The Birth of Prāsaṅgika: A Buddhist Movement in India and Tibet

Kevin Alan Vose
Bath, Maine

Master of Arts, University of Virginia, 1999
Bachelor of Arts, Bates College, 1992

A Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Faculty of the University of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Religious Studies

University of Virginia
May, 2005



Abstract

This dissertation examines the birth of a Buddhist intellectual movement in twelfth century Tibet, known by its Sanskrit name, Prāsaṅgika ("Middle Way Consequentialism"), and founded on the writings of the seventh century Indian, Candrakīrti. From its inception, Prāsaṅgika philosophy—ranging from logic to soteriology—quickly came to dominate Tibetan intellectual life, and continues to do so down to the present day. This project traces the movement's inauguration in the writings of eleventh century Indian Buddhists and its twelfth century institutional birth in Central Tibet, examining the philosophical issues that were its raison d'être and tracing the manner in which these issues and the texts embodying them were utilized to construct a religious community. Through analyzing the interplay of translation, canon formation, and doctrinal innovation and relating this analysis to the socio-political rivalries of this fractious and formative period of Tibetan Buddhism, this dissertation offers a new approach to interpreting Buddhist doctrinal and historical genres.

The first chapter introduces the Indian Buddhists who popularized Candrakīrti's writings and examines the issues around which they valorized them. These issues center on their interpretation of ultimate truth (*paramārthasatya*), the relationship of the ultimate to epistemological (*pramāṇa*) concerns and to tantric practice, and a unique view of Buddhahood. The second chapter traces the controversies precipitated by the introduction to Central Tibet of Candrakīrti's main writings just after the onset of the twelfth century. Philosophical issues and the social milieu contributed to the formation, for the first time, of Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika schools, which can best be understood as Tibetan "textual communities." The final three chapters explore these two schools' debates, examining the writings of Prajñākaramati (950-1030), Atiśa (c. 982-1054), Jayānanda (c. 1100), Abhayākaragupta (c. 1025-1125), Chaba Chokyi Sengé (*Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge,* 1109-1169), Mabja Jangchub Tsondru (*rMa bya Byang chub brtson 'grus,* d. 1185), Sonam Tsemo (*bSod nams rtse mo,* 1142-1182), and Drakpa Gyeltsen (*Grags pa rgyal mtshan,* 1147-1216).

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements

I am grateful for the generous support that this project received from an American Institute of Indian Studies Junior Research Fellowship and a Dissertation Writing Fellowship from the University of Virginia's Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. The material support of these fellowships allowed the research and the writing of this dissertation to develop into its present state. The AIIS fellowship additionally enabled my study in Darjeeling with Ken Rinpoche Ngawang Jinpa, among the last generation to complete his training at Loseling (*blo gsal gling*) College of Drepung (*'bras spungs*) Monastery in Lhasa, Tibet and a true savant of Tibetan learning. While he would heartily disagree with my presentation of Candrakīrti and Prāsaṅgika, his lively intellect and good humor deepened my understanding of many issues. I also thank the faculty and administrators of the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies in Sarnath, my hosts during my fellowship period. Both in Lhasa and here in Charlottesville, my work benefited from the expertise of Tibet University's Lhakpa Tseten, one of the brightest lights of Tibet's new generation of scholars. Additionally, the trip he arranged for me to visit Sangpu Monastery, the site of much of the drama in this study, enlivened this project.

I thank the participants in David Germano's Spring 2004 Tibetan Renaissance Seminar, who read a draft of my second chapter, and the panelists and audience of "Studies in Buddhist Philosophy and Mental Culture," moderated by John Dunne, at the 2004 American Academy of Religion's Annual Meeting, where I presented some of the ideas found in my fifth chapter. Feedback from both venues enriched the final product. My appreciation also goes to Derek Maher, whose extensive comments on my first chapter continue to improve it. I thank Helmut Tauscher for sharing his expertise on a particularly tricky passage in Chapa's text. My gratitude goes to each of my committee members: David Germano, Robert Hueckstedt, Karen Lang, and Anne Monius. The influences of each are clear throughout this project, which improved greatly as a result.

My deepest gratitude extends to my thesis director and mentor, Jeffrey Hopkins, in this the year of his retirement. This project was conceived in the autumn of 1997 in his Madhyamaka seminar, where I first learned of many of the figures and issues explored here. His guidance, knowledge, and enthusiasm for any Tibetan text I brought to him over three years of weekly reading shaped this work and formed me as a scholar. This study, while taking routes that diverge from his, intends to complement and honor Prof. Hopkins's great contribution to Madhyamaka and to the study of Buddhist doxography. His prolific scholarship continues to be a model for those investigating Buddhist doctrine and philosophy. May it continue for many years to come.

Finally, personal thanks are due to my family, whose love and support have helped me survive and prosper throughout a long graduate school career. Special thanks go to Suzanne Bessenger, Sally Vose, and to my son, Jakob, born the same year this project was first conceived.

Introduction

This dissertation examines the birth of a Buddhist intellectual movement in twelfth century Tibet, known by its Sanskrit name, Prāsaṅgika (those employing logical "consequences"), and founded on the writings of the seventh century Indian, Candrakīrti. From its inception, Prāsaṅgika philosophy—ranging from logic to soteriology—quickly came to dominate Tibetan intellectual life, and continues to do so down to the present day. This dissertation traces the movement's inauguration in the writings of eleventh century Indian Buddhists and its twelfth century institutional birth in Central Tibet, examining the philosophical issues that were its raison d'être and tracing the manner in which these issues and the texts embodying them were utilized to construct a religious community. Through analyzing the interplay of translation, canon formation, and doctrinal innovation and relating this analysis to the socio-political rivalries of this fractious and formative period of Tibetan Buddhism, this dissertation offers a new approach to understanding and interpreting Buddhist doctrinal and historical genres.

Previous scholarship on Indian and Tibetan Buddhist doctrinal history has examined the Madhyamaka ("Middle Way") writings of the supposed Indian founders of Prāsaṅgika and its competitor, Svātantrika (those employing formal inferences "of their own," proving their Madhyamaka positions with inference), Candrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka, respectively, in search of what distinguished these two subschools of Madhyamaka. Such scholarship has been informed by Tibetan scholarship of the thirteenth century and forward that consistently spoke of these two subschools of Indian Madhyamaka and of the superiority of Prāsaṅgika in elucidating the "true thought" of the founder of Madhyamaka, Nāgārjuna, and indeed of the Buddha himself. Tibetan scholarship, and consequently contemporary scholarship, was divided on whether Prāsaṅgika's superiority stemmed only from the logical procedures it employed to defeat rival positions and to prove the central Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness (*śūnyatā, stong pa nyid*) or whether Prāsaṅgika additionally represented a higher

understanding of emptiness. Tibetans and contemporary scholars have combed through the central writings of Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti in search of these distinctions.

Previous scholarship would endorse the existence of an Indian debate in the sixth and seventh centuries concerning the logical procedures appropriate to Madhyamaka and, possibly, the ontological commitments that those procedures entail. Scholarship on Tibetan renditions of the Prāsaṅgika-Svātantrika distinction could then evaluate Tibetans' fidelity to the Indian debate. However, the great gap in this scholarship that jumps from Candrakīrti in seventh century India to thirteenth and fourteenth century Tibetans obscures our understanding of the development of both Indian and Tibetan intellectual traditions. As discussed in detail in Chapter One, Indian textual evidence leads us to conclude that no intra-Madhyamaka debate took place in the seventh century and that, instead, Candrakīrti's writings were largely ignored until around the close of the first millennium. Additionally, as shown in Chapter Two, the terms "Prāsaṅgika" and "Svātantrika" are not known until the twelfth century, when they are first found in the writings of Jayānanda and Sonam Tsemo (*bSod nams rtse mo,* 1142-1182).

These conclusions, in turn, force us to reevaluate the received body of knowledge concerning Madhyamaka. On the Indian side, we have to consider the currents of thought and practice that contributed to Candrakīrti's texts suddenly receiving their due, over three hundred years following his death. On the Tibetan side, we have to investigate the social and intellectual landscape in which Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika schools first formed and how the formation of these schools contributed to the development of the orders of Tibetan Buddhism we are familiar with today. On both sides, we need to identify the issues upon which Candrakīrti's texts were brought to bear and how those issues relate to the concerns of earlier Indian and later Tibetan Buddhism. Rather than an Indian Prāsaṅgika lineage that passed unchanged for hundreds of years and a Tibetan Prāsaṅgika that accurately (or inaccurately) reflected that Indian lineage, a picture emerges of a dynamic Indian tradition

still developing in its final period and a Tibetan tradition that recast Indian texts in a unique social milieu and continued to develop those texts for hundreds of years.

In seeking to improve our knowledge of the final developments of Indian Buddhism and the formative period of Tibetan Buddhism, this dissertation looks to recover the eleventh and twelfth century debates, around which Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika schools formed, out from under the corpi of abstractions drawn by much later scholars. In understanding the relative successes of the lines drawn by these two exegetical schools, I examine important Tibetan translators, their work in creating Indian canonical bases for their Tibetan monastic academies, and the competition these translators engaged in when embedded within wider networks of socio-political administration. It is undeniable that Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika are traditions invented by a few well-educated and creative individuals who stood in the riptide of an Indian past quickly receding and a swell of translations sweeping into Central Tibet. However, the role of these individuals as abbots and important teachers in monastic academies requires that we examine the communities in which these interpretations took root and formed the bases for competing exegetical schools. This examination of social and intellectual history helps us to see Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika as living religious movements rather than as abstract doxographical categories.

Sources and Methods

Essential to this endeavor to trace the creation and early development of Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika exegetical schools is the recent availability of twelfth century Tibetan doctrinal texts. The most important to the present study is Helmut Tauscher's edition of a recently discovered manuscript of Chapa Chokyi Sengé's *Compilation of the Three Mādhyamikas from the East.*[1] This text contains a lengthy critique of Candrakīrti's views,

[1] Phya pa chos kyi seṅ ge, *dbu ma śar gsum gyi stoṅ thun,* ed. Helmut Tauscher (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1999). The manuscript Tauscher edited was

particularly as his eleventh and twelfth century champions present them. Previously, criticism of Candrakīrti has been virtually unknown,[2] with Indian authors by and large ignoring him and Tibetan authors glowing in admiration (if not always in agreement on just what he said).[3] Chapa's protracted and clear critique casts light on other doctrinal texts of the period, particularly two works by the second and third Sakya hierarchs, Sonam Tsemo and Drakpa Gyeltsen,[4] that have long been accessible but express more muted criticism of Candrakīrti's views, making that criticism more difficult to recognize. Chapa's text allows us to see some of the assumptions these authors worked under and some of the debates to which they refer.

Additionally, I utilize Indian canonical texts of the eleventh and twelfth centuries to identify the issues in Candrakīrti's texts that suddenly inspired Indian Buddhists after centuries of neglect. This body of literature has long been available; but, alas, the canon is large and scholars few. Crucial to understanding this literature is Jayānanda's (twelfth century)[5] massive commentary to Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle,*[6] the only known

---

discovered in Beijing by Prof. Leonard van der Kuijp. Since Tauscher's edition, a second manuscript of Chapa's text has been added to the materials in Gene Smith's Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center.

[2] One exception is the Jonang founder, Dolpopa Sherab Gyeltsen (*Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan,* 1292-1361).

[3] This situation has surely contributed to scholarly misperceptions of an Indian Prāsaṅgika school that passed from Candrakīrti to fourteenth century Tibetan scholars. Candrakīrti's major writings have long been widely available in Louis de la Vallée Poussin's editions of *Clear Words* and *Entrance to the Middle:* Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti,* Bibliotheca Buddhica, 4 (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970 [originally, 1903-1913]) and Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti,* Bibliotheca Buddhica, 9 (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970 [originally, 1907-1912]). The availability of these texts and the Madhyamaka writings of thirteenth and fourteenth century Tibetan authors would lend to the illusion of a continuity.

[4] bSod nams rtse mo (1142-1182), *Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa,* in *Sa skya pa'i bka' 'bum,* vol. 2 (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1968) and Grags pa rgyal mtshan (1147-1216), *rGyud kyi mngon par rtogs pa rin po che'i ljong shing,* in *Sa skya pa'i bka' 'bum,* vol. 3.

[5] In assigning Jayānanda to the twelfth century, I differ from David Seyfort Ruegg's assessment in his *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), 113. I discuss this in full in Chapter Two.

[6] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* Toh. 3870, *sde dge* edition, *dbu ma,* vol. *ra.*

Indian commentary to the text. Jayānanda's development of Candrakīrti's views and his travels through Central Tibet made his writings the key to Tibetans' development of a Prāsaṅgika school and, consequently, to our understanding of its formation.

Throughout the dissertation, I make use of Indian Buddhist sources—from the Madhyamaka, Yogācāra ("Yogic Practice"), and epistemology (*pramāṇa, tshad ma*) traditions—from periods much earlier than that investigated. In doing so, I hope to show some of the development of important themes that came to a head in the eleventh and twelfth centuries and to explicate Chapa's and others' writings. For Buddhist doctrinal literature always assumes; positions and arguments are stated as sparsely as possible with the assumption of a common background out of which a listener or reader could draw meaning. The need for exegesis in many cases is clear, particularly when dealing with figures whose texts are only now accessible and whose viewpoints have previously only been "known" through the writings of much later scholars espousing agendas very different than the author's own. Exegetical assistance comes most reliably from within a text, from juxtaposing an author's point in a later chapter with a discussion that seemed incomplete in an earlier chapter. Outside of a given text, we can look to period sources for help. However, even with the recent finds of doctrinal texts from this period, our resources are quite thin, and we often must look elsewhere for assistance in drawing out what was behind an author's use of particular arguments or particular terminology. Earlier sources can be helpful, giving us a sense of the assumptions twelfth century scholars would have shared. A given author's assumptions can sometimes be traced in earlier literature if one is both diligent and lucky.

Later Tibetan literature, casting a backward gaze with very different concerns than were embedded in the time period that it surveys, can also provide insights into issues that continued to perplex these authors centuries later. Frequently we see more systematic and complete discussion of issues in Tibetan doctrinal sources of the thirteenth century and forward; ideas fragmentarily expressed in the twelfth century become topics for tomes much

later. Utilizing later literature alongside twelfth century texts can aid both in our understanding of the development of Tibetan Buddhist intellectual traditions and in our attempt to understand the earlier period. However, later literature must be used with care. As we begin to learn of the ideas of eleventh and twelfth century figures from those authors' writings, we can begin evaluating the accuracy of later authors who would "restate" earlier authors' positions in the terms of their own arguments. Particularly in the case of certain Kadampa (*bka' gdams pa*) authors, whose schools did not survive into the later period, we see authors grossly misrepresenting their views.[7] In some cases, sectarian polemics may be at work in these misrepresentations; in other cases, it is likely that the later authors did not possess copies of the earlier materials. In any case, a more careful use of later sources is called for: later sources can aid our understanding of eleventh and twelfth century terminology and arguments but cannot be trusted to present accurate intellectual histories. As more doctrinal and philosophical sources from the eleventh and twelfth century continue to be uncovered,[8] our reliance upon later sources will lessen and a more complete understanding of early Tibetan intellectual history can be gained.

My approach to this varied literature is to conduct historically-based philosophical/doctrinal analyses, situating important Buddhist thinkers of the eleventh and twelfth centuries in their likely historical relations and in their institutional roles. First, I

---

[7] Of great pertinence to the present study are the misrepresentations of the Sangpu (*gSang phu ne'u thog*) abbots and authors, Ngok Loden Sherab (*rNgog lo tsā ba bLo ldan shes rab,* 1059-1109) and Chapa Chokyi Sengé. We see contemporary scholarship presenting these two scholars' views, referring to their views as the "Sangpu position," based on the writings of much later Gelukpa (*dge lugs pa*) and Sakyapa (*sa skya pa*) authors, especially Shākya Chokden's (*Shākya mchog ldan,* 1428-1507) intellectual histories (especially his *dBu ma rnam par nges pa'i mdzod lung dang rigs pa'i rgya mtsho, Collected Works,* vol. 14 [Thimphu, Bhutan: Kunzang Tobgey, 1975]). With the recent publication of several of Ngok's texts and one of Chapa's, we see great problems with the manner in which these two are represented and distinct differences between the two that would call into question a common "Sangpu position."

[8] Recently, an eight-volume "collected works" of Chapa was discovered in the Drepung (*'bras spungs*) Monastery Library; access to this collection is still tightly guarded.

examine late Indian Buddhist Madhyamaka literature to determine when interest in Candrakīrti arose, what issues his texts were brought to bear upon, and what currents of thought contributed to his rise. Indian authors' development of crucial issues in Candrakīrti's works are treated in later chapters in relationship to Tibetan authors' responses, responses that were in some cases formed in collaboration or debate with Indian Buddhists. I utilize a small part of the vast Tibetan historical literature in order to cast light on the institutional background of Tibetan doctrinal debates. Casting the debates in their monastic homes shows how certain Tibetan monasteries became centers for the study of certain Indian Buddhist textual traditions and were pit into competition with other monasteries for legitimacy, patronage, and political control. This combined historical, intellectual, and social analysis yields insights into the interpretive horizons of eleventh and twelfth century India and Tibet and into the formation and development of both doctrinal systems and religious institutions.

In tracing the rise of the Prāsaṅgika movement to eleventh century India and twelfth century Tibet, my conclusions vary considerably from the refined Tibetan scholarship that forged the positions of the respective orders of Tibetan Buddhism, positions that continue to be taught in monastic curricula today. Our differences are cast into greater relief when we further consider that we sometimes look to the very same Indian evidence to form our conclusions. For instance, the indifference toward Candrakīrti exhibited by the Indians Avalokitavrata, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla (treated in Chapter One)—all scholars who lived after Candrakīrti and held viewpoints similar to those Candrakīrti criticized—is interpreted by me as evidence for Candrakīrti's marginal status during his life and in the ensuing centuries. Tibetan scholars have looked at that same silence as evidence for the superiority of Candrakīrti's view. The Gelukpa scholar, Ngawang Belden (*Ngag dbang dpal ldan,* b. 1797) ends a discussion of Candrakīrti's superiority over Bhāvaviveka's Svātantrika system by writing:

> No one—such as followers of Bhāvaviveka and so forth—in the country of Superiors [India] refuted this master within mentioning his name, whereas this very master made refutations within mentioning the names of the master Bhāvaviveka, the master Dharmapāla, the master Dignāga, and so forth, but no Proponent of the Middle or Proponent of Mind-Only was able to do as he had done even though they disagreed with him.[9]

So stunning were Candrakīrti's arguments, in Ngawang Belden's assessment, no Indian could think of a response.

Our differing conclusions point to the great differences between contemporary and Tibetan scholastic projects and between how knowledge is generated in these two traditions. Tibetan doctrinal scholarship of the thirteenth century and onward sought to give order to a massive array of translated Indian texts, all claiming canonical authority. In creating order, Tibetans developed a ranked harmony between "systems" of Buddhist thought, categorizing lower and higher systems that less and more closely presented the "true thought" of the Buddha's teaching.[10] Later scholars inherited these systems. While they began (and continue to begin) with fixed ends (*grub mtha', siddha-anta*), their training brings to attention myriad contradictions between the Indian texts and the inherited system, as well as between the parts of the system itself. Rather than contradict the received system, or claim that the system contradicts itself, Tibetan scholars seek out new ways to interpret the texts and systems such that the original order and harmony can be maintained. Scholars gain a deeper doctrinal knowledge by confronting contradiction and creatively endeavoring to resolve these conflicts.[11]

---

[9]Translated in Jeffrey Hopkins, *Maps of the Profound* (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2003), 499-500.

[10] This is not to suggest that thirteenth and fourteenth century Tibetan scholars invented Buddhist doxography, a tradition that probably originated with Bhāvaviveka in the sixth century. The four-fold system of Buddhist thought—Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka—was well known in tenth to twelfth century India.

[11] Hopkins explains how Gelukpa scholars probe for deeper meaning and creatively express their novel insights within the confines of Tsongkapa's (*Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa,* 1357-1419) *Essence of Eloquence* (*Legs*

In contrast, when presented with a model (the existence and superiority of Indian Prāsaṅgika) that does not quite seem to fit the facts (little Indian interest in Candrakīrti until around the year 1000 and a thriving Madhyamaka system of interpretation that ignored Candrakīrti), the present investigator has sought to scrap the old model and build up an explanation that better matches the available historical data. In the relatively new fields of Tibetan Studies, Buddhist Studies, and History of Religions, we progress by poking holes in old explanations as we uncover new sources and new data, overlaying a new story that better fits the facts we see. To explain some of the same data, I see historical development where Tibetan scholars search out harmony and coherence. Our explanations must serve different purposes. I do not wish to convey the impression that I am an urban developer, leveling city blocks to build stunning new skyscrapers while the Tibetan scholastic patches the cracks in his roof. Rather, I wish to point out our differing models of knowledge and our differing epistemic practices: ours, constructive still, where new data and new explanations count for knowledge; theirs, enmeshed within a world structured by foundational texts, where a deeper working of those texts produces knowledge.

Chapter Summaries

Chapter One: The Eleventh Century Discovery of Candrakīrti's Ultimate

This chapter argues against traditional Tibetan and contemporary academic scholarship—which presents Prāsaṅgika as a monolithic Indo-Tibetan Buddhist school of thought, complete and consistent from Candrakīrti through its contemporary representatives—to present the textual stratigraphy showing that Candrakīrti's writings were not important in his own life and, in fact, received little attention from Indian Buddhists

---

bshad snying po), a doxographical treatise on the Yogācāra, Svātantrika Madhyamaka, and Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka systems; see "The Steel Bow and Arrow" in Jeffrey Hopkins, *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999), 15-25.

until the close of the first millennium. The many important eleventh century Indian Buddhists responding—both favorably and otherwise—to the same passages in Candrakīrti's writings show that his views on "ultimate truth" (*paramārthasatya, don dam bden pa*) became the source of his appeal and controversy in this period. Furthermore, I show that Candrakīrti's views rose hand in hand with the antinomian rhetoric and rituals of the final stage of Indian esoteric Buddhism: practitioners of esotericism saw in Candrakīrti the perfect exoteric complement to their own portrayals of an ultimate truth beyond the ken of both human intellect and the scholastic Buddhist intellectual practices of their day.

Chapter One concludes with an examination of Tibetan doxography, showing how this genre, when misread as a history of Indian Buddhist doctrinal developments instead of as Tibetan attempts to synthesize thematically a plethora of Indian views, distorts our understanding of Indian Buddhism. The historico-philosophical approach that I utilize in this and the following chapters instead allows us to see the intricacies and development of the final flourishing of Buddhism in India—in which scholars achieved complex syntheses of doctrinal, epistemological, and ritual issues—and opens our eyes to the mutiplicity of directions open to Tibetan Buddhists in the pre-canonical, proto-sectarian period.

Chapter Two: Tibetan Textual Communities and the Prāsaṅgika Movement

This chapter traces the controversies precipitated by the introduction to Central Tibet of Candrakīrti's main writings just after the onset of the twelfth century. I show that the eleventh century Indian resurrection of Candrakīrti's views combined with the fractured and competitive socio-political environment of Central Tibet to form for the first time a Prāsaṅgika "school," having definite institutional bases and evolving doctrinal positions. In response to this new movement, Sangpu Monastery near Lhasa, Tibet—supported by a competing political faction and formed around the study of an older current of Madhyamaka thought that advanced Buddhist epistemological developments—became home to a defense

of this older current that came then to be known as "Svātantrika." The ensuing doctrinal and political battles between these two schools saw the Prāsaṅgika viewpoint triumphant yet changed, adopting many positions of the losers in a blend of Candrakīrti's and Buddhist epistemological views that now characterizes the Madhyamaka school in Tibet. Chapter Two analyzes the births of these two Tibetan "textual communities" (expanding on the work of several scholars of medieval Europe in order to retrieve aspects of Tibetan manuscript culture), each founded on unique interpretations of Indian Buddhist texts and both claiming lengthy Indian pedigrees for the novel doctrinal positions that their respective institutes inculcated.

The second part of the dissertation, comprising the final three chapters, focuses on the wide-ranging controversies that I see dividing the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika movements in this period, utilizing the previously unavailable or neglected texts of eleventh and twelfth century Indian and Tibetan proponents of Candrakīrti: Prajñākaramati (950-1030), Jayānanda (c. 1100), and Mabja Jangchub Tsondru (d. 1185); as well as his detractors and apologists: Ngok the Translator (1059-1109), Chapa Chokyi Sengé (1109-1169, both Sangpu abbots), Abhayākaragupta (c. 1025-1125), Sonam Tsemo (1142-1182), and Drakpa Gyeltsen (1147-1216). Taking the historical refinements of the previous two chapters as its backdrop, Part Two adopts a largely thematic, systemic approach to draw out the religious and philosophical value of these doctrinal controversies. In short, after establishing the historical validity of Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika as living religious movements, I admit some of the thematic similarities between authors of this period and earlier Indian, as well as later Tibetan, Buddhists that would allow one to classify the writings of period authors together with the writings of authors who lived much earlier or later.[12] However, the differences that

[12] For instance, after arguing for the minor role of Atiśa in establishing an actual Prāsaṅgika school, I utilize his writings, which demonstrate clear affinities for Candrakīrti's views, in explicating an early Prāsaṅgika view of transformation.

I present between the early Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika schools compared with the more familiar thematic presentations of doxography still come to the fore, as the doctrinal issues dividing the schools at their inceptions significantly diverge from the differences presented in later Tibetan scholarship.

My emphasis on historical development underlies the final three chapters, as I examine the Indian Buddhist currents that helped produce the positions of Tibetan Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika schools. In Chapter Three, I show that debates within the Indian epistemological tradition formed a backdrop to twelfth century Madhyamaka debates. In Chapters Four and Five, I trace out problems in eleventh and twelfth century Madhyamaka views of transformation and Buddhahood in comparison with the Yogācāra solutions to these same problems. In each case, I attempt to elucidate the patterns of development of Buddhist intellectual traditions, the cross-currents that shed light on mutual Buddhist and, indeed, religious problems. In tracing out these currents, this dissertation ranges beyond consideration of the conflicts that first engendered the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika interpretations of Madhyamaka into consideration of some fundamental tensions in the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition.

Chapter Three: Taxonomies of Ignorance in Madhyamaka Debates on Validity

This chapter shows that the Prāsaṅgika presentation of the "two truths" (*satyadvaya, bden gnyis*) and their critique of valid cognition yield a great divide between human ignorance and the enlightened state while Svātantrika authors soften this divide to allow for valid human cognition of the ultimate. I demonstrate that in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the Indian controversies within the epistemological tradition concerning the nature of valid cognition were placed in conflict with the Madhyamaka understanding of the pervasive role of ignorance in binding sentient beings to cyclic existence. While the rejection or acceptance of formal inference (*anumāna, rjes dpag*) has long been known to be a central

factor in the formation of Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika interpretations of Madhyamaka, I show that the early arguments were much broader, debating the possibility of valid cognition itself and the validity of perception (*pratyakṣa, mngon sum*).

After surveying the tensions between Madhyamaka and epistemological notions of ignorance and validity, this chapter has three main parts: (1) I examine the problems that Prāsaṅgikas saw in the valid cognition enterprise, which, in Jayānanda's writings, took the form of a stark denial of the value of human rationality and a concomitant understanding of pervasive human ignorance. While all Mādhyamikas must posit distinctions between the two truths and between the types of consciousnesses that perceive them, the Prāsaṅgika distinction lies in pitting human consciousness, characterized by mistake, in blatant opposition with validity as Dharmakīrti and his followers define it. (2) I present the responses of Tibetan Mādhyamikas, most notably Chapa Chokyi Sengé, who viewed the valid establishment of human cognition to be essential to religious development. Chapa sought to temper the Prāsaṅgika portrayal of ignorance, positing levels of validity that allow ultimate and ordinary to be clearly distinguished but still validly known. (3) The final section of the chapter examines the syntheses, begun by Mabja Jangchub Tsondru, that led to a Prāsaṅgika that accommodated and came eventually to champion valid cognition. While Mabja disparaged what he labeled "objectively gained valid cognition," in doing so he allowed "mere valid cognition" into his Prāsaṅgika interpretation, essentially recasting Chapa's position on ordinary valid cognition in a Prāsaṅgika mold.

Each of these presentations give their own taxonomy of human ignorance, ranging from the delusion that traps us in cyclic existence to a kind of conceptual mistake that provides us with both useful knowledge of the world and ways to see through our delusion. The debates show us that the working out of how we validly know the world and come to have soteriologically essential knowledge were key features of twelfth century Madhyamaka.

Chapter Four: What Can Be Said About the Ineffable?

Building on the previous chapter's discussion of Madhyamaka debates on valid cognition, this chapter explores the problematic Prāsaṅgika claim that ultimate truth is entirely beyond the scope of human consciousness. I examine Prajñākaramati's and Jayānanda's discussions of this issue, showing that each author holds human consciousness to be irretrievably imbued with conceptuality (*vikalpa, rtog pa*) and therefore of no value in knowing the ultimate beyond all dualistic conceptions. The chapter then presents Chapa's unique understanding of ultimate truth. Whereas later Tibetan scholars concern themselves with distinguishing "positive" and "negative" interpretations of emptiness and attempt to classify previous positions into one or the other category, I show that Chapa's presentation exhibits features of both interpretations. For Chapa, emptiness must be knowable and able to "bear analysis" (*dpyad bzod*) on the one hand but must be a "non-affirming negative" (*prasajyapratiṣedha, med dgag*) on the other.

This chapter's final section examines "concordant ultimates" (*mthun pa'i don dam*), showing that early Svātantrikas developed concordant ultimates as a way of explaining how the ultimate is realized in stages, by first realizing phenomena that accord with the ultimate. Early Prāsaṅgikas' rejection of this notion was in keeping with their view of the ultimate as an entirely unknowable phenomenon. The debate over concordant ultimates allows us to see that the fundamental issue for Mādhyamikas was to develop an interpretation of ultimate truth that emphasized its singular importance as the object of salvific knowledge and at the same time allowed an explanation of how realization of it could come about. The Svātantrika position more successfully fulfilled these needs. Even while the Prāsaṅgika school of Madhyamaka came to win the day in Tibet, Svātantrika conceptions of the ultimate survived for later exegetes to include within Prāsaṅgika.

Chapter Five: Prāsaṅgika vs. Svātantrika on Non-Abiding Nirvāṇa

This final chapter investigates the two sides' arguments on the nature of Buddhahood and the process of transformation. I examine Jayānanda's development of several iconoclastic but incomplete themes within Candrakīrti's presentation of Buddhahood, showing that he attempted to work out notions of transformation within the view that at Buddhahood ordinary mind (*citta, sems*) ceases and, consequently, the ultimate is not actually known. His attempt to explain metaphorical knowledge of the ultimate as well as a Buddha's ability to know and aid the ordinary world without the benefit of ordinary mind was unsuccessful and, as a result, forced him to reach out to traditional Yogācāra explanations of transformation. Even Yogācāra views could not entirely rescue Jayānanda's conception of a Buddha unable to perceive ordinary appearances, leading him to admit a kind of ignorance into a Buddha's state that would allow ordinary perception.

Svātantrika critics portrayed the Prāsaṅgika view of a pristine Buddhahood—dissociated from human intellect and unable to perceive the mundane world—as entirely cut off from the human condition, impossible to attain and ultimately useless. Chapa and his student, Sonam Tsemo, developed their own solutions to how a cognitively pure Buddha can perceive and aid an ultimately unreal world. Whereas Jayānanda saw full realization of emptiness negating the perception of appearances, Chapa's Buddha sees phenomena that appear to bear analysis but are known to be empty. Chapa admits that a Buddha's perception of appearances involves some level of mistake but, like Jayānanda's ignorant Buddha, this mistake is rendered harmless. Each side in this debate is forced to come back to a position that embraces both of the conflicting poles of non-abiding nirvāṇa (*apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa, mi gnas pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa*), in which a Buddha is both always in meditative absorption on emptiness and constantly working for the welfare of sentient

beings. From their debates, we see that working out a viable path to enlightenment and a uniquely Madhyamaka explanation of nirvāṇa were core issues of the twelfth century.

Chapter One: The Eleventh Century Discovery of Candrakīrti's Ultimate

Prominent Tibetan scholars of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries uniformly speak of a Prāsaṅgika school of Madhyamaka ("Middle Way"), founded by the Indians Buddhapālita (c. 500)[13] and Candrakīrti (c. 570-640),[14] developed in India—in some accounts by a lineage of mostly unlettered disciples but always including such luminaries as Śāntideva (early eighth century) and Atiśa (c. 982-1054)—and propagated in Tibet down to these Tibetan scholars' time. The Tibetan systematizers likewise speak of clear differences between the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika interpretations of Madhyamaka, between these two identifiable schools, and of the superiority of Prāsaṅgika in elucidating the "true thought" of Nāgārjuna (c. 200), the founder of Madhyamaka. In this vein, Candrakīrti is said to have "refuted" Bhāvaviveka (c. 500-570), the "founder" of the Svātantrika interpretation, and established the preeminence of Prāsaṅgika through writing his commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle.*[15] While the precise nature of the Prāsaṅgika-Svātantrika division was debated in the Kagyu, Sakya, and Geluk schools throughout the fourteenth to eighteenth centuries and in the Nyingma school in the nineteenth century, there was no

---

[13] This date and the dates of Indian Mādhyamikas except where noted are drawn from David Seyfort Ruegg, *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981) to which one may refer for the complexities preventing more precise dating.

[14] Toshihiko Kimura, "A New Chronology of Dharmakīrti," *Dharmakīrti's Thought and its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy,* ed. Shoryu Katsura (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1999), 209-214.

[15] The Sanskrit of Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ* is found in J. W. de Jong, *Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ* (Madras, India: Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1977) while the Tibetan translation is *sde dge* edition, *dbu ma,* vol. *tsa,* 3824. Candrakīrti's attacks on Bhāvaviveka are in his commentary, *Prasannapadā* ("Clear Words"): Sanskrit text in Louis de La Vallée Pousin, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti,* Bibliotheca Buddhica 4 (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970); Tibetan text *sde dge* 3860, *dbu ma,* vol. *'a.* Bhāvaviveka's views that were the basis for Candrakīrti's critique are found in his commentary upon Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise,* called *Prajñāpradīpa* ("Lamp for Wisdom"); Tibetan text (*dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa shes rab sgron ma*) *sde dge* 3863, vol. *dza.*

disagreement that just such a division accurately reflected Indian Buddhist developments of the sixth and seventh centuries.[16] Tibetan scholarship on this distinction, from the fourteenth century into the present, has influenced a great deal of contemporary scholarship that continues to speak of two schools of Indian, and then Tibetan, Madhyamaka.

However, the Indian textual record presents a remarkably different view than fifteenth century Tibetan scholars' accounts. When we consider this record, we must conclude that Candrakīrti, rather than forming a school of Madhyamaka and triumphing over or refuting Bhāvaviveka, was in fact largely ignored in his day and for some three hundred years in both India and Tibet. Jayānanda (twelfth century)[17] is the only known Indian commentator on the works of Candrakīrti,[18] whereas there were eight Indian commentaries on Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle* and twenty-one Indian commentaries on Maitreya's *Ornament for Realization.*[19] The lineage of Indian Prāsaṅgika disciples stretching from Candrakīrti through Śāntideva and extending to Atiśa, the supposed progenitor of Prāsaṅgika in Tibet, varies widely in the Tibetan accounts and rarely includes figures known elsewise.[20] Furthermore, the argument from silence against Candrakīrti's

---

[16] While Tsong kha pa (1357-1419) admitted that the terms "Prāsaṅgika" and "Svātantrika" were coined by earlier Tibetans, he devoted a great deal of effort to showing how the terms applied to Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti, on the one hand, and to Bhāvaviveka, on the other, and concludes that the terms were not Tibetans' "own invention" (*rang bzo*). See his *Legs bshad snying po* (Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973), 139 and *Lam rim chen mo* (in *The Collected Works [gSuṅ 'bum] of rJe Tsoṅ-kha-pa Blo-bzaṅ-grags-pa,* vol. 19-20 [New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1975]), 343a.

[17] My rationale for dating Jayānanda to the twelfth century is discussed in Chapter Two.

[18] His commentary, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā* (*dbu ma la 'jug pa 'grel pa; sde dge* 3870, *dbu ma,* vol. *ya*) is discussed at length in the following chapters. The details of his life, travels in Central Tibet and Tangut lands, and his writings are treated in Chapter Two.

[19] *Abhisamayālaṃkāra, mngon rtogs rgyan.*

[20] Ruegg notes the presence of one (sometimes two) *Vidyākokila (*rigs pa'i khu byug*) in lineages drawn from Candrakīrti to the eleventh century Indian teacher of Patsab, Kanakavarman; see David Seyfort Ruegg, *Three Studies in the History of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Philosophy, Studies in Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Thought, Part I* (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 2000), 9, n. 10.

importance in India is bolstered by the fact that none of these shadowy figures is known by Tibetan scholars to have written on Madhyamaka (or anything else). This absence of any reported texts strongly suggests that, unlike the many volumes known to Tibetan scholars to have existed in India or Tibet in the past but no longer accessible to them or to us,[21] no such texts by these figures ever existed. Rather, these figures would seem to represent Tibetan historians' acknowledgement of great gaps in the Prāsaṅgika "lineage" and their attempts to fill in these holes with names, if not writings.

One can infer that the very survival of Candrakīrti's writings down to the time of Jayānanda could only have been brought about by some kind of following, whether Candrakīrti's writings were preserved in monastic libraries or transmitted in scribal families.[22] Most strongly, we can imagine the existence of a marginal school of thought that did not champion Candrakīrti with new treatises (at least none that survived even until the time of Jayānanda) but studied and preserved his texts. It may have been this sense of a "lineage" that Tibetan authors imagined and attempted to enliven with names. A school, family, or library preserving Candrakīrti's writings furthermore provides a more coherent picture of how his texts could later be popularized. At the least, we can conclude that if Candrakīrti founded an Indian Buddhist school of thought, his writings did not spawn a literary tradition for many hundreds of years.[23]

---

[21] An example of significance to this study is the Eighth Karmapa, Mi bskyod rdo rje's use of rMa bya byang chub brtson 'grus's commentary on Jayānanda's *Tarkamudgara,* a commentary no longer accessible; see Paul Williams, "rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus on Madhyamaka Method," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 13 (1985): 207 and 220, nn. 7 and 8. A classic list of "rare books" is A khu ching shes rab rgya mtsho's (1803-1875) *dpa rgyun dkon pa 'ga' zhig gi tho yig don gnyer yid kyi kunda bzhad pa'i zla 'od 'bum gyi snye ma,* reprinted in Lokesh Candra's *Materials for a History of Tibetan Literature* (Kyoto: Rinsen, 1981), 503-601. An Indian example is Avalokitavrata's list of eight commentaries on Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle,* four of which were never translated into Tibetan.

[22] I am grateful to Karen Lang and Robert Hueckstedt, who pointed out the necessity of repeated copying to the survival of Candrakīrti's texts through the humidity of Gangetic and Kaśmiri India.

[23] While the ongoing search for Sanskrit manuscripts could one day turn up a treatise from a member of a putative Candrakīrti following, findings thus far strengthen my case that Candrakīrti's popularity arose long

Furthermore, while Avalokitavrata (c. 700) in his subcommentary on Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for Wisdom* mentions Candrakīrti in a list of Indian scholars who wrote commentaries on Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle,*[24] he says nothing about Candrakīrti's lengthy criticisms of Bhāvaviveka. One can well assume that, in the Indian commentarial tradition, if Avalokitavrata deemed Candrakīrti's attacks damaging, it would have been incumbent upon him to respond. His silence, in an otherwise extensive treatise (spanning three Tibetan volumes), suggests that he viewed Candrakīrti's criticisms as insignificant, not worthy of response, perhaps not even as serious philosophy.

Likewise, the important Mādhyamikas Śāntarakṣita (eighth century) and Kamalaśīla (c.740-795) remained silent on Candrakīrti. Their extensive use of the Buddhist epistemological tradition, to an even greater degree than Bhāvaviveka, would require their responses to Candrakīrti's attacks on that tradition, had they viewed his attacks to be damaging. Both authors, instead, were more concerned with Dharmapāla's critique—from a Yogācāra viewpoint—of the feasibility of joining epistemology with Madhyamaka ontology.[25] Furthermore, in Ichigō's analysis, Kamalaśīla worked to refine Bhāvaviveka's and Śāntarakṣita's views, arguing against subtleties in their writings[26] rather than concern himself

---

after his death. Yonezawa identifies the "*Lakṣaṇaṭīkā*", a brief text first discovered by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, as a twelfth century Sanskrit commentary on Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā.* See Yoshiyasu Yonezawa, "**Lakṣaṇaṭīkā:* A Sanskrit Manuscript of an Anonymous Commentary on the *Prasannapadā,*" *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 47, 2 (1999): 1024-1022.

[24] *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā* (*shes rab sgron me'i rgya cher 'grel pa*), *sde dge* 3559, Peking 5259, *dbu ma,* vol. *wa,* 85a.8. The others listed are Nāgārjuna, Buddhapālita, Devaśarman, Guṇaśrī, Guṇamati, Sthiramati, and Bhāvaviveka.

[25] Tillemans (Tom J.F. Tillemans, *Materials for the Study of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti* [Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1990], 42-43) records several of their rejoinders to Dharmapāla. Rather than argue, like Candrakīrti, that the incompatibility of formal inference and the Madhyamaka ultimate requires the abandonment of formal inference "for oneself" (*svārthānumāna*), Dharmapāla argued that the incompatibility requires the abandonment of Madhyamaka ontology.

[26] Masamichi Ichigō, "Śāntarakṣita and Bhāviveka as Opponents of the Mādhyamika in the *Madhyamakāloka,*" in *Wisdom, Compassion, and the Search for Understanding: The Buddhist Studies Legacy of Gadjin M. Nagao,* ed. Jonathan A. Silk (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000), 147-170.

with the widely divergent views of Candrakīrti. The wide success of Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's Yogācāra-Madhyamaka interpretation, an interpretation well at odds with Candrakīrti's own, suggests Candrakīrti's insignificance during this time.[27] In contradistinction to what fifteenth century Tibetan authors state, the textual evidence leads one to conclude that Candrakīrti was a marginal figure in his day and uninfluential in India until the close of the first millennium.

Tibetan evidence—translations of Sanskrit Madhyamaka texts and native Tibetan commentaries and doxographies—from the establishment of Buddhism in Tibet until 1000 show a similar disinterest in Candrakīrti. Whereas a wealth of important Madhyamaka texts by Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Buddhapālita, Bhāvaviveka, and Śāntideva were translated during the early diffusion (*snga dar*), Candrakīrti's major writings were not translated into Tibetan until the eleventh century. Only one of his commentaries, on Nāgārjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning,* was translated in the "early diffusion" (*snga dar*).[28] A likely reason for its translation is that it is the only Indian commentary on Nāgārjuna's text.[29]

---

[27] Dreyfus and McClintock ("Introduction" in *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make?* eds. Georges B.J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock [Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2002], 33-34, n.6) note that Kamalaśīla seems to refer to two types of Madhyamaka (*dbu ma'i lam gnyis*), one corresponding to Bhāvaviveka's views on the conventional existence of external objects and the other corresponding to Śāntarakṣita's views on the nonexistence of external objects, in his commentary to Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* (*Madhyamakālaṃkārapañjikā,* Toh. 3886, *sde dge* edition, *dbu ma,* vol. *sa,* 128a). While this classification leaves room for Candrakīrti as a supporter of conventional external objects, it is further evidence that Kamalaśīla was not concerned with the most substantial of Candrakīrti's Madhyamaka interpretations.

[28] *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti* (*rigs pa drug cu pa'i 'grel pa*), *sde dge* 3864, *dbu ma,* vol. *ya*; Cristina Anna Scherrer-Schaub, *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti. Commentaire à la soixantaine sur le raisonnement ou Du vrai enseignement de la causalité par le Maitre indien Candrakīrti,* Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques, 25 (Bruselles: Institut belge des hautes etudes chinoises, 1991). Scherrer-Schaub (p. xxv) notes that the Tibetan translation of Nāgārjuna's verses preserved within Candrakīrti's commentary (translated by Jinamitra, Dānaśīla, Śīlendrabodhi, and Ye shes sde) bear close relation with the verses preserved in the Tun-huang collection.

[29] Similarly, the translations of Buddhapālita's commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle* and of Śāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Practice* do not indicate "Prāsaṅgika's" establishment in the early diffusion. While Ruegg (*Three Studies,* 16) notes "the existence of a *sṅa dar* translation of a major work

As is well known, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, both later categorized as Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas,[30] were instrumental in the early diffusion of exoteric Buddhism in Tibet, the former credited with creating the first monastery in Tibet at Samyé and ordaining the first Tibetan monks and the latter, his student, credited with establishing the orthodox "gradual path" at the Great Debate at Samyé. Their most important Madhyamaka texts were translated during the early diffusion, as well as those by another key Indian author, Jñānagarbha, who blended components of Dharmakīrti's epistemology with Madhyamaka thought.[31] Not surprisingly then, the first Tibetan doxographies by Yeshé Dé (*Ye shes sde*) and Kawa Peltsek (*Ka ba dpal brtsegs*) in the eighth century esteem the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka synthesis created by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla as the highest Buddhist school of thought.[32] Bhāvaviveka's Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka is ranked second; Candrakīrti is not mentioned. No Prāsaṅgika school is identified nor do we see the appellation, "Svātantrika," which—as discussed in Chapter Two—is employed only in the twelfth century, in contradistinction to Candrakīrti's views. This bifurcation of Madhyamaka into Yogācāra and Sautrāntika sub-streams, to the exclusion of Candrakīrti's views, is found also in Nyingma Nine Vehicle texts from this period and is repeated in the early Nyingma doxographies of Nup Sanggyé Yeshé (*gNubs Sangs rgyas ye shes,* tenth century) and Rongzom

---

connected with the Prāsaṅgika tradition, namely Buddhapālita's commentary on the *Madhyamakakārikās*", we have to appreciate when Buddhapālita's text was determined to express a "Prāsaṅgika" view. Until Candrakīrti's views became widespread in Tibet in the twelfth century, Buddhapālita's text was not labeled "Prāsaṅgika," but only "Madhyamaka." Bhāvaviveka's criticisms of Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti's countercritique of Bhāvaviveka presuppose their mutual adherence to Nāgārjuna's writings—to a Madhyamaka school—and not, as fourteenth century and later Tibetan literature maintains, to separate sub-schools. Śāntideva's writings are treated below.

[30] Tibetan doxographies from the fourteenth century on classify them as Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas, whereas the earliest Tibetan doxographies, as noted just below, write only of Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas.

[31] As recorded in the *lDan dkar ma* catalog edited by Marcelle Lalou, "Les textes Bouddhiques au temps du roi khri-srong-lde-bcan," *Journal Asiatique* 241 (1953): 333, nos. 578-585.

[32] Ruegg, *Three Studies,* 23-25.

Chokyi Zangpo (*Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po,* eleventh century), our earliest sources for the Madhyamaka of the later diffusion (*phyi dar*) of Buddhism in Tibet.[33]

This chapter will demonstrate that the Indian and Tibetan evidence point to an eleventh century resurrection of Candrakīrti's writings in India and a twelfth century birth of the Prāsaṅgika movement in Tibet. In addition to pinning down the movement's inception, this chapter discusses the fragmented Indian evidence that allows us insights into the philosophical and doctrinal issues (treated more fully in Chapters Three through Five) engendered by Candrakīrti's writings that polarized Indian and Tibetan Buddhists in this period. The central issue concerned the applicability of the conventions of "valid cognition"[34]—the epistemological enterprise foundational to Indian thought from at least the sixth century—to enlightening knowledge. This issue extended into appraisals of the value of human intellect in religious pursuits and the nature of Buddhahood. Further, in order to explore the reasons for Candrakīrti's sudden ascendency, following three hundred years of silence, I examine the connections between his popularizers and the final developments of Buddhist tantra in India. This chapter concludes with an evaluation of the Tibetan doxographical literature that became the source for scholarly misconceptions of an Indian Prāsaṅgika school, founded by Candrakīrti. The thematic unity that Tibetan authors sought in order to harmonize and classify the wealth of Indian Buddhist literature that confronted them marks doxography as a genre very different from our own understanding of intellectual history—despite the doxographer's and historian's employment of often the same textual data. An appreciation of the differences between the principles of doxography and our own guiding methodology prevents us from reading doxography as history, allows us to see the continued development of Buddhism in its final period in India, and alerts us to the

---

[33] Ruegg, *Three Studies,* 26-27 and 55-56.

[34] *pramāṇa, tshad ma.*

interpretive horizons available to Tibetan Buddhists in the pre-canonical, proto-sectarian period.

Reviving Candrakīrti's Critique of Ultimate Valid Cognition

As mentioned above, fifteenth century and later Tibetan authors frequently group Śāntideva's writings with Candrakīrti's as "Prāsaṅgika" and place him in a lineage stretching from Candrakīrti down to these authors themselves. Śāntideva is the one figure in these lineage lists prior to Atiśa about whom we have literary information. However, Śāntideva's own writings make no reference to Candrakīrti nor to any other of the figures that Tibetan historians would place in a lineage between Candrakīrti and Śāntideva. Śāntideva's surviving writings, consisting of poetry and comments interspersing his collection of sūtra fragments,[35] allow a great deal of interpretive room. Several verses from the ninth chapter of *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Practice* echo sentiments found in Candrakīrti's writings, especially the denial that ultimate truth is a referent of human intellect, the explanation of ultimate truth as "non-seeing", and the refutation of self-cognizing consciousness.[36]

It is important to note, however, that this text was commented upon from a decidedly non-Prāsaṅgika standpoint both in the early diffusion of Buddhism in Tibet and

---

[35] His poetry is *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Practice* (*Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra, byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa*), found in Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Prajñākaramati's Commentary to the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Çāntideva,* Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1902-1914); La Vallée Poussin's edition of Śāntideva's stanzas is based on I.P. Minaev, *Bodhicaryāvatāra, Zapiski* (Vostochnago Otdeleniya Imperatorskago Russkago Arkhealogicheskago Obshchestva, 1890). Saito's work and the *lDan dkar ma* catalog, referenced below, clarify that the early title of Śāntideva's stanzas was *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra*, "*Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Practice,*" rather than *Bodhicaryāvatāra,* "*Engaging in the Practice of Enlightenment,*" which the surviving Sanskrit manuscripts attest. Śāntideva's sūtra collection and comments is the *Compendium of Training* (*Śīkṣāsammucaya, bslab pa kun las btus pa*), found in Cecil Bendall, *Çikshāsamuccaya: A Compendium of Buddhistic Teaching,* Bibliotheca Buddhica I (Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1970).

[36] Stanzas IX.2, IX.35, and IX.24-26; La Vallée Poussin, *Prajñākaramati's Commentary*, (1905): 352, (1907): 417, and (1907): 399-401. These first two topics are discussed at length herein. Śāntideva's refutation of self-cognizing consciousness (*svasaṃvedana, rang rig*) is discussed fully in Paul Williams, *The Reflexive Nature of Awareness* (London: Curzon Press, 1998), chapters three and four.

during the later diffusion. Saito points to two Indian commentaries, likely the earliest, that treat Śāntideva's text from a Yogācāra-Madhyamaka perspective.[37] From the later diffusion, we see commentaries to the text by Ngok the Translator and Chapa, both of whom opposed Candrakīrti's views.[38] Furthermore, Śāntideva's text grew over hundreds of years: the version cataloged in the Den karma collection (c.800) is 600 stanzas in length,[39] while that preserved in the Dun-huang caves (dated to before 950) contains 701.5 stanzas.[40] Both are far shorter than the present canonical version in 913 stanzas. The fact that Śāntideva's stanzas were important to Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas and the growth of the text heightens our uncertainty as to which views we may ascribe to the eighth century Śāntideva.

While we thus cannot with any certainty show a historical link between Śāntideva and Candrakīrti, over two hundred years later Śāntideva's commentator, Prajñākaramati (950-1030), ties Śāntideva's views to Candrakīrti. Prajñākaramati cites Candrakīrti's

---

[37] Akira Saito, "Śāntideva in the History of Mādhyamika Philosophy," in *Buddhism in India and Abroad,* ed. Kalpakam Sankarnarayan, Motohiro Yoritomi, and Shubhada A. Joshi (Mumbai and New Delhi: Somaiya Publications, 1996), 259. Saito notes that these two commentaries are on the version of Śāntideva's text found in the Tun-huang collection and not on the version in the Tibetan canon. This virtually ensures that these two commentaries are from the early diffusion period although neither is mentioned in the catalog of texts collected in the Den Karma (*lDan dkar ma*) palace around the year 800. Mention should further be made of Śāntarakṣita's favorable citations of Śāntideva's stanzas in his *Tattvasiddhi* (38b.6-7). In this regard, however, we should allow for the possibility that the ninth chapter—in which Śāntideva's "Prāsaṅgika"-like statements are found—of Śāntideva's text was not available to Śāntarakṣita. As discussed immediately following, Śāntideva's text grew over the centuries.

[38] The whereabouts of Ngok the Translator's (*rNgog lo tsa wa bLo ldan shes rab,* 1059-1109) commenary is presently unknown. The commentary by Chapa (*Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge,* 1109-1169) is known to exist in the Drepung Monastery library but remains unavailable at present. In the meantime, the commentary by Chapa's student, Sonam Tsemo (*bSod nams rtse mo,* 1142-1182), is available and states in its colophon to be based on Chapa's teaching; portions of this text are treated in Chapters Four and Five.

[39] See the *ldan dkar ma* catalog, edited by Marcelle Lalou, ("Les textes Bouddhiques"), number 659.

[40] Saito, "Śāntideva in the History of Mādhyamika," 258. Additionally, Bu ston's (1290-1364) report that several Tibetan scholars ascribe authorship of the entire ninth chapter to Akṣayamati, not Śāntideva, (Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka,* 82, n.267) cannot be entirely overlooked. While Saito ("Śāntideva in the History of Mādhyamika," 258) shows that in the Tun-huang version the author of the entire text is called Akṣayamati (suggesting that Akṣayamati and Śāntideva are the same author), the possibility that the 168 stanzas of the ninth chapter circulated separately or were a later accretion remains.

Entrance to the Middle repeatedly in his commentary to Śāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Practice*.[41] Prajñākaramati relies particularly heavily on Candrakīrti in his comments to Śāntideva's proclamation of the two truths (*satyadvaya,* stanza IX.2), citing *Entrance to the Middle* four times, a lengthy sūtra passage found in *Entrance to the Middle,* and three sūtra passages found in Candrakīrti's *Clear Words*. The link we may establish is not between Candrakīrti and Śāntideva but between Candrakīrti and Prajñākaramati; the latter is the earliest Indian author to express overt enthusiasm for Candrakīrti's writings.

Vibhūticandra (c. 1200) likewise adopts stanzas from *Entrance to the Middle* in his comments on Śāntideva's stanza IX.2.[42] Vibhūticandra was part of the last entourage of Indian *paṇḍitas* to travel to Central Tibet in 1204 that included Śākya Śrībhadra (1127/1145-1225/1243),[43] with whom the extremely influential Tibetan scholar Sakya Paṇḍita (1182-1251) worked. As will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Two, Sakya Paṇḍita was the first to adopt the Prāsaṅgika position in the Sakya school.[44] Vibhūticandra, then, may have been partly responsible for this development within Sakya.

Śāntideva's brief stanza, in which ultimate truth is declared outside the realm of human intellect, reads:[45]

---

[41] Prajñākaramati's *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* is thereby the major source of Sanskrit fragments of Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*.

[42] He cites *Entrance to the Middle,* stanzas VI.28 and VI.25, although attributes the latter to Nāgārjuna; *Bodhicaryāvatāratātparyapañjikā Viśeṣadyotanī, byang chub kyi spyod pa la 'jug pa'i dgongs pa'i 'grel pa khyad par gsal byed* (Peking 5282) 285b.5 and 286a.1.

[43] J.W. de Jong, "La légende de Śāntideva," *Indo-Iranian Journal* 16 (1975): 164-165.

[44] David Jackson, "Madhyamaka Studies Among the Early Sa-skya-pas," *Tibet Journal* X, no. 2 (1985): 24.

[45] Stanza IX.2; La Vallée Poussin, *Prajñākaramati's Commentary*, (1905), 352:
saṃvṛtiḥ paramārthaś ca satyadvayam idaṃ matam /
buddher agocaras tattvaṃ buddhiḥ saṃvṛtir ucyate //.
The Tibetan of pāda cd (D3871, vol. *ya,* 31a.1) reads:
don dam blo yi spyod yul min / blo ni kun rdzob yin par brjod //.
Saito ("Śāntideva in the History of Mādhyamika," 261, n.3) reports that the Tun-huang version for pāda d reads: *blo dang sgra ni kun rdzob yin //* (= *buddhiḥ śabdaś ca saṃvṛtiḥ,* "awareness and speech are obscurational").

> It is asserted that there are two truths—obscurational and ultimate.
> The ultimate is not a referent of awareness; awareness is said to be obscurational.

Classical Indian aesthetics valued poetic brevity; elaborating on meaning was left to a commentator. So while Śāntideva may have meant his stanza to echo an important theme in Candrakīrti's writings that the ultimate "is just not an object of consciousness,"[46] Prajñākaramati makes the first certain connection between the two and is the earliest commentator to explicate this theme in either Candrakīrti's or Śāntideva's works. Prajñākaramati elaborates in some length, writing that Śāntideva's "awareness" means "all consciousness," that the ultimate "surpasses the sphere of all consciousness," and that it is "impossible to bring [the ultimate] within the sphere of awareness in any way."[47] He later notes, "All awareness, whether having an object or not having an object, has a nature of conceptuality and all conceptuality has a nature of ignorance."[48] Prajñākaramati also utilizes Candrakīrti's comparison of objects of consciousness to the flickering hairs seen by those suffering from eye diseases and cites Candrakīrti's explanation of ultimate truth.[49]

In linking Candrakīrti's and Śāntideva's texts on the radical separation of human consciousness and the ultimate, Prajñākaramati establishes an important tenet of his interpretation of Madhyamaka and shows a lengthy pedigree of the tenet, drawing upon a sūtra in which the Buddha himself makes such a proclamation;[50] he establishes a tradition of

---

[46] Introducing stanza VI.29; Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti,* Bibliotheca Buddhica, 9 (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970), 109.2-3: *shes pa'i yul ma yin pa nyid.*

[47] La Vallée Poussin, *Prajñākaramati's Commentary,* (1905), 363.7: *buddheḥ sarvajñānānāṃ / samatikrāntasarvajñānaviṣayatvādagocaraḥ / aviṣayaḥ / kena cit prakāreṇa tatsarvabuddhiviṣayākartuṃ na śakyata.*

[48] La Vallée Poussin, *Prajñākaramati's Commentary,* (1905), 366.2-4: *sarvā hi buddhirālambananirālambanatayā vikalpasvabhāvā / vikalpaśca sarva evāvidyāsvabhāvaḥ /.*

[49] Prajñākaramati (La Vallée Poussin, *Prajñākaramati's Commentary,* [1905], 364-365) refers to Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle,* stanza VI.29 and autocommentary (La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatara,* 109.6ff), calling Candrakīrti "knower of (Nāgārjuna's) *Treatise*" (*śāstravid*).

[50] The sūtra passage, which Candrakīrti also cited in support of this issue, is discussed in Chapter Four.

exegesis, the beginnings of a Prāsaṅgika interpretation. Furthermore, he posits a radical separation of ultimate truth and those things known by ordinary consciousness: what we call knowledge he calls ignorance. Such a vast divide between ordinary consciousness and knowledge of the ultimate runs directly counter to the epistemological project of establishing the valid foundations of all knowledge, conventional and ultimate, engaged in by Mādhyamikas since the sixth century. Indeed, Prajñākaramati concludes his discussion of ultimate truth by stating that only Āryas—advanced bodhisattvas who realize emptiness directly—have valid cognition concerning the ultimate.[51] This conclusion, too, is lifted directly from Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle.*[52] However, unlike in Candrakīrti's India—dominated by epistemological concerns across religious traditions in which such a separation could not be taken seriously—Prajñākaramati's great divide separating conventional knowledge from knowledge of the ultimate sparked debate among Mādhyamikas on both sides of the Himalayas.

As noted above, Atiśa (also called Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna), a junior contemporary of Prajñākaramati, is commonly credited with establishing Prāsaṅgika in Tibet. His *Introduction to the Two Truths* twice praises Candrakīrti, once for Candrakīrti's presentation of the two truths[53] and once for Candrakīrti's understanding of ultimate truth. The latter reads:[54]

> Candrakīrti is the disciple of Nāgārjuna

---

[51] La Vallée Poussin, *Prajñākaramati's Commentary,* [1905], 367.12-13: *tadetadāryāṇāmeva svasaṃviditasvabhāvatayā pratyātmavedyaṃ / atastadevātra pramāṇaṃ /.*

[52] Introducing stanza VI.30; La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 111.18-20.

[53] Atiśa's *Introduction to the Two Truths* (*satyadvayāvatāra, bden gnyis la 'jug pa*), stanza 19 cites Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle,* stanza VI.80 (La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 175.3) on the relationship between obscurational truth and ultimate truth—the former being the means to the latter.

[54] Stanza 15cd-16ab; Christian Lindtner, "Atiśa's Introduction to the Two Truths," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 9 (1981): 191: *chos nyid bden pa gzigs pa yi / klu sgrub slob ma zla grags yin // de las brgyud pa'i man ngag gis / chos nyid bden pa rtogs par 'gyur /*). In the *sde dge* edition, this is 3902, *dbu ma,* vol. *a,* 72b.4-72b.5.

Who saw the truth of the final nature.
The truth of the final nature is to be realized
According to the instructions of his lineage.

Leading up to this stanza, Atiśa denied the validity of both forms of valid cognition accepted by Buddhists—direct perception and inference—to realize the ultimate and further rejected the ability of conceptual and non-conceptual consciousness to realize it.[55] Clearly, his praise of Candrakīrti's understanding of ultimate truth references Candrakīrti's denial that the ultimate can be known by human intellect.

Atiśa also refers favorably to Bhāvaviveka,[56] the supposed founder of the Svātantrika interpretation of Madhyamaka, over whom Candrakīrti's Prāsaṅgika supposedly triumphed. In addition, Atiśa translated into Tibetan two of Bhāvaviveka's most important texts, *Heart of the Middle* and its autocommentary, *Blaze of Reasoning.*[57] Furthermore, these two texts were translated at the request of Ngok Lekpay Sherab,[58] whose monastic institute staunchly opposed Candrakīrti's ideas. Elsewhere, Atiśa lists Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti as authoritative interpreters of Madhyamaka, along with Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Śāntideva, and

---

[55] Stanzas 10-14; Lindtner, "Introduction," 191.

[56] In stanza 14; Lindtner, "Introduction," 191: *lung las kyang ni gsal po ru / rtog bcas rtog pa med pa yi / shes pa gnyis kyis mi rtogs shes / slob dpon mkhas pa bha bya gsung //* "The Master scholar Bhavya stated clearly in scripture that [the ultimate] is not realized by either conceptual nor nonconceptual consciousness." Lindtner points out a very similar statement in the *Jewel Lamp of Madhyamaka,* which I show below cannot have been authored by the same Bhāvaviveka who wrote *Heart of the Middle.* This statement shows much more affinity for Candrakīrti's views than those expressed in *Heart of the Middle.*

[57] *Madhyamakahṛdaya* and *Tarkajvāla, sde dge* edition 3855 and 3856, *dbu ma,* vol. *dza.* Both texts were partially translated in the early diffusion as is evidenced by the Den karma catalog (number 732; Lalou, "Les textes Bouddhiques," 337). Atiśa translated two other texts that he (and many Tibetan Buddhists and at least one contemporary scholar) believed was authored by Bhāvaviveka, *Compendium of Meanings of the Middle* (*Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha, sde dge* 3857) and *Jewel Lamp of Madhyamaka* (*Madhyamakaratnapradīpa, sde dge* 3854). However, like Ruegg (D. Seyfort Ruegg, "On the authorship of some works ascribed to Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya," in *Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka,* ed. David Seyfort Ruegg and Lambert Schmithausen [Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990], 59-71), I see no way that the ideas expressed in these texts could have been written by the same author who wrote *Heart of the Middle.* More on the multiple Bhāvavivekas below.

[58] *rNgog Legs pa'i shes rab; The Blue Annals,* George N. Roerich, trans. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1949 [1996]), 258-259.

Atiśa's own teacher, Bodhibhadra.[59] Atiśa clearly did not favor Candrakīrti's positions to the exclusion of all else. With slight modification I agree with Ruegg's characterization that "In Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna's time and circle, Bhavya's and Candrakīrti's schools of the Madhyamaka were apparently not clearly differentiated by distinct designations and they were evidently being studied side by side."[60] Extending Ruegg's point, the very issues that would polarize Bhāvaviveka's and Candrakīrti's writings into separate schools of thought were only in Atiśa's day coming to be elucidated.

However, we cannot understand Atiśa's ecumenism to override his favoring Candrakīrti's views. In his *Introduction to the Two Truths,* in which he favorably cites Bhāvaviveka's view,[61] he additionally criticizes another of Bhāvaviveka's views (without mentioning Bhāvaviveka by name). He writes, "Ultimate truth is only one; others assert that it is two."[62] As we have seen, Candrakīrti and Prajñākaramati rejected the applicability of valid cognition to ultimate truth. Anticipating such criticism, Bhāvaviveka wrote of two kinds of ultimate consciousnesses, which realize two kinds of objects:[63]

> The ultimate has two aspects: one engages the non-conceptual, passes beyond the world, is undefiled, and lacks proliferation; the second engages conceptually,

---

[59] Atiśa's *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā, sde dge* 3948, *dbu ma,* vol. *a,* 280a; also, Richard Sherburne, *The Complete Works of Atiśa* (New Delhi: Aditya Prakashan, 2000), 236-237.

[60] Ruegg, *Three Studies,* 17.

[61] It could well be that the ideas of "Bhāvaviveka" that Atiśa finds favorable stem from the latter Bhāvaviveka who, as I show below, was influenced by Candrakīrti, and not from the author of *Heart of the Middle.*

[62] Stanza 4ab; Lindtner, "Atiśa's Introduction," 190: *dam pa'i don ni gcig nyid de / gzhan dag rnam pa gnyis su 'dod /.*

[63] *Tarkajvāla, sde dge* edition 3856, *dbu ma,* vol. *dza,* 60b.4-5. It may well be that this passage from the *Tarkajvāla* does not "anticipate" Candrakīrti's criticism but, in fact, responds to it. Ruegg utilizes the work of Ejima, who distinguishes an "Ur-*Tarkajvāla*" from a revised *Tarkajvāla,* to suggest that many parts of the *Tarkajvāla* were not written by the same Bhāvaviveka who wrote the *Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā*s but by a later Bhāvaviveka who wrote the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa.* See Ruegg, "Some Works Ascribed to Bhāvaviveka," 64-65. Even if we regard this passage from the *Tarkajvāla* as authored by a later Bhāvaviveka, my point here remains: Atiśa, who considered these works to have been authored by the same Bhāvaviveka, here rejects this solution to inference's applicability to ultimate truth. More on the multiple Bhāvavivekas follows below.

> concords with the collection of merit and wisdom, is called "pure worldly wisdom," and possesses proliferations.

Bhāvaviveka explains that the second kind of ultimate consciousness realizes ultimate truth inferentially; he explains how inference is utilized in knowing ultimate truth. In rejecting that ultimate truth is two, Atiśa rejects Bhāvaviveka's solution to inference's utility. Atiśa further states that "The deluded whose vision is narrow say that the two [kinds of valid cognition, direct perception and inference] realize emptiness."[64] Clearly, we may place Atiśa along with Prajñākaramati as part of the unprecedented Indian interest in and favoritism of Candrakīrti's views on ultimate truth in the early years of the second millennium.

The themes that we see Prajñākaramati and Atiśa drawing from Candrakīrti's texts are amplified further in Jayānanda's extensive commentary to Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle,* written in the mid-twelfth century (far from India, in the Tangut kingdom) and the only commentary on Candrakīrti's writings written by an Indic author.[65] This text offers a fully developed presentation of the conflict Candrakīrti's views engendered on the issue of the ultimate and the value of human intellect. In Chapter Three, I examine Jayānanda's understanding of pervasive ignorance which, as it does in Prajñākaramati's presentation, characterizes all human consciousness. Jayānanda directly addresses the characteristic that Buddhist epistemologists employed to define valid cognition, "non-deceptiveness" (*avisaṃvadin*) or "unmistaken" (*abhrānta*),[66] and declares that no human cognition meets

---

[64] Stanza 10cd; Lindtner, "Atiśa's Introduction," 191: *gnyis pos stong nyid rtogs so zhes / tshu rol mthong ba'i rmongs pa smra /.* My bracketed addition is drawn from stanza 10ab.

[65] Jayānanda was Kashmiri. Prajñākaramati was a scholar at Vikramaśīla monastery in northeastern India, where Atiśa later served as abbot (Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka,* 116 and 111). Candrakīrti's texts, then, gained currency in both of the major centers of Buddhist study during this final phase of Indian Buddhism.

[66] As discussed further in Chapter Three, "non-deceptive" was Dharmakīrti's definition of valid cognition (*pramāṇa, tshad ma*)—both direct perception (*pratyakṣa, mngon sum*) and inference (*anumāna, rjes dpag*) meeting this criterion—while only direct perception was "unmistaken." The Mādhyamika Kamalaśīla (c.740-795) extended "unmistaken" to inference and, hence, "non-deceptive" and "unmistaken" came to be used

this criterion. In Chapters Four and Five, I show that Jayānanda's views on human ignorance led him to deny human consciousness any direct access to the ultimate. "Knowing" the ultimate becomes metaphorical; in reality, in the ultimate state consciousness ceases—"knowledge" of the ultimate cannot be understood as a cognitive event. These views become his basis for denying the Mādhyamika's use of formal inferences; instead, only apagogic reasoning is appropriate.

Another clear reference to Candrakīrti's views on valid cognition's inapplicability to ultimate truth was voiced by a third Candrakīrti (the second, the author of the *Guhyasamāja Tantra* commentary, *Pradīpoddyotana,* is discussed below) who lived in the eleventh century. This third Candrakīrti wrote the *Entrance to Middle Way Wisdom*[67] and translated it into Tibetan with Gö Kugpa Lhatse,[68] a student of Atiśa. His connection with Gö makes it impossible to identify him with either of the earlier two Candrakīrtis. While brief—only eighteen stanzas in length—his text expresses several of the themes that we have seen Candrakīrti's revivers singling out. He writes that, in the context of ultimate truth, "there is no thesis or reason,"[69] thereby denying that inference has utility in knowing the ultimate. Having argued for the non-existence of mind and mental factors, thereby supporting one of the primary features of Candrakīrti's views that generated controversy in the eleventh and

---

synonymously. See Toru Funayama, "Kamalaśīla's Interpretation of 'Non-Erroneous' in the Definition of Direct Perception and Related Problems," in *Dharmakīrti's Thought and its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy,* ed. Shoryu Katsura (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1999), 74 and 79. Jayānanda's use of "unmistaken" in denying that worldly cognition is valid shows his familiarity with Kamalaśīla's developments.

[67] *Madhyamakāvatāraprajñā, dbu ma shes rab la 'jug pa;* Tohoku 3863, *sde dge* edition, *dbu ma,* vol. *'a,* 348b-349a. The Sanskrit title suggests an English translation of *Entrance to the Middle [Called] Wisdom.* However, the text begins with this statement of purpose (348b.1-2): "I will explain the meaning of entering into Middle Way wisdom" (*dbu ma shes rab la 'jug pa'i don ni bdag gis bshad par bya*).

[68] 'Gos khug pa lha btsas. Gö also revised the Tibetan translation of the tantric Candrakīrti's *Pradīpoddyotana* with "Nag po" (= Kṛṣṇapāda?), raising the possibility that he understood some strong connection between the second and third Candrakīrtis.

[69] Toh. 3863, *sde dge* edition, *dbu ma,* vol. *'a,* 348b.7 (stanza 9a): *dam bca' gtan tshig nyid ma yin /.*

twelfth centuries, Candrakīrti III considers the objection that such a denial contradicts perception; he responds that he does not refute the non-analytical view.[70] The third Candrakīrti's "non-analytical" mirrored the first Candrakīrti's injunction that "worldly, conventional truths are not to be analyzed"[71] and substituted for his use of "what is renowned in the world," the contents of which both Candrakīrtis wish to leave unharmed. Despite the brevity of the third Candrakīrti's only known text, his framing of the non-analytical view was important to Chapa who adopted this terminology in his portrayal of Candrakīrti's system, which he argued against at length.[72] The issue of "non-analytical" in Tibet became the focus for disputations concerning how or if one may "prove" ultimate truth.

Rather than preserved in an unbroken lineage established by Candrakīrti himself, we see Candrakīrti's main texts—however they may have survived up to this point—receiving broader attention beginning around the year 1000. Śāntideva may have been aware of Candrakīrti's ideas but did not develop them. Instead, important eleventh and twelfth century Indian scholars suddenly took interest in these forgotten texts and saw in them a basis from which to criticize the widespread importance of Buddhist valid cognition scholarship. The consistency with which Candrakīrti's revivalists cited his critiques of valid cognition and his understanding of ultimate truth make clear the philosophical reasons for championing his interpretation of Madhyamaka. The following section explores some

---

[70] Stanza 8 (348b.6): / *mngon sum la sogs 'gal zhe na* / / *ma yin ma brtags nyams dga' ba* / / *de ni bdag gis bkag pa med* / / *tha snyad tsam zhig bsgrub pa'i phyir* / "If you say this contradicts perception and so forth, it does not because I establish a mere convention, no cessation, [through] a non-analytical perspective." The term, *ma brtags nyams dga' ba,* "non-analytical," more literally would be "not analyzing and relaxed."

[71] *Madhyamakāvatāra,* stanza VI.35; La Vallée Pousin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 120.5-8: *gang phyir dngos po 'di dag rnam dpyad na / de nyid bdag can dngos las tshu rol tu / gnas rnyed ma yin de phyir* ***'jig rten gyi / tha snyad bden la rnam bar dpyad mi bya /.***

[72] Candrakīrti III's phrasing, *ma brtags nyams dga' ba* ("not analyzing and relaxed") appears in Chapa's text at Helmut Tauscher, ed., *Phya pa chos kyi seng ge: dbu ma śar gsum gyi stoṅ thun* (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, 1999), 65.19. Chapa's views are discussed at length throughout the remaining chapters of this dissertation.

possibilities to explain why in the eleventh century, following hundreds of years of Mādhyamikas wrestling with the epistemological foundations and implications of Nāgārjuna's views, Candrakīrti's critique suddenly was taken seriously.

Candrakīrti and Tantra

Atiśa's literary output testifies to his interest in tantric Buddhist theory and practice. We might assume, given the widespread enthusiasm for tantra among Buddhists of this period, that Prajñākaramati and Jayānanda also maintained interest in tantra. However, neither of these three scholars' writings make any indication that their interest in Candrakīrti's texts is at all tied to late Indian tantric Buddhism. This section explores several authors who make just such an explicit connection and who suggest to us that Candrakīrti's views enjoyed their first broad popularity due to the consonances between his ideas on ultimate truth, as well as the inapplicability of valid cognition to its pursuit, and tantric concerns.

An important reference to Candrakīrti from a tantric text of this time period is found in Sahajavajra's commentary to Maitrīpāda's *Ten Stanzas on Reality*.[73] Here, what is said may not be as illuminating as where it is said. In discussing the second stanza, Sahajavajra endorses Nāgārjuna's, Āryadeva's, and Candrakīrti's explanation of dependent arising (*pratītyasamutpada*).[74] He further notes that Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle* presents the Indian Buddhist "Mind Only"[75] teaching as requiring interpretation.[76] While these two

---

[73] Maitrīpāda's text is *Tattvadaśaka, sde dge* 2236; Sahajavajra's commentary is *Tattvadaśakaṭīkā, sde dge* 2254.

[74] Sahajavajra writes: *de ltar na dbu ma pa 'phags pa klu sgrub dang / 'phags pa lha dang zla ba grags pa la sogs pas bzhed pa rten cing 'brel bar 'byung pa'i mtshan nyid de / de bzhin nyid ni 'dod pa'i don yin par 'gyur ro //* "In that way, the nature of dependent arising that Ārya Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Candrakīrti and others assert is the meaning of asserted to be suchness."

[75] *cittamātra.*

[76] *neyārtha,* literally "leading." Sahajavajra, just prior to referring to *Entrance to the Middle,* quoted the *Samādhirāja Sūtra,* and simply notes that *Entrance to the Middle* espouses a similar view.

references do not allow a clear sense of why Sahajavajra singled out Candrakīrti's interpretations, the connection of Candrakīrti with late Indian tantric texts is illuminating. Maitrīpāda is often linked to Atiśa, either as Atiśa's teacher or as a student whom Atiśa, in his role as abbot, had to expel from Vikramaśīla Monastery for Maitrīpāda's practice of illicit tantras.[77] He is also an important source of writings on the tantric practice, Mahāmudrā; in fact, all of his writings, including *Ten Stanzas on Reality,* are included in the "Tantra Commentaries" (*rgyud 'grel*) section of the Tibetan canon. Tibetan Kagyu sources claim Maitrīpāda, along with Patsab Nyimadrak, as the two sources of their Prāsaṅgika lineage.[78]

Kagyu tradition and Sahajavajra's citation suggest that Maitrīpāda held Candrakīrti's interpretation of Madhyamaka. While Sahajavajra's comment does not allow insight into just what about Candrakīrti's views he found favorable, he establishes a link between Candrakīrti's interpretation and the kinds of antinomian tantras that were created and disseminated across the Himalayas in the tenth and eleventh centuries. One can well imagine that Candrakīrti's rejection of the established practices of valid cognition that so dominated scholastic Buddhism throughout the second part of the first millennium would appeal to the creators and practitioners of these tantras. Furthermore, Candrakīrti's understanding of an ultimate beyond the scope of human cognition fits well with tantric portrayals of a pure, pristine ultimate state in which human consciousness—invariably intertwined with subject-object duality—can play no role.

---

[77] Mark Tatz, "Maitrī-pa and Atiśa," In *Tibetan Studies : Proceedings of the 4th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies*, edited by Helga Uebach and Jampa L. Panglung (Munchen: Kommission fur Zentralasiatische Studien Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1988), 473-482.

[78] D.S. Ruegg, "A Kar Ma bKa' brGyud Work on the Lineages and Traditions of the Indo-Tibetan dBu ma (Madhyamaka)," In *Orientalia Iosephi Tucci memoriae dicata*, edited by G. Gnoli and L. Lanciotti (Rome: Istituto italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1985), 1252-1279.

Another connection between Candrakīrti's idea of the ultimate and late Indian Buddhist tantric concerns appears in the *Compendium of Good Sayings,*[79] an anthology of citations from Buddhist texts that is dominated by extracts from "Highest Yoga Tantras" (*anuttarayogatantra*) but also contains nearly thirty stanzas from Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle.*[80] The *Compendium* cites Candrakīrti's statement on the relationship between obscurational truth and ultimate truth, linking it—as did Prajñākaramati—with Śāntideva's presentation of obscurational and ultimate truths.[81] The *Compendium* also cites several of Candrakīrti's stanzas that address the disparity between various conceptions of causality and the ultimate perspective, from which there is no causality at all.[82] These stanzas are cited following Nāgārjuna's famous denial of production from "four alternatives," which, in Candrakīrti's *Clear Words,* provided the occasion for Candrakīrti's lengthy criticisms of formal inference's usefulness in inducing knowledge of the ultimate.[83] While the *Compendium of Good Sayings* cites only Candrakīrti's verses from *Entrance to the Middle,* the

---

[79] *Subhāṣitasaṃgraha,* edited by Cecil Bendall, *Muséon* IV (1903): 375-402 and V (1904): 5-46 and 245-274.

[80] Along with Prajñākaramati's commentary on Śāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Practice,* the *Subhāṣitasaṃgraha* is one of the most important sources for Sanskrit fragments of Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle.*

[81] The *Subhāṣitasaṃgraha* (1903: 396) cites *Entrance to the Middle,* VI.79-80, followed by Śāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Practices,* IX.2, 33-35, 54, and 56-57. Jayānanda cites *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Practices,* IX.2 and 33-35 when explicating Candrakīrti's two truths.

[82] The *Subhāṣitasaṃgraha* (1903: 390-392) cites *Entrance to the Middle,* VI.12, 14-17, and 103-105 in this context, denying production from self, other, and causeless production (no citation is given for the denial of production from both self and other). Candrakīrti held that production from the "four alternatives" (*catuṣkoti*) could be denied even from the worldly perspective.

[83] Nāgārjuna's famous first stanza of the *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle* reads (de Jong, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ,* 1): *na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ / utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kva cana ke cana //* ("Nothing is produced anywhere, ever; not from self, also not from other; not from both, also not causelessly"). The *Subhāṣitasaṃgraha* (1903: 389) reads *bhāvā* for *bhāvāḥ.* Candrakīrti first supports Buddhapālita's commentary on this stanza, responding to Bhāvaviveka's critique of Buddhapālita, then criticizes Bhāvaviveka at length for his insistence that inference is necessary to understand emptiness. See Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti,* Bibliotheca Buddhica, 4 (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970), 14.1-36.2.

import of his *Clear Words* clearly is entailed: the *Compendium* endorses Candrakīrti's interpretation of the ultimate, for which formal inference is useless but with which tantra is well in consonance.

Candrakīrti's stanzas denying production from the "four alternatives" are preceded in the *Compendium of Good Sayings* by a similar statement there attributed to the noted tantric author, Saraha (but likely authored by the tantric Āryadeva), stating that reality is devoid of existence, non-existence, both existence and non-existence, and neither.[84] These stanzas of the tantric Āryadeva were adopted into at least four other texts composed by tantric authors in the early part of the eleventh century,[85] including the *Stainless Light* commentary to the *Kālacakra Tantra*.[86] The *Compendium of Good Sayings's* juxtaposition of these stanzas with Candrakīrti's refutation of production links Candrakīrti's and tantric understandings of the ultimate, suggesting that Candrakīrti's views were valued by proponents of late Indian Buddhist tantra for their utter rejection of the dualities of cause and effect (producer and produced), existence and non-existence. Tantric rhetoric indeed espouses discarding all notions of duality, all separations between the mundane world and enlightenment, and, concomitantly, Buddhist notions of a lengthy, gradual path followed by practitioners over

---

[84] Bendall, "*Subhāṣita-Saṃgraha,*" (1903): 389: *na san nāsan nasadasan na cāpy anubhayātmakaṃ / catuṣkoṭivinirmuktaṃ tattvaṃ mādhyamikā viduḥ* // "Mādhyamikas assert reality devoid of the four extremes: having a nature not existent, nor non-existent, nor both existent and non-existent, and also not neither." The *Subhāṣitasaṃgraha* cites this and the preceding two stanzas, which are stanzas 26-28 of the tantric Āryadeva's *Jñānasārasamuccaya;* see the edition of Katsumi Mimaki, "*Jñānasārasamuccaya* kk. 20-28, *Mise au point* with a Sanskrit Manuscript," in *Wisdom, Compassion, and the Search for Understanding: The Buddhist Studies Legacy of Gadjin M. Nagao,* ed. Jonathan A. Silk (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000), 240-241. As Bendall notes (p. 389, n. 4), the final stanza is also cited by Prajñākaramati in his commentary to *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Practices* (La Vallée Poussin, *Prajñākaramati's Commentary* [1905]: 359.10). See also Ruegg, *Three Studies,* 142-145, where this stanza is shown to be present in the writings of Maitrīpāda and to draw on much older sūtra sources.

[85] The *Subhāṣitasaṃgraha's* misattribution of the stanzas may indicate it to be at a greater distance from the original of the *Jñānasārasamuccaya.*

[86] John Newman, "Buddhist Siddhānta in the Kālacakra Tantra," *Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens* 36 (1992): 229-230.

countless lifetimes upon which the bodhisattva practices cause the development of enlightened qualities. Candrakīrti's denigration of the conventions of valid cognition and the value of human intellect would likewise seem to disable notions of gradual progress (although his *Entrance to the Middle* is structured on the bodhisattva grounds [*bhūmi*]) and are, instead, in keeping with tantric ideas of collapsing the bodhisattva's path down to the enlightened ability of this present life and body. These consonances between Candrakīrti's and late tantric views suggest that Candrakīrti's rise in popularity was due, at least in part, to the rise of "Highest Yoga Tantras" in turn-of-the-millennium India.

Furthermore, the *Compendium's* connection between Saraha, Nāgārjuna, and Candrakīrti likely stems from the *Compendium's* author conflating the **tantric** Nāgārjuna, and the **tantric** Candrakīrti, who lived and wrote in the eighth and ninth centuries, respectively,[87] with their much earlier sūtric namesakes. Ruegg has noted that the tradition taking Saraha as Nāgārjuna's teacher conflates the tantric and non-tantric Nāgārjunas: only the tantric Nāgārjuna was Saraha's disciple.[88] The affinities between the tantric Nāgārjuna and the tantric Candrakīrti—the tantric Candrakīrti and tantric Āryadeva were both said to be disciples of the tantric Nāgārjuna[89] and both the tantric Nāgārjuna and the tantric Candrakīrti wrote important texts on the *Guhyasamāja Tantra*[90]—would have facilitated the further step of associating Candrakīrti with Saraha.[91]

---

[87] These are the dates determined by Wayman for the tantric Nāgārjuna and the tantric Candrakīrti; see Alex Wayman, *Yoga of the Guhyasamājatantra* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977), 96. The tantric Candrakīrti's date may have to be adjusted slightly earlier if he is the author of the *Triśaraṇasaptati;* this is discussed just below.

[88] Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka,* 105.

[89] *Blue Annals,* 360.

[90] The tantric Nāgārjuna wrote the *Pañcakrama* (Peking 2667, vol. 61), an important text on the stages of practicing the *Guhyasamāja Tantra,* and considered the foundational text of the Ārya lineage of Guhyasamāja practice and exegesis. The tantric Candrakīrti wrote the most important commentary on the *Guhyasamāja Tantra* in the Ārya lineage, the *Pradīpoddyotana* (Peking 2650, vol. 60).

[91] We also see Saraha and Candrakīrti appearing together, along with Maitrīpāda, in Kagyu lineages of Madhyamaka; see Ruegg, "A Kar Ma bKa' brGyud Work," 1255. Two further links between Maitrīpāda and Saraha are made by the short "Question and Answer" text, *Śrī Saraha Prabhu Maitrīpāda praśnottara,* recording

Conflating the tantric Candrakīrti with his non-tantric namesake could well have contributed to the latter's eleventh century rise: the success of the tantric Candrakīrti's *Guhyasamāja* commentary may have been a primary factor in the belated success of Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle* and *Clear Words.* Atiśa, in the passage cited above in which he declares that "Candrakīrti is the disciple of Nāgārjuna" and proceeds to praise the non-tantric Candrakīrti's view, seems to make just such a conflation as the author of *Entrance to the Middle* was not a disciple of any Nāgārjuna. The principal Tibetan translator and exponent of the non-tantric Candrakīrti's texts, Patsab Nyimadrak,[92] also translated the tantric Candrakīrti's *Guhyasamāja* commentary with his Indian teacher, Tilakakalaśa;[93] both Patsab and Tilakakalaśa may thus have understood the authors of these texts to have been the same Candrakīrti. Certainly, much later Tibetan authors viewed praise of the tantric Candrakīrti's writings by the likes of Naropāda to entail praise of the non-tantric Candrakīrti's viewpoints (there being, in such a view, no difference between the tantric and non-tantric authors).[94] By the eleventh century, sufficient haze had formed around the eighth or ninth century tantric author that Indian Buddhists who esteemed the *Guhyasamāja* commentary felt compelled to take seriously *Entrance to the Middle* and *Clear Words.*

Some eleventh and twelfth century Indian scholars adopted a more critical approach to the multiple Candrakīrtis. Abhayākaragupta (c.1025-1125), an important scholar of both Nālandā and Vikramaśīla monasteries, wrote and translated numerous works on tantra and tantric practice and the Perfection of Wisdom literature in addition to translating

---

Maitrīpāda's questions on Mahāmudrā and Saraha's answers (P5048, vol. 87, 122.2.6-122.5.6) and Maitrīpāda's commentary to Saraha's *Dohākoṣa* (ed. Prabodh Chandra Bagchi, Calcutta Sanskrit Series, 1938).

[92] *Pa tshab nyi ma grags,* b.1055. Much more on Patsab's translation activity is found in Chapter Two.

[93] Candrakīrti's commentary, the *Pradīpoddyotana,* had already been translated by Śraddhākaravarman and Rin chen bzang bo; this first translation is preserved in the Tibetan *bstan 'gyur.* The *Blue Annals* (p. 366) reports that Patsab's translation did not flourish.

[94] See, for instance, mKhas grub dGe legs dpal bzang's comments in José Ignacio Cabezón's *A Dose of Emptiness* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992), 86-87.

Candrakīrti's commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness* with Nur Darmadrak.[95] His *Ornament for the Sage's Thought* refers to "the Master Candrakīrti" when citing *Entrance to the Middle* and to "Ārya Candra" when citing the tantric author.[96] While Abhayākaragupta does not discuss the relationship between these two appellations, by distinguishing the two he seems to acknowledge some discrepancy between their views, if not their personages. Further, when he cites Candrakīrti's *Seventy Stanzas on the Three Refuges,* he does not repeat Atiśa's comment that Candrakīrti was the disciple of Nāgārjuna but instead notes that Candrakīrti "follows Nāgārjuna's thought,"[97] suggesting again that he distinguishes between the non-tantric Candrakīrti who was not Nāgārjuna's disciple and the tantric Candrakīrti who was the tantric Nāgārjuna's disciple.

Ratnākaraśānti explicitly distinguished between the views (but not the personages) of the non-tantric and tantric Candrakīrti. While he believed that the same Candrakīrti wrote *Entrance to the Middle* and the *Guhyasamāja* commentary, he saw the former text espousing nihilism and only Candrakīrti's tantric writings reflecting true insight.[98]

---

[95] On Abhayākaragupta's life and works and sNur Dhar ma grags, see Felix Erb, *Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997), 27-29.

[96] In his *Munimatālaṃkāra,* written in 1113 (Erb, *Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti,* 29), Abhayākaragupta four times refers to *slob dpon zla ba grags* ("the Master Candrakīrti"), each time citing *Entrance to the Middle* or its autocommentary (Toh. 3903, *sde dge* edition, *dbu ma,* vol. *a:* 175b.5 cites *Entrance to the Middle,* stanza I.8; 180a.5 cites the autocommentary to stanza VIII.3; 208a.4 cites the autocommentary to stanzas XII.8-9; and 218b.1 cites stanza XII.4. At 222b.2, Abhayākaragupta cites stanza VI.214, attributing it only to *zla ba grags,* without using *slob dpon* or *'phags pa.* Three additional passages [101b.6, 113a.7, and 219a.5] likely refer obliquely to *Entrance to the Middle;* the former and latter attribute the view discussed to *slob dpon zla ba grags,* while 113a.7 uses only *zla ba grags*). At 111b.1-2, Abhayākaragupta refers to what "Ārya Candra said in his *Lamp [Commentary to the Guhyasamāja Tantra]*" (*'phags pa zla ba sgron mar gsungs pa*). Abhayākaragupta's appellations may not carry the intention that the "Master" and "Ārya" Candrakīrtis were different people but instead be used to distinguish between different bodies of literature, sūtric and tantric, much as Ratnākaraśānti distinguished these bodies.

[97] The authorship of the *Triśaraṇasaptatī* is discussed just below. Abhayākaragupta's text reads (82a.6-7): *'phags pa klu sgrub zhabs kyi dgongs pa'i rjes su 'brang ba'i zla ba grags pa*).

[98] As pointed out already by Ruegg (*Literature of the Madhyamaka,* 122), Ratnākaraśānti's colophon to his *Madhyamakālaṃkāropadeśa* states that he composed the text to refute "Bhadanta Candrakīrti's" views, but notes that Candrakīrti later "abandoned nihilism" in his *Guhyasamāja* commentary. The text is the earliest critique

The critical stances adopted by these two Indian polymaths, who both wrote extensively in the tantric and valid cognition traditions as well as on Madhyamaka, to Candrakīrti's corpus is matched by their either apologistic or critical approach to the non-tantric Candrakīrti's views. Ratnākaraśānti was openly critical of what he portrayed as Candrakīrti's "nihilism." Abhayākaragupta's citations of Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle* and its autocommentary are less openly critical, exhibiting an apologistic standpoint from which to explain what Candrakīrti was "thinking" (*saṃdhi, dgongs pa*) when he made certain problematic declarations, including Candrakīrti's proclamations that mind and mental factors cease upon Buddhahood and that enlightenment consists in utter non-perception.[99] Other citations are utilized as supports for a point Abhayākaragupta makes, with no further discussion of the passage;[100] these points suggest his endorsement of certain of Candrakīrti's views that proved useful in advancing his own. Abhayākaragupta's citations of Candrakīrti suggest again that Candrakīrti's non-tantric views on Buddhahood and ultimate truth had by the twelfth century gained wide currency and authority among important Indian tantric authors. His feeling the need to explain Candrakīrti's "thinking" on issues that he clearly did not agree with shows, along with Ratnākaraśānti's criticisms, that not all tantric authors of this period found Candrakīrti's ideas literally acceptable, particularly when those authors had strong ties to the valid cognition tradition. Candrakīrti's ideas rose to prominence with tantric ideals and fit most comfortably with tantrikas who would leave behind the established practices of valid cognition. Furthermore, an eleventh or twelfth century tantrika who

---

of Candrakīrti's views of which I am aware and as such presents more evidence that Candrakīrti only became important around the year 1000.

[99] The *Munimatalaṃkāra* (Toh. 3903, *sde dge* edition, *dbu ma,* vol. *a,* 180a.5ff) discusses Candrakīrti's "thinking" behind his discussion of non-conceptual wisdom in his autocommentary to *Entrance to the Middle,* stanza VIII.3. At 208a.4-208b.2, Abhayākaragupta spells out Candrakīrti's "thinking" behind his proclamation, in his autocommentary to stanzas XII.8-9, that minds and mental factors cease upon Buddhahood.

[100] See the list of references above in footnote 96.

wished to criticize Candrakīrti's non-tantric views needed to suggest some method for differentiating those views from the position of the esteemed tantric Candrakīrti.

While the tantric Candrakīrti may have provided late Indian tantric authors with a (perhaps misguided) reason for taking seriously the ideas of the non-tantric Candrakīrti, the tantric Candrakīrti and tantric Bhāvaviveka may in fact represent the earliest Indian interest in the sūtra-based author. As noted above, the tantric Candrakīrti composed a major commentary on the *Guhyasamāja Tantra* and likely was also the author of *Seventy Stanzas on the Three Refuges.*[101] The former text postdates the tantric Nāgārjuna's *Guhyasamāja* commentary, written in the late seventh or early eighth century; if *Seventy Stanzas on the Three Refuges* is indeed referred to by Haribhadra (late eighth century),[102] we could precisely date the tantric Candrakīrti to the mid-eighth century. A tantric author adopting this name in this time evinces perhaps the earliest interest in the sūtric Candrakīrti and connects the rise of his Madhyamaka ideas with the rise of the *Guhyasamāja Tantra.*

The case of the tantric Bhāvaviveka is more complex. A Bhavyakīrti wrote sub-commentaries on both Nāgārjuna's and Candrakīrti's *Guhyasamāja* works.[103] The Bhāvaviveka who wrote the *Jewel Lamp of Madhyamaka,* and who claims to be the author of

---

[101] *Triśaraṇasaptati;* Tohoku 3971, *sde dge* edition, *dbu ma,* vol. *gi,* 251a-253b; Per K. Sorensen, *Triśaraṇasaptati: The Septuagint on the Three Refuges* (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1986). Due to the presence of tantric notions unknown in and developed later than his writings—such as the idea of seven "baskets" (*piṭaka*), one of which is the "knowledge-holder basket" (*vidyādharapiṭaka*)—this text could not have been written by the Madhyamaka Candrakīrti and is likely by the tantric Candrakīrti. See Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka,* 105, n. 334.

[102] Ruegg (*Literature of the Madhyamaka,* 105, n. 334) notes that "Verse 33 seems to be quoted by Haribhadra, Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā i. 3 (p. 8-9)." Stanza 33 (*sde dge* edition, *dbu ma,* vol. *gi,* 252a.3-4) reads: */sangs rgyas chos dang dge 'dun ni/ /bdud rnams bye ba brgya yis kyang/ /gang phyir dbye bar mi nus pa/ /de phyir dge 'dun zhes bshad do/.* Unrai Wogihara, *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā* (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1932-1935), 8-9: *buddha-dharmau tathā saṃgho māra-koṭi-śatair api / bhettuṃ na śakyate yasmāt tasmāt saṃgho 'bhidhīyate //.*

[103] *Pañcakramapañjikā* (Peking 2696, vol. 62) on Nāgārjuna's *Pañcakrama* and *Abhisaṃdhiprakāśika* (Peking 2658, vols. 60-61) on Candrakīrti's *Pradīpoddyotana.*

Heart of the Middle and *Blaze of Reasoning* as well,[104] refers favorably to both Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle* and the tantric Candrakīrti's *Seventy Stanzas on the Three Refuges*[105] (the same text that Haribhadra seems to cite), apparently seeing no difference between the two authors.[106] These references make it impossible that the author of the *Jewel Lamp of Madhyamaka* also wrote *Heart of the Middle,* which was written before either Candrakīrti lived. The references also strengthen Ruegg's suggestion that Bhavyakīrti authored the *Jewel Lamp of Madhyamaka.*[107] Accepting this identification, the commonalities between the *Jewel Lamp of Madhyamaka,* the *Compendium of Meanings of Madhyamaka,*[108] and certain parts of *Blaze of Reasoning* (working on Ejima's notion of an "Ur-*Tarkajvāla*" that underwent later additions) allow us to extend the tantric Bhāvaviveka's authorship to these works as well.

I posit a late-eighth or early-ninth century tantric Bhāvaviveka,[109] indebted to the writings of the tantric Candrakīrti and not distinguishing these writings from the works of the sūtric Candrakīrti, but who yet is so compelled by the sūtric Bhāvaviveka's writings as to claim authorship over them—to identify with that author, to add to at least one text (*Blaze of Reasoning*), and to compose still others in that author's name. His identification with the sūtric Bhāvaviveka's epistemological convictions manifests in both the *Jewel Lamp of Madhyamaka* and the *Compendium of Meanings of Madhyamaka* in which he evinces views

---

[104] Ruegg, "Some Works Ascribed to Bhāvaviveka," 63.

[105] See Lindtner's translation of the "Two Truths" section of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* in his "Atiśa's Introduction," 171 and 173. Lindtner (ibid, 200, n. 14 and 202, n. 34) accepts the attribution of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* and *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha* to the same Bhāvaviveka who wrote *Heart of the Middle,* seeing no "external evidence" to disprove this. However, these very citations offer ample internal evidence of multiple Bhāvavivekas.

[106] Abhayākaragupta, who identifies the Candrakīrti who wrote the *Pradīpoddyotana* as "Ārya Candrakīrti" and the author of *Entrance to the Middle* as "Master Candrakīrti", also attributes *Seventy Stanzas on the Three Refuges* to "Master Candrakīrti."

[107] Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka,* 106, n.339.

[108] *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha.* The commonalities are discussed herein.

[109] Admittedly, terming this author "a tantric Bhāvaviveka" is problematic particularly when the works that interest me here are ostensibly Madhyamaka, not tantric, treatises.

similar to Jñānagarbha's Madhyamaka adoption of Dharmakīrti's "causal efficacy"—which Dharmakīrti took as the mark of ultimate existence—as the mark of conventional existence.[110] Both texts further adopt Jñānagarbha's characterization of conventional existence as "existing as it appears," with the *Jewel Lamp* repeating Jñānagarbha's corollary that the conventional world "exists when not analyzed."[111] The tantric Bhāvaviveka's commitment to the Madhyamaka epistemological project of his namesake extends the earlier figure's ideas with those of the eighth century confluence of Madhyamaka and Dharmakīrti's philosophy.

However, the tantric Bhāvaviveka's admiration for the tantric Candrakīrti and his identification of this figure with the sūtric Candrakīrti forced him to consider the sūtric Candrakīrti's attacks on the applicability of valid cognition to knowledge of ultimate truth. As a result, the *Compendium of Meanings* posits a two-fold ultimate truth, a figurative ultimate (*paryāyaparamārtha*) that can be expressed in language and grasped by conceptual thought and a non-figurative ultimate that is beyond expression and thought.[112] This two-fold ultimate is more elaborately explained in the *Blaze of Reasoning* passage—likely authored by the tantric Bhāvaviveka—quoted above. As noted there, a two-fold ultimate explains how

---

[110] In the *Jewel Lamp of Madhyamaka,* he writes (Lindtner, "Atiśa's Introduction," 173) that obscurational, or conventional, truth consists of all things known by their specific and general characters (*svasāmānyalakṣaṇa*), which are the two criteria by which Dharmakīrti divides ultimate and conventional truths, as well as knowledge itself. Real obscurational truth (*tathyasaṃvṛtisatya,* as opposed to false obscurational truth or *mithyāsaṃvṛtisatya,* this distinction itself being an eighth century invention unknown to the sūtric Bhāvaviveka) is characterized as produced by causes and able to produce effects (ibid, 170). The *Compendium of Meanings of Madhyamaka* also divides obscurational truth into real and false and differentiates the two on the grounds of causal efficacy (*arthakriyāsamartha*) in stanzas nine and ten (ibid, 200-201, n. 14 and Y. Ejima, *Chūgan-shisō no tenkai—Bhāvaviveka kenkyū* [Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1980], 19-20).

[111] For Jñānangarbha's development of "causal efficacy" (*arthakriyāsamartha*) and "existing as it is seen/appears" (*yathādarśana* or *yathābhāsa*), see Malcolm David Eckel, *Jñānagarbha on the Two Truths* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987), 51-58 and the corresponding portions of his translation and text. For the *Jewel Lamp*'s and the *Compendium of Meaning*'s uses of the latter notion, see Lindtner, "Atiśa's Introduction," 170, 172, and 200, n. 14.

[112] Stanzas four and five; Lindtner, "Atiśa's Introduction," 200, n. 14 and Ejima, *Bhāvaviveka,* 18.

inference can apply to ultimate truth, allowing for a certain kind of ultimate truth to fall within the range of formal reasoning. Additionally, the *Jewel Lamp* evinces several points conceded to Candrakīrti's critique of valid cognition. The *Jewel Lamp* denies that utilizers of inference can know reality through their analyses, states that ordinary sense perception does not constitute valid cognition, and opines that valid cognition of obscurational truth only functions within worldly conventions, for those whose vision is narrow.[113] This combination of delimiting the scope of valid cogntion while yet advancing criteria for the validity of certain kinds of conventional objects and conventional consciousnesses may represent the earliest attempt to reconcile Candrakīrti's critique of the Buddhist epistemological tradition with the philosophy he opposed. Further, this serious consideration of the sūtric Candrakīrti likely stemmed from the tantric Candrakīrti's importance.

While the tantric Bhāvaviveka's writings strengthen the notion that the sūtric Candrakīrti's rise was triggered by interest in the tantric Candrakīrti's corpus, they also show that involvement with tantra need not occlude serious interest in the Buddhist valid cognition tradition. We saw above that Abhayākaragupta and Ratnākaraśānti each wrote prolifically in both tantric and valid cognition genres. A further case, from the same time period as the tantric Bhāvaviveka, is Śāntarakṣita, the author of the *Tattvasiddhi.* While this text does not seem to date significantly later, Steinkellner casts doubt on the identity of this author with the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka author of the same name.[114] However, like the Madhyamaka author, the *Tattvasiddhi* author relies heavily on the valid cognition tradition in order to prove (*siddhi*) his point, in this case that tantric practice leads one to realization of reality (*tattva*), expressed in tantric terminology as "great bliss."[115] The *Tattvasiddhi* (perhaps

---

[113] See Lindtner's translation in "Atiśa's Introduction," 169, 170, and 172.

[114] Ernst Steinkellner, "Yogic Cognition, Tantric Goal, and Other Methodological Applications of Dharmakīrti's *Kāryānumāna* Theorem," in *Dharmakīrti's thought and its impact on Indian and Tibetan philosophy,* ed. S. Katsura (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1999), 356-357.

[115] Steinkellner, "Yogic Cognition, Tantric Goal," 355-356.

Proof [that Tantric Practice Issues Forth in Knowledge of] Reality) alerts us to how tantra was in some cases allied with the valid cognition tradition[116] and not to Candrakīrti's rejection of that tradition. Above, we saw consonances between themes developed in the final stages of Indian Buddhist tantra and themes eleventh and twelfth century authors popularized in Candrakīrti's thought: a pristine ultimate, inaccessible by human consciousness, free of all dualistic notions, particularly those of the valid cognition tradition. The *Tattvasiddhi,* and a good many other texts,[117] in contrast highlights dissonances between tantra and Candrakīrti's views: the tantric goal of "great bliss" and the tantric valorization of the phenomenal world are not immediately reconcilable with Candrakīrti's depiction of realization as "non-seeing" and as an utter lack of the instrument of perception.[118]

The importance of the tantric Candrakīrti to the rise of his non-tantric namesake forces us to examine what, other than the name, the two authors had in common. Doing so, in turn, draws us back to the eighth century to consider some trends of both sūtric and tantric thought over the following three hundred years. The tantric Bhāvaviveka's interest in the non-tantric Candrakīrti was certainly an exception in eighth and ninth century India, when the main current of Madhyamaka thought was Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla's Yogācāra-Madhyamaka synthesis. Śāntarakṣita's utilization of elements from the epistemological tradition and Yogācāra ontology to explain conventional existence, while holding to the

---

[116] The complex relationship—sometimes antagonistic but eventually soothed into harmony within Buddhist monastic education—between tantra and valid cognition deserves much more investigation. Ronald Davidson ("Masquerading as *Pramāṇa:* Esoteric Buddhism and Epistemological Nomenclature," in *Dharmakīrti's thought and its impact on Indian and Tibetan philosophy,* ed. S. Katsura [Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1999], 25-35) suggests that tantric authors utilized valid cognition conventions to show the authority of tantras and tantric masters and as a step toward gaining institutional acceptance.

[117] Steinkellner points to several other "tantristic texts transmitted under Śāntarakṣita's name" ("Yogic Cognition, Tantric Goal," 356).

[118] I discuss Candrakīrti's portrayal of "non-seeing" and his denial of mind and mental factors more fully in Chapter Five. Against my point here, one could argue that his notion of mind and mental factors ceasing at Buddhahood is well in harmony with tantric espousals of abandoning mind in favor of wisdom.

ultimate naturelessness of phenomena, must have been seen by many—including the *Tattvasiddhi* author—to be consonant with mainstream Buddhist tantra. Śāntarakṣita's synthesis encompassed the many vibrant threads of eighth century Indian Buddhism.

However, certain strains of Buddhist tantric thought emerging in this period seem to have been less amenable to both the valid cognition project and Yogācāra. Above, I discussed some consonances between the ideals of eleventh and twelfth century tantric revivers of Candrakīrti's writings and themes in those writings that imply the casting away of the epistemological tradition, imbued with notions of duality, that became entrenched in Buddhist thought. The tantric Candrakīrti may well have adopted the name due to his own opposition to the valid cognition tradition and to Yogācāra, which the non-tantric Candrakīrti opposed at great length in his *Entrance to the Middle.* The tantric Candrakīrti's *Guhyasamāja* commentary seems to evince a move away from Yogācāra ontology, which was a much easier fit with tantra, toward a "pure" Madhyamaka interpretation of tantra. Wayman notes the "Mādhyamika tone of commentary," with its "avoidance of the typical Yogācāra vocabulary found in many other commentaries, especially in the Pañcakrama tradition."[119] While Wayman's impressionistic characterization of Candrakīrti's commentary does not provide evidence, it alerts us to a theme developed over the ensuing centuries of Buddhist thought: the attempt to move tantra away from its more comfortable home in Yogācāra ontology toward a Madhyamaka interpretation.

The tantric Candrakīrti's *Guhyasamāja* commentary evidently was not in step with the main lines of *Guhyasamāja* exegesis in the eighth and ninth centuries. The two main lines, the "Jñāna" and "Ārya" interpretations founded by Buddhaśrījñāna and the tantric

---

[119] Wayman, *Yoga of the Guhyasamāja,* 103. Wayman is discussing, at that point, Bu ston's continuation of "the Mādhyamika tone of commentary" found in Candrakīrti's *Pradīpoddyotana.* At p. 93, Wayman discusses the *Pradīpoddyotana*'s penchant for turning away from Yogācāra terminology and notes that Bhavyakīrti's *Prakāśikā* returns to Yogācāra language.

Nāgārjuna, respectively, both seem to have accomodated Yogācāra thought. Buddhaśrījñāna's disciple, Haribhadra,[120] was an important exponent of the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka synthesis. Nāgārjuna's *Pañcakrama,* on the stages of Guhyasamāja practice, explained the *Guhyasamāja* with Yogācāra vocabulary, according to Wayman.[121] However, the attempt to distance Buddhist tantra from Yogācāra gained momentum by the eleventh century. As noted above, Sahajavajra's commentary on Maitrīpāda's *Ten Stanzas on Reality* praises Candrakīrti's declaration in his *Entrance to the Middle* that Yogācāra is "interpretable." The *Compendium of Good Sayings* also cites Candrakīrti's refutation of Yogācāra in *Entrance to the Middle.*[122] Both the tantric and non-tantric Candrakīrtis' appeal in this period may well have been intertwined with the move to separate tantra from Yogācāra.

While Śāntarakṣita argued against Yogācāra as ultimately true, his adaptation of Yogācāra on the level of conventional truth and his widespread utilization of valid cogntion elements—which were and are often tied to Yogācāra—must have made his synthesis look less appealing to those wishing to distance tantra from Yogācāra. By the eleventh century, some Mādhyamikas wishing to preserve the epistemological tradition found it necessary to separate it from Yogācāra; such a separation may have been a factor in Jitāri's and Mokṣākaragupta's claim that Dharmakīrti was a Mādhyamika.[123] We can well imagine that many tantric scholars could not accept Candrakīrti's complete denial of Yogācāra "self-cognition"[124] and that such features in Candrakīrti's corpus remained unacceptable to Indian

---

[120] Ruegg, *Literature of the Madhyamaka School,* 102.

[121] Wayman, *Yoga of the Guhyasamāja,* 93 and 103.

[122] The *Compendium* author cites *Entrance to the Middle,* VI.43, 45-51, and 88-89; Bendall, "Subhāṣita-Saṃgraha," (1903): 392-393.

[123] On the accuracy of Jitāri's and Mokṣākaragupta's claim, see Ernst Steinkellner, "Was Dharmakīrti a Mādhyamika?" in *Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka,* 72-90.

[124] *svasaṃvedana, rang rig.*

Buddhists, such as Abhayākaragupta and Ratnākaraśānti, who retained close ties with Śāntarakṣita's views. While Candrakīrti's rise coincided with strains of tantric thought that opposed Yogācāra and valid cognition, some Indian Buddhists found ways to harmonize the final developments of tantra, Madhyamaka, and valid cognition, either taking into account Candrakīrti's critique (in the case of Abhayākaragupta) or finding credible ways to ignore it (in the case of Ratnākaraśānti).

Situating Candrakīrti's rise within the broader currents of late Indian Buddhist thought allows us to appreciate both the complexity of the period that first gave his corpus serious consideration and the allegiances that his revivers made between his views and the tantric writing of the period. Whether or not Indian Buddhists uniformly confused the tantric Candrakīrti with his non-tantric namesake, eleventh and twelfth century tantric authors consistently referred to Candrakīrti's views on ultimate truth and the inapplicability of valid cognition to realizing ultimate truth as well as his arguments against Yogācāra. Candrakīrti's position in late Indian Buddhists' appraisal of why Madhyamaka was superior to Yogācāra, how tantra fit in with either system, and how or if valid cognition could be utilized within a Madhyamaka framework brought his texts their first widespread consideration. As we will see in the following chapter, this nexus of issues led to a Prāsaṅgika school in twelfth century Tibet, the success of which gave Candrakīrti's texts the pre-eminent place in Tibetan Buddhist exoteric thought that they retain today.

Conclusion: History and Doxography

From the preceding, we can see that Candrakīrti's views, while marginal in his own day, enjoyed a sudden popularity among important Indian Buddhists[125]—but by no means

[125] A number of Indian scholars, mostly Kashmiris, could be included in this examination of the Indian origins of Prāsaṅgika. However, as these scholars did not write on Prāsaṅgika and their contributions consisted of teaching and working with Tibetan translators, their contributions will be evaluated along with their Tibetan students in the following section.

among all Indian Buddhists nor to the exclusion of disparate interpretations of Madhyamaka—beginning in the early part of the eleventh century. We can also see that the central issue upon which Candrakīrti's supporters elevated his once unpopular views revolved around the relationship between valid cognition and knowledge of the ultimate, which in turn led his supporters and detractors to portray the ultimate in disparate ways. To speak of a "Prāsaṅgika" movement—a revival of Candrakīrti's texts—in the eleventh century, then, does not refer only to supporters of a mode of argumentation: it is not just a question of denying the validity of formal inference (or "inferences of one's own," *svatantra-anumāna*) in favor of apagogic (*prasaṅga*) reasoning. Crucial also to this movement were the ontological implications of reasoning. When Jayānanda, for the first time in the history of Indian Madhyamaka, writes of "Svātantrika,"[126] he does not only refer (disparagingly) to Mādhyamikas who employ formal inferences but to an interpretation of the ultimate at odds with his own.

We see a great deal of debate amongst fourteenth century and later Tibetan scholars, as well as among contemporary scholars, as to whether "Prāsaṅgika" and "Svātantrika" represent competing ontological visions or, instead, merely competing logical methods. Some recent scholarship focusing on "the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction" has examined the early Indian evidence—the writings of Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti—to determine if ontological concerns entered into Bhāvaviveka's procedural critique of Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti's subsequent defense of Buddhapālita and critique of Bhāvaviveka.[127]

---

[126] In his *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā, sde dge* edition 3870, *dbu ma,* vol. *ra,* 281a.6 and 281b.6. In both cases, Jayānanda glosses a pronoun ("that") found in Candrakīrti's text that is the butt of Candrakīrti's criticism. Jayānanda's glosses, substituting "Svātantrika" for "that", make it clear that he sees himself and Candrakīrti as opponents to the "Svātantrika" interpretation. He does not, however, refer to himself or Candrakīrti as "Prāsaṅgikas," an appellation that may have been first used by Patsab Nyimadrak, the main Tibetan translator of Candrakīrti's writings. "Prāsaṅgika" (*thal 'gyur pa*) is used by Chapa's student, Sonam Tsemo.

[127] William L. Ames, "Bhāvaviveka's Own View of His Differences with Buddhapālita" and C.W. Huntington, Jr., "Was Candrakīrti a Prāsaṅgika?" both in *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a*

Additionally, recent scholarship jumps forward some eight hundred years to examine the distinction that fourteenth and fifteenth century Tibetan writers made between these two "schools" of Madhyamaka thought, particularly Tsongkhapa's claim that the two schools hold divergent ontologies and several Sakya scholars' claim, in rebuttal, that the distinction is purely procedural.[128] This scholarship increases our awareness that the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction, as portrayed by Tibetan doxographies, is a distinction made by Tibetan scholars in order to categorize, harmonize, and explicate a wealth of Indian literature, the authors of which very likely never conceived of themselves as members of competing subschools of Madhyamaka. Scholarship has begun to highlight differences between Tibetan doxography and Indian historical reality.

However, scholarship has largely failed to examine the criteria that eleventh and twelfth century scholars employed to elevate Candrakīrti's Madhyamaka exegesis out of obscurity and to a position where it came, at least in Tibet, to eclipse that of Śāntarakṣita (whose Madhyamaka had already eclipsed that of Bhāvaviveka three hundred years earlier).[129] In sum, scholarship has ignored the criteria that those who were the first to make a

---

Difference Make? eds. Georges B.J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2002), 41-66 and 67-91.

[128] Jeffrey Hopkins, "A Tibetan Delineation of Different Views of Emptiness in the Indian Middle Way School: Dzong-ka-ba's Two Interpretations of the Locus Classicus in Chandrakīrti's Clear Words Showing Bhāvaviveka's Assertion of Commonly Appearing Subjects and Inherent Existence," *Tibet Journal* 14,1 (1989): 10-43; Tom J.F. Tillemans, "Tsong kha pa et al. on the Bhāvaviveka-Candrakīrti Debate," in *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies,* Monograph Series of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies: Occasional Papers 2, ed. Ihara Shōren and Yamaguchi Zuihō (Narita: Narita-san Shinshō-ji, 1992), vol. 1, 315-326; Kodo Yotsuya, *The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Candrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa: A Study of Philosophical Proof According to Two Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka Traditions of India and Tibet.* Tibetan and Indo-Tibetan Studies, 8 (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1999); Chizuko Yoshifumi, "Tsong kha pa's Reevaluation of Candrakīrti's Criticism of Autonomous Inference," in *Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction,* 257-288; and José Ignacio Cabezón, "Two Views on the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction in Fourteenth-Century Tibet," in *Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction,* 289-315.

[129] We see brief attempts at surveying the Madhyamaka literature pertaining to this distinction in this period in Helmut Tauscher, "Phya pa chos kyi seng ge as a Svātantrika," in *Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction,* 207-255, particularly 209-212, and Cabezón, "Two Views on the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction," 291-294.

Prāsaṅgika-Svātantrika distinction employed. While the distinctions that these eleventh and twelfth century scholars drew between Candrakīrti's Madhyamaka—called "Prāsaṅgika" by twelfth century Tibetans—and what Jayānanda and others called "Svātantrika" differ sharply from the distinction drawn by Tsongkhapa, clearly the issues in the eleventh and twelfth centuries are ontological and not only procedural. Our awareness of the important differences adduced by Indian and Tibetan scholars in this period prevents us from downplaying the significance of this divide. While later Tibetan scholarship drew out a doxographic distinction, the doxographic distinction took its names from historical reality, from a living dispute, from Indian and Tibetan arguments over Candrakīrti's importance. Twelfth century Tibetans amplified concerns of late Indian Buddhists in constructing subschools of Madhyamaka; the first Tibetans using the terms "Prāsaṅgika" and "Svātantrika" referred to living movements with Indian and Tibetan representatives. The distinction has historical merit.[130] We must view the later doxographic use of these terms as secondary to their historical usage in order to understand this formative period in Tibetan Madhyamaka and the final period of Indian Madhyamaka.

Contemporary scholarship's continuing focus on sixth and seventh century India and fourteenth and fifteenth century Tibet subtly allows Tibetan doxography to function as our historical guide, directing our attention to the Indian figures deemed thematically important while obscuring the historical validity of dividing Indian Madhyamaka into groups valorizing or downplaying Candrakīrti's views. This chapter has attempted to recover aspects of the historical rise of Candrakīrti, long after his death, and some of the philosophical and doctrinal trends that brought his rise to pass. In so doing, I have attempted to present a

---

[130] Thus, I do not agree with the conclusion found in the "Introduction" to Dreyfus and McClintock, *Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction,* 5 and 18, that the distinction proceeds solely out of Tibetan concerns. Eleventh and twelfth century Indians were divided over Candrakīrti's corpus. However, as I show in the following chapter, full-fledged subschools of Madhyamaka only formed in twelfth century Tibet.

more historically plausible picture of Indian Madhyamaka than doxography yields and to shift focus from thematically important figures to those historically responsible for the rise of what came to be known as Prāsaṅgika. A doxographic approach to Madhyamaka yields certain pictures, certain divides, certain sets of issues; a historico-philosophical approach yields others, with different concerns and different divisions.

Keeping a firm line between the concerns of doxography and the concerns of intellectual history affords us greater clarity in examining Indian Madhyamaka. From the doxographic view, we have evidence supporting a thematic connection between Bhāvaviveka and Śāntrarakṣita and a thematic dissociation of these two from Candrakīrti that would support our use of "Svātantrika" for the former two and "Prāsaṅgika" for the latter. Or, we may show thematic similarities between Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti that would support their classification as "pure Mādhyamikas" in contradistinction to Śāntarakṣita's syncretic "Yogācāra-Madhyamaka." Or, to revive earlier Tibetan distinctions, Jñānagarbha could be thematically dissociated from Śāntarakṣita and joined with Candrakīrti in supporting "what is renowned in the world" conventionally, in opposition to those, like Bhāvaviveka and Śāntarakṣita, who sought stronger philosophical grounding for the conventional world. All of these classifications possess exegetical merit and offer greater philosophical clarity.

However, from a historical perspective, we must appreciate that Bhāvaviveka, Jñānagarbha, and Śāntarakṣita were far more concerned with arguing for Madhyamaka's superiority over Yogācāra viewpoints than they were with establishing and defending Madhyamaka subschools. Any interest Śāntarakṣita had in defining a Madhyamaka subschool targeted Bhāvaviveka (championing his Yogācāra-Madhyamaka over Bhāvaviveka's "Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka"), not Candrakīrti. Likewise, Candrakīrti did not, in his lifetime, found a Madhyamaka subschool nor demonstrate the superiority of his interpretation of Nāgārjuna's corpus over that of Bhāvaviveka; he was not a player in the Madhyamaka

debates of the first millennium.[131] Our use of "Svātantrika" and "Prāsaṅgika" for any of these authors, then, has no historical validity. Probing for differing visions of the ultimate in Bhāvaviveka's and Candrakīrti's texts, also, has doxographical value and can aid our understanding of later disputes but cannot be understood to reflect sixth and seventh century Indian concerns.

I have suggested that the appellation "Prāsaṅgika" may have historical validity when applied to Candrakīrti's revivalists, Prajñākaramati, Atiśa, and Jayānanda, particularly when we see that Jayānanda used its companion term, "Svātantrika," to label his—and whom he saw as Candrakīrti's—opponents. However, regarding eleventh and twelfth century Indian Madhyamaka, "Prāsaṅgika" does not refer to a distinct subschool but to an intellectual movement.[132] We do not see Indian authors conceiving of Candrakīrti's views as excluding all else—of the authors investigated here, only Jayānanda may have eschewed all but Candrakīrti's Madhyamaka. Nor do we see a polarization of Indian exegesis: Abhayākaragupta shows us how one may take Candrakīrti's ideas seriously while yet holding to something like "Svātantrika" viewpoints. While eleventh and twelfth century India saw a popularization of Candrakīrti's views, the evidence supports the notion of a "common commentarial project"[133] among Indian Mādhyamikas, more than a sharp division into camps.

---

[131] While Huntington ("Was Candrakīrti a Prāsaṅgika?") argues that Candrakīrti did not **wish** to establish a Madhyamaka subschool but did so only grudgingly, we must acknowledge that Candrakīrti's intention had very little to do with the historical rise of Prāsaṅgika hundreds of years following his death.

[132] Cabezón ("Two Views on the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction," 290) writes of the possibility of conceiving of Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika as having "internal coherence" sufficient to speak of them as "distinct intellectual movement(s)." This understanding fits eleventh and twelfth century India but not earlier periods of Indian Madhyamaka, when no such movements existed, nor twelfth century Tibet, when the distinction became polarized into definite schools, as I examine in Chapter Two.

[133] Dreyfus and McClintock, "Introduction," 18.

Thus, when Bhāvaviveka in the sixth century criticized the logical procedures Buddhapālita utilized in commenting upon Nāgārjuna's foundational Madhyamaka treatise and Candrakīrti in the seventh century rejected Bhāvaviveka's logical methods (largely to deaf ears), competing schools of Madhyamaka did not ensue. However, when Prajñākaramati, Atiśa, and Jayānanda revived Candrakīrti's writings, these writings—at a great temporal and spatial distance—engendered an expansive eleventh and twelfth century Indo-Tibetan controversy. One focus of the controversy centered round the issue of whether a Mādhyamika may employ formal inferences in the manner developed by the great Buddhist logicians, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, when arguing for Madhyamaka emptiness. Eleventh and twelfth century Indian and Tibetan discussions of this logical, procedural issue expanded into wide-ranging areas of Buddhist ontology and gnoseology:[134] the ways in which a Mādhyamika argued said a great deal about what that Mādhyamika held to exist, both from the mundane perspective and from the lofty vision of a Buddha.

Our appreciation of the Indian Buddhist milieu in which Candrakīrti's texts finally gained favor enables us to see the avenues open to the Tibetan receptors of the manifold Indian textual traditions. Eleventh century Tibetans who made the arduous journey to Kashmir or northeastern India found an Indian Buddhist world wrestling with the complex interplay of a ritual theory and praxis seemingly at odds with its metaphysical basis and well-established epistemological practices seemingly at odds with both ritual and metaphysics.

---

[134] One issue in this controversy that is not fully explored herein is the manner in which Candrakīrti's interpretation of Madhyamaka became interwoven with Maitrīpāda's Mahāmudrā teachings to form what Gampopa called "sūtric Mahāmudrā" (Ruegg, "A Kar Ma bKa' brGyud Work," 1256-1257). As evidenced by Drolungpa's *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Teaching* and Gampopa's *Jewel Ornament of Liberation,* the combination of Candrakīrti's philosophy and Mahāmudrā reopened Tibetan discussion of the "sudden versus gradual" debate, upon which the Great Debate of Samyé centered; a reworking of the place of a practitioner's realization of emptiness within the Mahāyāna path structure ensued. See Gro lung pa blo gros 'byung gnas, *bDe bar gshegs pa'i bstan pa rin po che la 'jug pa'i lam gyi rim pa rnam par bshad pa* (Patna, India: Bihar Research Society, n.d.).

Chapter Two examines the activities of several of these Tibetan translators, their choices of translation and interpretation, and the debates they touched off when casting this complex of issues in the fractured socio-political landscape of late-eleventh and early-twelfth century Tibet. I examine the Tibetan translation and composition activity (some of which has only recently become available) that enables us to understand the nature of the Prāsaṅgika movement and its competing Svātantrika movement, showing the sense in which we may speak of these as "schools" of Tibetan Buddhism. In Tibet, we see opposing schools formed around the study of texts placed into competition—the formations of competing canons of Tibetan translations of Sanskrit texts—that enable us to speak of Tibetan "textual communities."

Chapter Two: Tibetan Textual Communities and the Prāsaṅgika Movement

The Indian interest in issues engendered by Candrakīrti's writings around the close of the first millennium enabled Jayānanda to write of the "Svātantrika" interpretation of Madhyamaka to which he saw himself, and Candrakīrti before him, in opposition.[135] We, then, can justifiably speak of a burgeoning "Prāsaṅgika movement"—keeping in mind that we have yet to see an Indian author use the term "Prāsaṅgika"—as a convenient label for those opposed to what Jayānanda calls "Svātantrika" and whose writings explicitly refer to Candrakīrti's writings as inspiration for their opposition to applying the conventions of valid cognition to the ultimate. Rather than the doxographic usage of these terms, in which Tibetan authors sought out doctrinal similarities among the disparate writings of important Indian Mādhyamikas in order to present a coherent and ordered synthesis of Indian Buddhism, in reference to twelfth century developments we can use these terms to refer to burgeoning intellectual movements and appreciate these movements as the initial referents of the terms.

Additionally, as Tibetans began re-importing Indian Buddhism just prior to the onset of the second millennium, translating hundreds of Sanskrit Buddhist texts—many for the first time—into Tibetan and configuring the Tibetan landscape around networks of Buddhist monasteries and temples, we see these competing doctrinal allegiances take the shape of competing socio-political institutions. Around the figures of important Tibetan translators, we can speak for the first time of living Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika "schools." This chapter traces the development of these schools in the translation, exegesis, and community formation of several important eleventh and twelfth century figures. Developing

---

[135] We also see the anonymous twelfth century author of the Sanskrit "*Lakṣaṇaṭīkā*" using the term "*svatantrasādhanavādin*"; see Yoshiyasu Yonezawa, "**Lakṣaṇaṭīkā:* A Sanskrit Manuscript of an Anonymous Commentary on the *Prasannapadā,*" *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 47, 2 (1999): 1023-1022.

themes of the previous chapter, I examine each side's primary philosophical concerns and show how the debates between them led to two distinct schools, in addition to charting the directions for a great deal of the scholastic Tibetan Buddhism that followed.

Territory and Translations in Tibet's Later Diffusion

The great importance of translating the Buddhist canon into Tibetan is suggested by the virtual equation in Tibetan sources of the two "diffusions" (*dar*) of Buddhism in Tibet with the two periods of translations (*'gyur*). The "early diffusion" (*snga dar*) or "early translation" (*snga 'gyur*) in Central Tibet was controlled primarily by the state, as a newly expanding Tibetan empire's widening conquests created contact between Tibetans and Buddhists of India, Central Asia, and China. The Tibetan emperor Trisong Detsen's proclamation of Buddhism as the official state religion led to constructing Samyé Monastery, ordaining the first Tibetan Buddhist monks, inviting the important Indian teachers Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla—the latter reportedly defeating a Chinese Ch'an monk in the Great Debate at Samyé and establishing the "gradual path" of Buddhist practice in Tibet,[136] and translating a massive amount of Buddhist scripture, primarily sūtra-based but including some tantras.

Davidson has shown that the bivalent imagery of Buddhist tantra made it appealing to both mendicants, as a religious practice, and rulers, as a model of divine kingship.[137] Tantric imagery of a central deity—with whom a practitioner identifies—in an elaborate palace, at the center of a fortress-like circle (*maṇḍala*) arrayed with lesser deities in smaller circles at the cardinal directions, with an adamantine (*vajra*) wall surrounding all became a powerful metaphor for the rise of semi-feudal lords encompassing and subjecting

---

[136] On this debate, see Paul Demieville, *Le concile de Lhasa* (Paris: Imprimerie nationale de France, 1952).

[137] Ronald M. Davidson, *Indian Esoteric Buddhism: A Social History of the Tantric Movement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 118-144.

neighboring lords in the decentralized period following the collapse of the Gupta empire. Kapstein has shown that this metaphor was not lost on the Tibetan emperors who, while not supporting the translation of most tantra, adopted the imagery of Vairocana.[138] Maṇḍala imagery could expand as the empire grew, subjecting neighboring deities/rulers, and offered a cosmic dimension, equating the emperor with a great Buddha. Samyé Monastery, the state-sponsored first Tibetan monastery, itself was constructed on the pattern of the Vairocana maṇḍala.

Pointing to a second imperial Tibetan interest, the Den karma catalog reveals a great wealth of Buddhist treatises of Indian human authorship, including collections of Madhyamaka treatises, Yogācāra treatises, non-tantric cosmological texts, and texts on logic.[139] These early state-sponsored translations speak to what Kapstein called "the charisma of reason"—the appeal that scholastic Buddhist treatises and their carefully constructed logic had to rulers wishing to portray themselves as legitimate centers of a well-ordered universe in which their rule was reasonable and logical.[140] These treatises' finely nuanced philosophy would not have been the primary concern of royal patrons.

The early translation period ended with the collapse of the Tibetan empire around 842. This is not to say that all Buddhist activity ceased, as clearly Buddhist practice existed outside of state patronage.[141] In what was known in Tibetan histories as a "Dark Period," formal contacts with neighboring Buddhist lands were broken, as was the monastic

---

[138] Matthew Kapstein, *The Tibetan Assimilation of Buddhism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 60-62.

[139] The *dbu ma'i bstan bcos* (Madhyamaka treatises) are Lalou (Marcelle Lalou, "Les textes Bouddhiques au temps du roi khri-srong-lde-bcan," *Journal Asiatique* 241 [1953]: 333) numbers 573-605, the *rnam par shes pa'i bstan bcos* (Consciousness-[Only] treatises) are numbers 614-654, the *theg pa chung ngu'i bstan bcos* (*abhidharma* treatises) are numbers 686-694, and the *tarka'i phyogs* (logic section) are numbers 695-722.

[140] Kapstein, *Tibetan Assimilation,* 54.

[141] Kapstein (*Tibetan Assimilation,* 11-15) points to the survival of the Tibetan translation language through the Dark Period as evidence for the continuation of Buddhist scholarship, in addition to Buddhist practice, during this period.

ordination lineage. As a measure of prosperity returned to Central Tibet approximately 150 years later, Tibetans sought to renew ordination, initially turning east to the vicinity of the newly formed Tangut kingdom. It is certain that Indian and Kashmiri monks traveled to Tangut lands in these years, some remaining while others traveled onward to the capitol of the Song emperor.[142] We can also note the confluence of accounts in Tibetan historical writing of the "purple-robed monks" who took part in the ordination of the Central Tibetan pilgrims and the accounts of monks in Tangut lands receiving honorary purple robes from the Song emperor.[143] Tibetans very likely turned to this new royal source of Buddhist patronage in order to revive their own monastic lineage.

Tibetan accounts speak of a small group of pilgrims who set out from Central Tibet seeking ordination such that they in turn could revive monastic Buddhism in their homeland.[144] Vitali has shown that following the return of these pilgrims to Central Tibet, several became heirs to imperial temples and founders of new temples and monasteries.[145] One can imagine that these revivalists must have had familial or at least material connection with aristocracy, both in order to make the journey to the east and to undertake building and restoration projects following their return. In certain cases, Tibetan histories tell of these figures returning to their familial lands, building, teaching, and gaining disciples, who in turn built new temples and monasteries. These groups (*sde pa* or *tsho;* "districts") of temples

---

[142] See Jan Yün-hua, "Buddhist Relations between India and Sung China," parts 1 and 2, *History of Religions* 6, no. 1 (Aug. 1966): 24-42 and 6, no. 2 (Nov. 1966): 135-168.

[143] Ruth W. Dunnell, *The Great State of White and High* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996), 30 and 188, n.11 records such an event as occurring in 980, the period when Tibetan pilgrims sought ordination to the east.

[144] Craig Earl Watson, "The Second Propagation of Buddhism from Eastern Tibet According to the 'Short Biography of dGongs-pa rab-gsal' by the Third Thukvan bLo-bzaṅ chos-kyi nyi-ma (1737-1802)," *Central Asiatic Journal* 22, nos.3-4 (1978): 263-285.

[145] Roberto Vitali, *Early Temples of Central Tibet* (London: Serindia, 1990), 11 and 37ff. Vitali (p. 62, n. 2) provides a complete listing of these figures from a variety of Tibetan accounts that variously list ten, six, or four pilgrims.

and monasteries linked to a common seat functioned as small-scale political entities or, as van der Kuijp termed them, "administrative-cum-vinaya districts."[146] The re-emergence of hierarchical rule over extended regions of Central Tibet can be attributed to the building efforts of disciples of the pilgrims, whose new centers remained loyal to their teachers' seats. One also finds references to competition and violence between the factions that emerged from the pilgrims, as these groups carved out their territories in Central Tibet.[147]

From this fractured and competitive socio-political landscape, very different from the Imperial period, the "later translation" effort was spawned. At our present stage of knowledge, we cannot precisely map each important Tibetan translator with a corresponding faction, temple, or clan (indeed, the precise relationships between temple networks, the old aristocracy, and newly important clans are not yet known). We may safely say that the newly formed networks of temples and monasteries sought the same kind of prestige and power that the Tibetan emperor gained in his royal patronage of translation, the poetic legitimation that Sanskrit, even in its translated form, offered.[148] Rather than a central ruler overseeing a unified, large translation project, the later translations were made by heroic individuals who took possession of particular lineages of texts and formed their intellectual property into the cornerstones of their monastic centers. The prestige of Sanskrit radiated from these Tibetan translators, who spent large parts of their lives studying in India, rather than from a central emperor. It contributed to the success of their monastic networks, which must be seen as the

---

[146] Leonard W.J. van der Kuijp, "The Monastery of Gsang-phu ne'u-thog and its Abbatial Succession from ca. 1073 to 1250," *Berliner Indologische Studien* 3 (1987): 108-109.

[147] *The Blue Annals,* (George N. Roerich, trans. [Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1949], 378) reports that parts of Samyé were burned in a conflict between two of the originial pilgrims, kLu mes and sBa reg.

[148] On the idea of the poetic power of Sanskrit, see Sheldon Pollack, "The Sanskrit Cosmopolis, 300-1300 CE: Transculturation, Vernacularization, and the Question of Ideology," in *Ideology and Status of Sanskrit: Contributions to the History of the Sanskrit Language*, ed. Jan E.M. Houben (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), 197-247.

forerunners to the great religious orders that would come to dominate Tibetan cultural and political life.

The reasons for Tibetans bifurcating the newly developed Indian lines of Madhyamaka exegesis into competing schools center around translation: texts that had either not yet been written or had yet to gain an Indian following during the early diffusion of Buddhism in Tibet were translated for the first time in the later diffusion—we also see important cases of texts being retranslated—and these translations became the cornerstones of competing proto-sectarian schools. Three categories of texts were chief among the extraordinary amount of material translated in this period: "Highest Yoga Tantras" (*anuttarayogatantra*), tantras utilizing "subtle body" practices that emerged in India after the collapse of the state-sponsored early translations; new interpretations of the logico-epistemological tradition of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti; and Candrakīrti's major writings as well as texts lauding them. While many translators took possession of particular tantras,[149] Ngok Loden Sherab[150] (1059-1109) made his monastic academy synonymous with the study of Dharmakīrti's epistemology and Yogācāra-Madhyamaka, while Patsab Nyimadrak[151]

---

[149] For instance, on Drokmi's (*'brog mi*) monopoly of the "Path and Fruit" tantric system, see Ronald M. Davidson, *Tibetan Renaissance: Tantric Buddhism in the Rebirth of Tibetan Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming).

[150] *rNgog lo tsa ba bLo ldan shes rab.* A biography of Ngok Lostawa, written by his immediate disciple, has recently become available: Dram Dul, *'Jig rten mig gcig blo ldan śes rab kyi rnam thar, Biography of Blo ldan śes rab, The Unique Eye of the World by Gro luṅ pa Blo gros 'byuṅ gnas, The Xylograph Compared with a Bhutanese Manuscript* (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 2004).

[151] *sPa tshab Nyi ma grags.* Van der Kuijp ("*Ratnāvali* in Tibet," *Tibet Journal* X, no. 2 [1985]: 4) casts doubt on the year of Patsab's birth, noting that Patsab could consider a trip across the Himalayas in 1136 and was still able to participate in an ordination in 1140. While it does seem unlikely that an 81-year old could even consider a trans-Himalayan trip, Lang ("Spa-tshab Nyi-ma-grags and the Introduction of Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka into Tibet," in *Reflections on Tibetan Culture: Essays in memory of Turrell V. Wylie.* eds. Lawrence Epstein and Richard F. Sherbourne [Lewiston, N.Y.: E. Mellon Press, 1990], 134) notes that Patsab very likely returned to Tibet from his 23-year sojourn in Kashmir by 1101. If Patsab arrived in Kashmir in 1077, he could not have been born long after 1055.

(b.1055) established the study of Candrakīrti's writings in addition to becoming the main teacher in Central Tibet of Nāgārjuna's treatises.

Ngok and Patsab: Textual Ownership and Competing Communities

The Ngok clan affords us one of the more complete pictures of the development of later translation monastic institutions out of the newly re-established ordination lineage. The picture shows a clan that maintained its aristocratic status from Imperial times through the latter diffusion; that split between two competing districts in the early years of the later diffusion; and that built an extremely successful monastic academy, Sangpu, supported by one such district and centered around the translations and teachings of its most illustrious member. The formation of the Sangpu academy and its tensions with monasteries of divergent teachings that were associated with competing districts and were yet ultimately aligned with the Kadampa[152] order offers insights into the creation of Tibet's religious orders from proto-sectarian doctrinal and district loyalties, as well as allowing us glimpses into the creation of competing lines of Madhyamaka exegesis.

The Ngok clan was part of the aristocracy during the Tibetan empire; one member was reportedly a minister to the emperor Trisong Detsen.[153] Following the return of the pilgrims with the monastic ordination lineage to Central Tibet, we see divisions in the clan. In 1010, Ngok Jangchub Chungnay[154] became a disciple of Lumay Tsultrim Sherab,[155] one of the pilgrims who returned the ordination lineage to Central Tibet and who undertook renovation and building activity in the Central Tibetan region of U.[156] Ngok Jangchub Chungnay took part in the renovation and expansion of the Imperial Yerpa Temple between

---

[152] *bKa' gdams pa.*
[153] *Blue Annals,* 324.
[154] *rNgog Byang chub 'byung gnas.*
[155] *kLu mes Tshul khrims shes rab.*
[156] *Blue Annals,* 74.

1011 and 1020 and built several affiliate temples, coming to be known as one of the "four pillars"[157] that supported the "roof beams" of Lumay and Sumpa Yeshe Lodro,[158] a mark of his significance in expanding the influence of Lumay.[159]

However, in this same time, Ngok Dorje Zhonu[160] maintained ties with the strains of Buddhism surviving from the early diffusion.[161] His son, Ngok Lekpay Sherab,[162] took ordination with Dring Yeshe Lodro,[163] one of Lumay's companions-turned-competitors in returning the ordination lineage to Central Tibet.[164] Ngok Lekpay Sherab made the journey to the east to study with Jowo Setsun[165] (showing that journeys east did not end with the initial reinstatement of the ordination lineage), and to the Western Tibet kingdom, where he worked with the famed translator, Rinchen Zangpo (958-1055).[166] From his travel and study, he seems to have built his own reputation, independently from Ngok Jangchub Chungnay, and built at least three more centers in the Lhasa area, including Sangpu Neutog, just to the south of Lhasa, in 1073.[167] When Atiśa arrived in Central Tibet in 1045, Ngok

---

[157] *ka ba bzhi.* We frequently see important founders and his disciples referred to as parts of a house. The founder seems to be equated with the roof beams (*gdung*), while his most important disciples are the pillars, lesser disciples are doors, planks, and so on. This "construction" metaphor reflects the role of disciples spreading their teacher's influence not simply through teaching but in staking out territory.

[158] *Sum pa Ye shes blo gros.* Sumpa was another of the "Ten Men" who returned the ordination lineage to Central Tibet. He was one of five men from the U (*dbus*) region. However, his importance seems to have been joined with or eclipsed by Lumay's, as the division of U into the districts connected with the figures from U, reported by Grags pa rgyal mtshan around 1200 (*rGya bod kyi sde pa'i gyes mdo, Sa skya bka' 'bum,* vol. 4 [Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1968], 296.4.2-298.3.3), includes only four names, leaving out Sumpa.

[159] *Blue Annals,* 74-75.

[160] *rNgog rDo rje gzhon nu.*

[161] Leonard W.J. van der Kuijp, *Contributions to the Development of Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology from the Eleventh to the Thirteenth Century* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1983), 30.

[162] *rNgog Legs pa'i shes rab.*

[163] *'Bring Ye shes blo gros.*

[164] Van der Kuijp, *Contributions,* 30.

[165] *jo bo se btsun.*

[166] *rin chen bzang po;* see *Blue Annals,* 93 and 324.

[167] Accounts of the history of Sangpu (*gsang phu ne'u thog*) are found in van der Kuijp, "The Monastery of Gsang-phu ne'u-thog," 103-127.

Jangchub Chungnay hosted him at Yerpa, requesting Atiśa to translate Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum.*[168] Ngok Lekpay Sherab studied with Atiśa at Nyetang[169] and requested that Atiśa translate Bhāvaviveka's *Heart of the Middle* and *Blaze of Reasoning.* These two members of the Ngok clan were both students of Atiśa and yet were key actors in spreading the networks of competing districts.[170] Indeed, van der Kuijp notes that three of Atiśa's main students founded monasteries that were each supported by the four competing "administrative-cum-vinaya districts" into which the U region of Central Tibet was divided.[171] In these instances, we see the new territorial divisions introduced with the return of the ordination lineage superceding clan loyalties and utilizing the prestige of the very same famed Indian teacher to advance competing agendas.

In the next generation, Ngok Loden Sherab, having been ordained by his uncle, Ngok Lekpay Sherab,[172] was part of a contingent of Tibetan translators that the king of Western Tibet convened in 1076 and that subsequently traveled to Kashmir, where Ngok studied for seventeen years.[173] Ngok's most important translations were Prajñākaragupta's

---

[168] *Uttaratantra* or *Ratnagotravibhāga.* See *Blue Annals,* 259.

[169] *sNye thang,* built by Atiśa's pre-eminent Tibetan disciple, Dromton (*'Brom ston rGyal ba'i 'byung gnas,* 1004-1063) in 1055. See *Blue Annals,* 324.

[170] We also see a third division of the Ngok clan, stemming from rNgok Chos kyi rdo rje (1036-1102) who was instrumental in spreading Mar pa's teachings. See *Blue Annals,* 403 and 667.

[171] Van der Kuijp, "Monastery of Gsang-phu ne'u-thog," 108-109. The four districts were Lumay, Ba (*sBa*), Raksha (*Rag sha*), and Dring. Ba and Raksha are together listed as supporters of Nyetang, explaining how three monasteries can be supported by four competing districts. This division of U (*dbu*) is reported by Grags pa rgyal mtshan in his *rGya bod kyi sde pa'i gyes mdo,* 296.4.2-298.3.3.

[172] Van der Kuijp, *Contributions,* 31.

[173] The "religious council" (*chos 'khor*) was convened by rTse lde, king of mNga' ris 'khor gsum at Tho ling; rTse lde's son, dBang phyug lde, sponsored Ngok's trip to Kashmir. See *Blue Annals,* 71, 325; Lobsang Shastri, "The Fire Dragon *Chos 'khor* (1076 AD)," in *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies,* edited by Helmut Krasser, Michael Torsten Much, Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Tauscher (Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997), vol. 2, 873-882; and Roberto Vitali, *The Kingdoms of Gu.ge Pu.hrang According to mNga'.ris rgyal.rabs by Gu.ge mkhan.chen Ngag.dbang.grags.pa* (Dharamsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1996).

Ornament for (Dharmakīrti's) Valid Cognition,[174] a commentary on one of Dharmakīrti's most important epistemological treatises that emphasizes the confluence of Dharmakīrti's logic and Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka; Dharmakīrti's second main work, the *Compendium of Valid Cognition,*[175] along with Dharmottara's commentary to it; and Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum,* one of five texts attributed to the future Buddha, Maitreya, primarily concerned with the "Buddha nature" present in all sentient beings. Furthermore, stemming from his studies in Kashmir, Ngok is credited with establishing the Tibetan study of "The Three Mādhyamikas from the East," the main Madhyamaka writings of Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla.[176]

Upon his return to Central Tibet, Ngok became the abbot of Sangpu Monastery where his mastery of Dharmakīrti's writings increased his fame to the point where he was reported to have 23,000 students.[177] Every important figure in Central Tibet was reported to have studied Dharmakīrti's tradition at Sangpu. In addition to establishing Sangpu as the

---

[174] *Pramāṇavārtikālaṃkāra.* Van der Kuijp (*Contributions,* 31-32) notes the confusion that this text was reportedly already translated prior to Ngok Loden Sherab's journey to Kashmir and offers the following solution: The text was indeed translated already by Zangs dkar lo tsa ba 'Phags pa'i shes rab, but this translation was found faulty. Ngok translated it again in Kashmir, whereupon his translation arrived in Western Tibet prior to his return, allowing Zangs dkar to edit the translation. Upon Ngok's return, he edited the translation again. This convoluted explanation accounts for the facts that we know about the text. A very similar explanation is given in Marek Mejor, "On the Date of the Tibetan Translations of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and the *Pramāṇavārttika,*" in *Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition,* ed. Ernst Steinkellner (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1991), 184-185, where it is suggested that bTsan kha bo che—who traveled to Kashmir with Ngok but returned prior to him—brought Ngok's first translation back to Western Tibet.

[175] *Pramāṇaviniścaya*

[176] The *dbu ma shar gsum* are Jñānagarbha's *Distinguishing the Two Truths* (*Satyadvayavibhaṅga*), Śāntarakṣita's *Ornament for the Middle Way* (*Madhyamakālaṃkāra*), and Kamalaśīla's *Illumination of the Middle Way* (*Madhyamakāloka*).

[177] *Blue Annals,* 73. This tradition needs to be reconciled with the accounts, reported by van der Kuijp ("Monastery of Gsang-phu ne'u-thog," 107), that two of Ngok's students, Tshes spong ba Chos kyi bla ma and Gro lung pa Blo gros 'byung gnas, were responsible for expanding Sangpu's physical size, apparently after Ngok Loden Sherab's death.

premier institute for Buddhist epistemology, Ngok wrote summaries (*bsdus don*) of and commentaries on "The Three Mādhyamikas from the East," texts that emphasized the compatibility of Madhyamaka philosophy and Dharmakīrti's epistemology.[178] While only three of Ngok's compositions are currently available, thus greatly limiting our knowledge of his views, his reported opposition to Prāsaṅgika accords well with what we see Indian champions of Candrakīrti expounding in this period: Ngok's commitments to the epistemological tradition would place him squarely in opposition to arguments against the inapplicability of valid cognition to the ultimate. As will be discussed briefly below and at length in subsequent chapters, Chapa—who after two generations followed Ngok as Sangpu's abbot—details his opposition to Prāsaṅgika at great length on just such grounds.[179]

In contradistinction to Ngok, Patsab Nyimadrak's interests centered on Candrakīrti's writings.[180] Patsab's ties with aristocracy are less clear than Ngok's. The Pa clan was certainly important during the Imperial period; however, Patsab Nyimadrak was not part of the entourage of translators commissioned by the king of Western Tibet. He studied in Kashmir for twenty-three years, mainly at Ratnaguptavihāra in Śrīnagar,[181] where he translated into Tibetan Candrakīrti's two most important works, *Entrance to the Middle* and

---

[178] It is interesting that Ngok did not translate these texts anew but instead relied upon the translations done in the early translation period by Ye shes sde and Ka ba dpal rtseg. Clearly, a wealth of materials survived through the "Dark Period" following the collapse of the Tibetan empire. Ngok's summaries and commentaries are not available at present; see van der Kuijp, *Contributions,* 57.

[179] This is not to say that Ngok Loden Sherab's views are exactly mirrored in Chapa's writings. In his commentary to the *Sublime Continuum* (*Theg chen rgyud bla ma'i don bsdus pa* [Dharamsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1993]), Ngok echoes Śāntideva's proclamation that the ultimate is not a referent of consciousness, a notion that Chapa argues against at length. One hopes for the discovery of more of Ngok's writings in order to illuminate how he understood Śāntideva. As has been noted above, Śāntideva's writings have been interpreted from a decidedly non-Prāsaṅgika viewpoint. One suspects that Ngok, with his emphasis on Dharmakīrti's epistemology, could not have meant, as Jayānanda from the Prāsaṅgika viewpoint wrote, that human valid cognition can play no role in ascertaining the ultimate.

[180] On Patsab, see Karen Lang, "Spa-tshab Nyi-ma-grags," 127-141.

[181] Jean Naudou, *Buddhists of Kaśmīr* (Delhi: Agam Kala Prakashan, 1980), 210.

Clear Words.[182] Patsab also translated Āryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas,* one of the foundational Madhyamaka treatises, and Candrakīrti's commentary on it. Additionally, he retranslated and revised several of Nāgārjuna's most important texts including the *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle.*

The disparities between Ngok's and Patsab's translation activities in Kashmir must have been due to personal inclinations and differing senses of mission. Considering the timeframe—Ngok's stay in Kashmir is reported as 1076-1093; Patsab's stay was likely 1077-1100[183]—and places of their travels, we can imagine that they would have come into contact with the same Sanskrit Buddhist texts; only what they chose to translate differed. This becomes particularly clear when we consider that these two chief Tibetan protagonists in the development of competing schools of Madhyamaka exegesis studied with some of the same Indian and Kashmiri teachers. While Patsab translated Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle* with Tilakakalaśa, Ngok translated Dignāga's commentary on the *Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra* and Śāntideva's *Compendium of Training* with him. Parahitabhadra taught Ngok Dharmakīrti's *Compendium of Valid Cognition* and *Drop of Reasoning*[184] along with Dharmottara's commentary on the former but is also said to have taught Candrakīrti's *Clear Words* to Mahāsumati, with whom Patsab translated it. Further, Patsab translated Āryadeva's *Four Hundred Stanzas* and Candrakīrti's commentary to it with Sūkṣmajana whose father, Sañjana, taught Ngok Maitreya's *Sublime Continuum.*

---

[182] The former text consists of stanzas and autocommentary; while the stanzas had been translated prior to Patsab's work, by Kṛṣṇa Paṇḍita and Nag tsho Tshul khrims rgyal ba (b.1011), his translation of the stanzas and autocommentary was the version that became widely known in Tibet.

[183] Lang, "Spa-tshab Nyi-ma-grags," 132 and 134.

[184] *Nyāyabindu;* Ngok translated Dharmottara's commentary on this text with Sumatikīrti who also translated Prajñākaramati's commentary on Śāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Practice* with Marpa Chos kyi dbang phyug and gNyan Dar ma grags at lCung ka mkhar in dBu ru. Ngok worked again with Sumatikīrti on the translation of another of Prajñākaramati's text, his commentary on the *Ornament of Clear Realizations* (*Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti-piṇḍārtha, sde dge* edition 3795), showing Ngok's familiarity with at least one of Prajñākaramati's texts. The *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* of Vinītadeva was translated in the early diffusion by Ye shes sde.

Sūkṣmajana's grandfather, Mahājana, taught Ngok Maitreya's *Differentiating Phenomena and Noumena,* while his great-grandfather, Ratnavajra, is said to have taught Candrakīrti's *Clear Words* to Parahitabhadra.[185] Bhavyarāja collaborated with Ngok in translating Prajñākaragupta's commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Commentary on [Dignāga's] Valid Cognition,* as well as revising Dharmakīrti's text; he worked with Patsab on the translation of Dharmottara's *Proof of Other Worlds.*[186]

Some of these examples, where Kashmiri is said to teach a text to Kashmiri, may only represent Tibetan attempts to fill in Indian lineages with the names of famed scholars. However, the colophons to the translations mentioned above allow us greater certainty that Ngok and Patsab indeed studied in the same circles. We see many Kashmiri teachers renowned as experts in quite disparate Buddhist literature and that at least some Kashmiris were well familiar with Candrakīrti's writings in the late eleventh century, but not to the exclusion of other studies. Candrakīrti's views, while known in learned, ecumenical Buddhist circles of eleventh century Kashmir, only became the focus for competing schools of Buddhist thought when Patsab arrived in Central Tibet, with Kanakavarman and Tilakakalaśa in tow, shortly after the year 1100.

We often meet accounts that Atiśa established Prāsaṅgika in Tibet. As discussed in the previous chapter, Atiśa clearly favored Candrakīrti's interpretation of the ultimate; the Kadampa school, founded by Atiśa's closest Tibetan disciple, Dromton, would be expected likewise to commit to this preference. We know that Naktso, a student of Atiśa, made the first Tibetan translation of Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle* (the stanzas, perhaps without autocommentary).[187] However, without the autocommentary—and without Candrakīrti's

---

[185] Naudou, *Buddhists of Kaśmīr,* 230.

[186] *Paralokasiddhi.*

[187] It is possible that Naktso did translate Candrakīrti's autocommentary but that his translation was lost over time and never included in any canonical collection. Tsongkhapa, in his own commentary to Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle* (his *dGongs pa rab gsal*), refers several times to what he calls Naktso's translation of

lengthier companion text, *Clear Words*—Tibetans would have had little hope of appreciating the subtleties in Candrakīrti's writings that led Atiśa to proclaim them to hold the superior interpretation of Madhyamaka. In the nearly fifty years between Atiśa's death and Patsab's return to Central Tibet, Ngok Lekpay Sherab—also a student of Atiśa's—built Sangpu and his nephew, Ngok Loden Sherab, established it as the pre-eminent center of scholastic Buddhism (recall the account of Loden Sherab's 23,000 students). Thus, rather than a Tibet converted to Prāsaṅgika by Atiśa, Patsab returned to find the study of non-tantric Buddhism flourishing without translations of Candrakīrti's most important texts.

Patsab was not immediately successful in establishing his teaching of Candrakīrti's texts. With Kanakavarman and Tilakakalaśa, he worked at two of Lhasa's most ancient temples, Ramoche and Lhasa Trulnang,[188] revising his translations of Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle* and *Clear Words*—on the basis of manuscripts different from those he had used in Kashmir[189]—as well as revising again Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle.* We have no certainty as to when he moved to Gyel Lhakang,[190] built by another of Lumay's "Four Pillars," near his birthplace north of Lhasa. There, the Kadampa Sharwapa sent his

---

Candrakīrti's autocommentary. Another commentary on Candrakīrti's text, written by one of Tsongkhapa's teachers, Rendawa (*Red mda' ba gzhon nu blo gros*), likewise seems to have access to Naktso's translation of Candrakīrti's autocommentary.

[188] *lha sa* (or, *ra sa*) *'phrul snang.*

[189] Ruegg (David Seyfort Ruegg, *Three Studies in the History of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Philosophy, Studies in Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Thought, Part I* [Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 2000], 45) translates the phrase *nyi 'og shar phyogs* in the colophons to these translations—describing the provenance of the manuscripts Patsab utilized at Ramoche—as "eastern borderland," and notes the identification of *nyi 'og* with the Sanskrit Aparāntaka.

[190] *rgyal lha khang* in *'phan yul* was built in 1012 by the bKa' gdams pa Zhang sna nam rDo rje dbang phyug (976-1060). Ruegg (*Three Studies,* 45, n.89) points out that its destruction by a Mongol army in 1240 may account for the lack of information we have on Patsab. The Blue Annals (p. 89) further notes that a rMa bya rNa ra ba (1060-1129) was the abbot of Gyel Lhakang from 1120 until his death in 1129. Patsab's ascendancy may have followed.

own students to study Madhyamaka with Patsab;[191] one wonders if Atiśa's Prāsaṅgika preference survived in some Kadampa circles, where the appearance of Candrakīrti's writings in Tibetan was eagerly awaited. In any case, at some time prior to Patsab's death shortly after 1140,[192] Gyel Lhakang became the center for Prāsaṅgika studies, and for the study of Nāgārjuna's treatises, in Central Tibet, affiliated—like Sangpu—with the Kadampa order but supported by Lumay's district—as opposed to Sangpu's connection with the Dring district—and based entirely on Patsab's translation activities.[193]

What was it about Ngok's translations, on the one hand, and Patsab's on the other, that led to the establishment of successful centers of competing exoteric study? We can look first to the quality of the translations. Saito has shown that Patsab's translation of Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle*—made first in Kashmir and a second time in Lhasa—follows the much older translation of Lui Gyeltsen[194] in places where the older

---

[191] *Blue Annals*, 272 and 342; Shar ba pa Yon tan grags's dates are 1070-1141. Both Patsab's and Ngok's monasteries were tied to the Kadampa order. An odd comment in the *Blue Annals* (327) states that rNgog Legs pa'i shes rab and rNgog bLo ldan shes rab were "holders of the Master's treatises," but that Legs pa'i shes rab, having also been a student of 'Brom ston pa, was a bKa' gdams pa. This suggests that the bKa' gdams order was understood as originating from 'Brom ston pa and was not strictly associated with Atiśa's teachings. gSang phu scholars following bLo ldan shes rab perhaps were not considered bKa' gdams pa. It could be that the "followers of Ngok" (*rngog lugs*) were distinguished from "mainstream" bKa' gdams in holding to a Svātantrika position, or it could be that bKa' gdams pa scholars maintained diverse views long after Candrakīrti's teachings first became widely known in Tibet.

[192] If more of Ngok Loden Sherab's (died in 1109) writings become available, we could better pin down the rise of Patsab's teaching career according to whether or not Ngok refers at length to Prāsaṅgika notions. Ngok's denial that the ultimate is an object of knowledge and his followers' opposition to Candrakīrti's views could be rendered more comprehensible if Ngok drew the former notion from Śāntideva's writings, without knowledge of Candrakīrti's positing a similar idea—that is, Ngok may have written before Patsab successfully spread Candrakīrti's writings. Some traditions, discussed below, have Chapa's (1109-1169) students leaving Sangpu to study with Patsab. If this were so, Patsab's fame may have come quite late in his life, as Chapa could not have had students to lose to Patsab until roughly 1130.

[193] Patsab is only known to have written one brief text, a "Questions and Answers on Madhyamaka" (*dbu ma'i dris lan*), written to Shar ba pa. This text does not survive but is noted in 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's *Grub mtha' chen mo* and in A khu Shes rab rgya mtsho's rare books list, *dPe rgyun dkon pa 'ga' zhig gi tho yig.* See Ruegg, *Three Studies,* 45, n.88 and 47, n.96.

[194] *cog ro klu'i rgyal mtshan.*

translation is clearly incorrect.[195] A more complete study would likely show instances where Patsab's translation of the stanzas differs from that of Lui Gyeltsen in order to reflect Candrakīrti's explanation of the stanzas. Philological accuracy, a criterion which most Tibetans would not have been in a position to judge, was not a simple matter of substituting Tibetan correspondences for Sanskrit originals but varied both depending on the commentarial tradition that a translator followed and the semantic connotations the translator wished to evoke, as we see in parts of Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle,* the stanzas of which Patsab re-translated into Tibetan.[196] Nor can we point to readability as a reason for the translations' success, as the Tibetan translations produce a Tibetan that would have been unrecognizable to literate Tibetans who did not know Sanskrit.

The incomprehensibility of the Tibetan translations points to both the function of the translation and the role of the translators. Writing of the turn across south and southeast

---

[195] Akira Saito, "Problems in Translating the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* as Cited in its Commentaries," in *Buddhist Translations: Problems and Perspectives,* ed. Doboom Tulku (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995), 87-96. Saito shows that Lui Gyeltsen translated Nāgārjuna's stanzas in accordance with Avalokitavrata's massive sub-commentary to Bhāvaviveka's *Lamp for Wisdom:* Avalokitavrata's text, in which Bhāvaviveka's and Nāgārjuna's texts are embedded in their entirety, was translated first, then Bhāvaviveka's and Nāgārjuna's texts were rendered according to Avalokitavrata's explanation. Lui Gyeltsen then translated two additional commentaries on Nāgārjuna's stanzas, Buddhapālita's and the *Akutobhayā,* which in places (Saito lists twelve instances) explain the stanzas differently from Avalokitavrata, and yet Lui Gyeltsen still utilized Avalokitavrata's rendering of these stanzas. In such places, Lui Gyeltsen's translation of Nāgārjuna's stanzas embedded in Buddhapālita's commentary and in the *Akutobhayā* is not in keeping with the explanation these commentaries give; a different translation was required. Patsab's translation of Nāgārjuna's stanzas—which was made according to Candrakīrti's explanation of the stanzas in his *Clear Words*—retained Lui Gyelsten's wording in some places (Saito focuses on one instance) where a differing translation should have been given.

[196] Tauscher has shown that Patsab edited—in conformity with his re-translation—only the parts of Naktso's translation of Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle* that he found most important (Helmut Tauscher, "Some Problems of Textual History in Connection with the Tibetan Translations of the *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ* and its Commentary," in *Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist Religion and Philosophy,* ed. Ernst Steinkellner and Helmut Tauscher [Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, 1983], 293-303). Even in those edited portions, we see disparities in the Tibetan including instances, discussed in Chapter Three, where Naktso's translation utilized a term crucial to the valid cognition (*'khrul ba*) tradition in places where Patsab chose a varying Tibetan term (*rdzun pa*).

Asia in the early years of the second millennium from composing high literature in Sanskrit to composing in vernacular, Pollack comments that the vernacular literature composed under the influence of the "Sanskrit Cosmopolis" was intelligible only to those who knew Sanskrit.[197] Tibetans' translations, rather than compositions, exhibit a similarly Sanskritized language that would have required the translator's explanation to become meaningful to Tibetans. This requirement recalls van der Kuijp's remarks on the importance of oral transmission in the early Tibetan "valid cognition" literature.[198] Van der Kuijp speaks of the importance for Indian *paṇḍitas* to have the proper oral transmission for a text in order to teach it to a Tibetan translator. As already noted above, lines of Indian transmission as reported in Tibetan sources vary considerably and may only represent Tibetan attempts to validate their teachings. Van der Kuijp's examples from Sakya Paṇḍita's opus, in which Sapaṇ attributes information to the Indian Śākyaśrībhadra's oral teaching, are more pertinent: there we see a Tibetan translator, teacher, and monastic abbot utilizing his relation with an esteemed Indian as justification for his interpretation of a translated text that, by itself, would have been incomprehensible.

Recourse to well-respected Indians' explanations operated in conjunction with translations that bore the stamp of the Sanskrit Buddhist tradition to enable Tibetan translators an interpretive power with which to teach and form monastic curricula. Kellner suggests the importance of translators' teaching activity as she wonders, regarding the early valid cognition literature, "how to conceive of the interrelation between translational activities, exegetical enterprises and individual interpretation in medieval Tibetan monastic culture."[199] The insights of several scholars of medieval Europe, studying the vernacular turn

---

[197] Pollack, "The Sanskrit Cosmopolis," 244.

[198] Van der Kuijp, *Contributions,* 2-7.

[199] Birgit Kellner, "Types of Incompatibility (*'gal ba*) and Types of Non-Cognition (*ma/mi dmigs*) in Early Tibetan *Tshad Ma* Literature," *PIATS*, Graz, vol. 1, 496.

away from Latin literature, help illuminate the nature of this interrelation. Stock's notion of "textual communities" highlights the communal role of the Tibetan translators: one conversant in both the "high" literature and the vernacular served as a reader for the larger community, an interpreter who delineated the community's views.[200] Ngok's and Patsab's roles as teachers and community leaders are well-attested. We can likewise see that their translation activity parlayed into definite interpretations of Buddhist exoteric literature that served as the "positions" of their respective monastic academies.

As noted above, Patsab's teaching activity did not yield literary productions, but was almost entirely oral. In contrast, Ngok was known to have authored many "summaries" and commentaries on valid cognition texts, Madhyamaka, and all five of the Maitreya texts.[201] Dagenais shows a strong link in European medieval literature between reception, reading, and the composition of glosses and commentaries, which he terms "lecturature," texts born out of reading and responding to received texts.[202] While still lacking much of the period manuscript evidence that could more fully document this, I suggest that the move from translating to teaching for these Tibetan figures can be located at least in part in their readings of their translated texts. Ngok's and Patsab's translations would have required their own readings, whether written or oral, to become intelligible. Stock opines that the commentarial reading of a text is the text that lives in a given community's minds[203] while Irvine sees the "authority of the gloss" marking a text as canonical and then imperceptibly

---

[200] Brian Stock, *Listening for the Text: On the Uses of the Past* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 22-23. Anne Blackburn has adopted Stock's ideas in her analysis of eighteenth century Śri Laṅkan Buddhist communities in Anne M. Blackburn, *Buddhist Learning and Textual Practice in Eighteenth-Century Lankan Monastic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). Karen Derris and Justin McDaniel (in yet unpublished work) likewise relate similar themes to their analyses of medieval Theravāda Buddhist communities in Southeast Asia.

[201] Van der Kuijp, *Contributions,* 57.

[202] John Dagenais, *The Ethics of Reading in Manuscript Culture: Glossing the 'Libro de buen amor'* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 24.[203] Stock, *Listening*, 27.

coming to replace it, as the commentarial meaning becomes the meaning of the text.[204] Even more than commentary, in which a Sanskritic term could be explained with recourse both to Indian commentaries and oral explanations, the Tibetan genre of "summary" (*bsdus don*) works to replace the text that it summarizes, as authors no longer follow the order and wording of a text but instead present their understanding of its condensed (*bsdus pa*) meaning (*don*). Ngok's extensive use of this genre maps onto the curriculum he established at Sangpu.[205]

The success of Ngok's and Patsab's monastic academies can be attributed in large part to their translation activities when we understand that the value of the translations lie not so much in their philological fidelity but as conduits of the Sanskrit Buddhist tradition. Ngok's and Patsab's roles changed dramatically upon their respective returns to Central Tibet, from student and translator to teacher and leader of monastic communities. Their translations stood as the basis for teaching, structuring the subject matter while at the same time serving to authenticate it. The legitimacy the two gained through their lengthy sojourns in Kashmir added to their translations' power, contributing to their teaching popularity. Built as they were on divergent visions of Buddhist scripture, their institutes' successes would bring the two into conflict over a nexus of issues that centered on the validity of human valid cognition in the attainment of Buddhahood. These divergent visions

---

[204] Martin Irvine, *The Making of Textual Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 390. Rita Copeland, in her *Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), likewise speaks to the primacy of the commentary, as it can be oriented toward the "changing conditions of understanding" of a community of readers (p. 64), whereas the text itself must remain stable.

[205] Van der Kuijp ("Monastery of Gsang-phu ne'u-thog," 111) lists four topics: valid cognition, the Maitreya texts, cosmology (*abhidharma*), and monastic discipline (*vinaya*). We also know that the Madhyamaka interpretation following Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla was taught there. Among the few of Ngok's texts currently available, we have a commentary on the *Sublime Continuum* (*Uttaratantra* or *Ratnagotravibhāga,* cited above) that adopts a synoptic style, overlaying its own topical outline (*sa bcad*) in order to present the subject matter of the text, and a commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Compendium of Valid Cognition* (*Pramāṇaviniścaya;* rNgog blo ldan shes rab, *Tshad ma rnam nges kyi dka' gnas rnam bshad* [Beijing: krung go'i bod kyi shes rig dpe skrun khang, 1994), that follows the root text more closely.

were known in eleventh century India but only when they became the textual bases of competing Tibetan monastic institutes did they become codified into separate Buddhist schools.

Texts in Conflict and the Scholastic Solution

As Sangpu and Gyel Lhakang, homes to directly competing visions of Buddhist exoteric teachings, were built roughly two days walk from one another, conflict between the two was certain to arise. We can surmise that Ngok was familiar with Candrakīrti's writings, given his connections in Kashmir with the same teachers with whom Patsab studied; we can also assume on the same grounds that he knew Patsab. However, the current lack of Ngok's writings coupled with our uncertainty as to when Patsab's fame grew prevent us from knowing whether this debate began in the period between Patsab's return to Central Tibet just after 1100 and prior to Ngok's death in 1109. Nor do we yet see Candrakīrti's ideas figuring prominently in the writings of Ngok's immediate disciples.[206] At present, we can only be certain that Candrakīrti's ideas gained sufficient prominence to provoke a lengthy critique by the sixth Sangpu abbot, Chapa Chokyi Sengé (1109-1169).[207] Despite the fairly close proximity of Sangpu and Gyel Lhakang, it may have been Jayānanda's travels in Central Tibet that engendered the clash between their readings of Buddhist literature.

Jayānanda worked closely with Khu Dodebar on translating several of Nāgārjuna's writings, including a revision of Nāgārjuna's *Refutation of Objections,*[208] and translating his

---

[206] I have yet to find any reference to the debates that Candrakīrti's ideas engendered in Gro lung pa bLo gros 'byung gnas's *bsTan rim chen mo;* however, my search of this massive treatise is not yet complete. We do see criticism of Maitrīpāda's *yid la mi byed pa* ("non-attention," literally, "taking nothing to mind") teaching, which may well be related. Gro lung pa was one of Ngok Loden Sherab's main students and Chapa's teacher of the Perfection of Wisdom literature. Van der Kuijp cites an account that Gro lung pa was still teaching at Sangpu when Chapa was the abbot, making it likely that he too took part in the arguments against Prāsaṅgika.

[207] *Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge;* much more on Chapa follows below and in subsequent chapters.

[208] *Vigrahavyāvartanī.*

own *Hammer of Logic,* a text that begins with a direct criticism of "logicians following Dharmakīrti."[209] That he promoted Candrakīrti's interpretation of Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka is certain from his lengthy commentary to Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle,* which was, however, composed after his stay in Central Tibet. He also worked at least once with Patsab Nyimadrak, in addition to Khu Dodebar, on the translation of Atiśa's *Compendium of Sūtras,* at the request of Patsab's supporter, Sharwapa.[210] We see reports that Jayānanda met Chapa Chokyi Sengé at Sangpu in order to debate the merits of Candrakīrti's interpretation of Madhyamaka; Chapa is said to have prevailed.[211] Following his stay in Central Tibet, Jayānanda traveled to the Tangut kingdom, Xi-xia, where he took part in the massive translation project from Chinese, Tibetan, and Sanskrit sources into the Tangut language.[212] He also wrote his commentary to Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle* in Tangut lands.

---

[209] *Tarkamudgara, rtog ge tho ba,* stanza 1; *sde dge* edition 3869, vol. *ya,* 374b.3-4: *yul dngos stobs kyis zhugs pa yi // tshad mas de nyid rtogs so zhes // chos kyi grags pa'i rjes 'brang ba'i // rtog ge ba rnams smra bar byed* / "Logicians following Dharmakīrti propound that reality is realized through objectively gained valid cognition." As discussed in Chapter Three, Jayānanda criticizes this view at length.

[210] *Mahāsūtrasamuccaya, sde dge* edition 3961; the colophon lists Jayānanda, Patsab, and Khu mDo sde 'bar as translators, working in dPal ldan Ya gad at Zhogs.

[211] As reported in Śākya mchog ldan (1428-1507), *dBu ma rnam par nges pa'i mdzod lung dang rigs pa'i rgya mtsho, Collected Works,* vol. 14 (Thimphu, Bhutan: Kunzang Tobgey, 1975), 518. Śākya mchog ldan's account of this debate is drawn directly from Chapa's *Compilation of the Three Mādhyamikas from the East* (*dBu ma shar gsum stong mthun*), in a section where Chapa states a number of (hypothetical) opponent's objections and his own responses. It is possible, but unlikely, that Chapa's text recounts the verbatim contents of an actual debate.

[212] On Jayānanda's role, see Leonard W.J. Van der Kuijp, "Jayānanda. A Twelfth Century *Guoshi* from Kashmir Among the Tangut," *Central Asiatic Journal* 3-4 (1993): 188-197. On the Tangut translation project generally, see E.I. Kychanov, "From the History of the Tangut Translation of the Buddhist Canon," in *Tibetan and Buddhist Studies Commemorating the 200th Anniversary of the Birth of Alexander Csoma de Koros,* ed. Louis Ligetti (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1984), 377-387. And on Tibetan culture among the Tanguts, see E.I. Kychanov, "Tibetans and Tibetan Culture in the Tangut State Hsi Hsia (982-1227)," in *Proceedings of the Csoma de Koros Memorial Symposium, 1976,* ed. Louis Ligeti (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1978), 205-211.

While the particulars of Jayānanda's travels, translations, and writings are not found, I propose this tentative chronology. Jayānanda worked with Khu Dodebar prior to leaving Central Tibet for Xi-xia. The ability to date Khu Dodebar would aid us in placing a likely year on Jayānanda's arrival in Central Tibet. We know that Khu was also a student of Patsab Nyimadrak, and that Khu and Jayānanda worked with Patsab. Jayānanda also worked with another of Patsab Nyimadrak's students, Patsab Gomnag, who went to Xi-xia with Jayānanda and the Tibetan Kungadrak.[213] Jayānanda was thus active in Central Tibet with Patsab Nyimadrak's junior contemporaries, suggesting that Patsab's reputation had already been made; this was likely between 1120 and 1140. Stressing further Jayānanda's relations with Patsab's students and not Patsab himself, we should note that Jayānanda's commentary on Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle* contains many citations of this text and one lengthy citation of Candrakīrti's *Clear Words* that differ markedly from Patsab's translations of these texts.[214] Jayānanda certainly did not use Patsab's translations of Candrakīrti when translating his own composition into Tibetan in Tangut lands.

During the reign of Tangut emperor Renzong (or Renxiao; r. 1139-1193) Jayānanda worked in Xi-xia, holding the position of National Preceptor (*guoshi*), with Kungadrak, who served as Dharma Preceptor (*fashi*).[215] Jayānanda wrote his commentary on Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle* in this time and worked on its translation with Kungadrak. While Indian Buddhists were known in Tangut lands from at least 980 and ethnic Tibetans from the neighboring Kokonor region were a constant presence among the Tanguts, Tangut

---

[213] On Pa tshab sGom nag, see *Blue Annals,* 923-928. Given the connection between Jayānanda, Kun dga' grags, and Pa tshab sgom nag and the certainty that the former two worked together on translations in Tangut lands, one wonders whether Pa tshab sgom nag could be the collaborator of Jayānanda and Kun dga' grags known only as Poloxiansheng, who held the office of Imperial Preceptor (*dishi;* see Van der Kuijp, "Jayānanda," 189-190).

[214] Jayānanda's citation of *Clear Words* is in his *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā, sde dge* edition 3870, *dbu ma,* vol. *ra,* 108b.6ff.

[215] Van der Kuijp, "Jayānanda," 188-189.

relations with Song China were much more vital, if antagonistic, than relations with its western neighbors until the Jurchen conquest of North China in 1126.[216] Renzong initiated the office of Imperial Preceptor and staffed it with Tibetan monks after 1149.[217] This date is a likely terminus for Jayānanda's sojourn in Central Tibet.

Jayānanda was active in Central Tibet, then, during Chapa Chokyi Sengé's maturity, thus lending credibility to the report that the two met at Sangpu. Jayānanda's commentary on Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle* had yet to be written during this period; only his *Hammer of Logic* would have been known to Chapa and his contemporaries. Chapa's lengthy critique of Candrakīrti's views in his *Compilation of the Three Mādhyamikas from the East,* Chapa's only text currently available,[218] was clearly written in knowledge of a contemporary portrayal of Prāsaṅgika and not only in response to Candrakīrti's texts; it was written in knowledge of Jayānanda's "smashing" the conventions of valid cognition with his *Hammer of Logic* and Jayānanda's presentation, yet unwritten, of Candrakīrti's views.[219] Jayānanda's commentary, in turn, was written in knowledge of and at least partially in response to Chapa's critique. We do, in fact, see Jayānanda retort to Chapa's criticisms of Candrakīrti's understanding of Buddhahood.[220] The cross-pollination between Candrakīrti's critique of valid cognition's applicability to the ultimate, as portrayed by several important

---

[216] Dunnell, *The Great State,* 27-50. Dunnell records four requests by the Tangut court to Song China for a copy of the Song Buddhist canon between 1031 and 1058. Kychanov ("History of the Tangut Translation," 381-382) shows the presence of Tangut translations from Tibetan at least from 1085. The Tibetan originals, however, could well have come from the Kokonor region and cannot be used as evidence for Tangut relations with Central Tibet in the late-eleventh century.

[217] Dunnell, *The Great State,* xxiv.

[218] Helmut Tauscher, ed., *Phya pa chos kyi seng ge: dbu ma śar gsum gyi stoṅ thun* (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, 1999).

[219] I show in Chapter Three that Chapa's portrayal of Candrakīrti presupposes knowledge of Jayānanda's ideas. It is well possible that Chapa had in mind the portrayal of Candrakīrti by his former students who abandoned his views in favor of Prāsaṅgika, particularly the writings of rMa bya byang chub brtson 'grus.

[220] *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā, sde dge* edition 3870, *dbu ma,* vol. *ra,* 146b.5ff, commenting on stanza VI.28. This is discussed at length in Chapter Four.

Indian scholars of this period, and the Sangpu tradition that actively propagated Dharmakīrti's epistemology took shape from this contact, either personally or literarily, between Jayānanda and Chapa.

Chapa's critique of Prāsaṅgika clearly identifies the philosophical issues at stake in the Prāsaṅgika movement. As discussed in detail in subsequent chapters, the debate focused on: whether or not human consciousness, prior to the direct realization of emptiness, could be valid cognition; whether or not formal inference could be utilized in knowing emptiness; and whether or not a Buddha has cognitive events of any kind—indeed, whether or not the state of Buddhahood bears any recognizable relationship to our mundane state. Chapa's affirmative stance on these issues, and the close relationship he saw between the conventions of valid cognition and knowledge of emptiness, set a course that most Tibetan scholarship would follow. However, during his lifetime, some of Chapa's best students left him in order to study Prāsaṅgika with Jayānanda and Patsab.[221] This loss signals a shift in Central Tibet away from the Sangpu position—which in this period bears the label "Svātantrika"[222]—toward Prāsaṅgika. Just as the contact between Jayānanda and Chapa began the active debate between these conflicting positions, Chapa's "loss" engendered a new type of Prāsaṅgika, one which had to account for Chapa's many and pertinent criticisms. Accommodating the conventions of valid cognition within a Prāsaṅgika view—which to Chapa and Jayānanda would seem ludicrous—would become a hallmark of Tibetan Prāsaṅgika exegesis, the implications of which are still elaborated upon in present-day Tibetan monasteries.

---

[221] Van der Kuijp (*Contributions,* 69) notes a "massive shift in allegiance away from Phya-pa."

[222] In the writings of Jayānanda, Mabja Jangchub Tsondru, and Chapa's student, Sonam Tsemo (who is discussed below).

Three of Chapa's students departed from their teacher in order to study Prāsaṅgika: Tsang Nakpa Tsondru Senge[223] studied with Patsab Nyimadrak; Mabja Jangchub Tsondru[224] studied with Jayānanda, Khu Dodebar, and Patsab; and Tsur Zhonu Senge[225] studied Prāsaṅgika with Tsang Nakpa and Mabja. Mabja's study with Jayānanda and Khu Dodebar suggests that his interest in Prāsaṅgika sprang from Jayānanda's physical or literary presence at Sangpu. In fact, Mabja wrote a commentary, not presently available, on Jayānanda's *Hammer of Logic,*[226] a text translated into Tibetan (and perhaps even composed) during Jayānanda's stay in Central Tibet and so known at Sangpu. Mabja also taught *Hammer of Logic* to Tsur Zhonu Senge.[227] Mabja's commentary on *Hammer of Logic* seems to have been the locus for his extensive discussion of a Mādhyamika's use of the conventions of valid cognition, on which he maintained a decidedly Prāsaṅgika stance.[228] It could well be that *Hammer of Logic* swayed Mabja away from Chapa's positions and led to him adopting the Prāsaṅgika view, which he then studied in full with Jayānanda and, following Jayānanda's departure to Tangut lands, with Patsab. This would explain how Mabja is credited with

---

[223] *gTsang nag pa brTson 'grus seng ge,* d. 1171. See David Jackson, "Madhyamaka Studies Among the Early Sa-skya-pas," *Tibet Journal* X, 2 (1985): 24.

[224] *rMa bya Byang chub brtson 'grus,* d. 1185. See Jackson, "Madhyamaka Studies," 24 and Leonard W.J. van der Kuijp, "Notes on the Transmission of Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvali* in Tibet," *Tibet Journal* X, 2 (1985): 8.

[225] *mTshur gZhon nu seng ge.* See Jackson, "Madhyamaka Studies," 24 and van der Kuijp, "Notes on the Transmission," 8. One of Tsur's valid cognition texts has recently become available: Pascale Hugon, *mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge, Tshad ma shes rab sgron ma* (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 2004).

[226] *Blue Annals,* 343.

[227] Jackson, "Madhyamaka Studies," 24.

[228] Williams notes that Mabja refers readers of his *'Thad pa'i rgyan* to an *dBu ma'i de kho na nyid gtan la dbab pa* for his own more thorough discussion of these issues. Williams suspects that this was the subtitle to Mabja's *Hammer of Logic* commentary; Williams takes as the main title that used by the Eighth Karmapa, Mi bskyod rdo rje, to refer to Mabja's commentary, *Rigs rgyan snang ba.* See Paul Williams, "rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus on Madhyamaka Method," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 13 (1985): 207 and 220, nn. 7 and 8. The (sub)title bears a close similarity to the alternative title Chapa gave to his *Compilation of the Three Mādhyamikas from the East,* namely, *dbu ma de kho na nyid kyi snying po.* Given this similarity, Mabja could instead be referring to his independent work, *dBu ma stong mthun* (*Compilation of Madhyamaka*).

linking the two Tibetan transmissions of Candrakīrti's writings—that stemming from Patsab and that stemming from Jayānanda.[229]

Chapa's students would have been well-versed in the Buddhist epistemological tradition that Jayānanda's interpretation of Prāsaṅgika so heatedly criticized. Tsang Nakpa's commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Compendium of Valid Cognition* survives into the present.[230] These students' revolt against Chapa cannot be seen entirely as a rejection of Chapa's epistemological project. Rather, their adoption of Prāsaṅgika began the process of conjoining Candrakīrti's writings with epistemological pursuits, a process that Jayānanda certainly, and Candrakīrti likely, would have found distasteful. While Jayānanda pried Mabja away from Chapa, Mabja did not fully leave Sangpu's epistemological tradition but rather utilized his early training to provide Prāsaṅgika defenses against Chapa's epistemological critique. As will be discussed at length in Chapter Three, Mabja's only presently-known text, a commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle* called the *Ornament of Disputation,*[231] evinces several developments in a Prāsaṅgika position that are not known to have been held by Patsab and were not held by Jayānanda.

Specifically, referring to the debate on whether a Mādhyamika may employ formal inference, Mabja allowed that a Mādhyamika may hold a positive thesis (a thesis maintaining the establishment of something) conventionally.[232] Mabja states this immediately after citing two positions that later authors attribute to Patsab and Khu Dodebar, respectively, the

---

[229] This link is reported in van der Kuijp, "Notes on the Transmission," 8. Van der Kuijp further reports that Tibetan historians disagree as to whether Mabja Jangchub Tsondru studied with Patsab directly or with one of Patsab's students, Mabja Jangchub Yeshe (*rMa bya Byang chub ye shes*). Mabja Jangchub Tsondru's study with Jayānanda make it more likely that he would have studied with Patsab's student, rather than Patsab.

[230] gTsang nag pa, *Tshad ma rnam par nges pa'i ṭika Legs bshad bsdus pa,* Otani University TibetanWorks Series, 2 (Kyōto: Otani University, 1989).

[231] rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus, *dBu ma rtsa ba shes rab kyi 'grel pa 'Thad pa'i rgyan* (Rumtek, Sikkim: Dharma Chakra Center, 1975).

[232] Ruegg, *Three Studies,* 164; Williams, "rMa bya pa," 205-208; and rMa bya, *'Thad pa'i rgyan,* 41-42.

former holding that a Mādhyamika may only hold a negative thesis (a thesis maintaining the refutation of something) and the latter holding that a Mādhyamika can hold no thesis at all.[233] Following Jayānanda's and possibly Patsab's idea, Mabja maintains that "objectively gained valid cognition" does not exist, an idea anathema to Chapa.[234] Mabja also writes that a Mādhyamika's use of logical consequences does not imply the statement of a formal inference;[235] this directly answers Chapa's claim that any effective logical consequence operates on the same grounds as, and comes to be identical with, formal inference (see the Materials section). Mabja's views evince a split from Chapa's standpoints and also a development from his Prāsaṅgika teachers that incorporates certain epistemological perspectives and argues against others.

Not all of Chapa's students abandoned his anti-Prāsaṅgika polemic. The second Sakya hierarch, Sonam Tsemo (1142-1182), studied with Chapa and wrote a commentary on Śāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Practices* that, according to its colophon, was

---

[233] Ruegg, *Three Studies,* 159-162. There, Ruegg points out that we do not know whether Patsab's view is here stated from an ultimate or conventional vantage point. Additionally, Mabja criticizes a third position, similar to that purportedly held by Khu Dodebar, that a Mādhyamika negates only with respect to the opponent's position and so does not have a negative thesis. This is regarded as Mabja Jangchub Yeshe's position. See Ruegg, *Three Studies,* 166-167. While Mabja Jangchub Tsondru reports these positions, he does not identify who held them; rather, this information is supplied by much later authors. As noted in the Introduction to this dissertation, the recent publications of eleventh and twelfth century Tibetan philosophical literature allows us to begin evaluating the accounts later Tibetan authors gave of these earlier scholars and, as noted there, the results are mixed: we see portrayals of, for instance, Chapa's views that seem to be entirely off base.

[234] In *'Thad pa'i rgyan* (p.41ff) Mabja argues against "objectively gained [valid cognition]" (*dngos po'i stobs kyis zhugs*) or "valid cognition with an unmistaken mode of apprehension" (*'dzin stangs mi 'khrul pa'i tshad ma*) in favor of "valid cognition renowned in the world" (*'jig rten la grags pa'i tshad ma*), noting that the latter category includes the four types of valid cognition that were accepted in non-Buddhist schools, the same four types that Candrakīrti also accepted in the "worldly renown" context: direct perception, inference, analogy, and testimony. Much more on this topic is found in Chapter Three.

[235] Ruegg (*Three Studies,* 167-168) notes Mabja's argument against *sgrub byed 'phen pa'i thal 'gyur* ("consequences that imply proof") in his *'Thad pa'i rgyan* (Thimpu edition, 21a; Rumtek edition, 44). I discuss Mabja's arguments in detail in Chapter Three.

written according to Chapa's teachings.[236] Sonam Tsemo's commentary to Śāntideva's famed text contains the earliest known use of "Prāsaṅgika" and "Svātantrika" for the names of two distinct movements. Sonam Tsemo first uses these terms to distinguish two arguments concerning a Buddha's ability to perceive the things that appear to our ordinary consciousnesses (*snang bcas kyi blo*): Prāsaṅgikas hold that Buddhas do not have this ability because perceiving ordinary appearances entails one's entrapment in saṃsāra; Svātantrikas maintain that Buddhas have "conventional wisdom" (*ye shes kun rdzob*) that allows them to perceive ordinary appearances without these perceptions acting as a cause for saṃsāra.[237] Following his report of the Prāsaṅgika view, Sonam Tsemo states "That is not correct," notes that his way of arguing for cutting saṃsāra is similar to the Prāsaṅgika arguments but that his answer differs, then proceeds to state the Svātantrika position.[238] On this issue, Sonam Tsemo clearly maintains a Svātantrika position, in keeping with Chapa's views.

Sonam Tsemo further employs the terms "Svātantrika" and "Prāsaṅgika" in listing arguments concerning the possibility of worldly valid cognition. Svātantrikas maintain its necessity, noting that if there were no worldly valid cognition meditation on emptiness would be pointless. Two varying Prāsaṅgika viewpoints refute worldly valid cognition, one maintaining that all minds are erroneous (*mṛṣā, rdzun pa*) and thereby not valid (the extension of this view is that Buddhas do not have minds) and the other holding that "mere yogic conventional [minds]" (*rnal 'byor gyi kun rdzob tsam*), while still erroneous, can be utilized to refute an opponent's wrong conceptions.[239] Sonam Tsemo does not comment here on the validity of one side or the other. However, both passages in which he uses "Svātantrika" and "Prāsaṅgika" offer more information on the issues that separated these

---

[236] bSod nams rtse mo, *Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa,* in *Sa skya pa'i bka' 'bum,* vol. 2 (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1968), 515.2.5-6 (vol. *ca,* 335a.5-6).

[237] bSod nams rtse mo, *sPyod pa la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa,* 495.4.1-496.1.3 (vol. *ca,* 296a.1-296b.3).

[238] bSod nams rtse mo, *sPyod pa la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa,* 495.4.5-6 (vol. *ca,* 296a.5-6).

[239] bSod nams rtse mo, *sPyod pa la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa,* 511.2.2-511.4.2 (vol. *ca,* 327a.2-328a.2).

developing schools of exegesis in the latter part of the twelfth century. Prāsaṅgikas hold a stark divide between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, disallowing that a Buddha has any mental state concordant with saṃsāra and negating any possibility that worldly consciousness can validly know the ultimate. Svātantrikas soften this divide, offering solutions for how a Buddha still perceives what we perceive and how our states of mind can non-mistakenly eliminate false understanding and develop insight into the ultimate.

The third Sakya hierarch and Sonam Tsemo's younger brother, Drakpa Gyeltsen (1147-1216), offers further insight into the manifold interpretations of Madhyamaka in his day and into the issues dividing the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika interpretations. His *Clearly Realizing Tantra: A Precious Tree* includes a doxographical section that, when dividing types of Madhyamaka, does not use the terms "Prāsaṅgika" and "Svātantrika" but instead employs a five-fold division of Madhyamaka according to assertions on conventional truth, perhaps linking followers of Candrakīrti's thought with "Mādhyamikas of Worldly Renown" (*'jig rten grags sde pa*).[240] Later, when discussing whether Buddhas have conventional states of mind or only ultimate states, Drakpa Gyeltsen recounts four views, calling the last two "Prāsaṅgika" and "Svātantrika."[241] This presentation allows us to see that the issues that the new Prāsaṅgika interpretation engendered did not concern issues of conventional truth but centered around the relationship between a Buddha's rarefied consciousness (although some

---

[240] Grags pa rgyal mtshan's *rGyud kyi mngon par rtogs pa rin po che'i ljong shing* (in *Sa skya pa'i bka' 'bum,* vol. 3 [Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1968], 15.3.2 [vol. *cha,* 30a.2]) makes this five-fold division into: *'jig rten grags sde pa, bye brag smra ba dang tshul mtshungs pa* ("Mādhyamikas similar to Vaibhāṣikas"), *sgyu ma pa* ("Illusion-[like] Mādhyamikas"), *mdo sde spyod pa* ("Sautrāntika Mādhyamikas"), and *rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma pa* ("Yogic Practice Mādhyamikas"). The connection between Mādhyamikas of Worldly Renown and Prāsaṅgika is not made overtly by Drakpa Gyeltsen but by his later commentators.

[241] When listing the four views in *Rin po che'i ljon shing,* 21.3.6-21.4.1, Drakpa calls the third and fourth *rgyun chad rab tu mi gnas pa* ("[Mental] Continuum Cutting Thoroughly Non-Abiding [Mādhyamikas]") and *zung 'jug rab tu mi gnas pa* ("Uniting [Method and Wisdom] Thoroughly Non-Abiding [Mādhyamikas]"), respectively. However, when discussing these, the third is called *dbu ma thal 'gyur ba* ("Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka," 21.4.5) and the fourth is called *dbu ma rang rgyud pa* ("Svātantrika Madhyamaka," 22.1.1).

in this debate would not accept the label "consciousness") and the objects perceived by our ordinary consciousness.

As will be seen in Chapters Four and Five, Drakpa Gyeltsen devotes no small effort to discussing the various views, current in his day, on the relationships between a Buddha's consciousness and ordinary states of mind and between our ordinary states of mind and emptiness. He discusses Yogācāra-Madhyamaka views on nirvāṇa, followed by two unattributed views, one of which appears to be a Prāsaṅgika answer to Chapa's criticisms (discussed in Chapter Five) that the Prāsaṅgika presentation of nirvāṇa amounts to nihilism.[242] After presenting the third view, that there is no fundamental difference between Yogācāra and Madhyamaka (a view reminiscent of Ratnākaraśānti's), Drakpa Gyeltsen concludes, "In any case, [these three] differ in their assertions on suchness but assert no differences regarding the mind of enlightenment and the practice of the perfections."[243] The Madhyamaka debates that Drakpa Gyeltsen reports, and around which the Prāsaṅgika-Svātantrika distinction was made, clearly center on various interpretations of how realization of emptiness is made, what transformations that realization entails, and how one so transformed relates to the ordinary world—and not issues of conventional establishment.

Drakpa Gyeltsen's text is extraordinarily valuable for the many interpretations it presents from this period and for the insights it offers into the progress of Candrakīrti's views. One might expect Drakpa Gyeltsen to express a strong Yogācāra-Madhyamaka view, following his older brother. This is in fact evidenced in certain passages. When discussing

---

[242] The three views seem to be varying ways of separating Madhyamaka from Yogācāra; the first two views—Yogācāra-Madhyamaka and, I believe, Prāsaṅgika—state how the Madhyamaka presentation of nirvāṇa differs from the Yogācāra position. The third view, claiming no essential difference between Yogācāra and Madhyamaka, does not discuss nirvāṇa directly. The Yogācāra-Madhyamaka view concludes on Grags pa, *Rin po che'i ljong shing,* 15.4.4 while the second view, introduced only by "certain Mādhyamikas" (*dbu ma pa kha cig*), is at 15.4.4-16.1.2.

[243] Grags pa, *Rin po che'i ljong shing,* 16.1.4: *gang ltar yang rung ste de kho na nyid la 'dod pa mi mthun gyi byang chub sems dang pha rol tu phyin pa'i spyod pa la khyad par mi 'dod pas.*

the views on what state of mind a Buddha has, referred to above, Drakpa favors the Svātantrika position on the grounds that it allows an explanation of non-abiding nirvāṇa.[244] However, when presenting the two truths, he frequently cites Candrakīrti's authority, quoting *Entrance to the Middle* five times and Candrakīrti's commentary to Nāgārjuna's *Sixty Stanzas of Reasoning* twice.[245] One of these citations is given to criticize contemporary Tibetan Madhyamaka viewpoints (*da lta bod kyi dbu ma pa*) while another is given to show Prāsaṅgikas' variance from Candrakīrti's own writings.[246] Drakpa is clearly interested in Candrakīrti's views and aware of Chapa's criticisms of them. His writings, like Mabja Jangchub Tsondru's, evince criticism of the first generation of Tibetans who presented Candrakīrti's teachings—identified as "contemporary Tibetans" or "Prāsaṅgikas"—and, perhaps, an attempt to form a Prāsaṅgika that would accommodate the epistemological concerns of Chapa and others.

One final point on Drakpa Gyeltsen's allegiances concerns how to practice the Buddhist path according to a Madhyamaka view. This concern extends from the relationships between ordinary consciousness and emptiness and between a Buddha's consciousness and our consciousness, as these relationships speak to how one realizes emptiness and becomes a Buddha—how one practices. Again, Drakpa Gyeltsen does not clearly express whether he holds a Prāsaṅgika or Svātantrika view. First, he refers those

---

[244] Grags pa, *Rin po che'i ljong shing,* 21.4.6 pronounces that the Prāsaṅgika position "is not correct." 22.1.1-4 presents the Svātantrika view that allows for non-abiding nirvāṇa and a presentation of a Buddha as both always in meditative equipoise and able to aid sentient beings.

[245] Grags pa, *Rin po che'i ljong shing,* 21.3.2-23.2.5-6.

[246] Grags pa, *Rin po che'i ljong shing,* 22.4.6: *de ltar du da lta bod kyi dbu ma pa phal cher yang 'dod do / / yang dag pa ma yin te* ("Most contemporary Tibetan Mādhyamikas assert this. It is not correct.") and 21.4.6-22.1.1: *slob dpon zla grags nyid kyis kyang / rigs pa drug cu pa'i 'grel pa las / bden pa gnyis su 'jog pa ni / 'jig rten pa'i blo la ltos te 'jog go zhes dam bcas pa 'gal bar 'gyur pa'i skyod yod do/* ("Also, [this view] has the fault of contradicting the master Candrakīrti's assertion, in his *Commentary on [Nāgārjuna's] Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning,* "Truths are posited as two from the perspective of worldly awareness"). I have not been able to locate this quote in Candrakīrti's commentary and assume it is Drakpa Gyeltsen's paraphrase.

wishing to practice Madhyamaka to train in accordance with Nāgārjuna's *Precious Garland,* Śāntideva's *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Practices,* and Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle.*[247] Later, addressing the issue of how one practices within the doctrine of "emptiness free from extremes," he enjoins "practice in the mode of union [of method and wisdom]."[248] As noted above, he previously equated "Union [of method and wisdom] Thoroughly Non-Abiding [Mādhyamikas]" with Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas. He may then be suggesting that a Svātantrika view accords better with the practical realization of the Madhyamaka view.[249]

The famed nephew of Sonam Tsemo and Drakpa Gyeltsen and the fourth Sakya hierarch, Sakya Paṇḍita Kunga Gyeltsen (1182-1251), may have ended this period of contested Madhyamaka exegesis when he adopted the Prāsaṅgika view.[250] Sapaṇ studied Candrakīrti's *Clear Words* and Jayānanda's *Hammer of Logic* with one of Chapa's lost students, Tsur Zhonu Senge, and Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle* with Drakpa Gyeltsen.[251] Sapaṇ's well-known association with Śākya Śrībhadra and his entourage, including Vibhūticandra who—following Prajñākaramati—linked Candrakīrti's and Śāntideva's views, likely was also a critical influence on his Madhyamaka views. Through his study with Śākya Śrībhadra, Sapaṇ broke the Sangpu monopoly over Dharmakīrti's logical writings, making Sakya a center for Buddhist epistemology. His development of a non-tantric curriculum at Sakya marks a new turn in Tibetan attempts, begun by Mabja, to work out Buddhist epistemological issues within a Prāsaṅgika view. The broad acceptance of his

---

[247] Grags pa, *Rin po che'i ljong shing,* 16.1.5.

[248] Grags pa, *Rin po che'i ljong shing,* 26.3.4: *zung 'jug gi tshul gyis nyams su blang ba.*

[249] However, the sources Drakpa cites in explaining this mode of practice are Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra,* the *Hevajra Tantra,* and the *Saṃpuṭa Tantra.*

[250] Jackson, "Madhyamaka Studies," 27 discusses Sapaṇ's methodology for distinguishing Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika and his reasons for holding the latter to be superior. It should be noted that Jackson's equating Sapaṇ's study of Candrakīrti's *Clear Words* with the birth of Sakya Prāsaṅgika study (p. 24) needs to be revised in light of the above discussion of Drakpa Gyeltsen's interest in Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle.*

[251] Jackson, "Madhyamaka Studies," 24 and van der Kuijp, "Notes on the Transmission," 8-9.

epistemological views, consistent with—rather than antagonistic to—Candrakīrti's writings, may mark Prāsaṅgika's final triumph in Central Tibet in the early thirteenth century.

Conclusion: Tibetan Schools of Madhyamaka

The Tibetan evidence of Candrakīrti's impact in the twelfth century shows that the Indian controversies that his writings evoked from around the beginning of the eleventh century were magnified and crystalized in Tibet, leading to two competing movements of Madhyamaka exegesis. The Prāsaṅgika movement, whether faithful to Candrakīrti or not (recall Drakpa Gyeltsen criticizing Prāsaṅgikas for being at odds with Candrakīrti), championed his writings for their denial of the validity of human intellect in realizing Buddhahood and their concomitant radical separation between ordinary consciousnesses and their referents, on one hand, and a Buddha's refined (non-)mental state and its nonduality, on the other. The Svātantrika movement, formed in reaction to Prāsaṅgika (and so different from but overlapping with the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka position that prevailed in Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka from the eighth through eleventh centuries), maintained the necessity of formal inference to see through the illusions of sensory data and to gain a reasoned knowledge of emptiness. In this view, human intellect can validly know the ultimate and, once transformed, can still validly know the ordinary world. Whatever the value and accuracy of later doxographies, adherence to these two positions is the meaning of "Prāsaṅgika" and "Svātantrika," respectively, in the first coinings of these terms.

The Tibetan evidence also allows us to speak of Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika "schools" in twelfth century Central Tibet. While our information about Gyel Lhakang is limited, Patsab certainly established it as a Prāsaṅgika school, training all important proponents of Candrakīrti's writings in this period. Sangpu was undoubtedly a Svātantrika school, as Chapa—continuing the curriculum of Ngok but now responding particularly to Prāsaṅgikas—focused his interpretation of Yogācāra-Madhyamaka against the rising tide of

Candrakīrti's supporters. In Chapter One, I focused mainly on doctrinal and philosophical reasons for Prāsaṅgika's ascendency—elucidating the issues engendered by Candrakīrti's writings and drawing out the ways in which Prāsaṅgikas allied Candrakīrti's views with the dominance of "Highest Yoga Tantras." Here, I have tried to suggest as well the competition evoked when these two opposing views became situated in the fractious environment of twelfth century Central Tibet. Conceiving of Gyel Lhakang, Sangpu, and Sakya as textual communities offers insight into the relationships between texts, doctrines, and their institutional bases, allowing us to appreciate the communal nature of doctrinal texts and the institutional factors that contributed to the success and failure of these doctrines. Indeed, Chapa's students who abandoned his positions abandoned Sangpu. The divide engendered by Prāsaṅgika's popularity may well have been a factor in the split—within twenty years of Chapa's death—of Sangpu into two competing colleges that eventually were absorbed by the Sakya and Geluk orders.[252]

Additionally, the wider competition in which these institutions were placed through their affiliations with the "districts" (*sde* or *tsho*) into which Central Tibet became divided must be taken into account. In addition to the philosophical subtleties of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika arguments and the movement of important figures from one position to the other, the relative successes of these districts may well have impacted the success of the Sangpu and Gyel Lhakang monastic institutes and the positions that they inculcated. As we come to understand better the processes through which competing networks of monasteries took the shape of religious orders, we will be in a better position to evaluate the spread of particular doctrinal interpretations and their implementation in monastic curricula.

---

[252] One meets with the opinion that it was Sapaṇ's critiques of Sangpu's curriculum that led to Sangpu's eventual downfall. However, van der Kuijp ("Monastery of Gsang-phu ne'u-thog," 113) notes that this split occurred around 1185, which would have been well before Sapaṇ "reformed" Tibetan *pramāṇa* studies.

Additionally, we see that several important doctrinalists-cum-community leaders of this period widened their patronage concerns beyond these districts: the first Karmapa, Dusum Kyenpa,[253] and the founder of the Drikung Kagyu order, Jigten Gonpo,[254] established connections with the Tangut court, the most powerful Central Asian political entity of this time period. The connections we have already seen between Jayānanda (along with at least two of his Tibetan collaborators) and Tangut royalty make it plausible that his Prāsaṅgika view took greater weight due to this association. Jayānanda's influence on Central Tibet's intellectual life may have extended well beyond his physical presence. Further, Sakya Paṇḍita's ties with the Mongol kingdom, which overran the Tangut kingdom in 1227,[255] are well known and put him in a position to influence the direction of Tibetan monastic education. His adoption of Prāsaṅgika, then, may have had repercussions much wider than directing Sakya's position.[256]

Finally, as I have tried to indicate in the final section, the "triumph" of Prāsaṅgika that led to its status as the highest Buddhist exoteric school did not vanquish the perspectives of its Svātantrika opponents. As any perusal of the later philosophical/scholastic literature

---

[253] *Kar ma pa I, Dus gsum mkhyen pa* (1110-1193), who had also studied Madhyamaka with Chapa (van der Kuijp, *Contributions,* 60). Elliot Sperling ("Lama to the King of Hsia," *The Journal of the Tibet Society* 7 [1987], 32-33) points out that Dusum Kyenpa sent his student, Konchog Sengé (*gTsang po pa dKon mchog seng ge*), to the Tangut court, in whose service the latter died in 1218/1219. Upon his death, the "imperial preceptor" (*ti shih*) post was filled by Tishri Repa (*Ti shri Sangs rgyas ras chen,* 1164/1165-1236), who seems to have held the post up until the collapse of the Tangut state in 1227 (Sperling, p. 34, notes that he returned to Tibet at age sixty-three).

[254] *'Jig rten mgon po;* Sperling, "Lama to the King," 32.

[255] Sperling strongly suggests that the pattern of religious advisor established by Tibetans and Tanguts provided the model for Tibetan and Mongol relations; see Elliot Sperling, "Rtsa-mi lo-tsā-ba Sangs-rgyas grags-pa and the Tangut Background to Early Mongol-Tibetan Relations," in *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 6th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Fagernes, 1992*, ed. Per Kvaerne (Oslo: Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, 1994), 801-824.

[256] We can recall (see footnote 190) that Gyel Lhakang was destroyed by a Mongol force in 1240. At least partly in response, Sakya Paṇḍita met the Mongol prince Köden in 1247 in order to negotiate Tibetan recognition of Mongolian overlordship. The relationship between Gyel Lhakang and Sakya requires further investigation.

will reveal, the issues of how human consciousness in general and formal inference in particular relate to knowledge of the ultimate and how a Buddha relates to the conventional world (particularly, whether or not a Buddha has "consciousness having appearances") continued to be re-evaluated into the contemporary period. As Mabja Jangchub Tsondru began to develop Prāsaṅgika answers to Chapa's criticisms, Prāsaṅgika came in time to stand for (in some interpretations) several positions that Chapa argued for, against the twelfth century proponents of Candrakīrti.[257] The recasting of the Prāsaṅgika-Svātantrika distinction by the likes of Tsongkhapa obscure the nature of the twelfth century debates that generated these two schools of thought and in fact testify to the continuing importance of the views once disparaged as Svātantrika.

[257] See for instance Tagtsang's (*sTag tshang lo tsa ba Shes rab rin chen,* b.1405) lengthy criticism of Tsongkhapa's Prāsaṅgika, charging that his position is, in fact, Svātantrika, in Jeffrey Hopkins, *Maps of the Profound* (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion, 2003), 527-575.

Chapter Three: Taxonomies of Ignorance in Madhyamaka Debates on Validity

In the Śālistamba Sūtra,[258] among others, the Buddha is depicted as teaching the twelve links of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), proclaiming the twelve steps by which sentient beings are enmeshed in cyclic existence. The first link, the root of cyclic existence, is ignorance (*avidyā, ma rig pa*), or delusion (*moha, gti mug*), from which the two other fundamental causes of suffering, desire and hatred, arise. In his *Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness,* Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Madhyamaka[259] school, encapsulated the central role of ignorance:

> The conception that things produced from causes and conditions are real
> The Teacher called "ignorance"; from it the twelve links arise.[260]

Throughout his corpus, Nāgārjuna writes of the human mind's propensity to conceptualize and dichotomize, portraying the intellect as fundamentally flawed and

---

[258] Most succinctly expressed in versified form, stanza 30 and following; English translation and Tibetan edition found in Jeffrey D. Schoening, *The Śālistamba Sūtra and its Indian Commentaries* (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1995), vol. 1, 351 and vol. 2, 542. See also his Appendix 1 for Sanskrit citations.

[259] Throughout, I use the Sanskrit term *madhyamaka* to refer to this school of Buddhism and *mādhyamika* to refer to proponents of the school. While "Middle Way" offers an accurate English translation, one is often forced into appending "Middle Way philosophy", "Middle Way thought", and so on to use such a translation equivalent. Madhyamaka is clearly much more than a philosophy or system of thought, as Mādhyamika authors devote a great deal of attention to the structure of the Buddhist path, practices of the Buddhist perfections, and types of meditation—some of which are shared with other Buddhist schools, some of which are not.

[260] *Śūnyatāsaptatikārikā, stong pa nyid bdun cu pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa,* stanza 64; *sde dge* edition of the *bstan 'gyur,* Toh. 3827, *dbu ma,* vol. *tsa,* 26b.3; Tibetan text edited by Christian Lindtner, *Master of Wisdom* (Berkeley, CA: Dharma Publishing, 1986), 114: *rgyu rkyen las skyes dngos po rnams / / yang dag nyid du rtog pa gang / / de ni ston pas ma rig gsungs / / de las yan lag bcu gnyis 'byung /.* While Nāgārjuna's text here reads "ignorance" (*ma rig*), the equivalence of ignorance and delusion is supported by the *Kāśyapaparivarta* (Alexander von Staël-Holstein, *Kāçyapaparivarta: A Mahāyanasūtra of the Ratnakūṭa Class* [Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1926], 137): *mohasya pratītyasamutpādapratyavekṣaṇā cikitsā.*

addicted to superimposing an entirely false "self-nature" (*svabhāva*) onto objects. His *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle* states:

> Desire, hatred, and delusion are said to arise from conceptuality.
> They mutually arise from falsifying [notions] of purity and impurity.
>
> Those which mutually arise from falsifying [notions] of purity and impurity
> Do not have self-nature; thus defilements are not of reality.[261]

In this view, the conceptual mind imposes dualities based on a non-existent self-nature, leading to the host of additional problems that comprise cyclic existence. This focus on conceptual ignorance and its propensity to see a self-nature where none exists became a central component of Madhyamaka for many of Nāgārjuna's followers. In a worldview based on such fundamental ignorance, one might well wonder if human reasoning can play any role in helping us to overcome ignorance and understand reality.

On the other hand, a strong current of Buddhist thought has been concerned with the epistemological enterprise of grounding knowledge upon valid parameters, separating knowledge from quasi-knowledge and falsehood. Dignāga's (c.480-540) seminal writings gave shape to previous Buddhist theorizing and formed a model for all future Buddhist investigations in positing two types of valid cognition (*pramāṇa, tshad ma*), perception (*pratyakṣa, mngon sum*) and inference (*anumāna, rjes dpag*), that correspond to two types of knowable objects (*prameya, gzhal bya*), particulars (*svalakṣaṇa, rang mtshan*) and universals (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa, spyi mtshan*).[262] Dharmakīrti,[263] Dignāga's most significant commentator

---

[261] *Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ,* XXIII.1-2; J.W. de Jong, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ* (Adyar, Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1977), 31-2: *saṃkalpaprabhavo rāgo dveṣo mohaś ca kathyate / śubhāśubhaviparyāsān saṃbhavanti pratītya hi // śubhāśubhaviparyāsān saṃbhavanti pratītya ye / te svabhāvān na vidyante tasmāt kleśā na tattvataḥ //.* Candrakīrti (Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti,* Bibliotheca Buddhica, 4 [Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970], 451) explains *saṃkalpaprabhavo* as *saṃkalpāt prabhavati,* "arise out of/due to conceptuality."

[262] Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya,* stanza I.2 and autocommentary; Masaaki Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception,* Harvard Oriental Series, 47 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 176-177 (fragmentary Sanskrit

whose importance even eclipses Dignāga's for the later Indian and Tibetan tradition, defined valid cognition as "non-deceptive" (*avisaṃvādin, bslu med can*),[264] clearly stating that some cognitions are, in fact, accurate and not delusive.

While the elegance of Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's system gained it widespread appeal in Buddhist intellectual practices of both realist and idealist persuasions,[265] even the basic features outlined above were not without their philosophical and exegetical difficulties. As is well known, Dignāga did not define "valid cognition" such that perception and inference were two instances that shared a common characteristic; instead, he simply stated

---

follows p. 237); Hattori's English translation is on p. 24. Dignāga equates "means of valid cognition"—which is the common non-Buddhist understanding of *pramāṇa* in Indian philosophy—with "valid cognition" itself—what non-Buddhists understand as the **result** of the means of valid cognition. This equation is adopted by Indian and Tibetan interpreters. To reflect this equation, I adopt the translation "valid cognition" throughout.

[263] Dharmakīrti is typically dated c.600-660; however, Kimura detects some knowledge of Dharmakīrti's writings in Dharmapāla's work and dates the latter to c.550-620. Kimura suggests Dharmakīrti is the elder of the two. See T. Kimura, "A new chronology of Dharmakīrti," in *Dharmakīrti's thought and its impact on Indian and Tibetan philosophy,* ed. S. Katsura (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1999), 209-214.

[264] In his *Pramāṇavārttika*, stanza II.1ab, we read: *pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam arthakriyāsthitiḥ* / (Yūsho Miyasaka, "*Pramāṇavārttika-Kārikā* [Sanskrit and Tibetan]," *Acta Indologica* 2 [1971-1972], 2). At stanza II.5c, again characterizing valid cognition, he writes: *ajñātārthaprakāśo vā*/ (Miyasaka, "*Pramāṇavārttika,*" 2). Dreyfus (Georges B.J. Dreyfus, *Recognizing Reality* [Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997], 289) translates the first "Valid cognition is that cognition [which is] nondeceptive. [Nondeceptiveness consists] in the readiness [for the object] to perform a function." The second passage Dreyfus (*Recognizing Reality,* 290) translates "Or, [i.e., another explanation is that *pramāṇa*] is the revealing of a [yet] unknown thing." Considerable debate has focused on whether Dharmakīrti intended this second passage to define "valid cognition" and if so, whether it is to be taken in conjunction with the previous statement or as an alternative to it. Dharmakīrti gives a further definition of "valid cognition" in his *Pramāṇaviniścaya,* written later than his *Pramāṇavārttika,* stating that perception and inference are valid cognitions "because they are nondeceptive with respect to the purpose [of the action] in the application [toward an object] after having determined it" (Dreyfus, *Recognizing Reality,* 291).

[265] Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are said to write both from the realist perspective of the Buddhist "Followers of Sūtra" (*sautrāntika, mdo sde ba*) and from the idealist perspective of the Buddhist "Yogic Practitioner" school (*yogācāra, rnal 'byor spyod pa,* also called the "Mind-Only" school [*cittamātra, sems tsam*]). However, some Indian and Tibetan thinkers who blended Middle Way ontology with epistemological developments considered Dharmakīrti to be a proponent of the Middle Way. See Ernst Steinkellner, "Is Dharmakīrti a Mādhyamika?" in *Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka,* ed. David Seyfort Ruegg and Lambert Schmithausen (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990), 72-90.

that perception and inference **are** the two types of valid cognition and proceeded to define those two types individually. Dignāga defined perception as "free from conceptuality," a characteristic that inference does not share; his initial discussion of inference lists it along with "mistaken cognition" and "cognition of the conventional" as types of pseudo-perceptions.[266] Inference, like "cognitions of the conventional," operates in the sphere of conceptuality, on fabricated images of the particulars that constitute the sphere of perception and that alone are ultimately real for Dignāga. Inference "conceptualizes what was previously experienced."[267] "Mistaken cognition" likewise conceptualizes (*kalpanā, rtog pa*) a false status upon objects of perception: shimmering, hot sand is conceptualized as water. While Dignāga clearly speaks of inference as a valid cognition, the qualities that it shares with mistake and conceptuality cause one to wonder just what about it he saw as valid.

As noted above, Dharmakīrti does provide an overarching definition of valid cognition: non-deceptiveness.[268] Furthermore, the mark of a non-deceptive cognition lies in

---

[266] *Pramāṇasamuccaya,* stanzas I.3c and I.7cd; Hattori, *Dignāga,* 28, 176-177, and 180-181. Stanza I.8ab continues the list of what is not perception, including memory, desire, and perceptions made with faulty sense faculties. While Dreyfus (*Recognizing Reality,* 531, n.16) is likely correct in stating that Dharmakīrti did not intend "cognitions of the conventional" to include inference, his correct identification of this passage in Dignāga as Dharmakīrti's source for "cognitions of the conventional" must be clarified. Dignāga here very clearly does not wish to include inference within cognitions of the conventional, as he lists inference immediately after cognitions of the conventional in his list of pseudo-perceptions. However, this very listing casts aspersions on the status of inference in Dignāga's system; it does not serve as a source to show that inference, not being included among cognitions of the conventional, must therefore be unproblematically valid.

[267] *anumānatatphalādijñānaṃ pūrvānubhūtakalpanayeti na pratyakṣam.* See the autocommentary on *Pramāṇasamuccaya,* I.7cd-8ab; Hattori, *Dignāga,* 28, 180-181, and corresponding Sanskrit fragments.

[268] Eli Franco (*Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth* [Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1997], chapter two, which is a reprint of his "The Disjunction in *Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇasiddhi* Chapter 5c," in *Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition* [Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1991], 39-51) argues that in the opening verses of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter, Dharmakīrti does not intend to define valid cognition such that he may then prove that the Buddha meets the definition but rather intends only to prove that the Buddha is valid (p. 57) using notions of validity known and accepted by Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike (64-66). Franco's argument does not harm my contention that Dharmakīrti regarded some cognitions—perception and inference—to be valid and not delusive. Furthermore, Franco's project of recovering Dharmakīrti's intention amid the "skillful but

its connection with a "causally efficacious" (*arthakriyā*) object. Devendrabuddhi, Dharmakīrti's earliest commentator, makes explicit that Dharmakīrti's definition of valid cognition extends to both forms, perception and inference.[269] Valid perception differs from pseudo-perception in having an object that performs a function: fire perceived validly would perform the function of burning, while an illusory appearance of fire would not. Inference differs from other forms of conceptuality likewise: the inferred presence of fire from the observed presence of smoke has functional validity—one could thereby locate the fire and utilize it for warmth; however, a conception of fire—a mental image of fire that is derived from a direct perception of fire—is not hot and will not burn. Dharmakīrti's criterion of "causal efficacy" allows inference to share in perception's validity by way of its utility in "reaching a real entity" (*vastulābha, dngos po rnyed pa*).[270]

However, elsewhere Dharmakīrti clearly differentiates the "universal," inference's conceptual object, from the causally efficacious object.[271] Additionally, a great deal of debate ensued over the issue of whether Dharmakīrti intended for his second definition of valid

---

cunning commentators' tricks" (p. 54) is much the opposite of my present purpose, which is to show that the issue of what constitutes validity was hotly debated and developed by Dharmakīrti's commentators and that this debate was picked up by Mādhyamikas in the eleventh and twelfth century who argued over whether any human cognition could be considered valid. If, as Franco holds (p. 60), Dharmottara represents a new turn in the Indian Buddhist epistemological tradition toward deep consideration of the notion of validity, the concern to define validity arose among epistemologists at roughly the same time as it arose amidst Mādhyamikas, as Kamalaśīla's Madhyamaka-epistemology writings show. A rejoinder to Franco and an alternate interpretation of the same passage is found in Claus Oetke, "The Disjunction in the Pramāṇasiddhi," in *Dharmakīrti's Thought and its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy,* ed. Shoryu Katsura (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1999), 243-251.

[269] See Devendrabuddhi's comments in Vittorio A. van Bijlert, *Epistemology and Spiritual Authority* (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1989), 125.

[270] *Pramāṇavarttika,* I.80-81; Miyasaka, "*Pramāṇavārttika,*" 126.

[271] *Pramāṇavarttika,* III.3; Miyasaka, "*Pramāṇavārttika,*" 42: *arthakriyāsamarthaṃ yat tad atra paramārthasat / anyat saṃvṛtisat proktaṃ te svasāmānyalakṣaṇe //* "The causally efficacious here exists ultimately; the other is said to exist conventionally. These are pariculars and universals." Stanza I.166 and the autocommentary make the same point, although van Bijlert (*Epistemology,* 129) shows how that passage can allow inference into the category of cognitions of the causally efficacious.

cognition to extend to inference or only to perception. His second definition,[272] "the revealing of a yet unknown thing," would seem to occlude inference, remembering Dignāga's comment that inference "conceptualizes what was previously experienced." Indeed, Devendrabuddhi understands Dharmakīrti to exclude inference from this second definition, explaining that "consciousnesses of universals are not valid cognitions according to this particular definition."[273] Devendrabuddhi states that only unmistaken (*abhrānta, 'khrul pa med pa*) consciousnesses of particulars—that is, valid perceptions—meet the criterion of this second definition. Elsewhere, Dharmakīrti himself declares that inference is mistaken but is still valid cognition due to being non-deceptive.[274]

What does it mean for inference to be non-deceptive, and so meet Dharmakīrti's first definition of valid cognition, but mistaken, and so—in Devendrabuddhi's estimation—fall short of Dharmakīrti's second definition? We have already seen that Dignāga lists inference along with mistaken cognition as pseudo-perceptions, but he does not label inference mistaken. Dharmakīrti, in his *Commentary on [Dignāga's Compendium of] Valid Cognition,* states that "perception is free from conceptuality"[275] (per Dignāga) while inference is mistaken.[276] In his later writings, *Ascertainment of Valid Cognition*[277] and *Drop of Reasoning,*[278]

---

[272] Franco (*Dharmakīrti on Compassion,* 50-52) notes that Devendrabuddhi and Prajñākaragupta regard Dharmakīrti's two statements as independent definitions of valid cognition while Dharmottara regards the two statements to form one definition.

[273] Devendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā,* ad II.6bc; Peking 5717, p. 6b.8-7a.2; van Bijlert, *Epistemology,* 156: *khyad par dang bcas pa'i mtshan nyid bshad pas spyi shes pa ni tshad ma ma yin no //.*

[274] Stanza III.56ab on *anumānasiddhiḥ*; Miyasaka, "*Pramāṇavārttika,*" 48-49: *abhiprāyāvisaṃvādād api bhrānteḥ pramāṇatā /; / bsam pa la ni bslu med phyir // 'khrul pa yin yang tshad ma nyid /* "Since that mind is non-deceptive, it is just valid cognition even though it is mistaken." I adopt Ernst Steinkellner's emendation to the Tibetan from his *Verse-Index of Dharmakīrti's Works* (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1977), Appendix I, p. 219: *bslu : bsul.*

[275] Stanza III.123a; Miyasaka, "*Pramāṇavārttika,*" 56: *pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍhaṃ.*

[276] Stanza III.55ab; Miyasaka, "*Pramāṇavārttika,*" 48: *ayathābhiniveśena dvitīyā bhrāntir iṣyate /* "We hold the second [that is, inference] to be mistaken, even though not manifestly attached."

he expanded his definition of perception to "free from conceptuality and unmistaken." In commenting on this definition in *Drop of Reasoning,* Dharmottara (750-810) explains that while perception is unmistaken, "inference is mistaken because it engages its appearing object by way of conceiving what is not a real object to be a real object."[279] In this explanation, "mistaken" hinges on inference's conceptual nature, on inference operating not upon the real particulars of objects but on a conceptual image, which it mistakenly holds as the real object. Dharmottara's explanation would seem to account for the second-class validity that both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti ascribe to inference.[280]

A second line of commentary viewed Dharmakīrti's addition of "unmistaken" in his later definitions of perception (in *Ascertainment of Valid Cognition* and *Drop of Reasoning*) to be a substitute for non-deceptive and, consequently, as no different from his early definition of perception as "free from conceptuality." Vinītadeva's (630-700) commentary on *Drop of Reasoning*'s perception definition makes this simple equation between unmistaken and non-deceptive,[281] seeing Dharmakīrti's addition of "unmistaken" to be a mere transposition of the "non-deceptive" in his definition of valid cognition, a quality that both perception and

---

[277] *Pramāṇaviniścaya,* stanza I.4a; Tillman Vetter, *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, Kapitel: Pratyakṣam* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1966), 40: *mngon sum rtog bral ma 'khrul ba /.*

[278] *Nyāyabindu,* aphorism I.4 (ed. Th. Stcherbatsky), Bibliotheca Buddhica 7, (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970), 6: *tatra pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam //.*

[279] *Nyāyabinduṭīkā,* ad I.4; Stcherbatsky ed., 7.12-13: *bhrāntam hy anumāṇam / svapratibhāso 'narthe 'rthādhyavasāyena pravṛttatvāt /.*

[280] Devendrabuddhi (in his *Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā,* ad II.1b; Peking 5717, p.2b.3-5; van Bijlert, *Epistemology,* 127), writing earlier than Dharmottara, likewise distinguishes inference as non-deceptive but mistaken, but without the further rationale for this distinction that Dharmottara provides. Inference's status as a second-class valid cognition leads Tillemans to adopt "incongruent," rather than "mistaken," to translate *bhrānta* as it applies to inference; thus, inference may be said to be "incongruent" but still "true," a more felicitous English than my calling inference "mistaken" but "non-deceptive." See Tom J.F. Tillemans, *Scripture, Logic, Language: Essays on Dharmakīrti and his Tibetan Successors* (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1999), 8-11.

[281] Toru Funayama, "Kamalaśīla's Interpretation of 'Non-Erroneous' in the Definition of Direct Perception and Related Problems," in *Dharmakīrti's Thought*, 80.

inference share. Vinītadeva makes the (seemingly unwarranted)[282] further correlation that inference, like perception, is unmistaken. Dharmottara clearly has Vinītadeva's correlation in mind[283] when, following the passage quoted above from his own *Drop of Reasoning* commentary, he states:

> Unmistaken is not to be taken here as non-deceptive. [If it were taken] in this way, perception [absurdly] would be the only correct consciousness; the other [that is, inference] would not be [correct consciousness, whereas Dharmakīrti stated in *Drop of Reasoning* I.2 that correct consciousness is twofold and in I.3 that the two types are perception and inference]. Since that [perception] is a correct consciousness, it is already established to be non-deceptive [in the definition of valid cognition]; further labeling it as "non-deceptive" [as would be done when Dharmakīrti defines perception as "free from conceptuality and unmistaken" if one equated "unmistaken" and "non-deceptive"] is just pointless. [If we accept your equation of unmistaken and non-deceptive] in that way, the meaning of [Dharmakīrti's] words would be: "The non-deceptive consciousness called 'perception' is free from conceptuality and non-deceptive"; this stating "non-deceptive" a second time would be utterly pointless. Due to that, it should be known that whatever [consciousness] is non-falsifying (*aviparyastam, phyin ci ma log pa*) regarding an entity that is apprehended as causally efficacious is here [the meaning of] unmistaken.[284]

---

[282] While this seems unwarranted, we do see evidence in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya,* stanza I.33, for equating "unmistaken" and "nondeceptive," as Funayama ("Kamalaśīla's Interpretation," 82, n. 42) points out.

[283] Krasser establishes that Dharmottara and Kamalaśīla wrote later than Vinītadeva; see Helmut Krasser, "On the Relationship between Dharmottara, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla," in *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies,* Monograph Series of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies: Occasional Papers 2, ed. Ihara Shōren and Yamaguchi Zuihō (Narita: Narita-san Shinshō-ji, 1992), vol. 1, 151-158.

[284] *Nyāyabinduṭīkā,* ad I.4; Stcherbatsky ed., 7.13-18: *na tv avisaṃvādakam abhrāntam iha grahītavyam / yataḥ samyagjñānam eva pratyakṣaṃ / nānyat / tatra samyagjñānatvād evāvisaṃvādakatve labdhe punar avisaṃvādakagrahaṇaṃ niṣprayojanam eva / evaṃ hi vākyārthaḥ syāt / pratyakṣākhyaṃ yad avisaṃvādakaṃ jñānaṃ tat kalpanāpoḍham avisaṃvādakaṃ ceti / na cānena dvir avisaṃvādakagrahaṇena kiṃcit / tasmād grāhye 'rthakriyākṣame vasturūpe yad aviparyastaṃ tad abhrāntam iha veditavyam /.* Malvania's edition (Dalsukhbhai Malvania, *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa,* vol. 2 [Patna: Kashiprasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1971], 47.3-7) records minor variants to this passage.

In Dharmottara's reading, if "unmistaken" and "non-deceptive" were equated, inference could not be considered non-deceptive (because Dharmakīrti elsewhere clearly called it mistaken). Likewise, defining perception as "unmistaken" would be pointless, as perception is one type of valid cognition and it is well known that valid cognitions are non-deceptive. Dharmottara's interpretation is predicated on two levels of valid cognition such that **some** status ascribed to perception cannot be true of inference. Vinītadeva will allow perception and inference to share in the same non-deceptive, unmistaken status, the two being non-conceptual and conceptual varieties of this status. In attempting to show why this cannot be, Dharmottara introduces a third term, non-falsifying, to delineate further what perception has that inference lacks.[285] We must be clear that we are not dealing with a simple matter of semantics—which among equivalent terms one wishes to apply—but a debate on whether perception and inference bear equal levels of validity, the two already being set apart from all other types of human consciousness, which must be considered invalid.

Debates among Buddhist epistemologists over the status of inference (is it non-deceptive? unmistaken? both?)—indeed, on how some types of human consciousness may be considered valid—form one important context for the debates that Candrakīrti's texts touched off regarding the value of human consciousness in attaining Buddhahood in eleventh and twelfth century India and Tibet. One can immediately see how the epistemologists' accounts would not be easily squared with Nāgārjuna's assessment of fundamental delusion. Certainly many Buddhists felt no need to rectify these accounts: many of those engaged in Buddhist epistemology ignored, derided, or radically reinterpreted Madhyamaka authors. As we will see, though, Candrakīrti's revivers argued vehemently

---

[285] In his *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (Peking 5727, vol. 136, 44b.1), Dharmottara glosses "unmistaken" as "unmistaken regarding the causally efficacious nature" (*don byed nus pa'i rang bzhin la ma 'khrul pa gang yin pa de ni ma 'khrul pa yin no*), without equating "unmistaken" and "non-falsifying"; see Funayama, "Kamalaśīla's Interpretation," 80, n. 35.

against those Mādhyamikas who sought ways of integrating these two streams of thought, much as Candrakīrti had argued (to deaf ears) against Bhāvaviveka's adoption of elements of Dignāga's thought.

A second tension lay in the status that epistemological notions of valid consciousness ascribe to knowable objects, a status that would seem to run directly counter to Nāgārjuna's denial of self-nature (*svabhāva*). As we have seen, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti both speak of the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) as the object of perception (more precisely, the particular causes an "image" [*ākāra*] in awareness that forms the object of perception) and claim perception's superiority over inference due to the ultimate existence of the particular. Van Bijlert points out that Dignāga's usage of "particular" stems from the older Abhidharma tradition, most notably represented by Vasubandhu (whom tradition holds to be Dignāga's teacher) who understood "particular" and "self-nature" to be synonyms.[286] The ultimate existence that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti ascribe to particulars indeed suggests that particulars are understood to have a real, albeit momentary, nature that is uniquely in the scope of perception.

While inference does not have the particular as its object (and in Dharmottara's explanation is mistaken regarding the causally efficacious self-nature of particulars), Dharmakīrti's explanation of it nevertheless contains several problem areas for Mādhyamikas. Dharmakīrti writes of three kinds of reasons that may validly produce inference (which then differentiate three kinds of inferences): nature (*svabhāva*), effect (*kārya*), and non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) reasons.[287] On the strength of the first type of reason, one may infer the predicate on the basis of the two sharing the same nature: one may prove the presence of a tree by reason of the presence of a banana tree, which possesses the "tree nature." Talk of

---

[286] Van Bijlert, *Epistemology,* 56.

[287] *Pramāṇavārttika,* I.1-4; Miyasaka, "*Pramāṇavārttika,*" 114.

"nature" extends also to effect reasons—such as inferring the presence of fire from perceiving smoke, fire's effect—as effect reasons and nature reasons are both explained to prove their predicates—the invariable concomitance necessary for the reasons to serve as proof being established—by way of a natural connection (*svabhāvapratibandha*) between the reason and the predicate.[288] Non-perception reasons do not operate by means of a "natural connection"; rather, one proves the absence of a particular thing in a particular place by reason of not perceiving that thing (which would be perceptible if present). However, one could argue that non-perception reasons share in perception's association with a particular and so with a self-nature: the lack of perception of a self-nature leads one to infer the absence of the thing possessing that nature.

Elsewhere, Dharmakīrti writes of "twofold inference,"[289] a statement that is explained by Karṇakagomin (fl. 800)[290] as referring to "inferences per force of fact" and "inferences dependent on scripture."[291] Inferences dependent on scripture allow one to know matters otherwise completely imperceptible (*atyantaparokṣa*) to the human mind, through relying on Buddhist scriptures; the workings of karma and rebirth belong to this class of phenomena. All other inferences fall into the former category, "inferences per force of fact" or "objectively

---

[288] Dharmakīrti discusses the role of *svabhāvapratibandha* in establishing invariable concomitance in his autocommentary to *Pramāṇavārttika,* I.1-2 and I.14; Raniero Gnoli, *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, The First Chapter with the Autocommentary* (Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1960), 2.19-21 and 3.3-4 and 10.21-25; the first two passages are translated in van Bijlert, *Epistemology,* 98-99.

[289] *Pramāṇavārttika,* I.215; Miyasaka, "*Pramāṇavārttika,*" 146.

[290] Steinkellner concludes that Karṇakagomin must have written after Dharmottara's *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* and consequently assigns him to around 800; Ernst Steinkellner, "Miszellen zur Erkenntnistheoretisch-Logischen Schule des Buddhismus," *Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens* 23 (1979): 148-149.

[291] Rahula Sankrityayana, *Karṇakagomin's Commentary on the Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti of Dharmakīrti* (Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co., 1982), 392.14-15: *anumānena ca dvividhena vastubalapravṛttenāgamāśritena.*

gained inferences," a status strongly suggesting that what inference knows is factually accurate, independent of any scriptural authority.[292]

Can Mādhyamikas accept that ordinary human inference knows "the fact," particularly when that inference is based on relationships of self-nature? Can they accept that perception perceives a self-nature that Nāgārjuna declared to be non-existent? All Buddhist schools maintain the necessity of overcoming delusion, however they variously conceive of it. Nevertheless, Nāgārjuna's conception of delusion as the perception of self-nature pits it in fundamental tension with the epistemologists' conception of valid cognition. As is well known, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla so fully integrated Buddhist epistemology with their interpretation of Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka that they are viewed as important developers of both traditions. It is also well known that some Tibetan interpreters, most notably Tsongkhapa and his Gelukpa followers, criticize Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla for allowing a "realist" position (*dngos po smra ba*) to infiltrate their Madhyamaka views; they charge Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, along with other "Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas," with holding to the conventional validity of the self-nature (*svabhāva*) that Nāgārjuna stringently denied.

Two recent investigations of whether Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla can fairly be said to be "quasi-realists" focus on the role of the perceptual "given," as defined and criticized by Wilfrid Sellars,[293] in their thought and reach different conclusions. Tillemans, equating "self-nature" with "the given," sees their reliance on valid cognition to know "facts" rather than, per Candrakīrti, resting on what the world believes to be true suggests "a version of the ideas

---

[292] For a further discussion, see Tom J.F. Tillemans, *Materials for the Study of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti,* vol. 1 (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1990), 24-35.

[293] Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), particularly pp. 68-69.

of deference [to an objective world] and self-assurance [in the ability to know that world] that we have taken to be central to realism."[294]

McClintock, on the other hand, views Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla as unassailable Mādhyamikas, seeing their "sliding-scale" of levels of reality as justifying their use of a perceptual given without entailing the ontological commitments that Tillemans sees.[295] Her analysis returns at key points to the role "mistake" plays in human cognition at each level of reality that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla posit. On a purely realist level, the two can easily adopt Dharmakīrti's definition of perception as "free from conceptuality and unmistaken"; however, from the "idealist" Yogācāra perspective—which they adopt on the level of conventional truth and hold to be superior to the realist view—the appearance of objects external to a perceiving consciousness are said to be generated from mistaken consciousness: realism is mistaken in this interpretation.[296] Kamalaśīla equates, per Vinītadeva,[297] "unmistaken" and "non-deceptive,"[298] stating that "unmistaken" cannot be interpreted to refer to perception's referent being a real object, otherwise Dharmakīrti's definition of perception would not apply to both realist and idealist systems (as it must do); only idealist perception would be considered unmistaken.[299] To save Dharmakīrti's perception definition, Kamalaśīla's interpretation softens the value of "unmistaken" such that realist perception qualifies. In equating perception's status with the general definition of valid cognition,

---

[294] Tom J.F. Tillemans, "Metaphysics for Mādhyamikas," in *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction,* ed. Georges B.J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003), 111.

[295] Sara L. McClintock, "The Role of the 'Given' in the Classification of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla as Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas," in *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction,* 125-171, particularly her conclusion on p. 151.

[296] McClintock, "The Role of the 'Given,'" 143; her basis here is Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha,* 2041-2043 and Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* thereon.

[297] That Kamalaśīla wrote later than Vinītadeva is established in Krasser, "On the Relationship," 151-158.

[298] Funayama ("Kamalaśīla's Interpretation," 81) notes that Kamalaśīla's adoption of Vinītadeva's equation runs overtly counter to Dharmottara's criticism, discussed above, of Vinītadeva.

[299] McClintock, "The Role of the 'Given,'" 143 and 166, n. 76, referring to Kamalaśīla's *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā, ad* 1311.

perception no longer holds a validity higher than inference; one could say that the need to allow for realist perception has dragged perception down to the level of inference. "Valid cognition" allows for consciousnesses—both perceptual and inferential—that may, from a higher perspective, not be quite so valid.

Kamalaśīla further reconfigures "unmistaken" when analyzing perception from a Madhyamaka perspective. He states that because all objects are empty of either a unitary or multiple self-nature, they have the status of appearances to mistaken consciousness.[300] Furthermore, true unmistaken consciousness is the direct, non-conceptual, meditative realization of selflessness, the (only) real entity, which is established by valid cognition.[301] "Unmistaken" has shifted from the faithful correspondence between a perception and its external object to realization of the Madhyamaka view of the final nature of reality. Kamalaśīla has nuanced the notion of mistake, showing how ordinary perception and inference can be considered unmistaken while, ultimately, only perception of emptiness is devoid of mistake.

Whether or not we may fairly say that Dharmakīrti and his followers, particularly Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, subscribe to Sellars's "Myth of the Given,"[302] Tillemans's and McClintock's analysis of their thought through Sellars's lens highlights the importance of perception in the work of Mādhyamikas who wished to integrate Dharmakīrti's epistemology within a Madhyamaka context. These Mādhyamikas worked within two overarching, somewhat incompatible frameworks: the works of Nāgārjuna, for whom human

---

[300] McClintock, "The Role of the 'Given,'" 146 and 170, n. 88, referring to Kamalaśīla's *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā, ad* 586-587.

[301] McClintock, "The Role of the 'Given,'" 150 and 171, n. 102, referring to Kamalaśīla's *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā, ad* 3338.

[302] Dreyfus (Georges B.J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock, "Introduction," in *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction,* 35, n. 26), in response to Tillemans's characterization of Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla as subscribing to the Myth of the Given, denies that a "given" is present in Dharmakīrti's thought, accepting only that Dharmakīrti's project was "foundationalist."

intellect is imbued with conceptuality that superimposes a false "nature" on its referents, and the works of Dharmakīrti, who posits valid levels of human consciousness operating in spheres of self-character, natural relations, and objective facts. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla faced a certain set of challenges to Madhyamaka epistemology, mainly from the Yogācāra author Dharmapāla whose criticisms, seemingly directed at Bhāvaviveka, were aimed at exposing how the Madhyamaka ontology of naturelessness did not allow for the valid establishment of conventional objects nor consciousnesses of these objects.[303] Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla did not respond to—that is, did not seriously face—the criticism that they were quasi-realists, but rather the criticism that Madhyamaka views did not allow a valid presentation of the everyday world. Even though historically Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla did not need to respond to criticism from Mādhyamikas who wished to keep Dharmakīrti's notions out of their tradition (for Candrakīrti's critique had yet to gain sufficient credibility), Tillemans and McClintock—along with Gelukpa scholars—draw out facets of their thought that can be set in opposition to Candrakīrti's views.

When, with the revival of Candrakīrti's ideas in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, we see Mādhyamika authors criticizing other Mādhyamikas for their adoption of Dharmakīrti's thought, a principal attack concerned issues of perception, the status of perception's referents, and levels of ignorance inherent in human consciousness. Unlike eighth century India, now Mādhyamikas with epistemological leanings were forced to account for their adaptation of Dharmakīrti, to show how his philosophy is compatible within Madhyamaka without making its proponents "realists". The body of this chapter focuses on how these issues of perception and ignorance were argued among Mādhyamikas of the eleventh and twelfth centuries and how these arguments contributed toward forming

---

[303] See paricularly Tillemans, *Materials,* p. 42, nn. 94 and 96 and p. 48, n. 107. Tillemans discusses Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's answers to the difficulties Dharmapāla raised.

separate sub-schools that twelfth century Tibetan scholars called "Prāsaṅgika" and "Svātantrika." My approach differs from that of Tillemans, McClintock, and traditional Tibetan scholars in that I do not look to draw only thematic points of convergence and divergence between figures whose lives did not intersect and whose philosophies were not in conversation. Instead, drawing on the historical connections traced in the first two chapters, I examine the manner in which these figures attempted to come to terms with the tensions endemic to a wedding of Nāgārjuna and Dharmakīrti, tensions which during their lifetimes were suddenly inescapable.

While the names "Prāsaṅgika" and "Svātantrika" signify their adherents' use of certain logical techniques—either apagogic reasoning (*prasaṅga*) or formal inference of "one's own" (*svatantra*)—the disputes were much broader, centering on the value of human intellect in religious pursuits, the mental transformations that occur when an ordinary person becomes a Buddha, and what states of mind a Buddha has such that a Buddha can aid ordinary beings in their religious pursuits. In this chapter, I explore:

- the wide problems that Prāsaṅgikas saw in the valid cognition enterprise, which, in Jayānanda's writings, took the form of a stark denial of the value of human rationality and a concomitant understanding of pervasive human ignorance;
- the responses of Tibetan Mādhyamikas, most notably Chapa Chokyi Sengé, who viewed the valid establishment of human cognition to be essential to religious development and sought to temper the Prāsaṅgika portrayal of ignorance, arguing for the necessity of rationality in order for us to understand ultimate reality and no longer assent to the false appearances that our senses provide;
- and the syntheses that led to a Prāsaṅgika that accommodated and came eventually to champion valid cognition.

The debate between these two sides shaped a great deal of Tibetan Madhyamaka exegesis in the following centuries, beginning with Mabja Jangchub Tsondru and extending into the

present, that managed to combine Candrakīrti's and Jayānanda's criticisms of valid cognition with the very edifices they argued against. Interweaving these two sides' texts gives us a taxonomy of human ignorance, ranging from the delusion that binds us in suffering to a useful sort of mistake that provides us conceptual understanding of extrasensory reality.

Mistaken Mind, Deceptive Mind

Perhaps counterintuitively, the point of entry into the eleventh and twelfth century Madhyamaka debates on perception and ignorance is Candrakīrti's interpretation of the "two truths," a central topic of Madhyamaka exegesis since Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle.*[304] Tillemans has noted that Candrakīrti's presentation, in his *Entrance to the Middle,* of the two truths bears directly on his denial that perception can correctly access a "given."[305] Candrakīrti's text reads:[306]

> The object [found by][307] correct seeing is suchness;
> That [found by] erroneous seeing is called conventional truth.

While this passage can be construed variously, the most straightforward reading is that Candrakīrti sharply bifurcates consciousness into "correct," that is, a direct perception of emptiness, and "erroneous," which would seem to be all other cognition. Recalling the

---

[304] Nāgārjuna's text, stanza XXIV.8, reads: "Buddhas teach the Dharma in dependence on two truths: Worldly, conventional truth and ultimate truth"; de Jong, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ,* 34: *dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā / lokasaṃvṛtisatyaṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ //.*

[305] Tillemans, *Materials,* 44, 48-51.

[306] *Madhyamakāvatāra,* stanza VI.23cd; Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti,* Bibliotheca Buddhica, 9 (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970), 102.10-11: *yang dag mthong yul gang de de nyid de / mthong ba brdzun pa kun rdzob bden par gsungs /;* Sanskrit preserved in Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā, Prajñākaramati's Commentary to the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Çāntideva,* Bibiotheca Indica 3 (1905): 361.4: *samyagdṛśāṃ yo viṣayaḥ sa tattvaṃ mṛṣādṛśāṃ saṃvṛtisatyam uktam //.*

[307] The addition of "found" (*rnyed pa*) is supported by Candrakīrti's commentary (La Vallée Pousin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 102.16-17): *don dam pa ni yang dag par gzigs pa rnams kyi ye shes kyi khyad par gyi yul nyid kyis bdag gi ngo bo* ***rnyed pa*** *yin* / ("The ultimate is the self-nature found by being the very referent particular to the wisdom of those with pure vision.") and (102.20-103.1) *mthong ba rdzun pa'i stobs las bdag gi yod pa* ***rnyed pa*** / ("the existence of a self found due to the force of erroneous vision").

manner in which Kamalaśīla nuanced levels of perception according to realist, idealist, and Madhyamaka viewpoints, allowing for perception to be unmistaken in a variety of ways other than being the ultimate direct perception of emptiness—which is still for Kamalaśīla the highest unmistaken perception—Candrakīrti's proclamation could well be taken as a return to a simpler method of delineating states of consciousness.

Upon the circulation of Candrakīrti's writings in Central Tibet after Patsab's return around 1100, Candrakīrti's two truths became the focus of debates concerning the validity of his views.[308] Chapa Chokyi Sengé's *Compilation of the Three Mādhyamikas from the East*, which contains the lengthiest critique of Candrakīrti's views now extant—a critique structured around Candrakīrti's denial of the use of formal inferences "of one's own,"[309]—

---

[308] We see evidence in Abhayākaragupta's writings that Candrakīrti's two truths were also the focus of debate in India in the twelfth century. For complete references, see Chapter One, footnote 81.

[309] *svatantrānumana, rang rgyud kyi rjes dpag.* This term is frequently translated as "autonomous inferences", a translation that relies on Gelukpa authors' equation (based on the Indian lexicon of Amarasiṃha, the *Amarakośa* [Peking 5787, vol. 140]) of *rang rgyud* with *rang dbang,* "own power," and *bdag dbang,* "self-powered"; see Jeffrey Hopkins, "A Tibetan Delineation of Different Views of Emptiness in the Indian Middle Way Schools," *Tibetan Journal* 14, no. 1 (1989): note 65. Such a translation allows the Gelukpa loading of this term, in which "autonomous inferences" are understood as inferences in which the "three modes"—the reason being a property of the inferential subject and the forward and reverse entailments—are established by way of their own character (*rang gi mtshan nyid kyi grub pa*). Such establishment is clearly unacceptable for a Mādhyamika and, consequently, such inferences are as well. The use of "autonomous inferences" by certain Mādhyamikas—most notably, Bhāvaviveka, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Jñānagarbha—allow Gelukpa authors to categorize them as Svātantrika Mādhyamikas. However, part of what I hope to accomplish in this dissertation is to show that the projects of later Tibetan authors' doxographies do not accurately reflect the debates of eleventh and twelfth century Tibet, the period in which the place of formal inference within Madhyamaka thought was first seriously debated. As will be shown, it is not at all clear that Chapa understood the inferences he employed to be "established by way of their own character." Rather, he emphasizes the need to employ inferences "oneself", utilizing reasons that are acceptable to oneself. As will be seen, this runs counter to Candrakīrti's use only of inferences "renowned by others", inferences which one employs against an opponent utilizing reasons the opponent accepts to deduce conclusion the opponent cannot accept. Inferences "of one's own", then, refers primarily to the status of the reason—one accepts it oneself. Inferences of one's own are not equivalent with the category of inferences seen in Buddhist circles at least from the time of Dignāga, "inferences for one's own sake" (*svārthānumana, rang gi don gyi rjes dpag*) in which one employs logic in order to reach previously unknown conclusions. The category "inferences for one's own sake" is in contradistinction to "inferences for the sake of others" (*parārthānumāna, gzhan gyi don gyi rjes dpag*), in which

begins his discussion with "Candrakīrti's and others'" method of bifurcating consciousness into mistaken and unmistaken and their positing of the two truths as the respective objects of these two classes of consciousness.[310] Chapa makes clear that he sees the Candrakīrti's position on this topic to be not traditionalist but iconoclastic in its rejection of the refinements of the valid cognition enterprise.

In presenting the Prāsaṅgika position, Chapa makes two subtle moves. First, where Candrakīrti wrote of "erroneous" (*mṛṣā, rdzun pa*) and "correct," Chapa reads him as "mistaken" and "unmistaken." Secondly, Candrakīrti's "seeing" becomes Chapa's "consciousness." By making these subtle shifts, Chapa brings Candrakīrti's proclamation of the two truths to bear directly upon Kamalaśīla's re-working (*a la* Vinītadeva) of the definition of perception—and, consequently, the definition of valid cognition. Where Kamalaśīla worked out ways of designating various sorts of perceptions as unmistaken and was willing to extend the unmistaken status to inference, thereby showing how some classes of ordinary human consciousness can be considered valid cognition, Chapa has Candrakīrti opposing the idea that any consciousness aside from the meditative equipoise of Buddhas and advanced bodhisattvas who are realizing the final nature (*dharmatā, chos nyid*)[311] could be

---

one employs logic to prove a point to an opponent. These two categories of inference have differing guidelines determining their validity, the latter category with more stringent requirements. The "inferences of one's own" that are the crucial issue here are utilized for one's own sake and the sake of others—they are advocated by Chapa both to understand reality and to demonstrate this understanding to others.

[310] Rather than "Prāsaṅgika," Chapa writes of "Candrakīrti and others"; Phya pa chos kyi seṅ ge, *dbu ma śar gsum gyi stoṅ thun,* ed. Helmut Tauscher (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1999), 58.9: *slob dpon zla ba grags pa la sogs pa.* As will be seen below, Jayānanda is among those figuring in Chapa's thinking as "others." Chapa's discussion of mistaken and unmistaken consciousness (*blo 'khrul ba dang ma 'khrul ba*) and the two truths—the "setting forth the opponent's position" (*gzhan gyi lugs dgod pa*)—immediately follows this passage.

[311] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 58.13-15: *sa thob pa'i mnyam bzhag dang sangs rgyas kyi sa na … chos nyid rtogs pas yang dag pa'i blo ma 'khrul zhes gdags ste* / "The meditative absorptions of those who have attained a ground (*bhūmi*) and [the mental states* of those] on the Buddha ground, due to realizing the final nature, are considered correct, unmistaken awareness." *Chapa presents Prāsaṅgikas as denying that Buddhas have any mental state. I use the term merely to convey English meaning; Chapa does not include it.

valid. As Candrakīrti is made to oppose the possibility of ordinary valid cognition, the fact that the only valid cognition he is allowed is meditative perception of emptiness points the challenges that Chapa will bring to his views squarely on the status of perception.

When showing the criteria by which Prāsaṅgikas separate out, within mistaken consciousness, both the perceptual illusions of those with defective sense organs and the wrong philosophies of non-Buddhists from useful (if still not "valid") cognition, Chapa again modifies Candrakīrti's words. Where Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle* reads:[312]

> Erroneous seeing has two aspects: clear faculties and faulty faculties.
> Consciousnesses from faulty faculties are asserted to be wrong relative to consciousnesses from good faculties.

Chapa (while faithfully quoting "erroneous seeing") glosses the passage as "mistaken awareness of erroneous seeing."[313] He sees Prāsaṅgikas as dividing mistake into two groups: consciousnesses known in the world to be veridical, based upon unimpaired senses and mind; and those that superimpose objects—either due to defective senses, specious reasoning, or false beliefs—that are known not to exist even in the world.[314] The pragmatic line—worldly renown—that Chapa draws is well-attested in Candrakīrti's text (if not in the stanza Chapa here cites), as will be discussed below. Of note is that Chapa has Candrakīrti equate "erroneous" and "mistaken" and then bases his division in terms of the latter; all that the world agrees upon as true is still in the broad category of mistake. While this may seem to be an innocuous linguistic turn, again it pits Candrakīrti squarely against the notion of

---

[312] Stanza VI.24; Chapa's citation varies slightly from the Tibetan text edited by La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 103.11. Variants in Chapa's and Jayānanda's texts are recorded in full in Appendix I.

[313] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 59.1: *mthong pa brdzun pa'i blo 'khrul ba.* It should be noted as well that Candrakīrti seems in this stanza to gloss "seeing" (*mthong ba*) with "consciousness" (*shes pa*), justifying Chapa's substitution (discussed just above) of "consciousness" (*blo*) for "seeing."

[314] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 59.4-7. Those with defective senses "superimpose" two moons upon one (they see two moons instead of one) or floating hairs where none exist; others "superimpose" the notion of "self" (*bdag, ātman*) due to specious reasoning and false beliefs.

valid cognition. Chapa depicts Candrakīrti as equating all cognition excepting direct perception of emptiness with invalid cognition, thereby denying much of what Buddhists and non-Buddhists would accept as valid cognition.

Indeed, Chapa fleshes out Candrakīrti's category of mistaken cognitions that are renowned in the world to be true with the four types of valid cognition that were commonly accepted in Indian non-Buddhist philosophy (Buddhists accepted only the first two): direct perception—including both a common person's perception which involves the conception that what appears is true and the perception of developed bodhisattvas (those who have "attained a ground") who do not conceive that the appearances outside of meditative equipoise are true—, inference, testimony (from authoritative persons or texts), and analogy.[315] Appearance itself is filed under mistaken consciousness, even when a bodhisattva is able to see through those appearances, knowing that they are not as they appear. Mistake, Chapa has Candrakīrti say, is very broad; validity is extremely narrow. To seal his case that Prāsaṅgikas deny that any worldly consciousness—already equated with mistaken consciousness—has the status of validity, Chapa cites Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle,* stanza VI.30:[316]

---

[315] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 59.1-4. Chapa here certainly draws on Candrakīrti's somewhat perverse admission—following his lengthy criticisms of Dignāga's valid cognition system and Bhāvaviveka's adoption of it in a Madhyamaka context—of all four types of valid cognition in his *Prasannapadā;* see La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā,* 75.9. One must appreciate the rather tongue-in-cheek tone Candrakīrti adopts in denying the Buddhist system of two types of valid cognition but then accepting the non-Buddhist system of four. Rather than understand Candrakīrti's "admission" of four types of valid cognition as evidence that he accepts the valid cognition enterprise, his acceptance of four types must be seen as further evidence of his wish to undermine the Buddhist—or Madhymaka—use of valid cognition: rather than privilege perception and inference, as most Buddhists do, Candrakīrti downplays these two types of cognition, downgrading them to a status no better than testimony and analogy.

[316] Chapa's text (Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 62.2) cites the final line of this stanza quite differently from La Vallée Poussin's text (La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 112.7) or any of the canonical editions, reading *blun po tshad mar gyur pa ga la yod* / for *blun po tshad mar rigs pa'ang ma yin no* /. The more standard edition translates: "It is not reasonable for foolishness also to be valid cognition." Chapa clearly understands *tshad ma*

> If the world were valid cognition, the world would see suchness.
> What need would there be for the others, the Superiors, and what would be the use of the Superior path?
> How could foolishness be valid cognition?

Having made his case for Prāsaṅgikas' opposition of ordinary human cognition and valid cognition, clinched with Candrakīrti's seeming equations of, on the one hand, valid cognition and seeing suchness and, on the other hand, the world and foolishness, Chapa turns to the respective referents of Candrakīrti's non-mistaken and mistaken consciousnesses: his ultimate and obscurational truths. Appearances—all objects of knowledge (*jñeya, shes bya*)—to "the false perception of mistaken awareness"[317] are Candrakīrti's obscurational truths (in Chapa's wording). Grouping all objects of knowledge as obscurational truths plays on the equation between worldly "knowledge" and mistake: just as Candrakīrti (in Chapa's presentation) equates the categories of valid cognition accepted by Buddhists and non-Buddhists with mistake, so the objects of those cognitions are true only for obscuration. Chapa's ample justification here is not just the stanzas he cites at this juncture (Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle*, VI.25, 26, and 28) but Candrakīrti's proclamation (discussed at length in the following chapter) that ultimate truth is not an object of knowledge: if ultimate truth—the object of the only valid cognition—is not an object of knowledge, objects of knowledge are altogether the domain of mistaken, invalid cognition.

To explain the term "obscurational truth" (*saṃvṛtisatyaṃ, kun rdzob bden pa*), Chapa cites stanza VI.28 of *Entrance to the Middle*, but with one important variation. Candrakīrti's text reads "Delusion is an obscurer because it veils the nature."[318] This explanation draws on

---

in this stanza to mean "valid cognition" and not simply "authority." This point is taken up in more detail in Jayānanda's discussion of the stanza below.

[317] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 59.13: *blo 'khrul ba log pa'i mthong ba.*

[318] La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 107.1: *gti mug rang bzhin sgrib phyir kun rdzob ste /;* la Vallée Poussin, *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* (1905), 353.3: *mohaḥ svabhāvāvaraṇāddhi saṃvṛtiḥ.*

a passage from the *Descent into Laṅkā Sūtra*,[319] which equates "the nature" (*svabhāva, rang bzhin*) with "the final nature," ultimate truth: delusion obscures ultimate truth. Obscuring the "real" truth, delusion takes appearances to be true; appearances are "true for obscuration," they are "obscurational truths." While Chapa cites Candrakīrti's passage faithfully, he explains that "Since we designate them to be true as referents of obscuring awarenesses that [have] the nature of delusion that veils the pacification of the operation of awareness, they are obscurational truths."[320] Chapa's equation of obscuration and delusion is certainly true to Candrakīrti's writings; however, he turns around the meaning of this verse, making *svabhāva* mean simply "character"—"the nature/character of darkness,"—whereas in the verse (expressed more clearly in the Sanskrit cited in *Bodhicāryāvatārapañjikā* than in the Tibetan translation) it means "emptiness."

In reinterpreting "the nature" to mean "the character" of delusion, Chapa changes what is obscured or veiled from ultimate truth to "the pacification of the operation of awareness." Chapa subtly shifts attention from emptiness—which any Mādhyamika (including Chapa, as will be seen below) must admit stands apart from all things "known" by delusion—to a cognitive process with which he takes issue. As will be seen in Chapter Five, Chapa argues at length against the notion—mentioned by Candrakīrti and elaborated upon by Jayānanda—that consciousness ceases its operation upon Buddhahood, upon realizing the final nature. Emptiness is unassailable; it is the Prāsaṅgika's version of how one comes to realize emptiness and the utter disconnect they posit between ordinary consciousness and

---

[319] *Laṅkāvatārasūtra,* stanza X.429; Sanskrit text in Bunyiu Nanjio, *The Laṇkāvatāra Sūtra,* Bibliotheca Otaniensis, vol. 1 (Kyoto: Otani University Press, 1923), 319: *bhāvā vidyanti saṃvṛtyā paramārthe na bhāvakāḥ / niḥsvabhāveṣu yā bhrāntistatsatyaṃ saṃvṛtirbhavet //;* "The production of things [is so] conventionally; it is not so ultimately. That [consciousness] which is mistaken regarding naturelessness is asserted as the obscurer of truth." Note that the sūtra's use of *bhrānti* lends more credence to Chapa's equation of delusion, obscuration, and mistake.

[320] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 60.4-5: *blo'i 'jug pa zhi ba la sgrib pa'i gti' mug gi rang bzhin kun rdzob kyi blo'i yul du bden par brtags pas kun rdzob kyi bden pa ste /.*

Buddhahood that Chapa seeks to overturn. In setting up Candrakīrti's two truths for the fall he intends to induce, Chapa focuses on the rift he sees between ordinary states of mind and Prāsaṅgika Buddhahood, a rift that denies validity to ordinary consciousness and places emptiness entirely out of human scope.

Chapa further explains Candrakīrti's ultimate truth as "seeing nothing at all"[321] and "having no object to be observed at all due to mistake being extinguished in an Ārya's meditative equipoise [on emptiness]."[322] "Realization" of ultimate truth is only called "realization"; actually, it is not a cognitive event at all as the operation of consciousness has ceased.[323] Chapa cites Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle* stanza VI.29,[324] which compares emptiness to the absence of cataract-induced visions for someone who does not have cataracts, and stanza XII.4,[325] which compares "realization" of emptiness to the way ordinary perception is explained by many Buddhist realists: just as perception does not actually perceive an object but perceives only a mental representation of an object and yet we still call this "perception of an object", so it is with "realization" of emptiness. This "realization" has no object and, indeed, no subject: mistake is extinguished and, concomitantly, consciousness has ceased. Chapa has Candrakīrti say that this cessation is the ultimate state.

In focusing on the Prāsaṅgikas' two truths, Chapa's principal interest is on the subjective correlates of these truths: he bases his presentation of Prāsaṅgika on a radical distinction between ordinary consciousness, invariably intertwined with error, and Buddhahood, in which consciousness has ceased. This separation marks the fundamental problem Chapa sees in Prāsaṅgika. While Chapa clearly understands Candrakīrti and his followers to be wrongly denying inference any utility in understanding Madhyamaka

---

[321] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 59.14: *ci'ang bltar med pa.*
[322] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 60.16: *'phags pa'i mnyam bzhag 'khrul pa zad pas cir yang dmigs par byar med pa.*
[323] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 58.13-15.
[324] La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 109.6.
[325] La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 357.20.

emptiness, this broader denial of ordinary valid cognition is Chapa's starting point and primary concern. Chapa has Prāsaṅgika say that any consciousness having an appearing object cannot be valid, even consciousnesses of advanced bodhisattvas who no longer assent to the veracity of appearances.[326] The Prāsaṅgika circumscription of human intellect—their denial of valid cognition—then, amounts to a rejection of an appearing "given" to perception. The appearances that we rely upon, the shared perception of which is a hallmark of correct perception and a bulwark against defective senses and hallucination, and from which one may draw reasoned conclusions are entirely false, the domain of mistake.

Jayānanda's Two Truths

We have seen how Chapa's critique of Prāsaṅgika is predicated upon pitting Candrakīrti's two truths—more precisely, the worldly consciousnesses that cognize obscurational truths—against valid cognition, as defined (and modified) by followers of Dharmakīrti. One may reasonably ask if this opposition is fair to Candrakīrti or, more importantly for this study, to his eleventh and twelfth century revivalists. Before presenting Chapa's solution to how a Mādhyamika can make the crucial distinction between obscurational and ultimate truth and yet allow for ordinary valid cognition—as well as a coherent system for refining consciousness in order to perceive the ultimate—an examination of his Prāsaṅgika interlocutors reveals that his portrayal is not unfair, that reading Candrakīrti's two truths as opposing ordinary valid cognition formed one of the central points of controversy in this period.

Jayānanda's reading of Candrakīrti's two truths offers a stark appraisal of the range of human intellect. He draws a radical separation between human intellect and a Buddha's mental state, causing one to wonder (as did Chapa) how the former could be developed into

---

[326] Chapa's critique of Prāsaṅgikas' denial that Buddhas have consciousnesses "with appearance" (*snang bcas*) is taken up in Chapter Five.

the latter. Such is the separation that the corresponding objects of these consciousnesses cannot be accessed by the other: ordinary minds cannot know emptiness while Buddhas cannot perceive the appearances that constitute reality for the rest of us. Jayānanda further draws out implications in Candrakīrti's writings to deduce levels of perception according to levels of ignorance. Jayānanda forms these conclusions around a small number of Candrakīrti's stanzas—which Chapa also draws upon—that do indeed facilitate his interpretation. Clearly, these select stanzas were the foci within Candrakīrti's writings around which Prāsaṅgika was either accepted or rejected in twelfth century Tibet.

Jayānanda's comments center round his two-fold interpretation of "nature" in the first line of *Entrance to the Middle,* stanza VI.28, "Delusion is an obscurer because it veils the nature." Following Candrakīrti, Jayānanda glosses "delusion" with "ignorance" (*avidyā, ma rig pa*), the first of the twelve links of cyclic existence and writes of its function in obscuring or veiling "the nature," emptiness.[327] Where Candrakīrti writes that delusion "veils the nature" and "The nature does not appear in any respect to the ignorant,"[328] Jayānanda states that delusion prevents suchness from appearing and obstructs perception of emptiness.[329] In this reading, "nature" clearly means "emptiness," which is inaccessible to the ignorant.

---

[327] Candrakīrti writes: "Because it obstructs (*rmongs par byed pa*) sentient beings from viewing the entity just as it abides, it is delusion (*moha, gti mug*); it is the ignorance (*avidyā, ma rig pa*) that reifies the non-existent self-nature of entities and has the character of obscuring (*sgrib pa*) perception of the nature" (La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 107.5-8: *de la 'dis sems can rnams ji ltar gnas pa'i dngos po lta ba la rmongs par byed pas na gti mug ste / ma rig pa dnogs po'i rang gi ngo bo yod pa ma yin pa sgro 'dogs par byed pa rang bzhin mthong ba la sgrib pa'i bdag nyid can ni kun rdzob po /*).

[328] La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 107.15-16: *rang bzhin ni ma rig pa dang ldan pa rnams la rnam pa thams cad du mi snang ngo /.*

[329] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā, sde dge* edition 3870, *dbu ma,* vol. *ra,* 144a.4: *gti mug gi stobs kyis yod pa dang med pa la sogs pa dang bral ba'i de kho na nyid mi snang ba* ("Through the power of delusion, suchness—free from existence, non-existence, and so forth—does not appear") and 144b.3: *ji ltar gnas pa'i dngos po lta ba la zhes bya ba ni stong pa nyid kyi dngos po mthong ba la'o /* ("[Candrakīrti writes] 'from viewing the entity just as it abides' [meaning] from seeing the entity of emptiness"). This latter passage expands upon Candrakīrti's autocommentary, translated in footnote 327. Jayānanda interprets *ji ltar gnas pa* as emptiness; thus, in his view, delusion obstructs one from viewing emptiness, contrary to Huntington's interpretation (*The Emptiness of*

Candrakīrti's comments suggest Jayānanda's second reading of "nature", "the obscurer that has a nature of delusion,"[330] the same interpretation we saw Chapa give above. Both Candrakīrti and Jayānanda equate "the world" with delusion and with obscuration: Candrakīrti writes of obscurational truth as what is "true for the worldly, false obscurer"[331] while Jayānanda writes that, "the world knows only falsely."[332] This second interpretation of "nature" makes a sweeping correlation between the conventional world and delusion, while the first interpretation sets off emptiness from the conventional world—emptiness is veiled by the ignorance that characterizes ordinary consciousness.

Jayānanda elaborates upon delusion's nature of obscuring, noting its two aspects that produce cyclic existence and ordinary appearances, respectively:[333]

> Here, "veil" (*āvaraṇa, sgrib pa*) has two aspects: afflictive ignorance and non-afflictive ignorance. Of those, afflictive ignorance is the cause of one continually engaging cyclic existence. Non-afflictive ignorance is the cause of the appearance of form and so forth. Supramundane Victors have no capacity for either stain and hence, the absence of the causes [that is, the absence of both afflictive and non-afflictive ignorance] results in the absence of effects [that is, cyclic existence and appearance]. Therefore, there is no cyclic existence and no appearance of form and so forth; how could mere conventionalities appear?

Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian Mādhyamika [Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989], 232, n.47) that delusion "causes sentient beings to become muddled in the view of entities as they are [in the full context of everyday experience]" and La Vallée Poussin's interpretation (*Muséon* 11 [1910], 303) that "les creatures se trompent [*mohayati*] dans la vue des choses comme elles sont."

[330] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 144a.4: *gti mug gi rang bzhin can gyi kun rdzob.*

[331] La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatara,* 107.10: *'jig rten phyin ci log tu gyur pa'i kun rdzob tu bden pa.*

[332] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 142b.6: *'jig rten pas phyin ci log nyid du shes pa yin no.*

[333] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 146b.2-3: *'dir sgrib pa ni rnam pa gnyis te / nyon mongs pa can gyi dang / nyon mongs pa can ma yin par ma rig pa'o / / de la nyon mongs pa can gyi ma rig pa ni 'khor ba'i rgyun 'jug pa'i rgyu yin la / nyon mongs pa can ma yin pa'i ma rig pa ni gzugs la sogs pa snang ba'i rgyu yin no/ / bcom ldan 'das rnams la ni sgrib pa gnyis ka mi mnga' bas rgyu med pas 'bras bu med pa'i phyir 'khor ba dang gzugs la sogs pa dag snang ba med pa'i phyir ji ltar kun rdzob tsam snang bar 'gyur /.*

In separating the type of ignorance that causes entrapment in cyclic existence from the ignorance responsible for appearances, Jayānanda must separate obscurational (or, conventional) truths from "mere conventionalities"[334] on the basis of whether appearances are conceived, or are not conceived, to be true (in doing so, he elaborates just what is "true" about obscurational truths). If appearances are intertwined with the conceptions "I and mine" then one is bound in cyclic existence; appearances, without the conception that these appearances are true, do not produce afflictive emotions and so do not entail entrapment.[335] The criterion, "conceived to be true," functions in two ways: it allows for the realization of "Hearers" (*śravaka*), "Solitary Buddhas" (*pratyekabuddha*), and Bodhisattvas (just what sort

---

[334] Candrakīrti likewise posits distinctions between obscurational truths and mere conventionalities. In his autocommentary to stanza VI.28, he writes, "That [ultimate truth] and anything considered erroneous even conventionally are not obscurational truths" (La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 107.16-17: *de dang gang zhig kun rdzob tu yang rdzun pa ni kun rdzob kyi bden pa ma yin no*). This dispenses one type of "mere conventionality," those things not considered true in the world. Candrakīrti continues, separating out from obscurational truths the appearances to realized beings, demarcating a second class of mere conventionalities: "Obscurational truths are posited through the force of afflictive ignorance. For those Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas who have dispelled afflictive ignorance, who see composite phenomena as similar to the existence of a reflection and so forth, those [obscurational truths] have a fabricated nature; they are not true because [these beings] do not exaggerate these as true. [Obscurational truths] deceive fools. However, these are mere conventionalities to the others, since [these appear as] just illusion-like dependent arisings" (La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 107.18-108.6: *nyon mongs pa can gyi ma rig pa'i dbang gis kun rdzob kyi bden pa rnam par bzhag go / de yang nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas dang byang chub sems dpa' nyon mongs pa can gyi ma rig pa spangs pa / 'du byed gzugs brnyan la sogs pa'i yod pa nyid dang 'dra bar gzigs pa rnams la ni bcos ma'i rang bzhin* yin gyi / bden pa ni ma yin te / bden par mngon par rlom pa med pa'i phyir ro / / byis pa rnams la ni bslu bar byed pa yin la / de las gzhan pa rnams la ni sgyu ma la sogs pa ltar rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba nyid kyis kun rdzob tsam du 'gyur ro / ** Jayānanda here reads *rang bzhin can,* which I adopt in my translation). Jayānanda (*Madhyamakāvatārațīkā,* 145b.6) reads *de las gzhan* as referring to people: Hearers, Solitary Realizers, and Bodhisattvas. This differs from Huntington's translation, "other things" (*Emptiness of Emptiness,* 233, n.47). Jayānanda further reads Candrakīrti's *sgyu ma la sogs pa ltar rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba nyid kyis* ("since [these appear as] just illusion-like dependent arisings") as *sgyu ma la sogs pa ltar rten cing 'brel bar 'byung ba nyid* ***du snang bas*** ("since these appear as just illusion-like dependent arisings"), making it clear that what are obscurational truths for ordinary people appear to these more realized beings as dependent arisings, without the conception that these appearances are true. It should be noted that Tsong kha pa, in his *dGongs pa rab gsal,* argues at length against the idea that "mere conventionalities" are not also obscurational truths.

[335] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatārațīkā,* 146a.2-4.

of bodhisattva will be discussed below) who do not conceive ordinary appearances to be true and it separates out the perceptual illusions and false beliefs that are not considered to be true "even in the world." Thus, "mere conventionalities" are of two types: ordinary appearances to realized beings and the hallucinations and ideas that ordinary beings consider false.[336] In this schema, there are four classes of beings, ranging from lowest to highest:

- those perceiving or believing what is widely regarded in the world as untrue—that is, those suffering from perceptual illusions or non-Buddhist views;
- ordinary beings of good faculties who do not hold non-Buddhist beliefs but who yet assent to the validity of appearances;
- realized Buddhists who know appearances are not true but still have the non-afflictive ignorance that results in their perceiving ordinary appearances;
- and Buddhas who possess none of these forms of ignorance.

Jayānanda makes clear that all appearances—even without the conception that they are true—entail a level of ignorance that Buddhas do not have; Buddhas are not so ignorant and consequently do not see the appearances that ordinary people and even realized beings see. He further makes clear the connection between seeing ordinary appearances and being obstructed from emptiness: he states that even a realized being's perception of illusion-like dependent arisings constitutes having the "mere ignorance" that veils emptiness, that keeps emptiness from appearing.[337] This interpretation separates a Buddha's knowledge of

---

[336] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 145b.6.

[337] Candrakīrti states (La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 108.6-9) *de yang shes bya'i sgrib pa'i mtshan nyid can ma rig pa tsam kun tu spyod pa'i phyir / snang ba dang bcas pa'i spyod yul can gyi 'phags pa rnams la snang gi / snang ba med pa'i spyod yul mnga' ba rnams la ni ma yin no /* ("These, also, due to the activity of mere ignorance that has the character of staining the object of knowledge, appear to those Āryas whose sphere of activities has appearances but do not [appear] to those lords whose sphere of activities is without appearance."). Jayānanda (*Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 145b.7-146a.1) reads *de yang zhes bya ba ni sgyu ma la sogs pa ltar rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba nyid du snang ba gang yin pa'o / / shes bya'i sgrib pa'i mtshan nyid can ma rig pa tsam kun tu spyod pa'i phyir zhes bya ba ni yod pa dang med pa la sogs pa dang bral ba'i de kho na nyid ni shes bya yin la / de'i sgrib pa ni gang gis de mi snang bar byed pa'o /* ("[Candrakīrti writes] 'These, also,': all that appears as illusion-like

emptiness from all other mental states, making a Buddha's knowledge entail a complete absence of perceptual appearances, on the one hand, and placing any perception of appearances in direct conflict with knowledge of emptiness, on the other. Jayānanda constructs a vast divide between "consciousness having appearances" and "consciousness not having appearances."[338]

Jayānanda's sweeping correlation of ignorance and appearance and his consequent denial that a Buddha can perceive the things that appear to us are troublesome issues, well implied (or even explicitly stated) in Candrakīrti, that later exegetes would attempt to soften. That he does not try to smooth over these points but instead amplifies them indicates his rejection both of the integrity of a perceptual given—expressed in these passages as "appearances" rather than "self-nature"—and of the validity of common perception. Jayānanda's taxonomy of ignorance allows three classes of ignorant beings. These three classes of ignorant beings all have non-afflictive ignorance and consequently continue to perceive ordinary appearances. What the ignorant perceive appear as a "given" only due to their ignorance; appearances' status is invalid.

Thus far, Jayānanda has denied the validity of appearances, eroding the value of perception by positing its object as arising only due to ignorance. The distance from rejecting ordinary perception to rejecting human valid cognition is not great and, indeed, is a

---

dependent arisings. [He writes] 'Due to the activity of mere ignorance that has the character of staining the object of knowledge': suchness which is free from existence, non-existence, and so forth is the object of knowledge. That which stains that [suchness] causes it not to appear."). Thus, Jayānanda understands this level of ignorance that causes ordinary appearances to obstruct knowledge of emptiness: *shes bya'i sgrib* is understood to mean "obstructs the object of knowledge [that is, emptiness]" rather than "obstructs [knowledge of all] objects of knowledge" or "obstructions to omniscience" as is the Gelukpa reading.

[338] In doing so, Jayānanda takes a very straightforward reading of Candrakīrti's statement, noted just above (La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 108.7-9), *snang ba dang bcas pa'i spyod yul can gyi 'phags pa rnams la snang gi / snang ba med pa'i spyod yul mnga' ba rnams la ni ma yin no* / ("[These things] appear to those Āryas whose sphere of activities has appearances but do not [appear] to those lords whose sphere of activities is without appearance."), in which Candrakīrti separates a certain class of Āryas from Buddhas. This will be discussed further below and in Chapter Five.

distance Jayānanda whole-heartedly travels. In starting down this path, he further elaborates on what distinguishes the two types of mere conventionalities from obscurational truths. Where Candrakīrti states that obscurational truths "deceive fools,"[339] Jayānanda explains that just as "the world" does not conceive a mirror reflection to be true (but "a fool" might think his reflection to be truly a person), so those who have overcome afflictive ignorance no longer conceive ordinary appearances to be true; these appearances yet deceive the rest of us, who "conceive what is not true to be true."[340] Those who take obscurational truths as their referents—those who believe ordinary appearances to be true—are deceived. In elaborating on Candrakīrti's distinction, Jayānanda clearly places the consciousnesses of ordinary people in opposition to Dharmakīrti's understanding of valid cognition: no ordinary consciousness can be non-deceptive.[341]

Drawing out the analogy between realized beings and ordinary humans, on the one hand, and ordinary humans and fools (or, those with defective senses), on the other, Jayānanda later comments that just as the illusory floating hairs of one with a cataract-like condition will still appear to such a person's vision even when that person knows that these floating hairs are not real, just so even those realized beings who no longer conceive appearances to be true still perceive those appearances, "because there is still the mistake (*bhrānta, 'khrul pa*) of appearances of the aggregates and so forth due to non-afflictive

---

[339] La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 108.3-4: *byis pa rnams la ni bslu bar byed pa yin la /.*

[340] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 145a.7-145b.5, especially 145b.4: *byis pa rnams la bden pa ma yin pa la bden par zhen pas slu bar byed pa yin.*

[341] One could well interpret Candrakīrti's statement as opposing ordinary valid cognition, as well. However, to see it as opposing a technical usage of valid cognition, one would need to find an equation of "valid cognition" and "non-deceptive" in the writings of Dignāga, Vasubandhu, or Dharmapāla or attempt to show Candrakīrti's familiarity with Dharmakīrti's corpus. On the other hand, one could argue that Candrakīrti does not mean to implicate valid cognition thinking in this statement and that Jayānanda simply adopts Candrakīrti's "deceive," also without intending to criticize the Dharmakīrti tradition. However, as we will see below, Jayānanda explicitly addresses some of his criticism at Dharmakīrti.

ignorance."[342] While those who have cultivated their understanding of Madhyamaka emptiness know that appearances are not true and consequently are not deceived into perceiving appearances **as** obscurational truths, they are still mistaken in perceiving appearances. In this reading, non-afflictive ignorance is mistake, the same quality that Dignāga equated with conceptuality and Dharmakīrti utilized to distinguish non-conceptual perception from conceptual inference. Jayānanda pushes the mistaken status to include perception; perception, too, is imbued with the conceptuality of subject and object, falling short of the non-dual realization of emptiness that is the Madhyamaka goal.[343] We may recall Dharmottara's explanation that inference's mistake rests in its engaging appearances by way of conceiving what is not a real object to be a real object. Jayānanda would say that no object short of emptiness can be considered real. Whereas the epistemological tradition distinguishes real, causally efficacious objects from conceptual fictions, Jayānanda blankets all appearances as unreal.

The class of realized beings who yet perceive appearances are exempt from deception and so, if Jayānanda is taking Dharmakīrti's definition, might be said to possess valid cognition. However, they are still mistaken and so, if Jayānanda understands valid cognition *a la* Vinītadeva and Kamalaśīla, could not be said to possess valid cognition. So, we may ask, which is it? Unfortunately, Jayānanda does not answer unequivocally but instead pulls in

---

[342] Commenting on stanza VI.29; Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 149b.1-6, especially 149b.6: *nyon mongs pa can ma yin pa'i ma rig pas phung po la sogs pa snang ba'i 'khrul pa yod pas so.*

[343] In Chapter Five, I examine at length Jayānanda's exposition of Candrakīrti's claim that mind and mental factors cease upon Buddhahood. That claim makes quite clear that all notions of subject and object, in which common perception is mired, are rejected. In his comments on stanza VI.29, Jayānanda notes that "Due to the cessation of all conceptuality, the nature [that is, the emptiness] of the aggregates and so forth is realized" (Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 149b.7-150a.1: *de'i tshe rnam par rtog pa thams cad log pas phung po la sogs pa rnams kyi rang bzhin rtogs pa yin no /*); conceptuality opposes realization of emptiness. He further explains that this nature is ultimate truth and one who realizes this nature possesses "the complete cessation of the movement of mind and mental factors."

two different directions in his comments upon the same Candrakīrti stanza that Chapa utilized to show that Prāsaṅgikas deny any worldly valid cognition:

> If the world were valid cognition, the world would see suchness.

First, Jayānanda adopts a Dharmakīrtian definition, stating (seemingly quite clearly) that "If something is non-deceptive, it is just valid cognition."[344] While Candrakīrti introduces his stanza by pointing out the contrast between the world, which is not authoritative, and Āryas who are and thus directs this line of the stanza as referring to types of beings rather than to types of mental states, by appealing to the Dharmakīrtian definition of valid cognition Jayānanda clearly interprets this stanza as referring to mental states.[345] Likewise, his use of the Dharmakīrtian definition would seem to imply that those who perceive appearances but are not deceived into thinking that appearances are true possess valid cognition. However, to this simple statement, he adds:

> Non-deceptive furthermore means having the quality of thoroughly knowing the entity [that is, emptiness] just as it is. This thorough knowledge is also thorough knowledge of the entity free from existence and non-existence. Therefore, if the world sees suchness, because of that, it would have dispelled ignorance.[346]

---

[344] Commenting on stanza VI.30; Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 151a.6-7: *'di'i don ni 'dir mi slu ba nyid yin par 'gyur na tshad ma nyid du 'gyur ba yin la /.*

[345] When translating Candrakīrti's stanzas and autocommentary, the first line of this stanza would then more comfortably translate as "If the world were authoritative, the world would see suchness." Elsewhere, in commenting on Candrakīrti's stanza VI.3, Jayānanda echoes Candrakīrti in calling Nāgārjuna an "authoritative person" (*tshad mar gyur pa'i skyes bu*); see *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 112a.6-112b.3. Interpreting Candrakīrti as referring to authoritative persons as separate from "the world" allows for the possibility that Candrakīrti accepts that valid cognition exists within the world. Jayānanda's interpretation here does not allow that reading.

[346] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 151a.7-151b.1: *mi slu ba nyid kyang dngos po ji lta ba bzhin du gnas pa yong su shes pa'i rgyu mtshan can yin la / yongs su shes pa de yang yod pa dang med pa dang bral ba'i dngos po yongs su shes pa yin no zhes pa'o / / des na 'jig rten pas de kho na nyid mthong bar 'gyur la / de'i phyir ma rig pa spangs par 'gyur ro /.* Candrakīrti likewise equates "authority," "seeing suchness," and "having dispelled ignorance" in his comments on this stanza; La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 112.8-10.

These further qualifications of "non-deceptive" seem to restrict the scope of validity. Perceiving appearances but not assenting to their veracity would not qualify in this presentation; only knowing emptiness, seeing suchness is valid. Where previously he had distinguished afflictive and non-afflictive ignorance, here Jayānanda draws a blanket opposition between seeing emptiness and being ignorant such that both the afflictive and non-afflictive kinds of ignorance seem to oppose valid cognition. Emphasizing this point, Jayānanda explicates the final line of the stanza, "It is not reasonable for foolishness to also be valid cognition": he writes "'Foolishness' lacks thorough knowledge of the entity [emptiness] just as it is and exaggerates falsified (*phyin ci log, viparīta*) entities of existence, non-existence, and so forth."[347] All cognition but realization of emptiness is foolishness.

Jayānanda states that the Āryas, whom Candrakīrti calls "the only authorities (or, the only possessors of valid cognition),"[348] are those on the "path of seeing,"[349] the third of the five paths leading up to Buddhahood—the first path that involves the attainment of a "ground"—upon which one has direct, but not uninterrupted, perception of emptiness. This identification helps clarify the distinction Jayānanda makes between levels of cognitive validity. Those on the path of seeing would have direct perception of emptiness—valid cognition—within meditation but subsequent to meditation would perceive ordinary appearances—foolishness. Not until Buddhahood would this alternation cease (what happens upon Buddhahood is an additional point of controversy, examined in Chapter Five). We can see in Jayānanda's portrayal a two-tier model of validity, much like

---

[347] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 151b.1-2: *dngos po ci lta ba bzhin du gnas pa yongs su ma shes pa dang / yod pa dang med pa nyid la sogs pa'i phyin ci log gi dngos por sgro btags pa la blun po zhes bya la /.*

[348] La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 111.18-19: *de kho na nyid bsam pa la 'phags pa rnams kho na tshad ma yin* ("In considering suchness, Āryas are the only authorities.").

[349] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 151b.6: *'phags pa'i lam khong du chud par zhes bya ba ni mthong ba'i lam khong du chud par bya ba'i phyir ro /* ("[Candrakīrti writes] 'Realizing the Āryas' path' [meaning] for the sake of realizing the path of seeing").

Dharmakīrti's own: at the highest level is the direct perception of emptiness but at a lesser level is the perception of ordinary appearances but with the knowledge that those appearances are not true. The lower level of validity, like Dharmakīrti's inference, is clearly held to be non-deceptive; these developed Āryas are not deceived into perceiving appearances as true. However, like Dharmakīrti's perception, only direct perception of emptiness is unmistaken; Āryas short of Buddhahood still possess mistaken consciousnesses which perceive appearances.

Jayānanda clearly rejects Dharmakīrti's own two-tier model, calling ordinary perception of the conventional world "deceptive" and placing a much more stringent requirement on validity. Validity consists only of the perceptions of realized being who no longer assent to the truth of appearances. The Dharmakīrti model of valid cognition, adopted and modified by Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Chapa, among others, implies too strong a level of existence for the referents of ordinary perception and inference. In his *Hammer of Logic,* Jayānanda criticizes "Logicians following Dharmakīrti who propound that reality is realized by way of an objectively gained valid cognition."[350] We can recall that Karṇakagomin posited a two-fold division of inference in order to separate "objectively gained inferences" from inferences derived from scripture, the latter category referring to our only method for knowing "entirely imperceptible phenomena." Karṇakagomin implies that ordinary inferences make known facts on the strength of those facts themselves, indeed embodying the kind of "deference" to an objective world with which Tillemans characterizes realism. Jayānanda's rejection of Dharmakīrtian valid cognition clearly intends to dispense with any purported factual state of the objective world, rejecting the truthfulness of what is

---

[350] Jayānanda, *Tarkamudgarakārikāḥ,* stanza 1; Toh. 3869, *sde dge bstan 'gyur, dbu ma,* vol. *ya,* 374b.3-4: */ yul dngos stobs kyis zhugs pa yi / / tshad mas de nyid rtogs so zhes / / chos kyi grags pa'i rjes 'brang ba'i / / rtog ge ba rnams smra bar byed /.*

given to common perception and allowing only a second-tier validity to the post-meditative perceptions of those Āryas short of Buddhahood.

However, in rejecting Dharmakīrtian valid cognition, Jayānanda elides what Karṇakagomin posited as a category of inference to characterize the project as a whole. In so doing, Jayānanda comes to draw a caricature of his Mādhyamika opponents whom he labeled "Svātantrika" and sees as adhering to a realism at odds with Nāgārjuna's writings.[351] After stating a quite accurate summary of both of Dharmakīrti's valid cognition definitions (as elaborated by his followers),[352] Jayānanda argues—by way of examining the distinction between "substance" (*dravya*) and "isolate" (*vyāvṛtti*)—against these definitions, first rejecting the possibility that perception could reach a particular or a universal. After noting the tension in the epistemologists' depiction of perception "reaching an identified object" but also being perception of a momentary, constantly changing object, Jayānanda notes that if one (in response to this tension) dispenses with "substance" (as he would have us), valid

---

[351] I think it clear that Jayānanda intends to include his "Svātantrika" opponents among "Logicians following Dharmakīrti" at the opening of his *Tarkamudgarakārikāḥ.*

[352] Jayānanda, *Tarkamudgarakārikāḥ,* stanza 2, 374b.4: */ blo gang bcad don thob byed pa / / tshad ma yin zhes kha cig smra / / la la ma rtogs don gsal 'dod / / gzhan dag bden pa'i don rtogs smra /* ("Some say that the awareness that reaches an identified object is valid cognition. Some assert that [valid cognition] reveals a [previously] unknown object. Other say [valid cognition] knows a true object."). Williams notes that Śākya mchog ldan's citation of a passage attributed to rMa bya byang chub brtson 'grus bears a close resemblance to this stanza. The reading is consistent with rMa bya's views, discussed below, and adds clarity to Jayānanda's stanza; it reads: *bcad don thob byed nus pa mi slu ba / tshad ma'i mtshan nyid yin zhes kha cig zer / ma rtogs yul la 'dzin pa ma 'khrul bas / sgro 'dogs sel ba'i don ldog kha cig 'dod /* ("Some say the definition of valid cognition is 'non-deceptive, able to reach an identified object.' Some assert that [valid cognition] has the meaning of removing superimposition upon a [previously] unknown object by way of an unmistaken apprehension."). See Paul Williams, "rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus on Madhyamaka Method," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 13 (1985): 220-221, n.11. rMa bya makes clear that "able to reach an identified object" marks a cognition as "non-deceptive" and that this status is the litmus of valid cognition, for the opponent. His addition of "by way of an unmistaken apprehension" would seem to be his own addition, which he attributes to a second opponent (much as Jayānanda attributes the views in this stanza to three different sources). One is reminded of the Vinītadeva-Kamalaśīla tradition of redefining valid cognition as "unmistaken." rMa bya's clarifications and additions indicate both development of Jayānanda's ideas and the facility of Tibetan composition.

cognition would no longer be consciousness of an entity (*vastu*).[353] This would nullify the Dharmakīrtian notion of ordinary perception. Note that Jayānanda equates "substance" and "entity," which is the same term that Jayānanda borrows from Karṇakagomin in labeling Dharmakīrtian epistemology "objectively gained" (*vastubalapravṛtta*). Where Karṇakagomin referred to a type of "objective" inference, Jayānanda sees perception likewise to have a purported "objectivity," to cognize faithfully an object that factually exists. Jayānanda rejects Dharmakīrtian perception because he understands it as the claimed perception of the kind of real entity the existence of which Nāgārjuna rejected.

Note also how the critique moves from subject to object: valid cognition is denied because of the overly strong status such validity would imply for the existence of its object. Jayānanda rejects the possibility that valid cognition could be defined as "cognizing a true object" since "truthfulness" is the very quality lacking in appearances; such a definition of valid cognition would make invalid cognition valid,[354] as a cognition conceiving of the truthfulness of its object is the principal form of invalidity for Jayānanda. Since the objects of ordinary perception are fundamentally false, any cognition of them cannot be considered valid. Indeed, he notes that if one posits a true object, one would posit that wrong consciousness—perception of a true object—is valid cognition.[355] Perceiving true objects counters Jayānanda's most basic Madhyamaka principles.

---

[353] Jayānanda, *Tarkamudgarakārikāḥ,* stanza 8, 374b.7: / *smig rgyu la ni chu bzhin du* / / *rdzas ldog rdzas su 'thad ma yin* / / *de lta yin na tshad ma ni* / / *dngos po'i yul can ma yin zhing* / ("Similar to water in a mirage, substance [from among] substance and isolate, is not feasible. If that is so, valid cognition is not a consciousness of an entity.").

[354] Jayānanda, *Tarkamudgarakārikāḥ,* stanza 11cd-12ab, 375a.2: / *bden don rtogs pa tshad ma yi* / / *mtshan nyid min te gang gi phyir* / / *bden nyid grub pa med phyir dang* / / *tshad min tshad mar 'gyur phyir ro* / ("Knowing a true object is not the definition of valid cognition. Why? Because truthfulness is not established and because invalid cognition would become valid cognition.").

[355] Jayānanda, *Tarkamudgarakārikāḥ,* stanza 13ab, 375a.2-3: / *yul bden yin par 'gyur zhig grang* / / *log shes tshad mar 'gyur pa'i phyir*/ ("Counting [appearances] as true objects would make wrong consciousness become valid cognition.").

Levels of Validity

Candrakīrti and Jayānanda (and, as will be seen, Mabja) discuss valid cognition within a broader discussion of Nāgārjuna's two truths; Jayānanda clearly pits his interpretation of the two truths against the possibility of worldly valid cognition.[356] Chapa's view of the necessity of ordinary valid cognition to religious development does not allow him to oppose cognition of obscurational truths with valid cognition. However, he still must posit a sharp distinction between the two truths, between the objects of ordinary cognition and ultimate reality. He accomplishes this by dividing validity broadly into "valid cognition of final analysis" and "valid cognition of non-final analysis."[357] This allows Chapa to hold that cognitions of all "truths" are valid—and that everything knowable is one kind or the other of the two truths[358]—but that cognitions of ultimate and obscurational truths are valid in different ways.

While Chapa provides an etymology of "obscurational" similar to that given by Candrakīrti and Jayānanda, based on the *Descent to Laṅka Sūtra,* that plays on a correlation between ordinary consciousness and a veiling of the final nature of reality[359] and explains

---

[356] Candrakīrti also seems to pit his reading of the two truths against the possibility of worldly valid cognition although, as noted above, understanding *Entrance to the Middle* VI.30 as denying that the world are authoritative persons allows for the possibility that valid cognition exists in the world.

[357] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 1.18-20: *mthar thug dpyod pa'i tshad mas gtan la phab pa don dam pa'i bden pa dang / mthar thug mi dpyod pa'i tshad mas gtan la phab pa kun rdzob kyi bden pa gnyis su dbye'o //* ("The two-fold division is: ultimate truth, delineated by the valid cognition of final analysis, and obscurational truths, delineated by the valid cognition of non-final analysis.").

[358] Chapa makes this point clearly, stating that "All grounds of objects of knowledge do not surpass [that is, are encompassed within] the two truths"; Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 1.12-13: *shes bya'i sa thams cad bden pa gnyis las ma 'das pas.* An additional outflow of this point, discussed at length in Chapter Four, is that ultimate truth is an object of knowledge, which is a claim Candrakīrti, Śāntideva, Jayānanda, Mabja, and even Ngok Lotsawa reject.

[359] Chapa states that "All consciousnesses that do not comprehend finality are called *saṃvṛti;* because they veil the meaning of reality, they are obscurational"; Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 14.16-17: *mthar thug mi 'jal ba'i blo thams cad ni saṃ bhri ti zhes pa yang dag pa'i don la sgrib pas kun rdzob po //.* He notes that worldly consciousnesses (*khams gsum pa'i blo*) and those of Hearers and others (realized being who are yet not Buddhas)

"truth" in "obscurational truth" as meaning that "The referents of that [veiling consciousness], all established appearances that do not bear analysis, are true in the perspective of mistaken thought,"[360] he softens the distinction between the "veil" and the realization of emptiness by allowing for "non-analytical" validity. He states that obscurational truths are true when not analyzed,[361] while ultimate truth is able to bear analysis and so is true for the "valid cognition comprehending finality."[362] Only the kind of Madhyamaka analysis that investigates a phenomenon's ultimate existence results in obscurational truths becoming untrue. Chapa further divides obscurational truth into "real" and "unreal," with the former being characterized as "that which is a referent of [an awareness] that does not comprehend finality but is not an object apprehended by mistake;"[363] unreal obscurational truths are apprehended by mistake. Real obscurational

---

share in the etymology (*sgra bshad*) but are not "the bases of engagement" (*'jug pa'i gzhi*) while consciousnesses of Buddhas having appearances are the bases of engagement but do not share in the etymology.

[360] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 15.1-2: *de'i yul dpyad mi bzod pa'i snang ba grub pa thams cad ni 'khrul pa'i bsam ngor bden pas kun rdzob kyi bden pa'o //.* To express the difference between "truth" in "obscurational truth" and what is "really" true, Chapa cites Nāgārjuna's famous dictum that "only nirvāṇa is true" from *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā,* stanza 35. For Candrakīrti's comments on that stanza, see Cristina Anna Scherrer-Schaub, *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti. Commentaire à la soixantaine sur le raisonnement ou Du vrai enseignement de la causalité par le Maitre indien Candrakīrti,* Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques, 25 (Bruselles: Institut belge des hautes etudes chinoises, 1991), 75-76 and 263.

[361] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 16.4: *mthar thug 'jal ba'i yul du mi bden la ma dpyad pa'i bsam ngor bden pa kun rdzob kyi bden pa'i mtshan nyid do //* ("The definition of obscurational truth is that which is not true as an object of cognition of finality but is true in the perspective of non-analytical thinking."). This is Chapa's definition of obscurational truths, rather than the etymology given just above.

[362] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 16.20-22: *don dam pa'i bden pa'i mtshan nyid ni mthar thug 'jal ba'i tshad ma'i yul du bden pa ste / ldog pa 'ga' zhig la khyad par dpyad pas bden pa'i zhen pa bzlog du myed pa ni dpyad bzod pa yin la de 'jal ba ni mthar thug 'jal ba'i tshad ma yin la de'i gzhal byar bden pa don dam pa'i bden pa'o //* ("The definition of ultimate truth is that which is true as the referent of a valid cognition that cognizes finality. The unreversibility of the conception of truth through analyzing attributes in a specific isolate is "bearing analysis." The cognition of that is the valid cognition comprehending finality. Being true as the object of that comprehension is ultimate truth."). Chapa, in contradistinction to most Tibetan scholars of his day and later, holds that ultimate truth bears analysis because when analyzed, one's conception of its truth is not reversed.

[363] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 18.2-3: *mthar thug mi 'jal ba'i yul 'khrul pa'i gzung yul ma yin pa ni yang dag pa'i kun rdzob po //.*

truths, while not being finally true when subjected to analysis, are unmistakenly known by the valid cognition that does not perform such analysis. For Chapa, unmistaken validity comes in ordinary and ultimate varieties.

What of Jayānanda's strong correlation between mistaken consciousness and appearances? We have seen Chapa state that obscurational truths are true for mistaken thought, but then subdivide this class of truths into real and unreal on the basis of being apprehended by unmistaken and mistaken consciousnesses, respectively. So are appearances indicative of mistaken consciousness? Chapa replies that appearances do entail mistake but that mistake itself is of two kinds, one that implies and another that does not imply that its bearer possesses defilements:

> The mistake that conceives what does not exist among objects of knowledge to exist—for instance, the conception of a permanent entity—and the mistake that takes what is empty of performing functions as its apprehended referent—for instance, the appearances of two moons, concepts (*don spyi*), and so forth—entail obstructions. However, if you state the fault that it follows that Buddhas have obstructions because of not having that capacity [for mistake], your reason is not established [that is, Buddhas have the capacity for mistake]. If you say that Buddhas have obstructions because of having the capacity for the mistake that is a referent-taker [that is, a consciousness] that does not bear analysis, your entailment is not established [that is, having the capacity for this kind of mistake does not entail having obstructions].[364]

---

[364] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 15.8-12: *rtag pa'i dngos por zhen pa lta bu shes bya la mi srid pa la srid par zhen pa'i 'khrul pa dang zla ba gnyis dang don spyi lasogs par snang ba lta bu don byed pas stong ba gzung yul du byed pa'i 'khrul pa la sgrib pas khyab kyang de sangs rgyas la mi mnga' bas sgrib pa dang bcas par thal ba'i skyon brjod na gtan tshigs ma grub pa yin la / dpyad mi bzod pa'i yul can gyi 'khrul pa mnga' ba'i phyir sgrib pa dang bcas par 'gyur ro zhe na khyab pa ma grub pa yin no //.* This passage is discussed again in Chapter Five, on the topic of how Buddhas perceive ordinary appearances. As I state there, the passage indicates three levels of mistake: the mistake that binds us in cyclic existence, the useful mistake that allows us to utilize concepts (here grouped with the perceptual mistake of those with faulty sense faculties—a common Madhyamaka metaphor for how we perceive the ordinary world), and the mistake that allows even Buddhas to perceive appearances.

As we will see in more detail in Chapter Five, Jayānanda concludes that because all appearances entail mistake Buddhas cannot perceive the appearances that lesser being perceive. Chapa is willing to concede that appearances indicate a level of mistake but holds that not all mistakes are problematic. On one level, cognitions of real obscurational truths can be called unmistaken even though such cognitions entail appearances; on another level, Buddhas can perceive appearances without this perception necessitating defilement.

As discussed in Chapter Two, Chapa's way of addressing the need for epistemological grounding within Madhyamaka very quickly lost favor with many of his students. However, his concerns left their mark on Tibetan Madhyamaka, beginning with the work of his student, Mabja Jangchub Tsondru,[365] who left Chapa to study with Jayānanda. Williams convincingly shows that the primary locus for Mabja's discussion of the opposition between the Madhyamaka view and "objectively gained valid cognition" must have been Mabja's no-longer extant commentary on Jayānanda's *Hammer of Logic*.[366] Jayānanda's brief text (twenty stanzas in length) would seem to be the important source of Mabja's discussion and, as suggested in Chapter Two, possibly one of the main factors that swayed Mabja to the Prāsaṅgika view. Mabja's only presently-known text, a commentary on Nāgārjuna's *Fundamental Treatise on the Middle* called the *Ornament of Disputation,* claims that "Svātantrikas" posit knowledge by way of "objectively gained valid cognition that is renowned to both proponent and opponent [in a debate] or by valid cognition having an

---

[365] *rMa bya Byang chub brtson 'grus,* d. 1185.

[366] Williams ("Madhyamaka Method," 207 and 220, nn. 7 and 8) notes that Mabja refers readers of his *'Thad pa'i rgyan* to an *dBu ma'i de kho na nyid gtan la dbab pa* for his own more thorough discussion of these issues. Williams suspects that this was the subtitle to Mabja's *Hammer of Logic* commentary; Williams takes as the main title that used by the Eighth Karmapa, Mi bskyod rdo rje, to refer to Mabja's commentary, *Rigs rgyan snang ba.*

unmistaken mode of apprehension."[367] Where Jayānanda kept closely to the Dharmakīrtian notion of valid cognition (although characterizing it as "objectively gained"), Mabja switches to "unmistaken" as a defining feature of valid cognition, quite possibly as a result of his study with Chapa. Mabja rejects such valid cognition even on the conventional level, positing instead a "mere valid cognition that is renowned by one's opponent or in the world."[368]

In distinguishing his own "mere valid cognition" from his opponents' "objectively gained valid cognition," Mabja quickly points out that his usage neither becomes a cognition "of one's own nor a consequence that implies a proof because there is not even conventionally an ascertainment of a tenet objectively known nor an implication [asserting] the opposite [of what one disproves]."[369] He equates *svatantra* with "objectivity," eliding the term (*svatantra*) that Candrakīrti had used in rejecting Bhāvaviveka's form of inference in order to criticize not just the use of formal inference but the Madhyamaka adaptation of the valid cognition enterprise. Mabja further distinguishes his opponents' understanding of "valid cognition having an unmistaken mode of apprehension" from his own position, following Jayānanda, that "the referents of consciousness having appearance" are true only for mistaken mind.[370] Perceiving appearances indicates mistaken perception; almost all of what the epistemological tradition calls unmistaken is, in Mabja's portrayal, mistake.[371]

---

[367] rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus, *dBu ma rtsa ba shes rab kyi 'grel pa 'Thad pa'i rgyan* (Rumtek, Sikkim: Dharma Chakra Center, 1975), 41.4-5: *rang rgyud du smra ba'i dbu ma pa dag rgol phyir rgol gnyi ga la grags pa'i dngos po'i stobs kyis zhugs pa'am / 'dzin stangs mi 'khrul ba'i tshad ma nyid kyis nges pa yin no zhes zer ro /.*

[368] rMa bya, *'Thad pa'i rgyan,* 42.5-6: *pha rol 'am 'jig rten la grags pa'i tshad ma tsam.* Williams's conjecture ("Madhyamaka Method," 222, n.26) that the following *las ma blangs* must be emended to *khas ma blangs* is supported by the Thimpu edition of rMa bya's text.

[369] rMa bya, *'Thad pa'i rgyan,* 44.4-5: *dngos po stobs zhugs kyis grub pa'i mtha' gcig tu nges pa dang / bzlog pa 'phangs pa ni kun rdzob tu yang med pas rang rgyud dang sgrub byed 'phen pa'i thal 'gyur du mi 'gyur bar shes par bya'o //.*

[370] rMa bya, *'Thad pa'i rgyan,* 45.4-5: *snang bcas kyi blo'i yul thams cad brdzun pa sgyu ma lta bu dang / blo 'khrul bar grub par mtshan gzhi shes bya tsam kun rdzob kyi mtshan nyid tha snyad kyi shes pa 'khrul pa'i yul du bden pa dang ldan par nges pa yin no/* ("All referents of consciousness having appearance, which are like false illusions,

Despite this strong correlation between appearance and mistake, Mabja nuances levels of mistake in a way that opens the way toward ordinary valid cognition and that is reminiscent of Chapa's portrayal. Although he divides obscurational truth from ultimate truth on the basis of what is true for a mistaken consciousness[372] and an unmistaken consciousness, respectively, he allows that "real obscurational truths" are perceived by worldly unmistaken consciousnesses.[373] This "worldly unmistaken consciousness" seems to be identical to Chapa's "non-analytical unmistaken consciousness" that cognizes real obscurational truths. Chapa takes the additional step of calling such a consciousness "valid cognition"; Mabja writes of "mere" or "worldly renowned valid cognition." As Mabja has

---

and mere objects of knowledge—illustrations that are established for a mistaken consciousness—are ascertained as being true as referents of conventional, mistaken consciousness, having the character of obscuration.").

[371] The exception that both sides would agree upon is "yogic direct perception," the meditative perception of emptiness. Mabja rejects the Dharmakīrtian notion that ordinary perception is unmistaken and the Vinītadeva notion that all valid cognition is unmistaken, siding with Jayānanda that only direct perception of emptiness is valid cognition.

[372] Within "mistaken consciousnesses" lie Āryas' consciousnesses having appearance, the appearances to which Mabja calls a second kind of obscurational truths (*'Thad pa'i rgyan,* 38.4: *nyong mongs can ma yin pa'i ma rig pas 'khrul par byas pa snang ba dang bcas pa'i 'phags pa gsum gyi rjes kyi shes pa 'khrul pa'i yul du grub pa 'phags pa'i kun rdzob kyi bden pa gnyis yin la /* "[Those which are] established as referents of the mistaken consciousnesses subsequent [to meditative absorption] of the three Āryas' who [have consciousnesses] having appearance, which are held to be mistaken due to non-afflictive ignorance, are the second, Āryas' obscurational truths."). Thus, like Jayānanda, he equates appearance and mistake. Unlike Jayānanda—who equates obscurational truths with the belief in the truth of appearances—Mabja considers all appearances to be obscurational truths, although he does (40.1-2) state that Āryas' obscurational truths are also called mere conventionalities (per Jayānanda). Mabja additionally states that "illustrations of obscurational truths" (*kun rdzob bden pa'i mtshan gzhi*) are "all the variety of knowable phenomena, referents of mind having appearance" (*'Thad pa'i rgyan,* 38.3: *snang bcas kyi blo'i yul shes bya'i chos gang ji snyed pa thams cad do /*). Mabja accounts for all phenomena (if we can say emptiness is a phenomenon, which Mabja would not seem to do) within the two truths, whereas Jayānanda must posit two kinds of mere conventionalities outside of the two truths. Both Mabja and Jayānanda hold that emptiness is not an object of knowledge and so deny that objects of knowledge are the basis of division of the two truths.

[373] *'Thad pa'i rgyan,* 37.6-38.1 presents Mabja's primary delineation of the two truths as the objects of mistaken and unmistaken consciousnesses; obscurational truths are "true as referents of conventional, mistaken consciousness" (*tha snyad pa'i shes pa 'khrul pa'i yul du bden pa yin*) while ultimate truth is "true as a referent of unmistaken consciousness" (*blo ma 'khrul pa'i yul du bden pa*). At 38.4-5, Mabja divides afflicted obscurational truths into real and unreal on the basis on being cognized by unmistaken or mistaken worldly consciousnesses.

redefined Svātantrika valid cognition as "objectively gained" and as having "an unmistaken mode of apprehension" and, in so doing, pushed his opponents (including Chapa) into a quasi-realist position, he can admit a worldly level of unmistaken validity. Mabja has recast Chapa's position on ordinary valid cognition in a Prāsaṅgika mold.

Additionally, Mabja is willing to include, within an Ārya's unmistaken consciousness, inferential knowledge of emptiness: ultimate truth is "true as a referent of unmistaken consciousness, that is, true in the perspective of either the non-conceptual wisdom of an Ārya's meditative absorption or a reasoning consciousness that analyzes finality—suchness—by way of a triple-moded reason."[374] Mabja's "reasoning consciousness" is very close (if not identical) to Chapa's "valid cognition comprehending finality," the analysis Chapa enjoins that yields knowledge of emptiness. The "triple-moded reason" refers to Dharmakīrtian inference; Chapa regards the inferential knowledge of emptiness to be essential to religious development, to the passage from believing the truth of appearances to understanding the reality behind them. Mabja, like Jayānanda, attempts to displace his Svātantrika opponents from the middle, arguing that their epistemological adaptations align them with "objectivity." Influenced by his study with Chapa, Mabja takes the additional step of adopting epistemological concerns—the provisional unmistaken status of ordinary consciousness and the need for inference in understanding ultimate truth—within a Prāsaṅgika view.

Mabja's "mere valid cognition that is renowned by one's opponent or in the world" opens the way to his accepting—along with Candrakīrti and Jayānanda[375]—four valid

---

[374] rMa bya, *'Thad pa'i rgyan,* 38.1-2: *blo ma 'khrul pa'i yul du bden pa ste 'phags pa'i mnyam gzhag mi rtog pa'i ye shes sam / tshul gsum pa'i rtags las mthar thug de kho na nyid dpyod pa rigs pa'i shes pa'i ngor bden pa'o /.*

[375] Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*, following a lengthy critique of Dignāga's notions of valid cognition and perception, adopts a four-fold model of validity (*pramāṇacatuṣṭaya*) for worldly knowledge, in which valid cognition and its object are established in mutual dependence and not established in their own natures (*svābhāvikī siddhiḥ*); see La Vallée Poussin, *Prasannapadā,* 75.6-9 and David Seyfort Ruegg, *Two Prolegomena to*

cognitions, an ironic twist after rejecting the Dharmakīrtian two-fold model of valid cognition. Mabja introduces his discussion of the four types—perception, inference, testimony, and analogy—by calling them "the four valid cognitions renowned in the world."[376] Mabja combines the non-Buddhist Nyāya conception of a four-fold model of valid cognition with what is "renowned in the world." One would expect the four-fold model to represent what is "renowned by one's [non-Buddhist] opponent" but Mabja—a Tibetan who likely never met a Naiyāyika—places the four-fold system in the hands of "the world," a move that points to a new distinction, not between Buddhist and non-Buddhist systems of validity (which was an important distinction in India) but between a two-fold system wrongly adopted by logic-addicted Mādhyamikas (who represent the only tenet system held in Tibet) and a "worldly" understanding.

Mabja, like Candrakīrti and Jayānanda before him, does not hold to the Naiyāyika model but instead adopts a looser standard of validity that allows him to claim, on the worldly level, four valid cognitions, all of which still fall within the category of mistake. Accepting a four-fold model does not show Prāsaṅgika allegiance to the valid cognition enterprise but indicates just how far they place themselves outside of the Dharmakīrti enterprise, a distance that allows them to adopt nominally a non-Buddhist model. Mabja offers a hedge toward ordinary valid cognition with his notion of worldly unmistaken consciousness and a four-fold "worldly renown" valid cognition. However, he presents the correlation between human consciousness and mistake as a basic maxim, held by any (good)

Madhyamaka Philosophy, Studies in Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Thought, Part II (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 2002), 132-135.

[376] rMa bya, *'Thad pa'i rgyan,* 42.6: *'jig rten la grags pa'i tshad ma bzhi.* This usage seems to be a subtle shift on Candrakīrti's wording.

Mādhyamika: "Mādhyamikas assert—just as they assert suchness in entities—that all referents of mind having appearance are erroneous and all mind is mistaken."[377]

Conclusion: Competing Schools of Philosophy, Unified Religious Vision

Like Candrakīrti and Jayānanda, Mabja's arguments against valid cognition occur within a larger presentation of the two truths.[378] Jayānanda and Mabja read Candrakīrti's interpretation of Nāgārjuna's two truths as staking out a stark divide between human consciousness and the Āryas' perspective that negates the possibility of Dharmakīrtian valid cognition (as they construe it). Any follower of Nāgārjuna must posit a fundamental distinction between ordinary "truths" and emptiness and between the classes of consciousnesses that cognize these. As we have seen, Chapa presents a distinction between each of the two truths and between ordinary consciousnesses and cognition of emptiness. The Prāsaṅgika distinction lies in pitting human consciousness, characterized by mistake, in blatant opposition with validity as Dharmakīrti and his followers define it. Both sides of this Madhyamaka debate take up the basic terms of the Indian Buddhist epistemologists'

---

[377] rMa bya, *'Thad pa'i rgyan,* 40.2-3: *dbu ma pa rnams kyis kyang dngos po la de kho na ltar snang bcas kyi blo'i yul thams cad brdzun pa dang blo thams cad 'khrul bar 'dod pa.*

[378] All of the passages quoted herein from Mabja's *'Thad pa'i rgyan* are found in a section discussing "the nature of the two truths" (37.5: *bden pa gnyis kyi rang bzhin*). In delineating the two truths' definitions and illustrations (the first two of three subsections into which "the nature of the two truths" is divided), Mabja cites Candrakīrti's "two truths" section of *Entrance to the Middle* six times (stanzas VI.23-26, 28-29—the same stanzas Chapa cites when setting up Candrakīrti's division of consciousnesses and their referents) and Śāntideva's declaration of the two truths in stanza IX.2 of *Engaging in the Bodhisattva's Deeds.* Mabja's critique of "objectively gained valid cognition" and differentiation of his own "worldly valid cognition" occurs in the third subsection of "the nature of the two truths," "the valid cognition that ascertains the definitions within the illustrations" (37.6 and 41.2). This three-fold discussion of the two truths mirrors closely Chapa's formulation in *dBu ma shar gsum stong mthun,* in which a five part presentation is given: *bden pa gnyis kyi so so'i mtshan nyid* ("Definitions of the individual two truths"), *mtshan nyid gnas pa'i rten mtshan gzhi* ("Illustrations that are the bases where the definitions abide"), *mtshan gzhi la brtsad pa spang pa* ("Dispelling objections to our illustrations"), *mtshan gzhi nges byed kyi tshad ma* ("The valid cognitions that ascertain the illustrations"), *de la mtshan nyid rten par nges byed kyi tshad ma* ("The valid cognitions that ascertain that the definitions are supported in those [illustrations]").

discussion of what characterizes valid cognition, either working out ways to incorporate the notion of validity within the Madhyamaka view of fundamental human ignorance or rejecting the possibility of human unmistaken consciousness because of that ignorance. Clearly, the epistemologists' notion of mistake (*bhrānta*) displaced concern with delusion (*moha*) in the twelfth century Madhyamaka debates that saw the school divided into Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika interpretations.

Mabja's bold statement of what Mādhyamikas assert can be read as an attempt to define a tradition. Mādhyamikas, Mabja would have us believe, reject Dharmakīrti, adopt a worldly notion of valid cognition (although whose world one must wonder), interpret Nāgārjuna's two truths as opposing unmistaken human cognition, and rely on Candrakīrti and Śāntideva in reaching these conclusions. Chapa's positions, with which Mabja was well familiar, are called Svātantrika Madhyamaka,[379] in opposition to what "Mādhyamikas assert." If Mabja goes further than Jayānanda toward accomodating human valid cognition, he does so only by first stigmatizing a Madhyamaka position that openly welcomes Dharmakīrti's epistemology. In the caricature they draw of Svātantrika, Jayānanda and Mabja stake out variant canons: their own Candrakīrti-Śāntideva line of interpreting Nāgārjuna and, in opposition to this, Mādhyamikas who adopt the Dharmakīrti tradition and so, in their eyes, reject Nāgārjuna's most fundamental tenets. In one sense, the creation of two subschools of Madhyamaka consists in this construction of competing canons, the invention of two traditions of exegesis that share little overlap. The sense of an uncommon foundation that each side held circumscribed their abilities to dialogue productively with each other, as well as our ability to evaluate their respective arguments.

In another sense, as I have tried to detail throughout this chapter, the creation of these two subschools of Madhyamaka entailed significant philosophical differences, the

---

[379] rMa bya, *'Thad pa'i rgyan,* 41.4.

arguments in support of which call for our evaluation. The competing allegiances that the twelfth century creators of the Prāsaṅgika movement constructed between Mādhyamikas who adopt Dharmakīrtian epistemology—whom they call Svātantrikas—and their own interpretation of Nāgārjuna's two truths brings into focus a tension between the Madhyamaka rejection of "self-nature" and epistemological foundationalism and between the sweeping ignorance with which Madhyamaka would seem to characterize the human condition and the need to posit distinctions between valid and deceptive human consciousnesses. If Prāsaṅgikas more clearly recognized this tension and brought their interpretation of Madhyamaka into open conflict with Buddhist epistemology, can we say that their characterization of Svātantrika as "objectivists" is accurate? Does twelfth century Svātantrika amount to realism? Do Svātantrikas hold that phenomena are (to use the much later phrase) established by way of their own character (*rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa*)? Of course Chapa, like Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, would not admit to realism. However, in evaluating their work, we may fairly step outside the historical-textual perspective and stand with later exegetes who draw out what they see implied in these figures' thought.

As discussed above, Tillemans sees eighth century "Svātantrikas" as falling back on a perceptual given that implies the kind of epistemological foundationalism that Candrakīrti rejects. In contrast, McClintock defends Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla from charges of realism on account of their "sliding scale" of analysis. Likewise, I see Chapa's levels of valid cognition as deflecting his opponent's attacks. The type of sturdy existence he is accused of granting to conventional reality—in which things exist "out there" in such a way that they impinge upon one's consciousness "in here"—is undermined by the Madhyamaka analysis Chapa enjoins that concludes with the realization that things do not exist as unitary nor multiple phenomena. Moreover, Prāsaṅgikas themselves—beginning with Mabja and extending to important later Tibetan developers of the tradition—saw that their eventual triumph over the Svātantrika position necessitated that they ameliorate the conflict between

Madhyamaka and Buddhist epistemology not by rejecting Dharmakīrti—as Jayānanda was wont to do—but by making the epistemological project palatable within a Prāsaṅgika world. The necessity of valid cognition within Madhyamaka is Chapa's greatest defense.

The survival of some of Chapa's most central views within a system that he vehemently argued against points to the need to move from asking "Are Svātantrikas guilty of subscribing to the contemporary philosophical notion, 'the myth of the given'?" (although my own use of this concept indicates how useful I find it) to appreciating the totality—the functioning Buddhist universe in which enlightenment is possible—that these figures wished to construct. In this vein, it is helpful to see that the most serious charges each side threw at the other were nearly identical: Chapa accuses Prāsaṅgika of making Buddhahood no different from nihilism[380] while Jayānanda, following Candrakīrti, claims that epistemologists who claim worldly valid cognition must think that the world has dispelled ignorance, thereby making the Buddhist path pointless.[381] For Chapa, a continuum of validity is essential to the progress from ignorance to enlightenment. For twelfth century Prāsaṅgikas, the epistemological turn is too strong, giving unwarranted credence to ordinary cognition without motivating us to seek the Āryas' path to Buddhahood. Despite their strongly held convictions of their opponent's flaws, the two sides share a common motivation. Their differing means for constructing a coherent religious path is a primary division of twelfth century Madhyamaka.

---

[380] Chapa (*dBu ma shar gsum,* 73.1-3 and 75.14ff) accuses the Prāsaṅgika of adopting the Indian Carvāka system, in which death is held to terminate living beings entirely without the possibility of afterlife or rebirth, or of holding a "nirvāṇa without remainder" position, in which the Buddhist path culminates in an extinction that does not allow for the compassionate aid of sentient beings deemed central to Mahāyāna notions of Buddhahood.

[381] Jayānanda here (*Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 151b) comments on Candrakīrti's rhetorical question in stanza VI.30, "What need would there be for the others, the Superiors, and what would be the use of the Superior path?"; La Vallée Pousin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 112.5-6: *'phags gzhan gyis // ci dgos 'phags pa'i lam gyis ci zhig bya /.*

Chapter Four: What Can Be Said About the Ineffable?

Buddhist thinking has long held the notion that what is salvifically essential cannot be expressed directly, but only pointed to with descriptive, metaphoric, or sometimes expository language. In the Madhyamaka context, ultimate truth—the object of salvific knowledge—has frequently been described as ineffable (*anabhilāpya*) and beyond conceptual thought (*vikalpa*). In a well-known passage of *Entrance to the Middle*, Candrakīrti extends this line of thinking, declaring that the ultimate "is ineffable and just not an object of consciousness."[382] Candrakīrti's extension singles out the soteriological importance of the ultimate for Madhyamaka, setting it off from ordinary human speech and consciousness, and at the same time raises the crucial salvific problem of how or if ordinary consciousness can be developed to know the ultimate. His formulation raises a fundamental issue in Buddhist thinking: if human consciousness is fundamentally flawed, how can it gain transformative knowledge? In Candrakīrti's Madhyamaka treatment, the issue becomes more pointed, as the object of liberating knowledge is proclaimed to be entirely outside of our mental capabilities.

This chapter traces the responses to Candrakīrti's iconoclastic[383] interpretation of the ultimate. I showed in Chapter One that the rise of interest in Candrakīrti's corpus in eleventh and twelfth century India and Tibet was fueled in large part by interest in his unique views on ultimate truth. Here, I explore the competing understandings of the ultimate developed, favorable to Candrakīrti, by Prajñākaramati (c. 950-1030) and

---

[382] Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti,* Bibiotheca Buddhica 9 (Osnabrück:Biblio Verlag, 1970), 109.2-3: *don dam pa'i bden pa bstan par 'dod pas de ni brjod du med pa'i phyir dang shes pa'i yul ma yin pa nyid kyi phyir dngos su bstan par mi nus pas* ("One wishing to teach ultimate truth cannot teach explicitly for it is ineffable and just not a referent of consciousness").

[383] It could well be that Candrakīrti viewed himself much more of a traditionalist than an iconoclast. Certainly, his use of sūtra to back up his contentions on ultimate truth support this interpretation. The quite radical manner in which his eleventh and twelfth century popularizers utilize his views to develop an interpretation of the ultimate and of Buddhahood seems to warrant the use of "iconoclastic."

Jayānanda (twelfth century), and, critical of Candrakīrti, by Chapa Chokyi Sengé[384] and Drakpa Gyeltsen.[385] When Candrakīrti's corpus gained wide exposure in the early years of the second millennium, Mādhyamikas were forced to account for his unique view of ultimate truth and, consequently, interpretation of the ultimate became a central focus of this period.

The Prāsaṅgika Ultimate

Jayānanda, commenting on Candrakīrti's proclamation that the ultimate is "just not an object of consciousness," writes that the ultimate "is not in the sphere of conceptual consciousness because those [consciousnesses] engage an object (*yul*) that exists, does not exist, and so forth."[386] Jayānanda, one of the chief figures responsible for gaining a wide audience for Candrakīrti's writings, states that it is "conceptual knowledge" that cannot know the ultimate, suggesting that this passage simply restates the older Madhyamaka maxim that the ultimate is beyond conceptuality. However, he also suggests that consciousness carries with it conceptions of existence and non-existence, which Nāgārjuna declared to be ultimately untenable. In this sense, Jayānanda—and Candrakīrti before him—may well be implicating all forms of consciousness and declaring them to be useless in realizing the ultimate. This interpretation is borne out by Jayānanda's positions, examined in detail in the following chapter, that consciousness does not know the ultimate and that consciousness ceases upon Buddhahood. That the ultimate is not an object of any kind of consciousness became, at least for Jayānanda, a hallmark of a fledgling Prāsaṅgika interpretation of Madhyamaka.

---

[384] *Phya pa chos kyi seng ge,* 1109-1169.

[385] *Grags pa rgyal mtshan,* 1147-1216.

[386] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* Toh. 3870, *sde dge* edition, *dbu ma,* vol. *ra,* 147b.4: *rnam pa rtog pa'i shes pa'i yul ma yin pa'i phyir te'o/ /de rnams yod pa dang med pa la sogs pa'i yul la 'jug pas so/.*

A very similar notion to Candrakīrti's declaration is voiced in Śāntideva's *Bodhicaryāvatāra,* in his discussion of the two truths:[387]

> It is asserted that there are two truths—obscurational and ultimate.
> The ultimate is not a referent of awareness; awareness is said to be obscurational.

This brief statement is amplified by Śāntideva's commentator, Prajñākaramati, who links Candrakīrti's and Śāntideva's ideas by quoting Candrakīrti four times in his commentary on this Śāntideva stanza.[388] He notes that "the ultimate, in reality, is just not a referent of obscurational consciousness."[389] In explanation of Śāntideva's "not a referent of awareness" he writes that "awareness" means "all consciousness," that the ultimate is "not a referent because of surpassing the sphere of all consciousness," and elaborates that it is "impossible to bring [the ultimate] within the sphere of all awareness in any way."[390] Prajñākaramati's restatement of ideas found in Candrakīrti and Śāntideva makes clear that, in his view, all consciousness is defective, imbued with obscuration. His formulation would seem to widen

---

[387] Stanza IX.2; Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Prajñākaramati's Commentary to the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Çāntideva,* Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1905), 352:
saṃvṛtiḥ paramārthaś ca satyadvayam idaṃ matam /
buddher agocaras tattvaṃ buddhiḥ saṃvṛtir ucyate //.
The Tibetan of pāda cd (D3871, vol. *ya,* 31a.1) reads:
don dam blo yi spyod yul min / blo ni kun rdzob yin par brjod //.
Saito ("Śāntideva in the History of Mādhyamika," 261, n.3) reports that the Tun-huang version for pāda d reads: *blo dang sgra ni kun rdzob yin //* (= *buddhiḥ śabdaś ca saṃvṛtiḥ*). I have translated pāda c in accordance with the canonical Tibetan; however, in accordance with the Sanskrit, it could be translated just as well—and with the same meaning—as "Reality is not a referent of awareness." The Tun-huang version of pāda d declares the both "awareness and speech are obscurational." This reading mirrors Candrakīrti's declaration more closely than the Sanskrit or Tibetan canonical readings.

[388] Prajñākaramati cites *Madhyamakāvatara,* VI.23, 25, 28, and 29, all stanzas in which Candrakīrti explicates his understanding of the two truths.

[389] La Vallée Poussin, *Prajñākaramati's Commentary,* (1905), 366.8-9: *paramārthasya vastutaḥ sāṃvṛtajñānāviṣayatvāt //.*

[390] La Vallée Poussin, *Prajñākaramati's Commentary,* (1905), 363.7: *buddheḥ sarvajñānānāṃ / samatikrāntasarvajñānaviṣayatvādagocaraḥ / aviṣayaḥ / kena cit prakāreṇa tatsarvabuddhiviṣayākartuṃ na śakyata.*

the gulf opened by Candrakīrti between ordinary consciousness and the ultimate, placing salvific knowledge further from the human ken while relegating consciousness to the realm of ignorance.

Prajñākaramati also follows Candrakīrti in backing up his contention that the ultimate is essentially unknowable by ordinary cognition by citing a passage from the *Introduction to the Two Truths Sūtra*. The passage reads:[391]

> Devaputra, if ultimate truth were ultimately a referent of body, of speech, or of mind, it would not be reckoned as "ultimate truth"; it would be just an obscurational truth. However, Devaputra, ultimate truth is passed beyond all conventions and it is not particularized. It is not produced and does not cease; it is devoid of object of speech and speech itself, as well as object of knowledge and consciousness. Ultimate truth is passed beyond entities ranging right through the referents of omniscient wisdoms endowed with the supreme of all aspects. It is not as expressed in the phrase "ultimate truth."
>
> All phenomena are erroneous and thus are deceptive phenomena. Devaputra, ultimate truth cannot be taught. If you ask "Why?" All phenomena—whoever teaches, whatever is taught, whomever is taught—are ultimately utterly unproduced. Utterly unproduced phenomena cannot be explained because they are utterly unproduced.

This sūtra source that Candrakīrti and Prajñākaramati cite to support their views shows a lengthy pedigree to the notion that the ultimate cannot be known by human intellect; the

---

[391] *bden pa gnyis la 'jug pa, satyakaparivarta;* P813, vol. 32. Cited in Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 110.15ff. Prajñākaramati cites the first paragraph, up to "It is not as expressed…" in his *Bodhicaryāvatātrapañjikā,* (1905) 366.10-16: *yadi hi devaputra parmārthataḥ paramārthasatyaṃ kāyavāṅmanasāṃ viṣayatāmupagacchet / na tatparamārthasatyamiti saṃkhyāṃ gacchet / saṃvṛtisatyam eva tad bhavet / api tu devaputra paramārthasatyaṃ sarvavyavahārasamatikrāntaṃ nirviśeṣaṃ / asamutpannamaniruddhaṃ / abhidheyābhidhānajñeyajñānavigataṃ / yāvatsarvākāravaropetasarvajñajñānaviṣaya-bhāvasamatikrāntaṃ paramārthasatyamiti vistaraḥ /.* Candrakīrti's citation differs in small measure from Prajñākaramati's. I give here the full passage cited by Candrakīrti but follow Prajñākaramati's reading as far as he cites. The portion cited by Prajñākaramati is translated in Christian Lindtner, "Atiśa's Introduction to the Two Truths," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 9 (1981): 187.

sūtra declares it to be not a referent of mind, devoid of object of knowledge and consciousness. These latter terms are paired with the sūtra's rejection of speech and its object, again referencing the ineffability of the ultimate. Taken together, the sūtra sounds a common Buddhist rejection of duality, here the dualities of speech and of knowledge, strongly suggesting that human knowledge is inherently dualistic. Prajñākaramati additionally cites the *Meeting of Father and Son Sūtra,* which speaks of the ultimate similarly, declaring that, "the ultimate is ineffable, incomprehensible, unknowable, uncognizable."[392] These sūtra passages point to a deep concern among Indian Mādhyamikas with the singular importance of the ultimate and, additionally, to a growing problem in Madhyamaka thinking of how to uphold the unique character of ultimate truth while yet maintaining its accessibility. With Prajñākaramati and Jayānanda in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, these concerns came to the forefront, heightening the debate within Madhyamaka over the ultimate, how it can be realized, and the resulting state—Buddhahood to the extent that a unique Prāsaṅgika subschool formed.

Prajñākaramati gives us further insight into just what it is about human intellect that renders it useless in ultimate concerns. He introduces his citation of the *Introduction to the Two Truths Sūtra* by stating that "all awareness has a nature of conceptuality…[and] all conceptuality has a nature of ignorance."[393] He then follows the sūtra passage by stating that the ultimate is "not a referent of conceptual construction."[394] Prajñākaramati's framing shows that, in his interpretation, conceptuality is what invalidates ordinary consciousness. It may well be that conceptuality invalidates certain kinds of ordinary consciousnesses but not others—that is, Prajñākaramati could well be ascribing to the broad Buddhist division of

---

[392] La Vallée Poussin, *Prajñākaramati's Commentary,* (1905), 367.6-7, citing the *Pitāputrasamāgamasūtra: yaḥ punaḥ paramārthaḥ so 'nabhilāpyaḥ / anājñeyaḥ / aparijñeyaḥ / avijñeyaḥ /.*

[393] La Vallée Poussin, *Prajñākaramati's Commentary,* (1905), 366.2-4: *sarvā hi buddhirālambana-nirālambanatayā vikalpasvabhāvā / vikalpaśca sarva evāvidyāsvabhāvaḥ / avastugrāhitvāt /.*

[394] La Vallée Poussin, *Prajñākaramati's Commentary,* (1905), 366.17: *ata eva tad aviṣayaḥ sarvakalpanānāṃ.*

non-conceptual and conceptual consciousnesses and, within that division, rejecting only the latter. Non-conceptual consciousness could still be a valid means of knowing the ultimate. In this interpretation, one would surmise that Prajñākaramati rejects the possibility of inferential knowledge of the ultimate but accepts a rarefied consciousness that directly perceives the ultimate. However, his comments, cited above, that the ultimate surpasses all consciousness suggest that the kind of conceptuality he objects to is found in all consciousness—all consciousnesses operate in a duality of subject and object.

In commenting on Candrakīrti's citation of the *Introduction to the Two Truths Sūtra,* Jayānanda states that the sūtra's rejection of the dualities of speech and knowledge means that the ultimate "is not a sphere for the activities of words and conceptuality."[395] He reads the rejection of knowledge as a rejection of conceptuality. The remainder of his comments on this sūtra quote have a similar tenor, as he notes that ultimate truth "is not an object of the word or concept 'suchness.'"[396] However, again, just how deep Jayānanda sees conceptuality running in human consciousness requires investigation: in rejecting conceptuality, does he reject a class of consciousness or are conceptuality and consciousness equated? Conceptuality seems to be a consciousness taking an object. In addition to his denial that the ultimate can be an object of conceptuality, he explains why the ultimate surpasses even the sphere of omniscience: "It is not reasonable for [ultimate truth], which is free from the four extremes (*mu bzhi, catuṣkoṭi*), to be an entity that is a referent (*yul gyi*

---

[395] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 150b.2: *sgra dang rnam par rtog pa dag gi spyod yul ma yin no zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go /.* Jayānanda adds this comment to an abbreviated citation of the sūtra passage that reads only *smar bar bya ba dang zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs te* / ("'object of speech and' and so forth is said"). As he cites no more of this sentence, it is safe to assume that his "and so forth" encompasses the sūtra's "speech itself, as well as object of knowledge and consciousness" and so his comment substitutes "words" for the sūtra's "object of speech and speech itself" and substitutes "conceptuality" for the sūtra's "object of knowledge and consciousness."

[396] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 150b.4: *de kho na nyid kyi sgra dang rnam par rtog pa'i yul ma yin pa'i phyir ro /.*

dngos po); we impute it to be an entity that is an object when we say, for [the sake of] trainees, 'omniscience knows suchness.'"[397] Convention leads us to speak as though the realization of the ultimate entails subject-object duality, but it does not. Knowing, for Jayānanda, involves subject-object duality and so can have no place in realizing the ultimate. Coupled with his amplification of Candrakīrti's rejection of mind and mental factors at Buddhahood (treated at length in the following chapter), this deep-seated equation of duality and conceptuality gives the impression that all forms of consciousness have no place in ultimate truth. For Jayānanda, the ultimate is unknowable.

Certainly Candrakīrti, Prajñākaramati, and Jayānanda all saw realization of the ultimate as of fundamental soteriological importance and as the goal of Buddhist practice. In declaring the ultimate to be not an object or referent of consciousness, they forge a basic disjunction between the functioning of consciousness and ordinary knowledge, on the one hand, and salvific realization. Rather than posit a type of consciousness purified of conceptuality that knows the ultimate, they choose to disavow consciousness in ultimate concerns and, as we will see in the following chapter, reject consciousness for Buddhas. This basic disjunction struck some Mādhyamikas of the day as untenable, as it would seem to leave no way of cultivating ordinary mental states into a Buddha's wisdom and to make the ultimate entirely inaccessible. These Mādhyamikas sought ways of emphasizing the singularly efficacious status of the ultimate while yet allowing for a continuity of consciousness such that one could come to know the ultimate. These debates on the status of the ultimate formed one of the primary sources of division in Madhyamaka in twelfth century Tibet.

---

[397] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 150b.3-4: *mu bzhi dang bral ba la yul gyi dngos po mi rigs pa dang / gdul bya rnams kyis thams cad mkhyen pas de kho na nyid thugs su chud pa yin no zhes yul gyi dngos po brtags pa yin pas so /.*

Chapa's Ultimate

Chapa Chokyi Sengé, one of the chief opponents of Candrakīrti's revivalists, argued directly against the budding Prāsaṅgika notion that the ultimate surpasses the sphere of consciousness. I set aside Chapa's understanding of how consciousness comes to know the ultimate until the following chapter where it will be investigated alongside the Prāsaṅgika notion that "knowing" the ultimate is merely metaphoric. Here, I examine his rejoinders to the Prāsaṅgika take on the nature of the ultimate and explore his own unique interpretation of ultimate truth. Chapa declared—in the highly formal language of scholastic discourse—that the basis of division into two truths must be the broad category of objects of knowledge (*jñeya, shes bya*).[398] In other words, ultimate truth, just like conventional truths, is a phenomenon knowable by consciousness.

Chapa begins his critique by drawing a portrait of Candrakīrti's views that relies a great deal on twelfth century developments. He characterized the Prāsaṅgika position as follows:

> A certain proponent of reasoning says: "The character of ultimate truth passes beyond the mark of objects of knowledge. No matter how one knows ultimate truth—as existent, non-existent, both [existent and non-existent] or neither [existent nor non-existent]—those are proliferations; but ultimate truth, due to being devoid of all proliferations, passes beyond the mark of objects of knowledge. Furthermore, since it is not in any way to be taken as a convention, it is uncharacterizable even by any means of positing; hence, it has no character either. Since it is not the conceived object (*zhen yul*) of words or conceptuality, it is also without proliferations. Since it is not established as not empty, it is also emptiness. Since it is not a compounded entity (*'dus byas kyi dngos po*), it is also a non-entity. Since it is not established as produced, ceasing, and so forth, it is also non-dual (*gnyis su myed pa*)."[399]

---

[398] Phya pa chos kyi seṅ ge, *dbu ma śar gsum gyi stoṅ thun,* ed. Helmut Tauscher (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1999), 1.17.

[399] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 18.7-13.

Chapa's characterization follows Jayānanda's above-cited comments closely, stating that any way of knowing the ultimate would involve conceptions of existence or non-existence and so ultimate truth cannot be an object of knowledge. One also hears overtones of the *Introduction to the Two Truths Sūtra* passage that Candrakīrti and Prajñākaramati cited, as Chapa has his opponent speak of the ultimate as beyond conventions and without character. Much as we saw with Prajñākaramati and Jayānanda, Chapa's Prāsaṅgika opponent equates knowledge with conceptuality and with proliferations (*prapañca*)—the verbal and conceptual overlay that blinds us to the ultimate and ensnares us in further suffering, which ultimate truth per force lacks. Ultimate truth, then, cannot come within the domain of consciousness in any way without losing its status as ultimate truth; it cannot be an object or referent of knowledge.

Chapa's rejoinders to the Prāsaṅgika understanding of an unknowable ultimate, as well as his own explication of ultimate truth, center on a close association of valid knowledge and the referents of valid knowledge. For Chapa, knowledge of any real object—and we will see below how he nuances "real"—must be valid knowledge. If the Prāsaṅgika wants to say that the ultimate, the very absence of proliferations, is not an object of knowledge, then it would not be an object of valid cognition (*gzhal bya, prameya*);[400] valid cognition itself would be useless in knowing the ultimate and ceasing proliferations. I suspect that the Prāsaṅgikas we have examined here would not object. However, to clarify his own position, Chapa has his opponent object that "Proliferations are ceased [by valid cognition] but there is no cognition (*gzhal ba*) of voidness of proliferations," to which he responds: "The very dispelling of the superimposition of proliferations is the meaning of cognizing voidness of proliferations."[401] The opponent wants a valid negation of proliferations that merely negates

[400] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 20.4-5.
[401] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 20.9-13.

without inducing cognition of emptiness. Rather than knowing emptiness, the negation of proliferations would seem to negate any object of consciousness and negate consciousness as well. Chapa's answer makes clear that in his view, emptiness is known in the very act of negating proliferations—the mental processes that overcome obstructions realize the ultimate. For Chapa, consciousness validly knows the ultimate.

As noted in the previous chapter, one of the ways Chapa stakes out the singular importance of ultimate truth from all other objects of valid knowledge is by creating a hierarchy of types of valid cognition and the objects of these cognitions. While consciousnesses of both kinds of "truths" are valid cognitions, they are valid on different levels: "that which is delineated by the valid cognition of final analysis is ultimate truth; that which is delineated by the valid cognition of non-final analysis is an obscurational truth."[402] "Final analysis" consists of the cognitive processes that investigate the ultimate mode of subsistence of phenomena; this analysis will find phenomena to be without establishment, empty. Chapa tells us "this very non-establishment is ultimate truth since it abides as the object cognized by final analysis."[403] Ultimate truth is the object cognized by this "final" form of valid cognition. Ordinary phenomena are validly established, but only by valid cognition that does not perform this final analysis. Chapa holds two levels of validity such that all truths are validly known, yet only ultimate truth is valid finally.

Speaking to what "final analysis" entails, Chapa describes how phenomena that are conventionally validly established (positive phenomena or affirming negatives)[404] are invalidated ultimately:

---

[402] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 1.18-20.

[403] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 10.9: *ma grub pa nyid mthar thug dpyod pa'i gzhal byar gnas pas don dam pa'i bden pa yin.*

[404] Playing with the much older Buddhist conception of phenomena as either positive (*sgrub pa*) or negative (*pratiṣedha, dgag pa*) and, further, the division of negatives into either affirming negatives (*paryudāsapratiṣedha, ma yin dgag*) or non-affirming negatives (*prasajyapratiṣedha, med dgag*), Chapa writes "I just accept the

> Mādhyamikas [assert that] the conceptions that temporal continua and spatial wholes are true are to be reversed through differentiating them into moments and particles [respectively]. Moreover, the conceptions that subtle particles and moments are true are to be reversed through differentiating those into [a particle's] ten directions and [a moment's] beginning, middle, and end. Similarly, the conception of truth with regard to parts is to be reversed through differentiating into parts within parts, since parts are endless. Thus, it is impossible for affirming negatives to be true as objects cognized by cognitions of finality.[405]

Only emptiness, the ultimate lack of establishment, holds up to this analysis; the conception that ordinary phenomena are true is overturned when one analyzes by division.

Clearly, for Chapa, ultimate truth is an object of knowledge and is found by final analysis. Additionally, ultimate truth is the sole phenomenon that is, in the end, "true" and that "bears analysis" (*dpyad bzod pa*). Mādhyamikas beginning with Nāgārjuna hold that the ultimate alone is true;[406] one suspects that this common assertion led Jayānanda and other

---

consequence that positives are negatives because all positives are affirming negatives" (Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 85.20: *sgrub pa dgag par thal ba ni 'dod pa nyid de sgrub pa thams cad ma yin dgag yin pa'i phyir ro //*). Defining these terms, he writes: "A positive phenomenon is that which is suitable for its own meaning generality to be conceived upon appearing as self-powered, without dependence upon its opposite's meaning generality appearing" (87.2-3: *bzlog pa'i don spyi 'char ba la ma ltos par rang nyid kyi don spyi rang dbang du shar nas zhen du rung ba rnams ni sgrub pa'i chos zhes bya'o//*). "A negative phenomenon is that which is suitable to be conceived upon the appearance of a meaning generality which is the opposite of the object of negation in dependence on the appearance of the meaning generality of the object of negation—[for instance] emptiness of performing a function, not being produced from causes, not ceasing, and so forth" (87.3-5: *don byed pas stong ba dang rgyus bskyed pa myed pa dang 'gag pa myed pa la sogs pa dgag bya'i don spyi shar ba la ltos nas de las bzlog pa'i don spyi shar ste zhen du rung ba ni dgag pa'i chos zhes bya'o*). "The definition of non-affirming negative is that which is determined by awareness as just negative when ascertaining just the simpliciter itself" (87.10-11: *myed dgag gi mtshan nyid ni ldog pa de kha yar nges pa na dgag pa 'ba' zhig par blos zhen par bya ba yin*). "The definition of affirming negative is that which is apprehended without dispelling the positive factor when ascertaining just the simpliciter itself" (87.11-12: *ma yin dgag gi mtshan nyid ni ldog pa de kha yar nges pa na sgrub pa'i cha ma dor bar zhen par bya ba yin*).

[405] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 17.10-13.

[406] In his *Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning* (*Yuktiṣaṣṭikā*), Nāgārjuna writes: "When the Conquerors have said 'Only nirvāṇa is true,' what wise person would think 'The rest are not false'?" (stanza 35; *sde dge* 3825, *dbu ma,* vol. *tsa*, 21b.5; Christian Lindtner, *Master of Wisdom: Writings of the Buddhist Master Nāgārjuna* (Oakland: Dharma Publishing, 1986), 84. While later Tibetan scholarship debates whether nirvāṇa, here meaning the ultimate, is

early Prāsaṅgikas to reject the possibility of conventional valid cognition (as discussed in Chapter Three)—if only the ultimate is true, conventionalities are false and "knowledge" of them must not be valid. However, Chapa has a unique take on what makes the ultimate true, namely, that it bears the analysis of division. He writes "Since emptiness of a true nature is not established as any entity at all, it is empty of all distinctions. Therefore, since [emptiness] is indivisible into distinctions, there is no reversing the conception of truth by dividing distinctions; hence, it bears analysis….Emptiness of a true nature is also true as an object of the cognition of finality."[407] For Chapa, the ultimate is an object of a special type of refined cognition, is true in final analysis, and—rather than just stand as the result of analysis—is able to bear that analysis: we believe that it is true and, upon analysis, our belief is not overturned.[408]

In the passage above, we see that Chapa holds an ultimate that lacks any distinctions (*khyad par, viśeṣa*)—there is no way of dividing the ultimate that would overturn the sense of its veracity. He additionally makes clear that this ultimate without distinctions is a non-affirming negative: "Since a non-affirming negative that negates a mere positive phenomenon as a referent of reasoning has no mere distinctions to be examined, the conception of truth cannot be reversed through analyzing its distinctions."[409] If, instead of a "mere" phenomenon, a phenomenon with particular qualities (or distinctions)—such as

---

ultimately true in the sense of ultimately established, Chapa clearly sees it as ultimately true and bearing analysis.

[407] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 25.19-26.1. Elsewhere (16.20), Chapa writes, "The definition of ultimate truth is that which is true as the referent of a valid cognition that cognizes finality. The cognition of that is the valid cognition comprehending finality. Being true as the object of that comprehension is ultimate truth." He also notes (17.19), "We assert that only a non-affirming negative possesses the definition of being true as the object cognized by cognitions of finality."

[408] Chapa writes "The unreversibility of the conception of truth through analyzing attributes in a specific isolate is 'bearing analysis'" (Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 16.21: *ldog pa 'ga' zhig la khyad par dpyad pas bden pa'i zhen pa bzlog du myed pa ni dpyad bzod pa yin la*).

[409] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 17.13-15. Chapa also writes, "Only a non-affirming negative possesses the definition of being true as the object cognized by cognitions of finality" (Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 17.19-20).

permanence—is analyzed, finding its emptiness will not be **final**, as further qualities will still require analysis: one will find the emptiness of a permanent phenomenon but the possibility of an impermanent phenomenon remains. Finding the emptiness of permanence would be an affirming negation that would itself have to be negated.[410] Only non-affirming negatives will require no further negation; only non-affirming negations are final.

Chapa seems to have developed his unique interpretation of an ultimate that exists without any distinctions in response to what he saw as the Prāsaṅgika denial that the ultimate exists at all. Whether or not Chapa's understanding of his Prāsaṅgika opponents is accurate, one can see that Candrakīrti's, Prajñākaramati's, and Jayānanda's denial that the ultimate is an object of knowledge easily allows Chapa to conclude that, for them, the ultimate does not exist. Chapa sees the Prāsaṅgika as rejecting any status for the ultimate (that is, as rejecting any thesis regarding the ultimate) whatsoever. That Mādhyamikas influenced by Candrakīrti's views advanced this view in the eleventh and twelfth centuries can be seen in the writings of several tantric commentators who linked the idea that the ultimate neither exists nor does not exist with Nāgārjuna's and Candrakīrti's declarations that production does not occur in any of the "four alternatives": from self, from other, from both, or from neither.[411] Chapa views this interpretation of the ultimate as logically

---

[410] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 17.15-19.

[411] See Chapter One, particularly pp. 22-23. The *Compendium of Good Sayings* makes this connection between the ultimate neither existing nor not existing and Candrakīrti's views most clearly by citing stanza twenty-eight from the tantric Āryadeva's *Jñānasārasamuccaya* immediately after citing Candrakīrti's denial of production. Prajñākaramati also cites the tantric Āryadeva's stanza in his commentary to *Engaging in the Bodhisattva Practices* (La Vallée Poussin, *Prajñākaramati's Commentary* [1905]: 359.10), in which there is a strong connection with Candrakīrti's understanding of the ultimate, as already discussed above. The *Compendium* passage is found in *Subhāṣitasaṃgraha,* edited by Cecil Bendall, *Muséon* IV (1903): 389: *na san nāsan nasadasan na cāpy anubhayātmakaṃ / catuṣkoṭivinirmuktaṃ tattvaṃ mādhyamikā viduḥ //* ("The Mādhyamika proclaims reality free of the four alternatives: not existent, not non-existent, not existent-and-non-existent, and not having the nature of neither"). The tantric Āryadeva's stanza is found in the edition of Katsumi Mimaki, "*Jñānasārasamuccaya* kk. 20-28, *Mise au point* with a Sanskrit Manuscript," in *Wisdom, Compassion, and the*

impossible and develops an ultimate that exists without any distinctions, or qualities that can be predicated to it, in response.

Chapa makes clear that his ultimate without distinctions answers the Prāsaṅgika notion of an ultimate that neither exists nor does not exist in a passage that throws additional light—albeit hazy—on his understanding of the ultimate. He writes:[412]

Search for Understanding: The Buddhist Studies Legacy of Gadjin M. Nagao, ed. Jonathan A. Silk (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000), 240-241.

[412] This passage has been translated by Helmut Tauscher, "Phya pa chos kyi seng ge as a Svātantrika," in *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make?* eds. Georges B.J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2002), 224-225. My translation and understanding of the passage differs slightly from his. Tauscher suggests (p. 224) that this passage "would clearly indicate Phya pa's ontological position and, in addition, establish him as a proponent of an own thesis in Madhyamaka and as being under the very strong influence of Yogācāra philosophy, yet only if one takes the introductory question to reflect Phya pa's opinion." The opening question must be Chapa introducing a hypothetical opponent, not a Prāsaṅgika and not himself, who holds that a consciousness that is established by experience—the Prāsaṅgika's own mode of conventional establishment—exists ultimately. Chapa nowhere else in this text claims that mind is the ultimate. I discuss this more immediately below. His point in introducing the imagined opponent's position is to bait the Prāsaṅgika into taking a stand: how can the Prāsaṅgika argue with his own "worldly renown" even when it is used to justify the ultimate existence of mind? Chapa only states his own position in the fifth sentence, where he writes, "We, also, do not assert any distinction regarding the ultimate." As shown above, Chapa argues for an ultimate without distinctions in several places. One weakness of my interpretation is the presence of "clear" (*gsal ba*) in this fifth sentence, which would seem to refer to the "clear awareness" in the first sentence. Rather than have Chapa claim "clear awareness" as his own ultimate, I twist the passage around to have just the one word, "clear," indicate the hypothetical opponent's idea of the ultimate. Tauscher's translation avoids this problem. Another way to interpret the sentence would be that Chapa merely pretends to adopt "clear awareness" as his ultimate in order to cause problems for his Prāsaṅgika opponent and does not, even in this fifth sentence, state his own position. In our informal correspondence on this issue, Prof. Tauscher indicated that he favors this interpretation, writing (January 14, 2005) "Still, I share your suspicion that the whole argument does NOT reflect Phya pa's position regarding *don dam pa*." Yet another possibility is to read the fifth sentences' *gsal ba* as "predicate" of a formal inference (that which clarifies the subject of the inference) rather than "clear." This interpretation is attractive because so much of Chapa's text aims at showing the proper way to inferentially realize emptiness—emptiness is the predicate of all phenomena. It is just barely possible to read the *gsal ba* in the first sentence of this passage in the same way: "…proponents of existence [who hold] the thesis that an awareness that is singularly established by experience has the predicate, only exists ultimately." However, this reading of *gsal ba* goes against the common usage of *blo gsal ba* as "clear awareness." Also, in the only other usage of *gsal ba* that I find in Chapa's text (Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 94.8-10) the term definitely refers to a broad quality of consciousness, "clarity," rather than a part of formal inference, because Chapa speaks to a feature of a direct perception in that passage.

> How can proponents of thesislessness refute those who propound the existence of the thesis that a clear awareness that is singularly established by experience only exists ultimately?
>
> [A Prāsaṅgika might say] We perform the analysis, "Is that awareness unitary or manifold; produced or not produced; permanent or impermanent?"
>
> [We respond:] That action [of analysis] itself also should be analyzed: is it a true entity or empty of being such?
>
> [A Prāsaṅgika] might say, "We have no assertions whatsoever."
>
> [We respond:] We, also, do not assert any distinction regarding the ultimate, [which the hypothetical opponent we began with holds to be] clear [awareness].
>
> [A Prāsaṅgika] might say, "Not asserting any distinctions regarding an entity [claimed by you to be] existent is not feasible."
>
> [We respond:] Casting out both of two explicit contradictories [that is, unitary or manifold, produced or not produced, permanent or impermanent] is not feasible.
>
> [A Prāsaṅgika] might say, "Although [two things] are established for the worldly as explicit contradictories, that is not established for us."
>
> [We respond:] Regarding an existent entity, not passing beyond permanent and impermanent or one and many, and so forth, is established in the world. However, this is not established for us.

Chapa has the Prāsaṅgika state that his claim of an ultimate that exists without distinctions is illogical only to show that the Prāsaṅgika notion of an ultimate that is neither

---

Additionally, due to my understanding of the first sentence of this passage, I do not accept the emendation to Chapa's text that Tauscher tentatively adopts (Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 67.4). Chapa's heading to this passage reads "[In the absence of theses, the Prāsaṅgika] would be unable to refute a mere consciousness that bears analysis" (*dpyad bzod pa'i shes pa tsam dgag mi nus pa*). In citing this passage, Śākya Chokden (Śākya mchog ldan, *Lung rigs rgya mtsho,* vol. 14, 519.2) reads "…a mere consciousness that does **not** bear analysis" (*dpyad **mi** bzod…*). In his edition of Chapa's text and in his translation of this passage (p. 224), Tauscher tentatively adopts Śākya Chokden's reading. My understanding is that the heading to the passage directly introduces the first sentence, the hypothetical position of a clear awareness that exists ultimately. In the heading, "a mere consciousness that bears analysis" refers to this clear awareness that exists ultimately. If we emend the text per Śākya Chokden, the reading "…a mere consciousness that does **not** bear analysis" would have to refer to something else, perhaps to a position that Śākya Chokden believes Chapa to hold.

of two explicit contradictories (*dngos 'gal, sākṣād virodha*),[413] likewise, is illogical. He clearly sees the Prāsaṅgika notion that the ultimate neither exists nor does not exist to stem from their utter rejection of any thesis. Throughout these pages of his text, Chapa is intent on showing that if Prāsaṅgikas deny one thing, they must hold the contradictory of that thing—they must at least have a thesis that states the non-existence of the thing they negate.[414] Quite typical of his arguments against Prāsaṅgika, Chapa lets the issue rest at showing that Prāsaṅgikas have the same faults that they would level at his own views. Both sides need to step outside of "worldly" logic in their presentations of the ultimate: Chapa's own ultimate without distinctions does not conform to worldly logic.

Throughout the back-and-forth style he adopts in his "debate" with Prāsaṅgika, Chapa adduces hypothetical positions that he does not hold simply because they cause problems for the Prāsaṅgika.[415] These positions bring out weaknesses in the Prāsaṅgika position but do not reflect his own view. While the passage cited above could be understood as Chapa holding that the mind, or "clear awareness," is the ultimate that lacks any distinctions, interpreting an ultimately existing awareness as a hypothetical position better fits the evidence. That Chapa could hold the mind itself to be the ultimate does not square with the many other clear statements he makes, cited previously, that the ultimate is a non-affirming negative and utter non-establishment. Even if one suggests that he holds the mind's ultimate non-establishment to be the ultimate, an emptiness of establishment would still be his ultimate, not the mind.

---

[413] For more on "explicit contradictories" and other classes of contradictories, see Birgit Kellner, "Types of Incompatibility (*'gal ba*) and Types of Non-Cognition (*ma/mi dmigs*) in Early Tibetan *Tshad Ma* Literature," *PIATS*, Graz, vol. 1, particularly pp. 499-500.

[414] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 66.7ff.

[415] In one important case (Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 73.1ff), Chapa shows that any argument the Prāsaṅgika could make against the Hedonist (*Cārvāka, tshu rol mdzes pa ba*) rejection of future rebirth can apply equally to their own rejection of mind and mental factors upon Buddhahood.

Further evidence that mind is not Chapa's ultimate occurs in his explanation of Nāgārjuna's famous claim that, "If I had a thesis, I would have a fault. Since I have no thesis, I am only faultless."[416] Having argued at length against the Prāsaṅgika's over-literal interpretation of thesislessness, Chapa states:

> It is not the case that emptiness does not exist as the basic disposition (*gshis*) of objects of knowledge because if emptiness does not abide, it would [absurdly] follow that a true entity (*bden pa'i dngos po*) is established. The intention of [Nāgārjuna's] declaration of no thesis is that although the emptiness of true entities is the ultimate truth, the thesis holder's awareness (*dam 'cha' ba bo'i blo*) is not established when analyzed through reasoning and, hence, this is not established as a thesis.[417]

Chapa clearly holds that emptiness is ultimate truth and is a positive statement regarding the nature of phenomena: all phenomena are empty. Whether or not he portrays Nāgārjuna's "intention" more faithfully than Prāsaṅgikas do, his interpretation makes clear that, in his view, the awareness that realizes the thesis, "all phenomena are empty," itself does not hold up to analysis. The awareness is not the ultimate.

We have seen that, for Chapa, the non-affirming negative, emptiness, is true in final analysis because it is not overturned by that analysis; it "bears analysis." Additionally, we have seen that it is "true as an object of the cognition of finality." But does Chapa hold that the ultimate is "truly established"? Emptiness exists as the ultimate; but does it ultimately exist? The term, truly established (*bden par grub pa*), and the distinction between existing as the ultimate and ultimately existing (*don dam du yod pa/don dam par yod pa*) do not seem to be part of Chapa's vocabularly.[418] Very likely, they are distinctions made by later scholars

---

[416] In his *Refutation of Objections;* E.H. Johnston, A. Kunst, K. Bhattacharya, *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna: Vigrahavyāvartanī* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1998), 14, 61: *yadi kācana pratijñā syānme tata eṣa me bhaveddoṣaḥ / nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmānnaivāsti me doṣaḥ //.*

[417] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 77.7-10.

[418] I only find Chapa using the phrase *don dam du yod pa* once, in the passage (Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 67.5: *blo gsal ba don dam du yod pa*), discussed above, in which Chapa challenges the Prāsaṅgika to refute one who

and were not part of twelfth century discussions. However, we can pose these questions to Chapa's work in order to highlight the differences between his understanding of the ultimate and the views of later and better-known Tibetan scholars. As discussed above, he states clearly that the ultimate is utter non-establishment. It would therefore seem that the ultimate would not be truly established, as nothing is. Additionally, for Chapa, the non-affirming negative, emptiness, exists without distinctions and is the ultimate; it would then "exist as the ultimate." That emptiness is found by final analysis suggests that Chapa may view it as ultimately existing, if by "ultimately" we mean "in final analysis." However, in a passage that continues from his interpretation of Nāgārjuna's "thesislessness," Chapa writes:

> Regarding suchness, or utter non-establishment, the phenomenon that is an object of valid cognition, and so forth, does not exist ultimately (*don dam par*). However, the phenomenon [suchness] that is a manifest object of valid cognition relative to yogic direct perception and is a hidden object of valid cognition relative to the inference that cuts proliferations abides conventionally (*tha snyad du*).[419]

For Chapa, the emptiness that is the object of a yogi's meditation or of a valid inference proving that phenomena are empty conventionally exists. He may only be saying that the inductive and meditative practices leading to awakening and the realization of emptiness

---

holds that "clear awareness ultimately exists." He uses the phrase *don dam par* more frequently. In several places, the phrase clearly means "ultimately": "ultimately, proliferations are negated" (74.19: *don dam par spros pa bkag pa*); "conventionally, not ultimately" (77.13: *kun rdzob du yin gyi don dam par ma yin no*); an opponent asks how he "negates the convention, ultimately existent (88.17: *don dam par yod pa'i tha snyad bkag pa*). Elsewhere, *don dam par* could mean "as the ultimate" particularly where the words are placed in an opponent's mouth; for instance, he argues against the Prāsaṅgika who "makes no assertion at all ultimately/as the ultimate" (69.18: *don dam par ci yang khas mi len pa'i dbu ma*). Twice (71.8-9) he uses *don dam gyi* for "ultimately."

[419] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 77.18-20: *de bzhin nyid cir yang ma grub pa la don dam par gzhal bya la sogs pa'i chos myed kyang tha snyad du rnal 'byor gyi mngon sum la ltos nas gzhal bya mngon gyur dang spros pa gcod pa'i rjes dpag la ltos na[s] gzhal bya lkog gyur yin pa'i chos kyang gnas pa.*

exist conventionally. However, the most straight-forward way of reading this passage is that the ultimate does not ultimately exist.[420]

The ultimate that Chapa argues for is unique in the history of Madhyamaka thought. The issues of how to maintain the ultimate's singularly important status but yet allow it to come under the same principles of valid cognition that bear on the conventional world came to a head in his era. The solutions he adduces were not always adopted by others, yet we see elements of and responses to his answers surviving into the present. In certain regards, Chapa's ultimate comes dangerously close to a "positive emptiness," consistently eschewed by Mādhyamikas. His language suggests that the ultimate is more than a simple absence, that emptiness—the final nature—holds up to analysis, that something stands out of nothing. However, this nature is a negation that does not affirm or imply the presence of something else but is utter non-establishment. As such, Chapa's ultimate is even more strongly aligned with a "negative" interpretation of emptiness. In sum, Chapa holds that the ultimate

- is ultimately true
- bears final analysis
- exists without characteristic
- conventionally exists
- is a non-affirming negative
- is utterly non-established.

---

[420] Donald Lopez (*A Study of Svātantrika* [Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 1987], 143) correctly reports that Chapa holds that the ultimate bears analysis and, perhaps less correctly, that the ultimate exists ultimately. The Gelukpa scholars whom Lopez represents equate "bearing analysis" and "ultimately existing" (much more precisely, Lopez writes "to not exist ultimately is to not be established as capable of bearing analysis by a conceptual reasoning consciousness which properly analyzes the mode of being of phenomena") but Chapa, it seems, does not.

This combination of characteristics allows for the ultimate to be found by inferential reasoning and to exist as the fundamental nature of all phenomena while yet being the negation of all conceptual proliferation. Chapa's emphasis on a knowable ultimate ran directly counter to his Prāsaṅgika contemporaries yet foreshadowed the direction that Tibetan Madhyamaka exegesis would take in the ensuing centuries.

Concordant Ultimates

We have seen Chapa's insistance that ultimate truth is a non-affirming negative and is the final nature of phenomena. This combination of traits poses certain problems, one of which is how positive phenomena (or affirming negatives which, as noted above, Chapa equates with positive phenomena) can have a final nature that is a non-affirming negative. Chapa's exploration of this problem adduces certain phenomena that are **almost** the ultimate, phenomena that he calls "concordant ultimates" (*mthun pa'i don dam*).[421] The notion of concordant ultimates was utilized by Chapa and other early Tibetan Svātantrikas to explain how the ultimate can be realized by human cognition and to explain how enlightened beings can still perceive appearances; concordant ultimates soften the divide between conventional and ultimate that all Mādhyamikas uphold. The early Prāsaṅgika rejection of concordant ultimates marks another key distinction between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika Madhyamaka in twelfth century Tibet.

In the course of explicating how the two truths are of one entity (*ngo bo gcig pa*), Chapa addresses the criticism that since appearances do not bear analysis, an emptiness that is of the same nature as appearances would likewise not bear analysis and would, therefore,

---

[421] As will be shown below, the topic of concordant ultimates is much older than Chapa, running at least as far back as eighth century India. It is developed in the works of Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla and in certain writings of Bhāvaviveka. The place of concordant ultimates in Bhāvaviveka's thought is unclear, particularly whether the sixth century Bhāvaviveka developed the idea or whether later authors writing under the name, Bhāvaviveka, developed it. I discuss this in more detail in Chapter One.

not be ultimate truth (assuming Chapa's correlation of ultimate truth and bearing analysis). The opponent argues that some other emptiness that is not of the same nature as appearances (an emptiness that is not an object of knowledge?) must be the "non-figurative [that is, actual] ultimate truth" (*rnam grangs ma yin pa'i don dam*) while the emptiness that shares a nature with appearances is only a "concordant ultimate, included among the obscurational."[422] Chapa replies that if "actual" ultimate truth were not of the same nature as appearances, realizing emptiness would not overturn the false belief in ultimately existing phenomena.[423] Without explaining the tension between an ultimate that bears analysis and appearances that do not, he upholds that an emptiness that is a non-affirming negative is the "non-figurative ultimate truth," of one nature with appearances.

Chapa counts certain affirming negatives among concordant ultimates. Given his own insistence that the ultimate bears analysis due to existing without any distinctions and given his inclusion of positive phenomena within affirming negatives, Chapa has an opponent ask whether the non-affirming negation of positive phenomena could be ultimate truth. If so, "it would be contradictory to explain it as a concordant ultimate,"[424] for it would be the actual ultimate. On one hand, the emptiness of positive phenomena would also establish the emptiness of affirming negatives; only the emptiness of non-affirming negatives would remain to be established. On the other hand, establishing the emptiness of positive phenomena would establish the emptiness of the "distinction,"[425] positive, and Chapa's ultimate has no distinctions. Chapa adjures that it cannot be a real ultimate; although one

---

[422] The opponent's objection runs Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 7.19-8.2.

[423] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 8.3-4: *de ltar na snang ba'i dngos po don dam pa'i dngos por zhen pa'i log shes dang don dam pa'i bden pa cir yang ma grub par rtogs pa'i tshad mas gnod bya gnod byed ma yin par 'gyur te gzhi tha dad la 'jug pa'i phyir* / ("If that is so, the wrong consciousness that conceives appearing entities to be ultimate entities and the valid cognition that realizes appearing entities to be utterly unestablished—ultimate truth—would not be invalidated and invalidator [respectively] because of engaging different bases").

[424] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 26.9-10.

[425] Here (Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 26.9), Chapa uses *bye brag,* which he uses interchangably with *khyad par.*

realizing the emptiness of positive phenomena "realizes a factor of ultimate truth," such a practitioner "does not dispel all obstructions"[426] and so has not realized ultimate truth. Additionally, he states that while a non-affirming negation is not a concordant ultimate, the negation of the distinction, positive, comes to have an affirming negative that is a concordant ultimate:

> The negatives that are connected with that basis [positive phenomena] or that appear to the conceptuality that eliminates the object of negation are affirming negatives and are conventional entities. By the factor of being empty of the object of negation, they are similar to a non-affirming negative; hence, they are explained to be concordant ultimates. The non-affirming negative is not explained to be a concordant ultimate.[427]

Affirming negatives that are deeply connected with an emptiness, such as the negation of a positive phenomenon that could be the first step toward a non-affirming negation of positive and negative phenomena, are considered concordant ultimates.

While he does not use the term, "concordant ultimate", Chapa's discussion of what is **not** the ultimate bears on the present discussion. Immediately following the above discussion of the emptiness of positive phenomena, Chapa addresses the possibility that the illusion-like (*sgyu ma lta bu*) nature of appearances could be considered ultimate truth. The illusion-like nature of phenomena is seen by a practitioner who realizes the naturelessness of phenomena and, retaining that realization, subsequently perceives appearances. Thus, as Chapa tells us, "illusion-like" is a composite of naturelessness and appearance.[428] If this composite were ultimate truth, the parts of the composite, naturelessness and appearance, could not be analytically separated nor overturned by analysis; they would be final. Then,

---

[426] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 26.10-12.

[427] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 26.12-14: *dgag pa de gzhi dang 'brel pa'am dgag bya bsal pa'i rnam par rtog pa la snang ba ma yin dgag dag kun rdzob pa'i ngo bo yin yang / dgag byas stong ba'i chas myed dgag dang 'dra bas mthun pa'i don dam du bshad pa yin gyi myed dgag mthun pa'i don dam du bshad pa ma yin no //.*

[428] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 27.21: *snang ba dang rang bzhin myed pa'i tshogs pa.*

appearances, as one inseparable part of ultimate truth, could not be overturned by analysis and would have to exist ultimately.[429] However, appearances are not found (*rnyed pa*) by final analysis and so a composite of appearance and naturelessness cannot be found by final analysis; the composite —and so, illusion-like nature—cannot be ultimate truth.[430]

Elsewhere, Chapa tells us that the inference that proves phenomena to have an illusion-like nature is an affirming negative and a conventional consciousness.[431] He does not call it a concordant ultimate but contrasts it with the non-affirming negative, emptiness, found by a reasoning consciousness (*rigs shes*).[432] Over two hundred years later, the Tibetan polymath, Tsongkhapa,[433] called illusion-like nature a concordant ultimate and argued against the notion that an illusion-like nature is established by a reasoning consciousness (*sgyu ma rigs grub pa*). In arguing against this, Tsongkhapa additionally shows that Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Haribhadra also do not hold the illusion-like nature to be the ultimate.[434] Chapa's and Tsongkhapa's rejections that an illusion-like nature is found by a reasoning consciousness would seem to be very much in line with each other and with these Indian masters. The ongoing debate, presented in detail by Napper,[435] in Gelukpa circles over whether those who accept that the illusion-like nature is established by reasoning can be

---

[429] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 27.21-28.4.
[430] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 28.11-13.
[431] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 87.16-18.
[432] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 87.15.
[433] *tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa,* 1357-1419.
[434] Jeffrey Hopkins, *Other Emptiness, Self Emptiness* (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, forthcoming), 200-201; Tsong kha pa blo bzang grags pa, *sKyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba'i byang chub lam gyi rim pa / Lam rim 'bring* (Mundgod, India: dga' ldan shar rtse, n.d.), 484.3-485.1. Tsongkhapa's and other Gelukpa scholars' views on illusion-like nature are also discussed in David Seyfort Ruegg, *Three Studies in the History of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Philosophy, Studies in Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Thought, Part I* (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 2000), 96-101.
[435] Elizabeth Napper, *Dependent-Arising and Emptiness* (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1989), 403-440 (Appendix I: The Division of Mādhyamikas Into Reason-Established Illusionists and Proponents of Thorough Non-Abiding).

equated with Svātantrikas can be answered—in relation to eighth century Indian authors and twelfth century Tibetan authors—with a decided "no." Chapa, the chief proponent of early Svātantrika, and the Indian authors whom he relies upon in no way accept that the illusion-like nature is ultimate truth.[436]

Further developing the idea that a reasoning consciousness does not establish the illusion-like nature, Chapa emphasizes the distinction between the non-affirming negative, emptiness, that a reasoning consciousness realizes and the affirming negative, the composite of appearance and emptiness (the illusion-like nature), that inference comprehends. The inference that proves "entities are empty of a true nature" must realize an affirming negative, because it associates the inferential subject, "entity," with the predicate, "emptiness." However, a reasoning consciousness realizes only the non-affirming negative, "empty of a true nature," based on this inference. Since, emptiness is of the same substance (*rdzas gcig, *ekadravya*) as "entity," a reasoning consciousness realizes the substance of "entity"; it realizes the emptiness of a true entity, not an emptiness unrelated with entity.[437] Again, Chapa is concerned to have the realization of emptiness be the realization of a non-affirming negative that operates along with affirming negatives, here the illusion-like nature. He never labels illusion-like nature a concordant ultimate but may well regard it so.

---

[436] As Napper shows (*Dependent-Arising and Emptiness,* 403-404), Tsongkhapa seems to indicate that some earlier scholars divide Madhyamaka into those who accept that the illusion-like nature is established by reasoning and those who hold "thorough non-abiding" (*rab tu mi gnas pa*) to be the ultimate. Ruegg (*Three Studies,* 35, footnote 60) points out that such a division is found in a work of Gampopa (*sGam po pa bSod nams rin chen,* 1079-1153) and that the latter category—proponents of throrough non-abiding—is further subdivided into "Uniting [Method and Wisdom] Thoroughly Non-Abiding" (*zung 'jug rab tu mi gnas pa*) and "Continuum Cutting Thoroughly Non-Abiding" (*rgyun chad rab tu mi gnas pa*) branches (the translations of these names is mine, based on usage examined below). These latter terms are adopted by Drakpa Gyeltsen, who equates them with Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas. This is discussed in detail below. Thus, in Drakpa Gyeltsen's usage, those who accept that the illusion-like nature is the ultimate—whoever they may be—are neither Svātantrikas nor Prāsaṅgikas.

[437] This is the thrust of Chapa's arguments spanning Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 93.14-97.14; see especially 94.14-18.

In his discussion of concordant and actual (*dngos*) ultimates, Tsongkhapa argues similarly to Chapa that the actual ultimate is intimately tied with conventional appearances but, as we have seen, the composite of appearance and emptiness is a concordant ultimate. He cites Kamalaśīla's *Illumination of the Middle,* which states that the absence of production "accords with the ultimate,"[438] and Śāntarakṣita's *Ornament for the Middle,* which contains a similar statement,[439] before noting:

> Many earlier [scholars] treated these as the two ultimate truths: figurative and non-figurative. [They identified] the emptiness that is a negative of ultimate production and so forth of phenomena such as forms as the figurative ultimate, asserting that this is imputed to be ultimate truth but has the character of obscurational truth. They asserted that the non-figurative ultimate truth cannot be taken as an object of any mind and therefore is not an object of knowledge.[440]

Tsongkhapa argues against these earlier scholars who interpreted Kamalaśīla's statement—and others like it in the writings of Śāntarakṣita and Jñānagarbha—to mean that these Mādhyamikas held the emptiness of ultimate production, realized by inference, to be only a concordant ultimate while the actual ultimate is beyond consciousness. He explains that "in the perspective of a conceptual reasoning consciousness," emptiness is not the actual ultimate, but emptiness "in the perspective of a non-conceptual reasoning consciousness" is.[441] The distinction that Tsongkhapa sees Kamalaśīla making is between the conceptual and

---

[438] *Madhyamakāloka;* Toh. 3887, *bstan 'gyur, sde dge* edition, *dbu ma,* vol. *sa,* 149a.5: "Because this absence of production also accords with the ultimate, it is called an "ultimate," but it is not actually so because actually the ultimate is beyond all proliferations."

[439] *dbu ma rgyan, madhyamakālaṃkāra*, stanza 70; Toh. 3884, *bstan 'gyur, sde dge* edition, *dbu ma,* vol. *sa,* 55b.2; edited Tibetan in Masamichi Ichigō, "Śāntarakṣita's Madhyamakālaṃkāra," in *Studies in the Literature of the Great Vehicle,* Michigan Studies in Buddhist Literature No. 1, eds. Luis O. Gómez and Jonathan A. Silk (Ann Arbor: Collegiate Institute for the Study of Buddhist Literature and Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Michigan, 1989), 214. The stanza reads "Because of according with the ultimate, this is called an "ultimate." In reality [the ultimate] is free from all the collections of proliferations." Ichigō's English translation is found on p. 215.

[440] Hopkins, *Other Emptiness, Self Emptiness,* 198; Tsong kha pa, *lam rim 'bring,* 482.2.

[441] Hopkins, *Other Emptiness, Self Emptiness,* 199ff; Tsong kha pa, *lam rim 'bring,* 483.6ff.

non-conceptual realization of the ultimate. While a conceptually realized emptiness can then be termed a concordant ultimate, since the object of conceptual reasoning consciousnesses is actually the same emptiness as the emptiness realized by non-conceptual wisdom it is only differentiated by the conceptual manner in which it is realized.[442] Both Chapa and Tsongkhapa argue that an emptiness intimately tied with ordinary appearances, knowledge of which is inferentially induced, is the actual ultimate truth. It could be that Chapa, like Tsongkhapa many years later (possibly under Chapa's influence), attempted to rectify what he understood to be a misinterpretation of Jñānagarbha's, Śāntarakṣita's, and Kamalaśīla's understanding of concordant ultimates.[443]

Another point of interest in Tsongkhapa's account of concordant ultimates, bearing on the understanding of the concept by early Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas, is his discussion of subjective concordant ultimates. In Chapa's account, only objects are considered concordant ultimates.[444] Tsongkhapa explains that Bhāvaviveka, Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla held both subjective and objective concordant ultimates: all four Indian scholars understood the reasoning consciousness that realizes emptiness to have a conceptual and a non-conceptual variety. Conceptual reasoning consciousnesses and their objects are designated as concordant ultimates, giving us a subjective and an objective concordant ultimate. While only emptiness is truly the ultimate, the non-conceptual wisdom realizing emptiness comes to be called the ultimate, not a concordant ultimate.[445] Unfortunately,

---

[442] Hopkins, *Other Emptiness, Self Emptiness,* 203-204; Tsong kha pa, *lam rim 'bring,* 486.6.

[443] The title of Chapa's text, *dBu ma shar gsum gyi stong mthun* ("Compilation of the Three Mādhyamikas from the East"), refers to the main Madhyamaka treatises of these three authors.

[444] This assessment is only provisional; as more of Chapa's writings come to light, we may find his own discussion of subjective concordant ultimates.

[445] Tsongkhapa's passage, with its many citations of Indian sources, is found in Hopkins, *Other Emptiness, Self Emptiness,* 198-204 and Tsong kha pa, *lam rim 'bring,* 482.3-487.6.

Chapa does not explicate this topic in the detail that Tsongkhapa does, leaving us uncertain as to whether concordant ultimates include, for him, consciousnesses or only their objects.

Tsongkhapa's discussion of the division of ultimate truths into real (or "non-figurative") and concordant (or "figurative") ultimates cites the writings of Bhāvaviveka, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Jñānagarbha—all of whom Tsongkhapa regards as Svātantrikas. He notes that the ultimate is divided differently in the writings of Candrakīrti, the Prāsaṅgika *par excellence.*[446] It would seem that Tsongkhapa recognized that "concordant ultimate" was a topic developed by Indian Svātantrika Mādhyamikas.[447] Furthermore, he recognized that some exegetes saw the importance of concordant ultimates as separating actual ultimate truth from the purvey of the mind: while a concordant ultimate could be talked and thought about, the actual ultimate could not. While he does not tell us who those Tibetans were, the notion that the ultimate is not an object of knowledge is clearly a view of early Prāsaṅgikas. No surviving evidence shows early Prāsaṅgikas adopting a distinction between real and concordant ultimates, but one can well imagine this distinction—made by such eminent Indian Mādhyamikas—being recast by Tibetan Prāsaṅgikas to highlight the difference between an ultimate that is a topic of ordinary parlance and the "real" ultimate that cannot be known.

The third Sakya hierarch, Drakpa Gyeltsen, saw a more stark divide between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika on the issue of concordant ultimates. In his *Clearly Realizing Tantra: A Precious Tree,*[448] he discusses concordant ultimates mainly in terms of mental states but also secondarily in terms of objects of mental states that accord with ultimate truth. His position both develops Chapa's ideas and prefigures the views of Tsongkhapa. He saw

---

[446] Hopkins, *Other Emptiness, Self Emptiness,* 197; Tsong kha pa, *lam rim 'bring,* 481.3

[447] Tsongkhapa never states that the topic of concordant ultimates is a Svātantrika notion nor that Prāsaṅgikas rejected the idea of concordant ultimates.

[448] Grags pa rgyal mtshan, *rGyud kyi mngon par rtogs pa rin po che'i ljong shing,* in *Sa skya pa'i bka' 'bum,* vol. 3 (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1968), 22.1.1-4.

Svātantrikas developing the notion of concordant ultimates as an answer for how ordinary consciousness can ascertain the ultimate and how Buddhas can continue to perceive and interact with the conventional world. Prāsaṅgikas, in his depiction, reject concordant ultimates in their views of an ultimate unreachable by ordinary consciousness and a Buddhahood that cannot perceive ordinary appearances.

Setting up his discussion of concordant ultimates, Drakpa Gyeltsen lists four positions on the issues of what classes of beings have ultimate states of awareness and whether a Buddha has conventional states of mind or only ultimate states—this latter question amounting to whether a Buddha can or cannot perceive ordinary appearances.[449] He then writes:

> Prāsaṅgikas hold, "All ordinary beings' awarenesses are **only** conventional. The meditative absorbtions of the three classes of Āryas are ultimate; their subsequent practices are conventional awarenesses. Since Buddhas are always in meditative absorbtion, they **only** have ultimate [awareness]." This, too, is not correct for [this view] has the fault that it would follow that Buddhas would not enter non-abiding nirvāṇa. Also, [this view] has the fault of contradicting the master Candrakīrti's

---

[449] Grags pa, *Rin po che'i ljon shing,* 21.3.6-22.1.4. Having stated that when all awareness is divided, there are conventional awarenesses and ultimate awarenesses, Drakpa Gyeltsen asks "What persons have the second awareness [ultimate awareness] in their continuums?" He then lists four positions: the Hearer's assertion (*nyan thos kyi 'dod tshul*), the Yogic Practice assertion (*rnal 'byor spyod pa'i 'dod tshul*), the [Mental] Continuum Cutting Thoroughly Non-Abiding [Mādhyamikas] assertion (*rgyun chad rab tu mi gnas pa'i 'dod tshul*), and the Uniting [Method and Wisdom] Thoroughly Non-Abiding [Mādhyamikas] assertion (*zung 'jug rab tu mi gnas pa'i 'dod tshul*). When discussing the third and fourth groups, he terms them Prāsaṅgikas (21.4.5: *dbu ma thal 'gyur ba*) and Svātantrikas (22.1.1: *dbu ma rang rgyud pa*), respectively. The question of "who has ultimate awareness?" becomes additionally the question of "what, if any, awarensses do Buddhas have?" Drakpa Gyeltsen tells us (23.4.2-4), "Hearer's hold that ordinary beings (*so so skye bo*) have only conventional awarenesses, Āryas have both [conventional and ultimate] awarenesses, and those entering nirvāṇa without remainder have no awareness at all.…Yogic Practitioners [in accordance with their view of three natures (*trisvabhāva*)] hold that imputational awareness (*kun brtags kyi blo*) is conventional while the dependent and thoroughly established [natures/awarenesses] are ultimate. Consequently, ordinary beings'awarenesses include both [conventional and ultimate awarenesses]. The three classes of Āryas have mere conventionalities, which are not conventional truths, and so also have both [kinds of awareness]. Since Buddhas are devoid of imputation, they only have ultimate [awareness]."

> assertion, in his *Commentary on [Nāgārjuna's] Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning,* "Truths are posited as two from the perspective of worldly awareness."[450]

In Drakpa Gyeltsen's characterization, Prāsaṅgikas hold a stark divide between ordinary and enlightened, with ordinary beings incapable of knowing the ultimate and Buddhas always in absorbtion on emptiness and therefore unable to perceive ordinary appearances. He criticizes this view on the grounds that it would not allow for a presentation of non-abiding nirvāṇa (*apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa, mi gnas pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa*), in which Buddhas are able to remain in meditation on emptiness and simultaneously aid ordinary beings. Additionally, Drakpa Gyeltsen directly addresses the view that "Ultimate truth is not the referent of any awareness," writing "Saying that would be senseless."[451] He rejects a clean divide between ordinary and ultimate awarenesses as well as the idea that ultimate truth passes beyond all awareness.

Drakpa Gyeltsen understands Candrakīrti's comment, "from the perspective of worldly awareness," to mean that the two truths are explicated in accordance with worldly

---

[450] Grags pa, *Rin po che'i ljon shing,* 21.4.5-22.1.1. I have not located this passage in Candrakīrti's *Commentary on [Nāgārjuna's] Sixty Stanzas on Reasoning* (*Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti* [*rigs pa drug cu pa'i 'grel pa*] Toh. 3864, *bstan 'gyur, sde dge* edition, *dbu ma,* vol. *ya*; Cristina Anna Scherrer-Schaub, *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti. Commentaire à la soixantaine sur le raisonnement ou Du vrai enseignement de la causalité par le Maitre indien Candrakīrti,* Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques, 25 [Bruselles: Institut belge des hautes etudes chinoises, 1991]). It could well be that the passage Drakpa Gyeltsen refers to was translated quite differently in the canonical editions of Candrakīrti's texts or that Drakpa Gyeltsen is paraphrasing. In one passage of his *Commentary* (7b.6-8a.2; Scherrer-Schaub, *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti,* 36ff), on stanza 5cd, Candrakīrti explains that the four noble truths are posited as the two truths in accordance with the world: Nirvāṇa, the noble truth of cessation, "by worldly conventions is called ultimate truth because it does not deceive the world. …The [other] three truths, due to having the character of compositional things and appearing to exist as their own entities (*ngo bo nyid*), deceive fools. Therefore, they are posited as conventional truths. …Nirvāṇa always abides as just nirvāṇa; by worldly conventions it is explained to be ultimate truth." This passage could be interpreted as Candrakīrti positing the division of two truths in terms of the world and could be what Drakpa Gyeltsen paraphrases, especially so because soon after the paragraph translated here, Drakpa Gyeltsen (at 23.1.5) quotes Nāgārjuna's stanza 5cd, the stanza upon which Candrakīrti here comments.

[451] Grags pa, *Rin po che'i ljon shing,* 22.3.6: *don dam pa'i bden pa de blo gang gi 'ang yul ma yin no zhe na / 'o na de smos pa don med par yang 'gyur la /.*

awareness: in technical terms, he writes "worldly awareness is the basis for division [into the two truths]."[452] Drawing heavily on the *Hevajra Tantra,* in addition to Candrakīrti, he explains that the two truths themselves are not awarenesses but that the same substratum is perceived as obscurational truth in the perspective of ordinary awareness and is perceived as ultimate truth in the perspective of ultimate awareness; the referents of the two types of awareness come to be posited as the two truths.[453] While the referent of ordinary, obscured awareness is obscurational truth, "being true as the referent of unmistaken awareness is purified cyclic existence; this is nirvāṇa."[454] Worldly awareness, then, is the basis of division for the two truths because it "establishes the conventional and blocks (*'gegs pa*) the ultimate."[455] Worldly awareness demarcates obscurational truth; its presence "blocks" ultimate truth while its purification marks the realization of nirvāṇa.

Drakpa Gyeltsen's explication of how Candrakīrti's comment should be understood to mean that worldly awareness is the basis of division for the two truths may not be immediately distinguishable from the Prāsaṅgika view that he criticizes. However, he goes on to explain how the Svātantrika view allows for concordant ultimates and, consequently, non-abiding nirvāṇa. In contrast to the hard and fast distinction between ordinary and ultimate awareness found in the Prāsaṅgika view,

> Svātantrikas hold that for an ordinary being, all subjects—that is, mental awarenesses—are conventional awarenesses. It is indeed the case that a consciousness

---

[452] Grags pa, *Rin po che'i ljon shing,* 22.1.6: *dbye ba'i gzhi 'jig rten pa'i blo nyid de /.*

[453] Grags pa, *Rin po che'i ljon shing,* 22.1.6ff. The first passage he cites from the *Hevajra Tantra* reads "Just this is called cyclic existence; just this is just nirvāṇa. Other than the abandonment of cyclic existence, there is no realization of nirvāṇa" (*'di nyid 'khor ba zhes bya ste / / 'di nyid mya ngan 'das pa nyid / / 'khor ba spangs nas gzhan du ni / / mya ngan 'das pa rtogs mi 'gyur /*). Drakpa Gyeltsen understands "just this" to mean "worldly awareness."

[454] Grags pa, *Rin po che'i ljon shing,* 22.2.6: *blo phyin ci ma log pa'o / de'i yul bden pa ni 'khor ba dag pa ste / mya ngan las 'das pa zhes bya ba'i don to /.*

[455] Grags pa, *Rin po che'i ljon shing,* 22.2.1-2: *blo de nyid la kun rdzob sgrub la don dam 'gegs pa'i tshul gyis dbye gzhir byed pa'i tshul lo /.*

> of the nature (*chos nyid*) is also conventional. However, since reasoning knowing the nature to be unproduced is partially concordant with a Buddha's mind (*thugs*) knowing the nature to be unproduced, it is called a concordant ultimate.
>
> As for the three classes of Āryas' consciousnesses, meditative absorbtions are ultimate; subsequent practices are conventional.
>
> Buddhas' non-conceptual minds are ultimate; [their] pure worldly wisdom (*dag pa 'jig rten pa'i ye shes*), being supported (*dmigs*) by [non-conceptual] wisdom, is a figurative conventional. Therefore, this is also non-abiding nirvāṇa.
>
> Wisdom, alternately, is unsurpassed; thus it is ultimate. It is also continuous meditative equipoise. Regarding this also, it should not be disputed that this concordant ultimate is just the ultimate.[456]

While all ordinary awarenesses must be categorized as conventional, certain realizations accord with non-conceptual wisdom, the ultimate awareness. Ordinary awareness can be developed to have an understanding of the unproduced nature of phenomena, which, while falling short of full realization of emptiness, is a stepping stone to that realization. Later, in consideration of the same passage from the *Introduction to the Two Truths Sūtra* that Candrakīrti and Prajñākaramati cited in support of their claim that ultimate truth is not a referent of consciousness ("Ultimate truth is passed beyond entities ranging right through the referents of omniscient wisdoms"), Drakpa Gyeltsen writes, "The emptiness conceived by ordinary beings' awareness, the absence of production, and so forth are not ultimate truth. … Those, also, however, are causes producing the ultimate and thus are figurative ultimates."[457] Rather than interpret the sūtra passage to mean that the ultimate is entirely out of the scope of ordinary consciousness, he understands that ordinary awareness

---

[456] Grags pa, *Rin po che'i ljon shing,* 22.1.1-4.

[457] Grags pa, *Rin po che'i ljon shing,* 22.4.1-2: *so so skye bo'i blos brtags pa'i stong pa nyid dang skye med la sogs pa de don dam pa'i bden pa ma yin te /…/de'ang 'on kyang don dam pa skye ba'i rgyu yin pas / rnam grangs kyi don dam pa'o /.*

can gain an image of emptiness that acts as a "cause" bringing about non-conceptual realization of emptiness.

Drakpa Gyeltsen seems to hold non-conceptual wisdom itself as a special kind of concordant ultimate. As we saw with Chapa and Tsongkhapa, Drakpa Gyeltsen speaks of ultimate truth as emptiness, the object of non-conceptual, ultimate consciousness. At the end of the passage quoted above, he calls wisdom "the ultimate" and "continuous meditative absorption" before noting that, "this concordant ultimate is just the ultimate." Drakpa Gyeltsen categorizes wisdom as a concordant ultimate—a notion suggested in the passages from Chapa and Tsongkhapa—but then singles out non-conceptual wisdom from ordinary awareness's conceptual understanding of emptiness, which he also categorized as a concordant ultimate. He understands the concordant ultimate, non-conceptual wisdom, to be "just the ultimate."

We additionally see Drakpa Gyeltsen introducing a previously unseen notion into this discussion: "figurative conventionals." As hinted at previously and discussed in full in the following chapter, the Prāsaṅgika notion of Buddhahood moves toward denying ordinary perception to Buddhas. Drakpa Gyeltsen characterizes Prāsaṅgika as holding that Buddhas only have ultimate awareness, non-conceptual meditative absorption on emptiness. The Svātantrika position, in contrast, affords Buddhas "pure worldly wisdom" that adheres to the non-conceptual realization of emptiness—the "purified" view of cyclic existence—but allows perception of worldly appearances. Pure worldly wisdom accords with conventional awarenesses, allowing perception of conventional truths. Whereas Drakpa Gyeltsen faulted the Prāsaṅgika view for not allowing for non-abiding nirvāṇa, the Svātantrika view of a Buddha having both non-conceptual wisdom and a pure worldly wisdom enables an explanation of non-abiding nirvāṇa, in which Buddhas are both fully realized and fully able to aid sentient beings.

The notion of "pure worldly wisdom" goes back at least as far as Bhāvaviveka's *Blaze of Reasoning*, in which we read of two kinds of ultimate consciousnesses:

> The ultimate has two aspects: one engages non-conceptually, passes beyond the world, is undefiled, and lacks proliferation; the second engages conceptually, accords with the collection of merit and wisdom, is called "pure worldly wisdom," and possesses proliferations.[458]

Bhāvaviveka understands pure worldly wisdom to be a form of conceptual consciousness and, consequently, to be embroiled with "proliferations." However, unlike non-conceptual wisdom, it allows for perception of worldly conventionalities. Drakpa Gyeltsen draws upon Bhāvaviveka's idea to solve the problem of how Buddhas can both abide in non-conceptual realization and still perceive and aid ordinary beings.

A presentation of figurative ultimates, both subjective and objective, that forms the likely basis for Drakpa Gyeltsen's discussion, is found in Bhāvaviveka's[459] *Compendium of Meanings of Madhyamaka.* Declaring that the ultimate has two varieties (*rnam pa gnyis*), Bhāvaviveka explains that the non-figurative (that is, real) ultimate is the "emptiness of all

---

[458] *Tarkajvāla,* Toh. 3856, *sde dge* edition, *dbu ma,* vol. *dza,* 60b.4-5. As discussed in Chapter One, it is difficult to know if this passage was written by the sixth century Bhāvaviveka or by a later author writing under the same name, who explanded the *Blaze of Reasoning.* The passage, in context, seems to answers a critic who claims that the Madhyamaka understanding of emptiness would invalidate attempts to prove that phenomena are empty. In response, Bhāvaviveka explains that "pure worldly wisdom" can perceive phenomena and so can attempt to demonstrate their emptiness. The criticism itself could come from Candrakīrti, who makes just such a criticism of the use of inference to prove that phenomena are empty, or it could come from a Yogācāra critic, for whom the seeming incompatibility of inference and Madhyamaka emptiness entails not the jettisoning of formal inference, as it did for Candrakīrti, but the incorrectness of the Madhyamaka view. Thus, one can see the sixth century Bhāvaviveka here answering a Yogācāra critic or one can see an eighth century Bhāvaviveka answering Candrakīrti. In either case, the passage is the likely inspiration for Drakpa Gyeltsen's discussion of "pure worldly wisdom."

[459] As discussed in Chapter One, this Bhāvaviveka is not the same as the sixth century author but likely lived in the eighth century. This Bhāvaviveka may have added to *Blaze of Reasoning,* the core of which was written by the sixth century author. Thus, the passage of *Blaze of Reasoning* discussed immediately above could have been written by the author of the *Compendium of Meanings of Madhyamka.* In the paragraphs that follow, I refer to the author of the *Compendium of Meanings* simply as "Bhāvaviveka," but understand the author to be a different person, living some two hundred years later, than the sixth century figure.

proliferations."[460] Figurative ultimates include both consciousnesses: the "reasoning figurative ultimate," the consciousness that utilizes the four reasons to refute the four alternatives (*catuṣkoti,* here listed as "production, cessation, and so forth"); and objects: "the ultimate of the negation of production," and "all appearing entities."[461] The first type of figurative ultimate, the likely basis for Drakpa Gyeltsen's understanding of reasoning consciousnesses as concordant ultimates, conceptually realizes the emptiness of production and cessation. One suspects that this conceptual realization induces non-conceptual wisdom and could be spoken of as a "cause" of ultimate consciousness, as we saw with Drakpa Gyeltsen. Bhāvaviveka does not write of non-conceptual wisdom in this short text, but may include it with reasoning consciousnesses as a type of concordant ultimate. As noted above, the non-figurative ultimate is only the emptiness of all proliferations, and, thus, he does not understand wisdom to be an actual ultimate.

The objective figurative ultimate found in the *Compendium of Meanings* refers to the first of the four steps in the reasoning process, the negation of production. Chapa and Drakpa Gyeltsen similarly spoke of the negation of a positive phenomenon and the absence of production, respectively, as concordant ultimates. As we saw, Chapa understood the negation of a positive phenomenon to be an affirming negative, a negation that would require the further negation of negative phenomena. Bhāvaviveka may consider the negation of production a concordant ultimate for the same reason: the negation of production would still require the negation of cessation (and the negation of both production and cessation and the negation of neither production nor cessation). The negation of production accords with

---

[460] *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha,* stanza seven; Yasunori Ejima, *Chūgan-shisō no tenkai—Bhāvaviveka kenkyū* (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1980), 19-20: *spros pa thams cad kyis stong pa / / de ni rnam grangs ma yin pa'i / / dam pa'i don du shes par bya /.* Stanza four declares the ultimate to be of two varieties.

[461] *Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha,* stanzas 5-6; Ejima, *Bhāvaviveka kenkyū,* 19: *dang po de yang gnyis yin te / / rigs pa rnam grangs don dam dang / / skye ba bkag pa'i don dam mo / / mu bzhi skye 'gog la sogs pa'i / / gtan tshigs bzhi yi rigs pa de / / snang ba'i dngos po thams cad kyang / / skye ba bkag pa'i don dam mo /.*

and leads to the negation of all four alternatives, which itself is the actual ultimate, the emptiness of all proliferations. Bhāvaviveka may understand "all appearing entities" to be concordant ultimates in the same way that Chapa and Tsongkhapa discussed the union of appearance and emptiness as, respectively, **not** the ultimate and a concordant ultimate. All appearing entities are, indeed, empty and their emptiness is ultimate truth. However, the appearance of entities can only accord with their ultimate emptiness.

While not wishing to elide the differences between these thinkers' projects, we can trace a common thread on the issue of concordant, or figurative, ultimates in the writings of Bhāvaviveka, Chapa, Drakpa Gyeltsen, and Tsongkhapa (while I have only touched upon their works above, we can also include Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, and Jñānagarbha). All of these Buddhist scholars placed a high premium on explicating an ultimate truth that could be accessed by ordinary consciousness. Tsongkhapa utilized concordant ultimates to explain how emptiness can be known conceptually. While not developing the notion as clearly, Chapa, in passages parallel to (and perhaps prefiguring) Tsongkhapa's, explains how conceptual inference knows the composite of appearance, or entity, and naturelessness, or emptiness. Bhāvaviveka and Drakpa Gyeltsen utilize the notion of subjective concordant ultimates to show how ordinary mind can conceptually know the ultimate. These two and Chapa (and quite likely Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla) write of objective concordant ultimates to explain how realization of emptiness develops in stages: one can realize the emptiness of production, a concordant ultimate, which leads to realizing the emptiness of all proliferations. Concordant ultimates were developed as solutions to making the ultimate accessible and were developed by authors whom, with the exception of Tsongkhapa, we can thematically regard as Svātantrikas.[462]

---

[462] Chapa and Drakpa Gyeltsen were part of the early Svātantrika movement. Bhāvaviveka, Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla can only be regarded as thematically Svātantrika, as they lived centuries before the Svātantrika interpretation of Madhyamaka developed. However, their writings formed the textual basis for

Drakpa Gyeltsen makes clear that the acceptance or rejection of concordant ultimates was a dividing line in the formation of Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika schools in twelfth century Tibet. Tsongkhapa's mention of earlier scholars who distinguished concordant ultimates, which could be talked and thought about, from the actual ultimate, which they posited as not an object of knowledge would seem to indicate that certain Prāsaṅgikas adopted concordant ultimates but reinterpreted the idea in order to keep real ultimate truth outside of the scope of ordinary mind. This reinterpretation runs counter to the thrust of concordant ultimates, which was to soften the distinction between the conventional and the ultimate, and amounts to a rejection of concordant ultimates as understood by Svātantrika authors. The early Prāsaṅgika assertion of an unknowable ultimate makes it likely that, as Drakpa Gyeltsen claims, they do not develop the idea of concordant ultimates at all.

In addition to the lack of discussion of concordant ultimates in any of the Prāsaṅgika-leaning authors examined here, we find some evidence that Candrakīrti's revivalists directly rejected the possibility of concordant ultimates. Whereas we saw the author of the *Compendium of Meanings of Madhyamaka* writing that the ultimate has two varieties, figurative and non-figurative, other authors specifically denied that the ultimate could be twofold. In his *Introduction to the Two Truths,* Atiśa writes, "The ultimate is only one; others assert that it is two."[463] Atiśa's comment takes a very literal reading of the common Madhyamaka dictum that ultimate truth is singular and unique, a dictum noted

---

Svātantrika. The reasons why Tsongkhapa so vehemently argued for the superiority of Prāsaṅgika, when so much of his system accords with that of Svātantrika authors, remains a great mystery only partially solved by his followers' defense of his system from Tagtsang Lotsawa's (*sTag tshang lo tsā ba shes rab rin chen*) critique that Tsongkhapa really was a Svātantrika; see Jeffrey Hopkins, *Maps of the Profound* (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2003), 527-575.

[463] *Satyadvayāvatāra,* stanza 4ab; Toh. 3902, *bstan 'gyur sde dge* edition, *dbu ma,* vol. *a*; Christian Lindtner, "Atiśa's Introduction to the Two Truths," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 9 (1981): 190: *dam pa'i don ni gcig nyid de / gzhan dag rnam pa gnyis su 'dod /.* Atiśa's preference for Candrakīrti's interpretation of Madhyamaka is discussed in Chapter One, pp. 12-14.

above that is emblemized in Nāgārjuna's famous statement, "Only nirvāṇa is true." The interpretation of this dictum formed a significant part of the Madhyamaka controversy of this period. Drakpa Gyeltsen directly aimed his development of concordant ultimates at what he saw as a too-literal understanding of Nāgārjuna's statement.[464] Those with Prāsaṅgika leanings, like Atiśa, who upheld a strict interpretation of Nāgārjuna's dictum rejected the presentations of a manifold ultimate as exemplified in the writings of Bhāvaviveka.

Conclusion: The Importance of the Ultimate

Chapter One demonstrated the importance of debates on the ultimate to the formation of Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika schools in eleventh and twelfth century India and Tibet. In doing so, the conclusion of that chapter points out differences between doxographic-based presentations of these two schools and historically sensitive investigations. The present chapter's discussion of the competing conceptions of the ultimate, while supporting Gelukpa doxographical claims that Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika hold differing views on emptiness, does not defend those claims but, rather, shows that the twelfth century debate centered on the ultimate in a very different way than understood in Geluk. In place of Gelukpa concerns over phenomena being or not being "established by way of their own character" (*rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa*), in the twelfth century we see debates over ultimate truth being a knowable phenomenon and over the existence of states of consciousness and referents of consciousness that accord with the ultimate. Just what the ultimate is formed an important nexus of issues in this period.

---

[464] Grags pa, *Rin po che'i ljon shing,* 22.4.1-2; Drakpa Gyeltsen there addresses a passage, discussed above, on concordant ultimates to an opponent who claims that Drakpa's view of the ultimate runs counter to Nāgārjuna's statement that "Only nirvāṇa is true." Chapa (Phya pa, *dbu ma śar gsum,* 15.7ff) likewise addresses Nāgārjuna's statement.

Additionally, the two sides' arguments point out the soteriological importance of the ultimate for Madhyamaka. For Prāsaṅgikas, the salvifically essential role of the ultimate required that it be kept out of the category of knowable phenomena altogether. All other phenomena invoke dualistic knowledge and entrapment in cyclic existence; ultimate truth induces release and so must be beyond all dualistic conceptions. The ultimate's importance led Svātantrikas down a different route. Instead of emphasizing the unique ontological status of ultimate truth, they sought explanations that allowed the ultimate to come into the sphere of consciousness. In their view, consciousness could be successively developed to know the ultimate. The status of the ultimate in these two schools of thought led quickly to divergent views on transformation and Buddhahood. The following chapter explores the debates between these two sides on how one knows the ultimate and transforms ordinary mind and body into Buddhahood and how, once transformed, a Buddha continues to know the conventional world.

Chapter Five: Prāsaṅgika vs. Svātantrika on Non-Abiding Nirvāṇa

As we saw in the previous chapter, those who reject concordant ultimates discard both an ultimate that is realized in stages—the absence of production that we saw Bhāvaviveka, Chapa, and Drakpa Gyeltsen argue for—and an ordinary consciousness that can gain conceptual insight into emptiness. The Prāsaṅgika rejection of the latter, subjective concordant ultimates, ties closely to their assertion that the ultimate is not knowable by ordinary consciousness. If concordant ultimates were developed to bring the ultimate into the scope of ordinary awareness, the rejection of concordant ultimates clearly reinforces the interpretation that ultimate truth is singularly set off from human cognition.

This chapter examines the views on transformation and Buddhahood of those eleventh and twelfth century Mādhyamikas who, in competition with those who argued for states of mind that accord with the realization of ultimate truth, sought to keep ultimate truth out of the scope of ordinary mind. Foundational to their emerging Prāsaṅgika interpretation was a metaphoric view of "knowing" the ultimate; in reality, mind has no relationship to the ultimate and in fact ceases altogether upon realization. This chapter examines how Prāsaṅgikas attempted to account for a practitioner's transformation to Buddhahood in the absence of mind and how they understood a Buddha to perceive ordinary appearances without the mental instrument of perception. Early Prāsaṅgikas had to find ways of reconciling their unique interpretation of Buddhahood with the wider Mahāyāna Buddhist understanding of non-abiding nirvāṇa (*apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa, mi gnas pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa*), in which a Buddha is both always in meditative absorption on emptiness and constantly working for the welfare of sentient beings. The final section of this chapter examines critics of the early Prāsaṅgika solutions, Chapa Chokyi Sengé and his student, Sonam Tsemo, who developed views of transformation and enlightenment consistent with concordant ultimates, allowing for a more coherent model of Buddhahood.

"Knowing" the Ultimate: Transformation in the Absence of Mind

We have examined in the previous chapter the Prāsaṅgika claim that the ultimate is entirely outside the scope of ordinary consciousness. As a corollary of this claim, we see early Prāsaṅgikas rejecting the validity of valid cognition (*pramāṇa, tshad ma*) in knowing the ultimate and rejecting that the ultimate is realized at all. In his *Introduction to the Two Truths,* the same text in which he declared, "The ultimate is only one," Atiśa argues against the possibility that any kind of ordinary valid cognition can know the ultimate.[465] He examines the two types of valid cognition, perception and inference, rejecting the utility of either to the ultimate, and writes, "The deluded whose vision is narrow say that the two [kinds of valid cognition, direct perception and inference] realize emptiness."[466] Having dispensed with the ordinary ways in which we know, Atiśa cryptically states that while emptiness is utterly undifferentiated, "We realize it through not realizing; hence, we impute the convention, 'seeing emptiness.'"[467] Seeing emptiness can be spoken of conventionally, but in truth there is no seeing, only a mysterious way of "realizing through not realizing." One suspects, much as we saw in Jayānanda's writings above, that Atiśa sees consciousness to be inextricably imbued with subject-object duality; consequently, "realizing" must mean the

---

[465] The Prāsaṅgika rejection of ordinary valid cogntion in realizing the ultimate extends the Prāsaṅgika ideas, examined in Chapter Three, that no ordinary cognition can be considered valid.

[466] *Satyadvayāvatāra,* stanza 10cd; Toh. 3902, *bstan 'gyur sde dge* edition, *dbu ma,* vol. *a*; Christian Lindtner, "Atiśa's Introduction to the Two Truths," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 9 (1981): 191: *gnyis pos stong nyid rtogs so zhes / tshu rol mthong ba'i rmongs pa smra /.* My bracketed addition is drawn from stanza 10ab. Stanzas 10-13 examine both forms of valid cognition in more detail. Additionally, we saw in Chapter One (pages 26-28) that the author of the *Jewel Lamp of Madhyamaka* (*Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*) firmly rejected the applicability of valid cognition and either conceptual or non-conceptual consciousness to the realization of the ultimate, writing "Both conceptual and non-conceptual consciousnesses do not realize this [ultimate truth]. The conventions of words and valid cognition are useless in meditating on that meaning."

[467] Stanza 6cd; Lindtner, "Atiśa's Introduction," 190: *rtogs med tshul gyis rtogs pas na / / stong nyid mthong zhes tha snyad gdags /.*

process of a subject realizing an object.[468] Only by rejecting the dualistic model of knowledge can Atiśa speak of "realizing emptiness." However, "realizing" is stripped of its usual cognitive force and "seeing emptiness" becomes only a conventional designation.

Jayānanda details his understanding of how a practitioner realizes the ultimate through explicating Candrakīrti's famous proclamation that "realizing the ultimate" can only be said metaphorically.[469] Candrakīrti draws upon a Sautrāntika[470] model of ordinary perception, in which an external object causes a perceiving consciousness to be produced in the aspect (*ākāra, rnam pa*) of the object; one perceives the aspect of the external object, not the object itself, but yet this is still called "perceiving the object." Just so, Candrakīrti tells us, an awareness takes on the aspect of the ultimate but never really perceives the ultimate; the taking on the aspect of the ultimate is conveniently called "realizing suchness." He writes,

> Since the final nature is without production and the mind also is devoid of production,
> Due to that [object] in the basis [that is, the mind] that has the aspect of that [birthless final nature, this is said to be] **like** 'knowing reality.'
> Hence, "knowing" [reality] is in dependence upon conventions,
> Just as [in Sautrāntika] a mind knows well its object due to arising in the aspect of that object.[471]

---

[468] This interpretation of Atiśa's thought on this issue puts it in line with Dunne's understanding of Candrakīrti (John D. Dunne, "Thoughtless Buddha, Passionate Buddha," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* LXIV/3 (1996): 525-557). Dunne (p. 542) sees Candrakīrti holding that ordinary perception is "in some sense conceptual" and (p. 544) that Candrakīrti's denial of appearances to Buddhas is due to his unique understanding of "conceptual" perception—Buddhas do not perceive appearances because they have dispelled all forms of conceptuality.

[469] Candrakīrti's metaphoric knowing is discussed in Dunne, "Thoughtless Buddha," 546-548.

[470] Jayānanda labels Candrakīrti's model "Sautrāntika" at *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 325a.4-5.

[471] Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti,* Bibiotheca Buddhica 9 (Osnabrück:Biblio Verlag, 1970), stanza XII.4, pp. 357-358: *gang tshe skye med de nyid yin zhing blo yang skye ba dang 'bral ba / / de tshe de rnam rten las de yis de nyid rtogs pa lta bu ste / / ji ltar sems ni gang gi rnam pa can du 'gyur ba de yis yul / / de yongs shes pa de bzhin tha snyad nye bar rten nas rig pa yin /.*

Jayānanda explains that "knowing" is simply a convention applied to the process of stopping all perception:

> Awareness also has the aspect of birthlessness. Hence, it is **as though** that awareness realizes suchness, which has the nature of birthlessness. … In that, there is no [duality of] illuminator and illuminated. … Just as one knows blue, knowing in dependence on convention in that way, we say that one knows (*adhigama, thugs su chud pa*) suchness in dependence on convention, not ultimately. … Thus, the very lack of observing (*anupalambha, mi dmigs pa*)[472] any suitable entity at all is knowing suchness.[473]

An awareness that approaches "perceiving" the ultimate takes on the aspect of its birthless nature. However, as we saw Jayānanda explain above, subject-object duality can play no part in "knowing" the ultimate. Awareness is intimately tied with duality and so cannot actually perceive or know the ultimate. Jayānanda's metaphor of "illuminator and illuminated" is a common means of referring to cognitive acts, in which the "light" of consciousness casts upon an object. Jettisoning this understanding of cognition, Jayānanda writes that not

---

[472] Jayānanda takes up a term, "non-observation," that had wide use in Madhyamaka circles but that had first gained currency in Yogācāra texts. As discussed by John Makransky (*Buddhahood Embodied: Sources of Controversy in India and Tibet* [Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997], 47-49), the *Ornament for Mahāyāna Sūtras* (*Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*), stanza IX.78, states that "Utter non-perception is the highest perception" (*sarvathā 'nupalambhaśca upalambhaḥ paro mataḥ //.* Makransky translation, p. 47, Sanskrit from Sylvan Levi's edition, cited in Makransky, p. 380, n. 25). Sthiramati explains that "non-perception" indicates not perceiving false conceptually constructed duality (the "imagined nature" [*parikalpitasvabhāva*] of the Yogācāra "three natures" ontology) and that when duality is not seen, the "perfected nature" (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*) is realized (Makransky, pp. 48-49). As will be discussed below, Jayānanda's use of "non-observation" is quite different, as he does not posit any "perfected nature" that is perceived when duality is negated, but instead holds to the interpretation that "realization" is simply a term tagged onto utter non-observation.

[473] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* Toh. 3870, *sde dge* edition, *dbu ma,* vol. *ra,* 325a.3-4: *blo yang skye ba med pa'i rnam pa can yin pas blo des skye ba med pa'i rang bzhin can gyi de kho na nyid rtogs pa lta bu yin te /…de la gsal bar byed pa dang gsal bar bya ba dag ni yod pa ma yin no zhes pa'o /…/ de bzhin tha snyad brten nas rig pa yin / / zhes bya ba ni sngon po yongs su shes pa bzhin du tha snyad la brten nas de kho na nyid thugs su chud par brjod pa yin gyi don dam par ni ma yin no /…des na dngos po gang yang rung mi dmigs pa de nyid de kho na nyid thugs su chud pa yin no /.*

observing any entity is to realize the ultimate. Similar to Atiśa's portrayal, "knowing the ultimate" is simply a convention applied to the cessation of perception.

Not only does perception cease in Jayānanda's process of becoming Buddha, but ordinary mind itself stops. For he offers a very literal interpretation of Candrakīrti's claim that at Buddhahood, mind and mental factors (*cittacaitta*) cease.[474] Rather than a true transformation of ordinary consciousness, as is found in the Yogācāra model of "transformation of the basis",[475] Jayānanda understands ordinary mind simply to cease along with all dualistic cognitive activity. He writes,

> Since enlightenment is by way of not knowing (*anadhigama*) at all, we assert that the activities of mind and mental factors—feeling and so forth—[all] having the character of experiencing, have ceased their engagement; there is no engagement of mind and mental factors. Therefore, there is no appearance at all, because all conceptuality has been blocked.[476]

Just as he has described "realizing the ultimate" to be a lack of perceiving, Jayānanda here explains that enlightenment is a process of "not knowing" and is characterized by the

---

[474] La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 108.9-11: *sangs rgyas rnams la ni chos thams cad rnam pa thams cad du mngon par rdzogs par byang chub pa'i phyir / sems dang sems las byung ba'i rgyu ba gtan log par 'dod pa yin no /;* "We assert that for Buddhas, due to being manifestly and completely enlightened to all phenomena in all aspects, the movement of mind and mental factors has entirely ceased." This passage is also examined in Dunne, "Thoughtless Buddha," 544. Candrakīrti makes similar statements in his discussion of Buddhahood, particularly in his autocommentary to stanzas XII.8-9.

[475] For a concise overview of the classical Yogācāra understanding of "transformation of the basis" (*āśrayaparivṛtti/-parāvṛtti*), see Makransky, *Buddhahood Embodied,* 63-83. For a lengthier treatment, see Ronald Mark Davidson, *Buddhist Systems of Transformation:* Āśraya-parivṛtti-parāvṛtti *Among the Yogācāra* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1985), 160-259.

[476] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 146a.7-146b.1: *ci yang thugs su chud pa med pa'i sgo nas byang chub pa'i phyir sems dang sems las byung ba'i rgyu ba gtan log par 'dod pa yin te nyams su myong ba'i mtshan nyid can gyi sems dang tshor ba la sogs pa sems las byung ba rnams kyi kun du spyod pa ste 'jug pa log par 'dod pa yin te / sems dang sems las byung ba rnams 'jug pa ma yin no zhes pa'o / / des na ci yang snang ba med pa yin no zhes pa'i tha tshig ste / rnam par rtog pa thams cad 'gag pa'i phyir ro /.* The last sentence is translated in Dunne, "Thoughtless Buddha," 545.

elimination of the knowing instrument, the mind. In this view, knowing is imbued with dualistic notions of subject and object and so too is ordinary mind itself.

As we have seen in the previous chapters, Jayānanda seems to understand the subject-object model of perception to operate conceptually. With conceptuality "blocked," he tells us here, perceptual referents do not appear. This point is amplified elsewhere, as Jayānanda distinguishes between obscurational (or conventional) truths and "mere conventionalities": Those who have contemplatively realized the emptiness of phenomena but have yet to attain Buddhahood continue to perceive appearances outside of meditation but, unlike ordinary people, no longer believe in the truth of those appearances; appearances for these beings are "mere conventionalities" rather than conventional truths.[477] However, Buddhas lack ordinary consciousnesses and so do not even perceive appearances: "Mere conventionalities do not appear to Supramundane Victor Buddhas who do not have the capacity to experience consciousnesses that have the aspect of blue and so forth.[478]" Jayānanda, then, denies Buddhas both subjects and objects. In his schema, there seems to be no overlap between the objects of ordinary, ignorant consciousness and the object (if we may call it that) of a Buddha's wisdom. Jayānanda's examination of the transformative process presents fundamental disjunctions between ordinary mind and enlightenment and between the appearances to ordinary consciousness and the utter lack of appearances to a Buddha.

In Atiśa's and Jayānanda's views, subjective concordant ultimates—which would allow for ordinary consciousness developing toward a conceptual and then non-conceptual understanding of the ultimate—are missing. In its place, we see explanations of a

---

[477] In his commentary to *Madhyamakāvatāra,* VI.28; Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 144a.2ff. Jayānanda also explains that those things regarded as false "even in the world" are mere conventionalities and not conventional truths because the world does not regard them to be true. Thus, he posits two types of mere conventionalities.

[478] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 146a.5: *sngon po la sogs pa'i rnam pa dang bcas pa'i shes pa nyams su myong ba mi mnga' ba'i sangs rgyas bcom ldan 'das rnams la ni kun rdzob tsam snang ba med pa'o/.*

metaphoric realization of emptiness that present a disjunct between ordinary consciousness and realization of the ultimate, rather than the model of progression implicit in concordant ultimates (most strongly exemplified by Drakpa Gyeltsen's statement that concordant ultimates are the "cause" producing realization of the ultimate). The question remains in these early Prāsaṅgika viewpoints of how transformation from ordinary awareness to "realization" occurs: what induces the cessation of dualistic knowing and how can Buddhahood arise from it?

Atiśa's brief poetic text provides no insight. However, Jayānanda, well aware of the pitfalls of his model, is very concerned with demonstrating how his Prāsaṅgika interpretation allows for transformation from an advanced Buddhist practitioner to a Buddha. Particularly, he wants to demonstrate how the cessation of a practitioner's mind can engender the three bodies (*kāya*) of a Buddha and how, without mind and appearances, Buddhas can still aid sentient beings. He imagines a lengthy objection:

> [Objector:] "If you assert that Supramundane Victors' minds and mental factors have ceased, positing the three bodies and the welfare of sentient beings is not feasible. If in this way [that you describe] the movement of the Supramundane Victors' minds and mental factors cease in all aspects, since thereby nothing at all remains, the Dharma Body (*dharmakāya*) is not feasible. Regarding that, "dharma" is the qualities, such as the [ten] powers and the [four] fearlessnesses. "Body" is the nature (*svabhāva*). Due to [your explanation of] emptiness, dharmas do not exist and hence, [their] nature does not exist. Therefore, the Dharma Body does not exist. Similarly, since mind and mental factors have ceased, there can be no uninterrupted enjoyment of the ambrosia of dharma, and hence the Complete Enjoyment Body (*sāmbhogikakāya*) is also unreasonable. Similarly, since there is no emanation, due to the cessation of mind and mental factors, how also are the Emanation Bodies (*nairmāṇikakāya*) reasonable? Similarly, because there is no wisdom, which is the cause of Dharma teaching, there is no positing of the welfare of sentient beings. Hence, how can you assert that the movement of Supramundane Victors' minds and mental factors has ceased?"

> We answer: This very master [Candrakīrti] explained [this], on the occasion of praising the Supramundane Victors of the three bodies, [in his stanzas] on the Buddha ground; hence, he did not say [the same thing] here [in this discussion of the two truths]."[479]

The objector sees that without a continuity of mind into Buddhahood, the qualities that make up the Buddha bodies would be impossible: the characteristics that mark the state of Buddhahood—the ten powers and four fearlessnesses—could not arise, as these characteristics would be entirely void; enjoyment of the state of Buddhahood could not arise without mind; and a Buddha's wisdoms, purified states of mind, would not exist, thus making it impossible for a Buddha to teach others and so work for their benefit.

Jayānanda's intriguing answer would seem to indicate that Candrakīrti has worked out these difficulties already. However, one familiar with Candrakīrti's presentation of the "ground of Buddhahood" (*buddhabhūmi*) will know that Jayānanda's response is only literally true: Candrakīrti does, indeed, state that Buddhahood consists of ten powers and three bodies and that one class of these bodies, the emanation bodies, works for the welfare of sentient beings.[480] However, Candrakīrti makes no attempt to answer the kinds of criticisms stemming from the denial of mind to a Buddha that Jayānanda admits. After

---

[479] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 146b.5-147a.2 (at the two points where the *sde dge* edition reading is marked incorrect, the correct reading is found in both the Peking and Narthang editions): */gal te bcom ldan 'das rnams kyi sems dang sems byung log par 'dod na sku gsum dang sems can gyi don gyi rnam gzhag byed pa mi 'thad de / 'di ltar bcom ldan 'das rnams kyi* (D: *kyis*) *rnam pa thams cad du sems dang sems las byung ba'i rgyu ba log pas lhag ma 'ga' zhig kyang med pas chos kyi sku mi 'thad de/ de la chos ni stobs dang / mi 'jigs pa la sogs pa'i yon tan rnams yin la / sku ni rang bzhin te/ stong pa nyid yin pas chos med pas rang bzhin med pa'i phyir chos sku yod pa ma yin no / / de bzhin du sems dang sems* [N172a] *las byung ba dag log pas rgyun ma chad par chos kyi bdud rtsi la longs spyod* [D147a] *pa med pas longs spyod rdzogs pa'i sku yang mi rigs so / / de bzhin du sems dang sems las byung ba log pas sprul pa med pa'i phyir sprul pa'i sku yang ji ltar rigs/ de bzhin du chos ston pa'i rgyu ye shes med pa'i phyir sems can gyi don gyi rnam gzhag kyang med pas bcom ldan 'das rnams kyi sems dang sems las byung ba'i rgyu ba log par* (D: *log pa*) *ci ltar 'dod ce na/ de la lan ni sangs rgyas kyi sar bcom ldan 'das la sku* [P135.1] *gsum gyi bstod pa'i gnas skabs su slob dpon rang nyid kyis 'chad par 'gyur bas 'dir ma brjod do / /.* This passage is summarized and a portion translated in Dunne, "Thoughtless Buddha," 545.

[480] Candrakīrti explains the three bodies in *Madhyamakāvatāra* stanzas XII.5-18 and treats the ten powers of a Buddha in stanzas XII.19-31.

some one hundred and eighty folios in Jayānanda's commentary,[481] we find that his answer does not rely directly on Candrakīrti's text but seeks a solution elsewhere: Jayānanda attempts to resolve a decidedly Prāsaṅgika understanding of Buddhahood—a Buddha without mind and without appearances—with resources from the Yogācāra tradition.

Jayānanda's solution borrows heavily, and rather oddly given his commitments, on well-worked Yogācāra models of transformation. In particular, he cites Candragomin's model of "The five wisdoms encapsulated in the three bodies [of a Buddha]."[482] With very little modification, Jayānanda explains Candragomin's system in which the eight types of ordinary consciousness in the Yogācāra model are transformed into the five wisdoms of Buddhahood. Among the five wisdoms are the "wisdom of the pristine sphere of reality" (*dharmadhātuviśuddhijñāna*)[483]—or the non-conceptual wisdom (*nirvikalpajñāna*) of the ultimate nature of reality—which Jayānanda tells us, "brings to finality contemplation on suchness, dominion over the collections to be dispelled and realized, compassion and non-dual wisdom devoid of the two obstructions along with their predispositions."[484] Additionally, Buddhas have the "wisdom of individual attention" (*pratyavekṣājñāna*), which allows them to "attend individually to the deeds of sentient beings through the previous

---

[481] This is the number of folios separating the objection and Jayānanda's answer in the *sde dge* edition of the Tibetan translation of Jayānanda's text (the objection starting at 146b.5, while his answer starts at 326a.5). In forging such a wide-ranging link, Jayānanda draws a strong connection between Candrakīrti's presentation of the two truths and his presentation of Buddhahood.

[482] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 326a.5: *ye shes lnga po 'di rnams ni sku gsum gyis bsdus pa ste /.* Jayānanda then cites Candragomin at length, giving his own prose explanation of Candragomin's stanzas.

[483] Makransky (*Buddhahood Embodied,* 63-64) shows that in most classical Yogācāra presentations, Buddhahood is defined by the twin notions of "purified thusness" (*tathatāviśuddhi*) and "non-conceptual wisdom [realizing it]" (*nirvikalpajñāna*) and that these twin notions are sometimes merged into a single term, "purified sphere of reality" (*dharmadhātuviśuddha*). Here, Jayānanda blends the two notions but retains the term, "wisdom."

[484] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 326a.1: *bag chags dang bcas pa'i sgrib pa gnyis dang bral ba'i snying rje dang shes rab gnyis su med pa'o spangs pa dang rtogs pa phun sum tshogs pa mnga' ba de kho na nyid bsgom pa rab kyi mthar gyur pa.*

prayer-wishes [of the now-enlightened being] and the merit of sentient beings, even though Supramundane Victors already only have non-conceptual [awareness] due to their meditative absorption."[485] Together, these two of the five wisdoms go far toward covering the ground traversed by concordant ultimates (and Drakpa Gyeltsen's notion of concordant conventionals). They allow a Buddha to be in constant meditative absorption and to aid sentient beings, even if only by way of their previous aspirations to do so and sentient beings' continued merit. In sum, the wisdoms explain non-abiding nirvāṇa.

In adopting a Yogācāra model of transformation, Jayānanda presents a conservative view of slow progress throughout a bodhisattva's career, the acquiring of limitless merit and the purification of even subtle taints, the overcoming of obstructions to both liberation and omniscience that culminates finally in perfect meditative absorption on reality. His explanation of the five wisdoms espouses a standard Mahāyāna Buddhist vision of transformation: ordinary consciousnesses yield Buddhas' wisdoms through the completion of meditative processses. His descriptions also evince a strong sense of the continuities between Buddhist practice and the goal of Buddhahood, with the collections of merit and aspirations yielding Buddhahood and contemplative practices being developed and brought to fruition in realization of the ultimate. Jayānanda does little more than recast the Yogācāra model, setting the model as a whole in his own Prāsaṅgika system. This strategy ties his unique views to a well-established vision of Mahāyāna Buddhist practice. The root text that Jayānanda follows, Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle,* similarly embeds a unique and quite radical philosophy within a widely accepted path-structure model.[486] While Candrakīrti was

---

[485] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 326a.4: *so sor rtog pa'i ye shes ni gang gis bcom ldan 'das de ltar mnyam par bzhag pas rnam par mi rtog pa kho na yin du zin kyang / sngon gyi smon lam dang / sems can rnams kyi bsod nams kyi dbang gis sems can rnams kyi spyod pa so sor rtog pa'o /.*

[486] Candrakīrti structures *Entrance to the Middle* on the ten grounds of the bodhisattva's progress to Buddhahood, frequently citing the *Sūtra on the Ten Grounds* (*Daśabhūmikāsūtra;* Peking 761.31, vol. 25).

intent on arguing (to largely deaf ears) against a vibrant Yogācāra movement, Jayānanda could more freely adopt features from Yogācāra into a Prāsaṅgika context.

However, Jayānanda's views evince problems that the Yogācāra model cannot solve. We have seen that early Prāsaṅgikas rejected concordant ultimates that would allow for a progressive model of cognitive transformation. While Jayānanda attempts to smooth over the problem of transformation with his account of the five wisdoms, attempting to cover some the same ground that concordant ultimates traverse, his account overlooks the process of **how** ordinary consciousnesses transform. His adaptation of the classical Yogācāra notion of "non-perception" loses its essence when transplanted to his Prāsaṅgika viewpoint. As explained by the important Yogācāra commentator, Sthiramati (fourth century), "non-perception" is a meditative process that is the "means for entering into Buddhahood."[487] Sthiramati explains that upon attaining the first bodhisattva ground (*bhūmi*), a practitioner no longer perceives the imaginary nature (*parikalpitasvabhāva*), the false conception of subject-object duality, and that this non-perception is the supreme perception, the perception of the perfected nature (*pariniṣpannasvabhāva*).[488] Sthiramati's Yogācāra model entails that the unreal nature is through contemplation not perceived, reality is thereby contemplatively perceived, and this yogic process is the means for entry into Buddhahood.

In contrast, for Jayānanda, non-perception entails the cessation of mind itself; nothing is thereupon perceived. Candrakīrti, aware of the difficulties involved with holding that mind ceases at Buddhahood, enigmatically writes, "Through burning all the dry kindling of objects of knowledge, peace; …Through stopping the mind, it is made manifest

---

[487] Makransky (*Buddhahood Embodied,* 379-380, n. 24) shows that commentarial evidence recommends that Levi's edition (p. 48) be emended from *Buddhatvopāyapraveśe* "Entry into the method of Buddhahood" to *Buddhatvapraveśopāye,* "The method of entry into Buddhahood" in the introduction to stanza IX.78 of *Ornament for the Great Vehicle Sūtras,* the stanza that declares "Utter nonperception is the highest perception." For complete reference to this stanza, see above, footnote 472.

[488] Translated in Makransky, *Buddhahood Embodied,* 48.

by the body"[489] and "Since mind and mental factors do not engage, we conventionally posit that [suchness] is made manifest by only the body."[490] Jayānanda comes to read the cessation of mind as something approximating a method for enlightenment. He writes that one has "'peace' because of being devoid of mind and mental factors"[491] and that one "finds the nature of suchness, which has the quality of peace, by stopping mind and mental factors."[492] He explains Candrakīrti's enigmatic statements:

> If one asks, "Well then, if one stops mind and mental factors, how is the Dharma Body made manifest?" [Candrakīrti's] answer to this is "Through stopping the mind, it is made manifest by the body." By stopping the mind, which has a nature of proliferations, the Complete Enjoyment Body finds [the Dharma Body] by way of making it manifest, through the method of not seeing. Therefore, we posit that [the Dharma Body] is made manifest by the body.[493]

Jayānanda tells us that one Buddha body, the Dharma Body, which is equated with emptiness, is realized by another, the Complete Enjoyment Body. A bodhisattva stops perception and stops the mind, whereby the nature of reality is "made manifest."

---

[489] La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* stanza XII.8, 361.11-14: *shes bya'i bud shing skam po ma lus pa / / bsregs pas zhi ste …sems 'gags pas de sku yis mngon sum mdzad /.* Let no one attribute Candrakīrti's lack of success in his lifetime to want for śāstric wit.

[490] La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 362.7-9: *de ltar na ye shes kyi yul de kho na nyid la rnam pa thams cad du de'i yul na sems dang sems las byung ba rnams mi 'jug pas sku kho nas mngon sum du mdzad par kun rdzob tu rnam par bzhag go /.* The passage in full reads "In that way [previously discussed], concerning the referent of wisdom, suchness, if it is a referent of that [wisdom] in all aspects, since mind and mental factors do not engage, we conventionally posit that [suchness] is made manifest by only the body." Having denied that the inherently dualistic mind operates in realizing suchness, here Candrakīrti uses the language of conventional cognition for realization of suchness, speaking of suchness as the referent (*viṣaya, yul*) of wisdom.

[491] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 333a.1: *zhi zhes bya ba ni sems dang sems las byung ba dag dang bral bas so /.*

[492] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 333a.1-2: *sems dang sems las byung ba dag log pas zhi ba'i bdag nyid can gyis de kho na nyid kyi rang bzhin brnyes pa gang yin pa'o /.*

[493] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 333a.2-4: *'o na sems dang sems las byung ba 'gags na chos kyi sku ji ltar mngon du mdzad ce na / de la lan ni / sems 'gag pa de sku yis mngon sum mdzad / / ces bya ba gsungs te / spros pa'i rang bzhin gyis* [read: *gyi*] *sems 'gags pas longs spyod rdzogs pa'i sku ma gzigs pa'i tshul gyis mngon sum du mdzad pa'i sgo nas brnyes pas skus mngon sum du mdzad pa yin no zhes rnam par 'jog pa'o /.*

Jayānanda does not discuss how the Complete Enjoyment Body first arises in order to "manifest" the Dharma Body. Turning back to his citation of Candragomin, we find that he summarizes Candragomin's stanza, "Afflicted intellect (*kliṣṭamanas*) when transformed is called 'wisdom of equality' (*samatājñāna*); Mental consciousness (*manovijñāna*) is the wisdom of individual attention (*pratyavekṣājñāna*)" by writing that these two wisdoms are the Complete Enjoyment Body.[494] He glosses Candragomin's "transformed" with "due to having dispelled the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience, along with their predispositions, [afflicted intellect] comes to be the wisdom of equality of self and other, devoid of the view of self and so forth."[495] This very general account of dispelling the two classes of obstructions does little to answer the question of how transformation occurs. Instead, we are left with the tension between conflicting models of transformation. Following Candragomin, Jayānanda wants the three bodies to encompass the five wisdoms, which themselves are transformations of ordinary consciousness. Following Candrakīrti, one body realizes another upon the utter cessation of consciousness. Whereas his explanation of a Buddha's five wisdoms emphasizes a continuity between practitioner, practice, and Buddhahood, his discussion of the details of transformation yields a fundamental discontinuity between practitioner and Buddha.

Jayānanda's denial of appearances to Buddhas highlights another difference between his views and the Yogācāra model of Buddhahood that he adopts. In discussing "What else remains" in the Yogācāra understanding of Buddhahood, Urban and Griffiths show that a mainstream current of Yogācāra presents a phenomenological explanation of what remains:

---

[494] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 326a.5-6: *slob dpon tsan dra go mis / nyong mongs yid ni gnas gyur la / / mnyam nyid ye shes zhes ni brjod / / yid kyi rnam shes gang yin de / / so sor rtog pa'i ye shes yin /.* He declares that they are the Complete Enjoyment Body at 326b.4.

[495] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 326b.3: *gnas gyur pa ni bag chags dang bcas pa'i nyon mongs pa dang shes bya'i sgrib pa spangs pa'i phyir bdag tu lta ba la sogs pa dang bral ba bdag dang gzhan mnyam pa nyid kyi ye shes brnyes pa'o/.*

upon negating the false constructs of subject-object dualism, a realized being is left with a stream of appearances without false conceptual overlay—a Buddha experiences a pure stream of consciousness not negated by emptiness.[496] While Griffiths and Urban critique this very notion, it is clear that, at least in the *Differentiation of the Middle and Extremes* literature, a Buddha has experience without conceptual construction; emptiness does not negate appearances. However, in the Prāsaṅgika thinking of Jayānanda, the possibility of non-conceptual experience seems to be denied. Holding the perception of any appearance to be inherently imbued with dualist conceptuality, his emptiness negates appearances along with conceptuality; no "pure stream" of experience is posited.

These points work against Griffiths's contention that Indian Mahāyāna presentations of Buddhahood "do not disagree significantly as to which properties should be predicated of Buddha's awareness."[497] Griffiths lumps together disparate doctrinal and philosophical works, including classical Yogācāra treatises,[498] Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle,* and occasionally the classic of non-Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy, the *Treasury of Manifest Knowledge*[499] into his category, "doctrinal digests."[500] From these "digests," he draws a picture of Mahāyāna Buddhahood that forms a basis for his "doctrinal criticism," in which he argues against the logical possibility of an omniscient Buddha.[501] While discussing what qualities the "digests" predicate to a Buddha's consciousness, he notes, "it isn't difficult to find places

---

[496] Hugh B. Urban and Paul J. Griffiths, "What Else Remains in Śūnyatā? An Investigation of Terms for Mental Imagery in the *Madhyāntavibhāga*-Corpus," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 17/1 (1994): 1-25. On pp. 19-21, the authors critique the possibility of a "pure" consciousness without dualistic notions of conceptuality.

[497] Paul J. Griffiths, *On Being Buddha: The Classical Doctrine of Buddhahood* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994), 157.

[498] Including the *Madhyāntavibhāga* texts, the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* texts, the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* texts, and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* texts.

[499] *Abhidharmakośa.*

[500] For his rationale, see particularly Griffiths, *On Being Buddha,* 27-46.

[501] Griffiths, *On Being Buddha,* 181-202.

in the digests where it is explicitly denied that Buddha's awareness involves the operations of the mind and its concomitants"; his footnote indicates only the passage in Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle* discussed above, in which Candrakīrti states, "[suchness] is made manifest by only the body."[502] Griffiths's comment belies the rarity of such a proclamation in Indian Buddhist sources and obscures the important differences between Candrakīrti's and Jayānanda's understanding of transformation and Buddhahood, on the one hand, and Yogācāra conceptions, on the other. The preceding analysis of the difficulties Jayānanda faces in attempting to adopt a Yogācāra Buddhalogy calls into question the wisdom of assuming a common view among Indian presentations of Buddhahood.

Griffiths's sense that "The issue, in the end, is one of where to draw a definitional line"[503] is certainly accurate. For the common Mahāyāna doctrine of non-abiding nirvāṇa poses definite problems of how to conceive of a Buddha in constant meditative absorption on emptiness while at the same time having the ability to constantly aid sentient beings. Yogācāra scholars developed a conception that allows a Buddha a pure stream of experience, in addition to a compatible means of transforming ordinary consciousnesses into the five wisdoms that individually account for the various aspects of non-abiding nirvāṇa. As I have shown in the previous chapter, some Indian and early Tibetan Mādhyamikas developed the idea of concordant ultimates (and, in one case, concordant conventionals) to explain how the Madhyamaka explanation of two truths can still allow for both constant realization of ultimate truth and perception of the conventional. Candrakīrti, also, saw the need to bring these disparate impulses into a coherent whole, writing that Buddhas "are intent on establishing the welfare of sentient beings and do not waver even for a moment from the

---

[502] Griffiths, *On Being Buddha,* 157. His reference to Candrakīrti is on p. 222, n.17.
[503] Griffiths, *On Being Buddha,* 157.

sphere of reality (*dharmadhātu*)."[504] Candrakīrti's "definitional line" excludes mental events from Buddhahood: a Buddha's wisdom is entirely other than ordinary consciousness. Jayānanda's attempt to hold that line while adopting Yogācāra conceptions works more to highlight the deep dispartities between Prāsaṅgika and Yogācāra understandings of Buddhahood. His work points to a gulf between the systematic conception of the Mahāyāna path resulting in Buddhahood and the Prāsaṅgika understanding of an emptiness that negates ordinary mind as well as appearances, a gulf that would be left for generations of Tibetan Prāsaṅgika exegetes to bridge.[505]

Making a Blind Buddha See

Griffiths's insights that Mahāyāna conceptions of Buddhahood are founded on the notion of "maximal greatness"—that doctrinal authors ascribe qualities to Buddhahood that would make a Buddha the greatest possible being—and that the principle of maximal greatness leads doctrinal authors to prioritize "great-making" qualities[506] is helpful in understanding Jayānanda's work on Buddahood. For Jayānanda, having offered Candragomin's explanation of five wisdoms encompassed within the three Buddha bodies, is aware that this doctrine does not answer all the problems of his unique conception of a

---

[504] La Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra,* 361.1-3: *sems can gyi don sgrub pa lhur mdzad cing chos kyi dbyings las skad cig kyang mi bskyod la /.*

[505] I have tried to suggest that Yogācāra ontology forms a much better fit with Mahāyāna conceptions of Buddhahood than the Prāsaṅgika understanding of emptiness does. Additionally, Yogācāra is widely held to be the ontological underpinning of Buddhist tantric developments. Thus, the triumph of Madhyamaka over Yogācāra for the ontological imagination of Mahāyāna Buddhists in Tibet and perhaps also in India poses a number of difficulties for Mādhyamikas, including how to graft a Madhyamaka explanation onto tantra and how to align Buddhahood with the doctrine of two truths. The "Svātantrika" doctrine of concordant ultimates allows an explanation of non-abiding nirvāṇa that, coupled with the frequent Svātantrika adoption of Yogācāra explanations of the conventional world, make for a plausible Buddhahood. Prāsaṅgika authors would take longer to develop satisfying answers, coming, by the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, to adopt positions similar to those held by twelfth century Svātantrikas.

[506] Griffiths, *On Being Buddha,* 58-60 discusses the doctrinal authors' intuition toward "maximal greatness," while pp. 182-183 discusses the need to prioritize "great-making" qualities.

Buddha arisen upon the negation of mind and lacking the ability to perceive appearances. If we allow that Jayānanda's three Buddha bodies do in fact arise even though mind has ceased, that the Complete Enjoyment Body somehow arises and makes manifest the Dharma Body and that somehow Emanation Bodies likewise arise, he has a further problem, that of how his Buddha's Emanation Bodies perceive and aid sentient beings. If Buddhahood entails compassionately aiding transmigrating beings, one suspects that Buddhas would have to perceive those beings and the difficulties in which they find themselves. Jayānanda is forced to decide what is greater: a Buddha's cognitive purity or the ability to see and aid others.

Rather than fall back on the Yogācāra model, in which three of the five wisdoms offer an explanation of how a Buddha can know ordinary objects and compassionately aid beings,[507] Jayānanda first resorts to metaphor to explain how Buddhas can perceive appearances. Having already correlated appearances with non-afflictive ignorance,[508]

---

[507] The three are "mirror-like wisdom" (*ādarśajñāna*), responsible for "reflecting" all objects; the "wisdom of individual attention" (*pratyavekṣājñāna*), allowing a Buddha to attend to each beings' aid; and the "wisdom that accomplishes activities" (*kṛtyasādhanajñāna*), which, based on the wisdom of individual attention, accomplishes the welfare of sentient beings. In discussing mirror-like wisdom, Jayānanda seems to regard it as sufficient explanation for a Buddha's perception (while his metaphor here would seem to belie this interpretation). He cites the *Ornament for Great Vehicle Sūtras* (*Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*), which states, "Mirror-like wisdom is unwavering," and concludes, "Since that [mirror-like wisdom], too, is of the same taste as the Dharma body, [the explanation that mirror-like wisdom is the Dharma Body] is feasible. Due to just that [mirror-like wisdom], Supramundane Victors have knowledge (*vidyā, rig*) that lacks the capacity of memory or forgetting since all entities appear as though in a mirror at all times." Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 327a.1: *mdo sde rgyan las / me long ye shes g.yo ba med / / ces gsungs so / / de yang chos kyi sku dang ro gcig ba'i phyir 'thad pa yin no zhes bya ba / de nyid kyi phyir bcom ldan 'das rnams la dran pa nyams pa mi mnga' ba rig pa yin te / dus thams cad du dngos po thams cad me long bzhin du snang bas so /.*

[508] This correlation was discussed in Chapter Three. Jayānanda (*Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 146b.2-4) neatly summarizes his position as follows: "The meaning of this is: here, stain (*sgrib pa*) has two aspects: afflictive ignorance and non-afflictive ignorance. Of those, afflictive ignorance is the cause of one continually engaging cyclic existence. Non-afflictive ignorance is the cause of the appearance of form and so forth. Supramundane Victors have no capacity for either stain and hence, the absence of the causes [that is, the absence of both afflictive and non-afflictive ignorance] results in the absence of effects [that is, cyclic existence and appearance]. Therefore, there is no cyclic existence and no appearance of form and so forth; how could mere conventionalities appear? Therefore, we assert that mind and mental factors have ceased." Excepting the last sentence, this passage is translated in Dunne, "Thoughtless Buddha," 545.

Jayānanda addresses the question whether wisdom appears to a Buddha; if so, would not a Buddha then also possess ignorance? In answer, he writes,

> [In explaining the twelve links of cyclic existence, Buddha][509] said that consciousnesses of afflicted cyclic existence are caused by ignorance; it is not the case that all consciousnesses are caused by it. Supramundane Victors' wisdom has as its cause compassion because, through the force of compassion, Supramundane Victors abide as long as cyclic existence abides. For instance, although a single lamp is already [burning] caused by its oil, upon the extinguishing of the oil if one pours oil in, it does not die. Similarly, here also although consciousness is already caused by ignorance, upon ceasing ignorance wisdom appears through the force of compassion; hence, it does not follow that Supramundane Victors possess ignorance [due to wisdom appearing].[510]

Jayānanda hints here that a Buddha's wisdom is a type of consciousness—this after denying that Buddhas have minds—but a special kind of consciousness, one brought about entirely by compassion. His lamp metaphor does not really address how a Buddha perceives appearances[511] but offers something of an explanation for the continuity from Buddhist practitioner to Buddha. Mind ceases upon the extinguishing of its fuel, ignorance. Wisdom arises due to the "pouring in" of compassion. While the details of transformation remain

---

[509] I supply this as the hypothetical objector has brought up the twelve links as a reason for suggesting that the appearance of a Buddha's wisdom entails ignorance, reminding Jayānanda that "Conditioned factors are caused by ignorance; consciousness is caused by conditioned factors…" (Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 328a.1: *ma rig pa'i rkyen gyis 'du byed 'du byed kyi rkyen gyis rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba gsungs pa*). Jayānanda explains what the Buddha meant in this statement as his point of departure here.

[510] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 328a.1-3: *nyon mongs pa dang bcas pa'i 'khor bar gyur pa'i rnam pa shes pa la ma rig pa'i rkyen can du gsungs pa yin gyi shes pa thams cad la ni ma yin te / bcom ldan 'das kyi ye shes ni snying rje'i rgyu can yin te / snying rje'i stobs kyis bcom ldan 'das rnams 'khor ba ji srid du bzhugs pas so / / dper na mar me dang po 'bru mar gyis rgyu can yin du zin kyang 'bru mar zad nas mar blugs na mi ldog pa de bzhin du 'dir yang shes pa ma rig pa'i rgyu can yin du zin kyang ma rig pa log nas snying rje'i stobs kyis ye shes snang bas bcom ldan 'das rnams ma rig pa dang bcas par thal bar mi 'gyur ba'o /.*

[511] While the hypothetical objector clearly means to play on Jayānanda's correlation between ignorance and appearances, a Buddha's wisdom does not "appear" in the way objects of perception appear. Jayānanda's term that I translate as "appears" (*snang ba, ābhāsa*) could be translated in this context as "dawns." A Buddha's wisdom "dawns," upon which, presumably, a Buddha perceives in a non-dualistic manner.

fuzzy, Jayānanda clearly considers some kind of "flame" to continue unwaveringly into Buddhahood: wisdom appears when ordinary consciousness ceases.

Jayānanda then addresses the issue of Buddha perception more directly. In addition to endorsing the account of Buddha perception as non-intentional or non-volitional that the notion of a mirror-like wisdom presents, he suggests that a Buddha is able to perceive sentient beings and their needs due to retaining a certain level of ignorance.[512] He denies that Buddhas have afflictive ignorance,[513] which in his schema is the cause trapping one in cyclic existence. Do Buddhas have non-afflictive ignorance, through which one perceives ordinary appearances? He writes, "Although Supramundane Victors already have the capacity to dispel ignorance, through the force of their compassion they do not dispel ignorance for otherwise they would be cut off."[514] In order to maintain the false sense of subject-object duality that marks our perceptual states, Buddhas share in one kind of our ignorance. This ignorance allows Buddhas to retain their connection to the phenomenal world, to continue to perceive and aid sentient beings. While Buddhas' wisdom does not "appear" due to ignorance, Buddhas perceive ordinary appearances because of ignorance. Both wisdom and the retention of appearances occur out of compassion.

However, not surprisingly, Jayānanda is reluctant to call the cognitive state that allows Buddhas to perceive conventional appearances "ignorance." It seems that the "capacity" to dispel ignorance that Buddhas possess renders harmless the ignorance that

---

[512] Dunne ("Thoughtless Buddha," pp. 533-534 and 534, n. 7) notes that Jayānanda mentions that "Some Indian Buddhists went so far as to say that buddhas actually retain some degree of ignorance in order to interact with the world on a conceptual level." As I discuss here, while Jayānanda's views on this matter are complex, he is clearly one Indian Buddhist who holds that Buddhas maintain a level of ignorance that allows them to perceive ordinary appearances.

[513] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 328a.6-328b.1.

[514] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 328b.3-4: *bcom ldan 'das rnams ma rig pa spong ba'i nus pa mnga' ru zin kyang bcom ldan 'das rnams kyi thugs rje'i dbang gis ma rig pa mi spong ba yin te / gzhan du na chad par 'gyur bas so /.*

allows appearances. He tells us that Buddhas know ignorance to be just ignorance and, in response to the possibility that Buddhas have non-afflictive ignorance, ridicules those who would "hold that Tathāgatas already know [ignorance] to be just ignorance and yet hold that Tathāgatas possess this very ignorance."[515] Buddhas' recognition of the ignorance that is responsible for perceiving appearances—their knowledge of ignorance—can justify the claim that Buddhas are not really ignorant.

Additionally, while explaining that a Buddha's bodies work to aid others, Jayānanda again states that Buddhas have the capacity to dispel all obstructions but objects to concluding that Buddhas truly are ignorant. He writes:

> The welfare of sentient beings also is not cut off because the Complete Enjoyment Body and Emanation Bodies work perfectly for the welfare of transmigrators. That, too, later will be cut off.[516] Because they are capable of dispelling the afflictive obstructions and obstructions to the object of knowledge,[517] along with their predispositions, Supramundane Victors are posited as having dispelled the afflictive obstructions and obstructions to the object of knowledge, along with their predispositions. But where is it said that those who have not dispelled [the obstructions] in all aspects and Supramundane Victors retain ignorance through the power of compassion?[518]

---

[515] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 328b.1: *de bzhin gshegs pa rnams kyis ma rig pa nyid du mkhyen du zin kyang de bzhin gshegs pa la ma rig pa yod pa nyid du khas blangs pa.*

[516] Jayānanda previously explained that a Buddha's wisdom is not "cut off" but that "later" it will be. We can only assume that Buddhas' wisdom and sentient beings' welfare are "cut off" only in the eschatological future ("later"), when all are established in enlightenment.

[517] While the term *shes bya'i sgrib* can often be translated as "obstructions to omniscience," with *shes bya* being understood as "[all] objects of knowledge," Jayānanda explains a similar use of *shes bya* to mean something like "the only really important object to be known, that is, emptiness." At *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 146a.1, he explains that mere ignorance, responsible for perceiving appearances, obstructs the object of knowledge and "suchness which is free from existence, non-existence, and so forth is the object of knowledge" (*yod pa dang med pa la sogs pa dang bral ba'i de kho na nyid ni shes bya yin la /*).

[518] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 329b.4-6: *sems can gyi don yang chad pa ma yin te / longs spyod rdzogs pa'i sku dang sprul pa'i skus 'gro ba'i don rdzogs par mdzad pas so / / de yang phyis 'chad par 'gyur pa'o / / bag chags dang bcas pa'i nyon mongs pa dang / shes bya'i sgrib pa spong pa'i nus pa mnga' bas bcom ldan 'das rnams bag chags dang*

The **capacity** to overcome obstructions seems to be sufficient for Jayānanda to say that Buddhas do not retain ignorance. He speaks of "knowing the non-nature of the afflictions"[519] as a means of overcoming them. He wants to say that Buddhas do not possess ignorance yet in some way they operate in the ignorance that allows perception of ordinary appearances, for the sake of aiding others.

That Buddhas' compassionate activity necessitates that they operate within some level of ignorance raises several exegetical and soteriological quandries: First, we must presume that Buddhas are ignorant in some unproblematic way. Jayānanda suggests as much when he tells us that since Buddhas know the non-nature of afflictions they are unaffected by them. However, this concession suggests that Buddhas are no different than those attaining "nirvāṇa with remainder" (*sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*). In this non-Mahāyāna conception, one has overcome the ignorance that traps one in cyclic existence but still functions in the world until death, or "final nirvāṇa" (*parinirvāṇa*), at which point one's mental and physical constituents cease, leaving "no remainder" (*nirupadhiśeṣa*). In Jayānanda's terminology, Buddhas have overcome afflictive ignorance, ensuring their release from cyclic existence, but still operate with some form of the ignorance of appearances, allowing them to aid sentient beings. In terms of Mahāyāna path structure, it would seem that Jayānanda's hero turns back from the point of Buddhahood, from dispelling appearances, in order to aid others. Yet Jayānanda still calls them Buddhas.

Finally, if Buddhas must operate within some form of ignorance in order to aid others, what does this say about the liberative value of overcoming ignorance? Put less problematically, if we speak in terms of Buddhas' "maximal greatness," we have to conclude that, in Jayānanda's view, compassionate aid is simply greater than cognitive purity. As he

---

bcas pa'i nyon mongs pa dang shes bya'i sgrib pa spangs par 'jog la / rnam pa thams cad du ma spangs pa dang / bcom ldan 'das rnams kyis snying rje'i stobs kyis ma rig pa bzhag pa yin no zhes bya ba de gang las gsungs /.

[519] Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* 329b.7: *nyon mongs pa rnams kyi rang bzhin med par thugs su chud pa.*

works toward reconciling the unique and problematic aspects of Prāsaṅgika Buddhahood with the wider notion of Mahāyāna nirvāṇa without remainder, Jayānanda must hierarchize a Buddha's "great making" qualities. His reconciliation was not a lasting one, as Tibetan Prāsaṅgikas would continue to reinterpret Candarkīrti's iconoclastic claims in order to better fit them into the Mahāyāna path structure. However, as Candrakīrti's views grew in importance in India and, especially, in Tibet, Jayānanda's efforts represent an early Prāsaṅgika attempt to work out aspects of his views that had been left undeveloped and difficult to accept. Dunne suggests that Candrakīrti's mindless Buddha "disquieted" his later interpreters, forcing them into new readings of his views.[520] More so, the success of Candrakīrti's views required his champions to smooth over the rough edges of his Buddhahood in order to make it more palatable to Buddhists concerned with the continuities between a practitioner and a Buddha and between a Buddha and sentient beings.

Svātantrika Solutions to Buddha Vision

As discussed in the previous chapter and suggested again in the present chapter, those Mādhyamikas who developed concordant ultimates did so in order to make explanations of transformation and Buddhahood more plausible. None of the scholars who asserted concordant ultimates championed Candrakīrti's interpretation of Madhyamaka. The lines that we see drawn in twelfth century Madhyamaka, then, separated those who took seriously Candrakīrti's claims that mind ceases upon enlightenment and that Buddhas do not perceive ordinary appearances from those who utilized concordant ultimates to explain the transformation to Buddhahood and a Buddha's ability to perceive and aid sentient beings. In the latter camp, we see Mādhyamikas arguing against the Prāsaṅgika interpretation of

---

[520] Dunne, "Thoughtless Buddha," 548.

Buddhahood, taking to task each of the unique features of this interpretation: the metaphoric nature of realization, the cessation of mind upon realization, and inability of Buddhas to perceive ordinary appearances. While critiquing these Prāsaṅgika views of Buddhahood, Chapa Chokyi Senge and his student, Sonam Tsemo, offer their own solution to how a cognitively pure Buddha can perceive an ultimately unreal world.

Chapa sees in Prāsaṅgika Buddhahood a close tie between their understanding of realization as metaphorical and their claims that mind ceases upon realization. His presentation of the Prāsaṅgika understanding mirrors closely Jayānanda's writings on the topic, while filling in connections that are suggested but not made explicit by Jayānanda. Chapa writes:

> During the meditative absorption of [a bodhisattva] who has attained a ground and upon the ground of Buddhahood, since no referent (*yul*)—that is, object of knowledge (*shes bya*)—is established, the engagement of a referent-taker [that is, a consciousness] is pacified. Thus, just the cutting off of the engagement of the mind and mental factors is designated the non-mistaken mind of reality through realizing the final nature. Just as Sautrāntikas call an awareness that is like blue "the realization of blue," so an awareness that is devoid of birth is similar to the birthless final nature and, hence, is to be called "the realization of the final nature."[521]

In Chapa's presentation, Prāsaṅgika Buddhahood is much like advanced bodhisattvas' meditation but is continuous: where bodhisattvas attain a dissolution of object and subject in meditative absorption but perceive appearances out of the meditative state, Buddhas have a continual absence of mind and appearances. Jayānanda writes that complete "non-perception" is conventionally labelled "knowing the ultimate" and that since "knowing the

---

[521] Phya pa chos kyi seṅ ge, *dbu ma śar gsum gyi stoṅ thun,* ed. Helmut Tauscher (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1999), 58.13-16: *sa thob pa'i mnyam bzhag dang sangs rgyas kyi sa na yul shes bya gang yang ma grub pas yul can gyi 'jug pa zhi ste sems dang sems las byung ba'i 'jug pa chad pa nyid la chos nyid rtogs pas yang dag pa'i blo ma 'khrul zhes gdags ste / mdo' sde bas sngon po dang 'dra ba'i blo la sngon po rtogs zhes brjod pa ltar chos nyid skye ba myed pa dang blo skye ba dang bral ba 'dra bas chos nyid rtogs zhes bya ste /.*

ultimate" is really not knowing at all it entails the cessation of mind and mental factors. Chapa turns this around subtly, equating non-perception and the cessation of mind and stating that the very cessation of mind and mental factors is called "realizing the ultimate." In Chapa's rendition, just as in Jayāndanda's and Candrakīrti's, realization is only metaphoric for Prāsaṅgika. Instead of true realization and transformation, Prāsaṅgikas set forth only a mind blowing meditative experience of blankness that they call "Buddahood."

Consistent with his contention that the ultimate is a knowable phenomenon (presented in Chapter Four), Chapa argues that the ultimate is truly known and is known by valid cognition. In trying to draw out just how the Prāsaṅgika understands realization-cum-mental cessation, Chapa conjectures that Prāsaṅgikas must utilize valid cognition to eliminate proliferations (*prapañca, spros pa*)—otherwise, how could they eliminate them?—but upon the elimination of proliferations, no object of valid cognition remains for them.[522] Upon eliminating proliferations, a meditative consciousness—"yogic direct perception" (*yogipratyakṣa, rnal 'byor mngon sum*)—should cognize (*gzhal ba*) emptiness; but in the Prāsaṅgika view, there is nothing left to cognize nor any cognizing agent. Chapa avers that if yogic direct perception is left without an object to cognize, it would be mistaken (*bhrānta, 'khrul ba*)[523] and so not valid. If realizing the ultimate is only metaphoric, without a real object, it cannot be valid. Chapa insists that the ultimate must be validly known. His attempt to tease out what the Prāsaṅgika could mean by metaphoric realization highlights the differences between his and Jayānanda's approaches. Where Jayānanda emphasizes mental cessation as the defining moment of transformation, Chapa stresses the continuity of

---

[522] Phya pa, *dbu ma śar gsum,* 21.1ff. In this section, Chapa argues that if the "voidness of proliferations" (*spros bral,* synonymous with emptiness) were not an object of knowledge, the continuum of a reasoning consciounsess (*rigs shes*) would be cut.

[523] Phya pa, *dbu ma śar gsum,* 21.20-21.21: *rnal 'byor gyi mngon sum gyis spros bral gzhal bya ma yin pa la gzhal bar rlom na blo de 'khrul pa dang bcas par 'gyur la.* "If yogic direct perception fancies that it cognizes when voidness of proliferations is not an object of valid cognition, that awareness would be mistaken."

mind: a reasoning consciousness inferentially knows emptiness whereupon this valid inferential consciousness is contemplatively developed into nonconceptual realization of emptiness.

Essential to Chapa's portrayal of mental cultivation is the basic notion that the mental continuum cannot be cut. The continuity of some form of mental stream forms the ground of a great deal of Indian and Tibetan religious thought. The standard Buddhist explanation is that one moment of awareness produces the next; awareness is separate from body, is not produced from the body, and cannot be stopped. One dissenting current in India were the Cārvākas, who maintained that mind and body alike end at death. Chapa's first attack on the Prāsaṅgika notion that mind ceases upon realization is to ask how Prāsaṅgika Buddhahood is different from the Cārvāka understanding of death: both claim that a certain moment of awareness, unlike all moments of awareness up to that point, lacks the ability to produce a further moment of awareness.

The Prāsaṅgika must understand the meditative absorption that engenders metaphoric realization to be unlike every previous moment of awareness. Chapa offers that, unlike other moments, this meditative awareness lacks "craving" (*tṛṣṇā, sred pa*) and so does not produce further awareness.[524] Chapa rejects this possibility, holding to the common Buddhist line that every awareness produces further awareness. If an awareness lacks craving, along with the other chief non-virtues, hatred and delusion, it produces a pure awareness instead of an impure one: "A pure consciousness is produced from the immediately preceding [consciousness], which is the virtuous mind of non-attachment, non-hatred, and

---

[524] Phya pa, *dbu ma śar gsum,* 73.8: *phyi ma skyed pa'i nus pas ni blo tsam la khyab pa ma yin te sred pa dang bcas pa'i blo la khyab pa yin la / rdo rje lta bu'i dus na sred pa myed pas blo phyi ma mi 'phen no zhe na /.* "Mere awareness does not entail the power to produce later [awareness]. Awareness that is conjoined with craving entails the power to produce later [awareness]. Since there is no craving during the adamantine meditative equipoise, further awareness is not impelled."

non-delusion."[525] For Chapa, mind continues upon Buddhahood just as it does through death: both the mind prior to Buddhahood and the mind of Buddhahood share in a basic status of mind.

In Chapa's view, practice of the Buddhist path takes the non-virtues as its negandum, not ordinary mind. While a Buddha's wisdom is a highly developed and unique state of mind, it develops out of a practitioner's ordinary consciousness. Reminiscent of the lengthy objection Jayānanda entertains, Chapa tells us that if awareness itself is cut, a Buddha's wisdom—which in his view is a special kind of awareness—cannot arise and so cannot give rise to the form bodies that enact sentient beings' welfare.[526] In an interesting turn, Chapa offers that a Buddha's form bodies arise out of emptiness itself. This possibility is one way of making sense out of Candrakīrti's claim that the Complete Enjoyment Body makes manifest the Dharma Body, which is the nature of reality, and that form bodies are somehow produced in this mix. However, Chapa points out that if the Prāsaṅgika would claim that emptiness produces form bodies, emptiness—the ultimate—would be an "ultimate entity," an ultimate capable of causal efficacy.[527] An ultimate entity is impossible in Madhyamaka

---

[525] Phya pa, *dbu ma śar gsum,* 73.13-14: *dag pa'i shes pa ma chags pa dang zhe sdang myed pa dang gti mug myed pa'i dge ba'i sems kyi de ma thag pa las khyang skye bar myong ngo /.*

[526] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 75.19-20: *'phrin las 'grub pa dang snang ba 'byung pa'i nus pa gang las yod / ye shes la yod par mi 'thad de blo rgyun chad pa'i phyir ro //.* "In what does the capacity to give rise to the accomplishment of Buddha activities and appearances exist? It is not feasible that [the capacity] exists in wisdom because [for you] the continuum of awareness is cut."

[527] Following immediately from the preceding passage; Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 75.20-21: *de bzhin nyid la yod par mi 'thad de de don dam pa'i bden pa 'ba' zhig yin la des 'phrin las sgrub pa'i don byed nus na don dam pa'i dngos por grub par thal bar 'gyur ro //.* "It is not feasible that it exists in suchness because [suchness] is ultimate truth alone and if [suchness] is able to perform the function of accomplishing Buddha activities, it would follow that it is established as an ultimate entity."

logic and, for Chapa and other Mādhyamikas, constitutes the chief object to be negated by reasoning.[528]

Finally, Chapa considers the possibility that, while mind has ceased, a Buddha's form bodies and the consequent activity for the welfare of sentient beings could arise from the bodhisattva's collections of merit and wisdom and from the bodhisattva's aspirations to attain enlightenment for the sake of aiding others. This solution, too, is impossible as without a mental continuum there is nothing to carry those collections into Buddhahood and, consequently, the welfare of sentient beings "would arise upon being cut off" (recall Jayānanda having to argue, likely in response to this charge, that in Prāsaṅgika Buddhahood, the welfare of sentient beings is not cut off).[529] Having found all these possibilities unsatisfactory, Chapa adjures that a Prāsaṅgika Buddha would utterly lack the abilities to generate form bodies and to work for the welfare of sentient beings and so would be no different than one attaining a "Hearer's nirvāṇa without remainder, which is the mere pacification of afflictions and suffering, like extinguishing a butter lamp."[530] I have suggested above that Jayānanda's reintroduction of appearances into Buddhahood through admitting some form of ignorance on the part of Buddhas is reminiscent of nirvāṇa with remainder. Here, Chapa claims that a Prāsaṅgika Buddha that cannot perceive appearances is the same

---

[528] The bulk (Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 58.5-124.10) of Chapa's *Compilation from the Three Mādhyamikas from the East,* including most of his argument against Prāsaṅgika, is structured around the correct way to refute an ultimate entity (*yang dag pa'i dngos po*).

[529] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 76.2-5: *tshogs dang smon lam ni 'gags nas ring du lon la 'gro ba la phan pa dus phyis 'byung bas chod pa las skye bar yang 'gyur la / tshogs sog pa dang smon lam ldebs pa byang chub sems dpa' kho na'i rgyud du gtogs pas byang chub sems dpa'i 'phrin las kho nar 'gyur gyi sangs rgyas kyi 'phrin las su gtan mi 'thad do //.* "The collections and wishes having ceased, the time for aiding transmigrating beings arises later, after a long time has passed. Hence, [aiding migrating beings] would arise upon being cut off [from the collections and prayer-wishes]. Since accumulating the collections and making prayer-wishes are included within the continuums of bodhisattvas only, these would be only bodhisattva activities; Buddha activities would be utterly unfeasible."

[530] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 75.15-16: *nyan thos phung po lhag myed ni mar me shi ba ltar nyon mongs pa dang sdug bsngal zhi ba tsam.*

as nirvāṇa without remainder. In Chapa's estimation, denying Buddhas awareness would disallow the fundamental predicates of Mahāyāna Buddhalogy, rendering it no different than non-Mahāyāna conceptions of the religious goal. Having a Buddha dispense with appearances destroys the nature of Buddhahood

Chapa's arguments for the continuity of mind from bodhisattva through transformation to Buddhahood tie closely to his arguments for the continuity of ordinary appearances into Buddhahood. As discussed in the previous chapter, Chapa does not consider the "illusion-like" nature, the union of emptiness and appearances, to be ultimate truth but likely considers it a concordant ultimate. In the context of rebutting the claim that Buddhas cannot perceive ordinary appearances, he considers whether a consciousness perceiving the illusion-like nature—"an awareness having appearance and realizing [appearances] to be like illusions"[531]—is an afflictive obstruction or an obstruction to the object of knowledge, emptiness.[532] We can recall that Jayānanda understood appearances to be caused by "mere ignorance," not afflictive ignorance, and that a Buddha overcoming obstructions to the object of knowledge no longer perceives ordinary appearances (unless they operate within some form of ignorance). Chapa, in contradistinction, argues that a consciousness perceiving appearances is not something to be negated by practice of the path: realizing emptiness dispels the conception that appearances are true, not the perception of appearances themselves.

---

[531] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 73.17-18: *snang bcas sgyu ma lta bur rtogs pa'i blo.* It seems clear that for Chapa, seeing the illusion-like nature is a post-realization state, as this argument occurs within his claim that Buddhas perceive appearances: if they perceive appearances, surely they perceive them as having the nature of illusion.

[532] As will be seen from his following discussion, Chapa, like Jayānanda, understands *shes bya'i sgrib pa* to mean "obstructions to the [only really important] object to be known [that is, emptiness]." However, overcoming this class of obstructions leads to two realizations: "knowledge of the mode of being" (*ji lta ba shes pa*), which is realization of emptiness itself, and "knowledge of the varieties" (*ji snyed pa shes pa*), which is the knowledge of all objects of knowledge (Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 74.1-2).

Chapa quickly dispenses with the possibility that a Buddha's consciousness perceiving appearances would entail afflictive obstructions (which no one has claimed to be the case). He explains that an awareness perceiving appearances but knowing them to be like illusions has necessarily overcome the conception of a "self of persons" through realizing that the five psycho-physical aggregates that make up the person are not permanent, unitary, or self-powered.[533] This level of realization is enough to overcome afflictive obstructions, including afflictive ignorance. Even in the Prāsaṅgika presentation, one with this realization would continue to perceive appearances outside of the meditative state but would not conceive that those appearances are real.

Coming to address the Prāsaṅgika claim that perception of appearances is caused by the ignorance that is an obstruction to the object of knowledge, emptiness, Chapa conjectures that the Prāsaṅgika could claim that conventional appearances and their ultimate emptiness are contradictory (*'gal ba, virodha*), such that emptiness would per force negate appearances. A consciousness perceiving appearances would then be contradictory with the realization of emptiness—no consciousness of the illusion-like nature would be possible. Yet no contradiction between emptiness and appearances can be claimed because emptiness, as all Mādhyamikas know, must be the final nature of appearances.[534] Chapa sees the need to

---

[533] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 73.19-22: *dang po ni mi 'thad de nyon mongs la nges par gang zag gi bdag 'dzin rjes su 'brel pas khyab pa yin na snang bcas kyi phung po lnga skad cig du mar shes pas rtag pa gcig pur 'dzin pa bsal la / snga ma snga ma las byung par shes pas rang dbang can du 'dzin pa bsal te gang zag gi bdag du 'dzin pa dang rjes su 'brel pa myed pa'i phyir ro.* "The first case is not feasible because, whereas afflictions entail connection with the conception of a self of persons, [an awareness] having appearance [and realizing appearances to be like illusions] (1) dispels the conception of the five aggregates as being permanent and unitary through knowing that they are momentary and multiple; and (2) dispels the conception of the five aggregates as being self-powered through knowing that they arise from earlier [causes]; and thus is not connected with the conception [of the five aggregates] as a self of persons."

[534] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 74.5: *spros bral snang ba'i chos nyid ma yin par 'gyur ba.* "Voidness of proliferations would not be the reality of appearances." Chapa (74.5-8) also point to the reverse fallacy, that if appearances and emptiness were contradictory, the experiential establishment of appearances would block the possibility that appearances are empty, which in turn would prove "the position of the proponents of [real]

preserve the relationship between emptiness and appearances and so must reject their mutual contradiction.[535] Additionally, Chapa reasons, in the Prāsaṅgika view, emptiness would negate the entire world of appearances, leaving no feasible way to explain cause and effect; all notions of religious development—especially over the course of many lifetimes—would be ruined.[536]

Having pointed out difficulties with conceiving emptiness to negate conventional appearances, Chapa explains how he understands appearances and emptiness to co-exist on different levels. He writes:

> The establishment of appearances from a non-analytic point of view dispels non-appearance from a non-analytic point of view; however, it does not dispel [their] utter non-establishment when analyzed. Hence, how would [the establishment of appearances from a non-analytic point of view] block the realization of [their] utter non-establishment when analyzed?[537]

The world of appearances, of causes that produce effects, is established when not analyzed. When the causal process is analyzed, according to whether effects are produced from causes that are either the same as, different from, both the same as and different from, or neither the same as nor different from themselves, one finds the emptiness of production. Appearances

---

entities" (*dngos por smra ba'i phyogs*), the chief opponent of Madhyamaka. Additionally, Chapa (74.8-9) dismisses the idea that appearances could obstruct emptiness even without the two being contradictory; if two things could obstruct each other without being contradictory, any two non-contradictory things could be said to obstruct each other, which would be logically unfeasible.

[535] One might ask Chapa if the "final nature" of the false conception of the self of persons and the self of phenomena—the false conceptions that emptiness negates, in Chapa's view—is emptiness. Realizing emptiness is contradictory with these false conceptions for Chapa, so could emptiness be the final nature of the self of persons?

[536] Chapa notes that the destruction of cause and effect (*rgyu 'bras*) would lead to the Cārvākas' (*tshu rol mdzes pa ba*) system (*dbu ma shar gsum,* 75.4-5) or to the Lokāyatas' (*rgyang 'phan pa*) materialism (75.13). These two Indian philosophies are generally regarded as equivalent, rejecting past and future lifetimes and the workings of karma.

[537] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 74.11-12: *ma spyad pa'i ngor snang ba grub pas ma dpyad pa'i ngor mi snang ba sel gyi dpyad na cir yang ma grub pa mi sel bas spyad na cir yang ma grub pa rtogs pa'i gegs su ji ltar 'gyur /.*

cannot "bear analysis" (*dpyad bzod*); their emptiness is found by that analysis. However, the ultimate emptiness of phenomena when analyzed does not negate the appearance of phenomena when not analyzed. Madhyamaka analysis forms Chapa's mechanism for moving from conventional to ultimate. Lack of analysis is his explanation for how phenomena appear.

Non-analytic appearances solve the issue of how even advanced bodhisattvas continue to perceive appearances outside of their meditative states. Jayānanda presumably would not object to this explanation, as we have seen him explain that bodhisattvas perceive "mere appearances" outside of meditative absorption: appearances would disappear during contemplation but "reappear" afterward. However, it is difficult to believe that Chapa intends non-analysis to explain how Buddhas perceive ordinary appearances: Buddhas would presumably not need to analyze in order to see the emptiness of appearances. Chapa's explanation of consciousnesses perceiving the illusion-like nature does not rely on an alternation—brought on by analysis—between perceiving emptiness and perceiving appearances. Rather, he speaks of perceiving the "composite" (*tshogs*) of emptiness and appearances.

We saw in Chapter Four that one of Chapa's arguments against the illusion-like nature being ultimate truth is that the illusion-like nature is a composite of emptiness and appearance and if this composite were ultimate truth, each part of the composite would have to bear analysis; this would establish that appearances bear analysis. Additionally, Chapa has argued that appearances are not an obstruction to perceiving emptiness and that Buddhist practice does not eliminate appearances.[538] Putting these pieces together, we can conclude

---

[538] Two sections of Chapa's argument that mind and mental factors cannot be cut off at Buddhahood are "[Consciousness] having appearance is not an obstruction and, hence, is not to be dispelled" (*dbu ma shar gsum,* 73.17: *snang bcas sgrib pa ma yin pas spang bya ma yin pa*) and "There is no antidote to that [consciousness having appearance]" (74.17: *snang bcas la gnyen po myed pa*).

that while bodhisattvas alternate between meditative realization of emptiness and post-meditative perception of appearances, part of the transformation to Buddhahood involves the ability to perceive appearances and their emptiness of bearing analysis at the same time, constantly. Where Jayānanda understood overcoming obstructions to the object of knowledge, emptiness, to negate appearances when emptiness is realized (appearances and emptiness being incompatible), Chapa views overcoming obstructions to the object of knowledge to involve both realizing emptiness and knowing all objects of knowledge—both emptiness and appearances are known simultaneously.[539]

An outflow of Chapa's position is that he, unlike Jayānanda, does not consider ignorance to be the cause of perceiving ordinary appearances, since this perception is neither kind of obstruction. Perhaps the duality that would seem to be inherent in a consciousness perceiving ordinary appearances is separable from this perception, allowing Buddhas to see somehow non-dualistically. Chapa only hints at his solution to **how** Buddhas continue to perceive ordinary appearances, having overcome their false duality. He tells us that while the referents of Buddhas' perceptions are called "mistaken appearance," the term loses its connotations in this context:

> Since [an awareness] having appearance and realizing [appearances] to be like illusions is a referent-taker of what is unable to bear analysis, we apply the convention, "mistaken appearance" (*'khrul snang,* "appearance to mistake").

---

[539] We saw above (footnote 532) that Chapa understands overcoming obstructions to the object of knowledge to invovle both realizing emptiness and "knowledge of the varieties" (*ji snyed pa shes pa*). When considering whether a consciousness perceiving the illusion-like nature could obstruct knowledge of the varieties, Chapa concludes that "it is contradictory for something to obstruct itself, realization of the varieties being the very [awareness] having appearance [and realizing appearances to be like illusions]" (*dbu ma shar gsum,* 74.13-14: *ji snyed pa rtogs pa snang bcas nyid yin pas rang nyid kyis rang la sgrib pa 'gal ba'i phyir ro //*).

> However, it is neither of the two kinds of obstructions. Hence, it is not feasible for that [consciousness having appearance] to be dispelled by a Buddha.[540]

A Buddha's consciousness perceiving ordinary appearances cognizes objects that, like all objects except emptiness, do not bear analysis. That these appearances do not hold up to analysis forces the conclusion that they do not exist in the way they appear. Thus, we can call the consciousnesses perceiving appearances "mistaken" even though a Buddha knows the emptiness of appearances along with the appearances themselves. For Chapa, appearances are not tied to either type of obstruction in the way that Jayānanda conceives and, consequently, are not cast off by Buddhas.

We can note in the above passage that Chapa moves quickly from "mistaken appearance" to "obstructions": we label a Buddha's consciousness perceiving appearances "mistaken" but it is neither kind of obstruction. He does not stop to answer the more basic question, is it mistaken? In a lengthy passage briefly analyzed in Chapter Three, Chapa writes of levels of mistake that, not unlike Jayānanda's solution, leaves even a Buddha's appearances tied closely to (mostly harmless) mistake:

> [Objection:] If Buddhas' [consciousnesses] having appearances are also mistaken and their referents are also true in mistaken perspective, then since Buddhas have the capacity for mistake, Buddhas have obstructions.
>
> [We reply:] The mistake that conceives what does not exist among objects of knowledge to exist—for instance, the conception of a permanent entity—and the mistake that takes what is empty of performing functions as its apprehended referent—for instance, the appearances of two moons, concepts (*don spyi*), and so forth—entail obstructions. However, if you state the fault that it follows that Buddhas have obstructions because of not having that capacity [for mistake], your reason is not established [that is, Buddhas have the capacity for mistake]. If you say

---

[540] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 74.14-17: *sgyu ma lta bur rtogs pa'i snang bcas dpyad mi bzod pa'i yul can yin pas 'khrul snang zhes tha snyad byed kyang sgrib pa gnyis gang yang ma yin pas de sangs rgyas kyis spong bar mi 'thad do //.*

> that Buddhas have obstructions because of having the capacity for the mistake that is a referent-taker [that is, a consciousness] of that which does not bear analysis, your entailment is not established [that is, having the capacity for this kind of mistake does not entail having obstructions].[541]

Chapa identifies at least three types of mistake: the truly problematic mistake that conceives of entirely unreal phenomena, binding us in cyclic existence; a useful kind of mistake that allows us conceptual mental functioning;[542] and the mistake that allows Buddhas to perceive appearances. It may be possible to correlate the first two types of mistake with afflictive obstructions and obstructions to the object of knowledge, respectively. The third type of mistake does not entail either class of obstruction so is not discarded by a Buddha. Chapa has argued that Buddhas without the ability to perceive ordinary appearances would not be Buddhas. We can conclude that Buddhas need this third type of mistake, that their ability to perceive appearances depends on it. Chapa notes that this mistaken consciousness perceives objects that do not bear analysis. It seems reasonable to extend his correlation, noted just above, between perceiving what does not bear analysis and mistake: that Buddhas perceive appearances that do not bear analysis is what makes the perceptions mistaken. In contrast to these Buddha perceptions, the cognition of emptiness (the one phenomenon that

---

[541] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 15.7-12: *gal te sangs rgyas kyi snang bcas kyang 'khrul pa yin la de'i yul yang 'khrul ngor bden pa yin na sangs rgyas la 'khrul pa mnga' bas sangs rgyas sgrib pa dang bcas par 'gyur ro zhe na / rtag pa'i dngos por zhen pa lta bu shes bya la mi srid pa la srid par zhen pa'i 'khrul pa dang zla ba gnyis dang don spyi lasogs par snang ba lta bu don byed pas stong ba gzung yul du byed pa'i 'khrul pa la sgrib pas khyab kyang de sangs rgyas la mi mnga' bas sgrib pa dang bcas par thal ba'i skyon brjod na gtan tshigs ma grub pa yin la / dpyad mi bzod pa'i yul can gyi 'khrul pa mnga' ba'i phyir sgrib pa dang bcas par 'gyur ro zhe na khyab pa ma grub pa yin no //.*

[542] Chapa lumps in with this type of mistake the perceptual mistake of those with faulty sense faculties. He may consider perceptual mistake to be a fourth type. The perception of two moons is a common Madhyamaka analogy for the false way in which ordinary beings perceive the world—the dualistic manner in which we perceive the world compared to how the world truly exists is similar to the way those with faulty senses perceive what does not exist. In the present context, Chapa may be using the metaphor to refer to a discussion like Jayānanda's equation of mere ignorance and mere appearances: having overcome afflictive ignorance, the non-afflictive ignorance that causes bodhisattvas to continue seeing appearances outside of meditation can be classified along with the useful mistake of conceptuality.

bears analysis), Chapa tells us, "is non-deceptive regarding what bears analysis."[543] Only this cognition has no kind of mistake.

In sum, Chapa's arguments against mind and mental factors—and with them the ability to perceive ordinary appearances—being cut off at Buddhahood are: appearances involve neither kind of obstruction to enlightenment, are not negated by practice of the path, and are a requirement of Mahāyāna Buddhahood. Chapa's arguments amount to the notions that Buddhas **must** have appearances and there is no reason for them not to. When pushed to account for how Buddhas perceive appearances, his answer sounds quite similar to Jayānanda's solution to the same problem. Both resort to a kind of ignorance or mistake that is rendered unproblematic for a Buddha. In Chapa's view, Buddhas have the ability to perceive both appearances that do not bear analysis and the emptiness that is appearances' lack of bearing analysis. Jayānanda understands the capacity to overcome ignorance (while not yet doing so) to be something like the actual overcoming of ignorance, making harmless the ignorance responsible for perception.

However, in addition to the very different conclusions they reach—Jayānanda that Buddhas have no mind and Chapa that mind must continue into Buddhahood—an important difference between these two routes to explaining non-abiding nirvāṇa is the status each ascribes to perception itself. Jayānanda equates all perception of appearances with ignorance and seems to regard the subject-object duality of perception to entail a kind of conceptuality. Full realization of emptiness negates the perception of appearances. Chapa clearly places conceptual mistake and a Buddha's mistake that allows perception of appearances into different categories: the former is an obstruction that is overcome by Buddhas while the latter is not. Chapa's Buddha sees phenomena that appear to bear analysis but are known to be empty. Realizing emptiness does not negate perceiving

---

[543] Phya pa, *dbu ma shar gsum,* 15.14: *dpyad bzod pa la mi slu ba.*

appearances. Put in the terms of later Tibetan Madhyamaka scholarship, early Prāsaṅgika puts forth a broader "object of negation" (*dgag bya*), negating perception itself, than the Svātantrika conception.[544]

In the following generation of scholarship, the positions that Jayānanda and Chapa created in their explorations of non-abiding nirvāṇa became identified with competing schools of Madhyamaka exegesis. While many of Chapa's viewpoints quickly fell into disfavor, the route he took toward working out a Madhyamaka conception of Buddhahood was championed by early Sakya scholars, as well as forming the map for much of later Tibetan exegesis. Chapa's student, Sonam Tsemo, saw the issue of a Buddha's ability to perceive ordinary appearances as a key dividing line between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika. He neatly summarizes the two sides: Prāsaṅgikas hold that Buddhas do not perceive ordinary appearances because the ignorance responsible for perception would entail entrapment in cyclic existence; Svātantrikas maintain that Buddhas have "conventional wisdom" (*ye shes kun rdzob*) that allows them to perceive ordinary appearances without these perceptions acting as a cause for cyclic existence.[545] Sonam Tsemo criticizes the Prāsaṅgika answer for its failure to allow for non-abiding nirvāṇa and endorses the Svātantrika solution.[546]

Sonam Tsemo's younger brother and successor as abbot of Sakya Monastery, Drakpa Gyeltsen,[547] enables us to see that the issue of Buddhahood, engendered by the circulation of Candrakīrti's texts, was crucial to the Madhyamaka debates of his day. We saw in Chapter

---

[544] It is a judgement call as to whether this is a more subtle object of negation, as Prāsaṅgika is claimed by later Tibetan exegetes to have. On the one hand, Jayānanda claims that perception is imbued with a false status that needs to be overcome. In this sense, his may be a more subtle object of negation, an object residing in the very manner in which we perceive the world. In another sense, he needs to throw away perception altogether in his conception of full enlightenment. It is hard to consider that level of surgery subtle.

[545] bSod nams rtse mo, *Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa,* in *Sa skya pa'i bka' 'bum,* vol. 2 (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1968), 495.4.1-496.1.3 (vol. *ca,* 296a.1-296b.3).

[546] bSod nams rtse mo, *sPyod pa la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa,* 495.4.5-6 (vol. *ca,* 296a.5-6).

[547] *Grags pa rgyal mtshan,* 1147-1216.

Four that Drakpa Gyeltsen favors the Svātantrika view that offers concordant ultimates and concordant conventionals to explain transformation to Buddhahood and a Buddha's ability to perceive ordinary appearances, respectively.[548] His explanation of concordant conventionals as "pure worldly wisdom"[549] echoes his brother's notion of "conventional wisdom." Having detailed his solution to the problem of non-abiding nirvāṇa, Drakpa Gyeltsen casts scorn on what he characterizes as the common Tibetan interpretation of Buddhahood, an interpretation centered on Candrakīrti's claim that "realizing the ultimate" is only said metaphorically:

> Some assert that it is established that: Āryas' minds (*thugs*) are ultimate. Those [minds'] referent—without production or cessation, free from elaborations—is ultimate truth. [To the objection:] Well then, [what about the *Introduction to the Two Truths Sūtra*] saying 'Ultimate truth is passed beyond the referents of omniscient wisdom'? [They respond:] That is indeed true; it is not known in the manner of referent and referent taker. As Candrakīrti says,
>
> > Since the final nature is without production and the mind also is devoid of production,
> > Due to that [object] in the basis [that is, the mind] that has the aspect of that [birthless final nature, this is said to be] **like** 'knowing reality.'
> > Hence, "knowing" [reality] is in dependence upon conventions,
> > Just as [in Sautrāntika] a mind knows well its object due to arising in the aspect of that object.
>
> That is called "realizing utterly unestablished suchness." In that way, suchness is called "nirvāṇa" and "the unconstructed reality" (*dharmatā*). Suchness is called the Ārya Hearers' nirvāṇa.

---

[548] Grags pa rgyal mtshan, *rGyud kyi mngon par rtogs pa rin po che'i ljong shing,* in *Sa skya pa'i bka' 'bum,* vol. 3 (Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1968), 21.4.6-22.1.4.

[549] Grags pa, *Rin po che'i ljon shing,* 22.1.3: *dag pa 'jig rten pa'i ye shes.*

> Most contemporary Tibetan Mādhyamikas also assert similarly. This is not correct; I debunked this already.[550]

Drakpa Gyeltsen tells us that many Tibetans have been led astray by Candrakīrti's notion of metaphorical realization and by the sūtra passage that Candrakīrti and Prajñākaramati cite to support their contention that the ultimate is beyond the scope of human intellect (examined in Chapter Four). Through their misunderstanding of Candrakīrti,[551] "most" held the ultimate to be beyond all notions of dualistic knowing. Drakpa Gyeltsen's comments show that Jayānanda's and Chapa's attempts to work out a Madhyamaka notion of nirvāṇa were not isolated arguments but instead indicate a wider problem, instigated by Candrakīrti, in the formation of doctrinal schools in twelfth century Tibet.

Conclusion: Madhyamaka Nirvāṇa

In these varied conceptions of transformation and enlightenment, we can see that arguments over Buddhahood were central to the formation of Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika schools and that cutting a workable path to enlightenment was one of the crucial issues of twelfth century Madhyamaka, engendered by the rise of Candrakīrti. Prāsaṅgika Buddhahood prioritized the cutting of a clear division between the ordinary and the

---

[550] Grags pa, *Rin po che'i ljon shing,* 22.4.3-7: *de la 'phags pa rnams kyi thugs ni don dam pa yin la / de'i yul skye ba dang 'gag pa med pa spros pa dang bral ba ni don dam pa'i bden pa'o / / 'o na mdo las / don dam pa'i bden pa ni rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye shes kyi yul las 'das pa'o zhes gsungs so zhe na / bden mod / yul dang yul can gyi tshul gyis shes pa ma yin te / slob dpon zla grags kyis / gang tshe chos nyid skye med yin zhing blo 'ang skye ba dang bral ba / / de tshe de rnams bstan la de yi de nyid rtogs pa lta bu ste / / ji ltar sems ni gang gi rnam pa can du gyur bas de yi yul / / de yongs shes pa de bzhin tha snyad brten nas shes pa yin / / zhes gsungs te / gang du 'ang ma grub pa de nyid la rtogs zhes bya'o / / de lta bu de nyid la mya ngan las 'das pa zhes bya'o / / chos nyid 'dus ma byas zhes bya'o / / de nyid la 'phags pa nyan thos dag mya ngan las 'das pa zhes bya ba zhig grub par 'dod do / de ltar du da lta bod kyi dbu ma pa phal cher yang 'dod do / / yang dag pa ma yin te sngar yang sun phyung la /.*

[551] Throughout this section of his text, Drakpa Gyeltsen cites Candrakīrti in support of points he makes concerning the two truths and once cites Candrakīrti to criticize a contemporary Prāsaṅgika viewpoint. While he favors the Svātantrika notion of Buddhahood, he clearly supported Candrakīrti's views and saw the need to refute common misinterpretations of these views. However, he may regard Candrakīrti's notion of metaphorical realization to be the problem here, rather than misinterpretations of that notion.

transcendent, with ordinary mind ceasing upon enlightenment and a Buddha, in full realization, unable to perceive the ordinary world. The distance between ordinary being and Buddha matches well with the features of early Prāsaṅgika examined in the previous chapters. In their rejection of the validity of ordinary consciousness, their espousal of an ultimate truth entirely out of the scope of human intellect, and their presentation of Buddhas without minds, we see Prāsaṅgikas drawing a blanket correlation between ordinary consciousness and the conventional world: as long as ordinary consciousness operates, the ultimate is not realized and as long as ordinary objects are perceived a Buddha's state is not attained. In contrast, we see early Svātantrikas emphasizing the continuities between ordinary mind and a Buddha's wisdom and between ordinary appearances and their ultimate emptiness. These continuities are crucial to a coherent picture of transformation and enlightenment and explain the success of the twelfth century Svātantrika understanding of Buddhahood, such that we can detect it in much later Tibetan presentations of enlightenment.

Through focusing on Jayānanda's and Chapa's solutions, we see the difficulties entailed in constructing a Madhyamaka conception of non-abiding nirvāṇa. Chapa's lengthy criticisms of Prāsaṅgika Buddhahood show how tricky non-abiding nirvāṇa is to posit for Mādhyamikas, particularly those who take seriously Candrakīrti's claims. Chapa's views, too, ran into difficulties and had to admit some level of "mistake" into a Buddha's mental state. While their routes diverge in significant ways, each side in this debate is forced to come back to a position that embraces both of the conflicting poles of non-abiding nirvāṇa: pure realization and constant compassionate activity. In their construction of a workable model for practice, transformation, and enlightenment, Madhyamaka authors faced problems that Yogācāra theorists did not. Without a notion of a "pure stream" of experience

that can easily elide the passage from ordinary to enlightened,[552] Mādhyamikas had to develop their own explanations of nirvāṇa that could fit the common Mahāyāna model and at the same time allow for their unique understandings of emptiness. Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle* took strides toward a uniquely Madhyamaka enlightenment. However, his icolonoclastic claims left many holes where a coherent model was needed. While the requirement for a coherent model of nirvāṇa was not novel to their time, eleventh and twelfth century Mādhyamikas devoted unprecedented energy toward creating solutions to the twin problems of transformation and Buddhahood, forging answers that would chart the directions for later Tibetan exegesis.

[552] Drakpa Gyeltsen seems to have in mind a similar notion of a stream of experience that is either perceived in an afflicted or enlightened manner when he writes that the two truths are "the very same referent but different by way of mental engagement" (*Rin po che'i ljon shing,* 23.2.5-6: *yul gcig nyid la blo mi 'jug pas tha dad do*).

Conclusion

In the preceding, I have tried to uncover aspects of the differences between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika in the initial period of these two Madhyamaka subschools. In so doing, this dissertation complements previous scholarship focusing on the Prāsaṅgika-Svātantrika distinction as it might apply to sixth through ninth century India and to fourteenth through twentieth century Tibet. The immediate contribution of this project lies in beginning to fill in a great gap in the history of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka.

In my focus on the historical rise of Prāsaṅgika, I have shown that Indian interest in Candrakīrti's texts centered on his understanding of ultimate truth and that the formation in Tibet of a Prāsaṅgika school championing his texts was based on unique interpretations of ultimate truth and Buddhahood, as well as issues of the validity of human consciousness in reaching liberative knowledge. These issues are very different from the issues scholars have seen separating proto-Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika interpretations in India and very different from the issues separating Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika in later Tibetan scholarship. Most of the literature on the Indian proto-Prāsaṅgika-Svātantrika divide examines the logical considerations from which these two schools derived their names. Tibetan scholarship either takes the same route or, in Gelukpa (*dge lugs pa*) circles, examines differing conceptions of emptiness, with the Prāsaṅgika understanding of emptiness alone negating that phenomena are "established by their own character" (*rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa*). While eleventh and twelfth century Mādhyamikas opposed each other over ontological, in addition to logical, concerns, their contentions over emptiness differ sharply from the divisions Gelukpa scholars posit.

That we see a different difference between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika in the twelfth century from that adduced in the fifteenth century has already been proffered by Helmut Tauscher, the only contemporary scholar to begin examining the distinction as portrayed by

the first Buddhists to make it in the twelfth century. Tauscher detects an "old" method and a "Gelukpa" method of dividing Prāsaṅgika from Svātantrika, with both methods based on the rejection or acceptance of *svatantra* reasoning: the old method of distinguishing the two views takes *svatantra* reasoning as a Mādhyamika holding a thesis (*pratijñā*) "of one's own" that is proved by way of formal inference in which the "three modes" (*trairūpya*) of inference are established by valid cognition; the Gelukpa method of distinguishing Prāsaṅgika from Svātantrika interprets *svatantra* reasoning as a formal inference that is "established in itself" and thereby implies the acceptance of conventional "self-natures" of phenomena.[553] Both "old" and "Gelukpa" methods focus on *svatantra* reasoning but differ in their interpretation of it. Tauscher endeavors to determine whether Chapa can be classified as a Svātantrika based on either the old or Gelukpa methods, answers "yes" to the first and "not really" to the second, and shows several clear similarities between Chapa's views and those of the Geluk founder, Tsongkhapa (*Tsong kha pa bLo bzang grags pa*).[554] Tauscher stops short of suggesting what his distinctions seem to imply, that Gelukpas might very well be considered Svātantrikas according to the "old" distinction.

My identification of the crucial issues dividing the early Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika schools—the issues of the validity of human consciousness, the interpretation of ultimate truth, and the development of Madhyamaka Buddhahood—has not touched on issues of logical procedure. Even my examination in Chapter Three of the debates on valid cognition (*pramāṇa, tshad ma*) focus either on the valid cognition project as a whole or upon perception (*pratyakṣa, mngon sum*), rather than on the only other type of valid cognition widely accepted by Buddhists, inference (*anumāna, rjes dpag*). Logical concerns were

---

[553] Helmut Tauscher, "Phya pa chos kyi seng ge as a Svātantrika," in *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make?* eds. Georges B.J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2002), 232-238.

[554] Tauscher, "Phya pa chos kyi seng ge as a Svātantrika," 235-238.

certainly important to the formation of these schools, as their names suggest. Jayānanda wrote disparagingly of Svātantrikas' insistence on formal inference as well as defending his own method of dispensing with inference.[555] Chapa wrote at length concerning the inability of logical "consequences" (*prasaṅga*) to negate the "object of negation" and establish emptiness and of the necessity of inferences "of one's own" to establish emptiness.[556] Several of Chapa's arguments on logical procedure have been investigated in Tauscher's two articles[557] and can be read in my translation of a large part of his text in the Materials section of this dissertation. Debates over the logical procedures befitting a Mādhyamika were one basis for the division into Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika schools in this period.

However, as other names for these early schools suggest[558] and as I have shown throughout this dissertation, the twelfth century distinction is much broader than logical procedure. For Chapa, even the debates on logical procedure had wider implications concerning competing views of what emptiness negates, how the world of appearance is validly established, and how one develops the mind to realize the ultimate. Chapa's exploration of "commonly appearing [inferential] subjects" (*chos can mthun snang*)—a requirement of Dignāgean inference in which the subject of an inference must be commonly perceived by both parties of a debate—makes clear that he sees the Prāsaṅgika rejection of

---

[555] Jayānanda's discussion of these issues occurs at greatest length in his *Commentary to [Candrakīrti's] Entrance to the Middle,* on stanzas VI.3-8. There, he cites at length Candrakīrti's defense/explication in *Clear Words* (*Prasannapadā*) of Buddhapālita's argumentative method based on logical "consequences" (*prasaṅgas*) and Candrakīrti's criticism of Bhāvaviveka's insistence on formal inference. See Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā,* Toh. 3870, *sde dge* edition, *dbu ma,* vol. *ra,* 138b.3ff.

[556] The bulk of his only currantly extant text takes these as its themes; Phya pa chos kyi seṅ ge, *dbu ma śar gsum gyi stoṅ thun,* ed. Helmut Tauscher (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1999), 58.7-124.9.

[557] Helmut Tauscher, "Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge's Opinion on *Prasaṅga* in his *dbu ma'i shar gsum gyi stong thun,*" in *Dharmakīrti's Thought and its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy,* edited by Shoryu Katsura (Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1999), 387-393 and Tauscher, "Phya pa chos kyi seng ge as a Svātantrika," 207-255.

[558] See Drakpa Gyeltsen's characterizations in Chapter Four.

common appearance to hinge upon their close association of appearances and ignorance, as does his endeavor to show that emptiness does not negate appearance (see Chapters Three and Five and the Materials section).

These wider concerns of the twelfth century may help us better understand the issues of the previous six centuries of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka. Tom Tillemans and Sara McClintock have each investigated the importance of perception and the ontological status of ordinary appearances in the eighth century thought of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.[559] The status of appearances is a chief concern of twelfth century Mādhyamikas; Chapa is an important developer of Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's views, bringing them to bear, probably for the first time, on Candrakīrti's system. Also, the twelfth century debates on "commonly appearing inferential subjects," intimately tied to the status of appearances, may illuminate a similar concern in Candrakīrti's writings.[560] Just as fourteenth and fifteenth century Tibetan scholarship has to date guided research seeking a Prāsaṅgika-Svātantrika distinction in Indian Madhyamaka, eleventh and twelfth century materials may now offer insights into the philosophical differences between Indian Buddhists who did not see

---

[559] As discussed in Chapter Three, these two scholars conclude differently, with Tillemans agreeing with Gelukpa scholarship that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla allow a quasi-realist position into their views, adhering to a form of Wilfred Sellars's "the myth of the given," and McClintock holding that the two are unassailable Mādhyamikas with no vestiges of realism in their system. See Tom J.F. Tillemans, "Metaphysics for Mādhyamikas," in *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction,* 93-123 and Sara L. McClintock, "The Role of the 'Given' in the Classification of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla as Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas," in *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction,* 125-171.

[560] Jayānanda, who has proven to be a quite faithful interpreter of Candrakīrti, develops a strong connection between ignorance and appearance and denies the possibility of common appearance for Mādhyamikas. In his *Clear Words* (*Prasannapadā*), Candrakīrti denies the possibility that an inferential subject could appear in common to two parties in a debate on the ultimate, even when putting aside the issue of how that subject is established in the tenet systems of the two parties, giving as his reason, "falsity and non-falsity are different" (Louis de La Vallée Pousin, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti,* Bibliotheca Buddhica 4 [Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970], 30: *bhinnau hi viparyāsāviparyāsau /*). Given Jayānanda's readings of Candrakīrti, this passage may indicate that Candrakīrti rejects "common appearance" and, consequently, formal inference due to his unique interpretation of appearances being the sole domain of ignorance.

themselves as members of Madhyamaka subschools[561] but nevertheless exhibited important divergences in view. Tauscher's "old" and "Geluk" Prāsaṅgika-Svātantrika distinctions, while not fully capturing the debates brought to the fore by my research, are helpful in highlighting the changing and contested nature of this distinction. Twelfth century materials show us a **different difference** between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika than the differences depicted in later sources.

My examination of the early history of Candrakīrti's revival also yields a **different kind of difference** between Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika than that drawn by later doxographies. The doxographic impulses driving Tibetan scholarship of the fourteenth century and onward on the Prāsaṅgika-Svātantrika distinction demanded an ordered and ranked harmony among the wealth of Indian Buddhist literature. Categories were constructed based on typologies abstracted from hundreds of Indian texts, and these categories were populated according to thematic similarities with the founders, who themselves were chosen for their doctrinal importance. While the names for these categories had historical referents and perhaps were employed with belief in their historical validity, conceptual construction was clearly a goal held more deeply than historical representation.

When we shift from thematically important figures to figures historically important to the formation of Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika schools, we see that Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika have historical validity, referring to living movements rather than only to thematic concerns. We deal with competing understandings of religious pursuits that spill over into issues of authority and legitimacy for the participants and their communities. Rather than the fixed ends of doxography, we see a myriad of potential directions and open

---

[561] Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla may in the eighth century have understood themselves to be Mādhyamikas of a different stripe than Bhāvaviveka. Certainly their Tibetan successor, Yeshedé (*ye shes sde*), did, writing of Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka (including Bhāvaviveka) and Yogācāra-Madhyamakas (including Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla).

outcomes. Our heightened appreciation of this difference should induce a healthy scepticism into our use of doxographic literature in historically sensitive investigations of late Indian scholastic Buddhism and Tibet's proto-canonical period. Thus, in addition to a reinterpretation of both earlier and later materials utilized in distinguishing Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika, this study suggests a re-examination of how those materials can be utilized.

Appreciating the myriad possibilities of twelfth century Tibet leads us to consider why Prāsaṅgika triumphed over Svātantrika[562] to become the exegetical system favored by nearly every Tibetan scholar from the thirteenth century into the present. Accepting that Candrakīrti did not establish Prāsaṅgika's superiority nor was he even taken seriously until the close of the first millennium, the questions become more pointed: why Candrakīrti? why the twelfth century? why in Tibet? As I have shown in Chapter One, interest in Candrakīrti did not arise only in Tibet; rather we see many important Indian Buddhists taking interest in Candrakīrti's views on ultimate truth in the eleventh century. Much of this interest was tied to concerns with the final developments of Indian Buddhist tantra. The affinities between tantric views and Candrakīrti's portrayal of a radical disjunction between conventional and ultimate, between ordinary awareness and a Buddha's state would seem to tie Candrakīrti's revival to the popularity of tantra. A wider circulation of Candrakīrti's texts could not fail to bring to attention the clear difference between his presentation of Madhyamaka and that of Bhāvaviveka or of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.

The sense of differing currents of Madhyamaka attested in eleventh century Indian sources proliferated in the fractious socio-political landscape of twelfth century Tibet to form competing subschools. As detailed in Chapter Two, Tibetan translators took possession of particular strains of Indian Buddhist literature that became the hallmark of their monastic

---

[562] As I have tried to indicate throughout this dissertation, many "Svātantrika" viewpoints of twelfth century Tibet survived to become part and parcel of later presentations of Prāsaṅgika.

academy's curriculum. I adopt the textual community model from Stock's analysis of medieval European developments in order to provide a non-reductive look at the myriad factors contributing to the relative successes of these schools. The broader competition between the administrative units that monasteries comprised undoubtedly influenced and amplified doctrinal divergences. The fine philosophical nuances of an exegete's interpretation of doctrine would not alone yield the triumph of one school of thought over another. However, the abilities of the monastic academies, in which these doctrines were developed and for which they shaped the intellectual and religious environment, to gain broader influence surely would contribute.

Directions for Future Research

My preliminary explanations of the success of Prāsaṅgika—its co-emergence with the later stages of Buddhist tantra and its propagators' success in broadly influencing Tibetan Buddhist exoteric curricula—each require more complete investigations. These investigations, in turn, will help us understand not just the Prāsaṅgika-Svātantrika distinction and the formation of these two schools but the development of Buddhism in its final flourishing in India and its broad systemization in Tibet. Late Indian Buddhism, from the tenth century onward, and proto-canonical Tibetan Buddhism, prior to the thirteenth century, have been the subject of very few investigations.

While literature on Indian and Tibetan tantric Buddhism has increased, investigations of tantra in its relationships with exoteric Buddhism have been few. We have long assumed that tantric doctrine (rather than tantric ritual) rose out of, or at least fit more comfortably with, Yogācāra views of Buddhist ontology. We know that when Buddhism was brought to Tibet on a large scale in the eighth century, Yogācāra was not a viable doctrinal option, but was already eclipsed by Madhyamaka. Yogācāra scholars in India likewise seem to be rare after the eighth century. In their place, we see Madhyamaka scholars with strong

Yogācāra leanings, such as Ratnākaraśānti and Abhayākaragupta. Both of these authors have written at length on Madhyamaka doctrine and tantra, making their writings likely sources for understanding how tantra became wedded to Madhyamaka doctrine (following its putative separation from Yogācāra) and how tantric concerns came to influence the final developments of Indian Madhyamaka which saw Candrakīrti's rise to fame.

A similar problem exists with late Indian and early Tibetan conceptions of Buddhahood. As discussed in Chapter Five, debates on nirvāṇa formed one nexus for the formation of Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika schools. However, Mahāyāna Buddhahood had been more completely and consistently developed by Yogācāra Buddhists, causing Jayānanda to borrow heavily from Yogācāra despite the very poor fit with his own views. While his unique views on Buddhahood contributed to Candrakīrti's rise, the problems in his interpretation exacerbated the need for a Madhyamaka conception of Buddhahood. Investigations of this problem, utilizing both long-available Indian sources (many available only in Tibetan translation) and several recently resurfaced Tibetan sources, will help us to understand the overlap and interrelations of the various currents of thought in the Indian and Tibetan Buddhist worlds.

Finally, I have tried to show the importance of the administrative networks of monasteries in twelfth century Tibet to the formation of Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika schools. However, our understanding of these networks and their relationships to important clans and political entities is very much incomplete. A fuller investigation of Tibetan historical sources pertaining to this period will allow us to better map the networks and allegiances of this period. Such a mapping, in turn, is crucial to our understanding of the formation of both tantric and exoteric systems of exegesis in Tibet and of Tibet's great religious orders, which had their beginnings in this period.

Materials: The Argument Against Consequential (*prasaṅga*) Reasoning and For Inferences of One's Own (*svatantra*) in Chapa Chokyi Sengé's (*Phya pa chos kyi seng ge*) *Compilation of the Three Mādhyamikas from the East* (*dBu ma shar gsum gyi stong mthun*)

As one of the very few texts that presents a sustained argument against Prāsaṅgika, Chapa's *Compilation of the Three Mādhyamikas from the East* is extremely important to our understanding of the issues engendered by Candrakīrti's texts upon their dissemination in twelfth century Tibet. The following is a translation, based on Helmut Tauscher's edition,[563] of a portion of this text.[564] The translation draws from Chapa's long excursus on the proper way for a Mādhyamika to "Refute a real entity," which is the primary purpose of Madhyamaka reasoning. Chapa begins by presenting the Prāsaṅgika method for refuting a real entity, then takes that method to task for its inability to do so. He then discusses the correct way to refute a real entity, through the use of formal inference. Along the way, he presents his critique of several important Prāsaṅgika positions, discussed in Chapters Three through Five, on the impossibility of human valid cognition (*pramāṇa, tshad ma*), the unknowable ultimate, and the mindless Buddha. As Chapa presents his own positions on these issues, as well as his critique of Prāsaṅgika, this portion of his text is perhaps our most important document for understanding the formation of Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika schools of Madhyamaka.

Throughout, numbers in curly brackets refer to the page and line numbers in Tauscher's edition. Square brackets give translator additions intended to improve the readability of the translation. Parentheses provide the original Tibetan terms, sometimes with the Sanskrit equivalents. The outline apparatus is drawn from the text's internal topical

---

[563] Phya pa chos kyi seṅ ge, *dbu ma śar gsum gyi stoṅ thun,* ed. Helmut Tauscher (Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1999).

[564] Corresponding to Tauscher's edition, 58.5-80.13.

outline (*sa bcad*). Footnotes provide explanatory information intended to improve the translation's clarity. Tauscher's edition notes the variance in Chapa's citations of Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle* from La Vallée Poussin's edition of that text.[565] As it is in most cases important to Chapa's interpretation of Prāsaṅgika, I follow Chapa's "misquotations" except where noted. In places, I indicate my divergence in understanding from passages that Tauscher has translated in his article on this text.[566]

The valid cognitions that ascertain an illustration of an ultimate truth—an affirming negative—to be empty of being established by reasoning

This section has two parts: refuting a real entity and refuting some other affirming negation that is related to that.[567]

Refuting a Real Entity

This section has two parts: debunking [Candrakīrti's position] that consequences negate the object of negation and [our own] mode of negating the object of negation through inference.

1. Debunking that Consequences Negate the Object of Negation

This topic is to be ascertained in four parts: setting up the opponents' system, debunking that, positing our system, and dispelling objections to that.

---

[565] Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti,* Bibiotheca Buddhica 9 (Osnabrück:Biblio Verlag, 1970).

[566] Helmut Tauscher, "Phya pa chos kyi seng ge as a Svātantrika," in *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make?* eds. Georges B.J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2002), 207-255.

[567] This second part is not included in the present translation.

a. Setting up the opponents' system {58.9}

This section is to be posited in four parts: the master Candrakīrti's and others':

- division of mistaken awareness and non-mistaken awareness,
- mode of division [of phenomena] into the two truths in dependence upon that,
- debunking that proliferations are negated by [inferences] of one's own, and
- mode of negating proliferations through consequences.

i. The division of non-mistaken awareness and mistaken awareness by the master Candrakīrti and others. {58.12}

[Non-mistaken awareness]

During the meditative equipoise of one who has attained a ground and upon the ground of Buddhahood, since no referent (*yul, viṣaya*)—that is, object of knowledge (*shes bya, jñeya*)—is established, the engagement of a referent-taker [that is, a consciousness] is pacified. Thus, just the cutting off of the engagement of the mind and mental factors is designated the non-mistaken mind of reality through realizing the final nature (*chos nyid, dharmatā*). Just as Sautrāntikas call an awareness that is like blue "the realization of blue," so an awareness that is devoid of birth is similar to the birthless final nature and, hence, is to be called "the realization of the final nature." As it says [in Candrakīrti's *Entrance to the Middle, Madhyamakāvatāra* XII.4]:

> Since the final nature is birthless and the mind [realizing it] is devoid of birth,
> Due to that [object] in the basis [that is, the mind] that has the aspect of that [birthless final nature, this is said to be] like "knowing reality."
> Hence, "knowing" [reality] is in dependence upon conventions,
> Just as [in Sautrāntika] a mind knows well its object due to arising in the aspect of that object.

[Mistaken awareness]

Mistaken awarenesses of false vision are:

(1) Cognitions that are renowned in the world to be true; that is, worldly awarenesses that rely on the unimpaired six sense faculties, such as:

- The direct perception of (i.) a common being, who has the conception that appearances are true and of (ii.) one who has attained a ground, who perceives forms and so forth, without having the conception that these appearances are true, subsequent [to meditative equipoise];
- The inference that conceives of fire and so forth;
- The ascertainment of future lives and so forth, which depends upon sound (that is, scripture);
- Inference by analogy, and so forth.

(2) Sense consciousnesses to which appear two moons, floating hairs, and so forth, that is, superimpositions of objects that are renowned to be non-existent even as a worldly referent—[consciousnesses] that depend on the impaired six sense faculties—**and** polluted mental consciousnesses that superimpose self and so forth in dependence upon specious inferences and bad tenets.

As it says [in the *Entrance to the Middle* VI.24]:

> Erroneous perception has two aspects: clear faculties and faulty faculties.
> Consciousnesses from faulty faculties are asserted to be wrong relative to consciousnesses from good faculties.

ii. [Candrakīrti's] Mode of Division into Two Truths in Dependence Upon That {59.11}

This section has three parts: the division into two truths; positing the nature of conventionalities; and positing the nature of the ultimate.

(a). The Division into Two Truths {59.13}

Appearances—as various objects of knowledge—in the perspective of the false perception of mistaken (*'khrul ba, bhrānta*) awareness are obscurational truths. Since there is nothing that correct perception sees, that is ultimate truth. As it says [in the *Entrance to the Middle* VI.23]:[568]

> All entities bear two natures—
> Entities found by correct perception and by erroneous perception.
> Whatever object is [found by] correct perception is suchness;
> That [found by] erroneous perception is said to be an obscurational truth.

(b). Positing the nature of conventionalities {60.1}

Objects of the six unimpaired sense consciousnesses—form, and so forth—that are true in the face of worldly minds (*'jig rten pa'i bsam*) are real conventionalities. Objects of the six impaired sense consciousnesses—two moons, dreams, and so forth—are non-existent even in the face of worldly minds. Since these are [only] imputed, they are unreal conventionalities. Both [real and unreal conventionalities] are imputed to be true as referents of the obscuring awareness (*kun rdzob kyi blo*) having the nature of delusion that veils the pacification of the operation of awareness. Thus, they are obscurational truths. As it is said [in the *Entrance to the Middle* VI.25-26, 28]:

> Anything that the world holds to be
> Apprehended by the six unimpaired faculties
> Is true only within the world.
> The remainder are considered wrong (*mithyā, log pa*) even in the world.[569]

---

[568] The Sanskrit of Candrakīrti's stanza as cited by Prajñākaramati is found in Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Prajñākaramati's Commentary to the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Çāntideva,* Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1905), 361.4: *samyagmṛṣādarśanalabdhabhāvaṃ rūpadvayaṃ bibhrati sarvabhāvāḥ / samyagdṛśāṃ yo viṣayaḥ sa tattvaṃ mṛṣādṛśāṃ saṃvṛtisatyam uktam //.*
In pāda a, Chapa's text reads *log pa* for *rdzun pa.* This may be significant for the manner in which Chapa construes Candrakīrti's understanding of *rdzun pa.*

[569] La Vallée Poussin, *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā,* 353.13: *vinopaghātena yad indriyāṇāṃ saṇṇām api grāhyam avaiti lokaḥ / satyaṃ hi tal lokata eva śeṣaṃ vikalpitaṃ lokata eva mithyā //.*

Whatever entities are imputed
By Non-Buddhists who are agitated by the sleep of ignorance
As well as imputations of illusions and mirages
Are seen to be non-existent even in the world.

Since it has a nature of delusion, which obscures, it is a concealer (*saṃvṛti*).[570]
Whatever entities that are imputed to be true by that [concealer][571]
The Sage called concealing-truths (*saṃvṛtisatya*).
Fabricated truths are conventionalities.[572]

(c). Positing the nature of the ultimate {60.14}

Just as good eyes do not see at all those falling hairs that appear to a mistaken awareness, so a superior's meditative equipoise, when directed toward the very objects of observation that appear variously to mistaken awarenesses, has no object to be observed at all,

---

[570] This line is translated per Chapa's reading of it, as indicated by his comments above. Such a reading seems to twist the word order and moves away from other interpretations which read "nature" as the direct object of "obscures": obscurational truth obscures the nature, emptiness. A more straight-forward translation is: "Delusion is a concealer because it obscures the nature." Jayānanda's reading also contains ambiguities. This stanza draws upon a stanza in the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* (*Laṅkāvatārasūtra, Lang kar gshegs pa'i mdo,* stanza X.429; Sanskrit in Bunyiu Nanjio, *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra,* Bibliotheca Otaniensis, vol. 1 [Kyoto: Otani University Press, 1923], 319): *bhāvā vidyanti saṃvṛtyā paramārthe na bhāvakāḥ / niḥsvabhāveṣu yā bhrāntistatsatyaṃ saṃvṛtirbhavet //.* The second part of the stanza makes it clear that, for this sūtra, "truth," that is, emptiness, is concealed by ignorance: "That [consciousness] which is mistaken regarding the lack of inherent existence is asserted as the concealer of reality (*yang dag kun rdzob*, *satyaṃ saṃvṛti*)."

[571] The translation of this line reflects both the variant readings found in Chapa's citation and Chapa's interpretation of the reading: his text reads *dngos rnams* for La Vallée Poussin's *bcos ma* and *brtags pa* for *snang de.* In explaining *kun rdzob bden pa* just prior to these citations, Chapa uses the reading *brtags pa,* stating that such entities are "imputed to be true." One can appreciate his reading of *brtags pa* at the end of pāda b, as the b pādas of stanzas twenty-six and twenty-nine each end with *brtags pa.*

[572] Here, again, Chapa's text contains a variant, reading *bden pa* for *dngos ni.* The translation of *kun rdzob tu'o* (*saṃvṛtim*) in pāda d as "conventionalities" agrees with Jayānanda's interpretation; Chapa says nothing concerning it. Finally, the Sanskrit as found in La Vallée Poussin, *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā,* 353.3, which in all cases agrees with La Vallée Poussin's edition of *Entrance to the Middle* (and for the most part with Jayānanda's interpretation), reads: *mohaḥ svabhāvāvaraṇād hi saṃvṛtiḥ satyaṃ tayā khyāti yad eva kṛtrimam / jagāda tat saṃvṛtisatyam ity asau muniḥ padārthaṃ kṛtakaṃ ca saṃvṛtim //.*

due to having extinguished mistake. [This absence] is ultimate truth. It is said [in the *Entrance to the Middle* VI.29]:[573]

> Know suchness to be like the nature
> With which one with good eyes sees
> Those unreal (*vitatha, log pa*) things—floating hairs, and so forth—
> Imputed through the power of ophthalmia.

iii. [Candrakīrti's] Debunking that proliferations are negated by [inferences] of one's own {61.4}

[Proponents of inferences of one's own say:] Regarding what is said in a [proof] statement of one's own, since the reason must fulfill the three modes (*tshul gsum, trairūpya*), a basis that appears in common (*gzhi mthun snang*) [to the two parties in a debate] entails that one's own inquiry is supported by a reason that proves it.

[Candrakīrti and others respond:] A basis does not appear in common.

- Since this appearance is an object of a mistaken mind, a worldly mind, and is not an object of a middle way mind, a basis does not appear to me.
- Even if it were allowed that [a basis] appears, if one says that an appearance that is like an illusion is the basis, it would not be established for a proponent of entities, and if one says that a true appearance is the basis, then this is not established for us.

[Some might say,] "Just as it is the case that, in the proof that sound is impermanent, a permanent sound is not established for Buddhists and an impermanent sound is not

---

[573] Chapa's reading of this stanza differs slightly from La Vallée Poussin's edition: for *de nyid bdag nyid gang du* (*yenātmanā*), he reads *de'i bdag nyid gang gis.* For *mthong de de nyid,* he reads *mthong ba gang yin.* The first variant follows the Sanskrit more closely and makes little difference to the translation. The second variant is perplexing; one imagines the *gang* is intended to handle the Sanskrit correlative pronoun *tat*, handled by the first *de* in La Vallée Poussin's edition. However, without *de nyid* (*tattva*), it is unclear what the stanza's simile is intended to describe. The Sanskrit, in La Vallée Poussin, *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 365.2, reads: *vikalpitaṃ yat timiraprabhāvāt keśādirūpaṃ vitathaṃ tad eva / yenātmanā paśyati śuddhadṛṣṭis tat tattvam ity evam ihāpy avaihi //.*

established for outsiders, but [both sides] have an appearance of mere sound in common, so, true appearances are not established for me and false appearances are not established for an outsider, but [we both] have a common mere appearance." This cannot be said because when a mistaken appearance is proved to be impermanent, an unanalyzed appearance that is common [to both parties] as mere sound is sufficient [to be the basis]. However, in this case, when ultimate truth is delineated, it is not suitable to take appearances that are common to mistaken minds as the basis; two moons appearing in common to two ophthalmics does not become suitable to be a basis for proving [that such appearance is] true.

Even if we allow that a basis appears [in common], the probandum that one desires to know is not to be proved[574] and, hence, a reason proving that [probandum] and a [proof] statement of one's own that demonstrates this reason are not feasible. This is because a Mādhyamika does not make any assertions at all as whatever one asserts—existence, non-existence, both existence and non-existence, and neither existence nor non-existence—is an extreme.

Even a reason that validly[575] fulfills the three modes is undemonstrable:

- because all of these reasons, pervasions, and so forth, are objects of worldly awarenesses and worldly awareness is not at all valid cognition, as it says [in the *Entrance to the Middle* VI.30]:

  If the world were authoritative,

---

[574] *bsgrub bya rang gi zhe 'dod bsgrub du myed pa,* literally, "The probandum does not exist to be proved as what one desires to know." Chapa seems to have the Prāsaṅgika say that even if we allow that the inferential subject can be a "mere appearance" (which is admitted only provisionally, as the Prāsaṅgika has claimed that there can be no commonly appearing subject), the probandum does not exist; hence, no reason can prove that a "mere" subject possesses a non-existent predicate. This criticism plays on Dharmakīrti's requirement that the subject in an inference be "enquired about" (*shes 'dod, jijñāsā*) as to whether it possesses the property of the probandum.

[575] The text reads *rtags tshul gsum tshad ma'i kham du tshang ba'ang bstan par byar med.* Tauscher conjectures that *kham du* may be emended to *lam du. tshad ma'i kham du* would seem meaningless; *tshad ma'i lam du* could mean "by way of valid cognition"—the three modes are cognized by perception or inference to be fulfilled.

The world would see suchness.
What need would there be for the others, the Superiors, and what would be the use of the Superior path?
How could foolishness be valid cognition?[576]

- and because a Mādhyamika who does not assert anything has no appearances at all and, hence, has no ascertainment of a sign, pervasion, and so forth.[577]

Furthermore, through assertions being internally contradictory, [the opponent] is debunked, as in the following:

- If a thing already exists, this contradicts production being sensible, and
- If production is sensible, this contradicts the already existent, and so forth.

Therefore, a reason of one's own that is proved by valid cognition is not necessary. Furthermore, if [an opponent] denies [that these are] contradictory, that [opponent] would also deny [a reason of one's own that is proved by] valid cognition. Hence, proofs of one's own have no power. As it says [in Nāgārjuna's *Refutation of Objections* (*Vigrahavyāvartanī*) 29:[578]

If I had a thesis,
I would have a fault.

---

[576] Both "authoritative" and "valid cognition" translate the same word, *tshad ma* (*pramāṇa*). The first *tshad ma* must be translated as "authoritative," as Candrakīrti introduces the stanza by stating that only Āryas are authoritative (*tshad ma*); non-Āryas are not. However, both Chapa and Jayānanda interpret the second *tshad ma* in this stanza as a mental state, Jayānanda explaining that "the world" is not non-deceptive (*mi slu ba,* using the Dharmakīrtian definition of valid cognition) and does not possess thorough knowledge (*yongs su shes pa*), and so does not possess "valid cognition." Furthermore, Chapa's text differs from La Vallée Poussin's edition in this fourth pāda: for *rigs pa'ang ma yin no,* it reads *gyur pa ga la yod.* Whereas La Vallée Poussin's edition, and Jayānanda's reading, conveys the statement: "It is not reasonable for foolishness also to be valid cognition," Chapa's reading poses a rhetorical question.

[577] Tauscher here indicates: "4 *akṣara* deleted or *gnyis ka* to be amended?" My provisional translation "and so forth" allows for the possibility that another word was intended in addition to "sign, pervasion," (*rtags dang khyab pa*), yet *lasogs pa,* even as conjuncted throughout the text, would not fit as "4 *akṣara.*"

[578] E.H. Johnston, A. Kunst, K. Bhattacharya, *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna: Vigrahavyāvartanī* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1998), 14, 61: *yadi kācana pratijñā syānme tata eṣa me bhaveddoṣaḥ / nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmānnaivāsti me doṣaḥ //.*

Since I have no thesis,
I am only faultless.

Or, as it says [in Āryadeva's *400 Stanzas* (*Catuḥśataka*) XVI.25]:

Whoever does not assert existence, non-existence, [both] existence and non-existence
Cannot be criticized, even for a long time.

In that way, a Mādhyamika has no theses whatsoever. Hence, a reason proving that [thesis] and an [inference] of one's own demonstrating that [thesis] are not feasible. Therefore, [inferences] of one's own do not cut off proliferations.

iv. [Candrakīrti's] Mode of Negating Prolferations through Consequences {63.1}

Therefore, proliferations are cut off only by consequences that contradict the assertion [as in the refutation of production, discussed at length here].

[**Refutation of Production from Self**]

Sāṃkhya asserts:

- Production is necessarily senseless for the manifest, and so forth, which already exist.
- The entity of an effect already exists even at the time of its causal entity.

[The Prāsaṅgika replies:] It says [in the *Entrance to the Middle* VI.8cd]:

There is no value [to say] that a thing is produced from itself, and
It is just not reasonable that a produced thing is produced again.

If one asserts that the unmanifest—an internal sense sphere, and so forth—already exists even at the time of its cause and asserts that production is still necessary, then we assert a contradictory consequence,[579] "It follows that the production of an internal sense sphere is senseless because it already exists at the time of its cause."

---

[579] *'gal ba sdud pa'i thal 'gyur.*

If one considers that entailment to be unestablished, then [we prove the entailment through] drawing parallels:[580]

- In as much as even that which already exists when it is unmanifest is produced, so, that which already exists when manifest also would also require production.
- In as much as that [which already exists when it is manifest] does not require production, so, already existing even when unmanifest entails that production is unnecessary.

One might differentiate as follows: manifest existence entails that production is unnecessary, however unmanifest existence does not entail that production is unnecessary. [We respond:] That distinction is the same as what is to be proved. Just as an effect existing in the cause is not established for us, that distinction [between manifest and unmanifest existence] also is not established. Hence, production from self is negated.

[**Refutation of Production from Other**]

Followers of the One Gone to Bliss assert that:

- Others are producers, since they assert that smoke is produced from fire—which is other than itself.
- Darkness is not produced from a tongue of fire.

To this, we state the contradictory consequence: It follows that a tongue of flame produces darkness because of being other than darkness. As it says [in the *Entrance to the Middle* VI.14ab]:

> If one thing arose in dependence upon another,
> Then thick darkness would arise even from a tongue of flame.

If one considers that entailment to be unestablished, then we establish the entailment through drawing parallels:

---

[580] *'go snyom pa.*

- In as much as darkness is not produced from a tongue of flame, which is other than darkness, so it is not suitable that smoke would be produced from fire, which is other than smoke.
- In as much as smoke is produced from fire, which is other than smoke, so darkness also must be produced from a tongue of flame, which is other than darkness.

One might say, "In that case, fire that is other than smoke has the power to produce smoke, whereby there is production [of smoke from fire]. However, a tongue of fire that is other than darkness does not have the power to produce darkness, whereby there is no production [of darkness from a tongue of fire]." [We respond:] That distinction is the same as what is to be proved; just as production from another is not established for us, it is not established that "Fire has the power to produce smoke but a tongue of fire does not have the power to produce darkness." [Hence] production from other is refuted.

[Refutation of Production from Both Self and Other]

Similarly, since it has both faults, production from both [self and other] is refuted.

[Refutation of Causeless Production]

It says [in the *Entrance to the Middle* VI.100]:[581]

> If the world were without cause,
> Just like the scent and color of a lotus in the sky, it would not be apprehended.
> Since the world in its exceedingly great variety is apprehended,

---

[581] In a parallel passage, Candrakīrti's *Clear Words* (Louis de La Vallée Pousin, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti,* Bibliotheca Buddhica 4 [Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970], 38.7) reads for the first two pādas:
gṛhyeta naiva ca jagad yadi hetuśūnyaṃ syād yadvad eva gaganotpalavarṇagandhau /.
In the third pāda, Chapa's reading varies from La Vallée Poussin's edition: *…bkra 'jig rten pa yis 'dzin de'i phyir* for *…bkra'i 'jig rten 'dzin pa'ang yin de'i phyir.* I have translated according to La Vallée Poussin's edition of *Entrance to the Middle*, as Chapa's reading simply introduces the "apprehender," which in any case is assumed, and if used would confuse the English.

It should be known that, just like one's own awareness, the world arises from causes.

In this way, if one asserts causeless production, we state a contradictory consequence: It follows that there is no apprehension [of worldly] variety by direct perception because the world has no cause. If one considers that entailment to be unestablished, the entailment is established through drawing a parallel:

- In as much as there are variegated appearances of the world even though the world has no cause, so too the scent and color of a lotus in the sky must appear to direct perception even though it has no cause.

One might assert, "While they are similar in being causeless, the world is an existent entity and, hence, appears. However, the scent and color of a lotus in the sky are non-existent entities and, hence, do not appear." [We respond:] That distinction is the same as what is to be proved. Just as causeless production is not established for us, so it is not established that "The world is an existent entity but the scent and color of a lotus in the sky are non-existent entities." Hence, causeless production is refuted.

In this way, proponents of entities are refuted.

b. Debunking the Opponent [Candrakīrti's] System {65.1}

This section has three parts: the unfeasibility of not asserting inferences of one's own, the unfeasibility of refuting proponents of entities by way of consequences, and the unfeasibility that minds and mental factors are cut off in Buddhahood.

i. The Unfeasibility of Not Asserting Inferences of One's Own {65.4}

This section has three parts: the absence of a commonly appearing inferential subject is not a suitable reason [for not asserting inferences of one's own]; the absence of theses is not a suitable reason [for not asserting inferences of one's own]; and the absence of ascertainment

by valid cognition that the reason is a property of the inferential subject[582] and of the reason's [forward and reverse] pervasions is not a suitable reason [for not asserting inferences of one's own].

(a.) The absence of a commonly appearing inferential subject is not a suitable reason [for not asserting inferences of one's own] {65.7}

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "Illusion-like appearances are not established for proponents of entities and appearances that can bear analysis are not established for Mādhyamikas; thus, there are no commonly appearing inferential subjects. Hence, it is not feasible to give an [inferential] reason for that [subject]."

[We respond:] An illusion-like person is not established for proponents of entities and a person that can bear analysis is not established for Mādhyamikas; hence, there is no common appearance of the person who is debunked. Hence, it is not feasible to state a consequence to that [person].

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "We state a consequence to that person who propounds entities and who is established to both of us, no matter if that person bears analysis or not."

[We respond:] We affix a reason to an [inferential] subject (*gzhi*) that is established to both of us as a mere appearance, a mere entity, or a mere object of knowledge, no matter if it bears analysis or not.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "An appearance in common to mistaken awarenesses, just like an appearance of floating hairs in common to two ophthalmics, is not suitable to be an inferential subject that is proved to have the property of [either] emptiness or bearing analysis."

---

[582] *phyogs chos*, *pakṣadharma.*

[We respond:] An appearance as a person to a mistaken awareness, just like an appearance as an illusory person in common to two persons whose eyes are affected [by a mantra], is not an object (*yul*) to whom one could state a consequence that would clear away the wrong conceptions of proponents of true entities.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "Although I am refuting the object of negation—the wrong conception of true entities—since I refute the wrong conception of existence for a person whom I do not analyze,[583] the appearance as a person to [my own] mistaken awareness is the person to whom a consequence is stated."

[We respond:] Although I prove [either] the property, voidness of proliferations or bearing analysis, it is proved in regard to an unanalyzed inferential subject; hence, it is feasible to affix a reason to an inferential subject that appears in common to mistaken minds.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "Although an inferential subject (*chos can*) appears, it [appears to] a worldly awareness. However, it is not feasible for a Mādhyamika, who makes no assertion at all, to state a reason, due to not perceiving [that appearance] as a subject (*gzhi*)."

[We respond:] Although a person who propounds entities appears, [that appearance] is an object of a worldly mind; however, it is not feasible for a Mādhyamika, who makes no assertions at all, to state a consequence to that [person], due to not perceiving a person. If you state a consequence even while not perceiving the person yourself, I could state a reason although an [inferential] subject (*gzhi*) does not appear to me.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "Well then, one could also affix a reason to the horns of a rabbit or the vase of a flesh eater."

---

[583] *ma brtags nyams dga' ba'i gang zag.*

[We respond:] In that case, you also could state a consequence to the son of a barren woman or to a flesh eater.[584]

(b.) The absence of theses is not suitable to be a reason [for not asserting inferences of one's own] {66.7}

This section has three parts: [In the absence of theses] it would not be feasible to refute wrong conceptions; it is not feasible to cast out both explicit contradictories; one would be unable to refute a mere consciousness that bears analysis.

(i.) [In the absence of theses] it would not be feasible to refute wrong conceptions {66.10}

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "It is not reasonable to state a reason because nothing is established for a Mādhyamika."

[We respond: According to you who holds no thesis whatsoever] the opponent does not have a wrong conception that is discordant with the basic disposition (*gshis*) of objects of knowledge [since you make no claim regarding this basic dispostion]. Hence, it is not reasonable to state a consequence that refutes that.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "Asserting ultimate entities is a wrong conception that does not accord with the basic disposition of objects of knowledge."

[We respond:] Well then, [your claim] of thesislessness deteriorates [because] you assert the emptiness of ultimate entities as the basic disposition of objects of knowledge.

(ii.) It is not feasible to cast out both explicit contradictories {66.15}

---

[584] While "the horns of a rabbit" and "the son of a barren woman" are common examples of things that do not exist in any manner, "a flesh eater" (*sha za*) is typically considered to exist but as a supersensory being. "The vase of a flesh eater" is utterly non-existent, as supersensory beings cannot be said to possess something that is in the range of our senses. It is possible that in Chapa's response he intends again "the vase of a flesh eater"; however, his rejoinders throughout this section posit some kind of being to whom a consequence is stated, not a phenomena about which one may argue.

If one asserts neither entities nor the emptiness of entities as the ultimate, how would one refute the assertion of both?

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "[Your] very establishment of one casts out the other; hence, asserting both is contradictory."

[We respond:] Just refuting one establishes the other; hence, asserting neither is contradictory.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "This very thing is not established."

[We respond:] The former, also, is not established.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "Regarding contradictories in the sense of mutual exclusion,[585] just the establishment of one is the refutation of the counterpart."

---

[585] *phan tshun spangs 'gal.* In this type of contradiction, as explained here, establishing one entity entails the denial of its counterpart, or "mate" (*zla bo*). However, unlike explicit contradictories (immediately below), it is possible to posit a third entity, unrelated to the two contradictory "mates." For example, the conception of self (*bdag 'dzin*) and the wisdom realizing emptiness (*stong nyid rtogs pa'i shes rab*) are contradictories in the sense of mutual exclusion; a eye sense consciousness seeing blue is neither. Onoda ("Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge's Theory of *'gal ba,*" in *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies,* Monograph Series of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies, Occasional Papers 2 [Narita: Narita-san Shinshō-ji, 1992], 197-202) has sketched out a possible framework of Chapa's understanding of "contradictories" (*'gal ba*), based on Sakya sources and on Tsangnakpa's (gTsang nag pa) *Tshad ma rnam par nges pa'i ṭi ka legs bshad bsdus pa.* It is not at all clear that the composite sketched from these sources reflects Chapa's views. It is well known that Chapa's positions were the chief target of Sakya Paṇḍita's *pramāṇa* writings and while Tsangnakpa was Chapa's disciple, he is said to have left Chapa in favor of the Prāsaṅgika position. So while a fair degree of knowledge of Chapa's views can be attributed to both, a certain amount of partisanship could distort their presentations. Furthermore, the additional Sakya sources were written at hundreds of years' distance. The composite is as follows: Chapa divides "contradictories" into "contradictory in the sense of not abiding together" (*lhan cig mi gnas 'gal*) and "contradictory in the sense of mutual exclusion." This latter is equated with "mere contradictory" (*'gal ba tsam*) and is further divided into "explicit contradictory" and "implied contradictory" (*rgyud 'gal*). Onoda (p. 201) concludes that "contradictory in the sense of not abiding together" (Onoda: "contraries where there is no [possibility of] co-existence") is of little importance for Chapa—it is not mentioned in this passage. Such a classification would seem to make "explicit contradictory" a stricter relation than "contradictory in the sense of mutual exclusion," consistent with Chapa's usage here. It is not clear that this classification would make the Prāsaṅgika's position "implied contradiction." If two things are contradictory in the sense of mutual exclusion but not explicit contradictories, would they necessarily be implied contradictories?

[We respond:] Regarding explicit contradictories,[586] just the refutation of one is the establishment of the other.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "The very ascertainment [of two things] as explicit contradictories is a worldly awareness."

[We respond:] The ascertainment of contradictories [in the sense of mutual exclusion] is a worldly awareness.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "While it is a worldly awareness, it is not harmed conventionally and is established through experience and [therefore] cannot be cast out."

[We respond:] Also, the limitation [of two things] as explicit contradictories is similar to that [in being unharmed conventionally and established through experience].

(iii.) [In the absence of theses] one would be unable to refute a mere consciousness that bears analysis[587] {67.4}

How can proponents of thesislessness refute proponents of existence [who hold] the thesis that a clear awareness that is singularly established by experience only exists ultimately?

---

[586] *dngos 'gal.* In this type of contradictory, all entities are divided into two classes, such as permanent and impermanent; no third choice is possible. Hence, as Chapa indicates, the denial of one entails the acceptance of the other. The import here is that Chapa views the first two options of the *tetralemma* (*catuṣkoṭi*) as explicit contradictories: if one denies existence, one must accept non-existence. As is clear just below, Chapa accepts the first option, stating that the ultimate exists.

[587] I see no reason to emend this reading from *dpyad bzod pa'i shes pa tsam dgag mi nus pa* to *dpyad mi bzod…* as Śākya mchog ldan (*Lung rigs rgya mtsho,* vol. 14, 519.2) and Tauscher have done. Chapa introduces a hypothetical opponent holding that a consciousness that is established by experience—the Prāsaṅgika's own mode of conventional establishment—exists ultimately. Chapa's point in introducing the imagined opponent's position is to bait the Prāsaṅgika into taking a stand: how can the Prāsaṅgika argue with his own "worldly renown" even when it is used to justify ultimate existence (or existence that is claimed to bear analysis)? Chapa is not stating his own position, as will be clear from what follows, and hence there is no need to change the heading's reading to "a mere consciousness that does not bear analysis" (which runs counter to the following sentence).

[A follower of Candrakīrti might say] We perform the analysis, "Is that awareness unitary or manifold; produced or not produced; permanent or impermanent?"

[We respond:] That action [of analysis] itself also should be analyzed: is it a true entity or empty of being such?

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "We have no theses whatsoever."

[We respond:] We, also, do not assert any distinction regarding the ultimate, [which the hypothetical "proponent of existence" we began with holds to be] clear [awareness].

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "Not asserting any particulars regarding an entity [claimed by you to be] existent is not feasible."

[We respond:] Casting out both of two explicit contradictories [that is, unitary or manifold, produced or not produced, permanent or impermanent] is not feasible.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "Although [two things] are established for the worldly as explicit contradictories, that is not established for us."

[We respond:] Regarding an existent entity, not passing beyond permanent and impermanent or one and many, and so forth, is established in the world. However, this is not established for us.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "Due to non-invalidated experience, you cannot cast out the limitation as entailer and entailed [in this case, existence and particulars]."

[We respond:] Due to non-invalidated[588] experience, you cannot cast out the establishment [of two things] as explicit contradictories.

---

[588] Tauscher (67.16) emends *gnod byed* to *gnod med*.

(c.) The absence of ascertainment by valid cognition that the reason is a property of the inferential subject[589] and of the reason's [forward and reverse] entailments is not suitable to be a reason [for not asserting inferences of one's own] {68.1}

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "A reason that establishes the voidness of proliferations is impossible."

[We respond:] A consequence that refutes proliferations is also impossible.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "[Consequences stated] to those who propound that the effect exists in the cause, such as 'It follows that production is pointless because the effect exists in the cause,' are consequences that refute proliferations."

[We respond:] In [the inferential subject] entities, the [reason] emptiness of real unity or multiplicity establishes the [probandum] emptiness of a real nature, and so forth, and is a reason that refutes proliferations.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "There is no ascertainment that the reason is a property of the inferential subject nor of the [forward and reverse] entailments regarding that [reason]."

[We respond:] A person who propounds that the effect exists in the cause and the wrong conceptions of that person are not established. Hence, it is not feasible to state a consequence.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "The person is manifestly established. [The wrong conceptions of that person] are established from the very inference that infers by way of the verbal communication [that is, the speech of the opponent] that [indicates that the opponent holds] a superimposition that the effect exists within the cause."

[We respond: Your defense of the use of consequences by establishing, through direct perception and inference, the person to whom a consequence is stated and the wrong

---

[589] *phyogs chos*, *pakṣadharma.*

conceptions of that person that are refuted by consequences] is similar to the following [defense of the use of inferences by establishing, through direct perception and inference, the reason's entailments and that the reason is a property of the inferential subject]: It is established by direct perception that the existence [of anything] entails that [the thing] is either unitary or manifold. By reason of being associated with manifold time, a unitary continuum is refuted. By reason of the impossibility of not being connected with earlier and later [moments], the possibility of a unit existing within a continuum is refuted. [These two refutations of the unitary] are established by inference. Due to the non-existence of units, the manifold [being a collection of units] does not exist, by reason of which multiplicity is refuted. Thus, the reason being a property of the inferential subject is established by inference.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "Direct perception and inference themselves are worldly awarenesses and are not valid cognition. Hence, they are not feasible to be ascertainers that the reason is a property of the inferential subject or of the reason's [forward and reverse] entailments."

[We respond: The statement] "It follows that production is pointless because of the effect existing in the cause," is not even a proper consequence for one who propounds that the effect exists in the cause. Hence, it is not feasible to refute the wrong conceptions of others by means of that [consequence].

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "That [consequence] has the ability to establish an undesired thesis [against the opponent] because of the general definition of mere consequence: the reason and the pervasion are established for the opponent. Hence, it is not established that it is not a proper consequence."

[We respond:] Direct perception and inference also possess the general definition of mere valid cognition: being contradictory with superimpositions upon a previously

unrealized object by an awareness that is non-mistaken regarding that object. Hence, it is not suitable that they are not valid cognition.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "As it says [in the *Entrance to the Middle* VI.30]:

> If the world were authoritative, the world would see suchness.
> What need would there be for the others, the Superiors, and what would be the use of the Superior path?
> How could foolishness be valid cognition?

If [worldly awarenesses, such as direct perception and inference] were valid cognition, it follows that a [worldly] awareness sees the truth."

[We reply:][590] If your consequence is proper, there also would be a reason that is asserted [by the opponent, namely, "because of the effect existing in the cause"], an entailment [namely, "if an effect exists in its cause, production is pointless"] that is ascertained by valid cognition, and [in a way similar to an inference] the dispelling of the [opponent's] thesis.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "There is no entailment because there are also consequences in which the entailment is asserted [by the opponent] and the thesis is dispelled by their own words."

[We reply:] Then also there is no entailment [in your statement] that it follows that a [worldly] awareness would see the truth. This is because it is not contradictory for there to be direct perception and inference that comprehend the conventional and for there also to be inference that comprehends ultimate truth without perceiving [ultimate] truth.[591]

---

[590] In this and the following paragraph, my translation differs from that in Tauscher, "Phya pa chos kyi seng ge as a Svātantrika," 226.

[591] Chapa distinguishes between "comprehend" (*'jal ba*) and "perceive" (*mthong ba*) in order to show that inference (*rjes dpag, anumāna*) is valid cognition (*tshad ma, pramāṇa*) even though it does not directly perceive the truth, in distinction to Candrakīrti's implication in the stanza above—made clear by Jayānanda's commentary—that only direct perception (*mngon sum, pratyakṣa*) of ultimate truth is valid cognition. Chapa's

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "A short-sighted[592] awareness [that is, an awareness not directed at emptiness] involves mistake. Hence, such an awareness cannot establish that the reason is a property of the inferential subject or the reason's entailments."

[We reply:] Your short-sighted awareness involves mistake, and hence you cannot refute the [opponent's] denial, "I did not assert that reason," and the [opponent's] denial of contradiction.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "If one denies an object that is renowned in the world, [such a denial] is harmed by a worldly awareness itself."

[We reply:] If one denies that the reason is a property of the inferential subject and the reason's pervasions that are renowned in the world, these [denials] also are harmed by the world.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "A worldly awareness perceives the reason and entailments; however, nothing is established for a Mādhyamika who holds no theses whatsoever. Hence, a Mādhyamika does not state reasons."

[We reply:] The world also perceives the reason and entailment as asserted [by the opponent of the Mādhyamika employing consequences]. However, a Mādhyamika does not perceive [the reason and entailment]. Hence, it is not reasonable for a Mādhyamika to state a consequence.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "A worldly awareness that comprehends conventions is also included within the continuum[593] of the very Mādhyamika who accepts

---

statement implies that only direct perception "perceives" while both direct perception and inference "comprehend." One wishes for an explanation of how direct perception "comprehends."

[592] *tshu rol mthong, avargdarśana.*

[593] 69.18: *tha snyad 'jal ba'i 'jig rten pa'i blo'ang don dam par ci yang khas mi len pa'i dbu ma nyid kyi rgyud du gtogs pa.* Tauscher ("Phya pa chos kyi seng ge as a Svātantrika," 227) translates: "Even worldly cognition examining conventionally belongs to the very tradition of Madhyamaka, which in an absolute sense does not affirm anything whatsoever." One appreciates reading *dbu ma nyid kyi rgyud* as referring to "the very tradition of Madhyamaka"; however, this stretch of *rgyud* and relocation of *nyid* to accommodate *dbu ma* (rather than

nothing at all as the ultimate. Hence, reasons and entailments are established as asserted [by the opponent] for this very person who propounds the middle.

[We reply:] Due to that very [point] the reason being a property of the inferential subject and the reason's entailments are also established for the very person who propounds the middle.

ii. Consequences are unable to refute proponents of entities {70.1}

This section has three parts: [consequences] are unable to refute completely[594] the object of negation; even if they were able [to refute the object of negation, consequences] are unable to refute all proliferations; and [consequences] are unable to dispel the qualm that proliferations exist.

(a.) [Consequences] are unable to refute completely the object of negation {70.4}

Proper consequences, such as "It follows that production is pointless, due to [a thing] existing already" and "It follows that [things] do not appear to direct perception, due to their being causeless," are to be examined as follows. Is one contradictory object refuted upon stating its contradictory counterpart as a reason, by way of the opponent's mere assertion that the already existent is contradictory with meaningful production; or, is one contradictory object refuted upon stating its contradictory counterpart as a reason, by way of

---

dbu ma pa) seems to miss the point: the Mādhyamika employing consequences is arguing that propounding "nothing at all" does not block one's own comprehension of conventionalities, such as the reason and entailment that the opponent of the Mādhyamika holds—such comprehension is still included within one's own mental continuum. This is the very point Chapa has been making in defense of the use of inferences: asserting nothing as the ultimate does not negate conventional comprehension, and it is conventional comprehension that comprehends the features of inference.

[594] *dgag bya gtan dgag mi nus pa.* Tauscher ("Phya pa chos kyi seng ge as a Svātantrika," 219) notes that construing *gtan* with *mi nus pa* makes this section's second sub-heading mysterious: if consequences are "utterly unable to refute the object of negation" how can Chapa then allow "even if they were able…"? A solution is to construe *gtan* with *dgag* as I have done here: consequences are "unable to refute **completely**", allowing that consequences have a certain effectiveness but are alone insufficient.

ascertaining that, in the basic disposition of objects of knowledge, [the already existent] is contradictory [with meaningful production]?

In the first case, I would be able to prove the entity of the ultimate upon [stating] the reason of dependent arising, by way of [simply] asserting that the appearance of dependent arising to a worldly awareness is related to the entity of the ultimate.[595]

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "If [the opponent] ascertains, by valid cognition, [two things] to be related, upon [the opponent] perceiving one, I am able to establish the related object. However, the mere assertion that [two things] are related cannot establish the related object."

[We reply:] If one ascertains, by valid cognition, [two things] to be contradictory, the perception of one contradictory object refutes its contradictory counterpart. However, the mere assertion that [two things] are contradictory does not refute the contradictory counterpart.

Also [in the second case] if one ascertains that [the already existent] is contradictory with [meaningful production] in the actual disposition of objects of knowledge:

- Is further production refuted, having established "already existing" as the basic disposition of objects of knowledge, or
- Is the already existent refuted, having established "further production" as the basic disposition of objects of knowledge, or
- Is merely the collection of these two [that is, the already existent and further production] refuted by ascertaining that the two are contradictory, or

---

[595] Chapa entertains the notion that the simple claim that two things are related could make them related in fact. In such a case, his claim that dependently arisen appearances are related with "the entity of the ultimate" (*don dam pa'i dngos pa*) would make dependent arising a valid reason to prove the ultimate.

- Although neither [pre-existence or further production] is established as the basic disposition of objects of knowledge, is one object refuted when its contradictory is asserted?

In the first case,

- The property of the inferential subject is "already existing" established as the basic disposition of objects of knowledge;
- There is an entailment due to the delimitation that "already existing" established as the basic disposition of objects of knowledge is contradictory with further production;
- The probandum is the emptiness of further production.

Therefore, just that explicit statement [of a consequence] comes to be a reason of one's own.[596]

In the second case,

- The property of the inferential subject is further production being definite as the basic disposition of objects of knowledge;
- The entailment is the delimitation that [further] production and "already existing" are contradictory;
- The probandum is the emptiness of pre-existence.

Therefore, hurling consequences comes to be a reason of one's own.

In the third case, the valid cognition itself that ascertains [the two] to be contradictory [has already] per force blocked the collection [of the two]. Hence, stating a consequence is pointless. Also, even though the collection [of the two] is blocked, mere "already existing" and mere further production are not blocked. Hence, one set of proliferations would not be blocked.

---

[596] *rang rgyud kyi rtags*. Chapa assumes the consequence, "It follows that things are empty of further production because of already existing." In his analysis, such a consequence functions in the same way as an inference of one's own.

In the fourth case, if [the opponent] has a wrong conception asserting one contradictory object, then the contradictory counterpart is per force blocked; if there is no such wrong conception, the contradictory counterpart is not blocked. Hence, the refutation of the object of negation would depend on a wrong conception. [If this were the case] it would [absurdly] follow that the [wrong] assertion that the entity of the ultimate must be ultimately one or many would prove that [the entity of the ultimate] is ultimately one or many. Also, it would [absurdly] follow that the [wrong] assertion that, conventionally, the five aggregates have a mere existence that contradicts being causeless and [at the same time] that the five aggregates have a permanence that contradicts having a cause would block being conventionally both causeless and with cause. Also, the assertion that there is fire on a mass of snow would block the touch of cold.[597]

Therefore, internally contradictory assertions incur terminological faults but not faults of meaning. Hence, assertions such as [a woman] being a mother and a barren woman come to be [terminological] contrarieties.[598] However, they do not block the possibility of contradictory objects.[599]

---

[597] With these absurd consequences, Chapa criticizes the idea that simple assertions—independently of proving their validity—could make things true in fact. If one grants statements the power to negate, without establishing these statements to be factually true, there would be no way of holding that only true statements can negate. If one accorded wrong conceptions such ability, wrong conclusions clearly would result. In the first consequence, the assertion is only wrong from Chapa's viewpoint; his Prāsaṅgika opponent would claim that a [hypothetical] ultimate entity must be one or many. However, both Chapa and his opponent would object to the conclusion, that the ultimate is established as one or many, simply by asserting it so. The second consequence, holding that things are both permanent and "merely" existent, seems hypothetical although could resemble a view held in India. The third absurdity exemplifies clearly both a wrong statement—fire does not not arise from snow—and the futility of mere words: stating "fire" does not produce warmth.

[598] *gegs byed.*

[599] Chapa concludes by claiming that the Prāsaṅgika is merely playing with words that are not grounded in reality. Consequences, if not operating on the same principles as inferences of one's own, have only the power to negate words. Chapa's portrayal of Prāsaṅgika resembles that of contemporary interpreters; see, for instance, the comparison of Candrakīrti's and Wittgenstein's views in C.W. Huntington, Jr., "The System of the Two Truths in the Prasannapadā and the Madhyamakāvatāra: A Study in Mādhyamika Soteriology," *Journal of*

Furthermore, [a follower of Candrakīrti] might state [the consequence] "It follows that a tongue of flame produces darkness because it is other than darkness" to one who propounds production from other.

[We respond:] Well then, if a consequence refutes production from other, then since [the statement] "It follows that production is pointless because of already existing" is a consequence also, it would refute production from other.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "That is not entailed."

[We respond:] Your previous consequence [that darkness would arise from flame] also is not entailed.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "The assertion that 'other' produces deteriorates."

[We respond:] The assertion that a consequence refutes production from other deteriorates.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "We propound that the means of refuting production from other is necessarily a consequence. However, we do not propound that [every] consequence necessarily refutes production from other."

[We respond:] We propound that producers are necessarily other. However, we do not propound that others are necessarily producers.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "Among what are merely other, producing and not producing are contradictory."

[We respond:] Also, among mere consequences, refuting production from other and not refuting production from other are contradictory.

Indian Philosophy 11 (1983): 77-106. However, Chapa, unlike Huntington, finds the "language game" insufficient: he maintains there are entities that need to be established and negated "in reality."

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "Since [mere consequences] are the same concept but different substances,[600] there is no contradiction."

[We reply:] Mere difference, also, is similar to that.

(b.) Consequences do not block all proliferations {72.4}

In the event that these consequences refute production from self, causeless production, production from other, and production from both [self and other]: is it ascertained that all four types of production are impossible or is there the qualm that some might be possible? In the latter case, the possibility of proliferations is not blocked. In the former case, we must ask: is it definite that all proliferations are covered by the four types of production or is it not definite?

In the first case, through ascertaining the absence of the entailed [that is, the four types of production], the ascertainment of the absence of the entailer [that is, all proliferations] comes to be a reason of one's own.[601] In the second case, proliferations that are not covered by the four [types of production] would not be blocked.

Furthermore, [returning to the first case, one must ask:] do consequences block what proliferations entail [that is, the four types of production] or do consequences not block what proliferations entail? In the first case, the entailed [that is, the four types of

---

[600] *ldog pa gcig kyang rdzas tha dad pa. ldog pa* is more commonly translated as "isolate"; here, the opposition is between particular consequences—distinguished from others by their ability to refute production from other—and the concept "consequence," not all of which have this ability. Both Chapa and his opponent suggest the impossibility of a single class of phenomena having contradictory characteristics. However, the problem is solved in both cases by maintaining that the commonality of the class is all members being of "the same concept," even though the members themselves are different substances.

[601] *rang rgyud kyi rtags.* Again, Chapa argues that only consequences that operate in the same manner as inferences of one's own are effective.

production] would not be observed [since consequences have blocked them].[602] In the second case, the qualm that proliferations are possible would not be cut off.

(c.) Consequences are unable to clear away the qualm that proliferations exist {72.12}

If you state to those who think that the effect exists in the cause, "It follows that production is pointless," how is the qualm that the effect exists in the cause refuted? Such a qualm is not refuted by a consequence because a reason for that [consequence] is not asserted.[603] If that [qualm] is not blocked, since there is still the qualm that proliferations are possible, you are not able to bring [the opponent] to the mode of not asserting anything whatsoever.

iii. It is not feasible that minds and mental factors are cut off in Buddhahood {72.16}

Even if we allow that since the features of objects of knowledge are not established ultimately, an awareness that observes them is not feasible, it is not feasible for conventionalities that appear like illusions to be non-existent [upon Buddhahood] because

- It is not feasible that there be no power to impel later [moments] of consciousness
- It is not feasible that [consciousness] having appearance be dispelled by antidotes
- If [a Buddha's consciousness] did not have appearances, [Buddhahood] would be no different than a Hearer's nirvāṇa without remainder.

(a.) It is not feasible that there be no power to impel later [moments] of consciousness {73.1}

---

[602] This seems to be a subtle criticism of the manner in which consequences are said to function: rather than prove (*sgrub*) or negate (*dgag*) as inferences do, consequences "block" (*khegs,* the intransitive form of *dgag*) without ascribing any reality to what is blocked. Chapa here plays with the term, suggesting that if production is "blocked" we would not see production. I suspect Candrakīrti would agree, given his refutation ("blocking") of production from other even in the world (*Madhyamakāvatāra,* VI.32 and auto-commentary).

[603] In this consequence, no reason is stated; if a reason were stated, Chapa has argued, pervasions would be established and the consequence would amount to an inference.

If you assert that an awareness during the adamantine meditative equipoise[604] [which is the awareness immediately preceding Buddhahood] does not have the power to impel later [moments] of awareness, how do you refute those Hedonists[605] who do not assert future (re)births due to [their claim] that an awareness at the moment of death does not have the power to impel later [moments] of awareness?

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "Just as a mere butter lamp entails the unobstructed power to produce light, it is established through experience that mere awareness also entails the unobstructed power to produce later awareness. Hence, one can infer that since an awareness at the moment of death is also a mere awareness, it has the power to produce later [awareness]."

[We reply:] An awareness during the adamantine meditative equipoise is also a mere awareness. Hence, how can you not infer that it has the power definitely to produce later [awareness]?

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "Mere awareness does not entail the power to produce later [awareness]. Awareness that is conjoined with craving entails the power to produce later [awareness]. Since there is no craving during the adamantine meditative equipoise, further awareness is not impelled."

[We reply: If a Hedonist said] "Awareness that is conjoined with craving does not entail the power to produce later [awareness]. Awareness that is connected with a body entails the power to produce later [awareness]. At death, since there is no awareness that is connected with the body, later [awareness] is not impelled," what would you answer?

---

[604] *rdo rje lta bu'i dus*, understood as *rdo rje lta bu'i ting nge 'dzin.*

[605] *tshu rol mdzes pa ba, cārvāka*; literally, in Sanskrit, the "Beautiful (*cāru*)-ites." The Tibetan adds "here" (*tshu rol*), yielding "those who hold that it is beautiful here."

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "A sense awareness depends on the body in this very lifetime. However, it is experienced (*myong*) that a mental awareness is produced from merely an immediately preceding [awareness]."

[We reply:] An impure consciousness depends upon craving, and so forth, in this very lifetime. However, it is experienced that a pure consciousness is produced from the immediately preceding [consciousness], which is the virtuous mind of non-attachment, non-hatred, and non-delusion.

(b.) It is not feasible that [consciousness] having appearance is dispelled by antidotes {73.15}

[This section has two parts: consciousness] having appearance is not an obstruction and, hence, is not to be dispelled; and there is no antidote to that [consciousness having appearance].

(i.) [A consciousness] having appearance is not an obstruction and, hence, is not to be dispelled {73.17}

If an awareness having appearance and realizing [appearances] to be like illusions is an obstruction, is it an afflictive obstruction [that is, an obstruction to liberation] or an obstruction to omniscience?

The first case is not feasible because, whereas afflictions entail connection with the conception of a self of persons, [an awareness] having appearance [and realizing appearances to be like illusions]

- dispels the conception of the five aggregates as being permanent and unitary through knowing that they are momentary and multiple; and
- dispels the conception of the five aggregates as being self-powered through knowing that they arise from earlier [causes]; and thus

is not connected with the conception [of the five aggregates] as a self of persons.

If [you say that an awareness having appearance and realizing appearances to be like illusions] is an obstruction to omniscience, does it obstruct knowledge of the mode of being[606]—the realization that, ultimately, [things] are devoid of proliferations—or does it obstruct knowledge of the varieties[607]—the realization of all objects of knowledge, conventionally?

In the first case, does [an awareness having appearance and realizing appearances to be like illusions] obstruct [knowledge of the mode of being] within the context that appearances of conventionalities and ultimate utter non-establishment are contradictory or is it an obstruction even without these two being contradictory?

In the first case:

- Voidness of proliferations would not be the reality of appearances[608]
- Appearances that are established by experience, having per force blocked the voidness of proliferations, would come to have proliferations
- Ultimate utter non-establishment, having per force blocked appearances, would completely cut off [the existence of] conventionalities
- Illusion-like appearances would not entail ultimate utter non-establishment.

Hence, the position of proponents of entities would be established.

[In the second case] if [an awareness having appearance and realizing appearances to be like illusions] obstructs [knowledge of the mode of being] even without [appearances of conventionalities and ultimate non-establishment] being contradictory, the realization of blue would block the realization of impermanence.

---

[606] *ji lta ba shes pa.*

[607] *ji snyed pa shes pa.*

[608] Chapa argues that if appearances and reality contradict each other, there can be no relationship between them: voidness of proliferations would have no relation with conventional appearances. Furthermore, the appearance of either conventionalities or reality would prohibit the other—either voidness of proliferations or conventionalities would be impossible.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "Just as the ascertainment of blue dispels not-blue but does not dispel impermanence, how would it block the realization of impermanence?"

[We reply:] The establishment of appearances from a non-analytic point of view dispels non-appearance from a non-analytic point of view; however, it does not dispel [their] utter non-establishment when analyzed. Hence, how would [the establishment of appearances from a non-analytic point of view] block the realization of [their] utter non-establishment when analyzed?[609]

Also, [an awareness having appearance and realizing appearances to be like illusions] does not obstruct the realization of the varieties of objects of knowledge because it is contradictory for something to obstruct itself, realization of the varieties being the very [awareness] having appearance [and realizing appearances to be like illusions]. Therefore, since [an awareness] having appearance and realizing [appearances] to be like illusions is a subject that is unable to bear analysis, we use the convention, "mistaken appearance"; however, it is not either of the two kinds of obstructions. Hence, it is not feasible for that [consciousness having appearance] to be dispelled by a Buddha.

(ii.) There is no antidote to consciousness having appearance[610] {74.17}

The collection of merit focuses on affirming negations[611] and, hence, it is certain that appearances exist conventionally. However, it is not an awareness that negates and so is not

---

[609] Considering the second possibility, that appearance and reality do not contradict each other but still somehow "block" each other, Chapa brings up the "consequence" that any mental state could be said to block any other mental state: knowing blue would prevent one from knowing impermanence. Chapa's conclusion is that the reality of phenomena when analyzed does not negate the appearance of phenomena when not analyzed.

[610] Whereas the previous section discussed a particular consciousness of appearances, that which realizes those appearances to be like illusions, and so picked out an example of a consciousness having appearance that disproves the broad entailment that all such consciousnesses are obstructions, this section explains that the broad category of consciousnesses having appearance cannot be dispelled.

an antidote to [consciousness] having appearance. If some awarenesses that perform negations were antidotes, are [such awarenesses] antidotes to appearance due to negating proliferations ultimately, or are they antidotes to [consciousness] having appearance [due to] ascertaining that the very appearances of conventionalities do not exist?

In the first case, is the negation of proliferations an antidote to appearances due to the ultimate emptiness of proliferations being contradictory with these appearances or is it an antidote even though [emptiness and appearances] are not contradictory?

In the first case, if one states a consequence that blocks proliferations, due to being contradictory with the absence of proliferations all appearances would be blocked. If you assert this, in thoroughly blocking all afflicted and pure [phenomena] and all cause and effect, the system of the Hedonists flourishes. Also, the faults expressed earlier would be difficult to dispel.[612]

In the second case [in which the negation of proliferations serves as an antidote to appearances even though emptiness and appearances are not contradictory], the ascertainment of impermanence would also dispel appearances.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "The awareness of impermanence is able to dispel the superimposition of permanence, which is contradictory with that. However, [the

---

[611] The collection of merit (*bsod nams kyi tshogs*) is said to focus body, speech, and mind on affirming negations (and yet itself is not a negation, as stated just below) because the common Buddhist list of meritorious activities are all negations (for instance, "non-harm" [*ahiṃsa*]) that stop ill-deeds and "affirm" good deeds in their stead. The collection of merit does not operate on the ultimate level—only the collection of wisdom (*ye shes kyi tshog*) leads to the realization of the ultimate non-establishment of phenomena. Chapa's logic is that since the collection of merit operates on the conventional level, does not negate appearances but instead operates within the negation of non-virtue and the affirmation of virtue, and has definite usefulness on the Buddhist path, we can be certain that the world of appearances exists conventionally.

[612] In the previous section (74.5ff), Chapa explained that if ultimate non-establishment and conventional appearance were contradictory, voidness of proliferations could not be the reality of appearances, either voidness of proliferations or conventionalities would become impossible, and illusion-like appearances would not entail utter non-establishment.

awareness of impermanence] does not dispel the observation of conventionalities, which are not contradictory with it."

[We reply:] The ascertainment of the voidness of proliferations dispels the conception of proliferations, yet, how could it dispel conventional appearances, which are not contradictory with the voidness of proliferations?[613]

Secondly, [if a follower of Candrakīrti holds that an awareness that performs a negation is an antidote to a consciousness having appearance, that person might say:] "The ascertainment that the very appearance of conventionalities does not exist dispels conventional appearances."

[We reply:] Is the ascertainment that conventionalities do not exist a wrong awareness or a correct awareness? In the first case, it is not feasible for a wrong awareness to dispel an object to be dispelled. It is also not feasible to cultivate a wrong awareness as a path. In the second case, since conventionalities would be utterly non-existent, cause and effect would be annihilated and you would spread the system of nihilism.[614]

(c.) If [a Buddha] did not have [consciousness] having appearance, [Buddhahood] would be no different from nirvāṇa without remainder {75.14}

If the continuum of mind and mental factors is cut off at Buddhahood, how is this different from the assertion that the Hearer's nirvāṇa without remainder is the mere pacification of afflictions and suffering, like extinguishing a butter lamp?

In the case that [a follower of Candrakīrti] says, "The appearances of a form body and Buddha activities for others do not arise from one who attains a Hearer's fruit.

---

[613] In a similar argument to the preceding section (74.8-12), Chapa argues that if emptiness "dispels" (*spong ba*) appearances even though it is not contradictory with appearances, any awareness—equally non-contradictory—could dispel appearances, in this case, the ascertainment of impermanence. He has the Prāsaṅgika respond that contradiction is, in fact, necessary for "dispellation," bringing us back to the first case examined here.

[614] *rgyang 'phan pa, [loka-]ayata.*

However, the appearance of a form body for trainees does arise from a Buddha, and that [appearance] accomplishes the task of setting [trainees] upon the three uncontaminated paths [of Hearers, Solitary Buddhas, and Bodhisattvas]."

[We reply:] In what does the capacity to give rise to the accomplishment of Buddha activities and appearances exist? It is not feasible that [the capacity] exists in wisdom because [for you] the continuum of awareness is cut. It is not feasible that it exists in suchness because [suchness] is ultimate truth alone and if [suchness] is able to perform the function of accomplishing Buddha activities, it would follow that it is established as an ultimate entity.[615]

In the case that [a follower of Candrakīrti] says, "The capacity to accomplish Buddha activities exists in the previous accomplishment of the collections and the performance of prayer-wishes for others' welfare."

[We reply:] The collections and wishes having ceased, the time for aiding transmigrating beings arises later, after a long time has passed. Hence, [aiding migrating beings] would arise upon being cut off [from the collections and prayer-wishes]. Since accumulating the collections and making prayer-wishes are included within the continuums of bodhisattvas only, these would be only bodhisattva activities; Buddha activities would be utterly unfeasible.

c. Positing our own system {76.6}

Either by a reason that refutes what is entailed by a real entity—[being] a real singular or plural, and so forth—or by reason of dependent arising, and so forth, which contradicts what is entailed by a real entity, a real entity is explicitly refuted. A real affirming negative, object of knowledge and so forth, qualified by that [real entity] is implicitly

---

[615] *don dam pa'i dngos po* (75.21). The contradiction that Cha-ba points out is that suchness is permanent and consequently is not able to perform functions. If the Prāsaṅgika claims that suchness is able to perform the function of accomplishing Buddha activities, then a functioning thing—an entity—would be an ultimate.

refuted.[616] Thus, when mere proliferations are refuted, all particularities of proliferations are implicitly refuted. When the possibility of proliferations is explicitly refuted in an [inferential] base—mere object of knowledge—they are implicitly refuted [in] particular objects of knowledge.[617] Thus, the possibility of proliferations is refuted through inference. The basis of that [inference]—object of knowledge, entity, and so forth—is established in common appearance by conventional valid cognition not qualified by either truth or falsity.

d. Dispelling [objections of] unfeasibility toward our system {76.13}

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "Since proliferations are refuted by a consequence that is an assemblage of contradictions,[618] there is no need for [an inference] of one's own."

[We reply:] If contradiction with the object of negation is established to be true [such a consequence] does not pass beyond [an inference] of one's own, as was expressed above.[619] If the contradictory object is refuted by a mere assertion even though it is not established to be true, then the **assertion** of an ultimate entity [by a proponent of entities] would establish

---

[616] Chapa's logic here seems to follow Kamalaśīla's understanding that the "non-observation reason" (*mi dmigs pa'i rtags, anupalabdhihetu*) used to refute a real entity is an affirming negative (*ma yin dgag, paryudāsa-pratiṣedha*); just what it affirms in Kamalaśīla's understanding is unclear (see Ryusei Keira, "Kamalaśīla's Interpretation of *Anupalabdhi* in the *Madhyamakāloka,*" in *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies,* edited by Helmut Krasser, Michael Torsten Much, Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Tauscher (Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997), 185-192. For Chapa, the inferential subject—object of knowledge or entity—is affirmed, while "real entity" is negated. He wishes to be clear that this affirming negative itself is not "real."

[617] Chapa distinguishes here between the category "object of knowledge" that is used as the inferential subject, or base, for proving the emptiness of proliferations and particular objects of knowledge, which are implicitly understood to be empty of proliferations. This is detailed in a subsequent section, "The mode of refuting proliferations through inference."

[618] *'gal ba sdud pa'i thal ba.*

[619] At 70.18-71.3, Chapa points out that if consequences function by way of contradictions that are established "in the basic disposition of objects of knowledge" (*shes bya'i gshis su grub pa*), consequences amount to inferences of one's own. Here, again, he is making a distinction between what is true in fact and what is merely stated to be true—what is just talk.

[an object to be] a real singular or multiple. Also, this [assertion that an object is refuted by an assertion] would harm your position of not asserting anything at all.

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "If the real entity itself [that you seek to refute] is not established to be true, how could you [inferentially] refute the establishment of what is entailed by that [real entity, such as being a real singular or plural] or refute [by reason of] what is contradictory with that [real entity, such as dependent arising]?"[620]

[We reply:] If the very thing that is contradictory with the object of negation is also not established to be true, how could you refute [through consequences the object of negation] that is contradictory with it? Moreover, conventionally, by asserting that [a woman] is a mother, her inability to produce a child is blocked; by asserting that [the same] woman is barren, her ability to produce a child is blocked. Hence, that base—the [same] woman—would [absurdly] neither be unable nor able to produce a child [because of these assertions].

[A follower of Candrakīrti] might say, "By asserting that a woman is barren, the statement asserting that she is a mother becomes faulty. However, there is no certainty [from that assertion] that it is impossible for that base [that is, that woman] to have the ability to produce a child.

[We reply:] Although a statement asserting the object of negation becomes faulty by an assertion that contradicts the object of negation, it is not established that the object of negation does not exist in a basis. Hence, the non-existence of the object of negation is proved by way of a correct reason; it is not the case that an [inference] of one's own is not necessary. A probandum that is proved by a reason that is established in common appearance cannot be denied [by the opponent]. Hence, it is not the case that an [inference]

---

[620] The additions in this paragraph are drawn from Chapa's statement of his position in the preceding section, which the opponent here criticizes.

of one's own has no power. If you say that an [inference] of one's own is not feasible due to [a Mādhyamika's] thesislessness, I have already stated that consequences would similarly be unfeasible due to wrong conceptions not being refutations.[621]

Even though [Nāgārjuna, in his *Refutation of Objections*] said "I have no thesis," it is not the case that emptiness does not exist as the basic disposition of objects of knowledge because if emptiness does not abide, it would [absurdly] follow that a true entity is established. The intention [of Nāgārjuna's statement] is that although the emptiness of true entities is the ultimate truth, the thesis holder's awareness[622] is not established when analyzed through reason and, hence, this is not established as a thesis. Furthermore, that is clearly said in [Nāgārjuna's] *Treatise called "The Finely Woven."*[623]

The awareness of a proponent who wishes to establish [a thesis] and the awareness of an opponent in whom establishment and dispellation do not arise are only obscurational truths; hence, these do not establish nor dispel emptiness. [The proponent's awareness] has the phenomenon [emptiness] that is taken as an object due to wanting to prove it; but this is so conventionally, not ultimately. Therefore, as an answer to an opponent [who said] "It follows that inference is pointless because the reason, and so forth, are not established as ultimate entities," the master Kamalaśīla said,[624]

---

[621] At 71.7ff, Chapa ridicules the notion that a wrong conception (*log rtog[s]*) could refute an opponent; if such a case were allowed, wrong conclusions would be reached. Furthermore, and more pertinent here, words alone—whether true or false—would have the power to establish and negate; establishing the validity of one's argument would not be necessary.

[622] *dam 'cha' ba bo'i blo.*

[623] *Vaidalyaprakaraṇa*, *Zhib mo rnam par 'thag pa,* P5226, D3826; Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti, *Nāgārjuna's Refutation of Logic (Nyāya): Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1995).

[624] As Tauscher indicates in his edition (p. 77, n.69), a very similar passage occurs in Kamalaśīla's *Illumination of the Middle* (*madhyamakāloka, dbu ma snang ba,* D3886, vol. *sa,* 171a.4-5): An opponent objects that because Kamalaśīla holds the inferential reason, example, subject, and so forth to not exist ultimately, the conventions of inference and inferable do not engage (*mi 'jug pa*). Kamalaśīla responds that he agrees; he does not accept that inference and the inferable engage ultimately.

> I accept the consequence that inference is non-existent ultimately, for the conventions of inference and what is inferred are conventional. They are not in suchness.

Therefore, it being the case that suchness is utter non-establishment, the phenomenon [emptiness] that is an object of valid cognition, and so forth, does not exist ultimately. However, the phenomenon [emptiness] that is a manifest object of valid cognition relative to yogic direct perception and is a hidden object of valid cognition relative to the inference that cuts proliferations abides conventionally. Hence, for ordinary beings, only inference refutes proliferations.

2. The Way of Refuting Proliferations Through Inference

This section has two parts: (a.) positing a general division between reasons that prove pervasive emptiness and reasons that do not and (b.) positing particular reasons that prove pervasive emptiness.

a. Positing a general division between reasons that prove pervasive emptiness and reasons that do not {78.4}

An ultimate entity does not exist among objects of knowledge. Hence, all specificities (*ldog pa*) that exist among objects of knowledge entail the emptiness of an ultimate entity. Due to that, there is no specificity that does not serve as a reason that proves that some inferential subject is empty of a true entity. The inference that proves an inferential subject that is a particular (*bye brag*) object of knowledge or entity to be empty of a true entity comprehends only a trifling emptiness. Hence, the Madhyamaka system is not delineated through that. The Madhyamaka system is delineated through only that inference that proves all objects of knowledge entail emptiness.[625]

---

[625] Here, Chapa states the thesis of the inference that proves "pervasive emptiness" (*khyab pa'i stong pa nyid*): "objects of knowledge are empty." Immediately below, Chapa discusses the reasons that prove "objects of

Regarding that, all specificities exist as one of the two: (1.) those that are not entailed by a mere entity and (2.) those that are.

(1.) Specificities that are not entailed by a mere entity are "arisen from exertion" or "having form," and so forth. When those [specificities] are stated as a reason, it is certain that such a reason entails [the probandum] emptiness. However, that very reason is not entailed by [the inferential subject, "mere] entity." Hence, that [reason] is not able to establish that all mere entities are empty. Thus, it only establishes a trifling emptiness.

(2.) [Specificities] that are entailed by [mere] entity are dependent arising, voidness of one and many, and so forth. Such [specificities] are of two types: (a.) those that must be ascertained as entailed by [mere] entity by way of direct perception and (b.) those that must be ascertained as entailed by [mere] entity by way of inference.

(a.) Specificities that must be ascertained as entailed by a [mere] entity by way of direct perception are mere appearance, object of knowledge, object of valid cognition, and so forth. These, too, are not reasons that prove that all mere entities are empty. If they were, it would be established that all sounds are impermanent because all sounds are "objects of hearing."

---

knowledge are empty" in detail. The inferential subject cannot be a particular object of knowledge but must be "objects of knowledge" in its generality, the category itself ("all [particular] objects of knowledge" cannot literally be the inferential subject prior to omniscience; Chapa has stated in the previous section that proliferations in particular objects of knowledge are implicitly blocked by this inference). Tom Tillemans ("Formal and Semantic Aspects of Tibetan Buddhist Debate Logic" in *Scripture, Logic, Language: Essays on Dharmakīrti and his Tibetan Successors* [Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1999], 130-131) suggests that confusion over what is meant by "object of knowledge" stems from the fact that Tibetan lacks definite articles and Tibetan authors rarely use indefinite articles or the abstractive particle, *nyid.* He is clearly correct that "object of knowledge" must sometimes be understood as "the quality of being an object of knowledge" (that is, *shes bya nyid, jñeyatva*). Such an interpretation—the quality of being in the category, "object of knowledge"—is similar to how I understand the present usage: the category "object of knowledge." Furthermore, in the following discussion, "entity" (*dngos po*) substitutes for "object of knowledge" (*shes bya*) despite being (along with "non-entity" [*dngos med*]) a subset of object of knowledge; Chapa explains how this can be so below.

Someone might say, "In that case, if one ascertains experientially that sound and object of hearing are indivisible, the same valid cognition that ascertains that all objects of hearing are impermanent would ascertain that all sounds, also, are impermanent. Hence, that all sounds are impermanent would not be inferable."

[We reply:] It is ascertained by way of direct perception that [mere] entity is indivisible from [mere] appearance, object of knowledge, object of valid cognition, and so forth. Hence, the same valid cognition that ascertains that all [mere] appearances, objects of knowledge, objects of comprehension, and so forth, are empty ascertains that all [mere] entities also are empty. Hence, that all [mere] entities are empty [absurdly] would not be inferable.

Opponent, "If object of hearing is not suitable to delineate the entailment with respect to something other than the basis of debate [that is, the inferential subject, sound], is it not the case that since object of knowledge, and so forth, applies to non-entity—that which is other than [mere] entity—once one has ascertained the pervasion in relation to [the example] non-entity, [the pervasion] would be then inferable in relation to [the inferential subject] entity [thereby making such inference meaningful]? Otherwise, is it not the case that since "all sounds exist" is ascertained by way of direct perception, if it is ascertained that all existents are momentary, it is ascertained that all sounds, also, are momentary, whereby there would be no inference [that sound is momentary]?

[We reply:] Well then, when it is ascertained that all objects of knowledge are empty in relation to non-entity, why does one not ascertain that the reason [being an object of knowledge] is a property of the inferential subject [entities], that is, that all entities are objects of knowledge, and the probandum, that is, all entities are empty?

[Opponent:] Well then, when one ascertains that all existents are momentary in relation to [the example] pot, and so forth, why does one not ascertain that the reason

[existing] is a property of the inferential subject [sound], that is, that all sounds exist, and the probandum, that is, all sounds are momentary?

[We reply:] It is so because when ascertaining the entailment [that all existing things are momentary, in relation to pot], one does not ascertain sound at all.

[Opponent:] Well then, when ascertaining that all objects of knowledge are empty [in relation to non-entity], that the reason [being an object of knowledge] is a property of the inferential subject [entities] and the probandum [all entities are empty] are not ascertained in relation to existent[626] because existent is not taken as an object at all.

[We reply:] Well then, it follows that the self-cognition (*rang rig, svasaṃvedana*) that exists with the valid cognition that ascertains the entailment [that all objects of knowledge are empty] is not a valid cognition because if [that self-cognition] does not ascertain the mere existence [of the valid cognition], then it would not be suitable for it to ascertain [that the valid cognition is] consciousness either.

(b.) Specificities that must be ascertained as entailed by [mere] entity by way of inference are dependent arising, voidness of one and many, and so forth. As for those, if it is ascertained that dependent arising entails emptiness in relation to the example of pot, it is seen also that dependent arising relates to [mere] entity. However, since one still must infer that the reason [dependent arising] is a property of the subject [entity],[627] it must be inferred also that all [mere] entities are empty. Hence, [dependent arising] proves pervasive emptiness. When it is ascertained that lack of a real one or many entails emptiness in relation to the example of a non-entity, if "all entities or objects of knowledge are void of one

---

[626] The line of reasoning followed throughout this argument calls for this phrase to read "are not ascertained in relation to entity because entity is not taken as an object at all." Chapa may regard "entity" (*dngos po*) and "existent" (*yod pa*) as mutually inclusive.

[627] Here (79.20), Chapa uses *khyab byed du phyogs chos,* instead of the more common *phyogs chos.*

or many" still requires inference, then "all entities or objects of knowledge are empty" also still requires inference. Hence, [lack of a real one or many] proves pervasive emptiness.

One might say: Since object of knowledge entails lack of a real one or many, if it is true that "all mere objects of knowledge are empty" can be inferred due to that [lack of a real one or many], how can pervasive emptiness be inferred by reason of dependent arising, which is not entailed by object of knowledge?[628]

[We reply:] Although [dependent arising] is not entailed by object of knowledge, it is entailed by entity. Hence, when one ascertains that entity entails emptiness [because of] that [dependent arising], whatever is an entity, due to the reason [of dependent arising] is ascertained to be empty. Whatever is a non-entity is not isolated from the reality collected with entity, due to being isolated [only] from mere entity;[629] the [opponent's] qualm is not generated. Hence, pervasive emptiness is ascertained.

b. Delineating the specific reason that proves pervasive emptiness {80.9}

[The reason is a case of] non-observation of the entailed:[630] "Anything that entails emptiness of a real one or many entails emptiness of real nature,[631] like the appearance of the meaning generalities,[632] non-entity and void of one or many, to a conceptual consciousness.

---

[628] The opponent's criticism rests on the fact that "object of knowledge" (*shes bya*) is divided into "entity" (*dngos po*) and "non-entity" (*dngos med*); only "entities" are dependent arisings, and thus, the reason "dependent arising" is not entailed by the inferential subject "object of knowledge," but only by one class of objects of knowledge.

[629] *dngos po dang yan dag tshogs pas mi dben pa.*

[630] *khyab byed mi dmigs pa, vyāpaka-anupalabdhi.*

[631] *yang dag pa'i rang bzhin.*

[632] Non-entity (*dngos med*) will always be a meaning generality (*don spyi*), not an object of direct perception; voidness of one or many is a meaning generality here in the inference, as objects of inference are also always meaning generalities. In meditation, voidness of one or many can be the object of yogic direct perception. As discussed above, non-entity is the example in relation to which the entailment is initially understood: non-entity is understood to lack real nature because it lacks a real one or many. This entailment is then applied to object of knowledge, object of comprehension, appearance, and mere entity.

Object of knowledge, object of valid cognition, appearance, and mere entity also entail emptiness of a real one or many."[633]

[633] This is stated in the form of an "inference for others" (*parārthānumana, gzhan gyi don gyi rjes dpag*), showing the "three modes" (*trairūpya, tshul gsum*) of a valid reason: the entailment is stated, then an example, followed by the fact that the reason (emptiness of a real one or many) is a property of the subject (object of knowledge, object of comprehension, appearance, and mere entity). In inference for others, the thesis is not stated; here it would be "Object of knowledge, object of comprehension, appearance, and mere entity are empty of real nature." Following this point, Chapa details the five parts of the inference that proves pervasive emptiness, giving long discourses on the inferential subject (*chos can*), predicate (*bsgrub bya*), reason (*gtan tshigs*), the reason being a property of the subject (*phyogs chos*), and pervasions (*khyab pa*).

Bibliography

A khu ching shes rab rgya mtsho. *dpa rgyun dkon pa 'ga' zhig gi tho yig don gnyer yid kyi kunda bzhad pa'i zla 'od 'bum gyi snye ma.* In Lokesh Candra. *Materials for a History of Tibetan Literature.* Kyoto: Rinsen, 1981, 503-601.

Abhayākaragupta. *Ornament for the Sage's Thought (Munimatālaṃkāra).* Toh. 3903, *sde dge* edition, *dbu ma,* vol. *a.*

Ames, William. "Bhāvaviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa.* A Translation of Chapter One: 'Examination of Causal Conditions' (*pratyaya*)." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 21, no. 3 (1993): 209-259.

———. "Bhāvaviveka's Own View of His Differences with Buddhapālita." In *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make?* edited by Georges B.J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock, 41-66. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2002.

Avalokitavrata. *Commentary on [Bhāvaviveka's] Lamp for Wisdom (Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā, shes rab sgron me'i rgya cher 'grel pa*). Peking 5259, Tohoku 3559.

Batchelor, Stephen. *Echoes of Voidness*. London: Wisdom Publications, 1983.

———. *A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life.* Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1979.

Bendall, Cecil. *Çikshāsamuccaya: A Compendium of Buddhistic Teaching,* Bibliotheca Buddhica I. Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1970.

———. *Subhāṣitasaṃgraha. Muséon* IV (1903): 375-402 and V (1904): 5-46 and 245-274.

Bhāvaviveka. *Blaze of Reasoning / Commentary on the "Heart of the Middle Way": Blaze of Reasoning (Madhyamakahṛdayavṛttitarkajvālā, dbu ma'i snying po'i 'grel pa rtog ge 'bar ba).* P5256, vol. 96; D3856, vol. *dza.*

———. *Commentary on [Nāgārjuna's] Fundamental Treatise on the Middle: Lamp for Wisdom (Prajñāpradīpa, dbu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa shes rab sgron ma).* Toh. 3863, *sde dge* edition, *dbu ma,* vol. *dza.*

van Bijlert, Vittorio A. *Epistemology and Spiritual Authority.* Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1989.

Blackburn, Anne M. *Buddhist Learning and Textual Practice in Eighteenth-Century Lankan Monastic Culture.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

Cabezon, Jose Ignacio. "The Prāsaṅgika's View on Logic: Tibetan dGe lugs pa Exegesis on the Question of Svatantras." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 16, no. 3 (1988): 217-224.

———.*A Dose of Emptiness.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992.

———. *Buddhism and Language: A Study of Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994.

———. "Rong ston Shākya rgyal mtshan on Mādhyamika Thesislessness." In *Tibetan*

Studies: Proceedings of the 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, edited by Helmut Krasser, Michael Torsten Much, Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Tauscher, 97-106. Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997.

———. *Scholasticism: Cross-Cultural and Comparative Perspectives.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998.

———. "Two Views on the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction in Fourteenth-Century Tibet." In *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make?* edited by Georges B.J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock, 289-315. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2002.

Candrakīrti III. *Entrance to Middle Way Wisdom (Madhyamakāvatāraprajñā, dbu ma shes rab la 'jug pa).* Tohoku 3863, *sde dge* edition, *dbu ma,* vol. *'a.*

Chu, Junjie. "The Ontological Problem in Tsoṅ kha pa's *prasaṅga* Theory: The Establishment or Unestablishment of the Subject (*dharmin*) of an Argument." In *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies,* edited by Helmut Krasser, Michael Torsten Much, Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Tauscher, 157-178. Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997.

Copeland, Rita. *Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation in the Middle Ages.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Dagenais, John. *The Ethics of Reading in Manuscript Culture: Glossing the 'Libro de buen amor'.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Davidson, Ronald Mark. *Buddhist Systems of Transformation:* Āśraya-parivṛtti-parāvṛtti *Among the Yogācāra.* Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1985.

———. "Reflections on the Maheśvara Subjugation Myth: Indic Materials, Sa-skya-pa Apologetics, and the Birth of the Heruka." *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 14, no. 2 (1991): 197-235.

———. "Masquerading as *Pramāṇa:* Esoteric Buddhism and Epistemological Nomenclature." In *Dharmakīrti's thought and its impact on Indian and Tibetan philosophy,* edited by S. Katsura, 25-35. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1999.

———. *Indian Esoteric Buddhism: A Social History of the Tantric Movement.* New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.

———. *Tibetan Renaissance: Tantric Buddhism in the Rebirth of Tibetan Culture.* New York: Columbia University Press, forthcoming.

Demieville, Paul. *Le concile de Lhasa.* Paris: Imprimerie nationale de France, 1952.

Dreyfus, Georges B.J. *Recognizing Reality: Dharmakīrti's Philosophy and its Tibetan Interpretations.* Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1997.

——— and Sara L. McClintock. *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make?* Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2002.

Dunne, John D. "Thoughtless Buddha, Passionate Buddha." *Journal of the American*

Academy of Religion LXIV/3 (1996): 525-557.

Dunnell, Ruth W. *The Great State of White and High.* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996.

Eckel, Malcolm David. *Jñānagarbha's Commentary on the Distinction between the Two Truths: An Eighth Century Handbook of Madhyamaka Philosophy.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987.

Ejima, Y. *Chūgan-shisō no tenkai—Bhāvaviveka kenkyū.* Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1980.

Erb, Felix. *Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti.* Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997.

Fanwen, Li. "The Influence of Tibetan Buddhism on Xixia." In *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies,* edited by Helmut Krasser, Michael Torsten Much, Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Tauscher, 559-572. Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997.

Fehér, Judit. "Buddhapālita's *Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti*—Arrival and Spread of Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika Literature in Tibet" in *Tibetan and Buddhist Studies Commemorating the 200th Anniversary of the Birth of Alexander Csoma de Kóros*, vol. 1, edited by Louis Ligeti, 211-240. Budapest: Akadmiai Kiado, 1984.

Franco, Eli. "The Disjunction in *Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇasiddhi* Chapter 5c." In *Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition*, 39-51. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1991.

———. *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth.* Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1997.

Funayama, Toru. "Kamalaśīla's Interpretation of 'Non-Erroneous' in the Definition of Direct Perception and Related Problems." In *Dharmakīrti's Thought and its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy,* ed. Shoryu Katsura. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1999.

Garfield, Jay L. *The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Germano, David. "The Renaissance of Translations and Treasures (c. 978-c. 1270)." unpublished.

Gnoli, Raniero. *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, The First Chapter with the Autocommentary.* Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1960.

Grags pa rgyal mtshan. *rGya bod kyi sde pa'i gyes mdo.* In *Sa skya pa'i bka' 'bum,* vol. 4. Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1968.

———. *rGyud kyi mngon par rtogs pa rin po che'i ljong shing.* In *Sa skya pa'i bka' 'bum,* vol. 3.

Griffiths, Paul J. *On Being Buddha.* Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1994.

———. "Scholasticism: The Possible Recovery of an Intellectual Practice." In *Scholasticism: Cross-Cultural and Comparative Perspectives*, edited by Jose Ignacio Cabezon, 206-208. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998.

Gro lung pa blo gros 'byung gnas. *bDe bar gshegs pa'i bstan pa rin po che la 'jug pa'i lam gyi*

rim pa rnam par bshad pa. Patna, India: Bihar Research Society, n.d.

Halbfass, Wilhelm. *Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought*. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1991.

Hattori, Masaaki. *Dignāga, On Perception.* Harvard Oriental Series, 47. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968.

Hobsbawn, Eric and Terrence Ranger, eds. *The Invention of Tradition.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Hopkins, Jeffrey. *Meditation on Emptiness.* London: Wisdom, 1983; rev. ed., Boston, Ma.: Wisdom, 1996.

———. "A Tibetan Delineation of Different Views of Emptiness in the Indian Middle Way School: Dzong-ka-ba's Two Interpretations of the *Locus Classicus* in Chandrakīrti's *Clear Words* Showing Bhāvaviveka's Assertion of Commonly Appearing Subjects and Inherent Existence." *Tibet Journal* 14, no. 1 (1989): 10-43.

———. *Emptiness Yoga.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1987.

———. *Emptiness in the Mind-Only School of Buddhism.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999.

———. *Maps of the Profound.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 2003

Huntington, C. W. Jr. "The System of the Two Truths in the Prasannapadā and the Madhyamakāvatāra: A Study in Mādhyamika Soteriology." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 11 (1983): 77-106.

———. *The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian Mādhyamika.* Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1989.

———. "Was Candrakīrti a Prāsaṅgika?" In *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make?* edited by Georges B.J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock, 67-91. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2002.

Ichigō, Masamichi. "Śāntarakṣita's Madhyamakālaṃkāra" in *Studies in the Literature of the Great Vehicle*. Michigan Studies in Buddhist Literature, 1, edited by Luis O. Gómez and Jonathan A. Silk, 141-240. Ann Arbor: Collegiate Institute for the Study of Buddhist Literature and Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, The University of Michigan, 1989.

———. "Śāntarakṣita and Bhāvaviveka as Opponents of the Mādhyamika in the *Madhyamakāloka*." In *Wisdom, Compassion, and the Search for Understanding: The Buddhist Studies Legacy of Gadjin M. Nagao,* edited by Jonathan A. Silk, 147-170. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000.

Iida, Shōtarō. *Reason and Emptiness*. Tokyo: Hokuseido, 1980.

Irvine, Martin. *The Making of Textual Culture.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Iwata, Takashi. *Prasaṅga und Prasaṅgaviparyaya bei Dharmakīrti und Seinen Kommentatoren.* Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1993.

———. "On *prasaṅgaviparyaya* in Dharmakīrti's Tradition—Prajñākaragupta and gTsaṅ nag pa." In *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies,* edited by Helmut Krasser, Michael Torsten Much, Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Tauscher, 427-437. Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997.

Jackson, David P. "Madhyamaka Studies Among the Early Sa-skya-pas." *Tibet Journal* 10, no. 2 (1985): 20-34.

———. *The Entrance Gate for the Wise (Section III): Sa-skya Paṇḍita on Indian and Tibetan Traditions of Pramāṇa and Philosophical Debate,* 2 vols. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1987.

———. "An Early Biography of rNgog Lo-tsā-ba bLo ldan shes rab." In *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 6th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies*, edited by Per Kvaerne, 372-392. Oslo: The Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, 1994.

———. *Enlightenment by a Single Means: Tibetan Controversies on the "Self-Sufficient White Remedy" (dkar po chig thub).* Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1994.

———. "rNgog Lo-tsā-ba's Commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga: An Early-20th-Century Lhasa Printed Edition." In *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies,* edited by Helmut Krasser, Michael Torsten Much, Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Tauscher, 438-456. Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997.

'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa. *Great Exposition of the Middle / Analysis of (Chandrakīrti's) 'Supplement to (Nāgārjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle"', Treasury of Scripture and Reasoning, Thoroughly Illuminating the Profound Meaning [of Emptiness], Entrance for the Fortunate (dbu ma chen mo/dbu ma 'jug pa'i mtha' dpyod lung rigs gter mdzod zab don kun gsal skal bzang 'jug ngogs).* Buxaduor, India: Gomang, 1967.

Jayānanda. *Commentary on [Candrakīrti's] Entrance to the Middle (Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā, dbu ma la 'jug pa 'grel pa). sde dge* 3871, *dbu ma,* vol. *ya.*

———. *Hammer of Logic (Tarkamudgara, rtog ge tho ba). sde dge* edition 3870, vol. *ya.*

Jha, Ganganatha. *The Tattvasaṅgraha of Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalashīla.* 2 vols. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1937 (1986).

Johnston, E.H., A. Kunst, and K. Bhattacharya. *The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna: Vigrahavyāvartanī.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1998.

de Jong, J. W. "La légende de Śāntideva." *Indo-Iranian Journal* 16 (1975): 161-182.

———. *Nāgārjuna, Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ.* Madras, India: Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1977.

———. "Text-critical Notes on the *Prassanapadā.*" *Indo-Iranian Journal* 20, nos. 1/2 (1978): 25-59, nos. 3/4 (1978): 217-252.

Kajiyama, Yuichi. *An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy: An Annotated Translation of the Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta: Reprint with Corrections in the Author's Hand.* Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1998.

Kapstein, Matthew. *The Tibetan Assimilation of Buddhism: Conversion, Contestation, and Memory.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

Kamalashīla. *Illumination of the Middle (madhyamakāloka, dbu ma snang ba).* P5287, vol. 101; D3887, vol. *sa.*

Katsura, Shōryū. "Nāgārjuna and the Tetralemma (*Catuṣkoṭi*)." In *Wisdom, Compassion, and the Search for Understanding: The Buddhist Studies Legacy of Gadjin M. Nagao,* edited by Jonathan A. Silk, 201-220. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000.

Keira, Ryusei. "Kamalaśīla's Interpretation of *Anupalabdhi* in the *Madhyamakāloka.*" In *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies,* edited by Helmut Krasser, Michael Torsten Much, Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Tauscher, 185-192. Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997.

Kellner, Birgit. "Types of Incompatibility (*'gal ba*) and Types of Non-Cognition (*ma/mi dmigs*) in Early Tibetan *tshad ma* Literature." In *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies,* edited by Helmut Krasser, Michael Torsten Much, Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Tauscher, 495-510. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997.

Kimura, Tshihiko, "A New Chronology of Dharmakīrti." In *Dharmakīrti's Thought and its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy,* edited by Shoryu Katsura, 209-214. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1999.

Krasser, Helmut. "On the Relationship between Dharmottara, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla." In *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies,* Monograph Series of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies: Occasional Papers 2, edited by Ihara Shōren and Yamaguchi Zuihō, 151-158. Narita: Narita-san Shinshō-ji, 1992.

van der Kuijp, Leonard W. J. "Phya-pa Chos kyi Seng ge's Impact on Tibetan Epistemological Theory." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 5 (1978): 355-369.

———. *Contributions to the Development of Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology, from the eleventh to the thirteenth century.* Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1983.

———. "*Ratnāvali* in Tibet." *Tibet Journal* 10, no. 2 (1985): 3-19.

———. "The Monastery of Gsang-phu ne'u-thog and Its Abbatial Succession from ca. 1073 to 1250." *Berliner Indologische Studien* 3 (1987): 103-127.

———. "Jayānanda. A Twelfth Century *Guoshi* from Kashmir Among the Tangut." *Central Asian Journal* 37 (1993): 188-197.

E.I. Kychanov, "Tibetans and Tibetan Culture in the Tangut State Hsi Hsia (982-1227)." In *Proceedings of the Csoma de Koros Memorial Symposium, 1976,* edited by Louis Ligeti, 205-211. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1978.

———. "From the History of the Tangut Translation of the Buddhist Canon." In *Tibetan and Buddhist Studies Commemorating the 200th Anniversary of the Birth of Alexander Csoma de Koros,* edited by Louis Ligetti, 377-387. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1984.

Lalou, Marcelle. "Les textes Bouddhiques au temps du roi khri-srong-lde-bcan." *Journal Asiatique* 241 (1953): 313-353.

Larson, Gerald James and Ram Shankar Bhattacharya. *Sāṃkhya: A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy.* Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, 4. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987.

Lang, Karen. *Āryadeva's Catuḥśataka: On the Bodhisattva's Cultivation of Merit and Knowledge.* Indiste Studier, 7. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1986.

———. "Spa-tshab Nyi-ma-grags and the Introduction of Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka into Tibet." In *Reflections on Tibetan Culture: Essays in memory of Turrell V. Wylie,* edited by Lawrence Epstein and Richard F. Sherbourne. Lewiston, N.Y.: E. Mellon Press, 1990.

Lindtner, Christian. "Atiśa's Introduction to the Two Truths, and Its Sources." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 9 (1981), 161-214.

———. "Buddhapālita on Emptiness." *Indo-Iranian Journal* 23 (1981): 187-217.

———. *Master of Wisdom.* Oakland: Dharma Publishing, 1986.

Lopez, Donald S. Jr. *A Study of Svātantrika.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1987.

rMa bya Byang chub brtson 'grus. *dbu ma rtsa ba shes rab kyi 'grel pa 'thad pa'i rgyan.* Rumteg, Sikkim: rGyal ba Karma pa, 1975.

MacDonald, Anne. "The *Prasannapadā: More Manuscripts from Nepal.*" *Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens* 44 (2000): 165-181.

———. "Interpreting *Prasannapadā* 19.3-7 in Context: A Response to Claus Oetke." *Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens* 47 (2003): 143-195.

Makransky, John. *Buddhahood Embodied: Sources of Controversy in India and Tibet.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1997.

Malvania, Dalsukhbhai. *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa.* Patna: Kashiprasad Jayaswal Research Institute, 1971.

Martin, Daniel. "A Twelfth-century Tibetan Classic of Mahamudra, The Path of Ultimate Profundity: The Great Seal Instructions of Zhang." *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 15, no. 2 (1992): 243-319.

———. "The 'Star King' and the Four Children of Pehar: Popular Religious Movements of 11th to 12th Century Tibet." *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungarium* 49, no.1-2 (1996): 171-195.

Matilal, Bimal Krishna. *Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Theories of Knowledge.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.

———. *The Character of Logic in India.* Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1998.

McClintock, Sara L. "The Role of the 'Given' in the Classification of Śāntarakṣita and

Kamalaśīla as Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas." In *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction,* edited by Georges B.J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock, 125-171. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003.

Mejor, Marek. "On the Date of the Tibetan Translations of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and the *Pramāṇavārttika.*" In *Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition,* ed. Ernst Steinkellner. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1991.

Mimaki, Katsumi. *Blo gsal grub mtha'.* Kyoto: Université de Kyoto, 1982.

———. "The *Blo gsal grub mtha'*, and the Mādhyamika Classification in Tibetan *grub mtha'* Literature." In *Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist Religion and Philosophy,* edited by Ernst Steinkellner and Helmut Tauscher, 161-167. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien, 1983.

———. "*Jñānasārasamuccaya* kk. 20-28: *Mise au point* with a Sanskrit Manuscript." In *Wisdom, Compassion, and the Search for Understanding: The Buddhist Studies Legacy of Gadjin M. Nagao,* edited by Jonathan A. Silk, 233-244. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000.

Minaev, I.P. *Bodhicaryāvatāra, Zapiski.* Vostochnago Otdeleniya Imperatorskago Russkago Arkhealogicheskago Obshchestva, 1890.

Miyasaka, Yūsho. "*Pramāṇavarttika-kārikā:* Sanskrit and Tibetan." *Indo Koten Kenkyu (Acta Indologica)* 2 (1971-72): 1-206.

Nagatomi, Masatoshi. *A Study of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavarttika: An English Translation and Annotation of the Pramāṇavarttika, Book I.* Ph. D. diss., Harvard University, 1957.

Nanjio, Bunyiu. *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra.* Bibliotheca Otaniensis, vol. 1. Kyoto: Otani University Press, 1923.

Napper, Elizabeth. *Dependent-Arising and Emptiness*. London: Wisdom Publications, 1989.

Newland, Guy. *The Two Truths.* Ithaca, N.Y.: Snow Lion Publications, 1992.

Newman, John. "Buddhist Siddhānta in the Kālacakra Tantra." *Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens* 36 (1992): 227-234.

Naudou, Jean. *Buddhists of Kaśmīr.* Delhi: Agam Kala Prakashan, 1980.

Oetke, Claus. "The Disjunction in the Pramāṇasiddhi." In *Dharmakīrti's Thought and its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy,* ed. Shoryu Katsura, 243-251. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1999.

———. "*Prasannapadā* 19,3-7 and Its Context." *Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens* 47 (2003): 111-142.

Ono, Motoi. *Prajñākaragupta's Erklarung der Definition Gultiger Erkenntnis (Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra zu Pramāṇavārttika II 1-7).* Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2000.

Onoda, Shunzu. "Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge's Classification of Thal 'gyur." *Berliner Indologische Studien* 2 (1986): 341-346.

———. "On the Tibetan Controversy Concerning the Various Ways of Relying to

Prasaṅgas." *Tibet Journal* 13, no. 2 (1988): 36-41.

———. "Abbatial Successions of the Colleges of gSang phu sne'u thog Monastery." *Bulletin of the National Museum of Ethnology* 15, no. 4 (1990): 1049-1071.

———. *Monastic Debate in Tibet: A Study on the History and Structures of bsdus grwa Logic.* Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1992.

———. "Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge's Theory of *'gal ba.*" In *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies.* Monograph Series of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies: Occasional Papers 2, 197-202. Narita: Naritasan Shinshō-ji, 1992.

Pollack, Sheldon. "The Sanskrit Cosmopolis, 300-1300 CE: Transculturation, Vernacularization, and the Question of Ideology." In *Ideology and Status of Sanskrit: Contributions to the History of the Sanskrit Language*, ed. Jan E.M. Houben, 197-247. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996.

Roerich, George N., trans. *The Blue Annals.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1949 (1996).

Ruegg, David Seyfort. "The Use of the Four Positions of the Catuḥkoṭi and Problem of the Description of Reality in Mahāyāna Buddhism." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 5 (1977): 1-71.

———. *The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India.* Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz, 1981.

———. "A Kar Ma bKa' brGyud Work on the Lineages and Traditions of the Indo-Tibetan dBu ma (Madhyamaka)." In *Orientalia Iosephi Tucci memoriae dicata,* edited by G. Gnoli and L. Lanciotti. Rome: Istituto italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1985.

———. "On the authorship of some works ascribed to Bhāvaviveka/Bhavya." In *Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka,* ed. David Seyfort Ruegg and Lambert Schmithausen, 59-71. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990.

———. "The Preceptor-Donor (*yon mchod*) Relation in Thirteenth Century Tibetan Society and Polity, its Inner Asian Precursors and Indian Models." In *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies,* edited by Helmut Krasser, Michael Torsten Much, Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Tauscher, 857-882. Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997.

———. *Three Studies in the History of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Philosophy, Studies in Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Thought Part 1.* Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universitat Wien, 2000.

———. *Two Prolegomena to Madhyamaka Philosophy, Studies in Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Thought, Part II.* Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 2002.

Saito, Akira. "Problems in Translating the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* as Cited in its Commentaries." In *Buddhist Translations: Problems and Perspectives,* ed. Doboom Tulku, 87-96. New Delhi: Manohar, 1995.

———. "Śāntideva in the History of Mādhyamika Philosophy." In *Buddhism in India and Abroad,* ed. Kalpakam Sankarnarayan, Motohiro Yoritomi, and Shubhada A. Joshi. Mumbai and New Delhi: Somaiya Publications, 1996.

Śākya mchog ldan. *The Collected Works (Gsuṅ 'bum) of Gser-mdog Paṇ-chen Śākya-mchog-ldan,* vol. 14. Thimphu: Kunzang Topgey, 1975.

Sankrityayana, Rahula. *Karṇakagomin's Commentary on the Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti of Dharmakīrti.* Kyoto: Rinsen Book Company, 1982.

Śāntarakṣita. *Ornament of Madhyamaka (Madhyamakālaṃkāra).* Toh. 3886, *sde dge* edition, *dbu ma,* vol. *sa.*

Scherrer-Schaub, Cristina Anna. *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti. Commentaire à la soixantaine sur le raisonnement ou Du vrai enseignement de la causalité par le Maitre indien Candrakīrti.* Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques, 25. Bruselles: Institut belge des hautes etudes chinoises, 1991.

Schoening, Jeffrey D. *The Śālistamba Sūtra and its Indian Commentaries.* Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1995.

Sellars, Wilfrid. *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997.

Shastri, Lobsang. "The Fire Dragon *Chos 'khor* (1076 AD)." In *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies,* edited by Helmut Krasser, Michael Torsten Much, Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Tauscher, 873-882. Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1997.

Shastri, Swami Dwarkidas, ed. *Tattvasaṃgraha with Kamalaśīla's Pañjikā.* Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1968.

Sherburne, Richard. *The Complete Works of Atīśa.* New Delhi: Aditya Prakashan, 2000.

bSod nams rtse mo. *Byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa.* In *Sa skya pa'i bka' 'bum,* vol. 2. Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1968.

Sopa, Geshe Lhundup and Jeffrey Hopkins. *Cutting through Appearances: The Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism.* Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion, 1989.

Sorensen, Per K. *Triśaraṇasaptati: The Septuagint on the Three Refuges.* Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1986.

Sperling, Eliot. "Lama to the King of Hsia." *Journal of the Tibet Society* 7 (1987): 31-50.

———. "Rtsa-mi lo-tsā-ba Sangs-rgyas grags-pa and the Tangut Background to Mongol-Tibetan Relations." In *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 6th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Fagernes, 1992,* edited by Per Kvaerne, 801-824. Oslo: Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, 1994.

von Staël-Holstein, Alexander. *Kāçyapaparivarta: A Mahāyanasūtra of the Ratnakūṭa Class.* Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1926.

Stcherbatsky,Th. *Nyāyabindu.* Bibliotheca Buddhica, 7. Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970.

Steinkellner, Ernst. *Verse-Index of Dharmakīrti's Works.* Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische

und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1977.

———. "Was Dharmakīrti a Mādhyamika?" In *Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka,* ed. David Seyfort Ruegg and Lambert Schmithausen, 72-90. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990.

———. "Early Tibetan Ideas on the Ascertainment of Validity (*nges byed kyi tshad ma*)." In *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies.* Monograph Series of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies: Occasional Papers 2, 257-273. Narita: Narita-san Shinshō-ji, 1992.

———. "Yogic Cognition, Tantric Goal, and Other Methodological Applications of Dharmakīrti's *Kāryānumāna* Theorem." In *Dharmakīrti's thought and its impact on Indian and Tibetan philosophy,* edited by S. Katsura, 349-362. Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1999.

Stock, Brian. *The Implications of Literacy: Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.

———. *Listening for the Text: On the Uses of the Past.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996.

Tanselle, G. Thomas. *A Rationale of Textual Criticism*. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989.

Tatz, Mark. "Maitrī-pa and Atiśa." In *Tibetan Studies : Proceedings of the 4th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies,* edited by Helga Uebach and Jampa L. Panglung, 473-482. Munchen: Kommission fur Zentralasiatische Studien Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1988.

Tauscher, Helmut. *Candrakīrti-Madhyamakāvatāraḥ und Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣyam.* Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, 5. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1981.

———. "Some Problems of Textual History in Connection with the Tibetan Translations of the *Madhyamakāvatāraḥ* and its Commentary." In *Contributions on Tibetan and Buddhist Religion and Philosophy,* edited by Ernst Steinkellner and Helmut Tauscher, 293-303. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, 1983.

———. "Phya pa chos kyi seng ge's opinion on *prasaṅga* in his *dBu ma'i shar gsum gyi stong thun.*" In *Dharmakīrti's Thought and its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy,* edited by Shoryu Katsura, 387-393. Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1999.

———. *Phya pa chos kyi seṅ ge: dbu ma śar gsum gyi stoṅ thun.* Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1999.

———. "Phya pa chos kyi seng ge as a Svātantrika." In *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make?* edited by Georges B.J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock, 207-255. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2002.

Tillemans, Tom J.F. "The Neither One nor Many Argument for Śūnyatā, and Tibetan Interpretations: Background Information and Source Materials." *Études de Letters,*

Université de Lausanne 3 (1982): 103-128.

———. *Materials for the Study of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti.* Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, 1990.

———. "Tsong kha pa *et al.* on the Bhāvaviveka-Candrakīrti Debate" in *Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies.* Monograph Series of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies: Occasional Papers 2. Narita: Narita-san Shinshō-ji, 1992.

———. *Scripture, Logic, Language: Essays on Dharmakīrti and his Tibetan Successors.* Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1999.

———. *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika: An Annotated Translation of the Fourth Chapter (parārthānumāna),* vol. 1 (k. 1-148). Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2000.

———. "Metaphysics for Mādhyamikas." In *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction,* ed. Georges B.J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock, 93-123. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003.

Tola, Fermando and Carmen Dragonetti. *Nāgārjuna's Refutation of Logic (Nyāya) Vaidalyaprakaraṇa.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1995.

Tsong kha pa. *Medium Length Exposition of the Stages of the Path / Short Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment (lam rim 'bring / lam rim chung ngu / skyes bu gsum gyi nyams su blang ba'i byang chub lam gyi rim pa).* P6002, vols. 152-153.

———. *Essence of Eloquence (drang ba dang nges pa'i don rnam par phye ba'i bstan bcos legs bshad snying po).* P6142, vol. 153 and Sarnath, India: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1973.

———. *Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (lam rim chen mo).* In *The Collected Works [gSuṅ 'bum] of rJe Tsoṅ-kha-pa Blo-bzaṅ-grags-pa,* vol. 19-20. New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1975.

Urban, Hugh B. and Paul J. Griffiths. "What Else Remains in Śūnyatā? An Investigation of Terms for Mental Imagery in the *Madhyāntavibhāga*-Corpus." *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 17/1 (1994): 1-25.

la Vallée Poussin, Louis de. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā commentaire de Candrakīrti.* Bibliotheca Buddhica, 4. Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1970.

———. *Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti.* Bibliotheca Buddhica, 9. Osnabrück, Germany: Biblio Verlag, 1970.

———. "*Madhyamakāvatāra.* Introduction au traité du milieu de l'ācārya Candrakīrti avec le commentaire de l'auteur," *Muséon* 8 (1907): 249-317; *Muséon* 11 (1910): 271-358; *Muséon* 12 (1911): 235-328.

———. *Prajñākaramati's Commentary to the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Çāntideva.* Bibliotheca Indica. Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1902-1914.

Vetter, Tillman. *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, Kapitel: Pratyakṣam.* Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1966.

Vibhūticandra, *Bodhicaryāvatāratātparyapañjikā Viśeṣadyotanī (byang chub kyi spyod pa la 'jug pa'i dgongs pa'i 'grel pa khyad par gsal byed)*. P5282.

Vitali, Roberto. Early Temples of Central Tibet. London: Serindia Publications, 1990.

———. *The Kingdoms of Gu.ge Pu.hrang According to mNga'.ris rgyal.rabs by Gu.ge mkhan.chen Ngag.dbang.grags.pa.* Dharamsala, India: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 1996.

Walleser, Max. *dBu ma rca ba'i 'grel pa Buddha pā li ta (Buddhapālita-Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti) Chapters i-xii.* Bibliotheca Buddhica, 16. Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1970.

Watson, Craig Earl. "The Second Propagation of Buddhism from Eastern Tibet." *Central Asiatic Journal* 22, nos. 3-4 (1978): 263-285.

Wayman, Alex. *Yoga of the Guhyasamājatantra.* Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977.

Williams, Paul. "rMa bya pa Byang chub brtson 'grus on Madhyamaka Method." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 13 (1985): 205-225.

———. *The Reflexive Nature of Awareness.* London: Curzon Press, 1998.

Wogihara, Unrai. *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā.* Tokyo: Toyo Bunko, 1932-1935.

Yonezawa, Yoshiyasu. "**Lakṣaṇaṭīkā:* A Sanskrit Manuscript of an Anonymous Commentary on the *Prasannapadā*." *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* 47, no. 2 (1999): 1024-1022.

Yoshifumi, Chizuko. "Tsong kha pa's Reevaluation of Candrakīrti's Criticism of Autonomous Inference."In *The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make?* edited by Georges B.J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock, 257-288. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2002.

Yotsuya, Kodo. *The Critique of Svatantra Reasoning by Candrakīrti and Tsong-kha-pa: A Study of Philosophical Proof According to Two Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka Traditions of India and Tibet.* Tibetan and Indo-Tibetan Studies, 8. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1999.

Yün-hua, Jan. "Buddhist Relations between India and Sung China." parts 1 and 2. *History of Religions* 6, no. 1 (Aug. 1966): 24-42 and 6, no. 2 (Nov. 1966): 135-168.