Typically German?":
National Character and the Eye of the Beholder

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Dissertation Abstract

"Typically German?:" National Character and the Eye of the Beholder

This cross-cultural, comparative analysis considers how the nation is constructed and understood differently across cultures. Taking Germany as my case study, I explore how images of the nation come to be influenced by the national membership of the observers. I discover a paradox in which varying images of Germany reveal more about the national character of those doing the perceiving than about the inherent nature of "Germanness." I find that social location comes to structure not just the image of this one nation but also influences understandings of the place of the nation in the larger world order. I term this process in which social location affects the role and image of the nation nationing. As I discover, this phenomenon comes to speak to issues of individualism, postmodernity, and stratification.

Drawing on literature from the sociology of culture and interdisciplinary research on the nation, I argue for an understanding of nations as cultural objects interpreted differently dependent upon the social position of the observer. Specifically, I compare the treatment of Germany in four major newspapers and nineteen world history school textbooks from India, Kenya, England, Germany, and the United States. I also conduct in-depth interviews with 45 Americans and Germans (in German), asking their thoughts and perceptions of nations. In each stage of the analysis a paradox emerges: an image of a nation speaks less to the inherent qualities of that nation and more to the national character of those doing the evaluating. I conclude that although the effects of globalization are far-reaching, there are still fundamentally different approaches to relating to the world that fall along national lines, and these profoundly affect our relationship to the world.

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I dedicate this to Barbara Prasse and the memory of Gisela Michaelis both of whom represent so many of the paradoxes that inspired this dissertation.

Chapter One

Introduction: What It Means to Nation

As a high school student, I remember a fellow student in history class commenting that we all speak of the colors blue and green, but that we do not really know if we are all seeing the same thing. The observation stuck with me for some time. I realized this could explain all the endless and pointless discussions I had had with people as to whether something was more a "bluish green" or a "greenish blue."

When I began considering a dissertation on the German nation, I found myself having similar kinds of conversations with Americans and Germans as to who the Germans *really* are. Although numerous visions were articulated, the strongest differences in images of Germany fell along national lines. Americans often agreed with one another, almost invariably calling up references to the Holocaust in their descriptions of the Germans as a united people. Germans also converged in many ways with their fellow citizens, describing a nation often conflicted as to its own identity and divided in its image of itself. At first, I too found myself emerged in the national equivalent of blue-green/green-blue debates, arguing that the Germans were more this than that and less that than this. It was only after countless discussions with no clear resolution that I slowly came to realize that these debates were similar to the color disputes I had once had.

This dissertation is an exploration of the cultural reception of nationhood and national identity. That is, how nations are perceived and the degree to which we mean the same thing when discussing them. It is also a study of the importance of nationhood and the process by which the "reality" of the nation takes form. Nations, their inhabitants, and the products they produce are attributed with characteristics that are seen as being "typical" or emblematic of that entity. Yet despite often-strong convictions that a nation can be "known," the symbols and

attributes that come to represent a nation are not, as I argue here, uniformly agreed upon across

cultures.

I maintain that the perception of a nation involves a process of *nationing*.[1] In this process

of nationing, of constructing an image of a nation's identity, individuals and collectives rely on

their own cultural lens to understand the place and significance of a nation to their worldview.

How we "nation" is thus dependent upon our social location, by which I mean the social

characteristics that come to structure our lives: our nationality, culture, politics, age, gender,

class, education, race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, and the many other socio-

demographic variables that affect how we experience the world around us. Nationing is thus, in

part, a process by which the image of a specific nation is influenced by social characteristics.

But nationing neither begins nor ends with the vision of a given nation; it also speaks to a

larger pattern of ordering the world. This is the second component of the social phenomenon of

nationing. As I will demonstrate, the relationship to the very concept of the nation is also

culturally dependent. In order to envision a specific nation, its role and meaning within the

larger world must first be placed in context. The very question of whether nations are a

meaningful category for defining the world into smaller groupings is dependent upon the

observer's worldview. This perspective then determines the kind of moral, political, cultural,

and economic role nations are expected to fulfill. Whether nations are seen, for example, as

desirable entities, realizations of positive ideals or negative values, and/or vehicles for achieving

social change are all dependent upon the eye of the beholder which is itself culturally, politically,

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[1] I am grateful to Sharon Hays for providing the terminology to describe this process. I use this term in much the same way as West and Zimmerman (1987) explain the process of "doing gender." In transforming the noun of gender into a verb, West and Zimmerman emphasize the ways in which gender is interactional and a social process continuously being negotiated. Like gendering, nationing requires those who "perform" and those who "read" this performance and interpret its significance (see West 1987). As the performance is read by the observer, nationality serves as a "way of seeing" (Berger 1972) and placing the nation in worldview.

and economically shaped. Before making sense of varying visions of a given nation, one must first make clear the relationship of the observer to the very concept of the nation. How an individual or collectivity talks and thinks about a specific nation is thus first dependent upon their expectations about nations in general, as it is held up to the ideals associated with what a nation *should* be. This is the essence of nationing: the application of cultural beliefs about nations in the grand scale to specific nations. And it is this process that, as I argue here, is dependent upon social location.

Although the process of nationing is a process of construction, its final product is reality. The work of individuals, cultural producers, and other collectivities combine together to create and reify the nation as valuable, knowable, and real. This is, in many ways, a national project, the news media, educators, academia, entertainment, government, and individuals all work, both consciously and unconsciously, to keep a vision of the nation in place. In that process, they collectively come to create a moral category of nationhood in which nations in general are expected fulfill a certain role within the world. Individual nations are then judged according to their ability of realizing these expectations.

A paradox emerges in this process as the image of the nation changes according to the eye of the beholder but stabilizes in the process of nationing. That is, although the nation does not exist in any absolute sense--making *one* cohesive vision of the nation impossible, national membership still operates to inform and generate visions of the nation. Indeed it is fair to say that the power and influence of the nation is found more in observing the evaluating nation as it is in the evaluated nation. Here, national preoccupations and worldviews come together to create an image of the world and the place of the nation within it.

Recognizing the multiple visions of the nation does not, however, imply infinite possibilities. As Griswold (1987a) argues, although there is the potential for a wide variety of interpretations of a cultural object, they are neither random nor infinite as they too are limited by social constraints. There are patterns to national identity that are based in experience. There are, for example, geographic boundaries, political institutions, and cultural life that correlate to nationhood. And, as I will argue here, there are national forms of consciousness as well that come to influence the world. It is this latter factor that leads to differing experiences of the former. Whether, for example, national boundaries are seen as permanent or disputed, whether a reigning government is viewed as legitimate or not, and whether a national culture is considered authentic or not, are all dependent upon the social experience of the viewer. Since such experience is varied, the many visions they produce represent such difference.

Once the significance of interpretation is fully recognized, it becomes clear that the definition of the nation is *always* more dependent upon the position of the viewer than on any inherent "reality" of the nation. Like the futility of the green-blue/blue-green debates, the question of which interpretation of the nation is most valid leads nowhere. Thus, this dissertation switches focus, concentrating on the *nature* of these differing interpretations and what these differences reveal about national character.

The Socially Constructed Nation

In a world in which nation-states are a central political, social, and cultural category, nations are a primary means for ordering the world and dividing it into meaningful groupings. It is therefore difficult to speak about variations in the world without relying on nations as a

discursive category.[2] During the last twenty-five years, theorists of the nation have come to

acknowledge the ways in which nations are "imagined," "invented," and "mythic" (Anderson

1991; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1983). This paradigm shift has led to a different perspective

among scholars in which the nation is no longer seen as bound in nature, continuous through

time, representative of a homogenous people, or especially static or stable (Handler 1988). In

other words, the nation, once understood as a "natural" entity handed down by God or Mother

Nature, has come to be seen, like other aspects of social life, as socially constructed.

Despite the virtual explosion of literature in the 1980s and 1990s focusing on the

constructed nature of the nation, several important assumptions have been left relatively

untouched and continue to be taken for granted. Often overlooked is the assumption that a

nation, even if recognized as socially constructed, contains certain key components that are seen

to have the same significance regardless of the social position of the observer. In other words,

many still expect the nation to reflect in some way a unified or consistent entity that has similar

symbolic meaning regardless of the social location of those doing the defining.

I argue that there is even less consensus as to what a nation represents than has previously

been recognized. As Handler (1988) notes, even among political nationalists themselves, there is

little agreement as to the *content* of a given nation. He writes, "the existence of a national entity

is a primary assumption of nationalist ideology, rarely questioned, but the content of national

being is the subject of continual negotiation and dispute" (Handler 1988: 51). The assumption

that, at bottom, "everyone means the same thing" when talking about a given nation ignores the

complexity and, as I will argue, *multivocality* of nationhood.[3]

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[2] The work of social scientists reflects this. See, for example, (Billig 1995; Brubaker 1996; Calhoun 1997; Corse 1997; Dann 1993; Gellner 1983; Greenfeld 1992; Handler 1988; Hobsbawm 1990; Varenne 1993.
[3] I take this term from Griswold's (1987) argument that cultural objects have the potential to be variously interpreted and are therefore "multivocal." See below for further discussion.

At points where differences in opinion do arise as to what a given nation symbolizes, many scholars and laypeople assume that one understanding is a more accurate reflection than another (e.g. Dann 1993; Johnston 1986; Keller 1990; Moore 1990; Nasalska 1995). In the media and popular culture, nations are routinely portrayed in absolutist terms (e.g., "the French are ethnocentrists;" "the British tradition-bound;" "South Africans racists"). Much of academic literature also assumes that national identity can be meaningfully discussed with little consideration of who is defining its central characteristics (e.g. Boerner 1986; Dann 1993; Elias 1994; Forsythe 1989; Greenfeld 1992; Johnston 1986; Tocqueville 2000; Weidenfeld 1986; Wiedemann 1986). Thus Elias (1994) writes of "German straightforwardness" as though people from around the world would uniformly perceive this as "typically German" regardless of who they are. Greenfeld argues that "German national consciousness was unmistakably and distinctly racist from the moment it existed" (1992) without considering that others might have considered Germany relatively tolerant. By applying such terms as "straightforward" or "racist," many social scientists help to reify and solidify the nation rather than recognize the ways in which the nation too can be variably interpreted.

Although many scholars recognize multivocality, they often retreat before exploring its full implications. Moore (1990), for example, discovers especially powerful evidence of varying perceptions of the United States in her analysis of Austrian, former West German, and former East German history textbooks. She finds that the West German reader "tends to politicize and moralize" by focusing on American racism, aggression, guilt, misuse of technology, militarism, violence, and political repression, often with "a tone of rivalry and almost contempt" (Moore 1990: 357). Moore suggests that this may reflect a preoccupation or "concern which West Germans may have with their recent past, and their need to come to terms with being dependent

in many ways upon the United States" (Moore 1990: 357). Moore surmises that East Germany's "own major concerns with its own social economic system perhaps provide the filter through which it views the United States"(1990: 358). Austrian texts, she argues, are most likely to portray Americans in a sympathetic light and Moore suggests that their own social and historical situation influences this approach:

> the relaxed and humanistic approach [could] be related to the fact that Austria was freed from occupying powers not many years after World War II, and is free from military or ideological pressure from any one other country[.] The Austrian reader seems to bend over backward to try to see American issues from an American point of view (Moore 1990: 358).

In each case, she notes how each nation is influenced by its own historical events and current relationship to the United States and how these considerations affect the presentation of American history in the different textbooks.

Despite her findings that suggest social location influences perceptions of the United States in history books, Moore's conclusions do not reach far enough. Moore ultimately evaluates these differences in perceptions of the United States in terms of their *accuracy* in reflecting America's "true" identity.[4] The East and West German perspectives that "moralize" or critique the United States are seen as being too politicized to provide a fair assessment of American history, whereas the more "relaxed," "humanistic" approach of the Austrians is seen as depicting the United States in a less biased manner. Where Moore seeks an accurate interpretation, I contend that these varying interpretations are equally "valid," representing instead the effect of social location on visions of United States history.

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[4] See also Nasalska (1995) for a similar treatment of Polish-German history.

Schwartz's (1987) study of George Washington mimics the logic of Moore's. He finds that the image of the first American president varies over time and across societies. Schwartz notes how the fascist government in Italy often described Washington as an "American Mussolini" whose "'love of liberty was unfailingly linked to the conception of a strong state whose authority was supreme'" (1987: 109). The *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, in contrast, describes Washington as the commander of America's "'bourgeois revolution'" who, as president, "'remained a representative of the propertied classes, and in this lies Washington's limitation; he was a bourgeois revolutionary'" (1987: 110). Schwartz argues that these "contrasting assessments of Washington and his relationship to the masses reflect the contrasts between fascist and communist ideology. Facts are selected, ignored, and bent to the service of political needs" (1987: 110). His conclusion further suggests that the symbolism of the first American president is interpreted differently dependent upon the interests of Washington's evaluators.

Yet, like Moore, Schwartz also argues for the accuracy of one interpretation over another, suggesting that "twentieth-century American observers would give a more accurate portrayal of Washington's significance to the founding generation" even though he too recognizes the problematic nature of such evaluations (Schwartz 1987: 110). Here again, I would argue that attempts to find George Washington's accurate or true cultural significance will forever fall short. The cultural significance of George Washington varies by culture, making it difficult to determine the "validity" of a single interpretation. As Fitzgerald notes, "[a]ll nations define a 'patriot' as one whose allegiance is toward his or her own people" (1979: 103). In other words, a 'patriot' for one country may very well be a 'traitor' for another. Schwartz (1987) and Moore

(1990) share a recognition of the multivocality of history; yet both ultimately seek to find an "accurate" interpretation rather than focusing on the effects of social context and social location.

Like the work of Schwartz (1987) and Moore (1990), much of the literature that focuses on the social construction of the nation has not fully analyzed the implications of "the eye of the beholder." Although there is room in the arguments of such theorists as Anderson (1991), Gellner (1983), Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), Handler (1988), and McDonald (1989) for such claims, there are no empirical studies that explicitly explore the multivocality of nations. Until now, most work on nationhood has considered either how a given nation constructs its own identity or how that identity has been constructed by others, but not in how such constructions differ from one another.[5] There has been no in-depth, systematic analysis of how perceptions of the nation vary across cultures.

There has also been no significant theoretical discussion of how these differences reflect the preoccupations of the evaluators, rather than solely being the product of the evaluated nation. By recognizing this, issues of which evaluation most "accurately" reflects a nation's identity become less relevant. Instead, attention is turned to how differences in perception reflect variations in social context and location.

Audience Reception

By recognizing the cultural influence on nationing, this dissertation argues for an understanding of the nation itself as a cultural object available for interpretation by audience members. As such, it contributes to a growing literature on the ways in which individuals and

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[5] See, for example, Berezin (1997); Brubaker (1992 and 1996); Cerulo (1995); Corse (1997); Fitzgerald (1979); Forsythe (1989); Griswold (1992); Handler (1988); Handler and Gable (1997); Hobsbawm (1990); Jaffe (1993); MacClancy (1993); Maier (1988); McDonald (1986; 1989; and 1993); McKechnie (1993); Sahlins (1989); Schudson (1989); Schwartz (1987); Zabusky (1995).

groups rely on their own social experiences to make sense of cultural objects in socially patterned ways. Audience reception theorists recognize how individuals actively process information to find their own meanings in packaged cultural products. Reception theory has drawn attention to the ways that social characteristics--class, race, gender, ethnicity, age, education, national membership—all structure understandings of the world (Baxandall 1972; Berger 1972; Corse 1997; Eck 1996; Griswold 1987a; Liebes 1990; Press 1991; Radway 1991; Shively 1992).

Reception theory also makes explicit the ways in which meaning involves an interaction between the object and the audience. Cultural meaning, as Griswold argues, "depends on an analogous interaction, that between the cultural work, text, or symbol and the human beings who experience it" (Griswold 1987b: 1080). Shively also explains how the meaning "imputed to cultural works varies over social space" (1987a: 725). Shared social location unites individuals in certain kinds of cultural and social experiences that come to influence the group's perception. Theorists of audience reception recognize the ways that social position in the world allows cultural objects to become "multivocal" and thereby open to multiple, although not unlimited, interpretations based on the audience.

Audience reception theory has contributed in two primary ways to studies of social life. First, its proponents are more inclusive in terms of who is qualified to interpret cultural objects. They suggest that minorities, women, the working class, the young, and the old are all able to derive their own (valid) interpretations without relying on the theories of "experts." Second, audience reception work contributes to theories of stratification and cultural positioning by suggesting that these "ways of seeing" cultural objects are dependent upon social location (Berger 1972).

In the following, I focus most heavily on national membership as a foremost characteristic that affects perceptions of the nation or how one nations. National membership speaks to one's embeddedness in the cultural, economic, and political structures of a give nation. Griswold's (1987a) seminal study of how the nationality of book reviewers affects their reviews of the same cultural product is thus particularly relevant to my work. Griswold demonstrates how the works of a West Indian novelist are seen to have markedly different significance for reviewers from the West Indies, Great Britain, and the United States. She finds West Indian reviewers focus on issues of local politics, for instance, while Americans concentrate overwhelmingly on themes of race. Conspicuously absent from British reviews, she argues, are any mentions of colonialism. She concludes that the importance of any given novel for different reviewers says as much, if not more, about the individuals' cultural and national preoccupations than it does for the inherent content of the books. West Indian investment in the internal workings of West Indian politics and Americans' own "obsession" with race (1987a: 1102) lead reviewers from both nations to play up these themes respectively. In contrast, the British concern with the end of colonialism leads those reviewers, she suggests, to be silent on this theme.

In their study on the cultural reception of the nighttime soap opera *Dallas,* Liebes and Katz (1990) also find national and ethnic membership to markedly influence interpretations of the television show. Here, the researchers turn not to "professional" experts, such as reviewers or critics, but to "average" audience members, noting that if scholars "do not tell the same story, even among themselves, why should we expect viewers to see a single story or to be affected by a monolithic message about which even the experts disagree?" (1990: 13). In comparing the reactions of Americans, Japanese, Israeli Russians, Moroccan Jews, Arab citizens of Israel, and

Israeli Kibbutz members, Liebes and Katz conclude that each "cultural group found its own way to 'negotiate' with the program – different types of readings, different forms of involvement, different mechanisms of self-defense, each with its own kind of vulnerability" (1990: v). This negotiation, they argue, is a "function of the symbolic resources of the viewer and the symbolic offerings of the text" (1990: 6).[6] The researchers conclude that national or ethnic membership leads to vastly different readings of the soap opera. Similar to the research of Griswold (1987b) and Liebes and Katz (1990), my own work explores the effects of national membership on perceptions of the nation by both "experts" (history textbook authors and newspaper journalists) as well as "average" individuals.

Thus far, what unites audience reception studies is that they have all focused on certain kinds of culture. Griswold (1987b), Corse (1997), and Radway (1991) all examine various forms of literature. Press (1991) and Liebes and Katz (1990) study the reception of television while Shively (1992) studies the Western and Eck (1996) nudity in photographed or painted images. All these subjects of research involve cultural products in the more traditional sense of culture associated with popular and elite forms of art (see Gans 1999). Given that art has traditionally been seen as open for interpretation – although normally by those qualified to do so, art "experts" (see Peterson 1999), the argument that art objects can be multivocal in one sense is compatible with the larger role and meaning of art in society.

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[6] Despite this insightful approach to understanding the cultural variations in interpretations of *Dallas*, Liebes and Katz (1990), contrary to their own thesis, still assume that one interpretation of the show is more accurate than all others. They argue that the soap opera has a "conservative and primordial message" that is "based on kinship relationships" and constantly play off themes of loyalty and treachery (1990: 71, 11). Unfortunately, this leads the researchers to pose at least one loaded question ("Why all the fuss about babies [on the show]?") rather than simply allowing their respondents to come to their own conclusions. Yet, even with these potentially leading questions, Liebes and Katz convincingly demonstrate that national or ethnic identification helps to shape the perceptions of individuals viewing television.

Despite the potentially larger social implications of audience reception studies, however, there has been no systematic application of this theory to how social position affects perceptions of non-art related cultural products. There is nothing inherent to audience reception theory that suggests that this work or theory could not be applied to a greater variety of social experiences. Nonetheless, the absence of non-art related studies inadvertently strengthens the implicit assumption that certain kinds of culture (e.g., art) are open to multiple interpretations while others are more static and stable (e.g., political entities). By exploring the multivocality of nationhood, I am arguing for an explicit expansion of the term "cultural object" in audience reception work beyond solely art-related products to a broader, more inclusive understanding. In my analysis of perceptions of the nation, the nation itself comes to be understood as a cultural object that is publicly available for evaluation and interpretation. It is produced, albeit through complex social processes, and available for reception and interpretation in ways similar to books, television, film, and other cultural products. And, like other forms of cultural objects, it is also understood differently dependent upon social position.

Operationalizing Nationing

The question thus arises how one discovers the process of nationing in action. Nationing, as I argue, is the process by which individuals or collectivities make sense of a specific nation in the context of larger expectations about the meaning and role of nations in general. I hypothesize that individuals sharing the same characteristics (and thus similar kinds of social influences) come to interpret nationhood similarly. Thus, having a common national membership can lead to similar understandings of nationhood and similar perceptions of specific nations.

I begin by taking Germany as my case study. As an economic, political, and cultural world power that has undergone significant transformations in the twentieth century, Germany is arguably in a position of prominence for the world. This prominence (in both the negative and positive sense) has led to a certain level of awareness of the nation around the world that makes Germany a particularly useful case study. Further, the power of World War II and the Holocaust as an internationally recognized event has arguably limited the potential for variation in understandings of Germany around the world. Many might expect images of the German nation to be more monolithic than those of nations with less powerful events tied to their identity. The discovery of national variations in how Germany is perceived would thus suggest that the same argument could then be applied to other nations with less notoriety. Thus, rather than understanding Germany as the exception to the rule, I argue that its uniqueness may in fact best illustrate the power of nationing in action.

This dissertation observes the process of nationing on both a collective and individual level, expert and popular. First I examine two kinds of national cultural products, secondary school world history textbooks and newspaper articles. Then I explore intensive interviews with "average" individuals. As noted, cultural products are simultaneously affected by and contribute to the process of nationing by helping to create a national image of other nations. The cultural products produced in a given nation (e.g., maps;[7] movies; fiction and nonfiction; monuments; news; television; radio; history books; art; educational tools; humor; and music) come to reflect the influence of this common national membership. Nationing is therefore a social process, not only conducted on an individual level, but also on a larger collective level through the production

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[7] World maps are a particularly interesting symbolically if one compares, for example, European world maps to those made in the United States. The former centers geographically around Europe while the American maps have the U.S. at its center (which ultimately requires both Russia and Asia to be split in half). The "center of the world" comes to be seen through a cultural, and even nationalistic, lens.

of cultural objects that represent this collective perspective. I begin my study of nationing in action by examining this national perspective.

In researching textbooks, I selected secondary-school world history books from five nations: England, Kenya, India, the United States, and Germany. My primary interest here was in finding a diverse sample of nations, rather than selecting places that had obvious connections to Germany. The first four represent four different continents and cultures. I then included Germany in the sample because, as the "self-view," it provides a crucial point of comparison. For each country, I located secondary school texts that concentrated on or included world history in the twentieth century.[8]

My method of collection varied by nation. To select my American textbooks, I located the lists of approved textbooks for California and Texas and then randomly selected four textbooks from these lists.[9] All others were obtained through the Georg Eckert Institute in Braunschweig, Germany. There I was able to select five German texts widely used throughout the nation.[10] I was also able to locate five widely used English texts. The six texts from India all satisfy national requirements for secondary level, history books.[11] For Kenya, I have thus far located one series of history and social studies textbooks. In total, I analyzed nineteen books: four each from England, Germany, and the United States, one from Kenya, and six from India. (See Appendix A for bibliographic information on the texts used in the sample.) For each text, I

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[8] In order to avoid researching the former East and West Germanys as separate nations, I chose 1990 as the earliest possible publication date. I therefore sought out books that recount the history of the two separate nations with the awareness of the subsequent reunification.

[9] The American school textbook industry, through numerous mergers, has been reduced to a small number of major publishing houses that each produce several world history textbooks. Although each individual school district is able to choose which textbooks they will use, the large number of school-age children in the Californian and Texan school systems ultimately set the standards for the larger textbook markets in the United States.

[10] In Germany, the selection of textbooks is determined at the state level.

[11] Rather than selecting just four of the Indian books, I included all six because each text included relatively little information about Germany and the additional two books helped clarify the Indian image of Germany in world history.

combed through the entire volume searching for references to Germany and collecting

information on what events were covered as well as any commentary included. I also took note

of how world history in general was organized within each text.

For the second leg of my research, I compared the articles published in one major

newspaper each from England, Kenya, India and the United States.[12] Again, I focus on

newspaper coverage from 1991 to 1998 so as not to confuse the reporting on East and West

Germany with that of the reunified nation. As criteria for selection, I sought a national

newspaper from each country with circulations over 100,000 that had respectable reputations

both in and outside of the country. I selected the *Guardian* from Manchester/London, England;

the *Times of India*, Bombay/Mumbai edition; the *Daily Nation* from Nairobi, Kenya; and the

New York Times from New York City, United States.[13] Each of these newspapers is read

primarily by the middle and upper classes in their respective country and thus tend to serve elite

audiences.[14]

For the survey, I researched randomly selected two-week time periods from each year

between 1991 and 1998.[15] I then reviewed the entire newspaper for each of the selected days and

copied all articles pertaining to or mentioning Germany[16] for a sample total of 318 articles

between the four newspapers. I coded articles for content, categorizing those issues discussed

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[12] Although I would have ideally included a German newspaper as well in this sample, this would have meant selecting almost every article published because the majority of all articles would concern Germany. For this reason, Germany was excluded from this portion of the study.

[13] Note: Circulation rates will be determined for each publication at a later date.

[14] Elite newspapers, although they tend not to be representative of the country at large, tend to include more substantial international/foreign news sections and this greater coverage allowed for the possibility of a larger sample of articles.

[15] The chosen weeks are as follows: April 14 – 28, 1991; January 19 – February 1, 1992; September 5 – 18, 1993; August 7 – 20, 1994; June 11 – 24, 1995; April 21 – May 4, 1996; January 26, 1997 – February 8, 1997; July 12 – 25 1998.

[16] Although I considered articles from all sections, I did not take articles from the Sports section that pertained solely to German athletes or teams; I did include articles more generally about Germany from this section. I also did not take articles from the Business or Finance sections that dealt exclusively with a specific German business, nor did I include advertisements for German companies.

(e.g., domestic politics, international relations, crime) (see Appendix B for frequencies) and making note of the language or analysis used in the articles to discuss Germany.

In order to complement the public, "official" presentations of Germany provided in the textbooks and newspapers, I then conducted a total of forty-five interviews with US-Americans and Germans to get individual perspectives on the German nation.[17] I found interview partners through a process of references from people I knew, random requests of strangers for interviews, and snowball sampling. For both Americans and Germans, I chose to interview people born between 1955 and 1975 who at the time of the interviews were anywhere in age from mid-twenties to mid-forties. My intention here was to control at least in part for generational differences, focusing primarily on those born well after World War II. In total, I located twenty-six interview partners in the United States, eighteen in and around Washington D.C. and eight in the Charlottesville, Virginia area. In Germany, I conducted thirteen interviews in Berlin (a city divided by the Wall), five interviews in Heidelberg, well within the borders of former West Germany, and (thus far) one in Jena, a similar-sized town found within former East German borders. While Berlin and Washington D.C. are urban settings, Charlottesville, Heidelberg, and Jena are all smaller towns with less than 100,000 residents.

For both groups, I sought the most diverse samples possible.[18] Each group is made up of roughly fifty percent women and fifty percent men. About half of my respondents in both countries have a university education, while the other half do not.[19] In the United States, my

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[17] Interviews were conducted with Americans in English and with Germans in German, but the latter are translated into English for the dissertation.

[18] See Appendix D for sociodemographic information on the respondents.

[19] Although I asked both Americans and Germans about their income levels, Germans especially were reluctant to provide this information. Americans were most likely to know what they made annually, while Germans consider income in terms of what they earn per month, making a significant distinction between gross and net income. A number of German respondents suggested that they did not have any idea what they earn per month, while others simply noted that they do not provide such information. Former East Germans seemed particularly hesitant to reveal their income and part of this distrust likely originates from the surveillance of the East German *Stasi* into private

respondents include African-Americans, Jews, gays, an Indian-American, Latina-American, and other "minorities." In Germany, I spoke with Turkish-Germans, Jews, and gays, all of whom serve as significant and conspicuous minority populations within the nation. I made a substantial effort to split my German interviews so that half are with former East Germans and the other half are with those from West Germans.[20]

Interviews followed a semi-structured format and each respondent was asked the same set of questions (see Appendix C for the interview schedules). Most individuals were interviewed alone, although three sets of Americans and one set of Germans were interviewed in pairs at their request. The formal interview lasted anywhere from twenty to ninety minutes with an average of about forty minutes. Respondents were also asked to fill out a self-survey for socio-demographic information at the end (see Appendix D for further information). Although I took notes, all interviews were taped and then immediately transcribed.

For the interview, I began by emphasizing that my questions were not a test of what they knew but more of a "free association" nature. This introduction was important for putting respondents at ease in terms of what they did or did not "know." Although my primary interest was in how individuals thought and talked about Germany, I suspected that asking questions about several nations allowed more for a contrastive relationship that could evoke more detailed responses from my interview partners. Indeed, as it turned out, by asking similar questions about three nations, Germany, England, and the United States, my respondents often provided more detailed answers about each nation, often going back retroactively to answer questions asked about a previous nation. I found asking concluding questions about the respondent's own nation to be particularly helpful. My interviewees were more able to speak about their feelings toward

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lives in the German Democratic Republic. Due to this incomplete information, I do not rely on income as a primary indicator of class.

their own nation after they had commented on others first. For the Americans, this meant asking

questions about Germany first, England second, and the United States last. For the Germans, I

began with the United States, then England, and finally asked about Germany.

Together, these three legs of research--the analysis of 19 world history textbooks, 318

newspaper articles, and 45 intensive interviews--combine to shed light on both the process and

effects of nationing. These public and private images of Germany from around the world

demonstrate how the process of forming a vision of the nation is socially structured. School

history textbooks, newspaper articles, and individual interviews provide unusual insight into the

multivocality of the nation.

Outline of the Dissertation

The dissertation begins by focusing on public images of the German nation, first through

textbook accounts of Germany's role in world history, then through newspaper accounts of

Germany's role in the contemporary world. In Chapter Two, I examine secondary school world

history textbooks from England, Germany, India, Kenya, and the United States. As one of the

first sources of exposure to the histories and characteristics of other nations, history textbooks

provide schoolchildren with their own nation's perspective on world history and teach children

what they should know about other nations. Further, world history texts also provide a way of

organizing the world in general. Some do so chronologically while others do so thematically.

Some structure world history around political events, others around economic or technological

developments. Some focus almost exclusively on the public realm while others incorporate more

on private or family life. World history can be presented teleologically and authoritatively or as

a changing history, debatable and open for interpretation. As this chapter demonstrates, how

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[20] I followed this same strategy in Berlin, interviewing half former West Berliners and half former East Berliners.

world history is organized ultimately affects depictions of Germany. Textbooks from each of these five nations present very different images of the German nation and its role in world history.

Chapter Three considers how newspapers are themselves the products of and contribute to the process of nationing. Newspapers provide insight into how a nation is viewed from a contemporary perspective and, as I argue here, this perspective is strongly influenced by the social location of the publications. In my review of the four newspapers from England, India, Kenya, and the United States, I address how Germany is routinely portrayed in negative terms as it contends, according to the newspapers' accounts, with a variety of threats to its stability. Yet, as I show, the four newspapers all take markedly different perspectives in explaining what issues most threaten to undermine the nation. Here again, social location comes to structure the image of Germany and the ways in which the nation is understood in a larger context, even as the newspapers unite in their dire forecast for German stability.

The second half of the dissertation centers around the results of my intensive interviews conducted with Americans and Germans. In Chapter Four, I compare Americans' and Germans' assumptions about the concept of the nation. This first interview chapter considers how national membership affects one's relationship not only to one's own nation but also to the very concept of the nation. I argue that their relationships to their own respective nations influence their understanding of such concepts as national symbols and national pride. As excerpts from interviews demonstrate, Americans tend to believe in the United States as the embodiment (in theory, if not in reality) of core ideal values. Given this, Americans are more likely to see positive potential in the idea of the nation and more readily believe in the nation as a source of pride. This connection to ideal values allows Americans to see all nations, not only the United

States, in positive terms. In contrast, Germans tend to be more wary of the concept of the nation, concentrating instead on the negative potential of the nation. For these respondents, the idea of national pride has less relevance, as they believe one can only take pride in one's own achievements, thus making national pride a moot concept.

Chapter Five extends from the previous chapter, by considering how these different relationships to the concept of the nation lead to different visions of Germany for my respondents. The Americans have a relatively vague image of modern-day Germany but show competence in discussing the Nazi era. Despite this overwhelmingly negative image, they still believe that Germans are united as a proud people. In contrast, German respondents find it rather difficult to speak about their own nation as a meaningful category at all. They are often divided in their visions, particularly between East and West, but unite in their discomfort and even self-consciousness when discussing the topic. Here, they specifically reject the idea of German national pride, suggesting that pride must be earned and instead make clear they want to be evaluated as individuals not as a "people."

Chapter Six examines how sociodemographic variables other than national membership affect the process of nationing. Factors such as age, class, gender, race, and ethnicity influence the process of nationing and complicate, rather than negate, the influence of national membership. Older East Germans thus express even greater skepticism about the idea of the nation than other Germans. African Americans concentrate more on race issues in the U.S. but are just as patriotic as other Americans. Immigrants to the U.S. cite their immigration status as a further reason for American pride, while Turkish immigrants to Germany explain why their status makes them even more skeptical about nationhood. Class and gender come to affect the ways in which people speak about the nation. Working class respondents tend to know less than

their middle-class counterparts and yet they all speak equally authoritatively on the subject. In contrast, women and men tend to be equally knowledgeable about the nation, but women are more likely to apologize for knowing too little. As I discover, these and many other variables profoundly come to affect the individual's approach to nationing.

As the last of the interview chapters, Chapter Seven questions whether a postmodern sensibility has entered the consciousness of my respondents when it comes to nationhood. In the interviews, I push my respondents to explain whether an "accurate" image of a nation exists. These questions lead to many contradictory answers. Yet, rather than arguing for a relativist or constructionist understanding of nationhood, my respondents accept or ignore these contradictions. Instead of embracing a postmodern approach, my respondents simply assume that they do not know "enough" about the nation to fully understand it. They cite inadequate knowledge on the topic rather than an inherent flaw about nations as the reason for contradictions, thus allowing their assumption of social order to remain unharmed. Nationing, I contend, requires a certain level of accepting things "as is," even if this means glossing over paradox, rather than embracing a postmodern consciousness.

The final chapter considers what these findings about nationing tell us about both Germany and the larger social world. As the preceding chapters show, how one relates to the very idea of the nation is socially structured. Many of the misunderstandings that arise in international and political encounters stem from the effects of nationing and the assumption that everyone relates to the nation in a similar way. Taken-for-granted assumptions ignore the very different ideas and values associated with the nation. Thus, for example, claims about the centrality of individualism to American life contrast with the responses of my interview partners, particularly in comparison to those of the Germans. I conclude that although the effects of

globalization are far-reaching, there are still fundamentally different approaches to relating to the world that fall along national lines, and these profoundly affect our relationship to the world. Studying the effects of nationing does not just lead to differing images of Germany, they lead to different understandings and moral judgments of the world order.

Chapter Two

'German History is World History': Ordering the World through History

The title of this chapter originates from a German librarian at the Georg Eckert Institut in Braunschweig responding to my request for help in locating German world history textbooks. Her response, "German history *is* world history," was not intended to be a statement of flippant ethnocentrism, but was instead meant to point to the uniqueness of the role of Germany in modern world history textbooks. From the German perspective, the most significant events of the past century – World War I, World War II, and the Cold War – have centered around Germany. Thus, for Germans, modern global history cannot be separated from a national history.

The librarian may well be correct on one level: German history has played a role in understandings of world history in the last one hundred years. Yet, on another level, her comment does not convey just how differently that history is understood throughout the world. Nor does her statement suggest how history can be variously organized and retold in different cultural settings. In this chapter, I analyze world history textbooks intended for high-school students published in the United States, England, Kenya, India, and Germany. I maintain that Germany is presented differently depending upon *whose* world history is recounted.

How we nation, or come to understand the nation and our relationship to it, is dependent in large part on placing that nation in a larger historical context. Here, I argue that the ways in which world history is packaged in school textbooks introduce young people to certain kinds of understandings of how the world is organized and the place of the nation in that world order. Cross-cultural variations in that organization in part reflect varying national worldviews as to

what aspects of history should be presented and emphasized. World history textbooks thus provide insight into the vision of the world intended for future citizens of a given society.

World history texts for schoolchildren are consciously nationalistic, conveying an image of the world that aligns with a larger national worldview. Fitzgerald argues that school history textbooks are unlike other histories in that they are "essentially nationalistic histories…written not to explore but to instruct—to tell the children what their elders want them to know about their country" and thus become a "series of instructive morality plays"[21] (1979: 47, 153). Boerner explains that "how a nation views itself and its past is often reflected in children's books and school texts" (1986: 10). These texts do not just reveal a national self-perception, however, they also relay a larger message of how the world and its history should be organized.

By providing a worldview, school textbook authors construct the nation and its larger meaning through their nationalist accounting of world history. In many ways, schoolbook authors play a similar role to Griswold's (1987a) book reviewers in her study of the reception of a West Indian novelist's works. In part, textbook authors, like book reviewers, are cultural producers, making cultural products available to members of a national community. But they, as members of national communities, are also cultural receivers. They interpret these products on behalf of their respective nations and provide their audiences with information relevant to the interests of the national community. Textbook authors do not write in a vacuum but are instead mindful of the interests of both their publishers and audience.

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[21] Given the nationalistic tendencies of schoolbooks, one might argue that differences in how history is presented to students around the world are to be expected. And yet, I would contend that while we find this claim on the one hand almost intuitive (see also Keller 1990), on the other, we still tend to believe that certain aspects of history are "sacred" and thus told similarly regardless of where one is (e.g. Dann 1993; Johnston 1986; Keller 1990). Many, including social scientists, still believe in a "correct" understanding of history (Moore 1990; Nasalska 1995; Schwartz 1987).

Many academics have recognized both the uniqueness of the material and the importance of school textbooks for social science research (Al-Qazzaz 1978; Boli 1989; Fitzgerald 1979; Moore 1990; Nasalska 1995; Sauer 1990; Smith 1983). Textbooks must follow conventional standards of "teachability," which result in textbook authors providing simplified stories of the past that can be easily package well into lessons (Schudson 1989: 215). Given their patriotic and over-simplifying tendencies, school textbooks are a peculiar and unique source of information about history. Yet their importance is not diminished by their peculiarities. For many children, textbooks are not only their first introduction to both foreign lands and the concept of "world history," they are also one of their last. Many adults do not keep up on foreign events and cultures and relatively few continue to read on the subject of world history. Al-Qazzaz explains the significance of such texts for schoolchildren:

> Textbooks are also a primary source from which the student acquires attitudes, beliefs and feelings about his people and other ethnic and foreign people; and studies in the field of social psychology indicate that attitudes held by adults toward particular groups can be traced in part to elementary and high school learning (1978: 451).

Schoolbooks thus serve as a lasting first impression for many.

As my interviews with Americans and Germans suggest, even those that do keep current on international events still often rely on what they learned in school. My respondents, upon hearing a question they were hesitant to answer, would often reply "Well, I know I learned in school that…"[22] Even in cases where my respondents were critical of what they had learned (which often they were not), it was apparent that this knowledge, first learned in school, became

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[22] When I asked one respondent about famous English people, he responded: "I'm thinking of social studies. Who invented that stupid reaper?" (A28).

the foundation to which all other knowledge was compared. In other words, even if what they

learned later led them to be critical of school knowledge, school knowledge, as the first

introduction to world history, made a strong first impression and was the basis for comparison.

The following analysis thus focuses on the kinds of information conveyed to students

through world history books. I consider foremost how world history is organized in the different

textbooks and the kinds of implicit and explicit messages sent to students about the relationships

between the world, history, and the nation. I turn to the textbooks' treatment of Germany in

twentieth century history as an illustration of how these different approaches to world history

affect the presentation of one nation's role in history. The different emphases and approaches to

the subject of Germany in world history, I argue, suggest the effects of audience reception on

visions of the world and the nation.

This survey includes modern world history textbooks from England, Germany, Kenya,

India, and the United States that concentrate on the twentieth century. The primary requirement

for inclusion was that the textbook had to be published between 1990 and 2000, thereby allowing

for the recognition of reunification in 1990. In total, I analyzed nineteen books: four each from

England, Germany, and the United States, one from Kenya, and six from India (see Appendix A

for a list of textbooks).

American Textbooks

Unlike the textbooks from the other four nations in the sample, U.S. textbooks are

exceptionally thick, heavy, and oversized. Their unwieldiness can be largely attributed to the

fact that the U.S. "modern world history" textbooks present in one volume what most other

nations present in several. [23] American textbooks begin, at the very latest, with the 1500s and

continue on through the 1990s. Given that most of the texts from other nations reported almost

exclusively on the twentieth century, I concentrated my analysis of the depiction of Germany in

American texts on the events of the last century.

American textbook authors organize world history first and foremost chronologically,

with each chapter picking up roughly where the last chapter left off in history, even if in a

different part of the world. By doing so, the authors relay history as a narrative with catalysts

that spark change, an event that occurs, and consequences that follow. Taken together, these

events suggest a teleology that moves toward positive progress. There is a tendency to

emphasize one cause for an event rather than suggesting that the explanations for historical

events can be multi-causal or complex. Although American textbook authors often include

quotes from individuals that illustrate an aspect of history (e.g., the account of a soldier involved

in fighting a war), these quotes are designed to support a specific accounting of history. Despite

this usage of personal stories, American textbook authors rarely depict history as relativistic.

That is to say, history is presented as facts, the interpretation of which is not dependent upon

time or place. Similarly, debates among historians as to the significance or importance of an

historical event are not incorporated into accounts of American world history.

This authoritative, sequential approach to history that emphasizes one cause for each

event enables the American authors to present a moral history with teleological implications.

Through this sequential approach, history comes to be seen as part of a larger narrative; one in

which all corners of the world are involved, and one in which even the world wars allows its

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[23] The Kenyan textbook also includes all of world history in one edition rather than in several volumes. But the textbook ultimately concentrates overwhelmingly on the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and thus is similar to the textbooks from England, India, and Germany. In fact, the Kenyan textbook is much thinner than those published in England, Germany, and the United States, second only to the smallness of the Indian texts.

citizens to progress toward greater values. Events that occur earlier in history are presented as a means of foreshadowing what is yet to come, arguably suggesting its inevitability as well as a positive progression.

American world history books are also gendered in their presentations of the past. American textbooks center history around political events, wars, battles, and international relations – all aspects of public, political life and the traditional domain of men.[24] Changes in family structure, gender relationships, home life and women's lives in general are, in this sense, essentially written out of history.[25] In their place are those aspects of history that overwhelmingly concern the work of men, particularly those of "great leaders," almost all of whom are male.

These general ways of organizing American world history chronologically, unicausally, morally, teleologically, and through public, political events unsurprisingly affect American depictions of Germany in this history. German history, like all of history, is presented sequentially starting furthest back in history and moving forward. It focuses exclusively on German political events and international relations (particularly regarding the World Wars) and solely on the public (male) domain. There is an implicit teleology that weaves its way into this history and the moral significance of Germany in the twentieth century is often explicitly addressed, as the following analysis illustrates.

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[24] This gendered rendering of history becomes acutely noticeable in presentations of the last century. Up until roughly the beginning of the 19th century, the emphasis on wars, foreign policies, and governmental decisions could arguably be explained by the fact that the more private aspects of social life were not as meticulously recorded as those in public life. However, history in the twentieth century need not rely solely on written documents, but can instead turn to personal narratives told by those still living. Despite the potential to include more aspects of private life in accounts of the twentieth century, these parts of history are still largely ignored in American history books.

[25] When women are addressed, it is primarily to mention how they contributed to public life. As my interviews with Americans suggest, this likely has an effect on women's investment in world history and nations in general. American women were less likely than their male counterparts to express an interest in or keep up with international relations or world history.

The first detailed discussion of Germany as a nation emerges in descriptions of Otto von Bismarck's role[26] in uniting the independent states. Here the teleological theme emerges clearly. Bismarck's use of war against external enemies is a primary theme in explaining how unification came to be. American textbook authors often cite the Prussian's proclamation that the great questions of the day will not be settled by speeches or majority rule, but by "blood and iron" (Beck 1999: 617; Ellis 1997: 582; Farah 1999: 459). There is an element of foreshadowing in the American emphasis on this statement, cited repeatedly, as well as a sense of inevitability as Bismarck's comment comes to symbolize the role of Germany in the wars of the twentieth century.

Given that historical events are rarely provided with complex causes in American textbooks, the U.S. authors devote relatively little attention to the causes of World War I, attributing the war to nationalist rivalries and alliances between European powers. History from 1914 to 1918 is solely a (gendered) account of World War I, its related battles, and military strategies. In discussing the consequences of the Treaty of Versailles, however, U.S. history textbooks are sympathetic to Germany, suggesting that Germany was treated too harshly through the stipulations and punishments meted out by the Allied nations. According to the American textbook authors, the French and British, despite U.S. protests, insistence that the Germans accept sole responsibility for World War I placed a "staggering burden" on Germany as a way of

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[26] Bismarck is presented in two of the American textbooks as a brilliant politician who used intricate and complicated political alliances to solidify the nation-state. However, in one profile of the chancellor, the authors note that

> Germans still have not decided how to judge Otto von Bismarck. To some…he was the greatest
> and noblest of Germany's statesmen. They say he almost single-handedly unified the nation and
> raised it to greatness. To others, he was a devious politician who abused his powers and led
> Germany into dictatorship" (Beck 1999: 618).

seeking revenge (Ellis 1997: 711). Ellis and Esler explain: "German resentment of the Treaty of Versailles would poison the international climate for 20 years – and help spark an even more deadly war" (1997: 711). The treaty left "Germany weakened and humiliated as well as deprived of great-power status… Germans' festering resentment burst forth upon the world with an even greater violence to decades later in the form of Nazism" (Farah 1999: 540). In these accounts, the Third Reich emerged out of a response to an exceptionally harsh punishment by the French and British, despite American reservations about such a biased settlement. American world history books are in agreement that this unjust treaty "left a legacy of bitterness and hatred in the hearts of the German people" that was the primary cause for the rise of Nazism twenty years later (Beck 1999: 762). The American analysis of Hitler's rise to power thus conveys a moral disapproval of the harsh treatment of the Germans and attributes the success of the Third Reich almost exclusively to Germany's inability to recover from an unjust treaty.

The treatment of Nazism in American textbooks takes on a particularly moral tone, with the emphasis overwhelmingly on the Holocaust, as each text devotes at least four separate pages to the subject and its meaning for today. As Farah and Karls explain, the "most shocking horror in a war filled with atrocities was the Holocaust" (1999: 633). Ellis and Esler begin:

> Hitler's rise to power is one of the most significant events of our century. His
> success raised disturbing questions that we still debate today…. Why did Hitler
> gain the enthusiastic support of many Germans?… The scale and savagery of the
> Holocaust have been unequaled in history… Why had ordinary people in
> Germany, Poland, France, and elsewhere accepted and even collaborated in
> Hitler's 'final solution'?" (1997: 778, 800, 809).

This quote suggests to American students that there may in fact be different ways to understand the person most responsible for the unification of Germany – at least for Germans. As such, this quote also serves as one of the few

The Holocaust thus becomes the primary defining event in Americans' accounts of the Nazi era.

American textbooks also make a significant effort to keep the Holocaust "current" and make clear that the moral "lessons" to be learned from it will never die. Farah and Karls, for example, note how "anti-Semitic Europeans" collaborated with Nazis throughout the continent, including banks in "neutral" Switzerland that "profited from the money and valuables stolen from Jews by the Nazis. Even as late as the 1990s, much of this wealth had yet to be returned to the families of the rightful owners" (1999: 617). In a section entitled "Let Us Never Forget," the same authors cite three (American) cultural products – Elie Wiesel's *Night,* Steven Spielberg's *Schindler's List*, and the establishment of the Holocaust Museum on the Washington Mall – as ways in which the Holocaust still has relevance today (1999: 616). Ellis and Esler explain how there are still lessons to be learned: "[t]oday, the record of that slaughter is a vivid reminder of the monstrous results of racism and intolerance" before concluding by asking whether "the Holocaust could happen again today? Explain" (1997: 809). Krieger et al. include an essay from a Jewish-American teenager, born at least thirty years after the end of the war, on the importance of the Holocaust for education, "'the story must be told…[so] that we can break down the walls that racism and discrimination build'" (1997: 724). The authors further summarize: "Many clung to life so that they could bear witness to what had happened. The survivors' efforts were not in vain…. The Holocaust demonstrated that evil orders must never be obeyed and that the values of tolerance and respect for others must be preserved" (1997: 725-6). The Holocaust illustrates a grander narrative for the American schoolbooks about the dangers of racism, prejudice, and violence that will always remain relevant.

Given this approach, American textbook writers face a predicament in how to reconcile their condemnations of the Holocaust with the fact that Germany will become an ally as early as

reminders in the American textbooks that history can be interpreted differently.

in the next chapter. Part of the way that the writers resolve this difficulty is to simultaneously

condemn the actions of "Nazis" while including a "put-yourself-in-their-shoes" discussion. In

one example, Krieger et al. (1997) has a section entitled "Interact with History" in which

students are asked to pretend that they are Germans in the 1930s who need to choose a candidate

in Germany. One such candidate reminds Germans to remember its "long and glorious past"

while the other suggests that there are "no simple or quick solutions to problems." Students are

reminded of "the defeated nations' bitterness toward the Versailles Treaty" and then asked to

consider how this too might affect their vote (Krieger 1997: 794). At the end of their discussion

of the Holocaust and Third Reich, the authors include a section on "Making Inferences" in which

students are asked: "Why do you think German soldiers and the German people went along with

the Nazi policy of persecution of the Jews?" (1997: 834). Here, students are told specifically to

think about: "Nazi treatment of those who disagreed; Nazi propaganda, the political and social

conditions in Germany at the time." They are then given a "Theme Activity" in which they are

to imagine the "ethical dilemmas" faced by German scientists and doctors asked to play a role in

the Holocaust, taking into account "the consequences of public opposition" (1997: 834).

Through such sections, American authors allow students a way of partly understanding the

actions of the Germans. Although just a few pages earlier, the same authors had documented a

deep-seated "hatred for Jews" (1997: 831) in their accounting of the Third Reich, interactive

questions attempt to provide a means for (partially) contextualizing Germans' actions. In doing

so, the American authors in part allow for an explanation of the relatively sudden transition from

German as enemy in one chapter to German as ally in the next.

Germany's identity at the end of the war radically shifts in the U.S. textbooks from

evilness to the ultimate symbol of the Cold War. As the German nation is split into two, the new

Germanys come to represent dichotomous values. More accurately, the German Democratic Republic comes to represent the totalitarian Soviet system while the power of the (American) democratic tradition reigns in West Germany. The "saving" of West Berlin was the turning point between the Western Allies and Germany from that of "occupiers and occupied to partners in a joint struggle to defend the free world" (Krieger 1997: 746). Postwar Berlin, destroyed by bombings, "challenged the resolve of the West to restore not only the structures but the spirit of the people [in West Germany]" (Ellis 1997: 644).

The erection of the Berlin Wall, "the most visible and powerful physical symbol of the iron curtain," in 1961 is central to this story of freedom, becoming "an ugly symbol of the Cold War and a propaganda defeat for the Soviets. It showed that workers, far from enjoying a communist paradise, had to be forcibly restrained from fleeing" (Ellis 1997: 848). American investment in (West) Germany is interpreted as a pure and unadulterated interest in maintaining the values of freedom and democracy for the post-war nation. And this commitment to Western values is the sole justification for the significant monetary, military, and political investment in the Federal Republic of Germany.

This revised way of seeing the post-war Germanys allows the American textbooks to describe the "economic miracle" and reestablishment of (West) Germany as a modern, industrialized power in positive terms. Postwar West Germany is defined largely as Western Europe's leading industrial nation (Farah 1999: 656), producer of the Volkswagen Beetle and other reliable German cars (Ellis 1997: 857), a powerful welfare state, "one of the world's most stable democracies" (Farah 1999: 656), and a crucial ally to the United States. Descriptions of East Germany, to the degree the country is addressed, are accounts of deprivation – of both

freedom and materialism, that stand in marked contrast to the values of West Germany (and the United States).

Unsurprisingly, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the resulting reunification of Germany symbolizes the triumph of Western (American) democratic principles over Communist, totalitarian dictatorships. Indeed, one textbook refers to 1989 as "A Year of Miracles" and describes in detail the fall of the Wall and resulting celebrations (Farah 1999: 781): 781): "Many slammed hammers into the wall, smashing the despised symbol of Communist oppression into small concrete souvenirs" (Krieger 1997: 848). In the American recounting, the tale of democracy and capitalism triumphing over communism ends with the most powerful symbol of the latter, the Berlin Wall, being put on the free market to be sold.

The dramatic story of the fall of the Wall also leads into the relatively recent reunification of the two Germanys. For the American textbooks, it appears this story is only at its beginning and there is not yet a clear story to be told in simplistic terms. Ellis and Esler note the "new challenges" and "serious problems" that "prosperous" West Germans face in financing the East's "difficult" transition to a market economy (1997: 858). In general, American authors express reservations about German reunification, most particularly in regards to the revival of neo-Nazi ideology. Ellis and Esler describe how neo-Nazis have come to see "the answer to hard times in racism and hatred," demonstrating against immigration, attacking, and even killing foreigners (1997: 857). Given the fact that the Holocaust is discussed earlier in the American textbooks as still having great significance in the 1990s, it is perhaps not surprising that Americans still see it as a primary theme for reunified Germany.

In sum, American textbooks are structured in a way to tell chronological stories of political history in an authoritative manner. History appears as an inexorable march of positive

progress (with a few setbacks along the way). Debates over the interpretation of history or emphasis on complex causes for historical events are rarely suggested. Whether it is the causes for the World Wars, the reasons for the rise of Nazism, or the symbolism of Germany in the Cold War, history is presented as having relatively simplistic explanations that are subject to debate or multiple interpretations. This history is gendered in that it relays political events, wars, battles, and international relations, but overlooks everyday or private life in Germany throughout the century.

Through this rendering of Germany's role in twentieth century world history, American textbook authors provide their student readers with a way of organizing history and seeing the world and their relationship to it. In doing so, American textbooks offer an initial framework to students for nationing, a means of reading the nation and selecting those aspects that are relevant to making sense of its role in the world. This approach shares much in common with English textbooks, but the differences that do arise offer suggestive clues as to how the nation is constructed differently in the two cultures.

English Textbooks

Like their American counterparts, English schoolbook authors present world history chronologically, again focusing on cause-and-effect.[27] With their emphasis on political events, international relations, and the public domain, English textbook authors provide as much of a gendered accounting of world history as the Americans do. However, unlike the U.S. versions,

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[27] Unlike American textbooks that incorporate events from the sixteenth century on into modern world history, English textbooks are presented in volumes, and the final volume, on "modern world history," begins with events in the twentieth century, either right before or right after World War I. By dividing up the volumes after certain political events, history, at least in part, also appears to have natural breaking points.

English texts tend to present history in a more complex manner.[28] English history books, in contrast to American ones, tend to be more relativistic, citing disagreements by historians with direct quotes. In a foreword to his textbook, Heater explains how "some important examples of historians' disagreements over interpretation have been included so that, even at this elementary level, the pupil may start to appreciate that history is not a static subject" (1996: Preface). The causes of historical events are not provided with one singular explanation but are often seen as multi-causal and worth considering from a variety of perspectives. By emphasizing the complexities of interpreting history and citing historical debates, English authors imply that history is not teleological but open to multiple interpretations that do not conform easily to a larger moral narrative.

English textbooks also tend to focus on the character or personality of historical figures as a means of explaining history more often than any other books in the sample. Thus, for example, the fact that the American President Wilson was "a religious man" is cited as one of the factors that resulted in the Treaty of Versailles taking the form that it did (McAleavy 1996: 13). Another author uses the description of the German Kaiser as an "unpleasant, arrogant man" as a means of explaining German political problems in the early twentieth century (Heater 1996: 6). The importance of the individual, his (and it is almost invariably "his") personality and quirks, to world history is emphasized far more in English textbooks than in American ones. This multi-causal, relativistic accounting that emphasizes the individual's role in political history also structures the English perspective on Germany's role in the twentieth century.

The tendency of English authors to analyze the causes of a major historical event from a variety of perspectives is immediately apparent. These texts begin by posing of the question of

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[28] English texts, however, are often more simply written with less text and more graphics than their American counterparts. One textbook author explains how he has taken pains to avoid "long and complex sentences,"

whether World War I was "the fault of the German government" (McAleavy 1996: 4). Lancaster and Peaple explain that "there was no single reason why war broke out in August 1914" (Lancaster 1996: 4). The English authors generally agree that European rivalries, particularly between England and Germany, over industry, military and, to a lesser extent, colonies were the primary factors leading to the war. More specifically, the authors note the complex system of alliances between European nations, fears of German militarism, the arms race, the Balkans, and a crisis in Morocco at the time. These multiple reasons for the outbreak of war in 1914 contrast with the American attribution to "international rivalries" which suggests similar issues but does not offer a similar level of complexity to the issue.

The English textbooks also emphasize the different interests of the British, French, and American governments in determining the appropriate treatment of Germany after World War I. In doing so, the authors emphasize the social processes that lead to the historical event rather than the finished product (as is the tendency for U.S. textbooks). In this discussion of the treaty negotiations, the French are seen as the party most seeking revenge while the British are presented by the English authors as relatively impartial.[29] The English writers, like the Americans, cite the Treaty of Versailles as the reason for the resulting "chaos" in Germany that left Germans "horrified." But the English also allow room for differing interpretations of the Treaty. Lancaster and Peaple suggest that "many historians" have criticized the Versailles

focusing primarily on that information "necessary for examination purposes" (Heater 1996: Preface).

[29] English textbooks have a greater tendency to set themselves apart from the French in their accounting of history in general and, in doing so, also tend to be more critical of the French. McAleavy, for example, refers to the French invasion of the Ruhr valley after World War I at least nine times. This attempt by the French to further punish the Germans is repeatedly cited as an action that only exacerbated a volatile situation. Although a recurring theme in the English textbooks, the invasion of the Ruhr is not mentioned in the American, Kenyan, or Indian textbooks and only briefly in the German ones. In another slight to France, Heater notes that France had "good reasons for fearing Germany" because the latter was a "very much stronger country" (1996: 4). McAleavy explains that between the wars, "France became a weak and bitterly divided country" (1996: 51) but that the British, at the time of the treaty, no more wanted a "German-controlled Europe," than they did one by "dominated by France" (1996: 17). Criticisms

Treaty for a lack of unity and direction (1996: 42). McAleavy also notes that since 1950, "most" historians have taken a more sympathetic view of the treaty. He cites one historian:

> 'The Versailles Treaty was severe, but it is amazing that it was not more so….
>
> Germany lost remarkably little territory, considering how thoroughly she had lost
>
> the war…. The real difficulty was not that the Treaty was exceptionally severe but
>
> that the Germans thought it was, and in time persuaded others that it was' (1996:
>
> 27).

By directly citing a historian who disagrees that the Versailles Treaty was so damaging, the textbook author provides evidence that there is more than one way to interpret this historical event. McAleavy further notes the hypocrisy of the Germans (when they were winning, they "ignored fairness, when they were losing they demanded it") and suggests that their economy was never destroyed by the Treaty, since, by 1925, Germany was producing twice as much steel as Britain (1996: 28). Despite this less sympathetic treatment of Germany after World War I, McAleavy still concludes that it was "wrong" to blame Germany alone, that the treaty punished the "people of Germany instead of the rulers" and was thus too severe (1996: 28). Thus, although the English authors come to a similar conclusion as the Americans as to the damage of the treaty, the recognition of differing interpretation by historians suggests to English students that history is not static but continues to be interpreted and reinterpreted.

The causes of World War II for the English schoolbooks are also of greater dispute than in the American textbooks (Lancaster 1996: 140; McAleavy 1996: 84-5). For the Americans, the Second World War is due to the unfair Treaty and the actions of Hitler and thus does not warrant much further analysis. English textbooks authors, however, pay closer attention to the details of

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of the French role in the twentieth century thus structure the English historical accounts in a manner unseen in the other textbooks in the sample.

politics in the Weimar Republic than the American history books. The English texts describe the

Weimar constitution, political assassinations, the role of the Social Democrats and communists,

the Kapp Putsch, the Beer Hall Putsch, the Stresemann era, the organization of the Nazi party,

how the Nazis consolidated power, and who actually supported them. In doing so, the English

complicate the question of how Hitler came to power rather than focusing solely on the German

reaction to the Treaty of Versailles. And, in explaining the causes for the war itself, the English

cite numerous factors including: the Treaty of Versailles, the failure of the League of Nations,

the Depression, Stalin's Alliance with the Nazis, and the British and French Policy of

Appeasement (McAleavy 1996: 84). The latter policy of placating Hitler by allowing him to

annex Austria and invade Czechoslovakia is considered highly controversial and interpreted in a

variety of ways.[30] World War II is, for the English authors, a product of complicated political

negotiations rather than solely, as the American authors explain, the result of Hitler's aggression.

The English authors also focus heavily on personality issues when discussing Hitler's

role in world history. McAleavy describes the man as "lazy but…a brilliant speaker," noting that

"sometimes he acted like a madman" (1996: 44, 67). Students are later asked in a discussion

point section to list "five different character attributes for Hitler;" explain what Hitler was "like

as a person;" and describe what the Munich crisis tells "us about the personality of Hitler"

(McAleavy 1996: 45, 67) (see also Heater 1996: 48). Lancaster and Peaple ask which "phrase

best describes Hitler": "an 'extraordinary individual' or a 'mediocre person'" (1996: 140). The

centrality of historical figures' personalities to history is a recurring theme found only in the

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[30] McAleavy concludes that historians now view the policy as "cowardly and stupid" and a "weak response to aggression" (McAleavy 1996: 72, 87). Rees is more sympathetic to the policy, arguing that the Depression left little money for war and that many English believed Germany had been treated too harshly by the Versailles Treaty and that Hitler could bring "stability to Germany" and help fight communism (1996: 40).

English authors' rendering of the past. Thus Hitler's character attributes gain an importance unseen in the other textbooks in the sample.

Although the Nazi era in general receives significant attention in the English textbooks, the emphasis is more on the Nazi state and far less on the Holocaust or persecution of Jews, a notable contrast to the American textbooks. For the English textbooks, the significance of the Third Reich is found more in the control of the nation by the Nazis than in the Holocaust. Thus after spending several pages describing the Nazi dictatorship, McAleavy (1996) devotes one paragraph to the Holocaust while Heater (1996) includes just one sentence on the intended final solution of the Jews.[31] And, unlike the American textbooks in which the Holocaust is kept "current," there is no sense in the English books that the "lessons" of the Holocaust have any greater relevance today than any other aspect of history. Although the English authors clearly do not support the actions of the Nazis, the moral language used by the American writers to discuss this time period is not to be found.

The division of Germany after World War II is as significant an event for the English as it is for the Americans. However, it is less the straightforward story of the moral triumph of the (American) value of democracy over Soviet dictatorship and is instead presented more as a strategic political move by the Allied powers. Berlin, shortly after the war, was a "symbol of defeated Nazism" but by 1948, it became a "symbol of Western freedom and the struggle with communism" that came to have an instrumental purpose (McAleavy 1996: 118). Berlin "became an island of Western capitalism in the middle of the communist sea of East Germany," that could

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[31] Heater describes Hitler's "Theory of the Master Race" and details his beliefs in anti-Semitism before concluding that there "was no scientific evidence for these theories," (1996: 52). Rees suggests that the Nuremberg trials "raised some difficult moral questions" because the Allies, according to some, "could hardly accuse the Germans of crimes against humanity, when they killed over half a million innocent civilians in their bombing raids over Germany" (1996: 176). Nonetheless, Rees concludes that "there was nothing to compare with the Nazi slaughter of the Jews in the death camps" (1996: 176).

be used as "an advertisement for the economic success of Western Europe" (1996: 152). Thus, "the shops were full and there were plenty of jobs for skilled workers" in West Berlin (Rees 1996: 195). The economic comparison "was damaging enough, but the comparison between the individual freedom in West Berlin and the tight police controls around it was still worse" (Lancaster 1996: 207). Berlin also became a "vital 'listening post'" for spies inside the communist world (Rees 1996: 195). Lancaster and Peaple note that it was an "almost unbelievable bonus to be able to carry out intelligence missions 110 miles deep in the enemy's territory" (Lancaster 1996: 207). In the American textbooks, the instrumental reasons are downplayed and the story of freedom and democracy is emphasized in justifying the enormous Allied investment in West Germany. The English, in contrast, complicate the subject by admitting the practical justifications for such an expensive endeavor. The logic of material self-interest thus coexists with the triumph of moral virtue in this rendering.

English textbooks also devote more attention to the specifics of post-war politics in both West and East Germany. Issues such as the general politics of West German Chancellors Konrad Adenauer and Willy Brandt; the mutual lack of official recognition between the nations; "de-Nazification" of the West; and the establishment of a "federal" German government in the West are highlighted. Despite this detailing of the post-war Germanys, the English provide almost no analysis or discussion of reunification. It appears that, despite the post-1990 publication dates, there have been few additions or revisions to the English textbooks since 1989. Rees briefly notes that as the Soviet empire collapsed and the Cold War was over, "German citizens, helped by border guards, tore down the Berlin Wall" (1996: 210). McAleavy (1996) never mentions reunification while Lancaster and Peaple (1996) provide only a visual image of the Wall coming down. Heater (1996) devotes the greatest attention to the symbolic and

practical consequences of a reunified Germany. He writes that the "destruction of the Berlin Wall and the unification of the two Germanys were very important symbols that the Cold War had come to an end" (1996: 199), but that this symbolic change led to difficulties for East German industries, a rise in unemployment, and the need for the West to subsidize substantially this transition. The focus on the threat of neo-Nazi violence, common in the American textbooks, is nowhere to be found in the English texts. In general, English students, however, are left with little impression of present-day reunified Germany from the textbooks.

And yet, the presentation of Germany to English students is consistent with the approach of the English textbooks to their understandings and organization of world history. Once again, world historical events involving Germany can be interpreted in many ways and historians' disagreements are often cited as examples of such debates. The causes of World War I, Hitler's rise to power, World War II, and the Allied intervention in Germany are complex and not always agreed upon by even the experts. Intricate explanations presented by the English authors, make improbable a teleological or moral narrative about the world and history in general. It is this difference that stands in strongest contrast to the American textbook approach to history. But in most other ways, by presenting history chronologically, focusing on cause-and-effect explanations for events, and by detailing political history and the public (men's) domain, English textbook authors are in agreement with their American counterparts.

Kenyan Textbook

The Kenyan series[32] is in many ways a stark contrast to the American and English textbooks in their organization of world history. Like the American textbooks, all of world

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[32] Thus far I have only been able to locate one series of Kenyan history and social studies textbooks (including four volumes, one of which concentrates on world history), but I am in the process of locating others.

history is found in one edition (with the exception of the issue of African colonialism which is largely dealt with in a different volume in the same series). However, unlike the American world-history textbooks that are unusually large and exceptionally unwieldy, the Kenyan textbook on world history is relatively short, suggesting that the textbook does not cover world history as comprehensively as either the American or English textbooks. Perhaps even more so than the American texts, the Kenyan series presents history as knowable and not subject to interpretation.[33] History is thus presented as coming from an authoritative historical voice that does not allow for ambiguities or interpretation.

It is not just through the level of detail that the Kenyan series contrasts to its Western counterparts in its vision of world history. American and English schoolbooks center history around political developments and international relations, while the Kenyan text concerns itself first and foremost with industrialization, trade, and modernization. These different foci ultimately lead to differing means of conveying history. Unlike those texts from England and the United States, the Kenyan schoolbooks do not cover events chronologically but instead do so topically, going back and forth through time depending on the subject (e.g., industrialization, inventions, religion). The table of contents in *History and Government: Form 2* covers world history in the following order:

> Kenya and the World Upto [sic] the 19th Century; Agrarian and Industrial
>
> Changes from the mid-18th Century to the Present Day; Development and
>
> Transport and Communications from the mid-18th Century to the Present Day;
>
> Trade; Religions; Government of Kenya (1993a: iii-iv).

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[33] For example, in a rare moment in which author Singh acknowledges historical disagreement, he notes that estimates of the fatalities in a revolt were between 70,000 and 200,000. Yet he concludes that the "true figure is probably somewhere near the 100 000 mark" thus suggesting that a "true" figure can be known (1993a: 31).

World history through 1800 is addressed only cursorily, taking up a total of 28 pages. After this

date, history is covered topically in relationship to agrarianism, industrialism, transportation,

communication, and religion. International relations, world politics, and world wars – primary

areas of emphasis for the American and English textbooks – are incorporated into history only

when they complement the above topics and are rarely given much context or analysis. Since

history is no longer relayed sequentially, there is far less emphasis on reporting history in terms

of cause and effect. This results in a more disjointed relationship between historical events,

since one "fact" does not necessarily follow temporally from the one that preceded it, and less

context or analysis is provided.[34] Yet despite not having a chronological focus, the Kenyan text,

like the American ones, suggest a progression of history in which industrialization represents a

positive good. They also, like the Americans, present history as authoritative rather than subject

to interpretation and debate. Although not centered on politics or international relations, Singh's

series is still a gendered approach to world history in that it focuses on industrialism and

technology, both aspects of the public domain and overwhelmingly the work of men.[35]

Singh's treatment of Germany follows this larger approach to the organization of world

history by concentrating mostly on German contributions to the development of technology and

industry and far less on accounts of political or international events. The first mention of

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[34] Despite this disjointedness, Singh often assumes a teleology to world history often using the word "yet" to signify the inevitability of history; thus he notes that in the mid-eighteenth century "Belgium did not exist yet" or that Kenya's borders "had not yet been defined" (1993a: 32).

[35] Despite this more disjointed approach that allows for less analysis, the Kenyan series demonstrates a clear morality, particularly on the subject of, for example, colonialism. In *Form* 3 of Singh's series on *History and Government,* the Kenyan author devotes the first half of his book to the European colonization of Africa and the Africans' response. Here, Singh includes a moral evaluation of history when discussing the Europeans' actions. In reporting on the Berlin Conference of 1884 in which several European powers met to discuss a division of Africa, Singh writes: "Of course, there were no African representatives present – the whole continent was sliced up with absolutely no reference to the indigenous inhabitants or their rulers . . . The European powers needed some kind of pretext for their invasion and occupation and they found it in the slave trade. Affecting deep concern for the peoples of Africa and their physical, spiritual and moral welfare, they then got down to the real business of looking after their own economic and political interest" (1993b: 18-9). This analysis suggests that the Kenyan author is not

Germany appears in a section on the "agrarian revolution in continental Europe" and is followed by brief references in a section on medical, agricultural, and technical discoveries. Here, names of German inventors and scientists are each given a sentence in rather disconnected paragraphs. Germany's role in the Industrial Revolution receives great attention. In a brief section on the political effects of this new industrialism, Marx and Engels are credited with laying the foundations for socialism and communism, but this political and social information is primarily presented as background information for the larger shift toward industrialization. The text concentrates less on a contextualization of political events through cause and effect and more on a direct listing of historical facts related to industrialization.

Similarly, Singh does not treat World War I as an event deserving of its own analysis or context, but instead first mentions the war in a section on the industrial power of the United States. In discussing Woodrow Wilson's reelection, Singh notes that the First World War was already two years old at this time. Why the war had begun or who was involved is not clear from this section. Singh also does not address the Treaty of Versailles by name, but does note that American President Wilson was against the punitive peace treaty that Britain and France supported. Kenyan students learn that "Wilson's attitude toward Germany was vindicated in the 1930s when Hitler took control of an economically unstable Germany and led it and the rest of the world towards World War II" (1993a: 50). It remains unclear who Hitler is or why his taking over an "economically unstable" country led Germany and the rest of the world into war.

The lack of context or need for explanation of causes and consequences for historical events becomes most apparent in Singh's treatment of World War II and Hitler's cultural significance for Germany. Again in the context of an American presidential election, Kenyan

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opposed to a moral analysis of history. Rather it is just different issues that bring out these evaluations than for Americans or the English.

students learn that "events in Europe were leading up to the Second World War. Hitler had revived German industry by concentrating on production" (1993a: 52). How Hitler's role with the revival of industry and the stabilizing of the economy led to war is again left unexplained. In the same section, Singh writes that the United States and Britain stood together against "Nazi domination of Europe" and, along with Russia, "fought Hitler," without explaining why Hitler or the Nazis had to be stopped (1993a: 52). In a section on the Soviet Union, we learn that "Stalin lived in constant fear" of an invasion by the Germans: "His fears increased when Hitler came to power in 1933 and undertook the remilitarization of Germany with astonishing success" (1993a: 54). Elsewhere, Hitler is credited with creating a highly efficient road-building program to move military personnel easily throughout the country (1993a: 88). This depiction of Hitler is one of an unusually efficient leader who went to war with other nations, but there is no explanation of the causes or consequences of his efficiency or the subsequent war.

From this discussion, Singh then jumps back in time from the United States in World War II to the "inventiveness and industriousness" of Germany in the 1800s (1993a: 6). The Kenyan author notes the creation of a *Zollverein* that allowed the Germans to trade with one another in the 1830s and then explains that Otto von Bismarck "achieved the reunification[36] of Germany in 1870 after the Franco-Prussian War" (1993a: 12). The "Franc-Prussian War of 1870-71," cited in American books as inspiring the unification of Germany, is credited in the Kenyan world history book with increasing German coal and iron ore reserves (1993a: 55). There is a brief reference to the cause of World War I as "industrial rivalry" and the effect of the Treaty of Versailles as the destruction of the German economy which made "it difficult for Germany to reestablish its industries," leading to an economic depression in the 1920s (1993a:

7). Political or international events have a significance for the Kenyan series only to the degree that they affect industry.

Singh returns to the subject of World War II in a section on Germany later in the text. Unlike the moral critique put forth by the Americans and, to a lesser extent, the English, the Kenyan text lacks moral commentary in discussing the events associated with Second World War. Singh reports that

> Hitler's coming to power in 1933 did a great deal to revive the German industrial infrastructure. Unfortunately, industry was now geared for war rather than peace…. Employment in arms factories and the armed forces certainly solved the massive unemployment problem which had existed previously, but was in the end bound to lead to disaster (1993a: 55).

Again, Hitler becomes best known for his contributions to industry. Singh further explains that German industry "proved itself during the Second World War," holding out for almost six years against "numerically superior forces" but that the end effect of the war was to leave the nation's industry "shattered" (1993a: 55). There is no mention of the Third Reich as a dictatorship nor does this separate section on Germany include any mention of the Holocaust. In a subsection on Judaism in a chapter on religion that appears at the end of the textbook, Singh provides the only mention of the Nazi genocide to be found in the text. At that point, the Kenyan author writes that the "slaughter of some 6 million Jews by the Nazis during World War II" later led to the

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[36]The fact that Germany had not yet been a unified nation, thereby making *re*unification impossible, escapes the textbook writer's attention. This error is later repeated in *Form 3* when "political reunification" is again credited to Bismarck, suggesting the use of the term is not a typo (Singh 1993a: 55).

establishment of Israel (1993a: 131).[37] It is not clear from this brief sentence who the Nazis were

or from where they came.

In an earlier section, Singh also makes the only mention of a divided Germany,[38] again in

terms of industrial accomplishments, but does not explain how or why the German nation was

split into two, noting only that the USSR "dominated" the East while the West was "supported

by the USA and the Allies" (1993a: 57). From 1955 on, German industry was "well and truly on

its feet again," establishing "superiority" through cars, cameras, optical goods, TVs, radios, and

other electronic products, earning Germans a well-deserved reputation for quality" (1993a: 57).

Singh cites the importance of "cheap labour" from other countries, the lack of expensive colonial

wars for independence, and the prohibitions on West German remilitarization (for reasons left

unexplained) as factors that enabled the industrial rebirth in Germany. Although the conditions

that led up to reunification are given no context, Singh does provide an analysis of unified

Germany through an economic lens.[39] Although economic progress is treated, implicitly, as a

moral good, reunification is not the triumph of moral virtue. On the positive side, the Kenyan

author notes, reunification has led to a greater reserve of raw materials, larger labor force, and a

greater domestic market for German goods. On the negative side was the integration of the east

and west economic systems which led to a "decline in industrial output" (1993a: 57). The

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[37] Following this, but jumping further back in time, students learn in a section on Christianity, about the Protestant Reformation by the German Martin Luther.

[38] In another Kenyan textbook (Williams 1989), not officially included in this sample due to its 1989 publication date, a section on "Germany in the 19th Century" is included. Here again, the emphasis is placed on Germany's industrial role, particularly in the development of chemicals and electrical engineering, and their inventions. After listing such accomplishments, the textbook notes: "West Germany and East Germany have both become leading industrial countries" (1989: 75) without explaining why or when (or even in which century) this occurred. In its later summary of the Cold War, the only other mention of Germany is in a note that the Berlin Wall divided the city between communist and democratic (1989: 146).

[39] This is further demonstrated by the six discussion questions at the end of the section. Four specifically concern German industry, one the European Economic Community, and one asks when Germany was reunited politically. Five out of six are thus economic/industrial based questions and only one specifically political.

consequences of reunification are overwhelmingly economic and not political, as the American

and English textbooks suggest, but are clearly seen as a moral good.[40]

There is a sense in which Singh relays history almost as though he expects Kenyan

students to already be familiar with the material, thus not requiring him to go into much detail or

explanation. Indeed, the chapters read more like the summaries found at the end of an American,

English, or German chapter than the actual chapters themselves. There is, however, no evidence

to suggest that Kenyan students do receive this information earlier. Instead, the relative

disjointedness of the Kenyan text signifies the thematic approach to history that requires less of a

cause-and-effect description of historical events required for chronological accounts of history.

American and English textbooks organize modern world history around the establishment of and

interaction between nation-states; the Kenyan text focuses less on a grand narrative of politics,

unless it relates to and is in the service of industrialization. Industrialization serves as a central

focus of the text, just as it is likely a great preoccupation for Kenyans in general at the beginning

of the twenty-first century.

Indian Textbooks

In many ways, the Indian textbooks are a cross between their American/English and

Kenyan counterparts. The Indian textbook authors' perspective allies with the American and

English authors' approaches to world history in that they too organize much of history around

political events. Yet, the books also present inventions, industrialism, and issues of

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[40] Again because Kenyan topics cover history topically rather than chronologically, after this discussion of reunification, Singh discusses various industrial inventions including the first diesel engine, electric locomotive, and motor car, all credited to German inventors in the 19th century. Moving even further back in history, the Kenyan author then recognizes German inventors for printing, first publishing news-sheets, and then inventing radio and television without providing a larger narrative to connect these individualized events. Kenyan students are left with an impression of Germany as a nation that has a strong relationship to industry.

modernization more centrally, thus bearing a greater resemblance to the Kenyan texts. The

Indian authors focus heavily on the subject of colonialism or "imperialism" as a means of

making sense of the last century in the world, a topic that does not receive comparable attention

in the American or English books but does in a separate Kenyan volume. This focus on

"imperialism," as the Indian authors most frequently call it, also lends itself to a more critical

approach to the West in general.[41] There is, as is also the case in Kenyan textbooks, a tendency

to not always follow history sequentially but rather topically. Thus in one book (Kher 1998b),

the rise and consequences of Nazism are addressed before the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.

Similar to both the American and Kenyan approaches to world history, history is not understood

as relativistic or culturally dependent. There are no attempts to include different voices in the

Indian rendering of history. The textbook authors themselves function as the official voice of

history.

The five textbook series (and six books in total) analyzed all satisfy India's requirements,

mandated by the national government, for a history syllabus for students in Classes VIII, IX or

X.[42] As one author notes, "we have a made a sincere effort to give a systematic course in the

History of Mankind from prehistoric times to the present day" (Kher 1998a). The larger themes

are overwhelmingly international political (gendered) issues chronologically organized, similar

to the Western books in the sample. And yet, in reading the texts, there is often little connection

between each period of history and the others. American or English textbooks tend to present

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[41] For example, in the beginning of each history book there is a list of advisements for behavior for Indian students
mandated by the national government. One of the fifteen recommendations is that students "avoid aping the West"
and instead "Remember: Indian culture is the richest of all." The presence of such a reminder suggests an Indian
attempt to distance themselves from a Western perspective.

[42] Those components expected in a syllabus for Class X include: "1. Imperialism; 2. The First World War; 3. The
Russian Revolution; 4. The World War from 1919 to Second World War; 5. The World after Second World War; 6.
Indian Awakening; 7. India's Struggle for Freedom; 8. Map Work" (Kher 1998: Preface). A textbook for Class VIII
requires the following topics: "Reformation, Rise of Great Britain; The French Revolution; 2. Birth of US; 3. WWI,
Versailles, League of Nations, WWII (for projects); 4. UN and Cold War" (Fuste 1998: Preface).

world history as one larger chronological narrative that ends in one chapter but picks up elsewhere in the world in the next. The Indian texts do not appear to take the same approach, presenting each piece instead as a separate event in history that has a relationship to the rest of history, but it is the historical event and not the continuous relationship that is emphasized. Moreover, it is the episodes and not the cause, effect, context, or analysis that is as important, and this factor lends itself to a more disconnected history. Perhaps because of this, Indian history is not explicitly teleological. But it does still have a moral component that emerges particularly when discussing imperialism. Unsurprisingly, these differences in approach affect the Indian depiction of Germany's role in world history.

There is a general consensus in the textbooks that the unification of Germany in the 1870s was "an important landmark in European history," although the reasons for its significance are never provided (see also Aggarwal 1998:134; Chowdhry 1997b: 97). Chowdhry suggests that "Germany had to struggle hard to emerge as a united and independent nation" (1997b: 97) and Aggarwal also notes that unification is a "story of struggle against both internal and external odds" (1998: 65). Kher provides the greatest insight in suggesting that a "spirit of rivalry" between the German states prevented unification until Bismarck "founded" the nation (1998a: 196). The lack of explanation for this struggle to establish a nation-state suggests that it is the event of unification rather than the reasons for it that are most relevant to world history.

Germany's initial importance, according to the Indian textbooks, can largely be attributed to its contribution to the escalation of imperialism and its desire for a "place in the sun" (Kher 1998b: 18). Kher explains: "This imperialistic attitude of Germany posed a great danger to the peace of Europe.... Thus the imperialist rivalries resulted in attempts to redivide the world, thereby creating a warlike situation" (Kher 1998b: 18). Germany is portrayed as a very

unpopular country as both France and England are cited as "her bitterest foes" and a "common hostility toward Germany" inspired a French-Russian alliance (Kher 1998b: 19). The resultant increase in military strength led to the "inevitable outbreak" of world war in 1914 (Chowdhry 1997b: 97). These rivalries are cited foremost as a result of competing interests in imperialism, a factor not cited at all in the American or Kenyan texts (although colonialism in general receives great attention in the latter), and only granted a minor role in the English accounts of the causes for World War I.

The First World War, the resulting treaty, and, again, the consequences of imperialist desires are credited with enabling the rise of Nazism. Although there is very little discussion of the implications of the Treaty of Versailles or the political disagreements surrounding it, the Indian authors emphasize the resulting prohibition of German involvement in colonialism as playing a significant role in the establishment of the Third Reich. The Indian writers take a clear moral stance against the Nazi era. Yet their concerns are different from those of the Americans who focus on the Holocaust and the English who concentrate on the control of the state over the people. The emphasis for the Indians is on a moral condemnation of the general destruction and killings at the hands of the Nazis. In their accounts, the authors note that Nazism was particularly "sinister," "barbarious," and "monstruous," (Kher 1998: 48). Hitler, whose thoughts were written in "'Mein Kempf' (My Story) [sic]"[43] was "the villain of the great drama" of World War II who led Germany to become a "great power" but whose "unbridled ambitions led to his ruin and defeat" (Aggarwal 1998: 146). Kher concludes that "the victory of Nazism was a calamity not only for the German people but for whole of Europe and many other parts of the world" (1998b: 49). The fascists had "turned a large part of Europe into a graveyard," killing

millions of people, particularly Jews to whom they demonstrated an "extreme hatred" (1998b: 48, 62). The Indian authors do not include many details or context for World War II in the texts, but they nonetheless make clear their moral condemnation of the Nazis and Hitler for the massive destruction and killing.

The division of Germany is only lightly touched on by the Indian authors and its connection to the previous events is not emphasized or contextualized. As a result of World War II, Aggerwal explains that "Germany was divided into two parts" (1998: 145) in which the East and West were "separated by a wall with the eastern part under communist control" (1998: 147). Why this is, how it came to be, and the significance of such are issues never discussed. The Indian authors never address Germany's symbolic role in the Cold War, a symbolism that defines the American and English perspectives. Here, the connection between historical events is particularly absent.

Reunification is also presented with only limited explanation, but the emphasis is overwhelmingly on the economic implications. Chowdhry writes that although World War II "ruined Germany[, v]ery much like the mythical Phoenix, Germany is once again emerging as the world's strongest industrial power. The partition that had followed the Second World War has been undone. The German Mark now stands as one of the strongest currencies in the world markets" (1997a: 23). In a later chapter, Chowdhry provides the most detailed explanation for why Germany was partitioned in the first place, noting that Germany was divided into four zones with the Soviets taking the East and West Germans establishing a new government in Bonn. Reunification, he explains, resulted in the return of the capital to Berlin and the adoption of West German currency for united Germany. This is the most extended discussion of the reunification

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[43] In another interesting form of cultural reception, the two Kenyan textbooks that mention Adolf Hitler's autobiography refer to it as "Mein Kempf" when it is actually entitled "Mein Kampf" and is translated from the

of Germany found in the Indian textbooks and here again the emphasis is on the economic

implications of the transition.[44]

The Indian depiction of Germany has elements in common with the textbooks from the

United States, England, and Kenya. Like the former two, the Indian texts focus on political and

international events as a primary means of accounting German history. However, like the

Kenyan series, the Indian books also concentrate on industrial and economic issues and do not

always rely on a chronological accounting of history. There is thus less emphasis on cause and

effect relationships between one historical event and another. This focus on the political,

international, industrial, and economic aspects of society lead to an exclusively gendered

accounting of history in which only the public (male) aspects of social life are incorporated into

German history. The Indian authors incorporate moral evaluations into certain aspects of

German history, particularly regarding colonialism and the Nazi destruction of Europe, but the

Holocaust and symbolic meaning of the division of Germany are left virtually untouched. At the

same time, the Indian authors also assume an authoritative, "factual" approach to discussing the

role of Germany in the twentieth century, although there appears to be less teleological

implications, in large part because of the relative disconnectedness between historical events. In

these ways, Indian textbooks share certain aspects of American, English, and Kenyan texts but

ultimately provide their own unique view of world history and Germany's place in it.

German Textbooks

The relationship between the worldview of German world history textbooks and their

accounting of Germany's role in history is complex. Germany's role in the world takes on a

German as "My Struggle" and not as "My Story" (Aggarwal 1998).

larger significance than in any other textbooks in the sample. In part this is normal, every nation

presents its own significance as more central than any other. Nonetheless, many nations separate

out their national history from the rest of world history and present it in a separate publication.

But Germans view their national history as integral to the events of the twentieth century. It is

for this reason that the German national history is incorporated into the modern world history

books rather than receiving its own treatment in a separate publication. Unlike in the American,

English, and Indian cases, there is no history of Germany in the twentieth century offered to

German students that is not simultaneously a world history. And it is this factor that allows

Germans, like the school textbook librarian, to conclude that "German history is world history."

German world history textbooks share much in common with those books from the

United States and England. All three sets of books organize the world and its history

chronologically and politically. German textbooks include remarkable numbers of outside

sources, especially from historians who debate the meaning of past events and do not seem to

suggest a teleological understanding of history. Germans authors do, however, incorporate

morality into their texts, often explicitly commenting on an aspect of history they see to be

particularly of concern. In doing so, German authors implicitly suggest that a "factual" history

without values is neither possible nor desirable.

Most notably, German books are the least gendered in the sample. They still

overwhelmingly document international political events that focus on "great" (male) leaders.

Yet, more so than the authors from the other nations, the German writers include information

about day-to-day private life, family transitions, and women's role in society, particularly in

regards to German life. Although only a small proportion of the history in general presented in

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[44] As a final note, Aggerwal acknowledges that India has "friendly relations" with such "Big Powers of the World" as Germany (1998: 69, 97).

the world history texts is feminized, the difference is stark. This inclusion suggests a meaningful role for the family and women in general in the organization of the world.

These aspects of the German approach to world history in general structure their accounts of Germany's role in that history as well. Although there is great variation in the topics covered by the German texts, the authors do unite in covering the following topics as a matter of course: World War I; the Weimar Republic; the rise of Nazism; World War II; the Cold War; a post-war, divided Germany; and, in most cases, reunified Germany and a unified Europe. Each book takes a different tone, however, by emphasizing a different aspect of German twentieth-century history and interpreting its significance differently: Hinrichs et al. (1998) focuses on the Third Reich; Brack (1996) on the post-war devastation in Germany; Askani and Wagener (1997) on the divided Germanys; and Berger (1996) on the threat of neo-Nazis.

Unsurprisingly, German authors provide the most detailed picture of Germany's role in history. In part, this represents the Germans' efforts to provide a more complex sense of world history in general. This is also explained in part by the fact that their national history is incorporated into the same volume and thus requires the attention to detail that would otherwise be found in a separate national history text. This greater detail is seen in every aspect of history. For example, the German authors provide a much clearer picture of Germany and its place in the world before World War II, detailing the November Revolution of 1918, the constitution and governmental structure of the Weimar Republic, the Treaties of Rapallo and Locarno that established peaceful relations with border countries, and the Stresemann era. The German authors also include direct quotes from various historians that represent individualized (and sometimes competing) interpretations of this time period. The American perspective in which the sole explanation for the rise of Hitler can be blamed on the economic devastation that

resulted from the Treaty of Versailles does not always align with the German authors' image of

this era as a time. Rather than seeing this solely as a time of turmoil and devastation, the

German authors consider the Weimar era as a point in which Germans attempted to regain

relative stability and the respect of their European neighbors.[45]

German history books also provide a much more detailed understanding of the political

tactics used by the Nazi party to establish their power. Rather than focusing on the momentum

(and implicit inevitability) of Hitler's rise to power suggested by the American or Indian texts,

the Germans emphasize the complexity and lengthiness of this political takeover. Askani and

Wagener also place the rise of German fascism in a larger European context. "Stable, survivable

democracies," they argue, were the exception to the rule, found only in Scandanvia, the Benelux,

France, and Britain (1997: 56). Within Germany, the rise of the Nazis was at first seen as no

different than any of the other (many) governmental shifts during the Weimar Republic (Hinrichs

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[45] Hinrichs et al.'s (1998) present a remarkably critical interpretation of Germany after the Versailles Treaty that contrasts markedly with the textbooks from other nations as well as those from Germany. There is a general consensus in the American, English, and even Kenyan and Indian textbooks that the Treaty of Versailles was exceptionally harsh toward the Germans. The treaty, according to these schoolbooks, left the Germans angry and ready to fight after their economy was destroyed by the unfair peace agreement. Hinrichs et al., however, describe a "strong pacifist movement" throughout Germany after World War I, suggesting that the "golden 20s" were a decade of "relative stability" (1998: 50, 70). Hinrichs et al. dismiss those who claim Germans had a right to be angry, arguing that it was "those who were responsible for the First World War who falsely convinced the people that Germany was being threatened by powerful enemies and must be saved," thus creating the need for war (1998: 50). Here Hinrichs et al. make their greatest and most critical departure from the sympathetic portrayals of Germany after the Versailles Treaty. In a section entitled "New Interpretations Change the Perspective," the authors write:

> From today's perspective, the critique at the time [of the Treaty] must be reevaluated: 1. In the case of a German victory, the plans were for significantly harsher treaty conditions for their opponents. 2. Undoubtedly, the Germans' shock would have been much less, had they recognized their (mutual) responsibility for the outbreak of the First World War . 3. Finally, one must realize that Germany, despite the Versailles Treaty, regained its economic dominance in Europe (1998: 63, my translation).

Hinrichs et al. refute the image of the Germans as innocent victims, arguing instead that had the Germans won, they would have been even more punitive than their opponents. The authors further suggest that this humiliation would not have been called for had the Germans originally recognized their own war guilt. And finally, they dismiss the suggestion that the Germans suffered terribly by noting how quickly they regained their economic power. Even the issue of extreme German inflation, which the other nations' authors attribute to the financial punishments meted out through the Treaty, are blamed by Hinrichs et al. on how the war itself was financed by the Germans and not on the conditions of the treaty (1998: 68). This critique of Germany after World War I is unrivaled in the sample, standing out for the lack of sympathy for Germans during this time period as well as a level of humility in addressing Germany's place in history.

1998). Although this emphasis on the politically complex conditions that led to Hitler's

assumption of power eliminate much of the mystery of the rise of the Third Reich, the German

authors still recognize that on some level, Nazism cannot be easily explained or contextualized.

Hinrichs et al., for example, begin this section by asking:

> Was it a contingency of history, or the necessary consequence of a long-
>
> developed flaw, i.e., a German "Sonderweg" [exception], that made this negative
>
> spirit and German nationalism stronger than in other nations?... How could the
>
> state structure and the entire population be sucked into a one-party dictatorship,
>
> an unlimited totalitarianism of one man? (1998: 76, my translation).

In regards to the law granting Hitler sole power, they write: "Even today it is still a puzzle how

elected representatives could actually support a vote to eliminate their power" (1998 89).

Hinrichs et al. further ask why "so many Germans took part in the persecution of Jews - whether

it came from a fear of punishment if they refused to participate or whether anti-Semitism ran so

deep in German culture that the victims could no longer be seen as human" (1998: 143). These

questions, posed by the German authors as unanswerable, reveal their difficulties with the

subject matter. These questions also reveal the ways in which morality works its way into the

German account of history.

In describing the realities of life (and death) in the Third Reich, the German textbooks

take a different approach in their account of this era, contrasting most notably with the

Americans' treatment of this point in history. As noted earlier, American textbooks are faced

with the problem of how they can condemn the Nazis (and thus the Germans) but still explain

how Germany has since come to be one of the United States' closest allies. The German

predicament is even harder: how to condemn the actions of the Nazis (and Germans in general)

while simultaneously recognizing that these actions were possibly committed by the students'
own family members. While American history books emphasize the experience of the
"survivors," giving no voice to non-Jewish Germans, Germans focus on the voice of the
"eyewitnesses" (i.e. non-Jewish Germans).[46] Here, German textbooks detail the experience of
everyday life for Germans living in the Third Reich, often including information on the personal
stories of women, children, and families in general as a means of illustrating to students what life
was like then. Others encourage students to debate further whether the Germans today have
sufficiently worked through this time period and recognized their responsibilities, thereby
incorporating a self-reflective morality into their history.

In presenting the most detailed image of Germany in general, the German authors broach
a subject left virtually untouched by the other nations' textbooks. All four German textbooks
include information as to how the German citizens and soldiers suffered during and after the war,
often including a number of images of a destroyed post-war Germany. In doing so, they again
acknowledge the ways in which average Germans endured hardship as well. Brack, for example,
notes that 500,000 (presumably non-Jewish) civilians were killed in the "German Reich" and
eleven million were taken prisoner, three million of whom "suffered terribly" in Siberia (1996:
6). He notes that: "One out of two Germans at the end of the war was in transit" and "countless
families were ripped apart" (1996: 6). The catastrophic state of roads and other forms of
transportation and disastrous shortage of housing and food affected women trying to feed and
shelter their children most drastically (1996: 7). The post-war de-Nazification of Germany is
also documented in a way not discussed/treated to the other textbooks authors. This detailed
discussion allows Germans to acknowledge the complicated fact that "innocent" Germans

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[46] In all four countries, Jews continue to be seen as "non-German." Thus, for example, a German textbook poses the
question: explain what role the German people had in the persecution of the Jews" (Hinrichs 1998: 142). Such

suffered as a result of this war and that many "guilty" individuals had yet to be punished for their crimes at the end of the war. It also allows the authors to incorporate the history of family life and the accomplishments of women during this era, a subject hardly broached by any of the other nations' textbooks at any point in history.

The post-war division of Germany is uniformly interpreted as solely a product of the Cold War. The importance of this division cannot be underestimated for the German authors--it serves as the ultimate example of the contingency (and not teleology) of history. Askani and Wagener explain that German history is "stamped by the breakup of the DDR that ended the forty-year division of Germany" (1997: 275). Brack explains that the four Allied victors, and not Germany, controlled the nation after the war.[47] Thus, for example, when Stalin proposed to reunify Germany, Brack writes, it was the Allies and "not the German Republic (!) [sic]" that was asked (1996: 58).[48] "German-German relations" we learn were also difficult because "the Germans had neither freely voted for this division nor were the Allied victors of World War II agreed" on this decision" (1996: 142). This separation thus comes to represent contingent nature of history as the German nation was arbitrarily split into two against the will of the people.

The German authors spend chapters describing the ramifications of this split, often comparing one aspect of West German culture (e.g., government, youth culture, family, women's rights, everyday life, travel) with and the same aspect from East Germany. Despite these differences, German textbook authors make real efforts to positively interpret the accomplishments of the DDR. A very conscious attempt is made not to see this division in moral

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statements are made without ever noting that many of those Jews were also "German people."
[47] Brack writes: "The victors all followed their own politics of occupation and applied their own pictures of society to their respective zones" (1996: 26).
[48] This becomes a recurring issues as Brack writes that reunification "was only possible with the approval of the Allied victors of World War II …and signified the 'final' borders of unified Germany as well as the 'full sovereignty over its domestic and foreign affairs" (1996: 200).

times; the authors make clear efforts not to disregard or degrade the experiences of the former East Germans. For example, after presenting a West German report on the building of the Wall, Askani and Wagener ask students to write a report from the East German perspective (1997: 191). No other textbooks in the sample convey the significance of this division in a comparable way.

Reunification is an extremely important issue to the German authors in a way unappreciated in the other textbooks. Askani and Wagener claim that "there has hardly been any other event in the last thirty years that has affected the world more than the opening of the Wall that, since 1961, has separated East and West Berlin" (1997: 211). Yet, the difficulties associated with this political transition illustrate the complexity of historical events rather than the inevitable march toward progress for the German authors. As Aksani and Wagener explain, "the Wall in the Germans' heads has not yet been overcome" (1997: 236). Students are asked to consider "which problems hinder the establishment of a united German identity? How can a 'coming-together' be realized?" They further encourage students to remember that "Germans are not only tied to one another through their language and history, we are all at home in Germany. Thus we must prevent a further distancing between the FRG and GDR and instead try to establish a way not just to live next to one another but also with one another" (1997: 250). Reunification, which is seen as relatively unproblematic for Germans in the textbooks from the other nations, is considered far more troublesome for the German authors.

The importance of reunification may not be debated, but other aspects of the united nation's future are, and here again the Germans choose to present a complex image of themselves rather than a clear-cut straightforward vision of a "new" Germany. Berger (1996), for example, suggests that the threat of rightist violence is a reality and thus juxtaposes images

from the Third Reich with pictures of neo-Nazis today. In contrast, Hinrichs et al. who acknowledge the problems that foreigners, particularly asylum-seekers, have faced in Germany, and ultimately conclude that postwar German society has shown remarkable tolerance for others (1998: 206). Brack contextualizes the issue, noting that attacks on foreigners have affected all of Europe, "for example, in Italy and France, but also the Federal Republic" (1996: 208). The potential "mistrust" of Germany's neighbors in regards to the question of the nation's past remains an issue for foreign policy nonetheless, according to the textbook authors. Askani and Wagener note that: "[f]oreign countries show concern over the rise of the [extreme rightist parties]. In the face of economic crisis in the German Republic, many ask whether Germany will once again fall prey to radical answers" (1997: 202). They conclude, however, that such concerns quickly, noting that such concerns are unfounded. Despite the worries of other nations, "Germany's future lies in a free, citizen-oriented, and world-open European Union … with the questions of Germany's future tied to the solutions of global problems" (1997: 274-5). Berger too poses the question for students: "why is it hard for foreigners, given our history, to come in contact with Germans" and later shows a picture of a German cartoon of a German boat riding on waves resembling Hitler asking "'why does no one like me?'" (1996: 255). There is thus a self-conscious awareness of how Germans are perceived around the world, particularly in Europe; but there is also a resistance to the idea that Germany could succumb to its past.

As to the ultimate significance of reunification, Hinrichs et al. ask whether fifty years of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland, with its "unprecedented economic and political stability, international recognition, and a resolved division of the nation," can be interpreted as a success story before suggesting that, yes, it can (1998: 188). Aksani and Wagener also note that unification "has made Germany the most populous and economically strong nation-state in

Middle Europe" but that the nation "must still find her new role in world politics" (1997: 274). Berger writes that "the German question is considered solved since the unification of the German states on October 2, 1990. Still, it is important, to consider once again what about the German question was, and may still be, so hard that it took so long, at least two hundred years, for the German and European history to overcome" (1996: 262). The German authors thus view the nation's future positively but cautiously; but leave this question partially open, suggesting that historical questions are too complex to be easily answered.

The German textbook authors present German history as far more central to world history than the other nations in the sample. There is hardly a nation that is not guilty of this; but unlike others in the sample, national history in Germany is not separated out from world history because the two are seen as fundamentally intertwined. Thus the depiction of German in the world history books is remarkably detailed, as it serves as their national history as well. Through this, the authors convey a strong sense of how the world should be ordered through their accounting of the German past. History is more relativistic and subject to interpretation than even the English textbooks. Historians are directly cited in the texts, rather than history simply presented as coming from one sole authority. The contingency of history is emphasized, particularly in analyzing the post-war division of Germany. Women are also incorporated into this history, as accounts of family life, gender relationships, and women's work receive a portion of the attention otherwise devoted to the public, political realm. Although the German texts share much with their English and American counterparts, they ultimately go farther in their inclusiveness of less traditional perspectives of history.

Conclusion

Historical events are not covered uniformly across national boundaries, nor are they interpreted similarly. Simply comparing the textbooks in this sample led to markedly different depictions of Germany's role in twentieth century world history. The issue of colonialism dominated Kenyan and Indian interpretations of Germany in the early twentieth century while the Western books give the question little, if any, attention. The disagreements involved in the signing of the Treaty of Versailles have great significance for the English authors but not for the others. American and English texts see the effects of the treaty as devastating for Germany while Germans have a mixed interpretation and the Kenyan and Indian texts do not devote attention to the issue. German and English books provide complex explanations for the rise of Nazism and subsequent outbreak of war, while the Americans solely blame the effects of the Versailles Treaty. The Kenyans and Indians do not provide much discussion at all for the causes of World War II. The defining event of the Nazi era for the American authors is the Holocaust (which still has implications today) while for the English it is the history of totalitarianism. The Kenyan series focuses on Hitler's economic and industrial accomplishments while the Indians condemn the Nazis for the general loss of life and extreme destruction as well as the negative consequences of imperialism. The German books incorporate many interpretations into their accounts of the Third Reich.

The division of Germany is seen for the United States textbooks as an opportunity for the triumph of the ideal of democracy over communism. The English see an instrumental purpose to the Western investment in the Federal Republic. Neither the Kenyan nor the Indian texts provide much explanation for the division or its significance. The Germans focus on the repercussions of such a division and the everyday experiences of Germans in both nations. Only the Americans

and Germans address the issue of reunified Germany in detail; the Americans fear a neo-Nazi revival, while they have a general, albeit hopeful, sense of not knowing what awaits the future for the Germans. When comparing these differing depictions of Germany, there is very little commonality that allows for a united image of German history.

If "German history is world history," we are left with the question, "which Germany?" And, equally important, "which world history?" How the world is ordered in school textbooks across cultures varies as much as German history does across those same cultures.

School history textbooks provide a lens through which to see the world, the nation's role within it, and the relationship of the individual to these larger phenomena. How that history is presented leads to different approaches to organizing the world. These worldviews are based, in part, in national cultures and are dependent on the cultural, political, and economic history of the nation from which they originate. By responding to their future audience, textbook authors attempt to shape world history in to a cultural vision. Thus the American, English, and German texts assume a vision of world history that is chronological and defined by political and international events, placing great importance on cause-and-effect understandings of those events. The Kenyan text covers world history thematically, juxtaposing events from different centuries to illustrate, for example, advances in communication. The Indian texts present history sequentially, but often with little connection between one historical event and those that preceded or followed it. These different approaches to world history undoubtedly affect students' ways of seeing the world and their place in it.

American, Indian, and Kenyan texts present history as coming from one authoritative source. The possibility for multiple interpretations of an historical event is rarely, if ever, considered. English and German authors, in contrast, frequently provide examples of the debates

by historians that suggest to students that history is not static. These varying approaches send different meanings to students about the teleology of history. Students who learn that history can be interpreted and judged differently likely have a harder time envisioning one grand narrative that makes history progress in a linear fashion toward a goal. Students who learn that history is not interpreted but is simply historical fact that needs no interpretation may be more likely to see the progression of world history.

World history textbooks are almost exclusively a gendered accounting of the world, focusing virtually entirely on the public domain and men's accomplishments. Women and their contributions are largely written out of this history and this in all likelihood affects female interests in the material. Even the German textbooks that conveyed far more information on family and private life overwhelmingly documented the political and public lives of men and their accomplishments. As I discuss further in Chapter Seven, I have seen observed of the gendered implications of this approach to history in my interviews with Americans and Germans. Men have a greater interest in international relations, politics, world events, and issues concerning the nation or, perhaps more accurately, male respondents indicate that they feel they *should* know more about such issues. Women demonstrate less interest in general in world history and politics and do not tend to feel a great expectation that they should have such knowledge (although they are often more uncomfortable because they believe they are wasting my time). A further analysis is explored in the following chapter on social characteristics.

How students (and, later on, adults) actually relate to this history is of course a complex question deserving of further study by audience reception theorists. Consumers of textbooks, including teenagers, actively interpret and engage the material before coming away with their own understanding of what they have read. Nonetheless, textbooks provide a way of framing

the world and conveying a sense of what is important to students, according to their own nation.

Given that these books often represent students' first introduction to notions of world history,

they likely leave a lasting impression. School world history texts help students to see history

either as chronological or thematic, part of a larger grand narrative progressing toward a goal,

full of contingency, gendered or more inclusive, authoritarian or open to multiple interpretations.

The place of the nation in a worldview is undoubtedly affected by these different

approaches to world history. The process of nationing is thus heavily dependent upon the

cultural presuppositions associated with how history should be organized. As this chapter has

shown, world history can be presented in markedly different ways. The image of Germany in

that history has also varied rather drastically in the accounts of the US-Americans, the English,

the Kenyans, the Indians, and the Germans. In the following chapter, I examine how depictions

of current Germany, much like its past, are culturally dependent, and I consider further how these

differences shed light on the process of nationing.

Chapter Three

The Nation under Threat: Four National Perspectives on the German Nation

In December 2000, an article appeared on the front page of the *New York Times* "Week in Review" entitled "Europe's Love-Hate Affair with Foreigners" (Cohen 2000). The article describes Europe's "new" crisis in which nationalist ideologies are on an upsurge in response to the pressure of immigration from "the outsider." The journalist, Roger Cohen, writes:

> The nation was a unifying idea imposed on diffuse history, and the German
>
> imagination – like that of many other European states – still longs for
>
> homogeneity, whatever the abundant evidence to the contrary… [C]enter-right
>
> parties, facing a left that has occupied the economic center and with no cold war
>
> left to fight, have been casting around for a new agenda. They have found it in
>
> threatened national identity (2000: 1, 6).

The center-right parties that Cohen describes are correct--threatened national identity is an issue. But this is not just the preoccupations of the conservatives, nor of politicians in general. The "nation under threat" is a subject that concerns numerous portions of society, including the media, academia, and ordinary citizens.

This chapter considers how news medias contribution to the construction of the nation. As I will demonstrate, Germany is constructed overwhelmingly in negative terms, as a nation whose stability is endangered. Newspapers are a primary source for current information on the state of a nation, providing readers with "factual" information about current events and descriptions of "typical" experiences associated with that nation. As such they complement the world history textbooks analyzed earlier particularly well. The schoolbooks provide their readers with a sense of how the world is organized, the place and importance of the nation within

it, and how a given nation's history fits into this larger historical experience. Nationing, however, requires not just an historical but also a contemporary understanding of the nation. Newspapers simultaneously provide a vision of the role of the nation in the present world and a model for how that nation can be positively and, more commonly, negatively evaluated for its ability to fulfill that role.

I argue here that studies of how we *nation*, or construct the nation and our relationship to it, must incorporate the role these threats to stability play in strengthening, rather than undermining, our conception of the nation. As my interviews in the following chapters demonstrate, individuals are very capable and often willing to speak of the problems that beset a nation. They gamely critique these structures that they otherwise see as quite powerful and readily compare these weaknesses to the strengths of other nations. In doing so, individuals rely on a discourse found in the news media, politics, and academia. If one listens closely to the language of the nation relayed through these sources, the theme of instability consistently reappears as one nation after another is seen as in danger of losing its identity or essence. According to these arguments, the insecurity of a particular nation is especially acute when compared to other, more stable, nations. It is not nations that are under threat, but a particular nation or group of nations that has difficulty maintaining its stability. The implication is thus that a given nation is under siege by internal and external forces, rendered more fragile and less secure than all other nations. This is an equal-opportunity phenomenon, which is to say that all nations are susceptible to such threats.

Newspapers, along with other news media, provide individuals with a way of viewing and relating to the nation, a way of nationing, that allows them to assess these large institutional

structures in critical ways.[49] How this is done – how they see the nation, its strengths and, more

so, weaknesses – is in large part culturally dependent. For instance, each nation uses its own lens

to envision Germany, and this lens is shaped and colored by culturally bound interests and

preoccupations. In the same terms, each journalist, editor, and publisher seeks to present

Germany in terms of what they believe to be relevant and important for their audience. As

Griswold explains in her study of literary reviews of a West Indian novelist:

> Meaning is a two-stage fabrication: part comes from what [book reviewers] think
>
> their readers will find significant. While reviewers may be aware of the two steps
>
> in this mediation, much of their communication depends on their social
>
> presuppositions: they simply take for granted that their readers have certain
>
> knowledge and interests. A reviewer tries to indicate 'what is going on' or 'what
>
> happens' in the book, and in doing so, he or she is both answering questions about
>
> the book's meaning for himself or herself and trying to make the book meaningful
>
> to the assumed audience (1987a: 1082-3).

Similar to book reviewers, journalists use their own cultural presuppositions to decide what is

and is of interest to their audiences and proceed to render the particular newsworthy event in a

way that will make it meaningful to that audience.

In general, newspapers select issues and events to report on that either conform or

complicate their nation's vision of Germany. What is determined newsworthy thus speaks to a

relationship between the events in Germany and the image the newspaper seeks to present to its

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[49] Newspapers, of course, are not without their problems. They represent "official culture" and most often those that include a larger focus on international events are consumed overwhelmingly by elites who do not best represent the nation at large. As such, these elite newspapers serve as only one potential way to discover how a national community imagines a given nation. And yet their importance is not diminished by the fact that there are other good sources of information (e.g., films, television, literature, music, personal experience with visitors or travel to that country) that lend to the construction of a nation. Nationing requires a complex combination of sources to allow for an image of a nation to arise and newspapers are a vital component to that mix.

readers. Although the foci may differ between newspapers, the ultimate message sent in this case is shared: Germany is overwhelmed by problems that endanger its stability.

This form of negative discourse is an integral part of the language we use to nation. Like journalists, academics tend to report the problems that threaten to undermine a given nation (see, for example, Bjornson 1986 on African states; Bowie 1993 on Wales; Johnston 1986 on Austria[50]). Like others, the German nation is also susceptible to such undermining forces, according to many social scientists, particularly in comparison to other more "stable" nations. Boerner writes:

> Perhaps nowhere in Europe is the question of 'national identity' raised as frequently as among the Germans. Since the land in which they live has historically been divided into various political, religious, and cultural spheres of influence, they have more difficulty apprehending their identity than do other peoples ensconced within firmly fixed borders (1986: 11).

According to Boerner, it is Germany that faces the difficulties of securing their identity while "other peoples" enjoy the stability that is ensured through their "firmly fixed borders." Forsythe too contends that "'Germanness,' as experienced from within has a "fragile, ambiguous quality that Germans themselves find highly problematic" particularly when they contrast theirs with the "crystal clear" identity of France (1989: 138, 142). Dann argues that a "basic dilemma for Germans in the European context has been its national identity… Its national borders were not a given and so modern nationally-conscious Germans have had to find other criteria for nationality [, 1993 #24: 314 [my translation]]. Seeba (1986) suggests that the uneasiness that Germans feel today in regards to their identity has historical roots in a nineteenth century German longing for identity. Wiedenfeld contends that German history has been noteworthy for its "extraordinary

lack of continuity" (Weidenfeld 1986: 76), while Wiedemann argues that "Germany has always essentially been a divided and divisible country" (1986: 141). Taken together, these evaluations of Germany appear damning: a nation that suffers exceptionally from an inability to know who or what it is. But this is the nature of such accusations: each time they are lodged, the implications of fragility are seen to be as devastating--as if such accusations had never been lodged against *any* nation before.

This is, as many social scientists argue today, part of the nature of nationhood. Nations are "imagined," "invented," and "mythic" (Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1983) in the sense that they are no longer seen as bound in nature, continuous through time, representative of a homogenous people, or especially static or stable (Handler 1988). Handler suggests that *all* nations are therefore "haunted by a vision of totality…of an irreducible, homogeneous unit, securely in control of its borders, self-contained, autonomous, and complete, asserting itself against a world of similar entities" (1988: 194). Given the constructed nature of national boundaries, both literal and figurative, he argues, this totality can never be achieved, leaving nations perpetually insecure and vulnerable. Members of a national community are thus left on the defensive as they combat internal and external pressures that threaten the existence of their collectivity.

These negative, destabilizing forces have routinely been understood as factors that are *opposed* to the identity of a nation. As such, they are destructive and threaten its very viability as a functioning entity. For instance, particularly central to the definition and construction of the nation have been the public symbols, events, history, or material objects that are traditionally cited as best representing the nation (Berezin 1997; Billig 1995; Cerulo 1995; Corse 1997; Elias 1994; Fitzgerald 1979; Maier 1988). Any factors that have threatened these comparably stable

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[50] Adams (1996) provides an interesting example of how Americans perceive such threats in regards to Tibetans.

sources have been viewed as dangerous in their ability to undermine the nation. Yet, as I argue here, not only are these destabilizing forces repeatedly connected to many different nations, they are also integral to our ways of thinking about those nations. Nationing requires an ability to speak in negative terms about what constitutes and threatens to undermine national identity as much as it requires an ability to speak positively of national symbols or characteristics.

Below, I compare the coverage of Germany in newspapers from England, Kenya, India, and the United States, analyzing the ways they write about the nation and how they come to construct different images of Germany in the news. Following the newspapers' leads, I focus on the ways in which they present the nation as overwhelmed by problems and consider how these observations are culturally dependent. I begin with an overview of cross-cultural differences in terms of frequency of publications before treating the content of each newspaper's coverage. I conclude by considering what these differences tell us about the preoccupations of the individual publications (and the nations in which they are produced) as well as discussing the importance of negative discourse for the process of nationing.

German Newsworthiness

As an economic and cultural world power that has undergone significant transformations, Germany finds itself in a position of prominent interest for much of the world and is thus regularly featured in the international sections from newspapers around the world. Here, I focus on newspaper coverage from 1991 to 1998 so as not to confuse the reporting on East and West Germany with that of the reunified nation. I selected one newspaper each from each nation: the *Guardian* from Manchester/London, England; the *Times of India*, Bombay/Mumbai edition; the *Daily Nation* from Nairobi, Kenya; and the *New York Times* from New York City, United States.

For the survey, I researched randomly selected two-week time periods from each year between 1991 and 1998. The chosen weeks are as follows: April 14 – 28, 1991; January 19 – February 1, 1992; September 5 – 18, 1993; August 7 – 20, 1994; June 11 – 24, 1995; April 21 – May 4, 1996; January 26, 1997 – February 8, 1997; July 12 – 25 1998.

I then reviewed the entire newspaper for each of the selected days and copied all articles that concerned Germany[51] for a sample total of 318 articles between the four newspapers (see next section for distributions). I coded articles for content, categorizing those issues discussed (e.g., domestic politics, international relations, crime) (see Appendix B for frequencies and explanations of coding) and making note of the language or analysis used in the articles to discuss Germany. I noted not only positively framed comments about the state of the German nation, but also those statements and analyses that suggested how the nation was "in danger."

The clearest evidence as to the difference of Germany's "newsworthiness" across the four newspapers emerges through a comparison of article frequencies over the eight years (see Table 1).[52] England[53] and the United States published substantially more articles concerning the nation than India or Kenya.[54] This variation alone suggests that certain events are not covered equally

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[51] Although I considered articles from all sections, I did not take articles from the Sports section that pertained solely to German athletes or teams; I did include articles more generally about Germany from this section. I also did not take articles from the Business or Finance sections that dealt exclusively with a specific German business, nor did I include advertisements for German companies.

[52] There was some variation in publication schedules that explains a small amount of the variation in frequency of articles between newspapers. The *Guardian* publishes a separate Sunday edition under the title of the *Sunday Guardian* that was not available on microfilm. The *Daily Nation* does not publish at all on Sunday. The *Times of India* comes out seven days a week but does not publish on January 27—a day that is included in my random sample for both 1992 and 1997. Although I considered eliminating Sunday editions for all newspapers, this ultimately did not seem a logical choice. My interest is in all articles about Germany that appear in a newspaper in a given time period. Although one can expect that the overall number of articles would be less for newspapers without Sunday editions, one can also assume that stories about Germany deemed important would be published on other days.

[53] Given that the *Guardian's* Sunday edition was not accessible, this ultimately meant that the English newspaper had sixteen less editions included in the sample than the *New York Times*, but still had only nine less total articles in the sample period than the American newspaper. This would suggest that it is the *Guardian* that publishes most frequently on the subject of Germany.

[54] Although the American and English newspapers publish substantially more articles in general than either the Indian or Kenyan ones do, this does not appear to explain the differences. Both India and Kenya still devote a

in all four newspapers. Over the years, interest in German events waxed and waned, but not similarly across cultures (see Table 1). The *Times of India* is relatively consistent in the attention it gives Germany for these eight two-week periods while the English *Guardian's* attention to Germany varies widely over the years,[55] again suggesting that there is not always agreement as to when Germany is "newsworthy" and when it is not.[56] The table of variations in issues covered in the coded articles reveals marked differences (see Appendix A), but these variations become remarkably pronounced only when one examines the content of each article. The following sections consider the construction of "Germany in the news" in four different cultural settings.

Table 1, Frequency of Articles by Newspaper and Year

Year

Newspaper	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	Total
Daily Nation (Kenya)	20	12	9	4	3	6	10	3	**66 (21%)**
Times of India	6	6	3	9	5	4	8	4	**45 (14%)**
Guardian (England)	18	17	11	5	4	6	36	4	**99 (31%)**
New York Times, USA	16	16	14	11	6	12	19	14	**108 (34%)**
Total	**60 (19%)**	**51 (16%)**	**37 (12%)**	**29 (9%)**	**18 (6%)**	**30 (9%)**	**73 (23%)**	**25 (18%)**	

substantial amount of attention each day to Europe and international events but in both cases German issues are not as frequently given the priority of being events newsworthy enough to publish.

[55] In four of the eight sampled years, the *Guardian* published six or less articles (or 6% or less per year) while the year 1997 produced 36% of all articles (n=36). Although this year resulted in a disproportionate number of articles being published in all four newspapers, 1997 represented only 15% of all Kenyan articles, 17% of all Indian articles, and 18% of all American articles. The English newspaper thus published unusually heavily in this year compared to the other nations.

[56] The newspapers also vary as to the average length of the articles they publish with the American and English newspapers printing significantly longer articles than those in the Kenyan or Indian publications. The *Daily Nation* averages 3.71 paragraphs per article on Germany; the *Times of India* 8.76; the *Guardian* 12.31; and the *New York Times* 14.95 (see Appendix A). Although part of these discrepancies can be accounted for by the fact that the *New York Times* and the *Guardian* are more likely to publish longer articles on average, it does not sufficiently explain such differences. *The Daily Nation*, for example, publishes many articles in their international section that are longer on average than four paragraphs, but they rarely concerned Germany in the time periods reviewed. These numbers again suggest a difference as to the amount and kind of attention given to Germany in each newspaper.

Germany in the *New York Times*

Like the other three newspapers in the sample, the *New York Times* overwhelmingly

publishes stories that focus on the problems that threaten German stability. For this reason, there

are few examples in the 108 articles published in this sample period that provide a positive or

merely descriptive contribution to the construction of the German image.[57] All other articles

focus on the troubles the nation faces and the ways in which its stability is under threat.

Even here, however, a diversity of images of "Germany under threat" do not emerge.

Rather, the American newspaper paints a rather clear portrait of Germany that is first and

foremost defined by its "struggle with its past." The Nazi-era is consistently the benchmark

against which Germany today can be measured. Although all four newspapers refer to the Nazi

past, the *New York Times* is distinctive both for the frequency with which it likens present-day

German issues to this era and its emphasis on the Holocaust (as opposed to, for example,

militarism and aggression) as the defining issue of this period. The U.S. publication also most

strongly envisions the Nazi-era as still having the potential to threaten, if not undermine, the

contemporary German nation. Further, rather than solely seeing the Holocaust era as an

historical reference to which present-day German can be compared, the American newspaper

also include issues related to the Holocaust as "news events" that continue to develop in the

1990s.

The *New York Times* relies on references to the Holocaust primarily as a means of

suggesting that present-day Germany will never be able to free itself from this incredible and

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[57] One article makes note of Germany's standing as the world's third-largest industrial economy (after the United States and Japan) while another comments that the German people "are nothing if not systematic" (NYT 9/8/93: D2; NYT 7/15/98: F1). In a more lighthearted account, one article describes the importance of bread to Germans, arguing that bread "matches people." The author writes that it is as hard to imagine a "Frenchman, full of Latin flair, choosing pumpernickel every day as it is to imagine a stolid German with a baguette or a ficelle on his table each morning" (NYT 7/15/98: F1). These articles are the only ones in the U.S. sample that do not speak in any way of the problems that beset the German nation.

incomparable tragedy "'whose immensity overwhelms the capacity of human comprehension'" (NYT 1/20/92: A1). One article cites a German politician who explains the significance of the Third Reich: "'That a highly modern state, working with such brutal success, killed all the members of a race it could capture, including mothers, children and old people—that is unique and without any historical parallel'" (NYT 1/20/92: A1). For the American newspaper, the Holocaust is not only incomparable, it is also unforgettable. The newspaper cites a Holocaust survivor: "'I know there is a new generation of Germans, but it can all start again… My attitude toward the Germans has changed—but I can never forget'" (NYT 4/29/96: 10). Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, having recently discovered that her grandparents had been Holocaust survivors, is quoted in a *New York Times* article: "Holocaust victims will keep returning as long as we remember them. Thank God" (NYT 2/7/97: A33). It is the unprecedented nature of the Third Reich that, according to the American newspaper, defines this era and makes it so unforgettable.

This event, however, is not solely a piece of history but an event that continues to have present-day ramifications worthy of reporting. As one Holocaust survivor, quoted in a 1997 edition of the newspaper, explains it: what is "'so distressing and perplexing is how long the tentacles of the Holocaust are…. I think the haunting thing…is it's still out there, it still impacts us'" (NYT 2/5/97: A8). As an example, the newspaper documents the opening of a memorial at Wannsee in 1992 that serves as the first permanent German monument to the killing of Jews. As to the relative belatedness of the event, the chief curator of the Wannsee memorial explains:

> It is much easier now to deal with the themes of Nazism and the mass murder of
> Jews than it was 25 years ago…Something has really changed… There is the
> effect of historical distance. People feel an inner freedom and a curiosity that was

not there before…[There is a] rising German interest in such uncomfortable topics…Some Germans must have hoped that by ignoring what happened there, they might somehow expunge the stain on their national conscience (NYT 1/20/92: A1).

The memorial is only possible, the *New York Times* reports, with historical distance and because more Germans are ready to face the "stain on their national conscience." Although fifty years in the past, the article suggests that this issue has as much relevance today for Germans as it did fifty years prior. One German politician, cited in the newspaper, summarizes: "'[e]xperience tells us that whatever we repress catches up with us later. No one can flee from their history'" (NYT 1/20/92: A1).

The American newspaper uses analogies of the Nazi era to make sense of contemporary events. In 1997, for instance, the *New York Times* published a number of articles concerning German restrictions on the Scientology movement. This resulted in the religious group comparing their treatment to the persecution of the Jews and accusing the government of "'Teutonic arrogance and insensitivity'" (NYT 2/1/97: A5).[58] American government spokespeople, the publication, reacted critically to such charges by Scientologists calling the comparison to Nazi-Germany "'outrageous and ahistorical'" (NYT 1/27/97: A4). What is noteworthy here is that although the American government critiques the Scientologists' view as unjustified, the U.S. newspaper nevertheless considers the allegations of Nazi-like policies as significant enough to publish in three separate articles.

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[58] In response, the *New York Times* reports, German officials defended their actions by claiming that it was "precisely because of their history that [Germans] are sensitive to the perils of totalitarian movements growing from modest beginnings" and that they therefore must take action "to limit the activities of groups perceived as threats to national well-being'" (NYT 2/1/97: A5; NYT 1/27/97: A4). The presence of such groups, according to the American newspaper, leaves Germans tangled in analogies to the Nazi era: banning the group results in accusations of totalitarian actions by outsiders, but allowing the "cult-like" group is seen by Germans as paving the way for other totalitarian movements and threatening the "well-being" of the nation.

Numerous issues call up memories of the Third Reich, according to the American newspaper. The economic investment of German firms in the early 1990s in Eastern Europe leads to "an undertone of worry." A Czech politician is quoted: "'We have to ask, for example, what is German capital? Does it have the same geopolitical context as in the 1930s?'" (NYT 1/23/92: A10). Rightist violence also threaten the foundation of the German nation, according to the *New York Times*, because of its reminders of past atrocities. One article cites former Chancellor Kohl who claims that these groups are "'an increasingly serious threat to our security…Jews in America and in Israel are looking at what's going on in Germany and saying, 'It's happening again' and 'Haven't they learned anything?''" (NYT: 9/15/93: A10).

Other issues compared to the Nazi era include: rising inflation in 1993, the potential appointment of a conservative federal president in 1993, and the wrapping of the Reichstag by eccentric artist Christo in 1995. The role of the Germans in the Iraqi War also lead to such analogies. As one politician explains to the American newspaper: "'if in place of General Schwarzkopf there had been a German general [in Iraq]…and if that German general was on television every day giving reports about the progress of German troops in the field, I don't think people in America or England or France would be happy'" (NYT 4/16/91: A4). The implications of seeing German military in foreign countries would be problematic, the American newspaper reports, because of the danger that the memories and fears of World War II would be revived. Time and again, the *New York Times* selects stories for publication that suggest that the memory and possibly the threat of Nazism have not been entirely lifted from the German nation.

Perhaps nothing in the *New York Times* has epitomized its depiction of contemporary Germany and its "struggle with its past" like the newspaper's 1996 coverage of the publication of *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* by Daniel J. Goldhagen.

One article begins by noting that since World War II, Germany has "undergone cycles of agonized self-interrogation over the Holocaust, focused perhaps on the most overpowering question of all: why was it the Germans who systematically killed the Jew?" (NYT 4/25/96: A4).[59] Goldhagen, as the article summarizes, claims that the Holocaust was the result of a "deep strain of specifically German anti-Semitism" that drew "enthusiastic, willing support" from ordinary Germans and made the Holocaust what Goldhagen calls a "'national project'" (NYT 4/25/96: A4). The *New York Times* reports that the German response to the Goldhagen book has been to condemn the book as "lacking in scholarship, one-sided, derivative, down-right wrong and willfully provocative," containing "'the darkest cliches'" (NYT 4/25/96: A4). Noting that reunified Germany was just beginning to recover from the "shame and brutality" of World War II, "the indignant, sometimes pained response from German intellectuals speaks volumes for modern Germany's contorted relationship with its past" (NYT 4/25/96: A4). What is significant here is the *New York Times* interpretation of the Germans' criticisms of the book as a symbol of their "contorted relationship" with history, rather than as a flaw of the book itself. This coverage again suggests the difficulties the German nation has today because of this troublesome relationship to their national history.

The U.S. publication includes other more optimistic perspectives on the state of the German nation in the 1990s, but even these more positive assessments still allude to the question of the dark "past." A 1991 interview with a German political leader is an illustration of this treatment as he explains the uphill battle Germans face:

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[59] One *New York Times* commentator compares the situation to that of mythical Sisyphus, forever condemned to push a boulder uphill: "'More than a half century after the death of Hitler, after German unification, it finally looked as if the Germans had freed themselves from the destiny of Sisyphus… Mr. Goldhagen has made every effort to shove them back to damnation'" (NYT 4/25/96: A4).

'There are still a lot of prejudices and a lot of awful films, even in America, that

put Germans in a bad light that I really don't think we deserve any more…. We

have learned to be friendly, open, peaceful, meek and non-militarist. In fact,

today we are exactly the way the Americans and the English and the French

always wanted us to be' (NYT 4/16/91: A4).

Another interview with former American Ambassador to Bonn echoes this sentiment: "'I don't

think we're in Weimar [the government that preceded the Nazi era] again…. Democracy in my

view is firmly rooted here…. I have always been skeptical of the notion that there is some

inherent anti-foreigner bias here in Germany'" (NYT 9/5/93: Week in Review 7). By selecting

these quotes, the American newspaper suggests that Germany has changed and no longer needs

to be compared to the past. And yet, by relying on these quotes, the newspaper further constructs

an image of Germany in which allusions to the 1930s and 1940s are still relevant.

A few issues not concerning Germany's struggle with the past do receive attention in the

New York Times, although these too are all presented as problems that have the potential to

threaten the stability of the nation. These include "troublesome" reunification; expensive health

care; the threat of spies infiltrating the German government; increasing tensions between German

and Soviet troops; violence against Turks; the influx of asylum-seekers from the former

communist bloc; the problematic role for Germany in the Gulf War; and the decline of German

as a global language. Although these relatively few articles provide a more multifaceted image

of Germany that is not solely defined in terms of the Holocaust, they still contribute to the image

of Germany under threat from both internal and external sources.

Ultimately, a quote from an author in the book review section captures the *New York

Times'* approach to Germany: "'[t]rying not to think about Nazis in Germany…is like trying not

to think about sex in a porno theater. Why go in at all?'" (NYT 4/21/96: Book Review 9). This

analogy between the Nazis and Germany and sex and pornography speaks for the *New York*

Times as well. It is relatively rare for the newspaper to report on Germany without calling up the

images of the Third Reich and their potential threat for Germany today. Although all four

newspapers refer to the Nazi past, the *New York Times* is distinctive both for the frequency with

which it likens present-day German issues to this era and its emphasis on the moral story of the

Holocaust as the defining issue of this period. The American newspaper does not just present the

Nazi era as an historical reference to which present-day Germany can be compared, but as an

event that continues to make news in the 1990s.

Germany in the *Guardian*

The English newspaper, the *Guardian,* also tends to construct an image of Germany

almost constantly under threat. In this case, however, the central threat is from internal forces

that have the potential to undo the stability of the nation. Unlike the *New York Times* that

focuses most heavily on the question of Germany's relationship to its Holocaust, the *Guardian*

most emphasizes issues of German national politics and their implications for European

unification. In its numerous accounts of German political troubles, the *Guardian* repeatedly

makes clear that the solution to Germany's – and Europe's – problems will be found in the

integration of the nation into the European Union. Although much of the coverage also refers to

the Third Reich, the moral emphasis is different from the commentary often presented in the *New*

York Times. For the *Guardian*, the implied moral solution is the integration of Germany through

European unification.

At almost every opportunity, the English newspaper discusses German political events in terms of what it will mean for a united Europe. In 1993, for example two conservative partner parties put forth a new campaign designed to revive patriotism and renew the "civic contract" between the individual and state. According to the *Guardian*, this campaign was intended to renew national pride while healing the "scars of 40 years' division" and asserting an international role for a united Germany. The newspaper quotes a conservative leader: "'We must become more secure and certain again in a feeling of national belonging… Patriotism is not old-fashioned. Our fatherland could do with far more patriotism'" (G 9/15/93: 8). The article then notes that, despite the new call to patriotism, the politician still sought to assure Europe that Germany's interests are also in a united Europe. Former Chancellor Helmut Kohl, according to the *Guardian,* also seeks to reassure his allies that German security can "only be guaranteed under a European roof …or Germany and its neighbours would re-live the 'evil gains' of nineteenth-century national rivalry" (G 9/14/93: 8). Kohl, the newspaper reports, claims that it is "'absurd to speak of German nationalism in a country where the people hardly know their own national anthem. There is no country in the world in which the people deal with the symbols of their state in such a tortured way as here'" (G: 9/15/93: 8). Nonetheless, this German election campaign, the first since World War II "with an avowedly patriotic platform" is viewed rather cautiously by the English publication as such patriotism had previously been "associated with Nazism and militarism" (G: 9/15/93: 8).

As a "symbol of the new German patriotism," the English publication reports, Kohl suggests the appointment of a conservative east German politician, a man who "has been accused of being a racist and a misogynist" to the largely ceremonial role of German president [60] (G 9/10/93: 12; G 9/14/93: 8). The *Guardian* expresses concern about this potential appointment

and its consequences for the European Union. Another German politician reaffirms the importance of Europe for Germany: "'We want the preservation of a national identity in the framework of European unity and that has nothing to do with a rapprochement to the [far-right] [sic] Republicans,'" (G 9/15/93: 8). In including these quotes, the *Guardian* makes clear that such a neo-Nazi resurgence would have negative consequences for the entire European Union; its avoidance requires Germany secured under a "European roof." As in the case with the world history textbooks, the emphasis is focused less on the Holocaust per se (as in the American case) and more on the issue of aggression in general.

Indeed, European unification is repeatedly seen as a means of preventing a return of Nazi aggression for the English newspaper. One article notes that economic and monetary union is in reality about politics "and specifically about the role of Germany in Europe" (G 1/27/97: 16). The reporter is direct in his analysis of the importance of European unification:

> Enthusiasts and sceptics proceed from the shared assumption that, faced with a
> wet Sunday afternoon and nothing to do, the Germans will invade either Belgium
> or Poland. This proves, say skeptics,…that the Hun is incorrigible, and that we
> should have nothing to do with him. Nonsense, say enthusiasts like President
> Chirac and Chancellor Kohl, all it proves is that we must tame the German beast
> by tying him into a European Union… The key is, once again, to accept the
> crucial role of the German behemoth (G 1/27/97: 16).

Again the fear of German aggression can, for the English publication, only be avoided through a strong German commitment to the European Union.

The darker side of the importance of Germany to European integration is addressed in a letter to the editor responding to the German conviction of a British citizen for denying the

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[60] This appointment, in fact, never happened. Roman Herzog was instead appointed Federal President.

Holocaust. The letter writer express frustration with the situation: "'Perhaps this is why so many youngsters today doubt the Holocaust's happening: because we [the British]—ably helped by the Germans themselves—have been intent on whitewashing the present Germany so that we can join them in a European single state'" (G 2/4/97: 14). In selecting this letter for publication, the *Guardian* suggests that the German integration into Europe can also have negative implications as well like the "whitewashing" of German guilt.

Given this interest in German integration into the European Union, the English newspaper concentrates more heavily on the details of German domestic politics and the troubles associated with them. Numerous articles focus on political crises that threaten German stability. The 1991 electoral loss of Kohl's party in his home states is seen as a "bitter personal blow to Dr Kohl, a former state premier, who tried to turn the election into a national vote of confidence. It indicates a collapse in support for him and his policies in both parts of Germany, six months after unification" (G 4/22/91: 1). Other articles are even more condemning in their interpretation of the defeat of Kohl's party, suggesting that "the knives are out once more for Helmut Kohl, the architect of German unity" who suffered "a catastrophic defeat for his own party" and "a crisis of confidence at home and abroad after his party's disastrous election defeat" (G 4/23/91: 19; G 4/22/91: 1). Kohl, according to these articles "lost…touch" with the dissatisfaction of western voters and the problems in the east and this sent him "plunging in the popularity ratings in both parts of Germany" (G 4/23/91: 19; G 4/22/91: 1). Disagreements in politics repeatedly speak to problems with German stability for the newspaper. At different points, the national parties are described as being in "disarray," "divided among themselves," facing a "fierce struggle for power" and a "deep political crisis" (G 6/12/95: 11; G 4/24/96: 20; G 4/17/91: 10; G 4/22/91: 1).

By detailing such political rifts and crises, the English publication paints a picture of a nation

deeply divided by political factions.[61]

The emphasis on politics for the *Guardian* is often within the context of Germany as an

exceptionally bureaucratic state. The English newspaper describes the nation as an "economic

powerhouse," whose citizens are "apostles of sound public finances;" but that due to its "lavish

welfare system" it is also "the most expensive country in which to employ people" (G 4/20/91: 8;

G 6/16/95: 19; G 4/24/96: 20; G 4/24/96: 20). The image of an elaborate German bureaucracy is

further substantiated by the *Guardian's* comments as to its "immensely complex taxation

system," the "incredibly complicated building regulations," and the "struggle to ease regulations

on [restrictive] shopping hours" (G 4/29/96: 7; G 5/1/96: 14). As to the latter, the newspaper

notes that those foreigners who have followed the debates over this issue "will smile wearily,"

because "[n]othing much ever happens in Bonn [the former German capital]" (G 4/25/96: 20). In

commenting that the "very German attention to detail has to provoke a smile," the English

newspaper constructs the image of an excessively bureaucratic nation that suffers from its

inflexibility (G 5/1/96: 14).

Reunification, for the *Guardian,* is perhaps the greatest liability to German political and

economic stability. "The Big Change," according to the *Guardian,* is the "deceptively mild

euphemism" used by both east and west Germans alike to describe reunification (G 9/17/93: 13).

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The *Guardian* cites one critic who argues that Kohl has used German unity "'as an excuse to limit social benefits, [which has] destroy[ed] the emotional and social basis of unification,'" (G 9/9/93: 10).[62] The English publication describes former West Germans' resentment of Kohl for inflicting exorbitant costs on them during a recession (G 4/20/91: 8; G 9/17/93: 13). Easterners also blame Kohl for "the collapse of the east German economy and his unfulfilled promises of prosperity within just a few years " (G 4/18/91: 11; G 4/20/91: 8). One article summarizes the ways in which reunification threatens to pull apart the nation:

> West Germans feel their long-lost cousins want immediately what they took 40
>
> years to get, and easterners feel they paid Germany's war debt to the Soviet Union
>
> for 40 years while Marshall Aid rebuilt the west…. Ossis [East Germans] liken
>
> their country to a colony run by Wessis [West Germans] …. It is notorious that
>
> few young Wessis are interested in the wild east (G 9/17/93: 13).

Reunified Germany[63] has become two nations living under the guise of one, leaving open the question as to whether Germany will "remain competitive and overcome the continuing problems presented by unification" (G 1/30/92: 10).

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[62] Kohl, the newspaper writes, is "unapologetic about the course of German unification, the problems it has brought, and his policies for dealing with them. 'I'm glad that we have these particular difficulties because they come with national unity and I always wanted this unity,' he says" (G 4/29/91: 8).

[63] The *Guardian* interprets the transition of Germany's capital from Bonn to Berlin as particularly symbolic of reunified Germany's attempts to negotiate its past and reunified future with European integration. Moving back to Berlin represents "the overcoming of division, not only within Germany but in Europe as a whole, and stands as much for resistance to fascism as it does for dictatorship" (G 4/24/91: 8). Again, as this quote suggests, this transition has political implications not just for Germany but for all of Europe, according to the *Guardian*. The "resurrected capital" symbolizes:

> the new Germany's coming of age—the transfer of power to Berlin within the next three years…
> 'This is an important day for the…. reunited fatherland,' Mr Kohl pronounced…. The new
> chancellery, Kohl claims…symbolises Germany's recent history,' said Mr Kohl. 'It embodies the
> brilliance and the hubris, the destruction and the new beginning' (G 2/5/97: 11).

Berlin, as the capital of reunified Germany, represents a turning away from notorious history to a more optimistic future, putting "the capital on par with Paris and London, and signal[ing] to east Germans that their interests [are] central to policy," (G 4/24/91: 8). Berlin is thus the symbol of a reunified nation optimistically looking toward the future, according to the English publication.

Ultimately, this picture of Germany presented to the English is one of a potentially powerful nation fraught with problems. There is a repeatedly expressed concern that German national politics, because of the nation's history as an aggressor, could potentially harm the continent if Germany turns inward. Thus, according to the English newspaper, domestic politics present the greatest threat to both German and European stability. For the *Guardian,* the key to both German and British interests lies in the integration of Germany into a unified Europe. Without this, the English publication implies that German aggression could once again have implications for all of Europe.

Germany in the *Daily Nation*

In comparison to its American and English counterparts, Kenya's *Daily Nation* paints a less detailed portrait of the German nation. In large part this can be explained by the fact that over half of the articles in the Kenyan newspaper come from a column entitled "Today in History" which simply lists events that occurred in the world on that particular day in the past. These historical notes primarily document the anniversaries of various wars and battles but provide no further context or explanation for the circumstances under which fighting occurred. In general, this column does little to foster an image of Germany, except as a nation often at war. An additional fifth of the Kenyan articles concern crimes that either took place in Germany or involved Germans, but the reports are not presented as having larger implications for the nation. In fact, very few (less than ten percent) of the articles include commentary that suggests how the Kenyan nation envisions Germany beyond its connection to anomalous crimes and military history. Those few articles that provide commentary construct an image of the German nation as plagued by a host of problems.

Most of this smaller set of articles address the threats to German stability brought on by reunification and its consequences for the lagging German economy. A 1991 article details the problems in the East:

> While Germans in the West of the country enjoy the fruits of economic success, the East is a wasteland of decaying factories…. 'It's worse now than in the depression' said [one official]…. [Violent crime] coinciding with a surge in labour militancy in the East, has raised a frightening question: is unification going violently wrong? Conditioned by decades of obedience to the state, East Germans were passive for months as they watched their own economic collapse, expecting government to step in and make things right…. East Germans began to feel they had been duped…. Today, the protesters attack the erstwhile hero of German unification, Chancellor Helmut Khol [sic] (DN 4/8/91: 306).

The Kenyan newspaper suggests that reunified Germans, particularly from the East, see reunification as a mistake that may be going "violently wrong." This "dire economic predicament" has led to a fear of right-wing, neo-Nazi violence and, as one Easterner is quoted, the "'situation is getting more and more explosive week by week'" (DN 4/26/91: 6). The *Daily Nation* notes that German Chancellor Helmut Kohl is on the defensive for his role in this difficult reunification. He is accused of "lying" and "duping" the east Germans who are "unconvinced by his protestations of innocence" (DN 4/26/91: 6). After Kohl's party suffered a "slap in the face" in the chancellor's home state election, the Kenyan newspaper notes the need for the party to "review their strategy for cementing German unity" (DN 4/23/91: 9). The problems, according to the *Daily Nation*, do not lie with the fact that sacrifices were made or taxes raised: "the scandal lies in the fact that people were deceived and their willingness to show solidarity was not

encouraged but paralysed" (DN 4/26/91: 6). This picture is one of a broken, even betrayed, reunified Germany that holds Kohl more than partly to blame for its dismal state of affairs.

Only three of sixty-six articles make reference to the Holocaust in the sample from the *Daily Nation*. In one cited above, there is a foreboding quality to the observation that Berlin's unemployment rate in 1991 "is expected to be higher than it was in 1932, the year before the Nazis seized power" (DN 4/26/91: 6). This article serves as the only suggestion in the Kenyan newspaper that a neo-Nazi threat is still possible. Another article describes Nazi medical experiments in the 1930s and 1940s concluding that memorialization is important "as a constant reminder that never again should this be allowed to happen" (DN 1/31/92: 11). An additional article on advertising questions why German advertising is so "bad," noting that the "country that put '*Arbeit macht Frei*' (work brings freedom) over the gates to the death camp at Auschwitz still feels the shadow of Nazism" (DN 7/14/98: 6). Although these three articles suggest that the Nazi era does have relevance to modern-day Germany, the Kenyan newspaper does not emphasize its potential to threaten the stability of the nation today.

The fact that only a small number of articles provide much analysis of the German nation at all means that readers of the *Daily Nation* do not receive an especially detailed picture of Germany. What emerges from these articles is a tendency to focus on anomalous crimes, battles in history, and problems with reunification. The latter represents the greatest struggle for the nation, according to the Kenyan newspaper, as it threatens to undermine both political and economic stability. Unlike the *New York Times* which focuses on the contemporary effects of the Holocaust and the *Guardian* that emphasizes the implication of German political troubles for Europe, the *Daily Nation* presents both of these issues as having few implications for

contemporary Germany. Instead the Kenyan newspaper's vision appears to be one of a nation

beset by crime, defined by a military history, and troubled by the implications of reunification.

Germany in the *Times of India*

The *Times of India* published fewer articles on Germany than the *Daily Nation* in the

researched time periods. Yet these articles arguably go further in constructing an image of the

nation than those by the Kenyan publication. The Indian newspaper focuses most on German-

Indian relations and their effects on trade with India. The picture of Germany in the Indian

newspaper is one heavily influenced by its role as an economic trading partner and international

power. And yet, those articles that provide commentary or analysis as to the state of the nation

overwhelmingly discuss the threats to German security due to internal problems.[64]

The *Times of India* is particularly critical of reunified Germany's new role in the world

order. However, unlike the English, they do not see this as a concern for European stability nor

do they see the need for Germany's integration into the European Union. Instead, the Indian

newspaper focuses on the role reunified Germany will take in the *world* rather than Europe. One

article notes that by advocating the recognition of Croatian and Slovenian independence,

"Germany demonstrated an unusual political assertiveness" and is now accused of seeking

> a return to German domination of the southern Slavs! Some in west Europe also
>
> felt that Germany was seeking to create a 'Teutonic block' in the Balkans. The
>
> reunification of Germany is a stale story but the country of 78 million continues to

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[64] There was only one statement in the sampled period in the Indian newspaper that does not concern Germany's many problems but still addresses what it means to be "typically German." In regards to the question of working Sundays, the *Times of India* reports that there is no "americanising Germany . . . Line-jumping, pushing and general rudeness is common inside the stores as closing hour approaches" (ToI 4/30/96: 11). This quote serves as the only description of the German that is not tied to a negative threat.

attract attention for its economic might, as well as its newfound will to acquire a

proportionate political clout (ToI 1/19/92: 9).

Here, the Indian newspaper critiques Germany for what is described as an overassertion of its

power in Eastern Europe.

Although the *Times of India* is critical of Germany for being too politically involved in

Eastern Europe, it judges just as harshly for the perceived lack of German intervention in Iraq.

The newspaper reports that Germany relied on "cheque-book diplomacy" throughout the Gulf

War by not sending military troops overseas, suggesting that "united Germany is an economic

giant and a political dwarf." The "slack German response" to the Gulf crisis is attributed to

domestic problems, particularly the reconstruction of the east as well as to a "strongly pacifist

tradition, essentially Eurocentric priorities, and domestic opposition to any active German

overseas military involvement" (ToI 4/27/91: 12).[65] The newspaper reports that Americans

perceived Germans as "being self-centred and conspicuously absent from the conflict" and that

the German contribution was "far below American (and, of course, British) expectations" (ToI

4/27/91: 12). Taken together, these articles imply that too much intervention by the Germans, as

in Eastern Europe, conjures up memories of the Third Reich, but too little, as in Iraq, means that

Germans are not pulling their appropriate weight. More so than the American or English

newspapers, the Indian publication presents Germany as a politically weak nation in search of its

appropriate role in world politics. Further, in suggesting that Germany is both "pacifist" and

"absent" from conflict, the *Times of India* conjures up an image directly in contrast to the

American vision of a Germany still actively struggling with neo-Nazism and an English

depiction of the potential for German nationalism to turn into German militarism.

Although the emphasis for the Indian newspaper tends to be more on Germany's troubles finding its political and economic place in the world, reunification is also seen as having disastrous effects for the nation. The ramifications of this transition are wide-reaching, affecting even the birth rate: "[n]o wars, famines or other catastrophes have had the same devastating effect on the birth rate as the crash westernization of eastern Germany" (ToI 8/14/94: 13). Due to their unhappiness with reunification, former Chancellor Kohl's popularity, according to the *Times of India*, "plummeted in the east" where both unemployment and social tensions were on the rise. The newspaper claims that the 1991 state election in which Kohl's party was defeated was "as much a referendum on the economic costs of unity as last December's election was a vote on the political issue of unification" (ToI 4/25/91: 10). These articles in the Indian newspaper suggest that the effects of reunification have been devastating politically, economically, and socially.

The worst consequence of reunification, according to the *Times of India*, is an increase in extremism and violence, particularly against immigrants. One articles summarizes the problem:

> While in western Germany, there is much concern about the cost of unification
> and some disgust with the 'too demanding easterners,' in eastern Germany, the
> people are agitated about the undesirable economic consequences of unification.
> The increasing economic misery in eastern Germany is breeding bitterness and
> political extremism, often expressing itself through street-riots and violence
> against immigrants. The strength of neo-Nazi demonstrators seems to be growing
> even as the police is [sic] unable to cope with right-wing violence and public
> disorder (ToI 4/23/91: 24).

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[65] The German constitution, the article notes, precludes the deployment of German forces beyond specifically delineated areas, but the *Times of India* suggests that this may have merely been used as an excuse for Germans not

The Indian newspaper makes clear that the state of affairs in the eastern part of the nation has been disastrous enough to threaten the public order and enable the revival of neo-Nazi ideology. An attempt to tighten asylum laws, the Indian newspaper argues, has done little: "Clearly, ordinary citizens do not feel reassured that the checks on immigration will automatically curb anti-foreigner violence. And indeed they have not . . . the government's tough new anti-immigration laws [may] have legitimised, rather than checked, xenophobic violence directed at foreigners." The newspaper then cites a poll on racism in Germany reporting that 50 percent of western Germans and 35 percent of eastern Germans fear a right-wing resurgence leading to "widespread fears among foreigners and Germans of the return of Nazism" (ToI 9/13/93: 13). The *Times of India* suggests that xenophobia, intolerance, and the specter of rightist extremism all loom large since reunification and threaten to undermine the nation.

When it comes the issue of the Holocaust, the *Times of India* aligns in approach, if not in quantity, with the *New York Times*. Like its American counterpart, the Indian newspaper suggests that the Holocaust is not solely an issue of the past. One arctile concludes that given German history and the virulence of neo-Nazi groups, "it is scarcely surprising—even though unjust—that the spectre of Nazism is so easily evoked" (ToI 9/13/93: 13). In a tone that echoes the American newspaper, the Indian publication claims that the "enduring trauma of the Second World War—the Nazi holocaust—refuses to go away" (ToI 2/6/97: 12). Although these few articles are not comparable to those in the U.S. publication during the same sampled time period, the Indian interpretation is similar: the importance of the Holocaust and the Nazi-era has not dissipated and there is still a serious threat to the nation that comes from this past.

However, unlike the *New York Times,* the *Times of India* does not focus overwhelmingly on this issue. Instead, its emphasis tends to be more on the question of Germany's role as a

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to get involved.

world and economic power in general and the implications of reunification for this new role. Yet, its assessment of Germany's ability to negotiate this role in power is dismal. Reunification, according to the Indian newspaper, has negatively impacted all aspects of German life, leaving the nation open to a neo-Nazi resurgence. The portrait painted by the *Time of India* is thus one of an increasingly unstable nation fighting an uphill battle to reestablish international and national political power.

Conclusion

To read the newspaper, watch the news, or even read academic analyses of the nation is to learn that nations are perpetually under threat. Indeed, if the media, politicians, and academics stopped reporting on the problems besetting the nation, they would have little to say. From this point of view, one might assume that nationhood does not work: for almost every time a nation makes the news, it is because its viability is threatened. And yet, this cannot be. The state of these nations cannot be as devastating as the negative discourse claims. After all, most nations do maintain their stability and live to combat the next crisis that awaits them. In fact, as I would argue, the vision of "threats" does not simply undermine or hinder the nation: it is integral to their identity. This is as much the case for internal visions of the nation as it is for external ones. That is, observers on the inside see as much potential for national crises to threaten the stability of the nation as do those on the outside, although there is little agreement as to *which* crises actually threaten the nation. Critically assessing the state of the nation is thus crucial to our being able to discuss the nation and its role in the world.

The problems that threaten to undermine the nation are not seen similarly everywhere; they are culturally influenced. In part, however, there is commonality. As Griswold argues,

cultural works "have the capacity to stimulate a wide, but not, random, variety of interpretations" (1987a: 1078). There is a degree of congruence in these differing understandings without which the nations would be unintelligible. In Germany's case here, this shared image is one of a nation plagued by problems – most directly associated with reunification and the threats of (neo-) Nazism. Together, these "threats" to German stability come to structure the newspapers' presentations of the German nation across cultures.

But these similarities do not tell the whole story: there are important nuances and differing emphases that demonstrate the effects of this cultural variation. Events were not all covered in each newspaper and, when they were, the presentation and commentary included often changed the tone of the information from one newspaper to the next. The *Times of India* spends the greatest time discussing Germany's role in world politics, particularly emphasizing Germany's economic and political relationship to the rest of the world and the internal problems the nation faces due to reunification. The *Daily Nation* provides the least detailed picture of Germany in the time surveyed, concentrating a disproportionate amount of attention on historical events and anomalous crimes. To the degree that it does construct an image, the Kenyan newspaper focuses most heavily on the troubles associated with reunification and least heavily on Third-Reich-related issues. The *Guardian* best details the German political crises and stresses the importance of European integration for anchoring Germany in the European Union. Finally, the *New York Times* focuses most heavily on Germany's struggle with its past, suggesting that Holocaust-related problems still threaten to overwhelm the nation.

These differing constructions and interpretations of Germany speak to the varying preoccupations and interests of those doing the reporting. The cases of India, England, the United States, and Kenya suggest that the interests of each respective nation are reflected in their

depictions of Germany. India's economic ties to Germany are arguably stronger than its cultural, historic, or political connections. As India seeks to in its own place in the international hierarchy, it considers the position of other nations, like Germany, within the world system particularly relevant. For these reasons, Germany may be presented first and foremost as an international trade partner.

The Kenyan *Daily Nation* provides the least defined image of the four newspapers as its emphasis on crimes and historic events overshadows other interpretations of Germany. It is not that political, economic, cultural, or historic events or concerns are ignored. Rather, it is more that the Kenyan newspaper surrounds German news events with little analysis or context. This relatively meager focus on Germany could be dismissed simply by the argument that Kenya has little investment in Germany: One is an African nation, the other European and that there is no strong connection between them. This is likely an oversimplification of a more complex relationship. Germany is a major trading partner and investor for Kenya and, as one of the articles notes, the primary tourist market for Kenyans (DN 4/17/91: 12). In this sense, the *Daily Nation* could conceivably consider Germany one of the most important nations in its international coverage. For these reasons, the Kenyan newspaper's relative lack of detail may speak more in general to the publications' approach to reporting on news, an approach that may be less focused on context and analysis than those found in its American or English counterparts. To the degree that one image does emerge, it is one of a nation trying to overcome the radical transition of reunification.

For England, the transformed political landscape in Europe increases its interest in both Germany's internal politics as well as its commitment to Europe in general as both nations consider and prepare for membership in the European Union. Further, because England has felt

the brunt of German military aggression in the past, this issue comes to heighten their concern

for a stable German future within a European context. Thus, the *Guardian* details German

national politics and repeatedly relates these issues to Germany's relationship to the rest of

Europe.

The United States, of course, also has strong political and economic ties to Germany. But

even these cannot be rivaled by its cultural and historical connection to the Holocaust. The story

of the Third Reich has come to inform the American newspaper's depiction of Germany more

strongly than any of the other three nations. The importance of the Holocaust for Americans has

been well documented (Barta 1996; Keller 1990; Lisus 1995; Margalit 1995; Markle 1992;

Monaco 1990; Montgomery 1995; Novick 1999; Ruffins 1997; Sauer 1990). And it is this

cultural and historical connection to the Holocaust that most strongly defines Germany's image

in the *New York Times* and allows for an image of the contemporary nation burdened by its past.

What emerges through this survey of four newspapers is a feel for how audience

reception on the broad, national level affects constructions of Germany in the news. Events are

not uniformly determined newsworthy across the newspapers and, when they are, they are not all

seen as having the same symbolic significance. Overwhelmingly, these events are presented as

undermining the nation. Yet, this is such an integral part of the discourse on the nation that to

read such discussions literally is to assume that nations are indeed under threat. To read this

discourse symbolically, one realizes that "threats to stability" and negative language concerning

the nation is a necessary component of understanding nationhood. The process of nationing –

the ways in which we think and talk about nations – requires an ability to speak not only about

what constitutes national identity but also what threatens to undermine these entities. This

ability, as the following chapters will demonstrate, is one in which my interview partners are

well skilled. And, as is the case relative to newspapers, the question of *which* threats come to

endanger the nation is culturally dependent and representative of differing perspectives on the

nation.

Chapter Four

The Question of Pride: Nationing in Action

Thus far, this dissertation has concentrated on the construction of the nation in the public discourse of different nations. As I argue in chapter two, schoolbooks provide a way of organizing world history and the nation's relationship to that history. Education serves as a medium through which the worldview of a nation is conveyed to its future citizens. In chapter three, I review how images of threats to the nation are a primary means through which news publications analyze and conceive of nations. As both the textbooks and newspapers demonstrate, the image of Germany in both history and current events is affected by *which* nation's textbook or newspaper is reporting on the nation.

Although both schoolbooks and newspapers shed light on this process of audience reception, they both represent official discourse and each has its own peculiarities. Schoolbooks are an oversimplified, nationalistic history; newspapers contain often elite or sensationalistic presentations of the present day. These two sources how cultural products and their producers are themselves influenced by their national and cultural surroundings. They do not answer the question of how individuals actively process that which they are offered up for consumption. The private discourse of individuals, in contrast, reveals the ways in which people receive and interpret the world around them. For this reason, I chose to conduct interviews in the United States and Germany as a means of discovering the ways in which individuals process and construct the nation.[66]

As this and the following chapters show, the German respondents do allow their history to inform and influence their relationship to the nation, making them more skeptical of the nation

in general. As noted in chapter one, Germany could be considered an unrepresentative case study given its relationship to twentieth century history. However, as both the textbook and newspaper chapters demonstrate, the centrality of this history is up for interpretation depending upon the social position of the observer. The assumption that the Holocaust or the totalitarian Third Reich (two distinctly different issues, according to the American and English perspectives) are the focal points of Germany history and contemporary life is not to be taken for granted. However, my interviews with Germans are intended to demonstrate that people from different nations have different relationships due to different cultural contexts. Insofar as Germans have a "unique" way of nationing, for whatever reasons, my thesis is strengthened.

U.S. Americans could also arguably be seen as an "unrepresentative" sample. As this and subsequent chapters demonstrate, Americans have a very positive relationship to the nation and strongly believe in national pride. Here again, what could be viewed as an "unusual" relationship only furthers my own argument. If Americans nation differently than Germans or than other peoples, again for whatever historical or cultural reasons, this gives additional strength to my claims that social context affects the process of nationing.

As numerous audience reception theorists have demonstrated, individuals interpret and relate to cultural products in vastly different ways dependent upon their social location (Eck 1996; Griswold 1987a; Liebes 1990; Press 1991; Radway 1991; Shively 1992). The concept of nationing recognizes that how one relates to the very notion of the term "nation" is culturally variable. In this chapter, I consider how Americans and Germans respond to questions about Germany, England, and the United States. Thus far, I have taken Germany as my case study to make arguments about how nationing occurs. In the following chapters, I will again turn to

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[66] Obviously, a full rendering would require interviews in England, Kenya, and India as well. However, time and financial constraints make this impossible for the dissertation. I do, however, hope to conduct further research in the

Germany to study the effects of nationing on perceptions of Germany. But first, I begin here by considering how asking questions about one's *own* nation in contrast to others reveals vastly different understandings of what a nation is and should be. Americans and Germans have profoundly different relationships to nationhood and these differences come through quite clearly in talking to my respondents.

I begin by comparing the responses of Americans and Germans to questions about national symbols. As I discovered, Americans are far more able to speak in terms of national symbols than are Germans. The responses to these questions reveal in part the fundamentally different ways that Germans and Americans relate to their own nations. Americans believe strongly in the United States as either embodying or having the potential to embody ideal values. This leads my U.S. respondents to think of nations in positive terms, at least in their ideal form, and also enables them to think in terms of national symbols. In contrast, Germans have a relatively troubled relationship to their own nation particularly when they reflect on the events of the twentieth century. For this reason, they do not automatically associate nations with positive values, but instead often see them as potentially harmful, particularly if they are not somehow constrained. This more difficult relationship to the idea of the nation leaves my German interview partners less able to speak in terms of national symbols.

These questions about national symbols then lead into an analysis of my respondents' answers to questions about national pride. Americans, because of their positive associations with the concept of the nation, find it quite easy to speak in terms of national pride, particularly in terms of their own nation. This assumption of the positive potential of the nation also makes it easier for them to comment on reasons that the English or Germans should also be proud. Germans, in contrast, often find it difficult to speak in terms of national pride concerning their

near future.

own nation. They do, however, recognize that others, such as Americans and the English, are able to speak in these terms and thus are generally able to provide reasons that these other nations might be proud. Yet, even here they express reservations, suggesting that pride is not always something desirable, particularly when expressed strongly or unequivocally.

As I argue, Germans' more complicated relationship to the question of national pride has both individual and national implications. After considering individual responses, I then address the implications of these reservations for the national, political level, and contrast this perspective to that of Americans. I ultimately argue that these profound differences in responses to national pride serve as a powerful illustration of differing visions of the place of the nation in the world and variations in the moral significance of the nation.

The Question of National Symbols

One of the first indicators of Germans' and Americans' notably different ways of understanding nations emerged in a question I originally did not expect to be very revealing. I ask: "what national symbols do you connect with Germany/England/the United States?" Perhaps because of my own social location as an American, I considered the question unremarkable. And indeed throughout my American interviews, I noticed nothing unusual about the kinds of responses I received. Virtually all of my interviewees were able to answer these questions without trouble. Two of my 26 respondents asked for explanations of what I meant by "national symbol" but then preceded to answer the questions as the others had.

Given that each respondent was posed this question three times (in regards to each of the three nations), this resulted in a total of 78 answers given. Only one time (in regards to English national symbols) was a respondent unable to provide an answer. In every other scenario,

American interviewees readily provided responses as to what counted as a national symbol for the three nations. They did so rather unproblematically, often providing a wide variety of answers to the questions. In fact, the Americans gave in total 74 responses listing 37 different symbols they connected with Germany, with the six most common responses being (from most to least frequently mentioned): the Swastika, the flag, beer steins, BMW, and sauerkraut and lederhosen (tied for fifth place). For England, they came up with a total of 83 responses, with 45 separate symbols named. The five most common being: the flag/Union Jack, the royal family, the London Bridge, and Buckingham Palace and Big Ben (tied for fourth place). In terms of the United States, Americans had the most to say with a total of 100 different responses and 35 different symbols named;[67] the most common being: the flag, the Washington monuments, apple pie and the Statue of Liberty (tied), and the eagle, the White House, the map (outline of the U.S.) the Golden Gate Bridge/ and the dollar sign (tied). I came away from my American interviews aware that my respondents were fully prepared to think and talk in terms of national symbols. This unproblematic attitude left me less prepared for the Germans' response to the same question.

Upon being asked what national symbols they connected with the United States, England, and Germany, my German interviewees often had trouble. Of 19 interviews, I needed to explain to seven of my interlocutors what I meant by the term "national symbol." In each case, I provided the example that when I think of Russia, I think of the Kremlin. Even with this explanation, my respondents still often could not answer this question. Out of 54 total questions asked (three per interview), thirteen went unanswered. Five German interview partners could not name an American national symbol, four had no answer in regards to England, and four were

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[67] Americans named a smaller variety of American symbols than they did English ones (35 to 45). In doing so, however, they showed more unity in their answers about the United States, naming "only" 35 different symbols in

at a loss in regards to their own nation. There was also significantly less diversity in the kinds of answers provided: with a total of 30 responses and only 15 different symbols named for the United States. The most common responses being in order: the flag, no response, the Statue of Liberty, Hollywood, and the national anthem and skyscrapers (tied). Sixteen separate symbols were named by the Germans for England for a total of 29 responses, the most common of which were: the flag, the monarchy, no response, Big Ben, and fish and chips, and cookies (tied). Germans came up with 21 separate symbols for Germany for a total of 32 responses, the most common being: the flag, Brandenburg Gate and no response (tied), and Berlin, Berliner Bear, the Reichstag/ and the Wall (tied).

This variation in answers from Americans and Germans was particularly pronounced during my interviews with residents of Washington D.C. versus Berlin. Upon first conducting my interviews in the United States, I realized that the Americans I interviewed who resided in Washington D.C. were particularly adept at providing long lists of national symbols. Each of the seventeen D.C. interviewees named something related to D.C.--eight of those specifically mentioned the Washington monuments. The Americans I interviewed in Charlottesville were also able to provide long responses to this question. But the details provided by my D.C. interviewees suggested that proximity to the monuments made them even more relevant to the question. My inclination was thus to conclude that living in the nation's capitol makes such a question easier to answer.

This theory was quickly refuted however during my interviews with Germans, particularly Berliners. In regards to the question of German national symbols, only six of my nineteen German interviewees mentioned anything at all related to Berlin (the city itself, the Reichstag, the Brandenburg Gate, and the Berliner Bear). And Berliners were as much at a loss,

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100 responses, while they listed 45 symbols in a total of 83 responses in the English case.

if not more, than those from Heidelberg or Jena to name any national symbols. My theory that living in a nation's capitol automatically enables one to think in terms of national symbols proved completely unfounded in Germany.

This difference is all the more striking if one considers the question of exposure to and knowledge of other nations. That is to say, one could reasonably expect that Americans would know more American symbols than the Germans (35 versus 15). But Americans were also able to provide significantly more *German* national symbols than their German counterparts (35 versus 21). This was despite the fact that twelve of the nineteen Germans interviewed had been to the United States, while only four of the twenty-six Americans had been to Germany. The Germans also followed international events more closely and were far more aware of political events relevant to the United States than vice versa. In this sense, German familiarity with the Americans was far greater than the Americans' with the Germans. And yet, "national symbol" did not lead anywhere close to the same level of effusiveness for the Germans.

Symbols, Pride, and the Germans

This difficulty for the Germans, my interviews suggest, does not end with the subject of national symbols. Rather, this question about naming symbols suggested larger issues Germans have with the potential connection between nation and pride. As became increasingly clear, my German respondents associate patriotism and national pride with negative acts once committed in the name of the German nation. The Germans I interviewed find it difficult to speak in terms of national symbols in large part because they are uncomfortable with any sentiments that suggest patriotism or nationalism. As Martin, a 27-year old West Berlin lawyer notes: "Germany

has, I think, virtually no symbols that are seen as 'German' throughout the world" [*][68] (G7).

Ulrike, a 34-year old lawyer from Heidelberg explains: "I really have no idea, what symbolizes, what I connect to Germany. That's really hard for me [69] (G15). Tilo, a 34-year old, former East German, who finds many of my questions problematic, answers that German national symbols are:

> probably less clear-cut than with the [US and England]. Because there are many
>
> things I can connect. But ones that really mean something to me, that's another
>
> story. Whether it's the flag, or the anthem, the national anthem, I can't really
>
> say... I personally have a rather cautious relationship to such kinds of symbols,
>
> and most importantly, to the actual use of such symbols[70] (G10).

Tilo verbalizes the "cautious" feeling he has to the idea of national symbols, a feeling in all likelihood shared by a number of my respondents.

In part this difficulty Germans' resistance or reluctance to name national symbols appears to stem from their discomfort with the subject of nationhood. Another part seems to come from their relative unfamiliarity with the subject of symbols. Unlike Americans who see U.S. national symbols everyday in advertisements and public discourse, Germans are less likely to be confronted with similar kinds of symbols that suggest national pride or patriotism in their everyday lives (see below for further discussion). This makes them perhaps less skilled in talking in these terms, and helps to explain why seven of the Germans (in comparison to only

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[*] German responses are translated into English within the text, but the original German answer is provided in footnotes below.

[68] "Also Deutschland hat finde ich auch also kaum kaum Symbole, die weltweit als deutsch gesehen werden" (G7).

[69] "Da habe ich auch keine Vorstellung. Was bedeutet, verbinde ich mit Deutschland. Das ist für mich schwer" (G15).

[70] "Wahrscheinlich weniger so zugespitzt als bei den Anderen. Weil es viele Sachen gibt, die ich verbinden kann. Aber auch die mir wirklich nahgeben, das ist eine andere Geschichte. Ob das in Deutschland die Flagge sind, ob das die Hymne sind – die Nationalenlied, dass sag ich insofern nicht... Und da wo ich selber eine sehr reservierte Einstellung zu selten Art von Symbolen und vorallen Ding zu verwenden von solchen Symbolen" (G10).

one of the Americans) needed further elaboration as to what was meant by national symbol. It would also help to explain why they were often (13 times) unable to come up with an answer to an individual question. It additionally explains why they were less likely to come up with symbols for the U.S. and England than the Americans were. Their "lack of practice" at naming and thinking in terms of national symbols extends beyond their relationship to their own country and affects their relationship to others as well.

Numerous times Germans explained to me that their compatriots would never display their flag or sing their national anthem, that such actions are considered highly suspect and result in great distrust. In interviewing two women simultaneously, Jale, a 33-year old Turkish German, and Carolina, a 32-year old German originally from Munich, this issue arose after I asked about American national symbols. Jale responds by describing an experience she had had in the United States:

> Jale: I was once at a concert there. And before the concert began, the national anthem was played. And everyone stood up and sang along. That was for me: wow!
>
> Caroline: Melodromatic!
>
> Jale: Yes. Yes. It was unbelievable. And I looked around at all the people and it was really totally racially mixed. Really. Asians, African Americans, all mixed. And they all sang this national anthem. And I thought, I don't know the German one nor the Turkish.
>
> Caroline: Me neither, by the way.
>
> Jale: And they all sang along![71] (G 12-13).

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[71] J –Ich war mal da auf so einem Konzert. Und da wurde vor dem Konzert die Nationalhymne gespielt. Und alle sind aufgestanden, haben mitgesungen, das war für mich, oau!

The wonder with which Jale describes the experience of watching Americans of diverse backgrounds sing the national anthem before a concert is a feeling many Germans describe after having observed a ritual of American national pride. And it feels very foreign to them.

Germans' fascination with American pride is echoed on several occasions. Matthias, a 31-year old political consultant in Berlin for the Christian Democratic Union (the largest right of center party in Germany), follows American events closely and is, by his own admission, a big fan of American football as well as of the United States in general. He sees Germans' difficulties with national pride as problematic and would ideally like to see Germans gain a healthier national consciousness, something he associates with American patriotism. In this context, he describes watching the Superbowl on German television that year. He explains that in regards to the United States:

> I think of course of an enormously strong national self-confidence. Let me go
>
> back to football for a moment. I guess I would say I am critically enthused [when
>
> it comes to the U.S.]. During the last Superbowl, after the pre-game show, the
>
> announcer came on and said [in English] 'And now ladies and gentlemen, an
>
> American hero, General Norman Schwarzkopf.' [laughs]. This is just so
>
> fascinating. If I were to imagine [in German]: 'And now ladies and gentlemen, a
>
> German hero, General Soandso.' And then right after that people would just start
>
> playing [European] football in the stadium. And then a bomber plane flies over
>
> the stadium. That is, I must say, an incredible picture. But on the other side.

C – Melodramatik!
J – Ja, ja. Das war wahnsinnig. Und dann habe ich mir die Leute so angeschaut und da war wirklich kunterbunt so. Richtig Asiaten, Afro-Amerikaner, alles gemischt, und die haben alle diese Nationalhymne gesungen. Ich dachte, ich kenn die Deutsche eigentlich und die Türkische auch nicht.
C – Ich auch nicht übrigens.
J – Und alle haben mitgesungen.

I find it fascinating. I find it really fascinating. And the people stand
there with tears in their eyes, regardless of which class they come from. And the
German commentators absolutely do not get it. The commentary on German
television at that point was 'And now they [the Americans] remember and
memorialize the 10-year anniversary of the Gulf War, a terrible war that need not
have been.' And I thought, not *one* person in that stadium is thinking that. Not
one. Never. And that just demonstrated to me that you really can't put yourself
in others' shoes (G16).[72]

The Americans honoring a war hero, flying a bomber plane over a stadium, or just mixing sports
with national pride fascinates Matthias and makes him a bit wistful for a stronger national pride
in Germany. He, like Jale, is amazed by the idea of *all* Americans regardless of class or ethnicity
uniting in their patriotism. At the same time, he experiences with "critical enthusiasm," and as
something foreign to his own national culture. In his response, he also begins a sentence "on the
other side..." but does not complete it, suggesting that he is not entirely comfortable with the idea
of this level of pride. This experience of national pride, even for a high-ranking political
consultant for the Christian Democratic Union, is so foreign as to evoke wonder and a bit of
skepticism in Matthias.

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[72] Ah so, ja und dann denke ich natürlich an [pause] ja an ein enormen hohes Selbstbewuβtsein. Also um, komme
ich ein bisschen auf den Football zuruck... Also ich habe eine kritische Begeisterung würde ich mal sagen. Wenn
ich, beim letzten Superbowl, denn nach der pre-game Show, dann der Sprecher kommt, „and now ladies and
gentlemen, an American hero, General Norman Schwarzkopf'. [lacht]. Nein aber das ist irgendwie so, das ist schon
faszinierend. Wenn ich mir so vorstelle und ‚nun meine Damen und Herren, ein deutscher Held und dann General
Wasweissichwas.' Und dann geht dann voll mit Fussballspiel auf dem Platz. Und dann fliegt ein
?Pankrankenbomber? über das Stadium. Das ist schon, da muss ich sagen, das ist, es ist natürlich tolle Bilder. Also.
Aber auf der anderen Seite dachte ich ?? Also, aber ich finde es faszinierend. Also ich finde es wirklich
faszinierend. Und die Leute stehen mit glänzenden Augen, egal aus welcher Schicht. Und dann das wird denn
wieder von deutschen Reportern überhaupt nicht verstanden. Der Kommentar im deutschen Fernsehen war an der
Stelle, ‚ja und jetzt gedenkt man, das 10 Jahre Golfkrieg, das wird jetzt gedacht, dieses fürchtbares Krieges, der

American Pride

In contrast to the Germans, Americans cannot imagine *not* having a feeling of national

pride. It is not just that they believe there are reasons to be proud of the United States, which

they do. Rather the Americans are guided by an even larger principle that regardless of

citizenship, one should be proud of one's country. Regardless of how critical they are of their

own country, and many are, my American respondents still believe that one *should* be proud of

one's own nation. It mattered not whether I asked about England, Germany, or the United

States, when it came to the question of whether there were reasons to be proud of one's nation,

my American respondents overwhelmingly responded in the affirmative.

For Americans, there is a sense of confidence as to what the positive aspects of their own

nation are. Some U.S. citizens are more critical than others in regards to the negative aspects of

being American or the problems that plague their nation. Yet, regardless of these issues,

Americans like to let the interviewer know how "good they've got it." The United States is,

according to my interview partners, the (sometimes flawed) embodiment of a wide array of

values that make Americans proud. Words like "freedom," "democracy," "diversity,"

"independence," "opportunity," "melting pot" pepper their answers.

Tommy, a 38-year old, gay waiter in D.C., provides the example of being able to walk

down a street in a dress, something he had recently done, as an example of "only in America."

When I ask what he considers a positive aspect of being American, he replies "Opportunity.

Freedom of choice. Just being able to do whatever you want… Just being able to say you're

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?sich auch so gefordert hat?.' Da habe ich gedacht, ‚das denkt *niemand* in dem ganzen Stadium. Keiner. Niemals.
Und das hat mir auch wieder so gezeigt. Irgendwie. Dass man sich da nicht reinversetzten kann (G16).

American" (A13). Karen, a 31-year old, African-American, teenage mother of three who manages a laundromat echoes this sentiment, noting that she associates the United States with "freedom" and that her greatest source of national pride comes from being able to vote. She notes "a lot of people [in other countries] can't. Proud to be able to dress how I want to. Proud to be able to say what I want to" (A25). Mirabella, a 37-year old exhibit designer who was born with British citizenship, has throughout the interview been critical of the U.S. Nonetheless, she recognizes "the most positive aspect of being American is being able to create your own identity" and that her greatest source of national pride comes from living in a "land of immigrants" (A24).

I ask David, a 35-year old computer specialist from D.C. about this feeling of national pride: "Just what came to mind was what I was saying about this imperative that all people are created equal. You know, not historically, in our history. But just kind of how embedded that idea is" (A1). Even if the United States has not realized the ideal of equality in actuality, the idea is a fundamental value he associates with his nation and is therefore a source of pride. Matthew, a 34-year old lawyer, answers the same question:

> I think of the constitutional form of government…. I think after the 14th
>
> Amendment and after the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s and 70s, I think we
>
> found, I mean I think we're getting there. I think getting to the sort of ideal. I
>
> think we're probably closer to the ideal than any other country in the world (A3).

For my American interviewees, the founding principles of the United States represent an ideal form of life in which the government protects the interests of its citizens. The very idea of these principles is worthy of national pride.

My American respondents repeatedly suggest how the United States is connected to the realization of Enlightenment ideals. They associate such desirable attributes as freedom, independence, democracy, equality, and opportunity with their own land. Some see the U.S. as the actual embodiment of such ideals. Others critique their country for its failure to live up to its own promises. They cite a wide variety of issues including racism, health care, poverty, education, and politics among others as the problems that prohibit the realization of these ideals. In doing so, their criticisms are often harsh because my respondents believe that the U.S. *should* embody these ideals and that they are still attainable. For my American interviewees, the very idea of the nation comes to be seen as a means of achieving desirable qualities for society. Their pride may be directly connected to the U.S., but their belief in the positive potential of the nation applies to all nations. For these reasons, national pride as a topic of conversation comes relatively easily to my American interview partners regardless of which of the three nations they are discussing.

Indeed, many of my respondents assume that Germans feel this same level of pride toward their own nation. Diane, a 41-year old social worker from D.C., when asked about the positive aspects of being German, responds: "I think um I think that there is a pride, a national pride that is that is admirable" (A7). Similarly, Matthew, a 31-year old securities officer in D.C., answers in regards to what he think of Germans: "I mean they're, I think they're very, they're still very proud people, as far as the country." Later he adds that a positive aspect of the country is "probably just the heritage, the pride in the country" (A11). Shalini, a 29-year old doctor in Charlottesville, explains that Germans have "a strong national pride. At least, more recently. At least probably since the 1800s, I would say. I don't know how it was before that" (A21). For

many of my American respondents, Germans are seen as a "proud people" who believe in the greatness of their nation in a manner similar to American pride.

This comes through in their answers to my question of what would be their greatest source of national pride if they were German. For Americans, the two greatest sources of national pride would be the nation's "long history" and its "beer" (these answers and others are discussed in greater detail in the next chapter). A third common source of national pride is its ability to be a nation. As Jamie, a 35-year old medical student from D.C explains when asked what his greatest source of pride would be: "just probably the land itself and the people. Just their resilience and their devotion to their family and the Fatherland I guess in many ways" (A12). Similarly, Paul, a 37-year old police officer from Charlottesville, responds:

> I would have to fall back on the culture. Just the food and traditions and things
>
> that went all the way back to sort of Germanic, you know, just the founding of the
>
> country. And um there must be just a wealth of wonderful things the country's
>
> about that has nothing to do with war. And I would probably focus on that. I
>
> mean, that's stating the obvious but... I would probably be proud of um what the
>
> country's about and how it came to be (A29).

Like many of their compatriots, both Jamie and Paul tend to speak in general terms that focus less on the specifics of Germany and more on the unnamed "traditions" that can make a nation great. In part, these responses represent the relatively sparse knowledge Americans have about other parts of the world, including Germany. But in part it also represents their general belief that there is almost always some ideal that a nation either embodies or strives to attain.

Americans who self-admittedly know very little about Germany serve as telling illustrations of the general belief by Americans that one should feel pride toward one's nation.

Although four respondents who knew very little about Germany chose to pass on the question of national pride, all other respondents chose to respond to the question of pride. Susie, a 41-year old administrative assistant from Washington D.C., admits that she does not have "very much knowledge" of Germany. Nonetheless, when asked about her greatest source of national pride if she were German, she does hesitate: "Oktoberfest. I've been to Busch Gardens" (A6). Similarly, Elizabeth, a 41-year old woman administrative worker, also explains that Americans such as herself neither know nor "care too much about what goes on in other places" (A9). Her answers and those of her friend, Tammy, a 45-year old data entry clerk, reflect this limited knowledge on the subject, as they assert that they are unsure whether there are computers, phones, microwaves, and other such amenities in Germany. Nonetheless, Elizabeth does not pass on the question of what her greatest source of national pride would be if she were German. She answers: "Beer… Good music… you've got the polka and all that. That's German and Polish" (A9). Others, at a loss for knowledge on the subject, simply respond by citing Germany's "long history" as a source of pride. Given that their only other comments about Germany's history tend to be associated with the Third Reich (see next chapter), this response is striking. Rather than simply suggesting that there may not be a source of pride or passing on the question, these respondents choose to overlook the atrocities they associate with German history and instead claim that history can be a source of pride for the Germans. Not one of my American respondents claims that the Germans might not have a source of pride, because according to their understanding of the nation, every nation provides reasons for national pride.

Perhaps the greatest and most revealing challenge to this question of national pride came from Yael, a 26-year old, Jewish woman with dual Israeli-American citizenship who lives with her husband in Washington, D.C. Yael's grandfather was a German Jew who had to leave

Germany at 18. This, as Yael admits, influences her perspective on Germany profoundly and she answers virtually every question on Germany in terms of the Holocaust and German responsibility for the atrocities committed. Her comments throughout the German portion of the interview are thus overwhelmingly negative. I come to my concluding questions in this section at which point I ask her what, if she were German, would be a source of national pride for her. She responds: "Hmm, greatest source of national pride. Um, [laughs] yikes. I just have such negative images, you know. So it's really hard to conjure up any images. Yeah, I really couldn't tell you" (A14). Yael's image of Germany, more so than any other respondent's, is overwhelmed by negativity and with each question posed, this becomes increasingly clear.

And yet, Yael, like other Americans, does believe that there is something appealing and worth of pride even in a nation like Germany that, for her, is so profoundly connected to horrific events. I ask her whether there are any positive aspects to being German and her response shows the transition she makes from speaking solely in negative terms to finding something positive to say:

Positive aspect of being German. Well I am German [laughs]. I mean that's the funniest part about it is that part of me is German. You know, which is amazing to me. It's so hard. It's so hard because I know we're talking about positive but it must be so strange when I think about, like, for my grandfather. Because here he is. That's his nationality. He was there for 18 years. His accent is like a really thick accent. He, you know, was subjected to so much and he just suffered. And it's so sad that that was his country, his native land and there he suffered.

The positive aspects of being German. You know it's funny that that doesn't--I don't think. It's amazing. I was very much affected by, you know, like

the Holocaust and all that so. Um, positive, mmm. Well I've heard at least parts

of it were a beautiful country. I mean *are* a beautiful country. That must be nice.

Um, and I suppose having such a history in your country, and maybe seeing how

far it's progressed must be a positive thing. And that they have um--how it was

that was what sixty years ago. And how well it's established itself (A16).

Even though it is difficult for her, Yael makes a remarkable transition in her response, ultimately

finding positive observations to make because she believes that there is something positive to be

found in each nation. Indeed, she too ultimately cites "history" as a reason for German pride,

despite her problems with at least a portion of that history. In coming to this conclusion, Yael

unites with the rest of my American respondents, arguing that there is something positive to be

found in every land and even a reason for pride.

Germans' Discomfort

In contrast to the Americans, my German respondents had a far more difficult, even

uncomfortable, time talking about national pride. The strikingly different experience I had

discussing this same topic with Germans is best illustrated through an interaction I had with my

second interview partner in Germany. Before each interview, respondents in both nations signed

consent forms that indicated that there were no expected risks or concerns associated with the

interview. My first experiences in interviewing on this subject were all with Americans who had

relatively unproblematic relationships to their nation and were quite happy to speak in terms of

pride. Given this, I could not imagine ever having a "traumatic" moment, and my interview

partners clearly felt the same as they would often make light of that part of the form before they

signed it.

It was thus a rather sudden awakening for me after I conducted my second interview with a German and the respondent ended up in tears. The tears came at the end of the interview right after I had turned off the tape recorder. Rachel, a 42-year old teacher of Catholic and Jewish parents, was equally surprised, and as moved by her own emotion as I was. She explained that it had suddenly struck her in answering my second-to-last question, "as a German, what is your greatest source of national pride?" that she had nothing of which to be proud. As a child of a Jewish parent, Rachel was arguably more sensitive to this issue than other Germans. And yet, her response, save for the tears, was not greatly different to the often pained responses I received from the non-Jewish Germans I interviewed.

In fact, Rachel's exact response to the question of national pride was echoed again and again in remarkable ways. At the point when I originally posed the question "as a German, what is your greatest source of national pride?" Rachel laughed and replied "I don't have an answer to that. I have nothing that I, as a German, am proud of. I honestly can say that. I'm proud of my private life, of my child above all. But as a German, I can't say there's anything I'm proud of" [73] (G2). Others echo this answer in remarkably similar ways. Ulrike, a 44-year old East German dentist, responds: "That's a hard question to answer. I don't define myself primarily as a German, but as a mother or professional. As a German… the term has no meaning for me" (G4).[74] Ilke, a 26-year old former East Berliner flight attendant, also has troubles with the question:

> That's really very hard. Because in order to be proud, it has to be something that
>
> I accomplished myself. And I couldn't choose where I was born. I could have

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[73] [lacht]. „Kann ich nicht sagen. Ich habe als Deutsche nichts worauf ich stolz bin. Kann ich ganz ehrlich sagen. Ich bin privat stolz auf mein Kind in erster Linie. Aber als Deutsche kann ich nicht sagen, dass ich auf irgendwas stolz bin" (G2).

just as well have been, say, an Indian. And that's why it's hard. But, of course, if

you have to be proud of something, then I suppose the culture, art, and what

writers have written (G3).[75]

Ilke, like Rachel and Ulrike, is hesitant to say that national pride is even possible, because one

should be proud of one's accomplishments and no more.

Indeed, as increasingly becomes clear in posing this question to Germans, pride is

directly correlated to achievement and what one has accomplished personally. This makes the

very idea of national pride a difficult proposition. It is as though Martin, a 27-year old lawyer

who grew up in West Berlin, has consulted the same guide for answering this question as the

others above. He responds, first by laughing, as many do, at the very idea of the question and

then explains:

Proud? Not proud. I think 'proud' is the wrong word because I can only be proud

of things that I personally influenced. Where I can say, 'that was my

achievement.' That I was born here, I had nothing to do with that. Ok, I wouldn't

want to live anywhere else, or be born anywhere else. But I'm much more

comfortable talking about my own accomplishments since birth (G10).[76]

This question that is so unproblematic when presented to Americans becomes the most difficult

one to answer for the Germans. And as the above quotations illustrate, national pride also leads

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[74] "Das ist schwierig, die Frage zu beantworten. Ich fühle mich nicht primär als Deutsche, sage ich mal als Mutter oder als Beruftätige. Also nur als Deutsche, das. Ich hänge das Deutschtum überhaupt nicht an" (G4).
[75] "Ich glaube, das ist ganz schwierig, auch weil stolz zu sein, bin ich auf das, was ich wahrscheinlich selber geleistet hat. Und ich konnte mich nicht aussuchen, wo ich geboren worden bin. Ich hätte ja genauso gut, was weiβ ich, eine Inderin werden können. Und deswegen ist es schwierig. Aber natürlich um um, ich denke, dass man, wenn man überhaupt eben auf etwas stolz sein kann. Denn vielleicht auf die Kultur, auf die Kunst. Also was jetzt Schriftsteller geschrieben. Oder ja" (G3).
[76] "Also stolz, [laughs, shakes head]. Ne, stolz. Stolz ist glaube ich deshalb der falsche Begriff, weil ich bin glaube ich nur auf Dinge stolz, die ich glaube ich selbstbeinfluβt zu haben. Wo ich sage, dass war meine Leistung. Dass ich hier geboren bin, dafür kann ich nichts... Aber ja also ich möchte nirgendwo anders leben, geboren sein... Und deshalb sind bestimmte Eigenschaften, seitdem ich geboren bin, die ich halt sehr angenehm empfinde" (G7).

a number of respondents to associate the term with "accomplishments." Accomplishments, in turn, lead these Germans to reject the idea of national accomplishments and instead focus on personal or individual achievements. As Germans repeatedly indicated to me, pride is something one can feel only for what one has actively contributed to; that they were born somewhere "at random" is not, for many, deserving of pride.

This hesitancy to speak in terms of pride is understandable particularly if one takes into account what is *not* said in the responses of many of my German respondents. From the point at which I start asking questions about their thoughts on their own nation, the responses and silences become more awkward. There is a non-verbalized recognition for many that talking about Germany as a nation means talking about the Third Reich. The answers they give are thus given in this context. And, as will become even clearer in the next chapter, many Germans are hesitant to take credit for national accomplishments because this would then mean they would also have to take responsibility for atrocities committed in the name of the German nation. For this reason, the question of German national pride often leads my interview partners to reject the idea in favor of their own personal achievements.

Others simply cannot find an answer to the question of national pride. Karin, a 32-year old waitress originally from the East answers that she, as a German, is proud of "nothing." Irene, a 44-year old art historian West German, remains silent after I pose the question. Tilo, a 35-year old East Berliner, replies that the concept of national pride "has no meaning" for him (G7). Markus, a 27-year old gas and water installer from East Berlin, also notes that he "cannot specifically say" (G6). The question leaves a number of my German respondents virtually speechless.

A few come up with answers to the question, although they often have a half-hearted sound to them. One mentions Goethe and Schiller, another German punctuality, and yet another the German transportation system. One woman concludes: "that's a hard question. I think about it a lot. [I'm proud of] a certain depth that the Germans have" (G13).[77] Another also answers: "Hmm. That's the problem. The Germans don't have national pride. Maybe our economic success. The prosperity of the country. And the opportunity to support others through charity" (G11).[78] A few others name the Brandenburg Gate, Berlin, and the Reichstag. Julian, a 34-year old filmmaker from West Germany, ultimately puts the most positive spin on the awkward question of German national pride. In response, he explains that Germans have the special opportunity to "learn from history" in a way unknown to most other nations (G9).[79]

Only one respondent comes out and directly says that he is proud to be German. Antonio, a 25-year old political science student from Jena who is active in the right-leaning Christian Democratic Union, is the only respondent to unconditionally declare his nation pride. After I ask what he is most proud of as a German, he answers that he is proud:

> Of my country. My country and my culture. I am proud that I was born a
> German, because I accept the history and tears of my country with all its breaks.
> They brought me to this point, where I was allowed to be raised in this land, so
> that all these breaks could influence me. And that's important, for me to develop,
> for me to be able to reflect (G21).[80]

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[77] "Eine schwierige Frage, ich tue es schwer mit stolz. Ja, es beschäftigt mich. Auf eine gewisse Tiefe, die Deutschen haben" (G15).

[78] "Tja. Ich glaube, das ist das Problem. Die Deutsche haben irgendwie keinen Nationalenstolz. Vielleicht auf die wirtschaftliche Erfolge. Auf das Wohl des Landes. Das man durch die Möglichkeiten durch Spenden anderen zu unterstützen" (G11).

[79] "Als spontan fällt mir nur wirklich wieder an, dass wir aus der Geschichte lernen dürfen" (G9).

[80] "Auf mein Land. Mein Land und meine Kultur. Ich bin stolz darauf, als Deutscher geboren zu sein, weil ich die Geschichte und die Risse meines Landes mit allen den Brüchen so akzeptiere und so mich an einen Punkt gebracht

Antonio's response is similar to Julian's ironic answer that Germans can be proud of the fact that they are allowed to "learn from history." Only Antonio sees this as a real gift; he is grateful for the fact that history has influenced his upbringing and made him and his country what they are today. As such, he is the only German respondent to claim a strong national pride.

Many of my German respondents spoke somewhat wistfully of American and English pride, although ultimately they rejected the idea that pride was desirable for Germans. A few, however, spoke of German pride as something to work toward, holding the Americans up as a model. Matthias, the 31-year old political consultant for the Christian Democratic Union, expresses frustration with the idea that Germans cannot be proud of their own nation, particularly on the political level. Although he too shies away from actually using such language himself, he repeatedly cites the "healthy" American pride and the "absent" German sense of self. He explains with a touch of envy: "It's taken for granted for Americans and British in politics, international relations, that one's national interest is clear.... I think it would work a lot better if Germans did the same. I really think it would do good. But…" (G16).[81] In trailing off his sentence, Matthias suggests that although there is something desirable in national pride, there is also something improbable or unlikely in that proposition.

It is this incredibly difficult relationship to the relatively recent past that so strongly marks the German relationship to the concept of the nation. For Americans who, critical or not, tend to believe in the possibility, and even desirability, of national pride, this is a way of nationing that seems truly foreign. Nationing for the Americans is an emotional process, one

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hat, wo ich selber in einem Land groβwerden darf, dass das mir alles, dass mir diese Brüche vermittelt. Und das ist wichtig, um mich selbst zu entwickelen, um reflektieren zu können" (G21).

[81] Und das ist das ist irgendwo ein fehlendes gesundes Selbstbewusstsein ?? Also nicht [anything bad] not what I mean]. Das man sich traut zu sagen. Das ist was für Amerikaner und Briten selbstverständlich zu sagen, in Politik machen, internationale machen, der nationale Interesse ist selbstverständlich... Ich glaube, dass es viel besser funktionieren würde, wenn Deutsche das auch machen. Also letztlich glaube ich, dass es gut tun würde. Aber...

that is expected to call up powerful feelings of connection and even allegiance to one's own nation. For Germans, the idea of embracing and identifying with their own nation more or less unconditionally is equally foreign. Where Americans see the potential for the realization of ideals in nations, Germans see the possibility for harm done in the name of the nation. The German approach to nationing is defined by rationality and emotional distance--nationing is a process that emphasizes the contingency of nationality rather than a connection or devotion to that nation.

It is this wariness that structures their relationship to their own nation as well as to the very concept of nationhood. Unlike Americans who themselves feel national pride and then apply these same feelings to all nations, Germans often resist the idea in terms of their own nation and observe the phenomenon warily and/or with wonder in other nations. It is not that they deny the possibility of national pride for others, but their own experiences and skepticism come to influence and structure their ideas about its desirability elsewhere. For the Germans, patriotism and national pride are associated with nationalism and potentially aggression--strong feelings regarding the nation are ideally to be avoided. What is perhaps most unimaginable for most Americans are the implications of this form of nationing for their larger national political scene.

German Pride on a National and Political Level

Halfway through conducting my interviews with Germans, a national debate[82] emerged in German national politics concerning the question of national pride. The controversy began when

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[82] Such national debates, in which Germans question the role of the nation in their lives, occur with somewhat regularity in Germany. Witness the *Historikerstreit* of the 1980s in which the question of whether the Holocaust was uniquely German was (and continues to be) debated for years; the bombings of Turkish homes in Solingen and Mölln in 1992-3; the wrapping of the Reichstag by Christo in 1995; the publication of Goldhagen's (1996) *Hitler's*

a member of the right-leaning Christian Democrat Party, Laurenz Meyer, was quoted as saying

that he is "'proud to be German.'" In response, a leader of the leftist Green party, publicly

denounced the comment, saying: "'Laurenz Meyer does not just look like a Skinhead, he has the

mentality of one. Laurenz Meyer announced himself that is he is proud to be German. Such

comments are the mark, the base morality, of every racist hooligan in this Republic' (quoted in

Beste 2001: 24).[83] For Americans, who witness politicians profess their love and pride in the

United States daily, the idea that claiming one's pride in one's nation could result in such a

political denunciation seems almost unfathomable. For Germans, the debate is reflective not just

of a very different kind of political climate, but also of a very different kind of relationship to the

nation.

Those politicians who claim national pride in Germany are distinctly remembered for

such pronouncements. Far more common are the politicians who distance themselves from

patriotic terminology. German national presidents, appointed by the Chancellor and Parliament,

serve in largely ceremonial positions, primarily as moral leaders. In these roles, the presidents

have routinely rejected the notion of national pride. Gustav Heinemann, president from 1969 to

1974, responded to the question of national pride with the comment: "'I don't love the State. I

love my wife'" (in Beste 2001: 29).[84] In the 1990s, German Federal President Roman Herzog

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Willing Executioners; Martin Walser and Ignatz Bubis' 1998 disagreement regarding the role of the Holocaust in Germany in the 1990s; the decade-long question of whether there should be a Holocaust Memorial in Berlin; the debate at the end of the twentieth century as to whether there is such a thing as German *Leitkultur* (leading culture). Each of these issues has resulted in national discussions as to the meaning of the nation for Germans.

[83] "Laurenz Meyer hat die Mentalität eines Skinheads und nicht nur das Ausssehen. Laurenz Meyer hat selber bekundet, dass er stolz darauf sei, dass er Deutscher ist. Das ist so die Flachheit, der geistige Tiefflug, der jeden rassistischen Schläger in dieser Republik auszeichnet."

[84] "Ich liebe nicht den Staat, ich liebe meine Frau."

explained: "'If pressed, I can perhaps love a region. But I love no institutions, the State as little

as, for example, the national insurance company'" (in Beste 2001: 29) .[85]

In response to this most recent debate in 2001, the present Federal President, Johannes

Rau, was also asked to comment: "In all honesty: The term 'pride' has nothing to do with my

thoughts about this place or the nation" (in Beste 2001: 29).[86] Although he has been quoted as

saying "I like being German," Rau distinguishes between a pride in Germany, which, he claims,

he "certainly" has and the question, "Are you proud of being German," which, he explains, is

"'another question.'" In answering this question, Rau sounds like so many of my interview

partners:

> I want to make clear that the term 'pride,' for me at least, describes one's own
>
> achievements, all the while experiencing joy or gratitude from the gift of having
>
> Germany as our Fatherland. I do not have a problem with the term 'Fatherland.'
>
> I also do not have a problem with the term 'nation,' although it has taken me fifty
>
> years for me to learn that (in Beste 2001: 30).[87]

Rau echoes the sentiments of a number of my respondents in claiming that pride is relevant only

in terms of one's own achievements, not in terms of the nation. For the Federal President to

reject the idea of being proud to be German suggests again the different nature of the relationship

to the nation.

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[85] "Ich kann vielleicht zur Not noch eine Landschaft lieben, aber ich liebe keine Institutionen, den Staat so wenig wie beispielsweise die Allgemeine Ortskrankenkasse."

[86] "Im Ernst: Der Begriff Stolz ergibt sich im meinem Denken bei der Heimat und bei der eigenen Nation nicht."

[87] "'Da war vorige Woche mein Bild zu sehen und darunter stand: 'Ich bin gerne Deutscher." – Und dann wurde eine Leserumfrage angekündigt: 'Sind Sie stolz auf Deutschland?' Da kann ich nur sagen: Ja, sicher! – Aber 'Sind Sie stolz darauf, Deutscher zu sein?' ist eine andere Frage… Mir ging es darum, deutlich zu machen, dass der Begriff Stolz, für mich jedenfalls, die eigene Leistung beschreit, das, was jemand beiträgt, während die Freude oder die Dankbarkeit von dem Geschenk ausgeht, dass Deutschland unser Vaterland ist. Ich habe keine Probleme mit dem Begriff 'Vaterland'. Ich habe auch kein Problem mit dem Begriff 'Nation' – obwohl ich das in den fünfziger Jahren erst habe lernen müssen.'"

Equally foreign to many Americans would be the idea of national athletes rejecting the possibility of national pride. Yet this too occurs in similar fashion when a German soccer player for the national team is asked in an interview whether he is proud to be German. He responds:

'I am very to be able to play for Germany" and as to the sentence: 'I am proud to be able to play soccer for Germany; there's no problem with that at all. That I made it on to the national team is something that I can at least say is due to my own achievement. And I can be proud of that. The sentence 'I am proud to be a German,' in all honesty, is difficult to get out of my mouth. That I was born in this country and live here makes me happy because I think that it's a country that offers very good opportunities and that we have a lot here that can be seen positively. But we also had of course many dark hours in our history. Given this, I don't have a ruined relationship to this nation, but I do have a critical one (Loetz 2001: 55).[88]

The athlete arguably speaks for many of his German compatriots in explaining that the "dark hours" of his nation's history have led him to have not a ruined, but certainly a critical, relationship to his own nation that hinders his ability to feel pride for anything beyond his own accomplishments. Again for many Americans, the idea that a national athlete, politician or army soldier would not express national pride is very difficult to imagine.

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[88] "'Ich freue mich sehr darüber, für Deutschland spielen zu können, und an dem Satz: 'Ich bin stolz darauf, für Deutschland Fußball spielen zu können', ist überhaupt nicht auszusetzen. Dass ich es geschafft habe, in der Nationalmannschaft zu spielen, ist zum Teil zumindest auch mein eigener Verdienst. Und darauf kann ich stolz sein. Der Satz 'Ich bin stolz ein Deutscher zu sein', da bin ich ganz ehrlich, geht mir nur sehr schwer über die Lippen. Dass ich es geschafft habe, in der Nationalmannschaft zu spielen, ist zum Teil zumindest auch mein eigener Verdienst. Und darauf kann ich stolz sein. Der Satz 'Ich bin stolz ein Deutscher zu sein', da bin ich ganz ehrlich geht mir nur sehr schwer über die Lippen. Dass ich in diesem Land geboren wurde und hier lebe, freut mich zwar, weil ich denke, das dies ein Land ist, das einem sehr gute Möglichkeiten bietet, und wir vile Dinge haben, auf die wir positiv blicken können. Aber wir haben natürlich auch viele schwarze Stunden in unserer Geschichte gehabt. Insofern habe ich kein gestörtes Verhältnis zu dieser Nation, aber schon ein kritisches.'"

Perhaps even more unimaginable is the idea of an army not built on national pride. In the German national army, however, soldiers who claim that they are "proud to be German" have the burden of then proving they are not Skinheads. As an Army spokesperson explains, "soldiers have to be patriots, but 'national pride' is not what we're teaching" (in Beste 2001: 28). Given Germans' relationship to their nation, an army filled with prideful Germans is viewed as potentially dangerous. For Americans who believe national pride is a given, the lack of such is seen as potentially dangerous, as soldiers may then be unwilling to die for their land or remain committed to it in the worst of circumstances. Notions of what a nation *should* be and how one should then relate to it lead to very different expectations as to the role of both politicians and the army. Those who are perhaps most patriotic in the United States, politicians, athletes, and the military, are as reluctant as their German compatriots to express such feelings of pride.

The national debate that emerged in March 2001 prompted a national survey of 1000 Germans respondents asking whether or not they were proud to be German. The results below demonstrate exactly how difficult that question is for many, as only 30% of all citizens claim pride in their nationality. Young people in particular are wary of such terminology, with only 8% of those younger than thirty claiming they are "proud to be German." Equally notable is the fact that even in the far-right leaning parties of the Republikaner, Nationale Partei Deutschlands, and the DVU – the parties associated with Neo-Nazis and Skinheads, less than half of all party supporters (48%) claimed pride in being German. The fact that only about half of far rightists in Germany are hesitant to claim a pride in their nationality perhaps best points to the relatively complicated relationship that Germans have to their nation.

Proud of Germany?*

	By Age Group				
	18-24	25-29	30-44	45-59	60+
I am proud to be a German	7	9	23	34	45
I am happy to be German, but not proud	24	48	37	40	31
It makes me uncomfortable, to be seen as a German	9	2	2	--	1
This question does not concern me	57	32	35	22	12

From (Beste 2001: 25-33).

Proud of Germany?*
By Political Party

	Total	West	East	SPD	CDU/ CSU	Bü. 90/ Grüne	FDP	PDS	Rep./DVU/ NPD
I am proud to be a German	30	31	27	30	45	11	39	9	48
I am happy to be German, but not proud	35	34	39	39	32	44	29	60	31
It makes me uncomfortable to be seen as a German	2	2	1	2	1	4	--	6	--
This question does not concern me	27	27	25	27	19	33	19	20	15

From (Beste 2001: 25-33).

Afterthoughts

For Americans, questions regarding their relationship to their own nation are relatively unproblematic. Many, if not most, of my respondents had points during the interview in which they would critique the United States and let me know the problems they have with their own nation. But despite these criticisms, my American interview partners could answer questions about their nation by invoking greater concepts such as "diversity," "freedom," and "opportunity" to describe their feelings. In relying on such positive terms, the Americans signal a relative comfort with the concept of the nation. That is to say, Americans' relationship to their own country is often a proud, and rarely a traumatizing, one.

Regardless of any troubles they have with their nation—and many do have them, the Americans completed the interviews without needing to "process." There was little discussion once the interviews ended. Americans were able to answer the questions I asked and then, once the tape recorder was turned off, their thoughts on the subject were also no longer verbalized. In

fact, once I turned off the tape recorder, the subject routinely switched almost immediately to another subject. Within fifteen minutes of the conclusion of the interview, I had normally said goodbye and was back in my car.

I originally expected, given previous interactions with Germans on similar subjects, that my German interviews would last significantly longer than those with Americans. I attributed this presumption to the fact that, through my own experience, Germans tend to engage strangers more in debate on political matters and also tend to be more aware of international issues than Americans. In fact, my interviews themselves were of roughly the same length as those in the U.S. What was drastically different were the conversations that occurred once the tape recorder was turned off. Most of my best conversations with Germans about their feelings toward their own nation occurred once the tape stopped. On average, I spent another half hour and often well over an hour with my interlocutors after I had finished my survey. My German interview partners used this time as a chance to "process" their thoughts about the interview, their feelings of national pride, the Holocaust, and reunification. The latter subject was especially an issue in Berlin (and the East) once the microphone was no longer there.

Although it is possible that former East Germans were more hesitant to be taped due to connections they still make with the Stasi, I do not believe that was the primary reason for why the discussions often became more interesting only after the formal interview was over. Rather, it seemed that the last few questions I asked about German pride and their problems with their nation, particularly offset by the prior questions about the United States and England, left Germans ready to speak about their relationships to their nation. More importantly, they were ready to engage me in their thoughts. During the interview, I could say or respond to little. But once the tape was off, they could ask me my thoughts and return to a debating or conversing

style that allowed them to more thoroughly explore their feelings toward the German nation. Again and again, Germans demonstrated to me how much discussing the nation in general and Germany in particular required self-reflection and a certain level of melancholy. The ease and nonchalance of the Americans on the subject of the nation was nowhere to be found.

Relating to the Nation

The Germans and Americans I interviewed responded very differently to the questions I posed about Germany, England, and the United States. Yet, the differences highlighted in this chapter do not concern variations in the ways in which my respondents concretely describe the three nations – a subject that will be treated to detail in the next chapter. Rather, the differences considered here concern larger assumptions about nations in general and how they affect relationships to one's own nation.

Put directly, Americans are proud of the United States. Because of their confidence in their own nation, they cannot imagine not having feelings of national pride. My American respondents feel that pride is a normal and healthy – even "natural" – feeling that one should have to one's own nation. Americans feel a mutual sense of pride that they share with other Americans. The United States, for them, represents many positive and admirable values. Frequently I heard in my U.S. interviews that there is nothing better than being American, that there is no better place to live, grow up, or raise a family. The United States is the *best* nation in all senses (why else, I was often asked, would so many foreigners want to come here?).

There is nothing in the discourse of my American interview partners that suggests that national pride has anything to do with personal achievement. In other words, one must not have contributed in any specific or concrete way to what "makes America great" to still feel proud of

being American. "Credit" can be taken by all because it is, according to their understanding, Americans that make America great. Although many of my American respondents mention issues such as racism, inequality, poverty, discrimination as problems that concern the United States, these issues do not hinder the possibility for American pride. There does not appear to be any problem either historic or contemporary that would warrant such a rejection of pride.

My American interview partners feel so secure in their relationship to their own country that they then have no problem applying this feeling to other nations as well. Because Americans believe in national pride as a healthy feeling to have, they have cannot imagine that citizens of other nations do not also have such feelings of national pride. Thus, in virtually every case, my respondents were able to come up with a source of pride in regards to England and Germany as well. In those few cases where they could not, it was, they explained, because they did not know enough on the subject and not because there was not reason for national pride.

What this meant in terms of my interviews is that my Americans interlocutors had a much easier time coming up with reasons to be proud of being German than my German respondents did. Germans do not assume that national pride is "natural" or even desirable. They have greater difficulty speaking in such terms in general and often were unsure of what was even meant by the term "national symbol." Finding such symbols that represented the German nation was all the more difficult. Here again, the Americans were able to name more German national symbols than the Germans.

Twentieth century history makes German national pride, many of the German interviewees tell me, at the beginning of the twenty-first century virtually impossible. As one respondent explained, Germans can be proud of the fact that they are allowed to learn from history. Not an easy source of pride at all. When Germans began speaking about their feelings

about the Nazi past, they repeatedly noted in their interviews how difficult it is to be held

accountable for a history of atrocities they personally did not commit.[89] As several respondents

explained, citizenship or national belonging is random, they could have just as well been born

somewhere else in the world. That they were born in Germany, decades after the fall of the

Third Reich, means that they bear the guilt for actions committed by others. Their frustration

with this reality comes to bear on the question of national pride. If Germans today resist the idea

of being held responsible for negative acts committed in the name of Germany, they also do not

want to take "credit" for anything achieved in the name of the nation. This leads many to equate

pride with national accomplishments that they had no personal hand in. They thus respond that

they cannot speak meaningfully of national pride because they are only proud of those

achievements that they personally accomplished (e.g., one's career, children, talents). It is the

flip side of the coin: if Germans are not to be held responsible for the atrocities committed in the

name of the Germans, they are also not going to take credit for accomplishments they had no role

in.

It is not just the Third Reich that defines the problematic relationship many Germans

have to the nation. For former East Germans, there is further cause for reluctance toward

national pride. East Germans often told stories, particularly once the tape recorder was off and

the conversation became more informal, of the ways in which national allegiance was not only

expected but also required in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). The fact that

East German citizens could not openly criticize their government made the notion of national

pride a seemingly ridiculous proposition. Further, they have had to come to terms with the fact

that the worldviews they grew up exposed to, if not actually accepted as reality, are no longer

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[89] I treat the issue of Germans' versus Americans' relationship to the issue of the Holocaust to greater detail in the following chapter.

relevant. Former East Germans are routinely confronted with the fact that much of what they

learned in school, read in the paper, watched on television, and in general were surrounded by, is

no longer applicable since the fall of the Wall – most especially when it comes to the subject of

nations.[90] Even for former West Germans, who were never personally subject to the laws of the

GDR, the realities of the Wall dividing at random what had once been one nation was a constant

reminder of the problems associated with acts committed in the name of the nation. These factors

taken together make the very notion of national pride for Germans even more problematic, if not

suspicious.

Thus, unlike the Americans who embrace the nation as the embodiment of ideals and

values, the nation for German respondents becomes an entity that one does not identify with,

trust completely, nor feel a strong allegiance to. My German interview partners treat the nation

as a concept to a healthy dose of skepticism. At the same time, Germans are aware that many

citizens of other nations do not have similar relationships to their own nations or the concept in

general. They accept that members of other nations might feel something like pride or allegiance

that they themselves have never felt. For this reason, my German respondents are still able to

answer questions of what their sources of national pride would be if they were English or

American. But there is a sense of wonder (like Jale had in watching Americans at a concert sing

the national anthem or Matthias watching the Superbowl) or skepticism there that was unknown

to my American respondents. At best, they can imagine a situation in which one would feel a

national pride, but almost none seem to have had an experience themselves. And it is this

distance to the concept of the nation that most strongly structures my German respondents'

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[90] Several of my interview partners specifically mentioned the radical transitions they have had to make from seeing
the United States as enemy to ally.

experience of nationhood in general. The nation, for them, remains something elusive that is better left that way.

In comparing Americans' and Germans' responses to the above questions, it becomes increasingly clear that the concept of the nation does not have the same meaning for both groups. Americans and Germans experience the process of nationing differently and this leads to very different ways of seeing their own nation and the role of nations in the world. For Americans, their national pride and belief in the positive potential of nationhood helps them to find reasons for pride in any nation. For Germans, their troubles with their own nation lead them to feel both skepticism and wonder at the idea of national pride found in other nations. This chapter has contrasted different relationships to the nation as a concept. The next chapter explores more concretely Americans' and Germans' perceptions of the German nation.

Chapter Five

The Pride of a Nation Versus Individual Accomplishments

As the preceding chapter demonstrates, Germans and Americans have very different approaches to nationing, diverging in their relationship to the very concept. This variation in ideas leads to very different feelings about their own nation and the question of national pride. In other words, the last chapter considered the first aspect of nationing: how social location affects perceptions of the place and meaning of nationhood in the world. This chapter considers the second aspect by applying these assumptions about what nations are and should be to a specific nation. This chapter is in many ways an application of these findings to Americans' and Germans' visions of Germany.

I begin here by analyzing my American respondents' comments and observations on Germany. As my interviews, many Americans have a rather limited sense of modern Germany, relying primarily on national stereotypes to talk about the nation. My American interview partners do, however, show competency in talking about the Nazi era, considering it a "national" struggle that affects Germany and its citizens across the board. Despite having an overwhelmingly negative image of Germany in history and vague perception of the contemporary nation, Americans demonstrate a striking determination to include Germans in their own vision of appropriate national pride.

Talking to Germans, however, leads to a very different and more complicated image of Germany. This first becomes clear in listening to the ways in which my German respondents compare themselves to the Americans and English. In general, Germans are more than Americans critical in talking about all three nations and this is rooted in the skepticism expressed in the previous chapter. In these discussions, it becomes increasingly apparent that Germans not

only liken pride to achievement but also to a question of deservingness. In talking about their

own nation and their feelings about their "historical burden," their difficult relationship to their

own nation become most apparent. These difficulties lead many of my German interview

partners to reject the idea of thinking in terms of "the nation," preferring instead to speak and be

seen in terms of their individuality.

In assessing the kinds of observations Americans and Germans make about one nation,

the processes of nationing become even clearer. The starkly different visions of one nation,

Americans' commitment to national pride, and the importance of both individualism and

deservedness for Germans are just a few of the aspects of nationing that become discernable. In

their discussions about Germany, Americans' relatively unproblematic relationship to the nation

become a distinct contrast to the Germans' troubled feelings about nationhood.

"Baloney," Beer, and Hitler

Although none of my American respondents appeared to be especially well versed in the

details of German contemporary life, their level of knowledge varied remarkably. Indeed, as I

describe further in the following chapter, a number of my respondents, most of whom were

overwhelmingly working class individuals, could not tell me whether Germany was an

industrialized nation. They questioned the availability of plumbing, telephones, and computers;

one was unclear as to whether the Berlin Wall was still standing or not. A few respondents

spoke of the poverty that afflicts Germany, making it more difficult to find food and evoking

"pity" from Americans. Another respondent told me she thinks of only two things when thinking

of Germany: "Hitler and baloney" (A25). Although these comments did not represent the whole

of Americans' thoughts on Germany by any means, these five of twenty-six individuals suggest the lower limits of knowledge on the subject.

What became increasingly clear in talking to Americans is that very few of my respondents, regardless of class or education, have a particularly detailed image of modern-day Germany. Their greatest emphasis is instead on the subject of the Nazi era, discussed below. When not talking in those terms, virtually all of my American respondents rely overwhelmingly on stereotypes of the German national character rather than more concrete images of the political or cultural landscape. After the Third Reich, my respondents most often mention beer in terms of what comes to mind when they think of Germany, treating it as "typically German," a cultural product, a national symbol, a positive aspect of being German, and a source of national pride. Similarly, *Oktoberfest* receives frequent mentions as do the traditions often associated with it: beer steins, bratwurst; sauerkraut; Lederhosen; and "polka" music. Beer and related themes appear and reappear throughout the interview as a fundamental piece of German life.

Images of Germans as a people are also strongly influenced by more stereotypical depictions of the German character. They are described as matter-of-fact, no-nonsense, hard-working, strict, rigid, and practical, with good organizational skills. Their efficient ways lead to clean cities and countryside and a very orderly form of social life. Like other American respondents, Kevin, a medical student from D.C., likens the "efficient" Germans to the quality products they produce:

> Typically German: like getting the most form and function out of a
> design…German engineering, like their cars are fantastic, BMW or Mercedes.
> The German beers are always very tasteful and not excessive in their sugariness

or whatever. They're very traditionally the same and very much reliable when

you order them (A12).

German efficiency, I am told, comes through even in their production of beer. Although the

Germans are seen by a few respondents as capable of enjoying themselves while drinking,

virtually all interviewees unite in an image of the German as generally more structured and strict.

They are seen often as hardy, stocky, or big-boned (particularly the women) and are believed to

be overwhelmingly blond and blue-eyed. They sound "halted" or abrupt due to the "guttural"

nature of their language and are often viewed as authoritative or brusque because of this. My

American respondents tend to consider the Germans more emotionally detached and serious than

other cultures, yet still hospitable, potentially even friendly. They also describe Germans as an

"intellectual" people and often associate them with science and engineering, art and music, and

intellectual life, particularly philosophy. Taylor, a program officer in D.C., summarizes her

feelings about Germans in a comparison to the English, claiming that the English are "more

neutral," the "vanilla to the Germans' chocolate" (A2). When asked to elaborate, she answers

that the Germans are more problematic and difficult as people (perhaps even symbolically

darker), while the English are blander and make fewer waves, thus more "vanilla."

When I ask my American respondents to list names of famous Germans, the limits of

their knowledge, particularly of modern-day German figures, become all the more apparent.

Adolf Hitler is far and above the most recognized "German;"[91] all but one of my respondents

mentioned him in this context.[92] As Joey, the fitness trainer, explains: "It all goes back there to

Hitler. That's the number one, Hitler. When you say Germany and you think negative, right off

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[91] Two of my respondents ironically that the most famous German is an Austrian, considering that Hitler was both born and raised in Austria.

[92] The one respondent who did not spoke nonetheless extensively about the "Third Reich" but just did not mention Hitler by name.

the bat, Hitler" (A8). Katarina, a lawyer, responds to my asking after famous Germans: "Hitler. He killed everyone. [laughs]. Sorry" (A4). Once he was mentioned, my American interview partners had few other famous Germans in common. After Hitler (named 23 times), Albert Einstein was the next most commonly named German (6 times), although several also noted that he was also a famous American as well. Former Chancellor Helmut Kohl was mentioned only three times, while Claudia Schiffer, Bertold Brecht, and World War II military leader Erwin Rommel were all named a total of two times each. Those mentioned only once were: Steffi Graf, Katarina Witt, Heinrich Himmler, Otto von Bismarck, Marlene Dietrich, Oscar Schindler, Friedrich Nietzsche, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, and artists Jean Dubufe and Hans Hoffmann.[93] In answering this question, David, the CPA/attorney, helpfully adds: "I could probably come up with a dozen Nazi-war criminals right off the top of my head" (A3). What becomes clear in this line of questioning is that my American respondents have very little sense for modern-day, particularly political, figures when speaking of Germany. Indeed with the exceptions of Hitler and, to a lesser extent, Einstein, my American interview partners do not have a united image of famous Germans at all.

This often-vague image of present-day Germany held by most of my American interview partners becomes even more apparent as I ask more on questions related to contemporary German issues. I ask Americans about sources of German national pride, positive and negative aspects of being German, pressing problems and struggles the Germans face, all of which could be interpreted (and usually are) as questions about present-day Germany. In response, my American interview partners often speak in broad terms that do not suggest an especially detailed vision of modern Germany. Yet, like the newspaper articles discussed in Chapter Three, my

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[93] In this and other sections, there was some confusion as to the nationalities of the Vikings (Scandinavian), Anne Frank (Dutch), and Mikhail Gorbachev (Russian), all of whom were named as German.

interviewees speak more freely about the problems that beset the German nation than the positives associated with it. It appears that the "default" mode to speak about nations is in terms of general threats that beset many nations.   As I discover, unemployment, the "economy," and racial/ethnic relations are primary themes for my respondents.

I ask my respondents about pressing problems that Germany is facing today. John, a computer specialist, follows international events in the media a few times a week and is relatively well informed in relation to other respondents. He answers, like many, in general terms:

> The same/few things that seem to be for most European countries: the change into
> the Economic Union, the general fiscal and monetary policies. What do you do
> about unemployment; resentment between different ethnic groups; and trying to
> figure out how to assimilate immigrants; and environmental concerns (A1).

Although these responses are more informed than the majority of answers I receive, they represent broad issues that could potentially affect any (European) nation rather than issues that speak specifically to Germany. Four of the Americans, for example, answer that Germans may have troubles with their "economy." What those specific problems might be are not stated except by one who claims that the troubles might lie with "inflation and the currency." Three respondents suggest that integration into the European Union and its implications for the retention of national culture may also be a source of trouble for Germany. Four mention "immigration," with one specifically mentioning the problems with Eastern European immigration due to upheaval in those nations. Six suggest that troubles with neo-Nazis and further issues related to the Holocaust are among the greatest issues threatening Germany. One claims poverty, one the lack of food available; another names the lack of industry, while yet

another is unsure how "free" the Germans are. What emerges through these answers is a sense that Germany does face problems, on which a few respondents can elaborate, but most are only able to provide general terms to refer to them, such as the economy, immigration, neo-Nazis, or poverty. With the exception perhaps of neo-Nazism, most of the other problems named do not at all appear to be specifically "German" problems.

Seven of my American interview partners mention reunification specifically as a pressing problem the Germans face. Here too, their explanations or elaborations suggest the limits of knowledge on this subject. One describes the most pressing problem confronting Germany as "East and West pretty much" while another asks "isn't East better than West or something?" One respondent explains that "it's been extremely different for a long time" while another notes that "people just want to stay on their side" [of the former Wall]. These answers suggest that these Americans do believe reunification has had negative consequences for Germany but that they are unsure as to the details of those problems.

What also becomes increasingly clear are the troubles Americans have in formulating a clear image of the Germans in the present day. It is easier for them to conjure up an image of a German in *Lederhosen* at *Oktoberfest* than it is for them to describe the troubles with reunification. It is also easier for them to name a "dozen Nazi war criminals" than the Chancellor in the year 2000. And although they are perfectly willing to rely on negative discourse to discuss the negative aspects of being German or the problems the nation faces, there is only subject that they are really proficient in discussing.

The Burden and the Pride

Every one of my American interview partners talked on some level about Hitler and the Holocaust as the ultimate burden for Germany as a nation. In doing so, they repeatedly emphasize the national implications of the actions of the Third Reich for Germany today. Taylor answers the question about negative aspects associated with Germany: "Nazis. Yeah, really bad. That's, you know, that whole Hitler thing. Bummer. Don't like that at all" (A2). Larry answers: "the whole Nazi connotation thing. And the seriousness. I'm so happy-go-lucky that that just seems bad. But really it's the whole monkey-on-the-back Nazism thing" (A13). Lola answers that same question by arguing that Germany's "national struggle would definitely be the history and the just, you know, I want to say atrocity. I don't know if that's the right word. But you know it's a very tragic history that was, and it is, very shameful" (A5).). Jim summarizes that Germany's biggest problem today is "overcoming the reputation of killing Jews" (A23). Elizabeth answers that Germany's biggest problem is:

> overcoming the whole Hitler thing. I mean because basically a nation was
>
> hypnotized. A large, major majority of that nation was hypnotized into following
>
> this absolute lunatic. So that I think the idea of thinking that Germans are
>
> lemmings or whatever [would be their greatest struggle] (A9).

From the American perspective, Germans acted as a collective during the Third Reich.

My American respondents talk about this struggle as a "national" struggle that affects all Germans, as members of the German nation. Joey questions:

> How a nation could put someone in office that – I'm not sure how they do that
>
> politically – Hitler himself. How could a nation be so blind, put this man in
>
> control of a whole nation. His objective was to just control the world and to, how

you do say, ah, was is it blond hair, blue eyes? [Aryan] Yeah, Aryan. And just to

kill six million people, Jews. This hate. (A8).

Joey emphasizes the role of the "nation" in his questioning of how this could occur, echoing the

sentiments of many Americans who ask how "Germany" and "the Germans" could have done

this.

The American focus on the Nazi past and their assumptions of the German collective's

participation has implications, respondents tell me, for Germans today. Like Germans in the

1930s and 1940s, modern Germans are also seen by my respondents collectively. Tommy, a 26-

year old college student in Charlottesville, describes the negatives of being German: "The Nazi

history. That would be hard to get over, I would think. I would apologize to everyone that I

knew: 'I'm German. I'm sorry.'" (A27). Katarina answers:

being stereotyped that you must be a Nazi because you're from Germany. And I

mean I guess I'm imagining that if I were a German that would be negative about

me being German… I guess not being able to really live down the past because, as

we said, it's always resurfacing. And it's so recent and it's not really, it doesn't

really seem like it's gonna go away altogether (A4).[94]

Kevin also recognizes the troubles Germans may have today:

I think they're going through a lot of guilt from World War II actually. As a

people, they're, you know, struggling just to come up with a new look [other

than] being the aggressor…in the last couple of world wars… The negative would

be that, you know, they do have this guilt that they carry around with them (A12).

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[94] Indeed, Katarina who herself has a German-sounding last name, describes the periodic awkward moments she has with an Orthodox Jewish colleague at work at points when she fears she will sounds insensitive because of her last name. She notes this is particularly absurd because, "I'm not even German. I mean not, you know, complete" (A4).

Philip, the Charlottesville police officer, explains that if he were German he "might feel like I sort of inherited something I didn't deserve. And I might feel like it was a sort of a black mark in my past and I wouldn't know how to swallow it" (A29). As these comments indicate, many of my respondents recognize the burden that Germans today carry as an unfair but also unavoidable one. The implication is that Germans today must take responsibility as a nation for what Germans in the past did as a nation.

The two most critical visions of Germany concerning the Holocaust come from two Jewish respondents. They see many of the characteristics associated with the Nazis not just as old stereotypes, but as real problems of character. Yet, they too realize the burden this places on the contemporary nation and its citizens. Yael, a 26-year old social worker, describes Germans as an "aggressive" people. She imagines what it would be like to be German today:

> Having my grandparents be Nazis and me just being horrified by that concept.
> Realizing how wrong that was. And how disgusting that was. That my relatives
> murdered all these people, were proud of it – possibly proud of it. I mean I think
> that would just be horrible, being German and knowing that your ancestors had
> done that. It would just be so hard to be proud of your heritage…. I think that
> this never will escape them. So I think they're constantly gonna have to deal with
> that. You know, cause you just don't forget history (A14).

Yael continues by talking about the difficulties Germans have upholding a "decent image…, trying to convince people that they're not all that bad anymore… They've changed and so forth and so I would imagine that's a battle, a constant battle, defending who they are" (A24). Similarly, Dan, a 43-year old physical therapist, considers Germans to be a "disciplined and

brutal" people and this description overwhelms his image of "the Germans" even today.[95] Yet,

he too recognizes the implications for modern Germans when I ask him what a negative aspect of

being German is:

> The first thing that comes to mind now is that current, you know, modern-day
>
> Germans still have to deal with, you know, how the rest of the world views them.
>
> Including me [laughs]. Um, they probably feel that they have to try to shrug off
>
> the whole Holocaust shroud that they still have. And um, so that would probably
>
> be a negative. As sympathetic as that may sound (A28).

Again and again my American respondents tell me that they think overwhelmingly in terms of

the Third Reich when they think about Germany as a nation. They recognize the burden this

places on citizens today, but it is nonetheless their primary way of defining the nation.

One might argue that the thoughts my American interview partners have about Germany

contribute to increasing the weight of this burden. My respondents acknowledge this in part,

often apologizing for repeatedly bringing up the Nazi era, recognizing that this may be, at least in

part, unfair to the Germans. After answering a number of questions with references to the Nazi

era, Philip, the police officer, apologizes while answering a question about what he associates

with German culture: "Neo Nazis, not because I'm, you know, because I'm savoring the fact that

this is a pimple on their face" (A29). Diane, who was once married to a second-generation

German American, claims she is "appalled" that the only famous German she can think of is

Hitler. In response to the question of which national symbols he associates with Germany,

Larry, a waiter, answers: "The swastika. It's terrible that I keep answering that. Do a lot of

people answer that? It's such a bad thing." Taylor tells me at the end of the interview that it was

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[95] Dan makes clear that he still thinks in terms of the Holocaust when considering contemporary Germany, explaining that his father refused to buy German products. This policy "rubbed off on" his son so that Dan goes

good that I had not interviewed her husband because he would only talk about the Third Reich and the "Krauts," (to which he, having overheard this, responds: "What about the Krauts?"). Over and over my interview partners claim that they feel terribly about the fact that they repeatedly connect Germany to the Third Reich. Yet, despite feeling badly, my American respondents have great difficulties thinking in terms other than the Third Reich.

Given this emphasis on the Nazi era and the exceptional burden it leaves Germans with today, it seems unlikely that Americans would be able to contribute much to the question of positive aspects of being German. This prospect seems even more unlikely given that my American respondents have a rather vague image of modern Germany; they speak in detail about the Third Reich or about national stereotypes and not much else. This limited knowledge makes them even less clear as to the positive aspects of the nation than in discussing the pressing problems the nations faces.

Thus, when addressing positive aspects, my American interview partners once again speak in rather vague terms. Two mention the stronger environmental movement, and one "clean air" as positive aspects of being German. Seven speak in terms of the "hard working" German, with strong "organizational skills," a sense of "law and order," and a real "intelligence," that comes through in their quality products and engineering. Four mention beer as a source of pride and another *Oktoberfest*. Larry provides what may be the greatest compliment from the American perspective in his comparison of the U.S. and Germany. He comments: "You know, you think of [the United States] as the best place to live. But Germany is probably the second best place to live, in terms of being prosperous, clean, and there being opportunity" (A13). Each of these comments reflects the Americans' general belief that there are positive aspects to being German, even if many do not have a specific knowledge of what those might actually be.

"out of his way not to buy German products" (A28).

The American emphasis on the Nazi era in thinking about Germany today could conceivably be a severe hindrance to their being able to answer the question about national pride. But as discussed in the previous chapter, Americans are deeply committed to the idea of national pride and they often assume citizens around the world, including, of course, Germans, do so as well. Thus, my American interview partners see the Germans as a proud people, proud of their culture, history, and values. Seven respondents speak of the pride Germans must feel in having a "strong national identity" or culture. This pride is also connected to "overcoming" both the Nazi era and the Cold War. Even more noteworthy, given this focus on the Holocaust, is the fact that three individuals cite German "history" as a positive aspect or source of pride for Germans. Tommy answers that the Germans' greatest source of pride is "probably the tradition and the history... It goes way way back, the German history does. And part of, some of that history goes through Nazi history, but it is a deep and rich history" (A27). This is, as I discover over the course of interviewing, a significant theme for Americans as they repeatedly tell me that both the Germans and also the English have reasons to be proud of this "history." By this, many of them do not mean the actual content of their history; indeed many of them specifically mention either the Third Reich or colonialism as sources of shame for the two countries. Nonetheless, many of my American interview partners see the mere possession of a "long" history as something positive and worthy of national pride. In doing so, they compare the relative youth of the United States to the old European countries and see the latter as enviable. Having a long history, despite the negative aspects associated with it, is worthy of pride to Americans.

In sum, many of my American respondents demonstrate a limited ability to speak in detail or especially knowledgably about the German nation. They rely on national stereotypes and have difficult mentioning present-day German figures beyond model Claudia Schiffer and

ice skater Katarina Witt. Although they have difficulties talking in detail about pressing

problems facing the German nation today, they do show a proficiency in discussing the Third

Reich. They recognize the burden many Germans must feel today because of this and even

acknowledge how they contribute to this problem. Yet they still consider this question of

historical responsibility to be a problem for which Germans as a nation must still answer.

Despite this overwhelmingly negative focus, Americans, relying more on their assumptions

about national pride and less on their limited knowledge, still find reasons for Germans to be

proud of their culture and "history."

A Critical Fascination

My German respondents reveal as much about themselves in talking about the United

States and England as they do in talking about their own nation.[96] In fact, it is difficult to

consider the German self-perceptions without first talking about the Germans' observations on

the Americans and the English. For this reason, my focus here shifts first to what the Germans

say about the Americans and the English before finally turning to what the Germans say

specifically about themselves.

My German respondents have a much more detailed image of the Americans than the

Americans do of the Germans. Indeed, this image is not only clearer; it is simultaneously more

flattering and more critical. Americans arguably assume the best of the Germans; they speak of

problems the nation has, particularly with the Holocaust past, but they ultimately are not

especially critical in their comments on present-day Germany. My German interview partners,

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[96] This is, of course, also the case for Americans—Americans reveal as much about their own nation when talking about England and Germany as they do about the latter two nations. However, because my focus has thus far been on Germany as the object of evaluation, I include in this chapter only that data relevant to the German nation. Elsewhere, I hope to explore further American and German perspectives on all three nations.

in contrast, are in many ways fascinated with Americans but are largely skeptical and even a bit distrustful of Americans' approach to "thinking positive," often contrasting this with their own ways of thinking and acting.

To talk about the Germans' perceptions of the Americans, one must begin with the term *Oberflächigkeit,* roughly "superficiality," because this is, as Germans have told me time and time again, their primary way of defining Americans. Fifteen of nineteen respondents told me that in contrast to the Germans, Americans are seen as friendly, helpful, generous, open, relaxed, and easy to talk to; as one German explained, using the English word, Americans are "happy" (G14). They are, I am frequently told, "always smiling" and have a "light" way about them when interacting with others. Small talk, a phrase that does not exist in the German language, is seen as quintessentially American; "blah, blah," as one respondent notes, is a nice way to put someone at ease and it is always a surprise when it comes from complete strangers at the supermarket (G8; G12). In contrast to American openness, my German respondents consider themselves to be closed, difficult to get to know, hectic, stiff, and stubborn.

Yet, this friendliness and openness also has a negative side for Germans. They interpret this "warmth" as extreme superficiality. As ten of my nineteen interviewees explained to me in detail, Americans are simple, naïve, uncomplicated, and dumb, according to my German respondents, and this stems from with their tendency to seem friendly at all times but not to dig below the surface. Rachel, a Berlin teacher, explains that Americans are "more interested in appearance" and less in reflective analysis; when it comes to content, they prefer not to search too deeply (G2). Interest in others, as Caroline, an interior decorator who lived in the U.S. for a few months, explains, "unfortunately remains relatively superficial." It requires, she says, a very, very long time to develop a real friendship with an American. Even then, she continues,

one can never be sure if the Americans are *really* friends or not. She provides what she calls a "classic example":

> You meet someone at a party who says 'Come by tomorrow. I've got a
>
> swimming pool.' And the European hears this and the next day is standing on the
>
> welcome mat while the American is saying 'Hey, who are you? Have I ever seen
>
> you before?' This doesn't really exist in Europe, this 'hey baby, you're my best
>
> friend' and the next day, he doesn't know you at all. That is for me rather 'typical
>
> American.' I've not experienced that anywhere else (G13).[97]

Caroline contrasts these experiences of seemingly American openness with the more European (and also German) reserved approach to meeting new people which, as far as she is concerned, at least lets her know where she stands. Antonio, a political science student, echoes this sentiment noting, in English, that the phrase "call me and I will call you" is not meant seriously but is instead nothing more than an empty phrase (G21).[98] Julian, a filmmaker, spent five years living and working in the United States; he describes this phenomenon as typical for an American "to be very friendly on the one side and extremely tough on the next side...It's a certain naïveté...contrasted with negotiation tactics."[99] These observations, repeated time and again, do not just speak to Germans' feelings about Americans; they also suggest German self-perceptions.

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[97] "Interesse an anderen Luten, was ja da leider relativ oberflächlich bleibt. Also ich finde es dauert sehr lange, sehr lange? Lange, bis man also drüber klar sein kann, bin ich jetzt mit einem Amerikaner befreundet oder bin ich nicht? Also diese klassische Beispiel hält, Du lernst jemanden auf eine Partie kennen, und ,komme noch mal vorbei, ich habe eine Swimmingpool' und die Europäer hören das und stehen am nächsten Tag auf der Matte und der Amerikaner denkt sich, ,hey, wer bist du? Habe ich dich schon mal gesehen?'. Also das ist, das gibt in Europa eigentlich nicht, so dieses, ,hey du bist, hey baby, mein Bestfriend so', und am nächsten Tag, kennt er dich nicht mehr. Das für mich, das ist schon ziemlich ,typisch amerikanisch,' das habe ich auch sonst im keinem Land erlebt" (G13).

[98] **"ein gewisser Form von Oberflächlichkeit wäre das falsche Wort also zu mindest von nicht andauernde, von lange andauernder Interesse da ist. Also solche Sachen, wie „Call me and I will call you" fallen sehr häufig. Aber das ist eine freundlichkeits Floskel als eine Ernsthaftigkeit" (G21).**

In comparison to Americans, Germans tell me, the Germans may be closed off and more difficult to get to know, but they are also more honest, at least in the sense that "what you see is what you get."

The United States is also known as a land of extremes and paradoxes and this theme plays out in many forms in my interviews with Germans. Four respondents specifically mention the "crass opposites" of Americans either being extremely physically fit or completely overweight; either "very in-shape people" or "packed with fast food," Matthias explains (G6). Ursula compares the "fat butts" she sees at the supermarket with the "fitness paraphernalia" and jogging she sees on the streets (G15). Antonio uses the English words "body, workout, and training" to describe the one side of American life and "hamburgers" to describe the other (G21). Matthias also observes another phenomenon he connects with American extremism and paradox. He explains that in the United States only a very small percentage of people "actually keep the country running," while the masses simply follow along. He describes those in control as "a very highly informed, very well-educated elite of about 2, 3, or 4 million people who sit on top of this system" versus the rest who have little idea of what goes on in the world (G16). In seeing the United States as a land of extremes, my German respondents implicitly contrast this vision with an image of their nation as one of moderation.

My German interview partners especially like to point out paradoxes in American claims about freedom and individualism, suggesting that the ideological rhetoric associated with the United States does not align with the reality of American life. Several interviewees note the extreme "prudery" and necessity for everything having to be spelled out ("Please go to the bathroom here. Please do not touch anyone's shoulder. Please follow to the left and right" [G6])

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[99] "Ein gewisses Verhaltens, das ist typisch amerikanisch to be very friendly on the one side und extremely tough on the next side... eine gewissen Näivität, die man manchmal als typisch amerkanisch um aufzieht. Das aber wiederum,

that contrast to Americans' rhetoric about freedom and individuality. As Markus, a heating and water installer, observes, this results in Americans being treated like and ultimately acting like children, so that they are no longer able to think for themselves or organize themselves on their own (G6).[100] Several others note that the idea of the "right to bear arms" is not a kind of freedom but a means of harming the society. Eleven respondents take issue with the fact that the United States functions as the "world police," constantly inserting themselves in other countries' affairs, all the while being completely "self obsessed." Equally common are critiques of social inequality in the United States and the, for the Germans, unfathomable discrepancy between rich and poor in the so-called "land of opportunity."

In talking about American extremes and paradoxes, my German interview partners engage in a very pointed cultural critique intended to question claims of American greatness. Yet, this also speaks to a German perception of their own nation as a land of moderation in which social discrepancies – be it in eating habits, class differences, standards of living, foreign politics, or freedoms versus state control – are never that extreme. This becomes particularly clear when Germans critique the lack of social welfare in the United States; a phenomenon that the Germans believe is the primary reason for American inequality.[101] Nicola, a medical supplies employee, explains:

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das im Gegensatz zu einer großen Verhandlungstaktik" (G9)

[100] "Ja sag ich mal, das diese gewisse Freiheit. Also persönliche Sachen die man vorschritten gemacht wenn sie in Europa sind. Genauso wie genauso wie man hat diese Stände ja, kann ich erklären, an die Hand genommen zu werden: ‚Bitte gehen Sie hier auf Toilette. Bitte keine Schulter anfassen. Bitte folgen Sie nach links und nach rechts.' Ich sag mal, dass viele Leute einfach nicht Erwachsene behandelt werden, sondern wie große Kinder. Also alles wird denn abgenommen. Du brauchst nicht mehr selber überwiegend zu organisieren oder irgendwie was zu denken im normalen Öffentlichkeit" (G6).

[101] "Akuteste Problem denke ich ist wirklich die Situation zwischen Arm und Reich. Und diese Absicherung runterrum. Das ist jetzt der Grund warum ich eben sage, also es ist nicht mehr das Land der grossen Träume für mich zumindest. Mit dieser Realität im Hintergrund Absicherung zu haben. Und vielleich vergißt man das, weil man es nicht weisst. Und dann ist man eventuell arm dran. Ich habe so gerade an Leuten ebengerade erlebt drüben, die eben drüben leben und älter sind. Die jetzt gerade auch das sehen als Negative. Und mein Bruder wollte auch die GreenCard und hat sie eigentlich auch schon erhalten. Er hat denn im letzten Moment denn zurueckgezogen" (G19).

The acutest problem [in the United States] is the situation between poor and rich.

And this whole question of [welfare, particularly insurance] coverage. That's

why I now way, that it's no longer the Land of Big Dream, at least for me. If you

have this background information about coverage. I've known people over there,

who live over there and are older. They especially see this as a negative" (G19).

Nicola continues on to explain how older and poor people are unable to afford their medical

needs and explicitly compares this to the German system in which Germans are all still covered

by insurance. She notes that her brother had recently won a Green Card from the thousands that

are given away in a lottery from the U.S. government. He ultimately, she explains, chose not to

take the opportunity because of his concerns about the American social welfare system.

Despite these pointed critiques, there are also ways in which the Americans fascinate the

Germans, although these too are an opportunity for criticism. First and foremost, almost all of

my Germans respondents comment on the size of the United States. Indeed, in a similar way to

the Americans' envy of the Germans' and English' "long history," my German respondents are

very impressed by the amount and diversity of American land. They do simultaneously note,

however, that the size of the country is a large part of the reason that Americans are far more

self-focused than they should be.

With much wonder, German respondents also comment on the *multikulti,* or

multicultural, aspects of American life in which peoples of diverse backgrounds and ethnicities

all lay equal claim to being American. Again though, this potential positive is seen as having a

negative side as well. Many respondents note the large problems Americans have with racial

disharmony. Although problems between Blacks and Whites are seen as highly troublesome,

nine respondents talked specifically about the Americans' history with Native Americans. This

too appears to be a reflection on their own preoccupations. Berlin filmmaker Julian recognizes this in commenting: "I could be nasty and add that [Americans] love to hang on the Holocaust rather than talk about their Native American problem" (G9). As my respondents indicate, Germans see many parallels between the German elimination of the Jews and the American elimination of the Native Americans. In bringing this issue up, they imply that Americans have less cause to be as moralistic than they are on this subject.

As Chapter Five suggests, arguably the greatest source of wonder and hesitation by the Germans concerns American pride. Caroline refers to the phenomenon as American "self-confidence" and a "healthy national pride" (G13) while Matthias calls it a "positive" and "enormously large national feeling" (G16). Rachel notes that "big, extreme national consciousness" is totally foreign to the Germans, particularly this kind of "uncritical" patriotism, accepted by the Americans as it is handed to them (G2). Antonio suggests that both the positive and negative aspects of being American originate in their *Selbstherrlichkeit,* or self-glory. He claims that Americans demonstrate a form of confidence that is the exact mirror image of the German experience (G21). Ilke thinks of this "rather large national consciousness and significant national pride" as something relatively positive, despite the fact, as she notes, that most individual Americans did nothing to contribute to the reasons for pride (G3).

Marc, an East Berlin tattoo artist is the only respondent to be almost wholly anti-American in describing this pride, relying on the term *Ami,* German slang, slightly derogatory, for Americans in describing this phenomenon:

> There's this patriotism, that everyone in America, over in *Ami*-land, has a house
>
> with the *Ami*-flag displayed. But other, every other country is not allowed to
>
> show national pride. Then the *Amis* feel threatened. But they want to spread their

national pride all over the world. All other [countries] should ideally not have

any culture at all (G17).[102]

Marc is by far the most critical of the idea of American national pride, finding it offensive how

they try to spread this pride over the entire world.

Although Marc is the most condemning, all my German respondents share this criticism

of the United States. In describing the paradoxes, extremes, and contradictions associated with

American life, they suggest that, at least on these subjects, Germany handles itself better.

Contemporary Germany, they imply, is not a land of extremes but can instead be defined in

terms of its moderation. Repeatedly my German interview partners suggest that their less

enthusiastic and more measured approach to nationing and conceiving of their own nation is a

more desirable way to go.

The Island People

In terms of the Germans' perceptions of England, there is one overwhelming comment

my German respondents make again and again that speaks simultaneously to their feelings about

England as well as to their own self-perceptions. Ten of my respondents speak of England as an

"island," the implications of which are far-reaching and suggest a certain level of resentment by

the Germans. Julian, a filmmaker in Berlin, explains that he thinks of the English as an

eigenbrödlerisches Inselatentum, by which he means an island filled of people who want to do

things their own way. He elaborates by explaining that this self-centered approach has to do

with "tradition… The English love to speak of 'Europe' or the 'Continent.' Europe never means

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[102] „Es gibt schon mit diesem Patriotismus, dass jeder überall in Amerika über Amiland hat so im Haus die Amifahne. Aber jeder an, jedes andere Land darf nicht Nationalstolz haben. Denn für die Amis sind bedroht. Aber selber wollen sie mit ihrem Nationalstolz verbreiten auf die ganze Welt. Alle Andere sollten am liebsten gar keine Kultur haben" (G17).

England; it always means the Continent. Those over there: the whole continent, the entire rest" (G9).[103] Bettina, a tax assistant, echoes this sentiment noting that the "snobby" English "are a little different. On the island. They are alone-goers and a bit different. They want to be rather independent from Europe and separate themselves from all of Europe. They don't want to know anything from the rest of Europe" (G11).[104] Uta, a 34-year old lawyer, too subscribes to this vision of England: "From the point of view of the English, I would say: 'I am on the island. I am something special. I am isolated'" (G15).[105] When I ask Antonio, a 24-year old political science student, what he would be proud of if he were English, he answers: "I would find it positive that we live on an island because we'd be separated from 'them' and that would make us an exclusive population. And I think in this self-understanding, I would find it positive that it's so exclusive" (G21).[106] Like many of my German respondents, Antonio, Uta, Bettina, and Julian speak of the English as a nation that is anything but a "team player." The implication is that Germany, in contrast, is far more focused on the interests of the whole of Europe than the English are.

This "island state," "island country," "island people," or "island character," I hear time and time again, remains distanced from European culture, preferring to have their own way on traffic rules, systems of measurement, and the Euro. This emphasis on their own traditions leads my respondents to refer to the English as bourgeois, dusty, anti-modern, close-minded, not

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[103] "Ich hatte also den britischen Akzent udn Eigenbrödlerischesinselatentum bezieht natürlich ja auch auf die Insel also auch die die Tradition. Wenn du in England bist, das ist ein schönes Beispiel, wenn du in England bist, dann sprechen die Engländer immer gerne von Europa oder the Continent. Europa ist nie England gemeint, immer the Continent gemeint, die dadrüben und der ganze Kontinent, der ganze Rest" (G9)

[104] "Ein bisschen anders sind. An die Insel. Sie sind einzelnen, und ein biβchen anders. Und ja sie wollten ziemlich unabhängig von Europa und sich von den Ländern vom ganzen Europa separieren... von der Reste von Europa wollen sie dann nichts wisse" (G11)*., snobistisch, indep*

[105] "Aus der Sicht des Engländers sage ich bin ich auf der Insel. Also ich gehöre irgendwie nicht ganz zu Europa dazu. Ich bin was eigenes. Ich bin isoliert" (G15).

[106] "Ich würde positiv finden, dass wir auf einer Insel lebe, weil die abgetrennt von allem und so zu einer exklusiven Bevölkerung macht. Und ich glaube in diesem Selbstverständnis würde ich es auch positiv finden, das ich auch exlusives finde" (G21).

innovative, hierarchical, stiff, conservative, aristocratic, arrogant, annoying, prude, odd, reserved, and snobby. Other troubles or disadvantages include the end of the British Empire, loss of colonies, the "overdone" political form of the monarchy, excessive drinking, bad food, rainy weather, unattractive citizens, poverty, a lower standard of living, ever-present class consciousness, and extreme discrepancies between rich and poor. There is little, beside their humor and often-cultivated ways, that is seen as positive about England according to my German respondents. And, as these critiques suggest, the Germans define themselves against the English in terms of having a more appealing form of government, less discrepancies between the haves and have-nots, better food and weather, and a greater tendency to think of others.

In discussing Germans' thoughts about English national pride, it becomes clear that Germans do not just equate pride with accomplishments; they also associate it with "deserving" accomplishments. In terms of England, it becomes increasingly apparent that my German respondents question the legitimacy of the English to claim national pride because they do not consider them deserving. A number of interviewees note that any reasons for English pride are now a part of history. As Irene, a philosopher and art historian, observes, England is the "loss of the British empire. Big colonies and they're all gone… I think for the English, that's a real problem" (G1). Katrina notes that the English "want to be a power" but that that is no longer possible. Martin suggests that while the English could be proud of their "long history and uninterrupted traditions," their greatest struggle is with the fact that they are still so connected to the Empire and that "it cannot continue this way much longer" (G7). Julian argues that the English' resistance of trends toward a united Europe is primarily "compensation for the loss of their world power." He suggests their greatest struggle involves giving up a piece of this outdated pride (G9). Antonio contends that despite being a "declining power," the English

refuse to recognize their dwindling importance and therefore have an undeservedly large sense of national pride (G21). With these responses, my German interviewees suggest that a nation must be "deserving" of the right to feel national pride and that the English, at least right now, have not earned this right.

Several of my German respondents do still claim that, despite all the negative aspects, the English are to be envied for the fact that they, as Julian explains, have a "good relationship to their history" (G9). Markus also cites as a positive that the English "can look back on a long history…[in which] they always came out of wars as the winner, at least in those conflicts that took place in Europe" (G6).[107] This allows the English to have a less difficult relationship to their nation (G7), a relationship the Germans, given their own difficulties, find reason to see positively.

The Germans' comments on England suggest a significant level of critique mixed with a more marginal amount of appreciation. In contrast to the English, the Germans see themselves as greater "team players" in that they are more bound to Europe and more willing to sacrifice national culture for the sake of the European unification. Although Germans may not be as friendly and open as Americans, they are also not as hierarchical and tradition-bound as the "snobby" English. The heavy criticism Germans direct toward the English and perhaps to a slightly lesser extent toward the United States is indicative of the skeptical relationship the Germans have to nationhood. In listening to the German respondents talk about England, it becomes apparent that they do not just connect the question of national pride, a concept they already greet with heavy skepticism, to achievement. They see it as an issue of earning that

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[107] " Ich denke mal, auf eine lange Geschichte zurückzublicken zu können. Das ist ?? man, an Unabhängigkeit um in Kriegen. Ja, auch denke ich mal, immer als Gewinner als aus den Kriegen rauszukommen zu sein. Sag ich mal, bei Konflikten, die innerhalb von Europa stattgefunden haben" (G6).

pride and it appears that, according to the Germans, the Americans at least have a better stake at making that claim than the English do.

The German Individual

When talking about England and the United States, the Germans' tone is on a rather critical. In talking about Germany, this tone changes to one of discomfort and sometimes frustration. This is directly connected to the *Vergangenheit,* or past, that still strongly influences Germans' self-perceptions. Unlike the Americans who speak of this past in terms of what it means for "Germany" and "the Germans" today, my German respondents speak more about what it means to be an individual unwillingly associated with this past. Although claims about the prevalence American individualism are often made (Putnam 2000), it appears that Germans are more likely to see themselves individually than collectively.

This distinction between the American perception of a national responsibility and the German one of individual responsibility becomes particularly clear in listening to my German interviewees. Irene, a 44-year old philosopher and art historian living in Berlin, notes that "in the negative sense, it's a typical German [experience] to be confronted with…someone who says, 'oh yes, [you are] German. Nazi…' That of course is taken personally. It's very difficult to make sense of that" (G1).[108] Ilke, a 26-year old flight attendant, also has problems being the "successor to a bad past or history. Although I had no influence on it. That one is always burdened with it or always has to carry it around."[109] Jörg, a 26-year old student and journalist,

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[108] „Zu dieser Art von Grausamkeit fähig gewesen zu sein; Mangel von Toleranz; Typisch Deutsch in diesem negativen Sinne ist glaube ich, was ich aaber auch nur weiß, was mir konfrontiert geworden ist. Um, in Amerika und jemand sagt ‚oh yes, German Nazi.'…Das ist denn natürlich, macht man natürlich sehr betroffen. Es ist sehr schwierig, man sich außeinander zu setzen (G1).

[109] "Nachfolger einer schlimmen Vergangenheit oder Geschichte. Obwohl ich darauf ja gar keine Einflüße gehabt – hatte. Oder ja, und das man da. Und das man immer noch damit belastet wird. Oder das man dann immer mit sich herumträgt" (G3).

first notes how hard it is to "justify yourself for your past" before correcting himself by saying "justify the country's past. Not your own" (G5).[110] Each of these respondents describes the troubles they have in being held individually responsible for acts committed long before they were born in the name of the nation.

Several interviewees talk about how difficult it is to be "reduced to" this historical event. Martin, a 27-year old West Berlin lawyer, resists the tendencies of others to define Germany by this twelve-year period, noting that Germany's history began in 912 A.D. and not in 1933. He finds it both "unpleasant" and "undeserved" that Germans today are forever confronted with this issue (G7). Petra, a 44-year old East Berlin dentist, says she is willing to talk about the past, but does not want to be reduced to only this (G4). Tilo describes the negatives of being German:

> The memory of the Nazi era; that the Germans, so to speak, attacked other
>
> peoples. And that one is always blamed for this. Which is legitimate looking
>
> back historically. But for the postwar generation, this certain level of guilt is for
>
> many people – when they're confronted with this – probably a real disadvantage
>
> to being German (G10).[111]

Marc, an East Berlin tattoo artist who likely has right-radical leanings, also feels this is a real disadvantage. He describes the World War II as

> ever-present in Germany. Always. We're always confronted with it… It's
>
> definitely negative that we're always talked into [this guilt]… There probably

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[110] "Sich von deiner Vergangenheit immer rechtfertigen zu müssen. Für die Vergangenheit des Landes rechtfertigen zu müssen. Nicht für die Eigene" (G5).

[111] "Die Erinnerung an die Nazizeit, dass die Deutsche so zu sagen, die anderern Völker herfielen. Dass man auch immer wieder darauf verwiesen wird. Was als historischer Rückblick legitim ist. Aber das natürlich, nach ein gewisser Art von Schuld zu weise heute sein kann. Für die nachfolgenden Generationen. Das ist so zu sage für manche Menschen wahrscheinlich, wenn sie damit konfrontiert werden, ein Nachtteil Deutscher zu sein" (G10).

were the wars.[112] But other nations have led wars too. And it's always about

Germany. Particularly for generations that had nothing to do with it. When

others in the world hear about Germany, they immediately think of Adolf Hitler.

And people won't have anything to do with those of us who live here (G17).[113]

As these respondents suggest again and again, it is difficult to be German because it means being

reduced by others to an historical event that occurred before they were even born.

When I ask Caroline and Jale about the negative aspects of being German, Caroline

grows silent, finally saying: "I can't do anything about it." Jale, understanding what Caroline

means but mindful of the tape recording the interview, tells her: "You have to speak. You have

to make yourself heard." Caroline says quietly: "I was, thank god, not born then. I did not have

to make decisions. And I'm really happy about that" (G12-13).[114] Caroline's comment here

suggests the kinds of mental and emotional work younger generations of Germans engage in

trying to make sense of this historical burden.

Three of my younger respondents, however, do not just describe this guilt but actively

resist or reject it. Matthias, a 31-year old CDU political consultant, describes this feeling in

detail:

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[112] It is unclear whether Marc is suggesting with this statement that revisionist history may have successfully called into question the actions of the Third Reich or whether he means something different. If so, it is unclear what that would be.

[113] "Ist immer allgegenwärtig in DL. Immer. Da wird immer damit konfrontiert. Ja und auch jetzt auch gerade. Und dann Wiedervereinigung natürlich. Ist klar. . Der negative wird hier als Deutscher eingeredet. Ich sage mal so, negativ sehr klar. Es gibt wahrscheinlich die Kriege. Aber Kriege haben andere Nationen auch geführt. Und DL wird immer wieder gemacht. Und bei Generationen, die mit der ??igkeit überhaupt nicht zu tun haben. Und wenn man DL hört in der Welt denkt man sofort an Adolf Hitler, ??, und Leute mittlerweile können nicht mehr mit dir anfangen, also von denen die hier leben" (G17).

[114] C – „Naja. Ich kann nichts dafür."

J – „Du musst es jetzt darein sprechen. Du musst dich jetzt bekennen."

C – „Ich war damals gottseidank nicht geboren. Ich musste mich damals nicht entscheiden. Und ich bin auch halb froh drüber" (G12-13)

It's an historical burden. I am aware of this historical situation, but I see my task

as one for the future… following the idea that I am not responsible for what

happened. I really am not. And that's why it bothers me. I don't express it, but I

am sometimes really pissed off when someone says I am responsible. But I am

not responsible for what happened. I am responsible for making sure it never

happens again. But I do not feel myself responsible for [the past] (G16).[115]

Matthias continues on in his rejection of feelings of blame by noting that the "bombardment" he

received on the subject as a schoolchild made him ultimately care less about the subject because

it was simply too much. Sandra, a 28-year old West Berliner who works for a medical supplies

distributor, is even less patient on this subject, when she answers that the negative of being

German is

The war with the Jews. Although I absolutely cannot and will not identity with it.

And it makes me mad, when people start stewing about it again. The extreme

right, probably every country has it. But here it's always the negative aspect.

And, of course, along with that our foreigner problem… I think every country has

a problem with foreigners and an extreme right. But here's it's the mark for

Hitler and the Jews. And then we're branded once again (G18).

Sandra continues on noting how when *Schindler's List* came out, she refused to go because she

"could not hear it anymore. Always with the Jews, the Jews. And the poor Jews. But what

they're doing over there in Israel, slaughtering with knives. No one talks about that. That make

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[115] "Es ist eine historische Belastung; Aber ich sage, ich bin auf der historische Situation bewusst, aber ich sehe das mehr als Auftrag in die Zukünft. Also das ist vielleicht ein biβchen abgedrückten. Aber ich sehe das wirklich nach dem Motto „ich bin nicht dafür verantwortlich, was da passiert ist. Bin ich wirklich nicht. Und deswegen stört/stosst es mir manchmal einfach. Ich äuβere das nicht und so. Ich störe so manchmal sauer auf, wenn man mich dafür verantwortlich macht. Aber ich bin, also ich bin nicht dafür verantwortlich, was passiert ist. Ich bin dafür verantwortlich, dass so was nie wieder passiert...Aber ich muss das wirklich sagen, ich fühle mich dafür einfach nicht verantwortlich" (G16).

me mad"[116] (G18). Although she ultimately found the movie moving and she does not condone the actions of neo-Nazis, she "flips out" whenever she thinks about the fact that something that happened an "eternity ago," that she has "no relation to," and played no role in could still be such an issue.[117] In her expressions of strong frustration, Sandra represents a potentially growing number of Germans who increasingly reject the idea that they should bear any responsibility for this "historical burden."

The "broken" biography or history that many of my German respondents describe in talking about Germany does not stop with World War II but also includes the historical division of their nation into East and West. Almost every one of my interview partners considers the consequences of reunification to be as a pressing problem and they are in virtual agreement that actual reunification has not yet been achieved. The Wall, I am told again and again, is still standing in the minds of Germans. My East German interview partners are most acutely aware of this and feel disadvantaged by West German prejudices, a phenomenon discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.[118] The division and subsequent reunification of Germany has,

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[116] She finds it particularly difficult to feel continued sympathy for the Jews given the present actions of the Israelis.

[117] "Negative denke ich kommt immer wieder auf: der Krieg mit den Juden. Obwohl ich damit überhaupt nicht indentifizieren kann und will. Und mich das immer wieder ärgert wenn da immer wieder drum rum gebruhert wird: die Rechtradikalen, die wahrscheinlich jedes andere Land auch hat. Aber hier ist das immer der negative Aspekt. Und dadurch mitbedingt Ausländerproblem... Ich denke, jedes Land hat irgendwo die Probleme mit den Ausländern mit den Rechtradikalern. Aber in DL ist dieser Markenzeichen mit Hitler und den Juden. Und dann gleich der Stempel ist wiederaufgesetzt… Ein schönes Beispiel war für mich Schindler's Liste. Da war ich noch in der Berufschule damals und wir müssten diesen Film. War ein sogenannter Kulturteile, den Film angucken. Ich habe mich strict/stick geweigert gehabt, weil ich konnte es nicht mehr hören. Immer mehr dieses mit den Jüden, mit den Jüden. Und die arme Jüden. Aber was sie da verbreiten im Gründe drüben in Israel, diese ?? und schlachten sich im Gründe mit Messern sich ab. Spricht keiner drüber. Und das ärgert mich. Und dann bin ich mit rein mit dem Film. Und im Nachhinein, der war wirklich bombig. Ich kann nicht viel dagen sagen. Aber dieser Punkt, der reisst mich immer wieder auf. Wenn ich das im Fernsehen sehe, ich konnte in die Luft gehen. Korrekt ist das nicht was die Rechtradikaler machen, davon na ab. Aber es ist ein kleiner Punkt, der sich immer immer noch böse findet, überall eben hat. Und der immer wieder repräsentativ für alle Deutsche ?? Volk. Und das was für ewigen Zeit passiert ist, naja da habe ich eben keine Relation mehr dazu. Und ich mache nicht

[118] Although my respondents often have a great deal to say on this subject, they become most vocal once the official part of the interview is over and the tape has been turned off. For West Germans, it appears that the subject may be more of an afterthought, albeit an important one by their own admission. Many of my East German respondents want to discover first whether I am receptive to their complaints before further discussing their troubles. Others may

according to my respondents, further taxed the Germans' ability to think of their own nation without reservations.

It is in the context of Germans' frustrations with bearing an undeserved, or at least not a personal, responsibility for the Holocaust and their troubles with reunification that their ambivalent feelings toward their own nation become most striking. Here in particular, they choose to speak as individuals rather than a national people. Tilo connects the idea of nationalism or patriotism with rightist extremism, rejecting the idea of thinking in terms of "Germany" because "it has no further meaning." Even speaking in terms of positive aspects of being German leaves him with a "strange aftertaste." What he can say is: "I have to live here and I want to live here." Germany is like a "homeland" for Tilo; although as soon as he speaks the word, he immediately rescinds, saying that that word too is problematic. Several others talk about their indifference to their own nation. Petra says she is not "bound to her country" and has never really "felt German" (G4). Karin speaks in very negative terms about her own nation, noting: "I wouldn't live here if I could elsewhere. There are nicer places on earth" (G8). Ilka notes that she could have also been born in India and that it is just pure chance where one ends up (G2). For these respondents, Germany comes to be seen as a place they "happen" to be in rather than a place they are proud to live.

Others do talk about a feeling of attachment they have to their own nation. Yet these are more humble emotions than those expressed by the Americans when they connect their country to larger ideals and values like freedom, equality, and democracy. Martin, for example, talks about a feeling of "familiarity that he finds endearing." Although he cannot say whether he is proud or happy to be German, he is always glad to be back in this familiar place after coming

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also still associate tape recorders with the *Stasi* and thus prefer not to be on record with their stronger critiques (as was at least part the case with Marc, the East Berlin tattoo artist).

back from a long trip abroad. Germany is after all, he notes, where he grew up and ultimately

made his home (G7). When I ask Ursula about what she thinks of the German people, she says

that the very term is problematic and that she cannot think of the Germans as a "nation" in that

sense. She can only answer the question with the response "I was born here and I was raised

here," although she then adds that she connects her nation with "many faces and many friends"

(G15).

Two Germans, both of whom identify themselves as members of the Christian

Democratic Union (CDU), the right of center party, suggest that national pride is relevant to the

Germans. Matthias, the political consultant for the CDU, claims that Germans have a

"repressed" national consciousness that they do not want to express but nonetheless have (G16).

He himself is proud that the Germans were able to turn their government from a dictatorship into

one of the "best functioning democracies," all the while maintaining fifty years of peace.

Antonio, a political science student, says that he does not "have a problem with German history"

and while he is not proud of those "twelve years," the Germans have since "come a long way in

rediscovering democracy." He feels that the greatest problem his nation faces is the self-denial

German have by not recognizing their reasons for pride.

Despite this difficult relationship to the nation most of my respondents express, they do

come up with positive aspects of being German and the German nations. Several mention the

present-day political system and the strong foundations for democracy. Most commonly,

German interviewees comment on their standard of living and strong social system that they

hope to see continue. My German respondents often see modern-day Germany as more

"balanced" and less extreme than either the Americans or the English, priding itself on a solid

middle class. Indeed, in a question about Germany's greatest contribution to the world, Julian

suggest it was the development of the middle-class citizenry which became the basis for the social state, which he considers "very German" (G9). My German interview partners see their compatriots as a reliable, punctual, efficient, and ambitious people who have a "depth" and ability to reflect that is relatively unknown to either the Americans or the English.

On the other side of that same coin, however, are the negative aspects of being German, according to my respondents. These include intolerance, bourgeois attitudes, inflexibility, excessive bureaucracy, and a tendency to categorize people. Three interview partners suggest that Germans' tendency toward "perfectionism and thoroughness" helped to make the Holocaust possible. As one notes "the persecution of the Jews was probably perfectly planned. I think something really only possible in Germany" (G15). Germans do not see themselves as especially "guest-friendly" or open to new cultures and this leads to problems, as many note, with foreigners. The latter issue comes to be seen as a pressing problem for many and is periodically mentioned in combination with a rise in rightist extremism.[119]

Two final points reveal a great deal about Germans' perceptions of themselves and how they feel others see them. During my questioning on Germany, I ask my respondents which Germans they imagine are well known or famous in other nations. Their answers, particularly in comparison to those of my American respondents discussed earlier, are enlightening. In the United States, twenty-three of my respondents thought first, and often only, of Hitler as a famous German. Former Chancellor Helmut Kohl came in second with only three mentions; the only other multiple mentions, each with two, were model Claudia Schiffer, writer Bertold Brecht, and

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[119] Two of my respondents did make comments that could align with the arguments of right radicals. Marc, the East Berlin tattoo artist, made a number of derogatory comments about Turks, ultimately concluding that they behave like "swine" (G8). Karin, a waiter who grew up in East Germany but then left with her family in the mid 1980s, claim that the greatest problem confronting Germany today is "foreigners." Although she condemns racial hatred, she also makes a curious statement that she does not elaborate on. After I ask what Germany's greatest contribution to the world was, she responds: "I think Hitler did a lot for us on this subject. He also pulled a lot of shit, that goes

WWII military leader Erwin Rommel. In contrast, Helmut Kohl was named eleven times by my

German respondents, making the former Chancellor the most frequently named famous German

in the world, according to the Germans. Adolf Hitler was a close second with ten mentions,

followed by Johann Wolfgang von Goethe with seven mentions. Other multiple mentions

included Ludwig von Beethoven (five times), Friedrich Schiller and former Chancellor Willy

Brandt (three mentions each). Named twice were former and present politicians Helmut

Schmidt, Joschka Fischer, and Gerhard Schroeder, in addition to scientist Albert Einstein,

theorist Karl Marx, soccer player Franz Beckenbauer, and actress Marlene Dietrich. Mentioned

once each were: soccer player Jürgen Klismann, actress Hildegard Knef, tennis player Boris

Becker, Friedrich Engels, writer Heinrich Heine, composers Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart and

Johann Sebastian Bach, the rock group Scorpions, and Otto von Bismarck. With the exception

of Hitler, there is very little compatibility then between the individuals Americans consider

"famous Germans" and those individuals Germans imagine to be well known throughout the

world.

  I also ask Germans what they believe are Germany's greatest contributions to the world.

Their answers are a further indication how Germans resist thinking in terms of national

contributions, instead focusing on the accomplishments of individuals. My interview partners

respond overwhelmingly in terms of the *Dichter und Denker,* writers and thinkers, who define

Germany. They speak of the individual contributions of philosophers, scientists, and musicians

as the greatest accomplishments in German history. Goethe, Schiller, Heine, Mann, Einstein,

Kant, Hegel and others are all listed as making great contributions to the world. It is the

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without saying. But I also think he did a lot" (G7). [**"**Ich glaube Hitler hat eine Menge gemacht in der Beziehung. Er hat viel Scheisse gemacht, davon abgesehen. Auch der hat glaube ich eine Menge" (G7)].

achievements of individuals that are the best way, according to my German respondents, to

evaluate the contributions of the German nation to the world.

Nationing on Germany

This final point on German contributions to the world is an interesting point of departure in thinking about how Americans and Germans nation on the subject of Germany. Over and over, my German interviewees talk about their own nation, how much they resist being seen as "the German people." Instead, my German respondents want to be seen as individuals, not responsible for a nation's deeds, but for their own accomplishments. Their repeated claim that individuals have made the greatest German contributions to the world is a further assertion of this same argument. In contrast, Americans seem to liken the Third Reich period to the actions of "the Germans." Although they realize this places an undue burden on individual Germans today, they still continue to think in these terms.

As their comments on both the United States and England suggest, my German respondents' are more critical in their discussions of other nations than Americans. The Americans are in part bound by their limited knowledge of present-day German life and therefore unable to provide detailed critiques. But they are also probably less likely to do so, given that they see nations as having more positive potential than the Germans. For Germans, the notion of national pride may be a problematic one in and of itself, but it becomes even more so when "undeserving" nations, like the English, demonstrate such pride. For Americans, national pride is a given and not a question of deservedness.

This chapter serves as an example of nationing in action. Throughout my interviews, two images of the nation emerge, each one reflecting the assumptions and preoccupations of the respondents. As these differences fall along national lines, it becomes even clearer exactly how it is that social location affects how one envisions nationhood.

Chapter Six

Beyond Nationality: Social Location and Nationing

Thus far in my analysis of the phenomenon of nationing, I have focused on national-level

variations in relationships to the concept of the nation as well as to perceptions of Germany.

National membership affects nationing in newspapers, textbooks, and the discourse of ordinary

citizens. To follow my argument about nationing to a logical conclusion, however, requires the

recognition that differences in the ways individuals nation do not end with national membership.

That is, nationing implies that one's location within the nation also affect one's vision of the

world. National membership is a primary element of social location; but numerous other social

characteristics affect our place in the world and how we relate to our surroundings. These

differences, as I argue here, do not negate the effects of national membership but often

complicates and even bolsters them, leading respondents in both the United States and Germany

to respond not just as Americans and Germans, but also, for example, as African Americans,

Indian Americans, Turkish Germans, East Germans, American men or German women.

Obviously, given the sample sizes, breaking down further to issues of age, geographic location,

race, ethnicity, class, and gender does not allow for large generalizations. Nonetheless, the

differences in kinds of nationing are suggestive and therefore deserving of analysis.

As I discovered in my interviews, the public presentations of Germany found in history

textbooks and newspaper articles may represent an "American" or "German" national standpoint,

but they do not always represent the variety of perspectives experienced by American and

German individuals. These differences often still align with the national perspective in many

ways, but the variations are no less significant for this. Indeed, many studies have shown the

influence of a variety of socio-demographic variables on the perception of cultural objects (Eck 1996; Griswold 1987a; Press 1991; Radway 1991; Shively 1992). As Liebes and Katz argue:

> Domestic audiences are not homogenous entities. The ethnic and cultural
> communities that make up most societies, not to speak of the aggregates of age,
> education, gender, and class, are all different enough to raise the possibility that
> decodings [of a cultural object] and effects vary widely within any given society
> (1990: 8).

In other words, ethnicity, age, education, gender, and class, among others, all come to affect our visions of the world that may still align with these societal perspectives but are nonetheless distinctly different.

In conducting my interviews, I selected a group of individuals in their twenties, thirties, and forties with diverse backgrounds. Below, I consider how some of that diversity affected the kinds of responses I received. As I discovered, East Germans, particularly those born before 1970, relate to their own nation as well as the very concept of the nation differently. Similarly, several of the African Americans I interviewed expressed more complicated feelings about the United States than the majority of the European Americans with whom I spoke, although they ultimately were equally patriotic. Three individuals who were born outside of the United States but have become American citizens suggest the power of the melting pot ideology. In contrast, the two Turkish Germans I interviewed illustrate how one can hold citizenship but still remain a foreigner. As I will show, issues of class and gender also affect the way in which an individual talks about nations. I consider how the social interests of individuals are a further indicator of the importance of location on nationing. Finally, I note how these demographic differences often come to strengthen rather than minimize national differences.

From East German to German

My interviews with Americans and Germans were conducted with individuals born

between 1955 and 1976. This meant my respondents were anywhere from in their mid-twenties

to mid-forties.[120] They had all had varied life experiences, particularly for the older versus

younger members in the sample. For all my interview partners, World War II was an historical

event, rather than a personal experience. In terms of the Cold War, however, there was a

difference. The older respondents had been raised at the height of Cold War tensions while the

younger ones came into adulthood after the fall of the Wall and the breakdown of the Soviet

Union. For American respondents, this factor did not lead to great variation in the kinds of

responses they gave to the questions I posed. Both younger and older interview respondents

referred equally (in)frequently to reunification. In fact, for the Americans, there seemed to be no

questions about any of the three nations that resulted in markedly different kind of answers or

interpretations based on age.

This was not the case however with German interviewees. The kinds of answers

provided by former East Germans over thirty (i.e., born before 1970) were markedly different

from both former West German interviews and East Germans born after 1970. These older East

Germans expressed more skepticism about the very idea of the nation. Tilo, a 35-year old East

Berliner, explains that it is difficult for him to speak in terms of German national symbols

because he has been a citizen of two German states and has never felt allegiance to either.

Ulrike, a 44-year old East Berlin dentist, tells me that she still considers Germany to be "made of

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[120] Originally I had selected interview partners in the hopes of their representing a "generation" of twenty years. The problematic nature of the "generation" (see??), ultimately made this goal moot. Instead, I continued to select individuals from this age range because they represent a group of people beginning or in the middle of their careers, often politically active, with several decades of influence in front of them.

two halves, just like it once was."[121] She later argues that Germans are "in it for themselves,"

but immediately adds that "that was not the case in GDR times" (G4). Ulrike suggests that the

reason that there are more traffic accidents today is connected to the fact that "this society has

more egoists than was the case earlier" in the German Democratic Republic. She explains,

> We were raised always with the awareness, or whatever you want to call it, that
>
> one should think of others. Whether this meant holding the door or helping
>
> someone on with their coat or to pull out a chair or just do something for another.
>
> And here [in reunified Germany] everyone does for him- or herself… They all
>
> want to go to psychologists… [It's] because no one has a partner anymore. Not
>
> everyone, but a lot of them don't have partners in their life with whom they can
>
> talk about their problems. So they all turn to the red couch [in the psychologist's
>
> office] (G4).[122]

For Ulrike, so much of the growing "egoism" that she sees throughout German society is

attributable to the loss of East German values of solidarity, replaced by Western notions of

individualism. Her comments, like those of other East Germans interviewed in their thirties and

forties, reflect a more complicated relationship to the nation. As Tilo notes, they grew up in one

nation only to find themselves as adults citizens in another. The question, therefore, is always

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[121] Dass Deutschland immer noch aus zwei Hälften besteht nach wie vor (G4).

[122] "Kleinkarriert. Ja irgendwie, dass sie sehr auf sich selbst bedacht. Wobei ja in DDR Zeiten war das noch anders erheblich. Etwas, womit ich selber endlich nur umgehen kann. Diese Geschichte ?? auf der Strasse ?? mehr Umfälle passieren, hängt das, zu meinem Begriff, auch damit zusammen, dass sie diese Gesellschaft mehr Egoisten hat als in früheren Fall hat. Da ist von knallen aus, sind wir groβ geworden immer mit der Anmahnung, oder wie man's auch nennen will, an den Nebenuns zu denken. Ja? Also wenn es mit Tür aufzuhalten oder immer den Mantel zu hälten, oder mal einen Stühl wegzuräumen oder überhaupt mal etwas zu jemandem irgendwas zu tun. Ja hier tut nur jeder was für sich selber. Und da sieht ??linksrum, wenn es nicht unbedingt war oder stört oder betrifft eigentlich gar nichts. Also und das finde ich un?? noch ein Egoismus. ?? Und sie wollen alle zu Pyschologen. Und das ist un??, weil wir alle kein Partner mehr haben, nicht alle aber viel, keinen Partner mehr im Leben haben, mit dem sie mal über ihre Probleme reden können, sie müssen alle auf die rote Couch" (G4).

"*which* German nation?" Despite the shared language, food, and history, their new citizenship is not accepted wholeheartedly or without reservations.

Indeed, Marc, a 38-year old, East German tattoo artist (who appeared to have right-radical leanings) demonstrates extreme anger toward reunified Germany and the "*Scheisswestler,*" shit-West Germans, in his responses to me. His responses illustrate the frustrations of many East Germans who are troubled both by their treatment by the *Westler*, a slang and slightly derogatory term he uses for West Germans, and what they perceive as the too large presence of foreigners. He tells me that when he thinks of Germany, he thinks of:

> Reunification of course. It's obvious. And I think now, really right now, after reunification that the East is being disadvantaged. And treated like we're total idiots by the *Westler* ones, yeah…. The older people from the East get 1000 Marks a month for their pension and they worked really hard. And the *Westler* get 3000 Marks for the same. That just can't be right. This is all according to the line that no one really worked in the East, that we were all lazy pigs. And in the West, everyone [worked so hard]. But in the West, they just got foreigners to build their shit nation. Yeah, it was like that from the beginning. First they got the Italians, then they got the Turks, and then they got the Greeks. And they had them do all the work and then they spoke of the economic miracle. But in East Germany, in the DDR, it was only the *Ostler* [East Germans] who worked. And in the West, they had 4, 5, or 6 different nations working for them. Yeah, and this injustice is the truth. *Ostler* have only been lied to. *Ostler* are more honest. And

they have strong opinions. These *Scheißwestler* don't have [a backbone] at all.

Not all of them of course…but in general they are (G17).[123]

The anger and frustration Marc expresses toward West Germans suggests the problems many

older East Germans have with the Federal Republic, a nation they do not always feel represents

their own interests.

In contrast, West German respondents mention reunification and its consequences, but do

so more in passing. They see reunification as an issue but do not feel as personally connected to

it or affected by it. Unlike many of their East German counterparts, West German interview

partners not only are living in the nation they grew up in, they take this fact for granted.

Although my younger East German interviewees are more aware of issues of

reunification than their West German counterparts regardless of age, they tend to see these issues

from a less personal or distrustful standpoint than fellow East Germans ten to twenty years their

senior. They are more likely to talk about reunification as a problem than the West Germans, but

they do not the personal feelings of frustration with the Federal Republic that the older East

German respondents express. Indeed my youngest interviewee, Antonio, a 24-year old political

science student from Jena who is affiliated with the conservative Christian Democratic Union,

rejects the idea that East Germans are in any way disadvantaged, a view otherwise held

uniformly by East German respondents. Antonio also serves as my only respondent to fully

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[123] "Und dann Wiedervereinigung natürlich. Ist klar. Und ich finde jetzt, gerade jetzt nach der Wiedervereinigung der Osten benachteiligt wird. Und auch behandelt wird wie als wenn wir hier Vollidioten sind von den Westlern, ja… Und die ältere Leute, die kommen aus den Osten, und die kriegen 1000 Mark Rente und haben aber richtig gearbeitet und die Westler kriegen 3000 Mark dafür, dass kann ja wohl nicht sein. Also nach dem Motto im Osten hat gar keiner gearbeitet, weil alle faule Schweine waren. Und im Westen haben sie alle ?geschindert?. Aber im Westen haben sie immer nur die Ausländer reingeholt, um ihren Scheiss?nation? zu bauen. Ja, es ging auch von Anfang an los. Die haben die Italiener geholt, die haben die Türken geholt, die haben die Griechen geholt. Und haben die die Arbeit machen lassen und haben denn vom Wirtschaftwunder gesprochen. Und ?? Ja, Im OstDeutschland, in DDR, da haben *nur* die Ostler gearbeitet und im Westen haben sie aus 4,5,6 verschiedenen Nationen, die für *sie* gearbeitet haben. Ja, und diese Ungerechtigkeit schlecht stimmen... Ostler sind nur nicht so

embrace the idea of patriotism and allegiance to Germany. His responses may very well be

indicative of a rising younger generation of East and West Germans who are more comfortable

with the idea of national pride and who no longer see significant difference between East and

West.

The fact that those individuals born before 1970 in the GDR have had to face issues of

citizenship and nation in ways that my other interviewees have not has also led them to

experience the concept of the nation in significantly different ways. The fall of the Wall

functioned as a profound life-altering experience, drastically changed the lives of a number of

my respondents. Those respondents born before 1970 had already completed the equivalent of

their high school degree by the time the Wall fell. For many of them, decisions had already been

made as to their future work plans. Since the government limited such individual plan making in

a variety of ways, many East Germans found themselves at the time of reunification living lives

that they otherwise would not have chosen to lead.[124] When the Wall fell, their options expanded

but many were left with frustration as to the limits that had previously been put on their lives.

Many of them came to resent the former German Democratic Republic for the limits on their

freedoms and, at the same time, the resented the reunited Federal Republic of Germany for its

neglect of East German interests. Given their critical relationship to the two nations in which

they have been citizens, my older East German respondents tend to speak more skeptically of the

very concept of the nation. Their age and geographic location influence their experience of the

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verlogen. Ostler sind ehrlicher. Und haben um, eine feste Meinung. Diese Scheiβwestler, sie haben keine. Nicht alle natürlich. Ja, es gibt überall, aber vom ganzen Wesen" (G17).

[124] Tilo, an East German respondent, explained to me that his parents had both been professionals. His application to study at an East German university was rejected and instead had to learn a trade and become a "worker." Although never explicitly given as a reason, it was understood by many East Germans that only members of the workers' party would be "rewarded" with academic studying. Children of the professional class were often closed out of opportunities to study by the government and thus left with the option of learning a trade and becoming a "worker."

nation in such a way that does not negate their "German" perspective, but still affects it. Their skepticism of nationhood appears to go beyond the skepticism expressed by other Germans.

Black Americans as Blacks and Americans

Racial and ethnic identifications, particularly seeing oneself as a minority within a majority state, also come to affect one's relationship to one's own nation as well as to the larger concept of the nation. Six of my twenty-six American interviewees identified themselves as being of non-European origin. Of them, two women and two men identified themselves as either Black or African-American, one woman as Indian American, and another as of half-German and half-Costa-Rican descent. As I discovered, several of these respondents related differently to the nation based on their minority status. Although their thoughts on nationhood were still largely informed and influenced by their "American experience."

Three of the four African Americans I spoke with brought up race as a primary way in which they think about the United States. Yet, they combine an awareness of what it means to be an American minority with a relatively uncritical approach to seeing the U.S. Tommy, a 26-year old returning college student, brings up issues of racism frequently in his discussions of the United States. When I ask what he thinks of when he thinks of America, he answers:

> all the feelings are much more romantic…like home, patriotism, all that George
>
> Washington, Thomas Jefferson, all that good stuff like that. Also too, a little bit
>
> of slavery in there too, let's not forget about that. Some oppression. But even
>
> with all that, I still feel pretty good (A27).

In response to a question about positive aspects of the U.S., Tommy responds that "difference" is the key: "we're all different, but we're all Americans." When I then ask about negative aspects,

he answers: "I think dealing with racism. Ah, dealing with more or less lines that aren't drawn by laws but lines that are drawn in people's minds that are expressed in different ways." In comparison to my white respondents, about two-thirds of whom bring up racial relations as a problem in the United States, Tommy sees race as a *primary* way of defining his country. But even here, he sounds like most of other respondents who may be critical of certain aspects of American society but still are proud of their nation overall. Even with slavery and oppression, Tommy still feels "pretty good" about his nation.

When I first ask Candace, a 38-year old African American secretary, about what she connects to the United States, her initial answers are rather neutral and not in any way race-specific. As the interview went on, however, Deborah changes her tone, becoming more critical in her comments, this shift is first apparent when I ask what she considers to be a positive aspect of being American. Here Deborah first introduces the issue of race:

> I don't know. It's different. I think it's different for minorities than it is for other people…. I think it's, I think for most people, it's everything…. But I think for a lot of, you know, minorities, it's a mix. I mean you're not totally, it's a free society, but you're not totally. It's like, it's not − it's like it's not totally our country. Yeah, I mean I think, I think of the Civil Rights Movement. Yeah. I think that was probably the worst. One of the worst. Things like the Civil War, and things like that. I guess when I think about the U.S., I think, you know, like [about the] Elian Gonzales [case]. I just think of the U.S. as like a big bully (A26).

She continues on nothing that she does not always feel like a full citizen of the United States. She compares herself with European Americans who, by virtue of their heritage, she feels, are automatically granted this status.

By the end of the interview, Deborah feels comfortable speaking in terms of her own experiences as an African American. In terms of her greatest source of pride as an American, she cites the Civil Rights Movement while the greatest problem or shame her country has faced is foremost for her the history of slavery. After the interview, she explains that at first she purposefully had not mentioned race issues because she assumed that I, as a Caucasian, would not understand and would not want to hear what she had to say. Perhaps more so than any other respondent, Candace sees her minority status as profoundly affecting her relationship to her nation. Yet, these troubles do not lead her, like my German respondents, to then reject her identification with the nation. Instead, she, like other Americans, answers many questions "as an American;" she too easily finds a source of national pride, one that is rooted in her identification as a minority: the Civil Rights movement. Toward the interview, she comments: "I don't want to sound anti-American. I wouldn't want to go anywhere else but..." In doing so, she shows her allegiance and a belief that the U.S. may the best option for her. Yet she also suggests with the trailing off of her sentence that her feelings are nonetheless in part qualified.

Joey, a personal trainer in D.C. who was raised on welfare, also makes clear that being African American affects his view of the United States, but that he is still very convinced of the greatness of his country. Joey's patriotism comes through time and time again in his answers. When I ask what he thinks of the United States, he first responds: "The wonderful United States of America. My home. Outstanding. God has really blessed this country and continues to smile

upon it" (A8). Joey subscribes to the American belief that anyone who works hard, will succeed.

Upon my asking what he thinks of America, he responds:

> There's a lot of thought there. We got so many people. Now I can break it down,
> me being African American. A lot of African Americans, you know, look to put
> blame for their conditions. There's the problem with drugs…. My answer to that
> is this: the white man didn't put you on a corner, force you to sell those drugs, he
> didn't force you to take the drugs and to smoke or shoot it in your veins. You
> understand? You have the same opportunities to go to school, go to class, sit up
> front, listen, and do your homework as the Caucasian. I don't like to say white:
> Caucasian. I don't want to hear [African Americans complain]. Stop putting
> blame. Ok? Unfortunately you was brought up in a rougher part of the
> neighborhood. But you still have opportunity to get out of there. Stop putting
> blame. Or the lazy people who just continue to have kids so that they get more
> off the welfare and don't want to work. System all screwed up…. Basically, to
> summarize, this is a blessed country with a lot of problems (A8).

Joey clearly adheres to the belief that work and education are the key to overcoming oppression

and that African Americans' complaints are best solved through their own initiative. He makes

clear that although he thinks in terms of race when it comes to the United States, he still

subscribes to the American ideology that individual hard work will be rewarded .

Joey's American understanding of race relations, however, does not just structure his

relationship to his own country, but also to other nations. When I ask what his greatest source of

national pride would be if he were German, he answers with a reference to the 1936 Olympics:

If I was German, doing very well in the Olympics. They're always up there.

Except for when the Olympics was whacked [in 1936]. And Jesse Owens and the

boys came to town. And put Hitler to shame. I think Jesse was the only Black

American on the relay team and the rest were Jews – outstanding story. Shot

[Hitler] down [in the figurative sense]. The people that [he was] trying to destroy.

Put [his] track team to shame. An African American. God bless that day (A8).

Joey interprets his greatest pride as a German through the lens of his own experience as an

African American, suggesting that as a German his pride would be in the accomplishments of an

African American. Unlike the Germans who might interpret this as an individual achievement,

Joey sees this as a success for *all* African Americans. Joey himself takes great pride in this

incident, although he personally was not involved.

In contrast, to Tommy, Candace, and Joey, Cathy, a 32-year old, African American

laundromat manager with three children ranging in age from 15 to 10, does not answer any

questions in terms of race. She is clearly convinced that being American is as good as it gets.

As to the positive aspects of being American and what she associates with the United States, she

responds with the word "freedom." She cannot think of any negative aspects of being American.

When I ask what she is most proud of as an American, she answers "proud to vote. A lot of

people can't. Proud to be able to dress how I want to. Proud to be able to say what I want to.

Proud to be able to be with my family" (A25). Liz has difficulty finding a source of national

shame, but finally settles on the "few wars we've been in" as an answer. Liz, at least according

to her interview, does not see the United States, Germany, or England in terms of race. She is

unabashedly patriotic and believes the United States to be the best place on earth. Her

identification as a minority thus takes a backseat to her patriotism as an American.

The African Americans I interviewed may all take different perspectives on the meaning of race in their own lives and their society, but they unite in their patriotism. In essence, what I heard each time was that, regardless of their issues with their nation, they define themselves nonetheless as Americans. In this, they, like European Americans, define themselves through and identify with their nation.

Immigrants as Patriots and Foreigners

Three respondents I interviewed in the United States were born elsewhere. Similar to other American respondents, they unite in their patriotic perspective on American national identity, although their immigrant experiences do structure this image. In the U.S. sample, three women, one born in India, one in Israel holding dual citizenship, and one in England all immigrated to the United States and took American citizenship. Mirabella, an artist born in England and raised in the United States, tells me that her greatest source of pride as an American comes from the fact that she belongs to "a land of immigrants" and has the freedom to create her own identity (A24). Although Mirabella is one of the more critical American interviewees, she nonetheless feels national pride that is in part connected to her own feelings as an immigrant.

Shalini, a physician born in India but raised in the United States, is especially appreciative of the "melting pot." When I ask what a positive aspect of being American is, she comments:

Being able to come from another country and then consider yourself American.
You know, some people may not agree with it. But I think the way this country
was settled, people, everyone basically is an immigrant or has immigrant

ancestors. So I think that makes everyone kind of fit in…so I think that no one

can really say that, you know, 'I'm more American than you are' (A21).

Shalini notes that being an immigrant has led her to especially values this part of the American

experience.

Her ethnic identity not only affects her relationship to the United States, it also structures

her opinions on England in stronger ways than virtually all my other interview partners. In

discussing England, she speaks frequently of the imperialist history and the English "sense of

being superior." [125] In terms of the most pressing problem the English have, she is the only

American or German respondent to answer that issues of "race" are their greatest troubles. She

explains: "That's only because, when I've been there, I know they have a lot of Indians there and

there's a lot of tension. So I guess kind of like Americans and African Americans have a lot of

tension" (A21). Shalini's experience with Indian family members who live in England leads her

to compare the status of African Americans to Indians in England, a comparison none of my

other interview partners thinks to make. In doing so, Shalini also suggests that her own

integration into American life makes her own experience totally incomparable to those

immigrants in England. Throughout the interview, Shalini speaks as a patriotic American, noting

how her immigration experience makes her appreciate this citizenship status all the more.

Yael, a Jewish social worker born with dual Israeli-American citizenship, relies on her

status as a Jewish minority in the United States even more than her immigration experience to

make sense of her feelings about the United States. She tells me how much she appreciates the

"freedom to express your religion," noting "I really feel strongly because I have a lot of Russian

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[125]Of my other respondents, one European-American respondent who had spent significant time in India also mentioned English colonialism. Tommy, the African American, non-traditional student thinks of the English as "people that colonize other people, make the world England." And David, a well-read European American, also addressed colonization. None of these interviewees saw the subject as centrally as Shalini did however.

Jewish clients who are so happy to be here for that reason. You know, they can express themselves, and people [have] just completely take it for granted" (A14). Yael appreciates this factor particularly as a member of a minority religion in the United States, although this minority status is sometimes an issue for her. She explains:

> I think that being American, you know, I'm a minority in that I'm Jewish. And that sometimes, I would say, doesn't feel so good. Sometimes I feel so great because I'm like 'Wow, I'm Jewish, I'm different.' But sometimes it would be nice to be part of the majority. So um just having that struggle with who I am. The Jew, the American, the American Jew versus the Israeli Jew and all that stuff. But other than that…I think that we should have a lot of pride. You know we should be proud of ourselves and what we stand for (A14).

Being Jewish in a nation that is overwhelmingly is often a struggle for her. And yet, in the end, she echoes so many of my American respondents of both minority and majority status: she believes that Americans should be proud of "what they stand for." Despite her periodic identity struggles, Yael's views ultimately align like those of Mirabella and Shalini in that she feels and appreciates the fact that she is fully integrated into American life.

The two Turkish Germans with whom I spoke also made clear that being a minority within Germany affects their relationship to their own nation as well as other nations.[126] However, unlike in the American case, these two German immigrants do not speak in terms of pride in their new nation, nor do they claim to "feel German."

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[126]In order to become a German citizen, an applicant must give up the citizenship rights to their country of origin which means that technically Turks must forsake their Turkish passports once they become Germans. In practice, however, the Turkish government will often reissue their Turkish passports "behind the back" of the German government which allows Turkish Germans to then keep their Turkish citizenship. Given the fact that Turks have not traditionally been integrated into German society but instead understood as temporary "guests," many of these individuals still feel themselves to be more "Turkish" than they do "German."

Abdul is a 34-year old mail carrier who immigrated to Germany when he was twelve. He speaks with an accent that is a mix of Turkish and German dialect. At home, he speaks only Turkish and virtually all of his friends and neighbors are also Turkish. Privately, Abdul leads a Turkish life in Germany. In contrast, Jale, 33 years old is far more integrated into German society. She has both German and Turkish friends, speaks German better than Turkish, received the equivalent of a Master's at a German university, and now teaches German to foreigners. Her life has been spent overwhelmingly in Germany, having immigrated at age six, her passport is German, and whenever she visits Turkey, she is reminded how much she thinks like a German. In this, her private life contrasts sharply with Abdul's. And yet, like Abdul, she rarely identifies herself as "German," most often not feeling like "one of them."

Despite leading very different lives as Turkish immigrants in Germany, Jale and Abdul sound very similar in talking about both the United States and Germany. In talking about the United States, Jale describes her fascination at witnessing Americans of all colors – "Asians, Afro-Americans, all mixed" – singing the national anthem together before an event. The level of pride Jale believes all Americans, regardless of ethnic or racial heritage, feel is completely foreign to her. Indeed, as she note, she knows neither the German nor Turkish national anthem. Similarly, Abdul, a 34-year old mail carrier, comments that the United States for him means "open" and "mixed," attributes he contrasts with "closed" German society. According to his own account, Abdul struggles with German culture regularly. He explains that in Germany, individuals are seen not as "persons" but instead are labeled as, for example, an Italian, Turk, American, or Indian. Abdul resists this kind of categorizations believing that one should only concentrate on the commonality of humanity rather than on a hierarchy in which some are considered less worthy than others.

In this context of asking about Abdul's feelings about Germany that a funny and revealing moment arises.[127] I spoke with Abdul in his living room with the television on, in the presence of his father, mother, wife, child, and visitor.[128] I had come to the end of the interview and had only two questions left to ask about Germany. Given the design of the interview, every respondent is asked about the "other" two nations before getting to questions about his or her own nation. The last third of the questions are thus designed to be about one's own country. With Abdul, however, it became clear at the end that he was not interpreting the final part of the interview in the same way as my other respondents. In my second-to-last question, I ask what he is most proud of as a German. He hears the question, however, as if I'd asked: "Imagine you were American/English, what would be your greatest source of national pride?" He proceeds to answer: "If I were German…" I interrupt him to double-check that he does in fact hold a German passport. He affirms. His father, upon hearing this exchange, immediately begins to mock Abdul for claiming to be "German." It is clear that Abdul nor his family have never considered him to be "really" German. The passport he holds is one of convenience not allegiance. His comments about Germans, despite having "German" citizenship, are understood as the observations of an outsider.

Although a number of Germans mention racism or *Ausländerfeindlichkeit* (foreigner hatred), as a serious problem confronting Germans, this issue is seen as a much larger problem by both of my Turkish-German interviewees. Both Jale and Abdul tell me it is more serious than the media or other Germans suggest; they also both note how it has been ignored throughout German society over the years. Jale explains that the media:

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[127] Unlike the ethnic Germans I had interviewed who often went to great lengths to make sure they were alone for their interviews, both Abdul and Jale choose to be interviewed with others present.
[128] In Jale's case, I ended up interviewing her and an ethnic German acquaintance simultaneously.

really was totally silenced. But it always came back as a "news" event whenever

something happened. But the problem was always there. Nothing much was

done about it. Only when the east borders opened and so many emigrants came

back to Germany did the problem really become acute. Then things really got

difficult, with immigrants, foreigners, and all that came from the outside (G12).[129]

In a similar comment to Jale's, Abdul also suggests that the Germans' problems with foreigners

are greater than the Germans would like to acknowledge. Abdul explains that recently the

situation for foreigners has improved slightly, but

four, five years ago, it was different. Because of the firebombings [in Mölln and

Solingen of asylum-seeker and Turkish homes]. Now they're getting a hold of the

problem more. Foreigners' homes burned. Many people. Blacks too, killed. It

happens everywhere. But here [in Germany] it's worse. A lot happens (G14). [130]

Jale and Abdul are in complete agreement that Germans have preferred to ignore the issue of

Ausländerfeindlichkeit rather than deal with the acuteness of the problem.

Despite repeatedly suggesting to me the ways in which both Abdul and Jale routinely feel

like Turks in Germany rather than Turkish Germans, Jale does describe the one kind of instance

in which she feels treated like a German. Caroline, the ethnic-German acquaintance

simultaneously being interviewed, had just brought up the historic burden of the Holocaust when

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[129] "Um ich glaube das ist die lange Zeit irgendwas mit Medien. Es wurde eine Zeitlang wirklich ein Problem totgeschwiegen. Es kam immer wieder nur dann, oder dann nur wieder aktuell, nur als irgendwas passiert. Aber das Problem war eigentlich ständig da. Und es wurde nicht viel gemacht, erst nachdem nachdem die Ostgrenzen gefallen sind und so viele Aussiedler nach DL kamen wurde das Problem sehr akut. Und da kam jetzt wieder versteckt in die Öffentlichkeit daran aber dann wurde auch so, unter allem kamen schärfe. Das ist dann Aussiedler, Ausländer, alles was von Außen kam. Dann wurde das wieder" (G12).

[130] „Also jetzige Zeit würde ich sagen ja. Aber vor vier, fünf Jahren waren das anders. Weil die ganze [firebombings]. Jetzt haben sie es jetzt schon wieder runter. Ausländerhäuser gebrannt. Viele Leute. Schwarzer auch, totgewesen. Es ist schon aber, passiert auch überall. Aber hier ist es harterer. Aber passier trotzdem viel" (G14).

Jale cuts in to explain that she, much like the acquaintance, feels like she must account for the

Holocaust when she is outside of Germany. She elaborates:

> Even if I'm not 100% German. I live in Germany and I notice whenever I'm in
>
> another country that I'm quite German. That means, abroad I am German. Here
>
> I'm a foreigner. But abroad I'm supposed to be German. And it's exactly the
>
> same for me with German history and responsibility. Despite being a not total
>
> German, I'm supposed to explain this [history]... It's a total paradox. It means
>
> I'm not recognized 100% here. But if I'm abroad and people ask and I answer I
>
> live in Germany, I was raised there, then for them I'm a typical German.
>
> Therefore I'm a German. So I'm treated exactly like a German is treated, but
>
> only abroad. That means I'm just as responsible and have to answer the same
>
> questions [as to historical responsibility] (G12).[131]

Although Jale is far more integrated into German society than Abdul, she still acutely feels her

foreignness on a regular basis. She notes the incredible "paradox" of feeling responsible for

Holocaust guilt abroad, although circumstances within German borders prevent her from ever

feeling German while in her "own" country.

Being an immigrant in both the United States and Germany does affect one's relationship

to one's own nation, yet, here too, these differences also fall along national lines. The American

immigrants I spoke with feel American and are especially appreciative of the ways in which they

are accepted as Americans. My Turkish-German respondents, in contrast, expressed an almost

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[131] "Auch wenn ich nicht 100% nicht deutsch bin. Ich lebe in DL und ich merke es immer wieder im Ausland, dass ich ziemlich deutsch bin. Das heisst, im Ausland bin ich eine Deutsche. Hier bin ich eine Ausländerin. Aber im Ausland bin ich eigentlich eine Deutsche. Und ich bin genauso mit DL und der Geschichte verantwortlich. Ich muss dazu sagen als nicht-ganz-Deutsche trotzdem erklären.... Es ist, eigentlich ist es total paradox. Das heisst, ich werde hier nicht 100% anerkannt aber dennoch wenn es, wenn ich im Ausland bin, und die Frage, die Leute fragen mich und ich sage, ich lebe in DL, ich bin da aufwachsen. Dann bin ich eigentlich für sie eigentlich typisch deutsch.

constant awareness of the ways in which they, despite their passports, did not really "belong" to their nation. In expressing their reservations about being "German," both Jale and Abdul actually sound much like other Germans interviewed. These hesitations are based in very different experiences than those of ethnic Germans. Yet, the results are similar. The Turkish Germans, like the ethnic Germans, are reluctant to identify or embrace their nation. Their experiences leave them feeling detached, rather than patriotic as was the case with immigrants to the United States.

Education and Articulation

It reviewing and analyzing my interviews, I discovered differences in the kind of answers my respondents gave based on education level. I was left with the question of whether more educated respondents were more knowledgeable on the subject of nations than with less than a college degree or whether they simply relied on different forms of communication. The answer to this question, it appears, is a combination of both. The fact that both these education differences were most pronounced in the United States than in Germany is a further influence of national experience on the experiences of individuals and sociodemographic groups within a nation.

Not surprisingly, the individuals I interviewed who had a university education tended to know more about specific nations than those who did not. They also tended to be more critical of their own country and were far more articulate about the kinds of criticisms they had. Particularly in the United States, knowledge of Germany was often minimal among respondents from the working class.

Also ich bin eine Deutsche. Also werde ich genau, genauso behandelt wie eine Deutsche, im Ausland aber. Das heisst, ich bin genauso verantwortlich, das heisst, ich muss auf Fragen beantworten" (G12).

A number of the comments made by less educated American respondents suggest how little exposure they have had to German society. Candace, a technical support worker, imagines Germany as "poor." Although she notes that she is "quite sure it's not all poverty," she cannot help feeling "sorrow and pity" for their situations (A26).[132] Joey, a fitness trainer, tells me: "[America] is a blessed country. You can go about every five blocks and see a McDonalds and a Burger King… [In Germany,] food is not as easy to get as it is here. Hard times, you know, every dollar, every penny is precious over there" (A8). Sally, an administrative assistant, says that she is "not sure if the country is real industrialized" (A6). Tammy, an administrative worker, echoes this assumption:

> They don't have enough industry… it seems to me that a lot of it's rural… They
>
> might not be as modern as we are here and not have the computer and the
>
> telephones. I would guess that probably everybody there out in the mountains and
>
> the chalets doesn't have telephones and all the modern conveniences we have
>
> (A10).

Elizabeth, whom I interview simultaneously with Tammy, agrees that Germany is probably not sufficiently industrialized, asking: "Who's to say our way is better anyway? Just because we have microwaves or cellular phones… I mean who's to say that we're better?"[133] (A9). The image of a poor, non-industrialized, developing nation is the primary way these respondents think about Germany.

Several American working class respondents seem to assume that citizens in countries other than the United States may live very restricted lives. In describing their own nation, they

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[132] Later in the interview, Candace also mentions a television show she had seen in which a character went to Germany to "meet Gorbachev" (A26).

[133] Elizabeth, seconds later, answers this question herself by noting that the reason people might make this claim is "because this country [the USA] is better" (A9).

boast about the freedoms they enjoy; in describing Germany, they often assume far more

government intervention. In continuing on about the negative aspects of being German,

Elizabeth adds: "I don't know how free they are. I don't know how much their government rules

what they do – what they can and cannot do" (A9). Tammy and Elizabeth, interviewed

simultaneously, talk about this issue at several points using the language of one nation being

"better than another." In discussing Germany, they have the following conversation:

> Tammy: Isn't one side better than the other? East is better than West or something.
>
> Elizabeth: No that was before.
>
> Tammy: But isn't it still kind of that way?
>
> Elizabeth: I don't think so.
>
> Tammy: I don't really know.
>
> Elizabeth: I think they're just unified now. (A9-10).

For several of my American working class respondents, it appears that "foreign countries" may

just melt into one another, leaving a somewhat hazy image of poverty and government control.

This ultimately convinces them further that the United States really is the "best" place to be and

serves as yet another reason for national pride.

As became increasingly clear in comparing the responses of working class and

professional Americans, the former group had far less exposure to information on foreign

countries. They had traveled less and, by their own admissions, were far less likely to keep up

on foreign events in the media. As Tammy explains, Americans tend not to hear much about

European countries "unless there's something major like an earthquake... Something really major

has happened, or someone really major has died" (A10). Tammy claims that this is the case for

all Americans and in part she may be right. As chapter five showed, Americans in general had a

relatively vague image of Germany that went beyond the Third Reich and national stereotypes. Nonetheless, it appears that education is a mitigating factor so that those with less education often were far less informed than those with a college education or higher.

In contrast to the American cases, interviews with less educated Germans did not yield the same kind of assumptions when they spoke about the United States or foreign countries in general. Instead, it appeared that those in the working class fell to one extreme or another in describing the United States. That is to say, my working class respondents tended to be (with one exception) far more flattering in their images of the United States than the professionals, often suggesting that they would much rather live there than in Germany. Karin, a waitress, claims that Americans are probably "better than the Germans" because they are "simpler, cooler, and more relaxed" (G8). Abdul, a mail carrier, suggests that Americans are, in one word, "happier" than others and that he considers them "far ahead of others," including the Germans, in many ways (G14). Katarina, who works for a medical supplies distributor, describes how the United States had always been, for her, "the land of great dreams" until she realized that she could not live on "air and love" (G18). Nonetheless, the country still holds much of the same mystique for her, particularly as she compares it to Germany.

The one great exception to this tendency of my less educated interviewees providing more flattering comments about the United States came from Marc, a tattoo artist. He, more so than any other interview, is critical of the United States, seeing it as a failure in terms of its attempts at being a multicultural society and rejecting Americans' claims to greatness. He is almost wholly anti-American in his answers. He informs me that he thinks of the term *Grosskotigkeit,* which very roughly translates as, "they make me want to puke," when he thinks

of Americans. He blames this on the "arrogance" and "self interest" of the Americans and therefore has little patience for them.

For Germans, being a member of the working class often resulted in a more skewed evaluation of the United States than was the case for professional Germans. Ultimately though, they too were strongly influenced by their national membership. Less educated Americans relied on comparisons with Germany to make claims about why their own nation is the "best." In contrast, less educated Germans used comparisons with the United States as a way in which to talk about their problems with their own nation. They also all spoke of the pride Americans feel with a sense of wonder and sometimes fascination, evaluating its "deservedness" (save for Marc, all thought the U.S. to be). They echoed the sentiments of many university-educated Germans by being both critical of Germany and the United States, but, in the end, were less critical than their more educated compatriots.

In both the German and American cases, those with less than a college education came across as less articulate when talking about nationhood than their professional counterparts. Although in part this difference was rooted in a disparity in knowledge on the subject, most of the answers my working class respondents in each nation provided were not substantively different from the comments given by the professionals. In the American case, high-school educated interviewees were as proficient on the subject of the Third Reich as the university-educated respondents. My American respondents, regardless of education, united in their assumptions about national pride and ultimately nationed in similar ways. Similarly, my German interviewees, regardless of education, evaluated nations in critical terms and questioned the deservedness of national pride was deserved or not. It appears that the amount of knowledge

may vary based on educational level within nations, but that the way one nations does not vary concomitantly.

Gender Differences in Nationing

In conducting interviews in the United States, I found myself confronting the question of knowledge inequality not only on the subject of education but also on gender. Differences emerged in the ways in which male and female respondents would answer my questions that again suggested different ways of relating to the subject of nationhood. These varying approaches became most differentiated at points in which my American respondents had troubles answering my questions.

Upon feeling unsure of an answer, the American women with whom I spoke would often apologize for not "knowing" the answers, express concern that they were wasting my time, or ask me whether they were answering the questions correctly. For example, Taylor after answering what she thinks of Germans, adds "that's kind of off the top of my head, right?" to make sure that she is responding in the right kind of way to the questions (A2). Diane provides an answer to a question about Germany but then adds after the fact: "I'm afraid I'm not terribly familiar at all [with the subject] unfortunately, but that's about it." She later adds, again after having provided an answer to a question: "I'm just trying to think. And I actually, when I think about it, I just don't feel [that I know] quite as much or I'm not paying attention as much to world news in terms of the changes and trends, you know, that have happened" (A7). Having already answered the question, Diane tells me she is unqualified to respond.

Similarly, Yael, having just provided an answer to a question, continues on: "Um, what else?… Oh my gosh I'm having trouble thinking. Cause it's not something I really think about

you know on a daily basis. Or on a monthly basis… I don't know. Let me, I'll think about it and ask if I can come back with something else" (A14). Shalini, also responds to a question about famous Germans before adding "Oh shoot, I can't think of anyone else" (A21). Later she answers another question before adding "I really don't know how things are." After having provided answers to a number of questions on Germany, Candace tells me she would tell a child who asked about Germany: "It's a foreign country. I know nothing about it" (A26). These comments, these American women all find ways to answers the questions asked before telling me how uninformed they are on the subject.

There were also times of course when my male interviewees would feel less secure about the answers they were providing. Some, like the women, would apologize for not coming up with what they felt was an adequate answer. Others would take issue with the questions, often resisting or critiquing the questions. Thus, for example, John answers the majority of my intentionally general questions by trying to narrow them down to more specific issues, at one point explicitly suggesting "better" questions I could ask. When I ask Joey whether he thinks most Americans see Germany the way he does, he responds: "I can't answer that. I have not spoken to 'most' Americans about Germany" (A8). After one question, Matthew responds that he does not "like sociologists," indicating his dislike for the questions I pose. Over time it becomes clear that the kinds of responses given are different than those from American women. Interesting though is the fact that the *content* of their answers is still similar, regardless of these different attitudes in responding.

One interview in particular, conducted with an engaged couple, David and Katarina, both attorneys, illustrates these differences particularly well. In general, David provides longer answers to questions and Katarina tends to be more doubtful as to whether she is answering the

questions "correctly." David periodically critiques Katarina's responses. After she explains that one of the positive aspects of being German involves overcoming the problems with the past, David responds: "I was agreeing with what you were saying up until that point" and then explains why Katarina is not completely correct. Katarina then reacts by suggesting that German philosophy could be a source of pride. David then questions this as well by noting:

> Yeah, but you know what the philosophy as a whole. I mean a lot of it is just
>
> such a load of crap. I mean when you look at Nietzsche… he's the one who's sort
>
> of held up as the great German philosopher of more recent times. You know
>
> that's the same philosophy that gave us the Nazi party… So, I don't think
>
> philosophy is necessarily anything to be proud of. I think that philosophy is very
>
> nihilistic and destructive (A3).

Katarina attempts to explain herself by noting that if she were German she might still be proud and that "it's hard to think what you might be proud of if you're German," but David again is critical of the notion that philosophy could be a source of pride.

Several times David takes issue with my questions, asking for clarification not because he cannot answer the question, but instead drawing attention to what he sees as flawed questions. At one point, David becomes explicit in his criticism. After I ask him whether the English or Germans have a better perception of the Americans than the Americans of themselves, he responds: "Well, again, there's a problem with the question." With this comment, he indicates that not only does he find this a bad question, but that the others that preceded it were also faulty. Katarina, in contrast, does not fault the questions but, like virtually all of the American women I interviewed, she considers her own answers inadequate. This became exceptionally apparent a

few days after the interview when I received an email from Katarina apologizing for being so "stupid" in the interview and not having contributed like she should have.

The tendency for David to see difficulties in answering a question as reflective of poor questions and for Katarina to these same troubles as reflective of her own inadequacies is illustrative of the effects of gender on how one nations. Here, the comparisons to class are relevant in that the American working class often had as much to say and contribute on the subject of nations than their professional counterparts, but their inability to articulate themselves made them appear less knowledgeable. Similarly, American women's tendency to apologize for all that they did not know brought attention to their lack rather than their wealth of knowledge. However, unlike in the case of class, my American female respondents had as much to say about nationhood as their male counterparts. It was only that their styles of communicating this were different.

These tendencies for women to apologize and men to assert themselves can be seen as part of a gendered division of knowledge (Gilligan 1982; Tannen 1991). The expectations of who should know what are reflected in the process of nationing. Knowing about nations, politics, history, and international relations is still in large part a male kind of knowledge. As the chapters on textbooks and newspapers demonstrate, what gets recounted in public discourse about nations is overwhelmingly information about the male domain. Political events, economic changes, international relations have all been traditionally a part of the male world. According to the cult of domesticity that envisioned women as properly confined to the home, women have neither taken a large part in this role nor have they been expected to show an interest in nationhood (Matthaei 1982).

Whether intended or not, a metamessage emerges from this approach to the world and the nation that suggests that the nation and politics are forms of knowledge which men *should* possess, since it is men who are engaged in these tasks. While women are not discouraged from learning such information, they are also not expected to know details – just as men are not *expected* to know the intricacies of cooking, sewing, cleaning, or raising children. Indeed the parallel to men's knowledge of household tasks is quite strong. In an "egalitarian" world like we have today, men are still not *expected* to know the details of the home, but women are very happy when they do. Similarly, women may not be *expected* to know the details of the political world, but men are impressed when they do. In the end, American women's social roles do not seem threatened by this a lack of knowledge on the subject of nations.

For my interviews, this meant many of the American women felt sure that there were more knowledgeable people out there who could better answer my questions. Their apologies doe not express a feeling of guilt that they *should* know the specific of nations, but rather a concern for my time. American men, in contrast, do feel more of an expectation that they *should* know this kind of information. Their response is to find ways of still asserting knowledge and expertise. Thus, they are more likely to take issue with the form of questioning or critique others answering (Tannen 1991).

My experiences with Germans did not lead to such marked gender differences as I experienced with the Americans. In part, this may be a result of my placing a greater emphasis on the fact that I was looking for opinions not facts when introducing this second set of interviews. Although I emphasized this more as way of putting Germans at ease, the unintended effect may possibly have been to minimize gender differences. A further factor likely comes from the fact that my German respondents are more informed in general about the United States

and England than Americans in general are about Germany and England. Further, as both male and female Germans frequently told me, they are more reflective than Americans when it comes to thinking and talking about their own nation and others.

Although nations have traditionally been the domain of men in Germany as in the United States, women appear to take a more active interest in the nation there than in the United States (need cites). This is reflected in the more prominent role of German women in politics than is true United States. And, as my textbook research indicated, women's lives are more incorporated into the world history of German textbooks – particularly in the accountings of the last century – than in any other texts in the sample. This incorporation of women into world history and political life, combined with Germans' interest in speaking in-depth about issues, may help to minimize or mitigate gender differences for Germans when nationing.

Social Location: Other Factors

In many other ways, social location came to affect the way in which respondents talked about nations. Most notably, the occupation of my interviewees affected the kinds of answers a number of respondents in both Germany and the United States. Philip, a Charlottesville police officer and avid gun advocate, answers my question about German products:

> I think of Heckler and Coke which is a machine gun manufacturer. Which has
>
> nothing to do with World War II. That's my police training… We use those
>
> weapons, I have one on my hip. And they're greatly admired. But that's not in a
>
> bad, that's not the SS. So I don't want to confuse it. That's modern day
>
> Germans, thumbs up, good job. Ah, that's right up there with the great
>
> coffeemaker [from Krups]. So that's not, I mean that not to have negative

connotations. It has nothing to do with any of the other things that might [trails

off]. That's a thumbs up in a modern world (A29).

Philip immediately thinks in terms of his profession and hobby in responding to my question

about German products, explaining that he does not associate the German weapons with the Nazi

era, but rather with a quality product.

Similarly Laura, a dental hygenist, and Jim, a dental machinery repairman, both from

Charlottesville connect German products first and foremost to quality dental products produced

in Germany. Mirabella, a Charlottesville art exhibit designer and artist, places art foremost in

her responses. When I ask what she thinks of when she thinks of Germany, she answers "Berlin

is a really exciting place at the moment for art" (A24). Joey, a D.C. fitness trainer who also

raises Rottweilers, immediately thinks of the dogs when I ask him about Germany:

Cause I'm definitely involved in my Rottweilers, that's the first thing for me.

Where they were bred and perfected, in Germany. My baby [his dog] has some of

the best German bred line they ever offered. I'm very proud . . . So basically

when you say Germany, that's the first thing that comes to mind, because that's a

passion of mine, Rottweilers (A8).

The hobbies and professions of these American respondents come to inform the kinds of answers

they provide in answering questions about Germany.

In a similar manner, my German respondents rely on their own occupational experiences

in thinking about the United States. When asked what he thinks of in terms of the United States,

Matthias, a political consultant for the CDU in Berlin, responds: "I think of the most professional

[presidential] campaign in the world because that connects to my own work" (G16). Just as

when I ask Mirabella, the artist, what famous American, German, or English people first come to

mind, and she answers in terms of artists, Oliver provides almost exclusively the names of politicians. Similarly, Irene, a trained philosopher and art historian living in Berlin, first thinks of the United States in terms of philosophy and art and Julian, a Berlin filmmaker speaks of *Gone with the Wind* and *Citizen Kane*. Both Americans and Germans rely on their own professional experiences in finding an image of both Germany and the United States.

Sexual identity also affects the responses of two of my respondents in a rather interesting way. Larry, a 38-year old gay waiter in D.C. illustrates his experience of freedom in the United States in terms of his sexual and gender identity. When I ask what a positive aspect of being American is, he responds that just recently he had gone out in a dress for the evening and felt completely tolerated. Although one might argue that this is a function of urban life that would make such conditions equally "safe" in London or Berlin (and not in a smaller town in any of the three nations), Larry interprets this tolerance as an American form of tolerance; an "only-in-America" experience. Conversely, Jörg, a 27-year old gay journalist and student living in Berlin, answers that his "sexual orientation" would be his biggest struggle if he were American. He notes that unless he ended up in a large city like New York or San Francisco, "the tolerance in general would not be particularly good (G5). Both Larry and Jörg rely on their identities as gay men to think about and answer my questions about nations, both seeing the potentials for intolerance being stronger in foreign nations.

These are just a few of the many ways in which the social location of my respondents come to structure the kinds of answers they give to my questions. Unlike the other factors considered here, the kinds of responses given do not seem to fall along national lines. Rather, these observations reflect more individualized influences on the ways in which my respondents nation.

The Importance of Social Location

Nationing is about social position in the world. The experiences of an individual come to inform and influence the ways in which they relate to the world. The previous four chapters have concentrated on the influence of national membership on this social process. This chapter serves as a recognition of the fact that many other influences also come to structure this worldview and the ways in which an individual nations. Each of these other social influences only help to distinguish between national approaches to nationing. East German interviewees born before 1970 demonstrate an even more skeptical relationship to nationhood than my other German respondents, due to the fact that have been the citizens of two nations neither of which have adequately represented their interests. Several of the African Americans I spoke with suggest that racial relations in the United States make it difficult to separate their feelings toward their own country from their troubles with racism. Nonetheless, like European Americans, they are ultimately patriots who easily find reasons for national pride. The American immigrant respondents took particular pride in the ways in which Americans allow for integration, even while allowing for different cultures to coexist; as far as these three women were concerned, they had as much claim to American pride as other Americans. In contrast, the Turkish immigrants to Germany remained "Turks in Germany" despite holding German passports. This allowed them an additional level of skepticism when speaking about nations in general and particularly about Germany. American working class respondents may have been less informed about Germany, but this made them no less likely to speak in terms of the Third Reich and national stereotypes than their professional counterparts. German working class interviewees may have been, for the most part, more flattering about the United States, but they still were rather critical and considered pride in terms of its "deservedness." American women may have apologized more,

but they ultimately had similar kinds of observations and contributions to make about nations as their male counterparts.

What becomes clear in each of these examples is that these individuals may think in terms of class, ethnicity, region, race, or gender, but they also ultimately also think as Americans and Germans. The kinds of language and degree of articulateness may change, but the influence of national membership more often than not remains. These many different social influences may complicate the national effects of nationing, but they do not negate them.

Chapter Seven

The Postmodern Nation?: Locating Objectivity

Over the last decade or so, there has been greater talk about the rise of postmodernity and its meaning for the individual. Postmodernists themselves argue that such ideals as Truth, Progress and Reason no longer have relevance to everyday lives (Baudrillard 1994; Derrida 1976; Lyotard 1984; Rorty 1995; Rorty 1997). Meaning, Reality, and Objectivity too may also be lost to the world. As Kumar argues, postmodern theory assumes the values of modernity to be "empty sounding words, no longer capable of inspiring commitment or action" (Kumar 1995: 134). Quite literally, nothing is sacred anymore, no center holds. There is not truth to be found. Instead, postmodernists argue, the world and its citizens are overwhelmed by relativism, social constructionism, and the inability to believe in any grand narratives (Gergen 1991). The "abandonment of grand narratives," paves the way for the "free play of 'little narratives,'… forms of 'customary' or 'local' knowledge, with the contextuality, provisionality and boundedness that this suggests" (Kumar 1995: 135). As cultural relativism abounds and "little narratives" take over, individuals find it more difficult to make sense of the world and their role in it.

The degree to which postmodernity has actually taken over the lives of individuals, and disrupted their meaning systems is still the basis for much debate. This chapter serves as an attempt to enter this debate. I consider what my interviews with Americans and Germans reveal about the individual's ability to "locate" the nation's true nature. My interest here is in seeing whether respondents resist the idea of there being one "true" or "objective" vision of a nation in favor of a more culturally relativistic, "multivocal," image. In the course of each interview, I pushed my interview partners to consider where the most "accurate" perception of a nation

originates, asking them whether Germans', Americans', or the English' image of each nation is more representative of reality. Encouraging my respondents to address the issue of accuracy resulted in an indirect confrontation with the issues of cultural relativism and social constructionism. That is, implicitly and explicitly, my interview partners provide answers that suggest there may be more than one source or one understanding of a nation. Indeed, they often contradict themselves in answering the question of who "knows" a nation best.

For many postmodernists and cultural observers, this kind of response might be equated with an awareness that we can no longer know Truth or Reality. Yet, my interview partners may not have one uniform answer to the question of whose perception of a nation is more accurate, but this does not uniformly lead them to deny that accurate perceptions can be known. Nor do these contradictions lead my respondents to suggest that the nation is thereby rendered meaningless. Instead, I maintain that individuals recognize and accept such tensions in nationing, yet continue on with their lives without being overwhelmed by a postmodern malaise of endless cultural relativism or social constructionism. The nation exists and the nation remains meaningful.

Locating the Source

Both my American and German partners find it worthwhile to evaluate the nation as a *Ding an sich,* a thing in and of itself. That is, they see it as an important topic, even if they personally know little about nationhood, and they believe it worthy of analysis. My interview partners repeatedly expressed their belief in the legitimacy of the nation as a subject of study. Interviewees took the interviews very seriously and clearly wanted to provide me with any information they could. It likely made them more willing to give me their time and think about

potentially "worthwhile" answers to my questions in a way they might not have done on a subject deemed less "legitimate" (e.g., stamp collecting or Hollywood trivia).[134]

The interviews with Americans and Germans are fascinating for what they reveal about perceptions of Germany, England, and the United States. But several of the questions posed also suggest the problematic nature of trying to "locate the source" of the nation and its identity. In their responses, most individuals revealed a remarkable lack of consistency in determining exactly who accurately knows a nation's identity. This becomes most notable during a series of questions I pose at the end of each section on the three nations. As detailed in previous chapters, I begin each portion of the interview by asking general questions about national characteristics, cultural symbols associated with the nation, and the positive and negative aspects of the nation (see Appendix D). Then I ask whether respondents' believe their own understandings of that nation to be representative of most of their compatriots. Next, I ask if that national image is likely to differ with the image that citizens from another nation might have. Finally, I question whose understanding is most likely to be the accurate depiction.[135]

These questions follow portions of the interview in which respondents answer rather authoritatively that Germans are one thing but not another (e.g., efficient, not lazy). Up until this point, there is a tacit assumption that a nation is a knowable entity that can be meaningfully discussed by my interview partners. The questions about representativeness and accuracy, in contrast, often lead respondents to consider whether there is more than one image for each

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[134] Although some might not believe that stamp collecting falls into this category, I found it difficult to name any hobby that has an overwhelmingly male following where this would not be a problem. In contrast, many female hobbies would more easily be dismissed as less "legitimate."

      [135] Thus, for example, in the case of asking Americans about the German nation, I pose the following questions:
          Do you believe your views of the Germans are representative of most Americans?
          Do Germans have a different perception of themselves than Americans do?
          If yes, how so?
          Which, if either, is a more accurate depiction of who the Germans really are?

nation. If they agree there are multiple visions (which most do), they are then left to answer

whether they believe there to be a "correct" vision of the nation and, if so, where it originates.

Often these questions are interpreted as a decision of who knows a nation best: insiders (i.e.

citizens) or outsiders (members of other nations). Less commonly, interview partners interpret

the question more broadly in terms of whether an accurate vision of a nation can be known at all.

Given that social location affects one's relationship to the nation in a variety of ways,

these questions about accuracy are also affected most notably by national membership. As

excerpts from interviews below demonstrate, Americans are more likely to answer questions

about accuracy "as is." That is, they are less likely to question whether "accuracy" is a

meaningful way of answering the questions, and instead gamely come up with one answer for

each question, even if this means contradicting themselves along the way. Germans, in contrast,

are more likely to resist answering the question, claiming that they do not know, cannot say, or

suspect that the answer lies somewhere in the middle, although they are not sure where. Like

their American counterparts, however, the German respondents often contradict themselves from

question to question.

Americans' Finding an Answer

More so than the Germans, Americans make a great deal of effort to answer the questions

regarding accurate visions of the nation. In virtually every case, Americans tried to come up

with a response as to which nation has a more accurate view. In doing so, however, they often

contradicted themselves. Four respondents were consistent in claiming that only a person living

within a nation can accurately judge a given nation. More notable, however, were the majority

of interview partners who did not show uniform agreement in their responses. Indeed, if there is

any consistency to be found in this part of the interviews, it is the lack of consistency in responses: eleven of the fifteen respondents who fully answered these questions contradicted their own answers.[136]

I ask Dan, a 44-year old physical therapist, about whether Americans' or Germans' have a more accurate picture of Germany. He responds:

> Ah, well I would imagine it's hard to say. Because unless you actually live in the
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> country and deal with the issues of the nation everyday, I think all we can do is
>
> really assume things. So I would imagine [the Germans] have a better take of
>
> what's going on within their own nation (A28).

My interview partners repeat this notion that only people within a nation can really know their nation time and time again. Dan seems to feel this strongly and echoes this sentiment relative to cross-nation perceptions of the English. Dan explains again: "Unless you live [in England] and you walk in their shoes, you really don't know what it's like." At this point, it almost seems pointless to ask about an accurate vision of the United States, as Dan will say that only Americans can "really" know themselves. But I pose the question nonetheless and receive a very different answer. When I ask: "Do the English or Germans have a different perception of Americans?" Dan responds:

> Um, I think they do. I think [about] when I was in Holland in particular. I think
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> that a lot of the Dutch people viewed Americans as being really wasteful. And
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> that we didn't have very, that we didn't really take good care of our environment.
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> And I'd have to agree with that (A28).

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[136]It was not until after my third interview that I realized the importance of this issue and came to ask these questions pointedly. Three people answered the question in such indirect manners that I could not categorize their responses. Two tapes were garbled for a portion of the interview and thus meant that I could not compare responses between all

Thus, when I ask then whether Americans or foreigners have a more accurate perception of the United States, Dan concludes: "Probably a mix. Yeah." Although Dan doubts whether outsiders can know what it means to be either German or English, he accepts the notion that outsiders may have as much, if not more, to say about the United States than the Americans do.

Tommy, a 26-year old college student, is also inconsistent in his response to the same questions. I ask whether the Germans have a different perception of themselves than Americans have of them. He answers:

> Definitely. Probably more or less how we see ourselves as Americans. Like
> we're the best country in the world out there. They probably, I hate to say it, but
> they're probably washing over their past history of Nazism (A27).

I ask which is a more accurate viewpoint, the Germans' or the Americans' and he concludes:

> Hmm. It would probably be someplace in the middle. But theirs is probably
> more or less, I mean, of course theirs is a more positive view. [It's] probably a
> much less stereotypical, typical view. So I'd find if I had to choose between the
> two, it'd be theirs. But it would be in the middle if I could (A27).

Tommy argues for a dialogical image of Germany, but his attitude changes in regards to England. He explains: "the English think they're much better than Americans. Number one. And I think they think they're better than just about everybody," Tommy then concludes that American's perceptions of the English are more on target. I then ask about English and Germans' images of the United States and Tommy explains: "I think they think we're a bunch of mongrel, ah, egotistical, megalomaniac, greedy, selfish, unsophisticated dogs." Whose

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three questions. In the end, I was left with only fifteen of twenty-six interview partners to analyze for these questions.

perception is more accurate? Tommy responds: "Ours [Americans]." Thus, Tommy believes that the most accurate sense of Germany comes only from combining Americans' and Germans' perceptions. In regards to England, the external view of the Americans is more accurate because it is more critical. But in terms of the United States, Tommy claims that only insiders"truly" know a nation's essence.

Mirabella, a 37 year-old white artist and exhibit designer who was raised by two English parents, recognizes this paradox as she answers my questions. She believes that the Germans' visions of themselves "would be more based in reality," and echoes the same sentiment about the English' perceptions of themselves. And yet, when I ask about the United States, she notes how much the world knows about American culture. In regards to the question of whose vision of the Americans is more accurate, she responds:

> Um, that's a tough one. It's not as… [trails off]. I'm tempted to say, yeah I think
> their perception might be more accurate than ours. But just sort of
> philosophically that seems completely wrong. But I do think that they're, I think
> that they're more educated about us than we are of them. So in comparison…
> (A24).

Mirabella concludes that the outsider perspective of Americans may be more accurate, despite having argued for the insider vision in the German and English cases. In noting that this seems "philosophically wrong," Mirabella recognizes the tensions but still argues for the idea of one accurate definition.

This tension is revealed again and again in numerous American interviews. Lola, a 36-year old white hairstylist from D.C., once married to an English man, concludes that Germans know themselves best because "they experience everything." As for Americans, she also

decides: "Our perceptions are more accurate. We know our country, our people." With the

English, Lola remains consistent, noting that they "definitely know more of their life…[and] are

probably more accurate just because they're there themselves." Nonetheless, she continues,

arguing that the English "will probably deny anything that I might say about [their having]

airs…. They probably won't agree with what I thought" (A5). She finally decides, in regards to

the English, the most "accurate" depiction involves a combination of both Americans' and

English' perceptions.

Depending on the country, many of my American respondents change perspective as to

whether an internal, external, or some combination of both is most accurate. Yet,

overwhelmingly, they do believe that these questions are "answerable." The often-contradictory

answers Americans provide suggest that my respondents are not always sure whether the view

from inside or outside is most accurate; yet, they show no resistance to answering questions of

accuracy. And they do so relatively unproblematically, assuming that there is, in the final

analysis, one "true" and "objective" answer to these often perplexing questions. Indeed, only

one American made a strong argument for why these questions cannot be answered, relying

heavily on social constructionist arguments.   I examine his claims and contradiction in greater

detail later in the chapter.

Germans Resisting an Answer

It is not that Germans do not provide equally contradictory answers because, as the

excerpts below will demonstrate, many interviewees do refute their own answers. Yet, there is a

remarkable difference in the kinds of answers my Germans respondents give to the accuracy

questions. Indeed, two patterns arise in the kinds of answers Germans give. With the first, the

Germans are decidedly more relativist, resisting the very idea of *one* accurate image. With the second, German respondents argue for one accurate vision, but claim that it is consistently the German perspective that is correct. They claim that critical edge and heightened self-awareness make them better able to accurately judge the central characteristics of their nation as well as other nations.

Seven of my nineteen German interviewees resist answering the questions about accuracy saying that they cannot say or do not know. They also tell me that the question is always contextually dependent. Unlike the Americans who sometimes argue for a "middle ground" vision, these Germans suggest that any one vision, dialogical or not, may not be possible. Carolina, a 32-year old interior decorator in Heidelberg, has problems with sweeping statements about nations because this means talking about "millions of people and one thinks like this and the other like that" (G13). Therefore, she contends that one cannot speak meaningfully about an accurate image of any nation since everyone is an individual with her or his own perspective. Tilo, a 35-year old East Berliner, suggests that "everyone has their own picture. It's too hard to say…too differentiated" and thus render the questions virtually meaningless (G10). When I ask Uta, a 34-year old Heidelberg lawyer, whether the Americans or the Germans have a more accurate image of the Americans, she answers: "I don't think that one can say 'the Americans know themselves better' or 'the Germans know the Americans better. I think it's very subjective" (G15). Like many of their compatriots, Carolina, Tilo, and Uta are hesitant to answer questions about accuracy because they question whether any one answer could be reflective of this complicated reality.

An additional eight respondents resist answering certain questions in a manner similar to Carolina, Tilo, and Uta, but then contradict themselves on other questions by claiming that one

perspective can, in fact, be more accurate. Like the Americans, this group is filled with

contradictions. Unlike them, however, is this tendency to deny at points the possibility for

determining an accurate perception. Ilka, a 26-year old flight attendant from East Berlin, with

reference to visions of America, responds that an accurate perception cannot be known. Yet,

when I pose the question relative to the English, she claims the English perspective to be most

accurate. In regards to who is more correct in perceiving the Germans, Ilka is again rendered

answerless.

Like Ilka, Ulrike, a 44-year old East Berlin dentist cannot respond in regards to

perceptions of the United States. But when I ask about a vision of England, she responds that

"that is always the question, whether living in a country for a longer time is needed in order to be

able to get a relatively realistic picture at all. So much is stereotype, so much from television, or

just from propaganda in the greatest sense" (G4).[137] When it comes to Germany, Ulrike claims

more strongly that those within the country (i.e., Germans) "absolutely" know themselves best.

Thus, Ulrike joins the ranks of both German and American interview partners who change

answers they give dependent upon the nation discussed.

In a similar manner, Julian, a 34-year old West German filmmaker who lived in the U.S.

for five years, first answers in terms of an accurate vision of U.S. by claiming (in English) that

"it depends." He quickly adds that he "is positive that the German interpretation is definitely not

more accurate than the American self-image" (G9).[138] When I ask about England, Julian claims

that for all nations, one can assume that the insider perspective is most exact. The English

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[137] "Aber das ist immer eine Frage, dass man länger in einem Land ist, an sich überhaupt von einem einigermaßen realistisch Bild machen zu können. Es ist irgendwie sehr viel von Vorurteile, von vielen mit Fernsehen, und an sich sagen es mal Propaganda im breitesten Sinne geprägt. So oder so" (G4).
[138] "Also ich glaube mit Sicherheit, dass die deutsche Einschätzung über die Amerikaner nicht genauer ist, als was die Amerikaner von sich selber haben. Mit Sicherheit nicht" (G9).

therefore know "a bit more about themselves than the Germans know about them" (G9).[139]

Despite this conclusion, when we discuss Germany, Julian responds differently, noting that "a wonderful answer for the question is… that it is the foreigners in a particular nation who have the most accurate image on that nation" (G9).[140] Thus, Julian switches from what is at first a reluctance to provide an exact answer, a notion that insiders always know best, and then finally to a combination answer in which outsiders hold the most accurate vision.

An additional four Germans find answers to the accuracy questions without pointing to the troubles inherent to the questions. Markus, a 27-year old East Berlin heating and electric worker, believes that there is an accurate view of the nation, but he is less clear as to where it originates. In regards to the United States, he responds that the view "from outside is better. It's particularly better if the person has been [to the U.S.] frequently" (G6). When questioned on the English, Markus answers that the difference the English and German perspectives "is not that large" and are thus both accurate. Markus argues that the German view is most correct. He notes that the Americans have the most inaccurate image, while in England "it's not as crass. The differences are not as great. They know more about Germany"[141] (G6). Marcus thus answers in each case differently, once for an external view, once for an internal, and once for a combination of both. But, in all cases, he is sure that a true and accurate vsion exists and that the German perspective is never wrong.

Matthias, a 31-year old political consultant, in response to visions of the United States, remarks "I think that a person on the outside can always see things a bit more accurately than one

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[139] "Ich glaube alle Frage auf alle Nationen musste ich wohl beantworten, dass von die Engländer vielleicht ein biβchen über sich selber als die Deutsche über die Engländer. Kannst du gleich bei den Deutschen auch eintragen.
[140] "Aber eine wunderbare Antwort für die Frage ist, die genaueste, wie war die Frage – die genaueste Vorstellung – die genaueste Vorstellung von einem jeweiligen Land haben Ausländer, die in diesem Land leben" (G9).
[141] "Um, ich bin auch ?vor? belastet durch Amerika ist schon klar. Aber im England, so im England ist es nicht so krass. Da sind nicht so grosse Unterschiede. Sie wissen schon mehr über Deutschland" (G6).

can see oneself. I mean, what's accurate? It's just [pause], it's just a different vision… But of

course, if we're talking about me, I think others could judge me better than I could do myself"

(G16).[142] Yet, when I later ask about whose vision of Germany is more accurate, Matthias notes

> Even if there is some dispute, the Germans do evaluate themselves a great deal….
>
> They have to… So I think the German evaluation of themselves is more exact,
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> because they are always forced to evaluate themselves, to consider themselves
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> (G16).[143]

Matthias' claim that the outsider knows best is trumped by the idea that Germans, because of

their tendencies toward self-evaluation, have a better sense of who they are than others do.

Interestingly, Antonio, the 24-year old student from Jena, makes the same set of claims,

noting at first that "the definition is always easier to get from the outside because one can

compare reflexively with oneself" (G21). Thus, he argues both in the cases of the United States

and England that the Germans have a more accurate vision of those nations. Yet, when it comes

to Germany, he claims that both the Americans and the English "unfortunately" have a "skeptical

image" of Germany and do not recognize the "deep psychological dimensions" that propel the

Germans forward. Thus, he concludes that the Americans and English will only understand the

Germans "superficially" but never in a deeper sense. Antonio, like Matthias, believes that the

German vision is consistently more accurate than the others' visions, even though this

contradicts his initial claim that the view from "outside" is "always" the most correct.

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[142] „Ich glaube, dass man von aussen immer ein bisschen genauer hinguckt, als man selber anzugucken bereit ist. Also insofern um, was heisst genauer? Es ist, es ist [pause], es ist einfach ein anderer Blick, das kann man nicht so genau sagen. Aber natürlich, ich glaube auch das auf mich selbst, ich glaube, dass andere Leute mich bessere einschätzen als ich das selber tun würde" (G16).

[143] "Also, ich glaube fast, dass auch wenn du nicht zu einer Lösung kommen, die Deutsche deutlich sehr viel über sich nachdenken. Das glaube ich wirklich. Sie müssen.... Dann glaube ich, die Einschätzung der Deutschen ah noch genauer ist, weil sie einfach immer dazu gezwungen werden, die sich mit sich selbst zu beschäftigen" (G16).

Similarly, Martin, a 28-year old lawyer who grew up in West Berlin, claims that Germans have a more accurate view of Americans than the latter have of themselves. In terms of England, Martin surmises that the English may not be sufficiently self-critical to judge themselves accurately. When it comes to Germany, he rejects the idea that the English or the Americans could have a better assessment of the Germans. He concludes that the English have too "skewed" a media image to allow for an accurate picture of Germany while the Americans, he believes, receive virtually no information on the subject of Germany is reported in the media. Martin thus concludes that the German image is therefore the most accurate of the options. In doing so, Martin decides in favor of the German evaluation in each case as the most accurate vision of a nation.

In examining the responses of those Germans who are not resistant to answering these accuracy questions, it appears that those interviewees never believe the German vision to be wrong. No American respondent argues the American vision consistently to be the most accurate of the three. Quite to the contrary, Americans seemed to assume more that the English and Germans were much better authorities on evaluating their own nations and often also the United States.

Nationing and Questions of Accuracy

Overall, Americans and Germans shared commonalities in their reactions to my questions about accuracy and the nation. Despite the Americans' contradicting themselves and the Germans' continuum of relativism and self-assured, critical "objectivity," neither group refused to answer my questions entirely or proclaimed that the nation as an entity is unknowable or meaningless. In fact, in both nations those who revealed inconsistencies were just as sure of

their ability to talk about and judge nations as those who did not. That is to say, inconsistencies did not prevent individuals from being able to speak meaningfully about, for example, what it means to be German, the advantages and disadvantages of being German, or the pressing problems confronting the German nation. Those few who expressed reservations about "knowing" the nation when asked about accuracy would, upon hearing the next question, immediately return to evaluating and commentating on the characteristics of the three specific nations. Despite the difficulties my respondents had pinning down one source for an accurate assessment of a nation, the nation became no less "real". No one argued that the nation is a meaningless or fluid category impossible to evaluate. In fact, all of my interview partners spoke equally authoritatively about the three nations as meaningful entities.

Nonetheless, Americans and Germans do respond differently to questions about the accuracy of cross-national perceptions. And these differences are a further indication of varying relationships to the nation based upon social location. As I have argued, Americans tend to conceptualize and understand the nation in a less problematic way than Germans do. They believe in the positive potential of the nation and this is reflected in their relatively uncomplicated responses to the idea of national pride. It is not that Americans are uncritical when it comes to nations, they can point out positives and negatives for each of the three nations. The nation is not just a source of pride--it is an "objectively" knowable entity. But they still tend to believe that the nation itself is an entity to be accepted more or less "as is," accepted without any necessity for existential analysis. For this reason, questions about accuracy tend to be seen as answerable, even if not consistently so.

Germans, in contrast, have a more difficult relationship to their own nation and the concept of the nation. My German respondents are reluctant to define themselves in terms of

their citizenship or in terms of national pride, choosing instead to focus on personal achievements. They show a hesitancy in discussing nations and question the desirability of both patriotism and national pride. Many of my German interview partners recognize differences in how they feel about their own nation and how citizens of other nations feel about their homelands. This awareness of differing relationships to the nation results in many of my German respondents' unwillingness to commit to an accurate vision of a nation or at least to an unreflective and uncritical vision of the nation. They are aware that their skepticism about nationhood is not felt uniformly across the world, but this knowledge seems to make them less clear as to whose perspective is most accurate. In terms of, German interviewees are more likely to advocate for a dialogue or combination of two nations' views or claim that they cannot provide an answer to that specific question. Many of them go so far as to argue that accuracy is a question of perspective and that therefore these questions cannot be answered absolutely.

In demonstrating these differences, my American and Germans interviewees echo the approaches of the world history textbooks from their respective nations. As I described in Chapter Two, American textbooks, like their Kenyan and Indian counterparts, present the history of the world as coming from one authoritative source and being both factual and knowable. My American respondents, for the most part, seemed also to subscribe to the idea that a nation's true nature is knowable, even if the source of that knowledge is less clear. In contrast, Germans textbooks, like the English ones as well, emphasized the debated nature of history including a variety of perspectives on historical events, suggesting the interpretive aspects of such. In doing so, the German books emphasized the contextual and changing nature of history. My German respondents, much like those texts, also emphasized context and interpretation, often resisting the idea that questions like the accuracy ones are even capable of being answered.

Yet even the hesitancy of the German respondents when it comes to the nation, their distrust of national pride, and their more relativistic way of seeing the nation, do not lead my German respondents to reject the nation as a meaningful category. The Germans' unwillingness to identify with Germany and their distrust of the nation as an orienting concept for their personal lives does not, in other words, lead them to conclude that the nation is no longer a valid category for organizing the world.

The tensions found in my respondents' answers to the accuracy questions are similar to the tensions Handler and Gable (1997) found in their study of Colonial Williamsburg. Handler and Gable discover that visitors to the historical area are willing to see certain aspects of history (e.g., accounts of slave life) as socially constructed--and therefore not "true." Other aspects (i.e. "traditional" white history), on the other hand, actually come to be seen as "more real" in contrast to these "constructed" or political pieces of history. Their awareness that certain types of history, particularly the history of minorities and women, are up for negotiation only helps to reinforce their beliefs that certain kinds of history, particularly that of European American men, are not.

Like visitors to Colonial Williamsburg, my interview partners periodically question certain aspects of nationhood, suggesting that they can be interpreted differently, and are therefore less "true". Those who hesitate to provide answers to the accuracy questions engage in such an effort, implying that certain aspects of nations, like determining which perspective represents the nation's "true" identity, are not entirely knowable. Yet this claim does not lead my respondents' to reject the entire category of nationhood just as Colonial Williamsburg visitors do not reject the overall narrative of American history. Rather, they pick and choose those aspects deemed "softer" and less fact based and separate out those that are "hard" and

knowable. They simultaneously gloss over any inconsistent and gray areas that do not easily fit in either category. In the process, the nation itself is not rejected as a meaningful or knowable category, just as history remains valid for Colonial Williamsburg visitors. In fact, the nation comes to be seen as that much more legitimate and "real" in comparison to the small details that remain contested and debatable.

A Crisis of Post-Modernity or the Assertion of Social Order?

While postmodern relativism may appear at the fringes of many interviewees' responses, most do not invoke this kind of discourse in an intentional or obvious way. Of my twenty-six interviews conducted with Americans, only one respondent during the course of the interview became self-consciously relativistic, rejecting the notion that one can "know" what a nation is. In doing so, his comments resembled of those made by Tilo, Caroline, Uta, and other Germans who took a relativist or constructionist stance in rejecting the possibility that the nation is knowable. In fact, David becomes even more explicit than they were in recognizing that the "nation" is a social construct, although he ultimately comes to contradict his own claims.

David, a 34-year old Catholic, white attorney/C.P.A. from D.C., like many interviewees, is at first cautious when I ask him what comes to mind when he thinks of Germans. He answers: "I guess I think of individuals who I know. And I don't really associate what I know about individuals with these stereotypes that I bring when I think about national identity" (A3). He later responds, when I ask about the positive aspects of being German, that "a lot of it depends on how you define Germany within its current borders or within the greater sort of Germany…. Are you talking about people that lived in the country or people that are sort of the Aryan lineage?" (A3). Through these responses, David resists, at least in part, the notion that one can

rely on blanket statements to discuss a nation or its citizens. Later, he demonstrates an awareness of the social construction of nationhood itself:

> You know, one of the troubles with talking about certain race or ethnicity or national identity is that it's all really an artificial concept. A lot of it is an artificial concept. You know, when you talk about it, you're trying to convey information but you're also trying to teach lessons and you don't want to teach people lessons about how racism is wrong by giving them bad stereotypes of a whole group of people…. To teach kids [for example] that 'racism is bad. Just look at Germany. The Germans were racists.' There's a sort of hypocrisy that can get into that sort of line of thinking (A3).

David suggests that describing Germans as racists is nothing more than a prejudiced stereotype and thus a form of racism in and of itself. David is therefore hesitant to define the Germans as "anything" at all. To do so would be relying on an "artificial concept."

> This relativistic way of understanding nations and their people makes it difficult for David to initially evaluate the accuracy of one perception of Germany over another. He explains that

> It's completely subjective… Your perspective is going to be different the further you are away from something, the less you have an interest in it, the easier it is for you to evaluate it objectively. But you might not have the right information. Your analysis might be more objective but the facts that you have may be less reliable…. I would say that if I were German, I would have a great deal of difficulty dealing with the country's recent history. And as an American who doesn't keep up on it, I don't feel I know enough to really comment on it (G3).

Despite his argument that visions of Germany are all subjective, in the course of his answer, David comes to argue that a nation could be evaluated "objectively." This becomes even more apparent when I ask whose perception of the English is more accurate. David answers: "I'm better informed than I was about Germany. I'm gonna be more objective as an American than I would as an English person" (G3). In regards to the United States, he believes that the English "in some respects" also have a less biased image of Americans than Americans of themselves, because the English can see things that Americans cannot. David's responses are thus filled with contradictions and tensions on the subject of accuracy.

Throughout the interview, David, like a number of German respondents, exhibits an awareness that the world is, in some respect, socially constructed. And yet, rather than being a Postmodern Poster Boy, he instead symbolizes the tensions involved in combining social constructionism and a belief in ultimate "truth." That David wants to take issue with certain aspects of the nation, claiming that they are "completely subjective," is contrasted with the fact that he can be "more objective" about England than the English can. Ultimately, David does not reject the idea that a nation or its people can be known or that one vision of a nation can be more accurate than another, despite his ascribing to the belief that nations are an "artificial concept."

David is the most articulate of my respondents when it comes to the issue of social constructionism. Yet, as I have argued, the majority of my interview partners contradict themselves in answering the question of who has the more accurate picture of a nation. Others, mostly Germans, echo David on a smaller scale, claiming that the accurate definition of a nation results from a dialogue, is contextual, culturally relative, or cannot be determined because there is no such thing as an "American" or "German" perspective – just many individuals finding their

own meaning in the world. Still more, mostly Americans, accept the questions as answerable, providing overwhelmingly inconsistent answers, but answers all the same.

The tensions, paradoxes, and contradictions found in my respondents' answers could arguably be symptoms of the postmodern condition described earlier in the chapter. Yet these tensions do not lead my respondents to question their larger sense of meaning. In fact, virtually none of my partners seemed aware of the fact that they had provided different kinds of answers to the accuracy questions for each nation. Each time the questions were asked, they answered rather authoritatively, even when they responded quite differently than they had when asked about a previous nation. My respondents seemed comfortable, or at least not greatly disturbed, by their often-contradictory answers and never subscribed to the belief that nations are constructed entities too fluid to analyze successfully. Instead, it appeared that my interview partners accepted the fact that there are some things they simply do not understand fully. Their difficulties in answering the accuracy questions demonstrated to them how complicated the nation is as an entity, one not to be totally understood without great expertise. If their answers sometimes contradicted themselves, this was an indication that nations are complex entities, possibly too complex for them to understand. Rather than see these contradictions as a problem inherent to nationhood, they saw it a reflection of their own personal inadequacies. This allowed them to continue answering my questions without threatening their meaning structure or their overall vision of the orderly and knowable nature of the world.

The willingness of my respondents to answer questions on nationhood and not be bogged down by occasions in which contradictions arose. It is an indication that postmodernity has not left individuals overwhelmed by a feeling of shifting realities and unstable meanings. The world is complicated, this they know, but that does not mean that they cannot understand it or find

meaning within it. When paradoxical or contradictory situations arise, they are not an opportunity for questioning meaning, but an indication that some things are just better left unquestioned. They assume personal inadequacy because they do not know more, rather than fearing that the social world might be inherently meaningless. In doing so, my respondents locate the social order in what might otherwise be seen as confusion, relativism, and ambiguity. They demonstrate the ways in which social beings make sense of the world, choosing to focus on the consistencies rather than inconsistencies that allow for social order.

From the sociological standpoint, of course, the nation *is* a constructed concept, filled with contradictions. The nation is a moving target and the value of national identity *is* questionable. Yet, none of my respondents were willing to say this. It seems that too much is at stake. Individuals, like newspapers, textbooks, and many other parts of society are dedicated to holding this social order in place.

Chapter Eight

Nationing in a World of Nations

Pinning down one vision of a nation is a virtually impossible task. As the previous chapters have shown, the image of a nation transforms and takes new shape depending upon the eyes of the beholder. And yet, nationhood does not become meaningless in the process. No *one* image of a nation emerges but nationality comes to shape the experiences and worldviews of a nation's members in such a way that nationality itself becomes predictive. That is to say, the influence of national membership affects the way in which nations are envisioned in an often-predictable manner.

As the previous chapter shows, individuals may contradict themselves in discussing the "reality" of nations, but they are rather determined to find meaning and reality in them. Even those who suggest that social constructionism or cultural relativism make "knowing" a nation difficult or impossible still speak authoritatively when asked to describe who the Americans, English, and Germans are. Ultimately, people do want to believe that nations can be known.

This effort to find meaning in nationhood is not done solely by individuals. All aspects of society participate in this process of nationing. Textbooks present world history in terms of a national worldview and the significance of specific nations is aligned with this larger history. Newspapers do not just report on current events in terms of national interests--they align these reports again in terms of a national worldview. The world is presented in terms of this national perspective.

On some level these discoveries are reminiscent of those "The World According to a New Yorker" posters that have since been replicated for many major cities. In the New York versions, the city appears as four-fifths of the world with just a small space for Russia, China,

Australia, and the rest of the world. The point of course is that New Yorkers see the world and

their place in it very differently than the rest of the world does. However, it is not simply, as the

poster suggests, that we see our role within the world as more important than others, although

that is also the case. Rather the shape of the world changes in our eyes due to perspective. The

meaning of the world and our expectations for it also change accordingly.

The implications of this are of course far-reaching and too numerous to detail. But

anecdotes from around the world can suggest how nationing affects the interpretation of

experience. I rely here on an anecdote relayed by an anthropologist of Tibet as one such

example of how expectations about nations come to influence an interpretive framework.

Adams' (1996) contrasts the "Western" vision of Tibet with that of the Tibetans' self-perception.

She first describes the "Western" image of pre-Maoist Tibet as a "universally and uniformly

religious" nation in which Tibetans, "one and all, possessed esoteric spiritual awareness and

religious knowledge" (1996: 515). Given this vision, Adams argues, Westerners interpret any

contemporary signs of secularism or declining religiosity as the result of Chinese oppression.

For Westerners who want to believe in the "purity" of the Tibetans' religious beliefs, signs of the

profane are attributed to the destructive intervention of the Chinese. She notes that, in present-

day Tibet, "if communities… demonstrate less highly religious trends, it is attributed [by

Westerners] to the presence of the Chinese. If the refugee communities demonstrate a high

degree of religiosity it is attributed to Tibetan history" (1996: 522). Adams contrasts this

Western picture of Tibet with the Tibetans' own self-perceptions in which religion plays a

significantly less crucial role in their everyday lives.[144]

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[144] Adams further notes how Tibetans, as they have grown increasingly aware of this Western image, have learned to
"market" themselves more to Western expectations.

Having provided this background information on differing interpretations of Tibetan life,

Adams describes an incident occurring on her way to Tibet that suggests the power of nationing:

When, following boarding, the departure of my China Southwest Airlines flight

was delayed for one day, the immediate explanation offered by several

Westerners on the flight was that it was the birthday of His Holiness the Dalai

Lama *and* the Chinese government wanted to keep tourists out of the city for fear

of protest demonstrations by Lhasa Tibetans, which the government would not

want Westerners to witness. Word spread rapidly among the Western tourists that

our delay in Kathmandu was part of a larger plot to hide political dissent from

us…

[T]he conspiracy theory [was never] confirmed. There were no protests in

the city… I later learned that airline flights were frequently canceled because

Chinese pilots and air hostesses liked to pass the night in casinos in Kathmandu.

This seemed like a plausible scenario at that point, even if it was the least

attractive in terms of the polemics prefiguring my Tibet experience. Although it

was and still is entirely possible for political protests and civil unrest in Lhasa to

disrupt plane deliveries of tourists, the possibility of other explanations is

frequently foreclosed by the limited set of discourses that undergird the cultural

politics of that city (1996: 518).

The power of this story lies in the multiplicity of "truths." The Westerners rely on their own

assumptions about the value of the Tibetan religion and the evil and manipulative character of

the Chinese to understand their flight cancellation. Through this cultural lens, they come to see

any obstacle placed between them and their arrival in Tibet as a political statement by the

Chinese. The actual reason for delay, as Adams suggests, may have been the flight crew's penchant for gambling. This explanation, however, does not fit easily into the Westerners' understanding of the Chinese oppression of the Tibetan experience at any cost. Instead, the Western passengers rely on their image of Tibet and its relationship to the Chinese to find an interpretation of this incident that aligns better with their worldview. No one knows for sure what is true, but the interpretations applied come to reinforce the beliefs and expectations of the observers.

Adams' description of the "Western" perspective serves as an illustrative instance of nationing in action. Ultimately, what she witnessed were the effects of different expectations and interpretations of Tibetan experience based on social location. In this sense, her findings are very similar to mine on differing interpretations of the German experience. Examples like this are to be found throughout the world.

Germany in the Eye of the Beholder

Right at the point that I had begun to think about this conclusion, I witnessed a small moment of nationing in action that was symbolic of these varying perspectives on the German nation. I had just run out to the neighborhood grocery store in East Berlin to pick up a few things. While waiting in line, I overheard a conversation between two young German girls, both around eleven, standing behind me. The taller blond girl was in the middle of telling her friend how she had recently heard that a girl with red hair was killed "by the Nazis" just for having red hair. Her smaller, freckled, curly redheaded friend responded: "I would have been killed by the Nazis because I have curly hair." Seeing the skepticism on her friend's face, the second girl

continued on: "My mother told me that the Nazis could have killed me too. Just for having curly hair."

This moment is fascinating for many reasons, but what is relevant in this context is the girls' reference to "the Nazis." It becomes clear in listening to these girls' conversation that neither one of them sees the "Nazis" as Germans. Rather, the image is more of an invading, evil people coming into the lives of otherwise well-minded Germans. This childlike picture may be an oversimplified image of the adult perception of this time period, but it is still indicative of a difference in mentality between Americans and Germans. As far as Germans are concerned, there is a very clear distinction between "the German people" and "the Nazis." They realize that the Nazis were German and that average Germans played a crucial role in keeping that totalitarian system in power. But, as my German respondents indicate to me again and again, they still think of Germans, especially today, as fundamentally separable from Nazis. In fact, as the redheaded girl suggests, it may be easier as a German today to identity oneself as a potential victim of the Nazis than as a perpetrator.

One does not need to search long in the United States to discover how central the Nazi era remains to American understandings of present-day Germany, as my research here only confirms. American world history books are rivaled perhaps only by the Germans in the amount of time they devote to the Third Reich and particularly the Holocaust. Far more than the newspapers from England, India, or Kenya, the *New York Times* reported on Germany and its attempts to maintain stability as a "struggle with its past." Again far more than the other newspapers in the sample, the American publication suggests that the historical burden of the Third Reich still threatens to overwhelm the modern German nation. My interviews with Americans only further demonstrate this perspective. My American respondents may not have a

particularly vivid image of modern-day Germany, but they can tell me in notable detail about the Third Reich.

Although many of my American respondents recognize that this means placing an exceptional responsibility on postwar generation Germans, they tend not to regard it as an excessive or unjust burden. Instead they accept that modern-day Germans, albeit somewhat unfairly, should accept responsibility for the actions once committed in the name of their nation as a nation.[145] In emphasizing this time period when discussing Germany, it becomes increasingly difficult for Americans to separate "the Nazis" from "the Germans." Although this process is not an intentional one, the distinction between the two becomes less and less delineated until one often comes to equate the other.

Germans, however, struggle with the awareness that they, as individuals, must carry the burden of responsibility for acts they themselves did not commit. It is in this context that they reject the notion of bearing responsibility or taking credit for anything they did not personally have a hand in. Many wish instead that they could simply disconnect themselves from their history and even nation. My German respondents and Germans in general, as national polls suggest, do not think in terms of national pride because they themselves do not want to be associated with acts conducted in the name of the nation, a prospect that has overwhelmingly negative connotations for them. In making this distinction between what they themselves have accomplished versus what others have done in the name of Germany, they reject the idea of "the Germans" and instead want to be thought of as German individuals. Indeed, even in answering a

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[145] It is particularly interesting to compare the American expectation that Germans should take historical responsibility for the Holocaust to Americans' own reluctance or resistance of bearing historical responsibility for slavery. Although this is worthy of its own study, it is quite possible that Americans find it easier to hold Germans responsible because of the fact that they equate Germans more easily with Nazis and therefore see postwar generations as more responsible. In contrast, Americans do not find similarities between modern Americans and slaveholders, thus making the proposition that they should be held responsible for the latter's actions seem more unreasonable.

question regarding German contributions to the world, my respondents overwhelmingly answer in terms of what German individuals have accomplished, having virtually nothing to say about the accomplishments of either the nation or Germans as a collective.

What arises from the responses of Americans and Germans is a rather unexpected finding about nationing and the question of individualism. Despite all the talk we hear about "American individualism" and the importance of the individual to American society, it appears that Germans, at least on the subject of the nation, are the committed individualists. They reject the idea that one can speak of "the German people" or their collective contributions to the world. They are equally dismissive of national pride or the idea of identifying with the nation. They do not think in terms of national symbols nor do they speak in terms of individual accomplishments. They are highly suspect of any actions undertaken in the name of the nation and believe, although not exclusively, in the negative potential of the nation. Americans, in contrast, are proud to be Americans and take credit for the actions of the United States. They identify with their nation, even if they are occasionally critical as well, and believe in the positive potential of the nation. Americans, unlike the Germans, think in terms of the collective.

As in the Tibetan example, these differing relationships to the nation have implications for specific events as well. In the German case, the significance of neo-Nazism is a particularly enlightening example of how nationing affects interpretations of events.

The American focus on the Nazi era as the defining moment of German history ultimately makes a "rise" in neo-Nazism a serious issue worthy of attention. This interest in the Third Reich overshadows most other aspects of modern-day life and culture in Germany. Individuals who cannot tell me whether Germany has food, telephones, or computers or whether the Wall is still standing can still tell me in great detail about both the Nazis and Adolf Hitler.

Further, the tendency of Americans not to make a clear distinction between "the Germans" and "the Nazis" helps to define this issue as a "national" problem.

This alone is enough to explain the American concern that neo-Nazism may still be a serious threat to German stability. However, there is one additional factor, very much related to the American way of nationing, that influences the American understanding of the neo-Nazi problem: Americans who themselves feel national pride assume others do as well. Since Americans are proud of their country, flaws and all, they expect the same of others, Germans included. These factors combine in such a way as to make any neo-Nazi presence have serious implications: Americans know little about Germany other than the Third Reich; they have a tendency to see Germans and Nazis as strongly related categories; and they assume Germans feel national pride. Thus, Americans have a hard time *not* imagining a rise in neo-Nazism. They assume Germans are proud of their nation and since German national pride immediately calls up memories of National Socialism, Americans fear a further rightist revival. This concern is reflected, as just once such example, in the frequency of such suggestions in the *New York Times* as well as in the American history world textbooks. The relationship Americans have to the German nation and their assumptions about nations in general make it difficult for Americans to imagine that neo-Nazism is *not* a problem in Germany.

Germans too are bothered by the rise of rightist violence in their nation, but their understanding and interpretation of this issue is significantly different. Germans are particularly disturbed by neo-Nazi violence because it serves as a further reminder of the present-day implications of this historical burden. It is less that they truly believe that Germany could be overwhelmed by neo-Nazi intolerance, a belief more likely to be held by Americans, and more that each act of violence and each photograph of a skinhead functions as yet more salt on the

wound. As several German respondents noted, rightist violence is everywhere in the world, but it is only in Germany that it is so laden with meaning. The fact that a relatively small number neo-Nazis could come to define all of modern-day Germany, only leads my German respondents to advocate all the more for being seen as German individuals, rather than as one "people."

Many times I have heard Germans tell me that Americans either do not know enough about Germany or that they are "obsessed" with the Holocaust. Similarly, Americans have told me time and time again that Germans are in denial about their problems with neo-Nazism and are simply unwilling to recognize the extent of their responsibility. These accusations, coming from both sides, ignore all the assumptions about nationhood that hide behind these criticisms. Without recognition of these differing perspectives, the debate becomes similar to the "blue-green" debate I described in the introduction of this dissertation in which individuals debate endlessly what color they are "really" seeing. The heart of the matter in both cases is more one of perspective, definition, and social experience and less one of accuracy.

I have often heard stories from Germans about their trips into remote parts of Africa or Latin America where they would hear expressions of admiration for Adolf Hitler. This was for the Germans not only unfathomable but also morally offensive and ultimately incomprehensible. Here again, I would argue that this is less an issue less of moral righteousness than it is one of nationing. This phenomenon mirrors my textbook analysis of Kenyan schoolbooks which organizes history not around international and political events but around industrial accomplishments. All else, the Third Reich included, fades into background information. Hitler, within this text, receives mention primarily for industrializing the German nation. For Kenyans, who themselves are concentrating on industrializing and who may otherwise learn little about this historical time period, expressions of admiration for Hitler likely have very little to do with

condoning the Holocaust. Rather this and many further misunderstandings may just be the unintentional outcome of different ways of relating and thinking about what nations are and should be.

Using the Nation to See the Nation

The implications of my findings here are not simply that Americans, Kenyan, Indians, the English, and Germans see Germany differently. That, in all likelihood, would not shock many. But the *extent* to which different visions of nationhood affect our understandings of the world has not been recognized and therefore the consequences have also not been acknowledged or explored. The fact that these differing interpretations also reflect different assumptions about the role of the nation in the world has been overlooked. In all likelihood, many funny and not-so-funny misunderstandings between individuals and nations are the result of peoples having fundamentally different ideas about what a nation is and should be. As I have shown here, the assumptions of Americans, English, Indians, Kenyans, and Germans about the role of the nation in the world vary greatly. These differing perspectives also lead to very different expectations and analyses of Germany's role in that world.

The German case is just one of many. The images of Germany envisioned by each of these five nations shares commonalities with the others, but ultimately they are distinct visions. The image of the nation becomes fluid in the process of comparing visions of the nation. And yet, simultaneously it becomes more focused when examining the effects of national membership on nationing. The depiction of Germany may change, but the ways in which Americans, Germans, the English, Indians, and Kenyans envision the nation is still strongly influenced by their own national experience. This paradox is therefore a complex one: we learn

less about the "essence" of a nation by examining how it is seen, but we learn more by considering how that national influence comes to structure the worldview of its members. The nation is to be found more in the process of seeing than being seen.

Nations, in the eyes of the world, take many forms. Understanding the influence of nationing sheds light on the ways in which the eye of the beholder affects what may otherwise be taken for granted. In thinking about the multivocality of the nation, attention turns less to whose vision of a nation is correct and more to the question of the assumptions and worldviews that support such a vision. The question of who the Germans are, for example, must first be answered with two questions: "who is asking?" and "who is answering?"

Appendix A

World History Textbook Sample

England

Heater, Derek. 1996. *Our World This Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lancaster, Tony and Derek Peaple. 1996. *The Modern World: GCSE History*. Lancashire: Causeway Press Limited.

McAleavy, Tony. 1996. *Modern World History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rees, Rosemary. 1996. *The Modern World: Foundation Edition*. Oxford: Heinemann Educational.

Germany

Askani, Bernhard and Elmar Wagener. 1997. "Anno 4: Das 20. Jahrhundert." in *Anno*, vol. IV, edited by B. a. E. W. Askani. Braunschweig: Westermann Schulbuchverlag.

Berger, Thomas. 1996. "Entdecken und Verstehen." in *Entdecken und Verstehen*, vol. III, edited by T. Berger, Karl-Heinz Mueller, Hans-Gert Oomen. Berlin: Cornelsen Druck.

Brack, Harro and Dieter Brueckner. 1996. "Treffpunkt Geschichte: Band 4 fuer die 10. Jahrgangstufe der Realschulen." in *Treffpunkt Geschichte*, vol. 4. Bamberg: C. C. Buchner.

Hinrichs, Ernst, Bernhard Mueller, and Jutta Stehling. 1998. "Wir Machen Geschichte: Vom Ende des Ersten Weltkriegs bis zur Gegenwart." in *Wir Machen Geschichte*, vol. IV. Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Moritz Deisterweg.

India

Aggarwal, J.C. and N.K. Chowdhry. 1998. *History (Modern India) and Civics (India Today, Challenges and Problems)*, vol. III. New Delhi: S. Chand & Company.

Chowdhry, N. K. 1997a. *The Contemporary World: A History Textbook for Class X*. New Delhi: S. Chand and Company.

—. 1997b. *A Textbook for Social Science: For Class X*. New Dehli: S. Chand & Company.

—. 1997c. *A Textbook of Social Science: For Class IX*. New Dehli: S. Chand & Company Ltd.

Fuste, J. and N.N. Kher. 1996. *A Complete Course in Certificate History: Class X*, vol. II. New Delhi: Pitambar Publishing Company.

Fuste, J. revised by B.N. Ahuja. 1998. *Aspects of World History: Book III: The Modern Age (From the Reformation to the Present Day)*, vol. III. New Delhi: Pitambar Publishing Company.

*Kher, N.N. and C.P. Rai Bhatnagar. 1998a. *Landmarks in the History of Mankind*, vol. I. New Delhi.

—. 1998b. *Landmarks in the History of Mankind*, vol. II. New Delhi: Pitambar Publishing Company.

Kenya

Singh, Malkiat. 1993a. *History and Government: Form 2, Revised Syllabus*, vol. II, Edited by M. A. Sheppard. Nairobi: Acme Press (K) Limited.

—. 1993b. *History and Government: Form 3, Revised Syllabus*, vol. III, Edited by M. A. Sheppard. Nairobi: Acme Press (K) Limited.

**Williams, Aidan, Tiyambe Zeleza, and Margaret Sharman. 1989. *History and Government*

for K.C.S.E. Nairobi: Evans Brothers Limited.

United States

Beck, Roger B., Linda Black, Larry S. Krieger, Phillip C. Naylor, Dhaia Ibo Shabaka. 1999.

World History: Patterns of Interaction. Evanston, IL: McDougal Littell Inc.

Ellis, Elisabeth Gaynor and Anthony Esler. 1997. *World History: Connections to Today*. New

Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Farah, Mournir A. and Andrea Berens Karls. 1999. *World History: The Human Experience: The*

Modern Era. New York: Glencoe-McGraw Hill.

Krieger, Larry, Kenneth Neill, and Dr. Edward Reynolds. 1997. *World History: Perspectives on*

the Past. Evanston, IL: D.C. Heath and Company.

* Volume I only included in sample for one sentence; Volume II is far more heavily relied upon.

** Not included in sample due to early publication date.

Appendix B

Newspaper Article Frequencies

Frequency of Issues by Newspaper[*]

Issue[γ]	Daily Nation	Times of India	Guardian	NY Times
Biography	1 (2%)	--	3 (3%)	8 (7%)
Int'l Business Market	3 (5%)	9 (20%)	12 (12%)	13 (12%)
Guestworker	--	--	--	2 (2%)
Crime	13 (20%)	10 (22%)	6 (6%)	11 (10%)
Culture	2 (3%)	--	10 (10%)	12 (11%)
East/West Euro Relations	2 (3%)	3 (7%)	3 (3%)	9 (9%)
Ger. Economy	2 (3%)	--	14 (14%)	2 (2%)
European Unification	1 (2%)	1 (2%)	8 (8%)	3 (3%)
Family	--	1 (2%)	--	--
Scientific Findings	--	3 (7%)	2 (2%)	1 (1%)
History	34 (52%)	--	--	2 (2%)
Holocaust (Germany)[φ]	5 (8%)	7 (16%)	12 (12%)	24 (22%)
Holocaust Other Nations[*]	1 (2%)	6 (13%)	18 (18%)	24 (22%)
International Relations	15 (23%)	17 (38%)	15 (15%)	18 (17%)
Jews	--	2 (4%)	1 (1%)	7 (6%)
Kohl	--	3 (7%)	6 (6%)	5 (5%)
Laws/Court Decisions	--	--	1 (1%)	6 (6%)
Military	--	1 (2%)	--	1 (1%)
Neo-Nazi	1 (2%)	3 (7%)	7 (7%)	5 (5%)

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[*] As noted, each article was categorized in terms of the issues addressed. Percentages could add up to more than 100 because an article could contain more than one issue.

[γ] A given article could cover more than one issue. Percentages therefore add up to more than 100.

[φ] Holocaust (Germany) represents all articles concerning the Holocaust that relate to Germany (e.g., a new Jewish memorial museum opening in Berlin). Holocaust (other nations) represents all articles concerning the Holocaust in other nations that indirectly relate to Germany (e.g., Swiss banks having held Nazi-loot in World War II).

Domestic Politics	2 (3%)	7 (16%)	22 (22%)	12 (11%)
Religion	--	--	1 (1%)	2 (2%)
Reunification	12 (18%)	2 (4%)	16 (16%)	5 (5%)
Culture Reviews	--	--	--	10 (9%)
Sports	1 (2%)	1 (2%)	1 (1%)	1 (1%)
World War II	16 (24%)	3 (7%)	3 (3%)	10 (9%)

Appendix C

Interview Schedules for Americans and Germans

Interview Schedule for Americans

I am interested in speaking with you about your thoughts on both Germany and the United

States. It's important that you not think of this as a test. There are honestly no right or wrong

answers to the questions I'll be asking you. I don't know what I'm looking for here. Rather, I'm

looking for you to tell me. You are welcome to stop me at any point if you do not understand

what exactly I'm asking or if you do not want to continue with the survey. Thank you very much

for your time.

Introductory Questions:
Have you ever lived or traveled outside of the United States? If so, where and for how long?

Have you ever been to Europe? If so, where were you? How long were you there?

Have you ever been to Germany? If so, where were you? How long were you there?

Do you speak German? If so, how long? How well?

What experiences have you had with Germans? What kind of an impression did you get from
these experiences?

Do you personally know any Germans? What relationship do you have to them?

I now want to turn to some questions to get your impressions of Germans in general.

What do you think of when you think of Germany?

What do you think of when you think of Germans?

Name famous Germans. What makes them famous?

Picture a German tourist. What stands out in your mind about this person's physical appearance
or behavior?

When I say the phrase "typically German" what do you most think of?

What national symbols most make you think of Germans or Germany?

What cultural products do you associate with Germans or Germany?
        (if prompted for a further definition: things you can buy)

What images from popular culture make you think of Germans? For example, picture Hollywood presentations of Germans; how are Germans represented?

What are the positive aspects of being a German?

What are the negative aspects of being a German?

Imagine that you had to do a report on Germany to people in the United States. This report would focus on modern Germany but could include historical information if you wanted. What kinds of things would you emphasize?

If a small child asked you "what is Germany?" what would you tell the child?

What are the most pressing problems confronting Germany today?

What do you think, in general, are Americans' perceptions of Germans?

How do think they could differ from Germans' perceptions of Germans?

Which of these perceptions, if either, is a more accurate reflection of what it means to be German? Why?

What, if anything, do you think influences these differences?

Imagine you're a German. What would be your greatest sources of national pride? What would be your greatest national struggles?

Before turning to England, do you have any final thoughts on Germany?

I now want to ask you your impressions of England.

What do you think of when you think of England?

What do you think of when you think of the English?

Name famous English people. What makes them famous?

Picture an English tourist. What stands out in your mind about this person's physical appearance or behavior?

When I say the phrase "typically English" what do you most think of?

What national symbols most make you think of England or the English?

What cultural products do you associate with England or the English?
    (if prompted for a further definition: things you can buy)

What images from popular culture make you think of England? For example, picture Hollywood presentations of England; how are the English represented?

What are the positive aspects of being English?

What are the negative aspects of being a English?

Imagine that you had to do a report on England to people in the United States. This report would focus on modern England but could include historical information if you wanted. What kinds of things would you emphasize?

If a small child asked you "what is England?" what would you tell the child?

What are the most pressing problems confronting England today?

What do you think, in general, are Americans' perceptions of the English?

How do think they could differ from English perceptions of the English?

Which of these perceptions, if either, is a more accurate reflection of what it means to be English? Why?

What, if anything, do you think influences these differences?

Imagine you're English. What would be your greatest sources of national pride? What would be your greatest national struggles?

Before turning to the United States, do you have any final thoughts on England?

What do you think of when you think of the United States?

What do you think of when you think of Americans?

Picture an American tourist. What stands out in your mind about this person's physical appearance or behavior?

When I say the phrase "typically American" what do you most think of?

What national symbols most make you think of the United States or Americans?

What cultural products do you associate with Americans or the United States?
      (if prompted for a further definition: things you can buy)

What are the positive aspects of being an American?

What are the negative aspects of being an American?

Imagine you were an American tour guide assigned to the task of giving foreigners a tour of the United States that would give these tourists a feel for what America is "really" like. Which places would you send them? Why?

If a small child asked you, "what is the United States?" what would you say?
What do you think, in general, are Germans' perceptions of Americans?

How do think they could differ from Americans' perceptions of Americans?

Which of these perceptions, if either, is a more accurate reflection of what it means to be American? Why?

What, if anything, do you think influences these differences?

What are your greatest sources of national pride as an American? What, if anything, are the greatest national problems Americans face?

Do you have any final thoughts on the United States, Germany, or any related issue?

Do you have any questions you'd like to ask me?

Demographic questions to follow

Interview für Deutsche

Ich möchte gerne mit Ihnen über England, Deutschland und die Vereinigten Staaten sprechen. Es handelt sich nicht um einen Test. (Bitte denken Sie nicht, daß dies eine Prüfung ist.) Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten auf die Fragen, die ich Ihnen stellen werde. Ich suche nach nichts Bestimmtem. Ich bin einfach daran interessiert, was Sie mir zu erzählen haben. Bitte unterbrechen Sie mich jederzeit, wenn Sie eine meiner Frage nicht genau verstehen oder wenn Sie das Interview abbrechen möchten.
Ich fange mit den Vereinigten Staaten an. Bitte sagen Sie mir Ihre ehrliche Meinung zu allen Fragen. Ob Sie kritisch oder lobend über die Staaten reden, es ist mir einfach wichtig, dass Sie offen mit mir reden.
Ich möchte mich an dieser Stelle schon einmal bei Ihnen bedanken, daß Sie mir Ihre Zeit zur Verfügung stellen.

Einführende Fragen:

Haben Sie jemals außerhalb von Deutschland gelebt? Wenn ja, wo und wie lange?

Sind Sie jemals im Ausland gereist? Wenn ja, wohin und wie lange?

Sprechen Sie Englisch? Wenn ja, wie lange schon?

Waren Sie jemals in den Vereinigten Staaten? Wenn ja, wo waren Sie? Wie lange waren Sie dort?

Kennen Sie irgendwelche Amerikaner persönlich? Wie gut?

Ich möchte Ihnen nun einige Frage zu Ihrem Eindruck von US-Amerikaner im allgemeinen stellen.

Woran denken Sie, wenn Sie an den USA denken?

Woran denken Sie, wenn Sie an Amerikaner denken?

Nennen Sie mir berühmte amerikanische Persönlichkeiten. Wofür sind Sie berühmt?

Stellen Sie sich einen Amerikaner vor. Gibt es irgendetwas an seinem äußeren Erscheinungsbild oder seinem Verhalten, was sie als besonders „amerikanisch" empfinden?

Woran denken Sie bei dem Ausdruck „typisch Amerikanisch"?

Welche nationalen Symbole verbinden Sie mit den USA oder Amerikanern?

Welche Produkten verbinden Sie mit Amerikanern bzw. den USA?

(Was verbinden Sie mit amerikanischer Kultur?)

Gibt es irgendwas von der Kultur (z.B. Filme, Kunst, Literatur, Sport), was Sie besonderes mit den Vereinigten Staaten verbinden?

Was gehört zu den positiven Aspekten ein Amerikaner zu sein?

Was gehört zu den negativen Seiten ein Amerikaner zu sein?

Stellen Sie sich vor, ein kleines Kind würde Sie fragen: „Was ist Amerika?" Was würden Sie ihm erzählen?

Welches sind Ihrer Meinung nach die akutesten Probleme, die die Vereinigten Staaten heute haben?

Glauben Sie, daß Ihre Vorstellungen über die USA repräsentativ sind? Das heisst, repräsentativ für die Einschätzung der meisten Deutschen von den USA?

Haben US-Amerikaner eine andere Vorstellung oder Selbsteinschätzung? Wessen ist genauer?

Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie wären Amerikaner. Worauf wären Sie am meisten stolz?

Was wäre Ihre größten Probleme mit ihrer Nation?

Jetzt würde ich Ihnen gerne ein paar Fragen zu England stellen.

Waren Sie schon mal in England? Wenn ja, wo und wie lange?

Woran denken Sie, wenn Sie an England denken?

Woran denken Sie, wenn Sie an Engländer denken?

Nennen Sie mir berühmte englische Persönlichkeiten. Wofür sind Sie berühmt?

Stellen Sie sich einen Engländer vor. Gibt es irgendetwas an seinem äußeren Erscheinungsbild oder seinem Verhalten, was sie als besonders „englisch" empfinden?

Woran denken Sie bei dem Ausdruck „typisch Englisch"?

Welche nationalen Symbole verbinden Sie mit England oder Engländern?

Welche Produkten verbinden Sie mit Engländern bzw. England?
(Was verbinden Sie mit englischer Kultur?)

Gibt es irgendwas von der Kultur (z.B. Filme, Kunst, Literatur, Sport), was Sie besonderes mit England verbinden?

Was gehört zu den positiven Aspekten ein Engländer zu sein?

Was gehört zu den negativen Seiten ein Engländer zu sein?

Stellen Sie sich vor, ein kleines Kind würde Sie fragen: „Was ist England?" Was würden Sie ihm erzählen?

Welches sind Ihrer Meinung nach die akutesten Probleme, die England heute hat?

Glauben Sie, daß Ihre Vorstellungen über England repräsentativ sind? Das heisst, repräsentativ für die Einschätzung der meisten Deutschen von England?

Haben Engländer eine andere Vorstellung oder Selbsteinschätzung?

Wessen ist genauer?

Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie wären Engländer. Worauf wären Sie am meisten stolz?

Was wäre Ihre größten Probleme mit ihrer Nation?

Jetzt würde ich Ihnen gerne ein paar Fragen zu Deutschland stellen.

Woran denken Sie, wenn Sie an Deutschland denken?

Woran denken Sie, wenn Sie an die Deutschen denken?

Welche deutsche Persönlichkeiten in der Geschichte oder heute sind im Ausland berühmt. Wofür sind Sie berühmt?

Stellen Sie sich einen Deutschen vor. Gibt es irgendetwas an seinem äußeren Erscheinungsbild oder seinem Verhalten, was sie als besonders „deutsch" empfinden?

Woran denken Sie bei dem Ausdruck „typisch Deutsch"?

Welche nationalen Symbole verbinden Sie mit Deutschland oder den Deutschen?

Welche Produkten verbinden Sie mit den Deutschen bzw. Deutschland?
(Was verbinden Sie mit deutscher Kultur?)

Was sind die größte Beiträge Deutschlands zur Weltkultur?

Wie werden die Deutschen bzw. Deutschland repräsentiert in Filmen?

Was gehört zu den positiven Aspekten ein Deutscher zu sein?

Was gehört zu den negativen Seiten ein Deutscher zu sein?

Stellen Sie sich vor, ein kleines Kind würde Sie fragen: „Was ist Deutschland?" Was würden Sie ihm erzählen?

Welches sind Ihrer Meinung nach die akutesten Probleme, die Deutschland heute hat?

Glauben Sie, daß Ihre Vorstellungen über Deutschland repräsentativ sind? Das heisst, repräsentativ für die Selbsteinschätzung der meisten Deutschen?

Haben oder Amerikaner oder Engländer eine andere Vorstellung von Deutschland?

Wessen ist genauer?

Als Deutscher, worauf wären Sie am meisten stolz?

Was sind die größten Probleme mit Ihrer Nation?

Demographic Survey for Americans

Age: _____   Race: _____   Ethnicity: _____

Gender: Male   Female   Marital Status: _____

Birthplace: _____   Citizenship: _____

Where were you raised? _____

Where do you live now? _____

Do you have children? Yes   No   Number/Ages: _____

Religion: _____

How frequently do you attend religious services?
Not at all   1-3 times a year   5-10 times a year   monthly   weekly

Political affiliation: Democrat   Republican   Independent   None
                              Other: _____

Do you read a newspaper? Yes   No   How often? _____

Which one? _____

Do you watch televised or listen to radio news?   Yes   No

How often? _____

Which shows? _____

Do you follow international news events? Yes   No

What are your primary sources for this information?

How often do you turn to these sources?

Are there particular nations or parts of the country that you particularly keep current on?
_____

Is there any particular reason for this? _____

Selbstfragebogen für Deutsche

Dieser Fragebogen dient der Erhebung grundlegender demographischer Informationen. Bitte benatworten Sie alle Fragen so gut Sie können. Vielen Dank für Ihre Zeit.

Alter: _____ **Geschlecht:** _____ **Ehestand:** _____

Sexualle Orientierung: Heterosexuell **Homosexuell** **Bisexuell**

Geburtsort: _____ **Staatsangehörigkeit:**
_____

  Haben Sie Kinder? Ja Nein Zahl/Alter: _____

Wie würden Sie Ihre ethnische Herkunft beschreiben? (z.B. Deutsch, Französich, Türkisch):
_____

Sind Sie Immigrant? Ja Nein Wenn ja, seit wann leben Sie in der BRD? _____

  Wo sind Sie aufgewachsen? (Stadt/Staat):_____

Sind Sie in der BRD oder DDR aufgewachsen? BRD DDR

Fühlen Sie Sich oder beschreiben Sie sich immer noch als West bzw. Ost Deutsche?
Ja Nein

Wo leben Sie jetzt? (Stadt oder Stadtteil von Berlin): _____

Ausbildung:
____ **kein Abschluss**
____ **Hauptschule**   ____ **Vordiplom**
____ **Realschule**   ____ **M.A./Staatsexamen/Diplom**
____ **Gymansium**   ____ **Promotion**
____ **Berufsschule**   ____ **Habilitation**

Was haben Sie gelernt/studiert? _____

Was ist Ihre derzeitige Beschaeftigung? _____

Wo arbeiten Sie? (Stadt oder Stadtteil): _____

Beruf des Vaters: _____

Beruf der Mutter: _____

In welcher religiösen Tradition wurden Sie erzogen? _____

Welcher Religion fühlen Sie sich heute zugehörig? _____

Wie häufig nehmen Sie an religiösen Veranstaltungen teil?
Gar nicht   1-3 mal im Jahr   5-10 mal im Jahr   jeden Monat jede Woche

Welcher politischen Partei stehen Sie nahe?

____	**Bündnis '90/Grünen**	____	**FDP**	____	**SPD**
____	**CDU**	____	**PDS**		
____	**CSU**	____	**Republikaner**		
____	**Andere (bitte spezifizieren Sie):** _____				

Haushaltsnettoeinkommen im Monat:

____	**unter 1.500 DM**	____	**7.000 bis unter 10.000 DM**
____	**1.500 bis unter 3.000 DM**	____	**10.000 bis unter 15.000 DM**
____	**3.000 bis unter 4.500 DM**	____	**15.000 und mehr**
____	**4.500 bis unter 7.000 DM**		

Lesen Sie eine Tageszeitung oder Zeitschrift?   Ja   Nein

Wie oft?

Welche?

Sehen Sie Nachrichten im Fernsehen?   Ja   Nein
Hören Sie Nachrichten im Radio? Ja   Nein

Wie oft?

Welche Sendungen?

Verfolgen Sie internationale Ereignisse? Ja   Nein

Gibt es bestimmte Nationen, Regionen oder Kontinente worüber Sie sich regelmässig informieren?

Gibt es dafür bestimmte Gründe?

Kennen Sie jemanden, der bereit wäre an dieser Studie teilzunehmen?   Ja   Nein

Wenn ja, könnten Sie eine oder mehrere Kontaktadressen zur Verfügung stellen?

Appendix D

American Respondents' Sociodemographic Information

Code	Name	Age	Sex	Race	Marital Sexual'	# Chil	Home	Educ-ation	Religion	Polit'l Party	Political Belief	Profession
A1	John	35	M	White	Sing. Het.	0	DC	College	Buddhist Weekly	Ind.	Anarchist	Computers
A2	Taylor	36	F	White	Marr. Het.	1	DC	M.A.	Prot. 1-3/yr.	Strg. Dem.	Liberal	Program Officer
A3	David	34	M	White	Eng. Het.	0	DC	J.D.	Catholic Monthly	Ind.	Hybrid	Attorney C.P.A
A4	Katarina	31	F	White Latina	Eng. Het.	0	DC	J.D.	Christian 5-10/yr.	Strg. Dem.	Liberal	Lawyer
A5	Lola	36	F	White	Div. Het.	0	DC	Some College	None 0/yr.	Ind.	Moderate	Hairstylist
A6	Sally	41	F	White	Sing. Het.	0	DC	Some College	Catholic 5-10/yr.	NS Rep.	Liberal	Admin. Assistant
A7	Diane	41	F	White	Marr. Het.	0	DC	College	Christian 5-10/yr.	Dem.	Liberal-Moderate	Social Worker
A8	Joey	32	M	Black	Sing. Het.	0	DC	Some College	Christian Weekly	Ind.	Moderate	Fitness Trainer
A9	Eliza-beth	41	F	White	Sing. Het.	0	DC	High School	None 0/yr.	Ind.	Liberal	Admin. Assistant
A10	Tammy	45	F	White	Marr. Het.	2	DC	Some College	Meth. 1-3/yr.	Dem. Rep.	Conserv.	Data Entry
A11	Matthew	31	M	White	Sing. Het.	0	DC	Some College	Catholic 0/yr.	Ind.	Moderate	Security Analyst
A12	Kevin	35	M	White	Sing. Het.	0	DC	M.D.	Ag/Budd 1-3/yr.	Grn.	Very Liberal	Physician
A13	Larry	38	M	White	Sing. Hom.	0	DC	Some College	Catholic 1-3/yr.	Strg. Dem.	Very Liberal	Waiter
A14	Yael	26	F	White	Marr. Het.	0	DC	M.A.	Jewish Monthly	Strg. Dem.	Moderate	Social Worker
A15	Ruth	42	F	White	Marr. Het.	1	DC	M.P.A.	Christian Weekly	Strg. Rep.	Conserv.	Environ'l Engineer
A16	Andrew	30	M	White	Sing. Het.	0	DC	M.A.	Catholic Weekly	Rep. Dem.	Soc'lLib. Mrl Con.	PhD Cand. Theology
A21	Shalini	29	F	Indian	Mar. Het.	0	CH	M.D.	Hindu 0/yr.	Strg. Dem.	Liberal	Physician
A22	Laura	37	F	White	Sing. Het.	0	CH	College	Lutheran 0/yr.	Ind.	Moderate	Dental Hygienist
A23	Jim	39	M	White	Sing. Het.	1	CH	High School	Catholic 0/yr.	Ind.	Conserv.	Service Technician
A24	Mira-bella	37	F	White	Eng. Het.	0	CH	M.A.	None 0/yr.	NStr. Dem	Very Liberal	Exhibit Designer

A25	Cathy	31	F	Black	Sing. Het.	3	CH	Some College	None 0/yr.	DK	Don't Know	Laundro-mat Mgr.
A26	Candace	38	F	Black	Sing. Het.	0	CH	Some College	Baptist 0/yr.	Strg. Dem.	Liberal	Technical Support
A27	Dan	44	M	White	Marr. Het.	2	CH	College	Jewish 1-3/yr.	Strg. Dem.	Liberal	Physical Therapist
A28	Tommy	26	M	Afr. Amer.	Sing. Het.	0	CH	College	NonDen. Monthly	Ind.	Very Liberal	College Student
A29	Philip	37	M	White	Sing. Het.	0	CH	College	"Lost" 1-3/yr.	Ind. NSR	Moderate	Police Officer

German Respondents' Demographic Information

Code	Name	Age	Sex	Race	Marital Sexual'	# Chil	Home	Education	Religion	Polit'l Party	Profession
G1	Irene	44	F	Germ.	Marr. Het.	0	WB	Habilit.	Jewish 1-3/yr.	Oth.	PhD-psych Philosophy
G2	Rachel	43	F	Germ.	Marr. Het.	1	WB	M.A.	Jewish 1-3/yr.	Ind. SPD	Teacher
G3	Ilke	26	F	Germ.	Sing. Het.	0	EB	Gymn.	None 1-3/yr.	None	Flight Attendant
G4	Ulrike	44	F	Germ.	Marr. Het.	2	EB	Promo.	None 0/yr.	PDS	Dentist
G5	Jörg	27	M	Germ.	Sing. Hom.	0	EB	Beruf Vordip	None 0/yr.	Grn	Student Journalist
G6	Markus	28	M	Germ.	Sing. Het.	0	EB	Beruf Realsc.	Protest. 1-3/yr.	SPD	Gas/Water Installer
G7	Martin	28	M	Germ.	Sing. Het.	0	WB	Staats- exam	Catholic Weekly	CDU	Lawyer
G8	Karin	32	F	Germ.	Marr. Het.	1	EB WB	Realsc.	None 0/yr.	None	Waitress
G9	Julian	34	M	Germ.	Sing. Het.	0	WB	M.A.	Christian 1-3/yr.	Grn	Director Author
G10	Tilo	35	M	Germ.	Sing. Het.	0	EB	MA Beruf	None 1-3/yr.	Grn PDS	Planner CallCenter
G11	Bettina	37	F	Germ.	Sing. Het.	0	HD	Beruf Hpt/Rl	Christian 1-3/yr.	Grn SPD	Tax Assistant
G12	Jale	33	F	Turk.	Sing. Het.	0	HD	M.A.	Muslim 0/yr.	Grn SPD	German Teacher
G13	Caroline	32	F	Germ.	Sep. Het.	0	HD	Beruf Gym.	None 0/yr.	Grn SPD	Interior Decorator
G14	Abdul	34	M	Turk.	Marr. Het.	1	HD	Beruf Haupt	Muslim 0/yr.	SPD	Mailcarrier
G15	Anika	34	F	Germ. Hung.	Sing. Het.	0	HD	Staats- exam	Christian 1-3/yr.	SPD	Lawyer
G16	Matthias	31	M	Germ.	Sing. Het.	0	WB	M.A.	Lutheran 1-3/yr.	CDU	Political Advisor
G17	Marc	38	M	Germ.	Sing. Het.	0	EB	Ober- schule	None 0/yr.	CDU	Tattoo Artist
G18	Nicola	27	F	Germ.	Sing. Het.	0	WB	Realsc. Beruf	Protest. 1-3/yr.	SPD	OfficeWkr Med Spply
G21	Antonio	25	M	Germ.	Sing. Het.	0	JN	Gymn.	Protest. 5-10/yr.	CDU	Student Poli. Sci.

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