A Study of Rongzom’s *Disclosing the Great Vehicle Approach (theg chen tshul ‘jug)* in the History of Tibet's Great Perfection Tradition

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The eleventh century in Tibet has been appropriately characterized as a renaissance of Buddhist civilization in Tibet, since an economic and political resurgence was accompanied by a remarkable deluge of new transmissions and translations from Indian Buddhism, and an equally extensive profusion of visionary revelations on Tibetan soil. It was an era of increasing religious diversity consisting in the profusion of Buddhist lineages, teachings, texts, and more. The fact of religious diversity, Paul Griffiths, writes, raises two questions immediately. First, what makes one religion different from another? Second, how does the kind of difference among religions so far mentioned map on to the great complexes of thought and practice often called the world religions – Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, and so on?\(^1\)

Though this study will not attempt to map inter-religious difference – e.g. Buddhism to other world religions *vis-à-vis* their comparative differences; it will explore the question of just what constitutes intra-religious difference between putatively different Buddhist communities in Tibet. Griffiths, for his part, defines religion as a “form of life that seems to those who belong to it to be comprehensive, incapable of abandonment, and of central importance” (xiv).

It comes in two kinds: the *home religion*, which is the one you belong to if you belong to one at all; and *alien religions*, which are any you do not belong to (ibid.).

For my purposes, different Buddhists traditions of practice can be understood along the same lines. This is not to suggest that different religious communities compose communities of different religions (surely they do not); or that different

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communities are themselves so carefully bounded as to be obviously amenable to a definitive identification. Rather, we only mean to use this nomenclature of home and alien to our comparative advantage. For there can be no doubt that the debates about continuity, validity, and religious authority among Tibetan intellectuals amount to arguments about what is true religion – the home religion. It is in this context that it is worth noting that Tibetan Buddhists themselves prefer to identify their religion as the tradition of “those at home” (nang pa).

* * *

This dissertation explores the nature and development of religious doctrine and identity by examining a text entitled Disclosing the Great Vehicle Approach, authored by the scholar, Rongzom Chokyi Zangpo. It is divided into three parts. In Part I, I outline the historical, theoretical, and interpretive issues that frame much of Rongzom’s work. Passages in The Approach often assume some knowledge of issues Rongzom has explored elsewhere. Thus, Part I offers context and background to the issues I emphasize in my study of The Approach.

In Part II, I survey each chapter of The Approach. In each chapter, there is both a survey of contents and an exploration of several thematically linked elements vital to the chapter. This text, written around the late eleventh century, represents an important indigenous response to the pressures of the cultural renaissance of the time that was driven by an influx of religious media from abroad. The aim of my work here is to supplement the work of other scholars of early Great Perfection in order to shed light on historical and theoretical questions concerning the development of Tibet’s Great Perfection tradition and Rongzom’s text, in particular. Throughout this effort, I explore the relation between Great Perfection and several classic Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrines
asking: what is the role of logic, epistemology, and reasoning in Rongzom’s presentation of Great Perfection? How does Rongzom’s presentation differ from other important figures. How do the topics explored in The Approach relate to each other? Underlying these questions is the problem of the other. That is, how can two putatively different things be related. What are the criteria required for such a comparison? We shall explore these questions in each chapter of The Approach and offer concluding reflections on this questions at the end.

To summarize, Chapter One of The Approach surveys a variety of Buddhist theoretical approaches to analyzing the reality of the afflictive states of mind in five principle systems – Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha, Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, in Guhyamantra. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that although a variety of Buddhist paths accept and penetrate the illusory nature of reality (i.e. that all is not what is appears to be), that realization – and its soteriological value – is only fully manifest in the view of Great Perfection. This chapter introduces us to the author’s doctrine of appearance, his inclusive philosophical method, and explores his reliance upon the writing of Tilopa in forming his view of equality. This chapter, as well as several others, also contains Rongzom’s critical comments on the folly of philosophical nonsense. Chapter Two builds on the discourse in Chapter One through a series of questions and answers that work to obviate any fatal flaw in Rongzom’s Mind-only inspired presentation of appearances outlined in the first chapter. He accomplishes this through classical philosophical discourse and the use of several remarkable myths as forms of

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2 kleśa-laksana : nyon mongs kyi mtha’ nyid. This phrase is an object of interest below.
3 The five principle systems given are the Śrāvaka, Pratyeka-jīna, Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, and Guhyamantra. Throughout his various works, however, it is interesting to not that Rongzom does not always give the same systems as focal points. See Almogi 2009.
argumentation. To that end, Chapter Two outlines four main issues in interrogating the supposed distinction between real and imaginary phenomena. Here, pure and impure phenomena are understood to be equally illusory and the Great Perfection is recognized as a means of interpreting the nature of illusion. Thus, the chapter works to dispel misunderstandings about the assertion that all phenomena, whether a mirage, hallucination, or a pure vision, are ‘basically the same’. In Chapter Three, Rongzom demonstrates the unique way that illusion is discussed and understood according to the Great Perfection. The purpose of this chapter is to show that while Great Perfection is genealogically related to other Buddhist teachings through its discourse on illusion, the discourse given in Great Perfection is in fact unique. To that end, the chapter revolves around two issues of appearance and describes what Rongzom describes as the Great Perfection’s own “nomenclature of illusion.” This chapter is built upon Rongzom’s example of an “image of a black snake in water.” Through this example, Rongzom shows that the lower paths realize the illusory nature of phenomena, but do so in a way that invokes a variety of psychological, emotional, and practical reactions. In Chapter four, Rongzom opens with some interesting remarks on the social and religious tensions in his day. After acknowledging the criticism made by partisans of Buddhist logic and epistemology, Rongzom responds that he will “set aside” the unique nomenclature of Great Perfection and make a detailed survey of several aspects of Buddhist logic and epistemology. The purpose of this chapter is a logical explanation – which is not to be confused with a logical justification – of several issues relevant to Great Perfection, the most important of which is the meaning of the term bodhicitta. In Chapter five, the longest in The Approach, Rongzom surveys just “what is disclosed in the writings of Great
Perfection.” This presentation marks an early stage of the development of this teaching. Rongzom’s presentation is dominated by one particular genre of writings and outlines several major rubrics of the newly emerging tradition of Great Perfection. It contains no details, however, on meditative practices associated with the later Great Perfection tradition. As such, the chapter is an important lens into the interpretive concerns of an innovative author in a formative time working within a distinctive Tibetan religious movement. In the final chapter of *The Approach*, Chapter Six, we find a basic primer of Buddhist practice and theory, replete with references to exoteric and esoteric Buddhist discourse. This chapter describes Buddhist practices “for those of us who are unable to simply rest in the natural state” of Great Perfection.

In Part III, readers will find four appendices. Appendix One contains an outline of the major topics of each chapter of *The Approach*. In Appendix Two, readers will find a complete translation of all six chapter of *The Approach*. Appendix three contains two editions of an important early Great Perfection text, one often cited by Rongzom. Appendix four contains an index of citations found in *The Approach* and their sources.
A CONTEXT FOR RONGZOM’S APPROACH

After the mid-ninth century implosion of the Tibetan empire during which Buddhism first penetrated the Tibetan plateau, more than one hundred years of shifting clan alliances and political instability ensued. In the eleventh century, the massive infusion of Sanskrit literature concerning religion, philosophy, art, and medicine, as well as a variety of Indian ritual, contemplative, ethical, and institutional practices began to transform the socio-political landscape of the Tibetan plateau and constitute the narrative ground in which institutions could take root and emplot themselves as part of the emergence of a broader socio-political culture. It was during this time that Buddhist institutions and sharp partisan boundaries within Tibet’s Buddhism begin to emerge; and a scholastic mode of discourse incorporating the newly imported South Asian nomenclatures came to be de rigueur.

The many ensuing religious divisions were organized at a higher level into an overarching bifurcation into the “Old” (Nyingma, rnying ma) and “New”

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(Sarma, *gsar ma*), which ignores the other religious tradition of historical Tibet, the Bön. The promulgators of lineages of Buddhist practice being newly imported into Tibet with an ideology of starting anew, which are traditionally categorized as the “New Schools,” largely dismissed the religious lineages that existed in Tibet prior to the eleventh century infusion of religious and intellectual civilization from the south as “old,” which suggested decadence, decay, and irrelevance. Adherents to religious traditions that existed in Tibet prior to the eleventh century, however, embraced their identity as the “Old School,” which for them implied tradition, ancient pedigrees, and association with the glorious Tibetan imperial past. While esoteric forms of Buddhism based in the scriptures known as “tantras” were common to both the New and Old schools, the lineages and forms were quite different, while the schools also diverged on the issue of the importance of exoteric schools of Buddhist philosophy and the relevance of monastic institutionalism. The New schools embraced monasticism and exoteric Buddhist philosophical systems, both of which were rapidly developed and assimilated into particularly Tibetan forms. In contrast, the Old School in these early centuries tended towards lay, often hereditary lineages outside of monastic institutions, while, their new literary production was most typically visionary revelations, the content of which were primarily esoteric thought and practice in content, or narrative tales of the past.

In this turbulent religious landscape of the eleventh century, then, Rongzom Chokyi Zangpo is not only one of the most brilliant intellectuals on the Tibetan plateau, but also is a unique figure who straddled the emerging boundaries between the new and old. Rongzom was deeply versed in the “old” esoteric traditions, but he was also a master of the newer exoteric dispensations,
and his personal compositions brilliantly ranged over both with creative and compelling lines of inquiry. His corpus includes commentaries on important New School literature, such as his *Commentary on the Difficult Points of the Sarvabuddha-samāyoga-ḍākinījalā-saṃvara-tantra*, and literature associated with the Old School tantras, as well. His work is remarkable among Old School figures of the time in that the majority of them confined their literary output to the esoteric traditions of their own past lineages, whereas Rongzom also engaged extensively with the New School literature and philosophy and its contemporary Indian imports. The text treated in this thesis, Rongzom’s *Disclosing the Great Vehicle Approach* (hereafter simply *The Approach*), exemplifies this aspect of his work as it is structured around a systematic analysis of various types of Buddhist thought and practice that situates them in relation to the Old School’s highly distinctive Great Perfection tradition. But before venturing into the subject of the text, let us say a few words about the man, himself.

Rongzom is reported to have lived and worked in sNar lung rong, a district in Ru lag in the western Tibetan region of Lower Tshang. While Rongzom's precise dates remain uncertain, what is not disputed is the formative

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5 Rong zom chos bzang, *Sangs rgyas thams cad dang mnyam par sbyor ba mkha’ ‘gro ma sgyu ma bde ba’i mchog ches pa’i rgyud kyi dka’ grel* in RZSB 2.457-620.

6 On Rongzom’s biographies, see Almogi 2002. On the “Four Horns” (ru bzhi) of Tibet, “the military-administrative organization of 7th-9th century Tibet,” see Uray 1960. According to Uray, Ru lag’s inclusion as one of the Four Horns occurred in the early eighth century, between 713-733 CE (49).

7 Precise dates are offered by Bradburn: 1012-1131 (2005: 87), perhaps following Dudjom, who gives one hundred and nineteen years (see Dudjom Rinpoche’s *The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism*, trans. by Gyurme Dorje and Matthew Kapstein (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1991, 709). The publishers colophon of the 1999 Chengdu edition of Rongzom’s collected works gives the Iron Dragon year of the eleventh century as his date of birth – i.e. 1040 (RZSB 2.639.6); this is the same date given in Cabezón 2013. According to the historian ’Gos lo tṣa ba (1392-1481) and others, Rongzom was the reincarnation of the “learned scholar called Ācārya Smṛtiśānakṛti” (BA 160); the same text reports that Rongzom met Atiśa during his brief tenure in Tibet (c. 1044-1054) and impressed him (id. 161). Upon their meeting, Atiśa was so sufficiently impressed as to wonder aloud what spiritual advice he could possibly have for the polymath (*kho bus ’di dang chos*).
kyi gtam bya ba ga la thub ces nges par gsung skad). While this might suggest an early eleventh century birth date, reports that Rongzom gained a scholarly reputation by age thirteen (cf. Mdz 1639.14-15) offer the possibility of his meeting the Bengali master in his youth - perhaps due to his precocity. According to one biography, the Ngö mtshar tshad ma sum ldan, Rongzom is said to have been possessed of deep insight, spontaneous in nature, from the time of his youth (sku gzhon nu nas lhan gyis grub pa'i shes rab chen po mnga’… | 276.20-276.21); he was able to learn grammar and language without intense effort and was able to speak the languages of animals (dua’ gro’i brda dang skad). This trope – the precocious child – appears to be common in Tibet’s hagiographies; cf. Schaeffer 2009: 6, 129. What is clear is that Rongzom is remembered as a remarkable intellectual. His literary output and quality, in subjects ranging from Sanskrit and Tibetan grammar to agriculture, was so high that people described him as a genius (smra sgo la sogs pa’i ’rge pa dang bstan bcos kyang mang du mdzad | blo gros kyi mthu bsam gyi mi khyab pas), an accomplished spiritual adept (gsang sqags kyi las dang dngos grub bsgrub pa) endowed with profound and beneficial spiritual insight (phan gdags pa’i dgongs pa zab mo mnga’ ba… | 277.08-211.13). An interesting, if not decisive addition to information dating Rongzom comes from the opening lines of The Charter of Mantrins Composed by Rongzom Chokyi Zangpo (rong zom chos kyi bzang pos mdzad pa’i sqags pa rnams kyi bca’ yig). This work is a “document of regulations” (bca’ yig), which bind together a common religious community, that is contained in his collected works (RZSB 2.393-405). This text is remarkable for what it represents and for what it suggests about Rongzom. First and foremost, historically, it is, as far as I am aware, the earliest Tibetan example of a constitution. In socio-cultural and political terms, it suggests Rongzom was an established religious figure in his area, with his own community of disciples. The text opens with a description of a royal Spu hrang wedding:

In the dragon year, at the wedding the prince Srong btsan ’bar, a descendent of Pha b=& mNga’ bdag la, ruler of the region of lower gTsang in the Four Horns of Tibet [i.e. Imperial era districts with administrative and military infrastructure (cf. Uray 1960)], recognized that both mantrins and ordained clergy - the bandé - were distracted from their vows and commitments and lacking in diligence with respect to a rigorous understanding of the holy dharma. After that, in the region of rNar lung rong, Rong zom chos kyi bzang po gathered his committed disciples, and after putting up some representations of the Three Jewels, gave a discourse primarily for householders who are mantrins [i.e. practitioners of Buddhist Secret Mantra or Tantra] (| 1 ’brug gi lo yul ru lag gtsang smad kyi btsad po pha ba [ldz] se’i yang dbon 1 rgyal bu srong btsan ’bar sku khab bzhes pa tsam gyis dus na 1 sqags btsun sde gnis is kyi ban de kun kyang so so’i zdom pa dang dam tshig brung ba la g.yel zhing dam pa’i chos legs par ’dzin pa’i rtse 1 dang mi ldan par mthong nas 1 yul [Rnar] lung rong du 1 rong zom chos kyi bzang pos rang gi dam tshig pa rnams bsdu te 1 dkon mcho gsum gyi rten gnas bu ’ga’ yang btsungs nas 1 dang por khyim pa’i sqags pa rnams la bca’ ba bgyis pa’i mdo | RZSB 2.393.01-393.07)

Dragons years in the eleventh century correspond to 1028 (sa’ ’brug), 1040 (lca’ ’brug), and 1064 (shing ’brug). Drongbu Tsering Dorje, of the Tibetan Academy of Social Sciences, identifies Srong btsan ’bar as the religious name (chos ming) of Lha bla ma Ye shes ‘od (personal communication from Steve Weinberger, 15 January 2012); Drongbu also glossed yang dbon as “great-grandfather” and notes that sku khab, rendered here as ‘marriage,’ can also indicate coronation (rgyal po chags). If the term does refer to that, then the phrase “great-grandfather of Pha b=’ide se” refers to the father of mNga’ bdag la, a man named mNga’ bdag cher po bKra shis ’khor re (Vitali 1994: 114). Vitali notes Pha ba the se [sic] settled in Kho re, in Ru lag, gTsang (1966: 243 n. 345; cf. Sørensen 1994: 468 n. 1751). Pha ba lde se is the middle son of ’Od lde (Sørensen 1994: 468). ’Od lde is the brother of Zhi ba ’od and Lha bla ma Byang chub ’od (Sørensen 1994: 457), who are each located in the “Royal Dynasty of mNga’ ris - in the early eleventh century (Smith 2001: 193). The three, dPal lde, ’Od lde, and sKyid lde, based on Sørensen and Vitali, seem to be siblings of Zhi ba ’od and Byang chub ’od. According to the Tibetan historian, Thu’u bkwam Ngag dbang chos kyi rgya mtsho (1680-1736), “the three lde” brothers were in fact the sons of dPal ’khor bzang (869-899). See Thu’u bkwam grub mthu (Lanzhou 1985: 56.09-56.10; Sørensen 1994: 465). He was an apparently incompetent ruler who was assassinated at age thirty. According to Sørensen, dPal ’khor bzang is the son of gNam ‘de ’Od srun[s] (1994: 438), who, in turn, is the son of the last emperor of Tibet, gLang dar ma. See also Kapstein’s discussion in The Tibetans (Blackwell Publishing, 2006), pp. 88-90, which puts the focus on fractious rivalries among competing camps.
nature of the time he flourished - circa the late eleventh century;\(^8\) and nobody today disputes his place among the luminaries of Tibet’s *Nyingma* tradition of Tibetan Buddhism.\(^9\) We should be cautious, however, about characterizing Rongzom in Tibetan intellectual history as a partisan representative of the ‘Old

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\(^{8}\) That the eleventh century is a formative time is not doubted; and just how Rongzom is situated there usefully complicates Martin’s themes of consolidation and renewal, which indeed have both “analytic and heuristic value even when they fail us” as temporal distinctions, as they perhaps do here. Themes of ‘renewal’ and ‘consolidation,’ “refer to a subjective Tibetan sense of what the main task ought to be” (2001: 6). These themes are a way to talk about the context of Rongzom’s work. Martin elaborates on their meaning:

> I would say, for the sake of argument, that eras of renewal are likely to occur after times of disruption, obviously, and during times of importation, when desirable properties and ideas are being brought in from outside for internal use. In such times, the locally glorious past is reasserted at the same time as the new items and ideas are being integrated. The nation feels strong and unchanging even as it is changing. Times of consolidation to the contrary occur under the real or imagined threat of unwanted invasions, when local goods and ideas are being threatened from without. Such times demand greater internal uniformity, greater conservatism with respect to the immediate past... The great concern at the end of the tenth century up until the Mongol incursion was revival, a kind of return to the glorious days of the empire, but with a primary emphasis on the empire’s religious achievements, not its military might” (loc. cit.).

*The Approach* certainly can be spoken of in terms of a “theme of renewal:” a time of importation after a putatively unstable period. Yet *The Approach* resists the former theme insofar as Rongzom’s lamentation at the opening of chapter four of *The Approach* indicates him to be critical of some consequences stemming from the invasion of a socio-religious culture that accompanies the new literature entering Tibet from South Asia starting in the eleventh century. As widely noted, Rongzom, and *The Approach*, is keen to “defend” local goods and ideas such as the Great Perfection; his notion of just what constitutes authentic Buddhist teaching (cf., *buddhasacana*) is expansive and does not entail Indian provenance (see, e.g. Wangchuk 2002: 284). In fact, Rongzom’s expansive notion of scriptural and religious authority contradicts Ronald Davidson’s assertion that, at the time, “anything un-Indian was by definition un-Buddhist” (2005: 14).

\(^{9}\) Rongzom and Longchenpa (Klong-chen rab-byams-pa, Dri-med ’odzer, 1308-1364) are described as the two indispensible intellectual figures of the Old School by no less a figure than ‘Jug Mi Pham rgya mtsho (1846-1912):

> Although there have been numerous scholar-adepts who have been holders of the long traditions associated with the early translations, two of particular distinction among them all are Rong & Long, who are as renowned as the sun and moon (snga ’gyur pa’i ring lugs ’dzin pa la mkhas grub du ma byon mod kyi \ kun gyi nang na khuyad par ’phags pa kun mkhyen rong klong rnam gnyis zhes nyi bla tar grugs pa yin zhing \ RZSB 1.15.03-15.05).

In fact, the three - Rongzom, Longchenpa, and Mipham - have been taken to represent the Old School’s “archetypical intellectual figures” (Wangchuk 2004: 173).
School.’ Such a statement problematically presupposes the existence of a definable Buddhist tradition called ‘Old School’ in the eleventh century.

The Approach represents one of Rongzom’s most important works. It is a masterly exposition of doctrine based around a constellation of core issues in a sustained argument about the nature of emptiness and illusion, perhaps the most crucial philosophical topic of Buddhism. To understand Rongzom’s thought, and through it arrive at a more nuanced understanding of the eleventh century origins of the most fundamental religious divide in the history of Tibetan Buddhism, this thesis is thus devoted to an interpretative exploration of the

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10 Ronald Davidson asserts that “no one who has read Rongzom’s works would regard him as unpartisan, for he was firmly a Nyingma spokesman” (2005: 232). To be clear, Rongzom does not describe himself as a spokesperson for the “Nyingma.” As will become clearer below, my reading of Rongzom is not that of a mouthpiece for a sect or tradition of Buddhism, but rather as a product of a time when sectarian boundaries are largely unsettled or absent. Therefore, his posthumous inclusion within the Old School (rnying ma), a tradition that with no institutional bases in Rongzom’s time, forms an anachronism, which will be discussed below.

In the context of a purely synchronic analysis (and suspending doubt concerning the conditions for such a historical possibility in a post-Rankean age), it should be clear that many of the themes treated in The Approach are associated with the early translation regime (snga ’gyur) and later explicitly codified under Old School rubrics; but this fact does not mean The Approach is best understood in its historical dimension as, strictly speaking, Old School or a product of it. Yet The Approach’s life owes itself to the Old School; and this point is of interest below in connection with the hermeneutic of tradition. Stealing a phrase from Willemen et al., we should be aware that “in light of the complex compositional and transmissional history of” the Great Perfection, “references to or even sustained discussion [within The Approach] to distinctive doctrines do not, therefore, in and of themselves provide adequate grounds to determine an entire text’s original sectarian identity or relative chronology” (1998: 146) to other lines of development, whether competing or not. The Approach is one voice in a larger conversation, one that survives. Again, Willemen et al.’s description of the history of Abhidharma literature is apt:

At the outset one must acknowledge that only some texts are preserved by the later tradition. Prior compositions are superseded by later ones; they may be either discarded or incorporated in part or in entirety, with the loss of any obvious sign of their initial, separate identity. One cannot, therefore, assume that the extant texts of any genre from any given period provide a complete picture. To assume that the canonized corpus of texts preserved by the tradition either reflects their actual course of historical development or accurately represents their relative significance at the time of their composition is too simple (id. 140).

Yet we must accept the receive history: Rongzom is one of three important intellectuals of the Old School tradition.

11 śūnyatā: stong pa nyid. While this term has various connotations, it is most often connected with the perfection of wisdom (prajñāpāramītā) and the Madhyamaka discourse and text traditions. As such, “emptiness” is the absence of inherent nature (svabhāva: rang bzhin) that qualifies all phenomena and people, meaning there is nothing in something or of something that is quintessential, eternal, and immutable.

12 māyā: sgyu ma/sgyu ‘phrul ma.
content of *The Approach* (i) within the context of Rongzom’s work, (ii) the history of the Old School, and more broadly, (iii) the origins of classical Buddhism on the Tibetan plateau. It is in the lattermost context, in particular, that I also want to remark on a “Tibetan renaissance” as concept and trope.13 The title of Davidson’s valuable work, *Tibetan Renaissance: Tantric Buddhism in the Rebirth of Tibetan Culture*, is, to my mind, problematic in suggesting unintended triumphalism in the service of what is essentially a sectarian perspective.

According to both Ronald Davidson (and Tibetan historiography, generally), the “vigor of the Tibetan Imperium (ca. 650-850)” preceded “the dark time of Tibetan social unrest (ca. 850-950)” that itself ended in the eleventh century, when “Tibetans had come out of the dark ages of the collapse of the Tibetan empire into the dawn of a new period of cultural and religious efflorescence” (2005: 5). As Davidson describes it, it was during the Imperium that “Tibetans developed their first unified civilization” (20). We should treat this idea – of a unified, identifiable “Tibetan” civilization – with caution. At the end of the tenth century, this narrative maintains that “Lha lama Yéshé-Ö was aghast at the forms of Buddhism on display in the kingdom of Gugé, so he sent twenty-one intelligent young men to Study in Kashmir.” In Kashmir and India, it was assumed that true religion could be found. One presumption that underlies this

notion is the idea of Kashmir and India stable societies and repositories of real Buddhism. This is contrasted by Stein, who writes that in Kashmir at the time, “Buddhism and Kashmiri religion had "to a great extent amalgamated."14 Far from perceiving Kashmir as a plenum of Buddhist civilization proper, Rongzom appears concerned about the multitude of discordant theories coming from such regions as Kashmir and Madhyaparadeśa (dbus = Maghada?).15 A criticism he makes several times in different writings.16 In any case, it is important to remember that the Buddhisms, as it were, that were present in Tibet and Kashmir at the beginning of the eleventh century were both equally innovative and temporally distant compared to the Tibetan Buddhism of the so-called Imperial transmission (ca. eighth and ninth centuries CE). Thus, the notion that the transmission of one Buddhism (from India) at one time constitutes a rebirth supposes, or suggests historiographically, that India was a thriving, conservative (‘well-preserved’) Buddhist civilization - and Tibet was, by contrast, degraded and in need of revitalization or rebirth as a Buddhist land. However, scholarly research suggests difference between the two is not a matter of orthodoxy on the

15 kha che dang dbus pa las stogs pa yul gyi dbang gis lta ba mi mthun pa mang du yod la | RZSB 1.463.09-463.10. I remain uncertain about whether the criticism should be interpreted as indicating that the discordant views are due to the influence of the geographical “regions” (yul) such as Kashmir or what Rongzom views as unfortunate philosophical agendas concerning “objects” (yul). Rongzom severally mentions this grouping. As noted above, “Sautrāntika” is a term that appears later than “Sarvāstivāda” (Willemen et al. 1999: 106); in first millennium India, “Sautrāntika” referred to the Western Sarvāstivādins in Bactria and Gandhāra, as opposed to the ‘orthodox’ Kāśmiri Vaibhāṣikas, who pejoratively referred to Sautrāntikas as “Dārśāntikas” (id. xii). Yet, critically, “the appellation Sautrāntika could have been used to encompass a broad range of individual opinions that conform to (some general principles] rather than to a defined and delimited set of doctrinal positions” (109). One note of interest, perhaps, is the “pronounced partiality to the Vaibhāṣika-s” (van der Kuijp 1983: 63) of figures such as the famed logician, Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109-1169), whose philosophical influence “has been felt in all the branches of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy, save for the tantras” (op. cit. 62). We shall explore this connection more below.
16 Similar lines are found in dKon cog ‘grel (RZSB 1.80.15-80.18), as well as in both lTa ba’i brjed byang (RZSB 2.08.15-08.17) and Man ngag lta phreng gi ‘grel pa (RZSB 1.314.21-315.01).
one side (India) and innovation on the other (Tibet), or Indian integrity
contrasted with Tibetan degradation,\textsuperscript{17} but, rather, of centuries of significantly
dissimilar innovations within some overlapping networks with shared
genealogies. An additional point elaborated by Schuh wisely cautions against of
the reconstructing religion in traditional Tibetan historiographical accounts
because such a historical model of the development of Tibetan Buddhism
assumes, incorrectly, Pace Davidson, that during the Imperium there was an
identifiable and unified “Tibetan” people and a unified (that is, single) culture
(\textit{kulturelle Inherits}) necessarily preceding the ‘Dark Age’ in which true \textit{dharma} was
all but lost in Tibet. Such a narrative entails rejecting the validity and authority of
any surviving Buddhism.\textsuperscript{18} Moreover, in lead-up to the eleventh century,
however ‘dark’ it was in Tibet in terms of the epistemology of our historical
knowledge of it,\textsuperscript{19} intellectual culture was clearly alive, innovative, and operative

\textsuperscript{17} The idea that the Tibet domain was without polity during the post-Imperial period is untrue. See, for example, Tsutomu Iwasaki’s “The Tibetan Tribes of Hexi and Buddhism During the Northern Song Period.” In \textit{The Tibetan History Reader}, Tuttle, Gray, and Kurtis R. Schaeffer, eds., (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), chapter 8.


\textsuperscript{19} The epistemological domain, as I mean it in the Tibetan context, is usually delimited in the familiar terms of a “dearth” or “paucity” of evidence - cf. Latin \textit{evidential, evident-} ‘obvious to the eye or mind’ - that indicates we do not know how to find our way because we cannot see the
amidst political and institutional instability, similar to the situation in Kashmir and other Indian locations that were normative for the New School at the time.
Nevertheless, “one persistent theme that develops during this time is the notion that India was the sole authentic source of the true dharma” (Gold 2007: 6).

Indian provenance, during eleventh century, was considered the hallmark of valid religious authority. It appears that the very nature and source of religious authority were contested issues.22

Personal mastery of Buddhist learning and ritual, above all in forms that were believed to represent authoritative Indian Buddhist sources, now became the preeminent marker of personal excellence, and hence the defining feature of an emerging cultural elite… It is the undisputed possession of Buddhist teachings stemming directly from India that verifies one’s worth.23

José Cabezón’s discussion of Buddhist doctrine suggests that a “perceived tension between language qua material entity and the nonmaterial experience that it [supposedly] elicits, leads to an ambivalence in which scripture is at times conceived as linguistic (material) and at times experiential (mental) in nature” (1994: 33). I interpret Cabezón’s statement to entail that the very notion of Buddhist doctrine – as linguistically expressed in an authoritative Buddhist scripture – slips back and forth between linguistic media and evoked experiences. As such, it is a concept structured in terms of both mental and extra-

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22 For example, in a discussion of the character of lay religious groups in the period, Dan Martin comments on competing notions of religious authority when he writes: “We also ought to consider these [lay] groups in the light of different religious points of view about the ideal sources of authoritative guidance and blessing. Arguably, Chag Lo-bsa-ba wa one who preferred to locate religious authority in authentic Indian scriptural texts, while the ‘accomplishment transmissions’ of Nyang-ral located authority and blessings in personal experience and in cults of saints in which the saints are defined as persons believed to have gained contact with Buddhas/Buddhahood through their personal experience or even identity. The Dgongs-gcig finds some of these same persons lacking in the authority that comes from ‘traditional meaning the handing down of realization through a lineage of accomplished masters. Too often we assume that everyone in Tibetan culture did, or had to, share a single vision on these sorts of issues.” See Martin’s 1996. “Lay Religious Movements in 11th- and 12th-Century Tibet: A Survey of Sources,” in *Kailash* 18.3-4, pp. 47.

mental (material) worlds. Likewise, I would suggest, doctrine can slip between the book containing its linguistic expression, and the person who embodies the experiences it seeks to elicit. Thus, the persona of authority in the form of individual religious masters is intimately linked in Tibet with the authoritative transmission and exposition of doctrine. In addition, the oral or written exegesis of these doctrines by such religious masters interprets, in potentially dramatic ways, the text of these scriptures. Accordingly, after Tibet’s “Dark Age,” Rongzom, a Sanskrit translator, scholar, and religious teacher embodies doctrinal authority and its reflection in new compositions for some communities in a transformative period. What is most distinctive about him is that the doctrines which he embodied included a remarkable blend of traditions from both the Old and New Schools.

This study of The Approach thus aims to shed more light on the complexity of the Tibetan response to the concurrent cultural renaissance – and the early history of the Great Perfection tradition, a creative and distinctive tradition specific to the Old School and the Bön. Prior to Rongzom, Great Perfection literature was a poetic, aphoristic, and largely esoteric tradition eschewing the normative Buddhist nomenclatures of Buddhist philosophy (abhidharma) and the South Asian tradition of logic and epistemology (pramāṇa) that were a strong characteristic of the New School literature, preferring instead to develop its own unique nomenclature, what David Germano has described as Great Perfection’s overarching "naturalism."24 The Approach thus creatively situates the distinctively

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24 This description is taken from an unpublished manuscript of David Germano’s 2009 Mysticism and Rhetoric in the Great Perfection (rDzogs chen).
Tibetan discourse on Great Perfection squarely in a broader engagement with other Mahāyāna Buddhist voices, and does so in a highly philosophical manner.

**Rongzom’s Mahāyāna**

The full title of *The Approach* is *Disclosing the Great Vehicle (mahāyāna) Approach.* Ordinarily, the Sanskrit term *mahāyāna* would refer broadly to one of two fundamental religious orientations discussed in the Himalayan Buddhist world; the other known by the polemically charged label *hīnayāna*, or “Lesser Vehicle,” which would presumably include the Śrāvaka and Pratyeka-buddha. In this traditional context, "the Mahāyāna" signals a large constellation of exoteric and esoteric doctrines and practices organized around the teaching of emptiness and the active and altruistic figure of the *bodhisattva.* Unlike the Hearers (*śrāvakas : nyan thos pa*) and mysterious Solitary Buddhas (*pratyeka-jīnas : rang rgyal ba*) that seek to evanesc in the exhaustion of discontent (*duḥkhah : sdug bsngal*) known as the peace of *nirvāṇa, bodhisattvas* actively turn away from that serenity and, striving to attain buddhahood, continue to enter and act in the world driven by the radical altruism called *bodhicitta (byang chub kyi sems)* characterizes their overarching motivations.

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25 There is no tradition of Buddhism that identifies itself by the pejorative diminutive *hīnayāna*; the term is traditionally used in sectarian writings valorizing the Sanskrit Mahāyāna teaching; the Buddhist traditions that organize their canonical identity around Pali literature would be less problematically identified by the more historically accurate ‘vehicle of the hearers’ or *śrāvakayāna;* or ‘vehicle of elders,’ translating the more *theravadayāna.*

26 Siderits 2007: 142. Samuels 1997 appraises of the *bodhisattva-śrāvaka* opposition. The metaphor, *constellation,* as Bernstein notes, is borrowed by Adorno from Walter Benjamin and refers to “a juxtaposed rather than integrated cluster of changing elements that resist reduction to a common denominator, essential core, or generative first principle” (Reynolds and Tracy 1992: 298).

27 More specifically in contrast to non-Mahāyāna forms of Buddhism, we may find soteriological (*bodhi*), philosophical (*śūnyatā*), cultic (the Mahāyāna pantheon), literary (Sanskrit *sūtras,* etc.), and social (broader inclusion laity) outlines distinguishing the Mahāyāna (See D’Amato, M. 2000. *The Mahāyāna-Hīnayāna Distinction in the Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra: A Terminological Analysis, Volume One.* Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, p. 2). This ‘great vehicle’ is also sometimes called
gi ‘grel pa, however, we find a discussion that divides the Buddhist path into two
types: the Dialectical Vehicle (mtshan nyid kyi theg pa)\textsuperscript{28} and the Indestructible or
Vajra Vehicle (rdo rje theg pa). This division follows that given in
Padmasambhava’s Man ngag lta ba’i phreng ba,\textsuperscript{29} which itself includes
Śrāvakayāna, Pratyeka-buddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna within the strictly
non-tantric Dialectical Vehicle.\textsuperscript{30} On this view, the tantric Vajra Vehicle is
contrasted with, and does not focus on the biased approach of, the Dialectical
Vehicle.\textsuperscript{31} Such a division of the paths is connected with the non-vehicle model
used by the Old School and Bön.\textsuperscript{32}

As chapter one opens with a brief discussion of the Mahāyāna, Rongzom
seems to be evoking a standard Mahayana orientation, but then quickly
rhetorically shifts to a quite different approach to understanding the meaning of
the term ‘great vehicle’ or mahāyāna (Tibetan: theg pa chen po). He begins by

\textsuperscript{28} The term tshan nyid kyi theg pa: “lakṣayāna “refers to the whole of Buddhist theory and practice
except” tantra (van der Kuijip 1983: 13). This accords with its position in both the MTPh attributed to
Padmasambhava and the Lta ba’i rim pa bshad pa/man ngag authored by (s)Ka ba Dpal brtsegs (Ehrhard 1990: 8-14); it is clear if the term unanimously includes non-Mahāyāna (ibid 8, 14), though Rongzom uses the phrase as if it does. See, for example, Rongzom’s discussion of vehicles in the Man ngag lta phreng gi ‘grel pa (RZSB 1.311.24-314.04). In other works, Rongzom does use the specific phrase mtshan nyid kyi theg pa chen po. See RZSB 2.34.16-34.19.

\textsuperscript{29} Op. cit.: mtshan nyid kyi theg pa la yang rnam pa gsum ste | mtshan nyid kyi theg pa dang | rdo rje’i theg pa’o | RZSB 1.293.11-293.12.


\textsuperscript{31} Op cit.: rdo rje theg pa ni | mtshan nyid de dag de ltar gtsor mi ston te | sku gsung thugs rdo rje lta’ bu rnam pa’ gsum gyi rang bzhin du mi phyed par ston pas de skad ces bya’o | RZSB 1.312.12-312.14.

\textsuperscript{32} Wangchuk 2007, ch. 5.
exploring the *mahāyāna* as signifying what is disclosed by the transformative realization that *all phenomena* are illusory in character and thereby all essentially equal in some fundamental, significant sense. This description fills the key qualification for realization and actualization of the spiritually liberated state of Great Perfection:

> The disclosure of the Mahāyāna (*theg pa chen po*) approach is something enabled through the realization of the illusory character of all phenomena. The authentic assimilation and consummation of the realization (*rtogs pa tshad du chud cing mthar phyin pa*) that all phenomena are basically the same in being illusory is the approach of the Great Perfection.

On Rongzom’s view, the “great vehicle” is an all-embracing rubric that includes exoteric scholasticism as well as tantric and post-tantric traditions, rather than being juxtaposed against esoteric forms of Buddhism. Thus, for him, it includes the cosmologies of Perfection of Wisdom Sutras and the tantric Kālacakra, the epistemologies associated with Abhidharma and *pramāṇa* and the ontologies described in Yogācāra and Madhyamaka text traditions, as well as the phenomenology of Great Perfection.

In the first chapter, the Tibetan term *theg pa chen po* – meaning “Great Vehicle” or “Mahāyāna” - appears in the first and last sentence of the chapter. This is no accident; the term signifies one of the chapter’s central rhetorical concerns: an inclusive path structure that marginalizes difference between varying practices from the Perfection of Wisdom Sutras revealed in India to the esoteric

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33 *The Approach: de ltar chos thams cad sgyu ma lta bu ’i mthshan nyid yin par rtogs pa ni | theg pa chen po’i tshul la ’jug par nus pa yin la | chos thams cad sgyu ma lta bur ’go mnyam pa rtogs pa tshad du chud cing mthar phyin pa ni rdzogs pa chen po’i tshul yin no | (RZSB 1.458.19-458.21). This qualification that one’s realization be assimilated and consummated - *rtogs pa tshad du chud cing mthar phyin pa* - is similar to one given below: *rtogs shing mthar phyin par khong du chud pas* (459.24-460.01). Both suggests realization of Great Perfection is not “sudden” or “instantaneous”; that it progresses through (*rim gyis*) shades of fulfillment unto completion.
Tibetan scriptures of the Great Perfection. The first sentence proclaims: “I am going to explain just a little bit about engaging in the Mahāyāna approach.”

The last sentence of the same chapter reads: “Those who desire to enter the way of the Great Vehicle should recognize that there is no real entity to be rejected in connection with afflictions; that all phenomena are taught to be fundamentally equal insofar they are like an illusion.”

The next use of the phrase Mahayana after these two incidents is in the first sentence of the third chapter, which is entitled "Distinguishing the Great Perfection Approach Perfecting the Illusory from Other Vehicles that Retain the Nomenclature of Illusion." There, Rongzom correlates accessing the Great Perfection approach (rdzogs pa chen po’i tshul la ’jug) with entering the "Great Vehicle" (theg pa chen po : mahāyāna); the only distinction the author strikes between the two approaches figures around the qualification that all phenomena are rendered "basically equal" (’go mnyams pa) in the realization they are illusory.

The disclosure of the Mahāyāna is enabled through the realization of the illusory character of all phenomena; and the authentic assimilation and consummation of the realization that all phenomena are basically equal in being illusory discloses the Great Perfection approach.

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34 The Approach: theg pa chen po’i tshul la ’jug pa mdo tsam brjod pa (RZSB 1.417.01).
35 The Approach: theg pa chen po’i tshul la ’jug par ’dod pa ruams kyi \ nyon mongs pa ruams la spang bar bya ba’i rdzas myed par shes par bya zhiing \ chos thams cad sgyu ma lla bur ’go’ mnyam par bstan pa’i skabs te \ dang po’o || || (RZSB 1.435.05-435.09).
36 The Approach: de ltar chos thams cad sgyu ma late bu’i mtshan yin par rtogs pa ni \ theg pa chen po’i tshul la ’jug par nus pa yin la \ chos thams cad sgyu ma lla bur ’go’ mnyam par rtogs pa tshad du chud cing mthar phyin pa ni rdzogs pa chen po’i tshul yin no \ (RZSB 458.19-458.21). The assertion that whatever has the character or mark of illusion (sgyu ma’i mtshan yin) precludes the extremes of existence and non-existence is found in Madhyamaka discourse employed in tantric literature such as Tōh. 2486: Rdo rje theg pa’i rtsa ba’i ltung ba’i rgya cher bshad pa (Vajrayāna-mālāpati-ṭīka) in bsTan’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1997, rgyud, zi’i, vol. 27, (Beijing: Krong go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang), which, for example, cites Āryadeva: \ ji srid yod par rtog pa na || de yang sgyu ma’i mtshan nyid min || ji srid med par rtog pa na || de yang sgyu ma’i mtshan nyid min || (801.01-801.03).
That is, according to *The Approach*, insight into the illusory nature of reality discloses Rongzom’s 'Mahāyāna approach' (*theg pa chen po’i tshul*) to Buddhist doctrine, i.e. recognizing that all phenomena are *illusory*; in contrast, the 'Great Perfection approach' (*rdzogs pa chen po’i tshul*) is the culmination (*mthar phyin pa*) of that disclosure, which adds a recognition of the total *equality* of all phenomena in their illusory character, whether positive or negative, "pure" or "impure," and so forth.37 One sense here is that, for Rongzom, Great Perfection is a way of reading or understanding Buddhist doctrine that precedes it, rather than being a completely different self-enclosed doctrinal system. The reader is reminded again by the chapter title of an important element of Rongzom’s project: the formation and distinction of a Great Perfection discourse different from, yet genealogically elemental to, other Buddhist discourses that teach all phenomena to be *illusory, akin to an illusion, or illusion-like* (*sgyu ma lta bu : māyopama*). Here, Buddhist discourse on the *illusory* (*māyopama : sgyu ma lta bu*) constitutes an important documentary dimension of *The Approach*. Through it, *The Approach* symbolically objectifies Rongzom’s Great Perfection discourse in *The Approach* with the well-known Buddhist trope concerning “the illusion-like nature of reality.”

Closely relating while contrasting the Tibetan terms *theg pa chen po* with *rdzogs pa chen po* ("Great Perfection") is the first hint a reader of *The Approach* receives concerning Rongzom’s inclusive theory of the Buddhist doctrine of the

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37 We note this qualification - *rtogs pa tshad du chud cing mthar phyin pa* - is similar to one given below: *rtogs shing mthar phyin par khong du chud pas* (459.24-460.01). Both suggest the possibility that the realization of Great Perfection is not an utterly "sudden" or "instantaneous" break from one state to an utter other; here, it progresses through shades of fulfillment unto completion. This attitude structures the Mahāyāna path such that Great Perfection discourse "does not deny, improve upon, or depart from" (*khyad du mi gsod, bogs mi ’don, phyir mi zlog*) the path set forth in the lower vehicles such as, for example, in Prajñāpāramitā discourse.
path. Corralling, as it does, several putatively different - and often traditionally (in polemical literature) said to be conflicting - approaches to the Buddhist path, the subject matter of the first chapter fosters our own opportunity to raise the question of interpretation in Rongzom’s work; and we glean insights into how he negotiates what appear to be incongruous approaches to Buddhist theory: How does Rongzom envision the relation between different theoretical approaches to the Buddhist path ranging from Śrāvakas to the Great Perfection? Here, it is important to recall Schmithausen’s remarks that while Buddhist teachers may innovate theoretically, they need not necessarily conceive of the innovation as "new in substance" (1981: 201); and this seems apt in the context of Rongzom’s inclusivist approach to Buddhist doctrine.

THE ISSUE OF AUTHENTICITY & THE WORK OF A HERMENEUTE

Before looking at the particulars of Rongzom’s Approach, a few words on the place of this work in Tibetan intellectual history. The Approach concerns doctrinal systems, a common topic for authors of the time. When the eleventh century renaissance began in Tibet, important political players in the emerging political kingdom in western Tibetan, called the kingdom of sPu hrangs, “launched a campaign of denunciation” against Tibetan religious traditions associated with earlier Imperial era lineages and translations (snga ‘gyur). The conviction that some of those traditions were not authentic partially motivated the Tibetan mission that sent monks to India and Kashmir at the time to find true religion.

38 Rongzom’s integrated theory of path structure forms a point of interest below and is discussed in the context of his essays.
39 Wangchuk 2002: 266.
Rongzom flourished at the beginning of the new translation period (gsar ‘gyur); he was, in fact, an important actor in the translation and exegesis of new literature.

The indigenous Tibetan response at the time amongst adherents to the older translations and lineages is, by and large, has yet to be fully documented. Ronald Davidson, however, has suggested those adherents became involved in an effort at reinvigorating the religious role of clans and aristocrats and promoting Imperial sites as well as Imperial and post-imperial era lineages in the production of “treasure” or gTer ma literature, responses to criticism of the authority of their literature and traditions, and safe-guarding of the Great Perfection from attacks. Davidson writes:

the most important parts of the indigenous reaction are the literary trope of the treasure texts as part of the legacy of the emperors, the rejoinders to questions about their own textual authenticity, and the defense of the Tibetan doctrines of the Great Perfection. These entailed reasserting clan and aristocratic functions, defending the new texts and their ideologies that were matured by Tibetans during and after the period of cultural dislocation, and revalorizing imperial (or ostensibly imperial) sites as the sources of true spirituality.⁴⁰

One thing adherents were not doing in Rongzom’s time is writing texts along the lines of The Approach, namely synthetic treatises exploring the doxographical systems of Indian Buddhism and writing systematic formulations of how they relate, including utilizing the Great Perfection as a lens into doxographical systems. That The Approach is so involved in exploring hierarchical rankings of Buddhist theoretical systems – and that it uses Great Perfection as a lens through which to resolve tensions between home and alien traditions. That is, the fact

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Rongzom uses Great Perfection to resolve consonant inter-relations between different systems commonly supposed to be in conflict with one another makes Rongzom’s *Approach* unique for the time. Before discussing the details of this issue, I want to discuss generally some of the complex issues of scriptural authenticity, doctrine, and textual expression, at work therein.

In his one paragraph story, *On Exactitude in Science*, Jorge Luis Borges describes a people so exceptionally ardent in the art of cartography that the culmination of their effort to map their Empire becomes as comprehensive as the Empire itself - when completely unfolded, the map’s size is precisely that of the Empire in its own geographical extent. This mania, in some sense, approximates J. Z. Smith’s notion of the work of a hermeneute in the face of canon and the necessity to extend its domain. A similar mania can easily overcome scholars when they confront complex, detailed intellectual systems consisting of many texts – cf. “canon”41 – ideas, and practices, with variants at every turn, especially when negotiating across such huge boundaries as the Himalayas between India and Tibet in the eleventh century, or the Pacific Ocean between Tibet and North America in the twenty-first century. Thus, especially in such a formative age as the Tibetan Renaissance, the task of the exegete or “hermeneute” to be selective, but to do so in an expansive way, as well as to provide a totalizing exegesis that

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41 “Fundamental to understanding some Tibetan ‘canons’ is that they are open entities. We can therefore only concur with P. Skilling, when he writes that it is even inaccurate to speak of a ‘canon’ in connection with ‘the Kangyur or the Tengyur.’ Being to some degree subjective compilations, based in part on the interests and biases of the individual compiler(s) or to the school to which he or they belonged, these collections never fully served as normative entities… We do not really know what a Kangyur or a Tengyur may have looked like from the tenth through the late-thirteenth centuries.” [final emphasis mine] See Schaeffer, Kurtis R., and Leonard W. J. van der Kuijp, eds. *An Early Tibetan Survey of Buddhist Literature: The Bstan pa rgyas pa rgyan gyi nyi ‘od of Bcom Idan Ral Gri* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies, 2009), 11. The topic of canon will be addressed again in thesis conclusions.
uses the tradition to explain everything from birth in samsāra to enlightenment as a Buddha, and everything in between:

When there is a canon, it is possible to predict the necessary occurrence of a hermeneute, of an interpreter whose task it is continually to extend the domain of the closed canon over everything that is known or everything that exists without altering the canon in the process. It is with the canon and its hermeneute that we encounter the necessary obsession with exegetical totalization.42

This is not to suggest that there was a readily identifiable and established “Buddhist canon” in Tibet in the eleventh century. In fact, there was nothing like a “closed” or “fixed” canon in Buddhist India.43 Thus, when I ask ‘What is Rongzom doing in The Approach?’ or “What is The Approach is doing in the intellectual history of Buddhism?”, I am trying to understand Rongzom’s negotiation of a pathway between his own interpretative agenda and the dangers of representational mania when confronted with the extraordinary complexities of Buddhist thought – and “the necessary obsession with exegetical totalization.”

A QUESTION OF DOCTRINE

The Approach thus engages many different types of Buddhist doctrinal systems in its larger, integrative effort, but does the text itself constitute a doctrinal system in its own right? Here, I will draw on a distinction given in Griffiths’ Problems of Religious Diversity between a teaching and a doctrine.44 For Griffiths, a doctrine

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44 As an example of the former in Christianity, he cites the religious doctrinal claim “Jesus is the Christ”, while for the latter, he points to a common teaching such as “frequently make private
is a religious claim that aims normatively to imbue itself with such authority that it becomes constitutive of the tradition’s identity and thus gain hold over the religious community in question. Teachings, on the other hand, can be rejected without a loss of religious identity. Just where to draw those lines in the Tibetan Buddhist world is difficult. What is the comparative status of different doctrinal systems within Buddhism? To be sure, we may say, along with traditional past and present, that the Four Seals of the Buddhist teaching (caturmudrā : phyaṅ rgya bzhi)—i.e. (i) everything put together falls apart; (ii) everything contaminated is something dissatisfying; (iii) all phenomena are without self; (iv) nirvāṇa is peace—constitute classical Buddhist doctrines in Griffiths’ sense. What is the comparative status of different doctrinal systems within Buddhism? We may refer to the “doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā” or its “doctrine of emptiness,” or to the “doctrine of tantra” or its “doctrine of primordial purity.” The text at the core of this dissertation has been described as a defense of rDzogs pa chen po or the Great Perfection, a Tibetan philosophical and contemplative tradition developed...

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45 confession of your sins”. I do not use this example, however, because the former is a truth-claim about reality and the latter is an practical recommendation. Griffiths is correct, I believe, in making his distinction between the two; but perhaps a more salient example of the latter for our purposes would be something like “homosexuality is a sin.” See Griffiths, Paul J. Problems of Religious Diversity (Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2001) § 2.2.

46 The so-called “four seals indicative of the Buddhist view” (caturmudrā / drṣṭinimittamudrā : phyaṅ rgya bzhi / bka’ rtags kyi phyaṅ rgya bzhi): 1) everything put together falls apart (sarvasamskāra anityatāḥ : ‘dus byas thams cad mi rtag pa), 2) everything contaminated is miserable (sarvasasravāduḥkhāḥ : zag bcas thams cdug bsngal ba), 3) all phenomena are without self (sarvadharmā anātmānāḥ : chos thams cad bdag med pa), and 4) nirvāṇa is peace (nirvāṇaśānta : mya ngan las ‘das pa zhi ba).

47 See, for example, Karmay, S.G. The Great Perfection (rDzogs chen): A Philosophical and Meditative Teaching of Tibetan Buddhism (Leiden: Brill) pp. 13, 124-125, 127; Jackson, David. Enlightenment by a Single Means: Tibetan Controversies on the ’Self-sufficient White Remedy (dkar po chig thub) (Vienna:...
mainly within Bön and Tibetan Buddhism’s Old School. It is believed the term *Great Perfection* was taken from the *Guhyagarbha-tantra*, where it refers to a ritual moment. When *Guhyagarbha* is traditionally interpreted, the commentarial tradition’s interpretation is given in terms of a distant lineage of transmitted precepts – the Mahāyoga interpretation of the Zur clan, Lilāvajra (a.k.a. Lilāsavajra), Buddhaguhya, and Gyung-ston rDo-rje dPal (1284-1365) and others. When interpreted more innovatively in terms of the resultant vehicle (*phala*yāna : *‘bras bu’i theg pa*), it is considered to be the Atiyoga interpretation of Sūryaprabhāśimha, Padmasambhava, Rongzom and kLong chen rab ‘byams. Interestingly, however, Dudjom Rinpoche reports that Rongzom and kLong chen pa represent different interpretations of Guhyagarbha. In any case, Atiyoga – a virtual synonym for “Great Perfection” – gradually developed into a distinct tradition considered the pinnacle of the Old School’s doxographical hierarchy of various doctrinal systems (*grub mtha’*). However, when we examine Tibetan texts

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48 See Tōh. 0832: Dpal gsang ba’i snying po de kho na nyid rnam par rneg pa (Śrī-guhyagarbha-tattva-nīśocaya) in bKa’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rying rgyud, kha, vol. 102 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang), 287-349. According to van Schaik’s analyses, “Great Perfection,” in its development, has referenced a framework for all tantric practice, as a trope for being free from yogic praxis, as a textual category, a Buddhist vehicle (*yāna* : *theg pa*) in its own right, a stage in yogic practice, and a distinct approach to Buddhist practice. See van Schaik, S. “The Early Days of the Great Perfection.” In *Journal of International Association of Buddhist Studies* 27(1), pp. 165–206. In *The Approach*, we are perhaps dealing with a framework not just for “tantric practice,” but as a framework for Mahāyāna practice more broadly. In any case, Wangchuk notes that ‘use of ‘mode’ or ‘method’ (*tshul*) in place of ‘vehicle’ (*theg pa*) is in agreement with Indian sources, where *naya* and *yāna* have been used interchangeably, the former being seemingly even more prevalent than the latter” (2007: 117).


that present these various, ranked traditions in a sequential order usually corresponding to the value placed upon the traditions, we can see clearly that the presentation of these traditions’ differentiating features are a combination of intellectual positions, contemplative practices, and purported states of realization engendered by both. Thus, when the Great Perfection newly emerges as a distinct Buddhist tradition in Tibet, and furthermore gets assertively located at the top of the Old School and Bönpo ranking systems, we must ask precisely in what lay the superiority of the Great Perfection? Does it offer superior intellectual traditions in the form of a systematic philosophy? Or does it represent the same “view” while offering superior methods of praxis to realize that view as a practical affair? Or is its superiority neither in philosophy or contemplation, but rather a more slippery claim that its overall result is in a deeper realization that is achieved more rapidly? Thus, as Rongzom confronts the Borgesian dilemma of a complex Buddhist terrain which he is trying to map, but also through which he is trying to find a distinctive, Great Perfection interpretative path, the precise nature of the Great Perfection’s superiority, and its very identity as a tradition (doctrine? teaching? contemplative system? hermeneutical strategy? etc.) is precisely what is at stake.

The Approach, however, does not contain several elements that come to famously characterize the Great Perfection in the post-eleventh century world. While it has is abundant discussion of many texts from the so-called Mind Series (sems sde) genre of the Great Perfection, The Approach makes no mention of two other important strands of Great Perfection literature: the Space Series (klong sde) and the Intimate Instruction Series (man ngag sde). Later Great Perfection exegeses would tend to normatively present the three – space, mind, and
intimate instruction – as constituting the traditional divisions in Great Perfection literature. Presumably, the reason Rongzom does not discuss the latter two series either because they were either unavailable or, perhaps, uncomposed by his time, or because their development was fundamentally problematic for his understanding of the Great Perfection and its authentic nature and function. In any case, The Approach has been broadly conceived as the earliest Tibetan composition to explicitly defend the Great Perfection from critics of its authenticity at the time through relating it in detail to a normative Buddhist doxography in detail. While this may be the case, we should ask how this is accomplished – by what processes? How does Rongzom intend The Approach to function in this respect in relationship to its reception and use by both advocates and critics in elite intellectual circles?

A SOCIAL ELEMENT TO RELIGIOUS LITERATURE

One way of getting toward an answer to this question is to view The Approach as an object of social interaction.⁵¹ Reading The Approach amounts to an engagement in what Randall Collins, borrowing Goffman’s term, calls an interaction ritual.⁵² The interaction ritual that consists in reading this text simultaneously invokes, secures, and describes a social and religious order while working to shape and

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⁵¹ To be sure, writing a book in Tibetan culture is a creation of “significant social” value (Schaeffer 2009: 139).
⁵² Typically, interaction rituals are types of interaction that connect people to communities. The interactions described “bind members into a moral community, and which create symbols that act as lenses through which members view their world, and as codes by which they communicate” (Collins 2009: 21-22). In the intellectual world, which is immersed in reading and writing, interaction rituals consist by their very nature in “expounding a worldview” (26). On this view, The Approach is concerned to objectify or “bring to life” the Great Perfection through symbolic associations that work to constitute and associate the Great Perfection (and its adherents) within particular intellectual communities.
determine it as well. This is not unlike Hayden White’s notion of *tropics*, processes that constitute the object they purport only to describe. As such, reading *The Approach* can be understood as both a model of and a model for a textual community.

As Michael Christian has observed, “the history of religion is to a very large extent the history of religious communities.” Thus, *The Approach* may be understood not only as a means for being exposed to a doctrine or worldview, but also as a means for exerting formative social effects on the form of religious life inhabited by a community. For the community who use it, *The Approach* builds a world in which Great Perfection plays a distinctive role in the religious projects of contemplation, theory, and interpretation. *The Approach* structures a particular connection between established Buddhist symbols (cf. figures, tropes, and so on), doctrines, practices, communities, etc., and Great Perfection. As a socially effective object, *The Approach* presumably works for a textual community in complex ways. The question, however, is in precisely what way does Rongzom intend *The Approach* to function in this regards and how does this reflect his precise understanding of the nature and status of the Great Perfection? This is essentially the key question of the current dissertation.

It does not appear *The Approach* was widely received in the domain of public discourse of the era. To my knowledge, and this is by no means a confident assertion, *The Approach* is rarely cited after its production until the nineteenth century, presumably 900 years after its composition. Considering that

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Rongzom’s *Approach* took a different tack than other proponents of the Old School at the time, it is perhaps not such a curious fact that *The Approach* appears to have made little or no impact on the public discourse around Buddhism – and the Great Perfection, in particular – in eleventh century Tibet, despite, being held in such high esteem in Tibetan intellectual history by figures such as Go rub lo tsa ba\(^{55}\) and eventually becoming part of the course of education for Old School scholars at institutions such as the Ngagyur Nyingma College in South India. Old School authors were simply not writing synthetic exegetical philosophical treatises in the eleventh century. Our study, nevertheless, treats *The Approach* as an object of social significance whose processes can be placed within the broader intellectual context of the milieu.\(^{56}\)

Paraphrasing Geertz we might say *The Approach* comprises “the essence of religious action” inasmuch as it works toward the “imbuing of a certain specific complex of symbols [i.e. the Buddhist world] – of the metaphysic they formulate and the style of life they recommend – with a persuasive authority.”\(^{57}\) That is to say, *The Approach*, in its documentary aspect, is interested in symbolic association with textual and intellectual communities that anchors its own identity within

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\(^{56}\) We shall return to this topic in the dissertation conclusion. According to McGrath, any discussion of the emergence of doctrine entails addressing three questions: How is the horizon of possibility determined by the past? What social and religious pressures influenced doctrinal assertions (and how)? and How does a doctrinal assertion relate to its historical context? These are important questions. We shall return to them below. For now, we only note that Rongzom was indeed esteemed for his erudition and as a spiritual teacher both during his lifetime and by later Old School figures. Further, as indicated by Dorji Wangchuk, Rongzom is held to be an foundational intellectual figure for the Old School. See Wangchuk, Dorji. *The rNin-ma Interpretations of the Tathāgatagarbha Theory* (Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens / Vienna Journal of South Asian Studies, Bd. Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien, 2004) 173. Cf. McGrath, Alister E. *The Genesis of Doctrine: A Study in the Foundations of Doctrinal Criticism* (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990).

\(^{57}\) See Geertz 1977: 112.
the broader religious project of Buddhism, which produces, conserves, imparts and authorizes structures of knowledge and practices that animate society. *The Approach* imbues a constellation of religious symbols figured around Great Perfection – and the practices and attitudes it recommends – with the religious authority they were lacking in Rongzom’s time. Thus, one function of *The Approach* is to argue for the appropriate place of Great Perfection within Buddhism overall.

Certainly, *The Approach* works to imbue Great Perfection discourse with religious authority. It does so through its documentary relationships with other, established Buddhist texts and contemplative methods, reasoning, allegory, and more. *The Approach* delivers a sustained discourse on Great Perfection that functions to build “upon elements of the past.” Thus, *The Approach* represents, in a sense, one voice in a *massive conversation* about concepts such as religious validity, continuity, and authority. As part of that conversation, which McGrath terms a type of *conflict*, there thrives an instinct to preserve tradition that is informed by the perceived need on Rongzom’s part to perpetuate the Great Perfection by significantly restating it in terms of more normative Buddhist doctrines of the time. To understand the form and content of *The Approach*, it is vital to understand that Rongzom flourished in a milieu in which the literature and lineages he cares most about are under attack. There is thus no need to doubt that the synthetic philosophical agenda of *The Approach*, which sets it apart from earlier works on Great Perfection by figures such as the ninth century Great

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58 The “new” in this case refers to Great Perfection, the Tibetan Buddhist contemplative tradition that was an object of criticism in Rongzom’s time. The “old” in this case refers to all those accepted and established points of Buddhist reference that frame Rongzom’s interpretative work situating the new in consonant relation with the old.
Perfection authors, gNubs chen sangs rgyas ye shes and dPal dbyangs. While both of these figures wrote on Great Perfection – the former’s bSam gtan mi sgron itself being a doxographical treatise “which reduces the various forms of Buddhism into four basic approaches, the gradual (rim gyis), the simultaneous (cig car), Mahāyana, and Atiyoga (i.e. Great Perfection),”59 and dPal dbyangs’ seven extant writings60 – neither’s work (and no prior work on Great Perfection that I know of) approaches the philosophical and synthetic sophistication of Rongzom’s Approach; and neither’s work settles Great Perfection within the broader framework of normative Buddhist doctrines of the time. One helpful way to visualize Rongzom’s integrative Approach is as “a rebirth of images”61 – i.e. as the reconfiguration of elements in his discourse such that they embody a broader more recognizably “Buddhist” domain. Such a rebirth of images is a characteristic accompaniment of the shift toward the “development of a more advanced level of interpretative” confidence that “underlies the genesis of doctrine.”62

**Rongzom & Authority**

As a world-building text (cf. Bildung), The Approach invokes “the prevailing conventions concerning the nature of informed discourse” (more on this just below vis-à-vis śāstra) and organizes itself around a family of “inherited [Buddhist] metaphysical commitments as self-evident, requiring no further

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61 Farrer, A. A Rebirth of Images (London, 1944).
justification.” By doing this, Rongzom not only situates his doctrine firmly within a Buddhist worldview of “inherited metaphysical commitments” (karma, mokṣa, saṃsāra, the sattva-to-buddha model of the path of spiritual development, and so forth) but he also goes beyond the insights of the established scriptures that he documents in connection with Great Perfection while at the same time ensuring his Great Perfection’s consonance with the central insights of those scriptures. This is not entirely surprising since it is clear that translators of the day, such as Rongzom, were part of the process of determining and promulgating forms of religious authority. Thus, The Approach constitutes an interpretative space in which a doctrine of Great Perfection is articulated. Here, we may ask if Rongzom’s doctrine of Great Perfection itself constitutes a full-throated Buddhist system or tradition? In this dissertation, I argue that The Approach does not present a fully-fledged systematic tradition à la kLong chen pa, with its own over-arching structure of ritual and meditative practice. Moreover, as Dorji Wangchuk has observed, Rongzom endorses a more expansive notion of doctrine and authority than some of his contemporaries and predecessors.

Rongzom did not consider Indian provenance as the hallmark of religious authenticity and authority. That he was an important translator and scholar of Indian Buddhist materials of the time makes his position all the more

63 McGrath 1990: 5; cf. N. Rescher’s The Strife of Systems: An Essay on the Grounds and Implications of Philosophical Diversity (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985) s.v. aporetic clusters; see note below.
64 While an analysis of the nature of Buddhist doctrine remains desideratum, such a project goes beyond our present scope. According to McGrath, any discussion of the emergence of doctrine entails addressing three questions: How is the horizon of possibility determined by the past? What social and religious pressures influenced doctrinal assertions (and how)? and How does a doctrinal assertion relate to its historical context? See McGrath 1990: 7.
remarkable. According to Ronald Davidson, the period was dominated by “the neoconservatives, those who formed and propounded the new Buddhist orthodoxy” associated with the renaissance-era formation and dissemination of the so-called New Schools (Davidson 2005: 13). Those schools themselves trace their origins to Indian and Tibetan connections from the tenth century through the thirteenth (Snellgrove 2002: 490), in which the Tibetans were maintaining the closest possible scholarly contacts in India (id. 45). For these neoconservatives,

... anything un-Indian was by definition un-Buddhist, so that all innovations in doctrine, ritual, behavior, or meditation instructions were, prima facie, illegitimate, simply because they could not be tied to an Indic text or Indian tradition (Davidson 2005: 14).

According to Dalton, “a restrictive orthodoxy was being formed” in response to accusations of, among other things, “demonolatry and violent perversions of the dharma” (2011: 16). Scholars describe the age as permeated by the charisma of translators and India as the source of true religion (saddharma). According to Jonathan Gold, throughout the period,

One persistent theme that develops during this time is the notion that India was the sole authentic source of the true dharma. This meant that many of the most important agents in this development would be, once again, "translators" (lo tsā ba) [Gold 2007: 6].

“According to this model,” Dalton writes, “Tibetans were to remain silent and add nothing of their own (rang bzo med pa) to the Buddhist traditions they were importing from India” (Dalton 2011: 16). According to Halbfass, the tradition of eschewing any original content in one’s work was also present in India.67 Thus, it

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67 Sara McClintock notes: “Halbfass (1988: 362) points to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa’s comments in the Nyāyamañjarī to the effect that "he is in no position to expound new ideas or doctrines of his own (na vaṣyam atmiyam abhikavām kām api kalpanām utpādayitum kṣamāḥ). Cf. also the Buddhist author Śāntideva’s well-known verse [at the opening of his famous Bodhicaryāvatāra]: na hi kiñcid apūrvam
is remarkable that, according to Heidi Köppl, “Rongzom appears to have been unconcerned with concealing any sense of ‘private production’ (rang bzo) in his works” (2008: 19). It is not accurate to say that Rongzom would certainly consider anything un-Indian to be un-Buddhist because he “does not categorically rule out the possibility of [an authoritative] tantra being a compilation or a composition of a Tibetan scholar” (Wangchuk 2002: 282). While it appears that some held lineage to be the criteria of authenticity par excellence, Rongzom’s own ideas about religious authority place reasoning and impartiality or “objectivity” (blo gu bo)\(^{68}\) above provenance. His writings display an expansive notion of how authenticity is constituted.

A fundamental conviction of [Rongzom’s], which he applies to argumentation, appears to be that objectivity (blo gu bo) is indispensable for any discussion. His rare sense of objectivity is accompanied by a readiness to combat using reasoning[s] that are invincible against the faults of others (skyon gyis mi brdzì ba), his choice of decisive (thog to phab pa) authoritative scriptures, his skilful use of the quintessential instructions of his predecessors and the treatises of grammar (sgra’i bstan bcos) and reasoning (rigs pa’i bstan bcos). In addition, his expositions are marked with striking analogies and short anecdotes that didactically lend a powerful effect. Employing these methods, he seeks to convince his critics by means of persuasion rather than by reactive attacks.\(^{69}\)

We will ourselves see below that The Approach, and much in Rongzom’s other writings, does employ a remarkable sense of objectivity in the service of making some uncommon arguments in favor of a more expansive interpretation of textual and doctrinal authenticity. For example, Rongzom’s commentary on the


\(^{68}\) Saying that a mind (blo) remains guz bo, is saying that it does not experience attachment to any given perspective (phyogs zhen med pa’i bya phyod kyi ming ste: blo gu bo gnas pa zhes pa lta bu | DYSG 701a).

Guhyagarbha-tantra, the first explicitly authored by a Tibetan on what is unquestionably one of the most important scriptures for the Old School,\textsuperscript{70} one that drew criticism during the renaissance period, suggests that for those who wonder whether or not a scripture is itself is the word of the Buddha (buddhavacana) and therefore to be accepted as authoritative, the job at hand is to establish a connection between the scripture in question and generally authoritative scripture.\textsuperscript{71} That connection is established when its content is properly explained and shown to be in concert with the word of the Buddha more broadly.\textsuperscript{72} This is accomplished through invoking “the three types of witnesses” (dpang po rnam pa gsum),\textsuperscript{73} an approach which, in the words of Pierre Arènes, is generally less suspicious of scripture and reasoning than other hermeneutics.\textsuperscript{74} The three witnesses, according to Rongzom, are used in debates with non-Buddhists (mu stegs pa) who reject the ultimate authority of the Buddha;\textsuperscript{75} the three are given as “the prophetic witness” (lung bstan pa’i dpang po), “the personal witness” (gang zag gi dpang po), and “the witness connected with knowledge by means of so-called scriptural coherency” (lung ’brel ba zhes bya

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{71} dKon cog ’grel: gzhung nyid thams can mkhyen pas gsungs pa’i bka yin nam ma yin the tshog za ba rnam la ni | gzhung spyi’i ’brel ba bsgrib par bya ba yin no \( \text{RZSB 1.76.21-76.22.} \)

\textsuperscript{72} dKon cog ’grel: \( \text{de la bka’ dang ’brel ba khong du chud par byed pa’i tshe ni de nyid kyi khungs su gyur pa’i lung gang yin pa dang nthun par bshad cing ngo bstan pas the tshom sel bar ’gyur ro} \( \text{RZSB 1.77.03-77.75.} \)


\textsuperscript{75} dKon cog ’grel (RZSB 1.78.0-78.10.
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In his general description of a “witness,” Rongzom writes:

In general, while the term witness is given in terms of a trust-worthy person. There is no conflict, however, when we term different bodies of reason [as “witnesses”] when they can bring about trust. These witnesses are established for the opponent and therefore something [they can] trust.

The prophetic witness refers to predictions that are trusted by the opponent as trust-worthy. Dorji Wangchuk describes the three witnesses according to Rongzom:

By witness of prophecy, [Rongzom] means a prediction regarding certain teachings or individuals made by someone accepted by the opponent as an authority. Witness of person refers to an individual of authority accepted by the opponent. References to key concepts of the text in question in a generally accepted work are described by him as witness of reasoning or witness of scriptural coherency (2002: 279).

In short, literature can be invested with authority via revelation, personal authority, and reasoning. This brings us to the question of Rongzom’s concept of doctrine.

**DOCTRINE IN RONGZOM**

In The Nature of Doctrine, George Lindbeck outlines three general theories of doctrine. The first is called a propositionalist theory of doctrine. According to Lindbeck, such theories concern themselves with “the cognitive aspects of
religion and stresses the ways in which church doctrines function as informative propositions or truth claims about objective realities” (1984: 16).79 The second theory of doctrine outlined by Lindbeck is called the *experiential-expressivist*. It “interprets doctrines as non-informative and nondiscursive symbols of inner feelings, attitudes, or existential orientations” (*op. cit.*). This type of doctrine “highlights the resemblances of religions to aesthetic enterprises and” maintains that different doctrines can have the same meaning (16-17). Lindberg’s third type of doctrine, a “cultural-linguistic approach” that combines the former two domains, is called a *regulative* or *rule theory* of doctrine.80 This view, Lindberg writes, emphasizes neither the cognitive nor the experiential-expressive aspect of religion; rather, emphasis is placed on those respects in which religions resemble languages together with their correlative forms of life and are thus similar to cultures (insofar as these are understood semiotically as reality and value systems – that is, as idioms for the constructing of reality and the living of life). The function of church doctrines that becomes most prominent in this perspective is their use, not as expressive symbols or as truth claims, but as communal authoritative rules of discourse, attitudes, and action. This general way of conceptualizing religion will be called in what follows a ‘cultural-linguistic’ approach, and the implied view of church doctrine will be referred to as a ‘regulative’ or ‘rule’ theory (17-18).

As I will argue below that Rongzom’s own approach to doctrine and his broader hermeneutical agenda, with its emphasis on rhetorical persuasion, is (i) at times, best understood as a rule theory of doctrine employing a “conceptual vocabulary

79 Lindberg adds: “For a propositionalist, if a doctrine is once true, it is always true, and if it is once false, it is always false. This implies…. that agreement [between different approaches to the Buddhist path, for example,] can be reached only if one or both” traditions of thought “abandon their earlier positions. Thus, on this view, doctrinal trconciliation without capitulation is impossible because there is no significant sense in which the meaning of a doctrine can change while remaining the same” (16-17).

80 A critical evaluation of Lindbeck’s three-fold typology can be found in McGrath 1990: 14-34 *et passim*. 

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and the syntax or inner logic” that structures the possibilities of certain types of truth claims within the doctrine.81 Here, “the cognitive aspect” associated with propositional claims about the setting of life, the nature of persons, or prescribed and proscribed forms of behavior,82 “while often important, is not primary” (id. 35). What is important within a regulative doctrine is a meta-frame for considering and using such things as logic, analogy, exemplars, scripture, and so forth, within a world of such obvious religious diversity. This shapes the character of the claims that can be made within the system in a way similar to the way a language shapes concepts. Material in each chapter in *The Approach*, we should like to suggest, is at times advantageously read as such a regulative doctrine. This helps us make sense, for example, of Rongzom’s insistence that, properly considered, there is no real and radical break between the different doctrinal systems he surveys in *The Approach*. A regulative doctrine foregoes treating conflicting truth-claims as logical propositions about objective reality and instead works to valuate particular features of what is a commonly shared view of the world or certain tensions, “intentions and dispositions” within that culture, and some of significant effects of particular courses of action (i.e. practices) within it.83 Such valuations, through structuring suggestions of emphasis and so forth, guide and structure what the textual community at first

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81 Another approach to this type of analysis is found in McClintock, Sara *Omniscience and the Rhetoric of Reason in the Tattvasamgraha and Tattvasamgrahapāñjikā* (Ph.D. Dissertation. Harvard University, 2002), §§. 2.1-2.2. There, McClintock discusses the approach to doctrine in terms of a rhetoric that slides up and down a scale of theories that are putatively contradictory. On this view, Dharmakīrti may be said to swing between a Sautrātika and Yogācārin views, positions which conflict, without being held to any.

82 On these three types of religious claims, see Christian, William A. *Doctrines of Religious Communities: A Philosophical Study* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 1.

accepts as part of its conversation with *The Approach*. Eventually, if the discourse is rhetorically successful, the textual community naturally assent to it in such a way that its method of considering the Buddhist path comes to have a claim on the community’s broader worldview and understanding of doctrinal associations. Regulative doctrines can be compared with Wiggenstein’s concept of *language games* (*Sprachspiele*), which is itself not unlike Bourdieu’s notions of *habitus* and *field*. In the sense of a language game, idiom, or nomenclature, Lindbeck compares a regulative doctrine to a “code” that guides users and shapes expectations, claims, and so forth. He contrasts it with the “encoded” content of propositional claims that characterize cognitivist doctrine and suggests its utility lies, in part, in the fact it may accommodate both a particular language game within a commonly shared group of religious suppositions about the setting of life, the nature of persons, or prescribed and proscribed forms of

84 In *Truth and Method*, Gadamer reminds us that conversation “is a process that goes toward an understanding consisting in openness” (TM 385; re openness: see ibid. 293, 362-363, 370, 375; cf. Dreyfuss 2003: 160 n. 27. All Gadamer outlines in connection with understanding texts - that is, hermeneutics - is applicable to his treatment of conversation (TM 385). As with all play, conversation - including most importantly here the understanding of a texts – one playfully, dialogically disappears into what is said (TM 475) as part of any honest engagement. The play of the text masters the players.

85 In *Problems of Religious Diversity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), Paul Griffiths defines a “doctrine” as religious claims that gains an explicit claim upon members of a particular religious community. For Griffiths, religious claims, following William Christian, concern three subjects: “the setting of human life,” “the nature of persons,” or “the proper conduct of persons” (20). When such claims explicitly become a requirement of a religion, they must be either assented to or accepted (24). “Acceptance requires choosing to treat a claim as true (if it’s the kind of claim that can be so treated), or choosing to take a claim as a guide for your life (if it’s that sort of claim)” (28). “If you assent to a claim,” on the other hand, Griffiths writes, “you take it to be true and to make a claim upon you” (26). The concept of “doctrine” used in the present effort, however, does not require the stipulation that it has an explicit claim on members of the Buddhist community. Buddhist doctrines, on the contrary, can be understood to be definitive in one context and provisional in another; and within one context, there maybe disagreement as to the status of a particular claim upon the community. Thus, the concept of “doctrine” at work here is more fluid and flexible than that defined by Griffiths.

behavior.\textsuperscript{87} Put another way, a regulative doctrine allows Rongzom the room to formulate something novel while anchoring it in shared suppositions about religious discourse and experience that negotiate the origins of a people, “their destiny, and why they are obliged to subscribe to particular rituals and moral codes.”\textsuperscript{88}

This stress on the code, rather than the (e.g., propositionally) encoded, enables a cultural-linguistic approach to accommodate the experiential-expressive concern for the unreflective dimensions of human existence far better than is possible in a cognitivist outlook. Religion cannot be pictured in the cognitivist (and voluntarist) manner as primarily a matter of deliberately choosing to believe or follow explicitly known propositions or directives. Rather, to become religious - no less than to become culturally or linguistically competent - is to interiorize a set of skills by practice and training. One learns how to feel, act, and think in conformity with a religious tradition that is, in its inner structure, far richer and more subtle than can be explicitly articulated. The primary knowledge is not about the religion, nor \textit{that} the religion teaches such and such, but rather \textit{how} to be religious in such and such ways.\textsuperscript{89}

It is my position that \textit{The Approach} does not intend to be the voice of a developed tradition. Rongzom’s “doctrine” of Great Perfection, rather, constitutes a set of meta-considerations that guide readers through a particular interpretation of Buddhist theories, stories, and practices drawn from diverse traditions. As such, it reflects a logic of experience exploring the aesthetics of the path, the mind, blessing, dedication, appearance, faith, and so forth. As such, Rongzom’s Great Perfection is not a new system of propositional assertions and contemplative

\textsuperscript{87} On these three types of religious claims, see Christian, William A. \textit{Doctrines of Religious Communities: A Philosophical Study} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).


practices jousting with other religious systems. As such, it is not a system in which one element or doctrinal system is strictly opposed to another in strictly propositional terms - e.g. the truth of faith vs. reason, quietism vs. progression, and so forth – or one in which other systems are dismissively subordinated.

Other approaches are, when properly considered, doors to Great Perfection. Thus, it does not appear that Rongzom views the doctrines associated with such systems as the Śrāvaka, Pratyeka, Yogācāra, and others, as truth claims about reality. Chapter one of The Approach and beyond instead present other doctrinal systems as leading to Great Perfection. Indeed, one might argue, they are necessary entry points without which, one might consider, there is confusion as to the first and final step that brings one to the sought after realization.

**RONGZOM’S INCLUSIVISM**

Rongzom’s doctrine or theory of the Buddhist path is structured around integrity, a term I use in the sense of being whole and undivided. I use this term in addition to the more obvious and popular term “inclusive,” which has been used in recent studies treating Rongzom, to have a technical meaning drawn from Schmithausen’s definition of Hacker’s concept of Inclusivism, defined as a method of philosophical debate (Auseinandersetzung) that "aims not so much at reconciliation but at prevailing over" subordinated approaches (1981: 223). I

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90 This is not to suggest that Rongzom does not criticize alternative theoretical orientation. Indeed, he does. What it more significant for the purposes of the present study, however, is the fact his doctrine of Great Perfection appears to be largely regulative in Lindbeck’s sense.

91 We shall have more to say on Lindbeck and Rongzom’s doctrine below.

92 Wangchuk 2002: 287-288; cf. Almogi 2009: 232 and Higgins 2013: 24-26. Wangchuk 2004: 193 displays caution using inclusivism to describe the approach of the dGe lugs pa luminary, mKhas grub dge legs dpal bzang (1385-1438); and David Higgins speaks of fourteenth century Nyingmapa, Klong chen rab ’byams’ exoteric writings in terms of “an inclusivist schematization” (2013: 21) and “framework” (22 n. 14), his exoteric work in terms of "his ongoing hermeneutic of
want to bracket this definition and I will return to it below because I wish to broaden the scope of the concept of inclusivism beyond this rather narrow characterization since I believe we must do so in order to get a better view of Rongzom’s *Auseinandersetzung*, which does not seem to be sufficiently triumphalistic to justify Schmithausen’s definition of Hacker’s concept of Inclusivism. For now, let us examine the comparative scholarly category of *inclusivism* more closely to see what else it may suggests about its doctrines and the “aporetic clusters” that animate its life in Rongzom’s *Approach*.93

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reconciliation” (24), and, more broadly, of an “obvious trend toward doctrinal inclusivism in rDzogs chen” (26). Concerning his use of this concept, Dorji Wangchuk writes:

Following Paul Hacker’s theory of ‘inclusivism’ as defined by Schmithausen, I distinguish the ‘inclusivistic’ approach from the ‘reconciliatory’ or ‘harmonising’ approach and consider them to be *diametrically opposed to each other*. Thus, a tradition that attempts to reconcile *rāṇ Āsto* and *gzan ston* doctrines by treating them as equal and complementary is said to follow a ‘reconciliator’ or ‘harmonising’ approach whereas a tradition that subordinates either one by interpreting it to have only a provisional sense, is said to follow an ‘inclusivistic’ approach (Wangchuk 2004: 191 n. 76, emphasis mine). Cf. Ruegg 1989: 9 n. 9, Ruegg 2008: 97-99; and Higgins 2013: 25 n. 20. Pace Wangchuk et al. Rongzom’s view is that all views are just that, equal - and not in conflict. Cf. ‘go’ mnyam pa and ‘gal myed.

93 The term “aporetic cluster” is taken from Nicholas Rescher, who writes: “An *aporetic cluster* is a family of philosophically relevant contentions of such a sort that:

1. as far as the known facts go, there is good reason for accepting them all; the available evidence speaks well for each and every one of them, but
2. taken together, they are mutually incompatible; the entire family is inconsistent (1985: 21).

Rescher’s examples of such a cluster includes propositions like “Reality is one: real existence is homogenous.” For our purposes, we might say that in Buddhism, one such aporetic cluster forms around the very foundation of Buddhist theory: the path from *sattva* to *buddha*. The basic conflict between concerned theorists of doctrine is whether over emphasis on the distinction between an unenlightened *sattva* and an enlightened *buddha* produces a soteriologically unbridgeable gap.

Or, conversely, whether over-emphasis on the immanence of *bodhi* within a *sattva* - often spoken of in genealogical or genetic terms (cf. Sanskrit *kūla, gotra*) - risks collapsing the foundational path/fruit distinction, rendering the former superfluous. In the history of Tibetan Buddhism, critics of the Great Perfection have often targeted its emphasis on immanence to rhetorically dismiss it as a “teaching of Hashang.” These attacks reflect the received history of the bSam yas debate in Tibet - in which the immanentism associated with the figure of Hashang and expressed in such phrases as “instantaneous access” (*cig car du ‘jug pa : yugapad*) is rejected in favor of a gradual progression often given in terms of rational engagement within a process of intellectual inquiry. Certainly the immanence of bodhi echoes again-and-again throughout Great Perfection theory; there are many passages in *The Approach*, for example, that say things such as “there is nothing to find,” “no path to traverse,” and “nothing to change,” suggesting the immanence of bodhi entails a lack of actual change along the Buddhist path. Anyone with some familiarity with Rongzom could easily cull such sentences from his writings that can be interpreted at face value as extolling a radical immanentism. According to Rongzom, these remarks indicate conventional ideas of what is, in the end, inconceivable. That said, the rdzogs chen view is that all phenomena
A general description of the concept of “inclusivism” in the context of religious studies is offered by Kristin Beise Kiblinger’s *Buddhist Inclusivism: Attitudes Towards Religious Others.*

Kiblinger writes:

What is meant by ‘inclusivism’? How does it compare to related terms? As I will show, the category of inclusivism has been used variously, but nevertheless there is a common thread. Simply put, the name ‘inclusivism’ comes from the idea of including, so an inclusivistic approach towards others has to do with willingness to include the other or something of the other’s. One might, for example, accept as true or good a doctrine or practice (or many doctrines/practices) from a foreign religious system. Or, one might believe that a religious other could attain ultimate fulfillment or salvation as conceived by the home tradition, despite (or even through) membership in an alien tradition. An inclusivist is open to the presence of truth and value in other traditions, feeling that there is overlap between the foreign and the home faith and/or that there is something distinct that the other can contribute and teach to the home community. In this general usage, the term covers, of course, many possible methods and justifications for such an attitude. It allows that the other tradition might be accepted as a whole or only in part, so that one may be inclusivistic with respect to one thing, such as the truth of doctrinal claims, but not with respect to something else, such as the possibility of salvation. In fact, one may be inclusivistic in my sense while still rejecting numerous or even central aspects of alien religious systems (1-2).

An "inclusivist" method, broadly speaking, "privileges one tradition, keeping it primary, and absorbs something foreign into that" *(id.)* So defined, the term opens up many subsidiary questions about the other element. Thus the term also invites questions, such as whether and to what degree the so-called "foreign" are already perfect. rdzogs chen rhetoric talks at length about how everything, including the sentient beings so typically said to suffer in an imperfect state of conditioning, is already perfect - and always has been *(yas nas sangs rgyas pa).* In the most common Buddhist formulations, perfection is typically correlated with the unconditioned Buddha, while imperfection characterizes the conditioned *sattva.* The phrase primordially perfected works to signal the idea championed in the Great Perfection that there is nothing real to refine or transform through a spiritual path. This idea calls into question the use of the intellect in reasoned analyses: If Great Perfection, in the end, requires an absence of effort *(rtsol myed)* and absence of biases, can it ever accommodate the effort and intellectual judgments that characterizes reasoned, rational consideration? Put another way using Schmithausen’s (1981: 223-224) terms: how is the immanentism so obvious in the "positive-mystical" element of Great Perfection reconciled, if at all, with the "negative-intellectualist" approach The Approach’s reconciles with Great Perfection?

doctrine or element – the “other” in relation to one’s home doctrine, system or tradition – absorbed is also significantly re-interpreted so as to potentially nullify its distinctiveness. Inclusivism is a strategy that deals with “the other.” “The question of the other” – of alterity itself – occupies a central position in any comparative effort, by definition; it is a primary issue in the disciplines of hermeneutics and philosophy.95 Otherness, in one way or another, is a problem that has occupied thinkers from the Madhyamaka figure,96 Nāgārjuna, to Derrida, Foucault, Ricoeur, Habermas, Levinas,97 and Wittgenstein,98 among others. This is the fundamental issue of alterity – how to relate one thing with something that is another thing that is utterly different. Inclusivism, understood in this way - is a strategy valorizing something at home while absorbing something other – which is foreign or different. So defined, the term opens up many subsidiary questions and thus variants, such as whether and to what degree the so-called "foreign" element absorbed is also so significantly re-interpreted as to

95 On the first page of Theunissen’s important study on “the other,” he writes: “Few issues have exercised as powerful a hold over the thought of this century as that of ‘the Other.’ It is difficult to think of a second theme, even one that might be of more substantial significance, that has provoked as widespread an interest as this one; it is difficult to think of a second theme that so sharply marks off the present – admittedly a present growing out of the nineteenth century and reaching the problem of the Other has been thought through in former times and has at times been accorded a prominent place in ethics and anthropology, in legal and political philosophy. But the problem of the Other has certainly never penetrated as deeply as today into the foundations of philosophical thought. It is no longer the simple object of a specific discipline but has already become the topic of first philosophy. The question of the Other cannot be separated from the most primordial questions raised by modern thought” (Theunissen 1984: 1; cf. Bernstein 1992: 295).

96 The opening quatrain of Nāgārjuna’s seminal Madhyamaka text, the Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā (MMK), can be interpreted, in part, as a meditation on the absurdity of the other. For, if something X is in fact a distinct other, Nāgārjuna wonders, how can it relate to anything else? A similar anxiety characterizes critical appraisals of inclusivism.


98 Wittgenstein locates the problem of the other in the nature of language and the nonsense he associated with philosophy. For Wittgenstein, it is simple: “as long as there are adjectives like ‘identical’, ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘possible’; as long as people speak of the passage of time and the extent of space, and so on; as long as this happens people will always run up against the same teasing difficulties and will stare at something which no explanation seems able to remove” (Klagge & Nordmann 424).
potentially nullify its distinctiveness. That is, if I can successfully borrow something other from elsewhere and incorporate it at home, it appears its otherness is significantly mitigated in the face of its consonant inclusion at home. In that case, the foreign element does not really qualify as an utterly distinct other. On the other hand, the concept itself seems to suggest that anything it qualifies stands alone as the “home” religion, tradition, system, while other religions, traditions, or systems being related to are secondary and subordinate. In this sense, the description of Rongzom as an inclusive theorist suggests that the Great Perfection that he holds to be the supreme approach to Buddhism is itself a established tradition and system. If we hold that Rongzom’s Great Perfection is not itself a systematized tradition that stands alone in such a manner, not only is the Home/Alien dichotomy inapplicable, we must ask how we describe its relationship to established Buddhist systems? This type of comparative problem is often referred to as “the problem of the Other;” and it calls the comparative nature of difference itself into question.

Thus, the problem of the other raises the question of interplay and interpretation – how do we negotiate what appear to be, or are received as, others, incongruous discontinuities or distinct discourses among religious theories? Given another way, the problem is this: if two things are relatable, just how “other” or “distinct” can they be? These questions touch upon familiar conceptual difficulties that obtain in explaining relations between two different things. The opening verse (kārika: tshig bcad) of Nāgārjuna’s seminal Madhyamaka text, the Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā, too, notes the absurdities inherent in this problem vis-à-vis the notion of “intrinsic nature (svabhāva: rang bzhiṅ) and causal entities. David Ruegg teases out a similar tension connected to
the broader problem of how putatively different religions are related. Ruegg also conjures a type of Uncertainty in his analyses of the relation/distinction conundrum found in juxtaposing strong versions of either the Substrate Model and Borrowing Model, respectively, when he notes that "continuity seems to be somewhat overlooked when, for example, we hear of the BORROWING of Brahmanical/Hindu deities in Buddhism, a procedure which evidently implies that the Indian religious ground or substratum is foreign and exogenous to Buddhism" (2008: 89):

This particular collocation of the two traditions of Buddhism and Brahmanism/Hinduism often presents itself synchronically as a horizontal justaposition in space of two distinct entities, despite the partly common roots of each and hence their diachronic CONTINUITY (2008: 80).

For Ruegg, Hacker's notion of inclusivism (Inklusivismus) falls short in the context of explaining Buddhism's historical and cultural relation with so-called Brahmanism/Hinduism whereas the "substratum model does imply a symbiosis (or an osmosis) between Buddhism and Hinduism that is both a historically conditioned diachronic one and a culturally determined synchronic one" (ibid. 89) thus attempting to dissolve the Uncertainty. Yet this should not suggest utterly no use for Hacker's sense of inclusivism, which Ruegg seemed to recognize, here given in Hacker's last published definition:

100 Cf. Sanderson 2000 as per Ruegg 2008: 105.
101 Ruegg admits his own use of SM is "less a final and definitive interpretation or judgment than it is a means of elucidating the issues at hand" (2008: 89). In order to avoid misunderstanding, Ruegg maintains that emphasis on a substrate does not "totally exclude any possibility of instances of BORROWING... Far from being entirely incompatible, the SUBSTRATUM and BORROWNING MODELS may in fact be complimentary" (90).
Inclusivism is a concept I use to describe data from the area which we term Indian religion and, in particular, Indian religious philosophy. Inclusivism means declaring that a central conception of an alien religious or weltanschaulich group is identical with this or that central conception of the group to which one belongs oneself. To inclusivism there mostly belongs, explicitly or implicitly, the assertion that the alien declared to be identical with one's own is in some way subordinate or inferior to the latter. In addition, no proof is generally furnished for the identity of the alien with one's own (Ruegg 2008: 97).

Schmithausen explains the term to suggest:

a method of intellectual debate in which the competing doctrine, or essential elements of it, are admitted but relegated to a subordinate position, or given a suitable reinterpretation, and which aims not so much at reconciliation but at prevailing over the doctrine or its propounders (1981: 223).

The question for us here is whether this is a useful interpretive tool in the present context. As Ruegg reminds us, to be useful and heuristically fruitful, the applicability of an 'ethic' concept to the study of Buddhism can be worked out in detail only once the 'emic' categories have been carefully identified and analyzed" (2008: 90). This brings us to the question of just how does Rongzom envisions the relation between different Buddhist views or doctrinal systems.

In Rongzom’s work, the term Great Perfection refers to the pinnacle of spiritual development; it is structured, as it were, by an absence of effort and an absence of biases (blang dor). Because of that, questions arise about the status of Great Perfection within Buddhist models of the path. Can the naturally effortless state of Great Perfection ever relate or, as it were, touch upon something other: effort. That is, effortful practices, which are, according to the Old School tradition, considered "lower approaches" when set in relation to the pinnacle of spiritual technologies (atiyoga), the Great Perfection. Can effortful practices lead

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to an effortless state? Moreover, if Rongzom’s doctrine or method is not inclusivist in Schmithausen’s sense, just how does Rongzom envision the relation between different approaches to the path?

Dorji Wangchuk writes that Rongzom’s approach “embraces the multiplicity of the various Buddhist views.” Orna Almogi also describes Rongzom’s respect for “other’s views despite the fact that he himself did not share them” (2009: 232). In the first chapter of The Approach, in which Rongzom survey’s different doctrinal orientations, his reading strategy is certainly one of reconciliation. The analyses there in fact show that these different approaches may similarly resolve a central point of concern for Rongzom. This is the point of his assertion, in the opening of the Madhyamaka section of chapter one (§1.4), that one “will not locate any real entity associated with affliction that is to be gotten rid of - even in the context of their own respective philosophical positions” (rang rang gi grub pa’i mtha’i dbang du byas kyang). In discussing the purpose of his expository method in The Approach, Rongzom writes that his purpose is not to argue against any other doctrinal position, but to demonstrate that, properly considered, theory need not beget more theory vis-à-vis dravya or real entities, which haunt the efforts of those mired in psycho-cognitive biases:

These reasonings, which demonstrate the absence of a real entity associated with afflictions that is something to be rejected, even this reference to undermining all the philosophical theories that insist upon the presence of a real entity associated with affliction that is to be rejected, are not stated in order to undermine someone else’s philosophical position through conflict [or contradiction]. Rather, it is proclaimed that [by means of these reasons] one will see eradication of her own philosophical position

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103 Wangchuk 2002: 288. To be clear, Wangchuk’s description is explicitly given in the context of Schmithausen’s interpretation of Hacker’s theory of Inclusivism (2002: 288); and that his interpretation of, for example, Guhyagarbha cannot be understood outside of it (287).
In *The Approach*, Rongzom continually cycles through explanations that accord with approaches found in "lower" spiritual orientations. *The Approach* is constantly making reference to the doctrines of Śrāvakas, Pratyeka-buddhas, Yogācārins, Mādhyamikas, and Guhyamantrins. Yet, as far as I know, *The Approach* makes no reference to a "lower vehicle" of Hīnayāna - and why would it? The title says it all: it is the *Mahāyāna* approach with which Rongzom is concerned. It is worth asking, as we will throughout this study, if Great Perfection, for Rongzom, is not a particular type of Mahāyāna meta-theory for interpreting Buddhist doctrines.

Rongzom's "embrace" of lower doctrines of the path means, among other things, that his writings often do work that takes in difference; his Great Perfection sits comfortably within the doctrines of other Buddhist systems. In this context, in particular, it does not appear that Rongzom is concerned with interpretative jousting his way to a logically faultless doctrinal victory in which Great Perfection "prevails" over lower approaches. Key to my interpretation is Rongzom's claim that the highest approach does not to *depart from, improve upon, or nullify* (bog mi 'don, khyad du mi gsod, phyir mi zlog) the admittedly effortful practices requiring intellectual engagement associated with the so-called lower

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104 *The Approach*: ‘di ltar nyon mongs pa rnams la spang bar bya ba’i rdzas myed par bstan pa’i rigs pa ‘di dag nyon mongs pa rnams la spang bar bya ba’i rdzas yod par ’dod pa’i grub mtha’ rnals la gnod pa dmigs pa ’di’ang | gzhan gyi grub mtha’ dang ’gal bas gnod do || zhes brjod pa ni ma yin te | rang rang gi grub mtha’ nyid kyi rang rang gi grub mtha’ ’joms par byed pa mthong ba brjod pa yin te | (RZSB 1.434.01-434.05).

105 The English word "prevail" derives, in part, from the L. *valere*, meaning 'have power.' This martial connotation is, I think, difficult to reconcile with Rongzom’s attitude. According to Rongzom, there is no conflict between higher and lower approaches.
approaches. Rongzom's integrative assertion is clear: there is no real, radical
distinction to be made between his Great Perfection and approaches considered
"lower" than it. Rongzom uses the ocean and its constitutive streams as a driving
metaphor.

Dorji Wangchuk points out that in his discussions on the variety of
different approaches to the Buddhist path, Rongzom uses the phrase *sangs rgyas
kyi chos thams cad ni ro gcig pa tshul gcig pa*, which means “the unified approach
or "one way in which all the buddhadharma is [resolved within a] single taste” or
affective experience. This phrase echoes a passage found in the *Mahāyāna Sūtra
in Thirty-three Chapters*, which states:

> O' divine child, if a bodhisattva is possessed of the four qualities, all
phenomena are recognized in one process, one affective experience, one
disclosure, and one teaching; because of that, that kind of recognition does

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106 Cf. TBJBy: | gong ma gong ma rnams 'og ma 'og ma rnams kyi spros pa chod pa'i rigs las bog mi 'don phyir mi ldog go | | spros pa mo chod pa'i rigs las spros pa gcad par bya ba yod cing gcod kyang gzhi khyad du mi gcod phyir mi zdog go | (RZSB 2.10.04-10.08). This should not suggest there are no differences between approaches that are meaningful to talk about. To the contrary, Rongzom
writes, bet

107 Cf. Wangchuk 2002: 287-288; Wangchuk 2004: 201 n. 105. The terms ekanaya, tshul gcig po, and ekarasa are notably correlated in Takasaki's treatment of RGV (303 n. 72). The *ekāyāna* theory, as is
well known, is associated with the Lotus Sutra and others. See PDB 281-281, Watson 31, Huineng et al. 76, among others. On the place of *ekāyāna* theory in the context of *tathāgataagarbha* and
various textual tradition’s interpretation of both, see Ruegg 1969.

108 Wangchuk translates the phrase: "All the Buddhist teachings are a single mode with a single
taste" (2002: 288). "Single taste" literally renders ro gcig : ekarasa. The Sanskrit term *rasa* is used in
literary theory referring to the aesthetized emotion; the term is traceable is to dramaturgy (*zlos
gar : nāṭika*), specifically, the *Nāṭyaśāstra* attributed to Bharata. Dates of this figure are unsure; but
the earliest known commentary, Udhamta, is 8th century. *Rasa* has a role in Sanskrit literary
theory connecting the use of particular poetic qualities (*yon tan : guṇa*) and figures of speech
(*rgyan : alāṅkāra*) to soteriologically valuable subjectification; that is, *rasa*-s, used properly, induce
aestheticized experience. McCrea (HOS 71) traces the changes marked with Anandavardhana's
articulation of *rasa-dhvani* theory in the *Dhvanyāloka*. The poetic theory of so-called Alāmkārikas
such as Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Udhamta, Vāmana, and Rudra (all of whom flourished between the
ninth and centuries) is juxtaposed with the *rasa-dhvani* theory of those such as
Anandavardhana (fl. 850) and his followers; and there are interesting ontological and
epistemological tensions underpinning the literary theories that come into view because of it.
Worth noting, too, is McCrea's use of a Kuhnian model of knowledge (i.e. paradigmatic) in his
study (see 19-26, n.b. p. 26 n. 43), on which, see Kuhn's 1970 Structure of Scientific Revolutions.
not access two types of phenomena [in terms of pure and impure,] worldly and transcendental... and that is because [those bodhisattvas] correctly do not see bodhi as something other than sattva.  

While it is not certain this passage inspired Rongzom, the similarities to his view of equality are remarkable. Rongzom's phrasing also recalls that of "a unified Great Perfection ground" (rdzogs pa chen po sa gcig pa) found in the Kun byed rgyal po; and it recalls the idea in Bön tantric epistemology that the ground need not be exclusionary in its unity.  

The basic idea is that the Great Perfection is the single ocean into which its constitutive streaming paths flow, thus suggesting a profound commonality. The ocean, in a fundamentally significant sense, is its streams. In his commentary
on the Guhyagarbha tantra, called dKon cog ‘grel, Rongzom discusses the relation
between various approaches in Buddhism. In translation from Dorji Wangchuk:

All the Buddhist teachings are a single mode with a single taste. Likewise,
there is in the end nothing that is not embraced and included in the
expanse of the great equanimity [of the Great Perfection]. For instance, all
the small rivers join the big rivers, and upon their arrival in the ocean, they
all become identical in their salty taste. Similarly are all the 'minor
entrances' of the lower vehicles: the water of realization of the selflessness
of the individual carries along gradually all the dirt of the belief in [real
entities], joins the greater vehicles, and finally flows into the great ocean

Beyond the interesting figure of "gradually" joining the ocean of Great Perfection,
we note the result is "taken" as the path to it; this paradoxically suggests the
resulting effect itself, paraphrasing George Herbert Mead, contributes to and
becomes an essential factor in its own development. 113 Again in his commentary
on Guhyagarbha, Rongzom speaks to the subject of any real difference between
approaches (the translation is my own):

In this [Great Perfection], there is no natural difference between
phenomena associated with ground, path, and fruit - or even all
phenomena associated with the buddha ground. Since the ground itself is
taken as the path and there is no particular distinction between the fruit
and the ground, [Great Perfection] presents what is called 'the esoteric
intimate advice (upadeśa) as the final definitive point of all the
buddhas.' 114

The binary samsāra and nirvāṇa is just a way of talking about things (tshig gi lam :
vākpatha); and if the two extremes aren't real, neither is any middle way between

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113 “But there is nothing odd about the product of a given process contributing to, or even
becoming an essential factor in, the further development of that process” (Tomasello 1999: 13). Cf.
tathāgataagarbha.
114 dKon cog ‘grel: sangs rgyas kyi sa’i chos thams cad kyang ’di’i gnas skabs su [202] gzhi dang lam dang
‘bras bu’i chos rnam par rang bzhiin bye brag tu gyur pa med di \ gzhi nyid lam du byas pa yin la \ ‘bras
bu gzhi las khyad par ’phags pa med pas \ ’di ni sangs rgyas thams cad kyi gsang ba’i man ngag nges pa’i
don mthar thug pa yin no zhes bstan no \ (RZSB 1.201.24-202.03). Cf. Wangchuk 2007: 41 n. 92 and
Almogi 2009: 200 n. 38.
Here, the Great Perfection is called the intimate spiritual advice that cuts to the core concerns of any tantric approach, whether generation or perfection stage. (To be clear, in The Approach, the term "Great Perfection" is given multiple valences; not just intimate advice. Great Perfection is, variously described as a yāna, āgama, pravacana, tantra, abhisamādhi/abhiprāya, and upadeśa.)

My interest here is not to jettison the value of inclusivism as a comparative category, but to expand its scope beyond Schmithausen’s notion of Hacker’s concept in the context of describing Rongzom’s philosophical method in The Approach. Certainly Rongzom is inclusivist in the sense that, in Kiblinger’s words, “he is open to the presence of truth and value in other traditions”; and he in inclusivist in Schmithausen’s sense insofar as Rongzom’s philosophical method does indeed admit and reinterpret elements of other doctrines into his exposition of Great Perfection. Rongzom’s integrative inclusivism, however, is not, strictly speaking, aimed less at reconciliation than at prevailing over these other approaches. Why does Rongzom emphasize an integrative rather than subordinative form of inclusivism of the path structure? Simply put, if you emphasize the flow of every river in the ocean, commonality comes to the fore. Rivers, like sentient beings, begin in a variety of environments and conditions: above and below ground, high and low; some are gentle; others turbulent; most somewhere in between. However, in the end, they all go the same place. In life,

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115 RZSB 1.506.09-506.12; cf. Almogi 2009: 258 n. 56.
116 man ngag : upadeśa. This term is explained in dKon cog ‘grel: man ngag sning po’i le’u zhes bya ba la | man ngag ces bya ba ni \ u pa dhe sha zhes bya [203] ba’i sgras don phyin ci ma log par gtan la ’be ba la yang bya \ nram pa gcig tu u pa ni ne ba \ dhe sha ni bstan pa ste \ don chen po bsgrub pa la thabs nye bar bstan pa ni man ngag ces bya’o | (RZSB 1.202.24-203.03).
117 gSung thor bu: \ ji skad du bstan pa’i tshul de dag [64] gis ni \ bskyed pa’i tshul dang rdzogs pa’i tshul gyis bs dus pa thams cad don gyis bs dus pa yin no \ rdzogs pa chen po’i tshul ni de dag thams cad rting gcod pa’i man ngag yin te | (RZSB 2.62.24-63.03).
the variety of personal mindstreams indicates a variety of approaches required
for healing them.

With the various approaches streaming into the ocean, the ocean becomes
as if conditioned by the streams though not caused by them. If radical absence
structures the possibility of writing in Derrida, harmony structures the
inevitability of Great Perfection in Rongzom. In Rongzom’s view, the ocean is, in
fact, a part of the river; and the sattva-to-buddha dichotomy conditions the
possibility of a rhetorical and interpretative space in which discourse about the
path takes place.

In Great Perfection, problems are "removed rather than rejected" (bsal
zhing dor ba yang ma yin te)\(^{118}\) and the character of awakening consists in the very
absence of any real possibility for either sin or merit.\(^{119}\) To put that another way,
if the later Wittgenstein’s method works to dissolve rather than resolve
philosophical nonsense, Rongzom’s model of the sattva-to-buddha path works to
dissolve rather than resolve the possibility of any real distinction between the
two.

Rongzom’s writing carves out the value of rational inquiry in particular
contexts, in careful terms. In his epistemological essay, in the very next sentence
after stating that dialectical inquiry is "not capable of logically proving anything
of vast and profound significance," Rongzom writes: "it is also nevertheless not
the case there is no method for understanding through analytical insight".\(^{120}\) For
Rongzom, the question of whether spiritual realization is swifter or slower is

\(^{118}\) The Approach: mtshan ma’i spros pas zin pa’ang myed | mtshan ma bsal zhing dor ba yang ma yin te
| RZSB 1.498.10-498.12.

\(^{119}\) The Approach: byang chub kyi mtshan nyid ni nges pa’i don du na | sdig dang bsod nams gn yi’ ga
nye bar zhi ba’i mtshan nyid tsam yin no | RZSB 1.443.02-443.03.

\(^{120}\) sNang ba lhar grub pa (RZSB 1.560.08-560.11).
hyper-contextual: it should be classified according to the distinctions relevant to a particular person, her particular path, and the particular occasions on that path; yet, on Rongzom's view, there is no distinction in the fruits the varieties of Buddhist paths attempt to cultivate.\footnote{gSung thor bu: \textit{de la lta ba la khyad med pa ni | don dam par chos sarba kun dang bral bar 'dod pa dang | kun rdzob snang ba sgyu ma tsam du 'dod pa ni theg pa chen po kun mthun no | snang ba nyi sens kyi snang ba yin par 'dod pa ni | mal 'byor spyod pa dang mthun no | spyod pa'ang snying rje chen pos sens can yongs su mnyan ngan las bzla ba' ispyod pa \_\_\_\_ | ni mthun no | mngon par rtogs pa myur mi myur ni gang zag gi khyad par dang lam gyi khyad par dang | lam gyi gnas skabs kyi khyad par gyis dbye'o | 'bras bu la khyad par med do | (RZSB 2.35.01-35.06).}

"The higher and lower theories," Rongzom writes, "only [embody] varying degrees of fixation on appearance as [solid, real] things."\footnote{The Approach: \textit{lta ba mthon dman ni snang ba la dngos por zhen pa che chung gi bye brag tsam ste | RZSB 1.459.04-459.05.} He does not oppose them in strictest terms; nor does he say they are irreconcilable or wrong in their view; the crux of the matter is assenting to appearance as real rather than illusory. When taking this very tantric orientation as the point of departure - Rongzom's preferred perspective - \textit{The Approach} analyzes and compares the higher and lower approaches in terms of their affinity with Great Perfection as a scale of decreasing fixation on the solidity of appearance that ascends toward Great Perfection. It is certainly true that \textit{The Approach} describes the downfalls of dialectical philosophy regardless of approach; but is quite clear that when properly considered, the work of various approaches, in the end, merges. This facet of Rongzom's work displays very little antagonism toward supposedly "lower" doctrines or systems.

In effect, higher doctrinal approaches do not depart from, improve upon, or nullify lower approaches. Streams can be (theoretically) guided; but that need falls away at the mouth of the sea, where they spill into the plenum of their completion. Here, subordinated doctrines are on a continuum with Great
Perfection that is characterized in terms of the degree to which one has assimilated and perfected her view of "equality" (mnyam pa nyid), which sees all phenomena to be fundamentally the same insofar as being equally illusory from the point of view of appearance. The language is suggestive of the conventional domain of experience and supposes an inversely proportional relationship between the conditioned view of inequality and the perfected view of equality characterized in The Approach’s Great Perfection discourse:

Insofar as the view of equality waxes, the view of inequality wanes. In short, [the view of equality] simply slowly diminishes fixation on realist views.123

Above, we noted phrases such as "nothing to change" and "no path to traverse"; here, Rongzom’s rhetoric swings to the other side of the horizon of conceptual tensions suggesting the kind of change denoted by verbs such as vdiminish. At face value, it could suggest change without effort. To be sure, the gradual Buddhist path is not strictly opposed to it own perfection here.

* * *

Now, I want to touch on the theme of the illusory as it works in The Approach; throughout, the notion of the illusory (sgyu ma lta bu : māyopama) echoes again and again as a touchstone for the text’s reflections on the intimate intersection of theory, practice, and reality. At the opening of The Approach’s third chapter, for example, Rongzom writes that "the authentic assimilation and perfection of the

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123 The Approach: ji ltar mnyam par lta ba shes che ba ltar | mi mnyam par lta ba ‘grib par ’gyur ro | ndor na dngos por lta ba’i zhen pa khad kyis bri bar zad do | RZSB 1.502.21-502.23. The term "realist view" corresponds here to the Tibetan dngos por lta ba. Realist views are found amongst “those who put forward the real or objective existence of entities” (dngos por smra ba). That is, the phrase is used to refer to “a philosopher who accepts unassailable reality in any form, whether objective or subjective.” See McClintock’s “The Role of the ‘Given’ in the Classification of Śāntarakṣīta and Kamalaśīla as Śvātantrika-Mādhyamikas.” In The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does Difference Make? Dreyfus, G.B.J. & McClintock, S.L. eds. (Wisdom Publications, 2003) 131.
realization\textsuperscript{124} that all phenomena are basically the same in being illusory is the Great Perfection approach." That phrase, "assimilation and perfection of the realization," corresponds to the Tibetan \textit{rtogs pa tshad du chud cing mthar phyin pa}. It is also found a couple pages later, when Rongzom writes:

\begin{quote}

it is because of realizing and, in the end, assimilating \textit{(rtogs shing mthar phyin par khong du chud pas)} the very basic equality of all phenomena according to the Great Perfection approach\textsuperscript{[460]} that awareness remains thus undeluded by the influence of appearance, is incapable of generating conceptual construction, is unbiased and remains unmoved and unexerted.\textsuperscript{125}
\end{quote}

This choice of words does not seem careless at all; and the phrases \textit{tshad du chud pa} and \textit{mtha’ la phyin pa} work for notions of progressive cultivation.\textsuperscript{126} In \textit{The Approach}, Rongzom does not attempt a narrative description of the transition or transformation from conditioned to unconditioned; but he does seems to mostly say that process is involved in getting there.

When it comes to the rather spooky move between conditioned and unconditioned that by definition eludes our descriptions, concepts such as "blessing" \textit{(byin gyis rlob)} and transmutation \textit{(sngo ba)} can play an important part; both invoke a kind of mysterious alchemy.\textsuperscript{127} Both terms figure in Rongzom’s Great Perfection. One mysterious reference in \textit{The Approach} states that "the non-abiding, non-conceptual dharma path with no point of reference"\textsuperscript{128} is elicited \textit{(byung)} through \textit{yongs su bsngo ba} - a term that might be translated as "complete

\textsuperscript{124} \textit{The Approach}: \textit{rtogs pa tshad du chud cing mthar phyin pa} (RZSB 1.458.20-458.21).
\textsuperscript{125} \textit{The Approach}: \textit{de bzhin du rdzogs pa chen po’i tshul} [460] \textit{gyis chos thams cad sgyu ma lta bur shin du ’go mnyam pa nyid du rtogs shing mthar phyin par khong du chud pas} \textit{de bas na snang ba’i dbang gis blo mi rmongs shing mongon par’ du byed pa skyed mi nus shing} \textit{mi len mi ’dor g.yo mi risol lo} \textit{RZSB1.439.24-460.03}.
\textsuperscript{126} Cf. Ruegg 1989: 3.
\textsuperscript{127} This connection has already been noticed in Ruegg 1989: 46.
\textsuperscript{128} \textit{The Approach}: \textit{mi gnas dmigs pa’i yul myed mi rtog chos kyi lam} ... RZSB 1.528.20-529.
dedicatory transferral" or "total dedication." This term, suggesting as it does, transformation, seems to preclude progressive stages of development. This verb, √bsngo, can also mean "explain," "bless," or "cast away." Another puzzle is Rongzom's use of the Tibetan byin gyis rlob in negative contexts, such as when he states that “all mind and mental factors are consecrated as contaminated.” I remain somewhat non-plussed at this usage. Understanding Rongzom's use of such phrases, however, might better clarify his ideas about the connection between the conditioned sattva and unconditioned buddha - just what that bridge between being and not being enlightened looks like.

In any case, there are, according to Rongzom, people who can access Great Perfection on the basis of their faith alone; but they too must be taught the core points of the Great Perfection to do so. In last chapter of The Approach, which concerns the value of effort for the rest of us who cannot naturally rest in Great Perfection, Rongzom stresses again that there is no real conflict between approaches. He links them more intimately when he states that the effortful and biased approaches that are traditionally said to be lower than Great Perfection function like doors to the Great Perfection.

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129 Cf. DYSG 199b s.v. √sngo and TDCM 1927b s.v. blos btang.
130 The Approach: sams dang sams las byung ba thams cad zag pa dang bcas par byin gyis rlob par byed do l RZSB 1.458.01-458.02.
131 The Approach: de ltar stond pa'i rdzogs pa chen po'i tshul 'di yang m'dor bsduis te bstan na l chos thams cad kyi risa ba ni sams dang sams snang ba tsam du 'dus la l sams kyi rang bzhi' yid byang chub yin pa ybyang chub kyi sams52 zhes bya'o l bstan par bya ba ni’di tsam las myed la l rdzogs pa chen po'i tshul la dad pa'i gang zag rnam s kyang l 'di nyid bstan pa tsam gyis rlogs shing 'jug par gyur ba yin na l RZSB 1.477.13-477.17.
132 “Regardless of what one has studied, the multiple means of accessing [the aim] means (bas) there is no conflict between the [various] methods concerning just how to train accordingly” (de ltar bsam gtan kyi sens zhi bar byas pa la de shin du ditl bar bya ba'i phyir dbugs dga g cing gyang ba la bslab par bya'o l de la ji ltar bslab pa'i thabs ni sgo mang bas gang ltar bslabs kyang 'gal ba myed do l RZSB 1.548.22-548.24).
133 The Approach: l de la sams bcos pa'i thabs kyang l pha rol tu phyin pa'i tshul dang l gsang sngags kyi tshul las sgo mang du snang ste l RZSB 1.540.13-540.15.
In his fifth chapter on Great Perfection, the longest in The Approach, we find Rongzom many times describing the approach of the Great Perfection as already present in discourses that might ordinarily be considered "lower" than Great Perfection. Rongzom locates Great Perfection discourse in texts such as the Gaṇḍavyūha, Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa, Sāgaramati-prccchā, Sañcayagāthā, and Mahāparinirvāṇa; and he uses phrases like: "this has already been taught in the sūtras..." (tshul ’di ni mdo las gsungs) or "this is not unlike what was taught in that [sūtra] (zhes gsungs pa’ang de ’dra’o).

To sum up, Rongzom’s discourse, rather than prevailing over the other approaches such as the Śrāvakayāna, rhetorically structures the impossibility of any real and radical break between them. Recalling Schmithausen’s remark that theoretic innovation need not suggest anything substantially new; and recalling Rongzom’s insistence that, given the proper view, the Great Perfection approach to Buddhism “does not deny, improve upon, or depart from” putatively lower approaches, caution should be used in stipulating Schmithausen’s concept of inclusivism when describing Rongzom’s doctrine or philosophical method.

Thus, it appears Rongzom’s doctrine or philosophical method is not, strictly speaking, “inclusivist” in Schmithausen’s narrower sense. Insisting that Rongzom’s Great Perfection prevails over lower approaches that culminate in it is like saying the garage prevails over the driveway, a destination prevails over its due course, or the top rung of a ladder prevails over another. You can say it, and people will understand the utterance, but it remains to be seen whether anything useful has been communicated in the process. Thus, the nature of Rongzom’s inclusivism, will be given consideration throughout the present effort. As Kiblinger has shown, there are a variety of ways to conceptualize the
general notion of inclusivism. Among them, she outlines three types of inclusivism distinguished in the work of Johann Figl: the essentialist-mystical, historical-revelatory, and inclusivistic universalism. The first “interprets a central thrust from the foreign religion to be identical with something central in the home religion” (6). The second “asserts that the home tradition is the last and most ultimate of a series of historical revelations, so that other religions are judged as good but provisional and surpassed by the superior home system” (id.).

The third, “like the essentialist-mystical type,... seeks a common essence among the religions in question, but the difference is that no one previously existing religion serves as the frame of reference for inclusion... in this kind of tradition, all traditions are supposedly relativized and transcended in favor of a newly articulated, mystical spirituality” (id.).

In the present study, we shall consider Rongzom’s inclusivism as a means to describe his notion of doctrinal theory vis-à-vis Great Perfection. As I hope to show below, Rongzom’s inclusivism is best described as a combination of Figl’s three types. Suffice here to say, Rongzom’s Approach is a unique text describing the important position of the Great Perfection approach within the Buddhist worldview. As such, The Approach is a book that world-builds (cf. Bildung) in unique ways. It is worth noting that some Tibetan scholars took Rongzom’s prolific literary production as audacious. No doubt the, in Rongzom’s day, the burgeoning body of Tibetan authored Buddhist literature indicated shifting

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conceptions among Tibetans of religious authority and authenticity. Whatever the attitude of Tibetans at the time, there are important reports that Rongzom’s literary production caused both anxiety and admiration among his Tibetan colleagues. In terms of the latter, one instance is recorded in the *Blue Annals*. ‘Gos lo tsā ba writes that prior to becoming a student of Rongzom’s, the translator named Go rub lo tsā ba sge slong Chos kyi shes rab was critical of Tibetan compositions; but once he had examined *The Approach*, he is said to have been inspired to become Rongzom’s disciple. According to *Blue Annals*, Indian scholars, referring to Rongzom by his Sanskrit moniker, Dharmabhadra, exhorted him to compose treatises, which they said would be a refuge for beings in Tibet. As we shall see below, Rongzom’s work is also said to have caused concern amongst important Tibetans scholars. According to the account given in *Blue Annals*, this group represented a faction that considered Rongzom’s literary production problematic. This attitude figures in the *Blue Annals*’ account, authored in the fifteenth century historian, ‘Gos lo tsā ba (1392-1481), of a group of prominent scholars – i.e. “all the scholars of the Four Horns” of Central Tibet (*ru bzhi’i mkhas pa thams cad*) – who approached Rongzom with the intent of censuring him for his literary production.

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136 Ronald Davidson suggests that last quarter of the eleventh century, the time when Rongzom presumably flourished, Tibetans gained the confidence necessary for interpretation and authorship of Buddhist literature; he writes: “The last quarter of the century, in particular, witnessed the development of a new orthodoxy in which emerged a Tibetan sense of the proper handling of the wealth of doctrinal materials from India, stratifying Indian texts and ideas on a scale of values and valorizing Tibetan compositions as necessary” (2005: 245).

137 ‘Gos 206.2-206.4; BA 162.

138 DNg: rgya gar gyi pa’i ta kun na re | dha rna bha dra khyod kyiis chos mang po rtsom la ’gro ba rnams skyogs shig | khyod kyi yon tan gzhan lta zhog gi | 207.04-207.06; cf. BA 163

139 They said: “it is not acceptable that people born in Tibet compose this many technical treatises” (bod du skyes pa’i gang zag gis bstan bcos ’di rtsom pa’i rigs so | 209.9-209.10).
THE STORY OF RONGZOM’S WOULD-BE CENSURE (AND THE CENSORS)

The third chapter of Blue Annals\(^\text{140}\) comprises an elaborate history of Old School tantric traditions and transmissions as organized in accordance with the Old School’s nine-fold classification of their tradition’s esoteric ritual literature. The apex of those nine are the trio of tantric traditions known as the tantras of Great Yoga (mahāyoga), Ensuing Yoga (anuoga), and Pinnacle Yoga (atiyoga). The Pinnacle Yoga is also known as the Great Perfection, which the Old School traditionally subdivides into the Mind Series (sems sde), the Space Series (klong sde), and the Intimate Advice or Esoteric Precept Series (man ngag sde). The Blue Annals’ third chapter only deviates from its overarching narrative focus on the lineal transmission of Old School literature when it treats Rongzom, a figure described by the author as “unrivalled by any given scholar in the traditions of the snowy land of Tibet.”\(^\text{141}\)

‘Gos lo tsā ba marks him as a unique figure, whose theories were different from, and superior to, all others.\(^\text{142}\) According to ‘Gos lo tsā ba, Rongzom was not only a consummate translator of exoteric and esoteric teachings classically attributed to the Buddha\(^\text{143}\) along with technical exegetical treatises,\(^\text{144}\) but also an important author in his own right treating diverse subjects from Sanskrit

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\(^\text{141}\) bod gangs can gyi rgyud ’dir ’di dang mnyam pa’i mkhas pa ni su yang ma byung | DNg 211.02-211.03); cf. BA 166.  
\(^\text{142}\) lta ba mchog tu gyur pa kun las khyad par du gyur bas (DNg 211.1-2).  
\(^\text{143}\) mdo sde dang rgyud sde.  
\(^\text{144}\) bstan bcos.
grammar to epistemology to the Buddhist sūtras to dairy farming, from the 
ethnographic to the phenomenological. As one verse goes:

Tshurton Yige is skilled in the discipline ('dul ba);
Yedrak is skilled in proper ritual practice;
The skill of Rong is in language and logic;
And it is said that the Father Chödrak prevails over them all!\(^{145}\)

In short, he describes Rongzom’s contribution to the eleventh century Tibetan 
socio-cultural and intellectual history as nothing short of extraordinary. The Blue 
Annals’ treatment of Rongzom also suggests that the authority of Tibetan 
authorship was in fact disputed during his time and, at the least, that Rongzom’s 
own compositions, including The Approach, were the object of fierce criticism by 
some of his contemporaries.

According to the Blue Annals, it was during this time when Rongzom 
“wrote numerous commentaries and scholastic treatises” that there was dispute 
among many Tibetan scholars from the Four Horns of Tibet – Shab kyi yang 
hum snying, Se khrom rgya 'bar, mTsham ston go cha, Bang ka dar chug, 
'Gos lhas btas, and rGya rgyal tshul – over whether or not it was acceptable that 
a person born in Tibet, Rongzom, had written so many exegetical treatises 
(śāstra). Saying that was unacceptable, they gathered to censure him; but “once 
they had seen each of the treatises and [Rongzom] proceeded to explain their

\(^{145}\) spyir gtam du yang | 'dul ba 'tshul ston db.yig gi mchas | cho ga khrigs bzangs kyi ye grags mhas | sgra dang tshad ma rong ba mchas | thams cad 'joms pa a pho rangchos grags rang zer skad (208.14-16).
Cf. Dudjom 706. Dudjom notes that the last line, i.e., also refers to Rongzom; but that leaves an 
asymmetry that begs the question of why he is mentioned the second time as holding dominion 
over, among others, himself.

\(^{146}\) Roerich gives mnga’ (BA 165).
meaning, they were amazed and, afterwards, each engaged in serving and revering” [Rongzom as their superior].

Such a passage suggests skepticism if not outright antagonism toward autochthonous composition in Tibet at the time. It also says Rongzom’s would-be censors disapproved of and decided to censure Rongzom without reading, or at least seriously studying, the works themselves. That only after seeing and discussing each treatise with Rongzom (bstan bcos re mthong zhing gsung glengs re mdzad pas), were their concerns put to rest and they were each taken to venerate Rongzom. This could mean they had read and simply misunderstood Rongzom; or that they had merely heard that Rongzom, “a person born in Tibet,” was composing a lot of śāstras and decided to put a stop to it. In the latter case, we may ask if this suggests that Rongzom’s work was not widely circulated?

The list given of Rongzom’s would-be censors is remarkable for the fact it contains the names of several Tibetans who were themselves prolific scholars. The first, Shab kyi Yangkhyé Lama, appears to be a proto-Old School figure.

‘Gos lo tsā ba reports that Zhao ma rod rue royal mishap’s son, royal chug, became proficient in three of Shab kyi’s specialties: exoteric teachings, the tantric

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147 ... 'grel pa dang bstan bcos mang du mdzad | de'i dus su shab kyi yang khyed bla ma | mar pa do ba | 'u yag pa mda' bsam gtan | mdo'i khyung po hüm snying | se khrom rgya mtsho 'bar | mtshams ston go cha | bang ka dar ching | 'gos lhas bta' | rgya rgyal tshul la sog s pa bod ru bzhi'i mkhas pa thams cad rtsod de | bod du skyes pa'i gang zag gis bstan bcos 'di tsam rtsom pa mi rigs so zhes zer zhingsun 'byin du 'ongs ba la | bstan bcos re mthong zhing gsun glengs re mdzad pas thams cad ngo mtshar skyes nas zhabs log re mdzad | chos re yang gsan | kun gis bla mar ’khur zhing spyi bo 'dud par gyur to | (DNg 209.05-209.12). The Ngo mtshar tshad ma sum ldan adds that once his would-be censors understood his work (don la ro myongs pas), they liked it. To be clear: at face value, Blue Annals’ account suggests that was the sheer volume of his literary output (’di tsam) was a cause for their concern. Obviously there were Tibetans such as (s)Ka ba dPal brtsegs, Cog ro Klui'i rgyal mtshan, and sNa nam Ye shes sde, who had authored important treatises during the Imperial period.

148 My use of the term ‘proto,’ from the Greek term, prōtos, meaning ‘first,’ is only meant to suggest an identify associated with the Old School, but prior to the Old School’s presence vis-à-vis discernable institutional structures, etc. Thus, a “proto-Old School figure” is a persona associated with the institutions, discourses, and practices that come to be identified later as “Old School,” as it were, avant la lettre.
cycle known as Māyājāla or Magical Net (māyājāla: sgyu ‘phrul), and the Mind
Series (sems sde) of the Great Perfection cycle. This point is interesting for several
reasons, not least of which is the nascent question of why, precisely, figures
associated with the Old School traditions, such as Shab kyi, who presumably
would welcome a defense of the Old School theory and praxis – would criticize
Rongzom. If a figure such as Shab kyi was himself a proponent of what later
come to be classified as the Old School traditions, why would he quite literally
seek to discredit its first defender?

Mar pa Do pa (1043-1138)149 – also known as Chos kyi dbang phyug of
Yar 'brig, a.k.a. Mar do (not to be confused with Mar lo [tsā ba], the famed
teacher of Mi las ras pa (1052-1135)150 – is reported to have studied the tantras in
India and Nepal with disciples of the famed tantric adept or siddha, Nāropa –
some sources suggest Mar do met with Nāropa, himself.151 Upon returning to
Tibet, he is traditionally said to have taught the tantras widely, particularly the
Cakrasamvara-tantra, which he apparently also translated subsequent to the effort
of Rin chen bzang po (955-1055); Mar do is also said to have translated the so-
called Five Treatises of Maitreya.152

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149 These dates taken from Gray, David B. The Cakrasamvara Tantra (The Discourse of Śrī Heruka):
144, n. 377. The mKhas grub rim byon ming mdo zod gives Marpa Dowa’s dates as 1042-1136 (s.v.
rong zom chos kyi bzang po) and states that on the basis of these dates that he and Rongzom were
contemporaries (1639.10-11). Though Bradburn gives Rong zom’s dates as 1012-1131 (87), I think
the precise dates remain obscure.

150 The Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center (TBRC) also gives the dates 1040-1123, in addition to
1052-1135.

151 See for example, Hookam p. 348, n. 49.

152 ‘byams chos sde lnga; (i) Abhisamayālaṃkāra, mgon par rtogs pa’i rgyan; (ii)
Māhāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, thbd pa chen po’i mdo sde rgyan; (iii) Madhyāntavibhāga, dbus dang mtha’ rnam
par ‘byed pa; (iv) Dharmaḥarmatāvibhāga, chos dang chos nyid rnam par ‘byed pa; (v)
Uttaratantraśāstra, rgyud bla ma. David Gray’s 2007 monograph treating the Cakrasamvara-tantra
notes that bLo bzang grags pa, alias rJe Tsong kha pa (1357-1419), refers to Mar do’s translation;
thus, while it is not presently extant, it was obviously still available in the late fourteenth century
Interestingly, ‘Gos lo tsā ba claims this man met Rongzom in the years prior to his reported attempt at discrediting him, in the context of the latter’s study of Sanskrit with some anonymous paṇḍit (BA 383).\textsuperscript{153} The Blue Annals notes Mar pa do pa had his own “system” or “school.”\textsuperscript{154} He also received teaching from Mar pa lho brag.\textsuperscript{155} He studied with the Kashmiri teacher, Sumatikīrti, the teacher and colleague of the translator, Pa tshab nyi ma grags, the translator of Candrakīrti’s works.\textsuperscript{156} Most surprisingly perhaps, is this: Mar pa do pa is himself also said to have authored commentaries on the Saṃvara root tantra\textsuperscript{157} and the Yoginīsañcaya-tantra, which is often traditionally associated with Luipā.\textsuperscript{158} In this case, one wonders – again – why such a person, who appears himself to be an author – or at least is traditionally remembered as one – would take issue with Rongzom’s composition, \textit{per se}. Should we assume that his own authorial adventure was subsequent to the Rongzom incident? Perhaps it is the

\textsuperscript{153} One immediate question is this: does ‘Gos lo tsā ba’s suggestion of a relationship between Marpa Dowa and Nāropa suggest a doctrinal orientation à la the Bka’ brgyud pa? Complicating this question are questions about the criteria that should be employed to identify a Buddhist tradition \textit{avant la lettre}. In the absence of any clear criteria, how are we, if at all, to categorize such a person in traditional terms? Is the anachronism, \textit{Nyidma}, acceptable?

\textsuperscript{154} \textit{lugs} (‘Gos 466.13; Roerich 385).

\textsuperscript{155} A.k.a. Mar pa lo tsā ba Chos kyi blo gros (ca. 1000-1081), the famed teacher of Mi la ras pa (fl. eleventh c.).


\textsuperscript{157} \textit{rtsa ba’i rgyud}.

\textsuperscript{158} \textit{mar pa do ba nyid kyis kyang rtsa ba’i rgyud dang kun spyod gnyis ka la bs dus don dang it ka rgyas par mdzad} (Gos 466.3-4); cf. Roerich 384.9-12u. The latter text, \textit{kun spyod}, is mentioned at Roerich 375. Stearns records: \textit{Yoginīsañcarya}, \textit{rNal ‘byor ma’i kun tu spyod pa} (Tōh. 375).
fact he is an exponent of the New lineages of theory and practice prevailing at the time. According to Dalton, “tensions often arose between the translators of the new tantras and the older families whose reputations were still deeply tied to the tantric systems dating from the earlier spread of Buddhism into Tibet.”

Perhaps the primary concern was the originality of Rongzom’s writing; or his expansive notion of scriptural and religious authority. Perhaps ‘Gos lo tsā ba is dead-wrong, and this man had no criticism of Rongzom or indigenous composition; if that is the case, such a mischaracterization calls into question ‘Gos lo tsā ba’s other characterizations, characterizations which are often employed in the service of academics by such scholars as Schaeffer (2009 et passim) and others. As the story is told in Blue Annals, after seeing each of Rongzom’s treatises and hearing them explained, his would-be critics realized there was no basis for their criticism. The group is reported to have been sufficiently inspired by Rongzom’s treatises and his explanations of the teachings as to also give cries and shows of devotion toward Rongzom.

Of the figures, I have as yet found out little about ‘U yug pa mda’ bsam gtan (also known as ’U yug pa mda’161), do’s khyung po hūm shying,162 Se khrom gray mtsho ’bar, mTsham ston go cha, rGya rgyal tshul, and Bang ka dar chug.163 ‘Gos chug pa lhas btas is a complex figure in this context. He was a

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160 bstan bcos re mthong zhih a tag a pas thams cad ngo mtshar skyes nas zhabs tog re mdzad | chos re yang gsan | chos re yang gsan | kun gyis bla mar ‘khur zhih spyi bos ‘dud par gyur to (‘Gos 209.11-13).
161 History of the Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism, vol. 2, p. 443.
162 Is this man is the figure referred to in BA as a probable contemporary of Po to ba rin chen sel (1027-1105)? Cf. ‘Gos 98.18-19; BA 73. Roerich, for his part, gives 1031 as Potowa’s year of birth.
163 The name does appear in a curious anecdote in Dudjom Rinpoche’s History of the Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism, vol. 1, p. 643, s.v. Pangka Tarcungwa.
student of ‘Brog mi¹⁶⁴ and Atiśa¹⁶⁵ and is remembered as “a vociferous opponent” of the Old School who instead promulgated the classic Sarma tantric cycles of the Guhyasamāja¹⁶⁶ and Hevajra.¹⁶⁷ However, he is said to have studied in his youth with the proto-Nyingmapa, the renowned Zur po che (1014-1074). Davidson records that ‘Gos lhag btas went on to accuse Zur po che’s clan – the Zur – of fabricating scriptures.¹⁶⁸ Davidson further describes ‘Gos lhag btas as having “launched a neoconservative assault on the literature of the older systems.”¹⁶⁹ Davidson also lumps this figure in with a group that was “assailed from time to time in Tibetan critical literature as having everything from sexual lapses to homicidal tendencies.”¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁴ Davidson 2005: 164.
¹⁶⁶ ‘gos lhug [152] pa lhag btas kyi sar dge s rdo rnam nyan du byon pas (pp. 151-152); cf. BA 117.
¹⁶⁷ Interestingly, he is remembered for having also criticized the Path and Fruit teachings as non-Buddhist (History of the Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism, vol. 1, p. 930), though said criticism is found in the ‘Byams yig included in the Sngag log sun ‘byin gyi skor [sic] (History of the Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism, vol. 2., p. 89, n. 1274), the authorial authenticity of which has been disputed (cf. Cabezón). In connection with the Sngags log sun ‘byin, Davidson notes: “There are two received versions of the Sngag log sun ‘byin. One is in Sog bzlog gsung ‘bum, vol. I, pp. 475-88, which includes the interlinear annotations and refutations of the translators position. The second version is found in the Sngags log sun ‘byin gyi skor, pp. 18-25’ The texts diverge in significant ways” (p. 403, n. 106).
¹⁶⁸ Davidson also suggests, without offering evidence, and in contrast to Dudjom’s suggestion, that Lhété’s complaint might have arisen from actually seeing scriptural fabrication take place (139).
¹⁶⁹ Davidson 2005: 119; this might seem queer considering his putative connection to Zurpoche, but Tibetan sources do record a falling out between the two; see below. In any case, this entire academic episode demonstrates an instance when once we pull on a historiographical string, much of the historical tapestry it comprises begins to unravel and further evidence is required.
¹⁷⁰ Davidson 2005: 208.
The *Blue Annals* indicates that this respected if controversial scholar presided over a council of scholars of the exoteric Buddhist canon.\footnote{71}{\textit{pitakadharas, sde snod 'dzin. ‘Gos 279.10-11; BA 226.}} Dudjom Rinpoche intimates, too, that he was a student of the proto-Old School figure, Zurpoche, who is reported to have denied ‘Gos leas btsas a requested teaching. This incident, according to Dudjom Rinpoche, is the slight that caused the resentment that instigated ‘Gos lhas btas’ sometimes caustic criticism\footnote{72}{cf. Cabezón, J. 2006: 23.} of the Nyingma, including casting doubt on the Indian providence of its main scriptures.\footnote{73}{See Dudjom Rinpoche’s *History of the Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism*, vol. 1, p. 914.} Did he at one time aspire to the teachings of the Old School? Did personal resentment, moreover, compel ‘Gos lhas btas, together with the other scholars of Ru lag, to attempt to censure Rongzom for the audacity of his compositions?\footnote{74}{\textit{Köppl} reports Marpa (1012-1097) also sought to “rebuke [Rongzom] for his irresponsible authorship” (18). ‘Gos lo tsā ba does go so far as to say, however, that Marpa, along with other translators and many of the most rigorous scholars of the day, were devoted to receiving his teachings, through their deep faith in his spiritual qualities, took him as their holy guru (\textit{gzhan yang mar pa chos kyi dbang phyug la sogs pa’i lo tsā’ ba dang | mkhas par grags pa’i blo rtsal can mang pos btud cing gsan par gyur le | gsan pa de dag gi slob brgyud thams cad kyang shin tu dad par gyur nas bla ma dam par ‘dzin no} (206.8-12); but he appear doesn’t mention any overt hostility. The biography included in Rongzom’s collected works (\textit{gsung ’bum}), however, includes Marpa in the list given above by ‘Gos lo tsā ba of scholars who sought to censure Rongzom for composition (RZSB 1.30.2-30.7).}\

What is somewhat perplexing is the picture drawn of ‘Gos lhas btas as both friend and foe to Rongzom. Both the *Blue Annals* and Dudjom Rinpoche’s *History of the Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism* give ‘Gos lhas btas as one of Rongzom’s disciples.\footnote{75}{‘Gos 206.8-12; BA 165; *History of the Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism*, vol. 1, p. 709.} Further, this man is also reported to have authored “several expositions of the *Yamāntaka-Tantra*.”\footnote{76}{BA 374.} With other Tibetan authors taking issue with Rongzom’s composition, it appears that composition itself was
not the main issue for Rongzom’s would-be censors. Perhaps it was the scope
and innovation of his work that concerned these intellectuals. In any case, it
appears that attitudes for or against Tibetan composition were not simple.

Ironically, while the Blue Annals describes ‘Gos lhas btas’ initial
reticence, if not outright hostility toward indigenous composition, it appears that
‘Brog mi complained in the colophon of his Sampuṭa-tilaka\textsuperscript{177} about plagiarism in
Tibet. In marginalia Davidson attributes to the Sa skya Paṇḍita (1182–1251), ‘Gos
Ihas btas is accused of precisely this type of plagiarism.\textsuperscript{178} In this case, a brief
investigation into one person leads to questions about just how to accurately
appraise an era of such fluid dynamism and uncertain sources.

This cursory examination of the group of scholars who purportedly
intended to censure Rongzom for his insistence upon writing technical treatises
yields interesting data but begs more questions than it answers. Does the fact
that some of these people are renowned in Tibetan intellectual history as authors
themselves shed any light on the would-be censoring of Rongzom? It appears
likely that the act of authorship was not itself a cause for their concern. If that is
so, what, then, was their concern? Blue Annals reports that Rongzom’s would-be
censors were concerned he had authored multiple treatises – “this many” (‘di
tsam). If Rongzom’s compositions did not violate any tacit rule treating Tibetan
composition en masse as anathema, is it possible Rongzom’s writings were
perceived as unacceptable in some other way? Is it possible that Rongzom’s work
was the cause of concern because of what it represents as a Buddhist doctrine?
We will pick up on this question again below.

\textsuperscript{177} Davidson 2005: 204.
\textsuperscript{178} loc. cit.
THE WORK OF ŚĀTRA (BSTAN BCONS)

The Approach is itself labeled – we do not know by whom – as an “exegetical treatise”\(^{179}\) or śāstra (Tibetan: bstan bcos), which derives from the Sanskrit root (dhātu), √śās, meaning “teach,” “instructor,” “ruler,” even “father.”\(^{180}\) According to the twelfth century Religious Chronicle or chos ’byung of mKhas pa lDe’u, the term śāstra (Tibetan: bstan chos/bcos\(^{181}\)) is explained by Vasubhandu to indicate protection from bad rebirths and conditioned becoming and attaining spiritual liberation.\(^{182}\) According to the twentieth century dGe lugs pa author, mKhyen rab dbang phyug:

the definition of the term śāstra, when given in the context of explaining the underlying intentions behind the doctrinal discourse of the teacher, the Tathāgata, is: words of explanation concerning the word of the Buddha given by its author, an intelligent bodhisattva, for the purposes of destroying the distractions of wrong view, doubt, and so on, which properly explicates a path that causes the attainment of spiritual liberation.\(^{183}\)

According to The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism, the term indicates literary


\(^{181}\) While I note the change from bstan chos to bstan bcos given a passage in Vasubandhu’s Vyākhyāyukti, I remain unsure as to whether that is Vasubandhu’s correction or Peter Skillings. See Peter Skillings’s “Vasubandhu and the Vyākhyāyukti Literature.” In Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 23(2), 2000, p. 304.

\(^{182}\) mKhas-pa lDe’u, rGya bsd dkyi chos ’byung rgyas pa edited by Chab spel tshe brtan phun tshogs (Lhasa: Bod ljongs mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1987) 127.11-127.16. On the various categories of Tibetan historical literature, see A. I. Vostrikov’s Tibetan Historical Literature, tr. H.C. Gupta (Calcutta, 1970), ch. 3.

\(^{183}\) bstan bcos kyi mtshan nyid \(\ldots\) See mKhyen rab dbang phyug. Grub mtha’ rin chen phreng ba’i tshig ‘grel thur bu (Beijing: 1996), 191 s.v. bstan bcos.
works contained in the various Buddhist canons attributed to various Indian masters. In his sense, the term is distinguished from SŪTRA, a discourse regarded as the word of the Buddha or spoken with his sanction. In the basic division of the Buddhist scripture in the Tibetan canon, for example, the translations of ŚĀSTRA (BSTAN ’GYUR) are contrasted with the words of the Buddha (or a buddha) called BKA’ ‘GYUR… In the Buddhist context, the genre is typically a form of composition that explains the words or intentions of the Buddha (PDB s.v.).

In any case, the fact The Approach is a śāstra warrants our attention. Thus, we shall venture a brief exploration of the genre to understand its place in Buddhist intellectual history. It is a term referring to a literary genre and indicates that the composition is an authoritative piece of interpretative religious literature.

According to Religious Chronicle of mKhas pa lDe’u, śāstras were categorized by Buddhist saints (arhat : sera bcom pa) living after the Buddha – and specifically in connection with the teachings given on the Mahāyāna (theg chen gyi bstan chos).  

In Buddhism, generally speaking, the Sanskrit term śāstra refers to commentarial and exegetical works by Indian Buddhist masters. As such, the term is often contrasted with sūtra (Cabezón 1994: 45), a name given to

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184ston pas don dang po sil bur gsungs pa la | phyi nas dgra mcom pas bsdus pas theg chung gi bka la theg chen gyi bstan chos su ’gro skad do |. See mKhas-pa lDe’u, rGya bod kyi chos ’byung rgyas pa edited by Chab spel tshe brtan phun thsogs (Lhasa: Bod ljongs mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1987), 84.13. On the emergence of śāstra as a Buddhist category cf. 81.13-84.14. The lDe’u chos ’byung, said to be composed circa 1260, continues several interesting passages concerning śāstra, where the emergence of the category is connected with, inter alia, particular exegetes and the emergence of the Sthaviravāda (gnas bstan sde) and Mahāsāṃghika (phal chen sde), schools that are often correlated with the early Theravada and Mahāyāna Traditions. See lDe’u chos ’byung 92.10-95.18. For more classical dicussion of the term bstan chos in the context of its subject matter (mrjod bya), its nature as discourse (ngo bo), the etymological derivation of the term (nges tshig), etc., see ibid. pp. 126.13-129.08. On the date of this text, see van der Kuijp. "On the Vicissitudes of Subhūtīcandra’s Kāmadhenu Commentary on the Amarakoṣa in Tibet." In Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies 5 (December 2009): 28 n. 92.

185Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism, s.v. śāstra; cf. Cabezón 1994: 45-46. Buddhist were not the only religious community to utilize śāstric form and norms. Broadly speaking, śāstra is a Sanskrit literary genre; and religious communities composing exegetical treatises in Sanskrit used śāstra as the vehicle. Paul Griffiths writes: “… a Buddhist śāstra is typically an ordered set of descriptive and injunctive sentences, together with arguments to ground and defend them, taken to give systematic and authoritative expression to Buddhist doctrine…” Griffiths, Paul J. On Being Buddha: The Classical Doctrine of Buddhahood (Albany, N.Y: State University of New York Press, 1994), 30. See his chapter 2 for an extended discussion of the term śāstra.
discourses classically attributed to or sanctioned by the Buddha. This term is ineluctably related with the concept of “doctrine” (dharma, śāsana, etc.),\(^{186}\) which in turn brings us to the traditional Tibetan Buddhist concept of *canon*.\(^ {187}\) The Tibetan canon’s various editions are generally divided into two sections: the translated word (*vacana*: bka’*) of the Buddha or Kangyur (bka’ ‘gyur) and the translated commentaries (*śāsana*: bstan pa) on those discourses called the Tengyur (bstan ‘gyur). Typically, the Kangyur comprises the *sūtras* and *tantras* traditionally attributed to or sanctioned by the Buddha;\(^ {188}\) and the Tengyur consists of the approximately two hundred and twenty-five translated treatises\(^ {189}\) – many of which are exegetical treatises given within traditional Indian exegetical genres. In the reckoning of the dGe lugs pa order, typically, an “exegetical treatise” or *śāstra* would be composed to elucidate on one of the

\(^{186}\) Cabezón 1994, chs. 1 and 2.


\(^{188}\) There are four major editions of the Kangyur named after the location of their publication: Cone, Snar thang, Sde dge, and Beijing editions. For a brief history of the Tibetan bka’ ‘gyur, see Paul Harrison, “A Brief History of The Tibetan bKa’ ‘gyur” in Tibetan Literature: Studies in Genre, José Cabezón & Roger Jackson, eds. (New York: Snow Lion Publications, 1996), pp. 70-94. Harrison notes the rubrics bka’ ‘gyur and bstan ‘gyur were only really present after the compilation of the Snar thang edition of the canon (op. cit. 87 n. 12).

\(^{189}\) Cabezón notes that “it is not always the case that the categories of “sūtra” and “śāstra” are mutually exclusive... Vasubandhu’s *Vyākhyāyukti*, defines a śāstra as ‘that which possesses the two qualities of opposition (’chos) and protection... [and] for rje btsun pa, all sūtras are śāstras” [skyob] (1994: 45). This idea that śāstric literature protects its audience is notable for the fact Blue Annals records an episode in which a scholar exhorts Rongzom to compose treatises precisely because the works will, in effect, protect readers (*dha rma bha dra khyod kyis chos mang po rtsom la ’gro ba rnam sskyobs shig | ’Gos 207.05-207-06; BA 163). On the Vyākhyāyukti, see Cabezón, J. “Vasubandhu’s Vyākhyāyukti on the Authenticity of the Mahāyāna Scriptures.” In J. Timm, ed., Texts and Contexts: Traditional Hermeneutics in South Asia (Albany: SUNY Press), pp. 221-243; Skilling, Peter. “Vasubandhu and the Vyākhyāyukti Literature.” In JIABS 23(2), 2000, pp. 297-350; Nance, R. Speaking for Buddhas: Scriptural Commentary in Indian Buddhism (New York: Columbia UP, 2012), pp. 98-152.
Buddha’s “discourses” or śūtras; “commentary” (vṛtti: ’grel pa) and “explanation” (bhāṣya: bshad pa) generally represent the next level of traditional commentary upon that; then we find “explanatory commentary” (ṭīkā: ’grel bshad) and “explanation” (vyākhya: rnam bshad). Additionally, we find “broad commentary” (vārttika: rnam ’grel) and “explanation upon difficult points” (pañjikā: dka’ ’grel), among types of śāstra, “most of which were written by Indians.”

The śāstric tradition, then, begins in India.

As a part of the Buddhist path, śāstric literature is generally characterized by ineluctably “soteriological elements.” That is, śāstras are defined, in part, by the idea that they work to counter the afflictions (kleśa: nyon mongs) that regulate unenlightened existence (saṃsāra: ’khor ba). In broader, more formal Indological terms, śāstra – from the germinal forms given in the descriptive vedāṅgas or “limbs of the Veda,” through the caveats of the Gītā (16.23-24), up through the its assimilation as de rigueur in Tibet – is about the business of synthesizing cultural data. In simplest terms, a śāstra is “a system of thought” (Matilal 1990: 10). As such, the form generally tends toward the stabilization -normativization - of authoritative principles – i.e. rules - in a model that ultimately

190 PDB, s.v. bstan ‘gyur; cf. PDB entry for śāstra. In his prefatory essay to the Golden Tengyur catalog, Ngag dbang nor bu lists several editions of the bstan ‘gyur: the Zhwa lu edition composed in 1335 by Bu ston rin chen grub (1290-1364), the Tengyur of the fourteenth century figure, Ta’i situ Byang chub rgyal mtshan (1302-64), the Tengyur associated with thirteenth century figure, R/Sga a gnyan dam pa kun dga’ grags (1230-1303), the ‘Phyongs rgyas attributed to the Great Fifth Dalai Lama, Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho (1617-1632) in 1668, Sde dge, Beijing (pe cing), Snar thang, Co ne, and others. See Ngag dbang nor bu’s “A few words explicating the context of the commentary translations” (bstan ‘gyur gyi byung ba mdo tsam brjod pa) in his Mi dbang pho lha ba’i gser bris bstan ‘gyur srid zhi’i rgyan gcig gi dkar chag (Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 2004), pp. 1-22. The hierarchy of the Tibetan commentarial tradition suggested here is outlined in brief in Dreyfus’ The Sound of Two Hands Clapping: the education of a Tibetan Buddhist monk (University of California Press, 2003), pp. 106-108.
191 Cabezón 1994: 45.
192 id.
193 The six "limbs" or auxiliary sciences studied in connection with the Veda are: śikṣā (phonetics and pronunciation), chandas (verse metres), vyākāraṇa (grammar), nirukta (etymology), jyotiṣa (astronomy), and kalpa or śrauta (ritual).
collapses any distinction between constitutive (e.g. chess) and regulative (e.g. etiquette) discourse in these normativizing bits of literature (Pollock 1985: 511-512). Remarkably, this collapse constitutes and regulates, in important ways, the dynamism that ineluctably produces innovation and synthesis. Not unlike White's tropics - that is “the process by which all discourse constitutes the objects which it pretends only to describe” (White 1986: 2; 1987: 193), śāstras instantiate, in some sense, the systems they only pretend to describe. In its normitivization of Great Perfection - that is, the way reading The Approach might get folks unaccustomed with Great Perfection and its relation to the broader Buddhist path accustomed, at ease with, perhaps naturally assenting to it – as a śāstra, the text does canonical work.194

194 In etic terms, Laurie Patton writes:

J. Z. Smith asserts that canon is a salutary category in the study of religion because it incorporates questions of authority and innovation simultaneously. In the study of exegesis, one can focus upon both the limiting of canon and the overcoming of that limitation through ingenuity (1994: 2).

Much of The Approach can be understood in the spirit of Smith's shifting sacred in which a constant process of "arbitrary limitation and of overcoming limitation through ingenuity" is the work of commentary, which simultaneously attempts to conserve a past while negotiating a progressing present and future. In this sense, Smith writes, commentary is fundamentally concerned with application, new associations between canon and elements surrounding canon. As the pressure is intensified through extension and through novelty, because of the presupposition of canonical completeness, it will be the task of the hermeneute to develop exegetical procedures that will allow the canon to be applied without alteration or, at least, without admitting to alteration (1982: 50).

Here, I would like to indicate two domains of The Approach drawing on terms used by Dominic LaCapra: the documentary and the workly. My translation, interpretation, and historical situation of this seminal treatise looks to trace the outlines of sectarian identity through the interplay between two dimensions of the text - the documentary and the workly – to examine one of Tibet’s earliest and most interesting instances of religious apology. The documentary dimension of the text is evinced in references to empirical or received realities such as historical persons, texts, institutions, events, and so forth. When, for example, citing an Indian scripture in support of a Tibetan authored text, the treatise objectifies itself through symbolic association that connotes membership within another textual community. The workly dimension supplements and enhances the documentary dimension through synthesis and interpretation. One way to describe this interplay between these two heuristically constructed domains is as type of Interaction Ritual (sometimes referred to as an ‘IR’). Randall Collins’ theory of Interaction Rituals and intellectual change is a model for "connecting symbols to social membership … [that] accounts for variations of solidarity and belief found across different social structures " (1999: 20). “Social structures,” in this case, are the inchoate religious communities that characterize this formative era. When, for example, The Approach cites Sāgaramatiparipṛcchā-sūtra (RZSB 1.534.16-534.20) beginning with the words, "for, this approach [to the path found in Great Perfection literature] was also taught in the
The label, “śāstra,” itself projects cultural cachet and tells us something about the doctrinal norms governing the era. For while primary doctrines are one of the ways in which a religious community tells us about how they understand themselves – how the community understands where it came from, where it is going, and why it is obliged to behave certain ways\textsuperscript{195} – “a community’s norms for its doctrines” tells us about “what the community has to say to itself about its doctrines.”\textsuperscript{196} Christian writes:

Doctrines about doctrines apply to the primary doctrines of a community, but not only to them, for they apply throughout the community’s body of doctrines and hence also to themselves. For example, a doctrine which would yield criteria of authenticity for doctrines of a community would have to satisfy these criteria to be acceptable as an authentic doctrine. Again, a doctrine which says that authentic doctrines of the community are consistent with one another would have to be consistent with authentic doctrines of the community if it is to be acceptable as authentic.\textsuperscript{197}

\textit{The Approach} is a doctrine of sorts about doctrine, specifically, an emerging doctrine that acts as, among other things, a reading strategy functioning as a method of interpreting different doctrinal systems in Buddhism. For Rongzom,

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\textit{sūtra teachings” (tshul ’di ni mdo sde kyang gsungs te), Rongzom is connecting Great Perfection to Indian literature with all its attendant symbolic cultural cachet. Understood as Interaction Rituals, such moves in \textit{The Approach} offer a conceptual model within which we can focus of the processes by which Rongzom constructs his Great Perfection in relation to other literature in \textit{The Approach’s} documentary domain. In emic terms, the fact \textit{The Approach} is marked as a śāstra speaks to its inhabiting a world wherein normitivization is at work. In a world where shifting conventions (\textit{tha snyad : vyavhāra} entail interpretation, the normitivization of the spiritual path in a relevant idiom and context (cf. Lde’u 84.10-84.14 on the synthetic nature of śāstra as a genre) is clearly something different than, for example, legitimation (I will have more to say on legitimation as a category for treating \textit{The Approach} in the conclusion).}
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\textsuperscript{195} Paraphrasing Edward Wilson, who has described religion as “the ensemble of mythic narratives that explain the origin of a people, their destiny, and why they are obliged to subscribe to particular rituals and moral codes” (Wilson, E. O. \textit{Consilience: the unity of human knowledge} (New York: Knopf, 1998) p. 247). Obviously, religion is not reducible to narrative, \textit{per se}. Other dimensions – the aesthetics, ritual and so forth – are deeply significant. Wilson’s description nonetheless parallels that of Christian.


\textsuperscript{197} Christian 1987: 2.
however – contra Christian – doctrines may be authentic and yet inconsistent when measured by a given norm of the community. In this regards, Rongzom tacitly acknowledges that Great Perfection is considered by some to be objectionable because it is rationally inconsistent. However, he compares those who reject it on that account to a fool that covets fake jewelry over a “wish-fulfilling jewel” like Great Perfection. The composition of a śāstra about Great Perfection, such as The Approach, suggests that he felt compelled to articulate it in a new way, namely in the form of a doctrinally normative exegetical treatise (śāstra). That is, if The Approach was composed for his own disciples edification, Rongzom was concerned to steep his own religious community in the increasingly normative form and content of śāstric literature. If, as Rongzom himself suggests, in at least one chapter, that The Approach was composed for the edification of these critics, then its śāstric form suggests that Rongzom felt compelled to persuade an audience of religious others, as it were, from a community that considered Great Perfection an insufficiently Buddhist alien other. In this particular context, we get a glimpse of the social realities of the time reflected in the author’s concerns.

The question of social dimension given in śāstra has been discussed by Ideologists, such as Halbfass and Pollock, who draw interesting lines in their picture of śāstric culture. Pollock’s conception of śāstra is rooted in its synchronic dimensions; he describes the oncologic of śāstra and its function to eliminate "the social dimension and historical reality of all cultural practices" in a genre where theory (śāstra) and practice (prayoga) are unified and "all contradiction between

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198 That is, Rongzom acknowledges that Great Perfection is criticized by adherents to the South Asian grammatical and logical sciences as worthy of rejection because it is “in conflict with reason.” See the opening passage of chapter four in The Approach (§4).
the model of cultural knowledge and actual cultural change is thereby at once transmuted and denied." (1985: 516) In contrast, Halbfass presumes, subtly, that Indian philosophical discourse, by which I take him to indicate śāstric culture, though responding to "social and historical realities ... do not deal with social and historical realities per se" (1991: vii).199 In the present case, as mentioned above, it appears The Approach does in fact articulate and respond to social realities, which I will explore in later chapters.

In his essay on the relationship between theory (śāstra) and praxis (prayoga) in India, Pollock suggests we move away from Naipaul's narrow conception of śāstras as analyses of "the components of cultural hegemony" (1985: 499). Tracing the outlines of śāstra's intellectual history, Pollock notes a dialectic connected with Kauṭilya (putative author of the Arthaśāstra) suggesting a shift or movement between - and convergence of - rules and revelation in a medium that is amenable to any normative mode of discourse from erotica to asceticism (502). Operating as "cultural logic" or a form of "cultural grammar" (500) within a given, but shifting and inconstant, form of life (lebensform) or imaginaire, the increasing use and influence of śāstra tends toward the consolidation of a "normative discourse," which is naturally conservative, and yet they can at times

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199 This apparently means that śāstra, while caused by social realities does not engage social reality as a subject. This is appears questionable depending on how one understands “social” since Sanskrit literature such Dharmaśāstra and juridical literature do “deal” in social realities; see, e.g., J. Duncan Derrett’s “Dharmaśāstra and Juridical Literature” in A History of Indian Literature IV/V (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1973). On further studies of śāstric literature, Patel notes: "Important discussions of this subject include Pollock 2003, which contains essays on the literary histories of Sanskrit and India’s regional literatures; Pollock 2006, which comprehensively treats the role Sanskrit literature played historically in India's regions; and Shulman and Bronner 2006, an introductory essay on the complex role of Sanskrit literary culture in many of the regions of South Asia and, in particular, southern India. See also Robert Goldman's essay (1992) on Sanskrit commentary and translation practices in the late medieval and early modern period” (Patel 2011: 245 n. 1).
also foster innovation through articulating different regulatory schemes articulating or supporting a new paradigm.

Writing such works requires, first and foremost, scholarship and all that it suggests in the Tibetan imaginaire. To say the least, a scholar is someone skilled in three domains: exposition, disputation, and composition (’chad rtsod rtsom gsum). In his classic work on Tibetan scholarship called The Gateway to Scholarship (mKhas pa ’jug pa’i sago), the renowned Sa skya Paṇḍita, Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan (1182-1251), “emphasizes the scholar’s role not as a writer or debater, but as a teacher of scripture” (Gold 2007: 26). The luminary also expresses concern that Tibetan scholars prior to him have been “for the most part mistaken” with respect to the categories critical for successful scholarship: grammar, logic, poetry, metrics, tropes, synonymics, drama, medicine, technology, astronomical calculation, and the Buddhist sciences of sutra, tantra, vinaya, abhidharma, etc. (id. 19). For Sa skya paṇḍita, the ideal articulation of Buddhist doctrine by scholars was an “Indianite” one (id. 24).

Eleventh century Tibetan sensibilities concerning composition by Tibetans appear to be complex and difficult to situate, but if Ronald Davidson is correct, and it is not until the last quarter of the eleventh century that Tibetans begin to laud indigenous composition, it would not surprising to find such robust criticism of Rongzom’s audacity. In addition, not all composition is equal – composition that cleaves closely to an Indian text in well established commentarial formats might be acceptable, while composition that is synthetic and explicitly innovative might be deeply problematic. The passage in Blue Annals describes a general hostility toward Rongzom due to his prodigious literary output. While his authorship reflects authorial and interpretative
confidence, suspicion toward Tibetan authorship and authorial innovation is widely noted even well past the eleventh century. Often there is an anxiety on the part of Tibetan authors who seem determined to convince their readership that the contents of their work is not original. This connects to the recognizable Tibetan insistence upon explicitly de-emphasizing literary and interpretative innovation (rang bzo).

In the context of the Blue Annals report of Rongzom, in particular, The Approach functions, in part, as a fulcrum in the emerging Tibetan discourse on interpretative confidence and the projection of religious authority. Indeed a monograph could be produced analyzing the sociology of the Blue Annals’ account of Rongzom's censure. The list of would-be critics and their shifting attitude toward Rongzom reveal several remarkable personal trajectories. Of critical importance here is awareness of the relation between writing, authorship, and power. Writing a book has symbolic cachet in any period. In Tibet,

the book symbolizes important cultural values and practies: scholastic expertise. The book is the symbol par excellence of the authority gained from a reputation for learning. In order to be influential, in order to wield authority, leaders are all but required to be skilled in reading, writing, and scholarly pursuits (Schaeffer 2009: 128).

Thus, writing a book is the creation of "significant social" value (id. 139).

In secondary literature treating Rongzom’s Approach, the text is often described as a response – usually described as “a defense of” the Great Perfection,200 thus suggesting that the work was composed within a specifically social context of responding to one’s critics. This notion, however, requires caution inasmuch as it might suggest that Great Perfection was, in Rongzom’s

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time, a full-fledged Buddhist tradition in its own right capable, \textit{ex hypothesi}, of being defended as such. Further, it does not appear \textit{The Approach} was composed for the purpose of securing popular consent for Great Perfection. However, Rongzom does appear concerned with dismissive criticism coming from factions he describes as learned in Sanskrit logic and grammar. These people, by dismissing Great Perfection as contrary to reason and therefore identified as a rejected spiritual approach, are causing something like a crisis of faith among some. The opening of chapter four of \textit{The Approach}, and other passages in Rongzom’s collected works, voice concern about the loss of popular faith in the tradition as a result of this criticism. This deprives the faithful, according to Rongzom, who are more then capable of penetrating and being spiritually transformed by Great Perfection, the opportunity for enlightenment. In this sense, \textit{The Approach} appears concerned to defend Great Perfection.

\textbf{Buddhist Disputes \& the Loss of Faith$^{201}$}

In Rongzom’s collected works, there is an essay in his miscellaneous writings (\textit{gSung thorn bu}) entitled \textit{Great Variety Among the Vehicles}$^{202}$, which states that Buddhists only dispute three basic subjects. He says:

\begin{quote}
... inasmuch as there is grounds for dispute among Buddhists, it boils down to disputing the nature of the mind \& mental [and] the way things
\end{quote}

$^{201}$ In the sections below, several passages found in the essays in RZSB are paraphrased in English prose with the intent of illuminating Rongzom’s view of the inter-relation between different Buddhist orientations and, thus, the broader Buddhist path, more generally. The \textit{Lta ba'i brjed byang} (TBJBy), \textit{Theg chen tshul 'jug}, and \textit{gSung thor bu} (STh) reveal the integrative, inclusive nature of Rongzom’s project. The Tibetan is given for each paraphrased passage below, although intervening notes may occur within a given passage.

$^{202}$ \textit{Theg pa'i bye brag chen po}. In \textit{Rong zomchos bzang gi gsung 'bum}, vol. 2 (Chengdu: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1999), 29.01-50.18.
Historically, Buddhists have of course found many grounds for disagreement beyond “the nature of the mind and mental [and] the way things are.” Debates about money, chastity, power, food, shelter, clothing, and sleeping, for example, animate commentarial literature on monastic discipline in the Vinaya. Given the sheer number of Buddhist discourses, it is no surprise that a commentarial tradition arose in relation with religious sects, which themselves work to focus charisma and modes of validation around a particular constellation of doctrines, aesthetics, practices, and so forth. Thus, in the history of Buddhist literature, we find accounts of knowledge in Buddhist scholastic philosophy (*abhidharma*) that are in conflict with works in the tradition of South Asian logic and epistemology (*pramāṇavāda*). According to the Tibetan tradition, the basis for these disputes is found in their differing configurations of the commonly accepted explanatory triad called “ground, path, and fruit” (*gzhi lam ‘bras*), which, as the phrase suggests, gives analysis of progression along the Buddhist path in terms of a foundation or “ground” – e.g., the selfless aggregates or buddha nature - upon which a method or “path” to spiritual liberation – e.g., realizing the sixteen aspects of the Four Noble Truths, the view of freedom from elaboration (*spros bral*) comes to “fruition” or “effect” – e.g. arhatship or buddhhood. Discussion of

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203 Sth: gal te rtsod par ’dod na | sems dang sems las byung ba’i rang bzhin | dngos po’i gnas lugs nyid la rtsod du zad do | (RZSB 2.29.03-29.05); cf. Sth: de (64) la cung cad mi mthun pa ni | bden pa dzer med pa’i rang bzhi dpal ’dod pa dang | kun rdzob sgyu ma lha’i dal du ’dod pa dang | sems kyi rang bzhi rang byung gi ye shes su ’dod pa dang | chos thams cad ye nas sangs rgyas par ’dod pas mi mthun no | (RZSB 2.64.01-64.03). The latter describes differences between dialectical and tantric approaches, which for Rongzom, center largely around the relation that obtains between the two truths as well as assertions concerning the status of divine *mandalas* and the nature of the mind as naturally arising gnosis.

204 For a survey of some topics discussed in the Vināya, see Mohan Wijayaratna’s *Buddhist Monastic Life According to the Texts of the Theravāda Tradition*. Translated by Claude Grangier and Steven Collins (Cambridge University Press, 1990).
the ground, for example, may be an ontological and epistemological discussion of the status of objects and their cognizing subjects, respectively. In classical Tibetan doxographical texts, the triad of ground, path, and fruit, thus forms the basis of a framework for explicating interpretive and philosophical difference. In the face of interpretative issues and the sheer volume of different Buddhist discourses given from which an exegete might draw, the emergence of a discourse about scriptural and exegetical authority and authenticity naturally emerged consequent to or as part of the project of interpretation. In *The Approach*, not only does Rongzom engage in reasoned argumentation about the criteria for scriptural authenticity,\(^{205}\) he discusses the corrosive effect on popular religious culture of the divisive Buddhist debates in his day. Since Rongzom himself engages in and has general praise for rational religious discourse, his concern for the deleterious social effects of philosophical conflict cannot amount to a strict rejection of rationality, logic, grammar, or philosophy *per se*. Rather, it appears that Rongzom is lamenting a type of philosophizing that values logical and grammatical coherence as the criteria of authority *par excellence*. It is in this context that Rongzom is keen to outline what he deems acceptable contours of inter-Buddhist dispute.

Buddhists agree on what Rongzom refers to as the "shared basis" in experience that connects and validates the fundamental Buddhist worldview: the causality of life in terms of interdependence.\(^{206}\) For Buddhists, what is shared is the insistence that the root of human suffering and discontent is a fixation on the

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\(^{205}\) See, for example, Wangchuk 2002.

\(^{206}\) TBJBy: *sangs rgyas rang gi gzhung gis 'jig rten phyi nang gi dngos po 'di | rgyu dang 'bras bu'i mshan nyid ni theg pa che chung med pas mthun par rten cing 'brel te 'byung ba'i mshan nyid du smra ste |* (RZSB 2.07.05-07.07).
transitory psycho-physical aggregates as a real self, that this must be abandoned
for a state rooted in the view associated with the empty and selfless, that there
are three types of concentration called the doors to liberation. 207 Moreover,
within the Mahāyāna in particular, the common basis consists in both the
philosophical insistence upon an ultimate that has nothing to do with the
phenomena of ordinary experience and the illusory nature of all conventions. 208
Conflicting philosophical positions among Buddhists, according to Rongzom,
should be understood within the context of common and shared appearances
(e.g. water appears as pus to all hungry ghosts), that elicit dramatically different
interpretations of their significance, as well as divergences in emotional response
and investment, and behavioral implications. 209 When the nature of appearance
is settled, biases fall away and one is relaxed 210 in the state of equality that is key
to Great Perfection.

As stated above, Rongzom’s aim in explicating the Great Perfection is not
to “depart from, improve upon, or nullify” the logical proofs offered in the
theories associated with the so-called lower vehicles. 211 Rather, he enjoys

207 rnam par thar pa'i sgo gsum po stong pa nyid kyi ting nge 'dzin dang | mshan ma med pa'i ting nge 'dzin dang | smon pa med pa'i ting nge 'dzin la gnas pas grol bar 'dod pa mthun no (RZSB 2.07.17-07.19).
208 Sth: don dam par chos sarba kun dang bral bar 'dod pa dang | kun rdzob snang ba sgyu ma tsam du 'dod pa ni | theg pa chen po kun mthun no | (RZSB 2.35.01-35.02). As we shall see, this qualification for Mahāyāna is challenged by the view of Great Perfection, which insists on the primordially perfected nature of all phenomena.
209 Sth: grub mtha' mi mthun pa thams cad kyang thun mong gi mthun snang gzhir byas nas | de mshan nyid ji la bu yin pa la risod par byed de | (RZSB 2.65.06-65.07); de'i phyir 'di la risod pa rnyams ni snang ba'i mshan nyid ji la yin pa las 'byung ste | (RZSB 2.66.07). Texts such as snang ba lha bsgrub pa (for an English translation, see Köppl 2008) go into great detail on just this subject. That is, what is the real nature of the appearance of a river of pus to hungry ghosts.
210 Sth: gzugs brnyan du shes pas spang ba dang blang ba'i blo mi 'byung ste cir yang mi rtso lo | | de bzhin du theg pa rnam kyi grub mtha' yang don de dang 'dra ste | (RZSB 2.66.17-66.18).
211 Cf. TBJBy: | gong ma gong ma rnam 'og ma 'og ma rnam kyi spros pa chod pa'i rigs las bog mi 'don phyir mi ldog go | | spros pa mo chod pa'i rigs las spros pa gcad par bya ba yod cing gcod kyang gzhii khyad du mi gsod phyir mi zlog go | (RZSB 2.10.04-10.08).
demonstrating significant affinity between different doctrines.\textsuperscript{212} What is clear is his insistence there is no real, radical distinction between the various mainstream Buddhist philosophical views.\textsuperscript{213} The more important point found in The Approach concerns the fallout that conflict around theoretical interpretation can generate in social and cultural terms. That is to say, for Rongzom, the intellectual religious debates of his day are so corrosive that they divide the attitudes of the faithful and uproot their very faith which would otherwise function as an entryway to profound spiritual experience.\textsuperscript{214} In remarks alluding to the atmosphere of the eleventh century, Rongzom laments narrow attitudes\textsuperscript{215} that

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{212} Between the dialectical and esoteric vehicles of the Mahāyāna, contentious issues of stem from four issues: the nature of the two truths, meditation on deity and manḍala, the identification of the ordinary mind with gnosis, and the assertion all phenomena are primordially perfected (ye nas sangs rgyas pa). Cf. RZSB 2.63.24-64.03.
  \item \textsuperscript{213} For example, centuries of conflicting interpretation is cleared away by Rongzom insisting that doctrinal concepts such as the powerful practices of bodhisattvas and ground-of-all consciousness are taught and present in the scriptures associated with the vehicle of the Hearers or Śrāvakāyāna but simply known as seeds (STh: theg pa’i bya brag thams cad thams cad du tha da dpal ni med de | dper na byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa rlab po che dang \| kun gzhi’i rnam par shes pa lta bu theg pa chen po’i khyad par gyi chos dag kyang \| nyan thos kyi lung las sa bon tsam grags pa lta bu’o \| (RZSB 2.64.19-64.22). As to the actually substance of the debate between the two different approaches, Rongzom is circumspect.
  \item \textsuperscript{214} Rongzom’s insistence that the faithful gain access to Great Perfection without training in the traditional five Indian Buddhist major “domains of knowledge” or “science” (pañcavidyāsthāna: rig gnas lnga), stands in contrast to the scholastic Mahāyāna dictum given in Tōh. 4020: Theg pa’i bya brag thams cad thams cad du tha da dpal ni med de \| dper na byang chub sems dpa’i spyod pa rlab po che dang \| kun gzhi’i rnam par shes pa lta bu theg pa chen po’i khyad par gyi chos dag kyang \| nyan thos kyi lung las sa bon tsam grags pa lta bu’o \| (RZSB 2.64.19-64.22). As to the actually substance of the debate between the two different approaches, Rongzom is circumspect.
  \item \textsuperscript{215} The opening of The Approach’s fourth chapter, ostensibly concerning the premise that Great Perfection cannot be undermined by force of reasoning, Rongzom again laments that some are obsessed with the sciences of grammar and logic, who apparently cannot see or hear anything not couched in those nomenclatures.
\end{itemize}
contribute to this problem. In a nod toward the nascent sectarian tensions of the time, he writes:

These days, people are interested in studying the words of the Buddha. However, interested parties have no time for all the considered thought interpreting the significance of those words; and after getting hold of the texts on whatever they are familiar with, they become people who distort the other interpretations by applying their own [narrow] experience; [their criticisms, substantively, read] as if the [critics] had not [even] looked [at the interpretations they are criticizing].

More specifically, Rongzom describes the tendency to juxtapose the scholastic sciences of logic and grammar - hot topics in the eleventh century - with soteriology and discusses the obsession/fixation (zhen pa) that consequently distorts the universal Buddhist project. As the debate rages, Rongzom's concern relates to how the divisiveness and narrow-mindedness of the debates between dialecticians and mantrins is effecting the broader religious community and causing some to develop misleading ideas about the path.

It is due to the influence of that [debate] that distortions concerning the [relationship between the] dialectical Mahāyāna and the Guhyamantra - i.e. that the two have distinct theories, practices, distinctions in how quickly one is spiritually transformed and in the fruit of that transformation - come to be articulated.
In reality, the ‘dialectical vehicle of the Mahāyāna’ (mtshan nyid kyi theg pa chen po) and the ‘vehicle of secret mantra’ or guhyamantrayāna (gsang sngags kyi theg pa) agree on much - in a nod to the Madhyamaka, Rongzom states the two approaches agree in their assertion that the ultimate is free from discursive structure and process (prapañcā : spros pa); and the two approaches agree that conventions are in fact illusory.

When it comes to the assertion that illusion pertains to mental appearance, Rongzom writes, the guhyamantrayāna concords with the Yogācāra. As to the mind and mental, the guhyamantrayāna is in agreement with a group Rongzom identifies as bodhisattvas who only postulate a single consciousness. In terms of practice, there is general agreement that the work of the spiritual life is aimed at the benefit of others. In terms of fruit, both secret mantra and the dialectical Mahāyāna accord in aiming toward unexcelled great enlightenment.219

Disagreements, however, are noted. Tensions between the dialectical vehicle and secret mantra, in particular, crystallize around what Rongzom describes as four "trifling" disagreements regarding Secret Mantra assertions: 220

1. the assertion that the two truths are indivisible
2. the assertion concerning meditation on a conventional and illusory deity and mandala

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219 Sth: phung po dang khams dang skye mched kyis bsdus pa'i chos 'di dag la | gsang sngags rdo rje theg pa'i gzhung dang | mtshan nyid kyi theg pa chen po'i grub mtha' mthun pa dang mi mthun pa rnams mdo bsdus nas bskyud byang du byas pa | de la chos thams cad don dam par spros pa dang bral bar 'dod pa dang | kun rdzob sgyu ma tsam du 'dod pa spyi mthun no | sgyu ma tsam de nyid sems snang ba yin par 'dod pa na 'byor spyod pa dang mthun | sems kyi tshul ji 'tar 'dod pa ni byang chub sens dpa' gcig pur smra ba dang mthun | spyod pas sens can gyi don nyams su len pa'i spyi mthun | grub pa'i 'bras bu bla na med pa'i byang chub chen por grub par 'dod pa yang 'dra ste | (RZSB 2.63.14-63.21).

220 Sth: de [64] la cung zad mi mthun pa ni | bden pa gnysis db yer med pa'i rang bzhin du 'dod pa dang | kun rdzob sgyu ma lha'i dal du 'dod pa dang | sens kyi rang bzhin rang byung ye shes su 'dod pa dang | chos thams cad ye nas sangs rgyas par 'dod pas mi mthun no | (RZSB 2.63.24-64.03).
3. the assertion that the nature of the ordinary, thematic mind is in fact naturally occurring gnosis

4. the assertion that all phenomena are primordially enlightened

While these points of contention may become animated within conflicting interpretations, Rongzom is clear they do not perforce constitute an utter distinction between approaches. Concerning the debate about whether or not there are significant differences between tantric and non-tantric approaches to Buddhism, Rongzom writes:

Some say there are all those differences [described by some polemicists]; some say there is no other difference except for a distinction in practice. It is thus, through that debate, that the seeds of doubt are sown in the intellects of those who wish to train [in the dharma] and a doorway of entry into [the dharma] is also closed - faith is destroyed.\(^{221}\)

The loss of faith due to intellectually divisive debates - perhaps by sowing cynicism within an individual or creating sectarianism within a group - appears to weigh heavily on Rongzom, specifically in connection with the Great Perfection, which in the absence of such conflict can be taught effectively through the simplest teaching, even to those whose foundation is merely faith. That is, according to Rongzom, the Great Perfection is a suitable for both the faithful and the intellectual, especially if the latter are willing to let go of their theoretical idols, which truck in the soteriologically problematic entities upon which the intellect fixates. The opening to the fourth chapter in *The Approach* states:

When this system of Great Perfection is taught in a condensed manner, it is said the basis of all phenomena is included within mind and mind-

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\(^{221}\) Literally, "... moreover, a door, is blocked, faith is destroyed"; cf. Sth 1 kha cig ni thams cad la khyad par yod do zhes zer 1 kha cig ni spyod pa'i khyad par 'ga' zhig ma gtogs pa gzhan khyad par med do zhes zer te 1 de lta rsod pa des bslab par 'dod pa rnams kyi blo the tshom du gyur te 'jug pa'i sgo yang 'gegs dad pa yang med par byed 1 (RZSB 2.34.19-34.22).
appearance alone; given that, the nature of the mind (citta) itself is awakening (bodhi) and thus referred to as "the mind of awakening" (bodhicitta). There is nothing to be taught outside of this; and when people with faith in the Great Perfection approach realize and penetrate it through being shown this alone, the people who are obsessed with grammatical treatises and logical treatises who have nevertheless abandoned the system of Great Perfection, which is like a wish-fulfilling jewel, become fixated on various trinket-like philosophical tenets and think: ‘These philosophical tenets of ours are established through grammatical points and reason. The Great Perfection system is in conflict with reason; and that which is in conflict with reason ought to be rejected!’

This kind of philosophizing is described as a sin: "We should cast away intellectual prejudice [concerning those other interpretations] and with an open 

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222 In the book, *Tibetan Renaissance*, Ronald Davidson grapples with the place of faith and reason in Rongzom’s work. There, Davidson criticizes David Jackson:

David Jackson’s description of Rong-zom as having ‘stressed the need for faith over reasoning’ (Jackson 1994b, p. 29) is not compelling. Theg chen tshul ‘jug [i.e. The Approach], p. 410, makes a place for faith, but it is posed as the technique for those who cannot otherwise enter the rdzogs chen method. The reasoning is explicitly and implicitly affirmed throughout (especially in chaps. 2 and 3, dedicated to objections and analysis), although, as with most Mahāyānists, Rong-zom presents absolute truth as beyond predication. Jackson’s predilection for epistemological authors perhaps is behind his focus on this narrow variety of analysis as ‘reasoning,’ whereas historically many kinds of reasoning have been used in Buddhism, and the word cannot legitimately be restricted to late Buddhist dialectical or syllogistic forms. The reification of authors positions into a dialectic of faith versus reason is surely inadequate to do justice to esoteric Buddhist complexity (2005: 425 n. 52, emphasis mine).

It is indeed difficult to describe The Approach or Rongzom as generally “stressing the need for faith over reasoning,” at least, not without specific passages for evidence. Yet Davidson goes too far in suggesting that chapters two and three - which are indeed reasonable presentations - somehow affirm Rongzom’s bias toward reasoning over faith. In fact, what is evident in The Approach is the suggestion that reason is posed as the technique for those who cannot enter Great Perfection by faith alone!

223 de ltar stond pa’i rdzogs pa chen po’i tshul ’di yang mdor bsdus te bstan na lchos thams cad kyi rtsa ba ni sens dang sens snang ba tsam du ’dus la l sens kyi rang bzhi yid byang chub yin pas byang chub kyi sens zhes bya’o l bstan par bya ba ni ’di tsam las nyed la l rdzogs pa chen po’i tshul la dad pa’i gang zag rnam kyang l ’di nyid bstan pa tsam gyis rjogs shing ’jug par’ gyur ba yin na l ’on kyang sgra’i bstand chos dang l rigs pa’i bstan chos la mgon par zhen pa’i gang zag dag ’di snyam du l bdag cag gi grub pa’i mtha’ ’di dag ni l sgra’i don dang rigs pas grub pa’ yin la l rdzogs pa chen po’i tshul ni rigs pa dang ’gal te l gang rigs pa dang ’gal ba de ni blang bar bya ba ma yin no snyam du sens te l rdzogs pa chen po yid bzhi gyi nor bu rin po che dang ’dra ba ’di lta bu spongs nas l nor bu ’ching bu dang ’dra ba’i grub mtha’ na tshogs la zhen pa’i gang lag la l (RZSB 1.477.13-477.23); cf. Karmay 2007: 128.

224 Sth: sgro skur gyi sdig pa yang sogs par ’gyur bas (RZSB 2.43.22).
attitude integrating what is shared [between approaches to the dharma] while determining what is particular [among them].”

Fundamentally, Buddhist theories share the tendency to separate what is ultimate from what is phenomenal. All the Mahāyāna, Rongzom writes, are in agreement in asserting that conventional appearance is mere illusion. All are in agreement with the Yogācāra-Mādhyamaka in asserting in that appearance itself is mental appearance. There is agreement concerning the entrance into practice connected to overcoming the total suffering [of] sentient beings by means of either emptiness or great compassion. The question of whether manifest realization is swifter or slower in relationship to different practices should be classified according to the distinctions that are due to a particular person, particular path, and particular occasions on the path. For Rongzom, moreover, there is no distinction in the fruits the varieties of Buddhist theory attempt to cultivate.
What is not shared between Buddhist theories, areas where views do not overlap, constitute the distinctive features of each. "Exoteric discourses" (mdo sde : sūtrānta) and "secret mantra" (gsang sngags : guhyamantra) call to mind particular notions. "Sūtra" (mdo) for example, calls to mind the three higher trainings so well-known as taught in the Śrāvakacarya system. The term "training" connotes that which is and is not shared between the two. The phrase "secret mantra" refers to the secret practices of skilled bodhisattvas and the vajra-holders that are unknown to the Śrāvakas. Thus, the yogatantra called Ārya-upāyapaśa speaks of a "sphere of buddha activity that is unknown to the Śrāvakas" because the activities of [such] unskilled [i.e. non-tantric] bodhisattvas are not precluded from the broader path shared between approaches.

The Śrāvakas do not mention the mandala of secret mantra, which Rongzom describes as something bodhisattvas talk about. When it is asked just what secret mantra is, Rongzom responds that it is signified by the nature of what are

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229 The Three Higher Trainings (trī-adiśīkṣā : lhaṅ pa’i bslab pa gsum) are training in higher morality (adiśīlaśīkṣā : lhaṅ pa’i tshul khrims kyi bslab pa), training in higher concentration (adhisamādhiśīkṣā : lhaṅ pa’i ting ne ‘dzin gyi bslab pa), and training in higher wisdom/insight (adhiprajñāśīkṣā : lhaṅ pa’i shes rab kyi bslab pa).

230 This work is often included in later lists of the eighteen Mahāyoga tantras (van Schaik 2004: 174 n. 26). Here, Rongzom identifies it as a "yogatantra." This raises interesting "chicken-and-egg" questions concerning the development of both categories - yoga and mahā.

231 Sth: 1 de la mdo sde dang gsang sngags zhes gang gsungs pa la mdo zhes bya ba ni bslab pa gsum dang ldan pa nyan thos rnam dang thun mong du grags pa gsums pa ste 1 ‘di ltar ‘khor gyi dkyil ‘khor du nyan thos dag dang thun mong ba ste grags pa tsam thun mong ba’o 1 bslab pa nithun mong yang yod thun mong ma yin pa yang yod do 1 gsang sngags zhes bya ba ni 1 thabs mkhas pa’i byang chub sens dpa’ rnam kyi gsang ba’i spyod pa yin pa dang 1 rdo rje ’chang rna’ms kyi gsang ba’i spyod pa yin te 1 de la nyan thos rnam dang grags pa tsam thun mong ma yin no 1 de ni ‘di ltar phags pa thabs kyi zhags pa zhes bya ba rnal ’byor gyi rgyud las 1 sangs rgyas bcom ldan ‘as rnam kyi gsang yul nyan thos dang thun mong ma lags pa zhes gsungs te 1 thabs mkhas pa’i byang chub sens dpa’ ni ma bkag go 1 byang chub kyi sens sngoms pa zhes bya ba rnal ’byor gyi man ngag las kyang 1 thabs chen byang chub sens dpa’i gsang ba’i spyod pa ‘di nyid do gzhes gsungs so 1 thabs mi mkhas pa’i byang chub sens dpa’ bkag ste 1 (RZSB 2.35.08-35.21).
called its pre-eminent, and thus *unshared*, methods and insight.\textsuperscript{232} In this context, pre-eminent insight is said to be the absence of mere convention or a perceptual basis for [attitudes and projections tied up in biases, which are signaled in Tibetan by the phrase] “bias,” literally, “acceptance and rejection”;\textsuperscript{233} and a pre-eminent method concerns such things as seeing letters, words, and signs as divine bodies capable of providing refuge, and so forth.

Tantra is indeed the resultant vehicle; and the path is understood to be constituted by the recognition that all phenomena are all primordially awakened or perfected (*ye nas sangs rgyas*) in the actual nature of the result.\textsuperscript{234} But there is a middle ground for understanding the relationship between approaches of the Śrāvakas, and so forth. Though he accounts for significant difference in method and predilection, Rongzom again emphasizes an integrated view of what are putatively different systems.

Admittedly, Rongzom’s Great Perfection understands itself partly in terms of the perfection stage practice outlined in the *Guhyagarbha-tantra*,\textsuperscript{235} especially

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\textsuperscript{232} With this statement in mind, we note that above Rongzom noted but did not engage in the debate about whether or not the differences between sutra and tantra are significant. Rather, his point above is to note the divisive effect of such debates.

\textsuperscript{233} Sth: | gsang sgags kyi dkyil ’khor du yang | nyan thos rnams ni ma smos | byang chub sms dpa’ ni smos so | gsang sgags nyi gang zhe na | thabs dang shes rab nyid phul du byung bas thun mong ma yin zhes bya ba'i don no | de la shes rab phul du byung ba gang zhe na | kun rtsobs tsam du’ang blang dor gyi dmigs pa (36) med do | (RZSB 2.35.21-36.01).

\textsuperscript{234} Sth: ’bras bu theg pa zhes bya ba ni | chos thams cad ’bras bu’i chos nyid du ye nas sangs rgyas nas lam yang de nyid la gnas kyang de nyid do zhes ’dod pa’o | (RZSB 2.36.22-36.24); cf. RZSB 1.196.03, 1.304.07-304.08, 1.492.05-492.07, 1.559.02-559.03.

\textsuperscript{235} Re the central role of the *Guhyagarbha-tantra* in the intellectual history of the Old School: Gentry’s summary is succinct:

*The Guhyagarbha-tantra* has been one of the single most important esoteric scriptures for the lineages claiming descent from Tibet’s dynastic period known as the Old School. Despite controversies surrounding its Indian provenance due to the unavailability of a Sanskrit manuscript for several centuries, successive generations of Old School scholars have composed commentaries on this important esoteric scripture. It appears, in fact, that demonstrating knowledge of this tantra and the many interpretative issues born from its exegesis was a prerequisite for being deemed a scholar of the Old School tradition. Thus, any scholar worth his salt felt compelled to pen a commentary, making the list of
its thirteenth chapter;\textsuperscript{236} and that very stage becomes the practice, which is, in actuality, the fruit. In this sense, Great Perfection is properly described as a resultant vehicle (‘bras bu’i theg pa). Great Perfection is emphasizing the ineluctable force of the movement forward for everyone, including the Šrāvaka.\textsuperscript{237} For Rongzom, the very meaning of the phrase "abiding in the view of the Great Perfection" refers to being divorced from all bias vis-à-vis clinging to theory. Streams can be theoretically guided; but that need falls away at the mouth of the sea.

The indivisibility of the two truths is a state (realized in the practice of secret mantra) that must precede what is referred to as "remaining in the view of the Great Perfection," which itself suggests simply being free from all clinging at theory and ideas. According to explanation of the Great Perfection in The Approach, while it is true that

the Šrāvaka realizes there is nothing that is the person, the Pratyekabuddha realizes that appearance, beginning with physical form, has no apprehended object, the Yogācārin realizes the non-duality of


\textsuperscript{236} Cf. e.g. Karmay 2007: 137-144, van Schaik 2004: 165-169.

\textsuperscript{237} This attitude, rather than prevailing over the Šrāvakayāna, simply makes it a path toward Great Perfection without significant break therefrom. On Rongzom’s view it does not make much sense to say Great Perfection prevails over lower vehicles; put another way, to insist upon it makes as much sense to Rongzom as to say the garage prevails over the driveway. Thus, while Schmithausen’s articulation of Hacker’s Inclusivism is useful, it requires, in the present context, modification. As we saw in the introduction, a similar modification is needed when the concept of "legitimation" is used to describe The Approach.
subject and object; the Mādhyamika realizes there is nothing ultimate, and the Guhyāṃtrin realizes the indivisibility of the two truths, these are all involved in grasping at theory. The conventional designation view of the Great perfection is also suggested by the words "the profound view of those never not free".

Thus, all theorizing, except the "view" of Great Perfection - the state of equality in which there is no cognitive or psychological bias - falls into some form of hypostatization.

**THEORY & "REAL ENTITIES"

... theory - the word itself says so - is a spectacle, which can only be understood from a viewpoint away from the stage on which the action is played out, the distance lies perhaps not so much where it usually looked for, in the gap between cultural traditions, as in the gulf between two relations to the world, one theoretical, the other practical (Bourdieu).

It appears from the analyses of *The Approach* that the lamentable facet of all these Buddhist views is the presence of *dravya* - the phenomenological equivalent of *svabhāva*, which is rendered herein as "real entity" or "entity." Rongzom’s

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238 In what might be a poke at more radical strains of Madhyamaka, the bottom of *The Approach* §1.3 shows Rongzom poking fun at the remarkably confused state of any Mādhyamika who simultaneously maintains that because all phenomena are ultimately pacified vis-à-vis conceptual elaboration they are not entertaining a view, in the negative (hypostatic) sense, when holding to the assertion that there is some real entity correctly and conventionally qualified that should be either relinquished or adopted (chos thams can don dam par spros pa thams cad nge bar zhi ste | bsgrub par bya ba gang yang mi sgrub par lta bzhi du | yang dag pa'i kun rdzob kyi mtshan nyid spang ba dang blang bar bya ba'i rdzas yod par 'dzin pa 'di ni | shin tu mi 'tsham pa 'dzin pa ste ngo mtshar ba'i gnas yin no | (RZSB 1.424.14-424.17); cf. Köppl 2010: 471-472.

239 The Approach: | de ltar na bden pa rnam pa gnyis dbyer myed par 'gyur ro || bden pa gnyis dbyer myed par rtogs paschos gnyis su myed par 'jug par nus par 'gyur ro || des rdzogs pa chen po'i lta ba la gnas pa zhes bya ba'i ming thob bo || de yang lta bar 'dzin pa thams cad dang bra la tsam la bye ste || 'di ltar nyan thos kyi gang zag la myed par rtogs | rang sangs rgyas kyi snang ba gzugs kyi phung po las btsams nas gzung ba'i (473) ba'i don myed par rtogs | rnal 'byor spyod pas gzung 'dzin gnyi ga myed par rtogs | dgu nas don dam pa myed par rtogs | gsang sngags kyi bden pa gnyis dbyer myed par rtogs zhes bshad de || de dag ni lta bar 'dzin pa dang bcas pa yin la | de lta bu lta bar 'dzin pa dang bra la lrdzogs pa chen po'i lta ba zhes thsang yod du gdags te || lta ba ye btag chen po zhes kyang bya'o | (RZSB 1.471.20-473.05). Cf. yi btag and ye btag in STMG 150.02, 226.02. Cf. Sth: de la sangs rgyas pa nag gi byi brag ni || nyan thos dag 'di skad du || 'di ni phung po tsam niyid de || bdag ni nam yang yod ma yin || dbang po'i grong khyer kham nsam kyis || 'jig rten don med ru nam par nams | (RZSB 2.07.19-07.21).

240 Cox 2004: 560.
use of dravya broadens the category of "realist views" (dngos por lta ba) to entail the inclusion of schools such as Madhyamaka, which is not traditionally described as school of realism." What is clear for Rongzom is this: "There is no turning back the awareness that generates biases so as long as the realist view is not subverted." Moreover, it appears from a passage in lTa ba’i brjed byang that the source of Rongzom’s concern about dravya is connected to the Sarvāstivāda compendium called the Mahāvibhāṣa, a text that distinguishes between real (dravya), imagined (prajñapti), and relative (āpekṣika) phenomena. According to Rongzom’s explanation, dravya has epistemological and psychological implications that are not immediately evacuated by the non-existence of, for example, the referent object so-called. That is, just because all Tibetan Buddhist theories deny a certain ontology of the self - as permanent, unified, and independent (rtag gcig rang dbang) - this does not mean their view is not perfumed with dravya. Since this concept is central in The Approach, we shall take a moment to discuss it here.

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241 Ordinarily, the Tibetan term rdzas is translated in terms of substance; but as noted by Dreyfus, its behavior as a concept can be “somewhat misleading” (1997: 67), sometimes referring to “a momentary thing-event that is causally effective” (loc. cit.) rather than, say, a Cartesian “substance.”

242 The Approach: ji srid du dngos por lta ba ma log pa de srid du chags sdang spang ba dang skye ba’i blo ni ldog par mi ’gyur mod kyi | RZSB 1.425.18.

243 RZSB 2.07-10. The Mahāvibhāṣa was not translated into Tibetan; and the Sanskrit is not available; the work did, however, was largely influential in both East Asia and Kashmir (Willemens et al.).

244 Cox 2004: 569. The lattermost, āpekṣika, refers to concepts such as short and long, time and place, which are mutually reinforcing (id.).

245 Rongzom description of dravya has psychological suggestions inasmuch as the perception of value per se correlates to the apprehension of dravya (gzungs shung bcang du rung ba’i phyir nor rdzas zhes bya ste | ji ltar ’jig rten phal pa ruams gser dang dngul la sogs pa don che ba’i phyir | rdzas su lta zhiṅ ’dzin par byed la | RZSB 2.09.09-09.11).

246 On just how dravya is dealt with in the doctrines of the Śrāvaka, Pratyeka-jina, Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, and Guhyamantra systems, see RZSB 2.09.16-10.02.
After translating a first draft of *The Approach*, I read the opening question Rongzom poses in the first chapter of my English translation. It read:

In that case, the character of afflictions should be scrutinized in order to find out whether so-called afflictions are something substantially real and whether migrators are bound in samsāra by them. Or, rather, is it the case that the afflictions that are to be gotten rid of are insubstantial (*rdzas myed*) - and yet beings appear as if bound by them?

While initially translating *The Approach*, I rendered *rdzas : dravya* here and elsewhere as "substance". However, upon re-reading this passage, around which the first section is centered, I began to wonder who Rongzom might have in mind in regards to attributing substance (*dravya*) to affliction (*kleśa*). Are *kleśa* not generally understood to be mentally derived or a "mental factor" (*sems byung : caitta*)? If so, does that not exclude the possibility of *kleśa* being *dravya*, which are generally conceived to be a material substance?

The Sanskrit term *dravya*, and its place in Rongzom’s work is complex.

The term is intimately associated with the more familiar term in Tibetan...
philosophical discourse, *svabhāva*. For example, the Sarvāstivāda school of thought maintains that all *dravya* or 'real entities' are, whether permanent or not, qualified by *svabhāva*. *Dravya* is listed in the Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism:

In Sanskrit 'substance,' 'constituent,' or 'real entity'; a term with wide ranging use in Buddhism, from the 'ingredients' of a medicine or magic potion to 'substance' in an ontological sense. The various schools of Indian Buddhism made use of the term in different ways. Although the term is virtually unknown in Pāli materials (where the equivalent is *dabba*), including its *abhidhamma* literature, in the Vaibhāsika school of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, *dravya* became virtually synonymous with *dharma*. The Vaibhāsikas conceived that all things that were 'real entities' (*dravya*) had unique characteristics of their own (*svalakṣaṇa*). In Mahāyāna, the Yogācāra school argued that because there is no external world, there were no physical constituents; only consciousness (*vijnāna*) possessed *dravya*. By contrast, the Madhyamaka school, in keeping with its doctrine of emptiness (*śūnyatā*), saw *dravya* as almost a synonym of inherent existence (*svabhāva*) and said that all things were ultimately devoid of *dravya*. See also *dravyasat*.

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251 In addition to overlap with *svabhāva*, *dravya* shares family resemblances with *guṇa* and *bhāva*, as well (Cox 2004: 548).

252 See Cox 2004 for a survey of Indian attitudes toward the term.

253 The entry for *dravyasat* reads: "In Sanskrit, 'substantially existent,' or 'existent in substance'; a term used in Buddhist philosophical literature to describe phenomena whose inherent nature is more real than those designated as *prajñātisat*, 'existent by imputation.' The contrast drawn in doctrinal discussions between the way things appear to be and the way they exist in reality appears to have developed out of the early contrast drawn between the false view (*mithyādṛṣṭi*) or a perduring self (*ātman*) and five real aggregates (*skandha*). The five aggregates as the real constituents of compounded things were further elaborated into the theory of factors (*dharma*), which were generally conceived as *dravyasat*, defined the term and which phenomena fell into which category. In the Sarvāstivāda *abhidharma*, for example, dharms are categorized as *dravyasat* because they have 'inherent existence' (*svabhāva*), while all compounded things, by contrast, are *prajñātisat*, or merely conventional constructs that derive from *dravyasat*. In the Madhyamaka school of Mahāyāna scholasticism, however, all things are considered to lack any inherent existence (*nihsvabhāva*). Therefore, Madhyamaka asserts that even *dharms* are marked by emptiness (*śūnyatā*) and thus nothing is 'substantially existent' (*dravyasat*). For Yogācāra followers, however, the reason that the flow of consciousness is *dravyasat* is not because it is free from causal conditioning and thereby involves inherent existence, but because the Yogācāra
The Sautrāntika theory254 connected to non-Vaibhāṣika abhidharma and represented in Vasubandhu’s encyclopedic Abhidharmakośa, "distinguishes between two different senses of 'real' (dravya): ontological and phenomenological" (Rankin 2005: 57);255 and for the Sarvāstivāda, dharma and dravya are equated (id. 111). The Sarvāstivāda notion of dharma resembles Patañjali’s description of dravya. Indeed, dravya is treated extensively in the Sanskrit grammatical sciences;256 suffice to say that for Pāṇini, Vaiśeṣikas, and Jains, among others, dravya came to be understood in terms of ‘substratum’ (adhiṣṭānam).257 In this sense, it was often employed in the scholastic context in the service of distinguishing between pure and impure dharmas, which the

denies the ontological claim that causal conditioning involves the absence of svabhāva, or vice versa. Thus the flow of consciousness, even though it is causally conditioned may still be conceived as 'substantially existent' (dravyasat), one of the three natures (trīsvabhāva) recognized in the school. Another strand of Mahāyāna thought that asserts there is something that is substantially existent is the doctrine of the buddha-nature (buddhadhātu) or tathāgatagarbha. As potentially inherent in each sentient being to become a buddha, the tathāgatagarbha is sometimes said to be both empty (of all attributes and qualities inherent in enlightenment) and non-empty (of all attributes and qualities inherent in enlightenment). In this context, there has been some dispute as to whether the buddhadhātu or tathāgatagarbha should be conceived as only dravyasat, or as both dravyasat and prajñaptisat” (PDB s.v.).

254 “Sautrāntika” is a term that appears later than “Sarvāstivāda” (Willemen et al. 1999: 106); in first millennium India, the term referred to the Western Sarvāstivādins in Bactria and Gandhāra, as opposed to the ‘orthodox’ Kāśmiri Vaibhāṣikas, who pejoratively referred to Sautrāntikas as “Dārśāntikas” (id. xii). Yet, critically, "the appellation Sautrāntika could have been used to encompass a broad range of individual opinions that conform to (some general principles) rather than to a defined and delimited set of doctrinal positions” (id 109).

255 Cf. Dreyfus 1997: 86-87. In her excellent treatment of the term dharma, Cox 2004 traces the development of the term svabhāva; and, there, asserts the term to be strictly ontological, though this is not the strict sense of the term as I understand it in the writings of Rongzom. Nevertheless, Cox’s essay reports:

In the earliest period, svabhāva denotes the categorial-type or nature by which groups or individual dharmas are classified, but as the focus of Abhidharma exegesis shifts to the character of individual dharmas and their existence, svabhāva becomes a special marker for uniquely determined, individual dharmas. Dravya, by contrast, is always associated with ontology and denotes the discrete and actual existence of recognized dharmas (571).

256 An concise survey of dravya in the context of South Asian grammatical science is found in Matilal 1990: 379-387. Dravya is treated in Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī sūtra 5.4.11, for example: kimettināvayagāthāṁ adhyavapakarṣe (Cardona 294); dravya is also treated in Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya, where the author treats Pāṇini’s sūtra 1.2.64, prescribing ekāṣeṣa; see the Matilal 1990’s excellent discussion; cf. Cox 2004: 548.

257 Ronkin 2005: 158; Cox 2004: 549.
aspirant is to, respectively, adopt and discard (i.e. bias vis-à-vis attitudes of 'acceptance and rejection' or blang dor in Tibetan). At least as early as the pre-Pāṇinian grammarian Vyāḍi, the term was being used in the sense of individual entity. For the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika, the distinction drawn between real and imagined existence (dravyasat and prajñaptisat, respectively) means, among other things, that the presence of svabhāva entails the dravya or reality of an object such that

To have a svabhava is to be a primary existent [i.e. a real entity]. Hence the svabhava is the determinant of a dharma which is dravya, a real entity, and what defines a dharma as having primary existential status regardless of its temporal status. Now both svabhāva and dravya are used to describe the existence of a dharma recognized as a primary existent. The difference is that they characterize the reality of a dharma from two different perspectives: svabhāva refers to the dharma’s individual essence that distinguishes it from all other dharmas. Dravya refers to any primary existing dharma that so exists by virtue of its own individual essence, as distinct from those dharmas that exist merely as provisional designations (prajñapti) [Ronkin 2005: 110].

In this context, dravya is the entitative phenomenal appearance added to the given259 of a ontological svabhāva.260 That is, insofar as the mind grasps at the appearance of a phenomena’s “inherent existence” (svabhāva : rang bzhin) that is the appearance of a “real entity” (dravya : rdzas). It is the presence of an apparently real entities such as this that concerns Rongzom.

258 Cox 2004: 548.
259 This term is borrowed from Wilfred Sellars. “For Sellars, the given is a kind of impossible entity postulated by some empiricists as the primary ontological support for their foundationalism. It is that fact that, if it were to exist, could be known immediately (i.e., noninferentially) without presupposing any other knowledge, in such a way that knowledge of it would provide an ultimate epistemological court of appeal. But facts that can be known in this fashion do not (and cannot) exist, argues Sellars, and hence they are nothing but a myth. We do not have immediate knowledge of any facts; rather we always come to know all facts through a mixture of sensing and interpretation that allows us to understand them” (Dreyfus & McClintock 2003: 12). Cf. Dreyfus 1997: 85.
260 It is my view at present that this conception of dravya animates Rongzom’s use of the term, although I have yet to trace the origins of his interest to any particular text, teacher, etc.
The discussions in his essays and *The Approach* are often of a character I would call "meta." Whereas others set up the dialectical shop, Rongzom steps back and examines the conditions for the possibility of a given view. The basis of his examination of theory (*lta ba* : *ḍṛṣṭi*) is *dravya*. One reason for this could be that it appears that, for Rongzom, all theories or views other than Great Perfection, including Madhyamaka and Guhyamantra, generally, truck in phenomenological entities.261 This fact, for Rongzom, ties that theory or view directly to what is paradigmatically anathema in Great Perfection: bias (*blang dor*).262 Thus, Rongzom's schematization of *dravya* with regard to theories - a theme throughout *The Approach* - signals his concern with the phenomenal rather than ontological register of his discourse. Focus on the ontological register structures the biases associated with theory or view. It is precisely the absence of this 'bias' that constitutes the state of equality that characterizes Great Perfection. We will return to Rongzom's thematization of *dravya* again below.263

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261 *The Oxford English Dictionary* describes a “phenomenological method,” generally, as any “method of clarifying phenomena by careful analytic description of the way they are subjectively experienced or apprehended.” My untechnical use of the term “phenomenological” refers broadly to this sense of mental appearance, irrespective of questions such as whether the appearance is deemed real or whether there is a non-mental reality, rather than to the theories of Husserl, et al.

262 Sth: ‘di lta sdug bsngal dang sdug bsngal gyi guas kyi chos ’di dag kun rdzob tu yang yod | dom dam par yang yod la de yang rdzas nyid du yod par ’dod pas | de ’i dbang gis yang dag par bglas te blang dor byed pa ni | RZSB 2.66.19-66.21).

263 Another interesting point of possibility, which we shall explore more below, is the idea that Rongzom’s concern with *dravya* might be connected with his concern for Vaibhāṣika-influenced theory coming out of places such places as Kashmir. As noted above, van der Kuijp reports that Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge, whose theories “constitute the very first *bona fide* Tibetan response to the understanding of Indian texts” transmitted in the later transmission had a “pronounced partiality to the Vaibhāṣika-s.” Moreover, this connection is worth noting because Rongzom is specifically concerned about Vaibhāṣika theories about objects; and van der Kuijp offers, as an example of Phya pa’s quasi-Vaibhāṣika tendencies, his theory of apprehended objects (*grāhyavisaya* : *gzung yul*). Rongzom is also concerned with *dBus pa* Vaibhāṣikas. As I will suggest below, this may refer to Candrakīrti.
SUMMARY

What does The Approach tell us about the history of Old School identity and the development of its Great Perfection tradition? My study of is structured around a detailed description of the form and content of the text itself. The following six chapters of this dissertation sequentially examines the six chapters of The Approach itself. Each chapter of this effort cannot be but a broad treatment outlining the documentary domain and important themes in the text’s workly effort. Chapter one surveys a variety of Buddhist theoretical approaches to analyzing the reality of the afflictive states of mind in five principle systems – Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha, Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, in Guhyamantra. Chapter two outlines four main issues in interrogating the supposed distinction between real and imaginary phenomena. Chapter three revolves around two issues concerning appearance and articulates what Rongzom describes as the Great Perfection’s own “nomenclature of illusion.” Chapter four is devoted to an innovative explanation of the Great Perfection that avoids its usual distinctive terminology and concepts, and instead purports to rely upon the of the increasingly normative logic and grammar of Buddhist theoreticians of the time, precisely those who harbor suspicions about the Great Perfection’s authentic Buddhist pedigree. Chapter five, the longest in The Approach, survey’s “what is disclosed in Great Perfection texts” in three main sections: (i) a four-fold rubric of Great Perfection teachings; (ii) the textual tradition of Great Perfection; and (iii) settling bodhicitta. The sixth and final chapter of The Approach contains

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264 kleśa-laksana : nyon mongs kyi mtshan nyid. This phrase is an object of interest below.
265 The five principle systems given are the Śrāvaka, Pratyeka-jīna, Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, and Guhyamantra. Throughout his various works, however, it is interesting to not that Rongzom does not always give the same systems as focal points. See Almogi 2009.
“instructions on the path that are encountered through methods associated with effort for those unable to remain in the natural state of Great Perfection.” The text then concludes with several final verses of dedication.

While my translation and interpretation of *The Approach* may be the first offered publicly, if it is a successful effort, it will not be the last. In my effort, I have attempted to stand on the shoulders of many people I admire; and it is my hope that my results contributes to our understanding of the development of Buddhism in Asia. In short, and paraphrasing Eliot’s *Prufrock*, my work here wants to *lick a tongue of light into less lit corners* of religious and intellectual history - with no pretense to full illumination.

INTRODUCTION

In Chapter One of *The Approach* we encounter a variety of Buddhist philosophical orientations represented that are traditionally considered to be in conflict with each other. His presentation uses traditional rubrics – Four Noble Truths, Twelve Links, Three Natures, the Pacification of Discursive Elaborations – to discuss different traditional approaches. The chapter functions to demonstrate a reading of each that resolves the view of equality at the heart of Great Perfection when the illusory nature of phenomena is seen to resolve the basic similarity of everything *vis-à-vis* the basis of appearance. As such, the first chapter of *The Approach* is a primer for reading Buddhist doctrine organized around traditional rubrics, doctrines, and the Buddhist teaching on the illusory nature of phenomena in which Rongzom’s text establishes certain inferences and inflection points that suit his rhetorical and interpretive agenda. The chapter also introduces us to the way in which Rongzom treats the Buddhist *other* in his discourse on the Great Vehicle (*mahāyāna*). 266 The discourse does indeed describe

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Great Perfection as the ‘consummation’ of the Buddhist project, though there is a marked absence of the typical triumphalism and examination of disconnections and shortcomings in another’s view that marks so much in Buddhist polemics. Rongzom’s method is more sympathetic and focused on commonality that functions to show vital connections. There can nevertheless be no doubt that Great Perfection is the perfection of any Buddhist path.

Below, I wish to draw particular attention to two issues: the way in which this rather ecumenical stance emerges and the influence of the Mahāsiddha Tilopa’s tantric song on Rongzom’s presentation of the illusory nature of reality vis-à-vis the five analogies that Rongzom uses to draw out the fundamental nature of the view of equality. While the implications of much of what is outlined here await further exploration in the future, my aim is to introduce the reader to the fact that in this first chapter Rongzom negotiates of a variety of putatively opposed theoretical orientations and shows there is no real and radical break between them. This conclusion is adduced through the particular way in which Rongzom explains the implications of illusory appearance for each and every theoretical orientation. Part of the implication is that Great Perfection is not a systematic theory itself – and thus not a Home or an Alien – but an overarching hermeneutic that may be applied to any Buddhist project because they all accept the illusory nature of appearance by definition.

Rongzom’s discussion begins, as mentioned, by setting forth a view that is widely accepted as part of the classical teaching of the Buddha: everything is illusory. The fact that all Buddhist schools accept the teaching of the Buddha that everything is illusory, facilitates Rongzom’s use of the trope of illusory appearance (sgyu ma late bur snang ba) to organize a reading and interpretation of
a variety of traditionally opposed orientations to the Buddhist path. Rongzom’s purpose in leading those who use this text through this hermeneutic is to show that each of their approaches, whether predicated upon the doctrine of the Four Noble Truths (i.e. the Śrāvaka), the Twelve Links of Interdependence (Pratyekabuddhas), the three natures (Yogācārins), the pacification of discursive schemes (Mādhyamikas), or empty appearance (Guhyamantrins), can resolve the ‘view of equality’ (samatāṛṣṭī : mnyam nyid late ba) if read according to the Great Perfection. This is because each approach itself accepts and is organized around the teaching of illusory appearance, but only the Great Perfection approach to the teaching ‘consummates and perfects’ that realization of the illusory. To be clear: all other approaches to the path assert and realize the illusory nature of reality – i.e. that things are not as they appear. The consummation and perfection of it is the Great Perfection.

This ‘conclusion’ is not so much the fruit of a systematic application of logic than it is an attempt to take those who use this text through a reading of a variety of Buddhist material in such a way as to culminate naturally in the view of equality that characterizes Great Perfection. Absent is any pejorative reference to ‘inferior’ vehicles or orientations. Yes, to take a classic metaphor of Buddhist soteriology, the Great Perfection represents the end of the movement toward to buddhahood. When we look closely, however, at his presentation, as we did in the Introduction, we see that the operative metaphor of the rivers allows for Rongzom to mark qualitative difference without marking radical disconnection. In the essay below, I will describe the basic sections of the chapter and the arguments they make. Special attention is paid to the language Rongzom uses, which is often mixes traditionally disparate modes of discourse. In
Rongzom’s *Approach*, much of the language used is technical terminology from Abhidharma, Madhyamaka, sutra, and tantra (i.e. ‘secret mantra’ or *guhyamantra*), approaches largely eschewed in the early works associated with Great Perfection. Thus, the chapter – and the text as a whole – represents an elaborate and highly synthetic discourse that constitutes a shift in form and content from the works available to me that proceeded it. Let us now turn to a description of the chapter

*The Approach* opens by stipulating an standard Buddhist worldview: sentient beings are trapped within conditioned existence. As such, they should, if they desire freedom from the afflictions of conditioned existence, learn to recognize the character of affliction in order to identify an antidote or method to counteract it. This is because, Rongzom writes, it is widely known in the Buddhist world that “without a thorough understanding of the character of afflictions, there is no getting rid of them.” That is, until the condition is diagnosed, a remedy can not be identified and implemented.267 This commonly accepted Buddhist view thus begs the question of the status of affliction, which will, in large part, consume the chapter below.

On the basis of this simple soteriological model – organized around the four noble truths – Rongzom extrapolates a claim that is more uncommon, more esoteric. Everything knowable, he writes, comes to be recognized and understood because of three things: recognizing (i) the nature of mind just as it

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267 The metaphor of healing, of the buddha as doctor and his teaching as prescriptive medicine for the illness of conditioned existence (*samsāra* : *khor ba*), and of the four noble truths as analogous to medical diagnosis, has a long pedigree in South Asian discourse tracing back to the early Védas, Upaniṣads and Pali *suttas*. For a survey of this metaphor in South Asian intellectual history, see Linda Covill’s excellent *A Metaphorical Study of Saundarananda* (Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2009), pp. 99-183.
is, (ii) the circumstance of the confused mind, (iii) and the circumstance of the unconfused mind. Then Rongzom poses the following question to himself, in which he shifts from a broadly accepted Buddhist view to a view more closely associated with Mahāyāna, in which the very reality of affliction is problematized through rational inquiry:

Is it that so-called afflictions, then, are actually a real entity and that migrators are bound in *samsāra* by them? Or, rather, is it the case that the afflictions that are to be relinquished are not real entities and yet beings appear *as if* bound by them?\(^{268}\)

The crux of the matter lies in the broadly accepted Buddhist teaching that things are ‘like illusions,’ ‘illusion-like,’ or ‘illusory’ (*māyopama* : *sgyu ma lta bu*). Just as quickly as he asks, he answers: “afflictions are not real entities (*dravya* : *rdzas*), not something to be gotten rid of” like an unwanted piece of furniture.

For the remainder of Chapter One, *The Approach* dedicates itself to showing how other doctrinal approaches to the path – Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha, Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, and Guhyamantra – may also resolve this same ‘view of equality’ in which everything is rendered basically the same (*'go mnyam*) by virtue of being illusory in nature. Such a view calls into question the nature of the philosophical enterprise classically conceived, in which interested theorists have, in the histories of Buddhism, competed in fierce debates with Buddhist and non-Buddhist opponents with the ostensive aim of establishing the correct philosophical system, theory, or view. To be sure, before the end of the chapter, Rongzom will describe the folly of any and all such efforts as ‘self-defeating philosophical positions’ (*rang la gnod pa'i grub mtha*).

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\(^{268}\) *The Approach*: ‘di’ *lta nyon mongs pa zhes bya ba* ‘di’ *i mtshan nyid rdzas sus grub pa zhig yin te* | *des ‘gro’ ba mams bcings par gyurd tam* | *'on te spang bar bya ba'i rdzas myed kyang bcings pa lta bur snang bar 'gyur ba zhig yin zhe na* | (RZSB 1.417.16-417.17).
Since the story Rongzom wants to emphasize conflicting interpretation, he does not simply oppose different theoretical orientations; and the philosophical content of Chapter One does not serve as a lens into the tensions that accompany traditional debates between different philosophical camps. Rather, since his primary aim is to show a reading of these doctrinal orientations that resolves the same view, his arguments sometimes, though not always, turn to discourse and rhetoric not traditionally associated with the doctrine in question. To be sure, all of the various Buddhist doctrinal systems – from the Śrāvaka system up to, but not including Great Perfection – treat afflictions as if something real – an entity – to be rejected or relinquished along the spiritual path. This is obviously an important point. Yet the fact that Rongzom writes a chapter in The Approach focusing on how contrary theoretical orientations may resolve the same final view constitutes one of the remarkable features of the discourse offered in Rongzom’s Approach.

**CHAPTER OVERVIEW**

Chapter One of The Approach is organized around a fivefold doxographical framework of a normative hierarchy of doctrines and views representing differing approaches to Buddhist theory and practice. In this chapter, however, each doxographical heading does not signal an expositional excursion into the system mentioned. Instead, each heading constitutes a main section of

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the chapter’s over-arching aim: to demonstrate that when illusory appearance is taken as the basis of analyses, all phenomena, whether traditionally considered “pure” or “impure,” are seen to be fundamentally equal. As a whole, the chapter consists of The Approach’s brief introductory remarks (pp. 417.01-417.18270), followed by five main sections and a conclusion. Main sections are announced by reference to traditional doctrinal rubrics – “In the Madhyamaka approach” (dbu ma’i tshul las) being a typical example – followed by their main philosophical concern. In chapter one, the five main sections and their topical concerns are given as follows:271

1. The “Hearer” or Śrāvaka approach (nyan thos kyi tshul 417.18-420.02) concerning the four noble truths (catvāri āryasatyāni : ‘phages bden bah)

2. The “Solitary Buddha” or Pratyeka-jīna approach (rang rgyal ba kyi tshul 420.02-420.17) concerning [the twelve links of] the Buddhist theory interdependence (pratītyasamutpāda : rten cing ‘brel bar ‘byung ba)

3. The “Practitioners of Yoga” or Yogācāra approach (rnal ‘byor spyod pa kyi tshul 420.17-421.18) concerning the three natures (trisvabhāva : mtshan nying gsum, ngo bo gsum, rang bzhin gsum)

4. The “Middle Way” or Madhyamaka approach (dbu ma’i tshul 421.18-435.08) concerning the pacification of discursive schemes (prapañcā-upaśānta: spros pa nye bar zhi ba)

270 Page and line numbers referencing The Approach, unless explicitly marked, refer to the edition found in Rong zom chos bzang gi gsung ’bum (Chengdu: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1999) pp. 417-555. This edition is abbreviated as RZSB throughout.

271 Each main section rubric is given in order below followed by the Tibetan transliteration, parenthetic page numbers from the 1999 Chengdu edition of The Approach, and a reference to the underlying framework of the section and their Sanskrit and Tibetan equivalents.
5. The Madhyamaka & “Secret Mantra” or Guhyamantra approach (dbu ma dang sangs sngaṅs kyi tshul 430.13-433.24) concerning the five exemplars [of illusion] (pañca-māyā-upama: sgyu ma’i dpe lnga)

6. Conclusion (434.01-435.08)

Throughout, each framework serves to explicate the primary theme of Rongzom’s chapter concerning the status of affliction. According to each of the specified Buddhist philosophical theories, Rongzom shows there is no real entity constituting the conditioned bondage of sentient beings. Thus, this chapter centers around the doctrine of kleśa - ‘defilement,’ ‘affliction,’ ‘afflictive states of mind,’ and so forth - which are said to disturb the minds of all sentient beings.272

More specifically, the chapter is titled nylon monks pa kyi mtshan nyid: ‘the character of the afflictions.’ The term for ‘character’ (or ‘reality’) is the Sanskrit lakṣaṇa (Tibetan than nyid), a polysemous term used broadly in South Asian and Tibetan religious discourse.273 Afflictions (kea : nyon mongs) are themselves the

272 Cf. Avalokitavara’s Prajñāpradīpa-tikā: nyon mongs pa ni sens can rnams kyi rgyud nyon mongs par byed pa’o zhes bya bas ni ‘dod chags la sogs pa nyon mongs pa rnams kyi mtshan nyid bstan to 749.11-729.12 in Tōh. 3589: She rab sgron ma’i rgya cher ’grel pa (Prajñā-pradīpa-tikā) in bsTan ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2000, dbu ma, zha-za, vol. 59 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang).

273 In discourses classically associated with the Buddha (sūtra), the term laksana is used in Buddhist philosophy (abhidharma) to refer to the primary qualities of phenomena (dharma); that is, it refers to “the principal characteristic or defining quality of something (PDB 462) and means “mark,” “characteristic,” “attribute,” and “definition,” among other things. For example, heat is a characteristic or attribute of fire and, in part, defines it. For example, the laksana of fire is “hot and burning” (tsha zhing sreg pa). In the Yogācārin doctrines of the Mahāyāna, all phenomena are qualified by “three characteristics” (trilaksana). In fact, Rongzom will discuss the “three characteristics” below in the Yogācāra section (§3) of chapter one of The Approach. According to the Madhyamaka school of the Mahāyāna, a laksana or “mark of inherent existence” (rang bzhin gyi mtshan nyid) is indicative of the ignorance (avidyā : ma rig pa) that qualifies conditioned existence. According to the tradition’s seminal text, Nāgārjuna’s Māla-madhyamaka-kārikā, the binary “character-characterized” (laksana-laksya) forms one of the (many dichotomous) avenues by which he critiques the notion of “inherent existence” (svabhava : rang bzhin). In Indian and Tibetan logico-epistemological discourse (pramāṇa), laksana refers to the phenomenal marks of an object. Outside of Buddhist discourse, this polysemous term is employed in a variety of contexts. In Pāñintan grammar, laksana refers to grammatical rules (Matilal 1990: 10). According to philosophers of the Nyāya, one of the six orthodox (āstika) schools of classical Indian philosophy,
subject of detailed examinations in Buddhist philosophy (*abhidharma*). In the *Madhyānta-vibhaga-kārikā*, one of the Five Works of Maitreya, a text of critical importance for the Yogācāra text tradition, we find nine types of characteristics of affliction (*nyon mongs mtshan nyid rnam dgu*), which are themselves also

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*lakṣāṇa* refers to linguistic signification (22); for the Indian polymath, Abhinavagupta, the term refers to the indicative power of words to invoke metaphor (168).

274 A general doctrine of affliction is given in chapter five of the *Abhidharmakosabhasyam* attributed to Vasubandhu (fl. fourth/fifth c.) and treated in the context of its synonym, a “proliferating tendency” (*anuṣaya* : *phra rgyas*). An English translation of Vasubandhu’s doctrine can be found in De la Valéé Poussin’s 1990 *Abhidharmakosabhasyam*, Volume four (Berkeley, Calif: Asian Humanities Press), pp. 767-868. According to the *dhāraṇa* theory of the Sārvastivāda school of Indian Buddhism, which maintained one of the largest, most elaborate Abhidharma canons in all of Buddhism and was an inspiration for the “Mahāyāna Abhidharma of the Yogācāra school” (PDB 780), there are six “fundamental” (*mitā : rtsa ba* or “broad” (*mahābhūmika* : *chen po ’i sa*) “defilements” or “afflictions” (*klesa* : *nyon mong* ) known as “outflows” (*āśraya * : *zag pa* ) that accompany every afflicted mental state: delusion (*moha* : *gti mug*), heedlessness (*pramāda* : *dag med*), indolence (*kaustiya* : *le lo*), lack of faith (*asrādhya* : *dad med*), sloth (*styāna* : *rmug*), and restlessness (*auchhatya* : *rgod*). In Kashmir, the Sārvastivāda school was associated with the name *Vaibhāṣaṇa or “Followers of the Vaibhāṣa,”* a massive Abhidharma compendium called the Great or *Mahā-Vibhāṣa*. As we shall see below, Rongzom takes notice of this school and its doctrine of entities (*dravya* : *rdzas*).

275 ‘byamschos sde lnga. These five Mahāyāna works are attributed to the bodhisattva, Maitreya: (i) The Ornament of Clear Realization (*Abhisamayālaṃkāra*: *mgon par rtags pa ’i rgyan* ); (ii) The Ornament of Mahāyāna Sūtra (*Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*: *theg pa chen po ’i mdo sde rgyan* ); (iii) *Madhyānta-vibhāga*: *dbus dang mtha’* rnam par ’byed pa; (iv) *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*: *chos dang chos nyid rnam pa ’byed pa* ; and (v) *Uttaratantrasāstra*: *rgyud bla ma*.

276 *Dbus dang mtha’* rnam par ’byed pa i tshig le ur byas pa (Madhyānta-vighaṅga-kārikā) in BsTan ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2001, mdo sde, pi-phí, vol. 70 (Beijing: Krun go’i bod rig pa i dpe skrun khang): *nyon mongs mtshan nyid rnam dgu ’o 11 kun tu sbyor nams sgrīb pa yin* (904.17-904.18). In his commentary on this text, Ju Mipham writes: “There are nine types of grasping at the character of afflictions such as ignorance, and the like, that are hindrances for the attainment of liberation. That which is qualified by the character of afflictions such as those – ignorance and so forth – is called a “fetter” (*samyojana*) because it shackles one within conditioned existence. It is proclaimed, “Fetters such as those are obscurations.” From among the nine fetters, there are five that are not views: (i) ignorance, (ii) attachment, (iii) anger, (iv) pride, and (v) doubt; and there are three that are reckoned together as one and called (vi) ‘view’: the view of the transitory collection (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*), wrong view (*mithyādṛṣṭi*), and extreme views (*antagrāhādṛṣṭi*); and fixation on views as supreme (*dṛṣṭiparāmarśa*) and holding that morality and asceticism are supreme (*śīlavṛtatrāparāmarśa*) are reckoned together as one [fetter] called (vii) fixation on supremacy (*parāmarśa*); and there is (viii) envy and (ix) greed, making nine” (*Dbus dang mtha’* rnam par ’byed pa i ‘grel pa rnam gnyis* , pp. 33-34: *thar ba’i go phang thob pa la gegs su gyur pa ni ma rig pa la sogs pa’i nyon mongs pa’i mtshan nyid ’dzin pa rnam pa dgu’ o 11 kun tu sbyor nams sgrīb pa yin* ; *de tshom sde lta min ina dang* ; *jig lta log lta mtshar lta gsum geig tu brtis nas lta ba zhes bya ba dang*; [34] *lta ba* mchog ’dzin dang ; *tshul khrims brtal zhung mchog* ’dzin gnyis geig tu brtis te mchog ’dzin ces bya ba dang phrag dog dang ; *se rna* sde ; *de lta dang dgu’ o 11*).
found in the abhidharma. Rongzom’s phrase nyon mongs kyi mtshan nyid – “the character of afflictions” – nicely intertwines three domains of discourse: ontology, epistemology, and psychology. It is ontological and epistemological because this discourse concerns knowledge of reality (mtshan nyid) and phenomenal character (mtshan nyid) in combination with the psychological doctrine of affliction (kleśa) and the Yogācāra doctrine of three natures (trilakṣaṇa). All three are themselves the subject of Buddhist logico-epistemology (pramāṇa). This doctrinal amalgamation – ontology, epistemology, psychology – provides Rongzom the rhetorical and conceptual ground for The Approach’s unique discourse. A tantric element is suggested by Rongzom’s insistence that all phenomena, from affliction to pure phenomena (dag snang), are fundamentally equal because they are all illusory (sgyu ma lta bu). Thus, while the doctrine of affliction is generally emphasized within Buddhist worldviews that entertain ontological binaries such as pure and impure phenomena, in The Approach the ontology of Buddhism’s doctrine of affliction is given within the tantric context in epistemological terms. A chapter summary below is followed by analyses of the central themes and issues at work, followed by concluding reflections.

DOCTRINE(S) AT WORK

Chapter one of The Approach is a lens into Rongzom’s theory of doctrine and his inclusivistic method. The chapter’s overarching rhetorical interest is two fold:

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278 On inclusivism as a comparative model in Rongzom, refer to the Introduction. Suffice here to day an “inclusivist” method, broadly speaking, “privileges one tradition, keeping it primary, and absorbs something foreign into that” (Kiblinger 2005: 2). This category implicates comparativism, generally, and the ubiquitous problem of “the other.” For a study of Buddhist inclusivism, see Kiblinger 2005; on the other, see Theunissen’s 1965/1977 Der Andere or McCann’s 1984 translation: The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Buber (Mass:
the first concern is to demonstrate that, when considered from the point of view of the illusory nature of all phenomena, the Śrāvaka, Pratyeka-buddha, Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, Guhyamantra, and Great Perfection approaches to the Buddhist path can be shown to be in agreement: each works to deny the existence of a real entity (dravya : rdzas) constituting the bondage of conditioned existence (samsāra).

The second concern of this chapter is to establish the fact that being qualified by their illusory nature is a basis for perceiving all phenomena to be fundamentally equal – a hallmark of the view of Great Perfection. Rongzom’s reading shows that various Buddhist theories are, on this view, not really in conflict concerning the reality of bondage in samsāra. This is a remarkable argument to make considering the fact that Buddhists fill texts with disputes concerning, among other things, the nature of existence. It begs the question that guides our exploration of the present chapter (and beyond): Just what type of overarching doctrine, if any, structures the theories advanced in this chapter of The Approach?

Using the three-fold typology of doctrine given by George Lindbeck’s The Nature of Doctrine (see Introduction), the following questions will guide our analyses: Does The Approach advance a propositionalist doctrine concerned with

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MIT Press). For an essay on the interplay of Gadamerian and Derridean hermeneutics of, respectively, reconciliation and rupture in the context of treating “the problem of the other,” see Richard Bernstein’s “Reconciliation and Rupture: The Challenge and Threat of Otherness” in Discourse and Practice. Eds. Frank Reynolds & David Tracy (New York: SUNY Press), pp. 295-314. 279 For example, Tibetan doxographies typically delineate the difference between Buddhist (and Hindu) theories. These texts often describe the differences under a three-fold rubric of basis (gzhi), lam (lam), and result (bras). The basis for example, deals with ontology. Considering the relationship, broadly construed in Buddhist teaching, between correct insight into the ontological status of objects and liberation from conditioned existence, Rongzom’s argument to the contrary warrants attention inasmuch as it sheds light on the rhetorical and interpretative concerns of this translator and exegete of religion in a time when a passion for logico-epistemological argumentation was gaining traction as the model for doctrinal and theoretical authority par excellence.
competing truth claims about objective reality? Or is the doctrine of the Buddhist path established in *The Approach* perhaps best described as an experiential-expressivist doctrine concerned with locating the common core of experience that is merely organized with different symbols in different systems? Is it possible that the best way to describe Rongzom’s overarching theory of doctrine is as a “regulative” or “rule-based” theory committed to a cultural linguistic approach?

Since, as discussed above, Rongzom rejects the idea of any real, radical break obtaining between the varying approaches to the Buddhist path described in *The Approach*, the different orientations that are mentioned are, on Rongzom’s view, moments on a continuum. The natural confluence of these different theoretical orientations is evinced in Rongzom’s analogy of rivers entering the ocean. This notion contains implications, as well, for Rongzom’s attitude concerning the supposed opposition said to pertain, for example, between the intellectual efforts of rational inquiry and quietist immanentism on the Buddhist path from suffering. A further consideration of his view should take into account, moreover, that, for Rongzom, different theories are the products of enlightened works and sermons of benevolent buddhas. In fact, Rongzom states in his commentary on *Guhyagarbha-tantra*, that “even the well-explicated written works from non-Buddhist extremists are declared to be the blessing of

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281 See Rong zomchos kyi bzang po, sGyu ‘phrul gsang ba snying po’i rtsa ryud tshul bzhi yan lag bco lngas bkral ba dkon cog ’grel (KChG). In Rong zomchos bzang gi gsung ‘bum (RZSB), Vol. I, pp. 31-250.
Beyond the two primary rhetorical concerns of the chapter, another notable element is the chapter’s organization around Rongzom’s assertion that “the recognition of the nature of mind just as it is, the circumstance of the confused mind, and the circumstance of the unconfused states of mind includes everything that is knowable.” As we shall see, according to Rongzom, the wrong philosophical approach actually constructs a thicker layer of delusive reality. In short, any form of psycho-cognitive bias that occasions one’s approach to the spiritual path generates a lamentable perception of real entities (dravya : rdzas). As mentioned in the Introduction, this is a major concern running through Rongzom’s writing.

ON FORM, CONTENT, AND PROCEDURE

Without a formal verse of homage, a commitment to complete the composition, or reference to a past text as the root text upon which his exegetical treatise (śāstra) comments, or any other traditional Indian protocols found in the

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282 dKon cog ‘grel: mu stegs can gyis legs par bshad pa’i gzhung yang sangs rgyas rnams kyis byin gyis brlabs pa dang sprul pas bshad pa yin pa | RZSB 1.85.04-85.05).

283 Just what this assertion means depends on whether the term shes par bya ba is understood as a noun (“knowable”) or a verb; in the latter case, the interpretation depends further on whether the verb strictly renders an optative periphrastic or is a play on words. Typically, all knowable phenomena (jñeya : shes bya) can be subsumed within saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, which are otherwise understood in terms of what is to be gotten rid of (spang bya : varjayet Negi 3355) and antidotes (gnyen po : pratipakṣa Negi 1615) - i.e. what is to be adopted (blang bya). The two concepts fuse in the term blang dor : heyopādeya (Mvp 7200) to compose a concept of cognitive and psychological bias. Such bias, while lauded in Dharmakīrtian epistemology (cf. Engle 2009: 83-88), forms a critical point of departure for Rongzom’s view of the Great Perfection; that is, for Rongzom, any type of biased attitude – including an epistemological position – fails to attain the Great Perfection’s view of equality (samatā : mnyam pa nyid). What remains to be investigated below is whether this statement suggests, as it seems to, that only mental phenomena are objects of knowledge or there is only so much one should know - and it is all included in the mental.
prefatory sections of texts, The Approach begins directly with this sentence: “I am going to explain just a little (mdo tsam) about disclosing the Great Vehicle approach.” As Köppl notes, this is a curious declaration considering the length of The Approach – one of Rongzom’s largest extant works (2008: 19). It is true that the absence of formal protocols is not out of the ordinary in the other works found in the 1999 Chengdu edition of The Collected Works of Rongzom Chözang (rong zom chos bzang gi gsung ‘bum). Rongzom’s important commentary on Guhyagarbha is an important exception (id. 138 n. 51) as is his commentary on the Sanskrit grammar entitled Vacanamukhāyudhopama and attributed to the famed pāṇḍita, Smṛtijñānakīrti. This text opens with the following:

At this point, desiring to compose a śāstra, one abandons obstacles to composition; and so as to accord with the reputable tradition, should make obeisance. Then, in order to establish the purpose of the composition, once

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285 The RZSB edition of The Approach comprises one hundred and thirty-eight pages that are twenty-one lines each. The NTh edition used in India and printed under the auspices of the Old School institutions there comes in at two hundred and thirty-two mostly six-lined folios.


having expressed her commitment, one composes a proper teaching of the scriptures, per se. And so that the composed śāstra, too, comes to be greatly meaningful, such things as the dedication of root virtue and so forth, should be written.288

Thus, Rongzom was obviously aware of the value of customary protocols (Köppl 19).289 Considering the period’s obsession with Indian provenance, his omission (if it is in fact an omission on the part of the author and not, say, a consequence of fragmentary transmission), appears all the more remarkable290 and suggests something of the man’s audacious character. Köppl adds:

Another interesting trait in Rongzom’s writings is that he—to my knowledge—never claims his discussions are repetitions of previous statements of the Buddha or masters of the past—a measure commonly employed by traditional scholars to underscore the validity of their writings. Especially during the eleventh century, with all its debates over authenticity, such an approach would seem sensible for anyone wishing a common acceptance of one’s writings. Yet Rongzom appears to have been unconcerned with concealing any sense of “private production” (rang bzo) in his works. Rongzom also reportedly criticized certain Indians visiting Tibet for frivolously writing their treatises only to cater to Tibetans and their particular, culturally determined likes and dislikes. In this way, he may have been objecting indirectly to matters of ethnicity and geography becoming instrumental for the validation of Dharma.291 As a whole, Rongzom’s style of writing gives the impression of an outspoken and undaunted character (2008: 19).

288 sMra sgo mtshon cha’i ’grel pa: | ’dir bstan bcos rtson par bzhed pas | bar go’od spang bar bya ba dang | ya rabs kyi tshul dang mthun par bya ba’i phyir | gang zhig bshad par bya bar dam bcas nas | bstan bcos kyi gzhung nyid legs par bstan pa dang | bstan bcos brtsams pa yang con chen por ’gyur bar bya ba’i phyir | dge ba’i rtsa ba bngo ba dang bcas pa bstan par mdzad do | RZSB 2.415.1-5.

289 It should be noted, however, that the composition of śāstras that do not take another work as a “root text” is not without precedent. Works such as Mūla-mādhyamaka-kārikā, Ratna-gotra-vibhaga, the “Śārīputrābhidharmāsāstra and Prajñāpāramitāśāstra, to name just a few, take no particular sūtra or so-called root text as a starting point (Willemen et al. 1998: 172-173).

290 Heidi Köppl’s 2008 translation of Rongzom’s sNang ba lhar bsgrub pa, which is published as EstablishingAppearancesasDivine(Ithaca, NewYork: SnowLion)also notesthat “Rongzom’s opponent and contemporary, ’Gos khug pa lhas btas (fl. eleventh-twelfth c.), a contemporary of Rongzom and his would-be censor, begins his treatise (Gsang ’dus stong thun) on the Guhyasamāja practice with the traditional homage and the ValidMeans of Cognition attributed to TrisongDeutsen also features an elaborate homage. Likewise, the Garland of Views as Oral Instructions attributed to Padmasambhava features an initial homage while Rongzom’s commentary on this text does not” (138 n. 52).

The Approach assumes a reader’s familiarity with the fundamentals of Buddhist theory. Its habit is not to systematically and in each-and-every-instance set forth the object, its definitions, and types, as is often the case in such works. When and where he does, I think says something about his agenda, but we’ll leave that for thesis conclusions. Let us now turn back to the text.

Immediately after its abrupt opening, Rongzom states what is commonly recognized in Buddhist teachings: sentient beings are adrift upon the ocean of conditioned existence; and if they desire freedom from conditioned existence,

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292 In what seems to be a citation or paraphrase (such as appear often throughout this Sanskrit scholar’s work), the Tibetan says the character of afflictions should be scrutinized because they bind beings who migrate within conditioned existence due to which they ‘have drifted on the ocean of samsāra’ (1 ‘gro ba rnam ’khor ba’i rgya mtshor ’kyams so zhes bka’ spyi las grags pa’i phyir |). Though I have not found a precisely corresponding citation, Rongzom’s phrase, *nyon mongs pa rnam kyi bsings*, does appear in texts such as appear, for example, in Tōh. 1148: brGya lnga bcu pa zhes bya ba’i bstod pa’i ’grel pa (Śatapañcāśatka-nāma[asya]-stotra-ṭīkā) in bsTan ‘gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1994, rgyud, ka, vol. 1 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang), where the phrased is to describe the equalizing state of bondage shared by the beings of the three realms (427.02-427.03). Rongzom’s source here is identified as the general vacana or word of the Buddha (bka’ spyi), which Old School scholar, Khenpo Gaden of Serlo Monastery in Nepal, identified as anything included in the tripitaka. Indeed, this phrase, *adrift on the ocean of samsāra*, is found in the Tibetan canon (more on ‘canon’ below). For example, in *Chos mngon pa’i mdzod kyi ’grel bshad* (Abhidharmakosāṭīka) in bsTan ‘gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2001, mgon pa, gu-ngu, vol. 80, reference is also made to those adrift on the ocean of samsāra due to ignorance (164906-1649.07); in Tōh. 4093: *Chos mngon pa’i mdzod kyi ’grel bshad mtshan nyid kyi rjes su’ brang ba* (Abhidharmakosā-ṭīkālakāśanasūtraṇī-nāma) in BsTan ‘gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2003, mgon pa, cu-ju, vol. 81 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang), being adrift on the ocean of samsāra is correlated with a lack of insight into selflessness (1724.01); in Tōh. 3887: *dBu ma snang ba* (Madhyamakāloka) in BsTan ‘gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2000, dbu ma, sha-sa, vol. 62, we find both ‘adrift on the ocean of samsāra’ (along with ‘city of nirvāṇa’) opposed to buddhahood (1379); in Tōh. 1126: *rDo rje ’chang chen po’i bstod pa* (Mahāvajradhātra-stotra), in bsTan ‘gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1994, rgyud, ka, vol. 1 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang), the phrase is used in the second of two verses extolling the purification of the samsaric aggregates, which consists in the transmutation of each into its buddhified counter-part, and the space-like state of the enlightened teacher, who is compared to the oarsman in a boat ferrying those alfoat on the ocean of samsāra because of a lack of understanding (‘khor ba’i sgrub pas ’khor gyur pa’i || phung po lnga ni rnam par dag | sangs rgyas lnga yi ngo bo nyid || nam mkhar gnas pa khyod phyag ’tshal || yongs su mi shes ’khor ba yi || rgya mtshor ’kyams pa’i lus can phyir | || yongs shes skya ba’ azin pa yi || ded dpon khyod la phyag ’tshal lo || (222.01-222.04); also in Tōh. 3316: Ye shes grub pa zhes bya ba’i sgrub pa’i thabs (Jñānasiddhi-nāma-sādhanopīka), bsTan ‘gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, wi-zhi, vol. 26 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang), we find description of the ignorant adrift on the ocean of samsāra and those who abandon conceptionality to pursue a pure state that forms an escape from it (*rnying pa gang gu’i phyir* || de ni ’khor ba’i rgya mtshor ’kyams || gang zhig rtog pa kun spangs pa’i || de nyid la ni yang dag gnas | || (98.08-98.10); and in Tōh. 3307: *Brtan pa’i ’khor lo’i cho gsa* (Sthiracakrabhāvant) in bsTan ‘gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1999, rgyud, mu, vol. 40 (Beijing: Krung go’i
they must cultivate an antidotal path based on insight into the nature of the afflictions (nyon mongs : kleśa) that constitute bondage in order to find “the opportunity for liberation.” This is not an uncommon Buddhist worldview.293

Quickly, however, The Approach shifts from this normative framework and introduces its own criteria for articulating a Great Vehicle Buddhist path. Rather than being organized, as it typically is, around skillful means, the six perfections of the Pāramitāyāna or ‘Perfection Vehicle,’294 the kāya or ‘buddha-body’ doctrine,295 or the Tathāgatagarbha or ‘Buddha Nature’ teachings,296 the “Great

bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang), we find lamentation because beings are adrift on the ocean of saṃsāra due to ignorance of their natural purity (kye ma sens can ’di dag rang bzhin gyis nrams par dag pa yin yang ma rogs pa da d Pang ’khor ba’i rgya mtshor ’khyams par gyur gyi | (12.13-12.14). The phrase 'limitless ocean of suffering' (anantādukhānasārā) is also found in Saṅdīciva’s BCA.9.158.

In Rongzom’s Memoradum of Theory (TB)By, Rongzom references an unnamed sutra which teacher that the spiritually immature have, from time immemorial, suffered from self-concern arising in the absence of any critical reflection on the nature of the self (nido las | byis pa so so’i skye bo nrams thog ma med pa’i dus nas bdag gi mtshan nyid la nrams par dpyad pa med par | bdag go snyams pa’i blo kun nas ’byung ngo zhes gsungs pa lta bu’o | (RZSB.2.03.11-02.14).

293 For example, the first sentence of the eighteenth chapter of Daśabalaśrīmitra’s Saṃskṛtāsamskṛta-viniścaya states that those wishing for freedom from conditioned existence (samsāra) should aim to recognize the character, types, and causes of afflictions (Th. 3897: ’Dus byas dang ’dus ma byas nram par nges pa (Saṃskṛtāsamskṛta-viniścaya) bsTan ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma), 2000, dbu ma, ha-a, vol 63 (Beijing: Krun go snyams pa’i blo kun nas ’byung ngo zhes gsungs pa lta bu’o | (RZSB.2.03.11-02.14).

294 The “six perfections” (satārmatāt : pha rol tu phyin pa drug) refers to the Mahāyāna rubric describing six virtues the culmination of which embody Buddhist enlightenment. The six perfections, so emblematic of the Mahāyāna or Great Vehicle of Buddhism, are termed: giving or generosity (dana : sbyin pa), morality or ethical discipline (śīla : tshul khrims), patience or forebearance (ksānti : bzod pa), effort or vigor (vīra : brtson ’grus), meditative absorption (dhyāna : bsam glan), and discriminative insight (prajñā : shes rab).

295 The ‘body’ of a buddha is exalted by the name kāya in Sanskrit, sku in Tibetan. The term can not only refer to the physical body of a person who is spiritually awake – i.e. a buddha – but also, in its more elaborate iterations, to other, metaphysical dimensions of a buddha’s embodiment. The enumeration of kāyas thereby varies. While the Pali scriptures do mention two types of kāya – the “truth body” or dharmacāya and the “form body” or rupakāya – it is in the Mahāyāna that this doctrine is elaborated. In general, Mahāyāna sūtras mention three basic types of kāya: a “truth body” (dharmacāya:chos kyi sku), a “body of perfect resource” or “enjoyment” (sambhogakāya : longs spyod rdzogs pa’i sku), and an “emanated buddha-body” (nirmānakāya : sprul pa’i sku). In Mahāyāna sūtras associated with the doctrine of “buddha nature” (tathāgatagarbha : de bzhin snying po), the list of buddha-bodies adds the “buddha-body of nature” (svabhāvākāya : ngo bo nyid kyi sku). In the tantras, there is also discussion of the “buddha-body of manifest awakening” (abhisambodhikāya : mgon byang sku) as well as an “adamantine buddha-body” (vajrakāya : rdo rje

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Vehicle” (mahāyāna: theg pa chen po) path described throughout the first chapter of The Approach and in the context of a variety of Buddhist orientations, is organized around the analysis of illusion and illusory appearance.

As stated above, the main section of the text begins with the Śrāvaka conception of the path; it then moves to treat the Pratyeka-buddha, Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, and Guhyamantra (“secret mantra”) approaches before broaching the logic of Great Perfection – the way the rhetoric of Rongzom’s Great Perfection structures the Buddhist path for some of those who use this text. Along the way, the chapter touches upon several classical rubrics and interpretative issues of interest:

- Four Noble Truths
- Twelve Links of Interdependence
- Identity & difference

296 The doctrine of “buddha nature” is also called the “womb” or “the matrix” (garbhā : snying po) of the “One Thus Gone” or Tathāgata, a Sanskrit epithet for a buddha. Simply stated, the doctrine of buddha nature asserts that the seed of Buddhist enlightenment is inherent within the mental continua of all sentient beings and makes possible every individual’s realization of her true nature. This concept is closely linked with Buddhist teachings espousing the nature of mind as pure and free from inherent obscurations and fetters. There are several important Mahāyāna scriptures associated with Tathāgatagarbha: the Śrīmālādevīśīhāsā-sūtra, the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, the Lankāvatāra-sūtra, and the Indian exegetical treatise (śāstra) referred to as the Ratnagotravibhāga or Uttaratanttra. On the latter, see Jikido Takasaki’s 1966 A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra) Being a Treatise on the Tathāgatagarbha Theory of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Serie Orientale Roma XXXIII, Guiseppe Tucci, ed., Rome: Is. M.E.O. On the emergence and character of the tathāgatagarbha doctrine, generally, see the fifth chapter in Paul Williams’. 2009 Mahāyāna Buddhism: the doctrinal foundations (Routledge) pp. 103-128. For translations of Śrīmālādevīśīhāsā-sūtra, see Śrīmālādevīśīhāsā-Sūtra, translated by A. Wayman and H. Wayman in the 1974 The Lion’s Roar of Queen Śrīmālā (New York: Columbia University Press); cf. C. C. Garma Chang’s 1983 A Treasury of Mahāyāna Sutras (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State UP); and D. M. Paul’s 1980 The Buddhist Feminine Ideal (Missoula, M.D.: Scholar’s Press).

297 For Rongzom’s general explanation of the practice of the “individually enlightened” or “solitary realizer” called a pratyeka-jīnas, see TBjBy (RZSB 2.14.17-14.22 and Memorandum on Doxography (Grub mtha’i bried byang or GTjBy), RZSB 2.213.20-214.03; cf. PDB 673 s.v. prayekabuddha.

298 Obviously, not all readers read alike.
Non-Buddhist theories of a creator deity
The process, rationality, and reality of negative emotion
Yogācārīn doctrine of the three-natures
Mādhyamika conceptions of causal efficacy in the world and in dreams
Types, criteria, and limitations of rational proofs
Analyses and descriptions of ten apparent conceptual dichotomies
Analyses and descriptions five exemplars of illusion (illusions, mirages, dreams, reflections, and emanations)
The folly of philosophical certainty.

We also find some treatment of logical discourse and its parameters, a subject taken up again in chapters three and four, in particular, as well as Rongzom’s fundamental equation of illusion (māyā: sgyu ma), which is traditionally correlated with impure phenomena, and emanation (nirmāṇa: sprul ba), often discussed in terms of pure phenomena. As we shall see in the chapters below, Rongzom’s position on the status of pure appearance is critically evaluated by another luminary of the Old School of Tibetan Buddhism, the fourteenth century kLong chen rab ‘byams pa (1308-1363). This interpretative distinction between the two Old School luminaries revolves around the ontological status of so-called impure phenomena. kLong chen rab ‘byams pa’s criticism of Rongzom’s “irrelevant”299 interpretation centers on a few lines found at the end of the first chapter of the Guhyagarbha root tantra (vv. 16-18).300

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300 The final passage of the first chapter reads: e e ma e ma ho | de bzhin nyi kyi dbyings nyid dbang sgyur ye shes dkyil ’khor thugs rje’i ngang | rang snang ba nyid ting ’dzin gzugs brnyan sgyu ma rnam
As mentioned above, the theories and arguments given in The Approach are often not typical; and when they are, their application is sometimes atypical. Rongzom is, in fact, renowned in Tibetan history as a unique intellectual figure altogether. The Blue Annals describes him as a scholar “whose theories were different from, and superior to, all others – a scholar whose equal has never appeared within the snowy land of Tibet.”

A distinctive feature of the text is its tendency to refuse to entertain issues as they are often stated and treated in traditional terms and contexts. For lack of a better description, we call Rongzom’s intellectual habit a meta-theoretical one. As will become clear throughout, his habit is to step back from apparent oppositions and theoretical conflicts in order to critically consider the underlying aporetic clusters that structure the appearance of dichotomy and conflict.

The method for this approach is highly contextual. At various times, Rongzom employs normative Mahāyāna rationality, such as the so-called logic dissolving identity and difference (ekānekaviyogahetu : gcig du bral gyi gtan tshigs). This is the same logic associated with the logical and epistemological doctrines advanced by figures at the famed scholastic center of learning, gSang phu ne’u thog (f. 1073), such as the later figure Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109-1169),

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301 DNG: lta ba mchog tu gyur pa kun las khyad par du gyur pa \( \text{\textbackslash n} \) bod gangs can gyi rgyud ’dir ’di dang mnyam pa’i mkhas pa ni su yang ma byung ngo \( \text{\textbackslash n} \) 211.01-211.02; cf. Roerich 166.
302 On this term, taken from Rescher’s The Strife of Systems: An Essay on the Grounds and Implications of Philosophical Diversity (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), see the Introduction.
the monastery’s sixth abbot. As I will discuss below, Rongzom aims some oblique criticism repeatedly at those he describes as obsessed with logic and grammar; and he repeatedly expresses frustration about the fact that Vaibhāṣika-type theories of object are the source of a variety of conflicting views circulating during his time. Below, we shall discuss the possibility that Phya pa, or perhaps even the institution of gSang phu ne’u thog as an institution, was the object of Rongzom’s concern.

At other times he uses math and allegory to provide rationalization for his rhetorical agenda. Other times, he resorts to the Sanskrit language to explain the meaning of a Tibetan term. The Blue Annals states Rongzom was a master of the inner and outer Buddhist sciences; Sanskrit and many other languages; that his work often gives precise terminological explanations for Tibetan

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305 I draw my use of the term “rhetoric” from Sarah McClintock’s 2008 use of “New Rhetoric” in explicating a “reception theory of rationality that neither reduces the rational to mere opinion nor restricts it to a single, absolute, and timeless standard” (“Rhetoric and the Reception Theory of Rationality in the Work of Two Buddhist Philosophers” in Argumentation (22), pp. 27-41).
306 The five domains called “major” are found in the Mahāyānasūtrālāmākārikā, though they perhaps drawn from the possibly earlier Yogācārabhūmi (van der Kuijip 1996: 393); they concern language (śabda : sgra), medicine (cītikīṣā : gso), technology (śīlakarma : bzo), logic & epistemology (hetu : gtan tshigs), and the so-called inner science of Buddhism proper (adhyātmavidya : nang don). The five minor sciences concern poetics (kāvya : snyan ngag), lexicography (kośa/abhīdhamma : mngon brjod), prosody and metrics (chandas : sde bsho), drama (niṭṭika : zlos gar) and astrology (gaṇita : skar rtsis). As Dreyfus has noticed (2003: 104), though these ten do not exhaust specified domains of Indian Buddhist knowledge, six of the ten given concern correct uses of language; specifically, Sanskrit. This list is not exhaustive, as several branches of learning, such as politics and the erotic arts, are not named. Those that are included complement the five major sciences and reflect the centrality of language in this curriculum. Four of the five minor branches are related to grammar – above all, Sanskrit grammar... the emphasis on Sanskrit reflects the Indian origins of the curriculum, borrowed from the great centers such as Nalanda and Vikramashila in North India”(id.).

Mastery of these major and minor sciences was made an important step in the construction of the intersection of intellectual (id. 103) and spiritual authority by renaissance figures such as Sa skya Paṇḍita (1182-1251), who famously to burnished his spiritual credentials by claiming mastery of the Indian Buddhist domains of knowledge (Kapstein 2000: 120) and is “rightly credited with having consolidated the study of the ‘five sciences’ across Tibet” (Gold 2007: 14). See Gold 2007.
terms. The Approach is proof of that.

Rongzom is careful in addressing the misunderstandings that underlie conflicting articulations of the Buddhist path as opposed, in conflict, and theoretically incommensurable. Throughout, we meet Rongzom’s erudition, his impressive and idiosyncratic rationality, and his synthetic agenda, one that aims to show how a proper analytic orientation privileging illusory appearance elides putative conflicts that often animate polemical Buddhist discourse.

Let us turn to a survey of the chapter’s contents, primary themes, and interpretative issues as they occur in sequence. Reference is made throughout to other works attributed to Rongzom when and if they illuminate any tacit suppositions. Section markers – e.g. “§1.2” – refer to breaks in The Approach, which can also be identified in both the outline (sa bad) of the text and the translation of The Approach given in the appendices.

The meaning of Rongzom’s assertion that “the recognition of the nature of mind just as it is, the circumstance of the confused mind, and the circumstance of the unconfused states of mind includes everything that is knowable” depends on whether the term shes par bya ba is understood as an expansion of the contracted noun shes bya (“knowable”) or a verbal construction. In the latter case, the interpretation depends further on whether the verb strictly renders an optative periphrastic or is a play on words. In normative Mahāyāna soteriological and philosophical discourse, all knowable phenomena (jenny : shes bya) can be subsumed generally within samsāra and nirvāṇa, which may also be understood in terms of what is to be gotten rid of (spang bya : varjayet Neigh 3355) and

DNg: phyi dang nang gi rgya pa’i gnas dang | sam skri ta dang skad rgya bya brag gzhan mang po la ma rmen gs pa | bod kyi skad nyid la yang ’di ni don ’di tsam zhi la ’jug go | zhes bya ba’i khyad par pra mo dag kyang gzhan las ches lhag pa | 210.13-210.16.
antidotes (gnyen po : pratipakṣa Negi 1615) - i.e. what is to be adopted (bang bya). The two concepts fuse to structure the concept of ‘bias,’ which is composed of a conjunction of the terms “adopt” and “reject” or blang dor : heyopādeya (Mvp 7200). Such bias, while lauded in Dharmakīrti’s epistemology (cf. Engle 2009: 83-88), forms a critical point of departure for Rongzom’s Great Perfection view of equality (samatā : mnyam pa nyid). For Rongzom, any type of biased attitude – including an epistemological position – fails to attain the Great Perfection’s view of equality. What remains to be investigated below is whether this statement suggests, as it seems to, that only mental phenomena are objects of knowledge or instead that there is only so much one should know - and it is all included in the mental.

SECTION SUMMARIES

In the first section of Chapter One of The Approach (§1.0) we encounter Rongzom’s reading of the Śrāvaka path, which is traditionally organized around the teaching of the Four Noble Truths. Here, Rongzom employs reductio ad absurdam reasoning based in analysis of identity and difference (ekānekaviyogahetu) to show that even Śrāvakas may resolve the view of equality given the right interpretation of the status of affliction. This reading is against the traditional reading of the Śrāvaka path, which is based on the acceptance of the latter two of the Four Noble Truths and rejection of the latter two. This reading of the Śrāvaka path is a Great Perfection reading of the path and, as far as I know, the first work on Great Perfection to explicitly take up and interpret “lower” paths accordingly. While it is difficult to say how the term rdzogs pa chen po or
"great perfection" was understood at the time of Rongzom’s composition, it is evident that the opening of The Approach clearly works to evoke an uncontroversial Buddhist worldview as a basis of discussion.

First and foremost (thog ma kho na), it is fitting that whosoever wishes to be freed from the ocean of samsāra and accomplish unexcelled awakening scrutinize the character of the afflictions since it is well-known from the general word of the Buddha that ‘since the afflictions have bound beings migrating in conditioned existence, they have drifted on the ocean of samsāra.’ Thus, it is fitting to seek out that which is the superior path that is an antidote to those afflictions and act to cultivate it because there is no getting rid of the afflictions without a thorough understanding of their antidotes; and when there is no thorough understanding of those antidotes, since there is no knowledge of the method that is to be cultivated, without disengaging from the afflictions the opportunity for liberation will not be found.

That is to say, sentient beings inevitably experience discontent because they remain ignorant of a means to remedy afflicted states of mind such as attachment, aversion, ignorance and the like. Until one becomes fully aware of the character or actuality (lakṣaṇa : mtshan nyid) of afflictions, there is no

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308 According to Sam van Schaiik (2004), the term rdzogs pa chen po was recognizable and shared much with the literature that comes to be identified with the so-called semdê (sems sde) or ‘mind-series’ or ‘mind-section’ of the later Great Perfection tradition. In tracing the evolution of the term rdzogs chen, he outlines several historical inflection points for the term. In the first (i), rdzogs chen is a term that describes “the ritual moment of the culmination of the perfection stage yoga” clearly set within "the universe of the Mañjuśrī tantras"; next (ii), rdzogs chen describes “the culmination of the three ways (tskul) of inner yogic practice” (i.e. generation, perfection, and great perfection); the third (iii) is described as “an independent approach” beyond simply being “the culmination of the perfection stage, or a framework for all yogic practice”; (iv) rdzogs chen as a “textual category” and (iv) as a "Buddhist vehicle" (theg pa : yāna). Though we note the term atiyoga is not a term Rongzom prefers, according to van Schaiik, it refers to a distinct vehicle already in the STMG of gnNubs chen sangs rgyas ye shes, whose dates are discussed in Vitali 1996: 546-547. Cf. Germano 2005 and his useful bifurcation of Great Perfection into Pristine and Funerary as a criteria of differentiation and development of the doctrines organized under the rubric, “Great Perfection.”

309 The Approach: thog mar kho nar nyon mongs pa rnams kyi mtshan nyid bragpa’i rigs so 11 gang gi phyir nyon mongs pa rnams kyi bsings te 1 ‘gro ba rnams ‘khorba’i rgya mtshor ‘khyams so zhes bka’ spyi las grags pa’i phyir ro 11 de’i og tu de rnams kyi gnyen por gyur pa’i lam gyi mchog tu gyur pa gangguin pa zhig btsal te 1 de la goms par bya ba’i rig 1 gang gi phyir nyon mongs pa rnamskhyi mtshan nyid lhong du ma chud par 1 de’i gnyen po’ang khong du chud par mi ‘gyur la 1 de dag khong du ma chud na goms par bya ba’i thabs kyung mi shes te 1 de rnamsdang ma bral na thar pa’i go skabs mi rnyed pa’i phyir ro 11 (RZSB 1.417.03-117.09).
opportunity to remedy suffering because there is no recognition of its remedy.\textsuperscript{310} The remedy is administered in the recognition (\textit{shes}) that the reality of affliction is such that there is no real afflictive entity (\textit{rdzas}) from which to gain freedom.

At this point in the text, the rhetorical ground shifts: penetrating this standard Buddhist worldview, Rongzom writes, is the key to understanding everything that ought to be understood (\textit{shes bya}) as all are included within three types of knowledge that concern:

1. the mind just-as-it-is,
2. the circumstance of the confused mind,
3. the circumstance of the unconfused mind.

This technical Tibetan term \textit{shes bya} corresponds with the Sanskrit \textit{jiñeya} and can be rendered as a noun: ‘knowable’; in this case it might refer to anything that is within the jurisdiction of object awareness; but understood as a contraction of the optative periphrastic \textit{shes par bya ba} – ‘what ought to be known’ - the term might be taken to refer more narrowly and playfully to what is necessary and thus ought to be recognized for spiritual freedom to take place.\textsuperscript{311} This three-fold set is curious, and a seemingly unnecessary complication to a foundational and apparently simple Buddhist doctrine. Yet, it is clear this triad is at the heart of the authentic Buddhist path for Rongzom and frames the initial question from which \textit{The Approach} unfolds. The question takes up this triad of concerns and employs

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{310} The character or actuality of affictions (\textit{nyon mongs pa’i mtshan nyid}) is said to refer to the intrinsic nature of affliction in Tö. 4032 \textit{dBus dang mtha’ rnam par ’byed pa’i ’grel bshad (Madhyanta-vibhaṅga-ṭīkā) in bsTan ‘gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2001, sems śam, vi-mi, vol. 71 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): 1 nyon mongs pa’i mtshan nyid ni nyon mongs pa’i rang bzhin mo 1 (575.18-575.19).

\textsuperscript{311} The useful ambiguity of the construction in this particular context causes me to read it as a bit of word-play or a pun (cf. śleṣa, L. paronomasia).
\end{footnotesize}
them within the interpretative space facilitated by a conceptual paradox at the heart of Buddhism. That is: sentient beings are trapped in an illusion.

The Approach §1.0 opens by inquiring into the reality of our bondage (cf. 1), its implications for freedom (cf. 2), and the condition of our freedom (cf. 3). In a subtle shift, Rongzom inquires into the status of affliction - is it real or not? If not, he asks, what then is the reality, if any, of our bondage?

Is it that so-called afflictions are actually a real entity [cf. 1] and that migrants are bound in saṃsāra by them? [cf. 2] Or, rather, is it the case that the afflictions that are to be gotten rid of are not real entities yet beings appear as if bound by them? [cf. 3]

The answer: afflictions are devoid of any real entity that form something to be gotten rid of along the Buddhist path. The implication is that beings only appear as if bound by afflictive states of mind. This rhetoric hints at calling into question the path structure as classically articulated - i.e., a sentient being or sattva can, by means of the teaching or dharma, become free from suffering - by suggesting the unreality of saṃsāra, which only appears to be real.312 The majority of Chapter One is devoted to exploring the various approaches used by Śrāvakas (§1.1),

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312 The suggestion that underlying saṃsāra is a pure reality is one emphasized in tantric discourse. On the rdzogs chen view, all phenomena, from saṃsāra to nirvāṇa, are included in the mind just-as-it-is; and they are primordially perfected (ye nas sangs rgyas pa). Not only is the notion of a pure underlying reality tantric, the shift from ontology to phenomenology - i.e. from how things are to a phenomenology of pure, enlightened, experience - is, as well. We see this clearly in Douglas Duckworth's juxtaposition of Madhyamaka and Vajrayāna discourse: We can see how the discourses of Madhyamaka deal explicitly with ontology and its deconstruction, what is and what is not, whereas a unique subject matter of tantra is a particular type of experience or subjectivity. In the philosophical systems represented within the 'causal vehicle' of non-tantric Mahāyāna, the empty aspect of luminous clarity ('od gsal) the fundamental nature of mind, is emphasized, and, in the 'resultant vehicle' of Vajrayāna (i.e. tantric Mahāyāna), the emphasis is on the aspect of clarity (gsal cha) (“Tibetan Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna.” In A Companion to Buddhist Philosophy. Emmanuel, Steven M, ed. (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy. Hoboken, N.J: Wiley, 2013) 104). That is, ontology in terms of the empty aspect is emphasized in non-tantric discourse while pure experience or subjectivity signals, among other things, a register shifting toward the so-called tantric. There is some correspondence between this structure of Buddhist discourse and what has been described as the negative-intellectualist and positive-mysticalist strains of Buddhist discourse, of which we shall have more to say below.
Pratyeka-jīnas (§1.2), Yogācārins (§1.3), Mādhyamikas (§1.4), and Guhyamantrins (‘practitioners of secret mantra’) (§1.5), respectively, to demonstrate that each approach fails to find any real entity qua affliction that forms something that is gotten rid on the way to spiritual freedom.\footnote{This process, by which the various approaches are described in consonant terms should not suggest any approach, improperly regarded/used, is above criticism. Indeed, criticisms are made concerning short-sighted approaches, but the aim of the chapter is to show that each approach proper finds no real entity to be rejected. Criticisms made are considered below in the context of Rongzom’s view that higher approaches do not depart from, improve upon, or nullify lower approaches and the idea that theory, defined in some sense through biased attitude, begets entity.}

The driving force of reason here is the logic connected with \textit{one} and \textit{many}/identify and difference (\textit{ekānekaviyogahetu} : \textit{gcig du bral gyi/}ba’i gtan tshigs). This dialectic exploits binary dichotomization to force two putatively acceptable (shall we call them \textit{logically possible}?\footnote{Mereologic such as the \textit{ekānekaviyogahetu} is used in “classifying arguments against the existence of substance-svabhāva” (Westerhoff 2009: 31).\footnote{Its use is prevalent, for example, in the \textit{Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra} (Tayé 2007: 209) ; on the dates of this text, see \textit{Jurnal of Indian Philosophy}, vol. VII, §138 (1999: 332-333).}) alternatives upon any object in order to demonstrate the untenability of both.\footnote{Its use is supposed to produce a rational inference of the illusory nature of the apparently solid reality that constitutes the world; and it has a long Buddhist pedigree.\footnote{Rongzom often uses a form of ‘the \textit{ekānea},’ if I may use an abbreviation, when seeking to determine whether or not any approaches to Buddhism locate a phenomenological entity in their evaluation of suffering and the path to its cessation. For Śrāvakas, whose} Its use is supposed to produce a rational inference of the illusory nature of the apparently solid reality that constitutes the world; and it has a long Buddhist pedigree.\footnote{Rongzom often uses a form of ‘the \textit{ekānea},’ if I may use an abbreviation, when seeking to determine whether or not any approaches to Buddhism locate a phenomenological entity in their evaluation of suffering and the path to its cessation. For Śrāvakas, whose}}
approach to the path is typically couched in terms of the Four Noble Truths, Rongzom employs the *ekāneka* and some conceptually ambiguous space in the structure of the Four Noble Truths - the ambiguity between the nature of a source of suffering and the nature of suffering itself. That is, Rongzom zeroes in on the simplistic idea that afflictions are simply identifiable as discrete things (or eighty-four thousand discrete things) with clear boundaries that make them easily quantifiable.

For the moment should we assume that the afflictions relinquished through perceiving [the truth of] suffering, the afflictions relinquished perceiving [the truth of suffering's] source, and so on, pertain to a single real entity within the afflictions relinquished through perception? – and what if the statement that [they are] distinct is scrutinized? If it is the case they are a single entity, then the abandonment, by virtue of perceiving dissatisfaction alone, would relinquish everything that is to be rejected. In that case, meditation on another path would be rendered pointless (*don med par 'gyur* ro). What if [on the other hand] one were to say the afflictions are present as distinct, discrete entities? In that case, when everything knowable is summed up in the context of the four truths it would all boil down to something divided into aspects of the four [noble] truths. That being so, whatever afflictions are to be gotten rid of would unquestionably be multiplied four-fold due to being a perceptual basis for the four truths qua object (*yul bden pa bzhi la dmigs pa'i dbang gis*). If that were the case, there could be no decisive reckoning of the divisions of what is knowable.

Do the afflictions said to be abandoned through seeing suffering form one single entity of affliction? Neither possibility is viable. If these afflictions are said to be the same, the entire path would be meaningless; if it is maintained they are different, absurdities follow in the form of a four-fold multiplication of afflictions vis-à-vis their concretization as entities via the Four Noble Truths.

In this arithmetic turn, we see a recurrent principle in Rongzom's writings: that is, theory can be constitutive of reality. In this case, the perceptible
objectification of the four truths (yul bden bzhi la dmigs pa'i dbang gis) somehow multiplies any given affliction by four. In this section, we also find discussion of theories postulating a creator and, in a passage that recalls Śantideva’s Bodhicaryāvatara 6.41, the logic of identity and difference (ekānekavīyogahetu) is applied to the entity of anger one feels toward a weapon - a stick or club - that has effected loss in one's life.

Ending the Śrāvaka section, The Approach describes the path of 'someone who has overcome her foes' (arhat) as the natural pacification of the delusion derived from the view of the transitory collection through realizing the selflessness of persons. This is the "hinayāna" path traditionally described in Mahāyāna literature. After the view of the transitory collection abates – until this point a person conceives of a self as an overlord of her own transitory psycho-physical constituents – a person's mind and body may be imbued with aspiring bodhicitta. Here we see direct linkage between the putatively lamentable view of the transitory collection and the illimitable source of merit described in Mahāyāna literature. Rongzom states that when a proper view towards the transitory collection (i.e. samsaric mind and body) is conjoined with aspiring

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317 It is not yet clear to me precisely how this math works. What is important here is that Rongzom never says the Śrāvaka method is, strictly speaking, wrong. Yet, he also does not employ what is a traditional exegesis of the Four Noble Truths – at least not to my knowledge. If there a tradition of using arithmetic in this way, it remain unknown to me. The same should be said of the arithmetic used in the Pratyeka section just below.

318 It is not entirely clear to me how this math works.

319 Such a phrase, seeks to articulate quanta of sensations and experience; and while the Rongzom's aim is to show there is no real entity of anger, the convention (albeit a deeply abstract and philosophical one) is acceptable. That is, in this discourse, we stipulate there is something that is anger and that we can naively indicate it as an entity in order to show it is not a real entity by virtue of the absurdity of supposing anything that exists to be either one or many in nature.

320 Rongzom paragraph finishes with a nod to the idea that theory begets suffering in one form or another: "It is due to the pacification of the illusion-producing view of the transitory collection that illusions associated with affective states of mind are simply pacified" ('jig tshogs lta ba'i sgyu mkhan nge bar zhi bar gyur te l des nyan mong s pa'i sgyu 'phrul thams cad rang bzhi bar gyur par zad do). Also, note that it does not appear that Rongzom makes any reference to an ‘inferior’ (dman) vehicle, though he severally mentions ‘lesser’ and ‘smaller’ vehicles.
bodhicitta (the altruistic intention to become a buddha to end the suffering of all sentient beings), that mind and body becomes "an illimitable source of merit," a phrase striking a distinctively Mahāyāna note.

This interesting turn reorganizes the Śrāvaka idea that the samsaric mind-body complex is a true suffering to be abandoned on the path and links it directly to the Mahāyāna notion of a buddha-body that is an infinite resource for the expression of buddha-activity. Here, The Approach states that if this mind and body qualified by bodhicitta are imbued with insight into selflessness, the impurity of afflictions will be transformed into pure appearance (dri ma dag par snang bar ’gyur). This ends the Śrāvaka section on the distinctively tantric note of pure appearance.

For Pratyeka-jīnas (§1.2), whose approach to the path is typically couched in terms of penetrating reality by means of the twelve links of interdependence, Rongzom employs the ekāneka (i.e. the logic that dissects identity and difference via reductio ad absurdam arguments) and some conceptually ambiguous space in the structure relating the twelve links of interdependence to the paths of seeing and meditation described as part of the five-fold path structure. The result is an argument to show that if affliction is held to be a real entity within that scheme, it leads to absurdities such as any given affliction being doubled through the paths of seeing and meditation and multiplied twelve times by the links of interdependence; eventually any affliction would be multiplied forty-eight times by means of the twelve links and Four Noble Truths.

In accordance with the approach of the Pratyeka-jina Superiors, it happens that realizing profound actual reality by means of the twelve limbs of interdependent origination through the paths of seeing and meditation, all
afflictions of the three realms that are to be rejected are gotten rid of; and this is said to be the attainment of the fruit of self-awakening. That being the case, [inasmuch as afflictions are held to be real entities that are] distinct, then, due to the twelve limbs of interdependent origination, the uninterrupted path and the path of thorough liberation will be multiplied by two and the perception of even a single affliction that is to be abandoned will multiplied by twelve. Furthermore, each of those individual limbs, as well, have the character of the four truths; and with ignorance as a condition - via actualizing karmic processes and so forth - would accordingly be akin to a burden, injurious by nature, and thus in the character of the truth of dissatisfaction. With karmic processes as a condition, consciousness and so forth actualize a state of dissatisfaction in the future, and thus pertains to the truth of sources. The negation of ignorance, since it negates karmic processes and so forth, pertains to the truth of cessation on account of those negations. Having meditated upon the characteristics of interdependent origination, then, pertains to the truth of paths. That being the case, even a single affliction that is to be relinquished would be rendered into forty-eight by means of the four truths. On the view of this system, then, there can be no decisive reckoning obtained in connection with a real entity of affliction.\footnote{321 The Approach: \( \text{\textbackslash 'phags pa rang rgyal ba rnam s kyi tshul ltar na \textbackslash 'rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba yan lag bcu gnysis kyi sgo nas \textbackslash'chos nyid zab mo rtogs te \textbackslash khams gsum gyi nyon mongs pa mthong ba dang bsgom pas apang bar bya ba ma lus pa spangs te \textbackslash rang byang chub kyi 'bras bu thob pa'i zhes 'byung bas \textbackslash'de bas na rten 'brel yan lang bcu gnysis kyi dbang gis \textbackslash're re la'ang bar chad med pa'i lam dang \textbackslash rnam par grol ba'i lam gnysis gnysis su 'gyur bas \textbackslash mthong bas spang bar bya ba'i nyon mongs pa gcig kyang bcu gnysis gnysis su 'gyur ro \textbackslash'gshan yang yan lag de dag re'ang bden pa bzhi'i mtshan nyid can yin te \textbackslash 'di ltar ma rig pa'i rkyen gyis 'du byed la stogsspa mngon par 'gyur pa'i sgo nas \textbackslash khur ltar gnod pa'i bdag nyid du gyur pas \textbackslash'sdug bsgal gyi bden pa'i mtshan nyid yinno \textbackslash 'du byed kyi rkyen gyis rnam par shes pa la stogs pa \textbackslash'ma'ongs pa na s Lug bsgal mngon par 'grub pa'i gnas su gyur pas \textbackslash'kun 'byung gi bden pa yin no \textbackslash' marig pa 'gags pas 'du' byed 'gags pa la stogs pas \textbackslash 'gog pa'i bden pa yin la \textbackslash de rnam s 'gog par bya ba'i phyir \textbackslash 'rten 'brel gyi mtshan nyid lam bsgomis pas \textbackslash lam gyi bden pa yin te \textbackslash de bas na bden pa bzhi'i dbang gis \textbackslash spang bar bya ba'i nyon mongs pa gcig kyang bzhi bcu rtsa bryad du 'gyur ro \textbackslash tshul 'di ltar na'ang nyon mongs pa rnam la rdzas kyi granges nges par bzung ba mi rnyed do \textbackslash (RZSB 420.02-420.17).}

While the reason the multiplication occurs is not totally clear to me, it does seem clear that maintaining any ontological commitment to affliction as a real entity means no end to affliction. In the case of the Pratyeka-jīnas, Rongzom is stating that their framework would not accomplish the goal of liberation if hey do not reject that bondage is not a real entity. If Śrāvakas are said to main bondage and affliction as real entities, Rongzom states, then by virtue of their primary soteriological frameworks – i.e. the twelve links and Four Noble Truths
– any given affliction would be multiplied forty-eight times. This *reductio ad absurdam* argument emphasizes Rongzom’s view of the constitutive interplay between theory and the distortion of reality. This connection is made throughout *The Approach*.

For Yogācārins (§1.3), whose approach is typically couched in terms of mind, mental factors and the three natures of *Sāndhiniromocana-sūtra* fame, Rongzom employs an example from *Mahāyānasamgraha* 2.29, that of gold ore underneath the earth, as well as the oft-used epistemological example of the spinning fire-brand or ember that produces the perception of a fire-wheel (*alāntacakra*: *’gal me’i ’khor lo*). On Rongzom’s view, the luminosity of the glowing brand is only a real entity inasmuch as both the fire-wheel and the fire-brand are taken to be real entities. If it is supposed that one – either the fire-brand or the fire-wheel – is a real entity while the other is not, the three-natures doctrine begins to collapse. On the other hand,

if it is suggested that] the fire-wheel [which is something totally imagined (kun btags)] is a real entity while the fire-brand [which is something perfected (yongs grub)] is not a real entity, then luminosity [which is something dependent (gzhan dbang)], would pertain to the [imagined] fire-wheel yet be absent in the second factor [- i.e., the perfected fire-brand].

Conversely, if the fire-brand is perceived as real while the fire-wheel is not, then luminosity, which is a dependent phenomenon, would absurdly only pertain to the brand; but on Rongzom’s view, “at the point when the [imagined] fire-wheel

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323 *The Approach*: ‘di’ ’ltar ’gal dum yang rdzas su grub la ’khor lo yang rdzas su grub pa zhiṅ na | gsla ba’ang gnyi’ ga’i char glog s pa yod par grub tu rung la | gal te ’khor lo rdzas su grub la ’gal dum rdzas su ma grub pa zhiṅ na | gsal ba’ang ’khor lo nyid kyi mṭshan nyid yin te | cha gnyis myed do | RZSB 421.08-421.11).
becomes apparent, the [perfected] fire-brand has progressively been occluded qua single object (’gal me gcig yul rim gyis gnon pa). Since what is imagined cannot exist as a real entity, whatever is considered conceptual or dependent phenomena cannot be included within both the imagined and the perfected.

likewise if both [the imagined and the perfected] are real entities, whether the perfected is a real entity or what is imagined is acceptably included within both, they pertain to the character of one's own awareness because neither have any basis in reality. What is imagined cannot be established in either. That being the case, no real entity that is to be gotten rid of will be detected that constitutes affliction.

The reality of three natures is not objective. They in fact pertain to one's own awareness. The argument concludes that the three natures proper do not in or among themselves lend any credence to perceptions of any real entity.

For Mādhyamikas (§1.4), whose approach is typically couched in terms of the ultimate emptiness of everything (including conventions) within the pacification of discursive elaborations, Rongzom glosses Jñānagarbha's Satyadvayavibhaṅga, verse twelve. He turns to the status of conventions and the trouble surrounding the idea that useful conventions are amenable to logical proofs. Indeed, Rongzom has some critical remarks on Mādhyamikas who overemphasize the reality of samsāra in their insistence upon logically validating conventions.

While what retains water is something that can be touched, color is not. That being the case, [such a] comparison between color and tactility is irrelevant. Distinct phenomena simply perform distinct activities and in this way, on this view, a vase retains water; this assertion that the reflection of a vase does not [function as a vase functions insofar as it does not retain water due to lacking the physical dimensions of a real vase] is simply an assertion in accordance with with what is known in the
world - that personal entities performs activities; and given that personhood is unreal (according to the dharma), how could there be a real entity of that activity?

Here, Ronzom recalls the tragedy of the mythical ruler, Anantayaśā, who is mentioned in both the Pitā-putra-samāgamana-sūtra and the Śikṣasamuccaya, in his drive to show that the Madhyamaka view of convention and is rendered lame by insisting on the reality of some entity that is to be gotten rid of by means of the path. This section follows with a passage concerning appearance and emptiness, which is discussed in the context of a well-known example: misapprehending a rope as a snake.

Rongzom ends this passage by aligning his view of the unreality of any real entity to be rejected with what he sees as the Madhyamaka approach proper - i.e. an approach that, at most, insists on establishing conventions for just a moment, no more. He writes: "only if the character of an object is properly set forth as unreal would it be on par with the entity that is set forth only for the moment (re shig par gzhag pa’i rdzas) because all characteristics are fundamentally equal - excepting what does not deny mere appearance." This approach to conventions challenges the idea that conventions cannot withstand analyses. According to Rongzom, if

[a convention] can not even withstand the burden of its own validating criteria per se how can a mere convention even be real? For example, if, unlike an elephant that is spurred by a metal whip and eradicates an enemy while bearing a host of soldiers, a cow working to plough just a field while wearing a yoke is not even able to bear being spurred by the

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324 'jig rten kyi grags pa (423.06) : lokaprasiddha. In this context, the term appears similar in import to rab tu mi gnas pa.
325 tho ba’i lcags (423.17).
326 dgra’i dpung ’joms par byed pa (423.16).
327 Read ba lang (BM 13.05); cf. ba la’ang (RZSB 423.18 & Th 57.03). On the trope of the elephant in Buddhist literature, see especially Covill’s 2009 analysis.
prod of a goad, how would the convention "working to plough a field" even apply? and what would then be the distinction [between such an ineffective creature in the context of "working to plough a field" and], say, a drove of castrated goats?

Conventions do have validating criteria, but they are purely contextual clues.

The Madhyamaka view that asserts the valid establishment of conventions only for a moment is roughly equivalent to the view that there is no real entity given with respect to the character of an object (don gyi mtshan nyid la ni yang dag par gzhag pa’i rdzas ma grub tsam na \ re shig par gzhag pa’i rdzas dang ’go mi mnyam par mi ’grub ste). This interpretive move functions to obviate a possible difficulty obtaining between the approaches of the Madhyamaka proper and Rongzom’s Mahāyāna.

The Approach then enters into a lengthy section (§1.4.1-10) on the variety of dichotomous appearances that qualify common experience. For each conventional dichotomy, an example is given and sometimes explanation.

Among these examples, reference is made to eye disease, hallucinogenic, martial military communication, Buddhist hells, hungry ghosts, and mythological creatures such as a deer that bathes in, or a mouse that lives in, fire. In a discussion of pure perception that is taken, in part, from the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-

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328 The Approach: ’di ltar yang dag par sgrub kyang rung \ re shig tsam du sgrub kyang rung rung ste \ rang rang gi sa tshad tsam sgrub par byed pa’i rig pa’i spungs tsam yang mi bzod na \ tha snyad tsam yang ji ltar ‘grub par ‘gyur \ dper na dgra’i spung’joms par byed pa’i glang po che la dpung gi tshogs khur nas tho ba’i lcags kyi bskul ba’i spungs bzod pa lta bu ma yin du zin kyang \ zing tsam rmo ba’i bya ba byed pa’i ba’la’ang gnya’ shing khur nas \ ‘khri shing gi lcag gis bskul ba’i spungs tsam yang mi bzod na \ zing rmo ba’i bya ba byed ces bya ba’i tha snyad kyang ji ltar ’jug ste \ ra skyes kyi spungs dang bye brag du gyur pa ci zhid yod (RZSB 1.423.14-423.20).

329 Ten valid conventional dichotomies are given: 1. the consistent or varying experience of appearance respective of karmic inheritance 2. totally pure and totally impure appearances 3. accessible (426.01) and inaccessible appearances 4. the falsely appearing and correctly appearing 5. appearances qualified by both (truth and fiction) 6. the perception of false appearances accompanied by error and perception of false appearances accompanied by veracity 7. appearances having a basis, those that are baseless, and those that have false bases 8. efficacious and ineffective appearances 9. appearing to exist as real entity and appearing as imputedly existent 10. totally imagined and actual appearance.
sūtra, Rongzom describes the distinctions that obtain between pure and impure perceptions of the world; and the Madhyamaka section ends by arguing for the fundamental equality between what is and is not real.

In the penultimate section of chapter one, §1.5, concerning Madhyamaka and Guhyamantra (this is the first explicit mention in The Approach of “secret mantra” (guhyamantra : gsang sngags), Rongzom articulates criteria (§1.5.1) for five analogies often used in Buddhism in the context of describing the nature of reality. The coupling of Madhyamaka and Tantra is, of course, noteworthy. As we shall see, while Rongzom does take issue with a particular type of Madhyamaka, he does resolve the two in broadly consonant terms. We are cautious, however, in categorizing Rongzom as a general a proponent of the Middle-Way (mādhyamika) because he criticizes rather than endorses the system, generally, in favor of the Great Perfection.

In Buddhism it is taught that all phenomena are like an illusion; like a mirage; like a dream; like a reflection; like an emanation. In the final section of chapter one, Rongzom explains precisely what constitutes each. The list of exemplars is not itself unusual in South Asian discourse or Buddhism, in particular.\footnote{Each is given, for example, in Westerhoff, Jan. Twelve Examples of Illusion (Oxford University Press, 2010).} The five Rongzom lists are:

- illusion (māyā : sgyu ma)
- mirage (marīci : smig rgyu)
- dream (svapna : rmi lam)
- reflection/image (pratibimba : gzugs brnyan)
- emanation (nirmāṇa : sprul pa)
In each case, Rongzom offers an illustration of each exemplar – an enchanted figurine for illusion (§1.5.1.1), an optical apparition caused by a combination of light and other facts is a mirage (§1.5.1.2), dreams of both pleasurable and painful abodes (§1.5.1.3), a reflection in a mirror (§1.5.1.4), and enchanted flowers of various colors that cause emanational visions (§1.5.1.5) – followed by a brief description of their causal production. Concerning illusion, Rongzom writes:

an illusionist who has made an effigy from such things as pebbles, sticks, grit, and so forth, and incanted mantras over a clay figure such that it has been penetrated through the force of applied practice, then [causes] various forms - that of a man, a woman, a horse, an elephant, whatever - to manifest in the experience [of others]. Though, from the first moment the images occur, they do not arise from anywhere at all. Even when apparent, since they are an illusion, nothing actual is present at all. Once persuaded they are an illusion they cease to be and do not appear.331

Critical to this doctrine of appearance is the fact illusory images occur yet “do not arise from anywhere at all” (*de dang po byung ba’i tshe na gang nas kyang ma byung*). With insight into their nature, they cease, that is, they do not appear. Yet at that moment, they have not gone anywhere” (*’gags shing mi snang bar ’gyur te | de’i tshe’ang gang du’ang ma song*). In the case of each exemplar, an illustration is given with a description of its causal conditions. In each case, appearance (*snang ba*) does not equal presence (*yod pa*), and the cessation of said appearance does not entail a destruction. Both appearance and non-appearance, Rongzom writes, share in a single nature given their indivisibly characteristicless character (*dbyer med par mtshan nyid med par mtshan nyid*). The cessation of such an appearance

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331 *The Approach*: *sgyu ma nikhan gyis rde’u dang shin bu dang gseg ma la stsoqs pa la ’dra’ gzugs byas te | gyo mo la sngags kyis btab nas sbyor ba goms pas bsnun na | skyes pa dang bud myed dang rta dang glang po la stsoqs pa’i gzugs sna tshogs snang ba ’byung bar ’gyur te | de dang po byung ba’i tshe na gang nas kyang ma byung | snang ba nyi [431] kyi tshe na’ang sgyu ma yin pa’i phyir mtshan nyid gang yang yod pa ma yin | sgyu ma bsdus nas ’gags shing mi snang bar ’gyur te | de’i tshe’ang gang du’ang ma song | RZSB 1.430.20-431.02.

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does not mean that a causal continuum operating in time and space has ceased.

As mentioned, each example is found in literature from the Pratītya-samutpāda tradition, such as the Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā-upadeśa-sāstrā-abhisamaya-alankāra-vṛtti. However, remarkably similar tropes and images are found in a passage from a collection of tantric songs called the *Acintyamahāmudra* attributed to the Indian siddha, Tilopa. This passage gives the same exemplars in the same order, using roughly the same illustrations, and employing the same theory of appearance in the same idiom of *The Approach*. Tilopa is an important Indian figure for the bKa’ brgyud pa sect of Tibetan Buddhism. In his *Acintyamahāmudra*, there is a song called “Advice for the Illusionist” (*sgyu ma mkhan la gdams pa*). There, a Bhadramukha (*bzhin bzang*) is told that in “all the Buddha’s doctrinal discourses that teach the great mode of conveyence” (*theg pa’i tshul chen*), the Buddha proclaimed all phenomena to be like an illusion, mirage, dream, reflection, and emanation. When this point is recognized, afflicting bias is is gone and a person is automatically free (*shes na nyon mongs spang du med | rang grol...*). Beginning with illusion, Tilopa also uses the example of an enchanted figurine. In discussing reflections, Tilopa also states that when they happen, they “do not first arise from somewhere” (*dang po gang nas kyang ni ma byung la*). When such appearances cease, as well, Rongzom uses an idiom similar to Tilopa’s. Appearances “cease at that moment. That is, they do not appear. Yet at that moment, they have not gone anywhere” (*’gags shing mi*

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333 Counted among the eighty-four famed “tantric adepts” or mahasiddha, the work of Tilopa, who is said to have flourished in the late tenth and eleventh centuries, forms an important source for literature associated with the bKa’ brgyud sect of Tibetan Buddhism (PDB, s.v.).
334 Ibid. 1645.03-1647.20.
snang bar 'gyur te | de’i tshe’ang gang du’ang ma song). In Tilopa’s text, the Tibetan phrase is almost identical: ‘gags shing mi snang gyur tshe gang du’ang song ba med.

In Tilopa’s text, “appearance and non-appearance are unified qua their indistinguishable nature (snang dang mi snang dbyer med mtshan nyid gcig). In The Approach, Rongzom states that both share in an indivisibly characteristicless character (dbyer med par mtshan nyid med par mtshan nyid) – and therefore share a single nature. In the dream exemplar, Rongzom and Tilopa make mention of dreaming about both pleasure groves (kun dga’ ra ba skyed mos tshal) and prisons and jails (btson ra khri mon/mun). The same example is used in the reflection section, too; and in the last section – on emanation – Rongzom uses the same example as Tilopa: colored flowers enchanted through the power of knowledge mantras (rigs sngags grub pa’i mthu las byung gyur pa | | me tog kha dog dbye ba’i rnam pa). In Rongzom’s example of a dream, he appears to again follow Tilopa’s Acintyamahāmudra. Both advance the illustration of prophetic dreams. These striking similarities in presentation and nomenclature suggest Rongzom drew upon Tilopa’s Acintyamahāmudra in this section of The Approach – and others – or that there may be or may have been a common source for both.335

Concluding comments (§1.6) to chapter one focus on the soteriological rather than logical concerns of Buddhist theory when properly employed. Rongzom chides those who wrap themselves up in theory. Regardless of how lucid one’s reasoning, one’s reasoning is always biased and thus flawed. Here, Rongzom draws on a story about two Brahmins: “Terrestrial Flower” (sa’i me tog) and Undying (mi ’chi ba), two figures also mentioned the

335 See §§. 2.1.2.1 and 2.1.2.2 below.
The story suggests the relative status of any given philosophical endeavor. That is, what looks like an exercise in rigor in pursuit of truth from one perspective looks like just so much reorganization of biases from another.

If it is said that someone proves any from among those self-defeating philosophical theories, this would [only reference] a flawless establishing proof for proponents of philosophical theories who perceive their own [dialectical] procedure to be unflawed. From the point of view of those of deep and expansive awareness, [philosophical proof] is nevertheless comparable to turbid water - a perception that [we] proclaim is fabricated as one's own experience.

On the heels of this, Rongzom cycles through the Śrāvaka, Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka approaches. Each is described and what is made clear is the potential for theory to participate in the construction of classifications which then become mutually reinforcing for the subject (‘dod pa | de’i dbang gis rnam grangs kyi dbye ba byas pas | de nyid kyi nges pa nyams byar byas). From the perspective of pure beings, and according to the approach valorized in The Approach, logical philosophical precision and insistence is, in the end, vulgar and misleading.

CHAPTER CITATIONS

In the first chapter, Rongzom examines the status of suffering in an illusory world from the perspective of several different Buddhist approaches to liberation. Chapter one cites, paraphrases or alludes to perhaps nine well-known

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336 bsSam gtan phyi ma rim par phyé ba rgya cher bshad pa (Dhyānottarapaṭalaṭika) in bsTan ‘gyur (dpebsdur ma) 1999, rgyud, thu-du, vol. 36 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang). I have not yet located the precise passage Rongzom gives, but the figures are mentioned at 6.08.

337 The Approach: ‘o na rang gis rang la gnod pa’i grub mtha’ de dag su zhig sgrub par byed ce na \ ‘di ni grub mtha’ ‘dzind pa rang rang gi blo dri ma nyed par mthong ba rnam s kyis s kyon nyed par sgrubs pa yin mod kyi \ de bas blo zab cing yangs pa rnam s kyis bltas na \ chu brnyogs pa bzhin du rang gis rang nyams par byas pa mthong ba brjod pa yin no \ (RZSB 434.09-434.12).
texts, leaving allowance for some lines being so common as to occur in multiple texts.\textsuperscript{338} They are given here in order of their appearance in the chapter with their corresponding section numbers from the translation and outline and a gloss of the content:\textsuperscript{339}

\begin{quote}
\textit{Verses Differentiating the Middle Way and Extremes} or \textit{Madhyānta-vibhaṅga-kārikā} attributed to the so-called Maitreya-Asaṅga Complex\textsuperscript{340} (§1.3: Yogacāra: the mental nature of "three realms")

\textit{Compendium of the Great Vehicle} or \textit{Mahāyānasamgraha} attributed to the Maitreya-Asaṅga Complex (§1.3: Yogacāra re: three natures)

Jñānagarbha’s \textit{Verses Differentiating the Two Truths} or \textit{Satya-dvaya-vibhaga-kārikā} (§1.4: Madhyamaka re: conventions)

\textit{Discourse of the Meeting between Father and Son} or \textit{Pitā-putrasamāgamana-sūtra} (§1.4: Madhyamaka: allegory of Anantayāśas)

\textit{Discourse on the Teaching of Vimalakirti} or \textit{Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra} (§1.5.2: Madhyamaka re: pure appearance)

\textit{Treatise called the 'Ornament of Clear Realization Commentary on the 25,000 line Perfection of Insight Sutra} or \textit{Pañca-vimśati-sāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramita-upadeśa-śāstra-abhisamaya-alaṅkāra-vṛtti} (§1.5: Madhyamaka & Guhyamantra re: the five exemplars)

Tilopa’s \textit{Inconceivable Great Seal} or \textit{Acintyamahāmudra} (§1.5: Madhyamaka & Guhyamantra re: the five exemplars)

\textit{Discourse called the 'Flower Ornament'} or \textit{Buddhāvatamsaka-sūtra} (§1.6.5: Conclusion re: the Brahmins Terrestrial Flower & Undying on philosophical theory as vice)
\end{quote}

To be precise, the chapter cites by name only three texts, \textit{Madhyāntavibhaṅga}, \textit{Mahāyānasamgraha}, and \textit{Satyadvayavibhaga}, all of which are found the Tengyur ,

\textsuperscript{338} The qualification, “perhaps,” is meant to indicate that the research presented here does not claim to have resolved all the citations and references given. It is my belief that Rongzom might have either paraphrased Tibetan or Sanskrit texts from memory. Being a pāṇḍit, I am presuming Rongzom kept Sanskrit literature.

\textsuperscript{339} Certainly, it must be determined whether or not the titles of texts cited appear in the \textit{Ldan dkar ma} and \textit{Phang thang ma} Imperial era catalogs. This will be taken up in the conclusion of the thesis.

\textsuperscript{340} \textit{Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy}, vol. 7 notes Vasubandhu’s Bhāṣya distinguishing ‘the ‘author’, Maitryanātha, from ‘the expounder of the text to us and others’ (1999: 757 n. 560).
the canonical collection of Indian exegesis of sermons classically attributed to the Buddha. Allegories from Pitā-putra-samāgamana-sūtra and Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra, and Buddhāvatamsaka are given in paraphrase only, perhaps suggesting he may have assumed an audience already familiar with such canonical passages, as well as raising questions as to whether Rongzom was paraphrasing from Sanskrit, recording the citation from memory, and so forth. There are also the litany of five famous similes - being like an illusion, mirage, dream, reflection, and emanation – acting as exemplars for illusion and which are each found in the Pañca-vimśati-sāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramita-upadeśa-śāstra-abhisamaya-alaṅkāra-vṛtti. These are discussed in detail in the fifth section of chapter one; but the discussion appears to proceed along the lines of a passage found in Tilopa’s tantric songs. Both appear in the context of Rongzom discussing the relationship between Madhyamaka and Guhyamantra.

CONCLUSION

All Buddhist schools accept the teaching that phenomena are illusory. In The Approach, this broadly accepted Buddhist teaching is set as the primary fulcrum

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341 There was neither an established Buddhist canon in India or Tibet in the eleventh century; as discussed above, that is part of what Rongzom’s story is all about. With that in mind, the examination of Rongzom’s sources aims to outline the Buddhist and South Asian intellectual culture that Rongzom draws upon in The Approach. My use of the term “canonical” thus does not refer to a closed collection of texts in Rongzom’s time; but, rather, refers to the two collections of Buddhist literature later referred to as “the word of the Buddha” or Kangyur in Tibetan (bka’gyur), traditionally said to comprise one hundred and eight volumes of sutras, tantras, and vinaya texts, and the “commentarial treatises” upon those called the Tengyur (bstan’gyur), though Harrison notes that some treatises are in fact inserted into the Kangyur next to the “root text” upon which they comment (Cabezón 1996: 87 n. 8). For a brief overview of the Tibetan Kangyur, see Harrison’s “A Brief History of the Tibetan bKa’gyur” in Cabezón, J.I. & Jackson, R.R. eds. Tibetan Literature: studies in genre, (Snow Lion Publications, 1994), pp. 70-94; cf. Gröbold, Günter. Der Buddhismische Kanon: Eine Bibliographie (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1984). On the reliability of tantric colophons for the historical study of Tibetan Buddhism, see Orna Almogi’s 2006 “How Authentic Are Titles and Colophons of Tantric Works in the Tibetan Canon? The Case of Three Works and Their Authors and Translators.” In Orna Almogi, ed., Contributions to Tibetan Buddhist Literature. PIATS 2006: Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the Eleventh Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Königswinter, pp. 87-126.
of analyses and used as a means to infer ‘the view of equality’ that is at the heart of Great Perfection. This view of equality is described elsewhere by Rongzom as *the consummation and perfection of the realization* of the illusory – and the actual Great Vehicle. That means that all the lower vehicles, too, realize the view of the illusory, but do not perfect that realization until all phenomena are ‘basically the same’ – i.e. equal (samatā). In Chapter One, Rongzom thus constructs a documentary domain that connects the view of the illusory to trainees of all doctrinal orientation while working in the text to show that Great Perfection is the domain in which the realization of the illusory is perfected. Thus, the teaching on the illusory bridges puts the lower vehicles on a continuum with the Great Perfection; they must be, for the latter is that in which all the former attain their fulfillment. As such, caution should be used in supposing the dichotomy of Home or Alien tradition does not apply when we associate Rongzom’s Great Perfection with other approaches to the path.

Most of Chapter One of *The Approach* is dedicated to revealing a particular doctrinal affinity that obtains between putatively different approaches to the Buddhist path. There are also important indications of where Rongzom saw those paths diverging. In order to demonstrate the affinity between them, however, Rongzom chooses an atypical point of connection between putatively different doctrinal systems around which to constellate their philosophical interest. That point: whether or not a real entity is located in connection with affliction. Since his primary aim to show a reading of these doctrinal orientations that resolves the same view, his arguments sometimes turn to discourse and rhetoric not traditionally associated with the doctrine in question. This is presumably because these different approaches to the path are traditionally
different in content and therefore polemically opposed.

The theory at work in chapter one does not fit the description of a propositionalist doctrine, though Rongzom does appear to make truth claims about reality when he states that sentient beings exist in the bondage of conditioned existence. This assertion is given within the context of a normative Buddhist worldview, which supposes that anyone who wishes to be free from the afflictions of conditioned existence should, according to the general teachings of the Buddha (bka’ spyi), seek out “the superior path that is an antidote to those afflictions.” This seemingly straightforward claim is subsequently complicated by Rongzom’s privileging of the illusory nature of reality. The paradox created by the centrality of the afflictions and their illusory character forms the central rhetorical structure of the chapter. Thus we may ask: what is the status of any truth claim by Rongzom if he is constantly insisting on the deceptive nature of reality? We may ask if Rongzom believes that the various doctrinal approaches he works with lead to what is a common experiential core. It cannot be denied that Rongzom’s language around the different doctrinal approaches, particularly his stream-to-ocean metaphor, suggests significant commonality, perhaps even a common final core of experience at the end of the spiritual progress effected by the doctrine. More on this topic will be revealed below when Rongzom explicitly outlines the various limits and capacities of various doctrinal approaches.

Suffice here to say that, at turns, Rongzom’s doctrine appears regulative—that is, a form of life (lebensform) consisting in an idiom qua language-game of accepted conventions that shapes and is shaped by the consensus of the community of language users. If that is so, we might ask whether or not

Rongzom’s view of doctrine sits comfortably within the *Buddhisms* of his day. Drawing on such figures as Tilopa in formulating his section on the five exemplars, Rongzom was explicating a view already found in Indian tantric literature – one that he saw as equally at home in both Madhyamaka and Guhyamantra discourse. Considering, for example, the fact Rongzom maintains that “even the well-explicated written works from non-Buddhist extremists are declared to be the blessing of the buddhas given by [their] emanations,”\(^{343}\) we may suggest that, for Rongzom, the question of doctrine is not best understood strictly in the cognitive/propositionalist sense. Chapter one of *The Approach* variously contains doctrinal elements that appear to be propositional, experiential-expressivist, and regulative; however, Lingbeck’s notion of a regulative doctrine shaping what kinds of claims can be significant seems *a proposit* here. Whether or not Rongzom employs one discernable doctrinal approach throughout the remainder of *The Approach* remains to be seen.

*The Approach* is identified as a śāstra, though it has few of the traditional protocols used in the genre. Rongzom was obviously aware of these protocols as he used them in other important works. The label brings cultural cachet with it and implicates the type of work the text seeks to do. In particular, it suggests that *The Approach* is a soteriological text working to stabilize or normativize the pattern of activities, actions, interactions and feelings which are inextricably interwoven with, and partly constituted by, uses of language. It rests upon very general pervasive facts of nature. It includes shared natural and linguistic responses, broad agreement in definitions and judgments, and corresponding behavior. The term is sometimes used so that it converges on the idea of a culture” (Baker, G. P., and P. M. S. Hacker. *Wittgenstein: Understanding and Meaning, Part II: Exegesis §§ 1-184* (Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations Vol. 1). 2nd ed. Blackwell, 2005. This concept is closely related - akin, as it were, to James & Shutz’s *multiple realities* (a term taken from William James), Geertz’s *cultural systems*, MacIntyre’s *practices* (Bellah 2011: 96), and Bourdieu’s concept of *fields* (Bellah 2011: 628 n. 141), and Randall Collins’ concept of the *network* (1998 passim).

\(^{343}\) *dKon coq ’groel: mu stegs can gyis legs par bshad pa’i gzhung yang sangs rgyas rnams kyis byin gyis brlabs pa dang sprul pas bshad pa yin pa | RZSB 1.85.04-85.05).*
authoritative principles that it employs. As such, the text collapses the distinction between constitutive and regulative and forms a tropical work in which, paraphrasing White, the processes at work constitute the object the text claims merely to describe.

This chapter also brings up the question of audience: who is *The Approach* written for? Some clues are found in the form and subject matter of the chapter, as well as in its citations. The use of atypical examples, such as the arithmetic employed in the Śrāvaka and Pratyeka sections, may be understood as Rongzom’s rhetorical refiguring of the tradition in question away from its traditional lines of discourse in the service of his doctrine of Inclusivism, the particulars of which we will sketch out throughout our examination of the subsequent chapters and in the final conclusion below.
**INTRODUCTION**

After a reading of different approaches to the path that resolves them in consonant terms, the second chapter of *The Approach* sets out to answer possible objections to that agenda which are raised by an anonymous interlocutor. The ideas parsed here are more philosophically subtle than those found in chapter one, but the chapters are intimately linked. The questions posed throughout this chapter are thus a lens into the interpretive concerns and pressures at work in Rongzom’s articulation of the view of equality as inferred through the illusory nature of appearance. As such, his Mind-only influenced doctrine of appearance (should we call it a ‘bias’?) is examined in more detail as a result of the discourse offered in Chapter One.

To sum up: in the first chapter of *The Approach*, Rongzom puts various forms of reasoning and association (from mathematical, to rational, to allegorical) to use in the service of a distinctive method of reading a variety of different Buddhist views. Rongzom’s method reading these various doctrinal orientations is organized around the broadly accepted doctrine of illusory appearance and functions to show that these opposed soteriological frameworks may be seen to resolve the view of equality, which is at the heart of Great Perfection. Thus, according to chapter one, when properly considered, the various views associated three vehicles (*trīyāna : theg pa gum*) of Buddhism – the Śrāvakayāna,
Pratyekabuddhayāna, and the Bodhisattvayāna—and the fourth vehicle of “Vehicle of Secret Mantra” (guhyamantrayāna: gsang sngags kyi theg pa), yield a the same view of humanity’s existential condition. Namely, there is no real entity constituting the conditioned bondage of sentient beings. The explication documents this reading in relation to terms, tropes, images, exemplars and, more broadly, discourses associated with the Śrāvakas doctrine of the Four Noble Truths, the Yogācārin doctrine of the three natures, the Madhyamaka doctrine of the pacification of discursive schemes, and others. Remarkably, this chapter does not pose these doctrinal systems as mutually incompatible views. Rather, Rongzom leads the reader of the text through a broadly regulative or rule-based doctrine consisting in a highly specific way of conceptualizing and interpreting Buddhist doctrine as an idiom, rhetoric, or language game, with its own unique vocabulary, logic (syntax), inflection points, and so forth. Such a doctrinal discourse allows Rongzom to avoid the contradictions and conflicts that arise when these different approaches are given as cognitivist or propositional doctrines. Such a discourse allows for—and evokes—a reading strategy or hermeneutic: the possibility of, and particular mode of interpreting, Buddhist doctrines. In this case, Rongzom interprets different approaches to the path in such a way as to show them to be in agreement on the non-existence of any real entity that constitutes the bondage of affliction.

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344 Among the others, are what appear to be non-Buddhist references. Just what non-Buddhist references in the service of The Approach might mean will be discussed below.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

The overarching theme promulgated in the second chapter of The Approach, entitled "Objections & Responses" or brgal lan in Tibetan, concerns Rongzom’s Mind-only inspired doctrine of appearance. The chapter begins by stipulating the truth of the illusory nature of appearance and questions its rational implications. For Rongzom, it is true that all phenomena are like an illusion, a mirage, a dream, a reflection, and an emanation, but this does not entail that the psycho-physical aggregates of a person and, say, an utter illusion such as a mirage, are the same. All appearances have sources. The force and duration of a given appearance, he says, derives from the power of its source. That is, everything is illusory; but some illusions are more effective over the long term than others.

As we shall see below, Rongzom has the same view of reasoning as he does of appearance: it is naturally flawed, but useful nonetheless. This approach to the nature of appearance has implications for Rongzom’s concept of Buddhahood, which have been examined in detail by Orna Almogi,\textsuperscript{346} who has shown that Rongzom’s conception of buddhahood denies that buddha’s have gnosis and maintains that buddhahood is simply the purified expanse of reality (\textit{dharmadātu} : \textit{chos dbyings}).\textsuperscript{347} In short, Rongzom’s view gives rise to numerous difficulties that Almogi summarizes under three points. That is, if a buddha in fact has no gnosis that would (1) “devalue” teachings that state otherwise; (2) render moot “all efforts at gathering the immeasurable accumulations of


\textsuperscript{347} Almogi 2009 \textit{et passim}. 
beneficial resources and gnosis”; and (3) render the Mahāyāna conception of buddhahood the same as the Śrāvaka conception and thereby render the Mahāyāna a redundant and superfluous enterprise. It is with regard to the second concern that we may more clearly understand Rongzom’s approach to Chapter Two. If buddhahood is simply purified reality devoid of gnosis, how could a buddha act benevolently in the world in accordance with the variety of intellectual capacities of sentient beings? This does not render Rongzom’s discussion of gnosis meaningless, however. In fact, just the opposite. Given Rongzom’s position on he subject – a buddha’s gnosis is mere appearance and not real – his use of the concept of gnosis is all the more remarkable. Yes, gnosis is simply one more appearance for sentient beings and thus delusive. However, within the samsaric domain, it appears to sentient beings that buddhas are qualified by their gnosis. This appearance does not correspond to the true nature of enlightenment, which is structured by an absence of appearance. Such a discourse, which was not exceptional either in eleventh century Tibet or among Indian proponents of Madhyamaka, says something important about Rongzom’s philosophical method and the doctrine of appearances. Orna Almogi writes:

Rong-zom-pa, however, does not deny that a buddha's gnosis, as mere appearance, manifests to those who have not yet attained release and thus have not yet eliminated all their delusions. A buddha, on the other hand, whose delusions have been completely exhausted, does not possess such gnosis. This position of Rong-zom-pa's does not seem to be an exceptional case. It can be shown in fact that numerous, if not the majority, of Indian Madhyamaka scholars of the eleventh century took a position similar to that of Rong-zom-pa (14).

Almogi refers to this absence of the cognitive as an absence of “substratum” and describes how proponents of this view might account for the qualities of buddhahood espoused in the Mahāyāna, such as unimpeded compassionate salvific activity for the benefit of sentient beings, in the absence of any such substrate. The example chosen is one Rongzom employs in Chapter Two: the ‘sage’ (rṣi : drang srong), which we shall discuss below.

In her monograph, Almogi explains the use of this example by those who reject gnosis at the level of buddhahood and explains how the example of a sage works to account for a buddha’s activity in the absence of any substrate.

They reject the need for a substratum, and employ the example of rṣi (i.e. 'sage'; drang srong), whose resolutions or aspirational wishes come about even after his death, without, that is, the need for the rṣi as a substratum that is endowed with capabilities, and even without any other substratum to which the capabilities have been transferred. In the same manner, they argue, the qualities appear for the sake of disciples, even though no non-conceptual gnosis exists to serve as their substratum. The buddhas appear to be endowed with qualities, since compassion and resolutions have been previously respectively attained and made. They do acknowledge, however, the possibility that the qualities appear on account of the continuity of another substratum to which the capabilities have been transferred, such as in the case of a rṣi who leaves behind a wooden splint to which the power of the guruḍa mantra attained by him had been transferred, and which is thus endowed with the power to cure poisoning long after the rṣi’s death. In this case, the qualities can arise on account of their having been [174] previously transferred to another substratum. Similarly, a buddha leaves behind in the world his four madras, namely, the mudra of pledges (dam tshig gi phyag rgya: samayamudra), the mudra of action (las kyi phyag rgya: karmamudra), the mudra of the Doctrine (chos kyi phyag rgya: dharmamudra), and the great mudra (phyag rgya chen po: mahamudra), which later measure up to the buddha himself in terms of salvific activities (Almogi 2009: 173-174).

On this view, sentient beings and a buddha are basically equal in nature. All phenomena are empty, naturally beyond sorrow, and naturally luminous. All phenomena are perfectly awakened from the beginning though sentient beings
do not experience this because they do not have a view of equality which renders all phenomena basically the same because they are illusory appearances.

Whoever realizes the object in this manner, his or her continuum comes to consist in the purified dharmadhātu and is thus indistinguishable from a buddha.

Such a mode for objects is not simply the purview of the guhyamantra approach alone. Chapter two engages several philosophical issues, which we will survey. We will also explore the contexts in which Rongzom does not employ a form of reasoning as such, but, rather, uses story and allegory to advance his view. The chapter is organized around four issues implied by various views that are broadly connected within the generally accepted Buddhist axiom that all phenomena are “illusory,” "like an illusion," or otherwise "illusion-like" (all translate sgyu lta bu: māyopama).349 The chapter is technical and sophisticated, employing subtle philosophical logic, allegory, striking metaphor, and making several interestingly diverse references that range over

- Abhidharma ontology
- reference to a Hindu350 epic
- an allegory recalling a Greco-Roman myth
- techniques of mirror divination associated with Kālacakra-tantra

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349 For example, in a famous verse found in the Prajñāparamitā discourses, we find the Buddha exhorting trainees to correlate the compositional with what, inter alia, the illusory: | skar ma rab rib mar me dang || sgyu ma zil pa chu bur dang || rmi lam glog dang sprin lta bur || ‘dus byas de ltar bīta bar bya || (Ṭoh. 16: 'Phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa rdo rje gcod pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo (Ārya-vajracchedaka-nāmā-prajñā-pāramitā-mādyāyana-sūtra) in bKa’ ‘gyur (dpe bsdur ma), 2007, shes rab sna tshogs, ka, vol. 34 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): 357.11-357.13.

350 There were no “Hindu” people in the eleventh century. The term “Hindu,” Doniger writes, is not a “native [Indian] word, but comes from a word for ‘the river’ (sindhu) that Herodotus (in the fifth century BCE), the Persians (in the fourth century BCE), and the Arabs (after the eighth century CE) used to refer to everyone who lived beyond the great river of the northwest of the subcontinent, still known locally as the Sindhu and in Europe as the Indus” (Doniger, Wendy. The Hindus: An Alternative History. Penguin, 2009: 30).
• the Buddhist doctrine of interdependence
• the status of conventions
• the origin of gnosis
• cosmology
• epistemology (the basis of confusion and error)

Several rhetorical concerns mark the chapter’s discourse. The primary theme around which objections and responses are raised is appearance. In general, the chapter works to persuade the reader of the durable power and fundamental equality of appearances. This discourse also accounts for their efficacy of a holy being’s previous aspirations, which may ripen and function in the future to profound effect. Appearances, though illusory, are effective. According to Rongzom, the reality of a projected appearance correlates with the power of its source.

Rongzom will discuss a variety of scenarios in chapter two in which appearances that vary in nature and potential are evoked. In accordance with Almogi’s comment’s above, Rongzom will argue that appearance works in the absence of any real substrate, which might be taken as its basis or source. Such a view invokes Rongzom’s sparse conception of enlightenment as the thoroughly purified dharmadhātu. In short, buddhas have no “knowledge” or cognitive operations. Such phenomena are said to be precluded from the domain of enlightenment.351 The positive qualities of a Buddha are not connected with any non-conceptual gnosis qua basis. To persuade readers of the sagacity of this

351 This position, however, must then explain how or in what sense a buddha can “know” the needs of sentient beings, and therefore continue to act in the world, in the absence of gnosis. Rongzom’s position in this dispute is treated in detail in Almogi 2009.
point, Rongzom describes the aspirations of a sage that may manifest and function even after the sage is passed out of this world.

In the chapter’s concluding remarks, Rongzom invokes a triad of subjectivity he terms the "three aggregates" of mind (sems : vijñāna), intellect (blo : buddhi), and cognition (rnam par rig pa : vijñāpti). Here, he discusses the dream-like unreality of the phenomena operating within "time" and "space." These two cognitive dimension which are both correlated, by Rongzom, to the apparent confusion that distinguishes a sentient being from a buddha. Here, The Approach also gives its first reference to the most cited text in The Approach: the Bodhicitta-bhāvanā attributed to Mañjuśrīmitra, of which we shall more to say in chapter five. In addition, as we shall see, except for the fifth chapter of The Approach, which treats Great Perfection, chapter two contains the greatest number of citations from other works overall.

SECTION SUMMARY

Rongzom has emphasized (§ 1.6) that all variety of conventions are measured by the scope of their criteria of appearance (snang tshad). On this view, a vase in the world and a vase in a dream can be said to be absent any fundamental dissimilarity when it is recognized that the only difference is the dream’s scope of appearance (snang tshod tsam). Both are fundamentally qualified by appearance and thus basically the same on this view: akin to a mirage, dream, reflection ("image"), and emanation.

Beginning with § 2.1, the first issue of chapter two inquires into the relation, if any, between reality and illusion. In other words, how illusion-like is reality? Put another way, how real is the illusory? For example, if things are like
an illusion because they lack any ultimate nature, does that suggest there is utterly no difference between an illusion proper – a mirage, a magician’s conjuring, etc. - and the psycho-physical aggregates that constitute a person suffering in saṃsāra and are proclaimed by the Buddha to be “illusion-like”?

What about a vase in the world and a vase in a dream? His discussions of convention in Chapter Three, especially in the context of comparing objects in the world of shared experience with objects in the realm of dreams, maintains that the only real distinction that can be offered against their basic similarity is the dream’s scope of appearance (snang tshod tsam). When the dream world and the waking world are compared merely in terms of appearance – and the physical and temporal elements of the equation are removed for the – it is only the dream’s scope of appearance (snang tshod tsam) that marks a difference between a dream vase and a waking-world vase. Both taken in their given context can hold water. Yes, a dream vase holds dream water; but, on the other hand, a waking-world vase can only hold waking-world water. It cannot, say, hold dream water. The waking-world vase is equally constrained within a particular scope of appearance – e.g. it cannot hold dream water. They are consistent insofar as they are qualified by appearance. No proof is needed for this point because all other points presuppose it: appearance is the basic indication (lakṣya: mtshan gzhi) of any and everthing, whether real or not – and no matter how real.

In the opening passage of chapter two, Rongzom glosses – and intermingles – the different conceptions of illusory in order to integrate them. In setting up the chapter, Rongzom again evokes traditionally different views – those associated Abhidharma, Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka. Each has its own traditional criteria for illusory: in the Abhidharma, all composite phenomena are
selfless and thus illusory. According to the Yogācāra, all phenomena are qualified by the three natures (trisvabhāva: rang bzhin gsum) – that is, the imaginary (parikalpita: kun btags), the dependent (paratantra: gzhan dbang), and the perfected (parinispanna: yongs su grub pa) – and thus illusory. According to the Madhyamaka, phenomena are illusory due to having no ultimate character. Rhetorically integrating these conceptions creates the rhetorical space in which Rongzom can explicate his doctrine of appearance with in that broader framework, one integrating the various criteria associated with these different approaches to the Buddhist path. The chapter opens with the following words:

Especially in the context of all composite phenomena being impermanent and all phenomena being devoid of a personal self, the phrase illusory applies. When all phenomena are proclaimed to be devoid of any essential nature and illusory because of being generated by distinct causes and conditions, this is done with three features in mind: (i) the [Abhidharma doctrines of the] selflessness of phenomena, (ii) the selflessness of persons, and (iii) the [Yogācāra doctrine of the] three natures that do not [in the end, themselves] exist. Since all phenomena are devoid of any ultimate nature [according to the Madhyamaka system], they are proclaimed to be like an illusion even though correct conventions are asserted to be real entities. Yet, it is not the case that the two - illusion and the aggregates - are utterly equal. Why so?

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353 The Approach: bka’ rnam las chos thams cad sgyu ma lta bu' gsums pa ni | 'dus byas thams cad mi rtag pa dang | thos thams cad la gang zag gi bdag myed pa'i sgo nas kyang sgyu ma lta bu'i sgra’ jug la | chos dang gang zag la bdag myed cing ngo bo nyid rnam pa gsum gyi ngo bo nyid myed pa rnam pa’ang gsum la dgon gnos nas | chos thams cad ngo bo nyid myed par gsums pa yin zhing | rgyu rkyen ghan gyi dbang las skye bas sgyu ma lta bu’i sgra’ jug go | (RZSB 1.435.09-435.13).

354 Here, like an illusion is described from the Madhyamaka perspective.

355 Reading ma yin no (BM 30.05; Th 83.03) rather than ma yi no (RZSB 435.16).

356 The Approach: ’dir brgal ba bka’ rnam las chos thams cad sgyu ma lta bur gsums pa ni | 'dus byas thams cad mi rtag pa dang | chos thams cad la gang zag gi bdag myed pa'i sgo nas kyang sgyu ma lta bu'i sgra' jug la | chos dang gang zag la bdag myed cing ngo bo nyid rnam pa gsum gyi ngo bo nyid myed pa rnam pa'ang gsum la dgon gnos nas | chos thams cad ngo bo nyid myed par gsums pa yin zhing | rgyu rkyen ghan gyi dbang las skye bas sgyu ma lta bu'i sgra' jug go | | chos thams la don dam pa'i ngo bo nyid myed pas | yang dag pa'i kun rdzob du rdzas yod par 'dod du zad kyang | sgyu ma lta bur gsums par zad de sgyu ma dang phung po gnyis shin du 'go' mnyam pa ni ma yi no | (RZSB 1.435.09-435.16).
Here we find qualitative distinction among appearances - i.e. the text moves to distinguish between appearances that are and are not associated with sentience in order to parse the question he poses to himself at the opening of the chapter. The question driving this section is this: is it not a mistake to teach that all phenomena are "like an illusion" and thus basically the same since there appears a rather obvious difference between a magician's illusion, which is "unfashioned by mind and mentality" and the five skandhas?

ON THE STATUS OF DIFFERENCE IN A WORLD WHERE THINGS ARE ‘BASICALLY THE SAME’

Key to understanding Rongzom’s notion of an appearance unfashioned by a sentient being’s karma is this: when a magician charms a figurine made of earth and twigs and it, as a result of her magical investment, becomes animated for an audience, that appearance of a charmed figurine is not said to be an appearance fashioned by sentience. A pink elephant imagined to be in the room by an inebriate is such an appearance because it is the drunk subject’s fantasy. The magician’s conjuring of an animated figurine, however, is (like all other phenomena in the realm of experience) reducible to illusory appearance. However, Rongzom does not consider it a fantasy of the audience. The magician has actually projected an appearance consequent to incanting the figurine, which then becomes animated.

In this passage, Rongzom is keen to interrogate the question of what is real in the context of the teaching that all is illusory. For example, if a magician’s illusion and a person are both illusory in nature, is there utterly no significant
distinction between them? is one more real than the other. What is the status of
difference in a world where all is ‘basically the same’ because of being illusory?

§2.1.1 of The Approach contains Rongzom’s remarkable response to this
question. In it, Rongzom draws on Indian mirror divination, a Mahāyāna sūtra, a
rare story based in the epic, Rāmāyāna, Abhidharma phenomenology, an allegory
that recalls the Greco-Roman myth of Arachne, and Sanskrit etymological
clarification (nirukti). The use of myth is interesting, as is the reference to the
Rāmāyana below, and is perhaps best described as myth as argument. Gananath
Obeyesekere has argued\(^\text{357}\) that myth is a cultural product in which the
sedimentation of debates past means the use of the myth as argument must
provoke debate due, in part, to an “underlying ideological claim behind such
stories.”\(^\text{358}\) Describing the use of myth as argument in her study of an index and
commentary on deities of the Rg Veda called the Brhaddevatā, Laurie Patton
discusses this type of “placing.” It may occur when, presumably, a problem is
provoked that is best resolved in myth. Though myth is considered by figures
such as Eliade, in his phenomenological approach, to be a deep pre-philosophical
structure, Patton describes the dynamicism of this sedimentation of past debates
in myth in practical terms by giving attention to philosophically motivated
narrative at work behind such stories and the fact the author chose to tell a story to
make a philosophical point.\(^\text{359}\) When considering the story’s non-Buddhist
provenance, we should recall that, for Rongzom, “even the well-explicated

\(^{357}\) Obeyesekere, Gananath. The Work of Culture: Symbolic Transformation in Psycho-analysis and
Anthropology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).

\(^{358}\) Patton, Lauri L. Myth as Argument: The Brhaddevatā as Canonical Commentary (New York:
Walter de Gruyter, 1996), 41,196.

\(^{359}\) Rongzom’s choice to use myth in the midst of his argument about appearances is indeed
worthy of further analysis; and I am preparing a more detailed study on the topic.
written works from non-Buddhist extremists are declared to be the blessing of the buddhas given by [their] emanations”;360 and the fact Rongzom’s presentation of the efficacy of mere appearance is based on the power of its projecting source, which may be Buddhist or not. In this case, it would seem, Rongzom decided to “use narrative to describe a persuasive event in which [a fecund appearance] arose, and [was] successful.”361 Just what status stories connected with the Rāmāyana had in Tibet – whether they were considered of non-Buddhist provenance in our current context, held to be stories of a Buddhist world, and so on – cannot be adjudicated within the scope of this work. To say the least, for our author, it is philosophically useful story.

The subject of apparent physical bodies is of obvious concern in the chapter. More specifically, Rongzom discusses the appearance of a physical body generated because of one’s own actions as well as the appearance of a physical body that is produced from the actions of another. The former is exemplified by a person’s body that is derived from her own actions (karma: las); the latter type of body, as we shall see below, is some other person’s creation, such as a powerful sage who creates a dopplegänger.

These two types of bodies are discussed in terms of their quality and efficacy as phenomena appearing in the world. Working to show that illusions and emanation share a fundamental similarity, The Approach explains that while appearances may derive from different sources of power, such as karma, meditative concentration, and aspirational prayers and resolutions, they have

360 dKon cog ’grel: mu stegs can gys legs par bshad pa’i gzhung yang sangs rgyas ruangs kyis byin gys brlabs pa dang sprul pas bshad pa yin pa ǀ RZSB 1.85.04-85.05.
causal production in common. On this view, a physical body occurring through the power of aspirations and resolutions is not fundamentally different in character from a physical body “brought about through the maturation of karma.” Though they are not fundamentally different, they are not exactly the same. According to Rongzom, karmic appearance manifests at a point in time much later than its cause – perhaps aeons. Appearances originating from meditative concentration manifest more immediately in this life. Appearances that originate through the power of aspiration and resolution appear in the very next moment.

If there is a slight difference, it would be that the power of karma and affliction appears at a later time;\(^{362}\) the great power of meditative equipoise\(^ {363}\) brings about perceived phenomena;\(^ {364}\) the power of sincerely uttered aspirations appear immediately.\(^ {365}\)

All, however, share in being causally produced.

The central concern throughout this chapter is the capacity and potential of "appearance" or snang ba in Tibetan. This Tibetan term snang ba is also translated into English as "manifestation," illumination," sometimes "intuitional ideation,"\(^ {366}\) and more. The Tibetan term translates several important Sanskrit terms, such as āloka (Mvp 1390, 3035, 3431, 6973), darśana (Mvp 315, 4633-4635), bhāsa (Mvp 4403), ābhāsa (Mvp 6655), avabhāsa (Mvp 709, 6297, 6304), prabhāsa (Mvp 3435), among others. The term, prabhāsa, is one evidently borrowed from

\(^{362}\) E.g. a later life.

\(^{363}\) mnyam par bzhag pa (439.05-439.06) : samāhīta (Mvp 1489), generally defined as an equal setting of the mind during single-pointed meditative absorption (ting nge ’dzin : samādhi) which is set (bzhag) in equanimity (mnyam) through having brought to mind (dmigs nas) the emptiness that is a selflessness of persons and phenomena (cha mnyam par bzhag pa ste \(\bar{\text{\&}}\) ting nge ’dzin sgom skabs gang zag dang chos kyi bdag med pa’i stong pa nyid la sens rse gcig tu dmigs nas mnyam par bzhag pa TDCM 990a).

\(^{364}\) E.g. in this lifetime.

\(^{365}\) E.g. in the next moment.

the Sanskrit grammarian, Bhartṛhari, by the Buddhist logician, Dignāga, who employed in his epistemology. Pratibhā is also used in epistemology, where it refers to the single "flash of understanding" that consists in understanding a sentence. For Dharmakīrti, too, a related term is used in describing how "the object flashes in our awareness" (pratibhāsate). All these terms, in one way or another, refer to illumination and appearance vis-à-vis the seen or perceived. Like many important Buddhist technical terms, such as pramāṇa (a term translated as ‘epistemological warrant,’ ‘valid cognition,’ ‘authority,’ and so on) and svabhāva (meaning ‘self-nature,’ ‘intrinsic nature,’ and so on), the Tibetan term snang ba contains a valuable ambiguity that allows it to straddle the divide between the objective and the subjective registers.

In the course of of this section, Rongzom discusses the causal production of all appearance and the correlation between the original source of an

369 Ibid. 138.
370 The useful ambiguity of several important terms is based on their polysemous character. For example, Ronkin (2005: 4-5) and van der Kuijp both render tshad ma : pramāṇa as “epistemology,” though van der Kuijp notes the term to be “fundamentally untranslatable” (1983: vii); both are correct in a given context because pramāṇa, not unlike the Sanskrit term, loka, dances between subjective and objective registers. In fact, it should be noted there is often an intensional and extensional ambiguity in technical terms of fundamental importance to Buddhism’s discourses. As noted in Westerhoff’s case (below), the ambiguity derives not from any alien content in the source domain [i.e. Tibetan, Sanskrit, etc.]; but from combinatorial elaborations therein not found in the target domain [English]. Cases such as these present clear difficulties for any interpreter. Examples other than tshad ma : pramāṇa include ’jig rten : loka famously pointed out by Gonda (1966: 110), the "fundamentally untranslatable term" tshad ma : pramāṇa (van der Kuijp 1983: vii), the strange behavior of dravya (Dreyfus 1997: 67), the unavoidable “translational problems” of bden pa : satya (Cowherds 2010: 4) and the critical Mahāyāna concept of rang bzhin : svabhāva (Westerhoff 2009: 19-20) - even the fundamental term, dharma, presents significant difficulties (Cox 2004: 543). Kapstein points on the "extramental or psychological" nuance of rigs pa : yuktī (1889: 374). Dreyfus severally comments on Dharmakīrti’s own ambiguities in that regard (cf. 1997: 64, (ch. 3) 73, 82, 188, 314); and Gombrich 1996 and 2009 make note of such ambiguities in the Pali canon. Such conceptual ambiguity is often strategically advantageous insasmuch as it offers a wider interpretative space. Such ambiguities should not suggest, however, that the source domain’s language is “inexact or vague” (Schmithausen 1981: 200); but, rather, this indicates an open interpretative space.
appearance and its perdurance. In short, appearances in the domain of ordinary sentient beings may per- endure and be causally productive even though their source may be both in remote in terms of time and agency from their source. This section of The Approach (§2.1.1) makes several notable references that we consider in terms of Rongzom’s use of Myth as Argument.

The first is Rongzom’s allusion to a practice of mirror divination referenced in the concise discourse on the ritual empowerment associated with the Kālacakra-tantra, called the Sekoddeśa (§2.1.2.1).371 The point of this rather mysterious example, in which a young maiden looks into a mirror enchanted with a prasenā mantra (phra phab/pra dbab) and sees the reflection of a thief that nobody else can see,372 is to show that (1) reflections are not really different from illusions, emanations, and so on; and (2) that not all appearances are equally available to all sentient beings. This last point concerns the fact the maiden, by

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371 Rongzom’s example is similar and perhaps drawn from the example of mirror divination found in Toh. 0361: dBang mdor bstan pa (Sekoddeśa) in bKa’ ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rgyud ’bum, ka, vol. 77 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): | ji ltar pa phab me long la | | gzhon nu mas mthong dngos med skyes | | de bzhin ’das dang ma ’ongs chos | | nikha’ la de nyid mna ’byor pas | | ‘di las dngos po dngos med ’gyur | | dngos po stong pa’i don mthong phyur | | dngos po dngos med don yod pa | | rgyu ma rni lam mig ’phrub bzhin | | med pa’i chos can dag la chos | | skye ba ‘di ni rab tu mthong | | yid bzhin nor ltar mtha’ yas pa’i | | sms can bsam pa yongs rdzogs byed | | pra phab pa yi gzhon nu mas | | ma mthong ba yi rkun po mthong | | nyi tshe ba yi mig dag gis | | song nas sgrub pa po yis mthong | | (40.05-40.12). See Orofino, Giacomella. Sekoddeśa : A Critical Edition of the Tibetan Translations (Roma : Istituto italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1994).

virtue of not being polluted through sexuality, has access to objects of experience that elude other, less pristine beings. Rongzom writes:

On this view, when a pure maiden looks at in a mirror incanted by *prasena* mantra she sees a female thief (*rkun mo*) who is otherwise hidden from the perception of ordinary people. This is because the character of the reflections are without [real] difference [from illusions, emanations, and the like]. In dreams in which people see the future through the power of a particular god, they are able to reveal things in the future. For ordinary people, however, this is not the case because, given the character of a dream, there is no [real] distinction [to be made between illusions, emanations, reflections, and dreams]. Take mirages, as well. The conditions of some, but not all, work to obscure [perception of] the road such that there is no [real] difference in the actual character of [the above mentioned and] a mirage.

The next passage does not concern the fundamental similarity of appearances, but rather potential differences between them. The example given, our second reference, comes from the *Bhadramāyākāra-vyākaraṇa-sūtra*, a Mahāyāna text in which a magician named Bhadramāyākāra (literally, a ‘Good’ or ‘Excellent Illusion-maker’), uses the power of mantra to magically to conjure the illusion of a feast to offer to the Buddha, who in turn transforms the conjured illusion into a significant and enjoyable object of merit: a long-lasting feast offering to the Buddhist community. The magician’s offering was a ruse – a use of comparatively feeble mantric power in an attempt to show up the Buddha and

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373 pra se na (436.07); cf. prasenam (Mvp 4268); this appears to be a reference to the Sekoddeśa (Dbang mdor bstan pa), where the practice of mirror divination is discussed.
374 The Approach: ‘di’ ltar gzugs brnyan dag la yang pra se na’i sngags grub pas mngon par bsnags pa’i me long la gzhon nu ma gsang mas bltas na’i ikog tu gyur pa rkun mo’i gzugs brnyannthong ba yod la | phal pas ni ma yin te | gzugs brnyan gyi mtshan nyid la ni bye brag myed do \( \| \) rmi lam dag la’ang lha khyad par can gyi dbang gis ltas nye bar ston pa’i rmi lam mthon ba dag ma’ongs pa’i dngos po’i ltas ston par nus pa yod do \( \| \) phal gyis ni ma yin te rmi lam gyi mtshan nyid la ni bye brag myed do \( \| \) smigs rgyu dag la’ang rkyen gyi dbang gis la la ni lam sgrib pa’i bya ba byed la \( \| \) la las ni ma yin te \( \| \) smigs sgyu’i mtshan nyid la ni bye brag myed do | (RZSB 1.436.09-436.12).
prove that he was not, in fact, “all-knowing.” As the story shows, the Buddha’s power to project māyā or illusions is greater than the magician. For Rongzom, all appearance is illusion, so the question is raised as to just how real an appearance may be. The story from the Bhadramāyākara-vyākaraṇa-sūtra shows that the Buddha is so powerful that he project illusory appearance that is enjoyable and efficacious. Remarkably, though the magician’s intent in conjuring the appearance of a feast was antagonistic, those who participated in the feast, including the magician himself, gained merit through it. Moreover, due to the Buddha’s superior power to project illusions, the illusions became a cause for the gathering of the two accumulations of merit and wisdom – even for the magician.

In a third notable reference, Rongzom is discussing the power of appearances that are not fashioned by one’s own mind that nonetheless endure in one’s experiential domain. These appearances are physical in nature and originate with someone other than the embodied subject. The remarkable story Rongzom offers to argue his point on appearance to be from an epic of South Asian Sanskrit literature, the Rāmāyaṇa. The story given, in brief, appears to combine several elements not often found together. The story is this: Sita, the mother of prince Bali, leaves her son in the care of a ṛṣi or sage (drang srong la bcol) who loses the boy and consequently creates his doppelgänger - literally, the ṛṣi "fabricated an illusion - something similar to the boy, Bali" (sgyu ma’i bu ’ba’ le

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377 According to Robert Goldman, stories that place Bali as the son of Sita are an uncommon iteration in the diffuse web of Ramkathā traditional networks associated with the Rāmāyāṇa (personal communication, 11 June 2014). My thanks to Dr. Robert Goldman for identifying this material and passage for me. He also offered several helpful suggestions about its interpretation.
ci ’dra ba zhig byas) to avoid informing the queen, Sita, of the precious loss of her son while under his care.378 This simulacrum or doppelgänger - an example of powerful, yet fabricated, appearance that is not fashioned by the mindstream of Sita and the king - is so similar to the real Bali, that upon comparison Sita and the boys’ father cannot determine which child is their real son. In the end they raise both as princes.

The placement of a myth from a non-Buddhist epic in a Tibetan treatise on Great Perfection is noteworthy. Such a choice is not whim; it is a deliberate placement with a type of claim and logic all its own.379 While I do not pretend to exhaustively explain the occurrence of this story here, I do wish to draw attention to the fact that Obeyesekere’s notion of myth as the sedimentations of past debates assumes a deep intertextuality that is not unexpected in Buddhist intellectual history. Indeed, it is conversation between texts that “comprises much of Indian intellectual history.”380 The question of why Rongzom chooses for example the Rāmāyana to make a point about his tantric doctrine of appearance requires insight into the place of the epic in eleventh century Tibetan culture as much as it requires an understanding of Rongzom’s concerns. Neither are obvious, though we shall return to this in concluding remarks below.

Returning to the story, the doppelgänger represents an appearance which is said by Rongzom to exemplify the sage’s great power in projecting

378 The phenomenon of manomaya iddhi or manifesting a double through meditation is already mentioned in the earliest Buddhist writings, such as the Sāmaññaphalasutta of the Dighaniyāya (DN 1.76-78) and the Mahāsakuludāyisutta of the Majjhimanikāya (MN 2.17-18). See, e.g., Westerhoff, Jan. Twelve Examples of Illusion (Oxford University Press. 2010) 11 n. 7; Almogi 2009: 271.
380 Ibid. 43 n.b. n. 41.
appearances. The point of the passage is to show that even a simulacrum that has not been primarily caused by the consciousness that experiences it can persist, effectively, for considerable periods of time. This passage requires further consideration to determine its origin. While I have not yet located any source for this story in Buddhist literature, a phrase similar to the one Rongzom uses is found in the *Acintyamahāmudra* attributed to Tilopa.

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381 Several interesting issues are brought to the fore through this example, but a survey would take us afield. I am currently preparing an article on the subject dealing with several interesting issues that intersect here, such as: mind-made phenomena, the power of a simulacrum, animation, etc.

382 While the original source for Rongzom’s story remains, at present, unknown to me, in the “Advice for the Magician” section of the *Acintyamahāmudra-nāma*, we find reference to “Bali, who was entrusted to the sages” (*drang srong dag la bha le bcol ba*). See Toh. 2035: *Phyag rgya chen po bsmi gyis mi khyab pa (Acintyamahāmudra-nāma)* in bsTan’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, wi-zhi, vol. 26 (Beijing: Krung go’i dpe skrun khang), 1646.16-1646.15. As mentioned, I have not yet located this story in its entirety in any Tibetan literature available to me. There are several mentions of “sages” (*ṛṣ: drang srong*) along with Rāma (not Bali!) and Sīta that make reference to physical transformations found in the gzhon nu’i kanṣa of dGe ‘dun chos ‘phel and Ra ka ra bkras mthong’s *Rāmaṇaṇakathā: gsar bsgyur rā ma yā na’i rtogs birod* (Mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 2005), pp 10-20. Other similar references are found elsewhere in that work. It is important to note, however, that the outlines of the story given in The Approach do in fact appear similar to an episode found in the *Gevä Dwîrgaḥiti* manuscript of the Laotian *Rāmaṇaṇa* tradition (Sahai 1976: 30-31, 67-74; cf. Sahai & Phuttaphôchân 1996). The story is given there. According to Sahai’s translation, palace maidens are curious to see, and therefore request a pregnant “Nān Sītā” to draw the likeness of, King, Rābhnaśvan, renowned to possess “supernatural powers, prowess and most beautiful form” (ibid. 67). Sīta draws an apparently admirable portrait upon a rock, which not only speaks on one occasion but inspires mortal jealousy and indignation in King Rām, who laments his many costly efforts to secure her return to his side: “Devil! I could get you back after the efforts of many years and months and after the loss of men, elephants and horses. Now you have a lover in addition to your husband” (68). The king orders Sīta taken from his sight and executed; but the man who offers “to go and kill Nān Sītā with [his] own hands,” Blah Lāk, sees his hands stayed by the pitiful sight of a pregnant Sīta and the merit of “the child in her womb, who had practised meditation during many past lives” (id.). Blah Lāk sends Sīta into hiding in the forest, where she is taken in by the hermit, Dipbahcākku. The Hindu god, Indādiraj, transforms himself into a newly dead dog that the would-be assassin “slashed... so that the sword might be (stained) with blood... so that [by displaying Blah Lāk’s sword to the king, Sīta’s excution would be] obvious to the king. Dipbahcākku and Sīta name the son born to her Brah Put. As he grows up, the boy takes to wandering in the forest; and whenever he is gone for a long time, Sīta cries until his return. The sage, intending to assuage her sorror and bring Sīta the constant company of her beloved son, draws a picture Brah Put intending to animate it through his magical powers; but he sets aside his plan when Brah Put returns along with Sīta’s happiness. Then, Sīta requests Dipbahcākku to “give life” to the picture to serve as “a playmate” for Brah Put; the doppelgänger is named Brah Rup. Sīta could not recognize one from the other (Sahai S. *Rāmaṇaṇa in Laos: a study in the Gevä Dwîrgaḥiti* [B. R. Pub. Corp 1976] 69). Sahai suggests a connection between these two names and the Sanskrit names Lava and Kuṣa (31). According to Saklani, the doppelgänger is created by Nāṅg Candā who effects this by injecting “life on the surrounding woods” (2006: 168). See also Sahai & Phuttaphôchân’s 1996 study of the Laotian *Phra Lāk Phrá Lām* or Rāma.
In §§2.1.2.4-6, Rongzom turns from *The Rāmāyana* to Abhidharma epistemology and its notion of “forms associated with the mental sense-field” (*dharmāyatana-rūpa*). This term is found in the Abhidharma’s five-fold iteration of forms associated with the mental sense-field. The twelve sense fields (*āyatana*), which “serve as bases for the production of consciousness,” correspond to two-thirds of the traditional list of eighteen elements (*dhātu : khams*) that constitute a sentient being in the desire realm. The twelve sense fields (*āyatana : skye mched*) are the six internal “faculties” (*indriya : dbang po*) – eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind – and six external sense “objective supports” (*ālambana : dmigs*) – forms sounds odors tastes, tangible objects and mental phenomena (*dharmāyatana*). According to this model,

contact (*sparśa : reg pa*) between and its corresponding sense object would lead to specific sensory consciousness (*vijñāna : rnam shes*); hence, the *āyatanas* are considered to be the ‘access’ (*āya*) of the mind and mental states.

The “forms associated with the mental sense-field” (*dharmāyatana-rūpa : chos kyi skye mched pa’i gzugs*) are five-fold: (i) “aggregates form” (*ābhisaṃkṣepikarūpa*: *bsdus pa las gyur pa’i gzugs*), (ii) “circumstantial form” (*ābhaya-vakāśikarūpa*: *mngon par skabs yod pa’i gzugs*), “adopted forms” (*sāmādānikarūpa*: *yang dag par blangs pa las byung ba’i gzugs*) “imaginary form” (*parikalpitarūpa*: *kun brtags pa’i gzugs*), “mastered form” (*vaibhūtikarūpa*: *dbang ’byor pa’i gzugs*). Here, contact between the mental faculty (*manendriya : sems kyi dbang po*) and mental object (*dharma : chos*) generates mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) in one of these five forms.

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*Jataka*. The story of Brah Put and Brah Rup is found there on pp. 313-326. I am in the process of collecting relevant materials for a paper pursuing this subject.

383 PDB 88.
384 PDB 88.
which are sometimes said to be “imperceptible forms” (avijñaptirūpa: rnam par rig byed ma yin pa’i gzugs), as in the case of vows, for example. Aggregated forms are said to be those composed of physical material. Circumstantial forms are found in an abstract context such as a reflected space or a clear empty space consisting in the utter absence of obstructive contact. Adopted forms are symbolic the forms that are, in Buddhist discourse, associated with commitments or vows. Imagined forms are contrived forms, like the vision of a dancing skeleton. Mastered forms are those typically said to be generated in connection with soteriologically significant meditations and the eight types of freedom (vimokṣa: rnam thar).

Ending his discussion of the Good Illusionist, Rongzom remarks that “the projections (‘phrul pa) of karma and affliction appear to endure for quite a long time.” Then he turns to a story incorporating Abhidharma epistemology and its three-fold rubric of imagined, mastered, and real forms. This is the story of an aspiring meditator who seeks out a meditation master from whom he might receive instruction. The master, wishing to gauge the student’s capacities initially instructs him to imagine or meditate on "the presence of excessively large buffalo horns on your head." When the efforts of the trainee manifest horns that he can actually see and touch, the horns are considered imagined forms; imaginary horns that become real enough to act upon the external physical world are mastered forms; and when those horns are perceptible to others, they are real forms.

The aspirations of others can also form a cause which acts as the impetus for "a physical body which is not one’s own idea." The example given here is, as

^385 TDCM 689b.
often the case in Rongzom’s writings, striking;\textsuperscript{386} it is a story that recalls the Greco-Roman myth of Arachne.\textsuperscript{387} The protagonist is a weaver from Lydia\textsuperscript{388} whose boast of being a weaver superior to the Roman goddess of craft, trade, and wisdom, Minerva, brings about a contest between the human and the goddess.\textsuperscript{389} In the end, Arachne’s weave is not only superior to that of the goddess, it is irreverent, its artwork depicting sordid acts of the gods. This iconoclasm enrages the goddess, who attacks Arachne. The weaver escapes the assault by suicide – i.e. hanging herself in a tree. Seeing Arachne’s body dangling by a rope in the tree, the goddess decides to transform Arachne into the world’s first spider (later taxonomically classed \textit{Arachnida}) and dooms her and her kin to a life of weaving while hanging from threads.

The Tibetan passage in question contains a similar story frame: a weaver is in the forest looking for wood from which to fashion a new loom. The weaver impresses a forest goddess (\textit{nags kyi lha mo}) by means of judicious virtue. That is, the weaver does not cut down a superior tree for a new loom. For not cutting down the fine tree, the goddess appears and rewards the weaver with a boon as a consequence of his good actions. The weaver, wishing to double his capacity to weave, requests limbs that protrude from his back as well as his front so he might work from both sides of his torso with twice as many limbs. With his wish

\textsuperscript{386} Dorji Wangchuk has described Rongzom’s writing as replete with “striking analogies and short anecdotes that didactically lend a powerful effect” (2002: 278).

\textsuperscript{387} The myth of Arachne is recorded in Latin hexameter in book six of the the first century work called \textit{Metamorphōsein librī or the Metaphorphoses}, which is attributed to the Roman poet Ovid. The similarity in Rongzom’s reference seems noteworthy. Perhaps this iteration of the Arachne story found its way to Tibet; perhaps this iteration is Rongzom’s own modification of the tale; and, perhaps, I am incorrect and the story is utterly unrelated to the myth of Arachne. The similarity of this passage to the Greco-Roman myth was first noticed by James Gentry.

\textsuperscript{388} Lydia was in a region of western Asia Minor, between Mysia and Caria in modern day Turkey that emerged as a regional power in the 7th century BCE. In the mid-sixth century, the last ruler, Croesus, was defeated by Cyrus and the location absorbed into the Persian empire.

\textsuperscript{389} Minerva is identified often with the Greek goddess Athena.
granted, the weaver returned to his village in his new form only to be killed by a frightened crowd who loath and fear his new appearance.

While the point of the Roman myth of Arachne might, arguably, be summed up by Horace, who advises that we, as it were, “don’t mess with Minerva (!)” the pseudo-Arachne story in The Approach is about the power of appearance. Appearance that is due to the power of another’s resolutions or aspirations (in this case, bodily limbs that appear due to the "magic" of a goddess) is not really different than a body brought about through the maturation of one’s own karma - except that the former can appear instantly and the latter appear much later in time than their causes. This is the position to which Rongzom wants readers to assent. As mentioned above, we may refer to this use of the story as “myth as argument.”

This section closes with an etymological explanation of the meaning and relation between the Sanskrit and Tibetan best rendered as "emanation" (Sanskrit nirmana : sprul pa) and "illusion" (Sanskrit māyā : sgyu ma) respectively. Although the ending of this section is punctuated by Rongzom pronouncing illusions and emanations to be “basically the same,” he does suggest a distinction between them when he remarks that the term nirmana “indicates a projection that is not of a totally distinct entity from its source.” This seems significant considering that the other examples given refer to instances wherein the projected appearance is not fashioned by its agent of enjoyment.

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391 Tu nihil invita dices faciesve Minerva (Horace 1828: 554).
392 See our discussion above.
393 The Approach: \( \text{\textbf{\textit{nir ma na zhes bya ba rang gi ngo bo nyid ma yin pa g}zhan dang g}zhan du rnam par 'phrul pa ste sprul pa zhes bya'o} \) | RZSB 1.439.10-439.11.
ON THE THAT IDEA CAUSALITY NEVER CEASES, PURE WORLDLY APPEARANCE, AND THE METAPHOR OF THE ‘DOUBTFUL BIRD’

Issue two (§2.2) turns to controversial buddhalogical issues raised in connection with Yogācārin epistemology. The section begins with the interlocutor’s suggestion that the causal continuum comprising saṃsāra – i.e. causes and effects – never ceases. We know this is the case, the interlocutor says, because the causal continuum appears to the “pure worldly gnosis” (śuddhalaukikajñāna : dag pa ‘jig rten pa’i ye shes) of some spiritually developed beings.394 The presumption here is that gnosis is by definition not delusive; thus anything that is an object of gnosis must be valid. For Rongzom, however, this logic doesn’t work (§2.2.1). The Buddha in fact did not proclaim that the continuum of cause and effect that constitutes the domain of conditioned existence is never severed. Rongzom’s exploration of this point begins with a comparison of two different Tibetan translations, along with the Sanskrit, of the famed Buddhist verse concerning the Buddha's teaching on interdependence known as the Ye dharma formula.395 The verse (and Rongzom’s following explanation) offers a general account, one

394 According to Orna Almogi, the term “pure worldly gnosis” refers to both “quantitative gnosis” (ji snyed pa’i ye shes) and “subsequently attained gnosis” (prṣṭhalabdhaijñāna : rjes las thob pa’i ye shes) that emerge in the post-meditation sessions of saints. In his auto-commentary on Viṃśatikā, Vasubandhu opposes the naturally supramundance (lokottara) non-conceptual gnosis to subsequently attained gnosis, which is a worldly event (laukika) [Almogi 2009: 163 n. 70]. While it is true that statements found in both Ratnagotravibhāga and Viṃścayasamgrahāṇī refer to pure worldly gnosis as both mundane and supremundane (Schmithausen, Lambert. “Philologische Bemerkungen sum Ratnagotravibhāgah.” In Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 15 (1971), pp. 162; Almogi 2009: 164 n.71), it is more common to say non-conceptual gnosis “characterized by non-duality, and being the gnosis of meditative absorption, is regarded as the cognitive subject of the absolute” while pure worldly gnosis is “considered the cognitive subject of the world characterized by manifoldness.” Almogi 2009: 163. In general, see op. cit. ch. 3 n.b. 160-171.

395 That is, the Sanskrit: ye dharmā hetuprabhāvā hetum teśām tathāgato hyavavāt | teśām ca yo nirodha evam vātī mahaśramanāḥ ||; its Pali correspondent is in Vinaya 1.41: ye dhammā hetuttaprabhavā teśām hetum tathāgato aha | teśām ca yo nirodho evam vātī mahādsamana (Jayatilleke, K.N. Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge [Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Delhi, 1963] 454).
acceptable at all levels of exegesis, including that of the "lower vehicles," of the
generation and cessation of the suffering, its causes, and the paths that lead away
from it. The first quarter-verse (pāda: rkang pa) of the Ye dharma, praises the
Buddha for teaching the reality of unenlightened, conditioned existence as
consisting in processes of "dependent-arising" (pratītyasamutpāda: rten 'byung)
and in the second two quarter-verses, the Buddha is praised for having
proclaimed precisely the cessation of that process through the path of the
Buddha’s teaching (dharma).

Shifting, Rongzom cites a nameless Mahāyāna "sūtra" that is in fact the
Mahāsāṃnipāta-ratna-ketu-dhāraṇī, which shows the Buddha proclaiming that he
knows from his own experience the formation and cessation of the world. This
knowledge, Rongzom shows in two citations from the Ārya-saddharma-anusṛty-
upasthāna,396 pertains to interdependence, which pervades all Buddhist doctrines,
from the Śrāvakayāna to Great Perfection. To these citations is added a
paraphrase of the teaching of interdependence found in the Vinaya-vastu-ṭīkā. The
passage rounds off with two citations from the Pratītyasamutpāda-hṛdyā-kārikā
attributed to Nāgārjuna. In the first, the view of eternalism is dispelled by
indicating that nothing that is the person transmigrates between lives; in the
second, the view of nihilism is dispelled by (i) conditioned causality and (ii) the
teaching that the causal continuum of conditioned existence is never severed.

The section ends here with Rongzom addressing the contention that
causality must never end because it is an object of pure worldly gnosis.
According to The Approach, the appearance of cause and effect does in fact appear

396 On the Tibetan texts containing this phrase in the title, reference can be made to van der
Kuijp’s "On the Vicissitudes of Subhūticandra’s - Kāmadhenu Commentary on the Amarakoṣa in
to pure worldly gnosis of bodhisattvas', this is due to hypostatization that originates through influence of the two types of fixation. Both are due to karmic imprints which still remain in the bodhisattvas' continuum. It is at this point, Rongzom alludes to, but opts out of directly addressing, what relation, if any, obtains between buddhas and a pure worldly gnosis:

Even though [the causal continuum] appears to pure worldly gnosis, its appearance to bodhisattvas' pure worldly gnosis simply pertains to the power of the two fixations that are due to karmic imprints which still remain [in the bodhisattvas' continuum]. The question of whether or not Tathāgatas are, in fact, possessed of a pure worldly gnosis, is a separate issue to explore.

After side-stepping this hotly debated topic, Rongzom offers the type of "striking analogies and short anecdotes that didactically lend a powerful effect," described by Wangchuk (2002: 278). In this case, the analogy concerns the downfalls of phenomenal reification vis-à-vis the overzealous use of theory. Here, we find wonderful sense of humor and an interesting suggestion about the nature of the path. In the first of two puns, we find the Tibetan term “the doubtful bird” (skyes bu pho rig khu 'khrig can). The doubtful bird is Rongzom’s

397 ‘dzin pa gnyis (441.08) : dvayagrāha (Chadra 2001: 664a). According to Almogi, the phrase ‘dzin pa gnyis refers to "the grasping at a self and the grasping at phenomena as real" (2009: 190). According to Köppl, "Rongzom explains different types of habitual tendencies: 1. ‘dzin pa gnyis kyi bag chags, 2. dkar po las kyi bag chags, 3. bdag tu lta ba’i bag chags, 4. mngon par brjod pa’i bag chags, and 5. sri pa yan lag gi bag chags. Among these five habitual tendencies (bag chags), Nagao lists (1994, vol. 2, p. 109) mngon par brjod pa’i bag chags and the srid pa yan lag gi bag chags as occurring in the Mahāyānasamgraha. As for the former three types of habitual tendencies (bag chags, vāsana), it remains unclear what sources Rongzom may have relied on for his enumeration" (2008: 159 n. 268).

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399 On this issue and the question of Rongzom’s position, see Almogi 2009.

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example of an obsessed intellectual. In the analogy, we find a doubtful bird moving along above the path. At some point, the bird sees that the path shifted a bit, presumably through time and use (cf. interpretation). The fact the path has changed causes the bird anxiety because he does not recognize the path. He descends from his heavenly abode for a better look in order to clear up his confusion. Landing among the trees, the bird is poked, prodded, and seems generally stressed by the lack of familiarity of the path. The doubtful bird quite literally loses the path. Placing itself on the edge of the path, the bird experiences pain.

Rongzom’s apposite metaphor couldn’t be clearer: an overly cautious and “doubtful” intellectual – our “skeptical bird,” naturally assumes and inhabits the dimensions of the world while looking down upon the path from above. Assuming this perspective pertains to what Bourdieu refered to as the spectacle of the word theory, “which can only be understood from a viewpoint away from the stage on which the action is played out, the distance lies perhaps not so much where it usually looked for, in the gap between cultural traditions, as in the gulf between two relations to the world, one theoretical, the other practical.”

Rongzom’s doubtful bird stops traversing the path in order to stand back and get a proper view of its beginning, middle, and end. In doing so, it moves away from practical

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400 The primary term of the compound, skyes bu, refers here to “a being” or “living creature.” According to José Cabezón, the more obscure Tibetan khu ‘phrig correlates with the Sanskrit term, bhīru, which itself means “fearful, timid, cowardly, afraid” (MW 758b); and the Tibetan khu ‘phrig, for its part, goes beyond simply indicating a lack of courage to connote a lamentable effort in intellectual inquiry. Cabezón notes it “is synonymous with: (a) rnam rtog za ba, ‘to doubt, to be superstitious about,’ and (b) brtag dpyad byed pa, ‘to investigate.’ In the contemporary (and definitive) Tibetan-Chinese dictionary, Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo,” where the term appears to have lost its timorous connotation, it is defined as dogs pa’am rnam rtog – that is, “doubt or superstition.” See José Cabezón’s Freedom From Extremes: Gorampa’s ‘Distinguishing the Views’ and the Polemics of Emptiness (Wisdom Publications, 2007), p. 319 n. 271.

concerns – at least according to Rongzom. It is important to note that the doubtful bird loses the path and veers into a sharp thicket (of views) purportedly in order to see the path more clearly. Let us look at the whole of Rongzom’s passage, which reads:

That being the case, a person who holds a philosophical position such as this is exemplified by a doubtful bird who, upon seeing that the footing of the path has shifted a bit, moves off a major established path fearing for cover. Thence moving off to the edge (mtha’) of the path, he is tormented by splinters [offered by the thick, tightly encircling wood]. Likewise, the Bhagavan proclaimed, given that phenomena arise as dependent relations, when cause and condition are interrupted, the effect will be obstructed. Having entered onto this traditional great path to liberation that dispels the two extremes, conflict ensues when, in fear of falling into the view of nihilism in which the causal continuum is severed, there is grasping at the extreme which takes the causal continuum to be eternal [literally, “one moves off to the side of the edge” (mtha’)]. This move is not unlike being tormented by the [intellectual] splinters of the philosophical systems of the realists.

The phrase, “seeing that the footing of the path has shifted a bit” is curious. What can it refer to? Perhaps it signifies Rongzom’s acknowledgement of diachronic change or, more simply, different doctrinal systems. We should recall that, for Rongzom, Indian origin is not the hallmark of religious validity or authority. Tibetan authorship or textual interpolation are not, strictly speaking, a mark of religious inauthenticity. That is, the ground may shift a bit with time and use just as a path through the woods shifts with time, weather, use, and the like. The doubtful bird’s suspicion of the practical shifts in the path causes the bird to veer off the path entirely. The doubtful bird is compelled over to the “edge” of the path. The word “edge” used here translates the Tibetan term mtha’, which itself translates the Sanskrit equivalent anta. These terms, when employed in Buddhist philosophy, indicate a lamentable “extreme” signaling that an interpreter has
gone beyond the purview of the Buddhist view proper – beyond the middle-way between the two extremes (ānta : mtha’) of eternalism and nihilism. This is an obvious allusion to Rongzom’s critical attitude about philosophy that is, for example, logically and grammatically, rather than practically oriented. As we shall see, this point of criticism – i.e. that the zealous philosopher misses the salvific forest for the logically and grammatically precise trees – is returned to below and further sharpened chapters two and three of The Approach.

In §2.3, the objections and responses raised in connection with issue three consume almost half the chapter and begin with the interlocutor’s continuing focus on the causal continuum. In the last issue, Rongzom is keen to show that according to the description of reality given in the teachings on interdependence - an impure, conditioned, unenlightened reality - the Buddha did not teach that the causal continuum is never severed. The chain of effects that constitute the domain of conditioned existence, rather, is interrupted by preventing their causes from coming to fruition.

THE TWO ACCUMULATIONS, PURE APPEARANCE, & THE METAPHOR OF THE IMMATURE CHILD

Beginning with issue three, Rongzom’s interlocutor suggests that pure, unconditioned and perfected phenomena of enlightenment such as “the appearance of a fully matured buddha-body, the display (bkod pa) of a totally pure field, and a perfectly encompassing ornament as an inexhaustible continuum of enlightened body, speech, and mind” are "actualized through illimitable collections of merit and wisdom." According to the interlocutor’s logic, the ‘illimitability’ of the source of these appearances entails that the
appearances themselves are illimitable and thus never-ending. The soteriological view expressed here requires the attainment of positive factors (slang bya) such as the three buddha-bodies, their marks and so forth, subsequent to the rejection of undesirable factors (spang bya) such as contaminated form aggregates (sāsravopādānaskandhā: zag bcas nyer len gyi phung po). Since, on this normative Mahāyāna view, it is taught in the Mahāyāna that a buddha’s body is the result of an illimitable collection of merit and wisdom, its effects must also be “illimitable” or “unceasing’ in nature.

Rongzom’s response (§2.3.1) is an interesting bit of causal reasoning; on the issue of good karma, he writes: “while meritorious karma is indeed a condition for the purification of appearances, it is not a actual causal and conditional basis of them.”402 Neither is the accumulation of wisdom. The analogy he offers is an atypical perspective on the relation between kindling and fire. In the analogy, fire depends on the wood - but for its depletion rather than its combustion: “fire is generated in dependence upon the wood, fire is nevertheless not a condition that causes the wood to remain for a long period of time and spread. Fire, rather, is actually a condition that depletes the wood.”403

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402 The Approach: dngos gzhi’i rgyu dang rkyen ni ma yin no | (RZSB 443.12-443.13). A ‘condition’ (rkyen : pratyaya) is generally defined as something that occasions the maturation of an effect or works to generate a particular effect (’bras bu smin par byed pa’i grogs su gyur pa’am ’bra bu’i khyad par skyped byed | (TDCM 100a); and ”cause-condition” (rgyu rkyen) sometimes translated as ”causes and conditions” or ”causal condition” indicates ”cause,” which generates the general nature of an object while ”condition” indicates what generates a particular distinction (ngo bo skyed byed kyi rgyu dang | khyad par skyed byed kyi rkyen | (560b). The Tibetan term dngos gzhi is defined in TDCM as las don ngo ma or ”the real work involved and what comes from it” (681a).
403 A similar idea is found in Tōh. 87: ’Phags pa ’od srung gi le’u zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo (Ārya-kāśyapa-parivartāḥ-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra) in bKa’’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, dkon brtsegs, cha, vol. 44, (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): ’od srung ’di lta ste | dper na shing gzis rlung gis drud pa | de las me byung ste | byung nas shing de gzis sreg pa de bzhin du ’og srung yang dag par so sor rtog pa yod na ’phags pa shes rab kyi dbang po skye ste | de skyes pas yang dag par so sor rtog pa de nyid sreg par byed do | de la ’di skad ces bya ste | dper na shing gzis rlung gis drud pa las me byung nas ni de nyid sreg par byed | de bzhin shes rab dbang po skyes nas kyang | so sor rtog pa de nyid sreg par byed | (365.11-365.17); cf. LRCM 788, where Tsongkhapa (1357-1419)
Likewise, gnosis occasions the depletion of appearance, not its proliferation, even, in the case of pure appearances.

The discussion become one of the mechanics of manifesting worldly and transcendental gnosis as well as the nature of enlightenment and how it relates to the domain of experience of ordinary beings. Rejecting the Yogācārin theory of *transformation of the ground*, Rongzom seems to be rejecting the broader conceptual model of transformation (\(\text{gnas gyur pa}\)) from ordinary, thematic mind to non-conceptual gnosis altogether.\(^\text{404}\) This rejection makes sense when we recall Orna Almogi’s description above. That is, while Rongzom accepts gnosis as something apparent to ordinary sentient beings, he denies it exists at the level of a buddha (Almogi 2009: 14). Likewise, while Rongzom accepts transformation at the level of mere appearance to ordinary sentient beings, he denies it reality outside of illusory appearance. Ultimately, there is no basis for confusion at all. Confusion pertains to the domain of appearance and sentient beings who are fixated upon (\(\text{zhen}\)) appearance.

Although there is no basis for either appearance or confusion, inasmuch as the conditions remain present, appearance and confusion are possible. The conflict for things lies in supposing that their bases are real, though they are not—just as a mirage initially appears real but ultimately is not. Further, the realization that bases are devoid of nature is incompatible with confusing things.\(^\text{405}\)

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\(^\text{404}\) Amogi 2009: 191 n. 8.

\(^\text{405}\) The Approach: *snang ba dang 'khrul pa la gzhi myed kyang \| rkyen nye bar gnas na snang du rung zhing 'khrul du rung ngo \|\| dngos po rams kyi 'gal ba ni gzhi dngos por ma grub pa la \| \| de ltar dngos por g rub pa cing byung na 'gal gyir \|\| smigs rgyu ltar snang ba nyid na dngos po gzed ma nas tha mar ma grub pa bzhi no \|* (RZSB 1.454.10-454.14).
In another work, Rongzom closely paraphrases the Guhyagarbha-tantra stating that in non-tantric Mahāyāna discourse, ordinary, unrealized beings are taught two types of bodhicitta generation. Only after that did the Buddha teach what is called the "primordially perfected mind," which emerges as gnosis. In the context of the highest view of the Great Perfection, however, it is only the condition for disclosing or revealing a primordial domain that is described when the term "primordially perfected mind" is used. On Rongzom’s view of it, the fact that all pure phenomena manifest or appear as images or reflections means there is no actual transformation on the path to buddhahood and pertains to naturally arising gnosis.

Rongzom contrasts his view with those who make qualitative distinctions between the ordinary mind and gnosis. In §2.3.3.1, Rongzom takes gold smelting as an analogy in order to tease out some of the theoretical problems associated with two different schools of Yogācāra thought - one positing a single consciousness, the other positing eight - and finishes by using the ekāneka reasoning of identity and difference so often seen in the first chapter to argue for

406 That is, Rongzom’s commentary on Guhyagarbha known as the dKon cog 'grel (RZSB 1.33-250).
407 dKon cog 'grel: de ltar ma rtags pa'i 'gro ba rnam la byang chub kyi sens rnam pa gnyis su bskyed par bstan pa'i phyir | de nas gnyis su med pa'i bdag nyid chen pos ye nas sangs rgyas pa'i sens ye shes su bskyed pa 'di gsungs so || zhes bya ba la sos pa smos te | (RZSB 1.123.22-123.24). This is similar to lines in the second chapter of Tōh. 832: dPal gsang ba'i snying po de kha na nyid rnam par nges pa (Śrī-guhyagarbha-tattva-niṣcaya) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rying rgyud, kha, vol. 102 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): thams cad ye nas sangs rgyas par || de bzhin gshegs pa nyid kyis mkhyen to || de nas gnyis su med pa’i bdag nyid chen pos ye nas sangs rgyas pa’i sens ye shes su bskyed pa ‘di gsungs so | (291.06-291.08).
408 dKon cog 'grel: ‘dir ni | ye nas yin pa’i don gsal bar byed pa’i rkyen tsam du ’dod de | de'i phyir ye nas sangs rgyas pa’i sens zhes smos pa’i yin no | (RZSB 124.02-124.04).
409 dKon cog 'grel: ‘zag pa med pa’i chos thams cad kyi gzung brnyan snang bas gnas ‘gyur ba med de rang byung gi ye shes zhes bya’o | (RZSB 125.04-125.05).
410 The importance of this distinction for classical Great Perfection philosophy is the subject of Higgins 2013.
411 On refining gold as a metaphor for mental cultivation, and gold refinement and production in Ancient India and Buddhism in particular, see Covill 2009: pp. 184-214.
the absurdity of couching discussions of enlightened gnosis within ordinary cognitive associations. The discussion turns to what relation, if any, can obtain between non-conceptual gnosis, karmic imprints (bag chags : vāsana), and causes and conditions. That is, what role, if any, do karmic imprints play in the emergence of gnosis and do they color actual reality? Here, we find the example of a white cloth stained with color. This example may be found in such scriptures as the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra and the Pramāṇavārttika-ṭīkā.412

In §2.3.5, the interlocutor asks how it is that the ultimate character of awakening and the uncompounded character of the peace associated with nirvāṇa can be set forth as in fact being illusory. This question pivots on the binary structure of pure/impure, acceptance/rejection, and so forth. Rongzom answers this question through reference to texts such as Māyājala-tantra, Prajñāparamitā-sūtra, and Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra, which teach that anything - even that which is "characterized by an absence of character" - is equally illusory and must, to some degree, be imagined. The subject then turns to the "continuum of great gnosis" (§2.3.6) and its immense power to shape our unreal reality. This gnosis not a perceptible referent of the ordinary mind and therefore the status of our knowledge of it and buddha activity is brought in for questioning. Here, Rongzom states clearly his view that a buddha’s projected appearances are in fact more real than the appearances of conditioned existence. If karma can build and project such an astonishing world as ours – saṃsāra – that is surely nothing compared with the power of a buddha to "project unimpeded compassionate

activity” from beyond the grave. *The Approach* proceeds, in §§2.3.7-9, to touch upon the tension between this compassion buddha’s perduing enlightened activity *vis-à-vis* the ability to project appearances in the world even long after disappearing from the world and the concept of *nirvāṇa* as well as traditional Buddhist cosmology found in the Abhidharma text traditions.\(^{413}\) This section is replete with citations from the *Bhadracarya-praṇidhāna-rājā, Bhadramāyākāra-vyākaraṇa-sūtra, Buddhāvatamsaka-sūtra, Jñāna-āloka-alaṃkāra-sūtra, Varjacchedikā,* and *Ārya-Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra,* which itself comprises the forty-fifth section of the *Buddhāvatamsaka.*\(^{414}\)

*The Approach* then returns to the question that opened the chapter in §2.4.1. If all phenomena are illusory what is the status or reality of suffering and discontent in the world? In another remarkable example of his didactic analogies, Rongzom discusses an ordinary being’s fixation on appearances through the example of a young prince or householder’s son whose immaturity\(^{415}\) drives his rowdiness (*rgyags pa myos shing*). While the story is simple, as with our example of the doubtful bird given in §2.2, it seems likely Rongzom is using word play to send more than one message. Sanskrit equivalents for the key Tibetan terms used in the example turn up an underlying register to the story, which describes a boy at home playing. In the family storeroom, he stuffs a jewel wrapped in a red cloth into a full basket breaking some of the cords that bind it together. The basket thus overflows and spills the liquids inside the basket. The basket’s

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\(^{413}\) Close attention to Rongzom’s ideas about the sage’s ability to project appearances in the world even long into the future shed light on his view of the path structure (treated below).

\(^{414}\) On the relation and identification of *Buddhāvatamsaka* and the *Gaṇḍavyūha* sutras, see Almogi 2009: 245-246 n. 26.

\(^{415}\) *shed ma bye ba* (451.08); might also be translated as “immature.” The term *shed ‘bye* is defined, generally, as the manner in which mental and physical vigour develop (*lus sms kyi stobs skye bzhin pa* TDCM 2858a).
broken cords, as well, are left in the cooked rice inside. Having tired himself out playing, the boy becomes hungry, returns to the storeroom in search of food, and looks for it in the basket he wrecked earlier.

There, he perceives a snake present in the cooked rice and returns frightened because of it. When he has gone in search of something to drink, he perceives the [spilled] drinks as blood and returns frightened. Pained by thirst and hunger he sits in tears, wailing until an servant (nye gnas) arrives and asks, "Boy, why are you crying?" [Here, the boy answers:] "when I went looking for food and drink because I was hungry and thirsty, there was a snake in the cooked rice and blood in the drinks. So, I got scared; and though I felt awful with hunger and thirst, I was not able to eat; so I was crying." Thereafter, the servant without even offering the smallest point of guidance (gdam ngag gi gnas) to the boy, says to him: "Boy, do not cry. I will get rid of the snake and clean up the blood and give you some clean food." After removing the cord and the jewel, when he gives the boy some food and drink, the boy thinks: "This servant, having cleaned up what is foul, gives me clean food and drink!" Thinking thus, he is freed from his discontent.

If there was even the smallest point of guidance that could be given to the youth, [one would] say this: "What is the snake here? This is the cord you placed [there]. What is the blood here? It is the light from the jewel you left here." Once the youth has recognized the food and drink to be clean from the beginning, he would be freed [from any discontent].

The metaphor at work here has four semantic parts I want to point out: first, the description of the boy as "rowdy"; the Tibetan terms rgyags and myos can mean rowdy and intoxicated or even lusty. Yet, the terms also suggest an elephant in "must" (mada); mada refers to the frenzied state - often called being in must - that "male elephants will periodically go through lasting anything from a few days to several months, during which time they are excitable and easily enraged. The term rgyags pa translates the Sanskrit mada (Mvp 1969); and the term myos pa

416 gdam ngag gi gnas (451.19). *Note the dual nuance here -- i.e. gdam ngag ceam mean both "advice" in the ordinary sense and "secret instruction" in connection with tantra.
417 gdod ma nas dri ma dang bral bar shes nas (452.03). Note the dual nuance: gdod ma nas can refer to both the fact the food and drink were never contaminated and the "originally pure" nature of mind referenced in such texts as Bodhicittavivaraṇa, RGV, etc.
translates the term unmāda (Mvp 6953) and the term myos rdul can, moreover - "dredged with unmāda" - is an epithet for elephant. While it is true to say both terms suggest inebriation, lust, so so forth, I believe the more interesting reading is connected to the terms as they relate to ancient Indian Elephantology (hastividyā) - which serves as an important source domain in Buddhist metaphors of spiritual training.418 Further, I would reject the rendering of the terms as rowdy and intoxicated on the basis of the fact the subject is a mere child, not one likely to be an inebriate. Since the source domain's agent of interest is obviously a child - one can hardly expect a palace servant to address a grown prince as "boy" (bu) - I do not read the use of the term mada as referring to the prince's lust (he seems too young); but, rather, to his recklessness. Moreover, terms that connote youth serve as euphemisms for the spiritually less "mature."

We also note the dual nuance of the term nye gnas (literally, "[one who] dwells near [his or her teacher]"); it refers not only to "a servant," but also to a disciple of a teacher; the Sanskrit equivalent, antevāsin, means "dwelling near the boundaries, dwelling close by... a pupil who dwells near or in the house of his teacher" (MW 43a; cf. upasthāṭri id. 211b). This comprises part of the source-domain of the metaphor - i.e. casting the servant as a Buddhist guide to the immature child, a spiritually immature being (cf. Tib. byis pa). In texts such as Catuḥśataka, we find phrases rendering the particularly religious context of its usage; e.g. 'phags pa lha ni... slob dpon klu sgrub pa kyi nye gnas nyid du 'gyur cing (Lang 1983: 65 n. 16).We also note a third component of the metaphor: 'a point of advice' (gdams ngag gi gnas, 451.19) has a dual nuance here -- i.e. gdams ngag may

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mean both "advice" in the ordinary sense and "intimate instruction" in connection
with the teaching of tantra. In a fourth component, we note the phrase "clean
from the beginning" (gdod ma nas dri ma dang bral bar shes nas, 452.03). This phrase
can simply indicate the food and drink were never contaminated, but the phrase
is also operatice in Great Perfection rhetoric to refer to the "originally pure" nature
of mind promulgated in Great Perfection and referenced in such texts as
Bodhicittavivarana, Ratnagotravibhaga, and others. This is not only a primary trope
in the tradition of Great Perfection, it is a primary trope in some of the most
influential literature of the later dissemination period. Thus, with a mind toward
Rongzom’s knowledge of Sanskrit and his target audience, a didactic example
expands into a broader, more interesting simile-metaphor that plays on esoteric
Buddhist nomenclature.

ON APPEARANCE & CONFUSION

In § 2.4.2, Rongzom then offers a discussion of the way our minds label and
understand things in our experience. Specifically, this section considers the
relation between objects and the specific qualities that putatively characterize
them - such as the blue color of an object. Rongzom’s concern, as is often the case,
seems to be for the constitutive power of theory to form distortions in experience
qua ‘real entities’ (dravya). For example, Rongzom believes that a biased
philosophical approach impacts upon the experience of the philosopher and
works in her experience to create an instinctive sense of the the basis of the
supposed, experienced appearance as an ontologically real entity. This
discussion impinges upon issues evoked under the classical rubric termed

What does it mean to say that phenomena lack their own intrinsic nature or essence? It means "emptiness" is their nature because phenomena have no solid reality. Stipulating this absence of a solid reality, he questions (§ 2.4.3) the basis or source of appearance and confusion: "Given that appearance entails a basis of appearance, is it not the case that confusion entails a basis of confusion?"

In answer, Rongzom maintains that appearances and confusion have no actual bases; yet insofar as the their conditions remain, so do they.

In the final passages of the chapter, The Approach explores the concept of error and confusion (both translate the Tibetan, 'khrul pa). The very appearance of time, space, and person, for example, are said to be confused appearances. We should infer from this that anything with temporal or spatial extension is a confusion. Such appearances fuel the experience of happiness and discontent within conditioned existence. Yet, for Rongzom, these ‘objects’ – and the world, more broadly - are non-existent objects from the point of view of what logical and philosophical precision demand and from the point of view of a Buddha, but for different reasons, respectively. Nevertheless they appear real to beings who have not rid themselves of the confusion of appearances as buddhas have. As an example, Rongzom takes an image "in" a mirror, which seems to appear both in the depths of the mirror and on its surface. Drawing on a passage from the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra, Rongzom destabilizes the idea of objective time and enters into a discussion of the processes of confused appearances. Giving several citations from the Bodhicittabhañvanā attributed to Mañjuśrīmitra (the most cited work in Rongzom’s text), The Approach works to show an intimate relation
between the mind and appearance vis-à-vis the fixations and obsessions of the ordinary, thematic mind. Finally, the chapter ends with advice:

If one wishes to turn away from confused appearance, all appearances are recognized as mental appearances; and thereby, the peg tethering the tent of self-grasping is pulled out [of the ground of ignorance]. Since an obsessive perspective on things and their character is overcome, when the delusive awareness that sees the mind as a self and seizes on objects as characterized is reversed - even with respect to veracious appearances - the force of turbulent karmas, too, is attenuated.

Truly, when the nature of phenomena is recognized, there is no real entity anywhere that is to be rejected or gotten rid of along the path except for that which is conventionally labeled the "afflictive." This puts things that are described in positive or negative terms on a fundamentally equal setting - that of the illusory. For ordinary beings, mere appearance pertains to the process of confusion; and by fixation on it, beings appear to bound in samsāra.

CHAPTER CITATIONS

There are, to my knowledge, twenty-seven citations or paraphrases in chapter two of The Approach. As with chapter one, these citations are often given without explicit identification.\(^{419}\) Where texts are explicitly identified, they are marked by an asterisk below. Chapter two cites or paraphrases the following sources:

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\(^{419}\) It is true that Rongzom often does not identify texts. Just which he does and does not identify will be again taken up in this thesis’ concluding reflections. Suffice here to say, Pace Davidson, I cannot follow his rather ungenerous characterization that Rongzom, when compared with other scholars of his day and in the context of the milieu’s scholarly practices, "seems lackadaisical and disinterested in other texts." As an example of Rongzom’s “lackadaisical” method, Davidson cites chapter 5 of The Approach. That chapter, the texts longest, contains more than one hundred citations. Rongzom’s Approach, with its scholarly exposition from a variety of perspectives does not in fact suggest any absence of enthusiasm or determination; neither may Rongzom’s scholarly method be described as, in one way or another, careless lazy. Just why and where Rongzom does and does not identify citations is, I believe, part of his broader rhetorical agenda. I will return to this subject in the conclusion. For Davidson's opinion, see Tibetan Renaissance: Tantric Buddhism in the Rebirth of Tibetan Culture (Columbia University Press, 2005), 263.
The Short Presentation on Empowerment (§2.1.2.1: the fundamentally equality of illusions, emanations, and the like)

Two citations from The Great Vehicle Sutra on the Prophecy of the Good Illusion-maker or Bhādra-māyākāravyākaraṇa-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra (§2.1.2.2: illusions can effect the two accumulations; appearances are as potent as their source)

Discourse on Discipline or Vināya 1.41 (§2.2.2.1: the Sanskrit Ye dharma formula concerning interdependence; §2.3.9.1: the nature of a buddha)

The Sublime Dharma Application of Mindfulness or Ārya-saddharmanusmṛtyupasthāna (§2.2.2.1: a Tibetan translation the Ye dharma)

The [Discourse on] Sublime Heart of Interdependence or Ārya-praṇītysamutpāda-hṛdaya-nāma (§2.2.2.1: an alternate Tibetan translation of the Ye dharma)

The Sublime Great Vehicle Discourse [called the Recitation that Holds] the Precious Crown of the Great Assembly or Mahā-saṃnipāta-ratnaketu-dhārani-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra (§2.2.2.1: the Buddha’s claim to knowledge of reality)

The Extensive Explanation of the Basic Discipline or Vināyavastu-ṭikā (§2.2.2.1: interpretation of interdependence)

Two citatations from Verses on the Heart of Interdependence or Pratītyasamutpāda-hṛdaya-kārikā: (§2.2.2.1: exemplars of interdependence qua rebirth; and a skillful conception of rebirth)

Glorious Indestructable Essence Ornament Tantra or Śrī-vajra-hṛdaya-alamkāra-tantra-nāma (§2.3.1: the simile of the raft)

The Commentary on Difficult Points Called ‘The Lamp Shedding Light on Clarification or Pradīpodyotanodyota-nāma-pañjikā (§2.3.1: the possibility of buddhahood is structured by the absence of any possibility for merit or sin)

The King of Esoteric Teachings, The Great Web of Illusion, or Māyājāla-mahātantra-rāja (§2.3.5.1: the nature of buddhahood)

Two citatations from Discourse on the Great Passing Beyond Sorrow [of the Buddha] or Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra (§2.3.5.1: the illusory nature of phenomena)

The King of Aspirations for Good Practice or Ārya-bhadracarya-praṇidhāna-rājā (§2.3.9.1: altruistic aspiration)
Two citations from *The Sublime Diamond Cutter Discourse* or Ārya-vajrachchedaka-nāmā-prajñā-pāramitā-māhāyana-sūtra* (§2.3.9.1: attaining the un compounded)

* Two citations from *The Extensive Flower Ornament Discourse* or Buddha-avatārisaka-nāma-mahāvaipulya-sūtra* (§2.3.9.1: the ineffable nature of a buddha)

Two citations from *The Ornament Illuminating Gnosis Discourse* or Ārya-sarva-buddha-visayavatāra-jñāna-āloka-alaṅkāra-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra* (§2.3.9.1: the ineffable nature of a buddha)

*The Discourse on the Teaching of Vimalakīrti* or Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra* (§2.4.3.1: the bodhisattva’s capacity to effect the passing of time)

*Four citations from Meditation on the Mind of Awakening* or Bodhicittabhāvanā attributed to Mañjuśrīmitra* (§2.4.3.1: the nature of conceptual error; karma and appearance; the nature of the imagined self; the limits of cognition)

**CONCLUSIONS**

In Chapter Two of *The Approach*, Rongzom’s concerns about appearance and his critique of the distinction between “real” and “imaginary” predominates. A central point of the chapter is to persuade readers that classical illusory appearances – a magician’s conjuring, a hallucination, a mirage, and so forth - are in a significant sense fundamentally the same as an ordinary being’s psycho-physical aggregates, which constitute their personal reality. On this view, illusions, mirages, dreams, reflections, and emanations all share in containing instances that perdure and are efficacious; and pure worldly gnosis is not a suitable condition for appearance enduring any more than fire is a condition for the enduring of the wood that is its fuel. That is, appearances are, on this view, a processual effect of sentience. Appearance qualifies and structures the character of sentience. In fact, it is constitutive of sentience in some significant sense. Here,
Rongzom uses known examples from Yogācāra to argue that it is not permissable to maintain that buddhas have non-conceptual consciousness.

Throughout the chapter, Rongzom draws on a remarkable variety of sources to argue – sometimes through reason, sometimes by myth – that exoteric discourses as well as discourses that appear to be entirely non-Buddhist can be interpreted and understood in terms of Rongzom’s doctrine of appearance; and to teach that sentient beings and buddhas, in the end, are basically equal. That this quintessentially tantric view can be drawn from sūtra and non-Buddhist literature is critical to understanding Rongzom’s Mahāyāna and his category of definitive discourse (ṅges don). It is equally important to recognize that although Rongzom’s view of equality stipulates that all phenomena, pure and impure, are basically the same insofar as they are qualified on the basis of illusory appearance, this is not the same as stating that all appearances are totally equal. Much of Chapter Two of The Approach also works to show that appearances can vary in their ability to endure and exert effects through variation in the power of their source. As we saw in Rongzom’s use of Myth as Argument, not all appearances are created equal; some are more real than others, although – in the end – they are still appearances that do not exist at the level of buddhahood.
INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The title of the third chapter in The Approach reads: "Distinguishing the Perfected System of the Illusory in the Great Perfection From the Other Vehicles that Retain the Nomenclature of Illusion." Thus, the purpose of this section is to differentiate the way the illusory is described in the Great Perfection from the way it is discussed in other approaches to the Buddhist path. To a large degree, Rongzom has said, all Buddhist discourse is organized around the trope of the illusory; and Buddhists of all doctrinal orientation are, by virtue of their respective orientations able to penetrate the illusory – to a degree. Only on the view of the Great Perfection, however, is that ‘penetration’ or ‘realization’ (adhigama : rtogs) taken into one’s heart and perfected (tshad du chud cing mthar phyin pa). As I have mentioned several times above, Rongzom’s doctrine of Great Perfection is often best recognized as a ‘rule-based’ or ‘regulative’ one and thus not unlike a type of discourse we may describe as a language game, which comprises a form of life (lebensform). In this chapter, The Approach works to make plain what

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420 Let me reiterate from above, the term form of life or lebensform, generally, refers to "a way of living, a pattern of activities, actions, interactions and feelings which are inextricably interwoven with, and partly constituted by, uses of language... The term is sometimes used so that it converges on the idea of a culture" (Baker & Hacker 2005: 74). This concept is closely related - akin, as it were, to James & Shutz's multiple realities (a term taken from William James), Geertz's cultural systems, MacIntyre's practices (Bellah 2011: 96), and Bourdieu's concept of fields (Bellah 2011: 628 n. 141), Collins' network (1998 passim); this family of concepts is more obliquely related to what has been described as the complex of socio-cultural phenomena we refer to as Hinduism (Gonda 1966: 7), which, along with Buddhism, thrives in particular type of socio-cultural ground or substrate (Collins 1982: § 1.1.1, 1.1.3, 1.4.3; Ruegg 2008 passim; Hamilton 1996: 37-39) - the so-called karma-sansāra-mokṣa complex, i.e. a constellation of ways of doing things and thinking about things and talking about things.
distinguishes the Great Perfection’s language game of illusion from the other vehicles that also have an important discourse around the topic.

In Chapter three of *The Approach*, Rongzom outlines the Great Perfection interpretation of the teaching on illusion or illusory existence as distinctive, broader and more fundamentally significant compared to its treatment in other Buddhists discourses. In short, Rongzom gives an impressive and erudite discussion employing the logical and epistemological models fostered in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism, but also offers a meta-discourse on philosophy examining the structure of the conditions that make philosophical discourse possible – negation, proof, epistemic validity, and so on – as a critique of the enterprise that insists on correlating valid and efficacious soteriology to logical and grammatical precision. On Rongzom’s view, the nature of mind and reality is not wholly reducible to a discourse that strives for linguistic and logical precision and coherence. There is a logic to Great Perfection, but it is not the normative Mahāyāna logic of the Pramāṇikas: the ‘Proponents of South Asia’s logico-epistemological schools (pramāṇa) or the relentless mereology of the Abhidhārmikas: the ‘Proponents of classical Buddhist philosophy.’ Chapter Three works to distinguish the Great Perfection’s unique discourse on illusion. At the end of the chapter, Rongzom defines Great Perfection in terms of several classical Buddhist categories.

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421 This attitude is, to my mind, not unlike the latter Wittgenstein’s attitude toward what he viewed as philosophical nonsense, on which reference may be made to Pitcher George. 1965. "Wittgenstein, Nonsense, and Lewis Carroll." In *The Massachusetts Review* 6(3): 591-611. Both view philosophical nonsense as often stemming from an unnatural fixation or obsession with linguistic and logical precision and coherence. There is discussion to this effect in Chapter Four of *The Approach*.
CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Chapter Three is organized around three main philosophical issues with a fourth and final section discussing what the Great Perfection is. In the first of the three philosophical issues, The Approach treats the epistemological status of appearance and confusion. That is, after Rongzom argues above for the fundamental equality of illusions, emanations, and the like, the first question he asked himself through the interlocutor is whether or not these illusions are in fact phenomenologically significant objects – i.e. are they objects observed by the mind (dmigs pa). This leads to discussion of the nature of the Buddhist doctrine of the two truths. It contains a striking comparison of the different degrees of fixation on appearance which occur, according to Rongzom, in connection with various theoretical approaches to the spiritual path. While comparisons between different views are often given in Buddhist treatises in terms of their view of ultimate reality (stong cha) or their view of valid conventional phenomena, the basis of comparison that Rongzom begins his chapter with is a false appearance; and not simply a false appearance: the appearance of a false image. The example Rongzom gives is, of course, “the appearance of a black snake’s image in water.” This metaphor is often referred to by readers of his as “Rongzom’s black snake.” Rongzom’s purpose in using this metaphor is to show how different doctrinal orientations to the path experience and act on the realization of the two truths. By means of this example, he is also suggesting just how the teaching of the illusory is effectively different from vehicle to vehicle. By “distinguishing between the varying degrees of fixation on appearance” (dngos por zhen pa che chung gi bye brag) that accompany a given philosophical stance, Rongzom interrogates the “hierarchy of
views” (*ita ba mthon dman*) that each traditionally purport to be the only view to clearly elucidate and evince the path.

In the second issue of the chapter, Rongzom interrogates the nature and scope of logical reasoning, affirmation, and negation. This discussion is the longest in the chapter, comprising five sections (§§ 3.2.1.1-3.2.1.5). It contains discussion of the basis of various theoretical views found among non-Buddhist, Śrāvaka, Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, Guhyamantra, and the Great Perfection, respectively. The section also outlines the biases that broadly structure the philosophical enterprise in general; and it offers a rather visceral metaphor for dangers involved in insisting upon philosophical precision.

A third philosophical issue explored in chapter three of *The Approach* is the nature of imputation, conceptuality, appearance, and the teaching of the two truths. There is also a fourth section of the chapter, which has two parts. The first is itself a cursory explanation of the distinctions between different approaches to the path. That is followed by a presentation of the status of Great Perfection as a broadly conceived concept that subsumes several important technical Buddhist rubrics. Great Perfection is polysemously defined. It is many things. This encourages the view that, for Rongzom, Great Perfection is not, strictly speaking, a traditional Buddhist system that may be set over and against other systems

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Let us now turn to specific issues and themes presented. In sum, the four sections of Chapter Three of *The Approach* are given as follows:

- Introduction: the Great Perfection approach to the path (458.19-458.21)
- Issue one: the epistemological status of appearances (458.21-460.15)
• Issue two: the scope of logic and reasoning and the character of philosophy (460.15-468.03) in the systems of non-Buddhists (461.16-462.21), Śrāvakas (462.21-463.23), Yogācāra (463.23-465.02), Madhyamaka (465.02-465.08), and Guhyamantra (465.09-473.05)

• Issue three: the nature and scope of imputation, conceptuality, and the two truths (468.03-473.05)

• Section four: distinguishing the limitations and potential of various approaches to the Buddhist path – Śrāvaka, and so on – and explicating the status of Great Perfection within the structure of Buddhist teachings (473.05-477.10)

SECTION SUMMARIES

At the close of chapter two, there is discussion of the ‘reversal,’ ‘collapse,’ or ‘overcoming’ (ṭhö̱ log) of fixation on appearance. Summing up, Rongzom writes:

there is no real entity whatsoever to be eliminated outside of what is simply labeled by the term thoroughly afflicted; there is no real entity to be established outside of what is simply labeled by the term utterly pure. Nevertheless, when [the illusory nature of phenomena is] not recognized, the process of confused appearance pertains accordingly to appearance itself.422

With that, Rongzom ends chapter two discussing the intimate relationship obtaining between confusion and appearance for those whose understanding of

422 The Approach: kun nas nyon mongs pa dang rnam par byang bar tha snyad btags pa tsam ma glogs pa \| \di la bsal bar bya ba’i rdzas sam \ gzhag par bya ba’i rdzas kyi ngo bo gang yang myed de \ ‘on kyang ma shes pa’i dus na ‘khrul snang gi tshul de ltar snang ba tsam yin no \ (RZSB 1.458.14-458.17).

Compare this with, for example, Almogi 2009: “Rong-zom-pa, however, does not deny that a buddha’s gnosis, as mere appearance, manifests to those who have not yet attained release and thus have not yet eliminated all their delusions. A buddha, on the other hand, whose delusions have been completely exhausted, does not possess such gnosis” (14).
reality is based upon anything other than the fundamentally illusory nature of phenomena. With that issue in mind, Chapter Three begins.

The opening sentence (§ 3.0) connects the view of equality (samatā : mnyam pa nyid) – an important thesis of Mahāyāna proponents of emptiness (śūnyatāvāda : stong nyid smra ba), the Yogācāra especially – to the Great Perfection. The Mahāyāna approach to the path, Rongzom writes, is truly revealed through recognizing the fundamental equality of all phenomena, which is shown by their illusory nature. Penetrating the illusory nature of reality is the doorway to the Mahāyāna’s path to total buddhahood, which is perfected through “the authentic assimilation and consummation” (rtogs pa tshad cing mthar phyin pa) of that primary recognition. Rongzom writes:

The disclosure of the Mahāyāna approach [discussed above] is something enabled through the realization of the illusory character of all phenomena. The authentic assimilation and consummation of the realization that all phenomena are basically the same in being illusory is the approach of the Great Perfection.424

Typically, the doorway to the Great Vehicle of the Mahāyāna is described in the context of the bodhisattva path to buddhahood, which is broadly characterized by a radical compassion (bodhicitta). To be sure, the view of equality described here suggests a compassionate stance. Rongzom’s description, however, is totally

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423 According to the locus classicus found in the Mahāyānasūtraśāṅkara attributed the Maitrey-Asaṅga complex (chapter 9 vv. 68-75), the view of equality is embodied in one of the four types of gnosis (ye shes bzhi) championed by the Mahāyāna. See Limaye, Surekha V. Mahāyānasūtraśāṅkara (By Asanga): Text, Translation and Commentary (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 2000), pp. 139-143.

424 This qualification - rtogs pa tshad du chud cing mthar phyin pa - is is similar to one given below: rtogs shing mthar phyin par khong du chud pas (459.24-460.01). Both suggests realization of Great Perfection is not “sudden” or “instantaneous”; that it progresses through (rim gyis) shades of fulfillment unto completion. Cf. van Schaik’s “The Early Days of the Great Perfection,” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 27(1), 2004: § ii. A similar attitude is found in the Yuktiśāstikā attributed to Nāgārjuna: srid pa smig rgyu sgyu ‘dra bar || blo yis mthong bar gyur pa ni || sngon gyi mtha’ ’am phyi ma’i mtha’ || Itas bas yongs so slad mi ’gyur (17). See also Eviatar Shulman’s “Creative Ignorance: Nāgārjuna on the Ontological Significance of Consciousness.” In Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 30(1-2), 2007(2009) 162.
organized around the view of equality, which attained through perfectly assimilating one’s realization of the illusory nature of phenomena. In this way, Rongzom situates Great Perfection as the consummation of the beginning of the basic Mahāyāna path, it’s natural outcome.

The title of the first chapter of The Approach, which is given in its last sentence, reads: “The first chapter, teaching the fundamental equality of all phenomena illusory to consist in their illusory nature.” It outlines the view of equality and connects the view to the ascertainment of the illusory nature of things. The illusory nature of all phenomena is broadly accepted by Buddhists, but Rongzom suggests that not everyone interpreted this as entailing the view of equality in which an illusion and an enlightened emanation are said to be basically the same. According to Rongzom, not everyone understands the fundamentality of the illusory to mean that an illusion proper, such as a mirage, and an enlightened emanation are ‘basically the same’ (‘go mnyam pa). Any discourse that makes truth claims about an objective – or objectively empty – reality, such as the Prajñāparamitā or Madhyamaka, is said by Rongzom to be engaged in bias – i.e. attitudes structured by the practice of accepting (blang) what is perceived to be good and rejecting (dor) what is perceived to be bad. Any such bias (blang dor) precludes the view of equality that is the true doorway to the Great Vehicle precisely because it is structured around bias – i.e. what is good (the accepted bits) and what is bad (the rejected bits) – and thus not a view of the fundamental equality of phenomena. In this chapter, Rongzom will show that just because a Buddhist realizes that phenomena are illusory does not mean

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425 The Approach: theg pa chen po ’i tshul la ’jug par ’dod pa rnams kyi | nyon mongs pa rnams la spang bar bya ba’i rdzas myed par shes par bya zhing | chos thams cad sgyu ma lta bur ’go’ mnyam par bstan pa’i skabs te | dang po’o || || (RZSB 1.435.05-435.08).
she has perfected the view of equality. A failure to perfect the view of the illusory is indicated, according to Rongzom, by the practice indicated in the Prajñāpāramitā text tradition wherein bodhisattvas exert themselves in the application of an antidote – the generation of Insight – as a remedy to perceiving illusion. In that approach, generating Insight (prajñā) or gnosis (jñāna) that perceives the ultimately empty nature of phenomena is the remedy to the perceiving illusion. In the Great Perfection, when the perception of the illusory nature of phenomena is refined or perfected, even remedies such as Insight and Gnosis are perceived as illusory. The view that all phenomena are basically or fundamentally the same because they are equally illusory wipes away real and radical distinction between pure and impure phenomena. This is the most refined or perfected interpretation or outcome of the general Buddhist teaching that all phenomena are illusory – and Rongzom connects it with Great Perfection, in particular. Returning to Rongzom’s oft-used metaphor of the rivers and ocean discussed in the Introduction, we should say that this perfected realization of the illusory is the great perfected ocean of enlightenment into which all its various constitutive streaming paths flow, including the so-called ‘lower vehicles.’

In chapter two, we saw Rongzom argue for this interpretation of “illusory,” which is organized around his ideas concerning the potency of appearance. He outlines this discourse using a variety means to persuade his audience, including myth, extended analogies, and divination metaphors, among others. Once finished arguing for this interpretation of “illusory,” Rongzom turns to further differentiating or “distinguishing the Great Perfection from other vehicles that retain the nomenclature of illusion” in order to make sure that readers of The Approach recognize his doctrine of Great Perfection to be, as it
were, supplemental.

After introducing the chapter title, Rongzom, moves to outline a particular ‘nomenclature’ (skad) or language game around illusion and distinguish its import from various other theoretical approaches (§3.1). Using the black snake metaphor, Rongzom shows that just because someone realizes the illusory nature of phenomena, she has not necessarily gained freedom the biased attitudes that qualify an unenlightened being. In each example, there are different intellectual, emotional, and behavioral outcomes as a consequence of each’s respective view of the illusory. As such, the “black snake” also describes the ways in which various doctrinal approaches practicably digest the two truths. The metaphor emphasizes that while each orientation to the path maintains its own theory of the illusory, none except for Great Perfection totally collapses fixation upon appearance, whether the appearance is a buddha-body of emanation or the image of a black snake in water.

The black snake metaphor begins with Rongzom posing the following question in response to the chapter’s opening, in which Rongzom states that the way to the Great Vehicle of the Mahāyāna way is disclosed when the realization the phenomena are illusory is ‘perfected’ (mthar phyin pa). In response, Rongzom writes: “To that, it might be asked: do [proponents of this view] philosophically insist upon the confused appearances [described above as illusions] being things perceived by the mind?” 426 This point revolves around the question of whether or not there is an enlightened being (buddha) who ‘understands’ or ‘cognizes’

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426 The Approach: rdzogs pa chen po’i tshul gyis ’khrul snang ’di dag dmigs par ’dod dam mi ’dod ce na (TBRC 458.20-458.21).
these illusions.\footnote{This topic is the subject of Almogi 2009.} Put another way, if appearance is confused, does that confused appearance appear in the mind of the spiritually realized being who is by definition free of confusion? Do they cognize or perceive confused appearance? Sentient beings are mired in unenlightened existence because of being trapped in the illusory (self, for example). The question here is whether or not these illusions appear to a buddha. If so, since buddhas know things perfectly by definition, what should be made of the appearance of an illusion to them? Do buddhas cognize or otherwise perceive these confusions just as sentient beings do?

Such a question touches upon two central philosophical issues. The first concerns the ontological validity of unreal objects and the epistemological validity of epistemic error. The second concerns what may be said about the ‘epistemic content’ of the mind of a being who has penetrated the view of equality at the most profound and ‘transformative’ level. In response to the question, Rongzom engages in his habit of stepping back from the question to explore the conditions that structure its possibility. In response to the question of whether or not confusing things appear to the mind of buddhas, Rongzom steps back and extrapolates an existential line of inquiry (i.e. a statement about whether or not something exists, \textit{yod pa}) in contrast to a predicative line of inquiry (i.e. a predicative statement affirming or not affirming \textit{how} something is, \textit{yin pa}). By posing the question this way, Rongzom employs what is an important binary structures at play in Rongzom’s critical discourse on philosophy: existential and predicative statements (\textit{yod pa dang yin pa}). At the start of Chapter Three, Rongzom writes:
Is that supposed to be a question about whether or not these - whatever they are - are appearing or not? Or is that a question of about whether or not said appearances are actually real or not?  

The first question is an existential one: ‘is the appearance? – i.e. does the appearance exist?’. The second questions supposes an affirmation of the first; that is, it asks: ‘how (real) is the (putatively existent) appearance?’ We recall from the Introduction that Buddhists do not dispute that phenomena appear to beings with working sense faculties. That is, appearance does not form the basis of dispute between Buddhists because no Buddhist disputes that confusing appearances, in fact, appear to beings with working faculties. We are all Buddhists, which means we recognize that we stuck in saṃsāra because we are because of the beguiling nature of the things that appear to us. We recall from the first chapter that Rongzom is emphasizing the mental nature of phenomena. No Buddhist disputes the fact the concept of saṃsāra is rooted in the idea that sentient beings are trapped in an illusion. Everthing in our experience is predicated on this illusion. No Buddhist disputes this.

If it is a questions about appearance - and they are said to appear - then what basis of dispute is there to be manufactured between various theories? Nobody at all disputes whether or not shared appearances do or do not appear to ordinary sense faculties.

Nobody can assimilate and perfect the realization of Great Perfection while maintaining that whatever appears is real. According to The Approach, “the entire horizon (mthon dman) of views simply correspond to] greater or lesser degrees of

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428 The Approach: ci ’di dag snang ngam mi snang cis ’dri bar byed dam | ’on te snang ba la mtshan nyid yod dam nyed ces ’dri bar byed | (RZSB 1.458.23-458.24).

429 The Approach: de la snang ngam mi snang ces ’dri na ni | mi snang na lla ba sna [459] tshogs kyi rtsod pa’i gzhi ci la byed de | thun mong gi dbang po’i mthun snang ’di la snang mi snang ni su’ang mi rtsod do | (RZSB 458.24-459).
fixation upon (zhen) appearances as [solid, real] things.”

Rongzom details this assertion, one of many statements about the reality of the philosophical enterprise Rongzom makes, through the black snake, which, by way of analogy, differentiates the varying degrees by which exponents of the “hierarchy of views” become unfortunately fixated upon, as it were, the given, as a consequence of their philosophical theory. Such a fixation may be described in the tradition of Great Perfection, as a point deviation (gol sa). According the Old School, a point of deviation is a distraction that moves the person away from recognizing the nature of equality. Movement away from that occurs due to the biases associated with effort, which are themseleves perceptions structured by attitudes of acceptance and rejection. According to Rongzom, in the end, each approach to the path, except Great Perfection, constitutes a so-called deviation – this includes the Madhyamaka and Tantra, in general. Descriptions of these points of deviation are raised by the ‘black snake’ example. Each deviation is described in percpetual, psychological, and behavioral terms. It is a rich metaphor with, I think, remarkable origins, that deserves to be cited in full. Before doing so, it should be said that nowhere does Rongzom say these ‘lower’ or ‘smaller’ paths (as opposed to ‘inferior’) deviational paths are not authentic Buddhist paths. They are. Each of the lower approaches structures their soteriology around a dicourse on the illusory; and each is an authentic Buddhist path, albeit not one that may be taken ‘non-stop, as it were, to the destination of Buddhahood. The relationship of these paths to Great Perfection is not unlike an

430 The Approach: de lta bas na lta ba mthon dman ni snang ba la dngos por zhen pa che chung gi bye brag tsam ste । (RZSB 1.459.04-459.05).
ocean’s relationship to the streaming paths of water that work to constitute it and structure the very conditions of its possibility. Nonetheless, as the black snake metaphor shows, each lower approach is limited by a theoretical error that consequently distracts them from the perfection of the realization of the illusory, which constitutes the Great Perfection view of equality. The black snake example reads:

Take, for example, the appearance of a black snake's image within water: for some, perceiving the snake as real causes fear; and they try to get rid of it [i.e. the snake]. Similarly, even though the dissatisfying state of things (sdug bsgal gyi gnas) is in fact illusory, the Śrāvakas' perceive it as real and attempt to get rid of it. And even though some recognize [the image] as an image, they still perceive there to be a danger in touching it and, thus, work to apply a remedy.

Similarly, the Prajñāpāramitā text tradition approaches phenomena as illusion-like; yet it also fabricates remedies - generating gnosis concerning the knowable and great compassion - because of its theory that [causal] efficacy is real [i.e. ‘truly exists’]. Some who recognize [the image] as an image, who, moreover, realize that no injury comes from contact with [the ‘snake’], are capable of persuading those incapable of making contact themselves on account of their fear, which is, in fact, unjustified.

Similarly, according to the approach of Kriya[ tantra] and Outer Yoga[ tantra], even though vulgar behavior and substances are understood to be without [any intrinsic] fault, some [practitioners] are themselves incapable of just letting-go, so they practice offering to deities, austerities, and use substances that pertain to spiritual accomplishment, and so on. Some recognize they will not be harmed by touching [the ‘snake’] and practice austerities while trampling it in order to swiftly eradicate [other's] fear [of it].

Similarly, to do away with all manner of practices and experience the equality of all phenomena according to the Inner Tantra approach, one engages in stomping on it and undertakes the austerities in which phenomena are considered neither good or bad and foods are neither pure or impure. [There are] some for whose awareness of the character of the reflection is unmistaken. They [see the reflection for what it is and thus] see all the above practices as child's play [i.e. for the spiritually immature]. They are thereby beyond such [unhelpful notions] as actually getting rid [of afflictions (as if they were real and beings were, in reality, bound by them) and so forth]. They in fact perceive the trampling upon a reflection
as if fearless is childish; and they are not capable of generating any conceptual construction whatsoever that is conditioned by biases. [For such an individual,] no perturbation occurs.

Similarly, it is because of realizing and, in the end, assimilating very basic equality of all phenomena according to the Great Perfection approach [460432] that awareness remains thus undeluded by the influence of appearance, is incapable of generating conceptual construction, is unbiased and remains unmoved and unexerted. On this view, the consummation of realization [of phenomena] as illusory is realizing or consummating the indivisibility of the two truths.433

That is, when confronted with the same false appearance, there is a wide degree of cognitive, emotional, and behavioral responses, and all of them are structured by the content of the subject’s philosophical stance. This is to be contrasted with the state of Great Perfection, which, qualified by the view of equality, ‘does away with [any requirement for any and] all manner of spiritual practices.’

The tantric orientations mentioned in the metaphor each share in a similar mode of realizing the two truths. Though they each recognize the appearance of

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432 NTh 73.06; Th 137.06; BM 67.06.  
433 The Approach: dper na chu'i nang na sbrul nag po'i gzugs brnyan snang ba la | kha cig gis ni sbrul nyid du mthong ste srgag nas spong bar byed do || de bzhin du sdiag bsgal gyi gnis kyi chos ruams gyu ma lta bu yin yang | nyan thos ruams kyi dang por mthong ste spong bar byed do || kha cig gis ni gzugs brnyan du shes kyang reg na myes pa yod par mthon nas sman sten to || bde bzhin du pha rol du phyin pa'i tshul ni | kiu rdozob sbyu ma lta bu yin yang | bya ba byed nus pa'i yod par lta bas | shes bya la ye shes bskyed pa dang snyan rje chen po'i sman sten par byed do || kha cig gis ni gzugs brnyan du shes pas reg kyang mi gnod par rtags kyang | nyam nga bas rang gis bag yangs su spyoed ni ni nus || bde bzhin du bya ba dang rnal 'byor phyi pa'i tshul gyis | dman pa'i spyoed pa dang rdzas ruams la skyon myed par rtags kyang | rang gis bag yangs su spyoed ni ni nus || lta la dbus ba dang | brtl zhugs kyi spyoed pa dang | dangs grub kyi rdzas la stsoqs spar ni spyoed nus so || kha cig gis ni reg na skyon myed par yang shes reg kyang nus la | nyam nga ba de nyid myur du myed par bya ba'i phyir | ched du rdzi ba'i brtl zhugs spyoed do || de bzhin du rnal 'byor nang ba'i tshul kyi chos mniam pa nyid myur du nyams su lon par byaba'i gnya' non du || chos la dge sdig myed pa dang zas la gisng sme myed pa'i brtl zhugs ched du dang du blangs ste spyoed do || kha cig gis ni gzugs brnyan gyi mthshan nyid la phyin ci ma lgog pa'i blo dang ldan pas spyoed pa de dag thams cd byis pa'i spyoed par mthong ste 'di ldar dangs su spong ba la stsoqs pa ghan lta zhog gi || gzugs brnyan gicg la dpa' dpa' ldar rdzi ba de nyid kyang byis pa'i blo can du mthong gzh || blang ba'am dor ba'am de'i rkyen kyi sngon par 'du byed pa'i blo dang yangskyed mi nus shing | g.yo rtsol mi 'byung ngo || de bzhin du rdzogs pa chen po'i tshul [460] gyis chos thams cd sgyu ma lta bur shin du 'go mniam pa nyid du rtags shing mthar phyi par khong du chud pas || de bas na snang ba'i dbang gis blo mi rmongs shing sngon par 'du byed pa skyed mi nus shing || mi len mi 'dor mi g.yo mi rtsol lo || de lta sgyu ma lta bu mthar phyi par rtags pa 'di ni | bzen pa gnyis dbyer myed par rtags pa'ang mthar phyin par grub pa yin no || (RZSB 1.459.05-460.05). I would like to express my gratitude to my friend, the Venerable Sean Price, for his help in rendering this passage.
the snake for what it is, some are “incapable of just letting-go, so they practice offering to deities, austerities, and use substances that pertain to spiritual accomplishment, and so on.” Similarly, others are driven to trample on the false appearance to induce the ignorant into action. These references do not function to denigrate such tantric practices – the perception of a snake may indeed be quite terrifying, and that is not something to make fun of. Rather, they describe the way in which the theories and attitudes that structure our religious life may become distractions from the goal.

ON THE CONTENT & MEANING OF THE BLACK SNAKE METAPHOR

The black snake metaphor given in The Approach is abbreviated version of a more elaborate metaphor found in an essay entitled “Black Snake” that is included in the Miscellanea (gsung thor bu) found in Rongzom’s Collected Works. This essay begins in terms drawn from the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra as follows:

Given the variety among theories and practices in the higher and lower vehicles, it should be recognized that, in short, they posit their various views in dependence upon these appearances of bodies and environments as objects of physical, verbal, and mental experience. Nevertheless, the question of whether or not they appear is in fact acceptable to people

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434 See RZSB 2.66.02-69.14.
holding to various textual traditions. That there is no dispute [among Mahāyānists] about the fact people enter the path and move through the tenth bodhisattva ground is due to the fact there is no distortion given in direct perception. For that reason, our disputes center around the reality of appearance. In short, there are five types of [attitude,] which I will describe here by example. Take, for example, the image of a black snake’s appearance in water…

A detailed comparison of the passage in The Approach and the essay in Rongzom’s Miscellanea goes beyond my scope here. An important point seen in the essay, however, draws the connection between theorizing (lta ba), real entities (rdzas), and bias (blang dor) – three elements anathema to Great Perfection – with respect to all doctrinal orientations, except Great Perfection, in which, qualified by the view of equality, no real entity is entertained. The essay also parses the concept of the indivisibility of the two truths in stages according to the philosophical stance of the subject. Yogācāris, for example, attain a competent mental integration of the two truths (bden pa gnyis dbyer med pa’i bsam pa bring du thob). The Madhyamaka stance attains realization of the illusory but still engages in bias vis-à-vis hypostatization of the two truths. The Great Perfection is an approach that has nothing to do with any theory (lta ba thams cad dang bral ba’i… tshul). Rongzom’s “black snake” essay concludes with words that sound very much inspired by the rhetoric of the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika and squarely place Rongzom’s rhetorical strategy in the same camp as Candrakīrti:

In case someone were to ask, ‘Just how is it your [Great Perfection] tradition is established?’ [We respond:] We simply overturn your bad
views such that nothing further of significance is suggested – and that is labeled ‘the great view of conventional equality’ in which there is not the slightest fixation on appearance.\(^ {437} \)

Such a philosophical practice is very similar to the so-called ‘consequentialist’ or ‘apagoric method’ \(\text{prasāṅgāpādana : thal ba bsgrub pa}\) advanced by Candrakīrti in the first chapter of his commentary on Nāgārjuna’s \(\text{Mūlamadhyamakakārikā}\), the \(\text{Prasannapadā}\). There he describes the philosophical practice of the so-called Prāsaṅgika or ‘Proponent of Consequences’ who use \textit{reductio ad absurdam} argumentation in order to draw out the absurdities in a philosophical opponent’s theory without suggesting anything that could be construed as one’s own theory as a consequence. Candrakīrti writes:

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\text{The method by which we adduce the absurdity of a given thesis consists simply in the negation of an opponent’s thesis. It is not the case that [in negating another’s position that we are suggesting] that the opposite would be the case. Therefore, the master Nāgārjuna has, for the most part, rejected an opponent’s thesis by drawing out undesired consequences [of it].} \tag{438}
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The aim of the third chapter of \textit{The Approach} is, ostensibly, to differentiate the Great Perfection’s unique \textit{idiom, nomenclature, or language game} – its way of talking and thinking and acting on the Buddhist project – from the other vehicles that retain their own discourse illusion. In this context, the example of the black snake distills the practical and experiential effects of one’s understanding of the

\(^{437}\) STh: \text{yang dris pa} \text{ ’o na khyed cag gi gzung ji lta bu zhiig sgrub ce na} \text{ kho cag ni khyed cag gi lta bu ngan pa bslog pa tsam ste} \text{ lhaq par don ci yang mi sgrub bo} \text{ de la tha snyad du mnyam pa chen po’i lta bu zhes ‘dogs te} \text{ lta bar zhen pa ni yang yang med do} \text{ RZSB 2.69.10-69.14)}.

\(^{438}\) Cf. \text{tataśca parapratijñāpratīṣedhamārāphalavatprasaṅgāpādanasya nāstī prasaṅgaviparītārthāpattih} \text{ de’i phyir thal ba bsgrub pa ni phyi rol pa’i dam bca’ ‘gog pa tsam gyi ’bras bu can yin pa’i phyir thal ba las bslog pa’i don du ’byur ba yod pa ma yin no} \text{ For the Sanskrit, see de la Valée Poussin, Louis. Mūlamadhyamakakārikās (Mādhyaṃkāsūtras) de Nāgārūna Avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti. BIBLIOTECA BUDDHICA IV (Germany: Froff \& Co, 1970), 24. The Tibetan is found in sLob dpon zLa ba drags pa. Dbu ma rtsa ba’i ’grel pa tshig gsal ba (New Delhi: Indraprastha Pres, 2011), 18.13-18.15.
two truths and shows how the philosophical stance of the lower vehicles structures their experience of the subject such that she becomes distracted from the goal. For these reasons it is worth exploring further.

**ON THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK SNAKE METAPHOR**

I want to touch on two points connected with the historical significance of the black snake example. For our purposes, Rongzom’s metaphor presents, first, an opportunity for an interesting comparison with passages given in the *Guhyagarbha-tantra* and the two extant Indian commentaries on this tantra. The first of these commentaries, the late eighth century tantric commentary called the *Guhyagarbha-mahā-tantra-rāja-ṭīkā*, is attributed to Līlavajra, also known as Lilāsavajra (Tibetan: sGeg pa’i rdo rje). The second commentary, entitled *Śrī-guhyagarbha-tattva-nirṇaya-vyākhyāna-ṭīkā*, is attributed the Indian figure Sūryprabhāsaṃśaṃha (Tibetan: Nyi ‘od seng ge). The second point I want to make in connection with the black snake example exploits an opportunity to explore Rongzom’s place in the intellectual history of the Old School.

**GUHYAGARBHA TANTRA, ṬĪKA, & THE BLACK SNAKE METAPHOR**

On the first point, let us turn to the root tantra of Guhyagarbha. Chapter 439

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six of the tantra describes, among other things, the way in which the varieties of worldly appearance, which are illusory, accord with the specific predilections of individuals and groups of sentient beings based on their view of reality, which constitutes their philosophical stance in the world. According to the Guhyagarbha-tantra, in a section explicating the way in which these kāya or buddha-bodies are revealed to be illusions or magical projections (ston nyid sgyu ma mig yor tshul), it is stated that buddhas appear variously to trainees of the three vehicles. This variation in appearance is connected with karmic obscurations that project confusions that ‘appear in’ or ‘upon’ a pure buddha-body that has emanated into the world for the benefit of beings. That is, when a sentient being sees a pure appearance such as an emanated ‘buddha-body’ called a kāya, her karmic predilections project on or upon that buddha-body, resulting in ‘obscuration.’ In the dynamics of this process, the resultant variation in the appearance of an emanated buddha-body teaching the dharma is not a variation in the percept, the kāya, but in the karmic inheritance of the perceiving subject. This is said to be not unlike the way a face is reflected on, upon, or in a mirror:

This kāya of the supreme mahāmudrā, although never wavering from basic space just as it is, is the totally liberated rupakāya. In order to tame individual beings, a variety of kāyas appear according to their needs. The way these are revealed is as magical or miragelike [ston nyid mig yor tshul], while the nature itself does not waver from the space of phenomena. While never wavering- when these varieties appear, the various different aspects arise similar to the individual [classes]. Although never departing from the essential nature, they [i.e., the nirmāṇakāyas] appear individually by the power of karma. For example, like a mirror or the moon in water.

At that time, to all six classes of beings, they fully manifest in forms to purify negativity. For all monastic practitioners, they manifest in the forms of foe destroyers; for all solitary realizers, in the manner of [being alone like a] rhinoceros. Furthermore, among these traditions according to the stages of the supreme vehicle: in the supreme place of the
unsurpassed Akanīṣthha, the kāya abides in the manner of Vairochana. To the entire assembly of bodhisattvas, he does not teach through speech like [the nirmanakāya does]. Through the kāya, the entire doctrine is revealed and understood. Like the way [one's face] is reflected in a mirror, imperfections become apparent and are removed. When the retinue gazes upon the kāya, their unfathomable obstructions to awakening appear upon the kāya like in a mirror. Then the stains of the ten grounds will be gradually removed; and perfectly pure, unsurpassed awakening will be attained.441

Even pure phenomenon such as a buddha-body of emanation apparently varies due to the ideas and attitudes of those who perceive that kāya. What we wish to note in comparing these passages is the basic structure they share. Rongzom’s view, which is suggested in the Guhyagarbha-tantra and Vilasāvajra’s commentary on it, is that ideas and attitudes structure perceptions of the real. In the black snake metaphor, however, the basis of perceptions is not a pure phenomenon like a kāya, but rather the appearance of a image in water. In the example given in the root tantra, the exemplar, a kāya or ‘buddha-body’ is perceived differently by adherents to different theoretical doctrines. Not unlike moons reflected in water or a faces reflected in the mirror, when ‘buddha-bodies

441 This passage from the root Guhyagarbha-tantra is translated here by a poet and scholar (mkhan pa) of the Old School, Lama Chönam, and the highly regarded Old School translator, Sangye Khandro. See Anonymous. The Guhyagarbha Tantra: Secret Essence Definitive Nature just As It Is. Translated by Lama Chönam and Sangye Khandro (New York: Snow Lion, 2011), p. 57. The corresponding Tibetan passage is given in Toh. 0832: Dpal gsang ba’i snying po de kha na nyid rnam par nges pa (Śrī-guhyaagarbha-tattva-niścaya) in bKa’ gur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rying rgyud, kha, vol. 102 (Beijing: Krong go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): 1 sku yi phyag rgya che mchog ni 1 de bzhin dbhyings las ma g.yos kyang 11 yang dag bhar pa’i [301] gugs sku dang 11 ’gro ba ma lus ’dul ba’i phyir 1 mthun byas sku ni sna tshogs ston 11 ston nyid sgyu ma mig yor tshul 11 tshul nyid dbhyings las g.yos pa med 11 ma g.yos bzhin du sna tshogs pa’i 11 de tshe mi mthun sna tshogs la 11 so so ’dra bar snang ba ni 11 de bzhin nyid kyis ma bcos kyang 11 las ’phro’i dbang gis so sor snang 11 dper na me long chu zla bzhin 11 de tshe ’dro drug thams cad la 11 dag spong gugs su rnam par bstan 11 dge tshul rnam la dgra bcom gugs 11 rang rgyal rnam la bse ru’i gugs 11 gzhana yang theg mchog rim pa bzhin 11 og min bla med gnas mchog tu 11 sku ni rnam par snang mdzad tshul 11 byang chub sems dpa’i ’khor rnam la 11 de bzhin gsang mchog mi smra ste 1 sku yi schos rnam sngan bar ston 11 me long bstan pa’i tshul bzhin du 11 dngos kyi mchod ngan thams cad sel 11 ’khor gyis de bzhin sku bblas na 11 byang chub sgrib pa gting dpag med 11 me long bzhin du sku la snang 11 de nas sa bcu rim gyis ’byang 11 bla med byang chub yang dag ’thob 1 (300.20-301.13). My thanks to this impressive translation team for permission to quote their work.
of emanation’ or nirmāṇakāya appear in the world and teach, perception of variation in variable forms indicates a variation in the ground of their reception, be it the surface of a mirror or water or mind of the trainee rather than in the source of it, i.e. ultimate reality (dharmakāya)

THE BLACK SNAKE & KLONG CHEN PA, & DOCTRINES OF PURE APPEARANCE

In Rongzom’s example of the black snake the difference lies in the putative nature of the exemplar. Unlike the exemplar here, a supreme emanation body that is traditionally described as a result of a bodhisattva’s accumulation of merit and wisdom, Rongzom posits a false appearance as the example: a causally produced but delusive or impure basis of comparison: an image of a snake reflected (‘appearing’) in water. Thus, Rongzom is, in some sense, purposely inverting the example found in the root tantra. Rongzom’s black snake is meant to suggest that just as beings’ karma manifests as appearance that projects onto the buddha-body of emanation causing that kāya to appear variously for the benefit of the correspondingly diverse sentient beings – a trope which accounts for, among other things, the continuity, validity, and authority of conflicting doctrinal orientations – the ideas, theories, and attitudes that one adopts along any of the variety of Buddhist doctrinal paths structures the perceptions, emotions, and behaviors that occur there. The black snake works to delineate the way the teaching of the illusory impacts trainees in the lower vehicles. It shows an increasing arc of epistemological refinement from Śrāvaka to a practitioner of tantra, structured by philosophical activity, that charts a decreasing obsession with or fixation on appearance in the approaching face of Great Perfection, in
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awareness remains undeluded by the influence of appearance, is incapable of generating conceptual construction, is unbiased and remains unmoved and unexerted.\textsuperscript{442}

One reason the inversion in Rongzom’s example – i.e. the causally produced impure and delusive phenomenon rather than the pure kāya – is useful is because it drives home Rongzom’s view, stated in his Establishing Appearances as Divine, that

All phenomenal appearance [even so-called pure appearance] is mental appearance. That being the case, everything pure and the impure result relies on a mental cause. Thus, all pure and impure objects of experience are mental effects generated through karmic imprints (vāsanā: bag chags) and therefore both are in fact genuine.\textsuperscript{443}

I don’t want to say this is the only reason Rongzom changes the metaphor.

However, such a view of equality (samatā: mnyam pa nyid) seems to drive, in part, Rongzom’s inversion of the example from the root tantra of Guhyagarbha. This is suggested by Lilāsavajra’s commentary on this passage in the Guhyagarbha in the exegetical treatise known in Tibetan by the name sPar khab or Rin chen spar khab. There, Lilāsavajra discusses this passage in a section rubric purporting to explain the way in which these kāya or buddha-bodies are taught to be illusion or reflected images (ston nyid sgyu ma mig yor tshul). On this view, all appearance in one’s own mental continuum is confused; and the example of a

\textsuperscript{442} The Approach: de bzhin du rdzogs pa chen po ’i tshul [460] gyschos thams cad sgyu ma lta bur shin du ’go mnyam pa nyid du rtags shing mthar phyi par khong du chud pas | de bas na snang ba ’i dbang gis blo mi rmongs shing mgon par ’du byed pa skyped mi nus shing | mi len mi ’dor mi g.yo mi rtsol lo | (RZSB 1.459.22-460.)

\textsuperscript{443} sNang ba lhār grub pa: snang ba ’i chos thams cad ni sens nyid kyis rnam par snang ba ste | de bas na sens kyis rgyu la lhos nas ’bras bu dag pa dang ma dag pa thams cad skye ba ’grub par byed pa yin pas | de ’i phyir dag pa ’i sphyod yul dang ma dag pa ’i sphyod yul thams cad bag chags kyis bskyed pa ’i sens kyis ’bras bu yin pas gnijis ga yang mtshan nyid par grub pa yin no | (RZSB 1.561.16-561.20); cf. Köppel 2008: 98, 116-117.
mirror is described as the method by which negative appearance is eliminated.

Then, if someone were to ask just what then is nature itself (ngo bo nyid), it is the vajrakāya, which, being undifferentiated into the two truths because of simply being the basic space of mind, is taught here never to waiver from the basic space of phenomenon. Nevertheless, since that nature itself appears variously, when its varieties appear, they appear to accord with specific [circumstances]. Though these [specific appearances] are not structured or composed of suchness per se, they manifest specifically due to karma. Everything that is effortlessly spontaneously present is the manifest enlightened buddha-body; and its progression as something appearing in accordance [with specific circumstance] is simply ‘karma.’

Take, for example, an image of a moon in water or in a mirror. Like the manner of a reflection (bzhin) in a mirror, all appearance is unwavering. That the image [in a mirror] does not go into the mirror in order to appear, and that it does not leave or exit the mirror when it does not, is indicated through the example of a moon reflected in water. All the various appearances [of buddhas teaching] manifest in terms of the rejection of negativity; for the ordained [i.e. Śrāvakas], [the emanation buddha-body or nirmānakāya] appears in the form of a Foe Destroyer [arhat : sgra bcom pa]. For the Pratyeka-buddhas, they appear in the form of the rhinoceros way. These words [which are from the Guhyagarbha-tantra] are easy to understand.

Furthermore, according to ‘the progression of the supreme vehicle’ [i.e. the Mahāyāna], in the practice of people who are devoted, [the buddha teaching] appears as an actual emanated body of a buddha [nirmānakāya]. For practitioners of Kriyayoga and others, the specific teachers in fact appear as suchness. In the supreme unsurpassed abode of Akaniṣṭa, the buddha-body is in the form of Vairocana. For the entire retinue of bodhisattvas [there], ‘the preaching is not given in spoken words [as if given by a nirmānakāya in the human realm]. It is through encountering the buddha-body that the whole of the dharma is demonstrated.’ Here, the buddha-body of enjoyment in Greater Akaniṣṭa does not teach through speaking like the emanated Tathāgata [in the human realm]. ‘According to some, the nirmānakāyas appears to teach with his eyes open. To others, these buddha-bodies teach with their eyes closed; and to some, the hand is extended out while for others it is drawn-in; for some, the buddha-bodies teach [327] with a consort while for others

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there is none.’ So it is said. It is the approach that teaches [via the example of a reflection in a] mirror that eliminates all apparent negativity.\footnote{Otani 4718: rGyud kyi rgyal po chen po dpal gsang ba'i snying po'i 'grel pa (Šrī-guhyā-garbha-mahā-tantra-raja-tīkā-nāma) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1999, rgyud, zu, vol. 43 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): 'o na ngo bo nyid ji lta bu zhe na | tshul nyid dbyings las g.yos pa med ces gsungs te | [326] dpe' de nyid kyi phyir sna tshogs su snang ba nyid na sens kyi dbyings nyid kхо na bas bden pa gnyis su mi phyed pas rdo rje'i sku'o || 'o na ngo bo nyid med sna tshogs su snang bas rtSol bas b yas so bar dogs pa la | ma g.yos bzhin du sna tshogs pa || de tshe mi mthun sna tshogs la || so so 'dra bar snang ba ni || de bzhin nyid kyi's ma bcos kyang || las 'phro dbang gis so sor snang || zhes gsungs te || thams cad brtsal bar lhun gyis grub pa ni || mngon par byang chub pa'i sky ste || de yang rim pa mthun par snang ba ni las kho na'o zhes bya'o || dper na me long chu zla bzhin zhes bya ba ni || de dag ma g.yos par kun tu snang ba ni me long dang bzhin gyi tshul lo || 'gro 'ong med par khyab pa ni chu zla'i dphes ston to zhes bya ba'o || de tshe mi mthun thams cad la || sdig spong gsungs su rnam par snang || dge tshul rnam la dra bcom gzung || rang rgyal rnam la bse’ ru tshul || zhes bya ba ni go sla'o || gzhlan yang theg mchog rim pa bzhin || zhes bya ba ni || nos pas sbyod pa la sprul pa'i sku nyid do || kri ya la sogs pa so so'i ston pa rnam kyang de bzhin nyid du snang ngo || 'og min bla md gnas mchog tu || sku ni rnam par snang mdzad tshul || byang chub sms dpai' khor rnam la || de bzhin gsung mchog mi smra ste || sku'i chos rnam 'jal bar ston zhes bya ba ni || 'og min chen po longs sbyod kyi sku ni sprul pa'i de bzhin gshogs pa ltar tshig gi gsung gis mi ston te || gzhlan dag las || de bzhin gshogs pa la la ni sphyen phyu bas chos ston to || la la ni btsums pas ston to || la la phyag bkyab bstan to || la la ni bskam pas ston to || la la btsun mo dang bcas pas ston to || la la ni btsun mo med [327] pas ston to zhes 'byung ba lta bu'o || zhes bya'o || me long bstan pa'i tshul bzhin du || dngos kyi mdog ngan thams cad sel || 325.20-326.02.}

Thus, inasmuch as the example of a mirror image or moon image reflected in water are used to eliminate negative appearance, Rongzom’s inversion – the appearance of a black snake image in water – might be seen as a means for eliminating any notion of pure appearance. If that is the case, we perhaps have a glimpse here of what Gentry describes as contrasting "formulations of gnosis as [either] intrinsically perfected within the formation of the psychophysical organism [- i.e. real], or as an epiphenomenon of mind created through meditative cultivation’ [- i.e. something that is, on Rongzom’s view, imagined].

This bifurcation concerns the status of such pure gnostic visionary phenomena as buddha-bodies. Are they causally produced and karmic phenomena? or are they ontologically prior and real. The tension between these two positions, Gentry writes, “exists in marked tension throughout Old School tantric exegetical
According to Gentry, kLong chen pa’s view concerning “the non-imaginary quality of tantric visualization exercises” is suggested in his own famed commentary on the Guhyagarbha-tantra, which states:

given that bodhicitta as open awareness (rig pa byang chub kyi sems), without basic or fundamental nature from the beginning, is not an ideational object, the totality of the feminine vajra nature and masculine Samantabhadra is not something conceptualized. That is to say, since the ineffable non-dual basic space of open clear awareness and emptiness pertains to the source of all gnosis which is beyond reckoning, it is the totality of masculine and feminine qua Samantabhadra.

Elsewhere, kLong chen pa quite simply writes: “since the three [buddha-bodies] are [always] present in their entirety as natural attributes, they need not to be sought elsewhere.” That is to say, in the case of whether or not so-called pure phenomena constitute what is real from time immemorial or are imagined and occur through the force of, for example, karmic causality, kLong chen pa and Rongzom appear to differ. For Rongzom, “all pure and impure objects of experience are mental effects generated through karmic imprints” while for kLong chen pa, pure phenomena are ontologically prior to karmic imprints (bag chags) – they constitute the real – and become manifest in the absence of karmic

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imprints. Both maintain that buddhahood entails the absence of karmic imprints. Where they differ is in kLong chen pa’s assertion of the presence of appearances nonetheless.

If described in Lindbeck’s doctrinal terms, we might say that while kLong chen pa appears to emphasize the sui generis nature of religious experience and an cognitivist and experiential-expressivist view of pure phenomena, Rongzom appears to emphasize socially constructed elements that suggest a cultural-linguistic model of interpretation is best suited to clarify the nature of Rongzom’s ‘doctrine’; best suited, it seems, for recognizing just how Rongzom intends The Approach to be used. For kLong chen pa, the content of pure visionary experience is ontologically prior – i.e. more real – than karmic experience, which is causally constructed and described within a socio-linguistic matrix within the human realm. Thus, the modes of explication surrounding that pure visionary experience are, for kLong chen pa, not simply “expressive symbolizations of experience.” They correlate, in some ineluctably factual manner, with the absolute reality of pure phenomena.

With Rongzom, however, it appears that even pure visionary phenomena, such as the kāyas and so on, are the product of karma. We again note the significant degree to which Rongzom maintains that the content of one’s perceptions – the percept itself – is always structured by one’s perspective or philosophical stance. The ideas one insists upon (‘dod) invoke and inform the structure of any given epistemological event in awareness. In Great Perfection, it is the absence of biases (blang dor) structures the possibility of gnosis.

Interestingly, while Great Perfection ostensibly eschews any bias in perception, its practitioners are capable of perceiving bias in some way. Echoing Rongzom and Lilásavajra’s commentary, the commentary attributed to Suryaprabhā[s]imhā reports that “practitioners of Mahāyāna Atiyoga (theg pa chen po a ti yo ga pas) look upon the rejection of objects apprehended by the Śrāvakas and the others to be a flaw.”

THE BLACK SNAKE IN OLD SCHOOL INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

A second point to be made in connection with the black snake example concerns Rongzom’s place in the intellectual history of the Old School. As mentioned above, the Guhyagarbha-tantra is a Mahāyoga tantra of considerable importance for the Old School tradition – for the Great Perfection, in particular. Old School exegeses of the Guhyagarbha-tantra are sometimes traditionally divided into one of two categories. In one camp, there are those that interpret the tantra in terms of Mahāyoga tantra; and in another, are those that interpret it in terms of ‘the highest yoga’ (atiyoga) Great Perfection. The fact of two camps does not necessarily entail that the interpretations of each camp are mutually incompatible. In fact, traditionally, they are seen to be resolvable within a single view. It is this second camp that is traditionally connected with Rongzom (and

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452 See Tôh. 0832: Dpal gsang ba’i snying po de kho na nyid rnam par nges pa (Śrī-guhyagarbha-tattvaniścaya) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rying rgyud, kha, vol. 102 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang), 287-349.

that other luminary of the Old School, kLong chen rab ‘byams pa). In his sPyi don ‘od gsal snying po, Ju Mi Pham writes:

The exegetical techniques through which this tantra has been studied comprise two great traditional paths, namely the exegetical method which is extensive and common, and the expository method which is profound and uncommon. The former refers to the wondrous tradition of the transmitted precepts of the glorious Zur family who were kings among all the holders of gnostic mantras, and is explained in accordance with Mahāyoga’s own textual tradition. The second refers to the unsurpassed tradition of the two lions of speech - Rongzom Paṇḍita Chokyi Zangpo and Longchen Rabjampa. Because this tantra is classified as the Ati (highest) subdivision of Mahāyoga, it is essentially identical to the Mahā-subdivision of Atiyoga, among the three classes of the Great Perfection... These two exegetical methods are of a single savour [ekarasa : ro gcig].

According to Gyurme Dorje, the first method is found in treatises given in the Old School’s ancient lineages transmitted person-to-person over the centuries called the ‘distant lineage of continuous transmission’ (ring brgyud bka’ ma). In this ‘continually transmitted’ cycle of teachings, which can be understood in contrast to cycles and objects called revealed ‘treasure’ (gter ma), we find the Guhyagarbha commentary of Vilāsavajra. The second interpretative method found in Guhyagarbha exegesis is exemplified by the commentaries of Sūryaprabhāśīma, Padmasambhava, Rongzom, kLong chen rab ‘byams pa, and Ju Mi Pham himself.

Old School exegeses are also traditionally divided in terms of whether or not they emphasize the empty aspect (stong cha) of reality in their explications or the simple primordial purity (spros bral ka dag) associated with the appearance aspect (snang cha), which is often described as luminously pure and spontaneously present (rang bzhin ‘od gsal lhun grub). For our purposes we may

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454 Loc cit. 123-124.
455 Loc cit.
draw on de la Valeé Poussin’s terms and say that while the latter emphasizes the “negative-intellectual” domain, the former emphasizes the “positive-mystical” in exegesis.456 According to Dorji Wangchuk, “the ‘negative-intellectualist’ current emphasizes the aspects of emptiness (stong pa’i cha), whereas the ‘positive-mystical’ emphasizes its aspect of luminosity (gsal ba’i cha)” (2004: 193).

“Luminosity,” here, simply refers to the appearance of pure reality. According to Dil mgo mkhyen brtse’s Zil gnon dgongs gsal, the empty aspect correlates with ‘primordial purity’ (ka dag), which itself pertains to freedom from extremes of conceptual elaboration – i.e. the fact that phenomena have never been anything but empty of inherent existence. The appearing aspect, moreover, correlates with the spontaneously present gnosis and buddha-bodies that are indicative of buddha-nature.457 Indeed, while de la Valeé Poussin’s terminology provides a useful etic criteria, emic discourse usually relies upon two traditional interpretative frameworks: the empty aspect and the apparent aspect.

This division in hermeneutical emphasis is found, for example, in the “detailed explanation of the unsurpassed ground” (bla na med pa’i gzhi bye brag tu bshad pa) given in kLong chen pa’s Theg pa’i mchog rin po che’i mdzod, where distinctions in the ground are given in terms of exegetical emphasis. Typically, an explanation of ultimate reality in Great Perfection may choose to emphasize an isolated factor of empty essence (ngo bo stong cha’i ldog pa) – i.e. the idea of a mere absence of intrinsic ontology and so-called negative phenomena – in contrast to an isolated factor of apparent nature (rang bzhin snang cha’i ldog pa) – a

457 Wangchuk 2004: 176-177 n. 16.
spontaneously present reality, which is a pure positive phenomena. While kLong chen pa’s own exegetical rubrics demonstrate his awareness of the tendency of emphasizing one aspect – either empty or apparent – over the other, he is understood in traditional Old School exegesis to emphasize the latter. In his Ocean of Eloquent Transmission, an explanation of the difficult points of the Abhisamayālāṃkāra attributed to Maitreya, Ra mgo mchog sprul (fl. 20th century) neatly locates each of the Old School’s three “archetypical intellectual figures” – Rongzom, kLong chen pa, and Ju Mipham – in terms of their respective emphasis on the negative-intellectual and the positive-mystical, with Mipham playing the role of synthesizer. He writes:

In general, the essence of the buddha ground is explained in detail vis-à-vis buddha-bodies and gnosis in presentations of the path of no more learning. In terms of exegetical method, primarily, the critical points of the simple essence of primordial purity are described by Rongzom Chokyi Zangpo, the critical points of naturally luminous spontaneous presence are explained by the All-knowing Great One [kLong chen pa], and the integration of the critical points of the interpretations of those two into a single [explanatory strategy] by Mipham Jamyang.

Thus, according to the Old School tradition, Rongzom is taken as a figure whose commentary on Great Perfection emphasizes the empty aspect, kLong chen pa as a figure whose commentary emphasizes the apparent aspect, and Ju Mipham’s interpretation is taken to be the synthesis of the two. We have seen that kLong

460 Lung gi rgya mtsho: 376.04-376.06: spyir sangs rgyas sa yi ngo bo mi slob lam gyi rnam bzhag sku dang ye shes sogs bye brag tu bshad pa’o \( \text{dang po la} \) rlo|ng zom chos kyi bzang pos ngo bo spros bral ka dag gi gnad bshad pa dang \( \text{kun mkhyen chen pos rang bzhin 'od gsal lhun grub kyi gnad bshad pa dang mi pham 'jam pa'i dbyangs kyis de gnyis kyi dgongs gnad phyogs gcig tu dril le 'chad tshul lo} \). See TBRC W21912: Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gi dka’ 'grel legs bshad lung gi rgya mtsho (Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1997).
chen pa holds that pure phenomenon constitute the real, they are radiant and spontaneously present – prior to delusive appearance altogether. Indeed, kLong chen pa’s assessment of buddha-nature is “quite positive” (Wangchuk 2004: 182). We should note, as well, that in his example of the black snake, Rongzom’s emphasis is quite clearly on the positive-mystical aspect of appearance rather than on the negative intellectual aspect of emptiness, with which he is traditionally associated.

WHY THE CHANGE IN THE METAPHOR

One question to be addressed is this: even if I am correct and Rongzom’s black snake is based on the mirror image example given in Guhyagarbha, we are still left with the question of why Rongzom in fact changed the metaphor from the image of a face in a mirror to the image of a black snake in water? That is, why did he not just use the same example given in the tantra? Here, I would like to speculate about a possible connection with New School traditions of tantra. Rongzom was obviously familiar with literature associated with, for example, the Kālacakra-tantra, as evidenced by his allusion to the Sekkoddeśa (dBang m dor bstan pa).

Kālacakra, for its part, represents not only the pinnacle of South Asian Buddhist civilization, it may be considered the hallmark of the New School esotericism in the Tibetan Buddhist world – a prestige still enjoyed today. According to Tayé, among the Kālacakra’s complex of practices called the ‘six limbs of yoga’ (sbyor ba yan lag drug) – the yogas of withdrawal (pratyāhāra : so sor sdud pa), meditative absorption (dhyāna : bsam gtan), control of the breath (prāṇayāma : srog rtsol), retention (dhāraṇa : ‘dzin pa), subsequent application
(anusmṛti : rjes su dran pa), and contemplation (samādhi : ting nge ‘dzin) – one of the signs of success in meditation connected with ‘withdrawal’ (pratyāhāra) is the manifestation of a pure appearance in the form of a black line of shimmering light that appears against a blue field or within ‘a blue sphere’ (thig le sngon po).

According to Vesna Wallace’s description of yogic practice in the Kālacakra, the black line image is associated with the limb of ‘meditative stabilization’ (dhhyāna).

During the initial practice of the yoga of meditative stabilization, the ten signs, which appeared earlier during the retraction phase, spontaneously reappear. During the daytime yoga, the tantric yogi gazes at the cloudless sky either during the morning or afternoon, with his back turned to the sun, until a shining, black line appears in the center of the drop. Within the central nadi, the body of the Buddha, which is the entire three worlds, appears. It looks clear like the sun in water, and it has all aspects and colors. It is identified as one’s own mind that is free of the sense-objects and not as someone else’s mind, because it lacks knowledge of other beings’ minds. Thus, in the six-phased yoga, one first perceives the appearance of one’s own mind with the physical eye (māṁsa-caksu) of the Buddha, and at the culmination of the yoga, one perceives the minds of others with the divine eye of the Buddha.461

According to Khedrup Norsang Gyatso the trainee should “look each day until, in the center of the [blue] drop, a ‘black line’ the width of a hair ‘emitting rays of stainless light’” is seen in the central channel. This ‘black line’ (re kha nag po) appears against an azure field.462 For this reader, such an image (gzugs brnyan) – a shimmering black line in a sea of blue – may suggest a curious connection to Rongzom’s example of the appearance of a black snake. Is it possible that Rongzom, through his black snake example, is implicitly referencing the black

line described as a sign of meditative success given in *Kalacakra-tantra*. Such appearances as this shimmering black line in a sea of blue are considered pure appearances. They are “empty images… simply appearances or reflections of the innate mind of luminous clarity (*gnyug ma ’od gsal gyi sems*) which is like a limpid sky; they are not fabricated by the mind but appear by themselves to the yogin.”

Thus, according to New School exegesis, the image of a black line shimmering in a blue field is not a mental fabrication at all. It stands as a pure appearance indicating a profound yogic attainment. For Rongzom, however, any image is basically equal to an illusion, mirage, an emanation and so on. While an exhaustive analysis would need to be made in conjunction with the *sBrul nag po* essay found in Rongzom’s *Miscellaneous Works* (*gsung thor bu*), here I can only suggest the possibility of an interesting comparison, the outcome of which must await another day.

**ON THE INDIVISIBILITY OF THE TWO TRUTHS**

According to Rongzom’s black snake example, only the approach of the Great Perfection totally avoids deviation from the path in order to realize and, in the end, assimilate

> the very basic equality of all phenomena according to the Great Perfection… [and thus] awareness remains thus undeluded by the influence of appearance, is incapable of generating conceptual construction, is unbiased and remains unmoved and unexerted. This, the perfect realization of the illusory in this manner penetrates or consummates [the realization of] the indivisibility of the two truths.\(^{464}\)

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\(^{464}\) *The Approach: de bzhin du rdzogs pa chen po’i tshul* [460] *gyischos thams cad syu ma lla bur shin du ’go mnyam pa nyid du rtags shing mthar phyin par khong du chud pas | de bas na snang ba’i dbang gis blo mi rmongs shing mgon par ’du byed pa skyed mi nus shing | mi len mi ’dor mi g.yo mi rtsol lo*
Surely, Wangchuk is correct in stating that “‘the indivisibility of the two truths’ is obviously equated by Roñ-zom-pa with” buddha-nature.\textsuperscript{465} In his \textit{Miscellaneous Writings}, Rongzom states:

In the approach in which the two truths are indivisible or indistinguishable, and even in which the truth is asserted to be dual, whatever is itself the utterly pure basic space of phenomena (\textit{dharmadhātuviśuddhi}: \textit{chos kyi dbyings rnam par dag pa}) should be taken to pertain to the \textit{Sugatagarbha},\textsuperscript{466} which constitutes the nature of all phenomena.\textsuperscript{467}

Wangchuk also writes that, for Rongzom, the indivisibility or indistinguishability of two truths is “the actual \textit{nītārtha} [“definitive meaning”] of the special Mahāyāna.” That is, “the actual ‘definitive meaning’ of the special Mahāyāna” is that the indivisibility of the two truths is the critical hermeneutic criterion for an interpreter of “special” Mahāyāna doctrine. In the passage cited from \textit{The Approach}, however, the reference to the indivisibility of the two truths is not explicitly concerned with buddha-nature,\textsuperscript{468} but with the perfection of the view of equality within one’s thinking and, consequently, one’s experience.

The teaching that all phenomena are illusory, as \textit{The Approach} has already said, is one broadly accepted in Buddhist theory. On Rongzom’s view, however,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{de Itar sgyu ma lta bu mthar phyir par rtogs pa ’di ni \| bden pa gnyis dbyer myed par rtogs pa’ang mthar phyin par grub pa yin no \|} (RZSB 1.459.24-460.05).
\item Cf. Wangchuk 2004: 202 n. 100.
\item \textit{gSung thor bu: \| de bas na bden pa gnyis dbyer med pa’i tshul dang \| bden pa gnyis su ‘dod pa’i tshul gnyis kyang \| chos kyi dbyings rnam par dag pa gang yin pa de nyi \| de bzhin gsheg pa’i snying po chos thams cad kyi rang bzhin yin par gzung dgos so \|} (RZSB 2.30.05-30.07).
\item Certainly the concept buddha-nature is related to themes of conventional and absolute, particularly in the context of the positive-mysticalist strain of discourse on the absolute nature of human being; and, inasmuch as the idea of buddha-nature structures the concept of a conventional person’s ultimate nature, this reference does indeed concern buddha-nature; I only mean to point out here that it is not explicitly thematized in the passage cited.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
illusion refers to more than a questionable ontological status. The idea of illusion in The Approach suggests that a fundamental equality obtains between everything that does and does not exist, the real and unreal. On this view, the illusionary nature of dreams, mirages, even “emanations,” a word intimately linked with the pure appearances associated with an enlightened buddha’s appearance in the samsaric world, are rendered fundamentally equal in some significant sense.469 Here, awareness of ontological illusion is less about empty ontological status of a thing or the generation of gnosis as an antidote to fixation on it than it is about a gnostike technē – ‘an epistemic technology’ or ‘art of knowing’470 – in which the stance precludes any possibility for antidotal epistemic instruments such as Insight altogether. The conditions for possibility of such an awareness of equality is structured by the absence of any such remedy or fixation.

As a critical hermeneutical and doctrinal concept in Rongzom, the indivisibility or indistinguishability of the two truths does not evince ontological distinctions that differentiate, for example, a mirage 2,600 years ago (unreal) from, say, the Buddha’s emanation-body 2,600 years ago (real); and the phrase should be read not so much as a cognitive or propositionalist doctrine making the assertion that a vase and the emptiness that qualifies it are indistinguishable.471 A better understanding of the phrase as a doctrine in Rongzom, rather, would be as a regulative or rule-based theory; a rule of

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469 As stated above, Rongzom contrasts such an attitude with the view of the view of the illusion found, for example, in the Prajñāpāramitā text tradition, where an antidote – gnosis – is prescribed to overcome the ignorance that fixates on the ontologically illusionary nature of reality.

470 The phrase, gnostike technē, which is reported to be the earliest occurrence of the Greek term Gnostikos, occurs in Plato’s Politica (258e-267a), where it is opposed with pratike. On the history of the term gnosis, see Smith, M. 1981. ”The History of the Term Gnostikos,” in The Rediscovery of Gnosticism (proceedings of the International Conference on Gnosticism at Yale), ed. B. Layton Leiden, vol. 2, pp. 796-807.

471 If that were the case, one would expect that anyone who knows a vase also simultaneously knows its ultimate nature.
association and inflection that rhetorically and conceptually structures and authorizes a set of Great Perfection inferences and sensibilities. The process, in part, consists in shifting the register of the Buddhist idea of the illusory in such a way as to make it an ends rather than a means to spiritual realization – i.e. the basis upon which one generates gnosis as antidotal insight. The Tibetan phrase ‘indivisibility of the two truths’ (bden gnyis dbyer med) at least calls into question any real distinction that might be asserted to obtain between conventional and ultimate reality. It may also evoke both the ontological and the epistemological. The phrase certainly signals a key hermeneutical indicator for Rongzom’s distinctive criteria for definitive Buddhist discourse. Put another way, the phrase also seems to work as a concept which may integrate the negative-intellectualist and positive-mysticalist dimensions of Rongzom’s discourse. In the black snake example, the perfect stance toward appearance is taken by one who has recognized that the two truths are indistinguishable – one for whom emotional and epistemological obsession with objects is ‘childish.’ Such a person is not marked by the various reactions that characterize the approach of the smaller vehicles.

Taking up the language of Dharmakīrti, Rongzom states that this critical Great Perfection discourse – the indivisibility of the two truths – is not something understood simply through insisting that a subject (dharma : chos) and its predicate (dharmin : chos can) are identical.472 The Madhyamaka view, he writes,
does not count as a non-dualistic view that penetrates the indivisibility of the
two truths because, according to Rongzom, Mādhyaamikas are fixated upon the
discursive scheme of the two truths. At this point, Rongzom engages an
epistemological model not unlike that set forth by Dignāga and his
contemporaries, which posits that “outer and inner things may be established”
through two types of authoritative knowledge: direct perception (pratyakṣa :
mngon sum) and inference (anumāna : rjes dpag). Rongzom’s own nomenclature,
however, uses the term non-observation (mi dmigs pa) rather than inference
(anumāna : rjes dpag).

ON THE NATURE OF LOGIC & HOW DIFFERENT THINGS
ARE BASICALLY THE SAME

Rongzom turns in § 3.2 to the second issue of chapter three of The Approach. The
interlocutor questions Rongzom’s insistence upon the primacy of appearance
and his notion of the illusory. Is Rongzom really equating what is totally
imagined with what is not? If so, how can what is causally produced be basically
the same (‘go mnyams pa) as what is totally imagined? If no actual basis is
established in relation to a given illusion, the interlocutor says, what, exactly, is
established as equal to what in this discourse?

In Rongzom’s response (§ 3.2.1), he begins to broadly characterize the
philosophical project. He begins by stating that the basic indication (mtshan gzhi)
of both the real and the imagined is appearance as-such. “All philosophical
theories,” he writes, “from the non-Buddhist extremists up through the
perspective of the Great Perfection - all the various theories take the character

Katsumi Mimaki. Blo gsal grub mtba’: chapitres IX (Vaibhāśika) et XI (Yogācāra) et chapitre XII
(Mādhyamika) (Zinbun Kagaku Kenkyusyo, Université de Kyoto, 1982), pp. 248-249.
[of] appearance as their basis such that what is disputed between them concerns what pertains to the character of appearance is and how it exists. This describes the folly of the philosopher, who imagines that his use of formal logical procedures validly establishes his own position as flawless while determining any opponent’s position to be flawed.

What pertains to the character of appearance would be established as true; its existence would be established as an objective basis. When a given appearance is made to be repudiated [as] totally imagined by another, it is negated as non-existent and something that does not [in fact] pertain. Through non-implicative negation, only what is the totally imagined is repudiated. Through implicative negation, some characteristic one asserts to qualify an appearance are validated. Here, the four procedures [that] negate and establish are simply mentioned; they will be explained below. In this way, using to the four procedures [that] negate and establish, others' philosophical positions are repudiated and one's own is established.

In this interesting meta-discourse on philosophy, rationality, and logical negation from a variety of doctrinal standpoints, a discussion in which all subject matter is qualified on the basis of appearances, Rongzom describes the intellectual dynamics of several philosophical projects. In each, the philosopher heirarchizes an entire horizon of views through a procedure that privileges her own theory.
while denying those of others. There are four types of conceptual procedure in which one engages in such an project of negation and establishment. In such a procedure, the outcome is predicably and biased:

others' philosophical positions are repudiated and one's own is established. Yet all theories are indistinguishable insofar as they consistently assert that causes and conditions give rise to effects that are established through direct perception and non-observation [i.e. inference], from which [one's assertion about] the actual existence [of a given appearance] and [how it] actually pertains is established and the similar assertions of others regarding what is actual are disputed as non-existent and not pertaining, such that they are established as being totally imaginary. Inasmuch the entire horizon of theories are hierarchically validated in this manner, first all one's own views are established to be actual; those [held] by others are established to be totally imaginary. When hierarchically established in that manner, eventually whatever is one's own point is the only one that is deemed actual, a real point that does not arrive at anything leftover [and unaccounted for].

All theories take phenomenal appearance as their basis; and the ultimately unreal status of phenomena encompasses even the mechanisms of logic through which one investigates religious truths, rejects an alien tradition, and accepts the

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479 *dgag sgrub ‘di bzhi’i tshul* (461.07-461.08).

480 One is reminded here of Nagarjuna: *sangs rgyas lam la brten nas ni \( \text{\textasciitilde} \) kun la mi rtag smra ba rtams pa mchog gzung bas\( \text{\textasciitilde} \) gnas pa yang rin de mdag do (Yuktisa\text{\textasciitilde}ntha 41); and Candrak\text{\textasciitilde}rti: *rang gi lta la chags dang de gzhan du \( \text{\textasciitilde} \) gzhan gyi lta la ‘khrug gang rtog pa nyid \( \text{\textasciitilde} \) de’i phyir dod chags khong khro rnam bsal te \( \text{\textasciitilde} \) rnam dpod pa na nyur du grol bar ’gyur (Madhyamak\text{\textasciitilde}vatara 6.119; cf. La Val\text{\textasciitilde}e Pousin 1907: 232.11-12, 232.16-17).

481 *lta ba mthon dman* (461.12-461.13); admittedly, my rendering loses the verticality trope (see Covill 1999: 215-241) but retains the spatial dimension of the metaphor, albeit horizontally.

482 *mtshan nyid pa* (461.13-461.14). Cf. STMG 494.01.

483 *mi rnyed* (461.16); cf. Ati\text{\textasciitilde}sa’s Satyaavayuvat\text{\textasciitilde}ra: kun rdzob ji ltar snang ba ’di \( \text{\textasciitilde} \) rigs pas brtags na ’ga’ mi rnyed \( \text{\textasciitilde} \) ma rnyed pa nyid don dam yin \( \text{\textasciitilde} \) yas nas gnas pa’i chos nyid do (Almogi 2009: 348 n. 16).

484 The Approach: *dgag sgrub ‘di bzhi’i tshul gyis gzhan gyi grub mtha’ ’ggegs shing rang gi grub mtha’ sgrub pa na \( \text{\textasciitilde} \) lta ba thams cad kyang byes brag rnyed par rgyu dang rkyen las ’bras bs byung bar ’dod pa dang \( \text{\textasciitilde} \) mgon sum dang mi dmigs pas grub par ’dod par mthun pa las \( \text{\textasciitilde} \) gang zhiig gi mtsnang nyis par yod pa dang yin par bsgrubs pa de \( \text{\textasciitilde} \) gzhan dag gis de lta bu ’i mtsnang nyid du rnyed pa dang ma yin par bkag ste \( \text{\textasciitilde} \) kun du brtags pa yin par sgrub bo \( \text{\textasciitilde} \) ’di gzhan du lta ba mthon dman rim par sgrub par byed pa na \( \text{\textasciitilde} \) dang po rang rang gi lta ba thams cad mtsnang nyid pa yin par sgrub bo \( \text{\textasciitilde} \) de gzhan dang gzhan gyis kun du brtags pa yin par sgrub bo \( \text{\textasciitilde} \) de gzhan du rim par grub pa na mthar don gang rang gi mtsnang nyid pa kho na yin te \( \text{\textasciitilde} \) kun du brtags pa ma yin pa’i don lhag ma lus pa’ang mi rnyed do \( \text{\textasciitilde} \) (RZSB 1.461.07-461.16).
home tradition. Thus, for those who do not recognize the view of equality from the illusory nature of phenomena, the philosophical project mainly consists in unconsciously arranging and describing what are theoretical prejudices. On this point, Wangchuk notes: "The philosophical debate [for Rongzom] is about whether there is anything behind the facade of ‘appearance’ and if so what. In other words, the philosophical debate is about the ‘being’ (yin pa) and ‘existence’ (yod pa) of the ‘characteristics’ of ‘appearance’" (2004: 198 n. 97). Thus, logical precision and rationality are obviously present in Rongzom’s own theories; yet he recognizes their shortcomings and describes them through his meta-discourse, which delineates the scope of any putatively logical and epistemological account.

At the end of Chapter Four, in which Rongzom presents some important facets of the logical and grammatical sciences, he states that his skepticism with regard to rationality as a totalizing epistemic instrument does not mean he rejects rationality outright. What we see, rather, is a figure who recognizes that Buddhist soteriology is not reducible to a logically and grammatically precise doctrine. As we shall see in Chapter Five, at the final stage of Buddhist training, there is need for intimate advice that is not associated with scripture, transmission, or formal public discourse of any kind. Each requires a particular push, as it were, out of the samsaric nest. Rongzom position on the matter is obviously practical; he obviously recognizes the value of rational inquiry and carves a significant niche for it along the path. After his interlocutor asks: "if your point is that all reasoning is corrupt (dri ma can), how is it you possess some distinct uncorrupt reason [that explains all this]?" In response, Rongzom writes that while all reasoning is, in the end, flawed, this does not mean that this
reasoning is never better than that reasoning. In fact, Rongzom embraces rationality even while recognizing its limits. He writes in response:

We485 do not [in fact] say there is an incorrupt reasoning. Nevertheless, because there are greater and lesser degrees of corruption, those reasonings of little corruption are capable of refuting those of greater corruption. If there were one incorrupt [system of] reason that handled [everything] knowable, what is the reason the Jinas, do lay out just that [system of reason] in all vacana from the very start? Regardless, none of this should suggest reliance on reason to be unhelpful. For example, the first glance and the first step do not complete the distance a person might intend to travel; yet it is not the case these are not to be relied upon.486

Discussion then turns to other doctrinal orientations. The treatment here appears to follow what is found in Rongzom’s commentary on Padmasambhava’s Man ngag lta phreng: (§3.2.1.1) non-buddhist extremists (tīrthika: mu stegs pa), (§3.2.1.2) Śrāvakas, (§3.2.1.3) Yogācārins, (§3.2.1.4) Mādhyamikas, and (§3.2.1.5) Guhyamantrins. In each section, Rongzom shows how proponents of each view use logic and reasoning to declare their view the only true view. Progressing through an ascending scale of subtlety, Rongzom’s aim is to delimit the boundaries of logical and philosophical precision of a variety of increasingly subtle realizations of the view of equality.

In §3.2.1.1, we find a description of the five types of uncaused agent given in Hindu discourse – Mahābrahma,487 Vaśavartideva,488 the eternal self,489

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485 kho bo cag (491.02) : tāvāvām (Chandra 2001: 80c).
486 The Approach: kho bo cag ni rigs pa dri ma myed pa yod par mi smra ste \ ’on kyang dri ma che chung gi bya brag yod pas ching bas che ba sun ’byin par nus so \ rigs pa dri ma myed pa geig gis shes bua’i mthar phyin par byed pa zhiig yod na \ rgyal ba rnamkys bka’ thams cad du de nyid thog mar ci’i phyir mi bstan te \ de il’ang ma yin \ rigs pa la rien cing phan mi ’dogs pa’ang ma yin te \ dper na skyes bu lam ring bor ’gro bar ’dod na \ mig rgyang dang po dang gom pa dang pos mthar phyin pa’ang ma yin \ de la ma rien par yang ma yin \ (RZSB 1.491.02-491.08).
487 tshangs pa chen po (461.17-461.18): mahābrahma. Re this deity, see RZSB 1.310-311. This is a term used in Abhidharma cosmology; cf. Martin 1987 and the Brahmajala-sutta (DN 1.1-46), which is cited in Rongzom’s Man ngag lta pheng gi ’grel pa at 1.312.01.
488 dbang sgyur gyi lha rtag (461.18). Cf. Man ngag lta phreng gi ’grel pa: gzhansyang kha cig gis gzhans ’phrul dbang byed kyi gnas na \ lha’i rgyal po dbang sgyur \ ’dod pa’i longs spyod pa thams cad la rang
eternal nature, and eternal minute particles – descriptions of non-Buddhist metempsychosis. In another nod to the spiritual accomplishment of non-Buddhists, Rongzom refers to non-Buddhist spiritual realization in terms of “what is observed through yogic direct perception” (rnal ’byor gyi mngon sum gyis dmigs). The section ends with a passage very similar to that found in the Brahmajala-sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya. This text is already of interest to scholars of Great Perfection thanks to an article by Dan Martin, who has drawn associations between the Guhyagarbha and the Brahmajala and the Kun byed rgyal po, a text traditionally considered “the fundamental tantra of the Great Perfection, particularly of its semdē or ‘mind-series’ (sems sde) literature.

In the Brahmajala, we find the Buddha explaining, among other things, the process by which a deluded sentient being comes to maintain the identity of a creator deity via cosmology. After a period of cosmic contraction, in which all beings are mostly reborn in the Ābhassara (Sanskrit: ābhāsvara) heaven of the form realm (rūpadhātu : gzugs khams), “they dwell, mind-made, feeding on

gis’phrul mi dgos par | gzhan kyis’phrul pa thams cad la dbang byed par mthong la | dbang sgyur gyi lha’chi’ ba yang ma mthong bas | gzhi’ de las dbang sgyur gyi lha rtag go zhes lla ba ’byung ste | de yang mngon sum dang mi dmigs pa la rien pa’o (RZSB 1.311.07-311.12). “In his lTa phreng ‘grel pa... Rong-zom-pa refers once again to this ‘sovereign king of gods’ and identifies his abode as Paranimitavāsavartin (gzhan’phrul dbang byed), which is the sixth and highest field in the Kāmadhātu” (Almogi 2009: 278 n. 4).

490 rang bzhin rtag (461.08).
491 rdul phra rab rtag (461.18). Cf. man ngag lta phreng gi ’grel ba: nu stegs can rtag par smra ba rnams kyi gzhung ni rnam pa lnga ste | tshangs pa’ chen po’ rtag pa dang | dbang sgyur gyi lha rtag pa’ dang | dag rtag pa dang rang bzhin rtag pa dang | rdul phra mo rtag pa | (RZSB 1.310.05-310.07).

493 This text is the subject of extended dicussion in chapter six. On this text, see Norbu, Chogyal Namkhai, and Andriano Clemente. The Supreme Source: The Fundamental Tantra Of Dzogchen Semde Kunjed Gyalpo (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion, 1999), 9.
494 manomayā. While this term refers here to divine beings who are not produced through sexual activity, in the first verse of the Dhammapada, we find the declamer: all phenomena are mental in nature (manopubbangama dhamma : chos rnams yid kyi rang bzhin te). On the Pali term, see Walshe’s
delight, self-luminous, moving through the air, glorious – and they stay like that a long time.” Then the cosmos begins to expand again; and, having exhausted her karmic merits, a person falls from the Ābhassara world into our world, albeit from a celestial position from which to look down upon terrestrial abode.

Becoming self-conscious, the first being becomes lonely and yearns. This wish coincidentally coincides with ongoing process of expansion that brings new beings to this world. The first being not only believes he is Mahābrahmā who has willed the other beings into existence, the newly born beings believe it, too, because they accept the fact that he was there first to indicate his identity as a divine creator. After the Brahmajala inspired passage, Rongzom describes these non-Buddhists and their philosophical orientation.

Their divine eyes see in that way. After that, when a end point is considered, given that distinct sentient beings are seen to die, this world too is seen as perishable; but at that point, Mahābrahma is perceived as remaining, undying - and there is no perception of a time after that. Like this, given that establishment pertains to observation through yogic direct perception and non-observation [i.e. inference] through yogic direct perception, [and] given these, too, appear as things that are causes and effects that are themselves established by direct perception and non-

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497 phyi ma’i mṛtha’ (462.16) : aparānta (Mvp 8307). The Tibetan is generally defined as a point of termination in the future (ma ’ongs pa’i zad mtshams TDCM 1744b).

498 rnal ’byor gyi mngon sum (462.08).
observation [i.e. inference], this is a view in which things exist just in the manner in which they appear.499

Rongzom is keen to show that appearance is the basis of the non-Buddhist tīrthika’s view. Their view, like the Prāmāṇika followers of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, makes claims to validity because it is modeled the epistemological model of direct perception and inference. From non-Buddhists, Rongzom moves to a school connected with the Śrāvakas (§3.2.1.2), an offshoot of the Sārvāstivādas called the Vātsīputrīya school. The term Vātsīputrīya500 refers to one of the eighteen traditional schools of “‘mainstream’ (i.e. non-Mahāyāna) Buddhism, which takes its name from its leader” (PDB 963 s.v.). This school is known for its philosophical assertion of an inexpressible (avācyate, avyākṛta : brjod du med pa) self. For this Buddhist school, “sentient beings exist in an inexpressible [relation] to the aggregates, similar to water and water-spirits” (naga : klu). The inexpressibility described here consists in a relation between the self and the aggregates – they are related somehow. In the case of water-spirits, their self is somehow both of the water as well as in it; and that somehowness is something not particularly amenable to predicative description. Such a analogy calls into question the nature of the aggregates as a whole: in what way, exactly, do they

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499 This reasoning is spelled out in Rongzom’s Man ngag lta phreng gi ’grel pa: de la dbang phyug rgyur smra ba rams mngon sum dang mi dmigs pas ji ltdar bsgrub ce na | dang po’ jig rten chags pa’i dus su | tshangs chen gyi gnas grub pa na \ tshangs pa chen po ’byung bar’ gyur te | tshangs pa chend po de’i ’dod pa’i dbang gis blon po dang zham ’bring du gyurd pa | ’dun na’ don dang tshangs ’khor la stogs pa skyed cing ’phrul par ’dod pa’i bsam pa skyes pa dang mthun par \ tshangs pa ’dun na’ don dang | tshangs ’khor la stogs pa’i gnas dang sens can chags shing byung bar gyurd te | gzhi de las | sugar ni mi dmigs la | khos bskyed cing sprul pas ni de lta’ bur mngon sum du grub pa dang | sens can rams kyi las [312] kyi dbang las skye ba ni ma dmigs pas \ tshangs chen ni lta ba’i gnas chen pa’ gyur te | de ltdar na’ ’di’ yang mngon sum dang mi dmigs pa la rten pa yin no | de nas gzan yang de’i rig byed skyod par gyurd pa | phyi rol gyi dge’ slong dag gis | bsam gtan gyi ting nge’ ’dzin dang mngon par shes pa thob ste | ’di’ yang mngon sum dang mi dmigs pa’ la rten pa yin no (RZSB 1.310.17-311.07). Again, this recalls the Brahmajala-sutta; see Martin 2007. Compare with RZSB 1.311.12-311.24.

500 Pali: vajjiputtakā, vajjiputtiyā, Tibetan: gnas ma’i bu pa.
relate to the self? Yet this Buddhist school utterly rejects the non-Buddhist notion of eternal causes by way of a negation that does not suggest, connote or confirm anything else in lieu of the explicit object of negation (prasajyapratishedha: med dgag). Their inexpressible self is inferred through a negation that is implicative—that is, the logical form of the negation functions to suggest, implicate, or connote something in lieu of the explicitly negated object. The point is to show that each perspective uses direct perception and non-observation to engage the mechanisms of proof and refutation in order to establish as valid their own view while rationally (i.e. validly) rejecting the views of others. For Rongzom, all theory, except the logic of his Great Perfection, is ineluctably mired in bias. Thus, except for the view of equality that is the consummation and perfection of the view that all phenomena are illusory—and the Great Perfection way—knowledge is rendered relative. For example, he writes: “What is established through the yogic direct perception and non-observation of non-Buddhist extremists, in being perceived in that way, is devoid of error even though there are others who do not perceive such.”

ON RONGZOM’S CONCERN FOR PERNICIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL INFLUENCES

In one of the most striking comments that is repeated through several works by Rongzom, we find expression of particular frustration with theories influenced by the Kashmiri Vaibhāšikas on the one side and the Central or dbus pa Vaibhāšika on the other. The Vaibhāšika school has been described as

501 The Approach: \mystegs can kyi rnal ’byor gyi mngon sum dang mi dmigs pas grub pa de ni de ltar mthong ba la ni phyin ci log myed mod kyi \ de la ma dmigs pa zhan zhig yod de \ (RZSB 463.16-463.18).
“ontologically promiscuous.” As I’ve noted several times above, van der Kuijp (1983: 63-64) has already identified the famed logician, Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109-1169), as an exponent of “quasi-Vaibhāṣika theories.” An example offered is Phya pa’s theory of apprehended objects (grāhyavṛtiya : gzung yul), which specifies a three-fold ontology of specifically characterized phenomena (rang mtshan), a concept universal (samānyārthe : don spyi), and lucidly appearing non-existent (med pa gsal snang). Such a theory was seen by Sa skya pa philosophers, starting with Sa skya Paṇḍita (1182-1251) himself, and strict proponents of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika’s epistemology to be nothing but “reifications or hypostasizations of cognitive processes.” For these reasons, we suggest a possible link between Rongzom’s criticism of Kashmiri-Vaibhāṣika influenced object theories may be connected with doctrines that were systematically developed by Phya pa – or perhaps with gSang phu ne’u thog, itself.

As to Rongzom’s concerns about the Central (dbus pa) Vaibhāṣika, this may be connected to the work of Candrakīrti, which was gaining popularity in the eleventh century and over the next three hundred years was to become an increasingly influential lens through which to interpret Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka discourse. Though little is known about Candrakīrti’s life, it is widely reported in Tibetan sources that the man was a South Indian who rose to become a long-serving abbot of Nalanda, the famed Buddhist monastic university (mahāvihāra). It is perhaps no coincidence that Nalanda University is located in Madhyaprades/Magadha – Tibetan: ‘central’ (dbus pa).

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503 Cf. Dung dkar tshig mdzod chen mo: na lendra yi dgon pa’i mghan po yun ring du mdzad de | (1815 s.v. zla ba grags pa).
By the twelfth century, there was already the suggestion that Candrakīrti’s approach was too close to that of the Central Vaibhāṣikas of Madhyapraδeś/Magadha. As to the substance of the connection, it will not be settled here. Suffice to say, the intimation was enough to cause some philosophers in Tibet to assert the existence of a school of a Madhyamaka called “those middle-way proponents whose approach accords with the Vaibhāṣika.” It seems not much is known about this type of Madhyamaka except that it appears some were converts to the Middle Way from the Vaibhāṣika view (i.e. classical Buddhist philosophy or abhidharma). In fact, proponents of Candrakīrti’s interpretation felt the need to reject the supposed connection between his theories and those of the Vaibhāṣika; for his part, rTsong kha pa (1357-1419) takes the time to reject the idea that Candrakīrti is influenced by the Vaibhāṣika as “totally unreasonable.” Obviously, this issue requires further, more detailed research. Yet the fact that Candrakīrti’s view was identified with the Vaibhāṣikas in

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504 For example, mChad kha’ba’i grub mtha’ ye shes rdo rje (1101-1175) writes in his eponymous doxography, mChad kha’ba’i grub mtha’; dbu ma bas kyang de dag ni ci rigs par bzhead kyang rjes su mi bzhad na | blook dpon zla ba grags pas ni dbus ba brag smra ba dang mthun par gsungs so 1. See bKa’ gdamgs gsung ’bum phyogs bsgrigs (dPal brtsegs bod yig dpe snying zhib ‘jug khang nas bsgrigs. Vol. 11), p. 240.01.

505 See, for example, in his rGyud kyi mngon par rtogs pa rin po che’i ljong shing, a text found in Sa skya pa’i bka’ ’bum, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1968), that Grags pa rgyal mtshan divides the Madhyamaka into the set concerned with what is known in the world (jig rten grags sde pa), those in concert with the Vaibhāṣika (brag smra ba dang tshul mthungs pa), proponents of illusion – cf. mitopam (sgyu ma pa), followers of the discourses (mde sde spyod pa) and practitioners of yoga (rnal ’byor spyod pa’i dbu ma pa). See Vose, Kevin A. Resurrecting Candrakīrti: Disputes in the Tibetan Creation of Prāsaṅgika (Wisdom Publications, 2009), 199 n. 113. My thanks to Karen Lang for this reference.

506 Nor brang o rgyan. Bod sil bu’i byung ba brjod pa shel dkar phreng ba (Lhasa: Bod ljongs mi dmangs dpe skung khang): bya brag smra ba dang tshul mthungs pa’i dbu ma pa ni | ’grel byed ’di yin gsal bar mi snang yang | thog mar brag tu smra ba’i grub mtha’ la gnas pa phyiis dbu ma la zhugs pa’i tshes | de dang tshul mthungs par ’dod pa nges par dgos te (447).

507 Lam rim chen mo: on kyang bloo dpon zla ba grags pa ni tha snyad du phyi rol yod par bzhead kyang grub mtha’ smra ba gzhan dang sgo mi bstun pas nyo sde spyod pa zhes byar mi rung la | de bzhin du brag tu smra ba dang mthun par ’dod pa’ang shin tu ni rigs so 1 (573.05-573.08).
Madagha (dbus pa bye brag smra ba) provides an interesting possibility for the object of Rongzom’s criticism.

Rongzom then explains the process of negation and proof by which the Yogācārin treats the Śrāvaka (§ 3.2.1.3). Again, though the emphasis is on showing the nature of the Yogācāra school’s philosophical use of the same basic mechanisms of proof and negation to establish the supremacy of its own theoretical view, Rongzom does go into some detail to describe the general philosophical stance of several schools of Yogācāra interpretation. He maintains, contrary to the traditional presentation of the Yogācārin doctrine of the three types of natures – the imagined (parikalpita : kun brtags), the dependent (paratantra : gzhan dbang), and the perfected (parinispannya : yongs su grub pa) – that all three natures are in fact imagined and thus unreal.

In § 3.2.1.4 Rongzom describes the Madhyamaka school in uncontroversial terms. Guhyamantra is treated in § 3.2.1.5 as a paramount theoretical system, where, “there is no ultimate thing [suggested and] conventions are just appearances to the confused mind.” Thus, “all appearances are consistent.” For that reason, “no proof is needed because appearance is the basic criteria upon which the various characteristics [of phenomena] are posited.” Mere appearance is consistent with respect to the particular karma of individuals. Therefore, Rongzom states, it does not seem to be posited as something real. Nonetheless, for practitioners of secret mantra (guhyamantra) with even the slightest conceptual activity, appearances do not pertain to the view of equality. Thus, even this paramount theoretical stance falls short of the consummation and perfection of the view of equality that qualifies the conventional designation,

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508 rtog pa cung zad rtas pa rnams (466.06).
‘view of the Great Perfection,’ which is also called "the great view of the timeless release" (lta ba ye btang chen po).

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This section has many interesting details and facets, including its epistemological tenor, that cannot be treated in detail here. In one comment that strikes several interesting notes, Rongzom sums up the underlying concept of his notion of the philosophical project: all philosophical systems or positions (siddhānta : grub mtha’) – Great Perfection does not to qualify – are qualified by appearance. That is, appearance is the basis upon which reality, its characteristics and nature (lakṣaṇa : mtshan nyid) are supposed. Thus, Rongzom concludes,

for skilled panditas, foolish women, elephant herders and everyone in between, outer and inner things that appear generated through causes and conditions, and these distinctions between appearances capable and incapable of performing functions are in fact possible in the context of mere appearance.

Philosophy in the lamentable sense, on this view, entails fixation on appearance that unavoidably structures its discourse around bias and an ineluctable ascension to the existence of real entities.

ON A VISCERAL METAPHOR

An additional point of interest is found in another striking metaphor. It occurs in a discussion of why secret mantra (guhyamantra) is secret, Rongzom’s interlocutor asks why the Buddha did not simply teach the Great Perfection view form the very beginning of his teaching career. In response, Rongzom writes that

509 mkhas pa paṇṭi ta (465.20).
510 klun mo (465.20-465.21)
511 ba glang rdzi (465.21).
the tantric teaching is not only difficult, but dangerous. In the hands of immature trainees, this most secret teaching leads to negative consequences. Tantra pertains to the domain of experience of those with vast and extensive discriminating awareness and conviction because if it were taught to those persons troubled by pride and afflictive emotions, it would be no different from those postulating a nihilism, the continua of migrators would be wasted, and all positive effort would be reversed. In deference to that fact, it not something that is to be taught to all and it is difficult to realize - therefore, it is called the system of secret mantra (sangs sngags : guhyamantra).”

The example that Rongzom evokes compares a progression of philosophical views with the stages of the overwhelming fear and anxiety of somebody being swept away in a roaring river. Here, I cite the passage in full:

Take for example a person who, carried away by water, searches for solid ground. Having grabbed a the tip of a branch of a tree that has fallen in the water, she thinks, "since this branch is not steady, I can't rely on it!" She quickly lets it go and clutches at a piece of the root gradually pulling herself closer and closer to the base of the root and thinks, "I've got dry land!" [But] with an unsound or diseased root (rtsa ba drungs byung), the water carries her away and the segment of the root itself sinks into the water while she searches. Upon seeing the tip of [another] root protruding from the river bank, she would once again make for that direction thinking, "before, the part of the root I thought stable was in fact a sinking weight. Part of the tip of the branch that I thought was unstable can support and save [me]. Now, I will break it up into something useful. I will lean on the branch pieces, breaking up the branches; some can be relied on; some act as shelter in the face of the wind; some act as an anchor against the wind; and some can be made into paddles - so I can get out of here!" Then, having acted on that, she is as if someone freed from the water (chus las thar pa de bzhin).

Similarly, those who desire the path of liberation, first clutch onto a worldly path. After perceiving it to be something totally imagined, they desire a path accompanied by fruition free of the totally imagined; [one] that is, by its own nature, genuinely qualified as perfected. When they
gradually investigate and search, they see that everything that is correctly imagined is unsound and not real. As for how they traverse the path, if they seize upon "one that is genuine," what need is there to even mention [their predilection for searching something out] that is seized on as ultimate? Grasping at conventionally correct character, in fact, is itself perceived as a sinking weight of bondage; and once the weapon of discriminative awareness severs all the correct theories, only awareness concerning the totally imagined remains [468]. One engaged in [such] skill-in-means is as if there is no bondage: not attached to or dependent upon anything. The accomplishing of whatever is desired by the one engaged in skill-in-means through play and sport just like a bird soaring through space.

According to this metaphor, all realist philosophical views – all views but that of Great Perfection – work in the context of bias and the supposition of a real entity. These views are rotten and without sound basis. Beings fixated upon them often work against their own real interest (i.e. spiritual freedom) and expose themselves to real dangers. In their efforts, they miss the forest of Great Perfection for the trees of philosophy.

ON THE YOGĀCĀRA CONCEPTION OF IDEAS & RONGZOM’S MADHYAMAKA AFFILIATION

§3.3 of The Approach comprises a rich discussion of the nature of conceptual thought and knowledge in an epistemological register atypical of early Great Perfection discourse. It begins the third issue treated in Chapter Three. Here, Rongzom uses the Yogācārin doctrine of conceptuality to explore the nature of ideas, epistemology proper, causality and the semantic scope of several technical terms such as idea or conception (kalpak : rtog pa), imagination (sankalpa : kun du rtog pa), and discursive conception (vikalpa : ram par rtog pa). This treatment leads to a remarkable discussion of epistemic criteria. The entire section demonstrates Rongzom’s knowledge and philosophical subtlety; and the passage leads toward
a description of “remaining in the view of Great Perfection.” This section also adds material to Rongzom’s argument that the philosophical project is, in large order, a precarious configuration of biases valorizing one’s own prejudices. For Rongzom, “whatever is itself presented as something realized by unmistaken awareness is established by someone else as being imputed by mistaken awareness.”\(^{513}\) As long as we are mired in language and concepts, there are certain ‘problems’ that will not resolve.\(^{514}\) Remaining in the Great Perfection view pertains to “the act of simply being divorced from all clinging to theory.”\(^{515}\)

Closing this section, Rongzom describes all doctrinal orientations, from the Śrāvaka through Guhyamantra approach, and what they are able to penetrate along the path according to their view.

It is interesting to note that Rongzom has been identified by Almogi (2009: 16, 228) as a proponent of the non-abiding middle way (apratiṣṭhānamadhyamaka : rab tu mi gnas pa’i dbu ma). This term is a forerunner to the well-known term prāsaṅgika, which entered Tibetan discourse through the work of the translator of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka works, Pa tshab nyi ma grags.\(^{516}\) Almogi writes that Rongzom "was a follower of the branch known as ‘Proponents of all phenomena being non-abiding’ (sarovdharmapratiṣṭhānavāda : chos thams cad rab tu mi gnas pa smra ba), which later came to be equated by some later Tibetans scholars with

\(^{513}\) The Approach: gang _zhig gis phrin ci ma log pa’i blos rtags par bzhag pa de nyid | gzhan gyis phrin ci log gi blos brtags pa yin par sgrub ste | (RZSB 1.472.08-462.10).
\(^{514}\) This point is not unlike one made by Wittgenstein, who wrote: ‘As long as there is a verb ‘to be’ which seems to work like ‘to eat’ and ‘to drink’; as long as there are adjectives like ‘identical’, ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘possible’; as long as people speak of the passage of time and the extent of space, and so on; as long as all this happens people will always run up against the same teasing difficulties and will stare at something which no explanation seems able to remove’. See Klagge and A. Nordmann (eds). Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951 (Hackett: Indianapolis and Cambridge, 1993), 424.
\(^{515}\) Rta bar _’dzin pa thams cad dang bral ba (472.22-472.23). Cf. Karmay (2007: 127), who renders the phrase in terms of the Great Perfection’s view being "objective."
\(^{516}\) Cf. Mimaki pp. 33-35.
Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka" (16). It must be added that scholars in the eleventh century were already making the connection between the two Madhyamaka camps. For example, none other than Pa tshab nyi ma grags (fl. late 11th c.), the figure who introduced the term thal ‘gyur pa : prāsaṅgika into Tibetan philosophical discourse, divided the Madhyamaka along these lines, equating proponents of non-abiding with thal ‘gyur pa or ‘consequentialists’ (prāsaṅgika).517

In his observation that some masters divide the Madhyamaka along these same lines, the bKa’ gdam pa master, mChad kha ba Ye shes rdo rje (1101-1175), uses the term ‘the middle way according to what is well-known in the world’ (lokaprasiddha : jig rten grags) synonymously with ‘non-abiding middle way’ (apraṃśṭhāna : mi gnas pa).518 mKhas pa lDe’u explicitly correlates the apraṃśṭhāna or ‘non-abiding’ view with the view of simplicity (spros bral),519 the Madhyamaka trope par excellence.

As is well-known, in the late fourteenth century, rJe rTsong khan pa (1357-1419) wrote his Lam rim chen mo that the division of Madhyamaka into Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika was the correct categorization. According to rTsong kha pa, who cites the great translator bLo ldan shes rab (1059-1109), the founder

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517 Pa tshab writes: de ‘dra ba’i dbu mar smra ba la \ | \ rang rgyud pa dang thal ‘gyur 2 \ | de la sgyu ma lta bu dang ran tu mi gnas zhes kyang zer \ | (bKa’ gdam gsung ‘bum, vol. 53: 141.03-141.04).

518 bKa’ gdam gsung ‘bum phyogs bsgrigs zhugs so: dbu ma bas de dag bkag nas lo ka na grags tshod do tsam 1 sgyu ma lta bur khas len par slob dpon kha 1 gis gsungs so \ | (dPal brtsegs bod yig dpe snying zhig ‘jug khang nas bsgrigs. Vol. 11: 240.094-240.05). The mKhas pa lde’us mdzad pa’i rgya bod kyi chos ‘byung rgyas pa offers a four-fold typology of non-abiding Madhyamakas and states that the Māyopamāvādins rely on the so-called rang rgyud shar gsum – the Śatyadevavibhanga of Jñānagarbha, the Madhyamakālamkāra of Śāntarakṣita, and the Madhyamakāloka of Kamalaśīla – while the non-abiding apraṃśṭhānavādins rely on Nāgārjuna’s corpus of reasoning. This adds further evidence to the idea that the apraṃśṭhānavāda referred to the ‘prāsaṅgika’ avant la lettre. Re loka: this term acts critically suggesting, as it does, both the physical world and awareness of it; on this context, for example, see Gombrich 2009: 68, citing Samyutta Nikāya 1.62; cf. Gombrich 1996: pp. 93-95.

of Tibet’s first institutional center for the study of logical argumentation, gSang phu ne’u thog in 1073, for support, the division of Madhyamaka into
‘Proponents of the illusory’ (māyopamāvāda : sgyu ma lta bur smra ba) and
‘Proponents of non-abiding’ (āpratiṣṭhānavāda : rab tu mi gnas par smra ba) is little
more than sophistic trick played on the intellectually immature.520 rTsong kha pa’s philosophical nemesis, sTag tshang lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen (1405–77),
however, dismisses rTsong khan pa’s remark outright and also maintained that
Prāsaṅgika-Svātantrika division corresponds directly to Māyopamā-
Āpratiṣṭhāna, respectively.521 Another voice in this discussion is that of Ye shes rgyal mtshan (b. 1395), who, in his fifteenth century commentary on the Theg pa spyi bcings of Kaḥ dam pa bde gshegs (1122-1192), states that among the several
ways in which people organize the Madhyamaka, when it is organized according
to how the ultimate is asserted, there are four divisions in which the view of non-
abiding (rab ti mi gnas pa) is placed higher than consequentialism (thal ‘gyur). In Ye
shes rgyal mtshan’s text, the four divisions correspond to (i) proponents of no
gnosis (ye shes med par smra ba), who utterly deny cognitivity or gnosis of any
type at the level of a buddha, (ii) proponents of the middle way (sgrags sde spyod
pa dbu ma pa) who use worldly confusions as criteria for their view, (iii) the
consequentialist (thal ‘gyur pa) who establishes formal arguments through

520 Lam rim chen mo: don dam ‘dad tshul gyi sgo nas gnyis su bzhag pa ni rmongs pa ngo mtshar skyed pa’i rnam gzhag go zhes lo tsā ba chen po blo Idan shes rab gsung ba ni shin tu legs te \ (mTsho sngon 1985: 572.11-572.12).
521 See Grub mtha’ kun shes nas mtha’ bral sgrub pa zhes in Bod kyi sgrub brygyud ‘dzin pa rnam kyi lta grub kyi legs bshad mthong ba kun grol. Khyu byug, ed. (Chengdu 2011): 1 thal rang gnyis su mkhas la grags shing grub || de nyis rim bzhiin rab tu mi gnas dang || sgyu ma rigs grub pa zhes ‘phags yul gyi || tshad Idan du mas bshad phyir dbye ba de || rmongs pa mtshar skyed yin zhes gsung mi rigs || (178.26-178.28).
reductio ad absurdam arguments (prayogavakya: sbyor ngag),\textsuperscript{522} and (iv) the proponent of a non-abiding middle way (rab ti mi gnas pa’i dbu ma pa) who assert an ultimate that is beyond the predicative nature of language and concepts yet describe it as something perfectly simple (spros bral ba).\textsuperscript{523} In the eighteenth century, the famed historian and translator, lCang ska rol pa rdo (1717-1786) also seemed to have no problem with the nomenclature, partly on the basis of its acceptance in Tibet by a number of scholars and its employment in the work of Atiśa. In support, he cites Šūra (a.k.a. Aśvaghoṣa: rTa dbyangs),\textsuperscript{524} a figure who has already been associated with this organization of the Madhyamaka in India (Ruegg 1981: 59, 120 nn.).

Considering the fact that Rongzom clearly situates the Madhyamaka among the theories that do not resolve a non-dual view free from bias and the supposition of real entities, should Rongzom be considered a Mādhyamika? Does Rongzom state anywhere that he is a Mādhyamika? No. Does Rongzom consider Madhyamaka to fall short due to distortion and bias? Yes. Clearly for Rongzom, the Madhyamaka falls short. We recall from his black snake metaphor that Mādhyamikas indeed realize the ultimate, but hey do not resolve non-


\textsuperscript{523} lTheg pa sbyi bcings rtsa ’grel: de lta bu ni dbu ma’i lta ba la nang tshad mi ’dra ba ’ga’ zhig yod de | ’dir kha cig bzhes zhes pa ni stong nyid don dam du ’dod pa’i dbu ma ’di la ming gi rnams grangs bzhi yod de | sangs rgyas pa’i du su thugs rigs pa’i ye shes med par smra bas | ye shes med smra ba dang | ’jig rt’en drags tshod pa rnams dang ’khrul ba’i ngo la blo mthun pas grags sde sbyod pa’i dbu ma zhes bya’o \| \| sbyor ngag thal ’gyur du bkod pas | thal ’gyur pa dang | mtha’ thug lta ba chos nyid spros bral ba shes brjod gzhal bya’i yul las ’das par ’dod pas rab tu ni gnas pa’i dbu ma dang bzhi’o \|. See Ye shes rgyal mtshan. Dam pa bde snga’ks kyi mdzad pa’i theg dgu’i sbyi bcings kyi ’grel bshad byi ma’i ’od zer zhes bya ba slob dpon Ye shes rgyal mtshan gyis mrdzad pa (Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1997), 254.10-254.18.

\textsuperscript{524} lHun po’i mzhes rgyan: bod kyi mhas pa nga ma daq rab tu mi gnas pa’i dbu ma pa zhes pa’i th snyad kyang gsungs te | slob dpon dpa’ po’i don dam byang chub kyi sogs bsgoms pa’i yi ge las | stong pa nyid sogs rnams grangs sog | sgyu ma la sogs dpe mtha’ yas | theg pa sna tshogs thabs tshul gyis | mi gnas dbu ma nyebar mtshan \| \| zhes gsungs pa la brten par snang zhing jo bo rje’i gsung sgros rnams laskyang tha snyad de ’byung la rje yab sras kyi kyang bkag pa mi snang ngo | in lCang ska ro la’i rdo rje. Grub pa’i mtha’i rnam par bzhag pa thub bstan lhun po’i mrdzes rgyan (mTsho sngon: Krung go bod kyi shes rig dpe skun khang, 1989), 282.22-283.01.
duality as a result of their clinging to the bifurcation of reality given in their model of the two truths.

§ 3.4. is labeled “just some supplementary explanation concerning the differences between [the aforementioned] theories’ respective limitations (tshad) and power” (mthu). In this section Rongzom begins by describing what is rejected and what is attained in connection with the doctrinal orientations of the Śrāvaka, Pratyeka-buddha, the Mahāyāna, broadly (theg pa chen po spyir bsdus nas), and then the Great Perfection. Rongzom omits any divisions of Mahāyāna, including tantra (i.e. secret mantra). Such an iteration seems to suggest again that Great Perfection is not, strictly speaking, a doctrinal orientation. In The Approach, Great Perfection is hermeneutic – a way of reading and interpreting Buddhist (and non-Buddhist) scripture that resolves the view of equality. Here, Rongzom answers the question – at least in part: what is the Great Perfection. §§ 3.4.1-3.4.6 answer this question.

**ON WHAT GREAT PERFECTION IS**

In § 3.4.1, Rongzom states that Great Perfection the very pinnacle of all vehicles (yāna). Just as ‘a pinnacle’ metaphorically represents the culmination or most successful point of something, Great Perfection is, metaphorically, the pinnacle of all vehicles. Vehicles denote conveyance. Great Perfection pertains a state of non-progression and thus is in fact, not a vehicle.

The complete liberation of the Śrāvakas is generated due to causality; and their concentration remains on the level marked by a mental object. The complete liberation of the Pratyeka-buddhas is apart from a verbalized path; and the source of their concentration are inexpressible phenomena. The complete liberation of the Mahāyāna is generated through gnosis that is devoid of discursive conceptions of apprehended and apprehender; and
their concentration engages in the expanse of utterly, totally pure phenomena. In the system of Guhyamantra, when the ‘acquisition of the three-fold diamond-like experience’ emerges, both complete liberation and concentration are indivisible and they all progress and emerge in relation. Here [in the system of Great Perfection], nothing is accomplished in that way because the state of non-progression pertains to the supreme path; and for that reason, it is said to be the highest pinnacle of all vehicles.\footnote{The Approach: | de la nyan thos rnams kyi rnam par grol ba ni | rgyu dang rkyen dang bral ba las skyes pa | ting nge 'dzin ni [474] dmigs pa dang bcas pa'i sa la gnas pa | rang sangs rgyas rnams kyi rnam par grol ba ni | ngag gi lam dang bral ba las skyes pa | ting nge dzin ni brjod du nyed pa'i chos kyi tshul la gnas pa | theg pa chen po'i rnam par grol ba ni | gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'rinam par rtag pa dang bral ba'i ye shes las skyes pa | ting nge 'dzin ni shin tu rnam par dang pa'i chos dbiyings la supod pa | gsangs sngags kyi tshul ni | rnam par grol badang ting nge 'dzin gnyi' ga dbyer nyed pa | todo rje lla bu rnam pa gsum gyi nyanstrne'd pa ces 'byung na | de dag thams cad ni byod cing 'byung ba la llos pa yin la | 'dir de lla bu dang yang mi sgrub ste | byod du nyed pa nyid lam gyi mchog yin pas | de'i phyi na theg pa thams cad kyi yang rise zhes bya'o | (RZSB 1.473,23-474.08).}

This passage presents the relationship between Great Perfection and the traditional vehicles of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, the Bodhisattvayāna and the Guhyamantrayāna. In § 3.4.2 Great Perfection is said to be the lord of all transmissions (āgama). As such, it encompasses and in some sense facilitates all other orientations to the path, which cannot encompass Great Perfection. And in a seemingly polemical observation, Rongzom also clearly states that while Great Perfection cannot be undermined by any other approach, it can in fact disprove (sun 'byin par byed) any other doctrinal orientation – an interesting remark when recalling that Rongzom does not deny Great Perfection is contrary to logic.

The meaning of the term transmission corresponds to [the Sanskrit] term āgama and suggests derivation from something other; it also suggests something fundamental and basic; and it is used to characterize the actual word of the Jina. Yet those kinds of vacana are incapable of revealing the Great Perfection approach, incapable of undermining it, as well - and incapable of surpassing it. Given that the system of the Great Perfection is capable, moreover, of distinctively disclosing each of all the [various] philosophical positions of all the vehicles, it is also capable of disproving all of them. In terms of what surpasses all the vacana, for example, just as the powerful sovereign who has placed a wish-fulfilling jewel at the tip of
Indra’s victory banner is unrivalled and irrepresible, [the Great Perfection] is the lord of all transmissions.\textsuperscript{526}

Just as the stream cannot anticipate its fulfillment in the plenum of the ocean, the constutive streaming paths that flow into the ocean of Great Perfection cannot surpass it. §3.4.3 labels Great Perfection the quintessence of doctrinal discourses \((pravacana)\). After explaining the Sanskrit formation of the word ‘doctrinal discourse’ \((pravacana : gsung rab)\), Rongzom describes them as either definitive or provisional in nature. He quickly notes the contextual nature of these rubrics. A definitive teaching may, in a different context, be provisional. When the path is given in the context of the Great Perfection, however, there is always definitive meaning.

Even in a single text, if both provisional and definitive [475] meaning is disclosed, in the context of the Great Perfection approach, there is no other \textit{vacana} that discloses provisional meaning that does not include some exalted definitive meaning. [In the Great Perfection system,] since there is nothing to be rid of and nothing affirmed as corrupt, it is called the quintessence of all doctrinal discourses.\textsuperscript{527}

In §3.4.4, Great Perfection is called ‘the general domain of all tantras’ and set in relation to other tantric practices. The meaning Rongzom gives to the Sankrit term ‘\textit{tantra}’ connotes contingency and even difficulty. Rongzom contrasts this

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{526} The Approach : 1 de la lung zhes bya ba’i don ni \textasciitilde a ga ma zhes bya ba’i sgra gzhan las ’ongs pa la yang bya \textasciitilde rten dang zhir gyur la’ang bya stel dngos su rgyal ba’i bka’i mtshan nyidla bya \textasciitilde de lta bu’i bka’ thams cad kyis kyang rdzogs pa chen po’tsul ston par byed kyang mi nus \textasciitilde gnod pa sgrub par byed kyang mi nus te \textasciitilde zil gyis gnon mi nus la \textasciitilde rdzogs pa chen po’tsul gyis ni \textasciitilde theg pa thams cad kyi sgrub pa’i mtha’ thams cadkhyang so so ma’ dres par ston par byed kyang nus la \textasciitilde thams cad sun’ byin par byed kyang nus te \textasciitilde bka’ thams cad zil gyis gnon pa ni \textasciitilde dper na brgya byin kyi rgyal mtshan kyi rise mo la yid bzhin gyi nor bu rin po che dbang gi rgyal po btsugs pa bzhin du ‘gran zla med cing rdzi ba med de \textasciitilde de’i phyir lung thams cad rgyal po zhes bya’o \textasciitilde (RZSB 1.473.09-473.17).
\end{flushright}

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\textsuperscript{527} The Approach : gzhung gcig la yang drang ba’i don dang nges [476] pa’i don gnyi’ ga ldan par ston pa’ang yod na \textasciitilde rdzogs pa chen po’tsul la ni \textasciitilde drang ba’i don du ston par byed pa’i bka’ gzhan gang yang med cing \textasciitilde nges pa’i don kyi mchog du gyur pa’ba’ zhih ma gtos pa \textasciitilde sel myed cing snyigs mar gzhag pa gang yang med pas \textasciitilde de’i phyir gsung rab thams cad kyi nying khu zhes bya’o \textasciitilde (RZSB 1.474.24-475.04).
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with the effortlessness of Great Perfection that is the ultimate point of the
spiritual path. In short, tantric practices may be consonant with or ‘embrace’
Great Perfection, not be conflict with it.

The term *continuum* corresponds to the [Sanskrit] term *tantra*, which is
used [in the sense of] something related, dependent, even turbulent.\(^\text{528}\)
Actually, in Kriya- and Yogatantras, the method of accomplishing
unexcelled awakening, the method for accomplishing the great worldly
accomplishments such as clairvoyance and others, and even all the various
elaborate means employed by the practitioner for [cultivating] peace, and
so forth, if they do not already embrace the domain of the Great
Perfection, they do embrace being symbolically bound; and from
embracing the domain of the Great Perfection, one is not taken, no matter
how the ocean of karma behaves. For that reason, the Great Perfection is
the general domain of all tantras.\(^\text{529}\)

Tantras differ from Great Perfection in being grounded in symbolic systems of
reference (*mtshan ma’i ‘ching bas*), whether those systems be the pure encoding of
tantra or the conceptual frameworks of ordinary language. Great Perfection is
not so grounded. Great Perfection is also called the deepest\(^\text{530}\) intention of all [the
Buddhas’] (*abhipraya*).\(^\text{531}\) In this passage, Great Perfection is the direct expression
of what can only underly other discourses.

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\(^\text{528}\) ‘brel pa’am rag las pa’am ’khrugs pa la bya ste (475.05).

\(^\text{529}\) The Approach: 1 de la rgyud ces bya ba 1 tan tra zhes bya ba’i sgra ‘brel pa’am rag las pam ’khrugs pa
la bya ste 1 dngos su bya ba dang rnal ’byor gi rgyud rnam las 1 bla na myed pa’i byan chub bsgrub
pa’i thabs dang 1 mugon par shes pa la stogs pa’i jig rten kyi dngos grub chen po rnam bsgrub pa’i thabs
dang 1 zhi ba la stogs pa las kyi spro spa’i thabs sna tshogs bsgrub pa po’i bya bar gyur pa mtha’ yas pa
thams cd kyang 1 rdzogs pa chen po’i don kyis ma zin na mtshan ma’i cing bas zin par ’gyur bas 1
de’phyir rgyud thams cd kyi spyt’ grel ces bya’o 1 (RZSB 1.475.04-475.11).

\(^\text{530}\) zhe phugs (473.20).

\(^\text{531}\) Sogan Rinpoche (Tulku Pema Lodoe from Amdo Golok) reminds us this phrase is a
metaphor; i.e. Buddhas do not form *intentions* per se. Yet, from the perspective of ordinary
beings, we can speak of an intention that underlies the activities of enlightened beings.
Wangchuk (2002: 268-269 n. 12) reports that one of “eight excellences” attributed to *Guhyagarbha-
tantra* is that it is “the noble ultimate intent of all buddhas (*rgyal ba thams* [269] *cad kyi
dgongs pa’i zhe phugs dam pa*). Elsewhere, the *Thugs rje chen* po’i gtor ma sha khrag ras pa’i gtor rgyud
chen po’s colophon describes itself as the *dgongs pa thams cad kyi zhe phugs*; and the colophon of *Dri med ka
dag gi rgyud sin po che* ’od gsal chen describes itself as *gter gyi suying po dgongs pa’i zhe phugs*. See
“The sGang steng-b nNyin ma’i rGyud ’bum manuscript from Bhutan” by Cathy Cantwell, Rob
380 and p. 35 n. 165 respectively.
According to the Śrāvaka system, the basis in thought (dgongs gzhi) in teaching by means of verbal expressions of existence and non-existence in all the Jina's vacana is the thought to proclaim the character of people and phenomena. According to the Yogācāra system, the basis in thought in teaching by means of verbal expressions of existence and non-existence in all the Jina's vacana, is the thought to proclaim the character of the three-fold nature. According to the Madhyamaka system, the basis in thought in teaching by means of verbal expressions of existence and non-existence in all the Jina's vacana, is the intention to proclaim the character of ultimate and conventional truth. And, indeed, these pertain to a basis in thought, though none of them pertain to the deepest. The deepest of all the teachings in the Jina's vacana that make allusions by means of a variety of terms is concerned to reveal the domain of non-dual quality [476]. Due to the fact no other [discourse] is possessed of this intimate thought of all the Jinas, it is for that reason [Great Perfection is] called the most intimate of all thoughts.

As the core of all ‘esoteric precepts’ or ‘intimate advice’ – § 3.4.6 – Great Perfection settles the ambiguities in all other doctrines that fail to resolve non-duality. As a category, ‘esoteric precepts’ – or ‘intimate spiritual advice’ – work to resolve important points along the path. Each doctrinal approach – Śrāvaka, Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, and Guhyamantra – is described by Rongzom for the purpose of contrasting them with Great Perfection. Though he hints at the tantric

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533 ngo bo nyid rnam pa gsum (475.19).

534 The Approach: | de yang nyan thos kyi tshul las 'di ltar | rgyal ba'i bka' rnam las yod pa dang myed pa'i tshig gis bstan pa thams cad kyi dongs gzhi ni | gang zag dangchos kyi mtsshan nyid la dongs te gsungs pa yin no zhe'o | rnal 'byor spyod pa'i tshul las | 'di ltar rgyal ba'i bka' rnam las yod pa dang myed pa'i tshig gis bstan pa thams cad kyi dongs gzhi ni | ngo bo nyid rnam pa gsum gyi mtsshan nyid la dongs te gsungs pa yin no zhe'o | dbyu ma'i tshul las 'dirltar | rgyal ba'i bka' rnam las yod pa dang myed pa'i tshig gis bstan pa thams cad kyi dongs gzhi ni | don dam pa dang kun rdoz kyi bden pa'i mtsshan nyid la dongs te gsungs pa yin no zhe'o | de dag ni dongs gzhi yin yang zhe phugs ni ma yin te | 'di ltar rgyal ba'i bka' rnam las tha snyad sna tshogs kyi sgo nas dongs pa sna tshogs bstan pa thams cad kyi zhe phugs ni | chos gnyis su myed pa'i don 'di nyid bstan par bya | rgyal ba thams cad la dongs pa'i phugs 'di las gzhan mi mnga' bas na | de'i phyir dongs pa thams cad kyi zhe phugs zhes bya'o | (RZSB 1.475.15-476.02).

535 man ngag (473.20) : upadeśa. This litany of qualities is also cited via Rongzom in Mestanza’s “La première somme philosophique du bouddhisme tibétain. Origines littéraires, philosophiques et mythologiques des ‘Neuf étapes de la voie’ (theg pa rim pa dgu) in Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines 8 (2005): who renders the passage: “Ainsi, cette approche de la Grande Perfection, dépourvue de toutes les vues, est le sommet de toutes les voies, le roi de toutes les écritures, l’essence de tous les discours, l’exégèse générale de tous les tantras, l’esprit profond de toutes les pensées, le cœur de tous les préceptes essentiels” (96).
nature of Great Perfection, he clearly indicates that tantras, in general, fail to resolve the final view. Summing up with Great Perfection, he writes:

the Great Perfection, like this fourth knowable [scheme] for all phenomena, is not recognized then abandoned, recognized then accepted, recognized then settled as equal, or then actualized - none of which is established. Thus, ‘all phenomena are resolved to be non-dual’ because at that point there is no distinction between ‘non-dual,’ ‘qualitative similarity,’ ‘absence of production,’ ‘absence of inherent existence,’ and ‘the empty, selfless [nature of phenomena].’ That being the case, the [Great Perfection’s] cultivation of the resolution concerning the nonduality of all phenomena in fact pertains to the very core of all intimate advice or esoteric precepts per se. For that reason, [the Great Perfection] is called ‘the core of all esoteric precepts.’

Rongzom also remarks on the very particular nature of the final stage of training on the path, in which circumstances are so unique as to require an ad hoc approach that is formulated under the rubric intimate advice (upadeśa): “Intimate advice, then, is a point [of significance] that is outside the usual explanatory current of the day.” This critical points will come up again in Chapter Five.

In all these instances of description, Rongzom identifies Great Perfection with a known rubric in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism, albeit metaphorically. This indicates, as all metaphors do, a likeness rather than a strict correlation. Moreover, as ‘a point [of significance] that is outside the usual explanatory current of the day,’ intimate advice lies outside traditional discourse.

This analysis shows, inter alia, that according to The Approach, Great Perfection is not itself reducible or identifiable as one particular orientation or

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536 The Approach: | rdzogs pa chen po’i tshul ni | chos thams cad la shes par bya ba bzhi po ’di ltar | shes te spang bar bya ba’am | shes te dang du blang bar bya’am | shes te btagsnnyoms su bzhag par bya ba’am | shes te mngon du bya ba rnams gang yang mi sgrub pas | chos thams cad gnis su myed par gtan la phab pa zhes bya ste | de’i tse chosgnis su myed pa zhes bya dang | mnyam pa nyid ces bya ba dang | skye ba myed pa ces bya ba dang | rang bzhin myed pa ces bya ba dang | stong zhol bya dang pa zhes bya ba rnams kyang bre brag myed do | (RZSB 1.477.03-477.10).
537 don gyi kha brgyud pa dang bral ba la man ngag ces bya’o (476.04). Re kha brgyud pa: cf. TDCM 190b.
rubric. As a concept, Great Perfection is not reducible to one thing by monothetic
definition. The third chapter ends abruptly. Before doing so, he emphasizes that
intimate advice accompanies a variety of religious sensibilities and acts as a
pointing-out-of-the-condition of pervasive equality of the illusion that structures
the ultimate view.

CHAPTER CITATIONS

At present, I have identified only three textual references given in the third
chapter of The Approach. Fortunately, each is a direct citation. They are as follows:

Two citations from Mañjuśrīmitra’s Meditation on Bodhicitta or
Bodhicittabhāvanā, which is also called rDo la gser zhun (§3.2.1.5: causal
nature of mind and mental appearance)

The Unexcelled Tantra of the Illusory Great Bliss Ďākīnī Equal to All the
Buddhas called, ‘Encompassing All Ideas’ or Sarva-kalpa-samuccaya-
nāma-sarvabuddha-samāyoga-dākinī-jāla-śamvara-uttarottara-tantra
(§3.3: on the nature and definition of “concept”)

CONCLUSION

The aim of chapter three is to set apart the Great Perfection’s nomenclature of
illusion from other doctrinal approaches that retain the rhetoric of illusion, which
is all of them. This is accomplished through a shift in the scope of the application
of the discourse on the illusory (māyopāma: sgyu ma lta bu) such that it is no
longer a means to an ends as it is in other doctrines, wherein penetrating insight
into the illusory nature of phenomena facilitates spiritual liberation that is
derived from the perspicacity of the vision. In traditional Buddhist rhetoric,
cutting through the illusory veil of appearances yields insight a liberating
experience of the real. Seeing things as illusory acts as an antitodal epistemic
mechanism to the beginningless ignorance that conditions sentient beings within unenlightened existence. All Buddhist doctrines teach the illusory nature of things; but only in Great Perfection is that realization perfected.

Disclosure of the Mahāyāna approach [discussed above] is something enabled through the realization of the illusory character of all phenomena. The authentic assimilation and consummation of the realization (rtogs pa tshad du chud cing mthar phyin pa) that all phenomena are basically the same in being illusory is the approach of the Great Perfection.

Here, penetrating the illusory does not allow us to then turn toward a clear view of what is not illusory. In Rongzom’s language game of illusion, one infers that all phenomena are illusory and are thus rendered basically the same (’go mnyam pa) by that fact. There is no appearance that is “pure” in kLong chen pa’s sense and thus not illusory.

In §§ 3.4.1-3.4.6, Rongzom describes Great perfection in the context of six classical Buddhist rubrics. “The Great Perfection approach,” he writes, “is said to be the very pinnacle of all vehicles (yāna), the lord of all transmissions (āgama), the quintessence of doctrinal discourses (pravacana), the general meaning of all tantras (tantra), the deepest intention of all [the Buddhas’] (abhiprāya), and the core of all esoteric precepts (upadeśa).” These correlations are metaphorical. Great Perfection is not reducible to any one of these descriptions. Perhaps the clearest description given of Rongzom’s otherwise polythetic definition is the simple and totalizing metaphor: Great Perfection is the ocean into which all its constituent streaming paths flow.
Chapter Four of *The Approach* is a detailed analyses of several philosophical categories in a scholastic style. It is the most sophisticated of the entire text and provides ample evidence of the author’s erudition and originality. The chapter begins on a note of social criticism about the intellectual and popular climate of the time. Rongzom acknowledges critics of Great Perfection, albeit without directly addressing or even denying their criticism, and then sets out on a detailed survey of several structural issues integral to the doctrinal orientations of factions he identifies as the critics. The chapter has five main sections and a conclusion discussing, among other things, the difference between the ordinary thematic mind (*citta* : *sens* ) and enlightenment (§4.1), *bodhicitta* and Rongzom’s three types of identity (§4.2), the conditions that structure the criteria of logical proof and negation itself (§4.3), grammatical science (§4.4), logical science (§4.5), and the four principles of reasoning (*yukti catuṣṭayam* : *rigs pa rnam pa bzhi*).
The entire chapter is structured around Rongzom’s stated intention to explain “some facets of a logical approach”\textsuperscript{538} to the Buddhist path. To be clear, this chapter is not simply an attempt to explain Great Perfection \textit{logically} or in logical terms, though Rongzom does make some sympathetic comparisons between the logical approach and Great Perfection. In those cases, it is less a logical justification of it than a logical explanation – a explanation given in a logical idiom. Such an approach to those who might be ignorant of the home tradition is championed by figures such as Āryadeva, who promoted the idea that Buddhists should attempt to persuade non-Buddhists to their view through, at first, their own idiom: “Just as a barbarian cannot be made to understand in a different language [than his own, the world cannot be known outside worldly [convention]].”\textsuperscript{539} Rongzom, for his part, is attempting to civilize the barbarity of the relentless logic developed in Indian Mahāyāna.

Chapter Four is perhaps described best as a survey of the overarching conditions that structure the possibility of the logical and epistemological discourse itself. Much of the chapter does indeed compare the Great Perfection approach with other approaches; nevertheless, Great Perfection remains outside that discourse. The chapter concludes with Rongzom’s appraisal of the limits and value of the reasoning in general. In short, rationality is indispensable, if not limited. The content of this chapter is critical for understanding Rongzom’s attitude toward the growing prominence of the logical and grammatical

\textsuperscript{538} \textit{rigs pa’i tshul phyogs ‘ga’} (477.24).
\textsuperscript{539} \textit{Catuhṣataka} 8.19: \textit{nānyayā bhāṣayā mlecchaḥ śākyo grāhāyitum yathā | na laukikam rīte lokah śākya grāhāyitum tathā || jī lhar kla klo skad gzhan gyis | gzhung bar mi nus de bzhin du || ’jig rten pa yi ma gtogs par || ’jig rten gzhung bar nus ma yin ||}.
discourse associated with Dignāga and Dharmakīrti – and the value of such discourse itself.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Chapter Four is entitled *The Great Perfection Approach is Not Undermined by Reason*. This statement should not be understood as a truth-statement about reality. In fact, Rongzom tacitly admits that Great Perfection is illogical. Nevertheless, Great Perfection is not undermined by reasoning because the rationalist project cannot by definition encompass Great Perfection. It is, in fact, smaller in scope that Great Perfection. The opening of this chapter contains a remarkable passage in which Rongzom states unequivocally that the Great Perfection can be penetrated through faith alone.540 Yet, he continues, people who are ‘obsessed with the logical and grammatical treatises’ have advocated the rejection of the Great Perfection on the basis that it is irrational (*rigs pa dang ’gal*). Notably, Rongzom does not deny this charge. As our author has argued, any effort at forging a conceptual framework is by definition based in biases – i.e. structured by acceptance & rejection – and therefore cannot perfect the realization of the illusory nature of phenomena. Great Perfection is not ratiocinative in nature. Logic and grammar are anchored in bias. Thus, in a move analogous to Nāgārjuna’s famous claim in a dispute among proponents of different views to be faultless by virtue of professing no view,541 Rongzom claims in a time of

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540 To be clear, the term is not “people with good karma” (*las ‘phro can*), it’s people with simple faith (*dad pa tsam*) in Great Perfection.
disputes among proponents of rationalist doctrines that Great Perfection is faultless by virtue of not being a domain of experience connected with the efforts of intellectual inquiry. Just as Nāgārjuna’s middle way is understood as the perfection of view itself – i.e. the pure view – Rongzom’s Great Perfection is the perfection of the path – i.e. enlightenment; the end. Thus, in a move not unlike Wittgenstein, who rejected the notion that of philosophy as a cognitive discipline as nonsense, Rongzom rejects the notion that Buddhist enlightenment is cognitive in nature – i.e. that it consists in, or emerges (in the end) from getting better at ‘knowing.’ Knowing is about discriminating a ‘this’ from a ‘that.’ Enlightenment is facilitated and structured by the absence of any possibility of discrimination. The idea that enlightenment is, strictly speaking, rationally construed is conceptually analogous to the idea that “the pain I’m having right now does not hurt,” which would be, obviously, nonsense. The point is that becoming a buddha is not an act or activity or transformation of the ordinary thematic mind (sems). In buddhahood, the ordinary mind is not transformed into something it is not. The conditions for its possibility are dissolved – that’s it. The state of enlightenment is not the jurisdiction of the intellect. Buddahood it is not a cognitive act. People with simple faith may penetrate Great Perfection through their faith alone.

543 In his critique of Nāgārjuna as a philosopher, Robinson (1972) writes: “‘Light illuminates itself’ and ‘Water makes itself wet’ are pseudo-transitives, better expressed by ‘Light is inherently bright’ and ‘Water is inherently wet.’” Pace Robinson, but a lamp lighting itself is more analogous to a pain hurting itself than it is to light being inherently bright. ”Light is inherently bright” and “Water is inherently wet” are akin to “My pain naturally hurts!” For his argument, see Robinson, R. 1972. “Did Nāgārjuna Really Refute All Philosophical Views?” In Philosophy East and West 22, pp. 325–331.
When this system of Great Perfection is taught in a condensed manner, it is said the bases of all phenomena are included simply within mind and mental appearance; the nature of the mind (citta) itself is awakening (bodhi) and thus referred to as "the mind of awakening" (bodhicitta). There is nothing to be taught other than this. People with faith in the Great Perfection approach realize and penetrate it through being shown this alone. People who are obsessed with grammatical treatises and logical treatises, who have abandoned the system of Great Perfection, which is like a wish-fulfilling jewel, and – fixated on various trinket-like philosophical tenets – think: ‘These philosophical tenets of ours are established through grammatical points and reason. The Great Perfection system is in conflict with reason; and that which is in conflict with reason ought not be accepted.’

What simple faith means in this context is not clear. Perhaps it refers to faith in the teacher or teaching such that uncritical acceptance characterizes the disciples attitude toward religious instruction. Faith may in this case refer to a stance that is simply opposed to one constructed philosophically. Being faithful may also be about relationships with teachers, deities, a particular ritual cultus, and so forth, thus invoking a type of Gadamerian openness, a being-susceptible-to of sorts. In any case, on Rongzom’s view, those who superordinate a soteriology that is logical and grammatical in nature are not unlike to those who would treasure costume jewelry over a wish-fulfilling gem: while the latter look nice – shiny, sparkly, lots of bling to attract the eyes of the unsophisticated – they are, relatively speaking, ineffective, of little worth, and given simply for show. This approach to the path is, according to Rongzom, missing the soteriological forest for the ideological trees.

Who are these people obsessed with ‘logical treatises’ (yuktiśāstra : rigs pa’i bstan chos) and ‘grammatical treatises’ (śabdaśāstra : sgra’i bstan chos) and what do these terms refer to? In general, both terms are used to refer to the epistemological discourse connected with the tradition founded by Dignāga
(fifth-sixth century) and Dharmakirti (sixth-seventh century). Further, it appears that Rongzom uses the term yuktiṣāstra, as we shall see below (§ 4.4), to refer to canonical texts that employ the so-called four principles of reasoning (yukti catuṣṭuyam : rigs pa rnam pa bzhī), such as Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, Śrāvakabhūmi, Abhidharmasamuccaya, and Mahāyānasūtraśāstra. The term śābdaśāstra reminds us of the well-known term śabdavidyā, which names one of the five Indian Buddhist ‘sciences’ or ‘domains of knowledge’ (pañcavidyāsthāna : rigs gnas lnga), the locus classicus of which is given in the sixtieth verse of the eleventh chapter of the Mahāyānasūtraśāstra.Śābdaśāstra, according to van der Kuijp, “not only [references] (Sanskrit) grammar, but also its ancillary sciences of poetics, prosody, lexicography and dramaturgy.” This term is commonly used to describe Thon mi sam bho ṭa’s eight grammatical treatises. It is also be used

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545 Mahāyānasūtraśāstra 11.60 famously states that while nirvāṇa is possible for those un schooled in the traditional Indian Buddhist sciences, no such person may attain bodhi. See Limaye, Surekha Vijay. Mahāyānasūtraśāstra (By Asanga): Text, Translation and Commentary (Sri Saṅguru Publications, 2000: 204): vidyāsthāna pañcavidhyā yogamākṣara sarvajñitvān nāti kathamat paramārthah | ityāyaśāṁ nigrhañāṇaṁ nigrhañāṇayā svajñārthā vā latā karotya evam | | rōg pā’i gnas lnga dag la brtson par ma byas na | | phags mchod gis kyang tham cad mkhyen ngyid thob mi ’gyur | | de bas gzhed dag tshar bcad rjes su gzung phyir dang | | bda’ gnyid kun shes bya phyir de la brtson bya | 1.


547 thing mi sam bho tas bod kyi skad la nye bar mkho ba’i sgra’i bstan bcos brgyad mdzad par grags pa | (240.16-240.17). On this figure and his grammatical work, see Miller, Roy. “Thon-mi Samboṭa
to describe exegetical texts that are considered ‘authoritative’ or ‘valid’ (pramāṇa : tshad ma) and which emphasize accounts of world given in terms of agent (kārtṛ : byed pa po), activity (kriya : bya ba), and instrument (karāṇa : byed pa).\(^{548}\) In the context of the present chapter, however, it appears the term śabdāśāstra is used most specifically to refer to the tradition of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. It would seem that strict adherents to this tradition rejected Great Perfection on the grounds it is irrational. Based on the opening of the chapter, this group of ‘logicians’ appears to comprise one audience of The Approach’s fourth chapter. Rongzom states from the outset that his chapter sets aside the rhetoric of Great Perfection and its particular terminology in order to survey some of the logical approach to the path. One reason for this rhetorical strategy might be that this comparison will be taken more seriously if given in the idiom of Indian Buddhist logicians; alternatively, the chapter may be seen as a primer on the logical methods of the proponents of the pramāṇa system of logico-epistemology, or

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\(^{548}\) Re the term śabdāśāstra : sgra’i bstan bcos: we find the following description: ‘on te gtsug lag de yang tshad ma ma yin na ni sgra’i bstan bcos ci’i pyir tshad ma yin | ‘jig rten na yang bya ba byed pa gzhan med par yang byed pa po ston pa mthong ste | sa bon las myu gu ‘byung bar byed pa yin zhes bya ba lta bu’o 1. See Tōh. 0211: rTen cing ‘brel par ‘byung ba dang po’i rnam par dbya ba bshad pa (Pratīyasyanutpādā-syādīvibhāṅgaṇīnirdsā) in bsTan’gyur (dpe bsdu ma), 2001, mdo sde, ci-chi, vol. 66 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): 733.18-733.21. The eighth chapter of Nāgārjuna’s Mālamadhyamakakārikā is his critique of hypostisized phenomena based on this type of model. According to the IDe’u chos ‘byung, a text of this type was composed three hundred years after the death of the historical buddha, Śākyamuni, at the request of the emperor Aśoka. The end result was a sgra’i bstan chos referred to as paṇipa (pā ni pa). See mKhas pa’ IDe’us mdzad pa’irgya bod kyi chos ‘byung rgyas pa (Bod ljongs bod yig rnying dpe skrun khang, 1987): de nas ston pa ‘das nas lo sum brya lon pa’i dus su rgyal po dharmd a sho ka’i sku drin la | slob dpon ‘bu ba ga zhes bya ba byon nas sgra’i bstan chos pā ni pa zhes bya ba brtsans l (93.02-93.04). On the use agent, activity, and object (las) in classical Tibetan, see Tillemans, Tom Johannes Frank, and Derek Dane Herforth. Agents and Actions in Classical Tibetan: The Indigenous Grammarians On Bdag and Gz'an and Bya Byed Las Gsum (Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, 1989).
‘Prāmāṇikas,’ written for students of Great Perfection. In any case, Rongzom states,

For their benefit, I will, set aside the idiom renowned in the Great Perfection approach, which uses such terms as *sphere* (bindu: *thig le*), [and] *the greatness* (*che ba*), [and instead] explain some facets of a logical approach using the more broadly accepted nomenclature.

The opening passage’s juxtaposition of faith and the condensed teaching of the Great Perfection on the one side, and the rejection of Great Perfection as irrational on the other, is remarkable. The condensed teaching of Great Perfection consists of two parts. The first is the statement that all things in our experience participate in the mental. This is Rongzom’s Mind-only oriented framework (should we call it a ‘bias’?). Second, is an explanation of the term *bodhi-citta* as “ordinary thematic mind (*citta*) is itself awakening (*bodhi*)”.

At face value, such a statement seems to collapse the basic Buddhist distinction obtaining between sentient beings and buddhas; below, Rongzom will explore whether or not this move is palatable to Mahāyāna logicians for whom the premium is on a logically coherent assumption of the path. Resolution of this apparent conflict is found in Dharmakīrti’s ideas concerning subject and predication. No chapter in Rongzom’s *Approach* is easy to read, but the present chapter is Rongzom at his most detailed and difficult. Chapter Four introduces or extends the following topics:

- unity & identity
- the relationship between *bodhi & sattva*

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549 According to Germano, the etymologies of this term in the writings of “Longchenpa tend[] to emphasize the etymological roots of this term, which correlate directly to the basic dyad of ‘original purity’ [*ka dag*] and ‘spontaneous presence’ [*lhun grub*].” See Germano, David. 1992. *Poetic Thought, the Intelligent Universe, and the Mystery of Self: The Tantric Synthesis of rDzogs Chen in Fourteenth Century Tibet*. Ph.D. dissertation. Madison: University of Wisconsin, p. 878.
• the structure of existential and predicative statements
• implicative and non-implicative negation
• holistic & atomizing types of cognitive awareness
• the nature of verbal signification
• the nature of ontological and epistemological distinction
• the nature & distinction model itself
• consolidation vs. preclusion as criteria for logical proofs
• the four logical procedures proving sameness & difference
• the nature of ideas or ‘conceptual generalities’ (samanya : spyi)

**SECTION SUMMARIES: A MODEL OF SUBJECT & OBJECT,**

**BODHICITTA**

Rongzom begins with an exploration of the relationship between bodhi and citta (§ 4.1.1) in terms of a three-fold model of conceptual framework (alambanā : dmigs pa), appearance (pratibhā : snang ba), and nature (svabhāva : ngo bo nyid). Each term has ontological and epistemological connections. In epistemological terms, conceptual frameworks correlate with modes of inference (anumāna : rjes dpaṅ), appearance with the sense impressions of ordinary direct perception (pratyakṣa : mngon sum), and nature with pure gnosis (jñāna : ye shes). In ontological terms, conceptual frameworks advances existential notions, appearance advances notions of veracity (or a lack thereof) and predicate attributes, and nature advances notions of validity.

In this context, a conceptual framework is the domain of experience qualified by discrimination. Appearance is a domain of experience qualified by sensation. The reality of nature itself is a domain of experience qualified by unadulterated discriminative awareness. By virtue
of a conceptual framework, such conventions as ‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’ are designated. At the level of appearance such conventions as ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ are designated. In terms of nature, such conventions as established and non-established are labelled.550

By means of this three-fold model, Rongzom explores the identity and difference that obtain between citta (i.e. sentience) and bodhi (i.e. enlightenment). Within conceptual frameworks, the two are of different natures. In appearance, the two are not coincident. In their ultimate nature, the two are actually indistinguishable. Presenting bodhi and citta as distinct, moreover, is a conceptual framework. Nature corresponds to the nonduality of the two. Appearance is something qualified by a temporal distinction between the two.551

The presentation here of mind and awakening as different natures in that way pertains to the character of a conceptual framework; their actual nature is non-dual. Yet at the level of appearance, the two do not occur at the same time.552

On this view, then, it is not in fact illogical to say citta is bodhi. Of the three, nature-as-such on the ontological side and pure gnosis on the epistemic side – nature/gnosis, as it were - is superior. Similarly, appearance/direct perception is middling and conceptual framework/inference is inferior. Conceptual frameworks are domains of experience wherein awareness apprehends a term and its referent as if mingled (sgra don ‘dre) by virtue of being qualified by

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550 The Approach: | | de la dmigs pa ni ’du shes kyis bye brag du byas pa’i blo’i spyod yul lo|| snang ba ni tshor bas bye brag du byas pa’i blo’i spyod yul lo || ngo bo nyid kyi mtshan nyid ni shes rab dri ma byed pas bye brag du byas pa’i blo’i spyod yul lo || de la dmigs pa’i sgo nas ni | yod dang myed pa la stogs pa’i tha snyad ’dogs par byed do || snang ba sgo nas ni yang dag pa dang yang dag pa ma yin pa’i tha snyad ’dogs par byed do || ngo bo nyid kyi sgo nas ni grub pa dang ma grub pa’i tha snyad ’dogs par byed do || (RZSB 1.478.12-478.15).

551 byang chub dang sens tha dad du bzhag pa dmigs pa | de gnyis gnyis su med pa ngo bo nyid | gnyis ga du gcig tu mi ldan pa snang ba | (Khenpo Gaden of Serlo Monastery, personal communication).

552 The Approach: | | de ltar sens dang byang chub kyi rang bzhin tha dad du bzhag pa ’di ni dmigs pa’i mtshan nyid yin te | ngo bo nyid kyi mtshan nyid ni gnyis myed do || snang ba ni gnyi’ ga dus gcig du mi ldan no | (RZSB 1.478.10-478.12).
discursive discriminations. Thus, we have three domains of experience; each can be given in subjective or objective terms.

In objective terms, conceptual frameworks are domains of experience wherein awareness apprehends a term and its referent as mingled (sgra don ‘dre) by virtue of being qualified by discursive discriminations.553 Directly perceived appearance is a non-conceptual domain of experience wherein awareness is qualified by sensations/impressions /feeling (tshor ba). The reality of nature (ngo bo nyid kyi mtshan nyid) pertains to a domain of experience wherein awareness is qualified by stainless insight (*amalaprajñā, vimalaprajñā: dri med shes rab).

The three are also given in subjective terms. Conceptual frameworks can also be said to excite the types of conceptual minds that tend to engage in making existential arguments (yod pa dang med pa dgag pa dang bzhag pa) and the designation of conventions. By means of directly perceived appearance, awareness causes the designation of such conventions as, for example, ‘real fire which is something that burns’ (me tsha zhing sreg pa yang dag pa) and such conventions as ‘unreal fire which is something that does not burn’ (me tsha zhing sreg pa ma yin pa yang dag ma yin pa’i tha snyad).554 Nature is given in subjective terms by means of the fact that stainless insight can cause conventional designations to be given in terms of systematic ultimates rather than merely appearing conventions. Such a proposition seems to imply that designations given from the perspective of stainless insight are not quite as delusive as ordinary conventions.

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553 We shall have more to say on this trope below in our discussion of South Asian logico-epistemology (pramāṇa: tshad ma).
554 This example is offered by Khenpo Gaden of Serlo Monastery in Eastern Nepal’s Sulu khumbhu region.
Each of the three, when given in subjective terms, moreover, can be described further in terms of action (byed las): here, the point is that conceptual frameworks are unable to remove the state of distortion imposed by ideation, which is forever grasping at a term and the idea it refers to as if mingled. In the case of directly perceived appearance, take, for example, such delusive conventions as those describing the presence of horns on a rabbit’s head (this trope is a metaphor for impossibility). Direct perception is capable to removing whatever confusion such a convention carries. Nevertheless, in the ultimate nature of insight, confusion cannot be removed. In the domain of Nature, confusion is eliminated because of penetrating the essential state of things qua object and a stainless insight within the nature of basic space qua subject.

Through this three-fold model, Rongzom goes on to draw analogies between the relationship between citta and bodhi, on the one hand, and the relationship between the appearance of a fire-brand and the appearance of a fire-wheel that occurs when that brand is spun quickly in a circle at the end of a string to produce it, on the other.

Mind and awakening are similar: at the level of conceptual framework, both mind and awakening are considered to be basically the same insofar as being conceived to exist as distinct entities. At the level of appearance, they do not coincide. When there is mental appearance, awakening does not appear. At the point awakening appears, ordinary mind (sems) does not. Mental appearance, on account of its deceptiveness, is confusion. Appearance in awakening is unmistakable since it is not deceptive. From the point of view of nature alone, when the very essence of the ordinary mind is established as something, the very essence of awakening has no basis in reality. When the very essence of awakening is established as something, the very essence of ordinary mind has no basis in reality. Thus, mental appearance is something confusing and, no matter how things appear, it does not correlate with their essential nature. That being the case (pas), it should be recognized that the nature itself of awakening pertains
to the state of appearance; and that the ordinary mind has no basis in reality.

Rongzom has presented this view of the nature of mind and awakening in terms of a logical approach. In one of the few points in this chapter where he makes a sympathetic point of comparison, he writes:

This point is not, in fact, unlike teachings according to the Great Perfection system that signifies the great path to total liberation is affliction itself, that karma itself is naturally arising gnosis, that discontent itself is awakened. In that [Great Perfection approach] ‘total liberation,’ ‘naturally arising gnosis,’ and ‘awakening’ are simply taught as specific conventions for turning back awareness fixated on the affliction, karma, and the discontent of sentient being. Its very nature is indivisible and unified.555

ON TYPES OF IDENTITY & DIFFERENCE

The Approach now enters into a meta-discourse on identity, which is discussed under a three-fold rubric: (i) identity in similarity (mtshungs pa’i gcig pa), (ii) identity in number (grangs kyi gcig pa), and (iii) indistinguishable identity (dbyer med pa’i gcig pa). In the first case, inasmuch as a vase and a pillar are both products, they share an identity in similarity. Similarly, a buddha and sentient beings share such an identity insofar as in and of both there is nothing stable, unchanging, or essentially ‘I’ and/or ‘mine.’ That is, their empty nature constitutes their identity in similarity. In a ‘reckoned identity,’ ‘identity in number’ or ‘numerical identity’ (grangs kyi gcig pa), quantitative difference is elided in the face of a single quantity. A unified or indistinguishable identity is

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555 The Approach: | don ‘dis rdzogs pa chen po’i tshul las nyid mongs pa nyid rnam par grol ba’i lam chen po | las nyid rang byung gi ye shes | sdu bsgal nyid byang chub bo zhes gsungs pa’i don yang ’di lta bu yin no || de la rnam par grol ba dang | rang byung give shes dang | byang chub ces bstan pa’ang | sems can gyi nyon mongs pa dang las dang sdu bsgal du zhen pa’i blo bzlog pa’i tha snyad so sor bstan par zod de | ngo bo nyid ni dbyer med cing gcig go || (RZSB 479.15-479.20).
derived when a subject and its predicate are indistinguishable. Bodhi and citta qua bodhicitta is the example. The concept of reckoned identity emerges from the way language and concepts structure any logical determination of unity. Take for example the position that the aggregates exist, but the self imputed in dependence upon them does not; or that objects exist, but their subjective knowers do not; or that one’s own awareness exists but a subject aware of an object does not. In each of these cases, a dyad is presented in which one limb is taken as real, the other as imagined. That is part and parcel of the function of theory (drṣṭi : lta ba), particularly when given in the context of logical and epistemological discourse, the essence of which is validating one view and invalidating another. Each higher view, in turn, reckons a unity of identity between what it terms an ultimate subject and its predicates after having determined its superiority through a similar process of rational deduction.

whether its [the Śrāvaka position] that the aggregates are said to exist, though both the person and their aggregates are said not to, or the Pratyeka’s apprehender is said to exist though the apprehended is said not to; or [the Yogācāra position that] one's own awareness is said to exist though both [object and subject] are said not to - whatever the case may be (la stogs pa) – [any given philosophical perspective (blta ba) consists in] various ways of validating [something supposed to be] real after eliminating what is [supposedly] totally imagined, asserting a subject and its predicate to form a single identity in what is itself real, and invalidating difference [between these two] reciprocal phenomena as if they consist in a single nature. A reckoned identity is given in the context of the proof of a thing’s unity.556

556 The Approach: 'di' ltar gang zag dang phung po gnyis ni myed phung po ni yod ce'am | de bzhin du gnyis po ni myed rang rig pa ni yod ces bya ba la stogs pa kun du brtags pa bsal nas mtshan nyid pa yod par sgrub pa dang | mtshan nyid pa de nyid la'ang chos dang chos can bdag nyid gcig par 'dod pa dang | chos phan tshunkyang ngo bo nyid gcig pa lta bu tha dad ni 'gegs par byed la | dngo po gcig ni sgrub pas de 'di skad du | gnyis ni myed do gcig ni yod do zhes gnos po gcig go blo mi gtong ba'di ni grangs kyi gcig pa zhes bya'o | (RZSB 1480.16-480.22).
One more example of an ‘indistinguishable’ or ‘indivisible’ nature is bodhi and citta when given in the phrase bodhicitta in discourse on Great Perfection. That is, while the term is understood to combine two opposing elements outside of the teaching of Great Perfection, from the view of Great Perfection, bodhi and citta in the phrase bodhicitta refers to a single nature and identity.

Even the so-called mind of awakening (bodhicitta) would be called a reckoned or numerical identity at the point when awakening is brought about in the arrest (bkag nas) of the ordinary mind (citta). Inasmuch as the subject ‘ordinary mind’ is not established, a mind of awakening that is described in dependence upon it is [necessarily] not established. Yet, just like when the nature of space is called ‘space itself’ and there is no insistence upon any separation between ordinary mind and awakening, [bodhicitta] is called an indistinguishable identity.557

Both types of identity are in fact taught in the Great Perfection approach. Yet from outside the view of Great Perfection, the relationship between ordinary mind and awakening is ontologically and epistemologically opposed. In another sympathetic comparison with the logical approach, Rongzom states that nothing coming in the fifth chapter of The Approach, which is about the early writings of Great Perfection, will add anything of significance beyond the points made here in the context of logic and epistemology. This should not suggest that the Prāmāṇikas teach the Great Perfection approach so much as to maintain the continuity evinced in Rongzom’s metaphor of the rivers and their relation to the ocean that is their outcome.

Both of these are taught in the system of Great Perfection: when the greatness of the mind of awakening proceeds to be taught, these terms are

557 The Approach: | de bzhin dy byang chub kyi sens zhes bya ba la’ang | sens bkag nas byang chub sgrub par byed pa de’i tshe ni | grags kyi gcig pa zhes bya ba bar ’gyur ro | gang gi tshe chos censens ma grub pas | de la rten nas gzhag pa’i byang chub kyang ma grub ste | ji ltarnam mkha’i rang bzhin nam mkha’ nyid ces brjod pa dang ’dra bar | sens dang byang chub kyi dbye ba mi rnyed par ’dod pa de’i tshe | dbyer myed pa’i gcig pa zhes bya’o | (RZSB 1.481.03-481.08).
taught according to a reckoned or numerical identity; when the nature of the mind of awakening is taught, [mind and awakening are] taught as indivisible identity. In sum, this is teaching the fundamental point; and in the chapter coming below treating the textual tradition of the Great Perfection (gzung nyid), none of the explanation given here [in accordance with the Prāmāṇikas] will there improve on this point. 558

What does it mean to say that Great Perfection does not improve upon a basic point deduced through logical discourse? This point – that ordinary mind and awakening, in the end, form an indivisible identity – is also half of the two-fold condensed teaching of Great Perfection offered at the top of the chapter. There, this point is included with one other dictum – i.e. all phenomena are included within the mind and mental – as a teaching by which those with faith alone penetrate Great Perfection.

The suggestion is that those who are fixated on logical and grammatical treatises – i.e. the followers of Dharmakīrtian logico-epistemology – are shortsighted in rejecting Great Perfection. Their own tradition, as Rongzom has demonstrated, deduces one of two key points of the condensed teaching: the notion that ‘all phenomena are included within the mind and mental.’ From this point, The Approach turns toward a description of the conditions that structure the possibility of particular types of logical entailment and exclusion. If we wonder why Rongzom omits any discussion of the mental nature of phenomena in Dharmakīrtian context, we might remember that, for Dharmakīrti, “all entities are [often said to be] mental.” 559

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558 The Approach: rdzogs pa chen po’i tshul kyang tshul ’di gnyis ston to  de la byang chub kyi sems kyi che ba ston pa’i tshe ni grags kyi geig pa’i tshul las brtams te ’ang stong to byang chub kyi sens kyi ral bzhin ston pa’i tshe ni dbzer myed pa’i geig pa nyid duston to ’di ni don gyi rtsa ba mdro bsdus nas bstan pa yin te ’og nas byung ba’i rdzogs pa chen po’i gzung nyid bstan pa’i skabs nas bshad pa kun kyi kyang ’di las bogs dbyang du myed do (RZSB 1.481.08-481.13).

I have not been able to locate Rongzom’s three-fold rubric of identity in similarity, reckoning, and indistinction in any other Buddhist work. It appears to have originated with Rongzom. More research is needed and the detailed assessment that should be made of this interpretive model cannot be made here, though its implications for shedding comparative light on the intellectual history of these two movements is obvious.

ON ESTABLISHMENT & NEGATION, AND SO ON

Rongzom devotes most of the space of Chapter Four to §4.2, which offers a ‘concise explanation of general [conceptual] systems of same & other, establishment & negation, and so on.’ This section, in other words, explores the conditions that structure the possibility for making existential and predicative arguments within the theoretical constraints adopted by proponents of ‘treatises on logic and grammar.’ This section, which mingles Abhidharma and Pramāṇa discourse, is astonishing and difficult. The section opens by summing up a general Buddhist conception of vital two mechanisms for philosophical proofs: establishment and negation.

All the numerous ways in which individuals assert the establishment of their own philosophical position (grub pa’i mtha’) and reject those of others are subsumed into two [types of discourse]: the establishment of something and the negation of something. All the numerous ways in which things are negated are included within non-implicative and implicative negation, the former of which pertains to the mere negation of an existent in which nothing else is established in its place; [the latter of which] pertains to invalidating non-understanding, wrong understanding, and gnawing doubt without teaching any other object. For example, the statement ‘there is no vase’ reverses only the idea that a vase is present; in places where there is no vase, [one] is not indicated. Similarly, if a person is described as non-existent, it is simply reversing the conception of the person’s existence rather than disclosing the presence of the aggregates.
that are empty of a person. [482 Explanations] along similar lines should be applied to everything.560

These, in turn, have their own types, which Rongzom outlines: establishment is qualified in terms of identity and difference. These, in turn, are qualified on the basis of another dyad: nature and distinction. Awareness that pertains to these two modalities is subsumed within two types. The first is a holistic awareness (ril por ’dzin pa’i blo: piṇḍagrāh), which takes a whole phenomenon as its object. The second is an anatomizing awareness (rjes su gzhig pa’i blo), which takes apart whole objects. Though these terms are used in tantra,561 my presumption is they are originally drawn from Abhidharma.562 The former is the preferred rubric under which philosophers present their own views. All types of logical proof are grounded in this fundamental conceptual structure, which qualifies itself in terms of nature and individuating distinctions within nature. Not only that, the fact that various ways different proofs are constructed upon the same assumed

560 The Approach: de la gang dag rang gi grub pa’i mtha’ sgrub par ’dod cing | gzhan gyi grub pa’i mtha’ dgag dgag par ’dod pa rnam s so’i elo ji snyed pa thams cad kyang | dngos po bgrub pa dang | dngos po dgag pa gnyis su ’dus so | de la dgag pa ji snyed pa thams cad kyang | myed par dgag pa dang ma yin par dgag pa gnyis su ’dus so | de la myed par dgag pa zhes bya ba ni | yod pa bdag pa tsam yin te | gzhed bgrub par ba’i don myed de | ’di ltar ma rtags pa dang log par rtags pa dangthue tshom za ba tsam sel bar byed pa kun du brtags apa tsam ’gog par byed pa yin te | don gzhed ston pa myed do | dper na bum pa yin par zhes byed na | bum pa yod par rtags pa bzung pa tsam du zhad de | bum pa myed pa sa phyogs la tso gs pa ni ston par mi byed do | de bzhin du gang zag myed ces brjod na | gang zag yod par rtags pa tsam’bzung par zhad de | gang zag gis stong pa’i phung po yod par ston par ni mi byed pa’o 11[482] de bzhin du kun la sbyar ro 11 (RZSB 1.481.15-482.01).

561 For example, in the twentieth chapter of the following tantra, the title of which demonstrates its organization around the view of equality (samatā: mnyam pa nyid), we find these two types of awareness posted in terms of consolidation (bsdus ba) and dispersal (spro ba nyid) that connect up to a unified view of reality: 1 ril por ’dzin pa’i bsdus pa bsdus ba dang | rjes su gzhig pa spro ba nyid | gnyis med btsam gtsan la gnas pa | gcig pu byed pa’i tshul bstan pa’o 11 zhes gsungs so 1. See Tökh. 0453: dPal de bzhin gshags pa thams cad kyi gsal ba rnal ’byor chen po rnam par rgyal pa zhes bya ba mnyam pa nyid gnyis su med pa’i rgyud kyi rgyal po rdo rje dpal mchog chen po brtags pa dang po’o (Śrī-sarva-

562 Cf. piṇḍagrāhabuddhī and *ekatvagrāhā: gcig tu ’dzin pa: “‘Belief in a unity’ is [a belief that is] formed by apprehending the five grasping heaps as a self that is a [single] mass” (ekatvagrāha iti pañcāparāśnaskandhēsu piṇḍātmagrāhātaḥ; gcig pur ’dzin pazhes bya ba ni nye bar len pa’i phung po lnga po dag la ril po’i bdag tu ’dzin pa te). See Engle 2009: 506, n. 593.
foundation is, according to Rongzom, lost on the proof’s promulgators, who insist the ideas of their own philosophical system are somehow immune to the obfuscatory tendencies of the philosophical project. Although these qualify the bases of all types of logical establishment, proponents of these views are blinded by their own cognitive and theoretical biases. To be clear: all philosophers are engaged in the same folly of supposing their prejudicial view to be objective and to correspond to the real while rejecting opponents’ view as prejudicial and corresponding to what is purely imagined. This is a result of the nature of logical discourse, which is structured by, among other things, the necessary conception that objects are qualified by a whole and essential nature.

In fact, the numerous ways of proving something are subsumed within two types of discourse [connected to] the establishment of what is [in direct perception] and the establishment of what is observed by the mind [in inherence]. The basis of these is given in terms of identity and difference (gcig pa dang tha dad pa); the basis of the these, in turn, are given in terms of both nature itself and distinction (ngo bo nyid khyad par).

Awareness concerned with these [functions of proof] are subsumed within two [species]: holisic awareness\(^{563}\) and anatomizing awareness\(^{564}\) both of which are indeed natural awarenesses. Nevertheless, when disputed between two opponents it is set forth, though it should not be, that one’s own philosophical position is integrated through a holistic awareness and cannot be broken by your philosophical position. Since the basis of all proofs that establish something are qualified in terms of nature itself and distinction, without understanding both there is no recognizing any proof for something. Thus, they are taught here first.\(^{565}\)

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\(^{563}\) ril por ’dzin pa’i blo (482.09) : piṅḍagrāha (Mvp 4643).

\(^{564}\) rjes su gzhig pa’i blo (482.09-482.10).

\(^{565}\) The Approach: 1 dngos po bsgrub pa ji snyed pa’ang mdo rnam pa gnyis su ’dus te 1 ’di ltar yod par sgrub pa dang 1 dmigs par sgrub pa’o 11 de dag gi gzhi yang rnam pa gnyis te 1 gcig pa dang tha dad pa’o 11 de dag gi gzhi yang rnam pa gnyis te 1 ngo bo nyid dang khyad par ro 11 de’i blo yang rnam pa gnyis te ril por ’dzin pa’i blo dang 1 rjes su gzhig pa’i blo’o 11 blo ’di gnyis ni rang bzhin gyis ldan mod kyi 1 ’on kyang rgol ba dang phyir rgol ba brisod pa na 1 ’di skad du 1 rang gi grub mtha’ ni ril por ’dzin pa’i blos bzlums te 1 khyed kyi grub mthas mi phyed par byed do 11 khyed kyi grub mtha’ ni rjes su gzhig pa’o blos bsrig ste ma grub par byed do 11 zhes khas ni mi len to 11 de la dngos po sgrub pa thams cad kyi bzhin ngo bo nyid dang khyad par yin pas 1 de khong du ma chud na dngos po sgrub pa thams cad khong du mi chud pas 1 de bas na dang po ’di bstan to (RZSB 1.482.06-482.15).
This turns the discussion to the question of just what nature itself is according to this logical approach. Rongzom describes it as an object that seems undifferentiated in value and scope to the cognitive awareness perceiving it. How can logicians speak of such a thing?

**ON THE NATURE OF SPEECH & THE CONTENT OF IDEAS**

In a description of linguistic utterance, Rongzom connects the Sanskrit words for ‘name’ (nāmaḥ) with the verb, nāyati. That is, the ‘names’ of things (nāma : ming) leads or guides (nāyati : khrid par byed pa) the hearer to the referent object. Such a model of language facilitates comprehension of a relation obtaining between linguistic terms with, for example, an abstract quality. Here, “we must remember that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti’s treatment of language (śabda, sgra) is at the same time a treatment of conceptual thought (kalpanā, rtog pa), for language and conceptualization are two sides of the same coin” (Cabezón 1994: 119). Keeping this in mind helps us recognize that when Rongzom shifts quickly from linguistic reference to abstract ideation, he is not shifting philosophical registers. He is describing the way in which the conceptual mind allocates linguistic reference such that the utterance elides or occludes any distinction between the subject and its predicates. As an example, he evokes a term is vital for Proponents of classical Buddhist philosophy (Abhidhārmikas), Proponents of Nāgārjuna’s Middle Way discourse (Mādhyamikas), and the ‘Proponents of logic-epistemology or pramāṇa (Prāmnākās): the term lakṣaṇa. Lakṣaṇa means ‘characteristic,’ ‘actuality,’ ‘sign,’ ‘evidence,’ ‘reality,’ ‘distinguishing mark,’ and also ‘indicator.’

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566 The Approach: blo gang la don gang snang ba na | ’di ltar grangs kyis ma phyergya che chung gis ma phye ste | don gang snang ba de nyid mtshan mar byar rung bar snang ba’o | (RZSB 1.482.16-482.17).
In Dharmakīrti’s epistemologically oriented model, although the very nature and definition of a ‘conceptual consciousness’ (kalpanā : rtog pa) entails that the distinction between the subject’s name and its ‘distinguishing marks’ – i.e. attributes predicated to it – falls away,\(^{567}\) Rongzom will find epistemological material in Dharmakīrti that supplements his discussion of subjects and predicates.\(^{568}\) Rongzom’s use of the Prāmāṇika system revolves around Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika, chapter one, vv. 60-62, which explore the relationship between subjects and their predicates (more on these vv. below). He begins by summarizing the function of the term ‘indicator’ (lakṣaṇa : mtshan nyid).

The [Sanskrit term] lakṣaṇa suggests [such concepts as] cause, distinguishing mark, or indicator. That being the case, once a given discursive awareness has mixed name and object, [483] it references the object as a whole; having qualified the object's distinguishing marks and indicators [a lakṣaṇa] is called a ‘reason’ [*or ‘evidence,’ and so on] (rgyu mtshan). Even the excellent marks of a buddha are said to be lakṣaṇa because they are taken as distinguishing marks or indicators. Such a name and reason are asserted in accordance with those [who adhere to] grammatical treatises and not affiliated with the object’s nature as-such, which is distinct from the name and reason [of an object].

Next, Rongzom moves to the question of logical distinction. “The term distinction qualifies whatever specifics are ind individuated from within an object’s nature

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\(^{567}\) As is well-known in the Tibetan tradition of blo rigs, which takes the Pramāṇa tradition as supreme, the definition of a conceptual consciousness is ‘a determinative knower capable of mixing term and object. The phrase ‘capable of mixing term and object’ is a common one. Cf. a typical definition of ‘conceptual consciousness’: sgra don ’dres rung du ’dzin pai zhen rigs rtog pa’i mtshan nyid. See Lati Rinbochay, Elizabeth Napper, and ’Jam-dpal-bsam-’phel. Mind in Tibetan Buddhism: Oral Commentary on Ge-Shay Jam-Bel-Sam-Pel’s Presentation of Awareness and Knowledge, Composite of All the Important Points, Opener of the Eye of New Intelligence (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1986) 179. According to Napper, “the reason that the definition specifies that sound and meaning generalities are apprehended as suitable to be mixed is that it is possible to have a thought consciousness apprehending only a sound generality, or apprehending only a meaning generality, or one apprehending the two as if mixed” (1986: 51).

\(^{568}\) See, for example, Dreyfus, Georges B. J. Recognizing Reality: Dharmakīrti’s Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations (State University of New York Press, 1997), pp. 182-187.
based on that nature. The problem, according to Rongzom, is that the structural binary – nature & distinction – assumes nature to be uncontingent upon distinction while taking distinction to be contingent upon nature. This is clearly a form of philosophical bias for Rongzom. Such a bias is, writes Rongzom, emerges from the fact distinction comprises “individuated instances of [a putatively whole nature's] differentiation” and therefore constructs, in some sense, perception of a putatively essential and distinct nature.

Words (vyāñjana : yi ge) carve out such individuations, plucking them from a whole nature as if they are but instances, rather than constitutive, of that nature. This fails to recognize the two mutually implicate each other. On this view, since the general character – i.e. nature – of a flower is measured by its characteristics – i.e. predicated attributes or qualities – it is not quite correct to say that the nature of the flower is contingent upon its parts and qualities. In an empty, illusory world, the two are basically the same and mutually implicative. One object can be described from many different perspectives. If, for example, we have blue cloth, it may be described in terms of its impermanence, its hue, as a physical phenomenon, and so on. All perspectives describe the same object. In each case, a predicated attribute is taken to comprise the object. The two are not, on this view, taken to be distinct. Words work like spices to accentuate and direct attention in a way that supposes the reference to be a totalizing one.

569 The Approach: ngo bo nyid de la brten nas bye brag gang gis ngo bo nyid de rnam par phyed ste khyad par dy byas pas khyad par zhes bya’o | (RZSB 1.483.04-483.05).
570 The Approach: | ngo bo nyid dang khyad pardu gzhag pa’ang | ngo bo nyid ni khyad par la ma rten par grub pa’o || khyad par ningo bo nyid la rten nas bye brag so sor rnam par phyed ba’o | (RZSB 1.483-17-483.19).
On that point, a word (yi ge\textsuperscript{571}) discloses that distinction. Here, the [Sanskrit] name vyañjana\textsuperscript{572} [that translates the Tibetan yi ge] is also a name for the [eighty] minor marks of excellence;\textsuperscript{573} it is also a name for spices\textsuperscript{574} as well as syllables.\textsuperscript{575} In terms of the major and minor marks excellence - so-called vyañjana: just as it is the case that while a flower's anthers\textsuperscript{576} themselves are the flower [and] the generality of the flower is measured by the anthers, it is the case that while the major and minor marks themselves are also included within [the concept of a buddha’s] character, the general characteristic [of a buddha, for example] is measured by the major and minor marks not unlike phrases such as ‘impermanent vase,’ which are stated (skad du'o) because they differentiate [a vase’s] nature as-such. [484\textsuperscript{577}] Just as in the manner of (ji ltar... ltar) accentuating (bye brag du 'byed)\textsuperscript{578} and directing the flavors of food with spice, some distinctive words, called syllables (yig 'bru : vyañjana), make differentiations in nature as-such leading to a single perspective.\textsuperscript{579}

We can speak meaningfully of an “impermanent vase” and an “impermanent Buddha.” Typically, when we consider a vase to be impermanent, we are taking the vase to be a particular individuation or instance of a real property or universal: impermanence. Thus, we may ask: what is the nature of impermanence such that it may be predicated of the two? Is the impermanence attributed to both a real entity? According to George Dreyfus, “Dharmakīrti’s likely answer would be that impermanence is unreal inasmuch as it is predicated of particulars.

\textsuperscript{571} yi ge (483.19) : vyañjana (Mvp 1997); cf. "syllable," "phoneme." The term vyañjana is also given in Tibetan as mtshan (Mvp 292), tshig 'bru (id. 1546), gsal byed (2013; cf. TDCM 2297b(2) s.v. tshod ma), and tshod ma (Mvp 5704); in Monier-Williams dictionary: "manifesting, indicating... (ā), f. (in rhet.) implied indication, allusion, suggestion...; a figurative expression, decoration, ornament RV. viii, 78, 2; manifestation, indication...; allusion, suggestion (=ā, f.)... a collection or group of consonants... seasoning" (1029c). Note RZSB gives bya dzā na for vyañjana, MW’s "implied indication, allusion, suggestion"?

\textsuperscript{572} bya dzā na (483.19).

\textsuperscript{573} dpe byad bzang po (483.20) : anuvañjana (Mvp 268)

\textsuperscript{574} tshod ma (483.20) : vyañjana (Mvp 5704).

\textsuperscript{575} tshig 'bru (483.20) : vyañjana (Mvp 1546).

\textsuperscript{576} ze'u 'bru (483.21) : kiñkalka (Mvp 6237; cf. MW 282b),

\textsuperscript{577} NTh 113.03; Th 189.01; DM 105.05.

\textsuperscript{578} Reading bye brag du 'byed (BM 105.05; Th 189.01) rather than byed brag du 'byed (RZSB 1.484.01).

\textsuperscript{579} phyogs (484.02) : pakṣa; cf. "class."
Predication is a conceptual relation that has little bearing on reality. It is a useful depiction of the similarities between individuals [ ] that is important in practical contexts where reasonings are used. There, we can identify general properties as being predicated on individuals. We can even talk about properties being instantiated by particulars but we have to recognize, however, that this is no more than a practical use of concepts that does not reflect their true nature (1997: 172).

Dharmakīrti’s rejection of the idea that ‘universals’ or ‘generalities’ (sāmānyā : spyī) are real entities is forged from his debates with the ‘Proponents of logic’ (nyāya) referred to as the Naiyāyika. This faction of non-Buddhist Indian logicians trace their origins to the Nyāya-sūtra of Gotama. Generally, Naiyāyikas assert that ‘universals’ are real entities and that the distinction between a subject and its predicates is ontological. For Naiyāyikas, the phrase “the vase is impermanent” refers to two ontologically distinct entities. According to Pramāṇavārttika I.60, however, the distinction between subjects and predicates, as we shall see below, is grammatical rather than ontological in nature (183). According to Dreyfus, both Dharmakīrti and the Naiyāyikas admit that universals are distinct from their particular ‘individuations’ or ‘instances’ (viśeṣa : bye brag). Dharmakīrti parts from the Naiyāyika presentation in rejecting the assertion that universals are real entities and asserting that the relation between subjects and predicates is grammatical in nature. “In actuality, properties are not instantiated by real things but superimposed on them.

Hence, predication does not warrant the ontological [173] assertion that impermanence as a real entity is the universal of individual colors. Dharmakīrti apparently does not consider the possibility that some universals are real. Locked in a contest with Naiyayikas, who assert that universals are real and independent from their particulars, Dharmakīrti’s strategy is to grant that universals are different from their particulars but to deny them any reality. It is extremely important to Dharmakīrti not to admit that any universals are real, for that would support the Nyāya contention that at least some general properties must be accepted as real!
Like Rongzom, Dharmakīrti denies the reality of such distinctions, which seem to emerge from the structure of the logical model. When structured by the nature & distinction binary, logical proofs of identity and difference are said to be four types: those proving identity or difference in nature (i-ii) or those proving identity or difference in quality (iii-iv). Predicative proofs establish something as real; existential proofs establish something to be conceptual. Proof of a unified nature (i.e. ‘identity’) consists in the preclusion (bzlog) of concordant and discordant types. A vase is not a pillar, and so forth. Proof of a distinct nature is given in relation to, and contingent upon, the assumption of a unified nature, from which the distinction is precluded and qualified. Rongzom’s typology is expanded when he offers four more logical procedures for examination in terms of adducing proofs through the criteria of isolation & consolidation:

Furthermore, there are two types of procedure (tshul) for proving something to be the same: (i) proving it to be the same [in terms of something] isolated, (ii) and proving it to be one [in terms of something] consolidated. There are also two procedures for proving [something] to be different: (i) proving [something] to be different [in terms of being] precluded; and (ii) proving [something] to be different [in terms of being] differentiated.580

When the question revolves around just what it is that constitutes proof of identity, the topic turns to the famed Prāmāṇika topic of the ‘concept-universal’ (sāmānya : spyī).

580 The Approach: | gzhan yang gcig du sgrub sgrub par byed pa’i tshul’gya rnam pa gnyis te | bkar te gcig du bsgrub par byed pa dang | bsdus te gcig du sgrub par byed pa’o | tha dad du sgrub par byed pa’i tshe na’ang gnyis te | bkar te gcig du bsgrub par byed pa dang | bsdus te gcig du sgrub par byed pa’o | tha dad du sgrub par byed pa’i tshe na’ang gnyis te | bzlog ste tha dad du bsgrub par byed pa dang | phyis ste tha dad du sgrub par byed pa’o | (RZSB 1.484.18-484.21).
ON DHARMAKĪRTIAN IDEAS

It is important to mark this topic. As I have suggested above, Rongzom’s oft-stated concern about the negative influence of Vaibhāṣika theories may be perhaps connected to the views that were eventually developed by Phya pa and what comes to be “his triadic conception of the so-called apprehendable object (gzung-yul, grāhyaviṣaya)” vis-à-vis the specifically characterized object (svalaśaṇa: rang gi mtshan nyid), the universal (sāmānyartha: don spyi), and the clearly appearing non-existent (med pa gsal snang) (van der Kuijp 1983: 64). Alternatively, it may perhaps be connected with gSang phu ne’u thog’s emphasis on Dharmakīrti’s logico-epistemology, more generally – or even with a particular individual or faction of whom we know nothing.

In any case, according to van der Kuijp, Phya pa significantly diverged from the Dharmakīrtian line of interpretation in the category of objects. “The concretistic and realistic theories of the vaibhāṣika-s,” writes van der Kuijp, are revealed in Phya pa’s “reifications or hypostisizations of cognitive processes by means of which access may or may not be gained to these specific object-types” posited (ibid). This diverges from Dharmakīrti, who “proposed a causal model for perception, a model that was obviously based on Sautrāntika ontology” (ibid). With this in mind, we are aware of the possibility that Rongzom’s concern might be connected to views that are eventually developed by Phya pa in the context of their “pronounced partiality to the vaibhāṣika-s” (op. cit.) rather than simply a critical remark on the Dharmakīrtian project per se. To be sure, he does disclose the possibility of asserting universals to be either real or imagined. What is of importance is the idea that the universal suggests a basis upon which two
individuations of nature are proven to be either identical or different in accordance with the logical criteria outlined above. According to Rongzom, Dharmakīrti’s model not only affords the possibility of a universal qua real entity, it ineluctably implicates real entities.

It is possible, moreover, to insist upon a generality that is a real entity [and] it is possible, as well, to insist upon [its] imputed existence, because, from the presence of multiple natures in the same universal, the statement ‘This is present as a unified nature’ is given. When given [in terms of] isolation (dkar), the proof [establishing something] to be utterly unified in nature [485] relies on the generality due to being established in multiple baseless natures; once isolated through preclusion, the statement ‘this pertains to the same very nature’ is validated.581

Proofs that consolidate nature claim to establish putatively different natures – otherwise, what need for the comparison? Two putatively different natures are established as utterly identical (gang dang gang gcig gang du gcig pa), in this case, “when a subject and its predicate are established as a single identity” (bdag nyid gcig par sgrub par byed pa). For example, when we speak of that lotus’ blue color. Proof of differentiation, for its part, relies on differentiation within a universal, though this differentiation is, on Dharmakīrti’s view not ontological but grammatical in origin. Within this criteria, Rongzom writes, both existential and predicative statements are proven. When the proof validates particular individuations within a universal, he writes, the proof supposedly validates that universal as part of its process.

In the case of proving the presence of different natures per se, a differentiation within the universal validates it. In predication, the

581 The Approach: spyi gcig la ngo bo nyid du ma yod pa las | ‘di ngo bo nyid gcig du yod do zhes | bkar te ngo bo nyid gcig yod par bsgrub bo ||bkar te ngo bo nyid [485] gcig yin par bsgrub pa ni | spyi la rtan pa myed par ngo bo nyid du mar gnas pa rnamslas los te | bzlog nas bkar te ‘di ngo bo nyid gcig du bsgrub par byed pa gang zhe na | ‘di ltar gang dang gang gcig gang du gcig ces sgrub par byed do | (RZSB 1.484.22-485.03).
preclusion of unity is established. When a phenomenon is established as a unity, if proven in the context of isolation, then apart from that unified nature \textit{per se}, each and every other distinction - so-called `being a holder of water,’ `being a product,’ `being impermanent’ - is abandoned and precluded in validating nothing but a unity. When proving a subject and its predicate to be a single phenomena each and every part of it is proven to consist in the unified phenomenon after its nature \textit{per se} is formed as a single class.\footnote{582 The Approach: de la ngo bo nyid tha dad yod par bsgrub pa na \| spyi las phyed ste sgrub par byed do \| yin par sgrub pa na geig las bzlog ste sgrub par byed do \| de la chos geig du sgrub par byed pa na \| bkar te bsgrub par byed pa'i tshe \| bum pa'i ngo bo nyid gang yin pa de'i cha shas ma lus par chu 'dzin par byed pa yin byas pa yin mo rtag pa yin no zhes khyad par gzhan spang shing chos geig las bzlog nas sgrub bo \| chos dang chos can gnyis chos geig du sgrub par byed na \| ngo bo nyid phyogs su byas nas de'i cha shas ma lus par chos geig du sgrub par byed do \| (RZSB 1.485.10-185.16).}

When subjects and predicates are collapsed within a universal such that a unified nature is perceived, as is the case with holistic awareness, Rongzom states that a real entity (\textit{dravya : rdzas}) is instantiated. In that case,

\begin{quote}
\begin{itemize}
  \item a subject and its predicate are not found to be naturally distinct. Natural difference, then, would not obtain [between a given] phenomenon and its quality. Rather than being present as a unified phenomena, that nature would be a real entity, whose nature would be qualified only in terms of instances and marks of itself. If [those instances and marks are, in turn,] taken as individual [instances of nature], the unified entity would be nullified. In that case, nature itself, devoid of components, is validated as existing [as] one entity or pertaining [to] a unity.\footnote{583 The Approach: chos dang chos can yang ngo bo nyid tha dad mi rnyed \| chos dang chos kyang ngo bo nyid tha dad mi rnyed de \| ngo no nyid de ni geig du yod pa'am ma yin par rdzas sgrub par 'gyur la \| de'i chos ni ngo bo nyid de'i bye brag dang mtshan ma tsam du byas pa te \| so so na rdzas kyi cha shes myed par 'gyur te \| de lta na ngo bo nyid ni cha shas du ma myed pa rdzas geig yod pa'am yin par sgrub par byed do \| (RZSB 1.485.09-486.12).}
\end{itemize}
\end{quote}

On the other hand, generalities are collapsed in the context of proving distinction \textit{via} anatomizing awareness. According to Rongzom, this leads to an absurd digression in which hierarchizing awareness can find not place to stop.

When an anatomizing awareness [makes] differentiations, the insistence [that differentiations] exist in one generality collapses (\textit{jig}) the [notion of a] unified generality due to differentiations into multiple natures. Due to nature itself being differentiated in multiple distinctions, [the notion of]
the same nature *per se*, devoid of components, collapses. Due to individuating distinctions that differentiate into components, [the notion of] a phenomenon's individual entity collapses - it cannot be. When phenomenal differentiation is hierarchical in that way, mereological awareness, unchanging differentiation for as long as even an age, is inevitable.\(^584\)

The universal is the basis upon which any assertion concerning the nature of a given entity is posited. In dependence upon a universal and the application of logical criteria, there is the possibility of establishing, in theory, concrete notions of identity and difference. These criteria structure this epistemological model. On this view, the condition for proofs attempting to consolidate nature is necessarily structured by two putatively different natures, which are then probed to be the same nature. Though Dharmakīrti recognizes the grammatical nature of the individuations, Rongzom’s emphasis is on the role of holistic and anatomizing minds that form awareness of logically inferred identity and difference, which much begin with comparison of difference. Comparisons begin with the supposition of separation and cannot proceed without it; it structures the conditions for the possibility of such a proof. Subjects and predicates are collapsed through holistic awareness within a universal such that a unified nature is perceived – and a real entity (*dravya* : *rdzas*) is instantiated in the philosopher’s experience. Proofs attempting to differentiate nature are structured by the philosophical insistence upon the presence of real distinctions within what is one generality collapses. The assertion functions to collapse (’jig) perceptions of unified generality because anatomizing awareness functions by nature to

\(^{584}\) The Approach: \(1\) de la rjes su gzhig pa'i blo s rnam par phyed du na ni | spyi gcig tu yod par 'dod pa ni ngo bo nyid du mar phyed bas phyed gcig po 'jig go \(1\) ngo bo nyid khyad par du mar phyed bas ngo bo nyid gcig pa cha shes nyed pa'i rdzas 'jig go \(1\) khyad par gcig po cha shes su phyed chos gcig po'i rdzas 'jig ste mi 'grub bo \(1\) de ltar rims kyi s rnam par phyed na | gcig dang du ma'i blo ni bskal pa'i bar du phyed yang mi ldog du rung la \(1\) (RZSB 1.486.12-486.17).
make differentiations within a perceived whole. Anatomizing awareness functions thus to collapse (‘jig) any perception of an entity as whole or complete. According to Rongzom’s description, proofs consolidating nature instantiate a class of entities. Proofs differentiating a single nature, instantiate real entities.

**ON LOGIC & THE IMPLICATIONS OF Sanskrit Grammar**

In the final passage of this longest section of Chapter Four, there is mention of theory that abandons this two-fold model. It nevertheless engages in the same philosophical folly as outlined above. Rongzom compares these theories, as Bourdieu does, to a spectacle (cf. L. *specere*, ‘to look’) or a limited perspective (cf. G. *theōria*, 'perspective'). In comparison with the oceanic Great Perfection, these other approaches are but glances at it.

In that case, via all that philosophical positions that hypostisize things, one's own philosophical theory [487] proves the existence of a unified real entity - nature itself - by means of holistic awareness; and the philosophical theories of others are dissected by an anatomizing awareness that proves the non-existence of [the opposing philosophy’s ultimate] entity. Howsoever it is proved it is thereby circumscribed and that absence of a perfect knowable is simply a scale of distortion. Yet, on this view, proving nature and attribute to be identical or different or free from both and differentce is possible. At the point of constructing a proof for identity, one might establish qualities as identical to nature *per se* or establish nature as a unified quality. Thus, insofar as all phenomena are perceived to be characterized by their contributing to the spiritual attainment, these rational attacks also appear to the mind as [just so many] opposing contradictions between proponents of realist theories. These [paradigms of] reason do not converge in the system of the Great Perfection, even in part, just as one cannot claim to have surveyed depth
of the ocean and extent of space by the shot of an arrow or glance of an eye.  

Rongzom then (§4.3) offers just a few sentences in a section called ‘According to treatises on grammar,’ referring to the discourse of the Prāmāṇīkas. The laconic section (two sentences) opens by reiterating the two types of negation mentioned above and connects them to the function of ‘secondary derivatives (taddhitapratyaya : phan pa’i rkyen) and ‘primary derivatives (kṛpratyaya : byed pa’i rkyen). Rongzom’s explicit treatment of the role of grammar is brief and should be cited in full. It states:

In the treatises on grammar, too, whatever convention is given, there is nothing other than non-implicative and implicative negation given in existential and predicative proofs. Proving something is mostly described through ‘secondary derivations’ (taddhitapratyaya : de la phan pa’i rkyen) and ‘primary derivations’ (kṛpratyaya : byed pa’i rkyen). Secondary derivations transmit their respective universals [or generalities], disclose natures and nature-like distinctions, as well as primary derivations, accordingly. Even with primary derivations, it follows, there is no loss in saying ‘to go far’ discloses attributes [in the existential sense] with respect to something that functions to go for a distance (ring du ‘gro bar byed pa); and there is no loss in saying ‘go far’ discloses attributes [in the predicative sense with respect to departing for a long distance].
Furthermore, given that nouns (nāman : ming) are only made attested from what is not attested and marked by grammatical case (vibhakti : rnam par dbyer ba) alone, they are described as conjugated (tiṇanta : yin byed) verbal roots (dhātu : khams) suffixed/affixed qua derivations. This means that even without disclosing existence and predication – as in making the white of a cloth (ras yug gi dkar po bya ba lta bu) – this point is not transgressed.\textsuperscript{589}

This suggests that, according to Rongzom, it is secondary derivatives that function to transmit the supposed content of a concept-universal. In the context of the highly technical language of the Prāmāṇikas, Rongzom’s concern is also to chart a doctrine concerning how identity and difference are instantiated. As mentioned above, the analyses given here revolves around the subject matter of Dharmakīrti’s discussion of subject and predicate in the first chapter of Pramāṇavārttika, vv. 1.60-63.\textsuperscript{590} Chapter one, verses sixty reads:

While both a subject and its predicates] may describe the the same thing, the differentiation given by distinct grammatical case Causes the impression (bzhin) that they are different.\textsuperscript{591}

Commenting upon this verse, Dreyfus writes:

There is no need for two elements to account for expressions such as ‘a cow being impermanent.’ When somebody asks whether this cow is permanent, we answer that the cow is impermanent. The difference between the predicate expression (chos brjod kyi sgra) ‘being

\textsuperscript{589} The Approach: | sgra’i bstan chos las kkyang | tha snyad ci brjod kyang med pa dang ma yin par dgag pa dang | yod pa dang yin par bsgrub pa tsam las med de | de la dngos po bsgrub pa’ang phal cher de la phan pa’i rkyen dang | byed pa’i rkyen gyis brjod de | de la phan pa’i rkyen ni ’di ltar can lta bu spyi ston pa dang | gang yin pa lta bu nga bo nyid ston pa dang | nyid lta bu khyad par ston pa dang | byed pa’i rkyen yang ’di ltar | ring du ’gro bar byed pa ni ring du ’gro ba zhes yon tan ston pa dang ring du ’gro bar byed pa ni ring ’gro zhes yon tan ston pa lta bu’ang yod pa dang yin par ston pa las gud na myed do | gzhan yang ming kha ma tshang ba las kha tshang bar byas pa tsam dang | rnam par dbyar ba dang bcas pa tsam la yin byed kyi mtha’ can zhes bya ste | ras yug gi dkar po bya ba lta bu yod pa dang yin par ston pa’i rkyen myed pa’ang don de las mi ’da’o | (RZSB 1.487.11-487.18).

\textsuperscript{590} See Miyasaka, Y, ed. Pramāṇavārttika-kārīkā (Sanskrit-Tibetan) Acta Indologica 2 (Tokyo:1971-1972), pp. 48-52; and Dreyfus 1997, from where I have taken the Tibetan, Sanskrit, and English of each of these three verses: 1.60 on p. 183, 1.61 on p. 184, and 1.62 on p. 176. Corresponding transliterations are found on pp. 505-506, nn. 49, 52, and 26, respectively.

\textsuperscript{591} Pramāṇavārttika 1. 60: dvayor ekābhīdhāne ’pi vibhaktir vyatirekīṇī | bhimman artham ivānveti vācye lesāvīśesatāḥ | gnyis kas gcig gcig brjod mod kyi | brjod bya’i shan [= gzhan?] gyi khyad par gyis | rnam dbyar tha dad ’byed pa yis | tha dad don bzhin sgrub par bye |.
impermanent’ and the subject expression (chos can brjod pa ’i sgra) ‘a cow’ is merely grammatical and reflects no real distinction. There is only one object to which we are referring, a cow, and it can be described in several ways.

For Dharmakīrti, identify and difference is anchored in reality “and thus not conceptual but perceptual.” Two entities are identical when they cannot be observed apart. Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika 1.61 states:

The basis upon which the hearer of a particular sign excludes or does not exclude particular distinctions
Lies in the intention of the one who understands it. 593

Commenting upon this verse, Dreyfus writes:

Different ways of describing the same thing are expressions of the hearer's interests and the speaker's intentions. We could just consider a cow as a cow. We might also wonder aloud whether a cow is impermanent or not. We would then be told about ‘a cow being impermanent.’ This way of presenting things just answers our qualm. It also excludes other characteristics from the field of inquiry. Or, we may inquire about the cow in relation to its other characteristics. We then talk about ‘the cow's impermanence.’ In any case, there is only a cow and its characteristics. There is no separate ‘impermanence,’ for the only entity observed is a cow (1997: 184).

According to Pascal Hugon, 594 “la strophe PV 1.61 expose le critère qui différencie l'usage un mot-sujet d'un mot-propriété, à savoir le ‘rejet et non-rejet des autres caractéristiques’” (2008: 576). That is, Pramāṇavārttika 1.61 sets forth the distinction given between a subjects and its predicates in order to explore whether or not attribution of phenomenal characteristics is at all acceptable.

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593 Pramāṇavārttika 1. 61: bhedāntarapatīpratikṣepāpratikṣepau tayor dvayoḥ | saṃketabhedaśya padaṃ jñātṛvāicācaḥrodhinaḥ || khyad par gzhman ni spong ba dang mi spong ba dag de gnyis kyi | brda yi bye brag rtogs pa po | ’dod pa'i rjes su byed pa'i gzi || .
Pramāṇavārttika 1.62 states that denotation of subjects and attributes as distinct does not naturally occur. Pramāṇavārttika 1.62 reads:

Distinction, in all cases, is described in terms of entity and property; Thus, there is no [real] distinction in what is denoted by the two words.595

In his comments on this verse, Mipham gives almost the same locution in the final sentences as Rongzom. The similarity between phrasing is close enough to suggest Mipham is following Rongzom’s Approach on the topic:

Such things as a universal and that which it qualifies, activity and that which it qualifies, attribute and that which it qualifies, and everything else, are entities. They are stated predicates and things predicating subjects. The distinctions described by the descriptive terms are nothing more than rejected and unrejected differentiations. For that reason, the expression of those subjects and predicates does not grant distinctions between them because both describe one thing. There are different types of terms for describing those systems. It is due to the intention to recognize such an object in association with attributes that are rejected and not rejected that a term, when suffused into a secondary derivation, describes such qualities as cowness and nothing but a cow. Suffixed particles such as –ti and so forth, which form primary derivations, are those that mark the disclosure of a subject like nothing but a dyed cloth and the activity of dying [a cloth]. If, apart from those two, some other suffixed conjugated verb explains nothing in particular, then phrases such as Devadatta’s sleeping and the white of a cloth, where sleep qualifies Devadatta and white qualifies a cloth – being terms that reject other particular instances of sleep and white [in the general sense] – would in fact would describe subjects. And naturally, when Devadatta’s sleep and the white of a cloth are described, they are descriptions of predicates because of abiding in the universal alone, which rejects other distinctions. Descriptions through other criteria are possible in such cases; through there is no difference between that and rejecting and not rejecting distinctions. Thus is has been stated. In short, then, all particles such as the affix su- and the suffix –ti form primary and secondary derivations (respectively). Moreover, given that nouns (nāman : ming) are only made attested from what is not attested and marked by grammatical case (vibhakti : rnam par dbye ba) and so forth, they are described as conjugated (tiṅanta : yin byed) verbal roots.

595 Pramāṇavārttika 1.62: bheda 'yam eva sarvaṇa ravaṇyabhāvabhāvabhājinoḥ | śabdāyor na tāyor vacye viśeṣaṃ tana kaścana ।। | kun la ṛdza dang drgo brjod pa'i । sgra yi khyad par de nyyid do । de phyir de dag bjod bya la । khyad par gang yang yod ma yin ।.
Concerning Pramāṇavārttika 1.63, Hugon writes:

L’état de fait (tam artham) que le locuteur veut faire connaître est à comprendre selon les commentateurs comme « le fait de rejeter ou non les autres caractéristiques ». Toute nuance dans la signification d’un mot apportée par l’ajout d’un suffixe/affixe (pratyaya, tib. rkyen), comme le suffixe abstrait «-tā/tvā » dans« gotva », peut s’expliquer en ces termes. La discussion prend ici un tour grammatical, puisque Dharmakīrti étend son explication à tous les mots dérivés, et réduit à cette simple différence d’intention l’usage des quatre types de mots reconnus par les vaiśeṣika comme se rapportant à autant de choses réelles distinctes: l’universel (jati), la propriété (guna), l’action (kriya) et la relation (sambandha).

Given that “toute nuance dans la signification d’un mot apportée par l’ajout d’un suffixe/affixe (pratyaya),” It is interesting to note the Vaiśeṣika influence in the four-fold structure of universal (jati), attribute (guna), activity (kriya), and relation (sambandha). Dharmakīrti’s turn toward the grammatical is not a surprise given his view that attribution is afforded by suffixation and affixation. This being the case, we are not surprised when “la discussion prend ici un tour grammatical, puisque Dharmakīrti étend son explication à tous les mots dérivés.”

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596 Legs bshad snang ba’i gter: spyi dang spyi ldan | bya ba dang bya ba can | yon tan dang yon tan can sogs gzhan kun la’ang rāzas tet chos can brjod pa dang | dangos po ste chos brjod pa’i sgra yi khāyad par ni khāyad par gzhan spon mi spong gi dbye ba ‘di stam nyhid du zad do \ de phyir chos chos can de dag brjod bya la khāyad par ‘gā’ yang yod pa ma yin te gnis kas kyang gcig brjod pa’i phyir ro \ tshul de dag rjod par byed pa’i sgra yi rnam pa tha dad pa yod de \ khāyad par spong mi spong gi don de lta bu shes par byed \ dod pas sgra de la phan pa’i de phan gi rkyen sbyar nas bstan na ba lang nyid dang ba lang tsam la sogs pa lta bu chos brjod pa’am \ tit soogs byed pa ldan pa’i rkyen gyis bsgrub na spyr ‘tshed pa tsam chos can dang ‘tshed pa’i bya ba nyid ston pa lta bu chos brjod pa can nam \ gal te de gnis las gzhan pa bye brag tu bshad du med pa yin byed kyi mtha’ can du byas na \ lhas byin gyis nyid lta bu [91] dang \ ras yug gi dkar po zhes pa lta bu lhas byin dang \ ras yug gi khāyad par du byas pa’i nyal ba dang dkar pos ni \ de nyis ma yin pa’i nyal ba dang dkar po gzhan spangs pas khāyad par gzhan spong ba’i sgrar ‘gyur te chos brjod par ‘gyur la \ rang brzin du lhas byin gyis nyid la dang ra dangs pas khāyad par gzhan spong ba’i sgrar ‘gyur te chos brjod par ‘gyur la \ rang brzin du lhas byin gyis nyid la dang ra dangs pas khāyad par gzhan par gzhan mi spong bar spyi tsam du gnas pos chos can brjod par ‘gyur ro \ de la soqs pa tshul gzhan gyis brjod kyang rung khāyad par spong mi spong de las khāyad par gzhan gang yang med do \ zhes mdor na rkyen thams cad su pa dang ti soqs byed ldan gi rkyen dang \ de phan gi rkyen dang \ de las gzhan ming ma tsang ba kha skong ba dang rnam dbye soogs yin byed kyi mtha’ can zhes bya ste rkyen gyi mtha’ de...

90.01-91.05).

597 As with each chapter of The Approach, I must admit that an exhaustive treatment lies beyond the scope of the present effort. Thus, I am collecting data and materials for a further study of Rongzom’s critique of Dharmakīrtian epistemology, which must await identification and review...
In presenting some facets of the logical approach, Rongzom has shown that bodhicitta as an indivisibility in nature and identity between bodhi and citta. Moreover, since the Dharmakīrtian view tends to assert the mental nature of phenomena – e.g. the difference between subjects and their predicates is a conceptual one derived through the mechanisms of grammar rather than a perceptual anchored in reality. Wherever they diverge, Rongzom has demonstrated some significant overlap between Great Perfection and logico-epistemology.

ON THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC & THE FOUR PRINCIPLES OF REASONING

In §4.4, the last of the chapter, Rongzom treats the science of logic (rigs pa’i bstanchos) and introduces (§4.4.1) the four principles of reason (yukti catuṣṭayam : rigs pa rnam pa bzhi), (§4.4.2.1) their respective criteria (tshad) and (§4.4.2.2) limits (thal). These four principles of reasoning, as given by Rongzom, are termed:

1. reasoning of reality (dharmatāyukti : chos nyid kyi rigs pa )
2. reasoning of efficacy (kāryakārānayukti : bya ba byed pa’i rigs pa)
3. reasoning of dependence (apekṣāyukti : ltos pa’i rigs pa)
4. reasoning of valid proof (upapattisādhanayukti : ’thad pa sgrub pa’i rigs pa)

The two sections on the criteria and limits of the four principles is noteworthy.

The manner in which the four-fold rubric was traditionally employed varied so widely as to leave uncertainty about its normative context in Buddhist discourse.

Describing the four principles of reason, Kapstein writes:

The four principles of reason are in Sanskrit called the yukti-catuṣṭayam. The term yukti, which may mean 'law, reason, proof, argument; what is of the topics first. This effort is slowed by the fact Rongzom is not citing Dharmakīrti but, it appears, paraphrasing.
correct, right, fit, appropriate,' had been used in connection with the earliest efforts of Indian Buddhists to formulate canons of interpretation. The precise enumeration of four *yukti* appears for the first time, it would seem, in the quintessentially hermeneutical scripture of the Mahāyāṇa, the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* (The Sūtra Which Sets Free the [Buddha’s] Intention)... Henceforth, this enumeration of the four principles of reason would remain a stable feature of the Indian and later Tibetan Buddhist scholastic traditions. The precise manner in which the four were individually defined and the manner of their interrelation were, however, subject to considerable variation. 598

In addition to Kapstein’s comments on the providence of the four principles, Heidi Köppl fills in some of the intellectual history in South Asian Buddhist literature.

The *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, the earliest known source that employs the four principles of reasoning, certainly may have been an inspiration. Another source that may have played a role is Asaṅga’s *Śrāvakabhūmi*, in which Asaṅga argues for the impure nature of things using exactly these four principles. 599 The four principles of reasoning are classically treated in Asaṅga’s *Abhidharmasamuccaya* and Maitreya’s *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, and Rongzom no doubt was familiar with these texts. Furthermore, we might also notice the Valid Means of Cognition, attributed to Trisong Deutsen, as a possible source of inspiration for Rongzom with its elaborate treatment of the four principles (62-63).

According to Köppl, whose translation and study of Rongzom’s epistemological essay, *Establishing Appearances as Divine* (*sNang ba lhar bsgrub pa*), examines Rongzom’s use of the four principles of reasoning in both that text and passages from *The Approach*, states that Rongzom’s view on “reasoning itself” can be understood from examining how he employs the four-fold scheme. Generally, Rongzom uses reasoning, she writes, in order “to establish a superior ontological

599 See, for example, Engle, Artemus B., Vasubandhu, and Sthiramati. *The Inner Science of Buddhist Practice: Vasubandhu’s Summary of the Five Heaps with Commentary by Sthiramati* (New York: Snow Lion Publications, 2009), pt. I, s.v. ‘the transcendent path’ n.b. p. 446 n. 685.
Yet she also offers an important qualifier: “Rongzom’s treatment of” the reasoning of reality “appears somewhat unconventional” (ibid). This, first and foremost, stems from the fact that Rongzom lists the principle reasoning of reality first rather than last, as it is in canonical sources (loc. cit.). Additionally, the term yukti has both objective and subjective connotations giving the trope a wide horizon of interpretation. This makes space for a vital continuity between subjective and objective domains of experience when discusses in terms of the four principles. The section opens with the following declaration outlining logical treatises and the relation that obtains between what is articulated in them and in the Great Perfection approach. For Rongzom, the quandaries and protocols of logical discourse cannot frustrate or even problematize the Great Perfection that encompasses it. Individuals fixated upon a logical approach at all costs are simply engaged in the philosophical folly Rongzom has described several times throughout The Approach.

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600 See Köppel, Heidi I. Establishing Appearances As Divine: Rongzom Chözang on Reasoning, Madhyamaka, and Purity (Snow Lion Publications, 2008), 61.
601 Such a dual connotation is not uncommon in vital Buddhist technical terms. For example, Ronkin (2005: 4-5) and van der Kuijip both render pramāṇa : tshad ma as "epistemology," though van der Kuijip notes the term to be "fundamentally untranslatable" (1983: vii). In fact, it should be noted there is often an intensional and extensional ambiguity in terms of fundamental importance to Buddhist discourse. Other examples include the “inherent ambiguity” of the term loka : 'jig rten (Gonda 1966: 110), the strange behavior of dravya : rdzas (Dreyfus 1997: 67), the unavoidable "translational problems" of satya : bden pa (Cowherds 2010: 4) and the critical Mahāyāna concept of svabhāva : rang bzhin (Westerhoff 2009: 19-20) - even the fundamental term, dharma : chos presents significant difficulties (Cox 2004: 543). Such conceptual ambiguity is often strategically advantageous inasmuch as it offers a wider interpretative space. Kapstein points on the "extramental or psychological" nuance of yukti : rigs pa (1898: 374). Dreyfus severally comments on Dharmakīrti’s own ambiguities in that regard (cf. 1997: 64, 73, 82, 188, 314); and Gombrich 1996 and 2009 make note of such ambiguities in the Pali canon. These ambiguities should not suggest, however, that the source domain’s language is "inexact or vague" (Schmithausen 1981: 200); but, rather, that the interpretative space – the “total responsiveness to the field of relevant force and intimation in which words conduct their complex lives” – is open to play. The quote is from Steiner, George. After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation (Open Road Media, 2013), 3.
In treatises on logic, refutations and proofs given in terms of the four principles of reasoning that do not go beyond the two types of negation and two types of proof [discussed above]. Even in the appraisal [of phenomena given] in terms of the four principles of reason, all that is observed is proponents of realist theories simply subverting one another's philosophical positions. Furthermore, once the reasoning itself is seen to be excessive, it is seen to be subverted once more due to the consequences of reasoning per se. As stated before (§1.6), such does not undermine the Great Perfection approach.\footnote{The Approach: | gzan yang rigs pa ’i bstan chos las rigs pa rnam pa bzhi’i sgo nas dgag sgrub byed pa rnas kyang | dgag pa rnam pa gnyis dang | bsgrub pa gnyis las mi ’da’ ste | rigs pa rnam pa bzhi’i sgo nas gzhal yang | dngos par lta ba rnam kyi grub mtha’ gcig la gcig gnod pa tsam yang dmigs la | gzhang yang rigs pa nyid thal bar gyur nas slar gnod pa [488] dmigs par zad de | des rdzogs pa chen po’i tshul la mi gnod pa ni snga ma bzhin no | (RZSB 1.48720-488.01).}

The four principles of reasoning are, in the end, like all other reasoning, too vulgar to utterly nullify sentient fixation on appearances though it has the power to attenuate it to some degree. § 4.4.1 describes the context of the four principles:

In the system of the four principles of reasoning, generally, it is established that arising as dependent relations is the character of phenomena. The [principle reasoning of reality is comprises proofs given in terms of nature itself. The [principle reasoning of efficacy is comprises of proofs given in terms of result. The [principle reasoning of dependence is comprises of proofs given in terms of cause. The [principle reasoning of valid proof is comprises of proofs given in terms qualified by stainless reasoning alone.\footnote{The Approach: | de la rigs pa bzhi’i tshul ni | spyirchos rtan cing ’brel te ’byung ba bsgrub pa’i mitshan nyid la | ngo bo nyid kyi sgo nas sgrub pa ni chos nyid kyi rigs pa | ’bras bu’i sgo nas sgrub par byed pa ni bya ba byed pa’i rigs pa | rgyu’i sgo nas sgrubpar byed pa ni ltos pa’i rigs pa | rigs pa nyid dri ma nyed par byas te sgrub par byed pa ni ’thad pa sgrub pa’i rigs pa’o | (RZSB 1.488.01-488.05)}

Each of the four principles has a particular object of exclusion (sel ba bzhi): the **reasoning of reality** excludes gnawing doubt concerning a given object’s nature. 

**Reasoning of efficacy** removes or excludes doubt about instruments of activity.

**Reasoning of dependence** removes or excludes doubt about manifestation or production. **Reasoning of valid proof** removes or excludes doubt about reasoning itself.
In a paragraph describing the ‘objects and limits’ (yul dang tshad) of the four principles, Rongzom valorizes the doctrine of purity, stating that such things as instrument, manifestation, and understanding can only be classed as one of the four principles insofar as the object that is the basis described by that reasoning is taken as pure and unstained. Rongzom compares the idea of an impure or stained basis to a sun-crystal hot to the touch. It is the effect of light being focused through the sun-crystal that produces combustion and heat and burning. Fire is produced when light passes through the structure of the crystal. Next, Rongzom compares the denial of the pure basis to denying that fire burns a creature who cleanses itself in fire yet is unburned by fire when standing in it. Yes, we may say the fire ‘burns’ the fire-bathing beast but this ‘burning’ constitutes a bath for such a creature. In short, denial of the pure basis stems from a misunderstanding of its nature. Rongzom is clear, in this passage, that the fourth principle, in particular, can be over-applied. In that case, there is the perception of stainlessness in all rational contexts and one becomes overly proud, which is a bad thing for a Buddhist.

Rongzom’s detailed explanation of the limits and excesses of the four principles (§ 4.4.2), begins by declaring that proponents of realism (i.e. philosophers engaged in biased assessments – including Mādhyamikas) prove things, for the most part, by means of the principle of reality and direct perception. A proof given via the first principle “is only a partial outline of distortions in what is an undeniable reality [and] simply settled as the principle reasoning of reality.” On this view, the theory behind the Madhyamaka assertion of true conventions acts as nothing but a ideological guardian of all realist theories [rather than a critique/refutation of them].
When, in accordance with the condensed teaching on Great Perfection, all phenomena are included within the mind and mental, then any “conscious awareness of reality apprehends, as stainless reality and stainless direct perception, an object that is to be comprehended and proven.”

Rongzom problematizes the notion of direct perception in the manner of a Madhyamika, suggesting undesirable consequences that ineluctably derive when the model of direct perception is structured in two-tiers, as Dharmakirti’s is. There is bare perception without any ideation (i.e. the first moment of direct perception) and direct perception that is marked by ideation (i.e. subsequent moments). In undermining the notion that direct perception is authoritative, Rongzom is moving his discourse past the subject of logical and epistemological models. We observe this shift in his reductio description of the Pramāṇika theory of direct perception (pratyakṣa: mgon sum).

Commonly, directly perceiving awareness is [said to be] something generated along with conceptual aspects or something generated along without conceptual aspects. If generated without conceptual aspects, how is an object made to be directly perceived? If [direct perception] is generated without conceptual aspects, what acts as the unmistaken witness? ‘That being the case, there also a refutation [of] direct perception that states it ‘is not a viable pramāṇa’.

Next, Rongzom moves to the Yogācāra model with the same type of problematization. He conjures up tension between the Pramāṇika’s direct perception and the Yogācārins axiomatic claim that the nature of mind and

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604 *The Approach*: shes bya thams cad sems tsam yin na | yang dag pa’i shes pa des gzhal zhing bsgrub par bya ba’i don gzhan yang cig zhig btsal dgos zhes chos nyid dri ma myed pa dang mgon sum dru ma myed par ’dzin to | (RZSB 1.490.03-490.05).

605 *The Approach*: ’di ltar thun mong ltar na mgon sum gyi blo de rum pa dang bcas par skye ba zhig gam | ’on te rum pa myed par skye ba zhig de la rumapa myed par skye na ni don la mgon sum du’ang ji ltar byed | gal te rum pa dang bcas par skye na ni ma ’khrul ba’i dpang po’ang gang gis bya | de bas na mgon sum ni tshad mar mi rung ngo zhes sun ’byin pa yang yod do | (RZSB 1.490.06-490.09).
mental factors are false conceptions. Rongzom, using a Prāsaṅgika strategy, problematizes the integration of the two tiers of this doctrine:

According to the Yogācārins, are not all the minds and mental factors associated with the three realms false conceptions? If false conceptions, how is it a directly perceiving awareness is free from concepts? If it is really unmistaken, how is it directly perceiving awareness is unconfused? Insofar as it is marked by conception and thus an confusion, how is it possibly a pramāṇa?606

The object that is indicated through the exclusionary and thus negational terms conceptual and unconfused indicate [respectively] negation in adherence (zhen par dgag pa) and negation in separation (bral bar dgag pa).607 Yogācārins might attempt to shift the definition of direct perception so as to facilitate its implementation into their interpretation. The crux of Rongzom’s argument suggests that, for committed Yogācārins, it is absurd to claim to be able to measure the degree of conceptuality at work in a given awareness considering the subtle mechanisms of negation. If the mind and mental are false conceptualizations, then any direct perception, which is non-conceptual by definition, would be free of confusion and distortion – and thus gnosis.

Moreover, even in non-conceptual perception, Rongzom questions whether or not the presence of sensation (tshor ba) nullifies the Yogācārin assertion that this perception is reflexive and non-conceptual because if it is qualified by sensation, which is confusing, confusion cannot be removed by cultivation of said perception.

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606 The Approach: | rnal ’byor spyod pa pa nyid kyi ltar na | khams gsum pa ’i sens dang sens las byung ba thams cad yang dag pa ma yin pa ’i kun du rtog pa ma yin nam | kun du rtog pa yhin na ji ltar mngon sum gyi blo rtog pa dang bral | yang dag ma yin par grub na ji ltar mngon sum gyi blo ma ’khrul | rtog pa dang bcas shing ’khrul pa dang bcas par gyur na tshad mar ji ltar rung | (RZSB 1.490.10-490.14).
607 zhen par dgag pa dang bral bar dgag par bstan pa yin te (490.15).
ON THE AUTHORITY OF RATIONALITY, INTIMATE INSTRUCTION & TANTRIC PRAMĀNA

After such a long and rich critical treatment of the limits and value of logic, epistemology, and reasoning, Rongzom’s interlocutor asks the obvious question: if all reason is in fact corrupt, by what uncorrupt reasoning have you inferred this point? In response, we find the pragmatist; the man who sees reason must be employed at times but does not raise it to the level of authoritative cognition (pramāṇa). Indeed, reasoning is, in the end, corrupt; but that does not mean some reasoning is not better than other reasoning. His position does suggest that reasoning is to be used moderately rather than as a totalizing soteriological structure. Summing up, Rongzom reminds readers that while key to his approach is the fact that Great Perfection is finally revealed in dependence upon transmission, intimate advice, and one’s own awareness.

We do not [in fact] say there is an incorrupt reasoning. Nevertheless, because there are greater and lesser degrees of corruption, those reasonings of little corruption are capable of refuting those of greater corruption. If there were one incorrupt [system of] reason that handled [everything] knowable, what is the reason the Jinas, do lay out just that [system of reason] in all vacana from the very start? Regardless, none of this should suggest reliance on reason to be unhelpful. For example, the first glance and the first step do not complete the distance a person might intend to travel; yet it is not the case these are not to be relied upon. Just as it is completed through reliance upon them, realization becomes perfect through scriptural transmission, intimate advice, and one’s own awareness arisen from reason.608

608 The Approach: ‘di skad du ’o na rigs pa thams cad dri ma can yin na | khyed la rigs pa dri ma myed pa gzhon ji lta bu zhig yod ce na | kho bo cag ni rigs pa dri ma myed pa yod par mi smra ste | ’on kyang dri ma che chung gi bye brag yod pas ching bas che ba sun ‘byin par nus so | rigs pa dri ma myed pa geig gis shes bya’i mthar phyin par byed pa zhig yod na | rgyal ba rnams kyiis bka’ thams cad du de nyyid thog mar ci’i phyir mi bstan te | de lta’ang ma yin | rigs pa la rten cing phan mi ‘dogs pa’ang ma yin te | dper na skyes bu lam ring bor ’gro bar ’dod na | mig rgyang dang po dang gom pa dang pos mthar phyin pa’ang ma yin | de la ma rten par yang ma yin | ded dpon gyi lung dang dbung la ma rten par yang ma yin te | de rnams la rten pas mthar phyin pa bzhiin du lung dang ma ngag dang rang gi blo rigs pas bskyed pa rnams kyiis mthar rto gs par ’gyur ro | (RZSB 1.491.01-491.10).
This three-fold criteria of authenticity given by Rongzom is a model for establishing what is religiously authoritative in body, speech, and mind. This three-fold model – scriptural transmission (āgama : lung), intimate advice (upadeśa : man ngag), and one’s own awareness arisen from reason (rang gi rig pa’i blo rigs pas bskye pa) – deserves some attention. In the present context, I wish to simply mention a few key places where a remarkably similar organizational set is mentioned.

A fairly similar set appears in the Lamp of the Mind (Thugs kyi sgron ma) and the Lamp of the Correct View (lTa ba yang dag sgron ma), two texts attributed to the ninth century tantric master dPal dbyangs. Scriptural transmission (lung), intimate advice (man ngag), and reason or awareness (rig pa) is mentioned several times, and in the context of several different sources, in gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes’ tenth century bSam gtan mig sgron. This source is particularly interesting for its list of other sources for dPal dbyangs’ triune iteration. It states: “in dPal dbyang’s meditation text, it states that total confidence in the nature of reality is resolved through scriptural transmission, intimate spiritual advice, and reason”.

Additionally, we find a remarkably similar three-fold model of ‘authenticators’ (tshad ma rnam pa gsum) in the Bönpo work on Great Perfection called Authenticity of Open Awareness: A Collection of the Essential Reasonings (gTan

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610 See, for example, Rnal ‘byor mig gi bsam gtan (S.W. Tashigangpa, Ladakh, 1974), p. 49.04-52.03, 188.05 (s.v. sngags gi gtan tshigs gsum), 192.05, just to mention a few.

611 bSam gtan mig sgron: mkhan po dpal dbyangs kyi bsgom lung las | lung dang man ngag rig pas thag bcad de || chos kyi rang bzhin yang dag yid ches bya | (49.04-49.05).
tshigs gal mdo rig pa’i tshad ma), which the Bön tradition traces to the eighth century. In her discussion of the opening of this interesting text, Klein writes:

Authenticity names what it calls three ‘authenticators of method’ (thabs kyi tshad ma) The term ‘authenticator of method’ is, as far as we know, unique to this presentation. The three are called ‘methods’ insofar as they are supports for understanding or establishing the view of unbounded wholeness.’ They do not, however, authenticate it. The term ‘authenticator’ is never defined in this text, though in its root text, Authenticity of Essential Precepts and Scripture (Man ngag lung gi tshad ma) ‘authenticator’ is defined as ‘that which finally clarifies misunderstanding.’ Authenticity itself calls these methods because they facilitate understanding of unbounded wholeness. The three methods are: (i) scripture (lung), (2) essential precepts (man ngag), and (3) reflexively authentic open awareness (rang gi rig pa’i tshad ma). The three authenticators are intimately related. Authenticating essential precepts connect the practitioner to authenticating scriptures, which themselves are authenticated through authentic open awareness. The principle of authenticity, then, is fluidly mobile, circulating among these three. How this circulation is energized is not explicitly stated. However, at the very least we can see that a mutually enhancing network of ‘methods’ suggests an authenticity that need not proceed linearly from one type of authenticating state to another... However, we will not be allowed for long to forget that in Dzogchen, method and goal, or path and fruit, are one. This will require us to reread these terms. Above all, it will require us to understand that open awareness is neither an authenticator nor ultimately authenticated in the course of these reasonings. Rather, it is revealed as itself authentic. This will be its unique way of clarifying misunderstanding, for its presence entails the absence of unawareness, ignorance (32-33).

According to the Bön tradition, the authenticity and authority one’s own awareness (rang gi rig pa’i tshad ma) “is itself a union of the clear and empty, for

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which reason it is also known as the base, the authentic state toward which the other two authenticators, scriptural and essential precepts, are directed” (35). Perhaps critically, none of the three are considered in Bön to be mental in nature. The authenticity and authority one’s own awareness – what Klein translates as ‘reflexively authentic open awareness’ – “has functions analogous” (id.) to mind that are nonetheless not mental. This is an obvious and striking difference between this presentation and that of the Prāmāṇikas. While only a detailed examination of Rongzom’s views in the context of the relevant intellectual history will evince a clear picture of the development of a tantric system of pramāṇa – more will be said on this below – Klein’s description of the three-fold Bönpo model of authority in contrast with that of the Prāmāṇikas might be helpful:

Unlike inference and direct perception in classic Buddhist discussions of mind and logic, reflexively authentic open awareness does not take the measure of anything. There is no process of authentication associated with open awareness at all; it is simply, in and of itself, authentic to its own nature. This is possible because, again, open awareness is not a consciousness (37).

In Chapter Four of The Approach, Rongzom mentions the three-fold model only once, when he declares that “realization becomes perfect through transmission, intimate advice, and one's own awareness arisen from reason.” If we recall, from the opening of Chapter Three, the way of Great Perfection consists in the perfection of the realization of the illusory, we can see from this statement (and more in Chapter Five) that at the very end of the path, the appropriate teaching that pushes the trainee from sentient being (sattva) to an awakened being (buddha) is totally particular to the individual – it is not a general discourse.
Moreover, for Rongzom, one’s own awareness is consciousness, distinguishing it from the Bönpo conception. In her excellent study, Klein also notes the democratic nature of this doctrine. The criterion of authority referred to as the authenticity of one’s own awareness makes the practitioner of Great Perfection an authority concerning the validity of her own spiritual experience. Though, for Rongzom, one’s own awareness is consciousness, Klein’s description the role of intimate advice (upadeśa : man ngag) on the Bönpo path of Great Perfection – she translates this term as ‘essential precepts’ – echoes Rongzom’s notion that awakening is not cognitive in nature, or even a process:

Thus, the soteriological function of essential precepts is similar to that of inference, yet the epistemological process invoked is quite different—Authenticity does not suppose that reasoning catapults one into an experience of unbounded wholeness. The ‘further development’ involved does not privilege reasoned knowledge (36).

Just how closely these remarks might describe Rongzom’s model remains to be seen. With only a single mention of the three-fold criteria by which one’s realization of the view of equality is perfected, we shall suspend comparison with the Bön for now.

The three-fold set of scriptural transmission, intimate advice, and reason/awareness are also mentioned in Sa skya Paṇḍita’s Clear Differentiation of the Three Codes (sDom pa gsum gyi rab tu dbye ba), said to be composed around 1232. It is also found in the polemic entitled Single Intention (dGongs gcig yig cha), said to have been completed around 1267, where Rongzom’s three-fold

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615 See Martin, Dan. 1997. "Beyond Acceptance and Rejection? The Anti-Bön Polemic Included in the Thirteenth-Century Single Intention (Dgongs-gcig Yig-cha) and Its Background in Tibetan
model of authority is found embedded a four-fold model. These are the ‘four warrants of authority’ (tshad ma bzhi) given and attributed to Phag mo gru pa rDo rje rgyal po (1110–1170).616 If that is true, he perhaps added the fourth warrant, which Martin translates as ‘The truth-test of history – interdependent origination’ (id.). In Sa skya Paṇḍita’s Clear Differentiation, the chapter on tantric vows contains a verse that connects Rongzom’s three-fold model of authority to Mahāyoga discourse on the three types of purity: ‘the nature of the three types of purity is described in Mahāyoga tantra, which are given by the guru in terms of scriptural transmission, [one’s own] awareness, [and] intimate advice.’617 Thus, Köppl is correct in connecting Rongzom’s use of the four principles of reasoning to a rhetoric working ‘to establish a superior ontological status for purity.’618

Clearly, the topic of tantric pramāṇa requires further consideration. Fortunately, Gentry (2013: 222-224) has laid the ground for such a work; certainly a study exploring the origin, development, and application of tantric pramāṇa is desideratum. My comments here are restricted to relevant historical comparisons.

**CHAPTER CITATIONS**

To my knowledge, there are no texts directly cited in this chapter. This omission suggests Rongzom was determined to address the issues herein in his own idiom.

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616 Martin 1997: 293 n. 30.
618 See Köppl, Heidi I. Establishing Appearances As Divine: Rongzom Chözang on Reasoning, Madhyamaka, and Purity (Snow Lion Publications, 2008), 61.
CONCLUSION

Chapter Four of The Approach offers a survey of the logical approach to the Buddhist path given in the tradition of Dharmakīrti and the Prāmāṇikas (sgra'i bstan chos smra ba) and through the four principles of reasoning, which are themselves found in several important Mahāyāna texts. Throughout, Rongzom’s treatment is respectful but critical. In the documentary domain of the chapter, we find terms and categories from Abhidharma, Pramāṇa, Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka connecting Rongzom’s discourse. In its workly dimension, this chapter functions to show that while the mechanics of the Prāmāṇika effort may appear be at odds with descriptions found in Great Perfection, there are important points of contact between the two that show them not to be in radical conflict. The fact subjects and predicates are not taken to be necessarily ontologically distinct is one point of contact that allows Rongzom to suggest that Prāmāṇikas may recognize the condensed teaching that bodhi is citta.

Over all, systematically applied models of knowledge are useful, though overreliance upon on such leads to the absurdities that are typical of philosophy. This cannot amount to a whole-sale dismissal of reasoning because the Buddhist path is articulated in terms of subjects, predicates, and reasons. For those of who are too far removed from a simple faith in Great Perfection by the viscidities and concretizing processes of philosophical realism, the liberatory forest is missed for the philosophical trees. Yes, philosophy is sexy – in the same shallow manner that costume jewelry is. It is shiny and attention grabbing; but, in the end, it is for children; nothing in comparison with the nuanced path of Great Perfection which may engage reasoning or not. Great Perfection, by comparison, is a wish-
fulfilling gem to those who are not certain that soteriology must be aligned theoretically with approaches that reinforce the existential and predicative import of philosophical realism. All philosophical systems work through bias. Great Perfection, on this view, is obviously not considered a philosophical system in the same sense. This chapter reinforces my primary assertion that Rongzom’s Great Perfection is a hermeneutic that may be applied to any interpretation of the path. At the end of the chapter, it has become clear that Rongzom sees philosophical approaches to the path as potentially conducive to spiritual growth. When set in relation to Great Perfection, however, and Rongzom’s emphasis on the ultimate value of transmission, intimate advice, and the authority of one’s own awareness born of reason vis-à-vis perfecting one’s realization, it becomes clear that Rongzom is quite familiar with the Dharmakīrtian project, which he spends all of Chapter Four explicating. While the comparison is in many ways sympathetic, the chapter as a whole serves works to demonstrate the limits and excesses of rational and epistemological inquiry.
**THE APPROACH, CHAPTER FIVE: THE WRITINGS OF GREAT PERFECTION**

**INTRODUCTION**

The fifth chapter of *The Approach* is explicitly dedicated to an exploration of early writings (*gzhung nyid*) of the Great Perfection. As such, it is, among other things, a window into the intellectual history of Great Perfection as it develops into a systematic tradition culminating in the fourteenth century. Chapter Five is organized by the author into three sections. The first is a very short section outlining a four-fold rubric for Great Perfection discourse that is perhaps Rongzom’s own. The second and third sections are roughly the same length – twenty-four pages in the 1999 edition. These two sections treat, respectively, Great Perfection discourse as given in writings on Great Perfection and the
methods given for consolidating or settling *bodhicitta*. A large portion of the chapter is devoted to a survey of the points of deviation from and obscurations to (*gol sgrīb*) the view of equality. These ‘deviations and obscurations’ are said to hinder an individual in penetrating the view of equality at the heart of Great Perfection’s reading of the Buddhist doctrine of illusory appearance. In addition, the third section of chapter five, on ‘settling’ or ‘consolidating’ *bodhicitta* (*byang sms gzhag thabs*), we find discussion of meditation and the relation between mindfulness and equanimity in Great Perfection as well as the writings that explicate them; and we also find discussion of the critical impediments to concentration and the mastery of *bodhicitta*. In the following chapter, we shall explore two primary domains of the text – documentary and workly – in order to clarify the character of Rongzom’s Great Perfection. In concluding remarks on the chapter, we shall assess where Rongzom’s Great Perfection discourse stands in relation a figure form whom Rongzom is said to have received many lineages of teaching: A ro Ye shes ‘byung gnas (fl. tenth century).620

**CHAPTER OVERVIEW**

**A QUESTION OF GENRE?**

At more than double the length of any other chapter, the fifth chapter of *The Approach* is the longest of the text, containing one hundred and eight citations that structure the chapter’s predominantly documentary domain and form the significant object of our attentions throughout this essay. These citations, which

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620 On this obscure figure, reference may be made to Khenchen Palden Sherab Rinpoche and Khenpo Tsewang Dongyal Rinpoche. *Pointing Out the Nature of the Mind: Dzogchen Pith Instructions of Aro Yeshe Jungne* (Sidney Center, N.Y.: Dharma Samudra 2012) pp. 1-9; as well as Roerich’s *Blue Annals*, pp. 999-1001.
organize the discussion below, are categorized into three recognizable groups, with a more amorphous but discernible ‘everything-else’ group making a fourth. In the first group of citations we find fifty references to five different chapters the Kun byed rgyal po, each of which correspond to five works of so-called Eighteen Works of the Mind Series (sems sde bco brgyad), which were becoming increasingly available (and systematized) in the tenth century. In the second


622 According to the Chos dbyings rin po che’i mdzod and its auto-commentary, Lung gi gter mdzod, the so-called Eighteen tantras of the sems sde consist of the five early translations of the Mind Series texts – Rig pa’i klu byug, rTsal chen sprug pa, Khnyung chen lding ba, rDo la gser zhum, Mi nub pa’i rgyal mtshan rdo rje sems dpa’ nam mkha’ che – and the thirteen later translations: rTse mo byung rgyal, Nam mkha’i rgyal po, bDe ba’ phral bkod , rDzogs pa spyi chings, Byang chub sems tig, bDe ba rab ’byams, Srog gi ’khor lo, Thig le drug pa, rDzogs pa spyi sbyod, Yid bzhi nor bu, Kun ’dus rig pa, rJe btsun dam pa, sGom pa don grub. Cf. Thub bstan chos dar’s rNy-ing ma rgyud ’bum kyi dkar chag gsal ba’i me long (Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 2000), pp. 70-75; Karmay 2007: 23-24 and Norbu; Clemente 1999: 250-259, where is noted the existence of seventy-seven sems sde tantras in India, only three of which were translated into Tibetan (250). See also The Nyinmg Na School of Tibetan Buddhism: Its Fundamentals and History: 2.221-222. According to Sam van Schaik, the sems sde resemble teachings “on the nature of mind, identifying it with wisdom, and referring to this as bodhicitta” (van Schaik, S. 2004. “The Early Days of the Great Perfection.” In Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 27(1), p. 185. We shall examine the nature of the these works in more detail below. For a brief overview of sems sde literature, see Germano. “Architecture and Absence in the Secret Tantric History of rDzogs Chen.” In Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 17, no. 2 (1994): 234-241; and Norbu, Chogyal Namkhai, and Andriano Clemente. The Supreme Source: The Fundamental Tantra Of Dzogchen Sems Kunjed Gyalpo (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion, 1999): part 1, section 2. Why ‘so-called’? Because it seems to me, and I am not certain of this, that eighteen operates symbolically – as a cipher, as it were. The number eighteen – 18 – evokes a sense of completeness. There are eighteen sciences (aśīdaśāvīdāśāsthāna) to comprise knowledge, eighteen instruments (rol mo’i bye brag) to comprise music, eighteen mainstream Buddhist schools (aśīdaśāśānākāyā) to comprise orthodoxy, eighteen types of emptiness (aśīdaśaśāsunyatā) to comprise Buddhist discourse on the ultimate, eighteen elements (dhatu) that comprise the ordinary being being mined in samśāra, and eighteen extraordinary attributes that comprise a transcendent Buddha. There are also eighteen secret warrior liberators (gsang ba’i sgrol ging) to comprise a class of protector that I do not understand (cf. Nebesky-Wojkowitz’s Oracles and Demons of Tibet: The Cult and Iconography of the Tibetan Protective Deities. Kathmandu, Nepal: Book Faith India, 1996: 278-279). That aside, the number 18 is deeply significant in non-Buddhist South Asian religious culture as well. 18, in Vedic numerology, denotes completeness (9+9=18); there are 18 directions, thus representing ubiquity. Bunce notes that 18 can also suggest chaos, deadlock and a spiritual hindrance. It is exemplified in: the eighteen parvas of the Mahābhārata; the eighteen chapters of the Bhagavadgītā; the eighteen sense elements or dhatu; and sunset (the 18th hour or 6:00p.m.). The charismatic number 108, it is to be remembered, is simply 18 infinity, with the empty zero or null (śūnya, a synonym for empty space) inserted inbetween. See Bunce, Frederick W. Yantras of Deities and Their Numerological Foundations: An Iconographic Consideration (DK Print World Pvt.Ltd, India, 2001).

623 José Cabezón writes: “The earliest texts of the Great Perfection are the eighteen Tantras of the Mind System (Sems sde). By the tenth century these Tantras were already being made more
group of citations are sixteen references to the *Bodhicittabhāvāna*, a text that is placed among the commentarial literature (*bstan ’gyur*) in the dPe bsdur ma, rather than the tantras. This work is traditionally attributed to the dynastic figure Mañjuśrimitra (*’jam dpal bshes gnyen*). In the third group are fourteen citations from the dynastic figure dPal dbyangs’ *Six Lamps*.

If one were to sum up these citations with one phrase, it would undoubtedly be *sems sde* or ‘Mind Series.’ In fact, if one were to sum up Rongzom’s presentation of Great Perfection in one phrase, the phrase would be the same. But what does that mean? According to Germano, the Mind Series genre represents the most diverse “literary canon” of the Great Perfection’s seven traditions. The Mind Series, he writes,

> a very loose rubric covering the majority of developments prior to the eleventh century, and their subsequent continuance by conservative authors. The texts that fall under this sub-rubric were thus authored over a lengthy time period, and are bound together (taking for granted the accessible through their digestion and synthesis into easily understood systems (*lugs* of ‘instructions’ (*gdams pa*”). See The Buddha’s Doctrine and the Nine Vehicles: Rog Bande Sherab’s Lamp of the Teachings (Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 239 n. 32.


625 Kammie Takahashi writes: “There are eight texts attributed to a Dynastic-era Pelyang in the Peking edition of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon. These are the Vajrasattva Questions and Answers (*rDo rje sens dpa’i zhus lan*), six poems collectively referred to as the *Six Lamps* (*sGron ma drug*), and a letter of instruction addressed to various Tibetan groups on Buddhist doctrine, hereafter referred to as The Letter (*gCes pa bsdus pa’i ’phrin yig*). The Six Lamps texts are as follows: The Lamp of the Mind (*Thugs kyi sgron ma*), The Lamp of the Correct View (*lTa ba yang dag sgron ma*), The Lamp Illuminating the Extremes (*mTha’i mun sel sgron ma*), The Lamp of Method and Wisdom (*Thabs shes sgron ma*), The Lamp of the Method of Meditation (*bsGom thabs kyi sgron ma*), and The Lamp of the Precious View (*lTa ba rin chen sgron ma*). The Six Lamps form a cohesive group, and together with the Vajrasattva Questions and Answers, provide a consistent description of Pelyang’s vision of Mahāyoga” (3). See Takahashi’s 2009. *Lamps for the Mind: Illuminations and Innovation in dPal dbyang’s Mahāyoga*. Ph.D. thesis. University of Virginia.
characteristic Great Perfection motifs and terminology) primarily by a
common rejection of practice of any type, as well as by their rejection of
funerary Buddhism.

What does it mean that Rongzom’s presentation of the writings of Great
Perfection in The Approach is organized, to a large degree, around literature that
was denounced by the tenth century prince, Pho brang zhi ba ‘od, scion of the
emerging Gugé political power in mNga’ ris, Western Tibet? We shall return
to this question below. To be sure, in terms of rhetorical orientation, Rongzom’s
presentation of the writings of Great Perfection should be said to be organized
around the Old School’s Mind Series discourse. So, let us proceed to the
questions of just what Mind Series literature is and what does it have to do with
the Old School’s Great Perfection?

The Mind Series (sans sde : *cittavarga/cittanikāya) is one of three
“divisions,” “trends” or “genres” – along with the Space Series (klong sde :
*abhyantaravarga/abhyantara-nikāya) and Intimate Instruction Series (man ngag sde :
*upadeśavarga/updeśanikāya) – traditionally structuring the discourse on Great
Perfection. It is often said that all Great Perfection tantras can be subsumed into
one of the three divisions. Tradition often traces this three-fold rubric to
Mañjuśrīmitra, who we shall discuss below; among academics, however, there is
also the view that the division originates with the work of the Zur clan.

626 See “An Open Letter by Pho-brang Zhi-ba ‘od,” in Karmay, Samten Gyaltsen. The Arrow and
the Spindle : Studies in History, Myths, Rituals and Beliefs in Tibet (Kathmandu : Mandala Book
627 Kapstein suggests, based on his evidence, “that the Sun of the Heart belongs to a stratum in
the history of the Rdo-rje-pa brgyud still close to that of the Bsam-gtan mig-sgron, which indeed was also
current within the early Zur tradition” (281). See Kapstein, Matthew. “The Sun of the Heart and
the Bai ro rgyud ‘bum.” In Tibetan Studies in Honour of Samten Karmay, Part II. Revue d’études
tibétaines 15, 2008), 275-288.
In broadly thematized contemporary academic terms, the Mind Series is described as Great Perfection literature that emphasizes “the immediate presence of the enlightened mind, and the consequent uselessness of any practice that is aimed at creating, cultivating or uncovering the enlightened state.”

Set in contrast to the other two divisions of Great Perfection tantras, the Mind Series literature is said to “emphasizes luminosity of the basic mind (rig pa) in its natural state” thus emphasizing a positive subject, gnosis, while the Space Series or Space Series “emphasizes the expansive of spacious mind in its natural state” otherwise known as the negative phenomena called emptiness; and the man ngag sde or Intimate Instruction Series “emphasizes the indivisibility of the two.”

Put otherwise, “it is said that sens sde teaches the clarity/awareness side of enlightenment, klong sde teaches the spatial side of enlightenment, and man ngag sde combines the two.” Critically, “a wide range of practices are included in the man ngag sde…” We will return to this vital point again below. Here, our object is to simply clarify the character of these three categories with particular emphasis on the Mind Series. To that end, we may follow David Higgins, who writes that “whatever their provenance, the Man ngag sde tantric and supporting exegesis appear to come to light in the 12th century as a set of interlocking texts

628 van Schaik 2004: 165
629 PDB 439 s.v. klong sde
630 PDB 528 s.v. man ngag sde. It should be noted that circumstances for a proper practice are in fact also found in connection with the sens sde. Cf. Kapstein, Matthew. “The Sun of the Heart and the Bai ro rgyud ’bum.” In Tibetan Studies in Honour of Samten Karmay, Part II. Revue d’études tibétaines15, 2008) pp. 277. For a description of Great Perfection practice tied to the man ngag sde, see Tülku Thondup Rinpoche’s 1989 Buddha Mind: An Anthology of Longchen Rabjam’s Writings on Dzopchenpo. Edited by Talbot, H. (Ithaca N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications), pp. 67-76. Within each division are further inner, outer, and secret division, which i will not treat here. A comprehensive treatment is found in one of kLong chen pa’s Seven Treasures (mdzod bdun), the Chos dbyings rin po che’i mdzod and its auto-commentary, Lung gi gter mdzod.
(replete with intertextual references) presenting a coherent, thematically integrated system of doctrine and practice."

It is a system that presupposes earlier rDzogs chen developments (especially Sems sde tantra such as the Kun byed rgyal po) as well as the broader currents of Indian Buddhist Yogācāra, Madhyamaka, and tantrism but claims (following an interpretative strategy common to Indo-Tibetan Buddhist doxographic works) to transcend them and mark their culmination.631

In the words of Sam van Schaik, \textit{sems sde} literature is “on the nature of mind, identifying it with wisdom, and referring to this as \textit{bodhicitta}.”632 Notably, it is also stated that writings comprising the Mind Series “do not necessarily share a single set of characteristics” (PDB 792), and thus we may look at how they are understood to form an important hermeneutical category for the Old School. Rongzom’s Mind Series-based presentation of Great Perfection, put succinctly, states that “the nature of the ordinary mind (\textit{citta : sems}) is awakening (\textit{bodhi : byang chub}) and thus it is called ‘the mind of awakening’ (\textit{bodhicitta : byang chub kyi sems}).633

The Old School tradition classifies the tantras of the Great Perfection under the three-fold rubric. The three are also described in broadly thematized and traditional terms, where it is said:

In Semde it is asserted that although various entities appear, they are not \textit{beyond} the play of the mere Mind [\textit{sems nying}], like the arising of various shades of white and red in the single face of a mirror. The favrious appearance do not exist in reality as they are percepts (appearances) of the mind and are non-dual (in relation to he mind.) The essence (\textit{Ngo-Bo}) of

631 Higgins 2013: 34
the mind is Mind, which is clarity, and it is self-arisen primordial wisdom...

The essence of Longde: it asserts that self arisen primordial wisdom and phenomenal existents which have arisen form it [i.e. jñāna : ye shes = ‘primordial wisdom’] are the great purity from their origin and are primordially liberated... [that] even the aspect of mind and the play, the appearance of the mind, do not exist...

Mengagde is superior to the two lower divisions [of sems sde and klong sde].

The superiority of the Intimate Instruction Series over the two other divisions of Mind Series and Space Series is often traditionally couched in terms of the fact the latter two genres perforce effect discursive analyses. Considering that he put Mind Series discourse to work in the service of explicating the view of equality, it appears Rongzom’s view of the role of this literature differs from kLong chen pa, who writes:

Since semde (asserts that phenomenal appearances) are mind, it involves mental analysis. Since Longde apprehends (phenomenal existents as) ultimate nature, it (also) has mental analysis. So mengagde is superior because it enlightens naturally (Rang-gSal) the ultimate nature (itself).

For kLong chen pa and the Old School tradition more generally, the Mind Series and Space Series constitute views that are, lamentably, derived from intellectual analysis (that is: via bias and effort). The Mind Series is, on this view, focused on the mind and nature of all phenomena as mental. The Space Series is focused on the empty nature of that phenomenal reality. The Intimate Instruction Series, rather than depending on discursive analyses to evoke liberatory spiritual

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635 Ibid. 51.

636 For example, in his commentary on kLong chen pa’s Yon tan rin po che’i mdzod entitled dKa’ gnad rdo rje’i rgya madu ‘grol byed legs bshad gser gi thur ma, Sgo po Ngag dbang bstan dar (1759-1839?) states that “Longde does not assert that phenomena are the arising of the power [rtsal] and play [rol] (of the mind) as Semde does” (Rinpoche 1989: 50 et seq.).
experience, is said to elucidate the integration of two views naturally (rang gsal) and without effort, which makes it superior to the previous two Mind Series genres.

What, then, is significant about the fact Rongom presents Great Perfection describing vis-à-vis the Mind Series. Why does his Great Perfection make no mention of tantras from either Space Series or Intimate Instruction Series? Another question to be asked in this connection is how the Old School historian, Rog ban de shes rab 'od (1166-1244), just a century later, saw the relationship between the three. The situation appears complex. José Cabezón writes that Rog equates Great Perfection with the sms sde while David Higgins states that Rog bande claimed the man ngag sde to be the highest of the vehicles within Great Perfection. What is quite clear, according to Rongzom’s presentation of Great Perfection vis-à-vis the Mind Series, is that bias (blang dor), effort (rtsol), and distortion (sgro skur) fall away into exhaustion – through the use of Mind Series discourse. Put another way, if the Mind Series is categorized by the Old School among the lower approaches to Great Perfection and the Intimate Instruction Series is considered superior to it, what are we to make of the fact The Approach is totally avoid of any discussion of that material and appears to valorize the Mind Series in a way rejected by the later tradition? Commenting on the historical trajectory of these trends, Samten Karmay, who states that sms sde texts do not date to before the tenth century, writes:

The rDzogs chen of the rNying ma pa has more or less three distinguishable trends, namely the Sms sde, Klong sde and Man ngag gi

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They represent for the rNying ma pa the authentic teaching of rDzogs chen… However, not all the three gained much ground as a teaching nor have all of them survived as a living tradition. The first two declined soon after the eleventh century and were finally extinguished as living religious practices, while the third which is in fact of relatively late origin, persisted and further developed all through the centuries until today. (Karmay 2007(1988): 206).

Since Karmay’s groundbreaking work, however, scholarly consensus has shifted. These three trends in Great Perfection are now said to have been “created simultaneously rather than sequentially, probably dating to the phyir dar, or later dissemination of Buddhism in Tibet that began in the eleventh century.”639 This would mean, at the very least, that there was a possibility that Rongzom had access to Space Series and Intimate Instruction Series tantras and chose to ignore them in his chapter on Great Perfection in The Approach. The possibility that, though extant at the time, Rongzom was unaware of such tantras, must also be considered. Additionally, though Rongzom cites important Mind Series literature, The Approach nowhere refers to a Mind Series or Mind Class (sems sde/sems phyogs) genre. Therefore, any reference to formation of the nd Series post eleventh century should be taken to refer to the formation of Mind Series as a traditionally framed genre rather than, say, a descriptive term for the existence of Mind Series literature because Mind Series literature avant la lettre is used in Rongzom’s Approach.640 Conversely, in the absence of any formal reference in The

639 PDB 792.
640 A similar point may be made about the phrase Old School. Re sems sde literature: it appears possible that the literature that inspired Tibet’s Mind Series goes back to Indian works in the tantric Madhyamaka mould, such as the Bodhicittavivarana. Cf. Ruegg, David Seyfort. The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India. A History of Indian Literature Series, Jan Gona ed. (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1981), 104-108. The Bodhicittavivarana presents an interesting case study with early Tibetan-authored works that come to be organized under the sems sde rubric. This text contains enough striking tropical and thematic similarities with the Mind Series genre as to warrant a comparative analysis, for which I am collected material for a study.
*Approach* to the Mind Series genre, Cabezón’s suggestion that the Mind Series was increasingly systematized in the tenth century into systems (*lugs*) of instructions (*gdam pa*) should be understood to refer to tropically and thematically related writings rather than a traditionally recognized genre of Great Perfection tantras.

Though unmentioned in *The Approach*, literature that come to be classified among the tantras of the Space Series or Space Series are indeed traced back to the ninth century. What connection may be drawn between the formation of Old School literature as genres such as the three-fold tantric rubric of Mind, Space, and Intimate Instruction (*sems klong mang ngag gsum*) and the formation of the Great Perfection as a traditional system of theory, ritual, aesthetics, and so on? and, more broadly, what connection exists between the emergence of such genres and the Old School tradition itself?

The very possibility of a process of formation of New School Tibetan religious traditions is is structured by, *inter alia*, the establishment of physical institutions marking the land – monasteries, in many cases. In his *Tibetan Renaissance: Tantric Buddhism in the Rebirth of Tibetan Culture*, Davidson draws significant connections between the emergence of the New Schools and their construction of a physical presence to rival the remnants of Tibet’s old world. According to Davidson, this emergence of the New Schools was in many ways “unexpected and disturbing” (210). He suggests that important factions active in the formation of new institutions saw the “the power of the religious forms that had been flourishing in the four horns of Tibet in the absence of monastic

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Buddhism” in adversarial terms (ibid).642 Thus, a supposed conflict ensued between two groups – lay mantrins representing an older way of religion and institutional monastics – that Davidson describes as “a conflict of values and models of religiosity” pitting the local values and dynamics that animated older ways of religion perfumed with a post-dark age triumphalism against the more universalizing modalities that organized the New School’s monastic movements, which is described in timid terms.

The lay mantrins represented the royal dynastic and indigenous Tibetan ideology of the unity of the sacred and secular; the gods and kings of Tibet were just as important as the Buddhas of India. This kind of sage was grounded in the political and religious power inherited from his ancestral connection to aristocratic lines of descent from a clan divine in nature and emplaced in a specific valley, whose spirits were under his control. The mantrins saw their home temples as citadels of religion, and their duty to perform rites for the immediate communities of gods and men, over which they wielded both religious and temporal authority, for these two were understood as inseparable. They saw that while monks had fled U-Tsang when trouble began with Darma Trih Udum-ten, the mantrins held their ground, maintaining the secret practices and protecting Central Tibet as chaos reigned. Convenely, the monks represented theoretically egalitarian values... (107).

Recalling Kissinger’s dictum that history is a memory of states, we may see the trope of the period of fragmentation – Tibet’s dark age – as one predicated upon an absence of an overarching entity of state and institutions. Only insofar as there is an establishment of the New School(s) (gsar ma) may there be an Old

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642 He continues: “The surviving elements of the old order had several agendas that did not coincide with the new models of Dharma being brought in, and the old masters did not see the importance of this revival, since they had not concluded that religion was lost in any significant sense. Even while they maintained, for example, library materials associated with some of the old temples-materials initially hidden during Darma’s suppression and brought out again they were accused of misunderstanding them in the new climate. With their political connections, proven economic assets, and energetic building programs, the protagonists of the Eastern Vinaya in early-eleventh-century Central Tibet were destined to interact with the remnants of the older dispensation. Inevitably there arose friction between the new monks and the older established communities - the Arhats with hair knots, the Bende, the Ngakpa, and temple guardians of various stripes - many of whom were well practiced in the Nyingma esoteric system” (210). Pace Davidson, this point would be clearer without the anachronism, “the Nyingma esoteric system.”
School. The two identities are, of course, mutually implicating. According to Davidson, the “temple constructions, community organizations, land cultivation, linguistic prowess, foreign representatives, social mobility, and new religious expressions” threatened the charisma of the old world, which traced its origins Tibet’s Imperial age. “To make matters worse,” Davidson writes, the translators' new familiarity with India, Nepal, and Kashmir, coupled with their new virtuosity in the languages of South Asian Buddhism called into question the pedigree of many of the texts and practices sustained by the traditional lamas. As time progressed, it became clear to the literate public that many of the most cherished tantras could not be traced to surviving Indian sources, leaving those newly designated as the Nyingmapa (old school) adrift on a sea of textual and ritual uncertainty. They were not slow to respond, and the complexity of the nativist Tibetan reply is only beginning to become evident as our understanding of the tenth through the twelfth century becomes clearer (211).

Davidson describes two indigenous responses to these pressures, the first of which is organized around the emergence of the Tibetan ‘Treasure revelations (gter ma). Additionally, he writes, “the the second Nyingma response to Sarma polemics was to embody these attitudes” (232) through which “these new materials allowed Tibetans [233] to formulate a nativisitic reponse at a time of insecurity, a response that appropriated the main body of the new learning and represented it in a comforting format, with the assurance of Tibetan supremacy in all things sacred” (231-232). As an example, Davidson offers Rongzom. This is a propos. The Approach represents what “may be considered the most important treatise on rDzogs chenwritten in the eleventh century that has come to light” (Karmay 2007: 126) and “Rongzom was certainly the influential Nyingma

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643 Germano (1994) terms this “mutually constituting creativity” (266). Such a dynamic should caution against equating the notion of an early translation school or snga ‘gyur with the rNyin ma.

intellectual of his day” (Davidson 2005: 162). Therefore, The Approach should be considered an important part of that response – perhaps the important response of the formative period, the late eleventh century, though Davidson does not do so. Higgins, for his part, directly connects “the self-definition and institutionalization” of the Old School “and its amalgamation of rDzogs chen traditions under a single sectarian identity” to “part of the broader pattern of monastic hegemony that defines” the period in which the New Schools become anchored on the Tibetan plateau.

In any case, the emergence of institutions and all they embody – continuity, validity, authority – is recognized as an important part of the New Schools’ emergence within the broadening shift in culture in the eleventh century. Part and parcel of these institutions is their movement toward normativite discourse that provides a stable, acceptable forms of life that is, in some sense, professionalized as a result of various processes of institutionalization. Such a description obviously encompasses more than physical constructions – for example, material sacra form texts to pills to buildings form a vital vein in body of Tibetan religious life – to include ghostly aesthetic structures such as narrative tropes and literary genres. This view ties the formation of institutions to, among other things, the codification of literary traditions; and ties the codification of literary materials to the formation of

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645 Davidson’s focus on Rongzom’s part as a response to the New Schools shows little interest in the details of The Approach and is aimed at an interesting passage found in Rong ban de’s famed chos ’byung that is attributed to Rongzom. See Davidson 2005: 232-235. I shall revisit Davidson’s impressions of The Approach in this thesis’ conclusions.
646 Higgins 2013: 25.
647 As mentioned above, Sa skya monastery, gSang phu ne’u thog, and gYas ru dBen sa kha were all established in 1072/1073.
traditional institutions. That is, the codification of a literary genre amounts to a form of institutionalization qua the professionalization and disciplinization of discourse working itself toward normativity. We shall revisit this point below.

A GROUP OF THREE

In the fifth chapter of The Approach, about three-quarters of the Great Perfection writings cited by Rongzom are from works categorized by the Old School as Mind Series. To repeat, The Approach does not explicitly mention the other two genres of types of Great Perfection tantras called Space or Intimate Instruction Series; but it does offer perhaps eighty references to the Mind Series.

In addition to the three groups of citations mentioned above, however, there are thirty references – just about a quarter of the chapter’s total – that may comprise a fourth group of references. Many citations in this group are drawn from well-known Mahāyāna discourses in the Buddhist canon such as Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra and the Buddhāvatamsaka-sūtra. Some appear to be identified by category – e.g. ‘the text’ or ‘the textual tradition of non-conceptual meditation’ rNam par mi rtog sgom lung649 or, more broadly, ‘in the teachings of the Conqueror’ or rGyal ba’i bka’ rnam las; and in a few cases I have found no corresponding citation at all, though the phrase in question appears to be a formal citation.650 In any case, presuming that Rongzom considered the sources

649 Cf. Karmay 2007: 88-89 nn. 19-20, where the term sgom lung is correlated with the Cig car ba or simultaneist doctrine. This term is used bSam gtan mig sgron (49.05), where it qualifies work attributed to dPal dbyangs. Cf. van Schaik 2004: 196 n. 87.
650 In one example, Rongzom obviously cites what he entitles rDo rje sens dpa’ nam mkha’ che (RZSB 1.494.13); though I have not yet found any corresponding lines. For another example, the following lines, which I have been unable to locate in another text, bear some marks of formal citation: | ji skad du | sens de kho na byang chub ste | | byang chub gang yin sens yin no | | sens dang byang chub gnyis myed de | | dbyer myed de bzhin yo gas so | | zhes gsungs pa lta bu’o | (RZSB
he cites in the fifth chapter to be represent what he held to be the important writings on Great Perfection of his day, the content and context of the chapter’s citations forms the basis of our study and further studies in the future. Before looking at details, let us turn to the sources for the first three groups of citations, beginning with those found in the text entitled Kun byed rgyal po.651

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The Kun byed rgyal po is considered the fundamental tantra of one of the three traditional divisions Great Perfection, the Mind Series. The title, Kun byed rgyal po, is, however, unmentioned in The Approach; and it is not mentioned in the important tenth century work on Great Perfection, the bSam gtan mig sgron of gNubs chen sangs rgyas ye shes,652 which Rongzom was apparently familiar with, though, curiously, he nowhere mentions it.653 Moreover, only some of the Kun byed rgyal po’s chapters are found in an early collection of Old School esoteric writings called The Collected Tantras of Vairocana or Bai ro rgyud ‘bum, which scholars suspects was compiled in the twelfth century,654 perhaps by the Zur

1.493.12-493.14). In concluding remarks of the thesis, I will have more to say on Rongzom’s citations and what they suggest about the audience of The Approach.

651 Unlike previous chapters, where the content of chapter citations formed a small section of the essay, here the topic comprises the primary concern.

652 On this figure, see Dylan Esler, “On the Life of gNubs-chensangs-rgyas ye-shes.” In Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines, no. 29, April 2014, pp. 5-27.

653 On this figure, see Higgins 2013: § 1.5.3.

clan, though this suggestion comes carefully qualified.\textsuperscript{655} The \textit{Kun byed rgyal po}, as a whole, appears to come together only after the eleventh century,\textsuperscript{656} when it is compiled from twenty-one texts considered the primary writings of the \textit{samsāra} or Mind Series.\textsuperscript{657}

There are sixteen references to the \textit{Bodhicittabhāvanā} attributed to Mañjuśrimitra. Of Mañjuśrimitra, nothing much that can be categorized as historical fact is available. He a figure of considerable importance in Tibetan tantra, in general, being associated with at least five major works that do not concern Great Perfection.\textsuperscript{658} It is said that he was a scholar at the Buddhist university of Nālandā, signaling that he was active in an important institution of Indian Buddhist learning in an age of Mahāyāna efflorescence. In the Old School tradition, Mañjuśrimitra is of particular importance to the Great Perfection as a transmitter, codifier, and exegete and, further, for his involvement in the early dissemination (\textit{snga dar}) of Buddhism in Tibet; and the propagation of Old School materials in India prior to that.\textsuperscript{659} According to one Old School

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{656} \textit{Kun byed rgyal po} is not named in the writings of Rongzom (fl. eleventh century) or gNubs sangs rgyas ye shes (fl. tenth century), author of the \textit{bSam gtan mig sgron}. See Higgins, David. The Philosophical Foundations of Classical rDzogs Chen in Tibet: Investigating the Distinction Between Dualistic Mind (Sems) and Primordial Knowing (Ye Shes). Arbeitskreis für Tibetische Und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien, 2013: 33.
  \item \textsuperscript{657} Germano (1994) suggests a tenth century compilation for the \textit{Kun byed rgyal po}, however, using Germano’s logic, the fact Rongzom does not appear to cite the text suggests it might have been compiled as late as the late eleventh century. Germano also notes that while “the eighteen Mind Series texts appear to have been understood initially as simple human-authored compositions by one of six Indic figures,” the \textit{Kun byed rgyal po} is understood within the tradition to be “a transcript of a teaching by a Buddha” (235). For an English translation and explanation of \textit{Kun byed rgyal po}, see Norbu, Chogyal Namkhai, and Andriano Clemente. The Supreme Source: The Fundamental Tantra Of Dzogchen Semde Kunjed Gyalpo. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion, 1999; as well as Neumaier-Dargyay’s 1992 The Sovereign All-Creating Mind: The Motherly Buddha: A Translation of \textit{Kun byed rgyal po}’i mdo (Albany: State University of New York Press).
  \item \textsuperscript{658} Cf. Töh 2532, 2543-2578, 2591, 2592. It is notable that none of the works attributed to him here concern Great Perfection.
  \item \textsuperscript{659} The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism: Its Fundamentals and History, 1.39.
\end{itemize}
Mañjuśrimitra was born in Dvikrama in western India and showed a proclivity for the academic and cultural sciences in his youth. Later in life, at the urging of a dākinī named Sūryakirāṇa, Mañjuśrimitra is said to seek teaching from the master, Mañjuśrītīkṣṇa (‘Jam dpal rnon po). He is said to have received the Great Perfection from dGa’ rab rdo rje, who is also known by the Sanskrit names Pramodavajra, Prahevajra, Praheśavajra, and Vajra Prahe. Traditionally, this figure is said to be the immaculately conceived son of a tantric Buddhist nun and and Adhicitta (sems lhag can) who transmits the Great Perfection to Mañjuśrimitra. Ga’ rab rdo rje’s mythic origin story, if read as a cultural product containing the sedimentation of past debates (see chapter two above, s.v. ‘myth as argument’), this story reveals several interesting points about the origins and development of the teaching.

Briefly, according to tradition, Ga’ rab rdo rje’s story begins in a Buddhist utopia on the mythical island of Dhanakośa, in Oḍḍiyāna, where a princess named Sudharmā or ‘Good Dharma’ was born and eventually became a Buddhist nun. She then moved one yojana away to a gold covered island with a servant and practiced yoga and meditation.

One night the nun had a dream in which an immaculate white man thrice placed a crystal vase sealed with the syllables OM ĀH HŪṂ SVĀHĀ upon the crown of her head. The light radiating from the vase was such that she could

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660 The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism: Its Fundamentals and History, p. 1.477
662 ‘Vajra Prahe’ is the name given in the collection called the Bi ma snying thig, bibliography 29: 194.04 (Namkhai and Clemente 1999: 266 n. 47).
663 See Dudjom Rinpoche’s The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism: Its Fundamentals and History, book 2, part 2, chapter 7: “The Lineage of Atiyoga, the Great Perfection.”
664 A yojana is a measure of distance, which is defined for example in Abhidharmakośa 3.87-88: “Twenty-four inches equal one cubit. Four cubits equal one bow-span. Five hundred bow-spans equal one ‘range of hearing.’ Eight ‘ranges of hearing’ are said to equal one yojana” (Dudjom’s Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism, 2.38 n. 508).
clearly see the three world realms. Not long afterwards, the nun gave birth
to a child, who was none other than the son of the Conqueror, Adhicitta,
the divine emanation of Vajrasattva who had propagated the Great
Perfection in heaven. But the nun was ashamed, and saw [his birth] as a
great impropriety.

The servant, who is named Sukhasāravatī or ‘She with a blissful heart’ (bde ba’i snying ldan ma, a phrase suggesting spiritual realizastion), exhorts Sudharmā not
to despair. “He is the son of the buddhas,” she comforts the distraught
renunciate, who sees no precedent for the form of her offspring. The nun, not
listening to the servant, casts the child into a pit where divine displays of sense
objects, and the child unharmed, convince Sudharmā that she was wrong to
despair. Soon all the creatures of the world recognize this child’s extraordinary, if
not untraditional, excellence. When the child is young, he yearns to discuss the
buddhadharma with scholars. His mother cautioned him against it, warning that
he will need time to mature before such a meeting, so instead he meets with
scholars partisan to the family. “After lengthy discussions” (1.493), they bow
down to the child’s brilliance and his father named him ‘Indestructible Highest
Bliss’ or dGa’ rdo rje, in Tibetan. He transmits Great Perfection to
Mañjuśrīmitra, who he met in the Śītavana charnel ground, just north-east of
Vajrāsana. There, he taught him for seventy-five years. Mañjuśrīmitra, for his
part, buries the teaching near Vajrāsana, the seat of the Buddha’s enlightenment
in South Asia.

In short, dGa’ rdo rje represents a semi-divine point of origin and
transmission of the Great Perfection into the human world and Mañjuśrīmitra
represents its first fully human site of Great Perfection activity. What does the
story tell us? Great Perfection was unexpectedly born as the offspring of a
marriage of traditional and transcendent forces. This unexpected turn, we are
told is unprecedented, initially misunderstood and persecuted at the site of its
own worldly origin, while its mother – who is a pure Mahāyāna renunciate
representing an authentic locus of Buddhist religion. Such a child is beyond the
ordinary mind (adhicitta: sems lhag can) and the traditional buddhadharma, which,
as represented by the pious nun. This child will eventually transmit Great
Perfection to Mañjuśrimitra, who does not fully understand the teaching during
his teacher’s life, but requires a visionary experience to consummate his
understanding. Nonetheless, the teaching is unavailable in the human world and
remains hidden for some time

After his master dGa’ rab rdo rje passed away, Mañjuśrimitra is said to
have “divided the six million four hundred thousand verses of the Great
Perfection” – counted in another place as as two million three hundred thousand
verses\textsuperscript{665} – into three genres or classes of Great Perfection literature:

The Mental Class [sems sde] is for those who abide in the mind.
The Spatial Class [klong sde] is for those who are free from activity.
The Esoteric Instruction Class [man ngag sde] is for those who
are intent upon the innermost essence.\textsuperscript{666}

Thus, according to the Old School tradition, not only is Mañjuśrimitra the first
fully human agent of activity for Great Perfection in our world, he is traditionally
said to be responsible for systematizing some apparently enormous amount of
Great Perfection writings into the Mind, Space, and Intimate Instruction Series
and is also the author of what Rongzom obviously considers a fundmentally
significant writing on Great Perfection. In point of fact, the possibility has also

\textsuperscript{665} Op. cit. 325.
\textsuperscript{666} Op. cit. 494.
been recognized that this three-fold classification of Great Perfection was
organized by members of the Zur clan, who were responsible for maintaining
and transmitting much tantric material through Tibet’s dark age into the
In any case, according to the Blue Annals, Rongzom is a
legatee of the \textit{sems sde} lineage, among others, which were passed down through
the A ro Ye shes ‘byung gnas.\footnote{DNg: ‘di la sngon gyi man ngag brgyud pa mang du mnga’ ba dag kyang bla ma’i brgyud pa’i rim par ‘dus par snang ste \ ‘di ltar slob dpon padma’i gdamgs pa rnam kyang sna nam rdo rje bshad ‘joms \ mkhar chen dpal gyi dbang phyug \ dom a tsab ra dpal me tog sgru rdo rje zho nu \ zhang zhung yon tan grags \ rong ban yon ran rin chen \ ron ban chen tshul khrims kyi bar du brgyud de gsha no \ yang bai ro tsas g.yi sgra smy ing po \ des bla chen po dgongs pa gsal \ des grun shing glag can \ des snubs dpa’ bstan \ des ya zi bon ston \ des rong zo la bshad de sams sde’i brgyud pa gcig go \ (211.03-211).}

The work which Rongzom repeatedly cites is Mañjuśrimitra’s text entitled
\textit{Bodhicittabhāvanā (Byang chub sems kyi bsgom pa)}, which is sometimes classified as
one of the eighteen transmissions (\textit{lung}) of the Mind Series and included in the
\textit{Kun byed rgyal po}. Moreover, the name “Mañjuśrīmitra” is the only name
mentioned of a historically active Great Perfection teacher that I have located in
Rongzom’s collected works.\footnote{Cf. Rongzom’s \textit{gSung thor bu}: ‘jam dpal bshes gnyen gyi yul nas snga nas gsungs… (RZSB 2.121.03).}

The figure dPal dbyangs is an important early author of several \textit{sems sde}
texts of whom we have little historical data.\footnote{On dPal dbyangs, see Takahashi 2009.} His writings are said to comprise
eight important \textit{sems sde} texts such as his collection called the ‘Six Lamps’ (\textit{sGron ma drug}) and ‘The Dialogue with Vajrasattva’ (\textit{rDo rje sems dpa’i zhus lan}). Thus,
we may begin our exploration of the Great Perfection chapter of *The Approach* bearing in mind its over-all orientation to the Mind Series. That is to say, it appears that, inasmuch as we presume this chapter to present what Rongzom takes to be the most important writings of the eleventh century, we should describe this Great Perfection as one organized around or emphasizing the Mind Series. *The Approach* omits what come to be vital categories in Great Perfection exegeses such as ‘Breakthrough’ (*khregs chod*) and ‘Leaping Over’ (*thod rgal*) and contains none of the elaborate cosmological, theoretical, and ritual structure that come to animate traditions of Great Perfection such as the *sNying thig*.

Two points seem important to remember in this discussion. First, according to David Higgins, the Mind Series is included along with the Space Series in the Old School hierarchy of spiritual approaches to be among the lower vehicles – to be a teaching for the ordinary mind (2013: 21-22) and therefore comprising a deviation from the path. Moreover, according Higgins, the Old School’s hierarchy of a nine-fold division of vehicles, which classifies the Mind Series among the lower vehicles rather than in “the highest pinnacles of all vehicles” (§ 1.3.4), is an Inclusivistic structure in the sense of Schmithausen’s interpretation of Hacker’s concept, *Inklusivismus*, which we discussed above.⁶⁷² That means that while *The Approach* implies that the Mind Series genre is Great Perfection literature *par excellence* in the eleventh century, by the time the *sNying thig* emerges as a system in the fourteenth century after a two century “process of the transformation of pristine Great Perfection into funerary Great Perfection,”⁶⁷³ the Mind Series literature has been subordinated and rendered inferior because it

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⁶⁷² Higgins 2013: 22-23, 25-26 n. 20. On inclusivism, see the Introduction.
aims not so much at reconciliation as at prevailing over subordinated doctrines. For Rongzom, the Great Perfection described in the Mind Series discourse that constitutes the fifth chapter of The Approach constitutes what he considers a Great Perfection that is the pinnacle of all vehicles and the deep intention of all the buddhas. For the Old School, the Mind Series is considered a Great Perfection division subordinate to the Intimate Instruction Series. Though the Mind Series literature is said not to be tied together by any one essential feature, this should not to suggest that common tropes do not tie the group together as a recognizable body of rhetoric. As a group, Mind Series literature does “tend toward simple, evocative statements that deny the need for any practice or moral concerns” (Ibid). According to David Germano,

The early Great Perfection was principally a tantric development of buddha-nature discourse without any complex systematic literature or meditative practices. It is thus difficult to ascertain precisely what type of formal contemplation might have been associated with early Mind Series literature, since it devotes little space to such practical presentations. The language of the early texts suggests that in the beginning its proponents may have had little use for visualization (1994: 239).

Germano describes the Mind Series literature as “characterized by the language of letting-go, relaxation, naturalness and simplicity, in stark contrast to the rhetoric of control, analysis and ‘marshaling of resources’ found in Indian Buddhist logico-epistemological treatises, as well as strands of tantric discourse dominated by sexual and violent imagery” (240). Germano also suggests that only “from at least the [late] eleventh century onwards” did promulgators of Great Perfection begin to actively assimilate some of the technologies more closely associated with New School tantras into the discourse on Great Perfection. At that time, “Great Perfection groups began to experiment
increasingly with various contemplative techniques and procedures generally classed under the two rubric of ‘general phase’ and ‘perfection phase’” (241). The culmination of those efforts, it is said, is the Intimate Instruction Genre.

It is thus remarkable that Ronzom does not use this tripartite categorization of Great Perfection at all, though it is said the three divisions “were created simultaneously rather than sequentially” (PDB 792); and, though Ronzom makes many references to works found in the Kun byed rgyal po, he nowhere mentions that title. Thus, we may ask if Ronzom’s use of Mind Series writings of Great Perfection means the Intimate Instruction Series is omitted because Ronzom rejects it. Or, perhaps its content, as tradition maintains, are seeded within the Mind Series674 such that there was no compelling need to mention it (or there was a compelling need to keep it secret!). At present, the picture is uncertain. More research would be required to determine whether or not he had access to these traditions; and if he did, whether his omission signals his rejection of them or, if not, what, if anything, that omission adds to our picture of the hermeneutics of tradition and the intellectual history of the tradition?

Putting aside the Space Series and Intimate Instruction Series, of which Ronzom has nothing to say in The Approach, we should focus attention on the “Mind genre,” as Higgins (2013) calls it. According to Germano, the development of Mind, Space, and Intimate Instruction as genres should be understood within the context of the development of the New Schools, with the Mind section functioning to consolidate an older traditions along with its

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674 For example, chapter twenty-two of the Kun byed rgyal po, a highly cited source in this chapter (see below), is traditionally considered one of the original sources for the practices that, among other things, constitute the Intimate Instruction Series (Norbu & Clemente 1999: 103).
conservative innovations; and the Intimate Instruction genre should be recognized as situating and authorizing the integration of developments related to the New Schools within the emerging Great Perfection system known as the sNying thig. “At some point in the eleventh century,” Germano writes, a new movement emerged in connection with the discourse on Great Perfection that shifted it toward atotalizing systematization of theory and practice. In addition, the systematization of Great Perfection included

new modernist doctrines, indigenous Tibetan religious concepts, innovative strains of the Great Perfection drawing upon a variety of sources other unknown influences. It may even be that these visionary practices were partially already present as an oral transmission largely contemplative in nature and in conjunction with a limited graphic tradition focused on tantric themes of buddha-nature nad primodial purity; the Seminal Heart may then reflect the subsequent gradual elaboration of this into a systematic philosophical discourse.

As a result of the movement toward consolidation and systematization, it appears that the Mind Series literature, while being organized into a “genre” of tantras, was eclipsed by the rapid developments taking place in connection with the New School tantras. The development of Great Perfection during the eleventh to fourteenth centuries emphasized elements from the New School literature. As a result, the tradition focused on “an increasing incorporation of tantric sādhana-based ritual, a significant decrease in creative philosophical developments, and a tendency to work within received sub-rubrics rather than to generate new rubrics of identification” (Germano 2005: 3). By the fourteenth century –

675 It is helpful to keep Randall Collins’ dictum concerning the sociological movements of intellectual culture: STRONG POSITIONS DIVIDE AND WEAK POSITIONS UNITE. We may return to this point in the thesis conclusions. For his excellent work on intellectual culture, which analyzes the structure of intellectual culture in terms of interaction rituals, see Collins, Randall. The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change (Belknap: Harvard University Press, 1998).
and above all else with Klong chen rab ’byams pa (1308-1363) – we find an explosion of Great Perfection literature, the first lengthy corpus of treatises explicitly attributed to a Tibetan author, the dominance of the Seminal Heart (Snying thig) variant, and the systematization of the Great Perfection in relation to trends among the “new” or Modernist (Gsar ma) sects (2).

By the seventeenth century, “practically nothing much survived of the Mind Series apart from the transmission of the ‘permission’ (lung)” (Germano 1994: 279), though, importantly, the twelfth century figure Kah dam pa bde gshegs (1122-1192) established an institutional place where the theory and practices associated with sens sde were maintained. “However, over the centuries, this institution dwindled on account of the spread of the Mennagde termas” (Norbu & Clemente 1999: 61). In sum, there came to be several flourishing sens sde ‘systems’ or lugs, one of which is called the ‘System of Rong[zom]’ (rong lugs). “In contemporary times,” however, “the Mind Series and Space Series systems barely survive”; the Intimate Instruction genre, on the other hand, has “been preserved in its unique exegetical form as well as experientially” significant content (id.).

If, according to Rongzom, Great Perfection qua Mind Series is the highest vehicle, how do we explain that this highest vehicle is eventually divided into more vehicles along the lines of the three-fold series? Germano attributes the movement to both exegetics – i.e. grouping language-games or rhetoric – and experience – i.e. as a consequence of the content of the visionary spiritual experience of Old School exercitants. The elaboration of internal divisions within Great Perfection developed as a means for assimilating and organizing the identity and character of Great Perfection discourse in light of the emergence and
influence of the New Schools because the formation and “ascendancy of the New Schools gave a powerful impetus to codify and further develop traditional doctrines and practices” (Higgins 2013: 25). This suggests the Intimate Instruction genre represents the category of Great Perfection teachings innovated in light of the influence of the New Schools in Tibet. This perhaps clarifies why the Mind Genre is connected with the continually transmitted bKa’ ma teachings of the Old School but not its gTer ma, with which the Intimate Instruction series is associated with.\footnote{Germano 1994: 283; cf. Kapstein 2008: 285 n. 32.}

Higgins’ terming the Mind Series a ‘genre’ has the advantage of allowing us to use Bakhtin’s ideas about genre in our own quest to understand Rongzom’s ‘doctrine’ and rhetorical focus. In \textit{Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel: Notes toward a Historical Poetics}, Bakhtin states that genres can "determine to a significant degree the image of man in literature" (85). In chapter four of \textit{Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics}, Bakhtin describes a genre in terms of its formative effects, which are not unlike some of the important functions of Tradition, which simultaneously (and somewhat paradoxically) works to conserve a vital connection with the past \textit{vis-à-vis} the traditional notions of authority, continuity, and validity while working in the present to negotiate and maintain its own relevance in the future. Like a tradition, the \textit{sens sde} genre fixes a image of an ultimately relaxed, natural and simple man that is tied to a discourse on the nature of mind. In this way, a genre produces, sustains, imparts and authorizes forms of life emphasized by he promulgators of the culture connected with the genre. Bakhtin writes:
A literary genre, by its very nature, reflects the most stable, ‘eternal’ tendencies in literature's development. Always preserved in a genre are undying elements of the archaic. True, these archaic elements are preserved in it only thanks to their constant renewal, which is to say, their contemporization. A genre is always the same and yet not the same, always old and new simultaneously. Genre is reborn and renewed at every new stage in the development of literature and in every individual work of a given genre. This constitutes the life of the genre.677

Communication within a genre, he continues, has its own typical conception of the addressee, and this defines it as a genre.678 The form and content of a genre function as a language game – which is not unlike a culture: a way of thinking and talking about things that directs a way doing things. As such, the nomenclature or idiom of a genre – its language game – can be understood to be something like a set of rules that work to instantiate a particular form of life that simultaneously and intimately connects an already preserved way of talking and thinking with an emerging one. Bakhtin writes:

When we select words in the process of constructing an utterance, we by no means always take them from the system of language in their neutral, dictionary form. We usually take them from other utterances, and mainly from utterances that are kindred to ours in genre, that is, in theme, composition, or style (87).

In this sense, the Mind Series connects up a discourse on the path organized around simple evocative statements concerning the natural and relaxed state free of confusion. Suchg statements are found in a wide variety of Buddhist discourse. Eventually, the Mind Series develops its own voice.679

679 The Mind Series does not always retain its sparse ontology. As Germano has written, “eventually the Mind Series itself apparently yielded... and began to include a certain degree of contemplative praxis drawn form generation and perfection stages” (Germano 1994: 241), though these are not noticed in Rongzom’s Approach.
In The Approach, the Mind Series literature comprises the Great Perfection writings that constitute the subject of the chapter. We should recall, however, Higgins’s observation that the Mind Series is understood as a lower vehicle subordinate to the Intimate Instruction Series. Higgins has connected this subordination to Schmithausen’s interpretation of Hacker’s concept of inclusivism. According to Higgins, such inclusivism characterizes the nine-fold doxography (and over-arching exegeses) associated with the Old School and which hierarchizes all vehicles with Great Perfection as their culmination. He writes:

In the spirit of inclusivism, antecedent doctrines were encompassed as lower stages leading toward a more fundamental and encompassing vision. This is mirrored in the doxography of nine vehicles that is found already in early rDzogs chen works such as the dGongs ’dus pa ’i mdo and Man ngag phreng ba. To this nine-fold scheme, the rDzogs chen sNying thig tradition introduces a further subclassification of the final vehicle Atiyoga into a Mind Genre (sems sde), Space Genre (klong sde) and Esoteric Guidance Genre (man ngag gi sde), with further subdivisions amongst these. Thus, the ascending doxography of vehicles is considered to find its culmination in the Esoteric Guidance Genre (man ngag gi sde).680

Interestingly, another traditional origin story of the Mind Series describes the early origins and development of the Mind Series as mired in political intrigue, fear, and secrecy. According to an authoritative Old School tradition’s account – and, again, reading myth as argument – the Tibetan, Vairocana, from the central Tibetan place called sNye mo bye dkar, journeyed to India at the command of Emperor Khri srng ldie btsan (fl. eighth century), where he met the master Śrī Śimha, from whom “he requested teaching on the effortless vehicle.” The Indian

680 Higgins 2013: 24. Higgins adds that “The self-definition and institutionalization of the rNying rna school and its amalgamation of rDzogs chen traditions under a single sectarian identity must be seen as part of the broader pattern of monastic hegemony that” defines post-eleventh century Tibet.
master’s response indicates that teaching Mind Series public was considered a crime at that time punishable by death. Therefore, Vairocana’s study of the Mind Series was done in secret: during the day he studied the causal vehicle with other scholars; at night, Vairocana studied Intimate Instructions.\(^{681}\) Upon his return to Tibet, Vairocana set about translating the five original texts of the Mind Series at night, in secret. Vairocana’s behavior at this time was enough cause for concern among to bring about his exile from court for a time. During his time in Tibet, before moving on to Khoton, Vairocana is said to have transmitted his teaching to five individuals including a Khotanese woman named Shes rab sgron ma and gNyags Jñānakumāra, an early figure categorized as an important exegete of the Old School.\(^{682}\)

The Mind Series thus appears to emerge as a body of teachings thought to be, by their nature, of questionable providence, which were nonetheless transmitted through a continuum of individuals on the basis of their profound value until they (1) came first to form a genre of their own and then (2) come to form one-third of an elaborate systematization of Great Perfection that resulted in fully articulated systems of theory, practice, and so on, which comes, in its most popular form, to be called the snYing thig. In this system, however, the Mind Series is subordinated to the elaborated Intimate Instruction Series. In the fifth chapter of Rongzom’s Approach, however, we find no mention of any fully-articulated theory or practice of Great Perfection; certainly the presentation of Mind Series given does not describe any systematic theory of practice. In

\(^{681}\)’ong kyang shin tu ma gsang na rgyal po’i chad pas srog gi nyan du ‘gyur bas nyin par pa’di ta gzhan rnam la gyu ‘bras kyi chos nyan || mtshan mo man ngag gi chos bstan par bya’o gsungs te… (sNga ‘gyur bka’ ma’i bzhugs byang yid bzhi rin po che’i mdzod. Chengdu: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 2006: 108).

\(^{682}\) The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism: Its Fundamentals and History, p. 1.539-540.
Rongzom’s use of the *sems sde* genre, we find an over-arching interpretative structure that may be layed upon any fully-articulated theory; and which may be employed as a type of interpretative strategy concerning of the path. Here, let us turn to how and where Rongzom uses the Mind genre.

**THE WHO, WHAT, & WHERE OF RONGZOM’S PRESENTATION OF THE RDZOGS CHEN GZHUNG**

As mentioned above, the *Kun byed rgyal po* is the fundamental tantra of the Great Perfection *sems sde*. It is cited fifty times in the fifth chapter of *The Approach*. *Kun byed rgyal po* is a large text, spanning one hundred and eighty-six twenty-one line pages in the *dPe bsdur ma* catalogue. As a whole, the text has eighty-four chapters, which are traditionally divided into three groups: the root tantra comprising chapters one through fifty-seven, a later tantra (*phyi ma'i rgyud*) described as explaining realization, and a final (*phyi ma'i phyi ma*) tantra described as a transmitting discourse on meditation. *The Approach* only cites the root tantra – and within the root tantra, which comprises chapters one through fifty-seven of the *Kun byed rgyal po*, Rongzom only cites four chapters:

- **Chapter 22**: On the absence of the non-abiding domain from the ten sources concerning perfected non-activity (*bya med rdzogs pa'i lung bcu las mi gnas yul med*): nine citations.

- **Chapter 27**: On explaining originary pure basic space of perfected non-activity (*bya med rdzogs pa rnam dag dbyings kyi lung bstan pa*): three citations.

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684 Cf. rtsa ba'i rgyud, phyi ma'i rgyud (rTogs pa bshad zhes bya ba'i rgyud phyir ma), and phyi ma'i phyi ma'i rgyud (bsgom pa'i mdo lung). See Norbu & Clemente 1999: 257-259.
Chapter 30: The unwaning victory banner nature of indestructible being 
(rdo rje sms dpa'i rang bzhin mi nub pa'i rgyal mtshan): thirty-four citations

Chapter 31: On the six vajra lines (rdo rje tshig drug gi le'u): one citation

First, chapter twenty-two of the Kun byed rgyal po: five times, Rongzom introduces citations from this chapter as being from from the Khyung chen. One time, Rongzom identifies a citation from this chapter as being from the Byang chub kyi sms yul kun la 'jug (528.20).685 In the remainder of occurrences, he either does not name it at all or, the possibility must be admitted that I have not yet identified some citation. The tenth century bSam gtan mig sgron cites material gathered in the twenty-second chapter of the Kun byed rgyal po by the names Kun la 'jug (29.02, cf. RZSB 524.13), Nam mkha' che (64.02, cf. RZSB 510.19), and Khyung chen. The colophon of a commentary on the Khyung chen lding pa contained in the bKa ma shin tu rgyas pa collection and attributed to gNyags Jñānakumāra (gnyags dznyā na ku mā ra) does, however, make a reflexive reference to yul la 'jug pa'i bsam gtan mchog.686 In any case, within the Collected Tantras of the Old School or rNying ma rgyud 'bum (Vol ka, ff. 419.03-423.02), this work is called the Khyung chen lding pa; and it is in fact quite different from either chapter thirty of the Kun byed rgyal po or the Khyung chen lding pa given in the Bai ro rgyud 'bum, the two of which significantly reflect each other.687 According to the contemporary Great Perfection master, Namkhai Norbu, this chapter is an important original source

685 Cf. Man ngyag byang chub kyi sms yul kun la 'jug pa, Bai ro rgyud 'bum, vol. 1, pp. 22-01-48.06.
686 rNying ma bKa ma shin tu rgyas pa (Mkhan po ' Jam dbyangs, ed. Chengdu, 1999), v. 93, 24.06. Higgins 2013: 28 n. 25 mistakenly identifies this citation as being in volume 103.
687 Cf. Khyung chen lding ba'i rgyud attributed to Śrisimha, which is located in Vima snying thig (vol. 2, 376-387).
for practices such as *khregs chod* or ‘Breakthrough’ and *thod rgal* or ‘Leaping Over,’ Great Perfection practices that are elaborated within the *man ngag sde*.

Three references are made to the twenty-seventh chapter of *Kun byed rgyal po*. The last of these three references is comprised by two lines that are themselves abstracted from one of the two earlier (and longer) references. Thus, in essence there are two different citations of this text. Lines from this chapter are identified by Rongzom as from the *rTsal chen sprugs pa*. The same lines do in fact occur in a text by that name in the *Bai ro rgyud ’bum* in (v. 5, 305-308). There is one reference to chapter thirty-one of the *Kun byed rgyal po*. The lines cited here have elsewhere been identified in IOL Tib J 647: *Rig pa’i khu byu* (Liljenberg 2010). Rongzom identifies the source for this reference by yet another well-known name: *rDo rje tshig drug pa*. These lines occur in the *Bai ro rgyud ’bum* in a text by yet another name: *brTsal chen sprugs pa* (v. 5, 306.03).

Thirty-four references are made to chapter thirty of *Kun byed rgyal po*, which is entitled *Mi nub rgyal mtshan*, also known by the title *Nam mkha’ che*.688 There are two lines given from chapter thirty of the *Kun byed rgyal po* that appear as the first two lines of a verse found in the *Bai ro rgyud ’bum* within the *Khyung chen lding* (v. 2, 357-370). Though not cited by Rongzom, the last two lines of this verse are found in the *bSam gtan mig sgron* and identified as being from the *Nam mkha’ che* (352.04-352.05, 441.01-441.02) – a phrase given in the opening line of the *Bai ro rgyud ’bum* edition of the text. This phrase does not, in point of fact, appear in the opening lines of the dPe bsdur ma edition, but only after an introduction of the chapter by a gloss of its content in six lines (78.06-78.12) and the words

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‘Here, the Mi nub rgyal mtshan is proclaimed:’ At least nineteen of the references from this chapter (e.g. RZSB 506.03, 506.16, 507.20) are also found in the Bai ro rgyud ‘bum edition of the Khyung chen lding pa (e.g. BGB v. 2, 360.04, 361.02, 361.05). At least one line from these citations is given in bSam gtan mig sgron as being from the rMad byung (487.03). The majority of the citations from this chapter of the Kun byed rgyal po, which is only five pages long in the dPe bsdur ma, are given in the sections concerning deviations and obscurations. Thus, among all other sms sde literature, the twenty-second chapter of the Kun byed rgyal po proves to be the most cited source.

The works cited in chapter five of The Approach that are attributed to dPal dbyang are as follows: four citations from the Lta ba yang dag sgron ma, four citations from the mTha’i mun sel sgron ma, one citation from the rDo rje sms dpal zhus lan, one citation from the lTa ba rin chen sgron ma, two citations from the sGom thabs kyi sgron ma, and one citation from the Thabs shes sgron ma. None of these works are found in the tantra (rgyud) section of the canon, but rather are all found in the commentarial literature (bstan ‘gyur).689 There are sixteen references to Mañjuśrīmitra’s Bodhicittabhāvanā, which is found in the commentarial section of the dPe bsdur ma (bstan ‘gyur) in the fifth chapter of the approach (and several others throughout different chapters of the text).

In the fourth group of citations, we find the following: two citations from the Māyājāla-mahātantra-rāja – which Rongzom identifies once by the title Vairocan- māyājāla-tantra or rnam par snang mdzad sgyu ‘phrul drwa ba’i rgyud and

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689 It is perhaps important to remember that Karmay has observed Rongzom quoting the rgum chung texts, which are important in connecting up the ground (gzhi) and the mind-as-such (sms nyid) (Higgins 2013: 164), by replacing the term with ‘Lamp’ (sgron ma); see his The Great Perfection (2007), pp. 65-68.
once by the title Nam mkha’ lta bur dri myed (RZSB 1.504.06, 504.08). He offers two citations from the Buddhāvatamsaka-nāma-mahāvaipulya-sūtra, three citations from the Ārya-prajñā-pāramitā-saṅcaya-gāthā, two citations from the Bhagavatī-prajñā-pāramitā-hṛdya, three citations from the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra, one citation from Pitā-putra-samāgamana-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra, and one citation from the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra. There are also two citations identified as from a rNam par mi rtog sgom lung, one from the “Sūtrānta,” two citations from “rGyal ba’i bka’ rnams,” one from “guhyamantra,” and one from “definitive discourses.” There are also sixteen occurrences of what I have assumed to be unattributed citations, but which I have not yet been able to identify in terms of source.

Having made this brief survey of the documentary domain of the fifth chapter of Rongzom’s Approach, let us now turn to the work this chapter does.

SECTION SUMMARIES

The fifth chapter of The Approach introduces us to Rongzom’s unique treatment of the writings of Great Perfection. Here, he discusses Great Perfection in connection with his own particular interpretive frameworks, frames that the author himself readily admits (§ 5.0) are his own (cf. rang bzo). Nevertheless, Rongzom assures us, his discourse on Great Perfection does not go beyond the discourse given in the writings of the Great Perfection he treats. Though he states that his framework is not found in other works, it is organized around discourses connected with the Kun byed rgyal po. Discourse on the “deviations and obscurations or gol sgrib, which comprises much of chapter five, is found in the Kun byed rgyal po, where the topic forms the subject of the whole of chapter nine – just over five pages – in a chapter is called “the chapter on correcting
obscurations and deviations” (gol sgrib skyon sel gyi le’u). We also find discussion of gol sgrib in the tenth century work, the bSam gtan mig sgron. The opening of chapter five in The Approach connects up discourse on obscurations and deviations to bodhicitta, which are the subject of the ninth chapter of the root tantra of the Kun byed rgyal po with the five types of greatness (che ba lnga), which are discussed in the fifteenth chapter of the Kun byed rgyal po and also treated in a more cursory fashion in bSam gtan mig sgron (pp. 336.03-339.01). Why does Rongzom seek to connect up these two domains of discourse? Below, we shall look at the interpretive space opened up in Rongzom’s chapter, where the teaching on gol sgrib comprises an important site of conjunction between the documentary and workly domains of the text. The opening of chapter five in The Approach states:

Any and every writing that discloses the system of the Great Perfection is included in four types (of teaching) - that is on (i) the nature of bodhicitta, (ii) on the greatness of bodhicitta, (iii) on deviations and obscurations connected with bodhicitta, and (iv) on methods for ‘settling’ or ‘consolidating’ (gzhag thabs) bodhicitta. The teaching of deviations and obscurations, in fact, becomes a teaching on the nature of bodhicitta. In the teaching on nature, greatness is penetrated and deviation and obscurations is discontinued. Therefore, even though there is no such [four-fold] organizing rubric in the writings, themselves, [the discourse in the writings] does not go beyond [what I present here].


691 Norbu & Clemente identify this as the fourteenth chapter of the Kun byed rgyal po (1999: 153-155). The dPe bsdur ma collection, however, gives it as the fifteenth chapter. See Töh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayaḥ-rājita) in bKa’gyur (dpebsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): 48.08-55.16

692 The Approach: da ni rdzogs pa chen po’i gzhung nyid la ’jug par bya ste | de la rdzogs pa chen po’i tshul ston pa’i gzhung ji snyed pa thams cad las kyang | don mdor bsdu’ na nam pa bzhi’ dus te | ’di ltar byang chub sens kyi rang bzhin bstan pa dang | byang chub sens kyi che ba bstan dang | byang chub sens kyi gol sgrib bstan pa dang | byang chub sens kyi gzhag [492] thabs bstan pa’o | de la che ba dang gol sgrib bstan pas kyang rab bzhin bstan par ’gyur | rang bzhin bstan pas kyang che ba rtogs shing gol
These four categories are frameworks for the chapter that structure the *workly* dimension that connects up the nature and greatness of *bodhicitta* with the dissolution of deviations from, and obscurations to, *bodhicitta*. The text reveals a structure of eleven identifiable points of interest for Rongzom that frame the chapter’s topics. It is within the topics that Rongzom’s interpretative emphasis on (i) the nature of *bodhicitta*, (ii) on the greatness of *bodhicitta*, (iii) on deviations and obscurations connected with *bodhicitta*, and (iv) on methods for ‘settling’ or ‘consolidating’ (*gzhag thabs*) *bodhicitta* is unpacked. The following topical outline covers the whole of chapter five. Section page numbers from the Chengdu edition are given parenthetically. Corresponding page folio numbers in the three other editions that I used while translating *The Approach* can be found in the translation in the Appendix I. Chapter five is as structured by the following topics, in the following order:

§ 5. WRITINGS (*gzhung nyid*) ON GREAT PERFECTION (491.21-540.06)
§ 5.1. THE NATURE OF *BODHICITTA* (492.04)
§ 5.2. THE GREATNESS OF *BODHICITTA* (492.07)
§ 5.3. DEVIATIONS & OBSCURATIONS (492.12)
§ 5.4. METHODS FOR ‘SETTLING’ OR ‘CONSOLIDATING’ (492.14)
§ 5.5. TROPES FROM THE WRITINGS ON GREAT PERFECTION (492.21-516.13)
   § 5.5.1. EIGHT ADDITIONAL RUBRICS (493.01-493.11)
   § 5.5.2. ALL PHENOMENA ARE SEEN TO BE PERFECTED WITHIN THE SINGLE SPHERE OF *BODHICITTA* (493.11-493.22)
   § 5.5.3. ALL CONFUSED APPEARANCE IS SEEN AS THE PLAY OF SAMANTABHADRA (493.22-494.12)
   § 5.5.4. ALL SENTIENT BEINGS SEEN AS THE FIELD OF DEEP AWAKENING (494.12-494.17)
   § 5.5.5. ALL DOMAINS OF EXPERIENCE SEEN AS NATURALLY OCCURRING SELF-APPEARING GNOSIS (494.17-496.11)
   § 5.5.6. ALL PHENOMENA SEEN AS PERFECTED WITHIN THE NATURE OF THE FIVE TYPES OF GREATNESS GIVEN IN TERMS OF ENUMERATION (496.11-498.01)
   § 5.5.6.1. FIVE TYPES OF GREATNESS (*che ba lnga*) (496.14)
   § 5.5.7. THE SIX GREAT ‘SPHERES’ (*thig le*) (498.01-498.24)
   § 5.5.8. THE ELIMINATION OF DEVIATIONS AND OBSCURATIONS BY MEANS OF THE THIRTY DEVIATIONS AND OBSCURATIONS (498.24-514.19)

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gsrib chod par ‘gyur te | de bas na gzhung rnam las kyang lhag par ’di ltar gud du phyé zhing bstan pa’ang myed la | ’di rnam las ‘da’ ba’ang myed do | (RZSB 1.493.21-494.04).
§ 5.5.8.1. TEN BASIC CATEGORIES (499.09)
(Obfuscations:
1. Worldly
2. Srāvaka
3. Pratyeka-Buddha

Common deviations:
4. Paramitā-class Sūtras
5. Kriya
6. Ubhaya

Special deviations:
7. Yoga
8. Mahāyoga
9. Anuyoga
10. Atiyoga)

§ 5.5.8.2. DEVIATIONS VIS-À-VIS THE TEN BASIC CATEGORIES (499.11)
1. Worldly
2. Srāvaka
3. Pratyeka-Buddha
4. Paramitā-class Sūtras
5. Kriya

§ THREE REALITIES (tri-tattva : de kho nyid gsum) (500.11)
6. Ubhaya
7. Yoga
8. Mahāyoga
9. Anuyoga
10. Atiyoga

§ 5.5.8.3. TWENTY-THREE POINTS OF DEVIATION (503.08)
§ 5.5.8.4. SEVEN OBSCURATIONS (503.15)
§ 5.5.8.4.1. THREE DEVIATIONS FROM THE ESSENCE OF AWAKENING (snying po byang chub) (503.18)
§ 5.5.8.4.2. THREE DEVIATIONS FROM CONCENTRATION (dhyāna) (504.19)
§ 5.5.8.4.4. FOUR DEVIATIONS FROM PATH VIS-À-VIS ACTUAL REALITY (dharmatā) (506.03)
§ 5.5.8.5. SEVEN OBSCURATIONS (512.05)
§ 5.5.8.6. THE THREE BEINGS (yin pa gsum) (514.19-515.02)
§ 5.5.8.7. THREE GREAT CERTAINTIES (gdeng) (515.02-515.09)
§ 5.5.8.8. THREE FUNDAMENTAL UPADEŚA (515.09-515.18)
§ 5.5.8.9. RESOLVE THROUGH BODHICITTA (515.18-515.22)
§ 5.5.10. WHAT IS RESOLVED IN GREAT PERFECTION (515.22-516.13)

§ 5.6. THE DISCLOSURE OF METHODS FOR CONSOLIDATING BODHICITTA (516.13)
§ 5.7. DISCLOSING THOSE POINTS BY MEANS OF SCRIPTURAL SOURCES (519.14-528.15)
§ 5.8. NOW, EXPLAINING JUST A BIT ABOUT CRITICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO CONCENTRATION (528.15-533.10)

§ 5.9. HERE, A LITTLE SHOULD BE TAUGHT ABOUT THE CRITERIA FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF MASTERY OVER THE MIND AFTER ABIDING IN THE EXPANSE OF REALITY AND GAINING CONFIDENCE WITH RESPECT TO BODHICITTA (532.10-535.18)

§ 5.10. NOW A BIT OF INSTRUCTION CONCERNING THE SIGN OF WARMTH (535.18-536.11)

§ 5.11. HERE, JUST A LITTLE EXPLANATION CONCERNING THE QUALITIES OF BODHICITTA (536.11-450.06)
As mentioned above, the most heavily referenced work in the fifth chapter of *The Approach* is one Rongzom identifies as *Khyung chen*, which corresponds to chapter thirty in the later compilation called the *Kun byed rgyal po*. This most heavily cited work is associated with one of the five earliest translations of the Eighteen Primary Scriptures of the Mind Series (*lung chen bco brgyad*). There is, however, one citation offered by Rongzom that is identified by him as from a Mind Series text called *rMad byung*, which scholars do not consider one of the first five Mind Series works.\(^{693}\) Within the *dPe bsdur ma* edition of the Tibetan *bKa’ gyur*, the thirtieth chapter of the *Kun byed rgyal po* runs from page 78 line 06 through page 83 line 13. It appears that 78.06-78.11 are a later edition. The *Khyung chen lding* given in the *Bai ro rgyud ’bum* (v. 2, 357-370) begins with the verse Rongzom first from this chapter. Here we may ask what work is being done by this text? That is, to what exegetical end does Rongzom put this work? The thirty citations from the chapter are found in eight sections of *The Approach*. Their distribution is as follows and given:

\[ § 5.5.8.4.4. \text{four deviations from path [of] actual reality (}dharmatā\text{):} \]
\[ \text{fifteen citations} \]

\[ § 5.5.8.2. \text{Three beings (}yin pa gsum\text{):} \]
\[ \text{four citations} \]

\[ § 5.7. \text{disclosing those points by means of scriptural sources:} \]
\[ \text{five citations} \]
\[ \text{(including one from *rMad byung*)} \]

\[ § 5.8. \text{explaining just a bit about critical impediments to concentration} \]
\[ (528.15-533.10): \]
\[ \text{two citations} \]

\[ 5.5.4.8.1. \text{three deviations from the essence of awakening (}byang chub snying po\text{:}} \]
\[ \text{two citations} \]

\[ 5.5.8.4.2. \text{three deviations form concentration (}dhyāna\text{):} \]
\[ \text{two citations} \]

§ 5.5.8.4.3. three deviations from causality: one citation

§ 5.11. just a little explanation concerning the qualities of bodhicitta: one citation

From this, we can see that most of the work of this text is done in the service of explicating deviation from reality, as in § 5.5.8.4.4, which is one of the larger sections of the chapter at just more than six pages (RZSB 1.506.03-512.05). The only other citation given in the section is a line the Prajñāpāramitā-saṅcāyagāthā extolling a celestial store-house abode.

The Bodhicittabhāvanā attributed to Mañjuśrīmitra is the second most referenced work of the chapter, promoting its identity as an early and important seminal writing. Unlike the Kun byed rgyal po, however, which is located in the bKa’ ‘gyur – i.e. discourses traditionally connected the person of the Buddha – the Bodhicittabhāvanā, which is just over five pages in the dPe bsdur ma, is in the commentarial section called the bsTan ‘gyur. The Bodhicittabhāvanā is given the Tibetan title Byang chub sems kyi bsgom pa. Two texts with this title occur in the Imperial lDan dkar ma catalogue, 609 and 610. The first is said to be a work authored by an Ācārya Jayaprabhā (slob dpon rgyal ba’i ’od) and the second authored by ‘Jam dpal bshes gnyen – a.k.a. Mañjuśrīmitra. In the Bai ro rgyud ‘bum and the bsTan ‘gyur, moreover, there is a commentary on this text entitled Byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa don bu gnyis bstan pa. Yet another commentary, which is perhaps unrelated to this text but found in the bKa’ ma shin tu rgyas pa and attributed to gNyangs Jñānakumāra, is entitled Byang chub sems bsgom rdo la gser zhun gyi ‘grel pa (vol. 96 pp. 339-354). Dimitri Pauls, a doctoral candidate at the University of Hamburg is working on this text, discussed its trasmission

694 The remainder comprise fragments, which may or may not be found in other works as well.
history at the August 2014 conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies in Vienna. He reported that the text is also in the ‘Phang thang ma catalogue and the rNying ma ‘gyud bum. He reported five editions are given in the various bsTan ‘gyur canons, all of which are contained in the Yoga section and the Bai ro ‘gyud ‘bum includes it among the other early sems sde works. In the dPe bsdur ma, the occupies just over five pages (vol. 34, 809.11-816.18). Of the sixteen references to the Bodhicittabhāvānā, the distribution is as follows:

§ 5.7. disclosing those points by means of scriptural sources (519.14-528.15): nine citations

§ 5.8. explaining just a bit about critical impediments to concentration (528.15-533.10): three citations

§ 5.10. a bit of instruction concerning the sign of warmth (535.18-536.11): three citations

§ 5.11. now, just a little explanation concerning the qualities of bodhicitta (536.11-450.06): one citation

In one of Rongzom’s thematic essays contained within in his Miscellanea, with the distinctively Great Perfection-esque title of Rang byung ye shes, he makes direct reference to Mañjuśrīmitra by his Tibetan name, ‘Jam dpal bshes gnyen, when citing the Bodhicittabhāvānā edition found in the dPe bsdur ma. Notably, the text by the same name in the Bai ro rgyud ‘bum (vol. 2, 339-355.02) is strikingly different from that found in the dPe bsdur ma. In any case, it is obvious that Rongzom’s expansive notion of scriptural authority applies to the writings of

695 STh: ‘jam dpal bshes gnyen gyi zhal snga nas gsungs pa || kun du rtog can yang dag ma yin kun du rtog pas risol med nyams || blo gros phyin ci log tu gyur cing ma dag rkyen gyi dbang song bas || sems dang sens las byung ba de nyid lus gsum don du snang ba yin || zhes gsungs so || (RZSB 2.121.03-121.06). These lines correspond to Toh 2591: Byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa (Bodhicittabhāvānā) in bsTan ‘gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krong go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): 811.06-811.08. One interesting difference is the dPe bsdur ma reads: “due to the former influence of the condition of ignorance” (ma rgyen gyi dbang song bas) rather than “due to the former influence of the condition of impurity (ma dag rkyen gyi dbang song bas).
Great Perfection itself. They, at least in one case, may be authored by people, rather than being the products of the Buddha or some other form of trascendental authorship.

Rongzom refers to six works that are identified as those attributed to the dynastic figure dPal dbyang. Of this figures Six Lamps, Rongzom cites all but one. That is, Rongzom cites lTa ba yang dag sgron ma four times; mTha’i mun sel sgron ma four times – one instance corresponding to the opening verse of IOL 594, sBas pa’i rgum chung;696 lTa ba rin chen sgron ma two times; sGom thabs kyi sgron ma two times, and the Thabs shes sgron ma one time. Only the Thugs kyi sgron ma is omitted. In addition, Rongzom cites the rDo sms zhus lan one time. Perhaps more important than which of dPal dbyang’s writings are cited is where they are cited.

§ 5.7. disclosing those points by means of scriptural sources (519.14-528.15): ten citations

§ 5.8. explaining just a bit about critical impediments to concentration (528.15-533.10): two citations

§ 5.11. now, just a little explanation concerning the qualities of bodhicitta (536.11-450.06): two citation

Rongzom concentrates his use of both Mañjuśrīmitra’s and dPal dbyang’s work in § 5.7, which is explicitly about exegesis via textual sources for Great Perfection. A significant percentage of his references to the early Mind Series, as well, are given in this section.

* * *

Discussion begins with the nature of bodhicitta (§ 5.1). Three contemporary scholars of the Old School (mkhan po) point out that the nature of bodhicitta

described here is not entirely unlike a traditional Old School discussion of the ‘basis’ or ‘ground’ (gzhi, cf. adhikaraṇa, āśraya): “In the view of Dzogpa Chenpo, the ‘basis’ is primordially pure.” The nature of bodhicitta, Rongzom writes is just that: “originally primordially pure pure/perfected” (gdod ma nyid nas sangs rgyas). According to tradition, the spontaneous nature of the ground (gzhi) is associated with by the “inner clarity” of the spheres (thig le) with its luminous and numinous expression qua “appearances as the Basis (zZhi-sNang)”. Rongzom describes the nature of bodhicitta as uncompounded, primordially perfect and spontaneous. He compares the greatness of bodhicitta to a place that cannot be alloyed: an island composed of gold on which not even the term ‘stone’ is known (§ 5.2). This example is also found in gNubs sangs rgyas ye shes’s bSam gtan mig sgron, the Great Perfection literature of the Bönpos, and in the Buddhist commentarial writings (bstan ‘gyur) in a tantric “Vajra Song” called the Mahāmudrā-vajra-gītī.

In his introduction to the teaching of the “deviations from and obscurations to bodhicitta” (§ 5.3) Rongzom states that all theories and practices of the lower vehicles are for “the wordly person who is not realized and who is mis-informed.” Spread through the chapter Rongzom discusses thirty deviations from and obscurations to bodhicitta. Methods for consolidating or ‘settling’ bodhicitta connect Great Perfection up with meditation, states of great

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698 Ibid.
instrospection\textsuperscript{701} and equanimity,\textsuperscript{702} among others, which are each compared to a vessel and Rongzom states that this approach is also found in “more well-known ordinary idiom” in connection with expressions such as \textit{subtlety, peaceful}, and comparisons to \textit{basic space} (§ 5.4).

**GREAT PERFECTION TROPES, SPHERES, \& NOT TRYING TO SETTLE BODHICITTA**

In section 5.5, Rongzom enters into a more detailed discussion of the writings of Great Perfection, stating that he will treat several tropes that occur in those writings through such statements as: all phenomena as the intrinsic nature of \textit{bodhicitta}, the single great sphere, confusing appearances as the play of Samantabhadra, sentient beings are considered as the profound field of awakening, and all domains of experience are experienced as naturally arising gnosis. Here, Rongzom lays out the framework for discussing these tropes within twelve tropical rubrics. The tropes Rongzom treats are as follows:

1. all phenomena are considered awakened in the intrinsic nature of \textit{bodhicitta}, a single great sphere
2. all confusing appearances are considered as the play of Samantabhadra
3. all sentient beings are considered as the profound field of awakening
4. all domains of experience are considered to be naturally arising gnosis
5. phenomena are considered to be naturally perfected as the five types of greatness
6. all phenomena are enumerated in terms of being considered to be naturally awakened as the six great spheres
7. how to determine deviation and obscurcation \textit{via} the thirty deviations and obscurations
8. removing the hindrance of doubt via the three types of being
9. determining the confident intent \textit{via} the three pillars

\textsuperscript{701} \textit{shes bzhin} (492.16) : \textit{samprajanyaam}.
\textsuperscript{702} \textit{btang snyoms} (492.16) : \textit{upeksa}.
10. resolving all knowables through bodhicitta [within] a single great ‘sphere’ or thig le
11. recitation connected to the greatness that is devoid of anything that is not already perfect
12. the ground of the indivisible Samantabhadra is entered spontaneously without effort in the present state

When phenomena are realized as the nature of the essence of awakening, there is no obscuration to dispel and there is no need to generate gnosis (§ 5.5.2). When phenomena are said to be the play of Samantabhadra, it means there is no goal to strive toward and no core point to resolve.703

The meaning of the word play (līlā : rol ba) in this context is perhaps becomes clearer when we recall the concept of play employed in Johann Huizinga’s work, Homo Ludens.704 There, play is connected to religion and variously described as an interuption of the purely appetitive work, a world of its own that transcends the ordinary dimensions of life; play is irrational, beyond notions of good and bad, voluntary, and has a quality of freedom that delineates it from viscittudes of ordinary life. Huizinga’s notion of play helps us to understand the trope, the play of Samantabhadra, to indicate living beyond the scope of karmic restriction, beyond good and bad, and totally free from the relentless logic and rules of conditioning. As such, play is a joyous (sukha : bde ba) and spontaneous form of life that cannot be encompassed by the rules (read: causality) that guide samsāra. In such a state of play as this, there is no longer need for a “resultant vehicle” or a practice such as deity yoga wherein one essentially pretends to be a buddha until one actually is a buddha. “In play as we

703 mthil phab pa’i don dang ma bral (RZSB 1.493.24).
704 Huizinga, J. Homo Ludens (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009). My glosses here are mainly derived from chapter one, on the nature and significance of play.
conceive it the distinction between belief and make-believe breaks down. The concept of play merges quite naturally with that of holiness” (Huizinga 2009: 25). When phenomena are seen as the play of Samantabhadra, there is no perception and thus no fixation on or participation in the rule of causal conditioning.

The greatness of phenomena means they pertain to the primordially perfected nature that the deity Samantabhadra embodies. Here (§ 5.5.3), Rongzom paraphrases, but does not explicitly cite, a text called *Byang chub kyi sms rdo rje tshig drug ma* or *The Six Vajra Verses on Bodhicitta*, to connect the trope “all phenomena seen as the play of Samantabhadra” to his interpretive framework.

This description, [phenomena] as primarily the play of Samantabhadra, is taught in the Six Vajra Verses [of] *Bodhicitta*, where what determines the deviations from the nature of bodhicitta is taught through the two first verses. The unceasing ornament, the play of Samantabhadra that is the greatness of bodhicitta is taught through the two middle verses. The last two verses disclose the resolution for settling or consolidating bodhicitta.705

§ 5.5.5. takes up a phrase found in exoteric Buddhist discourse: ‘domain of experience’ (*gocara: spyod yul*). This phrase typically refers to the experiential domain of ordinary beings structured *ex hypothesi* by the five physical senses and a mental sense as constituent of conditioned personhood. Here, however, this domain is perceived as naturally occurring gnosis (*rang byung ye shes*). In order to show this notion is not alien to exoteric discourse, Rongzom cites or paraphrases the famed Mahāyāna text of the Prajñāpāramitā tradition, the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-*

705 *The Approach*: | kun du bzang po'i rol pa gtsos smos pa 'di ni | byang chub kyi sms rdo rje tshig drug pa las | tshig dang po gnyis kyi ni byang chub sms kyi rang gzhin gol sa bcad pa dang bcas pa bstan to || tshig bar ma gnyis kyi ni byang chub sms kyi che ba kun tu bzang po'i rol pa'i rgyan mi 'gog par bstan to || tshig tha ma gnyis kyi ni byang chub sms kyi gzhag thams la bzla' ba dang bcas par bstan to || (RZSB 1.494.07-494.11).
śūtra. Without a hint of irony, Rongzom introduces this text under the aegis of “definitive discourses” and then proceeds to interpret that citation/paraphrase to mean something it does not explicitly state. His point is to associate the Great Perfection trope to a doctrine accepted by the Yogācārin tradition of the Mahāyāna, albeit with qualifications. The accumulation of merit is indeed practiced, though that practice presupposes the deceptive nature of so-called practice of accumulating merit. “Similarly,” Rongzom writes, ordinary phenomena actually “are curative because, though they are devoid of potency at their core (bcud du bya ba myed); all phenomena are made curative qua gnosis (ye shes bcud du byas) and therefore rendered something relied upon.”706 Beyond connecting this discourse to the Yogācāra, Rongzom then turns quickly to cite the famed exoteric Mahāyāna discourse, the Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra, the early Mind Series work, Khyung chen (i.e. the twenty-second chapter of the Kun byed rgyal po), and, in conclusion, the Saṅcayagathā of the Prajñāpāramitā tradition. Why? Does Rongzom do this to show that this trope about all domain of experience pertaining to naturally occurring gnosis is not simply a product of the writings of Great Perfection? Or is he suggesting that texts such as Vimalakīrtinirdeśa, Gaṇḍavyūha, and Saṅcayagathā should be considered actual writings (gzhung nyid) of the Great Perfection approach to the path?

Next, Rongzom enters into discussion of the five types of greatness (§ 5.5.6), which, as mentioned above, are already mentioned in both the relatively lengthy fifteenth chapter of Kun byed rgyal po and the bSam gtan mig sgron. Of particular note, here, is the fact that after characterizing each type of greatness,

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706 The Approach: 1 de bzhin du gob yin te bcud du bya ba myed pa yin yang don la phyin ci ma log pa’i ye shes bcud du byas te bsten par bya’o (RZSB 1.435.0-435.02).
Rongzom sets each as the member of a syllogism in a passage that also marks the superior distinction of Great Perfection from “lower vehicles” (we note the absence, here, of the pejorative term hīnayāna or ‘inferior vehicle.’ In fact, though we find mention of inferior theories, practices, and states of awareness, we only find nine references in The Approach using the less pejorative phrase “lower vehicles.” His syllogism also marks the superior distinction of Great Perfection from the Yogācāra, two discourses sharing a significant constellation of philosophical terms.

The five types of greatness that act to surpass five objects - i.e. inferior theories, nihilist theories, realist theories, doubt, and real exertion - are called ‘great’ because they are overwhelming in brilliance. The overwhelming brilliance of being manifestly awake eclipses inferior theory because, in contrast to those in lower vehicles who remove obscurations and assert that awakening is accomplished in the transformation of appearance, here there is no phenomenon to be relinquished that is rejected. The phenomenon that is to be transformed is absent any transmutation. The phenomenon that is to be actualized is nothing that is to be obtained. Teaching only the directly perceived, the immediate, to be the awakened is overwhelming in brilliance [relative to] those inferior theories and an antidote to them; thus ‘greatness’ is due to the destruction of the attitude connected with biases [i.e. with acceptance and rejection]. That will applied to those below Dominion in connection with everything is the Lord of Knowledge (i.e. Samantabhadra), who is autonomous [cf. greatness 1]; the essence of enlightenment does not rely on the power of another [cf. greatness 2]. The three remainders are understood easily. Indeed, these five types of greatness, in their five-fold iteration, reveal the one domain of Great Perfection. On this view, the first [greatness] is the thesis (pratijñā : dam bca’). The next two define it (laksana : mtshan nyid). The fourth is the logic of that (yukti : gtan tshigs). The fifth resolves it (la bzla’ ba’o).

708 The Approach: de la che ba rnam pa lngas zil gyis gnan par bya ba’i yul lnga ni | lta ba dman pa dang | chad par lta ba dang | dngos por lta ba dang | the tshom dang | rtsol sgrub rnams zil gyi gnon pa’i phyir che ba zhes bya’o || de la mngon par sangs rgyas pas lta ba dman pa zil gyis gnon pa ni ’di ltar | theg pa ’og ma ba rnams sgrub pa bsal | snang ba gnas bsgrur nas sangs rgyas bsgrub par ’dod pa rnams la | spang bar bya ba’i chos pang du myed | gnas gyurd par bya ba’i chos gnas bsgyur du myed | mngon du bya ba’i chos thob par byar myed de | mngon sum ngo ’thon kho nar sangs rgyas par bstan pas | lta ba dman pa de dag zilz kyis gnon cing de’i gnyen por ’gyur te | spang blang gi blo ’jig pas chen po zhes
Clearly for Rongzom – and he is not alone among Great Perfection exegetes in this\(^{709}\) – one aim is to distinguish Great Perfection from lower vehicle discourses – Yogācāra and Guhyamantra, in particular – that make use of many of the same terms categorizing and emphasizing the mental, though nuanced in different ways. In his book, *The Philosophical Foundations of Classical rDzogs chen* in Tibet, David Higgins describes the Great Perfection’s distinctive paradigm to be a “disclosive” one, significantly different from the remedial strategies of the Śrāvakas, Yogācārins, and Guhyamantrikas, whatever the idiomatic resemblance.

The importance and far-reaching implications of the rDzogs chen disclosive paradigm of goal-realization cannot be emphasized too strongly. It is typically invoked to distinguish the rDzogs chen way from Hinayana stratagems of renouncing or eliminating (*spong ba*) the cognitive and affective obscurations, Mahayana stratagems of counteracting (*gnyen po*) them, and Yogacara and Vajrayana stratagems of transforming (*bsgyur ba*) them (23).

Rongzom then (§ 5.5.7) introduces the six ‘spheres’ or *thig le*. This phrase, *thig le drug pa*, corresponds to a title of one of the seminal *sems sde* works. Karmay (2007: 23, #3) identifies the text as one of the Five Early Works (*snga ’gyur lnga*) of the *sems sde*, though Liljenberg 2009 includes the *thig le drug pa* among the so-called Thirteen Later Works (*phyi ’gyur bcu gsum*).\(^{710}\) This six spheres are given as:

1. sphere of reality\(^{711}\)

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\(^{711}\) chos nyid kyi thig le (498.02).
2. sphere of the expanse  
3. sphere of the totally pure expanse ("sphere purifying images of the expanse")  
4. sphere of great gnosis  
5. sphere of Samantabhadra  
6. sphere of the spontaneous state

Traditionally, the six sphere are said to "represent six fundamental aspects for understanding and practicing the rDzogs chen Sems sde." Rongzom connects them to the particular discourse of Intimate Instruction (upadeśa : man ngag) and contrasts the first two with the confusion of sentient beings. Three, four, and five are contrasted with remedial methods, and the last with effort. He writes:

when the reality of phenomena is taught in the context of ‘intimate advice’ or ‘esoteric precepts’ (upadeśa : man ngag) above, then from teaching the empty and selfless up through the teaching of non-duality, there is no transforming something's nature into something else by means of various phenomena. There is indeed no phenomenal elaboration. Characteristic marks are eliminated and not in fact dispensed with (mtshan ma bsal zing dor ba yang ma yin). Due to being like that very nature of actuality, it is called the sphere of reality. That alone (de nyid) is the sphere of reality’s expanse due to being the source of all perfected quality. That alone is the sphere of great gnosis due to being naturally luminous, self-manifesting, naturally arising gnosis. That alone is the sphere of Samantabhadra due to being the unceasing ornament of Samantabhadra's play. Even an object like that is the sphere of the spontaneous state due to being unreliant upon either change from the ground up (da gzod bgrod) or refinement.The first two are untainted by sentient being's confusion. The middle three are not modified by antidotal means. The last is transcending effort in experience (la bzla’ ba’o).
For Rongzom, these five types of greatness and six great spheres work to show the nature and greatness of bodhicitta, as well as the elimination of deviations from it. In this presentation of Great Perfection the method for consolidating bodhicitta correspond to the actual capacity to remain free from effort and be confident (rdeng). At this point, Rongzom opens a very large section of the chapter treating twenty-three deviations from and seven obscurations to bodhicitta, which will occupy § 5.5.8 of The Approach.716

In chapter eight of Dudjom Rinpoche’s The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism: Its Fundamentals and History, entitled The Superiority of Atiyoga, the Great Perfection, Rinpoche describes the Great Perfection as the “climax of all vehicles” and the “culmination” of all spiritual paths. It is superior to all other vehicles because each of the other vehicles deviate into biases that preclude an authentic path.717 Rinpoche writes that those in the lower vehicles ineluctably exert themselves in biased distortions that fall short of the transformative experience of anadulterated reality described as the view of equality.

They have referred to as flawed that in which there is nothing to be clarified, with an intellect which is not to be obtained by their hopes and doubts that it is to be elsewhere obtained; and they have obscured the pristine cognition, which intrinsically abides, by their strenuous efforts, with respect to that which is effortlessly present. Hence they have had no occasion to make contact with the reality of the fundamental nature (ibid).

716 Karmay gives us a gloss of gol sgrib found in the Bai ro rgyud ’bum: “’og mar gol ba’i gol sa—‘deviation to a lower level’; gong ma mtshong ba’i sgrib pa—‘obscuring one’s vision of the upper level’” (2007: 70 n. 52).
Rongzom’s primary source for treating this subject, as mentioned above, is the work known to scholars as *Mi nub rgyal mtshan Nam mkha’ che* or ‘The Unwavering Vistory Banner [of] Great Space,’ of which he cites about half the verses.\footnote{José Cabezón has, in a personal communication, counted out the verses Rongzom cites from this text. It appears, when referring to Wilkenson’s critical edition, that Rongzom cites about half the text; it appears that Rongzom’s fifth chapter refers to vv. 1, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46, and 55. More work is obviously required to clarify the intertextual issues involved here.} The reason for taking this text, he writes, is because this interpretation has been given the imprimatur of past exegeses of scholars and is considered exhaustive in scope. Rongzom writes:

These deviations and obscurations have been explained in dependence upon the *rDo rje sems dpa’ nam mkha’ che* because from the injunctions of past scholars (*sngon kyi mkhan po rnams kyi lung khong thon las*) it is well-known that in the *Mi nub rgyal mtshan Nam mkha’ che* that each specific deviation and obscurcation is revealed like the sun in the sky. Those deviations and obscurations are simply explained as simple parameters, beyond which one does not go. When [deviation & obscurcation, as a category, is] broken down and taken as and taken in seminal groups (*bcar te ’bru ’thus su gzungs na*), there are twenty-three points of deviation and seven obscurations equalling thirty.

We are fortunate that within the recently discovered collection of continuously transmitted works of the Old School, the *bKa’ ma shin tu rgyas pa* collection, is *rNal ‘byor rig pa’i nyi ma*, a commentary on the *Mi nub rgyal mtshan Nam mkha’ che* ascribed to the tenth century figure, gNubs chen sangs rgyas ye shes. About this text, Wilkinson writes that while it’s authorship is difficult to determine on the basis of the scripture alone, stylistic similarities and the fact it is ascribed to him in the “open letter’ of Gugé scion, Pho brang Zhi ba ‘od, causes Chris Wilkinson some assurance with regard to gNubs chen’s authorship of the work.

The *rNal ‘byor rig pa’i nyi ma* is a commentary on the *Byang chub kyi sems mi nub pa’i rgyal mtshan rdo rje sems dpa’ nam mkha’ che*. It can be
found at present in the bKa’ ma shin tu rgyas pa collection. The text’s colophon does not explicitly state that gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes is its author. The title Rig pa ’i nyi ma is directly associated with gNubs chen in Zhi ba ’od’s Open Letter. The style of writing and vocabulary usage are consistent with that in gNubs chen’s bSam gtan mig sgron. [Based on my intuition about the text.] I do not doubt that this is gNubs chen’s writing" (34).

Did Rongzom used this controversial work? If so, what does his lack of acknowledgement of gNubs chen tell us? We may make a cursory examination by comparing, for example, Rongzom’s use of citations in § 5.5.8.4.1 (RZSB 1.503.18-504.18), which treats the three deviations from the essence of awakening (nying po byang chub gol sa gsum) to the section on divorce from exertion (brtsal ba dang bral ba’i skabs) found in gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes’s rNal ‘byor rig pa’i nyi ma (Bai ro rgyud ’bum, 64.04-70.05), which corresponds to section within the text according to Chris Wilkinson. In this section, the first thing to note is that both authors are treating the concept of enlightenment essence (byang chub snyin po), an important term for the Old School exgesis, particularly for connecting the ground to Buddha-nature (Higgins 2013). gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes’s chapter references verses six through eleven of the Mi nub rgyal mtshan.

In The Approach, Rongzom offers five references in support of his gloss of the category. He cites Kun byed rgyal po’s thirtieth chapter – i.e. the Mi nub rgyal mtshan nam mkha’ che – three times (vv. 7, 10, and 11); and, as mentioned above, Rongzom cites the Māyājāla-mahātantra-rāja twice, referring to citations from different chapters within the Māyājāla-mahātantra-rāja as being from two sources: Vairocana-māyājāla-tantra or rnam par snang mdzad sgyu ‘phrul drwa ba’i rgyud (RZSB 1.504.06) and Nam mkha’ lta bur dri myed (504.08). On the basis of this alone, it appears that Rongzom might be following gNubs chen’s exegesis. If so,
should we expect their respective gloss of a given verse from the *Mi nub rgyal mtshan* to be similar in both cases? To be clear, there is no requiremnt for Rongzom to follow closely even if he is using gNubs chen’s *Rig pa’i nyi ma* as a guide. They lived in different milieus and worked within different intellectual networks stimulated by different pressures of their respective ages. Nevertheless, let us look, for example, at the use of verse eleven from the *Mi nub rgyal mtshan*, which reads:

The cause itself is akin to an adamantine condition
Because it is unborn, it is indestructible.
In the primordial awakening essence,
The expanse [of basic space] is unmoved by the force of thought.\(^{719}\)

When explaining verse seven, the *Rig pa’i nyi ma*, gNubs chen employs the last two lines in order to explain obscuration via deviation in settling awareness,\(^{720}\) whereas in *The Approach* this verse explains the verse in connection with the practice of meditation in Great Perfection that emerges when there is no deviation form enlightenement essence. Rongzom writes: “The meditation pertains when there is no exertion at all because the nature of the essence of awakening has nothing to do with the character of appearance; once there is desire to generate [actual reality] it is a deviation through effort.” In *Rig pa’i nyi ma*, gNubs chen writes:

It is due to the appearance of the twelve course and subtle factors of interdependent causality that there is an idea there might be some authentic warrant (*pramāṇa* : *tshad ma*) associated with direct perception. The statement that ‘the cause itself is not unlike an indestructible

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\(^{719}\) Toh. 0828: *Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po* (Sarva-dharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayāṃ-raja) in bKa’ ˙gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang) | rgyu nyid rdo rje rkyen dang ’dra || ma skyes pas na jig pa myed || gdod nas snying po byang chub la || btsal ba’i bsam pas dbyings mi bskyod || (79.10-79.12). Cf. BGB Khyung chen 360.01. The fourth *pada* reads *btsal ba’i* rather than RZSB’s *brtsal ba’i* (504.17).

\(^{720}\) *Rig pa’i nyi ma*: blo gzhag thabs gol sas sgrib pa (66.02).
condition because it is unborn and indestructible' pertains to the deviation on the part of Pratyeka-ñānas, [who deviate into] hankering after the production of interdependent causality. In this case, since causality is devoid of any essential autonomy outside of merely appearing [to an awareness] obsessed with confusions, one’s own awareness is uncompounded and thus all conditions are indeed, on this view, uncompounded. Thus, since what is referred to as ‘this actual basis of naturally occurring gnosis’ is not something that appears, the fact it is without the phenomenon of movement passes beyond birth and death.721

Rongzom’s own remarks are succinct, but do not deviate significantly from this exegesis as he also connects the verse to:

The actuality (mtshan nyyid) of what appears as cause and condition accords with the indestructible because of the indivisible reality (mtshan nyyid) devoid of arising and ceasing that is absent of any point of movement due to causal force.722

Both indeed organize their interpretation of this verse around dynamicism, with gNubs chen writing of an absence of ‘phenomenon of movement’ (‘pho ba’i chos) and Rongzom referencing the absence of ‘a dynamic state caused by effort’ (rtsol bas g.yo ba’i gnas). Here, it appears that Rongzom was in fact familiar with and following gNubs chen’s Rig pa’i nyi ma; and while we are fortunate to have the materials needed for a detailed comparative study of Rongzom’s presentation, time and space prevent that analysis here, where only cursory remarks are offered in comparative terms.723

Rongzoms rather mysterious qualification, “from the injunctions of past scholars (sngon kyi mkhan po rnams kyi lung khong thon), is worth remarking on, its

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721 Rig pa’i nyi ma: ‘o na rgyu rkyen bcu gnyis phra rags las skye bar snang bas mngon gsum [sic] pa’i tshad ma yod do snyam pa la rgyu nyiID rdo rje rkyen dang dra ma skyes pas na ‘ig pa med zhes pa rang rgyal ba dag rten ‘grel gyi rgyu rkyen las skyes par ‘dod pa [70] gol sa yin to ‘di rgyu nyiID khrul pa’i zhen snang tsmi los bo rang rgyud med pa’i phyir rang rig pa ‘dus ma byas pa yin pas rgyen rnams kyang de ltar ‘dus ma bys te rang byung gi ye shes dgos gZhi rnam pa ‘di’o zhes mi snang bas pho ba’i chos kyang med de skye shi gnyis kyi rgyud las rgal to (69.05-70.02).

722 The Approach: rgyu dang rkyen du snang ba’i mtshan nyid rdo rje ltar dbyer med pa’i mtshan nyid pas skye ‘gag med pa la rgyu rkyen gyi rtsol bas g.yo ba’i gnas myed do zhe’o (RZSB 1.504.17-504.19).

723 I am preparing a more detailed study of this chapter for publication at present.
seems. Perhaps this refers to gNubs chen. If so, we are left with the question of why Rongzom does not mention him by name. We shall return to this point in our conclusions below. Suffice here to say: it is in my view significant that Rongzom continues to cite works, such as the *Rig pa'i nyi ma*, which were objects of censure by the scion Pho brang zhi ba ‘od, often without identifying them explicitly.

Three deviations from concentration (*dhyāna : bsam gtan*) Rongzom glosses in § 5.5.8.4.2 follows the three deviations from enlightenment essence (§ 5.5.8.4.1). After that are the three deviations from causality (§ 5.5.8.4.3). Here, Rongzom remarks that deviations that hypostisize causality or being attached to the appearance of it constitutes a ‘small vehicle’ path.724

Due to perceiving causal phenomena and karmic virtue and wickedness as ultimately real, this [oceanic] world [of] samsaric discontent amounts to a grievance such that one thinks, ‘I ought to depart from this [ocean] of discontent to the dry land of liberation,’ which is a state of bias. This, in fact, is engaging in the smaller vehicle.725

There are the four deviations from the path of actual reality (§ 5.5.8.4.4), in which Rongzom points out the extraordinary – and conventionally paradoxical – nature of the path of Great Perfection and glosses the ‘great bliss’ of the buddhas, which is, as an object of attachment and craving, forms a deviation form reality. That is, in Great Perfection, though the domain of the Tathāgata’s experience is not sought as something different from the domain of an ordinary being’s experience, the “object of meditation is the domain of a Tathāgata’s experience,

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724 We note, again, that Rongzom refrains from using the pejorative theg dman.
725 *The Approach: chos rgyu ’bras dang | las dge sdiq don dam par yod par mthong bas | ’jig rten ’khor ba’i sdiq bsngal ’dis skyo ste | sdiq bsngal gyi ’jig rten ’di las thar pa’i skam sar mngon par ’byung bar byao snyam du blang dor gyi brod pa la gnas pa rnam so || ’di ni phal cher theg pa chung ngu la ’jig go | (RZSB 1.50518-505.21). Cf. dKon cog ’grel (RZSB 1.46.22-46.23); and Wangchuk 2004: 112 n.34.
actual reality, [in] which phenomenal characteristics have abated.”726 In this approach to the path, investing maintaining hope about the cultivation of beneficial or pleasurable states in the future is deviation. This type of deviation is in fact an obsession with the character of phenomena, which is ironic considering the fact the domain (don) of Great Perfection is unconditioned and atemporal, thus making any phenomenal mark an indication of conditioning and temporality.

Those obsessed with types of characteristic marks, fixated on the reality of the appearance of fruits arising from their causes at a later time, invest hopes and aspirations that fruits that will arise at some other time, [though] they do not come to be in that way. This is not unlike the example wherein people develop faith in the word of the Buddha after the Bhagavan proclaimed that ‘emptiness exists’ on account of the [varying cognitive] faculties of the trainees [present in the audience]. Yet these people subsequently seek, and do not find, the fact of emptiness. This is not unlike the nature of essence awakening being atemporal. Thus investment into hopes and aspirations at a point in time is a deviation.727

There is also some mention here of scripture (I remain uncertain that this term should not be translated as ‘transmission’) that is definitive contrasted with ordinary scripture, as well as the category of tantric vows called samaya. Samaya can also form a deviation to the degree that it reifies a framework structured by bias. The analogy he uses in this passage is interesting. The comparison at its heart juxtaposes the unatimately unreal conventional nature of the person qua psycho-physical aggregates & elements as if real in order to make an analogy

726 The Approach: bsgom pa’i don ni de bzhin gshegs pa’i spyod yul chos nyid mtshan ma zhi ba yin pas | (RZSB 1.506.22-506.23).
727 The Approach: mtshan ma’i rnam pa la zhen pa rnams | rgyu las ’bras bu dus phyis ’byung bar snang ba de bzhin du bden par zhen nas | ’bras bu dus gzhans du ’byung ba’i re smon ’jog pa ni | de bzhin du ’byung bar muyi ’gyur te | dper na bcom ldan ’das kyi gstd ba’i dbang gi phyir stong pa nyid yod do zhes gsungs pa las | de’i dbang gis gang zag de sangs rgyas kyi bka’ la dad par gyur te zhungs nas | de nas stong pa’i dngos po btsal ba na ma rnyed pa bzhin no | ’di ni snying po byang chub kyi rang bzhin la dus snga phyi myed bzhin du | dus kyi mtha’ la re smon ’jog pas gol ba yin no | (RZSB 1.509.02-509.09).
with the primordially perfected nature of the person qua psycho-physical aggregates & elements.

Teaching internal and external samaya is said to constitute a point of deviation because there is in fact nothing guarded or unguarded. Just as beings wandering in conditioned existence pertain to the nature of the aggregates and elements and thereby have no means to transcend that reality, the natural quality (rang bzhin nyid) of the aggregates and elements pertains to the greatness of primordial perfection and therefore there is no method for transcending that reality.

Since the nature of essence awakening has nothing to do with a state that should be realized, there is, on this view, no basis for any state that is to be accomplished through the application and order of outer austerities and disciplined conduct. In traditional discourse on Great Perfection, being free from such notions of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ dissolves commensurate with one’s experience of rig pa, a term of special significance for the Great Perfection tradition, which is not one especially employed in The Approach.

In a discussion of deviations to concentration, Rongzom emphasizes that the domain of phenomena as spiritually immature. This, again, points to the notion that all lower vehicles constitute deviations on account of being discourses that elicit the biases associated with effort. It is in this section that we find more explicit mention of tantric technologies, which constitute deviations to concentration through their application of images, recitations, mandalas, rituals, and so on. In support, Rongzom cites two non-contiguous passages from the

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728 sangs rgyas kyi che ba (510.05).
729 dka’ thub (510.11) : tapas (Mvp 1608).
thirtieth chapter of Kun byed rgyal po – i.e. the early sems sde work referred to as Mi nub rgyal mtshan – revealing its rather iconoclastic orientation.

After taking the body of Great Heruka,
By means of the attributes of the wrathful maṇḍala
Regardless of evincing the syllables,
The state of peace is not seen.731

No matter how many hundreds of thousands of times
[The wrathful Heruka] is generated, [mere] flowers arise;
Because of the fact of being devoid of characteristic marks [in reality],
[Nothing ultimately real] will emerge from that hideaway.732

The term used for ‘hideaway’ is actually the Tibetan sti gnas, which corresponds to the Sanskrit āśram, meaning hermitage, suggesting that trainees may become carried away within the parameters of deity yoga practices. Summing up the twenty-three points of deviation, Rongzom states any acceptance of the nature of reality as the essence awakening, which itself pertains to great bliss, to be something other than one’s own naturally luminous awareness is a deviation.

Actual reality, which is the nature of essence awakening qua great bliss [of] bodhicitta essentially uncorrupted by distortions, if [taken to be] something besides one’s own luminosity and naturally arising awareness – that is, as some objective reference realized by gnosis – is not plausible as actual reality.

We hear echoes in this statement of Sa skya Paṇḍita’s famous declaration in his twelfth century sDom gsum rab dbyer that “the view of Atiyoga concerns gnosis


732 Toh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayaḥ-rājaḥ) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, mying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): ’rnam grangs brgya stong phrag yas pa || gang ltar spyad kyang me tog [82] skye || mtshan ma med pa’i dbang gis na | bsti gnas de las ’byung mi’ gyur || (81.21-82.01).
rather than a vehicle. It is said that to make a subject of what is ineffable is not
the plan of a scholar.”

The seven obscuration are introduced in § 5.5.8.5, the first of which
concerns the fact that the awakening essence is beyond decay. In this section we
find some criticism of the Guru Puja and “manḍalic systems” of being
encompassed by false objects and participating in distortions. “Both black and
white clouds obscure the sky,” he writes. Rongzom’s critical remarks should not,
however, suggest that Rongzom is broadly dismissive of manḍalic systems,
rituals, and so on. Such critical remarks in the context of Great Perfection
discourse, moreover, should be recognized in connection with the fact Rongzom
was deeply involved with ritual manḍalic systems (witness his commentary on
Guhyagarbha). Rongzom’s exhortations to “just letting-go” and “naturally
resting” in the nature of reality should be connected with his position as the
leader of an ethical community (witness his elaborate discussion of ethics in his
tantric constitution or yig bca’, RZSB vol. 2, 393-412). Thus, Great Perfection
rhetoric cannot be taken literally at face value. Again, what we see here is not a
propositionalist doctrine – but a strategy.

We come to a discussion of “the three beings” (yin pa gsum) in § 5.5.8.6.
Karmay has noted the connection between the three beings and the seminal
Great Perfection work identified as IOL 594, the sBas pa’i rgum chung. It is also
important, I believe, to note that the yin pa gsum are also referenced in the ninth
chapter of the Kun byed rgyal po, which is in fact the chapter on removing

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733 sDom gsum rab dbyer: a tī yo gu ’i lla ba ni | ye shes yin gyi theg pa min | brjod bral brjod byar byas
pa ni | mkhas pa ’i dgongs pa min zhes bya | (Higgins 2013: 251 n. 65).
deviations & obscurations (gol sgrib skyon sel gyi le’u). Let me cite the the text directly:

The view that acting on causes [will obtain the] results
For those who see theory and practice as unconnected,
Deviates into obscurity for three human lifetimes;
Prejudicial acts within a single essence means
Perceiving duality rather than unity;
Thus, as long as there is bias, there is deviation and obscuration;
Meditation on the three beings in connection with what is unified,
and naturally occurring,
Is said to be a deviation from the transmission beyond effort.734

Here, meditation on the three beings constitutes deviation. In The Approach, however, the entire significance of the Great Perfection is subsumed within these three types of being. Thus, it appears that reference to the yin pa gsum is not homogenous within the writings of Great Perfection, for if the yin pa gsum are indeed connected with effort, bias, and deviation, this iteration appears to be significantly dissimilar from Rongzom’s conception of the three beings, which are symbolized as Samantabhadra, Samantabhadri, and the non-dual one.

The three great certainties (gding chen po gsum) are discussed in § 5.5.8.7, where the emphasis is on the unfabricated nature of the mind and the nature of spontaneity as being beyond refinement. This leads us to an interesting discussion, in § 5.5.8.8, of the three fundamental intimate instructions (upadeśa: man ngag). Intimate instruction is at the heart of the Great Perfection approach to the path. It is the final mode of teaching in which the particularity of a trainees

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734 Toh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdo rje pa chen po byaṅ chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsānti-bodhicitta-kulayā-hāja) in bKa’yur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): 1 rgyu la spyod cing ’bras bu lta ba ni || lta spyod so so gnyis su bglas pa yis || gnyis su med la mi the gsum bsgrigs gol || snying po gcig la blang dor byed pa de || gcig tu ma mthong gnyis su mthong bas na || blang dor ma bral bar du gol zhi’ing bsgrigs || rang byang gcig la yin pa gsum bsgrms pas || rtsol bral lung las gol zhes lung ston cig || ji ltar snang zhiṅ srid pa’i chos rnam la || snying po de bzhin nyid du ma rtogs par || dbyings dang ye s hes rgyu ’bras bglas pa’i phyir || (27-06-27.12)
course to enlightenment requires unsystematized and perhaps even arbitrary
spiritual instruction. These three types of intimate instruction concern

1. the pith instruction that is not based on authoritative Buddhist
   scripture/transmission\textsuperscript{735}
2. the result that is not due to cause\textsuperscript{736}
3. the dharma that does not emerge from the mind\textsuperscript{737}

The reader immediately notices that the first intimate instruction contravenes
any requirement for the teaching to be connected with an authoritative Buddhist
scripture or transmission and that notions of causality drop away. Attainment of
Great Perfection \textit{qua bodhicitta}, on this view, not something established through
the causal collection of merit and wisdom.

When Rongzom begins his discussion of consolidating or settling
\textit{bodhicitta} (§ 5.6), which describes stages of meditation for the first time in \textit{The
Approach}. These lead to resting naturally in \textit{bodhicitta}. Ronzom writes: “once [the
mind is] conjoined with the vessel of great introspection\textsuperscript{738} so-called ‘settling in
\textit{bodhicitta’} is simply remaining in a state of great equanimity\textsuperscript{739} This section is
fascinating and certainly requires further analyses. Suffice here to say: there are
discussions of affliction and glosses of terms such as introspection, equanimity,
space-like, and so on. This section concludes with the following statement:

\begin{quote}
To sum up, the realization that all phenomena are basically the same as an
illusion and a mirage is called the realization - and thus view - of the
domain of the Great Perfection. The state that is inseparable from the
realizing awareness is said to be encompassed by the vessel of great
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{735} \textit{jung la ma brten pa’i man ngag} (515.10).
\textsuperscript{736} \textit{rgyu las ma byung ba’i ‘bras bu} (515.11).
\textsuperscript{737} \textit{sems las ma byung ba’i chos} (515.11).
\textsuperscript{738} \textit{shes bzhin} (516.15-516.16) : samprajanya.
\textsuperscript{739} \textit{btang snyoms chen po’i ngang la gnas pa tsam la byang chub sens kyi gzhag thabs zhes bya’o} (516.16-
516.17).
introspection, due to which no exertion connected to karmic processes is generated on purpose; it is called remaining in the state of great equanimity. It is indeed called meditation. Through those three terms, the view and meditation connected to the Great Perfection is wholly complete.\footnote{The Approach: | mdo bsdus na chos thams cad sgyur ma dang smigs rgyu dang ’go mnyam par rtogs pa ni | rdzogs pa chen po’i don rtogs pa ste lta ba zhes bya | rtogs pa’i blo dang mi ’bral bar gnas pa ni shes bzhin chen po’i snod kyi zin pa zhes bya | de’i dbang gis ’du byed kyi rtsol ba ched du mi skyed pa ni | btang snyoms chen po’i ngang la gnas pa zhes bya ste | de la sgom pa zhes kyang bya’o | tshig de gsum kyiis rdzogs pa chen po’i lta sgom ma lus par rdzogs pa yin no | (RZSB 1.519.09-519.14).}

This brings us to a wonderful section (§ 5.7) in which Rongzom constructs an interlocutor posing questions that provide Rongzom the interpretive space to offer glosses of each important point of the discourse on Great Perfection with a verse and accompanying explanation, albeit brief. This passage of The Approach is animated by questions such as “who is it that meditates on what?”, "just how is it the convention ‘meditation’ is designated?”, “How is it that under the influence of previous karmic imprints the directly perceived experience of confused appearances of objects and the generation of various conceptually derived sensations are fabricated?” and “If there is no imperfection in what appears, what deceives sentient beings causing them to revolve [in conditioned existence]?” This section of The Approach cannot be done justice here. It requires a full and detailed study, which I cannot produce here. Suffice to say: Rongzom explains that sentient beings and buddhas are indistinguishable in nature, that spiritual transformation is not something that is contrived through a path; and thus there is no accomplishing it. This should not suggest that Rongzom utterly denies the work of the path. What is being denied here is the veracity of the thematic mind’s accounts and the rationalistic frameworks within which a sentient being might misconceive the nature of spiritual experience.
because confused mental appearance is itself similar to a mirage it is said that does not abide in any underlying basis -and] does not observe in any object at all. Given it is unreasonable that it should be refined through some distinct mode of conception, the nature of the mind, like space, is devoid of any nature as-such. Thus, it is said that it is not even reasonable to refine it.

Yet is is necessary to show that each of the lower paths deviate from reality. Stating that Great Perfection is not something accomplished through a path means just that: the perfect state is not some thing which is produced through causes and conditions – that would make it a conditioned and thus imperfect thing. This is not to say spiritual transformation is utterly non-existencnt. It means, rather, that its nature is beyond the predicative nature of language and concepts and thus not amenable to expression and indication without the possibility of distortion. Given the absence of bias, the mind-as-such is the non-dual bodhicitta great bliss. The symbolism of Samantabhadra and Vajrasattva are explained as totalizing state of primordial perfection - very nature of phenomena. Gaining total confidence with respect to this state is perhaps best described as the path of Great Perfection itself. This is the assimilation and consummation of the nature of equality.

In brief, it is through the writings on the Great Perfection that both the nature of bodhicitta and methods for settling bodhicitta are [given] in the same system vis-à-vis simply remaining in a state of awareness consonant with the realization of that nature.741

In a nod to his inclusive view of the path, Rongzom writes that while those in the lower vehicles train on a different path; but they do not obtain a different result in the end.

741 The Approach: | mdor na rdzogs pa chen po’i gzhung gis | byang chubsems kyi rang bzhin dang | byang chub sms kyi gzhag thabs gnyis la tshul thadad myed de | rang bzhin ji ltar rtoqs pa de dang mthun par blo gnas pa tsam du zad do | (RZSB 1.527.05-527.08).
In a section on critical impediments to contraction (§ 5.8), there are also a good number of citations given in a discussion of the nature of non-conceptuality and the appearance of buddha-bodies along the path. Yes, the appearance of the buddha-bodies are described in terms of confused appearances; but Rongzom connects this confusion to gnosis. On Rongzom’s view, confusing appearances are the only type of appearances there are. Yet the fact they occur is indicative of their nature as naturally arising gnosis. Here, the referent meaning of the phrase ‘a hare’s horn’ and the phrase ‘a hare’s horn’ itself are both without significance except as an example of the impossible. The thing that is expressed in that phrase is not experienced so it is called an unreal object. Similarly, both space and the idea of it calls to mind (dmigs) are basically the same because they are both unconditioned. Thus both are basically the same because space, being devoid of any nature per se is unborn; percepts and the ideas they bring to mind (dmigs), being devoid of an object, are deemed equally unborn. This is the view of equality in which confused appearance pertains to the mind-as-such (sems nyid). If the nature of mind is not real, neither are its ideas. The very possibility of such appearances is structured by their empty nature. Thus, appearance per se (snang ba nyid) are expressions of that nature.

even confused appearance is the mind-as-such, since the mind's own nature is not real, [and] its ideas do not inherently exist. That being the case, whatever objective images appear or whatever mental ideas are generated, the nature of an appearing idea itself is naturally luminous and thus naturally arising, self-occurring gnosis.

Experience itself is understood here to be conceptual in nature (§ 5.8). In a discussion of the criteria for spiritual experience, Rongzom discusses the impossibility of communicating what the taste of salt is like to a person who has
never tasted it. Great Perfection is like this because it is not reducible to an idea or a sensation. This point is made in exoteric scriptures, too, such that the writings of Great Perfection becomes, in fact, a wide category. Throughout this section, we find detailed discussion of karmic latencies and obscurations to omniscience in a section mixing citations from the Abhidharma, Mahāyāna sūtra, and tantric discourse, and including a range of technical Sanskrit terms, which Rongzom explains. The section ends by declaring the state of non-conceptuality as being the first step, within a state of being aware of the reversal of fixation on appearance _qua_ ideas, to resting in _bodhicitta_. This step is called the attainment of the warmth of _bodhicitta_. In a brief section 5.10, Rongzom recapitulates this state of _warmth_ with reference to _Bodhicittabhāvanā_. His point is that when resting in _bodhicitta_ is approached by reversing the obsession with ideas and conceptuality, the need for formal instruction and training falls away because “the unmistaken path is the realization of the nature of one's own mind just-as-it-is alone - and the cultivation of that realization.”

In the final section of the chapter, called ‘just a little explanation concerning the qualities of _bodhicitta,_' Rongzom begins with a gloss of the lower vehicle approach to the path in which good karma propells someone along the _bodhisattva_ path.

In the systems of the lower vehicles, at first the generation of the aspirational mind is by means of the force of the disposition [for compassion] and a spiritual guide [and] one is moved to loving-concern through the force of great compassion because of all sentient beings' [deluded] apprehension of 'I' and 'mine' such that positive qualities are perfected and aspirations are accomplished spontaneously in deeds in which the _dharmakāya_ obtained.
This is a normative description of the Mahāyāna path, on which compassion is certainly generated, but only in association with the realist theories that consist in bias and distortion. Such compassion, Rongzom states, never becomes great compassion and is in fact not unlike the compassion of Śrāvakas and ordinary beings. This is the distinction between the minor compassion and great compassion:

In short, the non-dual realization of state of equality of phenomena thus does not become minor compassion; rather it become like [that of] the buddhas and bodhisattvas. Compassion due to the realist theories of reality does not become great compassion; but rather become like [that of] the Śrāvakas and ordinary beings.⁷⁴²

In the tantric approach, it is different. The effect of buddhahood is taken as the path so compassion rises from the very start. In both these approaches, a radical compassion described as bodhicitta is different from the uncompounded nature of bodhicitta described Great Perfection. As a result, in order to avoid people on the path rejecting the Great Perfection, the qualities of bodhicitta must be explained because the qualities of a buddha emerge without effort through the power of bodhicitta. Such a power is similar to the play of illusion. Therefore, it is said by Rongzom to be taken hold of ungrasped (gzung bas mi zin), like a moon in [reflected] in water. Rongzom states that the appearances of the qualities of greatness will emerge from calling to mind Buddhist doctrinal discourses and the power of the Buddha – both acts of the ordinary Mahāyānist. The chapter ends thus:

More need not be said here except that in the Great Perfection approach, there are no qualities connected to awakening, no flaws or imperfections

⁷⁴² The Approach: | mdor nachos mnayam pa nyid gymis sumyed par rtags pas | snying rje chung bar mi 'gyur te | sangs rgyas dang byang chubsems dpa’ bzhin no | (RZSB 1.539.15-539.16).
that are not already perfect.

CONCLUSION

David Germano has described the development of Great Perfection within two categories he terms pristine and funerary. Pristine Great Perfection is represented by the Mind Series genre, which Germano describes as “the earliest public Great Perfection traditions marked by the absence of presentations of detailed ritual and contemplative technique, and by the absence of funerary Buddhism,” which emphasizes domains of interest: (i) the focus on charnel grounds and their corpses, (ii) funerary rituals, (iii) the signs of dying and death (particularly relics), (iv) “intermediate process” (bar do, antarabhava) theory, and (v) contemplative yogas based on death.743 The Great Perfection described in Rongzom’s Approach fits this bill.

The aim of my work on this subject has been to supplement the already fine academic work on Rongzom done by Karmay, Germano, Wangchuk, Almogi, Higgins, Koppl, and others, by shedding some more light on the form, content, and sources for Rongzom’s chapter. Thus, I can venture some concluding remarks based on the analyses given above. I shall begin with Randall Collins’ social theory of intellectual culture and its dynamics and the role of rivalry and consolidation in the formation of a community.744

I have repeatedly rejected the presence of what The Approach may be best described as what Lindberg terms a propositionalist or cognitivist doctrine structured by truth-claims about reality. Often, rather, the work of The Approach

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743 Germano 2005: 5.
is best described as a rule-based theory. Rule-based theories of doctrine are like Wittgenstein’s notion of language games, which itself is not unlike Bourdieu’s conception of the *habitus* and *field*. They are also consonant with Collins’ theory of Interaction Rituals (IR) and intellectual change, which is a model for "connecting symbols to social membership, and hence both to emotions of solidarity and to the structure of social groups... [that] accounts for variations of solidarity and belief found across different social structures, and for the dynamics of individual lives." In the context of studying *The Approach*, this is the crossroad of the documentary and workly dimensions of the text. The Durkheimian flavor of this model is obvious. It presumes, along with Bloor (1976), though we need not even consider such a qualification in the context of explicitly religious discourse, that "intellectual truth has all the characteristics that Durkheim stated for the sacred objects of religion: transcending individuals, objective, constraining, demanding respect."

Collins’ work presumes that "every fleeting encounter is a little social order, a shared reality constructed by solidarity rituals which mark its entering and its closing through formal gestures of greeting and departure, and by the little marks of respect which idealize selves and occasions." Small or

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747 Collins 1998: 19
748 Cf. play vis-a-vis shared attention - the fundamental social fact.
749 Collins 1998: 22. For example, when two people meet, one offers her hand. If the other refuses (to play), there are consequences; for latter has rejected civility. Cf. L. civilis, its connection to society - and society’s connection to the ritual games that world-build (Bildung) it.
large, these ritual encounters are charged with Emotional Energy (EE) linked with whatever Cultural Capital (CC) is brought to them.\textsuperscript{750}

Collins work focuses on the interaction ritual chains that form when people move through a \textit{network} or \textit{grid of encounters} – cf. a cultural milieu with its own dominant actors – and acquire through their IRs a "personal repertoire of symbols loaded with membership significance" that comes, in short, to comprise one's cultural capital.\textsuperscript{751} The focus of Collins excellent tome\textsuperscript{752} is the intellectual world, "a massive conversation, circulating cultural capital" in its own IR chains - and its literature.\textsuperscript{753} This world of intellectual culture is at its most productive in an age similar to eleventh century Tibet. In such an age, there is a "structure of contending groups, meshing together into a conflictual super-community."\textsuperscript{754}

Using the law of small numbers,\textsuperscript{755} Collins gives a compelling picture of the dynamic constraints active in the complex movements of global intellectual

\textsuperscript{750}Emotional energy is the very essence of the sacred (Child 2007: 136).
\textsuperscript{751}Collins 1998: 29; cf. Bourdieu's \textit{field}.
\textsuperscript{752}“One of the finest books ever written by an American sociologist is Randall Collins’s \textit{The Sociology of Philosophies}” (Robert Bellah, \textit{Where do religions come from?}). Dr. Schaeffer mentioned criticism of Randall; I have read some - none of which persuades me to disagree with Bellah.
\textsuperscript{753}While I’ve read some critical reviews of Collins 1998, I remain convinced it is ignored by the Indo-Tibetanist at her own peril for precisely the reason that it treats intellectual culture, so often the subject of Tibetan History of Religion. I will say, however, that the work precedes a proper treatment of the digital age; and, more deeply, I am unconvinced that IRs must result from physically face-to-face rituals. While Collins makes room for the IR as reading, visionary experience, etc. in his model, I don’t think he accounts for it fully enough - that is, as an IR, capable as any other. He writes: “Since words, ideas, and texts are loaded with connotations of membership in different segments of intellectual communities, the experience of reading, even of thinking about intellectual topics, also affects one’s emotional energies. Reading and thinking are vicarious interaction rituals to the extent that an individual can take part in them, and thus can affect his or her level of emotional energy. This is true also of the experience of writing. Writing is a vicarious participation in the world of symbolic memberships; insofar as one is able to work out a satisfactory relationship among ideas, one is creating social coalitions including oneself” (Collins 1998: 35-36). My experience of reading for this exam suggests he is correct!
\textsuperscript{754}Collins 1998: 73.
demonstrating over and over the dynamic at work: in short, **STRONG POSITIONS DIVIDE AND WEAK POSITIONS UNITE**.\(^7\)

Such a sociological dictum might help us understand what is happening in *The Approach*. In reading myth as argument above with respect to the emergence of the *sems sde* literature, we saw a story layered within the mythical account that describes the origination of the Mind Series genre as unexpected, of dubious origins, and misunderstood. In Rongzom’s Mind Series-oriented presentation of Great Perfections, we see the amalgamation of a rhetorical aesthetic that is emerging from the Mind Series genre (works rejected as forgeries by the emerging hegemon in the West) and broadly accepted canonical works. That is, in identifying a great part of writings referenced by Rongzom in the fifth chapter of *The Approach*, we are struck by the rather large percentage that included in the list of those works that were in fact rejected by the emerging polity in the western Tibetan kingdom of Gugé (*mnga’ ris*) as inauthentic – i.e. they were works of Tibetan authorship. This fact, combined with what we have already described in the introduction as Rongzom’s rather expansive notion of scriptural authority make quite clear that Rongzom is totally rejecting the idea that Tibetan authorship is a bad thing. That is, Rongzom does not accept that if Mind Series works are composed by Tibetans they are *ex hypothesi* not authentic Buddhist discourses. They certainly can be – and are.

If, further, we recall that Rongzom’s project most often works to position Great Perfection discourse as a supplement to that of the lower vehicles, which can only progress so far due to the bias and distortion that occasion their

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\(^7\) Bellah 2011 also obtains this result in his analyses of Axiality throughout.  
\(^7\) Collins 1998: 195.
method, we cannot doubt that – insofar as proponents of Great Perfection felt themselves to be under attack from promulgators of Tibet’s New School literature and technologies – the fifth chapter of The Approach works to consolidate a position for the weaker movement – i.e. the Mind Series genre. That is, in this milieu and through the work of Rongzom, the weak position is uniting in a movement toward codification. Here, there is not yet the super-structure of icons (outside of the dyad of Samantabhadra-Vajrasattva), practices, rituals, and so forth; but a reading strategy not unlike a language game that functions as an Interaction Ritual for readers. Bakhtin’s notion of genre helps us to see here that the Mind Series does work to shape an image of the human being in literature.” This image is reflected what van Schaik describes as its “one central theme”: the natural state of mind, which is gnosis *qua* uncompounded *bodhicitta*; it is also reflected in what Gemano states is given “in the rhetoric of being simple (*spros med*), natural (*rang bzhin gyis*), stress-free (*’bad rtsol med pa*) and the like” (1994: 241). This image of the human being, in her most radical state of freedom, is the stable, eternal tendency in the literature’s development in the Bakhtinian sense: it is always preserved in the Mind Series genre, which is renewed not only through its integration within the emergence of fully-articulated systems of theory, practice, aesthetics, and so on, such as *sNying thig*; but this Bakhtinian renewal, wherein the genre “always the same and yet not the same, always old and new simultaneously,” is also maintained in the Old School’s tradition of revelation (*gTer ma*). This literature, as Bakhtin observed, has its own conception of the addressee: those interested in Great Perfection discourse. In The Approach, the genre is used in a way that simultaneously preserves that audience while renewing it. That is, in The Approach, we are seeing a new use of the Mind Series
genre, which does not substantially detract from the human image it imagines in the natural state of Great Perfection. This rhetoric is retained in the Mind Series genre traditions maintained in the emerging systems of Great Perfection such as the sNying thig cycle of teachings, which incorporated categories that dominated the New School tantric literature, such as “contemative praxis drawn form generation and perfection phase traditions” (id.).

Just as kLong chen pa incorporated New School tantric ideology to structure the sNying thig and Mi pham incorporated logico-epistemological discourse (pramāṇa: tshad ma) into the structure of his discourse on reflexive awareness or rang rig (svasamvedana/svasamvitti), Rongzom incorporated a broader element of Buddhist discourse to structure the presentation of the Great Perfection in The Approach. In its documentary domain, the fifth chapter of the The Approach connects Great Perfection discourse and its early writings sympathetically to Mahāyāna sūtras that are definitive in meaning (nitārtha: nges pa’i don). In its workly dimension, only a cursory description of which is permissable here, the fifth chapter of The Approach functions, among other things, to objectify Great Perfection; it expresses soteriological and philosophical values, axioms, and aesthetics that structure a broader discourse than is found in previous works such as bSam gtan mig sgron and Theg pa chen po’i rnal ’byor la ’jug pa’i thabs, which we mention again below. Rongzom’s workly dimension in early Great Perfection is not driven to a severe increase in theoretical and practical complexity à la kLong chen pa’s work on the sNying thig cycle. Rongzom’s Great Perfection remains an ontologically spares sems sde-oriented hermeneuetic that may be applied to all variety of spiritual orientations. In this way, the work of Rongzon and kLong chen is markedly different. Indeed, both are builders doing
innovative work. kLong chen pa’s work is not unlike making some modifications to the foundation of an already laid foundation and then building the addition of a New School-inspired superstructure. Rongzom’s work in Great Perfection here, generally speaking, simply broadens the foundations. Rongzom’s Great Perfection works to take other discourses in and, often, to reconfigure its points of inflection and inference.

That is, for people who use *The Approach*, it works to connect-up symbols – cf. tropes, citations from other works, metaphors, an so forth, which are found in broadly accepted works – to emerging social communities that identify with the discourse on Great Perfection, such as the seminal works of the *sems sde*. The documentary domain of Rongzom’s Great Perfection of the text is objectified or instantiated through these symbolic associations that connect the discourse in one community to another membership in consonant terms. Where Rongzom’s work builds upon those ideas is the subject for another study. Here, we wish to say that Rongzom’s Great Perfection does indeed appear to unite a “weak [literary] movement” in his amalgamative discourse. Additionally, *The Approach* works to integrate classical Buddhist references in order to show that the Great Perfection approach to the path is not at odds with those found in the lower approaches, which, according to Rongzom’s analyses, includes any cycle of the New Schools.

According to Rongzom, those who accept and engage in Great Perfection have no ostensive requirement for training in the scholastic philosophical methods and sources that were becoming *de rigeur* in Tibet during the eleventh century. What, then, are we to make of Rongzom’s inclusion of such materials in his discussion here? The answer to this question, I believe, revolves around who
the audience of *The Approach* is. I will return to this subject in the thesis conclusions. Suffice here to say: I believe *The Approach* is authored with an audience of New School elites in mind. The demanding nature of its discourse, the fact it requires a substantial education in Buddhist philosophy, grammar, epistemology, mythology and beyond, all suggest that Rongzom wrote *The Approach* for elites, perhaps as a primer for proponents of Great Perfection against would-be critics; or perhaps explicitly for critics. What seems clear to me is that this text is quite different than earlier seminal efforts.

Take for example, the *Theg pa chen po'i rnal 'byor la 'jug pa'i thabs bye brag tu 'byed pa* attributed to A ro Ye shes 'byung gnas,\(^758\) which has been considered similar to *The Approach*.\(^759\) A cursory review of this work, which is forty-three folios in length, reveals much tropical family resemblance. Certainly it is similar in focusing on the character of the state of suffering in a chapter (ff. 12.02-19.04) and incorporating Abhidharma categories (e.g. water appearing as pus to hungry ghosts, f. 27.06). A ro Ye shes’s work indeed maintains that ethics are the domain of the illusory;\(^760\) and the dream-like nature of reality is a constant trope in the text; as is the notion that the significant distinction that obtains between a sentient being and a buddha is the influence of conceptuality.\(^761\) The text also states that the nature of *samsāra* pertains to the domain of emptiness and the mind-as-such; and that the nature of reality is primordially pure.\(^762\) The *Theg pa chen po'i rnal 'byor la 'jug pa'i thabs bye brag tu 'byed pa* attributed to A ro Ye shes

\(^758\) TBRC W25983.
\(^759\) Karmay 2007: 126.
\(^760\) *Theg pa chen po'i rnal 'byor la 'jug pa'i thabs: dge sdig las ni rmi lam yul bzhin snang* (13.03).
\(^761\) *Ibid.*: | *sangs rgyas sms can rang bzhin gcig mod kyi* | *rnam rtog yod med dbang gis khyad zhugs pas* (35.01-35.02).
\(^762\) *Ibid.*: | *'khor ba'i rang bzhin yul dang sms nyid yin* | *yin ni stong pa nyid du 'di ltar brtag* | *phyi nang snod bcud 'jig rten rang bzhin ni* | *'di bzhin ye nas yod pa ma yin no* (27.01-27.03).
‘byung gnas thus shares a body of tropics and ideas that are found in Rongzom. Certainly, A ro Ye shes’ concern for the status of suffering and exoteric Buddhist ideas suggests an affinity with Rongzom’s *Approach*: both appear to be products of authors who are working in a milieu in which the discourse around Great Perfection was not yet codified into even a systematic discourse. Further research is needed, however, to determine just how much the two texts share. What seems clear is the fact Rongzom’s *Approach* constitutes the largest and most elaborate explanation of the emerging role of Great Perfection discourse we have from the tumult of the eleventh century. Though further research is required for certainty, if there can be such a thing here, Rongzom’s fifth chapter reads as a primer for a hermeneutic or reading strategy that is given under the rubric of Great Perfection at the time. It incorporates the early writings of Great Perfection into a broader discourse on the path while demonstrating that all lower paths eventually move toward Great Perfection as the trainee attenuates obsession with appearance. This is not to suggest there must, in all cases, be a progressive movement toward Great Perfection – Rongzom has stated explicitly that this is not the case – but that anyone on a lower Buddhist path is ineluctably headed for it.
INTRODUCTION

In the sixth and final chapter of The Approach, Rongzom presents an essay, for the most part descriptive in nature, on methodical approaches to the path associated with effort for those of us who are ‘unable to remain in the natural state’ of Great Perfection, exertion being anathema to the Great Perfection. The chapter has eight sections.

1. methods for improving the mind in the system of the Pāramitās or Guhyamantra as doors to Great Perfection
2. the six faults connected to ‘concentration’ or ‘meditative absorption’ (bsam gtan)
3. on conceptuality (kalpanā : rtog pa)
4. the nine obscurations connected to the path
5. the eight-fold qualified concentration\textsuperscript{763} that relinquishes the five faults\textsuperscript{764} 

6. six-limbed yoga 

7. the five signs of stability  

8. indicators of stability subsequent to attainment 

A ninth section may be added corresponding to the verses of poetry that close 

\textit{The Approach}. Within these explicitly stated topics, Chapter Six discusses several topics: 

\begin{itemize}
\item deity yoga 
\item the basis-of-all (\textit{kun gzhi}) 
\item \textit{matha} and \textit{vipaśyāna} 
\item corruption 
\item confusion 
\item intellectual grasping 
\item the nature of the breath 
\item the emanation and absorption of lights 
\item the nature and types of dieties
\end{itemize} 

The treatment of these categories, including deity yoga, is respectful in tone. For example, Rongzom states that being contemptuous of other theories creates obstacles on the path. The chapter reads like a primer on exoteric and estoric methods of Buddhist meditation. As with all other chapters in \textit{The Approach}, Chapter Six deserves a detailed treatment that is not possible in the context of the present effort. Suffice here to say: for those of us unable to simply rest in an unfabricated state due to our want of discrimination and so on, Rongzom 

\begin{flushleft} 
\textsuperscript{763} \textit{du byed brgyad} (RZSB 543.14) : \textit{aśtasaṃskārā}. 
\textsuperscript{764} \textit{nyes pa lnga} (RZSB 543.14) : \textit{pañcadosā}. *See Engle 2008. 
\end{flushleft}
describes a group of practices in sympathetic turns and exhorts the practitioners to connect these practices to the view of equality. If so, that practice, for example, deity yoga, becomes qualified by skill in method and therefore a doorway to Great Perfection.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

Chapter Six opens with the following statement:

Indeed, the view of great perfection should be embraced because the great bliss of bodhicitta is the basis of the dharma that functions to alleviate all the maladies connected to the bondage [of conditioned existence]. Like it is stated in the Bodhicittabhāvanā:765

Any virtuous dharma possible that is not encompassed by Samantabhadra, Even the practice of Samantabhadra, is the work of Māra (the deceiver) and thus diminishes in the end; Actions that accompany it are indeed the work of Māra, though proclaimed to be the practice of a bodhisattva.

As to that, even methods to improve the mind in the paramitā and guhyamantra vehicles appear as many doors [to the path of Great Perfection,] because, on this view, what is called a path to liberation emerges that pertains to relinquishing the five faults and removing the ten obscurations to concentration; one also emerges associated with the dharmās of the psycho-physical aggregates, the constituents,766 and the bases.767 There, what is called a path to liberation emerges in terms of the concentration that overcomes grasping, imagination, negation and differentiation; the path to liberation also emerges in terms of the six qualities of disciplined recitation and meditative absorption for the mind that is naturally difficult to tame;768 and a path to liberation also emerges in terms of concentration that observes the triune mind, body, and divinity. While these are several of the methods taught for improving the mind, all cannot be seen and taught [here]; these are only partially explained.

765 Cf. STMG 455.04-455.06.
766 kham (RZSB 540.17) : dhātu.
767 skyê mchen (RZSB 540.18) : āyatanam.
768 Re chos drug; see Almogi 2009: *271 (n. 94), 395 s.v. bde ba’i chos drug. *When asked about this phrase, Khenpo Terchok Gyalsten of Thupten Choling Monastery, referenced the collected works of Dzokchen Patrul Rinpoche, a nineteenth century figure.
Thus, from the onset, Chapter Six, the shortest in *The Approach* (fifty percent shorter than the next shortest chapter), Rongzom agenda is clear. Chapter Six, among other things, is a primer for exoteric practices given in the context of Great Perfection as a strategy for interpreting those practices. The chapter is remarkable not only for its descriptions of well-known Buddhist rubrics, some particularly connected with the New Schools, but also for its striking comparisons and references to animals. In Chapter Six, Rongzom makes the following comparisons:

- the confused mind is like a bird at night: obscured.
- beings fixated on a state of concentration are not unlike a baby sparrow who remains in the nest, unwilling to move onto a mature path.
- on the path of Great Perfection, goal and effort are lost, not unlike an arrow that has disappeared into its target.
- the desire to attain supernatural powers along the path is not unlike a farmer who, in his desire for pure butter and from his reliance upon dairy

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769 *The Approach*: §. da ni rdzogs pa chen po’i tshul la ji lta ba bzhin du gnas par mi nus pa rnams la | rtsol ba can bcas pa’i thabs kyi lam btsal ba bstan par bya ste | de yang rdzogs pa chen po’i lta bas zin par bya’o | | gang gi phyir byang chub kyi sens bde ba chen po ni chos kyi risa ba yin te | ’chung ba’i nad thams cak ’byin par byed pa’o | | ’di skad du | byang chub kyi sens bsgom pa las | | kun du bzung mos ma zin dge ba’i chos ni gang yang rung | | kun du bzung po’i spyod pa’ang bdul kyi las te zad cing mthar thugs ’gyur | | ’di de dang ldan pa’i las ni bdud kyi las kyang byang chub spyod par gsungs | | zhe107 gsungs pa lta bu yin no | | de la sms bcos pa’i thabs kyang | | pha rol tu phyin pa’i tshul dang | gsang snyags kyi tshul las sgo mang du snang ste | ’di ltar bsam gtan kyi skyon drug spang shing sgrub pa bcu bsal ba’i bsam gtan ni thar pa’i lam mo zhes kyang ’byung | | nges pa lnga spong ba’i ’du’ byed brgyad dang ldan pa’i ting nge ’dzin ni thar pa’i lam mo zhes kyang ’byung | | phung po dang kham dang skye mchel kyi chos la | | bzung btags bkag phyu bcom pa’i ting nge ’dzin ni thar pa’i lam mo zhes kyang ’byung | | sams rang bzhin gyi gdul bar dka’ ba’i chos drug btor ba’i bzlas brjod dang bsam gtan ni thar pa’i lam mo zhes kyang ’byung | | ’lus sms la dang gsun la dmigs pa’i ting nge ’dzin ni thar pa’i lam mo zhes kyang ’byung | | ’di lta bu la stogs pa | | sams bcos pa’i thabs mang du gsungs pa’ang | | thams cad mthong bar yang mi nus la | | bstan par yang mi nus pas re shig ’di dag tsmam bshad do | | (RZSB 1.540-07-540.23).
770 As an amateur ‘birder,’ Rongzom’s analogy hit me at once. Birds are strikingly absent at or obscured during the night, in which, for the most part, they avoid movement once settling safely out of reach of predators in order to roost.
cows, becomes fond of milk and yogurt therefore never actually tastes real butter

- thinking one has become deeply profound, pride in one’s spiritual accomplishment, and the denigration of other theories is not unlike the spoiled children of a king or minister who do not apply their minds to the advice of holy beings
- a person who fixates on the psycho-physical aggregates is a ‘greedy monkey’\textsuperscript{771}
- the designation of conventions is not unlike a theiving cat
- the psycho-physical aggregates are an empty house
- when the senses are disciplined, the cracks, crevices, and windows of that house are closed
- the minid-basis-of-all is described as not unlike a source of medicine inside a pot of poison, gold obscured in turquoise, or a precious jewel concealed in a mire
- the ordinary mind is not unlike a monkey that does not engage in its own affairs but engages in what is not its affairs
- the ordinary mind is not unlike the waves in the great ocean
- the ordinary mind is like a trickster (s\textit{gyu} \textit{can})
- what is not like a monkey is send to tend to its own business/purpose

\textsuperscript{771} g\textit{togs} ‘\textit{dod} spre’u ‘\textit{di} bzung nas kyang (RZSB 544.04). Toshiya Unebe has found the term g\textit{togs} ‘\textit{dod} may refer to verses of the \textit{Bhagavād-gītā}, \textit{Vaishnavas}, and even Śiva. TDCM states the term refers to the Sanskrit \textit{Mahādeva} [\? = Iśvara] from Abhidharma. Rongzom’s conjection of the term with the word for ‘monkey’ (s\textit{pre’u}) might signal a play on words, a joke about a certain South Asian monkey god connected, perhaps, with wealth. See Unebe, Toshiya. 2000. “\textit{Jñāśāśrbhadra’s Interpretation of Bhartrhari as Found in the} \textit{Laṅkāvatāravṛtti} (’Phags pa langkar gshags pa’i ’grel pa).” In \textit{Journal of Indian Philosophy} 28: 348 n. 37. For an example from Abhidharma, see De la Valée Poussin, Louis. \textit{Abhidharmak\textsc{ṣ}abhāṣyam}, 4 Volume Set. Translated by Leo M. Pruden in 4 vols (Berkeley, Calif: Asian Humanities Press, 1990), vol. 1, p. 306.
Several important passage organized around a rather cryptic metaphor, given in verse, which may be the author’s own. It reads:

Even after seizing this greedy monkey,\textsuperscript{772}  
A thieving cat fabricates the imagined;  
After razing each and every bit of an empty house,  
All the cracks and crevices\textsuperscript{773} and windows are closed;  
Yet if the royal storehouse is open,  
They are forever awake.

In the section summaries below, we shall move through the associations Rongzom draws using this metaphor. In sum, Chapter Six confirms Rongzom’s inclusivism. Stating that the lower practices and theories he treats may be doors to Great Perfection is not, in point of fact, a philosophical method that appears most concerned with prevailing over, rather than reconciling, Great Perfection from other approaches to the path.

SECTION SUMMARIES

After his introduction, which ends with the declaration that “methods to improve the mind in the [esoteric] pāramitā and [exoteric] guhyamantra vehicles appear as many doors” to the Great Perfection (§ 6.1), Rongzom begins the body of the chapter with the six faults to ‘concentration’ or ‘meditative obsorption’ (§ 6.2), which correspond to the two most fundamental types of Buddhist meditation: ānāpānasati and vipaśyāna.

\textsuperscript{772} gtogs ’dod spre’u ’di bzung nas kyang (RZSB 544.04). Toshiya Unebe has found the term gtogs ’dod may refer to verses of the Bhagavadgītā, Vaiṣṇavas, and even Śiva. TDCM states the term refers to the Sanskrit Mahādeva [? = Iśvara] from Abhidharma. Rongzom’s conjunction of the term with the word for ‘monkey’ (spre’u) might signal a play on words, a joke about a certain monkey deity associated with wealth. See Unebe, Toshiya. 2000. “Jñāsaśrībhadra’s Interpretation of Bhartṛhari as Found in the Lankāvatāra-avṛtti (’Phags pa langkār gshegs pa’i ’grel pa).” In Journal of Indian Philosophy 28: 348 n. 37. For an example from Abhidharma, see De la Valette Poussin, Louis. Abhidharmakosabhāṣyam, 4 Volume Set. Translated by Leo M. Pruden in 4 vols (Berkeley, Calif: Asian Humanities Press, 1990), vol. 1, p. 306.

\textsuperscript{773} gser chung (RZSB 544.05); as per Sogan Rinpoche.
1. distraction due to sensation (byung tshor dbang gis g.yeng ba)
2. torpor due to laxity (bying rmugs dbang gi ’thibs pa)
3. [apparent] solidity due to constancy (ther zug dbang gis ’thas pa)
4. blockage due to an obsessive mind (’dzin chags dbang gis ’gog pa)
5. ontologically derived corruption (yod med dbang gis nyams pa)
6. confusion due to narrow-mindedness (shes rgya chung bas ’khor ba)

The first three pertain to an inability to practice ‘Serenity’ meditation, also known as ‘Calm Abiding’ (śamatha : zhi gnas). The first two circumstances are compared with a lamp buffeted by wind such that it does not increase in brightness. The third concerns previous recollections that flow constantly, like water drops that appear as one solid stream of water to the ordinary observer.

Numbers four through six correspond to obscurations to Insight meditation (vipaśhyāna : lhag mthong). In the context of Insight meditation, blockage occurs due to an obsessive mind. Corruption emerges due to existence and non-existence and pertains to the veiling of gnosis through constantly falling into extremes. Confusion occurs due to a “narrow scope of awareness” (shes rgya chungs pas) that cannot penetrate its object. Rongzom then moves (§ 6.3) to conceptuality, which he explains on the basis of a citation from the Old School tantra called Sarvathāgata-citta-guhya-jñāna-artha-garbha-khrodha-vajra-kula-tantra-piṇḍikārtha-vidyā-yoga-nāma-māhāyāna-sūtra, known more simply as the Kun ’dus rig pa’i mdo.774

In § 6.4, Rongzom discusses the nine obscurations connected with effort, concentration, and mindfulness on the path. The first three – unwavering

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774 On this text, reference can be made to Dalton, Jake. The Uses of the dGongs pa ’dus pa’i mdo in the Development of the rNying-ma School of Tibetan Buddhism. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 2002.
meditative absorption, the integrated path, and the manifestation — are hindrances to proper effort. The desire to generate many thoughts within the ordinary mind, the desire to attain clairvoyance, and the desire to issue forth the miraculous marks of a buddha, form obscurations to proper concentration. The final three — thinking "I have attained the dharma that is unsurpassable," being puffed up with pride over one’s theory, or being contemptuous of other’s theories — form obscurations that hinder proper mindfulness.

Rongzom then moves, in § 6.5, to the topic of concentration that destroys the five faults to concentration: laziness, forgetting the object of meditation, slackness and excitement, non-application, and [over-]application. Such concentration has eight qualifications. His description states clearly that in the context of proper application, the balance of Insight and Serenity means that bias is absent.

Among the eight factors that relinquish the five faults, four - faith, aspiration, effort, and pliancy - do away with laziness. Through mindfulness, one does not forget the object of meditation. Through introspection, one is rid of slackness and excitement. If there is excessive non-application, intention fortifies [the mind]. Equanimity supresses
excessive [over-]application. Thereafter, when śamatha and vipaśyanā are in equilibrium [544.01789] no effort is made to apply a superfluous antidote. Settling into a relaxed equanimity, then, creates familiarity with the object [of meditation]. In this system, [this] is the so-called ‘path to liberation.’

Immediatley following, The Approach asks: What is the concentration that overcomes grasping, imagination, negation and differentiation? In response, Rongzom offers a verse in metaphor, which he unpacks throughout the remainder of the section.

Even after seizing this greedy monkey,
A thieving cat fabricates the imagined;
After razing each and every bit of an empty house,
All the cracks and crevices and windows are closed;
Yet if the royal storehouse is open,
They are forever awake.

The greedy monkey mind “seizes” onto the aggregates or whatever can be seized on, not unlike mental consciousness. This monkey “is always wandering aimlessly” until it is “put into the container of introspection and mindfulness.”

A theiving cat represents another unconscious facet of the ordinary mind beyond the monkey mind’s wandering: the natural will of the ordinary mind designate and categorize, an unconscious drive to label everything. As such, the cat is a “designator designating whatever can be designated” with ease and subtlety, much like when the cat “steals away another creature’s life without the other being aware” of it. The cat represents a more sinister flaw than unconscious mental wandering: unconscious mental fixation. The greedy monkey mind connects to the need for Serenity meditation while the theiving cat connects to the need for Insight. The empty house that is razed is not unlike a “razed empty village” without residents and therefore unreal. This corresponds with Insight

789 Th 312.02; NTh 212.06.
meditation. The five types of awareness not scattering in distraction pertains to repairing the cracks, crevices, and windows of the house.

In the phrase royal storehouse being open, Rongzom refers to the fact the reality of the mind-basis-of-all is recognized for what it is. In the lower vehicles, that means understanding that it is like a source of medicine with poison inside. From the perspective of the higher vehicles, however, since “the character of the basis-of-all is at the heart of awakening (byang chub kyi snying po), naturally pure from the very first, the basis-of-all is called “mind of awakening” (byang chub kyi sens).” Summing up the import of this metaphor, Rongzom’s last gloss of it conencts up to Great Perfection:

Whatever the case may be (gang ltar yang rung), given that all positive and negative phenomena are simply appearance of the fundamental consciousness, even that appearance is due to karmic imprints in connection with karmic processes because however they appear does not accord with how they are; and therefore if the nature of all phenomena are realized to be beyond sorrow (mya ngan las ‘das par rtogs na), the royal storehouse is open, at which time even the monkey is seized. The cat is also something imagined. Even the empty house is razed. The windows are shut as well. There is no need to look anywhere else for the buddha's path when possessed of awareness like this.790

Rongzom makes mention, here, of two types of method for training those who are difficult to tame: through showing favor (anugraha) and through showing restraint, subjection, or discipline (nigraha). These are methods for taming that Rongzom considers “vulgar” (tha mal), which are appropriate for some.

Rongzom moves, in § 6.6, to the subjct of the six-limbed yoga known from

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790 The Approach: | mdo r nag ston po'i snang ba tsam yin la \ snang ba de'ang 'du' byed kyi bag chags kyi dbang gis snang ba yin te \ ji ltar snang ba de bzhin yod pa ma yin pas \ chos thams cad rang zhin yin mya ngan las 'das par rtogs na \ rgyal po'i dkar mdo zod kha phyur ba yin te \ de'i tsho spre'u yang bzung ba yin no \ byi la yang btags pa yin no | khang stong yang bshig pa yin no | skar khung yang khegs pa yin no | 'di lta bu'i blo dang ldan na sangs rgyas kyi lam gzhan nas btsal mi dgos so zhe'o | (RZSB 1.548.18-548.24).
With this model, Rongzom begins to treat the structure and methods for deity yoga, which we can only survey here in a cursory manner. In short, the six limbs, he says, pertain to “contemplation of the characteristic marks connected with the shape and color of the dharma syllables upon the heart and tongue of a deity and, furthermore, the investigation and analysis connected with the actual reality of the terms and their referents (sgra dang sgra’i don) are causes for attaining meditative absorption.” The passage continues with descriptions of training on the breath and generating bliss, after which the trainee “ought to train on holding-in the breath in order to stabilize and fortify” it. Here, the relationship between mind and breath is explicit When the breath is pacified, so is the mind. This evokes several signs (§ 6.7-6.8) well known in classical Tibetan Buddhist eschatology: mirage, smoke, fireflies, a lamp, real

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791 On the six limbs in Kālacakra, see Wallace, Vesna A. The Inner Kālacratantra: A Buddhist Tantric View of the Individual (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 203-207. Tayé offers the following summary of the six limbs and their place in Kālacakra practice: “The sixth yoga (rnal ’byor yan lag drug, śādaṇga-yoga), emphasized in Kalachakra: specific withdrawal (so sor sdu dpal, pratyāhāra); meditative absorption (bsam gtan, dhyāṇa); life control (wind control techniques) (srog rtol, prāṇāyāma); retention (’dzin pa, dhāraṇā); subsequent application (rjes su dran pa, anumṛtī); and contemplation (ting nye ’dzin, samādhi). The first two branches, withdrawal and meditative absorption, purify the central channel and cause the appearance of the empty images of the ten signs, and so forth. Wind control techniques cause the winds that circulate in the lālana and rasana to dissolve in the central channel. As a consequence, the mind of luminous clarity (’od gsal gyi sems) is made manifest, further purifying the empty form self-manifestation of such mind. Then, by means of the fourth, retention, through the experience of the four joys in the descending and ascending order, the innate bliss of the mind of luminous clarity is conjoined with emptiness, and the pristine awareness of bliss and emptiness is developed. Thereafter, with the fifth, subsequent application, the real empty form of the male and female deities in union is actualized. Simultaneously, the practitioner repeatedly enters the state of pristine awareness of bliss and emptiness in which observer and observed are one. By relying on the great seal of the empty form with the last branch, that of contemplation, one proceeds through the twelve levels of realization, gradually exhausting the 21,600 karmic winds until the mind of luminous clarity arises as immu- [455] table bliss, the awakened dimension of great bliss.” See Tayé, Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö. The Treasury Of Knowledge Book 6, Part 4: Systems Of Buddhist Tantra (thaca, New York: Snow Lion, 2005), pp. 454-455 n. 37.

792 The Approach: lha’i thugs ka dang lugs stengs suchos kyi yi ge kha dog dang dbyulbs kyi mdzhan mar bsam pa dang | de yang sgra dang sgra’i don kyi chos nyid dang bcas par brtag cing spyad pa ni bsam gtan thob pa’i rgyu yin te | (RZSB 1.548.04-548.06).
appearance, and a cloudless sky. These signs also play an integral role in Kālacakra’s six-fold model of yoga.

In the final section of Chapter Six, § 6.8, a discussion of the indicators of stability once it has been attained, we find the breath easy to control, lights manifesting in our field of vision. Over time, the lights increase in duration and other signs appear. This section contains an interesting discussion of the physiology of breath. Rongzom’s erudition is again on display.

The nature of the breath, because of being in the nature of the five physical elements, the nature of the breath pertains to the nature of the five elements such that, in that connection, the earthen breath is hard and heavy; watery breath is relaxed (dal zhiṅg) and soft; fiery breath is light and warm; windy breath is light and rough (rtsub bo); spatial breath is subtle and its movements are unsensed. The source of the breath is the cavity [at] the heart and the cavities connected with the lungs. The domain of the breath is the interior of the body, which is wholly permeated by the movement of the breath, predominantly from the navel up throughout the range of the [body, spanning throughout the limbs] sixteen fingers and toes. The path of the breath is mainly via the throat, from the secret [place up through] the nose’s aperture. The activity of the breath is dual: the action of retention and the action of producing. Retention of the breath tangibly benefits the body and also maintains it. The breath works as a rider on the mind; and it holds the mind, too, such that it is called the vitalizing activity of both body and mind. The activity of producing [the breath] moves both mind and body at the time of its motion. When [the breath is] unmoving, neither [body nor mind] move.

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794 Vesna Wallace writes: “The first two phases of the six-phased yoga, retraction [i.e. withdrawal] and meditative stabilization, constitute the worship phase of the gnosis-sadhāna. They are also called the “tenfold yoga,” since by means of these two phases, the contemplative mentally apprehends the ten signs, including smoke, and so on.” See Wallace, Vesna A. *The Inner Kalacakratantra: A Buddhist Tantric View of the Individual* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 203.
795 ‘dzin pa’i las dang byed pa’i las so (RZSB 550.10-550.11).
796 The Approach: de yang dbugs kyi rang bzhin dang | de bzhin du gnas dang | yul dang | lam dang | las dang | dngigs pa’i thabs dang | yon tan no | de la dbugs kyi rang bzhin ni | lus nyid kham snga’i rang bzhin du gnas pas | dbugs kyi rang bzhin kham snga’i rang bzhin yin te | de la sa’i dbugs ni sra zhiṅg lcic’o | thu’i dbugs ni dal zhiṅg ’jam mo | me’i dbugs ni yang zhiṅg ‘dro’o | lzung gi dbugs ni yang zhiṅg rtsub bo | nam mkha’i dbugs ni phra zhiṅg rgyu ba mi tshor ro | dbugs kyi gnas ni snying khong stong dang | glo ba khong stong ngo | dbugs kyi yul ni nang du las kun la yang khyab par rgya na | shas cher lte ba yan chad nas | phyi rol kyi sor bcu drug tshun chad do | dbugs kyi lam ni gtsor mgrin
This passage is followed with one in which Rongzom describes the movement of the breath and its relation to the elements within the body in the context of tantric practice; then he states that for those who do not rely upon the dharma, breath simply pertains to movement of the internal and external breath with no extraordinary marks at all. This leads to some discussion of phenomena that play a role in deity yoga, such as color, tactile objects, and more.

The qualities that are engendered through observation of the breath, Rongzom writes, preclude the instantiation of a monistic view (gcig por lta ba), a realist view (dngos por lta ba), and views fixated on purity. This facilitates the emergence of Insight, which, once attained, makes the body and mind truly practicable.

Toward the end of the chapter, Rongzom discusses the source of the deity—a sentient being’s body and mind such-as-it-is (lha’i gnas ni | sems can kyi lus dang sens nyid do); he also discusses the method of the deity as an objective support in three types of meditation with three types of objective support: the consecratory, the imagined, and the perfected. Although Rongzom’s treatment of these topics is respectful, he does state that it is taught this way for the spiritually immature because, in the end, recognizing the deity in deity yoga consists in recognizing the empty nature that elides any real distinction between my body and the buddha-body I might imagine in deity yoga. In remarks to that effect, Rongzom writes: “the body itself is an aspect of the mind. That being the case, the

pa’i gsang nas sna’i bu ga’o \| dbugs kyi las ni gnyis te \ ‘dzin pa’i las dang byed pa’i las so \| de la ‘dzin pa’i las ni reg pas lus la phan ’dogs shing \| lus ’dzin par yang byed \| sens kyi bzhon pa byed cing sens kyang ’dzin par byed de \| lus sens gnyis ga ’dzin par byed pas srog ’dzin pa’i las byed ces bya \| byed pa’i las ni \| g.yo ba’i tshe lus sens gnyis ga yang g.yo bar byed \| mi g.yo ba’i tshe gnyi’ ga yang mi g.yo bar byed do \| dbugs la dmigs pa’i thabs ni sgo mang ste gang ltar yang ’gal ba myed do \| (RZSB 1.550.02-550.15).
recognition that the very essence of any of the whole of phenomena within and without\(^{797}\) is in the nature of a deity is, first, the recognition of the deity.” The deity is characterized by three principles: radiance,\(^{798}\) clarity,\(^{799}\) and brilliance.\(^{800}\)

Radiance is something not solid. Clarity is something unwavering. Brilliance is something unobstructed. Something not solid suggests an absence of intrinsic nature, akin to a reflection of a moon [in] water. Unwavering suggests being unmoved by the thorns of lethargy and excitement, like the light of a large precious jewel. Unobstructed suggests that being marked by the aforementioned two means (pas) the appearance of utter luminosity, devoid of both the obscurations connected to not misunderstanding and the obscurations connected with what is confused. Utter luminosity is such that [one] gazing \([553.01]\) upon it] would be unbearable. These are explained in the context of those who desire to train properly.\(^{802}\)

According to Rongzom, anyone who trains in and practices deity yoga properly, may apply her mind to “the domain of Great Perfection and the nature of the deity just-as-it-is” in a ritual context. This may be achieved in either in a single moment of perfection phase yoga or “by means of devotion and [divine] pride.” The deity may be visualized during recitations and meditations or not, lights may be emanated and re-absorbed, and anyone with a single-minded focus may be transformed by it. This section is followed with additional discourse on the nature and number of deity types. Meditation on the buddha-body in this context may take the form of analyzing the particular shape, its capacity and

\(^{797}\) de bas na phyi nang snod bcud kyi chos thams cad kyi rang gi ngo bo lha nyid du shes pa ni (RZSB 552.15)

\(^{798}\) lham me (RZSB 522.19-522.20) : bhrājate.

\(^{799}\) lhan ne (RZSB 522.20) : tapati.

\(^{800}\) lhang nge ba (RZSB 522.20) : virocate.

\(^{802}\) The Approach: de la lham me ni ma brdros pa lhan ne ni ma g.yos pa lhang nge ni m bsgribs pa’o \(1\) de la ma brdros pa ni snang la rang bzhin myed pa ste gzugs brnyan nam chu zla lta bu’o \(1\) ma g.yos pa ni bying rgod kyi zug rongs ma bskyod pa ste nor bu rin po che’i ’od lta bu’o \(1\) ma bsgribs pa ni de gnyis dang ldan pas ma rTo gs pa’i sgri pa dang mi gsal ba’i sgrib pa gnyis myed par shin du gsal bar snang ba dbang pos bbla \([553]\) bar mi bzod pa tpar shin tu gsal ba’o \(1\) de dag ni tshul bzhin du slob par ’dod pa rnam s kyi dbang du bshad pa’o \(1\) (RZSB 1.552.20-553.02).
power, in the context of one’s commitment vows to that deity, as a function of the blessings of great gnosis, in the context of merit and good karma; and, as the physical emanation of buddha-nature.

Rongzom’s treatment of deity yoga here is detailed enough to warrant more study. At present, however, this descriptive analysis will have to suffice. Chapter Six ends The Approach with the following prose and closing verses, which contains a reference to the person who apparently requested the composition of The Approach:

In short, all these species of ‘meditative absorption’ or concentration (dhyāna) become the practice of those skilled in method inasmuch as they are qualified by the significance of the Great Perfection. Inasmuch as they are not, they will become practices of the unskilled in method. Here ends the sixth chapter on the techniques of lineage.

All phenomena are said to be illusory
And while this is widely known in the basic doctrines,
[Metaphors] such as an Illusion, a mirage, etc.
Work to disclose their equality.

In practicing this approach, there is
The approach to Great Perfection, which is definitive in meaning,
There is answering objections and making rational differentiations
Which do not work to subvert it.

The definitive meaning of bodhicitta,
Its nature and its greatness,
Points of deviation and obscurations, methods for settling, too,
Is the teaching of a lineage imbued with method.

Insisting that the effect does not manifest
While its effective conditions are present
Does not constitute the denial of anything; thus
There is no state that is denied perceived here.

In the system of causal interdependence,
There is no object imposed
Outside of mere appearance,
Because causal things are not real.
Whatever other significance there is in being divorced from distortions,
I have [given them here] according to my own understanding
For those working to accomplish [liberation] via other systems,
Following the definitive word of the Buddha.

Because this simple disclosure the Great Vehicle approach,
Was composed for the benefit of Lhogom;
Will it be seen by beings wandering in samsāra
Who are suitable vessels [for] the Great Vehicle?

Even those with intellects fixed on commentaries
That establish what is accepted in the world,
Can perceived [the truth of the Great Perfection]
Through the blessings of the real Mahāyāna,

Penetrating the domain divorced from biases,
Is like a great garuda soaring through space:
Unbound and unmoving
Covering great distance at ease.

It is interesting that Rongzom wonders out loud, as it were, if The Approach will be
seen by the people that it is appropriate for: those able to engage in the Great
Vehicle. The reference to real Mahāyāna hints at part of an underlying agenda in
the text: to situate Great Perfection as an inevitable description of the final
perfection of one’s own liberatory insight into the nature of reality.

CHAPTER CITATIONS

There appear to be nine citations from eight sources in Chapter Six, seven of
which are identified below and one of which I have not been able to locate. The
references in this chapter are few and most all from tantras or commentaries,
reflecting the normative tantric tenor of the chapter.

_Kun 'dus rig pa'i mdo_ (two citations)

_Bodhicittabhāvanā_
CONCLUSION

Chapter Six of *The Approach* comprises a concise survey of tantric theory and practice that connects up the lower vehicles to the Great Perfection. Rongzom’s integrative path structure – i.e. his inclusivistic philosophical method – is again on display.

Here, I want to emphasize that Rongzom’s Great Perfection approach to Buddhism "does not deny, improve upon, or depart from" the so-called lower approaches. Therefore, caution should be used in stipulating Schmithausen’s concept of inclusivism when describing Rongzom’s doctrine or philosophical method. In point of fact, Rongzom’s inclusivism is not focused so much on prevailing over other approaches rather than reconciling with them. Examining Rongzom’s integrative inclusivism, which is anchored in the view of equality, suggests that superordinating Great Perfection is absurd. It would be akin to asserting that the garage prevails over the driveway, a destination prevails over its due course, or the top rung of a ladder prevails over the others. Such observations are projected onto the structure at hand based on a distorted understanding. Yes, Great Perfection is ‘the highest’; but the metaphor of the
river and ocean emphasizes continuity, a point Chapter Six is begins and ends on.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

“You are doing,… the whole text?” she asked incredulously, fixing me with a glance across a dinner table in Kathmandu, dark eyes peering long through a creased brow over the thick frame of her glasses. “Yes, professor” I said, “the whole text.” Dr. Orna Almogi, one of the world’s leading authorities on
Rongzom, knew that _The Approach_ could not be exhaustively treated within my thesis. Her own exemplary work on Rongzom demonstrates just how much work can be put into a text a fraction of the size of _The Approach_. For my part, I have only been able to complete this study by avoiding detailed examinations of all the pertinent issues presented in the text.

There are, nevertheless, several questions that have driven my interest in _The Approach_. The first revolves around identifying Rongzom as a _rNying ma pa_, or member of the Old School of Tibetan Buddhism. It must be recalled that nowhere does the term _rNying ma pa_ occur in Rongzom’s work, though we do find reference to “early translations” (_snga’gyur_), which does not amount to the same thing. The Old School was not formed as an identifiable group until after Rongzom, thus it appears that simply designating him Old School is an anachronistic – at least as anachronistic as labeling Atiśa a “bKa’ gdam pa.” When the tradition labels Rongzom a _rNying ma pa_, it is an opportunity for scholars of religion to recognize that the tradition and the academy sometimes use different criteria of identity. This should not suggest I reject the intimate connection between Rongzom and the tradition that later forms and claims him as a archetypal intellectual as an important identifier. Certainly, it is – it is Rongzom’s _traditional_ identification, especially in terms of his early and important scholar of _Guhyagarbha-tantra_ and Great Perfection, both hallmarks of the Old School.

As argued throughout, the Great Perfection described in _The Approach_ does not itself constitute a systematized and traditional doctrine of the Buddhist path. It is, rather, a logic of experience authorizing and sustaining a set of sensibilities and inflection points within traditional Buddhist discourse. As such,
this “system” can be overlaid upon fully-articulated doctrinal orientations. This idea is at odds with the Old School tradition, which uniformly maintains that *The Approach* is a text explicating the practice of Great Perfection; and, to be sure, the Old School has begun to develop an elaborate interpretive framework to several important sections of the text, which unpack Rongzom’s discourse within a variety of traditional Old School rubrics, the logico-epistemology of Mipham, in particular. Unfortunately, this exquisite (and inchoate) hermeneutic cannot be the subject of our discussion here, though such work obviously remains desideratum. Below, I will elaborate a bit on the implications of *The Approach* as a logic of experience.

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There are two forces at work that compel us to label Rongzom Old School. First is his posthumous inclusion in the Old School. Like rTsong kha pa (fl. fourteenth century) whose work formed the foundation of a tradition that later claims him as a member, Rongzom Chokyi Zangpo is an important figure in the Old School, said by its most important masters in recent times to be an indispensible part of its tradition. Second, Rongzom’s extant collected works contain important and early expressions of Old School Buddhism. In that regard, there is no denying that Rongzom is a defender of the Old School – arguably its first. His work also contains important work in the New School, as well. It is, in fact, Rongzom’s role on both sides of the Old School/New School divide as it formed throughout the eleventh century and into the twelfth that makes him such a remarkable figure for the time and causes me to caution the scholar of history against identifying Rongzom as *rNying ma pa* without qualification. In fact, as I want to suggest, the absence of any clearly identifiable traditional
institutional membership is one factor that makes Rongzom’s *Approach* remarkable. The “doctrine” presented in *The Approach* begins with the broadly accepted doctrine of illusion and describes an ineluctable interpretive movement of that doctrine along the path toward the ocean of enlightenment.

In Chapter One, we were introduced to Rongzom’s view of the relationship of Great Perfection to other approaches to the spiritual path, which emphasizes continuity. Chapter Two engages in an examination of possible conflicts in his doctrine of appearance in the dialogical style of Buddhist polemics. Chapter Three outlines and differentiates the Great Perfection’s own unique mode of discourse around the concept of the illusory and distinguishes it from way other doctrinal approaches discuss it. Chapter Four explains important elements of the logico-epistemological discourse that was becoming de rigueur in Rongzom’s time. Chapter Five offers a review of early writings on Great Perfection that confirm it was not a fully-articulated system in Rongzom’s text. Chapter Six provides a primer on Indian tantra, again suggesting a continuity with Great Perfection *qua* the total assimilation of the view of equality. Each chapter of the text builds another element of Rongzom’s discourse. The aim of the discourse is to structure the impossibility of any real and radical break between Great Perfection as the culmination of the path and its preceding stages of development (i.e. “lower” paths). Put another way, the text structures the necessity of Great Perfection as the final assimilation of the liberatory Buddhist experience. In this sense, it is not a path, not a vehicle, not a bit of intimate instruction, or a doctrinal discourse – Great Perfection is the final consummation of the beginning of leaving the path entirely.
As stated above, *The Approach* has been described as a defense of Great Perfection. This description, however, should be qualified by the awareness that Rongzom’s defense is not an attempt at strong legitimation. That is to say: first, Rongzom’s Great Perfection does not form a unified and fully-articulated system of Buddhist contemplation. It does not claim to be a system of rationally coherent system. As such, it cannot be set over and against a rationalistic account of the Buddhist path. Thus, we stipulate caution in describing *The Approach* as “a defense of the Great Perfection” inasmuch as the phrase invokes the idea of a systematic Buddhist tradition. This means that *The Approach*’s defense of Great Perfection does not comprise a defense of a contemplative system, *per se*. Great Perfection, on Rongzom’s view, *cannot be reduced* to a vehicle, tantra, intimate instruction, and so on.

Rongzom’s defense of Great Perfection is not a strong form of legitimation. Legitimation is only a meaningful act in the context of the recognition of illigitimacy. There is no evidence that Rongzom acknowledged that Great Perfection is illigitimate. In fact, Rongzom’s rather expansive notion of religious authority would suggest that Rongzom would totally reject any notion that Great Perfection is illigitimate. Just as an atheist may reject the structure of the question, “do you believe in God?”, by responding “it is not a matter of belief,” it is my position Rongzom would utterly reject the structure of the question, “Is Great Perfection a legitimate Buddhist tradition?”. At the end of the path, intimate instruction, which may be totally contrary to Buddhist doctrinal discourse, and the authority of one’s own awareness, are the final arbiters of religious experience. Rongzom’s Great Perfection, as it works in *The Approach*, works, I believe, in the service of *professionalizing* or *disciplining* Great Perfection.
discourse. This is a movement, to be sure, that structures the possibility of elaborate systematization; but does not amount to as much in its own right. Rongzom’s Great Perfection is the ocean into which all streaming paths flow. As such, the description of it as a vehicle and so on is purely metaphorical and given in the service of explicating its nature as a hermeneutic that may be applied in the context of a variety of discourses on the Buddhist path.

With this in mind, we may ask if Rongzom’s hermeneutical Great Perfection constitutes a doctrine in Lindberg’s sense of the term. Throughout my work, I have attempted not to point out every instance of propositions in the text – there are many. My focus, rather, has been to show that while The Approach does doctrinal work, it is not easily subsumed into any one of Lindberg’s three categories. This focus evinces a rule-based or regulative doctrine not unlike a language game. Such a discourse structures the inevitability of Great Perfection as the culmination of liberatory realization – i.e. the assimilation and perfection of the realization of the illusory – without any requirement for a totalizing and systematic framework.

We have seen throughout The Approach that Rongzom is familiar with a wide range of religious discourse and literature. In The Approach, we find sūtra, tantra, śāstra, abhidharma, pramāṇa, and a variety of other modes of Buddhist discourse. Since prior to Rongzom – and for a long time after him – Great Perfection exegetes eschewed much in these categories, his enthusiastic application of these modes of discourse must be recognized as part and parcel of his inclusivistic method, which seeks to place Great Perfection on a horizon of spiritual experience with the so-called lower vehicles. This wide variety of Buddhists voices suggests The Approach was written for intellectuals. Pace
Davidson, Rongzom is quite clear that faith is a valid and efficacious avenue for experiencing Great Perfection. That being the case, Rongzom’s thick application of some of technical rubrics in *The Approach*, is all the more remarkable. Rongzom’s statement that Buddhist intellectuals have stupidly rejected Great Perfection because it is illogical is also relevant here. He never denies the charge; he shows that logic, while a possible avenue to Great Perfection, is incapable of attaining it because of being structured by bias. Bias structures the normative soteriology of Buddhism, which states that virtue is to be adopted and non-virtue is to be rejected. Such bias cannot be present within the view of equality that infers the basic equality of all phenomena, whether ‘impure’ and karmic or ‘pure’ and thus nirvanic. The view of Great Perfection, unlike other approaches, does not concern itself with differentiating good from back, pure from impure, *buddha* from *sattva*. These are categories that only participate in biased awareness. On this view, it is not the accumulation of merit and wisdom that produces enlightenment, but the absence of any possibility for merit or wisdom, which are both made possible only in the context of effort organized around bias.

Who is *The Approach* written for? This is another question. Karmay has already noticed that the closing verses of *The Approach* mention it was composed for a person named *Lho sgom* (2007: 131 n. 60). Karmay suggests this is the name of a student of Rongzom. Such an inference seems the obvious one. It is possible, however, this is mistaken. Of the four Old school figures I worked with during Fulbright IIE grant period in Nepal in 2013-2014, none were certain of the reference. One Old School teacher, an incarnate lama from Amdo, suggested that the name *lho sgom* referred to in the closing verses might refer to a place in the south where people meditate (cf. *Lho* [*phyogs par zhugs pa’i*] *sgom* [*rgyas mkhan*]...
rnams}). This is an interesting possibility, as is Karmay’s. Unfortunately, this question cannot be resolved today. If, however, further research is made into the identity of Lho sgom as a person who requested the composition of The Approach, it is my view that this person might not have been a follower of the lineages valorized in the Old School tradition. In other words, it is possible “Lho sgom” was a proponent of New School tantras such as Kālacakra.

Obviously, this is pure speculation on my part based on two things. First: The Approach describes the Great Perfection approach in terms eschewed in centuries of Great Perfection discourse. Rongzom’s favorite segue of choice is certainly “… and this is not unlike what is found in…”. This trope connects the documentary and workly domains of The Approach. These domains are constantly active through The Approach and help us to answer the question: what does The Approach mean?

In its documentary domain, The Approach is eager to objectify the Great Perfection. It is a tropical work. Tropics is “the process by which all discourse constitutes the objects which it pretends only to describe” (White 1986: 2; 1987: 193). Rongzom’s Approach objectifies the Great Perfection through symbolic associations, such as citations and references to empirical and received realities and widely accepted domains of discourse. This works to objectify the Great Perfection and sets it in consonant relation to other textual communities. In its workly domain, we see Rongzom’s synthetic project, which demonstrates that Great Perfection discourse may supplement its documentary domains or otherwise enhance a received discourse.

Reading the origins of Mind Series literature as myth as argument, we saw that early Great Perfection arose in conjunction with institutional Buddhism and
visionary experience. It was presumed in the beginning to be a misunderstood and pernicious discourse. But much like Rongzom’s *Approach*, which was at a first taken as an object of censure and only later, upon detailed examination by scholars, taken as authoritative and the work of a great Buddhist master, the Mind Series literature came to form a vital part of the basis for the later tradition. In this connection, it is interesting to note that Rongzom (in another work) refers to Mañjuśrīmitra, whose *Bodhicittabhāvanā* is the single most cited work in Rongzom’s *Approach*. This, and our awareness that Rongzom rejected the notion that Indian provenance was the hallmark of Buddhist authority, cause me to suppose that Rongzom might have, at least in the case of Mañjuśrīmitra, recognized the human origins of Great Perfection discourse in some respect. Though Rongzom names Mañjuśrīmitra, he never names this figure, or any other, in *The Approach*.

The absence of any reference to gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes is also remarkable, particularly insofar as Rongzom seems indebted to the work. One is tempted to think this might suggest Rongzom wanted to avoid association with a figure whose work was named by Pho brang zhi ba ’od’s ordinance as fraudulent and inauthentic. I do not, however, believe this is the case. I do believe *The Approach* is aware and responding to criticisms coming out of the emerging western kingdom of mNga’ ris. In fact, I believe that *The Approach* is significantly motivated by it.

These ordinances identify the “tantrists living in villages who have no connection with the Three Ways and yet who claim ‘we follow the Mahayana way’ (*theg chen tshul*) as objects of severe criticism. As I mentioned above, Rongzom was one of these village mantrins. This is evidenced by his tantric
constitution. These communities were objects of concern for the ascendant political faction in the west keen to extend control over a wide domain where there were not institutions. As part of that process, we find Atiśa’s famous *Lamp for the Path to Enlightenment*, which formulated the relationship of tantra to exoteric Buddhist discourse in ways that facilitated a newly emergent and soon to be dominant interpretive framework for integrating the practice of sutra and tantra. For the emerging kingdom in the west, which was keen on establishing a network of Buddhist institutions, criticism of these village masters and their religious communities was part and parcel of their expansionist agenda, which concerned, in part, assimilating (read: bringing under control) these small and widely distributed communities of house-holders who would otherwise not be joining the newly emerging monastic institutions of scholastic learning favored by the rulers.

With this in mind, the documentary domain of Chapter Five of *The Approach* is all the more remarkable because so much of the work cited there is included in Pho brang zhi ba ‘od’s list of fraudulent works. Rongzom exhibits no self-consciousness about using these works, so often cited by gNubs chen, as vital discourse on Great Perfection. If Rongzom was aware of the charges coming out of the western Tibetan kingdom, he does not at all seem worried about them. He unapologetically, audaciously, relied upon, and promulgated as authoritative, works included in the list of problematic works – and he did it in a way that intimately connected these works with broadly accepted Buddhist discourse.

While the observations I offer here can only be cursory due to the fact I did not identify the connection until the end of the dissertation process. That
said, *The Approach*’s connections with New School tantra are actually immediate, beginning with the centrality of the doctrine of afflictions. It is traditionally recognized that the tantric explanation of the process of unenlightened existence differ from the explanation given in Abhidharma, which centers on affliction (*kleśa* : *nyon mongs*). Describing the distinction made between tantric and Abhidharmic doctrines of affliction, bsTan ʿdzin rgya mtsho, the fourteenth and current holder of the office of Dalai Lama, points to karmic imprints (*vāsanā* : *bag chags*) as category that supplements the traditional doctrine of affliction in Kālacakra literature; he writes:

This is a very complex class of emotions and thoughts, described in detail in the Abhidharma literature. For example, according to Abhidharma there are six root afflictive emotions or thoughts, out of which arise twenty secondary of emotions and thoughts. The Abhidharma therefore presents a comprehensive explanation of the whole world of thought and emotion.

There is another explanation of the process of being in samsara in the Tantric Vajrayana literature, which details eight types of thoughts or concepts which are indicative of our being in an unenlightened state. The [74] Kalachakra literature, which belongs to the Vajrayana class, further identifies the causes of samsaric existence in terms of propensities or natural dispositions [*vāsanā* : *bag chags*].

These afflictive emotions and thoughts, which arise from our fundamental delusion, give rise to volitional actions. So together, delusions and karmic actions are the origins of our suffering.803

The Kālacakra tradition is self conscious about its theoretical departure from traditional Buddhist philosophy (*abhidharma*).804 The critical point of departure is

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804 Rubrics purporting to “resolve contradictions between Kālacakra and Abhidharma” are found in such texts as the fifteenth century *Ornament of Stainless Light*. See Gyatso, Khedrup Norsang, and Gavin Kilty (translator). *Ornament of Stainless Light: An Exposition of the Kalachakra Tantra*. Edited by Thupten Jinpa (Boston, Mass: Wisdom Publications, 2001).
perhaps seen in the assertion within Kālacakra literature that the mental consciousness that enters the womb is “the very subtle mind of clear light.”

According to the Abhidharmakośa, on the other hand, the consciousness that penetrates the womb is a mental affliction; according to the Yogācāra Abhidharmasammucaya, “those who assert the collection of eight types of consciousness describe it as a foundation consciousness, which is an untaught [lung ma bstan], unobstructed phenomenon and associated with neutral feelings (163). According to the famed commentary on Kālacakra, The Ornament of Stainless Light (Vimalaprabhā), “highest tantras, such as the Kālacakra, are in agreement that the clear-light nature of mind is the basis of all things in samsara and nirvana” (163). This amounts to “another unique feature of the Kālacakra-tantra’s theory, namely, the assertion that all sentient beings are Buddhas.”

Although the Kālacakra tradition asserts that sentient beings are gnosis endowed buddhas, it also asserts, paradoxically, that there is no attainment of gnosis without the accumulation of merit (Wallace 2001: 7). Thus, gnosis, conditions for the possibility of which are structured by bias (i.e. merit making), is simultaneously the goal and the path to it (155) in this tradition.

Kālacakra shares Rongzom’s concern with the folly of philosophy (17). It also asserts that “ascertainment of one’s own gnosis as enlightened awareness entails the absence of afflictive and cognitive obscurations, which impede one’s

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805 Gyatso, Khedrup Norsang, and Gavin Kilty (translator). Ornament of Stainless Light: An Exposition of the Kalacakra Tantra. Edited by Thupten Jinpa (Boston, Mass: Wisdom Publications, 2001), p. 162. According to Vesna Wallace, this “interpretation of enlightened awareness as the mind that, though free of the habitual propensities of karma (karma-vāsanā), supports transmigratory happiness and suffering and terminates them, is based on the Nāmasaṃgiti’s (v. 96) description of the discriminating gnosis (pratyaveksaṇa-jñāṇa) of the Buddha as the mind that ends happiness and suffering” (2001: 19).

self-recognition. According to The Approach, “the reality of awakening is simply the pacification of both the negative and the meritorious” (RZSB 1.443.02-443.03). Put another way, both approaches envision the condition that structures the possibility of enlightenment as an absence of any stance structured by the biases of the merit-making model, which engages in practices of adopting (blang) certain behaviors while rejecting (dor) others. This is a view also seen in the Sekoddeśa (Wallace 2001: 172-173), which Rongzom was familiar with. Another idea “fundamental” to Kālacakra is that afflictions are unreal (173). But a critical point of departure lies in the Kālacakra’s emphasis of “the nature and function of prāṇas,” subtle winds of energy within the sentient body, “as the immediate cause of mental afflictions and their elimination,” (loc. cit.). Like Rongzom’s Great Perfection, Kālacakra stresses “recognizing the ultimate nature of one’s own mental afflictions, which is gnosis” (id.).

Unlike Rongzom’s Great Perfection, Kālacakra tradition denigrates the idea that spiritual attainment may be transmitted through the blessings of a guru; and, in contrast to the village mantrin image of Rongzom, Kālacakra exalts the image of the qualified teacher as the celibate (read: institutionalized) guru. In a phrase that appears in tension with Rongzom’s rather wider horizon of spiritual transformation, the New School tantra of Kālacakra asserts that “one cannot achieve omniscient Buddhahood and lordship over the three worlds by the mere blessing and authority of a spiritual mentor” (loc. cit.). Admittedly, while Rongzom never says otherwise, he discourse strongly suggests the possibility that an individual whose religious conscious is structured by uncritical faith alone can be transformed through hearing the phrase “bodhicitta’ heard in terms of a predicative nominative declaration. In essence: “the ordinary
mind (citta) is enlightened (bodhi)."

The highly technical nature of The Approach, Rongzom’s repeated allusions to and incorporations of, elements of New School tantra ranging from his use of myth as argument vis-à-vis the Sekkodeśa, his repeated references to the Kālacakra’s six-limbed yoga – including his important reference and critical reference to the image of a shimmering black line (read: snake) against a field of blue (read: in water) – his discussions of the nature and efficacy of deity yoga in relation to Great Perfection, and the introduction of the text organized around a doctrine of affliction, have all combined in my estimations of Rongzom’s text recently. In combination, further research is needed to investigate what I believe may be an important factor in identifying one important audience of the text: a scholar of the New School(s), perhaps another scholar of Sankrit. I leave these remarks here with a caution and the promise to investigate this possible connection further in the future.

Another fascinating aspect of Rongzom’s work is the role The Approach plays in Old School intellectual history. In my time researching and translating The Approach, I had the opportunity to work with a number of impressive Old School scholars and adepts. My work with them reveals that there is no received interpretation of The Approach within the tradition. This means there are parts of the work about which there is no traditional consensus. The interpretive ball is rolling, however. With The Approach now being taught by an extremely small number of scholars in institutions in India and Tibet, the Old School is now involved in what Gadamer called the hermeneutics of tradition. Scholars such as mKhan po Tshul khrims blo gros are teaching the text with a remarkable degree of subtlety, correlating even exoteric terms and phrases with elements of
traditional Great Perfection systems of practice.

When speaking with these scholars, they each stated that the purpose of *The Approach* was to teach Great Perfection meditation, though such an agenda is not obvious when reading the text. It contains no mention of the traditional rubrics of Great Perfection meditation such as “Cutting Through” and “Leaping Over” practices. At face value, *The Approach* describes Great Perfection as a hermeneutic – an interpretive strategy that may be used to understand and refine the path. As such, it should not be described as “a defense of Great Perfection” without qualifying the fact that the elaborate systems of Great Perfection known to us today were not yet developed at the time of *The Approach*. Thus, such a description is, in some important sense, anachronistic.

As I have stated in the introduction, paraphrasing Eliot, I have only attempted to lick a tongue of light into less lit corners of Buddhist intellectual history, with no pretense to full illumination. My own time dissertating on *The Approach* has been spent coming to grips with its difficult prose and synthetic agenda. A deeper, more nuanced understanding of its content and implications awaits further research. For my part, I have attempted to help facilitate that further effort through this thesis. I respectfully submit that, shortcomings notwithstanding, the knowledge I have produced here warrants the Ph.D.
Appendix 1: Outline of The Approach

1. the character of affliction (417-435.09): nyong mong kyi mtshan nyid: what is the reality of affliction?
   1.1. the Śrāvaka approach: nyan thos kyi tshul (417.18-420.02): the four noble truths
   1.2. the Pratyeka-jīna approach: rang rgyal ba kyi tshul (420.02-420.17): the twelve links of interdependence
   1.3. the Yogācāra approach: rnal ’byor spyod pa kyi tshul (420.17-421.18): the three natures
   1.4. the Madhyamaka approach: dbu ma’i tshul (421.18-435.08): the pacification of discursive schemes
      1.4.1. the consistent or varying experience of appearance respective of one’s karmic inheritence: las kyi bgo skal la spyod pa mthun pa dang mi mthun par snang ba dag (426.09)
      1.4.2. totally pure and totally impure appearances: yongs su dag pa dang yongs su ma dag par snang ba dag (427.14)
      1.4.3. accessible and inaccessible appearances: nye bar spyod pa dang bcas pa dang nye bar spyod pa dang ldan pa ma yin par snang ba dag (428.16)
      1.4.4. the falsely appearance and correctly appearing: phyin ci log du snang ba dang phyin ci ma log par snang ba (429.01)
      1.4.5. appearances qualified by both [truth and fiction]: gnyis ga’i cha dang ldan par snang ba rnam (429.03)
      1.4.6. perception of false appearances accompanied by error and perception of false appearances accompanied by veracity: phyin ci log du snang ba mthong ba phyin ci log dang bcas pa (429.08)
      1.4.7. appearances having a basis, those that are baseless, and those that have false bases: snang ba rten gzhi yod pa dang \ rten gzhi myed pa dang \ rten gzhi yang dag pa ma yin pa dang ldan pa rnam (429.09)
      1.4.8. effective and ineffective appearances: bya ba byed nus pa dang nus pa ma yin par snang ba dag (429.21)
      1.4.9. appearances present as real entities and those imagined: rdzas su yod pa dang brtags pa’i yod par snang ba dag (430.01)
      1.4.10. totally imagined and actual appearance: kun tu btags pa dang mtshan nyid par snang ba (430.02)
   1.5. the Madhyamaka & Guhyamantra approach: dbu ma dang sangs sngags kyi tshul (430.13-433.24)
      1.5.1. five analogies (430.20-433.24):
         1.5.1.1. illusion: sgyu ma (430.21-431.08)
         1.5.1.2. mirage: smig rgyu (431.08-431.20):
         1.5.1.3. dream: rmi lam (431.20-432.08)
         1.5.1.4. image/reflection: gzugs brnyan (432.08-432.19)
         1.5.1.5. emanation: sprul pa (432.19-433.23)
   1.6. conclusion (434.01-435.08)
2. objections & responses (435.09-458.18)

2.1. Issue 1 (435.09): the phrase "like an illusion," "illusory" (sgyu ma lta bu : māyopāma)

2.1.1. brgal ba : objection (435.09): the aggregates and illusions are the same

2.1.2. lan (brjod) : response (435.20): the power of appearance

2.1.2.1. mirror divination; phra phab : prasena(m)/pratisena (example from Sekodeśa commentary on Kālacakra-tantra)

2.1.2.2. example of the Bhadramāyākāra, 'the Good Illusion-maker'

2.1.2.3. example of Bali (a character from the Ramāyana)

2.1.2.4. "imaginary form" kun brtags pa'i gzugs (437.18-438.01)

2.1.2.5. "real form" grub pa'i gzugs (438.08-439.04) and the myth of Arachne.

2.2. Issue 2 (439.14-441.19): the reality and continuity of conventional causality

2.2.1. objection (439.14): the causal continuum never ceases; it cannot since it is an object of pure worldly gnosis.

2.2.2. response (439.18): the Buddha did not teach that causal continuum never ceases: pratītyasamutpāda

2.2.2.1. 'ye dharma' as the 'seal impressed upon all dharma discourses (gsungs rab mtha' dag)

2.2.2.2. analysis of two different translations of the ye dharma formulation

2.2.2.3. metaphor of the doubtful bird (skyes bu pho rig gi khu 'phrig can) re grub mtha'

2.3. Issue 3 (441.19-451.03): the status of enlightened phenomena vis-à-vis causality

2.3.1. gzhan dag gis brgal ba (441.19): the display of pure phenomena

2.3.2. response (441.23)

2.3.3. objection (444.11): the status of conventions as illusory

2.3.4. response (444.13)

2.3.5. objection (445.12): gnosis and causality

2.3.6. response (445.16)

2.3.7. objection (446.19): bag chags or nyer len as the source of gnosis

2.3.8. response (446.20)

2.3.9. objection (447.06): relation between "illusory" (māyopāma) and nirvāṇa

2.3.10. response (447.08)

2.3.11. objection (448.08): the continuum of gnosis and non-abiding nirvāṇa

2.3.12. response (448.11)

2.3.13. objection (448.18): the formation of the physical world is the existing force that emerges as something manifesting in accordance with the karma of the unbroken continuum of beings wandering in conditioned existence.807

2.3.14. response (448.20)

807 ThCh: snod kyi 'jig rten 'byrub pa ni 'gro ba rnams kyi rgyun rgyud ma chad pa la \ 'jig rten mngon par 'grub pa'i las de lta byung ba yod pa'i dbang yin no \ RZSB 1.448.18-448-20); cf. Schmithhausen 1987: §3.13.4 n.b. 342 n. 444.
2.3.15. objection (448.21): the world is actualized from equal parts projecting karma from the past and presently occurring karma.
2.3.16. response (448.22)
2.3.17. objection (449.09): the power of a sage's aspirations
2.3.18. response (449.10)
2.4. Issue 4 (451.03): even if there is no real entity to be relinquished in connection with afflictions and all phenomena are naturally beyond sorrow, migrants who are bound nevertheless experience various disatisffactions.
2.4.1. objection (451.03): suffering is actual
2.4.2. response (451.06): the metaphor of the rowdy boy explains how karmic processes of conceptual construction occur
2.4.3. objection (452.10): the basis of phenomena
2.4.4. response (452.16): the example of a blue cloth
2.4.5. objection (454.10): If all phenomena are empty of their own nature, then what source is there for their appearance? What source is there for confusion? Given that appearance entails a basis of appearance, is it not the case that confusion entails a basis of confusion?
2.4.6. response (454.10): there are conditions for appearance and confusion; but no basis for them.
  2.4.6.1. time & awareness
  2.4.6.2. the process of confusion
  2.4.6.3. appearance ceases when fixation on things stops due to insight and concentration
3. shan sbyar (458.19-477-12): Distinguishing the Great Perfection from other vehicles that retain the nomenclature of illusion
3.1. Issue 1 (458.21-460.15)
  3.1.1. objection (458.21-458.22): confused appearance in the mind as its 'reality'
  3.1.2. response (458.23-460.15):
    3.1.2.1. the reflection of a black snake under water (459.05-459.24)
    3.1.2.2. penetrating the inseparability of the two truths (460.03-460.15)
3.2. Issue 2 (460.15-468.03)
  3.2.1. objection (460.15-460.23) the imagined and the actual
  3.2.2. response (460.23-468.03): appearance and existence
    3.2.2.1. mu stegs pa (461.16-462.21)
    3.2.2.2. nyan thos (462.21-463.23)
    3.2.2.3. rnal 'byor sphyod pa (463.23-465.02)
    3.2.2.4. dbu ma (465.02-465.08)
    3.2.2.5. gsang sngags (465.09-466.14)
  3.2.3. objection (466.14): what is the character of apparent causality?
  3.2.4. response (466.15)
  3.2.5. objection (466.23): why did the buddhas not teach this quintessential point from the beginning?
  3.2.6. response (466.24)
3.3. objection (468.03): The Yogācārin explanation of conceptuality as not totally imagined
3.1. response (468.04)
3.2. Supplementary discussion (473.05-477.10)
3.3.1. yāna (473.20)
3.3.2. āgama (474.09)
3.3.3. pravacana (474.17)
3.3.4. tantra (475.04)
3.3.5. abhisamādhī, abhiprāya (475.11)
3.3.6. upadeśa (476.02)

4. rigs pa mi gnod tshul (477.12-491.20): Great Perfection is not undermined by logic
4.1. byang chub kyi sems (477.24-481.13)
   4.1.1. relation between byang chub kyi sems and sems (478.10) - (dmigs snang ngo bo gsum)
4.2. gcig pa gsun (479.20): three types of identity/unity
   4.2.1. mtshungs pa’i gcig pa (479.23-480.13)
   4.2.2. grangs kyi gcig pa (480.13-480.22)
   4.2.3. dbyer myed pa’i gcig pa (480.22-481.13)
4.3. da ni skabs ‘dīr gcig pa dang tha dam par sgrib pa dang dgag pa la stogs pa’i spyi’i tshul (481.13)
   4.3.1. dgags pa (481.17)
   4.3.2. bsgrub pa (482.06)
      4.3.2.1. ngo bo nyid (482.15-483.03)
      4.3.2.2. khyad par (483.04-484.03)
      4.3.2.3. gcig dang tha dad pa (484.03-486.06)
      4.3.2.4. de ltar sgrub par byed pa de yang blo rnam pa gnyis (486.06-487.11)
4.4. sgrā’i bstan chos (487.11-487.20)
4.5. rigs pa’i bstan chos (487.20-488.01)
   4.5.1. rigs pa’i bzhi’i tshul (488.01)
      4.5.1.1. ’di rnams kyi sel ba bzhi (488.06)
      4.5.1.2. ’di rnams kyi yul dang tshad (488.08)
   4.5.2. rigs pa gzhis’i thal ba (488.14)
   4.5.3. mngon sum gysis grubs pa (489.15)
4.6. Concluding issue: the status of reasoning (491.01-491.19)
5. rdzogs pa chen po’i gzhung nyid la ’jug par bya (491.20-540.06): what is disclosed in the scriptures of Great Perfection
5.1. Four-fold rubric of rdzogs chen teachings
   5.1.1. byang chub sens kyi rang bzhin bstan pa (492.04)
   5.1.2. byang chub sens kyi che ba bstan pa (492.07)
   5.1.3. byang chub sens kyi gol sgrib bstan pa (492.12)
   5.1.4. byang chub sens kyi gzhag thabs bstan pa (497.14)
5.2. From the textual tradition of Great Perfection : rdzogs pa chen po’i gzhung nyid las ’byung ba (492.20-516.13)
   5.2.1. chos thams cad byang chub kyi sems thig le chen po gcig gi rang bzhin du sangs rgyas par lta’o (493.11-493.22)
   5.2.2. de bzhin du ’khrul snang thams cad kun tu bzang po’i rol par lta’o (493.22-494.12)
   5.2.3. sems can thams cad zab mo byang chub kyi zhih du lta’o (494.12-494.17)
5.2.4. spyod yul thams cad rang byung gi ye shes rang shar par lta’o (494.17-496.11)
5.2.5. rnam grangs kyis na chos thams cad ni che ba rnam pa lnga’i rang bzhin du sangs rgyas par lta’o (496.11-498.01)
5.2.6. six great spheres: thig le chen po drug (498.01-498.24)
  5.2.6.1. sphere of reality
  5.2.6.2. sphere of the expanse
  5.2.6.3. sphere of the totally pure expanse
  5.2.6.4. sphere of great gnosis
  5.2.6.5. sphere of Samantabhadra
  5.2.6.6. sphere of the spontaneous state
5.2.7. gol sgrib sum bcus ni gol ba dang sgrib pa bcas (498.24-514.19)
5.2.8. yin pa rnam pa gsum gyis ni the tsom gyi gebs bsal (514.19-515.02)
5.2.9. gding chen po gsum gyis dgongs pa’i rdeng gcad (515.02-515.09)
5.2.10. man ngag gi rtsa ba gsum gyis man ngag gi gzhi gzung (515.09-515.18)
5.2.11. byang chub kyi sems thig le chen po gcig gyis ni shes bya thams cad kyi gdar sha ji ltar gcad (515.18-515.22)
5.2.12. thams cad nas thams cad du sangs ma rgyas pa med pa’i che bas ni la zla’ ste | kun tu bzann po dbyer med pa’i sa la dta nyid nas brtsal med par lhun gyis ’jug pa (515.22-516.13)
5.3. byang chub sems kyi gzhag thabs bstan te (516.14)
6. brgyud pa’i thabs bstan pa (540.06-555): Instruction on the paths encountered through methods connected to effort for those unable to remain in the natural state according to the Great Perfection
6.1. method to improve the mind in the paramitā and guhyamantra approaches manifest as entryways to the Great Perfection
6.2. six faults connected to meditative absorption - bsam gtan: dhyāna (541.01)
  6.2.1. byung tshor dbang gis g.yeng ba: distraction due to sensation
  6.2.2. bying rmugs dbang gi ’thibs pa: torpor due to laxity
  6.2.3. ther zug dbang gis ’thas pa: [apparent] solidity due to constancy:
  6.2.4. ’dzin chags dbang gis ’gog pa: blockage due to an obsessive mind:
  6.2.5. yod med dbang gis nyams pa: ontologically derived corruption
  6.2.6. shes rgya chung bas ’khor ba: confusion due to narrow-mindedness:
6.3. conceptuality: rtog pa (542.02)
  6.3.1. two types of subtlety
  6.3.2. two types of coarseness
6.4. nine obscurations associated with the path (542.18)
6.5. eight-fold qualified concentration that gets rid of the five faults (543.14)
6.6. six-limbed yoga (547.03)
6.7. five signs of mental stability (549.03)
  6.7.1. smig rgyu: mirage
  6.7.2. du ba’i tshul: smoke
  6.7.3. sring bu me khyer ’dra: akin to fireflies
  6.7.4. mar me bzhin du ’bar ba: blazing like a butterlamp

808 rdzogs pa chen po’i tshul la ji lta ba bzhin du gnas par mi nus rnams la | rtsol ba dang bcas pa’i thabs kyis lam btsal ba bstan par bya ste | (RZSB 540.07).
6.7.5.  *rtag du snang ba*: constant appearance
6.8.  *bṛtan pa’i rtags thob nas* (547.17): subsequent to attaining indicators of stability
  6.8.1.  breath as a method for visualization of body, mind, and deity (550.01)
7.  Closing verses (554.08)
Appendix 2: Translation
The Commentarial Treatise entitled, ‘Disclosing the Great Vehicle Approach

by:
Rongzom Chokyi Zangpo
§ chapter one: the character of afflictions (417.01-435.09)

I am going to explain a bit about engaging in the Great Vehicle (mahāyāna) approach.811 First and foremost (thog ma kho na), it is fitting that whosoever wishes to be freed from the ocean of samṣāra and accomplish unexcelled awakening scrutinize the character of the afflictions since it is well-known from the general word of the Buddha812 that "since the afflictions have bound beings migrating in conditioned existence, they have drifted (khyams) on the ocean of samṣāra." Thus, it is fitting to seek out that which is the superior path that is an antidote to those afflictions and act to cultivate it because there is no getting rid of the afflictions without a thorough understanding of their antidotes; and when there is no thorough understanding of those antidotes, since there is no knowledge of the method that is to be cultivated, without disengaging from the afflictions the opportunity813 for liberation will not be found.814

811 tshul : naya; Sam van Schaik, in the "Early Days of the Great Perfection" (2004), writes that rdzogs chen is a "way" (tshul) and that the term tshul suggests "a mode of practice rather than a separate set of practices. It is certainly not considered a vehicle" (p. 175, emphasis mine). The Tibetan term has several nuances: TDCM (2278a) gives method (thabs), means/livelihood ('tsho ba skycl bu), a process of doing work (las ka byed tshul). There is also the sense of tshul as procedure, technique, system, mode, model, way -- e.g. a criterion or way of proceeding ("gro tshul"); as in a way of speaking (skad cha bshad tshul); a state/natural state, a condition (gnas tshul); also in the sense of rigs pa, tshul dang tshul min mkhas pa, and tshul bzhin byed pa; i.e. viable, tenable, appropriate, a reason for the way things are (yin lugs rgyu mtshan cf. TCMC s.v. rigs pa) -- as in skill in distinguishing tenable from untenable; correct, appropriate, correctly, or "someone acting accordingly" (tshul bzhin byed pa). Note, too, there is a sense of pretension, affectation, as in feigning -- e.g. "don't feign knowledge!" (khul; mi shes shes tshul ma byed). In DYSG (643) the process of calculating a series (phreng rtis rgyaq tshul); the process of healing illness (nad gso tshul); the process of planting crops, and so forth (lo tog 'debs tshul zhes pa lta bu). Signifying form or character (dbyings dang mam pa'i don te); the form spoken language (skad cha bshad tshul); acting characteristically respectful (gus gus kyi tshul du byed); quality (gnas tshul iso. 'character of a state'); apparitional form or mode of appearance (snang tshul), and so forth; signifying a systematic course (lam lugs kyi don te), according to a character (tshul dang mthun), heterodox behavior (tshul min gyi spyuod pa), explained systematically and so forth (tshul bzhin bshad pa zhes pa lta bu). Dorji Wangchuk writes: 'The use of 'mode' or 'method' (tshul) in place of 'vehicle' (theg pa) is in agreement with Indian sources, where naya and yāna have been used interchangeably, the former being seemingly even more prevalent than the latter" (2006: 117); cf. id. n. 63. Rongzom's constant use of such phrases such as as nyan thos kyi tshul, pha rol tu phrin la'i tshul, gsang snyags kyi tshul confirm that Rongzom does use tshul in The Approach intending a synonym for theg pa : yāna.

812 bka' spyi : *samanyayacana. According to Lde'u, there are three categories governing what is termed 'the general word of the Buddha': (i) those explicitly spoken by the historical buddha, (ii) those that are sanctioned and (iii) those that are received through blessing (de la bka' la gyi gnyis su byed de । bka' la gnyis te । spyi dang byeg brag zhes so । spyi la yang phe bus gsum du 'gro ste । spyi la gsum ste zhes pas zhal nas gsungs pa'i bka' । rjes su gnang ba'i bka' । byin gyis bbras pa'i bka'o । (110.08-110.11). See also dKon cog grol. Rongzom uses the concept of bka' spyi in the context of enumerating the issue of vehicles (RZSB 1.46.19-47.21). According to Khenpo Gaden of Serlo Monastery, anything that is included within the tripiṭaka (sde snod gsum) can be included under the rubric, bka' spyi.

813 Reading go skabs (BM 3.1; Th 43.2) rather than sgo skabs (RZSB 417.09).

814 We find this view of the path articulated in exoteric discourses on the path such as Tōh. 4034: Mdo sde'i rgyan gyi 'grel bshad (Sūtrālankāra-śrīti-bhāṣya) in bStan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma 2001, sems tsam, tsi-tshi, vol. 72 (Beijing: Krong go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): nyan thos kyi theg pa la

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Through these [words] alone everything knowable is comprehended due to recognition of the nature of mind just-as-it-is, the circumstance of the confused mind, and the circumstance of the unconfused mind since that includes everything that is knowable; and because of which there should be no generation of an incomplete entry unto liberation akin to the awakening of the Śrāvaka and Prayetka-buddha. It is concerning that point that the investigation into the character of the afflictions will be explained:

Q. On this view, someone might ask: is it that so-called afflictions are actually a real entity\textsuperscript{815} and that migrants are bound in samsāra by them? Or, rather, is it the case that the afflictions that are to be relinquished are not real entities and yet beings appear as if bound by them?

It is understood that the afflictions are not entities, i.e., something to be gotten rid of.\textsuperscript{816} And how is this so?

\textbf{§ 1.1 the śrāvaka system (417.18-420.01)}

In the Śrāvaka system, the superior ones who have overcome their [internal] foes\textsuperscript{817} have rid themselves of the entirety of the three realms’ afflictions through [the paths of] seeing and meditation; and after severing all the fetters\textsuperscript{818} of conditioned existence are known to have "attained the fruit of one who has overcome [her] foes." Accordingly, if the statement that there is some count of entities given in in connection with afflictions that are to be rejected is scrutinized, no reckoning of entities will be found. How is this so?

For the moment should we assume that the afflictions relinquished through perceiving [the truth of] suffering\textsuperscript{819} [418\textsuperscript{820}], the afflictions relinquished perceiving seeing [the truth of suffering’s] source, and so on, pertain to a single real entity within the afflictions relinquished through perception? - and what if the statement that [they are] distinct, discrete is scrutinized?

If it is the case they are a single entity, then the abandonment, by virtue of perceiving dissatisfaction alone, would relinquish everything that is to be rejected; and, in that case, meditation on another path would be rendered pointless (\textit{don med par ‘gyur ro}).

\textsuperscript{815} nyon mongs pa zhes bya ba ’i ’di’i mtshan nyid rdzas su grub pa (417.15).
\textsuperscript{816} I have variously translated spong in terms of "relinquishing," "rejecting," "discarding," "abandoning," and "getting rid of," and the like.
\textsuperscript{817} ‘phags pa dgra’ bcom pa (417.417.18-417.19) : \textit{arya arhat}. See Rongzom’s martial etymologies for these terms in his Man ngag lta phreng ‘gre: sri pa’i rtse mo’i nyon mongs pa chung ngu’i chung ngu yang spangs pa ni sgra’ bcom pa ste \( \vdash \)
\( a \) ri ha ta zhes bya ba ’i sgra’ \( \vdash \)
\( a \) ri ni dgra’ \( \vdash \)
ha ta ni boom pa ste \( \vdash \)
thams gsum du skye ba len par byed pa’i nyon mongs pa nrams nyid bdud dang dgra’ yin la \( \vdash \)
de dag bcom pas de skad ces bya’o \( \vdash \)
rum pa gcig tu a ri na ha ta ba zhes bya ste \( \vdash \)
a ri na ’os shing rigs pa’i don \( \vdash \)
ha ra ni mchod sbyin gyi tshig ste \( \vdash \)
thams gsum gyi sred pa’ zad pa’ de la \( \vdash \)
dod chags dang bcas pa thams cad kyis mchod pa’i ’os yin pas \( \vdash \)
mchod’os zhes bya [318] bar yang bskad do \( \vdash \) (RZSB 1.317.19-318.01; cf. Almogi 2009: 280 n. 9).
\textsuperscript{818} kun to sbyor ba (417.20) : cf. Skt. \textit{samyogayam}.
\textsuperscript{819} Objects that are abandoned through the path are considered \textit{kun brtags} (Skt. \textit{parikalpita}) as opposed to \textit{tham skyes} (Skt. \textit{saheja}).
\textsuperscript{820} NTh 4.04; Th 44.06; BM 4.05.
What if [on the other hand] one were to say the afflictions are present as distinct, discrete entities? In that case, when everything knowable is summed up in the context of the four truths it would all boil down to something divided into aspects of the four [noble] truths. That being so, whatever afflictions are to be gotten rid of would unquestionably be multiplied four-fold due to being a perceptual basis for the four truths qua object[s?]. If that were the case (de lta na), there could be no decisive reckoning of the divisions of what is knowable. Accordingly, just the truth of suffering — understood as the aspects impermanence, dissatisfaction, the empty, and the selfless — pertaining as it does to the receptiveness that understands the attributes of suffering, would thus (pas) through the force of that [assertion, entail that] perceiving dissatisfaction would multiply each of the [afflictions] to be relinquished by four.

If someone suggests that these are identical to the character of dissatisfaction, and thus wouldn't multiply, then in that case (de lta na) the true sources would not be something distinct from true sufferings since all processes are characteristic of dissatisfaction (bsdug bsgnal) and anything qualified as a sensation is explained by superiors as dissatisfaction. This is not unlike the theory held by non-Buddhist extremists postulating a creator as cause wherein effect is not contingent upon a cause; and given the activity of the eternal cause per se, it is like saying that even an effect is not manufactured by a function. This is unlike the view postulated by the Buddhist for whom phenomena emerge on the basis of relations in which even the cause is contingent upon the fruit and wherein the fruit, too, is contingent upon the cause. Thus, in fact, through a process of karmic maturation, the state of the five acquired psycho-physical aggregates constitutes injurious burden-like embodiment which, given that it is characterized by dissatisfaction is, in fact, occasioned by the manifestation of dissatisfaction in the future and that state is thus is a characteristic of [a true] source of suffering. That being the case, simply bringing the five psycho-physical aggregates to mind, the realization of the selflessness of phenomena will, without doubt, rid one of all afflictions. Furthermore, whatever an endless analysis into knowables [rnam pa] has differentiated, upon the realization of selflessness regarding those [knowables], all the afflictions will be abandoned.

In one sense, when a violent person murders another being’s father with a piece of wood, enmity is elicited toward that one [particular piece of] wood.
wood on account of it. Thus, when anger is generated, inasmuch as it is
generated toward any number of varieties of wood,⁸²⁹ [we might ask] if those
instances of anger are a singular entity [each differentiated from the
aforementioned anger]? But if they are not, they would each be distinct entities.
If it were a single [anger], then, inasmuch as one [piece of] wood were burnt to
ashes it would entail (rigs) that all angers be eliminated; but that is not the case. If
they are each distinct, an enumeration of them could not be rendered even by the
end of the aeon; and to the degree that those are to be gotten rid of, then each
instant relinquishing each anger, too, would not achieve an exhaustive end.

If numerous afflictions are gotten rid of through a single path, then
meditation upon varieties of the path would be rendered pointless. If a single
affliction is gotten rid of by means of numerous paths, the Buddha’s teaching
(gsungs pa) of a variety of afflictions w
would also be rendered pointless. If it were
the case that the varieties of paths have not worked to weaken (nyams par ma
byas) afflictions even a little, numerous paths would also not rid [us of] them; and
if they did, it would not be the case that afflictions pertains to a single entity. If
that was so (de lta na), there would be no complete reckoning of entities in regard
to afflictions. Therefore, like in the Śrāvaka approach, there is no real entity
connected with afflictions.

Nevertheless, when we describe (brjod) into how it is that superiors who
have overcome their foes have relinquished afflictions, it is said that those who
have overcome their foes realize the selflessness of persons. Thus (pas) the
illusion producing⁸³⁰ view of the transitory collection⁸³¹ is pacified and, thereby,
the delusive illusion⁸³² of all afflictions simply abate automatically (rang zhi ba).
Though, when view of the transitory collection is conjoined with aspiring
bodhicitta⁸³³ it is transformed into an illimitable collection of merit; and when it
is conjoined with by the discriminating awareness of selflessness, blemishes of
afflictions are transformed into pure appearances. It is not, in any case, that there
is a real entity associated with the impure (dri ma’i rdzas). For example, while a
dream [in a dream] appears in dependence upon the dream and an illusion
[within an illusion],⁸³⁴ too, depends upon the illusion⁸³⁵ [420] insofar as they
are both devoid of real entities yet appear as if present as real entities, they are
seen as if basically equal.

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⁸²⁹ E.g. a club (dbyug pa : daṇḍa).
⁸³⁰ sgYu ma mkhan (419.19) : māyākāra.
⁸³² sgYu ’phrul (420.20) : māyā.
⁸³³ smon pa byang chub kyi sems (419.21).
⁸³⁴ sgYu ma (419.24) : māyā.
⁸³⁵ This phrase refers to dreams within dreams and illusions within illusions.
⁸³⁶ NTh 7.06; Th 49.01 BM 7.06.
§ 1.2 the pratyeka-jina system (420.02-420.17)

According to the approach of the Pratyeka-jina\(^{837}\) Superiors, profound actual reality\(^{838}\) is realized by means of the twelve limbs of interdependent origination through the paths of seeing and meditation. Thereby, all afflictions of the three realms that are to be rejected are gotten rid of; and this is said to be the attainment of the fruit of self-wakening. That being the case, [inasmuch as afflictions are held to be real entities that are] distinct, then, due to the twelve limbs of interdependent origination, the uninterrupted path and the path of thorough liberation will be multiplied by two and the perception of even a single affliction that is to be abandoned will multiplied by twelve. Furthermore, each of those individual limbs, as well, are characterized by the four truths; and with ignorance\(^{839}\) as a condition - via actualizing\(^{840}\) karmic processes\(^{841}\) and so on - would accordingly be akin to a burden, injurious by nature, and thus characterized by the truth of dissatisfaction. With karmic processes as a condition, consciousness\(^{842}\) and so forth actualize a state of dissatisfaction in the future, and thus pertains to the truth of sources. The negation of ignorance, since it negates karmic processes and so forth, pertains to the truth of cessation on account of those negations. Having meditated upon the characteristics of interdependent origination, then, pertains to the truth of paths. That being the case, even a single affliction that is to be relinquished would be rendered into forty-eight by means of the four truths.\(^{843}\) On the view of this system, then, there

\(^{837}\) phags pa rang rgyal ba (420.02). An etymological explanation of Pratyeka-buddha is found, for example, in dKon cog 'grel, RZSB 1.45.15-45.17.

\(^{838}\) chos nyid (420.03) : dharmatā.

\(^{839}\) ma rig pa (420.09), the first of the twelve limbs. While the term "ignorance" denotes an absence of knowledge, Guenther notes ma rig pa does not refer to "a denial of 'knowledge' (rig-pa, Sanskrit vīdya)," which could be rendered rig pa med pa. "The term ma-rig-pa," Guenther writes, "merely states that the cognitively capacity is not up to its optimum operation... That ma-rig-pa implies something quite different from rig-pa med-pa is clearly stated by mKhan-po Nus-Idan in his mKhas-'jug mcchan-'grel, a commentary on 'Jam mgon 'Ju Mi-pham rgya mtsho’s mKhas-'jug, p. 525" (1984: 219 n. 9).

\(^{840}\) mngon par 'grub pa (420.09); cf. Skt. vābhiniṣṭa. According to the Śālistambasūtra, the third limb of interdependent origination is "an actualizing limb" or mngon par 'grub par byed pa'i yan lag (Takahashi 332 n. 1139). Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccayaḥ, for instance, refers to the eighth, ninth, and tenth limbs - i.e. craving (trsūḍa : sred pa), grasping (upādāna : nye bar len pa ), and becoming (bhava : srid pa) as the "productive limbs" or abhinirvātakaṅgam : mngon par 'grub par byed pa'i yan lag. See TDCM 512b s.v. 'grub pa'i yan lag gsum; cf. Engle 424 n. 41.

\(^{841}\) du byed (420.09) : saṁśkāra, the second of the twelve limbs. The Pāli equivalent, sañkhāra or saṁkhāra - referring to "certain volitional and formative activities" (Hamilton 1996: 69) - is "virtually interchangeable with saṁkhāta" (Hamilton 67). As Hamilton (op. cit. ch. 4, s.v. Paticcasamuppāda Formula) points out, saṁkhāra is "variously and often confusingly translated by terms such as mental formations [e.g. I.B. Horner (op. cit. 80 n. 18)], habitual tendencies or dispositions, conditional aggregates, and former impressions, terms which have little precise meaning for us in English” (1996: 66). Moreover, Hamilton writes: "the term applies to the way in which a human being arises, not to the way in which saṁsāra in the wider sense of the objective world in general arises, and confusing the two can be very misleading” (69). Cf. Gombrich 2009 on saṁsākāra as "process" vs. Kapstein, who renders the term "existence-factors" (1987).

\(^{842}\) rnam par shes pa (420.11) : viśāṇa, the third of the twelve limbs.

\(^{843}\) By virtue of the multiplication of each of the twelve limbs by four vis-a-vis the four noble truths(?).
can be no decisive reckoning obtained in connection with a real entity of affliction.

§ 1.3 the yogācāra system (420.17-421.18)

Even in the Yogācāra approach, the philosophical position asserted is that the mind and mental factors associated with the three realms, the character of which are false conceptions, function neither as the apprehended nor the apprehender; and are defined as empty of duality and simply one’s own awareness and are made as conflicting with the character of affliction, which is falsely marked in the production of an object.

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844 yang dag pa ma yin pa’i kun tu rtog pa (420.18), or simply yang dag min rtog (Skt abhidarpanicalpa), is a phrase famously used in the Madhyantavibhāga, Chapter 1 vv. 1, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 11. Verse 5 reads: brtag pa dang ni gzhante dbang dang | byongs grub pa nyid kyung ngol don phyir yang dag min rtog phyir | gnyis po med pa’i phyir bshad do. Verse 1.8 reads: yang dag ma yin kun rtog ni | sems dang sems byung kham gsum pa’i. Nagao notes the Skt. variation abhidarpanicalpa (Hopkins 2003: 308a). Cf. de yang ’di ltar so so skyé bo’i shes pa ni | rang byung gi sems can du yang smra’o | khams gsum pa’i sems dang sems las byung ba yang dag pa ma yin pa’i kun tu rtog pa yin par yang smra’o | (RZSB 2.113.12-113-15); so so skyé bo tha mal pa’i shes pa’ang | rang byung gi ye shes can du smra ba dang | khams gsum pa’i sems dang sems las byung ba yang dag pa ma yin pa’i kun du rtog pa yod par smra ba ’di yang de dang ‘dra ste | ’khral ba’i shes pa’ang de ltar rdzas su yod par ’dod la | rang byung gi ye shes kyung de ltar rdzas su ’dod cing | de gnyis shes pa’gzig gi mtshan nyid du smra na ni | ’gal ba ’du bar gyur ba zhiin yin na | de ltar sgrub par byed pa ma yin te | ’khral ba’i shes pa ni tha snyad tsam du yod do zhes sgrub bo | (id. 1.116.16-116.22); cf. id. 2.117.18-117.19. See also Rongzom’s citation of Maṇjuśrīmitra’s kun du rtog can yang dag ma yin kun du rtog pas rtso med nyams | blo gros phyin ci log tu gyur cing ma dag rkyen gyi dbang song bas | sems dang sems las byung ba de nyis lus gsum don du snyang ba yin | (2.121.03-121.06); cf. Almogi 2009: 179 n. 103. On Mipham’s contribution to Yogācāra, see Kawamura s.v. Appendix 1 in Keown 2006, Buddhist Studies From India To America: Essays In Honor Of Charles S. Prebish, Taylor & Francis. Cf. “Mipam, Garland of Light Rays, 669.5-669.6: yang dag ma yin kun rtog ces bya ba gang yin na | de ni gzung ‘dzin gnyis su snyang ba can | khams gsum gyis bdus pa yi sems dang sems byung ba de thams cad do’” (Duckworth 2008: 224 n. 79).

845 gzung ba dang ‘dzin pa (420.19): gralhnya grāhaka. For Rongzom, this issue is connected, at least rhetorically, to the nature of gnosis and its relation to ordinary consciousness. Almogi notes: “When a quickly turning firebrand appears as a fire-wheel, the characteristic of this appearance is the quick turning and not the wheel. Similarly, when a rope appears as a snake, the cognition of the appearance is a cognition that arises as an image of a rope, and not a cognition that arises as an image of a snake. Likewise, the conceptual thought that arises as ‘grasped’ and ‘grasper’ (i.e. object and subject) is something that arises as having the characteristics of self-cognition and not the characteristics of grasped and grasper. Furthermore, although the characteristics of quick turning and a fire-wheel are mutually exclusive, the appearance does not truly exist as something that has the characteristics of a fire-wheel, and thus there is no contradiction in it being established as having the characteristics of quick turning. Likewise, deluded conceptual thoughts do not truly exist, and thus there is no contradiction in them being established as having the [218] characteristics of self-cognition. Neither the mental continuum of deluded cognition nor the mental continuum of self-occurring gnosis exists. Cognition is established as one continuum, just as the continuity of a fire-wheel and the continuity of quick turning do not exist as two” (2009: 217-218).

846 rang rig pa tsam (420.20). Cf. gang gi tshe gzung ba dang ‘dzin pa’i kun du rtog pa skyes pa de’i tshe’ang | rang rig pa’i mtshan nyid du skyes pa las | (RZSB 2.118.13-118.14); de bzhin [119] du bzng ba dang ’dzin pa’i rnam par snang ba’i shes pa skyes pa’i tshe nyid na’ang | rang rig pa’i mtshan nyid du shes pa tsam las ma gtoogs pa | bzng ’dzin gyi mtshan nyid du skyes pa skad cig tsam yang ma grub pas | (RZSB 2.118.24-119.02). This is connected to Rongzom’s assertion that an individual’s ordinary
In any case, it is a well-known philosophical position [in this system] which states, for example, that earth, gold, and earth element appear to the mind perceiving gold ore.\textsuperscript{848} In this case, the perception of gold as earth is false; perceiving it as gold is correct; and the earth element [421\textsuperscript{849}] is included in both. Similarly, and in connection with the character of dependent phenomena,\textsuperscript{850} consciousness is qualified by self-arisen gnosis (de ltar na so so'i skye bo tha mal pa'i shes pa'ang rang byung gi ye shes can no (RZSB 2.119.06).

\textsuperscript{847} The idea here seems to be: If there are no objects, there is no basis for the production of afflictions. Cf. Almogi 2013: afflictions “have the characteristic of arising [as a result of] an erroneous [view of their related] objects” (1343). Cf. de bas na shes pa gang la gzung ba dang ’dzin pa’i rnam par snang ba de’i tsho nyid na gnyis pos stong pa’i rang rig pa tsam nyid yin pa grub pa’o | rang rig pa de nyid ye shes zhes bya ston la phyin ci log pa’i phyur | (RZSB 2.117.13-117.14); cf. Karmay 2007: 114 n. 42. Cf. TBJBy: de nas rnal ’byor spyod pa pas de’i steng du chos rnamgs gzung ba dang ’dzin par kun tu brtags pa’i dngos pos kun nas stong nge zhes spros pa bcad pa la | (RZSB 2.11.01-11.02). For a general discussion in this context, see 2.116.15-121.24.

\textsuperscript{848} sa khong na gser yod pa : käñcanagarbhāṁrttița (Mvp 7650); cf. Hanson 1998: 220 n. 453. Rongzom’s example is drawn from Msg 2.29 (see note below). An interesting comparison is found in RGV; ji ltar mi dbul khyim rnam sa ’og na | mi zad pa yi gter ni gnyur la | mi des de ma shes te gter de yang | de la nga ’dir yod ces mi smra ltar | (CITATION).

\textsuperscript{849} NTH 9.04; Tj 51.03; BM 9.04.

\textsuperscript{850} gzhan dbang (421.01) : paratāntra; Lc. Guṇākara’s questions in chapter six (yon tan ’byung gnas kyé le’u ste drug pa) of the Sandhinirvāṇo-cana-sūtra. "The other-dependent nature is the mere consciousness of false imagination that appears as the entities of apprehender and apprehended, because these are appearances under the influence of something other, the latent tendencies of awareness" (Brunnhölzl: 464-465). See also Kawamura’s discussion in Keown 2006 for Mipam’s interpretation vis-a-vis the Mahāyānasamgraha.

\textsuperscript{851} yongs gru grub pa (421.02) : parināpananna.

\textsuperscript{852} L.c. Msg: 2.29: chos mron pa’i mdo las chos ni gsum ste | kun nas rjon moins pa | <hi char ghtogs pa> dan | rnam par byan ba | <hi char ghtogs pa> dan | de gni gahi char ghtogs pa zo šes bcom ldan hdas kyis gaṅ gsum pa ci la dgonš te gsums še na | 1.1.1. gzan giy dban gi no bo niṅ la kun tu brtags paṅ ho no bo niṅ yod pa ni kun nas rjon moins char ghtogs pa ho | 1.2. yonis su grub paṅ ho no bo niṅ la kun tu brtags paṅ ho bo bo niṅ yod pa ni kun nas rjon moins paṅ char ghtogs pa ho | 1.3. gzan giy dban de niṅ ni de gni gahi char ghtogs pa ste | hdi la dgonš nas bkaḥ stsal to | don hdi la dpe ci yod ce na | sde ni sa khoṅ gser yod pa ste | dpur na sa khoṅ na gser yod pa la ni saḥi khamṣ dan | sa daṅ gser dan gsum dmigs so | 11.1. de la sa’i khamṣ la ni med paṅ sa dmigs | yod paṅ gser ni saṅ dmigs te | hdi ltar mes sreg na sa ni mi saṅ la gser ni saṅ no | saḥi khamṣ ni sar saṅ na | na log par saṅ no | gser du saṅ na ba de bzin <niṅ> du saṅ no | 11.1. de bas na saḥi khamṣ ni gni gahi char ghtogs pa ho | de bzin du rnam par rig pa la rnam par mi rtog paṅ ye šes kyi mes sa rong pas na | rnam par rig pa de yāṅ dag pa ma yin pa kun tu brtags paṅ ho no bo niṅ du saṅ gi | yāṅ dag pa yonis su grub paṅ ho bo niṅ di mi saṅ la | rnam par rig pa la rnam par mi rtog paṅ ye šes kyi mes sreg pas na | rnam par rig pa de yāṅ dag pa yonis su grub paṅ ho no bo niṅ du saṅ gi | log par kun tu brtags paṅ ho no bo niṅ du mi saṅ no | 11.1. de ltar bas na yāṅ dag pa ma yin pa kun tu rtog pa i rnam par rig pa gzan giy dban go no bo niṅ de ni gni gahi char ghtogs pa yin te | sa khoṅ na gser yod pa la saḥi khamṣ bzin no (Lamotte 1973: 39-40). Hanson notes: "The definitions [of the mtshan nyid gsum] are deliberately fluid, for the model of the three natures is perspectival, rather than absolute. Seen from one perspective, for example, the dependent nature is the act of constructing appearance. Seen from another perspective, it is the constructed objects. The same is true of the imagined nature. Along these lines, Asanga tells us that the three natures should be thought of as being both the same and different from one another. He explains the identity of the three natures from the stance of the dependent nature. The dependent nature, he says, is dependent in one sense, imaginary in another. It is dependent in that it depends on the resultant seeds of past deeds to arise. It is
So accordingly, with regard to a fire-wheel,\(^{853}\) wherein fire-brand, wheel, and luminosity\(^{854}\) appear to the mind, we might say perceiving the fire-wheel as a wheel is false perception;\(^{855}\) perceiving it as a fire-brand is correct,\(^{856}\) [and that] luminosity is included in both.\(^{857}\) Here, just as only insofar as the fire-wheel and the fire-brand are [considered] real entities is the presence of luminosity acceptably included within both, if it is suggested that the fire-wheel [which is something totally imagined (\textit{kun btags})] is a real entity while the fire-brand [which is something perfected (\textit{yongs grub})] is not a real entity, then luminosity [which is something dependent (\textit{gzhan dbang})], would pertain to the [imagined] fire-wheel yet be absent in the second factor [- i.e., the perfected fire-brand].

With respect to the real entity, the fire-brand, however, there is no real fire-wheel. While it is the case, moreover, that at the point when the [imagined] fire-wheel becomes apparent, the [perfected] fire-brand has progressively been occluded qua single object (\textit{\textquotesingle{}gal me geig yul rim gyis gnon pa\textquotesingle{}}) such that since the [imagined] fire-wheel has no basis in reality (\textit{glan ma grub pas}), the [dependent] luminosity therefore simply pertains to the fire-brand alone and is thus not [included in] the second [i.e. the imagined] aspect.\(^{858}\)

It is likewise if both [the imagined and the perfected] are real entities: whether the perfected is a real entity or what is imagined is acceptably included within both, they pertain to the character of one’s own awareness such that since neither have any basis in reality. What is imagined cannot be established in

imaginary in that it is the cause of mental creation (\textit{parikalpa}). And it is perfected in that [it] is absolutely non-existent (\textit{ātyantikābhava}) in the manner in which it is imagined [n. MS 2.17]. The [218] dependent nature serves as a bridge between the imagined and perfected natures in that it contains aspects of both of them. Asaṅga illustrates this interrelation with an analogy involving gold ore [n. MS 2.29]. Gold ore, he explains, contains three elements: the element of earth (\textit{prthivīdhatu}), earth (\textit{prtivī}), and gold (\textit{kāñcau}). From the ordinary perspective, the clump of ore appears as clay, since the gold is hidden. When the ore is burned, however, the clay disappears, and the gold becomes visible (1998: 219-210).

\(^{853}\) \textit{\textquotesingle{}gal me\textquotesingle{}} i \textit{\textquotesingle{}khor lo} (421.05): alāntacakra; cf. 504.10; cf. Almogi 2009: 217 n. 105. See, also, Bouy, C. 2000. \textit{Gaudapāda, L\'Agamaśāstra. Un traité vedāntique en quatre chapitres, Texte, traduction et notes. Publications de l\'Institut de Civilisation Indienne 69}, De Boccard, Paris. Cf. CŚ: \textit{de lla yin dang srog \textquotesingle{}di ni \textquotesingle{} rtag tu yid med ci ste min \textquotesingle{} sngar mthong pa yi don gang zhig yid kyis smig rgyu llar \textquotesingle{}dzin pa \textquotesingle{} de ni chos kun rnam gzhag la \textquotesingle{} du shes phung po zhes bya\textQuotesingle{o} \textquotesingle{} mig dang gzugs b tret nas yid \textquotesingle{} sgyu ma bzhin du skye bar \textquotesingle{} gyur \textquotesingle{} gang la yod pa nyid yod de \textquotesingle{} sgyu ma zhes byar mi ri rigs so \textquotesingle{} gang tse mkhas pa sa stengs na \textquotesingle{} lngo mtsar min pa \textquotesingle{} ga\textquotesingle{'} med pa \textquotesingle{} de tse dbang rtogs de \textquotesingle{} dra la \textquotesingle{} ya mtsan zhes bya ci zhis yod \textquotesingle{} mgal \textquotesingle{} me\textquotesingle{i} \textit{\textquotesingle{}khor lo sprul pa dang \textquotesingle{}} \textit{\textquotesingle{} rmi lam sgyu ma chu zla dang \textquotesingle{}} \textit{\textquotesingle{} khug rna nang gi brag ca dang \textquotesingle{}} \textit{\textquotesingle{} smig rgyu sprin dang srid pa mtsungs}}.

\(^{854}\) \textit{E.g. light from the fire}

\(^{855}\) Cf. \textit{\textquotesingle{}kun btags\textquotesingle{}}.

\(^{856}\) Cf. \textit{yongs grub}.

\(^{857}\) Cf. \textit{gzhan dbang}.

\(^{858}\) Rongzom uses the same complex of reasoning when asserting that karma is not substantially real - i.e. as not what it appears to be. For if it was, gnosis would be rendred nil (RZSB 1.504.10-504.14); the fire-brand argument is again employed in the \textit{Rang byung ye shes} in connection with the argument that ordinary consciousnes consists in gnosis (RZSB 2.115-23-116.05). Almogi notes: "When a quickly turning firebrand appears as a fire-wheel, the characteristic of this appearance is the quick turning and not the wheel. Similarly, when a rope appears as a snake, the cognition of the appearance is a cognition that arises as an image of a rope, and not a cognition that arises as an image of a snake. Likewise, the conceptual thought that arises as 'grasped' [\textit{bzang ba}] and 'grasper' [\textit{\textquotesingle{}dzin pa\textquotesingle{}}] (i.e. object and subject) is something that arises as having the characteristics of self-cognition and not the characteristics of grasped and grasper (2009: 217)."
either. That being the case, no real entity that is to be gotten rid of will be detected that constitutes affliction.

§ 1.4 the madhyamaka system (421.20-435.08)

Accordingly, insofar as the realists will not find any real entity associated with affliction that is to be gotten rid of - even in the context of their own philosophical positions - in the Madhyamaka approach, the fact there is nothing ultimately established in connection with their insistence that conceptual elaborations\(^{859}\) are [ultimately] pacified should be understood when it is asked: “how could there be any real entity found that is to be gotten rid of?” In that case, it is said that although there is no real entity to be relinquished ultimately, the correct and incorrect conventions\(^{860}\) perceived by the mind suggest perförce that there is no conflict when someone suggests that according to correct conventions there exist afflictions [422\(^{861}\)] to be relinquished. In that case, I would say this: when it is asserted there exists something that is to be correctly established, then however many varieties of conventions [that might be construed to concern and discern that are therefor] recognized, they, too, would be correctly established; [but] when it is asserted there does not exist something that is to be correctly established, all variety of conventions are rendered basically the same. Moreover, it is said, the setting forth of the division of conventions into correct and incorrect is presented in terms of instances of efficacy or a lack thereof, though [both are] similar in appearance.\(^{862}\) This is not unlike [the fact] the material form of a vase retains water while the material form of a vase’s reflection cannot annot. [In]

\(^{859}\) spros pa (421.21) : prapañca has been translated as "discursive development" (Ruegg 1981: 64), “the expanded world,” “the principle of languange,” “empirical status” (Lindtner EoIP IX: 372, 442).”discursiveness” (Brunnhölzl 2004), “manifoldness” (Almogi 2009), “diffuseness” (Karmay 2007: 118), and so on such that the term suggests, inter alia, the representational, propositional, or otherwise discursive mind. Almogi, following, Schmithausen, meets with evinces the term prapañca’s unwillingness to be either monotheistically defined or categorized in strictly subjective or objective value: “In his lengthy comment on prapañca (spros pa), Schmithausen remarks that this term has in the first place a subjective meaning, namely, a mental act produced by a subject, but that it also has an objective meaning, that of the manifold phenomena. He further notes that in the first case, the term prapañca is associated with (1) terms such as ’speech’ (vāc) and ’designation’ (abhilāpa), (2) ’conceptual thoughts’ (vikalpa) and similar expressions, and (3) terms that describe (mental) effort, activity, or restlessness. These three categories are, however, not mutually exclusive, for prapañca is occasionally elucidated with terms from more than one of these categories. These categories indeed seem to be different aspects of the same semantic field, for conceptual thoughts are clearly connected with speech, particularly ‘mental speech’ (manojalpa), and with mental activity and restlessness” (2009: 170-171). Thus, the locus classicus is the homage at the beginning of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā - spros pa nyan zhi zhi bstan pa : prapañcoperapañcamanā śivam - which, distills the purpose of the Buddha’s doctrine.

\(^{860}\) yang dag pa’i kun rdzob : tathāsaṁyānti; yang dag ma yin pa’i kun rdzob : mithyāsaṁyānti (421.23-421.24).

\(^{861}\) NTh 11.02; Th 53.04; BM 11.01

\(^{862}\) Jñānagarbha’s Satyadvayabhānāga, v. 12: snang du ‘dra yang don byed dag | nus pa’i phuyir dang mi nus phuy | yang dag yang dag ma yin te | kun rdzob kyi na dbya’ang byas 1; cf. Jñānagarbha & Eckel 1987: 39, 163. See Rongzom’s MNTPG: de la yang dag pa’i kun rdzob ni | dngos po’ rgyu rkyen las skeyes pa | mthun par snang ba | don byed nus pa | brtags na dben pa’i mthun nyid can nams so | log pa’i kun rdzob ni | snang du ‘dra yang de ltar don byed mi nus pa nams so | (RZSB 324.11-324.13).
such a presentation as this one, though the personal entity is proven to be functional, the phenomenal entity is not.

In that case, one might ask how is the personal entity is established? Two points, comprising internal and external continua, are sketched out here. First, there is the inner continuum consisting in the continuum of a person such as a man or woman, person, god and so forth wherein a real entity is retained respectively in each. Yet in the context of the dharma, these are the six elements, six sources, and five psycho-physical aggregates, the simple collection of which manifests a single mental awareness - with there being no real entity of a sentient being, whether person, god, what have you. Second, in the context of the outer continuum, we are speaking of such things as a pillar, a vase, and so forth, which are of a single concordant, consistent state, in which the natural state of a single vase or natural state of a single pillar is retained. Yet in connection with the dharma, even these are simply something composed of the five elements, the six external sense fields - and not one real entity is found that is the natural state of a vase. That being the case, the statement that a vase retains water is also something that proves the functionality of a personal entity because in the case of an phenomenal entity, the very appearance of some characterized object to some given conscious awareness is a phenomenon; and in such a case, a reflection of a vase appears due to a vase, but only in the sense of being a tactile object, etc., which it is not. If, however, the function of color associated with the personal entity were indeed fulfilled by the phenomenal entity's reflection, then insofar as the performance of a phenomenon's activity is presented mostly in terms of the activity instigating help and harm, it would follow that a representation of sun[light] would, accordingly, injure the eyes; a representation of moon[light] would benefit, and both would scatter darkness. While what retains water is something that can be touched, color is not. That being the case, such a comparison between color and tactility is irrelevant. Distinct phenomena simply perform distinct activities and in this way, on this view, a vase retains water; this assertion that the reflection of a vase does not function as a vase functions insofar as it does not retain water due to lacking the physical dimensions of a real vase is simply an assertion in accordance with what is known in the world - that personal entities performs activities; and given that personhood is unreal (according to the

863 A view perhaps best described doxographically as mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma rang rgyud pa: Saurāntika-svātantrika.
864 Alternatively, "How is the substance of persons established [to be real]?"
865 khams lnga pa (422.18): dhatupāñcakam.
866 phyi'i skye mched drug (422.18): ṣādabhaṭyaṭataṇam.
867 The representation of the vase, devoid of the whole of what comprises a physical vase - is merely phenomena since it does not fully participate in the personhood of a real vase. On this view, a physical object's tactility, along with, for example, its taste and smell, cannot comprise any part of strictly visual perception in the ordinary sense, whereas a physical object's shape and color can - and must.
868 NTh 12.06; Th 55.05; BM 12.05
869 jig rten kyi grags pa (423.06) : lokaprasiddha.
dharma), how could there be a real entity of that activity? Such an establishing proof (bsgrub pa) is akin to someone who, being carried away by a river, seizes upon a rotted root! In that case, someone might suggest that if no ultimately establishing proof is insisted upon - [and one is] content not to analyze mere conventions since, when analyzed, convention cannot withstand the burden of reason\(^\text{870}\) - there would there not then be no contradiction when [convention is] denied by reason! But then, if reasoning is unnecessary for a merely conventional establishing proof, isn't the statement that although they are similar in appearance, correct and incorrect [conventions] are arranged by virtue of distinctions in efficacy, or a lack thereof, itself a reason? On this view, positive affirmation too, is appropriate, even if only affirming but for a moment;\(^\text{871}\) but if, however, [a convention] can not even withstand the burden of its own validating criteria per se how can a mere convention even be real? For example, if, unlike an elephant that is spurred by a metal whip\(^\text{872}\) and eradicates an enemy\(^\text{873}\) while bearing a host of soldiers, a cow\(^\text{874}\) working to plough just a field while wearing a yoke is not even able to bear being spurred by the prod of a goad, how would the convention "working to plough a field" even apply? and what would then be the distinction [between such an ineffective creature in the context of "working to plough a field" and], say, a drove of castrated goats?

In the same way, while unable to withstand the burden of reason connected with proving, ultimately, the existence of a real entity, and given that what can be proven to be real entity is, moreover, merely a correct convention, just how is the conventional expression "correct convention" applied? And what would then be the distinction from, say, the view of an ordinary mundane individual?\(^\text{424,875}\) Holding such a dislocated view as this is quite a boggling state, indeed. A case in point is Anantayaśā,\(^\text{876}\) the ancient Cakravartin sovereign whose unending personal aspirations\(^\text{877}\) took him to the world of the Trayastrimśa heaven\(^\text{878}\) where the Lord of Gods, Indra, split his throne in half [to make a seat for Anantayaśā,]\(^\text{879}\) who indeed gained enjoyments equal to those of

\(^{870}\) rigs pa'i spungs (423.10): "burden of reason"; Köppl renders the phrase "load of reasoning" (2008: 45). Figuratively, we might render this term profitably as "burden of proof."

\(^{871}\) re shig tsam du sgrub (423.14); alternatively, "only for the time being," "occasionally."

\(^{872}\) tho ba'i lcags (423.17).

\(^{873}\) dgra'i dpung 'joms par byed pa (423.16).

\(^{874}\) Read ba lang (BM 13.05); cf. ba la'ang (RZSB 423.18 & Th 57.03).

\(^{875}\) NTh 14.04; Th 58.01; BM 14.01.

\(^{876}\) grags pa mtha' yas (424.02); cf. anantayaśās (Chandra 2007: 21a). Also given as Anantayas in Bendall's 1922 edition of the Śiksasamuccaya (236). This figure is the center of an alegory found in the Ratnakūṭa section of the Tibetan canon, Tōh. 60: 'Phags pa yab dang sras mjal ba zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo (Pītā-putra-samāgamana-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra) in bKa' 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1999, dKon brtsegs, nga, vol. 42 (Beijing: Krong go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang), pp. 363.04-373.02.; cf. Śiksasamuccaya : Bslab pa kun brtus (142a); also Köppl 2008: 46.

\(^{877}\) mi'i don pas. It seems that his good deeds, rather than course and karmically negative desire (kāma) took him there; cf. Bendall 1922: 236. Below Rongzom tells us the ruler's mind was afflicted ('dod pa'i sems nas kyis 424.04-424.05).

\(^{878}\) sum cu' rtsa gsum kyi gnas (424.03), a heavenly realm located on top of Mount Meru.

\(^{879}\) de nas po grags pa mtha' yas dpung gi tshogs yan lag bzhi ba dang lhan cig tu ring po mi thogs par ri'i rgyal po ri rab kyi rtse mor phyin pa dang lha'i dbang po bsgya byin gyis rgyal po grags pa mtha' yas rgyang rin po nas 'od pa mthong ngo po tshur sbyon | rgyal po chen po byon pa legs so || rgyal po chen
Indra. This turn of events, however, provoked in him a fierce mind of covetous desire through the force of which he fell [from heaven] back down to the earth, where his confusion caused him to repeatedly ask of the people "Whose country is this?"

"We hear from our elder generations that this land is that of its first sovereign, Anantayaśā,", they said. "With an impassioned mind, he died, like a lamp buffeted by winds;880 such is what people have heard - that he was born into quite an astonishing state!" they said. "Anantayaśā, who emitted the seven precious stones from the crown of his head, was on par with Indra - no person surpassed him; yet, dying from an impasioned mind as he did, there was no person more lowly than him. Alas, he stupefied us!"

It is just such a stupified state that is totally unable to conceive of how inapt it is to hold, vis-à-vis the character of correct convention, that there is some real entity that should be either given up or adopted while maintaining there is no establishing proof for anything because all phenomena are, in the end, undisturbed881 qua conceptual elaboration.

In that case, someone might ask: "If there is establishing proof proper, how is it that all conventions are basically the same?" A case in point is the occasion a rope is perceived as a snake, at which point the rope, correctly, is present and the snake has no basis in reality.882 The awareness perceiving the rope is a correct consciousness and the conscious awareness perceiving a snake is a confused consciousness. The [appearance of the] snake per se, since it is false, also does not exist in the manner in which it appears. That being so (pas), [the snake perceived by awareness,] since it is simply imputed one thing to another, attains no natural identity883 of its [own]. Moreover, if the rope is carefully scrutinized, it is perceived as a collection of just so many strands of grass or wool. Thus, when the conscious awareness of the rope as [something] singular [and] round is dissolved, it exists simply as a collection of its parts. The rope [425884] and the snake, then, are basically the same because neither have any basis in reality.

An awareness perceiving a simple collection of parts is a correct understanding. The awareness of the rope then is not unlike the awareness of the snake - that is, both are confused. After that, moreover, if the grass or wool parts are themselves carefully scrutinized, perceiving the simple collection of atoms such that when the grass or wool strands, too, are realized to be unreal, the object and conscious awareness of it proceed just as in manner above [i.e. dissolution]. After that, moreover, if conscious awareness marks off (phyed) atoms per se, it realizes that the atoms, themselves, are not real because at the time of perceiving the presence of the mere emptiness of empty form, all objects and the

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880 'dod pa'i sens nad kyis mar me rlung gis bskyod pa bzhin du de nyid de shi bar gyur to (424.09-424.10).
881 nye bar zhi ba (424.14).
884 NTh 16.02; Th 60.03; BM 15.04.
awarenesses assuming them will proceed in just as in the manner above [- that is, dissolution]. Thus, when emptiness is analyzed, what we refer to as "the empty" positions itself as something contingent upon a thing because if the actual thing, does not exist, neither does [its] emptiness. Whatever is empty, of what quality is it it empty? whose empty [is it] since when it is realized there is no quality that is established as real, all objects are basically the same in that absence.

In being something confused, all conscious awarenesses are basically the same. In not existing as they appear, everything that is confused is basically the same. Everything for which that is not the case is basically the same in not acquiring a natural identity. If something is devoid of an acquired natural identity, moreover, both the object and conscious awareness of it are devoid of being fundamentally unequal.

In that connection, when at first a snake is perceived, fear, then hostility, is generated. After that, upon perception of the rope the haughtiness connected with having rid oneself of [the initial fear] emerges. Then, when awareness of the rope is dissolved - after awareness fixating on the rope [as something] singular [and] round is broken off - an awareness connected with the inception of fixation on the simple collection of its parts emerges because there can be no elimination of the cyclical relation between the realist view and awareness tied up in [the extremes of] fixation and aversion. Only if the character of an object is properly set forth as unreal would it be on par with the entity that is set forth for the moment (re shig par gzhag pa’i rdzas) because all characteristics are fundamentally equal - excepting what does not deny mere appearance.

In such a manner, all variety of conventional [objects] appear thus qualified by a common, consistent appearance. The appearance of particular variations, on this view, are

1. the consistent or varying experience of appearance respective of karmic inheritance
2. totally pure and totally impure appearances
3. accessible [426] and inaccessible appearances

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885 gang zhig stong chos gang gis stong (425.09).
886 bsgrub par bya ba’i chos gang gos myed par rto gs pa na | don thams cad myed par ‘go mnyam mo | (425.09-425.10). Köppl renders this same sentence: “When one realizes that there is no property of a probandum whatsoever, then all is at the same level of nonexistence” (2008: 47). While this translation is, in one sense, correct - i.e., bsgrub par bya ba’i chos can be translated as "property of a probandum" - I hesitate in following Köppl’s lead in this passage because Rz is not explicitly disusscussing logical argumentation, per se; he is, admittedly, discussing how a progressive shift in the scope of analyses vis-à-vis a shifting subject (cf. chos can) reveals that everything is, in an important sense, equally unreal.
887 dngos por lla ba (425.17) : bhātvarśṭṭi: theory / view of entity
888 bye brag mi mthun par snang ba (425.22).
890 yongs su dag pa dang yongs su ma dag par snang ba dag (425.23-425.24)
891 NTh 17.06; Th 62.04; BM 17.01.
892 nye bar spyod pa dang bcos pa dang nye bar [425] spyod pa dang ldam pa ma yin par snang ba dag (425.24-426.01). “I had considered rendering this term, nye bar spyod pa : upadcra, as “inapplicable;” cf. longs su spyod pa | mi tshang mas rgyun du zas gos la nye bar spyod dgos | (TDCM 962b).
4. the falsely appearing and correctly appearing\textsuperscript{893}
5. appearances qualified by both [truth and fiction]\textsuperscript{894}
6. the perception of false appearances accompanied by error\textsuperscript{895} and perception of false appearances accompanied by veracity\textsuperscript{896}
7. appearances having a basis, those that are baseless, and those that have false bases\textsuperscript{897}
8. efficacious and ineffective appearances\textsuperscript{898}
9. appearing to exist as real entity and appearing as imputedly existent\textsuperscript{899}
10. totally imagined and actual appearance,\textsuperscript{900} etc.

Thus, just as it is acceptable that all arrangements of various conventional appearances be established as real in accordance with the consensus among specific individual [communities], they would all thereby be fundamentally equal in that context.

§ 1.4.1 the consistent or varying experience of appearance respective of karmic inheritance (426.09)

Q. What is consistent or varying experience of appearance respective of karmic inheritance?

Whether in the context of those who speak of the presence of external objects,\textsuperscript{901} for whom something such as fire is an instance of form that is real by virtue of common karma, or in the context of those who speak of the absence of external objects, for whom the appearance [of that same instance of fire] - by virtue of the karmic imprints of common karma - is seen as the external objectification of the mind-as-such, given that "in" a single fire-appearance, which is an instance of form, a single phenomenon qualifies as something commonly established as a substrate (gzhi), conflicting varieties of appearance [of the world and the beings who reside within it] are nevertheless such that when people and ordinary animals come into contact with fire, they appear to burn; and this appears as a state of suffering. For an animal species, the so-called deer cleansed by fire\textsuperscript{902} - fire, instead of burning, works to bathe the fur and thicken the coat; thus fire [here] does the work of water. [Also] among animal species, the so-called fire mouse - for whom a home is constantly made amid a wild-fire - enters in places alight with flames; and thus fire [here] does all the work of a

\textsuperscript{893} phyin ci log du snang ba dang phyin ci ma log par snang ba (426.01-426.02).
\textsuperscript{894} guyi ga’i cha dang ldan par snang ba rna.ms (426.02).
\textsuperscript{895} phyin ci log du snang ba mthong ba phyin ci log dang bcas pa (426.03-426.04).
\textsuperscript{896} phyin ci log du snang ba mthong ba phyin ci ma log pa dang ldan pa (426.02-426.03).
\textsuperscript{897} snang ba rten gzhi yod pa dang \| rten gzhi myed pa dang \| rten gzhi yang dag pa ma yin pa dang ldan pa rna.ms (426.04-426.05).
\textsuperscript{898} bya ba byed nus pa dang nus pa ma yin par snang ba dag (426.05-426.06)
\textsuperscript{899} rdzas su yod pa dang btags pa’i yod par snang ba dag (426.06).
\textsuperscript{900} kun tu btags pa dang mtshan nyid par snang ba (426.06-426.07).
\textsuperscript{901} phyi rol gyi don yod par smra ba (426.10-426.11) : baḥyārth[āstī]vādin.
\textsuperscript{902} ri dwags me’i gtsang sgra can (426.17); cf. 488.13.
home and food. Among types of hungry ghosts (pretā), the fire prettī, among divine species, there are the divine ṛṣis, fire-gods who receive burnt offerings from the brahmin caste whose body itself is rumored to be something made from the fire element. Cases such as these qualify as consistent appearances that are experienced respective of karmic inheritance. An addition to that would be something such as grass which, for most animals, appears as a source of enjoyment that sustains life. For most people, it does not appear in that way, for it does not provide sustenance. This, too, is an instance of consistent or varying appearance that is experienced respective of karmic inheritance.

Furthermore, when a sentient being is in hell, it appears as a state of suffering like the Land of Burning Iron and the Groves of Mount Shalma; when in heaven, it appears as sources of enjoyment like a wish-fulfilling tree, excellent vase, and the like. These appearances are not just individual, specific manifestations, but real, even for migrants who are human - either while under the influence of common karma or under the influence of common karmic imprints for whom the mind itself appears as the object. In any case, it is not by due to their influence that the condition for personal happiness or dissatisfaction is brought about. What is more, while people’s food, drink, clothes, etc., can actually be real and commonly enjoyed, the enjoyment is, for many, not self-determined since some part of such enjoyments might be under the control of some powerful lord (iśvara) or some such other controlling factor; for others, enjoying a degree of autonomy means enjoying anything one desires. [Things] like this constitute a variety of appearances, experienced as consistent or varying, respective of karmic inheritance.

§ 1.4.2 totally pure and totally impure appearances (427.14)

Q. What are totally pure and totally impure appearances?

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903 yi dwags ma (426.21) : pretā: cited, for example, in Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam and Avadānasatakam (Negi 5789b).
904 lha’i drang srong (426.21) : devarṣi, exemplified by Nārada; such figures are cited, for example, in the Jātakamālā (Negi 7567b).
905 byin bsregs (426.22) : homa; cf. yajñaviśoṣa (Negi 4140a).
906 NTh 19.04; Th 64.06; BM 18.04.
907 I am confused as to whether this is one hell or two; cf. TDCM 759a s.v. lcags kyi shal ma li’i ri and 2839b s.v. shal ma li’i tshal.
908 bum ba bzang po (427.05): bhadrakūṭa. One of the so-called eight auspicious symbols, it is a vase which yields whatever one wishes. It is defined in the Bodhicaryāvatāra-pañjikā: bum pa bzang zhes bya ba ni dangs po gang dang gang ’dod pa’i bsam pas der lag pa bcug na de dang de thams cad phun sum tshogs par byed pa o | (Negi 3756b). Cf. bhadrakūṭa (loc. cit.).
909 sems nyid (427.08). Guenther writes: “It is important to note that when emphasis is on Experiences-as-such, the indigenous Tibetan texts, mostly of the old tradition (nying-ma), clearly distinguish between sems-nyid (Experience-as-such) and sems "mind" as a feedback mechanism for representational thought processes. For the old tradition sems-nyid (or... sems kyi rang-bzhin-nyid) is synonymous with ye-shes and rig-pa (1984: 228 n. 55).
910 dbang phyug (427.11) : iśvara. While this term often refers to the Hindu god, Iśvara, here it per refers to a powerful person; Khenpo Gaden remarks the term can refer to kings, ministers, etc.
In this case, while the single river Ganges\(^{911}\) is located at one terrestrial point for both humans and pretas and appears to both as an enormous flowing river, it does not comprise a different basic subject [for either]. Nevertheless, for pretas, however, the state\(^{912}\) of the water appears impure, as something like pus, etc.,\(^{913}\) appearing as something totally incapable of being enjoyed. To people, though, the state of the water appears as water, purely appearing, appearing unpolluted, capable of being enjoyed.\(^{914}\) Furthermore, the pure field of the Bhagavan Śākyamuni,\(^{915}\) the four continents of this world itself, is reputed to be a utterly impure field; and for that reason Śāriputra said: "I have seen this field of the Bhagavan's filled high and low [with] ravines, precipices, and grime."\(^{916}\) On his return from The Buddha Nirvāṇa Field Devoid of Sorrow,\(^{917}\) Brahma Jāṭī\(^{918}\) remarked: "Venerable Śāriputra [428\(^{919}\)], don't utter such words; for it is only in your mind that there is high and low;\(^{920}\) in the Bhagavan's field there is nothing utterly impure.\(^{921}\) I see this field of the Bhagavan as pure, like the divine abode\(^{922}\) of Paranirmatavaśa,\(^{923}\) the perfectly structured ground of precious stones.\(^{924}\)

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\(^{911}\) ganggā (427.15).

\(^{912}\) snang ba rendered here in terms of gnas pa (TDCM 1589a) and phyi'i gnas tshul (id. 1589b).

\(^{913}\) This example is also treated in RZSB 1.40.13, 82.17, 103. 14, and 2.124.22-125.14.

\(^{914}\) For Rongzom’s use of this example, cf. RZSB 1.82.17-82.19, 1.103.17-104.07, 1.563.06-563.16, 2.124.22-123.14.

\(^{915}\) Rongzom appears to paraphrase Tōh. 176: 'Phags pa dri ma med par grags pas bstan pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo (Vimalakīrti-nīrdeśa-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra) in bKa’' gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2009, mdo sde, ma, vol. 60 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang), pp. 471.21-474.20.

\(^{916}\) mthon dman dang gcong rong dang g.yang sa dang ljan ljin gyis gang bar mthong ngo (427.22-427.23). The term mthon dman might also be rendered figuratively as "mountains and valleys."

\(^{917}\) mya nag med pa'i zhiing (427.24) : ašokakṣetra, one of the fields in the ten directions (phyogs bcu’i zhiing kham) - the southern field.

\(^{918}\) tshangs pa ral pa can (427.24); cf. Jāṭīn Brahmapā (Almogi 2009: 296 n. 63), Brahma Sikhin (Thurman 2003: ch. 1).

\(^{919}\) NTh 21.02; Th 67.01; BM 19.07.

\(^{920}\) In the Šāvatadātā’s discussion of prāvivikta or "seclusion" (rab tu dben pa), for example, that among the five aspects of a perfect place (for seclusion) is without undulation (shang shong med pa) . "The Tibetan is found on pp. 259-262 of SUZUKI, Koshin, Ed. (2000), a digital edition of rNal ’byor spyad pa’i sa las snyan thos kyi sa from sde ge found online at http://www.chofukuji.jp/de_Jong/souvenir/dedications.html.

\(^{921}\) Cf. e.g. the description in the Śūraṃgamasmādhi-sūtra 159 (Lamotte 2003: 229 n.b. 321).

\(^{922}\) thā'i gnas (428.03) : surālaya.

\(^{923}\) gzhan ’phrul dbang byed (428.03) : paranirmatavāśavartinah (Negi 5258b); cf. paranirmata (Chandra 2007: 363c). One of the twenty-eight types of divine beings of the Desire Realm (‘dod kham).

\(^{924}\) Cf. dKon cog ’grel: gang bden pa gnyis kyi mtshan nyid rnam par gzhag pa dang | ngo bo nyid gsum gyi mtshan nyid rnam par gzhag pa dang | phyi dang nang gi skye mched rnam pa gnyis kyi mtshan nyid rnam par gzhag pa dang | brdzus te ‘byung ba’i sams can gang zaag gi mtshan nyid rnam par gzhag pa ‘di rnam snang ba tsam la brten nas rnam par bsgrub pa nye bar gzhag pa’i mtshan nyid tsam yin par bye brag med do zhes ’dod do | | de bzhi du rnam par gro b la yang thun mong ma yin te | | nyon mongs pa’i rang bzhin nyid rnam par gro b’o | | rnam par gro b’i ye shes mthong ba yang thun mong ma yin te | | khams gsum pa’i sams dang sams las byung ba nyid rang byung gi ye shes so | | zhing dang sphyed yul yang thun mong ma yin te | | bcom ldan ’das shākya thub pa’i zhing kham yongs su ma dag pa’i di nyid kyang yongs su dag pa’i zhing kham so | (RZSB 1.41.20-42.13).
At that moment, the Bhagavan, having made this buddha-field [i.e. this world of Jambudvipa] appear to all around like the eastern pure buddha-realm, Arrayed with Jeweled Ornaments, said to Śariputra: "What utter impurity of sun and moon [causes] the blind not to see [them]?

Śariputra replied, "sun and moon are not flawed; the blind are flawed."

The Bhagavan said, "Likewise, this buddha-field of mine, like the eastern pure buddha-realm arrayed with jeweled ornaments, is always like this [i.e. perfect]; yet you don't see it. For example, even though devaputras ingest nourishing nectar from within a single jeweled vessel, there would be varying experience of the taste that accords with each [individual's] accumulation of merit; likewise, even for one born into a single buddha-field, whether [one] sees it as either pure or impure depends on the degree to which their karma is purified." That being so, it is not that appearances such as these manifest (snang) differently to everybody; they appear as a single basis. It is not that appearances are consistent for everyone; apparent variety is a matter of pure and impure [vision]. Appearances such as these are varieties of appearances that are utterly pure and those that are not utterly pure.

§ 1.4.3 accessible and inaccessible appearances (428.16)
Q. What appearances are applicable and inapplicable?

In this case, take two migrators who are people live together. One, drunk, is passes out - dispossessed of sensation or applied discriminations; and one is in a state possessed of mindfulness and introspection. When both are touched in the same measure by fire, it is as if one seems not to experience the dissatisfying touch of fire while the other seems to. Yet both [experiences] pertain to consistent appearances that are experienced respective of karmic inheritance. That being the case (pas), the word burn is warranted in both uses; and in this way can a variety of accessable and inaccessible appearances understood.

§ 1.4.4 the falsely appearing and correctly appearing (429.01)
Q. What is a false appearance?

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925 'khor gyi dkyil 'khor (428.04-428.05) : parśatsaṁnipāta (Chandra 2001: 104c); cf. parśaṁmaṇḍala (Chandra 2007: 371c). Also rendered as "circle of attendants" or "maṇḍalic retinue," etc.
926 zhing khams (428.06) : kṣetra.
927 Cf. dKon cog 'grel in RZSB 1.82.17-82.19. Is this the name of the pureland? Khenpo Gadan: This term refers not to a pure realm; but to the name of the eastern buddha. Notably, the names of the buddhas can differ.
928 lha'i bu (428.11) : devaputra; one of the four types of demons (TDCM 1364b).
929 This same scene is recounted in slightly more detail in dKon cog 'grel; see RZSB 1.104.07-104.20. On the pure vision of those who holding the position of guhyamantra, see, for example, Rongzom's gŚung thor bu in RZSB 2.124.03-124.09.
930 ra ro (428.19-428.20) : matta (MN 777c).
931 dran pa dang shes bzhin (428.21) : smṛti ca samprajanyam.
932 NTh 22.05; Th 69.02; BM 21.03.
It is akin to the appearance of a fire-wheel in connection to a spinning fire-brand.

Q. What is a correct appearance?
   It is the appearance of any object just as it actually is.\(^{933}\)

§ 1.4.5 appearances qualified by both [truth and fiction] (429.03)

Q. What are appearances that are qualified by both truth and fiction?
   When a rope is perceived as a snake, a rope aspect does appear to the sense consciousness. The consciousness accompanied by discursive recognition\(^{934}\) [i.e. "Snake!"] is accompanied by the appearance of a snake aspect; and in this way is there a so-called appearance qualified by both [truth and fiction].\(^{935}\)

§ 1.4.6 perception of false appearances accompanied by error and perception of false appearances accompanied by veracity (429.08)

Q. What is a perception of false appearance accompanied by error?
   It is akin to spinning a fire-brand in front of those who are children.\(^{936}\)

Q. What is a perception of false appearance of accompanied by veracity?
   It is akin to spinning a fire-brand in front of a scholar.\(^{937}\)

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\(^{933}\) _gang don ji lta ba bzhin du snang ba_ (429.03); literally, "the appearance of some object just as in actuality."  Reading _bzhin du_ (BM 21.04; Th 69.04) rather than _zhin du_ (RZSB 429.03).

\(^{934}\) _rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa'i shes pa_ (429.05).

\(^{935}\) It is important to note, here, that both appearances, for Rongzom, are false! Cf. _Sangs sa chen mo_, which states: "Nevertheless, the arising of consciousness and knowing, whether appearing in terms of dualistic appearance or not, is merely appearance through the influence of karmic imprints; and since appearances, however they appear, are confusions and do not exist in that way, even [the ordinary consciousness] that occasions a sentient being is pure and thus called "naturally arising gnosis": "on kyang shes shing rig pa'i mtshan nyid du skye ba ni \_ gzung 'dzin du snang yang rung \_ mi snang yang rung ste \_ bag chags kyi dbang gis snang ba tsam grub pa yin la \_ snang ba ni ji ltar snang yang ;khrul ba yin te \_ de bzhin du yod pa ma yin pas sens can gyi dus na yang rnam par dag pa yin te \_ des na rang byung gi ye shes zhes kyang bya sle \_ (RZSB 2.71.16-71.19). Cf. Almogi 2009: 243, 393-394. Immediately thereafter, Rongzom then cites a verse from the _Gaudacyuha-sutra_ that alludes to the space-like nature of naturally arising gnosis (_rang byung ye shes_): 'jig rten khams mang la la dag \_ bsam gyis mi khyab ihsig gyur kyang \_ nam mkha' 'jig par mi \_ gyur bzhin \_ rang byung ye shes de bzhin no \_ (RZSB 2.71.20-71.21; cf. Almogi 2009: 245-246). Guenther writes that _rang byung ye shes_ "is functionally synonymous with _rig-pa_ (excitatory intelligence) which, in turn, is synonymous with _snying-po_ (energy), particularly when it occurs in the compound _bde-gshegs snying-po1_ [sic] (the energy that makes a system move in the direction of self-optimization)" (1984: 221 n. 27).

\(^{936}\) _byis pa_ (429.07) : _bla;_ here, "children," indicate those who are spiritually immature. In Tibetan, the term is understood in contradistinction to saints ('phags pa : _drwa_) and those who are skilled / wise (mkhas pa : _kusha_) - i.e. ordinary beings as well as fools. Cf. _skye 'phags mkhas blun gyi zlas phyi ba'i so skye phal pa'am \_ blun po \_ (TDCM 1887a).

\(^{937}\) Again, note that the appearance to a scholar is indeed false.
§ 1.4.7 appearances having a basis, those that are baseless, and those that have false bases

Q. What are those [appearances] having a basis?
   The appearance of a fire-wheel by virtue of a spinning fire-brand; the appearance of a double moon when for one with cataracts; and the appearance of a moving mountain to one who is sitting in a boat.938

Q. What are [appearances] having no basis?
   The appearance of falling hairs to one with cataracts; the appearance of the sky filled with needles939 to one who has ingested940 downy datura;941 and furthermore, appearance emerges as something else due to the karmic imprints connected with the manifestation (snang ba). On this view, an[other] example of a baseless appearance concerns a sovereign’s soldiers [march] upon the road with the beat of their drums. For a distance [the sovereign, too] would accompany them. Having arrived at the enemy front, he will disperse his army’s divisions to see whether or not the enemy army has arrived. As long as the the enemy is not physically seen, the drum sound, resounding, continues to be heard; and because of that (des), since, by force of karmic imprints,942 the sovereign does not understand the appearance qua sound of the drum simply as a resounding drum sound [but, rather, as a correct sign943 which induces knowledge of the absence of an enemy troop], he will, at a distance,944 think ”the enemy host is at a distance [from] here” [while the drum is heard]. [Here, the appearance having no basis] is akin the mind thinking ”the enemy host is unseen” [as long as] the drum sound resounds.945

Q. What is [appearance] having false basis?
   It is akin to the perception of water in a mirage946 because even a mirage is devoid of a primary element947 as a basis;948 and inasmuch as it is devoid of its apparent entity [water], it nevertheless appears as that.

938 Recall the triad of epistemological error in terms of site wherein error is found in the yul (fire-brand) rten (diseased eyes) or gnas (boat).
939 Cf. Prajñākaramati’s Pañjikā: yathā timitra-prabhāvati taimirikāh sarvam akāśadeśaṃ kesōdukuñṇatītīm iti tattato mukham vikṣipann api paśyati । (364). My thanks to Wiesiek Mical for drawing my attention to this passage.
940 zos pa (429.12-429.13).
941 lang lang tse (429.12); cf. dhustūra (Das 1206a); cf. tse (BM 22.01); tso (Th 70.03); cf. lang thang tsi: black henbane seed (Goldstein 1064b). Cf. NyS 209. See Sikloš 1993. * A hallucinogen, henbane, also known as Hyoscyamus niger, family Solanaceae; a plant with such psychoactive components as hyoscyamin, scopolamine, etc (BDR 953). *See Wiesiek Mical’s email on the subject.
942 bag chags (429.17-429.18) : vāsana (Mvp 6594).
943 As an example of inferred knowledge, such an instance entails the knowledge be generated in dependence upon a ”correct sign” (rtags yang dag). * Give a normative definition.
944 The sovereign’s host beats their drums until they come face-to-face with the enemy host, at which time their drumming will halt, thus signaling their arrival. The sovereign, who has sent his host in search of the front at which the battle will occur, thus hears the drums cease from his safe distance. My thanks to the Venerable Sean Price for discussing this phrase.
945 Cf. RZSB 1.457.01.
946 smigs rgyu (429.20) : martci, martcikā (Chandra 2007: 479ab); cf. maroci (Chandra 2001: 625c); cf. Negi 4617b.
§ 1.4.8 effective and ineffective appearances (429.23)
Due to the consistency and inconsistency connected with these appearances, something that appears capable of acting upon the mindstream of individual migrators will appear to be incapable. The incapable will appear capable [430\textsuperscript{949}].

§ 1.4.9 appearances present as real entities and those imagined (430.01)
The apparent presence of a real entity will become the apparent presence of something imputed. The apparent presence of something imputed will become the apparent presence of a real entity.

§ 1.4.10 totally imagined and actual appearance (430.02)
Something that is apparently totally imagined will become the apparently actual.\textsuperscript{950} Therefore, inasmuch as each specific attribute works as proof of being real, the truly proving of even one establishes it as a present and consistent ordinary appearance [for] the person;\textsuperscript{951} an instance of appearance [for] the person,\textsuperscript{952} too. If [something were] ever validated,\textsuperscript{953} then all the various conventions would be capable of establishment in accordance with however they are commonly understood in the world.\textsuperscript{954} If the true establishment of something is not insisted upon [theoretically], then just establishing consistent appearances [for] people\textsuperscript{955} will not establish [its] instances because all conventions are fundamentally equal. If [a given convention] functions as proof of the extensive influence\textsuperscript{956} of something apparently inconsistent [for] people, even if something truly established is already asserted, [we might say]

One appearance clears one away because

\textsuperscript{947} byung ba chen po (429.21) : mahābhūta. Isn’t it the case, however, that a primary element - air - is the basis of a mirage insofar as it is caused by the refraction of light from the sky by heated air?
\textsuperscript{948} Cf. dKon cog ‘grel: de la rten med pa de las ‘byung ba ni dngos po yod pa’ang ma yin te \| ji ltar smiṅ rgyu’i chu sno ba dang g.yo ba daṅ la rten gyi ‘byung ba chen po med par ma zad kyi \| ji ltar snang ba de lla bu’i rang gi ngo bo ‘byung ba ‘ang yod pa ma yin te long ba rnam’s kyi mung pa’ang de dang ’dra st\| de bas na ‘khor ba dang mya nge n\| das pa’i chos sna’i tshogs su snang ba’ang rten dang gi ngo bo khyis ka ma grub pa’i phyir \| sens can dang sangs gyi\|s ka’ang rang bzhin mnyam par snra’o \| \| ‘di ni theg p\|a chen po thun mong ma yin pa’i tshul yin te \| de yang m\|ts\|han nyid thun mong ma yin pa ni chos thams cad rnam par bsgrub pa’i gzhag pa’i m\|ts\|han nyid tsam du’’dod do \| (RZSB 1.41.20-42.04).
\textsuperscript{949} NTh 24.03; Th 71.04; BM 22.06.
\textsuperscript{950} kun du brtags pa par snang ba ni m\|ts\|han nyid par snang bar ‘gyur ro \| (430.02-430.03).
\textsuperscript{951} gang zag thung m\|ong gi snang ba (430.05).
\textsuperscript{952} bye brag gi snang ba yang m\|thun pa (430.05-430.06).
\textsuperscript{953} kho re chung ngu tsam la sgrub par byed na (430.06).
\textsuperscript{954} ji ltar grags pa bzhiṅ du (430.07).
\textsuperscript{955} gang zag snang ba m\|thun pa rnaṃs la (430.08).
\textsuperscript{956} rgya chen po’i dbang du sgrub par byed na \| (430.09-430.10).
No instance whatsoever is present and
All are fundamentally equal.

§ 1.5 Madhyamaka & Guhyamantra systems (430.13-433.24)

That being the case, the Madhyamaka and Guhyamantra systems prove nothing whatsoever among all phenomena to be truly established because phenomena are described in the context of an innumerable variety of trainees’ [capacities and dispositions]. Yet all the various instances [of things in] the world, characterized by nothing other than their respective apparent criteria, are fundamentally in the sense that the form of a dream vase appears capable of retaining water though the form of a vase’s reflection is incapable of retaining water. Nevertheless, except for the dream’s scope of appearance alone, there is no distinction in actual capacity - or lack thereof - to act, given its nature. Therefore, all phenomena are proclaimed to be like an illusion; like a mirage; like a dream; like a reflection; like an emanation.

§ 1.5.1 five analogies (430.20-433.24):

§ 1.5.1.1 illusion (430.21-431.08)

Q. In that case, what is the character of an illusion?

Here, an illusionist who has made an effigy from such things as pebbles, sticks, grit, and so forth, and incanted mantras over the clay figure such that it has been penetrated through the force of applied practice, then [causes] various forms - that of a man, a woman, a horse, an elephant, whatever - to manifest in the experience [of some others]. Though from the first moment the images occur they do not arise from anywhere at all (de dang po byung ba’i tshe na gang nas kyang ma byung). Even when apparent [431], since they are an illusion, nothing actual is present at all. Once persuaded they are an illusion they cease to be, do not appear. Yet at that moment [they] have not gone anywhere. In any case, here it is stated: "By force of the circumstance that one has been persuaded the form is an illusion, it is not present in one’s sensory domain," thus it is simply not

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957 gsang sngags : guhyamantra (430.13); this term is most often used interchangeably for so-called vajrayāna.
958 ‘jig rten gyi grags pa’i bye brag thams cad (430.14).
959 snang tshad (430.15) - apparent criterion.
960 snang tshod tsam (430.18).
961 ngo bo (430.18) : bhāva.
962 gyo mo la sngags kyi btab nas (430.22).
963 NTh 26.01; Th 73.05; BM 24.02.
964 dbang po’i spyod yul (431.03) : indriyagocara; TDCM makes reference to the famous instance of the term’s usage by Śāntideva: "the ultimate does not pertain to the domain of the intellect []; the intellect is said to be sanvärti (dper na | don dam blo yi spyod yul min | blo ni kun rdzob yin par brjod]
manifest. Yet it is not set forth\textsuperscript{965} that [in such an instance] a momentary continuum has ceased or been eliminated. Here, while both appearance and non-appearance, are, given their absence of character, of the same character, and given that as long as the conditions remain the appearance - or perceived object - remains, the character of that appearance per se (\textit{tsam}) is thoroughly established. In this sense, since there is no other objective factor that could be established it is an utter illusion (\textit{sgyu ma sgyu ma}).

\section*{§ 1.5.1.2 mirage\textsuperscript{966} (431.08-431.20)}

Q. In that case, what is the character of a mirage?

In a place where sand is present, the sun’s oppressive heat beating down on it, and someone is looking from a distance, there would be the experience [- an appearance -] of something like a water stream that is manifest through these conditions. At that first moment, though, it did not arise from anywhere. Even at the moment of appearance, since there is no elemental basis\textsuperscript{967} [*i.e. no water], it does not pertain (\textit{yin}) actuality whatsoever. Upon the sun-setting, it ceases and does not appear. Yet at that moment it has not gone anywhere. In any case, here it is stated: 'By force of the circumstance that the sun has set, the mirage is not present in one’s sensory domain; thus it is simply not manifest. Yet it is not set forth that a momentary continuum has ceased or been eliminated. In this case, though both appearance and non-appearance, given their indivisibly characteristicless character,\textsuperscript{968} are of the single character. Given that, as long as the conditions remain, the appearance - or perceived object - remains, the character of the appearance per se is thoroughly established. In this sense, since there is no other objective factor that could be established it is 'a mirage' so-called.'

\section*{§ 1.5.1.3 a dream (431.20-432.08)}

Q. In that case, what is the character of a dream?

In a sleeping being’s dream, the mind observes and there appear both sources of enjoyment - such as pleasure groves, parks, and so forth - and sources of discontent: prisons, jails, and the like. Yet even from the first moment, [neither] arose from anywhere. Even at the moment of appearance, since both

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{zhes pa lta bu’o} (1684a). Cf. LVP’s Prajñākaramati’s \textit{Pañjikā} on BCA 9.2b: \textit{buddher agocaras tattvam buddhih samyrtvam ucyate} (1905: 352).
\item \textit{rnam par gzhag pa} (431.03) : \textit{vyavasthāpita}.
\item \textit{ragyu}’i chu sno ba dang g yob daṅ lta gyi \textit{byung ba chen po med par ma zad kyi} \textit{ji ltar snang ba de lta bu’i rang gi ngo bo ‘byung ba’ ang yod pa ma yin te long ba rnam s kyil mun pa’ang de dang ‘dra ste de bas na ‘khor ba dang myaangan las ‘das pa’i chos sna tshogs su snang ba’ang rten dang rang gi ngo bo gnysis ka ma grub pa’i phyir s ca dang sangs gnysis ka’ang rang bzhin mnyam par smra’o l l ’di ni theg pa chen po thun mong ma yin pa’i thshul yin te l de yang mtsan nayid thun mong ma yin pa ni chos thams cad rnam par dbogrub pa nye bar gzhag pa’i mtsan nayid tsam du’ dod do (RZSB 1.41.20-42.04).
\item \textit{rten gyi} \textit{byung ba chen po} (431.12), literally “a basis of primary elements.”
\item \textit{dbyer med par mtsan nayid} \textit{med par mtsan nayid} (431.16-431.17).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
pertain to a dream there is no actual reality [432969] present whatsoever. Upon awakening, they stop, do not appear. Yet at that moment they have not gone anywhere. In any case, here it is stated: "By force of the circumstance that one awakes,970 the dream is not present in one's sensory domain; thus is simply not manifest. Yet it is not set forth in teaching that a momentary continuum has ceased or been eliminated. Though, both appearance and non-appearance, given their indivisibly characteristicless character (dbyer med par mtshan nyid med par mtshan nyid), are of the single character. Given that, as long as the conditions remain, the appearance - or perceived object - remains, the character of the appearance per se is thoroughly established. In this sense, since there is no other objective factor that could be established it is 'a dream' so-called."

§ 1.5.1.4 a reflection (432.08-432.19)
Q. In that case, what is the character of a reflection?

In this case, when an undistorted image, such as a face (bzhin), remains as a clear image (gzugs) upon such a thing as a mirror, there emerges the appearance of a reflection. At that first moment, though, it did not arise from anywhere. Even at the moment of appearance, since there is no elemental basis, nothing actual is present at all. Any partial condition [thereof means the reflection] stops, will not appear. Yet at that moment it has not gone anywhere. In any case, it is stated: "By virtue of incomplete circumstances, the reflection is not present in one's sensory domain; thus is simply not manifest. Yet it is not set forth that a momentary continuum has ceased or been eliminated. Though, both appearance and non-appearance, given their indivisibly characteristicless character, are of a single character. Given that, as long as the conditions remain, the appearance - or perceived object - remains, the character of the appearance per se is thoroughly established. In this sense, since there is no other objective factor that could be established it is 'a reflection' so-called."

§ 1.5.1.5 an emanation (432.19-433.23)
Q. In that case, what is the character of an emanation?

In this case, [we consider] emanations connected with gnosis,972 emanations connected with concentration,973 and those which are neither: i.e.

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969 NTh 27.05; Th 75.06; BM 25.05.
970 Is there a word play here vis-à-vis vsad, which not only means gnyid sad, "to awake" (tha mi dad), it also means brtag dpyad, "to investigate" (tha dad pa). See TDCM 2917b.
971 Reading gzugs brnyan zhes bya'o (RZSB 1.432.19; Th 77.03) rather than bzugs brnyan gzugs brnyan zhes bya'o | (BM 26.05).
972 ye shes (432.19-432.20) : jñāna - "which rendered literally would correspond to the German Urwissen" (Guenther 1984: 218 n.5) is variously translated as "gnosis" (Almogi 2009; on this Greek term, generally, see: M. Smith 1981), "pristine cognition" (Guenther 1984: 218), "wisdom" (Köppl), "primordial wisdom" (Klein 2006); and in less esoteric contexts as "knowledge" (EoIP vol. IX, p. 420), "subtle knowledge" (Gomez in JIABS 33(1): 538), and so forth.
973 ting nge 'dzin (437.23) : samādhi (Mvp 126, 523, 530, 532, 555 et passim), a form of single-pointed concentration inducing apprehension qua mental factor (sens byung : caitta) upon a
emanations achieved via *vidyāmantra*. Here, when mantras are incanted over a white flower that is then cast into the sky, there appears something approaching a thousand Tathāgatas. Likewise, when mantras are incanted over a golden flower that is then cast into the sky, there appear numerous beings who have overcome their foes (*arhat*). Incanting mantras over a red flower that is then cast into the sky, there appear numerous *yakṣas* and *rakṣasas*. Though from the first moment they occur they do not arise from anywhere at all. Even when apparent, since they are emanations, nothing actual is present at all. Once persuaded they are emanations they cease to be, do not appear. Yet at that moment, they not gone anywhere. In any case, here it is stated: "By force of the circumstance that one has been persuaded the form is an emanation, it is not present in one’s sensory domain," thus it is simply not manifest. Yet it is not set forth that a momentary continuum has ceased or been eliminated. Here, while both appearance and non-appearance, given their absence of character, are of the same character, and given that as long as the conditions remain the appearance - or perceived object - remains, the character of that appearance per se is thoroughly established. In this sense, since there is no other objective factor that could be established it is 'an emanation' so-called." In

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974 *rig sngags* (432.20) : *vidyāmantra* (Chandra 2001: 749a), literally "knowledge mantra." I have rendered this phrase passively though it is not written as such; i.e. *de ma yin pa rig sngags grub pa'i sprul pa*.

975 *de bzhin gshes pa* (432.22-432.23) : *tathāgata*. The Sanskrit term has been rendered "One-Thus-Gone" (Hopkins et passim; Jiang), "moving over and into the as-is" (Guenther 1984: 215 n. 16) and so forth; "thus" and "as-is," perhaps suggesting the manner of the transformation or state of the Buddhas which proceeded the one referred to as *tathāgata* (cf. MW 433c s.v.). Coulson's Sanskrit grammar (p. 111) notes that -gata collocations – e.g. *sugata, tathāgata, durgata* – can be rendered by the grammatically inessive, thus: 'being-in-tathā'; cf. such phrases as that found in the Saundarananda 15.69, where a monk whose mind is pure is a monk whose mind is in control (manah-śuddho bhikṣur vasaṅgatam Covill 2009: 194). Tathā understood as "being in-x" or "in that manner" can be understood to refer to, for example, previous buddhas vis-à-vis a buddha’s qualities and knowledge (id.). TDCM defines *tathāgata* in terms of having achieved awakening on the basis of the path to a spiritual state free of the extremes of both existence - i.e. remaining a conditioned being- and peace - leaving the world entirely and remaining absorbed in the serenity one’s achievement consists in (srīd zhi guyis mthā’ la mi gnas pa’i de bzhin nyid kyi lam la brten nas byang chub chen por mngon par gshes pa 1287b). See Guenther 1984: 215-216 n. 26. Herein, I have capitalized the term when referring to the historical buddha, Śākyamuni; when referring to buddhas, generally, the term is not capitalized.

976 NTh 29.03; Th 77.06; BM 26.07.

977 *gnod sbyin* (433.01) : *yakṣa*, a type of non-human demonic deity (*mi min lha ’dre’i rigs TDCM 1553b*).

978 *srin po* (433.01) : *rakṣasa*, a general term indicating a malevolent (*gdug pa can*) demon (*gdug ’dre spyi’i ming TDCM 2979b*).

979 *dbang po’i spyod yul* (431.03) : *indriyagocara* (PMV 360.06; cf. Yamaguchi 1974: pt. 1, p. 57). TDCM gives, as a famous instance of the term's usage: "the ultimate does not pertain to the domain of the intellect []; the intellect is said to be *samtverted* [dper na | don dam blo yi spyod yul min [ | blo ni kun rdzob yin par brjod] zhes pa lta bu’o (1684a). Cf. LVP’s Prajñākaramati’s Commentary on BCA 9.2b: *buddher agocaras tattvam buddhih samtvertir ucyate* (1905: 352).

980 *rnam par gzhag pa* (431.03) : *vyavasthāpita*. 452
this way, all these appearances of various internal and external things, as well, manifest as appearances so long as karmic imprints imagining the [objective] apprehended [and subjective] apprehender remain [within the continuum of the individual]. At that first moment, though, they not arise from anywhere. Even at the moment of appearance, since they pertain through the force of karmic imprints, nothing actual is present at all. When the karmic imprints of both apprehended and apprehender are exhausted, they stop - do not appear. Yet at that moment they have not gone anywhere. In any case, it is stated: "Since they do not pertain to the domain of non-conceptual gnosis, which is devoid of conceptions of apprehended and aporehender, they simply are not manifest. Yet it is not set forth that a momentary continuum has ceased or been eliminated. Though, both appearance and non-appearance, given their indivisibly characteristicless character, are of a single character, and given that as long as the conditions remain the appearance - or perceived object - remains, the character of that appearance per se is thoroughly established.

In this sense, since there is no other objective factor that could be proven, all phenomena are thereby proclaimed to be like an illusion; like a mirage; like a dream; like a reflection; like an emanation. Therefore, because all things are characterized in this way, [434981] no actual real entity [constituting a something to be rejected that] associated with afflictions, which are characterized by thoroughgoing confusion.

§ 1.6 conclusion (434.01-435.08)

On this view, these reasonings, which demonstrate the absence of a real entity associated with afflictions that constitutes something to be rejected, given the observation of the fallacy that philosophical systems posit the existence of an entity that is to be rejected vis-à-vis affliction, is not stated with the intention of undermining someone else’s philosophical system through contradiction.982 Rather, it is a description of the perception that one may cause the collapse of another philosophical system through one’s own philosophical system alone.983 This is not unlike, for example, when a damaging wind rises in in a dense wood, the wood becomes a shelter - and not too much damage is done. When, however, a damaging fire occurs, there is no shelter in the wood, which is consumed until not even a trace remains.984

If it is said that someone proves985 any from among those self-defeating986 philosophical theories, this would [only reference] a flawless establishing proof.
for proponents of philosophical theories who perceive their own [dialectical] procedure to be unflawed. From the point of view of those of deep and expansive awareness, [philosophical proof] is nevertheless comparable to turbid water - a perception that we proclaim is fabricated as one's own experience. For example, in the past, just as when Brahmin Terrestrial Flower said to Brahmin Undying:

Alas, brahmin, your
Totally faultless methods,
When seen from my point of view, [you] with every word.

Just as it has been said [here] that what is said by Brahmin Undying, who perceives his own method to be faultless, is, from the point of view of Brahmin Terrestrial Flower, like something tainted working to corrupt [Brahmin Undying's] perception, it also follows that the insistence found in the Śrāvakas

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987 rang la gnad pa'i grub mtha' (434.09), literally "self-undermining philosophical position," "self-defeating philosophical tenet," etc., in the sense that fixation on a philosophical position, in the end, holds one back from meaningful spiritual transformation. Köppl's understands the phrase rang la gnad pa - "something that injures one" - verbally. She writes: "Rongzom points out that the Madhyamaka is not at fault here simply because the school's explanation conflicts with the way of unsurpassable Mantra. Rather, the Mādhyamikas "flaw themselves" (rang la gnad pa) because their presentation is inherently contradictory" (43). Yet, the phrase rang la gnad pa'i is an adjective qualifying the noun grub mtha' ("established point," "philosophical position," "doxography," etc.). What is not clear to me, however, is the idea that, for Rongzom, the presentation of the Madhyamaka is "inherently contradictory" - how the Madhyamaka is not at fault. For, it would seem queer for a Mādhyamika to hold that there is a Madhyamaka per se that stands outside of its various presentations. As Candrakīrti has made clear, the Mādhyamika's words do not stand on their own work from within, as it were, to undermine another's philosophical assertion (PPMV 24). This is precisely how a Mādhyamika engaged in debate can maintain she has no thesis to prove.

988 grub mtha' 'dzin pa (434.10).
989 blo (434.10) : buddhi. While this term is primarily defined in epistemological terms (i.e. rang yul suang ba'i rig pa) and thus often rendered in terms of consciousness - i.e. "awareness" (e.g. Duckworth 2008), "mind" (e.g. Cabezón 2006), etc - it is also defined as thab shes "method" and las jus "procedure" (TDCM 1918a). The Sanskrit buddhi, too, has both nuances, mental and strategic (MW 733c). For this reason, it might perhaps be profitable to read the phrase rang rang gi blo dri ma med par mthong ba rnams kyis skyon med par bsgrubs pa yin mod kyi as a play on words.

990 dri ma med pa (434.10) : amala (Mvp 609, though Chandra 2001: 390 gives Mvp 610); cf. nirmala (Mvp 73); cf. nyama (Engel 2009: 444 n. 650).
991 blo zab cing yangs pa rnams kyis bglas na (434.12)
992 sa'i me tog (434.13).
993 Reading blo gros (Th 81.02) rather than bla gros (RZSB 434.14; BM 29.02).
994 Khenpo Gaden: brnyogs reads like habit; see TDCM 1016ab.
995 The Approach: kye ma tshangs pa khyod kyi blo || shin du dri me myed pa dag || blo gros ldan pa nang bglas na || shing ra la ni brnyogs pa bzhi (RZSB 1.434.14-434.15). The two brahmins mentioned here are also found in Toh. 2670: Sangs rgyas phal po che zhes bya ba shin tu rgya pa chen po'i indo (Buddhāvatāmaka-nāma-mahāvaiṣṇu-puṣṭra) in 2007, phal po che, kha, vol. 36 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang), p. 6.08.
approach\textsuperscript{996} - i.e. that associated with afflictions are actually a number\textsuperscript{997} of real entities to be gotten rid of - perforce functions to manufacture a number of classifications; and because the assertion itself has fabricated (byas) certainty in the number it is thus something tainted in having manufactured a debased assertion concerning real entities.

Within the Yogācāra system, the assertion of a real entity to be abandoned has created classifications of attributes; thus, like something tainted, it has created something self-debasing.

Within the Madhyamaka system, these special classifications created concerning correct and incorrect [conventions] are simply stated to be as if something tainted, [435\textsuperscript{998}] self-debasing. This is not proclaimed because the [Madhyamaka] system is in conflict with the Unexcelled Secret.\textsuperscript{999} In this case, though already discredited because of (pas) clinging to shelter in one's own philosophical theory, [the Mādhyamika] will not be perceived to be discredited. The description that someone who has conquered herself appears by means of her own philosophical position is an explanation of the reasons due to which one becomes without shelter and until not a trace remains. For that reason, these faults [described above] were discussed.

Those who desire to enter the way of the Great Vehicle should understand that there is no real entity to be rejected in connection with afflictions, that all phenomena are taught to be fundamentally equal insofar they are like an illusion.\textsuperscript{1000} And [here] the first chapter ends.

\textsuperscript{996} yyan thos kyi tshul las (434.18); cf. Pagel §12.4.2 s.v. ablative of origin.
\textsuperscript{997} rnam grangs (434.19) : paryaya.
\textsuperscript{998} NTh 32.04; Th 82.02; BM 29.06.
\textsuperscript{999} gsang ba bla na med pa (435.01), literally "the Unexcelled Secret" (\textit{guhyānuttara}).
\textsuperscript{1000} sgyu ma lta bu (435.07) : māyopama.
§ CHAPTER TWO: OBJECTION & REPLY\(^{1001}\) (435.08\(^{1002}\)-458.18)

Here, the issue is with the Buddhist teaching (vacana) that proclaimed all phenomena to be "like an illusion."

§ 2.1. issue (435.09-439.14): objection (435.09-435.21)

Especially in the context of all composite phenomena being impermanent and all phenomena being devoid of a personal self, the phrase "like an illusion" [or "illusory," "illusion-like," etc.] applies. When all phenomena are proclaimed to be devoid of any essential nature and "like an illusion" because of being generated by distinct causes and conditions, this is done three features in mind:\(^{1003}\) (i) the selflessness of phenomena, (ii) the selflessness of persons,\(^{1004}\) and (iii) the three natures\(^{1005}\) that do not [in the end, themselves] exist.\(^{1006}\)

Since all phenomena are devoid of any ultimate nature, they are proclaimed to be like an illusion even though correct conventions are asserted to be real entities.\(^{1007}\) Yet, it is not the case\(^{1008}\) that the two - illusion and the aggregates - are utterly equal. How so? An illusion only appears for a moment whereas the aggregates of beings wandering in samsāra appear to be stable for a length of time. Since an illusion is not something totally conjoined with mind and mental factors and it is not something accessible by sensation and discrimination\(^{1009}\) whereas the aggregates of migrators are completely conjoined with mind and mental factors and accessible by sensation and discrimination. Therefore, it would not be right to fundamentally equate the two.

§ 2.1.1. response (435.20-439.14)

Here, we explain that instances of appearance such as those discussed above are indeed counted among illusions as well as emanations. In the case of

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\(^{1001}\) At the end of the chapter, its title is given as brgal lan bstan pa’i skabs or “The Chapter Demonstrating Objections and Responses (RZSB 1.458.18-458.19).

\(^{1002}\) NTh 33.01; Th 82.05; BM 30.02.

\(^{1003}\) Here, like an illusion is described from the Yogācāra perspective.

\(^{1004}\) It is traditionally maintained in Tibetan doxographical writings that the Śrāvakayāna does not teach the selflessness of phenomena, but only that of persons.


\(^{1006}\) The Approach: bka’ rnam las chos thams cad sgyu ma lta bu gsungs pa ni | ’dus byas thams cad mi rtag pa dang | thos thams cad la gang zag gi bdag myed pa’i sgo nas kyang sgyu ma lta bu’i sgra ’jug la | chos dang gang zag la bdag myed cing ngo bo nyid rnam pa gsum gyi ngo bo nyid myed pa rnam pa’ang gsum la dgongs nas | chos thams cad ngo bo nyid myed par gsungs pa yin zhing | rgyu rkjen gzhan gyi dbang las skye bas sgyu ma lta bu’i sgra ’jug go | (RZSB 1.435.09-435.13).

\(^{1007}\) Here, like an illusion is described from the Madhyamaka perspective.

\(^{1008}\) Reading ma yin no (BM 30.05; Th 83.03) rather than ma yi no (RZSB 1.435.16).

\(^{1009}\) tshor ba dang ’du shes kyi nye bar spyod pa can ma yin la (435.18-435.19).
emanations, moreover, some of the emanations that the Tathāgata and empowered bodhisattvas manifest for the benefit of beings wandering in samsāra are present acting to accomplish the deeds of a buddha for an aeon or longer. Some are present acting to accomplish the deeds of a buddha for only a year, month, a day, for as long as the sun shines, a morning, or an hour. Some of those appear to conjoined [or merged] with gnosis and [some are] effected without being conjoined [with gnosis]; some appear conjoined and are effected in being joined. Some appear unjoined and are effected as joined. Nevertheless, given the absence of [any real] distinction between the character of illusions and emanations, they are fundamentally the same.

§2.1.2.1 On this view, when a pure maiden looks at in a mirror incanted by prasena mantra she sees a female thief (rkun mo) who is otherwise hidden from the perception of ordinary people. This is because the character of the reflections are without [real] difference [from illusions, emanations, and the like]. In dreams in which people see the future through the power of a particular god, they are able to reveal things in the future. For ordinary people, however, this is not the case because, given the character of a dream, there is no [real] distinction [to be made between illusions, emanations, reflections, and dreams]. Take mirages, as well. The conditions of some, but not all, work to obscure [perception of] the road such that there is no [real] difference in the actual character of [the above mentioned and] a mirage.

§2.1.2.2 Even in regard to the illusionist, it is due to the level of real power associated with secret mantras connected with illusion that a given appearance might remain for a moment or for some further duration. Some appear as just a color or shape; some appear as scent, flavor, or even [a sense of] contact. In just such a case as this, [a magician called] Bhadramāyākāra (this term means ‘the Good Illusion-maker’ and may be working as either a name or simply a description), in order to test whether or not the Bhagavan was all-knowing or not, magically issued forth a multitude of delectables and invited the Bhagavan along with his community of Śrāvakas [for lunch]. The Bhagavan, knower of [the three] times and [others’] mindstreams, accepted the invitation and went; and having transformed Bhadramāyākāra’s illusory issuance through
the force of his power to effect the minds and experience of others, the illusory delectables remained constant [in reality. Thus the Buddha and his retinue consumed [them for] lunch - and finished with an aspiration, in which [the Buddha] proclaimed:

Whosoever gives, whatsoever is given,
Gives just such without objectification,
That alone is the very essence of equal charity;
May that come to completion for the good.

Thus, there are even illusions that can bring about the two-fold accumulation. That is to say, whereas the transformative power of Bhadramāyākāra’s secret mantra was feeble and, thus, his magical issuance was incapable of any apparent constancy, the true transformative power of Bhagavan’s unsurpassable faculty entails his capacity to [issue] persistent appearances. Nevertheless, the absence of actual character associated with illusions entails that they are fundamentally equal.

§2.1.2.3 Appearances in the experiential domain of others that are not appearances totally conjoined with the mind or one’s own experience are capable of enduring in time for a long period undifferentiated. The powerful mantras of illusionists occur, in just such a way. [Take, for example,] King Ramacandra’s son, called Bali, who was entrusted to a sage to watch after by his mother

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1018 byin gyis brlabs (436.21); often translated simply as "blessing." Here, byin, is rendered according to the definition given in TDCM: gzhan gyi bsam pa dang snanb ba sogs bsgyur thub pa’i nus pa’am mthu (1884a).

1019 smon lam (436.21) : pranidhāna.

1020 The Approach cites the verse: gang gis byin dang gang la sbyin || sbyin pa ji ltar mi dmigs pa || sbyin pa mnyam pa de nyid kyis || bzang po la ni yongs rdzogs shog || (RZSB 1.436.022-436.23), which varies slightly from the citation found in Tōh. 0065: Sgyu ma mkhan bzang po lung bstan pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mao (Bhadra-māyākāra-cyakara-na-mahāyāna-sūtra) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, dkon brtsegs, ca, vol. 43 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): l gang gis sbyin dang gang la sbyin || sbyin pa ji ltar mi rtags pa || sbyin pa mnyam pa de nyid ni || bzang po la ni yongs rdzogs shog || (70.11-70.12) Two differences are the use of dmigs pa in place of rtags pa and the presence of the ergative kyis rather than ni. In this latter instance, the difference might be read as the distinction between whether the culmination occurs through, because, or by means of (kyis) or is (ni) a radically selfless type of charity valorized in the figure of the bodhisattva - "giving without mental referent" (sbyin pa mi dmigs pa). The last word bzang po : bhadra, meaning 'good,' 'excellent,' 'excellent,' etc., is the first word in the two word name of the magician, Bhadramāyākāra. This allows for the word play ‘for the good’ in the last line to suggest both ‘the Good [Illusion-maker]’ and ‘the good practitioner of this transcendental generosity. The term bhadra originally refers in the sūtra to Bhadramāyākāra, the magician who challenges the Buddha; in the last line of the quatrain it can be seen to be reconfigured to include a broader, ethically oriented, referent. Thus, bzang po without sgyu ma mkhan māyākāra - is playing on both the partial name of the protagonist and the abstract positive quality indicated allowed by the the term bzang po: bhadra, which means "good" or "excellent" and the like. In that play, the term may include all who give in the manner prescribed by the Buddha, who the Buddha deems bzang po or ‘good.’

1021 NTh 35.06; Th 86.03; BM 32.05.

1022 rgyal po ra ma na (437.06); cf. King Rama Chandra (Das 311a).

1023 drang srong (437.07) : rsi, a term generally defined in Tibetan in terms of physical, verbal, and mental virtue that is unbending (lus ngag yid gsum g.yo sgyu med par drang po’i phyogs su srong ba TDCM 1320a).
[i.e. Sita] who had left for a village on an errand. While she was gone, the sage did not notice the boy was not tagging along with him. Having lost the boy, the sage sought but did not find him. With nothing else at hand (thams gzhan med pus), he fabricated an illusion - something similar to the boy, Bali,\(^{1024}\) - and it persisted in reality.

Around the time the goddess Sita returned, the boy Bali also returned from his maternal grandmother’s and remained in his dwelling. His mother, not recognizing which was her son, thought one boy disguised one her son by birth. So she took them before the king and reported all that happened. The king, too, did not recognize his son; and for a long time, both acted as princes. In this case, too, because the power of the sage is superior to that of the illusionist, his illusion, too, is the more stable appearance. Similarly, because the power of the illusionists secret mantra is weak, the appearance is simply cannot appear without change\(^ {1025}\) (i.e. stable); and the power of karma and affliction is greater still than that.\(^ {1026}\) For that reason, the projections (‘phrul pa) of karma and affliction appear to endure for quite a long time.

*Imagined forms\(^ {1027}\) as well as mastered forms\(^ {1028}\) are a similar case. At one time in the past, there was a person who wished to practice yoga and went to a teacher for a [dharma] transmission.\(^ {1029}\) The teacher [first] wanted to check whether or not this person had any capacity to meditate. Rather than giving him any transmission, he said: "Meditate on the presence of excessively large buffalo\(^ {1030}\) horns on your head." Upon hearing this, the person thence went home, meditated resolutely, and sooner or later attained concentration such that something like a direct perception of buffalo horns became clear to him, though they did not appear in such a ways as to be able to touch or hold them by hand.\(^ {438}\)\(^ {1031}\) At that point, [the horns] are an imagined form. By meditating in that

\(^{1024}\) sgyu ma’i bu ’ba’ le ci ’dra ba zhi gyas (437.09).

\(^{1025}\) bstan pa (437.16), defined as "unchanging" ('gyur ldog med pa TDCM 1123a s.v. bstan po).

\(^{1026}\) * Thus, for Kongzom, the difference between all these is merely quantitative - in terms of power - rather than qualitative - in terms of fundamental essence of reality.

\(^{1027}\) kun btags pa’i gzugs (437.18) : parikalpitārūpā; cf. kun btags pa’i gzugs (TDCM 18b); rendered by Lamotte as “matière imaginaire” (Conze 1975: 648 n. 17). The term is refers broadly to an emergence of a mental appearance of form, such as the appearances of a horse, elephant, house, etc., within a dream (TDCM 18b). Jamgon Kongtrul glosses the term: kun btags pa’i gzugs mi gisang ba’i ting nge ’dzin gyi rkeng rus lla bu \(\downarrow\). See Shes bya kun khyab mdzod (3 vols. Beijing: Bod mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1982), 2.369.10

\(^{1028}\) dbang ’byor ba’i gzugs (437.19-437.20) : vaibutvikarūpa; "mastered forms" are counted among the five formal sources of phenoemena (chos kyi skye mched pa’i gzugs : dharmāyatana-rūpa) - forms, such as blue and so forth, which, through the force of having mastered concentration (bsam glan : dhyāna), appear [to the mind] (chos kyi skye mched pa’i gzugs lnga’i nang gses \(\downarrow\) bsam glan la dbang ’byor ba’i stobs kyi snang ba’i gzugs zad par sgon po la sogs pa ta bu’o TDCM 1935a). Jamgon Kongtrul glosses the term: dbang ’byor ba’i gzugs zad par so sogs kyi ting nge ’dzin las byung ba’i sa sogs lla bu ste \(\downarrow\). See Shes bya kun khyab mdzod (3 vols. Beijing: Bod mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1982), 2.369.11-369.12.

\(^{1029}\) slob dpon (437.20) : ācarya, a teacher who has the qualities gained through learning or spiritual training or spiritual mentor is of religious and material benefit to their students (yon tan slo bmkhan dge rgyan \(\downarrow\) ... rang gi slob ma la chos dang zang zing gi sgo nas phan ’dogs pa’i dge ba’i bxhes gnyen TDCM 3000a).

\(^{1030}\) ma he (437.21) : mahīśa (Mvp 4814); cf. MW 803a.

\(^{1031}\) NTh 37.04; Th 88.04; BM 34.02.
manner over the long term, at some point they become capable of being touched. The person thus thought: "I should ask the teacher if I have accomplished the buffalo horns and what I should do [next]." As the person prepared to walk out, s/he could not get through the door and summoned the villagers. "Raze the door!" the person said. The villages, when they had arrived, [remarked on] the beautiful horns present upon the person's head and proceeded to raze the doorway. [Freed, the person] went before the teacher who, also astonished, gave the transmission. [Thereafter, the person] attained success in Mahāmūdra. Horns capable of producing [such an] incident in and of themselves (rang la nus pa tsam na), are mental objects called "mastered form." When they are present in the ordinary sensory domain of all, they are termed "real form," which is no different from [the type of apparent form] that is the maturation of previous karma.

Even a physical body which is not one's own idea can be actualized through the aspirations of others. In the past, there was a weaver who went to the forest to cut a loom. Among the finest trees, thinking "it would not be right to cut such trees for my simple loom," [the weaver] continued on to find an appropriate tree, which remained unfound. The difficult search took [the weaver] all around the forest. Pleased, a forest goddess appeared before [the weaver] and said: "Human, since yours is fine work (bya ba 'phra mo), it is good that you did not cut down fine trees (shing legs pa) to do it! What boon (dngos grub) do you desire?" The weaver, not knowing what choice to make, asked a friend who was not very intelligent. "We being weavers, wouldn't it be great if we could weave from both our front and back." After hearing this, the goddess appeared before them. "Bestow [upon me] a knowledge of weaving both front and back," [the weaver said]. "May it be so," answered the goddess, immediately after which the entirety of the weaver's body and senses were transformed: two additional hands and feet emerged behind her, manifesting the semblance of an unhuman body. When went back to her village the villagers cried: "There are actual demons[1039] upon us" as they set upon her with stones, killing her. Thereafter, her viscera and body remained and the people lamented: "Kyé-ma! the slain demon's [439] has a human corpse - what is this?" All

1032 phyag rgya chen po'i dngos grub thob bo (438.07).
1033 grub pa'i gzugs (438.09).
1034 tha ga ba (438.11) : tantuviña (Mvp 3784).
1035 Reading shing 'di ltu bu ni nga'i thugs cha tsam gyi phyir (Th 89.05) rather than shing 'di ltar bu ni nga'i thugs cha tsam gyi phyir (RZSB 438.12) or shing 'di ltu bu'i nga'i thugs cha tsam gyi phyir (BM 34.07).
1036 Reading phra mo rather than either 'phra mo (BM 35.02) or 'phra' mo (RZSB 438.15, Th 90.01).
1037 According to Khenpo Gaden of Serlo Monastery, the virtue of the weaver's choice lies in the fact that the finest wood was not chosen for the simple parts for, or work of, weaving (thags cha tsam); while some wood is finer than others, the finest is simply not proper for the job. What is unclear is why, if at all, the weaver was tempted to cut the finest tree down if cutting fine wood just would not be proper; but if that is the case, what is the conflict and why is the goddess pleased by the decision? Perhaps the goddess is concerned not with the proper choice of wood but the survival of the trees.
1038 yu bu cag (438.17) : vayam (Chandra 2001: 718c).
1039 Reading 'dre (BM 35.05) rather than 'dre' (RZSB 438.22, Th 90.05).
1040 NTh 39.02; Th 90.06; BM 35.06.
the flesh, blood, bones, and faculties, too, were those of a human albeit with additional limbs; and it was learned this was the well-known and accomplished weaver.

In this case, too, [the appearance produced] via the power of another’s aspirations is no different than a body that will be brought about through the maturation of karma. If there is a slight difference, it would be that the power of karma and affliction appears at a later time,\textsuperscript{1042} the great power of meditative equipoise\textsuperscript{1043} brings about perceived phenomena,\textsuperscript{1044} the power of sincerely uttered aspirations appear immediately.\textsuperscript{1045} In these cases, [what is shared between the three] they are nothing other than various appearances due to the influence of contingent causes and distinct conditions.

The Tibetan term "gyu-ma" [i.e. "illusion"], when etymologically analyzed,\textsuperscript{1046} is traced to the Sanskrit term "ma ya" (māya), indicates something deceptive or incorrect.\textsuperscript{1047} The Sanskrit term "nir ma na" (nirmāṇa, i.e. "emanation"), which renders the Tibetan term trül-pa (sprul pa), indicates a projection that is not of a totally distinct entity from its source. As such, all apparent phenomena, indeed, do not obtain their own state as an entity; they are simply deceptive, false objects appearing due to the influence of different causes and conditions. That being the case, everything that appears should simply be recognized as basically the same to illusion and emanation.

\section*{§ 2.2. issue (439.14-441.19): objection (439.14-439.18)}

Yet someone might argue that these things that appear as cause and effect are not simply reducible to appearances that remain constant over a long period of time because of the continuum of momentary cause and effect appears to pure worldly gnosis\textsuperscript{1048} and because the continuum of momentary cause and effect is never severed or eliminated. For if it were said to be severed, that would be postulating a form of nihilism (char par smra ba nyid).

\begin{verbatim}
1041 Reading ro mi’o (BM 35.06) rather than ro mi ’ong (RZSB 439.01; Th 90.06).
1042 E.g. a later life.
1043 mnyam par bzhag pa (439.05-439.06) : samāhita (Mvp 1489), generally defined as an equal setting of the mind during single-pointed meditative absorption (ting nge ’dzin : samādhi) which is set (bzhag) in equanimity (mnyam) through having brought to mind (dmigs nas) the emptiness that is a selflessness of persons and phenomena (cha mnyam par bzhag pa ste | ting nge ’dzin sgom skabs gang zag dang chos kyi bdag med pa’i stong pa nyid la sens rise gcig tu dmigs nas mnyam par bzhag pa TDCM 990a).
1044 E.g. in this lifetime.
1045 E.g. in the next moment.
1046 nges pa’i tshig (439.08) : nirukti (Mvp 199).
1047 Reading slu zhiin yang dang pa ma yin pa’i don ston to (BM 36.02-36.03) rather than slu zhiin yang dang pa’i don ston pa’o (RZSB 439.09, Th 91.04).
1048 dag pa rjig rten pa’i ye shes : sūdhalaukikajñāna. *Cf. sangs rgyas pa’i dag pa ’jig rten pa’i ye shes ni | de bzhin du yod dam med pa ni brtag par bya ba ste | bsam gyis mi khyab pa’i chos yin no (RZSB 1.567.21-567.23; Almogi 2009: 193 n. 11); and yong ni de bzhin gshlegs pa’i spyod yul ni | bsam gyis mi khyab pa’i yul yin pas ’di la mi brtsad par bshag go zhes bshad do (RZSB2.1211.24-122.02; Almogi 2009: 193 n. 11).
\end{verbatim}
§ 2.2.1. response (439.18-441.19)

In this case, the Bhagavan proclaimed that phenomena arise as dependent relations. On this view, if a cause is present a result will arise; and if cause and condition are interrupted (‘gags), result, too, will be prevented (‘gags). Just this alone (‘di nyid tsam) was proclaimed [by the Buddha] to be the great pathway to freedom that dispels the two extremes.

It was not proclaimed [by the Buddha] that the continuum of cause and effect is never severed. Accordingly, the special seal impressed upon all the dharma discourses, given by the Bhagavan and all the bone relics of the Buddha’s body, on the worldly sciences and objects of worship is the essence of interdependence (rten ’brel gyi snying po).

All the above mentioned should be recognized as being stamped, impressed with this, the Buddha’s seal. As to its meaning, it is rendered either as:

- All phenomena arise from causes;
- Those causes were pointed out by the Tathāgata;
- The great śramaṇa taught this [and]
- Proclaimed that which is their cessation.

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1049 "rten cing ’brel bar ’byung ba (439.19) : pratītyasamutpāda.
1050 choś kyi gsungs rab mtha’ da. The term gsung rab : pravacana (Mvp 1433) typically refers to what Guenther (1984: 210-211 n. 3) terms the "twelve literary representations" of the "Three Baskets" (tripitaka) of the Hinayāna and Mahāyāna: i.e. sūtra (prose discourses), geya (a mixture of prose and verse), vijākarana (explanations), gāthā (stanzas), udāna (pithy sayings), nidāna (narratives of beginnings), avadāna (tales of heroic deeds), ītyukta (short speeches), jātaka (birth stories), vaipulya (questions and answers), adhibhūta-dharma (report of miracles), and upadeśa (instructions). Rongzom explains the term: de la gsung rab ces bya ba ni pra tsan na zhes bya ba ’i sgra lsa na ni tshig gam ngag pra ni nye bar bsgyur ba don lha gra par ston pa’i tshig ste gsung rab ces btags te ‘jig rten gyi gtsug lag don chung ba rnam la ku ba lsa na zhes bya ste ku ni rgyan par ston pa’i tshig go de tla bu ma yin pa tshig gam ngag gan gis thar pa’i lam sron par byed pa ste dngos su gsung rab yan lag bcu gnyis kyi bsdu pa’i choś kyi phung po la bya’o (RZSB 474.17-474.22), rendered by Guenther: "The term gsung-rab corresponds to (the Sanskrit word) pravacana: vacana means sentence or speech; and pra is a preposition which points out that something out of the ordinary is means. This is what meant by the term gsung-rab. Worldly areas of study, dealing with trivialities, are referred to by the term kuvacana, in which the syllable ku indicates a low-level content. Such is not the case with (gsung-rab) since its sentences and what it has to say disclose the way toward freedom. In concrete terms, the twelve literary forms constituting what is termed gsung-rab, are all that makes up Buddhism" (211).
1052 NTh 40.05; Th 93.01; BM 39.02.
1053 Cf. the ye dharma-formula, the hrdaya of the pratītyasamutpāda (Almogi 2009: 84).
1054 The Approach: ye dha rna he tu prabhā bā | he dün te śan ta ga ta to hya ba | tad te śan lsa yo ni ro dha | ē bān bā dī mā hā shra ma nā (RZSB 440.01-440.03). Jayatilleke locates these words in the Pali Vinaya 1.41: ye dhamma hetupābhāvā tesāṁ hetuṁ tathāgato dha | tesāṁ ca yo nirodho evam vādī mahāsamanō (1963: 454).
1055 The Approach: choś rnam thams cad rgyu las byung | de rgyu de bzhiṅ gshegs pas gsungs | de la ’gog pa gang yin pa | dge sbyong chen po ’di skad gsungs (RZSB 440.04-440.07). This verse is found,
It is explained on this view, which is in accordance with the explanations given by the world’s teacher [i.e. the Buddha], that phenomena are not produced by a creator, not emanated by Isvara, not arisen through self-nature, not transformed by time, and not arisen causelessly. Thus, this teaching that phenomena arise from causes and conditions is that of the Tathāgata, and none other. The teaching that when the cause of a given phenomenon is interrupted, its effect is obstructed, too, is that of that great śramaṇa, the Buddha Bhagavān in the world with its gods and no one else’s. And to be clear: it was not proclaimed [by the Buddha] that the continuum of cause and effect is never severed.

In a different sūtra, there is an explanation of the fact phenomena arise as dependent relations, the purport of which is similar: "Just as the world is something formed in association with karma and affliction, inducing the causes that prevent karma and affliction pertains to knowledge, as it is proclaimed [by] the chief expounder of the supremacy of liberation, who declared that he himself had knowledge of the state beyond the suffering of birth, old age, and death."

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or as:

Of phenomena that arise through causes, The Tathāgata taught the causes
By the great śramaṇa is [also] stated
The manner of their cessation.

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1061 Cf. Rongzom’s Man ngor lta phreng gi ‘grel pa; de la rten cing ‘brel [319] bar ‘byung ba’i sgo nas chos nyid zab mo rtags pa ni | ‘di’ ltar chos thams cad ni | rten cing ‘brel te ‘byung ba’i nithan nyid de | byed pa mos ma byas | dbang phyug gi ma bkos | rang bzhin ma byung | dus kyis ma bsgyur | rgyu nyed pa las ma byung st | rtags pa’ ma yin | chad pa ma yin (RZSB 1.318.24-319.04).


1064 khyu mchog (440.18) : vrṣabhā (Mvp 7359); the highest ranking among a group (mang po’i nang gi mchog tu gyur pa TDCM 265a); ‘(cf. rishabha) manly, mighty, vigorous, strong… (in Veda epithet of various gods… ‘a showerer of bounties, benefactor’… the chief, most excellent or eminent, lord, or best among” (MW 1012c).
decay.”

This is also corresponds to the meaning of the teaching which states: "Monks, when this is present, that comes to be; from the production of that, this arises, and in this way, with ignorance as a condition, karmic processes [comes to be] up to "samsāra’s perennial heap comes to be," as well as the

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1065 The Approach: mdo gzhahn las kyang | ji ltar ’jig rten las dang nyon mongs rgyur bcas byed ’byung ldan ’gyur cing | las dang nyon mongs pa dag ldog rgyu de ’ang ’dren pas mkhyen te rab tu gsungs | gang na skye dang rgang dang rgyud pa ’i sdu rig bya’i dang bar tu ni gnas pa | thar pa ’i mchog de smra ba ’i khyu mchog de yi rang gs mthabs te gsungs | (RZSB 440.15-440.18).

1066 ’di yod na ’di ’byung | ’di skyes pa ’i phyir ’di skye ste (440.19) : asmin sati idam bhavati | tasyatpadti idam utpadyate. P. imasmin sati, idam hoti | imas’ uppadda idam uppajjati (e.g. MN 1.262-263, 2.32, 3.63, SN 2.28, 2.70, 2.78, 2.95-96). Cf. Thö. 287: ‘Phags pa dam pa’i chos dran pa nye bar zhor pa (Ārya-saddharmo-anusmṛty-upasthāna) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, mdo sde, sha, vol. 69, (Beijing: Krun go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): ’di yod pas ’di ’byur | ’di skyes pa ’i phyir ’di skye | (453.04).

1067 ma rigs pa’i rgyen gyis ’du byed (440.19-440.20) : P. aviññapaccaya sākhāra; ’du byed (440.20) : sāmakṣapa (Mvp 2243).

1068 ‘khor ba’i srid pa’i phung po (440.20) : āsamsārikaskaṁdha, could also be translated as “the for-as-long-as-samsāra-heap” (“khor ba’i srid pa’i phung po). This, which does not appear in the Pāli formula given below, appears to replace the Pāli term kevalasasa dukkhackhandhassa, often translated as “mass of suffering” or “dissatisfaction. For its part, the term ‘khor ba’i srid pa’i phung po appears twice in the first chapter of Mahāyānasamgraha: (1.11.3): sa ston gyi sde’i lung las kyang ‘khor ba’i srid pa’i phung po [rnams] shes ’byung ste | mānas grangs de seng de nyid bstan te | la la res ‘ga’ gzugs dang sas rgyun chad par snang kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la de’i sa bon ni rgyun mi ’chad pa’i phyir ro | (1.11.3) | ‘phags pa gnas brtan pa mānas kyi lung las kyang | srid pa’i yan lag la ba dang | shes pa dang ni glong par dang | gyo ba dang ni rtoqs par dang | bden pa’i phyur byed pa yis ’i ‘gzis ’byung ngo | (1.12) de’i phyur phyur shes bya’i gnas la <kun gzhi rnam par shes pa nyid dang > len pa’i mānas par shes pa nyid dang | sams nyid dang | kun gzhi [mānas par shes pa nyid] | srid pa’i yan lag tu bstan pa de ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa s | kun gzhi rnam par shes pa’i lam gom byed pa kho na yin no | (Lamotte 1973: 7-8). Cf. ‘The Mahāyānasamgraha’ also cites several concepts proffered by various Abhidharma schools, which we have mentioned briefly above, claiming that these schools are in fact teaching the alāyavijñāna by different names (parīyāya), i.e., the root-consciousness (mālavijñāna) of the Mahāsamghikas, the aggregate that lasts as long as samsāra (āsamsārikaskaṁdha) of the Mahāśāsakas, and the bhavanga of the Sthivavādins, the present-day Theravādins” (Walrond 30); cf. id. 72-73, n. 214.

1069 P. imasmin sati, idam hoti, imass’ uppadda idam uppajjati, yadidam aviññapaccaya sākkhāra, sakkatthapaccaya vihitānān, viññānapaccaya nāmarūpam, nāmarūpapaccaya saññātata’nān, saññatānappaccaya phass, phassapaccaya ‘vedanā, vedanāpaccaya ‘tanhtā, tanhitāpaccaya upādanā, upādānapaccaya bhavo, bhavapaccaya jāti, jātipaccaya jāramaraṇam sokapariyavadukkhadhammadussaṅgaśā sambhavanti, evam - etassa kevalasasa dukkhackhandhassa samudayo hoti (MN 1.261, 3.64-65, SN 2.28).

For the Tibetan, see Thö. 0212: ‘Phags pa’i rten cing ’brel bar ’byung ba zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo (Pratityasamutpāda-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rgyud ’bum, na, vol. 88, (Beijing: Krun go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang), pp. 183-185. Interestingly this formula does not appear in DN, although both the Mahāpādāna and Mahānīdāna saṅgatas appear to retain their own iteration of a like formula, albeit altered in number; cf. Walshe 1996: 35-36, who interprets the distinction as marking a distinct Dīgha bhāvakā tradition. Gombrich (1996: 45-48), following Frauwallner (1973: 167) points out “that the full twelve-link formulation combines the theory that our troubles are all due to ignorance (the intellectualist analysis) with the theory that they are due
teaching which states: "when this is interrupted, that is ceases to be; because due to the interruption of ignorance, karmic process ceases to be" up to "samsāra's perennial heap ceases to be." Thus, it was not proclaimed [by the Buddha] that the continuum of cause and effect is never severed.

The two extremes are indeed dispelled: the extreme of eternalism is dispelled by the fact nothing personal transmigrates. [441] Thus, it is stated [by Nāgārjuna]:

By means of [analogy to] orality, lamp, mirror, and stamp,
Sun-crystal, seed, the sour, and sound,

to desire (the emotionalist analysis);" and he has suggested (loc. cit.) the twelve-link formula is an amalgamation of two lists.

1070 'di 'gags pas 'di 'gag (420.21) : P. imasmin asati idam no hoti, imassa nirodhā idam nirujjhati.
1071 The Approach: i dge slong dag 'di yod na 'di 'byung la 'di skyes pa'i phiyir 'di skye ste 'di litar ma rig pa'i rkyen gyis 'dus byed ces bya ba nas 'khor ba ji srid pa'i phung po 'byung bar 'gyur ro zhes bya ba'i bar dang 'di 'gags pas 'di 'gag ste ma rig pa 'gags pas 'du byed 'gag ces bya ba nas 'khor ba ji srid pa'i phung po 'gyur par 'gyur ro zhes gsungs pa'i don yang de 'dra ste (RZSB 440.19-440.23). This is not unlike a passage found in the Vinaya: Th. 4113: 'Dul ba gzhi rgya cher 'grel pa (Vinaya-vastu-tikā) in bKa'gur (dpe bsdur ma) 2002, 'dul ba, tshu-thu, vol. 87 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): rten 'cing 'brel bar 'byung la mkhas pa zhes bya ba ni 'di lta ste 'di yod pas 'di 'byung ba 'di skyes pa'i phiyir 'si skyes ba ste 'di lta ste ma rig pa'i rkyen gyis 'du byed rnam zhes bya ba nas 'de litar na sdbu bsgal gyi phung po chen po 'bab zhiq pa 'di 'byung bar 'gyur ro zhes bya ba'i bar dang 'di lta ste 'di med pas 'di mi 'byung la 'di ma skyes pa'i phiyir 'mi mi skye ba ste 'di lta ste ma rig pa 'gags pas 'du byed rnam 'gags ches bya ba nas 'de litar na sdbu bsgal gyi phung po chen po 'ba zhiq pa 'di 'gag par 'gyur ro zhes bya ba'i bar gyi dbys bas lugs su 'byung ba dang (699.03-699.11). Cf. P. imasmin asati idam no hoti, imassa nirodhā idam nirujjhati, yaddanam avijjānirodhā sankhāranirodho, sankhāranirodhā viññānanirodho, viññānanirodhā nāmarūpanirodho, nāmarūpanirodhā satyātana-nirodho, satyātana-nirodho phassanirodho, phassanirodho vedānānirodho, vedānānirodhā tānthānirodho, tānthānirodhā upādānanirodho, upādānanirodho bhavanirodho, bhavanirodhā hātthinirodho, hātthinirodho jāramanūjani sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā nirujjhati, evametassasa kevalassasa dukkha-kkhanna-nirodho hoti (MN 1.264).

1072 rtag pa'i mtha' (440.20-441.01) : sāsuttānta.
1073 gang zag pa' pho ba med pa nyid kyis (440.24).
1074 NTh 52.03; Th 95.03; BM 38.06.
1075 mar me (441.01) : dipa (Mvy 1167). The lamp metaphor for rebirth rather than reincarnation is famously found in the Milindapañha Sutta where we find Nāgasena and the Bactrian king called in Greek, Menendra (P. Milinda) discussing the issue: bhante nāgasena atti koci satto yo imanāhā kāya anyavyam kāyaṃ saṃkamati ti | na hi bhante ti | ... kathāṃ bhante nāgasena na ca saṃkamati paṭisandahati ca | opannam karohi ti | yathā mahārāja koci deva puriso padipato padippam padippya kunnu kho so mahārāja padipo padippamhassamkamanto ti | na hi bhante ti | evam sa koci kui saṃkamati paṭisadahati cāti. Since the phung po do not (re-)connect (nyid mthams bshor ba), no intermediate state being (antarābhava) is required; therefore, there is no incarnate being per se and thus no transmigration or (P.) saṃkamati (pho ba : saṃkrānti).
1076 me long (441.01) : adarśa (Mvy 111). This example is discussed in the third chapter of the Abhidharma-kosā-bhāṣyam: "But, one would say, a reflection (pratibimba) arises on a mirror, on the water, etc., without being continuous to the image (bimba) with which It forms a series. Hence the elements of arising do not depend on the elements forming an uninterrupted series between the place of death and the place where they reappear" (ADKB 383-384); "Now if a real physical matter, the reflection, should arise, it would arise on the surface of the mirror, and would be perceived as being on the surface of the mirror. A reflection is thus only an illusory idea taking the form of the reflection (pratibimbākāram bhṛtānām vijnānām). Such is the power of this complex, mirror and object, that it produces the seeing of a reflection, of an image resembling the object. Incomprehensible is the power of the dharmas and the variety of this power" (ADKB 385).
The extreme of nihilism is dispelled by the fact that production derives by cause and condition. Thus, it is stated [by Nāgārjuna]:

Whosoever imagines that even the subllest entity ceases,
That fool does not see what it means to arise conditionally.
It is not taught here (ni) that "because the continuum of cause and effect is never severed the extreme of nihilism is dispelled."

Even though [the continuum of cause and effect] appears to pure worldly gnosis, its appearance to bodhisattvas' pure worldly gnosis simply pertains to the power of the two fixations that are due to karmic imprints which still

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1077 me shel (441.01) : sūryakāṇṭha (Mvp 8979); i.e. 'sun-loved,' the sun-stone, sun-crystal (a kind of crystal supposed to possess fabulous properties as giving out heat when exposed to he sun (MN 1243b).
1078 sa bon (441.01) : bita (Mvp 6368).
1079 nyiṅg mtsams sbyor ba (441.02) : pratisandhiḥ; P. paṭisandahati. This term might also be rendered "re-entry" and, in Tibetan, is generally associated with entry of conscious awareness into the womb vis-à-vis the process of rebirth (yang yang skye srid du mtsams sbyor ba ste rnam shes mngal du 'jug pa TDCM 952a).
1080 'pho ba (441.02) : samkrānti (Mvp 1379), samkrāma (Mvp 2986); P. samkamati/-anti.
1081 The Approach: kha thon mar me me long rgya || me shel sa bon skyum dang sgras || phung po nyiṅg mtsams sbyor ba yang || mi 'pho bar yang mthos riogs bya || (RZSB 1.441.01-441.02). See Töh. 3836: rTen cing 'brel bar 'byung ba'i snying po'i tshig le'ur byas pa (Pratītya-samutpāda-hṛdaya-kārīka) in bsTan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2000, dbu ma, tsa-cha, vol. 57 (Beijing: Krun go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): || kha thon mar me me long rgya || me shel sa bon skyum dang sgras || phung po nyiṅg mtsams sbyor ba yang || mi 'pho bar yang mthos riogs bya || (403.01-403.02).
1082 cha dp a mi nthu (441.03) : ucchedānta.
1083 shin tu 'phra ba'i dngos po (441.03) : sūkṣmabhava.
1084 rnam par mi mthos [pa] (441.04-441.05); alternatively: "unwise," "unskilled," etc.
1085 rkyen las byung ba'i don (441.05) : pratyayotpannārtha.
1086 The Approach: shin tu 'phra ba'i dngos la'ang || gangGIS chad par rnam brtags pa || rnam par mi mthos de yis ni || rkyen las byung ba'i don ma mthong (RZSB 441.03-441.05). This verse is found in Töh. 3836: rTen cing 'brel bar 'byung ba'i snying po'i tshig le'ur byas pa (Pratītya-samutpāda-hṛdaya-kārīka) in bsTan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2000, dbu ma, tsa-cha, vol. 57 (Beijing: Krun go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): || shin tu phira ba'i dngos la yang || gangGIS chad par rnam brtags pa || rnam par mi mthos de yis ni || rkyen las byung ba'i don ma mthong (403.03-403.04). This verse is a remarkably similar to v. 12 of Nāgārjuna's Yuktisāṣṭikā (Rigs pa drag bcos pa): dngos po shin tu phira ba la'ang || gangGIS skye bar rnam brtags pa || rnam par mi mthos de yis ni || rkyen las byung ba'i don ma mthong (Lindter 1987: 106), which itself is remarkably similar to a verse found in the Madhyamaka-ratna-pradīpa: shin tu 'phra ba'i dngos la yang || gangGIS chad par rnam brtags pa || rnam par mi mthos de yis ni || rkyen las byung ba'i don ma mthong (Iamieson 2000: 51 n. 6).
1087 'dzin pa nyīṣ (441.08) : dveṣaghnā (Chandra 2001: 664a). According to Almogi, the phrase 'dzin pa nyīṣ refers to "the grasping at a self and the grasping at phenomena as real" (2009: 190). According to Köppel, "Rongzom explains different types of habitual tendencies: 1. 'dzin pa nyīṣ kyi bag chags, 2. dkar po las kyi bag chags, 3. dbang tu 'tia ba'i bag chags, 4. mngon par brjod pa'i bag chags, and 5. sri pa yan lag gi bag chags. Among these five habitual tendencies (bag chags), Nagao lists (1994, vol. 2, p. 109) mngon par brjod pa'i bag chags and the srid pa yan lag gi bag chags as occurring in the Madhyāyānasamgraha. As for the former three types of habitual tendencies (bag chags, vāsana), it remains unclear what sources Rongzom may have relied on for his enumeration" (2008: 159 n. 268).
remain [in the bodhisattvas' continuum]. The question of whether or not Tathāgatas are, in fact, possessed of a pure worldly gnosis, is a separate issue to explore. That being the case, a person who holds a philosophical position such as this is exemplified by a doubtful bird who, upon seeing that the footing of the path has shifted a bit, moves off a major established path fearing for cover. Thence moving off to the edge (mtha’) of the path, he is tormented by splinters [offered by the thick, tightly encircling wood]. Likewise, the Bhagavan proclaimed, given that phenomena arise as dependent relations, that when cause and condition are interrupted, the effect will be obstructed. Having entered onto this traditional great path to liberation that dispels the two extremes, conflict ensues when, in fear of falling into the view of nihilism in which the causal continuum is severed, there is grasping at the extreme which takes the causal continuum to be eternal [literally, “one moves off to the side of the edge” (mtha’)]. This move is not unlike being tormented by the [intellectual] splinters of the philosophical systems of the realists.

§ 2.3. issue (441.19-451.03): first objection (441.19-441.23)

If it is true that in the impure realm of thoroughly afflictive causality effects are obstructed inasmuch as their causes are interrupted, then the appearance of a fully matured buddha-body, the display (bkod pa) of a totally pure field, and a perfectly encompassing ornament consisting in the inexhaustable continuum of enlightened body, speech, and mind actualized through illimitable collections of merit and wisdom would be unceasing.

§ 2.3.1. response (441.23-444.11)

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1088 skyes byo pho rig gi khu ’phrig can (441.11). On the term khu ’phrig : bhītru, Cabezón reports: “The Tibetan word khu ’phrig varies in its meaning according to different sources. According to Chos grags’s Dictionary (Dharamsala: Damchoe Sangpo, 1980), it is synonymous with: (a) rnam rtog za ba, ’to doubt, to be superstitious about,’ and (b) brtag dpyad byed pa, ’to investigate.’ The Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo, 230, renders it similarly dogs pa’am rnam rtog, ’doubt or superstition’” (Freedom From Extremes: Gorampa’s ‘Distinguishing the Views’ and the Polemics of Emptiness (Wisdom Publications, 2007), p. 319 n. 271).

1089 kun nas nyo mong pa (441.19) : samkīśa (Chandra 2001: 11b).

1090 rnam par smin pa’i sku (441.22) : vipākakāya. In his commentary on Guhyagarbha-tantra, the dKon cog ’grel, Rongzom describes impure bodies that are the result of the maturation of karma; and two types of pure body: a "pure body" that is established through the aspirations of those who have attained power over karma; and an "utterly pure body" of Jīnas that appears as the mandala of a buddha’s body and gnosis (de la ma dag pa’i lus ni las kyi rnam par smin pa’i lus dang nig dkyil ’khor du snang ba’o | dag pa’i lus ni las la dbang thob pa rnam smin la’i sgrub pa’i lus dang nig dkyil ’khor du snang ba’o shin tu rnam par dag pa’i rgyal ba rnam smin kyi sku dang ye shes kyi dkyil ’khor du snang ba’o | RZSB 1.105.03-105.06; cf. Almogi 2009: 243 n. 20; cf. 112). Cf. what Almogi terms the third position that maintains the existence of three constituents on the buddha-ground. From Rongzom’s Sangs sa chen mo: sku dang bde ba nyams so myong ba’i tshor ba la stogs pa ni mi mnga’ ste | de bzhin gshogs pa la bsod nams kyi bsgrub pa’i rnam par smin pa’i sku dang | longs spyod kyi tshor ba mnga’ na | sangs rgyas rnams lus dang gnas dang longs spyod can du ’gyur bas ’di dag ni mi mnga’o zhes zer ro (RZSB 2.72.19-72.22; Almogi 2009: 248)
While it is true that the collection of merit and wisdom would be cause and condition for the apprehension and appearance of a completely pure body and domain, they are not the fundamental cause of that appearance. How so? The occasion of merit accumulation is also a context in which harm can occur by force of turbulent karma. At that time, meritorious karma indeed appears as something beneficial. For example, this is not unlike the fact that, in the absence of a [fundamental] basis, a white cloth may be infused with stains, cleansed by washing, and again infused with a fine color. Similarly, if earth, water, and time elements are present, seeds will give forth their fruit; otherwise, if water is absent, nothing can grow. Likewise, when the underlying basis marked by karmic imprints of the two fixations is moistened by the water of craving, the seeds of karma will grow; when devoid of just the water of craving, the seeds of karma will not grow. Accordingly, because they are devoid of the moisture of grasping even though they remain on the ground of

1091 lus ... yongs su dag pa (441.24-441.01). It appears that, for Rongzom, a completely pure body corresponds to an utterly pure body (shin tu riam par dag pa'i lus cf. RZSB 1.105.05) inasmuch as a complete purity appears to mark a buddha (Almogi 2009: 174); we should note that in Snang ba lhar bsgrub pa, Rongzom writes that "it is not simply that exhausting each and every karmic imprint pertains to the appearance of a completely pure domain of experience" (bag chugs thams cad ma lus par zad pa la ni yongs su dag pa 'i spyod yul yang snang ba ma yin no | RZSB 1.567.20-567.21; cf. Almogi 2009: 221 n. 112).

1092 NTh 44.01; Th 97.05; BM 40.03.

1093 dngos gzhi (442.01-442.02) : maula (Mvp 1486).

1094 This point is considered in Rongzom’s Sangs sa chen mo: "If a tathāgatha were to possess a Body of Maturation (rnam par smin pa'i sku: vipākakāya) - brought about by the beneficial resources - and a sensation of enjoyment, this would lead to the undesired consequence that the buddhas are endowed with a body (lus: deha), an abode (or: support) (gnas: pratiṣṭhā or pada), and [the sensation or objects of] enjoyment (longs spyod: bhoga or artha), which are worldly elements. Therefore, [a tathāgata] does not have these [constituents]" (Almogi 2009: 248). The question here is whether or not - and in what way - can meritorious karma be a cause of pure appearances, if at all. Are there appearances on the buddha ground, that is: at the stage of being a buddha (sangs rgyas kyi sa)? If not, that would mean even pure appearances cease.

1095 gnas nyan len (442.02) : duṣṭhulya (Chadra 2001: 455c), dāṣṭulya (Mvp 2102), duṣṭhula (Mvp 8424, 4873). The term duṣṭhulya been variously translated as "errant tendencies" (Powers 1995: 299), "negative conditioning" (Wedemeyer 1999: 240), "spiritual corruptions" (Waldron 2003: 25), "negative instinctual conditionings" and "depravity" [Maitreyanātha/Āryāsaṅga 2004: 50, 77 n. 20], "badness" (Radich 2007: 1131, 1257), "baseness" (Wangchuk 2007: 164; Almogi 2009: 191) "cause birth in bad places" (Karmay 2007: 179), "negative propensities" (Tayé 2007: 316 n. 202), "indisposition" (Engle 2009: 424 n. 408), "turbulence" (Ruegg 2010: 333), "perpetuation of ignoble states of existence" (Tayé & Barron 2012: 307), etc. Tayé 2007 notes that the term "refers to both the presence of the seeds, or causes, of the mental afflictions and the habitual tendencies they create. It is similar to the term 'appropriated aggregates' [nyer len gyi phung po : upādānaskandha] (316 n. 202).

1096 ras yug dkar po (442.04) : śuklāḥ paṭa. The stained white cloth analogy is found in the Lankāvatāra-sūtra and the Prāmāṇavārttika-kārikā (Hugon: 577 n. 124). Cf. Vaṭṭhapana-sūtra, found, e.g. in Rahulā 1974: 106-109.

1097 bsgo (442.05) : vāsita ; cf. PPMV 313 n. 7 s.v. paribhāvita (Mvp 9312). Cf. Kamalaśīla’s Tattvasaṅgrahā: cittam eva hi samsāro rāgādiklesāvāsitam | tad eva tair vinirnuktaḥ bhavāntā iti kathyate (McClintock 189 n. 73): Just the mind, infused (vāsita) by such afflictions as fixation and so forth is conditioned existence (samsāra); that very mind, disjoined from those afflictions, is called the end of existence’; McClintock’s translation renders vāsita as "impregnated" (loc. cit.).
conceptuality,\footnote{1098} noble beings (’phags pa) who have overcome their foes, do not generate fully mature aggregates\footnote{1099} even by meritorious karma. It is not unlike, moreover, the fact a boat works to advantage as long as the danger of a river is present; once the river’s danger is removed and one proceeds onto dry land – at that point – the boat works to no advantage. Likewise, as long as the harms of turbulent actions are present, meritorious karma works to one’s advantage; and at the moment there is no harm from turbulent action, meritorious karma is of no benefit. Even the Buddha proclaimed that the fact of being divorced from all benefit and harm is termed "awakening." Here, it is stated:

\begin{quote}
Take as an example that which traverses
To the other shore of a rising river
Composed from grasses and wood and the like;
Equipped to cross the water;
One gets in; once having crossed,
Cast it aside\footnote{1100} and go on happily.
The path across \textit{samsāra}
Is like that since once generated
What is and is not dharma is relinquished;
Awakening is happily attained.\footnote{1101}
\end{quote}

\footnote{1098} Cf. Rongzom’s TBJB; there Rongzom gives an outline of the Śrāvakas vehicle in a triad of terms: (i) view (ita ba : drṣṭi), (ii) concentration (ting nye ’dzin : samādhi), and (iii) criterion of abandonment (spong iṣhad); in general, he writes, the Śrāvakas maintain that spiritual freedom consists in the abandonment of fixation upon a self, which is achieved by three techniques: first, meditation upon ugliness of the body [the body without skin, its blood, sinews, internal organs, etc., the decomposition of a corpse - this subject is covered in detail in Buddhaghosa’s oeuvre, the \textit{Visudhimaggha}]; second, taking as an antidote, the attainment of mental equipoise by meditating that follows the inhalation and exhalation of the breath (cf. \textit{P. ānāpānasati}); third, meditation on the four noble truths. Looking at the theories, concentrations, and criteria of abandonment of the Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and Mahāyānists in brief, the Śrāvakas’ view is realization of the selflessness of persons; their concentration remains on the conceptual level; their criterion of abandonment is the abandonment of all the fetters (kun tu sbyor ba : sanyojana) of existence (srid pa : bhava): spyiṅ ynaṅ thos pa ni bdag la chags pa spangs pas grol bar ‘od pa la | chags pa spongs ba ’i thabs kyi sgo gsun du smra steyi | mi sduṅ pa bsom pas chags pa song ba dang | dbugs phyi dang ruγ naγ ba rjes su dran ba bsom pas sems mn̄yam par bzhag pa thob pa’i phyir ‘od pa dang chags pa’i gnyen por gyur te chags pa spongs pa dang | bdeu pa bzhí ’i don bsom pas chags pa spongs pa’o | ő niγ thos dangrang sangs rgyas dang theg pa chen po rnams kyi lla ba dang | ting nye ’dzin dang | spong iṣhad gsun gyi phyag mdo bsdus pa ni | ő niγ thos rnams kyi lla ba ni γang zag la bdag med par rtogs pa’o | ting nye ’dzin ni dmigs pa dang bcas pa’i sa la γnas pa’o | spong iṣhad ni srid pa kun tu sbyor ba thams cad spongs pa’o zhe’o (RZSB 2.14.08-14.16).

\footnote{1099} rnam par smin pa’i lus : vipākākāya.

\footnote{1100} Reading hor te (BM 41.05; Th 99.05) rather than por te (RZSB 442.21).

\footnote{1101} The Approach: dper na chus gang chu klung gis | pha rol ’gro ba’i ’gro gang dag | rtwa dang shing la stogs bsdus nas | chu las brgal ba’i gzings byas te | de la ’jug te legs rgal nas | por te bde bar ’gro ba lla | de bzhin ’khor ba’i pha rol gyi | chos kyi lam ni bkṣyed nas kyang | chos dang chos min rnam spangs nas | byang chub bde bar thob pa bzhin (RZSB 442.19-442.23). Rongzom also uses this example in a discussion of the seven types of distinction that obtain between the bodhisattva and mantra vows in his dKon cogs ’greal: dper na chu klung chen pos khyer ba’i mi dag gru gzings dang ’phrad par gyur na da ni bdag gis skam sa la phyin po ’i lam med do snyam ste | chus’jigs pa med cing dbugs phyin par ’grur la | gang zhig rmi lam na chus khyer rnis pa las | gnyid cung zhig sbrab par gyur te | de nyid rmi lam yin par shes pa’i blo byung na chur sngang ma log kyang ’di snyam du ’di ni rmi lam yin te dngos su khyer ba med do | sngang ba’i di rmi gnyid sad pa’i dus na mi ’byung ste | de bas na bdag chus ’chi ba’i dus byed pa’i ’jigs pa las log nas | gnyid sangs par bya ba’i sbyor ba tsam la snying stobs
Akin to that is the proclamation:

The creator, who emits and gathers
All illusion-like entities;
That one, thence, has no evil.
Merit [443\textsuperscript{1102}] is like that, too -
To be without merit and evil,
That is indeed proclaimed to be awakening.\textsuperscript{1103}

In definitive terms, the reality of awakening is simply the pacification of both the negative and the meritorious. It is not unlike the teaching that awakening is characterized as peace, beyond sorrow. Thus, while treatises on language\textsuperscript{1104} give "nirba ṇa" (i.e. nirvāṇa) as a term for the extinguishing of a flame, it is also the name of the Buddhist monk who is beyond sorrow;\textsuperscript{1105} and "nirba ṇa a ga" is a term for the extinction of a flame. In this manner, the expression "fire extinguished" is simply the pacification of an actual blaze. It has not gone anywhere; it does not remain anywhere at all either. Thus the term "nirba ṇa is used. The term "nirba ṇa bi kṣu" is the name of a monk who is beyond sorrow.

Accordingly, the term indicates a ideal monk\textsuperscript{1106} who has simply pacified the

\textsuperscript{1102} NTh 45.04; Th 100.01; BM 41.06.

\textsuperscript{1103} The Approach: sgyu ma ’dra ba’i dngos po kun || ’byin dang sdud par byed pa po || des na de la sdig mi ’gyur || bsod nams dang kyang de bsod no || gang la bsod nams sdig med pa || de la byang chub rab tu gsungs (RZSB 1. 442.23-443.02). A similar passage is found in Toh. 1790: Sgro ma gsal byed pa’i gsal byed cyes bya ba’i dka’ ‘grel (Pradipodyanodyota-nāma-paṇijjika) in bsTan’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1997, rgyud, a-ki, vol. 16 (Beijing: Krong go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang), which claims to cite Toh. 443: ’Dus pa phyi ma (Skt. n/a): ||chos nams thams cak sgyu ma bszin || skyes dang sdud par mdzad pa po || des ni de ngyi sdig mi ’gyur || bsod nams ngyid kyang kyad par du’o || gang la bsod nams sdig med pa || de ni byang chub yin par gsungs || (387.12-387.16).

\textsuperscript{1104} sgra’i bstan chos (443.04-443.05) : śābdāśāstra (Chandra 2001: 186a s.v. sgra’i bstan bcos).

\textsuperscript{1105} dge slong snyan las ’das pa (443.05-443.06).

\textsuperscript{1106} sgra’i bstan chos (443.04-443.05) : śābdāśāstra (Chandra 2001: 186a s.v. sgra’i bstan bcos).

\textsuperscript{1102} NTh 45.04; Th 100.01; BM 41.06.

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\textsuperscript{1104} sgra’i bstan chos (443.04-443.05) : śābdāśāstra (Chandra 2001: 186a s.v. sgra’i bstan bcos).

\textsuperscript{1105} dge slong snyan las ’das pa (443.05-443.06).

\textsuperscript{1106} sgra’i bstan chos (443.04-443.05) : śābdāśāstra (Chandra 2001: 186a s.v. sgra’i bstan bcos).
fires of attachment, aversion, and delusion. In actuality, they have not gone anywhere; they do not remain anywhere at all and thus the term "nirvana" is used.

Therefore, while meritorious karma is indeed a condition for the purification of appearances, it is not a actual causal and conditional basis of for it." Neither is the accumulation of yeshé or 'wisdom' (ye shes kyi tshogs), which, in due course, pertains to non-conceptual yeshé or 'gnosis' (de la re shig rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes) that is obtained after generating bodhicitta and through the power of spiritual disposition and guidance. [The accumulation of yeshé or 'gnosis'] is the continuum composed of an immeasurable root of virtue that envisions (dmigs pa) the expanse of reality; it is also something born of the faculty of mindfulness. Yet because the reality of gnosis actually arises divorced from concepts of apprehended and apprehender, it is not a conducive condition for appearance. Take, for example, the blazing fire at the end of an aeon.

Who is the ultimate monk? The Bhagavan Buddha, the great bodhisattva monk possessed of great achievements, with control over all phenomena, or those of pratyeka enlightenment, the arhat, the nonreturner, the once-returner, and the stream enterer: these seven types of being make up the category of ultimate monk. Also, those beings who live in house, do not shave their heads and their beards, do not wear the three robes, have not taken all the monastic pratiniksha ethics, do not take part in requesting, ceremonies, purification rituals, and monastic activities: if they possess the dharma of the aryas and they possess the fruits of those dharms, they are also known as ultimate monks. This is the meaning of being an ultimate monk" (Gyatso, Desi Sangye. A Mirror of Beryl: A Historical Introduction to Tibetan Medicine (Wisdom Publications, 2010) pp. 426-427). My thanks to the Venerable Gyalten Lekden for bringing this passage to my attention.

He is a particular distinction being "cause," which generates the general nature of an object, and "condition" indicates what sometimes translated as "causes and conditions" or "causal condition" and is defined in terms of effect or works to generate a particular effect (pratitya samutpada or 'cause and condition').

The Approach: de bas na bsod nams kyi las kyang snang ba dag par byed pa’i rkyen yin yang | dngos gzhi’i rgyu dang rkyen ni ma yin no | (RZSB 443.11-443.13). The Tibetan term dngos gzhi is defined in TDCM as das don ngo ma or "the real work involved and what comes from it" (681a). A ‘condition’ (rkyen : prataya) is generally defined as something that occasions the maturation of an effect or works to generate a particular effect (’bras bsin par byed pa’i grogs su gyur pa’am ‘bra bu’i khyad par skyped byed | (TDCM 100a); and "cause-condition" (rgyu rkyen), as a pair, is sometimes translated as "causes and conditions" or "causal condition" and is defined in terms of being "cause," which generates the general nature of an object, and "condition" indicates what generates a particular distinction (ngo bo skyped byed kyi rgyu dang | khyad par skyped byed kyi rkyen | (560b).

Cf. Sangs sa chen mo: kha cigs na re | sangs rgyas rnam ni rig mdzad | (RZSB 443.15-443.16) smrtindriya.

Cf. Sangs sa chen mo: kha cigs na re | sangs rgyas rnam ni rig mdzad | (RZSB 443.15-443.16) smrtindriya.

Cf. Sangs sa chen mo: kha cigs na re | sangs rgyas rnam ni rig mdzad | (RZSB 443.15-443.16) smrtindriya.
which is not conducive for bringing together the conditions of conceptual construction.\textsuperscript{1114} Pure worldly gnosis, too, is qualified by dualistic appearance\textsuperscript{1117} and its emergence is contingent upon a basis of virtue\textsuperscript{1118} in which the three spheres are completely purified.\textsuperscript{1119} Thus, it is generated in dependence upon appearances. That said, though it's character qualified by erroneous appearance, it is characterized by correct perception.\textsuperscript{1120} It is, for example, not unlike spinning a fire-brand in front of discerning folks. That being the case, it is not a conducive condition [for appearances].

For example, when, after piling up a lot of kindling, a fire is lit, there is\textsuperscript{[444]}\textsuperscript{1121} some kindling that burns, some not burning, and some about to start burning. While it is the case that fire is generated in dependence upon the wood, fire is nevertheless not a condition that causes the wood to remain for a long period of time and spread; it is, rather, actually a condition that depletes it.\textsuperscript{1122}

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\textsuperscript{1114} Rongzom perhaps draws this example from Tökh. 3790: Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag ngyi shu lnga pa (Pañca-vimśati-sāhasrīka-prajñā-pāramitā) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2007, kyi khri, ka, vol. 26 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): | rab ’byor ‘di lta ste dper na | bskal pa’i me ‘bar ba’i tshes | byed byed kyi rnam pa thams cad kyi gnas med do | rab ’byor de bzhiu du byang chub sens dpa’ sens dpa’ chen po shes rab kyi phyin pa la spyod pa’i byang chub sens dpa’i tshig gi don med do | (407.02-407.07); among the other instances of this example is Tökh. 3787: “Phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag ngyi shu lnga pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtags pa’i rgyan gyi ‘grel pa (Pañca-vimśati-sāhasrīka-prajñā-pāramitā-upaśeśa-sāstra-abhisamaya-alankāra-cūrtti) in bsTan’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1999, sher phyin ka-kha, vol. 29 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): Here, the same example is given in a passage concerning the flaws and remedies as an example of a state where the processes and links necessary for life are impossible (gnyen po dang spang ba gnyis kyi rten gang yin zhe na | rigs yin no zhes bya ba skabs su bab pa yin no | de la gnyen po’i rten ni ni ma’i dkyi’ khor shar ba’i od la gnas [443] med cing mi dngogs pa’i dpes gsungs pa yin no | mti mthun pa’i phyogs spong ba’i rten ni bskal pa’i me ‘bar ba’i tshes ‘du byed kyi gnas med cing rjes su mi dngogs pa nyid kyi dpes bag chags kyi mtshams sbyor ba spong ba’i don gyis gsungs pa yin no | 133.20-134.04).

\textsuperscript{1115} bskal pa’i me (443.18): kalpāgni. This term refers to the all-consuming blaze asserted in both Theravada and Mahāyāna that occurs at the end of an aeon according to abhidharma cosmology (phuydnod kyi’i rten tshang ma bskal ba mthar ‘ji dus kyi me TDCM 181a s.v. bskal me). Cf. Sikṣasamuccayā 99b, where bodhicitta is likened to the kalpāgni, burning away all faults. Rz has employed a similar analogy vis-à-vis gnosis in his commentary in KChG. There he writes that gnosis is naturally wrathful, like the blazing fire at the end of an aeon - devoid of any conceptually constructive state: ye shes ni rtags pa ngang gi khor ste | bskal pa’i me ‘bar ba la mngon par ‘du byed pa’i gnas med pa bzhiu no (RZSB 1.206-03-206.04; cf. Almogi 2009: 129). The term is also referred to, in Bya bral kun dga’ rang drol’s nam thar, as one facet of the bar do (Williams 140 n. 27).

\textsuperscript{1116} mngon par ‘du byed pa’i (abhisamskāra) rnam kyi ‘du ‘phrod (: sāmaṅgri) kyi rkyen du mi ‘tsams pa bzhiu no (443.18-443.19). The term mngon par ‘du byed is rendered "notional construction" (Ruegg 1981: 64-65), "contrivance" (Phuntsho 2005: 137), "consolidate" (Wangchuk 2007: 249 n. 77), "shaping of consciousness" (Engle 2009: 277), "evolution" (Almogi 2009: 166).\textsuperscript{1117}

\textsuperscript{1117} gzung ‘dzin du snang ba dang bcas (443.20).

\textsuperscript{1118} dge ba’i rtsa ba (73.07) : kuśulamūla; cf. Almogi 2009: 249 n. 35.

\textsuperscript{1119} ‘khor gsum yongs su dag pa (443.20) : trimadāla-pariśuddha (Mvp 2537); the three spheres referring to agent (byed pa po), object (bya ba’i yul), and action (bya ba’i las). See Almogi 2009: 166 n. 83.

\textsuperscript{1120} de’i mtsham nyid ni snang ba phyin ci log dang bcas pa yin yang | nthông ba phyin ci ma log pa dang ldan pa yin te (443.21-443.23). Cf. Almogi 2009: 191.

\textsuperscript{1121} NTh 47.03; Th 102.03; BM 43.03.

\textsuperscript{1122} Cf. Almogi 2009: 166-167. A similar idea is found in Tökh. 87: ‘Phags pa’ od srung gi le’u zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo (Ārya-kāśyapa-parivartah-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur
Pure worldly gnosis, as well, is similar: it is qualified by seeds along with their appearances, which are due to a temporarily beginningless karmic propensity for clinging, it is generated in dependence upon a basis of virtue in which the three spheres are completely purified; it thoroughly understands all phenomena to be like an illusion and emanation absent any inherent nature, empty of name and reason and only generated from cause and condition; thus, pure worldly gnosis is not a conducive condition for the proliferation of the continuum of appearances. There is, moreover, no phenomenon generated in the absence of cause and condition; nor any phenomenon generated from incompatible causes and conditions. That being the case, no other cause and condition for the generation of pure worldly gnosis is found when the consciousness to which appearances [manifest] transforms.
§ 2.3.2. objection (444.11-444.12)

This, too, is stated: If its emergence is not asserted ultimately, there is no conflict in conventions appearing as the arising of mere illusions.

§ 2.3.2.1. response (444.13-446.19)

That phenomena have no ultimate nature does not conflict with the fact conventional phenomena are produced. If there were such a conflict, the distinguishing mark of the Jina’s teaching - i.e. that phenomena arise as dependent relations - whether asserted ultimately or conventionally, would be such that there would be no conflict between the continuum of conditions being severed and an effect of that continuum being observed; if that were the case, then conventional phenomena - even as mere illusions - would be non-existent, without even a so much as an ontologically viable trace. Therefore, it is not proper to say "the continuum of utterly pure appearance, too, is unceasing [because it has "immeasurable collections" as a cause]."

Moreover, here it is said [buddhas are] possessed of a fully matured buddha-body that is the embodiment of a basis of great gnosis; [but] after having relinquished the view of the self along with its karmic imprints, how could one cling to the body, which is a burden, and remain in gnas ggzang gling? If it is not viable for the continuum of appearances to remain, how is established that tathāgatas are possessed of pure worldly gnosis? Again, if [the issue] scrutinized with a discerning intellect, establishing that tathāgatas are possessed of even a state of non-conceptual gnosis seems

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1128 don dam par rang bzhin med na kun rdo’zob du skye bar mi ‘gyur zhes ‘gal ba ni med na \ rgyal bas gsungs pa’i chos rten cing ‘brel par ‘byung ba’i mtshar nyid ni \ don dam par ’dod kyang rung kun rdo’zob du ’dod kyang rung ste \ rkyen rnam gsungs chad par ‘gyur kyang \ ’bras bu dmigs par ‘gyur ba la ’gal med na pi \ kun rdo’zob tsam du yang med la cha shas tsam du yang yod du mi rung ngo (444.13-444.18).

1129 The subject is identified further as utterly pure phenomena (447.04), a term often traditionally contrasted with totally afflictive phenomena (kun nas nyon mong pa’i chos : sāṃskārikaḥ).

1130 As mentioned above, Köppel (2008: 159 n. 268) lists bdag tu lta ba’i bag chags among four types of bag chags found in the work of Rongzom.

1131 Cf. Ju Mipham’s interpretation of Rongzom’s conception of buddhahood is described in his dKar chag me tog phreng ba: bod na rong zom chos kyi bzhan po o zhes rong zom pa’i gsung ’ol spyi tsam la brten nas slob dpön ’dis rgyas la ye shes gan mi bzhan par bshad pa ni bdag nyid chen po ‘di’i dgongs pa’i gting ma rnyed pa ste... rong zom pas rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes kyi mthar thug par rigs pas dag pa brjod pa ’di dag ni gzhan byung gi ye shes dag q pa kho na yin te (RZSB 1.15.06-15.14); cf. Almogi 2009. Cf. Rongzom’s commentary on Gubyagarbha-lantra, dKon cog ‘grel, which marks the issue: de ltar sku gsung thugs kyi byin rabs spyis snang ga de dag gi gziyang rnam pa bzhis ste \ de yang gzhung kha cig ni rtsod gzihi med pa’o \ kha cig ni rtsod gzihi dang bcas pa’o \ de la gzihi rnam pa bzhis ni \ dang po de bzhin [38] gshegs pa nyid la gong du bstan pa’i tshul lnga po de dag ji ltar smos pa bzhin du ldan pa yin te \ gyal bya’i dbang la snang ba tsam yang ma yin no zhes ’dod do \ gnyis pa ni de bzhin gshegs pa nyid la ni lus dang gnas dang spyod yul du snang ba ni mi mnga’ o \ de dag ’ji lta ba dang ji snyed pa mchyes pa’i ye shes don dam pa dang kun rdo’zob kyi bden pa’i yul can rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes dang dag pa ’jig rten pa’i ye shes mnga’o zhes ’dod do \ gsum pa ni de bzhin gshegs pa la dag pa’i ’jig rten pa’i ye shes kyang mi mnga’o zhes ’dod do (RZSB 1.37.22-38.07).
inappropiate on account of the emergence of non-conceptual \[445^{1132}\] gnosis when bodhisattvas are in meditative equipoise.\[1133\] According to the texts in which bodhisattvas postulate a collection of eight consciousness, the emergence of non-conceptual gnosis is contingent upon a fundamental consciousness\[1134\] - fully matured, untransformed, containing all [karmic] seeds - [and] generates a mental consciousness; and if it emerges through a seed that is the collection of an illimitable basis of virtue,\[1135\] perception of the expanse of reality\[1136\] [as] object, a mind of discriminative awareness and concentration arisen from the faculty of mindfulness that is free from any state of viewing the self,\[1137\] and through being divorced from conceptual appearances of apprehended and apprehender, when an uncontaminated mind obtains the label transcendent mind or gnosis, if the fully mature fundamental consciousness is transformed, then in contingency upon what causes and conditions does a consistent type of gnosis like that non-conceptual gnosis of bodhisattvas emerge?\[1138\]

When exaustively analyzed,\[1139\] [difficult to know] whether it be the case that the transformed state of the fundamental consciousness itself is itself mirror-
like gnosis\textsuperscript{1140} and thus non-conceptual gnosis or whether in that fundamental basis, mental consciousness generates a transformed individually discriminating gnosis\textsuperscript{1141} that is an ultimately real subject. If that is the case it would conflict with [the idea of] transition.

\section*{§ 2.3.3. objections and brief retort (445.13-445.16)}

If someone says "it is an inconceivable phenomenon," then the persistance of all imputed phenomena would also be a viable locus for the inconceivable. If someone were to say that [non-conceptual gnosis] emerges from that [mind/mental consciousness], then - similar to [the discussion of] pure worldly gnosis [above] - [there would be] a need to seek its causes and conditions.

\section*{§ 2.3.3.1. response (445.16-446.19)}

According to texts of those who postulate a single [consciousness],\textsuperscript{1142} for example, when a stone containing gold flecks\textsuperscript{1143} is smelted the gold flecks are extracted.\textsuperscript{1144} First, what is perceived is the appearance of a rock after which, when gold is perceived, it is thought about in conventional terms as the valuable rock from which gold is obtained. If scrutinized with a discerning intellect, the two are not naturally cause and effect of one another; rather, both the gold flecks and the stone share the single character of earth element.

Through fire, the underlyling stone, the undesirable element, is extracted\textsuperscript{1145} after which there is a desirable remainder. For most folks, the undesirable element is thought of as stone; when the desirable element is manifest\textsuperscript{446}\textsuperscript{1146} they would think of it as something gold particles are obtained from. From that, since the manifestation of natural gold conditions the manifestation of the undesirable element, people think rust emerges from the

\textsuperscript{1140} me long lta bu’i ye shes (445.10) : ādarṣājñāna (Mvp 111). *Cf. "mirror-like gnosis, which is connected with the dharma- or svaḥāvikākāya, is the result of the transformation of the 'fundamental mind' (ālayavijñāna)" (Almogi 2009: 68). Padmaavajra explains that mirror-like pristine awareness (me long lta bu’i ye shes, ādarṣājñāna) is the realization that appearances are without inherent nature. Pristine awareness of total sameness (mnyam nyid ye shes, samatājñāna) is the realization that does not discriminate between oneself and other. Discerning pristine awareness (sor rtog ye shes, pratyaveksanajñāna) is the realization that the general and specific characteristics of phenomena are without inherent nature. Accomplishing pristine awareness (bya ba grub pa’i ye shes, kṛtyanuṣṭānajñāna) is working for oneself and others without partiality. Pristine awareness of the ultimate dimension of phenomena (chos dbyings ye shes, dharmadhatujñāna) is the nature of all the other four as well as their objects. See Toh. 2502: Commentary on [Buddhaguhya’s] Guide to the Meaning of Tantra” (Tayé 2005: 411 n. 25).

\textsuperscript{1141} so sor rtogs pa’i ye shes (445.11) : pratyaveksanajñāna.

\textsuperscript{1142} gcig pur smra ba (445.16) : ekatvavāda.

\textsuperscript{1143} gser rdul (445.16); cf. *hemānu, kanakānu.

\textsuperscript{1144} Covill 2009: ch. 5 describes this process.

\textsuperscript{1145} See Covill 2009: 5.3; cf. Saundarananda 15.68: kramenādbhiḥ śuddhaṃ kanakam iha pāmsu-vyavahitam (id. 194).

\textsuperscript{1146} NTh 50.05; Th 106.06; BM 46.03.
gold. After that, the manifestation of a yellow mineral or pigment and the non-manifestation of impurities occasions the thought "gold flecks!" In a similar way, when training occasions the convergence of insight and concentration within a single consciousness, an undesirable element is extracted after which there is a desirable remainder which, in conventional terms, are [respectively] labelled mind and gnosis. Moreover, given that through some conditions impurities do not manifest and through some conditions impurities do manifest, non-conceptual and pure worldly are conventionally designated [vis-à-vis gnosis]. According to this approach, though, there is no separation between the desirable and undesirable elements. The gold flecks, moreover, are extracted through smelting which refines it and attenuates impurities; and in the end [both] would be consumed. Similarly, [undesirable] consciousness [and desirable gnosis] are of a single element of consciousness. Thus, according to this approach, moreover, there is no good element that is a something separate from a bad element because, in the end, there would be no appearance [of either].

Even if the collection of eight consciousnesses is asserted, one is not freed from this fallacy. Since stainless awareness arises when all the karmic seeds in the fundamental consciousness are destroyed there is no reason whatsoever seen by which some remaining extra karmic seed is found that generates cognitive awareness. Again, neither system can establish that non-conceptual gnosis is itself something that transcends the character of cognitive awareness. For, gnosis emerges either in conjunction with sensation or divorced from it; if it is qualified by sensation, how could be non-conceptual? If divorced from it, how

1147 *gsor tshur* (446.02); cf. *ser tshur* (Das 1280a). cf. *mtshur nag*. Goldstein (2001, s.v.) gives the Latin equivalent “black fibroferritum” (sic). This is also the term (with the same wrong spelling) for *nag tshur ser tshur* in the “Khrungs dpe dri med shel gyi me long” (p. 89). In the Latin glossary (ibid., 444), however, its correct form *fibroferritum* is listed. The chemical formula of *fibroferrite* is given as Fe2O3SO3.10H2O (ibid., 89), but the correct form must be Fe+++ (SO4) (OH).5H2O. In the Dharma (ed. Rahder), 30.8-10 gold is purified with what is called *kāśīsa* in Skt. (“green sulphate of iron” (MW. s.v.)). It is rendered with *nag tshur* in Tib. (DRSM, 30.15).

1148 Note, in this passage, the simile-metaphor overlap; it is important because it explains, in part, why I use the term "extract" to translate *byung, zad pa*, and *tshur du... je chung*. Cf. “the metaphor reinforces or clarifies the meaning of the simile, and vise versa” (Covill 2009: 18). Here, the source domain is derives from a psychology of perception concerning gold-flecked stone. The simile, paraphrasing Covill (2009: 18), likens the perceptions that flow from attitudes concerning the gold-rock relation to the Yogâcâra attitude concerning a transformation of mind into gnosis. Presumably, as per Covill, such material would be easily understood, well-known to Rongzom’s audience.

1149 The conceptual metaphor at work here - “mental development as refining gold” (Covill 2009: 193) - has a long pedigree (e.g. DN 1.39, 78, 209; MN 2.18, 3.243; AN 3.16-19, among others; op. cit. 201 n. 16) and, in Aśvaghosa’s *Saundarananda* 15.66-69, works on several levels (op. cit. 193-202), at times doing the same work as lotus metaphor, e.g. *Saundarananda* 13.04, 13.06.

1150 *gnod pa* (446.11) : *bātha*. In using the term “fallacy,” I am thinking of a flaw in the systematic theory of the Yogâcâra as Rongzom presents it; this purports with the terms general definitions; i.e. “a mistaken belief, esp. one based on unsound argument; a failure in reasoning that renders an argument invalid; faulty reasoning; misleading or unsound argument.”

1151 *shes rig* (446.13).

1152 *tshor ba* (445.16).
could be cognitive awareness? If it is independent of sensation, how is the convention inanimate not applied? That being the case, if it is maintained that it is divorced from sensation, there is no need debate.

§ 2.3.4. objection (446.19-446.20)

Some even state that [non-conceptual gnosis] emerges from the karmic imprint of actual reality. Some also state that it emerges from its own substantial cause.

§ 2.3.4.1. response (446.20-447.06)

Are karmic imprints of actual reality (chos nyid kyi bag chags) infused by something distinct or are they not so infused? If so, how is it feasibly actual reality at all? If it is not so infused, how can one avoid postulating its own nature [as its] cause? Further, is the substantial cause something dependent upon a contingent condition or not? If not, how could phenomena arise as dependent relations. How could one avoid, moreover, postulating a cause that obtains to a self-governing causal agent? [447] If it is dependent on such, what distinction is there between its general causal conditions and its nature? When it is said, in this case, that this is proven through the reasoning on reality, there is no need for proof via another form of reasoning. As to the notion there is nothing at all that entails a fallacy, we shall analyze the object,

1153 Perhaps critically, Rongzom understands sensation to be something entailing (ordinary) experience. Cf. Sangs sa chen mo: sku dang bde ba nyams su myong ba’i tshor ba la stsogs pa ni mi mnga’ste (RZSB 2.7219-72.20).
1154 bems po (446.18) : jada.
1156 chos nyid kyi bag chags (446.19). On such a view, for example, see Töh. 453: dPal de bzhin gshegs pa thams cad kyi gsang ba rnal’byor chen po rnam par rgyal ba zhes bya ba mnyam pa nyid gnyis su med pa’i rgyud kyi rgyal po rdo rje dpal migog chen po brtag pa dang po (Śrī-sarva-lādhāgata-guhyatāntara-yoga-mahārāja-dovya-samatā-vijaya-nāma-vajra-śrī-paramahātya-pādi) in bKa’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rgyud ’bum, cha, vol. 82, (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): śrid gsum ma luschos nyid de’i | || snang ba gzugs dang sgra la sogs || || dri dang ro dang reg bya dang || || thams cad chos nyid bag chags ‘byung || || ’rgyu las ’bras bu bskyed pa’i phyir || || geig las du ma’i chos kun shar (271.12-271.14).
1157 nye bar len pa’i rgyu (446.20) : upādānakāraṇa.
1158 vśgo might also be rendered in the sense of ‘contamination.’
1159 The impossibility of such a position - i.e. utpanna na svato - is prominent in MMK 1.1.
1160 NTh 52.03; Th 109.02; BM 47.07.
1161 Reading bye brag tu (BM 47.07; Th 109.02) rather than bye bra tu (RZSB 447.01).
1162 Almogi writes that Rongzom is “employing ‘reasoning [based on the rule-boundedness] of reality [itself]’ (chos kyi kyi rigs pa: dharmatāyukt).” On the so-called ‘four principles of reasoning’ (rigs pa bzhin : yukti-catuvāyām), see e.g. Kapstein 1987: 372+ and 2001: 320-327 and Karma Phunts’o’s Tshad ma’i stan bcos rigs pa’i them skas (Bylakuppe: Ngagyur Nyingma Institute, 2007). On the Śrīvācābhūtim’s use of the four reasonings, see Yoshimizu (1996): 160. On Mipham’s, see Mkhas ’jug and Don rnam par nges pa shes rab ral gri.
criteria, consequences, etc., of the reasoning on reality below. Therefore, it is not possible to prove that "the continuum of causes and effects that appears as totally pure phenomena is unceasing." In fact, all phenomena are basically the same as an illusion.

§ 2.3.5. objection (447.06-447.08)

If that is so, it might be asked: "If all phenomena are akin to an illusion, how is it the ultimate character of awakening [and] the uncompounded character of the peace associated with nirvāṇa set forth as akin to an illusion?"

§ 2.3.5.1. response (447.08-448.07)

While the character of awakening is not some thing amenable to convention, beings wandering in samsāra nevertheless observe recognition of the conventional designation "there is an awakening to be achieved that is the attainment of an uncompounded actuality." Thus, inasmuch as calling something to mind establishes it as existent, it is itself illusory. Along these lines, it is said:

Consciousness is like an illusion;
Awakening, too, is akin to an illusion;
For example, some illusionists Incant mantras over a figurine, after which The finely crafted form is Penetrated through the force of applied practice;
To the captivated mind, such forms as A quadruped, etc., appear. Similarly, the mind cultivated through the Collection of merit and gnosis Manifests in the imagination of Sentient beings as unexcelled awakening.

1163 yul dang tshad dang thal ba la stsogs pa (447.03-447.04).
1164 rnam par byang ba'i chos (447.04) : vyavādānīkadharmāḥ.
1165 byang chub kyi mtshan nyid ni tha snyad dang bral mod kyi (447.08).
1167 The Approach: | sens ni sgyu ma'i rnam pa ste || byang chub kyang ni sgyu ma 'dra || dper na sgyu ma'i mkhan po 'gas || gyo mo la ni sngags bzlas nas || legs par byas pa'i gzugs dag la || sbyor ba goms pas bsnun na ni || rkang bzhi pa la stogs pa'i gzugs || zhen pa'i sens la snang bar 'gyur || de bzhin bsod nams ye shes las || byung ba'i tshogs kyis bsog pa'i sens || sens can rnam kyis bsam pa la || bla myed byang chub snang bar byed (RZSB 1.447.11-447.15). This is found in Tōh. 466: rGyud kyi rgyal po chen po sgyu 'phrul dra ba (Mañjuśrī-mahāmantra-rāja-nāma) in bKa'g 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rgyud 'bum, ja, vol. 83 (Beijing: Kring go'i bod (Beijing: Kring go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | sens ni sgyu ma'i rnam pa ste || byang chub kyang ni sgyu ma 'dra || dper na sgyu ma'i mkhan po 'gas || gyo mo la ni sngags bzlas te || legs par byas pa'i gzugs dag la || sbyor ba goms pas bsnun na ni || skng bzhi pa la sogs pa'i gzugs || zhen pa'i sens la snang bar 'gyur || de bzhin bsod nams ye shes las || byung ba'i tshogs kyis bsog pa'i sens | (386.05-386.10); and also cited in Tōh.
[And] as it is said: "If there is some phenomena that is either greater than or superior to nirvāṇa, that too, [we] say, is like an illusion, like a dream." Thus, [among] everything that can possibly be set forth as an object of designation, there is nothing that is not illusory.

When nirvāṇa is discussed in the context of its [absence of true] nature there is no illustration [that may be offered] that establishes its illusory character. Such phrases as "all phenomena are like an illusion," and so forth, occur in sūtras in which the words proclaimed are applied definitively and in some which, it is claimed by some, teach in excessive terms. Praised in definitively applied terms, it is stated:

All rivers flow in zigs and zags,
All women are illusive, flattering,
Everything included as the forest,
Is undoubtedly taken to be wood,
Everything made is impermanent,
Anything produced is dissatisfying,
All phenomena are illusory.

[448] And just as it is proclaimed in excessive terms:

All rivers flow in zigs and zags,
The Nerañjarā, however, runs straight;

2092: Mtshan yang dag par brjod pa'i 'grel pa mtshan don gsal bar byed pa'i sgron ma (Nāma-saṅgiti-vytti-nāmārtha-prakāśa-karana-dipa-nāma) in bsTan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, tshi-zi, vol. 25 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang), p. 27.13-27.16. Additionally, Almogi notes the first two lines - | sans ni sgyu ma'i rnam pa ste | | byang chub kyang ni sgyu ma 'dra' - are found in Thō. 3912: Don dam pa byang chub kyi sogs bsgom pa'i rin pa yi ger bris pa (Paramārtha-bodhicitta-bhūdāna-krama) attributed to Aśvaghōsa : rṬa dbyangs (2010: 141 n. 8)

1168 The Approach: ji skad du mya ngañ las 'das pa las ches khyad par du 'phags pa'i chos gzhan zhig yod na'ang | de'ang sgyu ma lta bu rim lam lta bur smra'o zhes gsungs pa lta bu ste | (RZSB 1.447.16-447.17). This appears to gloss a line found in Thō. 3791: 'Phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa brgyad stong pa'i bshad pa | mgon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi snang ba (Ārya-prajñā-pāramitā-asā-sahasrākā-vyākhyā-abhisamaya-alankāra-dolokā-nāma) in bsTan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2000, sher phyin, ca-chā, vol. 51 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): mya ngañ las 'das pa las ches khyad par du 'phags pa'i chos mi srid mod kyi | de lta na yang khas blangs te smra ba ni | gal te mya ngañ las 'das pa las khyad du 'phags pa'i chos gzhan zhig yod kyang de'i tshe chos de ṣyang sgyu ma la sogs pa dang 'dra'o zhes smra'o | (1108.16-1108.19).

1169 Cf. Mahāvagga section of the SN "whatever great rivers there are ... all slant, all slope" (p. 1549).

1170 The Approach: | chu bo thams cad gya gyur 'bab | bud med thams cad sgyu gcam bcas | nags tshal gtags pa thams cad ni | | gdon mi za bar shing du nges | | byas pa thams cad mi rtags ste | | ji tsa mi skye skye ba sde bsgal bcas | | chos kun sgyu ma lta bu'o (RZSB 1.447.22-447.24). Very similar lines are found in Thō. 119: 'Phags pa yongs su mya ngañ las 'das pa chen po'i mdo (Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra) in bk'as 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, mdo sde, nya, vol. 52 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | 'bab chu'i chu kzung thams cad ni | | nges par gyu gyu yod yon dag | | nag tshal gtags pa thams cad ni | | nges par shing de gdon mi za | | [371] bud med snos pa thams cad ni | | kun kyang g.yo sgyu yod du nges | (370.20-371.01).

1171 NTh 54.01; Th 111.03; BM 49.04.

1172 Reading ne ra 'dza ra - as a reference to the Nerañjarā river - rather than na ra 'dza ra (BM 49.05) or ne ra 'dza' na (RZSB 1.448.02; Th 111.04). Kittay identifies "Narajana") as the "river on whose bank Buddha practiced austerities" (Kittay, David R. 2011. Interpreting the Vajra Rosary:
All women are illusive, flattering.
Women who have conquered their foes are not.
Forests are all determined to consist of wood,
A forest of precious jewels is not wood,
Everything made is impermanent,
The exhalted body (sku) of one who has gone to bliss
constantly resides.
Anything produced is dissatisfying and
Emergent non-conceptual gnosis is bliss;
All phenomena are illusory.

Thus, whatever is present and holds its [own] character is called a "phenomenon" that is feasibly established as an entity and whatever is said to be characterized by its absence of character [for example, nirvāṇa] is [thus] something that simply [must be] imagined.

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Truth and Method Meets Wisdom and Method. Ph.D. dissertation. Columbia University, p. 5088 n. 2052) while the Šaṅkhaśāstra and Mahāvagga refer to the Nerañjarā as a place the Buddha dwelt after his awakening. Perhaps Kittay, too, refers to this post-bodhi period. Walpola Rahula identifies Nerāñjara as being where the Buddha was enlightened, located in modern day Bihar (1959: xxv). "The Mahāvagga refers to Buddha's stay at Uruvelā on the banks of the river Nerāñjara" just after his awakening" (Law 2000: 84). Law writes that Gotama "pracitised unmatched hardships. All this was of no avail; he, therefore, partook of material food and regaining bodily perfection, went to the foot of the Ajāpāla banyan tree where he sat facing the east. Sujātā, a beautiful woman, mistook him for a sylvan deity and offered him a gold vessel of milk rice. The Sage took it, and having gone to the bank of the Nerāñjarā river he ate the food, took his rest" (2000: 606). Law also notes the Buddha became a buddha on the same river (2000: 643, 647, 653). DN 2.267 refers to the Buddha's dwelling on the bank of the Nerāñjarā prior to his awakening. The reader is invited to read word-play into the Sanskrit word, naraījana, which can be understood as a derivative of nara-ja - "born a man" (cf. MW 528c s.v. nara; thus playing against on the following line which describes women as beguilers.

1173 This passage reminds us of one found in the Satipatthānasamyutta section of the Mahāvagga. There, it is said: "Bhikkhus, just as the river Ganges slants, slopes, and inclines towards the east, so too a bhikkhu who develops and cultivates the four establishments of mindfulness slants, slopes, and inclines towards Nibbāna." See Bhikkhu Bodhi The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the Samyutta Nikāya, 2 Vols. (Boston: Wisdom Publishing, 2000), p. 1665. Cf. id. 1549, 1548, and 1622. The second line may refer to both the river where the Buddha is said to have dwelt - as a straight forward, just and correct being- and, in the more strained reading, as a play on the word nara-ja, "born a man," which leads to a juxtaposition with women, who are not straight forward, but beguiling: deceptive, crafty artisans (gcam [tu]); this line that juxtaposes with the fourth, which refers to the arhat, who is the opposite of that - i.e. gcyu gcam med (448.03).

1174 A discussion of the constancy of the buddha-body (kāya) of form and gnosis is found in Tōh. 2503: De kho na nyid bsdu pa’i rgya cher chshad pa ko sa la’i rgyan (Kosala-alanikāraya-tantra-saṅgrahā-tikā) in bsTan’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, yi-ri, vol 28 (Beijing: Krong go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang), pp. 11.12-12.07; cl. dus ni brda ste kun rdzob tu dus gsum dag tu gzugs kyi sku yang ye shes kyi sku la llos nas nram par gnas pa’i sku mngag’ bas na dus gsum [12] rtag par bzhugs pa’i sku zhes bya ste | (loc. cit.).

1175 I have not located these lines in the dPe bsdur ma collection. Note the duplication of vskye:
\[ ji tsaṃ skye pa sdug bsngal bcs | mi rtog ye shes skyes pa bde | (RZSB 1.448.05). In the first use, skye is qualified by discontent (sdug bsngal : duḥkha) while in the second skyes is qualified by bliss (bde ba : suḥkha).
§ 2.3.6. objection (448.08-448.11)

Here, someone might suggest that if the continuum of great gnosis alone is not a perceptible referent of the mind, then because there would be no basis upon which [a buddha’s] deeds of great compassion could arise, how could peace [in the form of] a partial nirvāṇa\textsuperscript{1176} be avoided? How could the term “non-abiding nirvāṇa”\textsuperscript{1177} even be applied?

§ 2.3.6.1. response (448.11-448.18)

Along those lines, if at a determined point in time - through the influence of migrators’ collective karma\textsuperscript{1178} - processes manifest that are themselves precipitated\textsuperscript{1179} by previous actions (\textit{karma}), and if they are actually capable of projecting periods of destruction, formation, vacuity, and subsistence of the arena that comprises the world during a great aeon accordingly, what about the fact that buddhas who - from generating the exalted mind [of \textit{bodhicitta}] up to experiencing\textsuperscript{1180} diamond-like concentration\textsuperscript{1181} - through the force of accomplishing great waves of enlightened activity for the benefit of migrators by means of the ten perfections, are capable of projecting unimpeded compassionate activity? And what source is there for astonishment?

§ 2.3.7. objection (448.18-448.20)

Here, as well, someone might suggest that the formation of the physical world is the existing force that emerges as something manifesting in accordance with the karma of the unbroken continuum of beings wandering in conditioned existence.\textsuperscript{1182}

§ 2.3.7.1. response (448.20-448.21)

If that were the case, how would the world form during the period of vacuity?

\textsuperscript{1176} \textit{phyogs gcig pa’i mya ngan las ’das} (448.10).
\textsuperscript{1177} \textit{mi gnas pa’i mya ngan las ’das pa} (448.10-448.11) : \textit{apratiśṭhitananirvāṇa} (MVP 1728).
\textsuperscript{1178} ‘gro ba rnams kyi spyi thun gyi las (448.13).
\textsuperscript{1179} ‘phangs pa (448.12), also translated as “projected,” etc.
\textsuperscript{1180} \textit{thug} (448.15), which can alternatively be rendered “meet,” “touch,” or “encounter” (\textit{reg pa dang} \textbackslash ‘phrad pa TDCM 1163a).
\textsuperscript{1181} \textit{rdo rje lta bu’i ting nge ’dzin} (448.15) : \textit{vajropamaḥ} \textit{samādhi}. Cf. RZSB 2.2.83.23; cf. Almogi 2009: 175, 406.‘Cf. Engle 2004: 183.
\textsuperscript{1182} The Approach: \textit{yang ‘di skad du snod kyi ‘jig rten ‘bgrub pa ni ’gro ba rnams kyi rgyun rgyud ma chad pa la \textbackslash ‘jig rten mngon par ‘grub pa’i las de ltar byung ba yod pa’i dbang yin no} \textbackslash RZSB 1.448.18-448.20); cf. Schmithausen 1987: §3.13.4 n.b. 342 n. 444.
§ 2.3.8. objection (448.21-448.22)

Further, it might be said that the world is actualized from equal parts projecting karma from the past and presently occurring karma.

§ 2.3.8.1. response (448.22-449.09)

If that were the case, after arising as one who has conquered her foes, how could the body of someone who has reached nirvāṇa avoid destruction immediately upon attaining the uncompounded? What holy body relics would subsequently be left over? Thus, what is precipitated through intensely powerful [449] karma of the past need not rely upon presently occurring karma; and even if the intense energy of karma happening currently was present and it was capable of preventing the maturation of previous karma, there would be no contradiction.

On this point, moreover, if the power of some sages' aspirations, which can remain for perhaps a hundred or even a thousand years after the sage passes away, can project the manifestation of virtuous good and malevolent negativity wherever that sage has made aspirations, then what about the capacity of buddhas to project the emanations that manifest conducive to whatever the needs of trainees, [the capacity for] which is accomplished from first taking up the aspiring mind on through the limitless aspirations that are finally perfected aspirations on the ninth bodhisattva ground? How could such a state be impossible? And what source is there for astonishment?
§ 2.3.9. objection (449.09-449.10)

It might be also suggested that the objective basis for the sage’s aspirations and sentient beings are set forth in virtue of being blessed (literally, ‘transformed through majesty’: byin gyis brlabs pa).

§ 2.3.9.1 response (449.10-451.03)

In this system, [compassionate activity] is unimpeded. If it does not rely on the continuum of the aspirant, then the wish itself is something that has a basis in sentient beings. Accordingly, the object of compassion is indeed sentient beings and therefore it is stated:

For as long as the afflictions that sicken migrators are not healed,
There is no curing the compassion of bodhisattvas.\textsuperscript{1187}

It is also said in The Teaching on the Limits of Aspirations:\textsuperscript{1188}

However far the utmost limit\textsuperscript{1189} of space,
The bounds of sentient beings, too, are like that;
Whatever the utmost limit of karma and affliction,
The bounds of my aspirations, too, are like that.\textsuperscript{1190}

This, as well, is taught: "Into each of and every atom of the world that is the environment, into each and every pore of the sentient beings that are its inhabitants, the innumerable blessings of compassion enter." Teachings such as these amounts to nothing more than reasonings, many elucidations of which appear in sūtras of definitive meaning;\textsuperscript{1191} whether [in the Vajracchedikā-sūtra] where it is said:

\begin{itemize}
  \item [\textsuperscript{1187}] The Approach: ‘gro ba rnams kyi nyon mongs pa’i nad ma sos kyi bar du ∣ ∣ byang chub sens dpa’ rnams kyi snying rje’i snyun mi gdangs so (RZSB 1.449.13-449.14).
  \item [\textsuperscript{1188}] The Approach names the text as Smon lam gyi mtha’ bstan pa (449.14); this appears to be another name for the Tōh. 4337: ‘Phags pa bzang po spyod pa’i smon lam gyi rgyal po (Ārya-bhadracarya-praṇidhāna-rājā) in bKa’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2007, ‘dul ba, pa, vol. 13 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang), commonly known in Tibetan as bzang spyod smon lam.
  \item [\textsuperscript{1189}] mthar thug (449.15) : paryantā (PPMV 469.13; May 414.14), niṣṭa (PPMV 306.08); readings mthar thug (BM 51.07; Th 115.01) rather than mthar thugs (RZSB 449.15).
  \item [\textsuperscript{1190}] nam mkha’i mthar thug gyur pa ji tsam par ∣ ∣ sens can ma lus mtha’ yang de bzhin te ∣ ∣ ji tsam las dang nyon mongs mthar gyur par ∣ ∣ bdag gi smon lam mtha’ yang de bzhin no (449.15-449.16).
  \item [\textsuperscript{1191}] Some of the texts Rongzom cites under the rubric nges pa’i gzhun zab mo mtha’ dag las gzhung ‘di nyid gsiors bsgrubs are named as Vajracchedikā, Ratnakūṭa, and Sarva-buddha- viṣaya-avatāra-jiñāna-āloka-alankāra-sūtra (RZSB 2.75.10-75.21).
\end{itemize}
One brought forth by the uncompounded,
Is a noble person,\(^{1192}\)
or whether\(^{1193}\) where it is stated:

Do not view a buddha as form;
Do not study [a buddha] in terms of name, race\(^ {1194}\) or family;\(^ {1195}\)
[A buddha] is not explained as sound,
[A buddha] is not brought forth by mind, consciousness, or intellect;\(^ {1196}\)
That which is actual reality - that is the Bhagavan.\(^ {1197}\)

Or whether it is stated:

Insofar as someone classifies [450]\(^{1198}\) characteristics
They are in a child's domain of experience;
Such [a person] does not perceive
The ineffable buddhas.\(^ {1199}\)


\(^{1193}\) Rongzom also cites this passage, which is found in Bhadramāyākāra-vyākaranā-sūtra, in his Sangs sa chen mo but simply identifies it from the Ratnakāta section of Buddhist literature (RZSB 2.75.16).

\(^{1194}\) rigs (449.22) : gotra (MN 364c); cf. RGV 1.27-28, where this concept is discussed.

\(^{1195}\) rgyud (449.22) : anvaya (MN 46ab).

\(^{1196}\) Almogi notes: “the terms citta, manas, and viññāna were originally understood as synonyms, or at most taken to refer to different aspects of the mind in general, and it is only later that they started to be given substantially specific meanings, namely, equating citta with ādānaviññāna (i.e. ālayaviññāna), taking manas as a faculty of the mind that gives rise to a sense of ego (the notions of ‘I’ and ‘mine’), and employing viññāna to designate the traditional kinds of mental faculties responsible for perception” (2009: 254 n.49).

\(^{1197}\) The Approach: || sangs rgyas gzugs su mi blta mtshan dang ni || rig dang rgyud du mi brtags sgra dang ni || chad par ‘gyur ba ma yin sms dang ni || rnam shes yid kyis rab tu phyed ba min || (RZSB 449.22-449.24). With slight variation, this verse is found in Tōh. 65: Sgyu ma mkhan bzang po lung bstan pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo (Bhadra-māyākāra-vyākaranā-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra) in bKa’ ‘gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, dkon brtsegs, ca, vol. 43 (Beijing; Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): || sangs rgyas gzugs su mi blta mtshan dang ni || na tshod rigs su ma yin sgra dang ni || ‘chad par ‘gyur ba ma yin sms dang ni || rnam shes yid kyis rab tu phyed ba min || (68.08-68.10); cf. Almogi 2009: 254 n. 41. Cf. Sangs sa chen mo: dkon mchog brtsegs pa la kyang || sangs rgyas gzugs su mi blta mtshan dang ni || rig dang rgyud du mi brtags sgra dang ni || ‘chad par ‘gyur ba ma yin sms dang ni || rnam shes yid kyis rab tu phyed ba min ||chos nyid gang yin de ni bcom idan ‘das || zhes gsungs te || tshul ‘dis kyang lus dang ngag dang yid kyis phyed ste || sangs rgyas su ma gzhag gi || chos nyid gang yin pa sangs rgyas su gzhag go || ye shes ni yid kyis phyed ba min te || ma na zhes bya ba skad kyi byings las || rtags par rtags pa dang shes pa’o zhes bshad do || de bzhin gshegs pa’i yul la ‘jug pa ye shes snang ba rgyan gyi mdo las || rtags tu skye med chos ni de bzhin gshegs || chos rnam thams cas bde bar gshegs dang ‘dra’ || byis pa’i blo can mtshan mar ‘dzin pa dag || ‘jig rten dag na med pa’i chos la spyod (RZSB 2.75.10-75.24).

\(^{1198}\) NTh 57.03; Th 116.01; BM 52.04.

\(^{1199}\) The Approach: || ji srid mtshan nyid rnam [450] bzhag pa || de dag byis pa’i spyod yul te || gang zhig mtshan nyid kun myed pa’i || || sangs rgyas rnam ni mi nthong ngo || ce’am || (RZSB 1.449.24-450.02); similar lines are found in Tōh. 44: Sangs rgyas phal po che zhes bya ba shin tu rgyas pa chen

485
The virtuous, uncontaminated quality of a Tathāgata,
Is the supreme dharmakāya, in which
There is no tathā per se, no being-in-tathā;
[Like] a reflection, [a Tathāgata] appears in worlds.1200

Or whether it is stated:1201

A Tathāgata is a phenomemon forever unarisen;1202
All phenomena are akin to a Sugata;
Childish minds, fixated on characteristics,
Act on phenomena not present in [their] worlds.1203
Or whether where it is stated:1204

Whosoever perceives me as form,
Whosoever understands me as sound,
Engages in a mistaken effort;1205
That person does not perceive me.
The guides1206 are the dharmakāya;
One should see a buddha as actual reality.1207

Such passages as these thus proclaim in detail the buddha’s own nature, which both authoritative scripture1208 and reasoning1209 show to be utterly pure dharmadātu.1210 In that case, sentient beings and a buddha are equal in nature and all phenomena are empty of nature. All phenomena are naturally beyond sorrow.1211 All phenomena1212 are naturally luminous. All phenomena are manifestly perfectly awakened from the beginning.1213 Whoever realizes the object in this manner, his or her intelligence is indistinguishable from a buddha; and regardless of the [fact the] five psycho-physical aggregates [of a person] are

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1204 Cf. Songs sa chen mo: de ltar ma yin te nges pa’i gzhun zab mo mtha’ dag las gzhung ’di nyid gtsor bsgrubs te | ’di ltar rdo rje gcig pa las | gang gis nga la gzugs su mthong | gang gi nga la sgrar shes pa | log par spong bar zhugs pa ste | skye bo de yis nga mi mthong | ’dren pa rnam ni chos kyi sku | chos nyid du ni sangs rgyas blta | zhes gsungs te | sangs rgyas ni chos nyid la bua bar gsungs kyi gzugs dang sgra’i tshul gyis sangs rgyas su ’dzin pa ni sangs rgyas nyid spong bar bshad do (RZSB 2.75.11-75.14).

1205 Re spong ba (450.07) : prahāna as “effort.” Almogi 2009: 253-254 n. 47.

1206 ’dren pa (450.07-450.08) : nāyaka.

1207 The Approach: | gang gis nga la gzugs su mthong | gang gis nga la sgrar shes pa | log par spong ba zhugs pa ste | skye bo des ni nga mi mthong | ’dren pa rnam ni chos kyi sku | chos nyid du ni sangs rgyas blta (RZSB 1.450.06-450.08). See Tōh. 16: ’Phags pa shes rab kyi pha pha rol tu phyin pa rdo rje gcig pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo (Ārya-vajrachchedaka-nāma-praṇīṭh-pāramitā-māhāyanasūtra) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma), 2007, shes rab sna tshogs, ka, vol. 34 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): | gang dag nga la gzugs su mthong | gang dag nga la sgrar shes pa | log par spong bar zhugs pa ste | skye bo de dag nga ni mthong | sangs rgyas rnam ni chos nyid blta | ’dren pa rnam ni chos kyi sku | (354.04-354.07). Cf. Sanskrit, found at PPMV 448.11-448.15 with: ye māṃ rūpeṣa adhākṣur ye māṃ ghoṣena aveṣuḥ | mithāprahāṇaprasārtā na drakṣyaṃti te janaiḥ | dharmato buddhā draśṭāve dharmakāya hi nāyakāḥ | dharmatāt cāpy avijñeyā na sā sākṣyā vijñātiḥ | 1208 lung (450.10) : agama.

1209 rigs pa (450.10) : yukti.

1210 Cf. Songs sa chen mo: lung zab mo rnam las kyang sangs rgyas kyi dngos po ni | chos kyi dbyings rnam par dag pa yin par gsungs so (RZSB 2.76.04-76.05).

1211 rang bzhin gyis mya ngan las ’das pa (450.11) : prakṛtiparirṇa (Chandra 2001: 738b).

1212 Reading chos (BM 53.02; Th 117.01) rather than cho (RZSB 1.450.12).

1213 Cf. Man ngag lta phreng: chos thams cad ni ngo bo nyid kyi srong pa’o | chos thams cad ni gzed ma nas rnam par dag pa’o | chos thams cad ni yongs kyi ’od gcig bo | chos thams cad ni rang bzhin gyis mya ngan las ’das pa’o | chos thams cad ni ye nas mgon par dzogs par sangs rgyas pa’o zhes gsungs so (Wangchuk 2004: 184 n. 47). Cf. Rongzom’s Man ngag lta phreng ’gre p’o: rang bzhin gyis gsang ba ni rdzogs pa chen po’i tshul te | der ni chos thams cad rang bzhin gyis mya ngan las ’das pa | ye nas mgon par rdzogs par sangs rgyas pa’o | da lam gyis bsgrub cing gyun po bcos su myed par bstan po’i phyir ro (RZSB 1.304.05-304.08). See also sNang ba lhar bsgrub pa: ye nas sangs rgyas pa yin pas da lam gyis sgrub pa lta bu ni ma yin no (RZSB 1.559.02-559.03).
illusive, when possessed of the intelligence of the state of the Tathāgata, [they] pertain to the supreme path because what does not pertain to the supreme path is any perceived distinction [between sentient beings and buddhas]. Such a mode for objects is not simply the purview of the guhyamantra approach alone. It is also proclaimed in the sūtras of definitive meaning in accordance with the Ārya-Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra, which proclaims:

I and the buddhas - and anyone -
Naturally abide in equality;
And those who do not, who do not get it,
Will [yet] become Sugatas.

Form, sensation, and discriminations,
Consciousness, intentions
They will become Mahāmuni -
Tathāgatas beyond count.

Those who deprecate the [tantric] teaching that the aggregates are the Jina's manḍala will necessarily deprecate sūtras that teach such a meaning as this, as well. Moreover, for those that assert [this] teaching to be a merely imagined meditation intended, in fact, as an antidote for the sake of the path, [I would] point out such things as the imagined and mastered forms, and so forth,

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1214 nges pa'i don gyi mdo sde (450.17). Following Wangchuk, we translate the Tibetan term mdo sde as sūtra rather than sūtrapitaka, the proper rendering of which in Tibetan would be mdo sde'i sdo snod. "As recorded in the Mahābuddhāpti, the term mdo sde is a translation of either sūtrânta or simply sūtra" (Wangchuk 2002: 280 n. 60).

1215 The Gaṇḍavyūha-sūtra is one of two names used by Tibetans to designate the forty-fifth section of the voluminous Avatāninsaka; see Almogi 2009: 245-246 n. 26.

1216 The line reads: rang bzhin mnyam par rab gnas shing, which invites reading rab gnas as suggesting both “abide” or “remain” as well as the more ethereal connotations of “consecrate” or even "blessed."

1217 This is a slightly altered list of the five psycho-physical aggregates (pañcaskandha: phung po lnga), which is typically given in terms of form (rūpa: gzugs), sensations (seda: tshor ba), discriminations (samjñā: du shes), karmic processes or compositional factors (samskāra: du byed), and consciousness (viññāṇa: rnam shes).

1218 The Approach: gang zhi bdag dang sangs rgyas rnams | rang bzhin mnyam par rab gnas shing | mi gnas len pa myed pa de | de dag bde bar gshegs par ’gyur | gzugs dang tshor ba ’du shes dang | rnam par shes dang sms pa dag | grangs myed de bzhin gshegs pa rnams | de dag thub pa chen por ’gyur | zhes gsungs pa lla bu yin te | (RZSB 1.450.13-450.22). See Töh. 0044: Sangs rgyas phal po che zhes bya ba shin tu rgyas pa chen po ’i mdo (Buddha-avatāninsaka-nāma-mahāvatipulya-sūtra) in bKa’ gvyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2007, phal po che, ka, vol 35 (Beijing: Krun go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang).

1219 For example, Töh 1679: Rgyud kyi rgyal po chen po dpal sangs rgyas thams cad dang mnyam par sbyor ba mkha’ gro ma sgyu ma bde mchog ces bya ba’i dkyil ’khor gyi cho ga sms can thams cad kyi bde ba skyed ma (Sarva-buddha-samayoga-dākini-sambhara-mahātantra-rūpa-nāma-mandala-vidhi-sarvasattra-sukhodaya) in bsTan’ gvyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1999, rgyud, la-sha, vol 14 (Beijing: Krun go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang).

1220 NTh 59.01; Th 118.03; BM 54.01.
mentioned above. And, moreover, the character of conceptuality and imputation will be explained below.

§ 2.4. issue (451.03-451.06)

Some might say: Even if there is no real entity associated with afflictions to be relinquished and all phenomena are naturally beyond sorrow, wanderers, who are bound, nevertheless experience various disatisfactions [drifting upon] on the ocean of samsāra.

§ 2.4.1. response (451.06-454.07)

To that, it should be said that, although there is nothing [real] restraining beings, it is from the appearance of seeming to be bound that the appearance of the experience of suffering comes to be. Take, for example, a young prince or householder's son whose immaturity\textsuperscript{1221} drives his phrenetic rowdiness.\textsuperscript{1222} He remains at home to play. In the storeroom, he stuffs a jewel wrapped in a red cloth into an albeit full basket, which thus overflows and spills the drinks inside. In the basket cord, as well, is leftover cooked rice, which spills. Having exerted himself over and over, his playing stirs up his appetite after which, once hunger is upon him, he has gone to the storeroom in search of food. There, he perceives a snake present in the cooked rice and returns frightened because of it. When he has gone in search of something to drink, he perceives the [spilled] drinks as

\textsuperscript{1221} shed ma bye ba (451.08); might also be translated as "immature." The term shed 'bye is defined, generally, as the manner in which mental and physical vigour develop (lus sems kyi stobs skye bzhin pa TDCM 2858a).

\textsuperscript{1222} rgyags shing myos pa (451.08); reading myos pa (BM 54.04; Th 119.01) rather than myong ba (451.08). The metaphor at work here is connected with the fact that both rgyags and myos suggest an elephant in must (mada). The term rgyags pa translates the Sanskrit mada (Mvp 1969), the term myos pa translates the term unmāda (Mvp 6953), and the term myos rdul can - "dredged with unmāda" - is a term for elephant. So while it is true to say both terms suggest something of inebriation, I believe the more interesting reading is connected to the terms as they relate to ancient Indian elephantology (hastividyā) - which serves as an important source domain in Buddhist metaphors of spiritual training; see Covill's useful treatment of the subject (Covill, Linda. A Metaphorical Study of Saundarananda [Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2009] ch. 3). Since the source domain's agent of interest is a child - one can hardly expect a palace servant (nye gnas : anterāsin or upasthātri; see below) to address a grown prince as "boy" (bu) - I do not read the use of the term mada as referring to the prince's drunkenness or lust (he seems too young); but, rather, to his wrecklessness. Moreover, rgyags pa : mada refers to the frenzied state - often called being in must - that "male elephants will periodically go through... lasting anything from a few days to several months, during which time they are excitable and easily enraged... Sanskrit literature is fond of depicting elephants in mada.. However, mada has a wide semantic range and can indicate pride, inebriation and sexual excitement as well as with bellicosity" (Covill 2009: 72-73). MN defines mada in terms of "hilarity, rapture, excitement, inspiration, intoxication... sexual desire or enjoyment, wantonness, lust, ruttliness, rut (esp. of an elephant)... pride, arrogance, presumption, conceit" (777c). Spyod 'jug las: kun nas dran pa'i thag pa yis | lus sems kyi glang po dam btags na | 'jig pa thams cad med | gyur zhung | dge ba thams cad lag tu 'ong (5.3 cited in Klong chen snying thig gi snong 'gro'i ngyag 'don rtsa 'grel bzhugs 76-77); cf. sems gyi glang chen myos pa ni | chos ka sems pa'i ka chen la | ji ltar btags pa mi | 'shor bar | de ltar 'bad pa kun gyi brtag (5.40); BCA references elephants at 5.2, 4, and 7.66.
blood and returns frightened. Pained by thirst and hunger he sits in tears, wailing until an servant\textsuperscript{1223} arrives and asks, "Boy, why are you crying?" [Here, the boy answers:] "when I went looking for food and drink because I was hungry and thirsty, there was a snake in the cooked rice and blood in the drinks. So, I got scared; and though I felt awful with hunger and thirst, I was not able to eat; so I was crying."

Thereafter, the servant without even offering the slightest bit of advice\textsuperscript{1224} to the boy, says to him: "Boy, do not cry. I will get rid of the snake and clean up the blood and give you some clean food." After removing the cord and the jewel, when he gives the boy some food and drink, the boy thinks: "This servant, having cleaned up what is foul, gives me clean food and drink!" Thinking thus, he is freed from his discontent.

If there was even the smallest point of advice that could be given to the youth, [one would] say this: "What is the snake here? [452\textsuperscript{1225}] This is the cord you placed [there]. What is the blood here? It is the light from the jewel you placed here." Once the youth has recognized the food and drink to be clean from the beginning,\textsuperscript{1226} he would be freed [from any discontent].

In the same manner, although all phenomena are like an illusion, sentient beings, not recognizing this to be the case, appear - due to the influence of a realist view - to be bound by afflictions and appear to experience discontent. Accordingly, [sentient beings] are obsessed with appearances of illusory phenomena; because of that, they are fixated on characteristics.\textsuperscript{1227} Thence, the emergence of the attachment to ambitions\textsuperscript{1228} in which affliction totally perturbs [the mind] and by force of which the various karmic processes of conceptual construction occur. It is in that context these dissatisfying aggregates come to be. Under the influence of appearance, moreover, the emergence of obsession with things, and so on, occurs, as we discussed above.

§ 2.4.2 issue (452.10-452.19)

In that case, while the nature of things is such that the character of afflictions, karma, and discontent (duhkha) emerges only through this process of cause and result, if it is said that it is indeed the case they are real entities, then,

\textsuperscript{1223} Note the dual nuance of the term nye gnas (literally, "[one who] dwells near [her teacher]"); it refers not only to "a servant," it refers to a disciple of a teacher; the Sanskrit equivalent, antevāsin, means "dwelling near the boundaries, dwelling close by... a pupil who dwells near or in the house of his teacher" (MW 43a; cf. upasthātri id. 211b). This comprises part of the source-domain of the metaphor - i.e. casting the Buddhist guide as a servant to the immature child, who is the spiritually immature being (cf. Tib. byis pa).

\textsuperscript{1224} gdam ngag gi gnas (451.19). Note the dual nuance here -- i.e. gdam ngag can mean both "advice" in the ordinary sense and "secret instruction" in connection with tantric teaching.

\textsuperscript{1225} NTh 60.05; Th 120.04; BM 55.04.

\textsuperscript{1226} gdod ma nas dri ma dang bral bar shes nas (452.03). Note the dual nuance: gdod ma nas can refer to both the fact the food and drink were never contaminated and the "originally pure" nature of mind referenced in such texts as Bodhicittaviśvarāṇa, RGV, etc.

\textsuperscript{1227} Recall the previous citations - in particular the Jñāna-āloka-alanikāra-sūtra cited above.

\textsuperscript{1228} smon chags 'byung (452.07).
accordingly, when there is no need to search for a distinct actual basis in what appears as any given thing, no need to search for a distinct factor of the actual basis, no need to search for other qualitative factors, [and] no need to search for a distinct fundamental basis, then if one were to label the mere appearance of actual character [of a phenomenon], that designation would be acceptable. In that case, what distinct actual basis should be sought?

§ 2.4.2.1 response (452.16)

That is like saying, for example, when a blue cloth is perceived, there exists the need to recognize something outside the consciousness itself appearing in a blue aspect as the real entity present, something distinct that is the actual [objective] basis, the causal efficacy of which qualifies a real object whose own character [in this case] is derived from a primary element. In that case, what distinct factor of the actual basis are there to be validated? What is said, here, is this: what appears is merely the blue of the cloth. Distinct factors of blue - such as lapis lazuli, leaves, and so forth - and other factors of blue of the cloth itself, as well, appear so long as obscuration does not hinder them. Yet this is like suggesting there are distinct unperceived factors of blue that are hindering obstructions that should be recognized.

Q. In that case, what distinct qualitative factors are there to be validated?

Here, it is said that only the cloth’s color and shape are perceived; but other things - its type, cause, source, manufacturing, weight, texture, quality, value, etc. - should be recognized.

Q. In that case, what distinct basis is there to validate?

Here, this is like suggesting that when a blue leaf is perceived as a blue cloth, [we] say something like "here, something appears like a blue cloth because the actual basis is the blue leaf, yet there is something else that is not recognized that should be recognized." Accordingly, these validations of distinct
characteristics arise due to philosophical insistence upon ('dod) personal and phenomenal entities. In that connection, the validation of a distinct factor that is an actual basis and the validation of its qualitative factors each flow from a philosophical insistence upon a personal entity. Both the validation of a distinct actual basis and the validation of the qualities of the basis each emerge due to asserting the presence of a real phenomenal entity. Accordingly, for those who insist philosophically upon a real personal entity, when a cloth appears, different types of things, such as a vase and so forth, are precluded, and since similar types of things such as a second cloth, as well, are precluded when the cloths' unified nature is itself something validated as a real entity, its color, tactility and so forth - everything is comprehended as an instance of that nature’s quality - thereby remain unperceived qua different factors though one factor of a single quality is perceived.

Things like vases and other cloths, as well as other things, both have their own respective natures. Even the ones that are themselves blue, since their respective blue color is distinct from the blue of a given cloth [such as the one mentioned above], [its color] is a distinct [color blue] from the blue factor of the cloth given above. Therefore, when validating a real phenomenal entity due to putting an end to a real personal entity, the factors of both [the given blue cloth and the other, distinct blue articles] are precluded. Accordingly, though it is possible to perceive a blue cloth or blue leaf, when [the perceiving] consciousness is generated in a blue aspect it perceives that object's nature en toto. Given there is no perception of a distinct factor that is an actual basis, there is also no perception of a distinct qualitative factor.

In insisting upon external objects as real entities in the assertion of a real phenomenal entity, an actual basis that is distinct would be validated. For, just as discussed above, when a blue cloth is perceived, then except for something besides the mere appearance of consciousness per se as blue, an object, which is itself characterized by efficacy and the presence of a real entity, would be asserted.

When external objects are denied as real entities while insisting upon a consciousness as a real entity, then here it is stated that, in accordance with your assertion, when a blue cloth is perceived, it does not exist as some real entity distinct from the consciousness [perceiving it]. Yet if the consciousness per se appears as if blue, then a distinct actual basis of appearance characterized by false conceptions would recognize the actual presence of some actual entity. [In light of such an assertion, such] a statement would be proved. If [assertions ] such as these are not validated, simply labeling the mere appearance of characteristics as the character [of a given phenomenon] would not be taken as a fault.

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1243 *bzlog* (453.11) : vārita (Mvp 1631) vivartana (Mvp 2665), vinivartana (Mvp 740, 3407).
1244 *rnam par shes pa nyid sngon par snang ba tsaṃ ma togs...* (453.24). The editions I am working with have included the interlinear notation las gzhan du (“other than”) inserted here (RZSB 453.24; NTh 64.01; BM 58.04; Th 124.06).
1245 NTh 64.01; Th 124.06; BM 58.04.
§ 2.4.3. objection (454.07-454.10)

If all phenomena are empty of their own nature, then what source is there for their appearance? What source is there for confusion? Given that appearance entails a basis of appearance, is it not the case that confusion entails a basis of confusion?

§2.4.3.1. response (454.10-458.18)

Although there is no basis for either appearance or confusion, inasmuch as the conditions remain present, appearance and confusion are possible. The conflict for things lies in supposing that their bases are real, though they are not - just as a mirage initially appears real but ultimately is not. Further, the realization that bases are devoid of nature is incompatible with confusing things. Although they are without nature, what conflict is there in not realizing as much and without having become familiarized with that?

Q. If it is the case that appearances that are confused do not entail a base, what are its conditions?

These two become unified within a single cause (‘di guyis ni gcig gi rgyur gcig ’gyur te) due to the influence of non-existents that appear; and awareness is confused due to the influence of non-existents that appear.,

Q. If that is the case, which of these two is first?

They are basically the same. For example, when an awareness to which non-existent objects appear existent is generated in a dream, at the very first moment in which consciousness to which non-existent objects appear existent is generated, the awareness generated is something confused. At the very first moment that a confused awareness is generated, its generation is accompanied by an image that appears as the object. Therefore, these two are basically the same. Likewise, all sentient beings’ confused appearances are basically the same.

Q. If that is the case, what, where, [455] and for how long have these confused appearances confused?

In the context of mere convention, it is said if someone is confused it is the sentient beings of the six regions that are confused. In terms of where they are confused, it is in the three realms of samsāra. In terms of for how long, it is from beginningless time that they are confused. [Thus] is it explained in the context of mere convention, though, in reality, that is not the way it is.

Q. How is it then?

The appearances of place, time, and person per se are confused appearances. Take, for example, an instance of appearance of a non-existent object that appears as a real object in a dream. Through the appearance of place, time, and person, happiness and discontent manifest in experience. Here, oneself

1246 NTh 65.05; Th 127.01; BM 60.01.
1247 rgyud drug gi sens can (455.01-455.02), referring to the sentient beings who inhabit the three lower migrations - hells, realm of the hungry ghosts, and animal realm - and the three higher migrations - realms of the humans, anti-gods, and gods.
1248 khams gsum (455.02) : tridhātu (Mvp 865).
and other people live in places – some of which are agreeable, some of which are not – participating in experiences of happiness and discontent for what appear to be varying durations of time. In the appearance per se there is no such object, no such person,\(^{1249}\) no time, either; even happiness and discontent are not present. Nevertheless, [such phenomena] appear as if existent, though non-existent. Likewise, while beings wandering within conditioned existence appear to revolve [in samsāra] under the sway of two [types] of ignorance from a beginningless point in time,\(^{1250}\) in a single moment of the fundamental mind,\(^{1251}\) its own nature appears as the illimitable world. That is to say, though a reflection appears to reside deep within a mirror, and while it appears to reside upon [its surface], since a mirror has no depth it inhabits no distinct [physical] point. Likewise, given that it is not something distinct in the mind, there is no dimension to the world.\(^{1252}\) In a dream, time, too, does not pass - not even an hour. Although one might have a dream [that seems to last] for an aeon or longer, no prolonged period of time passes, either. When bodhisattvas transform a [the passing of a] week into [the passing of a] great aeon,\(^{1253}\) the week and the great aeon, as well, are mere appearances to awareness neither of which comprise any real temporal extension. During the transformation of a week into an incalculable aeon, moreover, there is no elongation of short moments of time into longer moments of time. Similarly, even those who assert samsāra to be without a beginning point in time confuse awareness for time.

Q. If that is the case and all appearances are confusing experiences, by what process does confused awareness appear?\(^{1254}\)

Here, it is explained \(^{456}\) in Meditation on Bodhicitta:\(^{1256}\)

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\(^{1249}\) Reading gang zag (BM 60.05; Th 127.06) rather than ga zag (RZSB 455.10).

\(^{1250}\) thog ma med pa’i dus can (455.12) : anādikālika.

\(^{1251}\) kun gzhi sems (455.13).

\(^{1252}\) ’jig rten la rgya che chung med do (455.16).

\(^{1253}\) byang chub sems dpa’ ruangs zhag bdun gyis bs kal pa chen po ’da’ bar byin gyis rlöb ste (455.18-455.19). This example is taken from Tōh. 176: “Phags pa dri ma med par grags pas bstan pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo (Vimalakirti-nirdeśa-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2009, mdo sde, ma, vol. 60 (Beijing: Krun go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): de la ruangs par thar pa bsam gyis ni khyab pa la gnas pa’i byang chub sems dpa’ ni ’khor ba tshad med pas ’dus ba’i sems can ruangs ’dul ba’i dbang gi phyir zhag bdun yang bs kal pa ’das par ston te | (534.03-534.06). Cf. “The bodhisattva who lives in the inconceivable liberation, for the sake of disciplining those living beings who are disciplined through immeasurable periods of evolution, can make the passing of a week seem like the passing of an aeon, and he can make the passing of an aeon seem like the passing of a week for those who are disciplined through a short period of evolution. The living beings who are disciplined through an immeasurable period of evolution actually perceive a week to be the passing of a week for the sake of disciplining a short period of evolution. The living beings who are disciplined through a short period of evolution actually perceive an aeon to be the passing of a week” (Vimalakirti 2003: 43).

\(^{1254}\) ’o na snang ba tham[s] cad ’khrul snang yin na \’/ ’khrul pa’i blo la tshul ji ltar snang bar ’gyur zhe na (RZSB 1.455.23-455.24); alternatively, ”If, however, all appearance is confused appearance, in what mode do they appear to a confused awareness?”

\(^{1255}\) NTh 67.03; Th 129.01; BM 61.05.

\(^{1256}\) byang chub kyi sems bsgoms pa (455.24-456.01); one of the so-called eighteen texts of the Mind Series (sems sde) or Mind Class (sems phyogs). Cf. Almogi 2009: 178-179. This work, perhaps the most often cited in The Approach, is the first citation explicitly named in the text. According to Tibetan Great Perfection master, Namkhai Norbu and Adriano Clemente, the rDo la gser zhun was
A thinker's false conceptions are experienced without beginning; the intellect is incorrect, conditioned by the force of ignorance, thus the happening itself of mind, mental factors, and the three bodies appear as objects. Thus, since the mind of migrants has been overpowered by ignorance, [and] since it is primordially devoid of inception, it is naturally discursive, corrupted through false conceptions. Under their influence, the happening itself of mind and mental factors appears as the three actual bases of objects; and, therein, the three actual bases - the happening itself of mind and mental factors - appear as three aggregates.

What are the three? Mind, intellect, and cognition. On this point, moreover, those who postulate a collection of eight consciousness philosophically insist upon the mind [- the first of the three actual bases -] being fundamental, and that cognition comprises the collection of six [consciousness]. Those who postulate a single [consciousness] assert a single cognitive element whose subtle or gross

probably composed on the basis of the Byang chub sems sgom, which is itself one of the eighteen authoritative scriptures (āgama: lüng) of the sems sde. See Norbu and Clemente. The Supreme Source: The Kunjed Gyalpo, the Fundamental Tantra of Dzogchen Semde (New York: Snow Lion Publishing, 1999), 268 n. 62.

1257 byung ba nyid (456.03)
1258 These lines do not occur contiguously in BSG, which reads as: gang du rtog., ce na | yang dag pa ma yin pa log pa'i | rnam par kun tu rtog pas | thog ma'i rtson pa med pas nas | bden pa mthong ba las nyams shing | blo gros phyin ci log tu gyur cing ma rig rkyen gyi dbang song bas | yang dag pa'i don ma mthong bas | blo gros phyin ci log tu gyur cing bden bpa mthong ba'i stobs dang ni idan bas | ma rig pa'i dbang du song ba'i phyir | sms dang sms las byung ba de nyid lus gsum don du snang ba yin (281.06-282.02). Cf. Rongzom’s DKon cog ‘grel: de la rten med pa de las ‘byung ba ni dngos po yod pa'i ang ma yin te | ji ltar smig rgyu'i chu sna bo dang g.yo bo dag la rten gyi ‘byung ba chen po med par ma zad kyi | ji ltar snang ba de lla bu'i rang gi ngo bo ‘byung ba‘ang yod pa ma yin te long ba rnam kyi mun pa‘ang de dang ‘dra | de bas na ‘khor ba dang g.yo nga las ‘das pa'ichos snu tshogs su snang ba‘ang rten dang rang gi ngo bo gnyis kyi ma grub pa'i phyir | sms can dang sangs gnyis ka'ang rang bzhi mnayam par smra'o | ‘di ni theg pa chen po thun mon ma yin pa'i tshul yin te | de yang mthzan nyid thun mong ma yin pa ni chos thams cad rnam par bsgrub pa nye bar gzhag pa'i mthzan nyid tsam du 'dod do | gang bden pa gnyis kyi mthzan nyid rnam par gzhag pa dang | ngo bo nyid gsum gyi mthzan nyid rnam par gzhag pa dang | phyi dang nang gi skye mched rnam pa gnyis kyi mthzan nyid rnam par gzhag pa dang | brdzus te ‘byung ba'i sms can gang zaag gi mthzan nyid rnam par gzhag pa 'di rnam snang ba tsam la brten nas rnam par bsgrub pa nye bar gzhag pa'i mthzan nyid tsam yin par bye brag med do zhes 'dod do | de bzhi du rnam par grol ba yang thun mong ma yin te | nyon mongs pa'i rang byung niyd rnam par grol bo | rnam par grol ba'i ye shes mthong ba yang thun mong ma yin te | khams gsum pa'i sms dang sms las byung ba nyid rang byung gi ye shes so (RZSB 1.41.20-42.11).

1259 The Approach: kun du rtog can yang dag ma yin kun du rtog pas rtsom nyid nyams | blo gros phyin ci log du gyur cing ma rig rkyen gyi dbang song bas | sms dang sms las byung ba de nyid lus gsum don du snang ba yin (RZSB 1.456.01-456.03). These lines appear, with variation, in Töh 2591: Byang chub kyi sms bgsom pa (Bodhicitta-bhāvand) in bsthan ‘gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing; Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): kun du rtog pa can yan lag ma yin kun du rtog pas rtsom med nyams | blo gros phyin ci log tu gyur cing ma rig rkyen gyi dbang song bas | sms dang sms las byung ba de nyid lus gsum don du snang ba yin (811.05-811.08).

1260 rang bzhi gnyis kun tu rtog pa can (456.04-456.05).
1261 rnam par rig pa (456.08): viññāpti.
1262 kun gzhi (456.09): dhātāya.
1263 nyon mongs pa can gyi yid (456.09): kliṣṭāmanes.
production is distinguished through cause and condition. For example, the single nature of the ocean is an unwavering state consisting in its moist\textsuperscript{1264} and wet\textsuperscript{1265} character. By virtue of the condition of its medium\textsuperscript{1266} [i.e. water] it is always moving just a little bit; and the quality\textsuperscript{1267} and quantity\textsuperscript{1268} of its waves undulate by virtue of external conditions. Not unlike that, what is referred to as mind is that very consciousness, a state embodied by various potentialities, that is characterized by cognitive awareness.\textsuperscript{1269} What is referred to as the intellect is that very mind which, by nature, constantly grasps at an 'I' under the influence of its medium.\textsuperscript{1270} So-called consciousness is said to be that very intellect [described] in terms of giving rise to the various subtle and gross [aspects] by means of [its respective] object and faculty. In sum,\textsuperscript{1271} it follows [that the actual bases] appear as the three objects\textsuperscript{1272} by force of the three aggregates. In terms of the mind appearing as an object, it is stated:\textsuperscript{1273}

When the power of habit grows under the influence of karmic imprints accumulated through various karmic processes, The appearance of the mind itself qua object and the body appears like something filled with bones.\textsuperscript{1274}

\textsuperscript{1264} gsher (456.12) : samśveda.
\textsuperscript{1265} mnyen pa (456.12) : picchilatvam.
\textsuperscript{1266} nye bar len pa'i rkyen (456.12-456.13); cf. upādāna-pratyaya. This term refers, presumably, conditions that provide the material medium for a product.
\textsuperscript{1267} drag zhan (456.14).
\textsuperscript{1268} mang nyüng (456.14).
\textsuperscript{1269} shes shing rig pa'i mtshan nyid (456.14-456.15). Re shes shing rig pa: this term is also found at BSG 285.06-286.01. Compare Rongzom's Sangs sa chen mo: ‘on kyang shes shing rig pa'i mtshan nyid du skye ba ni | gzung ‘dzin du snang yang rung | mi snang yang rung ste | bag chags kyi dbang gis snang ba tsam grub pa yin la | snang ba ni ji ltar snang yang ‘khruṣl ba yin te | de bzhin du yod pa ma yin pas sems can gyi dus na yang rnam par dag pa yin te | des na rang byung gi ye shes zhes kyang bya ste’ | ‘di ltar sdong po bkod pa’i mdo las | jig rten khams mang la la dag | ‘bsam gyis mi khyab tshig gyur kyang | nam mkha’ ‘jig par mi ‘gyur bzhin | rang byung ye shes de bzhin no | zhes gsungs pa lta bur sams khyung shes rig gi mtshan nyid ‘gyur ba med pas | de bzhin dbogs pa nyid dang ‘dra ste’ | ‘on kyang bye brag ni | sams can gyi dus na ‘khruṣl ba’i bag chags kyi dbang gis rnam rtog gi shes pa gzung ba dang ‘dzin par snang ba skye’o (RZSB 2.71.16-71.24). Cf. Almogi 2009: 245-246, 393-394.
\textsuperscript{1270} rang gi nye bar len pa’i dbang gis (456.15-456.16).
\textsuperscript{1271} don bsdus na (456.18) : pindārtha.
\textsuperscript{1272} yul gsum (456.18)/ This phrase, common in normative Tibetan epistemology, perhaps refers to the appearing object (snang yul), the referent object (zhul yul), the observed (dnigs yul). See Lati Rinbochay, Elizabeth Napper, and 'Jam-dpal-bsam-'phel. Mind in Tibetan Buddhism: Oral Commentary on Ge-Shay Jam-Bel-Sam-Pel’s Presentation of Awareness and Knowledge, Composite of All the Important Points, Opener of the Eye of New Intelligence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1986).
\textsuperscript{1273} This citation is found in the Bodhicittabhāvānā. Cf. inverted lines found in Bai ro rgyud ‘bum edition of the text, which reads: rang rig sems de dag nyid ‘og nas ‘byung ba’i lus gsum gyi don snang ba yin no \’ l du byed sna tshogs dag gi bag chags bsags la goms mthu ltas te (v. 314 p. 282.02-282.05).
\textsuperscript{1274} The Approach: ‘du byed sna tshogs dag gis bag chags bsags las gang goms mthu brtas tshe \’i sams nyid yul dang lus ‘dar snang ba rus pas gang bzhin du snang l (RZSB 1.456.19-456.21). These lines are found in Toh 2591: Byang chub kyi sams bsgom pa (Bodhicitta-bhāvanā) in bsTan’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krong go'i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): ‘l du byed sna tshogs dag gis bag chags bsags las gang goms mthu brtas tshe \’i sams nyid yul dang lus ‘dar snang ba rus pas gang bzhin du snang l (811.09-811.11). Cf. Bai ro rgyud ‘bum, which reads: ma rig pa’i
Thus, when the power of the mind itself is growing due to the force of conceptual construction’s karmic imprints, which are accumulated in the mind through a variety of karmic processes by means of cognitions, [the mind itself] appears like external objects and the body along with its faculties. This is a confused appearance devoid of a fundamental basis not unlike [457] the hairs [that appear to] those with cataracts, the sound of drums of a ruler’s army, and the pile of bones upon which one meditates on the unpleasant, which appear under the influence of internal conditions that are devoid of any external fundamental basis.

In connection with the second actual basis of objects, a text teaches:
The self generated due to the intellect [as an] object in the continuum of accumulated karmic imprints is non-existent.

So, the intellect, with its focus on the self and sense of self-importance connected to the mental continuum associated with karmic imprints, is fixated on a self that does not exist in the mind; and by force of that, self and other are differentiated like a snake and its tongue. These are confused appearances that have a fundamental basis, like the appearance of a fire wheel produced from a [spinning] fire brand and the appearance of a snake produced from seeing a rope. Brought to mind, it appears as [if a] [qualified by] self. In connection with the third actual basis of objects, it is stated:

Cognition is produced from that which is clouded and does not perceive what is subtle.
Since, outside of subtle processual factors being produced as a course karmic process associated with mental factors, cognition is clouded, the mind's objects and sentient beings are generated as the multiplicity of different things we are attached to. In this case, confused appearance is accompanied by a fundamental basis that is false. For example, whether from a [mental] state fixated upon water not knowing it to be a mirage or the animating play of a small replica [animated through illusion], the awareness [involved] is stimulated by other conditions. At a given point when attachment and aversion are generated strongly, the appearance of a small replica one has manufactured, though produced, is perceived as a distinct woman, which is akin to fixation on a thing and the production of attachment and aversion.

These three confused appearances, moreover, comprise a unity of condition because cognized objects are not recognized as mental appearances since there is fixation on things as distinct; and through various karmic processes, under the influence of a variety of karmic imprints accumulated in the mind, the confused mind appears as object and as sentient being. Under that influence, the intellect gives rise to the conceit of self and other. Due to the influence of both, cognition forms a basis of comparison because it appears as the object in dependence upon [the dualistic projection of self and other] appearing to the mental faculties.

So, in the fixation upon and the appearance of various objects, the intellect produces something similar to the view of the transitory collection on account of the mental conceit of self [458\textsuperscript{1280}] because all minds and mental factors are made to issue forth (byin gyis rlob par byed pa) as contaminated.\textsuperscript{1281} Under the influence of both, awareness of various selves and phenomena are generated due to which the cycle of becoming [revolves] uninterrupted.

If one wishes to turn away from confused appearances, all appearances are recognized as mental appearances per se – and thereby, the peg tethering the tent of self-grasping is pulled out [of the ground of ignorance]. Then because an obsessive perspective on things and their character is overcome, when the inaccurate awareness that sees mind-as-self and seizes on object-as-characterized\textsuperscript{1282} - even with respect to veracious appearances - is reversed, the force of turbulent karmas, too, is attenuated. Meritorious karmas, as well, become conjoined with a non-objectifying insight.\textsuperscript{1283}

Take objects that appear in dreams, for example. When recognized as a dream because [one's] sleep has become a bit lighter,\textsuperscript{1284} this is nosimilar to the

\textsuperscript{1280}NTh 70.05; Th 133.03; BM 64.05.

\textsuperscript{1281}sems dang sems las byung ba thams cad zag pa dang bcas par byin gyis rlob par byed do (458.01-458.02). This appears to be another play on the word byin gyis rlob par byed pa; that is, a play on its sanctifying denotation similar to one given in § 2.3.9.1? It is worth remember, as noted above, that byin is given in TDCM as “the force of power to effect the minds and experience of others” (gzhan gyi bsam pa dang snab ba sogs bsgyur thub pa'i nus pa'am mthu | 1884a).

\textsuperscript{1282}sems la bdag tu lta zhi ng yul la mtshan mar 'dzin pa'i blo log pa (458.05-458.06).

\textsuperscript{1283}mi dmigs pa'i shes rab (458.07); cf. *anupalambha-prajñā. This type of awareness is described as the actual method of the Mahāyāna (STMG 259.06-260.02). Cf. The Approach RZSB 1.436.22-436.24 citing Bhadra-māyaṅkāra-vyākaraṇa-sūtra.

\textsuperscript{1284}gnyid cung zad bsrabs par gyur nas (458.08-458.09).
inability to generate attachment and aversion because fixation - even on veracious appearances - has been reversed.

After that, when one has awakened and appearance per se is reversed, whence could attachment and aversion be produced? Likewise, divorced from an obsessive perspective on things because appearance per se is reversed through the generation of the power of insight and concentration, how could conceptual construction come to be in connection with appearances that are mere illusion? Therefore, in simply recognizing or not recognizing the nature of phenomena, [we find] there is no real entity whatsoever to be eliminated outside of what is simply labeled by the term thoroughly afflicted. There is no real entity to be established outside of what is simply labeled by the term utterly pure. Nevertheless, when [the nature of phenomena is] not recognized, the process of confused appearance nevertheless pertains accordingly to appearance alone.

[Here concludes] the second chapter pointing out objections and responses to the teaching that all phenomena are basically equal in terms of being illusory.

§ chapter three: distinguishing the perfected system of the illusory in the great perfection from the other vehicles that retain the nomenclature of illusion

The disclosure of the Mahāyāna approach [discussed above] is something enabled through the realization of the illusory character of all phenomena. The authentic assimilation and consummation of the realization (rtogs pa tshad du chud cing mthar phyin pa) that all phenomena are basically the same in being illusory is the approach of the Great Perfection.

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1285 The Approach: rdzogs pa chen po'i tshul rgyu ma lta bu mthar phyin pa dang | sgyu ma'i ming 'dzin pa'i theg pa gzhan rnams | shan dbya ba bstan pa'i skabs te | gsum pa'o (RZSB 1.477.11-477.12).

1286 This qualification - rtogs pa tshad du chud cing mthar phyin pa - is is similar to one given below: rtogs shing mthar phyin par khong du chud pas (459.24-460.01). Both suggests realization of Great Perfection is not “sudden” or “instantaneous”; that it progresses through (rim gyis) shades of fulfillment unto completion. Cf. van Schaik’s “The Early Days of the Great Perfection,” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 27(1), 2004: § ii. A similar attitude is found in the Yuktiśāstikā attributed to Nāgārjuna: srid pa snig rgyu sgyu ‘dra bar || blo yis mthong bar gyur pa ni || sngon gyi mtha’ ‘am phyi ma'i mtha’ || ltas bas yongs so slad mi ’gyur (17). See also Eviatar
§ 3.1. issue one (458.21-458.22)

To that, it might be asked whether or not [proponents of the Great Perfection approach] would philosophically insist upon the confused appearances [that were described above] being perceived by the mind.

§ 3.1.1. response one (458.23-460.15)

Is that supposed to be a question about whether or not these - whatever they are - are appearing or not? Or is that a question of about whether or not said appearances are actually real or not? If it is a questions about appearance - and they are said to appear [4591287] - then what basis of dispute is there to be manufactured between various theories? Nobody at all disputes whether or not shared appearances do or do not appear to ordinary sense faculties.1288 If it is a question about whether or not appearances are actually real or not and one holds that they are actually real, how could she perfectly realize illusion-like according to the Great Perfection?

Therefore, the hierarchy of views only [correspond to] greater or lesser degrees of obsession with appearances as [solid, real] things. Take, for example, the appearance of a black snake's reflection within water:1289 for some, perceiving the snake as real causes fear; and they try to get rid of it [i.e. the snake]. Similarly, even though the dissatisfying state of things (sdug bsgal gyi gnas) is in fact illusory, the Śrāvakas' perceive it as real and attempt to get rid of it. And even though some recognize [the reflection] as a reflection, they still perceive there to be a danger in touching it and, thus, work to apply a remedy.1290 Similarly, the Prajñāpāramitā text tradition approaches phenomena

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1287 NTh 72.02; Th 135.04; BM 66.02.
1289 The Approach: chu’i nang na sbrol nag po’i gzung brnyan snang ba (RZSB 459.05). There is a short essay called “Black Snake” (sbrul nga po) condensing the vital clarifying points (stong thun) in RZSB 2.66.02-69.14. This same essay correlates the experience of real entities to the manufacture of biases (blang dor byed pa, RZSB 2.66.21-66.22) and stipulates that taking the view that all phenomena are illusion-like does not entail the stipulation real entities (2.67.08). It appears that Rongzom’s “appearance of a black snake’s reflection in water” may be related to a passage in the sixth chapter of the Guhyagarbha-tantra. The black snake also appears comparable to a passage in Līlavajra/Lilāsavajra’s so-called sPar khab commentary on the Guhyagarbha-tantra. On this text’s murky history, see Wangchuk 2002: 274-275 n. 40. In the sPar khab, we find an example similar to Rongzom’s: i.e. “the mirror image of a moon reflected in water” (me long chu zla bzhi), which is applied along the same lines as Rongzom’s example in The Approach. See Otani 4718: rGyud kyi rgyal po chen po dpal gsang ba’i snying po’i ‘grel pa (Śrī-guhyā-garbha-mahā-tantra-rāja-tikā-mā) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1999, rgyud, zu, vol. 43 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang) pp. 325.15-327.05.
1290 sman sten (459.09). The medical language point out attention to the fact this path model is built on "acceptance [&] rejection" (blang dor) or bias; one diagnoses an affliction the cause of which is abandoned, and takes up the cause of its antidote. The healing metaphor is one of
as illusion-like; yet it also fabricates remedies - generating gnosis concerning the knowable and great compassion - because of its theory that [causal] efficacy is real (i.e. "truly exists"). Some who recognize [the reflection] as a reflection, who indeed realize that no injury comes from contact with [the "snake"] are capable of persuading others who are incapable of making touching it themselves on account of their fear, which is, in fact, unjustified. Similarly, according to the approach of Kriya[tantra] and Outer Yoga[tantra], even though vulgar behavior and substances are recognized to be without [any intrinsic] fault, some [practitioners] are themselves incapable of just letting-go, so they practice

Buddhism’s most prominent; it has a long pedigree in South Asia drawing on Āyurveda. Buddhism’s own long use of this metaphor can be traced to the Mahāvagga section of the Pali vinaya, specifically two chapters: the Bhesajja-khandhaka and Cīvāra-khandhaka; for a discussion of healing in Buddhism, see Covill, Linda. A Metaphorical Study of Saundarananda (Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2009) 99-183. This model, which is based in bias (blang dor), is overcome in Great Perfection. Here, we note the presence of strategems of “renouncing or eliminating” (spong ba) in Mahāyāna traditions and the strategem of “counteracting” (snyen po) affliction among non-Mahāyāna approaches; cf. Higgins 2013: 27.

1291 On Rongzom’s enumeration of the Nine-vehicle system (theg pa rin dgu), see Wangchuk 2006: 117-118 n.b. nn. 61-62; cf. Dalton’s 2005 "A Crisis of Doxography: How Tibetans Organized Tantra During the 8th-12th Centuries." In Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 28(1), pp. 115-179 and Cabezón, José Ignacio. The Buddha’s Doctrine and the Nine Vehicles: Rog Bande Sherab’s Lamp of the Teachings (Oxford University Press, 2013) 20-31. The nine-fold scheme is mentioned in both Bön and the Old School. It is also found, for example, in Vīlayavājra’s commentary on the Gughyagarbha-tantra, called the Spar khab. See Otani 4718: rGyud kyi rgyal po chen po dpal gsang ba'i snying po'i 'grel pa (Śrt-guhya-garbha-mahā-tantra-rāja-tīkā-nāma) in bKa’ gyur (dpe dburs ma) 1999, rgyud, zu, vol. 43 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): 1chos thams cad gtan la phab pa zhes bya ba ni 1 theg pa dgu'i chos ril gsang ba'i snying po'i byin bral la sgo nas phyir gzhag ste 1 de la lta bas kund rzob tu byin bral la 1 308-13-308.14. In his Man ngag lta phreng gi 'grel pa, Rongzom glosses the difference between outer and inner tantra in terms of their divergent theory and practice: rnal 'byord phyi pa’ thub pa rgyud ces bya ba la 1 phyi pa ni mdor bsdu na lta spod phyis kyi sgo nas phyis gzhag ste 1 de la lta bas kund rzob tu byin bral la [333] snyad rgyas mnya nam pa'i mla ba dang 1 spod pas mnya nam pa'i brtul zhugs dang du mi len pa'o 1 thub pa ni brtung du myed pa'i dam tshig myams su len mi rns te 1 thun mong gi sdom pa rgyal rnas dang ma 'bral ba'o 1 nag pa’ thabs kyi rgyud ces bya ba ni 1 de las bzhag pa’ nyid yin te 1 byin bral dang ma nor ba'i dbang phyug chen por lta ba dang 1 mnya nam pa'i brtul zhugs dang du len pa dang 1 sgo gsum gyi spod pa la bkag pa myed kyang skyon kyi sgo dge na thabs mkhas pa'o (RZSB 323.23-334.06). Cf. RZSB 2.245.14, 2.236.08; and see Wangchuk 2006: 326. Köppel’s translation of this passage reads: “As for the external yoga, the capacity tantra, briefly, it is generally set forth as external with reference to its view and conduct. Regarding its view, oneself and the Buddha are not regarded as equal on the relative level. Regarding its conduct, there is no practice of the yogic discipline of capacity. As for the sense of capacity, this refers to the inability to practice the samayas which are not to be observed, and [this practice] is thus not free from the ordinary vows. The internal tantra of skillful means is the opposite of that. One regards oneself as the unmistaken Maheśvara and practices the yogic discipline of equality. Even though nothing is prohibited with regard to the conduct of the three doors, one is unstained by faults and therefore skilled in method” (2008: 27). Also noteworthy is Blue Annals (351), which correlates the outer Yoga-tantras with Anuttara-yoga-tantras: “During the Period of the Later Spread of the Doctrine there has been a great increase in the preaching of both the "Outer" Yoga Tantra and "Inner" Yoga-Tantra (Phyin-nai, i. e. the Yoga and the Anuttara-Yoga-Tantras); cf. Tayé 2008 237 n. 5.

1292 bag yangs su spod (459.14). This term has the sense of “easy-going behavior,” “acting relaxed,” “going with the flow,” and the like. It seems to suggest an openness that is not perturbed by anything that appears,
offering to deities, austerities, and use substances that pertain to spiritual accomplishment, and so on. Some recognize they will not be harmed by touching [the "snake"] and practice austerities while trampling it in order to swiftly eradicate [other's] fear [of it]. Similarly, to do away with all manner of activities and experience the equality of all phenomena according to the Inner Yoga[tantra] approach, one engages in stomping on a reflection as if being bound by them. They in fact perceive trampling on a reflection as if being fearless as childish; and they are not capable of generating any conceptual construction whatsoever that is conditioned by biases. [For such an individual,] no perturbation occurs.

Similarly, it is because of realizing and, in the end, assimilating (rto gsings mthar phyin par khor du chud pas) the very basic equality of all phenomena according to the Great Perfection approach [460] that awareness remains thus undeluded by the influence of appearance, is incapable of generating conceptual construction, is unbiased and remains unmoved and unexerted. Thus, the perfect realization of the illusory in this context ('di ni) pertains to the penetrating or consummating [the realization of] the indivisibility of the two truths.
Further, simply asserting the identical nature of subject\textsuperscript{1303} and its predicate\textsuperscript{1304} does not count as a realization of the indivisibility of the two truths. On this view, even in the Śrāvaka approach, where the character of karmic processes are asserted to be impermanent, impermanence \textit{per se} is not asserted to be something distinct from karmic processes. In the Yogācāra, where the character of false imaginations are asserted to be empty of duality,\textsuperscript{1305} it is not asserted that emptiness is something different from dependent phenomena. That being the case, even if predicates asserting the existence of actual reality do not assert it to be something different [than the subject], then when Mādhyamikas\textsuperscript{1306} assert that all phenomena are qualified by an absence of inherent nature, what point is there bringing up any assertion [on their part] that emptiness is something distinct [from the phenomena that is putatively qualifies].\textsuperscript{1307} Nevertheless, since [Mādhyamikas] will not let go of the discursive scheme of the two truths,\textsuperscript{1308} their's is not counted as a non-dualistic view; and when these appearances of outer and inner things are seen to be totally imagined and basically the same, \textit{that} is proclaimed to be seeing the indivisibility of the two truths.

§ 3.2. issue two (460.15-460.22)

Illusions, emanations, and the like, are brought to mind [as] mere appearance; that being the case, if it is established or if it is possible that the appearances of those [illusions, emanations, etc.] and outer and inner things are basically of the same character due to being alike in appearance,\textsuperscript{1309} then what is totally imagined – the eternal self of the non-Buddhists,\textsuperscript{1310} and so on – is comparable to what has no basis in reality, like a hare's horn,\textsuperscript{1311} which is an imposed object

\textsuperscript{1303}chos (460.05) : dharma.
\textsuperscript{1304}chos can (460.05) : dharmin.
\textsuperscript{1305}yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kun du rtog pa gnyis pos stong pa'i mtshan nyid can do 'dod na (460.08-460.09).
\textsuperscript{1306}dbu ma pa (460.11) : mādhyamika.
\textsuperscript{1307}Cf. Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 15.3: kutaḥ svabhāvasyābhāve parabhāvo bhaviṣyati.
\textsuperscript{1308}bden pa gnyis kyi blo mi ‘dor bas (460.12-460.13). My rendering of blo as discursive scheme is guided the definition given in DYSG: bsam tshul gyi ming 547b).
\textsuperscript{1309}snang bar 'dra bas (460.16-460.17).
\textsuperscript{1310}mu stegs can gyi bdag rtog pa (460.17-460.18).
\textsuperscript{1311}ri bong gi rwa (460.19) : śaśavisāna (Chandra 2001: 748b).
that is [actually] denied.\textsuperscript{1312} If outer and inner things, which are established through direct perception and non-observation,\textsuperscript{1313} are in fact generated due to causes and conditions, how can they be basically the same [as the totally imagined]? Given that if an actual basis is found in connection with the totally imagined, it might be said their being equal or not can be qualified and indeed possible;\textsuperscript{1314} but without establishing the actual basis itself in connection with the totally imagined, what [exactly] would be established as equal to what?\textsuperscript{1315}

\section*{§ 3.2.1. response two (460.23-468.03)}

The basic indication\textsuperscript{1316} establishing something as totally imagined or in terms of its own characteristics is appearance itself.\textsuperscript{1317} All philosophical theories - from the non-Buddhist extremists up through \add{461.24} [according to Rongzom] the perspective of the Great Perfection - all the various theories take the character [of] appearance as their basis\textsuperscript{1319} such that what is disputed between them concerns what pertains to the character of appearance and how it exists.\textsuperscript{1320} What pertains to the character of appearance would be established as true; its existence would be established as an

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[1312] sgro skur gyi guas (460.18). The term sgro skur refers to two distortions - i.e. imposing (sgro 'dogs) something where there is none and denying (skur 'debs) something where there is one (med pa la yod par sgro 'dogs pa dang yod pa la med par skur ba 'debs pa TDCM 621b).
\item[1313] mi dmigs pa (460.20) : anupalambha (Mvp 971); i.e. inference. Note a similar nomenclature given in Masahiro Inami's "On the Determination of Causality," in Katsuura, Shoryo (ed.), Dharmakīrti's Thought and its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy: Proceedings of the Third International Dharmakīrti Conference. Beiträge zur Kultur – und Geistesgeschichte Asiens. (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1999) 131-154, e.g. 139 n. 54.
\item[1314] RZSB's interlineary note reads gzhal du'ang rung --la (1.460.21); Th reads gzhal du'ang na rung ce la (139.04); and BM reads gzhal du'ang rung na la (69.02).
\item[1315] Alternatively: "Given it might be said it is possible to comprehend whether they are equal or not if an actual basis is obtained with respect the totally imagined, without establishing the actual basis itself in connection with the totally imagined what is established as equal to what?"
\item[1316] mtshan gzhi (460.24); often translated as "illustration." Cf. Rongzom's presentation in TsJG of mtshan nyid dang mtshan gzhi (RZSB 1.264.07).
\item[1317] snang ba nyid (460.24). Note the use of this term in South Asian logic and epistemological discourse (pramāṇa). There, Dignāga, uses the term in connection with cognitions pertaining to external objects. For Dignāga, appearance per se is, in that context, “authentic” or pramāṇa (yul gyi snang ba nyid de 'di'i 1 tshad ma). See Hattori Masaaki. Dignāga, On Perception, Being the Pratyakṣaparicchedha of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968) 29. Dan Arnold notes that Dharmakīrti "makes the same point at Nyāyānīkā 1.20" in Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief: Epistemology in South Asian Philosophy of Religion (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008) p. 231 n. 11.
\item[1318] NTh 75.04; Th 139.06; BM 69.03.
\item[1319] Ila ba'i bya brag thams cad snang ba mtshan nyid gzhir byas te (461.01-461.02). Note the structure: the mtshan gzhi (460.24) is appearance per se and all the tenets are qualified by appearance qua mtshan nyid.
\item[1320] de'i mtshan nyid ji ltar yin pa dang ji ltar yod pa la rdzod do (461.02). On this point, Wangchuk notes: "The philosophical debate [according to Rongzom] is about whether there is anything behind the facade of “appearance” and if so what. In other words, the philosophical debate is about the “being” (yin pa) and “existence” (yod pa) of the “characteristics” of “appearance” (ibid., p. 461.2: de'i mtshan ñid ji ltar yin pa dan ji ltar yod pa la rtshod do)" (2004: 198 n. 97).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
objective basis. When a given appearance is made to be repudiated [as] totally imagined by another, it is negated as non-existent and something that does not [in fact] pertain. Through non-implicative negation,\textsuperscript{1321} only what is the totally imagined is repudiated. Through implicative negation,\textsuperscript{1322} some characteristic one asserts to qualify an appearance is validated. Here, the four procedures [that] negate and establish\textsuperscript{1323} are simply mentioned; they will be explained below.

In this way, using the four procedures [that] negate and establish, the philosophical positions of others are repudiated and one's own is established. Yet all theories are indistinguishable insofar as they consistently assert that causes and conditions give rise to effects that are established through direct perception and non-observation [i.e. inference], from which [one’s assertion about] the actual existence [of a given appearance] and [how it] actually pertains is established; and the similar assertions of others regarding what is actual are disputed as non-existent and not pertaining, because of established what is totally imaginary.\textsuperscript{1324} Inasmuch the entire horizon of theories are hierarchically validated in this manner, first all one's own views are established as true;\textsuperscript{1326} those [held] by others are established as totally imaginary. When hierarchically established in that manner, eventually whatever is one’s own point is the only one that is [deemed] actual a real point that does not arrive\textsuperscript{1327} at anything leftover [and unaccounted for].

\section*{§ 3.2.1.1. non-buddhists extremists (461.16-462.21)\textsuperscript{1328}}

The basis of the non-Buddhist view - the eternalist view, the view of a creator as cause - is given in terms of five types,\textsuperscript{1329} which is to say:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1321} med dgag (461.05) : prasajyapratisedha; i.e. negation of an absolute (Ruegg 2000: 35 n. 60), non-presuppositional, and non-implicative type (id. 98 n. 208); cf. "existential negation" (Köppl 2008: 147 n. 115).
  \item \textsuperscript{1322} ma yin dgag (461.05-461.06) : paryuddśa; i.e. negation of a relative, presuppositional, or implicative type (Ruegg 2000: 170 n. 81); cf. "predicative negation" (Köppl 2008: 147 n. 115).
  \item \textsuperscript{1323} dgag sgrub 'di bzhi'i tshul (461.06-461.07). Cf. Wangchuk 2004: 198.
  \item \textsuperscript{1324} One is reminded here of Nāgārjuna: sangs rgyas lam la brten nas ni \| kun la mi rtag smra ba rnams \| rtso d pa dug os rnams mchog gzung bas \| gnas pa gang yin de rmad do (Yuktisāṣṭikā 41); and Candrakīrti: rang gi tla cha gdsangs dde bzhin du \| gzhan gi tla la 'khrug gang rtag pa nyid \| de'i phyirod chags khro nram bsal te \| nram dpyod na mnyur du gral bar 'gyur (Madhyaṃkāvatārā 6.119; cf. La Valée Pousin 1907: 232.11-12, 232.16-17).
  \item \textsuperscript{1325} tla ba mthon dman (461.12-461.13); admittedly, my rendering loses the verticality trope (see Covill 1999: 215-241) but retains the spatial dimension of the metaphor, albeit horizontally.
  \item \textsuperscript{1326} mtshan nyid pa (461.13-461.14). Cf. STMG 494.1.
  \item \textsuperscript{1327} mi rnyed (461.16); cf. Atiśa’s Satyadvayaṭātāra: kun rdzob ji ltar snang ba 'di \| rig pa brtags na 'ga' mi rnyed \| ma rnyed pa nyid don dam yin \| yas nas gnas pa'i chos nyid do (Almogi 2009: 348 n. 16).
  \item \textsuperscript{1328} This section follows Man ngag lta phreng gi 'grel ba, RZSB 1.310.05-311.24.
  \item \textsuperscript{1329} Cf. Rongzom’s Man ngag lta phreng gi 'grel ba: mu stegs can rtag par smra ba rnams kyi gzhung ni nram pa lnga ste \| tshangs pa' chen d pa' rtag pa dang \| dbang sgyur gyi lha rtag pa' dang \| dag rtag pa dang rang bzhin rtag pa dang \| rdul phra mo rtag pa (RZSB 1.310.05 -310.07).
\end{itemize}
Mahābrahma,1330 Vaśavartideva,1331 the eternal self,1332 eternal nature,1333 and eternal minute particles.1334 Though these are eternal, they are also causes that are eternal. It is through their power that appearances - outer and inner things that are impermanent - exist as the effects of their emanations.1335 The causes, the productive activity,1336 of eternal causes alone, never fails to produce their effects. These outer and inner things, the productive activity of constant effects alone, never fails to be caused. In that case, these outer and inner things exist due to causes and conditions; and the nature of the effects themselves are seen to be impermanent [462]1337 and established via direct perception and non-observation [i.e. inference].

On this view, sages who are endowed with the divine eye once the concentration of meditation is attained,1338 in having seen the transmigration of sentient beings see the transmigrating person who is a so-called sentient being - from the body that is composed of minute particles of those who have died to the occurrence of sentient beings who move from one state to another and are born instantaneously;1339 even the birth of corporeal beings whose bodies are composed of minute particles are observed through yogic direct perception1340 and instantaneously born sentient beings, who do not transmigrate, whose bodies are composed of minute particles, are observed through yogic direct perception. Therefore, on this view, under the influence of [the conception of] the eternal sentient being, since all that exists is composed from minute particles that are impermanent, since all that exists is composed from minute particles that are impermanent

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1330 tshangs pa chen po (461.17-461.18): mahābrahma. Re this deity, see 1.310-311. This is a term used in Abhidharmakosā cosmology; cf. Martin 1987 and the Brahmajala-sutta (DN 1.1-46), which is cited in Rongzom’s Man ngag lta phreng gi ’grel pa at 1.312.01.

1331 dbang sgyur gyi lha rtag (461.18). Cf. Man ngag lta phreng gi ’grel pa: gzhon yang kha cig gis gzhon ‘phrul dbang byed kyi gnas na lha’i rgyal po dbang sgyur l ’dod pa’i longs spyod pa thams cad la rang gis ’phrul mi dgos par l gzhon kyi ’phrul pa thams cad la dbang byed par mthong la l dbang sgyur gyi lha’i chi’ ba yang ma mthong bas l ’gshi’ de las dbang sgyur gyi lha rtag go zhes ’byung ste l ’de yang mngon sum dang mi dmigs pa la rten pa’o (RZSB 1.311.07-311.12). “In his Itha phreng ’grel pa... Rong-zom-pa refers once again to this ‘sovereign king of gods’ and identifies his abode as Paranimitavāsāvartini (gzhon ’phrul dbang byed), which is the sixth and highest field in the Kāmadhātu” (Almogi 2009: 278 n. 4).

1332 bdag rtag (461.18).

1333 rang bzhin rtag (461.08).

1334 rdul phra rab rtag (461.18).

1335 Cf. TBJBy: l rtag par lta ba rnam ni tshangs pa chen po rtag l dbang sgyur gyi lha rtag bdag rtag l rang bzhin rtag l rdul phra rab rtag l de rnam las mi rtag pa’i ’jig rten mngon par grub bo zhe’o (RZSB 2.06.20-06.23); and Man ngag lta ba’i phreng ba: mu stegs pa ni chos thams cad la kun tu brtags pas bdag rtag pa zhig yod par lta ba (RZSB 1.293.08-293.09).

1336 bya ba byed de (461.21) : kāryakara.

1337 NTh 77.02; Th 142.01; BM 69.03.

1338 bsam glan gyi tig nge ’dzin (462.01-462.02): dhyāna-samādhi. Cf. Man ngag lta phreng gi ’grel pa: bsam glan gyi tig nge ’dzin dang mngon par shes pa thob ste (RZSB 1.311); and TBJBy: bdag de rnam par byang bar byed pa ni bdag gi byed pa bzang po l yid la bya ba bzang po la zhugs pas sad to mi dhe ba’i chos rnam spangs te l dhe ba bcu’i las kyi lam yang dag par blangs nas l ’dod pa thams cad la ma chags pa’i drang srong gi da’ i thub bzang ba dang l bsam glan gyi tig nge ’dzin thob par byas te l mthun ma ci yang mi ’dzin pa’i snyoms par ’jug pa la gnas pas bdag rnam par byang bar ’gyur ro zhes ’dod do l (RZSB 2.06.14-06.19).

1339 rdzus te skyes pa’i sams can cig byang (462.04).

1340 rnal ’byor gyi mngon sum gyis dmigs la (462.05-462.06).
are eternal, the aggregates that are established through the composition of particles are emanated, fabricated. Then, since [the particles] move to another person after [a person] is destroyed, the assemblage of minute particles is impermanent. Yet the minute particles per se are permanent - never subject to destruction.

When, moreover, the beginning point [of a cosmic cycle] is considered through that divine eye, inasmuch as at first there are no other sentient beings, there is a perception of the arisen Mahābrāhma such that there is no perception of a prior time where Mahābrāhma was not arisen. Consequently, [the non-Buddhist extremist thinks] the formation of the world is due to being conceived by Mahābrāhma and in accordance with his wishes, thinking: the entire world is emanated by me. Their divine eyes see in that way. After that, when a end point is considered, given that different sentient beings are seen to die, this world too is seen as perishable; but at that point, Mahābrāhma is perceived as remaining, undying - and there is no perception of a time after that. Given observation by the mind through yogic direct perception and non-observation [i.e. inference] through yogic direct perception, [and] given these, too, appear as things that are causes and effects that are themselves established by direct perception and non-observation [i.e. inference], this is a view in which things exist just in the manner in which they appear.

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1341 *sngon gyi mtha’* (462.12) : *pūrvaṇa, pūrvako*(Mvp 8305-8306). The Tibetan *sngon gyi mtha’* is generally defined as the foremost point in time for the emergence the physical world and the sentient beings within it (*snod bcud ’jig rten sogs thog mar ’byung dus kyi ya mtha’* TDCM 715b).

1342 This is not dissimilar to the narrative of the *Brahmajala*-sutta (DN 1.1-46), the Tibetan of which is found in Martin 1987, who argues there for a connection between the aforementioned sutta and the *Guhyagarbha-tantra*.

1343 *phyi ma’i mtha’* (462.16) : *aparānta*(Mvp 8307). The Tibetan is generally defined as a point of termination in the future (*ma’ongs pa’i zad mtshams* TDCM 1744b).

1344 rnal ’byor gyi mngon sum (462.08).

1345 This reasoning is spelled out in Rongzom’s *Man ngag lta phreng gi ’grel pa: de la dbang phyug rgyur smra ba rnam mngon sum dang mi dmigs pas ji ltar bsgrub ce na| dang po’’jig rten chags pa’i dus su| tshangs chen gyi gnas grub pa na| tshangs pa chen po ’byung bar ’gyur te| tshangs pa chend po de’i ’dod pa’i dbang gis blon po dang zham ’bring du gyurd pa| ’dun na’ don dang tshangs ’khor la stsoqs pa skyed cing ’phrul par ’dod pa’i bsam pa skyes pa dang mthun par| tshangs pa ’dun na’ don dang| tshangs ’khor la stsoqs pa’i gnas dang sens can chags shing byung bar gyurd te| gzhi de las| sugar ni ni dmigs la| khos bskyed cing sprul pas ni de lta’ bur mngon sum du grub pa dang| sems can rnam kyi las [312]| kyi dbang las skye ba ni ma dmigs pas| I tshangs chen ni lta ba’i gnas chen po ’gyur te| de ltar na ’di’ yang mngon sum dang mi dmigs pa la rten pa yin no| de nas gzhan yang de’i rig byed spyad par gyurd pa| ’phyi rol gyi dge’ slong dag gis| bsam gtan gyi ting nye ’dzin dang mngon par shes pa thob ste| bdag dang ’jig rten gyi mtha’ brtags pa kha cig gis| I tshangs pa chen po’’chi’ ba ni ma mthong| gzhan ’chi’ ba ni mthong la| sens can gyi las kyi bag chags kyang ma mthong bas| tshangs pa chen po rtag pa’’rgyur lta ba byung ste| ’di’ yang mngon sum dang mi dmigs pa’ la rten pa yin no(RZSB 1.310.17-311.07). Again, this recalls the *Brahmajala-sutta*; see Martin 2007. Compare with RZSB 1.311.12-311.24.
§ 3.2.1.2. śrāvaka system (462.21-463.23)

Among Buddhists, and included among the theories of the Vaibhāṣikas, those such as the followers of Vatsiputra, say that Mahābhrama and Vaśavartideva are neither existent nor eternal, and they are not causes; [their] selves and nature have no basis in reality. The people that are instantaneously [463.01] born sentient beings exist in an inexpressible [relation] to the aggregates, similar to water and water-spirits. The transmigration of that which is the person (gang zag ba) [463.1350] is like a water spirit fleeing from a barren place. Nevertheless it is asserted that it exists as a momentary impermanent thing. Minute particles, however, are not [subject to] the impermanence of perishability; [and] they claim “momentary impermanence is real” (“exists,” god). According to this philosophical position, the non-Buddhists extremist view that Mahābhrama, among others, is permanent and a cause is proven by non-implicative negation to be totally imagined and [it is therefore] denied. That which is the person is proven through implicative negation to be existent, transmigrating, and indestructible such that ultimate reality is proven a real entity of which things may be predicated. More need not be said [on the matter] given the fact that the Vaibhāṣikas and those in their camp – the Sautrāntikas, as well – and regions such as Kashmir and

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1347 NTh 78.06; Th 144.02; BM 70.07.

1348 Regarding its origins, kLong chen pa states: "at the time when the Buddha was about to pass into nirvana, a teacher of the tradition of Naked Ascetics approached him. With the words, 'Come here,' the Buddha ordained him and he became a śrāvaka. This teacher, Vatsiputra, then asked the Buddha whether the individual self is the same as the mind-body aggregates, or distinct from them, or both, or neither. The Buddha’s answer was to say nothing at all, which Vatsiputra interpreted to mean that the self does exist but is inexpressible. Although he had embraced the dharma, he accepted the existence of an inexpressible self" (Klon-ch’en-pa Dri-med-’od-zer. *The Precious Treasury of Philosophical Systems: A Treatise Elucidating the Meaning of the Entire Range of Spiritual Approaches* Junction City, Calif: Padma Pub, 2007, p. 68-69).

1349 klu (463.01) : naga. Here, inexpressibility pertains to the relation between the self and the aggregates. In the case of nagas, their self is somehow both of the water as well as in it; and that somehowness is something not particularly amenable to description. This calls into question the nature of the skandha: what, exactly, are they?

1350 NTh 78.06; Th 144.03; BM 72.04.

1351 There is a tantric work, Tōh. 2880, called Dpa‘u phyag na rdo rje’i spur gsad las tshogs bsdus pa in bsTan’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, nu, vol. 37 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang), pp. 830-834, containing a mantra section called klu ’bros pa’i sngags : nāgāpanayamantra, pp. 833-834. The phrasing is the same as that given by Rongzom (klu ’bros pa), but it does not appear to be directly related.

1352 skad cig ma’i mi rtag pa (463.03-463.04) : kṣaṇānitya.

1353 ’jig pa’i mi rtag pa (463.03) : vināśānitya.
Madhyadeśa / Maghada (dbus pa),1354 are the source of so many conflicting theories.1355

To summarize for the moment, in the Śrāvaka system, that which is set forth as actual according to the system of the non-Buddhist extremists are these outer and inner things, totally imagined and therefore without any basis in reality. The character of the aggregates, elements and sources is not like that. [These] outer and inner things are bifurcated, produced due to causes and conditions, established through direct perception and non-observation [i.e. inference] - [i.e.] things with their own character - because the how and the what of them1356 is established as ultimately real entities.1357

What is established through the yogic direct perception and non-observation of non-Buddhist extremists, on that view, is devoid of error even though there are others who do not perceive such. Here, at the point where the state of death1358 ceases, that enables the coming-into-being1359 of the intermediate state,1360 the cessation of that enables the coming-to-be of the state

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1354 In Tibetan intellectual traditions, the Vaibhāṣika are divided into three camps: the Kashmiri Vaibhāṣika, the nyi ‘og or “Western” Aparantika Vaibhāṣika, and the yul dbus or “Central Region” Vaibhāṣika. I am unsure as to the specific referent of this latter term. It is important to note that Tibetan intellectuals maintain that the Vaibhāṣika schools all maintain that the ultimate is a real entity (rdzas yod). See, for example, the discussion in Grub mtha’ rin chen phreng ba’i tshig ‘grel thor bu (Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1996) 13-15. This concern for the influence of the Vaibhāṣika is a consistent concern in Rongzom’s writing, one worth investigating. Cf. Rongzom’s TB]By: dbang po dang don yang kha dog dang mthun pa’i rdul phra rab rdzas su yod do zhes bya ba la sogs pa lta ba mi mthun pa’i bye brag mang du yod la | bye brag tu smra bu nyid la yang kha che bye brag tu smra ba dang | yul dbus kyi bye brag tu smra la sogs pa yul gyis phyre ba yang yod do | (RZSB 2.08.14-08.17); and dKon cog ‘grel: theg pa chen po yang de dang mthun par byung ste | chos la bdag med par smra ba dang | byang chub sens dpa’i sdom pa la sogs pa cung zad mi ’dra ba ni nang gi bye brag ste | ’di lta bu ni | khyed cag nyid la yang ndo sde pa dang | bye brag tu smra ba dang | kha che bye brag tu smra ba dang | yul dbus kyi bye brag tu smra ba dang | sde pa so sor lta ba dang sgom pa nang mi mthun pa yod pa dang ’dra’o | de bas na khyed rnuans kyi theg pa chen po sangs rgyas kyi bka’ ma yin par the tshom za bar mi bya’o | (RZSB 1.80.13-80.19). Critically, Rongzom’s concern for the Vaibhāṣika is connected to their theories concerning real entities (dravya : rdzas).

1355 As noted above, the phrasing of this passage leaves me nonplussed; and I remain uncertain about whether Rongzom’s criticism should be interpreted as indicating that the discordant views are due to the influence of the geographical “regions” (yul) such as Kashmir or what Rongzom views as unfortunate philosophical agendas concerning “objects” (yul). Perhaps this is a false dilemma.

1356 yod pa dang yin pas (463.15). That is, the how of something’s existence; and what it pertains to. We might also consider the two, respectively, existential and predicative.

1357 As is well known, for Vaibhāṣika’s ultimate truth or reality or real or existent entity are synonymous (don dam bden pa dang rdzas yod don gcig).

1358 ‘chi ba’i srid pa (463.18): maranabhava; this term is generally defined as one of the four types of becoming; the moment just after one has lost the physical body of this life or [being] just about to die (srid pa bzhi’i sgras shig ste | iše ’di i lus rten bor ma thag pa’am ’chi kha ma o TDCM 865b).


1360 bar ma do’i srid pa (463.18-463.19): antarabhava (Mvp 7680). On the mechanics of Buddhist rebirth, see the third chapter of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam. Alot must depend on the schematization of the twelve links of interdependence. Wayman, in his essay, “The Intermediate-State Dispute in Buddhism” writes: “Perhaps the most important doctrinal opposition to an intermediate state is the interpretation of the first two members of pratītyasamutpāda as pertaining to he previous life. This interpretation is deeply impressed on the Abhidharma literature, both in the Pāli and Sanskrit languages. Of course, birth was standardized in terms of vijñāna, third member of pratītyasamutpāda. Therefore the first two
of birth such that the continuity of the five aggregates is without interruption. Given that is the case, when one of the three states of being comes to an end, insomuch as one has failed to realize the true character (mtshan nyid) of obtaining a single birth, the view that fixates on the imagined emerges. In yogic direct perception, there is no confusion. Even an idea of a beginning point and end point, too, of the self and the world is analogous to that (de bzhin no).

§ 3.2.1.3. yogācāra system (463.23-465.02)

According to the approach of the Yogācāra, given these appearances of outer and inner things, the Śrāvakā’s insistence that [i] external [464] objects are real entities independent of cognitive recognition that have their own particular characteristics which are naturally capable of being grasped, and [ii] that cognitive recognition itself [an internal object] is also a real entity capable of being grasped, are [both] totally imagined with no basis in reality and something [Yogācāra’s] work to negate [via non-implicative negation].

[In the Yogācāra approach,] false conceptions that are neither of those [i.e. external nor internal], although devoid of duality, are indeed characterized by their dual appearance. Given these are generated due to causes and conditions and are not, moreover, incompatible with direct perception and non-observation [i.e. inference], are not the actual occurrence of mind and mental factors a

members, avidyā and samskāra would perforce constitute an intermediate-state, after no. 12, jarāmarana [Tib. rga ’chi], unless the first two members could somehow be understood to not follow upon death. A solution was to say that those two belong to the previous cycle.“ See Wayman, Alex. Buddhist Insight (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Pub, 2002) pp 251-266. We can see this same theory in the pratityasamutpāda verses of the Lalitavistara. Saṃkalpakalpajanitena ayoniśena | bhavate avidyā na pi saṃbhavako’ṣya kaścit | samskāraḥetu dadate na ca saṃkramaṇo’sti | vijnājām udbhavati saṃkramanaṃ pratītya (Edgerton’s Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Reader, p. 24). This shows the Lalitavistara to be in agreement with the theory found in the Pāli (that the first two members of pratityasamutpāda pertain to the previous life (this differs from, say, Asanga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya, which does not). On this model, vijnāna starts the transference dependent upon the samskāra just as a face in the mirror depends on the face. The Pitāputrasamādgaṇa-sūtra, too, takes up this line, stating that prathamaviṃśa arises having two conditions pertaining to birth (aupapatti), by reason of the caramaviṃśa (‘last perception,’ see Wayman’s Insight 255) as the predominant condition (adhipatipratyaya) and by reason of karma as supporting condition (ārambanapratyaya). Also noteworthy is the analog found in the pratityasamutpāda’s formulation; it mirrors the Bhṛhadārāyana Upaniṣad (1.2.2). In the Bhṛhadārāyana we find: aiveha kimcāṇāgra asīti | nṛtyunaivededamārthamāśadānāyā | aśāyā hi nṛtyah | tanmano’kṣutātmanoṣ tyāmīti (“In the beginning there was nothing here at all. Death along covered this completely [cf. avidyā], as did hunger; for what is hunger but death? [cf. samskārā] Then death made up his mind: ‘Let me equip myself with an ātman’ [cf. vijnāna], etc. See Olivelle’s Early Upanishads, pp. 36-37 and Wayman’s Insight, p. 256 for more on this parallel.

1361 skye ba’i srid pa (463.19) : upapattibhava (Mvp 7681).
1362 srid pa gsum (463.20) : tribhava (Chandra 2001: 819c); the three are generally understood as the states of birth, death, and the intermediate state (ske srid dang | ’chi srid | bar srid bcas gsum TDCM 2976b).
1363 NTh 80.04; Th 146.03; BM 74.01.
1364 ’gags par byed (464.03).
reflexive direct perception?\textsuperscript{1365} Is direct perception \textit{per se} not knowledge of reality?\textsuperscript{1366} In that case, what need is there to prove knowledge of reality through some other form of reasoning?\textsuperscript{1367} Is there is some powerful distinct second knowledge of reality that repudiates it establishes the ultimate state as something whose existence and being is substantially real? [In the Yogācāra approach, non-dual cognition] is established as an real entity in existential and predicative terms.

Among the [schools of Yogācāra,\textsuperscript{1368} there are] Yogācārins who postulate real images.\textsuperscript{1369} For them, it is said that, in the end, whatever appears is substantially a real entity.\textsuperscript{1370} [There are also Yogācārins] who postulate false images.\textsuperscript{1371} For them, the presence of generated appearances of object and subject - false appearances - if true, are conventionally true. What is real is said to be characterized by reflexive awareness - empty of duality - which is, in the end, a real entity.\textsuperscript{1372} [There are also Yogācārins] who postulate the non-existence of images.\textsuperscript{1373} For them, there is not even a [single] moment of experience wherein there is the generation of subjective and objective images connected with mind and mental factors associated with the three realms\textsuperscript{1374} because dualistic appearance pertain to karmic imprints, which can not be described as either the mind or something other than the mind-as-such. That itself is something said to be imagined. Therefore, all obscurations, such as afflictions and the like, in fact pertain to adventitious\textsuperscript{1375} karmic imprints and their character is totally imagined. The mind’s own nature,\textsuperscript{1376} even for a sentient being [i.e. not a

\textsuperscript{1365} \textit{rang rig pa’i mngon sum} (464.06) : svasaśvedana-pratyakṣa.
\textsuperscript{1366} \textit{yang dag dag pa’i shes pa} (464.06-464.07) : samyagjñāna (Mvp 4469). Perhaps this term is better rendered “correct understanding,” “correct cognition,” “proper knowledge,” and the like.
\textsuperscript{1367} Again (cf. ch. 2), we might do well, here, to recall Kapstein’s remarks concerning the term: “The Tibetan \textit{rigs pa}, like its Sanskrit counterpart \textit{yukti}, is a term whose reference may be either extrametalional or psychological - note the analogy to the English reason, when taken to include, for example, the reason it happened as well as his reason for doing it” (2001: 322).
\textsuperscript{1369} \textit{rnam pa bden par smra ba} (464.10) : satyākāravādin.
\textsuperscript{1370} Cf. Rongzom’s TBJBy: \textit{de la rnam pa bden par smra ba ni} l \textit{lus dang gnas dang spyod yul du snang ba thams cad} \textit{sens nyid kyi ngo bo yin pa’i phyir} \textit{ji ltar snang ba de bzhih du yang dag par bden pa yin no zhe’o} (RZSB 2.16.06-16.11)
\textsuperscript{1371} \textit{rnam pa brdzun par smra ba} (464.11) : alīkāravādin.
\textsuperscript{1372} Cf. Rongzom’s TBJBy: \textit{rnam pa rdzun par smra ba ni} l \textit{sens can gyi dus na yang gzung ‘dzin du skye ba’i rtag po ni yod pa yan la} \textit{de ni yang dag pa ma yin pa kun tu rtag po ste} \textit{yand dag po na gnyis pos stong pa} \textit{rang rig pa’i mtshan nyid tsam du yod la} \textit{sangs rgyas pa’i dus na yang dag po} \textit{jig rten pa’i ye shes kun rdzob kyi bden pa’i tshul tsam nminga ste} \textit{on kyang yang dag pa’i ye shes ni rnam par mi rtag po’i ye shes skad cig ma tsam mo} \textit{RZSB 2.16.11-16.15)
\textsuperscript{1373} \textit{rnam pa myed par smra ba} (RZSB 464.14-464.15) : nirākāravādin, anākāravādin.
\textsuperscript{1374} Cf. TBJBy: \textit{rnam pa med par smra ba ni} l \textit{sens can kun gyi dus na yang sens dang sens las byung ba gzung ‘dzin gya rnam pa skad dag cig tsam yang skye ma myong ste} (RZSB 2.16.15-16.17).
\textsuperscript{1375} glo bur ba (464.19) : agantuka; cf. Ruegg 2008: 164 n. 217; Mvp 6937, 8746.
\textsuperscript{1376} \textit{sens kyi rang bzhih} (464.19-464.20) : cittasvabhāva (Chandra 2001: 809b).
buddha], is something radiant, reflexively aware, and inherently real. Even for a superior, there is no enhancement [of the mind] beyond that [of a sentient being] and thus the mind’s own nature is a natural state of gnosis divorced from images.\footnote{Cf. Gsungs thor bu: rang byung gi ye shes kyang secs rang rig pa tsam yin pa dang | gzhan yig pa rnam kyang ’khrul ba yin pa ’i phyir | de bzhin yod pa ma yin pas | secs ye nas dag pa ’i phyir dang | rnam par mi rtog pa ’i ye shes skyes pa ’i tshe yang | | rang rig pa tsam las bogs dbyung du med pa ’i phyir dang | rang rig pa nyid kyang ngo bo nyid kyi stong pa ’i phyir | rang byung gi ye shes so (RZSB 2.65.20-65.24); cf. Almogi 2009: 216 n. 102; and TBJBy: rtags pa tsam mo ’phags pa ’i dus na yang ngo bo nyid de las bogs dbyung de med de | on kyang khyad par ni blo bur ba ’i bag thugs yod pa snyam byed pa | de dang bral ba’o zhe’o (RZSB 2.16.20-16.23).} If there be a slight distinction, it would be that, for sentient beings, [the mind’s own nature] is not experienced as radiant due to the obscurations caused by adventitious karmic imprints; but at the level of the superior it is said to be experienced as radiant. To sum up in conclusion, all [Yogācārins maintain that] whatever is marked by non-conceptual \footnote{NTh 82.01; Th 148.04; BM 75.05.} gnosis, the very natural state of which is empty of duality, is said to be an ultimately real entity.

§ 3.2.1.4. madhyamaka system (465.02-465.08)

According to the Madhyamaka approach, it is said that whatever the Yogācārins’ theories about the existential and predicative status of the character of the ultimate, it is something totally imagined, with no basis in reality, and is non-implicatively negated. For a Mādhyamika,\footnote{dbu ma pa (465.05) : mādhyamika.} there is no establishing an ultimate that can be established within implicative negation.\footnote{For a different interpretation of the passage, see Pettit, John W. Mipham’s Beacon of Certainty: Illuminating the View of Dzogchen, the Great Perfection (Wisdom Publications, 1999) 255.} Correct conventions, which are just conventional illusions, are generated due to causes and conditions; they have the capacity to perform a function [and they are] only agreeable only insofar as they are not scrutinized. When scrutinized, they cannot withstand the burden of reasoning.\footnote{We recall from a passage above: don dam par bsgrub par bya ba ni ’dod na | kun rdzob tsam ni ma btags na nyams dga’ ba | btags na rigs pa’i spungs mi bzod pa yin pas | rigs pas gnod pa la ’gal ba ngyed do zhe na (RZSB 1.423.09-423.10).} They are devoid of inherent nature;\footnote{rang gi ngo bos dben pa (465.07). cf. isolé de la nature (Zaregradsky, Michel. Le grand livre de la progression vers l’éveil (Editions Dharma, 1992) 351).} and however they appear corresponds to the how and the what of them such that this is said not to conflict with either direct perception or non-observation [i.e. inference].

§ 3.2.1.5. guhyamantra system (465.09-466.14)

According to the Guhyamantra approach, given that there is no ultimate thing [and] conventions are just appearances to the confused mind, the manner
in which a thing exist is just as it appears. The apprehension of how and what it actually is totally imagined and has no basis in reality. Since it appears to confused consciousness on that account, it is not possible for the apprehension to actually be in accordance with the appearance. For example, an appearance that is generated due to causes and conditions in a dream: just as all the following - harvest being due to the flowing of a field, drinking poison leading to illness, and recovery being due to the taking medicine - appear to arise due to causes and conditions. In fact, dynamic appearance\textsuperscript{1383} does, too. Furthermore, in a dream, a vase’s form appears capable of retaining water and the reflection of a vase appears incapable of retaining water. That being the case, even the context of just a dream, given that appearances like that do not require any proof, there is nothing at all to actually distinguish them.

Similarly, `outer and inner things that appear generated through causes and conditions and these distinctions between appearances capable and incapable of performing functions, too, for skilled panditas,\textsuperscript{1384} foolish women,\textsuperscript{1385} elephant herders\textsuperscript{1386} and everyone in between, are possible in terms of mere appearance. Varieties of appearance, such as experience of consistent appearances respective of one’s karma, totally pure and totally impure appearances, etc.,\textsuperscript{1387} are all consistent given they are all said to appear. No proof is needed [on this point] because appearance is the basic criteria upon which the various characteristics [of phenomena] are posited. Characteristics are proven in accordance with their appearance, though they have not even minutest particle. Therefore [466\textsuperscript{1388}], all presentations of things [in term of] their own character ineluctably characterize what is totally imagined. That being the case,\textsuperscript{1389} since the possibility of proving the how and the what of something empty of the totally imagined that has its own characteristics is non-implicatively negated with respect to everything that is knowable, there is nothing at all left over upon which to base the teaching [of the totally imagined]. Given in terms of appearance alone, those inconsistent experiences that vary respective of one’s karma do not seem to be posited as something characterized. Yet for those with even the slightest conceptual activity\textsuperscript{1390} they seem to be posited as something totally imagined.

These explanations that correct conventions exist defined by their generation due to causes and conditions [and] the ability to perform functions, which are given here only in brief explanations used by scholars of the past according to the system of Guhyamantra, pertain to the character of the totally imagined. In Madhyamaka approach, beginning with the assertion that since these outer and inner things arise as dependent relations they cannot be ultimately produced, conventions are said to arise and cease due to the influence

\textsuperscript{1383} bya ba byed par snang ba (465.14-465.15).
\textsuperscript{1384} mkhas pa paṅ ti ta (465.20).
\textsuperscript{1385} klun mo (465.20-465.21)
\textsuperscript{1386} ba glang rdzi (465.21).
\textsuperscript{1387} “Etc.,” here, refers back to the apparent dichotomies given at § 1.5 above.
\textsuperscript{1388} NTh 83.05; Th 150.05; BM 77.02.
\textsuperscript{1389} de bas na (465.24).
\textsuperscript{1390} rtog pa cung zad rtas pa rnams (466.06).
of causes and conditions and thus are impermanent [and] changeable. All these are said [in Mañjuśrīmitra’s Meditation on Bodhicitta] to "arise and cease to be via the mode of interdependent origination; there is no cause and effect akin to a burnt seed [producing a sprout]: there is no non-existent nothing arising from nothing."  

Q. If that is the case, what is the character of appearance as cause and result?  
It has been proclaimed in extensive detail in such texts [as Mañjuśrīmitra’s Meditation on Bodhicitta that] "Given that the mind itself fixates on things and conceptualizes causality, it appears as cause and condition..." Thus, in the system of Guhyamantra, all phenomena are totally imagined, that’s it. Whatever is merely imputed, that per se is totally imagined. The inherent nature of that which is totally conceptual is the character of the totally imagined since the character of perfected phenomena is devoid of any basis in reality. Indeed, the totally imagined is itself the character of knowable phenomena - it is also the path and the fruit. That being the case, yogins who persist in the system of Guhyamantra should understand knowables in terms of an awareness of just the totally imagined and objectified result.  
Q. If that is the case and it is true the character of phenomena is like this, why did the Buddhas (rgyal ba rnams) not teach that to be the case from the very beginning?  
This [particular teaching] pertains to the domain of experience of those with vast and extensive discriminating awareness and conviction because if it were taught to those persons troubled by pride and afflictive emotions, it would be no different from those postulating a nihilism, the continua of migrators would be wasted, and all positive effort would be reversed. In deference to that fact, it not something that is to be taught to all and it is difficult to realize - therefore, it is called the system of secret mantra (sangs sngags : guhyamantra).

1391 rnam par 'gyur ba'i chos can (466.11-466.12) : parināmadharma.  
1392 A.k.a. rDo la gser zhun.  
1394 Tö 2591: Byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa (Bodhicittabhyāsā) in bsTan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): 1 dngos por zhen cing rgyu dang 'bras bur rtog pa'i sens nyid ni 1 l rgyu dang rkyen du snang ste de gnyis med phyir skye dang 'jig pa med 1 812.14-812.15.  
1395 Reading kun du rtog pa rnams (BM 78.03; Th 152.02) rather than kun tu tog pa rnams (RZSB 466.18).  
1396 Thus, for Rongzom, the three natures of Yogācāra theory are all subsumed into the category of totally imagined - equally.  
1397 mgon du bya (466.23) : sākṣātikāra.  
1398 NTh 85.03; Th 152.05; BM 78.06.  
1399 'gro ba'i rgyud chud gson pa (467.02-67.03).  
1400 rnam par dkar ba'i rtsol ba thams cad zlog par byed do (467.03).
Thus, it is necessary to bring minds of those fixated on things [to the tantric view] slowly and gradually. Take for example a person who, carried away by water, searches for solid ground. Having grabbed the tip of a branch of a tree that has fallen in the water, she thinks, "since this branch is not steady, I can't rely on it!" She quickly lets it go and clutches at a piece of the root gradually pulling herself closer and closer to the base of the root and thinks, "I've got dry land!" [But] with an unsound or diseased root (rtsa ba drungs byung), the water carries her away and the segment of the root itself sinks into the water while she searches. Upon seeing the tip of [another] root protruding from the river bank, she would once again make for that direction thinking, "before, the part of the root I thought stable was in fact a sinking weight. Part of the tip of the branch that I thought was unstable can support and save [me]. Now, I will break it up into something useful. I will lean on the branch pieces, breaking up the branches; some can be relied on; some act as shelter in the face of the wind; some act as an anchor against the wind; and some can be made into paddles - so I can get out of here!" Then, having acted on that, she is as if someone freed from the water (chus las thar pa de bzhin).

Similarly, those who desire the path of liberation, first clutch onto a worldly path. After perceiving it to be something totally imagined, they desire a path accompanied by fruition free of the totally imagined; [one] that is, by its own nature, genuinely qualified as perfected. When they gradually investigate and search, they see that everything that is correctly imagined is unsound and not real. As for how they traverse the path, if they seize upon "one that is genuine," what need is there to even mention [their predilection for searching something out] that is seized on as ultimate? Grasping at conventionally correct character, in fact, is itself perceived as a sinking weight of bondage; and once the weapon of discriminative awareness severs all the correct theories, only awareness concerning the totally imagined remains [468]. One engaged in [such] skill-in-means is as if there is no bondage: not attached to or dependent
upon anything. The accomplishing of whatever is desired by the one engaged in skill-in-means through play and sport just like a bird soaring through space.

§ 3.3. issue three (468.03-473.05)

Q. If that is the case [i.e. that everything is, in the end, totally imagined.] how is it that the Yogācārins do not explain conceptuality as totally imagined?\footnote{Alternatively: "If that is the case, how is it that the Yogācārins' explanation is not that conceptuality is totally imagined?" (’o na rnal ’byor spyod pa dag gis kun rtog pa ni | kun brtags par bshad pa ma yin pa ’di ji lta bu zhe na 468.03-468.04).}

There is no one who holds their own tenets to be totally imagined. For each perspective, respectively, there are two explanations of instrument and activity: as independent or dependent. When they are validated as the one, they are denied as the other. Accordingly, when the instrument - an axe - and the activity - chopping wood into pieces - are two, they are described as dependent. It is not possible to validate the statement: "an axe cuts itself." If, when validating [instrument and activity] as dependent, we are establishing something like a lamp qua something that throws off light,\footnote{mar me snang bar byed pa lta bu (468.10).} the lamp is the instrument that illuminates;\footnote{gsal bar byed pa (468.11).} the activity, illuminating a darkened area;\footnote{gsal bar bya ba ni mun pa dang ldan pa’i sa phyogs (468.11).} the illuminated was made an area devoid of darkness. If validated as independent, the lamp is the instrument that illuminates, as well; the lamp, moreover, is illuminating activity; the actual lamp was illuminated, generating a divorce from ongoing darkness. It is possible to validate either independent or dependent [concepts of instrument and activity]. When considering the two, if an instrument is given as existent - not something negated - it’s not tenable to negate its product as non-existent. Accordingly, whether [insisting upon] the existence of an instrument that chops wood while denying the wood that has been chopped or [insisting upon] the existence of an instrument illuminating darkness while denying what was [illuminated], a proof is untenable.

Similarly, given the existence of the conceptual, a denial of its product is not tenable; yet the textual tradition in which instrument and activity are described as dependent is simply refuted. Accordingly, the totally imagined as activity [and] an the instrument as conception are of the same class of dependence; and if the kinds of conceptual awareness that are actively capable of labeling conventions are posited in terms of something totally imagined, which is characterized by object and subject, it is possible to negate as non-existent something totally imagined as distinct.

According to the procedure [validating] independence, just as it is not tenable to prove the non-existence of what was illuminated [i.e. the actual lamp (469\footnote{NTh 88.05; Th 157.01; BM 81.07.}) given that the lamp is the instrument that illuminates and the illuminating activity, then inasmuch as the mind and mental factors associated with the three realms pertain to false conceptions, the totally imagined as activity is not something distinct from the [instrument qua] mind and mental factors.
Even the totally imagined, being that they proceed via causality qua mind and mental factors, appear dual though they are in fact non-dual. That being the case, when "totally imagined" is said in other contexts as well, because varied conceptions persistently involved in what is only imputed are perceived, it applies to everything [else] that way.

In sum, when the character of conceptions and imputations are all given in general, conceptions comprise at least three [species]: conception, imagination, and discursive conception. When these three terms are invoked, [they are not unlike,] for example, the terms affection, secondary affection, and the thoroughly afflicted: when [the terms are used] casually [or liberally], there is a sizable semantic range; when the terms are used strictly, the import is consistent. These three [connected to] conception are likewise. The term conception has a broad semantic range and applies to the path, fruit, and doctrinal discourses. The term imagination applies to the mind and all mental factors, too, that are associated with the three realms. The term discursive conception applies to intention and particular species of discriminative awareness some classes of which are active in labeling conventions. There are some contexts in which what is imagined is itself indicated by the term discursive conception. On occasions when that term is applied in connection with a buddha’s emanations, the path, and the dharma that is taught, are also called skillful conception.

Q. What is it that those conceptions consider?
That alone (de nyid) is considered by skillful conception; and only those conceptions are considered as skillful. Further, it is stated:

From within [the domain of] non-conceptual phenomena,
Sentient beings understand objects;
Anything that is imputed through ideas,
Is, on that account, called a concept.

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1413 de nyid rgyu dang 'bras bu'i tshul du grub pa (469.04).
1414 kun du rtog pa (469.08-469.09) : śānti-kālpa.
1415 rnam par rtog pa (469.09) : vi-kālpa.
1416 ngyon mong (469.09) : klesa.
1417 nye ba'i nyon mong (469.09-469.10) : upāklesa.
1418 kun nas nyon mong pa (469.10) : samklesa.
1419 yul khyab che chung (469.11).
1420 yul rgya che ste (469.12).
1421 sems pa (469.15) : cetanā.
1423 bstan pa'i chos (469.17) : deśanādharmaḥ.
1424 thabs kyi rtog pa (469.18).
1425 The de nyid (469.19) is read here as if it refers back to rtog pa nyid (469.16).
1426 Thō. 367: rTog pa thams cad 'dus pa zhes bya ba sangs rgyas thams cad dang dnya'm par sbyor ba mktar ’ gro sgyur ma bde ba'i mchog gi rgyud phyi ma'i phyi ma (Sarva-kalpa-samuccaya-nāma-sarvabuddha-samāyoga-dākint-jīla-sāmvara-uttarottara-tantra) in bKa'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rgyud 'bum, ka, vol. 77 (Beijing: Krong go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang).
There are others, as well (la stogs pa). In whatever way these are related in tantra of Guhyamantra\textsuperscript{1427} and individual conceptions, they are broadly connected not only to conception but to imputation. What is imputed by the imagination was already explained above. What is imputed by discursive conception was already carefully explained above in the context the individual philosophical positions concerning the self [asserted by] non-Buddhist extremists [470]\textsuperscript{1428} and Śrāvakas in connection with such [conceptions] as apprehended and apprehender and so forth.

Q. What, then, is it that appears imputed with those concepts?

As in the case of what appears imputed in connection with skillful conceptions, they concern such things as the capacity of this karmically developed body\textsuperscript{1429} to train for the buddha ground until it is discarded by the attainment of those who secure the spiritual accomplishment that is the divine buddha-body – the Great Seal\textsuperscript{1430} endowed with the major and minor marks of awakening and the six types of clairvoyance.\textsuperscript{1431} Even [if] it does not become like that, it does become a fire-like substance that is as if ablaze, soaring through space, moving through the totally pure realms and capable of remaining for an age, and so on. In the case of the imagination, what appears imputed are all that manifests and is developed with respect to the bodies, locations, and resources of the three realms.

In the case of discursive conception, what appears imputed are things like monks of the past who are unsurpassable companions who live together and by the force of contemplating the repulsive become objects of animosity.

Q. What is incapable of appearing in that way, though imputed by those conceptions?

What is incapable of appearing in that way though imputed by skillful conception is what is incapable of being brought about through such things as the syllables and symbolic gestures regardless of having meditated when cultivating the path of Guhyamantra; nevertheless, [its] seeds grow. What is incapable of appearing though imputed by the imagination is karma the coming together of which exists though its total development is not capable of being drawn out through the mind and mental factors; nevertheless, [its] seeds grow. What is incapable of appearing though imputed by discursive conception are such things as the self [asserted] by the non-Buddhist extremists; nevertheless, [its] seeds grow.

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\textsuperscript{1427} gsang sngags kyi rgyud (469.22).
\textsuperscript{1428} NTh 90.03; Th 159.02; BM 83.04.
\textsuperscript{1429} rnam par smin pa'i lus (470.03-470.04) : "vipākadeha. One of the three embodiments noted by Rongzom above and in his TBJBy (cf. 2.18.19), described in STMG as a nasty entanglement that obscures (rnam smin lus ngan drwa bas bsgrigs pa yis 41.04); cf. Jackson’s "Birds in the Egg and Newborn Lion Cubs: Metaphors for the Potentialities and Limitations of 'All-at-once' Enlightenment," § 3.A n. 5 in TIBETAN STUDIES Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies NARITA 1989, p. 99 n. 5.
\textsuperscript{1430} lha'i sku phyang rgya chen po (470.04) : kāyamahāmudrā.
\textsuperscript{1431} mngon par shes pa drug (470.05) : śaṭabhijñā (Mvp 46); cf. Mvp 201-209 and Almogi 2009: 268 n. 80.
Q. What does not appear due to not being imputed by these conceptions?

What does not appear due to not being imputed by skillful conceptions are the qualities of superiors, which do not appear to ordinary beings who have not in fact cultivated the path. What does not appear due to not being imputed by the imagination is the unconditioned due to conscious awareness' insufficient conditions; [and] the unproduced aggregates. In terms of what is not imputed through discursive conception, there are two: what is not imputed [via] insufficient conditions due to which concepts are not generated; this [type] is subsumed in the what was given above. Since individually discriminating awareness analyzes individually, it realizes the empty and the selfless. As for what does not appear because it is not imputed as self or thing, it is through cultivation of the path the unconditioned is attained.

There is no conflict in the appearance of what is nonetheless not imputed because the appearance of falling hairs are imagined by those with cataracts. A hare’s horn, too, is imagined and does not appear through imputation because there is simply no accumulation of the karma that produces a horn within that continuum. Given that discursive conception applies to the conventions called imputation and realization, on this view the false perceptions connected with discursive conceptual awareness are designated imputations. The perceptions connected with unmistaken awareness are called realizations.

Here, someone might object and say that these two terms have something in common. On that view, the term realization (rtogs pa) even applies to perceptions that are false - just as in the so-called not realized or wrongly realized; [and it might be said that] unmistaken perceptions also apply to the term imputation, whether its individually discriminating awareness correctly imputing something or the so-called cessation through individual analysis.

Yet this objection does not follow because even though the words realization and imputation might indicate something similar as terms, they are applied in two different contexts in connection with the action of activity and the action of the instrument since the false perception indicated in terms of the action of activity is not applied in connection with the term realization. The term imputation is not applied to unmistaken perceptions. In terms of the action of the instrument, the term realization is applied even to false perceptions; and the term imputation is even applied to unmistaken perceptions, as well because in fact the

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1432 mngon par ’dus ma byas pa (470.22) : anabhisaṃskāra.
1433 rkya’i ma tshang ba (470.21) : pratyayavaikalyam.
1434 so sor rtog pa’i shes rab (470.24) : pratisamkhyaśrajaḥ.
1435 DB 84.07; Th 161.03.
1436 Reading bdag med par rtogs so (NTh 92.01) rather than bdag m(y)ed par rtogs te (RZSB 1.471.01, Th 161.03, and BM 84.07).
1437 ma rtogs pa (471.09).
1438 log par rtogs pa (471.09). This term is often, and perhaps best, rendered “misunderstanding” (e.g. Kapstein 1987: 336); but I have attempted to maintain Rz’s play on words.
1439 so sor brtags pa’i ’gog pa (471.11) : pratisamkhyānirodha. While the Tibetan term Rongzom is playing on a verbal element that can be rendered in connection with either of the verbs "to impute" or "to analyze," depending on context, the play is not retained in English since the term so sor brtags pa’i ’gog pa cannot be rendered "cessation through individual imputation" without losing something essential.
[Sanskrit] term *kalpita*\(^{1440}\) indicates something imputed; *unnmistaken* indicates action of the instrument, either [through the Sanskrit term] *avabodha*\(^{1441}\) [meaning "understanding"] or *pratisaṃkyā*\(^{1442}\) [meaning "analytical"]). Therefore, it follows that what is "totally imagined" by the discursive conceptual awareness that is false is an object [subsumed under the concept of "distortion," which is rendered in the Tibetan binary,] imposition and denial (*sgro skur*), because it is [in fact] an imposed object,\(^{1443}\) like the five bases of the eternalist view described above. An object that is denied\(^{1444}\) is one in which the basis is denied inasmuch as it is assailed along the lines of being without cause, without effect, without instrument, or without distinctive\(^{1445}\) qualities. The designation of the convention *realization*, given an unmistaken perception by a discursive conceptual awareness, is an object [subsumed under the binary,] imposed and denied since, as was already explained above, an imposed object is unmistakenly\(^{1446}\) realized. For the denied object, there is a cause, the seed, which is a cause of a sprout. That effect, the sprout, is an effect of the seed. There is an agent, a being, who engages in the activity of planting the seed. In terms of the presence of distinctive quality, it is not unlike [the fact] the three jewels\(^{1447}\) are said to be obviously superior to all worlds and something sublime. Likewise, as long as everything is posited as totally imagined and something actual, there are two types [of posited object] along these lines (*'di bzhin du*): what is set forth as imputed due to being perceived by a mistaken discursive awareness and what is set forth as actually realized due to being perceived by an unmistaken discursive conceptual awareness. Whatever is itself presented as realized by unmistaken awareness is established by someone else as being imputed by mistaken awareness. That being the case, eventually something actual is not found and such an awareness that is unmistaken, as well, is not found. Since it is the case they are not found, even the objects that are not found - being something posited under the influence of varying [species of] discursive awareness along these lines – [and] even the character of all subtle and course false conceptions that are generated – are alike.

Therefore, the establishment of the cognitive nature of consciousness, as well, is something imputed that appears because there is no real perfected nature that is established. Take, for example, the similar objects of expressions like "some person killed by an enemy" and "killed by a weapon"; the one who is killed by a weapon *per se* is killed by an enemy. In the same way, the expression "all conscious awarenesses are produced from their own seeds" and the expression "imputed and perceived by discursive conception" have similar objects because by saying "produced from its own seed," [it is understood] there

\(^{1440}\) *ka la pi ta* (471.17).
\(^{1441}\) *a ba bo dha* (471.18).
\(^{1442}\) *pra ti sang kya* (471.18).
\(^{1443}\) *sgro 'dogs kyi gnas* (471.20), the Tibetan *sgro 'dogs* corresponding to the Sanskrit *samāropa*.
\(^{1444}\) *skur ba 'debs pa* (471.21) : *apavāda*.
\(^{1445}\) *khyad par can* (471.22) : *viśīṣṭa*, *antara*.
\(^{1446}\) NTh 93.05; Th 162.05; BM 86.04.
\(^{1447}\) *dkon mchog gsum* (472.04) : *triratna*. 

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is no conscious awareness that is not something imputed appears that is itself obtained. Thus, the two types of truth [i.e. conventional and ultimate truth] are indivisible; and because of realizing the indivisibility of the two truths, one is capable of entering into the non-duality of phenomena. Thereby, what is suggested in the phrase *abiding in the view of the Great Perfection* is secured.

[Abiding in the view of the Great Perfection] is the act of simply being divorced from all clinging to theory. On this view, it is said that explanations claiming that the Śrāvakas realize there is nothing that is the person, the Pratyeka-buddha, realizes what appears, beginning with aggregate of form, as being absent apprehended object, the Yogācārin realizes the non-duality of subject and object, the Mādhyamika realizes there is nothing ultimate, and the Guhyamāntrika realizes the indivisibility of the two truths, all pertain to [some form of] clinging to theory.

Given the “view of Great Perfection” is designated in being divorced from clinging to theory in that way. The conventional designation "view of the Great Perfection" is also called "the great view of the timeless release" (*lta ba ye bhang chen po*).

§ 3.4. here, just some supplementary explanation concerning the differences between [the aforementioned] theories' respective limitations and power (473.05-477.10)

Śrāvakas realize the absence of any [absolute] person. Thus, the insider’s view of the transitory collection, the abandonment of the retinue of mental afflictions generated under its influence, and the karmic life that ensues from it are purified; [and] some slight power is obtained. Pratyeka-buddhas, having diminished conception in terms of both [the subjective] self and the [objective] apprehended, through realizing the absence of the objective external form aggregate qua appearance, secures the abandonment of anything connected with karmic imprints and obtains the great power to purify the karmic life that ensues from them. Summing up the Mahāyāna, it is due to realizing the selflessness of both phenomena and people that a gnosis divorced from all ideas of self and duality is obtained. Thence anything connected with karmic imprints is totally abandoned and the great power of the Tathāgata’s inconceivable blessing is obtained. This should suffice to say [concerning the lower systems] in supplement.

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1448 *bdag nyid* (472.20).
1449 Reading *bden pa rnam* (NTh 95.01; BM 87.06; Th 165.03) rather than *bden pa rnams* (RZSB 1.471.20).
1451 NTh 95.02; Th 165.05; BM 88.01.
1453 Here, Rongzom explains how he construes the inter-relations between Great Perfection and other vehicles.
In view of that, this Great Perfection approach is said to be the very pinnacle of all vehicles (yāna), the lord of all transmissions (āgama), the quintessence of doctrinal discourses (pravacana), the general meaning of all tantras (tantra), the deepest\(^\text{1454}\) intention of all [the Buddhas'] (abhiprāya),\(^\text{1455}\) and the core of all esoteric precepts (upadesa).\(^\text{1456}\)

§ 3.4.1. yāna (473.20)

The term vehicle, corresponding to the Sanskrit yāna,\(^\text{1457}\) is a term applied to a conveyance that acts on an actual path, which, in context, is applied to the activity of conveyance and to doctrinal discourses. Since what it indicates will emerge just below, suffice here to [mention] that acting on the path per se [conduces] the unexcelled, the highest pinnacle of all paths. The complete liberation\(^\text{1458}\) of the Śrāvakas is generated due to causality; and their concentration \([474.01]\)\(^\text{1459}\) remains on the level marked by a mental object. The complete liberation of the Pratyeka-buddhas is apart from a verbalized path; and the source of their concentration are inexpressible phenomena. The complete liberation of the Mahāyāna is generated through gnosis that is devoid of discursive conceptions of apprehended and apprehender; and their concentration engages in the expanse of utterly, totally pure phenomena. In the system of Guhyamantra, when the “acquisition of the three-fold diamond-like

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\(^{1454}\) zhe phugs (473.20).

\(^{1455}\) Sogan Rinpoche (Tulku Pema Lode from Amdo Golok) reminds us this phrase is a metaphor; i.e. Buddhas do not form intentions per se. Yet, from the perspective of ordinary beings, we can speak of an intention that underlies the activities of enlightened beings. Wangchuk (2002: 268-269 n. 12) reports that one of “eight excellences” attributed to Guhyagarba-tantra is that it is “the noble ultimate intent of all buddhas (rgyal ba thams [269] cad kyi dgongs pa’i zhe phugs dam pa’i).” Elsewhere, the Thugs rje chen po’i gtor ma sha khrag rus pa’i gtor rgyud chen po’s colophon describes itself as the dgongs pa thams cad kyi zhe phugs; and the colophon of Dri med ka dag gi rgyud sin po che’od gsal chen describes itself as gter gyi snying po dgongs pa’i zhe phugs. See “The sGang steng-brNying ma’i rGyud ’bum manuscript from Bhutan” by Cathy Cantwell, Rob Mayer, Michael Kowalewski & Jean-Luc Achard in Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines 11, June 2006, p. 66 n. 380 and p. 35 n. 165 respectively.

\(^{1456}\) man ngag (473.20) : upadesā. This litany of qualities is also cited via Rongzom in Mestanza’s "La première somme philosophique du bouddhisme tibétain. Origines littéraires, philosophiques et mythologiques des 'Neuf étapes de la voie' (theg pa rim pa dgu) in Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines 8 (2005): who renders the passage: "Ainsi, cette approche de la Grande Perfection, dépourvue de toutes les vues, le roi de toutes les voies, le roi de toutes les écritures, l’essence de tous les discours, l’exégèse générale de tous les tantras, l’esprit profond de toutes les pensées, le cœur de tous les préceptes essentiels" (96).

\(^{1457}\) theg pa (473.20) : yāna. Cf. dKon cog ’gre: spyir theg pa zhes bya ba’i nges tshig ni | ya na [sic] zhes bya ba’i gro ba’i bya ba ston pa’i tshig yin pas tshig gzugs par lam la bya’o | (RZSB 1.46.15-46.16). There, Rongzom enumerates various iterations of vehicles then cites the locus classicus from the Lantikṣātṝa-sūtra on the proliferation of vehicles (id. 1.46.16-47.15). The citation is also found in Dudjom Rinpoche’s The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism: Its Fundamentals and History. Gyurme Dorje with Matthew Kapstein trs. & eds. (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1991) 81.

\(^{1458}\) rnam par grol ba (473.24) : vimukti (Mvp 107, 147), vimukta (Mvp 401, 1027).

\(^{1459}\) NTh 96.06; Th 167.07; BM 89.07.
experience” emerges, both complete liberation and concentration are indivisible and they all progress and emerge in relation. Here [in the system of Great Perfection], nothing is accomplished in that way because the state of non-progression pertains to the supreme path; and for that reason, it is said to be the highest pinnacle of all vehicles.

§ 3.4.2. āgama (474.09)

The meaning of the term transmission corresponds to [the Sanskrit] term āgama and suggests derivation from something other; it also suggests something fundamental and basic; and it is used to characterize the actual word of the Jina. Yet those kinds of vacana are incapable of revealing the Great Perfection approach, incapable of undermining it, as well - and incapable of surpassing it. Given that the system of the Great Perfection is capable, moreover, of distinctively disclosing each of all the philosophical positions of all the vehicles, it is also capable of disproving all of them. In terms of what surpasses all the vacana, for example, just as the powerful sovereign who has placed a wish-fulfilling jewel at the tip of Indra’s victory banner is unrivalled and irrepressible, [the Great Perfection] is the lord of all transmissions.

§ 3.4.3. pravacana (474.17)

The term doctrinal discourses corresponds to the [Sanskrit] term pravacana wherein -vacana indicates a verbal expression or speech; and pra- is a prefix indicating extraordinary [religious] significance whereby it is designated [a Buddhist] doctrinal discourse. Worldly sciences concerning what are

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1460 rdo rje lta bu rnam pa gsum gyi nyams rnyed pa ces 'byung na (474.06).
1461 a ga ma (474.09).
1462 dngos su rgyal ba'i bka'i mtshan nyid la bya (474.10).
1463 de lta bu'i bka' thams cad (474.10-474.11); *Note for the term vacana.
1464 ston par byed pa (474.11).
1465 sun 'byin par byed pa (474.14) : saṃdāsāna-karoti.
1467 Reading pra ba tsa na (474.17; Guenther 1984: 210-211 n. 3); cf. pra ’ba’ ca na (DB 90.06) rather than pra tsa na (RZSB 1.474.17; Th 169.03).
1468 nye bar bsgyur ba (474.18) : upasarga (Mvp 4710).
paltry matters\(^\text{1469}\) are given in terms of *kuvacana*\(^\text{1470}\) wherein *sku*- indicates something negative. Yet such is not the case with verbal expressions or speech that disclose the path to liberation. The twelve branches of doctrinal discourse\(^\text{1471}\) are included in the collection of dharma [teachings].

There are two types of instruction given in these branches of discourse: those disclosing teachings of definitive meaning\(^\text{1472}\) and those disclosing teachings of provisional meaning\(^\text{1473}\) and whatever espouses the definitive meaning [might] through others, moreover, disclose provisional meaning. Even in a single text, if both provisional and definitive [475.0]\(^\text{1474}\) meaning is disclosed, in the context of the Great Perfection approach, there is no other *vacana* that discloses provisional meaning that does not include some exalted definitive meaning. [In the Great Perfection system,] since there is nothing to be rid of and nothing affirmed as corrupt, it is called the quintessence of all doctrinal discourses.

**§ 3.4.4. tantra (475.04)**\(^\text{1475}\)

The term *continuum* corresponds to the [Sanskrit] term *tantra*, which is used [in the sense of] something related, dependent, even turbulent.\(^\text{1476}\) Actually, in *Kriya*- and *Yogatantras*, the method of accomplishing unexcelled awakening, the method for accomplishing the great worldly accomplishments such as clairvoyance and others, and even all the various elaborate means employed by the practitioner for [cultivating] peace, and so forth, if they do not already embrace the domain of the Great Perfection, they do embrace being symbolically bound;\(^\text{1477}\) and from embracing the domain of the Great Perfection, one is not taken, no matter how the ocean of *karma* behaves. For that reason, the Great Perfection is the general meaning of all tantras.

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1469 'jig rten gyi gtsug lag don chung ba rnams (474.19).
1470 *ku ba tsa na* (474.19-474.20).
1473 *nges pa’i don* (474.23) : nithārtha.
1474 NTh 98.04; Th 170.01; BM 91.03.
1475 Here, the Great Perfection’s relationship to other tantric systems is found.
1476 ‘*brel pa’ am rag las pa’ am ‘khrugs pa la bya ste* (475.05).
1477 *mtshan ma’i ‘ching bas* (475.09).
§ 3.4.5. abhisandhi/abhiprāya\(^{1478}\) (475.11)

The term thought (dgongs pa) corresponds to the [Sanskrit] term abhisamādhi\(^{1479}\) which suggests some verbal expression is not straightforward – that it reveals [its significance] in a figurative and indirect manner;\(^{1480}\) and it might correspond to] the [Sanskrit] term abhiprāya,\(^{1481}\) which [refers to] when the language at use is totally different than what being taught.\(^{1482}\) In short, they are termed, respectively, hidden intention\(^{1483}\) and thought.\(^{1484}\)

According to the Śrāvaka system, the basis in thought (dgongs gzhi)\(^{1485}\) in teaching by means of verbal expressions of existence and non-existence in all the Jina’s vacana is the thought to proclaim the character of people and phenomena. According to the Yogacāra system, the basis in thought in teaching by means of verbal expressions of existence and non-existence in all the Jina’s vacana, is the thought to proclaim the character of the three-fold nature.\(^{1486}\) According to the Madhyamaka system, the basis in thought in teaching by means of verbal expressions of existence and non-existence in all the Jina’s vacana, is the intention to proclaim the character of ultimate and conventional truth. And, indeed, these pertain to a basis in thought, though none of them pertain to the deepest. The deepest of all the teachings in the Jina’s vacana that make allusions by means of a variety of terms is concerned to reveal the domain of non-dual quality [476\(^{1487}\)]. Due to the fact no other [discourse] is possessed of this intimate thought of all the Jinas, it is for that reason [Great Perfection is] called the most intimate of all thoughts.

§ 3.4.6. upadeśa (476.02)

The term intimate advice or esoteric precept corresponds to the [Sanskrit] term upadeśa,\(^{1488}\) a term which functions to indicate advice and resolution on a

\(^{1478}\) On these two terms and their eight species, see Mahāyānasūtraśālākāra 7.16-18; cf. Ruegg 1985. See also Dung ēkar tshig mdzod, pp. 1171-1172.

\(^{1479}\) a bi sandi (475.12).

\(^{1480}\) tshig gang gzugs por ma bstan te lde’u dang zur gyis ston pa la bya (475.11-475.12).

\(^{1481}\) a bi pra ya (475.13).

\(^{1482}\) tshig gzhan dang gzhan gyis don gzhan dang gzhan bstan par bya ba yod pa la bya ste (475.14).

\(^{1483}\) Idem por dgongs pa (475.14) : abhisamādhi. Cf. Rongzom’s GTJBy, where explanations and distinctions are made with respect to both idem por dgongs pa and dgongs pa (2.216.08-217.16).

\(^{1484}\) dgongs pa (475.14) : abhiprāya.


\(^{1486}\) ngo bo nyid nam pa gsum (475.19).

\(^{1487}\) NTh 100.02; Th 172.02; BM 93.01.

\(^{1488}\) u pa de sha (476.03).
point. An esoteric precept, then, is a point that is outside the usual explanatory current of the day.\textsuperscript{1489}

Q. How is a point resolved through intimate advice?

Inasmuch as the point comes to a decisive resolution, when it is pointed out it should be understood in connection with the point that all phenomena are resolved to be empty and selfless, without inherent nature, absent production, qualitatively the same, and non-dual.\textsuperscript{1490} On occasion, the meaning of these terms may be indistinct; and at times, they indicate that there are verbal points made precisely in accord with the terms that are used to express them. Thus, according to the Śrāvaka system, all phenomena are not their own identity and the assertion that in phenomena there is something that is a self or something that is not is, in fact, given in terms of "all phenomena being empty" and "something resolved as selfless." Nevertheless, on account of insisting upon the [dual] nature of apprehended and apprehender, their's does not count as "resolving the absence of inherent existence." According to the Yogācāra system, the insistence upon the absence of any essential nature connected to apprehended and apprehender is called "resolving the absence of inherent existence" because at that point it is not distinct from the absence of inherent existence and the empty, selfless [nature of phenomena]. Nevertheless, because they insist upon the existence of the causal production of dependent phenomena, their's does not count as "resolving the absence of inherent existence." According to the Madhyamaka system, the insistence upon the ultimate as devoid of conceptual elaboration is called "resolving the absence of production" because at that point there is no distinction between the absence of production, the absence of inherent existence, and the empty, selfless [nature of phenomena]. Nevertheless, because of their insistence upon correct conventional truth, their's does not count as "resolving qualitative similarity." According to the system of Guhyamantra, the insistence upon the indivisibility of the two truths is called "resolving qualitative similarity because at that point there is no difference between qualitative similarity, the absence of production, the absence of inherent existence, and the empty, selfless [nature of phenomena]. Nevertheless, because of the existence of those timorous souls\textsuperscript{1491} incapable of experiencing the practice of sameness,\textsuperscript{1492} and [477\textsuperscript{1493}] on account of the existence of those such as the ones who voluntarily take up austerities in order to swiftly nullify that timorousness, their's does not count as "resolving the non-duality of all phenomena."

Regardless of those, the Great Perfection, like this fourth knowable [scheme] for all phenomena, is not recognized then abandoned, recognized then

\textsuperscript{1489} \textit{don gyi kha brgyud pa dang bral ba la man ngag ces bya'o} (476.04). Re kha brgyud pa: cf. TDCM 190b.

\textsuperscript{1490} \textit{don nye bar thog du phab ste bstan na 'di chos ruams kyi don ni ' stong zhiing bdag med pa dang rang bzhin myed pa dang ' skye ba myed pa dang ' mnyam pa nyid dang ' gnyis su myed par gtan la phab bo zhes shes par bya ste} (476.05-476.07). Wangchuk 2002 renders \textit{thog tu phab pa} as "decisive" (278).

\textsuperscript{1491} \textit{nyam nga ba} (476.24). It should be clear the term "soul" here is used figuratively.

\textsuperscript{1492} \textit{mnyam pa'i spyod pa} (476.24). The so-called practice of sameness is one of austerity, in which one practices sameness in making no distinction of any kind between pure and impure (\textit{de la brtul zhuugs mnyam pa'i spyod pa ni ' gtsang rme'i ruams pa ci la'ang bye brag mi bya} [258.4] \textit{bar mnyam pa nyid du spyad do} (STMG 258.03-258.04).

\textsuperscript{1493} NTh 101.06; Th 174.03; BM 94.05.
accepted, recognized then settled as equal, or then actualized - none of which is
established. Thus, "all phenomena are resolved to be non-dual" because at that
point there is no distinction between "non-dual," "qualitative similarity," "absence
of production," "absence of inherent existence," and "the empty, selfless [nature
of phenomena]." That being the case, the [Great Perfection's] cultivation of the
resolution concerning the non-duality of all phenomena in fact pertains to the
very core of all intimate advice or esoteric precepts per se. For that reason, [the
Great Perfection] is called "the core of all esoteric precepts."

Here ends the third chapter that distinguishes the perfected system of the
illusory in the Great Perfection from the other vehicles that retain the
nomenclature of illusion.
§ chapter four: the system of great perfection is not undermined by reasoning\textsuperscript{1494} (477.12-491.20)

When this system of Great Perfection is taught in a condensed manner (§4), it is said the bases of all phenomena are included simply within mind and mental appearance; the nature of the mind (citta) itself is awakening (bodhi)\textsuperscript{1495} and thus referred to as "the mind of awakening" (bodhicitta).\textsuperscript{1496} There is nothing to be taught other than this. People with faith in the Great Perfection approach realize and penetrate it through being shown this alone. People who are obsessed with\textsuperscript{1497} grammatical treatises\textsuperscript{1498} and logical treatises,\textsuperscript{1499} who have abandoned the system of Great Perfection, which is like a wish-fulfilling jewel, and – fixated on various trinket-like philosophical tenets – think: "These philosophical tenets of ours are established through grammatical points\textsuperscript{1500} and reason. The Great Perfection system is in conflict with reason; and that which is in conflict with reason ought not be accepted."\textsuperscript{1501} For their benefit, I will, set aside the idiom renowned in the Great Perfection approach, which uses such terms as sphere,\textsuperscript{1502}
[and] the great,1503 [and instead] explain some facets of a logical approach1504 using the more broadly accepted nomenclature.

§ 4.1. bodhicitta (477.24-481.13)

Regarding [4781505] the term mind of awakening (bodhicitta); awakening1506 corresponds to the [Sanskrit] term bodhi,1507 suggesting avabodha,1508 which is used in the sense of exhausted,1509 of conscious awareness not generated,1510 of that which is totally pure of all blemishes,1511 of unmistaken penetration1512, or even of total mastery.1513 The term mind corresponds to the [Sanskrit] term citta,1514 suggesting vicitta,1515 whose various meanings are used in the sense of cognizing a variety of objects perceived by the mind; or, in another sense, as the seeds of karmic processes are gathered, it acts like a container, a little bag in which things are mangaged.1516 [The Sanskrit terms] cetanā and citta1517 mean, respectively, intention and mind; and any karmic process concomitant1518 with intention that mentates upon, moves toward, or penetrates various activities, is for that reason called "mind." [The Sanskrit term] cittamanavidyārtha suggests "mind" and "awareness" are synonymous. It is called mind due to being immaterial, embodied by cognitive awareness.

1503 che ba (477.23).
1504 rigs pa ’i tshul phyogs ’ga’ (477.24).
1505 NTh 103.04; Th 176.04, BM 96.02.
1506 byang chub (478.01).
1507 bo dhi (478.01)
1508 a ba bo dha (478.01).
1509 zad pa (478.01). Rongzom’s dKon cog ’grel uses the term in this context as indicating the complete exhaustion of karmic propensities (bag la nyal yongs su zad pa RZSB 1.43.03); his sNang ba lhar bsgrub pa uses the term in the sense of “having exhausted all karmic imprints without remainder” (bag chags thams cad ma lus par zad pa | RZSB 1.567.20); cf. Almogi 2009: 221 n. 112.
1510 mi skye ba shes pa (478.01-478.02).
1511 dri ma thams cad yongs su dag par gyurd pa (478.02).
1512 phyin ci ma log par khong du chud pa (478.02-478.03).
1513 kun chub (478.03) : avagata (Chandra 2001: 6a).
1514 tsi ta (478.03).
1515 bi tsi ta (478.04).
1516 chun pa’i sgye’u snod ltar gyur pa (478.05). According to Karmay 1998 sgye’u means "small bag" (326 n. 69). Silk suggests the term might intimate managerial or administrative functions. See J.A., Managing Monks: Administrators and Administrative Roles in Indian Buddhist Monasticism. Oxford University Press, 2008: 164). The Tibetan v’chun also suggests a sense of control in the context of taming a horse and the possibility of taming malevolent people (rta rgod po bcun nas ’chun pa’i mi ngan rang bzhin gyis ’chun mi yong | TDCM 866b).
1517 tsin te na tsid dha ste (478.06).
1518 mtshungs par ldan pa (478.06-478.07) : samprayogataḥ.
§ 4.1.1. dmigs-snang-ngo bo triad (478.10)

The presentation here of mind and awakening as different natures in that way pertains to the character of a conceptual framework; their actual nature is non-dual. Yet at the level of appearance, the two do not occur at the same time. In this context, a conceptual framework (dmigs pa) is the domain of experience qualified by discrimination. Appearance (snang ba) is a domain of experience qualified by sensation. The character of nature itself (ngo bo nyid kyi mtshan nyid) is a domain of experience qualified by unadulterated discriminative awareness.\(^{1519}\)

By virtue of a conceptual framework, such conventions as ‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’ are designated. At the level of appearance such conventions as ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ are designated. By virtue of nature itself such conventions as established and non-established are labelled. At the level of conceptual frameworks, [the mind] has no capacity to remove states of [epistemic] distortion.\(^{1520}\) At the level of appearance, given the capacity to eliminate objective distortions, there is yet no capacity to remove confusion. At the level of nature itself, even confusion is eliminated. Therefore, awareness following after the discriminative [i.e. the conceptual, propositional] domain of experience is inferior; awareness following after sensation [i.e. bare perception] is middling; and the awareness following after after the domain of unadulterated discriminative is superior.

Take, for example, a fire-wheel: at the level of conceptual framework both the fire-brand and wheel are each observed to be basically the same in being present.\(^{1521}\) At the level of appearance, they coincide;\(^{1522}\) yet when the fire-wheel appears \(^{479}\)\(^{1523}\), the fire-brand does not; and when the fire-brand appears the fire-wheel does not. At the level of nature itself, neither two are not real. If there is a wheel’s nature per se, the brand has no basis in reality. If there is a fire-brand’s nature per se, the wheel has no basis in reality. That being the case, here, only at the point when the wheel appears is the fire-brand’s nature itself real and it should be recognized that the nature of the wheel has no basis in reality.

Mind and awakening are similar: at the level of conceptual framework, both mind and awakening are considered to be basically the same insofar as being conceived to exist as distinct entities.\(^{1524}\) At the level of appearance, they do not coincide.\(^{1525}\) When there is mental appearance,\(^{1526}\) awakening does not appear. At the point awakening appears, ordinary mind (sems) does not. Mental appearance, on account of its deceptiveness, is confusion. Appearance in

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\(^{1519}\) Reading dri ma myed pas (BM 97.01; Th 177.05) rather than dri ma byed pas (RZSB 478.13-478.14).

\(^{1520}\) de la dmigs pa’i sgo nas ni sgro skur gyi gnas kyang sel bar mi nus so (478.17-478.18).

\(^{1521}\) That is, when a fire-brand whirlered in a circle quickly enough will produce the illusion of the fire-brand being a fire-wheel; the faster the swirl, the more complete the illusion of a fire-wheel.

\(^{1522}\) dus cig du gnyis mi snang (478.24).

\(^{1523}\) NTh 105.02; Th 178.05; BM 97.06.

\(^{1524}\) gnyi’ ga’ go mnyam du so sor yod par dmigs (478.23).

\(^{1525}\) gnyis dus gcig du mi snang ste (479.07-479.08).

\(^{1526}\) sems su snang ba (479.08).
awakening is unmistakable since it is not deceptive. From the point of view of nature alone, when the very essence of the ordinary mind is established as something, the very essence of awakening has no basis in reality. When the very essence of awakening is established as something, the very essence of ordinary mind has no basis in reality. Thus, mental appearance is something confusing and, no matter how things appear, it does not correlate with their essential nature. That being the case (pas), it should be recognized that the nature itself of awakening pertains to the state of appearance; and that the ordinary mind has no basis in reality.

This point is not, in fact, unlike teachings according to the Great Perfection system that signifies the great path to total liberation is affliction itself, that karma itself is naturally arising gnosis, that discontent itself is awakened. In that [Great Perfection approach,] "total liberation," "naturally arising gnosis," and "awakening" are simply taught as specific conventions for turning back awareness fixed on the affliction, karma, and the discontent of sentient being. Its very nature is indivisible and unified (gcig go).

In this context, the meaning of unified [identity] is three-fold because there could be identity in similarity (mtshungs pa'i gcig pa), identity in number (grangs kyi gcig pa), and indistinguishable identity (dbyer med pa'i gcig pa). Although similar in turning back pluralizing awareness, all terms for identity are separated into species of distinction in foundation, quantitative observation, and non-observation.

Q. What is identity in similarity?

Here, a pillar is characterized by holding up a canopy, a vase is characterized by holding water; when both are, furthermore, byang chub du snang (479.09-479.10). In the Rang byung ye shes, Rongzom supposes someone to ask: "Are there appearances or even confused appearances in the gnosis of a Tathāgata?" In response, he writes: "since appearance in non-conceptual gnosis is non-conceptual, it is not appearance per se" (de yang mi rlog pa'i ye shes kyi snang ba ni snang ba nyid ma yin te | mi rlog pa nyid yin pa'i phyir ro (RZSB 2.121.20-121.22). N.b. Almogi 2009: 224-225 n. 123.

snang ba nyid na (479.13-479.14). Cf. dKong cog 'grel: pha rol tu phyin pa'i indo sde nyid las | bdag dang sangs rgyas rang bzhin mnyam par gnas pa dang | phung po lnga grangs med pa'i de bzhin gshregs pa yin pa dang | nyon mongs pa de bzhin gshregs pa'i rigs yin pa dang | nyon mongs pa'i rang bzhin rnam par grol ba yin pa dang | sens can gyi sems rang byung gi ye shes gyi snying po can yin pa dang (RZSB 1.81.14-18). Note the Prajñāpāramitā is here cited in support of the view of the Great Perfection.


The above descriptions appear to be grangs kyi gcig pa.

du ma dmigs pa dang | gcig dmigs pa dang (479.22-479.23). Here, perspectives dominate and one of a binary is rejected while the other is superordinated; cf. 480.13-480.22; this is described as occasioning sens bkag nas byang chub sgrub par byed pa de tshe'i ni (481.04).

mi dmigs pa (479.23). Here, a form of metonymy appears at work; cf. 480.23-481.03.

Reading ka ba (RZSB 479.24; Th 180.05) rather than ga ba (BM 99.03).

'gil tar ka ba ni bla gab 'dzin pa'i ntshan nyid de (479.24).

NTh 106.06; Th 180.05; BM 99.03.
described as something made, the pillar as something made resides in the pillar’s own nature, a vase as something made resides in the vase’s own nature, and though each is brought to the mind as possessed of its own character, in the context of being the quality of being a product, they are observed to be the same. Although they are not conceived as distinct products, a pillar cannot change into a vase and a vase cannot change into a pillar. The reality of their respective roof-holding and water-holding is not lost.

In such a system as this, the hell-being in Unrelenting Torment is the characterization of perfect suffering. The Buddha Bhagavan is the characterization of perfect bliss. When both are described in terms of being empty of actual me and mine, the character of suffering and bliss is not lost, though they are not conceived as different in emptiness. If something empty of essential nature is not real, then a hell-being empty of l and mine would not change into a buddha. A buddha does not revert into a hell-being. Yet actual bliss and suffering are not lost.

For example, it is like when one hundred or two hundred is described as one thousand or two thousand it is true to say that hundred and thousand alone are both alto; yet because two one hundreds (brgya pa gnyis) are not divisible into one one hundred (brgya pa gcig), the single term one hundred is applied.

Q. What is reckoned or numerical identity? Take, for example, the phrase “rhino-like”: it can be used to describe a leathery beast that has a single sword-like [horn] – not two horns grown simultaneously – just as the phrase “a rhino” can. Analogously, whether its

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1538 Note each describes a subject (chos) and predicate (chos can). The chos chos can structure follows the whole argument in the following section.
1539 byas pa (480.01) : kṛta, karana.
1540 byas pa nyid (480.03) : kṛtkatva; i.e. their quality as a product.
1541 byas pa tha dad mi dmigs kyang de ka ba’ang bum par mi ldog (480.03-480.04).
1542 mnar myed (; avoc) pa’i sens can dmyal ba ni (480.06).
1543 bdag dang bdag gi mtshan nyid kyis stong pa (480.07-480.08); obviously, bdag might be more accurately rendered self - i.e. self and of the self.
1544 sangs rgyas kyang dmyal bar mi ldog (480.10). This trope may be compared with passages such as found in, for example, a commentary on the Khyang chen lding pa contained in the bKa ma shin tu gya pa collection and attributed to gNyangs Jñānakumāra (gnyags dznyā na ku mā ra), which asks whether or not a sentient being is changed into a buddha: ‘o na sens can mi las sangs rgyas su ‘gyur ro zhe na 1. See rNyin ma bKa ma shin tu rgyas pa (Edited by Mkhan po ’ Jam dbyangs. Chengdu, 1999), v. 93, 24.06. Higgins 2013: 28 n. 25 mistakenly identifies this citation as being in volume 103. Another example may be found in the Rig pa rang shar, where the assertion that the all-ground or kun gzhi of Great Perfection is simply another name for the dharmaṅka is disputed. Cf. Higgins 2013: 305.
1545 brgya dang stong nyid kyang mang po yin mod kyi (480.12).
1546 bse’ ru ita bu (480.14) : khadgaviṣṇuṣakalpa (Mvp 1006). Is Rongzom punning?
1547 Is he referring to ri dwags with two horns as excluded from the definition? *DYSG notes rhinos are mammals, whose shape is a bit like a cow, whose body is almost totally devoid of hair and has lots of wrinkles, which grows a horn on top of its nose; in India they only have one horn; on the African continent there are those with two horns (nu ma nu ba’i srog chags sug bshi’i rigs shig ste, dbyibs phal cher ba lang dang cha ‘dra la, lus na ha lam spu gcig kyang med cing, gnyer ma mang la, sna mgor rwa skyes yod pa zhig yin. Rgya gar na yod pa la rwa gcig ma gtags med pa dang, a hphe ri ka’i sling na yod pa la rwa gnyis yod | 852.b s.v. bse ru). Is Rz unaware that African rhinos can have two horns?
that the aggregates are said to exist, though both the person and their aggregates are said not to, or the Pratyeka’s apprehender is said to exist though the apprehended is said not to; or one’s own awareness is said to exist though both object and subject are said not to - whatever the case may be (la stsogs pa) – [any given philosophical perspective (blta ba) consists in] various ways of validating something supposed to be] real after eliminating what is [supposedly] totally imagined, asserting a subject and its predicate to form a single identity in what is itself real, 1548 and invalidating difference [between these two] reciprocal phenomena 1549 as if they consist in a single nature. A reckoned identity is given in the context of the proof of a thing’s unity. The phrase ‘there is not two – there is one!’ 1550 is what we say in establishing the unified thing.

In terms of an indistinguishable identity, for example, even though the conventional object "space" and the conventional object "nature of space" are [481 1551] applied in connection with, respectively, the subject and its predicate, "space" is another expression for the term emptiness. Calling the nature of space 1552 "space itself," too, is another expression for the term emptiness and nothing is being presented in terms of the binary [subject and predicate]. 1553 Along those lines, even the so-called mind of awakening (bodhicitta) would be called a reckoned or numerical identity at the point when awakening is brought about in the arrest (bkag nas) of the ordinary mind (citta). Inasmuch as the subject "ordinary mind" is not established, a mind of awakening that is described in dependence upon it is [necessarily] not established. Yet, just like when the nature of space is called ‘space itself’ and there is no insistence upon any separation between ordinary mind and awakening, [bodhicitta] is called an indistinguishable identity. Both of these are taught in the system of Great Perfection: when the greatness of the mind of awakening procedes to be taught, these terms are taught according to a reckoned or numerical identity; when the nature of the mind of awakening is taught, [mind and awakening are] taught as indivisible identity. In sum, this is teaching the fundamental point; and in the chapter coming below treating the textual tradition of the Great Perfection (gzhung nyid), none of the explanation given will there improve on this point. 1554

1548 Cf. Rz’s SGNyBy: rang bzhin grub gcig ces bya ba dang | de bzhin zhes bya ba ni gtan tshigs te | gang gi phyir 'di dag gi don de nyid kyi rang bzhin gyis grub pa'i phyag rgya gcig pu yin bshad | | spyod ba'ang phyag rgya yin par bshad | | ces bya ba ni | de la dam tshig ni mi 'da' ba'i mtshan nyid yin la | phyag rgya zhes bya ba'ang mi 'da' ba'i mtshan nyid yin te | de bas na 'dir bka'ng phyag rgya yin pas phyag rgya la dam tshig ces bshad do (RZSB 2.603.11-603.17); cf. Almogi 2009: 100 n. 197.
1549 chos phan tshun kyang (480.20).
1550 gnyis ni med do gcig ni yod do (480.21).
1551 NTh 108.04; Th 182.06; BM 100.07.
1552 nam mkha' zhes bya ba'ang stong pa nyid kyi tshigs bla dwags (481.01).
1553 'di la gnyis su gzhag pa'i don dang yang mi myed do (481.03). Alternatively, "it is not at all the case here something (don) is being presented as two [things]."
1554 'og nas 'byung ba'i rdzogs pa chen po'i gzhung nyid bstan pa'i skabs nas bshad pa kun kyis kyang 'di las bogs dbyung du myed do (481.11-481.12).
§ 4.2. concise explanation of general [conceptual] systems of identity & difference, establishment & negation, and so on (481.13)

All the numerous ways in which individuals assert the establishment of their own philosophical position (grub pa’i mtha’) and reject those of others are subsumed into two [types of discourse]: the establishment of something and the negation of something. All the numerous ways in which things are negated are included within non-implicative and implicative negation, the former of which pertains to the mere negation of an existent in which nothing else is established in its place; [the latter of which] pertains to invalidate non-understanding, wrong understanding, and gnawing doubt without teaching another object. For example, the description ‘vaseless’ or ‘devoid of a vase’ (bum pa myed) reverses only the idea that a vase is present in such places as where there is [in fact] no vase. Similarly, if a person is described as non-existent it is simply reversing the conception of the person’s existence rather than disclosing the presence of the aggregates that are empty of a person. [4821555] Explanations] along similar lines should be applied to everything.

Q. What is an implicative negation?

In negating one thing, another is pointed out1556 since, just as a place without a vase is made sense of1557 when it is described as "vase-less," you disclose an aggregates empty of anything personal1558 when you describe them as "person-less." Inasmuch as that is the theory, a non-implicative negation is simply isolating1559 your opponents philosophical position1560 because it is not sufficient to implicatively negate them; one’s own philosophical position is also validated.

§ 4.2.1. dngos po bsgrub pa ji snyed pa’ang mdo rnam pa gnyis su 'dus (482.06)

In fact, the numerous ways of proving something are subsumed within two types of discourse [connected to] the establishment of what is and the establishment of what is observed by the mind,1561 the basis of these being qualified in terms of both identity and difference (gcig pa dang tha dad pa); the basis of the these,

1555 NTh 110.02; Th 184.06; BM 102.04.
1556 gzhan bkag nas gzhan ston pa ste (482.01); reading bkag (BM 102.04) rather than bgag (RZSB 1.482.01; Th 184.06).
1557 go bar byed pa (482.02-482.03) :
1558 gang zag gis stong pa’i phung po (482.03).
1559 sel ba (482.04); it can also suggest rejection, denial, for example, of an opponents philosophical thesis (logs su dgar ba’i don te \ 'bru nang gi rdo zegs sel mkhan zhes ... med par btang ba’i don te \ (DYSG 820a).
1560 de lta bas na myed par dgag pa ni gzhan gyi grub pa’i mtha’ sel ba tsam yin la (482.04-482.05).
1561 yod par sgrub pa dang \ dmigs par sgrub pa’o (482.07); alternatively, “established to be an existent and proven as observed by the mind.” Cf. RZSB 1.484.08-484.09.
in turn, being qualified in terms of both nature itself and distinction (ngo bo nyid dang khyad par). Awareness concerned with these [functions of proof] are subsumed within two [species]: holisic awareness\(^{1562}\) and anatomizing awareness,\(^{1563}\) both of which are indeed natural awarenesses. Nevertheless, when disputed between two opponents it is set forth, though it should not be, that one’s own philosophical position is integrated through a holistic awareness and cannot be broken by an opponents philosophical position. Since the basis of all proofs that establish something are qualified in terms of nature itself and distinction, without understanding both there is no recognizing any proof for something. Thus, they are taught here first.

Q. What is nature itself?

When the appearance of an object in an awareness is undifferentiated in value and scope, it in fact appears possible to signify [that undifferentiated mode as its nature].\(^{1564}\) That which indicates\(^{1565}\) it is the name, corresponding to the [Sanskrit] term \(nāma\).\(^{1566}\) The name [moreover, is given because] - in connection with the [Sanskrit] term nayati\(^{1567}\) - it ["leads," "brings," or] "guides" said awareness to said object with which the name is made to connect, which accords with the possibility connecting [their] very nature [to] such [names] as "pillar" and "vase" in a narrower context and the possibility of connecting such terms as "compounded" and "uncompounded" in a broader context. Whatever the object a term brings [to mind] by its name, we call that its very nature.

The [Sanskrit term] lakṣaṇa\(^{1568}\) suggests [such concepts as] cause, distinguishing mark,\(^{1569}\) or indicator.\(^{1570}\) That being the case, once a given discursive awareness has mixed name and object, [\(483^{1571}\)] it references the object as one; [and] having qualified the object’s distinguishing marks and indicators it is said to be a "reason" [or "evidence," etc] (rgyu mtshan). Even the excellent marks of a buddha are said to be lakṣaṇa because they are taken as distinguishing marks or indicators. Such name and reason are asserted in accordance with those [who adhere to] grammatical treatises and not affiliated with the object’s nature itself which is separate from the name and reason [of an object].

Q. What is a distinction in object?

The term distinction qualifies whatever specifics are individuated from within an object’s nature based on that nature. It in fact pertains to character as well since it pertains to things describable or description. [Distinction] is also referred to by the [Tibetan term] chos [or "quality"], which [translates the Sanskrit]

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\(^{1562}\) *ril* por ’dzin pa’i blo (482.09) : *piṇḍagrāha* (Mvp 4643).
\(^{1563}\) *rjes su* gzhig pa’i blo (482.09-482.10).
\(^{1564}\) *blo* gang la *don* gang snang ba na \(\text{`}di* ltar grangs kyi* ma* phye* rgya che* chung* gis* ma* phye* ste \| don* gang snang ba* de* nyid* mtshan* mar* byar* rung* bar* snang* ba*’* o \(482.16-482.17).\)
\(^{1565}\) *mtshon par* byed pa (482.17).
\(^{1566}\) *nā* ma (482.18).
\(^{1567}\) *na* ya di (482.18); cf. nayati (\(\sqrt{\text{ni}}\)): "leading," "he leads," etc.
\(^{1568}\) *la* kṣa* na* (482.22).
\(^{1569}\) *mtshan ma* (482.23).
\(^{1570}\) *rtags* (482.23).
\(^{1571}\) NTh 111.05; Th 186.06; DM 106.01.
term *dharma*, which [derives from] *dhara*,\(^{1572}\) meaning something that holds, and the particle *-ma*, yielding [dharma i.e.,] *chos* or *quality*, because of being held [as an attribute]. That is to say, [something is termed] a *chos* or *quality* because of either taking hold (*'dzin par byed pa*) or being apprehender and apprehended. At times, [something is] a *quality* because of taking hold [of something] due to lessening, taking hold of knowledge,\(^{1573}\) [and] taking hold of character. At times, this distinction is apprehended naturally (*ngo bo nyid kyi bsung ba*) and, due to being based on nature itself, it is reliant upon something else, thus [the term] *quality*, which is applied along these lines. So, any *quality* present is a predicate. Any character present is a distinguishing basis. Any distinction present is a basis of distinction; and accordingly, there is no difference in object between them in nature itself. If there is some slight difference, awareness of an object like that very nature, one that does not rely on other object, emerges. Such things as those qualified by a predicate, a distinguishing basis, and so forth, since depending upon such things as a subject, bring about awareness of such things as something qualified by a predicate, thus there is no distinction here.

In fact, the classification into nature itself and distinction takes nature itself to be unreliant upon distinction while taking distinction to be reliant upon nature itself because [distinction comprises] individuated instances of [nature’s] differentiation. On that point, a word (*yi ge*\(^{1574}\)) discloses that distinction. Here, the [Sanskrit] name *vyāñjana*\(^{1575}\) [that translates the Tibetan *yi ge*] is also a name for the [eighty] minor marks of excellence;\(^{1576}\) it is also a name for spices\(^{1577}\) as well as syllables.\(^{1578}\) In terms of the major and minor marks excellence - so-called *vyāñjana* - just as it is the case that while a flower’s anthers\(^{1579}\) *per se* are the flower [and] the generality of the flower is measured by the anthers, it is the case that while the major and minor marks *per se* are also included within [the concept of a buddha] characteristic, the general characteristic [of a buddha, for example] is measured by the major and minor marks not unlike phrases such as "impermanent vase" that are stated (*skad dū’o*) because it differentiates [an vase’s] nature itself. [484\(^{1580}\)]

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\(^{1572}\) *dha ra* (483.07); *cf. vdhra*.

\(^{1573}\) I.e. comprehension.

\(^{1574}\) *yi ge* (483.19): *vyāñjana* (Mvp 1997);* cf. “syllable,” “phoneme.” The term *vyāñjana* is also given in Tibetan as *mtshan* (Mvp 292), *tshig ’bru* (id. 1546), *gsal byed* (2013; cf. TDCM 2297b(2) s.v. *tshod ma*), and *tshod ma* (Mvp 5704). Cf. MW: “manifesting, indicating... (उ), f. (in rhet.) implied indication, allusion, suggestion...; a figurative expression, decoration, ornament RV. viii, 78, 2; manifestation, indication...; allusion, suggestion (=उ, f.)... a collection or group of consonants... seasoning” (1029c). Note *RZSB gives bya dzā na, perhaps vyāñjana, MW’s “implied indication, allusion, suggestion”?

\(^{1575}\) *bya dzā na* (483.19).

\(^{1576}\) *dpe byad bzang po* (483.20): *anuvyañjana* (Mvp 268)

\(^{1577}\) *tshod ma* (483.20): *vyāñjana* (Mvp 5704).

\(^{1578}\) *tshig ’bru* (483.20): *vyāñjana* (Mvp 1546).

\(^{1579}\) *ze'u ’bru* (483.21): *kiṅkalka* (Mvp 6237; cf. MW 282b),

\(^{1580}\) NTh 113.03; Th 189.01; DM 105.05.
Just as in the manner of (ji ltar... ltar) accentuating (bye brag du 'byed) and directing the flavors of food with spice, some distinctive words, called syllables (yig 'bru : vyāñjana), make differentiations in nature itself leading to a single perspective.

In this way, after being qualified by the nature and distinction [model], proving same and different, it follows, validates a single nature itself, a different nature, a single quality, a different quality. [Being] based on those, existential and predicative (yod pa dang yin pa) proofs, accordingly, validate or prove [predicates such as] being a single nature, [there] being one, being a different nature, [there] being difference, being a single quality, [there] being a single, being a different quality, [and there] being a different quality. Predicative proofs (yin par grub pa) prove something real. Existential proofs prove something to be a conceptualized object. Moreover, predicative proofs prove [something to be] in relation to (ltos nas) and existential proofs prove [something to be] in dependence upon (rtan nas).

Q. What are those? That is to say, what is a proof [of] a unified (gcig) nature?

Precluding (bzlog) multiple concordant and discordant types. Thus, a vase is precluded from being a pillar, being a discordant type; and it is also precluded from being a second vase, though it be a concordant type; and it validates the vase’s one single nature itself.

Q. What is a proof of nature as different?

It is proven in relation to a unified nature. After being precluded in relation to one concordant type of vase, a second vase, and others, are proven to be distinct. Once discordant types like a pillar are collected, after being precluded they are proven to be different from such things as a vase, straw, a horse, an elephant, and so forth. That is to say, the system for proving phenomena to be the same (gcig) and different is like this.

Furthermore, there are two types of procedure (tshul) for proving something to be the same: (i) proving it to be the same [in terms of something] isolated, (ii) and proving it to be one [in terms of something] consolidated. There are also two procedures for proving [something] to be different: (i) proving [something] to be different [in terms of being] precluded; and (ii) proving [something] to be different [in terms of being] differentiated.

Q. What is it that proves the existence of [something being] the same?

It is possible, moreover, to assert a generality that is a real entity and it is possible, as well, to assert [its] imputed existence, because from the presence of multiple natures in the same universal [or generality], the statement "This is present as a unified nature" (‘di ngo bo nyid gcig du yod do) is given. In [terms of] isolation (dkar te), the existence of one (gcig) nature will itself be proved (bsgrub pa). In isolation, the proof [establishing something] to be utterly the same nature (ngo bo nyid [485 gcig yin par]) relies on the generality due to being

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1581 Reading bye brag du 'byed (BM 105.05; Th 189.01) rather than byed brag du 'byed (RZSB 1.484.01).
1582 phyogs (484.02) : pakṣa; cf. "class."
1583 re lde (484.17) : kaṭa (PPMV 89.12).
1584 spyi rdzas su yod par ’dod kyang rung (484.22).
1585 spyi gcig la ngo bo nyid du ma yod pa las (484.23).
1586 NTh 115.01; Th 191.01; BM 107.01.
established in multiple baseless natures; once isolated through preclusion, the notion that "this pertains to the same very nature" (ngo bo nyid gcig yin no) is validated.

Q. In [terms of] consolidation, what will prove that something is the same nature?

In this case, something is proven to be utterly identical (gang dang gang gcig gang du gcig pa). Here, when a subject and its predicate are established as a single identity (bdag nyid gcig par sgrub par byed pa) a unified nature is established [to obtain between them]. For example, the fact of blue on an utpala flower per se or the nature of a vase’s impermanence or production. In fact, within this criterion itself are both existential and predicative [statements] proven.

In the case of proving the presence of different natures per se, a differentiation within the universal validates it. In predication, the preclusion of unity is established. When a phenomenon is established as a unity, if proven in the context of isolation, then apart from that unified nature per se, each and every other distinction - so-called "being a holder of water," "being a product," "being impermanent" - is abandoned and precluded in validating nothing but a unity. When proving a subject and its predicate to be a single phenomena (chos gcig par) each and every part of it is proven to consist in the unified phenomenon after nature per se is formed as a single class.

Different natures are consolidated when phenomena prove to be the same (chos gcig du sgrub par byed pa); and if it is claimed they are utterly identical (gang dang gang gcig gang du gcig pa), there will be consolidation. For example, as when both the very nature of a pillar and the very nature of a vase are "the same" (gcig go) in being a product, proving the phenomena [to be] the same (chos gcig du), which establishes either existential or predicative proofs that validates difference accordingly. [We] distinguish specific color, shape, tactility, and characteristics in a vase's unified nature (ngo bo nyid gcig la). In its character, as well, [we] distinguish specific characteristics such as fabrication (byas pa), impermanence, and so on.

When phenomena are validated as being different through preclusion, being a product [for example,] pertains to a phenomenon is different, which has been precluded from impermanence. A product is, on this view, characterized by the manifestation of conditioning. [486] Impermanence is characterized the interruption of karmic processes. Therefore, the quality of being a product is impermanence. [Thus,] karmic process would not manifest [in the absence of impermanence per se]. Along these same lines, the statement "if the quality of being impermanent is itself a product, conditioning would not cease" is validated.

In all those, too, establishing the character of existence and predication are disclosed in a procedure wherein other distinctions are not abandoned by

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1587 rten pa myed par ngo bo nyid (485.01).
1588 bzlog nas bkar te (485.02).
1589 ngo bo nyid gcig du bsgrub par byed pa gang zhe na (485.03).
1590 ka ba'i ngo bo nyid dang bum pa'i ngo bo nyid gnyi' ga'ang byas par gcig go || zhes bsdus te chos gcig du sgrub par byed de (RZSB 1.485.18-485.19).
1591 NTh 115.01; Th 193.01; BM 108.05.
1592 byas pa nyid (486.01).
existent terms and awareness. That which validates in that manner is qualified
by two types of awareness: an awareness that apprehends holistically, if
validating as the same, a subject and its predicate are not found to be naturally
distinct. Natural difference, then, would not obtain [between a given]
phenomenon and its quality. Rather than being present as a unified phenomena,
that nature would be a real entity, whose nature would be qualified only in terms
of instances and marks of itself. If [they are] taken as individual [instances of
nature], the single entity would be nullified. In that case, nature itself, devoid of
components, is validated as existing [as] one entity or pertaining [to] a unity.

When an anatomizing awareness [makes] differentiations, the insistence
[that differentiations] exist in one generality collapses (’jig) the [notion of a]
unified generality due to differentiations into multiple natures. Due to nature
itself being differentiated in multiple distinctions, [the notion of] the same nature
per se, devoid of components, collapses. Due to individual distinction
differentiated into components, [the notion of] a phenomenon’s individual entity
collapses - it cannot be. When phenomenal differentiation is hierarchical in that
way,1593 mereological awareness,1594 unchanging differentiation for as long as
even an age (bskal pa’i bar du phyed yang), is inevitable (mi ldog du rung la). For the
establishing proof that the nature of all things exists in that way, physical form
cannot be measured,1595 it cannot [be done] due to the aspect of mind and mental
factors. In the end, there is no eternal source whose character is space-like.

In some contexts (skabs kha cig tu), it is even taught the two-fold
classification of awareness is abandoned1596 when analyzed in terms of being
reliant on both components, both karmic processes and their character,
impermanence.1597 After observing fault in even identity and difference1598 it is
in fact free from both. Similarly, the character of dependent and perfected
phenomena is like that. In that case, via all that philosophical positions that
hypostize things,1599 one’s own philosophical theory [4871600] proves the
existence of a unified real entity - nature itself - by means of holistic awareness;
and the philosophical theories of others are dissected by an anatomizing
awareness that proves the non-existence of [the opposing philosophy’s ultimate]
entity. Howsoever it is proved it is thereby circumscribed1601 and that absence of
a perfect knowable is simply a scale of distortion.1602 Yet, on this view, proving
nature and attribute to be identical (gcig du) or different or free from both and
difference is possible. At the point of constructing a proof for identity (gcig du
bsgrub par byed pa’i tshe) one might establish qualities as identical to nature per se

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1593 Reading de ltar rim gyis nuan par phyed na rather than de ltar rims kyis nuan par phyed na | (RZSB 486.16; BM 109.05; Th 194.03).
1594 gcig dang du ma’i blo (486.16-486.17); mereological in the sense of concern for relation between part (cf. Gk. µερος) and whole.
1595 bong tshod (486.18) : parimāna (Mvp 4607).
1596 skabs kha cig du blo nuan pa gyis su phyogs pa bor te (486.20).
1597 ’du byed ruams dang de’i mtsan nyid mi rtag pa gyis (486.21).
1598 gcig pa dang thu dad pa gyis ga la’ang skyon dmigs nas (486.21-486.22).
1599 dngos por lta ba’i grub mtha’ thams cad kyis (486.24).
1600 NTh 118.03; Th 195.01; BM 110.02.
1601 ji ltar bsgrub pa de ltar tshad zin cing (487.04-487.05).
1602 dri ma che chung tsam du zad do (487.03).
or establish nature as a unified quality. Thus, insofar as all phenomena are perceived to be characterized by their contributing to the spiritual attainment, these rational attacks also appear to the mind as [just so many] opposing contradictions between proponents of realist theories. These [paradigms of] reason do not converge in the system of the Great Perfection, even in part, just as one cannot claim to have surveyed depth of the ocean and extent of space by the shot of an arrow or glance of an eye.

§ 4.3. Grammatical science (sgra’i bstan chos, 487.11)

In the treatises on grammar, too, whatever convention is given, there is nothing other than non-implicative and implicative negation given in existential and predicative proofs. Proving something is mostly described through ‘secondary derivations’ (taddhitapratyaya : de la phan pa’i rkyen) and ‘primary derivations’ (kṛtpratyaya : byed pa’i rkyen). Secondary derivations transmit their respective universals [or generalities], disclose natures and nature-like distinctions, as well as primary derivations, accordingly. Even with primary derivations, it follows, there is no loss in saying "to go far" discloses attributes [in the existential sense] with respect to something that functions to go for a distance (ring du ’gro bar byed pa); and there is no loss in saying "go far" discloses attributes [in the predicative sense with respect to departing for a long distance]. Furthermore, given that nouns (nāman : ming) are only made attested from what is not attested and marked by grammatical case (vibhakti : rnam par dbyer ba) alone, they are described as conjugated (tiṅanta : yin byed verbal roots (dhātu : khams) suffixed/affixed qua derivations. This means that even without disclosing existence and predication – as in making the white of a cloth (ras yug gi dkar po bya ba lta bu) – this point is not transgressed.

§ 4.4. Logical Treatuses (rigs pa’i bstan chos, 487.20)

In treatises on logic, refutations and proofs given in terms of the four principles of reasoning that do not go beyond the two types of negation and

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1603 chos thams cad rnam par bsgrub pa nye bar gzhag pa’i mtshan nyid du dmigs na (487.06-487.07); cf. dKon cog ’grep: chos thams cad rnam par bsgrub pa nye bar gzhag pa’i mtshan nyid (RZSB 1.81.18-81.19, 82.15);
1604 ‘di ltar can lta bu spyi ston pa dang (487.14).
1608 rigs pa’i bstan chos (487.21) : yuktiśāstra.
two types of proof [discussed above]. Even in the appraisal [of phenomena given] in terms of the four principles of reason, all that is observed is proponents of realist theories simply subverting one another’s philosophical positions. Furthermore, once the reasoning itself is seen to be excessive, it is seen to be subverted once more [488\textsuperscript{1610}] due to the consequences of reasoning *per se.* As stated before (§1.6), such does not undermine the Great Perfection approach.

§ 4.4.1. four principles of reasoning (488.01)

In the system of the four principles of reasoning,\textsuperscript{1611} generally, it is established that arising as dependent relations is the character of phenomena. The [principle reasoning of reality]\textsuperscript{1612} is comprises proofs given in terms of nature itself. The [principle] reasoning of efficacy\textsuperscript{1613} is comprises of proofs given in terms of result. The [principle] reasoning of dependence\textsuperscript{1614} is comprises of proofs given in terms of cause. The [principle] reasoning of valid proof\textsuperscript{1615} is comprises of proofs given in terms qualified by stainless reasoning alone.

Their respective four exclusions are: the exclusion connected to the principle of nature is gnawing doubt concerning nature *per se.* The exclusion connected to the principle of efficacy is gnawing doubt about instruments. The exclusion connected to the principle of dependency is gnawing doubt concerning manifestation. The exclusion connected to the principle of valid proof is gnawing doubt concerning reasoning.

Regarding their objects and limits:\textsuperscript{1616} inasmuch as the actual basis of reality is stainless and not denied\textsuperscript{1617} it is possible to posit it as the principle reasoning of reality. Similarly, if explicit bases - instrument, manifestation, and knowledge - are stainless and undenied, they can be set forth as principles. That is to say, the presence of stains in the actual base is would be like a sun-crystal [which is used to direct light in such a way as to start a fire itself becoming] hot to the touch. Denial of an actual base is akin to denying fire burning a deer [standing in fire] that is termed ‘cleansed by fire.’ Another [point,] as well, is [this]: what principle is applied?

On the limits of the four principles: if excessive\textsuperscript{1618} with proofs via the principle of reality, things are all undenied and eventually one becomes a [Sāmkhya-like] proponent of nature as cause.\textsuperscript{1619} If excessive with proofs via the

\textsuperscript{1609} rigs pa rnam pa bzhi (487.21) : yuktī catuṣṭāyam.
\textsuperscript{1610} NTh 120.01; Th 197.01; BM 111.06.
\textsuperscript{1611} rigs pa bzhi’i tshul (488.01).
\textsuperscript{1612} chos nyid kyi rigs pa (488.01) : dharmatāyuktīh.
\textsuperscript{1613} bya ba byed pa’i rigs pa (488.04) : kāryakāraṇayuktī.
\textsuperscript{1614} los pa’i rigs pa (488.04-488.05) : apeksāyukti.
\textsuperscript{1615} ’thad pa sgrub pa’i rigs pa (488.05) : upapattisādhanayukti.
\textsuperscript{1616} yul dang tshad (488.08).
\textsuperscript{1617} dgnos gshis ma log na (488.09).
\textsuperscript{1618} thal drags na (488.14-488.15).
\textsuperscript{1619} rang bzhin rgyur smra ba (488.15), a.k.a. the Sāmkhya.
principle of efficacy, agent and effort are not denied and one becomes a proponent, in the end, of creator as cause. If excessive with proofs via the principle of dependency, all authority will not be denied and one will become a proponent of Iśvara as cause. If excessive with proofs via the principle of valid proof, all contexts in which there is reasoning are made stainless and eventually one becomes overly proud.

§ 4.4.2. rigs pa bzhi'i tshad dang thal ba (488.21)

When proponents of realism prove things, for the most part, it is done via the principle of reality and direct perception. Therefore, the limits and excesses wrought by these two ought to be described.

§ 4.4.2.1. tshad

As long as [there is] intellectual assessment into objects, as explained above, observations via the intellect are qualified by discriminative distinction, appearances to the intellect are qualified by distinctive sensations, and realized by the intellect that is qualified by stainless discriminative awareness. That is to say, [489] appearance that participates in sensation's domain of experience, while being experienced because of being incapable of clearing away confusion, nevertheless is comprehensible, simply something like a real entity. Observations by the mind via discrimination, being incapable of removing imposition and denial, are nothing but a non-recognition. Like a correct appraisal, stainless discriminative awareness understands (rtogs).

Discriminative awareness is two-fold: individually discriminating awareness and non-conceptual discriminative awareness. When the nature of reality (dharmatā : chos nyid) is assessed via individually discriminating awareness, distortions are cleared away gradually. Just as it was demonstrated earlier, for those who categorize phenomenal character, there is a gradual clearing away of distortions related to the totally imagined. Thus, eventually, there is no end to distortion as long as the actual basis in reality is undenied [i.e. taken as real]. When realized through non-conceptual gnosis, the actual base of reality is denied. Therefore, this proof through the principle reasoning of reality

1620 Reading dri ma med par (BM 112.07) dri ma myed pa (Th 195.04) rather than dri ma byed par (RZSB 488.19).
1621 mngon pa'i nga rgyal (488.19) : abhimāna (Mvp 1950).
1622 dngos por smra ba rnams (488.20); *bhatvādīn?
1623 don la blos 'jal ba (488.22). Assess in the sense of sizing up the character of something ('jal byed yo byad kyis dngos rdzas kyi lci yang ring thang mang nyung sogs brtis pa'i don te 1 DYSG 250a).
1624 Nth 121.04; Th 199.01; BM 113.03.
1625 ngos mi lta bu (RZSB 489.03, Th 199.03, NTh 121.05). BM gives mi lta bu (113.04). In trying to make sense of the phrase ngos mi, I have read ngo mi 'dzin pa lta bu zhig – 'something not unlike the unrecognized,' which appears consonant with the surrounding context.
1626 mtshan nyid rnam par bzhag pa rnams (489.07).
is only a partial outline of distortions in undeniable reality simply settled as the principle reasoning of reality.

§ 4.4.2.2. thal

Apart from limits, there is excess. Just as the Madhyamaka’s correct convention [means] poison is actually lethal and medicine is actually salutary, if they are in the actual nature of things, then the mind and gnosis associated with the would ultimately exist or transform into dharmatā; the subject/object dualism of the Šrāvaka in the end, becoming the very theory of nature as cause itself such that [the Madhyamaka's convention] amounts to being a guardian of all realist theories [rather than constituting a critique/refutation of them].

What is established through direct perception, too, is like this. As pointed out above, establishment via direct perception according to the Šrāvaka system is said to be refuted by some other reasoning. According to the Yogācāra system, a given object is a confusion in the actual base of reality; a stainless reality is intelligence simply appearing in the inner and outer sense fields. Therefore, reflexive awareness does not pertain to something that fabricates any subject or any object. What is established as the reality of mere reflexive awareness, characterized as non-dual, is stainless reality.

This need not be proven, however, by reasoning; and [it is] incapable of being subverted by reasoning. Then, are not all mind and mental factors reflexive direct perception? If that is the case, is direct perception per se not conscious awareness of reality? In which case, what is the point of proving it by another reasoning? Furthermore, there is another greatness through power due to that second conscious awareness of reality that is capable of disproving the other conscious awareness of reality. When all knowables are only mind, that conscious awareness of reality apprehends as stainless reality and stainless direct perception an object that is to be comprehended and proven. "What need is there to seek anything else?" On the other hand, there are also proofs they are impure.

Commonly (thun mong ltar na), directly perceiving awareness is [said to be] something generated along with conceptual aspects or something generated along without conceptual aspects. If generated without conceptual aspects, how

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1627 thal bar gyur na (489.11).
1628 chos nyid du 'gyur (489.14).
1629 nyan thos kyi gzung 'dzin (489.14).
1630 mngon sum gyis grub pa (489.15-489.16).
1631 rnam par rig pa nyid (489.19) : vijñaptitva (Chandra 2001: 472a).
1632 rang rig pa (489.20).
1633 mngon sum nyid yang dag pa'i shes pa ma yin nam (489.24).
1634 NTh 123.02; Th 201.03; BM 115.01.
1635 mthu rtsal gyis che ba (490.02).
1636 de las could be read as either "apart from that" or "from that"; thus de las ... gang zhig yod could be read "there is something apart from that" of "there is something from that," i.e. due to that.
is an object made to be directly perceived? If [direct perception] is generated without conceptual aspects, what acts as the unmistakable witness?\textsuperscript{1637} That being the case, there also a refutation [of] direct perception that states it "is not a viable pramāṇa" (tshad mar mi rung ngo).

According to the Yogācārins, are not all the minds and mental factors associated with the three realms false conceptions? If false conceptions, how is it a directly perceiving awareness is free from concepts? If it is really unmistakable, how is it directly perceiving awareness is unconfused? Insofar as it is marked by conception and thus an confusion, how is it possibly a pramāṇa?

Furthermore, on this view, what is indicated through the negational terms conceptual and unconfused\textsuperscript{1} indicate [respectively] negation in adherence and negation in separation.\textsuperscript{1638} Accordingly, just as what is disclosed by phrase "the absence of darkness at the heart of the sun" discloses nothing at all about source of obscuration, a faculty of awareness does not become distracted with nature per se; it is the very nature of gnosis.

If negation is subtle or slight, then, like stating "no discrimination" where there is subtle discrimination, subtle conceptions are described as "non-conceptions"; just as a little material is described as "no material," a little confusion is described as "unconfused." Given that nature per se is conceptual and confused how could it possibly be a pramāṇa?

Further, even though the [dualistic] nature of apprehended and apprehender is eliminated, if the cognitive state generated is something experienced through sensation, since the senses' domain of experience does not separate confusion, whether such a reflexive awareness is real or not is uncertain and still ought to be assessed.\textsuperscript{1639} [491]\textsuperscript{1640}

Q. Here, I might be stated: "if your point is that all reasoning is corrupt (dri ma can), how is it you possess some distinct uncorrupt reason [that explains all this]?"

We\textsuperscript{1641} do not [in fact] say there is an incorrupt reasoning. Nevertheless, because there are greater and lesser degrees of corruption, those reasonings of little corruption are capable of refuting those of greater corruption. If there were one incorrupt [system of] reason that handled [everything] knowable, what is the reason the Jinas, do lay out just that [system of reason] in all vacana from the very start? Regardless, none of this should suggest reliance on reason to be unhelpful. For example, the first glance and the first step do not complete the distance a person might intend to travel; yet it is not the case these are not to be relied upon. Just as it is completed through reliance upon them, realization becomes perfect through transmission, intimate advice, and one's own awareness arisen from reason. As it is stated: "Previous skilled adepts, until stable, do not subsequently give up. After becoming stable, they gradually give up, without falling into the abyss of defeat and come to realize all positive points."

Therefore, those who are devoted to grammatical treatises and logical

\textsuperscript{1637} dpang po (490.08) : sākṣin. On this term, see dKon cog ’grel: RZSB 1.78.10--80.09 cf. Wangchuk 2002: 279 n. 58.
\textsuperscript{1638} zhen par dgag pa dang bral bar dgag par bstan pa yin te (490.15).
\textsuperscript{1639} da rung gzhal bya yin no (490.24).
\textsuperscript{1640} NTh 124.06; Th 203.03; BM 116.05.
\textsuperscript{1641} kho bo cag (491.02) : tātvāvām (Chandra 2001: 80c).
treatises and, moreover, think they adopt their own philosophical position via incorrupt reasoning reject the system of the Great Perfection because it is not established through reasoning, should not use their mind in this way but, rather, faithfully engage in [the Great Perfection system]. For if they do not, they will come to be overly proud. This is the fourth chapter concerning how the system of the Great Perfection is not undermined by reason.
§ chapter five: writings on Great Perfection  (491.21-540.06)\textsuperscript{1642}

Here, we should disclose something of the actual writings (gzhung nyid) on the Great Perfection. Any and every writing that discloses the system of the Great Perfection is included in four types (of teaching) - that is on (i) the nature of bodhicitta, (ii) on the greatness of bodhicitta, (iii) on deviations and obscurations\textsuperscript{1643} connected with bodhicitta, and (iv) on methods [492-540.06] for ‘settling’ or ‘consolidating’ (gzhag thabs) bodhicitta. The teaching of deviations and obscurations, in fact, becomes a teaching on the nature [of bodhicitta]. In the teaching on nature, greatness is penetrated and deviation and obsuration is discontinued. Therefore, even though there is no such [four-fold] organizing rubric in the writings, themselves, [the discourse in the texts] does not go beyond it.

§ 5.1. the nature of bodhicitta (492.04)

In sum, then, [consider] the nature of bodhicitta: all phenomena, outer and inner, appearance and existence, [is] non-dual bodhicitta - the primordial nature of the essence of enlightenment (snying po byang chub) is primordially perfected (sangs rgyas), not something refined and corrected through a path and is accomplished spontaneously, without effort.\textsuperscript{1645}

§ 5.2. the greatness of bodhicitta (492.07)

Concerning the greatness of bodhicitta: consider an island of gold where the word ‘stone’ does not even exist because everything is naturally occurring gold.\textsuperscript{1646} By analogy, given [the true nature of] all phenomena included within outer and inner, appearance and existence, there is [in the end] no name for such things as saṃsāra, bad migrations, and so forth, which are imagined as faulty and imperfect phenomena. Everything pertains to the very greatness of the tathāgata, simply unimpeded appearance, Samantabhadra’s ornament of play.\textsuperscript{1647}

\textsuperscript{1642} rdzogs pa’i gzhung nyid bstan pa’i skabs te lha pa’o (540.06).
\textsuperscript{1643} gol sgrīb (491.24).
\textsuperscript{1644} NTh 126.04; Th 205.04; BM 119.02.
\textsuperscript{1645} Cf. Karmay 2007: 70 n. 50.
\textsuperscript{1646} dper na rin po che gser gling nas rdo’i ming yang nyed do | (RZSB 492.08). Cf. STMG: dper na ’dzam bu gser gling na sa rdo btsal gyi mi rjed pa bzhin no | (374.01-374.02); and Klein, Anne Carolyn, and Tenzin Wangyal. Unbounded Wholeness: Dzogchen, Bon, and the Logic of the Nonconceptual (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2006), 94.
\textsuperscript{1647} thams cad kun tu bzang po’i rol pa’i rgyan ma ’gags pa tsam du snang ba de bzhin gshegs pa’i che ba nyid do (492.11-492.12).
§ 5.3. deviations & obscurations (492.12)

Accordingly, deviations from and obscurations to *bodhicitta* pertain to all [of] the theory and praxis of the lower vehicles of the wordly person who is not realized and who is mis-informed. In sum, there are as if thirty deviations from and obscurations to *bodhicitta*.

§ 5.4. ‘settling methods’ or ‘methods of consolidation’ (492.14)

Concerning methods for ‘settling’ or ‘consolidating’ *bodhicitta*: even the dynamic awareness of a yogic being,\(^{1648}\) having taken hold of something like the domain of Great Perfection just as it is\(^{1649}\) through the vessel of great introspection,\(^{1650}\) remains within a state of great equanimity.\(^{1651}\) These words of the Great Perfection teaching in this way are said, as well, in a more well-known, ordinary idiom,\(^{1652}\) given in expressions such as *subtlety, peaceful*, and comparisons to *basic space*. The systems of the lower vehicles speak a language of *subtlety* and *peace*, as well, yet are coarse and distressed\(^{1653}\) like the material aggregates.

§ 5.5. from the writings on Great Perfection (492.21-516.13)

That being the case, this system of Great Perfection requires consideration by broad, deep, and subtle awareness. To that end, [below I will treat several] statements that emerge in the textual tradition of the Great Perfection\(^{1654}\) [such as the statement that] (1) state all phenomena are considered awakened in the intrinsic nature of *bodhicitta*, a single great sphere; (2) [those that] state all confusing appearances are considered as the play of Samantabhadra; (3) [those that state] all sentient beings are considered as the profound field of awakening; (4) [or those that state] all domains of experience are considered to be [493\(^{1655}\)] naturally arising gnosis.

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\(^{1648}\) *rnal 'byor gyi skyes bu blo yang rab du gyur pa gang gis* (492.14-492.15).

\(^{1649}\) Reading *ji lta ba* (BM 119.01; Th 206.05) rather than *ji ltar ba* (RZSB 492.15).

\(^{1650}\) *shes bzhin* (492.16): *samprajanyam*.

\(^{1651}\) *btang snyoms* (492.16): *upekṣā*.

\(^{1652}\) *che che rags rags skad du* (492.17).

\(^{1653}\) *'phra’ zhis zhis zhi skad du smra yang rags shing brdo ste* (492.19). Reading *brdo ste* (BM 119.03) rather than *brdo’ ste* (RZSB 492.19; Th 207.01).


\(^{1655}\) NTh 128.02; Th 207.03; BM 119.05.
§ 5.5.1. eight additional rubrics (493.01-493.11)\textsuperscript{1656}

Further, [below I will examine how] phenomena are enumerated in terms of (5) being considered to be naturally perfected as the five types of greatnesses; and (6) how all phenomena are enumerated in terms of being considered to be naturally awakened as the six great spheres. Further, on this view, [we shall see] (7) how to determine deviation and obscuration \textit{via} the thirty deviations and obscurations. [We shall explore] (8) removing the hindrance of doubt \textit{via} the three types of being;\textsuperscript{1657} determining the confident\textsuperscript{1658} intent \textit{via} the three pillars;\textsuperscript{1659} (9) comprehending the bases of esoteric precepts \textit{via} the three fundamental esoteric precepts; (10) resolving all knowables through \textit{bodhicitta} [within] a single great ‘sphere’ or \textit{thig le};\textsuperscript{1660} (11) recitation connected to the greatness that is devoid of anything that is not already perfect; (12) [how] the ground of the indivisible Samantabhadra is entered spontaneously without effort in the present state; thus the glorious Vajrasattva is second and suitable to pay homage to not unlike like a king empowered by a precious wish-fulfilling jewel through which everything possible and impossible. Now, to demonstrate what I’ve mentioned

§ 5.5.2. all phenomena are seen to be perfected within the single sphere of \textit{bodhicitta} (493.11-493.22)

As pointed out above, the term \textit{bodhicitta} signifies the indivisibility of mind (\textit{sems}) and awakened (\textit{byang chub}). For, it is said:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Citta} alone is \textit{bodhi};
What is \textit{bodhi} is \textit{citta}.
There are not two - \textit{citta} and \textit{bodhi};
Such a unity derives through \textit{yoga}.
\end{quote}\textsuperscript{1661}

The meaning of \textit{sphere} is simplicity (i.e. "free from elaborations").\textsuperscript{1662} \textit{Greatness} naturally, totally pervades all phenomena whose nature is perfect. Obscuration is not cleared away and gnosis is ungenerated given the nature of the essence of

\textsuperscript{1656} This \textit{sa bcad} covers material through 516.14 under twelve rubrics.
\textsuperscript{1657} \textit{yin pa gsum} (493.04).
\textsuperscript{1658} Reading \textit{gdengs chen po gsum gsys} (cf. Karmay 2007: 130 n. 53) rather than \textit{bde chen po gsum gysis} (DB 119.07), \textit{gdeng chen po gsum gysis} (Th 207.05), or \textit{gdeng chen po gsum gysis} (RZSB 493.04).
\textsuperscript{1659} \textit{deng chen po gsum} (493.04).
\textsuperscript{1660} \textit{thig le chen po gcig} (493.06). According to Gyatrub Rinpoche, "the “sole bindu” is the one \textit{dharma kāya}, which is replete with all the qualities of all the buddhas and which encompasses the entirety of \textit{samsāra} and nirvāṇa" (Dudjom Rinpoche & Dudjom Lingpa 2012: 88 s.v. \textit{bindu}).
\textsuperscript{1661} Reading \textit{de bzhin yo gis so} (Th 208.04) rather than \textit{de bzhin yod gis so} (BM 120.04) and \textit{de bzhin yo gas so} (RZSB 493.14).
awakening. For example, take the eyes of a jackal,\textsuperscript{1663} which see clearly regardless of whether it is day or not. There is no need to rely on the power of appearance since darkness need not be dispelled because at that moment luminosity is known in the nature of space.\textsuperscript{1664} Along those lines, when all phenomena are realized as the nature of the essence of awakening, there is no obscuration to dispel, there is no need to generate gnosis because at that time \emph{bodhicitta} is recognized as naturally luminous.

§ 5.5.3. all confused appearance is seen as the play of Samantabhadra (493.22-494.12)

ConcerAbout the phrase ‘play of Samantabhadra’: everything is ‘all-good’ or \emph{samantabhadra} because there is nothing at all negative or given up in connection with everything known to migrants to be confused appearances (\textquoteleft{khrul snang}). Since there is not any goal to strive toward and no core point to resolve\textsuperscript{1665} \cite{494,1666}, since illusion is a state like a game, it is play. Totally unimpeded appearance never strays from reality and is in fact indivisible from reality itself - and, thus, an ornament. Given there is no phenomena that is not totally perfect (\emph{sangs rgyas}), everything, because of being the very proof of the Tathāgata's deeds, pertains to the nature of greatness. Just as it is stated in the \emph{sātrānta}:\textsuperscript{1667} “Eighty-four thousand afflictions,\textsuperscript{1668} all causing affliction for sentient beings, are the very proof of the Buddha’s deeds. Even the four types of demons establish the deeds of a buddha.” This description as primarily the play fo Samantabhadra, which is taught in the \emph{Six Vajra Verses [of] Bodhicitta}, where what determines the deviations from the nature of \emph{bodhicitta} is taught through the two first verses. The unceasing ornament, the play of Samantabhadra that is the greatness of \emph{bodhicitta} is taught through the two middle verses. The last two verses disclose the resolution for settling or consolidating \emph{bodhicitta}.

\textsuperscript{1663} \textit{Ice spyang} (493.17): \textit{śicā} cf. MW 1075-1076 s.v. Note, the analogy of the jackal's eye appears, according to Almogi, who interprets as the term as ‘jackal’s vision’ in Ye shes gsang ba sgon ma’i rgyud (p. 829.5-6): rin po che yi gser gling du \textbar{} phyin pas thams cad gser du snang \textbar{} 'khor ’das bzang ngan med par shes \textbar{} ce spyang ’e na’i mig bzhin du \textbar{} gnyis su med par thag gcad do \textbar{} "e na stands for e na, a species of a deer or antelope (see MW, s.v. \textit{eṇa}; BHSD, s.v. \textit{eṇa}). See Almogi 2009: 216 n. 101.

\textsuperscript{1664} \textit{de’i tšhe nam mkha’ rang bzhin gyi’ od gsal bar shes so} (493.19).

\textsuperscript{1665} \textit{mthil phab pa’i don dang ma bral} (493.24).

\textsuperscript{1666} NTh 129.05; Th 209.04; BM 121.02.

\textsuperscript{1667} \textit{mdo’ sde} (494.07); \textit{sātrānta}; cf. Wangchuk 2002: 280 n. 60.

\textsuperscript{1668} Reading \textit{brgyad} rather than \textit{brgya’} (RZSB 1.494.04; Th 209.06) or \textit{brgya} (BM 121.04).
§ 5.5.4. all sentient beings seen as the field of deep awakening (494.12-494.17)

Regarding the phrase “sentient beings, the profound field of awakening”: it is not unlike one given in the Bodhicitta Vajrasattva Great Space,\textsuperscript{1669} which states: ‘greatness, which concerns actual reality (dharmaṭā : chos nyid) – supremacy itself (che ba’i che ba) – pertains to all sentient beings, the profound field of awakening’ because sentient beings are migrating aggregates. They are awakened and they are a field. Thus they are an awakened field on account of being a source of all the qualities [that derive from the Mahāyāna path]. It is called “a profound field” due to not appearing to and not being realized by cognizant beings migrating within conditioned existence [as such].

§ 5.5.5. all domains of experience seen as naturally occurring self-appearing gnosis (494.17-496.11)

Consider the phrase ‘all domains of experience to be naturally occurring gnosis appearing to itself’; [typically,] domains of experience (gocara : spyod yul) are comprised by the migrator’s six fields of sense experience. Naturally occurring gnosis (rang byung gi ye shes), in fact, consists in the natural pacification of all karmic processes [and thus those fields of experience]. Gnosis is naturally occurring.\textsuperscript{1670} In fact, this system is also asserted by the Yogārins who deny the existence of images (nirākāravāda/anākāravāda : rnam par med par smra ba).\textsuperscript{1671} This is proven, moreover, in different śūtras of definitive meaning, such as when it is stated: "Indeed, [naturally occurring gnosis] is not something collected (gsog); it is absent curative power (gsob), and foundationless;\textsuperscript{1672} merit is not something accumulated, gnosis is not something that cures, and devoid of a consecreated heart of naturally occurring gnosis.”\textsuperscript{1673} Accordingly, even though all phenomena are collections and deceptive subjects, the accumulation of merit \textsuperscript{[495]}\textsuperscript{1674}, seen as not deceptive, is practiced.\textsuperscript{1675} Similarly, they are curative because, though they

\textsuperscript{1669} byang chub kyi sems rdo rje sens dpa’ nam mkha’ che (RZSB 1.494.13).
\textsuperscript{1670} ye shes rang ’byung yin te (494.19-494.20). See Almogi: “Ratnagotravibhāgabhyākhyā, commenting on verse 1.5, refers to Buddhahood as self-occurring (Johnston, p. 8.9-10; Takasaki 1966, p. 157). For further references see TSD, s. v. rang byung and rang ’byung ba; cf. s. v. rang byung gi byang chub” (2009: 207 nn. 64-65).
\textsuperscript{1671} tshul ’di ni rnal ’byor spyod pa rnam pa myed par smra ba’ang ’dod do | (494.20).
\textsuperscript{1672} This gsog gsob snying med trope appears in Vimlakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra (Almogi 2009: 209 n. 77).
\textsuperscript{1673} Cf. Töh. 0176: ’Phags pa dri ma med par graọs pa bslan pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo (Vimlakīrti-nirdeśa-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra) in bKa’ ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2009, mdo sde, ma, vol. 60 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): mi skye bar so sor rtog kyang nyan thos kyi nges par yang mi lhung | gsog dang | gsob dang | snying po med pa dang | bdag po med pa dang | gnas med par so sor rtog kyang bsog nams gsog ma yin pa dang | ye shes gsob ma yin pa dang | bnuogs pa yongs su rdzogs rang byung ba’i ye shes su dbang bsukar ba dang | rang byung gi ye shes la brtson pa dang | nges pa’i don sangs rgyas kyi rigs la rab tu gnas pa yin te | (592.01-592.06).
\textsuperscript{1674} NTh 131.03; Th 211.05; BM 122.06.
\textsuperscript{1675} bsod nams kyi tshogs [495] mi slu bar yang bltas te spyad do | (494.24-495.01).
are devoid of potency at their core (bcud du bya ba myed); all phenomena are made curative qua gnosia (ye shes bcud du byas) and therefore rendered something relied upon. Even though all phenomena are without a core, what is referred to as ‘a consecrated heart or core of naturally occuring gnosia,’ is something that will be perceived to be undistorted and unsullied by the nature of conscious awareness.\textsuperscript{1676} While in accordance with the assertion of Yogācārins, these [assertions] are not factual.\textsuperscript{1677} Thus, [naturally occuring gnosia] is indeed not something collected, not curative, and foundationless. This is not unlike the approach given in the \textit{Gandavyūha-sūtra}:\textsuperscript{1678}

Even though some inconceivably [number of] Worldly realms would be burnt, Space would not come to be destroyed. Naturally arising gnosia is like-wise.\textsuperscript{1679}

A similar system is proclaimed in \textit{The Great Garuda}:\textsuperscript{1680}

\begin{quote}
Unsupported, without objective basis, unimaginable qualities of the path
Emerging from an object that is the subtle factors of the mind’s movement\textsuperscript{1681} correlate with
The realized, cultivated dharmakāya, devoid of any distinctive point, which
Remains in all [ways] just as it is - non-conceptual, naturally arising gnosia.\textsuperscript{1682}
\end{quote}

This, being the vital point of meditative absorption,\textsuperscript{1683} even though it is required in the context of settling bodhicitta, is taught here as well due to being the abiding state of naturally arising gnosia. Accordingly, non-conceptual concentration is something that does not reside in a given basis, is not taken to mind as a given object,\textsuperscript{1684} and does not conceptualize images just as they are. Therefore, the

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{1676}{shes pa ngo bo nyid kyis drī ma dag pa ma yin par yang bla’o \| (495.03-495.04).}
\footnotetext{1677}{yang dag par yod pa (495.05), in the sense of *factual?}
\footnotetext{1678}{sdong pos bgyan pa’di mdo (495.06). *See Almogi 2009: 245-246 n. 26 for a brief survey of Rzs’s use of this text in RZSB.}
\footnotetext{1679}{Tōh. 0044: Sangs rgyas phal po che zhes bya ba shin tu rgyas pa chen po’di mdo (Buddha-avatāra-saṅga-mahā-puṣṭa-sūtra) in bKa’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2007, phal po che, ka, vol 35 (Beijing: Krong go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): \|’jig rten khams rnams la la dag \| bsam gyis mi khyab tshig guur kyang \| nam mkha’’jig par’gyur ba med \| rang’byung ye shes de bzhin no \| (675.16-675.18).}
\footnotetext{1680}{NGB vol ka, folio 419.03-419.04. This version varies considerably from what is found in the Bairo rgyud ’bum. The fourth line is cited in STMG 341.2.}
\footnotetext{1681}{bsngo ba’i cha shas ‘phra’ mo’i yul las byung ba (495.09). Cf. DYSG 199b.}
\footnotetext{1682}{Tōh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahā-santi-bodhicitta-kulaya-rāja) in bKa’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krong go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): \| mi gnas dmigs pa’i yul med mi rtag chos kyi lam \| bsngo ba’i cha shas phra[64] mo’i yul la byung ba ste \| rtag sgon chos kyi sku ni khyad par don don med pas \| rang’byung ye shes mi rtag kun tu ji bzhin gnas \| (63.21-64.03).}
\footnotetext{1683}{bsam gtan (495.11) : dhyāna. *Reading gal’gag (TDCM 353a) rather than gal ggangs (RZSB 495.11; BM123.04; Th 202.05).}
\footnotetext{1684}{yul gang la’ang mi dmigs (495.14).}
\end{footnotes}
phrase "it is to be practiced in that manner," because of falling into the extreme of bias, is not divorced from factors of the mind’s movement (bsngo ba’i cha shas). The dharmakāya is not a single quality (chos gcig) particularized through [dichotomizing schemes such as] acceptance and rejection [i.e. bias] and then especially enhanced. Though the domain of experience connected to the six sense faculties is conceptualized and distracting, it does not accept and reject objects or even recognize them. Ordinary conscious awareness is, moreover, something luminous by nature. This system free of bias should be recognized as being analogous to the example of the jackal’s eye(s) pointed out above (§5.5.2). What is not in accord with the Yogācāra assertion here, however, are teachings such as orginal gnosis itself also being said to be free from all explanation (bsnyad pa).

Some think this: if naturally arising gnosis exists, what obscures? [there is nothing to] abandon. Do not think [like this]. For example, to people’s eyes, illumination exists as the elimination of darkness; because of that, even the power of illumination, the antidote to that [darkness], is perforce relative. Upon obtaining the jackal’s eye, [any] entity that is to be rejected is realized to be non-existent. If space is something naturally luminous, then the presence of a primary element as the basis of illumination would not be an instrument of the activity of removing darkness, though it is taken to be a real entity. Along those lines, when the stainless dharma eye is obtained, then even in the case in which the afflicted and what is not afflicted are not recognized, if recognized as an unreal entity (rdzas myed par shes pa na), the nature of the ordinary mind is recognized as something luminous, at which point non-conceptual gnosis is not concomitant with obscuration even while perceiving the character of cognitivity to be a real entity. Indeed there is no instrument of the activity of removing obscuration that appears before the mind. When that is the case, whatever appears to a confused awareness as a sensed domain of experience is not comprehended as real. Therefore, the rhetoric of abandoning obscuration pertains to a child’s domain of experience; it is not the domain of experience of the skilled. This point it is not unlike [one] in the Sañcayagāthā that states:

After a migrator understands confusion to be like a snare for wild beasts,
The insightful wander like a bird in the sky.

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1685 de ltar sgom zhes zer ba ni (495.15). In this the line from the Thabs shes sgron ma of dPal dbyangs? Cf. sangs rgyas rnu ms kyi dgongs pa ji ltar ba \| sens kyi rang bzhin gnas med de ltar bsgom (Takahashi 2009: 419).
1686 blang dor gyi mthar lung bas bsngo ba’i cha shas dang ma bral ba (495.16).
1687 dbang po drug gi spyod yul du ji ltar rnu m pai rto`g cing g.yengs par gyur kyang \| don la’ang blang dor med cing shes pa’ang rang bzhin gus ‘od gsal ba yin no (495.18-495.19).
1688 NTh 133.03; Th 213.05; BM 123.07.
1690chos kyi mig (496.02-496.03) : dharmakās (Chandra 2001: 243a).
1691 ‘khrul pa’i blo tshor ba’i spyod yul du gang snang snang la rdzas su mi gzung ngo (466.07).
1692 Toh. 0013: ‘Phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa sad pa tshigs su bcad pa (Ārya-prajñāpāramitā-sañcaya-gāthā) in bK’a’ gyu’r (dpe bsdur ma), 2007, shes rab sna tshogs, ka, vol. 34
§ 5.5.6. all phenomena seen as perfected within the nature of the five types of greatness given in terms of enumeration (496.11-498.01)

In that manner, after having spelled out the meaning of the Great Perfection by means of each term in brief, now I will demonstrate [it] by means of enumeration. In the phrase "all phenomena are considered to be naturally awakened as the five types of greatness," all phenomena are unmixed and totally perfected phenomena. In that context, unmixed pertains to diversity in appearance. Completely perfect pertains to what is naturally not dual.

§ 5.5.6.1. five types of greatness (496.14)

The five types of greatness:

- greatness of the clearly awake
- greatness of awakening as great being (*"embodied"?)
- greatness of awakening in dharmadhātu
- greatness of awakening connected with being that
- greatness of the non-existence of everywhere everything as perfect.

The term awakened was already explained above. The term clearly [indicates] something directly perceived or immediate. Great Being [here, indicates] mastery. Dharmadhātu [indicates] being separate from all phenomenal character. As being that [indicates] that there is no gnawing doubt. The absence of buddhahood [indicates] what is beyond convention. Re greatness: something should be called "great" because it eclipses the lesser (chung ngu rnams). At a given time (lan cig gi tshe), the term "great" [might be used in connection with] this vast and spacious awareness that surpasses those [with] lower-vehicle intellects in brilliantly surpasses. Yet, in the presence of an awareness

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(Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): \( \text{‘gro ba ’khrul pa ri dags rgyar chud ’drar shes nas} \mid \text{shes rab ldan pa mkha’ la bya bzhin rnam par rgyu} \mid (15.02-15.03). \)

1693 ma’dres pa (496.14).

1694 Re che ba lnga: see Karmay 2007: 114 n. 40, passim; n.b. STMG 336.03-339.02.


1696 mngon par sangs rgyas pa’i che ba dang \( \text{bdag nyid chen por sangs rgyas pa’i che ba} \mid \text{chos kyi dbyings su sangs rgyas pa’i che ba dang} \mid \text{de yin pa’i sangs rgyas pa’i che ba dang} \mid \text{thams cad nas thams cad du sangs rgyas pa myed pa’i che ba’o} \mid (496.15-496.18). \)

1697 mngon sum pa’ang ngo ’thon nyid du’o (496.19).

1698 mnga’ brnyes pa’o (496.19-496.20).

1699 zil gyis guon par byed pas (496.23-496.24).
qualitatively superior or inferior, it is not possible to say that the nature of that awareness itself is great absent any qualitative objectivity. Accordingly, this is not unlike what is proclaimed in [texts] like The Great Garuda:

Spacious, great, supreme dhārma,
Are proclaimed to be the antidotes of the lesser ones.\textsuperscript{1701}
For the greater ones, from the factor of equality,\textsuperscript{1702}
Lesser and Greater are free of objective basis.\textsuperscript{1703}

The five types of greatness that act to surpass five objects - i.e. inferior theories, nihilist theories, realist theories, doubt, and real exertion\textsuperscript{1704} - are called "great" because they are overwhelming in brilliance. The overwhelming brilliance of being manifestly awake eclipses inferior theory because, whereas for those in lower vehicles who remove obscurations and assert that awakening is accomplished in the transformation of appearance, here there is no phenomenon to be relinquished that is rejected. The phenomenon that is to be transformed is absent any transmutation. The phenomenon that is to be actualized is nothing that is to be obtained. Teaching only the directly perceived, the immediate, to be the awakened is overwhelming in brilliance [relative to] those inferior theories and an antidote to them; thus "greatness" is due to the destruction of the attitude connected with biases [i.e. with acceptance and rejection]. That will applied to those below Dominion in connection with everything is the Lord of Knowledge (i.e. Samantabhadra), who is autonomous [cf. greatness 1],\textsuperscript{1705} the essence of enlightenment does not rely on the power of another [cf. greatness 2]. The three remainders are understood easily.\textsuperscript{1706} Indeed, these five types of greatness, in their five-fold iteration, reveal the one domain of Great Perfection. On this view, the first [greatness] is the thesis. The next two characterize that. The fourth is the rationale for that (de’i gtan tshigs). The fifth gives verbal expression to them.

Q. That is to say, on this view, how is the character [of] what is clearly perfect (mngon sum du sangs rgyas pa) [in fact] awake (sangs rgyas)?

Everything is naturally occurring self-arisen gnosis without reliance upon some distinct nature of enlightenment essence (snying po byang chub);\textsuperscript{1707} and

\textsuperscript{1700} NTh 134.05; Th 215.05; BM 125.07.
\textsuperscript{1701} yangs so che’o chos chan po || chung ngu rnam kyi gnyend por gsungs (497.01-497.03).
The NGB edition, vol. ka, reads: || yangs so che’o chos chan po || chung ngu rnam kyi gnyen po yin (419.03-423.02).
\textsuperscript{1702} che la dmigs pa’i cha mnyam nas || chung che de rnam dmigs dang bral (497.02-497.03).
Reading mnyam nas (NGB ka 422.02) rather than bsnyams na (RZSB 497.03), bsnyis na (BM 125.07), or snyams na (Th 215.05).
\textsuperscript{1703} Toh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sams kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-
mahāsānti-bodhicitta-kulayāti-rāja) in bKa’ gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2008, mying rgyud, ka, vol. 101
(Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): || yangs so che’o chos chan po || chung ngu
rnam kyi gnyen po yin || che la dmigs pa’i cha bsnyams nas || chung che de rnam dmigs dang bral ||
(66.04-66.06).
\textsuperscript{1704} Cf. “searching activity” Karmay 2007: 114 n. 40.
\textsuperscript{1705} rig pa’i rgyal po rang dbang du gyur du (497.12-497.13).
\textsuperscript{1706} su (497.14).
\textsuperscript{1707} A criticism of the doctrine of tathāgatagarbha?
gnosis itself transcends all characteristics. When it is characterized, it is characterized in terms of being something ineffable or beyond description (bsnyad pa’ thams cad dang bral ba).

Q. What is the reason for that?

Even though this teaching states ‘because that is its nature, and, therefore, it is perfect,’ whether it applies to the presence of some flawless quality or the the absence of a state of reality similar to that, ‘everywhere at all times perfect’ has nothing to do with the convention labled sags ma rgyas pa or ‘not totally perfect’ because it is [a trope] that will disclose this domain, which is said [498\textsuperscript{1708}] to be intoned effortlessly by virtue of the fact that it transcends the domain of all exertion in conceptual construction.

§ 5.5.7. the six great ‘spheres’ (thig le) (498.01-498.24)

Q. What are the six great spheres or thig le?

sphere of reality\textsuperscript{1709}
sphere of the expanse
sphere of the totally pure expanse (*sphere purifying images of the expanse)
sphere of great gnosis
sphere of Samantabhadra
sphere of the spontaneous state

Concerning these: reality is the immutable; sphere signifies simplicity.\textsuperscript{1710} For example, the reality of a mirage is that it is simply empty of water. In fact, being mental movement and fluctuation alone pertains to being empty. Emptiness is viable appearing as the generation of a mirage as well as appearing as [its] obstruction because, given that in emptiness, there is nothing to be transformed into something else and entities are not encompassed by what is not simple.\textsuperscript{1711}

Along those lines, when the reality of phenomena is taught in the context of ‘intimate advice’ or ‘esoteric precepts’ (upadeśa : man ngag) above, then from teaching the empty and selfless up through the teaching of non-duality, there is no transforming something’s nature into something else by means of various phenomena. There is also not an already elaborated characteristic [quality of] concreteness. Characteristic marks are eliminated and not dispensed with. Due to being like that very nature of actuality, it is called the sphere of reality. That alone (de nyid) is the sphere of reality’s expanse due to being the source of all perfected quality.\textsuperscript{1712} That alone (de nyid) is the sphere of the totally pure expanse due to being primordially purified [of] all distortion. That alone is the sphere of great gnosis due to being naturally luminous, self-manifesting, naturally arising

\textsuperscript{1708} NTh 136.03; 217 06; BM 127.03.
\textsuperscript{1709} chos nyid kyi thig le (498.02).
\textsuperscript{1710} thig le ni spros pa dang bral ba’i don te (498.04).
\textsuperscript{1711} dngos po’i spros pas zin pa’ang myed (498.08).
That alone is the sphere of Samantabhadra due to being the unceasing
ornament of Samantabhadra’s play. Even an object like that is the sphere of the
spontaneous state due to being unreliant upon either change from the ground up
(da gzod bgrod) or refinement. The first two are untainted by sentient being’s
confusion. The middle three are not modified by antidotal means. The last is
transcending effort in experience (la bzla’ ba’o).

Indeed, these five types of greatness and six great spheres teach the nature
of bodhicitta, the greatness of bodhicitta, and the elimination of deviations from
bodhicitta. In fact, the method for settling bodhicitta pertains to the actual capacity
to remain free from effort and be confident (rdeng).

§ 5.5.8. the elimination of deviations and obscurations by means
of the thirty deviations and obscurations (498.24-514.19)

Now, after having hitherto analyzed (bcad nas) intellectual confidence in
terms of [various] enumerations, the method of the effortlessly spontaneous state
is to be disclosed – that is to say: the [4991714] the elimination of deviations and
obscurations through the thirty deviations and obscurations.1715 The thirty, as
generally known terms, are ten basic categories [in] two bases.1716 The two bases
are points of deviation1717 and obsuration. In this context, obsuration is
something that works works in hiding (sgrib par byed pa) great buddhahood; on
this view, the accomplishment of that [great buddhahood] is effortless.
Q. What, moreover, are they [i.e. points of deviation]?

The worldly, Śrāvakas, and Pratyeka-buddhas! Points of deviation
comprise two [types]: common and special. Those called common deviate from
internal mental yoga.1718 That is to say, on this view: the approaches associated
with Paramāṭa-class discourses,1719 Kriya and Ubhaya [classes of tantra]. Special
points of deviation separate out four types of union (yoga : rnal ’byor) that indeed
distinguished within a single single yogic system, on this view, distinguished as:1720

Yoga
Mahāyoga
Anuyoga

1713 The Approach: de nyid rang bzhin gyis ’od gsal te | rang byung gi ye shes rang shar bas | ye
shes chen po’i thig le’o | (RZSB 1.498.14-498.16).
1714 NTh 138.01; Th 219.06; BM 129.01.
1715 Karmay 2007 notes: “Usually abbreviated as gol sgrib. In TY (p. 169) it is explained as: ‘og mar
gol ba’i gol sa—deviation to a lower level’; gong ma mthong ba’i sgrib pa—‘obscuring one’s vision of
the upper level’. There are thirty kinds of gol sgrib” (70 n. 52).
1716 spyir grags pa ming du sum cu rdzas su bcu rtsa ba gnyis so (499.01.499.02).
1717 gol sa (499.02).
1718 nang sems kyi rnal ’byor (499.05).
1719 mdo sde pha rol du phyin pa’i tshul (499.06). *sūtra-nikāya-paramitā-nīti.
1720 rnal ’byor gyi tshul gcig la yang yo ga rnam pa bzhir phye ste (499.07).
Atiyoga

The lower would be deviations with respect to the higher.\textsuperscript{1721} Thus, ten basic categories (\textit{rdzas su bcu}):

§ 5.5.8.1. ten basic categories (499.09)

[Obscurations:
Worldly
Śrāvaka
Pratyeka-buddha
Common deviations:
Paramitā-class sūtras
Kriya
Ubhaya
Special deviations:
Yoga
Mahāyoga
Anuyoga
Atiyoga]

Re the thirty as terms: each of the four types yoga, as well, has six common deviations and obscurations totally twenty four. Special points of deviation [number] one, two, and three; add six [to twenty-four] to get to thirty.

§ 5.5.8.2. deviations \textit{vīś-ā-vīś} the ten basic categories (499.11)

1. \textbf{WORLDLY}

To that point, nothing need be said on the worldly.

2. \textbf{ŚRĀVAKA}

Śrāvaka theory and practice finds its source in the significance of the four truths and such things as the four root transgressions and (\textit{parājik}) vows\textsuperscript{1722} and so forth. Remaining in the \textit{pratimokṣa} discipline, it is renounced from the three realms. Yet, it forms a point of deviation from yoga, in general, due to having nothing to do with the yoga of reality;\textsuperscript{1723} it deviates from the Great Perfection due to ailing under effort. It is a point of deviation, here, moreover, due being explained as transformation into buddha.\textsuperscript{1724} It is an obscuration due to not

\textsuperscript{1721} de dag 'og ma gong ma'i gol sar 'gyur ro (499.08). *See Almogi 2009: 30.
\textsuperscript{1722} sdom pa'i rtsa ba 'pham pa bzhi (499.12-499.13).
\textsuperscript{1723} de kho na nyid (499.14) : tattva.
\textsuperscript{1724} sangs rgyas su 'gyur bar bshad pas (499.15-499.16).
generating the mind as great enlightenment. Generally, all points of deviation also are obscurations.

3. **Pratyeka-Buddha**

Pratyeka-buddha theory and practice finds its source in the system of interdependence; the basic vows are consistent with the Śrāvakas and thus the [two] are alike in being renounced from the three realms.

4. **Paramitā-Class Sūtras**

Paramitā-class sūtras theory and practice along with its vows originate after generating the mind of great enlightenment, practicing the six and ten perfections (paramitā). In particular, the theory of the two truths originates. Having relied upon the pratimokṣa [as] the basic vow, remaining committed to the great enlightenment encompassed by the four uncommon root parājika vows and minor offenses, great enlightenment is accomplished in reliance upon the [three] precious jewels and sentient beings; or accomplishing great enlightenment by means of practicing, primarily, the great compassion that acts to fulfill the aims of sentient beings [500]. It is a point of deviation from the yoga, in general, due to having nothing to do with the yoga of reality. It deviates from Great Perfection due to actualizing effort.

5. **Kriya**

In the general approach of guhyamantra, enlightenment is accomplished in reliance upon the [three] precious jewels and sentient beings and the practice consists primarily in enacting delight vis-à-vis vidyāmantra or ‘knowledge-mantra and guhyamantra or ‘secret mantra’ and, more peripherally (zhar la), acting on behalf of sentient beings. Apart from that, the theory and practice of Kriya is to remain in bodhicitta and [its] three principles of reality. Vidyāmantra and guhyamantra completely gratify (mnyes par byed pa). The basic vow is due to the pratimokṣa and the basis of great enlightenment. Abiding in the five bases of training, the four great root downfalls to be relinquished are abandoned. By enduring in the thirteen root samaya to be taken up and numerous branch samaya, great enlightenment is accomplished. These basic vows are a ‘discipline’ or vinaya (‘dul ba) of the guhyamantra because all bases rely on this. Then, the vows proclaimed primarily in the teachings of yogatantra are kept secure. Common vows are the basis for worth guarding what is worth protecting and functioning to consolidate what is worth consolidating. As such, they are something to lean on (rten pa).

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1725 rten 'brel gyi tshul (499.17-499.18).
1726 nyes byas (499.22).
1727 NTh 139.05; Th 224.01; BM 130.05.
1728 byang chub sems dang de nyid gsum la gnas pas (500.05-500.06). Cf de nyid gsum refers to de kho na nyid gsum; see 500.17-500.18.
1729 bslab pa'i gzhis lnga (500.07-500.08) : *paśca-śikṣāpada (cf. Mvp 7008).
§ THREE REALITIES (500.17)

Bodhicitta and the three principles of reality, too, are the bases of all theory and practice in the guhyamantra and all knowables are included within them. Thus, I will explain a little bit about them on account of being essential in all the work of guhyamantra yoga. Here, bodhicitta is something generated by a mind composed from discriminating awareness and compassion. The three realities\textsuperscript{1731} are:

- one's own reality (bdag gi di kho na nyid)\textsuperscript{1732}
- divine reality (lha'i gi di kho na nyid)
- recitation connected with the real\textsuperscript{1733} (bzlas brjod kyi de kho na nyid)\textsuperscript{1734}

One's own reality comprises the nature of conditioned phenomena just as they are. Divine reality comprises the character of unconditioned phenomena. Recitation of the real comprises the character of the means to accomplish that.

The so-called self [referenced here] is the domain of the five psycho-physical aggregates, not something simply not distinguished by the intellect. One's own reality becomes three types under the influence of the three doors. According to the Śrāvakas, this collection of five psycho-physical aggregates is empty of such things as the self that is imagined by non-Buddhist extremists and [501\textsuperscript{1735}] what is of that self,\textsuperscript{1736} eternalism, and nihilism and so forth; they are empty of being imagined. The impossibility of rejecting the character of these aggregates, elements and sources, as utterly nothing (chos tsam myed) is one's own reality.

According to the Yogācāra, the reality of this collection of five aggregates is not only empty of self and what belongs to [that] self, it is also empty of the imagined Śrāvaka [notion] of subject and object. Mind and mental factors, being only one's own awareness,\textsuperscript{1737} pertain neither to the apprehended (i.e. object) nor the apprehender (i.e. subject); and that is its reality. Further, when untainted by notions of subject and object, if there is no difference from the state of perfection,\textsuperscript{1738} then because of tainting, [such a] difference is [thus] distinguished.

In accordance with the Madhyamaka, the reality of this collection of aggregates is further empty being the ultimately existent non-conceptual gnosis

\textsuperscript{1730} The following passages are also found in a text called Slob dpon chen po pad ma 'byung gnas kyis mdzad pa'i man ngag lla ba'i phreng ba'i mcham 'gre' nor bu'i bang mdzod (http://rywiki.tsadra.org/-vindex.php/Key_Instructions:_A_Rosary_of_Views). See TBRC W23468.

\textsuperscript{1731} See Karmay 2007: 155 s.v. four divisions of samādhi, where, in addition to this triad, yig 'bru'i do kho na nyid is inserted between two and three. This triad differs from that givein in Dudjom’s The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism glossary of enumerations.

\textsuperscript{1732} See Dudjom’s The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism, 1.32-33, 207.

\textsuperscript{1733} bzlas brjod (500.18) : jāpa (Mvp 4250).

\textsuperscript{1734} See Almogi 2009: 283-284 n. 23.

\textsuperscript{1735} NTh 141.03; Th 224.01; BM 132.03.

\textsuperscript{1736} kun du brtags pa'i bdag dang [501] bdag gi (500.24-501.01).

\textsuperscript{1737} Reading rang rig pa tsam (DB 132.05; Th 224.04) rather than rang rigs pa tsam (RZSB 501.06).

\textsuperscript{1738} sangs rgyas nyid (501.08) : buddhatva (Mvp 6908).
imagined by the Yogācārin; this complete pacification of conceptual elaboration is [the aggregates’] reality.

From this, it follows that anything tenable as one of the three realities is infused with divine reality. Due to meditation on the commitment being, the gnosis being is perceived by the mind to be present, which seeks, through the production of accompanying recitation, to achieve a distinctive reality. In that connection, divine as perfected (sangs rgyas) is beneficial and distinctively sublime and thus called lha, ‘divine’. Divine reality is included within eight qualities and six deities. The eight qualities:

the totally pure dharmadhātu
non-conceptual gnosis
the non-dual concentration of that [non-conceptual gnosis]
conceptual gnosis

These four along with the four variations in the appearance of form equal eight qualities:

appearance as sound
appearance as name
appearance as form
appearance as mudrā

These are infused by the divine. Both pure actual reality of the divine and the impure reality of the self, moreover, are realized to be absent any difference [in] nature such that meditating along those lines, even both divine gnosis qua pure natural awareness and the impure self-awareness of egoic conscious awareness are likewise indivisible. Given that (la), the distinctively sublime appearance as divine body and speech should be understood to be similar to appearance as egoic body and speech, which is not distinctively [sublime], as well. Due to that, one will be transformed into a deity and that generation is practiced, therefore (pas) the phrase ‘infused with the divine’ is designated because of achieving the deity.

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1739 dam tshig sens dpa’ (501.12-501.13) : samayasattva.
1740 ye shes sens dpa’ (501.13) : jñānasattva.
1741 chos baryad (501.15) : *aṣṭadharmā.
1743 chos kyi dbyings rnam par dag pa (501.16).
1744 de gnyis su myed pa’i ting nge ‘dzin (501.17).
1745 rnam par rtag pa dang bcas pa’i ye shes (501.17-501.18).
1746 gzugs kyi bya brag du snang ba bzhi (501.18).
1747 lha’i ye shes rang rig dag pa (501.22).
1748 bdag gi shes pa rang rig ma dag pa (501.22).
1749 NTh 143.01; Th 226.02; BM 133.06.
1750 bsgoms (502.01) : bhāvanā.
1751 lhar grub pas (502.02); alternatively, ”because of accomplishing the deity,” or ”established as divine.”
Given such an object as this, some might say: when cultivating such things as syllables, mudrās, buddha-bodies, and so on, it is said these are ‘something imagined cultivated with an antidotal purpose alone,’ which constitutes slander that accumulates a very onerous karma. After thinking one’s own reality is real nature itself, [there is] the thought that divine reality pertains to the totally imagined. This is not unlike, for example, a fool who takes a trinket as a precious jewel and the precious jewel as to be a mere decoration.

The divine reality which, according to the system of guhyamantra, encompasses absolutely everything, is nothing other than different systems of consolidating (bsdu), combining (sbyor), and considering (lta). [One could] elaborate [here] at length. Even this teaching [i.e. Kriya] as such deviates from yoga generally due to the external activities and primary activities done. It deviates from the Great Perfection through the construct [of] effort.

6. Udbhaya

Udbhaya is also this way because it does not dispense with activities.

7. Yoga

The four types of Yoga are in general agreement because of primarily engaging in yoga of the internal mind. In terms of internal distinctions, given that Yoga is connected to acceptance and rejection, ordinary thought dualizes the divine and the self.

8. Mahāyoga

Mahāyoga is the opposite of this.

9. Anuyoga

Anuyoga is called ‘subsequent yoga.’ In one moment [of] awareness of the non-duality of the expanse [of basic space] and gnosis, theory and practice are asserted to be complete. Thus, it accords with atiyoga; but because it is not free from slight effort, it is called ‘concordant yoga.’

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1752 yi ge (502.02) : aksara (Mvp 2014).
1753 phyag rgya (502.02).
1754 sku (502.02) : kāya.
1755 shin du lei ba’i las gsog pa (502.04).
1756 kun las kyang ‘dir ma ‘dus pa gang yang myed (502.08).
1757 Cf. Rongzom’s three-fold division of yoga in Dam tshig mdo rgyas: rnal ’byor rnam pa gsum du phyuc ste | rnal ’byor chen po dang | rjes su mthun pa’i rnal ’byor dang | shin tu rnal ’byor ro | de nyid la bskyed pa dang | rdzogs pa dang | rdzogs pa chen po’i rnal ’byor zhes kyang grags te | de dag thams cad kyang rnal ’byor chen po nyid kyi bye brag tsam du shes par bya’o (RZSB 2.365.05-365.08). See Wangchuk 2007: 313 n. 114.
1758 dbhyings dang ye shes gnyis su myed pa’i rig pa skad cig ma geig la (502.15-502.16).
10. **Atiyoga**

These internal divisions in *guhyamantra* assert the indivisibility of the two truths, first beginning with Kriya and ending with Great Perfection. Due to that, one’s own reality and the divine reality are considered to be equal in nature, from Kriya through the Great Perfection. Insofar as the view of equality waxes, the view of inequality wanes. In short, [the view of equality] simply slowly diminishes fixation on realist views.

A view such as this [wherein one’s own reality] is the same nature as the divine is present in those sets of discourses that are definitive in meaning (*nges pa’i don kyi mdo sde*). Nevertheless, there is not much other explanation than this concerning a means [explaining] how equality is accomplished. [5031760] This is not unlike, for example, the bodhisattva’s jataka tales in the *Śrāvaka* system, which are simply teachings on the accomplishment of enlightenment through practicing for the benefit of sentient beings over a long period of time with no explaining the means of just how [such] is accomplished –i.e. of *bodhicitta*.

These deviations and obscurations have been explained in dependence upon the *rDo rje sens dpa’ nam mkha’ che* because in the the injunctions of past scholars (*sngon kyi mkhan po rnam kyi lung*1761 *khong thon las*) because it is well-known that in the *Mi nub rgyal mtshan nam mkha’ che*1762 that each specific deviation and obsuration is revealed like the sun in the sky. Those deviations and obscurations are simply explained as simple parameters, beyond which one does not go. When [deviation & obsuration, as a category, is] broken down and taken as and taken in seminal groups (*bcar te ’bru ’thus su gzungs na*), there are twenty-three points of deviation and seven obscurations equalling thirty.

§ 5.5.8.3. twenty-three points of deviation (503.08)

In connection with the twenty-three points of deviation, the first set of ten is comprised of the three points of deviation concerning the essence of enlightenment (*bodhigarbha/bodhimanda : byang chub kyi snying po*1763), three points of deviation concerning concentration, and four points of deviation concerning the path of actual reality.1764

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1760 NTh 144.05; 228.02; BM 135.04.
1761 Cf. Nyang ral nyi ma ’od zer (1124-1192) uses the term *lung chen po bco brgyad* (Nyang ral Chos byung: 320)
1762 See Christopher Wilkinson’s study of this text in, “The Mi Nub Rgyal Mtshan Nam Mkha’ Che,” Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines 24 (October 2012): 21-80. THL reports: “There are two other texts with the same name in the mTshams brag and the Bai ro’i rgyud ‘bum editions of the rNying ma rgyud ‘bum, although the contents are not the same (the mTshams brag and the Bai ro’i rgyud ‘bum are basically the same text while the gTing skyes edition is different. The gTing skyes edition is the one incorporated in the 30th chapter of the Kun byed rgyal po.”
1763 On this term, see David Higgins.
1764 chos nyid lam (503.10).
The second set of ten is comprised of one point of deviation concerning attachment to the types of bliss [associated with] great gnosis, two points of deviation concerning the source of limits for hopes and aspirations, three points of deviation concerning scriptural transmission, one point of deviation concerning cause, and three points of deviation concerning the fruit of attaining concentration.

In connection with the three points of deviation concerning dharma, the non-emergence of dharma from dharma, plus the dharma not relying upon dharma, plus the not realizing dharma through dharma equals three points. Thus, the twenty-three points of deviation.

§ 5.5.8.4. seven obscurations (503.15)

Re the seven obscurations: there are three obscured obscurations are not encompassed within the domain of yogic activity due to the fact there is corruption in the nature of the essence of awakening; there are three more obscurations embraced through the illness of the bondage of affliction, making six; and there is one more obscuration embraced through imposition and denial concerning scripture, making seven.

§ 5.5.8.4.1. three deviations from the essence of awakening (503.18)

In connection with the three points of deviation concerning the essence of awakening, the first concerns the nature of actual reality, bodhicitta [and] the essence of awakening, which have nothing to do with all characteristics of appearance. It is stated that exertion, resulting from (bas) desiring to generate actual reality, pertains to a deviation:

Actual reality, devoid of appearance,
Is meditation setting forth non-effort;
Analogously, when the former is sought in the latter
Reality cannot thereby emerge.

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1765 ye shes chen po (503.11) : *mahājñāna.
1766 re smon gyi mtha’ la gnas pa (503.11).
1767 lung (503.12) : agama.
1768 bsgribs pa’i sgrigs pa (503.15-503.16).
1769 chos nyid mgon du bya bar ’dod nas (503.20).
1770 395.02-395.04. "The latter two lines are cited in STMG: 352.4-342.5 as Nam mkha’ che.
1771 Alternatively, "is cultivated" (bsgom pa yin).
1772 Toh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi Sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsānti-bodhicitta-kulayā-rajā) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, nyi rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): || snang ba med pa’i chos nyid ni \| ma btsal
The meditation pertains when there is no exertion at all because the nature of the essence of awakening has nothing to do with the character of appearance; once there is desire to generate [actual reality] it is a deviation through effort.

The second [deviation concerning the essence of awakening] is given in the [autonomy of] essence of awakening [504], unchanged through the power of something else. It is stated:\textsuperscript{1774}

When there is a congruence of features,
The term \textit{karma} is designated;
Anything under the influence of karma
Is not naturally arising gnosis.\textsuperscript{1775}

However various instantiated conceptions\textsuperscript{1776} appear, given [they] are the same character, indivisible in the nature of the essence of awakening, virtuous and wicked karma is something totally imagined by confused beings wandering in conditioned existence. Such an approach is also given in the \textit{Vairocana-Mâyâjâlatantra}:\textsuperscript{1777}

Ignorant sentient beings, in their delusion,
Act the fool [entangled in] the web of concepts;
The virtue and wickedness they do,
Is labelled into two bundles.
This \textit{dharma} is naturally pure\textsuperscript{1778}

This is not unlike what is stated in the \textit{Nam mkha’ lta bur dri myed}:

Due to the diffusion of sentient consciousness,
The process of karma varies.\textsuperscript{1779}

\textit{bzhag pas bsgoms pa yin \| de dang der ni rnam btsal na \| de las de bzhin de mi ’byung \| (79.02-79.04).}

\textsuperscript{1773} NTh 146.03; Th 230.03; BM 137.01.
\textsuperscript{1774} Cf. STMG 395.05; 424.01-424.02.
\textsuperscript{1775} Töh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kuns byed rgyal po (\textit{Sarva-dharma-mahâdsanti-bodhicitta-kulayâh-râjâ}) in bKa’ ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krun go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): \| khyad par cir yang mtslings pa la || las so zhes ni rnam par brtags \| ci ste las kyi dbang ’gyur na \| rang ’byung ye shes yod ma yin \| (79.08-79.10).

The first line of this verse also appears in Töh. 0829: De bzhin gshegs pa thams cad kyi thugs gsang ba’i ye shes don gyi snying po rdo rje bkad pa’i rgyud rnal ’byor grub pa’i lung kun ’dus rig pa’i mdo theg pa chen po mgon par rtogs pa’i chos kyi rnam grangs rnam par bkod pa (\textit{Sarva-tathâgata-citta-jñâna-gulya-artha-garbha-oyâha-oja-tantra}) in bKa’ ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krun go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang), p. 355.07.

\textsuperscript{1776} Reading \textit{rtogs} (BM 137.03; Th 230.04) rather than \textit{log} (RZSB 504.03).
\textsuperscript{1777} rnam par snang mdzad sgyu ’phrul drwa ba’i rgyud (504.06).

\textsuperscript{1778} Töh. 0466: rGyud kyi rgyal po chen po sgyu ’phrul dra ba (\textit{Mâyâjâla-mahâtantra-râja-nâma}) in bKa’ ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rgyud ’bum, ja, vol. 83 (Beijing: Krun go’i bod (Beijing: Krun go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): \| sens can mi shes pas rmoon gs te || thams cad shes rab rnam mangs sning \| phyi rol dgos la mgon zhen pa \| rnam rtog dra bas blun byas gang \| de dag gis ni dge sdig gi \| phung po guyis su rnam par brtags \| chos ’di rang bzhin gyis steg (393.17-393.20).
That being the case, in a moment of instantiation of conceptual schema (mngon par ’du byed pa’i dus nyid), naturally occurring gnosis is self-appearing. In a different moment, that is not the case because when karma is [grasped as] a real entity, naturally arising gnosis is impossible. Take, for example, the radiance of a spinning fire-brand: if the character of the circle’s radiance is itself the real entity, there would be no basis in reality for the fire-brand’s inherent brilliance.\(^{1781}\)

The third [deviation concerning the essence of awakening] is given in terms of the essence of awakening not being produced causally. In the desire to establish awakening causally, effort constitutes a deviation; it is stated:\(^{1782}\)

The cause per se is not unlike to an indestructible condition

Because it is unborn, it is indestructible.

In the primordial awakening essence,

The expanse [of basic space] is unmoved by the force of thought.\(^{1783}\)

The actuality (mtshan nyid) of what appears as cause and condition accords with the indestructible because of the indivisible reality (mtshan nyid) devoid of arising and ceasing that is absent of any point of movement due to causal force.

§ 5.5.8.4.2. three deviations from concentration (504.19)

[Concerning] the first [deviation from concentration, it is stated ;\(^{1784}\)

The concentration on great qualities,

Being a state of concentration, is not thought;

Unthought and untrained, just as are phenomena,

Gnosis emerges from a state of conceptuality.\(^{1785}\)

1779 Toh. 0466: rGyud kyi rgyal po sgyu ’phrul dra ba (Māyājāla-mahātantra-rāja-nāma) in bKa’ ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rgyud ’bum, ja, vol. 83 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang) | de yi byang chub spel ba’i phyir | las kyi tshul ni sna tshogs yin | (386.21). Two things of note: the first line in the verse reads [sangs rgyas yi byang chub phyir rather than sens can shes pa spel ba’i phyir; second, this verse is identified by Rongzom as being from the Nam mkha’ dri myed rather than in the seventh chapter of the Māyājāla-mahātantra, where it is found in the dPe bsdur ma catalogue.


1781 rgyud ’bum (504.14) : abhāsvara (Mvp 2291); cf. prabhāsvara, anṣū (Mvp 3037).

1782 360.01. Cf. STMG 243.04.


1784 Cf. Bairo Khyung chen: 360.01-360.03.

The unceasing formation of all merits in the heart of equality and, moreover, automatic abatement of impure karmas, is in accordance with the concentration on great qualities. Not penetrated in that way, [505\[1786\]] because of the thought that desires to purify afflictions and accomplish spiritual qualities, one resides in a state of concentration encompassed by the ailment of bias – acceptance and rejection. When, however, unreliant upon thought and the effort of training, one remains in an unfabricated state (ma bcos pa’i ngang la gnas), conceptuality becomes luminous as gnosis. [Concerning] the second, it is stated:1787

After a minor door\[1788\] is named
The secluded\[1789\] mind seeks a path\[1790\]
And taking hold of continual\[1791\] seclusion in the wild,\[1792\]
If analyzed, meditation becomes conceptual.\[1793\]

In this case, the term minor is applied in two contexts: [first,] the association given along these lines here wherein something is minor because of [some kind of] corruption; after a non-existent object is conceived as an object, the mind, isolated from object and busyness\[1794\] [of] the body, is perceived as the path to liberation. When awareness is carefully analyzed that is conceptual meditation. If applied in a horizon of contexts, it is stated in the rNam par mi rtog pa’i sgom lung:1795

In non-conceptual meditation,
Awareness does not construct some kind of basis;
No object at all serves as an objective basis;
The meditation does not conceive any image whatsoever.

\[1786\] NTh 148.02; Th 232.03; BM 138.06.
\[1787\] Cf. BGB Khyung chen 360.02-360.03; cf. STMG 434.04.
\[1789\] dben pa (505.04) : vivikta (Mvp 1478); P. vivitta.
\[1790\] Reading dben pa (BGB 360.02; BM 139.01; Th 232.03) rather than dbyen pa (RZSB 505.04).
\[1791\] Reading rgyun tu (BGB 360.03) rather than rgyud du (RZSB 505.05; BM 139.01; Th 232.05; STMG 434.04)
\[1792\] dgon pa (505.04) : aranya (Mvp 2991); P. araṇā.
\[1794\] ‘du ’dzi (505.08) : samsarga (Mvp 6535).
\[1795\] Karmay (2007) connects the term sgom lung to the cig car ba tradition.
[On this view,] subtle factors of bias are present due to the desire to actually obtain the natural condition devoid of three faults. Here, so-called conceptual meditation is nothing other than when the assertion that the path consists in the seclusion of the mind from things and their characteristic marks, and seeking this seclusion from busyness [of] the body, is scrutinized with a discerning intellect. These subsequent tendencies pertain to points of deviation from the Great Perfection.

§ 5.5.8.4.3. three deviations from causality (505.16)

It is stated:¹⁷⁹⁶

Labelling causality¹⁷⁹⁷ with a term and
Dispelling both virtue and wickedness
Are said to occur in this world with
The enormous pride [of] bias.¹⁷⁹⁸

Due to perceiving causal phenomena¹⁷⁹⁹ and karmic virtue and wickedness as ultimately real, this [oceanic] world [of] samsaric discontent amounts to a grievance such that one thinks, ‘I ought to depart¹⁸⁰⁰ from this [ocean] of discontent to the dry land of liberation,’ which is a state of bias. This, in fact, engaging in the smaller vehicle.¹⁸⁰¹

The phrase dispelling both virtue and wickedness, in one sense, signals the extinction of both virtue and wickedness, which is the anullment of karmic life according to Śrāvakas and Pratyeka-buddhas whereby on account of the cessation of life, the cessation of karma is accomplished. On account of stopping karma, the cessation of afflictions [506¹⁸⁰²] is accomplished. When afflictions are halted, the dissatisfying aggregates are said to depart from this [oceanic] world [of discontent] to the dry land beyond sorrow (nirvāṇa),¹⁸⁰³ which generates enormous want of acceptance and rejection.

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¹⁷⁹⁶ BGB Khyung chen 360.03-360.04.
¹⁷⁹⁷ rgyu dang 'bras bur ming btags shing (505.16-505.17). *Cf. “Affixing the name of cause to the result.”
¹⁷⁹⁹ chos rgyu ’bras (505.18).
¹⁸⁰⁰ mngon par ’byung ba (505.20) : naiśkramya (Mvp 7554).
¹⁸⁰¹ theg pa chung ngu (505.21). Cf. KChG 1.46.22-46.23; Wangchuk 2004: 112 n.34.
¹⁸⁰² NTh 149.06; Th 234.03; BM 140.04.
¹⁸⁰³ That is, has gained freedom from the waves of birth, old age, sickness, and death that roil the ocean of samsāra.
§ 5.5.8.4.4. four deviations from path [of] actual reality (506.03)

[In connection with the] first deviation from the non-dual path, seeking a middle way, it is stated:\(^{1804}\)

The lord of beings\(^{1805}\) proclaimed
Attachment and non-attachment to be [just] a way of words (vākyapatha : tshig gi lam),
Like the middle way, akin to an echo;
Happiness and discontent have a common cause (nisyanda : rgyu mthun).\(^{1806}\)

It is taught that attachment is a state of desire and thus worldly, non-attachment is being freed from that and thus nirvāṇa, [and] the pair are [just] the way of talking because of being verbally signified. Verbal significance is the province of convention. The province of convention is devoid of essence. On this view, inasmuch as essence itself does not obtain\(^{1807}\) to the binary extreme of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, neither does the middle way. Therefore, the phrase like the middle way was used. All, being devoid of objective referent, are merely the way of words and thus proclaimed to be akin to an echo. That being the case, the glorious Vajrasattva, who is the guru to all [sentient beings],\(^{1808}\) proclaimed it so given the indivisibility of discontent of attachment and the happiness of non-attachment [in terms of] causality or nature.

The second [deviation from the non-dual path] obtains after considering the characteristic marks [connected with] six sense faculties’ domain of experience as imperfect. It is stated:\(^{1809}\)

Ema-ho! This primordially perfected (sangs rgyas) domain of experience
Is not a place found when sought;
As in the six [pāramitā] doctrines (saḍḍharma : drug gi chos), like a blind person clutching at space

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1804 Cf. Bairo Khyung chen 360.06-360.05. Almogi gives the citation as Nam mkha’ che’i rgyud: 179.01-179.02 (2009: 257 n. 56).
1805 ’gro ba’i mgon po (506.05) : jagannātha (Chandra 2001: 162c)
1806 Toh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa’ chen po byang chub kyi sms kuns byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsānti-bodhicitta-kulayāḥ-rāja) in bKa’’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): 1 | chags dang ma chags tshig gi lam | 1 | dbyung ma bzhi nte brag ca’ dral | 1 | bde dang sdu’g bsngal rgyu mthun zhes | 1 | ’gro ba’i mgon pa sms dpas gsungs | (79.18-79.20).
1807 bdag nyid thob pa’ myed (506.09) : alabdhātmaka. Cf. RZSB 2.615.12-615.19, where this phrase is explained; cf. Almogi 2009: 256-257 n. 56.
1808 kun gyi bla ma (505.13); alternatively, ”guru of all,” ”superior to all,” ”all-supreme one” (Almogi 2009: 257 n. 56), etc.
1809 BGB Khyung chen contains a verse (361.02-361.03) that is the same except for the first line, which reads: ’jig rten yongs kyi spyod yul ’di.
Where there is no objective factor.\textsuperscript{1810}

The domain of experience of a Tathāgata is not sought as something other than the domain of experience of a sentient being’s six sense faculties. The very nature (\textit{de nyid}) of the domain of experience of the six sense faculties, in its nature just as it is (\textit{ji ltar gnas pa}), is indeed the domain of experience of the Tathāgata. Given such a characteristic nature as that, due to which these domains of experience concerning characteristics, a sentient being’s domain of experience, are false, it is not an object upon which one ought to meditate. The object of meditation is the domain of a Tathāgata’s experience, actual reality, [in] which characteristics have abated. When one thinks \textit{that should be meditated upon}, this is similar to a blind person clutching at [empty] space, which is a deviation from the path’s own nature \textsuperscript{507}\textsuperscript{1811}. For example, because of the cultivation of the Field of Infinite Space,\textsuperscript{1812} form is eclipsed,\textsuperscript{1813} and while one goes beyond [cognitive] discrimination of form and material resistance, which also recedes [from experience, one not free from the bondage of form since the predilection toward form has not been relinquished.

If, after realizing the very nature of form and the very nature of space are indivisible, someone attains concentration in that way, that is liberation from the bondage of form. Similarly, after someone has seen the appearance of characteristic marks as imperfections, if she has cultivated peace [as] the absence of characteristic marks, characteristic marks are eclipsed. Yet this is not freedom from the bondage of characteristic marks. At the point after which someone realizes everything that appears as a characteristic mark has nothing to do with nature itself, which is free of characteristic marks, one has not seen characteristic marks as imperfections and has not given up characteristic marks; if she obtains a concentration that is devoid of characteristic marks by virtue of becoming familiar with characteristic marks thorough understanding, then she becomes free from the bondage of characteristic marks.

In connection with the third, which concerns deviation from the untraversed path due to desiring to traverse the progressive path, it is stated:\textsuperscript{1814}

\begin{itemize}
  \item The ever exalted path of purity,\textsuperscript{1815}
  \item Free of activity, does not conduce phenomena;
  \item When the path is traversed,
  \item Like the limit of space, there is no [destination] reached.\textsuperscript{1816}
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{1810} Toh. 0828: \textit{Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po} (\textit{Sarva-dharma-mahāsani-boddhicitta-kalaya-rāja}) in \textit{bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma)} 2008, mying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bo d rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): 1 e ma’ o sangs rgyas spyod yul la || btsal bas rnyed pa’i gnas med de || drug gi chos bzhin yul med pas || ldongs pas nam mkha’ bsnyabs pa bzhin || (80.07-506.09).

\textsuperscript{1811} NTh 151.04; Th 236.04; BM 142.01.q

\textsuperscript{1812} \textit{nam mkha’ mtha’ yas skye mched} (507.01) : akāśānanyāyatana, the first level of the formless realm (\textit{gzung med kham} : ārūpyadhatu). \textit{Cf.} Almogi 2009: 268.

\textsuperscript{1813} \textit{zil gyis mnan} (507.01-507.02) : abhibhūya (Mvp 6436).

\textsuperscript{1814} \textit{Cf.} BGB \textit{Khyung chen} 361.03-361.04. \textit{Cf.} STMG 319.04-319.05.

\textsuperscript{1815} \textit{tshangs pa’i lam} (507.13) : brahmapatha (Mvp 6974).
Given the reality of phenomena is the very nature of phenomena, there is no traversing a path or ground in stages. If the ground(s) are purified gradually and purity and liberation are gradually accomplished, then all phenomena have no basis in reality. Thus, if that which is obtained is something totally different, in there end there would be no acquisition.

In connection with the fourth, given that the nature of awakening essence is without division or bias, the deviation from the path of equality is due to the path being partially grasped. It is stated:

A complete path like that
Moon that emerges with its support;
Given their being totally equal
A partial perception [of one] is not real.

The nature of essence awakening is suchness. And like suchness, essence awakening is whole. Since sentient beings and buddhas constitute a shared path, the phrase complete path is used; path and ground and of similar significance. The Sañcaya-gāthā states:

This vehicle, like space, is an inconceivable celestial mansion.

It is not that [one] is creating something different to traverse; one simply acts within the natural state of that [awakening essence (bodhiagarbha: snying po byang chub)]. Moon that emerges with its support is said because to being analogous to a

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1817 phyogs dang ris myed pa (507.19).
1818 Cf. BGB Khyung chen 361.05.
1821 de bzhin nyid (507.22) : tathata.
1822 cha shas myed (507.23).
1823 BM 143.05; Th 238.04.
moon [reflected in] water. On this point, wheresoever the water - as support - is, the moon [reflected in] water is present; and just as there is nothing of being present in one part and not another, people say that having glanced from wherever one stands, the moon moon [reflected in] water is seen to be in each place. Under the influence of that, people subsequently think: this moon in water appears here; it appears over there. Similarly, given that the nature of essence awakening is without division or measure and due to [its] being the nature of all phenomena, people who apprehend it in part deviate from equality (mnyam pa nyid). These constitute the first set of ten.

Connected to the second set of ten is the point of deviation concerning attachment to the types of bliss [associated with] great gnosis. It is stated:  

Bliss in the present and the future [respectively]  
Emerge in the immediate and subsequent;  
Yet even that pertains to a flaw and therefore  
Should not be relied upon.

Bliss in the present is immediate and is non-conceptual gnosis. Bliss that emerges in the future is pure worldly gnosis. These two [types of] great bliss are seen, [respectively], on the path of buddha (and perceived to be worth taken up) and perceived to be something discordant (that ought to be let go).

Connected to the two points of deviation concerning the source of limits for hopes and aspirations, first, is the point of deviation that consists in making aspirations for high status in the world. It is stated:

Even the purification of the three conditioned states,  
Manifests as illusion in name only;  
The great abode of a cakravartin, too,  
Is a hermitage (āśramapada : bsti gnas) for purifying illusion.

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1825 Cf. BGB Khyung chen 361.06.
1826 Reading ṛgyab (NTh 153.06; BM 144.03; Th 239.04) rather than rgyal (RZSB 508.11).
1827 Toh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayāḥ-raja) in bKa’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, nying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): 1 de ltar bde dang phyi mar bde || mngon sum pa dang rgyab nas ’byung || de yang rnam pa’i skyon yin pas || de la brten par mi bya’o || (80.15-80.17).
1828 mngon par mtho ba (508.17) : abhyudaya (Mvp 5377).
1830 srid pa gsum (508.17) : tribhava (Chandra 2001: 820b).
The three conditioned states indicates the three realms. Even the various states of higher status are merely labels that appear as illusion; thus they are not a suitable state to hope and aspire toward. The attainment of a cakravartin ruler is indeed a state of higher status in this human world; and because the human world is hermitage of mere illusion, something to be purified and restrained, it is not ‘a source of hope and aspiration.’

The second point of deviation concerning the source of limits for hopes and aspirations is connected to the point of deviation concerning investing hopes and aspirations in fruits that emerge at a later point in time. [509] It is stated:


Those obsessed with types of characteristic marks, fixated on the reality of the appearance of fruits arising from their causes at a later time, invest hopes and aspirations that fruits that will arise at some other time, [though] they do not come to be in that way. This is not unlike the example wherein people develop faith in the word of the Buddha after the Bhagavan proclaimed that ‘emptiness exists’ on account of the [varying cognitive] faculties of the trainees [present in the audience]. Yet these people subsequently seek, and do not find, the fact of emptiness. This is not unlike the nature of essence awakening being atemporal. Thus investment into hopes and aspirations at a point in time is a deviation.

The first of the three points of deviation concerning scripture [or ‘transmission’?] is the point of deviation consisting in imposition upon scripture.

“(variously labeled a dgon pa, ri khrod, and sgrub gnas) is located near Pelyül Monastery, though on the opposite side of the Dri River. Muksang was a hub of Nyingma and Kagyü visionary movements in the seventeenth centuries. The most renowned lamas associated with the center during this time were Karma Chakmé (kar+ma chags med; 1613-1678), Namchö Mingyur Dorjé (gnam chos mi ‘gyur rdo rje; 1645-1667), and Kunzang Sherap (kun bzang shes rab; 1636-1698). The latter went on to found Pelyül Monastery in 1665. For more on Muksang see the late Jampel Zangpo’s (’jam dpal bzang po; b.1900) ‘biography’ of the place, called Phrin las grub pa’i dben gnas chen po rmugs sangs gnas kyi rtogsbrjod tshangs sras bzhad pa’i sgra dbyangs.” See Ronis, Jann. Celibacy, Revelations, and Reincarnated Lamas: Contestation and Synthesis in the Growth of Monasticism at Katok Monastery from the 17th through 19th Centuries. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Virginia, 2009: 46 n. 73.
It is stated:  

The whole [i.e. the ultimate] is completely beyond typification;  
Yoga is a path soaring through space;  
Given the unarisen, unborn essence,  
How could phenomena labelled through imposition be [real].  

The term scripture indicates something that qualifies as the word [of the Buddha] as reliable. There are definitive and ordinary scriptures. Definitive scripture decisively resolves [its subject matter] such that it is free of any imposition. If so, the frame of reference of the scripture is itself essence awakening, due to which it is not taught by anyone. Therefore, the words in scriptures that do teach [such phenomena] are impositions that deviate from the nature of [real] scripture.  

The second point of deviation concerns concentration, which is faulted for external exertion to [counter] internal impurity and thus constitutes a deviation from the concentration on equality. It is stated:  

Both internal and external, external per se is internal;  
There is no profound object realized partially;  
The mere name conditioned existence [is] a misleading force;  
By it, equality is divorced.  

External means a mind desiring to gain mental bliss. Internal means bliss obtained. The phrase external per se is internal teaches the inversion [of] the outer-inner [dichotomy] as if the state of exertion is going to become [internal] peace. Already being bound to attachment to bliss, it is external, which does not realize the significance of the profound; because of being under the influence of the bondage of conditioned existence ‘there is no profound object realized partially; the mere name conditioned existence [is] a perverted force” is stated. And, being a deviation from concentration on equality [510], it is proclaimed to have nothing to do with equal concentration.  

The third, here, is the point of deviation from samaya. There is no internal and external differentiation in the heart of equality. Teaching internal and external samaya is said to constitute a point of deviation because there is in fact nothing guarded or unguarded. Just as beings wandering in conditioned

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1838 Khyung chen lding pa (Bai ro rgyud 'bum): vol. 2, 362.03-362.04. Cf. STMG 364.05-364.06.  
1839 Th. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayāh-rājā) in bKa’’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krong go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): cl gcig ste rnam pa yongs kyi med cil rnal ’byor nam mkha’i bya lam gnas cil ma byung ma skyes snying po la cil sgros btags chos kun ga la yod cil (81.02-81.04).  
1840 362.04. Cf. STMG 364.06.  
1841 Th. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayāh-rājā) in bKa’’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krong go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): cl phyi nang gnyis ka phyi nyid nang cil zab mo cha shas rtogs yul med cil srid pa ming tsam log pa’i stobs cil de bas ting ’dzin mnayam dang brag cil (81.04-81.06).  
1842 NTh 156.03; Th 242.05; BM 146.06.
existence pertain to the nature of the aggregates and elements and thereby have no means to transcend that reality, the natural quality (rang bzhin nyid) of the aggregates and elements pertains to the greatness of primordial perfection and therefore there is no method for transcending that reality. On account of the deviation due to teaching samaya as internal and external, it is stated:

Internal and external oaths;\textsuperscript{1845}

Remain like the nature of aggregates and elements;
Not being divorced from the three times,
Oaths are thus not nominally imputed.\textsuperscript{1846}

Concerning the one point of deviation connected to cause, it is stated:\textsuperscript{1847}

Here, there is no state to realize
Through disciplined and fierce conduct;
If possessed of a and par images,\textsuperscript{1848}
It is asserted that illusory bliss occurs.\textsuperscript{1849}

Given that the nature of essence awakening has nothing to do with a state that should be realized, there is no basis for a state that is to be accomplished through the application and order of outer austerities\textsuperscript{1850} and disciplined conduct. Nevertheless, possessed of an awareness that is not attached to the unborn object, it is said that qualities that are mere illusion appear.

In connection with the three points of deviation concerning the fruit of attaining concentration, first there is the point of deviation stemming from desiring to attain bliss. It is stated:

Due to the unity of nature remaining undetermined,
Things are taken to be as they appear;
Indeed, the bliss of the exerted mind desiring appearance

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\textsuperscript{1843} sangs rgyas kyi che ba (510.05).
\textsuperscript{1844} Cf. BGB Khyung chen 362.04-362.05; STMG 364.06-365.01.
\textsuperscript{1845} tha tshigs (510.08). Cf. tha tshig (TDCM 1135b), though the Bairo edition also reads tha tshigs as does STMG 364.06-365.01.
\textsuperscript{1846} Tōh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsānti-bodhicitta-kula-yājñā) in bKa’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): \texttt{\textbackslash m 1 de la tha tshig phyi dang nang \textbar | rang bzhin phung po kham bzhin gnas \textbar | dus gsum ‘di dang mi ‘bral bas \textbar | tha tshig ming du btags pa med | (81.06-81.08).}
\textsuperscript{1847} Cf. BGB Khyung chen 363.01-363.02; STMG 435.03-435.04.
\textsuperscript{1848} a dang par (RZSB 510.10, BM 147.04, Th 243.04); the Bairo Khyung chen, however, reads *yang dag par (363.01). Perhaps a reference to prajñā and upāya?
\textsuperscript{1849} Tōh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsānti-bodhicitta-kula-yājñā) in bKa’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): \texttt{\textbackslash m 1 ‘di la brtul zhugs drag shul kyi \textbar | gnas su bya ba’i ming med de \textbar | a dang par ni rnam ldan na \textbar | sgyu ma’i bde ba ‘byung bar ’dod | (81.11-81.13).}
\textsuperscript{1850} dka’ thub (510.11) : tapas (Mvp 1608).
Is in fact a great obstacle and defect.\textsuperscript{1851}

On account of not even being the essence of the nature of phenomena, awareness experiences in accordance with how it has ordinarily looked upon \([\text{phenomena}]\). Deviation is due to effort arising from the hope to obtain bliss in the experience of real essence.

The second [of the three points of deviation concerning the fruit of attaining concentration] concerns the point of deviation connected to the subtle distinguishing marks of the limbs of enlightenment. It is stated:\textsuperscript{1852}

The limbs of enlightenment, the entryway for all,
Being meditation on attributes,\textsuperscript{1853} are like a moon [reflected in] water;
Even when without attachment and without defilement,
The meditation is thus akin to a child's domain of experience.\textsuperscript{1854}

The marks of divine attributes are an entryway to the limbs of enlightenment. Whatever parts may be included within totally perfected and not perfected become evident due to being what is indeed uncovered by obfuscating distortions (\textit{sgrib pa'i dri mas ma gos pa}). Since a phenomenal appearance is evident, it it pertains to the domain of experience of a child.

The third \textsuperscript{[51]}\textsuperscript{1855} concerns the point of deviation concerning course distinguishing marks. It is stated:\textsuperscript{1856}

\begin{quote}
After taking the body of Great Heruka,
By means of the attributes of the wrathful \textit{maṇḍala}
Regardless of evincing the syllables,
The state of peace is not seen.\textsuperscript{1857}
\end{quote}

The significance this passage accords with [what was said] above. The term 'syllables' if applied in [a given] context [to indicate] actual reality, gnosis, name, and pure form, suggests the nature of the divine body.

\textsuperscript{1851} Tö. 0828: \textit{Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po} (\textit{Sarva-dharma-mahāsānti-bodhicitta-kulayāh-rājā}) in bKa’ \textit{gyur} (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): 1 rang bzhin geig tu ma nges pas \| ji ltar blass pa de ltar snang \| snang ’dod rtsol sens bde ba yang \| de ni de sgrīb skyon chen yin 1 (81.13-81.15).

\textsuperscript{1852} Cf. \textit{Khyung chen} BGB vol 2, 363.02; STMG 64.02, citing Nam mkha’ che. Ho

\textsuperscript{1853} cha lugs (510.20) : nepathya (Mvp 9300).

\textsuperscript{1854} Tö. 0828: \textit{Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po} (\textit{Sarva-dharma-mahāsānti-bodhicitta-kulayāh-rājā}) in bKa’ \textit{gyur} (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): byang chub yan lag kun gyi sgo \| cha lugs bsgoms pas chu zla bzhin \| ma gos ma chags ’byung ’gyur yang \| bsgoms pas byis pa’i spyod yul bzhin 1 (81.15-81.16).

\textsuperscript{1855} NTh 156.04; Th 244.05; BM 148.04.

\textsuperscript{1856} CF. BGB \textit{Khyung chen} 363.02-363.04; STMG 64.03.

\textsuperscript{1857} Tö. 0828: \textit{Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po} (\textit{Sarva-dharma-mahāsānti-bodhicitta-kulayāh-rājā}) in bKa’ \textit{gyur} (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): dkyil ’khor khro gyur cha lugs kyis \| khro bdag chen po’i lus bzung nas \| yi ge mngon du byung na yang \| zhi ba de nyid mthong ba min 1 (81.17-81.19).
In connection with the three points of deviation concerning dharma, the first is connected to the non-emergence of dharma from dharma. It is stated\textsuperscript{1858}:

No matter how many hundreds of thousands of times
[The wrathful Heruka] is generated, [mere] flowers arise;
Inasmuch as there is the influence of the signless,
[The state of peace] will not emerge from that hermitage.\textsuperscript{1859}

Even though the entryways to the dharma are to be beyond count, they are all indeed for the benefit of beings because while they indeed generate the quality of greatness, since there are no phenomenal signs in actual reality, core qualities may not emerge outside the enumerations of dharmas.

The second concerns the dharma not relying upon dharma. It is stated:\textsuperscript{1860}

Totally complete perfection,
Unchanging and whole,
Is boundless like space and
not a dharma relying on something else.\textsuperscript{1861}

The term dharma, here, [refers to what encompasses] its own quality or character\textsuperscript{1862} such that something reliant upon another is not its own quality. For example, when establishing the quality of a thing, the light of a sun-crystal is not something that need not rely upon the sun; if the character of a sun-crystal’s hotness is something established, it is not established because of reliance. Fire, being hot without necessarily relying upon something else, is the established quality of the hotness of fire. In the case of when something is validated as the quality of a non-thing, [we might take] for example the quality of a mirage, which is empty of water, blue, and movement. When established as something empty, while [it is the case] conventional awareness undertakes this in dependence upon the mirage, the quality of emptiness does not rely on the mirage. The mirage can exist insofar as the sun shines; when the sun disappears, the mirage ceases. Within emptiness, there is nothing that is a different nature. Similarly, conventional awareness is engaged in dependence upon appearance as the characteristic marks of a qualified phenomena (chos can), which is a quality

\textsuperscript{1858} Cf. BGB Khyung chen 363.03-363.04; STMG 452.01.
\textsuperscript{1859} Toh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsānti-bodhicitta-kulayāl-rajā) in bKa’’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, nyiṅg rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang):

1858\textsuperscript{1860} Cf. BGB Khyung chen 363.05-364.01.
\textsuperscript{1861} Toh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsānti-bodhicitta-kulayāl-rajā) in bKa’’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, nyiṅg rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang):

1862 rang rang gi chos sam mtsan nyid (511.13-511.14).
that is [in the final analysis] essentially pure; and that is devoid of any reliance upon anything whatsoever.

The third concerns not penetrating dharma through dharma. It is stated:1863

The spontaneously1864 abiding great bliss,
By virtue of unparalleled gnosis,
Is a dharma from the power of one's [512]1865 awareness;
It is not emergent from something else.1866

Actual reality, which is the nature of essence awakening qua great bliss [of]
bodhicitta essentially uncorrupted by distortions, if [taken to be] something besides one's own luminosity and naturally arising awareness1867 – that is, as some objective reference realized by gnosis – is not plausible as actual reality. Thus are the twenty-three points of deviation.

§ 5.5.8.5. seven obscurations (512.05)

The first three [obscurations] concern obscurations connected to corruptions. The first concerns the corrupting obscuration [fallaciously assuming] that the nature of essence awakening decays,1868 which it does not. It is stated:1869

Simple, yet difficult, difficult because of being simple;
Not an immediate state, yet ubiquitous;1870
In the teaching, the unsymbolized1871 Vajrasattva
Is called 'this mere name.'

Given that the nature of essence awakening is without decay or effort, there is ease. Corruption obscures, thus it is not realized; and for that reason there is

1863 Cf. Bai ro rgyu ’bum Khyung chen vol. 2, 364.01; STMG 331.04-331.05, where only the latter three lines are given.
1864 Reading lhun gyis (BGB 364.01; NTh 159.06) rather than lhun kyis (RZSB 511.23-511.24; BM 150.01; Th 246.05).
1865 NTh 159.06; Th 246.06; BM 150.01.
1866 Tōh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa ’chen po byang chub kyi s隆 kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayāḥ-rājā) in bKa’ ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): lhun gyis grub pa’i bde chen de || mtshungs pa med pa’i ye shes kyi || rang gi mthu yi rig pa las || chos ni gzhon las ’byung mi ’gyur || (81.05-81.07).
1867 rang ’od gsal zhing rang rig pa las ma glogs pa (512.03).
1868 dang po snying po byang chub kyi rang bzhin gud na myed bzhin du bslad pas bsgrigs pa ni (512.05-512.06).
1869 Cf. Bai ro rgyu ’bum Khyung chen vol. 2, 364.01-364.02; STMG 463.02-463.03.
1870 kun la khyab (RZSB 512.10; BGB 364.02) vs. kun tu khyab (NTh 160.02; BM 150.04; Th 247.03; STMG 463.02).
1871 mtshon du myed (512.08).
difficulty. It is like the expanse of space because it does not appear to direct perception. In that sense, it is proclaimed that it is ubiquitous; its nature transcends conventions connected to characteristic marks; and Vajrasattva is unsymbolized in the teaching as ‘this mere name.’

Concerning the second, due to obscuration through corruption, the teaching required clarification by spiritual guides. It is stated:

This is the all equalizing path,
The abiding nature for all migrants;
It is corrupt because children error,
As if medicine searched for a doctor.

Although it pertains ot [one’s own] nature, corruption obscures [such that one] does not recognize her authentic nature. Take medicine, for example. While medicine is in fact naturally helpful with illness, like being a doctor looking for medicine, beings wandering in conditions existence are naturally free, though corruptions preclude recognizing that. That is the reason it was necessary for spiritual guides’ to make clarifications. You must please rely on a sublime spiritual guide!

The third concerns [the fact that] in great bliss there is no division or bias; appearance of corruptions apportion the physical world and bias the beings within it. It is stated:

Great bliss in the realm of discursive understanding
Is itself a pure world[ly gnosis];
Due to gathering the direction’s light,
That is, the four cardinal and intermediate directions, zenith and nadir,
From the indeterminate colors of a rainbow,
The distinctive [buddha] families clearly appear.

Given that great bliss has no division and bias, all biased appearance pertains to the play of great gnosis that is itself the ornament of greatness. Yet, the

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1872 nam mkha’i dbyings (512.09-512.10).
1873 Cf. BGB Khyung chen 364.03-364.04; STMG 344.04.
1874 *Reading byis pa ’khrul pas blad pa’i phyir (BGB 364.03) rather than byis pas bslad pas ’khrul pa’i phyir (RZSB 512.14; BM 151.01; ).
1875 Toh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsānti-bodhicitta-kulayāla-rājā) in bKa’ ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): || ’di ni thams cad mtshungs pa’i lam || ’gro ba kun gyi rang bzhin gnas || byis pas bslad pas ’khrul pa’i phyir || sman nyid sman pa tshol ba bzhin || (82.11-82.13).
1876 phyogs chad pa (512.20).
1877 Cf. BGB Khyung chen 364.04-364.05; STMG 50.02-50.03.
1878 Toh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsānti-bodhicitta-kulayāla-rājā) in bKa’ ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): || go ba’i yul na bde ba che || ’di ni rnam dag ’jig rten yin || de la phyogs kyi ’od ’dus pas || phyogs bzhin mtshan dang bla’og ’grub || ma nges ‘ja’ tshon kha dog las || rigs kyi khyad par mngon par snang || (82.13-82.16).
appearance, too, as the physical world and the beings within it is due to corruption. The phrase due to gathering the direction’s light [indicates] the apportioning appearance of whatever is not real as if it is real\textsuperscript{1880} that appears as the physical world. The phrase colors of a rainbow [indicates] the appearance of something that is without divisions that nevertheless appears as if with divisions that appears as the beings within the world.

In short, given a single basis, there is appearance as the totally pure and impure world; and appearance as impure is called obscured due to corruption. Systems like this are also proclaimed in sūtras where, [among] all the worlds constituted by the physical world and the beings within it, non are not buddha-fields. The trainees therein are of two types: disciplined and arrogant beings. The former comprise bodhisattvas; the latter comprise ordinary beings and Śrāvakas.

To that end, in order to train sentient beings trainees, there are blessings connected with appearing as the completely pure world and the body of perfect resource.\textsuperscript{1881} In order to tame arrogant sentient beings, the completely impure world and buddha bless in appearing wicked and destitute.\textsuperscript{1882} Even via the eighty-four thousand afflictions that work in afflicting migrators and the four demons,\textsuperscript{1883} too, buddhas without fail engage in enlightened deeds.

According to the common word of the Buddha, the physical world and the beings within it come into being through the influence of sentient beings' karma. Nevertheless, in these two systems, appearance is not different and there is no foundation for appearance. As the mere condition of appearance, compassion and karma may both be common [to the system].\textsuperscript{1884} Since emancipation\textsuperscript{1885} and bondage are equal inasmuch as appearance is itself the condition for both, then it is possible to establish [them] in accordance with both systems. If a concordant awareness, which is incotrovertible, is accordingly established as true in that way, that manner of compassion's blessing would be real.

Yogic activity is not encompassed by an object; and the three obscurations are encompassed by the bondage of afflictions. On this view, all yogic activity \textsuperscript{[514\textsuperscript{1886}]}, moreover, is condensed into three types: such things as the dedicated feast offering is offered for the purpose of offering [to] superior beings (’phags pa). According to the mandalic system of the ornament of play,\textsuperscript{1887} the undertaking of oceanic action (karma) for the benefit of beings wandering in conditioned existence, and, in order to generate the field of merit, the Guru Puja,\textsuperscript{1888} the practice of genorosity and so forth - all things [concerned with]

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{1879} NTh 161.04; Th 248.06; BM 151.06.
\textsuperscript{1880} cir yang ma grub pa la grub grub itar (513.02).
\textsuperscript{1881} yongs su dag pa’i ’jig rten dang | longs spyod rdzogs pa’i skur snang bar byin gyis rlob bo (513.11).
\textsuperscript{1882} yongs su ma dag pa’i ’jig rted dang | sangs rgyas ngan cing dbul bar snang bar byin gyis rlob bo (513.12-513.13).
\textsuperscript{1883} bdud bzhis (513.16) : catvāro mātā. ‘See TDCM 1364b.
\textsuperscript{1884} thun mong du ’gyur du rung la (513.20).
\textsuperscript{1885} byang grol (513.20) : apavarga (Mvp 1730).
\textsuperscript{1886} NTh 63.01; Th 250.06; BM 153.03.
\textsuperscript{1887} rol pa’i rgyan kyi dkyil ’khor kyi tshul gyis (514.02).
\textsuperscript{1888} bla ma mchod pa (514.03-514.04) : guru puja.
\end{flushleft}
merit-making activity that are not abandoned, are encompassed by an object such that is taught to be the bondage of affliction apart from what is practiced. The falsehood and object of the three is easily recognized and thus not arrayed [here].

The last concerns the obscurations conjoined with imposition and denial connected to transmission (āgama : lung). It is stated:1889

Therefore, given the transmission itself,
The practice becomes obsuration;
When it is conceived that way,
There is no attaining the real.1890

Transmission itself is what it is because of being something fundamentally superior (gzhi’i mchog yin pas), which is itself the reality of bodhicitta: the nature of essence awakening. Practice concerns all existential awareness (yod med kyi blo) and the production of effort in language due to attaining and penetrating reality. These are obscurations not unlike a wind that disturbs the surface of the water. That being the case, when settling into the natural state of one’s own nature, great bliss is present; during that state, it is said conception does not obtain. Here, water and fire, if unmodified, is stable and clear. Inasmuch as modification is applied, to that degree one thereby hinders oneself. Similarly, given that when the ordinary mind is realized to be without nature per se no modification is entailed, modifying activity and an explicit basis of acting, too, is not found. If unrecognized, just as coercion modifies, conception simply is something that [makes] alternations. Analogously, both white and black clouds obscure the sky. Thus, these points of deviation and obscuration outlined through the thirty deviations and obscurations are themselves either teaching the nature of bodhicitta or else teaching methods for settling bodhicitta.

§ 5.5.8.6. the three beings (514.19-515.02)

The three beings (yin pa gsum)1891 are Samantabhadra, Samantabhadrī, and the non-dual one. These three beings are the condensed esoteric precepts (man ngag) for the five types of greatness. This is because the fact that whatever appears is mastered as the play of Samantabhadra constitutes what may be called being Samantabhadra (kun du bzan po yin pa zhes bya’o); the fact that whatever appears is itself essentially unreal constitutes what may be called being Samantabhadrī (kun du bzang mo yin pa zhes pa’o); and the fact that their respective characteristics are not established as dual is because the state of appearance is something unborn. The unborn state is given in the uninterrupted

1889 Cf. BGB Khyung chen 365.06. Cf. STMG 374.05.
1890 Thō. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kalayāh-rājā) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): | de bas de lung de nyid la || de la de s byar sgrib par ’gyur || de ltar de la de rtag na || de la de nyid grub pa med || (83.10-8311).
1891 Cf. sBas pa’i rgum chung as a source for the yin pa gsum (Karmay 2008: 130).
continuum of [all] variety of appearance [515] appears and is the uninterrupted continuum of compassion’s blessing (byin rlabs). Indeed, the entire significance of the Great Perfection is subsumed within these three expressions.

§ 5.5.8.7. three great certainties (515.02-515.09)

The three great certainties (gding\(^{1893}\) chen po gsum) are esoteric precepts for the six great thig le.

Q. What are the three?

state (nisarga : ngang)\(^{1894}\)
nature (svabhāva : rang bzhin)
great being (mahātma : bdag nyid chen po)

That is to say: the state is unfabricated;\(^{1895}\) the nature is uncontrived;\(^{1896}\) the great being is spontaneous.\(^{1897}\) The term unfabricated indicates that regardless of corruptions due to sentient beings' confusion, the nature of the mind is not something transformed into something different. The term uncontrived indicates that regardless of how the Jinas methodically improve it, there is no refinement of the quality of bodhicitta. Being spontaneous means being something that has passed beyond progression and improvement.\(^{1898}\)

§ 5.5.8.8. three fundamental upadeśa (515.09-515.18)

The three basic esoteric precepts\(^{1899}\) are those that summarizes putting an end to the points of deviation connected to the thirty deviations and obscurations.

Q. What are the three?

the pith instruction that is not based on authoritative Buddhist scripture\(^{1900}\)

the result that is not due to cause\(^{1901}\)

\(^{1892}\) NTh 164.05; Th 253.01; BM 155.01.
\(^{1893}\) Klein notes 'The term gding carries the connotation of being non-dualistic, signifying the subject's quality of surety, in contrast to rmst (yid ches) which appears below and connotes a more sutra style understanding of trust as belief in something or someone, hence a dualistic state” (2000: 216 n. 14); cf. Karmay 2008: 130 n. 53.
\(^{1894}\) Cf. rasa (Mvp 7413).
\(^{1895}\) ma byas pa (515.04) : akṛta (Mvp 8456).
\(^{1896}\) ma bcos pa (515.04) : anadhiṣṭa (Chandra 2001: 587a).
\(^{1897}\) lhun gyis grub pa (515.04) : anabhoga (Chandra 2001 849c).
\(^{1898}\) lhun kyis [sic] grub pa ni de lta bas na bgrod cing sbyong ba las ‘das pa’o (515.06-515.07).
\(^{1900}\) lung la ma brten pa’i man ngag (515.10).
\(^{1901}\) rgyu las ma byung ba’i ’bras bu (515.11).
the dharma that does not emerge from the mind

It is because of the thirty deviations and obscurations that the nature of bodhicitta is not realized and [spiritual] attainment through the force of sustained effort is hindered. Here, again, this point is made: bodhicitta is the heart (snying po yin pas) of all phenomena. That means that bodhicitta is the superior esoteric precept for severing ordinary awareness. Yet it is not voiced in scripture.

Bodhicitta is indeed something naturally luminous, yet it is not a phenomenon that emerges from the ordinary mind that is included in discriminative awareness and concentration. Bodhicitta is, moreover, is something manifestly [and] primordially perfected (sangs rgyas pa) and indeed not something established through the causal collection of merit and wisdom.

§ 5.5.8.9. resolve through bodhicitta (515.18-515.22)

Q. How is it bodhicitta, the single great thig le, resolves all phenomena?

All phenomena are included within the mind. Therefore, there is nothing knowable outside of the mind. The nature of the mind itself is enlightened; and because of that, as explained above, the four activities connected to what is knowable are transcended such that doubt is non-existent and there is perfect resolution.

§ 5.5.10. what is resolved in Great Perfection (515.22-516.13)

The phrase ‘what is resolved through the non-existent greatness of primordial perfection’ resolves the absence of effort required to search for anything given the fact there is no primordial perfection and primordial imperfection (sangs rgyas dang sangs ma rgyas). That is what is resolved. Yogic beings, who understand the significance of such a point [516] spontaneously abide on the a level that is indivisible [from] Samantabhadra. The level that is indivisible [from] Samantabhadra pertains to the overarching ground of all the buddha levels. That reality is seeing the domain of Great Perfection just as it is.

The phrase "the second Glorious Vajrasattva" indicates the Glorious Vajrasattva and a concordant enlightened perspective. In the phrase "becoming and unbecoming," becoming refers to the generation of sentient beings.

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1902 sens las ma byung ba'i cho (515.11).
1903 de lta bu'i don dang ldan [516] pa'i rnal 'byor gyi skies bu (515.24-516.01).
1904 NT 166.03; Th 255.01; BM 156.05.
1905 kun tu bzang po dbye ba myed pa'i sa (516.01).
1906 rdzogs pa chen po'i don ji lta ba gang yin pa de nyid do (516.03).
1907 dpal rdo rje sens dpa' gnyis pa zhes bya ba ni (516.03-516.04).
1908 bgongs pa mthun pa (516.04-516.05).
1909 srid pa dang mi srid pa (516.05).
beings’ karmic life [pertaining to] ordinary beings; and bodhisattvas and unbecoming refers to the interruption of said karmic life [that pertains to] Śrāvakas and Pratyeka-buddhas. All of these[repeated statements] that qualify [Great Perfection] writings teach that that just as worthy of honor as a powerful sovereign who is a precious wish-fulfilling jewel is the yogic being who penetrates and gains confidence with respect to the domain of Great Perfection because of being the second Vajrasattva. They pertain to teachings on the nature and greatness of bodhicitta and on the deviations from and obscurations to bodhicitta.

§ 5.6. the disclosure of methods for consolidating bodhicitta (516.13)

The teaching on the methods for ‘consolidating’ or ‘settling’ bodhicitta, when given in brief, states that all phenomena should be recognized as basically the same as such things as an illusion, mirage, and, and so forth [cf. §§ 1.5.1.1.-1.5.1.5] because, once conjoined with the vessel of great introspection, so-called settling in bodhicitta is simply remaining in a state of great equanimity. In that respect, illusion and basically the same were already explained above in detail [§ 1]. Accordingly, through the force of views concerning the basic equality and inequality connected with illusion, which are qualified by introspection and great introspection, and through which a proper mindfulness is applied to physical, verbal, and mental activity. In that connection, introspection, when set correctly within the mind even at the time of resting in equipoise, in setting the mind, thus clearly recognizes (rab du shes) so-called lethargy when present; clearly recognizes so-called mental agitation when present; clearly recognizes that directing the mind toward an antidote for lethargy is something lauded; clearly recognizes the fact mental agitation is suppressed through its antidote, equanimity; and even recognizes, along those lines (de bzhin du), when awareness in a state of equipoise, free from the thorns of both lethargy and excitement such that, like a vigilant observer, recognizes, most especially, the state wherein there is no generation of the effort upon which an antidote relies, which [here would] not be unlike, for example, guarding a vessel against tipping over due to being filled with water (snod chus gang ba phyir ma bo bar srung ba lta bu’o). That emerges from views concerning illusion and inequality. For example, elephants that are naturally haughty and rutting become even more so when they have drunk wine. If not seized by a metal hook and chain,

1910 shes bzhin (516.15-516.16) : samprajanya.
1911 btang snyoms chen po'i ngang la gnas pa tsam la byang chub sems kyi gzhag thabs zhes bya'o (516.16-516.17).
1912 yang dag [par] 'jog [pa] (516.21) : pratiṣṭhāpayati.
1913 NTh 168.01; Th 256.06; BM 156.05.
1914 bya ra ba (517.03) : gulmika (Chandra 2001: 543c).
1915 dregs (517.05) : garvita (Mvp 7338).
1916 rgun chang (517.05) : mrdvīkā (Mvp 5718).
it will destroy greenery and houses, kill living beings, and so on. Once reticence about applying [them] to the various faults is destroyed, the two instruments of mindfulness and introspection are constantly maintained. Taken and disciplined thereby, the enemy host is destroyed and the presence of great qualities functions to stabilize the war ravaged domain.\textsuperscript{1917}

Thus, on this view, due to both faults and qualities there is the awareness of hope and doubt on account of which the two instruments are maintained. Similarly, given the elephant of the mind is naturally difficult to discipline, if it is not seized by the iron chain and hook of introspection, afflictions such as attachment, lethargy, excitement, and other secondary afflictions, which are [states not unlike those in which] drinking wine would totally perturb and afflict [the mind] creating only turbulent karma that is the cause of constant wandering in \textit{samsāra} and negative migrations. Thus, through faults and defects there is fearful apprehension; yet when [the mind] is conjoined with the instrument of introspection, it does not fall under the sway of afflictions.\textsuperscript{1918} The presence of great qualities joined to the fruits of higher states of existence within \textit{samsāra} and liberation is thus marked by hope. That means the presence of both hope and doubt act to protect through the instrument of introspection.

Q. What is great introspection?

Take, for example, the great ocean that encompasses the surrounding limit\textsuperscript{1919} of the world. Endless great rivers flow [into it] and nobody doubts the [rivers] will diminish.\textsuperscript{1920} Disturbed by the winds of time or even scattered by the wings of a Garuḍa, since it is within the surrounding limit, nobody doubts it may go beyond. Similarly, when all phenomena are recognized as being basically the same as an illusion, there is nothing of hopeful and doubtful awareness and thus (\textit{bas}) there is awareness that realizes the absence of the both guarding and not guarding. For example, when an illusory elephant appears and is perceived \textsuperscript{[518]}\textsuperscript{1921}, it is recognized as an illusion. Due to having broken free, not even an doubtful awareness connected to a degenerated object emerges. Conjoined with an instrument and disciplined causes the hopeful awareness connected to guarding to be ungenerated, which is perforce akin to not relying upon the iron hook and chains.

In reliance upon two types of introspection, there is a split into two, equanimity and great equanimity. Initial equanimity,\textsuperscript{1922} as it is called, consists in an awareness in a state devoid of affliction that is free from any imbalance \textit{vis-à-vis} mental lethary and agitation, due to which a mental state of equality is attained. When control subsequently over the mind grows, [one] obtains a so-
called intermediate equanimity vis-à-vis the mind resting in the natural state\textsuperscript{1923} without any need for the antitodes to the two thorns [of lethargy and agitation]. Subsequent to that, at the point of utter control over the mind, when there is no fear that the two thorns will disturb at all, one obtains a spontaneous mind divorced from any effort to apply antitodes.

Q. What is great equanimity?

If the realization that [phenomena are] illusory is qualified by great introspection, which is indistinguishable from the antidote for discord, there is no effort to reject discord, no effort to rely on an antidote, [and] no effort to realize an object. That means one just spontaneously remains in an uncontrived state.\textsuperscript{1924} Further, when pointed out through the mirage example, it appears as if one does not stir from the state of [basic] space which appears as if filled by the [shimmering] water of [a running] river. At the moment appearance, that state is simply devoid of water; and at the moment of appearance of the blue color and the shimmering, there is neither the blue nor movement. The nature of space abides [where the mirage appears].

Q. What is the natural state of space like?\textsuperscript{1925}

After sentient beings analyze the existence of an empty thing that is opposed to form, there is no space that is not included in what merely acts as the conventional object called "space"; there is no essential nature in space at all. Similarly, just as all phenomena by their nature do not stir from a utterly pure state, since up to the buddha-body and gnosis, as long as the state of sentient beings and discontent appears, at the very point of appearing in that way, a variety of totally imagined things such as water and the like, is nothing other than the empty. What is akin to the blue and the movement is the mind that is self aware and gnosis that is one’s own awareness, though [such is] not their corresponding reality since actual reality is a purely natural state.\textsuperscript{1926}

[519\textsuperscript{1927}] So-called pure reality (chos nyid dag pa) is itself also similar to space; and that which is without a self as an object of awareness of a conventional mind is classified as [a state of] "pacified conceptual elaborations,"\textsuperscript{1928} which has absolutely no nature per se.\textsuperscript{1929} Realization in this way is called the realization that [phenomena] are basically the same as a mirage. That realization is not subject to any undermining doubts through the mirage [example]; and just as with no hope for benefit either, [the realization] is not accompanied by awareness of hope and doubt, there is no doubt that thoroughly afflictive phenomena are actually undermined. Being posessed of awareness that does not hope for benefit by virtue of totally pure phenomena (rnam par byang ba’i chos), said to be being conjoined with the vessel of great introspection, is the influence due to which there is no effort whatsoever. Remaining in an uncontrived state is said to be remaining in the state of great equanimity.

\textsuperscript{1924} ma bcos pa’i ngang la lhun gyis gnas pa tsam mo (518.13).
\textsuperscript{1925} nam mkha’i rang byin bya bzhin nyid ji lha bu zhe na (518.17).
\textsuperscript{1926} chos nyid dag pa’i rang byin bzhin du gnas so (518.24). BM omits this line at 161.01.
\textsuperscript{1927} NTh 171.03; Th 260.06; BM 161.02.
\textsuperscript{1928} spros pa nye bar zhi ba (519.01) : *prapañcā-upaśanta.
\textsuperscript{1929} ngo bo nyid gang yang myed do (519.02-519.03).
To sum up, the realization that all phenomena are basically the same as an illusion and a mirage is called the realization - and thus view - of the domain of the Great Perfection. The state that is inseparable from the realizing awareness is said to be encompassed by the vessel of great introspection, due to which no exertion connected to karmic processes is generated on purpose; it is called remaining in the state of great equanimity. It is indeed called meditation. Through those three terms, the view and meditation connected to the Great Perfection is wholly complete.

§ 5.7. disclosing those points by means of scriptural sources (519.14-528.15)

Now, when those points are disclosed by means of scriptural sources, some without faith will become faithful; and some who do not understand will come to understand [the Great Perfection]. That being the case, [they] are disclosed in terms of a collection of writings (gzhung gi tshog kyi tshig gis bstan to). In those writings, except for what is to be conjoined with introspection, there is no modification through effort; and because even both conceptual and non-conceptual are equal in terms of nature, there is no need for modification through effort. It is stated in the ITa ba yang dag sgron ma:

Happiness and discontent in dreams
Are the equal insofar as one awakes;
Both conception and non-conception, too,
Are the same when recognized by awareness.

Thus, all mental images past, present, and future, once understood
Do not to go beyond the natural state;
When naive imposition is not pursued
The natural state emerges, contrivance is transcended.

Conjoined with great introspection and simply not following after imposition constitutes the absence of an object contrived through effort which is thereby described, moreover, as "actual reality." [520] Since all phenomena are included in the mind, there is no exceptional phenomena other than the mind. The mind, which is by its very nature unborn is simply called "actual reality." Now, who is it that meditates on what? It has been thus stated:

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1932 Takahashi 2009: 410 gives de lta rdu gsam rnam par dag pa dag.
1933 NTh 173.01; Th 262.06; BM 162.03.
Just as space is without characteristics and therefore
Space itself is not meditated upon, similarly,
How could the mind that is by its very nature unborn
Meditate on the unborn per se?

Yet, if someone asks: "just how is it the convention 'meditation' is designated?" it
is stated: 1935

All effort is relinquished after recognizing that [so-called] 1936
Dissonance and antidote are indistinguishable;
Settled within an uncontrived state of great equanimity,
Practice that simple convention termed 'meditation.'

That is, when it is recognized that both the class of discordant [afflictions] that
ought to be given up and the antidotes that should be adopted are
indistinguishable by nature, all effort connected to acceptance and rejection is
relinquished, and one simply settles into a state of great equanimity that is only
conventionally termed "meditation."

Q. How is it that under the influence of previous karmic imprints the directly
perceived experience of confused appearances of objects and the generation of
various conceptually derived sensations are fabricated? It is stated: 1937

Since neither faults nor qualities are generated, then
No matter what marks of conceptualization arises,
It 1938 is uncontrived, unfabricated, and luminous in and of itself;
Unobstructed, naturally arising, unpursued, and automatically at rest.

When both the concept that is a confused appearance considered a fault and the
gnosis that is considered a quality, and which has nothing to do with manifest
idea, 1939 are realized to be indistinguishable in nature, [then] whatever objective
aspect appears, no matter what mental conception is generated, it is considered
as a fault in the manifest idea even on the view of the lower vehicles; and
because it is unobstructed it is said to be unobstructed [and] naturally arising. Since
ordinary sentient beings do not comply with them, they are said to be unpursued
[and] automatically at rest. Therefore, the nature of of bodhicitta is not contrived
through some other condition or effort; and given it is not fabricated by anyone
at all, it is said to be luminous in and of itself. This very point is also proclaimed in
Byang chub kyi sems bsgoms pa: 1940

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1936 Takahashi reads: rang gis shes na rtsol ba kun spangs te (2009: 140 n. 172 and p. 411) rather than
gang gis shes nas rtsol ba kun spangs te (RZSB 520.06).
1938 Below, Rongzom suggests the subject is the nature of bodhicitta. Cf. Takahashi.
1939 snang stog (RZSB 520.15-520.16).
1940 Cf. STMG 440.06.
Thus, because the limits of phenomena are imputed and either naturally illusive in nature or non-existent,

There is not any non-existent reliant upon an existent and non-existence is devoid of being the absence of non-existence;

Since the limits are non-existent, there is no center - and even the center does not constitute a point;

Whether coming up or not, intentionally [521] not abandoning, no mental basis is maintained, evidence does not pertain.

Regarding said terms: All the totally afflictive and totally pure phenomena are described above as unreal; and thus so-called ultimate and conventional are also just instructive conventions. In definitive meaning even the two truths are taught to be non-existent in terms of [real, established] categories in that way. When the limits of phenomena are scrutinized by a discerning intellect, if they are not existent even as conventions whose nature is only illusion, then how could they be considered to be really existent? And in that case, inasmuch as of all the objects connected to the meaning of present conventions are not real, that which relies upon them is also not [real], not actual. Further, the significance of teaching in terms of no self-nature and unborn is said to be because [phenomenal] elaborations are established as something at peace or non-existent; and thus the absence of non-existence, too, is non-existent. In that way, if there is no limit there is no center and the center is not a real point. Having realizing that perspective, a method for settling awareness consistent with that was proclaimed. "Whether arising or not, intentionally not abandoning, no mental basis is entailed, and it is not evident" was taught because due to the realizing that the discordant and [its] antidotes are indistinguishable, [there is] no abandonment of characteristic marks and the conceptual mind that do not come up; in not coming up, a mental basis is not maintained; and no object to be obtained is evinced. The teaching of the reasoning that sets forth the absence of acceptance and rejection: [That which does not pertain to Mañjuśrī, which stirs even slightly, is not reality, does not abide.] And even the sensation

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1941 NTh 174.05; Th 264.06; BM 164.03.
1942 sems rten mi 'cha' (521.01).
1943 Tōh 2591: Byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa (Bodhicittabhāvanā) in bsTan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | de liar drag po mtha' rnams tag dang ral bzhi gnyu ma'ang med gnyur phyir | yod la llos pa'i med pa'ang med de med pa'ang med | mtha' rnams med phyir dbyu med dbus la'ang gnas par mi byed la | (813.15-813.17). The line is not contiguous here. It is found at 814.11-814.12 of the dPe bsdur ma edition.
1944 don dam pa dang kun rdzob kyi bden pa zhes bya ba'ang bkri ba'i tha snyad tsam yin te | (521.03).
1945 nges pa'i don la ni (521.04).
1946 yang dag par yod pa lta ga la 'grub (521.06).
1947 rang bzhi myed pa (521.07-521.08) : svabhāva-virahita.
1948 ma skyes pa (521.08) : anupalambha.
1949 myed pa'i myed pa'ang myed ces smros (521.09).
1950 Cf. STMG 440.06-441.01.
1951 Tōh 2591: Byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa (Bodhicittabhāvanā) in bsTan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | 'jam dpal ma yin rdul tsam g.yo ba de yin der mi gnas | 814.11-814.12).
given in stirring slightly [from] the misunderstanding that does not pertain to the equality of actual reality, that itself is actual reality due to which no exertion is made to abandon characteristic mark and the conceptual mind. It is stated: "Since there is no nature per se in actual reality, [there is] no dwelling within it." Given the conceptual mind does not come up, an conceptual framework is not maintained; there is not even a realization of an object. It is stated: "Since the ground of meditation is not found, there is nothing found through meditation",\textsuperscript{1952} and conventionally, though the mind names actual reality ‘meditation,’\textsuperscript{1953} the unreality of the mind is described as ‘actual reality.’\textsuperscript{1954} Thus, regardless of meditation upon whatever by whoever, is there something attained? No, there is no object is realized.

Q. How is it that under the influence of previous karmic imprints the directly perceived appearances of the domain of experience connected to confused appearance and the generation of various conceptual processes are fabricated?

Since faults are devoid of nature per se, it is taught that when the nature of appearance is \[522\] recognized there is no removing imperfections. It is stated: "Actual reality belongs to phenomena in the conscious awareness that constitutes the domain of mental experience."\textsuperscript{1956} In the unmistak Conscious awareness, a domain of mental experience, whatever appears, those [phenomena] themselves are actual reality that is undecaying and thus cannot be grasped.

Q. If there is no imperfection in what appears, what deceives sentient beings causing them to revolve [in conditioned existence]?

Given that sentient beings revolve [in conditioned existence] because they are fixated on the appearance of things and grasp at characteristic marks, realizing there is no thing connected to the appearance due to the teaching that such appearances accompanied by conceptual images (\textit{rnam pa dang bcas pas}) are unpursued, it is stated: "Meditate on this supreme path which is supreme, devoid of image and without end."\textsuperscript{1957} Unpursued appearances are due to realizing appearances are devoid of things. Similarly, whatever mental conceptions are generated are also devoid imperfect phenomena and thus unsuppressed (\textit{mi dgag}) and unpursued because they are naturally arising, their own nature being unreal, which is the point of being proclaimed to be automatically at rest. It is stated:

\textsuperscript{1952} Tökh 2591: \textit{Byang chub kyi sms bsgom pa} (\textit{Bodhicittabhāvanā}) in b\textit{bsTan 'gyur} (dpe bsdur ma)\texttt{1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | bsgom pa'i sa mi rnyed phyir bsgoms pas rnyed phrad mi 'gyur te | (814.12).}

\textsuperscript{1953} \textit{tha snyad du sms kyi chos nyid sgoom zhig btags kyang} (521.20-521.21).

\textsuperscript{1954} \textit{sms dngos por ma grub pa nyid la chos nyid zhes brjod pa yin pas} (521.21-521.22).

\textsuperscript{1955} NTh 176.03; Th 266.06; BM 165.06.

\textsuperscript{1956} Tökh 2591: \textit{Byang chub kyi sms bsgom pa} (\textit{Bodhicittabhāvanā}) in b\textit{bsTan 'gyur} (dpe bsdur ma)\texttt{1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | sms kyi spyod yul shes pa de dag chos nams kyi ni chos nyid yin | (814.13).}

\textsuperscript{1957} Tökh 2591: \textit{Byang chub kyi sms bsgom pa} (\textit{Bodhicittabhāvanā}) in b\textit{bsTan 'gyur} (dpe bsdur ma)\texttt{1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | rnam bral gang la mchog dang tha ma med par lam mchog 'gi bsgom mo | (814.14).}
Ungenerated karmic process, unoriginated phenomena, utterly phenomena beyond sorrow,
When all is unreal,\textsuperscript{1958} recognized [as] \textit{dharmadhātu}, [one is like] the arhat Subhūti.\textsuperscript{1959}

Since all conceptually constructed phenomena are naturally unborn, any [and all] phenomena never arise.\textsuperscript{1960} At the point things are conceived in that manner, if all manifest ideas are also recognized [as] the \textit{dharmadhātu}, "like the awareness of the arhat Subhūti" is said. Here, the analogy\textsuperscript{1961} given states: "Space, without objective basis,\textsuperscript{1962} is simply name, without differentiation into virtue and non-virtue, unborn."\textsuperscript{1963} In the analogy, what is simply called by the name "space"\textsuperscript{1964} is devoid of any objective basis [vis-à-vis] by nature per se. Similarly,\textsuperscript{1965} given that virtue, non-virtue, and the like are also devoid of nature itself, they are thus unsuppressed and unpursued. Inasmuch as that is the case, when such an awareness as that is set in equipoise, it is proclaimed to be qualified by its separation from these conceptual frameworks (\textit{dmigs pa ’di rnams}). It is stated:

In the absence of any mental exertion of effort at all, there is no mental volition (\textit{sems}), nothing of understanding and ignorance;
No mindfulness and discrimination in any rejection/acceptance at all, no joy or comparison, no support;
An equal state (\textit{mnyam gnas}), non-dual, ineffable, devoid of activity and inactivity, and so on, is undiminishing.\textsuperscript{1966}

The unreality of flaws [523\textsuperscript{1967}] and qualities means there is no biased mental exertion. The unreality of instantiating reality means there is no mental volition at all.

\textsuperscript{1958} dngos myed (522.12) : abhāva.
\textsuperscript{1960} Cf. Almogi, Orna. 2013: 1340 n. 25.
\textsuperscript{1961} Roesler, \textit{Habilitation}, s.v. Exempla als didaktisches Mittel in der indischen und tibetischen Literatur.
\textsuperscript{1962} \textit{mi dmigs} (522.17).
\textsuperscript{1963} Tōh 2591: \textit{Byang chub kyi sens bsgom pa (Bodhicittabhāvanā)} in bsTan ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): 1 nam mkha’ mi dmigs ming tsam dge dang mi dger dbyed med skye ba’ang med (814.16-814.17).
\textsuperscript{1964} dper na nam mkha’ zhes ming du brjod pa tsam du zad de (522.18).
\textsuperscript{1965} Note BM 166.07 reads: dper na nam mkha’ zhes ming du brjod pa tsam du zad de \ ngo bo nyid med do (corresponding to RZSB 1.522.19); The next line, i.e. BM 167.01, reads: ‘di dang skyar ro \ de ltar brtan pa’i rtags thob nas..., which corresponds to RZSB 1.549.15-549.16, skipping more than twenty pages.
\textsuperscript{1966} Tōh 2591: \textit{Byang chub kyi sens bsgom pa (Bodhicittabhāvanā)} in bsTan ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): 1 rtsol ba yid la mi byed gang la’ang sens med shes dang mi shes bral 11 drang dang ’byed med gang la’ang ‘ga’ dang mtshungs med mi gnas mi dmigs shing 11 mnyam nas gnyis su brtag med brjod bral bya dang mi bya med de stsogs bri med (814.17-814.19).
Since the mind-as-such is indeed unreal, the character of cognition does not pertain [to it]. Since it does not pertain to the character of physical matter, it has nothing to do with (bral) understanding and ignorance. Being devoid of differentiation between what is discordant and [its] antidote, there is no antidote that is to be recalled and no application of bias. Both being equal, there is not even a comparable classification and no objective basis whatsoever. The absence of desirable and undesirable marks a state of equality. Not being separated into distinction, there is no dualistic analyses; beyond conventional expression, it is ineffable. Since there is nothing to aspire toward, there is no activity. Given the three types of karma are not considered to be flawed, there is in fact not an absence of activity. There is no acting to complete the two accumulations; nor is there acting to diminish obscuration. This is not unlike the statement in the Prajñāpāramitā that "nothing is diminished; nothing is added." This point itself is also proclaimed in the Khyung chen.

On this point, it is stated:

Casting away [and] setting forth [are] natural, [yet ultimately] Nothing is asserted and nothing even accepted; Not even a trace of delight is generated and Like a great garuda soaring through space -

Without any expansion or even contraction - [There is] no need for evasion, nor keeping anything fixed; All variety of phenomena issue forth In an oceanic primordial state.

Nothing is to be established [or] thus cast away; nothing is to be rejected [or] thus set forth; there is no object to objectify [and] thus nothing asserted. Since the very nature of things are unreal, nothing is adopted. There is no joy and thus not even a trace of mental delight is generated. Analogously, for example, a garuda, soaring through space does not flap its wings yet traverses the whole in one fell swoop, unreliant upon anything and without falling into the abyss, having conquered space. Being unreal, without anything terrifying (bhayānaka:}

1967 NTh 178.01; Th 268.06; BM suddenly skips more than 20 pages at this point. See note just above.
1968 sens nyid kyang ma grub pas shes rig gi mtshan nyid kyang ma yin (RZSB 523.02-523.03).
1969 Toh. 0531: bCom ldan 'das ma shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i snying po (Bhagavatt-prajñā-pāramitā-hṛdaya) in bKa’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rgyud 'bum, na, vol. 88. (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): bri ba med pa | gang ba med pa'o | (298.15).
1970 GGB 422.03-423.04; STMG 383.01-383.03.
1972 nam mkhar ldings pa ‘dab gshog spro bsdu myed bzhin du (523.18).
1973 spyi rgya rabs kyi chod de ci la yang mi rten bzhin du g.yang sar ltung ba’ang myed pa (RZSB 523.18-52319).
‘jigs pa), means there is no need to evade anything. On account of that alone, there is not even a object of fixed reference. Nevertheless, on account of those things, there is no use for anything terrifying (de dag gis ‘jigs par mi bya’o). The removal of all fears in fact pertains to emptiness because taking things to be real has not protected anyone or made [anyone] free.\footnote{1974}

How so? Even the Śrāvaka freed through realizing selflessness considers subject and object [to be real] and therefore is not freed. The Pratyetka-jina freed through realizing the non-existence of the object, too, is not freed because [524\footnote{1975}] of considering the subject [to be real]. The Yogācārin freed through realizing the non-existence of subject and object, too, is not free because of considering the mind to be real. Even the Madhyamaka, who should be freed (sgrol gyis) through of realizing that nothing is ultimate, is not free because of considering conventions to be real.

Q. If that is the case - if things not considered to be even slightly real, [would not] the continuity of skillfull practices\footnote{1976} would be severed and divorced from compassion; would there not be no liberation at all insofar as there would be no union of discriminating awareness and compassion?

Compassion is produced through the support of sentient beings;\footnote{1977} nevertheless, it is not necessary to consider the substance of sentient beings to actually be real. For, in the manner in which sentient beings are unreal, the things that are mere illusion that benefit what appear as a sentient beings' pleasure and pain is a pure great compassion in which there is no obsession and no exhaustion. That being the case, there is no need, in connection with skillful practices, to consider [things] to be real.\footnote{1978} Therefore, this emptiness that dispels all fears is not something to be afraid of.\footnote{1979}

All variety of phenomena issue forth
In a primordial state akin to the ocean.\footnote{1980}

Just as the waves themselves that arise in the ocean are the ocean, characteristic marks appear variously from within emptiness without wavering from [emptiness]. Appearance per se is empty and thus unobstructed and naturally arising; unadopted and automatically at rest. Moreover, it is also stated in this

\footnote{1974} Cf. Wangchuk 2007: 348-349 n. 78.
\footnote{1975} NTh 179.05; Th 270.06.
\footnote{1976} Reading thabs kyi spyod pa (Th 271.01; NTh 179.06) rather than thams kyi spyod pa (RZSB 524.03-524.04).
\footnote{1977} snying rje ni sems can la dmigs nas skye ste (RZSB 524.05); alternatively, "compassion is generated after sentient beings become objects of observation."
\footnote{1978} Reading thabs kyi spyod pa (Th 271.04; NTh 180.02) rather than thams kyi spyod pa (RZSB 524.08).
\footnote{1979} Cf. Wangchuk 2007: 348-349 n. 78.
Entering onto this pure path in the vast heart, immediate and
Totally non-conceptual, sovereign equality is attained.\textsuperscript{1982}

Given that appearing ideas indeed manifest in direct perception, both the reality of appearance [and apparent ideas] are unreal and therefore unbiased. Given that in the mind there is nothing real, there is nothing real in an idea. The phrase the vast heart (\textit{yangs pa’i snyin po}) is used due to the fact there is nothing to be inherently objectified. Free from all cognitive grasping (‘dzin pa), one remains on a pure path. When endowed with just such an awareness as that, there is a sovereign equality that becomes the attainment of primordial perfection (sangs rgyas). It is stated that it can not to be something attained through biased awareness.\textsuperscript{1983} This very system is also proclaimed in the \textit{Rtsal chen sprugs pa} where it states:\textsuperscript{1984}

The formost domain of reality is spontaneously complete, without aspiration;
It is the unaccomplished, superior dynamism (\textit{rtsal sprugs}) free of activity;
In the natural bliss purified [of] conceptual engagement
How can childish misunderstanding act to beguile?

In the behavior of all sentient beings the non-dual great bliss is Confused; and thus is the construction of a faulty path.
Yet it is nothing distinct from that superior path taught above; [and]
The lord of all awakened ones \textsuperscript{[525]}\textsuperscript{1985} is evinced in recognizing [that] equality.\textsuperscript{1986}

\textsuperscript{1981} The lines are found in the NGB edition (Vol. ka) of the \textit{Khyung chen} 419.07. These lines do not appear to be in the Bairo edition; however cf. \textit{Bai ro rgyud ’bum}, vol. 2, 363.01.


\textsuperscript{1983} blang dor gyi blos thog par mi ’gyur ro zhes bya ba yin no (RZSB 524.19-524.20).

\textsuperscript{1984} Cf. STMG: \textit{slu ba byed rtsal sprugs smon pa med pa yi || byar med lhun rdzogs snga ma de nyid don (347.06); TK W21518-1757: sgrub med tsal sprugs smon pa med pa yi || bya med lhun rdzogs sna ma de nyid do (423.04); TK W21519-1757-465-475: bsgrub med rtsal sprugs smon pa med pa yi || ma nor dam pa’i lam chen lhun rdzogs pa (466.06-466.07, cf. 467.01); TB W21521-0604-526-539: bsgrub med rtsal sprugs smon pa med pa yi || ma nor dam pa’i lam chen lhun rdzogs pa (526.07; cf. 527-01-527.01); byar med lhun rdzogs snga ma de bzhin pas (529.06). Cf. Rtsa mo byung rgyal Tb.29: bsgrub med rtsal sprugs smon pa med pa yi || bya med lhun rdzogs bde gshags bde bzhin te || rtag spyod rnam dag chis med chos dbyings la || log rtag ’khrul pa’i dbang du ga la ’gyur (610.06-610.07).

\textsuperscript{1985} NTh 181.03; Th 272.06.


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Since sentient beings and buddhas are indistinguishable in nature, [spiritual transformation] is not something that is contrived through a path; and thus there is no accomplishing it. Given conscious awareness and knowables are not something improved upon, it is dynamism. Insofar as there is no progress via qualitative distinction, it is aspirationless. The discordant and [their] antidotes are indistinguishable and thus there is no activity. Being that all qualities (chos) of a buddha abide primordially and are spontaneously complete, [they] pertain to the foremost domain of reality. Such an object, tainted by confused awareness, remains something unchanging in nature. For that reason, [we find] the proclamation: "in the natural bliss purified [of] conceptual engagement, how can childish misunderstanding act to beguile?"; and if the conceptual mind is itself essentially unreal, how could the unsettling perturbations of karmic processes be real? For that reason, the mind-as-such is the non-dual bodhicitta great bliss.

In that case, how can it be tainted? Aggregates [like] a mirage are similar to space, which is untainted. It is appearance-as-if-tainted itself that is the great path connected to purity. Therefore, just as a mirage and space are indistinct and indistinguishable in terms of nature, both the construction of a conditioned path by one who is confused and the construction of a liberatory path by one who is not confused are also indistinguishable. Thus, realization and confidence with respect to that point on the part of yogic beings and their remaining in that state [of awareness] stands in agreement with the profound attitude and state of Samantabhadra-Vajrasattva. Thus it is proclaimed that "the lord of all awakened ones is evinced in recognizing equality." This system is itself found in the rDo rje tshig drug pa:

Since it is already (zin pas), the spontaneous state is settled

When the illness of effort is abandoned.

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1987 yon tan gyi khyad par gong du bsgron du myed pas smon pa myed do 1 (RZSB 1.525.03-525).
1988 bkhyod pa’i du byed kyi skyod pa rnam ga la ‘grub (RZSB 1.525.08-525.09).

1991 lhun gyis gnas pa (RZSB 525.18). Karmay renders this term "rest" or "remain spontaneously" and suggests it only occurs after the eleventh century (2007: 51 n. 43).
1992 Toh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdo’rgs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharmadhāsaṇti-bodhicittā-kulāyāḥ-rājā) in bKa’’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, mying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): zin pas rtsol ba’i nad spangs te mnyam par shes pas dangs rgyas kun gyi rje 1 (83.19-83.20). While the commentary found in IOL Tib J 647 suggests zin pa’ indicates the fact "all desires are already complete in the present (’dod pa thams cad da ltar rdo’rgs zin pa’i ton te), thus rendering effort superfluous and a malady (cf. Karmay 2007: 57), Rongzom (RZSB 525.19-525.20) reads the the term in connection with the nature of phenomena being already perfected, which is suggested in the previous lines: ji bzhin ba zhes myi rtag kyang mnyam par snang mdo’zad kun du bzung ji bzhin ba zhes myi rtag kyang mnyam par snang mdo’zad kun du.
Since the nature of all phenomena is already perfected within the great vajra bliss of Samantabhadra’s body, speech, and mind, the discordant and their antidotes - the illness connected to [fixation on] what is accepted and rejected - is abandoned; and thus from this spontaneous state within this great equanimity is is the object of so-called settling into equality (mnyam par bzhag pa). Indeed, in the rDo rje sms pa’ nam mkha’ che, it is stated: 1993

Indestructible being qua great space is
The all-good (kun bzang) expansive dharmadhātu,
Since it is the pure, great path liberating all,
It is unborn, unceasing, [and] nothing intended at all. 1994

Indestructible being (vajrasattva : rdo rje sms pa’) is the nature of bodhicitta, [526] 1995 uncompounded in the three times and devoid of any point of transition that, on account of being totally unwavering is [termed] indestructible being or vajrasattva. The term ‘being’ (sattva : sms can) also applies to realization of just such an object consecrated through naturally arising great gnosis, 1996 something naturally luminious and therefore termed indestructible being or vajrasattva. Space is an example of something all pervasive yet unreal. The great is the quality of bodhicitta, which, along with indestructible being, marked by the five types of greatness, constantly resides.

The point, to sum up, is that just as the nature of all physical form [is equal to] the very nature of space, the nature of all phenomena are primordially perfected (sangs rgyas) as the nature of indestructible being.

The term bodhicitta-vajrasattva – or ‘mind of enlightenment’ [comprising] indestructible being’ – is something that points out the primordially perfected nature of all phenomena. In the phrase "all-good (kun bzang) expansive dharmadhātu," the term all [refers to] all phenomena [as] unmixed and a totality; unmixed, here, [suggests] apparent variety; totality, in this context, [suggests] something without bifurcated nature; and because of none of any of these are something negative, something to be rejected, they are all-good (samantabhadra). That is the very nature of all phenomena. Take, for example, space: it also abides in the nature of everything physical and is something open 1997 [yet] not something real in the proper sense. 1998 At the same time, since it is neither

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1995 NTh 183.01; Th 275.01.
1996 Cf. Apte 1618 s.v. sattvam. This term is also rendered as ‘being,’ ‘nature,’ ‘truth,’ ‘reality,’ ‘wisdom,’ ‘inherent character,’ and so on.
1997 go ’byed pa (526.14-526.15).
1998 Reading yang dag pa myed pa rather than yang dog pa myed pa (RAZSB 1.526.15. NTh 184.01).
something in the nature of samantabhadra nor something not included [within it], it is expansive, and on that account, ‘the sphere of reality’ or dharmadhātu.

To summarize, [we ask:] are all phenomena the nature of bodhicitta-vajrasattva? [They are] enlightened in the nature of samantabhadra and all totally great and expansive. That being the case, vajrasattva and indeed samantabhadra are similar in meaning; greatness and expansive are also similar in meaning. In fact:

The sphere [of] samantabhadra-vajrasattva; it is given. Just as it is also proclaimed:

Expansive, great, the supreme dharma!

Reality alone is the domain of this great path; and training on a different path in accordance with the lower vehicles (theg pa ‘og ma) is not something that attains a different fruit. It is in terms of this nature that remaining in a state of liberation that is natural to all sentient beings is called the great path. When yogic beings realize and gain confidence with respect to reality they become equal to the Glorious Vajrasattva (“indestructible being”) or Samantabhadra (“all-good”), which is also called liberating freedom. Further, it is also called awakening [or buddhahood]. It is stated:

Just as objects [ultimately] do not proceed,
Liberating freedom is due to inactivity.

And it is proclaimed in the rMad du byung ba:

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1999 mdo rbsdun chos thams cad ni byang chub kyi sems rdo rje sems dpa’i rang bzhin nam (526.16-526.17).
2000 Cf Takahashi 2009: 177 n. 234 and 279. The entire verse reads: cho rnam stham chad dgra dag n i snye myed don dam dbyungs su ro gci pa d nyt dus gsum rgyal ba’i chos nyid de kun tu bstag po dpo rje sems dpa’i ngyang (loc. cit.).
2001 Peking 5082: rDo rje stsa’i zhus lan in bStTan ‘gyur (dpe bsdur ma), 1999, rgyud, khe-gc, vol. 48 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): dpo bsa med pas kun tu bstag po (zhe am go’ng gi) rdo rje sems dpa’i ngyang | (351.10-351.11). “[ ]” represent interlinear notes.
2002 Cf. NGB Khyung chen 422.01.
2004 NTh 184.05; Th 277.01.
2005 527.01.
2006 The second line varies slightly: “liberation through inaction is freedom” (bya ba med pas grol bas grol (358.03).
2008 Cf. STMG 313.04.
Realizing this marvelous enlightenment [and]  
The quintessential nature of indestructible being, too,  
Is awakening on the indestructible seat (vajrasana).\textsuperscript{2009}

In brief, it is through the writings on the Great Perfection that both the nature of bodhicitta and methods for settling bodhicitta are [given] in the same system\textsuperscript{2010} 
vis-à-vis simply remaining in a state of awareness consonant with the realization of that nature. Given it is said to be unborn and unceasing, due to lacking causal conditions then, bodhicitta is devoid of any generative and dissipative nature per se. Given the absence of generative and dissipating nature per se, there is no state of conceiving it and thus it is said to be "nothing intended at all."\textsuperscript{2011} Further, a similar system is taught:

Actual reality that is devoid of appearance  
Is something cultivated through settling [the mind] effortlessly.\textsuperscript{2012}

This path, which is settled without acceptance and rejection and manipulation,\textsuperscript{2013} is also taught elsewhere - i.e. in the mTha’i mun sel sgron ma:\textsuperscript{2014}

The mental continuum in migrators is not held to be two;  
It is unborn and itself unobserved by the mind;  
Yet apart from that, since there is no other mind  
How can there be manipulation of or settling within it?\textsuperscript{2015}

Within beings wandering in conditions existence, there are not two continua of conscious awareness; its single nature is unborn and at the point confused faculties appear to be generated as cognitive awareness, it is not self-observing. For these reasons, there is no essential nature that is manipulable or settled into. Yet if that is the case, insofar as it is not improved, is it not unblemished by the imperfections of characteristic marks? It is stated:\textsuperscript{2016}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{2009} BGB Don mchog ’di yang thung mong min rMad byung: | rmad byung chub don rtogs nas | | rdo rje sens dpa’ bdag nyid kyang | | rdo rje gdan la yang sangs rgyas | (109.04-109.05).
  \item \textsuperscript{2010} Ishul tha dād myed (527.06).
  \item \textsuperscript{2011} Toh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsānti-bodhicitta-kulayāh-rāja) in bKa’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnyiṅg rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): | mi skye mi ’gag cir mi ’dgongs | (78.09).
  \item \textsuperscript{2012} Toh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsānti-bodhicitta-kulayāh-rāja) in bKa’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnyiṅg rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): | snang ba med pa’i chos nyid ni | | ma btsa bzhag pas bsgoms pa yin | (79.02-79.03). BGB Khyung chen lding: | snang ba med pa’i chos nyid ni | | ma btsal bzhag na bsgom pa yin | (359.02).
  \item \textsuperscript{2013} BGB Don mchog ’di yang thung mong min rMad byung: | rmad byung chub don rtogs nas | | rdo rje sens dpa’ bdag nyid kyang | | rdo rje gdan la yang sangs rgyas | (109.04-109.05).
  \item Toh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsānti-bodhicitta-kulayāh-rāja) in bKa’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnyiṅg rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): | gro la sens rgyud gnyis mi ’chang | | de ni ma skyes rang mi dmigs | | de las gzhan pa’i sens myed phyir | | bchos shing [963] gnas pa gang zhig yod | (962.20-963.01).
  \item \textsuperscript{2015} Toh. 4448: mTha’i mun sel sgron ma in bsTan’gyur (dpe bsdur ma), 2005, sna tshogs, no-po, vol. 120 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): | ’gro la sens rgyud gnyis mi ’chang | | de ni ma skyes rang mi dmigs | | de las gzhan pa’i sens myed phyir | | bchos shing [963] gnas pa gang zhig yod | (962.20-963.01).
  \item \textsuperscript{2016} BGB Don mchog ’di yang thung mong min rMad byung: | rmad byung chub don rtogs nas | | rdo rje sens dpa’ bdag nyid kyang | | rdo rje gdan la yang sangs rgyas | (109.04-109.05).
\end{itemize}
As long as it is conditioned by conceptual confusion,
The ordinary mind appears like a mirage;
When its nature is recognized, there is nothing to modify;
When not recognized, it is like something that conjurs a mirage.\(^{2017}\)

For as long as the condition of conceptual confusion is not exhausted, illusive conscious awareness connected to appearing objects will be generated without interruption even though there is no such object. When nature is recognized, there is nothing to improve. The non-existence of something, some contrivance, \(\text{vis-à-vis}\) manipulation [of the mind for the sake of supposedly improving its condition] is akin to the desire to construct a mirage. This indicates appearance \(qua\) concept is absent improvement – and unceasing. Furthermore, it is taught there is no following after appearance \(qua\) concept. Thus, it is stated:\(^{2018}\)

The non-conceptual and uncharacterized mind as such [528\(^{2019}\)],
Does not work to remain even within the uncharacterized;
If not remaining even within the uncharacterized,
What need is there to mention it does not remain within the
categorized?\(^{2020}\)

Inasmuch as an awareness seeking out things is not generated, conceptual images are not conceived.\(^{2021}\) The so-called \textit{uncharacterized mind}, in that connection, is one divorced from fixation upon and apprehension of characteristic marks; and since such an awareness as that does not construct a underlying basis in connection with even the uncharacterized, what need is there to mention that it does not construct an underlying basis connected to characteristic marks? Even in the \textit{lTa ba rin po che sgron ma} it proclaims a system similar to that:\(^{2022}\)

Illusory characteristics directly perceived without hindrance
Are realized as the uncharacterized, of a single taste in the ultimate
expansive.\(^{2023}\)

\(^{2017}\) Toh. 4448: \textit{mTha’i mun sel sgron ma} in bSTan \textquote{gyur (dpe bsdur ma), 2005, sna tshogs, no-po, vol. 120 (Beijing: Krun goggles, do skrun khang): | khrul rto\textquote{}g rkyen dang ldan gyi bar \| smig rgyu bzhin du sens snang na \| rang bzhin shes pas bcos su med \| mi shes smig rgyu bcos pa bzhin | (963.01-963.03).


\(^{2019}\) NTh 186.03; Th 279.02.

\(^{2020}\) Toh. 4448: \textit{mTha’i mun sel sgron ma} in bSTan \textquote{gyur (dpe bsdur ma), 2005, sna tshogs, no-po, vol. 120 (Beijing: Krun goggles, do skrun khang): | mi rto\textquote{}g mtshan med sens rnams kyis \| ma rto\textquote{}gs mtshan ma med la’ang gnas ma byed \| mtshan ma med la mi gnas na \| mtshan mar gnas pa smos ci dgos | (963.03-963.05).

\(^{2021}\) dngos po tshul ba’i blo mi skyes pas na rnam par mi rto\textquote{}g pa’o (RZSB 528.02-528.03).


\(^{2023}\) Toh. 4451: \textit{lTa ba rin chen sgron ma} in bSTan \textquote{gyur (dpe bsdur ma), 2005, sna tshogs, no-po, vol. 120 (Beijing: Krun goggles, do skrun khang): sgyu ma’i mtshan nying ma ’gags mngon sum ste \| mtshan med ro gcig don dam dbyings su rto\textquote{}gs | (972.03-972.05).
This point about settling without manipulation into such a state is something taught in the *Lus sems bcos myed thabs kyi sgron ma*.

Just as space is uncharacterized,
Divorced from striving to observe or not observe,
Similarly, the mind as such space, as well,
Is to be considered naturally so.

Even the body and so forth are similar:
Rootless and therefore considered in the same way.
Insofar as there is no remaining in that which is remainderless,
There is no conflict at all.

Space, for example, is devoid of its own characteristics as an object and therefore there is no effort connected with either observation or non-observation [with respect to it]. Similarly, the mind, too, is devoid of its own character *per se* and thus is not a domain connected to effort. All the karmic processes of body and speech, moreover, are similar to that. That is the point made above.

§ 5.8. now, explaining just a bit about critical impediments to concentration (528.15-533.10)

In general, even if the nature of thirty deviations and obcurations explained above pertain to critical impediments connected to both theory and meditation, here they are briefly explained as something else: critical impediments to intimate instruction, subtle points to grasp that are themselves difficult to identify [as] impediments. In the *Byang chub kyi sems yul kun las ’jug*, which primarily teaches the critical impediments to concentration, it states:

The non-abiding, non-conceptual dharma path with no object of observation
Emerges from a subtle point of transmutation;
The *dharmakāya* contemplated is absent [any] objective attribute,

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2024 The text where these lines are found is identified by Takahashi as *bsGom thabs kyi sgron ma*; cf. Karmay 2007: 84-85 and Takahashi 2008: 421, 423
2025 Toh. 4450: rNal ’byor spyod pa’i lugs nges pa’i don la ji bzihin sgon thabs kyi sgron ma in bsTan ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma), 2005, sna tshogs, no-po, vol. 120 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): || ji ltar mtshan med nam mkha’ ni || dmigs dang dmigs med rtsol dang bral || de bzihin sams nyid nam mkha’ yang || rang bzihin nyid kyis de la’o || las la sog kyang de bzhin te || rtsol ba med phyir gang ltar yang || gnas pa med de mi gnas na || mi ’gal tsam du gyur pa yin || (969.01-969.05)
2026 *These lines open the NGB Khyung chen (Tk 21 419.03-419.04).
Thus, naturally arising gnosis is non-conceptual, ubiquitously, actually present.\textsuperscript{2028}

And in the transmissions of non-discursive meditations (rNam par mi rtog pa’i sgom lung dag las) the following is asserted:\textsuperscript{2029}

When in non-conceptual meditation,
There is no underlying, abiding mental state at all;
The meditation in which no images whatsoever are conceived\textsuperscript{[529]}\textsuperscript{2030}
Is the path of the dharmakāya.

Once appearance and ideas concerning mental states, objective referents, and conceptual images are seen to be obscurations and imperfections and are transcended, that itself is asserted to be the unmistaken path. It is not divorced from subtle points of dedication; and it derives from total dedication to a desired aim\textsuperscript{2031} because it is actually a conceptual state of meditation. In that context, the phrase subtle consideration is defined in terms of wishes and aspirations.

Although it does not pertain to remaining in a state accompanied by an objective referent in accordance with the Śrāvakas, the phrase subtle points does suggest a conceptual state of awareness that has fallen into the extreme of biased attitudes.

If that is the case, one might then ask "how does one rest [the mind]?” In proclaiming such things as "the dharmakāya has no objective attributes," the phrase dharmakāya refers to nothing other than the sublime object that is specifically evinced from the confused appearances of sentient beings. That which is the very essential nature of confused appearance per se, termed the svābhāvikakāya [or essential nature body of a buddha], is simply called the dharmakāya. Given that even confused appearance is the mind-as-such, since the mind’s own nature is not real, its ideas do not inherently exist. That being the case, whatever objective images appear or whatever mental ideas are generated, the nature of an appearing idea itself is naturally luminous and thus naturally arising, self-occuring gnosis. In the rDo rje snek dpa’ nam mkha’ che, moreover, it states:\textsuperscript{2032}

\begin{quote}
Space is conceived\textsuperscript{2033} as unborn and
The idea itself is similar to space;
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{2028} Toh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sans kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsānti-bodhisattva-kalayāḥ-rāja) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang):\textsuperscript{1} mi gnas dmigs pa’i yul med mi rtog chos kyi lam \textsuperscript{1} bsngo ba’i cha shas phra [64] mo’i yul la byung ba ste \textsuperscript{1} rtog sgm chos kyi sku ni khadya par don med pas \textsuperscript{1} rang ’byung ye shes mi rtog kun tu ji bzhin gnas \textsuperscript{1} (63-20-64.02).

\textsuperscript{2029} As mentioned above, Karmay has connected the term sgom lung to the cig car ba tradition. Here, Rongzom uses the phrase ‘in the scriptures on non-conceptual meditation…’ (rnam par mi rtog pa’i sgm lung dag las); here, the title’s additional dag perhaps suggests this source is a scriptural tradition rather than a single text?

\textsuperscript{2030} NTh 188.01; Th 281.02.

\textsuperscript{2031} yongs su bsngo ba’i yul ’dod pas las byung ba (RZSB 529.04).

\textsuperscript{2032} Cf. BGB Khung chen lding ba (2.360.06).


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Through dispassionate space[-like] dedication,
The space that is of immense benefit to oneself emerges.

For example, when one uses the expression 'a hare's horn' the phrase doesn't refer to an object, which is a fiction (brdzun) because it has no basis in reality. Therefore, the both the meaning of 'a hare's horn' and the phrase 'a hare's horn' are meaningless (don myed pa) and the thing that is expressed is not experienced so it is akin to an unreal object. Similarly, both space and the idea of it calls to mind (dmigs) are basically the same in being unborn because space, being devoid of any nature per se is unborn; and the idea called that to mind, being devoid of an object, is unborn. That being the case, the idea that thinks space an objective support (dmigs pa) is similar to the nature of space insofar as it is not experienced as being being produced for even a single moment. It is similar because there is no objective condition in the object to the way in which all the ideas appearing as something generated are contingent upon an objective condition [530][2036] [530][2036].

Thus, a dispassionate awareness like space - no desiring or rejecting anything - is thus called "space[-like] dedication"; and remaining within that and gaining confidence is becoming a buddha and thus said to be "the space that is of immense benefit to oneself." This manner of proceeding is itself also proclaimed in the Lus sems bcos myed thabs kyi sgron ma:

One should recognize that the mind does not to observe anything at all And does not abide in anything at all; In the mind is the subtle mental grasping connected to what is dispelled - The imperfections abiding in and observed by the mind. If, like a mirage, there is no mind, What is the instrument of non-abiding and non-observation? To state that space does not abide in itself In an instruction without any marked meaning.

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[2034] Toh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahisanti-bodhicitta-kulayah-rati) in bKa’ ‘gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, mying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krong go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): \[1\] nam mkha’ rtog pa skye med cing \[1\] rtog pa de nyid nam mkha’ ‘dra’ \[1\] ma chags nam mkha’i bsngo ba las \[1\] rang don chen po nam mkha’ ‘byung \[1\] (80.01-80.03). Cf. BGB Khuyang chen lding ba: \[1\] nam mkha’ rtog pa skye med cing \[1\] rtog pa de nyid nam mkha’ ‘dra’ \[1\] mi chags nam mkhar bsngo ba las \[1\] rang don chen po nam mkhar ‘byung \[1\] (2.360.06).

[2035] dmigs pa’i rkyen (529.24) : ḍalambanapratyaya.

[2036] NTh 189.05; Th 283.03.


[2038] Karmay and Takahashi read shes bya ba rather than zhes bya ba (RZSB 530).

[2039] Both Karmay 2007: 85 and Takahashi 2008: 422 both read nam mkha’ rang la’ang mi gnas shes rather than ... mi gnas zhes (RZSB 530.07; STMG 440.05-440.06).

[2040] Toh. 4450: rNal ’byor spyod pa’i lugs nges pa’i don la ji bzhin sgon thabs kyi sgron ma in bsTan ‘gyur (dpe bsdur ma), 2005, sna tshogs, no-po, vol. 120 (Beijing: Krong go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): \[1\] sens ni ci la’ang mi gnas dang \[1\] ci la’ang mi dmigs shes bya ba \[1\] sens la gnas dmigs skyon sel ba’i \[1\] sens ’dzin phra mo de la yod \[1\] smig sgyu bzhin du sens med na \[1\] mi gnas mi dmigs byed pa gang \[1\] rma mkha’ rang la’ang mi gnas shes \[1\] (968.13-968.16). Identified as the Lus sems bcos myed thabs kyi sgron ma.
For example, when the nature of a mirage pertains to [that of] space, the mirage, too, is considered something that has no abiding basis at all. It does not make sense (mi rigs) for someone else to decree that "it is a something unobserved in any object"; it is, moreover, observed in connection with space. It does not make sense for someone else to decree that "space is a something that does not abide even as its own nature." Similarly, because confused mental appearance is itself similar to a mirage it is said that does not abide in any underlying basis -and does not observe in any object at all. Given it is unreasonable that it should be refined through some distinct mode of conception, the nature of the mind, like space, is devoid of any nature per se. Thus, it is said that it is not even reasonable to refine it.

This system itself is also taught in Byang chub kyi sens bsgom pa, which, among other things (sogs pa), states:

Once grasping at form, characteristic, and aspiration is relinquished,
Even meditation on the three doors of liberation is the work of Māra;
form itself is empty.

On this view, when meditating on the concentrations associated with the doors of liberation, the three - realist views, grasping at characteristic marks, and fixation on aspiration – should be relinquished. Their antidotes - the door of liberation qua emptiness, which is characterized by isolating entities (dngos pos dben) and, similarly, concentration on the signless, which is characterized by pacification and aspirationless concentration, which is characterized by the cleansing of discontent - are all asserted to be meditations. [Nevertheless] they fall into the extreme of biases and interrupting the generation of awareness of the equality of phenomena and therefore they are the work of Māra.

If that is the case, someone might ask: how, then, should one act? It is proclaimed that "form itself is empty!" and what is called the liberation of those skilled in method consists in (pas) realizing that the discordant and its antidote are indistinguishable. The so-called liberation connected to natural luminosity consists in the realization that the discordance is devoid of any substance to be relinquished. What is termed the unconditioned liberation consists in the realization that nothing has its own essential nature. It is said the significance of such should be embraced. Furthermore:

2042 bdud kyi las (RZSB 530.18): mārkarma (Chandra 2001: 401a). Cf. STMG: rnam bzhis blang dor byas pa dang | de'i ming ni bdud kyi las zhes bya'o (126.02).
2044 mtsan ma myed pa'i ting nye 'dzin (RZSB 530.21-530.22): ānimittasamādhi.
2045 smon pa myed par ting nye 'dzin (RZSB 530.22): apraṇīhitasamādhi.
2046 NTh 191.03; Th 285.03.
2047 mngon par 'dus ma byas pa (RZSB 531.04): anabhisaṃskāra (cf. Mvp 799).
Relinquishing the three saṃsāric paths and even meditation upon the path of nirvāṇa are themselves activities of Māra; Those alone do not pacify; do not cultivate [a pure, or] abandon [a delusive] nature.2048

After perceiving the three - attachment,2049 aversion,2050 and delusion2051 - as saṃsāric paths and rejecting them, and the meditation induced after perceiving the fundamental virtue of the dispassionate and so forth as a nirvānic path is indeed the activity of Māra because it falls into the extreme of acceptance and rejection [or ‘bias’]. Thereby, there is no perception of the significance [of the fact] that all phenomena are naturally at peace.2052 For that reason, the nature of phenomena is not found either in cultivation or abandonment.2053 It is stated in Vimalakīrti’s teaching: "Regarding liberation it is asked: 'is it not the case liberation is due to the abandonment of attachment, aversion, and delusion?'"

The arrogant are the ones who say the abandonment of attachment, aversion, and delusion constitutes (pas) liberation. For the unselfish, the actual nature (rang bzhin nyid) of attachment, aversion, and delusion pertain to liberation, which is consonant [with Mañjuśrīmitra’s teaching]. From that text, as well, it is said: "In this way, there are those superior ones who have conquered their [spiritual] enemies (arhat : sgra bcom pa) pompously think, 'I have abandoned all afflictions,' though they are not [in fact] those who have conquered their [spiritual] enemies," which is similar to that approach, as well.

Here, someone might ask, ‘if that is the case, what is the explicit basis of the path of a superior?’ Given the object and state of accomplishment perceived by all superior beings is nothing other than the non-dual equality of phenomena, the path attaining nirvāṇa, as well, is nothing other than the non-dual equality of phenomena. That being the case, so long there is no confidence vis-à-vis penetrating the non-dual equality of phenomena [5322054], for just that long there is some subtle point of the awareness connected to bias, which is simply a source of liberation rather than there itself being the essence of the path [to it].2055 Therefore, in all the teachings of the Conqueror (rgyal ba ’i bka’ ’rnyams) it is also proclaimed: "there is no becoming a buddha through some path other than the realization of this path." There is no attainment of the state of buddhahood insofar as there is no penetrating the significance (don ma rtogs) of the non-dual equality of phenomena, which is the point of the the phrase "the deepest of all intentions." This approach is also consonant with what is taught in the

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2048 Thō 2591: Byang chub kyi sens bsgom pa (Bodhicittatattvavāda) in bsTan ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krong go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): ‘khor ba’i lam gsum spong zhing mya ngan ’das lam bsgom pa ang bsud kyi las nyid do \ de nyid rang bzhin ma zhi rang bzhin btsal spangs gar mi gnas | (205.06-205.08).

2049 ’dod chags (RZSB 531.08) : rga; cf. kāma.

2050 zhe sdag (RZSB 531.08) : dvesa; cf. khrodha.

2051 Reading gti mug (Th 286.01; NTh 191.06) rather than ti mug (RZSB 531.08) : moha.

2052 des chos thams cad rang bzhin gyis zhi ba’i don ma mthong ngo (RZSB 531.10-531.11).

2053 gang gi phyir chos kyi rang bzhin ni btsal spangs gnyis la gnas bcar myed pa’i ro (RZSB 531.11-531.12).

2054 NTh 193.01; Th 287.03.

2055 lam gyi rang gi ngo bo ma yin no (RZSB 523.02); alternatively, "is not the path’s own essence."
**Ganḍavyūha-sūtra:**

I and the buddhas - and anyone -  
Naturally abide in equality  
And those who do not, who do not get it,  
Will [yet] become Sugatas.

Form, sensation, and discriminations,  
Consciousness, intentions,  
They will become Mahāmunis -  
Tathāgatas beyond count.

§ 5.9. here, a little should be taught about the criteria for the attainment of mastery over the mind after abiding in the expanse of reality and gaining confidence with respect to bodhicitta (532.10-535.18)

Furthermore, it is said in the Byang chub kyi sens bsgom pa:

As long as there is mental movement, for that long there is the activity of Māra and a minor path;  
Moving and unmoving are terms for non-abiding [and] not remaining within a state;  
The Sugatas call the middle-way path devoid of appearance bodhicitta.2058

On this view, any appearing idea is unobstructed, naturally arising - unpursued, then, it is [also] naturally peace. At the point of settling long-term into the sphere of great equanimity that is divorced from effort, inasmuch as any bit of power is obtained, it is generated without any grasping at phenomena and their characteristics, regardless of the constant generation (rgyun du skye’ang) of appearing ideas. For example, the appearance of an object in a dream is delicate due to sleep. This is akin to the [fact] fixation on realist views and grasping at characteristics is incorrect even though an appearance is not unreal. That being

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2056 This appears to be a slightly altered list of the five psycho-physical aggregates.

2057 Tōh. 0044: Sangs rgyas phal po che zhes bya ba shin tu rgyas pa chen po'i mdo (Buddha-avatāraśākamāma-mahāapiulya-sūtra) in bKa’gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2007, phal po che, ka, vol 35 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): || gang rnams bdag dang sangs rgyas dag || rang bzhin mnyam par rab gnas shing || mi gnas len pa med pa rnams || de dag bde bar gshegs par ’gyur || gzugs dang tshor ba’du shes dang || rnam par shes dang sms pa dag || drangs med de bzhin gshegs pa rnams || de dag thub pa chen por ’gyur || (430.14-431.18).

2058 Tōh 2591: Byang chub kyi sens bsgom pa (Bodhicittabhāvanā) in bsTan ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): || ji srid yid kyi g.yo ba de srid bsdud kyi yul te phra ba’i lam || g.yo dang mi g.yo thar snad mi gnas gnas pa la yang gnas par mi byed do snang med dbu ma’i lam de byang chub sens zhes bde gshegs gsungs || (814.02-814.05).

the case, moreover, when discriminative awareness and concentration are practicable, their production is not simply reducible to some subtle grasping at characteristics. That is similar to, for example, in a dream, when deep sleep becomes lighter it is not simply reducible to a reversal of fixation on appearance itself [in the dream], which is also subtle appearance. When there is total mastery over discriminative awareness and concentration, then, the experience or even consideration of the mind’s movement or its stillness is not something experienced beyond those two terms. [532] That being the case, it is called the "the middle-way path devoid of appearance" because both the experience in such a moment as that and the recognition of something like it after it ceases are have nothing to the two manifestations of sensations such as those; and something that can be conventionally labeled some such constructed object as this should be called ‘the middle-way path devoid of appearance.’ This very approach is also taught in the mTha’i mun sel sgron ma:

To what degree does the profoundly non-conceptual

Manifest as an object to awareness?

The experience of the profound non-conceptual,

Since it is experience, it not reality.

When there is no way to transmit to someone else the profound object of non-conceptuality, someone might question [whether or not it] is experienced by one’s own awareness. Yet even in that case, since it is experience it is simply

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2059 las su rung ba (RZSB 523.19) : kar manyam (Mvp 2103).
2060; Th 289.03; NTh 194.05.
2061 These lines in the seminal Mind Series text, IOL 594, sBas pa’i rgum chung. See Karmay 2007: 61, where he states that Rongzom names the source of this citation to be ITa ba rgum chung. Tracing the influence of this work and a relationship between it the Six Lamps of dPal dbyangs, Karmay states that Rongzom refers to the ITa ba rgum chung and the Man ngag rgum chung by replacing the term rgum chung with sgron ma; cf. ibid. 65-67, 74-75, 71-71 *(n. 61). Cf. Takahashi 2008: 415, 413 (n. 1764). Van schaik (2004) states: “Several lines from the sBas pa’i rgum chung, the Dunhuang text attributedto Buddhagupta, are found in two of six lamps (nos. 2 and 3 which have alternative titles also ending with rgum chung) as well as in the Zhus lan. Thus dPal dbyangs appears to have been incorporating into his own writings lines from a work he considered a statement or precept by an earlier figure in his teaching lineage, Buddhagupta” (192-193). This perhaps explains how Rongzom identifies lines from IOL 595, the sBas pa’i rgum chung, to one of dPal dbyangs’ Six Lamps. In qualification, van Schaik adds the caveat: “In theory, the incorporation could have been the other way around, as the Dunhuang manuscript may be no earlier than the end of the tenth century. But because the early evidence for the existence of a Buddhagupta involved in Mahayoga that we reviewed earlier is quite strong, it seems likely that this figure was an influence on the work of dPal dbyangs” (193. n. 79). Takahashi 2009 (4-5) describes the borrowing – and we shall not be able to improve upon her effort here, sadly.
2062 ji isam rtog nyed zab mo zhi (RZSB 533.05).
2063 Toh. 4448: mTha’i mun sel sgron ma in bsTan’gyur (dpe bsdur ma), 2005, sna tshogs, no-po, vol. 120 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): ji ltar rtog med zab mo zhi || blo yi yul de snang zhe na || mi rtog zab mo’i nyams myong ba || myong ba yin phyir de nyid min || (963.07-963.09).
something conceptual and thus should not be referred to as *perceiving the real*.

On this view, what is impossible for someone to transmit to another is all one’s own direct experiences [particularly] of actual reality. For example, while for the most part people and animals share in the experience of tasting salt there is nevertheless no means to transmit that experience to those who have never tasted it by saying ‘this is what the taste of salt is like.’ Similarly, though one has experienced the taste of concentration it is impossible to transmit it to others. What does not count as profound is something that is reducible to an idea. This approach is also taught somewhere else where it is proclaimed: "the path of bliss is divorced from sensation." It is said that unexcelled enlightenment is also divorced from sensation and has nothing to do with the intellectual domain. In Vimalakirti’s teaching, something similar is proclaimed:

Lord of Sages, in completely subduing the powerful host of demons, You attained supreme enlightenment - total peace, undying bliss - Wherin there is nothing of mental sensation or the intellectual domain of experience.

What is spoken of here is the point at which enlightenment was attained. In regards to the distinguishing feature [that is the] difference between perceiving the truth and this mind of the buddha, if it is also presented as a slight distinction between the proponents of the collection of eight consciousnesses and the proponents of a single consciousness is, to be brief, this: *perceiving the truth* is the reversal of the constantly occuring appearance qua concepts. Exhausting latent biases is the attanemnt of the state of enlightenment, though this is called "perceiving the truth." The term *perceiving no phenomena whatsoever* is an alternative name [for it].

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2064 Sogan Rinpoche (Golok Tulku Pema Lodoo) adds that there are two types of experience (nyams su myong ba): that of ordinary beings that is marked by sensation, etc., and the experience within the exalted knower (mkhyen pa) of a superior being who has overcome her foes (’phags pa dgra bcom pa).

2065 de ita na yang nyams su myong ba nyid kyi phyir rtog pa zhig du zad pas | bden pa mthong ba zhes mi bya’o (RZSB 533.08-533.09). Re bden pa mthong ba: see Karmay 2007: 111-112.

2066 ’di ltar rang gis myong ba gzhan la bstan par mi nus pa ni mngon sum kun gyi chos nyid yin te (RZSB 533.09-533.10). "According to Sogan Rinpoche, the point of the term kun here is emphasize that direct perception (mngon sum) is not something that can be transmitted; i.e. that "one cannot give any of their own directly perceived experiences to someone else."

2067 zab mo’i grangs su mi chud de rnam par rtog pa’ zhig du zad do (RZSB 533.14); alternatively, "... something that is simply conceptual."

2068 tshor bral bde ba’i lam (RZSB 533.15).

2069 thub dbang (RZSB 533.17): munindra, mahāmuni (Chandra 2001: 346c).

2070 Toh. 0176: ’Phags pa dri ma smed par grags pas bstan pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo (Vimalakirti-nirdesā-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra) in bKa’ gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2009, mdo sde, ma, vol. 60 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rīg pa’i dpe skrun khang): 11 thub dbang khyod kyis bsdug dpung stobs can rab btul nas | 11 byang chub mchog rab zhi ma mi ‘chi bde ba brnyes | (465.10-465.12).


2072 bag la nyal (RZSB 533.22): anusāya (Mvp 2136).
Just as it is said in Vimalakīrti’s teaching:

If even those who perceive the truth [5342073] have no perception of truth itself,
How can there be perception viewing falsities?2074

This is similar to the Sañcayagāthā, which states:

Sentient beings use words to say2075 they can see space; [and] Just how this space seen is a point that is imagined;
Similarly, seeing the dharma is also taught by the Tathāgata.2076

As above,2077 the concentration of those who perceive the truth has nothing to do with conception. Insofar as there emerges a nomenclature about there being no difference between [them] and the Tathāgatas, the term latent bias is nevertheless used in connection with conceptuality, the subtlety of which, one is simply unaware of; and should not be used in connection with what is resolutely (mi g.yo ba) conceptual from the bottom up.2078 The [Sanskrit] designation anuśāya is a name [that can be] connected to a water-dragon2079 that pursues the shadow of water-fowl. The so-called shadow is just name for a reflection; and the reflection exists in the depths of the ocean as the bird soars above it. As the sea-dragon pursues it, the bird remains unaware, which is termed anuśāya. In the context of the sūtras, the designation latent biases is used. In the context of abhidharma the term underlying defilements2080 is used. At the point in which the bird descends onto the surface of the water, the bird and its reflection coalesce; and when the bird becomes aware of the fact the sea-dragon is pursuing it, it rises up2081 [off the water into the sky], which is referred simply in terms of the [Sanskrit]

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2073 NTh 196.03; Th 291.04.
2074 Thō. 0176: ‘Phags pa dri ma med par grags pas bstan pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo (Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra) in bK’a’ gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2009, mdo sde, ma, vol. 60 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): bden pa mthong bas kyang bden pa nyid yang dag par rjes su ni mthong na brdzun lta ga la mthong | (568.14-568.16).
2075 rab du brjod pa (RZSB 534.02-534.03) : pravaharati.
2077 yong ni (RZSB 534.04). “This is the gloss given by KTD.
2078 rtog pa ’phra bas ma tshor ba tsam la bya’i । rtog pa gzhi nas mi g.yo ba la ni mi bya ste । (RZSB 534.07-534.08).
2079 chu srin (RZSB 534.08) : makara = sea-dragon (Mvp 4833), kumbhīra = aligator (Mvp 4835; cf. MW 293b), nakra = crocodile (Mvp 4836; cf. MW 524a). While the term chu srin could very well be rendered as crocodile or aligator, I have chosen “sea-dragon” precisely because Rz’s example references the ocean whereas crocodiles and aligators do not live in the ocean. Images of ‘sea-dragons’ are found, for example, in thang ka paintings, where they might dwell in a pure land and thus represent something auspicious. My thanks to Tashi Lama for this information.
2081 kun nas ldang ba (RZSB 534.14) : paryutthāna (Mvp 814, 2137).
Conceptuality, in fact, is subtle and course movement corresponding to experience of which we are aware and unaware and which are labeled in terms of the constantly occurring and latent. Neither waver from the [conceptual] basis. This system is also taught in the sūtras - [for example] in the Sāgaramatiparipṛcchā, which states:

Considered from a distance, Sāgaramati, an immense body of water appears to be utterly still. Yet, upon arriving at its edge, [one sees] it is not still. Similarly, that which appears to be the utterly still concentration of the bodhisattvas is not seen to be still in the when viewed through the eye of a Tathāgata’s gnosis.

It is said, moreover, the nature of obscurations to omniscience, themselves, are such that [even] at the point of the attainment of a still mind during in meditative equipoise, one is unaware of the presence of subtle conceptuality. Here, it is said:

What are the bodhisattva’s obscurations to omniscience?
It is that a still mind is not itself suchness.

It is like fast-moving water that appears still from a distance but not so upon [535] approach. That is proclaimed to be the supremely subtle core of conceptuality. This is also said:

Bodhisattvas of the ten grounds see the nature of the Tathāgata, yet they do not see it properly because [that vision] is generated through the power of the concentration of courageous progress, which is a perception that differentiates.

This seeing and not seeing the nature of the Tathāgata, moreover, only pertains to the power connected to the nature of non-conceptual gnosis. "Seeing the nature of the Tathāgata by means of pure worldly gnosis" is not imputed even conventionally. This is similar to what is stated in the Mahāparinirvāṇa:

Śrāvakas, being predominantly [engaged in] śamatha and less so with vipaśyanā, do not see the nature of the Tathāgata. Bodhisattvas, being predominantly [engaged in] vipaśyanā and less so with śamatha, do not see the nature of the Tathāgata properly. Tathāgatas, being [engaged in] the

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2082 Reading pa byud tha na (Th 292.04; NTh 197.02) rather than pha byung tha na (RZSB 534.13).
2083 sems gnas pa (RZSB 534.21) : cittasthiti (Mvp 561).
2084 Reading ma tshor ba (Th 293.03; NTh 197.03) rather than mtshor ba (534.22).
2085 NTh 197.06; Th 293.04.
2086 gnas pa’i bceu’i byang chub sems dpa’ rnams kyis (RZSB 535.02).
2087 dpa’ bar ’gro ba’i ting nge ’dzin (RZSB 535.04-535.05) : sūraṅgamasamādhi (Mvp 506). Note there is a sūtra by this name: Śūraṅgamasamādhi-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra ; dPa’ bar ’gro ba’i ting nge ’dzin zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo (Toh. 0132, P800).
2088 Reading tha snyad du’ang (NTh 198.03) rather than tha snyad su’ang (RZSB 535.07; Th 294.01).
Therefore, in the system of guhyamantra it is said:

Except for recognizing appearance qua conception as actual reality, meditations on the still [or] unborn [mind], which are referred to as presentations of mental stillness [or] non-conceptuality, are simply reducible to fixation on conceptuality making it impossible to penetrate the non-conceptual sphere as long as one is not awakened (sangs ma rgyas bar du).

That being the case, this presentation of the extent to which the mind has arrived at [meditative] experience boils down to a setting forth a temporary measure connected to the simple reversal of the continuous occurrence of appearance qua conception. The state of being aware of the reversal of fixation on appearance qua conception is the attainment of the warmth of bodhicitta.

§ 5.10. now a bit of instruction concerning the sign of warmth (535.18-536.11)  
In Byang chub kyi sens bsgom pa this is said:

The unagitated recognition of equality consisting in no deliberate effort [and] no so-called mental application;  
No attachment to anything [and] no excitement [or] anxiety concerned with objects, without separation or remaining;  
The four unagitated recognitions of the classes [of discordant phenomena] and the paramitas.

In accordance with the teaching above, practice, cultivation, and signs such as these emerge; and when they arise, through concentration - at that time, too - then through the force of not fixating [on them] as objects, whatever images of objects arise, regardless of appearing attractive [5362093], they are not generating an attached and impassioned mind. Even though appearing attractive, there is no generation of an anxious or antipathetic mind. That even [things] appearing as things through the force of direct perception are not perceived and do not

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2089 Cf. Tōh. 0119: 'Phags pa yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa chen po'i mdo (Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra) in bKa’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, mdo sde, nya, vol. 52 (Beijing: Krong go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): gzhan yang u zhes bya ba ni de bzhin gshegs pa’i rang bzhin nyan thos dang rang stats rgyas thams cad kyis sngon ma thos pa (294.16-29418).

2090 *See BGB, BSG: 301.01 (W21519-5).

2091 *Cf. STMG 473.05.


2093 NTh 199.05; Th 295.05.
become delusions by means of direct perception, even though divorced and abiding awareness are not being generated, it is a sign of cultivating bodhicitta. Furthermore, though everything is subsumed within dharma perspectives connected to paths and fruits and the pāramitas [and] indeed within great gnosis, when awareness emerges that is nothing other than the realization of the non-duality of dharmas, at that time, there is attainment of the signs of cultivating bodhicitta. When realized in this way, there is no need for training on a multitude of paths and therefore the unmistaken path is the realization of the nature of one's own mind just-as-it-is alone - and the cultivation of that realization. Thus, it is stated "there is no luminosity through meditation on other than this meditation on the mental sphere" as well as "meditation on Vajrasattva pertains to an unmistaken practice of all paths."

§ 5.11. now, just a little explanation concerning the qualities of bodhicitta (536.11-450.06)

In the systems of the lower vehicles, at first the generation of the aspirational mind is by means of the force of the disposition [for compassion] and a spiritual guide [and ] one is moved to loving-concern through the force of great compassion because of all sentient beings' [deluded] apprehension of 'I' and 'mine' such that positive qualities are perfected and aspirations are accomplished spontaneously in deeds in which the dharmakāya obtained; because of being a collection of qualities it is called "the body of qualities" (dharmakāya) and it is due to that [body of qualities] the unceasing deeds of the two types of rupakāya emerge.

In some systems of guhyamantra, an effect emerges that is exactly like the cause and thus, from the very outset (dang po nyid nas), the power of great compassion rises; and after the deeds of a buddha are practiced, the two types of rupakāya are cultivated such that by means of activities that benefit of sentient beings and those that delight the Tathāgata, one engages in the accumulation of merit; and from unmistaken meditation upon the dharmadhūtu, it is asserted there is the buddhahood qua qualified by the three resultant buddha-bodies. For that

2094 Toh 2591: Byang chub kyi sms brsg pa (Bodhicittabhāvanā) in bsTan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang); sms kyi dbyings su goms pas lam 'di gzhvan du bsrgoms pas 'od gsal mi 'gyur ro | (815.02-815.04). Also see BGB BSG: 301.04 (W21519-5), which agrees with RZSB.
2095 smon sms (RZSB 536.12) : pranidhicitta.
2096 Sogan Rinpoche identifies the "lineage" (rigs) here as snying rje chen po'i rigs. Cf. dKon cog 'gre: de yang thun mong da grags pa ni rigs dang bshes guyen gyi slob la bhrten nas | shes rab dang snying rje rgyud la bskyed pa ni byang chub kyi sms bskyed zhes 'dod de | 'dir ni ye nas yin pa'i don gsal bar byed pa | rkyen tsem du do de | de'i phyir ye nas sangs rgyas pa'i sms zhe smos pa yin no | (124.01-124.04); cf. Wangchuk 2007: 41 n. 89.
2097 bshes guyen (RZSB 536.12-536.13) : kalyānamitra.
2098 dkar po'i chos (RZSB 536.14) : śukladharma (Mvp 1117).
2099 rgyu ji la ba bszhin du 'bras bu 'byung ba (RZSB 536.17-536.18).
reason, if the qualities of bodhicitta are not explained we come to the point [where it is] rejected.

In that regard, the explanations given in terms of cause and effect found in the lower vehicles [5372100] are not in conflict with explanations concerning the causes of fictive appearance because illusory appearances result from illusory causal illusory appearances.2101 Nevertheless, though appearance of objects to sentient beings are not something to rely upon - they are also not precluded in the system of the Great Perfection;2102 and it is through the inconceivable power of [its] ocean of methods (thabs), the ocean of appearances comes to be. Even so, all the qualities of a buddha emerge without effort from the power of bodhicitta and, moreover, the power of [its] nature and manifestation. Even in the Khyung chen it states:

Immediatley upon bodhicitta,
A great ocean of concentration emerges;
Appearance, like a great ocean - non-conceptual,
Vast and open, (yangs) like the limits of space.2103

On this view, immediately upon realizing the significance connected to awakening essence2104 all the qualities of greatness as well - dhāraṇī, concentration, power, uniqueness, etc. - emerge as blessings that are unwavering, like a great ocean. For trainees, even appearances emerge without effort like the ocean; yet non-conceptual and pervasive like the limits of space - thus vast and open. This system itself is also proclaimed in the rDo rje sens dpa’ nam mkha’ che:

Great miracles are not something difficult [for those who have realized bodhicitta2105]
Through the subtlety of its realization
All their qualities and strengths
Naturally occur.2106

Such a teaching is similar to that [above]. The insistence upon an utter absence of effort [eliciting] the result is also taught in sūtras of definitive meaning. It is

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2100 NTh 201.03; Th 297.05.
2101 rgyu rkyen sgYu ma las ’bras bu sgYu mar snang ba ’groB pa’i phyir ro l (RZSB 537.02).
2102 rdzogs pa chen po’i tshul la de dag bkag pa’ang myed de l (RZSB 537.04); cf. Wangchuk 2007: 41 n. 91.
2103 Töh 2591: Byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa (Bodhicittabhāvanā) in bsTan ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krun gO’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): l byang chub snyin por de ma thag l l ting ’dzin rgyal po chen po ’byung l l snang ba rgya mtsho chen po bzhi’ n l l mi rtog nam mkha’i mkha’ ltar yangs l (66.13-66.15). NGB reads nam mkha’i mkha’ ltar yangs (W21518-1757: 422.05).
2104 byang chub kyi snying po’i don rtogs ma thag du (RZSB 537.09).
2105 As per Sogan Rinpoche.
2106 Töh 2591: Byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa (Bodhicittabhāvanā) in bsTan ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krun gO’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): l cho ’phrul chen po dka’ ba min l l yon tan kun dan ssslobs kyi rnams l l ji bzhi’ rtogs pa phra ba yis l l de ma thag tu rang las ’byung l (79.01-79.02).
stated:

If this is realized through that which is the unexcelled great secret (bla myed gsang chend)
It is the effortless result; and thus primordial perfection (sangs rgyas).

Such a proclamation is consonant with [that given above]. In that very text [we also find] the great compassion which acts for the benefit of migrators; it says:

Taking hold of the non-conceptual, the equality qua dharmakāya
Is similar to a moon [reflected] in water - ungrasped (mi zin);
The play of Samantabhadra
Teaches language (a li ka li) in depth (zab du bstan).\textsuperscript{2107}

The nature of the dharmakāya is non-conceptual and a state of equality. Thus, like space, it is all-pervasive. All the buddhas' emanations, as well, which do not waver from that [state], are not non-existent (myed pa ma yin) because [Samantabhadra's] play is similar to the play of illusion and is thus said to be taken hold of ungrasped (gzung bas mi zin), like a moon in [reflected] in water. It is through such a nature as that that all migrators are set in the ornament of Samantabhadra \[538.01\textsuperscript{2108}] and through the profound practice of method and discriminative awareness [they] are set in liberation. Thus (pas), the statement:\textsuperscript{2109}

The play of Samantabhadra
Teaches language (a li ka li) in depth (zab du bstan).\textsuperscript{2110}

A li ka li, here, signify\textsuperscript{2111} Samantabhadra, Samantabhadrī, and [their] nonduality through which the illusory world is purified and acts of training are pointed out. In that connection, short-a (a) signifies that everything is unborn. Long-a (ā) signifies the continuous practice of compassionate deeds. Short-ka (ka) signifies the instrument [of doing] because great gnosis has a command over everything. Long-ka (kā?) signifies acts that move a migrator from one state to another.\textsuperscript{2112} La [corresponds to the Sanskrit] layati\textsuperscript{2113} phri na [?], which signifies holding and grasping (len cing 'dzin pa). When the vowel marking the 'i' sound (gu gu) is explained elsewhere in the context of its shape, it is said that the 'i' is

\textsuperscript{2107} Toh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayāḥ-rājāḥ) in bKa’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): \textlq; rtog med mnyam ngyid nos kyi sku \textrdq; 1 \textlq; kun du bzang bas mi zin chu zla’ dra’ \textrdq; 1 kun du bzang po’i ol pa yis 1 \textlq; a li ka li zab tu bstan \textrdq; 1 (80.03-80.05).
\textsuperscript{2108} NTh 202.05; Th 299.05.
\textsuperscript{2109} Cf. STMG 27.04-27.05.
\textsuperscript{2110} Toh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayāḥ-rājāḥ) in bKa’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): \textlq; kun du bzang po’i ol pa yis 1 \textrdq; a li ka li zab tu bstan 1 (80.04-80.05).
\textsuperscript{2111} Compare the passage in dKon cog ‘grel at RZSB 1.187.09-187.15.
\textsuperscript{2112} ‘gro ba gnas nas gnas su bskyod par mdzad pa’i don (RZSB 538.07).
\textsuperscript{2113} See MW 903b s.v. laya.

\textsuperscript{2113}
like an elephant's trunk (glang po che'i sna) and to signify that great compassion cradles, rather than casting away, migrators. In the context of [grammatical] terms, 'i' marks the [Sanskrit feminine called] strilinga\(^{2114}\) is signifies the dhāraṇī of discriminating awareness that apprehends of all phenomena. When its affixation to 'la' is explained, it signifies mastery over the deeds of profound method and discriminative insight. Therefore, in regards to teaching the system of how the meaning is constructed is said:\(^{2115}\)

- That is a adorned by ta,
- Pa is an attribute, like an elaboration;\(^{2116}\)
- In the whole domain of worldly experience,
- The profound teaching of the Buddha arose.\(^{2117}\)

In that context, a is long-a (ā) an signifies the unceasing practice of the deeds of great compassion. The the adorning of ta pertains to the deeds practiced; the adornment itself [refers to] the unwavering state within which discriminative awareness is purified and elaborations are absent. Ta is the nature of discriminative awareness formed of a moon maṇḍala. Pa is the work of liberating all sentient beings within those two [i.e. compassion and discriminative awareness] such they are, moreover, not outside; and while this alone is the common practice for beings wandering within conditioned existence, for those with a lot of postive karmic residues (las 'phro dang skal par ldan pa rnams), moreover, there is, depending on one's capacity, appearance as a refuge; and for those [karmically] unfortunate beings, it does not even appear [538.19]. If it does not appear that way, however, the nature of method and discriminative awareness, like the growth of a branch, pervades the common [ones, stems from them] and thus it is stated:\(^{2118}\)

- Pa is an attribute, like an elaboration;
- In the whole domain of worldly experience,
- The profound teaching of the Buddha arose.\(^{2119}\)

*Khyung chen,* as well, states:\(^{2120}\)

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\(^{2114}\) sgra'i sgo nas i stri ling ga zhes bya ste (RZSB 538.10).
\(^{2115}\) See Wilkinson; cf. STMG 27.04-27.05.
\(^{2116}\) yan lag spros pa bzhin (RZSB 538.13); alternatively, "like the growth of a branch."
\(^{2117}\) Toh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sms kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsānti-bodhicitta-kulayā-rajā) in bKa’ ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): ‘di ni a dang mrdzas pa’i ta || pu dang yan lag spros pa bzhin || ‘jig rten yongs kyi spyod yul la || sangs rgyas gsung gi zab mo ’byung || (80.05-80.07).
\(^{2118}\) rDo rje sms dpa’ nam mkha che, a.k.a. Mi nub rgyal mtshan.
\(^{2119}\) Toh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sms kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsānti-bodhicitta-kulayā-rajā) in bKa’ ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): ’pa dang yan lag spros pa bzhin || ’jig rten yongs kyi spyod yul la || sangs rgyas gsung gi zab mo ’byung || (80.06-80.07).
\(^{2120}\) *Cf. NGB Khyung chen, 421.03-421.05, where the lines read: brtags na med la gzhan na sna tshogs ’byung ba’i legs pa che || dngos su mi snang chags pa’i cha lugs kun la ston || bdag dang gzhan du bral*
Bodhicitta is not found when sought; if settled, it will arise properly; it does not appear in direct perception; its occurrence totally fulfills all, regardless of comportment; Free of fixation on self or other, it is a precious treasury that shows the way; It is not an object that accomplishes all; it is taught as selflessness and compassion.

There are statements such things as: "Attachment comes from being an object causes attachment and [in the case of bodhicitta] there is no observed object to set one's mind on." So, bodhicitta is not a manifesting object, though it is the fulfillment of all and wants. It doesn't take to mind self and other, it works perfectly for their benefit. It is not an object to be accomplished, though it arises of selfless compassion. The mind of compassion that forms for the benefit of sentient beings, though it is divorced from any object that one sets one's mind to - this is selfness compassion! In the Ita ba rin po chen sgron ma, it is stated:

Insight devoid of an object is also unsullied by the dust of attachment; It is through compassion that sentient beings do not grieve in the conditioned realms.

And something similar to that is proclaimed in the Thabs dang shes rab gsal ba’i sgron ma:

If it is recognize that sentient beings and buddhas comprise a unified reality -
That one’s own mind itself is primordially perfected -
There is nothing else at all to be accomplished;
Therefore, there is indeed nothing to be rejected.

After recognizing just such a dharma as that,
Compassion emerges for those who don’t understand;
Once compassion is generated, it is by means of illusory concentration
That any and all beneficial methods of practice are disclosed.

\[ ba’i ston mkhan rin chen mdzod || thams cad grub pa’i yul zhes bdag med snyin rjes bstan (W21518-1757-424-430: 421.03-421.04) \]
\[ NT 204.04; Th 301.05. \]
\[ Th. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahdsanti-bodhicitta-kulayaḥ-rāja) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): \]
\[ brtags na med la bzhag na legs pa ’byung ba che || dmogs su mi snang chags pa’i cha luugs kun la ston || bdag dang gzhan du bral ba’i ston mkhan rin chen mdzod || thams cad grub pa’i yul zhes bdag med snying rjes bstan || (65.11.65.14). \]
\[ The text differs: yul phyir chags shing yul la bsngo ba’i dmigs pa med (W21518-1757, p. 421.05). \]
\[ Cf. Takahashi 2008: 426, 429. \]
\[ Th. 4451: Ita ba rin chen sgron ma bsTan ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma), 2005, sna tshogs, no-po, vol. 120 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): \]
\[ shes rab gnas med chags pa’i rdul bral yang || snying rne sens can kham la skyo ba med || (972.02-972.03). \]
\[ Cf. Takahashi 2008: 130, 418. \]
In short, the non-dual realization of state of equality of phenomena thus does not become minor compassion; rather it become like [that of] the buddhas and bodhisattvas. Compassion due to the realist theories of reality does not become great compassion; but rather become like [that of] the Śrāvakas and ordinary beings.

In the systems of the higher vehicles, it is said that through the power of aspirations and meditation, the qualities of the *rupakāya* come to emerge; and not only that, but the power of non-dual *bodhicitta* is not something that simply boils down to the force of [good] karma. Indeed, it is stated in the *Khyung chen*:

> What is taught and the buddha are brought to mind and appear
> Not unlike the images of an illusionist;
> The fluctuating [perturbations of mind] are something that have obscured the gnosis [Which is the source] from which [the qualities of the *rupakāya*, etc.] emerge.

It is from the power of calling to mind the doctrinal discourses of the sublime dharma and the power of the buddha that the appearances of the qualities of greatness indeed emerge. Take, for example, the appearance of an illusion that is an image of something non-existent: while the basis of the image has no status or physical scale (*mthon dman*) [5402130], appearances as physical scale, like what appears under the influence of some obfuscatory condition, is an obscuration marked by observed objects and the fluctuating conceptions. Thus, appearances akin to images of qualities emerge. Yet, they are not the qualities that consist in the nature of *bodhicitta*. More need not be said here except that in the Great Perfection approach, there are no qualities connected to awakening, no flaws or imperfections that are not already perfect.

Here ends the fifth chapter explaining the writings of the Great Perfection.

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2127 Tōh. 4449: *Thabs shes sgron ma* in bsTan ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma), 2005, sna tshogs, no-po, vol. 120 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): | *sems can sangs rgyas bden par tshul gcig cing* | | *rang gi sens nyid* [966] *sangs rgyas yin shes na* | | *gzhon nas bsgrub par bya ba ci yang med* | | *de lta ba sbrang bar bya ba’ang med* | | *’di lta bu yi chos kyi tshul rig na* | | *ma rig rnuams la snying rje yongs kyis skye* | | *snying rje skyes nas sgyu ma’i ting dzin gyis* | | *phan ’dogs thabs kyi spyod pa cir yang ston* | | (965.20-966.04).

2128 Cf. NGB *Khyung chen* 422.02-422.03.

2129 Tōh. 0828: *Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po* (Sarva-dharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayāḥ-rāja) in bKa’ ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): | *gsung dang rgyas dang dmigs dang snang* | | *sgyu mkhan ri mo’i rnam pa bzhi’* | | *‘byung ’jug ye shes rmugs pa yi* | | *de yi dbang las skye bar ’gyur* | | (66.06-66.08).

2130 NTh 206.021; Th 303.05.
§ chapter six: giving instruction on paths encountered through methods connected to effort for those unable to remain in a natural state according to the approach of the great perfection (540.07-554.07)\textsuperscript{2131}

The view of great perfection should be embraced because the great bliss of bodhicitta is the basis of the dharma that functions to alleviate all the maladies connected to the bondage [of conditioned existence]. Like it is stated in the \textit{Bodhicittabhāvana}:\textsuperscript{2132}

\begin{quote}
Any virtuous dharma possible that is not encompassed by Samantabhadrī,
Even the practice of Samantabhadra, is the work of Māra (the deceiver) and thus diminishes in the end;
Actions that accompany it are indeed the work of Māra, though proclaimed to be the practice of a bodhisattva.
\end{quote}

§ 6.1: doors to Great Perfection (540.09)

As to that, even methods to improve the mind in the pāramitā and guhyamantra vehicles appear as many doors [to the path of Great Perfection,] because, on this view, what is called a path to liberation emerges that pertains to relinquishing the five faults and removing the ten obscurations to concentration; one also emerges associated with the dharmās of the psycho-physical aggregates, the constituents,\textsuperscript{2133} and the bases.\textsuperscript{2134} There, what is called a path to liberation emerges in terms of the concentration that overcomes grasping, imagination, negation and differentiation; the path to liberation also emerges in terms of the six qualities of disciplined recitation and meditative absorption for the mind that is

\textsuperscript{2131} da ni rdzogs pa’i tshul la ji lta ba bzhin du gnas par mi nus opa rnams la \mid rtso l ba dang bcas pa’i thabs kyis lam btsal ba bstan par bya (RZSB 540.07-540.08).
\textsuperscript{2132} Cf. STMG 455.04-455.06.
\textsuperscript{2133} khams (RZSB 540.17) : dhātu.
\textsuperscript{2134} skye mched (RZSB 540.18) : āyatanam.
naturally difficult to tame;\(^{2135}\) and a *path to liberation* also emerges in terms of concentration that observes the triune mind, body, and divinity. While these are several of the methods taught for improving the mind, all cannot be seen and taught [here]; these are only partially explained here [for a thorough, exhaustive explanation would go beyond the scope of the present effort]. These doors are teachings that are accessed due to the force of people's convictions [and] arise individually; [and] while mutually \[^{541.01}\]\(^{2136}\) advantageous, their emergence is thus only briefly described here.

§ 6.2 Six faults connected to concentration (541.01)

There are six faults associated with meditative absorption\(^{2137}\) [the first three of which are:] distration due to sensation, torpor due to laxity and lethargy, and solidity due to endurance. These pertain as the inability to practice śamatha.

With regard to the first two [we might consider], for example, a lamp: if buffeted by an external wind its does not [become increasingly] brighter. Regardless of whether the causal continuum of wind ceases, the lamp is nevertheless going to meet its end [eventually]. Likewise, a state of mind becomes distracted while fanned by various karmic processes; and regardless of whether the karmic processes causal continuum ceases, that very mind will meet its end; thus, its own processes are not negated given the cessation of [some] other process.

The third - [the perception of reality's] solidity - is qualified by previous recollections, subsequent to which it constantly flows like, for example, [a stream of] water drops that, here, are observed by the mind as a one [solid stream of water].

§ 6.3 Conceptuality

[The fourth, fifth, and sixth faults connected to meditative absorption are given in terms of] three obscurations to Insight meditation (*vipaśyāna* : lhag mthong). What is termed *blockage*, and is due to an obsessive mind,\(^{2138}\) is the blocking of liberation such that it - because of having no discriminative awareness that realizes selflessness, and because of constantly having an obsessive mind with regard to any appearing object connected to meditative absorption - is obscured.

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\(^{2135}\) Re chos drug: see Almogi 2009: *271 (n. 94), 395 s.v. bde ba'i chos drug.* *When asked about this phrase, Khenpo Terchok Gyalsten of Thupten Choling Monastery, referenced the collected works of Dzokchen Patrul Rinpoche, a nineteenth century figure.*

\(^{2136}\) Th 305.06; NTh 207.06.

\(^{2137}\) bsam gtan (RZSB 541.01) : dhyāna, which is here divided into śamatha : zhi gnas & vipaśyāna (lhag mthong), the latter of which is touched on below.

\(^{2138}\) ’dzin chags dbang gis ’gog pa (RZSB 541.11-541.12).
What is termed corruption, and is due to existence and non-existence, corrupts gnosis in the sense of veiling it because of being ignorant of interdependent origination to the degree that whatever one considers one falls into extremes of existence and non-existence [in considering it]. What is termed confusion, and is due to the narrow scope of conscious awareness, happens because of the narrow scope of [any] discriminative awareness connected to what is heard and considered. Consequently, any object of meditative absorption that is accessed is not penetrated. Like a bird that is afraid of the dark and is thereby obscured, the mind is confused and bewildered. While these are obscurations in actuality, they interfere with the production of śamatha and vipaśyāna and thus called the six faults connected to meditative absorption because of being greater faults and imperfections. Only the imperfections connected to conceptual distraction, moreover, are taught [as] the five faults. Here, it is stated:

The mountain of course conception,
Charactertic marks, animation,2141 sensation,
And awareness of occurence are the five faults that to be gotten rid of.
Conceptions are two-fold: course and subtle,
Characteristic marks are two-fold: greater or lesser;
Animation is two-fold: enduring and brief;
Likewise, sensations are manifest or not;
Sensation is also given as two:
Fleeting and drawn-out.2142

These are also similar to instances of realization [542.022143], categorized in terms of instances of coarse and subtle and instances of aspect. Instances of aspect are those described in terms of conception that is the differentiation seeking an objective entity; characteristic marks refer to differentiation through fixation and grasping; animation describes continual differentiation; sensation refers to experiential differentiation; and awareness of occurrence refers to differentiation through fluctuation; and coarse and subtle refer to structure2144 and instance [respectively].

2139 shes rgya chung pas ‘khor ba (RZSB 541.16). Reading rgya chung bas (NTh 209.01) rather than rgya chungs bas (RZSB 541.16; Th 307.02).
2140 Cf. STMG 231.02-231.03, where the source of citation is identified as rNam bkod, which is perhaps an alternative name for Buddhaguhya’s Lam rnam bkod kyi ṭikka.
2142 Toh. 0831: De bzhin gshegs pa thams cad kyi thugs gsang ba’i ye shes don gyi snying po kho lo rdo rje’i rigs kun ‘dus rig pa’i mdo rnal ’byor grub pa’i rgyud zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo (Sarva-tathāgata-citta-guhyā-jñāna-artha-garbha-khrodha-cakra-kula-tantra-pindikārtha-vidyā-yoja-nāma-māhāyāna-sūtra) in bKa’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rying rgyud, kha, vol. 102 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): \[ rto g pa’i skyon inga spang bar bya || rto g pa’i ri bo dang || mthshan ma rgyu ba tshor ba dang || byung tshor skyon inna bsal bar bya || rto g pa layang gnyis yod de \[ || rags dang phra bar snang ba yin || de bzhin mthshan ma che chung gnyis || rgyu ba rling po thung ngu gnyis || de bzhin tshor ba gsal mi gsal || byung thor gnyis su snang ba yang || mnyur ba dang ni bul ba’o \] (61.09-60.13).
2143 Th 308.01; NTh 209.05.
2144 Reading go rim (NTh 209.06) rather than go rims (RZSB 542.04; Th 308.03).
To sum up, subtlety pertains to two types: subtle production and subtle grasping; the coarse, as well, pertains to two types: coarse production and coarse grasping. The awareness of scholars [is marked by] subtle grasping within coarse production. Coarse production suggests all knowables are conceived and disclosed while subtle grasping suggests an absence of fixation on their entities or characteristic marks. The awareness of fools [is marked by] coarse grasping within subtle production, which is to say: in subtle production, all knowables are unable to be conceived and disclosed; while in coarse grasping, there is no avoiding grasping at or fixation upon entities. That being the case, at the point of non-conceptual meditation, a mind connected to coarse grasping within subtle production does not pertain to a path of liberation because of conducing to state within which there is absorption devoid of discrimination, thus obscuring the path.

Therefore, at first one becomes familiar with a mind marked by subtle grasping within coarse production and production itself is made increasingly subtle through the power of subtle grasping, after which one finally is divorced from these five types of conception. [Then] when the mind’s self-awareness is unceasing it is called "seeing the real" (bden pa mthong ba : "satyanāraṇa"). When there is a gradual coming into awareness of pacification of these [conceptions] by means of conceptions grasping at objects and by means of conceptions grasping at the grasping at objects, one will seize upon the attainment of mental warmth; at the point at which one is aware of subtle production that is unaware of subtle grasping the will be no grasping the warmth of the path.

§ 6.4 nine obscurations connected to the path (542.18)

That [touches] upon the nine path obscurations [which I will describe here in terms of] three [points] - unwavering meditative absorption, the integrated path, and the manifestation - that are hindrances to proper effort. Here, [immovable meditative absorption] does not cast off a preceding path; regardless of being unwavering, there is no effort to attain another path, not unlike a baby sparrow who remains in the nest.

Similarly, even on the integrated path there is no [such] effort - like an arrow that has disappeared [into its] target. Even

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2146 sems kyi drod thob par gzung ngo (RZSB 542.17).
2147 Three types of obscurations - great, middling, and lesser - each with great, middling, and lesser divisions totalling nine obscurations.
2148 Reading lam thim pa (Th 309.05; NTh 210.06) rather than lam thib pa (RZSB 542.19).
2149 yang dag pa’i rtsol ba (RZSB 542.19-542.20) : samyagvyāyāma.
2150 tshang na gnas pa’i byi’u phrug lta bu (RZSB 542.21).
2151 ‘ben thim pa’i mda’ lta bu’o (RZSB 542.22); I have rendered this phrase in accordance with Sogan Rinpoche’s reading though it might also suggests such notions as an arrow whose target has disappeared.
being utterly manifest is effortless - like the faculty of awareness holding a manifest object.2152

The desire to generate many thoughts within the ordinary mind, the desire to attain clairvoyance, and the desire to issue forth the miraculous2154 marks [of a buddha], hinder proper concentration.2155 Take, for example, when a householder who desires pure butter and from his reliance upon dairy cows becomes fond of milk and yogurt and thereby hinders [his ability to enjoy] pure butter.

From here [we consider] three [things] - thinking "I have attained the dharma that is unsurpassable [--- others are below me]," being puffed up with pride over one’s theory, and being contemptuous of other’s theories - that are hinder proper mindfulness.2157 Here, proper mindfulness concerns not forgetting the meaning of definitive śūtras and hewing to the council given by spiritual guides. For when obscurations are present, these are neglected.2158 This is akin to, for example, the wild, rowdy children of a king or minister who do not apply their minds to the advice of holy beings. The tenth [obscuration] is natural obscuration. The ten types of practice2159 mutually obscure one another like flat wooden planks all lined up in a row. Thus, the point is said to be this: those who abide in the great objectives such as meditative absorption and so forth, do not practice the lesser objectives such as being a scribe. It is proclaimed that through these points, one enters the path to liberation by getting rid of all the obscurations and defects connected to meditative absorption.

§ 6.5 the eight-fold concentration that relinquishes the five faults (543.14)

Q. What is the concentration marked by the eight factors that relinquish the five faults?2161

The five faults are laziness,2162 forgetting the object of meditation,2163 slackness and excitement,2164 non-application,2165 and [over-]application.2166

2152 That is, it does not take effort to see what is obviously in front of one’s eyes.
2153 Th 310.02; NTh 211.02.
2154 rdzu ’phrul (RZSB 542.24) : rddhi.
2155 yan dag pa’i ting nge ’dzin (RZSB 543.01) : samyaksamādhi.
2156 ’di ’las bla ’na myed pa’i chos thob bo snyam pa (RZSB 543.03-543.04).
2157 yang dag pa’i dran pa (RZSB 543.06) : samyaksmṛti.
2158 yal bar ’dor te (RZSB 543.08).
2159 chos spyon rum bcu (543.10). This phrase is found in the Madhyāntavibhāga. TDCM gives the ten as copying the doctrinal discourse literature, making offerings, practicing generosity, listening to dharma teachings, upholding the dharma, reading the dharma, explaining the dharma, reciting the dharma, contemplating the meaning of the dharma, and meditating upon the meaning of the dharma (gsung rag kyi yi ge’ bri ba dang | mchod pa’i bal ba | sbyin pa gdong ba | chos nyan pa’i ’dzin pa | klog pa’i ’chad pa | kha ton du bya ba | chos kyi don sems pa | chos kyi don sgom pa bcas bcu’ o 840a).
Laziness concerns not listening and a lack of engagement with religious injunctions. Forgetting the object of meditation concerns the weakening of deliberation such that does not remember the dharma they have heard and studied. Slackness and excitement concern the conditions that do not allow for awareness to cultivate its object of meditation. Non-application and over-application both create obstacles to merging śamatha and vipaśyanā.

Among the eight factors that relinquish the five faults, four-faith, aspiration, effort, and pliancy - do away with laziness. Through mindfulness, one does not forget the object of meditation. Through introspection, one is rid of slackness and excitement. If there is excessive non-application, intention fortifies the mind. Equanimity suppresses excessive over-application. Thereafter, when śamatha and vipaśyanā are in equilibrium, no effort is made to apply a superfluous antidote. Settling into a relaxed equanimity, then, creates familiarity with the object of meditation. In this system, this is the so-called "path to liberation."

Q. What is the concentration that overcomes grasping, imagination, negation and differentiation?

Here, it is stated:

Even after seizing this greedy monkey, a theiving cat fabricates the imagined; After razing each and every bit of an empty house, All the cracks and crevices and windows are closed;
Yet if the royal storehouse is open,
They are forever awake.

In this context, the greedy monkey who seizes refers to the psycho-physical aggregates, elements, and sense fields of phenomena that seize on whatever can be seized on; because, in this way, mental consciousness not unlike a greedy monkey. [It is] yet unable to assess the precise point of a viable object; and given an object that is not viable, it will absorb itself into it without any dissent. This [consciousness,] which is always wandering aimlessly, is put into the container of introspection and mindfulness such that it is perforce (dgos) confined [therein and] not shifting somewhere else.

Similarly, there is the thieving cat who is the designator designating whatever can be designated. A cat, for example, acting with ease and subtlety (dal zhog 'jam pa'i spyod pas), steals away another creature's life without the other being aware. Similarly, the afflicted mind, through its subtle movements, is internalized unto an egoic intention under whose influence mental awareness is, furthermore, generated concomitant with a realist view [of reality] and everything is transformed through its power "blessed," as it were] into something defiled by it. That being the case, if this is not labelled by means of being retained in the insight that realizes the selflessness of all phenomena, the opportunity for liberation will never be disclosed. Here, the practice pertains to vipaśyanā. The aforementioned practice pertains to śamatha.

The [notion of] every bit of an empty house razed pertains to the [ontologically?] razed empty village that is the psycho-physical aggregates and the sense fields. These are all empty villages devoid of residents; and because of being something razed insofar as its own entity is unreal, there is also no empty village per se, which should be understood to be like space. This, too, is the practice of vipaśyanā.

The phrase cracks and crevices and windows being closed references the five types of sensory awareness [operative] when the mind’s power to internally consolidate those objects that come before it as natural distractions ceases and they do not scatter [the mind]. This, too, is the practice of śamatha.

The royal storehouse being open is a phrase (zhes bya ba ni) used for those schooled in the character of the fundamental consciousness. For example, there are such things as precious jewels, even priceless things, in a royal storehouse; yet there are baser substances, too - poison and the like. In a similar way, the fundamental consciousness is the storehouse of all contaminated and uncontaminated phenomena such that it is the source of everything knowable. On that point, however, according to the explanations given in the lower vehicle systems, because the reality (mtshan nyid) of the basis-of-all (kun

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2176 rigs pa dang ldan pa (RZSB 544.08) : yukt-sahita.
2177 snod du bcug ste (RZSB 544.11).
2178 nyon mong s pa can gyi yid (RZSB 544.14).
2179 thams cad zag pa dang bcsas par byin gyis riob par byed do (RZSB 544.16-544.17).
2180 rgyal po'i dkor mdzod kha phyed zhes bya ba ni | kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'i mtshan nyid la mkhas par byas pa ste (RZSB 545.01-545.02).
2181 dug la sgsa gs pa dman pa'i rdzas kyang yod do
gzhi) endures in the essence of the cause and result of phenomena that are contaminated, [and] given it is similar to a ripening fruit [from a seed], it is simply the basis of and source for the uncontaminated, like a source of medicine inside a pot of poison. According to the higher vehicle systems, because the character of the basis-of-all is at the heart of awakening (byang chub kyi snying po), naturally pure from the very first, the basis-of-all is called "mind of awakening" (byang chub kyi sens). Afflictive and turbulent karmas are adventitious stains; and like gold obscured in turquoise or a precious jewel concealed in a mire, not the slightest quality is evident, [and] yet its nature is not corrupted. Just as it is stated in the rDo rje bskod pa:

Since the precious stone that blazes [like] a lamp
Has qualities that naturally illuminate it
Even while sunk in a terrible mud,
Its light illuminates space.

Like that, the precious jewel that is the mind itself,
Even while sunk in a terrible samsāric body,
Is itself naturally luminous and thus
Insight illuminates the space of actual reality.

To sum up, whatever the case may be (gang ltar yang rung), given that all positive and negative phenomena are simply appearance of the fundamental consciousness, even that appearance is due to karmic imprints in connection with karmic processes because however they appear does not accord with how they are; and therefore if the nature of all phenomena are realized to be beyond sorrow (mya ngan las 'das par rtogs na), the royal storehouse is open, at which time even the monkey is seized. The cat is also something imagined. Even the empty house is razed. The windows are shut as well. There is no need to look anywhere else for the buddha's path when possessed of awareness like this. Regarding the six qualities that are disciplined in the mind that is difficult to discipline, it is stated in the dpung gzungs [546.01]:

The mind, comparable to lightning, a wind, a monkey,
Similar to the waves of a great ocean;
Caused, always delighting in objects,
The fluctuating, wandering mind must be tamed.

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2182 Reading gser g.yus g.yogs pa (RZSB 545.12) rather than gser gyas g.yogs pa (Th 315.03; NTh 215.03).
2184 Re dpung gzungs (RZSB 546.01), cf. ’Phags pa rgyal mtshan gyi rtse mo’i dpung rgyan zhes bya’i gzungs (DhvaigraKEYA-nāma-dhārani).
2185 Th 316.03; NTh 216.02.
The mind is similar to lightning insofar as it is something the illuminates for just a moment rather than continuously.\textsuperscript{2187} The mind, similar to a wind insofar as it is devoid of an essentially abiding quality, is something characterized by fluctuation and distraction. It is similar to a monkey insofar as being an actor\textsuperscript{2188} that does not engage in its affairs while engaging in what is not its affairs.\textsuperscript{2189} It is similar to the undulating waves in a great ocean because it [too] is inexhaustible mental activity (\textit{rnam par rtog pa mi zad pa}).\textsuperscript{2190} It is tricky (\textit{sgyu can}) since it is something that always discloses a false object. It is always delighting in objects and thereby it does not delight in retiring into practice.\textsuperscript{2191} Just such a nature as that - i.e. difficult to discipline - is trained via recitation and meditative absorption which are thereby applied on the path to liberation.

There are even, to be concise, two types of method for disciplining for those [who are difficult to discipline]: through favor (\textit{anugraha}), which is to hold on to [trainees] by means of what is is favored [by them],\textsuperscript{2192} and through restraint, subjection or discipline (\textit{nigraha})\textsuperscript{2193} - [i.e.] to drive away (\textit{bzlog}) then take hold of (\textit{gzung}) or to overcome and then take hold of.\textsuperscript{2194}

In that connection, to take of hold due to being appropriate, like the brief brilliance of lightning, first classifies the object of meditative concentration (\textit{bsam gtan}) for just a moment, yet no longer. Like wind, it is instigated by means of disparate processes. Like a monkey, it engages in anything agreeable. Like the ocean, it acts in concert with various mental activities. It is like a trickster (\textit{sgyu can}), which, although not entirely up front, can be reliable in the context of training. It even tends even toward objects of desire while delighting in object[s].

[In that context, consider the phrase] to drive away then taking hold of\textsuperscript{2195} The opposite of lightning is brilliance nduring over a long time. The opposite of

\textsuperscript{2186} Töh. 2673: ‘\textit{Phags pa dpun bzung kyi zhus pa’i rgyud kyi bs dus pa’i don ‘grel ba’i brjed byang (Ārya-subādu-paripreckā-nāma-tantra-pīṇḍārtha-cṛtti) in bsTan’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1999, rgyud, thu-du, vol. 36 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): [\textit{sams dran pa nye bar gzhag pa’i dbang du mdzad nas}] | [\textit{sams ni glog dang spre’u dang rlung dang mtshungs}] | [\textit{rgya mtsho chen po yi ni rlabs dang ‘dra}] | [\textit{sgyu can ‘dod dgur ‘dod yon mngon dga’ ba}] | [\textit{g.yo zhing ‘phyan pa nges par gdul bar bya}] (284.05-284.08).

\textsuperscript{2187} skad cig tsam gsal rgyun du gsal bar mi gnas pa yin (RZSB 546.03-546.04).

\textsuperscript{2188} las can (RZSB 546.06) : karmaka.

\textsuperscript{2189} spre’u dang ‘dra ste bya ba la mi ‘jig cing bya ba ma yin pa la ‘jug pa’i las can yin (RZSB 546.05-546.06); alternatively, “not engaging in [its] activity while engaging in what is not [its] activity.” “One interesting twist here, among others, is that the ordinary mind appears to have a job proper rather than being merely some appetitive process to be extinguished. *Is this a metaphor for distraction being mischievous?*

\textsuperscript{2190} \textit{rnam par rtog par mi zad pa yin} (RZSB 546.07).

\textsuperscript{2191} \textit{nang du yang dag ‘jog} (RZSB 546.08) : pratisamlayana.

\textsuperscript{2192} a nu gra ha zhes bya ba rjes su mthun pas gzung ba (RZSB 546.11). Alternatively, e.g. “that which is understood to be consisting in ‘compassionate care’ called \textit{anugraha}.”

\textsuperscript{2193} Reading ni gra ha, a rendering of the term \textit{tshar bcad pa} (Mvp 8350), rather than \textit{pi gra ha} (RZSB 546.11; Th 317.03; NTh 217.01). The Sanskrit \textit{nigraha} also translates \textit{snyams smad pa} (Engle 2009: 443 n. 647), that is: ‘.

\textsuperscript{2194} ni gra ha zhes bya ba bzlog ste gzung ba’ang tshar bcad pas gzung ba gnyis so (RZSB 546.11-546.12). * Msa 11.60: rig pa’i gnas lha dag la brtson par ma byas na \textit{’phags mehog gis kyang thams cad mkhyen nyid mi ‘gjur te \textit{de} lta bas na gzhian dag tshar bcad rjes bzung dang \textit{bdag nyid kun shes bya phyir de la de brtson byed. See Ruegg 1995: 101.}

\textsuperscript{2195} bzlog ste gzung ba ni (RZSB 546.18).
wind is that which is unmoving. The opposite of the monkey tends toward the appropriate purpose. The opposite of the ocean is waves of mental activity pacified. The opposite of the trickster discerns the real point. The opposite of delighting in objects is settling into spiritual practice.

In short, in this method for taming, which is appropriate for a vulgar mind’s system of dharma, there is no bias for one so-called method or another. Therefore, whatever manner of mental processes proliferate, whatever they penetrate, however many times, they are all considered afterward to be something appropriate for a possible object of meditative absorption. Thus, since even the extreme of conceptuality is beyond the realm of meditative absorption, there is no other point found to which one goes. This is most likely taught in the context of the practice of śamatha.

§ 6.6 the six-limbed yoga of Kālacakra (547.03)

With regard to the concentration endowed with the six limbs of yoga, it states in the Dars pa:

Specific withdrawals, meditative absorption;
Stopping, inhaling and holding the breath;
Recollection and concentration -
Are called the six applied limbs of yoga.

These limbs that attain to the yoga of the inner mind number six. Specific abandonments pertain to abiding in a vow. Since, just as through the desire for perfect ethical discipline, the constantly restrained sense is absent distraction and the stains of regret, it is a cause for attaining concentration; in a similar way, these "specific withdrawals," too, are not objects to be abandoned since, by means of object and sense faculty, conscious awareness has seen everything produced as flawed; nor are characteristic marks seen as things to be pursued. Constantly seen as one's own divine nature, these two things that are to be abandoned - obsession with and negation of entities in practice - naturally restrain the sense faculties, which are not touched by the longing to suppress desire; and when the royal blessing grows closer, [the mind] becomes a receptacle for meditative absorption. Here, the phrase "specific practices" is used and by it resources [are

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2196 chos lugs (RZSB 546.22).
2197 thabs ’di dang ’di zhes ris su chad pa myed de (RZSB 546.23).
2198 Th 318.04; NTh 217.06.
2201 * Cf. STMG: ji ltar chu la rnuog ma (256.01) dngas ’gyur na || nui zla’i gzugs brnyan ’byung ba btsal mi dgos || rang sms bsal ’byor dag par ’gyur pa na || rgyal ba’i byin rlbs ’byung ba btsal (256.02) mi dgos (256.01-256.03).
referenced]; and "specific abandonments" is used, moreover, because distraction is abandoned through desire. Since meditative absorption is something generated in isolation from desire and wicked, non-virtuous qualities, it stands to reason that the meditative absorption becomes subsequently more stable.

Further, the five limbs pertain to conception, analysis, joy, bliss, and single-pointed mind. Even the object of meditative absorption is the nature of the three secrets because all seals are included within [them]. It is through seals that the totally pure deities, moreover, are gathered in [their] objective and logical modalities. In that connection, in the three secrets there is the secret of the buddha-body - the particular color, shape, and animation of a divine form. This is similar to the teaching, wherein it is said:

Eyebrows, eyes, teeth, and lips,
Like bodies and limbs
Are the seals of glory [548.01] of Vajrasattva
That accomplish acts for one's own welfare.

What is taken to mind as object in meditative absorption is given in terms of all the systems of buddha-bodies. With regard to the secret of buddha-speech, it is not unlike such teachings as:

Verbal and non-verbal analyses (rnam dpyod)
In the Dhyānottara-tantra [it states]:

Roar the hidden vajra teaching
In accordance with such statements, contemplation of the characteristic marks connected with the shape and color of the dharma syllables upon the heart and tongue of a deity and, furthermore, the investigation and analysis connected with the actual reality of the terms and their referents (sgra dang sgra’i don) are causes for attaining meditative absorption. Thus, it is not unlike the statement:

Meditative absorption originating in sound is an instrument for attaining yoga;
Meditative absorption originating at the end of sound confers liberation.

In this context, primarily spoken of in terms of meditative absorption, ubiquitous verbalization (ngag sgra grags par brjod pa) becomes a cause for distraction. With

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2203 phyag rgyas ni yongs su dag pa’i lha thams cad kyang don dang rtags kyi tshul kyis bsdu’ so (RZSB 547.21-547.22).
2204 sku’i gsang ba (RZSB 547.22-547.23) : kāyaguhya.
2205 The dPal sangs rgyas thams cad dang mnyam par sbyor ba mkha’ ’gro ma sgyu ma bde ba’i mchog ces bya ba’i rgyud phyi ma (KtD0366-ka-2) contains two similar lines: smin ma mig dang so dang mchu l kha dang lus dang rtags lag gis (192b.1) as the first two lines in a quatrain.
2206 Th 320.05; NTh 219.04.
2207 sku’i tshul thams cad kyi sgo nas l bsam gtan kyi yul du dmigs pa’o (RZSB 548.01.548.02).
2208 gsung gi gsang ba (RZSB 548.02) : vāgguhuya.
2209 nga ro sbas pa rdo rje’i gsung (RZSB 548.03).
regard to the secret of the buddha-mind,\textsuperscript{2210} the meditation on the vajra intention in one’s heart\textsuperscript{2211} and meditation such as upon the gnosis-being\textsuperscript{2212} are characteristic marks of the exalted mind (\textit{thugs kyi mtshan ma}); its object, analyzed as \textit{bodhicitta} and characteristics that abide in the \textit{dharma-kāya}, is itself the buddha-mind. Likewise, the goal in meditative aborption is the three secrets as meditative support (\textit{dmigs pa}).

The five limbs form the meditative support. Conception of it is generates awareness that conceives of the characteristics of the three secrets just as they are. Analysis is the constant preparation of awareness to just that and again and again penetrating its significance. Joy is the emergence of a type of experience resembling (\textit{’dra snang gi rnam pa}) the three secrets due to attaining the meditative absorption connected to both conception and analysis, at which point it is isolated from desire; and great waves of uncommon joy are generated through experiencing a previously unexperienced object. Bliss is the attainment of a concentrated mind due, which is experienced as blissful physical and mental sensations. Once a single-pointed mind is very concentrated in this way, it is no longer generated in the knower/knowable duality and thereby becomes just one’s own awareness.

Thus, given that a mind made calm by meditative absorption is aimed at totally disciplining the mind (\textit{de shin du dul bar bya ba’i phyir}), there should be training on the breath - [both] to stop [it] and [on] breathing [itself].\textsuperscript{2213} Regardless of what one has studied, the multiple means of accessing [the aim] means (\textit{bas}) there is no conflict between the [various] methods concerning just how to train in this way. After that, once the mind\textsuperscript{549.01}\textsuperscript{2214} is tamed and the breath pacified, one ought to train on holding-in the breath in order to stabilize and fortify [it].

\textbf{§ 6.7 five signs of mental stability (549.03)}
Then, the connection with the breath means the mind, as well, becomes totally pacified, after which, when stability is attained, the five signs\textsuperscript{2215} emerge. Here, it is stated:

\begin{quote}
First is something like a mirage;  
The second is the medium of smoke;  
The third are similar to fireflies;  
The fourth blazes like a butter lamp;  
The fifth is eternal appearance, 
Which is like a cloudless sky.\textsuperscript{2216}
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{2210} \textit{thugs kyi gsang ba} (RZSB 548.09) : cittaguhya.
\item \textsuperscript{2211} \textit{thugs kar sems pa’i rdo rje bsgom pa} (RZSB 548.10).
\item \textsuperscript{2212} ye shes sms dp’ (RZSB 548.10) : \textit{jñānasattva}.
\item \textsuperscript{2213} \textit{dubug dgos cing gtim la bslob par bya’o} (RZSB 548.23).
\item \textsuperscript{2214} Th 322.06; NTh 221.02.
\item \textsuperscript{2215} \textit{mtshan ma rnam pa lnga} (RZSB 549.03).
\item \textsuperscript{2216} Toh. 1401: \textit{dpal ’khor lo sdom pa’i dka’ ’grel sgrub pa’i thabs kyi gleng gzhi} (Sādhana-nidāna-nāma-śrī-cakra-saṃvara-pañjikā) in bKa’’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rgyud ’bum, ba, vol. 8 (Beijing;
Further, this sign has inner and outer aspects. The external sign is when the breath is held in; externally, light appears in the field of vision in the space in front, which is to say: first the breath is held steadily after which, when [the lights] are seen steadily over time in the space, there will be the perception of the aspect of smoke, the aspect of mirage as the previous signs of the experience of light. Once that is stable, something similar to fireflies will be perceived. Once that is stable, everything will become clear like a cloudless sky and thereby the signs have reached their fulfillment.

Here, what has been taught pertains to the context of daytime; yet when seen at night, all the similitudes of smoke, fire, and light will gradually expand.

§ 6.8 consequent to attaining signs in that way (549.17)

Once signs of stability are obtained in that manner, one ought to cultivate recollection for the purpose of attaining total pliancy of the mind because one should distill the dynamism of the mind through emanating and absorbing various magnitudes and quantities of light through some higher or lower aperture scattering outward that are aspects of śamatha qua the three secrets. After having achieved that in such a manner, we turn to training in concentration. Through the force of such an accomplishment in the way stated above, gnosia that is one’s own awareness (ye shes rang rig pa) is obtained, manifesting non-conceptual gnosia, which severs all the lattice of obscurations.

The qualities of the other limbs become the deep intention of the Sugata by means of specific purifications. In attaining meditative absorption, clairvoyance is attained. Through mastery of the breath, a luminous mandala emerges.

Q. Given than (de la) [550.01], what is the process by which body, mind, and deity are brought to mind?

What is an observed object in the body (dmigs pa) is observed (dmigs) through the breath and in terms of the nature of the breath, it’s source, domain, path, activity, methods for [using it] as an observed object, and [its] qualities. The nature of the breath, because of being in the nature of the five physical elements, the nature of the breath pertains to the nature of the five elements such that, in that connection, the earthen breath is hard and heavy; watery breath is relaxed (dal zhing) and soft; fiery breath is light and warm;
windy breath is light and rough (rtsub bo); spatial breath is subtle and its movements are unsensed. The source of the breath is the cavity [at] the heart and the cavities connected with the lungs. The domain of the breath is the interior of the body, which is wholly permeated by the movement of the breath, predominantly from the navel up throughout the range of the [body, spanning throughout the limbs] sixteen fingers and toes. The path of the breath is mainly via the throat, from the secret [place up through] the nose's aperture. The activity of the breath is dual: the action of retention and the action of producing. Retention of the breath tangibly benefits the body and also maintains it. [The breath] works as a rider on the mind; and it holds the mind, too, such that it is called the vitalizing activity of both body and mind. The activity of producing [the breath] moves both mind and body at the time of its motion. When [the breath is] unmoving, neither [body nor mind] move. The methods for taking the breath as an observed object in [in meditation] are many. Thus, whichever [one should take up], there is no conflict.

In short, [there are two types:] an observed object in harmony with the dharma and and observed object that does not rely upon the dharma. In harmony with it is explained in connection with fire and wind elements movement in the right [side of the body], the earth and water elements movement in the left [side of the body], and space element moving in the central [part of the body]. When those, too, are differentiated, then by means of both the entirety of movement of each of the five respective elements at right and left, and, the rough idea, that, in short, [also by means of] the teachings on some of the respective elements that are, moreover [located at] right and left, [phenomenal] color, shape, size, and type, are each specifically taken as objective referents. Even the type is observed as a type similar to a light, letter, characteristic mark, and subtle buddha-body. Not relying upon the dharma [means] just movement of the internal and external breath, with no specific differentiation [of] particulars such that the observation of any possible single type of mark whatsoever, or [551.01] the observation of only a tangible object is viable; but only with the aim of setting the mind without distraction.

The generally known qualities and flaws connected to color and size: the elements are characterized by something that is dangerous. Thus, given only an object of meditative absorption, or when [its] power is analyzed, flaws and qualities are present. In that connection, it comes to be said the color white is characterized by the pacification of what is harmful; the color gold characterizes apprehension [of] what is harmful; the color red characterizes the intensification of what is harmful; [and] the color black characterizes the arising of what is harmful. Indeed, tactile objects [such as the elements] and physical dimensions, like hardness and thickening, bring about discontent in the body. When the parts of things are observed as smaller, subtle and, at first, like a moon [reflected] in water, discontent does not arise in the body.

The qualities of observation upon the breath [include those such as the fact one] precludes monistic views (gcig por lta ba), views of realism (dngos por lta ba), and views revolving around bliss and purity such that Insight (vipāśyana) arises. Once that state of mind is attained, the body becomes practicable. Even

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2223 ‘dzin pa’i las dang byed pa’i las so (RZSB 550.10-550.11).
2224 Th 327.02; NTh 224.04.
when the mind is the observed object, the same applies because the nature of the mind consists in the element of appearance, the element of mental conceit, and the element connected to the cognition of specific things. The mental state abides in the body connected to the five elements after [the mind] has mounted on the wind connected to the five elements. The mental objects are appearing objects, which all phenomena are. The object of the concealed mind is the mind itself. The objects connected to cognition comprise [those of] the external sense fields. The mental path are the faculties. The activity of the mind is dual: the activity of grasping, which works to comprehend all phenomena; and the activity of producing brings about all positive and negative karmic processes.

With regard to the method for observing the mind, once the mind is made practicable through taking the breath as the objective support [in meditation], then mindfulness and introspection are laid hold of and thereby the actual character of the mind is taken in and assimilated into experience because of observing the nature of just exactly how the mind arises.

The qualities of [this] object of observation preclude [any possibility] of views of the self, eternalist views, and all realist views because Insight arises. Once the mind is made practicable, meditative serenity is attained. After the body and mind qua objective supports for meditation are made practicable, one ought to use a deity as the objective support. The provisional character of the deity, too, are taught to be consonant with mind and body because, on this view, the nature of a deity is the nature of the five constituents: pure reality, non-conceptual gnosis, gnosis’ vivid exalted knower of anything (ci yang), the rupakāya (form buddha-body) connected to taming migrants, the buddha-speech of the teacher of the holy dharma in each language.

The source of the deity is a sentient being’s body and the mind itself. The deity’s domain is the dharmadhātu and the fields of compassion. Although the divine path is dispossed of comings and goings, sentient beings are comprehended. The refuge for sentient beings is the deity such that they become a path by means of the two relations/connections - i.e., the qualities of the path which connects a sentient being to a deity and the qualities of scripture which connects a deity to a sentient being. Divine activity [is two-fold]: There is the activity of retention, which

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2225 sems la dmigs pa’ang de bzhiin sbyar te (RZSB 551.11).
2226 mngon par ’du byed pa (RZSB 551.17) : abhisamākāraṇam.
2227 re zhig gi mtshan ma (RZSB 551.23); alternatively, this phrase might mean "some of the characteristics."
2228 Cf. Almogi 2008: 282-284, n.b. n. 21 re: dKon cog ’grel: 205.24-206.02. Rongzom gives first gives the dyadic :chos nyid, ye shes (RZSB 551.24-552.01), followed by the triadic: sa le mkhyen pa’i ye shes, gzugs sku, so so’i skad du dam pa’ichos ston pa’i gsung ste 1chos lnga’i rang bzhin no (RZSB 552.01-552.03).
2229 so so’i skad du dam pa’ichos ston pa’i gsung (RZSB 552.02).
2230 lha’i gnas ni | sems can kyi lus dang sems nyid do (RZSB 552.03).
2231 thugs rje’i zhiing (RZSB 552.04).
2232 lha’i lam ni ’gro ‘on mi mnga’ ’ang (RZSB 552.04).
2233 lam gi chos (RZSB 552.06) : marghadharma.
2234 lung gi chos (RZSB 552.06) : āgamadhārma.
consists in having all qualities. The activity of producing consists in the buddha-activity that works to liberate sentient beings.

The method for the deity as an objectiver referent (dmigs pa) pertains to the cultivation of the body and the mind as the deity and involves meditation on the three types of yoga - any system of which, whether the way of consecration, or [the way of the] completeley imagined, or the way of perfection, is possible.

The two types of accumulation are perfected at one time as the qualities. Thus, training progressively with the three types of objective support in that manner, and this explanation by means of teaching in stages, is so that children will only enter at first. In actuality, the body itself is an aspect of the mind. That being the case, the recognition that the very essence of any of the whole of phenomena within and without is in the nature of a deity is, first, the recognition of the deity. Next, understanding the method for deity meditation is something taught in a variety of sadhanas the teachings [on] methods for improvement via the scriptural transmission and mind connected to meditative absorption as taught above. Finally, on the topic of teaching the criteria for practibility, the criteria for a deity that is devoid of characteristic marks was already described above.

On the topic of the criteria for meditation upon the buddha-body of a deity with characteristic marks, even if there is a teaching on the ten scriptures connected to a deity, they are included within three principles: radiance, clarity, and brilliance. Radiance is something not solid. Clarity is something unwavering. Brilliance is something unobstructed. Something not solid suggests an absence of intrinsic nature, akin to a reflection of a moon [in] water. Unwavering suggests being unmoved by the thorns of lethargy and excitement, like the light of a large precious jewel. Unobstructed suggests that being marked by the aforementioned two means (pas) the appearance of utter luminosity, devoid of both the obscurations connected to not misunderstanding and the obscurations connected with what is confused. Utter luminosity is such that [one] gazing upon it would be unbearable. These are explained in the context of those who desire to train properly.

Whoever is devoted and acts thus becoming distracted and unable to [train] properly, should apply her mind in the significance of the Great Perfection and the nature of the deity just-as-it-is because when that is done it indeed is done it is through the stages of the ritual - either the perfection phase in a single moment, [via] the force of karmic imprints, or by means of devotion and [divine]

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2235 See Wangchuk 283-284 n. 23.
2236 lha la dmigs pa’i thabs ni lus dang sems nyid lhar bsgoms pa ste | de yang rnal ’byor rnam pa gsum gyi tshul kyis | byin kyis rlob pa’i tshul lam | yongs su brtags pa’am | rdzogs pa’i tshul gang yang rung bar bsgom mo (RZSB 552.08-552.10).
2237 dmigs pa rnam pa gsum (RZSB 552.11-552.12) : trividhālambana.
2238 de bas na phyi nang snod bcud kyi chos thams cad kyi rang gi ngo bo lha nyid du shes pa ni (RZSB 552.15)
2239 lham me (RZSB 522.19-522.20) : bhrājate.
2240 lhan ne (RZSB 522.20) : tapati.
2241 lhang nge ba (RZSB 522.20) : virocate.
2242 Th 331.03; NTh 227.06.
pride. The undistracted mind takes hold and recitation and concentration are penetrated.

It's suitable to visualize the deity in front of oneself even when engaged in recitations; yet not visualizing is also possible. The absence and presence of dispersing and gathering-in [light] is also possible. Any visualization of the path or the result is also possible because, in general, great power and transformation accords with striving in single-pointed focus.

Generally, divine reality known as the so-called six types of deities, the ultimate deity the deity of actual reality, the deities connected with particular intentions, deities imputed [by some], and the deity imagined by beings with tantric commitments are widely known. Insofar as the sealed marks [of a buddha-body] are something known to be divine, a number of types imagined are engaged: [1] analyzing ‘the particular shape of a body that is fully matured’; [2] analyzing ‘they the marks of great beings’; [3] analyzing ‘they are the capacity and power of consecrated beings’; [4] analyzing ‘they are something imagined to be deities by beings who hold samaya’; [5] analyzing ‘they are indistinguishably mix a particular fully matured form and the blessings of great gnosis’; and [6] analyzing ‘that they are physically emanated as the characteristic of the state of gnosis connected to the secret buddha-mind, like water becoming ice via conditions connected to cold water’; and [7] asserting that ‘apart from all phenomena pertaining to the nature of the spontaneous seals [they] appear specifically under the influence of merit and karmic good fortune; and for those pure ones who become tamed, [they] appear as the accouterments of the emanation body connected with renunciation.

All those subsequently manifest as seals that depend on ordinary form since they are all asserted, moreover, to be without distinction in spontaneous seals. The five above are explained in the context of realist views. The last two are explained in the context of separation from fixating on things.

Although engaged in just that analysis, what is recognized is recognized in the case of the latter (phyi ma ltar gzung bar bya’o). In short, all these species of meditative absorption or concentration (dhyāna) become the practice of those skilled in method inasmuch as they are qualified by the significance of the Great Perfection. Inasmuch as they are not, they will become practices of the unskilled in method. Here ends the sixth chapter on lineage techniques.

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2243 spyir dmigs pa rtse gcig pas ’bad pa ltar mthu dang byin rlabs che’o (RZSB 523.08-523.09).
2244 lha’i de kho na nyid (RZSB 523.09).
2245 chos nyid kyi lha (RZSB 553.10).
2246 sems pa’i bye brag gi lha (RZSB 553.11-553.11).
2247 dam tshig can gyi skye bos brtags pa’i lha (RZSB 553.11).
2248 See a similar passage in KCh’G, RZSB 1.72.07; *Rz begins his analysis of mudra on 70, his basic etymology of the term on 71.02-71.14. Cf. Almogi 2009: 90 n. 164.
2249 de nyid bdag nyid chen po rnams kyi thugs gsang ba’i ye shes nyid mtshan ma’i gzugs su sprul pa ste chu grang ba’i rkyen kyis chab brom du gyur pa lta bo’i zhes brtag pa (RZSB 553.18-553.20).
2250 Th 333.03; NTh 229.05.
[Closing verses]

All phenomena are said to be illusory
And while this is widely known in the basic doctrines,
[Metaphors] such as an Illusion, a mirage, etc.
Work to disclose their equality.

In practicing this approach, there is
The approach to Great Perfection, which is definitive in meaning,
There is answering objections and making rational differentiations
Which do not work to subvert it.

The definitive meaning of bodhicitta,
Its nature and its greatness,
Points of deviation and obscuration, methods for settling, too,
Is the teaching of a lineage imbued with method.

In stating that the effect does not manifest
While its effective conditions are present
Does not constitute the denial of anything; thus
There is no state that is denied seen here.

In the system of causal interdependence,
There is no object imposed
Outside of mere appearance,
Because causal things are not real.

Whatever other significance there is being divorced from distortions,
I have [given them here] according to my own understanding
For those working to accomplish [liberation] via other systems,
Following the definitive word of the buddha.

Because this simple disclosure the Great Vehicle approach,
Was composed for the benefit of [a?] meditator[s?] in the South;
Will it be seen by migrators
Who are suitable vessels [for] the Great Vehicle?

Even those with intellects fixed on commentaries
That establish what is accepted in the world,
Can perceived [the truth of the Great Perfection]
Through the blessings of the real Mahāyāna,

Penetrating the domain divorced from biases,
Is like a great garuda soaring through space:
Unbound and unmoving
Covering great distance at ease.
Appendix 3: Two Great Garudas

Bai ro rgyud 'bum edition (358.01-366.01):

[358.01] bcom ldan 'das dpal rdo rje sems dpal la phyag 'tshal lo // chos nyid kyi skabs // rdo rje sems dpal nam mkha' che // kun bzangs yangs pa[358.2]chos kyi dbyings // rnam dag lam chen kun sgrol phyi // mi skye mi 'gag cir mi dgongs // byams pa'i don nyid rnam dbyangs phyir // snying rje chen po cir mi mdzad // che bas che ba'i[358.03] zab mo'i // yon tan cir yang bsngags pa med // don rnamz ji bzhin mi bskyod de // bya ba med pas grol bas grol // rang 'bungs ye shes btsal med pas // rang 'byung ye shes btsal med pas // grol nas grol ba'i[358.04] lam yang ston // chos nyid thig le // rang bzhin lhun gyis gnas pa'i skabs (snyis pa) // 'byung ba chen po bcom ldan 'das 'gro ba kun la rang bzhin gnas // phyin ci log tu rnam[358.05] btags kyang // 'gro ba rang 'byung gzhan las min // rang bzhin gyis che la gnas pa'i skabs (gsun pa) // che ba'i ye shes rnyed dka' bas // shes rab thabs la rten pas grub // ming[359.01] tsam gzhan la rten 'dra yang // mgon sum bde ba rang las 'byung // rtsol ba dang bral ba'i skabs (bzhin pa) // cho 'phur chen po dka' ba men // yon tan kun dang stobs kyi[359.02] rnamz // ji bzhin rtags pa'i 'pha ba las // de ma thag tu rang las 'byung // snang ba med pa'i chos nyis ni // ma btsal bzhag na bsngom pa yin // de dang der ni rnam btsal na // de las[359.03] de bzhin de 'byung // brjod pa dang bral ba'i skabs (snga pa) // mchog tu gsang ba'i chos nyid ni // rna dbang gzhan la thos mi 'gyur // de bzhin le'i dbang po kyang // de las brjod du rdul tsam med[359.04] dbyings kyi thig le // 'gro ba las kyis mi 'khol ba'i skabs (drug pa) // 'gro ba'i sdug bsngal byang chub sems // kun tu chub pas rnam par rol // de la bskyod pa med bzhin du // nam ka'i[359.05] smtha' ltar mnyam par gnas // khyad par ci yang mtshungs pa la // las so zhes ni rnam par btags // ci ste las kyi dbang gyur na // rang 'byung ye shes yod ma yin // [360.1] rgyu nyid rjo rje rkyen dang 'dra // ma skyes pas na 'jig pa med // gdod nas snying po byang chub la // btsal ba'i bsam pas dbyings mi bskyod // btsal sems dang bral ba'i skabs (bdun pa) // yon tan chen po'i[360.2] bsam gtan ni // bsam gtan nyid las bsam du med // ma bsams ma dbyangs chos bzhin du // rnam rtog nyid las ye shes skye // 'phra ba'i sgo mor ming btags nas // sems kyi dben pa'i lam[360.3] tshol zhing // dgon pa'i rgyun tu dben 'dzin te // btags na rnam par rtags 'gyur bsgoms // 'rgyu dang 'bras bur ming 'dogs shing // dge sdig gnyis ka rnam par ser // 'jig rten 'di las 'byung ngo[360.4] zhes // blang dor drod pa mchog tu bskyed // gnyis su med pa skyon dang bral ba'i skabs // chags dang ma chags tshig gi lam // dbu ma bzhin du drag cha 'dra // bde dang sdug bsngal rgyu mthun zhes // 'gro ba'i[360.5] mgon po sems dpas gsungs // ye shes rang las byung ba'i skabs // 'dod chags zhe sdang gti mug kyang // 'byang chub chen po'i lam las 'byung // kun spyod yon tan rnam lnga yang // chos dbyings kyi[360.06] kyi rgyan zhes
gsungs // nam mkha' rtog pa skye med cing // rtog pa de nyid nam mkha' 'dra // mi chags nam mkhar bsn la las // rang don chen po nam mkhar 'byung // dbyings nram par dag pa'i[361.01]thig le // gzungs kyi sbyor thabs kyi skabs // rtog med mnyam nyid chos kyi sku // bzungs bas mi zin chu zla 'dra // kun tu bzang po'i rol pa yis // a li ka li zab tu bstan // [361.02]di ni a dang mdzes pa'i ta // pa dang yan lag spros pa bzhin // jig rten yongs kyi spyod yul 'di // btsal bas rnyed[361.03]pa'i gnas med de // drug gi chos bzhin yul mod pas // mdongs pa nam mkha' mnyag pa bzhin // gong nas gong du tshangs pa'i lam // bya bral chos dang mthun pa med // ci ste lam la bgrid gyur na // [361.04]nam mkha'i mtha' bzhin thug pa med // yongs su rdzogs pa'i skabs // de ltar de bzhin de'i phyir // de la de bstan de yang thob // de ni snying po de bas na // de las de byung ngo mchog che // sngon gyi de dang da ltar[361.05]de // de bzhin de'i gnas su che // de ltar de'i rang bzhin no // de dang 'dra ba yongs kyi lam // zla ba las byung rten dang bca // kun gyi mnyam nyid yin pa las // phyogs su bltas pas grub pa med // [361.06]chags pa dang bral ba'i skabs // da ltar bde dang phyi mar bde // mngon sum pa dang rgyab nas 'byung // de yang rnam pa'i skyon yin pas // de la rten par mi bya'o // gdod ma nas phyi ba'i snyin po nyi kyi skabs // [361.01]dus gsum cig te khyad par med // sngon med phyis med gnod nas 'byung // cho skus khyab pas gcig pa'i phyir // che ba'i chen por rang bzhin gnas // kun tu smon dang bral ba'i skabs // // [361.02]srid pa gsum na sbyong ba yang // ming tsam rgyu mar snang ba ste // 'khor lo bsgyur ba'i gnas chen yang // sbyu ma sbyong ba'i gti gnas yin // rnam spyod dus la ltos pa rnam // dus der 'byung bar mi 'gyur[362.03]te // ma bral smon pas spyod pas na // stong pa'i mtshan nyid gungs pa bzhin // lung ston pa'i skabs // gcig ste rnam pa yongs kyis med // rnal 'byor nam mkha'i bya lam gnas // ma byung ma skyes[362.04]snying po la // sgros btags chos kun ga la yod // phyi nang gnyi ga phyi nyid nang // zab mo cha shes rtags yul med // srid pa'i ming tsam log pa'i stobs // de bas ting 'dzin mnyam dang 'bral // de la tha tshigs[362.05]phyi dang nang // rang bzhin phung po khams bzhin gnas // dus gsum 'di dang ma 'bral bas // tha tshigs ming du btags pa med // ye shes chen po'i thig le // mnyam pa nyid kyi skabs // mi g.yo ba ni sku'i[362.06]rgya // mi bskyod pa ni ye shes che // mi len pas na bdag med cing // mi 'dor tshig bral mnyam nyid do // gang dang gang gi gang du yang // kun 'khor kun spyod bzhin las byung // 'di la skyes pa bud med ces // [363.01]mnyam pa'i rgyal po yongs ma gsungs // dngos grub bde la chags pa spong ba'i skabs // 'di la brtul shigs drag shul ygi // gnas su bya ba'i ming med de // yang dag pa ni rnam ldan na // sgyu ma'i[363.02]bdbe ba 'byung bar 'dod // ma gos ma chags 'byung 'gyur yang // bsgoms pas byis pa'i spyod yul bzhin // dkyil 'khor khrong chu lhags kyi // khro bdag chen po'i lus bzung ste // yi ge sngon du phyung ba yang // [363.04]zhi ba de nyi mthong ba min // nyon mongs pa'i dbang gis na // ta la'i mgo bo bcad pa dang // sa bon me yis tshig pa bzhin // de'i dbang du ma 'gyur ston // rnam grangs brgya stong phrag yas pas // gang ltar spyad[364.04]kyang me tog skye // mtham med pa'i dbang gis na // sti gnas 'di las 'byung mi 'gyur // stsol smas dang bral ba'i skabs // gleng bral 'di la gang gnas pa // rnal 'byor de ni bskal ba bzang // bdag dang gzhan[364.05]don mi byed pas // sgyu ma lhun grub yul la rol // chos nyid kun tu ma 'gyur ba'i skabs // lhag ma med pas yongs su rdzogs // 'gyur ba ma yin drang por gnas // nam mkha' bzhin (du) mtha mnyam zhing // [364.01]gzhan la ltos 'gyur gos ma yin // lhun gyis gnas pa'i bde chen de // mthshungs pa med
pa'i ye shes kyis // rang gi mthu yi rig pa las // chos ni gzhan las 'byung mi 'gyur // sla zhing dka' ba sla phyir dka' // [364.02]mgon sum mi gnas kun la khyab // ming tsam 'di zhes bstan par ni // rdo rje sems dpas mtshon du med // rgyu rkyen las mi grub pa'i skabs // ngo mtshar smad 'byung rol pa 'di // bya ba la nam mkha' ji bzhiin te // [364.03]ci yang mi dmigs gti mug las // de ma thag tu rang las 'byung // 'di ni thams cad mtshungs pa'i lam // 'gro ba kun la rang bzhin gnas // byis pa 'khrul pas bslad pa'i phyir // sman nyid sman pa tshol[364.04]ba bzhiin // 'gro ba yongs la sangs rgyas pa'i skabs // go ba'i yul na bde ba che // de nyid rnam dag 'jig rten yin // de la phyogs kyi 'od 'dus pas // phyogs bzhi mtshams dang bla' og 'grub // ma nes ja'[364.05]tshon kha dog las // rigs kyi khyad par mgon bar snang // de bzhiin g.yo rdul mi g.yo ba // 'byung ba Inga las gtso chen yen // kun tu bzang po'i thig le // tshogs 'byul ba'i skabs // // [364.06] 'das dang ma byon da ltar gyi // tha snyad ming las mi gnas te // skye 'gag med par rnam brtsags shing // 'di nyid dus gsum chen por sbyor // mnyam par rim pa bkod pa med // gcig pas phyogs su dang[365.01]bral // tshogs kyi rgyan rams bkram pa yang // rang bzhin gnas pas 'grem pa med // lhun gyis gnas pas mi sngo zhing // gdod gnas dag pas bdud rtsi yin // 'du mched bcu gnyis[365.01]khyad par du // lhag pa'i bsam pas bzung du med // chos kyi rgyan rams rang bzhin lhun gyis grub pa'i skabs // yid kyi bsams pas yon bdag ste // bltas pa'i stobs kyi bkram pa'o // mthong bar[365.03]gyur pas dngos grub la // de nyid mnyan bzham yongs rdzogs pa'o // lhun gyis gnas pas skabs // yud tsam bzung bas sbyor ba yin // dga' bar gyur pas dam tshig ste // thabs kyi gar thabs bskyod[365.04]pa yis // gnyis med sbyor ba phul ba yin // las rgya mtsho'i skabs // mi gzung stong pas gtor ma yin // bya ba med pas las rams zin // mi rtog ye shes bgegs bslal nas // mi gsung mnyam[4675.05]bzhal sngags tshig go // bdag dang bcas pa gtong ba 'ching bar bstan pa'i skabs // bla ma mchod dang gtong ba dang // de bzhin bsdod rams thams cad kyang // ma chags mi g.yo'i stobs med na // byas na[365.06] 'ching ba chen por 'gyur // lus grel pa brdar stan pa'i skabs // de bas de lung de nyid la // de las de sbyar sgrub par 'gyur // de ltar de la de rtog na // de la de nyid grub pa med // lhun gyis grub pa'iul[366.01]thig le'i // bcom ldan 'das lung thams cad kyi bdag nyid dpal rdo rjes sems dpas de skad gsungs so // rdo rje sem,s dpas' nam mkha' che // rdzogs so // //

rNying ma rgyud 'bum edition, Vol ka, ff. 419.03-423.02
[Vol ka, Folio 419.03] // bcom ldan ldas 'jam pa'i dbyangs la phyag 'tshal lo mi gnas dmigs pa'i yul med mi rtog chos kyi[419.04]lam // bsgo ba'i cha shas phra ba'i yul las byung pa ste // rtoq sgom chos kyi sku ni khyad par don med pas // rang byung ye shes mi rtog kun tu ji bzhin gnas // bya bral yul la mi gnas gnyen pos[419.05]bcos su med // yan lag chos kyi dbang gis snying po yul tshol zhing // rpm pa ciyang mi rtog thabs kyi de la rol // snying po rang bzhin 'byung baschos sku gzhan na med // rdul phran gcig[419.07]las brtsags shing phyogs bcu kun dang bral // mi gnas don nyid legs pa'i ye shes rang byung ste // mgon sum kun tu mi rtog yangs pa'i snying po la // rnam dag lam 'dir zhub pas mnyan pa'i rgyal po[420.01]thob // mi 'gyur 'gyur ba med pas chags pa'i gnas med de // de bzhin gzung ba'i yul med chos kyi gnas kyang med // mgon sum thob par 'dod pas rgyu la rtag tu bsgom // sgom chags bde ba de la[420.02]mnyam pa'i don mi 'byung // sku gcig kun tu khyab
pas bsnun pa'i chos med de / / mtha' la thug pa med cing dbyings la bri ba med / / chos dang chos nyid rtag tu 'dres shing dbyer med la / / [410.04]don dam chos zhes lhay par bshad pa med / / 'khruul dang byang chub lam ste rtog pas thob pa med / / rang byung ye shes nyid kyang tshig gi mtha' dang bral / / ye nas sangs rgyas bdag nyid mngon sum gnas[420.05]pa la / / sgrigs ba gzugs kyi dpe bzhin de la rtog pa 'byung / / med de med pa mi yin med pa'i snyin po 'byung / / stong stong po stong pa ma yin stong pa'i yul la gnas / / nam mkha'i rang bzhin de la 'byung ba'i[420.06]dran pa skye / / bya bral zin pa'i bde ba 'dod pa med pas len / / bza' ba'i yul med de las ye shes 'byung par rtson / / sngon gyi drang srong rjes su sgom pa'i yid kyang 'jig / / rang bzhin lam ste 'khruul pas[420.07]thams cad mkhyen pa med / / ji bzhin pa zhes rnam rtog ji bzhin rtag sgom pa / / bde ba chen po 'dod pas chags pas nad yin te / / mi g.yo rang bzhin gnas pa'i sman chen ma byas na / / mtho ris[420.01]bgsod pa'i rgyu des nyon mongs zin par 'gyur / / lam med lam du 'jug pa rnam s kyi nad che ba / / phyin par 'dod pas ri dags smig rgyu snyed pa 'dra / / rnyed pa'i yul[421.02]med 'jig rten gsum las yong mi 'byung / / sa bcur ltsos pa'i gnas kyang byang chub sgrigs pa yin / / shin tu myur ba'i ye shes bsam pa kun dang bral / / bshes gnyen kun las 'byung ba'i nor bu[421.03]rin chen bzhin / / dmigs pa med cing 'gyur ba med pa'i gnas la mi ltos par / / gi rang ri rang bzhin legs pas re ba thams cad skong / / btags na med la gzhang sna tshogs 'byung ba'i leg[421.04]pa che / / dngos su mi snang chags pa'i cha lugs kun la ston / / bdag dang gzhang du bral bai ston mkhan rin chen mdzod / / thams cad grub pa'i yul zhes bdag med snying rjes bstan / / rang nas[421.05]ma g.yos nang du btsal ba'i yul med de / / yul phyir chags shing yul la bsgna yo dmigs pa med / / mi 'byung mi 'jug bdag med snyin rje de yin na / / gzhang gyi nor ming mi 'on ye nas gnas pa[421.06]yin / / bde ba 'dod pas bde la rgyab kyi phyogs / / bde nges zin te bde bas bde ba 'tshol / / byang chub 'khruul ba ye ngam chos la za / / de lta'i yul can sngas rgyas mthong ba med / / sangs[421.07]rgyas med pas sngas rgyas ming yang med / / sngo rgyas ston pas ming du btags pas nor / / sngas rgyas gzhang na thob med nor pa'i lam / / gzung medchos kun bshad pa rdul tsam med / / [422.01]zin pas chags dang bral dang zhin / / dngos po med dang rnam par spang / / bdu dtshi chen po'i rang bzhin la / / bza' ba'i thabs la rag pa med / / yangs so che'o chos chen po / / chung ngu rnam s kyi gnyen po[422.02]yin / / che la dmigs pa'i cha mnyam nas / / chung ngu de rnam sdmigs dang bral / / gsungs dang rgyas la dmigs dang snang / / sgyu mkhan ri mo'i rnam pa bzhin / / 'byung 'jug ye shes bying rmugs kyi / / [422.03]de yi dbang las skye bar 'gyur / / btang ngo bzhag go rang bzhin te / / 'dod pa med cing len pa med / / brod pa rdul tsam mi skye zhing / / khyung chen nam mkha' ldings pa ltar / / spro ba med cing bsdus ba med / / [424.04]stong par mi dogs bsa' ba med / / bza' ba'i yul dang bral te re dogs med / / rgya mthos bzhin du ye gnas la / / chos rnam sna tshogs 'byung bar byed / / yon tan nam mkha' mtha' dang mnyam / / bsdus[422.05]ba'i gnas su nges ba med / / byang chub snying por de ma thag / / ting 'dzin rgyal po chen po 'byung / / snang ba rgya mtho chen po bzhin / / mi rtog nam mkha'i mkha' ltar yangs / / kun tu bzung po'i spyod yul la / / [422.06]skye zhing 'pho ba'i gnas med de / / rgyu rkyen yan lag bcu gnyis po / / skur btags pas bshad pa yin / / 'khruul pa rnam s kyi sgo tsam du / / mkhas pas de bzhin shes par gyis / / 'gro ba'i rgyud[422.07]drug snang ba yang / / dang po'i lam du shes par gyis / / 'dod sbyod snying rjes brnyal pas na / / gang du dag 'bar byang chub spyod / / shan pa mdag 'tshong mthams med
Inga / kha na mtho 'jig rten spod / [423.01]yongs su rdzogs pa chos kyi rtsi / bde ba che las gzhan med do / rnam par mi rtog snyin po 'di / yongs kyi rgyus la spas pa med / mi len byang chub spyod lam la / [423.02]rnam pa kun tu rang bzhin gnas / yul thams cad la 'jug pa'i bsam gtan du bya ba / rnam par mi rtog pa'i snyin po / man ngag 'di rnams kyang sms chos kyid du gyur pa rnams kyi rna bar rgyud pa[423.02] / khyung chen ldings pa rdzogs so
Appendix 4: Citation Index

Entries with page numbers in red are unidentified. Sources marked by ‘*’ signify where citations are not explicitly identified by Rongzom. Entries marked by ‘cf.’ are considered so similar as to warrant the identification of a source. When an entry appears to be a gloss of a general trope, readers will find multiple references to the sources.

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<th>Page(s)</th>
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<td>Chapter 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>417.03-417.04</td>
<td>The first clause - <em>nyon mongs pa rnams kyis beings</em> - is found in works such as Tōh. 1147: Brgya lnga bcu pa zhes bya ba ’i bstod pa (Satapañca-śatika-nāmasya-stotra) in bsTan ’gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 1994, bstod tsgos, ka, rgyud, ka, vol. 1 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): 427.02; and the second - <em>’khor ba’i rgya mtshor ’khyams</em> - is found in texts such as Tōh. 4092: Chos mgon pa’i mdzod kyi ’grel bshad (Abhidharma-kośa-tkā) in bsTan ’gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2001, mgnon pa, gu-ngu, vol. 80 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): 1649.06; and Tōh. 0829: De bzhin gshegs pa thams cad kyi thugs gsang ba’i ye shes don gyi snying po rdo rje bkod pa’i rgyud rnal ’byor grub pa’i lung kun ’dus rig pa’i mdo theg pa chen po mngon par rto gs pa’i chos kyi rnam grangs rnam par bkod pa (Sarva-tathāgata-citta-jñāna-guhya-artha-garba-vyūha-vajra-tantra in bKa’ ’gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): 328.18. Cf. Tōh. 3307: btsan pa’i ’khor lo’i cho ga (Sthiracakra-bhāvanā) in bsTan ’gyur (Dpe bsdur ma), rgyud, mu, vol. 40, p. 9. These lines also occur in Tōh. 1126: Rdo rje ’chang chen po’i bstod pa (Mahāvajradhāra-stotra), bstan ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1994. Beijing: Krung go’i bod kyi shes rig dpe skrun khang, rgyud, ka, vol. 1, p. 222. The same lines found there also appear in Tōh. 2219: Ye shes grub pa zhes bya ba’i sgrub pa’i thabs (Jñānasiddhi-nāma-sādhana-pikā), btsan ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1994, rgyud, ka, vol. 26 p. 98.</td>
<td>gang gi phyir nyon mongs pa rnams kyis beings te ’gro ba rnams ’khor ba’i rgya mtshor ’khyams so</td>
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<td>420.17-</td>
<td>Tōh. 4021: Dbus dang mtha’ rnam par ’byed</td>
<td>khams gsum pa’i sens dang</td>
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<td>420.19</td>
<td>pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa (Madhyānta-vighanga-kārikā) in bSタン 'gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2001, mdo sde, pi-phi, vol. 70 (Beijing: Krun go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): <strong>yang dag pa</strong> yin kun rtag ni</td>
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<td>420.20-421.04</td>
<td><strong>Töh. 4048: Theg pa chen po bsdzus pa</strong> (Mahāyānasamgraha 2.29) in bSタン 'gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2001, sems tsam, ri-li, vol. 76 (Beijing: Krun go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): dper na sa khong na gser yod pa la sa dang gser dang sa'i kham gsum dmigs so de la gser la sar mthong ba ni phyin ci log du mthong ba'o gser du mthong ba ni yang dag par mthong ba'o sa'i [421] kham gsum ni gnyi ga'i char glogs pa'o</td>
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<td>422.05-422.10</td>
<td><strong>Töh. 3881: Bden pa gnyis rnam par 'byed pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa</strong> (Śatya-dvaya-vibhaga-kārikā) in bSタン 'gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2000, dbu ma, sha-sa, vol. 62 (Beijing: Krun go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): <strong>gzhzan yang</strong> 'di skad du <strong>yang dag pa</strong> dang yang dag pa ma yin pa'i kund rdozob kyi dbye ba rnam par gzhag pa snang du 'dra yang don byed nus pa'i phyir dang mi nus phyir yang dag yang dag ma yin pas kun rdozob kyi ni dbye ba byas</td>
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<td>424.06-424.08</td>
<td><strong>cf. Töh. 0060: 'Phags pa yab dang sras mjal ba zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo (Pitāputra-samāgama-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra) in bKa' 'gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 1999, Dkon brtsegs, nga, vol. 42 (Beijing: Krun go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang), pp. 363.04-373.02.</strong></td>
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<td>427.20-428.14</td>
<td><strong>cf. Töh. 0176: 'Phags pa dri ma med par grags pas bstan pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo (Vimalakīrti-nirdesā-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra) in bKa' 'gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2009, mdo sde, ma, vol. 60 (Beijing: Krun go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang), pp. 471.21-474.20.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>430.19-430.20</td>
<td>cf. Tōh. 3787: 'Phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag nyi shu Inga pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi 'grel pa (Pañca-vimśati-sāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramita-upadeśa-sāstra-abhisamaya-alaṅkāra-vṛtti) in bsTan 'gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 1999, sher phyin ka-kha, vol. 29 (Beijing: Krung go'i bōd rīg pa'i dpe skrun khang), s.v.</td>
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<td>434.15</td>
<td>tshang pa mi 'chi ba zhes bya ba la smras pa</td>
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<tr>
<td>435.10-435.11</td>
<td>cf. Bka’ rtags kyi phyag rgya bzhí</td>
<td>dus byas thams cad mi rtag pa dang</td>
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<td>435.12-435.14</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>chos thams cad ngo bo nyid nyed par gsungs pa yin zhiṅ rgyu rkyen gzhan gyi dbang las skye bas gsu ma lta bu’is sgra ’jug go</td>
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<td>436.07-436.09</td>
<td>cf. Tōh. 0361: Dbang mdor bstan pa (Sekkōdeśa) in bKa’ ‘gyur (Dpe bsdu ma) 2008, rgyud ‘bum, ka, vol. 77 (Beijing: Krun go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang):</td>
<td>di’i ltar gsungs brynang dag la yang pra se na’i sngags sgrub pas mngon par bsngags pa’i me long la gzhon nu ma gtsang mas bta na</td>
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<tr>
<td>436.22-436.24</td>
<td>Tōh. 0065: Sgyu ma mkhan bzang po lung bstan pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo (Bhadra-māyākāra-vyakaraṇa-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra) in bKa’ ‘gyur (Dpe bsdu ma) 2008, dkon brtsegs, ca, vol. 43 (Beijing: Krun go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang):</td>
<td>di skad du</td>
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<td>437.21-437.22</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>di’ skad du khoṇ kyis ’go’ la ma he’i rwa shin du che ba gnyis yod par gsoms shig ces smras so</td>
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<tr>
<td>439.18-439.22</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>de la’i di brjod par bya ste</td>
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<td>440.01-440.04</td>
<td>cf. Pali Vinaya 1.41</td>
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<td>440.04-440.06</td>
<td>'Toh. 0287: 'Phags pa dam pa'i chos dran pa nye bar gzhag pa (Ārya-saddharmānusmṛtyupasthāna) in bKa’ guur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2008, mdo sde, sha, vol. 71, (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): chos rnam thams cad rgyu las byung</td>
<td>de rgyu de de bzhin gshegs pas gsungs</td>
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<td>440.06-440.07</td>
<td>'Toh. 0981: 'Phags pa rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i snying po (Ārya-pratītyasamutpādha-rdaya-nāma in bKa’ guur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rgyud 'bum, na, vol. 88, (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): chos rgyas thams cad rgyu las byung</td>
<td>de rgyu de de bzhin gshegs pas gsungs</td>
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<td>440.15-440.18</td>
<td>'Toh. 0138: 'Phags pa 'dus pa chen po rin po che tog gi gzungs zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo (Mahāsāminīpataratanakutudhāra nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra), in bKa’ guur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2008, Mdo sde, na (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): ji ltar 'jig rten las dang nyan mongs rgyur bca' byed rgyu ldan 'byung dang</td>
<td>las dang nyan mongs pa dag ldog rgyu de yang 'dren pas rab tu gsungs</td>
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<td>440.19-440.23</td>
<td>cf. 'Toh. 4113: 'Dul ba gzhi rgya cher 'grel pa (Vinaya-vastu-tīkā) in bKa’ guur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2002, 'dul ba, tsu-tshu, vol. 87 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): rten 'cing 'brel bar 'byung ba la mkhugs pa ches bya ba ni 'di lta ste</td>
<td>'di yod pas 'di 'byung ba 'di skyes pa'i phyur 'si skyes ba ste</td>
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*dang rkyen 'gags na 'bras bu' ang 'gags par 'gyur te | 'di nyid tsam mtha' gnyis bsa'i 'bri rnam par gral ba'i lam po chen yin par gsungs yi | rgyu 'bras kyi rgyun nam yang mi ldog go zhes ma gsungs so | (439.18-439.22).*

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<td>440.19-440.23</td>
<td>cf. 'Toh. 4113: 'Dul ba gzhi rgya cher 'grel pa (Vinaya-vastu-tīkā) in bKa’ guur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2002, 'dul ba, tsu-tshu, vol. 87 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): rten 'cing 'brel bar 'byung ba la mkhugs pa ches bya ba ni 'di lta ste</td>
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*dil tar | ye dha rmāhe tu pra bha ba | te dur te sāng ta thā ga to hāya ba | dat te sān tsā yo ni ro dha | e bān bā di ma hā shra ma na | zhes bya ba 'di dis rgyas bta'b par thams cad | sāngs rgyas kyi phyag rgyas bta'b par shes so | (440.01-440.04).*
ltar na sdug bsgal gyi phung po chen po 'bab zhig pa 'di 'byung bar 'gyur ro zhes bya ba 'i bar dang 'di lta ste 'di med pas 'di mi 'byung la 'di ma skyes pa 'i phyur 'di mi skye ba ste 'di lta ste ma rig pa 'gags pas 'du byed rnams 'gag ches bya ba nas 'de ltar na sdug bsgal gyi phung po chen po 'ba zhig pa 'di 'gag par 'gyur ro zhes bya ba 'i bar gyi dbye bas lugs su 'byung ba dang (699.03-699.11).

ste ma rig pa 'gags pas 'du byed 'gag ces bya ba nas 'khor ba ji srid pa 'i phung po 'gag par 'gyur ro zhes gsungs pa'i don yang de 'dra ste (440.19-440.23).

441.01.441.02  Töh. 3836: r'en cing 'brel bar 'byung ba'i snying po'i thshig le'ur byas pa (Pratitya-samutpāda-hṛdaya-kārikā) in bsTan 'gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2000, dbu ma, tsa-cha, vol. 57 (Beijing: Krong go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): 'kha thon mar me long rgya 'me shel sa bon skyar dang sgras 'plung po nyiṅ mtshams shyor 'ba'ang 'mi 'pho bar yang mkhas rtogs bya ba 'gag ces bya ba nas (403.01-403.02).

441.04-441.05  Töh. 3836: r'en cing 'brel bar 'byung ba'i snying po'i thshig le'ur byas pa (Pratitya-samutpāda-hṛdaya-kārikā) in bsTan 'gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2000, dbu ma, tsa-cha, vol. 57 (Beijing: Krong go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): shin tu phra ba'i dngos la yang || gang gi chad par rnam brtags pa || rnam par mi mkhas de yis ni || skyen las byung ba'i don ma mthong (403.03-403.04). This verse is a remarkably similar to v. 12 of the Yuktiṣṭhikā (Rigs pa drug bcu pa): dngos po shin tu phra ba la'ang || gang gis skye bar rnam brtags pa || rnam par mi mkhas de yis ni || skyen las byung ba'i don ma mthong (Jamieson 2000: 51 n. 6).  

442.19-442.23  Töh. 0451: Dpal rdo rje snying po rgyan gyi rgyud (Sri-vajra-hṛdaya-ālaṃkāra-tantra-nāma) in bKa' 'gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rgyud bum, cha, vol. 82, (Beijing: Krong go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): dper na mi gang chen bya ba'i chen po chen po 'bab zhig pa 'di 'byung bar 'gyur ro zhes bya ba 'i bar dang 'di lta ste 'di med pas 'di mi 'byung la 'di ma skyes pa 'i phyur 'di mi skye ba ste 'di lta ste ma rig pa 'gags pas 'du byed rnams 'gag ches bya ba nas 'de ltar na sdug bsgal gyi phung po chen po 'ba zhig pa 'di 'gag par 'gyur ro zhes bya ba 'i bar gyi dbye bas lugs su 'byung ba dang (699.03-699.11).
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<td>442.23-434.02</td>
<td>'Tōh. 1790: Sgron ma gsal byar byed pa'i gsal byed cyes bya ba'i dka' grel (Pradīpodyotonodyotana-pañjikā) in bsTan 'gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 1997, rgyud. a-ki, vol. 16 (Beijing: Krun go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang), which claims to cite 'Tōh. 443: 'Dus pa phyi ma:</td>
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<td>447.10-447.16</td>
<td>'Tōh. 0466: Rgyud kyi rgyal po chen po sgyu 'phrul dra ba (Māyājala-mahātantra-rāja-nāma) in bKa' 'gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rgyud 'bum, ja, vol. 83 (Beijing: Krun go'i bod (Beijing: Krun go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang), p. 386.05-386.10; also cited in 'Tōh. 2092: Mtshan yang dag par brjod pa'i 'grel pa mshon don gsal bar byed pa'i sgron ma (Nāma-sangiti-vṛtti-nāmārtha-prakāśa-kañāna-dīpa-nāma) in bsTan 'gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, tshi-zi, vol. 25 (Beijing: Krun go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang), p. 27.13-27.16</td>
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<td>447.22-448.01</td>
<td>'Tōh. 0119: 'Phags pa yongs su bya'ng na las 'das pa chen po'i mdo (Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra) in bKa' 'gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2008, mdo sde, nya, vol. 52 (Beijing: Krun go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): 1 'bab chu'i chu klung thams cad ni 11 nges par gya gyu yod yang dag 11 nag tshal glog pa thams cad ni 11 nges par shing de gdon mi za 11 [371] bud med smos pa thams cad ni 11 kun kyang g.yo sgyu yod du nges (370.20-371.01)</td>
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<td>448.01-448.06</td>
<td>cf. 'Tōh. 0119: 'Phags pa yongs su bya'ng na las 'das pa chen po'i mdo (Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra) in bKa' 'gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2008, mdo sde, nya, vol. 52 (Beijing: Krun go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): 1 'bab chu'i chu klung thams cad ni 11 nges par gya gyu yod yang dag 11 nag tshal glog pa thams cad ni 11 nges par shing de gdon mi za 11 [371] bud med smos pa thams cad ni 11 kun kyang g.yo sgyu yod du nges (370.20-371.01).</td>
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byas pa thams cad mi rtag ste ◐ bdor gshegs sku mchog rtag par bzhugs ◐ ji tsam skye ba sdu掘 bsngal bcas mi rtag ye shes skyes pa bde ◐ chos kun sgyu ma lta bu ste ◐ mnya ngan 'das pa guy 'phrul bral ◐ zhes gsungs pa lta bu’o ◐ (448.01-448.06).

di skad du ’gro ba rnams kyi nyon mongs pa’i nad ma sos kyi bar du ◐ byang chub sens dpa’ rnams kyi snyin rje’i snyun mi g dang so zhes ’byung ba dang ◐.

smon lam gyi mtha’ 'bstan pa las ◐ nam mkha’i mthar thugs gyur pa ji tsam par ◐ sens can ma lus mtha’ yang de bzhin te ◐ ji tsam las dang nyon mongs mthar gyur par ◐ sens can ma lus mtha’ yang bde te ◐ ji tsam las dang nyon mongs mthar gyur par ◐ bdag gi smon lam mtha’ yang de bzhin no ◐ zhes gsungs pa lta bu yin no ◐ (449.14-449.17).

1 yang ’di skad du ◐ snod kyi ’jig rten dang bcud kyi ’jig rten du bcas pa rnams kyi ◐ rdul ’phra mo re re dang ba spu’i bu ga re re la’ang ◐ thugs rje chen po’i byin brlabs grangs med pa’ jug go zhes kyang bshad pa yin no ◐ (449.17-449.19).

sangs rgyas gzugs su mi blta mtshan dang ni ◐ rig dang rgyud du mi brtag sgra dang ni ◐ chad par ’gyur ba yin yin sens dang ni ◐ rnam shes yid kyis rab tu phye ma yin ◐ chos nyid gang yin de ni bcom ldan ’das ◐ ce’am (449.22-449.24).
bya ba shin tu rgyas pa chen po'i mdo (Buddha-avatamsaka-nāma-mahāvaiypula-sūtra) in bKa’-gyur (Dpebsdur ma) 2007, phal po che, ka, vol. 35 (Beijing: Krun go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): 1 chos nyid de ni shes pa min 1 mtshan ma dag la spyod gti mug dra ba ‘phrub bar ‘gyur 11 sangs rgyas gang gis ma mthong ba 1 (539.15-539.17); and: 1 gang rnam mtshan ma’i rjes ‘brang ba 11 de dag byis pa’i chos nyid de 11 de phyir mtshan nyid kun med pa’i 11 sangs rgyas rnam kyang mi mthong ngo 1 (540.04-540.06).


Töh. 0100: ‘Phags pa sangs rgyas thams cad kyi yul la ’jug pa’i ye shes snang ba’i rgyan zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo (Ārya-sarva-buddha-visayavatāra-gñāna-āłoka-alankāra-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra in bKa’-gyur (Dpebsdur ma) 2008, mgo sde, ga, vol. 47 (Beijing: Krun go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): 1 de bzhin gshegs pa rtag tu skye med chos 11 chos rnam kyang bde bar gshegs dang ‘dra 11 byis pa’i blo can mtshan mar ‘dzin pa rnam 11 ’jig rten dag na med pa’i chos la spyod 1 (748.09–748.11).


Töh. 0004: Sangs rgyas phal po che zhes bya ba shin tu rgyas pa chen po’i mdo (Buddha-avatamsaka-nāma-mahāvaiypula-sūtra) in bKa’-gyur (Dpebsdur ma) 2007, phal po che, ka, vol. 35 (Beijing: Krun go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): 1 gang rnam bdag dang sangs rgyas dag 11 rang bzhin mnyam par rab gnas shing 11 mi gnas len pa med pa rnam 11 de dag 1 (450.06-450.08).
| bde bar gshegs par ’gyur || gzugs dang tshor ba ’du shes dang || rnam par shes dang sens pa dag \ | de dag thub pa chen por ’gyur \ (430.14-431.18). |
|---||---|

| 451.23-452.03 | x \ di skad du ’di na sprul ga re \ (451.23-452.03). |

| 455.24-456.03 | ’Toh 2591: Byang chub kyi sens bsgom pa (Bodhicitta-bhāvana) in bsTan ’gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krun ggo'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): \ kun du rto g pa can yan lag ma yin kun du rto g pas rtson myed nyams || blo gros phyin ci log du gyur cing ma rig rkyen gi dbang song bas || sens dang sens las byung ba de nyid lus gsum don du snang ba yin \ (811.09-811.11). |

| 456.19-456.21 | ’Toh 2591: Byang chub kyi sens bsgom pa (Bodhicitta-bhāvana) in bsTan ’gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krun ggo'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): \ ’du byed sna tshogs dag gis bag chags bsags las gang goms mthu brtas tshes \ sens nyid yul dang lus 'drar snang ba ras pas gang ba bzhin du snang \ (811.09-811.11). |

| 457.03-457.04 | ’Toh 2591: Byang chub kyi sens bsgom pa (Bodhicitta-bhāvana) in bsTan ’gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krun ggo'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): \ bag chags bsags pa'i rgyun la dmigs skyes yid la brtags pa'i bdag med pa \ (811.11-811.12). |

| 457.09-457.10 | ’Toh 2591: Byang chub kyi sens bsgom pa (Bodhicitta-bhāvana) in bsTan ’gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krun ggo'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): \ ’du byed mthu yis bsgrigs shing 'phra ba ma mthong de las rnam rig skyes \ zhes gsungs pa ste \ (RZSB 457.09-457.10). |

| Chapter 3 |

| 466.12-466.14 | ’Toh 2578: Byang chub kyi sens bsgom pa don bcu gnyis bstan pa (Bodhicitta-bhāvana) in bsTan ’gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krun ggo'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): \ ’di kun rten cing 'brel ’byung tshul te skye dang ’gag par ’gyur zhes pa \ tshig pa'i sa bon bzhin du myed las myed pa mi ’byung rgyu 'bras myed \ zhes bya ba las stogs pa'o || \ 196.07-196.09). |
Tôh 2591: Byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa (Bodhicitta-bhāvanā) in bsTan 'gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang):

dngos por zhen cing rgyu dang 'bras bur rtog pa'i sems nnyi ni \| rgyu dang rkyen du snang ste \| zhes bya ba la sstogs pa rgya cher gsungs so \|

Tôh. 367: rTog pa thams cad 'dus pa zhes bya ba sangs rgyas thams cad dang mnyam par sbyor ba mkha’'gro sgyu ma bde ba'i mchog gi rgyud phyi ma'i phyi ma (Sarva-kalpa-samuccaya-nāma-sarvabuddha-samāyoga-dākinī-jāla-śaṃvara-uttarottara-tantra) in bKa’ 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rgyud 'bum, ka, vol. 77 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): \| de la ji ltar rtog pa'i don rgyud yin zhe na \| rnam par mi rtogchos dag las \| sems can don du yongs su rtog \| de phyir rtog par yang dag bshad \| rtog pa yongs su dag phyir ro \| 552.05-552.07

rnal 'byor spyod pa'i tshul las \| 'di ltar rgyal ba'i bka’ rnam las \| yod pa dang myed pa'i tshig gis bstan pa thams cad kyi dgongs gzhi ni \| ngo bo nyid rnam pa gsum gyi mtshan nyid la dgongs te gsungs pa yin no zhe'o \| (475.17-475.19).

rgyal ba'i bka’ rnam las yod pa dang myed pa'i tshig gis bstan pa thams cad kyi dgongs gzhi ni \| don dam pa dang kun rdzob kyi bden pa'i mtshan nyid la dgongs te gsungs pa yin no zhe'o \| (475.20-475.22).

las nyid rang byung gi ye shes \| sādug bṣingal nyid byang chub bo zhes gsungs pa'i don yang ‘di lta bu yin no \| (479.16-479.17)

'di skad du \| rang gi grub mtha’ ni ril por 'dzin pa'i bloṣ bzulms te \| khyes kyi grub mthsas mi phyed par byed do \| khyed kyi grub mtha’ ni rjes su gzhig pa’o bloṣ bṣiṅg ste ma grub par byed do \| zhes khas ni mi len to \| (482.11-482.13).

ji skad du \| sems de kho na byang chub ste \| byang chub gang yin sems yin no \| sems dang byang chub

Chapter 4

las nyid rang byung gi ye shes \| sādug bṣingal nyid byang chub bo zhes gsungs pa'i don yang ‘di lta bu yin no \| (479.16-479.17)

'di skad du \| rang gi grub mtha’ ni ril por 'dzin pa'i bloṣ bzulms te \| khyes kyi grub mthsas mi phyed par byed do \| khyed kyi grub mtha’ ni rjes su gzhig pa’o bloṣ bṣiṅg ste ma grub par byed do \| zhes khas ni mi len to \| (482.11-482.13).

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<td>*byang chub kyi sems rdo rje sems dpā’ nam mkha’ che las</td>
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<td>494.21-494.23</td>
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<td>Cf. Tōh. 0176: ‘Phags pa dri ma med par grags pas bs tan pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo (Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra) in bKa’ ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2009, mdo sde, ma, vol. 60 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): mi skye bar so sor rtog kyang nyan thos kyi nges par yang mi ltung</td>
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<td>495.06-495.08</td>
<td>Tōh. 0044: Sangs rgyas phal po che zhes bya ba shin tu rgyas pa chen po’i mdo (Buddhāvalamsa – nāma-mahāvāipulya-sūtra) in bKa’ ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2007, phal po che, ka, vol 35 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang):</td>
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<td>495.08-495.11</td>
<td>Tōh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayaḥ-rājā) in bKa’ ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i</td>
<td>*sdong pos brya’ tan pa’i mdo las</td>
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650
504.07. Töh. 0466: Rgyud kyi rgyal po chen po sgyu phrul dra ba (Māyājīta-mahātantra-rāja-nāma) in bKa’’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rgyud ‘bum, sgom chos kyi sku ni khyad par don myed pas || rang byung ye shes mi rtag kun du ji bzhin gnas || zhes gsung pa ste || (495.09-495.11).

503.22. Töh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarvadharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayāḥ-rāja) in bKa’’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krun go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): \( \text{snang ba } \text{med pa’i } \text{chos nyid } \text{ni } \text{ma } \text{btsal } \text{bzhag pas } \text{bsgom pa } \text{yin } \text{de dang der } \text{ni } \text{rnam btsal na } \text{de las de } \text{bzhin de mi ’byung } \text{|| (79.02-79.04). Cf. BGB Khuyung chen lding; } \text{snang ba } \text{med pa’i } \text{chos nyid } \text{ni } \text{ma } \text{btsal } \text{bzhag na } \text{bsgom pa } \text{yin } \text{|| (359.02); cited in STMG (352.04-342.05) under the name Nam mkha’}’

504.01-504.03. Töh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarvadharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayāḥ-rāja) in bKa’’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krun go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): \( \text{khyad par cir yang } \text{mtshungs pa las } \text{|| las so } \text{zhes ni } \text{rnam par brtags } \text{|| ci ste las kyi dbang gyur na } \text{|| rang byung ye shes yod ma } \text{yin } \text{|| (79.08-79.10). The first line of this verse also appears in Töh. 0829: De bzhin gshegs pa thams kad kyi thugs gsang ba’i ye shes don gyl snying po rdlo rje bkod pa’i rgyud rnal ‘byor grub pa’i lung kun ’dus rig pa’i mdo theg pa chen po rnung par rtags pa’i chos kyi rnam grangs Nam par bkod pa (Sarva-tathāgata-citta-jñāna-guhya-artha-garbha-tyāha-vajra-tantra) in bKa’’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krun go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang), p. 355.07.}

503.20-503.22. Töh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarvadharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayāḥ-rāja) in bKa’’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krun go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): \( \text{snang ba myed pa’i } \text{chos nyid } \text{ni } \text{ma } \text{btsal } \text{bzhag pa } \text{bsgom pa } \text{yin } \text{de dang der } \text{ni } \text{rnam btsal na } \text{de las de } \text{bzhin de mi ’byung } \text{|| (66.04-66.06).}

496.09-496.11. Töh. 0013: ’Phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa sgd pa tshigs su bcad pa (Ārya-prajñā-pāramitā-saṃcaya-gāthā) in bKa’’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, shes rab sna tshogs, ka, vol. 34 (Beijing: Krun go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): \( \text{’gro ba’ } \text{khru’l pa } \text{ri dags rgyar chud } \text{’drar shes nas } \text{|| shes rab Idan pa mkha’ } \text{la } \text{bzhin rnam par rgyu } \text{\| (15.02-15.03).}

497.01-497.03. Töh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarvadharmatā-bodhicitta-kulayāḥ-rāja) in bKa’’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krun go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): \( \text{yangs so che’o } \text{chos chen po } \text{|| chung ngu } \text{rnam kyi } \text{gyen po } \text{yin } \text{|| che la } \text{dngos pa’i } \text{cha } \text{bsnyams nas } \text{|| chung che de } \text{rnam dsungs dang bral } \text{|| zhes gsungs pa } \text{ita bu yin no } \text{|| (496.09-496.11).}

651
504.08-504.10
'Thö. 0466: rGyud kyi rgyal po chen po sgyu phral dra ba (Māyājāla-mahātantra-raja-nāma) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rgyud 'bum, ja, vol. 83 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang) 1 yi byang chub spel ba’i phyril 1 las kyi tshul ni sna tshogs yin 1 (386.21). Here, the text is identified as the Vairocana-Māyājāla and Rongzom’s text omits three lines.

504.16-504.17
'Thö. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarvadharm-%mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayah-rāja) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang) 1 rgyu nyid rdo rje rkyen dang’ dra 1 ma skyes pas na ’jig pa myed 1 gdod nas snying po byang chub la 1 brtsla ba’i bsam pas dbyangs mi bskyod 1 zhes gsungs pa dang yang mthun no 1 (504.08-504.10).

504.19-504.21
'Thö. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarvadharm-%mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayah-rāja) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang) 1 yon tan chen po’i bsam gtan ni 1 bsam gtan nyid pas bsam du med 1 ma bsams ma sbangs chos bzhin du 1 rnam rtog nyis las ye shes skye 1 (79.10-79.12). Also found in the Khyung chen.

505.03-505.05
'Thö. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarvadharm-%mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayah-rāja) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang) 1 phra’ ba’i sgo mor ming btags te 1 sens kyi dben pa lam tshol zhing 1 dgon pa’i rgyud du dben ’dzin cing 1 brtags na rnam par rtog ’gyur bsgeom 1 (79.15-79.17).

505.10.505.11
rNam par mi rtog sgom lung

rnam par mi rtog pa sgom pa na 1 blo rten gang la’ang mi ’cha’ 1 yul gang la’ang mi dmigs 1 rnam pa cir yang mi rtog pa’i bsgeom no (505.10.505.11)

505.16-505.18
'Thö. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarvadharm-%mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayah-rāja) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang) 1 rgyu dang ’bras kyi gol sa ni 1 rgyu dang ’bras brur ming btags shing 1 dge sdig gnyis ga rnam par sel 1 ’jig rten’i las ’byung ngo zhes 1 blang dor brod pa mchog du skyed 1 ces
*(Töh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsānti-bodhicitta-kulayab-rāja) in bKa’ gur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): 1. chags dang ma chags tshig gi lam 1 1 dbu ma bzhin te brag ca’ dra 1 1 bde dang sduŋ bsgal rgyu mthun zhes 1 1 ’gro ba’i mgon po sems dpas gsungs 1 (79.18-79.20). Cf. BGB Khyung chen 2, 306.04-360.05.

506.03-506.06

dang po lam dbu ma tshol ba gnyis su myed pa’i lam las gol ba ni 1 1 chags dang ma chags tshig gi lam 1 1 dbu ma bzhin te brag cha’ dra 1 1 bde dang sduŋ bsgal rgyu mthun zhes 1 1 ’gro ba’i mgon po sems dpas gsungs 1 (506.03-506.06).

506.16-506.18

dma’o sangs rgyas spyod yul ’di 1 1 btsal bas rnyed pa’i gnas med de 1 1 drug gi chos bzhin yul med pas 1 1 mdongs pas nam mkha’ bsnyabs pa bzhin (80.07-80.09). Cf. BGB Khyung chen (361.02-361.03) contains the verse minus the first line.

507.13-507.14

gsum pa lam gyi rim pa la bgra’ ba’i ’dod pas 1 bgra’ ba’i lam las gol bar gur pa ni 1 1 gong nas gong du tshangs pa’i lam 1 1 btsal bas rnyed pa’i gnas med de 1 1 drug gi chos bzhin yul med pas 1 1 mdongs pas nam mkha’ bsnyabs pa bzhin (79.18). Cf. BGB Khyung chen.

507.20-507.22

dde’ang ’dra ba yongs kyi lam 1 1 zla ba las byung rten dang bcas 1 1 kun kyi mnyam nyid yin pa la 1 1 phyogs su bglas pas grub pa myed 1 (507.20-507.22).

508.01-508.02

sdul pa tshigs su bcad pa las 1 theg pa’i di ni mkha’ ’dra gzhal nyed khang chen te 1 1 zhes gsungs pa bka’ bu ste 1 (508.01-508.02).

508.10-508.12

da bka’i bde dang phyi ma’i bde 1 1 mgon sum pa dang rgyal las byung 1 1 de’ang


509.09-509.11  "Töh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahâsânti-bodhicitta-kulayâh-râja) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsud ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Kung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | de la rten par mi bya'o | || zhes gsungs pa ste (509.09-509.11).

509.18-509.20  "Töh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahâsânti-bodhicitta-kulayâh-râja) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsud ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Kung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | de la rten par mi bya'o | || zhes gsungs pa ste (509.18-509.20).


byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po
(Sarva-dharmamahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayahrājā) in bKa’ gyur (dpebsdur ma) 2008,
nying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang):
| ‘di la brtul zhugs drag shul kyi || gnas su bya ba’i ming
med de || a dang par ni rnam ldan na ||
sgyu ma’i bde ba’ byung bar’ dod ||
| ces gsungs pa ste (510.09-510.11).

510.19-510.21
‘Tōh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po
byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po
(Sarva-dharmamahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayahrājā) in bKa’ gyur (dpebsdur ma) 2008,
nying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang):
| byang chub yan lag kun kyi sgo || cha lugs bsgoms pas chu zla bzhin || ma gos ma chags ‘byung
gyur yang || bsgoms pas byis pa’i spyod yul bzhin (81.15-81.16).

511.01-511.03
‘Tōh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po
byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po
(Sarva-dharmamahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayahrājā) in bKa’ gyur (dpebsdur ma) 2008,
nying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang):
| dkyil ’khor khrong gyur cha lugs kyi || khrong bdag chen po’i lus bzung nas || yi ge
mgon du gyur na’ang || zhi ba de nyid mthong ba min ||
| ces gsungs pa ste (511.01-511.03).
| 511.23-512.01 | "TöEHICLE. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahåsånti-bodhicitta-kulayab-råja) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krong go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | lhun gyis gnas pa'i bde chen de || mtshungs pa nyed pa'i ye shes kyi || rang gi mthu' yis rig [512] pa las || chos ni gzhlan las 'byung mi 'gyur || zhes gsungs pa ste (511.23-512.01). |
| 512.06-512.08 | "Töehicle. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahåsånti-bodhicitta-kulayab-råja) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krong go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | sla zhung dka’ la bslad phyir dka’ || mngon sum mi gnas kun tu khyab || ming tsam ’di zhes bstan par ni || rdo rje sems dpas mtshon du nyed (512.06-512.08). |
| 512.13-512.15 | "Töehicle. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahåsånti-bodhicitta-kulayab-råja) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krong go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | di ni thams cad mtshungs pa'i lam || ’gro ba kun la rang bzhi gnas || byis pas bslad pas ’khrul pa'i phyir || sman nyid sman pa tshol ba bzhi || zhes gsungs pa ste (512.13-512.15). |
| 512.21-512.23 | "Töehicle. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahåsånti-bodhicitta-kulayab-råja) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krong go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | go ba'i yul na bde ba che || de nyid rnam dag ’jig rten yin || de la phyogs kyi’ od ’dus pas || phyogs bzhi mtshams dang bla’ og ’grub || ma nges ’ja’ tshon kha dog las || rigs kyi khyad par mngon par snang || zhes gsungs pa ste (512.21-512.23). |
| 514.07-514.09 | "Töehicle. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahåsånti-bodhicitta-kulayab-råja) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krong go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | de bas de lung de nyid la || de las de byar sgrib par 'gyur || de ltar de la de rtag na || de la de nyid thob pa nyed || zhes gsungs pa ste (514.07-514.09). |
| 519.18-519.23 | "Töehicle. 4447: Lta ba yang dag sgron ma. See Takahashi 2009 for critical edition of the text. | rmi lam dag gi bde dang sdug bsngal yang || sad par gyur na rang bzhi mnjam pa ltar || rnam par rtog dang mi rtog gnyi’ ga’ang ||
| 520.03-520.05 | *Tōh 4447: Lta ba yang dag sgron ma. See Takahashi 2009 for critical edition of the text. |
| 520.06-520.08 | *Tōh 4447: Lta ba yang dag sgron ma. See Takahashi 2009 for critical edition of the text. |
| 520.21-521.01 | Tōh 2591: Byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa (Bodhicittabhāvāna) in bsTan ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang) |


| 520.03-520.05 |
| 520.06-520.08 |
| 520.13-520.14 |
| 520.21-521.01 |
| 521.14-521.16 |
| 521.18-521.18 |
"Tönh 2591: Byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa (Bodhicittabhāvānā) in bsTan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): bsgom pa'i sa mi rnyed phyir bsgoms pas rnyed par mi 'gyur te | zhes gsungs pa ste (521.19-521.20).

"Tönh 2591: Byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa (Bodhicittabhāvānā) in bsTan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | bsgom pa'i sa mi rnyed phyir bsgoms pas rnyed par mi 'gyur te | zhes gsungs pa ste (522.01-522.02).

"Tönh 2591: Byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa (Bodhicittabhāvānā) in bsTan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | sems kyi spyod yul shes pa de la de dag cho's rnam kyi ni cho's nyid yin | zhes gsungs te (522.11-522.13).

"Tönh 2591: Byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa (Bodhicittabhāvānā) in bsTan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | nam mkha' mi dmigs ming tsam dge dang mi dger byed med skye ba'ang med | (814.16-814.17).


"Tönh 2591: Byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa (Bodhicittabhāvānā) in bsTan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | rtsol ba yid la mi byed gang la'ang sems med shes dang mi shes bral | drang dang 'byed med gang la'ang 'ga' dang mtshungs med mi gnas mi dmigs shing | mnyam nas gnyis su brtag med brjod bral bya dang mi bya med de stogs bri med | (814.17-814.19).

"Tönh 0531: bCom ldan 'das ma shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i snying po (Bhagavatti-prajñā-pāramitā-hṛdaya) in bKa' 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rgyud 'bum, na, vol. 88, (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): bri ba med pa | gang ba med pa'o | (298.15).

"Tönh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po (Śarva-dharma-mahāsānti-bodhicitta-kulayārāja) in bKa' 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnyid rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | btang ngo gzhag go rang bzhin te | d'od pa myed cing len pa'ang myed | brod pa radl tsam mi skyed cing | kho'gyur chen nam mkhar ldings pa bzhin |
bzhag go rang bzhin te || 'dod pa med cing len pa med || brod pa rdul tsam mi bskyed do || khyung chen nam mkha' iding ba bzhin || spro ba med cing bsdu ba med || rgya mtsho bzhin du ye gnas la || chos rnam sna tshogs 'byung bar byed || (66.08-66.12). Cf. BGB Khyung chen; but cited in STMG (352.04-342.05) under the name Nam mkha' che. I think the last two lines are found in the NGB edition (Vol. ka) of the Khyung chen 419.07; and that these lines do not appear to be in the BGB edition; however cf. BGB edition 363.01.

524.13-524.15
'Tōh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayahrāja) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing; Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): || mong sum kun la mi rtog yangs pa'i snying po la || rnam dag lam der rhugs na nmyam pa'i rgyal po thob || (64.06-64.08). *Tōh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayahrāja) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing; Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): || mong sum kun la mi rtog yangs pa'i snying po la || rnam dag lam der rhugs na nmyam pa'i rgyal po thob || (64.06-64.08). *Tōh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayahrāja) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing; Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): || mong sum kun la mi rtog yangs pa'i snying po la || rnam dag lam der rhugs na nmyam pa'i rgyal po thob || (64.06-64.08). *Tōh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayahrāja) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing; Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): || mong sum kun la mi rtog yangs pa'i snying po la || rnam dag lam der rhugs na nmyam pa'i rgyal po thob || (64.06-64.08). *Tōh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayahrāja) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing; Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): || mong sum kun la mi rtog yangs pa'i snying po la || rnam dag lam der rhugs na nmyam pa'i rgyal po thob || (64.06-64.08).

524.20-525.01
'Tōh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayahrāja) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing; Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): || bsgrub med rtsal sprugs smon pa med pas na || bya med lhun rdzogs snga ma de nyid don || rtog spyod rnam dag gnis med chos dbyings la || log rtog byis pa'i spyod pas ci zhih bslus || gnis med bde chen sems can kun spyod la || 'khrul pa nor ba'i lam du brtags pa yang || gong du bstan pa'i lam chen de la mi gnis pas || mnyam par shes pas sangs rgyas kun gyi rje || (73.02-73.07). Identified by Rongzom as rTsal chen sprugs pa || tshul 'di nyid rtsal chen sprugs pa las kyang gsungs te || 'di skad du || bsgrub myed rtsal sprugs smon pa myed pa yi || bya myed lhun rdzogs snga ma'i de bzhin nytid || rtog spyod rnam dag bde chen rang bzhin la || log rtog byis pa'i spyod pas ci zhih bslu || gnis myed bde chen sems can kun spyod la || 'khrul pa nor ba'i lam du brtags pa'ang || gong du bstan pa'i lam chen de las mi gnis pas || mnyam par shes na [525] sangs rgyas kun kyi rje || zhes gsungs te || (524.20-525.01).

525.06-525.08
'Tōh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayahrāja) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing; Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): || rtog spyod rnam dag bde chen rang bzhin la || log rtog byis pa'i spyod pas ci zhih bslu || (525.06-525.08).

525.16-515.17
rājā) in bKa’’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): | zin pas rtsol ba’i nad spangs te | lun gyis gnas pas gzhag pa yin | (83.19-83.20). Identified by Rongzom as the Rdo rje tshig drug pa; Liljenberg (2010) identifies this as IOL Tib | 647: Rig pa’i khu byung. These lines appear in the brTsal chen sprugs pa (BGB v. 5, 306.03).


526.20-526.20 *Peking 5082: rDo rje sems dpa’ i zhus lan in bsTan’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) in bsTan’gyur (dpe bsdur ma), 1999, rgyud, khe-ge, vol. 48 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): | (dor ba med pas) kun tu bzang po [zhe’am gong gi] rdo rje sems dpa’i ngang | (351.10-351.11).


527.02-527.03 Tōh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayah-rājā) in bKa’’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): | don rnam sja bzhiin mi skyod de | bya ba med pas grol bas grol | (78.11-78.12). [Bairo Khyung chen]

527.03-527.05 BGB Don mchog ’di yang thung mong min rMad byung: | mad byung chub don rtogs nas | rdo rje sems dpa’ bdag nyid kyang | rdo rje gdan la yang sangs rgyas | (109.04-109.05).

527.09-527.10
yang sangs rgyas || zhes gsungs pa lta bu’o || (527.03-527.05).

cir mi dgongs zhes gsungs pa yin no || (527.09-527.10).

527.10-527.11

527.12-527.14
*Tōh. 4448: mTha’i mun sel sgron ma in bTsān gyur (dpe bsdur ma), 2005, sna tshogs, no-po, vol. 120 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): || ’gro la sens rgyud gnyis mi ’chang || de ni ma skyes rang mi dmigs || de las gnas pa’i sens myed phyir || bchos shing [963] gnas pa gang zhig yod !(962.20-963.01).

527.18-527.19
*Tōh. 4448: mTha’i mun sel sgron ma in bTsān gyur (dpe bsdur ma), 2005, sna tshogs, no-po, vol. 120 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): || ’khrul rtog rkyen dang ldan gyi bar || smig rgyu bzhin du sems snang la || rang bzhin shes pas bcos su med || de shes smig rgyu bcos pa bzhin || (963.01-963.03).

527.24-528.02
*Tōh. 4448: mTha’i mun sel sgron ma in bTsān gyur (dpe bsdur ma), 2005, sna tshogs, no-po, vol. 120 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): || mi rtog mtshan med sems nyid kyis || ma rtogs mtshan med sems rnam kyis || ma rtogs mtshan ma med la’ang gnas ma byed || mtshan mar ma med la mi gnas na || mtshan mar gnas pa smos ci dgos || (963.03-963.05).

528.05-528.07
*Tōh. 4451: lTa ba rin chen sgron ma bTsān gyur (dpe bsdur ma), 2005, sna tshogs, no-po, vol. 120 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): || sgyu ma’i mtshan nyid ma ’gags mngon sum ste || mtshan med ro gcig don dam dbyings su rtogs || (972.03-972.05).

528.08-528.12
*Tōh. 4450: rNal ’byor spyod pa’i lugs nges pa’i don la ji bzhin sgom thabs kyi sgron ma in bTsān gyur (dpe bsdur ma), 2005, sna tshogs, no-po, vol. 120 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig || lla ba rin po che sgron ma las kyang || sgyu ma’i mtshan nyid ma bka’ mngon sum ste || mtshan myed ro gcig don dam dbyings su rtogs || zhes gsungs pa’i tshul yang de ’dra’o || (528.05-528.07).
pa'i dpe skrun khang): ji ltar mtsshan med nam mkha' yang || || rang bzhin nyid nam mkha' yang || rang bzhin nyid kyis de lta'o || (969.01-969.03).

528.20-528.22 *Töh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsānti-bodhicitta-kulayahrāja) in bk'a' gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): || mi gnas dmigs pa'i yul med mi rtog chos kyi lam || bsngo ba'i cha shas phra [64] mo'i yul la byung ba ste || rtog sgom chos kyi sku ni khyad par don med pas || rang 'byung ye shes mi rtog kun tu ji bzhin gnas || (63-20-64.02). Identified as Byang chub kyi sens yul kun la 'jug || byang chub kyi sens yul kun la 'jug las || mi gnas dmigs pa'i yul med mi rtog chos kyi lam || bsngo ba'i cha shas phra mo'i yul las byung ba ste || rtog sgom chos kyi sku ni khyad par don med pas || rang 'byung ye shes mi rtog kun du ji bzhin gnas || (528.20-528.22).

528.23-529.01 In the rNam par mi rtog pa'i sgom lung dag ruami par mi rtog pa sgom pa'i tshe || sens gnas gang la'ang mi rien cing mi gnas || yul gang la'ang mi dmigs || ruami pa ji lta bur yang mi rtog par sgom pa ni || [529] chos kyi sku'i lam yin no zhes 'dod de || (528.22-529.01).

529.15-529.17 *Töh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sens kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsānti-bodhicitta-kulayahrāja) in bk'a' gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): || nam mkha' rtog pa skye med cing || rtog pa de nyid nam mkha' 'dra || ma chags nam mkha'bsngo ba las || rang don chen po nom mkha' 'byung || (80.01-80.03). First two lines - 'yang nam mkha' rtog pa skye med cing || rtog pa de nyid nam mkha' 'dra || ma chags nam mkha'bsngo ba las || rang don chen po nom mkha' 'byung || (BGB Yul kun la 'jug pa, 1.44.01) rdo rje sens dpa' nam mkha' che las kyang || nam mkha'i rtog pa skye med cing || rtog pa de nyid nam mkha' 'dra || ma chags nam mkha'bsngo ba las || rang don chen po nom mkha' 'byung || zhes gsungs te || (529.15-529.17).

530.05-530.08 *Töh. 4450: rNa'l 'byor spyod pa'i lugs nges pa'i don la ji bzhin sgom thabs kyi sgron ma in bsTan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2005, sna tshogs, no-po, vol. 120 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): || sens ni ci la 'ang mi gns dang || ci la'ang mi dmigs shes bya ba || sens la gns dmigs skyon sel ba'i || sens 'dzin phra mo de la yod || smig sgyu bzhin du sens med na || mi gnas mi dmigs byed pa gang || nrma mkha' rang la'ang mi gnas shes || (968.13-968.16). Identified as the Lus sens bcos myed thabs kyi sgron ma. || tshul 'di nyid lus sens bcos myed thabs kyi sgron ma las kyang gsungs te || sens ni ci la'ang mi dmigs dang || ci la'ang mi gnas zhes bya ba || sens la gns dmigs skyon sel ba'i || sens 'dzin 'phro mo de la yod || smigs rgyu bzhin du sens myed na || mi gnas mi dmigs byed pa gang || nam mkha' rang la ma gnas zhes || bsngo ba don dang ldan ma yin || zhes gsungs te || (530.04-530.08).
530.16-530.18 Tôh 2591: Byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa (Bohidicitabhāvanā) in bsTan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krungh go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): \( \text{tshul 'di nyid byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa las kyang gsungs te | 'di skad du | gzugs dang mtshan ma smon par 'dzin pa rab du spang nas ni | rnam thar gsum po sgom pa’ang bdud kyi las yin gzugs nyi stong pa’o | zhes bya ba la tsogs pa gsungs te | (530.16-530.18).} \)

530.01 Tôh. 0531: bCom ldan 'das ma shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i snying po (Bhagavat-prajñāpāramitā-ḥṛdaya) in bKa’ 'gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rgyud, 'bum, na, vol. 88, (Beijing: Krungh go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): \( \text{gtzugs nyid stong pa’o zhes gsungs te | (531.01).} \)

531.06-531.08 Tôh 2591: Byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa (Bohidicitabhāvanā) in bsTan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krungh go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): \( \text{gzhan yang | 'khor ba’i lam gsum spong zhing mya ngan | las lam bsgom pa’ang bdud kyi las nyid do | de nyid rang bzhin ma zhi rang bzhin btsal spangs gar mi gnas | (205.06-205.08).} \)

531.13-531.14 Tôh. 0176: 'Phags pa dri ma med par grags pas bstan pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo (Vimalakīrti-nīrdeśa-nāma-mahāyānā-sūtra) in bKa’ 'gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2009, mdo sde, ma, vol. 60 (Beijing: Krungh go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang) \( \text{di skad du | dri ma myed par grags pas bstan pa las | rnam par grol ba ni ‘dod chags dang ze sdang gti mug spangs pas rnam par grol ba ma yin nam | (531.13-531.14).} \)

531.17-531.19 Vimalakīrtinīrdeśa \( \text{gzhan yang de nyid las | 'di ltar ‘phags pa ‘dra’ bcom pa rnam ni | bdag gis nyon mongs pa thams cad spangs so snyam du riom sms sod na’ang | dgra bcom par mi ‘gyur ro zhes gsungs pa’i tshul yang de ‘dra’o | (531.13-531.19).} \)

532.02-532.03 rGyal ba'i bka' rnams \( \text{de bas na rgyal ba’i bka’ rnams su lam ‘di ma rogs pas lam gzan gyis sngs mi rgya’o zhes gsungs pa’ang | (532.02-532.03).} \)

532.03-532.05 rGyal ba'i bka' rnams \( \text{chos mnig pa nyid gyis su myed pa’i don ma rogs pas rgyas nyid mi ’thob pas | de bas na dgongs pa thams cad kyi zhe phugs zhes gsungs pa’e don yin de yin no | (532.03-532.05).} \)

532.05-532.09 Tôh. 0044: Sangs rgyas phal po che zhes bya ba shin tu rgyas pa chen po'i mdo (Buddha-avatamsaka-nāma-mahāvai pulpulayā-sūtra) in bKa’ 'gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2007, phal po che, ka, vol 35 (Beijing: Krungh go’i bod rig pa’i dpe) \( \text{tshul ‘di ni sdro dang po bgyan pa’i mdo las kyang | gang zhig bdag dang sngs rgyas rnam | rang bzhin mnig pa ral gns shing | (532.05-532.09).} \)
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<td>533.04-533.06</td>
<td>Tōh. 4448: mTha’i mun sel sgron ma in bsTan ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma), 2005, sna tshogs, no-po, vol. 120 (Beijing: Krong go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang):</td>
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<td>Tōh. 0176: ’Phags pa dri ma med par grags pas bstan pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo (Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra) in bKa’gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2009, mdo sde, ma, vol. 60 (Beijing: Krong go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): 1 thub dbang khyod kyis bdu’d dpung stobs can rab btul nas 1 byang chub mchog rab zhi ba mi’chi bde ba brnyes 1 de bzhin chos</td>
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<td>533.24-534.02</td>
<td>Tōh. 0176: ’Phags pa dri ma med par grags pas bstan pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po’i mdo (Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra) in bKa’gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2009, mdo sde, ma, vol. 60 (Beijing: Krong go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): 1 thub dbang khyod kyis bdu’d dpung stobs can rab btul nas 1 byang chub mchog rab zhi ba mi’chi bde ba brnyes 1 de bzhin chos</td>
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<td>Tōh. 0013: ’Phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa sdu’d pa tshigs su bcad pa (Ārya-prajñā-pāramitā-sañcaya-gāthā) in bKa’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2007, shes rab sna tshogs, ka, vol. 34 (Beijing: Krong go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): 1 nam mkha’ mthong zhes sens 1 sdu’d pa tshigs su bcad pa las 1 nam mkha’ mthong zhes sens can tshig du rab brjod pa 1 nam mkha’ ji llar mthong ste don’i di brtag par gyis 1 de bzhin chos</td>
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| 534.16-534.20 | "Tökh. 0060: 'Phags pa yab dang sras mjal ba zhes bya ba theg po'i mdo (Pitāputra-samāgama-sāma-mahāyāna-sūtra) in bKa’gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 1999, Dkon brtsegs, nga, vol. 42 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang)

| 534.22-535.01 | ?

| 535.02-535.04 | ?

| 535.07-535.12 | cf. Tökh. 0119: 'Phags pa yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa chen po'i mdo (Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra) in bKa’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, mdo sde, n ya, vol. 52 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): gzhana yang g yu shab na de ni de bzhin nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas thams cad kyi sngon ma thos pa (294.16-29418).

| 535.13-535.15 | In Guhyamantra…'
Töh 2591: Byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa (Bodhicittabhāvānā) in bsTan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krong go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | ched du rtsol bar yid la mi byed cis kyang mi 'khrugs mnyam shes dang \| \| gang la'ang [815] chags dang yul gyis myos skrag med de mi 'bral mi gnas shing \| \| mi 'phrogs mnyam shes bzhi po phyogs dang pha rol phyin rnas der shes te \| (814.20-815.02).

Töh 2591: Byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa (Bodhicittabhāvānā) in bsTan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krong go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | ched du rtsol bar yid la mi byed cis kyang mi 'khrugs mnyam shes dang \| \| gang la'ang [815] chags dang yul gyis myos skrag med de mi 'bral mi gnas shing \| \| mi 'phrogs mnyam shes bzhi po phyogs dang pha rol phyin rnas der shes te \| (814.20-815.02).

Töh 2591: Byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa (Bodhicittabhāvānā) in bsTan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krong go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | rdo rje sems dpa' bsoms pas lam kun ma nor bsgoms pa yin (815.08-815.04).

Töh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsanti-bodhicitta-kulayab-rāja) in bKa' 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krong go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | byang chub snying por de ma thag \| \| ting 'dzin rgyal po chen po 'byung \| \| snang ba rgya mtsho chen po bzhin \| \| mi rtog nam mkha'i mtha' ltar yangs \| (66.13-66.15). NGB reads nam mkha'i mkha' ltar yangs (W21518-1757: 422.05).

Töh 2591: Byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa (Bodhicittabhāvānā) in bsTan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krong go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | cho 'phrul chen po dka' ba min \| \| yon tan kun dan sttobs kyi rnams \| \| ji bzhin rto gs phra ba yis \| \| de ma thag tu rang las 'byung \| (79.01-79.02). Identified as rDo rje sems dpa' nam mkha' che.

Töh 2591: Byang chub kyi sems bsgom pa (Bodhicittabhāvānā) in bsTan 'gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krong go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | cho 'phrul chen po dka' ba min \| \| yon tan kun dang sttobs kyi rnams \| \| ji bzhin rto gs phra ba yis \| \| de ma thag tu rang las 'byung \| (79.01-79.02). Identified as rDo rje sems dpa' nam mkha' che.
### In definitive discourses

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<td>538.24-539.03</td>
<td>‘Töh. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahāsānti-bodhicitta-kulayahrāja) in bKa’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang):</td>
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(65.11.65.14).

539.03-539.04 Tö̱h. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sms kuns byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahasanti-bodhicitta-kulayahrāja) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnyi gnyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang); | yul phyir chags la yul la bṣngo ba’i dmigs pa med | (65.16-65.17).

539.08-539.10 Tö̱h. 4451: lTa ba rin chen sgron ma bsTan ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2005, sna tshogs, no-po, vol. 120 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang); | yul phyir chags la yul la bṣngo ba’i dmigs pa myed | (538.03-538.04).

539.10-539.15 Tö̱h. 4449: Thabs shes sgron ma in bsTan ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2005, sna tshogs, no-po, vol. 120 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang); | thabs dang shes rab gsal ba’i sgron ma las kyang | (66.06-66.08).

539.20-539.22 Tö̱h. 0828: Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sms kuns byed rgyal po (Sarva-dharma-mahasanti-bodhicitta-kulayahrāja) in bKa’ gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnyi gnyud, ka, vol. 101 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang); | kun du bzang mas ma zin dge ba’i chos ni gang yang rung | (539.10-539.15).

Chapter 6

540.10-540.13 Tö̱h. 2591: Byang chub kyi sms bsgom pa (Bodhicittabhāvana) in bsTan ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma) 1998, rgyud, ngu-cu, vol. 33 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang); | kun du bzang mas ma zin dge ba’i chos ni gang yang rung | (539.20-539.22).

541.21-541.24 Tö̱h. 0831: De bzhin gshegs pa thams cad kyi thugs gsang ba’i ye shes don gyi snying po khro rdo rje’i rigs kun ’dus rig pa’i mdo rnal byor grub: pa’i rgyud zhes bya ba theg pa | rlog pa rangs pa’i ri bo dang | (66.06-66.08).
**Chen Po'i Mdo** (Sarvathāgata-citta-guhyajñāna-artha-garbha-vidyā-yoga-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra) in bKa'gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rnying rgyud, kha, vol. 102 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod ri gya ma). In the list of 21 texts introduced to Tibet in early 7th century by Thon mi Sambhoṭa (Mdo rgyud nyer gcig), according to the Mkhas pa'i dga' ston (oldest source is probably the Mani bka' 'bum); see Lahuli, Thon-mi, p. 54. Lahuli identifies this as the 'Od zer bka' mdo (TibSkrit 229).

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| 544.03-544.06 | x | gtags 'dod spre'u 'di bzung nas kyang | | rkun mo byi la btags byas te | | khang stong phang phung kund bshig nas | | gseb khung skar khung kun bkag ste | | rgyal po'i dkar mdzod kha phyena | | de dag rig du sangs rgyas yan. |

| 545.14-545.17 | *Tōh. 0831: De bzhiin gshegs pa thams cad kyi thugs gsang ba'i ye shes don gyi snying po kho rdo rje'i rig kun 'dus rig pa'i mdo rnal 'byor grub pa'i rgyud zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo (Sarva-thāgata-citta-guhyajñāna-artha-garbha-vidyā-yoga-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra) in bKa'gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 2008, rying rgyud, kha, vol. 102 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | gal te ngan khung sbas gyur kyang | | de nyid yon tan rang snang bas | | 'od ni mkha' la gsal bar 'gyur | | de bzhiin snez nyid rin chen sgron | | lus nag 'khor bar bying gyur kyang | | rang byung rang zhi rang snang bas | | sges rab chos nyid mkha la gsal | | (35.17-35.20) |

<p>| 546.01-546.03 | *Tōh. 2673: Phags pa dpung bzangs kyis zhus pa'i rgyud kyi bsuds pa'i don 'grel ba'i brjed byang (Ārya-sūtra-paripṛcchā-nāma-tantra-piṇḍārtha-cinti) in bsTan'gyur (Dpe bsdur ma) 1999, rgyud, thu-du, vol. 36 (Beijing: Krung go'i bod rig pa'i dpe skrun khang): | sems ni glog dang lhung dang spre'u dang mtshungs | | rgya mtsho chen po yi ni rlabs dang 'dra | | sgyu can 'gter du yul la mngon dga' ba | | g.yo zhin 'phyan pa'i sems ni grol bar bya. |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Page Range</th>
<th>Text</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>547.22-548.01</td>
<td>Töh. 0366: dpal sangs rgyas thams cad dang mnyam par sbyor ba mkha’ ’gro ma sgyu ma bde ba’i mchog ces bya ba’i rgyud phyi ma (Śrī-sarva-buddha-sama-yoga-dākinī-jāla-sambara-nāma-uttara-tantra) in bKa’ ’gyur (dpe bsdu ma), vol 77 p. 524 smind ma mig dang so dang mchu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>548.02-548.0</td>
<td>Töh. 0477: dpal zla gsang thig le zhes bya ba rgyud kyi rgyal po chen po (Śrī-candra-guhya-tlaka-nāma-nalā-tantra-rāja) in bKa’ ’gyur (dpe bsdu ma) 2008, rgyud ’bum, ja, vol. 83 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): [sgra dang sgra min rnam dpyad pa?] li bsam gin phyi ma l nga ro sbas pa rdo rje’i gsal 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>549.03-549.06</td>
<td>Töh. 1401: dpal ’khor lo sdom pa’i dka’ ’grel sgrub pa’i lhabs kyi gleng gzhi (Śādhanā-nidāna-nāma-śrī-cakra-saṃvara-pañjikā) in bKa’ ’gyur (dpe bsdu ma) 2008, rgyud ’bum, ba, vol. 8 (Beijing: Krung go’i bod (Beijing: Krung go’i bod rig pa’i dpe skrun khang): dang po sles rab dro ba ste li gnyis pa du ba ldan par ’gyur li gsum pa la ni’ od ’khrug ’byung li bzhed pa mar me lta’ bar ba li lnga pa rtag tu snang ba ni li sbrin med pa yi nam mkha’ bzhin ] (954.14-954.17). dang po smigs rgyu ’dra ba dang li gnyis pa la ni du ba’i tshul li gsum pa srin bu me kher ’dra li bzhed pa mar me bzhed du ’bar li lnga pa rtag du snang ba ni li sbrin med pa yi nam mkha’ bzhin.</td>
</tr>
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§ Abbreviations:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Aitareya Arāṇyaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADK</td>
<td>Abhidharmakośa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADKB</td>
<td>Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam (La Valée Poussin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>Aṅguttara Nikāya (PTS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA</td>
<td>Blue Annals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCA</td>
<td>Bodhicaryāvatara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDR</td>
<td>Brill Dictionary of Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGB</td>
<td>Bai ro'i rgyud 'bum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BM</td>
<td>Theg chen tshul 'jug dbu med manuscript²²⁵¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSG</td>
<td>Byang chub sms bsgom (aka Rdo la gser zhun), BGB²²⁵²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CŚ</td>
<td>Catuḥṣataka</td>
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<tr>
<td>CŚT</td>
<td>Catuḥṣatakāṭika²²⁵³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Db</td>
<td>Daśabhūmika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Rdo rje rgyal po'i gsungs rtsom phyogs bsgrigs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dh</td>
<td>Dhammapada (Dge 'dun 1985)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DN</td>
<td>Dīgha Nikāya (PTS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNg</td>
<td>Deb ther sngon po</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DTKM</td>
<td>Deb ther kun gsal me long</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DYSG</td>
<td>Dag yig gsar bsgrigs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EoIP</td>
<td>Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.</td>
<td>German</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gg</td>
<td>Guhyagarbha</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gk.</td>
<td>Greek</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²²⁵¹ TBRC W15575.
²²⁵² TBRC W21519-5.
²²⁵³ TBRC W23703-103.
JG's note
Grub mtha'i brjed byang
Harvard Oriental Series
Dujom Rinpoche 1991
In the sense of...
Rje lam rim pa'i gsung 'bum
Journal of Indian Philosophy
'Jam mgon bla ma tsong kha pa chen po'i gsung 'bum
Dkon mchog 'grel
Kun bzang bla ma'i zhal lung
mkhan po Tshe ring rdo rje
mkhan po Sang rgyas phun tshogs
locus classicus
Mkhas pa Lde'u 2010
Lam rim chen mo
de la Valée Poussin
Mkhas grub rim byon ming mdzod
Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra
Mahāyānasamgraha (Lamotte 1973)
Mahāvyutpatti (Sakaki)
Majjhima Nikāya (PTS)
Man ngag lta phreng (RZSB 1.293)
Man ngag lta phreng gi 'grel pa (RZSB 1.301)
Monier-Williams Sanskrit-English Dictionary
Snang ba lhar bsgrub
Theg chen tshul 'jug Namdroling edition

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NyS  Dudjom Rinpoche 1991
OED  Oxford English Dictionary (online)
P.   Pāli
PDB  Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism

PPMV  Prasannapadā (de la Valée Poussin*)
PTS  Pāli Text Society
Q.   Rhetorical question
Rā   Ratnāvalī
RET  Revue d’Etudes Tibétaines
RGV  Ratnagotravibhāga
RT   Rājataraṅginiḥ
Rz   Dharmabhadra Rong zomchos kyi bzang po
RZSB Rong zomchos bzang gi gsung 'bum (Chengdu 1999)
SGNyBy  Sangs rgyas thams cad dang mnyam par sbyor ba mkha' 'gro ma sgyu ma bde ba'i mchog ces bya ba'i rgyud kyi dka' 'grel (RZSB vol 2 pp. 459-620)
Śs   Śūnyatāsaptati
Skt.  Sanskrit
SN   Saṃyutta Nikāya (PTS)
Sr   Samādhirāja-sūtra (Mtsho sngon 1998)
Sth  Gsung thor bu (RZSB vol. 2 pp. 29-130)
STMG Bsam gtan mig sgron
TBJBy Lta ba'i brjed byang
TBRC Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center
TDCM Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo
TG   Tathāgatagarbha
GTJBy Grub mtha' brjed byang (RZSB 2.197-2.231)
Th   Theg chen tshul 'jug (Thimphu 1976)
ThCh Theg chen tshul 'jug (Chengdu 1999)
Tib.  Tibetan
TM   Truth and Method (Gadamer 2004)

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<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tract.</td>
<td>Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus</td>
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<td>TsJG</td>
<td>Mtshan yang dag par brjod pa'i 'grel pa rnam gsum bshad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vin</td>
<td>Vināya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vn</td>
<td>Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VP</td>
<td>Vaidalyaprakaraṇa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vsm</td>
<td>Visuddhimaggha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YS</td>
<td>Yoga Śūtras of Patañjali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YTMz</td>
<td>mkhan po Yon tan rgya mtsho's Yon tan mdzod 'grel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Citing p. 146 (vis-à-vis mtshan ma ’ching) in connection with ThCh 475.09.

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