Acquisitive Aggressors or Rational Risk Takers? A Study of Territorial War Aim Expansion

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-Karen E. Farrell

Chapter One: An Introduction to the Puzzle of Territorial War Aims

Why Study War Aims?

There are many motivating questions that can drive analysis in international politics and in international security specifically. But, at its core, much of our theorizing on the state of the world and the behavior of states comes down to one factor: conflict. Without conflict, or at least the threat of conflict, world history would look very different. Conflict drives history, and progress, and it is only through the study of conflict that we can truly understand why the world behaves as it does. Despite the importance of conflict studies, one particular facet of conflict remains under-theorized. This is the question of state war aims. Quibbles about rationality aside, a state that enters into conflict must have an aim in mind. Even if an aggressor forces war upon the state, the state will still has the basic aim of survival. Moreover, states that do willingly enter conflict have particular goals in mind. They may aim to destroy a rival, gain more power, protect an ally or smaller state, or satisfy a domestic population. War aims drive how states fight, and how they end wars.

This dissertation project asks a simple question: what determines whether states will expand their war aims during conflict? If a state has already achieved the war aims with which it began the conflict, will it choose new aims to pursue while the conflict is still raging or will it be satisfied with what it has already accomplished? I argue that we lack an explanation of this phenomenon. In particular, I am interested in territorial war aims, which I define as the amount of territory a state seeks to occupy militarily before the conflict ends. Why do some

states pursue expanded territorial war aims during conflict, while others do not? This dissertation advances an answer, rooted in the existing literature on bargaining and state security, but different from what has come before. I argue that the desire for important territory and the desire to bolster one's bargaining position drive states to want expansion, but fear about the consequences in the future from present action can cause them to hold back from it. Territory is valuable, but sometimes it is not worth jeopardizing one's future security in order to attain it. Chapter Two of this dissertation lays out this theory in detail, and shows how fear of the future can make even desirable territory not worth the risk of occupying it. But in order to understand this theory's place in the field, we must have a better understanding of what we already know about war aims and bargaining in general.

This chapter has two main goals. The first is to assess the state of knowledge on bargaining, war termination, war aims, and reputation. These topics are all important for the following analysis, as previous scholarship field helps us to understand the impact of bargaining on choices about war aims. There is existing research on the subjects of bargaining, reputation, signaling, and the question of cooperation in the international order, and we need to understand the major themes and main disagreements in these fields. No theory exists in a vacuum; it will always be grounded in what has come before and must therefore both respect and respond to existing theory. Moreover, as with all theorizing, this study's theory is not the first explanation for expanded territorial war aims to be advanced in the field. Other explanations for the expansion of war aims do exist, and we should be cognizant of these explanations' strengths and shortcomings in terms of explanatory power. The

second goal of this chapter is thus to outline two existing theories that attempt to explain the choice to expand or remain satisfied with territorial war aims. These theories are: the offensive realism of John Mearsheimer and Eric J. Labs, and the commitment problem argument, as best outlined by Dan Reiter. It is only by understanding the assumptions and predictions of these theories that we will be able to understand their potential explanatory shortcomings, and then assess through the empirical analysis of the dissertation whether this study's theory is more successful at explaining outcomes.

Bargaining Theory and War Termination

Our review of past literature must begin with a look at bargaining, for this is the framework in which the coming theory ought properly to be understood. This study makes use of bargaining theory in order to provide context for understanding the actions of states. The bargaining theory of war is a rational-choice understanding of international politics, which attempts to explain how wars begin and end. Rational-choice theory comes with a particular set of assumptions regarding the way states make decisions and the way information is processed by leaders, and we must examine them. There are three key assumptions that most of the works in this vein make. First is the assumption that war is inefficient, and states would optimize their gains in the system by avoiding it[1]. There should, therefore,

[1] This is because war is costly and destructive, even for the victor. As Fearon notes in his seminal piece on bargaining and war, war involves paying costs, whereas bargaining and getting the same result does not: "As long as both sides suffer some costs for fighting, then war is always inefficient *ex post*- both sides would have been better off if they could have achieved the same final resolution without suffering the costs (or by paying lower costs). This is true even if the costs of fighting are small, or if one or both sides viewed the potential benefits as greater than the costs, since

always be a bargain that would be preferable to starting or continuing a war. Second, these theories often assume that there is private information regarding the intentions, relative power, and cost of conflict for states in the system[2]. Private information is important because it provides a key reason for conflict: if states do not have the same information during the bargaining process, and do not know the other's type, they may not find the bargain that states would prefer to war. Rational choice scholars who deal in information typically believe that wars will conclude when states have gained information they were lacking prior to the start of the conflict, and can see the other's type and strength[3].

Finally, while early work in this vein tended to see war as a costly lottery during which bargaining was suspended, most modern bargaining literature recognizes conflict to be part of the bargaining process[4]. If we believe bargaining

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there are still costs…war is inefficient *ex post*". James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (Summer 1995), 379-414. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300033324. 383. (Italics in original).

[2] See Alastair Smith and Allan C. Stam for a good introduction to the idea of private information: Alastair Smith and Allan C. Stam. "Bargaining and the Nature of War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 6 (December 2004). 783-813. DOI: 0.1177/0022002704268026. 785-786.

[3] For the prototypic example of this, see Geoffrey Blainey's *The Causes of War*, in which he views war in exactly these terms: he sees war as an "an abacus of international power" and notes that "War itself is a dispute about measurement; peace on the other hand marks a rough agreement about measurement". Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (South Melbourne: The MacMillan Company of Australia PTY LTD, 1988. Third Edition). 122.

[4] R. Harrison Wagner explains why the difference between the two views of conflict matters in his 2000 piece; he provides a strong critique of the costly lottery view, arguing that models utilizing it are "at best either irrelevant to historical wars (since they ignore the possibility of negotiated settlements once war has begun) or contain no information…At worst they are examples of fallacious reasoning in which a costly lottery is defined one way in the premises of the argument (an all-out war fought to the finish) and another way in the conclusion (a bargaining process which is preceded or accompanied by fighting". R. Harrison Wagner, "Bargaining and War,"

continues through conflict, a wider variety of bargaining models closer to reality are available to us[5]. From these three main assumptions, a great deal of work has been done on bargaining and conflict. We move now to the question of the temporal aspects of bargaining, as well as factors that affect the outcomes of bargaining.

Much of the literature implicitly or explicitly divides the bargaining realm into three temporal sections: bargaining before war in order to avoid conflict, bargaining during conflict as a process of learning and gathering information, and post-war bargaining over the war settlement. In terms of bargaining during conflict, we have seen that the literature generally views this type of bargaining as a process of constantly updating information and assessing the effects of changing costs on the

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American Journal of Political Science 44, no. 3 (July 2000), 469-484. DOI: 10.2307/2669259. 471.

[5] The prototypic example of this type of model is Robert Powell, "Bargaining and Learning While Fighting," *American Journal of Political Science* 48, no. 2 (April 2004), 334-361 doi: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00074.x; he "sees war as a bargaining process during which the states run a risk of military collapse…The bargaining in the model begins before there is any fighting, continues during the fighting, and concludes only when the states agree to a settlement or one of them collapses" (345). For another take on bargaining during war, see Darren Filson, Suzanne Werner, "A Bargaining Model of War and Peace: Anticipating the Onset, Duration, and Outcome of War," *American Journal of Political Science* 46, no. 4 (October 2002), 819-838, doi:10.2307/3088436. Useful to remember for our purposes is that their model's "assumptions imply that each player always wants more resources and more benefits… a disputant's willingness to risk resources in battle is increasing in his amount of resources and decreasing in the size of his benefits" (822). See also Alastair Smith, "Fighting Battles, Winning Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 42, no. 3 (June 1998), 301-320, doi: 10.1177/0022002798042003005, who also looks at bargaining during wars. Notably, he attempts to define war aims as "forts", which are "a discrete approximation of what nations are fighting over" (303). Crucially, Smith includes an understanding that what is gained during battle may not be the state's overall objective: "forts have an intrinsic value to each nation, but allowing them to be intermediates that must be captured to secure the real objective does not fundamentally alter the structure of the model" (303).

decision-making of and bargaining between belligerents[6]. In terms of postwar bargaining, there has been much work done on postwar settlements, starting as early as Paul Kecskemeti's iconic *Strategic Surrender*[7]. These works recognize that "absolute victory" as Clausewitz defined it[8] is relatively rare, and, as Clausewitz himself states, that most conflicts end with some kind of negotiated settlement[9]. Even losers of wars can have an impact on the bargaining process, and so the question of how conflicts are resolved and whether they are likely to recur is an

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[6] For further examples of this type, see for instance Paul R. Pillar's book *Negotiating Peace.* He argues that conflict is inherently about the bargaining process, and that conflict is about raising the opponent's costs: "disagreement is made more costly for the enemy in order to make him more inclined to concede… an increase in the opponent's disagreement costs should make him more compliant at the negotiating table". Paul R. Pillar, *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 145. For an alternate take, see H.E. Goemans, *War and Punishment*, in which he argues that "the fundamental cause of war termination is a change in the minimal demands, that is, the minimum terms of settlement of the combatants". H.E. Goemans, *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War*, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), 3.

[7] Kecskemeti is notable for addressing the problem of ending conflicts from the "loser's" point of view. In particular, he notes quite reasonably that no state sets out to lose a war, but at a certain point, a losing state may have to accept it cannot win (9). Moreover, he argues that "In wars dominated by the strategy of attrition, the supreme strategic question at any given time is whether the curves of the attrition suffered by the two sides have become divergent… surrender is definitely indicated when the loser in such a war is forced to conclude that the trend of divergent attrition has become irreversible". Paul Kecskemeti, *Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), 9.

[8] The Clausewitzian sense I refer to is "the aim of *disarming the enemy* (the object of *war in the abstract*, the ultimate means of accomplishing the war's political purpose, which should incorporate all the rest)" (italics in original). Carl von Clausewitz, *On War,* Ed. and trans. Michael Howard, Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 91.

[9] Indeed, as Clausewitz notes, "Many treaties have been concluded before one of the antagonists could be called powerless- even before the balance of power had been seriously altered". Clausewitz, *On War*, 91. He even builds in the idea of cost, noting that "Inability to carry on the struggle can, in practice, be replaced by two other grounds for making peace: the first is the improbability of victory; the second is its unacceptable cost" (91).

important one[10]. Whether the peace stays peaceful also depends on how the victor uses the postwar outcome in order to achieve his preferences[11]. On a related note, while not specifically part of the bargaining literature, there has been increased attention paid to how present actions can have serious future consequences, a theme this study's theory will return to in later chapters[12]. There has also been limited examination of a "prenegotiation" phase, in which actors prepare for future bargaining, though this literature is largely occupied with the decision to start

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[10] The question of conflict resurgence has been particularly salient in the civil war literature, as this form of conflict is known to be particularly intractable. Monica Duffy Toft, for instance, examines civil war settlements, and argues that "military victories are more stable than negotiated settlements" (40), saying that "negotiated settlements are more likely to result in result in war recurrence because, although peace agreements typically delineate an acceptable distribution of goods and services from the state, the disposition of military and police are often overlooked in these settlements…there is an imbalance of *benefit* and *harm*". Monica Duffy Toft, *Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars*, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010), 37 (italics in original).

[11] See for example G. John Ikenberry, who notes that "The winning postwar state is newly powerful- indeed, in some cases it is newly hegemonic, acquiring a preponderance of material power capabilities. The question is: what does this state do with its new abundance of power?" G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars,* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 4. He argues that "institutions play an ordering role as mechanisms of political control (10), and that "The most enduringly powerful states are those that work with and through institutions" (20).

[12] For a look at the consequences of gains, see John C. Matthews III, "Current Gains and Future Outcomes: When Cumulative Relative Gains Matter", *International Security*, 21, no. 1 (Summer 1996), 112-146, DOI: 10.2307/2539110. He argues that it is important to look at "*cumulation effects"* (114, italics his) when considering events in the present; "If a relative gain in a current round of interaction creates advantages that allow additional gains in future rounds, relative gains will be more important" (114). For a look at other important future effects of present action, see Robert F. Trager, "Long-Term Consequences of Aggressive Diplomacy: European Relations After Austrian Crimean War Threats", *Security Studies* 21, no. 2 (2012), 232-265, DOI: 10.1080/09636412.2012.679204. He argues that present threats can impact future action in various ways; for instance, that "Threats convey information about how hostile the threatening state is to the foreign policy objectives and interests of the threatened state" (240). His case studies will be of interest when we consider the German unification wars in a later chapter of this dissertation.

bargaining, not how states might prepare for the bargaining[13]. In short, it is clear that bargaining and war are inextricably linked, and the concern for the bargaining process is key for explaining why conflict occurs and how it is carried out.

While this study is geared more towards the end of the conflict than the beginning, it is worth taking a moment to consider whether the literature on the initiation of conflicts can shed light on the questions of bargaining and war aims. Of key importance for this study is the idea of fear of the future, and this is a topic best discussed by some of the literature on war initiation. In particular, the role of the future in determining present actions is of key importance. If, as some in the literature argue, states start wars because they fear for their future security, then perhaps future security should play a role in how they bargain during wars[14]. This will be an important feature of this dissertation's theory.

We should also consider the roles that allies and third parties may play in bargaining and negotiation. While realists are correct to highlight the "self-help" anarchical nature of the international system, bargaining theorists have frequently

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[13] See for example David H. Bearce, Katherine M. Floros, and Heather Elko McKibben, who identify a "prebargaining phase" (720) during which the "decision to enter into a strategic bargaining phase" (719) is made. David H. Bearce, Katharine M. Floros, Heather Elko McKibben, "The Shadow of the Future and International Bargaining: The Occurrence of Bargaining in a Three-Phase Cooperation Framework", *The Journal Of Politics* 71, no. 2, (April 2009), 719-732, Doi: 0.1017/S002238160909056. Janice Gross Stein also highlights the existence of a phase before bargaining, which she terms "prenegotiation". Janice Gross Stein, "Getting to the Table: The Triggers, Stages, Functions, and Consequences of Prenegotation", In *Getting to the Table: The Processes of International Prenegotation*. ed. Janice Gross Stein, (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

[14] See Dale C. Copeland, who argues that serious conflict occurs in large part because "states in decline fear the future" (4); in particular, they fear "the depth and inevitability of decline" (5). Dale C. Copeland, *The Origins of Major War*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2000).

identified a role for third party actors in bargaining and war termination, arguing that these actors can have a significant impact on outcomes[15]. Scholars generally acknowledge that third parties can play a role in forcing a ceasefire or a pause in the conflict, and that they can influence the outcome of the eventual bargaining and settlement under certain conditions[16]. A major question in the literature is whether a third party should be entirely impartial, or whether bias towards one combatant can actually lead to more stable outcomes[17]. Now, let us turn to other questions of bargaining, namely, reputation and signaling.

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[15]As Oran B. Young notes, however, there is a distinctive difference between a third party mediating a conflict and a third party *entering into* a conflict: "Above all, the role [belonging to the third party] is basically persuasive rather than coercive in the sense that it does not involve the direct use of military force… the concept of third-party intervention does not cover acts amounting to entry by a party into the crisis as a participant on the same level as the original opponents". Oran B. Young, *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 35. Young also makes it clear that an outside intervener is its own particular beast: "A distinction should be drawn between the nature of the activities of an intervening third party on one hand and those of the balancer (at any given moment) in a balance-of-power system… The intervening third party attempts to facilitate the realization of common interests and to contribute to the control of crises rather than to acquire power for itself or to add its weight to the fight against the hegemonic designs of one great power or coalition" (43).

[16] As an example, see Andrew H. Kydd, who discusses the circumstances under which third-party mediators can affect outcomes. He sees the role of a third party thusly: "The mediator has formed a judgment about the trustworthiness of the two sides, and can share this judgment with the parties in an effort to reassure them". Andrew H. Kydd. "When Can Mediators Build Trust?", *American Political Science Review* 100, no.3 (August 2006).449-462. doi:10.1017/S0003055406062290. 450. He argues that the best "mediator must have some preferences over the issue in dispute, have a moderate ideal point on the issue, and not find war too costly. If the mediator is too focused on preventing conflict or does not care about the issue in dispute, it will be tempted to say whatever maximizes the likelihood of agreement… However, if the game is repeated, the mediator can acquire a reputational incentive to be honest" (450).

[17] Katja Favretto, for instance, argues that bias is a good thing in mediation in a 2009 article: "when highly biased major powers intervene in a crisis, a peaceful settlement is likely because crisis actors are certain the major power will enforce an

Reputation and Costly Signaling

Another topic in bargaining theory that we must consider is costly signaling, or the means by which states can demonstrate their intentions and make their preferences clear. Costly signaling refers to the idea that, in order to show resolve, states will undertake an action that would be too costly if they were not serious in their intentions[18]. In other words, states act in order to show their true type to their opponent. Scholars have argued that costly signaling is one means by which cooperation can be achieved even in an uncertain world; even when mistrust abounds, if a state is able to make a concrete gesture to show its resolve and its commitment to a particular outcome, its opponent will be more likely to acquiesce and conflict may therefore be avoided[19]. It should be noted, however, that there is certainly a coercive aspect to costly signaling, as states may use it to achieve their

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agreement by military means". Katja Favretto, "Should Peacemakers Take Sides? Major Power Mediation, Coercion, and Bias", *American Political Science Review* 103., no. 2 (May 2009), 248-263, doi:10.1017/S0003055409090236, 249.

[18] Fearon says that "a threat may be rendered credible when the act of sending it incurs or creates some cost that the sender would be disinclined to incur or create if he or she were in fact *not* willing to carry out the threat… to be credible, a threat must have some cost or risk attached to it that might discourage an unresolved state from making it". James D. Fearon. "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 1 (February 1997), 68-90, DOI: 10.1177/0022002797041001004. 69 (italics in original).

[19] Fearon identifies two types of costly signals: "Tying-hands signals", which "typically appear as public statements of intent by state leaders to the effect that national prestige is on the line", and "sunk-cost signals", which "are actions that are costly for the state to take in the first place but do not affect the relative value of fighting versus acquiescing in a challenge". Fearon, "Signaling Foreign Policy Interests", 70. Branislav L. Slantchev, however, argues that the two can overlap; he notes that "military actions which states take during a crisis – mobilizing troops, dispatching forces – entail costs that are paid regardless of the outcome, and in this sense are sunk; however, they also improve one's expected value of war relative to peace, and in this sense they can tie one's hands". Branislav L. Slantchev. "Military Coercion in Interstate Crises", *The American Political Science Review* 99, no. 4 (November 2005), 533-547, Doi: 10.1017/S0003055405051865, 535.

objectives through threat of force rather than through cooperation; if conflict is avoided, it is not because the signaling state is peaceful, but because its ability and intention to carry out its threat is clear[20].

Finally, the importance of reputation in bargaining and in international politics is worth considering. Reputation has been a complicated topic in the literature for some time, with many scholars doubting reputation has any importance[21], and others seeing a key importance in the repute a state has achieved in terms of its ability to bargain with challengers. Bargaining theory has been generally tolerant of the idea of reputation, with some scholars dealing with its importance and insisting that a good reputation allows a state to bargain effectively, while a negative one creates bargaining problems for a state that is trying to be reasonable[22]. For those that see reputation as important, it is generally with regards

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[20] Moreover, costly signals can be coercive without being militaristic; David J. Lektzian and Christopher M. Sprecher look at the use of economic sanctions as costly signals, for instance. They however lack confidence in the effectiveness of this method, arguing that, "all too often, the sender nation, following sound domestic economic practices, designs sanctions in a manner so that they will have minimal costs to themselves. This affects the costly signaling properties of sanctions, and instead of signaling resolve, sends a signal of weakness or indecisiveness on the part of the sender, ultimately making militarized conflict all the more likely". David J. Lektzian, Christopher M. Sprecher, "Sanctions, Signals, and Militarized Conflict", *American Journal of Political Science*, 51, No. 2 (April 2007), 415-431, DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00259.x, 415.

[21] One of the better-known studies of this nature on reputation is that of Jonathan Mercer, who draws a distinction between "situational attributions" and "dispositional attributions" to cast doubt on the importance of reputation. Jonathan Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics,* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), 46.

[22] See for example Barbara F. Walter's book on civil wars, in which reputational fears actually prevent negotiation; conflict is more likely as "a result of reputation building, where governments are refusing to negotiate with early challengers in order to discourage others from making even more demands in the future". Barbara

to credibility and another state's ability to judge whether the state is likely to uphold its agreements or carry out its threats[23]. As we have seen with costly signaling, for effective coercion or diplomacy, a state must be able to both communicate its intentions and have those intentions believed. Therefore, reputation is intimately connected to credibility, another weighty topic with many different theories jostling for supremacy[24]. Ultimately, reputation and credibility are important for bargaining in that it impacts on whether states can commit to bargains they have made, or persuasively compel others to accept preexisting bargains. While power can "solve" many problems, it cannot entirely overcome the importance of reputation in terms of gaining and keeping allies and supportive third powers. Let us now turn to the final topic of interest in the extant literature: the question of war aims and how states choose those aims.

War Aims

As for the expansion and maintenance of war aims, the existing rational-choice literature is relatively light. Notable exceptions include Suzanne Werner and Dan Reiter, who we will consider later when we discuss the commitment problem

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F. Walter, *Reputation and Civil War: Why Separatist Conflicts Are So Violent,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 8.

[23] See Anne E. Sartori, who considers how a good reputation is important for deterrence, arguing that "Reputations for honest play a key role in explaining the success of diplomacy. When a state has a reputation for honesty, it is better able to use diplomacy successfully to communicate that it is more resolved than an adversary previously had believed to be the case". Anne E. Sartori, *Deterrence by Diplomacy* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005), 13-14.

[24] See for instance Daryl G. Press, who argues that credibility is not based on past reputation, but on current power: "countries do not need to take costly actions (such as fighting wars) to protect their future credibility. Future commitments will be credible if – and only if – they are backed up by sufficient strength and connected to weighty interests". Daryl G. Press, *Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats.* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2005). 3.

argument. Werner sees the idea of war aims as explicitly tied to bargaining; in other words, that the empirical puzzle to be explained is why some states ask for more at settlement than others[25]. Werner's main finding is that settlement terms (and therefore, war aims) will be harsher when the winning state has taken on more costs, is more powerful than the losing state, and is able to fight the war on the loser's territory[26]. She also notes that domestic politics can play a role, as leaders must assess the relative domestic risk of continuing to fight versus making a more moderate settlement[27].

In terms of territorial war aims, there has been limited work on territorial disputes in general, but relatively little on the importance of territory in general wars[28]. Aside from a focus on border disputes and conflict between neighbors[29], the

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[25] Werner states that "bargaining leverage, or the ability to demand more favorable terms, arises from multiple sources. Most obviously, a leader's ability to demand more favorable terms depends on his state's ability to impose costs on his opponent in the next battle relative to his opponent's ability to do the same to him". Suzanne Werner. "Negotiating the Terms of Settlement: War Aims and Bargaining Leverage", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42, no. 3, (June 1998), 321-343, DOI: 10.1177/0022002798042003006. 328.

[26] Werner, "Negotiating the Terms of Settlement", 336-337.

[27] Ibid., 339.

[28] For an excellent overview of the literature on "territorial contiguity, i.e. issues involving disputes over land adjacent to states" (124), see John A. Vasquez, *The War Puzzle*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). One scholar who examines territorial disputes in some detail is Paul K. Huth; he examines "territorial disputes as a distinct theoretical cause of international conflict" (6), as "territorial disputes have been the primary source of conflict leading to war" (7). Less useful for our purposes however is, as he states here, that his focus is more on territory as a *reason for* conflict, not a facet of war aims *within* conflict. Paul K. Huth, *Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict*. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996).

[29] For a different take on territorial disputes, one that looks at the relationship between regime type and these disputes, see the impressive examination of the democratic peace in Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee, *The democratic peace and territorial conflict in the twentieth century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

territorial dispute literature has largely focused on the value of territory to various opponents, and is particularly interested in the indivisibility of territory and the problems this creates for bargaining[30]. Indeed, issue indivisibility, according to Fearon[31], is one of the reasons why states have difficulty reaching a bargain both prefer to conflict. This is due to the fact that some goods, such as territory under

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2002). The scholars examine whether territorial conflict provides any traction in understanding the democratic peace and argue, in part, that "The diplomatic and military behavior of states in territorial disputes provides a particularly demanding and critical test of the democratic peace. This is because territorial disputes are a central issue over which militarized disputes, crises, and wars have erupted" (31). For another take on democracy and territory, see Douglas M. Gibler and Steven V. Miller; the authors consider democracy as a factor in the likelihood of territorial conflict, and "argue that states must often settle territorial issues with their neighbors in order to democratize. Political power centralizes when the state is under constant territorial threat, and only by removing these threats are political systems able to liberalize…the correlation of democracy with short, victorious conflicts is the result of state development paths and the removal of territorial issues". Douglas M. Gibler and Steven V. Miller, "Quick Victories? Territory, Democracies, and Their Disputes", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57, no. 2, (2012), 258-284, DOI: 10.1177/0022002712446126. 259. See also Peter Liberman, who looks at the related question of whether occupying states are actually able to use the value in conquered territory. He states: "ruthless invaders can, in fact, successfully exploit industrial societies, at least for short periods of time…I mean only that a conqueror or occupier can extract a large percentage of the economic potential of industrial nations. Nationalism and "people power" alone cannot prevent ruthless states from extracting large imperial profits". Peter Liberman, *Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). 4.

[30] For instance, Toft examines issue indivisibility with regards to the value put on certain territory; her goal is to rehabilitate issue indivisibility, and she notes that "literal divisibility and side payments do not undermine the explanatory utility of issue indivisibility". Monica Duffy Toft, "Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons as Rationalist Explanations for War" *Security Studies* 15, no. 1 (January-March 2006), 34-69, DOI: 10.1080/09636410600666246, 37. See also Ron E. Hassner, who discusses the importance of "the ownership of sacred sites" as indivisible issues in conflict. Ron E. Hassner, ""To Halve and to Hold"": Conflicts Over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility", *Security Studies* 12, no. 4 (summer 2003), 1-33, DOI: 10.1080/09636410390447617. 5.

[31] He does, however, find issue indivisibilities to be a less salient explanation for bargaining failures, believing that there are possible means for resolving them. (Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War", 382).

certain conditions, cannot be divided, and so one state will receive all of the good and the other state will get nothing. Nonetheless, there is little reason to believe that territorial war aims are substantially different from other war aims that states may have, and as territory is often a key reason why states fight, we must consider territorial war aims to be extremely important.

In summation, the existing literature has had much to say about bargaining, reputation, war aims, and war termination. However, several problems still exist. In general, the literature suffers from a tendency to view conflict as simply about the process of achieving victory, either through military success or through convincing one's opponent to bargain. However, this ignores the fact that states can often recognize that their eventual victory is assured, long before the other state surrenders or comes to the bargaining table. What then, do these states do when victory is assured?

I argue that the logical course of action is to use the time left in the conflict to prepare for the victory, and to make sure that they are well placed in order to succeed at the future settlement and bargaining over the future of the system. There has been relatively little work done on the ways in which states prepare for bargaining; furthermore, there has been little consideration of how conflict processes both drive and are driven by considerations of postwar preferences. The theory following in the succeeding chapters sets out to explain how states may use conflict to prepare for the postwar peace by occupying territory, and the circumstances under which they will be constrained from such an action. However, this theory is not the only one that attempts to explain the expansion of war aims,

and we need to understand other potential explanations that could provide the answer we seek.

Alternate Explanations for Expanded War Aims

Now let us turn to the second topic of this chapter, which is to consider theories that provide explanations for the specific question of territorial war aims. While the literature on war aims in general is somewhat scanty, there are nonetheless two main theories that offer clear, testable propositions about when states should expand their territorial war aims. In particular, it is worth considering first offensive realism, and then the commitment problem argument, as potentially successful explanations of expanded or maintained war aims. These two theories, one focusing on the balance of power and one on the rational decision-making of states, call into question the fundamental motivations of states, as well as the priorities that state leaders will choose to focus on when expanding or maintaining war aims. Interestingly, they both also tend to predict the expansion of territorial war aims, or at least argue that there are times that predicate it. This is because these theories see war aim expansion as providing a solid good for the state, be that security or a more stable outcome to the current conflict and a low risk of recurrence. Let us begin with offensive realism.

Offensive Realism: Expansion for Security

Probably the best known of the theories with strong predictions about expanded war aims is offensive realism. The tenets of this theory have clear and coherent predictions about when states should desire expansion and additional territory; in general, offensive realism predicts frequent expansion of territorial

aims, and would expect states to occupy additional territory for the purpose of gaining more power and solidifying its security. Offensive realism starts with a certain set of assumptions about the international system; as outlined by John J. Mearsheimer, these are: anarchy, uncertainty of aims, self-help, and the desire for hegemony[32]. In general, offensive realism predicts that states should favor expansion of territorial war aims whenever possible; however, as Mearsheimer notes, not when the costs are too high. A key criticism in fact that Mearsheimer attempts to answer is precisely the question of whether states will expand under every circumstance. It is all too easy to cast offensive realism as arguing that states will want to constantly go on the offensive; however, Mearsheimer makes it clear that this is an incorrect reading of the theory:

> great powers are not mindless aggress so bent on gaining power that they charge headlong into losing wars or pursue Pyrrhic victories. On the contrary, before great powers take offensive actions, they think carefully about the balance of power and about how other states will react to their moves. They weigh the costs and risks of offense against the likely benefits. If the benefits do not outweigh the risks, they sit tight and wait for a more propitious moment[33].

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[32] For the first two, Mearsheimer notes that "Three features of the international system combine to cause states to fear one another: 1) the absence of a central authority that sits above states and can protect them from one another, 2) the fact that states always have some offensive military capability, and 3) the fact that states can never be certain about other states' intentions". John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, Updated Edition, (New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014). 3. For self-help, Mearsheimer insists that "States operating in a self-help world almost always act according to their own self-interest and do not subordinate their interests to the interests of other states… it pays to be selfish in a self-help world" (33). On the question of hegemony, Mearsheimer notes that "There are no status quo powers in the international system, save for the occasional hegemon that wants to maintain its dominating position over potential rivals. Great powers are rarely content with the current distribution of power…They almost always have revisionist intentions, and they will use force to alter the balance of power if they think it can be done at reasonable price" (2).

[33] Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* 37.

The fact that offensive realists focus on expansion is due to their belief in the constant need to bolster one's position and improve one's power in the system, through material gain[34]. This is because offensive realists assume other states in the system to always have hostile, or at least greedy, intentions[35]. They will therefore always be a risk of future conflict, and states should do everything they can to assure their own security. Indeed, offensive realists focus intently on the value of gaining power in order to protect security[36]. In terms of offensive realism and war aims, Eric J. Labs focuses specifically on war aims in an offensive realism world. As Mearsheimer does, Labs acknowledges that states will not blindly expand their war aims if it will damage their security[37]. However, Labs develops the argument much

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[34] Despite their critique of certain forms of realism, Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik are quite right to note that "Realists have long insisted that control over material resources in world politics lies at the core of realism". Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?", *International Security* 24, no. 2 (Fall 1999), 5-55. doi:10.1162/016228899560130, 18.

[35] See Mearsheimer, who argues that "even if a great power does not have the wherewithal to achieve hegemony (and that is usually the case), it will still act offensively to amass as much power as it can… All states are influenced by this logic, which means that not only do they look for opportunities to take advantage of each other, they also work to ensure that other states do not take advantage of them. After all, rival states are driven by the same logic, and most states are likely to recognize their own motives at play in the actions of other states". Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* 35.

[36] See for example Christopher Layne, "The "Poster Child for Offensive Realism": American as a Global Hegemon", *Security Studies* 12, no. 2 (Winter 2002/3), 120-164, DOI: 10.1080/09636410212120011. He nicely sums up Mearsheimer's argument concerning the goal of great powers: global hegemony is ideal, but unlikely, so regional hegemony is the more practical option for most great powers (123-124).

[37] See specifically where he argues that "A necessary condition of opportunity is the absence of systemic constraints. If another state threatens to change substantially the balance of power by intervening against a state that is contemplating new objectives, then such an expansion is unlikely to occur". Eric J. Labs "Beyond victory:

further, making it clear why, in his view, states choose to expand aims: in his own words, "States expand their war aims during war in response to threat and opportunity… When policymakers expand their war aims by demanding an additional slice of land, a new political concession, or even the destruction of the enemy's military infrastructure or regime, they do so because they believe that the future security of their own state is at stake"[38]. In short, as Mearsheimer does, Labs argues that states expand their war aims to protect their future security, but will refrain from doing so when they face punishment in the present[39].

However, offensive realism has faced its fair share of criticism, concerning both its assumptions and its predictions. An obvious objection, one that most systemic theories face, is that there is a serious loss to ignoring the non-systemic levels of analysis[40]. It is clear that the domestic level of analysis, for instance, can

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Offensive realism and the expansion of war aims", *Security Studies* 6, no. 2 (summer 1997), 1-49, DOI: 10.1080/09636419708429321. 20.

[38] Labs, "Beyond Victory", 18.

[39]Labs insists that this distinction is best captured by offensive realism: "I argue that states expand their war aims in response to strategic opportunities that may arise as a result of events on the battlefield or the belief that the costs of expansion are low. States will exploit opportunities to maximize their relative power and secure themselves better in the postwar world, regardless of the level of threat they currently face. It is that lower threshold required for expansion that distinguishes offensive realists". Ibid., 19. On this point, see also Steven E. Lobell, "War is politics: Offensive realism, domestic politics, and security strategies", *Security Studies* 12, no. 2 (Winter 2002/2003), 165-195. DOI: 10.1080/09636410212120012. He notes with regard to offensive realism that "One important caveat is that as opportunistic expansionists, states are sensitive to cost, and are not mindless expansionists. Offensive realism does not predict that states will always adopt the most costly military strategies or that they will pursue expansionist strategies at all times and under all circumstances". (170).

[40] See Lobell, who argues that, "Ignored by offensive realism is that war is politics…By black boxing the state, offensive realism's narrow focus disregards how a state's external security strategy is driven by internal political competition" (Lobell, "War is politics", 166).

provide much insight into how leaders choose to conduct wars, and it is easy to object to offensive realism on these grounds[41]. To be fair, Mearsheimer acknowledges some of the easy objections to the assumptions of the theory, noting certain instances where offensive realism lacks a strong causal explanation[42]. He argues that, while domestic politics and individual leader variables are much less important compared to power variables, they can matter under certain conditions[43]. Questions also remain as to whether offensive realism's predictions about hegemony are logically consistent and supported by empirical evidence[44]. Moreover, offensive realism's focus on the difficulties of cooperation has been called into question by an alternate strain of realism: defensive realism.

Defensive realism is best typified by the work of Charles L. Glaser. In particular, this strain of realism believes that cooperation can be possible even in an

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[41] Indeed, examples abound of scholars who argue that understanding domestic level factors is vital in order to explain international outcomes. See for instance Alan C. Stam III, who argues that domestic factors deserve at least as much consideration as systemic-level factors. For instance, he identifies "the principal domestic political choice that leaders must make during a war, namely, whether or not to repress dissent with the state's borders. Unlike the previous [systemic] factors, repression clearly falls outside the realist approach to world politics but is a factor that… I show to be potentially one of the more potent tools available to decision makers in states at war". Alan C. Stam III, *Win, Lose, Or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War*, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996). 58-59.

[42] Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 10-11.

[43] He argues that "These omitted factors, however, occasionally dominate a state's decision-making process; under these circumstances, offensive realism is not going to perform as well". Ibid., 11.

[44] For a critique of Mearsheimer's arguments about region versus global hegemons, see Layne, "The Poster Child of Offensive Realism": he notes "a palpable tension in Mearsheimer's argument: if regional hegemons are satisfied, why do they worry so much about what happens geopolitically in distant regions, and why are they tempted to go mucking about in them?" (129). He also argues that the U.S. is, in violation of Mearsheimer's arguments, and notes that "Whether the United States is a global hegemon (as I believe is the case), or is a regional hegemon/offshore balancer (as Mearsheimer believes) has important real world implications" (162).

anarchic world; as Glaser notes, the theory "predicts that, under a wide range of conditions, adversaries can best achieve their security goals through cooperative polices, not competitive ones"[45]. In particular, Glaser argues that states can inform other states of their type, which should make cooperation more likely[46]. In terms of war aim expansion, Glaser adds in an additional layer by considering state motivations rather than just simply assuming that all states desire more power and therefore that they will always come into conflict[47]. Ultimately, what defensive realism shows us is that cooperation is possible between states, and it highlights offensive realism's lack of understanding of why states might sometimes hold back from expansion. It also seriously undermines offensive realism's focus on other states as eternal sources of hostility and security risks.

Overall, perhaps the most serious failing of offensive realism is that it has little to say about the process by which state leaders calculate the costs and benefits

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[45] Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help", *International Security* 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994-1995), 50-90. DOI: 10.2307/2539079, 51.

[46]He argues that "a country can use its military policy to communicate information that should lead its adversaries to reassess its motives and intentions". Glaser, "Realists as Optimists", 53. He notes in his book that a key way this is done is through the use of costly signaling; in particular, with regards to territory, he notes that "A policy that reduces a state's ability to take territory will often be more costly for a greedy state than for a pure security seeker because the security seeker places less value on taking territory". Charles L. Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation,* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010). 65.

[47] He notes that "I focus on motives (as opposed to policy objectives and intentions) because *why* a state wants to expand matters. The value that a security seeker places on expansion varies with the international environment it faces…A security seeker that is very secure will see little or no value in expansion; in this situation, the security seeker would accept the status quo, even if the costs of changing it were quite small". Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics*, 37-38.

of actions[48]. How do leaders go about weighing the risks to their security? What other states matter, and in a self-help world, what reactions of other states would be most risky? These are factors that need further explanation, and Mearsheimer's work does not provide the answers. Labs does address some of these concerns when discussing war aims, attempting to provide a better explanation of when offensive realism would predict expansion versus maintenance of aims. In terms of Labs' arguments concerning war aims, it is certainly reasonable to agree that "the absence of systemic constraints" is important in order for a state to want to expand[49]. I will even agree with his assertion that "With respect to war aims, the future shadows the present"[50]; however, I argue that offensive realism fundamentally ignores the future consequences of present actions, and this has significant consequences for its ability to predict the expansion or maintenance of war aims. Looking to the system to explain behavior is not problematic; however, under offensive realism, states should weigh the *present risks* of expanding their war aims against the *future benefits* to security that could accrue from the expanded aims. However, because offensive realists assume expanded aims will improve future security, they overlook the very real *future costs* that might come from

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[48] Other scholars struggle with this point as well; see for instance Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). His assertion is "that states seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and/or economic expansion until the marginal costs of further expansion and change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits" (146), but his explanation of *how* states weigh costs is limited. He does note that geography, "optimum size" (147), and balancing dynamics have a role to play in weighing costs (146-147), but these are generalized risks and we are left wondering precisely how they ought to be weighed against potential gain.

[49] Labs, "Beyond victory", 20.

[50] Ibid., 21.

present action. Labs does not consider future costs of present action as a possibility, and indeed, he focuses solely on the future benefits of present action[51].

In summation, offensive realism remains one of the most compelling explanations for extended war aims. By virtue of its clear, consistent assumptions, it makes several solid, testable predictions for when states should expand their war aims. While the question of whether the cost/benefit analysis should rightly consider the present or the future remains, it is nonetheless true that offensive realism sets the standard for explaining war aims.

The Commitment Problem: Expansion Without Trust

We must now consider the commitment problem as a means of explaining the decision to expand territorial war aims. The commitment problem argument is somewhat different from offensive realism in that it originally derives from rational-choice game-theoretic work. In its classic form, the commitment problem argument explains why states have difficulty ending conflicts: it is because they cannot credibly commit to an agreement that would bring the fighting to a close[52]. There

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[51] Labs argues that "Even if a state is winning a war decisively, it may believe that its opponent has the intention, the will, and the latent power to recover and rearm in the postwar world for a rematch…To preclude that outcome, a state will expand its war aims during the existing conflict to acquire an even greater measure of future security" (Ibid., 20-21). However, he does not consider whether expanding aims might cause conflict as much as prevent it.

[52] On conflict enforcement and bargaining, a seminal work is James D. Fearon, "Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation", *International Organization*, 52, no.2 (Spring 1998), 269-305, DOI:10.1162/002081898753162820. He focuses on the question of how the likelihood of conflict restarting has an impact on the bargaining process itself; "the analysis here suggests that though a long shadow of the future may make *enforcing* an international agreement easier, it can also give states an incentive to *bargain harder*, delaying agreement in hopes of getting a better deal" (270; italics in original).

are, as always, certain assumptions made by this theory about how states behave and weigh costs and benefits. In particular, scholars who study the commitment problem in conflict are implicitly accepting the assertion that conflict is part of the bargaining process rather than the end of the process. If wars are in fact part of the process, states have plenty of time to consider whether expanding their war aims makes sense in light of the current situation. At the start of the conflict, the state may have had certain aims, but now that the conflict is in progress and the other state seems unwilling or unable to commit to a reasonable settlement, expanding war aims can appear very attractive in order to achieve an end to the conflict.

The scholar who best explains the commitment problem argument with regards to war aims is Dan Reiter. The main thrust of his argument is largely concerned with the commitment problem, and whether states are able to credibly commit to ending the conflict before total victory. In particular, Reiter argues that absolute victory is sometimes required when the commitment problem is especially bad[53]. Reiter then considers variables such as costs and expected chances of victory to be the important considerations in setting and updating war aims[54]. He finds it likely that war aims will expand if both sides cannot reach a credible commitment to peace[55]. Therefore, in this view of war aims, territory is worth the expansion of aims when taking it will force the losing state to give up fighting, or in a less extreme

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[53] He notes that "If a wartime belligerent fears its adversary might break a war-ending agreement and reattack after war ends, one possible solution to this non-compliance problem is the imposition of an absolute war outcome". Dan Reiter, *How Wars End,* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2009), 25.
[54] Reiter, *How Wars End,* 38-41.
[55] He notes that "*the more a belligerent fears its adversary will violate war-ending commitments, the more likely that belligerent will be to pursue absolute victory*" (italics in original). Ibid., 31.

version, to credibly commit to the terms of the winning state. Reiter does in fact present an argument for how the commitment problem argument can cope with limited wars; he argues that

> Under some conditions, a belligerent may be willing to forgo an absolute war outcome because a limited war outcome may offer at least a partial solution to a credible commitment problem. Most centrally, seizure of at least part of the disputed good may decrease the likelihood that the adversary will defect on a war-ending agreement by making the prospect of a future attack by the adversary prohibitively costly or unlikely to succeed…if acquiring a specific component of the good makes a future attack less attractive to an adversary, then this may help alleviate the commitment problem. Specifically, possessing a specific increment of the good may make it easier to repel a future attack by the adversary, thereby decreasing (though not eliminating) the adversary's incentive to renege on the war-ending commitment and launch a future attack. Most commonly, this occurs when the attacker can seize a strategically critical piece of territory that makes national defense easer[56].

Therefore, we need not look for instances of absolute victory in order to find instances of the commitment problem logic.

There are many reasons to believe in the commitment problem's explanation of war aims. First of all, it has the benefit of coming from a rationalist framework, and thus can step out of the disagreement over assumptions that plague much of the debate between realism and liberalism. With rationality on the part of leaders as the only absolute assumption, discussion of overall human nature and the implications of the system can be set aside. Second, there is much plausibility in the idea that additional territorial war aims can help bring a conflict to a satisfactory close. If a state has achieved its initial war aims in the conflict but its opponent has either not accepted its victory or has expanded its fight, it makes sense that a state would be tempted to occupy additional territory in an attempt to make its opponent recognize

[56] Ibid., 42.

the new status quo. Furthermore, if the two states have fought in the past and might fight in the future, additional territorial war aims can represent a means of both ending the conflict in the present and making future conflict more difficult by providing a buffer or changing the power differential between the two states.

However, there are certain problems with the commitment problem explanation whose seriousness should not be underestimated. First of all, by its very definition the commitment problem only applies in certain contexts: not every conflict will be plagued by the commitment problem. It is notable that absolute victory is relatively uncommon: if more limited expanded war aims occur in conflicts that do not reach this stage, we must question whether the commitment problem can account for these cases as well. While Reiter does show that limited war aims can be in congruence with the commitment problem argument, this does not account for instances in which territory was returned to losing states, or times in which territorial war aims were expanded even though the state in question did not need the territory to improve its security. Therefore, there is still uncertainty as to whether the commitment problem argument can account for all limited war aims.

Second, the commitment problem argument is subject to the many objections against rational choice theory. Scholars who doubt the ability of leaders to rationally weigh options and choose the optimal outcome could very easily object to the assumptions and predictions of the commitment problem. Would any leader risk pursuing further conflict in other to guarantee an optimal outcome? Finally, while the commitment problem explains quite well why states might expand their war aims, its explanation of state satisfaction with the status quo war aims is rather

simplistic. The only logical explanation for a lack of war aim expansion in this conception of world politics would be that there was no commitment problem. If, however, there was no commitment problem, would that stop greedy actors from expanding in the knowledge that the conflict would end whenever they desired it? The lack of a commitment problem might be a propelling factor towards expansion, rather than a reason not to expand. In the end, the commitment problem represents a good potential explanation for an expansion in war aims, but some questions as to the circumstances under which it applies remain.

Why Territorial War Aims?

Finally, let us consider the overall question of territorial war aims. It is apparent that states may have many different types of war aims in any particular conflict. They may be fighting for security, for economic benefits, or for ideology. However, this study focuses on territorial war aims, by which I mean the aim of occupying territory before the end of the conflict. As will be discussed further on, states may have a territorial war aim concerning territory that they will not be keeping after the conflict, if the territory is instrumentally valuable to them for bargaining purposes. But there are several reasons why territorial war aims are well worth a deeper analysis.

First of all, if power is a state's primary goal, territory represents a valuable means of attaining that power. Whether by exploiting natural resources or by attaining more room for a domestic population to expand, there is latent power in territory for states to exploit. Second, territory may increase security, if a state gains itself a new buffer against a dangerous enemy or diminishes a potential rival's

power by taking territory away from it. Moreover, occupying additional territory may be a means of bringing a war to a definitive close and avoiding commitment problems. Therefore, both of the alternate theories therefore have an explanation for why states should desire territory, and why expanding or maintaining war aims should apply in various circumstances. Using territorial aims, therefore, is a means of giving the alternate theories a good chance of being applicable; if these theories are unable to explain such a powerful drive as the need to acquire territory, it is worth questioning whether there are any types of war aims they are able to successfully explain.

Conclusion

In summation, we have seen that the existing literature has a great deal to tell us about bargaining, relations between states, and war aims. However, questions remain as to why states would expand their war aims in some circumstances but not in others. While the existing literature has provided us with many details regarding the behavior of states during bargaining, the importance of war aims, and the means by which states terminate conflicts, the question of why war aims change still needs further explanation. We have also seen the potential explanations for the expansion or maintenance of territorial war aims, and these explanations have much merit. However, there are also potential problems with each of the theories, and there are circumstances under which we might doubt their effectiveness. Below is a chart summarizing the key points of each alternate theory, showing the assumptions, when states will choose to expand or keep to the status quo, and potential problems with each theory.

Figure 1.1: Summary of Alternate Theories

Theory	Key Assumptions	Why Expanded Aims Pay	When Will States Expand Their Aims?	When Will States Stay with the Status Quo?	Potential Problems with the Theory
Offensive Realism	Anarchy; Self-Help. States rarely satisfied with the status quo.	Expanding aims in the present helps protect future security.	States will usually expand their aims, so long as doing so will not provoke balancing against them in the present or risk intervention by another state.	If expansion of war aims will trigger balancing or conflict in the present, states will not risk expansion.	Little detail on how states weigh risks and benefits of expansion. An underestimation of the potential for cooperation between states. Little More work needed to determine why states don't expand their war aims more frequently.
Commitment Problem Argument	Rational-choice framework in place: conflict is part of the bargaining process, and will only conclude when all states acquiesce to the bargain.	Expanded aims may solve the commitment problem by resolving the issues such that commitment is no longer difficult.	When the state has achieved its initial war aims, but its opponent has not agreed to terminate the conflict, or when a negotiated settlement is seen to be unlikely.	When occupying additional territory will not resolve the commitment problem, or when there is no commitment problem to resolve.	Not every war is subject to a commitment problem: how then to explain conflicts where the clearly dominant state expands its aims even when a settlement is possible?

The next chapter will propose a new theory and explain why this theory improves on the assumptions and predictions of the preexisting theories. In the empirical section that follows Chapter Two, this study's theory will be compared to the two alternate theories in a variety of cases to see which theory provides the most compelling explanation of outcomes.

Chapter Two: Theory of Territorial War Aims

While large strides have been made in understanding war termination and bargaining using conflict, much remains to be done. The purpose of this study is to examine a particular facet of state decision-making that greatly impacts on bargaining: the expansion or maintenance of territorial war aims during conflict. Why do states sometimes expand their existing territorial desires and attempt to occupy more territory before the conflict ends, while at other times they remain satisfied with the status quo? This dissertation posits that the choice of whether to expand war aims can be explained by a new theory concerning future security and territorial value. I argue that states desire territory because of its inherent value or its usefulness in the postwar bargaining, but they fear creating the circumstances for future insecurity by damaging important alliances, leaving their opponents dissatisfied, or gaining a negative reputation among third party states. In short, whether or not a potential occupier chooses to expand its war aims will depend on two factors: 1., the value of the territory to the potential occupier, and 2., the risk that taking the territory will adversely impact the state's future security by affecting its relationship with important states.

This chapter will proceed as follows. First, there will be a brief definition of important terms and a discussion of the basic theoretical assumptions at work. Next, I discuss territorial value, distinguishing between inherent value and instrumental value and explaining why states desire territory with differing values. I also emphasize that states act during conflict in the knowledge that bargaining is coming, and that they frequently mistrust their own bargaining strength. I will then turn to

what holds states back from taking territory: their fears about the future. In particular, I examine the importance of alliances and of not leaving one's opponent dissatisfied. Interacting with these risks is the general risk of gaining a reputation for being untrustworthy. Each of these factors will be discussed in turn, and testable propositions will be presented. Finally, I consider two conditions that affect whether states will have the ability to expand their aims at all.

First, however, let us consider why existing explanations for expanded war aims are not sufficient to explain the change in territorial war aims. We have seen that up to this point, the clearest explanation for territorial expansion has come from the offensive realists. They have generally argued that expanding territorial war aims can increase a state's power and therefore, improve a state's future security; thus, states should always want to expand. However, it is the raw power of other states and the risk of provoking intervention and balancing against them that stops states from expansion in some cases. It is a question of pure power; discussions of exactly how territory increases power or how states weigh the risks of present intervention are left unanswered. I assert that the offensive realist explanation of territorial expansion is lacking in several regards. First of all, the argument that states only hold back from expansion when they face a balancing coalition does not explain several important examples of territorial expansion or the lack thereof. There was no group of states able or willing to threaten the United States during the Gulf War; nonetheless, the U.S. refrained from expanding its war aims and driving to Baghdad. Simple dynamics of power cannot account for state decision-making in key conflicts. Second, by assuming states will always seek

territorial expansion, offensive realists ignore very real questions concerning why certain territory seems to be more desirable than others. Finally, offensive realism, by focusing on power as the sole source for future security, ignores the very important role of other states in the state's ability to achieve its postwar preferences. It is a very rare state that is able to assure its security on its own, and that does not need any interaction with other states to secure its place in the system.

The second explanation we have considered is that of the commitment problem argument. Theorists of this ilk, such as Dan Reiter, see expanded war aims as a means of avoiding a commitment problem; for example, states may pursue "an absolute war outcome" if they cannot find a bargain to which they can both commit[57]. Expanded war aims are thus designed to protect future security by making the present bargain more stable. In its concentration on territorial occupation as a means of achieving future security, this argument is similar in some ways to offensive realism. However, I argue that the commitment problem logic, while it might explain some cases, cannot fully account for the behavior of states any more than offensive realism can. Not every state facing a decision to expand war aims also faces a commitment problem. Moreover, the commitment problem argument assumes that occupying territory helps assure future security by ending the conflict in a more stable manner. It does not adequately consider the risks in the future of possessing the territory, or that other states besides the ones involved in the conflict may have opinions regarding the expanded aims and the ability to punish the expanding state for them. Finally, the commitment problem argument, as

[57] Reiter, *How Wars End,* 25.

is common with rational-choice analyses, has little to say about systemic pressures on states, and how those pressures may affect state decision-making.

Ultimately where this project differs from previous research is in its rejection of power differentials and balancing as the sole explanation for why states sometimes choose not to expand war aims. This is an explicit rejection of offensive realism. Like offensive realism (and indeed, like the commitment problem argument), I see the choice to expand war aims as a cost/benefit analysis weighing the present against the future; however, I argue that existing theories have the causation backwards. They tend to argue that the costs of expanding war aims are visible and felt in the present as states balance against the expanding state or expend additional resources to continue fighting, while the benefits of these new aims will continue to accrue in the future[58].

However, I assert that the main risk to expanding war aims is that states cannot be certain how such a present action will impact their future security. Given that the offensive realists assume that self-help is necessary and cooperation is unlikely, it makes sense that they view additional territory as a way to guarantee future security. However, defensive realists, believing that cooperation is possible, argue that states can find other means of achieving their preferences besides the use of and accruement of pure power. If we side with the defensive realists and believe both that cooperation and reputation are important for state security and that states may have other, non-security goals, we need to consider whether expanded aims

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[58] Recall from the previous chapter that Labs argues "a state will expand its war aims during the existing conflict to acquire an even greater measure of future security". Labs, "Beyond Victory", 21.

will adversely impact the potential expander's future security by making cooperation less likely and leaving the state with a negative reputation. The offensive realists see future security as the main reason to expand aims; I see future security as the main reason *not to* expand. Moreover, this theory pushes beyond the commitment problem argument by incorporating aspects of both bargaining theory and systemic-level international relations theory.

This theory represents a combining of bargaining theory and defensive realism, in order to explain the behavior of states engaged in the later stages of conflict. Bargaining theorists have done a great deal of work on explaining how states negotiate to end conflicts. Defensive realists, by contrast, have focused on overall security concerns and on explaining how states behave in order to protect their future security. But there is a dearth of work looking at both together. I argue that the outcomes of conflict deeply impact a state's future security, and states, understanding this, make certain decisions during conflicts that impact on the nature of the bargaining after the war ends. In some cases, states seek to avoid needing to bargain over some issues; in other cases, states use conflict in order to put themselves in the best possible bargaining position. Before getting into the details of the theory however, we need to be clear on certain definitions and assumptions used throughout.

Definitions and Assumptions

It is important to clearly define terminology used throughout the discussion. "Territorial war aims" refers to the amount of territory a state desires to occupy by the time the war ends (whether that end comes by ceasefire, armistice, or absolute

victory). As will be discussed, occupying territory does not necessarily mean that the state desires to keep the territory permanently. Rather, occupying territory may be used to achieve many different goals, only some of which involve the occupier gaining possession of the territory. "Occupation" means that the occupying state has become either the recognized or the de facto authority in the territory, and is able to deny the military, strategic, and economic use of the territory to any other state actor. "Expansion" refers to the decision of state leaders to attempt further territorial occupation than had previously been planned.

For the purposes of this study, expansion is only noted if the military attempts to carry out the decision made by state leaders. Leaders might express a desire for more territory, but the only way to know if that desire is truly serious is to see whether they communicate that objective to the military and the military attempts to carry out the command. Note as well that there is no presumption of military success; a failed attempt to acquire more territory is still an expansion in war aims. Furthermore, "the leader" of a country represents not only the single head of state, but also his or her closest advisors or political team. When I say that something was in "the leader's" interest or that "the leader" decided on a policy, I am not assuming a unilateral decision-making process. Others may contribute in the formation of policy or the execution of it. Furthermore, "status quo" refers to the state's preexisting territorial war aims, and "satisfaction with the status quo" means that the state does not choose to expand its war aims and attempt further territorial occupation.

Next, the definition of "future security" for this study is key. I agree that states, in the abstract, would like to guarantee their future security by power. Most states would likely prefer to be the only great power in the system, able to deal with any threats to their security or to their power. States might also prefer in the abstract that they lived in a different neighborhood, or that their key rivals did not exist. However, states, unlike people, cannot simply pick up and move, nor can they take all the power in the system in a single swoop. Therefore, for the purpose of this study it is best to focus on future security as most states can attain it. I am in accord with the offensive realists on a key fact: as Mearsheimer puts it, "The best outcome a great power can hope for is to be a regional hegemon and possibly control another region that is nearby…the ideal situation for any great power is to be the only regional hegemon in the world"[59]. Furthermore, if a state it cannot eliminate its opponents from the system, it will at least prefer to have sufficient power to guarantee its own security, and will prefer that its opponents have less relative power and little desire to restart conflict in the future.

Finally, if the state cannot do this on its own, it will prefer to have a reliable alliance, and a reputation for being trustworthy so that other states will be willing to cooperate with it. What is clear is that not all future security preferences can be achieved by power alone. The way the war ends, the material endowments in their possession, and their relationship with other actors in the system all go toward creating the new postwar international and domestic order, and that impacts a state's future security. Finally, throughout the study the state that is contemplating

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[59] Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics,* 41-42.

expanding its war aims and occupying territory will be called the "potential occupier" state. Now that the terminology used throughout is clear, we will turn to some assumptions made throughout as well.

Assumptions are always important for theories in order to produce clear, coherent predictions. While these assumptions represent simplifications of reality, they do not stretch beyond what could actually be seen in the real world. The first key assumption for this theory is that state leaders are able to rationally weigh the costs and benefits of various actions. This does not mean that a leader may not have non-rational goals; rather, I assume that the leader is rational in choosing among various possibilities for action. In other words, that the leader optimizes his strategy in order to achieve his particular ends. This is an important assumption in order to be able to assume that the choice to expand war aims and occupy territory represents the optimal choice in a cost-benefit analysis preformed by states. Leaders must be able to rationally judge their preferred choice amongst various political options, and weigh the risks versus the benefits of action.

The second important assumption is that the civil-military is such that state leaders are able to keep strong command over their military leaders, and use them as instrumental tools to carry out the strategic aims of the state. The key point of the assumption is that it is the civilian leadership that drives policy, not the military leadership. In order to show that expanded territorial war aims reflect the goals of the state, we must be able to assume that the military carries out civilian plans, rather than choosing war aims themselves. The distinction means that, instead of events on the ground being driven by military leaders with no thought of the

strategic political consequences of their actions, choices in terms of war aims and occupations are made by the leaders who are able to see the larger picture and rationally weigh the consequence of occupation in broader terms This does not mean that military leaders and men cannot show initiative; rather, it asserts that a change in war aims must come from the civilian side. The civilians may well be (and as a matter of effective decision-making, almost certainly should be) in consultation with their military commanders, but the decision to expand aims comes from the civilian side of the divide. Of all the assumptions, this is the one that requires the most relaxation in real life; civilian authorities cannot always retain control of events on the ground, and individual initiative on the part of unit-level forces can create situations that the civilian leaders never envisioned nor intended. Nonetheless, the assumption is worthwhile, if only to create clearer predictions.

Finally, there is an assumption that the state is in a position to realize any expanded war aims. This means that the state has the military capability, momentum, and political will to expand its aims. Not every state involved in conflict will be able to do this. Rather, it will most likely be the states that are currently succeeding in the conflict that will have the opportunity to expand their war aims. While losing states would probably prefer to expand their war aims, they frequently lack the ability to achieve their existing ends, much less take on new ones. Even if such a state did plan to expand its aims, it lacks the capability to fulfill those plans. It is thus difficult to establish the existence of expanded aims empirically in these instances, and the assumption that expanded aims will not exist in these cases is justified. As will be discussed later, an assumption that the state has the capability

needed does not mean that the state leader will choose to expand their aims. All the assumption requires is that the state have the option of expanding its war aims, and this option only exists where the capability to expand does as well. Now that we are clear on the theory's basic assumptions, let us turn to an examination of territorial value and its impact on bargaining.

Why Is Territorial Occupation Desired?

If we are to explain territorial war aims, we must understand why states want additional territory in the first place. I remain dissatisfied with offensive realism's assumption that all territory adds to a state's power. I argue instead that the key to understanding why states want territory is recognizing that not all territory is valuable for the same reasons. States want territory in order to accomplish their preferences, but how they use the territory differs based on the territory itself. While some scholars have acknowledged various ways in which territory provides value, we lack a systematic understanding of what utility certain territory can bring[60]. I divide territory into two types: inherently valuable territory, and instrumentally valuable territory. The former is territory that the state desires for its own sake. There is something unique to that territory – resources, people, strategic value – that makes *that particular piece of territory* valuable to the potential occupier. The territory itself is part of the state's postwar preferences; it

[60] Glaser for instance lists several reasons why "a state seeking security could find territorial expansion to be desirable and therefore be willing to engage in an arms race and start a war to change the status quo. Expansion could increase a state's security in a variety of ways, including increasing its resources and resource autonomy; decreasing its adversary's resources and in extreme cases eliminating its adversary as a sovereign state; and improving its ability to employ its resources effectively by, for example, providing a buffer zone against invasion, strategic depth, or more defensible borders". Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics*, 36.

provides security, power, or domestic stability. The reason for occupying inherently valuable territory before the conflict ends is that states fear leaving such territory to be bargained over and dispensed in a negotiated settlement. It is better, if possible, to occupy the territory before the war ends and remove it from the bargaining table. In summation, inherently valuable territory is territory the state desires to keep for itself after the conflict ends, because of the particular value to the potential occupier inherent in the territory.

By contrast, territory with instrumental value is not valuable to the potential for its own sake, but for the effect its occupation can provide. Using the territory to accomplish a particular end, the potential occupier seeks to achieve its postwar preferences. Instrumentally valuable territory is valuable because it gives the state a stronger bargaining position. For instance, territory that is of limited importance to the potential occupier, but is extremely valuable to its opponent, may be occupied in order to use it as a bargaining chip. The reason for occupying this type of territory is thus specifically to bargain with it, rather than to avoid bargaining over it. I will now examine these two types of territory in detail, giving some examples, and showing how the territory might or might not be used in bargaining.

Inherently Valuable Territory

As already explained, inherently valuable territory is territory the potential occupier state desires for its own sake. Given that the state desires to keep the territory after the conflict, occupying it before the shooting stops sends a powerful signal of intent to other states. If allies or opponents at the bargaining table did not understand the extent to which the potential occupier valued the territory,

occupying it before the conflict ends shows that the state is willing to expend blood and treasure in the effort to acquire it. It thus increases the state's costs during the conflict, and may therefore convince its opponent that it will be unable to wrest the territory away from the current occupier at the bargaining table.

If, however, the state valued the territory to this extent, why was it not part of the state's initial war aims? Why not aim for it from the beginning? This question is easily answered if we remember that wars do not always proceed as anticipated, nor do states always correctly guess the outcome. States may do worse than they had anticipated; however, they may also do better. A state may find itself in the position where territory it could have only dreamed about is now available for the taking. Its opponent may have proved weaker than anticipated, or a third party may have entered the conflict and put its territory within the purview of the potential occupier. This is precisely what happened during the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Israeli leaders had not even considered the occupation of the Old City of Jerusalem to be possible prior to the conflict; when events proceeded such that the territory was available for occupation, Israel rapidly expanded its war aims and acquired it[61].

Moreover, being able to present the occupation as a fait accompli allows the state to essentially remove the territory from the bargaining range, and increases the likelihood of the state getting to keep the territory. States may therefore desire to preempt a bargaining round that they fear might go badly for them. If a state

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[61] This was flying directly in the face of Israel's great power ally (the U.S.) as well as much of the international community: Michael B. Oren notes that it was after Israeli leaders knew of the potential for a UN ceasefire that they decided to take the Old City. Michael B. Oren, *Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East*, (New York: Ballantine Books, 2002, 2003), 242.

greatly desires a piece of territory, but fears that it lacks the bargaining power to acquire it during the settlement process, the state may choose to avoid the bargaining and attempt to acquire the territory before the conflict is over. In terms of why territory may have inherent value, it should be noted that there are three main ways in which inherently valuable territory differs from other territory. These are: material value, strategic value, and domestic political value. I will examine each of these in detail.

A key reason for occupying territory is the material value of the territory in question, and the implication that has for the potential occupier's material power. Indeed, the material value of territory is frequently a primary reason why states expand their war aims, in order to possess valued resources or to otherwise increase their material power. There are several kinds of material value. First of all, natural resources such as oil and metals might encourage a state to choose occupation in order to exploit those resources and grow their own material wealth. Many states lack their own natural resources or have already realized their existing resources into actual power. The need to gain more resources to attain military or economic power can be a powerful incentive to act. Second, there is often material value inherent in coastal territory, which can contain ports or access to shipping lanes that would be very valuable to a nation engaged in trade. If the potential occupier is land-locked or lacks its own access to good ports, the territory might be highly valuable. Even if the state already has water access, some states may desire more than they already have, and would want to take such territory. Third, there may be latent or existing capacity for industry in a territory. If its current owner has

already developed the territory, the presence of factories or important cities would make the territory valuable even if the ground itself were not necessarily worth the risk. In short, if we accept, as many do, that states put a premium on material power within the system, then the idea that states would want to expand their territorial war aims in the hope of realizing future military and economic gains through territory should not be surprising at all.

We should, however, recognize that this is material value in the abstract. There are factors that can decrease the material value of the territory. For instance, the conflict itself may have damaged the material value by destroying the territory's material endowments. There also may be more difficulty in occupying a piece of materially valuable territory than there would be in taking a less-important piece of land; depending on the nature of the territory's value, it is unlikely that the territory will be in the periphery of the state, or be poorly defended. The current owner of the territory has likely expended its own capital to use the material endowments, and may thus value it more and defend it considerably. Finally, the risks of gaining a reputation as an untrustworthy or "greedy" actor are especially acute when occupying territory for the sole purpose of material gain[62]. It will be apparent to other states in the system that the reason for the state's expanded aims is the material value of the territory, and if this represents a change in the state's

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[62] Glaser defines a "greedy state" as "a state that is motivated by both greed and security; that is, "greedy state" actually refers to a state with mixed motives, a security-seeking greedy state". Glaser, *Rational Theory of International Politics*, 37. He also notes that "a greedy state is willing to run risks and incur costs to expand, even if it is entirely secure. A purely greedy state would not respond positively to strategies designed to increase its security" (38). It is clear that taking territory for material power would be quite likely to get a state branded as greedy.

originally stated war aims, the state can hardly help but appear greedy for pursuing the additional material wealth[63].

Now let us turn to a second way that territory can contain inherent value. Territory can hold definite inherent military strategic value for the state that possesses it. By strategic value, we are now considering the military value of territory. This is distinct from the economic or material value in that the usefulness of the territory is in making military operations on or through it difficult for an opponent and easier for the possessor of the territory. The importance of having defendable ground is well recognized by military strategists[64], but is rarely discussed in terms of strategic bargaining or war aims. Nonetheless, it is clear that many states recognize the value of having defendable territory. This means that if there exists a natural border, defendable boundary, or superior position of any sort, a state will have a strong incentive to occupy that strategic zone in order to create a more defendable position for the remainder of the conflict, and especially to have a strong defendable position for future conflicts. Moreover, a state that is small in the geographic sense may want additional territory in order to slow attacks against it. If

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[63] Being seen as a greedy state is especially problematic because it makes it difficult for the potential occupier to get other states to cooperate with it; as Andrew H. Kydd argues in his book about how trust plays into cooperation between states, "cooperation is possible if both sides' level of trust exceeds a minimum trust threshold that is determined by their motivations and the structure of the situation…More powerful states will require a greater level of trust to cooperate, as will states with greater expansionist desires". Andrew H. Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations*, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005). 41. In other words, states that cannot achieve trust, such as those that appear acquisitive, will have trouble attaining cooperation.

[64] Many examples could be given; Clausewitz for instance says "High ground offers three strategic assets: *greater tactical strength, protection from access, and a wider view*". Clausewitz, *On War*, 353 (italics in original).

one can increase the time it would take an attacking army to move through your state and reach valuable objectives, then you have added to the defense of your state. Buffer zones of this type do not even need to be geographically defendable; they exist solely to slow prospective attackers down. Additional territory can therefore be very useful from a strategic standpoint to states in need of better defense.

Protecting one's future security is a powerful incentive for a state to act, and of the motivations for territorial occupation, this is one that can frequently persuade states to act and expand their aims. Nonetheless, there are some circumstances that limit the extent to which strategic strength creates inherent value. If the potential occupier is not fighting on its own or its neighbors' territory, the strategic strength of the territory will not be salient. States do not always fight in their own region, and will not always be concerned with preparing for a future conflict in the same area. This is particularly true for great powers, who often fight far from their own borders; while they may be interested in helping their allies, occupying territory they themselves cannot use may not be a good enough reason to expand war aims and expend military resources. Furthermore, strategic territory of this nature does not exist everywhere. There is immense variation within and among regions in terms of strategic territory, and where there are no mountains, ridges, bodies of water, or thick forests, states will not look to territorial occupation and acquisition to protect their future security. Finally, when a state already possesses strongly strategic territory, it will be less interested in trying to attain further territory of this nature. It already has a bulwark; why would it need another one? Nonetheless, this

reason for territorial occupation is very salient to many states, and is one of the prime reasons why territory has inherent value.

Finally, while international relations scholars tend to prefer a focus on international politics, it is an open question whether state leaders have the same luxury to focus solely on relations between states rather that politics within states. As many have noted, there is ample reason to believe that leaders must balance between the wants and desires of their domestic political audience and the needs of the state in the international system[65]. If we accept that domestic politics plays a role in the decisions made by state leaders on the international level, we can see that there are two main paths by which domestic politics can cause a piece of territory to have inherent value. First of all, if the territory is valuable to a particular domestic constituency for historical, religious, ethnic, or cultural reasons, expanding war aims to occupy it might satisfy that domestic audience[66]. This is especially true in cases where the leader has problems with the domestic constituency; if, for instance, a significant portion of a minority ethnic group inside the potential occupier state is

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[65] Of note for this argument is, of course, Robert Putnam's two-level games theory. This theory posits that there are two negotiations (or, games) going on simultaneously: "At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers… Each national political leader appears at both game boards". Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games", *International Organization* 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), 427-460, DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300027697, 434.

[66] Other scholars have recognized the particular value that some territory may hold for certain groups: see Toft, who notes that "a group's attachment to territory can make violent disputes over even objectively worthless territory rational". Toft, "Issue Indivisibility and Time Horizons" 37.

located in the territory of interest, uniting these populations may bolster the leader's position with the group or make them willing to invest in the occupier state. Second, a leader might choose to expand aims and occupy inherently valuable territory in order to bolster his or her domestic power. A leader that contributed substantially to a state's overall power by occupying important territory for the state may win popularity for him or her, and bolster his chances of reelection or of remaining in power in an authoritarian regime.

However, the presence of a domestic audience may cut both ways in terms of territorial war aims. For example, Suzanne Werner argues that state leaders will be unwilling to expand their war aims if their domestic audience is not supportive of the actions[67]. This view would argue that domestic politics would act as a constraining factor on expanding war aims. We might therefore doubt whether leaders would be willing to risk the possibility of over-extension or military failure for the sole purpose of satisfying a particular domestic audience, especially if failure to successfully occupy might cause widespread dissatisfaction among the rest of the domestic population.

In summation, these are the three key causes of inherent value in territory. It is worth emphasizing that the goal in taking inherently valuable territory is to remove the territory from the postwar bargain; in other words, to lay claim to the territory by conquest so that it cannot be lost through bargaining. States fear going

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[67] She uses the Gulf War as an example, in which she argues that George H.W. Bush refused to push to Baghdad because "Bush clearly worried that continuing the war would increase domestic opposition… He knew, in contrast, that few complaints would be lodged from settling the war". Werner, "Negotiating the Terms of Settlement", 339.

into the settlement phase of conflicts without having "locked down" what they value most. It is the fear of not getting what one wants through bargaining that drives the desire for inherently valuable territory. There is, however, also instrumentally valuable territory to consider, and that is what we will do now.

Instrumentally Valuable Territory

Inherently valuable territory is not a difficult concept to grasp; political scientists and military theorists alike are used to considering the value contained by a particular piece of ground. Instrumentally valuable territory, however, is more complicated. It is not that instrumentally valuable territory lacks value: however, it lacks value *for the potential occupier.* In other words, it is territory that the potential occupier state is not interested in keeping. Its value for the potential occupier lies in its usefulness in the postwar bargaining. I argue that states are aware as conflicts wind down that there will be a postwar settlement, and they frequently fear that their bargaining position is not strong enough. States, aware that a bargain is coming over the postwar settlement, ought to do everything they can to improve bargaining position while the conflict is still raging. One way of improving their position is though expanding war aims and occupying new territory. Under some circumstances, expanding to occupy additional territory can provide the state with a stronger bargaining position by gaining something its opponent desperately wants back or by communicating information about type to bargaining partners. I will address each of these types of territory.

The main reason a state might occupy territory for bargaining purposes is if it anticipates using the territory as a bargaining chip against its opponent. In this

case, occupying the territory is purely instrumental; the state does not intend to keep the territory after the conflict. But, if a state is able to occupy territory that its opponent values (for inherent historical, cultural, material, or strategic reasons), then the state has a powerful tool to use in wringing concessions from its opponent. The occupying state recognizes that its opponent will pay dearly to get its territory back, and uses this fact to extract concessions that it could not have gotten without occupation of the territory. This would be an expansion in aims if the state had not anticipated using territory for this purpose. Perhaps the state intended to force its opponent to the bargaining table by raising costs or by a simple show of military might. But if these were not successful, the state might find itself in a position where it has less to bargain with than it intended. Indeed, in cases of stalemate, expanding aims to occupy territory can be a means of breaking the stalemate and forcing the opponent to concede. Territory then presents a tempting tool for achieving the aims that had existed prior.

However, there are also problems with using territory as a bargaining chip. First of all, opponent states may decide to continue the war in order to win back territory rather than bargain at a disadvantage. Moreover, using territory as a bargaining chip to exact concessions from an opponent requires an effective understanding of what the opponent values. In particular, it requires that the territory occupied be of sufficient value to the opponent that they will acquiesce on other concessions in order to get the territory back. How does a potential occupier know if its opponent will trade dearly for territory taken? In many cases, it will be easy to see if a state values a piece of territory. It will have historical, strategic, or

cultural significance to its possessor, and another state may easily guess its worth and go after it as a useful bargaining chip.

However, states may see some territory as essentially fungible. States with large swaths of territory might care little for losses on the perimeter, and states with a strong strategic core might see little value in trading for territory that does not make them stronger or more secure. Even if the state does greatly value the territory, if it can recoup the value elsewhere (by exploiting different resources or finding new defensive positions), the occupier's bargaining chip may be less useful than it predicted. This is, therefore, not a reason for occupying territory that will always apply in every situation. Nonetheless, of the reasons for wanting to expand war aims, territory for bargaining purposes is one of the most pertinent reasons for attempting this strategy and going after greater gains.

The second reason why territory may have instrumental value is for its use in showing type to opponents, allies, and other third parties. The problem of information is a key one in bargaining games. Actors are constantly unsure of their opponent's type, and whether or not their opponent is likely to cooperate or defect. To solve this problem, states look for means to signal their intentions and type to other states. States will always worry about their opponent's intentions, and so states seek to send both credible signals of resolve and signals that will reveal them to be reasonable and trustworthy actors. This is frequently referred to as a costly signal; as Glaser notes, "A state may be able to signal its benign motives by sending a costly signal – choosing a strategy that a security seeker finds less costly than

would a greedy state"[68]. Signaling is thus a key aspect of relations between states, especially in high-stakes environments such as crises and conflicts.

On the face of it, occupying territory – while certainly costly in that it requires military effort and expenditure – seems that it would send a signal that a state is an aggressive power, one likely to defect from future agreements and likely to cause future conflicts. And, if the estate is expanding its war aims by occupying the territory, there is a significant risk that it will be seen as a greedy power that cannot be satisfied at any cost. While these risks are valid, states that already have a poor reputation have the possibility of using territorial occupation as a signal that they are more worthy of trust than was previously believed. A state willing to occupy and then withdraw from a territory as part of a bargaining agreement can frame that withdrawal as a signal of their reasonableness. For instance, a state might occupy a territory to protect its citizens or to preserve the territory for another state, and then withdraw in good time leaving a stable region in its place.

Having the ability to offer such a seemingly altruistic or trustworthy action during the bargaining may improve the state's reputation amongst its opponents, allies, and third parties. If the state can be in possession of territory and willingly give it up, perhaps they are more worthy of a place in the international order, and can be relied on a potential ally. They also may be able to gain concessions through demonstrating their reasonableness concerning this particular piece of territory. Thus, if a state is already struggling with a reputation for aggression or

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[68] Glaser. *Rational Theory of International Politics*, 52.

untrustworthiness, using territory to show a reasonable nature can greatly assist in future interactions with the same actors.

On the other hand, states might legitimately worry about attempting such a risky strategy in order to achieve a better reputation for reasonableness. This is probably the riskiest reason for expanding territorial war aims, as there is the chance that the audience states will receive the exact opposite signal from that which is intended by the potential occupier state. Since using territory in this manner requires expanding war aims and occupying it first, states would be right to be concerned as to whether their opponents will correctly read the later signal of withdraw as a sign of their reasonable nature. It is possible that their opponents will instead see the first move of occupation as what truly reveals the nature and the intentions of the occupying state. Even if the state is a beneficent occupier, and leaves the territory in good time, there is the risk that these moves will be ignored or discounted by the audience. Wanting to improve one's reputation is therefore a risky reason for occupying territory, and though it is still a quite important reason, there are many times when states will justifiably fear to expand their war aims in this way.

Why Add In Territory?

A reasonable scholar might wonder why it is important to consider the value of territory at the juncture. Does existing theory consider territorial value to be an important factor, and if not, is it worth consideration? I argue that including territory in the calculation of war aim expansion allows for an examination of causal complexity that is lacking in existing theory. Indeed, what is interesting is that the

two key alternate theories – offensive realism, and the commitment problem argument – do not carve out much room for differing territorial values to be considered. Indeed, neither theory gives causal strength to territorial value. Take for instance offensive realism. When we consider the question in this manner, it becomes clear that offensive realism lacks a clear explanation of how the value of territory impacts the rational calculation of the risks of expansion. The question of whether there is sufficient present risk of intervention or balancing determines the potential occupier's choice to expand. Because all territory increases power under offensive realism, there is little consideration of whether some territory might be worth a greater risk than other territory. This can be seen in Figure 2.1, which shows the predictions of offensive realism given a high or low risk of intervention and balancing, and my dichotomy of instrumentally and inherently valuable territory.

Figure 2.1: Territorial Value and Offensive Realism

	Instrumental	Inherent
High Risk of Intervention or Balancing	Don't Expand War Aims	Don't Expand War Aims
Low Risk of Intervention or Balancing	Expand Aims	Expand Aims

As we can see, under offensive realism, there is little causal strength to the value of territory. Expansion comes down to a single calculus: if one will be punished for expansion, do not expand. If one will not be punished, expand. Similarly, if we consider the commitment problem argument, we see that it too has little concern for

territorial value. Any territory that will convince the other state to accept a bargain, or that will contribute to the ending of the conflict through absolute war, is worth expansion in the commitment problem argument. Therefore, we see that territorial value matters little for this argument, as can be seen in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2: Territorial Value and the Commitment Problem Argument

	Instrumental	Inherent
High Risk of Commitment Problem	Expand War Aims	Expand War Aims
Low Risk of Commitment Problem	Don't Expand Aims	Don't Expand Aims

This still leaves the question of why it is worth including territorial value as a variable in the analysis. I offer three reasons why this innovation is key to understanding territorial war aim expansion. First of all, as is clear from the above analysis, territory does differ significantly in value: to deny or ignore that is to ignore a potentially vital causal mechanism. Without an understanding of how territory can be valuable, we cannot understand why a potential occupier might desire it. Second, incorporating the value of territory improves on the analysis of existing theory by filling in the gaps of why some territory might be worth the risk of outside intervention, or might be superior at solving the commitment problem. Finally, dichotomizing territorial value as I have done is of key importance because it allows us to understand how potential occupiers might use territory in different ways to achieve their future preferences, something for which existing theories

cannot account. I argue therefore that territorial value is indeed an important causal factor, one that cannot be overlooked.

How To Distinguish Reasons for Expanded Aims

We have now examined the two key ways that territory may be valuable to states, and thus tempt them into expanding their war aims and acquiring territory. I have explained what states can hope to achieve from occupying territory of both an instrumental and an inherent nature. It is worth taking a moment, however, to consider how to approach the problem of distinguishing between these various impetuses for occupation. From an empirical standpoint it would be useful to understand how we may distinguish these reasons from one another in the real world. Moreover, if there are different implications for instrumental and inherently valuable territory, then we must be able to distinguish between the two. Of course, this is a difficult proposition, for the reason that territory may serve more than one aim of states. For example, inherently valuable territory may have such value for more than one reason. A state leader might choose to expand war aims in order for inherent material gain, but may accrue domestic political benefits because of the popularity of the action. How are we to know which reason for occupation is the one propelling the state to action, and which reason is simply a facilitating or reinforcing factor that increases the likelihood of the state expanding its aims?

It has already been suggested that some aims are more likely to predominate than others. In particular, I argue that the inherent aims of material gain and strategic strength, and the instrumental aim of bargaining are the ones most likely to be the propelling factors that lead states to expand their aims. This is because

these reasons for occupation are likely to be salient for many states in many instances of conflict. However, in terms of distinguishing inherent motives from instrumental motives, there are a few things the researcher may do. One may, of course, look at what leaders and other state officials *say* about the reasons for wanting to occupy territory. If one finds evidence that states are discussing territory as a bargaining chip, there is increased credence for that explanation of expanded aims. One can also look at what opponents, third parties, or allies perceived upon seeing a state expand its war aims. These are states that wish to understand why this action has been enacted; they will likely leave some information as to their perception of the state's war aims, information that can be found by the interested scholar.

Finally, while this is the least preferred option, this is a case where one can look at *what* was done to determine *why* it was done. For instance, in order to distinguish territorial occupation for the purposes of bargaining, a key question is: did the state in fact use the territory as a bargaining chip during negotiations? There are many issues with post-hoc reasoning; nonetheless, it has its role to play in distinguishing between the reasons for occupation. However, the reasons for expanding war aims are only part of the story. To understand why states sometimes choose to remain satisfied with the status quo, we must look at the risks of expanding war aims.

In summation, the reason states expand to take inherently valuable territory is to remove that territory from the bargaining table. By contrast, states go after instrumentally valuable territory in order to use it at the bargaining table. In the

former instance, the state fears leaving the outcome to be determined after the conflict ends; in the latter, the territory is valuable insofar as it helps the state determine the outcome after the conflict. Ultimately, there are two questions that potential expander states must ask themselves. First, is the expected benefit of owning the territory (if inherently valuable) worth the cost? Second, is the expected benefit of bargaining using the territory (if instrumentally valuable) worth the cost? This brings us to the question of cost, which is the main theoretical innovation of this study's theory: I argue that states fear damaging their future security by taking territory, and this damage comes in the form of impact on the state's relationships with other states.

Future Security Risks: Allies, Opponents, & Reputation

We have seen that states frequently desire to occupy territory for inherent and instrumental motivations. Now we need to examine why states might hold back from expanding their territorial aims. This study's theory asserts that the main risk to expanding war aims is that other states have the ability to adversely impact the state's future security in response to such an action. Territorial occupation through expanded war aims may help achieve a state's postwar preferences and grow its power; it may also put its security into jeopardy. No potential occupier exists in a vacuum, and while a state may gain some benefits from territorial occupation in the short term, it may create the circumstances for conflicts and mistrust among states that greatly damages its security in the long term. In short, the reason why potential occupiers fail to expand their war aims is that they fear the impact on their future

interactions with the states that help to determine their future security and place in the system.

The main risks potential occupier states face are: 1. The risk of gaining a reputation among third parties as an untrustworthy actor, 2., The risk of losing the support of a valued ally with different postwar preferences and 3., The risk of seeding the ground for further conflicts with the current opponent. States care about their interactions with other actors in the system because their security is based on relationships with other states. It is a rare case where a state is capable of achieving its security using only its own power. Usually, states will have to rely on allies or will have to bargain with opponents or third parties to achieve the results they desire. The reason states fear the potential impact of territorial occupation is that, in order to achieve their preferences about their future security and future place in the system, states have to consider both their own power and their relationships with other states that can adversely impact their preferences. Moreover, there will be different effects depending on the value the territory has for the potential occupier. The key distinction between inherently valuable territory and instrumentally valuable territory has to do with whether other states are able to either sufficiently raise the costs of taking the territory or offer alternate solutions such that the potential occupier would decide the benefits are not worth the costs.

In general, when territory has inherent value for a potential occupier, the potential occupier is more likely to expand unless other states can provide a lot of punishment or alternate incentives. This is because the territory itself is part of the state's postwar preferences, and some of those preferences may be unable to be

fulfilled without the territory. By contrast, when the territory has instrumental value for the potential occupier, it is using the territory because it believes that is the best way to achieve its preferences. If, however, the potential occupier could be convinced that its preferences can be achieved by other means, or that occupying the territory will in fact jeopardize its security more than it will protect them, then it might choose not to expand its aims. The particular value of the territory, coupled with the particular impact different states may have, determines whether expanding territorial war aims is worth the potential costs. We will now examine the three key risks that come from expanding war aims, and discuss how these risks interact differently when the territory has inherent value versus instrumental value. Let us first begin with the general risk to the state's reputation among third parties.

Risk of Gaining a Reputation for Untrustworthiness

The first important risk to future preferences is the risk of gaining a reputation as an untrustworthy actor in the system. As noted in the review of prior literature, the importance of reputation is a complicated topic in international relations; however, most would agree that having a reputation for being an unreasonable actor is likely to lead to adverse consequences. At the least, it may impinge on a state's ability to recruit new allies, and may impede its ability to exert its will in even minor situations. It is reasonable to assume that when interacting with the same actors repeatedly, having a reputation as a reasonable actor is one of the key ways to get to cooperation rather than defection. A state with an interest in repeated interactions and bargains with the same actors should care about its reputation, and should act to preserve it. Reputation has an impact on future

relations with allies, with former opponents, and most importantly, with third parties who are neither allies nor adversaries, but which may become one or the other in the future. States ought to fear any actions that will turn a neutral third party into an unfriendly state or an adversary, and should act to avoid such problems.

There is such uncertainty about the future in the international system that states will remain uncertain as to whether third parties who are currently neutral, somewhat supportive, or somewhat opposed to their actions, will remain so in the future. They will rationally fear gaining a reputation that will affect their ability to keep neutral states neutral, and friendly states friendly. Even with currently hostile states, gaining a reputation for untrustworthiness can dramatically exacerbate tensions. It is one thing to have a hostile state that nonetheless understands you to have a trustworthy reputation. It is quite another for that hostile state to see you as untrustworthy and greedy. And in terms of truly neutral third parties, potential occupiers must consider that those states are gathering information about their type and their intentions. Expanding war aims may send a signal that they are greedy, untrustworthy actors, and this may in turn affect the dealings the potential occupier has with these states in the future.

However, potential occupier states will not always face a high risk of gaining a negative reputation. Circumstances may be such that the state could expand in relative security, at least against this risk. For example, if the state's opponent is sufficiently disliked and vilified, the potential occupier state might be able to expand without evoking sympathy for its opponent. Moreover, if the potential occupier was

the aggrieved party in the conflict, it may be able to present its expansion to the world as a justifiable act, decreasing the impact to its reputation. If the territory is instrumental, and the opponent ends up getting it back, the potential occupier state may be able to justify its actions as simply part of the process of conflict. Thus, there will be times that the risk of gaining a negative reputation is higher or lower. In general, when the risk of hurting one's reputation is higher, states will be less likely to expand their aims. However, of the three risks, I argue that reputational risks are the ones states are most likely to ignore if they sufficiently value the territory. There are two other risks to the state's future security, and these are in fact more serious than the risks to its reputation. We will turn now to the risks to alliances, in order to see how allies can impact the state's future security.

Allies, Future Security, and Risks to Expansion

Though self-help is a fundamental tenet of international relations theory, few countries are able to rely completely on their own power in order to achieve their ends. Rather, it is necessary to form alliances and cultivate allied support in order to win wars and obtain strategic ends. For the purposes of this argument, "allies" are not just the states with which the potential occupier has official alliances. Allies are those states that currently support the potential occupier in the current conflict. However, there is an important question to answer, which is: how would an alliance be affected by a state's expansion of its territorial war aims? The explanation has to do with the differences that even close allies have in their post-war preferences, future security and their desires to shape the post-war international order. It is quite true that all states will have preferences, but it is rare that states share all of

their preferences. Some preferences may be shared, but a good many will differ from ally to ally. Even close allies will have different preferences given differences in their geographic location, economic capability, and relative power; indeed, it is entirely possible for states' preferences to actually conflict with one another. This may mean that the states' securities are incompatible with one another on certain levels.

The question potential occupier states must face is whether it is worth expanding one's aims if it comes at the expense of an ally's preferences and security. This can easily be the case for territorial war aims. One state may believe that the territory in question should belong to a third party, or that it should be left to the opponent in order to lower the risk of future conflict. Moreover, even if the two allies are on good times, the ally might reasonably fear the potential occupier in the future if it suddenly increased its material power or strategic security. Safe behind a new defendable piece of territory, will the ally be involved in maintaining security, or will it instead turn isolationist? Occupying territory therefore can impact greatly an ally's preferences, and this has very real consequences for the relationship between the two states.

If the ally is willing and able to punish the potential expander for adversely impacting the ally's preferences and security, the relationship between the two will certainly suffer. From the perspective of the ally, the state has just betrayed its promises. Initial war aims are generally visible and frequently understood by all; to suddenly expand on those aims and go after new territory represents a significant departure from the understanding these states had with one another. If the

expanded aim has only a limited impact on the ally's preferences, the result may simply be a complaint by the ally and a small amount of lingering mistrust. However, if the expanded war aim has a significant impact on the ally's ability to achieve its own preferences, a state that betrays its ally in this manner will likely face several unpleasant effects as the ally seeks to punish the occupier for its actions. At worst, the ally might turn into an adversary, or will at least revoke the alliance. At best, the ally will be left with a great deal of mistrust towards the potential occupier, and if it does not immediately end the alliance, it will likely begin looking for alternate allies for the future.

However, the ally is also in a position in which it can offer to help the potential occupier achieve its aims without use of the territory, and it may offer to do so in place of expansion. The ally may be able to substitute its own power or aid to allow the potential occupier to achieve its postwar preferences without needing to occupy the territory. This will, of course, be easier to accomplish when the territory is valuable for instrumental reasons rather than inherent ones. If the ally is able to guarantee the potential occupier's postwar preferences will be fulfilled without needing to occupy the territory, and threatens to revoke the alliance if such aid is not taken, then the potential occupier is less likely to expand its aims. In summation, when potential occupiers are weighing whether expanding territorial war aims will adversely impact their postwar preferences vis-à-vis their allies, they must consider the value of the territory as well as the likelihood that their ally will punish them or guarantee their preferences through other means. It is worth noting that for the purposes of this theory, I am assuming the ally is in fact opposed to the

potential expander's plans; if it were not, there is little reason to consider the ally as a problem or future risk. There are certainly cases where the ally would have no opinion, or be in favor of, the potential expander's aims. In this case, whether or not the potential expander went forward would likely depend on the effect of the current opponent or of third parties.

Moreover, if the ally is opposed to the expansion but does not adequately communicate that fact to the potential expander, the ally's opinion will not factor into the potential expander's choices; the potential expander would not know it was risking the alliance by expanding its territorial aims. Finally, there may be cases where the ally is opposed to expansion, but lacks the credibility to punish the potential occupier because the occupier represents the only feasible alliance for the ally in a particular region or in a particular circumstance. If the ally needs the potential occupier, and cannot easily find another alliance, then the ally lacks the power to punish the occupier for its actions. In this case, the potential occupier could proceed as though the ally's support meant little, for the ally lacks the mechanism to punish it for its actions.

Finally, if the ally has made its opposition to expansion clear, and it has the power to back it up, the key question for the potential occupier is whether it considers the ally important for its postwar security. As we have noted, alliances may be of two characters: short, temporary alliances in order to achieve a particular end, and long-term alliances that are designed to carry on though many different circumstances and potential conflicts. These different types of alliances have different effects on the decision-making of states. Is this an alliance that will be

needed into the future to protect the potential occupier's security, or is a more ad hoc, less necessary alliance? If the former, the potential occupier will risk much more if it offends that ally than if it believes the alliance unnecessary for its security. Whether the alliance is long-term or short-term will depend both on the potential occupier's own preferences as well as the ally's preferences. Is the ally able to end the alliance and find a new partner, or does the ally lack other options?

For instance, if the ally is the weaker partner, they may not be able to find another strong state willing to take them on as a partner. Other factors such as domestic characteristics or regional concerns may make it impossible for the ally to swap a different state for the potential occupier, and thus make the alliance long-term even if the potential occupier is less than faithful to its ally. The potential occupier, in fact, could even treat this type of ally as being of low importance in the future, because the ally has no recourse to punish them. Ultimately, the length of the alliance, combined with the value of the territory, will determine whether the potential occupier is likely to expand its territorial war aims. Below is a summation of possible options, showing what this study's theory predicts in each circumstance given the importance of the alliance and the risk to reputation:

Figure 2.3

		Instrumental	Inherent
High Impact on Reputation	High Importance of Ally for Postwar Security	**8** Expansion of Territorial War Aims Least Likely; highest risk to future security cancels out potential bargaining gains.	**7** Expansion Very Unlikely; the risk to future security from losing both the alliance and a good reputation are high, but the inherent value of the territory may tempt some states.
	Low Importance of Ally for Postwar Security	**4** Expansion Possible; risk to reputation may not outweigh potential bargaining gains.	**3** Expansion Likely; gaining the territory and keeping the alliance intact likely outweighs risks to reputation.
Low Impact on Reputation	High Importance of Ally for Postwar Security	**6** Expansion Unlikely; the gains in bargain may not outweigh the cost of losing the alliance, even if reputation is not affected.	**5** Expansion Less Likely; losing alliance is damaging to security, but the value of the territory may make expansion worth the risk.
	Low Importance of Ally for Postwar Security	**2** Expansion Very Likely; gains in bargaining are very low in risk to the state's future security.	**1** Expansion of Territorial War Aims Most Likely; there is the least risk to the state's future security, and value is high.

The possible cases are arrayed across eight different groups in Figure 2.3, numbered from one (most likely to expand) to eight (least likely to expand). I argue that territorial war aim expansion is most likely when the impact on the potential occupier's reputation is low, the importance of the ally for future security is low, and the territory itself is inherently valuable. This is because the territory is necessary for the potential occupier's postwar preferences, and the ally has very little power over the potential occupier because the alliance is of low value. Therefore, where territory is instrumental, the alliance has high importance, and the risk to reputation is high, there are the cases where territorial war aim expansion is least likely to occur. This is because the ally, as well as third parties looking at reputation, have a great deal of power to affect the potential occupier's future security, and the territory itself is only valued for achieving a particular end, not for its own sake. The potential occupier ought thus to look for another way of achieving its preferences, possibly even with the ally's assistance.

In between the two extremes, we have cases where there are varying likelihoods of the potential occupier expanding its aims. In general, we can see that expansion is more likely when the territory is inherent, regardless of the risks; this is because the territory itself is more valuable than when it is instrumental. However, the higher the importance of the ally, the lower the chance of expansion. Finally, high damage to reputation acts generally to lower the chance of expansion, but potential expanders may expand even in the face of reputational damage if the territory is inherently valuable and the ally's value is relatively low. However, the ally is not the only state with which the potential expander may be concerned. The

current opponent, in some situations, can make expansion just as risky as the current ally can.

Risk of Future Conflicts

The final risk to expanding war aims is the potential for future conflicts and leaving one's opponent dissatisfied with the current status quo. As Clausewitz notes, wars can frequently recur; the reasons for the start of the conflict are not always resolved by the postwar settlement[69]. The issue states must face is how to end conflicts in such a manner that their opponents are most likely to be satisfied with the status quo, and unwilling to risk future conflicts over the same aims. What this means for expanding war aims is that states must weigh whether the benefits of expanding war aims are worth the risks that they will create the conditions for future conflict. It is unlikely that a victorious state would consider fighting again in the future to be optimal for its future security; rather, the state ought to want to bask in its success, and prevent another costly war from eroding its future strength. Moreover, most states would likely prefer being able to establish positive relations in the future with their current opponent. It may not always be possible; some states will have great difficulty resolving the security dilemmas they have with each other, but in general, a state with which good relations is possible is preferable to a hostile one That being said, why would expanding territorial aims create future conflict with the same opponent?

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[69] He notes, "even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date". Clausewitz, *On War*, 80.

First of all, if a state expands its aims, occupies its opponent's territory, and then keeps the territory, the opponent could very easily be dissatisfied with the postwar settlement, and might hope to change it in the future. An obvious example of territorial acquisition that caused lasting hostility is the acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine by the Prussians in the wake of the Franco-Prussian War. We might easily question whether the value of this territory was worth the lasting effects on the relations between the two states (though this will be discussed in Chapter Four). Furthermore, to the extent that domestic political opinion may impact on relations between states, even a rational leader in the losing state that seeks to maintain future peace may find him or herself in a position where encouraging the hostility best serves his domestic interest. It is entirely conceivable that elements of the domestic population might take badly to losing important territory, and even if the state's current and future leaders are able to accept the loss as a necessary cost in the international system, the population may force them into a situation in which they have no choice but to initiate conflicts and crises in order to try to get their territory back.

If the territory is particularly valuable to the domestic political audience, then wresting it from the losing state creates the breeding ground for future conflict. This is especially salient when the territory has cultural or historic value; such territory has innate value far beyond its material value, and even if the potential occupier compensates the losing state for the material value of the territory, the leader and his or her domestic audience may remain unsatisfied and seek a change in the future. Even if the territory in question has strategic value rather than what

we might term emotional value, there is increased reason for the losing state to want to reacquire it. Especially after coming out behind in a conflict and its settlement, states will fear for their own security even more than before they had lost their territory. Therefore, an expanded war aim in order to remove territory from one's opponent can be quite risky, if the territory is particularly valuable strategically or domestically. Second, even if the expanding state does not keep the territory, there may still be the potential for future conflict due to the territorial occupation. If, for instance, the territory is being used as a bargaining chip to gain concessions from the opponent, the opponent may be left with significant hostility. Just because the opponent gets the territory back does not mean that it did not lose something valuable in the process. Moreover, if the potential occupier has revealed itself to be untrustworthy by its use of instrumentally valuable territory, this may send a signal to the current opponent that the potential occupier state is not to be trusted in the future.

However, there is also the possibility that the opponent will not be dissatisfied if the potential occupier expands its aims. Just because the territory has inherent value for one state does not mean it has inherent value for all. If for instance the territory contains an ethnic group that is a minority in the opponent state and a majority in the potential occupier state, the opponent might consider itself well rid of the territory. Moreover, even if the potential occupier uses the territory instrumentally to gain certain concessions, it is possible that the opponent gets enough of something else out of the bargain that it does not resent giving up some concessions in order to get its territory back. Finally, if there is more than one

opponent in the conflict, some states will not be dissatisfied if their co-belligerent loses some territory.

Where this consideration of opponent dissatisfaction differs from that offensive realism is in this very fact that opponents do not always have to be dissatisfied after conflict, and conflict recurrence is not always a given. Offensive realism, as we have seen, assumes a high risk of continued on the part of an opponent, so territorial acquisition is always rational barring a risk of intervention. If, however, we believe that some states can fight conflicts, end them, and not be left with lasting hostility, then it is clear that territorial gains can be as much of a risk as a reward. What we need to consider therefore is whether expanding war aims would *change* the risk of leaving the opponent dissatisfied. Offensive realism does not distinguish between a high risk of opponent dissatisfaction because of territorial expansion and a high risk of opponent dissatisfaction regardless of expansion. This theory can; I argue that potential occupiers who know that expanding will cause dissatisfaction that would not otherwise exist will be less likely to expand, whereas potential occupiers who believe the losing state will not be dissatisfied, or will be dissatisfied regardless of what aims the potential occupier pursues, will be more likely to expand. Therefore, this variable can also be plotted from low to high. Adding it to our consideration of territorial value, we see that it is the interaction of the territory's value with the probability that the opponent will be left dissatisfied and the likelihood of gaining a negative reputation if war aim are expanded that determines whether or not the potential expander is likely to occupy additional territory. This is demonstrated in Figure 2.4 below.

Figure 2.4

		Instrumental	Inherent
High Impact on Reputation	High Likelihood of Increasing Opponent Dissatisfaction	**8** Expansion of Territorial War Aims Least Likely; highest risk to future security cancels out potential bargaining gains.	**7** Expansion Very Unlikely; highest risk to future security, but the inherent value of the territory may still tempt some states.
	Low Likelihood of Increasing Opponent Dissatisfaction	**4** Expansion Possible; states may discount the risk to their reputation in order to realize bargaining gains.	**3** Expansion Likely; gaining the territory without making the opponent more dissatisfied likely outweighs risks to reputation.
Low Impact on Reputation	High Likelihood of Increasing Opponent Dissatisfaction	**6** Expansion Unlikely; the gains in bargain may not offset the risks of leaving the opponent dissatisfied, even if reputation is not affected.	**5** Expansion Less Likely; risk to security from a dissatisfied opponent is high, but the value of the territory may make expansion worth the risk.
	Low Likelihood of Increasing Opponent Dissatisfaction	**2** Expansion Very Likely; gains in bargaining are very low in additional risk to the state's future security.	**1** Expansion of Territorial War Aims Most Likely; the state can gain the territory with little additional risk to their future security.

As with the risk from an ally, we see here that where there is the highest risk of increased opponent dissatisfaction and a high risk of an adverse impact on reputation, the potential occupier is least likely to expand its war aims, particularly if the territory is only instrumentally valuable. On the opposite end of the spectrum, when there is a low likelihood of increased opponent dissatisfaction and of an impact on reputation, and the territory is inherently valuable, the state is very likely to expand its territorial war aims. Between these two extremes are varying likelihoods of territorial war aim expansion; again we see that it is the interaction of risks to future security and territorial value that determine whether the state is likely to expand its aims.

Allies and Opponents: One and the Same?

So far, I have described allies and opponents as though they are easily distinguished from one another, and as though the categories of "allies" and "opponents" are such that states do not easily move from one category to another. Some might allege however that dichotomizing important states into allies or opponents misses a third, very important category of states: those states who may assist the potential occupier in the future conflict, but whose future status as an ally is hardly assured, and opponents who are arrayed against the potential occupier for various reasons that will likely cease to exist after the conflict ends; these states may in fact be plausible allies for the future. In other words, where is the line between allies and opponents? To what extent is it important to clearly distinguish between these groups?

First of all, we must consider the question of whether a single state could be both an ally and a potential future adversary, or an opponent and a potential future ally. States do not always remain the same across conflict. A state that began a conflict as an ally might, through no fault of the potential occupier, begin pulling away and pursuing different preferences. The ally might, in fact, begin to look more like a third party or even a potential future opponent rather than the trusted partner it once was. This is different than the risk of provoking the ally to pull away; in this case, the potential occupier understands that the ally may be important in the present, but less reliable in the future. Similarly, it is important for the potential occupier to consider whether it is sufficient just to avoid leaving its opponent dissatisfied, or whether it can actually create a future ally by its treatment of the current opponent. If this study's theory focuses on present calculation of future risk, can it cope with the notion that present allies and opponents may exogenously change without impact from the potential occupier?

I argue it can, precisely because the risk of antagonizing an ally can be higher or lower depending on whether the potential occupier believes it will need that state for its future security. If a current ally might become a future opponent, and if the potential occupier has any inkling this might occur, it will likely rank the need for that ally as lower than it would otherwise be. Moreover, even if it is hard to predict an exogenous change in relations, we can see from the figures that the risks of hurting a valued ally and the risk of creating dissatisfaction in a potential opponent would point in the same direction. A potential occupier, even if it might fear losing the ally anyway, would likely air on the side of caution if it believed that

ally could be dissatisfied with its expansion. If it remained an ally, occupying the territory could alter that relationship; if it became an opponent, the dissatisfaction could create the circumstance for adverse relations or even conflict in the future. We might therefore consider whether, when applying the theory to some conflicts, it would be better to think of allies and opponents as being more flexible than the basic theory has lain out.

Second, what if the potential occupier has both an important ally, and a potentially dissatisfied opponent, to worry about in the same conflict? It is certainly possible that both could exist at the same time, leaving the state with several pertinent concerns. However, I believe in most cases that the potential occupier will either be most concerned by its alliances, its opponents, or ambiguous states, but rarely will contend with all at once. For example, states that are great powers will likely have fewer important allies to worry about; they are largely able to guarantee their own security, and maintaining long-term alliances will not matter as much. For these states, the importance of the opponent will be key. For smaller states, the reverse is likely true. The ally is more important than the opponent. The opponent may differ from conflict to conflict, in that some opponents will be more likely to interact with the potential occupier in the future. For example, if the opponent is a near neighbor of the potential occupier, then anything that risks future conflict with that opponent is more serious than if the two states are far away from each other.

If somehow the potential occupier has both important allies and cares about whether its opponent is dissatisfied, this is not a major problem for the theory. Indeed, as I have shown, the two risks would generally point in the same direction.

The territory will have the same value, and the risk to reputation will be the same. Depending on whether the other two risks are both high, both low, or mixed, the likelihood of expansion would still be predictable.

We should also consider the falsifiability of this theory. No theory should claim to explain every case, or say that there is no way to show the theory to be incorrect in some examples. Here, since the theory makes clear predictions about when territory is likely to be occupied, it is easy to come up with an example of a falsifiable case. If, for instance, a state occupied additional territory that it used instrumentally, thus losing itself an important alliance or creating a situation that led to conflict in the future, this would go against the predictions of the theory. Moreover, if a state chose not to expand despite little risk and high territorial value, the theory would have problems because it clearly could not explain why expansion did not occur in that case. In the empirical case studies, we will consider whether there are cases that contradict the theory, or ones that the theory cannot explain as well as the alternate theories. While I argue that this study's theory can explain a greater number of cases, and is especially useful for understanding several important cases, I will show that there are some examples in which offensive realism and the commitment problem argument at least as well, if not better than, than the theory. Before getting to the empirical chapters, however, there is one more factor to consider, and that is the general question of feasibility.

Two Caveats About Feasibility

Thus far, aside from the assumption that states have the capability of expanding their aims, we have not considered whether there are any practical

difficulties to occupying territory. As I have noted, I am interested in the choice to expand aims, not whether the state successfully occupies the territory. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind two potential difficulties that could impact the state's ability to achieve its ends using the territory. The first involves the potential length of the occupation. If the territory is inherently valuable, can the state successfully absorb the territory? If it is instrumental, can the potential occupier keep control of the territory for the length of time necessary to use it? For example, the local population of the territory may be unwilling to accept the occupation, even if it is temporary. The prospect of an insurgency against an occupation is one that no state should take likely. History abounds with examples of states that occupied new territory, only to find themselves facing an insurgency that quickly raised the costs of the occupation far beyond what was originally anticipated.

Second, a potential occupier state must look to its own internal stability before embarking on expanded war aims. Leaders typically fear domestic instability that may arise from unpopular policies, and they may fear risks to their power, their domestic supporters, or their political system. It is possible that occupying additional territory may destabilize the domestic sphere of the potential occupier. If the territory is taken for inherent reasons, hostile populations dissatisfied with their new nationality may present domestic difficulties in the future by creating separatist movements or by other political activities. Moreover, populations within the original borders of the expanding state might be dissatisfied with the presence of this new territory and population, and may create domestic unrest of their own in order to express this dissatisfaction.

Ultimately, however, I do not believe states are typically constrained by fears about the occupation or about domestic unrest. I believe it is relatively common for state leaders to ignore the likelihood of domestic instability or unpopularity or to act to make sure that such instability does not occur. It is all too easy for leaders to discount the future in the domestic sphere. If they are in a democracy, the consequences of the occupation may not occur until after they leave office. Leaders of all sorts may have overconfidence in their own popularity or in their own ability to prevent domestic unrest. Moreover, leaders often have a wide range of options for getting a domestic population to support their activities. Whether it be by peaceful means such as the media or speech-making, or by violent means such as suppression of dissidents, most world leaders have a great deal of power to shape domestic stability.

As for fears about successfully occupying territory, states have often had trouble correctly assessing the costs of initial and extended occupation; if the 2003 Iraq War shows anything, it is that overconfidence in these matters is hardly unusual. Moreover, the failure to successfully occupy does not mean the state was irrational to choose to expand its war aims, nor does it mean that the necessary condition of a high probability of success was not fulfilled. There are no certainties, and even a state with a very high probability of success may occasionally fail. We will see an example in the World War II case study of a country (Yugoslavia) failing to successfully occupy, in part because their opponents were frightened of surrendering to them. In short, while feasibility is important to consider, I believe most state leaders with the capability of expanding will assume they can do so

successfully without the cost of the occupation being too high or without destabilizing their domestic sphere.

Final Thoughts

This chapter has laid out this study's theory, explaining the background assumptions, necessary conditions, and causal mechanisms it posits for explaining territorial war aims. I believe that if capability to occupy exists, leaders will attempt occupation unless the factors that risk their future security are present. I have shown that states have many reasons for expanding their territorial war aims, ranging from material value to bargaining power. I have argued that it is states' fear of the future – namely, the fear that other states will have adverse impacts on their security, their relative power and the international order – that is the true determinant of whether states will choose to expand their territorial war aims. When expanded war aims are not met with opposition from important long-term allies, when current opponents are unlikely to create a resurgence in conflict, and there is little risk of gaining a reputation as a greedy actor, states will be very likely to expand their aims. In order to test this theory, I present three empirical chapters. The first two are case studies, which are of key importance for establishing causal mechanisms at work and for looking in-depth at decision-making and behavior. The first is a consideration of the end of World War II. The second looks at German and Italian unification in the nineteenth century, comparing the wars that made up this process. The final empirical chapter will look at significant post-WWII interstate conflicts by region and by the nature of the conflict, considering the theory's overall success across the universe of cases.

Finally, this analysis will consider throughout whether the alternate explanations for war aims – offensive realism, and the commitment problem argument – do as good a job as this study's theory at explaining the circumstances under which states will choose to expand war aims. If the offensive realists are correct, we should see expansion of war aims when there are no states willing or able to balance against the potential expander. If the commitment problem explanation is correct, we should see states expand their war aims when involved in particularly intractable conflicts, and when they have reason to believe that neither side can commit to a possible ceasefire or settlement to the conflict. Thus, throughout these chapters I will be comparing my theory to offensive realism and to the commitment problem argument. At the end, I will consider the overall success of this study's theory at explaining territorial war aim expansion, and consider what it can teach policy-makers for the future.

Chapter 3: The End of World War II

Why This Case?

There are many potential cases that could be examined to shed light on the decision-making behind the choice of whether or not to expand territorial war aims. However, there is one conflict that can hardly be ignored in this regard, and that is World War II. There are many factors that make WWII an ideal case for studying war aims. First of all, this was a great power war par excellence, which spawned massive changes in the status quo international order, territorial ownership, and the balance of power in the European system and the world as a whole. The choices taken by states in this conflict had enormous implications for their future security, and indeed for the stability of the system as a whole. Moreover, this was a situation in which multiple states had multiple opportunities to expand their territorial war aims, so there is ample opportunity to examine how states' decision-making differed at various times and in different locations.

This chapter takes a closer look at two key territorial concerns at the end of WWII. First, I examine the squabbles over the city of Trieste and its surrounding area. I look at both Tito's choice to expand his aims, and the Western Allies' choice to expand theirs and try to prevent his occupation by getting there first. Second, I look at the uncertainty surrounding Austria. The Western Allies chose not to expand their aims and push to Austria, and, while Stalin did arrive there and occupy the country, he did not coalesce his occupation into true political control. I argue therefore that he also failed to expand his war aims. While most of the questions of territorial occupation, political influence, and ownership were resolved shortly after

the end of the war, these two cases did not see a satisfactory political settlement for about a decade after the conclusion of the conflict. Indeed, the debate over Austria and Trieste represented the shift from the end of WWII to the beginning of the Cold War; while the issues needing resolution stemmed from actions (and inactions) taken at the end of the conflict, the bargaining over the ultimate outcome of the territories was solved in a Cold War context. Ultimately, in the case of Trieste and its surrounding region, both the Western Allies and Tito in Yugoslavia chose to attempt territorial expansion and try to consolidate control before the other power arrived. I argue in this chapter that this was because both sides found the territory to have inherent value, and both Tito and the Western Allies believed their alliance was soon coming to an end. There was no reason to refrain from expansion when the states' future securities did not depend upon maintaining their current alliance; allied opposition was not sufficient to overcome the value of the territory and prevent expansion. By contrast, neither the Western Allies nor Stalin chose to expand aims with regards to Austria; true, Stalin arrived in Austria first, but he did not add it to his sphere of influence when he had the capability to do so. In this case, I argue that Austria was of low value – instrumental at best – and the two sides still valued their alliance. Stalin had no desire to end the benefits he accrued from the Western Allies, and they in turn (the United States in particular) saw no reason to risk damaging the alliance over territory with such limited value.

These two cases are of interest to compare for a few reasons. First of all, unlike much of Eastern Europe, these two areas were close enough geographically to the Western Allies that they could (and did, in one case) choose territorial war

aim expansion. Second, the postwar outcomes for the two areas were uncertain. There was much debate as to what a postwar Austria would look like, and Trieste had only been an Italian possession since the end of the first World War. The ethnic makeup of the city and surrounding countryside made the right to the city's ownership ambiguous at best. There was thus opportunity for multiple actors to attempt territorial expansion in both these cases.

This is important because it allows us to ask in each case, why did certain actors choose to expand their aims, while others did not? This is especially salient given that this was one of the preeminent examples of the victors of the conflict being able to dictate the terms of postwar settlement amongst themselves, rather than having involved negotiations between the winning state and the losing states. The requirement of unconditional surrender, and the absolute nature of the military victory over Germany meant that the eventual outcome reflected the negotiated preferences of the most powerful states in the system.

These cases are also important because the alternative explanations for changes in war aims would make very different, and quite clear, predictions. As has been discussed, offensive realism will generally predict maximalist war aims, and frequently expansion of war aims when the opportunity exists, barring specific circumstances in the present. Moreover, an explanation of war aims that relies on the commitment problem argument would assume that territorial expansion would be based upon a state's need to achieve a end to the conflict to which all states will commit, and will often expect absolute war aims when a commitment problem exists. Neither of these predictions is borne out by the facts, as this analysis shows.

Ultimately, this case study looks at the goals and postwar preferences of the victor states, and examines the choices these states made about territorial occupation and expanded war aims. As I have noted, I argue that the most salient factors in the case were the value of the territories and the states' views of the necessity of maintaining what was already a somewhat troubled alliance. Third party actors were a more minimal factor in this case, as the conflict was so far-reaching that there were relatively few actors outside the conflict to worry about; likewise, there was little concern about the losing state, given the demand of unconditional surrender. I will examine what occurred in each of the cases, showing how the choices made by leaders were executed on the battlefield. It should be noted that not all of the attempted occupations were successful: in particular, events on the ground in the city of Trieste prevented Tito's partisans from achieving the total occupation required to achieve his war aims. I will show why the states involved made the choices they did, and why these choices varied over the region of the conflict. Finally, I will examine the predictions of the alternate theories in detail, and examine why these theories are not able to explain the variation observed throughout the World War II case. First, let us begin with an examination of the "cast of characters": the states and state leaders who were involved in the choice of whether to expand territory.

The "Cast of Characters"

It is necessary to examine the important states that had an opportunity to expand territorial war aims. In particular, we will look at the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, and Yugoslavia in terms of the position of these states in

the system, the preferences of the leaders of these states, the alliance structure between the states, and the opportunities for territorial expansion that arose towards the end of the conflict. These states had to make decisions about war aim expansion in several different contexts, and it is necessary to understand their preferences in order to understand why some war aims were expanded while others were not. Each of the major powers had multiple concerns that they were trying to control and achieve simultaneously[70], and multiple opportunities to expand their war aims. I assert that the leaders of these states were all instrumentally rational; setting aside their motivations, they were able to rationally weigh options and choose the option that appeared to optimize their benefits. Let us begin then with an examination of the two US presidents who played a significant role in shaping the outcome of the conflict, and in these two cases in particular.

The United States: Roosevelt and Truman, Continuity and Change

Of the great powers in the war, the United States was alone in having a change in leadership at a crucial moment in the conflict, just at the point where decisions on war aim expansion were being made. It is therefore necessary to examine both Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman's political views, understanding of the United States' position in the system, and preferences for the postwar peace. Roosevelt, responsible for setting US policy for most of the conflict,

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[70] See for example John Keegan's biography of Winston Churchill; in 1944, Churchill was scarcely concerned with Operation Overlord because he was too busy thinking about "the postwar settlement of Poland's frontiers, over which he had bargained with Stalin at Tehran; the Italian campaign as always; and the subsidiary landing in the south of France, code-named Anvil… the still faltering British campaign in Burma; the bombing offensive". John Keegan, *Churchill*, (London: Weidenfold & Nicholson, 2002), 151.

had put events in action; Truman then had to execute and deal with the consequences of the outcomes.

Franklin Roosevelt was the primary architect of the United States' war aims and preferences about the postwar order, and despite his death before the end of the conflict, much of the ultimate outcome bears his stamp. Initially constrained by US public opinion and Congressional opposition from entering the war in Europe, he walked a delicate balance between making promises to his closest ally, the British, and remaining uninvolved[71]. Once Japan's attack on the United States and Hitler's declaration of war had occurred, however, Roosevelt was able to get involved in the war to the fullest extent. It is necessary to understand the particular worldview of Roosevelt to understand his postwar preferences and the type of world he envisioned after the conflict. Combining realist and liberal tendencies[72], he was strongly in favor of regional powers and great power "policemen" to make sure a war on the scale of WWII would not occur again[73]. Moreover, it is clear that his primary goal during the conflict was to avoid making any definite decisions as to

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[71] For a good summation of Roosevelt's dilemma, and his skill at handling both Churchill's expectations and his own domestic audience, see John Charmley, "Churchill's Roosevelt" in *The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance, 1941-45,* Ed. Ann Lane and Howard Temperley, (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc, 1995), 94.

[72] Warren F. Kimball describes this as being Roosevelt's legacy from two key figures in his life, Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson: "TR brought "realism" and Great Power politics to bear; Wilson offered, well… Wilsonianism, that idealistic combining of a belief in an American style political economy… with a mission, a duty to proselytize, all wrapped neatly in a blanket labeled "international cooperation"". Warren F. Kimball, "The Sheriffs: FDR's Postwar World". In *FDR's World: War, Peace, and Legacies.* Ed. David B. Woolner, Warren F. Kimball, David Reynolds, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 93-94. (first ellipsis in original).

[73] See Kimball, "The Sheriffs", 95.

territory[74]. As to his relationships with the other world leaders, he was closely tied to Churchill, and perfectly willing to give Stalin the benefit of the doubt when it came to his motivations and postwar preferences[75]. This can clearly be seen in his willingness to defer questions of the ultimate territorial makeup of Europe for after the conflict was over. Unlike Churchill, who as we will see was nearly always suspicious of Stalin, Roosevelt was willing to work with him as far as possible. He even so far as to act in some ways as a go-between between Churchill and Stalin, as he knew his two allies were suspicious of the other[76]. He was, however, somewhat cynical concerning the likelihood of permanent spheres of influence, and found it likely that the country occupying a piece of territory would be likely to retain political control of it after the conflict[77]. This can be seen as a fault as much as a

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[74] See for example Susan Butler's commentary in *My Dear Mr. Stalin: The Complete Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and Joseph V. Stalin*, Ed., with commentary, Susan Butler, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005), 62.

[75] Wilson D. Miscamble notes for instance that that, "As late as the Yalta Conference in 1945 when Roosevelt looked across the meeting table at Stalin, he did not see a brutal and ambitious tyrant but his crucial, if sometimes difficult, wartime ally and the man he deemed his major partner in the postwar world". Wilson D. Miscamble, "Roosevelt, Truman and the Development of Postwar Grand Strategy", *Orbis* 53, Issue 4. (Fall 2009), 533-570, DOI: 10.1016/j.orbis.2009.07.008, 562.

[76] See Butler, *My Dear Mr. Stalin*, 63; she quotes Roosevelt as telling Churchill that "I think I can personally handle Stalin better than either your Foreign Office or my State Department. Stalin hates the guts of all your top people. He thinks he likes me better, and I hope he will continue to do so" (63).

[77] In response to Stalin and Churchill's plans for dividing up spheres of influence in Easter Europe, Roosevelt noted disapprovingly in correspondence to Churchill that "we acknowledge that the militarily responsible government in any given territory will inevitably make decisions required by military developments but are convinced that the natural tendency for such divisions to extend to other that military fields would be strengthened by an agreement of the type suggested. In our opinion, this would certainly result in the persistence of differences between you and the Soviets…We believe efforts should preferably be made to establish consultative machinery to dispel misunderstandings and restrain the tendency toward the

benefit; some have argued that Roosevelt sinned in not recognizing that trying to defer a discussion about the post war settlement was to grant Stalin the time he needed to consolidate his power in Eastern Europe[78]. As we will see, this was certainly a critique Churchill held of him with regards to Austria. Ultimately, we can say that Roosevelt's goals were to work with the other great powers for as long as possible to defer a settlement until the end of the war, and then to set up an international order where those great powers would police the world.

Harry S. Truman, by contrast with Roosevelt, was relatively untried when it came to international affairs. Nonetheless, upon Roosevelt's death and his taking office, he was given a full run-down of Roosevelt's prior positions on the UK, the USSR, and the plans for the liberation of Europe[79]. Ultimately, he had the unenviable task of maintaining his predecessor's commitments, choosing his own postwar preferences, and doing what he could to shape the end of the conflict to coincide with what he saw as the United States' best interest. It was to him to make the

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development of exclusive spheres". Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Doc. 378, Roosevelt to Churchill", June 10, 1944. In *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence,* Ed. Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, Manfred Jonas, (New York: Saturday Review Press/E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc, 1975), 527.

[78] For example Remi Nadeau, speaking of the decision-making about Austria (which we will soon consider), notes that "Roosevelt misread Stalin's intentions. Winning the war was the immediate imperative; they would take up the peace afterward. This order of priorities meant that Stalin, after occupying all of Eastern and Central Europe, would be vastly strengthened at the peace table. Such an outcome was clear to Churchill, if not to Roosevelt". Remi Nadeau, *Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt Divide Europe*, (New York, Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger, 1990). 91.

[79]Truman included his first report from the State Department (on April 13th, 1945) in his memoirs; of particular interest is the report's mention of Churchill's belief (or rather, insistence) on specifying spheres of influence in Europe: "He [Churchill] is inclined however to press this position with the Russians with what we consider unnecessary rigidity as to detail". In Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, Volume One: Year of Decisions*. (Garden City: Doubleday & Company Inc., 1955). 14.

difficult choices at the end of both the war in Europe and the war in the Pacific; moreover, it was his choices after the conflict that, for better or for worse, set up the beginning of the Cold War. Roosevelt sought to defer the judgment about territory until the end of the conflict, which meant that Truman had the all-important power to take what he understood of his predecessor's beliefs and opinions, and incorporate them with his own. During the period we are considering, Truman was certainly willing to take advice from both his own advisors, as well as the other leaders as he sought to bring the war to an end.

In terms of his personal and political relationships with the other powers in the conflict, it seems clear that, while he was less impressed with Churchill personally, he was at least initially willing to support the plans Churchill and Roosevelt had already set into motion[80]. He also, as we will see, seems to have been more willing to listen to Churchill's suspicions regarding the intentions of various erstwhile allies. Ultimately, however, Churchill lost his position as Prime Minister shortly after the conflict ended, and therefore his usefulness for Truman was more at the beginning of Truman's tenure, when he was learning the situation on the ground in Europe. As for Stalin, Truman was certainly initially impressed with Stalin on a personal level, and seemed willing to give him some leeway in his behavior at

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[80] Truman recorded his initial impressions of Churchill at the Potsdam Conference in his diary of July 16th, 1945: "We had a most pleasant conversation. He is a most charming and a very clever person –meaning clever in the English not the Kentucky sense. He gave me a lot of hooey about how great my country is and how he loved Roosevelt and how he intended to love me etc. etc… I am sure we can get along if he doesn't give me too much soft soap". Harry S. Truman, "Diary, [Potsdam] July 16th, 1945", in *Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman*. Ed Robert H. Ferrell. (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1980). 51.

the start of their working relationship[81]. However, he was well aware that he had a great deal of leverage over Stalin, and was unafraid of using it[82]. While Truman let his predecessor's opinions and plans guide him to a certain extent, he was willing to go his own way and make quick decisions, ones that had enormous impact on the nature of the postwar settlement. As William Taubman notes, "Truman *did* bring a new firmness to American policy; at time his approach resembled Stalin's in reverse: what's mine (in the American case, Western Europe, Japan, and other areas not heretofore open to Soviet penetration) is mine; what's yours (Eastern Europe) is negotiable"[83]. It should be noted though that, as some have asserted, even Truman did not truly desire a Cold War, but felt that the Soviet Union could become too powerful if he did not take strong steps to hem it in[84].

In summation, both US leaders understood that they were going to be operating from a position of strength, but nevertheless had to rely on allies for assistance during and after the war. Nonetheless, the two presidents were unwilling to subordinate the U.S.' interests and preferences to those of their allies, as we will see with FDR's unwillingness to support Churchill on Austria. Ultimately, both

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[81] Examples abound; in Truman's diary of June 7, 1945, he noted that "I'm not afraid of Russia. They've always been our friends and I can't see any reason why they shouldn't always be". Harry S. Truman, "Diary, June 7th, 1945", in *Off the Record*, Ed. Robert H. Ferrell*,* 44.

[82] Truman noted in his diary after his first meeting with Stalin that "he [Stalin] had some more questions to present. I told him to fire away. He did and it is dynamite – but I have some dynamite too which I'm not exploding now". Harry S. Truman, "Diary, [Potsdam], July 17th, 1945", in *Off the Record*, Ed. Robert H. Ferrell*,* 53.

[83] William Taubman. *Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War*, (New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1982). 100. Italics in original.

[84]See Copeland's argument in *The Origins of Major War*, Chapter 6 for a strong argument of this point. Copeland, *The Origins of Major War*, 146-175.

presidents had an important role in shaping decision-making about territorial war aims.

The United Kingdom: Churchill Hangs On

Perhaps no victorious state had as difficult a choice between its wish for present victory and its desire to achieve its postwar preferences as the United Kingdom. Winston Churchill was in the unenviable position of piloting a state that had weathered going it alone, watched new allies arise, and realized that those allies were more interested in their own preferences than in the preservation of the previous world order. Moreover, Churchill's UK was clearly a lesser power than the US or the USSR after those states entered the conflict[85]. However, Churchill was able to guarantee a place for the UK at the bargaining table, and at least attempt to achieve certain postwar preferences[86]. As to Churchill's postwar preferences, he was primarily concerned with making sure the UK was considered one of the world's great powers, and that it would continue to have a significant role in international politics. However, of the three Great Powers, however, he had the most to lose, and the least to gain, from his allies achieving their particular preferences. There was little room for the British Empire in FDR's vision of the world[87], nor was there room

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[85] Keegan notes that 1943 was the peak of British influence: "Thenceforward the policies of naked power would increasingly count, and Churchill, whose military resources were declining, would slip downward in importance among the Big Three" (Keegan, *Churchill*, 147).

[86] Keegan points out for instance that Churchill was the leader who traveled the farthest for most of the conferences, "so that Britain's importance as a combatant, diminishing as it was, might be sustained by treaty or diplomacy", Ibid., 142.

[87] Indeed, he had to deal with Roosevelt's outright hostility as concerned the British Empire. Kimball notes that "At the start of the war, Roosevelt had viewed European power politics and colonialism as the greatest threats to postwar peace". Kimball, "The Sheriffs", 96. Furthermore, John Charmley argues that "FDR saw Churchill as

on the Continent for the UK to play a substantial role once the US and the USSR had both achieved their particular preferences. Churchill therefore had to balance between satisfying his own aims and keeping his allies satisfied with his role in the conflict.

In terms of his relations with those allies, it is clear from even a cursory reading of his correspondence with the two US Presidents that Churchill was infinitely more suspicious of Stalin than Roosevelt was, and approached relations with the Soviet Union extremely carefully[88]. Nonetheless, unlike Roosevelt, he was intent on negotiating with Stalin regarding the relative spheres of influence in various regions of Eastern Europe, and seems oddly trusting that Stalin would adhere to his commitments[89]. By contrast, some have argued that Churchill consistently underestimated and trusted Roosevelt's intentions more than he

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'pretty much a nineteenth century colonialist', and American policy-makers took their cue from this. In any event, the idea of the British as a race of colonialists was one which fitted easily into the American stereotype". John Charmley, "Churchill's Roosevelt", 100.

[88] Stalin was no more a fan of Churchill than Churchill was of him; Jonathan Haslam quotes Stalin as having said in 1944 "Perhaps you think that just because we are the allies of the English we have forgotten who they are and who Churchill is… Churchill is the kind of man who will pick your pocket of a kopeck if you don't watch him". Quoted in Jonathan Haslam, "Soviet War-Aims". In *The Rise and Fall of the Grand Alliance,* Ed. Ann Lane and Howard Temperley, 37. Ellipsis in original.

[89] Churchill described their discussion (or lack thereof) of the matter in his memoirs: after proposing a series of divisions in Europe in October 1944, he "pushed this [the list of divisions] across to Stalin, who had by then heard the translation. There was a slight pause. Then he took his blue pencil and made a large tick upon it, and passed it back to us. It was all settled in no more time than it takes to set down". Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Vol. 6, Triumph and Tragedy.* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953). 227. While Churchill did acknowledge in his memoirs that they "were only dealing with immediate war-time arrangements. All larger questions were reserved on both sides for what we then hoped would be a peace table when the war was won" (227), it seems clear that he did hope and intend that these agreements would be adhered to by all powers.

should have; John Charmley argues that "It is doubtful whether Churchill understood Roosevelt. For this he is hardly to be blamed – one of Roosevelt's main aims in life was to avoid any such possibility"[90]. As for his relationship with Truman, this was somewhat truncated given Churchill leaving power so soon after the end of the conflict. However, as we will see in the cases, he was certainly willing to press Truman to military action for interests that were perhaps more pertinent to the UK than to the US. Ultimately, I would argue that Churchill seemed to be the leader most aware of the bargaining that would come after the conflict, and most willing to expand his aims in order to have a stronger hand in that bargaining[91].

The Soviet Union: Stalin Balances Power and Allies

When asked to give an example of "strange bedfellows" in international relations, many scholars would likely identify the alliance of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union in World War II. Despite sharing the goal of defeating Nazi Germany, these powers differed greatly in their domestic politics and postwar preferences. Nonetheless, Stalin, like the other great power leaders, was deeply concerned with balancing his preferences against his security, and doing what was necessary to achieve optimal levels of both. In moving from bearing the brunt of Hitler's army on his borders to marching on Berlin, Stalin had assured his

[90]Charmley, "Churchill's Roosevelt", 93. Charmley also notes that "What Churchill never recognized… was that FDR was not so much the 'soldier of freedom', as the architect of the 'American century'; he was the personification of America's 'manifest destiny'" (93).

[91] See for example Truman's memoirs; in discussing the situation in which he found himself when he entered office, Truman notes Churchill's concerns about getting to Berlin before the Soviets. He says that "Churchill was worried over Russian intentions and wanted all the territory we could get for bargaining purposes after the war. All this, he argued, was part of broad strategy and could not be left out of war plans". Truman, *Memoirs*, 212.

country would be deeply involved in the postwar settlement, and would have an excellent opportunity to realize the postwar goals he held dear.

In terms of those postwar preferences, Harriman probably summed them up best in an early meeting with Truman; as discussed in Truman's memoirs, he noted that the USSR "had two policies which they thought they could successfully pursue at the same time. One was the policy of co-operation with the United States and Great Britain, and the second was the extension of Soviet control over neighboring states by independent action"[92]. Above all, it is clear that Stalin wished to assure Soviet security. Alone among the three allies, Stalin's country had endured physical invasion; he had to fight on his own soil, something that the US and the UK never experienced. Moreover, his was the only state that would have to share a continent with whatever form of Germany remained after the war. This led to Stalin's primary postwar preference: that Germany be crippled in power and unable to restart another conflict[93]. After two wide-ranging conflicts in the first fifty years of the century, to Stalin's mind Germany had proved itself utterly expansionistic and incapable of true peace.

Second, Stalin wanted to be in control in Eastern Europe. Finally, as noted, Stalin was in no hurry to end the wartime alliance. William Taubman provides a

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[92] Ibid., 70.

[93] While it is possible that Stalin did not desire a divided Germany such as the one he got (for an interesting take on this, see Wilfried Loth, "Stalin's Plans for Post-War Germany", in *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-53*. Ed Francesa Gori and Silvio Pons. (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc, 1996). 23-36.), he was certainly willing to consider breaking Germany up into small pieces. For the discussion at the Tehran Conference on this regard, see US Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.* 1943. http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS. Pg 602.

clear explanation of Stalin's preferences when he notes that "Stalin did not want a cold war. Second only to a hot was between the former allies, that was his last choice. Détente was not Stalin's first preference either. What Stalin wanted was nothing less than continued entente"[94]. He had profited from his relationship with his Western Allies, and understood that his chances of achieving his other preferences were greater so long as he could maintain their support[95]. As reported by Truman in his diary, Stalin "said he wanted to cooperate with U.S. in peace as we had cooperated in War but it would be harder" [96]. While of course Stalin had every incentive to have Truman believe this to be true, it nonetheless is clear that he was in no hurry to destroy the existing alliance. Stalin was a wise enough politician to appear conciliatory while negotiating with his allies, and certainly was willing to give in rather than risk confrontation at this stage[97]. Despite his behavior in most of

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[94] Taubman, *Stalin's American Policy,* 74. Taubman is quick to note, however, that "the entente Stalin desired was not the benign relationship revisionists depict. It was designed to foster Soviet control of Eastern Europe… to expand Soviet influence in Western Europe, the Near East, and Asia; to position the USSR for even greater gains when the next Western economic crisis struck; and to achieve all this while subsidized to the tune of at least six billion dollars in American credits….In addition to these maximum goals, the Soviets had minimum aims (ensuring Communist hegemony over Eastern Europe and defeating, disarming, and obtaining reputations from Germany) to which they could always retreat" (74).

[95] Alexander Dallin, for instance, notes that "For a number of perfectly good reasons – from international security to economic benefit – Stalin was eager to maintain and extend the alliance as long as possible beyond the end of the war. This meant not antagonizing his Western partners by asking for, or indeed advancing, too much too fast". Alexander Dallin, "Stalin and the Prospects for Post-War Europe: a Comment on Chapters 1, 2 and 7". In *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-53*. Ed. Francesa Gori, Silvio Pons, 186.

[96] Harry S. Truman, "Diary, [Potsdam], July 18th, 1945", in *Off the Record,* 54.

[97] This was understood by the Americans, at the least; in Truman's *Memoirs,* he notes that Harriman informed Truman of his opinion that the Soviets were still in need of assistance from the US (70), and Truman responded that "the Russians needed us more than we needed them" (Truman, *Memoirs,* 71). Taubman sums up

Eastern Europe, he was willing to refrain from expansion when it would damage his interests. This was a delicate balancing act, one that he was fully capable of performing. That he saw the challenge as knowing when to hold back is clear; see for instance, Dallin, who highlights a conversation between Eden and Stalin in 1941; "'We should not underestimate Hitler. He is a very able man. But he made one mistake. He did not know when to stop,' Stalin said. As Eden relates it, he must have smiled, whereupon Stalin turned to him and said: 'I know why you're smiling. You think that if we are victorious I shall not know when to stop. You are wrong. I do know'"[98]. We will see that he did, at least with regards to Austria, and even to Trieste.

Yugoslavia: Tito, Master Manipulator

Finally, let us consider the position of Yugoslavia; or, rather, let us consider the unique talent of Josef Broz Tito in gaining Yugoslavia a seat at the bargaining table with the great powers in a way that few other leaders were able to do. Tito was one of the best diplomatic manipulators of the conflict. He was certainly one of the few to get the better of Winston Churchill, having convinced the UK leader early in the conflict that he had every intention of working with the Yugoslavian monarchy, rather than instituting a communist regime[99].

Soviet policy nicely: "even more circumspect in areas where Western interest was intense and Western troops were present" (Taubman, *Stalin's American Policy*, 78).

[98] Dallin, "Stalin and the Prospects for Post-War Europe", 187.

[99] Due to the British government's support of the Yugoslavian king in exile, this was a prime concern of Churchill's government. He wrote to Roosevelt on June 23rd of 1944 that "I have, also, taken action to try to bring together a union of the Tito forces with those in Serbia and with all adhering to the Royal Yugoslav Government, which we have both recognized… we are bearing this heavy burden which at present rests mainly on us. Here again, nothing would be easier than to throw the

However, Tito's and Yugoslavia's situation was much more complicated than those of the great powers. Unlike the great powers, Tito could not "go it alone" in the system. His Yugoslavia lacked the power to dictate terms to the great powers; any benefits from victory and changes in the postwar system that he desired would have to be negotiated and won from the other great powers. However, a key issue he faced was that he was not the US and the UK's preferred actor in Yugoslavia, and they were quite suspicious of his aims. Moreover, while Stalin and Tito were allies at the time, we will see that Tito was hardly one of Stalin's top priorities. Tito had Stalin's verbal support, yes, but this would turn out to mean little. Indeed, Stalin was perfectly willing to ignore Tito's preferences in order to maintain his relationship with the United States and Great Britain. Now that we have a clear view of the actors involved at the end of the conflict, we can turn to a discussion of the two main cases. I begin first with the city of Trieste and its environs. This is an excellent example of how this study's theory can explain what would otherwise appear to be reckless expansion by a smaller power in the face of great power disapproval.

Tito and Trieste: Expansion Against Allies

Let us now examine our first case of expanded territorial aims, which led to attempted military occupation and- eventually- to one of the longest lasting territorial disputes that came out of World War II. We start with Yugoslavia, a lesser

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King and the Royal Yugoslav Government to the wolves and let a civil war break out in Yugoslavia to the joy of the Germans. I am struggling to bring order out of chaos". Winston Churchill, "Doc. 392, Churchill to Roosevelt, June 23rd, 1944". In *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence,* 540. As late as September 1944, Churchill was still insisting that "The only chance of saving the King is the unity between his Prime Minister, the Ban of Croatia, and Tito". Winston S. Churchill, "Doc. 429, Churchill to Roosevelt, September 1, 1944". In *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence*, 570.

power amongst the victorious states; nonetheless, Tito's ambitions and preferences were no lesser than those of his great power allies. He had, from early in the conflict expressed a particular territorial ambition, one that would increase his material power, his strategic position, and would contribute to domestic stability – and one that could lead to substantial tensions between the great powers.

A key issue in Yugoslavia was that the border between Yugoslavia and Italy was hardly set in stone; indeed, certain portions of the northeast corner of Italy, known as the Friuli-Venezia-Giulia region, had only become officially Italian after World War I (despite the presence of an Italian-speaking, Italian-identifying population in the region for many years). Of particular interest to Tito was the ownership of the Adriatic port city of Trieste, the main city in the region. Historically, the city had been a key port of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The question was whether the city and its region would revert to Italy after the conflict, or, as Tito hoped, would be given to Yugoslavia. This would unite some of his ethnic populations and gain material power and strategic power; thus Tito had made it clear from early in his discussions with Winston Churchill that he greatly desired Trieste[100]. However, due to the opposition of his allies, a factor we will soon discuss, it had become clear to Tito that if he wanted to occupy the city with an eye to eventual ownership, he would have to do so on his own before the Allied forces moving through Italy got there.

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[100] See Jasper Ridley, who notes that "Tito told Churchill that he thought that Yugoslavia was entitled to have Trieste after the war; but Churchill said that this was impossible, because as the Italians were now fighting on the side of the Allies, they should not be deprived of Trieste". Jasper Ridley, *Tito.* (London: Constable, 1994). 242.

Trieste is an important case for several reasons. First of all, it is interesting because this particular region had been a source of conflict for many years. Chapter Four of this dissertation deals with Italian unification, and Trieste was a particularly challenging piece of territory in terms of joining it to Italy; it was one of the last parts of modern Italy to become Italian. Moreover, Trieste is interesting because it took so long to resolve the post-World War II dispute. Nearly a decade passed before the borders between Italy and Yugoslavia were finalized. And most importantly, Trieste is perhaps a paradigmatic example of states choosing certain behaviors precisely because the end of the conflict was near. If Tito and the Western Allies had not known WWII was at its end, they would have behaved very differently. Thus, Trieste represents a case in which both sides – Tito and the Western Allies – chose to expand their aims and "race" to the city in order to be in possession before the war ended. I argue that both sides chose territorial expansion due to having a similar decision-making calculus. This is because the territory was of great inherent value to Tito, and instrumentally valuable to the Western Allies in that occupation of the territory would achieve the end of preventing Tito (and, they assumed, the Soviet Union) from gaining more power. However, the main factor driving both decisions was the shared belief that the alliance between Tito and the Western Allies was at its end. The Western Allies had had their fill of Tito, and despite their much greater power, he knew he had little need of them in the future now that the war was at its end.

I find that this study's theory explains both Tito's drive to Trieste as well as the Western Allies' choice to race him there. Tito knew that the Western Allies were

opposed to his aim to take Trieste, and he recognized that their insistence on waiting until after the war was over to decide territorial outcomes would make his claim on the city hard to support. If he wanted to guarantee his strength at the bargaining table, he needed to expand his aims and occupy the city. He had no reason to need his alliances with the Western Allies after the conflict, and knew the Soviet Union was supportive of his aims so long as he could achieve it without their assistance. The Western Allies understood Tito's incentives, and raced because they wanted to prevent him from succeeding. This therefore shows that the Western Allies thought in terms that my theory would predict. As we move into the full examination of this case, we will first examine the value of the territory. Next, we will look at each side's belief about the strength of the alliance. Finally, as third parties and opponents were of limited to no importance here, I spend some time looking at the interesting role of the Soviet Union in acting as a somewhat unfaithful ally, at least as regards giving Tito any meaningful assistance.

Friuli-Venezia-Giulia and its Value

As to the value of the city and the countryside, this is a clear case of territory having strong inherent value for a particular country. One of the key Yugoslavian diplomats who worked on the question of Trieste and the Istrian peninsula after the conflict, Vladimir Velebit, highlighted the material factor in a later interview: "we thought that we – the Yugoslavs – needed an efficient port for our trade operations. Why should we invest a lot of capital in building a new port when there was already

a port in existence which had all the advantages necessary for our foreign trade?"[101]. Furthermore, of great importance to Tito was the fact that while the city itself was culturally Italian, the countryside had a substantial Slavic and Slovene population, one that he dreamed of bringing into Yugoslavia[102]. This can be seen in a January 1945 conversation between Stalin and a Yugoslavian politician, Hebrang. "Hebrang said that Istria which currently belongs to Italy, with the ports of Trieste, Poola and Reika (Fiume) should also be transferred to Yugoslavia. Croats and Slovenians populate Istria, and only the port towns have a certain percent of Italians. Hebrang showed an ethnic map of those regions and a map with the border demarcation requested by the Yugoslavs"[103]. Finally, and perhaps most important, the city's port

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[101] "The Yugoslav Negotiator, Vladimir Velebit". In *Successful Negotiation: Trieste 1954: An Appraisal by the Five Participants.* Ed. John C. Campbell. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976). 82. Velebit's personal history displays the multiethnic and multicultural nature of the territory in question; while possessing a Slavic name and aligning politically with the Yugoslavian government, he identifies himself in the same interview as a "Triestino" (93).

[102] For a discussion of the ethnic and cultural divides in the Venezia Giulia region, see Bogdan C. Novak, *Trieste 1941-1954: The Ethnic, Political, and Ideological Struggle*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970). Chapter 1. He notes that "Italians are mostly limited to the cities, [and] Istrian coastal towns…The Slavs inhabit the great portion of the rural territory" (11). See also Roberto G. Rabel, who notes that "the area is a natural crossroads between the Italian peninsula, the Balkans, and Central Europe". Roberto G. Rabel, *Between East and West: Trieste, the United States, and the Cold War, 1941-1954*. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), 2, and that the region represents "one of the few points of direct contact between all three of Europe's major ethnic groupings: Latins, Slavs, and Germans" (3). Leonard Unger and Kristina Šegulja note that the Slavic name for the region is Juljska Krajina, which is "a term signifying "a frontier land where neighboring states have met and struggled for political and military control," a "land of passage" between two regions of greater natural wealth". Leonard Unger and Kristina Šegulja, *The Trieste Negotiations*. (Washington, D.C.: Foreign Policy Institute, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, 1990), 1.

[103] "Record of I.V. Stalin's Conversation with the Head of the Delegation of the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia, A Hebrang". January 09, 1945, History

is deep water, and the city itself represented a strategically and materially valuable addition to the state that possessed it[104].

A second reason to consider the territory inherently rather than instrumentally valuable is the fact that everyone –Tito and the Western Allies – believed that whoever held the territory at the end of the conflict would be likely to keep it no matter what happened at the bargaining table. The Yugoslavians clearly expected that their occupation of Trieste would lead to their later possession of it. Velebit noted that ""we thought – and I am still of that conviction – that whoever is in the possession of a certain territory has a ninety-nine percent chance of keeping it…it is true today: look at Berlin or wherever you want; it is a fact of history. And we, the Yugoslavs, understood this in 1944"[105]. The US and the British understood it as well; as we will see, much of their decision-making was driven by the intuition

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and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, AVP RF, f. 06, op.7, p.53, d.872, 1. 8-28. Published in Vostochnaia Evropa, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, vol. 1 pp. 118-33. Translated for CWIHP by Svetlana Savranskaya. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118440.

[104] Indeed, Churchill thought the region so important that he used it as a justification for the importance of the Italian campaign; in a letter on July 1st, 1944, he argued to Roosevelt that "At Teheran you emphasised to me the possibilities of a move eastward when Italy was conquered and mentioned particularly Istria. No one involved in these discussion has ever thought of moving armies into the Balkans: but *Istria and Trieste in Italy are strategic and political positions*, which as you saw yourself very clearly might exercise profound and widespread reactions" (italics mine). Winston S. Churchill, "Doc 400, Churchill to Roosevelt, July 1, 1944", in *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence*, 546. (italics mine).

[105] "The Yugoslav Negotiator, Vladimir Velebit". 84. Other observers shared this view; Franklin Lindsay, a member of the OSS on the ground at the time, notes that "The Yugoslav Partisan claims to the entire area were based in part on ethnic grounds, in part on the old Austro-Hungarian border lying to the west of Trieste and in part on raw power: to the victor belongs the spoils. To those of us in Belgrade it was certain that unless the Allies negotiated, or simply declared unequivocally, a line of demarcation… we would find ourselves in a frightful mess". Franklin Lindsay, *Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisans in Wartime Yugoslavia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993). 292.

that letting Tito get to Trieste first was tantamount to allowing him to keep it after the conflict, an outcome that was anathema to Churchill and Truman. In terms of the value for them, while there was some strategic utility to the region, the territory was largely instrumentally valuable in that they desired to prevent Tito from gaining more power. And, as we will see, they were well aware that the only method they had at their disposal for preventing Tito from gaining the territory was to race against him to get there first. Let us now turn to the risks to future security that Tito faced by expanding his aims.

Risks to Expanding Aims: Allied Opposition

The risks Tito faced from expanding his territorial aims and attempting to grab Trieste were several. Of greatest importance was the opposition he faced his ostensible allies, the United States and the United Kingdom, who were deeply resistant to Yugoslavian ownership of the city and determined to oppose any move by Tito to claim the territory before the conflict. Winston Churchill in particular, certainly no friend to Tito, was especially opposed to Tito's possession of the region[106]. He was blunt on this point, stating clearly on March 11, 1945, that "My feeling is that henceforth our inclination should be to back Italy against Tito. Tito can be left to himself in his mountains to stew in Balkan juice which is bitter…we are generally favorable to Italian claims at the head of the Adriatic"[107].

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[106] There is a good argument to be made that some of this was personal: Tito had effectively conned the British into supporting his cause, and resentment against him was clear: One politician in the British orbit wrote during the conflict that "In spite of all the help Tito has obtained only from us, he has not behaved loyally to us. I fear that our interests will suffer by his supremacy in Yugoslavia". Quoted in Ridley, *Tito,* 248.

[107] Quoted in Rabel, *Between East and West*, 40.

Despite Tito being (at least in name) an ally, and Italy having been an earlier opponent, Churchill was firm in his belief that Trieste and the Istrian peninsula should revert to Italian control after the conflict ended. As it became clear that Tito had opted for territorial expansion, Churchill's opposition led him to suggest "racing" for the city in an attempt to get there first. He stated to Harry Truman (April 27th, 1945): "It seems to me vital… to get Trieste if we can do so in the easy manner proposed, and to run the risks inherent in these political-military operations. The late President always attached great importance to Trieste… that there should be an outlet to the south seems of interest to the trade of many States involved. The great thing is to be there before Tito's guerillas are in occupation"[108]. Tito clearly understood that expanding his aims might cost him the support of his allies. It was clear to that any move to expand his aims would lead to the end of his alliance with these states, and that they were willing and able to send troops towards Trieste in order to block Tito's access to the city. However, his claim on the region could only be supported by his occupation of the territory. Without the bargaining chip of possessing the territory, he had nothing else to use to gain the territory he so desperately desired. The question was: were the benefits of the territory worth losing the relationship he had with his allies, and the benefits that came with those relationships?

I argue that Tito expanded because he was not counting on maintaining his alliance with the UK or the US after the conflict. He was aware that Churchill already mistrusted him, and his sympathies were certainly more with the Soviet Union. To

[108] Quoted in Churchill, *The Second World War: Triumph And Tragedy*. Vol. 6. 551-552.

be fair, as late as April 1945, Tito's Minister of Foreign Affairs told Molotov that "relations with the British and the Americans were developing very well, and that he personally is trying to do everything possible in order to keep these relations good for the future"[109]. While it is certainly true that actively antagonizing the Western Allies was suboptimal, it is also clear that there was little more the Western Allies could truly do for Tito. Within the Yugoslavian and Italian countryside, Tito had started off dependent on Allied help, but had then consolidated and strengthened his forces to the point that taking Trieste became both feasible and preferable to bargaining over it[110]. Some observers clearly saw an increase in Tito's military power: British Field Marshal Alexander informed Winston Churchill that "Tito…now finds himself in a much stronger military position than he foresaw when I was in Belgrade, and wants to cash in on it. Then he hoped to step into Trieste when finally I stepped out. Now he wants to be installed there and only allow me user's right"[111]. Tito had been dependent on the support of these allies at an earlier point in the conflict, but at the point where he could choose whether to expand his war aims, he had already consolidated his domestic power and achieved all the objectives that he could not do without their help.

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[109] "Record of Conversation between V.M. Molotov and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia I. Ivan Šubašić," April 06, 1845, History and Public Policy Digital Archive, Foreign Policy Archive of the Russian Federation, fond 06, op 7, p 53, d872, II. 24-30. Document No. 58 in Vostochnaia Evropa, edited by G.P. Murashko, et al, vol. 1. Translated for CWIHP by Svetlana Savranskaya. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118455.

[110] See Ridley, *Tito,* 239 for a commentary on Tito's dependence on Great Britain early in the conflict, and his inability to truly resist British plans.

[111] Telegram from May 5th, 1945, quoted in Winston Churchill, *The Second World War: Vol. 6, Triumph And Tragedy.* 553 (ellipsis in original).

Most importantly, the prospect for continued relationships with these allies was slim. Tito was well aware that he was casting his lot in with the Soviet Union, and that this would mean he could no longer expect a good relationship with the US and the UK. Given there was no expectation of a beneficial future alliance, Tito had little reason to heed his allies' preferences in the present. Nor was his ability to achieve future goals and preferences dependent on continued relations with the UK or the US. To put it simply, there was nothing these states could give him in the present or in the future that was worth more than the benefits of occupation he could accrue by taking Friuli-Venezia-Guilia.

However, Tito could hardly have hoped to maintain any kind of military preponderance once the Allies arrived in force. There was therefore a window of opportunity where military capability to occupy existed, but Tito could not have believed that opportunity would last forever. Moreover, Tito could hardly been unaware that a bargain was approaching, and that the general consensus was that ownership of Trieste would not be settled until this bargain. The U.S. and the UK were not inclined to permit or support any preemptive moves to settle the question before the war ended. Therefore, not only did Tito possess the military capability to occupy the city, but the capability was soon to disappear.

We need to now consider the role of the Soviet Union as an ally for Tito. Ostensibly Yugoslavia's greatest supporter, while Stalin did not overtly block Tito's goal of claiming Trieste, he also did little to support Yugoslavian claims to the city. Indeed, there were certain risks to Stalin's own alliances from giving too much support to Tito. One scholar notes the USSR's recognition of the value of the city, but

also Stalin's awareness of the opposition to Tito's desire for territory[112]. Stalin even went so far as to work (albeit passively) against Tito's interests regarding Trieste, being all too willing to ignore his ally's concerns in order to maintain his relationship with the U.S. and the UK. Richard S. DiNardo points out that Stalin had encouraged the British to send troops through the region in question for the purpose of defeating the German army in Italy; moreover, this could not have been inadvertent, as DiNardo notes that Tito had already informed Stalin of his opposition to this move, yet Stalin ignored his concerns in order to maintain his relationship with the other allies[113]. One Yugoslavian politician later alleged that the Soviet's lukewarm assistance was because "relations between the Soviet Union and the Western allies were still in their wartime honeymoon, and the Soviet Government wished, by observing this formality, to avoid complaints"[114].

Instances abound of Stalin's laissez-faire attitude towards providing diplomatic assistance to Yugoslavia in terms of supporting territorial claims. During the conversation with Hebrang, Stalin noted "that it would be necessary that those regions themselves [such as Istria] demanded to join Yugoslavia"[115]. This could hardly have been welcome news for the Yugoslavians. At the same time, the Soviets

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[112] See Ann Lane. *Britain, the Cold War and Yugoslav Unity, 1941-1949*. (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 1996). 56. Moreover, Lane argues that Stalin believed Trieste going to the Italians would help strengthen the Italian communist party; she argues that, "In one sense, then, Stalin could not lose in Trieste and, given his predisposition towards opportunistic policy-making, it is likely that he formulated Soviet policy accordingly" (56).

[113] Richard S. DiNardo. "Glimpse of an Old World Order? Reconsidering the Trieste Crisis of 1945". *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 21, No. 3, (Summer 1997), 365-81. DOI: 10.1111/1467-7709.00077. 367.

[114] Quoted in Taubman, *Stalin's American Policy*, 90.

[115] "Record of I.V. Stalin's Conversation with the Head of the Delegation of the National Liberation Committee of Yugoslavia".

were certainly willing to encourage Yugoslavian expansion, or at least, suggest it was likely their best opportunity to gain what they sought. This can again be seen in the conversation between Shubashich and Molotov. The recorder of the meeting noted that "Shubashich believes that if during the present war the Yugoslavian troops occupy Istria, in that case it would be easier for Yugoslavia to resolve the issue"[116]. When he went on to discuss coming up with an academic argument to justify this, "Molotov noted that it would be difficult to persuade everybody by an objective argumentation"[117]. Given that Molotov did not object to the suggestion, this comment presents as rather an example of silent encouragement. Thus, though Stalin was not overly supportive of Tito's plans, Tito had no expectation that pursuing territorial occupation would damage this key relationship.

In terms of preserving his reputation for third parties and for neighbors, there is no evidence that Tito had any concerns of this nature. This was perhaps because he knew he had the support of the Soviet Union, or perhaps because he believed Italy would be a sufficiently weak power after the conflict that it could not pose a threat to him. Indeed, while the ultimate negotiations over the region were ostensibly between Italy and Yugoslavia, in reality Italy's interest was largely maintained and supported by the U.S. and the UK. Ultimately, despite the risks to occupation outlined, Tito made the decision to expand war aims and attempt to occupy the Istrian peninsula and occupy Trieste. I assert that this decision was made because the potential benefits of occupation in gaining the territory outweighed the

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[116] "Record of Conversation Between V.M. Molotov and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia".
[117] Ibid.

potential risks to occupation. In particular, while the U.S. and the UK were strongly opposed to Tito's plan to the point of attempting to prevent his occupation, there was little they could do to punish him for it after the fact, nor did the support of these allies represent an important postwar aim for Tito.

Similarly, the U.S. and the UK also chose to race to Trieste, largely for the same reasons I have outlined here. To be fair, continued military involvement was costly, and there was the risk, however small, of conflict with the Soviet Union over a region with relatively low importance in the grand scheme of postwar Europe. However, given the fact that Stalin had not made his support of Tito's aims overt and pointed, it is reasonable that the Western Allies would be likely to discount this risk. So what happened after Tito made his choice to expand aims? In the end, Tito was only partially successful in realizing his primary territorial objectives. His partisan forces became bogged down when attempting to occupy Trieste, and this had major implications in terms of his overall success in claiming the territory. Oddly enough, it was the actions of the German forces within Trieste that altered the city's destiny and prevented Tito from achieving all of his territorial objectives. These Germans chose to strongly resist the Yugoslav onslaught. For logical reasons (of self-preservation), the German troops strongly preferred to surrender to the Allies rather than the Yugoslavs, and so held on as long as they could[118]. For example, Geoffrey Cox notes one instance in which German forces let New Zealand troops (the New Zealanders were the first Allied forces to reach Trieste) enter a building they were occupying as the Yugoslav partisans laid siege to it, and even suggested that

[118] Geoffrey Cox, *The Race for Trieste,* (London: William Kimber & Co. Limited, 1977), 184.

the two forces work together to fight off the partisans[119]. Rabel says in the end that "The "race" for Trieste had ended somewhat ambiguously"[120], which left Tito unable to consolidate his control of the city and achieve the hoped-for occupation that would solidify his claim to the city and award him possession after the conflict.

Recognizing he could not successful occupy the city, Tito nonetheless did not hesitate to use the ground he had occupied to gain political concessions from what he had taken. For example, there was a tacit trade between the partisan forces and the British, in which the Yugoslavians pulled their forces out of Trieste, and the British delivered 23,000 captured anti-Partisan prisoners to their custody[121]. However, his occupation of the countryside meant he had substantial bargaining power. It was not until 1954 that a partition agreement was finalized between Italy and Yugoslavia, which gave the city of Trieste to Italy, and most of the Istrian peninsula to Yugoslavia. Although Tito had recognized from the start that Trieste was likely out of his grasp, he had maintained his claim on the city for the purpose of solidifying his possession of the Yugoslav administered half. As an aide questioned his continued claims on Trieste, Tito stated that "If we are not decisive, they will ask for Zone B [the Yugoslav administered half of the region] too. That is what I am afraid of"[122]. This quote of Tito's clearly showed his understanding that he could still instrumentally use territory he had not actually acquired, in order to guarantee his claim to his inherently valuable territory. Ultimately, while Tito did not gain the city

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[119] Cox, *The Race for Trieste,* 187.
[120] Rabel, *Between East and West*, 48.
[121] Ridley, *Tito*, 256. The 23,000 prisoners were executed by the Yugoslavian Partisans almost immediately after the British had delivered them (257).
[122] Quote in Ibid., 318.

of Trieste, he did end up achieving an impressive amount of territorial gain through expanded war aims and hard bargaining after the conflict. Let us now turn to the other case of interest: that of Austria.

Austria: No Racing, No Consolidation

One of the more under-studied territorial debates during and after World War II surrounded the question of Austria. While seen by many as a willing participant in Nazi Germany's reign, it was nonetheless accepted that the country should be accorded different treatment than its near neighbor[123]. It makes sense, therefore, that Austria was not permanently (as far as anyone at the time was able to predict) divided as Germany was, and indeed, ultimately Austria became a neutral nation politically independent from any of the allies who had occupied it. However, this outcome is in fact surprising when one considers the military strength of the Soviet Union in the region, and the fact that Stalin's forces were in occupation long before the Allies got there.

This did not need to be the case; indeed, one of the reasons Churchill wanted a stronger Mediterranean campaign was to get to Austria sooner. What is of interest is that his motivations seem to have been clear at the time. Nadeau notes Elliott

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[123] Audrey Kurth Cronin notes that Churchill and Roosevelt had both mentioned Austria as a victim rather than an aggressor in public speeches early in the conflict, and even Stalin had "expressed his determination to restore an independent Austria". Audrey Kurth Cronin, *Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria,* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986),18. That the three leaders had discussed treating Austria differently may be seen in their conversation at the Tehran Conference of 1943; while discussing the possibility of dividing Germany into multiple smaller states, Stain argues that Austria should instead be given its prewar independence back. He noted that "Austria, for example, had existed as an independent state and should again". Found in US Department of State, FRUS, *The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran*, 602.

Roosevelt as recalling that FDR said: "Whenever the P.M. argued for our invasion through the Balkans, it was quite obvious to everyone in the room what he really meant. That he was above all else anxious to knife up into Central Europe, in order to keep the Red Army out of Austria and Rumania, even Hungary, if possible. Stalin knew it, I knew it, everybody knew it"[124]. Churchill was still bitter about Roosevelt's insistence on Operation Overlord when writing his memoirs, noting that "a heavy price was paid. The army of Italy was deprived of its opportunity to strike a most formidable blow at the Germans, and very possibly to reach Vienna before the Russians, with all that might have followed therefrom" [125]. We thus must consider why the Western Allies (or rather, Roosevelt and Truman, given Churchill's expressed preferences) chose not to race to Austria as they did with Trieste and with other regions of Europe.

Moreover, once the Western Allies had let the Soviet Union get to Austria first, Stalin could easily have expanded his territorial aims beyond occupation to consolidation and forced the Western Allies to accede to his solo occupation of the territory and indeed, his creation of a soviet satellite state in Austria[126]. Instead, he eventually allowed the Allies to share in the duties of occupation, which created the circumstances for involved negotiations, a difficult situation that lasted for ten

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[124] Quoted in Nadeau, *Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt Divide Europe,* 79.
[125] Churchill *The Second World War Vol 6, Triumph and Tragedy,* 100.
[126] Wolfgang Mueller notes the USSR's strength in the area: "Weeks before the western allies reached Austria's borders, Soviet troops had already liberated from the Nazi regime and occupied one-third of the country including Vienna, where a provisional government installed by Stalin had stared to function". Wolfgang Mueller, "Stalin and Austria: New Evidence on Soviet Policy in a Secondary Theatre of the Cold War, 1938-53/55", *Cold War History* 6, no. 1 (February 2006), 63-84, DOI: 10.1080/14682740500395444, 63.

years, and led eventually to Austria becoming an independent, if officially neutral, state[127]. Although negotiations over the fate of Austria dragged on much as those over Trieste had, ultimately Austria remained apart from the Soviet Union, despite Stalin's ability to likely force a different outcome. The question is why Stalin and his government would have allowed this conclusion when he had the ability to make Austria as much of the USSR as Poland and other Eastern Bloc states. Therefore, the questions of interest are: why did the Western Allies choose not to expand their aims and try to beat Stalin to Austria, and why did Stalin not expand his aims and insist on solo occupation of Austria when he had the capability to do so? I posit that this study's theory can explain both the failures to expand in this case. I argue that Austria possessed, at best, instrumental value to the Western Allies, and that the main reason the Western Allies did not race to it was simply that Roosevelt believed he lacked the key requirement for territorial expansion, which is military capability

[127] It should be noted that Churchill at least had no expectation that Stalin would adhere to prior agreements in this regard; he noted to Roosevelt in a communication on April 5th, 1945, that "I may remind you that we proposed and thought we had arranged… the provisional zones of occupation in Austria, but that since Yalta the Russians have sent no confirmation of these zones. Now that they are on the eve of taking Vienna and very likely will occupy the whole of Austria it may well be prudent for us to hold as much as possible in the north". In *The Second World War Vol 6, Triumph and Tragedy,* 512. At least at the beginning of the USSR's occupation, it seemed that Stalin was unwilling to let the Allies have their agreed-upon role in Austria; Churchill went so far as to send Truman the text of a telegram (on April 30th, 1945) to Stalin, noting the USSR's unwillingness to let Allied governments become involved in Austria, and complaining that "It has been our understanding that the treatment of Austria, as of Germany, is a matter of common concern to the four Powers who are to occupy and control these countries". Ibid., 519. As Kurth Cronin notes, it was not until two months later that Allied forces were allowed into Austria; however, she suggests that the delay was more due to the USSR's desire to plunder Austria's resources unopposed than because of any long-term planning on Stalin's part. (Audrey Kurth Cronin, *Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria*, 26).

to expand. Moreover, he had committed to entering Europe through France, and to blunt that campaign was essentially to betray the Soviet Union. He had no desire to damage that alliance.

As for Stalin's decision-making once he was in position in Austria, it is true that he was in a position of material strength and could have insisted on solo occupation, but he was already losing some of his good reputation with his allies. I argue that the marginal benefits of expanded aims, given that Austria's inherent value could easily be seized and realized in the early months of occupation, was as only instrumentally valuable, were not worth providing his allies with definitive proof of his untrustworthiness. Once Austria's material value had been taken, Stalin did not sufficiently value the territory in and of itself; rather, the territory's value came from his willingness to use it instrumentally, in order to bargain. Indeed, he was certainly able to use the territory instrumentally without consolidating his possession of it[128].

The gains to continued solo territorial occupation and the expansion of aims to exclude the allies from it were not worth the costs to his security by angering his allies and revealing his type so early. In order to demonstrate this, I will briefly consider the value of Austrian territory and the extent to which both Stalin and the Western Allies cared about maintaining their current alliance; for both sides, this alliance was well worth preserving.

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[128]He was certainly willing to use Austria to play hardball with his allies at the bargaining table, however; Kurth Cronin argues that "In the years following the war Austria increasingly became an instrument rather than an object of great power policy; the country's fate was considered in the broader context of each government's conception of the future of Europe". Audrey Kurth Cronin, *Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria*, 19.

Austria's Territorial Value

For both the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, the rather low value of Austrian territory played an important role in decision-making. For all states concerned, I assert that Austria's territorial value was much more instrumental than inherent. To begin with, there is little evidence that any of the powers considered Austria a land-locked country in the middle of Europe, to be strategically important[129]. Indeed, perhaps its only value was in dealing Germany another terrible blow by denying them the use of the territory and its resources at the end of the conflict. For example, the United States and Great Britain had no postwar preferences that were dependent on having a voice and impact on Austria's governance and internal politics. At best, it seems that Churchill saw Austria as instrumentally valuable in denying the use and political control of the territory to the Soviet Union. But it is equally clear that neither Churchill's own military leaders nor those of the United States saw much military value in occupying Austria, even with the goal of ending the conflict sooner. For example, as Nadeau notes, Eisenhower "was contemptuous "of wandering off overland via Trieste to Ljubljana.""[130].

Stalin too saw Austria as only instrumentally valuable territory. The fact that Stalin saw little value to the territory can be seen in his general willingness to allow Austria to be an independent country after the war was over. As early as 1943, the

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[129] It is amusing to remember that a former part of Austria –Trieste and Istria – was indeed strategically vital, but without this Austro-Hungarian coastline, Austria had lost a significant source of its inherent value.

[130] Nadeau, *Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt*, 81. He also notes that "the British Chiefs of Staff were not ready to support Alexander and Churchill in a drive toward Vienna" (81).

Soviet Union's goal was, in the words of a Soviet committee, "to make Austria a viable, but small state"[131]. Moreover, as Aleksei M. Filitov points out, even internally in the Soviet Union there was the argument that Austria could become an independent nation, and that it was not a territory of vital concern to the Soviet Union[132]. This is also born out by Wolfgang Mueller's argument; he notes that "From the Kremlin's perspective, however, Austria, with its peripheral location and comparable in size to Hungary, was of minor importance"[133]. In general, for both sides the only value to Austria was instrumental value, and while Stalin did not hesitate to take the territory, the lack of inherent value does a lot to explain why he did not consolidate his aims. Let us turn now to the Western Allies, and look a bit closer at why they did not choose to race Stalin to Austria.

The Western Allies' Preferences, Alliance Politics, and Austria

I argue that, despite Churchill's misgivings, Roosevelt and later Truman were unwilling to expand and challenge the USSR for Austria for several key reasons. It is certain that this was an American decision, rather than a British one, as Churchill's

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[131] Quoted in Mueller, "Stalin and Austria", 66. He argues that "the type of Eastern European federation envisaged by the British was seen, in the words of deputy people's commissar Solomon A. Lozovskii, as 'an instrument of anti-Soviet policy'" (66).

[132] See Aleksei M. Filitov, "Problems of Post-War Construction in Soviet Foreign Policy Conceptions During World War II", in *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-53*, Ed. Francesa Gori and Silvio Pons, 13.

[133] Wolfgang Mueller, "Soviet Policy, Political Parties, and the Preparation for Communist Takeovers in Hungary, Germany, and Austria, 1944-1946", *East European Politics and Societies* 24, No. 1 (Winter 2010), 90-115. DOI: 10.1177/0888325409354557. 91. Mueller also points out that "Austria was never claimed as part of the Soviet sphere of influence. This was most probably a consequence of the country's location at the periphery of the Soviet orbit and the participation of the Western allies in its military occupation, as had been negotiated in 1944. Austria never held a high priority for Stalin". 108.

insistence on getting to Vienna was almost obsessive. Why then did Roosevelt not want to expand? The key reason is that Roosevelt did not think the territory was worth risking the military planning for Normandy. Nadeau notes that "The truth is that the U.S. military was not interested in any project that might detract from Overlord, and Roosevelt believed the American voters would oppose sending American soldiers into the Balkan backwater, especially when the fields of France offered a straight line to Germany"[134]. We have seen the relative lack of value of Austrian territory, and this is ever more important when we consider that the Western Allies were not considering long-term occupation and annexation as the USSR was in several areas of Europe. In essence, Roosevelt chose to liberate France rather than Austria.

While there was a low risk of reputation and a low risk from the opponent, I argue that the value of Austria was so low, and the risk of adversely affecting the important relationship with the Soviet Union was so high, that Roosevelt was unwilling to try it. At this point in the conflict, the Western Allies needed the Soviet Union to a great extent, in order to successfully end the conflict. The USSR's manpower and other contributions to the defeat of Germany were indispensible, and it was not worth risking the loss of that alliance in order to gain territory of little inherent value to the Western Allies.

Ultimately, we can say that the Western Allies did not go after Austria because the territory was not inherently valuable to them, United States had no desire to break with the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom had neither the

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[134] Nadeau, *Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt,* 82.

desire nor the ability to force the issue with the United States. It should be noted, however, that just because the Western Allies chose not to expand their aims, that does not mean they were indifferent to what the USSR did in Austria. By contrast, they were intent on holding Stalin to his previous promises, and on carving out a role in Austria's future. Truman for instance noted to Churchill in June that "I consider the settlement of the Austrian problem as of equal urgency to the German matter"[135]. This can be seen in their repeated insistence on coming to an agreement about what zones each side should occupy, and that the Soviet Union must allow Western diplomats and forces into Austria.

Of particular interest is Churchill's willingness to link Germany and Austria together; or rather, his belief that there should be a quid pro quo between what the Western Allies did in Berlin and what the Soviet Union did in Austria. He noted in multiple messages to Truman that the US and the UK should only agree to give the USSR a role in Germany if Stalin allowed them into Austria[136]. In a sense, the Western Allies were using territory they held instrumentally in order to convince

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[135] Harry S. Truman, "Truman to Churchill (No. 70), June 12, 1945", In *Defending the West: The Truman-Churchill Correspondence, 1945-1960*. Ed. G.W. Sand. (Westport, Connecticut, London: Praeger, 2004). 120.

[136] For his discussions with Truman, see for instance Churchill's message of June 9th, 1945, in which he worries about "Austria as [being] in the Sovietized half of Europe", and links the decisions made there with the Soviet demands about Germany. Winston S. Churchill, "Churchill to Truman (No. 81), June 9, 1945", in *Defending the West*, Ed. G.W. Sand, 117. See also his message of June 14th, in which the same themes emerge. He posits alterations to a telegram Truman was to send to Stalin; these alterations deliberately link the question of zones in Germany and zones in Austria, and he notes to Truman that they should insist on this matter: "I for my part attach particular importance to the Russians evacuating the part of the British zone in Austria that they are now occupying at the same time as the British and American forces evacuate the Russian zone in Germany". Winston S. Churchill, "Churchill to Truman (No. 87), June 14th, 1945" in Ibid, 121).

Stalin to give them a role in Austria. As I will show, however, Stalin needed less convincing than they thought.

Stalin and Austria: His Preferences, His Options, and His Reputation

Let us now turn to the Soviet Union; in particular, the question of why Stalin eventually allowed the Western Allies to have a role in Austria, setting up years of negotiations, and eventually allowed Austria to become a neutral state. All this represents a choice not to expand aims and force Austria to become part of the Soviet Union. I argue that the missing factor in this analysis is Stalin's understanding of how Austria in particular would impact his relations with the Western Allies. Stalin was unwilling to expand his aims because he still hoped to achieve gains from the alliance with the Western Allies; it was not in his interest to destroy their cooperation at that time. In particular, there were two key risks to his postwar security that stemmed from damaging the alliance: first, that the Western Allies might retaliate by making difficulties in Germany, a much more important concern, and second, that the allies might push for a plan of making Austria part of a new state in the center of Europe, a plan that Stalin adamantly opposed. He thus allowed the Western Allies a role in Austria so as to maintain their positive relationship, and to assure they would not punish him by pushing for this alternate plan of expanding the state.

Stalin was certainly aware from the Western Allies' protests that they wanted a role in Austria, and he knew they were linking his actions in Austria to their actions in Berlin. Germany was of much greater importance to Stalin's postwar security than Austria, mostly due to his geographic position on the continent. He

certainly wanted Germany weakened; he also wanted to be sure the Western Allies did not have everything their own way in Germany[137]. Anything that got in the way of him having a say in Germany was to be avoided, and he did not sufficiently value Austria enough.

Moreover, Stalin particularly dreaded the Western Allies trying to come up with new configurations in Europe. In particular, Stalin's key postwar preference at this point was to destroy the possibility of a strong state at the center of Europe. While German itself was certainly to be weakened and divided through conflict, there was an ongoing discussion as to whether Austria should be made the center of a new European state. One suggestion, made by the British, was in essence to create a middle bloc in Europe that would incorporate Austria with other middle European countries[138]. The idea was in circulation from at least 1943 onward, and it is clear that Stalin was deeply opposed to the creation of any potentially powerful state in the middle of Europe. He noted during the Tehran Conference that he was adamantly opposed to recreating Austria-Hungary or giving Austria any additional power[139]. In essence, the USSR was not willing to let Austria become a strong state once again after the war. As Mueller notes, the ideal for the USSR was to put the minimum effort in to guarantee Austria would never be a serious threat to Soviet

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[137] See Loth, "Stalin's Plans for Post-War Germany", 26

[138] Mueller, "Stalin and Austria", 66.

[139] US Department of State, FRUS, *The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran*, 603. Stalin argued that "it was a great mistake to unite Hungary with Germans [Austria] since the Germans would merely control the Hungarians and to create large frameworks within which the Germans could operate would be very dangerous".

interests[140]. The thought of creating a new state in Europe was one that Churchill had supported for some time; he had broached the idea repeatedly to Stalin, with mixed success. Churchill's communication to Roosevelt of October 22nd, 1944, noted a conversation with Stalin on this regard: "Contrary to his [Stalin's] previously expressed view, he would be glad to see Vienna the capital of a federation of South German States…. As you know, the idea of Vienna becoming the capital of a large Danubian federation has always been attractive to me"[141]. Whatever Churchill might have believed at the time, this was extremely detrimental to Stalin's postwar security; even a politically independent Austria was preferable to an expanded one.

It is likely that Stalin was willing to let Austria go and refuse to expand his aims, if behaving reasonably would keep the Western Allies from punishing him through keeping him out of Germany or through proposing new states in Europe. While Stalin was still deeply interested in Austria's ultimate fate, and willing to draw out negotiations over the final fate of Austria, there was little more he could gain by adding it to the USSR. Instead, by being reasonable and limiting his aims, Stalin minimized the potential for conflict in the region, gained another bargaining chip to add to the discussions surrounding spheres of influence in Germany, and could still hope that Austria's future governments would be supportive of his politics and aims. There was no reason for Stalin to fear an unfriendly Austrian state on the border; at

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[140] He argues that "Moscow therefore had to prevent any European rival or anti-Soviet bulwark from coming into existence…In the case of Austria, Soviet diplomats were ready to accept some minor territorial gains (South Tyrol, Berchtesgaden) but ruled out any major changes in the 'balance of weakness' in East-Central Europe". Mueller, "Stalin and Austria", 66.

[141] In Churchill, *The Second World War Vol. 6, Triumph and Tragedy,* 241.

the least, he could hope for a neutral presence, and at best, he might have a government quite friendly to his purposes in place.

That Austria was of low importance for Stalin is somewhat supported by a speech from his successor, Khrushchev. Khrushchev noted in 1955 that "I remember how Stalin, about a year before his death, said several times: -Why don't we conclude a treaty with Austria? But this matter kept being postponed"[142]. It is always risky to rely too much on post-hoc reporting of someone else's thoughts, especially when the reporter has every incentive to be less than honest. While one could imagine Khrushchev putting any words he needed into Stalin's mouth after the latter's death, the fact that his report of Stalin's beliefs lines up with Stalin's actions is suggestive.

In summation, Austria at first appears to be an anomaly in post-war Europe, as a state that was occupied by the Soviet Union but whose ultimate fate was decided by careful negotiation after nearly a decade. It became an independent, if officially neutral, state. This does not fit into the typical narrative of the "grasping" Soviet Union racing the Western Allies to the edges of the Iron Curtain. However, an understanding of this study's theory shows that Austria's relatively low (and only instrumental) value, combined with Stalin's desire to not destroy important alliances, accounts for his unwillingness to consolidate the territory.

Alternative Explanations for Events

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[142] "Central Committee Plenum of the CPSU Ninth Session, Concluding Word by Com. N.S. Krushchev, 12 July 1955," July 12th, 1955, History and Public Policy Digital Archive, TsKhSD f.2, op.1, d. 176, II.282-95. Translated by Benjamin Aldrich-Moodie. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110452.

As a final point, it is important to consider the relative success of this study's theory at explaining the choice to expand or maintain territorial aims. In particular, let us consider whether offensive realism or the commitment problem argument do a better job at explaining the decision-making of states in these two cases. While there are some factors that support each theory, I assert that in general, these theories do not explain the full decision-making of state leaders, and cannot fully account for the events as they played out. Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to look at these alternate explanations, and give them credit where they do correctly predict the outcomes in this case. To say that the theory I pose does a better job is not to say that these theories cannot provide any explanatory power.

Offensive realism, as we have already discussed, asserts that states should frequently expand their war aims when the military capability to do so exists. Offensive realists recognize maximalist war aims to be the preferred preference among states, and believe that states seek power and maximization of their place in the system before anything else. Having little room for alliances or even for reputation, offensive realists would predict states to "go it alone" and seek power before all else. The only risk to expansion is the immediate risk of intervention or balancing by powerful states. Examining the case in light of this theory, at first glance there is much to recommend offensive realism. The states in question were the victorious powers, and they had the capability to expand their aims and achieve great gains. There is much evidence of states seeking additional gains and increasing their material power. While it is true that Stalin did not consolidate his control of Austrian territory, his push to gain as much territory as possible before running into

the Western Allies makes it easy to believe offensive realism's assertions about states being willing to expand until balanced against. Furthermore, Tito certainly desired Trieste for the material and strategic power it provided. Here too, there was attempted expansion, foiled only when the Western Allies moved troops to prevent Tito from achieving his aims. Their power balanced against him made it impossible to completely control Trieste, and an offensive realist would assert that this raw power explains the key outcomes in this conflict. Indeed, the general pattern of expansion and balancing seems to support offensive realism.

Nonetheless, offensive realism does not provide a sufficient explanation of why certain war aims were expanded and others were not. In particular, offensive realism falls down when looking at soviet decision-making in Austria. Why would a state willingly give up an occupation and cede control of territory? Under offensive realism this choice makes little sense. An offensive realist might point to the US and the UK acting as a balancing coalition against the USSR, but this certainly did not stop Stalin from expanding his aims in many other areas. Offensive realism cannot explain why Austria had a different outcome from Poland, for instance. Since offensive realists make little distinction between the values of different territory, they cannot properly explain why Stalin held back in the Austrian case but not in other Eastern European cases.

Moreover, offensive realism is inadequate to explaining the case of Trieste as well. This is because Tito was well aware that any move toward the city would provoke the kind of balancing coalition that is supposed to stop states from expansion. There is no doubt that Tito acted in full knowledge that he was

destroying any remaining trust the US and the UK had in him, and he did so knowing that his most important ally was lukewarm at best to his plans. This is irrational according to offensive realism; therefore, this theory has several significant problems with regards to important outcomes at the end of World War II. Given the importance of this war, the theory's difficulty in coping with these cases should not be ignored.

As regards the commitment problem argument as an explanation of the expansion of war aims, again, at first glance there is much to recommend this theory in the case of World War II. The commitment problem argument in a nutshell is that states cannot credibly commit to upholding a bargain they have agreed upon prior to the end of the conflict, and so they expand their war aims rather than risk losing out in the spoils of war. It is a problem based in mistrust of the other actors in the system. On the face of it, the commitment problem does a good job explaining the reason for the race to Trieste, and perhaps Churchill's constant worrying about Austria. Certainly Churchill, Roosevelt, and later Truman were aware that Tito had every reason to defect from the agreement that the final disposition of Trieste would be left for after the conflict; it was not in his interest to adhere to this arrangement, and their actions were undertaken with the understanding that Tito could not and would not commit to waiting on Trieste when he had the military means to bring about the outcome he preferred. Thus, they took matters into their own hands rather than waiting and being forced into accepting a later status quo that would be unfavorable. If this cannot be explained by a lack of trust and an inability to commit to an outcome unfavorable to one's own interest, what could account for it?

However, from Tito's perspective, the reason for expanding and occupying Trieste was not because he feared the allies would not adhere to a prior commitment, but because they refused to make a commitment in the first place. He had been repeatedly told that the final allotment of Trieste would occur after the conflict, and he was well aware that waiting would mean he would be in a disadvantageous bargaining position and would be unlikely to gain the territory. Trieste's inherent value was such that he could not wait until the end of the conflict. He understood the Western Allies' unshakable commitment to not making a commitment, and this is what forced his hand. Therefore, the commitment problem argument can explain the race to Trieste from one side, but not from the other.

Moreover, if we look at Austria, we again see that the commitment problem argument is inadequate at coping with the entire situation. The commitment problem argument runs around with regards to Austria; this is where we see that the commitment problem argument's lack of consideration of territorial value is problematic. If it was so clear that Stalin could not be trusted, why could Roosevelt not see it? Moreover, while it is clear Churchill in particular worried about Stalin keeping to earlier agreements, one of the key problems was that there were not clear agreements in place. Moreover, if the Western Allies did indeed get to Austria first, would that make the postwar settlement more stable? There is no indication that this would be true. The commitment problem argument cannot account for why Stalin would take Austria in the first place, or why he would be willing to allow the Western Allies to have a role in it. There was no commitment problem that was solved by Stalin getting to Austria, aside from the basic explanation that the conflict

was an absolute war. And, the commitment problem argument has no possible explanation for why he would fail to consolidate his power. If he did not want to bargain over the territory, or he wanted to protect his interests from the Western Allies, he had every incentive to expand. Therefore, this theory also runs into problems in this important case. Ultimately, I argue that my theory has a superior explanation of territorial war aims in these two cases.

Conclusion

This case study has examined the end of World War II, and analyzed the decisions made by the great power leaders in the last stage of the conflict. In particular, I have argued that the choice of whether or not to expand war aims and attempt to occupy additional territory throughout the end of the conflict was driven by a rational calculation involving the value of the territory versus the need for alliances and a positive reputation in the future. Where war aims were expanded – for instance, Tito's attempted occupation of Trieste – the inherent value of the territory that the potential occupier could gain was far greater than the value of continuing alliances. Tito had no expectation of maintaining his current alliances into the future, nor did concerns about his reputation hold him back from a potentially profitable occupation.

By contrast, the Western Allies did not move to Austria because the territory was of such low value. Stalin too refused to expand his aims and solidify his occupation of Austria, because in the short term, the territory was only instrumentally valuable, and in the long term, he was unwilling to immediately destroy his alliances and reputation. The fact that the Cold War began and these

alliances disintegrated anyway should not be held against the theory; it is clear that Stalin hoped to work with the US for at least the foreseeable future, and Austria was not worth risking that relationship.

As a final examination of how these cases work with regards to my theory, let us return to the predictions of Chapter Two concerning territorial war aim expansion. Recall Figures 2.3. and 2.4, in which the risks to alliances or of changing the opponent's dissatisfaction were laid against territorial value and reputation. There were eight possible combinations of factors. Which apply to our cases here, and do the cases support the predictions? First of all, I offer Figure 3.1, in which I note where the two cases (each with two opportunities for expansion) lie.

Figure 3.1

		Instrumental	Inherent
High Impact on Reputation	High Importance of Ally for Postwar Security	**8** Expansion of Territorial War Aims Least Likely; highest risk to future security cancels out potential bargaining gains.	**7** Expansion Very Unlikely; the risk to future security from losing both the alliance and a good reputation are high, but the inherent value of the territory may tempt some states.
	Low Importance of Ally for Postwar Security	**4** Expansion Possible; risk to reputation may not outweigh potential bargaining gains.	**3** Expansion Likely; gaining the territory and keeping the alliance intact likely outweighs risks to reputation.
Low Impact on Reputation	High Importance of Ally for Postwar Security	**6** Expansion Unlikely; the gains in bargain may not outweigh the cost of losing the alliance, even if reputation is not affected. **Austria- USSR and Western Allies**	**5** Expansion Less Likely; losing alliance is damaging to security, but the value of the territory may make expansion worth the risk.
	Low Importance of Ally for Postwar Security	**2** Expansion Very Likely; gains in bargaining are very low in risk to the state's future security. **Trieste- Western Allies**	**1** Expansion of Territorial War Aims Most Likely; there is the least risk to the state's future security, and value is high. **Trieste- Tito**

As we can see, the theory is well-supported by these cases. Trieste falls into the two sectors where war aim expansion is predicted to be most likely, and this is supported by the facts of the case. Similarly, Austria is in a sector where expansion is unlikely, even if it is not in the least likely sector. This is because third-parties, and therefore, the potential occupiers' reputations, were such a negligible factor in this particular case. Nonetheless, the theory would predict no expansion in the case of Austria, and this is indeed what we find.

However, some might argue that my theory is problematic, because at this point in the conflict the Western allies and their communist brethren should not be seen as allies but as adversaries. Certainly one could point to disagreements and the mistrust between them as a sign that all was not well. However, as a rebuttal to this point, I offer Figure 3.2, in which I show what would happen if we consider the potential occupier states to be each other's opponents rather than allies. The question would then become whether expanding territorial war aims would lead to a change in opponent dissatisfaction rather than a risk of losing the alliance.

Figure 3.2

		Instrumental	Inherent
High Impact on Reputation	High Likelihood of Increasing Opponent Dissatisfaction	**8** Expansion of Territorial War Aims Least Likely; highest risk to future security cancels out potential bargaining gains.	**7** Expansion Very Unlikely; highest risk to future security, but the inherent value of the territory may still tempt some states.
	Low Likelihood of Increasing Opponent Dissatisfaction	**4** Expansion Possible; states may discount the risk to their reputation in order to realize bargaining gains.	**3** Expansion Likely; gaining the territory without making the opponent more dissatisfied likely outweighs risks to reputation.
Low Impact on Reputation	High Likelihood of Increasing Opponent Dissatisfaction	**6** Expansion Unlikely; the gains in bargain may not offset the risks of leaving the opponent dissatisfied, even if reputation is not affected. **Austria- USSR and Western Allies**	**5** Expansion Less Likely; risk to security from a dissatisfied opponent is high, but the value of the territory may make expansion worth the risk.
	Low Likelihood of Increasing Opponent Dissatisfaction	**2** Expansion Very Likely; gains in bargaining are very low in additional risk to the state's future security.	**1** Expansion of Territorial War Aims Most Likely; the state can gain the territory with little additional risk to their future security. **Trieste- Tito and Western Allies**

What we see in Figure 3.2 though is that it does not matter whether we consider the potential occupier states to be each other's important allies, or each other's future opponents. If they are each other's allies, then expansion could damage that alliance. If they are each other's opponents, then expansion could change the risk of dissatisfaction. Therefore Figure 3.2 suggests there should be expansion in the case of Trieste, and no expansion in the case of Austria; it matches up with Figure 3.1 perfectly.

Beyond the arguments of my own theory, I have argued that alternative explanations for these events do not fully capture the causal mechanism for the outcomes of interest. Ultimately, what the study of this conflict has shown us is that state leaders will always have their postwar preferences in mind when acting in the present; while they are not always capable of predicting the outcomes of their choices, they nonetheless weigh present gains against future security risks, and behave in a way that they believe will optimize gains and minimize risks.

Chapter Four: European Unification Wars

Many scholars of international relations have focused their empirical research on European wars, for important reasons. Continental wars involving multiple regional powers are relatively common in European history, and at least three wars (the Seven Years' War, World War I, and World War II) had important consequences for the rest of the world as well. Nonetheless, the nineteenth century, after the end of the Napoleonic wars, is often portrayed as a time where the balance of power kept Europe relatively peaceful. However, it is a mistake to view Europe as calm or settled during this time. There were multiple small conflicts between two European powers, especially as two modern states, Germany and Italy, unified out of disparate territorial elements. These wars have been relatively under-studied in international politics, and yet had extremely important effects on later European politics. This chapter focuses on the process of unification, and on the conflicts these two states fought in order to unify their territory. In particular, the primary focus of this chapter is on the main conflicts of German unification: the Austro-Prussian/Italian War and the Franco-Prussian War, and the main conflicts of Italian unification: these two prior conflicts, and an additional war between Austria and Italy and France in 1859, whose effect on European politics cannot be doubted.

These case studies are appropriate for this analysis for several reasons. First of all, Germany and Italy's unification processes took place at nearly the same time, in the same region, with the same great powers and interested parties. Both states interacted with the same opponents and third parties, and we can therefore look at the ways in which the two states and their leaders reacted to similar power

dynamics and alliances. Moreover, there is both in-case variation as well as variation between cases. This can be seen best in the very different outcomes of the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian conflicts, as German leaders made different war aim expansion choices in these different conflicts. Finally, though there were certain differences between their methods of unification, both processes faced certain challenges. In each case, there was one preeminent state that sought to unify the various ethnic and linguistically similar territories around it into a single state, and in both cases, there was substantial pushback from some of the European great powers.

While both these unification processes involved territorial ambitions, the extent to which each state expanded their war aims and occupied additional territory varied greatly. In the Prussian conflicts, Prussian forces had the opportunity and the means to expand war aims and occupy a substantial amount of their opponent's territory. However, only in the Franco-Prussian War did they undertake such a belligerent action. By contrast, Bismarck, Prussia's preeminent statesman, was relatively restrained in his ambitions against Austria, despite having the opportunity to occupy much of Austrian territory and gain significant concessions. The Italian unification process represents cases in which the ultimate aim of conflict was always to acquire new territory; however, Italy was different from Prussia in that Italian military might was consistently lower than it needed to be, and so the role of allies and third-party states was especially salient. We will see that Italy was often in the position of trying to determine when to reject past alliances that had once been useful, but no longer allowed it to achieve its aims.

I find that this study's theory does a superior job of explaining the choices made by Prussia and by Italy during their unification processes. In particular, I contrast Prussia's refusal to expand aims in its conflict with Austria to its willingness to expand aims in France. In the former conflict, there were high risks to Prussia's future security if Austria was excessively punished or had to relinquish territory, and the territory was neither extremely useful for bargaining nor worth keeping (i.e., it was of low inherent value, and no obvious instrumental value) given Bismarck's overall war aims. In particular, I argue that Bismarck was afraid of increasing the risk of opponent dissatisfaction if he took territory from Austria. This was the key risk in this conflict, and I argue that it was sufficient to convince Bismarck not to expand. While some highlight the risk of French intervention as the primary cause of Bismarck's restraint, I show that this was at best a reinforcing factor, not a propelling factor, in his decision-making. Bismarck was ready to expand if he had to, but ultimately he was able to convince William I to remain satisfied with existing aims.

In the French conflict, I show that Bismarck's initial war aims did not include territorial acquisition, but battlefield dynamics allowed him to expand and demand the cession of Alsace-Lorraine. He was willing to demand this territory because he believed taking it would not change the risk of French dissatisfaction (which was high regardless of any territorial loss), and that there were not other significant risks to expansion. In order to guarantee Prussia would gain this inherently valuable territory, it was necessary (due to a combination of French domestic politics, pushback and meddling from the Prussian military, and most important, a lack of

serious risks to Prussia's future security from present actions) to drive to Paris and use that occupation instrumentally in order to force French politicians to the table. I argue that this was not entirely by Bismarck's choice, as the Prussian military began acting on their own, but that he ultimately accepted that it was necessary to achieve a successful end to the conflict, and that the risks were as low as they were for taking Alsace-Lorraine.

In terms of Italian unification, I find that this study's theory can explain why Italy continued to attempt territorial expansion despite rarely succeeding militarily. In particular, I show that the first true war of unification, the 1859 war, is an excellent example of how a state may act against its ally's preferences when it believes that alliance will not be important in the future and when the territory is of high inherent value. We will see that Cavour, Italy's most important statesman, did everything he could before the conflict to keep the alliance between Italy and France close. Immediately after the main fighting ended, however, he expanded his aims and took significant portions of Italian territory in the knowledge that this was contrary to Napoleon III's plans. This was because he did not believe Italian security was dependent on maintaining an alliance with the French, so there was a low risk of losing the ally. There was also a low risk to reputation, and no change in risk in terms of leaving Austria dissatisfied.

In the Austro-Prussian/Italian War, although Italian leaders knew they had already gained Venice through diplomacy, they continued the conflict in an attempt to occupy it and other territories. They had the luxury of trying to use Venice instrumentally (although the territory was extremely inherently valuable to them)

in order to bolster their bargaining position. Italy did not have great military success, but it is important to understand why fighting for territory they knew they would soon possess was a rational strategy. Again, there was little indication that refraining from taking territory would lessen the risk of Austrian dissatisfaction, and, though France provided some assistance to Italy, again, it was not an alliance Italy felt it had to protect. Ultimately, there was little risk to fighting Austria multiple times, given France's support of Italy, and much inherently valuable territory to gain. Finally, during the Franco-Prussian war when the French could no longer support the Pope, I argue that Italy chose to expand and take Rome because it had no significant allies at that moment, and knew that its reputation would not be adversely affected; it was worth it to attain this inherently valuable territory.

This chapter will examine each of these unification processes in turn. First, I describe the European balance of power at the time, showing the milieu in which Italy and Germany were situated. As a note, I will generally use "Italy" as simple shorthand to refer to the Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont throughout this chapter; while "Italy" did not exist until after the 1859 war, it is good for clarity to standardize terminology. I will generally use "Prussia" when discussing the state involved in conflicts with Austria and France, but "Germany" when talking about the process of unification. After discussing the European balance of power, I will turn to the two unification processes and the conflicts these states used to gain territory. I will end with a consideration of the alternate theories, especially with regards to the Austro-Prussian/Italian War and the Franco-Prussian war. I show that, while

offensive realism and the commitment problem in particular have some explanatory value, they cannot account for the full range of decision-making across these cases.

The "Cast of Characters" and the European Balance of Power

Before getting into the details of these two unification processes, it is worth taking some time to establish the state of the European balance of power, and to review the states and decision-makers who played a role in the outcomes of interest. Europe in the latter half of the nineteenth century, while hardly a peaceful continent, was nonetheless a pacific one in the sense that no state desired a state of general, major war. However, instability had been introduced into the system by the slow yet inevitable unification of both Italy and Germany. We must consider the main powers of Europe, and what sort of role they might choose for themselves in the unification processes to come. In particular, aside from Prussia, and Italy themselves, we should consider Austria and France as their primary opponents (and occasional allies), and the role of Great Britain and Russia as uninvolved but important great powers.

Both Austria and France at this point in European history present certain challenges to the scholar who assumes rationality on the part of leaders. In particular, both states had governments controlled by monarchs with uncertain policies, even irrational policies, often led one way or another by the key figures around them. Both also had a certain amount of concern about their domestic situation, though this was certainly more acute for Austria.

Much of Austria's external difficulties stemmed from its internal difficulties; it was certainly the most multi-ethnic state in Europe at this time. This multiethnic

makeup made politics difficult and, as we will see, it was a distinct liability on the battlefield as well[143]. Austria in many way represented the old guard of Europe, desperate to hang onto its empire and suspicious of any changes to the status quo[144]. It also had the poor luck to have to deal with both Prussia and Italy's territorial aims and unification strategies, given its role as a preeminent German state and its possession of significant Italian territory. It also had the unfortunate honor of being led during this time period by Emperor Franz Joseph, whose stubbornness and decision-making with regards to whom he put in charge of the military and whose counsel he followed was unfortunate at best[145].

Austria's view of Prussia in the lead-up to the wars of German unification is simply described: Austria believed itself to be the preeminent German state, and any

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[143] An obvious flaw in the Austrian army at the time was that many ordinary soldiers did not in fact speak German, which made command difficult and affected the strategic choices made by Austrian leaders; Geoffrey Wawro notes that the use of "shock" tactics "spared the emperor the considerable cost of rifle training and gave him the means to preempt language and morale problems by literally herding his ethnically mixed regiments together like cattle". Geoffrey Wawro, *The Austro-Prussian War: Austria's War with Prussia and Italy in 1866,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 33. This tactic in particular would be extremely problematic during the Austro-Prussian war.

[144] See for example Otto Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany: The Period of Unification, 1815-1871*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); he argues that "For Franz Joseph… it was an abiding principle, ultimately fatal for the empire, not to surrender except under duress any fragment of his inherited power either at home or abroad. He deluded himself that Austria was equal to a two-front war as long as France or Russia did not intervene on the opposing side" (288).

[145] Wawro for instance notes Franz Joseph chose a war minister "precisely for his tractability in order to quash Prussian-style army reforms" (28), and refused these reforms because "such innovations violated army "tradition"" (29). Wawro, *The Austro-Prussian War*. Compared with Prussian decision-making and willingness to innovate, these choices are both inadequate and irrational even by the standards of Franz Joseph's day.

changes to that status quo would be unacceptable[146]. Prussia was Austria's main rival in the Germanic states, and Austria's desire to give as little ground as possible to Prussia proved a costly strategy in many ways[147]. As to Austria's opinions regarding its territories in Italy, we can look to an early Austria statesman, Prince Metternich for an excellent summary of Austrian views in this regard. He wrote that

> The word "Italy" is a geographical expression. Though it is a term that slides easily off the tongue, it has none of the political implications which the revolutionary ideologist are trying to attach to it…
> The Emperor is King of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom, which, though south of the Alps, forms part of the Austrian Empire. At the time of the great territorial systematizations in 1814, the late Emperor Francis wanted no reference at all to any *Kingdom of Italy*, for the very idea seemed a permanent threat to other rulers in the peninsula.
> The difference between Austria and France, or indeed any other country, does not lie in the political fact of whether they are an Italian Power or a non-Italian power; the difference rather lies in material conditions of geographic situation and practical, effective authority. All countries should be judged by

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[146] See Chester Wells Clark, who notes that two key goals of Austria after 1848 were to maintain for "the young Emperor Franz Joseph I his most cherished possession, the primacy in Teutonic Europe", and "to bring the entire monarchy – Hungarians, Slavs, and Italians included – into a new Germanic federation, so as to secure the military aid of all Germany in case of an outside attack". Chester Wells Clark, *Franz Joseph and Bismarck: The Diplomacy of Austria Before the War of 1866*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934). 4. See also William Carr, *The Origins of the Wars of German Unification*, (Longman: London and New York, 1991). He notes "the basic weakness in Austrian policy between 1848 and 1866. It was not that Austrian statesmen lacked ability or did not suspect Prussia of aggressive designs, as has sometimes been suggested. The real malaise in Vienna was a propensity to believe, despite ominous signs to the contrary, that Prussia would agree in the final resort that dualism was the only salvation for conservative monarchy. The Austrians avoided facing up to the simple fact that the ruling élite in Prussia, while as determined as the Austrians to fight liberalism all the way, did not have a vested interest in the status quo" (100).

[147] For instance, Wells Clark notes Austria's failings in the 1859 Austro-Italian/French War came about in part because Prussia did not enter the war on Austria's side. Franz Joseph was unable to get Prussia to come to his aid "because the Emperor was unwilling to confer upon his rival the command of the army of the Confederation. Rather than yield his position in Germany, the young Habsburger suddenly came to terms with Napoleon and yielded Lombardy". Wells Clark, *Franz Joseph and Bismarck*, 7. We will discuss this in greater detail when the case arises.

> this same standard. I have touched on this question only to show the French cabinet that we are very much concerned over the possible diffusion of these erroneous ideas of *nationality*. Such ideas are being dangerously exploited by elements of disorder who are pitting themselves against the hard reality of political fact.[148]

To put it simply, Austria considered itself justified in owning significant portions of the Italian peninsula, and was adamantly against any move to develop an "Italian" nation-state. In short, Austria had the most to lose by German and Italian unification, and it should not be surprising that it was the state that put up the most challenges to both these developing states.

Moving onto another key state in the European system, France's role in Europe at the time is quite important due to both its geopolitical concerns and the particular concerns of its ruler, Napoleon III. Geopolitically, of course France kept an eye on the situation in the German states, aware that any change in the balance of power in this area would have significant consequences for its own security[149]. Moreover, Napoleon III's wife, the Empress Eugenie, who had a strong hatred of Prussia and the ability to influence her husband's positions, made relations with

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[148] Prince Metternich, "*Metternich defies Italian Nationalism, 1847"*, In *The Making of Italy 1796-1870*. Ed. Denis Mack Smith. (New York: Walker and Company, 1968). 123-124.

[149] See for instance David Wetzel, who notes that prior to the Franco-Prussian War, Austria and France found themselves unable to agree to an alliance although France had a deep interest in seeing that the smaller German states remained independent of Prussia; "Neither the German Austrians nor the Hungarians of the Habsburg monarchy could bring themselves to regard Napoleon III as the defender of South German independence, though it was precisely that independence upon which France's security as a Great Power largely depended". David Wetzel, *A Duel of Nations: Germany, France, and the Diplomacy of the War of 1870-1871*, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), 27.

Prussia difficult at times[150]. In terms of Italy, France was, as we will see, certainly no opponent of Italian unification, and frequently assisted Italy in its aims[151]. However, one key factor that had important consequences was Napoleon III's religiosity, and the fact that he needed to keep a significant conservative, religious portion of his constituency happy. This meant that any Italian unification scheme that threatened the Catholic Pope's temporal or religious power would not be met with any favor in France[152]. At its height, this meant that French troops were stationed in Rome in order to protect the Pope from any threat from Italy.

As far as Prussia is concerned, before it embarked on German unification, it was an important state, but not as powerful as some of its neighbors. It was certainly a revisionist state, however, intent on challenging Austria for a role in German politics and on gaining recognition as a great power. As for the internal politics of Prussia, it is clear that Otto von Bismarck should be considered the key decision-maker of Prussia at this time. He was constrained though by the need to achieve the support of his king and members of the royal family, and he was hardly the only voice of power in Prussia. King William I was certainly willing to take an active role in government, and as we will see, Bismarck frequently had to justify his

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[150] See David Wetzel, who notes of the Empress that "Of all her enthusiasms and passions, the greatest and most consuming were her hatred of Prussia and of Bismarck". David Wetzel, *A Duel of Giants: Bismarck, Napoleon III, and the Origins of the Franco-Prussian War*, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2001), 22.
[151] E. Ann Pottinger notes that, just before the Austro-Prussian War, "Napoleon favored the nationalist cause, as represented by the Italians and the Prussians" (149). Pottinger also notes "Napoleon's long-term commitment to Italian nationalism". E. Ann Pottinger, *Napoleon III and the German Crisis 1865-1866,* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 149.
[152] See Wetzel, *A Duel of Nations,* 30; he points out that Napoleon III depended on "clericalist support", and he could not pull out of Rome.

choices and his opinions to his king. We should thus see Bismarck's decision-making taking place in a sphere where he had enormous input, but frequently found himself arguing against the king and his military advisors, and having to make compromises as to the timing of events and diplomatic communications. He could, in essence, choose a particular path, but not execute his choice without the agreement of the ruler. We will, of course, consider questions of Prussia's relationships with other states, especially other German states, when we look at its process of unification.

Italy, and its complicated process of unification, will be examined later, but it is sufficient to say for now that "Italy" as a state did not exist prior to unification. Much more than the German states, which were at least linked politically, the states of the Italian peninsula were scattered, controlled by different monarchs and countries, and lacked power overall. "Italy" was a dream, a political slogan, but it was not truly a country in any real sense of the term. I will discuss the political entities that existed on the Italian peninsula later in this chapter.

Russia's role in the balance of power should not be understated either. In particular, Russia's role as an implacable foe of Austria after the Crimean War had an important impact on the alliance options available for various states, and on the possible configurations of opponents[153]. As we will see, Russia had an important

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[153] Of particular interest is Trager's examination of how interactions around the Crimean War had a major impact on Russia's view of Austria-Hungary. He notes in part that "Russia's reaction to the Austrian threats was to cease its opposition to revolution in Hungary, encourage France and Sardinia to strip Austria of Northern Italy, favor Prussia in the struggle with Austria for influence in Germany…The direct result for Austria was the loss of the Italian provinces of Lombardy and Venetia, the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich of 1867 in which Austria ceded significant political authority to Hungarian elites, and the war between Prussia and Austria". Trager, "Long-Term Consequences of Aggressive Diplomacy", 244. See also Kathrine Schach

impact on the situation precisely because it was unwilling to either partner with Austria or to abandon Prussia even when Bismarck was rearranging Europe to suit his own interests. Finally, while Great Britain was not deeply involved in either conflict, the state had a very definite role in the overall European balance of power at this time. Consistent with its usual stance, Great Britain was determined to act as a balancer against instability in Europe. It did not, however, become substantially involved in any of these conflicts except as an observer, as we will see. This was because British politicians saw little likelihood of their interests being adversely affected by the conflicts. Whether they were correct in that analysis is open to debate, but we will see especially in the German unification cases that British politicians considered getting more deeply involved, and ultimately decided against it.

Ultimately, what we must understand about this period of European history is that the strong alliances of the early twentieth century – the alliances that played a role in World War I – were not yet set. No states had unbreakable or even particularly strong alliances to one another, and there was shifting all the time. This will play an important role in this study's theory, as I show that Prussia and Italy had little fear of destroying important alliances by their actions. Other risks may explain why they chose not to expand territorially, but alliances at this time were

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Cook, who focuses more on the impact on Italian politics; she notes that "Russia and Austria together had kept Italy divided prior to 1859. With the Austro-Russian entente disrupted, Italy achieved nationhood". Kathrine Schach Cook, "Russia, Austria, and the Question of Italy, 1859-1862", *The International History Review* 2, no. 4 (October 1980), 542-565, DOI: 10.1080/07075332.1980.9640227, 543.

less salient than we might otherwise believe[154]. Now that we have a better understanding of the important players, we can take a deeper look at the political process of unification and the conflicts that drove them.

Germany: Unification

The unification of Germany is the process by which Prussia absorbed nearly all of the small German states, forced Austria out of its position as the leader of the "German People", and won enough wars to be considered a preeminent power in Europe. We must therefore understand how Prussia went from being one Germanic state among many to being the leading light of a new German state. As we will see, there were two main conflicts that were part of this process, and it is truly through conflict that modern Germany was born. I consider the two Prussian wars together, examining Prussia's territorial ambitions and whether it expanded its war aims or no. These two conflicts are important events in European history, given the impact of the creation of Germany on the balance of power in Europe. Moreover, these conflicts set in motion events that contributed greatly to the relations between European states that impacted much of twentieth-century European history[155].

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[154] For instance, W.E. Mosse notes that "On the morrow of the Austro-Prussian war, each of the major powers found itself in a state of relative isolation". W.E. Mosse, *The European Powers and the German Question 1848-71: With Special Reference to England and Russia*, (New York: Octagon Books, 1981). 253. I argue that this was in fact more the norm than the exception; at least, there was little reason for any state to rely on alliances when they were so fluid at this time.

[155] See Labs, who argues that "Prussia's decision to annex Alsace-Lorraine during the Franco-Prussian War had consequences for the European balance of power and ultimately contributed to the outbreak of the First World War". Labs, "Beyond Victory", 6.

The two cases function as matched set, given the similarities in time period, states involved, and leaders controlling the states' destinies[156]. However, there were major differences between the two conflicts in terms of territorial aims. Despite military success in both conflicts, Prussia expanded territorially in one conflict but not in the other. Scholars have searched for an explanation; for example, Labs, an offensive realist, argues that in the Austro-Prussian War, Bismarck refrained from taking territory because he did not want to see Austria destroyed; the state was more valuable as a potential ally[157].

While he is right to emphasize the risks of expansion in the Austro-Prussian War versus the Franco-Prussian War, as well as the fact that Bismarck hoped to make Austria a future ally, he overstates the risk of balancing behavior in this conflict and does not consider whether the value of the territory in question could have impacted the analysis. Similarly, when looking at the Franco-Prussian War, he focuses on the acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine as a Prussian hedge against future fighting with France; while this is the key reason why this territory was worth bargaining over, he does not consider why Prussia expanded to take it in the first place, nor why it was necessary to push to Paris in order to guarantee Prussia would keep it[158]. It is only through the use of this study's theory that we can properly

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[156] Their value in this regard is noted by Labs; he registers the importance of "hold[ing] many domestic and systemic features constant". Ibid., 7.
[157] He notes that "In the long run Bismarck believed that Austria alive made Prussia stronger and safer than Austria dead or even Austria incorporated". Ibid., 26.
[158] See Ibid., 34, where he summarizes his view and argues that "Prussia was not motivated by the *existing* French threat but by a *future* French threat that did not yet exist Bismarck wanted to enhance Prussia's relative power now, while he had the chance, believing that one day the French would threaten Germany again… in the end, Prussia took Alsace-Lorraine simply because it could" (italics in original). This

understand why there was such a difference between Prussia's choices in the two conflicts.

I consider the conduct of each war, looking at how Bismarck in particular was intent on keeping the Prussian army in check in the Austro-Prussian War, and, while not entirely willing to let them go in the Franco-Prussian War, could at least reconcile himself to it after the fact. These two conflicts in particular give us the ability to hold background conditions and preferences constant, and examine why one country would behave so differently in two largely similar wars. I assert that it was Prussia's fear of its future security – to be specific, the desire to keep Austria as a viable great power and the realization that other states would benefit greatly from its removal or diminishment – that led it to give fairly generous terms to its opponent in that conflict. There was also little value to be expected from taking Austrian territory or trying to bargain using it.

By contrast, the Franco-Prussian war required diplomacy with an intractable opponent, one that Bismarck saw little likelihood of turning into an ally regardless of his territorial aims. As we will see, Bismarck's initial war aims did not necessarily include territory, but Prussia's sudden military successes made territorial acquisition of Alsace-Lorraine possible. Moreover, Bismarck would perhaps have been willing to end the conflict without pushing to Paris, but events on the ground, coupled with the low risk of expansion, combined to force his hand. Let us now

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simplistic statement fails to explain the value of the territory, and by focusing solely on future gains, it ignores the future risks that might or might not have come about due to the expansion.

begin with the Austro-Prussian conflict, and see why this war remained relatively minor, and Prussia's demands relatively moderate.

The Austro-Prussian War: Military Rout, Diplomatic Calm

The first war of interest here is the 1866 Austro-Prussian War. This war arose out of unresolved issues from a prior war over the provinces of Schleswig-Holstein[159]. This previous conflict, one in which Prussia and Austria allied together to fight against the Danish, had left Prussia with the possibility of gaining control of the provinces and provoking Austria into a confrontation at the same time. The 1866 war had in many ways been building for a long time. It is clear that Bismarck was interested in fighting Austria, but he was careful in the time leading up to the conflict to try diplomacy in order to push Austria out of German affairs. Carr points out that Bismarck said, "in brutally frank conversations in December 1862 with Count Alois Károlyi, the Austrian ambassador in Berlin, [that] Austria should abandon her pretentions to be a German power, concentrate her efforts on her dominions and allow Prussia to establish Little Germany…One thing was made crystal clear to Károlyi: if Austria persisted in her present policy, war could be the only outcome"[160].

Bismarck was, however, not so set on war that he would pursue it at a time inconvenient to Prussia, nor did he believe the only way to achieve his objectives was through conflict [161]. He said in February of 1866 that "it would be cleverer to

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[159] See Geoffrey Wawro, *The Austro-Prussian War,* 40-44, for an explanation of the Schleswig-Holstein war and of how it helped lead to this conflict.
[160] Carr, *The Origins of the Wars of German Unification,* 118.
[161] See Carr, *The Origins of the Wars of German Unification*, 123-124, for a discussion as to why Bismarck refrained from conflict in 1865, and seemed willing to negotiate

bring about [a war] when the situation is favorable to us than to wait until Austria starts it in conditions advantageous to herself"[162].

The military phase of the conflict does not concern us specifically; suffice it to say that the fighting functionally ended with Austria's massive military defeat at Königgrätz several weeks after the start of the war, and peace terms followed soon after. The war was a huge success for Prussia, and it was in a position to demand maximalist aims. However, Prussia did not significantly expand its territorial aims, even though Austria was in no condition to resist either militarily or diplomatically. Indeed, Prussian troops could easily have marched to Vienna had the leadership of the country desired it; certain leaders did[163]. It was left to Bismarck to hold back his King and military from further action against Austria or the other German states; for instance, Pflanze quotes Bismarck writing at the time about the "thankless task of pouring water into the bubbling wine and making clear that we do not live alone in Europe"[164]. Why did Bismarck want Prussia to remain satisfied with the status quo?

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with Austria at this time. See also Pflanze, who notes about Prussian policy-makers that in early 1866, "What William desired was not an immediate decision for military action, but preparation for its eventual necessity. Nor had Bismarck abandoned his double course. He was never one to confuse probability with inevitability. During the months ahead many things could happen. French policy might shift; the Italian alliance might not develop; William's final scruples might not be overcome; the Austrians, isolated in Europe and nearly bankrupt at home, might compromise once more" (Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany*, 284-285).

[162] Quoted in Carr, *The Origins of the War of German Unification,* 127 (insertion in Carr's text).

[163] See Labs, who does an excellent job of summarizing Moltke's preference of further conflict (Labs, "Beyond Victory", 24-25). See also Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany*, 308, for a note on how William I also was unwilling to end the conflict.

[164] Quoted in Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany*, 309.

I assert that there were two key reasons for the lack of expansion of aims. The first was the risk that came from leaving Austria dissatisfied; in other words, Bismarck and other Prussian politicians desired to avoid future conflict with Austria, and even hoped that the two states could establish positive relations in the future. This was particularly problematic given the multipolar nature of the European order; alienating Austria in particular might make Prussia's future position particularly acute, given its particular geographic locale in the center of Europe. Even given the existing difficulties between the two main German states, Austria was likely Prussia's best hope for a strong future ally.

Moreover, the risk of leaving Austria dissatisfied was not worth the potential value of the territory, given that Bismarck perceived the territory to be instrumentally valuable at best, and certainly not inherently valuable. The territory that Prussia could have acquired in this conflict was mostly instrumental rather than inherently valuable; its purpose would have been for punishing Austria, something King William I preferred until convinced it was not in Prussia's interest[165]. To be fair, Prussia did acquire territory in the conflict, just not from Austria; by denying Austria a significant future role in the German states, Prussia gained either overt or functional control over several German states[166]. The territory it could have taken from Austria was instrumental at best. I do argue though that there was a low risk to Prussia's future reputation, and that it had no long-term alliances to worry about.

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[165] See Dennis Showalter, *The Wars of German Unification*, (London: Arnold, 2004), 199-200.

[166] Wawro gives a good summary of how much the Prussians gained here. Wawro, *The Austro-Prussian War,* 277.

To be clear, what territory might Prussia have taken from Austria, and how do we know it was not inherently valuable? From purely a military capability standpoint, Prussia was in the position of occupying or demanding nearly anything it desired. Indeed, Vienna was prime for the taking had Prussian leaders made the decision to go for the capital city[167]. I argue though that a key reason why Bismarck did not want to expand was that he had significant reservations about the potential value of this territory. He describes his reasoning in his memoir: "German Austria we could neither wholly nor partly make use of. The acquisition of provinces like Austrian Silesia and portions of Bohemia could not strengthen the Prussian state; it would not lead to an amalgamation of German Austria with Prussia, and Vienna could not be governed from Berlin as a mere dependency"[168].

A key reason for his unwillingness to take Austrian territory was his concerns about the loyalty of the people living there. Bismarck noted that "I gauged the proposed acquisitions from Austria and Bavaria by the question, whether the inhabitants, *in case of future war*, would remain faithful to the King of Prussia…I had not the impression that the population of these districts, which had become habituated to Bavarian and Austrian conditions, would be disposed to meet

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[167] When the last main battle of the conflict, Königgrätz, ended, the Austrian army opted to pull back into fortifications; Moltke was quick to capitalize by occupying more territory and equipping his army for a march to Vienna, should Prussian leaders choose such a strategy. See Ibid., 275-76.

[168] Otto Fürst von Bismarck. *Bismarck, the Man & the Statesman: Being the Reflections and Reminiscences of Otto, Prince von Bismarck*. (New York: Harper & brothers, 1898). Vol. 2. http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015058413280;view=1up;seq=13 50.

Hohenzollern predictions" (italics mine)[169]. He therefore could not identify any significant inherent value in this Austrian territory. However, given that Bismarck had the benefit of hindsight when writing his memoirs, ought we to accept his conclusion that Austrian territory was not worth occupying for either inherent or instrumental reasons? I argue there is ample evidence to support Bismarck's later assertions. Certainly, compared with Prussia, the economic value of Austrian territory was relatively low. The territory had a dearth of natural resources, and its economic prospects lagged well behind Prussia[170]. It is illustrative that it was Franz Joseph who wanted Prussian territory in the event of an Austrian win, and not the reverse[171]. Given that Prussia could successfully take control of most of the German states, any value Austrian territory could provide was extremely limited.

Besides the lack of inherent value in the territory, why did Bismarck refuse to expand his aims? Ultimately, I argue that Bismarck's chief concern was Prussia's future interactions with Austria. That they would have future interactions was certain; given their shared political interest in the German states and near proximity, interactions between the two states would certainly continue. Given this, Bismarck had to weigh whether the benefit of expanding his war aims and occupying Austrian territory was worth the risk that Austria would become a

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[169] Bismarck, *Bismarck, the Man & the Statesman,* 44

[170] See Carr, *The Origins of the Wars of German Unification,* 108-109: he highlights the fact that "Prussia enjoyed several natural advantages which put her decisively ahead of Austria. By an accident of geography the major industrial areas were in Prussian territory" (108).

[171] See Wawro, *The Austro-Prussian War* 295; "Had Austria won the war of 1866, Franz Joseph planned to seize Upper Silesia, the coal-rich, formerly Austrian province around Breslau, which had been lost to the Prussians in 1740. This annexation would have vastly augmented Austria's high-grade coal reserves".

revisionist state. Bismarck discusses the question of future relations between Austria and Prussia extensively in his memoir. He notes that

> It was my object, in view of our subsequent relations with Austria, as far as possible to avoid cause for mortifying reminiscences, if it could be managed without prejudice to our German policy. A triumphant entry of the Prussian army into the hostile capital would naturally have been a gratifying recollection for our soldiers, but it was not necessary to our policy. It would have left behind it, as also any surrender of ancient possessions to us must have done, a wound to the pride of Austria, which, without being a pressing necessity for us, *would have unnecessarily increased the difficulty of our future mutual relations*…In positions such as ours was then, it is a political maxim after a victory not to enquire *how much you can squeeze out of your opponent, but only to consider what is politically necessary* (italics mine)[172].

The fact that Bismarck was most concerned about keeping Austria as a potential viable partner is noncontroversial; nonetheless, it is a vital point in order to understand Prussia's actions in the conflict. Bismarck went on to say in his memoirs that

> We had to avoid wounding Austria too severely; we had to avoid leaving behind in her any unnecessary bitterness of feeling or desire for revenge; we ought rather to reserve the possibility of becoming friends again with our adversary of the moment, and in any case to regard the Austrian state as a piece on the European chessboard and the renewal of friendly relations with her as a move open to us. If Austria were severely injured, she would become the ally of France and of every other opponent of ours; she would even sacrifice her anti-Russian interests for the sake of revenge on Prussia[173].

While it took an active argument with his king, eventually Bismarck won out[174].

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[172] Bismarck, *The Man & the Statesman*, 42-43.
[173] Ibid., 50.
[174] See Ibid., 51-53; Bismarck emphasized to his king that "*our task was the establishment or initiation of a German national unity under the leadership of the King of Prussia"* (51, italics in original), and he insisted that Prussia not take territory from German states who might one day try to get it back (52). Carr also notes Bismarck holding William back from taking Austrian territory, and argues that this was in order "to avoid unnecessary provocation likely to send her into the arms of the French" (*The Origins of the Wars of German Unification*, 163).

Again, ought we to trust memoir-writing Bismarck to give the full story of why Austria was spared? Lawrence D. Steefel for instance cautions that "it is well known that what Bismarck wrote or said in the 1890's was not necessarily true for the time to which he referred"[175]. However, I argue that, generally speaking, Bismarck's later assertions as to why he was unwilling to continue the war and expand his territorial war aims are supported by the evidence and line up with his actions and opinions at the time. We will see that during the Franco-Prussian war, Bismarck was clearly thinking in terms of future relations with France. That he was doing the same with Austria is absolutely reasonable.

There is, however, one troubling fact. If Bismarck was willing to spare Austria to avoid leaving the state dissatisfied, and because he wanted Austria as a future ally, what are we to make of the fact that Bismarck was also ready to stir up revolution in his unstable rival if Austria continued the conflict? Pflanze shows that Bismarck was willing to encourage domestic unrest and revolution in Austria-Hungary's delicate empire if the war could not end in good time[176]. He notes that

> Eighteen months later Bismarck told Carl Schurtz that, if France and Austria had joined hands, "we would have been forced to explode every mine" in Germany, Serbia, or Hungary. "If this primer had been ignited, of course, retreat would no longer have been possible. To treat with Austria would have been out of the question. Her destruction would have been unavoidable. A great empty space would have been opened between Germany and Turkey. It would have been necessary to create something to fill this vacuum. We could not have left our Hungarian friends in the lurch." In an extremity Bismarck was prepared in 1866 to unleash forces which he recognized were beyond his power to control.[177]

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[175] Lawrence D. Steefel, *Bismarck, The Hohenzollern Candidacy*, *and The Origins of the Franco-German War of 1870*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962). 9.
[176] Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany*, 307.
[177] Ibid., 307-308. Carr also notes Bismarck stirring up nationalist tensions, and argues that "Nothing came of these plans simply because of the decisive defeat of Austria at Königgrätz. The argument that Bismarck intended to threaten Austria

This fact seems congruent with the predictions of the commitment problem argument; if a bargain could not be found, Bismarck was essentially willing to move to an absolute war outcome by drastically rearranging the map. However, I argue that this is also congruent with my theory. Bismarck was not willing to take territory in Austria, and preferred it to remain a viable state. If however he could not achieve a good end to the conflict, no viable Austria was preferable to a hostile Austria. Ultimately however, Prussia was successful at keeping Austria as an ally; it was only a few short years after the conflict ended that relations between Austria and Prussia substantially improved. The two states, after all, were quite natural allies. Sharing similar geographic concerns sandwiched in the middle of the continent, without any lasting animosities from the conflict the two states were eventually able to become close allies[178].

Next, we should consider the role that reputation vis-à-vis third parties in the system played in Prussian decision-making. Would expansion of territorial aims into Austria have had an adverse impact on Prussia's reputation and its preferences concerning the postwar order? I argue that reputational concerns were rather less salient in this conflict. This is because Prussia had already in effect defanged the European great powers by getting them on board with its earlier unification project.

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only with this bogey-man and never intended to release the nationalist genie from the bottle does not convince. Had the war dragged on, the legions would have marched, and national passions would have been aroused in the Habsburg dominions and would soon have spread to Prussian Poland" (Carr, *The Origins of the Wars of German Unification,* 135).

[178] For an extended look at how this happened, see Nicholas Der Bagdasarian, *The Austro-German Rapprochement, 1870-1879: From the Battle of Sedan to the Dual Alliance*, (London: Associated University Presses, 1976).

As described by Stacie E. Goddard, starting from the Danish-Prussian War over Schleswig-Holstein, Prussia leaders had followed a strategy that made balancing against it – or punishing it for expansion – extremely difficult[179].

Bismarck took advantage of a time in which Austria was largely isolated in Europe, or at least could count on little initial intervention from other states. In particular, the role of Napoleon III in not stifling the conflict cannot be understated, and it seems clear that his main reason for not doing so was that a protracted war between the two main German states could be turned to his advantage[180]. And, he believed the conflict would be protracted because he believed Austrian power to be greater than it was[181]. It is certainly true as well that Bismarck worked hard to try to

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[179] She "argue[s] that Prussia's legitimation strategies – the way it justified its expansion – undermined a potential balancing coalition. As Prussia prepared to invade the duchies, it appealed to shared rules and norms, strategically choosing rhetoric that would resonate with the great powers" Stacie E. Goddard. "When Might Makes Right: How Prussia Overturned the European Balance of Power", *International Security* 33, no. 3 (Winter 2008-2009), 110-142, DOI: 10.1162/isec.2009.33.3.110. 112.

[180] Pflanze notes that Napoleon III "was pleased at the prospect of a German war and helped foster it by promoting the Italian alliance with Prussia…He aimed to detach Venetia from Austria and fulfill the long-standing promise to the Italians which troubled his conscience. The grant of Venetia might also be a useful level with which to limit the Italian union in a way favorable to France. Similarly he wished to restrict Prussian expansion to the region north of the Main and to replace Austrian with French influence among the southern states. Out of the coming cataclysm, moreover, would emerge the chance, probably even the necessity, of further territorial gain for France" Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany*, 291.

[181] Thomas J. Christensen, for instance, highlights Napoleon III's belief that Austria was more capable militarily prior to the conflict. Thomas J. Christensen, "Perceptions and Alliances in Europe, 1865-1940", *International Organization* Vol. 51, no.1 (Winter 1997), 65-97, DOI: 10.1162/002081897550302. 72. In particular, he argues that "Napoleon did not fail to assist Austria because of the domestic politics of the Italian issue. He failed to do so because he believed that Austria was the stronger of the two German powers" (72). See also Steefel, who argues that "The emperor of the French, however, seems to have expected the two sides in the war to be evenly matched. He thought it possible that Austria might win and took care to

assure that the French would not step in; Carr notes that "Bismarck began to angle for French neutrality in the event of war by informing the French ambassador that he would not object to French expansion 'wherever French was spoken in the world'"[182]. While we have seen that Napoleon III was considering intervention, the fact that Bismarck was able to keep him out of the conflict at the beginning should be seen as a sign of his ability to handle third-parties; by isolating Austria, he made sure that Prussia would not suffer from conflict because it had made it less likely that third-parties could punish it in the future. I thus argue that there was a low risk to Prussia's future security from this action.

Taking a closer look at the key third-party states, Great Britain and Russia (France is a challenge precisely because it was somewhere between an uninvolved power, an ally, and an opponent), we see that Great Britain was concerned about war in Europe, but entirely unwilling to get involved either in the present or in the future[183]. Indeed, as we will see, it was not long before Bismarck consolidated his future security by making France appear to be a more serious threat. There was

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insure, by formal treaty with that power, a settlement that would take account of French interests. He had failed to make a definite arrangement with Prussia and apparently counted on Bismarck's gratitude in case of Prussian victory. In this he was mistaken. Before the war, Bismarck had been amiable and yielding…After the war, Bismarck no longer felt the same need of France". (Steefel, *Bismarck, The Hohenzollern Candidacy*, 2-3.

[182] Carr, *The Origins of the Wars of German Unification,* 125. Carr also describes Bismarck and Napoleon III meeting in the fall of 1865 (125-126), and that Bismarck said of Napoleon III that he was willing to "dance the cotillon with us without knowing in advance when it will begin or what figures it will include" (126).

[183] Mosse notes that before the war started in 1866, the British government received a suggestion by Queen Victoria to try to do more to prevent conflict (229), and opted to do nothing. This was because there was little gain to Britain; as Mosse sums up, "neither English honour nor English interests were involved" (230). Mosse, *The European Powers*.

therefore little risk to Prussia's future security, because it was unlikely to gain a poor reputation vis-à-vis Great Britain In terms of Russia, there was little risk to expansion in the present from this state, even though it had the capability[184]. This is because, as we have seen, the end of the Crimean War had extremely adversely affected Russia's relationship with Austria, and it is very clear that Russia would do nothing to help Austria nor would punish Prussia for its actions[185]. Indeed, one Russian politician summed up the situation thus: "Europe being broken up by the foolish Crimean War, that great German had to be made either by Prussia or by Austria. Between the two our choice could not be in doubt"[186]. This also shows that there was a low risk to Prussia's future reputation from expansion, as concerns Russia. Austria was despised so much that no action taken against them would be seen as hostile. However, even if the risk from reputation was low, the low value of the territory and the concerns about leaving Austria dissatisfied made Prussia relatively unlikely to expand its aims even if there was a low risk to its reputation.

Finally, we must consider the risks to Prussia's alliances that came from expansionistic aims. We have already touched upon France, which straddles the line between a third-party and an ally. It was potentially willing in to guarantee the peace if Prussia pushed too far, and would not necessarily have worked against

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[184] Trager for instance notes that "Russia certainly had the ability to intervene had it wished to and showed itself ready to go to war in other situations" (Trager, "Long-Term Consequences of Aggressive Diplomacy", 260).

[185]See for instance Carr, who argues that "The real explanation for Russian inaction lay in the history of Russo-Prussian relations since the Crimean War…In view of the deepening antagonism with Austria in the Balkans, her defeat was a matter of some satisfaction in St Petersburg" (Carr, *The Origins of the Wars of German Unification*, 162).

[186] Quoted in Trager, "Long-Term Consequences of Aggressive Diplomacy", 262.

Prussian and Italian interests[187]. Was there a risk therefore that that expansion would turn a somewhat positive state -- France -- into a potential adversary by appearing expansionistic?

Many, particularly the offensive realists, have cited the fear of French intervention in the present as a reason why Bismarck did not expand his aims. This risk should not be understated, especially as Bismarck later noted it as a key reason why he opposed a drive to Vienna. He noted that the delay needed to prepare for a march to Vienna would be difficult to achieve; "My first impression was that we could not lose a fortnight without bringing at least the danger of *French* interference very much nearer than it otherwise would be"[188]. It is true that Napoleon III had deeply involved himself in the negotiations to end the conflict, and while Bismarck may have been overstating the true danger of French involvement he was nonetheless deeply concerned. However, I argue that Bismarck was well prepared to make the conflict wider, should he have desired it. In fact, there is evidence he was even prepared to deal with French intervention if it came. We have already discussed the fact that Bismarck was willing to cause domestic unrest in Austria to gain his ends. Moreover, there are significant questions as to whether the threat of French intervention was even credible. Indeed, Carr notes that the French desire –

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[187] See Pottinger, who argues that we must accept "the inescapable impression that Napoleon had decided on armed mediation, with the threat of intervention in case of refusal…It is impossible to say what terms Napoleon would have offered; but in view of his attitude throughout the crisis, it is by no means a foregone conclusion that he would have been zealous for Austrian interests". Pottinger, *Napoleon III and the German Crisis,* 156.

[188] Bismarck. *Bismarck, the Man & the Statesman,* 40-41 (italics in original).

and ability – to intervene if Prussia continued the war was circumscribed at best[189]. In particular, there is every indication that the French were unprepared for the quick Prussian victory, and were left searching for a reasonable strategy. Christensen for instance quotes an Italian observer of Napoleon III:

> Napoleon said: "It is advisable for Italy to conclude the treaty with Prussia… In this way Italy will get Venice and France will enjoy the advantage of a conflict between the two powers [Austria and Prussia] by whose alliance she is now held in check."…The battle of Königgrätz took him completely by surprise; he had assumed that battles would be won and lost, and that he would in the meantime be free to arrange matters as he liked"[190].

If the risk of French intervention in the present has been overstated, what about the risk of losing France as a potential ally in the future? I argue that this risk was low, precisely because Bismarck did not particularly value an alliance or any help he could receive from the French. Unlike Austria, which had the potential to become a useful ally in the future, Bismarck did not accept the likelihood of a long alliance with France. The very fact that Bismarck was willing to fight a war with

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[189] Indeed, the French were waffling on whether intervention would be useful: certain French advisors "buttonholed the emperor after the council meeting [where intervention was discussed] and persuaded him that France was too weak to engage in a hazardous policy which could easily backfire if Prussia refused an armistice. To end up at war with Prussia and Italy could lead to charges of double-dealing in view of prior French promises to these countries. Finally, public opinion had suddenly swung from a belligerent to a pacific posture when war suddenly loomed on the horizon. This may well have been a decisive consideration" (Carr, *The Origins of the Wars of German Unification*, 155). See also Pflanze, who notes that Napoleon III could have acted more decisively and held Prussia back, but in the end, "With much of her army committed in Algeria and Mexico, France was in no condition to fight a European war". (*Bismarck and the Development of Germany,* 310). Geoffrey Wawro points out as well that Napoleon III "had left his combat troops scattered across the globe: 63,000 in Algeria, 28,000 in Mexico, 8,000 in Rome, and 2,000 in Indochina…netting Louis-Napoleon scarcely 100,000 war-ready troops after Königgrätz". Geoffrey Wawro, *The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest of France in 1870-1871,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 18.

[190] Quoted in Christensen, "Perceptions and Alliances", 74 (bracketed inserts in Christensen's text).

France just a few years later (in fact, that he provoked France into it) should be seen as a signal of the low importance he put on the French alliance. Similarly, we can take the fact that Bismarck refused to continue the conflict as a sign of his preferences concerning Italy. As we will see, Italy needed the war to continue, and by holding back, Bismarck was declaring this alliance to be of low importance. Indeed, the limited nature of the agreement before the conflict began speaks to this[191]. I therefore argue that the risk to alliances was low, because there were no substantial alliances to risk.

Although, as we have seen, there was a low risk to Prussia's reputation, and a low risk of being punished by ally partners, Prussia did not expand its aims and take Austrian territory. In particular, this is because the expected value of occupying Austrian territory was low, and the risk of future conflict with Austria would have been acute if Austria had been left unsatisfied. Under these circumstances, expansion and occupation did not pay.

The Franco-Prussian War

Let us turn now to the Franco-Prussian War. It is surprising that this war remains relatively under-studied when one considers some of the consequences of the conflict: the end of a monarchist empire in France, significant territorial changes, and the first clear evidence that Germany would be a force to be reckoned with for a very long time in European politics. However, to a scholar of modern war, there is something almost quaint about the diplomatic squabbling that led to the start of the

[191] See Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany*, 287, for a note on why and how Bismarck achieved the Italian alliance; crucially, "the Italians were committed to join only if the attack were begun within three months" (287).

Franco-Prussian War. Questions of monarchical succession such as the one that was the proximate cause of this war seem to belong to the fifteenth century rather than the nineteenth. Given the nature of the cause of the conflict, there is active debate about whether Bismarck deliberately manipulated the situation in order to cause war; in particular, it is unclear whether he desired war from the beginning of the crisis. Certainly Bismarck's feelings towards France were hardly positive[192]. There is, however, ample evidence that Bismarck was willing to go to war with France, and at a certain point, actively encouraged such an outcome[193]. Indeed, it is clear that such a conflict was seen as a means to achieve his particular end of unification: Steefel quotes Bismarck as writing before the war, "That German unity would be furthered by measures of violence, I regard as probable. But whether we are called upon to bring about a violent catastrophe and to take the responsibly for choosing the time for it is another question… that German unity at this time is not ripe fruit, seems to me obvious"[194]. Conflict however was manifestly against French interests,

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[192] Wetzel notes for instance that "Bismarck took up the Hohenzollern candidacy not for domestic political purposes, not for reasons having to do with unrest and instability in the south German states… but overwhelmingly (if not exclusively) as a counter in the power struggle that he had, for the last four years, been waging against France". David Wetzel. *A Duel of Giants,* 72. See also Steefel, who sums up a certain amount of scholarly uncertainty on the question of whether Bismarck provoked the conflict (Steefel, *Bismarck, The Hohenzollern Candidacy*, 230-232).

[193] Steefel notes for instance that "Bismarck, on July 13, undertook to goad the French to war and for the rest of his life he boasted of his success. Yet this does not necessarily mean that they [Bismarck and his French counterpart] or their associates created the crisis in order to have a war or that, until quite late, they saw war as the only acceptable solution". Steefel, *Bismarck, The Hohenzollern Candidacy*, 220-221.

[194] Ibid., 9-10. Steefel notes though that "If war came, Bismarck felt reasonably certain of success. The German army organization was superior to the French, and the tsar of Russia had promised military support if Austria joined France" (10).

particularly because France was at that time quite isolated[195]. This was in part due to Bismarck's own actions, and partially due to French ineptitude[196]. As to the conduct of the war, this conflict was both more complicated and wide reaching than that of the Austro-Prussian War. Prussia mobilized first, invaded, and eventually pushed all the way to Paris. This was an extremely successful conflict from Prussia's point of view; any modern campaign in which the head of state is captured and his army destroyed must be seen as a military triumph, even if this did not entirely end the conflict[197].

Given Prussia's success on the battlefield, its bargaining position was unimpeachable; it was able to practically dictate terms to France[198]. The terms of the conflict's conclusion were several; key for our purposes, however, is the fact that

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[195] Michael Howard notes that "Thus by a tragic combination of ill-luck, stupidity, and ignorance France blundered into a war with the greatest military power that Europe had yet seen, in a bad cause, with her army unready and without allies. The representatives of Austria and Italy, like those of Russia, Britain, and the South German States, made it clear that they could not support France in such a struggle". Michael Howard, *The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871,* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962). 57. Wawro also points out the wrong-headedness of French thinking, noting that Gramont expected other states to enter into the conflict, but took no definite diplomatic steps to assure this outcome. (Wawro, *The Franco-Prussian War*, 36).

[196] Wawro notes that Bismarck had learned from the Austro-Prussian War that the great powers would not intervene when the two sides were seen as equal: "The same calculation might apply in a Franco-Prussian war. France *seemed* so powerful, and had foolishly publicized its desire for Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Rhineland after Königgrätz…these territorial ambitions made France appear more threatening than Prussia. Bismarck understood this; indeed, he discretely stoked France's appetite for territory after Königgrätz to make Napoleon III seem menacing to the other powers" (Wawro, *The Franco-Prussian War*, 21-22, italics in original).

[197] See Showalter, *Wars of German Unification,* 284, for a description of Napoleon III's personal surrender to Prussia.

[198] See Richard Hartshorne, who notes that, with regards to Prussian territorial goals, "The French found themselves forced to accept the German demand almost completely". Richard Hartshorne, "The Franco-German Boundary of 1871", *World Politics* 2, no. 2 (Jan 1950), 209-250, DOI: 10.2307/2009189, 213.

Prussian troops drove to Paris, alienated the French by engaging in a victory parade, and, most notoriously, demanded the cession of Alsace-Lorraine to Prussia. The decision of Prussia to engage in this behavior seems problematic for our purposes; certainly, occupying French territory and demanding important territory was not going to contribute to future peace between the two nations. It created lasting tensions between the two states that certainly affected their later interactions.

There are two instances of war aim expansion we should examine in this conflict. First of all, there is the Prussian decision to enter French territory and occupy Alsace-Lorraine with the goal of retaining this territory after the conflict. The second instance is the Prussian decision to continue the conflict after Napoleon III had been defeated, and to fight to Paris. At first glance, it seems apparent that this decision was suboptimal; if Prussia's postwar preferences included peace in Europe and positive relations between it and its near neighbor, then it would seem that its territorial expansion in continuing the war after Napoleon III fell contradicts our theory. Moreover, given the lasting issues from the French loss of Alsace-Lorraine, we must examine whether the choice to take this territory can be considered rational.

If this study's theory is to explain territorial expansion in this case, certain facts must be true. First of all, in terms of Alsace-Lorraine, the territory should be inherently valuable to Prussia given that Prussia wanted to keep it after the conflict; it must also be true that this represents an expansion of war aims, rather than a primary aim. Second, pushing to Paris had to be at least instrumentally valuable, if not inherently valuable. Third, Prussian leaders must have concluded that the effect

on Prussia's reputation from both of these actions would be relatively mild; if Prussia could anticipate a serious blow to its reputation, the theory would predict a lower likelihood of expansion. Finally, Prussian leaders must have determined that twice expanding their war aims and taking territory would not substantially alter the risk of future conflict with France. Despite later war between the two states, I assert that this was the case, and this study's theory is thus able to cope with the Franco-Prussian War.

First of all, can we be certain that the occupation of Alsace-Lorraine is an expansion of Prussian war aims, rather than a primary goal? I argue that this is very clearly the case, especially because initial Prussian planning for the conflict revolved around fighting a defensive war at first, with the potential to expand if they were successful at pushing the French out of Prussian territory. Indeed, the very fact that the Prussians expected France to invade them, and to then repulse that invasion, should support the assertion that Alsace-Lorraine was an expansion of war aims, not a primary aim[199]. Michael Howard notes that starting on defense, and then if the war went well, expanding, was the key to Prussian war planning in the 1860s, and notes Moltke's thought process: "An offensive to the south held out much better hopes. "If the former German provinces of Alsace and Lorraine were conquered" he reflected, "it is conceivable that we might keep them"; and at very least they would provide very useful pawns at the peace conference"[200]. It seems clear therefore that

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[199] Carr notes that "The Germans were greatly surprised by the French failure to cross the Rhine" (*The Origins of the Wars of German Unification*, 204).
[200] Howard, *The Franco-Prussian War,* 43. Vitally, Howard notes that "It is clear from the context that that these invasion-schemes were no more than high remote conjectures *in a plan which was almost entirely concerned with the defense of German*

actual invasion of France was an expansion of war aims, and taking Alsace-Lorraine was something that was hoped for, but not guaranteed.

Of key importance then is the value of Alsace-Lorraine. Is there sufficient evidence that this territory contained inherent value for Prussia? Recall that for a territory to have inherent value, it must have material or strategic value for the potential occupier. Alsace-Lorraine's material value is addressed by Richard Hartshorne; he notes that there were indeed important iron ore deposits in the region, though it is debatable whether the value of these were understood at the time[201]. The strategic value of the territory was probably the key factor; as Hartshorne points out, control of Alsace-Lorraine was seen as a vital security necessity by the military[202]. Indeed, as Bismarck negotiated the end of the conflict, this was the theme he sounded; he cited "the firm will of the German people to secure the south German frontier through annexations from France and to make easier the defense of our borders against repetition of predatory attacks like those which have occurred in the last two centuries[203]. We can therefore reasonably consider this territory to have high inherent value, and so there would be a higher likelihood that its occupation would be worth the potential risks.

Prussia did decide to expand its war aims and had already succeeded in occupying Alsace-Lorraine. However, the occupation meant little if Prussia could not get France to accept its war aims in the postwar bargaining process. Bismarck faced

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territory" (43; italics mine). Carr also notes the German desire for Alsace-Lorraine at least as early as 1860 (*The Origins of the Wars of German Unification*, 147).
[201] See Hartshorne, "The Franco-German Boundary", 209-210.
[202] He states that "The protection of South Germany seemed to require control of the Upper Rhine Plain and eastern slopes of the Vosges in Alsace" (Ibid., 217).
[203] Quoted in Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany,* 476.

two problems at this stage. The first was the question of who to negotiate with, and the second was the will of his generals. The situation in France was so fluid that Bismarck was willing to negotiate with whomever he had to in order to get a bargain. In particular, he told Great Britain that "It is a matter of indifference to us who rules France…whether Napoleon or a white or red republic"[204]. He had extreme difficulty making the French government understand that the only acceptable end of the conflict would include them losing territory[205]. The fact that the French had not accepted losing Alsace-Lorraine can be seen in a letter Bismarck sent to his son. Bismarck wrote that

> So far I have three times negotiated here by the hour with the French…but they still get the gripes so severely about Alsace that we had to break off. They believe they will be able to pay five thousand millions of francs and seem to be ready, if we let them keep Strassburg. But I told them we would speak later about the money; first fix the German frontier and make it tight. For as soon as they should get strong enough they would attack us again, I said, which they denied under the most pompous protestations of peace. All that has happened before[206].

Could Bismarck have gained all the territory he wanted without driving to Paris? I argue it is uncertain. Therefore, further territorial expansion became of instrumental value in forcing the France to accede to his bargain. Moreover I must

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[204] Quoted in Ibid., 464. Pflanze says "What mattered was that a government be found which would cede Alsace-Lorraine" (464).

[205] See Wetzel, *A Duel of Nations,* 108-111 for an explanation of the inexplicable inability of the French to face facts; he notes "the amateurism, the ignorance, and the emotional erraticism of the figures agitating for peace on the French side…Only people of such limitations could have indulged themselves in the illusion that Bismarck could be induced to forget all the redundant evidences of German opinion concerning border security" (108).

[206] "37, To Count H. Bismarck, Ferrières, September 23, '70". In Otto Fürst von Bismarck, *Bismarck's letters to his wife: from the seat of war, 1870-1871.* Trans. Armin Harder, with an introd. by Walter Littlefield. (New York: D. Appleton. 1903). http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc2.ark:/13960/t6g15x006;view=1up;seq=85 61.

acknowledge that the Prussian decision to push to Paris is not entirely in accord with certain assumptions of my theory. In particular, this is a case where the civil-military relationship broke down to a certain extent, and Bismarck was not always completely in control of the choices made. Bismarck had to a certain extent lost control of the generals, and it is unclear that he could have stopped them going to Paris. By this point in the war, Pflanze notes that the German generals "had firmly determined to exclude Bismarck from the war councils in which the crucial issues of strategy were debated and decisions taken"[207]. Moreover, as Wetzel points out, Moltke was actively trying to undermine Bismarck's policies and wanted an absolute victory[208]. However, Bismarck did succeed in ending the conflict short of total war; he was able to convince William I that such a decision was preferable to Moltke's plans[209]. Now that we know what expansions Prussia pursued, we ought to examine why (beyond military expediency) they pursued them.

First of all, was there a risk to Prussia's reputation from taking Alsace-Lorraine? There is evidence that reputation was not a significant factor in Prussian decision-making. Certainly this stems in part from the fact that France was seen as the aggressor in the conflict. It is clear that any goodwill France might have had in the eyes of other European powers had been badly affected by the French attitude

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[207] Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany*, 463. Crucially, he notes that "after Sedan ignorance of the generals' intentions disrupted his [Bismarck's] efforts to end the war" (463).
[208] Wetzel says that Moltke had decided that he would rather fight "to bring the French to the point of ruin". Wetzel, *A Duel of Nations,* 151. See 149-154 for a fuller discussion of the breakdown between the two.
[209] See Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany*, 468.

throughout the crisis period and well into the conflict[210]. Moreover, some states actively cheered Prussian success. Nicholas Der Bagdasarian notes the overt favor Prussia received from the Russian tsar, and that this largely kept Austria quiet[211]. Given that France was seen as provoking the war, it is clear that even a Prussian invasion of France was unlikely to damage its future security. Of particular importance is the fact that even the remaining German states, hesitant as they were to trust Prussia, were hardly on the side of the French. Steefel for instance notes that before the war began the French knew from "a telegram… that any additional insistence on the part of France would be regarded in South Germany as proof of French belligerence and would lend color to the opinion that for France, the Hohenzollern candidacy was simple a pretext to secure war"[212]. Moreover, not only were the British unfavorably disposed to the French before the conflict began, there was no credible risk of intervention[213]. This was because, as Michael Howard points out, the conflict was not seen as deeply affecting Britain[214]. I argue therefore that

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[210] Wetzel notes that the French did have support from other European states early in the diplomatic crisis before the war, but that "the effect of Gramont's declaration was to raise the stakes ruthlessly and dramatically, to commit France to war if the candidacy were not called off, and make it more difficult for her to pull out of the setback with the rest of Europe on her side…. Accusations of aggressiveness could now legitimately be laid against France rather than against Prussia". Wetzel, *A Duel of Giants*, 110.

[211] See Der Bagdasarian, *The Austro-German Rapprochement*, 42.

[212]Steefel, *Bismarck, The Hohenzollern Candidacy*, 197.

[213] Wawro notes that after the end of the Hohenzollern candidacy, "The British ambassador in Paris worriedly noted this in a conversation with Gramont on 12 July: "I pointed out [to Gramont] that the Prussian renunciation wholly changed the position of France. If a war took place now, all Europe would say that it was the fault of France, that France rushed in from pride and resentment"" (Wawro, *The Franco-Prussian War*, 37-38, bracketed insertion in original).

[214] He argues that "Whatever the sympathies of the British people – and as the war progressed these veered more and more strongly to the side of France – the

there was little risk of gaining a negative reputation by taking Alsace-Lorraine, and as far as continuing the conflict beyond that point, the situation was so fluid that it seems unlikely the other powers would have punished Prussia for continuing the conflict.

Crucially, we must consider whether the risk of future conflict with France ought to have held Prussia back from territorial expansion. Would Prussian leaders have had a reasonable expectation that taking Alsace-Lorraine would have increased the risk of French dissatisfaction, and would this risk have outweighed the benefits of taking the territory? Given the past history between these two states, their geographic proximity, and their competing interests, it ought to be clear that there was a substantial risk of future conflict. Indeed, it is all too easy to criticize Prussia on this score, given the disaster of World War I. However, I argue that the risk of future conflict due to French dissatisfaction was high *regardless* of whether Prussia claimed Alsace-Lorraine or not. Unlike with Austria, there were far too many differences in preferences, culture, and politics between France and Prussia. The two states had been opposed diplomatically on several issues for a long time, and there was little reason to assume that refusing to expand aims would significantly improve their relations in the future. The best Prussian leaders could hope for was a significantly defanged France that would not be able to significantly challenge them for some time[215]. That Bismarck understood this is clear: in his own words, "We

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immediate interests of the British nations were too marginally affected by the continental struggle for its Government to consider intervention". (Howard, *The Franco-Prussian War*, 454).

[215] Howard comments that "so long as France was kept isolated from continental allies and encouraged to develop colonial enterprises which brought her into

must have the two fortresses…in order to make difficult for France another aggressive war, not in order to bring Alsace and Lorraine back to Germany"[216]. Crucially, he noted elsewhere that "French bitterness will exist in the same degree even if they came out of the war with or without cession of territory…Even if our victory at Königgrätz roused bitterness in France, how much more will our victory over themselves"[217]. It is clear that Bismarck thought territorial expansion would not change the risk of French dissatisfaction; conflict with France was likely regardless. Taking Alsace-Lorraine helped assure Prussia's physical security against future French attack, and may in fact have lowered the risk of future conflict more than holding back from expansion would have. In short, with inherently valuable territory at stake, no increase in the risk of future conflict with France, and a low risk of a bad reputation, there was every reason for Prussia to pursue territory expansion.

In summation, we have seen that in the two Prussian wars, Prussian leaders had the opportunity for territorial expansion because of the success of their military. In the Austro-Prussian War, the territory's lack of inherent value, the moderate-to-low risk to the state's reputation, and the fear of future conflict with Austria made territorial expansion unattractive. In the Franco-Prussian War, the fact that expansion did not substantially alter the risk of future conflict (which was

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conflict with Italy and Britain, her irredentist ambitions could be considered a minor, if never a negligible menace, and one which was likely to decrease with time". (Howard, *The Franco-Prussian War*, 454).

[216] Quoted in Pflanze, *Bismarck and the Development of Germany*, 474.

[217] Quoted in Wetzel, *A Duel of Nations,* 214; ellipsis in original.

already high) and the higher value of the territory meant that Prussia chose to expand its war aims.

Italy: Unification and Conflict

In now turning to the wars of Italian Unification, it is worth taking a few moments to consider the particular process of unification for this state. Italy faced a more complicated process than Germany, mostly because nearly every inch of territory that would ultimately be united into modern Italy had been fought over and owned by various Europeans powers at different times. In particular, Austria and France both had deep interest and territorial claims in what we would now consider Italian territory. In order to unify, Italy would have to directly confront significant European powers in a way that Prussia did not.

The extent to which these two unification processes were related is rarely emphasized. However, Italy's progress in unifying was due in no small part to Prussia, as it took advantage of other states' focus on Prussia in order to achieve its own aims. Italy's involvement in the Austro-Prussian War, however poorly its army may have performed, allowed it to gain Venice, and a few years late, it took full advantage of France's war with Prussia in order to finally seize Rome. It is interesting to note that, while Prussia's wars may be said to have taken place concurrently with unification, and with unification as an important reason, unification was solely achieved through territorial expansion in conflict. By contrast, the wars of Italian unification were truly caused by the desire to unify various disunited elements of an Italian population into a single state.

In some ways, the Italian Unification process presents a challenge for my theory, in that several theoretical assumptions cannot be said to be true in the Italian case. In particular, Italy's capability to fight a successful war, or even to be a winning state at the end of the conflict, was never as great as this study's theory generally assumes to be necessary for a state to even consider expanding its aims. There could therefore be reasonable doubt that these cases are even within the scope of the theory, given that Italy was never truly in a position to expand its war aims during conflict. Indeed, while Italy did receive territory through conflict, it was never completely successful during its conflicts, and rarely received as much as it hoped; indeed, as we will see, the best example of Italian expansion came after conflict, though could not have occurred without the war. Nonetheless, this study's theory can provide a better theoretical understanding of how and why Italy unified as it did than those advanced by existing theories. If we consider the process as a whole, and each new conflict as an expansion of aims, then this study's theory does an excellent job of explaining why conflict recurred. I focus on the high inherent value (due to cultural and material/economic factors), and the fact that Italy could consistently count on low risks to its future security, or at least the fact that conflict would not substantially change the risk to its future security. I will now look at the main conflicts of unification – the Austro-Italian/French War of 1859, the Austro-Prussian/Italian War, and Italy's actions against Rome concurrent with the Franco-Prussian War – in order to show how unification came about and how Italy achieved nearly as much as Prussia with much less power and even less military success.

I do not examine every conflict that gained Italy territory; most importantly, I do not consider Garibaldi's conquest of the south or much of Garibaldi's behavior in general. This is because this action was largely outside the purview of the state of Italy; indeed, it seems difficult to determine whether Cavour was in favor of Garibaldi's Sicilian campaign or seriously opposed to it[218]. By contrast, Italy's entrance into its various wars with Austria, and its willingness to take advantage of other conflicts, were actions chosen by the state. The conflicts examined here were those most vital for Italian unification, as it was though these wars that important strategic, material, and cultural territory was added to Italy.

It is necessary to briefly examine the states in existence on the Italian Peninsula at the start of the unification process. While a detailed examination of each of these entities is outside the scope of this paper, we must have a basic understanding of the building blocks of Italy before we can examine how these blocks were united into a single state. After the Napoleonic era, in which the peninsula was largely unified under French control, ended, most of the rulers who had been forced out by Napoleon came back into power. The role of Austria as a major player on the peninsula became particularly salient at this juncture, given that they received Venice and Lombardy after Napoleon fell[219]. Its main rival for control

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[218]See for instance Denis Mack Smith's discussion of Garibaldi's "Thousand"; he notes that scholars disagree on Cavour's motives, given that sometimes "the evidence seems to show both persecution of, at the same time as assistance to, Garibaldi" (176); he ultimately concludes that Cavour, caught between two unpleasant alternatives, tried first to prevent, and then chose to support, Garibaldi's campaign (179). Denis Mack Smith, *Victor Emmanuel, Cavour, and the Risorgimento,* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).

[219] Harry Hearder, *Italy In the Age of the Risorgimento 1790-1870,* (London and New York: Longman, 1983), 30. Denis Mack Smith also notes that "The settlement of

of the Italian peninsula would be the Kingdom of Piedmont/Sardinia, ruled by the house of Savoy. Although certainly not the most culturally or historically interesting, Piedmont/Sardinia was notable for having a well-developed governmental system[220]; it therefore was the state in the best position to become a major Italian power.

Probably the power on the Italian peninsula after Austria most likely to make difficulties for unification was the Pope, given his temporal power over Rome and the Papal States. Although Napoleon had conquered the Pope's territory[221], it was restored to the papacy after Napoleon's fall from power. Much of central Italy belonged to the Pope, and all the popes who reigned from the restoration onward were adamant about their right to control the temporal as well as the religious. Indeed, Pope Pius IX was perfectly willing to execute political prisoners to protect his power[222]. Moreover, the Pope had additional advantages that other temporal rulers did not, thanks to Catholic rulers in Europe. Indeed, as we will see, the main reason the Pope was able to hang on in Rome for so long during Italy's unification process was that troops sent by Napoleon III, a staunchly Catholic ruler with a

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1815 left Austria so much in command all over Italy that, for the moment, none of the local rulers had any leverage with her…Only much later, when France had had time to recover from her catastrophic defeat, would something of a balance of power be restored in southern Europe". Denis Mack Smith, "Introduction", in *The Making of Italy 1796-1870* (New York: Walker and Company, 1968), 7.

[220] See Hearder, *Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento*, 43-44; he notes Piedmont/Sardinia's advantages as being "the strongest army of an independent Italian state…second, a good diplomatic service; and third, an effective bureaucracy".

[221] Ibid., 101.

[222] Ibid., 119-120.

staunchly Catholic base of power, protected Rome from the Kingdom of Italy[223]. Finally, though this case study does not study them in detail, there was the Kingdom of the two Sicilies (i.e., Sicily and Naples), ruled by a Bourbon dynasty notable for its repression[224] and Tuscany, ruled by a grand duke. We can now turn to the value of the territory of interest, which in this case is the Northeast of Italy, and Rome.

In general, all of the territory in the Italian unification process was of inherent value to Italy. While we will discuss the value of certain regions in greater detail when considering the various conflicts, the one factor all this territory had in common was that it was recognized as culturally and geographically Italian. Nonetheless, some of the territory was clearly of greater inherent value. The region with the greatest inherent value was probably Lombardy, as it was extremely materially valuable and within easy grasp of the Kingdom of Piedmont/Sardinia[225]. However, Venice and Rome were both of great cultural/historical inherent value, and some of the territory Italy eventually pursued in the northeast was materially valuable as well[226]. In summation, the kingdom of Piedmont/Sardinia could thus begin by expanding into territory closest to it in the North, and then took advantage

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[223] See Denis Mack Smith, who notes in his survey of diplomatic documents that, "So long as a French garrison remained in Rome, the Italian government could not afford to attack this last remaining outpost of papal territory" (Denis Mack Smith, "Rome", in *The Making of Italy,* ed. Mack Smith, 401.

[224] See Hearder, who notes the difference between life in the Two Sicilies and the rest of the Italian states: "By 1848 the contrast between the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the rest of Italy was acute. In Piedmont and Tuscany there was much open political debate, and even in the Austrian provinces civil, criminal, and administrative justice was conducted…Only in the Kingdom of Naples did an arbitrary and brutal tyranny offer no hope for the future" (Hearder, *Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento*, 142).

[225] See Ibid., 33-41 for a discussion of Lombardy's economy during this time.

[226] See Chapter 3 of this dissertation for a discussion of Trieste and its region, which was in play during this time period as well.

of Garibaldi's success in the south to gain territory that was of lesser importance to it.

Overall, the process of Italian unification was more diffuse, more complicated, and more revolutionary than German unification. The latter represents a case of top-down unification, where one unitary state sought to bring more territory into its purview. While Italian unification also involved one more powerful state absorbing additional territory, there were multiple political actors involved in the process, and these actors did not always share the same preferences. There are four names that students of the Risorgimento learn: Camillo Cavour, Victor Emmanuel II, Giuseppe Mazzini, and Giuseppe Garibaldi. For the purposes of this chapter, we will focus our efforts on understanding Cavour (as well as his successors who finished the process he began), as he can truly be said to be the guiding light of unification.

Victor Emmanuel II, while extremely important in his own right as a ruler many Italians could rally around, was nonetheless a constitutional monarch who often found himself outmaneuvered by Cavour, and sometimes seemed anxious to get rid of him. For example, Victor Emmanuel once wrote a letter to the Pope when an anticlerical law spearheaded by Cavour angered Pius IX, stating that "Perhaps in a short time this Cavour ministry will fall; I shall then nominate a right-wing ministry and make it a *sine qua non* condition that it carries out for me a total adjustment with Rome"[227]. Moreover, while Mazzini was extremely important for the cultural and political atmosphere at the time, he did not have any true control

[227] Victor Emmanuel II, "*Victor Emmanuel II to Pope Pius IX, February 9, 1855*". In *The Making of Italy*, ed. Mack Smith, 186.

over the political situation in Piedmont/Sardinia, nor was he able to negotiate with other countries as Cavour and Victor Emmanuel could. Leaving Garibaldi out could be considered controversial, as he did contribute to the unification in important ways. Garibaldi was instrumental in gaining the south of Italy, and his military capabilities cannot be denied; but he was hardly in a position to conduct the entire unification process, or to negotiate with other states.

How did Cavour intend to unify Italy? He made his purpose clear in a work early in his political career. He argued that

> The history of the last thirty years, as well as an analysis of the various elements in Italian society, will prove that military or democratic revolutions can have little success in Italy. All true friends of the country must therefore reject such means as useless. They must recognize that they cannot truly help their fatherland except by gathering in support of legitimate monarchs who have their roots deep in the national soil…This will enable the country to profit from such favorable political circumstances as the future must bring, and so free itself from foreign domination[228]

Cavour's stance was important precisely because it differed so from those of the revolutionaries who had tried many times to unite Italy through popular revolt. He understood that "Italy" needed a central state as a starting point, and obviously given his role in the government of Piedmont/Sardinia, that state would be his. It was through conflict and negotiation that Italy could be made, not through disorganized rebellion. Throughout the process of unification, he showed a good understanding of how to balance competing factors and keep Italy's needs paramount. Let us now look at the first conflict of interest, which is the Austro-Italian War of 1859.

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[228] Camillo Cavour, "*Cavour on railways and national independence*". In *The Making of Italy*, ed. Mack Smith, 108.

The Austro-Italian War

It should be clear at this point that Austria represented the greatest challenge to Italian unification, much as it did to German unification. However, it is also clear that Italy was in a very different position vis-à-vis Austria compared to Prussia. While Prussia was arguably Austria's equal in power, and quite likely its superior at military tactics, Italy at all stages of unification was no match in material power or military superiority, and it was certainly not respected by any key power in Europe. This was particularly true on the eve of the Kingdom of Sardinia/Piedmont's conflict with Austria. It is a notable war because it set Italy's strategy of unification through conflict, though in no war that Italy fought for unification did its military perform particularly well. Yet in all conflicts it managed to achieve at least some territorial gains. I argue that, while this study's assumptions and predictions are not perfectly fitted to these conflicts, this theory still provides a better explanation of how Italy managed to achieve unification despite a lack of military success and a lack of overall power. In particular, it is due to Italy's ability to make temporary alliances with partners it was willing to reject in the future; in other words, Italy generally saw a low risk from losing its alliances, and acted accordingly. Moreover, as conflict with Austria was always likely, there was little reason to try to avoid it by remaining moderate in territorial aims.

This war is interesting in that Italy and France planned it for the sole purpose of territorial gain. Cavour and Napoleon III agreed in 1858 to form an alliance that could fight against Austria[229]. In return for French assistance, Italy would give up

[229] Wawro discusses the build-up and conduct of the 1859 war, noting that

Savoy and Nice[230]. In particular, as the situation developed toward conflict, it is clear that Cavour's greatest concern was in getting his ally to commit to conflict, and to prevent other states from having a role. There was talk of a European congress to deal with Italian affairs, and this was unacceptable to Cavour, especially if Italy was not allowed a seat at the table. Writing to Napoleon III, Cavour made it clear that conflict was preferable to negotiation. To prevent a congress, his goal was to make the situation so unreasonable that Austria would choose conflict. It is worth examining his words in detail, as it shows Cavour's keen understanding of both Austrian and French pride, and his ability to gain Napoleon III's assistance by appealing to his dignity:

> our exclusion from a Congress would deprive us of the strength and prestige which we need for that grand enterprise which is our duty and our right and which would for ever be the glory of your reign. Incidentally I think if you support us by formally asking Piedmont's admission to the Congress, Austria will have to refuse, and we will then escape from this great danger.
> If on the other hand, Austria does agree to debate the Italian Question with us, I think we ought to have the agenda quite clear first. Vienna does not intend to make serious concessions; for instance she will not give up her protectorate over the *Duchies*, nor over Tuscany and the papal Legations; so that she will probably refuse to agree to this preliminary request, in which case it will be her responsibility if the Congress does not take place…Austria has misjudged you and adopted a menacing or even provocative tone. She is playing the role of aggressor. And this makes me hope that before long she will commit one of those *aggressive acts* which will justify your armed

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Napoleon III "and Cavour conspired to provoke the Austrians into declaring war on Piedmont, which would permit France to join the war under the pretext of "defending" Piedmont" (Wawro, *The Franco-Prussian War*, 11). He notes though the difficulty Napoleon III faced in trying to protect the Pope and keep his promises to his Italian allies (11).

[230] See "*Treaty between France and Piedmont, January 1859 (but antedated to December 12, 1858*", in *The Making of Italy*, ed. Mack Smith, 260. This was not a serious loss to Italy; Hearder notes that the territory was "two very beautiful corners of the world but, before the days of mass tourism, not particularly valuable". Hearder, *Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento*, 223.

intervention[231].

Writing the same day to a fellow Italian, Cavour was even more explicit in his goal to provoke the Austrians into conflict and make sure the French came along: "I hope that we avoid the Congress, for I cannot see where it would lead us. How the devil could we then start a war?...Buol's ugly tone, together with the unbelievable insolence of the official press in Austria, must surely arouse public opinion in France and make it impossible for the Emperor to back down"[232].

From what we have seen so far, it is clear that Italy was clearly reliant on France as an ally; in fact, given the weakness of Italian forces, the French were essential. It is clear though that Cavour was trying to do as much as possible himself in order to keep the French satisfied. Writing to his Minister of War, Cavour showed his clear understanding of why it mattered for the Italians to pull their own weight even when they had French assistance. "If the war is to have a fortunate outcome for Piedmont and Italy, we must be prepared to make the very greatest efforts. The French, who are being dragged into it against their will, will never forgive us if the weight of the enterprise falls mainly on their shoulders. Woe to us if we triumph solely through French help"[233]. Why risk conflict at this point? The high inherent value of any potential territorial gains, combined with the benefits of the French alliance, made trying to achieve expansionistic aims through war a feasible and preferable option.

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[231] Camillo Cavour, "Cavour to Napoleon III, March 19, 1859". In *The Making of Italy*, 272. (italics in original).
[232] Camillo Cavour, "Cavour to Nigra, March 19, 1859". In *The Making of Italy*, 273.
[233] Camillo Cavour, "Cavour, from Paris, to General Lamarmora, Minister of War, March 29, 1859". In *The Making of Italy*, ed. Mac Smith, 274.

The war came in spring/summer of 1859, with France doing the lion's share of the fighting[234]. Before Italy had made many territorial gains, Napoleon III soon tired of conflict and took it upon himself to sign an armistice with Austria that only netted Italy Lombardy for its troubles[235]. Why would France behave this way? Scholars suggest that it may be because Napoleon III wanted power over Italian politics, but did not desire a strong Italy. Wawro for instance notes that Napoleon III did not intend Italy to gain major territorial concessions from this conflict[236]. However, Cavour was a canny politician, and he was able to use the gains from the war to create the kingdom of Italy; as Wawro notes, "Cavour moved quickly after Solferino to take as much of Italy under Piedmontese control as he could. In 1860, the Piedmontese army occupied Lombardy, Venetia, Tuscany, Modena, Parma, Romagna, Naples, and Sicily"[237].

Given the aid France had just given Italy, why would Cavour so suddenly betray his ally and risk the alliance he tried so hard to maintain? I argue it is due to the fact that Cavour was always intending the alliance to be short in duration, and of

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[234] See Hearder, *Italy in the Age of the Risorgimento*, 225 for a description of troop numbers and the fighting.

[235] Ibid.„ 225-226. Schach Cook notes that this occurred "even though France had not fully carried out her part of the original bargain, which included the acquisition by Piedmont of Venetia as well as Lombardy" (Schach Cook, "Russia, Austria, and the Question of Italy", 552).

[236] He writes that "This Franco-Austrian War of 1859 was meant to be the start of the new French order in Europe. Napoleon III not only expanded the territory of France and improved its frontiers; in his dealings with Cavour, he insisted that Piedmont not expand beyond Lombardy and, eventually, Venetia, the lush plain between Milan and Venice. To maintain primacy and control in Italy and assure the subservience of Piedmont, Napoleon III planned to cut the rest of Italy into French-sponsored satellite states". (Wawro, *The Franco-Prussian War*, 11-12).

[237]Wawro, *The Franco-Prussian War*, 12). He argues that "The raw speed of these Piedmontese annexations and the popular enthusiasm that they generated everywhere except the south prevented Napoleon III from intervening" (12).

low importance to his future security. That Cavour was perfectly willing to backstab his erstwhile ally can be seen in a letter he wrote to an official in Tuscany, one of the regions he hoped to claim in the aftermath of the war. Cavour argued that

> If we had proclaimed the annexation of Tuscany to Piedmont three weeks ago, it would perhaps have aroused suspicions in Europe. But, now that French troops have arrived there with Prince Napoleon, our annexation will be accepted as a guarantee against possible French ambition in central Italy. At least it will be thought preferable to republicanism or to being given a ruler from Napoleon's family[238].

Cavour was quickly working against French interests, because he understood that his erstwhile ally was of limited utility for his future security. Indeed, one British statesman summed up Napoleon III's failure thus: "In 1859, he encouraged an Italian war, hoping to establish an Italian confederacy dependent on France. Instead of that he has created a strong united Italy, not even friendly to France"[239].

Reputational concerns were unlikely to be of consequence here. Other European states were far from opposed to Italy receiving some territory from Austria; indeed, even Venice was not considered out of Italy's reach. Years earlier during the Crimean War, British diplomats considered whether Austria could be convinced to give some territory to Italy in return for Italy entering the war[240]. If other states agreed Italy deserved some territory, it is unlikely that Italy would have feared expansion would damage its reputation.

As for risk of future conflict with the same opponent, this risk was likely high regardless of whether Italy went to war in the present or not. Any Italian unification

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[238] Camillo Cavour, "Cavour to Count Boncompagni, Royal Commissioner in Tuscany, May 20th, 1859". In *The Making of Italy,* ed. Mac Smith, 279.
[239] Quoted in Mosse, *The European Powers*, 241.
[240] See Sir James Hudson, "*Sir James Hudson, British Minister at Turin, to Lord Clarendon, October 24th, 1854"* in *The Making of Italy*, ed. Mack Smith, 193-194.

project would have to come at Austria's expense, and was between the two states was in a sense inevitable. So long as Austria controlled Venice, Italy would look to conflict to change the status quo if diplomacy could not succeed. It is interesting to note as well that Austria had to fight this conflict without assistance from Prussia, from which Austria expected help, and the fact that it never came had significant implications for Austro-Prussian relations[241]. This was a lucky break for Italy, in that it meant that Austria's hostility was focused in part on Prussia. Ultimately however, the risk of continued conflict with Austria was high regardless. By 1860, Cavour wrote that

> War against Austria has no terrors for me, even though there would be more than one chance of things going wrong. I would have no doubt about the result so long as our recently acquired provinces were inspired with the same spirit as Piedmont. But Your Highness knows how hard it is to find men or money in central Italy, and so you will understand that my confidence in the outcome of such a war is not unlimited[242].

All in all, though this first war of Italian unification did not achieve as much as Italy's leaders hoped it might, it was hardly without significant rewards. Lombardy was a notable trophy, and possessing it definitely increased the material power of the forming Italian state. And the expansions after the war were of extreme value as well; Italy could not have gained so much without the instrumental use of France as an ally. Let us now turn to the second important conflict in the Italian unification.

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[241] See Carr, *The Origins of the Wars of German Unification*, 103, for a discussion of Prussia's role (or lack thereof) in this conflict: he notes Prussian statesmen were not unwilling to get involved, but would only do it on their terms. Austria did not accept assistance when it could have made a difference.

[242] Camillo Cavour, "Cavour to Prince Carignano, the king's representative in Florence, July 20, 1860". In *The Making of Italy*, ed. Mac Smith, 317.

The Austro-Prussian/Italian War

What is known as the Austro-Prussian War is also properly a war of Italian unification[243]; though Italy's participation in the war is often overlooked, it was this conflict that led to Italy receiving a significant portion of its modern-day territory. What is intriguing is that Italian forces did terribly on the battlefield, and indeed, it would be difficult to say that Italy had the military opportunity to expand its war aims. Nonetheless, this study's theory has something to say about the Italian side of the conflict, as well as the Prussian side. This conflict in particular shows how this study's theory can explain war aim expansion even with regards to a weak state with little military power. Although Italy was not successful militarily, it expanded its aims because it knew its most important goal had been achieved without conflict, and because it had little risk from continuing to fight.

Venice had long been a key source of dissatisfaction between Italy and Austria. An independent republic until Napoleon I's reign, the city was given to Austria after the Napoleonic Wars, and Austria lost no time in consolidating its control on the territory. Early in the process of unification, Austrian leaders made it clear that they would defend their rights to Venice, and that any attempt to take it would be unacceptable. In a conversation with an Italian working for the Austrian state, Metternich noted that

> The Venetian territory belongs to us absolutely. It is part of our states by necessity and this cannot be changed. Lombardy's position is different…His Majesty was not very enthusiastic about accepting it. Possibly our strength would have been greater had we stood on the line of the Adige River instead

[243] Wawro notes that the typical name of the conflict is actually misleading in this regard. Wawro, *The Austro-Prussian War*, 1.

> of extending our positions further west. We obtained Lombardy as a result of mere political transactions. It is just a military bulwark[244].

We see therefore that, compared with Lombardy which Austria was willing to cede to Italy, Venice was much more important. Conflict to attain Venice was likely inevitable, given that it was inherently valuable to both Italy and to Austria.

The opportunity to expand came during the Austro-Prussian War, which Italy entered in large part at Prussia's behest and through Bismarck's planning[245]. However, towards the end of the conflict, Italy continued to fight for Venice, and even expanded to pursue other territorial aims. Indeed, multiple reports by Italian ministers were dedicated to the necessity of fighting Austria wherever possible, and about gaining Venice by force. For instance, the Minister to Paris wrote that "Je partage votre avis sur la nécessité de créer le plus d'embarras possibles à l'Autriche, en Hongrie, Dalmatie, partout le plus tôt possible. Il faut pour une foule de raisons que la libération de la Vénétie soit dûe aux armes, au moins autant qu'à la diplomatie", or, roughly translated from the French, "I share your view on the necessity of making the most embarrassment possible for Austria, in Hungary, Dalmatia, wherever possible. It is necessary for many reasons that the liberation of Venice comes from arms, and not diplomacy"[246]. The same minister later wrote,

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[244] Prince Metternich, "*An interview in 1832 between Metternich and Paolo de Capitani, a Lombard in the Austrian Service".* In *The Making of Italy,* ed. Mack Smith. 68.

[245] See Carr, who highlights Moltke's insistence that Prussia needed Italy to divert some of Austria's troops away from Prussian forces (*The Origins of the Wars of German Unification*, 127).

[246] Nigra, "59. Il Ministro A Parigi, Nigra, Al Minstro Degli Esteri, Visconti Venosta", Parigi, 4 Luglio 1866. Italy. Commissione per la pubblicazione dei documenti diplomatici. *I Documenti diplomatici italiani.* Roma: Libreria dello Stato. Ser.1, v. 7

concerning other Italian aims, that "Il serait très important avoir une victoire et occuper le Tyrol si faire se peut"[247]. What is unusual, however, is that in some sense Venice was already won. Napoleon III, who engaged in a lot of diplomacy to end the conflict, had already received Venice in a transfer from Austria, and planned on giving it to Italy[248]. Why then would Italy keep fighting when it had already achieved what it wanted, before the conflict had even begun?[249]

This study's theory can easily explain why Italy chose to expand its aims and continue fighting for Venice in this conflict, even knowing that they would gain it in the postwar settlement regardless. In essence, there was little risk to Italy's future security from continuing to fight, and the territory was of high inherent value. In particular, given that Venice was already out of Austrian hands regardless, pursuing additional war aims could potentially take care of the last major issue areas that Italy and Austria could fight over; in essence, the Italians could perhaps remove the potential for future conflict by gaining all the territory they were likely to fight

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(1866). http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951d00554737r;view=1up;seq=7, 38.

[247] "It would be important to have a victory and occupy Tyrol if possible". Nigra,"64. Il Ministro A Parigi, Nigra, Al Minstro Degli Esteri, Visconti Venosta". Parigi, 5 Luglio 1866. Italy. Commissione per la pubblicazione dei documenti diplomatici. *I Documenti diplomatici italiani.* Roma: Libreria dello Stato. Ser.1, v. 7 (1866). http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951d00554737r;view=1up;seq=7, 41.

[248] Carr notes that "In June [1866] Austria, frightened by the possibility of a Franco-Prussian alliance, came to terms with Napoleon. It was agreed that if Austria won the war she would surrender Venetia to France – this, incidentally, made a complete nonsense of the Prusso-Italian treaty *for whoever won in Germany Venetia was certain to become Italian*" (Carr, *The Origins of the Wars of German Unification,* 129. (italics mine)).

[249] Mosse notes that Italy preferred conflict even though it was guaranteed Venice; he notes that in the end, it "wished to win Venetia by force of arms and had, with Napoleon's blessing already linked her national aspirations with those of Prussia". Mosse, *The European Powers* 213-214.

over[250]. That this was clearly understood at the time is obvious; before the conflict began, the British encouraged Austria to give up Venetia immediately in order to prevent Italy from demanding more through conflict[251]. Therefore, while Venice was won, continuing to fight and expand gave Italy hope that it could gain further territorial concessions in the Tyrol or in the Trieste/Istrian area.

Moreover, there is little indication that Italy would have gained a negative reputation or would have alienated Prussia or France by continuing to fight. We have seen that the alliance with Prussia was temporary at best, and there was little need to worry about Prussia in the future. There is even indication that Prussia and Italy may have colluded to push off the peace settlement by Italy's expanded aims, as this would help both states[252]. Although when push came to shove, the Prussians were unwilling to wait for the Italians before ending their phase of the conflict, this

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[250] See Visconti Venosta's letter to the Minister at Paris; he mentions specifically that he hopes to negotiate and perhaps win both the Tyrol and Istria in the postwar settlement. Visconti Venosta, "74. Il Ministro Degli Esteri, Visconti Venosta, Al Minstro A Parigi, Nigra". Firenze, 6 Luglio 1866. Italy. Commissione per la pubblicazione dei documenti diplomatici. *I Documenti diplomatici italiani.* Roma: Libreria dello Stato. Ser.1, v. 7 (1866). http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=umn.31951d00554737r;view=1up;seq=7. 45.

[251] Mosse sums up Russell's view as being that "Were Austria to wait until Venetia was wrested from her, the claims of victorious Italy might extend to parts of the Dalmatian coast. By making the cession now, Austria could determine its extent". Mosse, *The European Powers*, 232.

[252] See Pottinger, who notes that "While the Italians were maintaining that they could not agree to an armistice until Prussia had done so, the Prussians declared that they would accept the armistice only on the condition of Italian concurrence. Evidently, this move was concerted between the two powers. There is some evidence that the Italians were secretly urging the Prussians to refuse the armistice. They were presumably motivated in part by the desire to make good the claim to Trentino which they had put forward more or less in the middle of the campaign". Pottinger, *Napoleon III and the German Crisis*, 164.

is again indicative of the fact that this alliance was temporary at best[253]. As for France, though Napoleon III was working hard to gain a peaceful resolution to the conflict, his sympathies were squarely with Italy. If he had intervened, his intervention would likely have come against the Prussians. In terms of third parties, Italy generally benefitted from Austria's isolation in the same way that Prussia did. For example, if Russia was unwilling to back Austria against Prussia in the more serious part of the conflict, it was certainly not going to assist Austria against the Italians[254]. In short Italy risked little by continuing to fight, and so it expanded its aims. Although it did not succeed in its military goals, this is still an important case of war aim expansion, and it is important for Italian unification because Italy gained Venice. However, given the less than stellar support from both France and Prussia, and the temporary quality of these alliances, it is unsurprising that Italian leaders still felt they would have to rely on their own power and ingenuity in any future conflicts[255].

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[253] Wawro notes that "not only did Bismarck refuse to back Italian expansion north to the Alpine watershed – Italy's "natural frontier" – he also took Prussia abruptly out of the war, depriving Italy of the counterweight needed in August to balance Austrian armed force and French political pressure". (Wawro, *The Austro-Prussian War*, 278). He goes on to argue that it was largely Italian incompetence on the battlefield that made Bismarck willing to write off his erstwhile ally (278-279).

[254] Schach Cook notes that the Russians refused to support the Austrian position during the peace process: she argues that "Gorchakov did not consider the issue important enough to risk offending Napoleon III…Austria herself, in his view, was to blame for her recent losses because her constant meddling in Italian affairs had aroused nationalist resentment". (Schach Cook, "Russia, Austria, and the Question of Italy", 547).

[255] Lawrence Sondhaus notes the difficulties Italians faced in deciding what state to trust after 1866: "Italian liberals considered the French emperor an enemy to their cause because of his stubborn defense of the pope. Proponents of the 1866 Prusso-Italian alliance on anti-Austrian grounds, liberals now favored a revival of the alliance, assuming that an eventual Prussian defeat of France would deliver Rome to

Italy and the Franco-Prussian War: Taking Advantage

Finally, we must consider how Italy used other conflicts in Europe to its advantage in order to get a final, pivotal piece of its unification project. While Italy did not directly take part in the Franco-Prussian War, the conflict created circumstances under which Italy chose to expand and to attempt a war aim it had held for many years: the conquest of Rome. As discussed during the conversation concerning the Papal States, Rome presented a particular challenge to unification. The Pope, Pius IX, was in an unusually strong position relative to his own military might, as his claim to religious legitimacy gained him the support of several other key states in the system. During this time, no state was as important to the maintenance of the Pope's temporal authority over his domain as France. However, the events of the Franco-Prussian War provided the leaders of Italy with a rare opportunity to expand and take Rome once and for all. Due first to France's wartime needs, and second to Napoleon III's defeat and capture, the French troops in Rome that protected the Pope's temporal authority returned to France[256]. This gave Italy the capability of expanding, as Rome lay largely undefended.

I assert that this study's theory is quite capable of explaining why Italy chose to take Rome in 1870, and not before or later. We need only spend a few words establishing Rome's inherent value for the Kingdom of Italy. Its historical value and

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the kingdom of Italy. Conservatives, however, acknowledged Napoleon III's military support in the War of 1859 and diplomatic support in 1866 as decisive factors in the progress of Italian unity thus far. Trusting Napoleon III more than they did Bismarck, conservatives hoped that Rome could be acquired by negotiation with France". Lawrence Sondhaus, "Austria-Hungary's Italian Policy Under Count Beust, 1866-1871", *Historian* 56., Issue 1 (September 1993), 41-54, DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6563.1993.tb01295.x., 42.

[256] See Mack Smith, "Rome", in *The Making of Italy*, 407-408.

importance in Italian culture is obvious, and it is equally clear that the Italian state desperately desired it. As to the timing of the operation, before, an expansion to Rome would have caused immediate conflict with France, an occasional ally, and would likely have been impossible given Italy's weaker military. However, the tensions between France and Prussia over the Hohenzollern candidacy gave Italian politicians ideas before the Franco-Prussian war even began[257]. In fact, it might have been possible for Italy to acquire Rome without force of arms; Howard notes that Italian leaders suggested before the war that an alliance with France might be acceptable if they could gain Rome[258]. As he points out, however, "Napoleon found the draft unacceptable….on the Roman question he showed the stubbornness of despair. To yield Rome to the King of Italy would be finally to alienate his Catholic supporters, the more fanatical of whom were openly saying that they would have "rather the Prussians in Paris than the Italians in Rome""[259]. Once the war began, however, there was little risk to expansion. The withdraw of French troops was a signal that France would no longer protect Rome, and the downfall of Napoleon III meant that he and his conservative Catholic constituency would not be able to affect

[257] Before war was declared, it is clear there was some disagreement in Italy on what action to take: Sondhaus notes that "The parliamentary left, strongly pro-Prussian in any event, wanted the government to take advantage of France's preoccupation with Prussia and annex Rome at the earliest opportunity. However, King Victor Emmanuel II, who sought to place a prince of the House of Savoy on the vacant Spanish throne, pressed for an anti-Prussian policy that would spoil the Hohenzollern candidacy" (Sondhaus, "Austria-Hungary's Italian Policy", 47).
[258] Howard, *The Franco-Prussian War*, 64.
[259] Ibid.,, 64-65.

Italy's future security. With the fall of France, Italy had no important allies that would object to it gaining Rome[260].

As for other states, it is clear there were few that were able or willing to threaten Italy's future security over this issue. Despite a half-hearted attempt by Austria-Hungary to warn Italy away from Rome, there is little evidence that this was an action risky to Italy's future security[261]. Moreover, papal armies were not a concern; Mac Smith notes that only seventy combatants died taking the city[262]. As the expansion ended the papacy's temporal power, Italy certainly had no need to worry about its current opponent. Italy expanded because of the high inherent value, and the low risk of territorial expansion to its future security from allies, opponents, and third parties.

Ultimately, Italy's war aim expansions came in a diplomatic setting in which no alliance was worth losing the chance to gain territory, and where conflict with the same opponent was likely regardless. This study's theory therefore predicts ample war aim expansion, even given Italy's general weakness. As we have seen, this is borne out by the evidence.

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[260] Mack Smith notes that Italy would be breaking an agreement with France, but without Napoleon III in power, there was no one to punish them for it. Mack Smith, "Rome", *The Making of Italy,* ed. Mac Smith,407-408.

[261] Sondhaus notes that "The French defeat at Wörth left the fate of the pope's political authority in doubt; it was at this point that Austria made military preparations in the Tyrol and assembled the naval squadron at Naples. Austrian pressure on Italy was primarily a distraction to prevent the Italian government from acting against Rome until a French victory over Prussia freed Napoleon II to resume his role as the pope's defender...the subsequent collapse of the French Empire doomed the cause of preserving the pope's temporal powers, and Francis Joseph could not actually prevent Italy from annexing Rome" (Sondhaus, "Austria-Hungary's Italy Policy, 51).

[262] Mack Smith, "Rome" 412.

Alternative Theories: Evidence and Objections

In considering whether the alternative theories do a superior job of explaining outcomes in the two Prussian wars, it is worth remembering that these ought to be good cases for them. As we have already seen, Labs uses these cases to support his argument concerning offensive realism and war aims. Reiter as well focuses on the Franco-Prussian War, arguing that the choice to take Alsace-Lorraine was due to a commitment problem[263]. If I am to argue therefore that my theory is more persuasive, I must show where the alternate theories lack a good explanation.

Offensive Realism

As noted, offensive realists provide a very persuasive explanation of the outcomes in the two Prussian wars. Indeed, Eric Labs uses the cases as primary evidence for his theory of war aims. His view of the two cases aligns in certain ways with the predictions of this study's theory. In particular, he sees the main reason for Prussian leniency in the Austro-Prussian war as Bismarck's fear of the balance of power; he argues that "Bismarck, however, vigorously opposed continuing the war… First, he did not want completely to alienate Austria; he wanted to preserve the possibility of making it a future ally. Second, and more important, he feared outside intervention by other European powers"[264]. Labs notes that "Prussia had the battlefield opportunity for wider war aims, but not a systemic one"[265], by which he

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[263] He argues that "Prussia's desire for territorial gains was driven by credible commitment concerns. It perceived France as an enduring threat, and saw territorial acquisition as one means of making the French commitment not to attack in the future more credible by making the execution of such an attack more difficult". Reiter, *How Wars End*, 43.
[264] Labs, "Beyond Victory", 25.
[265] Ibid., 27.

means that the risks of great power intervention and balancing against Prussia were simply too high.

At first glance, this argument is both eminently reasonable, and quite similar to that proposed by this study's theory. I generally agree with Labs' reasoning; however, I believe he does not give the proper preference to the reasons for not expanding, nor does he properly distinguish between current risks and future risks. Remember that my theory differs from the offensive realists in that I weigh future risk again present gain, rather than present gain against future risk. This study's theory also carves out greater room for the consideration of reputation and third parties, as well as the importance of alliances. Labs does highlight Bismarck's desire to use Austria as an ally in the future[266]; however, he considers this to be a secondary consideration, compared to the fear that other European states would get involved.

More seriously, however, I believe the risk of current intervention in both the Austro-Prussian War and the Franco-Prussian War has been seriously overstated. I have shown that Bismarck was less concerned about France than most scholars have indicated. To be sure, he did prefer to end the conflict before French intervention became a fact. However, this was because he expected little value in pushing to Vienna or trying to take more Austrian territory. We have already seen that Bismarck, while certainly worried about French intervention, was prepared to destroy Austria's internal stability if necessary if the French entered the conflict. He

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[266] He notes that "Punitive aims against Austria, Bismarck believed, risked making that course impossible. Austria was a future friend for which moderate terms were necessary to moderate its resentment" (Ibid., 25).

was prepared, if Austria did not accept the end of the conflict, to continue fighting and risk (weak) French intervention. This is not in accord with offensive realism. However, even in the Franco-Prussian War, there is significant evidence that there was no serious risk of outside intervention. This was in part because France was isolated, and also because the conduct of the war meant that France was effectively defeated before any state could intervene[267].

Labs does have a keen understanding of why Alsace-Lorraine was worth taking; he is correct that Bismarck saw it as a key to future security. However, his explanation for why Bismarck did not accede to Moltke's insistence on pursuing a total war needs to be more closely examined. Labs argues that "Prussia could not expand its aims even more against France – as Moltke wanted – because, while the military opportunity was great, the systemic opportunity did not extend beyond the provinces"[268]. Labs does not consider other reasons why Bismarck would not have wanted to expand into French territory. In particular, what could he have done with it? We have seen that Bismarck did not like incorporating non-German populations

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[267] See Christensen for a summary of Austrian and Russian decision-making on this score; he argues that it was confidence in French capabilities that held Austria back from entering the conflict at the beginning, and later, "French defeat seemed inevitable; Vienna thus rejected any eleventh-hour action to save France" (Christensen, "Perceptions and Alliances", 80). As for the Russian role, he notes that they also played a role in preventing Austrian intervention: "Russian leaders believed that France was likely stronger than Prussia…The Russians believed that the short-term threat was to Prussia (not France) and so they chained themselves to Prussia by threatening to enter the war if Austria mobilized" (Christensen, "Perceptions and Alliances", 81). See also Trager, who notes that "Russia was willing to send 300,000 troops to the Austrian border to prevent Austria' entry into the Franco-Prussian War". (Trager, "Long-Term Consequences of Aggressive Diplomacy", 261).

[268] Labs, "Beyond Victory", 34. He notes in the footnote that the neutral powers had objected to any further expansion.

into his state, and he could gain nothing by using the territory instrumentally. I assert therefore that there are significant issues with offensive realism's ability to explain these cases.

As for offensive realism's capability of dealing with the wars of Italian Unification, at a first glance it is easy to believe that these are good cases for offensive realism. They are, after all, nearly all cases of attempted expansion, which offensive realism tends to over-predict. Moreover, examples such as the taking of Rome, where there was certainly no risk of a balancing coalition once France had pulled its troops, would seem to show that offensive realism is a definite possibility in these cases. However, an examination of the facts on the ground shows that offensive realism is severely lacking in its explanatory power for the Italian cases as a whole. This is because Italy generally was lacking in power compared to its opponents and allies, sometimes expanded even when there was a risk of intervention (Austro-Prussian War), and generally cared more about territory for cultural and historic reasons rather than material ones. Offensive realism is therefore somewhat lacking; let us see what the commitment problem argument can do.

Commitment Problem Argument

The commitment problem explanation for some of the outcomes in these two unification processes is simple, but fairly compelling. In the Austro-Prussian War, no commitment problem existed because both sides were able to agree on the outcome of the conflict without additional territorial occupation. By contrast, the domestic instability of France presented a definite commitment problem in the Franco-

Prussian conflict. The military decision to drive to, and later blockade, Paris, represents in my mind a "win" for the commitment problem argument. I have shown that Prussia's war aims were not substantial at the start of the conflict. Why then did the war become nearly absolute? The commitment problem Prussia faced should not be underestimated.

As we have seen, just trying to determine which French government to negotiate with was difficult. In the absence of a bargaining partner that could end the conflict, what choice did Prussia have but to expand its aims and continue fighting? The two states could not agree to end the war because, by a certain point in the conflict, one state had no leader able to credibly commit to a settlement. There was no one to bargain on France's behalf, and no one capable of forcing the country as a whole to agree to the end of the conflict. Lacking a bargaining partner, Bismarck had no choice but to let his military seek additional gains, and hope to end the war by something closer to capitulation rather than a negotiated settlement. This is exactly what the commitment problem would expect.

Is the success of the commitment problem argument here a failure for my argument? It is true that my argument's assumptions do not cover the situation in this case. However, I argue that my theory explains the outcome at least as well, if not better, than the commitment problem does here. In particular, by looking at the value of Alsace-Lorraine and at the diplomatic milieu of the time, I can fill in the gaps of why going to Paris was necessary and of relatively low risk. It is interesting moreover that Reiter actually misses the commitment problem explanation of the drive to Paris, and focuses on Alsace-Lorraine. This is a flaw because Reiter misses

the fact that taking the territory could make conflict more likely, if more logistically difficult. In causing bad blood between the states, territorial acquisition can hardly be said to help create a stable peace. True, it would be harder for France to attack, but the very fact of expansion made the possibility of attack more serious.

As to the Italian unification process, the commitment problem argument is perhaps less salient in these conflicts, but can still provide a certain explanatory value in certain wars. In particular, the commitment problem explanation probably works best in explaining why during the unification of Rome, Italy again could not credibly commit to leaving Rome outside of Italy when French troops were not in control of the city. A proponent of the commitment problem argument might even point to the fact that there were multiple wars of Italian unification as support for the theory. After all, we saw time and time again that Italy was left dissatisfied with its gains in each conflict, as it continued trying to acquire more and more territory every time an opportunity presented itself. If Italy had had the opportunity to gain all the territory it desired in a single conflict, would there have been multiple wars with Austria? It seems unlikely. A believer in the commitment problem argument would say that no commitment would succeed so long as Italian territory remained in Austrian hands, and so more conflict was always inevitable. However, if the commitment problem can explain Italian behavior, it certainly cannot explain why neither France nor Austria realized that Italy had the incentive to keep fighting and keep consolidating. If states so clearly understand the problem of commitment, why did Napoleon III for instance assume that Italy would accept his goal of keeping their territorial gains minimal? In some ways, bringing in commitment raises more

questions than it solves. In summation, while I do feel that the commitment problem argument advances good explanations, I still find it lacking compared to my own theory.

Conclusion

In summation, we have seen that Prussia and Italy both used conflict in order to guarantee their unification processes. Italy was typically expansionist, getting into conflict after conflict in order to gain the inherently valuable territory it desired. Prussia, by contrast, was, thanks to Bismarck more cautious, expanding in one conflict but not another. In terms of what these conflicts tell us about the relative success of my study's theory, it is worth looking at how the conflicts would be arrayed along the spectrum of risks and territorial value. Considering first the risk of alliances and reputation, I present Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1

		Instrumental	Inherent
High Impact on Reputation	High Importance of Ally for Postwar Security	**8** Expansion of Territorial War Aims Least Likely; highest risk to future security cancels out potential bargaining gains.	**7** Expansion Very Unlikely; the risk to future security from losing both the alliance and a good reputation are high, but the inherent value of the territory may tempt some states
	Low Importance of Ally for Postwar Security	**4** Expansion Possible; risk to reputation may not outweigh potential bargaining gains	**3** Expansion Likely; gaining the territory and keeping the alliance intact likely outweighs risks to reputation
Low Impact on Reputation	High Importance of Ally for Postwar Security	**6** Expansion Unlikely; the gains in bargain may not outweigh the cost of losing the alliance, even if reputation is not affected.	**5** Expansion Less Likely; losing alliance is damaging to security, but the value of the territory may make expansion worth the risk
	Low Importance of Ally for Postwar Security	**2** Expansion Very Likely; gains in bargaining are very low in risk to the state's future security. **Austro-Prussian War: Prussia (No)** **Franco-Prussian War-Prussia, Going to Paris (Yes)**	**1** Expansion of Territorial War Aims Most Likely; there is the least risk to the state's future security, and value is high. **1859- Italy (Yes)** **Austro-Prussian War: Italy (Yes)** **Franco-Prussian War: Prussia, Alsace-Lorraine (Yes)** **Franco-Prussian War/Capture of Rome: Italy (Yes)**

Of the expansion opportunities, we see that the majority (four out of six) fall into the sector where territorial expansion is most likely, and indeed, states did expand their territorial aims in each of the cases. The other two fall into the sector where territorial expansion is still predicted to be very likely. Prussia in the Austro-Prussian War falls into this sector, and as we know, there was no expansion in this case. However, I argue that in this case, the risk of increasing opponent dissatisfaction was so high that it cancelled out the low risk from alliance and reputation. These cases therefore strongly support this study's theory

Turning to the risk of increasing opponent dissatisfaction versus reputation and territorial value, we get the information in Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2

		Instrumental	Inherent
High Impact on Reputation	High Likelihood of Increasing Opponent Dissatisfaction	**8** Expansion of Territorial War Aims Least Likely; highest risk to future security cancels out potential bargaining gains.	**7** Expansion Very Unlikely; highest risk to future security, but the inherent value of the territory may still tempt some states.
	Low Likelihood of Increasing Opponent Dissatisfaction	**4** Expansion Possible; states may discount the risk to their reputation in order to realize bargaining gains.	**3** Expansion Likely; gaining the territory without making the opponent more dissatisfied likely outweighs risks to reputation.
Low Impact on Reputation	High Likelihood of Increasing Opponent Dissatisfaction	**6** Expansion Unlikely; the gains in bargain may not offset the risks of leaving the opponent dissatisfied, even if reputation is not affected. **Austro-Prussian: Prussia (No)**	**5** Expansion Less Likely; risk to security from a dissatisfied opponent is high, but the value of the territory may make expansion worth the risk.
	Low Likelihood of Increasing Opponent Dissatisfaction	**2** Expansion Very Likely; gains in bargaining are very low in additional risk to the state's future security. **Franco-Prussian War: Prussia, Going to Paris (Yes)**	**1** Expansion of Territorial War Aims Most Likely; the state can gain the territory with little additional risk to their future security. **1859: Italy (Yes)** **Austro-Prussian: Italy (Yes)** **Franco-Prussian War: Prussia, Alsace-Lorraine (Yes)** **Franco-Prussian War/Capture of Rome: Italy (Yes)**

The change in the risk to opponent dissatisfaction is in fact an excellent predictor of outcomes in all of these conflicts. As with Figure 4.1, most of the conflicts fall into the category where expansion is most likely, and all of these cases are ones of expansion. The one case where there was no expansion, Prussia in the Austro-Prussian War, falls into a category where expansion is unlikely, and indeed, there was no expansion. While it is not in the least likely to expand sector, this is because the risk to Prussia's reputation was fairly low. Overall, we can see that these cases support this study's theory, and this theory provides a nuanced explanation of why state behavior differed through these conflicts.

Ultimately, it is worth noting that both states were embroiled in future territorial conflict, though for different reasons. Alsace-Lorraine, while not the primary cause of conflict between France and Germany in the first World War, was certainly an unresolved issue that had lasting impact on how these states behaved towards one another. As for Italy, the two Italian regions left out of Italy after the process of unification would be the source of significant future conflict. Indeed, I have already discussed one of them – the city of Trieste – earlier in this dissertation. Trieste, however, was too inherently valuable to Austria at this stage in history, and it would not be until after World War I that Italy could truly claim to be finished its unification process. Germany would lose Alsace-Lorraine after World War I as well. It took many years for European territorial concerns to be settled; in the next chapter, we will expand this analysis to the rest of the world and the modern era, and look at territorial war aim expansion writ large.

Chapter 5: Post-World War II Interstate Wars

Why These Cases?

So far, we have examined the success of this study's theory at explaining state behavior within a single case, as well as across several interrelated cases within the history of two states. This has given us a good understanding of the dynamics of territorial war aim expansion in historical contexts. However, so far we have only looked at historical cases, largely involving great powers. The cases have also been geographically focused on Europe. In order to have a comprehensive test of this study's theory, we should look at other conflicts; namely, conflicts between smaller powers and non-European powers. It is also important to see how the theory fares against a wide number of cases. Therefore for the final empirical analysis, this chapter presents an extended overview and sorting of the cases of serious (i.e., over 5000 battle deaths) interstate wars between 1945 (the end of World War II) and 2003. By taking as its focus a larger number of cases, ranging across time and space, this chapter provides a serious test of this study's theory's predictions against the two main alternative explanations of expanded war aims, using different methods than previous chapters.

In particular, rather than in-depth case studies, the methods in this chapter are meant to aggregate data and compare the whole set of important cases to one another. Inspired by Charles Ragin's "Fuzzy Set" methods, as well as those employed by Virginia Page Fortna in her book *Peace Time*, I sort the cases by their risk factors and compare the extent to which the risk to the states' future security correlates

with war aim expansion[269]. This allows us to go beyond case study research to more fully understand these phenomena within the cases. These methods, while under-utilized in political science, are extremely useful for examining a theory with detailed causal mechanisms and different independent variables working in tandem. Quantitative methods tend to be more common; indeed, for many analyses, they are quite useful. However, quantitative methods also have important drawbacks. In particular, quantitative methods are ill suited to examining causal mechanisms, and are often limited by the need to find quantifiable variables and measurable proxies for analysis[270]. By contrast, using qualitative methods on a large number of cases simultaneously allow the researcher to examine causal mechanisms, and be more flexible in understanding the unique details of a particular case[271]. They are most appropriate for the theory under examination.

This chapter has two parts. In the first, I provide a narrative examination of the twenty-one cases of serious interstate conflict after World War II. While whole

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[269] Virginia Page Fortna gives perhaps the best summary of why her "'large-*N* qualitative' comparison" is useful: "the third research method falls somewhere between the quantitative analysis and the in-depth case studies, and draws on the strengths of both… This "systematic eyeballing" of minicases or "large-*N* qualitative" method allows one to see patterns in the date that get lost both in the condensation of complex cases into numerical data and in case studies of only a few cases". Virginia Page Fortna, *Peace Time: Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace*, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004), 6-7.

[270] Moreover, Charles C. Ragin notes that "Those who conduct quantitative analyses of large *N*s usually must forfeit the opportunity to gain in-depth knowledge of the cases they study". Charles C. Ragin, *Fuzzy-Set Social Science*, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 26.

[271] See again Ragin, who argues, "In a comparative case study of commonalities, by contrast, causation is typically understood conjecturally in terms of *combinations of conditions*. The goal of this type of analysis is to identify the causal conditions shared by the cases. Causal conditions do not complete with each other as the do in correlational research: they combine". (Italics mine) Ragin, *Fuzzy Set Social Science*, 33.

studies can be (and have been) devoted to each single conflict, this chapter gives a general sense of what occurred in each conflict, and provides an examination of where there was recurring conflict within regions. We will see that certain regions were more prone to interstate conflict than others, and this study's theory can provide an explanation as to why some regions experienced more expansion in territorial war aims than others. Throughout the narrative, I identify cases in which war aim expansion was possible, and where it took place. In particular, I focus on the eight conflicts in which I argue that there was an opportunity for expansion. These conflicts are: the Azeri-Armenian war, the Ogaden war, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, the War for Bangladesh, and the Korean War. I show why we ought to consider at least one state in these conflicts to have had an opportunity to expand its aims, and look at both territorial value and the potential risks to expansion.

The second section of the chapter contains comparative statics of the cases as a whole. As noted, I find that at least ten opportunities to expand war aims exist in eight of the interstate wars, and of those opportunities, seven were realized by potential occupier states. I look more closely the potential risks of expansion, and find that there is much support for the risk of losing an important alliance and the risk of increasing opponent dissatisfaction as having a key impact on the opportunity to expand. There is less support for the risk to reputation, but I have already argued that this risk is less important. I also show that my theory's arguments about territorial value are supported by the cases of expansion opportunities; there is a key correlation between territorial value and expansion.

Moreover, I examine the overall success of offensive realism and the commitment problem at explaining these same cases. If the predictions of the alternate theories do at least as well as this study's theory at explaining territorial war aim expansion, then the theory would be greatly challenged. However, we will see this is not the case. Not only does the narrative analysis show this study's theory performing very well in key conflicts, it also performs well when compared against the alternate theories across the entire universe of cases. For example, offensive realism, although supported by the evidence in several cases, has some particularly notable failures, ones that will be discussed throughout the narrative analysis. Offensive realism, however, is better-supported by the cases than the commitment problem argument, which is only successful in explaining half of the expansion opportunities. In the end, I argue that this study's theory is well supported by the case evidence from these wars, and that the unique methodology used here is useful for understanding these cases in a new way.

Regional Conflict: Defining Terms and Parameters

Before I begin the narrative analysis of the cases, it is important to understand just what cases are of interest in the post-WWII world. I use the Correlates of War (COW) dataset to identify interstate wars, of which there are thirty-eight between 1945 and 2003[272]. However, these wars range from major conflicts with well over one million battle deaths (such as the Iran-Iraq war) to small conflicts fueled in part by soccer rivalries (the Football War), with less than

[272] see Meredith Reid Sarkees and Frank Wayman. *Resort to War: A Data Guide to Inter-State, Extra-State, Intra-State, and Non-State Wars, 1816 - 2007*. (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2010). For the interstate war dataset, see http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war .

two thousand casualties[273]. While one of the goals of this chapter is to examine both large and small conflicts together, we must be careful not to force a comparison between entirely dissimilar cases. As a primary filter, therefore, I choose to focus on wars that have at least 5000 battle deaths. While the COW dataset considers any conflict with at least 1000 battle deaths in a year to be an interstate war[274], I argue that setting a higher threshold is appropriate for this analysis. In particular, looking at death toll allows us to find especially serious conflicts, whether they involve great powers or small powers. Even small powers can fight devastating conflicts with extremely high death tolls[275]. Therefore, setting a threshold on the number of battle deaths makes no assumptions about the relative power of the states involved in the conflict. Nor does it make any assumptions about the war aims any state might have. As we will see, death tolls range wide across conflicts, whether the war aims are discrete or unspecified. However, limiting the analysis to conflicts with 5000 or more battledeaths allows us to focus on especially serious conflicts. We want to see how the different theories fare in the wars that have the potential to have the widest impact on the system.

If we only consider conflicts with 5000 or more battle deaths, we are left with twenty-one conflicts in this period, or slightly over half of the thirty-eight total wars. Of the regions COW codes, there were three wars in Europe, two wars in Africa, eight wars in Asia, six wars in the Middle East, and one war (the War over the

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[273] See Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War*, for the battle deaths for each conflict.
[274] Ibid., 75.
[275] Take for example the Badme Border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, which COW codes as having 120,000 battle deaths (Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War*, 181*)*.

Aouzou strip) that was across regions, as one state is coded as African while the other is coded as Middle East[276]. There is, therefore, a significant difference across regions in terms of the number of conflicts in the time period. Asia and the Middle East were relatively war-prone, while Europe and Africa were relatively peaceful. The severity of conflicts also differs across regions, with Asia in particular having several conflicts with large numbers of battle deaths. I will examine each region's wars and general balance of power, where appropriate. While some wars have certainly been the focus of more research than others, it is important for the following analysis that we at least touch on the important facts of conflict within each region.

We also need specific criteria for identifying opportunities for war aim expansion, the risks of expansion, and the alternate theories' causal mechanisms in these conflicts. It is important to come up with objective criteria that can be applied to each case; otherwise, the researcher can fall into the trap of explaining away any inconsistencies with the theory. However, there is also a problem with objective criteria, which is that, at best, the criteria are simply proxies for large causal mechanisms such as "risk of leaving the opponent dissatisfied". There is always the risk that the criteria will fail to capture an important case, or alternately, that the criteria will make a case where none existed. Nonetheless, this is a useful exercise

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[276] The COW dataset codes cross-regional wars as separate from individual regions (i.e., Europe, Asia, and Europe & Asia), but only one war in the time period is across regions. See Meredith Reid Sarkees, "Inter-state Wars (Version 4.0): Definitions and Variables", the codebook for the interstate wars, found at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war. Note that none of the wars in the Western Hemisphere meet my criteria of at least 5000 battle deaths.

because it allows the researcher to compare across cases using a standard analysis. If the criteria are picked carefully, there is a great deal of benefit to this method.

Expansion Opportunities

First of all, we need a means of identifying an opportunity for war aim expansion. Despite the challenges of proving a negative (i.e., identifying a case where states could expand, but chose not to), I believe it is possible to identify aim expansion opportunities using two basic criteria. First, has one of the states in the conflict clearly achieved its initial war aims? If so, this should represent an opportunity for expansion. For instance, if a state has repulsed an invasion, and considers whether to counter-invade the opposing state, this would be an opportunity to expand war aims. This criterion should capture cases where the potential occupier may have achieved its aims, but the opponent is intent on continuing the conflict regardless. It will pick up cases where the war may still be raging. The second criterion is: if the potential occupier's opponent has clearly signaled its willingness to end the conflict, then the potential occupier has an opportunity to expand its aims. This criterion is designed to capture cases where the opponent has largely been defeated, and the potential occupier is able to enforce its own will. With both these criteria, we are looking for instances in which war aims were achieved. We cannot simply look at times when states clearly expanded, because it is the choice of expansion that interests us.

Of key importance will be distinguishing between a territorial war aim expansion and the opening of a new front in the conflict. At first glance, the two actions might look identical. In both cases, a state would choose to pursue territory

that they had not originally made part of their war aims. However, a new front differs from a territorial war aim in a key fashion. In the former, territory is being occupier in the service of an existing war aim. For instance, a state might escalate conflict by moving from bombing to an actual ground campaign. While the attempt to occupy the territory is new, the main war aim may not have been fulfilled. In that case, I would not consider the state to have had an opportunity to expand or to have taken that opportunity.

Alliances

Second, we must look at whether states with an opportunity to expand had an ally in the conflict, and whether their ally was highly important to their postwar security. This study's theory argues that the higher the risk of losing an important alliance (assuming a high-value ally is opposed to expansion), the less likely a potential occupier will expand territorial war aims when given an opportunity. In order to look at the risk of losing alliances across the various opportunities for expansion, we must therefore establish three facts. First, did the potential occupier with an opportunity for expansion have an ally? Since this study's theory applies whether the ally is "unofficial" or has clear treaty obligations, we need a working definition of "ally". For the purposes of this study, I ask three questions for each opportunity for expansion. First, does the potential occupier have a co-belligerent on its side, fighting on its behalf? If so, the potential occupier has an ally. Second, is the potential occupier clearly supported in the conflict by a major power or a superpower? This support may come in the form of diplomatic assistance, arms sales, military aid, or financial assistance. If such a power exists, then the state has

an ally. And finally, is there a regional power that supports the potential occupier, even if that regional power is not a great power? This tries to capture states that are not necessarily hugely powerful, but on whose support the potential occupier relies. If the answer to any of these questions is yes, then the potential occupier has an ally.

The second question is: if there is any ally, did the ally clearly express its opposition to the potential expansion? I define "clearly express" as the ally clearly making an identifiable public statement opposing aims or a clearly identifiable private statement, or attempting to prevent expansion via diplomatic or military means. Finally, if there is this opposition, how important is the ally for the state's postwar security? There are three criteria I use to proxy for the importance of the ally, two that ought to identify important allies, and one that, by contrast, indicates low-importance allies. First of all, is the alliance of long (at least ten years) standing? This should help distinguish between temporary alliances for the purpose of the conflict, and alliances of greater duration and likely of greater importance. Second, does the potential occupier need the ally to advance its (the potential occupier's) interests in a particular region or in a particular diplomatic context? This should identify important allies who directly contribute to the potential occupier's security through military means, which ought to make them important. Finally, is there another state the ally could switch its allegiance to if it broke ties with the potential occupier? If yes, the ally can be treated as less important. This weeds out cases where the ally might otherwise be considered important, but where the ally is unable to punish the potential expander because the ally needs the potential expander. Even if the ally is important, the potential expander can behave as though

it were not. Overall, these criteria should identify the presence of an ally, the ally's opinion on expansion, and the risks of expansion given the ally's opposition.

Opponent Dissatisfaction

Next, we must look at the probability of future conflict with the same opponent. As I have argued, a key risk to future security is that the potential occupier will create the circumstances for future conflict by leaving its current opponent dissatisfied with the status quo. Occupying additional territory carries the risk that the opponent will want to go to war again in the future in order to regain its territory; or, if the territory is used instrumentally and traded back to it, to regain whatever it had to give up in order to ransom its territory. As every potential occupier engaged in conflict has an opponent by the very nature of war, we do not need a definition of opponent. Measuring the change in the risk of dissatisfaction, however, is a challenging task, as it asks us to weigh the likelihood of a future event based on the situation when the potential occupier is making its decision. I propose the following criteria. First, would the potential expansion threaten the opponent's homeland, rather than disputed territory? If yes, then there should be a higher risk of increasing dissatisfaction. This is designed to identify cases where the opponent might either lose highly valuable territory to the potential occupier, or pay a high cost to get it back if the occupier uses it instrumentally. Second, have the two states fought at least once in the past twenty years? This should highlight cases where the two states are rivals or perhaps have unresolved issues from prior conflict; in such cases, there may already be "bad blood" between the states, and any expansion would be likely to inflame tensions and risk leaving the opponent dissatisfied. We

must, however, be careful to distinguish cases where the opponent is such a threat that the risk of opponent dissatisfaction will be high regardless of territorial expansion. Finally, would the potential occupation overthrow the opponent's government, or otherwise eliminate the opponent from the system? If yes, there is a low risk of increasing opponent dissatisfaction, because the aim of the expansion is eliminating the opponent from the postwar order, either by overthrow or by absorbing the opponent. In these cases, there would be a low risk of opponent dissatisfaction, as the opponent would not be a part of the postwar order.

Reputation

Finally, the risk to a potential occupier's reputation from expanding territory aims needs to be understood. States do not always know which third-party states they might need in the future, and it often behooves them to keep on good terms with these uninvolved parties in case these states may become important in the future. A state that gains a negative reputation may find diplomacy and bargaining more difficult in the future, and this would adversely affect its future security. In order to identify circumstances under which a potential occupier might predict a higher risk of gaining a negative reputation, I suggest three criteria that should indicate whether a state is likely to gain a negative reputation or not. First, is there a ceasefire or proposed ceasefire on the table that the potential occupier would reject if it expanded? This should help identify times where the state will look like an untrustworthy bargaining partner, or at least one not acting in good faith. Second, would the expansion be significantly disproportionate to the initial cause of the conflict or to the potential occupier's initial war aims? This would be a likely

indicator of times where the potential occupier might appear greedy if it expanded. If at either of these questions may be answered with a yes, then I consider the potential occupier to have a high risk of gaining a negative reputation. However, there is one more option. Did the opposing state break a ceasefire before the potential occupier did? I argue in this case that there would be a lower risk of gaining a negative reputation, as the potential occupier can likely cast its opponent as the unreasonable state.

Alternative Theories

We ought also to consider the alternative theories as we move through these conflicts, and so need criteria for identifying the likelihood of their causal mechanisms being in effect. Offensive realism, as we have seen, considers war aim expansion to be relatively likely, as states will only refrain from expansion when they face a potential balancing coalition that can immediately punish them for such an action, or an intervener state. Therefore, we need to look for the presence of balancers or interveners in any given conflict. If they exist, offensive realism would predict expansion. If they do not, offensive realism would predict expansion. If such a coalition existed, offensive realism would predict no expansion.

For the purposes of this argument, I consider a balancing coalition and an intervener to be one and the same: I look for at least one state that has made a clear threat to intervene militarily unless a state stops fighting. This is a strict reading of offensive realism, as even a single state of any strength willing to oppose the potential occupier would mean that no expansion should occur. Nonetheless, it is in line with the expectations of the theory.

Moving to the other alternate theory, we know that the commitment problem argument says war aim expansion is most likely when the potential occupier believes future conflict is either inevitable, or that the states involved in the conflict will not be able to credibly commit to a settlement that would end the conflict. We can look at the overall explanatory value of this argument by looking at how many times potential expanders faced a potential commitment problem, and how often they chose to expand aims when they faced such a problem. First, we have to establish a baseline for when a commitment problem would likely exist in a conflict. I identify three proxies to help detect when a potential occupier might reasonably assume the existence of a commitment problem. First, were there prior attempts during the conflict to find a ceasefire that did not succeed? Second, even if a ceasefire was not proposed, have there been clear attempts to bargain earlier in the conflict? And finally, have the states fought before over the same issues? The first two criteria should point to times where a potential occupier might have reason to assume a negotiated settlement will be difficult; the third indicates when the states have already experienced issues with resolving conflicts, and might therefore do so in the future. These are cases where a potential occupier might reasonably believe a negotiated settlement based on the existing status quo will be difficult to enforce. Any war aim expansion that took place when any one of these criteria was present would therefore provide evidence for the commitment problem argument.

Territorial Value

In summation, these criteria are designed for the purpose of standardizing the analysis of the twenty-one cases of interest. They are easily to observe; unlike

the case studies, where establishing state decision-making was key, the goal of this analysis is to ask whether we would expect a potential occupier to expand given the conditions of the conflict and its relationships with other states. It should be noted that we have not discussed territorial value, an important component of this study's theory. We know the theory argues that states weigh the relative value of the territory they could occupy against the risk that the occupation will endanger their future security by damaging alliances, adversely impacting their reputation, or creating the circumstances for future conflict with the same opponent.

However, developing a consistent definition of inherent or instrumentally valuable territory that can be even applied across many conflicts and time periods is extremely difficult because state preferences differ so much. Territory may have strategic value for one state because of its location or its other strategic defenses, but another state may not be able to realize the same amount of value. Similarly, territory may be inherently valuable to one state because of its cultural value or its importance to a domestic population, but this value would hardly apply for another state. Inherent value may even shift over time as a state develops and changes; for example, a state that has just discovered a natural resource within its own borders would likely see other territory with that natural resource as being less inherently valuable than it was before the resources were discovered, as it would have less need of those resources. Thus, we cannot simply ask whether the territory is materially, strategically, or economically valuable in the abstract, and a single set of criteria is nearly impossible to define. I will, when possible, identify cases where

inherently valuable territory should exist, but the consideration will be on a case-by-case basis.

Instrumentally valuable territory is also difficult to determine. When a state does choose to expand and take instrumental territory, we can often judge it to have been instrumental territory by how the state uses it. But if the state opts not to occupy the territory, it can be difficult to determine what value the territory may have had. The territory may have value or lack value in the abstract, but without an in-depth analysis of the lack of inherent value *for that particular state*, we cannot draw any conclusions about the overall value of the territory. Again, we will have to look at territory on a case-by-case basis. While the regional summaries will highlight the potential value of the territory, the comparative analysis will focus largely on the risks to future security as a reason for refusing to expand. As we know, a high risk to the state's future security should decrease the overall likelihood of expansion regardless of how valuable the territory is. If I can show that states with high risks to their future security were less likely to expand given the opportunity to do so, that provides significant support to the theory even without an extended examination of the differences in territorial value. Now that we know the metrics we will use to examine the conflicts, we can move onto the case narratives.

Europe: Post-Cold War Conflict

We have seen in this dissertation's prior chapters that Europe has been a hotbed of conflict in many eras of history. However, after the ravages of World War II, Europe has been relatively peaceful in terms of conflict on the continent. While Great Britain and France, for instance, were involved in several conflicts concerning

decolonization, Cold War dynamics helped to prevent interstate conflict between European states. It is notable that the there are only three conflicts within Europe during the postwar period with significant casualties, and all of them occurred after the Cold War had ended; all three also concerned states in Eastern Europe. Of these three, two stem from the same source of conflict: the breakup of Yugoslavia. We know of Tito's political acumen from his dealings with his great-power allies; no less important was his ability to hold together a disparate country by downplaying ethnicity[277]. While it would be an exaggeration to say that Tito's death was the main reason Yugoslavia was no longer viable as a country, it was not long before the bloody business of disintegration hit the country. Of the multiple conflicts that comprise the breakup, two, the first part of the war in Bosnia, and the NATO involvement in Kosovo, meet the criteria of interstate conflicts with at least 5000 casualties.

In the strictest sense the War of Bosnian Independence was only an interstate war for a brief time, while Yugoslavian forces were officially engaged in Bosnia[278]. To be more specific, the Yugoslav army (the JNA), which was at this point essentially in the service of Serbian leaders, began working with Serb forces to take control of Bosnian territory in April 1992[279]. After much discussion and negotiation,

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[277] For example, Barry R. Posen, speaking about Kosovo, says that "the symbolic and immediate emotion value of Kosovo to Serbs today may be higher than it was in Tito's time *when a kind of cosmopolitan, socialist, Yugoslav patriotism was the state ideology*" (italics mine). Barry R. Posen, "The War for Kosovo: Serbia's Political-Military Strategy", *International Security* 24, no. 4 (Spring 2000), 39-84. doi:10.1162/016228800560309. 42

[278] Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War* 177.

[279] See Laura Silber and Allan Little, *Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation*. (New York: Penguin Books, 1997). 222. See also Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History*

and a certain amount of diplomatic pressure, Yugoslavia (which was at this point, essentially Serbia) pulled its army out to "end" the interstate war[280]. It is clear though that there was substantial interaction and assistance between Yugoslav forces and Bosniac Serb forces even after the interstate portion was over[281]. In order to consider each of these conflicts evenly, I do believe we ought to focus on the clear examples of interstate conflict, even if in this case that means overlooking several years of much more serious, and much more significant, conflict. Looking strictly at the interstate conflict, I cannot see that there was any opportunity to expand war aims on either side. Serb forces wished to remain in Yugoslavia, whereas Bosnian leadership wanted independence and unification[282]. Unfortunately, neither of these aims would be achieved by June 1992. It would take several more years of bloody conflict to end the struggle over Bosnia, and then new conflict over the former Yugoslavia began.

Once again, when it comes to Kosovo, we have a distinction between a significant amount of violence that was not interstate, and a limited, but still

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(Washington Square: New York University Press, 1994), 236, who notes the territorial intentions of some of the paramilitary groups.

[280] See Silber, Little, *Yugoslavia*; they note that "Under intense international pressure, Belgrade ordered the JNA to withdraw from Bosnia later that month. But the pull-out was cosmetic because by now most of the officers and soldiers stationed in Bosnia were natives. They did not withdraw. Belgrade had transformed them into a Bosnian Serb army 80,000 strong". (242-243). See also Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War,* 177.

[281] See Malcolm, who argues that "It is not possible to believe that the army which was fighting in Bosnia from late May onwards consisted entirely of Bosnian Serbs"; he also notes that "Not until eleven months later…was there any divergence between the strategy of the 'Bosnian Serb' army leadership and the policies of Belgrade" (Malcolm, *Bosnia*, 239).

[282] Silber and Little highlight the Serbs in Bosnia choosing to try to create the Republika Srpska (*Yugoslavia,* 218), while the Bosnian leadership was "fundamentally opposed to any division of Bosnia" (219).

casualty-prone, interstate conflict. The interstate portion of the war in Kosovo concerns the NATO bombing campaign in 1999. Perhaps unique among the wars of interest, this war has been called a "'humanitarian war'"; its purpose was to force Serbia to cease its ethnic violence campaign in Kosovo[283]. This was a war of airpower, at least on the NATO side, designed to stop the violence and bring Milošević to the table[284]. While the effectiveness of the bombing campaign had its uncertain moments[285], what is certainly true is that Milošević eventually gave in and agreed to end the conflict while it was still in the air power stage[286]. Given the clearly limited nature of NATO war aims and the desire to keep their role in the conflict restricted to their air, I argue that it would be wrong to consider there to have been an opportunity to expand aims in this case. Yes, when Serbia agreed to

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[283] See Adam Roberts, "NATO's 'Humanitarian War' over Kosovo", *Survival*, 41, No. 3, (Autumn 1999), 102-123, DOI: 10.1080/00396339912331342943, for an point about this as a 'humanitarian war" (102). As to why NATO became involved in the first place, Roberts argues that at least part of the reason was "the NATO states were united by a sense of shame that, in the first four years of atrocious wars in the former Yugoslavia (1991-1995), they had failed, individually and collectively, to devise coherent policies and to engage in decisive actions". (104).

[284] See Benjamin S. Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operation Assessment* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), who notes about NATO's war plans that "the declared goals of which were a verifiable halt to ethnic cleaning and atrocities on the ground in Kosovo; a withdrawal of all but a token number of VJ, MUP, and paramilitary troops from Kosovo; the deployment of an international peacekeeping force in Kosovo; the return of refugees and their unhindered access to aid; and the laying of groundwork for a future settlement in Kosovo" (10).

[285] Lambeth discusses the different stages of the air war, noting at least in the early part "that Operation Allied Force had failed to meet its declared goal of halting Serbian violence against the ethnic Albanians". Lambeth, *NATO's Air War*, 26.

[286]Posen argues that Milošević came to the table in part because of the bombing campaign was becoming more dangerous, in part because "the Russians had probably made clear that they had gotten as much as they could or would for Serbia. And the escalating scale of the bombing, despite collateral damage…ought to have show Milosevic that NATO would not split over this issue" (Posen, "The War for Kosovo", 82).

come to the table, NATO achieved all its war aims, but given the almost unique nature of this conflict, this cannot be seen as an opportunity to expand aims. I would argue in particular that this conflict, despite the death toll and the interstate nature, is properly seen as a coercive action. Yes, NATO achieved its aims. But since its aims were coercive rather than expansive, the only way to be sure the aims would be met would be to agree to end the bombing as promised. To expand after that would be to fair to achieve the aim.

Ultimately, I argue that neither of these conflicts presented an opportunity for expansion on the part of any of the belligerents. While territory was occupied in this part of the Bosnian conflict, the Serbs did not achieve all their war aims[287], nor did Bosnia indicate it wished the conflict to end. There was, therefore, no opportunity to expand. Similarly, the war for Kosovo presented neither the NATO allies nor their Serb opponents with a clear opportunity to expand. While one could argue in the strictest sense that the NATO forces had the military opportunity to expand their aims once Milošević had given in, the nature of their aims was such that territorial expansion was unfathomable and would have made ending the conflict impossible, as the end of the conflict was predicated on successful coercion. In short, due to a combination of maximalist war aims (Bosnia) and coercive war aims (Kosovo), no state in these conflicts truly had an opportunity to consider war aim expansion. Let us now turn to the other conflict in Europe during this time.

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[287] See Peter Calvocoressi, *World Politics Since 1945*, Ninth Edition (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 2009), 272; he notes that Bosnian Serbs had the aim of "a distinct Serb state in as much of Bosnia as they might be able to conquer". (272).

The Azeri-Armenian war, oddly ill known given how recently it occurred, is also a difficult one to examine because of its nature as a mixed civil/interstate war[288]. However, unlike the Yugoslavian wars, the interstate portion of this conflict was fairly lengthy, and had an opportunity for territorial war aim expansion. The main cause was the question of the province of Nagorno-Karabakh, up until now part of Azerbaijan, but largely Armenian in makeup; indeed, there had been conflict throughout the Soviet era in this province as it hoped to leave Azerbaijan[289]. Fighting on the part of Nagorno-Karabakh rebels began in 1991, though the interstate conflict did not officially begin until 1993[290]. It is clear that Armenia's main goals were to help Nagorno-Karabakh break away from Azerbaijan, and likely to gain it for itself; however, we must contend with the question of whether Armenia's strategy of expanding into Azeri territory (rather than remaining in the disputed province) in the later part of the conflict should count as both an opportunity and a choice to expand war aims.

I assert that, while Armenian gains in Azeri territory as of spring/summer 1993 were part of initial war aims, it had attained its main war aims before a ceasefire went into place. and thus when the ceasefire was broken, it had an opportunity for expansion. At the time of the ceasefire, Nagorno-Karabakh and

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[288] See Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War,* who note the "several interrelated problems in coding these wars (the intra-state and the inter-state)" (179).
[289]See Svante E. Cornell, "Turkey and the Conflict in Nagorno Karabakh: A Delicate Balance", *Middle Eastern Studies* 34, No. 1 (January 1998), 51-72, DOI:10.1080/00263209808701209: he provides a good explanation of the background of Armenian/Azerbaijani issues, and of Nagorno Karabakh in particular (52-56).
[290]See Cornell, "Turkey and the Conflict", 56, for a discussion of the early part of the conflict, and Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War*, 179, for a discussion of Armenia's entry into it.

Armenia had already moved into Azerbaijani territory, though this was arguably in order to consolidate their prior gains rather than a change in aims[291]. After Azerbaijan broke the ceasefire, they pushed for different Azerbaijani territory, which was of inherent strategic importance[292].

Since this is an opportunity (and a claimed one) for expansion, let us look at the risk factors. I argue that Armenia did not possess an important ally. True, Russia did provide military aid, but this was limited in its utility; Thomas De Waal notes that "it is debatable if it [Russian aid] was the primary cause of the Armenian victory in 1993-1994"[293]. There is also little indication that Russia would have objected to war aim expansion; indeed, it can be argued that Russia needed Armenia too much to make much of a protest[294]. However, there ought to have been a high risk of opponent dissatisfaction in this conflict, given that the expansion was into

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[291] See Michael Kambeck and Sargis Ghazaryan,"Timeline 1918-2011". In *Europe's Next Avoidable War: Nagorno-Karabakh*. Ed. Michael Kambeck and Sargis Ghazaryan. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 26. They note that in March and August 1993, "Combined Armenian and Karabakhi forces launch a counter-attack, regain parts of eastern and northern Nagorno-Karabakh and move westward, eastward, and southward, beyond the administrative borders of Nagorno-Karabakh. The goal is to control strategic places from where the key Azerbaijani attacks have originated in the past and to shorten the frontline". (26).

[292] See Kambeck and Ghazaryan, "Timeline"; they note that "Their goal is now to gain a significantly shorter frontline in the shape of a simple rectangle touching Armenia in the west and Iran in the south. The new much shorter frontline faces "risks" only from the east and north and lies in more controllable lowland area" (27).

[293] Thomas De Waal*, Black Garden : Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War,* (New York : New York University Press, 2003), ProQuest ebrary. 200.

[294]See Cornell, who notes that "After Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent, however, it soon became clear that Armenia was Russia's only reliable ally in the region". Cornell, "Turkey and the Conflict", 58.

Azerbaijani territory proper[295]. As for reputation, while taking Azerbaijani territory could be seen as unreasonably disproportionate to aims, there is little evidence that there were any significant third-parties even paying attention to the conflict at the time[296]. All in all, I would characterize this as a low risk to reputation. In terms of the alternate theories, offensive realism is supported by the fact that no state appeared to be interested in intervention, so there was little to hold Armenia back from continued war aims. And, the fact that the territory was taken to consolidate existing gains after the broken ceasefire also supports the commitment problem, especially as it was the opponent that broke the ceasefire and signaled that it could not be trusted to end the conflict. In summation, this was an opportunity to expand into inherently valuable territory that was seized, by a state with a low risk to its alliances, a high risk of opponent dissatisfaction, and a low risk to reputation. It also supports both alternate theories. Of the three European conflicts, therefore, we see that while all three involved issues of territorial control, only in one was there an opportunity to expand. Let us now turn to another region, one that, while it was hardly peaceful, only had a few significant wars.

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[295] See Cornell, who notes that by the end of the conflict "Not only the territory of the NKAO was under the control of Armenia forces, but also neighboring and surrounding regions, which were homogenously Azeri-populated". Ibid., 56.

[296] See Elmar Brok, who notes for instance that "the EU was too busy with its imminent neighborhood and internal reforms when the so-called "frozen conflicts" emerged….Our televisions were showing victims every evening, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro, but virtually no camera went as far as the South Caucasus. The war in Nagorno-Karabakh was something very far away and abstract…Our foreign policy structures were too weak, and not at all integrated between the EU members, to address frozen conflicts". Elmar Brok, "The EU's New Foreign Policy and Its Impact on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict", In *Europe's Next Avoidable War: Nagorno-Karabakh*. Ed. Michael Kambeck and Sargis Ghazaryan, 104. See also Cornell, who notes that "Azerbaijan received little support, either real or verbal, from the world community". Cornell, "Turkey and the Conflict, 57.

Africa: Fixing the Borders

While post-World War II Africa was certainly not without violence, there were relatively few interstate conflicts after World War II. The significant ones that did take place were by and large wars about borders and territorial makeup of states. Of five interstate conflicts, three are significant and worth examining. In particular, we see an opportunity to expand aims in one conflict, though the opportunity was not seized.

This conflict is the Second Ogaden War, phase two, between Somalia and Ethiopia in the late 1970s. This is an interesting and important conflict to study, as it is an example of how even conflict between two minor powers can escalate into serious conflict, and can open up opportunities for expansion. Like several smaller conflicts in the universe of cases, this conflict had its roots in a dispute over territory. In particular, the Ogaden region, officially owned by Ethiopia, was the subject of ownership claims by Somalia; the territory was desirable because of domestic factors[297]. Somalia invaded the territory in July 1977[298] and, while it took Ethiopia some time and substantial outside material assistance – in particular, the Soviet Union "began massive arms deliveries to Ethiopia, decisively tilting the

[297] See Gebru Tareke, "The Ethiopia-Somalia War of 1977 Revisited", *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 33, no. 3 (2000), 635-668, DOI: 10.2307/3097438. He notes that "the Somali state sought to wrest the Ogaden from Ethiopia on ethnic and cultural grounds" (637).
[298] See Tareke, "The Ethiopia-Somalia War", 644.

balance" [299]– it was able to push Somali forces out of the Ogaden region and retake its own territory[300].

I argue that at this point, Ethiopia did have an opportunity to expand its territorial aims, as it had recovered nearly all of its own territory and achieved the initial aim of restoring its territorial integrity[301]. Ethiopia could theoretically have pursued aims into Somali territory, or at the least, attempted to regain even more of its lost territory. Why did it not do so? The reason is that the territory it could have occupied inside Somalia had essentially no value: it was neither inherently valuable nor particularly instrumentally useful for bargaining purposes. Even the Ogaden itself could be seen as being of limited value, at least for Ethiopia[302]. Regaining its territory was a worthwhile aim, especially if it could do so with the assistance of a superpower, but additional territory would not be worth the military effort of expansion.

In terms of risks, given the extent of the Soviet Union's support, and a lack of any indication that it would have objected to additional aims, I must argue that there

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[299] Ibid., 655. Soviet advisors and Cuban troops also arrived to support Ethiopian aims (656).

[300] See Ibid., 660. Tareke notes that "the Somalis were on the run and it took just three weeks to restore Ethiopian sovereignty over nearly all of the occupied areas".

[301] To be fair, Tareke does note that some territory previously belonging to Ethiopia remained outside of its control at the end of the conflict (Ibid., 660).

[302] See Tobias Hagmann and Benedikt Korf, "Agamben in the Ogaden: Violence and Sovereignty in the Ethiopian-Somali frontier", *Political Geography* 31 (2012), 205-214, Doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2011.12.004. They note that "The Ethiopian highland elite and much of Ethiopian historiography… perceive the Somali borderland as a largely empty space, devoid of civilization" (206). See also Tareke, who notes that "the Ogaden is mostly desert; only thorn vegetation thrives…Except for the fertile belts along river basins where limited sedentary life exists, it is a barren and bleak landscape of flat-topped hills and arid plains" (Tareke, "The Ethiopian-Somali War Revisited", 636-337).

was a low risk from alliances. The U.S.S.R had given so much to Ethiopia in order to achieve victory; there is no indication that they had any objection to expansion, or that that aid would be removed if Ethiopia went too far. There was certainly a high risk of opponent dissatisfaction if they expanded, given that it would have been into a neighbor's territory; even without expansion, conflict between the states did not entirely end with the war[303]. Moreover, given the ineptitude of the OAU in promoting negotiations before the conflict, the fact that it was Somalia that started the conflict, and the U.S.'s hands-off attitude, there is no reason to believe Ethiopia's reputation would have suffered unduly from expansion; third-parties were clearly mostly disinterested in the conflict[304]. Since there seems to be no potential intervener against Ethiopia (again, remember that U.S. was largely hands-off), offensive realism would likely predict expansion, so the fact that Ethiopia did not expand is quite problematic. To be fair, an offensive realist might argue that offensive realism was not designed to deal with the problems of small states; nonetheless, this is a significant problem for this alternative theory. And, while conflict between the two states did continue, indicating a commitment problem, there is no reason to believe that taking additional territory would solve it. I would say therefore that the commitment problem argument should predict no expansion, which is what occurred.

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[303] See Tareke, "The Ethiopian-Somali War Revisited", 663.
[304] See Donna R. Jackson, "The Ogaden War and the Demise of Détente", *Annals, AAPSS* 662, (November 2010), 26-40, DOI: 10.1177/0002716210378833. She points out the OAU's rather unsuccessful role (28), and that "the [Carter] administration continued to believe that "African problems should be solved by Africans themselves"". (29).

Next, we have the War over the Aouzou strip, between Chad and Libya. This conflict also involved fighting over the ownership of disputed territory; in this case, the Aouzou strip, a materially valuable piece of territory on the border between the two states[305]. There was, in fact, a long-standing military claim of the Aouzou strip by Libya, stretching back more than a decade before the conflict actively became a serious interstate war[306]. Indeed, Libya had taken a certain amount of Chad's territory before the war began[307]. However, despite nearly a year of fighting, and a certain amount of success on the part of Chad to regain the territory, when a ceasefire came down from the OAR there was no definite change in the ownership of the territory[308]. I argue therefore that state had a clear opportunity to expand aims. If ownership of the territory was both states' main war aim, this was not resolved by conflict or by negotiation during the conflict[309].

Finally, the Badme Border war, a conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, is, despite its rather horrific death toll, also of limited interest for war aim expansion. The two states began fighting over where the border between them lay in 1998, and while the fighting was intense, ultimately I argue there was no opportunity to

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[305] The strip was of inherent territorial value; see Gino J. Naldi, "The Aouzou Strip Dispute- A Legal Analysis", *Journal of African Law* 33, no. 1 (Spring 1989), 72-77, DOI: 10.1017/S0021855300007993. Naldi notes that "The Aouzou Strip is a region of some 44,000 square miles in the north of Chad bordering the whole 500 mile frontier with Libya. It is reputedly rich in minerals, particularly uranium" (72).

[306] See Naldi, "The Aouzou Strip Dispute", 73.

[307] See "Chad/Libya", *Africa Report* 39, Issue 3, (May-June 1994), 7. ISSN: 00019836. It notes that "By 1983, Libya… had extended its occupation far deeper into Chad, effectively controlling the half of the country which lies north of the 16th parallel". (7).

[308] Naldi notes that Chad had pushed Libya out of its own territory, but that there was still fighting over the strip itself when "The OAU…negotiated a temporary truce". (73).

[309] See "Chad/Libya"; the dispute was eventually "taken before the ICJ" (7).

expand war aims for either side. While on the face of it, this conflict was about territory, some scholars even allege the conflict was more about inter-ethnic group dynamics than about territory or security[310]. It is true that Ethiopia advanced into Eritrean territory, but this appears to have been part of the existing plan of defeating the Eritrean army rather than an attempt to occupy the territory[311]. While Ethiopia might be said to have had an opportunity to expand aims, given its success on the battlefield and the fact that it had recovered its territory, I argue that Eritrea's unwillingness to give in and end the fighting before the Ethiopians chose to end the conflict indicates that Ethiopia did not have a clear opportunity to expand[312]. An opponent that is willing to keep fighting indicates that the aims of conflict – both recovering territory and ending the debate over ownership – were not entirely gained.

In summation, as with European conflicts, we see that one out of three African conflicts had an opportunity to expand aims. It is interesting to note that

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[310] See Leenco Lata, "The Ethiopian-Eritrea War", *Review of African Political Economy* 30, no. 97, The Horn of Conflict (September 2003), 369-388, DOI:10.1080/03056244.2003.9659772. Lata even calls into question whether this should be seen as an interstate war: "typifying the war that broke out between Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 1998 as inter or intra-ethnic, inter or intra-state, inter or intra-national seems to depend on the perspective of the designator". (374). See also Martin Plaut, who quotes the Ethiopian leader as saying "For us, Badme is nothing, but the principle behind invading Badme is everything". Quoted in Martin Plaut, "Background to War: From Friends to Foes". In *Unfinished Business: Eritrea and Ethiopia at War*. Ed. Dominque Jacquin-Berdal and Martin Plaut (Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press, Inc., 2005). 3.

[311] Martin Plaut argues that "Its [Ethiopia's] objective for the last few months of the war was to retake all areas occupied by Eritrea…and then to destroy as much Eritrean military capacity as possible before international pressure force a halt to the fighting". Martin Plaut, "The Conflict and Its Aftermath", In *Unfinished Business: Eritrea and Ethiopia at War*. Ed. Dominque Jacquin-Berdal and Martin Plaut, 104.

[312] See Plaut, "The Conflict and Its Aftermath", 106-107.

both the conflicts with expansion opportunities – the Azeri-Armenian war and the Ogaden war – were wars over territory between two smaller power states. Unlike Armenia, however, Ethiopia chose not to expand its aims. I have argued that this was almost entirely due to the low inherent and low instrumental value of the territory that could have been taken. There was also a high risk of opponent dissatisfaction. This is, moreover, a conflict that the alternative theories cannot explain well. There is no indication of any state being willing to intervene; offensive realism should predict expansion. So should the commitment problem argument, as the high likelihood of future conflict in the region was high; maximalist aims might have prevented Somalia from being able to attack again. Let us now turn to a more war-prone region, and one where there was multiple opportunities to expand war aims during conflict.

The Middle East

The Middle East is second only to Asia in regions most prone to interstate conflict between 1945 and 2003. It is also a notable region for having multiple conflicts between several of the same actors, decade after decade. Of the ten total wars, seven meet our criteria, which means that most of the wars in this region were significant. In particular, Israeli fought four significant wars against neighboring states in less than sixty years; It is thus appropriate to examine these together, as the belligerents were similar time and again. We begin therefore with the multiple Arab-Israeli wars, starting in 1948, as Israel sought to gain its full independence and territorial integrity. After looking at these wars, I examine the three other wars, all of which involved Iraq.

Israeli Wars

As I have noted, of the seven significant wars in the Middle East between 1945 and 2003, four of them involved Israel and its near neighbors. Much of the history of the modern Middle East is marked by the conflict over Israel's existence, borders, and relationships with its neighbors. Indeed, this is a region where territory is especially important, given the relative size of these states, material resources, and strategic advantages of certain bits of land. If territorial expansion would pay in any region of the world, it should pay in the Middle East. We must therefore consider the Arab-Israeli conflicts as especially important in this study.

Conflict between these belligerents dates from the very beginning of Israel as a state, in the Arab-Israeli War in 1948. No sooner had Israel attained its independence when many of the Arab states attacked Israel simultaneously[313]; over the next eight months, however, Israel proved that it could be very successful against multiple opponents, even given its small size[314]. This was a war for survival, for testing Israel's fledgling state, and for consolidating control over territory. And, though the IDF faced many challenges, it was overall very successful in this conflict[315]. I do not, however, consider there to have been an opportunity for territorial expansion during this conflict. True, Israel gained some territory in the

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[313] Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War,* 146.

[314] It was assisted in part by ineffectual fighting on the part of its opponents; Calvocoressi notes that "Five Arab states marched against Israel but their action was no index of their keenness for a fight or their effectiveness in it. The Syrians did little and the Lebanese less; the Iraqis retired early and the Egyptians arrived late; the Jordanians were thwarted by the Jewish defense of Jerusalem". Calvocoressi, *World Politics Since 1945*, 321.

[315] For a in-depth examination of the fighting, see Martin van Creveld, *The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002). Chapter 6. "Repelling Invasion".

conflict, but its primary aim in the conflict was self-defense, and leaders only went beyond this in order to try to defeat Egypt militarily[316]. Moreover, although some of the belligerent states left the war early, the fact that Israel had to continue fighting Egypt indicates there was no true opportunity to consider other aims[317]. Nor is there any indication that Israel achieved all its aims by the end of the conflict, as it did not destroy the Egyptian army[318]. Therefore, despite the importance of the 1948 war in establishing Israel's statehood, territorial claims, and rivalries with its neighbors, it is not a conflict in which we should look for war aim expansion. However, other conflicts did include opportunities for war aim expansion, and we should look at those now.

Of all the conflicts between Israel and its neighbors, the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, also known as the Six Day War, is the one where there was both the greatest opportunity for territorial war aim expansion, and also the most territorial expansion undertaken. It is also the war that did the most to create the modern Middle East, as Arab states have spent years trying to recover from the loss of prestige, and Israel has spent years trying to live up to the reputation for military

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316 See Avi Kober, who notes Ben-Gurion's understanding "that Israel must defeat the Egyptian army as quickly as possible…No less important was his belief that operational convenience did not justify risking a conflict with the great powers and that pushing the Egyptians back to the international border could be achieved without operating on Egyptian soil. Ben-Gurion's instruction to the Israeli troops to limit the territorial scope of the operation was met with reservations on the part of the military but was obeyed". Avi Kober, "Great-Power Involvement and Israeli Battlefield Success in the Arab-Israeli Wars, 1948-1982", *Journal of Cold War Studies* 8, No. 1, (Winter 2006), 20-48, DOI: 10.1162/152039706775212058. 26-27.

317 Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War* 146.

318 van Creveld, *The Sword and the Olive,* 93; he notes that "But for Ben Gurion's decision to heed the UN Security Council resolution and let it go [the Egyptian army], it would have been annihilated"

success it attained in this conflict[319]. Perhaps a true preemptive war as few wars have been, this conflict started when Israel chose to attack its neighbors first in the fear that war was coming[320]. After establishing air superiority in a truly spectacular fashion[321], Israel did extremely well, fighting on multiple fronts at once and eventually gaining two opportunities for territorial expansion, one against Jordan, the other against Syria. Though Israel did also gain territory from Egypt, taking Egyptian territory had been discussed as part of Israeli war planning, and so, though the opportunity arose, taking the territory should not be seen as an expansion in aims. It was an achievement of existing aims[322].

By contrast, Israel had not originally intended to fight Jordan, still less to take the Old City of Jerusalem; however, when Jordan entered the conflict (albeit rather weakly[323]), instead of ignoring it Israel went on the offensive, likely because it had already achieved a fair amount of success against Egypt and had the military capability to focus elsewhere. Israel did indeed take advantage of the opportunity it was afforded by having already achieved its war aims against Egypt; it expanded and took territory. Crucially, Israeli forces went for the Old City of Jerusalem, which had incredible inherent value for its cultural and historic significance to Israelis.

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[319] Oren highlights just how earth-shattering this war was: "All but 15 percent of Egypt's military hardware, $2 billion worth, was destroyed, and vast stores – 320 tanks, 480 guns, 2 SAM missile batteries, and 10,000 vehicles – became Israeli booty. The Jordanian list was also painfully long… In all, the IAF destroyed 469 enemy planes". Oren, *Six Days of War*, 305-306.
[320] Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War* 158.
[321] Oren notes that, on the first day of the war, "In little over half an hour, the Egyptians had lost 204 planes – half their air force – all but nine of them on the ground". Oren, *Six Days of War*, 175.
[322] van Creveld, *The Sword and the Olive,* 182-183.
[323] Ibid., 188.

Similarly, Israel did not expand against Syria until after Egypt had bowed out; it then used this opportunity for expansion to expand with the aim of attaining the Golan Heights[324]. The Heights represented extremely important, inherently valuable territory, as their strategic value cannot be denied[325].

In the end, we see that Israel had two main opportunities for expansion, and it took both of them. In terms of risks, there was overall a low risk of from Israel's main ally, the U.S. While it is clear the U.S. did not support Israel's full expansionist aims[326], it was neither adamantly opposed nor in a position to seriously punish Israel given that it was the U.S.' main ally in the region. While the U.S. might disapprove of Israeli action, Israeli politicians had no reason to fear that war aim expansion would risk dissolving what was certain to be a long-term alliance regardless. In essence, they could proceed as though the U.S. was of low value to Israel's future security, as the U.S. could not punish it.

Of course, there was a high likelihood of opponent dissatisfaction with both opportunities, given prior conflict and the fact that Israel was taking important territory. However, given the Arab states' extreme hostility towards Israel anyway, what is clear is that expanding did not substantially change the likelihood of Arab dissatisfaction. Given the 1948 War and the state of diplomatic discourse, conflict between these actors was clearly likely regardless of whether Israel pursued additional aims. I therefore consider this conflict to be an example where there was

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[324] Ibid., 192.
[325] Oren notes that "Exceedingly vulnerable before the war, its major cities all within range of Arab guns, the Jewish state now threatened Damascus, Cairo, and Amman" . Oren, *Six Days of War,* 307.
[326] See Ibid.*,* 242.

a fairly low risk of *increasing* opponent dissatisfaction by expansion. There was also a fairly high risk to reputation, given Israel's preemption and the fact that the expanded aims could easily be argued to be disproportionate. As for the alternate theories, I would say that a commitment problem did exist here, given prior war between these states; however, it is unclear that taking additional territory could solve this commitment problem. While attaining the Golan Heights certainly made attack from Syria more difficult, it did not make it impossible, and certainly taking the Old City did not make Jordan less likely to restart conflict. Finally, I argue that this is a strong case for offensive realism. While Soviet Union could be considered a balancer who might have intervened, there is evidence that once Egypt was out of the war, the risk of Soviet intervention went down[327].

The next conflict between Israel and Egypt, the War of Attrition, stemmed purely from these already existing territorial concerns[328]. In particular, this conflict included skirmishing and conflict along the new border between Egypt and Israel. While the battle deaths eventually reached a level where we need to consider this a serious conflict, it is notable that this "war" was largely low-level conflict spread over a limited period of time; this is not an example of pitched battles or significant fighting. Even though Egypt was assisted by the Soviet Union, it was unable to do

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[327] van Creveld, *The Sword and the Olive,* 192. See also Kober, who argues that "the threat to Soviet interests in the region, particularly to Moscow's relations with its regional clients, was not of the highest order… these factors prompted the USSR to do no more than warn Israel". Kober, "Great-Power Involvement and Israeli Battlefield Success", 30-31.

[328] Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War,* 160.

much to Israeli forces[329]. This therefore is not a case where there was an opportunity to expand war aims. Indeed, the very aim of the war on Egypt's end seems largely to harass Israel, and Israel simply responded militarily[330].

Finally, let us turn to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. This conflict, an attempt by Egypt and Syria to reverse Israeli gains from 1967 and to recover their territory, put Israel in a very different position than it had been in during the previous war. This was a difficult war for Israel, given its troubling position after it was taken unprepared by Egypt and Syria's attack[331]. However, the IDF (Israeli Defense Force) was a formidable opponent, and though the conflict was brutal, Israel did succeed in reversing its opponents' gains[332]. Moreover, even though Israel had lost enough materiel to need assistance from the United States, the fact that it had regained all of its territory and satisfied its initial war aims on both fronts meant that there was two opportunities to expand during this war: one against Egypt, and the other

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[329] The assistance should not be understated, however; Dima P. Adamsky notes that "Throughout the Arab-Israeli Cold War crises, Moscow made explicit or implicit threat to intervene militarily…only during the War of Attrition – an engagement that took place between March 1969 and August 1970 – did the Soviet threat prove to be more than a political bluff. An Air Defense division and two Air Force regiments – numbering around 10,000 men, arrived in Egypt and clashed with the Israeli Defense Forces". Dima P. Adamsky, "'Zero-Hour for the Bears': Inquiring into the Soviet Decision to Intervene in the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition, 1969-70", *Cold War History* 6, no. 1, (February 2006), 113-136, DOI: 10.1080/14682740500395501. 113-114.

[330] Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War*, 160. They actually note that "neither side was achieving its aims".

[331] See van Creveld, *The Sword and the Olive,* 225-229 for a summary of the opening of the Egyptian side of the conflict, and 229-232 for the Syrian side, which was much more dangerous for Israel.

[332] van Creveld notes for instance that "When the guns finally fell silent the IDF on the Golan Heights had recaptured all the territory lost to the Syrians during the first days of the war and then some". Ibid., 236.

against Syria[333]. In both cases, Israel chose to counter-attack and occupy additional territory. It did succeed, although the amount of territory occupied was nowhere close to what it had achieved in the 1967 conflict.

We therefore have two opportunities for expansion in this conflict, both of which were realized. I argue that this represents a case in which there was a low risk to Israel's key alliance – the United States – from expansion. What is interesting is that this is for a different reason than during the 1967 war. In this conflict, the U.S. was providing much stronger support in this case, and was anxious to see a strong Israeli victory[334]. While Israel was likely aware it could not go too far, some additional territorial gains would not damage this alliance. I also argue that, given that Israel was on the defense this time, there was a lower likelihood of gaining a negative reputation than there was in the 1967 war. As Israel had not been the preemptor, and as it had had a difficult fight, I cannot see that the risk to its reputation would have been particularly high. Finally, as with the 1967 war, while there was a high risk of opponent dissatisfaction, this would be true regardless of

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[333] For a description of Israel's negotiation with the U.S. for additional materiel, see David Tal, "A Tested Alliance: The American Airlift to Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War", *Israel Studies* 19, No. 3 (Fall 2014) 29-54, DOI: 10.1353/is.2014.0028. Tal notes in terms of expanded aims that "The Israeli government had decided to launch counterattacks on both fronts that day. The objectives were to drive the Egyptian army back across the Canal; to repel the Syrian army across the cease-fire line; and to inflict heavy blows on both armies". (37).

[334]See Tal, who notes that "Kissinger would urge Israel time and again to achieve a sweeping victory. Viewing the war both in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Cold War, he thought that Israel, using American arms and being an ally, should demonstrate the benefits of the association with the US for US Arab allies – and for those not allied with the US – to plainly see. In addition, a decisive Israeli victory would allow the war to be terminated and a move to the next step under American terms, and not Soviet". Tal, "A Tested Alliance", 37.

expansion. If Israel's opponents were dissatisfied about the territory taken in 1967, they would be dissatisfied about this territorial expansion as well.

In terms of the alternative theories, this is a case that supports offensive realism, even though the Soviet Union made an intervention threat[335]. However, as Kober demonstrates, at this point the USSR had likely lost credibility, and Israel was not afraid to expand in the face of the threat[336]. It was not therefore a credible intervener. This is, however, not an excellent case for the commitment problem argument; while a commitment problem existed, there is no evidence that this extra territory would be useful in helping to solve it. Let us now turn to the other Middle East wars; to be more specific, the three wars concerning Iraq.

Wars Involving Iraq

The last three wars in the Middle East involved Iraq as one of the belligerents, and so again, we can examine these wars together. These three conflicts were all due in large measure to Saddam Hussein: the Iran-Iraq War, because he began the conflict, the Gulf War, because of his occupation of Kuwait, and the 2003 Iraq War, because of the Bush administration's belief in him as a risk to U.S. security given his past behavior. It is interesting that in two of the three

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[335] See Kober, "Great Power Involvement and Israeli Battlefield Success", 34-35: Kober notes that "The Israeli advance on the Syrian front aroused great concern in Moscow" (34), and that "On the southern front, the higher the probability of Egyptian defeat, the more inclined the Soviet Union was to intervene. To this end, Soviet leaders put their strategic air force on alert…Israel responded by deploying Jericho surface-to-air missiles, leaving the nature of their warheads for the Soviet Union to ponder" (35).

[336] Kober notes that "The Soviet Union's cautious pattern of military engagement in the Middle East and its preference for demonstrative acts rather than direct military intervention, combined with Israeli and U.S. deterrent postures, account for Moscow's failure to save the Egyptians from defeat". Ibid.

conflicts, war aims were either maximalist from the start or expanded to become so in the hope of getting rid of Hussein, and if aims had been expanded in the case of the Gulf War, those aims would likely have been maximalist as well.

We begin with the Iran-Iraq war, easily one of the most brutal interstate wars after World War II. This is a clear example of an opportunity to expand territorial war aims that was in fact realized. The conflict was begun by Iraq, as Hussein hoped to score an easy victory against what he perceived to be a weak Iran; such a victory would also bolster his position in Iraq, and might lead to territorial gains[337]. At first, Iraq had a certain level of success, and Hussein looked close to achieving these aims[338]. However, after two years of fighting, Iran was able to push Iraq back, achieving its initial aim of protecting its own territory[339].

This opened an opportunity for expansion, which Iran pursued by invading Iraqi territory[340]. What was its reasons for doing so? In essence, Iran had chosen to pursue maximalist aims of forcing Hussein out of power[341]. Religious and domestic political concerns were also important, as Iran hoped to demonstrate the strength of

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[337] See Williamson Murray and Kevin M. Woods, *The Iran-Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). They note that "An invasion and quick victory would, he believed, allow him to cast himself in the role of historic Arab leadership and would further his long-range aims and goals in the region" (41). They also note that "Certainly Saddam believed that the oil-rich areas of Arabistan (Khuzestan) were within his reach... Another bonus… was the possibility that military operations would cause Khomeini's regime to collapse" (49).

[338] See Dilip Hiro, *The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq Military Conflict.* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 39, for a description of initial Iraqi gains.

[339] Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War,* 172.

[340] Hiro notes that "the Iranian Supreme Defence Council weighed the pros and cons of attacking Iraq. In the end the hardliners won". Hiro, *The Longest War*, 69.

[341] Murray and Woods, *The Iran-Iraq War*, 190.

its revolution and strengthen Islam[342]. In terms of the risk to expansion, all of them would be coded low in this conflict. Iran was largely isolated after its revolution, and it had no clear ally in the conflict[343]. With no ally to hold it back, there was no reason for Iran not to pursue expanded aims.

Furthermore, as the goal of the territorial expansion was to end Saddam Hussein's regime[344], the risk of opponent dissatisfaction was low; recall that when aims are maximalist, the goal is to not have the opponent around to be dissatisfied in the future. And, given Iran's isolation, I find it necessary to code the risk to its reputation as low even though the expansion was quite disproportionate. In particular, there is little indication that Iran would have worried about its reputation among third-parties, at least so far as gaining a reputation for aggression.

As to the commitment problem, this is a good case for this alternative theory, as Hussein's aggression made it likely that conflict could restart in the future. Ending his regime by expanding to absolute victory would solve this commitment problem permanently. Finally, there was no indication of any punishing state that would hold Iran back out of offensive realism fears, so this is also an excellent case for offensive realism. As noted, Iran's relationship with the great powers was anything but positive; however, there is little indication that either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R cared sufficiently about Iraq to risk military intervention. Even if they had, the unique

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[342] Ibid., 117.
[343] Hiro notes that neither the US nor the Soviet Union could be considered a friend to Iran at this time. Hiro, *The Longest War*, 71. Murray and Woods note that "the Iranian regime discovered just how unpopular in the international arena it had become in the first months of the war". Murray and Woods, *The Iran-Iraq War*, 97.
[344] See Hiro; he notes that Hussein leaving power was "the primary [Iranian] condition for agreeing to a ceasefire". Hiro, *The Longest War,* 68.

quality of Iran's religious government might have made them discount the risk of intervention and willing to expand to protect itself from Iraq in the future. The conflict also fulfills the offensive realist assumption that states will always seek more power, and should care deeply about the amount of power their neighbors and opponents have. Offensive realism predicts that a state such as Iran should fear Iraq's future intentions, and should try to either gain as much power as possible, or eliminate its opponent from the system. This is therefore a case where my study's theory and the alternative theories all have strong explanations for the outcome. This does not diminish the importance of any of the theories; however, what it does show is that there can be multiple reasons why expansion is rational.

We turn now to the two US/Iraq conflicts, the Gulf War and the U.S. Invasion of Iraq; the first, designed to push back Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, and the second, designed to end his rule of Iraq. The Gulf War presents us with one of the more interesting cases in which potential occupiers could expand their aims, and decided against it. This conflict also began due to Hussein's aggression against his neighbors: in this case, the U.S. and its coalition entered into conflict with Iraq in order to force Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, which Hussein had invaded[345]. The war was quite successful from the standpoint of the U.S. coalition, and once it had succeeded in liberating Kuwait, there was very little preventing the US-led coalition from pushing all the way to Baghdad[346]. This is, therefore, a clear expansion

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[345] Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War,* 176.

[346] Rick Atkinson notes that, "By mid-February, Wolfowitz and others suspected that an armored spearhead to Baghdad would be an easier enterprise than anyone could have dreamed". Rick Atkinson, *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War*. (Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993). 298.

opportunity; the US had achieved its original war aims[347] and had the capability to do much more. However, it did not expand its aims, and we must consider why this might be.

It is apparent that the risks to important alliances and to reputation were huge, even if the risk from the opponent (assuming the goal was to remove Hussein from power), was low. The risk of antagonizing important allies is clear; many of the US' partners in the Middle East and in Europe did not desire war aim expansion[348]. One author argues that "Accepting a war to bring democracy to Iraq would be almost as terrifying as accepting Saddam's seizure of one of his neighbors. Local rulers had to balance their self-interest in beating off an aggressor against fear that the United States would export its ideology… effectively enough to destabilize them"[349]. While the U.S.' allies would have liked Hussein to be out of power, they made it clear to the U.S. that war aim expansion was not something they desired. In terms of reputation, it is clear that this was a significant concern of the U.S., due largely to the extreme power differential between it and its opponent. This was a concern of President Bush as well, who noted later that, "If we continued the fighting another day, until the ring was completely closed, would we be accused of a

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[347] That the U.S. did not have maximalist plans from the beginning is demonstrated by Atkinson, who notes that "Even the US Senate had barely given Bush endorsement of his limited war aims", Atkinson, *Crusade,* 299.
[348] See Ibid., 298-299; Atkinson notes that "Most of America's European allies, notably the French, adamantly opposed broadening the war. The Saudis, Syrians, and other Arabs wanted Saddam removed but preferred divine intercession – or one well-placed bomb – to the messy uncertainty of a wider conflict".
[349] Norman Friedman. *Desert Victory: The War For Kuwait*. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991). 259.

slaughter of Iraqis who were simply trying to escape, not fight?"[350]. The U.S. did not want to hurt its positive reputation, so this is an additional reason not to expand.

This is a particularly weak case for offensive realism. The U.S. was functionally the only superpower at this point, and enjoyed a massive amount of military power. Given the likelihood of Hussein destabilizing the Middle East again in the future, why would the U.S. not expand, gain additional power, and end the threat to a region it cared deeply about? Offensive realism cannot account for the outcome in this case, although, to be fair, it could be argued that Hussein in power was less problematic for Middle East stability than Hussein out of power would be[351]. It is also a poor case for the commitment problem argument, as leaving Hussein in place, given his past history, would seem to risk a resurgence in conflict. In fact, as we will see, the U.S. did pursue future conflict against this leader. While Hussein might have been able to commit to ending the Gulf conflict, it seems unlikely that he could credibly commit to refraining from conflict in the future. The U.S. therefore had clear incentives to expand, and did not do so. This case therefore is a strong one for my study's theory.

The Invasion of Iraq in 2003, despite the many years the US has spent in the country, is in fact only a brief interstate war. Brought about by the George W. Bush administration's desire to remove Saddam Hussein as a potential threat, the war proceeded quickly from its initiation to its final battle; less than two months of

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[350] Quoted in: Michael R. Gordon, General Bernard E. Trainor. *The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict In the Gulf*. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995). 416.

[351] Colin Powell, for instance, "had argued that it ran counter to American interests to eviscerate Iraq and leave a power vacuum that strengthened Iranian or Syrian influence in the Middle East" (Atkinson, *Crusade*, 452).

fighting were sufficient[352]. After Saddam Hussein left power, the interstate portion of the conflict was over, and the subsequent fighting is of a different character[353]. Given this face, this is a case where there was no opportunity for war aim expansion, as the US' war aims were maximalist from the start of the conflict[354]. Nothing less than the end of Hussein's regime and a total occupation of the country would be accepted, as can be seen by Bush's speech to the world just before the start of hostilities[355]. In short, there was no opportunity for expansion because war aims were so grand. In summary, we have seen that the Middle East was both relatively conflict-prone during this time period, and also prone to conflicts where war aim expansion was both possible and pursued. Let us now turn to our final, and most war-prone region, Asia.

Asia

Of all the world regions in the post-WWII era, Asia saw the greatest number of conflicts over the twentieth century, and many of these conflicts are noticeable for having particularly high death tolls. A complete total of fifteen conflicts in less than sixty years is nothing to ignore, and when nine of these wars reach over 5000 battle deaths, it is clear that conflict in the region is well worth studying. This region is also particularly salient to study for Cold War scholars, as several of the key

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[352] See Sarkees and Wayman, Resort to War, 187.
[353] Ibid.
[354] See David A. Lake, who notes that the Bush Administration talked about absolute war in order to get rid of Hussein in early 2001. David A. Lake, "Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War", *International Security* 35. no. 3 (Winter 2010-2011), 7-52, DOI: 10.1162/ISEC_a_00029. 22.
[355] George W. Bush, "A transcript of George Bush's war ultimatum speech from the Cross Hall in the White House", Monday, 17 March 2003. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/18/usa.iraq.

conflicts either started because of the Cold War or were certainly fueled by it. Asia was also prone to some recurrent conflict during this time; certainly with regards to India and Pakistan, and Vietnam and its near neighbors, the region was particularly persistent in its conflict. These conflicts were largely territorial in nature, and thus it is particularly important to examine them for this analysis.

India/Pakistan Conflicts

India and Pakistan, bitter rivals from nearly the very moment of their independence from Great Britain, fought four interstate wars between 1945 and 2003. Three of these wars concerned the same territorial dispute: the ownership of Kashmir; however, only one of the Kashmir Wars, the Second Kashmir War, had over 5000 battle deaths. The Second Kashmir War represented a resurgence in conflict between the two states, after the stalemate of the first conflict[356]. Pakistan started the conflict, moving against Indian interests and attempting to change the status quo[357].

While Pakistan was initially successful, India soon battled back by military force within Kashmir and military force directed at Pakistani territory[358]. The question we must ask is: does India's movement against Pakistan proper represent an expansion of war aims, or simply the opening of a new front in the conflict? I

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[356] See Farooq Bajwa, *From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965* (London: Hurst & Company, 2013), 14, for a summary of the situation at the end of the 1947-49 conflict.

[357] See Bajwa, *From Kutch to Tashkent*, 74.

[358] See Jean-Marc F. Blanchard, "Linking Border Disputes and War: An Institutional-Statist Theory", *Geopolitics* 10 (2005), 688-711, DOI: 10.1080/14650040500318464; he notes that "To counter Pakistani successes, India expanded the war into Pakistan proper on 6 September, sending its troops towards Lahore, Sialkot and Hyderabad, and launching air assaults on Pakistan proper". 706.

argue that the latter is true, and that there was no true ability for India to expand its war aims. Despite the fact that India did move into Pakistani territory in order to try to beat the Pakistani military,[359], I see no evidence that either state achieved its initial aims of changing the status quo in Kashmir prior to the end of the conflict, nor that either had the opportunity to expand after the other was ready to end the conflict. The expansion into Pakistan's territory was designed in order to achieve victory over the military, not to successfully occupy said territory.

The other significant case of India/Pakistan conflict, an outlier in that its main cause was not Kashmir (though fighting still took place there), is the War for Bangladesh. This conflict also stemmed from territorial issues remaining after the end of British rule, though the issue in this case was the status of East Pakistan. While some might debate the commonly-held assumption that a country with two disparate geographic entities was doomed from the beginning[360], it is nonetheless true that by 1971, the situation was such that the Dhaka province of East Pakistan was in revolt, and was being violently suppressed by the Pakistani army[361]. When a humanitarian crisis drove refugees into India, Indian politicians opted to use the opportunity to encourage conflict with Pakistan and support East Pakistan[362].

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[359] See Bajwa, *From Kutch to Tashkent*, 392; Bajwa notes that India's fighting "did not go according to plan for India as although some territory was captured, the offensive did not inflict any serious damage on the Pakistan Army".
[360]See Srinath Raghaven, *1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 2013), who "contends that there was nothing inevitable about the emergence of an independent Bangladesh" (8).
[361]See Raghavan, *1971*, 42-52.
[362] India, as Raghavan notes, "aimed at capturing maximum possible territory, installing the government of Bangladesh, and thereafter securing the withdrawal of Pakistani forces, leading to eventual independence of Bangladesh". Ibid., 236.

In support of the independence of East Pakistan, India responded to Pakistan's initiation of the conflict[363] by attacking both in the East and responding to Pakistan's offensive in Kashmir[364]. India did quite well in the fight for Bangladesh, and at least kept the situation in Kashmir at a stalemate.[365] This case is particularly fascinating because of the U.S.' involvement in behind the scenes coercive diplomacy. Buoyed by clear dislike and resentment of India, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger did their utmost to influence American public opinion[366], used the UN instrumentally to try to put pressure on India[367], and perhaps most important, deliberately engaged in coercive diplomacy by trying to encourage the Chinese to skirmish along India's border, an action that might well have led to serious conflict between the superpowers[368].

The US pursued this later strategy in part because it feared India would expand its war aims and attack West Pakistan directly[369]. I therefore consider India to have an opportunity for expansion, as it had already achieved its aims in the East. That this would have been an expansion in aims is clear; India's goals did not include Pakistani territory, or even an attack on Pakistan proper in order to achieve its other aims[370]. Why did it choose not to expand? This is a good case for offensive

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[363] See Gary J. Bass, *The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013). 268.
[364] Bass, *The Blood Telegram,* 273.
[365] Ibid., 273-274.
[366] Ibid., 286-287.
[367] Ibid., 283-84.
[368] Ibid., 291-292.
[369] Bass notes Kissinger had intelligence that would support this belief (Ibid., 289-290).
[370] Indeed, India went out of its way to convince the Soviets of this. See Raghavan, *1971*, 255.

realism, as it is clear that the US should be seen as a balancing coalition; it was certainly willing to goad China into action should India expand, and the Nixon administration even engaged in illegal actions in order to get military equipment to Pakistan[371]. While this latter action was private and not visible to India, the US' use of the UN to hurt India's reputation certainly made its views clear, and it is true that India did not expand war aims.

I consider India to have had an ally, the Soviet Union, despite being a key played in the Unaligned movement. I code the presence of an ally because the Soviet Union clearly supported India diplomatically by vetoing anti-India resolutions in the Security Council[372]. However, it is clear they were not entirely on board with expansion, and would not entirely support India against possible U.S. interference[373]. It was, however, important for India's future security, given the USSR's provision of military materiel.

I code a high risk of dissatisfaction from Pakistan if India had expanded, both because the expansion directly threatened West Pakistan and the states had fought multiple times; similarly, there would have been a high risk to reputation given the UN's involvement in trying to end the conflict[374], which India would have repudiated had it invaded. As multiple states refused to support India at the U.N., there was a clear indication that the current conflict was not seen in a positive light. Expansion would certainly have created a negative reputation. As I have said, this is a good case

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[371]Bass, *The Blood Telegram*., 293-298.
[372] Ibid., 311.
[373] See Raghavan, *1971*, 255.
[374]Bass notes "Indian troops racing against the UN's clock" (*The Blood Telegram,* 312).

for offensive realism, and it is also good for the commitment problem, as the ceasefire attempts and bargaining that took place were among the international community, not between the belligerents; and, although India and Pakistan had fought before, this conflict was motivated by different goals.

Conflicts Of Vietnam and Its Neighbors

The wars of Vietnam and its neighbors are well worth a consideration at this juncture. By these wars, I mean the six wars in the dataset involving Vietnam, all of which had well over 5000 battle deaths. The first is what Americans recognize as the Vietnam War, and the others are concurrent or subsequent conflicts arising from unresolved issues and expansion of strategy. While these wars are of interest to students of American foreign policy and those that study civil wars and insurgencies, I will argue here that they are of limited interest when considering war aims. This is because the war aims in all these conflicts were either maximalist (total defeat of the opponent), unspecified aggression, or unfulfilled throughout the conflict, even though new fronts and new strategies were attempted. I will show, in particular, that while U.S. strategy expanded in the Vietnam War, there was never a true opportunity to expand territorial war aims. The aims were so improbable to begin with, there was never a moment in which the U.S. could credibly claim to have achieved its initial war aims or to have brought its opponent to the point of acquiescence. This was a conflict about escalation and de-escalation, expansion of methods and strategies, but no expansion or escalation of territorial war aims.

While a full discussion of the U.S.'s reasons for partaking in the Vietnam War is far beyond the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that by 1965, Robert

McNamara could sum up the U.S.'s goals thus: "Our object in Vietnam is to create conditions for a favorable outcome by demonstrating to the VC/DRV that the odds are against their winning. We want to create these conditions, if possible, without causing the war to expand into one with China or the Soviet Union and in a way that preserves support of the American people and hopefully, of our allies and friends"[375]. He argued that to accomplish this, the U.S. should have the stated aims of making sure the South Vietnamese government "stays independent (hopefully pro-US, but possibly genuinely neutral)" and making sure that it "exercises governmental functions over substantially all of South Vietnam"[376].

I argue that the US would have little room to expand its war aims beyond these substantial and even somewhat ill-defined goals. Indeed, to put it simply, the US' single goal through the entire conflict was "to prevent communist government in Vietnam"[377]. It changed its methods and implemented different strategies, but the single war aim of holding on in Vietnam never allowed for expansion; as it was never achieved. Insofar as we can say it expanded, it was only in that the U.S. began to try to prevent communism in Vietnam's neighbors as well as in Vietnam proper. We will look at these conflicts, but I argue that they all represent different facets of the same war aim. If the U.S. had started invading or bombing in order to keep territory, or in order to achieve a different goal, then war aims would have changed. This however is not the case. This can be seen in part by the fact that, by end of the

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[375] Robert McNamara. ""July 20th, 1965. To: The President, From: Sec. McNamara, Re. Recommendations of additional deployments to Vietnam". In *Lyndon B. Johnson's Vietnam Papers: A Documentary Collection* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1997). 214.
[376] McNamara, "July 20th, 1965", 215.
[377] Calvocoressi, *World Politics Since 1945*, 464.

U.S. involvement in the conflict, aims actually contracted; to, as Kissinger put it, "withdraw as an expression of policy and not as a collapse"[378].

Similarly, there is little indication that North Vietnam had a chance to expand its war aims, given that they were also maximalist. Of all the conflicts, the Vietnam War highlights a very important distinction between expansion in methods and expansion in aims. At first glance, a major territorial offensive such as Tet looks like an expansion of territorial war aims. However, was the aim of Tet any different from North Vietnam's prior war aims in the conflict? The answer is no. The goal of the Tet offensive was to provoke revolution and gain control of South Vietnam[379]; this is a maximalist goal, and it was the same goal throughout the conflict. Therefore, this most interesting conflict is actually not a good example of war aim expansion. When war aims are either maximalist or unclearly defined, states cannot easily expand.

One could argue, however, that the other conflicts in the region represented expansions of the U.S. war aims in Vietnam. Supporting this view is the fact that the war in Laos, while technically fulfilling the COW rules for an interstate war, should properly be seen as part of the Vietnam war in almost every way. In particular, the U.S. was intent on keeping Laos from falling to communism, and later, to not allow the North Vietnamese to use it[380]. While the U.S. did drop an impressive amount of

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[378] Quoted in Gregory A. Daddis, "Out of Balance: Evaluating American Strategy in Vietnam, 1968-72" *War & Society* 32, no. 3 (October 2013), 252-270. DOI 10.1179/0729247313Z.00000000026. 254.

[379] See Williamson A. Murray and Geoffrey Parker, "The Post-War World 1945-2007". In *The Cambridge History of War*, Revised and Updated. ed. Geoffrey Parker. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 381.

[380] See Martin Stuart-Fox, who argues that "From the beginning, US policy towards Laos had but one goal – to prevent Pathet Lao (PL) forces from extending the area under their control and toppling the Royal Lao Government… The purpose of US

bombs on Laos, if we look at just this conflict by itself, I cannot see that it ever had a chance to expand its war aims[381]. The question is, however, does the war in Laos represent a territorial war aim expansion of the Vietnam War? In other words, should we see the existence of this conflict as evidence of the U.S. expanding its territorial war aims from the Vietnam conflict? When considering this question, we ought also to consider the War of the Communist Coalition, as this too was part of a unified conflict between the US, its allies in the region, and communist forces[382]. The goal of this conflict was to prop up the existing leader in Cambodia[383]; this actually gives us the biggest hint as to why there could be no expanded aims in either Laos or in Cambodia. The U.S.'s aims were to maintain the status quo; in other words, to keep governments in place, and prevent communist takeovers. In fact, the U.S.'s entire war aim for the whole region was that it remain the same: how can one expand an aim when the aim is the status quo? And as the opponents to the governments the U.S. was attempting to save had maximalist goals of gaining power

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intervention was therefore, beneath the cloak of neutrality, to strengthen the anti-communist resolve of the Lao government and to prepare the Royal Lao Army to crust any PL military activity". Martin Stuart-Fox, "William J. Rust, *Before the Quagmire: American Intervention in Laos 1954–1961* Seth Jacobs, *The Universe Unraveling: American Foreign Policy in Cold War Laos*." *Intelligence & National Security* 29, no. 1 (February 2014): 150-156. DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2013.786610 150. He also points out that the US did not want Laos to be used by the North Vietnamese (155).

[381] See Alfred W. McCoy, "Reflections on History's Largest Air War", *Critical Asian Studies* 45, no. 3 (2013), 481-489, DOI:10.1080/14672715.2013.829670; he describes the scale of the bombing (482-483).

[382] See Calvocoressi, who essentially describes the U.S. as pursing a military tactic of denial against North Vietnam in Cambodia (i.e., trying to denying them the use of the territory and their materiel) (*World Politics* 466).

[383] Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War*, 162.

for themselves, they had no room to expand their aims either. Therefore, war aim expansion was not a factor in these three conflicts.

Now let us consider the Vietnamese-Cambodian War. From 1975 onward, the two states had low-level conflict along their shared border, but true interstate conflict did not begin until 1977[384]. Vietnam's main goal, as with the Laos war, was to have a large amount of power in its neighbors, and it wanted to make sure the regime in Cambodia was friendly to its interests.[385] While conflict was initiated, perhaps irrationally[386], by Cambodia, the conflict was ended by Vietnam when it used an invasion to capture Cambodia's capital and end the current regime[387]. I assert that Vietnam's Cambodian invasion is a case of maximalist war aims, in which the ultimate goal was the overthrow of the Khmer Rouge regime. Again, there can be no expansion of war aims when the aims are maximalist from the start.

Finally, at the end of a decade of deteriorating relations, there came a conflict between China and Vietnam. Indeed, the Sino-Viet Punitive War ought properly to be seen as the climax of the negative relationship between two states that had once been allies[388]. The Punitive War came about in part because of the Vietnam-Cambodia conflict. Indeed, much of the goal of the conflict (which took the form of

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[384] Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War,* 169.
[385] See Stephen J. Morris, *Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia* (Stanford; Stanford University Press, 1999), 107; he notes Vietnam's goal was "that there could ultimately be a restoration of pro-Vietnamese communist leadership in Cambodia".
[386] See Morris, *Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia,* 113-115.
[387] Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War,* 169.
[388] See Anne Gilks, who argues that "By mid-1968, the Sino-Vietnamese alliances had reached a nadir, and their pivot-wing relationship was consequently weakened". Anne Gilks, *The Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 1970-1979* (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Center For Chinese Studies, 1992). 28.

an invasion of Vietnam) seems to be for the Chinese to show they were "saving face" [389] and to punish Vietnam for its actions in Cambodia. The Chinese may also have had the goal of trying to get Vietnam out of Cambodia, but if so, they did not achieve the aim[390]. If this is the key war aim, then China was never in a position to realize it, and so could not have expanded[391]. If the aim was to hurt Vietnam, China had limited success, but its claim that it had achieved its full aim before it decided to end the conflict is somewhat suspect given the situation on the ground[392]. Therefore, these conflicts, while all important in the saga of the Cold War and the history of the region, do not tell us much about the expansion of war aims.

The Korean War

The final significant conflict in Asia, the Korean War, represents a case where diplomacy, deterrence threats, and credibility all came into play in various ways. It is also a case where war aim expansion ended disastrously for the potential occupier state, the U.S. This is a key conflict to examine, as it is a major example of conflict between the great powers (albeit through proxies to a certain extent). The source of the conflict lay in the division of the Korean peninsula into two parts after the end of World War II; in retrospect, this was a clear source of conflict, and it is unsurprising that one side or the other would challenge this status quo. The conflict started in 1950 when North Korea invaded the South; in particular, it has been

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[389] Morris, *Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia*, 221.
[390] Ibid.
[391] See Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War* 171; China encountered a great deal of difficulty in its invasion.
[392] Gilks argues however that "The question of whether or to what degree China achieved its objectives is a moot point. The military balance sheet clearly shows that both sides were punished and learned some military lessons". Gilks, *The Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance*, 231.

argued that it did so because the Soviet Union did not believe Korea was an important issue for the U.S. [393]. Nonetheless, the U.S. did become involved, and after its initial war aim of getting North Korea out of the south was accomplished, I do consider the U.S. to have had an opportunity in the Korean War to expand war aims; in particular, the US had to decide whether to cross the 38th parallel and continue the conflict in North Korean territory. That this was an expansion of the U.S's original war aims is clear from the documentary evidence of the Truman administration; as of June 26th, both Truman and Dean Acheson were clear that military action must stay below the 38th parallel[394]. However, by the end of September, Marshall was telling MacArthur that "We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of 38th parallel"[395].

Ultimately for reasons we are about to discuss, the US opted to push beyond the 38th Parallel, arguably in order to end the source of conflict on the peninsula once and for all[396]. This expansion of war aims brought China into the conflict, and

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[393] This war is a classic case for deterrence theory, as it is argued that the US could have, but did not, successfully deter North Korea and the Soviets from invasion. Indeed, scholars often point to Dean Acheson failing to include South Korean as important in a noted speech (Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory And Practice*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974). http://quod.lib.umich.edu.proxy.its.virginia.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=acls;idno=heb00720.0001.001 149). George and Smoke consider this "a failure to employ deterrence more effectively" (142).

[394] See "Document 19, Memorandum of Conversation, June 26, 1950" in *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, Vol. 18: The Korean War: The United States' Response to North Korea's Invasion of South Korea, Jun 25th, 1950-November 1950. General Ed. Dennis Merrill. (University Publications of America, 1997). In particular, Truman said "that no action should be taken north of the 38th parallel. He added "not yet"." 43.

[395] "Document 175, Message [JCS 92985], September 29, 1950" in *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, Vol. 18. 496.

[396] George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy,* 185

the war devolved into a brutal back-and-forth before finally ending in 1953; while often overlooked in favor of consideration of the Vietnam War and later conflicts, the role this war played in establishing the tenor of the Cold War and affecting regional dynamics in Asia cannot be denied.

In terms of the risks the U.S. could predict it would run from expansion, I must code a low risk of opponent dissatisfaction in the future, as the goal was to make the war total and get rid of North Korea. There was no risk of increasing opponent dissatisfaction when the reason for expansion was to end the risk from the opponent once and for all. I will also note the existence of a commitment problem, and that the U.S. acted in order to resolve this commitment problem. Indeed, Reiter makes use of this conflict in his examination of the commitment problem[397]. It is clear that the value of expansion was to unify Korea, and so make sure there would be no further conflict on the peninsula. That indicates the fear of a commitment problem, or at least, that the US feared future conflict from North Korea. Taking the fight onto North Korean territory was an excellent means of resolving the commitment problem.

We turn now to the risks to reputation, alliances, and the case for offensive realism. In terms of the latter, this case is an especially difficult one for this theory. This is because there is ample evidence that China threatened to intervene militarily, and made this clear to the US[398]. This should have stopped expansion,

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[397] He notes this as an example of how "a relatively low cost of continued fighting in relation to the danger of a broken war-ending commitment can encourage the belligerent to eschew negotiations and press on for absolute victory". Reiter, *How Wars End*, 78.

[398] See George and Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy,* 185.

according to offensive realism. However, Sartori makes it clear that US leaders did not believe Chinese threats, and behaved accordingly[399]. Offensive realism, so focused on power, does not account for credibility. In terms of the other risks, given the support of the UN, there is a low risk to reputation even given the size of the expansion, and given the multilateral nature of the operation, I cannot see that there were any important allies that opposed expansion. In summation, we have seen that Asia was particularly war-prone during this time period. However, there was a relative lack of war aim expansion. Only in the Korean War and the War for Bangladesh were there clear expansion opportunities, and only in Korea was the opportunity realized.

Regional Conflicts: A Summary

In summation, looking at these conflicts by region has accomplished several goals for this analysis. First of all, we have a better sense of the nature of these conflicts. Some were explicitly about territory, especially in cases where borders remained uncertain after colonial powers had left. Other conflicts centered around more prosaic matters such as revenge, ethnic troubles, and personal issues between different leaders. Second, we have seen that there are definite differences between war aim expansion between states. Some conflicts definitely presented potential occupier states with opportunity to expand war aims, whereas other conflicts presented no such opportunities. Finally, we have seen that these conflicts have differed in the relationships the potential occupier states had with their opponents, their allies, and with third parties where their reputation is paramount. However, in

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[399] See Sartori, *Deterrence by Diplomacy,* 26-30.

order to study these expansion opportunities and future security risks in greater detail, I will now compare these conflicts more specifically in order to look at the overall persuasiveness of this study's theory.

Conflict Comparison: Risks and Explaining Outcomes

With a firm understanding of the types of conflict and the relative level of conflict between different regions, we can look at trends in expanded war aims and territorial occupation after World War II. We now have a better sense of what happened in each conflict. In order to see the overall effectiveness of this study's theory versus the alternative theories, I will now group the conflicts together based on relative risks to future security, the value of territory, and the likelihood of the alternate theories' logics applying. This is not a quantitative approach; while such methods have become quite popular in political science, we know that there are notable methodological strengths in qualitative methods. We have already seen the strength of case studies; this analysis complements the case studies by allowing us to compare a larger number of cases, and draw conclusions about this study's theory overall.

Let us first begin with an overall look at opportunities for expanded aims in conflict, and how often states choose to expand their aims. Once we know how many cases of there are, we can then examine whether the theories of interest are able to explain the outcomes. We saw in the narrative analysis that there were several opportunities for expanded territorial aims in the twenty-one seriously conflicts between 1945 and 2003, with some conflicts having more than one opportunity if there were multiple opposing states involved. The chart below lists the

opportunities by conflict. Next, we must consider how many times states opted to expand their aims when the opportunities existed. The figure also shows whether the potential occupier attempted territorial war aim expansion.

Figure 5.1: Opportunities for Expansion And Expansion Attempts

War	Opportunities for Expansion	Territorial Occupation Attempted
1948 Arab Israeli War	No; Israel did not achieve all its war aims before agreeing to end the conflict.	No opportunity for expansion.
Korean War of 1950-53	Yes (US); originally, the U.S. did not plan to cross the 38th Parallel, but then gained all its initial war aims and had the opportunity.	Yes; the U.S. crossed into North Korea.
Vietnam War Phase 2 of 1965-75	No; U.S. and North Vietnamese War aims were both absolute and diffuse. Expansion of conflict to other countries is an expansion of strategy, not of aims.	No opportunity for expansion.
Second Kashmir War of 1965	No; while India did move into Pakistani territory, this was in service of their original war aims.	No opportunity for expansion.
Six-Day War of 1967	Yes (2); Israel could expand against 1., Syria and 2., against Jordan, once it had achieved its territorial war aims against Egypt.	Yes (2); Israel took territory from both Syria and Jordan.
Second Laotian War Phase 2 of 1968-73	No; this conflict was, from the U.S.'s point of view, part of its overall war aims in Vietnam, and the North Vietnamese had maximalist aims.	No opportunity for expansion.
War of Attrition of 1969-70	No; aims were punishment and defense,	No opportunity for expansion.

	not to try to achieve any kind of victory.	
War of the Communist Coalition of 1970-71	No; war was an expansion of strategy/methods, but not of aims	(No opportunity for expansion)
War for Bangladesh of 1971	Yes; India had largely achieved its war goals in East Pakistan/Bangladesh and could have invaded West Pakistan (as the U.S. thought it would).	No; India remained satisfied with its initial war aims.
Yom Kippur War of 1973	Yes (2); after much difficulty, Israel reversed Egypt's and Syria's gains and could pursue additional territory.	Yes (2); Israel occupied limited additional territory beyond regaining what it had lost.
Second Ogaden War Phase 2 of 1977-78	Yes; Ethiopia could have expanded its aims and moved into Somalia proper once it had reestablished the border.	No; Ethiopia did not pursue gains into Somalia.
Vietnamese-Cambodian Border War of 1977-79	No; maximalist/absolute war aims for both states.	No opportunity for expansion.
Sino-Vietnamese Punitive War of 1979	No; war aims were vague and punitive in nature; unclear China achieved its goals.	No opportunity for expansion.
Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88	Yes; Iran successfully pushed Iraq out of its territory and got Iraq to seek the end of the conflict.	Yes; Iran invaded Iraq and sought absolute victory/maximalist aims in order to get rid of Saddam Hussein.
War over the Aouzou Strip of 1986-87	No; status of the territory still up for debate at end of conflict.	No opportunity for expansion.
Gulf War of 1990-91	Yes; coalition forces had pushed Iraq out of Kuwait, and could have gone all the way to Baghdad.	No; U.S. leaders decided to remain satisfied with what they had already achieved and did not pursue occupation of Iraq.
War of Bosnian Independence of 1992	No; maximalist aims that were not achieved during the interstate portion of the conflict.	No opportunity for expansion.
Azeri-Armenian War of	Yes; Armenia achieved all	Yes; Armenia pursued

1993-94	its aims prior to the ceasefire, which was broken by Azerbaijan.	additional territorial gains inside Azerbaijan proper.
Badme Border War of 1998-2000	No; uncertain war aims, no state had definitely achieved its goals before both agreed to a ceasefire.	No opportunity for expansion.
War for Kosovo of 1999	No; coercive quality of conflict meant aims could not be achieved unless conflict ended.	No opportunity for expansion.
Invasion of Iraq of 2003	No; absolute war/maximalist aim of getting rid of Saddam Hussein meant there was no room for expansion.	No opportunity for expansion.

This is an important analysis because it tells us the relative frequency of the phenomena being studied. Of twenty-one wars, there were opportunities to expand in eight of them, or over one-third of the total conflicts. There were, in fact, ten opportunities to expand, as Israel twice had wars in which there were multiple opportunities. Of the ten opportunities, the potential occupier seized the chance in seven of them. This tells us that states do often take the chances they are offered, which my theory would expect. It is only when the territory is not worth the risks to the state's future security that a state should avoid expansion.

In terms of the risks, it is important to consider them both individually and as interactive risks. While this study's theory focuses on the interaction of different risks with each other and with territorial value, there is much value in looking at individual causal factors. In particular, if we see that one risk is able to predict expansion or lack of expansion by itself, and interacting it with territorial value or another risk does not improve our ability to explain expansion, then that risk has

most of the explanatory value. Moreover, looking at the risks individually allows us to see how often alliances are salient compared to how often states must be concerned with their opponent's dissatisfaction. We know that some states will worry more about their allies than about their opponents, and some states will not have any significant allies to speak of in conflict. Looking at the risks one by one before interacting them allows us to see which risks are the most common ones state face, at least in this time period. After looking at the risks individually, I will then put them together, and finally look at the relative success of the alternate theories against this study's theory.

Alliances and Opportunities for Expansion

Let us first look at the risks that can come from antagonizing a needed ally. Recall that for a potential occupier to worry about risking an alliance, it must a., have such an alliance, b., know it would risk that alliance by expanding, and c., believe it will need the ally in the future. Thus the figure below summarizes the instances in which there was an expansion risk in the form of the potential occupier's ally. I show both whether an ally opposed to expansion existed, and whether it was highly important to the state's postwar security. While the United States was of course highly important to Israel's security, in the case of the 1967 war I argue that Israeli leaders could plausibly believe that the U.S. was unlikely to abandon Israel even if it acted aggressively. They could, in essence, act as though the U.S. was of low importance.

Figure 5.2: Risk From Alliance

Opportunity for Expansion	Ally Opposed to Expansion?	High Importance of Ally for Postwar Security?	Does this study's theory Predict Expansion?	Did Potential Occupier Expand?
Korea	No; NATO and regional allies on board.	_	Yes	Yes
Israel 1967- Jordan (West Bank)	Yes; US actively seeking an end to the conflict	No; US could not abandon Israel without risking its own security	Yes	Yes
Israel 1967- Syria (Golan Heights)	Yes; see above	No; US could not abandon Israel	Yes	Yes
Bangladesh	Yes; while the USSR had supported India so far, evidence they would not support expansion	Yes; given India's negative relationship with the U.S. and China, they could not alienate yet another great power	No	No
Israel 1973- Egypt	No; U.S. was highly supportive and looking for a definite Israeli victory	_	Yes	Yes
Israel 1973- Syria	No; see above	_	Yes	Yes
Ogaden War	Unlikely, given amount of support from the USSR	_	Yes	No
Iran-Iraq War	No; Iran largely	_	Yes	Yes

	isolated in world politics, no important ally			
Gulf War	Yes; Gulf allies and European allies opposed to expansion	Yes; the U.S. needed its regional partners for future security	No	No
Azeri-Armenia	No; Russia provided arms but otherwise was largely uninvolved.	_	Yes	Yes

As we can see from the above evidence, the risk (or lack thereof) of losing a valued ally in the future does a good job of predicting whether a state expanded its war aims. This study's theory would predict expansion in eight of the ten, and states expanded in seven of those cases. In the two cases where this study's theory would predict no expansion, there was no expansion. Only with regards to the Ogaden War does this study's theory predict expansion when there was none. I will show that this is because the Ogaden War's outcome was largely driven by territorial value, which we have yet to incorporate. This is a positive finding; let us see whether other risks are similarly correlated with outcomes in these wars.

Risk of Future Conflict with Current Opponent

We know that this study's theory predicts that, where taking territory has a high risk of leaving one's opponent dissatisfied in the future, potential occupiers should be less likely to expand. Figure 5.3, below, therefore looks at whether there

was a high risk of opponent dissatisfaction, as well as whether that risk would be high regardless of whether the potential occupier chose to expand. Recall that if the potential occupier believes it cannot satisfy its opponent even if it remains moderate in its aims, it has no reason not to attempt territorial expansion. I thus show whether this study's theory would predict expansion in the circumstances surrounding the conflict.

Figure 5.3: Risk of Opponent Dissatisfaction

Opportunity for Expansion	Was There a High Risk of Opponent Dissatisfaction?	Was the Risk High Regardless of Expansion?	Does this Study's Theory Predict Expansion?	Did Potential Occupier Expand?
Korea	No; aim of expansion was to eliminate opponent from the system.	_	Yes	Yes
Israel 1967-Jordan (West Bank)	Yes; Israel would be taking highly valued, culturally significant territory from a neighbor.	Yes; Israel's very existence meant a high risk of future conflict.	Yes; though expansion is risker.	Yes
Israel 1967-Syria (Golan Heights)	Yes; Israel would take highly valued, strategically important territory from a neighbor.	Yes; see above.	Yes; though expansion is riskier.	Yes
Bangladesh	Yes; India would move onto a neighbor's territory, with whom it had previously fought several times	No; while there was a risk of future conflict over Kashmir, and bad feelings concerning Bangladesh,	No	No

		occupation of actual Pakistani territory would have been highly problematic.		
Israel 1973-Egypt	Yes; given the war was an attempt to reverse Israel's prior gains, additional gains could only increase dissatisfaction.	Yes; Israel's gains from 1967 were still in place and a source of contention.	Yes; though expansion is riskier	Yes
Israel 1973-Syria	Yes; see above	Yes; see above.	Yes; though risky	Yes
Ogaden War	Yes; expansion would have been against a neighboring state.	No; issues between the states themselves resolved by conflict.	No	No
Iran-Iraq War	No; aim was to eliminate opponent from system.	_	Yes	Yes
Gulf War	No; aim would have been to eliminate opponent from system.	_	Yes	No
Azeri-Armenia	Yes; conflict was against a neighbor, and additional gains would have been from Azerbaijan proper rather than the disputed area.	Likely No; domestic instability in Azerbaijan and the establishment of Nagorno-Karabakh as a quasi-independent entity meant conflict	No	Yes

		would likely be between it and Azerbaijan.		

What we see here is that opponent dissatisfaction is somewhat successful at predicting whether a state will expand. While outcomes correlate with predictions in eight out of ten cases, in the four Israel cases, the risk of opponent dissatisfaction given territorial expansion is especially acute. That the risk of recurrent conflict with the Arab states would be high regardless should not diminish the fact that Israel ought to have been very cautious in expanding, yet it did so four times. The Gulf War also cannot be explained by opponent dissatisfaction, though we saw that in that case, the risk to alliances was particularly high. Finally, the Azeri-Armenian case may be explained by the fact that the additional territory taken was strategic and likely to help against any future Azeri onslaught. Though it might have made future conflict more likely, it also likely made future conflict harder, a finding that is perhaps more consistent with the commitment problem argument. Let us now look at the final singular risk, which is to a potential occupier's reputation among third parties in the system.

Risk to Reputation

The final significant risk to a potential occupier is gaining a negative reputation. I argue that this risk is especially acute when expansion will make the potential occupier look like the aggressor, or like a greedy state by taking more than seems reasonable. Going back to the opportunities for expansion, we get the

information in Figure 5.4, which looks at the times when a negative reputation was likely in each case.

Figure 5.4: Reputation and Opportunities for Expansion

Opportunity for Expansion	High Likelihood of Gaining a Negative Reputation?	Does This Study's Theory Predict Expansion?	Did Potential Occupier Expand?
Korea	No; nature of the Cold War meant that there were few true third-party states with which to be concerned. Negative reputation already for USSR and China.	Yes	Yes
Israel 1967-Jordan (West Bank)	Yes; ceasefires were being discussed, and Jerusalem represented a huge expansion in aims.	No	Yes
Israel 1967- Syria (Golan Heights)	Yes; see above.	No	Yes
Bangladesh	Yes; given the UN's involvement, India clearly saw other states opposed to the conflict even before expansion would have occurred.	No	No
Israel 1973-Egypt	No; as Israel was attacked and had a difficult struggle, unlikely that it would have been faulted for additional aims.	Yes	Yes
Israel 1973-Syria	No; see above.	Yes	Yes
Ogaden War	No; little indication of much outside interest in this conflict.	Yes	No

Iran-Iraq War	Yes (ordinarily); however, Iran's regime had little concern for its reputation. Ultimately: No.	Yes	Yes
Gulf War	Yes; expansion would have been in the face of the U.N's mandate.	No	No
Azeri-Armenia	No; no indication of great outside interest, and more importantly, ceasefire broken by Azerbaijan first.	Yes	Yes

We see here that reputation is successful at predicting war aims, though not as much as alliances or opponent dissatisfaction. Three cases do not correctly correlate with reputation. With regards to the 1967 war, additional territory may have been so valuable that reputation was less important; conversely, with the Ogaden war, territory was so lacking in value that even the free ability to expand was not pursued.

It should be remembered, however, that reputation acts mostly as an interacting factor in this study's theory. By this I mean that a potential occupier with an opportunity to gain highly inherently valuable territory and not facing any risks from its ally or its opponent would be more likely to take the territory even if it was likely to gain a negative reputation in the process. Reputation is an important factor, but states should be more willing to risk gaining a negative reputation than they would risk losing an ally or gaining a dissatisfied opponent. Let us turn now to the question of territory.

Territory

Finally, let us consider territorial value. This is a more challenging factor, as it can be difficult to surmise how a state could have used territory, or what value the territory might have had. Nonetheless, I posit that it is possible to at least tell when territory was of high inherent value, or when territory had very limited value. Figure 5.5 shows the cases of expansion opportunities, broken up by likely types of value.

Figure 5.5: Territorial Value

Expansion Opportunities: Territory With Clear Inherent Value	Expansion Opportunities: Territory With Clear Instrumental Value	Expansion Opportunities: Territory of Unlikely Value or Limited Utility
Israel 1967: the Golan Heights were incredibly strategically important for such a small state.	Israel 1973: Egyptian territory could be used in order to defeat army, or at the bargaining table in order to hold onto 1967 gains.	Ogaden War: Likely hostile population, unlikely further gains from bargaining from gaining the territory. Material value unlikely.
Israel 1967: West Jerusalem was of high emotional and cultural value.	Israel 1973: Syria, see above.	Bangladesh: unclear that India could have desired Pakistani territory, given a hostile population. Unclear what bargaining value it could have.
Azeri-Armenia: additional territory could consolidate existing gains and make it more defendable.		Gulf War: while Iraq had material value, it was of limited utility to the U.S. given that it was not interested in annexing or rebuilding Iraq.
Korea: eliminating North Korea would give the U.S. a stronger partner and deny the peninsula to Communism		

Iran-Iraq: Iraqi territory was inherently materially valuable; an opportunity to promote ideology.		

We see that several of the cases had inherently valuable territory, especially for strategic and military purposes. It is notable too that every case of inherently valuable territory is a case where the potential occupier expanded. Similarly, the three cases where territorial value is either unclear or limited are the cases where expansion did not take place. There is much to be said, therefore, for a consideration of the value of territory.

Finally, as this study's theory is built on interactions of risk and territory, we should now combine these singular risks together in order to see how the theory performs overall. Let us return once again to the spatial outline of this study's theory, in which we can interact reputation, territory, and first alliances, then opponents. We have already seen in the prior chapters that the cases have ranged across the spatial dimensions of the theory; let us see where the modern cases fall Figure 5.6, below, shows the risk to alliances against territory and reputation, with the cases from this chapter.

Figure 5.6

		Instrumental	Inherent
High Impact on Reputation	High Importance of Ally for Postwar Security	**8** Expansion of Territorial War Aims Least Likely; highest risk to future security cancels out potential bargaining gains. **Bangladesh (No)**	**7** Expansion Very Unlikely; the risk to future security from losing both the alliance and a good reputation are high, but the inherent value of the territory may tempt some states
	Low Importance of Ally for Postwar Security	**4** Expansion Possible; risk to reputation may not outweigh potential bargaining gains	**3** Expansion Likely; gaining the territory and keeping the alliance intact likely outweighs risks to reputation: **Israel 1967- Jordan (Yes)** **Israel 1967-Syria (Yes)**
Low Impact on Reputation	High Importance of Ally for Postwar Security	**6** Expansion Unlikely; the gains in bargain may not outweigh the cost of losing the alliance, even if reputation is not affected.	**5** Expansion Less Likely; losing alliance is damaging to security, but the value of the territory may make expansion worth the risk **Gulf War (No)**
	Low Importance of Ally for Postwar Security	**2** Expansion Very Likely; gains in bargaining are very low in risk to the state's future security **Ogaden War (ally not opposed to expansion): No.**	**1** Expansion of Territorial War Aims Most Likely; there is the least risk to the state's future security, and value is high **Korea (ally not opposed to expansion): Yes** **Azeri-Armenia (ally not opposed to expansion): Yes.** **Iran-Iraq: Yes** **Israel 1973- Egypt (ally not opposed to expansion): Yes.** **Israel 1973-Syria (ally not opposed to expansion): Yes.**

Figure 5.6 shows very strong support for the theory overall. We see the most expansion (and indeed, the most cases) in boxes where there is a high likelihood of expansion. Only one conflict – the Ogaden War – does not line up well with its box. I code a low importance of an ally because there is no evidence that the USSR was opposed to expanded aims. The theory would say that war aim expansion was quite likely in this conflict, but none occurred. I argue that, while I am willing to consider the territory to have potential instrumental value, in actuality there is little indication that Ethiopia could have done anything useful with it. Even when there is little security risk to expansion, it is hard to justify military effort for useless land. Let us now look at the risk of increasing opponent dissatisfaction, which is presented in Figure 5.7, below.

Figure 5.7

		Instrumental	Inherent
High Impact on Reputation	High Likelihood of Increasing Opponent Dissatisfaction	**8** Expansion of Territorial War Aims Least Likely; highest risk to future security cancels out potential bargaining gains. **Bangladesh (No)**	**7** Expansion Very Unlikely; highest risk to future security, but the inherent value of the territory may still tempt some states.
	Low Likelihood of Increasing Opponent Dissatisfaction	**4** Expansion Possible; states may discount the risk to their reputation in order to realize bargaining gains	**3** Expansion Likely; gaining the territory without making the opponent dissatisfied likely outweighs risks to reputation **Israel 1967- Jordan (Yes)** **Israel 1967- Syria (Yes)**
Low Impact on Reputation	High Likelihood of Increasing Opponent Dissatisfaction	**6** Expansion Unlikely; the gains in bargain may not offset the risks of leaving the opponent dissatisfied, even if reputation is not affected. **Ogaden War (No)**	**5** Expansion Less Likely; risk to security from a dissatisfied opponent is high, but the value of the territory may make expansion worth the risk **Azeri-Armenian War (Yes)**
	Low Likelihood of Increasing Opponent Dissatisfaction	**2** Expansion Very Likely; gains in bargaining are very low in risk to the state's future security **Gulf War (No)**	**1** Expansion of Territorial War Aims Most Likely; the state can gain the territory with little additional risk to their future security. **Korea (Yes)** **Iraq-Iran (Yes)** **Israel 1973- Egypt (Yes)** **Israel 1973- Syria (Yes)**

Figure 5.7 shows further support for the theory, although the evidence is somewhat more mixed. We see that two conflicts – the Gulf War and the Azeri-Armenian War – do not perfectly align with the sectors in which they are located. The Azeri-Armenian war is in a quadrant where expansion is judged to be less likely, but not out of the question if the territory is of sufficient value: in this case, the territory certainly was valuable. And while the risk of opponent dissatisfaction in the Gulf War was low given that the expansion would likely have removed Saddam Hussein from power, we have already seen that the risk to the U.S.'s alliances was sufficiently high to make this course of action unlikely. Other than these two conflicts, we see that the risk of a change in opponent dissatisfaction is a good predictor of expansion. Where there was a low risk of increasing dissatisfaction – namely, in the Arab-Israeli conflicts and the Korean War – we see expansion, and where there was a high likelihood of increasing dissatisfaction – the war in Bangladesh and the conflict in the Ogaden – we do not see expansion. Therefore, the evidence in these cases also support the risk of opponent dissatisfaction as a reason for or against war aim expansion.

Alternative Theories

We ought also to look at our two main alternate theories through these methods in order to see whether their arguments are equally supported by the data at hand. Can offensive realism or the commitment problem argument do as well as or better than this study's theory at predicting the likelihood that an opportunity to expand will be taken? I examine both in turn. Offensive realism expects that, in the absence of a balancing coalition, states should expand. The chart below compares

whether the balancing coalition existed against whether the occupier expanded, and whether the case supports offensive realism.

Figure 5.8: Offensive Realism

Opportunity for expansion	Was there an intervener or a balancing coalition?	Did potential occupier expand?	Does case support theory?
Korea	Yes; certainly China, possibly USSR.	Yes	No
Israel 1967-Jordan (West Bank)	Likely no; Israel judged Soviet intervention as less likely by the time it had the opportunity to expand.	Yes	Yes
Israel 1967- Syria (Golan Heights)	Yes; see above	Yes	Yes
Bangladesh	Yes; the U.S., and China	No	Yes
Israel 1973- Egypt	No; while the USSR made threats, Israel discounted them.	Yes	Yes
Israel 1973- Syria	No; see above.	Yes	Yes
Ogaden War	No; no clear intervention threat	No	No
Iran-Iraq War	No; no sign that superpowers would intervene, and Iran's ideology would likely discount one if there was.	Yes	Yes
Gulf War	No; no other state powerful enough to threaten U.S.	No	No
Azeri-Armenia	No; no clear intervention threat.	Yes	Yes

Of the ten opportunities for expansion, seven support offensive realism's prediction. That is an impressive number, and we should not discount offensive realism's success. Indeed, given the predominance of the Israel cases, and the fact that these

cases fit with offensive realism's assumptions about the likelihood of future conflict and the intentions of opponents, it is reasonable that the theory does well. However, more than the number of cases, it is important to note some of the cases that do not support offensive realism. As we have already discussed, the Korean War ought to be seen as a significant blow to offensive realism, as should the Gulf War. Moreover, the inability of offensive realism to explain the Ogaden war is troubling, as it hints yet again that offensive realism may face challenges when it is not looking at great powers. Therefore, while offensive realism is fairly successful, it still leaves us with issues in terms of explaining all the outcomes. Let us now turn to the commitment problem argument, and see if it is any more successful at predicting war aim expansion.

The Commitment Problem Argument

When we consider the success of the commitment problem explanation, we need to examine three factors: whether there was a commitment problem in the conflict, whether expanding aims would solve the commitment problem and whether the state chose to expand. The commitment problem argument should predict expansion in cases where a commitment problem exists. Looking across the nine opportunities for expansion, we can assemble the following figure.

Figure 5.9: The Commitment Problem Argument

Opportunity for Expansion	Did a Commitment Problem Exist?	Would Expanded Aims Solve the Commitment Problem?	Did Potential Occupier Expand?	Does Case Support Theory?

Korea	Yes; North Korea could attack again in the future.	Yes, by eliminating North Korea.	Yes	Yes
Israel 1967-Jordan (West Bank)	Yes; current conflict and past conflict showed an inability to commit to peace.	No: it would likely exacerbate it by creating another reason for conflict.	Yes	No
Israel 1967-Syria (Golan Heights)	Yes; see above.	No; while the territory would help strategically, taking it would likely exacerbate the commitment problem.	Yes	No
Bangladesh	No, with regards to Bangladesh. Other commitment issues (Kashmir) not salient.	_	No	Yes
Israel 1973-Egypt	Yes; see 1967 conflict.	No; no indication that additional territorial gains would solve 1967 problems.	Yes	No
Israel 1973-Syria	Yes; see 1967 conflict.	No; see above.	Yes	No
Ogaden War	Yes; continued conflict between the states likely points to inability to commit.	No; no indication that additional territorial gains would	No	Yes

		make commitment easier.		
Iran-Iraq War	Yes; Saddam Hussein seen as a destabilizing force.	Yes; absolute war would end the threat.	Yes	Yes
Gulf War	Yes, given Saddam Hussein's behavior in the region.	Yes; absolute war would end the threat.	No	No
Azeri-Armenia	Yes; Azerbaijan was the state that broke the ceasefire.	Yes; additional territory would protect and consolidate gains.	Yes	Yes

We see here too that the commitment problem argument can explain some cases well, only running into difficulties when it comes to the Israel cases and the Gulf War. That is, it can explain five out of ten cases quite well. It is interesting that the difficulty it faces in the Israeli cases is that, while a commitment problem may have existed, there is no reason that expanding territorial war aims would have resolved it. This highlights the commitment problem argument's difficulty in comparing different types of territorial value, for it has little to say when the territory may be valuable enough to take despite the presence or absence of a commitment problem.

We should, at this point, take a moment to consider potential confounding variables that would affect the results. In particular, it is important to consider the role of the Cold War during this time period in depressing the risk of losing an alliance. If Israel had had to seriously worry about going against the U.S. in the 1967

war, the outcome may have been different. Moreover, the fact of the Cold War may have improved offensive realism's performance. We have seen, particularly in the Middle East, that the US and the USSR may have made intervention by the other less likely because of the risk of escalation. There might, therefore, have been cases where an intervention threat or a balancer ought to have existed, the potential occupier was aware of it, and yet understood that the threat to intervene was not completely credible because of the risk from the other superpower. Offensive realism may in fact do worse if we looked at a set of cases that differed temporally from these. The Cold War may also have had an impact on the success of the commitment problem argument. This is because the presence of two great powers anxious to avoid direct conflict with one another may have helped solve the commitment problem in some conflicts by reassuring their allies that they would be protected if the conflict recurred, and by actively dissuading them from pursuing expanded war aims. I maintain, however, that these cases are extremely important. Given the wide range of different types of conflicts, any theory that does well at predicting outcomes is likely to be successful in other time periods as well.

Conclusion

In summation, this chapter has examined this study's theory through the use of historical analysis by region and comparison of cases.. I have examined the full universe of cases of serious interstate war between 1945 and 2003, first by narrative summaries of each region during this time period, and then by identifying the opportunities for expansion in each conflict and examining whether the conditions of this study's theory or the alternate theories were present. I have

shown in this chapter that throughout the 1945-2003 period, there were multiple opportunities in conflict for a potential occupier to expand its territorial war aims and take more territory. I have also shown that considerations of risks to future security and territorial value are superior at explaining outcomes compared to offensive realism and the commitment problem argument. The strength of my theory is that it can explain both major conflict between great powers, and more limited disputes between small states. It also can explain outcomes in cases with differing war aims, whether the states were motivated by territory, ethnic tensions, or regional power struggles. While there are conflicts that can be explained by both my theory and the alternate theories, I have convincingly demonstrated that my theory can explain a wider range of cases. Along with the case studies of previous chapters, this provides compelling evidence that considering territorial value and risks to future security is best for explaining changes in war aims.

Chapter Six: Concluding Thoughts

What We Have Found

This dissertation has taken as its theme territorial war aim expansion. In particular, I have shown that the question of why some states embark on additional territorial occupation during conflict has remain under-studied in the extant literature. I have advanced an theory of war aim expansion that looks at the relative value a potential occupier puts on a piece of territory, versus the risk that taking that territory will have a negative impact on the potential occupier's future security. These risks are: that a needed alliance will be destroyed or adversely affected by expansion, that the current opponent will be left dissatisfied by the expansion and negative relations that could have been avoided will ensue, and that the potential occupier will develop a negative reputation among third-party states. I have looked at how this theory fares across three empirical chapters, each looking at a different facet of conflict.

The first of the empirical case studies, an analysis of World War II, has demonstrated how the same states, facing similar future risks to expansion, make different choices based on the territory in question. It also shows the importance of state forecasting about the likelihood of an ally remaining an ally versus eventually becoming a rival. First, in the case of Trieste, I note that both Tito and the Western Allies chose to expand and try to get to the city first. I argue that this was because the city had high inherent value for Tito, and at least instrumental value for the Western Allies. Moreover, even though they were allies at the moment, both sides understood that the wartime alliance would not long endure after the conflict came

to an end. While expansion would bring the alliance to a close, its death-knell had already been heard. That it took many years for the final territorial division of Trieste and its region to be settled is due to battlefield dynamics on the ground; this is a useful reminder to the scholar that it is the *choice* to expand aims that is of interest, not necessarily the *success*. While successful expansion shapes the eventual outcome, attempts to expand tell us about the incentives states face as well as the risks. That the expansion was not successful does not mean that the state did not rationally weigh the risks versus the benefits.

In terms of Austria, I argue that this territory was only of instrumental value for both the Western Allies and for Stalin; in particular, though Churchill saw the territory as useful in opposing Stalin, he was overruled by both military leaders and by FDR, who did not see any reason to risk damaging the still-important alliance with Stalin in order to gain Austria. Similarly, while Stalin did arrive at Austria first as per existing planning, he did not consolidate his control of the territory, and was willing to let it remain outside of the Soviet Union. I have argued that this is because the territory was of low value to him, and he desired to maintain the alliance with the Western Allies, at least for the foreseeable future. While again, it took several years after World War II for the great powers to settle on an agreement concerning Austria, I argue that this should not reflect on the decision to refrain from expansion in the first place. The decision not to expand was made in the hopes that the alliance between the USSR and the Western Allies would continue; that it soon disintegrated into the Cold War does not mean the states were wrong to refrain from expansion. Ultimately, what we gained by looking at the end of World War II is an

understanding of how territorial expansion can play a role in establishing a new international order after major conflict. Even in the case of all-out, truly significant great power conflict, leaders stilled planned for the postwar order and considered whether the gains from territory were worth risking their relationships with other important states.

The second set of case studies, the wars of German and Italian unification, have shown us how territorial war aim expansion can differ from conflict to conflict, even when state goals remain largely the same. It has also allowed us to see how two states embarked on various conflicts with the ultimate goal of gaining and unifying territory. Despite having this overall goal, the extent to which Prussia and Italy expanded their territorial war aims differed throughout the conflicts in which they engaged. The states also differed in their overall capabilities and ability to achieve their ends without the use of allies. There was also a notable difference in how each state valued the territory into which they had the opportunity to expand; Italy considered essentially all culturally and linguistically Italian territory to be inherently valuable, whereas Bismarck did not value Germanic Austrian territory in the same way.

I have argued that Bismarck and the Prussian government were constrained from pursuing territorial aims into Austria during the Austro-Prussian War by the lack of inherent value of the territory and the high risk of causing Austrian dissatisfaction (and therefore, the risk of losing the potential for an alliance in the future). This case could potentially be challenging for my theory, as an offensive realist could easily argue that it was the role of France as a potential intervener that

caused Bismarck not to pursue further territorial gains rather than the value of the territory or the risk from Austria. However, I have shown that Bismarck was more willing to continue the conflict than has commonly be acknowledged, and that the risk of French intervention has been overstated. This is an important contribution to the understanding of this conflict, as it means that we must look deeper for the explanation of Bismarck's actions. I have argued that my theory provides this explanation in a way that existing theories do not.

By contrast to the Austro-Prussian War, the Franco-Prussian War was marked by territorial occupation of a large portion of France. I argued that this was an expansion in two stages; first, Prussia chose to expand its initially defensive war aims and occupy Alsace-Lorraine, and then it chose to drive all the way to Paris in order to bring the conflict to a close. I have shown that Alsace-Lorraine was not an initial war aim, and that Bismarck judged expansion to be worthwhile because the territory was of high strategic value in protecting Prussia from further French aggression. He believed France was likely to remain dissatisfied in the future, and an opponent of Prussia, regardless of whether Prussia took any territory. Given this, and given the low risks to Prussia's reputation (due to France being seen as the aggressor) and a lack of important allies opposed to expansion, it is reasonable that Prussia took Alsace-Lorraine, even if the loss of this territory remained a source of dissatisfaction for France for years in the future. I have shown that Bismarck was less set on additional territorial occupation in France; if he could have achieved his aims without it, and successfully restrained his military leaders, it might not have happened. However, he could not achieve his aims without the instrumental use of

this territory, as French leaders were unwilling to accept that they had lost the conflict. He was therefore willing to let the expansion continue. And while it is true that his military leaders were acting somewhat unilaterally, I argue that Bismarck understood that reining them in was not necessary. Again, France was going to be dissatisfied regardless, and the other risks to expansion remained low. Despite the certainty of leaving France dissatisfied, I argue that Bismarck behaved rationally throughout this conflict, and weighed the value of the territory against the low risk that taking it would adversely alter Prussia's future security.

In terms of the Italian cases, we have seen that Italy was in a challenging position due to its military weakness and inability to achieve many territorial goals on its own. Nonetheless, in each of the three main conflicts of its unification, Italy expanded its war aims in order to try to gain inherently valuable territory. In the 1859 war, Italy allied with France to force Austria to give up limited territorial concessions. However, immediately after the primary part of the conflict, Italy expanded its aims beyond what its ally desired in order to consolidate and claim as much territory in Northern Italy as possible. I argue that this was done because Cavour did not intend on keeping the French alliance into the future, and did not believe Italy's future security was predicated on fulfilling Napoleon III's aims. Quite simply, he had no reason to adhere to what his ally wanted, in order to protect his future security. Similarly, taking additional territory did not change the risk of opponent dissatisfaction when it came to Austria, as conflict between Italy and Austria was certain if Italy desired any more territory. And, as there is every

indication that third-party states were willing to see Italy expand, there is no reason to believe it would have impacted Italy's reputation.

Italy then allied with Prussia prior to the Austro-Prussian War, and was able to achieve Venice regardless of outcome of the conflict after Austria ceded it to the French. Even though this main territorial aim was already achieved, Italy continued to fight after Prussia and Austria were willing to end the conflict. It did this because taking Venice by force would put it in a stronger bargaining position, and it could also potentially gain other inherently valuable territory. Again, Italy did not see Prussia or France as a long-term ally, so it was not held back by these concerns. Austria was still Italy's likely future opponent, so the risk of opponent dissatisfaction was not increased by continuing to fight, nor was Italy's reputation at stake, given that several third-party states were accepting of Italian unification.

Lastly, Italy took advantage of France pulling its troops out of Rome during the Franco-Prussian War, and finally achieved the capital city it desired. As we have seen, Italy was never willing to put aside its territorial goals in order to keep France happy, even when France was acting as an ally. Especially once Napoleon III was out of power, Italy had no reason not to expand. The Papacy was certainly not a secular opponent to worry about after the conflict, given the goal was to take his temporal power, and no third-party state (aside from Austria, Italy's typical opponent) expressed serious concerns. Ultimately, examining German and Italian unification together has allowed us to examine several related cases in great detail, and look at changes over time in a way that a single case study cannot provide. These conflicts

helped create the circumstances of European conflict in the 20th century, and their importance cannot be overlooked.

Finally, looking at the large-N historical survey and analysis of post World War II cases has allowed us to see the overall explanatory value of this study's theory over a large number of cases. We have moved from variation within a single case of conflict, to variation in repeated conflict by the same states, and now, to a survey of the universe of cases of serious conflict within a certain time period. What we have gained is an understanding of how often states have the opportunity to expand war aims; in twenty-one cases of conflict, eight conflicts clearly presented potential occupiers with the opportunity for expansion, and two of those conflicts presented more than one opportunity for expansion. For those that doubt whether territorial war aim expansion is a concern in the modern world, this is a clear indicator that this is an important phenomenon. Moreover, this section showed us that great power states and lesser states alike can have opportunities to expand their aims. Ethiopia and Armenia had the same opportunity for expansion that the United States did. It also indicates that it is not simply the powerful that expand their aims, nor the weak that refuse to do so.

We have seen that this study's theory is able to explain most of the outcomes when states had opportunities to expand their territorial war aims, and that it does substantially better than either offensive realism or the commitment problem argument (even though these alternate arguments are supported by certain cases). My argument is convincing across the opportunities for expansion, as it is able to explain both the cases where expansion did not occur, such at the Gulf War, and

ones in which it did, such as the multiple opportunities for expansion during the Arab-Israeli conflicts. Unlike offensive realism and the commitment problem argument, which can provide explication in some conflicts but not others, the nuance and depth of this theory shows that it can easily adapt to explaining outcomes in a variety of circumstances. This analysis did demonstrate however that offensive realism was more successful at explaining outcomes than the commitment problem, an intriguing finding in its own right. From a single case, to several interrelated cases, to a large number of dissimilar cases, I have shown both that territorial war aim expansion is an important phenomenon worth studying, and that my study's theory is capable of explaining outcomes in a large variety of cases.

Alternative Theories

I examined two alternative theories throughout the dissertation: offensive realism, and the commitment problem argument. These are the existing theories best able to cope with the question of territorial war aim expansion. Offensive realism chiefly predicts that territorial war aims will be expanded so long as there is little risk to the potential occupier in the present; namely, that there is little risk of provoking intervention by another state or causing a group of states to balance against the potential occupier. A key assumption of offensive realism is that relations between states engaged in conflict are nearly always likely to remain negative in the future; offensive realists believe that the risk of opponent dissatisfaction is always high. Their solution therefore is to expand whenever possible.

I have shown in this dissertation that this assumption is problematic, and leads to offensive realists over-predicting expansion. To be sure, I acknowledge that there are important instances in which the risk of opponent dissatisfaction is high regardless of how the potential occupier behaves: see for instance the Franco-Prussian War, which is often seen as a strong case for offensive realism, as well as the Arab-Israeli cases. However, offensive realism misses the nuance of the cases in which territorial expansion would *cause* opponent dissatisfaction, and it nearly completely ignores the role of alliances in assuring future security. By not considering the value of maintaining alliances, and the risks states run if they throw aside their alliances in favor of more territory, offensive realism is left unable to explain the end of World War II, for instance, and has significant problems with explaining why a great power such as the US would fail to expand in the Gulf War. And, by not considering differences between different types of territorial value, offensive realism also cannot account for cases where states had little fear of outside intervention, or significant fears of outside intervention, and acted contrary to the predictions of offensive realism. Offensive realism's predictions are not necessarily wrong; however, those predictions are predicated on assumptions that this dissertation has shown do not always apply in the real world.

As for the commitment problem explanation, we have seen that this theory is particularly useful at explaining maximalist war aims, and times where states pursue absolute victory in conflict. The commitment problem explanation is particularly concerned with times where expanding territorial war aims will help prevent conflict in the future, either because the potential occupier can remove the

opponent from the system, or make it easier for the opponent to commit to peace in the future. The commitment problem is particularly strong in certain cases in the modern period; its explanations for Iran's expansion in the Iran-Iraq War, and the U.S.'s expansion in the Korean War, are clear and logical. It is also able to explain why Prussia had to drive to Paris, as France was unable to commit to an end of the conflict before then. However, this theory also faces certain challenges.

In particular, the commitment problem argument has difficulty explaining why a state would expand into territory that would not help to end the conflict, or would not make the state more secure in the future. While one could argue that Israel's territorial gains in the 1967 conflict made actual attack more difficult, it is also true that those gains gave the Arab states additional reason to restart conflict in the future. It also does not do a good job of explaining expansion in the World War II case; for instance, Tito did not need to solve a commitment problem with the allies by taking Trieste. As with offensive realism, the commitment problem argument's failure to consider the different types of territorial value create issues for its success. Some valuable territory may not resolve a commitment problem, but it may be desirable nonetheless.

Ultimately I assert that the commitment problem argument, while useful, is one that does not apply in every circumstance. Sometimes states do not want to pursue absolute victory, and sometimes territorial expansion cannot solve the commitment problem, but is useful nonetheless. I should note that the goal of this study was not to "disprove" the alternative explanations. I have been clear that these theories can offer good explanations, even of the cases I examine here. What I do

believe however is that my theory is better equipped to explain a greater variety of cases, and is particularly strong at explaining important cases.

Unanswered Questions and Future Research

I ought to acknowledge certain problems this theory has faced when looking at the evidence. In particular, it has become clear throughout the analysis that reputation may have a lesser role to play than this theory would suggest. I did suggest when explaining the theory that reputational concerns were unlikely to be sufficient to prevent a potential occupier from expanding. However, what we have seen is that reputational concerns seem to be of low salience in many conflicts. Given the unique nature of the World War II era, it is not surprising that reputation was not a significant concern. But what are we to make of the lack of significant reputational concerns in the period of European unification, or the fact that Israel expanded even when it was likely to develop a negative reputation among third-party states? Perhaps a deeper analysis of how and why reputation matters would be a valuable contribution to future analysis of this type.

A second challenge to this theory would come in the analysis of territorial value. I have acknowledged that, while some value can be objectively assessed (the presence of natural resources, the location of strategic assets), other types of inherent value can differ depending on the domestic politics or ideological makeup of a state. One could easily argue that states can always find inherent value in territory, or, when they choose not to take territory, argue that there was no real value in the territory even if that is not the case. Future research into territorial

value would be useful in further demonstrating that states do weigh territorial value in making decisions.

Finally, one large unanswered question is whether my theory's explanation of territorial war aim expansion can explain other forms of conflict besides that between states in the system. What about civil wars and insurgencies? I assert that this theory should be fully capable of explaining interactions in these sorts of conflicts. Rebel groups and those that seek to create a new state must weigh whether trying to gain territory is worth the risk; in this case, the risk of raising opponent dissatisfaction may lead to the conflict continuing for an extended period. They also should be concerned with their reputation and with alliances, if they are a group that hopes to win legitimacy and support for their cause. Nonetheless, as none of my cases deal with this type of conflict, the question of whether the dynamics of territorial war aim expansion in other-than-interstate conflicts must be left to future research to answer.

Policy Implications of the Theory

In concluding this analysis, it is well worth considering what this theory can tell us about foreign policy, especially given the current state of the international system. It cannot be denied that states engaged in internal and external conflict still possess territorial war aims, and the occupation of territory for particular ends has not ceased in the modern world. One need only read the news from Syria, Iraq, and the Ukraine to see that territory still matters, and state and non-state actors are still willing to expend resources to occupy it. It is important to remember that the best theories are prescriptive as well as descriptive. If a theory is able to explain why a

state chooses certain actions, it is likely that the theory can also shed light on why other options were less attractive. The question is, what does this study's theory tell us about the options for "solving" crises such as these? Can this theory, by explaining the causes of these territorial conflicts, predict likely future actions and suggest the optimal response for other states in the system?

I argue that there are a few key important policy implications that follow from this study's theory. First of all, what this theory suggests about alliances and alliance politics is that long-term allies can have an important role in restraining potential occupier states. These allies have a great deal of power, should they disapprove of expansion by their partner. If this opposition can be made clear to the potential occupier, then the potential occupier will be less likely to expand its aims. The converse of this, however, is that states that are more isolated in the system are more difficult to restrain from territorial expansion. Consider the difference between the United States in the Gulf War and Iran in the Iran-Iraq War. There are of course reasons beyond alliances for each state's decisions, but the U.S. had important long-term allies opposed to expansion: Iran did not. To be more specific, isolating a state in the hope that the state will "learn a lesson", or applying sanctions and other coercive methods to a state may do little to prevent that state from expanding its territorial war aims. A state with little to lose vis-à-vis its alliances is one that may see territorial value as being especially important. I argue therefore that states concerned with preventing others from expanding their territorial aims should be especially concerned with those states that are isolated in the system. It is

not the states with strong alliances that expand: rather, those that lack such ties have the incentive to grab additional territory.

Second, this study suggests that the change in opponent dissatisfaction is a key factor in state decision-making. This suggests that particular intractable or recurrent conflicts are more likely to see war aim expansion, as the states in these conflicts have less to lose. Mediators of such conflicts must be especially vigilant for expansion. Such mediators do however have one strength: they can work to tie the potential occupier's reputation to its behavior. If the mediator can plausibly demonstrate to the potential occupier that expansion will risk its reputation, it can decrease the likelihood of such an action.

Finally, this study has suggested that some territory may be more at risk of being the subject of territorial war aims than others. It is crucial that policy-makers understand what makes a particular piece of land valuable to a potential occupier; it is equally important to understand what would make a piece of land less valuable. One way that allies and mediators can solve conflict is by offering the potential occupier the benefits of expansion without forcing it to pay the costs: in other words, if the ally knows why the potential occupier wants the territory, it may be able to offer some other benefit that would equal the advantage the potential occupier could accrue using the territory. Furthermore, when mediating between two claimants to territory, outside states must be aware if the states differ in their valuation of the territory or in the likelihood that they would want to expand and take it through conflict. These are but a few of the policy implications of the theory,

and an understanding of the reasons for territorial war aim expansion can only improve diplomacy in the modern world.

War Aim Expansion in Modern Times

Finally, it is worth considering this study's theory in light of current world events. While social scientists often shy away from serious analysis of current conflicts, it is nonetheless useful to highlight similarities in causal conditions between these conflicts and conflicts of the past. In particular, the dynamics of war aim expansion have surfaced in Vladimir Putin's behavior towards Crimea and the Ukraine in the past two years. In terms of policy suggestions, we should ask: what ability do the U.S. and its allies have to affect Putin's decision-making calculus, and is it possible to force him to consider whether the future consequences of his actions are worth the present gains? I assert that Putin has every incentive to attempt territorial war aim expansion by supporting rebel forces in Ukraine beyond the Crimea[400]. I also assert that there is relatively little the United States can do at present to change the value of the territory or greatly impact the risks to Russia's future security.

The main reason for both Putin's choice to expand aims and the United States and its NATO/EU allies' inability to prevent him from doing so is the same: there are low risks of expansion, and the U.S. and the West cannot increase the risks. None of these states represents an important ally for Putin, so he has little reason to refrain

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[400] See James Miller, "Russian-Backed Rebels are Restarting the War in Ukraine". *Foreign Policy*, June 8, 2015. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/06/08/russian-backed-rebels-are-restarting-the-war-in-ukraine/. He notes that rebel forces have employed a "strategy [which] has been successful in retaking territory without the benefit of requiring a headline-making major offensive".

from expansion. Further undercutting the ability to affect Putin's future security is the fact that the West clearly will not become involved militarily[401]. As for reputation, while Russia's reputation is certainly suffering, it is unclear that Putin is concerned. Moreover, it could be argued that Putin's domestic support is such that he is insulated from reputational concerns; a leader that is popular at home is less likely to fear being unpopular abroad, especially when he is a major power[402]. Therefore, Putin faced little risk to expansion, and continues to face little risk in the future. There is simply little the U.S. or its allies can do to punish him (given our unwillingness to increase the stakes of the conflict), or to change his calculus such that the value of the territory is not worth the risks he will run. I must end on a pessimistic note, at least as regards this conflict. Nonetheless, knowing *why* the U.S. has trouble preventing territorial expansion can help policy-makers find new strategies.

Conclusion

In summation, this dissertation has examined the topic of territorial war aims, advanced a new theory, and tested it using case studies of several different

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[401] See Michael Birnbaum, "Putin appears the biggest winner of Ukrainian cease-fire talks", *Washington Post,* February 12, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/as-ukraine-peace-negotiations-continue-war-intensifies/2015/02/12/e81403c4-b27f-11e4-886b-c22184f27c35_story.html Birnbaum quotes "Ivo H. Daalder, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO" as saying "We're constantly telling him [Putin] what our bottom line is and that's that… we don't want a military confrontation, period". (ellipsis in original).

[402] See Michael Birnbaum and Karoun Demirjian, "A year after Crimean annexation, threat of conflict remains". *Washington Post*, March 18, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/a-year-after-crimean-annexation-threat-of-conflict-remains/2015/03/18/12e252e6-cd6e-11e4-8730-4f473416e759_story.html. The authors note Russian excitement over the taking of the Crimea, and emphasize that Putin's "approval ratings have soared to record highs".

types. I have shown that my theory provides nuance and improved explanatory power compared to alternative theories, and that it gives us improved understanding of key conflicts in world history. I have now shown that it also has policy significance, and that there are multiple avenues for future research. Territory is a key source of conflict in world politics, and this dissertation represents an important contribution to our understanding of the phenomenon of territorial war aims.

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