

Talking Trade: the Discursive Evolution and Divisive Articulation of Trade in  
American Politics

Colin P. Arnold  
University of Virginia  
Department of Sociology

Introduction

The 2016 US Presidential Election saw an unprecedented emphasis on the adverse consequences of globalization and free trade. A Pew study carried out around Election Day found that ‘the economy and trade’ was the number one concern among 84% of the total US electorate, and was the top concern for 90-percent of Donald Trump’s supporters (2016). Both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders built their campaigns around the idea that the “American Dream” and way of life had been undermined by political and economic elites pursuing their own interests through global economic expansion (Inglehart and Norris 2016, Judis 2016). Voters and candidates alike railed against the manufacturing jobs lost to China, and blamed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for suppressing wages, stifling job creation, and sparking what has become a 20-year “race to the bottom” (Davis 2017, Gillies 2018). Resistance to the continued liberalization of trade, and a rejection of elite neoliberal consensus was very much a part of how many voters, from the political left and right, describe their reasons for supporting insurgent candidates like Trump or Sanders (Inglehart and Norris 2016, Judis 2016).

However, the political divides between the various pro- versus anti-trade factions in 2016 did not align with conventional economic or political expectations. Following the basic idyllic assumption of democratic theory, studies of policy preferences and political behavior start from the general premise that individuals have at least somewhat rational, material interests, and then go on to support the party and/or candidate they feel most likely to advance policies that align with those interests (Achen and Bartels 2016). Scholars of trade policy typically argue that individuals’ policy preferences are largely based in a material cost-benefit analysis of how trade has, or is expected to affect an their income (Mansfield and Mutz 2009). Trade policy debates are therefore expected to reflect either industry (import- versus export-oriented) or class (high-skilled versus low-skilled workers/occupations) cleavages (Irwin 1996). Scholars of democratic and electoral politics argue that political parties are generated by, and serve to reflect these underlying cleavages and corresponding policy preferences (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Party policies are seen as tied to the collected interests of their respective base and are expected to ebb and flow accordingly (Karol 2009). Consequently,

debates over American trade policy have historically unfolded along partisan lines (Irwin 2017).

This is clearly not the case in terms of trade today. Strong pro- and anti-trade factions can be found in both major American political parties. Urban service sector workers are part of the same Democratic coalition as many creatives and elite technology executives (Miles 2002, Markusen 2006). On the other side of the aisle, corporate financial elites find themselves part of the same Republican Party as many rural, working class Americans scattered throughout the Southern and Midwestern United States (Hochschild 2016, Bartels 2008). Economists are quick to note that the industrial/class cleavage predicted by conventional trade theory is consistent with the competing policy preferences found in both coalitions (Irwin 2017), just as many political scientists rightly note the significant consistency of party line voting on Election Day (Jacobson 2017). However, studies in this vein cannot explain how so many voters with competing policy preferences managed to rationalize their support competing candidates in terms of their positions on free trade. How does one explain these noted contradictions? Why has trade become such a divisive wedge issue between *and* within both major political parties? How did the contours of this debate develop? Why have party elites and the broader electorate seem to have drifted so far apart in their respective positions on trade? Finally, how have both parties managed these contradictory positions within their respective coalitions?

I argue that a number of disciplinary and theoretical boundaries have led the answers to such questions to elude many scholars for sometime, and have in turn hindered our ability to make sense of contemporary popular debates over trade, and the altogether strange political landscape more broadly. Mainstream political economists, sociologists, and policy scholars emphasize very different factors in in the development of policy preferences, but collectively presuppose problematic dichotomies between state and market, and between ideas and interests (Trentmann 1998), and also problematically conflate the politics of governance and campaigning (de Leon, Desai, and Tugal 2015a). I aim to address some of these issues by drawing on the frameworks of constructivist political economy, particularly Schmidt's (2008) "discursive institutionalism", which emphasizes the role of ideas and discourse in shaping and legitimating contingent interpretations of politico-economic conditions and interests (Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons 2010, Schmidt 2001, 2008), as well as de Leon et al.'s (2009) party-centered theory of political articulation.

The constructivist approach in political economy argues that economic interests are not predetermined by objective material interests, but are necessarily mediated by the *ideas* we carry about who we are, our goals and objectives, and related causal beliefs (Hay 2002). Or, as Rodrik (2018) most recently puts it, "we don't have 'interests.' We have *ideas* of what our interests are" (163). Individuals' policy preferences therefore hinge on their perceived interests, and how they believe those interests are most likely to be politically achieved. This second-level of interpretation is largely shaped by the institutionalized discursive connection between particular ideas or interests with concrete political strategies and policy agendas (Schmidt 2008). This operates at two levels: the "coordinative discourse"

among policy actors and the “communicative discourse” between political actors and the public (Schmidt 2008: 305). Coordinative discourse effectively structures and legitimate policy debates, while communicative discourse takes those debates to public. It follows that electoral politics is fundamentally a competition between dueling communicative discourses competing to sell different interpretations of a shared coordinative discourse (Mutz, Sniderman, and Brody 1996). Political parties occupy a unique space between these two discourses, and compete for voters’ support by politicizing and naturalizing linkages between particular “interests” and particular policies (de Leon, Desai, and Tugal 2009, Eidlin 2016). Rather than simply reflecting particular interests, objective or otherwise, parties play a key role in structuring political debates and policy preferences.

Drawing on a multi-step textual analysis of party platforms, I argue that the evolution of public opinion toward trade policy, and apparent undoing of the pro-trade consensus is part of a larger, collected sequence of parties’ reactions and counter-reactions to successive moments of economic uncertainty. I find that the Democratic Party has consistently been first to incorporate trade policies in their interpretation of politico-economic crises, using trade as a means of expressing commitment to new issues, grievances, and groups. In contrast, the Republican Party has been slower to respond in critical moments, and has traditionally done so by simply reaffirming its commitment to the ideals of market fundamentalism. Rather than offering new ideas of how trade or related policies may be altered and incorporated in efforts to alleviate the strains of various crises, the GOP has consistently doubled-down, and simply blamed the given crisis on Democrats’ failure, or complete inability to govern. I argue that the extended use of this strategy by the GOP is key to understanding the strange life, non-death, and complex sustenance of the free trade consensus. Furthermore, as opposed to viewing the protectionist rhetoric of Donald Trump as an anomaly within the Republican Party, I suggest that his brand of scapegoating economic populism is simply a continuation of how the GOP has historically incorporated trade within their collected platforms.

The following work opens by considering the constructivist literatures that inform this analysis in relation to more conventional political and economic frameworks. I then offer an overview of how the pro-trade consensus has evolved by considering the two major parties together, before moving to compare how the two parties have incorporated trade within their competing electoral discourses overtime. Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion of the implications and contributions of this analysis, as well a number of possible avenues for future research.

### Constructing Economic Policy Debates

As noted above, conventional understanding of political economy and democratic politics start from the premise that political behaviors are motivated by exogenous interests, and in turn assume that the electoral outcomes produced by the collected behaviors of a given polity naturally reflect the interests of the popular majority (Achen and Bartels 2016). Political parties and elected officials are then expected to advance policies that align with the interests of the majority who

elected them rather than risk losing voters' support ahead of the next election (Fiorina 1981). In the case of trade, individuals' preferences are expected to reflect the likely impact of increased exposure to trade on their personal economic interests (Mansfield and Mutz 2009). People, and consequently the politicians who represent them, are then expected to form policy coalitions with those who share similar interests (Rogowski 1989).

This view carries a number of other assumptions, also noted above, that prove problematic in trying to understand the complexities of current debates around the politics of free trade. More specifically, this view embodies the fallacy of market fundamentalism most notably associated with Polanyi (Block and Somers 2014, Polanyi 1944). By treating politics and the economy as separate and autonomous analytical spheres, where the market economy is seen as morally neutral, non-ideational, and self-sustaining, political expectations are reduced to simply reflecting the shifting distributional preferences of the social majority. The rising trends in incumbent reelections (Davis and Mason 2016), and fact that individuals' policy preferences change significantly faster and more often than their partisan affiliations (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002) suggest that the realities of democratic electoral politics are likely less idyllic.

The alternative account developed here centers on the role of economic ideas and political parties in the structuration of political cleavages and policy debates. Ideas actively shape how individuals interpret their economic interests, and are particularly central in bridging the gap between perceived interests and specific policy strategies (Béland 2009). The connection between the two is far from predetermined, and the failure of prior assumptions can alter how individuals interpret their ideal policy preferences. As Blyth often puts it, social structures do not come with instruction sheets for managers and policymakers to follow objectively (Blyth 2003). People often interpret their shared material environment in very different ways, leading many "similar people" to make many "dissimilar choices" to the point that mainstream theoretical expectations are, at best, time- and space-specific in for particular subsets of society (Abdelal et al. 2010: 2). In this case, if people hold very different ideas of how the economy works, and consequently hold different ideas of how trade will affect their personal interests, people may support radically different policies that will lead to significantly different outcomes despite similar initial conditions (Blyth 2002: 33).

Schmidt (2008) extends these principles to a new framework she titles "discursive institutionalism." Following Schmidt's definition, institutions are seen as "simultaneously structures and constructs internal to agents whose 'background ideational abilities' and 'foregrounds discursive abilities' make for a dynamic, agent-centered approach to institutional change"(305). The terms of a particular discourse are characterized as "institutionalized structures of meaning that channel political thought and action in certain directions"(309). In the case of political economy, there are two primary discursive forms: the "coordinative discourse" consisting of the individuals and groups at the center of policy construction, and the "communicative discourse" that occurs in the political sphere, and consists of the presentation, deliberation, and legitimation of political ideas to the public (310).

This article centers on the latter communicative discourse and the public battle over political ideas.

I argue that electoral politics is best thought as a contest between dueling communicative discourses, offering distinct policy prescriptions that nonetheless aim to address similar problems in line with principled ideas. Bridging the coordinative and communicative discourses is thus the primary task of political parties. In this case, parties “politicize, or ‘articulate’ social cleavages to build powerful blocs of supporters in whose name they attempt to reshape states and societies” (de Leon, Desai, and Tugal 2009, 2015b). It follows then that ethnoreligious, economic, gender differences, and the like have no natural political valence on their own, and do not predispose the electorate to vote in any particular way. Following de Leon et al.’s (2009) definition—political articulation is the “process through which party practices naturalize [social cleavages] as a basis of social division by integrating disparate interests and identities into coherent sociopolitical blocs” (195).

This is not to suggest that parties go about conjuring divisive, coalition-organizing issues and identities out of thin air to serve their particular interests, but are constrained by the structural and cultural contexts in which they operate (de Leon, Desai, and Tugal 2009, Desai 2002, Eidlin 2016). As Eidlin (2015) aptly puts: “Parties’ actions bridge the gap between possible and actual outcomes” (495). Political parties then represent *semi*-autonomous organizations in that the strategies employed to articulate particular cleavages as salient is largely a matter of parties’ internal interpretations of political opportunities in the broader social situation (Desai 2002).

Political articulation then points to political parties’ unique capacity to engage in these boundary-shaping and identity-defining processes as part of their effort to gain or maintain political power (Desai 2003). This is accomplished through the expression, and successful naturalization of connections between various social groups and issue-preferences vis-à-vis other groups and issue orientations. As opposed to the preexisting distinctions assumed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), cleavage formation in this case notes a developmental political process through which particular structural and cultural reference points are mobilized in opposition and then translated into politics through the actions of party translators (Bartolini and Mair 1990, della Porta 2015). Formative political change then lies in “acts of *recombination*, in the rearrangement of often disparate social ideational fragments” into new, seemingly coherent and widely accepted associations (Hattam and Lowndes 2008: 204). Once naturalized, individuals come to see their interests and policy preferences as logically associated with a particular party and the groups articulated into the party’s bloc, and similarly see the interests and policy preferences of those within the opposing bloc as fundamentally antithetical and threatening to their own.

#### Data, Methods, and Analytic Strategy

Political parties have the capacity and means to articulate the connections between various groups, interest, and policies in a number of ways. Scholars often

draw upon private correspondence, policy proposals, or public speeches in studies of political discourse. This article, however, draws upon a multilevel textual analysis of party platforms published by both the Democratic and Republican Parties in presidential election years from 1928 through 2016 as part of their respective national convention and nomination processes.

I have opted to focus on party platforms over other mediums of political discourse because they offer greater insight into the extended evolution of the relationships between particular groups of voters and various issues overtime. For example, while a number of scholars have analyzed public speeches within the broader political battle for influence and position (Fairclough 1993), such studies tend to focus on the rhetorical evolution of a single party (Fairclough 2002), a single issue (Gillion 2016), or the distance between rhetoric and policy (Imbeau 2009). As platforms represent one of the few means by which parties can make their comprehensive policy positions known to voters, they offer a unique opportunity to explore the interplay between otherwise separate points of interest (Conger 2010).

Moreover, party platforms are ideal for at least three more specific reasons. First, both parties draft and publish their platforms at roughly the same time as part of the national convention and nomination process. Secondly, platforms allow for comparison within *and* between parties at particular points and over an extended period of time. Finally, the public nature and intended comprehensiveness of these platforms force parties to make strategic decisions about what social divisions or policy issues they want to emphasize and codify for the entire electorate simultaneously.

This particular analysis employs the platforms adopted by both major parties during their national conventions in each presidential election year from 1928 through 2016. The election of 1928 saw Republican Herbert Hoover squared off against the Democratic Governor of New York, Al Smith. This particular election marks the last before the Great Depression, and the last before Franklin D. Roosevelt began his run of four consecutive successful campaigns. Therefore, 1928 offers the last opportunity to consider the electoral emphasis and policy orientations toward trade prior to the postwar economic boom. Concluding with 2016 is more clearly justified, as it was the most recent presidential election cycle at the time of this writing. In total, this leads to a sample of 46 individual platforms—23 from each party.

The analytic strategy employed here is effectively two-fold. I first conducted a cursory round of content analysis focusing solely on frequency of the relevant concepts and categories (Roberts 1989). This allows me to track the prevalence of the considered categories independently. I then proceeded to conduct a more detailed mapping analysis focusing on the inter-relationships among the concepts of interest, and the frequency of those inter-relationships (Carley 1993, Carley and Kaufer 1993). I began by noting each trade-related statement across the sampled platforms, classifying each according to three indicators of parties' positions on trade: (1) the proposed political function or predicted consequence of trade; (2) the specific mention of a negotiated trade agreement(s); and (3) whether or not the statement explicitly refers to the failures or threat of the opposing party.

After reviewing each of the 46 platforms in full, and noting statement related to trade, I moved to consider the intended function or predicted consequence of trade in each statement. I effectively identified and separated these proposed functions, or “projects”, into one of four categories: (1) U.S. Workers/Jobs, (2) International Relations, (3) National Security, and (4) General U.S. Economic Health. Statements aimed at U.S. workers often relate to the promise of new jobs, better working conditions, or improved standards of living in the United States. International relations also prove to be a significant factor in parties’ trade agendas. These statements often frame trade as a means of bolstering or incentivizing diplomatic relations between a given trading partner and the U.S., but also highlight the centrality of trade in mainstream political approaches to global economic development.

Statements related to U.S. national security often appear in close proximity to those promoting trade as a means of diplomatic assurance, but are distinct in at least two important aspects. First, these statements often call for stronger trade relations as a means of promoting international coordination and cooperation with U.S. military operations abroad or against a specific security threat (i.e., terrorism or international drug trafficking). Alternatively, these statements also call for increased trade as a means of promoting economic development and democratization, but are framed in terms of fending off the economic strains that lead people to accept particular ideologies (terrorism) or illicit markets (drug trafficking) in search of economic stability. Finally, statements related to U.S. economic health represent the broadest category included in this analysis. These statements address a broad range of proposed functions from the stabilization of domestic markets, to reducing barriers to U.S. exports, but are made without reference to a specific constituency (i.e., U.S. workers) or non-economic function (i.e., improved diplomatic relations).

After classifying each trade-related statement according to one of the five noted project categories, I reviewed the full collection of statements across all 46 platforms again, noting those that explicitly refer to the respective oppositional party. These blatantly partisan statements often describe how the opposing party is misguided, misinformed, or utterly incapable of securing America’s objective trade interests. These statements highlight much of nuance in cases where the two parties propose markedly different ways of achieving an otherwise similar trade policy objective.

### A Remarkably Persistent Consensus

A cursory analysis reveals more similarities than differences between the two parties in terms of their relative support for liberal trade policies. These noted commonalities reflect the evolution of a shared coordinative discourse, which continues to advocate for the further liberalization and expansion of free trade. On the other hand, the nuanced distinctions between the two parties respective articulatory projects shed light on the competitive use of communicative discourse

in electoral contests. This is achieved through a form of policy bundling<sup>1</sup> by which parties aim to link otherwise separate issues and policies to one another, and then attempt to naturalize, or *articulate* those associations by drawing on the politico-economic ideas and interpretations that underlie and legitimate their shared coordinative discourse.

The overarching coordinative discourse around trade in both parties' platforms reflects the conventional timeline and aligns with conventional readings of American economic development over the nearly 100-year period considered in the sampled platforms (Levinson 2016). Trade was rarely mentioned by either party up through the 1960s and into the early 1970s. Parties began to emphasize, and take stronger positions on trade in the period between the elections of Jimmy Carter and 1976 and Ronald Reagan in 1980. It is important to note that the increased salience of trade and trade policy comes at the same point as the dual inflation and oil crises that effectively setoff America's most recent turn toward hyper-marketization and neoliberal economic policies more generally (Harvey 2007).

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

The marked increase in discussions of trade cannot simply be attributed to the Hayekian laissez-faire economic philosophy that has become colloquially synonymous with the Reagan Administration (Dadkhah 2009). As seen in Figure 1, both parties began to emphasize the expansion of trade at roughly the same point, and have remained in relative step with one another ever since. This mutual support is highly indicative of a significant shift in the coordinative discourse among political actors away from the Keynesian discourse that organized the postwar economy toward a market-oriented, Hayekian discourse centered on the extension of the market and market forms of governance (Hay 2007, Peck and Tickell 2007).

This mutual shift in coordinative discourse can also be seen in the more technical aspects of both parties' reported policy agendas. The American trade policy process historically centered on the adjustment of tariffs in order to negotiate access to foreign markets and limit competition from foreign imports (Irwin 2017). The Reciprocal Tariff Act of 1934 authorized the president to negotiate tariff reductions with other countries without interference from Congress so long as the final agreement met the standard of reciprocity. Tariffs were highly politicized with candidates offering to advance a particular set of interests in negotiations if elected (Schattschneider 1935, Brock and Magee 1978). With the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, these talks shifted from politicized bilateral affairs to multinational negotiations aimed toward achieving reciprocal market access for all nations involved. Domestic coordinative discourse adjusted accordingly, and, still today, centers on these types of large multinational agreements like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and NAFTA, or the

---

<sup>1</sup> This is not to be confused with the use of the term in policy studies noting the combination of multiple policies or bills in order to offset the salient costs of the independent bills (Milkman et al. 2012).



supranational institutions that mediate these agreements, particularly the World Trade Organization which replaced the GATT in 1995 (Wilkinson 2002, Ford 2002, Narlikar 2006). Over this time, as indicated in Figure 2, both parties have come to see these types of agreements as the most effective way to negotiate greater access to foreign markets (Wilkinson 2002, Ford 2002).

[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Widespread faith in the benefits of trade within the coordinative discourse fit with what Williamson would eventually coin as the neoliberal, or “Washington Consensus” (Naím 2000, Williamson 1993). A majority of mainstream economists and policymakers agree that open trade is key to promoting global economic development by maximizing global economic efficiency (Irwin 2002), strengthening international diplomatic relations (Bergijk 1994), and promoting a global culture of democratization and human rights (Milner and Kubota 2005, Baccini 2011). It appears that U.S. public opinion still accepts many of the basic tenets of the pro-trade coordinative discourse, as a majority of Americans (59%) share this belief that increased international trade has, and will continue to benefit the national economy (Blendon, Casey, and Benson 2017).

Taking these findings in hand with recent public opinion data clearly does not fit with the popular narrative regarding the dramatic rejection of the free trade consensus and the recent electoral divisiveness of trade. However, the nuanced contours of the current trade debate begin to emerge only after a more detailed comparative review of how trade has been brought into relation with other political issues in the evolution of both parties’ positions on trade.

### Party Politics and the Dynamic Evolution of the Free Trade Consensus

As previously noted, parties *do not* simply go about their respective articulatory projects without constraint, and cannot simply create new political issues or cleavages from nothing. Parties are limited by previously articulated identities and associations, which in turn limit the range of possible coalitions parties might articulate (Riley 2015). Similarly, parties are mutually subject to the same exogenous shocks and conditions that are obviously beyond their control (Eidlin 2016). Finally, parties operate within the contexts of broader articulatory conflicts and crises that occur beyond the scope of electoral politics: “Economic strategies and spatiotemporal horizons must be realigned with changes in the structurally inscribed strategic selectivity of modes of growth and their associated political regimes” (Jessop 1999: 398).

In this case, parties’ articulatory strategies have developed in response to key moments of uncertainty within the broader coordinative discourse, or “economic imaginary” that has come to be known as neoliberalism. Episodes of collective uncertainty arise when the economic assumptions that organize neoliberal politics and policymaking fail. At this point, policymakers adapt the coordinative discourse, adjusting particular politico-economic explanations within the value-laden principles underlying sociopolitical institutions at the given point and time.

A fair amount of previous scholarship has sought to explain the neoliberal turn from this perspective (see Blyth 2002, Crouch 2011, and Windmaier 2016). These accounts center on the disembedding of key social institutions founded on the Keynesian economic principles that organized much of the postwar politico-economic order. These studies offer more complete explanations for the reassertion of market fundamentalism and development of market-centered neoliberal coordinative discourse, but can only account for the market-ideology that motivates the rather surprising continued support for liberal trade policies among a majority of Americans. Making sense of the strange coalitional divides and recent electoral salience of free trade, however, requires an account of the evolving communicative discourse through which political parties and partisan actors present competing market-justified policy agendas to the public. What follows traces the evolution of parties' competing discursive articulations in support of free trade in relation to the trajectory of neoliberalism and the key episodes of uncertainty that have been consequential in shaping recent politico-economic history.

### *Fraying Consensus and a Crisis of Keynesian Faith*

The hegemonic politico-economic project of the post-World War II era centered on a powerful national state, which managed seemingly closed national economies (Jessop 1999). This postwar system of democratic-capitalism (Streeck 2013, 2016), or Fordist hegemony (Riley 2017, Burnham 1997) was founded on the principles of Keynesian welfarism, and a compromise between labor and capital based in the dominant ideas of economic growth through high wages, healthy profits, and relatively full employment (Riley 2017: 23). It was the role of individual nation-states to maintain this compromise through regulative policies aimed toward shielding its citizens from extreme market forces, and welfare programs by which government spending was intended promote widespread economic participation and circulation (Fraser and Gerstle 1989, Jessop 1996). Following nearly three decades of consistent economic growth, the idea of nationally managed economies and assumed functions of the sovereign national state became widely taken for granted.

This period of growth came to an end in the late 1960's and early 1970's, as the state could no longer maintain its preexisting distributive commitments or achieve the long-desired goal of full employment (Streeck 2014). The state was able to delay an all-out crisis through some creative and accommodating fiscal and monetary fine-tuning with the idea that growing unemployment could be tamed by facilitating gradual inflation (Windmaier 2016). This proved untenable following Nixon's move to unpeg the dollar from the gold standard in 1971 and the rapid spike in oil prices following the 1973 oil crisis not long after. The State's inability to control inflation and effectively intervene to spark economic growth challenged the legitimacy of Keynesian ideas and consequently led to a crisis of politico-economic uncertainty.

The primary policy objective at this point was to maintain the improved qualities of life gained following WWII. However, the existing policy repertoire could not seem to control skyrocketing inflation or jumpstart macroeconomic

growth. The Carter Administration opted to focus on controlling inflation by advancing policies of monetary and fiscal austerity. Democrats began to incorporate trade into their economic policy agenda at this point as a way of assuring voters that the challenges of austerity could be limited by expanding access to foreign markets and increasing U.S. exports.

This Democratic trade agenda was founded on a particular set of ideational assumptions. Because incomes policies and wage-restraints were seen as the most plausible way of controlling inflation, the economic livelihoods of working and middle class Americans hinged on the ability to sell the fruits of their production abroad. Because the government had already pushed through a set of unpopular policies, the Democratic Party began to see the liberalization of trade as a way to express support for American workers even while maintaining unpopular domestic austerity policies. This would however require rolling back a number of previously established regulations in order to allow capital to pursue lower production costs in order to sustain domestic price controls (Blyth 2002: 137). Secondly, increased access to foreign export markets would only work to facilitate growth if those markets could actually afford to purchase American goods. Consequently, Democrats began to emphasize trade as a means by which the government could leverage diplomatic relations to promote and eventually access developing economies. In 1976, Democrats went as far as call for increased economic cooperation and trade with Soviet Union as a way to strengthen the U.S. economy and facilitate domestic job growth.

The Republican Party quickly adopted some of the market-oriented policies put forward under Carter, but did place the same emphasis on trade as a cornerstone for American economic recovery. Republicans at this point generally called for expanding free trade for one of two related reasons. First, they argued that increased economic interdependence would help redevelop the international institutions and agreements like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, or GATT central to maintaining international monetary stability under the Bretton Woods system. Or, secondly, they saw trade as a way of containing the Soviet sphere of influence. Republicans soon echoed Democrats' support for foreign economic development, but framed their support in terms of limiting the influence of Communist ideologies, particularly in Latin America, by showing developing countries all the supposedly obvious benefits of democratic capitalism.

While both parties began to advocate for more liberal trade policies, the narratives and connections articulated within their competing communicative discourses are significant. Democrats' support for trade reflects the attempts of the Carter Administration to reassert state legitimacy through pragmatic deregulations that were intended to make unpopular policies of domestic wage and price restraints more palatable. Consequently, Democrats adopted a "rising tide" narrative around trade in an effort to naturalize support for trade as a means of improving the national economy. This particular narrative actively framed trade as benefiting working and middle class Americans, and then sought to link those interests to policies of active foreign economic investment and development.

On the other hand, Republicans' support for trade was part of a broader attempt to recover government legitimacy by delegitimizing the Carter

Administration as weak and out of touch with American principles. The problem did not lie with the global economic system or institutions, but rather the failure of the sitting Democratic president to reinforce those institutions in order for the market to operate efficiently. Republicans adopted an “America first” narrative in which liberal trade policies offered a concrete way to correct the failed ideas of the Carter Administration and repair the supposedly damaged international image of the U.S. In this case, trade was associated with advancing U.S. interests in international relations above all else, containing the threat of communism, and bolstering national security. This association between liberalizing economic policies and international relations would eventually become a key part of Reagan’s 1980 campaign and administration, but efforts to naturalize these associations were already underway in the Republican Party.

### *Free Trade and the Supply-Side Revolution*

The 1980 campaign between Reagan and Carter was an epicenter of a larger battle between two competing narratives of the economic crises and uncertainty that had defined much of the previous decade. Carter and those Democrats still in his corner argued that the economic downturn reflected a “crisis of confidence” in the wake of Watergate and the war in Vietnam (Biven 2002). In what would eventually be criticized as the “malaise speech”, Carter aimed to reaffirm his faith in principled Keynesian ideas, and warned against growing cynicism regarding collective commitment to the greater public good (Morris 1996). Carter only managed to dig himself deeper by failing to couple his ideational narrative with concrete policy proposals and then requesting the resignation of his entire cabinet (Carter 1982). The lack of creative policy developments are clear in reviewing the Administration’s trade agenda, which simply doubled-down on reducing export-barriers in order to alleviate the domestic fallout of their austerity policies. Faith in the government had cratered to a new low, and the Democratic administration had failed to offer any policies to address the collective uncertainty of the time.

As noted above, Reagan and the GOP offered a very different narrative of the inflation crisis that applied the ideas of neo-classical economics to the perceived failing of the embedded liberal, or Keynesian institutions. First, rather than trying to manage domestic economic activity via strategically redistributive fiscal policies, Republicans offered a narrative based in monetarist ideas of classical economics, arguing that manipulating the supply of money was the most efficient way of facilitating commercial exchange and economic growth (Domitrovic 2009). As opposed to the belt-tightening and austerity policies, Republicans argued that the crisis was the result of the government’s market-distorting fiscal policies and could only be corrected by putting more money in the pockets of individual consumers and fostering conditions that would stimulate private commerce. This was further supported by framing their narrative in the terms of public choice theory, arguing that regulatory interference in individual’s pursuit of their rational and efficient economic interests would only lead to inefficient economic consequences (Buchanan and Tollison 1984).

The GOP creatively incorporated this individualistic crisis narrative into their trade agenda as well. Trade is most notably hailed as a way of creating new economic opportunities for both American consumers and producers. By rolling back government regulations, American producers would be free to access new foreign markets, grow their business, and then create jobs in the U.S. and internationally. At the same time, they argued that more accommodating fiscal policies would lure foreign producers to the U.S., create jobs, and offer a means of enforcing labor standards by using access to American markets as a bargaining chip in debates over wage suppression. This would also benefit individual consumers and households since lower taxes would leave more money in their pockets, which they could then invest as they see fit, and would allow for greater overall economic participation.

The Reagan Administration eventually encountered a communicative problem of its own—debt, and lot's of it. Following a number of dramatic cross-the-board tax cuts, the government found itself with a critical shortage of revenue (Streeck 2014). However, the increasingly market-oriented ideology that organized the new neoliberal coordinative discourse made it difficult to raise taxes, particularly given the immense public support for the Reagan tax cuts (Prasad 2012). Consequently, the Administration began to run-up massive sums of public debt. This was justified by filtering it through the previous crisis narrative and attributing to the blunders of the Carter Administration, or conversely, by playing-up the communist threat in order to rationalize large spikes in military spending.

Again, these ideational trends emerge in the evolution of the Republican trade agenda that dominated the 1980's. This entailed adopted a mixed “free and fair”-“America first” narrative in which trade still served to address the consequences of previous Democratic polices, but also became a key part of what was presented as a “comprehensive” foreign policy and national security platform (Kristol and Kagan 1996). More specifically, trade was seen as the political centerpiece for promoting economic development in Latin America, which was presented as necessary to defend “the Americas” from the specter of communism. The GOP had effectively linked the issue and consequences of trade policy with a need to defend an abstract concept of the American identity and managed to employ this frame to rationalize their otherwise ideologically contradictory addition to the public debt.

### *Creative Connections and the Neoliberal Blame-Game*

By the time Bill Clinton was elected in 1992, the neoliberal ideas that increasingly organized American coordinative discourse had solidified within both parties. For policymakers on both sides of the aisle, the American economy appeared to be chugging-along just fine. Clinton was elected as a “New Democrat”, who was able to capitalize on then President George H.W. Bush’s failure to stick by the monetarist and hawkish fiscal ideas that held the GOP together by raising taxes as part of the bipartisan 1990 budget agreement. Clinton and the rest of the moderate wing of the Democratic Party sought to convince that public that they had found a new “third” way between the historical Left and Reaganite-Right by

embracing the market “risk society”, founded on the principles of opportunity, personal responsibility, and the primacy of the market (Romano 2007).

Democrats remained faithful to the communicative discourse and underlying ideas ushered in during the Reagan years, and went further to discuss the positive role of the market in restructuring many of the social welfare programs so hotly detested by those on the other side of the aisle. This only served to further legitimize the communicative discourse that had characterized American politics during the 1980s. Trade policy centered on negotiating beneficial trade agreements and bolstering international institutions for both parties at this point. While challenged this new bipartisan support for globalization, this resistance was limited and diffuse (Rodrik 2018). This apparent convergence in communicative discourses continued up through much of the George W. Bush’s presidency, with candidates from both parties running on strongly expansionary platforms, the promise of lower taxes, and lax regulatory policies.

Three decades of monetarism and discretionary macroeconomic policies eventually led to widespread overconfidence in the self-regulating abilities of the market. This misplaced certainty contributed the eventual collapse of the housing market in 2008, and similarly conditioned the coordinative response. Policymakers quickly set out to recover what was left of the financial sector by bailing out a number of firms that years of deregulation had allowed to grow and consolidate to the point that the global economic consequences of their failure would be catastrophic beyond even the crash of 1929. The evolution of both parties’ communicative discourses in the wake of this episode of collective uncertainty has proved similarly problematic.

In the wake of the global financial crisis, Democrats adopted a new hybrid narrative by combining features of the “America first” rhetoric normalized during the 1980’s with an updated version of their historically optimistic “rising tide” discourse. In 2008, Democrats cast their support for the continued expansion of trade in broadest possible terms. The Party pledged to renegotiate and make previous trade agreements more efficient. This would lead to more jobs and improved labor standards at both ends of the relationship. This would also tie the hands of big corporations that may otherwise invest their money abroad by raising foreign costs and disincentivizing capital flight. Jobs gained from increasing trade were explicitly linked to creating new opportunities for those working in lower paying service occupations to pursue degrees in higher education. This version of the “America first” narrative is presented with a sense of nostalgia, calling for a return to the community and working class-centered roots of the Democratic Party. Moreover, the Party goes out of its way to describe particular pro-trade policies in support of both urban and rural workers by through sector-specific subsidies. In this case, Democrats have sought to address post-crisis uncertainty by connecting a particular set of value-laden principles with a particular vision of the postwar era and working class prosperity, but remain committed to recovering that prosperity through the market.

The Republican Party offered a similarly market-oriented response to the 2008 crisis, but placed greater emphasis on the international dimensions of their hypothetical economic recovery plan. The communicative response from the GOP

took a far more negative position through a rather cynical combination of “free and fair” and “America first” narratives, emphasizing the failures of mismanaged international governance and their failure to promote the principle of reciprocity. They cite the failure of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to enforce agreements with China in each platform since 2004, and often go further to argue that this lack of enforcement has led China to suppress the value of the Yuan and set the stage for another inflation crisis. Nonetheless, they consistently reaffirm their support for the WTO but call for the reprioritization of American interests. Despite these conflicting positions, they increasingly call for more liberal trade policies, often suggesting that reciprocal trade and economic interdependence offers greatest hope of improving diplomatic relations with China. Here, Republicans offer an explanation for the crisis that shifts the blame onto international institutions and Democrats’ naïveté for failing to live up to the principled ideas that underscore the coordinative neoliberal discourse.

The second use of this hybrid narrative is employed to criticize Democrats for failing to enforce the previously negotiated trade agreements. As far back as 2000, Republicans have explicitly suggest that Democrats’ failure to enforce the enforce particular parts of NAFTA have sparked an immigration crisis, which they argue has led to the loss of American jobs, increased crime, created a national security risk, and contributed to an ongoing crisis of national sovereignty. During the George W. Bush years, Republican effectively combined the anti-communist rhetoric of the Reagan Administration with Democrat-bashing developed during the 1990’s. They actively employed this narrative in regards to a supposed immigration crisis caused by the *mismanagement* of NAFTA. At the same time, they consistently, even in 2016, affirm their support for the agreement and a need to mutually reduce barriers to trade between the U.S. and Mexico.

### Conclusion

This study aims to make sense of the current divides in political debates over free trade. While conventional studies center on the likely impacts of trade on individuals’ incomes and the consistency with which people vote according to their objective interests, the alternative explanation developed here centers on the role of political parties in naturalizing the associations between separate groups, interests, and policies. I show how the Republican Party has consistently articulated a pro-trade policy agenda that centers nearly as much on the failures and inabilities of their Democratic opponents as it does on their justifications for such liberal trade policies themselves. Moreover, this frequently involves naturalizing the association between Democratic mismanagement and the sociocultural threat of increased immigration. After exploring this pattern, we begin to see how so many can rationalize their support for competing political parties or candidates in terms of an otherwise shared ideal policy outcome.

## References

2016. 2016 Campaign: Strong Interest, Widespread Dissatisfaction. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center.
- Abdelal, R., M. Blyth, and C. Parsons. 2010. "Constructing the International Economy." In *Constructing the International Economy*, edited by R. Abdelal, M. Blyth and C. Parsons, 1-20. Ithaca, NY and London, UK: Cornell University Press.
- Achen, C.H., and L.M. Bartels. 2016. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*: Princeton University Press.
- Baccini, L. 2011. "Democratization and Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of Developing Countries." *European Journal of International Relations* 18 (3):455-479.
- Bartels, L. M. 2008. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. New York, NY: Russell Sage.
- Bartolini, S., and P. Mair. 1990. *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: the Stabilization of European Electorates-- 1885-1985*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Béland, D. 2009. "Ideas, Institutions, and Policy Change." *Journal of European Public Policy* 16 (5):701-718.
- Bergijk, P.A.G. 1994. *Economic Diplomacy, Trade, and Commercial Policy: Positive and Negative Sanctions in a New World Order*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Biven, W.C. 2002. *Jimmy Carter's Economy: Policy in an Age of Limits*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Blendon, R.J., L. Casey, and J. Benson. 2017. "Public Opinion and Trump's Jobs and Trade Policies." *Challenge* 60 (3):228-244.
- Block, F., and M. Somers. 2014. *The Power of Market Fundamentalism: Karl Polanyi's Critique*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Blyth, M. 2003. "Structures Do Not Come with an Instruction Sheet: Interests, Ideas, and Progress in Political Science." *Perspectives on Politics* 1 (4):695-703.
- Brock, W., and S.P. Magee. 1978. "The Economics of Special Interest Politics: The Case of the Tariff." *The American Economic Review* 68 (2):246-250.
- Buchanan, J.M., and R.D. Tollison, eds. 1984. *The Theory of Public Choice*. Vol. Vol.2. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Burnham, P. 1997. "Globalisation: States, Markets and Class Relations." *Historical Materialism* 1 (1):150-160.
- Carley, K. 1993. "Coding Choices for Textual Analysis: A Comparison of Content Analysis and Map Analysis." In *Sociological Methodology*, edited by P. Marsden. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- Carley, K., and D. Kaufer. 1993. "Semantic Connectivity: An Approach for Analyzing Semantic Networks." *Communication Theory* 3:183-213.
- Carter, J. 1982. *Keeping the Faith: Memoirs of a President*. New York, NY: Bantam Books.
- Conger, K.H. 2010. "Party Platforms and Party Coalitions: The Christian Right and State-Level Republicans." *Party Politics* 16 (5):651-668.



- Dadkhah, K. 2009. *The Evolution of Macroeconomic Theory and Policy*. London, UK and New York, NY: Springer.
- Davis, M. 2017. "The Great God Trump and the White Working Class." *Catalyst: A Journal of Theory & Strategy* 1 (1):151-172.
- Davis, N.T., and L. Mason. 2016. "Sorting and the Split-Ticket: Evidence from Presidential and Subpresidential Elections." *Political Behavior* 38 (2):337-354.
- de Leon, C., M. Desai, and C. Tugal. 2009. "Political Articulation: Parties and the Constitution of Cleavages in the United States, India, and Turkey." *Sociological Theory* 27 (3):193-219.
- de Leon, C., M. Desai, and C. Tugal. 2015a. *Building Blocs: How Parties Organize Society*: Stanford University Press.
- de Leon, C., M. Desai, and C. Tugal. 2015b. "Political Articulation: The Structured Creativity of Parties." In *Building Blocs: How Parties Organize Society*, edited by C. de Leon, M. Desai and C. Tugal. Stanford University Press.
- della Porta, D. 2015. *Social Movements in Times of Austerity*. Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press.
- Desai, M. 2002. "The Relative Autonomy of Party Practices: A Counterfactual Analysis of Left Party Ascendance in Kerala, India, 1934-1940." *American Journal of Sociology* 108 (3):616-657.
- Desai, M. 2003. "From Movement to Party to Government: Why Social Policies in Kerala and West Bengal are So Different." In *States, Parties, and Social Movements*, edited by J. Goldstone, 170-196. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Domitrovic, B. 2009. *Econoclasts: The Rebels Who Sparked the Supply-Side Revolution and Restored American Prosperity*. Wilmington, DE: ISI Books.
- Eidlin, B. 2016. "Why Is There No Labor Party in the United States? Political Articulation and the Canadian Comparison, 1932 to 1948." *American Sociological Review* 81 (3):488-516.
- Fairclough, N. 1993. *Discourse and Social Change*: Wiley.
- Fairclough, N. 2002. *New Labour, New Language?*: Taylor & Francis.
- Fiorina, M.P. 1981. *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Ford, J. 2002. "A Social Theory of Trade Regime Change: GATT to WTO." *International Studies Review* 4 (3):115-138.
- Fraser, S., and G. Gerstle, eds. 1989. *The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order, 1930-1980*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Gillies, J. 2018. "'Feel the Bern': Marketing Bernie Sanders and Democratic Socialism to Primary Voters." In *Political Marketing in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election*, edited by J. Gillies, 97-112. Cham, CH: Springer International Publishing.
- Gillion, D.Q. 2016. *Governing with Words: The Political Dialogue on Race, Public Policy, and Inequality in America*: Cambridge University Press.
- Green, D., B. Palmquist, and E. Schickler. 2002. *Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters*. New Haven, CT and London, UK: Yale University Press.


- Harvey, D. 2007. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*: OUP Oxford.
- Hay, C. 2002. "Ideas and the Construction of Interests." In *Ideas and Politics in Social Science Research*, edited by D. Béland and R.H. Cox, 65-82. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Hay, C. 2007. "The Genealogy of Neoliberalism." In *Neoliberalism: National and Regional Experiments with Global Ideas*, edited by R. Roy, A.T. Denzau and T.D. Willett, 51-69. Abingdon, UK: Routledge.
- Hochschild, A.R. 2016. *Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right*. New York, NY: The New Press.
- Imbeau, L.M. 2009. *Do They Walk Like They Talk?: Speech and Action in Policy Processes*: Springer New York.
- Inglehart, R.F., and P. Norris. 2016. Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash. In *Faculty Research Working Paper Series*, edited by Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government. Cambridge, MA.
- Irwin, D.A. 1996. "Industry or Class Cleavages over Trade Policy? Evidence from the British General Election of 1923." In *The Political Economy of Trade Policy: Papers in Honor of Jagdish Bhagwati*, edited by R.C. Feenstra, G.M. Grossman and D.A. Irwin, 53-76. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Irwin, D.A. 2002. *Free Trade Under Fire*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Irwin, D.A. 2017. *Clashing Over Commerce: A History of US Trade Policy*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Jacobson, G.C. 2017. "The Triumph of Polarized Partisanship in 2016: Donald Trump's Improbable Victory." *Political Science Quarterly* 132 (1):9-41.
- Jessop, B. 1996. "Post-Fordism and the State." In *Comparative Welfare Systems: The Scandinavian Model in a Period of Change*, edited by B. Greve, 165-184. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- Jessop, B. 1999. "Narrating the Future of the National Economy and the National State: Remarks on Remapping Regulation and Reinventing Governance." In *State/Culture: State-Formation After the Cultural Turn*, edited by G. Steinmetz, 378-405. Ithaca, NY and London, UK: Cornell University Press.
- Judis, J.B. 2016. *The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics*. New York, NY: Columbia Global Reports.
- Karol, D. 2009. *Party Position Change in American Politics: Coalition Management*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Kristol, W., and R. Kagan. 1996. "Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs* 75 (4):18-32.
- Levinson, M. 2016. *An Extraordinary Time: The End of the Postwar Boom and the Return of the Ordinary Economy*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
- Lipset, S.M., and S. Rokkan. 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. New York, NY: Free Press.
- Mansfield, E.D., and D. Mutz. 2009. "Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety." *International Organization* 63:425-457.

- Markusen, A. 2006. "Urban Development and the Politics of a Creative Class: Evidence from a Study of Artists." *Environment and Planning* 38 (10):1921-1940.
- Miles, S. 2002. *How to Hack a Party Line: The Democrats and Silicon Valley*. Berkeley & Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
- Milkman, K.L., M.C. Mazza, L.L. Shu, T. Chia-Jung, and M.H. Bazerman. 2012. "Policy Bundling to Overcome Loss Aversion: A Method for Improving Legislative Outcomes." *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes* 117:158-167.
- Milner, H., and K. Kubota. 2005. "Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in Developing Countries." *International Organization* 59 (1):107-143.
- Morris, K.E. 1996. *Jimmy Carter, American Moralist*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.
- Mutz, D., P. Sniderman, and R. Brody. 1996. *Political Persuasion and Attitude Change*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Naím, M. 2000. "Fads and Fashions in Economic Reforms: Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion." *Third World Quarterly* 21 (3):505-528.
- Narlikar, A. 2006. "Fairness in International Trade Negotiations: Developing Countries in the GATT and WTO." *The World Economy* 29 (8):1005-1029.
- Peck, J., and A. Tickell. 2007. "Conceptualizing Neoliberalism, Thinking Thatcherism." In *Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers*, edited by H. Leitner, J. Peck and E. Sheppard, 26-50. New York, NY: The Guildford Press.
- Polanyi, K. 1944. *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Times*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Prasad, M. 2012. "The Popular Origins of Neoliberalism in the Reagan Tax Cut of 1981." *Journal of Policy History* 24 (3):351-383.
- Riley, D. 2015. "Coda: Hegemony and Decomracy in Gramsci's *Prison Notebooks*." In *Building Blocs: How Parties Organize Society*, edited by C. de Leon, M. Desai and C. Tugal. Stanford University Press.
- Riley, D. 2017. "American Brumaire?" *New Left Review* 103:21-32.
- Roberts, C.W. 1989. "Other Than Counting Words: A Linguistic Approach to Content Analysis." *Social Forces* 68:147-177.
- Rodrik, D. 2018. *Straight Talk on Trade: Ideas for a Sane World Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Rogowski, R. 1989. *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments*. Princeton University Press.
- Romano, F. 2007. *Clinton and Blair: The Political Economy of the Third Way*. New York, NY: Taylor & Francis.
- Schattschneider, E.E. 1935. *Politics, Pressures and the Tariff*. New York, NY: Prentice-Hall.
- Schmidt, V. 2001. "Discourse and the Legitimation of Economic and Social Policy Change in Europe." In *Globalization and the European Political Economy*, edited by S. Weber, 229-272. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Schmidt, V. 2008. "Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discours." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11:303-326.

- Streeck, W. 2013. "The Crisis in Context: Democratic Capitalism and its Contradictions." In *Politics In the Age of Austerity*, edited by A. Schäfer and W. Streeck, 262-286. Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity Press.
- Streeck, W. 2014. *Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism*. London, UK and New York, NY: Verso.
- Streeck, W. 2016. *How Will Capitalism End? Essays on a Failing System*. London, UK and New York, NY: Verso
- Trentmann, F. 1998. "Political Culture and Political Economy: Interest, Ideology and Free Trade." *Review of International Political Economy* 5 (2):217-251.
- Wilkinson, R. 2002. "The World Trade Organization." *New Political Economy* 7 (1):129-141.
- Williamson, J. 1993. "Democracy and the "Washington Consensus"." *World Development* 21:1329-1336.
- Windmaier, W. 2016. *Economic Ideas in Political Time: The Rise and Fall of Economic Orders from the Progressive Era to the Global Financial Crisis*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.


Appendix

**Figure 1: Positive Mentions of Trade in U.S. Political Party Platforms, 1928-2016**



Note: N= 46 platforms; all political party platforms published in presidential election years.

**Figure 2: Support for Trade Agreements in U.S. Political Party Platforms, 1928-2016**



Note: N= 46 platforms; all political party platforms published in presidential election years; all mentions of trade agreements are included in the reported total mentions in Figure 1.

