Pious Plans and Porous Borders:
Rebel Governance and Cross-Border Sanctuary in the Syrian Civil War

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B.A., Wesleyan University, 2012

A Thesis presented to the Graduate Faculty
of the University of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of
Master of Arts

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University of Virginia
May, 2014

Abstract

A recent trend in civil war scholarship focuses on the variants and dynamics of local-level governance by armed groups, examining how rebels rule in territories under their control in the midst of conflict. This pattern is present in the ongoing Syrian Civil War, where rebels have established various structures and institutions in the areas they have wrested from the regime. A particular focus in the Syrian conflict has been on how Islamist armed groups, such as Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have dictated the lives of civilians under their control. The majority of news and policy reports paints a monolithic picture of these groups' modes of governance, attributing such behavior to the extremist ideology of these rebels. However, the reality seems to be less clear cut and uniform. In the northern city of Raqqa, JN and ISIS exhibited variation in the way they governed the local population from March 2013-January 2014. While JN exhibited restraint in its attempts to reshape local society and opted for a more limited mode of rule from March-April 2013, ISIS sought to impose its ideal governance strategy on the city's population in a ruthless and recalcitrant manner in the subsequent months through January 2014. Existing explanations of rebel governance cannot account for this puzzling variation in local-level rule across the two groups. Instead, a dual focus on armed group ideology and cross-border sanctuary provides the basis for explanation in the Syrian case. This theoretical framework provides the foundation for future research on both governance and armed group behavior in multiparty civil wars.

Acknowledgements

David Waldner, Jonah Schulhofer-Wohl, Deborah Boucoyannis, John Owen, Michael Poznansky, Susan Brewer, Jon Forney, Jeff Jackson, Kenneth Lowande, Andrew Clarke, the participants of the Spring 2014 Graduate Development Seminar, my family, and SSS.

1 Introduction

What explains variation in how rebels govern in civil wars, particularly concerning the extent of armed group intervention in local political, economic, and social affairs? Rebel groups that govern in civil wars exhibit marked differences in the nature of political and institutional development and service provision they undertake at the local level, practices which in turn shape the relative extent of armed group intervention in local affairs upon interaction with civilian preferences and local conditions (Wickham-Crowley 1987, Bakonyi and Stuvoy 2005, Weinstein 2007, Kasfir 2008, Mampilly 2011, Staniland 2012b, Huang 2013, Kalyvas 2014, Sukyens 2014, Barter 2014). Within the existing literature, the general assumption is that rebels employ governance practices and design local-level institutions in an effort to extract resources for the fight against the incumbent regime, and seek to do so in the most cost-efficient manner given local circumstances, preferences, and the demands of fighting (Kasfir 2005, Kalyvas 2006, Metelits 2010, Keister 2011, Arjona 2013). The general theoretical implication underlying this assumption is that armed groups should employ governance practices that allow them to most efficiently extract resources for fighting, keeping in mind both local civilian preferences and the costly, resource-intense nature of waging war against the state (Sinno 2008, Staniland 2012a, Hazen 2013).

Given this theoretical expectation, the governance practices employed by rebel groups in the ongoing Syrian civil war exhibit puzzling variation. For example, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has intervened extensively in local civilian affairs in an attempt to establish and implement a conservative, religious-based form of local-level governance (Al Attar 2013, Al Tamimi 2013a, Abouzeid 2013, Birke 2013, Walsh et al. 2013, Gul et al. 2013, Szybala 2013b). These interventionist governance practices have generated both non-violent and violent backlash against the group, while also diverting resources from the effort to depose the Assad regime[1] (Hubbard and Barnard 2014, Sly and Morris 2014, Saad and

[1]While theh group's stated goal is to re-establish the Islamic Caliphate (Al Tamimi 2013b), the overthrow of the Assad regime is a necessary first condition that must be met for this ultimate goal to be realized.

Gladstone 2014, Landis 2014). This presents a puzzle for conventional explanations of rebel governance based on the logic of low-cost, high-efficiency resource extraction that provides for effective war-fighting and increased organizational capacity.

Indeed, the practice employed by ISIS becomes more puzzling when we consider the actions of Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), a similarly extremist ideological group that, like ISIS, maintains the same ultimate objective of re-establishing the Islamic Caliphate (Al Tamimi 2013b, Benotman and Blake 2013, Barnard 2014). Rather than seeking to impose a blueprint of governance that is demonstrably undesired by the civilian population and diverts resources away from fighting the regime, JN has instead pursued a more limited mode of governance, refraining from extensively intervening in local affairs in a manner agnostic to civilian preferences (Abouzeid 2013, Baczko et al. 2013a, Barnard 2014, Barnard and Gladstone 2014, Holmes and Dziadosz 2013, ICG 2013, Lund 2013b, Szybala 2013a and 2013b, Syria Untold 2013, Rosenblatt 2014).

I argue that this divergence in governance practices, specifically with regard to the extent of armed group intervention in local society, can be explained by considering each group's ideology and relative possession of a cross-border sanctuary. Both JN and ISIS have a similar ideological orientation, seeking to instantiate an Islamic state and re-establish the Islamic Caliphate with rule based on sharia (Anjarini 2013, Benotman and Blake 2013, Birke 2013, Kirder 2011, Szybala 2013, Tamimi 2013a, Jones 2013, O'Bagy 2012, Wyer 2012). As I elaborate below, this ideological orientation generates an ideal governance strategy that leads both groups to seek extensive intervention in the local political, economic, and social affairs in order to re-shape society in accordance with their preferred post-conflict state of the world. ISIS's possession of a cross-border sanctuary in western Iraq (al-Salhy 2014, Baczko et al. 2013c, Kaplow 2014, Lake 2014, Leigh 2014, Pizzi and Shabaan 2013, Riedel 2013 and 2014, Schreck 2013, VICE News 2014, Zirulnick 2014), territory that it controls, has access to, and uses as a source of extra-conflict resources and reinforcements, allows the group to pursue fully its ideal governance strategy of extensive intervention because of such

extraneous resources and territory. On the other hand, JN's lack of a cross-border sanctuary constrains its ability to realize the group's ideal governance strategy, leading the group to settle for limited intervention in local society as its mode of rule.

I illustrate this divergence through examination of the different sets of governance practices employed by JN and ISIS in the northern city of Raqqa from March 2013-January 2014. During the roughly two months that JN ruled Raqqa in concert with two other armed groups from March 2013-May 2013, the group governed in a limited and restrained manner across the political, economic, and social domains of local society (Holliday 2013, Holmes and Dziadosz 2013, Menapolis 2013, Meuse 2013a, O'Bagy 2013, Spencer and Rose 2013). Upon ISIS's takeover of Raqqa in May 2013, there was a marked change in how the city was ruled, with the group violently eliminating all other armed groups and attempting to realize its strict governance strategy in all three domains of society by extensively intervening in local civilian affairs (Al Attar 2013, Birke 2013, Looney 2013, Syria Untold 2014). I argue that the relative possession of a cross-border sanctuary in Iraq allowed ISIS to realize its ideal governance strategy in the same location where JN's lack of a cross-border sanctuary constrained it from be able to do so.

This thesis proceeds by outlining the research design underlying the project, specifying the methodological approach called for by the subject nature, available data, and biases. Next, I provide a refined conceptualization of rebel governance in civil wars, with a focus on the extent of armed group intervention in local society. This is followed by a discussion of the empirical variation in governance practices across JN and ISIS in the Syrian city of Raqqa. I then integrate the results of these previous two tasks in Section 5 to generate an explanatory framework that accounts for the variation in governance practices across the two groups in the city. The final section concludes the thesis with a discussion of the empirical and theoretical findings and their implications for both future research and practical application.

2 Research Design

In this section, I lay out the research design and underlying logic of inference in the thesis. I first discuss the Potential Outcomes Framework that provides the basis for approaching causal inference, and how one might consider application of the proposed theoretical explanation to an experimental framework. I next discuss the method of process-tracing in the context of studying civil wars to illustrate its ideal application in the proposed framework, and illustrate why the Syrian case does not allow for its application. Finally, I specify the method to be used in the thesis, descriptive inference, and how it fits into the explanatory framework of the thesis.

2.1 The Potential Outcomes Framework and the Ideal Experiment

The framework that provides the foundation for the more recent literature on causal inference is the Potential Outcomes Framework (POF) (Little and Rubin 2000, Brady 2008). This framework allows one to consider the implications of a single unit in alternative states of the world, often specified as "Treatment" and "Control," with the former being the one in which the unit is exposed to a treatment and the latter the state of the world in which it is not (Morgan and Winship 2007, 31-35). This heuristic provides a way to think about purported causal effects after some intervention or "manipulation" is undertaken to alter outcomes (Holland 1986, Woodward 2003). The POF implies that we must consider the consequences of a unit's exposure or non-exposure to "treatment," or the observed and counterfactual outcomes.

Beyond this basic specification of a counterfactual, the POF also allows one to consider the implications of the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference (FPCI): that the potential outcome for a unit under treatment can never be observed in the control state, and vice versa (Morgan and Winship 2007, 35). Herein lies the value of a randomized experiment, which allows one to approximate the counterfactual state of the world for units under treatment

and control, provided a sufficiently large number of units and randomized assignment to treatment and control.[2] Through this method, one can ascertain the effect of treatment on the observed outcomes across both treatment and control groups, providing the basis for making valid causal inferences.

However, attempting to ascertain the determinants of variation in the governance strategies employed by armed groups in civil wars is plagued by the fact that one is working with observational data, where units may select themselves to treatment or, stated alternatively and more generally, there is potentially non-random assignment to treatment (King et al. 1994). As mentioned in the brief overview of the proposed explanation for the case of Raqqa in Syria: ISIS's possession of a cross-border sanctuary in Iraq allowed it to fully pursue and realize its ideal governance strategy in the city, while JN's lack of such an extraneous possession led to a restrained mode of rule.

Keeping this explanatory framework in mind, we can construct an ideal experiment that would allow us to test the effect of cross-border sanctuaries on rebel governance practices. In an ideal world, we would randomly distribute armed groups in conflict to treatment and control groups, with groups in the former receiving the "treatment" of possessing a cross-border sanctuary. We would then "run" several multiparty civil wars and observe the governance strategies across both treatment and control groups, seeking to ascertain whether groups with possession of a cross-border sanctuary were more interventionist in their rule in comparison with groups lacking such an extraneous possession. Invoking the same assumptions discussed above, we would then be able to come to a valid conclusion about the effect of cross-border sanctuaries on rebel governance practices. We unfortunately do not have access to this ideal world, and therefore must settle for methodological approaches that can best account for observed confounders and the elimination of alternative or rival explanations.

[2]In addition, the investigator would need to invoke the assumptions of unit homogeneity, conditional independence (which may not necessarily be assured by randomized assignment), and non-interference across units (or SUTVA) in order to proceed with making causal inference based on this method of inquiry (King et al. 1994, Morgan and Winship 2007).

2.2 Process-Tracing and Civil Wars

One such method is process-tracing. The proposed explanation for the divergence in governance practices across JN and ISIS implies a focus on the decision-making process among the leadership of each group. More specifically, the researcher should focus on the extent to which efforts at implementing the ideal governance strategy would be pursued by each groups, and how the relative possession or lack of a cross-border sanctuary shaped the ultimate decision that was made with respect to such efforts. The most ideal method a researcher can use in order to ascertain that such a calculus was indeed underlying the actions taken by each armed group is that of process-tracing, a technique that "uses a longitudinal research design whose data consist of a sequence of events (individual and collective acts or changes of a state) represented by nonstandardized observations drawn from a single unit of analysis" (Waldner 2012, 68). The method relies not on simple covariation between purported cause and effect, but *concatenation* of the "causally relevant events" that constitute a causal process linking independent variable(s) to the outcome of interest and specification of the causal mechanisms that sequentially link these constituent events (Ibid., 68-69).

In this case, we would seek to trace a decision-making process in which the relative possession of a cross-border sanctuary shaped an armed group's decision to pursue its ideal governance strategy. However, this project faces temporal, informational, and practical constraints that preclude the use of process-tracing as a method of explanation. Temporally, the MA thesis demands completion before the opportunity for extensive and sufficient fieldwork arises, as well as a short time frame itself for completion. Second, the information upon which the proposed explanation relies is wholly secondary in nature, taken mostly from journalistic accounts and policy/research reports. Such information is likely biased in terms of both topical and spatial coverage. In terms of governance itself, it is quite possible that certain aspects of governance practices remain under- or non-reported due to (1) strategic displays by armed groups and (2) selection effects in terms of secondary provision of information from

civilians and local observers.

Spatially, it is highly likely that access to areas where rebels are governing is dictated by a multitude of factors: security situation, transportation infrastructure, allegiances of one's contacts, and so on. Moreover, journalist access and coverage of the Syrian Civil War has notoriously been extremely limited by the nature of the conflict itself, the ban on foreign journalists enforced by the Syrian state, and the fostering of an unworkable reporting environment in which journalists have been systematically targeted by both sides.[3]

Finally, even if the researcher had the necessary temporal flexibility to travel to the zone of conflict and conduct fieldwork, gaining access to the relevant actors, in this case the members of extremist armed groups fighting in a civil war, is (a) highly unlikely and (b) would even still prove very dangerous (and possibly life-threatening) for the researcher should access be secured. As a next-best choice, one would ultimately seek to conduct fieldwork upon conclusion of the Syrian Civil War, following the approach taken by researchers of micro-level studies of civil war. However, post-conflict fieldwork, despite occurring after the realities and danger of civil war have mostly subsided, is unlikely to be "smooth sailing" for the scholar of civil war, as reliance on retrospective recall of past events, often themselves quite traumatic and prone to several psychological biases, does not make for straightforward collection of data.[4] This is the "name of the game" when it comes to studying rebel governance and (more generally) civil war at the micro-level, a fact that has not gone unnoticed by scholars of the phenomenon itself (Mampilly 2011) and of civil war in general (Lyall [forthcoming], 16-17). That said, researchers have employed the method to varying degrees of success in studies of topics such as individual participation in insurgency (Petersen 2001, Wood 2003), armed group organization and use of violence (Kalyvas 2006, Weinstein 2007, Metelits 2010), and alliance formation among armed groups (Christia 2012). Following these studies, future iterations/expansions of this project would ultimately seek to employ process-tracing, provided that security conditions and access allow for use of the method.

[3]For a recent report on this subject in the context of the Syrian conflict, see Lynch et al. 2014.

[4]See Kalyvas 2006, 32-51 and Wood 2006 for extensive discussion of these issues.

2.3 Descriptive Inference and Theory-Building

As a result of the previously discussed constraints associated with studying rebel governance in the Syrian Civil War, the project will employ descriptive inference to inductively build a theory of rebel governance. Descriptive inference is "the process of understanding an unobserved phenomenon on the basis of a set of observations" (King et al. 1994, 55). One focuses on ascertaining and distinguishing the systematic features from the non-systematic features of a phenomenon of interest, and hypothesizing about what might be generating the observed variation. In the context of this thesis, I develop a conceptual framework of armed group governance, which I then apply to the practices of JN and ISIS in Raqqa. This allows me to conceptualize the different governance practices of the two groups in the case within an abstract framework that lends itself to subsequent theory building.

It should be explicitly noted that the claims being made concerning the possession of a cross-border sanctuary and more interventionist governance practices should in no way be taken as attempts to substantiate a causal relationship in the case of Raqqa. Consequently, rather than the traditional sequence of theoretical specification followed by case studies to test the theory, the thesis proceeds with a discussion of the empirical variation in governance practices across JN and ISIS in the city of Raqqa, which is then followed by a specification of the proposed theoretical explanation for the divergence in outcomes.

3 Rebel Governance

In this section and the next two, I undertake three tasks. First, I provide a refined conceptualization of rebel governance in civil wars, focusing on the extent of armed group intervention in local civilian affairs as constitutive of rebel governance practices. In the subsequent section, I employ this refined conceptual framework in my discussion of the empirical variation in governance practices exhibited by JN and ISIS in the Syrian city of Raqqa from March 2013-January 2014. Finally, in Section 5, I integrate the results of these

two previous tasks to provide an explanatory framework that accounts for the variation in governance practices across JN and ISIS in Raqqa.

3.1 Rebel Governance: Approaches and Conceptualizations

3.1.1 Scope Conditions

Implicit in providing a conceptual framework of rebel governance are the specific scope conditions under which one can consider rebels to be governing. The extant literature often does not explicitly specify these conditions, or does so in an incomplete manner. Besides driving the consideration of rebel governance as a concept, specifying these scope conditions is essential for determining what observed instances constitute the universe of cases of rebel governance. Among the works that do implicitly or explicitly consider scope conditions, there is inconsistency regarding two main scope conditions: (1) the degree of territorial control that must be maintained by insurgents (partial vs. complete/dominant) and (2) whether a *single* armed group or multiple armed groups can be considered to be governing in the same territory.

Some authors argue that armed groups must have "dominant" or complete control[5] of a given territory to be considered governing (Weinstein 2007, Kasfir 2008, Metelits 2010,[6] Mampilly 2011). Justifications for this strict condition are twofold. First, rebels must have a monopoly on the use of force within the territory (Weinstein 2007, 164). Second, groups must control territory in order to induce collaboration[7] and actually start providing services, as only control of territory provides armed groups with the capacity to govern (Kasfir 2008,5; Mampilly 2011, 59-63). On the other hand, Arjona (2013) argues that rebel governance can occur in zones where an armed group "has a continuous presence (regardless [of] their level

[5]Discussions of "control" in the rebel governance literature usually rely on the conceptualization and continuum of control developed in Kalyvas 2006.

[6]Although Metelits does not explicitly specify scope conditions regarding rebel governance, her theoretical framework implies that full control is required for an armed group to be considered the ruler of an area given her independent variable of active rivalry (Metelits 2010, 11-12 and 26-28). See Section 5.1 for further discussion of her work.

[7]As defined by Kalyvas 2006, 118-132.

of control)" (Arjona 2013, 2). Such "zones" of territorial control can range from contested to "liberated" areas in which rebels have a presence (Ibid.).

Scholars also differ regarding whether a single group must have a monopoly on governance in a given territory, or instances of multiple armed groups governing an area can also be included in the universe of cases. Some scholars imply, but do not explicitly specify, that a single rebel group must exercise a monopoly on governance within a given territory (Weinstein 2007, 164-166; Kasfir 2008, 5; Mampilly 2011, 59-63). Again, Arjona (2013) argues that a given armed group can be considered to be governing even when other armed groups are present in the same territory (Arjona 2013, 2-3). This is so because a single community may interact with multiple armed groups at the same time (Ibid., 3).

3.1.2 Rebel Governance: Concepts and Definitions

Both scholars of civil wars and insurgency and insurgents themselves have acknowledged the analytical and practical importance of rebel governance[8] in civil wars. As noted by Mampilly (2011), classic guerrilla war theorists, such as Che Guevara and Mao Tse-tung, highlighted in their works and speeches the importance of accommodating and providing for the needs of the local population so as to win support for the guerrilla cause (Mampilly 2011, 11-13).

Perhaps the first academic to recognize the role that insurgent governance plays in rebellion, Robert W. McColl argued that local-level rule allowed rebels to demonstrate to both the incumbent state and local population that they provide a viable alternative to the existing social order (McColl 1969). Since McColl wrote in 1969, approaches to conceptualizing rebel governance have usually adopted one of two orientations. One is to frame rebel governance as akin to that of European state-building, with armed group rule the product of a "social contract" (Luebbert 1987) between the rulers and the rule. This approach usu-

[8]It is important to note that the research program of rebel governance is distinct from the broader study of "civilian-rebel interactions," the latter of which is usually concerned with examining rebel treatment of civilian populations in terms of the levels and type of violence used against noncombatants (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006, Kalyvas 2006, Weinstein 2007, Metelits 2010, E. Wood 2009, R. Wood 2010).

ally presents rebel governance outcomes as either coercive or non-coercive, depending on the presence or absence of a social contract (Wickham-Crowley 1987, Metelits 2010, Keister 2011, Huang 2013). The other approach rejects the analytical equivalence of rebel governance with the historical process of European state-building, arguing that rebel governance is indeed *not* "an elementary form of state-building" due to the teleological and normative implications that underpin such a theoretical approach (Mampilly 2011, Risse 2011). Instead, these scholars focus on the established structures and interactions between armed groups and local civilian populations, allowing the the empirics of what they are studying to drive their conceptualizations of the phenomenon (Weinstein 2007, Kasfir 2008, Mampilly 2011, Arjona 2013).

Two authors of the latter approach focus extensively on the political, economic, and social aspects of rebel rule. Zachariah Mampilly (2011) grounds the concept of "rebel governance" in a framework based on the existing structures of the state in society and armed group interaction with several actors, including local civilians, organizations, and external states, based on case studies of armed groups in Sudan, Sri Lanka, and DRC (Mampilly 2011). He builds on Nelson Kasfir (2002)'s definition of rebel governance: "the range of possibilities for organization, authority, and responsiveness created between guerrillas and civilians" (Mampilly 2011, 4 from Kasfir 2002, 4), adding the point that "a system of governance entails not just formal institutions, but all the practices and norms that regulate the daily life of civilians as well" (Mampilly 2011, 55-56).

Ana Arjona (2013) defines "wartime social order"[9] as "the set of norms that structure civilian and combat behavior in a given community" (Arjona 2013, 1). An extension of this definition is her focus on how armed groups' presence in a given area affects local "civilian affairs": "any realm of public and private life, including politics, economics, social relations, religious practices, and sexual behavior" (Ibid.). Given an established social contract between the rebels and the local population, the form order takes in a given area "varies depending

[9]Arjona uses this term instead of "rebel governance" to refer to the phenomenon of armed group rule in civil wars.

on the scope of the group's intervention in civilian affairs, which can be broad or narrow" (Ibid., 5).

These existing conceptualizations of armed group governance seek to capture different aspects of the phenomenon of rebel governance, such as the manner by which armed groups shape interactions and behavior in the political or economic or social spheres. Armed group actions at the local level, however, often influence all spheres of local society. In addition, the majority of these existing conceptual frameworks do not provide explicit indicators that can be used for operationalization and measurement of the disaggregated aspects of rebel governance in a consistent manner across cases. The following section seeks to build and improve upon the existing literature by providing a refined framework of rebel governance, focusing on how armed group rule affects the political, economic, and social domains of local society.

3.2 A Refined Conceptualization of Rebel Governance

3.2.1 Why a "Refined" Conceptualization?

The conceptualization of rebel governance employed in this project builds primarily on that developed by Arjona (2013). As stated just previously, Arjona's conceptual framework is the most broad in the existing literature in terms of the aspects of local society that it covers. Indeed, her operationalization of the political and economic aspects of local-level rebel rule provide the basis of measurement for some of these same aspects in the framework developed below. However, Arjona's conceptual framework suffers from three theoretical and empirical shortcomings that prevent it from being directly and wholly applied to analyses of armed group rule outside of Colombia, and consequently call for refinement.

First, Arjona's focus on the distinct aspects of rebel governance (political, social, economic, etc.) is not introduced until she is actually measuring the phenomenon empirically; it is left out of her initial conceptual framework of "wartime social order" provided in Chapter 2 of the book manuscript. Consequently, there is no explicit theoretical and

empirical justification for each of the aspects of rebel governance, particularly in terms of why a separate focus on the economic, political, public goods, norms, and social is necessary for analysis.[10] Second, this differential framework of armed group intervention is not employed consistently in examining the empirics of her cases. Arjona only focuses on these separate aspects of armed group rule in instances of rebelocracy in the qualitative portion of her empirical discussion. Though a product of the way in which she defines the variants of wartime social order, this conceptual and empirical inconsistency rules out our ability to classify cases where armed groups may intervene to limited or even varying extents across and within *all* of the specified domains of society.[11]

Finally, some of the indicators used to measure the extent of armed group intervention in each of the domains of local society are directly derived from the case of Colombia, and therefore cannot be applied cross-nationally to other cases of rebel governance. For example, Arjona's indicators for the extent of armed group "social" intervention are constituted by "whether combatants and civilians played pool together, attended parties, and played soccer" (Arjona 2013, n.p.). Besides their empirical limitation to what occurred in the case of Colombia, one could argue that these indicators are not capturing the degree to which armed groups are intervening in local civilian affairs, but rather the extent to which armed groups are both *integrated* into local society and/or *interacting* with civilians.

Moreover, Arjona's measurements for the extent of armed group intervention vis-a-vis local "norms" are given by "whether the group established norms to regulate domestic violence; personal image (like skirts in women and long hair and earrings in men); and sexual behavior (like forbidding homosexuality or regulating prostitution)" (Arjona 2013, n.p.). The various activities and actions referenced in these sets of indicators are not necessarily going to be present to a consistent and measurable degree in other instances of rebel governance, and

[10] Arjona provides discussion of the different aspects of rebel rule in Chapter 3 of the manuscript, but this discussion does not include an explicit justification for why governance should be analyzed on a domain-by-domain basis.

[11] Examples of such variation in armed group intervention across the different domains of local society are provided in Section 3.2.2.

indeed may not represent appropriate indicators for "norms" in other cases. They therefore cannot be employed to measure the extent of armed group intervention in these domains of society in cases other than Colombia.

3.2.2 Armed Group Intervention in Local Society

Recalling the discussion of scope conditions provided earlier, a necessary condition for any undertaking of rebel governance is that armed groups must maintain complete control over a given territory. In other words, the given territory must be a "zone of insurgent control," such that the incumbent regime/state is absent from the territory (Kalyvas 2006, 88). In addition, at least one armed group must be present in the area in order to maintain insurgent sovereignty and provide public security. This condition implies that multiple armed groups may be considered to be "governing" the same territory simultaneously.

In terms of the phenomenon of "governance" itself, the framework here builds on Thomas Risse's general definition: "the various institutionalized modes of social coordination to produce and implement collectively binding rules, or to provide collective goods" (Risse 2011, 9). This definition implies processes of coordination, enforcement, interaction, and public goods and services provision. Risse goes on to note that this conceptualization of governance as a "process" implies two dimensions of consideration: (1) actors and (2) modes of coordinating social action (Ibid., 11). In the context of rebel governance, armed groups constitute the *actor* that is governing and governance practices are the *modes of coordinating social action* within the controlled territory.

Building on Risse's general definition and borrowing semantically from Arjona (2013)'s conceptual framework, *rebel governance* is defined here as the relative extent of armed group intervention in the local political, economic and social domains within the territory under its control. The extent or degree of armed group intervention in local society encompasses both the structures through which power is organized and deployed and the relative prescription and proscription of local-level actions, activities, and interactions by

rebels in the territory.[12] As discussed earlier, armed group rule often has differential effects depending on the specific aspect of local society one is considering. Thus, the extent of armed group intervention in a given territory should be analyzed with regard to the following three domains of society:

Political: the extent to which an armed group attempts to reshape local politics and replace structures of authority and adjudication, and provide public goods and services to the population.

Economic: the extent to which an armed group, through practices such as taxation and resource extraction, seeks to alter existing modes of economic transactions and permitted material-generating activities.

Social: the extent to which an armed group enacts and enforces policies that seek to alter and re-shape social interactions, traditions, customs, and private/public behavior at the local level.

It is important to distinguish between a focus on the extent of armed group intervention in local civilian affairs from a focus on how armed group rule differs from what came before.[13] A conceptualization of rebel governance that emphasizes the extent to which armed group intervention changes local society from the pre-conflict status quo conflates intervention with change. One can imagine a scenario in which an armed group takes control over a territory and is content with existing institutions and structures of rule that themselves are interventionist in the eyes of the local population. In this case, we would code such armed group rule as an instance of "extensive intervention" even though the armed group itself did not expend resources to establish such institutions and structures. Therefore, when conceiving of the extent to which an armed group intervenes in local society, we should focus on armed group actions themselves, particularly regarding the *effort* such intervention entails in terms of organizational resources. The connection between governance practices and resources is developed in Section 5.2.1.

In terms of operationalization and measurement, armed group intervention within

[12]Note that this refined framework says nothing about whether rebel rule is "coercive" or not. "Intervention" merely refers to the extent to which armed groups act to reorient and reshape local civilian affairs across and within these three domains of local society, and implies nothing about the specific *means* by which such rule is pursued.

[13]I thank Michael Poznansky for pointing out this important distinction.

and across the three domains of local society can be considered to be either *extensive* or *limited*, depending on the degree to which armed group governance practices align with the sets of domain-specific indicators listed below in Table 1.

Table 1: *Type and Extent of Armed Group Intervention in Local Society*

Type of Intervention	**Extent and Indicators**
Political Intervention	*Extensive* -Establishment of Political Authority Structures as Replacement -Establishment of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms/Structures as Replacement -Provision of Public Goods and Services *Limited* -Reliance on/Maintenance of Existing Political Authority Structures -Reliance on/Maintenance of Existing Dispute Resolution Mechanisms/Structures -Lack of Provision of Public Goods/Services - and/or - -Reliance on Secondary Actors for Provision of Public Goods/Services
Economic Intervention	*Extensive* -Direct Taxation -Reorientation of Economic Activities and Production -Redistribution of Resources *Limited* -Indirect or No Taxation -Reliance on/Maintenance of Existing Economic Activities and Production -Limited or No Redistribution of Resources
Social Intervention	*Extensive* -Reorienting Social Interactions and Relations -Prescribing and Proscribing Private and Public Behavior *Limited* -General Maintenance of Existing Social Interactions and Relations -General Maintenance of Private and Public Behavior Practices

Political Intervention The first two indicators for political intervention aim to capture whether rebels have established structures of political authority and dispute resolution in a given territory to position themselves as de facto rulers, or if they are relying on existing structures of rule alongside their own established institutions (or existing structures of rule alone). As Mampilly (2011) notes, these two aspects of armed group governance usually constitute the primary focus of insurgents upon capturing a territory (Mampilly 2011, 63). If armed groups have established alternative structures of political authority and instituted

dispute resolution mechanisms that displace or replace existing structures and mechanisms, we can consider this aspect of political intervention to be extensive.

Examples of armed groups that established such political authority structures and dispute resolution mechanisms to replace existing ones are abound. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) established centralized political authority structures and a fully-functioning judiciary in the areas it controlled in Sri Lanka (Stokke 2006; Mampilly 2011, 112-119). In Sudan, the post-1994 Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) established a fully-fledged civilian administration, courts, and penal code (Metelits 2010, 52-71; Mampilly 2011, 145-158). In the Greek Civil War, the National Liberation Front (EAM) established political and judicial structures in areas under its control (Kalyvas 2014). In Peru, Shining Path established a complex and robust governance apparatus, combining the military and political wings of the movement with civilians in local authority structures (Kalyvas 2006, 219; Weinstein 2007, 186-192).

The National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda established local authority councils and held democratic elections for such councils in areas under its control; these councils also served as local judicial authorities (Kasfir 2005; Weinstein 2007, 175-180). In Afghanistan, the Taliban established their own religious-based political authority structures and dispute resolution mechanisms during their rise to power in the 1990's (Coll 2004, 332-334; Sinno 2008, 227; Braithwaite and Wardak 2013). In Ethiopia, the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF) established local political authority structures and judicial departments (Johnson and Johnson 1981; Connell 2001; Tareke 2009, 67-74). In Guinea, the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) established extensive local administrative structures and adjudication institutions in the territory it controlled (Kasfir 2008, 11-13).

On the other hand, armed groups that rely on or maintain existing structures of political authority and adjudication can be said to be ruling "indirectly," or "through the mediation of local elites" (Waldner 1999, 21), and therefore constitute instances of limited

intervention vis-a-vis these two political aspects of rebel rule. Examples of such limited political intervention on these two aspects are several. Renamo in Mozambique relied on traditional authority structures and modes of justice (Weinstein 2007, 181-186). The SPLA in south Sudan relied on indirect rule and administration of justice through local traditional courts until organizational change in 1994 altered the group's governance strategy to be more interventionist (Metelits 2010, 52-53). Up until the late 1990s, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines relied on inconsistent and ad-hoc political authority structures, and did not develop consistent mechanisms of dispute resolution in areas under its control (Keister 2011, 401-417).

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo/Zaire, the Rassamblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Goma (RCD-Goma) relied on pre-conflict traditional authority structures and weak state administrative apparatuses while maintaining existing legal codes and dispute resolution mechanisms in areas it controlled (Mampilly 2011, 191-192; Tull 2003, 201-203). Although the EPLF intervened extensively in areas under their control to establish political authority and adjudication structures in the Eritrean struggle for independence, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) did not, and instead relied on traditional structures of political authority in its controlled territory (Johnson and Johnson 1981; Tareke 2009, 61). Unlike its counterpart the EAM, the National Republican Greek League (EDES) relied on traditional and pre-existing structures of political authority at the local level (Kalyvas 2014).

The third indicator concerns the direct provision of public goods and services by armed groups. Although Arjona (2013) positions such activity as its own categorical indicator of armed group intervention, I subsume it under political intervention because of the established ties and recursive effects between public goods and service provision and political rule (Olson 1993). Whether armed groups themselves are providing public goods and services, such as infrastructure, education, or health services, can serve to indicate the extent to which rebels are undercutting existing provision of such goods and services or are the initiators of such practices within a given territory. The Unizo Nacional para Independencia

Total de Angola (UNITA) provided education and health services to populations under its control during the decades-long civil war in Angola (Burke 1984; Heywood 1989; Mampilly 2011, 219). In addition to establishing structures of authority and adjudication, Shining Path provided all civilians with education in areas under its control (Weinstein 2007, 191). The LTTE constructed a comprehensive, full-fledged education system in Sri Lanka, though its provision of health services lagged behind such efforts (Stokke 2006; Mampilly 2011, 119-123).

Armed groups often score consistently across the three indicators for political intervention, as groups that do not establish structures of authority or dispute resolution also usually provide little in the way of public goods or services and/or rely on third actors to provide such goods and services (such as NGOs). The limited institutional capacity of the SPLA in its early years prevented it from providing education and health services, while transnational NGOs stepped in to fill the provision gap in these areas (Mampilly 2011, 149-165). The same was seen with the RCD-Goma in the Democratic Republic of the Congo/Zaire (Tull 2003, 436; Mampilly 2011, 195-205) and the ASG in the Philippines up until the late 1990s (Keister 2011, 404-407).

Economic Intervention Armed group intervention in the economic domain of local society can be captured initially by whether there is direct taxation of the population by the rebels. This has been the case in many instances of rebel rule: Sendero Luminoso in Peru (Weinstein 2007, 190-191), the LTTE in Sri Lanka (Stokke 2006, 1022), the Forces Nouvelles in the Ivory Coast (Hazen 2013, 166-168), the NRA in Uganda (Weinstein 2007, 268-269), and the EAM in Greece (Kalyvas 2014). Indirect taxation, on the other hand, indicates a lower level of economic intervention, as armed groups suffer the same revenue accumulation inefficiencies as elites in pre-modern Europe that relied on tax farming (Weiss and Hobson 1995). Examples of such limited taxation include the RCD-Goma in the Democratic Republic of the Congo/Zaire (Mampilly 2011, 195) and insurgencies in Cuba, Colombia, Peru,

Guatemala, Venezuela, and Bolivia during the 1950s and 1960s (Wickham-Crowley 2014, 65).

A second broad indicator of armed group intervention in the economic domain concerns the degree to which rebels reorient and organize economic production and functions, including labor organization, the establishment of wage and/or price schemes, and altering the revenue-generating activities in the local economy. Pursued to their fullest degree, such actions indicate extensive economic intervention by rebels within a given territory, as they significantly alter the modes of economic transactions and activity. Examples of such extensive intervention include Shining Path across Peru (Weinstein 2007, 190-191) and in the Upper Huallaga Valley (Ibid., 192-195), as well as the LTTE in Sri Lanka (Stokke 2006), the EPLF in Eritrea (Johnson and Johnson 1981; Tareke 2009, 73-74), and UNITA in Angola (Burke 1984). On the other hand, groups such as the SPLA in Sudan (Mampilly 2011, 149-165) and the RCD-Goma in DRC/Zaire (Ibid., 195; Tull 2003), partially as a result of their low political capacity, engaged in limited interference in local economic activities.

Finally, whether rebels significantly redistribute resources, such as financial wealth or land, aims to capture the extent to which the distribution of wealth (and therefore local patterns of consumption) has been affected by armed groups. The Shining Path in Peru redistributed both financial wealth and land among populations under its control (Weinstein 2007, 190-191). In Eritrea, the EPLF redistributed land to both men and women in areas it controlled (Tareke 2009, 68). Though fighting in the same conflict, the ELF did not pursue such land reform and limited redistribution of resources overall (Johnson and Johnson 1981, 188).

Social Intervention As noted earlier in the section, armed group intervention in the social domain has largely been overlooked by scholars of rebel governance.[14] Continuing in this more recent tradition, this conceptual framework examines armed group intervention in

[14]As the previous discussion of this aspect of rebel governance noted, Mampilly (2011) and Arjona (2013) remain the sole works that investigate the social repercussions of rebel rule.

the social domain of local society: whether rebels reorient social interactions and relations among the local population and prescribe and proscribe private and public behaviors.

Armed groups can promulgate rules and policies concerning interactions and relations among social units within the population, especially with regard to gender roles, marriage, and family matters. They can also selectively permit and/or prohibit specific types of behavior in private and in public. For example, the SPLA in Sudan (Metelits 2010, 54-63) and the EPLF in Eritrea (Johnson and Johnson 1981, 190-191; Connell 2001, 355; Tareke 2009, 71) both implemented policies that radically altered gender relations and the role of women in both movements and local society in areas under the groups' respective control.

The Taliban in Afghanistan notoriously imposed a strict version of Islam in areas they gained during their ascendency to rule in the country, essentially banning women from the public sphere (including schools) and requiring them to veil their faces in public while banning music, television, cigarettes, singing, dancing, and the use of toothpaste in both public and private (Coll 2004, 333-334; Braithwaite and Wardak 2013, 184-185). The FARC and various paramilitaries in Colombia imposed rules concerning social conduct, often banning alcohol and homosexuality while regulating norms of appropriate dress for both men and women (Arjona 2013). On the other hand, limited reorientation of social interactions/relations and regulation of private and public behavior can be seen in the cases of Renamo in Mozambique (Weinstein 2007, 181-186) and the RCD-Goma in DRC/Zaire (Tull 2003). Partially as a product of these groups' indirect rule, they did not extensively intervene in the social domain of local societies under their control.

4 Rebel Governance in the Syrian Civil War: JN, ISIS, and the City of Raqqa

This section builds on the refined conceptual framework developed in the previous section, employing the conceptual framework and associated indicators of armed group in-

tervention to illustrate the divergence in governance practices across JN and ISIS in Raqqa from March 2013-January 2014. First, I establish the similar ideological orientation of the two groups, showing that they both espouse the Islamic-based rule and the re-establishment of the Islamic Caliphate. Next, I discuss the relative strategic importance of Raqqa in the Syrian conflict from the eyes of armed groups. Following this is an examination of each group's rule in the city from March 2013-January 2014.

4.1 Ideological and Organizational Origins

JN and ISIS have common ideological origins in al-Qaeda and organizational origins as the offshoots of the Islamic State in Iraq (Anjarini 2013, Benotman and Blake 2013, Birke 2013, Kirder 2011, Szybala 2013). Both groups seek the re-establishment of the Islamic Caliphate and possess the ultimate goal of creating a transnational empire that spans the globe (Al Tamimi 2013a, Jones 2013, O'Bagy 2012, Wyer 2012). JN was created in January 2012 by the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) as its Syrian wing in the uprising against Assad, and received support in the form of fighters, weapons, and funding from the ISI (Karouny 2013, Mortada 2013a). However, the chosen head of JN, Abu Muhammad al-Gowlani, was Syrian, as were most of the members of the group itself, and many of the group's members had previously fought in Iraq against American occupying forces and Shiite armed groups (al-Amine 2012, Baczko et al. 2013c). The asserted logic behind JN is that it was created by ISI's leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in order to prevent ISI fighters from leaving Iraq to join the fight against Assad in Syria (Jones 2013, Mortada 2014a). In other words, JN was created as a Syrian-dominated, separate entity for ISI-related activities in Syria.

On April 9th, 2013, al-Baghdadi proclaimed that JN was indeed the extension of ISI into Syria, and from that point on would be merged with ISI to form the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (Caillet 2013). Dozens of JN fighters defected to the new group, expecting the proposal to be accepted by JN leadership (Atassi 2013, Hmeidi 2013). However, al-Gowlani rejected the merger, and instead pledged allegiance directly to the head of al-Qaeda,

Ayman al-Zawahiri (Joscelyn 2013). Two months passed, and on June 9th, al-Zawahiri sided with al-Gowlani, rejecting the merger and stating that JN was to remain for Syria and ISIS to remain in Iraq (Atassi 2013, Mouzahem 2013). Al-Baghdadi rejected al-Zawahiri's order, and instead asserted that ISIS would remain in Syria and Iraq, expanding the group's presence in the following months (Sly 2013c).

It is important to note that this split occurred *after* JN had already started governing Raqqa, effectively ruling out an explanation for the variation in governance practices rooted in organizational fragmentation. Moreover, the fact that ISI did not cut off JN's material support prior to the split, but did so upon al-Gowlani's refusal to accede to the merger, casts further doubt on the potential that the two groups possessed different ideological orientations (Mortada 2013b). If the ISI had disagreed with the manner in which JN was governing Raqqa before the split, one might imagine a threat or actual cessation of support to JN. Instead, such support continued unabated until al-Gowlani's implicit rejection of the merger in April 2013, a month into JN's cooperative rule over Raqqa.

4.2 Raqqa

The city of Raqqa is located in northeastern Syria. Its main value stems from two geographic factors: (1) a dam on the Euphrates River, located 53km from the city; and (2) its location on the main road that runs through Syria from western Iraq (Heidemann 2006). The city itself has no significant resources (such as oil or minerals), and was last considered politically strategic in the time of the Abbasid Empire, when it was the empire's capital from 796-809 CE (Ibid., 33).

In terms of Weinstein (2007)'s focus on the need for rebels to extract food supply from local populations, armed groups have actually been distributing food to the local population since the city fell to the opposition in March 2013 (Bazcko 2013c). Indeed, with regard to natural resources as sources of revenue for rebel groups (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Ross 2012), both JN and ISIS have maintained access to oil fields elsewhere besides the city in

the surrounding provincial areas and the province of Deir az-Zour throughout the conflict, in some cases selling oil directly back to the regime to fund rebel operations and rule (Borger and Mahmood 2013, Hubbard et al. 2014, Sherlock 2014). Kalyvas (2006)'s focus on the need for local collaboration with rebels does not apply to the case of Raqqa, as the regime withdrew from the area following rebel capture in March 2013, thereby precluding the possibility for denunciation against the rebels given the lack of variation in insurgent control in the time period (Holliday 2013). The city of Raqqa thus presents few motivating opportunities for resource extraction to potentially drive the logic of local-level governance practices, leaving open the question as to why two ideologically similar groups ruled the city in different ways.

4.3 Raqqa under JN: Limited Intervention

On March 2nd, 2013, JN and two other armed groups, Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Wahdat al-Tahrir al-Islamiyya, wrested Raqqa from regime control through a short but decisive battle (Barber 2013). The rebels immediately established units to provide public security and prevent looting in the city (O'Bagy 2013).

4.3.1 Political Intervention

Along with the two other armed groups, JN established both a city council and a legal body, the Sharia Authority (Baczko 2013c, 12; Williams 2013), though the rebels continued to cooperate with existing local-level institutions and councils for the purposes of both governance and service provision (Holliday 2013) and also preserved existing state institutions (Abouzeid 2013a). Indeed, JN and the other two armed groups largely ceded political decision-making authority to these local civilian councils, though such concession began to wane in late March and early April when ISIS began to infiltrate into Raqqa and challenge JN's cooperative rule with violence (Enders 2013, Looney 2013, Syria Untold 2014). This cooperative mode of rule indicates limited political intervention on the part of JN.

Public services continued to function much as they had before opposition takeover,

with public areas kept clean, limited power outages, and a consistent supply of food in the city maintained by the group's reliance on local actors and organizations for distribution and provision (with the exception of flour) (Abouzeid 2013a, Enders 2013, Menapolis 2013, O'Bagy 2013). Though not without small-scale demonstrations against the perceived imposition of Islamist rule (Abouzeid 2013b, D. Hassan 2013), JN remained open to consultation during their period of rule, with a hotline set up for locals to report complaints and issues (Abouzeid 2013b and 2013c, Hubbard 2013). Political intervention on the part of JN in Raqqa was thus quite limited, preserving existing modes of opposition rule alongside restrained and limited political and judicial institutions.

4.3.2 Economic Intervention

JN did little beyond maintaining extant economic activities and modes of production in Raqqa during its two months of cooperative rule. The most significant action it took in terms of economic intervention was to take control of flour distribution and reopen several bakeries that had closed prior to opposition takeover, thereby lowering the price of bread to its pre-war level (Enders 2013, Hubbard 2013). In terms of economic institutions, JN and the other two groups maintained the integrity of the local central bank, refraining from looting it (Abouzeid 2013a). The groups did not embark on any redistribution or taxation schemes either, exhibiting further JN's limited intervention in the economic domain of local Raqqan society.

4.3.3 Social Intervention

While publicly endorsing and recommending a strict, fundamentalist form of Islam (Benotman and Blake 2013, Jones 2013), JN refrained from enforcing strict versions of Islamic law in the city and generally preserved and respected religious minority rights and local traditions and customs in Raqqa (Abouzeid 2013a and 2013c, Birke 2013, Prothero 2013). The two churches in Raqqa were protected and kept open, though the group was reported to

have killed several Alawites (Abouzeid 2013a). Although it publicly disseminated information and preferences regarding how society should be organized around Islamic principles, JN exhibited restraint and conciliatory actions when it came to its attempts to shape the social domain of Raqqan society. Policies for how women should dress were presented and publicized by JN, but they refrained from harshly imposing such policies on the population and allowed women to dress as they pleased (Abouzeid 2013a, Birke 2013, Holmes and Dziadosz 2013). Religious practices in the city were thus largely left as they were prior to rebel takeover, with JN overall generally maintaining existing social interactions, relations, and behavior.

4.4 Raqqa under ISIS: Extensive Intervention

The ISIS takeover of Raqqa city came after the aforementioned April 2013 announcement by the leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, that JN and ISI would merge to become one group (ISIS), a statement rejected by Abu Mohammed al-Gowlani, the leader of JN (Caillet 2013). Following this split were defections of fighters from JN to ISIS in Raqqa, leading to and facilitating the latter group's takeover of the city on May 14th, 2013 (Looney 2013). Immediately following its consolidation of power in Raqqa, the group refused to cooperate with any other armed groups (including its ideological affiliate JN) in ruling the city, instead actively fighting and driving them out of Raqqa in the subsequent months through targeted bombings and attacks (al-Hakkar 2013, Looney 2013).

4.4.1 Political Intervention

Following its capture of Raqqa in mid-May 2013, ISIS immediately established its own political and judicial authority and banned existing structures, including local elected councils and civil society organizations that had been set up following the opposition takeover in March and maintained during JN's prior cooperative rule (Al Attar 2013, Birke 2013, Menapolis 2013, Pizzi and Shabaan 2013, Syria Untold 2014). ISIS then began a campaign

of power consolidation, targeting and assassinating local elites and notables as well as commanders of other rebel brigades (Looney 2013, Syria Untold 2014). Rather than taking the consultative and cooperative approach of JN, the group sought to displace all other rival power structures while arresting and torturing local activists and dissidents that expressed opposition to ISIS policies (Al Sharq Al Awsat 2013, Amnesty International 2013, Birke 2013, Leigh 2013, Whewell 2013) while also preventing media from operating in the city (Walsh et al. 2013).

In addition, rather than relying on existing local structures and civilian councils for service provision, ISIS set up its own administrative organization for public service provision, the Islamic Administration of Public Services (Caillet 2013). The group also set up its own transportation services, distributed relief packages to residents of the city, and provided oil to the city from oil reserves it controlled in Deir az-Zour (Barfi and Zelin 2013, Looney 2013, Tastekin 2013). ISIS's displacement and replacement of existing authority and legal structures, along with its wholesale substitution of existing service provision mechanisms, constitutes extensive intervention in the political domain of local Raqqan society.

4.4.2 Economic Intervention

ISIS has intervened to an extended degree in the Raqqan economic domain, although not as consistently as it has in the political and social domains and to an extent that can only be measured with some error given available information. After its takeover, ISIS imposed taxes on commercial establishments in the city (Syria Untold 2014). Like JN, ISIS took control of bread production, but went further, seizing the mechanisms of wheat provision in Raqqa and actually bringing such resources to Raqqa itself using trucks from areas along the border with Turkey (Barfi and Zelin 2013). As far as existing information allows, the group has not sought to redistribute resources in the city.

4.4.3 Social Intervention

ISIS gained notoriety for its campaign of religious imposition in Raqqa since May 2013. All businesses were required to close for all five prayer times, and residents were required to attend mosque (IWPR 2014). The group ordered women to cover their hair and face in public and mandated that a male relative accompany females in public, while also limiting times in which women are allowed to be in public (Tuysuz et al. 2013, Walsh et al. 2013). In addition, the group banned cigarettes, alcohol, cameras, and music in Raqqa in accordance with strict interpretations of Islamic law (Spencer 2013, Abouzeid 2014, AFP 20 Jan 2014). All of these measures have been enforced through coercion (Barfi and Zelin 2013, Looney 2013, IWPR 2014). The group destroyed churches and burnt bibles (Agenzia Fides 2013, Meuse 2013b) while abducting and expelling Christians and Alawites from the city (Al Attar 2013, Leigh 2013).

Through its Raqqa Outreach Bureau, the group aimed to "educate residents in what it considers the proper teachings of Islam" (Barfi and Zelin 2013), distributing materials that present its views on the proper place of Islam in society and holding public forums (Zelin 2013a). ISIS offered informational courses and opened a children's school in Raqqa as well, separating the latter by gender and writing new textbooks for a new curriculum (Looney 2013, Pizzi and Shabaan 2013, Syria Untold 2014). This extensive and interventionist mode of governance led to repeated civilian protests (Al Attar 2013, Barak and Zellin 2013, Abouzeid 2014, Al Khatieb 2014). This popular opposition evolved into violent rebel infighting pitting ISIS against other armed groups in early January 2014, briefly resulting in the group's loss of control over Raqqa in mid-January 2014 (AFP 2014a, Saad and Gladstone 2014, Morris 2014, Szybala 2014, Weiss 2014). However, ISIS was able to recapture the city after a few weeks, and governed Raqqa through the end of the period of observation (January 31st, 2014) (al-Hakkar 2014).

5 Ideology, Cross-Border Sanctuaries, and Rebel Governance

5.1 Existing Explanations and the Syrian Case

Scholarly explanations of rebel governance practices range from resource and endowment-based approaches (Weinstein 2007, Metelits 2010, Keister 2011) to a focus on group characteristics and pre-existing institutional structures and qualities (Mampilly 2011, Arjona 2013) to political identity (Kalyvas 2014, Sukyens 2014) to political incorporation (Barter 2014). In addition, two explanations, one based on organizational learning and the other based on organizational factors, have been advanced by journalists and policy researchers to explain the divergent governance practices of JN and ISIS. Examination of these explanations illustrates their shortcomings in accounting for the case of Raqqa from March 2013-January 2014.

5.1.1 Rebel Governance

Ana Arjona (2013) argues that the mode of rebel governance that emerges in civil war is a product of armed groups' behavior towards civilians and civilians' response to such behavior. More specifically, the relative extent of armed group intervention in local civilian affairs is an outcome of a rebel group's time horizons, the quality of pre-existing institutions, and the strategic value assigned to a territory by groups. With long-term time horizons, groups seek to establish order over disorder. The variant of order that emerges, aliocracy or rebelocracy, is a product of the relative capacity for civilians to collectively resist, which itself depends on the relative quality of local, pre-existing institutions.

In Arjona's framework, rebel groups possess perfect information regarding the relative quality of pre-existing institutions, and by extension the likelihood of collective civilian resistance, for three reasons: they learn from other rebel groups' experiences and experiments with governance, they can read particular social cues that indicate the capacity for

local-level collective action, and they can use violence strategically in an effort to ascertain civilian responses to governance. With high-quality institutions, the likelihood of collective civilian resistance is high, and groups settle for aliocracy, intervening only to tax and maintain security in the area. With low-quality institutions, the likelihood of collective civilian resistance is low, leading to extensive intervention in political, economic, and social affairs of the area in the form of rebelocracy. If a territory is "strategic"[15] and possesses high-quality institutions, groups seek to establish rebelocracy regardless, but civilian resistance ensues and disorder is produced.

Arjona's theory would predict three things concerning the governance practices of ISIS and JN in Raqqa from March 2013-January 2014. First, ISIS would correctly ascertain the quality of pre-existing institutions in places such as Raqqa, and refrain from attempting to establish rebelocracy in the city. Moreover, once collective civilian resistance against ISIS is exhibited, the group would settle for the more non-interventionist form of rule, aliocracy. As is clear from the empirical discussion above, this is not the case: ISIS continues to attempt to implement its interventionist blueprint for governance despite repeated acts of violent and non-violent opposition to its program. Finally, Arjona's theoretical assumption that rebel groups have perfect information about what works and what does not work in terms of governance does not bear out in Syria. If this were true, we would see ISIS observing the earlier relative success of JN's limited governance practices, and adapt theirs accordingly. Instead, we see attempts by a recalcitrant ISIS to implement an interventionist governance strategy in the exact same location in which JN maintained a more limited mode of rule.

Jeremy Weinstein (2007) argues that the outcome of local-level governance is shaped by a group's initial endowment upon which it relies for organizational development. In Weinstein's framework, groups are reliant on either economic or social endowments, resource

[15] Arjona's definition of "strategic" is quite fluid: "Some places are targeted, for example, because they are easy to conquer, and simply add to the lot of territories under rebel control; others are deemed economically important; others function as safe havens, where leaders are well-protected, wounded combatants can be healed, and new recruits can be trained; and other places are used as corridors for smuggling weapons in, and illegal resources out" (Arjona 2013, 17).

types that in turn shape membership profiles, internal group control, local-level governance, the level of violence employed towards civilians, and organizational resilience. Groups with resource endowments, such as minerals or external support, tend to draw opportunistic individuals, which makes internal control a challenge and, by extension, produces a coercive governance strategy that lacks both inclusion or participation by noncombatants (Ibid., 7-10).

Groups without such initial resources rely instead on social endowments, appealing to ideology, religion, or ethnicity as a means of recruiting individuals, who tend to be "activist" in nature given the concerted appeal of the group. These individuals, along with the social basis of the group, lead such organizations to be more reserved and restrained in their interactions with civilians, leading groups to employ more inclusive and participatory governance structures. With regard to ISIS and JN in Syria, Weinstein's framework is theoretically overdetermined, as both groups possess internal and external resources *and* are built around a "social" endowment based on religious ideology (Al Tamimi 2013b, Dickinson 2013, Karount 2013, Hubbard et al. 2014, Sherlock 2014). It is therefore not clear which initial set of assumptions we should rely on to explain the governance practices of the two groups in the case of Raqqa.

Claire Metelits (2010) argues that the relative level of competition in a given insurgent zone of control, or active rivalry, shapes rebel governance strategies. Governance strategies can be either *coercive*, in which groups forcibly extract resources without providing services in return; or *contractual*, in which rule is based on a social bargain (Metelits 2010, 5). "Active rivalry" includes the nearby presence of either non-state or state actors. The presence of other groups that "feed" from the same pool of resources (both material and non-material) breeds competition; once a group perceives a threat to resource extraction, they will switch to a strategy of coercion towards the local population. With regard to the case of Raqqa, the variable of active rivalry would not allow us to explain why JN has cooperated with other armed groups to govern Raqqa, rather than fighting them for to obtain a local-level

monopoly on the use of force. Moreover, given the presence of other armed groups in the city, the fact that the group governed in Raqqa in a way that does not resemble Metelits' previously described strategy of coercion is puzzling for her explanatory framework.

Zachariah Mampilly (2011) argues that rebel governance outcomes are a product of group preferences and the interactions of insurgents with various actors such as civilians and other rival militias in civil war. Rebel group preferences themselves are a product of two pre-war conditions: (1) the pre-conflict state-society relationship (specifically the relative pre-war penetration of state into society) and (2) the ethnic composition and ultimate strategic objectives of the group (Mampilly 2011, 15-16). Because ISIS and JN possess the same ultimate strategic objectives, we cannot employ Mampilly's framework to explain their different governance practices. This becomes even more evident when we consider that the groups have pursued different governance strategies in Raqqa despite an identical pre-conflict state-society relationship.

Jennifer Keister (2011) argues that rebel governance strategies and subsequent practices are driven by budget limitations and the role of ideology. Service provision and coercion require a trade-off in terms of financing, and ideology shapes the choice between the two and therefore what governance strategy (coercive vs. social bargain) a group employs. For extremists, ideological compromise is costly vis-à-vis civilian preferences, and coercion is therefore more appealing as a mode of rule. In other words, investing in service provision becomes more costly as rebel and civilian ideological preferences increase in distance from each other. In the case of Raqqa, ISIS and JN have similar ideological platforms yet exhibit variation in governance practices. We therefore cannot rely on Keister's theoretical account to explain the variation in the two groups' governance practices in the city.

Stathis Kalyvas (2014) argues that variation in the political identity of armed groups, mediated through the extent of territorial control, led to different rebel governance practices in the Greek Civil War. The form of governance implemented was shaped by group ideology, in this case communist vs. noncommunist, with the former rebels extensively intervention-

ist in their rule and the latter more limited. In addition, the degree of territorial control shaped the extent to which armed groups were able to realize their preferred strategies of governance. Bert Sukyens (2014) argues that armed groups' initial premises shape their subsequent governance practices. Whether rebels seek to naturalize their rule based on a particular ethnic group or revolutionize society for all citizens determines their associated governance practices. In the case of Syria, neither of these approaches would allow us to account for the variation in governance practices of JN and ISIS, which maintained the same degree of territorial control in Raqqa and shared the same ultimate goals and ideological orientation.

Shane Barter (2014) takes an approach based on political incorporation in explaining variation over time in the governance practices of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). He argues that the organization's local-level governance practices varied over time due to GAM's incorporation of two disparate social groups in the northern area of Aceh, the ulama and student activists. These two groups influenced and altered the GAM's objectives and governance practices by pursuing their own individual goals in exchange for providing support to the movement, while the GAM maintained cohesion through patronage and concessions. However, Barter's explanation is limited in its applicability to the Syrian case, as neither JN nor ISIS undertook any schemes of political incorporation in Raqqa or elsewhere in areas they have governed.

5.1.2 Organizational Learning

The most prominent explanation in news reports and research briefs for the divergent governance practices of JAN and ISIS is that the al-Qaeda-linked groups in Syria have "learned from the past" (Prothero 2013). In other words, the overall poor performance of al-Qaeda-linked groups with control and governance in Yemen and Iraq informed and shaped how JN and ISIS approach their interactions and dealings with civilians in Syria (Simcox 2012, Green 2013, Looney 2013, Zellin 2013a and 2013b). But this would predict

more moderation and restraint in governance strategies across *both* JN and ISIS, given their shared ideological and organizational origins in Al-Qaeda in Iraq (Al Tamimi 2013a and 2013c, Szybala 2013). Moreover, since both groups contain significant numbers of individuals that fought for the Islamic State of Iraq (Abouzeid 2012b, Birke 2013, Hmeidi 2013), the members of *both* groups should have internalized such previously unsuccessful experiences to transform how they approach local-level governance in Syria. As described in the previous section, this is not the case.

5.1.3 Organizational Factors

Besides this lay explanation, other factors such as organizational structure, recruitment, membership composition and size, and resources may account for the variation across the two groups. In terms of organizational structure, the information available indicates that both JN and ISIS are hierarchical, top-down organizations in which much control is exerted by leadership and subordinates possess very little agency (Kirder 2011, Benotman and Blake 2013). Recruitment into JN is strict and stringent: individuals must first obtain the personal recommendations and approval from two existing members of JN, and then are required to undergo a 10-day religious training course and a subsequent 15-20-day military training course that includes live military action on the front lines (Abouzeid 2012d, Benotman and Blake 2013, O'Bagy 2012). Recruitment into ISIS is similarly strict, requiring pledges of loyalty to group leaders and isolation from family members, along with subsequent frequent rotation among units to prevent defection and dissent (Baczko et al. 2013c).

The consensus on the membership composition of the two groups is not as clear, but the asserted belief is that both groups are mixed in terms of foreign vs. Syrian fighters (Abouzeid 2012b, Baczko et al. 2013c, Al Tamimi 2013a, Whewell 2013). The size of the two groups in Syria is estimated to be about 5,000-7,000 fighters for both JN (Benotman and Blake 2013, IHS Jane's 2013) and ISIS (The Economist 2014, IHS Jane's 2013, Morris 2014) in Syria. In Raqqa, the groups were estimated to have in the hundreds in terms of

fighters, with ISIS having about 400 and JN in the "low hundreds" (Meuse 2013a). Based on this available information, the mixed composition of JN and ISIS and the latter estimate of fighters in Raqqa both rule out an explanation for variation in governance practices based on a difference in the balance of forces across the two groups. Finally, both JN and ISIS have had access to natural resources such as oil throughout the conflict, and have generated revenue from sales that they have used for funding armed groups activities, including governance practices (Borger and Mahmood 2013, Hubbard et al. 2014, Sherlock 2014). Such similarities nullify a focus on organizational resources as a cause for divergence in governance practices across JN and ISIS.

5.2 Ideology and Cross-Border Sanctuaries

A combined focus on the internal and external dynamics of the Syrian civil war can account for the variation in governance strategies across the two groups. An examination of the similar ideological orientation of the two groups (internal) along with each group's relative possession of a cross-border sanctuary (external) can account for the variation in local-level governance practices employed in Raqqa from March 2013-January 2014. To develop this explanatory framework, I first outline the two countervailing demands of conflict faced by rebels in waging war against the state: resource extraction and changing society. I then briefly examine the literature on ideology in both interstate and intrastate conflict, and use this discussion to provide a foundation for linking armed group ideology to local-level governance strategies and practices. Following this, the role of cross-border sanctuaries in conflict is examined both in general and in the context of ideology and rebel governance practices, concluding with an application of the framework to the case of Raqqa.

5.2.1 The Demands of Conflict: Resource Extraction vs. Changing Society

Scholars have argued that insurgency is not just a military competition, but also a competition over the shaping of political order (McColl 1969; Kalyvas 2006, 218-220;

Staniland 2012b, 247). In other words, rebels seek both to defeat the incumbent *and* to impose their vision of what society should look like after victory. However, their ability to undertake this combative effort against the state is primarily a function of organizational resources, primarily the capacity that such resources provide for waging war (Weinstein 2007, Sinno 2008, Metelits 2010, Hazen 2013). Following Metelits (2010) and Hazen (2013), I define *resources* as any set of items, material or non-material, that allows an insurgent group to achieve its objectives, be they defeat of the incumbent and/or beyond. Resources for rebellion include materiel, training, manpower, finances (both internal and external), natural resources, information, public support, and external sanctuary. Insurgents require resources in order to mobilize and fight, and many theoretical frameworks position rebels as expending such resources in the most cost-efficient manner given the demands of conflict and the scarcity of such items in the context of civil war (Olson 1993, Weinstein 2007, Metelits 2010, Keister 2011).

These two claims concerning resource extraction and changing society imply countervailing tendencies for armed groups. On the one hand, the genesis of insurgency is rooted in a fight to shape the future. On the other hand, rebels need to efficiently extract and expend resources to wage this very fight. From these two tendencies, we can specify the following logic of resource extraction and local-level governance in civil war: rebels will employ governance practices and design local-level institutions in an effort to extract resources for the fight against the incumbent regime, and will seek to do so in the most cost-efficient manner given local circumstances, civilian preferences, and the demands of fighting (Weinstein 2007, Metelits 2010, Keister 2011). Because local-level governance itself requires expending organizational resources (Kasfir 2008, Arjona 2013), we should expect armed groups to employ governance practices that allow them to most efficiently extract resources for fighting (Staniland 2012a, Hazen 2013). However, the role of armed group ideology may lead rebels to seek to rule in ways that run counter to this logic of extraction-driven governance, as the following discussion illustrates.

5.2.2 Ideology, Civil Wars, and Rebel Governance

Ideology[16] has received increasing attention in both the general field of international relations (Haas 2005, Owen 2005, Owen 2010) and in the study of cross-subfield phenomena such as terrorism (Piazza 2009) as an important factor in explaining political outcomes. In IR, scholars have argued that ideology can shape the likelihood of conflict between states (Haas 2005), as well as foreign intervention (Owen 2010) and alliance formation (Owen 2005). Within the literature on terrorism, ideology is sometimes seen as a motivating (Drake 1998, Ron 2001, Asal and Rethemeyer 2008) or a facilitating (Berman and Laitin 2008) factor in terrorist attacks and target selection.

In scholarship on civil wars and insurgencies, ideology has long been acknowledged as playing an important role in generating outcomes and/or shaping behavior, but has rarely been positioned as an explicit central or causal factor in explanation[17] (Gutierrez and Wood 2014). However, scholars have recently begun to employ ideology as an explanatory factor in studies of various phenomena in civil wars. Groups that are forced to rely on social endowments, such as "ethnic, religious, or ideological ties" (Weinstein 2007, 9), are more constrained, disciplined, and conciliatory in their behavior when undertaking rebellion. Ideology itself can directly shape the use of selective versus indiscriminate violence in civil war by prescribing restraint on the part of rebels, as Thaler (2012) shows in his study of Marxist-Leninist groups in Angola and Mozambique. Ideology may also contribute to armed group restraint when it comes to sexual violence against noncombatants (Wood 2009). Finally,

[16]Because it is grounded in the study of armed groups, I rely on Gutierrez and Wood (2014)'s definition of ideology: "a more or less systematic set of ideas that includes the identification of a referent group (a class, ethnic, or other social group), an enunciation of the grievances or challenges that the group confronts, the identification of objectives on behalf of that group (political change - or defense against its threat), and a (perhaps vaguely defined) program of action..." (Gutierrez and Wood 2014, 3). Other relevant definitions of ideology are either too grounded in the epistemology of IR (Haas 2005, 5; Owen 2005, 74) or conflate "identity" and "ideology" (Drake 1998, 54-55. Also see Gerring (1997) for an overview of the concept of ideology in social science and Barnes (1966) for an overview in the context of political conflict. These latter three references were adopted from Thaler (2012), an excellent recent work that incorporates ideology into the explanation of the use of violence by armed groups.

[17]Exceptions include Abdullah (1998) and (2006), though these are more critiques of the greed-oriented approach in the literature of the later 1990s and early 2000s (i.e. Collier and Hoeffler 2004).

a group's ideology can largely influence how rebels fight in civil war (Kalyvas and Balcells 2010).

In addition, ideological factors may also come analytically prior to material factors in the study of armed group behavior: variation in the organizational patterns of armed groups may best be accounted for with reference to such groups' ideologies (Gutierrez and Wood 2014, 2). Armed group ideology thus may empirically underpin the initial variations in material factors (organizational capacity, resilience, etc.) that are subsequently used to account for outcomes of interest, such as insurgent group success (Sinno 2008) and rebel behavior (Weinstein 2007, Gutierrez 2008, Gutierrez and Giustozzi 2010). Moreover, ideology itself can play multiple roles in the context of civil wars and insurgency. Gutierrez and Wood (2014) note that ideology plays both instrumental and normative roles for armed groups. First, ideology is "used as a discourse to attract support...to interpret the world and to structure everyday hierarchical and horizontal relations between members" (Gutierrez and Wood 2014, 6). In other words, ideologies are employed by armed groups to reduce challenges to collective action and coordination through socialization to a coherent set of principles. Second, in a normative sense, ideologies may prescribe specific modes of conduct for armed groups, such as those concerning mobilization and the use of violence (Ibid., 8-10).

Following from the role that ideology can play with regard to particular norms of behavior concerning the use of violence (Wood 2009, Thaler 2012) or the strategies and institutions groups rely on for mobilization (Gutierrez and Wood 2014), an armed group's ideology can shape how it governs at the local level.[18] Indeed, ideological content itself provides "blueprints for strategies and institutions" for armed groups in rebellion (Gutierrez and Wood 2014, 7). Based on these premises, I argue that an armed group's ideological orientation, be it secular, religious or Marxist/Leninist, influences how it views post-conflict

[18]As noted earlier, a few extant works on rebel governance have already incorporated ideology into their explanations of the variants of local-level rebel rule (Kalyvas 2014, Sukyens 2014), though they cannot account for variation in governance across ideologically-similar armed groups. Other works have recognized the importance of particular ideologies in partially shaping governance outcomes (Mampilly 2011), but position ideology as a factor that shapes the relative *success* of rebel governance rather than variation in governance practices.

society and consequently determines the manner by which it seeks to re-shape and re-orient society in conflict. From a group's ideological orientation, we can derive an ideal governance strategy that will best allow the group to mold local society as it sees fit in areas under its control. Drawing on Weinstein (2007), then, ideologically-based armed groups will be more likely to establish regular modes of rule at the local level. Moving beyond Weinstein, however, I argue that certain armed group ideologies can engender extensive intervention in local society as part of a group's quest to realize its ideal mode of rule. As Nelson Kasfir states, if "rebellion is ideologically or religiously driven, [rebels] may prefer to relate to local civilians through new structures they design" rather than through existing structures (Kasfir 2014, 29-30). In summary, given a particular ideological orientation (such as Marxist-Leninist and/or religious), rebels seek to re-shape local society by extensively intervening in local political, economic, and social affairs in the areas they control to establish new structures of rule that comport with their view of how the post-conflict state of the world should be ordered.

Groups that employ Marxist-Leninist doctrine espouse a "counter-hegemonic model of political and social organization" for society (Balcells and Kalyvas 2010, 3-4). As Mampilly (2011) notes, dozens of insurgent leaders (both past and present) read and indoctrinated followers in the works of Mao and Guevara, both of whom called for significant attention to rebel-civilian interactions and the importance of establishing local-level structures of governance (Mampilly 2011, 10-13). Such "revolutionary" movements are focused not on "outfighting" the incumbent, but "outadministering" them and providing "alternative structures and arrangements" in order to effectively obtain mass support for the insurgency (Ahmad 1982, 246-248). This implies the need for extensive intervention within local society in order to reorient populations towards a revolutionary society and away from the status quo state of the world constructed by the incumbent.

Groups that rely on religious doctrine and content as the basis of their organizing principles construct a "natural organizing node for community provision of local public goods"

(Berman and Laitin 2008, from Iannaccone 1992). Such groups are often quite efficient at providing public goods precisely because of such doctrine-based organizing principles (Berman and Laitin 2008). Indeed, the literature on Islamist movements is an example of such efficiency in practice (Berman 2003). From the terrorism literature, groups with religious-based ideologies are more likely to kill civilians in terrorist attacks, relying on extremist rhetoric to justify such actions through accusations of impiety that appeal to "divine audiences" (Juergensmeyer 2003; Asal and Rethemeyer 2008, 246-249). Along a similar vein of doctrine-based motivations, various insurgencies in the late 20th century have religious origins, with insurgency itself still constitutive of a "competition in government" (Beckett 2005, 1-2). In the specific context of rebel governance, as Jennifer Keister (2011) demonstrates in her study of religious-based insurgent movements, ideologically-extreme rebels will be uncompromising in their modes of rule the further their preferences are from those of the civilian population. Like Marxist-Leninist ideologies, then, religious-based ideologies provide a tendency for the need to extensively intervene in local affairs in order to reorient society towards that prescribed by pious ideological doctrine.

5.2.3 Resources, Ideology, and Ideal Governance Strategies

Taking into account the discussions in 5.2.1 and 5.2.2., we can now explicitly specify two things regarding resources, ideology, and rebel governance. First, armed group rule, specifically the extent of intervention in local society, is contingent upon the possession of the necessary resources necessary for such efforts. Second, ideologically-oriented armed groups are inclined to seek to intervene extensively regardless of organizational resources in order to re-shape and re-orient local society as they see fit. In other words, a group's ideal governance strategy may call for extensive intervention regardless of whether it has the capacity to do rule in such a way, but this does not necessarily mean that it is able to *realize* such a strategy of rule.

Integrating these two specifications together, I argue that an ideologically-oriented

group's ability to realize its ideal governance strategy hinges on its procurement of the necessary resources required for such a committed interventionist undertaking. In other words, armed groups that are inclined to extensively intervene in local society in governing can only do so when possessing the necessary resources that permit such a mode of rule. This is because the more extensive armed group intervention is in local society, the more costly such a governance strategy will be in terms of group resources, especially in the face of civilian backlash and previously demonstrated more efficient and limited modes of rule (Keister 2011, Arjona 2013).

The costly nature of extensive intervention is due to the significant requirements of *altering* existing institutions, *implementing* and *enforcing* such institutional changes, and *monitoring* subsequent civilian behavior (Hechter and Kabiri 2008, 47-49). As stated previously in 5.2.1., the demands of intrastate war place a premium on resource extraction: armed groups seek the maximal amount of civilian collaboration, information and resources (such as food, finances, medical supplies, and materiel) that will allow them the capacity to wage war (Kalyvas 2006, Weinstein 2007, Sinno 2008, Metelits 2010, Hazen 2013). We should then expect armed groups to govern in a way that takes into account these two aspects of rule and conflict: (1) the costly nature of institutional change and monitoring given civilian preferences vis-a-vis governance and local conditions and (2) the resource-intense nature of waging civil war.

As mentioned in 5.2.1., given baseline levels of organizational resources, these two aspects imply a trade-off between efficient local-level resource extraction and re-shaping local society to fit the rebels' ideal, preferred worldview. However, if armed groups possess an abundance of resources extraneous to the conflict and consequently do not have to worry about local-level extraction, they may be unconstrained when it comes to governance, and will act accordingly. This is very similar to Weinstein's argument concerning external support and armed group behavior: rebels will employ limited forms of rule when possessing access to external material support (Weinstein 2007). However, this framework differs from

Weinstein's in that it predicts the exact opposite: armed groups may potentially intervene *more* at the local level to shape society as they see fit when possessing access to extraneous resources, as such items allow them to pursue their ideal governance strategy in practice.

In other words, if we recall that insurgency is both a military competition for the state and a political competition over the shaping of order (McColl 1969, Staniland 2012b), ideologically-oriented armed groups that possess extra-conflict resources may have an incentive to implement interventionist governance practices, so as to reorient local society in accordance with their worldview. Possession of a cross-border sanctuary, a significant extraneous resource in the context of conflict, may allow armed groups to impose their preferred mode of rule even in the face of civilian backlash and prior instances of more limited interventionist rule. On the other hand, groups without such a possession may be forced to settle for more limited modes of rule in practice, all else being equal. The following discussion of cross-border sanctuaries illustrates this logic further.

5.2.4 Cross-Border Sanctuaries

The importance of a cross-border sanctuary (CBS) to rebels has been recognized in writings on both insurgency and counterinsurgency. Within the former, most of what has been written on such sanctuaries concerns their postulated role in intrastate conflict duration and outcomes (Salehyan 2007, Hazen 2013) and the onset of interstate disputes and war (Salehyan 2008 and 2010). In addition, counterinsurgency doctrine and academic studies of counterinsurgency often highlight the importance of cutting off insurgent access to cross-border sanctuaries, as these have often proved to be empirically decisive in insurgency outcomes (McColl 1969, Cilliers 1985, Staniland 2005, Bruscino Jr. 2006, Downes 2007, Connable and Libicki 2010, Paul et al. 2013, US Army 2013). In their study on external support for insurgent movements, Byman et al. (2001) elaborate on the importance of cross-border sanctuaries in their discussion of safe havens:

> "Sanctuaries protect the group's leadership and members; provide a place where insurgents can rest, recuperate, and plan future operations; serve as a staging area from which to mount attacks; and, in some cases, function as an additional base for recruitment, training, dissemination of propaganda, and contact with the outside world...without a safe haven, insurgencies are constantly vulnerable to government forces" (Byman et al. 2001, 84-86).

The preceding discussion and quote illustrate the clear utility of cross-border sanctuaries to rebels in terms of organizational capacity and the ability to continue the fight. One might move beyond capacity to consider how such an extraneous resource might shape armed group *behavior* in civil wars, in a similar vein to recent studies of external material support in civil wars (Weinstein 2007, Keister 2011, Salehyan et al. [forthcoming]). Besides its role as a location from which attacks can be launched, I argue that such proximate geographical territory can serve as a continuous source of supplies, resources, and manpower for an armed group that can free rebels from reliance on domestic resource extraction for fighting, while potentially allowing rebels to act as they please in conducting the war. In other words, in addition to baseline resources that armed groups may obtain domestically, a cross-border sanctuary allows rebels to essentially have a secure, physical base of external support.

Cross-border sanctuaries can be categorized as either *voluntary* or *involuntary* (Hazen 2013, 46). The former type of sanctuary is often (though not exclusively) constituted by active support for the insurgency on the part of the host state, which tolerates the rebels' presence and their undertaking of operations from its territory (Salehyan 2009, 44-45; Connable and Libicki 2010, 39-40). In this situation, neighboring states provide armed groups with both sanctuary and material support, which can free rebels from the need to extract resources domestically, but comes with both more limited autonomy and a more constrained range of armed group behavior to the external backer (Keister 2011; Hazen 2013, 58-59). For example, a host state may train rebels and provide tactical support to the insurgency, but may also restrict the geographic movements of rebels and the extent of their fighting to avoid provoking greater conflict. The latter type of sanctuary exists when a host state simply lacks the capacity to expel an armed group from its territory (Salehyan 2009, 45-46).

In this situation, armed groups essentially have a permanent external safe haven in which they are free to act as they please without repercussions from the host state or incumbent regime.

While arguments exist that position involuntary cross-borders sanctuaries as more constraining because "the insurgents are restricted to operating in inhospitable terrain, perhaps in remote jungle or mountain areas" (Connable and Libicki 2010, 40), I argue that such involuntary sanctuary may in some situations provide an armed group with *more* freedom in conducting its activities in the target state, as it can maintain an external, cross-border base without the strings attached that come with voluntary cross-border sanctuaries or external material support (Salehyan 2009, 56-57). In other words, an involuntary cross-border sanctuary comes without the inherent limitations often imposed on armed groups by their foreign sponsors in instances of outside material support and/or voluntary cross-border sanctuaries (Salehyan et al. 2011, 715-717; Connable and Libicki 2010, 40). In the context of external support from a particular actor or a voluntary CBS, armed groups may be forced to compromise and constrain significant aspects of their behavior, such as its use of violence against civilians (Salehyan et al. [forthcoming]) or the specific nature of its governance strategies (Keister 2011). With an involuntary cross-border sanctuary, however, armed groups can not only act with relative impunity in their dealings with other groups and noncombatants, but do not have to worry about the consequences of doing so given secure and continuous access to extraneous resources and supplies provided by the sanctuary.

5.2.5 Summary: Ideology, Cross-Border Sanctuaries, and Rebel Governance

The logic of the theoretical framework developed in the previous discussions starts with the premise that certain armed group ideologies, such as those based on Marxist-Leninist or religious principles and doctrine, prescribe more interventionist governance strategies at the local level than others. From such ideological orientation, we can derive ideal governance strategies for ordering post-conflict society, and specify how such ordering principles may

lead rebels to seek extensive intervention in order to reorient local affairs as they see fit. The ability of armed groups to realize such ideal governance strategies hinges on their capacity to acquire the resources necessary to implement these preferred modes of rule, given the established trade-off in the context of armed conflict between resource extraction and changing society. Rebel access to extraneous resources, specifically an involuntary cross-border sanctuary, can provide them with the requisite resources that may allow the group to fully pursue its ideal governance strategy in practice. On the other hand, armed groups that lack such an extra-conflict resource may be forced to settle for a more limited mode of rule than that which is prescribed by their ideological orientation, all else being equal.

5.3 Explaining Governance Practices in Raqqa, March 2013-January 2014

Taking the theoretical framework developed in the previous subsections, this section examines the roles of ideological orientation and cross-border sanctuaries in the case of JN and ISIS in Raqqa. In terms of ideological orientation, both JN and ISIS espouse an extremist and fundamentalist worldview, seeking establishment of an Islamic Caliphate that eventually extends worldwide (Al Tamimi 2013a, Jones 2013, Kirdar 2011, Barnard 2014, Zellin 2013a). Both groups view Islamic-based law (or "sharia") as the sole form of acceptable governance and adjudication (Benotman and Blake 2013, Baczko et al. 2013c). The ideal governance strategy in both cases would entail extensive intervention within all three domains of local society – re-shaping and re-orienting authority structures, economic transactions, and social interactions in a manner consistent with this extremist ideology.

With regard to the case of Raqqa, ISIS employed interventionist governance practices, seeking to implement its blueprint of rule in the city. Seen through the lens of the resource-central assumptions underpinning existing explanations of rebel governance, this appears counterintuitive, as the group should have settled for compromise with the local civilian population and other armed groups in governing the city, as JN did from March-May 2013.

This would have allowed ISIS to dedicate more of its organizational resources to the fight against the regime, which continued to impede its overall goal of establishing the Islamic Caliphate as long as Assad remained in power.

However, when we take into account ISIS's possession of a cross-border sanctuary in Iraq (al-Salhy 2014, Baczko et al. 2013c, Kaplow 2014, Lake 2014, Leigh 2014, Pizzi and Shabaan 2013, Riedel 2013 and 2014, Schreck 2013, VICE News 2014, Zirulnick 2014), we are able to account for its recalcitrant behavior in the same city where JN employed more limited governance practices. The group's ideological orientation, coupled with its possession of immediate proximate territory in western Iraq, led ISIS to pursue extensive intervention in Raqqa as facilitated by the associated relaxed constraints on extraction and expenditure that such a cross-border sanctuary provides. Moreover, ISIS was largely able to implement its ideal strategy immediately upon coming to power, ruling out any sort of explanation based on temporal dependency. These practices are similar to those that the group undertook elsewhere in Syria in areas that it controlled, such as Azaz, parts of Aleppo, and Ad-Dana (Al Tamimi 2013d, Damon and Razek 2014, Rosenblatt 2014). On the other hand, JN's lack of access to a cross-border sanctuary mediated and moderated the effect of its ideological orientation on the group's governance practices. As a result, JN ultimately opted for a limited approach to ruling Raqqa, constraining the implementation of their extremist ideological blueprint for local-level governance and pursuing a practice of limited intervention across the three domains of local society. JN undertook similar modes of restrained rule in places such as Aleppo and Deraa (Abouzeid 2013, Baczko et al. 2013a, Barnard 2014, Barnard and Gladstone 2014, Holmes and Dziadosz 2013, ICG 2013, Lund 2013b, Szybala 2013a and 2013b, Syria Untold 2013).

This discussion implies the following theoretical explanation: an armed group's ideological orientation can shape its approach to local-level governance in civil war (i.e. the relative extent of intervention in the local political, economic, and social domains), but its ability to realize this ideal governance strategy may be conditioned by resources, whether

internal or external. In this case, whether a group possesed a cross-border sanctuary played a key role in facilitating the relaxed constraints on armed group behavior that permitted the realization of such desired or preferred governance strategies.

6 Conclusion and Discussion

This thesis examined the variation in governance practices across JN and ISIS in the Syrian Civil War, with a particular focus on the city of Raqqa from March 2013-January 2014. In doing so, a refined conceptual framework of rebel governance was developed, along with a potential explanation for the empirical variation. This section concludes the thesis, beginning with a summary of the empirical findings and ending with discussion of the implications of the proposed theory, future expansion of the thesis, and the practical implications of the concepts, framework and case under study.

6.1 Summary of Findings

In Raqqa, JN pursued limited intervention overall, establishing its own institutions but tolerating and working with existing structures of rule in the city. Moreover, JN and the two other armed groups with which it was governing ceded political authority in the beginning to local civilian councils. The rebels relied on existing modes and mechanisms of provision in Raqqa to provide public goods and services. JN did little beyond maintaining and perpetuating ongoing economic activities and modes of production, merely taking control of flour distribution to lower the price of bread. Though it explicitly endorsed a strict interpretation of Islam, JN exhibited marked restraint in its practices vis-a-vis the social domain of the city. While publicly recommending behaviors such as veiling and the primacy of Islam, the group demonstrated that it did not seek to impose such views on the population while relying on consultation and exchange between Raqqans and the group.

On the other hand, ISIS intervened extensively across all three domains of Raqqan so-

ciety, establishing its own political and judicial institutions to replace all existing structures of rule while consolidating these new institutions through a campaign of targeted assassinations and bombings against other rebel groups in the city. The group also established its own entity for distributing goods and services, displacing existing rebel and civilian mechanisms for public service provision. In the economic domain, the group imposed taxes on commercial establishments and gained a monopoly on bread production by capturing the entirety of the supply chain. ISIS's policies and rules regarding the social domain are well-known by casual observers of the conflict, as the group has set up a conservative form of social organization and interactions based on a strict interpretation of Islam. This extensive intervention generated both nonviolent and violent backlash against the group, yet they continued to employ such governance practices through the end of the time period under study.

6.2 Theoretical Innovation and Future Expansion

The theoretical contribution of this project is twofold. First, this project provides a potential explanation that may capture variation in rebel governance practices across two groups in the same conflict. As previously discussed, the extant literature on rebel governance cannot account for the governance practices of both JN and ISIS in Raqqa. However, consideration of ISIS's possession of western Iraq as a cross-border sanctuary completes the picture, as we can then account for the divergence in local-level rule employed across the two groups. The relaxed constraints on ISIS's behavior stemming from this cross-border sanctuary relieves it of the need to rely on domestic resource extraction, which then frees it of the resource extraction vs. changing society trade-off groups like JN were forced to make.

This paves the way for potential application of the theoretical framework to other cases of rebel governance in multi-party civil wars. Cases such as the Eritrean War of Independence (1961-1991) and the Afghan insurgency against the Soviets in the 1980s are two potential similar instances where ideologically similar armed groups varied in the extent of intervention in local society in areas under their control while also maintaining access to

cross-border sanctuaries (Johnson and Johnson 1981, Young 1996, Connell 2001, Rubin 2002, Sinno 2008, Tareke 2009). Other cases of multiparty civil wars, such as the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), the ongoing Iraqi Civil War (2003-Present), the Liberian Civil War (1989-2003), and the Dhofar Rebellion (1962-1976), provide for additional avenues of empirical exploration for this proposed theory given the constituent empirics.

The second theoretical contribution is that the conditioning factor of a cross-border sanctuary, and perhaps external support in general, may potentially explain other aspects of rebel behavior, such as the propensity to employ violence against civilians or cooperate/ally with other armed groups in conflict. This observation is not new in the literature on civil wars (Weinstein 2007, Keister 2011, Salehyan et al. 2011, Hazen 2013, Salehyan et al. [forthcoming]). When armed groups have access to external patrons and/or extraneous resources, this may free them of the need to extract resources domestically, contemplate alliance formation, or take into account the repercussions of indiscriminate violence. Absent such external support, particularly in the form of cross-border sanctuaries, armed groups may have incentives to constrain their behavior.

On a related note, another way in which this proposed theory refines thinking about external factors and civil war is the need to think of external support as a continuum rather than as a dichotomy. One can consider external support as ranging from from external material support to voluntary cross-border sanctuaries to involuntary cross-border sanctuaries. As one moves from material support to voluntary CBS to involuntary CBS, the constraints on armed group behavior lessen, and rebels may have more leeway to do what they will in governing, using violence against non-combatants, and choosing whether to form alliances, among other behaviors. This postulate, however, should not be taken with certitude, as the literatures on violence and alliance formation in civil wars are each their own substantive works of scholarship (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006, Kalyvas 2006, Weinstein 2007, Metelits 2010, R.Wood 2010, Christia 2012). Rather, one should take this proposal as a way to think more about how different variants of external support may potentially have

different impacts on rebel behavior both in concert and in contrast with existing predictions and explanations of these aspects of rebellion.

6.3 Practical Implications

Besides its theoretical innovations, this project has three practical implications. First, the proposed theoretical explanation highlights the strategic value of cross-border sanctuaries to insurgents, and the implicit need to cut them off from such areas in order to ensure an effective counterinsurgent victory and constrain rebel behavior. American post-invasion operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have been directed against insurgencies that have access to cross-border sanctuaries (Syria and Pakistan, respectively). This study's discussion of the implications that such sanctuaries have for the conduct of armed groups in civil war reinforces the central strategic importance of eradicating such sanctuary access to insurgents.

Second, as with other prominent studies of rebel governance (Keister 2011, Mampilly 2011, Arjona 2013), this study demonstrates that governance strategies can significantly alter local society to varying degrees across armed groups. All else being equal, an ideologically-oriented group's inability to procure and maintain a cross-border sanctuary may actually force it to restrain and limit its intervention in local civilian affairs in ways that might preserve existing humanitarian conditions and situations. On the other hand, a group that is ideologically-oriented and possesses a cross-border sanctuary can afford to intervene extensively to reshape local civilian affairs even in the face of demonstrated civilian backlash and opposition. The result of such loosened constraints on armed groups in the context of local-level rule can be devastating for local populations, as the case of Raqqa under ISIS rule illustrates.

Finally, the project's empirical discussion implies that ideologically extreme groups may indeed have trouble finding genuine and popular support among potential populations, demonstrating that their transnational appeal may not be so "transnational" after all. The empirical rejection of ideologically extreme groups like ISIS in Syria indicates that policy-

makers' fear of the spread of Islamist safe havens may indeed be unfounded, as such groups cannot seem to muster the concentrated popular support that establishing such havens requires.

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