial for organization's performance. In addition, individuals who exceed duties can do it not because they primarily want to benefit their organizations but because of other reasons, for instance, driven by their intrinsic need to help people.

To put it another way, supererogation values going beyond duty per se, due to its morally intrinsic value, not necessarily linking supererogatory acts to the benefit of organization. For example, when a senior, highly competent manager helps a low level employee with some of her tasks, this could be considered supererogatory. However, if manager's helping in the aggregate is not beneficial for the organization it would not be classified as OCB, since it would be better for the organization to apply the manager's unique skills to solving more important managerial challenges instead of spending his valuable time on helping his colleague with low-skill tasks. This over-focus on company performance at the expense of ethical aspects has been of concern for a number of management scholars who argued that the role of ethical consideration in management theories could be higher than it has been so far (Bosse and Phillips, 2016).

Moral Salience. What also differentiate supererogation from OCB is that the latter does not require moral salience in the actions of going beyond duty, while explicit moral

praiseworthiness is a crucial element of supererogatory behavior. This is not to say that OCB behaviors cannot be morally praiseworthy – they could. But moral goodness is not required for qualifying as OCB, so its extra-role behaviors also include a broad range of actions where morality is not salient. For instance, staying late at work to get more things done can be described as OCB, but if this behavior is not morally salient in this particular context (e.g., it does not involve helping others or keeping a promise), then it would not fall under the category of supererogatory acts.

Scope. OCB specifies employee's responsibilities too narrowly, only focusing on in-role behavior. However, employees' duties are shaped not only by job-related requirements, but also by moral norms and societal expectations. For instance, OCB literature mentions courtesy at work as "a distinguishable form of OCB" (Organ et al., 2006: 24), since it is not stipulated in job contracts, it is not directly recognized by the corporate reward system, and it promotes organizational effectiveness. However, small acts of courtesy would not be qualified as supererogatory because, though courtesy is not required by job descriptions, it is still part of person's duty according to moral norms of the society we live in. In other words, practicing courtesy at work would not be considered as going beyond individual's moral duty and, as such, would not be qualified as supererogatory behavior. In other words, the scope of supererogation spans much broader than that of OCB since the former applies beyond the context of organizations and covers other domains of individuals' lives.

Magnitude. If a particular moral behavior that exceeds norms, e.g. helping others, could be represented as a measurable scale, then OCB would typically occupy the lower rung of this scale, while supererogation would tend to lean towards a higher (sometimes even extreme) end

since OCB behaviors "do not involve a significant departure from norms in a various direction. Instead, they are minor deviations from job descriptions" Spreitzer and Sonenshein (2003: 218).

Motives. Alike philosophers and business ethicists working on supererogation, OB scholars came to a similar conclusion about irrelevance of considering motives in defining the concept of going beyond duty in OCB:

> *Our position is that OCB, like most human behaviors, is caused by multiple and overlapping motives. …* [One] *might have helped, in part, for selfish reasons, but that does not rule out the possibility that other reasons – such as affiliation (the desire to have positive relationships with other people), power (the kind of power that comes about from people being debt to you for favors), or organization loyalty – also were at play. … our contention is that understanding the proximal motive for OCB is not essential to our appreciation of it, nor to our recognition, definition, or understanding of it. In the definition of OCB, then, … we excluded from it any qualifiers about motive.* (Organ et al., 2006: 7)

It has to be also mentioned that behavior of going beyond duty at work is typically considered as positive, however, some scholars explored negative sides of OCB (Deery et al., 2016; Bolino et al., 2013). The undesirable consequences of OCB, what is sometimes referred to as the dark side of OCB, include counterproductive work behavior (i.e., underperformance in core work tasks due to distraction from extra-role activities), lowered career prospects, reduced work-life balance, and the perception of impressions management.

§3.2   Job Crafting

Another OB construct that has some similarities with supererogation is job crafting which is defined as "the physical and cognitive changes individuals make in the task or relational boundaries of their work" (Wrzesniewski and Dutton, 2001: 179). Job crafting affects one's meaning of the work and one's work identity.

Differently from OCB, job crafting does not link extra-role behavior to organizational efficiency but sees it primarily in the relation to individual's meaning and identity. According to job crafting, the roots of doing more than required at work lie in employees' needs for control of their work environment, positive image of themselves in their own and others' eyes, and connection to others (Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001). The employees, experiencing these needs at work, start crafting their jobs by changing the way they see their work which results in modifying their work activities, including with whom they interact at work.

There is an overlap between job crafting and supererogation when it comes to i) going beyond duty at work, ii) when such a behavior is other-regarding (oriented at helping others), and iii) it happens due to crafting a new meaning of one's work. There were a few supererogatory cases collected in the empirical study on supererogation (see Part II of the dissertation) that fit this definition, in particular, see case *Coffee Corner* and, partially, case *Study Abroad* in Appendix 4. However, there are also large areas where job crafting and supererogation differ from each other. Job crafting requires that an agent rethinks her job responsibilities by providing a new meaning for them, while it is not a necessary condition for supererogation. An agent can conduct a supererogatory act having the same understanding of her job responsibilities as she had before, and her supererogatory behaviors are invoked not by a change in her perspective on her job, but by her desire to help someone, even if it involves doing more than typically expected in this situation. Another difference between these two constructs is that supererogation always includes actions that are morally-salient, while ethical aspects are not a necessary condition for job crafting. In job crafting, a person may change task or relational boundaries of her work that would be meaningful only for her, but not for others, for instance, a nurse can reshuffle furniture

in the TV corner in a hallway from time to time believing that she contributes to a better aura of the medical facility. However, if hospital visitors or passing-by medical staff do not care about it or do not find it useful, then there is not much supererogatory behavior in that activity.

§3.3   The Use of OB Constructs vs. Supererogation.

In aftermath, we have three concepts in management scholarship that consider going beyond duty within the context of organizational workplace: OCB, job crafting, and supererogation. Then the question arises whether we need all the three or one of them can explain the phenomenon of going beyond duty in organizations?

There is one important notion to be borne in mind here. The three concepts look at the phenomenon of going beyond duty in organizational settings from different perspectives and this stipulates differences in their concept constructs: OCB ties the phenomenon of going beyond duty to organizational efficiency, job crafting links it to meaning at work, while supererogation explores it in relation to morality.

Building on the premise that language is a tool to solve problems and different language is appropriate in different situations (Wittgenstein, 1953), we may conclude that each of the concepts of going beyond duty – OCB, job crafting and supererogation – are useful depending on a situation one faces in an organizational context. Supererogation is particularly relevant in analyzing organizational situations where morality is salient as both OCB and job crafting either ignore morality or keep it somewhere in the periphery of the phenomenon of going beyond duty. Even though in everyday language the word supererogation denotes actions that just go beyond

duty, for philosophers and business ethicists it is moral praiseworthiness that makes going beyond duty supererogatory.

At the same time, it may be helpful to use the language of OCB in a corporate boardroom when senior executives discuss how organization can function more efficiently and looking at it from an OCB perspective can be relevant in this context. The language of job crafting can be useful for human resources managers dealing with high employee turnover, as letting employees craft their jobs can contribute to finding meaning at work and, thus, raise employees' satisfaction with what they do.

However, in certain morally salient contexts it is more reasonable to speak about supererogation rather than OCB or job crafting. A good illustration of supererogation at work is a personal story shared by a health care professional. In this story, "[a] medical student worries about an elderly Chinese patient's understanding of his prescribed medication and makes the extraordinary effort of visiting the patient's home on several occasions until it is clear that the patient understands the proper dispensing of his medication." (Kushner & Thomasma, 2001: 115). This student was doing residency in a hospital and he tried to help the patient, however, he was criticized by his supervisor for doing what doctors do not typically do. Moreover, the resident doctor was not adding on this task to enhance the meaning of his job (cf. job crafting). In his conversation with the supervisor, he emphasized that he thought it was the responsibility of every doctor to follow up with the patient in this particular way. Clearly, in this case his supererogatory performance stemmed from his extended understanding of duty (see section §5.4 on extended duty). In fact, from his own perspective his actions could not be classified as

supererogatory (it is just duty for him). However, those around him (including his supervisor) were most likely considering his behavior as supererogatory.

The literature review shows that there is a striking lack of empirical studies on supererogation in organizational settings. There are a number of reasons why supererogation has not received proper attention among management scholars and why it should. First, going beyond duty in morally salient situations is not what the majority of people would expect to see in a business environment where they think the focus should be on financial gains. Second, OB scholars who were interested in the phenomenon of going beyond duty designed alternative concepts such as OCB (Organ, 1988) and job crafting (Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001); however, these constructs concepts did not incorporate morality in their constructs and, as such, cannot provide understanding of the organizational situations with morally-salient context. Third, differently from OCB and job crafting, supererogation has been researched mostly on a conceptual level with no empirical work done in the context of organizations. Thus, many scholars who are interested in doing empirical research and who can be initially attracted by supererogation, avoid the topic due to the hardship of being 'pioneers' in a new terrain. Considering the lack of empirical knowledge of supererogatory behaviors in organizations, the dissertation aims to fill this void.

In view of the identified underexplored areas on supererogation in philosophy and business ethics literatures, the dissertation aims to investigate the following four main research questions: 1) What leads people to exhibiting supererogation in organizations? 2) How are supererogatory behaviors perceived in organizational settings? 3) What is the taxonomy of

supererogatory acts in organizations? and 4) What is the relationship between supererogation

and traditional major moral theories?

PART II. EMPIRICAL STUDY ON SUPEREROGATION

Chapter 4. Explanation of the Methodology

§4.1   Research Method

The study examines the phenomenon of supererogation in organizations, in particular, people's motivation to engage in supererogatory behavior, how supererogation is performed, and individuals' attitudes toward supererogatory acts. In view of limited theoretical knowledge on the subject and the absence of empirical findings about the phenomenon of supererogation in organizations, the researcher applied a qualitative research methodology because qualitative data have often been advocated for as the best approach to discovery and exploration of a new area (Miles, Huberman and Saldana, 2014: 12).

Supererogation takes place in a socially constructed system of norms, values and beliefs (Mazutis, 2014;) which "only makes sense within a certain cultural context" (Zagzebski, 2017: 96) and needs a social agreement on the requirements and limits of duty (Wolfe, 1989). This points out that supererogation is, to a large extent, a socially constructed phenomenon and, thus, in-depth interviews are best suited for its empirical investigation. Applying extensive interviewing as a research method fits well the purpose of the study, since interviews allow to explore people's perceptions and attitudes by providing "accurate accounts of the kinds of mental maps that people carry around inside their heads" Luker (2008: 167). The obtained qualitative data are "fundamentally well suited for locating the meaning people place on the events … and for connecting these meaning to the social world around thus (Miles et al., 2014: 11). Besides,

interviews serve well for building a theory (Luker, 2008: 167) which has been much needed for the phenomenon of supererogation that is largely unexplored, not well understood and conceptually underdeveloped (Mazutis, 2014).

The researcher's intention to build the theory of supererogation in organizations called for the use of qualitative research methodology which is especially relevant when "the concepts pertaining to a given phenomenon have not yet been identified … [and] the relationships between the concepts are poorly understood or conceptually undeveloped." (Strauss & Corbin, 1990: 37). Qualitative research is indispensable when it comes to exploring "the inner experiences of participants, … how meanings are formed and transformed, … areas not yet thoroughly researched, … [and] to take a holistic and comprehensive approach to the study of phenomena" (Strauss & Corbin, 1990:). Furthermore, the data obtained in the qualitative, interview-based study have been collected in close proximity to the specific situations of interest and, as such, they are rich in terms of providing "thick description" (Miles, Huberman & Saldana, 2014: 11-12) of the phenomenon of supererogation in organizations.

The researcher used grounded theory to collect and analyze data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The researcher's main purpose was to develop a theory of supererogation and using the grounded theory method would work well in this case (Strauss & Corbin, 1990: 37). Grounded theory is based on the pragmatist philosophy of knowledge (Corbin & Strauss, 2015), where knowledge stems from practice since "[a]ll reflective inquiry starts from a problematic situation" (Dewey, 1929: 189). Dewey, a prominent philosopher and educator and a co-founder of the philosophical school of pragmatism, believed that ideas should be grounded in consequences,

and this characterizes what makes supererogation come into existence – going beyond duty in practical terms. As Dewey mentioned,

> *The test of ideas, of thinking generally, is found in the consequences of the acts to which the ideas lead, that is in the new arrangement of things which are brought into existence" (Dewey, 1929: 136).*

In grounded theory, the concepts and the subsequent theory are inductively derived – discovered, developed, and validated – from the data collected during the research process, and "data collection, analysis, and theory stand in reciprocal relationship with each other" (Strauss & Corbin, 1990: 23). Thus, qualitative research guided by the principles of grounded theory makes it possible to explore the concepts of supererogation in organizations much more comprehensively, including their properties and dimensions (Corbin & Strauss, 2015).

§4.2   Study Sample

The study was conducted in three major business schools in the South-East of the United States. Aiming at the variety of relationships between faculty members, staff, and students, the researcher selected three business schools that represent different business school context in terms of public vs. private institutions and graduate vs. undergraduate programs. So one of the selected business schools belonged to a public institution and it was primarily focusing on undergraduate business education; the second business school was part of a private institution offering educational programs at both graduate and undergraduate levels; and the third business school one belonged to a public institution and it was specializing only in a graduate business education. All the three business schools were ranked by BloombergBusinessweek among the Top-50 U.S. Best Graduate (2017) or Undergraduate (2016) Business Programs.

Business schools provide a useful context for studying supererogation in organizations for three reasons. First, most people working in academia hold graduate (mostly doctoral degrees) degrees and can be considered highly educated. This served well for discussing sophisticated concepts such as the higher flights of morality, i.e. supererogation. Second, even though business schools are organizations somewhat different from those in the corporate world, they are still organizations, and the results obtained in this study can be useful for other types of organizations in business, military, education, or sports areas. Third, business school provide a diverse environment in terms of functional areas (finance, strategy, marketing, organizational behavior, etc), international employees' body, gender, race, and age, and this enables exploring the phenomenon of supererogation from different angles.

In the three business schools, the researcher conducted 20 interviews where an average interview length was about 1 hour, overall ranging from 30 min to 2 hours. The respondents' pool profile was the following: 17 faculty members, 2 staff members, and 1 doctoral student. Among the faculty members, there were 8 full professors, 6 associate professors, 2 assistant professors, and 1 adjunct lecturer. About 80% of the faculty members were tenured. In terms of respondents' functional areas, 6 respondents specialized in Finance/Accounting, 5 in Strategy/Entrepreneurship, 3 in Organizational Behavior, 3 in Marketing, and 1 in Operations.

The average age of the respondents was 55 years old, in particular, 1 person was under 30 years old, 2 people under 40 y.o., 3 people under 50 y.o., 6 people under 60 y.o., and 8 people over 60 y.o. Among all the respondents, 70% were men, 90% were married, and 75% had children. On average, the respondents spent 23 years working in academia overall, including 18 years in their current institution.

§4.3   Data Collection

The initial pool of candidates for interviews was identified using purposeful sampling aiming to account for different profiles of people working in business schools: specialization area, seniority level, age, and gender. The first few interviews were scheduled with the help of the scholars from the researcher's network who sent individual emails asking potential respondents to meet with the researcher; those endorsement emails were followed up by the researcher. After the completion of the first few interviews, all the subsequent interviews were scheduled by the researcher himself via email or through stopping by the respondents' offices. The interview acceptance rate among the targeted respondents was 95% (there was only one staff member at an IT desk who refused to be interviewed despite a couple of researcher's attempts).

As initial findings started to emerge, and trying to account for different perspectives on supererogatory acts, the researcher turned to theoretical sampling by interviewing persons that "will maximize the opportunity to develop categories to their fullest extent" (Corbin & Strauss, 2015: 218). Focused data gathering was carried out by applying a snowball technique (Goodman, 1961) where that potential candidates for subsequent interviews were determined by the data collected in the previous interviews: either the name of the person for the next interview was mentioned in one of the supererogatory stories described in the previous interviews; or the name was mentioned at the end of the interviews when the researcher typically asked the respondents if they would be willing to name persons in their organizations who might have an interesting perspective on going beyond duty in a morally praiseworthy way.

The Institutional Review Board for Social and Behavioral Research (IRB-SBS) at the researcher's home institution has approved conducting the study in the three business schools.

All the participants were informed about the purpose and nature of the study and were asked to sign the consent form.

All the interviews were conducted by the researcher himself. Each interview was audio recorded by means of a smart phone and written consents were received prior to the interviews. 75% of the interviews were conducted at respondents' work offices, 20% at outside locations (e.g. during having a meal), and 5% at respondents' home. The interview audio files were transcribed either by the researcher, or by a professional transcribing service whose work was verified by the researcher.

Aiming to allow interviews to flow the way that the respondents prefer, but also trying to touch upon a few common topics with each respondent, the researcher used semi-structured interviews since in grounded theory they "enable researchers to maintain some consistency over the concepts that are covered in each interview" (Corbin & Strauss, 2015: 39). Appendix 2 contains a sample of an interview protocol, where the researcher starts discussion topics but provides the respondents with flexibility to take discussion in the direction they choose. A sample of the interview protocol is provided for an illustration purpose as the researcher did not strictly adhere to the protocol because the protocol structure as well as the sequence of asked questions varied throughout the interview process due to the inherent specifics of theoretical sampling (Corbin & Strauss, 2015: 137, 143).

At the end of the interview, the respondents were given three vignettes each containing a supererogatory case (typically, though not always, the following three cases outlined in Appendix 3 were given: *Concert Tickets and Babysitting, Help with Job in Investment Banking, and Mindfulness Meditation*). Vignettes can be used as a complementary technique to enhance the

main data collection method, such as interviewing, by supplementing already collected data and generating data not captured by interviews (Barter & Renold, 1999). In the study, the vignettes were especially helpful to explore participant's attitude to different types of supererogation. The supererogatory cases selected for the vignettes differed by the salience of different elements in supererogatory acts (e.g., intentions, outcome, motivational drivers – more on this is discussed in the Findings section). Interview participants where requested to read each case and then the researcher started off a discussion with the opening question: "Which case was about going beyond duty the most and why?" When asking this question, the researcher was not inasmuch interested in seeing which case the respondents nominated the most supererogatory, but in their explaining of their choices.

The researcher stopped conducting interviews when the study reached the point of saturation, when no new concepts were emerging and the collected data in the subsequent interviews started repeating over and over again those collected in the previous interviews. At the point of saturation, all major categories were fully developed, showed variation, and were integrated (Corbin & Strauss, 2015: 134).

When discussing supererogatory stories during the interviews, the researcher did not mention the technical term "supererogation", as the respondents were unlikely to be familiar with the term. Instead, the researcher framed the overall interview topic by outlining two key features of the phenomenon of interest: 1) people's behaviors of going beyond duty in their organizations, and 2) those behaviors should be morally praiseworthy, meaning that they should be other-regarding (not only limited to respondent's self-interest). After framing the overall interview topic, for simplicity the term 'going beyond duty' was typically used to refer to those

behaviors throughout the interviews. None of the respondents mentioned the term 'supererogation' on their own. Yet, at the end of interviews, a few respondents asked more about the study and researcher's scholarly interests, so at that time the researcher could use the term 'supererogation'.

§4.4   Data Analysis

The conducted interviews provided a rich material on supererogatory acts in academia. The researcher collected 83 cases that respondents shared about their own supererogatory behavior or the supererogatory behavior of their colleagues. These 83 supererogatory cases will be further referred throughout the dissertation as *the Broad Collection* of supererogatory cases in academia. Out of these large number of collected supererogatory cases, the researcher has selected and outlined in detail 27 cases (see Appendix 3) which will be further referred as *the Self-Reported Collection* of supererogatory cases in academia. The supererogatory cases for the self-reported collection were selected by the two criteria: i) those were the stories shared by the respondents about their own supererogatory behavior (though the perspectives of other case stakeholders were also collected, wherever available) and 2) they provided rich material about the agents' own experience with supererogation. The broad collection of supererogatory cases has been used to develop the taxonomy of supererogation in academia, whereas the self-reported collection has been used to develop affectual theory of supererogation since it made possible to learn about the agents' motivations and attitudes from the first hand.

One of the unique, beneficial elements of the conducted study is that the researcher in many cases managed to collect different perspectives toward the same supererogatory acts by

talking to multiple stakeholders of the supererogatory cases: the agent (the one who behaved supererogatorily), the beneficiary (the person who benefited from the supererogatory act), and the observer (the one who witnessed or knew about the act). As a result, the multiple respondents' descriptions of and their attitudes toward the same supererogatory acts, that has been identified and discussed in the interviews, provided a thick description (Mills, Durepos, & Wiebe, 2010) of the phenomenon of supererogation in organizations.

The obtained data have been coded by the researcher using an inductive open coding method (Miles et al., 2014), where the initial codes were derived from the first interviews' data. Open coding enabled capturing respondents' meanings of supererogatory cases. The initial codes, generated from the first raw data, were further revised, modified, deleted, or expanded based on the ongoing insights received in the process of conducting and analyzing subsequent interviews. At later stages, the derived codes were triangulated, whenever relevant, against the literature (Locke, 2001) on supererogation and moral decision making. Throughout the analysis, the raw data and the derived codes were examined for similarities and differences with the help of the constant comparison technique (Charmaz, 2006) and by constantly asking analytical questions of the data, as well as using other thinking strategies and analytical tools from the grounded theory method (Corbin and Strauss, 2015). The obtained first level codes were grouped into more abstract second-order categories and those were combined into third level themes (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The data structure is outlined in Figure 2. Finally, the core category – a salient role of emotions in supererogatory behavior – emerged. The interactions among the themes were analyzed and some potential causal relationships have been discussed (see Findings section for more details).

Figure 2. Data structure.

1st Order Concepts	2nd Order Concepts	3rd Order Categories
Finding out about an opportunity of going beyond duty by noticing it on her own through conversations, emails, news, or through personal observations; having more flexibility later in choosing a way to act	Agent-driven Learning	Learning about supererogatory opportunity
Being approached by a recipient or a third party who asked to conduct a supererogatory act; it is often a newly emerged opportunity happening unexpectedly; less flexibility in choosing a way to act	Request-driven Learning	
Attending to supererogatory opportunity because it lies in the area of agent's hobbies, interests, or passions; it is interesting, enjoyable and gratifying; agent's interest is important to the agent	Interest	Triggers of Attendance
Relating to supererogatory opportunity due to having a similar experience in the past; sharing same cultural or social background with a recipient; remembering similar difficulties; appreciating help in the past	Similar Experience	
Attending to supererogatory opportunity through associating herself with the recipient or event through belonging to the same social structure: friendship, classroom, organization, gathering; affiliation by shared values or common attributes	Affinity by Values	
Anticipating enjoyment from conducting a certain supererogatory act; liking it; finding it gratifying; being passionate about it; inherently rewarding; being excited; eagerly looking forward to it; considering it absolutely fun; loving doing it; being happy to be able to do it; getting a sense of well-being from it; doing it due to the way one's wired	Enjoyment	Drivers of Action
Attuned to the suffering of others; feeling bad for others' pain; emphasizing with others; feeling sympathy for somebody's situation; willing to act to alleviate someone else's suffering; a strongly developed feeling of empathy; a sense of when people are needing help; being emotional; feeling connected to other humans	Compassion	
Considering it a duty, whereas the majority of people do not see obligation; thinking that others would have done the same thing; not perceiving it as above and beyond; feeling being positioned better than others to do it; feeling an urge to act.	Extended Duty	
Having limited time availability; having family commitments that other people may not have; overwhelmed with tenure pressure; trying to keep one's head above water; being very busy with other things; having to draw a line for what can be realistically done; having already very demanding current responsibilities	Bandwidth	Capacities
Requiring certain skills for performing particular acts of supererogation; being able to help; knowing how to do it; possessing a necessary experience; being capable of doing it; having multitasking skills helps overcome bandwidth limitations	Capability Fit	
Being satisfied with status quo; not being stressed out; not feeling overwhelmed or unsecure; not fearing performing a particular supererogatory act per se; not being over-ambitious; not being critical of some supererogatory behaviors	Emotional Fit	
Personal synergy between an agent and a recipient; feeling comfortable working with the person; approaching an agent with a request in the right way.	Interpersonal Fit	
The existence of many supererogatory acts is contingent on the recipient's willingness to participate or accept benefits; recipient's cooperation makes the act gratifying for agent; the more recipients, the more value is generated by a supererogatory act; recipients can cooperate willingly or unwillingly – not wanting to harm the relationship with agent; declining agent's offer due to seeing no value or offered sacrifice is too much to accept	Recipient's Consent	Supererogatory Behavior
Agent's likes and dislikes influence her approach to conducting a supererogatory act; performing supererogation act in a way congruent with agent's preferences; having less freedom (and subsequently less enjoyment) in choosing a way to perform supererogation if an approach to supererogation is already predetermined in a request	Agent's Preferences	
Agents: finding it gratifying; being proud. Recipients and observers: appreciating; admiring; being touched; seeing the agent as a nice person; being struck or inspired	Positive reaction	Reaction to Supererogation
Agents: initially underestimating required efforts – being burnt out or emotionally drained; or initially overestimating the goodness of the supererogatory act – feeling frustrated because no one seems to care. Recipients and observers: not much appreciating the act if the agent is perceived to be acting primarily from her own understanding of the recipient's good; when supererogation distracts the agent from her main responsibilities	Mixed reaction	

The derived concepts were discussed with experts in the field of moral philosophy, moral psychology, business ethics, and organizational behavior. The extensive brainstorming about the obtained categories and the constant dialogue between the analysis and the data allowed to outline the process map of supererogation and develop the theory explaining the relationship among major pillars of the process of supererogatory behavior. Once a provisional model of supererogation had been developed, the researcher challenged the derived interpretations by re-attending to the data to either validate or disconfirm the provisional conclusions. Afterwards, the researcher solicited feedback in further meetings with respondents to validate the developed concepts and the proposed affectual theory of supererogation.

During the study, the researcher purposefully considered evidence from diverse group of individuals to account for a number of organizational and individual characteristics that might also potentially influence respondent's attitudes toward supererogatory acts: organizational culture, position, specialization area, and demographics (age, marital status, children, gender, and education).

Part of the collected data, in the form of respondents' direct quotes and descriptions of supererogatory cases, has been presented in the dissertation to illustrate study findings. In those cases, the personal identifying information has been disguised to protect respondents' identity. For instance, respondents' characteristics (gender, seniority, etc.) and events' particular settings have been modified in many cases. However, the modification of the collected data does not distort the overall storyline provided in the interviews.

Chapter 5. Study Findings and Discussion

§5.1 Taxonomy of Supererogatory Acts in Academia

Aiming to provide the reader with a better understanding of the phenomenon analyzed in the study, the Findings section starts with outlining supererogatory acts in academia. All the supererogatory cases in the broad collection were analyzed and grouped by their similar characteristics and later juxtaposed to supererogatory categories discussed in the literature (see §1.2). The analysis led to the creation of The Taxonomy of Supererogation in Academia outlined in Table 2 (a more detailed synopsis of supererogatory acts is provided in Table 3 Appendix 4).

Table 2. The taxonomy of supererogation in academia.

Supererogation	
Categories	**Types of Behavior**
Favors	Substituting Meeting / Speaking Reviewing Sharing Knowledge Providing meals Providing recognition Consoling
Ownership	Initiating Bettering Mentoring Taking Responsibility
Volunteering	Contributing Serving
Beneficence	Donating Donating thoughtfully
Forbearance	Forgoing Resources Extending Deadlines Forgoing Reciprocity
Gratitude	Thanking

The created taxonomy, covering the most typical supererogatory acts in academia, contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it confirms some of the categories defined in the literature, questions others, and expands the list of known supererogatory categories. Second, the collected real life examples help us better understand what constitutes supererogation in organizations. The developed taxonomy of supererogation in academia arms scholars with empirical evidence and a more nuanced knowledge about going beyond duty in academic settings, and therefore it enables the development of theory of supererogation.

Through the whole discussion in the contemporary literature on supererogation started from the two supererogatory categories such as Saintliness and Heroism (Urmson, 1958), the study did not collect any data on a supererogatory case that would fit into this category. This could potentially be explained by the fact that saintliness and heroism involve an extraordinary sacrifice from a person, whereas work environment in business schools does not provide occasions where such sacrifices could be displayed. Differently from a battle field in military or a life-threatening disease in medicine, professors and staff in business schools do not have situations with large sacrifices at stake.

Forgiveness was also not mentioned by the respondents in their supererogatory stories. This can be explained by the fact that forgiveness does not seem to come on top of human mind when discussing supererogation because it takes a mental effort to realize that forgiving can be considered as going beyond duty. Thus, no association between forgiveness and going beyond duty was made in the interviews. It also has to be mentioned that there could be some overlap between supererogatory forbearances and forgiveness.

At the same time, there are four categories of supererogatory acts that have also been discussed in the literature and that have been confirmed by the study: Favors, Volunteering, Beneficence, and Forbearance. Out of these four supererogatory categories, favors is most commonly practiced supererogatory acts in business schools constituting about 30% of the broad collection of supererogatory acts, followed by volunteering (about 20%) and forbearances (about 10%); while the supererogatory stories involving beneficence rarely mentioned by respondents.

The paucity of beneficence could be explained by the fact that donations in academia involve small amounts and oftentimes employees are expected to donate to different money-collecting initiatives undergoing at their schools (though there are some exceptions discussed below). That is why perhaps the respondents did not mention many beneficence-related stories on going beyond duty in a morally praiseworthy way.

Finally, two more supererogatory categories were identified in the study: Ownership and Gratitude. Ownership was as popular in the respondents' stories on supererogatory behavior as favors constituting about 30% of the broad collection of supererogatory cases. As it will be discussed below, there are some similarities between favors and ownership, but ownership takes supererogatory behavior to a higher level since it is a behavior of much bigger scale. Differently from favors, where the agent conducts only a part of a bigger action or event, the agent takes ownership over the whole process and this distinction seems to be important and warrants favors and ownership to be separated into distinct categories.

With regard to gratitude, the study showed that gratitude is multifaceted and some of its manifestations could be supererogatory. Differently from other supererogatory categories, we cannot talk about gratitude as the whole category that falls under supererogatory acts because

in many cases gratitude is obligatory. Yet, the study demonstrates that there are some manifestations of gratitude that are clearly above being obligatory and, thus, they can be classified as supererogatory.

Below I analyze each supererogatory category in more details by providing types of supererogatory behaviors per each category and support them with the collected supererogatory cases. All of the examples outlined below fit the conditions of a supererogatory act discussed in §1.1: going beyond duty (not obligatory, done voluntarily, and its omission does not deserve criticism) and being morally praiseworthy (morally good intended consequences and other-regarding).

FAVORS. This is one of the two categories where the largest number of supererogatory cases was collected in the study. Favors "usually consist of small services performed without a great deal of sacrifice or loss to the agent" (Heyd, 1982: 148). Differently from the organizational behavior literature, where doing favors is often explored instrumentally – as a way to advance the agent's own well-being (Grant, 2014; Regan, 1971), the supererogatory view on favors is not necessarily instrumental. In supererogation, favors are primarily done with an intention of someone else's good and this makes them meritorious. The study showed that in the academic environment, favors most typically occur in the forms of:

- ***Substituting***. This type of a supererogatory behavior typically starts with a request from a colleague to replace her in conducting a class due to her (or child's) illness. In some cases, the agent may be asked to conduct a class due to possessing a special expertise that the beneficiary of supererogation does not have, like having a capability of teaching

Monte Carlo analysis to finance students. The underlying assumption for qualifying favors as supererogatory is that there was no committed reciprocity between the agent and the beneficiary, and the agent was free to decline a request for substitution, without being undeservingly criticized. As one of the respondents who agreed to substitute a colleague's class mentioned, "there's no obligation. … [I could say] I'm sorry, I'm just swamped with my own class." When the request requires a much larger sacrifice from the agent, like substituting for the entire course, then this behavior would better fit the ownership category of supererogatory acts.

- *Meeting / Speaking*. The agent agrees to meet with solicitors (e.g., people from outside the university, or from another department) or to speak at a community event. As a senior faculty member mentioned, "I did some talks around the campus, when invited I've usually said yes and that's not required and it's something that's easy to say no to but I usually say yes." In addition, agreeing to being interviewed by the researcher investigating supererogation is one of such examples.

- *Reviewing*. This type of behavior includes reviewing colleagues' manuscripts, reviewing manuscripts for journals, or serving on journal editorial boards. The same assumption of no reciprocity applies here as well: the agent should not have to feel pressure to agree to becoming part of the journal editorial board due to having many of her own publications in this journal. Even if no-reciprocity assumption is met, there is another aspect to take into account: on the one hand, serving on journal editorial boards can be considered as self-serving since it contributes to the agent's academic status; on the other hand, reviewing for journals is also other-regarding as it helps both scholars whose manuscripts

are reviewed and the corresponding journal, and it also enhances the research image of the reviewer's school. As discussed in §1.2, supererogation does not rule out a self-serving component, which can be present in may supererogatory acts, but it requires other-regarding in agent's intentions, so supererogation is performed for someone else's sake. Another professor, who was on the editorial board of two top journals in management, when talking about his work on the boards mentioned, "I think it's good for [school name]'s image and for one thing we're a small school, so to have people on boards is to be a little bit more noteworthy I think … [Dean's name] wanted to build research … So I felt like I was helping in that regard, I felt like I was helping the evolution of the school". Another senior professor, who offered a junior faculty member to review his manuscripts before submitting them to publishers, mentioned, "so the why was because of being an assistant professor and on tenure and I wanted to help".

- **Sharing Knowledge**. Some examples in this category include assistance to colleagues in developing online courses; sharing knowledge on using simulation software; forwarding useful links/studies.

- **Providing meals**. Examples here include taking students for lunch; hosting dinner for students; and bringing snacks to student study team after classes.

- **Providing recognition**. An illustration of this type of supererogation includes learning about a meritorious action done by a colleague (e.g. organizing a conference in Africa to ease access for local scholars) and making sure that she gets a proper credit by mentioning it at a faculty meeting.

- *Consoling*. The collected examples on this type of supererogatory acts include emotional help during the hard divorce of a colleague; and visiting a colleague in a remote hospital (500 miles away) after a bike accident causing a brain injury.

OWNERSHIP as a category of supererogatory acts has not been mentioned in the literature on supererogation, but the study shows that it is an important type of supererogatory behaviors. Similarly to favors, supererogatory ownership involves service to others. However, ownership also has two distinctive differences: first, the required sacrifice is much larger than "small services" and, second, it involves taking ownership of the whole project rather than a small part of a bigger event. The meaning of the term 'ownership' used in supererogation is different from the legal perspective on ownership used in the business literature which defines ownership as the exclusive right to control at item of property (BusinessDictionary, 2019). Ownership in supererogation is rather similar to the term used in the psychology literature where psychological ownership stands for the feeling that something is yours (Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2003). In supererogation, an agent feels ownership over improving the current state in a particular area and letting others benefit from it.

- *Initiating*. The collected supererogatory cases include: initiating and conducting the improvement of school procedures so that others can benefit from it; regularly cleaning up and stuffing a coffee corner so that others enjoy a better work environment; initiating and organizing a field conference in Africa so that local scholars can have an easier access to the event; running a weekly mindfulness meditation club; starting large scholarly projects (e.g., edited books) when not being rewarded for it.

- **Bettering**. This type of supererogatory behaviors deals with making the assigned work better than required: teaching well even if satisficing would be enough for the employer; supporting students during a study-abroad departure on a snowy weekend; being surprisingly quick in addressing requests.

- **Mentoring**. It is about taking care of a person in a particular area. Some of the examples of supererogatory mentoring include attending classes of a junior faculty member to help her with teaching; or guiding students in their job search process, including conducting mock-interviews, personally contacting potential employers and providing elaborative recommendations.

- **Taking Responsibility**. It includes feeling responsibility for something that others would not expect. It can be the responsibility for correcting a mistake, e.g., in hiring a junior faculty member who turned out to be negligible to student needs.

VOLUNTEERING. Differently from favors and ownership, where performing supererogation can be done by a particular individual without expecting others to do the same, an appeal to volunteering is collective, meaning that it applies to a larger group where the action can be carried out by a smaller number of those who were requested (Heyd, 1982).

- **Contributing**. Illustrations of this type of supererogatory behavior include conducting extracurricular seminars (e.g., Personal Finance) requested by a student club "Smart Women and Securities"; or participating in community events to learn more about issues and to help the involved parties. As one of the respondents mentioned about her colleague who actively participates and contributes to many community events, "part of

going above and beyond is just showing up. … [Name] shows up, he shows up at a lot of events. When I go to events, he's there."

- **Serving**. Though service is expected in academia, some faculty members go way beyond regular requirements. Typical examples of supererogatory amount of service include sitting on over a dozen committees at a department, school, university and community levels as well as serving at student events, e.g. being a judge on student competitions.

BENEFICENCE. This supererogatory category mainly includes "acts of giving" (Heyd, 1982: 146). Differently from the literature, which tends to combine all acts of charity under the same type, I distinguish between two types of giving: pure financial donation and thoughtful donation. Thoughtful donation is one step ahead of pure financial donation because it requires more efforts on top of writing a check: deliberation, discussion, and preparation of a donation.

- **Donating**. Examples include faculty contributing financially to end-of-year bonuses for the school staff in the initiative coordinated by the business school administration; or providing financial contributions to the families of deceased colleagues.

- **Donating Thoughtfully**. This type of beneficence goes beyond just financial contribution, and represents additional efforts made by the agent in a supererogatory act. For instance, arranging the donation in the honor of the deceased colleague in the form of a tribute such as a path brick in one of the Nature Conservation Parks.

FORBEARANCES. This category of supererogatory behaviors stands for not executing the right that the agent is entitled to. There had been three main types of supererogatory forbearances in academia that have been identified by the study:

- *Forgoing Resources*, that is letting others take resources that the agent is eligible for. E.g., offering first authorship in a manuscript to a co-author even though the work was done equally or more was done by the agent; letting a Muslim colleague take a more spacious office due to the need to pray several times a day; forgoing being paid for study-abroad teaching in order to provide a better learning experience for students; not demanding compensation for car damage that took place in a university parking garage.

- *Forgoing Reciprocity*. Not counting how much others owe you. E.g., having substituted three classes for a colleague, but not expecting him to substitute exactly the same number of classes in return.

- *Extending Deadlines*. Extending the earlier-agreed deadlines, e.g., when working on a joint project even though one has a right to demand it; offering to extend a submission date to the students who experienced issues in their personal lives.

GRATITUDE. Philosophers writing on supererogation considered gratitude, including gratitude to supererogation, as a duty since "[i]t is the natural duty of anyone who voluntarily accepts the benefits of a supererogatory act. Its binding force as a duty can be shown by our intense moral disapprobation of ingratitude" (Heyd, 1982). However, what is missing in their analysis is that the magnitude of gratitude is not always predetermined, but is rather a degree of many possible manifestations. The study shows that the duty of gratitude has reasonable limits

and exceeding those limits can make gratitude supererogatory. For instance, in one of the collected cases, the adjunct lecturer in a business school invited students after classes (offering pizza in the process) to write 'thank-you' notes to the course sponsor whose donation to the school made the course offering possible. Later, with the help of the school IT Support, the lecturer also made a touching video about the sponsor's impact and invited the sponsor to come to class, speak and watch the video together with the students. On the one hand, that is true that the opportunity to teach the course became possible due to the sponsor's financial contribution, so one would expect her to be grateful. On the other hand, the donation was made a while ago, and it was made not specifically for the agent's course but to the school overall, and the donation was arranged not by the lecturer but by the Dean. So the lecturer who was assigned to teach the course did not need to worry about the course prospects. There was no expectation of the lecturer to thank the course sponsor to the degree she chose to do it, especially arranging student thank-you notes and making the film. In this case, it is the high magnitude of the displayed gratitude that makes the case supererogatory.

AGENT'S SACRIFICE AS VALUE TRANSFER. The Taxonomy of Supererogation in Academia outlined above has classified supererogatory acts from the behavioral perspective. There is another important feature of supererogation by which it can be also classified – the type of sacrifice made by the agent. As a matter of fact, the role of sacrifice in supererogation has also been emphasized by prominent figures in philosophy who used it to define supererogation:

> *When the benevolent action is one that brings much good for the other person and when it is undertaken at considerable loss or risk to the agent as estimated by his interests more narrowly construed, than the action is supererogatory.* (Rawls, 1971: 438)

The study identified four most common types of sacrifice: 1) *time spent* (which may involve a considerable thought process for preparation, e.g., in substituting a class, or it may not, e.g. in taking students to lunch), 2) *material resources*, 3) *own reputation* (e.g., risking own reputation when recommending a student for a top job), and 4) *personal well-being* (e.g., emotional support can be quite "draining" for the agent).

The agent's sacrifice can be viewed as a transfer of uncompensated value from an agent to a beneficiary. From this perspective, supererogation 1) creates additional value and 2) it transfers the value from the agent, who could have captured it for herself, to the beneficiary of a supererogatory act. Thus, going above and beyond in a morally praiseworthy way means sharing value that the agent could have captured for herself.

The collection of supererogatory cases classified and outlined above provides rich empirical data that enables the development of affectual theory of supererogation whose building blocks are discussed in the next sections. The synopsis of the broad collection of supererogatory cases is provided in Table 3 in Appendix 4. These cases are used in subsequent sections of the Dissertation to support the study findings and their discussion.

§5.2   Learning about Supererogatory Opportunities

The process of supererogation starts from a *supererogatory opportunity*. In the majority of collected cases, the supererogatory opportunity occurs unexpectedly and its emergence opens a chance to supererogation, e.g. a professor gets sick (so someone needs to substitute her in class) or a faculty member gets divorced (opening room for emotional support). In rare instances, the supererogatory opportunity has already existed for a long while, e.g., on-going anxiety among

some students about study pressure (so a faculty member initiates conducting mindfulness meditation sessions).

The process of supererogation begins when the agent *learns* about the supererogatory opportunity. What is meant by *learning* is that the supererogatory opportunity gets into agent's radar so she gets to know about it. Learning can come in many different ways – through a personal conversation, from circulating news, or by getting an email – but this is when the agent notices the opportunity so she is no more ignorant of it. Below are some examples of respondents talking about their *learning* of supererogatory opportunities:

There was a student who was also a military veteran, and he was having a really hard time adjusting to [our school]. *… Anyways,* **this young man was sitting here** [during office hours] **and he was in tears. He was just breaking down, we talked for a long time.** *He just didn't know I was going to handle this. So,* **we spent a lot of time talking, but that conversation made me start thinking** *we have a fair number of military veterans who are students here.* **After we had that conversation** *that was probably I would say, January, or February, or just classes started, I decided to start organizing dinners. So every spring, I have a dinner at my home for all students and faculty who are military veterans, so I have 25-30 people at my house and we sit around and we talk.*

[case: Dinners for Students with Military Background]

So, one of the students I taught in the proceeding Fall, **I ran into the hallway and I chatted with her about pleasantries, and I asked her if she knew where she was going to work**. *She was a 4ᵗʰ-year student, after graduation. She was still looking and I was surprised because she was very talented young woman.*

[case: Helping with Job in Investment Banking]

I found out that he [student] **wasn't having any luck with a job** *and I've been trying to track down people who might be interested in this guy. This is not part of my job description. He didn't seek me out, I just became aware of the situation. … I had a visitor into my class and we told students would meet them over at* [restaurant name] *for a beer if they wanted to come over. He was with some other people who came over and* **the visitor asked him where he was going**.

[case: Helping with Job for International Student]

It was in the news, this [part of the country] *was devastated* [by a hurricane]. … *Our Senior Associate **Dean sent an email** when it came in the news and copied me … to say* [to the colleague whose family suffered from the hurricane] *"we are thinking about you" which I though was really nice. … Then I just was asking her, I just was checking in with her that whole week because they still haven't heard from some family members.*

[case: Concert Tickets and Babysitting]

*There is a staff member. Her husband passed away. I worked with this person for administrative relationship. … So she lost her husband and **it was circulated on the department email list. Just notifying about the loss and that they requested any gifts, condolences, etc. to be instead paid toward** [an NGO name].*

[case: Thoughtful Tribute]

One may argue that the discussion about learning may be redundant as learning is so naturally integrated into our lives and is so common that there seems to be little if any need to explicate it. However, considerations of learning are necessary for our complete understanding of the process of supererogation.

First, how *learning* occurs affects how supererogation is performed. In particular, the study shows that *learning* about the supererogatory opportunity happens in two ways: 1) as *agent-driven learning*, that is when the agent learns about a supererogatory opportunity on her own, without anyone asking her to do it, or 2) as *request-driven learning,* that is when the agent learns about an opportunity through a request from others (e.g. the beneficiary or other stakeholders) (e.g., a fellow colleague asking to substitute him in class tomorrow).

Depending on which type of learning has preceded a supererogatory act, the act itself will be performed differently. Agent-driven learning opportunities can be connected to more flexibility on the part of an agent to perform supererogation. This flexibility results in an act that is more strongly grounded in agent's likes and dislikes, thus making the performance of

supererogation more enjoyable for the agent. In contrast, request-driven learning opportunities can be linked to less freedom, and even creativity, in agent's ability to choose how the act should be carried out. As a result, agent's experience in request-driven learning is more constrained and less enjoyable (see §5.6 for discussion).

Second, *learning* does not necessarily correspond (though it may in some cases) to the concept of *moral awareness* which stands for "being able to interpret the situation as being moral" (O'Fallon & Betterfield, 2005: 376). The difference between *learning* and *moral awareness* stems from different questions that the literature on supererogation and the literature on moral decision-making try to answer. The latter mainly deals with resolving ethical dilemmas, where moral awareness helps the agent single out a moral component from other aspects (e.g. economic) of a dilemma, so the agent recognizes the existence of a moral dilemma in the first place (Jones, 1991). Moral awareness is necessary for managers who in their decision-making are too much occupied with pursuing economic goals and thus do not easily discern ethical aspects of their decisions. However, when it comes to supererogation, in the process of learning there is no need for an agent to mentally label the situation as moral in order to act upon this situation supererogatorily. That is because per definition of supererogation not acting supererogatorily does not deserve blame, sanction or criticism since supererogation is about going beyond moral duty. Even though supererogation is about higher flights of morality, it does not necessarily have to deal with resolving ethical dilemmas by contrasting moral vs. economic aspects. In this regard, learning in supererogation is closer to pragmatist ideals that characterize the juxtaposition of ethical vs. economic as a false dichotomy (Putnam, 2002; Parmar, Phillips, & Freeman, 2016).

In the case of supererogation, there is no need for the agent (though it is not precluded) to become aware of a moral component in a supererogatory opportunity. For the process of supererogation to start off, it is sufficient for the agent to *learn* about the supererogatory opportunity, even without cognitively deliberating about moral aspects in the given opportunity. The *learning* stage in the process of supererogation stands for becoming *aware* of the supererogatory opportunity, not necessarily *morally aware*.

Third, by singling out *learning* as a separate stage in the process of supererogation, we show that the *triggers of attendance* (see the following section §5.3) are distinct from *learning.*

§5.3   Triggers of Attendance

Learning about a supererogatory opportunity does not necessarily warrant the performance of a supererogatory act. Once learning has occurred, an opportunity can be either discarded or attended to. A person may simply ignore the supererogatory opportunity the very moment she learned about it. The agent may consider it unworthy her attention and her mind may meander to consider more salient events. So why do some individuals who have learned about a supererogatory opportunity, *attend* to it?

The difference among people in the level of *attending* to supererogatory opportunities does not seem to be a permanent trait that an individual either possesses or not. Rather, the study shows that the degree of *attending* to a supererogatory opportunity correlates with how well the *specifics* of a particular case match the *specifics* of the agent. In other words, the degree of agent's *attendance* to a supererogatory opportunity depends on whether a supererogatory opportunity contains some *specific elements* that resonate with the *specifics* of the agent. The

study did not find any single participant who pursued a supererogatory opportunity without some personal connection to the opportunity. All the interviewed study participants attended to supererogatory opportunities when something in those opportunities resonated with the peculiarities of their personalities. More specifically, all the people who performed supererogation *related* to the supererogatory opportunities through common features between the opportunities and their personalities.

In the performance of moral acts beyond the level of duty, it is the feeling of *relatedness* to a particular situation in one way or another that made the agent *attend* to a supererogatory opportunity. The study identified three affectual processes – which will be further referred to as *triggers of attendance* – that can help individuals feel *related* and, thus, *attend* to the supererogatory opportunity. These three triggers of attendance – interest, similar experience, and association – create a disequilibrium in the agent's mind and, thus, alert her to a supererogatory opportunity.

INTEREST. The first trigger of attendance to a supererogatory opportunity is agent's *interest.* In a broad sense, *interests* stands for activities that the agent *enjoys* doing and which lie in the areas of her hobbies, interests, or passions. When a supererogatory opportunity comes in the area that the agent finds *interesting,* this makes the agent *attend* to the opportunity. For instance, when the Associate Dean tells a professor that she is thinking about launching a study abroad program and checks if he would be interested in leading the program for the next two years on top of his current job responsibilities, it is his *enjoyment* of traveling and of being in the company of students that prompt the professor to *attend* to the supererogatory opportunity

more closely and carefully instead of finding valid excuses to kindly decline the offer. Later, the same *interest* in traveling and socializing with students propels the professor to *attend* to another supererogatory opportunity of forgoing large part of his payment for teaching abroad since not enough students subscribed for the study-abroad program and part of the overhead expenses could not be covered:

> In the 1990s, we had a connection at the University of [name] *in England.* **I took a semester leave and went there**, *research fellow, and sort of* **got the idea of doing study abroad and started doing study abroad programs** *through Western Europe, a kind of European unification class in the context of business. At that time, I think we all had two study abroad classes going, one was a finance class that visited financial capitals and then mine. Our Director of Undergraduate Programs asked me, we thought we'd like to see if we can do something to develop a permanent semester-long program and asked me to do it, and so I designed this program that basically expanded. …* **I've done 31 study abroad trips with top classes overseas, so an average of more than one a year. At least twice I've had to do it where we didn't get enough students, so I offered just not taking any pay because that's how committed I was and wanted to go. I see that as a reasonable thing. I had to be alive anyway, it might as well be doing that, doing what I want***.*
>
> <div align="right">[case: Study Abroad]</div>

In another example of attending to a supererogatory opportunity out of *interest,* a faculty member *enjoys* mindfulness meditation: he regularly practices it on his own as well as publishes articles on mindfulness in management journals. He observed that some students experienced stress from study pressure and started wondering if offering mindfulness meditation sessions at his business school would be helpful for students. So he launched weekly mindfulness meditation sessions that he has already been running it for more than three years:

> **I have been engaged with meditation groups for number of years** *and I* **decided to start offering meditation sessions here** [business school]*. I offer a 20 minute guided meditation to students who want to come by, there is a specific room. Nobody asked me to do that,* **I completely took it on my own to promote it***. … I'm not doing it for extrinsic*

*reasons, I'm not getting any extrinsic benefit from this. I do it because I'm **trying to help the students and it's something that I have some knowledge to give to them**. … **I have had about a 40 year interest in Buddhism**, going back to my undergraduate. **I have published 2 recent articles, on Buddhism, Buddhist psychology and the other is on mindfulness**. … I didn't really get serious about the practice of meditation until roughly into the 90s and real serious about it, within the last 10 years. **I've been reading and reading and reading but I now have written an article on Buddhist psychology and consumer research** that was in the Journal of* [name]. *I also have an article that I was involved in on mindfulness that was in the Journal of* [name]*, and right now I'm **making notes on another article that I'm going to write possibly from a Buddhist perspective** … **In the morning, almost every day, I usually do it in the morning**, I will do yoga for 15 or 20 minutes then I will meditate for 20-30 minutes.*

[case: Mindfulness Meditation]

This is a clear instance of supererogation – the professor initiated mindfulness sessions without any extrinsic rewards in store and without any expectation of praise. The response to a learning opportunity – students' stress – was triggered by professor's strong interest in mindfulness. We could perhaps speculate that the potential expected reward that may disqualify this act from being supererogatory is the expectations of students' gratitude. Yet, this is not the case:

*There are times when nobody shows up. I'll come in, and no student comes. Sometimes I'll have 3, sometimes I've had 10, more often it's like 2, 3, 4 ,5, but sometimes it's zero. So, I'm waiting around … I drive back home most of the time that they anybody shown up, **I feel like it's been valuable**, but if nobody showed up and naturally I can feel some frustration because it's like gosh! **I know there are people that would benefit** but they're not showing up.*

[case: Mindfulness Meditation]

Professor's long-sustained strong interest trumps the potential frustration and helps him keep his sessions running. Thus we can say that interest not only triggers, but also sustains supererogation.

The next example of *attending* to a supererogatory opportunity due to *interest* is grounded in what may seem to be the most academia-related interest – interest in learning. In this example, the professor volunteered to actively participate in the dialogue sessions with students organized at a business school after a troublesome incident that had happened on university campus. Throughout his life, the professor finds *enjoyment* in learning new things, so he enthusiastically *attended* to the invitation to participate in the community dialogue sessions because he could learn more about different perspectives on the distressing incident on campus:

> *I've been always willing to help students because as I tell them, I look forward to* ***learning together with them. And I sincerely mean that, I'm always learning***. *… I'm with younger people, so I probably in some ways maybe dress younger, act younger, think younger, and so I* ***just like being in this environment***. *… I think that's* ***the mark of an educator that you're interested in learning***. *I tell students each semester that I* ***look forward to learning together*** *with them and sometimes* ***I learn as much if not more than they do***. *… I attended several of those* [dialogue sessions with students] *… These were voluntary of the school, there are a lot of things to promote diversity, promote the sense of community. … So, I did come to several of those I was able to make. …* ***Just to learn things and see what was going on and also see how the students are feeling. Just so I understand that.*** *… Well, I knew we were here in the community and also at the university of rather unique or unusual situation. … Once a week in my class, we try to spend 10-15 min - I call it* ***"stuff about which we should know"***. *So we have a session about stuff which we should know. It's open discussion. Anything anyone wants to bring up pertaining to business or pertaining to the class. …* ***I always try each class once a week have just spend like***. *I say we're going to spend 10 or 15 minutes, sometimes we spend the whole class, and I call that "stuff about which we should know". Anyone can bring up something and then that means as a family member you need to be well-read. …* ***We're learning together, just everyone's learning***.
>
> [case: Dialogue Sessions]

Another example comes from a top R1 school where high expectations for research dominate the landscape. Large investment into teaching is discouraged and an average quality of teaching would quite suffice for the employer. That is why we may consider the case of a

prominent researcher teaching well to be supererogatory in nature. This study participant teaches well due to his genuine *interest* in teaching. Not only does he enjoy it, but also thinks that teaching is important:

> I've been with several major employers and **I always try to teach and do research, teach well and publish well.** Some employers care more about one than the other. So, some people only do what's expected, the one and not the other but I try to do both even if the situation doesn't expect both. … **So even in research schools I've worked harder than most to teach well. … A combination of liking both things and plus thinking both things are important**, and in the case of the teaching, students deserve it. So I don't want that to slip.

> [case: Teaching Well]

An *interest* to a supererogatory opportunity can also come from considering that particular area important, and being part of something important is *enjoyable* for people. As one of the respondents reflected on supererogatory behavior of his and his colleagues,

> What you've asked them to do or what they're volunteering to do turns out to be something that is otherwise **important to them.** Let's say the topic has to do with the some ethics in business and they're interested in ethics and so they work harder on helping you put a case together or a course together or something. Because, ethics is something in their church and in their lives is something they think about. … **It's intrinsic,** it's something that measures with who they are and what matters to them.

In all these interest-triggered cases, supererogation is also grounded in one's belief in being able to authentically contribute to some important noble cause.

SIMILAR EXPERIENCE. The second trigger of attendance is the recognition of *similar experience*: the agent can *attend* to a supererogatory opportunity because she experienced, to some degree, a similar situation in the past. Such recognition evolves while learning about an opportunity. In one of the earlier examples, the professor first experiences learning – observing

a student struggling at a business school. During that learning experience, he also discovers that the student *has a background very similar,* in fact almost identical to his: first, serving in the army, and then going to a community college prior to joining a premier business school. So the professor *attended* to the supererogatory opportunity to help all the students with the similar military and community college backgrounds and, as a result, started hosting annual dinners for them:

> ***I'm a military veteran, and back about 2007, there was a student who was also a military veteran,*** *and he was having a really hard time, adjusting to* [our school]. *He got out of Navy,* ***went to community college,*** *came here, and this happens to a lot of people, the transition from a community college to* [our school] *is difficult. I think it is even more difficult I think if you are military because you are older, and you have different life experiences. … Community colleges are not as rigorous as* [our university]*, people come from a community college, and they have a 3.5 or 3.9, or 4 GPA, they think they are really smart, they get here and they get hammered. …* ***When I get out of the military, I went to a community college and then I went through a 4 year school, so I'd gone through all the same things these guys were going through****. I just wanted them to see that we will get through. …* ***I have been through it, they had gone through.***
>
> [case: Dinners for Students with Military Background]

In this example, similar experience facilitates empathy that serves as a catalyst for supererogation (for further discussion see section §5.4).

Similarly, another study participant offered to a doctoral student to be the first author in the manuscript to be submitted to a journal, even though the professor could contribute equally or even more, and his status could have easily warranted him first authorship. The professor *remembered himself* being a graduate student and how harsh a job market experience could be:

> ***I know what it means to do a PhD. …*** *Getting a paper published … it would be more helpful to* [student's name]'s *career than me at my stage in my career. If that signal was a little bit of the positive in the launching of his academic career that was worth more than my expression of a prideful place of being listed first.* ***My career is mostly behind***

me, his is mostly ahead of him, and if [third co-author's name] *and I can turbocharge it for* [student's name]*, good for us.*

[case: First Authorship]

By the same token, another professor remembered herself being a student and how much she appreciated being helped. That is why, though being limited with her time, she agreed to meet with students from another school to help them with their project:

Why did I not refuse [to meet]*? Because **I also remember what it is like being a student and I wanted to get information from people and I always really appreciated it when other people took their time to meet with me**. … I remember when I was a grad student, and I needed to talk to somebody, I needed to collect data.*

[case: Meeting with Students from Another School]

Another example where *similar experience* made the agent *attend* to a supererogatory opportunity comes from a senior person who *remembers what it means being* a foreigner in the US. The agent *attended* to the student's struggles to speak in graduate seminars and to her overall struggle adjusting to the new country because in the past, he had a similar experience of coming to the United States from a country with a very different culture. He suggested having joint walks around the campus where the student, while doing a physical exercise, could improve her command of English:

*My goal was for her to benefit from it. I saw somebody who was struggling, living in a new country, in a very stressful, demanding environment and the problem was multidimensional. She was struggling with how to separate it out, because she had family, she had school, she had language, she had social sort of attractions. She also had a commitment to, a strong sense of loyalty to the people who had found a way to bring her here. She felt very strongly that she did not want to let them down. And **all these things really resonated for me because I remember how I felt myself when I first came to the United States. How my parents felt when they moved to the United States. How isolated they felt. They were very worried about money, about family, about many things.** And I empathized with her. I felt like, well, I don't have much to offer other than my time for somebody like that. And I thought, an hour of walking around in a circle with*

her, for an hour, is good for her. And I noticed that she was mostly speaking in [language name] with all her friends. And this was a way for her to practice her English.

[case: Walks with International Student]

More importantly, due to similar experiences, the agent had cultural sensitivity that allowed him to understand that the cultural norms of the student's home country required respect to authority. So during these walks, he especially wanted to make sure that the student had an opportunity to overcome cross-cultural barriers by freely talking to a more senior person:

Most Asian societies are very hierarchical. So what happens is it's hard to get to the place where you feel like you can challenge somebody who's older than you, male. And part of my thinking was, and this was purposeful, because I noticed that in classes she would be respectful – so sometimes I thought that when she had a lot to contribute in class, she was not speaking up. *At first, I thought it was just because her language was, she didn't feel comfortable with her language. But then I also realized that there were times when she would not challenge the professor or somebody older. … Then you don't get to hear her point. And that's a loss to me. … So part of what I was doing was helping her how to figure out to speak up. So that she could be a contributor in the classroom because I felt that the classroom and me would be better off if she spoke up. We would have a different voice there. … There were some answers in her questions. But she was not saying it.*

[case: Walks with International Student]

Another example where agent's *attendance* to a supererogatory opportunity stems from *similar experience* is that of a senior faculty member who *remembers* how hard it was for her to be working toward tenure while being married and having children. That is why she *attends* to the problems that a junior colleague with a similar background is having:

I had the fact of being married and having young children and being pre-tenure. The complications of life like that is easier for me to recognize those, having been through it. *So whereas other people are dealing with their own struggles* **that is a set of struggles that I'm more attuned to just based on my own experience**. *… ***I've been in the faculty, I had children when I was pre-tenure**, *you're trying to get tenure, you're trying to do all this stuff and you also trying to take care of young children. … If their wives* [of male

professors] *are kind of taking care of it, they aren't thinking that. … If someone either didn't have young children during the program or it's been a really long time, you just kind of forget* [about the struggles of others]*.*

[case: Concert Tickets and Babysitting]

The similarity of experience between the agent and the beneficiary in the case *Concert Tickets and Babysitting* has also been confirmed by another faculty member who, when describing the supererogatory protagonist*,* mentioned that "as a female faculty member, she had it a little more challenging, had some challenges along the way."

There were multiple examples of similar experience serving as a trigger to supererogation: a professor who, *remembering* his own struggles with creating the first online course, *attended* to the difficulties that his colleague had with using an online software in a similar situation; another study participant who, being a bike rider herself, closely *attended* to the bike accident that happened to her colleague and visited him in a hospital 500 miles away from a university town. As she mentioned, "there could be any number of reasons [why visiting him]. But it seems it is the understanding of that it could have been you – I ride my bike a lot" that made her initially *relate* to a supererogatory opportunity. All in all, similar experiences connect people in ways that allow supererogatory opportunities to evolve into supererogatory acts.

AFFINITY BY VALUES is the third trigger of attendance. The agent *attends* to a supererogatory opportunity when: i) she *associates* herself with it through being affiliated with a potential beneficiary of the supererogatory act or because she considers herself a stakeholder in the situation, and ii) her values are aligned with the supererogatory opportunity or the

beneficiary. When one's values are jeopardized or not supported, an individual may feel vulnerable. Conversely, when one's values are perpetuated, an individual feels in control and having psychological safety (Edmonson, 1999).

Affinity by values is different from *similar experience* discussed above in that the agent feels affiliation not through having experienced similar experience in the past but by being members of the same social structure (friendship, gatherings, or organizations) or by being one of the stakeholders in a particular event and holding values pertinent to that event.

In the example below, one of the professors decided to help the student secure a job in the same industry (e.g. investment banking) where the professor had worked before. This condition meets our first criterion for the *affinity by values* trigger (i).

> *So,* **one of the students I taught in the proceeding Fall** *… she was still looking* [for a job] *and* **I was surprised because she was very talented young woman.** *She had missed most of the* [opportunities]*, she had tried and was unsuccessful in terms of persuading investment banks to hire her. …* **I then contacted one of my friends at investment bank.** *… He then contacted the campus recruiter, and though they'd already interviewed, they opened up an opportunity for her. They interviewed her, they liked her, they hired her, and then she was offered. … This person went to* [bank name]*, and they had* [bank name] *hired 80 students that year. Like her, 80 recent grads with Baccalaureate credits like her. She was like number one ranked by the people of* [bank name]*. And they made her an offer for the 3rd year and promoted to an associate.*
>
> [case: Helping with Job in Investment Banking]

In a similar example, we can observe how *affinity* is established when a student responds to a professor's invitation to the whole class to attend a dinner with a guest who spoke earlier in class. Notably, few students showed by which allowed to establish a closer association and, thus, a potential supererogatory learning opportunity between the professor and the student. Again, this meets our first criterion for the trigger (i):

*I'm sitting here right now reading letters from a student that **I just plucked out of the classroom** when I found out that he wasn't having any luck with a job and I've been trying to track down people who might be interested in this guy. … **I had a visitor into my class and we told students would meet them over at [restaurant name] for a beer if they wanted to come over. He was with some other people who came over** and the visitor asked him where he was going. **The guy's very impressive** and basically, the issue with him is he's not a US citizen. He's getting stuffed in all the usual ways, but I would argue that **he's probably our top student this year if not the top then, one of the top, two top people**. … I'm pushing really hard [for him]. … I think **he's a great candidate**. … I'm much more inclined to go out of my way for **students who I can see are really going the extra mile in class**, so you can do it to some extent is reciprocal. … Politically, I don't like where things are going down with immigrants. … The fact that this guy can't find anything, it says a lot and **he's really quite good**.*

[case: Helping with Job for International Student]

Importantly, in both cases the study participants *attended* to students' difficulties with finding a job because those students were among the brightest in *their* classes. These professors' values were based on meritocracy and, thus, the professors saw a supererogatory opportunity to help those who in their beliefs deserved being helped. In this way, they sustained their beliefs in meritocracy. Thus both examples above also meet our second criterion – ii) the presence of values congruent with a supererogatory opportunity.

In another instance, a faculty member *attended* to a supererogatory opportunity to help her co-worker whose husband passed away. The agent chose to do it because, differently from his other colleagues in the business school, he *associated* himself with the deceased person: the two men turned out to share the same strong interest in the Nature Conservation Centers. As the faculty member mentions, he would not have made this kind of well-thought contribution, had the interests between him and the deceased person differed, especially their values.

*There is a staff member. Her husband passed away. I worked with this person for administrative relationship. It turned out that **her husband had a particular affinity for***

*wolves and wild life. … So my family and I made a donation in his name, as a kind of tribute to him, and **as something that we have shared**. … We made a donation and his name will be on a brick on a trail, for these two packs of wolves. And when I think about this educational efforts at this wolves' center in* [city]. *I guess my thinking at the back of my mind was that I wouldn't be surprised if someday she would travel there and I thought it would be nice for her to see his name as a tribute to him. … I thought it would be meaningful to her. And **it was meaningful to me too. And I think it is something that my family values. It is a kind of we share support for wild life and nature, for the cause that will be tribute to his legacy**. … So if there was a different scenario, e.g. spouse really loved guns and you make a donation to the NRA* [National Rifle Association]. *I would not make it* [contribution]. *… **I generally value nature and wild life, so anything about that is not just to live that way, but I also share that person's beliefs about that***.

[case: Thoughtful Tribute]

While other faculty members made monetary contributions to honor the deceased husband of their colleague, this participant made what was referred to in the Taxonomy of Supererogatory Acts (see §5.1) as *Beneficence: Donating Thoughtfully* because his contribution clearly involved a significant additional effort on top of a monetary donation. Specifically, the participant took time to ponder how he could contribute in his special meaningful way so he chose to donate in the form of a tribute such as a path brick in one of the Nature Conservation Parks to honor the deceased person whose values he deeply shared.

In another example of *relating* to a supererogatory opportunity due to *affinity by values,* a faculty member *attends* to her colleague's anxiety about an on-going divorce process because they were both from the *same* specialization area at their business school and the agent considers the beneficiary as one of *her* friends at work.

There was a member of our faculty** going through a very difficult divorce and very emotionally. … Young children involved and just seem to be a person who's kind of falling apart. So I spent an enormous amount of time with this individual. … **I saw a bit of myself in the person, you know, friends, getting to know someone.

[case: Emotional Support]

The agent went beyond what may typically be expected in a similar situation by spending a lot of her time listening to her colleague and comforting her, and even hosting her little children at her house while the distressed colleague needed time to get back to life. Both the agent and the beneficiary shared strong family values which triggered the agent to *attend* to the supererogatory opportunity.

The following example epitomizes *affinity by values* as it concerns relatedness on common religious grounds because a religion is about values (Hick, 1989). In this episode, a scholar *relates* to the colleague's (who is a Muslim) need for a closed work space for praying because the scholar has some connection to Islam, though not praying himself, so he sacrifices a better workspace for himself and makes arrangements to share a closed office space with the colleague.

> *I felt like that somebody else in that group was feeling awkward. And I don't know if that was true or not, but I felt it was. It felt that* [name] *was feeling awkward because **he was going to have to pray regularly and he needed a place**. This was before the meditation room was there and he wanted to have a place where he could pray. So he knew that the office space will be closed. The question really became "Who's going to share that with him?" And **I thought that I was born a Muslin, though I have not been a Muslim for a long time. I'm very comfortable with growing up in that world. So to me, it was natural that I should be the person who takes that spot. Because it would have been not awkward***.

> [case: Office Space]

To a certain degree, the scholar was internally obliged to help arrange the workspace for his colleague to pray so he does not jeopardize the co-shared values of Islam. In this case, the attendance to the supererogatory opportunity due to *affinity by values* evolved to the driver of action called *extended duty* that is discussed further in section §5.4.

The attendance to a supererogatory opportunity due to *affinity by values* clearly reveals itself in the supererogatory story about a senior faculty member who *attends* – though in a critical way – to the candidate's half-way tenure review more than others. She *associated* herself to the candidate's prospects in their business school more than others because she was *part of* his hiring decision three years earlier. What this story also demonstrates is that *affinity by values* can be grounded not only on shared values between individuals (an agent and a beneficiary) as was evident in the aforementioned accounts, but also on shared values between an individual and an institution:

> *I have heard not great things about this candidate that we have in mind. **I felt that I had to do a lot more digging** into this person's background, into the numbers, teaching evaluations. … So in my mind I felt that I had to invest more time and effort than I normally would. … So the candidates will put together their stuff, they will prepare all the teaching materials, the publication stuff, like that. All the tenured members of committee have access to those documents. It's also a question of how much detail you're seeking too. … So they can look at anything they want to and then we have a meeting that's convened and then everybody just going to say. … So definitely there is ambiguity, there's no standard procedure that says you need to look at all these things, you need to spend so many hours, you need to contact these people. … So, we don't go out to look for reasons why they should fail. But this was an anomaly and the person doesn't seem to be fitting. So if we continue to say, "He's okay", we will just do a superficial review and just let it go. … So **his behaviors are not aligned with the values of our business school. So we are so much student-centric school. Where we tend to be more developmental towards students, we tend to be more sympathetic towards them. This person's perspective or previous experiences are really more that our teaching is a necessary evil.** We go in, you teach a few hours and then you get out and just, "Don't come and bother me." So that you can focus on your research. … First of all, **I was one of the proponents for him when we were making the hiring decision. He was hired probably because I said, "Oh, yeah, he has strong potential."** … **Some guilt in fact for bringing on someone who didn't turn out that well. … So I feel guilty of our previous decision, and also because I feel an obligation to the department.** If there's a problem in the department, we need to fix it rather than just sweep it under the rug and hope that it goes away or pretend that it's not even there. So, there's also this sense of like, "I owe to the department, I owe it to the school right."*

*Our reputation is really built on how student-centered we are. If we have one bad apple it could contaminate the rest of the barrel and so, it deserves to be highlighted. … **This person's expectations on values are different, he doesn't see it that way**. So there's a lot of counselling over coffee or over lunch and I said, "You cannot just keep blaming the students and you can't say, they are all spoilt brats, all rich kids."*

[case: Ownership of Mistake]

In a way, the agent feels responsible for the candidate's performance which makes her more *affiliated* with the candidate through an emotional attachment. The candidate's poor teaching performance as well as his values jeopardize the business school's *values,* which the agent cherishes and nurtures, making the agent vulnerable. This serves as a trigger to *attend* to the supererogatory opportunity.

Another example about *association* is about the professor who conducts extracurricular sessions on Personal Finance for the student club consisting of female students. When requested by the students, the professor *attended* to the supererogatory opportunity because she was asked to present on the *same* topics that she had been teaching at the business school. More importantly, the agent did not look for an excuse to decline the students' request because, being a woman, she felt *affiliated* to female students, sharing their values of making business education and business environment a more equitable place for women:

*Every year there's this one student group that asks me to give two presentations for semester at the beginning of the semester, one week and then the following week. This is my 5th time for doing this for them. … This is a student group called "**Smart Women and Securities**" and … they ask me because I teach Personal Finance. I do Introduction to Why Investing is Important, Introduction to Personal Finance and the second one is Introduction to the Stock Market.*

[case: Sessions for Student Club]

This example, as well as the aforementioned supererogatory case *Emotional Support,* suggest that belonging to the same group, in this case by gender, triggers agent's attendance to supererogatory opportunities. We can perhaps extrapolate and suggest that this trigger based on 'belonging to the same group' can, in general, be relevant to other instances of *affinity by values.* For instance, it can be claimed that the case *Office Space* serves as an example of the agent and the beneficiary belonging to the same religious group. In other cases, *affiliation* with a particular group is not by birth (e.g. gender or, in many cases, religion) but is rather acquired in the course of one's life. It becomes apparent in the situation when one of the respondents agreed to meet with the researcher conducting the study on supererogation and answer his questions because the respondent used to work at the school where the researcher was pursuing his doctorate. As the respondent mentioned, "I've taught at your school. I taught there for five years. You're a [school name] student. I would like to help you out."

The next two supererogatory stories emphasize *affinity by the value* of gratitude (see section §5.1 on Gratitude in the Taxonomy) which triggered participants' attendance to supererogatory opportunities. In the first case, the lecturer *attended* to a supererogatory opportunity of thanking – in an elaborate, emotionally touching way, beyond any expectation – the sponsor who donated funds to the school. The lecturer organized students to write "thank you" notes to the sponsor every year and she also organized filming a video honoring the sponsor. The lecturer *related* to the opportunity of thanking beyond any expectation because she *associated* her course with the donation that enabled her course being offered to the students outside her business school.

> *I was at a faculty meeting where **the Dean … was talking about, he made a comment about trying to get the alumni more engaged. I thought about that. And then I thought***

about somebody said something about [sponsor's name] *to me. And I thought, I want to know how* [sponsor's name] *is ... I looked him up and got his birthday and realize he's turning 90. I decided that it would be nice of the students, if the students wrote him a little note. ... What I did was every year, every semester I give a review session before the midterm and offer pizza. I offer pizza because I decided how to get people to show up at 6 p.m. But I also got some cards and some Sharpies, not cards but like cardstock. ... I put* [sponsor's name] *picture up. I said, "I want you to write a note about he is turning 90" ... "You can just write happy 90th or happy birthday but you know it would be nice if you say thank you for endowing this course". And they were lovely things. Some of them just wrote "go* [university mascot]*!" but I bundled all of them up and send them over to him. And he said, they made him cry and they really touched him. I thought when people make gifts, they get a nice little letter from Dean and the engagement* [office] *but those don't make people cry. ... Last summer I saw him and **I talked to him about it and said "thank you for endowing the course"**, we chatted. I had someone take a picture of us and I showed it to the class. ... He [sponsor] wrote me, he said it brought tears to his eyes ... I just felt touched and told my students, and I read them the email* [from the sponsor]*.*

[case: Thanking Course Sponsor]

In the second case *attending* to a supererogatory opportunity due to *affinity by the value* of gratitude, a professor donated to the staff end-of-year bonus pool far above a recommended amount specified in the Dean's email. The professor did it because he thought about particular staff members who helped him:

*The Dean gets the list, so you really do feel it's a duty. That's why I feel like it's a duty, I have to do this. And also I'm blessed – come on, I'm a faculty up here, so I'm blessed. $40? No problem. But to **go above and beyond would be to write a $100 check**, and the reason I write a $100 check is because perhaps I'm **exceptionally grateful for the work that the staff did, or perhaps a particular staff**.*

[case: Donating Extra]

Both of these supererogatory examples are similar in that they demonstrate that the agents' attendance to the supererogatory opportunity is triggered by *affinity by the value* of gratitude.

In sum, *interest, similar experience,* and *affinity by values* are powerful triggers that each on its own can prompt an agent to *relate* and to *attend* to a supererogatory opportunity. In each of the aforementioned supererogatory cases, the salience of one particular trigger of attendance was emphasized, however, in many supererogatory situations triggers of attendance can work in combination. For instance, in the case *Dinners for Students with Military Background,* on top of attending to the supererogatory opportunity due to *similar experience* with the students (military and community college backgrounds), the agent also related to them because it was *interesting* for him to socialize with military veterans, and also because he felt *affinity by values* stemming from belonging to the same group – the military. In other words, a particular trigger of attendance can be quite salient in some supererogatory situations, however, it is equally common to see the combination of two or even three triggers of attendance jointly affecting an agent.

§5.4   Drivers of Action

After the agent *learns* and subsequently *attends* to the supererogatory opportunity, she may still not be willing to conduct a supererogatory act. The study identified three *drivers of action* that can influence the agent's *willingness* to perform supererogation: enjoyment, compassion, and extended duty. Each drivers by and in itself can serve as a single impetus to action, but just as it is the case with the triggers of attendance, it is also not uncommon to observe the combination of drivers working together to affect the agent's willingness to act.

ENJOYMENT is the first driver of action and it is what the agent anticipates to receive from performing supererogation. The person may be willing to behave supererogatorily because

she may simply enjoy doing this activity, she can even be passionate about it. The agent knows he will derive pleasure from this activity and this emotional anticipation of pleasure allows to approximate the advent of an enjoyable supererogatory action by pushing the agent to act. Emotions move people to act, they have an affective aspect which is potentially motivating (Zagzebski, 2017). This role of emotions as a motivator for taking actions has been explored in detail in evolutionary psychology (Tooby & Cosmides, 2008).

For instance, one of the respondents who was a staff member would clean and set up the coffee corner for faculty and staff everyday though doing so was not among her job responsibilities. When she was talking about it, she was imagining what it would be if she set the coffee corner and juxtaposed it to what it would be if she did not. In the course of the interview, it was obvious that her enjoyment came from imagining and anticipating how great it would be for everyone in the school to have their day started right, and how great it would be to avoid setting the wrong tone for the day:

> *I just **like when they** [faculty] **come in, they can start your day out right**. Because I think once, when they don't, **when they can start their day out right, then that sets the tone for them. Once they come in and nothing, they see that nothing is, it's like see it's dirty or messy aside, that sets the tone for them then they're not going to have a good day**. So they could come in and see that everything is fresh and looking good and looking nice. It's such a good tone for them and for the rest of their colleagues and for their students. If I come in and it see it's like it's not ready for them or nobody is basically taking care of them, then it's like nobody cares for me either. Nobody appreciates me either. … You know [tears appear in her eyes, voice starts trembling], if everybody has a good day, then somebody, I would say, if we all have a good day, then you know it's a good day. It's a good day for everybody, **if you start your day out with it, then everybody has a good day**. If you come here, sometimes coming into work, you know, somebody cuts somebody off or whatever. But **if you come into work and see that the coffee is ready whatever then it's just like "Oh, wow! You just made my day."** I started out bad but I'm coming in and that's ready for me, that took everything else away.* [case: Coffee Corner]

Enjoyment as a driver of action in supererogation should be distinguished from for a basic form of pleasure derived from hedonic enjoyment. Generally, the latter lacks meaningful purpose even for the agent, while the former is more in line with the concept of eudaimonia developed in Ancient Greek Philosophy (Aristotle, 1999) that in social psychology denotes happiness through meaningful personal expressiveness (Waterman, 1993). Whenever respondents were speaking about enjoying performing certain supererogatory acts, these activities also turned out to be meaningful to their lives. In other words, finding enjoyment in particular supererogatory acts was tightly interwoven with the importance of those acts to the respondents' sense of wellbeing.

One of the respondents, who was actively reviewing numerous manuscripts of his colleagues and those received from journal editorial boards, excitedly spoke about his enjoyment of doing research and reviewing manuscripts of others. When explaining his motivation (and motivation of other people similar to him) in the supererogatory behavior of reviewing, the participant mentions that he does it mostly in the areas of his interest so he *enjoys* the process of reviewing:

> *Finding it **not inherently interesting to the person** [when people do not agree to review]. In other words, to ask a favor in the domain of that person's interest they would probably be responsive to, but outside the domain of their interest it would be non-responsive. … Perhaps not willing to give it the time or while being busy with other things, but **being willing to give it time if he found it interesting**. … Do I like it? [reviewing] **Fundamentally I do.** If I'm busy I'm annoyed to have to do it, but **in the end it's kind of gratifying to do the work**. … Then **the liking thing** - sometimes it's very tedious and boring – **but it is gratifying** [reviewing for journals]. … **I like the research process,** it is very time-consuming and demanding and that's an up-and-down thing, but **it is very gratifying when it's coming together and the product is satisfying.***
>
> [case: Reviewing Manuscripts]

In the case with mindfulness meditation, the professor had been eagerly looking forward to his sessions and he was emotionally anticipating that students would also be longing to participating in his sessions:

Those other times I drive in and when I see students come even if they're only one who's there, but who tells me that appreciates the experience. Then that's good, and what happens as the year goes on, I often will have one or two people coming back more regularly. They'll be coming back and that is gratifying because that tells me there is really meeting a need of theirs. They wouldn't be taking that time at 5 o'clock to come in. ***Maybe they were off campus, or maybe they were in the library and they had to keep an eye on the clock and what time it was knowing that they had to be over at the room at 5 o'clock, I mean it was on their agenda and they wanted to be there. That's gratifying for me that they would prioritize it in their life and come over and do it****.*

[case: Mindfulness Meditation]

The story with the professor who has forgone his pay is another example of acting out of *enjoyment*. In the study abroad programs, students can attend their degree-required courses abroad and professors from their business school would accompany them to teach the courses. Faculty members are typically compensated for their travel expenses and are also paid for their teaching time. However, in this supererogatory case, the professor offered not to be paid for his teaching abroad because there were not enough students enrolled for the trip but he strongly wanted to go to *enjoy* that experience:

The students are paying enough to cover their own expenses and my expenses and my salary through the summer session, through the tuition. It's a sort of complicated formula that if you plan to get 15 students, and you only get 10, then you're losing a lot of the contribution to the overhead. And I just pick that up out of my salary because they pay me enough. … ***To me, it seems so obvious, if you want the trip to go, you don't cut two days out of it, you figure out a way to make it work so that you can do the trip you want. I've done that a couple of times.*** *… **We just had a really neat trip scheduled there**, just weren't enough students to make it work. … **I didn't need to be paid, and I had met some of the students, they were excited to go. At some point, you can just tell yourself, "This is going***

*to be really fun because we only have 10." You can go into a restaurant with 10 or 12 people and get a table, you don't have to have reservations compared to 30. It's a fairly minor thing. … **I put a lot of effort into this. It's absolutely fun**. The one I'm thinking of* [now] *is going to Greece and Turkey. … **The value of studying abroad, and actually seeing things, talking to people, seeing how different the world is, how much it had affected my life. … I'm just happy to be able to choose what I get to do. If I can choose what I'm doing, then I'm doing what I want** and getting paid.*

[case: Study Abroad]

Another example is the story of a professor who regularly takes his students to lunch (individually or in groups) and pays for everyone. He likes socializing with students, getting to know more about them, about their struggles and their career prospects. He finds this whole experience quite *enjoyable* to him.

*I take students to lunch today. I had two students to lunch, I invite my whole class to go to lunch with me sometime during the semester because **I like it, so I don't want to take too much credit for this, and I think this is what I like doing.***

[case: Taking Students to Lunch]

The last two examples demonstrate that since the agents are enjoying the process, they do not realize that they are doing something extraordinary – going beyond duty in a morally praiseworthy way. Rather, the participants see this as a natural course of action. For instance, the professor for the case *Study Abroad* mentions "to me it seems so obvious" and the participant from the case *Taking Students to Lunch* states explicitly that he is not to be credited for what he is doing.

It is not only the agent herself who can reveal her enjoyment from acting supererogatorily. Others can also notice it. In one of the interviews, a female colleague of the professor in the case *Taking Students to Lunch* pointed to his supererogatory behavior with the students describing him as a person who "genuinely enjoys being part of the community and

engaging with the students." In another business school, a faculty member also described a supererogatory behavior of his colleague in a similarly exciting way,

> *I have a colleague who continuously meets with students. She meets with student groups one on one to help prepare for presentations, actively encourages that, meets with them and I know she's helpful to them. That isn't required in our job.* ***That's beyond. … She's exceptionally generous with her time****. … **She'll meet in the evening, she'll meet on the weekends.** … I think we have a duty to meet with students during office hours, but I don't think we have an obligation or a duty to meet in the evenings or on weekends or at other times. … Certainly because* ***she enjoys it****. She gets* ***a sense of well-being****, there are many reasons, but the main reason would be* ***because she enjoys, because she gets sense of well-being****.*
>
> <div align="right">[case: Spending Time with Students]</div>

The next two examples demonstrate enjoyment as a driver for supererogatory behavior in the research and service domains. One of the professors put a lot of efforts in organizing a conference on the topic that was initially developed by his colleague. He found it personally enjoyable to him to advance the scholarly area, whose idea he started to believe in and what he started writing on. One may argue that it was done to promote his own status in academia, which might also be the case among other things, but he primarily was driven by *enjoying* promoting what he believed in:

> *That is why we did it and really that's about the only reason we did it. …* ***We believed in the idea. Nobody, I don't believe that anyone can say that they don't get personal value from doing something like that,*** *and I think they'd be lying. But for most of the things that we do in life we have more than one reason. So then you kind of prioritize you say, well what was the primary drive. … One could argue that it was fun and we were having a good time. One could argue that advances our reputation which it did. We could also argue that it helps our societies to which we belong, especially Strategic Management Society. So the outcomes were very good but* ***primarily we wanted to advance this idea into the mainstream strategy and the rest of business.*** *… So those of us who do it and they're a lot of us who do it. Do it just because* ***we love to serve and we love to promote things that we think are important.*** [case: Organizing Conference]

Though many faculty members treat their engagement in service as a necessary evil, some people actually enjoy it. For instance, one of the professors interviewed in the study was actively participating on an enormous number of different committees at business school-, university-, and city-levels, as well as at local and state-level committees in public and private organizations, because it was enjoyable for him to live such a serving-oriented lifestyle. As he described himself, "*I don't believe I have ever said 'no' to anything at this university. … That's just the way. I guess one answer is maybe I haven't got a life other than this. It's also the way I'm wired.*" A professor in another business school, who also has had an extensive record of serving on different committees, including at multiple student organizations, mentioned that it was his intrinsic motivation, which can be interpreted as an enjoyment, to contribute to service as he *enjoyed* participating in the variety of activities going on at his business school,

> *I had a clear set of ideas on why I came back* [from industry] *to do this, and I came back to do this type of work to **participate in the full life of the university**. Not only to do the research, not only to do teaching and as **these opportunities** [service] were presented to me, **I found that I enjoy them**. I think they were **intrinsically rewarding**, though certainly not extrinsically rewarding. They had nothing to do with my tenure case and my raise might have varied a couple of dollars, but not anything existential. … It's an opportunity to **learn something new and make a different contribution**. … I served as a chair of the business school's Strategic Planning Committee and I did that for one term and then the Dean asked if I would do it for another term. I did it for six years, and then she asked if I would do it for another term. By that point, I felt very comfortable within myself that … I was **ready to do something new**. … I said "no" to a third term. Selfishly speaking, it was probably a lack of variety for me.*
>
> [case: Extraordinary Service]

Enjoyment, as a driver of action, helps sustain supererogatory behavior for a long while. However, when enjoyment from a particular activity fades away, so does the willingness to act supererogatorily. In the case *Extraordinary Service,* the professor served for six years on one of

the most difficult school committees because he found his engagement in the committee's affairs enjoyable to him. However, when he was offered to serve on the committee for the third term, he eventually declined the offer due to losing interest in that particular committee because by that time there was nothing new and enjoyable for him there anymore.

COMPASSION is the second driver of action which stands for "being attuned to and responsive to the suffering of others" (George, 2014: 7). What differs compassion from related concepts of empathy and sympathy is that compassion is not only about feeling (i.e. empathy) or recognizing (i.e. sympathy) somebody's pain (Eisenberg, Wentzel, & Harris, 1998), but it is also about undertaking efforts to alleviate somebody's suffering. When analyzing interview data, the researcher concluded that what the participants often referred to as empathy, in the academic literature would be called compassion – in their supererogatory behavior, the respondents did not only empathize with those in pain, but they also tried to ease the suffering of others.

The above definition of compassion has two components: 1) being *attuned* to the suffering of others, and 2) being *responsive* to them. All the supererogatory cases provided in this section support the second component of compassion – responsiveness – because the agents not just talked about helping others, but they did perform supererogation. Thus, in what follows, the researcher will elaborate on the first component of compassion – being attuned.

The study shows that the phenomenon of being attuned reveals itself in two ways: agents talking about the difficulties of others and agents talking about their own feelings. When describing the problems of others, the attuned agents noticed their struggles, pressure, stress, difficult adjustment, breaking down, being in tears, falling apart, and having a difficult time. And

when the attuned agents described their own feelings, they mentioned feeling bad about what

was happening, feeling sad and worried. Below is what some of the participants said:

> *He* [student] *was having a **really hard time adjusting** to* [our school]. *… this young man is sitting here **and he was in tears. He was just breaking down** …*
> [case: Dinners for Students with Military Background]

> **He** [student] **wasn't having any luck with a job**. … I feel sympathy for his situation. I don't think it's fair. … It's a way of comparison. … **He's not getting the consideration he should**.
> [case: Helping with Job for International Student]

> *There was a member of our faculty going through **a very difficult divorce and very emotionally. … Young children involved and just seem to be a person who's kind of falling apart**. So I spent an enormous amount of time with this individual. …* [Interviewer: Why did you do it?] ***Empathy, yeah, that one is easy, I felt really bad for this person** and also it was clearly going through a difficult time.*
> [case: Emotional Support]

> *We were **worried** that if it didn't turn around it was going to affect her ability to get her third review, to get her tenure. … I do remember a few specific cases where I was able to help her, but also the main thing is **just to say that "It's not, don't worry". She was inwardly stressed.** What you can see is a lot of pressure and as a career going, thing going over here. But **she put a lot, a lot of pressure on herself**.*
> [case: Mentoring Junior Colleague]

> ***I saw somebody who was struggling**, living in a new country, in a very stressful, demanding environment and the problem was multidimensional. She was struggling with how to separate it out, because she had family, she had school, she had language, she had social sort of attractions. She also had a commitment to, a strong sense of loyalty to the people who had found a way to bring her here. She felt very strongly that she did not want to let them down. … **And I empathized with her.** I felt like, well, I don't have much to offer other than my time for somebody like that.*
> [case: Walks with International Student]

On the other hand, less-attuned study participants were well aware that there were

people more prone to being empathetic. Low-attuners, while not strongly exhibiting compassion-

related qualities themselves, were quite appreciative of those who had a strongly developed feeling of empathy that made them stand out from the rest, either in their workplace or in their family:

> Some people have that **DNA where they're much more aware of when others around them are lacking or hurting or in need of. Their antennae are up and pick up on those and they respond to that.** My daughter is that way, much more than I am. I might have been standing in line to go to concert and might never have dawned on me that Lucia [see case *Concert Tickets and Babysitting*] would be somebody maybe that I could help it, whereas others are always having those thoughts.

Data from the first wave of interviews pointed to the difference in the degree of displayed empathy among the participants. Based on that finding, subsequent interviews were, among other things, aimed at exploring what interviewees' characteristics might be associated with empathy. These were supplemented by researcher's field notes taken after each interview. It turned out that empathy was developed to a much higher degree in those people who were more emotional. These are extracts from the researcher's field notes: "a couple of times tears appeared on her [respondent's] eyes when she was talking about her intents to alleviate someone's pain", "his voice started trembling", "she needed to take a pause as otherwise she would cry when talking about her colleague's distress", "tears showed up in his eyes".

The developmental psychology literature posits that empathy is correlated with affective intensity (Larsen & Diener, 1987) and emotion regulation (Eisenberg, Wentzel, & Harris, 1998), where affective intensity, or emotionality, stands for "stable individual differences in the typical intensity with which individuals experience their emotions" (Eisenberg, Wentzel, & Harris, 1998: 509). The current study confirmed there was an association between emotionality and empathy. However, there was no evidence for the role of emotion regulation in the development of

empathy. One reason could be that the psychology findings were mainly based on experiments with children, while the study's interviews were conducted with adults whose emotion regulation has been largely developed. Recent finding in cognitive science demonstrate that for individuals in their early twenties "the brain becomes more interconnected. This is especially true with respect to the connections between the prefrontal cortex and the limbic system" (Steinberg, 2015: 71). Since the limbic system is responsible for emotions and the prefrontal cortex is responsible for self-control, in the adult age, upon reaching maturity, emotion regulation is not such a differentiating factor as it is among children.

At the same time, the difference in emotionality remains even after children's brain development reaches maturity because emotional intensity is a dispositional inclination (Eisenberg, Wentzel, & Harris, 1998). When discussing supererogatory cases during the interviews, the researcher probed the respondents, who seemed to be very high on empathy, about their emotions and they responding in the following way:

> [Do you consider yourself emotional?] ***When I watch movies, yes. Even in professional setting I'm getting teary*** *when I shouldn't. Like we had a retiring party for one of the older faculty and people were going around saying how much they appreciate him blah, blah, and I just couldn't do it. **I couldn't speak because I know I will start crying**. … [Is your empathy average, above or below average?] It depends on the audience. **I'm more empathetic towards the underdogs, the underprivileged, those who are disadvantaged.** I'm not very empathetic to those who are already have it made, I'm not empathetic to, say, the president, I'm not emphatic to the rich, people who feel entitled, I'm not.*
> [female professor]

> [Do you consider yourself emotional?] *Very.* [When you watch movies, do you..?] *Yes, **I cry. … I cry pretty regularly, even television shows will get me sometimes, I'm very emotional. … I'm purely emotional, always.** … [Is your empathy average, above or below average?] Extraordinary. … **I feel the people's pain, in a very real way.** I feel the joy, in a very real way. Both of those emotions are needed too sometimes.* [male professor]

People high on empathy notice somebody's suffering more often than others and, as a result, they have a higher likelihood to *learn about* and *attend to* supererogatory opportunities. Highly empathetic individuals were described by their colleagues in the following way,

> *She has a lot of **compassion**. … She feels **very connected to other human** regardless of where they are. … Especially to those who are **in need**.*

> *She's **very empathic**, I think she has **a lot of empathy.** They're doing it for empathic reasons. So, I think when it involves helping out a colleague, it's **very clear that what motivates her to do that is empathy for a colleague**.*

> *Well, I get the impression from hearing other people talk. **He is helpful to everyone all the time**, without being intrusive, without saying "I know the better way". He just would sit down and talk with people. **He has a sense of when people are needing help, or people are just a little bit off kilter, he just has a sense of that.** He will sit down and talk with people, "Let's go get a coffee." And one time, I was struggling, "Let's go" and then we got a beer. So, I went there and we didn't spend the whole lot of time talking about our school, it came up a little bit, but he was just being collegial. Again, **my sense is that he does that not just with me, but with everybody.***

Those people with high predisposition to empathy not only notice the suffering of others more often, but also notice the supererogatory behavior of others more often. A staff member, both highly emotional and empathetic, spent a lot of time talking – emotionally and empathetically – about a staff member from another department,

> *She is doing administrative, she keeps the programs going. But in the meanwhile they're hiring more mid-level directors, but then those people give her more work. But **they're not hiring anybody to help her run the programs.** And so they got her sitting in a corner in a storage room. She's not in her office like this. She in the corner in the storage room. **She used to have her own office and then they moved her out**. … She goes on her own time to buy all this stuff, rather than school time. She goes after work, on Saturdays. So that to me is like she should be taking off early on a Friday afternoon or whatever, but no, **she's going on Saturdays or Sundays to do that because she doesn't have the time during the***

week, cause she has to be here from 7 to 4 or 7 to 6. And she comes on Saturdays till 1 o'clock for these programs.

However, people with lower emotionality and empathy initially struggled to come up with

supererogatory cases in their business schools,

> *I think people acted as they were supposed to, or maybe they didn't last as they were supposed to be on, but **in terms of someone going beyond the call of duty, nothing really comes to mind**. … In a working environment, you are to do what you are supposed to do. Academic setting rarely are your bonuses, etc. But even if there were, working towards the bonuses, as supposed doing something above, beyond what's was expected. … Differences, that I don't think, go to the spirit of your question, which is as I understand it, "Can you give observations or examples of what people are doing more than what's expected, without any expectation of additional reward associated with it?" There I say, **nothing really could come in mind**, so I'm not certain why people.*

> **No, I don't think in terms of, in kind of major examples really come to mind**.

> **I can't really think of any. I think everybody's doing what they're supposed to be doing, and it's possible that people go beyond but I just I haven't seen it myself.**

> **It's not on top of my mind right and maybe that's because there are not many examples.** *I've worked very hard at research and teaching and service but I would say all are expected here.*

Later in the course of interviews, when prompted by the researcher, the low-attuners

were eventually able to share supererogatory stories of their colleagues and those of their own.

It shows that emotionality helps not only react to supererogatory opportunities by a means of

compassion, but also notice and appreciate supererogatory behaviors of others.

EXTENDED DUTY is the third driver of action. The researcher has introduced this term to

define the individual's feeling of duty in the situations in which the majority of other people

would not see duty. It is called *extended duty* because what some respondents considered their duty, the majority of people would not see it as an obligation. To some extent, it is similar to the account of supererogation (Levy, 2015) in which no one can hold the agent responsible for performing supererogation, except for the agent who holds herself responsible.

The driver of action stemming from *extended duty* can be demonstrated when considering the case *Hospital Visit* where a few people thought they had a duty to visit the patient, while the majority of people would consider it supererogatory. In the case, a professor had a bike accident causing him a brain injury and he was transported for a surgery to the hospital 500 miles away from the university hometown. After the accident, a few people from the business school visited him in the hospital being driven by *extended duty* which, however, was stemming from different perspectives. One of the study participants had been recently appointed as Department Chair and she felt it was part of her responsibilities to take care of the colleagues in her department, so she flew 500 miles to visit the colleague hospitalized in another city. She mentioned that she felt like "Oh, my gosh! I'm in charge. My role was sort of between, the liaison between the dean and the wife." Another colleague spent 15 hours driving to and back the remote hospital being driven by friendship obligations. As he mentioned, "I wouldn't consider him a close friend, but I would count him as a friend", so he wanted "just to lend support in any way … one way we could help in some sense was to get his wife some relief and just spend time with him." Each of these people spent a few days of their lives visiting their injured colleague transported to a remote city. However, they did not consider their behavior as going beyond duty, and as one of them mentioned,

> *That is the thing about people that may be perceived to be* [going above and beyond]*, they may not perceive it themselves as going above and beyond. … There are a lot of*

*people here that would have done the same thing. … It's one of these things where you have a couple step forward and step back and that kind of thing. So maybe that's why **I don't perceive it so much as above and beyond** because it's clearly above and beyond for* [person's names] *to go, I mean that's a long way to* [city name].

[case: Hospital Visit]

This reveals that a person feeling extended duty does not see herself going beyond duty because she assumes that other people would do the same in her situation. Furthermore, her assumption of similar behavior of others is significantly amplified if she happens to see someone else behaving supererogatorily. However, if the agent does not happen to see others taking an emerged supererogatory opportunity onto themselves, then the agent explains her own supererogatory response to the situation by her being better positioned than others to conduct this supererogatory act,

*It's kind of obvious **if you don't, then nobody will**. It's not like other people will do it, if you don't do it. It kind of just counts on people realizing that they just got a lot more responsibility here. …*

***I'm the one who's in the position, I should do that. Who else is going to do it if I don't?** We didn't think of it in advance.*

This duality of extended duty – either assuming that others would do the same or perceiving themselves better positioned than others to do it – determines a large part of supererogatory behaviors driven by extended duty.

Finally, it also has to be taken into account that many respondents who agreed to meet with the researcher and participate in interviews, generally speaking, behaved supererogatorily. The researcher was not from their business schools and they were busy with their own research projects, teaching and service. Yet, these people agreed to be interviewed and spend 1-2 hours of their time with the researcher. Some of them initially did not quite see their behavior as

supererogatory, rather at the back of their mind they felt it was their duty. As one of the respondents mentioned,

> *When it comes to students, I don't know if I do this because I've got these gears laid on me, like you emailed me and asked, "Can you help me?" And yes, I can do that. I don't have to, you are definitely way beyond the scope of my duty,* **except that because you're a student, I've got this belief that I should help.**

DRIVERS OF ACTION WORKING IN COMBINATION. Each driver of action can be a strong motivator on its own, but agent's volition to perform supererogation becomes stronger if it is a combination of drivers simultaneously running through the agent's mind. In the example with the professor who helped his student find a job in investment banking, the agent's supererogatory behavior was driven by all three drivers of action. The professor previously worked in investment banking and he admitted that it was *gratifying* for him to see his student following his way and becoming successful in the same field. He also *sympathized* with the student because, being one of the most talented in his class, she nevertheless was not able to secure many job interviews with investments banks; and the one interview she got invited to went downhill after she accidentally knocked down the bowl of soup on her lap. Finally, the professor received his Doctorate degree in one of the top economics schools and was a strong believer in market efficiency. It was quite disturbing for him to notice labor market inefficiency when a bright student of his could not get employed, so he felt an urge (*extended duty*) to correct this inefficiency.

> *She was still looking* [for a job] *and I was surprised because she was* **very talented young woman. She had missed most of the** [opportunities]*,* **she had tried and was unsuccessful** *in terms of persuading investment banks to hire her. Related how she had been to* [bank name] *for an interview and then during lunch,* **she had ordered soup, and her bowl of soup fell on her lap, apparently so she didn't get that job**. *…* [EMPATHY] **I then contacted**

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one of my friends at investment bank. … *He then contacted the campus recruiter, and though they'd already interviewed, they opened up an opportunity for her. They interviewed her, they liked her, they hired her, and then she was offered.* … *This person went to* [bank name]*, and they had* [bank name] *hired 80 students that year. Like her, 80 recent grads with Baccalaureate credits like her.* **She was like number one ranked by the people of** [bank name]**. And they made her an offer for the 3rd year and promoted to an associate. It was satisfying** [ENJOYMENT] **to kind of help her out, and stories like that are then kind of common throughout my career in terms of helping students.** [SUSTAINED SUPEREROGATION] … *You know that as a finance professor and studying in the University of* [name]*,* **market efficiency was essential part** *in modern finance, it still is, over security market efficiency, it doesn't necessarily apply to labor market efficiency. In her case, it was a great illustration really to me.* **We could have a very efficient capital market, at the same time we have labor market inefficiency.** *That's why I highlighted that* **she was rated number one out of the 80 people and would not have been hired without somebody helping her open the door. It happened to be me.** [EXTENDED DUTY] *But I'm convinced, if it hadn't been a colleague and she would have gotten into a different investment bank, I knew she would have performed equally well. Again it is kind of* **a stark reminder that as much as we talk about market efficiency, that applies to capital markets and not labor market***.*

[case: Helping with Job in Investment Banking]

The drivers of action can affect an individual in a sequential combination also because some drivers may actually originate from other drivers of action. To illustrate the point, we may consider agent's *extended duty* as stemming from individual's *interests* and passion – the areas where the person derives *enjoyment* from. What agents see as their duty might actually be tied to what their individual passions or priorities are. In the case *Mindfulness Meditation,* the agent launched weekly meditation sessions to help students with their stress from studies because practicing mindfulness meditation was *enjoyable* for him personally. However, once he launched his meditation sessions, he committed to conducting them every week and, as a result, started feeling *extended duty* to do so. As the protagonist in the case reflected on his experience,

Every Monday I do that. It's pretty big commitment because I work at home a fair amount when I'm not teaching, because I have a home office. Today, I'm not teaching but I'm here today. … If I'm working at home on Monday, the only reason I have to be here is at 5 o-clock [meditation]*. … So, I drive in, I park, it's not a big deal, but you get my point. I often on Mondays don't have anything other reason to be here. So, it is a bit of a time commitment. … Sometimes I have other things that I have on my agenda that I would like to be working on, but **I feel like I made this commitment and because I made the commitment there is an obligation. I told people that they can come at 5 o'clock to a room, and I'm the one who has to be there. I have chosen to make that commitment,** no one told me to. There is sometimes a sense in which, even though I may not want to have to step up and do the job, parents do this with their kids, and other people do in other settings. Where there are times when you have a commitment, when you wish that and you made the commitment. But **there are times when you wish now, that maybe I just give the day at this time, that you didn't have to step up and do it because maybe there's a conflicting or other opportunity**.*

[case: Mindfulness Meditation]

Thus passion develops into "pretty big commitment", which in a way is akin to other duties one may have. The last part of the protagonist's discourse shows that from time to time he may regret having committed to this endeavor, but since his affectual response has been based on a combination of drivers, it is easier for the agent to sustain his volition to perform supererogation. A similar effect is observed in the above mentioned case *Helping with Job in Investment Banking,* where a combination of drivers affecting the agent's willingness to perform supererogation made his supererogatory behavior recurring and even permanent – as the agent mentioned, "stories like that are then kind of common throughout my career in terms of helping students."

§5.5   Capacities as a Moderator to Supererogatory Behavior

The drivers of action are strong affectual impulses that cultivate agent's willingness to conduct a supererogatory act. However, the study findings point to the fact that there is a

moderator between agent's willingness and her actual behavior – the agent's capacities. Even if the agent experiences a driver of action, her initial willingness to conduct a supererogatory act may not convert into a supererogatory behavior due to the lack of *capacities* for carrying out supererogation. The study discovered four main types of capacities that moderate agent's potential supererogatory behavior: *bandwidth*, *capability fit, emotional fit,* and *interpersonal fit.*

BANDWIDTH stands for agent's time availability. No matter how strongly an agent is willing to conduct a supererogatory act, she may be extremely busy at the current stage of her life, which would prevent her from performing supererogation. For instance, she might have time-demanding family commitments (children, spouse, or parents), or she may be overwhelmed with tenure pressure, thus constantly working on her research projects. The respondents described the bandwidth capacity as something that has tangible boundaries and these bandwidth boundaries make corrections in what one may initially be willing to achieve,

> *I'm sitting in a meeting and people are sort of volunteering for this and or for that, and I may sit there and say "Well, I may volunteer but, or else **somebody draw a line, there is a boundary here**, I can do this." As we say some time, **I don't have the bandwidth for this right now, and sometimes you got to speak up and say, I'm sorry, but right now I can't do that.***

> *You have such **a set of responsibilities and once you realize what those are, there's no real use** in going above and beyond.*

> *Early in my career I said yes* [to reviewing manuscripts for many different journals]*, but by the time when I became a board member on those two* [top management journals]*, **I stopped saying yes to other things**. So I stopped, I took away that, **that was above and beyond the call of duty then, but I now stopped doing that because of other things***.

> *When I do 12 hours of work versus if I do 6 hours of work, then it would be **easier to stay later everyday***.

*What if one is **very busy?***

One of the study participants who performed supererogation admitted that she was able

to do it only in the second year after joining the school, as in the first year she was overwhelmed

with adjusting to the school,

> ***The first year I didn't do that, first year I was just really trying to get up to speed, it was a really sharp learning, a steep learning curve. … The first year I was just trying to keep my head above water.*** *Second year, and I always liked continuous improvement so it's like in 2nd year, I'm better of that, "what else can I do?"*
>
> [case: Thanking Course Sponsor]

The same respondent also admitted that she was able to perform her supererogatory act

because she did not have tenure pressure, so she had more time compared to other junior faculty

in her department,

> *It was easy for me because …* ***I'm an adjunct, I'm not trying to get tenure. I can see how if I were a new, young faculty member trying to get tenure, trying to do all those things I have to do****.*
>
> [case: Thanking Course Sponsor]

Similar to the aforementioned case, other respondents also compared themselves to

their colleagues to demonstrate family-related bandwidth limitations that they face:

> *The story I tell myself about her behavior is that* ***she's single and I'm married and I have been raising a family for many years****. That's the story I tell myself. …* ***She is not married, no children*** *and the story I tell myself, is that she's doing it either because* ***she has the time,*** *and certainly because she enjoys it. She gets a sense of well-being, I get a sense of well-being from students as well, but* ***I no longer meet with them in that fashion. That definitely changed once I had kids, once we got married, had kids****.*
>
> *One of the things is, he is* ***very close to here to the school, he is single, the school is his life,*** *when he retires I don't know what he is going to do with himself. When students have of a major project do, they are crazy in the labs, 11 o'clock in the night. He would show up with bags of cookies or something like that, just talk with them.*

*He doesn't have as many conflicts maybe, **he's not married or has children.***

*If they could make it happen due to their **schedule**, due to their familiarity with the content or the material, they're going to say yes* [to substituting class upon request].

Those with more bandwidth would agree with the above comments. The professor who spends four evenings per week in his business school helping students with their group projects and group studies mentioned,

> *That's why I can be here, **I haven't got children, and I can be here in the evenings. And I recognize there are colleagues who can't do that. They need to be home, they need to be taking care of their children**. In fact, … I had a faculty member saying I'll be there. I thought "I don't want you here". And **you've got three small children, he needed to get home, just to speak with them**. … Some are not here of course, **some faculty members have younger children, they have other responsibilities, I understand and respect that**. And this is something I can do and I'm willing to do it, and no one's asked me to do it. … I'm probably in 4 nights, I just remain here. I'm usually here around 7:30 in the morning. And I'm usually here till 9, 10, or 11 o'clock in the night. I can be very very busy with classes and meetings. And just not meetings at the university, but meetings in the community. … I have a lot of meetings during the day, a lot of meetings by telephone, by conference call like video conferencing, and it just works. I keep myself well scheduled. And it comes very frustrating for me when I get across something cross schedule. … I got something in Outlook I forgot to put it in the pen. That doesn't happen too often but it happens occasionally. And that can be frustrating.*

Other people, who performed supererogatory acts, shared similar understanding of their colleagues with less bandwidth,

> *Some might have **been in a different position**. …* [Name] *might have had several **young children or something at home.***

> [case: Hospital Visit]

CAPABILITY FIT is the second type of capacities moderating supererogation and it stands for individual's ability to perform a particular supererogatory act. The study on supererogation

in business schools revealed that some acts of supererogation require the possession of certain knowledge and skills whose absence may restrain agent's initial willingness to perform supererogation. For instance, the supererogatory behavior of reviewing numerous colleagues' and journal-sent manuscripts can properly be performed only if the agent has appropriate knowledge in the corresponding area. As the protagonist in the supererogatory case mentioned,

> **This is a topic I know a lot about and I can really help** with versus I'll look for typos. ... So maybe I can't be **very much helpful**. So maybe the motivation varies, but maybe **the ability** varies as well. … Perhaps **feeling able to give constructive feedback if it's in his area of interest**, feeling not able if it's on another topic.
>
> [case: Reviewing Manuscripts]

In another example of capability fit performing a role of a moderator, a senior professor mentored a junior faculty member on teaching business students (case *Mentoring Junior Colleague*). The agent had been previously teaching business students for many years and, thus, had a rich experience and knowledge to share. As a result, she was quite capable of behaving supererogatorily by providing mentorship to her junior colleague. In another example, the lecturer who was invited by the student club "Smart Women and Securities" to conduct two sessions on Personal Finance for their members (case *Sessions for Student Club*), had taught this subject for several years and was quite capable of conducting a supererogatory act of teaching students on this particular topic beyond her curriculum hours. In both cases, the agents believed in their capacity and, hence, had high self-efficacy (Bandura, 1982) that enabled them to perform supererogation.

Having a capability in a particular skill not only enables an agent to conduct a supererogatory act, its supererogatory application can also bring enjoyment to the agent. In this regard, *enjoyment* as a driver of action and *capability fit* as agent's capacity are closely interlaced.

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One of the respondents, possessing an extensive experience in video technology, enjoyed helping others in his business school and felt great that his competence could be applied,

> *Here's a situation where **I know what they need to know**. … So **that made me feel mostly good**. Maybe it was a self-serving thing but, I don't know. Maybe **it felt good to help them** because I knew I could help them and that's like **a very specific skill set that I have**, that I could do something.*

Apart from domain-specific capabilities, it is also important to mention *multitasking skills* as another capability that an agent can tap into to mitigate her limited bandwidth. Apparently, if individual's current responsibilities do not occupy most of her time and she has some bandwidth remaining, then it is much easier to perform supererogation. Otherwise, bandwidth limitations can be overcome and supererogation can be performed even with a limited bandwidth in case the agent possesses multitasking skills. If the person is able to run several projects simultaneously, then it would be possible for her to conduct a supererogatory act on top of her current responsibilities. As some respondents mentioned,

> *There's some relationship between multitasking and going above and beyond, so you **don't get so absorbed in your main set of responsibilities** that you don't have any capacity to go above and beyond. If you have some multitasking ability or ability to manage multiple things in parallel, then you will always have some spare cycles available, if something meaningful comes up.*

> ***I balance it*** *[different things, including behaving supererogatorily]* ***among my family demands***, *those things.*

> ***Multitasking*** *has been a factor in my career, that's clear.*

> *[respondent talking about a supererogatory, single person, whose runs many things and his calendar is fully packed:] I think if he were married, or have a family here, that he will do the same thing [going beyond duty], I just think he is that kind of a person.*

EMOTIONAL FIT is the third type of capacities moderating supererogation. People are more likely to perform supererogation if they are satisfied with their status quo; and vice versa, people are less likely to behave supererogatorily if their current emotional state is threatened. For instance, a person may be stressed out, feeling overwhelmed or insecure and, as a result, she may simply be unable to attend to a supererogatory opportunity or get motivated to act upon it. Or, even if an individual is not stressed out with any significant problems in her life, she may still fear performing the supererogatory act itself seeing it as a potential threat to her comfort zone. For instance, not every professor would feel comfortable organizing a whole new conference by herself (case *Organizing Conference)* or babysitting small children (case *Concert Tickets and Babysitting*). Or, a person may lack an emotional fit due to being over-ambitious, thus, perceiving the success of his colleagues, including potential beneficiaries of a supererogatory act, as a threat to his own success. Or, an individual may simply be critical of a particular supererogatory opportunity. This is what respondents shared in this regard,

> [People may be] ***Overwhelmed by other things in their personal lives, and they are so stressed out*** *that they don't want to stick their neck out and do something even more than what they might be asked to. … They feel already **too stressed**, either in their work life, or in their private life. **I have had that happen sometime, I had so much going on in my family life***.

> *This person feels already **overwhelmed legitimately or not by the things they have been asked to do***.

> *Maybe if I didn't have that* [colleagues' recognition]*, I would seek it. But because I have it, it's not a grinder. It's kind of like if you're really hungry you want food, but once you have food you don't really need more food. So, **I got lots of praise, so I don't need any more at all.***

*I've gone to them in the past and other places and **I don't find them particularly useful** [public forums/dialogue seminars]. Everybody knows what they should be doing, and what all they do is sit around and say what you should do. I find it **a waste of my time**. I went to one on subliminal prejudice or something like that. Went from like nine to noon and it was a complete waste of time as far as I was concerned. I sat there and did it, they really pushed, I don't know what the short word is - fairness to everybody. So, you see my door got a tag about the safe place training and blah, blah, blah. I will do those things but frankly I think **I don't believe I need to be trained to treat people fairly**.*

INTERPERSONAL FIT is the fourth component of agent's capacity which denotes how comfortably an agent feels about helping a potential beneficiary. If the agent does not like the way how a potential beneficiary asked him to help, or she does not like the personality of the potential beneficiary, then the likelihood of performing supererogation significantly decreases. Informally speaking, there should be some "interpersonal chemistry" and "something synergetic" between the agent and the beneficiary so that the agent feels comfortable to behave supererogatorily toward the beneficiary. When one of the study participants was asked to think deeper about the supererogatory stories that he shared with the researcher, he mentioned the following:

*You wonder sometimes when someone works with you if they do, when they're going beyond the call of duty, because there's **something synergistic about the two of you**. Maybe **the way that you approach them, maybe they feel comfortable working with you and you make them feel good about working with you and so, they want to do more. It's like there's an interpersonal synergy**, whereas as somebody comes walking in and says, "I got this project, and it needs to be done by 4 o'clock and I realized we only got 2 more hours, but someone's got to do this." … But it might be better if it's like, "Hey, I've got this thing, it's fallen into my lap and there're some deadlines and I'm just really worried, but I think you can help me out here and let me tell you what it is. I would really appreciate, if you have any extra bandwidth with your day to help me." If you do it, you ask in the right way, and they know that it's important and they know that you will appreciate them, then this ignites their willingness to go beyond the call of duty. …*

*Sometimes it's just **interpersonal chemistry** that people will work together and go beyond because it just feels good, feels right there being appreciated.*

It has to be stressed out that the agent's four capacities – *bandwidth, capability fit, emotional fit, and interpersonal fit* – are not the drivers that motivate the person to perform supererogation. However, their role in supererogation should not be undervalued since the absence of any of these four agent's capacities would make the performance of a supererogatory act unlikely.

§5.6   Supererogatory Behavior

The supererogatory process culminates in the performance of a supererogatory act. Supererogatory opportunity converts into a supererogatory act if the process of supererogation is "walked through" in its entirety (see Figure 3 in §6.1). The categories and types of supererogation in academic settings were discussed in detail in §5.1, however, there is much more to explore in supererogatory behavior beyond the taxonomy.

AGENT'S PREFERENCES – her likes and dislike – play an essential role in determining the way supererogation takes place. In the case *Dinners for Students with Military Background,* the professor could help student veterans in many different ways, but he decided to do it by hosting dinners at his place. During the interview, it turned out that he chose to have joint, informal gatherings because, as the professor mentioned himself, he likes socializing with students. As a result, he chose to conduct his supererogatory act in a way that was also enjoyable for him,

*I have a dinner at my home for all students and faculty who are military veterans, so I have 25-30 people at my house. And **we sit around and we talk**, we don't tell war stories, but just remember what it was like to be in the military. … So, if we sit down in an area away*

from [school name]*, no expectations, or just started talking, then it might do something good. I think it does, and I have been doing that every year since 2007. **I like doing it***, and it is not part of my job description in any way, but it **makes me feel good to watch other people have a good time***. … **I love talking, helping students outside the classroom, and just getting to know them outside the classroom, and participating in social events***.

[case: Dinners for Students with Military Background]

However, the agent's preferences are reflected in a supererogatory act to a lesser degree if learning about a supererogatory opportunity comes from receiving a request. In this case, a leeway for choosing how to perform supererogation is limited because the request for supererogation often specifies a desired approach for supererogation. For instance, one of the professors reflected on his experience of serving as a judge in student case competitions,

*I have seen more than my share of being a judge in case competitions and stuff like that, **which I don't really like very much.** But somebody needs to do it because the students are putting on a program and they need support. Somebody has to do it, so I figure I can do that.*

In a similar manner, seeing *interest* (as a trigger of attendance to a supererogatory opportunity) and *enjoyment* (as a driver of action to supererogation) is less common if the agent learned about a supererogatory opportunity from a request. In the case *Substituting Class,* the finance professor was invited by his colleague to conduct a class to his students on a Monte Carlo analysis since the colleague was not an expert on the topic. The same professor was also asked by another colleague to teach a couple of his classes. The finance professor agreed to both of them but he was not very happy about it,

My fellow that was just coming by here, he's my colleague in finance. I know how to use Monte Carlo analysis, which is an excel heading. He's an older professor, great guy, unbelievably smart in all sorts of things, but he's not the Excel wiz. I'm pretty good at Excel. He wants his kids to be able to use this tool in the laboratory to do analysis for his real estate class. He really can't do that, but I can do it for him. I can help him out and I'm going

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*to teach his class here tomorrow. I spent several hours taking this badge spreadsheet, put it in the way just for his class. … That's above and beyond the call of duty, because it's not my class and it's nothing other than … Why did I do that? He's a friend, he has been generous with his time to me. I am repaying some of the favors he's done for me with a favor I'm doing for him. … I do need to do more for a friend than for other people. That's true. But **there's no obligation.** [Interviewer: Could you have said 'no' to him?] Sure, like "I'm sorry, I'm just swamped with my own class." … I'm teaching the class. I did this last week for two sessions for another professor. … **It takes preparation. It takes a fair amount of preparation. Actually, I'm fairly stupid for doing this.** … I'll be really specific about this – after I'm done, I'm going to think it's great. Before it's happening [Interviewer: "It takes your time?"] Exactly [chuckles]. … I do know that we'll have made a difference with those students, that would be great, and the next time which I would probably end up doing this for him again, it will be easier, because I will partly prepare for it. … **Right now, I'm a little annoyed**, I've got some things.*

<div align="right">[case: Substituting Class]</div>

BENEFICIARY'S CONSENT is typically not discussed in the literature on supererogation. However, the study results point out that there are at least three important aspects of beneficiary's consent that show its essential role in supererogation and make it worth of scholarly attention. First, in many cases the performance of supererogation is contingent on the beneficiary's acceptance of the act. It would be simply impossible for the agent to perform supererogation if the potential beneficiary were not willing to participate in the act or did not accept the offered benefits.

In the case *Dinners for Students with Military Background,* students had to accept the professor's invitation and come to the dinner as, apparently, without their acceptance the supererogatory act would not have taken place. Similarly, in the case *Mindfulness Meditation,* students had to "buy" into the offer and attend mediation sessions. Even though the professor made an admired commitment to be in the room at 5 o'clock every Monday, without students

attending his mindfulness meditation, the supererogatory act would not have taken place. By a similar token, beneficiary's consent was a necessary element in making supererogation happen in many other supererogatory cases: students had to choose to come for lunch (case *Taking Students to Lunch*), scholars had to come to a conference (case *Organizing Conference*), a co-author had to choose to agree to be the first author in a manuscript (case *First Authorship*), and the junior faculty member had to accept the opportunity to go to the concert and let her children being babysat (case *Concert Tickets and Babysitting*).

Second, it should not be underestimated how important it is for the agent herself that her offer to perform supererogation is accepted by the potential beneficiary of a supererogatory act. As a matter of fact, the act of supererogation is oftentimes much needed for both the beneficiary of the act and the agent performing supererogation. Performing supererogation can be needed for the agent for many reasons: to feel gratified if performing a supererogatory act lies in the area of her passion; to relieve her pain from empathizing with those who suffer; and to come to an peace with herself if supererogatory behavior is driven by extended duty. Thus, if a potential beneficiary turns down the agent's offer, the agent might get frustrated, and even discouraged from doing supererogation in the future. People who conducted supererogatory acts mentioned,

> *If you stick out your hand to somebody asking for help and it comes back empty, that hurts. But that doesn't hurt as much, as if you seek after hand to offer help and it is not accepted. That really hurts, it hurts even more. So,* ***I like to stick out my hand offering help and having that help accepted. It is a good feeling.***
> [this respondent was mentioned by many others as a person who often does supererogation]

> *I drive back home most of the time that anybody shown up, I feel like it's been valuable. But if nobody showed up and naturally I can feel some* ***frustration*** *because it's like "Gosh! I know there are people that would benefit, but they're not showing up. What can I do?" I*

*am into 3rd year of doing this now, and I do have **frustration over the fact that we don't have more people showing up**.* [meditation] *… I do have it running in my mind moments when I say, if this doesn't get better attendance, **I may not do this again**.*

[case Mindfulness Meditation]

*It was fun, I think it was nice just to do that. … I don't know if this is selfish or whatever. … I felt like I helped, I guess **I felt less powerless in relieving their pain**. … I felt like that was something I could do, that would at least take a little bit of pressure off them. I don't know what else I could have done, it was being able to do that, it felt good for me because I just feel so bad of what they're going through.*

[case Concert Tickets and Babysitting]

Third, the value of supererogation increases if more potential beneficiaries agree to participate in the supererogatory act. The more people join mindfulness meditation sessions and the more people with a military background come to dinners, the more valuable each of the supererogatory acts become. In view of the fact that in some cases agent's supererogatory offer can be declined by literally every potential beneficiary, while in other cases agent's offer can be accepted by many people, it is important to understand what makes supererogation attractive to potential beneficiaries so they accept it.

The study findings show that when a beneficiary of a supererogatory act accepts the agent's offer, he can do it willingly or with some reservation. The beneficiary willingly participates in the supererogatory act if he sees value in the offer and the amount of agent's sacrifice is reasonable. Conversely, the beneficiary prefers not to participate in the act because he does not see much value in it or, on the contrary, the offered sacrifice on the agent's side seem to be unreasonably high, making the agent feel uncomfortable. Even then, the beneficiary may still accept the offer either because he may not want to upset the agent by turning it down or the beneficiary might be afraid that declining the offer may harm the relationship between them. In

the case *Concert Tickets and Babysitting,* the beneficiary and other respondents reading the vignettes mentioned,

> *Because of the news she emailed to check to see how we were doing. She emailed and she asked about it a couple of times, and then we had faculty picnic, at the picnic she mentioned that she had these tickets and she wanted to see if we wanted to go and I said, "No."* … ***Because I felt like asking for, it was too much to accept both the tickets and babysitting.*** *… Then I thought about it again, the next day I contacted her like, "I have changed my mind, I will go."… We also had plans to do something else that day, so we weren't sure how long does plans would go, and whether or not we would even be able to take advantage of the tickets. But then we figured we could leave other thing early to go. … [We]* ***didn't want to stay too long too*** *[at the concert]. Because again* ***she is a professor, she is not a babysitter, we didn't want to stay too long and have her babysit the kids for that long.***
>
> [case: *Concert Tickets and Babysitting*]

> *It is clear that the person went through, they paid the price of waiting in line for the tickets, they were very thoughtful of … what might need to someone else. And then they even babysat. At the same time,* ***I could imagine the person who got to go to the concert and had a night off, they might hate that music and in fact they might have enjoyed being at home with their children more but felt obliged to go because it was a senior faculty number.***
>
> [junior faculty member reflecting on the vignette
> with the case *Concert Tickets and Babysitting*]

§5.7 Reaction to Supererogation.

In the literature, the discussion of supererogation usually stops at the performance of an act. However, the study showed that the process of supererogation continues even after the completion of a supererogatory act since it involves stakeholders' reaction to supererogatory behavior which in its turn can lead to a new cycle of supererogation. We can distinguish three stakeholders whose reaction to a supererogatory act matters because it can influence whether supererogation will happen in the future: the agent, the beneficiary, and the observer.

POSITIVE REACTION. Reaction to supererogatory cases had been overall positive. The majority of agents who conducted supererogatory acts either enjoyed carrying them out or found it was worth doing them, even if they felt frustrated; most beneficiaries benefited from supererogation and felt grateful; and the majority of observers either admired supererogatory acts or were neutral about them. This is what some of the agents said,

> *I take a great pride in what I did. I didn't even think twice.*
>
> [case: Hospital Visit]

> *They* [people who know about the supererogatory act] *fall into one of two camps, they either don't care, and there is no problem, they just don't care. Then I think there are other people even though they themselves may not be coming to the session, I think they appreciate. I step up trying to help students. It's those two, I don't think anybody is against it. … As long as I'm not doing anything wacky.*
>
> [case: Mindfulness Meditation]

> *I haven't had any negative reaction yet* [from other people]*, all the feedback I have had has been positive. … He* [the beneficiary] *said they made him cry and they really touched him* [thank you notes form students and a birthday video]. *I thought when people make gifts, they get a nice little letter from Dean and the engagement* [office]*, but those don't make people cry.*
>
> [case: Thanking Course Sponsor]

> *I think they* [other people] *felt that was good.*
>
> [case: Mentoring Junior Colleague]

Most beneficiaries of supererogatory acts also had quite a positive attitude toward the act and the agents who helped them,

> *One professor told me that he gave a memory block* [tears in her eyes; voice starts trembling] *at the Wolf Education legacy walk. Because "I still remember you telling me that your husband liked wolves" and he said "I thought that would be great memory of his name, will be out at legacy walk." And that just struck me. I said I was blown away by that* [again tears and softened voice].
>
> [case: Thoughtful Tribute]

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My epithet, my eulogy [about the agent] *is going to be five words long, and "**he was a nice guy**." I can quit there, I have done my job.*

[another case on mentoring a junior colleague]

She's [the agent] *just a nice person, I think **she is just a nice person**.*

[case: Concert Tickets and Babysitting]

Most observers of supererogatory behavior confirmed the positive reaction to supererogation that was perceived by the agents,

*I just thought **it was great, I was inspired, I admired** a lot, I admired her commitment. She showed a commitment to somebody at a vulnerable time.*

[case: Mentoring Junior Colleague]

***I was thrilled**, I thought "Wow, that's something!"*

[case: Hospital Visit]

*Our Dean stepped in to teach one semester. … There was no expectations that he should teach. We were really kind of stuck and he did that and I thought **that was pretty amazing**. … Somebody got sick and he ended up stepping up to teach. … He stepped up to do that in a way, **I felt it was great**.*

MIXED REACTION. Though supererogation, on balance, was positively perceived, there were several supererogatory cases which received a mixed reaction (a mixture of negative positive attitudes). This phenomenon – a mixed reaction to the behavior which is morally praiseworthy – requires a deeper investigation since it can potentially, if not understood properly, weaken people's positive attitude toward supererogatory behavior and negatively affect the occurrence of supererogation in the future. The roots of a mixed reaction differed among the agents, the beneficiaries, and the observers, so the reaction of each stakeholder group will be analyzed separately. A mixed reaction of the beneficiaries of supererogatory acts has

already been discussed in the section §5.6 on beneficiary's consent. In what follows, a mixed reaction to supererogation coming from the agent herself and from the observers of supererogatory acts will be discussed.

An Agent's Perspective. The study showed that agent's response to a supererogatory act can differ before and after conducting the act. Once supererogation has been carried out, the agent may examine her experience performing supererogation and recalibrate her attitude to it. This could happen because i) the agent might initially underestimate her required involvement in performing supererogation, and/or ii) the agent might overestimate the goodness of the outcome of her supererogatory act. In both cases, the agent can give a different interpretation or meaning to her actual supererogatory experience compared to what she initially expected.

> *I thought I was helping through a short-term situation that **turned out to be a much longer-term situation**. … That became **very emotionally draining on me**. … [The beneficiary] potentially maybe became too dependent, just to some crossing. I'm sure the blame is on both sides of expectations or what was not there. … Let's just say **it was a really difficult situation**. I think in doing the same thing in another circumstance could have ended differently and better.*
>
> [case: Emotional Support]

> *At times you can get **burnt out and feel like 'Why am I may be doing this** if no one cares?'.*

A Perspective of Beneficiaries and Observers. Supererogation is less appreciated by the observers if they think that the act has been primarily done from the agent's perspective, rather than through the lens of the beneficiary. If the agent behaves supererogatorily toward the beneficiary, but does it from her own understanding of the beneficiary's good, then it may not be much appreciated. When discussing vignettes of supererogatory cases collected in business schools, some respondents mentioned,

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*Mindfulness one strikes me as less about going above and beyond the duty … in the sense that **this person felt like it was important to get other people to do what he was doing.***
[reflecting on the case *Mindfulness Meditation*]

*I suppose it is **going beyond duty narrowly considered**. So, someone invites some neighbors into the church, because they hope that they will enjoy the summons or whatever. I suppose that's going beyond duty, it **depends on what the person wants to receive** in that. … I mean the gesture is very nice. … Suppose somebody invites people to attend their church, maybe these people are depressed or whatever. It is a nice gesture, but maybe a person doesn't want to go. **They don't want to go to church** or whatever.*
[reflecting on the case *Dinners for Students with Military Background*]

*That was a nice gesture though it is **a little bit odd in the sense of the source and the trouble** of the hurricane affecting relatives. What was done for them* [parents] *was allowed concert without the kids, and the kids will be babysat. So that was a nice gesture. **If they were returning to a flood damaged house or relatives, but it doesn't necessarily remedy that particular situation**. … The source of the problem is – let's say flood damage, presumably relatives weren't that affected, and so it was nice to give the parents an opportunity for some escapism. **But the reality was unchanged. It wasn't "let's go down to Houston or to Tampa and work and rebuild the house or whatever".** So, it was a nice gesture. … **The gesture is nice but does this sort of address the problem?** If someone is hungry, and you give somebody else food, they just killed a deer. Then if that person is vegetarian, **they made a nice gesture, but it doesn't really address the issues**.*
[reflecting on the case *Concert Tickets and Babysitting*]

Some people can even be critical of supererogation if it is viewed as distraction from the agent's main responsibilities. This criticism applies equally to junior and senior faculty members. When it comes to junior faculty members, in many business schools they are expected to be active in research, be a good teacher, and contribute to service. If performing supererogation is perceived as happening at the expense of the agents' main responsibilities, then others may not properly appreciate that supererogatory behavior.

*I hope it's not **distracting him from what he needs to do to stick around**.*
[reflecting on a junior faculty member attending public dialogue sessions]

They get pulled back in*. *It's a delicate balance for them.

<div align="right">[reflecting on junior faculty members who do "too much" service]</div>

When it comes to senior faculty members, many of them have additional administrative/managerial responsibilities. And If managers do a lot of supererogation outside their administrative responsibilities, it can deprive others of much needed managerial attention to different organizational problems. Some respondents shared a situation with the Dean who stepped up to teach a course when a faculty member got sick. However, Dean's volunteering created a number of problems for the school, as he became less available for others and this paralyzed many on-going activities. One may perceive Dean's volunteering as the unintentional evasion of his direct responsibilities:

> *The trade-off can happen if you have senior people stepping in. Sometimes it might be better if they found somebody else to step in. Because if you're an administrator, maybe being strategic and recognizing that this problem needs to be solved, **but if I'm the one who solves this problem then what's going to get compromised**. … So, it's like mixed reaction. … If you're putting yourself in to be a player then you're going to be too exhausted to kind of do something. … When people are stretched then and step in and there's not kind of an institutional structured cover, other important areas that can sometimes be just some trade-offs involved in there. … We have people that kind of go and above and beyond what their jobs are, but it … can be potentially institutionally damaging. … If you had somebody who steps in to teach a class without maybe thinking through what the implications are to be, of the other, of that person's other responsibilities. If I teach a class and really that means I can't do X Y and Z which are important. … I don't think there's much thoughtful reflection of the collateral, some of the second-order effects of what they do. … I think different people have different … bias for action. So, rather than thinking about it all day, let me just do this. I think if someone an expedient view what's the quickest way I can get this pain to go away – this is the quickest way to get this pain to go away. … I want to solve this problem and go to the next thing. So I think sometimes bias for action is positive I think. It gets to be expedience that can be overriding recognition of trade-offs, the organizational costs of the extra effort might not be weighed as they could be.*

<div align="right">[reflecting on the Dean stepping up to substitute a course]</div>

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Finally, an initially positive reaction to a supererogatory act may change to negative when supererogatory behavior is used to set the bar for others, so other people in the organization would be expected to behave in a similar supererogatory way.

> *If I were a new, young faculty member trying to get tenure, trying to do all those things I have to do. If someone said to me "**Why can't you do something like what she did?**". … If someone put that expectation on them, **I can see how that can be negative.**
> [reflecting on the case Thanking Course Sponsor]*

§5.8 Calculative Mindset is Uncommon for Supererogation in Academia.

When launching the study on supererogation, the researcher initially expected to find that some portion of supererogatory acts would be driven by a calculative mindset when an agent's behavior is driven by an instrumental reasoning in the pursuit of personal gains (Wang, Zhong, & Murnighan, 2014).

However, a calculative approach to supererogation was not much common in the supererogatory stories shared by the respondents. This could be explained by the specifics of working in academia. First, business schools are low-hierarchical organizations where professors have a somewhat nebulous reporting line. Though faculty members' performance is evaluated once per year, there is no boss who would manage professor's work on a daily basis. Faculty members are more likely to be independent self-contractors who manage their work on their own. This makes calculative considerations in academia less relevant compared to business organizations since in academia there is no closely-situated boss that an agent would need to impress with her supererogation to receive quick benefits. As some of the respondents mentioned,

I do think for the faculty is a really different world, whereas if you are in a standard company or you work at the restaurant, or you work at the hospital – I think in those environments … the hierarchy and the management of labor are far more complicated than for a faculty member.

In addition, an institute of tenure in academia further reduces the need for an agent to "show off" in front of her boss. Tenured faculty members feel much more secure compared to employees in other industries, and if they go beyond duty, it is unlikely to be due to calculative reasons of self-preservation and/or self-promotion.

*It's faculty, **I don't have a boss**, I don't report to anybody. It's true the Dean can withhold my salary increase, he can make my life pretty miserable in certain ways if I deserve it. But in several ways **he can't fire me**, unless I do something egregious, probably something that's illegal. But I don't report to anybody.*

Second, in many business schools, faculty's work schedule is quite flexible as there is no need for professors to be at their workplace if they do not teach at that time. Hence, the level of socializing among faculty members is limited. The study showed that the majority of supererogatory stories shared by participants were known only to a small handful of people in the business schools. As a result, limited socializing among colleagues does not prompt much the calculative thinking of doing supererogation to impress colleagues and increase own reputation. As some of the faculty members mentioned,

*Some of the things you got **nobody else knows**. We're talking about it, **nobody else knows what I'm doing, really**.*

*As a faculty member I tend to be in many respects a kind **of a lone wolf**. I teach my courses the way I want to teach them, I work on research that I want to work on. It turns out I'm not currently involved in co-research with anybody in* [school name] *right now. I don't supervise anybody either.*

*Professors and faculty are, they are **specialized group, many of whom may not be that close to see who goes beyond and above the duty***.

*There are **not a lot of interpersonal stuff**, in a way. **We are all like independent contractors**. Faculty that makes you really different than when you are in an organization where everybody is not an independent contractor. They are **working laterally, horizontally**. … In the faculty world it is not, I'm not saying there is none of that, but there's **not as much of it**, at least that's my perception.*

The absence of a closely-situated supervisor and limited socializing practices in academia significantly reduce the need for going beyond duty out of a calculative mindset. That is why other drivers of action – such as enjoyment, compassion, and extended duty – are much more salient than calculative thinking in performing supererogation in academia.

Chapter 6. Affectual Theory of Supererogation

and Contributions to Scholarship and Practice

§6.1 Affectual Theory of Supererogation

The study findings provide the basis for the development of affectual theory of supererogation presented in this section. The proposed affectual theory of supererogation delineates the process of supererogation, comprising six stages, and explains what makes the agent progress through each of them, so eventually a supererogatory opportunity converts into a supererogatory act.

The process of supererogation spans much farther than the act itself. In brief, the process starts from agent's *learning* about a supererogatory *opportunit*y which happens through either *agent-based* learning or *request-based* learning. Then, the performance of the supererogatory act largely depends on the agent's *affectual response* to the supererogatory opportunity which consists of two components: first, *attending* to the supererogatory opportunity and then *willing* to act upon on it. The performance of supererogation is moderated by agent's *capacities.* The process ends with the reaction to the supererogatory act. The reaction of the agent as well as the reaction of the beneficiary and the observers may influence agent's affectual response to a subsequent supererogatory opportunity determining whether the cycle of supererogation can go on. The model in Figure 3 is a simplified representation of affectual theory of supererogation.

The model depicts the triggers of attendance and the drivers of action as being sequential to each other, but being in proximal vicinity between themselves. The graphical proximity between the triggers of attendance and the drivers of action represents not only their belonging

to an affectual response, but also the fact that the transition from one to anther may often evolve within a blink of a second.

Figure 3. The model illustrating affectual theory of supererogation.

The model illustrating affectual theory of supererogation traces all stages of the agent's involvement in the process of supererogation. The model is agent-based since it is designed from the agent's perspective. Though the specifics of the process of supererogation are such that the last two stages also include actions made by other stakeholders – the stage *Performing Supererogatory Act* covers beneficiary's consent to participate in the act and the stage *Reacting to Supererogatory Act* considers reactions of beneficiaries and observers, – the involvement of other stakeholders in the process of supererogation is provided through the prism of the agent's interpretation. In other words, the agent interprets the receipt of the beneficiary's consent and

his reaction to supererogation, and agent's interpretations can make the agent adjust the performance of her current supererogatory act and/or her supererogatory behavior in the future.

In what follows, affectual theory of supererogation is explained in more detail. The performance of supererogation is largely dependent on agent's feelings aroused during her affectual response and displayed throughout the process of supererogation. The theory is built around the idea that emotions, or affects, play a major role in supererogation and this is reflected in the name of the theory.

In the psychology literature, affect is the concept used to describe the experience of emotions which can both precede and follow cognitive processes in an individual (Lerner & Keltber, 2000). More specifically, affect is a component of an emotion that provides "a characteristic feeling" for that emotion (Zagzebski, 2017: 33). In affectual theory of supererogation, the decisive role in the process of supererogation is played by agent's affectual response which denotes an agent's expression of feelings about a supererogatory opportunity after learning about it. If one's affectual response is low, an individual is likely to ignore the supererogatory opportunity. Conversely, a strong affectual response leads to the performance of supererogation.

Based on the study results, affectual theory of supererogation distinguishes two stages of an affectual response: first, the agent has to *attend* to a supererogatory opportunity and second, the agent has to become *willing* to act supererogatorily. The *attendance* part in an affectual response does not emerge out of nowhere – there should be some stimulus in the supererogatory opportunity that would make the agent relate to it. There should be something in the supererogatory opportunity that would resonate with the agent making her *attend* to the

supererogatory opportunity. In other words, there is an element of specificity in supererogation (see triggers of attendance discussed further) as its performance is dependent on the activation of the *relatedness* link between the specifics of an individual and the specifics of the circumstances. This relatedness to the situation through the triggers of attendance makes people attend to supererogatory opportunities. The study identified *three triggers of attendance*: interest, similar experience, and affinity by values.

Interest makes the agent relate to the supererogatory opportunity if the opportunity lies in the area of the agent's hobbies, interests, or passions. Looking at the supererogatory opportunity through the lens of *interest* makes the agent see it as interesting, enjoyable, and gratifying. In many supererogatory cases, agent's interests, hobbies, and passions were important to her.

Similar experience prompts the agent to attend to the supererogatory opportunity by recognizing similarities between the beneficiary's struggles and her own experience in her past. Similar experience may stem from sharing with the beneficiary the same social or cultural background, remembering similar difficulties in the past and how someone's help was much needed and appreciated.

Affinity by values propels the agent to relate to the supererogatory opportunity through affiliating herself with the beneficiary or the event via belonging to the same social group through friendship, classroom, organization, or gathering, and through holding to the values that are important to the agent. Each of these triggers of attendance – *interest, similar experience,* and *affinity by values* – is sufficient in and by itself to make the agent attend to the opportunity. At

the same time, it is also common to observe the combination of any two triggers of attendance or even all three of them.

According to affectual theory of supererogation, the attendance to the supererogatory opportunity does not warrant the performance of supererogation per se. It is when the second part of the affectual response – *the three drivers of action* – comes into play that an agent develops volition to conduct a supererogation act. The first driver of action is *enjoyment* that the agent anticipates from conducting certain supererogatory acts. Put simply, the agent derives enjoyment from doing whatever constitutes the act itself and finds this activity gratifying. She may even be passionate about the activity finding it inherently rewarding because, as one of the respondents mentioned, it is "the way one's wired". Driven by enjoyment, the agent can consider the supererogatory act as absolutely fun, feel excited about it and eagerly look forward to carrying it out. She can get a sense of well-being from performing supererogation that is enjoyable to her.

The second driver of action is *compassion.* The study showed that some people are more attuned to the suffering of others. They feel bad for others' pain, empathize with others and feel sympathy for somebody's misfortune. But they are not just passive observers: agents driven by compassion are also willing to act upon the situation to alleviate someone else's suffering. They feel connected to other humans and have a sense of when people are in need of help. The study also showed that people high on compassion can also be characterized as very emotional.

The third driver of action is *extended duty.* The duty is called extended because what is seen as duty by an agent in a supererogatory act, is not seen as such by the majority of people, including the beneficiaries and the observers. The agents whose supererogatory doing was driven

by extended duty did not see their behavior as going above and beyond and often thought that another individual would have done the same thing in a similar situation. When a chance comes up and others do not behave in a similar supererogatory way, the persons driven by extended duty would feel that they were positioned better than others, due to specific circumstances, to perform supererogation. Those with extended duty feel an urge to act due to their unique understanding of the situation since they see obligation where others do not see it. Each of the drivers of action can be sufficient on its own to make the agent be willing to act. At the same time, the combinations of any two, or even all three drivers of action are also common in supererogation.

There are no exclusive links between particular triggers of attendance and drivers of action. However, some triggers and drivers are more likely to work in pairs. In particular, attending to a supererogatory opportunity out of *interest* often finds its continuation in *enjoyment; similar experience* often turns into *compassion*; and *association* often converts into *extended duty.* Other links between triggers of attention and drivers of action are less common, but are also possible.

Though grounding supererogation in individuals' affects, affectual theory of supererogation does not necessarily point to a view that some people have permanent traits that make them more supererogatorily. Even though people who performed supererogation were primarily driven by emotions (i.e., drivers of action: anticipating *enjoyment,* experiencing *empathy,* and feeling *extending duty)*, those emotions were not permanently characterizing the agents, but were rather affectual responses to specific situations. The specifics of those situations resonated with the agents through the triggers of attendance (*interests, similar background,* and

affinity by values) that made the agents *attend* to supererogatory opportunities. In the situations, where agent's *attendance* was not triggered by *interests, similar background, and affinity by values,* the agent would not experience the same emotions. This shows that we should not talk about supererogatory traits, but rather consider agent's affects triggered by specific situations. This conclusion is supported by some scholars who believe that "actions beyond the call of duty are very often performed on an impulse, with no prior deliberation, and are not necessarily the expression of a stable inclination, firm character, a consistent life plan, or a behavioral policy" (Heyd, 2015: 34).

In affectual theory of supererogation, the relationship between the agent's affectual response and potential supererogatory behavior is moderated by agent's *capacities* which consist of bandwidth, capabilities fit, and emotional fit. In terms of *bandwidth*, the agent will be able to perform supererogation only if the availability is not constrained by competing demands such as family commitments or tenure pressure. If the agent is extremely busy with fulfilling other commitments and all her efforts are directed toward mainly keeping her head above water, then there is no room left for supererogatory behavior. If the agent's current responsibilities are very demanding, then she may not be able to cross the line of duty to go beyond it.

The second moderator of the relationship between the affectual response and supererogatory behavior is agent's *capability fit*. The performance of some supererogatory acts requires certain skills. Without knowing how to do it, the agent may simply not be capable of going beyond duty. In some cases of supererogation, the agent may lack a required experience or a necessary skill to perform it. Among other things, the capability fit also includes the ability to multitask which to a certain degree helps overcome the bandwidth limitations – it is much

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easier to go beyond duty for people who are capable of doing several things simultaneously, so they are less constrained by different competing demands.

The third moderator is *emotional fit.* The agent may not be able to go beyond duty because even complying with duties can be hard for her due to *emotional distress*. In order to perform supererogation, the agent needs to be satisfied with the personal status quo and experience emotional stability (Hills & Argyle, 2001). Otherwise, when the agent feels stressed out, overwhelmed, or insecure due to some problems in her life, supererogation does not get to the front line of her attention. Other elements influencing agent's emotional fit include: fearing the performance of a particular supererogatory act per se as some attributes of the act may make the agent feel uncomfortable; not keeping personal ambition within healthy boundaries so, as a result, over-ambitiousness prevents her from helping others since others' success is perceived as a threat to her own success; and feeling critical of the underlying idea of supererogation in particular situations.

According to affectual theory of supererogation, if all previous stages of the process of supererogation – *learning* about a supererogatory opportunity, *attending* to it, *willing* to act on it, and *possessing* necessary capacities – have been accomplished, then an agent conducts a supererogatory act. The main categories and types of supererogation have been described in detail in section §5.1 in the taxonomy of supererogation in academia. In addition, there are also two components of supererogatory behavior that are stipulated by affectual theory of supererogation as important to supererogatory act: one of them is essential to supererogation to take place, and the other one explains why certain supererogatory acts are carried in a certain way and not in the other.

The first component is *beneficiary's consent*. In fact, the existence of many supererogatory acts is contingent on the beneficiary's willingness to participate in the act or to accept benefits of the act. Without beneficiary's willingness to cooperate with the agent, the process of supererogation will not get complete and lots of supererogatory opportunities will not convert into supererogatory acts. Apart from being important for the performance of supererogation overall, beneficiary's cooperation is also important for the agent herself because it helps the agent derive gratification from the act itself. In addition, the number of consented beneficiaries also matters since the more beneficiaries accept an agent's offer and get involved in an act, the more value is generated by the supererogatory act. Another aspect to consider is that beneficiaries can cooperate with the agent willingly or unwillingly depending on their attitude to the act. The beneficiary's attitude toward an offered supererogatory act could be unfavorable, if he does not see much value in it or, on the contrary, he considers the offered sacrifice on the agent's side too much to accept. Even if the attitude is unfavorable, the agent can still unwillingly accept the agent's offer because the beneficiary may not want to harm his relationship with the agent.

The second component of supererogatory behavior is *agent's preferences.* The study showed that agent's likes and dislikes largely influence agent's approach to conducting a supererogatory act. The study showed that an agent often performs a supererogation act in a way that is congruent with agent's preferences. Here, it makes sense to look one more time at the beginning of the process of supererogation since the way *learning* about the supererogatory opportunity has happened largely affects how the agent conducts a supererogatory act. If it is a *request-driven* learning*,* then the agent has less freedom in choosing an approach to perform

supererogation and subsequently derives less enjoyment from it. This is because a request to conduct a supererogatory act often predetermines for the agent the way the act should be carried act out. In case of *agent-driven* learning, the agent has more freedom in choosing an approach to supererogation, so she carries it out in a way more enjoyable to her.

The salience of agent's preferences in the process of supererogation can also be seen in the fact that it is much easier to perform supererogation when supererogatory behavior is related to agent's likes, passions, and interests. Thus, among the three drivers of action, *enjoyment* is the easiest to follow, whereas it is much harder to behave supererogatorily out of *compassion* and *extended duty* as those may not be in the agent's core interests, core capabilities, and core passions.

In affectual theory of supererogation, the process of supererogation ends with reaction to a supererogatory act. Though the reaction to the supererogatory act is not by itself a part of the act, the reaction does become an integral part of the process of supererogation when we account for its impact on agent's affectual response to a supererogatory opportunity in the future. Affectual response is influenced by both agent's own reaction to her supererogatory act and the reaction of other stakeholders in the act.

On balance, the reaction to supererogation is positive among all stakeholders of supererogation. Agents often find their performance of supererogation gratifying for them and are often proud of having done the act, whilst beneficiaries and observers appreciate supererogatory acts, and even admirer them. They are often touched by supererogatory behavior and explicitly emphasize the benevolence of the agent considering her a "nice" (i.e., benevolent) person. The beneficiaries and observers of supererogation may be so affected by the

act that it pushes them to seriously consider taking up the role of an agent in subsequent supererogatory opportunities.

In some cases, though, stakeholder can have a mixed reaction to supererogation. When it comes to agents, there are two reasons why they may not find their supererogatory behavior gratifying for them. First, an agent can underestimate required efforts for performing supererogation and, as a result, get burnt out in the process or even become emotionally drained. Second, an agent may initially overestimate the goodness of her supererogatory act and, consequently, become feeling frustrated that potential beneficiaries did not accept it. When it comes to observers of supererogation, there are two different reasons why they may not appreciate the supererogatory act. First, they may look at agent's supererogatory behavior critically if they perceive that she was acting primarily from her own understanding of the beneficiary's good, which may not coincide with the understanding on the part of the beneficiary and, thus, be less or not valuable to him. Second, observers of supererogatory behavior, especially those in senior roles, may feel critical of supererogation in their organizations if they perceive it as distracting agents from their main responsibilities.

In sum, affectual theory of supererogation shows that the process of supererogation is more complex than it is typically discussed in the literature. The process has six stages and each stage has a few components and altogether they define whether and how a supererogatory act will be carried out. The theory also demonstrates that emotions play the pivotal role in the process of supererogation, starting from an affectual response, followed by an approach to a supererogatory act, and ending with a reaction to it.

§6.2 Contributions to Scholarship on Supererogation

A number of contributions that affectual theory of supererogation makes to the literature on supererogation can be grouped into three buckets: 1) specifying the domain of supererogation by developing the taxonomy of supererogatory acts in academia; 2) discarding a fact-based understanding of supererogation and instead introducing a process-based view of supererogation; and 3) showing the pivotal role played by emotions in supererogatory behaviors.

SPECIFYING THE DOMAIN OF SUPEREROGATION. The conducted study allowed to create the taxonomy of supererogatory act in academia (see Table 2 in §5.1 and Table 3 in Appendix 4). The created taxonomy contributes to the literature on supererogation in several ways. First, the broad (n=83) and narrow (n=27) collections of real-life supererogatory acts in academia provide rich clinical data for scholars exploring supererogation. Until now, most conceptual research on supererogation was based on several supererogatory stories that were either made-up by the authors themselves or taken from literature (see Appendix 1). The collected supererogatory cases, especially the narrow collection (see Appendix 3) that has been based on the narratives of the agents who conducted supererogatory cases themselves, can catalyze new scholarship on supererogation that would be based on the collected rich clinical data.

Second, the created taxonomy of supererogation confirms some of the categories defined in the literature, questions others, and expands the list of known supererogatory categories. In particular, four categories of supererogatory acts, which have been discussed in the literature, have been confirmed by the study: Favors, Volunteering, Beneficence, and Forbearances. Three categories – Saintliness and Heroism, and Forgiveness – were not supported by any collected data from the study in organizations. This could potentially be explained by the fact that the

supererogatory behaviors of saints and heroes involve an extraordinary sacrifice from them, whereas the specifics of work environment in business schools does not provide many occasions where such sacrifices could be displayed. Differently from battle fields in the military and life-threatening epidemics in medicine, professors and staff in business schools do not have situations with large sacrifices at stake. When it comes to forgiveness, the study participants did not seem to realize that forgiving could be considered supererogatory. Finally, two more supererogatory categories have been identified – Ownership and Gratitude – thus expanding the scope for research on supererogation.

REPLACING A FACT-BASED UNDERSTANDING OF SUPEREROGATION WITH A PROCESS-BASED VIEW ON SUPEREROGATION. In the literature on supererogation, supererogatory cases are described in a *simple* way. These accounts do not mean to suggest that supererogation is easy to do – on the contrary, in many supererogatory cases discussed in the literature, supererogation is described as something admirable because it is hard to carry out. What is meant by *simplistic* understanding of supererogation is that supererogatory cases are typically depicted as being easy to comprehend. The process itself has rarely, if ever, been discussed. Rather, supererogation has been typically stated as a fact corresponding to a conducted action of going beyond duty in a morally praiseworthy way (see Appendix 1 for examples). Then the fact has been examined in terms of whether the act behind it can be qualified as supererogatory (Heyd, 1982; Mellema, 1991a) or whether it can be linked to other related concepts (Cavazos, Rutherford, & Berman, 2017). However, the comprehension that supererogation is quite a complex process and an agent has to go through many stages in order make supererogation happen is lacking in the literature on supererogation.

Based on the qualitative study involving many participants in organizations, affectual theory of supererogation shows that the current understanding of supererogation in the literature is over-simplistic and we need to look closely at the process rather than take it as a fact. To conduct a supererogatory act, an agent has to go through six stages and a failure on each of them can prevent supererogatory behavior from happening.

EMOTIONS PLAY THE PIVOTAL ROLE IN SUPEREROGATION. Until today, most of the scholarly work on the phenomenon of supererogation has been done in philosophy. The philosophy literature on supererogation primarily focuses on the four main areas: defining what acts qualify as supererogatory, examining the scope of supererogation, elaborating on its demarcation with duty, and analyzing the compatibility of supererogation with major moral theories (see Chapter 1). However, philosophers, in their writings on supererogation, mostly preoccupied themselves with analyzing supererogatory acts per se, without paying proper attention to the inner world of individuals who actually perform supererogation. In the most comprehensive work on supererogation that has largely influenced the exploration of supererogation until nowadays, Heyd mentions that "supererogation is primarily an attribute of acts or action (rather than persons, traits of character, emotions, intentions, or states of affairs)" (Heyd, 1982: 115).

However, affectual theory of supererogation argues that narrowing down a discussion on supererogation strictly to an act and ignoring the processes going inside the agent hold a larger portion of the phenomenon of supererogation unexplored. The characteristics of an agent play an enormous role in supererogation as it is the agent who reacts, who decides, and who conducts a supererogatory act. Thus, without understanding the agent, we can commit ourselves to only

defining and classifying supererogatory behaviors, rather than understanding the original causes of supererogation and how to make it more.

The study shows that personal characteristics of the agent, especially her emotions, play a pivotal role in supererogation. An agent's affectual response to a supererogatory opportunity largely determines whether supererogation takes or does not take place. It is highly likely that positive emotions are a single most important factor in performing supererogation.

For supererogation to happen, it is crucial that the agent's learning about a supererogatory opportunity is further elevated by a positive affectual response that propels her to conduct a supererogatory act. The affectual response consists of two stages: *attending* to a supererogatory opportunity and *willing* to act upon it. The evoked triggers of attendance – interests, similar experience, and association – make the agent *feel related* to the supererogatory opportunity so that the agent *attends* to it. The attendance to the supererogatory opportunity induces the drivers of action – enjoyment, empathy, and extended duty – and this is when the agent becomes determined to conduct a supererogatory act.

Affectual response to a supererogatory opportunity is the essential part of the affectual theory of supererogation and it points out to supererogation being largely emotion-laded. Emotions play the primary role in an individual's motivation to perform supererogation. When the agent reacts to the triggers of attendance, she does it through emotions – by feeling either enjoyment, or compassion, or extended duty, or a combination of the three.

Recognizing enjoyment and compassion as emotions, one may argue that when it comes to extended duty it is more about being rational than emotional. The same critic would refer to Kant's deontology where duty is determined through mental deliberation. However, what is

missing in the critic's challenge is that *extended duty* is different from *duty* in that the former is an exaggerated understanding of one's duty. Extended duty happens when an individual sees obligation where the majority of people do not see it. If extended duty had been rational, then the agent would have rationally realized that it is not her duty to conduct a particular supererogatory act. Believing otherwise stems from an agent's *feeling* of duty rather than from her mental deliberation. It is individual's emotions that make her see duty where there is no such. Another way to describe extended duty is to say that the agent *feels* duty where there is no such an obligation in place.

By linking supererogation to an agent, in particular to her emotions, affectual theory of supererogation brings supererogation back to its origins. In his seminal work *Saints and Heroes,* Urmson believed that supererogation is an attribute of an agent rather than an act and defined supererogation primarily through the agent with the act-driven definition being secondary. And even Heyd, who was influential in narrowing down the definition of supererogation solely to an act, pondered a question, "[t]he relation between supererogation and virtue raises the problem of the agent of the act in question. Is there any necessary correlation between acting supererogatorily and having a special personality trait?" (Heyd, 1982: 7). Affectual theory of supererogation demonstrates that supererogation is primarily an attribute of an agent whose personal inclinations, background, and beliefs get expressed in her affectual response that determines whether supererogation takes or does not take place.

§6.3 Contributions to Scholarship on Moral Behavior.

Supererogation is part of the moral domain, so affectual theory of supererogation contributes not only to the literature on supererogation, but it also taps into the literature on moral decision-making. It contributes to the literature by demonstrating that moral behavior is largely driven by positive emotions, and showing that the role of duty in moral behavior is overestimated.

POSITIVE EMOTIONS PLAY A MAJOR ROLE IN MORAL BEHAVIOR. Until now, the body of management literature on moral behavior in organizations had largely been developed by the scholars belonging to one of the two camps: cognition-centered or emotion-centered.

A Cognitive Perspective on Moral Behavior. The cognition-centered scholarship, which hosts under its umbrella the majority of researchers working on moral behaviors in organizations, has been influenced by the seminal works on moral cognition developed by such prominent psychologists as Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg (1976). Since then, the field of moral psychology has been dominated by a cognition-centered approach to moral behavior (Haidt, 2012).

The dominance of a cognition-driven approach in moral psychology largely influenced business ethics scholars whose works on moral dilemmas in organizations has been predominantly written from a cognitive perspective. For instance, the influential person-situation interactionist model (Treviño, 1986), that has been developed to explain ethical decision making in organizations, is primarily based on Kohlberg's stages of cognitive moral development of individuals. Another influential model in business ethics that brought to light the importance of considering moral intensity of an issue itself – an issue-contingent model of ethical decision making by individuals in organizations (Jones, 1991) – has also been cognition-driven. The latter,

an issue-contingent model, synthesized the advancements of other previously developed cognition-centered models of ethical decision making in organizations.

From a cognitive perspective, moral decision making in organizations has four sequential cognitive stages: recognizing moral issues (also known as moral awareness), making moral judgement, establishing moral intent, and engaging in moral behavior (O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). An outsider to the scholarship on moral decision making, when considering the names of the stages, may mistakenly assume that they encompass both cognitive and emotional processes in an individual. However, these four stages have been defined in the literature from a solely cognitive perspective:

> [M]oral awareness – being able to interpret the situation as being moral; moral judgment – deciding which course of action is morally right; moral intent – prioritizing moral values over other values; and, moral behavior – executing and implementing the moral intention. (O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005)

Since influential conceptual scholarly works on ethical decision making in organizations were predominantly developed from a cognitive perspective (Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; Jones, 1991; Hunt & Vitell, 1986; Rest, 1986; Trevino, 1986), the cognition-centered approach to moral behaviors in organizations also dominated the landscape of empirical research on the subject. The reviews of hundreds empirical studies on ethical decision making in business (Loe, Ferrell, & Mansfield, 2000; O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005) showed that for their dependent variables scholars mainly chose to test cognition-related concepts (such as moral awareness, moral development, moral philosophy, moral judgement, moral intent) that were shown to be influenced by individual's demographics, job characteristics, organizational environment, and issue-specific

considerations. However, the role of emotions in ethical behaviors in organizations has been largely left unexplored.

An Emotion-Centered Perspective on Moral Behavior. The scholars belonging to the second camp believe that ethical behaviors are primarily driven by emotions. This view perpetuates that morality is based on innate receptors, the so called moral foundations (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004, 2007), and a characteristic emotion arouses when a corresponding moral foundation is strongly activated. Emotions are also considered to mediate the relationship between the established norms and actual ethical behavior (Schwartz & Howard, 1981). Emotions move us, they motivate us to take action (Zagzebski, 2017: 33) and, being rapid information processing-systems, emotions often make us act quickly (Tooby & Cosmides, 2008).

However, the mainstream research in the emotion-centered scholarship attributed ethical behavior mainly to negative moral emotions: feelings of guilt and shame can help people activate personal and social norms (Matthies, Klockner, & Preissner, 2006), anger can promote constructive conversations and needed change (Geddes, Callister, & Gibson, 2018), fear is helpful in sustaining respect to authority (Haidt, 2012) just as sensitivity to other's fear is found to be a marker for altruism (Marsh, 2017), disgust helps preserve sanctity and avoid degradation (Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997), rage at traitors contributes to loyalty (Haidt, 2012), and resentment to inequality and coercion promotes liberty and helps fight oppression (Haidt, 2012). As a reflection of the trend, top organizational behavior journals called for more research on positive effects of negative emotions and negative effects of positive emotions (Lindebaum & Jordan, 2012).

Looking at Moral Behaviors through the Lens of Positive Emotions. Without refuting an important role of negative emotions in ethical behavior, we believe that the emphasis on them in the contemporary scholarship is disproportionally large. The over-emphasis on negative emotions has been admitted by psychologists themselves: "[t]he most dramatic feature … is that research on negative moral emotions is 15 times more common than research on positives" (Haidt & Morris, 2009). The analysis of PsycINFO database shows that blameworthy emotions such as guilt, shame, anger, disgust, and contempt were explored in about 7,000 articles, while praiseworthy emotions such as pride, self-satisfaction, gratitude, admiration and elevation were the subject of scholarly research only in about 400 publications (Haidt & Morris, 2009).

Affectual theory of supererogation balances the emotion-centered landscape by looking at moral behaviors from a lens of positive emotions. In doing so, affectual theory of supererogation contributes to the Positive Organizational Scholarship that studies positive attributes and outcomes of organizational members (Cameron, Dutton, and Quinn, 2003). By exploring the positive role of such positive emotions as enjoyment, compassion, and extended duty, affectual theory of supererogation stresses that positive emotions have a tremendous impact on individual's moral behavior.

<u>Enjoyment.</u> People often behave ethically not due to guilt, shame, fear or anger, but simply because they *enjoy* expressing themselves in that way. It happens to be that what they enjoy doing is also considered ethical. Behaving morally out of enjoyment is akin to the postulates of virtue ethics where moral actions are done out of internal predispositions (Aristotle, 1999; Solomon, 1993). For instance, some faculty members enjoy teaching and they do it really well, even though they work in research-focused institutions that do not require high teaching

standards. Faculty's passion for teaching happens to be in line with agent's moral norms inherent in helping others (e.g., helping students have better lives and also because students deserve to be taught well).

Compassion. Though compassion has been extensively researched in moral psychology (Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010), it received limited consideration in the management theory literature which "can be mostly measured in a matter of month" (Solomon, 1998). Although compassion was at the very core of Adam Smith's writings, it did not receive a proper attention among economists whose views on capitalism were mistakenly influenced (Werhane, 1991) by a separate reading of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (1776), in isolation from his *Theory of the Moral Sentiments* (1759). However, recent advancements in the management literature (Rynes, Bartunek, Dutton, & Margolis, 2012; Solomon, 1998) show that compassion can be a primary driver for certain ethical behaviors in organizations. Affectual theory of supererogation expands the current understanding of the role of compassion in organizations by exploring its triggers and moderators, and it also demonstrates that compassion is especially present in those people who are high on emotionality. These people are more attuned to the sufferings of others and feel an internal urge to alleviate their struggles.

Extended Duty is rather a new concept in the literature on moral behavior introduced by affectual theory of supererogation. It refers to the individual's feeling of duty in the situations in which the majority of other people would not see duty. It is called *extended duty* because what some respondents considered their duty, the majority of people would not see as having any moral obligation. This concept, though without being named, has been exemplified in the story about the villagers of a small Protestant town in southern France called de Chambon who, risking

their own lives and the lives of their family members and relatives, saved thousands of Jewish children and adults from the Nazi SS (Hallie, 1994).

In sum, both negative and positive moral emotions can lead to moral behavior. However, we would prefer to behave morally due to positive emotions rather than negative ones. In other words, if moral behavior could be largely achieved by positive emotions, then our society would be much happier. That's why one of the main contributions of affectual theory of supererogation is bringing positive emotions to the literature on moral decision making.

QUESTIONING AN OVERESTIMATIED ROLE OF DUTY IN MORAL BEHAIVOR. The cognition-centered view on morality considers moral behavior as a product of moral reasoning that acts through "the normative pull of cognitive motivation" (Blasi, 1983). In other words, moral reasoning motivates moral decision-making by imposing on a person a moral duty (Saltzstein, 1994). However, affectual theory of supererogation shows that even though many ethical behaviors are dutiful from a moral reasoning perspective, it does not necessarily mean that these behaviors are conducted out of duty. On the contrary, a large part of dutiful behaviors are actually driven by motives other than duty.

Ethical acts below the level of supererogation are characterized as moral duty. That is why these moral behaviors are usually perceived as dutiful and many great minds in philosophy (Bentham, 1776; Kant, 1785) and business ethics (Bowie, 2017) posit that moral behaviors ought to be conducted out of duty. However, this perception is misleading and affectual theory of supererogation disproves the overestimated role of duty as a motive. Supererogation is well positioned to analyze the motives behind moral behaviors because it stands for ethical behaviors

which are not dutiful since, by nature, supererogatory behaviors go above. Thus, studying supererogation allows to see real motives in behaving morally.

The underlying assumption here is that the motives of moral behavior, identified for supererogation, can also be applied to ethical behaviors required by duty. This assumption is based on the fact that it is the same person who conducts both dutiful and supererogatory acts, so an individual's dominant personality is expressed in a similar way in morally-salient situations (Fleeson et al., 2014). In other words, a person, who conducted a supererogatory act due to being driven by enjoyment since the supererogatory lied in the area of her interests, will also execute a dutiful act out of enjoyment if it lies in the same area of person's interests. By a similar token, a person who performed supererogation when being driven by compassion, will also conduct a dutiful act out of compassion, if both events lie in a similar domain.

§6.4   Practical Implications and Recommendations.

This section explores some attributes of supererogation that make it important for organizational performance and provides practical recommendations on supererogation in organizations.

IMPORTGANCE OF SUPEREROGATION IN ORGANIZATIONS. Perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to say that both employers and employees would like to see more supererogatory behaviors in their organizations – the place where people spend a bigger portion of their time and which is well positioned to make people's lives more meaningful and happier (Solomon, 1993). Similarly, stakeholders would like to see supererogatory acts in inter-stakeholder interactions. Supererogation is especially valuable because it brings to organizations: 1)

exemplary ethical behaviors, 2) extra capacity against the unforeseen, 3) enjoyable environment, 4) more successful teams, and 5) competitive advantage.

Exemplary Ethical Behavior. First and foremost, it is good to have ethical people in organizations, but it even better to have people who do more than ethical standards require. Supererogation represents higher flights of morality (Urmson, 1958) and, as such, it is especially valuable. As one of the respondents mentioned, supererogation is "essential topic, …. it is a very laudable topic." In addition, supererogatory behaviors are inspiring for others, prompting more people to behave supererogatorily. As a study participant, when describing a supererogatory behavior of his colleague, mentioned, "it definitely clearly resonates for me".

Extra Capacity against the Unforeseen. Organizations, no matter how stable and predicted they are and how well their activities have been planned, always had and will always operate under a certain degree of uncertainty. It is impossible to account for all factors affecting organizational life and some problem come up unexpectedly. As one of the study participants described well, "people enter into formal contracts [in organizations], they may even enter into informal agreements with one another or an understanding on what's expected, but you can never really contract on every state of the world." Another respondent mentioned that "there's some understanding between us, but that doesn't cover all possible things we could have ever imagined."

Supererogation can be a solution toward unexpected problems and, in some cases, supererogation can even be the only possible remedy to an emergency. As one of the respondents pointed out, "you go beyond the duty when there's an emergency … when there's a crisis that needs to be addressed." In this regard, we can consider supererogation in

organizations as an extra capacity against the unforeseen. When discussing supererogation in organizations, one of the respondents eloquently described it in the following way,

> *You can never know what opportunities need to be taken advantage of, with either all hands on deck or short timeframe. … So it* [going beyond duty] *provides some degrees of freedom and provides some expanded capacity to be responsive to situations that you just can never anticipate and specifically plan for. It's nice to have that upside available.*

When learning about a supererogatory opportunity is agent-driven (vs. request-driven), then the agent's performance of a supererogatory act is often unexpected for other organizational members. The attribute of unforeseenness in supererogation makes it particularly valuable in difficult times and especially appreciated by others. As a study participant mentioned, "it's the kind of thing where you don't expect people to see this [a problem] and find out how things should go and "Is there a problem?" and be proactive." After all, the unanticipated nature of supererogation, as one of the respondents mentioned, makes it "a pleasant surprise" that comes handy and timely to resolve a problem.

There is one important caveat to be borne in mind here. Some managers can regard supererogation in the workplace as a sign that their organization has not been designed properly and, therefore, supererogation was needed due to some malfunctioning in the organization. Even though appreciating supererogation, these managers can become defensive treating supererogation as a sign of organizational deficiencies. When sharing their attitude toward supererogation, a few senior faculty members mentioned the following,

> *I think managers look at that and are appreciative of that. But not always openly complimentary because, in some ways, as a manager you feel like a little guilty for noticing that someone's doing something very good beyond what they're supposed to do. You're very happy that they do it, but you feel like "Oh, no, there must be something deficient in this system if somebody has to do more than they're expected to do". So you're always, as*

a manager, you're grateful and happy, but you're also a little bit defensive. Because if a system was working perfectly, it would not need the extra.

What's going on in our organization as a system that this problem came up? If we are so that the only solution is for someone who has way too much to do to step in to do this, what does that say about us as an organization? So, I think kind of reflecting on the organizational implications, I think that can be problematic.

However, employees' supererogation should not be seen as a sign of managerial incompetence. It is impossible, and even not desirable, to fully control organizational processes and some discretion at an employee level should be preserved. On the contrary, we suggest that employees' supererogation could and should be regarded as a sign of good management since the leadership team managed to create an environment favorable for supererogation.

Enjoyable Work Environment. Managers should be credited for creating an enjoyable work environment for their employees who feel inspired to go beyond duty in helping their colleagues. Supererogation can be an indicator of a healthy work environment and, as one of the study participants mentioned, supererogation needs to be "*taken as a signal of providing a good environment where people are willing to try."*

The more supererogation is performed in an organization, the more enjoyable the work environment is there. As another respondent noticed, supererogation strongly contributes to creating an enjoyable work environment because "you do something nice, they reciprocate". In the case of business schools, supererogatory behavior of faculty members toward students (e.g., cases *Dialogue Sessions, Dinners for Students with Military Background, First Authorship, Helping with Job for International Student, Helping with Job in Investment Banking, Meeting with Students from Another School, Mindfulness Meditation, Sessions for Student Club, Spending Time with Students, Study Abroad, Taking Student to Lunch, Teaching Well,* and *Walks with International*

Student) strongly contributes to a better environment for students which pays back in better student performance in classes and a more enjoyable work place for everyone in the business school. One of the respondents, when bringing up a supererogatory case of her colleague, considered his supererogatory act as a cause of a virtuous cycle in their business school:

> *He genuinely enjoys being part of the community and engaging with the students. One of the nice things about the school I think that makes it worthwhile – the students respond positively, it becomes a virtual circle. You do something nice, they reciprocate, and it helps in the classroom. … All of these people I think are good examples and those faculty here … they really enjoy engaging with the students, and I think that back to that virtuous circle, it makes a difference to the quality of education and the quality of experience for everybody.*

More Successful Teams. More people can succeed due to supererogatory behaviors of their colleague. The study showed that supererogation was especially helpful for vulnerable faculty members in difficult times in their careers. For instance, mentoring a junior faculty member and attending her classes made a real different on the beneficiary's success in her business school. In another supererogatory story, a faculty member provided extensive emotional (as well as other) support to a colleague who was going through a difficult divorce process involving small children and this helped her get back on track afterwards.

Competitive Advantage. Finally, supererogation can be a competitive advantage that would allow good firms to become great (Collins, 2001). The majority of people in organizations live up to moral norms, which is praiseworthy but it does not allow their organizations to achieve maximum value. When responsibilities are complemented by supererogation, it ultimately makes a difference between an organization, whose personal just complies with its responsibilities and creates some value for its stakeholders (Freeman, 1984), and an organization that is successful in fulfilling its full potential and, as such, creating the highest possible value.

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Supererogation provides organizations with a competitive advantage due to several reasons. First, in a more dynamic business environment, clear-cut responsibilities cannot exhaust all the constantly popping-up expectations from the society and from other organization's stakeholders. Where organization's responsibilities cannot reach, supererogatory actions can come in as a complementary, if not an ultimate, solution. Second, organization's employees tend to regard their responsibilities as something imposed on them from outside and there is no little motivation for them to internalize responsibilities into their daily business to become being driven intrinsically, not extrinsically. As a result, their actions to comply with stipulated requirements can often be piecemeal, expedient, and remedial. Supererogation, on the other hand, stemming from good will, provides a more systematic, preventive, long-lasting solution to many vital problems faced by organizations. Third, without the presence of supererogatory actions, the chance for organizations to fulfill their mission is limited. Responsibilities are needed to make organizations work efficiently, however, without supererogation organizations' efficiency can be palliative and incomplete.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS. Since supererogation is so beneficial for organizations, then it would make sense for their leadership to ponder how to foster more supererogatory behaviors in organizational settings.

Financial Incentive is Not an Option. One of the most common ways for organizations to achieve the desired employees' behaviors is to apply financial stimuli. However, this approach is not going to work with supererogation because financial incentives contradict the definition of supererogation in a few ways. First, intention in supererogation is primarily focused on helping

others, while financial incentives switch the focus of agent's intention from other-regarding to self-regarding. Second, going beyond duty due to a monetary reward is not much morally-praiseworthy because agent's behavior is mainly driven by pursuing her gain rather than by willing to help others. In this regard, supererogation is similar to Organizational Citizenship Behavior which is "not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system" (Organ, Podsakoff, & MacKensie, 2006: 3). Third, a financial incentive would negate an attribute of supererogation of exceeding expectations since a possibility of being monetarily rewarded automatically raises expectations from the agent.

Financial incentive is even likely to be counter-productive in case of supererogation. Affectual theory of supererogation specifies a major role of emotions in supererogatory behavior. Agent's affectual response to a supererogatory opportunity is intrinsically motivated by such emotions as anticipating enjoyment, undergoing compassion, and feeling extended duty. However, financial stimulus is based on external motivation and the recent advancements in the phycology literature show that extrinsic motivation destroys intrinsic motivation (Hepach, Vaish, & Tomasello, 2012; Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008) and the latter lies at the heart of supererogation.

Some may argue that financial incentives promote justice because they are meritocratic. However, justice is more associated with duty and another approach – based not on monetary reward, but on human values – is preferred for promoting supererogation. As Rawls mentioned, "[t]he love for mankind is more comprehensive than the sense of justice and prompts to acts of supererogation, whereas the latter does not."

Requiring Supererogation is Not an Option either. If financial incentives are not an option for fostering supererogation in organizations, then leaders in organization can consider trying another popular approach to their Human Resources: make it obligatory to behave supererogatorily. However, this approach is not going to work either. The nature of supererogation is in going beyond duty and it does not make sense to make a duty to exceed duty. If a certain behavior is dutiful, then it ceases to be supererogatory.

Some business ethicists, supporting the idea of supererogation as a requirement, may argue that an obligation to behave supererogatorily can be done in the form of Kant's imperfect imperative when there is a duty to do a good thing in a certain domain, but the way how it should be done is not specified and is rather left at the agent's discretion (Kant, 1785). However, our answer would be the same: in this case we are not talking about supererogation anymore since supererogation is beyond duty so it cannot be made dutiful. And even if anyone installed a duty to go beyond duty, which is a contradiction in terms, then the extrinsic motivation (a demand from company management) would eventually subside an intrinsic motivation which typically propels supererogation.

Cultivating Environment Favorable for Supererogation. Our view on having more supererogation in organizations suggests a different approach. A much more actionable way to having more supererogatory acts in organizations lies in cultivating an organizational environment where supererogation could freely grow.

Affectual theory of supererogation points to a decisive role of emotions in supererogation. Thus, organizational environment that would be favorable for cultivating supererogation should be grounded not in the rational, like the aforementioned financial

incentives or Kant's imperfect duty, but on emotional appeals. We see four foundational blocks of cultivating such an environment: providing recognition as a personal affirmation, empowering people's capacities, building an appropriate organizational attitude, and establishing networks of like-minded individuals.

Recognition as a Personal Affirmation. Supererogatory acts should be properly recognized in organizations to make their agents feel welcomed and appreciated. This can be done through recognizing by example rather than through financial means (though employees' financial stability is crucial for supererogation and it is discussed in section on "empowering people's capacities"). Neither a public acknowledgement of the agent by the company management at the corporate events would be helpful. This type of large-scale public recognition can ruin the agent's initial intrinsic motivation to go beyond duty by replacing it with an external stimulus that over time can become the main reason for going beyond duty.

Rather, recognition can be made in the form of a personal affirmation by the beneficiary or an immediate observer to sincerely show that the agent's supererogation has been noticed and appreciated. The recognition serves as a confirmation to the agent that her supererogatory act was useful and valuable, thus inspiring her, and others around, to do it in the future again.

Unfortunately, the study showed that not all participants showed their appreciation to the agents, and not all agents felt that their supererogation was valued. The absence of recognition can be demotivational for the agent since he may perceive that her efforts were in vain. One of the study participants shared her attitude to this, "at times you can get burnt out and feel like 'why am I may be doing this if no one cares?'" Another respondent revealed how important it is for him that his supererogatory behavior is helpful and noticed,

For me it's sort of all comes down to I would love it if someone noticed that I'm doing this. If it isn't really making any difference then it's just more difficult for me to do so. Why do it? … It becomes really demotivational for me where I served aside. I'm not going to do anything extra where no one really notices and whoever, it doesn't seem to be for anyone or helping anyone, so you're doing something that is on your own mind.

In contrast, receiving a recognition in the form of personal affirmation can be quite gratifying for the agent. As one of the interviewed faculty members mentioned,

One of my joys is once in a while you get an email from a student that attended the class: "Thank you for calling on me and sticking with me. I was unsure about what I was doing, but you helped me see through and contribute in the class discussion."

Gratitude from the student shows that recognitions in the form of small affirmations are important in our lives. The faculty member felt really happy when the student, whom he helped to overcome his anxiety of speaking in class, showed appreciation of professor's help.

Empowering People's Capacities. Affectual theory of supererogation posits that the relationship between agent's affectual response to a supererogatory opportunity and actual supererogatory behavior is moderated by agent's capacities consisting of *bandwidth, capability fit, emotional fit,* and *interpersonal fit.* If any of these capacities is corrupted, then the likelihood for an agent to conduct a supererogatory act significantly decreases. Thus, in order to cultivate an environment favorable for supererogation, organizations need to make sure that their employees are empowered with each and any capacity.

This means that people in organizations should not be overwhelmed with their work tasks to their very limits (*bandwidth*); they should be educated and trained in performing certain tasks (e.g., reviewing manuscripts or using online teaching technologies in business schools) (*capability fit*); their work relationships should be sustained at a low-stress level (*emotional fit),* and boss-

subordinate and project team members should be selected with taking into account members' personalities (*interpersonal fit*).

Appropriate Organizational Attitude. Another foundational block in cultivating an environment favorable for supererogation is creating an organizational attitude where supererogation can flourish. Employees' attempts to behave supererogatorily should be welcomed by the leadership and their co-workers. The welcoming attitude to supererogation should be reflected in organizational process, whereas any potential bureaucratic roadblocks should be reduced to a minimum. Organizational system should encourage employees' proactiveness, rather than throwing monkey-wrenches into persons who are going to act on supererogatory opportunities. One of the study participants has had such a negative experience with anti-supererogatory environment at this previous work place:

> *I've been in other organizations where I tried to introduce something that was above and beyond and it got nowhere. People throw roadblocks, "no, we can't do that, because of this", "no, we can't", or "Oh! Yeah, I will get to it" and all that kind of stuff. I've had experiences where you can keep bringing it up and you know a year later you still at the same place still talking about the same thing or it's been completely shut down.*

Later in the interview, the same participant revealed that he was very much appreciative of the pro-supererogatory culture in his current business school. He mentioned that whenever he was willing to go beyond duty, "here, everybody was willing to try and work towards it."

Networks of Like-Minded Individuals. Finally, the study showed that people, who often practice supererogation, help themselves in their supererogatory endeavors by establishing informal networks of like-minded individuals. Apparently, it is easier to provide a positive affectual response to a supererogatory opportunity when one is surrounded by people feeling in a similar way. These people find and cooperate with each other because they cross their paths

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at joint events involving supererogation. For instance, one of the faculty members, sitting on numerous committees at department-, school-, university-, and community-levels, mentioned:

> *If you have a group of people with this trade, they might know who other people like them are in the organization. They might form networks of like-minded people. People who feel like serving the community in a certain way.*

Thus, the cultivation of an environment favorable for supererogation depends on all the stakeholders in an organization – leadership team, co-workers, and supererogatory people themselves.

PART III.   CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS
OF THE ROLE OF SUPEREROGATION IN THE MORAL DOMAIN

Chapter 7.   Supererogation as a Bridge

between Deontic and Aretaic Moral Doctrines

The title of this chapter could easily be *'the integration of major ethical theories'* since a large portion of the text is dedicated to an attempt to merge major moral theories that fall under the aretaic and deontic moral doctrines. However, the chapter is named after supererogation to give proper credit to the role supererogation plays in integrating the aretaic and deontic values and contributing to attaining a comprehensive account of morality.

The phenomenon of supererogation – going above and beyond the call of duty in a morally praiseworthy way – has moved away from the periphery to the forefront of philosophical thought over the last half a century. Most philosophers writing on supererogation focused on elaborating a more nuanced definition of supererogation, determining its scope, and exploring the room for supererogation in major moral theories (Heyd, 1982; Mellema, 1991a).

However, what slipped philosophers' attention is that supererogation plays a much bigger role in moral philosophy than the notion of "[t]he higher flights of morality" as Urmson (1958) referred to the phenomenon of going beyond duty. In this chapter, I demonstrate that supererogation provides a necessary link between major ethical doctrines. In doing so, supererogation enables the integration of moral theories and makes it possible to comprehend morality in its entirety.

Until now, there have existed separate views on morality, the majority of which fall under the deontic and aretaic doctrines. Though each doctrine is an important part of the moral domain, neither one of them alone can be sufficient for building a full, comprehensive account of ethics unless it accounts for the other. In this chapter, I argue how aretaic and deontic values can be integrated. The merger of aretaic and deontic judgments toward the same agent can be achieved by separating them in time. In that, supererogation plays the key role by enabling the shift from deontic to aretaic values in the mind of an agent involved in a moral action.

The proposed integration of major moral theories that fall under aretaic and deontic moral doctrines, as well as the role of supererogation in the process, contributes to a long-lasting debate in moral philosophy on what it means to behave morally. In addition, the chapter also contributes to the business ethics scholarship by exploring how the proposed temporal integration of the major moral doctrines and the understanding of the essential role of supererogation in organizations can help build more moral organizations, avoid unnecessary conflicts in the workplace, and contribute to meaningful work.

§7.1 Incompatibility of Deontic and Aretaic Doctrines.

There are two major views on morality in philosophy: the focus is either on (1) moral *actions* that have to be done out of *duty*, or the emphasis is on (2) the *agent* who behaves morally out of his *virtues.* I will call these two views on morality deontic and aretaic doctrines respectively.

Major ethical theories that fall into the deontic doctrine's camp are deontology and consequentialism. What unites these ethical theories is that they impose duty on the agent to perform the right action. Though duties can be determined through different mechanisms (such

as the appropriateness of the action according to universal maxims in Kantian ethics, or the maximum usefulness of the ends in utilitarianism), for the purpose of this paper it is enough to mention that the focus of morality in deontic doctrine is on *action* to be performed out of *duty*. The virtuousness of the agent and his motives do not matter much as long as the agent aims at fulfilling duty by performing the right action.

Major ethical theories that fall into the aretaic doctrine's camp are virtue ethics and ethics of care. What unites these ethical theories is that they both center on individual's character with its positive inclinations and dispositions (virtues). Though the composition of virtues in the desirable character may differ between these aretaic theories, for the purpose of this paper it is enough to mention that the focus of morality in the second doctrine is on the *agent* whose behavior is stipulated by the development of his *virtues.* The concepts of duty and rightness are not essential for aretaic doctrine since moral behavior is achieved when a fully virtuous person acts according to his virtuous inclinations and dispositions.

The majority of philosophical works on ethics discuss morality either through the lens of deontic doctrine or aretaic doctrine, but not both. Looking at ethics from the perspective of action and duty seems to be conceptually very different from the perspective of agent and virtue. As a result, philosophers in their views on morality join either the deontic or the aretaic doctrine's camps. But what makes the two doctrines incompatible? At least two things preclude the harmonious merger of deontic and aretaic doctrines: (i) the difference in the focal objects between deontic and aretaic moral judgments, and (ii) the difference in attitudes to agent's efforts.

With respect to (i), the cornerstone of moral judgment in deontic ethical theories is the fulfillment of duty. The adherents of the deontic doctrine (e.g. Kant, 1785; Mill, 1861) see duty as a powerful mechanism that can force people to do the right thing, regardless of their virtuousness. As such, there is no need for an ethical theory within deontic doctrine to explore the agent's character, his virtues and motives as it would considerably complicate the analysis of morally salient situations[4], and is simply redundant. As Stocker mentioned,

> [A]s Ross, at times joined by Mill, argues, for a large part of ethics, there is simply no philosophical question of harmony or disharmony between value and motive: you can do what is right, obligatory, your duty no matter what your motive for so acting. If it is your duty to keep a promise, you fulfill that duty no matter whether you keep the promise out of respect for duty, fear of losing your reputation, or whatever. What motivates is irrelevant so far as rightness, obligatoriness, duty are concerned. (Stocker, 1976: 454-455)

In contrast, moral behavior in aretaic doctrine is achieved through virtuous inclinations and predispositions of the agent's character. Actions, which are so important in deontic doctrine, are considered only as means to developing virtue (practicing good deeds develops virtue). The cornerstone belief of aretaic ethical theories is that a virtuous person behaves virtuously (Aristotle, 1999). Therefore, aretaic judgments focus on the degree of virtues' development in the agent. There is no room for duty here since a fully virtuous person behaves morally out of his inclinations and dispositions, and not out of duty.

With respect to (ii), deontic judgments give a moral praise to the actions whose performance has been hard for the agent. Higher difficulty in complying with duty makes moral behavior especially praiseworthy for deontic judgments. Differently from deontic doctrine, moral behavior in aretaic theories is considered praiseworthy when it is done without much effort

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[4] By a morally salient situation I mean a state of affairs whose moral aspects get to the forefront of agent's consideration.

because of virtuous inclinations and dispositions of the agent's character. The incompatibility between deontic and aretaic doctrines is in that one praises either difficulty or easiness in behaving morally, but not both opposing attitudes.

§7.2   Previous Attempts to Merge Deontic and Aretaic Doctrines.

Previously there have been a number of attempts to combine ideas of deontic and aretaic doctrines. Stocker (1976) criticized deontic ethical theories for creating moral schizophrenia by separating one's reasons, values and justifications from one's motives and motivational structure. Stocker argued that "we should be moved by our major values and we should value what our major motives seek" (Stocker, 1976: 454). According to him, the harmony between deontic and aretaic behavioral causes would be a mark of a good life, while disharmony between reasons and motives is a sign of moral schizophrenia.

Trianovsky (1986) attempted to combine deontic and aretaic judgments by giving a closer attention to the concept of supererogation – going beyond duty (more on supererogation is discussed later in the paper). Trianovsky believed that the deontic characterization of supererogation was misleading as it did not account for a negative aretaic judgment in case of the omission of a supererogatory act. Trianovsky found it possible to combine deontic and aretaic judgements when exploring supererogation in the view of excuses and blame,

> If an act is supererogatory, then, I suppose, no negative deontic judgments can appropriately be made of the person who fails to perform it. In particular, the agent cannot appropriately be blamed. But it does not follow that no negative aretaic judgment can appropriately be made; for the agent may still have acted from a less-than-virtuous motive or, it seems, even a vicious motive. (Trianovsky, 1986: 29)

However, the above attempts to combine the ideas of deontic and aretaic doctrines did not find their way to the mainstream of philosophical thinking. These attempts failed due to the fact that they approached the integration of deontic and aretaic doctrines within the same timeframe, that is they tried to simultaneously apply deontic and aretaic logic to the same agent in the same situation. However, deontic and aretaic judgments are incompatible if applied to the same agent at the same time. It is either doing the right thing out of duty, or behaving in a morally good way out of virtue. Combining both is incompatible because virtue is irrelevant for duty, and duty is irrelevant for virtue. We either praise internal difficulty that the agent overcomes in behaving morally (deontic doctrine), or we adore easiness with which the agent behaves morally (aretaic doctrine).

Yet, deontic and aretaic judgments need and can be integrated to attain a comprehensive account of morality. As Stocker mentioned,

> [D]uty, obligation, and rightness are only one part – indeed, only a small part, a dry and minimal part – of ethics. There is the whole other area of the values of personal and interpersonal relations and activities; and also the area of moral goodness, merit, virtue. (Stocker, 1976: 455)

A PRAGMATIST PERSPECTIVE ON SUPEREROGATION. In this regard, it is important to consider what pragmatism says on the subject due to its rich history of successfully resolving eclectic issues both in philosophy and practice (Parmar, Phillips, and Freeman, 2016) by identifying and doing whatever works best in a particular situation (Greene, 2013).

Pragmatism postulates that the meaning of ideas lies in their practical application, so that the real-world consequences of ideas are the core criteria for defining knowledge (Peirce, 1878). Thus, our intellectual capacity should primarily be put at service to solving real-life problems (James, 1907) to make our living better (Dewey, 1920). Pragmatism posits that most dualisms are

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deceptive (Bernstein, 2010) as theory cannot be disentangled from practice (Quine, 1951), values from facts (Putnam, 2002), knowledge from opinion (Rorty, 2010), and business from ethics (Freeman, 1994). From a pragmatist perspective, framing and the use of language are central to understanding the world (Davidson, 1984) and instead of 'truth', which may be impossible to find, human strivings should be directed toward solidarity and freedom (Rorty, 2010).

Without denying ethical principles, pragmatism yet does not believe in a pre-selected set of universal solutions that would be applicable to any morally salient problems (Dmytriyev, Freeman, Kujala, & Sachs, 2017). In contrast, pragmatism applies a deliberative approach to ethics by urging an agent to consider all different factors pertaining to a morally problematic situation since each ethical case is unique and merits its own deliberation (Dewey, 1988).

Until now, there has not been much written on supererogation from a pragmatist account and it becomes especially worthy exploring it in this dissertation. From a perspective of pragmatism, the vital question concerns the core idea of supererogation – whether the distinction between duty and what is beyond justifies its very existence or this demarcation is rather a false dichotomy (Putnam, 2002). Thus, when looking at supererogation from a pragmatist account, we first and foremost need to explore what makes sense to single out non-obligatory well doing (i.e. supererogation) from duty. The dissertation provides three main pragmatist-type arguments that justify the existence of supererogation from the perspective of pragmatism: infeasibility of executing unattainable moral standards, the necessity and benefits of freedom, and an epistemological justification.

Infeasibility of Executing Unattainable Moral Standards. The pragmatist nature of supererogation reveals itself in the fact that it is practically impossible to build a sustainably

functioning society by raising duties to the whole universe of moral actions. The imperative of duty cannot be limitless as an ordinary human being simply does not have a necessary capacity for fulfilling all morally good actions that would constantly emerge as duties around him. Even if he would, a moral agent would not find his relentless pursuit of all potential morally praiseworthy actions enjoyable (Wolf, 1982) and, eventually, his willingness to comply with almighty duties will start diminishing (Urmson, 1958). From a pragmatist standpoint, "there is an inbuilt limit to the scope of duty" (Heyd, 2017: 30), so it is anti-pragmatic to set duties so high that they become unattainable for an average person of the like of us (Urmson, 1958).

The Necessity and Benefits of Freedom. Another strong argument for placing boundaries on duties lies in providing an opportunity for freedom in moral decision-making. Though deontic moral doctrines tend to extend duty to the whole domain of morality (see discussion in §1.4), pragmatism restricts the scope of duty to empower a person with an agency to voluntarily choose the performance of moral actions after a certain threshold of duty is met.

Supererogation, by promoting freedom in morality, also strengthens aretaic moral doctrines. The demarcation between duty and supererogation is justified by enabling individuals to pursue "the opportunity of exercising virtuous traits of character, of acting altruistically, and of fulfilling their individual ideals" (Heyd, 1982: 10)

Supererogation also plays an important role in how our social institutions are designed and function – our social system enables and encourages supererogatory behavior in many occasions. For instance, "it is felt by many people that a system of blood donation based on voluntary giving is morally superior to a system based on commercial exchange and economic utility (or, alternatively, it is superior to a system which legally requires the donation of blood)"

(Heyd, 1982: 9). Similarly, our social system often prefers to encourage volunteering for different types of extra-role assignments rather than making them obligatory or randomly assigned, e.g., serving at different committees in academia or serving as associate editors and reviewers for academic journals. In addition, some scholars argue that "the value of some virtuous actions like giving and forgiving would be lost if these become morally obligatory demands whose omission entails blame and condemnation." (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2015).

An Epistemological Justification. Finally, apart from aforementioned arguments based on infeasibility of executing unattainable moral standards and the necessity and benefits of supererogation, there is another argument justifying the idea of supererogation that stems from an epistemological standpoint. Duty and supererogation are interdependent since the existence of each of them cannot be justified without the presence of the other. More precisely, "supererogation cannot be *conceptually* articulated without reference to duty and duty cannot be *normatively* justified without reference to what lies beyond duty." (Heyd, 2015: 31)

§7.3   The Temporal Integration of Deontic and Aretaic Doctrines

Though the previous attempts to merge ideas of deontic and aretaic doctrines did not succeed, their integration is worth pursuing. I argue that the integration of deontic and aretaic judgments should be done differently from what has been done so far. More specifically, it can be achieved by separating the application of deontic and aretaic doctrines in time. That is deontic and aretaic judgments can be applied to the same agent but for different virtues and at different stages of the agent's life, depending on whether a particular virtue is developed or not. These are the three tenets that characterize the proposed integration of deontic and aretaic doctrines:

(1) Integrating the aretaic and deontic doctrines through separation in time.

(2) Aretaic doctrine is preferred; if the agent fails acting on aretaic values, then deontic values have to be applied.

(3) Supererogation done out of virtuous motives enables the shift from deontic to aretaic values.

The integration of aretaic and deontic doctrines within a particular domain of virtue is illustrated in **Figure 4**. In what follows, I will describe in more detail each of the three tenets.

Figure 4. The temporal relationship between aretaic and deontic doctrines.

(1) Integrating the aretaic and deontic doctrines through separation in time.

Aretaic and deontic doctrines have to be integrated to reflect the wholeness of morality. However, due to the incompatibility of the two doctrines, deontic and aretaic judgments cannot be combined at the same time. Rather, the merger of the two doctrines becomes possible if we separate their application in time.

The criterion for determining which doctrine to use for a particular agent in a certain context depends on whether the agent has developed the virtue corresponding to the morally salient situation in question. If yes, the agent should be considered from the aretaic lens. If not, the situation should be assessed from the deontic perspective.

The proposed separation of ethical doctrines in time means that the use of aretaic and deontic judgments toward the same agent can vary depending on the changes in his virtuousness. This is not to say that virtuousness comes and goes easily, but the presence of virtues is not constant either. This is reflected in empirical studies in psychology in which virtues are typically translated into traits (Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006; Caspi, Roberts, & Shiner, 2005; McCrae et al., 1999; Srivastava, John, Gosling, & Potter, 2003; Gore, Cross, & Russell, 2013; Löckenhoff et al., 2009)

To illustrate the point, let us consider the case of a young management scholar named Boris. At the beginning of his career, when he was still pursuing his doctorate degree in a business school, Boris strongly advanced the virtue of caring for others[5] while teaching a course on working in organizations to undergraduate students. At that time, Boris cared about his students' learning, and he was eagerly contributing to their becoming successful and ethical individuals at work. He willingly put a lot time and effort in preparing for his classes. He was also willing to assist students beyond his designated office hours and volunteered to conduct mock job interviews for every interested student. In this case, during an annual performance review, the director of the

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[5] Though *Caring for Others,* also known as Care or Caring, is not in Aristotelean original list of virtues, I will treat it in this paper as virtue since care is an important human trait that makes the society much better. Care has been acknowledged as a cornerstone virtue in the ethics of care (Gilligan, 1982). Care is also considered a corporate virtue in the business ethics literature (Solomon, 1993; Sander-Staut, 2011).

PhD program in their business school could draw on aretaic values, namely caring for others (e.g. enjoying helping students learn and become successful at work), when discussing with Boris his teaching experience.

However, upon finishing his PhD, the recent management graduate joined the faculty in a top business school where teaching was not appreciated, as it was mainly research accomplishments that led to tenure and colleagues' recognition. As a result, Boris's virtue of caring for others, in particular his inclination to teach and see his students learn and become successful and ethical individuals at work, deteriorated over time. Research started occupying most of his time, while preparation for classes and communication with students considerably suffered. Due to external factors such as the institutional system of rewards and benefits and peer pressure, the young professor's virtue of caring for others (making high quality learning experiences for students) weakened. In this case, the associate dean for faculty in Boris's new business school should appeal to deontic values (e.g. duty to help students learn) in his conversations with the young professor.[6] Apart from the first tenet, the case with the junior professor is also useful for illustrating the second tenet that is discussed in the section that follows.

(2) Aretaic doctrine is preferred; if the agent fails acting on aretaic values, then deontic values have to be applied.

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[6] This illustration holds under the assumption that the dean wants to keep the undergraduate learning experience at an appropriate level. Research is very important for academia, but so is teaching as students have a right to get a high quality learning experience.

There are at least three reasons why the desire of acting morally out of the virtuous inclination of the agent's character is preferred to acting morally out of the compliance with duty. First, aretaic doctrine allows to avoid moral schizophrenia described by Stocker when an agent does not enjoy performing a moral act but still does it to fulfil his duty.

Second, acting out of internal disposition (aretaic doctrine) is more efficient and more sustainable than when moral behavior is driven by duty only (deontic doctrine). Recent advancements in motivational theory support this claim. Psychology scholars distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation where the former is generated from inside a person (the self-desire, a genuine interest or enjoyment in the task itself), while the latter is imposed from outside (external rewards or pressures to stimulate the desired behavior) (Rayn & Deci, 2000a, 2000b).

The advantage of intrinsic over extrinsic motivation already appears in early childhood years. For instance, Warneken and Tomasello (2008) showed that 20-month-old toddlers who did not receive material reward for helping were subsequently more likely to engage in further helping as compared with children who had received such reward. Toddlers' helping behavior is primarily intrinsically motivated, while extrinsic material reward undermines intrinsic motivation (Hepach, Vaish, and Tomasello, 2012). Similarly, another study showed that students engage in their tasks more willingly, and they work on developing their skills more eagerly, if they are intrinsically motivated (Wigfield, Guthrie, Tonks, and Perencevich, 2004). Management scholars (Wrzesniewski, Schwartz, Cong, Kane, Omar, & Kolditz, 2014), analyzing over 10,000 West Point cadets within the 14 year period, found out that mixing extrinsic motivation with intrinsic

motivation harmed cadets' career outcomes that depended on persistence and performance quality.

Third, it is the primacy of virtue in the family-friend circle. We expect people that we have relationships with, especially those within our close circle that consists of family members and friends, to behave morally towards us because of their authentic character dispositions rather than fulfilling their duty. Stocker described well why we should give a preference in achieving moral behavior to the agent's virtuous character rather than to his acting out of duty,

> Duty seems relevant in our relations with our loved ones and friends, only when our love, friendship, and affection lapse. If a family is "going well," its members "naturally" help each other; that is, their love, affection, and deep friendship are sufficient for them to care for and help one another (to put it a bit coolly). Such "feelings" are at times worn thin. At these times, duty may have to be looked to or called upon (by the agent or by others) to get done at least a modicum of those things which love would normally provide. To some rough extent, the frequency with which a family member acts out of duty, instead of love, toward another in the family is a measure of the lack of love the first has for the other. But this is not to deny that there are duties of love, friendship, and the like. (Stocker, 1976: 465)

There is no need to talk about duty to a person who would do a morally good action anyway out of his virtue. The talk about duty is irrelevant, if not detrimental, for that person. For an emergent management scholar, Boris, who liked teaching students and seeing them learning and growing as individuals, it would be irrelevant, or even harmful, to repeatedly hear from the director of the PhD program about his duty to do a good job in teaching students. Similar to a negative influence of extrinsic motivation on intrinsic motivation, irrelevant appeals to duty can negatively affect virtuous inclinations of person's character.

This is not, however, to say that duty should not be raised in conversations with people holding virtues. They are not so fragile as to start panicking whenever they hear the word duty.

Virtuous people realize that there are duties. And in the work setting it is even expected to have a conversation about duties so one knows about her job responsibilities. Virtuous people can also talk about duty in a general context as part of a philosophical discussion, as well as in many other contexts.

Yet, what I caution against is appealing to duty in order to make someone work when that person is likely to do a great job anyway, out of his virtuous character, being driven, for instance, by virtue of caring for others. A professor caring about his students would do his best to help them learn without any appeal to his duty. A manager caring about her team would do her best (through coaching, mentoring, and the involvement in the ongoing team's matters whenever needed) to create an enjoyable working environment in her department without getting a call to her duty. The reference to duty is, at least, redundant in these cases and, more likely, it can be harmful. It can make the work of the professor and the manager, before perceived enjoyable, look tedious and, subsequently, unpleasant to him. The term duty is often associated with lack of excitement, but it nevertheless has to be done. It bears a mark of boredom and exertion. Why then would you try to motivate someone to do his job by appealing to duty if that person already has character inclinations to do that job?

However, a different approach should be used for a person who does not have a fully developed virtue in a particular area. This is when deontic doctrine is needed. An appeal to duty is very relevant for a person whose virtuous predispositions of the character are not developed. Making a call to duty is appropriate for the professor who does not enjoy teaching and for the manager who does not care about his employees' working environment.

When integrating aretaic and deontic doctrines, the former gets primacy over the latter in that sense that we initially appeal to agent's aretaic values. But if our attempt fails because it turns out that the agent's character is not properly developed and he lacks a particular virtue, then we move on to applying deontic judgements. Deontic doctrine is needed when aretaic doctrine fails.

We need to refer to duty in case we got assured that the agent's ability to act out of virtue is weak. Appealing to deontic values is a last resort when the agent fails to act out of aretaic values. The fact that duty is needed when virtue fails is well noticed by Cowley,

> In the father-infant context it is obscured by the widespread thought that a parental duty is meant to pick up the slack when the spontaneous loving feelings are absent. (Cowley, 2015b: 16)

Going back to our example with a young management professor Boris, it would be relevant for the dean for faculty to appeal to professor's duty to invest substantial time and efforts in quality teaching if Boris does not have (or lost in our case) proper inclinations to do so.

(3) Supererogation done out of virtuous motives enables the shift from deontic to aretaic values.

Let us refer back to the example with the management scholar when judgements toward him shifted from aretaic to deontic. The change in judgements happened because of the corrosion of his virtue of caring for others (in particular, caring for students' learning and subsequent success) over time. The next question to address would be if the shift from aretaic to deontic values is irreversible, or whether the movement in an opposite direction – from deontic to aretaic values – is possible as well. This question is especially relevant in view of the assertion that the aretaic doctrine is preferred over the deontic one.

I argue here that there is a phenomenon which enables the move from a deontic to an aretaic perspective. It is the strict account of supererogation that makes the integration of the deontic and aretaic doctrines possible. This is because the strict account of supererogation accounts for *intended* and *other-regarding* morally good consequences – the two elements that are essential for enabling the move from deontic to aretaic values.

Most people exhibit morally good behaviors when such behaviors are required by duty. People comply with duty because performing below duty may lead to external blame and punishment, or cause internal discomfort. Duty is what people are expected to do and, except for the extreme cases of laziness or wrongdoing, people typically follow the legal, organizational, and societal norms.

The same people, who diligently comply with duty, behave quite differently when it comes to the phenomenon of going above and beyond the call of duty. I argue that a person will not go beyond duty in a particular situation if he does not have a corresponding virtue. Why would he? Exceeding duty requires sacrifice in the form of personal resources such as extra efforts, time, health, or even one's well-being. So why would anyone commit this sacrifice if it is perfectly fine to perform an act at the level of duty, without exceeding it? Only the presence of virtue can make an individual exceed duty. Therefore, I argue that a morally praiseworthy act of exceeding duty, when it meets the requirements of the strict account of supererogation, points out to the development of virtue in the individual.

A critic may object to the link between supererogation and virtue by drawing the examples of people who went beyond duty not because of their virtuous inclinations, but because they were driven by calculative, selfish motives. For instance, a faculty member may put

extraordinary efforts in creating a great learning experience in the classroom not because of the virtue of caring for others (the success of the students), but calculatedly expecting that outstanding student evaluation at the end of the course might help him get tenure. However, self-oriented behaviors of going beyond duty are not the kind of supererogation that fall under the strict account of supererogation. Calculative behaviors in supererogation are ruled out by the strict account that requires *intended good consequences for others*.

The critic, though, may keep arguing that selfish behaviors do not exclude intended good consequences for others. True. However, the pursuit of good consequences for others is secondary for the selfish person, since his own well-being is primary for an egoist. While the spirit of the strict account of supererogation, at least in the way I define it, requires pursuing benefits for others as a primary goal of going beyond duty.

Another critic may challenge the role of supererogation as a springboard from the deontic to aretaic values by referring to passion. Indeed, some acts of going beyond duty occur because an agent is passionate about a particular activity so she eagerly exceeds duty. Nevertheless, the presence of passion does not change the essence of the act. What matters here is the area that the passion is associated with. If this passion is associated with caring for others (e.g. our junior professor Boris exceeds any expectations in teaching because he enjoys thinking that he contributes to students' future success at work) then this points to the development of virtue. Yet, if he does an amazing job in teaching due to his passion of being at the center of attention and getting recognition for his great teaching skills, then this kind of going beyond duty does not meet the strict account of supererogation since the professor's primary motives are not about benefitting others.

At times, it may be hard to untangle the true motives and intensions of the agent for the people around him, and even for the person himself. However, this task is no more difficult than distinguishing between virtuous and non-virtuous intentions in aretaic ethical theories. Moral intentions are an important component of morality and they should be accounted for when making the shift from deontic to aretaic judgements toward the agent.

The proposed merger of aretaic and deontic judgements apparently reflects the way people use moral judgments in their everyday lives. In the relationships with children, family members, friends, and even colleagues at work, we either appeal to (or judge on) their virtuous character to do morally good things, or we refer to the call of duty when we are in doubt about their intrinsic inclinations to behave appropriately.

It is important to mention that the temporal integration of aretaic and deontic doctrines does not require full virtuousness as if the agent behaves virtuously in all situations (i.e. a fully virtuous person), or conversely in none. The unity of virtues does not need to hold[7] to make the temporal integration work. Rather, each virtue should be considered separately whenever a situation opens up to practice it. Suppose a management professor has developed the virtue of courage, but he is lacking the virtue of caring for others. I argue that for this person, we need to apply aretaic judgements in the situations where the virtue of courage is involved (e.g. raising voice on important ethical issues), and we need to apply deontic judgements in the situations dealing with the virtue of caring for others (e.g. caring about students' success at work by

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[7] The unity of virtues implies that the development of one virtue in an individual speaks for the development of all his virtues due to the common element that is required for each virtue. Russell (2009) believed that this common element is phronesis (practical wisdom).

constantly delivering great learning experience in the classroom). Figure 5 illustrates a separate

approach across virtues in applying aretaic or deontic judgments.

Figure 5. The application of aretaic and deontic doctrines across virtues.

Virtue 1

Aretaic Doctrine

Supererogation

Corrosion of Virtue

Deontic Doctrine

Virtue 2

Aretaic Doctrine

Supererogation

Corrosion of Virtue

Deontic Doctrine

§7.4   The Relevance of the Temporal Integration of Deontic and Aretaic Doctrines to Business Ethics.

Business ethicists have been looking at what constitutes moral behavior in organizations

from different, standalone ethical perspectives, depending on a moral doctrine they adhere to.

A large number of organizational scholars explored business ethics in organizations from an

aretaic perspective. Among many names, Robert Solomon (1992; 1993; 1999a; 1999b; 2003;

2004), Edwin Hartman (1996; 2006; 2008a; 2008b; 2011; 2013), Domènec Melé (2003; 2005;

2009a; 2009b), and Geoff Moore (2002; 2005a; 2005b; 2012) were especially prolific in

connecting business ethics with the virtue of care. Other scholars were bringing to business the

ethics of care (e.g. the collection of articles in Hamington & Sander-Staut, 2011). There were

also many prominent business ethicists who explored ethics in business from a deontic

perspective, especially through the lens of Kantian ethics (Bowie, 1999, 2002, 2017; Arnold &

Harris, 2012; Pfeiffer & Forsberg, 2014) and utilitarian ethics (Nantel & Weeks, 1996; Mack,

2004).

Most business ethics scholars looked at ethics in organizations from either aretaic or

deontic perspectives while the comprehensive account of morality has been missing. Some

business ethicists tried to triangulate different ethical principles from major moral theories into

their analyses of business ethics issues, e.g. De George (2017) used a coherence approach and

Werhane (2017) argued for applying wide reflective equilibrium. However, these business

ethicists triangulated major ethical theories within the same-timeframe perspective, which

seemed to be problematic due to incompatibilities between aretaic and deontic doctrines, as

discussed earlier. It is the *temporal* integration of aretaic and deontic moral doctrines,

proposed in this article that offers a comprehensive account of business ethics in organizations.

People often join organizations feeling attraction to their new workplaces. Newcomers

often come with an aretaic perspective on their work. Contractual duties, which new

employees assume upon arrival, serve more as a task guidance for them, rather than the

primary motivational factor. Over time, however, many employees lose interest in their job,

and this is when the shift from aretaic to deontic values takes place.

The misapplication of aretaic vs. deontic judgments creates conflicts at work. These

conflicts at the workplace could be avoided should both managers and employees understand

the temporal sequence of appealing to aretaic and deontic values. When a manager constantly

uses a duty-loaded language with his team, it causes a negative impact on those employees

who are driven in their work by virtuous inclinations of the character. Unnecessary calls to duty

undermine individual's initial excitement about job and result in a shift from an aretaic to deontic perspective on work, which reduces job satisfaction. An opposite example would be a manager who appeals to aretaic values in his team, but this does not resonate with deontic-driven employees. As such, the manager starts feeling a growing disappointment with some employees who do not share his aretaic attitude to work.

The solution in both cases lies in using a tailored approached to employees based on the development stage of their virtues. A common evidence supporting the tailored approach can be found in corporate town hall meetings. Whenever a senior executive uses a general appeal to the audience – either inspirational, virtue-loaded, or duty-based, the right thing to do – there will always be people who are either skeptical of the inspirational message, or disappointed with the duty-loaded language. This difference in perspectives should be accounted for when deciding on the audience and on the message

As shown earlier, the aretaic doctrine is preferred over the deontic one. It is beneficial for organizations to have employees who are driven by virtuous inclinations of their character, rather than the obligations of duty. However, in today's reality many people do their work because of duty. Many organizations would like to change the situation and instill aretaic values among their employees but they are using ineffective, even counter-productive, approaches. Increasing financial compensation or providing a corporate car will not automatically lead to forging a virtuous character in employees. Those are usually good tools to sweeten the burden of duty, but they are irrelevant for developing virtuous dispositions in individuals.

A number of business ethicists argued for bringing Aristotelean ethics to organizations and creating a work environment favorable for virtue development. In doing so, Solomon

(1992) prescribed treating corporations as communities, improving the concept of membership, honing a good judgment, and pursuing excellence, integrity, and holism. Agreeing with Solomon on creating the good organizations as the good communities (Hartman, 1996), Hartman (2013) also believed that virtue has to be practiced before joining organizations and argued for teaching virtue in business schools.

Yet, I believe we need to be more specific here. I argue that what organizations need is to create the work environment where employees start feeling comfortable to behave *supererogatorily*. When employees go beyond duty in a morally praiseworthy way, they make a shift in their mind from deontic to aretaic values. Supererogation is the key element in enabling the shift, and organizational efforts should be focused toward fostering supererogatory behaviors.

Behaving supererogatorily at work points to the fact that the area, where the behavior of going beyond duty takes place, is important for the agent. If it were not important, the agent would not exceed duty. The importance of some work aspects to the agent contributes to finding meaning in agent's work. In other words, the person exceeds duty in those areas that are important and meaningful for her.

Summary. This chapter proposed the integration of deontic and aretaic doctrines to attain the comprehensive account of morality, since both views on ethics are essential and neither one separately can speak for the whole realm of morality. The integration of aretaic and deontic values can be attained if we separate their application in time. That is the decision which judgements – aretaic or deontic – to apply depends on the agent's status in relation to the

development of virtue. If the agent has developed a particular virtue, we apply aretaic judgments in moral situations corresponding to this virtue; if the agent is lacking a particular virtue, we apply deontic judgements in corresponding moral situations.

When applying moral judgments to an agent, aretaic values (virtuous inclinations and dispositions of the character) are preferred since the presence of virtue (i) allows to avoid moral schizophrenia, (ii) embraces a more valuable intrinsic motivation (compared to extrinsic one), and (iii) enables behaviors exhibited out of virtuous inclinations (compared to behaviors made out of duty) that are much more valued among family members, friends, and others who we have relations with.

However, if due to external circumstances, the agent has experienced the corrosion of virtue, deontic judgments (duty, obligation, rightness) have to be applied to the agent. The move from aretaic to deontic doctrine is not irreversible. Supererogation, in the strict account of the term, can serve as a springboard for moving from deontic to aretaic values. To put it another way, doing more than is required by duty and being driven by virtuous motives signals that the person has developed inclinations and dispositions of a virtuous person's character, and aretaic judgments can be applied to him in moral situations corresponding to this virtue. In this case, it is irrelevant, and even harmful from a human nature perspective, to use the terminology of deontic doctrine – duty, obligation, rightness – to appeal to the person who is already predisposed to doing a morally good action out of his virtuous character. The described process has earlier been illustrated in Figure 5.

The proposed integration of major moral theories, and the role of supererogation in the process, contributes to an unresolved discussion in moral philosophy on what constitutes moral

behavior. Furthermore, the article also contributes to the business ethics research by exploring how the proposed temporal integration of the major moral doctrines and the understanding of the essential role of supererogation in organizations can help build more moral organizations, avoid unnecessary conflicts in the workplace, and contribute to meaningful work.

Conclusion

Key Research Findings. The dissertation findings show that the process of supererogation is more nuanced than has been previously considered in the literature on supererogation. According to affectual theory of supererogation, presented in the dissertation, the process of supererogation consists not only of an actual supererogatory act (which is the primary focus in the literature), but spans much further: i) it starts with learning about a supererogatory opportunity, and whether this learning is agent-based vs. request-based influences agent's approach to conducting a supererogatory act, ii) it continues in exhibiting an affectual response, iii) whose impact on supererogatory behavior is moderated by agent's capacities, and iv) it ends with reaction to a supererogatory act that stipulates subsequent affectual responses to potential supererogatory opportunities in the future.

Affectual theory of supererogation contributes not only to a better understanding of the phenomenon of supererogation in organizations, but also to the literature on moral decision making showing that moral behavior is often driven by positive emotions (enjoyment, compassion, and extended duty) in contrast to the perspectives of cognitive reasoning (Kohlberg, 1976; Piaget, 1932) and negative emotions (Haidt & Morris, 2009) that have been prevailing in the literature. In fact, every single supererogatory case collected in the qualitative study has confirmed an essential role of agent's affectual response: it starts from attending to supererogatory opportunities through one of the triggers of attendance (enjoyment, similar experience, and association) and then an affectual response is stipulated by one of the drivers of action (gratification, empathy, and extended duty).

The conceptual part of the dissertation, when exploring the relationship between supererogation and traditional major ethical theories, argues that supererogation can serve as a bridge between ethical theories based on deontic and aretaic doctrines. It shows that by separating in time aretaic and deontic judgments (depending on the development stage of agent's particular virtues), supererogation enables a shift from deontic to aretaic values in the agent's mind.

Limitations. The study on supererogation in organizational settings is based on the qualitative study in several business schools. However, this posits a question whether study findings can apply to other domains and organizations, e.g., to other academic fields, as well as to areas outside academia such as business and military. Given that business school are also organizations and the study was conducted in both private and public business schools, one may arguably conclude that the large portion of study findings can be extrapolated to other types of organizations. More specifically, one may expect that the proposed affectual theory of supererogation analyzes individual's behavior in organizations in general and it can be similarly applied to other workplaces.

Practical Implications. It is important to have supererogation in organizations because it promotes exemplary ethical behaviors among managers and employees, provides extra capacity against the unforeseen so it is much easier to cope with any arising issues, significantly contributes to enjoyable work environment, makes teams more successful, and serves as firm's competitive advantage.

Aiming to promote supererogation in organizations, managers should bear in mind that financial incentives are unlikely to be an appropriate tool due to the specifics of supererogation

– it is emotionally-laden and inherently rewarded; while extrinsic rewards are likely to kill intrinsic motivation to behave supererogatorily. At the same time, making supererogatory behavior obligatory is not an option either. Instead, organization's leadership team should cultivate an organizational environment that would be favorable for exhibiting supererogation in work settings. This includes leading by example by making recognition as a personal affirmation, empowering employees' capacities, fostering an appropriate organizational attitude, and facilitating in creating networks of like-minded individuals.

Future Research. The dissertation findings point to a number of future research avenues. First, the conducted qualitative study discovered variables and the relationship among them that later can be tested through quantitative forms of research (Corbin & Strauss, 2015). For instance, the relationship between learning about a supererogatory opportunity and a subsequent affectual response; or the relationship between the affectual response and actual supererogatory behavior, as well as a moderation role of agent's capacities in the process. In addition, quantitative tests can examine whether the difference in the type of learning about a supererogatory opportunity – agent-based vs. request-based – matters for how an act is conducted.

Second, it can be worthy exploring whether supererogatory opportunities that, according to affectual theory of supererogation, are a starting point for the process of supererogation, have some similarities with entrepreneurship opportunities widely explored in the entrepreneurship literature. In particular, are supererogatory opportunities created or are they discovered by agents?

Third, study findings preliminarily signaled that in supererogatory acts there might be some correlation between an agent's inclination toward specific types of sacrifice – time, material resources, reputation, or personal well-being – and exhibited categories of supererogatory behavior (e.g., favors, beneficence, forbearance, etc.). This preliminary observation was not covered in detail in the dissertation as it warrants a separate study on the subject.

Fourth, it would be interesting to empirically analyze the communication about supererogation among colleagues in organizations from a slightly different angle – supererogatory storytelling. A supererogatory act is out of the ordinary and once it is conducted, it inspires others towards spreading stories about such an act both in the company and beyond. This supererogatory storytelling can contribute to shaping corporate culture and can be a key driver of company success. Further research in this area may shed light on the impact of supererogatory storytelling on the success of the company

Fifth, future empirical work on supererogation can explore and compare the phenomenon in different organizational settings: juxtaposing supererogatory behaviors in small vs. large organizations as well as comparing companies across various industries such as business vs. medicine vs. education. We can only hypothesize if there is any correlation between a particular company's type or industry and the specifics of supererogatory behaviors.

Finally, it would be worthy exploring whether supererogation could be a major driver of moral progress in organizations. This account could be built on the argument that what is considered supererogatory in business at some point, over time becomes expected or even obligatory. For example, corporate social responsibility (CSR) was considered admirable some 30

years ago, but now it is widely expected from any corporation. Yet another example is stakeholder theory which is supererogatory in nature: a stakeholder orientation of business (Freeman, 1984) could be considered as supererogatory a few decades ago, but it is becoming a commonplace nowadays.

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1. Handbook of Supererogatory Cases from Philosophy Literature.

(listed alphabetically)

Case 1: **The Doctor Coming to a Plaque-Stricken City**

"We have considered the, certainly, heroic action of the doctor who does his duty by sticking to his patients in a plaque-stricken city; we have now to consider the case of the doctor who, no differently situated from countless other doctors in other places, volunteers to join the depleted medical forces in that city." (Urmson, 1958: 324)

Case 2: **The Good Samaritan**

"30 In reply Jesus said: "A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, when he was attacked by robbers. They stripped him of his clothes, beat him and went away, leaving him half dead.
31 A priest happened to be going down the same road, and when he saw the man, he passed by on the other side.
32 So too, a Levite, when he came to the place and saw him, passed by on the other side.
33 But a Samaritan, as he traveled, came where the man was; and when he saw him, he took pity on him.
34 He went to him and bandaged his wounds, pouring on oil and wine. Then he put the man on his own donkey, brought him to an inn and took care of him.
35 The next day he took out two denarii[a] and gave them to the innkeeper. 'Look after him,' he said, 'and when I return, I will reimburse you for any extra expense you may have.' " (The Bible, Luke 10:30-35, NIV)

Case 3: **The Prisoner Held by Political Terrorists**

"Suppose a man is held prisoner by political terrorists. He is commanded to swear allegiance to the leader of the terrorists and to renounce allegiance to his own government. The prisoner

knows that a refusal to cooperate will result only in bad consequences. He will be beaten, and the angered terrorist will only stiffen their resolve to eradicate all opposition to their cause. Moreover, no one but the terrorists will even know if he refuses. Nevertheless. The man is willing to endure these bad consequences. As a man of high principle, he is simply unwilling to renounce allegiance to his own government. He is willing to endure pain rather than cooperate." (Mellema, 1991a: 19-20)

Case 4: **The Soldier Jumping on a Live Grenade**

"We may imagine a squad of soldiers to be practicing the throwing of live hand grenades; a grenade slips from the hand of one of them and rolls on the ground near the squad; one of them sacrifices his life by throwing himself on the grenade and protecting his comrades with his own body. It is quite unreasonable to suppose that such a man must be impelled by the sort of emotions that he might be impelled by if his best friends were in the squad; he might only just have joined the squad; it is clearly an action having moral status. But if the soldier had not thrown himself on the grenade would he have failed in his duty? Though clearly he is superior in some way to his comrades, can we possibly say that they failed in their duty by not trying to be the one who sacrificed himself? If he had not done so, could anyone have said to him, "You ought to have thrown yourself on that grenade"? Could a superior have decently ordered him to do it? The answer to all these questions is plainly negative." (Urmson, 1958: 324)

Appendix 2. An Interview Protocol

Table 1. A protocol for interviews on supererogatory behaviors in organizations.

Interview Topic	Interview Questions
Introduction	*[introducing the interviewer and the study]*
Warming-Up	• For how long have you been working in Academia in general? • How long have you been working at the current business school?
Supererogation in general	• Please tell me what you think about going beyond duty at work? I'm interested in other-regarding behaviors, those that also benefit others.
Supererogatory Behaviors of Others	• Do you remember any situation at the business school when someone did more than was expected, e.g. he or she did more than typical norms would require to do? Could you please describe this situation? What was that he/she did?
Supererogatory Behaviors of the Respondent Herself/Himself	• Were there any situations at the business school when you went beyond duty? Could you please describe those situations?
Vignettes with Supererogatory Cases	• I have three stories that I collected at business schools. Could you please read them? *[giving three vignettes to respondents]* • In your opinion, which story is about going beyond duty the most? Why?
Perspective on Work Tasks	• What do you like doing at work the most? • What are the things that you like doing at work the least?
Organization's Culture	• How would you describe your organization's culture in three words?
Checking insights from previous interviews	• E.g., do you consider yourself emotional (e.g. when watching movies?) • E.g., do you often feel empathy? • E.g., do you consider yourself ambitious?
Potential leads for next interviews	• Would you like to recommend me anyone in your business school who could have an interesting perspective on going beyond duty?
Demographics	• Demographic questions.
Closing remarks	*[thanking and closing the interview]*

Appendix 3. The Handbook of Supererogatory Cases in Academia

Case 1:   COFFEE CORNER.

Case 2:   CONCERT TICKETS AND BABYSITTING.
A senior professor in a business school, Elizabeth, stood in line for a couple of hours on a Saturday morning to obtain two tickets for a concert with several top stars coming to their town. This was going to be a major event in their small town as popular singers do not come there often. Elizabeth was lucky to obtain the tickets that were soon totally sold out, and she was impatiently looking forward to going to the concert with her husband. At about the same time, the devastating hurricane Katrina hit the South of the United States. Elizabeth lived in a state that was not affected by the hurricane. However, she started thinking about the new junior faculty member, Lucia, who has recently joined their business school and whose family came from the place hit by the hurricane. Elizabeth thought that Lucia and her family must be worrying about their parents and relatives who stayed in the South and who might suffer from the hurricane. Elizabeth also recollected how hard it was for her when she was a young female professor in a business school, so she empathized with Lucia. So Elizabeth decided to give Lucia her two concert tickets, so Lucia and her husband have a night off. Elizabeth also offered to babysit Lucia's children during the concert. Several days later, when Lucia and her husband returned home from the concert (where they spent over 4 hours), Elizabeth told them that she played with the children, fed them and already put them to bed.

Case 3:   DIALOGUE SESSIONS.

Case 4:   DINNERS FOR STUDENTS WITH MILITARY BACKGROUND.

Case 5:   DONATING EXTRA.

Case 6:   EMOTIONAL SUPPORT.

Case 7:   EXTRAORDINARY SERVICE.

Case 8:   FIRST AUTHORSHIP.

Case 9:   HELPING WITH JOB FOR INTERNATIONAL STUDENT.

Case 10:   HELPING WITH JOB IN INVESTMENT BANKING.
After working in investment banking industry for over 10 years where he held senior roles, Bill decided that it was time to switch his career from a practitioner to an academic. So Bill

obtained a PhD and became an economics professor in one of the top business school. At his business school, he liked talking to students and help them with career advice. One day he talked in the hall to Jennifer, one of his students, and asked how her job search process was going. She said that she would like to go to work in investment banking and she applied to over 10 banks. But she got invited to only one job interview where she accidently dropped a bowl of soup during lunch and then it didn't go well and she got rejected. Bill knew Jennifer as a high potential student in his class and believed that Jennifer would perform in investment banking well. What was important to Bill was that he strongly believed in market efficiency. However, when he listened to Jennifer's story, he was disappointed to see labor market inefficiency where a strong candidate couldn't land a good job. It bothered him and Bill thought that this labor market inefficiency had to be corrected. So Bill called his friend in one of the top investment banks, recommended Jennifer and asked if their HR department could give her a chance by inviting her to job interviews. Soon Jennifer got invited to job interviews with that bank. She did not receive any benefit from a personal connection and was treated the same way as the rest of the candidates. Within a few weeks, Jennifer successfully passed three rounds of interviews, and was finally accepted as an investment associate in the bank. A year later, the bank recognized Jennifer as the top performer among its all new hires that year.

Case 11:   HOSPITAL VISIT

Case 12:   MEETING WITH STUDENTS FROM ANOTHER SCHOOL.

Case 13:   MENTORING JUNIOR COLLEAGUE.

Case 14:   MINDFULNESS MEDITATION.
Mike was a marketing professor at a business school. Several years ago, he started getting interested in mindfulness meditation. He learned that it helped deal with stress and improve other health issues. Mike joined a meditation group for practicing it a few times a week and he also regularly practiced meditation at home. He became passionate about it. He read lots of literature on mindfulness meditation and even published several of his own articles on mindfulness in marketing. After several years of actively practicing meditation, he thought that students at his business school could also benefit from it given how stressed they are because of high pressure to deliver on their courses. So Mike decided to run a weekly meditation club for 30 min every Tuesday. As of today, Mike has already been running his meditation club for 3 years. The attendance may be 2-4 students per session, but sometimes there can be zero students showing up. Mike may sometimes get frustrated of a small participation, especially when he has no reason to come to school that day, other than running the meditation club. But Mike committed himself to running the club, and he never skipped it. He does not get any reward from the school for running the meditation club, it is his own initiative, and he believes that students can get value from it.

Appendix 4. Taxonomy of Supererogation in Organizations with Examples.

Table 3. The taxonomy of supererogation in academia with examples from the broad collection of supererogatory cases.

Category	Types	Examples
Favors	**Substituting**	– Teaching colleague's class, or even a course, due to illness or possessing a special expertise.
	Meeting / Speaking	– Meeting with solicitors from other department/school upon request; Speaking at an event.
	Reviewing	– Reviewing colleagues' manuscripts; Reviewing for journals/conferences; Serving on journal boards.
	Sharing Knowledge	– Tips on developing online courses; Software usage; Forwarding useful links/studies.
	Providing meals	– Taking students to lunch; Hosting dinners for students with military background; Bringing snacks to student study teams.
	Providing recognition	– Making sure others get proper credit, e.g., during faculty meetings.
	Consoling	– In hard times, e.g. during a divorce; Visiting an injured colleague in a remote hospital.
Ownership	**Initiating**	– Improvements; Events (e.g. academic conferences): Optimizing school procedures; Regularly cleaning up a coffee corner; Running extracurricular events (mindfulness meditation club); Publishing in top journals/ books, when not rewarded.
	Bettering	– Taking assigned work to a higher level: Teaching well even if satisficing would work for the employer; Supporting student abroad trip on a snow weekend; Being quick in addressing requests.
	Mentoring	– Attending colleague's classes to improve teaching; Helping students with a job; Advising/encouraging the underprivileged.
	Taking Responsibility	– Taking responsibility for correcting a mistake, e.g., a junior faculty who turned out negligible to student needs.
Volunteering	**Contributing**	– To activities organized by others, e.g., Seminars for student clubs; Participating in community events to learn and help.
	Serving	– On multiples committees and student events (judges in student competitions).
Beneficence	**Donating**	– To staff's end-of-year bonuses; Contributing to funeral.
	Donating thoughtfully	– Donating in the form of a tribute such as a path brick in the Nature Center enjoyed by a passed away colleague.
Forbearance	**Forgoing Resources**	– Letting others take resources that one is eligible for, e.g., First authorship; Office space; Pay for study abroad; Car damage.
	Extending Deadlines	– Extending agreed deadlines, e.g., to ill person; to a co-author working on join manuscript.
	Forgoing Reciprocity	– E.g., not counting how many classes one substituted in order to request the same number in return.
Gratitude	**Thanking**	– More than typically expected, e.g., filming a movie for a course sponsor.