

ISIS and Al-Qaeda:

A Study of Islamist Propaganda

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ABSTRACT

The Islamic State (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda (AQ) are well known and fairly well researched in the modern world. The two terrorist organizations were once closely affiliated and have since split drastically. Their similarities, differences, and tensions are well documented in the literature, but what is less documented is what they directly say about one another. I have conducted a content analysis of ISIS's *Rumiyah* and *Dabiq* searching for direct mentions of AQ, as well as a content analysis of AQ's *Inspire* looking for direct mentions of ISIS. My findings reveal that although their relationship has been well documented in the literature, they do not say much about each other in the publications. There are of course some mentions of one another, but a search for obvious key terms revealed little in the two organizations' very detailed publications. Therefore, I conducted a closer reading of the publications, which highlighted both the audiences of the publications as well as their utopian, specifically millenarian, ideologies. While there are some differences between the publications' millenarian ideologies and audiences, it shows both organizations are more focused on spreading their ideology to their respective audiences, which do not include one another therefore, explaining the lack of mentions of the opposing organization in *Dabiq*, *Rumiyah*, and *Inspire*.

INTRODUCTION

ISIS and AQ are two of the most well known terrorist organizations in the modern world. While AQ seemed to pose a significant threat from 1990 to the 2000s, since 2010 the main terrorist threat for the Western World has revolved more so around the Islamic State, otherwise known as ISIS. In this paper I seek to understand the relationship between the two terrorist organizations as well as their growing differences and tensions. In order to have a

better chance at understanding both organizations it is important to understand the relationship between the two. Similarly, the recent literature has focused on the growing resentment between the two groups. While this resentment has mostly played out within the Syrian War Zone, it is still an important problem that could affect the rest of the world. I will look at whether or not the two groups are actually concerned with one another or if the West has dramatized the tensions. It is also relevant to look at what led to the fallout between the two groups in the first place and how it has developed over time.

News outlets all across the world, especially in the US, cover the attacks orchestrated by them as well as possible future threats. Although they were once affiliated with each other, they have since separated drastically. The focus of this paper is not only on the background of the two groups and their leaders, but also their ongoing tensions with one another. Many have speculated that they are openly in war with one another to be the leading jihadist movement. I will focus on popular scholarly literature revolving around the relationship of the two groups as well as the mentions of one another in their publications. By using the publications of ISIS (*Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*) and AQ (*Inspire*), I will look at what, if anything, the groups have to say about one another in order to further understand the on-going tension filled relationship between them.

Beyond looking at the literature and conducting a specific content analysis, I also conduct a close reading of all issues of *Dabiq*, *Rumiyah*, and *Inspire*. This reveals primarily the discussion of utopian ideologies, which are most prominently expressed in all three publications as millenarian utopian ideology. Believers of this ideology are known as millenarians and “believe that the end of this world, and of historical time, is at hand. A new world, and a new

time, will be inaugurated, usually through the agency of a messiah: a savior or deliverer” (Kumar, 7). Beyond the millenarian ideologies, both specific and indirect references to the publications’ audiences appear. I will look at both types of audiences and what this means for each organization, as well as their relationship with one another.

BACKGROUND

The literature on ISIS and AQ can be difficult to follow because the groups have gone by many different names in the past. In particular, ISIS is known by many names in the scholarly literature. When ISIS was first founded in 1999 by Zarqawi, its name was Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad. The group did not become referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq until 2006 and since 2013 they have gone by the name of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (Zelin, 1). For the sake of this paper, the organization will be referred to strictly as ISIS. Similarly, AQ’s literature is also difficult since beginning in the early 2000s many local branches of AQ arose. During this same period is when AQ in Iraq (which this paper mainly focuses on) began to shift its focus towards attempting to build an Islamic state. AQ in Syria is also referenced throughout the paper because it is a legitimate branch of AQ. Similarly, most of the tensions between the organizations have played out in Syria, making AQ’s local branch in Syria critical to the conversation.

AQ’s leader Bin Laden and ISIS’s leader Zarqawi grew up during the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union in the 1980s. Their organizations, however, “have distinct genetic material, attributable in part to their different backgrounds, leadership styles and aims” (Zelin, 1). AQ’s objectives today include: “prepare Muslims for Jihad against their enemies, liberate Muslim lands now ruled by non-Muslims, and revive the Islamic caliphate” (Karmon, 71). ISIS’s

objectives have been harder to decipher but the most well known aspects of ISIS include that it is a predominantly Sunni jihadist group, seeks to sow civil unrest in Iraq and the Levant with the aim of establishing a caliphate—a single, transnational Islamic state based on sharia (Zaub and Masters, 1). Other ideologies relating to ISIS that are less cited and well known include the following – the belief that it represents the restoration of the caliphate of early Islam, and that all Muslims are required to pledge allegiance to it and to al-Baghdadi; that a defiled Islam must be purged of apostasy; that the final Day of Judgment by God is near; and all Muslims must have a strict adherence to following the orders of the Prophet Muhammed. ISIS and AQ are both primarily based out of Iraq with branches in Syria, as well as a few other places (such as ISIS in Lebanon).

While the two groups had a partnership during the war in Iraq in 2004, they have since separated drastically, including their ideology and goals. ISIS is now under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi while AQ is now under the leadership of Zawahiri, but the divisions between the two groups began before al-Baghdadi and Zawahiri were in charge. The fight between the two groups for the global jihadist movement, however, has continued through today between al-Baghdadi and Zawahiri. Similarly, the two have had several successful and failed attempts at terrorist attacks. As of 2015, however, ISIS has recruited “in its ranks the highest number, some 71%, of the 25,000 foreign fighters, mainly from Arab, Muslim and Western countries, who are fighting in Syria and Iraq, according to recent United Nations’ estimates” (Karmon, 77). These numbers show ISIS’s power in the global jihadist movement, but the question still remains as to what this means for AQ and their relationship.

HISTORY OF THE RELATIONSHIP

The leaders of ISIS and AQ come from very different socioeconomic backgrounds, which have been attributed as to one of the possible reasons surrounding the differences between the two organizations. Zarqawi, for example, and those closest to him came from poor and not well educated backgrounds. Bin Laden, on the other hand, grew up in the upper middle class and received a university education. Zarqawi also has a criminal past and extreme views regarding *takfir* (accusing another Muslim of heresy and thereby justifying his killing) (Zelin, 1). Zarqawi's views on *takfir* have been cited as one of the causes of friction and distrust between him and Bin Laden when they first met in Afghanistan in 1999. "At issue was Zarqawi's penchant for bloody spectacle—and, as a matter of doctrine, his hatred of other Muslims, to the point of excommunicating and killing them" (Wood, 5). In Islam, the practice of *takfir* is essentially excommunication. "If a man says to his brother, 'You are an infidel,' " the Prophet said, "then one of them is right." If the accuser is wrong, he himself has committed apostasy by making a false accusation (Wood, 5). The punishment for apostasy is death. One of the biggest sources of friction was Zarqawi's expansion of the range of behavior that could make Muslims infidels, or in other words lead to *takfir*.

During the time period in which Bin Laden and Zarqawi met, Bin Laden had the most leverage among "Afghan Arabs" that were training in the Taliban controlled country. Bin Laden's legitimacy during the time derived from his "money, his attacks abroad, and the failure of many local Arab jihadist insurgences in the early to mid 1900s" (Zelin, 2). Bin Laden provided Zarqawi with a small amount of seed money for Zarqawi to set up his own training camp in Herat. Zarqawi's camp, however, was based on the other side of Afghanistan and had a "largely

distinct, if occasional overlapping agenda” with AQ (Whitlock). During the Iraq war a strong divide arose between Zarqawi and Bin Laden because Zarqawi believed authority is derived from people who are on the battlefield front lines rather than behind the scenes (Zelin, 2).

While it is common knowledge today that ISIS’s intent is to build an Islamic state, both AQ and ISIS started out with different goals. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, AQ’s main “organizational goal was to lend financial support to roving foreign fighters in places such as Bosnia and Chechnya who were attempting to liberate what they perceived as occupied Muslim territory” (Zelin, 2). AQ planned to achieve this goal by first defeating the West, or in particularly the United States. Meanwhile, Zarqawi wanted to topple the Jordanian monarchy. Although AQ was prominent in the news before the US invasion of Iraq after 9/11, Zarqawi did not become popular until after the invasion. During this time he became known for his “personal beheadings and fast-paced suicide bombing campaigns against Shiite religious targets and Sunni civilians” (Zelin, 2).

Similarly, Zarqawi thought that the only way to save the global Islamic community was through purging itself. Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s number two and now leader of AQ, believed that the apostate institutions needed to be changed and that the Muslim community was not the problem (Zelin, 3). Zawahiri repeatedly urged Zarqawi to tone down the violence extreme enforcement of sharia law. Zawahiri felt Zarqawi’s acts were alienating Sunnis and hurting the long-term goals of the global jihadist project. Zawahiri urged Zarqawi to remember “that we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media” (Zelin, 3).

It was not until October 2004 when Bin Laden was in hiding that Zarqawi pledged *baya* to him and the two organizations created a “marriage of convenience” (Zelin, 2). The U.S. State Department designated AQ in Iraq a foreign terrorist organization the same month. “For AQ, attaching its name to Zarqawi’s activities enabled it to maintain relevance even as its core forces were destroyed [in Afghanistan] or on the run,” wrote Brian Fishman, a counterterrorism fellow at the New America Foundation (Zaub and Masters, 1). During this time period ISIS controlled resources and the flow of foreign fighters, which helped it gain loyalty from individual fighters during this time period. This created a generational difference between the two organizations. While those who fought and/or trained with AQ in the 1980s and 1990s in Afghanistan remained loyal to them, while those who trained around the time Zarqawi was in charge tended to feel loyal to him more so than AQ and Bin Laden. Many of the strong allegiances to ISIS we see today can be attributed to the relationships made and connections formed during Zarqawi’s time helping AQ during the Iraq fighting (Zelin, 3).

However, on June 7, 2006 Zarqawi died. After his death the new appointed leader of ISIS became al-Baghdadi. Al-Baghdadi and current day ISIS have continued with Zarqawi’s notion of takfir and continued to “purify the world” by executing vast numbers of people, both Muslims and non-Muslims (Wood, 6). Unlike Zarqawi, al-Baghdadi never pledged *baya* to AQ, therefore Zarqawi’s pledge to AQ was invalidated and ISIS no longer had to do as AQ wished. In other words, ISIS has not technically been subordinate to AQ in eight years” (Zelin, 3). AQ and Zawahiri claim that Baghdadi did, in fact, pledge *baya* to Zawahiri in private. Therefore, according to the reasoning of *baya*, Baghdadi and ISIS broke a religious oath and have become a deviant group that disobeyed the emir’s orders (Zawahiri).

In 2013 Zawahiri released a pamphlet titled “General Guidelines for the work of a Jihad” in which he codifies the rules of engagement for AQ and highlights the limits and concerns he had previously raised with Zarqawi. Similarly, Zarqawi’s mentor Maqdisi has condemned his actions and recently sided with AQ involving the conflict in Syria between AQ’s official branch and ISIS. Before Zarqawi’s death, Maqdisi advised him to focus on the long-term gains instead of shortsighted strategies. In regards to fighting in Syria, Maqdisi stated, “ISIS is a deviant organization from the path of truth, [they are] aggressors against the mujahidin...I also call upon the members of ISIS to join the ranks of Jabhat al-Nusra [AQ in Syria], giving *baya* to its leaders” (al-Maqdisi).

The majority of the hostility documented today between the two organizations broke out in 2013 when al-Baghdadi announced he was extending ISIS into Syria. Al-Baghdadi also made a comment that ISIS and the Syrian branch of AQ were one in the same (Zelin, 4). Zawahiri claimed he and the head of AQ in Syria were never informed of al-Baghdadi’s decision to extend into Syria. Zawahiri tried to tell ISIS to leave the Syrian front to AQ and return to Iraq but his attempts failed. AQ’s ultimate disaffiliation with ISIS occurred due to several reasons, “including the January 2014 uprising against ISIS by mainstream Syrian rebel’s over the group’s excesses; the group’s general predatory way of taking territory and resources from other rebel groups; and a failed public reconciliation effort” (Zelin, 5). Many believe one of the reasons Zawahiri took so long to condemn ISIS reflects his overall reluctance to be associated with internal fighting within the global jihadist movement (Mendelsohn).

Some similarities, however, are still prominent between the two groups. One example of their similarities is the use of social media to lure people from the global jihadist community.

It has been speculated that social media platforms, such as Twitter, have actually increased hostility between the groups. Examples of social networking fights between the two camps in newspaper articles shows individuals from both organizations refusing to back down from an argument, most likely in an attempt to prove their loyalties to their leads (Zelin, 5). Both organizations have also used the media to showcase official testimonials of defectors from the other side. ISIS and AQ also have their own magazines designed to influence Western sympathizers. These magazines will play a pivotal role in the rest of this study on the relationship between the two organizations.

Most recently ISIS and AQ have been in the news for possibly being behind terror attacks in the US, such as the Ohio State shooter, the Orlando Nightclub Shooting, the Paris attacks, and the California attacks. Both organizations have built up a large network and following through social media and the media itself, including their own newspapers as well as Western media. These networks make it easy for people to claim ISIS or AQ as their reasoning behind their terror attacks. Propaganda is also key to the state's success; it has been cited that ISIS's social media and online presence have helped expand their army with as many as 31,000 foreign fighters from 86 countries (Smith, "ISIS").

The main differences between the two organizations arise over authority and methodology as well as revisionist histories (Zelin, 5). ISIS feels that Zawahiri's authority is illegitimate and accuses the organization of deviating from the path created for them by Bin Laden. Interestingly enough, ISIS considers itself the true heir of Bin Laden's AQ. An example of this arose in 2014 when ISIS spokesperson Adnani stated,

The leaders of AQ deviated from the right *man-haj*, we say this as sadness overwhelms us and bitterness fills our hearts...Verily AQ today has ceased to be the base of jihad, rather its leadership has become an axe supporting the destruction of the project of the Islamic State and the coming caliphate...AQ now runs after the bandwagon of the majority and calls them as 'the Umma,' and softens in their stance at the expense of the religion, and the *taghut* (tyrants) of the Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood) (al-Adnani al-Shami, "This Is Not Our Manhaj").

Regardless of whether or not this is true, since Zarqawi and Bin Laden had their own hostilities, it does not change the fact that this just one more way in which ISIS can undermine AQ and its leaders. ISIS also differs from nearly every other current jihadist movement in believing that it is written into God's script as a central character (Wood, 14). It is in this casting that the Islamic State is most boldly distinctive from its predecessors, including AQ. They feel that the belief that they are written into God's will gives them more religious legitimacy over AQ.

Another difference between the two groups is the idea that ISIS is not "an ordinary jihadi group controlled or influenced by AQ" (Gulmohamad, 2). ISIS has its own conception and position and has also disobeyed AQ and Zawahiri on many occasions. Their disobedience of AQ comes not only from their ideological differences, but also the attempt by ISIS to separate itself from the group and emerge as the leading global jihadist movement. Similarly, the members of ISIS are only loyal to al-Baghdadi and no one else. This is evident in their song of faith, which is translated as, "We have closed ranks and pledge bay'ah to Baghdadi, for our emir in our Iraq and ash-Sham," (Gulmohamad, 2). I have stated earlier the rift between the two groups regarding *baya* to Zawahiri, but the group's song of faith is a clear indication of where their

loyalty lies. Whether or not al-Baghdadi pledged *baya* to Zawahiri is still unknown, but al-Baghdadi and his followers swear he did not.

Similarly, the funding for both groups has been reported as coming from two very different sources. AQ is typically cited as receiving most of its funding from supporters in the regions of Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. According to the US Treasury and documents confiscated from Iranian Revolutionary guards, AQ has also received funding from Iran. The reasoning behind Iran's funding has been documented as helping to challenge the US military presence in the region (Zaub and Masters, 1).

ISIS's funding, however seemingly less legitimate than AQ, has proven to be part of the organization's resiliency. Part of the net revenue comes from 3-8 million USD/day in potential oil reserves (Smith, "ISIS"). The bulk of their financing comes from smuggling, extortion, and other crimes (Gulmohamad, 5). They have also relied on funding from manpower and recruits, although this is a significantly smaller portion of their finances. In June of 2014 the organization "extorted taxes from businesses, netting upwards of \$8 million a month" (Zaub and Masters, 2). Similarly, "Ransoms, citizen taxes (2.5% annual income), state fees such as traffic tickets and fines, agriculture, trade, misappropriation of cultural artifacts, human trafficking, escape bribes, and private donations also contribute" (Smith, "ISIS"). ISIS has also been able to procure more modern military equipment since their overpowering of the Syrian and Iraqi national armies (Brown, "AQ vs ISIS"). The majority of the equipment held by the Iraqi Army was provided by the US military during Iraq's reconstruction effort, therefore giving ISIS access to very modern weaponry.

ISIS and AQ also have different strategies in general for their organizations as they attempt to achieve their goals. AQ pursues a staged global strategy to achieve its global domination and destruction of competing social, political and religious orders (Hoffman et al, 6). The strategy itself is global in its scope, principals, and ideology, but still local and pragmatic in its current applications. Hoffman et al break down the stages of AQ's plan beginning with establishing organizations in a multiplicity of Muslim-majority countries. Many believe AQ focuses on this because they believe only the US has the resources, capabilities, and willingness to defeat them (Hoffman et al, 6). Their next step focuses on removing the United States and their forces/politics from Muslim-majority countries. During both of these stages AQ has tried to enforce their own governing system upon countries where they have established groups, such as Somalia, Yemen, Syria, and Northern Pakistan (Hoffman et al, 7). In these areas they create shadow governments with their own military commanders, religious places, political rulers, and judges. In areas where the US does not have a strong presence, AQ focuses on creating these government systems.

Marc Sageman also wrote a book documenting the ways in which AQ is more of an "association of loose networks" rather than an organized institution (Brown, "AQ vs ISIS"). In other words, the popularity and legitimacy around AQ's name has caused other organizations to act in their name, therefore creating what Sageman and others refer to as a terrorist network. These organizations acting in AQ's name has created various AQ franchises, or branches. AQ's training manual for its members also directs them in how to conduct secret operations. AQ's secret operations have been successfully implemented, meaning it has been effective in accumulating passive support therefore making the organization more of a network

than a structured organization (Brown, "AQ vs ISIS"). The ways in which ISIS has been cited to be gaining legitimacy, as discussed later, is opposite of a network strategy. ISIS typically conducts itself more in the open and has less documented offshoots than AQ. This idea of a network as opposed to an organization could be one of the reasons ISIS is growing in legitimacy while AQ is declining. On the other hand, many independent terrorist actors have cited ISIS as their reasoning behind their attacks regardless of any actual affiliation with the group. Perhaps ISIS is becoming more of a "terrorist network" as well.

Since ISIS's actions have been so recent, there is not as much scholarly analysis on their courses of action and concrete strategies. However, those that have analyzed the organization state it has a more pragmatic stance when compared to AQ. Documents taken from Iraq highlight the group's adaptation of Ba'athist military and political strategies (Hoffman et al, 7). In other words, their caliphate has a realist image, especially in comparison to the ideological motivations of AQ. ISIS also uses its ideology to shape its appeal to Muslims, to justify its murder and enslavement of innocent people, and create its governance structure in Syria and Iraq (Hoffman et al, 7).

Although their leadership is extreme, it operates similarly to a state governing system. "The Islamic State is no mere collection of psychopaths. It is a religious group with carefully considered beliefs" (Wood, 1). It is well known that ISIS established a caliphate, al-Baghdadi, and adherence to him is very strict. The caliph commands obedience and those who continue in supporting non-Muslim governments, after being duly warned and educated about their sin, are considered apostates, therefore worthy of takfir (Wood, 13). ISIS has established a capital in Raqqa, Syria and there is an 8-man cabinet under al-Baghdadi whose members perform

functions from finance director to detainee supervisor. The Islamic State is also broken up into six different provinces, each headed by a governor (Sherlock, "Inside the Leadership"). ISIS also ensures that governors, local councils, the legal system, and government departments controlling everything from religion to garbage disposal, are all closely selected and controlled by executive leadership (Smith, "ISIS"). Similarly, ISIS claims that Muslims around the world have an obligation to migrate within its borders and they demand the allegiance of all Sunnis in Western Iraq (Fishman, 49). Therefore, ISIS does indeed claim real religious and political authority. So far it has been estimated that tens of thousands of Muslims have immigrated to the Islamic State (Wood, 8).

The ways in which ISIS and AQ have acted on the ground in Syria also highlight the growing differences between the two organizations. The Syrian civil war situation has been ongoing for many years now and escalates everyday, as indicated by very recent attacks in Aleppo. The fight between ISIS and AQ in Syria has been primarily over territory, but "Syrian observers believe that JN [AQ in Syria] is Syrian-centric and has slightly flexible relations with other rebel groups who have similar aims. ISIS, on the other hand, with its more extreme behavior, has antagonistic relations with all other groups" (Gulmohamad, 3). In regions like Syria, ISIS's decline is clear and the organization continues to carry out savage attacks against local residents of Syria as well as anyone who resists their authority. However, the fighting in Syria between AQ and Iraq has been documented as being due to its extreme interpretation of Sharia law. Similarly, the group is losing popularity and becoming extremely resented "because of its extreme implementation of the Sharia law, expansionist attitude that disrespects local

cultures, intra-group fighting for authority and territory, and ambiguity and suspicions about its sponsors” (Gulmohamad, 7).

The tactics taken by each of the two organizations in Syria also differ. For ISIS, which believes it truly is an Islamic state, all residents of territory it takes over fall under the group’s sovereign will and must abide by its interpretations of God’s law (Zelin, 6). Under these circumstances there can be no competition and/or power sharing with anyone other than ISIS. AQ in Syria, on the other hand, believes they must work with other governing groups in the area in order to fight the Assad regime and govern liberated areas within Syria. Unlike the radical approach taken by ISIS, AQ believes that forcing their ideals upon people will not work. Therefore, they choose to take a more gradual approach in order to socialize and normalize their ideas within Syria. In other words, AQ wants to keep a low profile for now, seeing the rejection of ISIS by other rebel groups and the Syrian locals (Gulmohamad, 3). Although AQ’s approach sits better with locals in Syria, “ISIS’s ‘forcing it down people’s throats’ style is more popular with its foreign fighter contingent, which makes up about 50 percent of its fighting force and provides support for its out- of-theater power projection” (Zelin, 6). Therefore, while both groups believe they are right, their tactics on the ground in Syria prove to sit well with some and not others. Similarly, AQ’s tactics seem to only be proving their weakness and reluctance to enforce Shariah law in the eyes of ISIS.

The outcome of the power struggle between these two movements in Syria is unknown. Both have made advances in so far as gaining support, but AQ is facing a challenge since ISIS has battlefield gains in both Syria and Iraq. More recently, ISIS has lost more ground in Syria and is becoming less powerful. However, many argue that the confrontation and power struggle

between the two will not end quickly since there is no force on the ground like the US to consolidate insurgent gains against ISIS (Zelin, 7). Similarly, ISIS's hardline tactics towards locals in Syria may backfire and cause many to side with AQ. Most importantly, it is not known currently how the power struggle between the two, which is currently mainly taking place via social media and in Syria, will unfold in the rest of the world.

After AQ in Iraq suffered a major setback in Iraq, many scholars cited their "hardline ideology" as one of the reasons their movement failed (Phillips, 64). Starting in late 2006 AQ suffered significant setbacks by Sunni militia forces and coalition forces. For example, Andrew Phillips states, "AQI's defeat can be ascribed to its ideological inflexibility, its penchant for indiscriminate violence, and its absolute unwillingness to accommodate the sensitivities and political interests of its host communities" (Phillips, 64). The articles stating that AQ lost Iraq because of their hardline ideology were published before ISIS became a main player in the global jihadist movement around 2010. However, ISIS's strategies have been far more extreme and inflexible than AQ. We can see this dynamic between the two groups being played out in how they are dealing with the situation in Syria, as mentioned before, as well as the terrorist attacks occurring around the world that ISIS has taken responsibility for. Phillips also points to "al Qaeda's mishandling of its local allies in Iraq" as representing an instance of their tendency to alienate host communities (Phillips, 64). All of Phillip's analyses from 2009 as to why AQ failed in Iraq are tactics now being deployed on an even more extreme level by ISIS in Syria.

Ironically, the hardline tactics ISIS is using in Syria and in Western terrorist attacks is one of the most appealing aspects of ISIS for foreign fighters. ISIS has promised the creation of an Islamic state with a caliphate and their actions in Syria are proving to many global jihadists that

they are going to do whatever it takes to keep this promise. This aspect has drawn many foreign fighters to ISIS and has also given the organization control over many recruitment and facilitation/logistics networks (Zelin, 7). Their tactics are also causing rebel groups and locals in Syria to turn against them. However, coercion, exploitation of tribal conflicts, and regional economic deals have helped to lower local resistance against ISIS. Similarly, initial comparative economic relief and propaganda by ISIS has elicited more support for them (Smith, "ISIS").

Similarly, returning to Zarqawi's idea that authority is derived from front-line battle, the conflict in Syria is creating bonds between many ISIS fighters. In other words, fighting creates solidarity and brotherhood amongst members who will continue to keep in touch with one another even once they return to their country of origin. Those fighting for ISIS not only are forming strong relationships, they have also been on the winning side of a battle. Unlike AQ, who has not had a clear victory in a long time, ISIS is continually building its prestige and legitimacy within the global jihadist movement (Zelin, 7). ISIS is further trying to prove their validity not only to jihadists but also to those seeking to stop the organization. Given the group's evolving controls, defenses, and expansions of territory, ISIS is becoming more of a legitimate threat across the world. While many hoped that AQ's condemnation and lack of endorsement for ISIS would delegitimize them, their growing power is only furthering their legitimacy (Bilger, 11).

ISIS's growing power has been reinforced by studies indicating that the organization is actually a military group that operates from the top down. The legitimacy given to a militant organization is much higher than that given to a network, which AQ has recently been described as. The militant aspect of ISIS has been documented by ISIS themselves when the

masked killer dubbed 'Jihadi John' beheaded American journalist James Foley in August 2014, stating, "You are no longer fighting an insurgency. We are an Islamic army" (Fromson, 9). Scholars themselves have taken up this rhetoric of ISIS being a militant group rather than an extremist organization. For example, through analysis of ISIS attack types and numbers in Iraq, Alex Bilger notes that "While ISIS is tailoring its tactics to fit the operating environment of individual provinces, the organization is making several nation-wide changes to its tactics. This is a strong indication of a unified, coherent leadership structure that commands from the top down" (Bilger, 10). So usual media rhetoric that indicates ISIS is simply an extremist group with individuals that act of their own accord, Bilger uses ISIS's number of attacks as well as the types of attack in order to prove they are actually a well thought out militant group that typically gives orders from the top down. The statistics Bilger analyzes come directly from ISIS's produced reports. One of the most visible shifts in ISIS's attacks is from armed attacks to specific assassinations/targeting killings and IEDs (Bilger, 11). This shift shows a shift in ISIS's strategy towards phased campaigns in order to capture new cities and terrain. Bilger concludes ISIS is a controlled military insurgency moving to control terrain, therefore must be treated as such. Fromson explains that three aspects of ISIS's fighting machine – its number and quality of troops, sophisticated material and sheer aggressiveness – explain the group's military progress to date (Fromson, 9). Other authors, such as Audrey Cronin, have agreed that counterterrorism will not work on ISIS because they are in fact a military organization as opposed to a terrorist organization.

CONTRIBUTION TO LITERATURE

Regardless of which group is more legitimate, the real question is – Are their tensions and hostilities as real and prominent as we think they are?¹ There have been many comparisons of ISIS to AQ and vice versa by politicians and security officials across the world, ranging from remarks about their once close affiliation to the growing threat that ISIS poses and the possibility of Western powers siding with AQ to dismantle the regime. Both organizations differ drastically in their tactics, organization, and ideology although they were once connected, but how much has this affected their relationship? Many scholars cite what is happening in Syria as proof to their tensions, but what is their relationship beyond the borders of Syria? Scholars also cite speeches by their leaders in condemnation of one another, but do these condemnations hold true to their publications?

While many scholars have written about the relationship between ISIS and AQ, the majority of scholarly work is from 2015 or prior. Similarly, most scholars have written on the original split between the two groups and who is “winning” or more “legitimate” in a war for the global jihadist movement. While most focus on the territory gained by each group and the number of recruits, my focus is to build upon this preexisting knowledge by looking at what ISIS and AQ specifically say about one another. Rather than focusing on news coverage, I will focus on the publications of the two organizations in order to obtain a more recent as well as more concrete description of the relationship, beginning from when the organizations first began and ending with their most recent issues.

¹ For references on tensions and hostilities between ISIS and AQ, see Bibliography, including – Byman, Byman and Williams, Bloom, Brown, Celso, Holbrook, Karmon, Mendelshon, and others

From here I will read closely all three publications to understand the potential audiences and their ideologies and what this means for understanding these groups both separately and together. Conducting a literary analysis of the publications will not only allow me to see things that a content analysis does not, it will also provide other insight to the publications as a whole. For example, I will be able to see if there are references to the opposing organization that was not picked up in searching for key terms as well as what the publications focus on, such as a utopian ideology and calls to action for Muslim youth. This will reveal what, if any, focus the publications give to the opposing organization and the reasoning behind the focus, or lack thereof. This type of research is also important more broadly to religious extremist propaganda because there is always more to be understood outside of key words, such as background information and the reasoning behind the use or disuse of said terms.

INITIAL RESEARCH DESIGN: A CONTENT ANALYSIS

In order to answer the question regarding what ISIS and AQ say about one another, I conducted a content analysis of their publications. Instead of summarizing what scholars have said about the two organizations, a content analysis of the two publications will allow me to directly see what they say in regards to each other. Since ISIS has had two publications, I focus on all 15 issues of *Dabiq* and all 7 issues of *Rumiyah*. AQ has only had one publication, *Inspire*, and I have reviewed all 17 issues.

My content analysis focuses on what they may obviously say about one another and this is evident in the key terms I have searched the publications for. When beginning, I searched *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* for these terms – AQ, Al Qaeda, AQ, AQAP, Bin Laden, and Zawahiri. Researching the leaders of each organization allows for further insight into the relationship on a

more personal level. Similarly, a search for the obvious terms and names of the organizations allow for a more explicit description of their feelings towards one another. After reviewing a few publications of *Inspire*, I added another spelling to my search – Al-Qā’idah. I found this term mentioned in a title of one issue, “The Allies of Al-Qā’idah in Sham” and noticed the importance of the different spellings. I used a similar tactic for searching the *Inspire* publications, using key terms such as – ISIS, ISIL, Islamic State, Baghdadi, and Zarqawi. I again noticed a different spelling, this time for Baghdadi, so I added a new key term to my list – Baghdādi.

Originally my intention was to work backwards with the publications, beginning with the most recent issues in order to get a more recent picture of the relationship. This tactic, however, proved unsuccessful when I noticed that *Rumiyah* did not have many mentions of AQ. I therefore began working chronologically on each issue and focused on all issues rather than the most recent. I obtained safe PDFs of *Rumiyah* and *Dabiq* from *The Clarion Project’s* website. For *Inspire* I found safe PDFs of all issues at jihadology.net. While my content analysis can be expanded to include other terms and also can be examined more closely for what the two organizations may say cryptically, it does provide a more obvious level analysis of the relationship between the two groups in their own words. Similarly, it reveals what aspects of the other organization are important to each terrorist group.

FINDINGS IN *DABIQ* AND *RUMIYAH*

Since ISIS has two publications, I originally began by looking at the most recent, *Rumiyah*. My search, however, turned up little to no results in *Rumiyah*. After searching through all seven issues looking for AQ, Al Qaeda, AQAP, AQ, Bin Laden, and Zawahiri, I found no mentions of AQ in all seven publications. Even after returning and searching for Al-Qā’idah,

there were still no matches across the *Rumiyah* publication. Since this is the most recent publication of ISIS, it is interesting that my obvious search turned up no results. Even though the summaries provided by *The Clarion Project* seemed to allude to AQ, the obvious titles for the organization and its leaders turned up no results. One of the issues I thought would allude to AQ was issue five, which states that ISIS “attacks the Muslim enemies of the Islamic State for forming alliances with non-Muslim powers” (theclarionproject.org). Similarly, the most recent issue, issue 7, is about why other Islamist movements failed to establish Caliphates. Despite their summaries, neither issue obviously mentioned AQ by its obvious names or the organization’s leaders, Bin Laden and Zawahiri. It seems their message is meant to be more subtle in regards to which terrorist organizations it is targeting, but it is targeting AQ nonetheless for failing to establish a Caliphate.

There were far more mentions of AQ in the issues of *Dabiq*, but still not as many as I expected to find based on the abundance of information about the relationship and tensions between the two groups.² The abbreviation AQ turned up zero results across all 15 issues of *Dabiq*. The second least mentioned term was Al Qaeda, with only three mentions across two issues of *Dabiq*. Two mentions were in the “Words of the Enemy” section of the first issue and the third match was in the footnotes of issue 11. The two mentions from the first issue were comments made by Douglas A Ollivant, former Director for Iraq at the UN Security Council, who called ISIS an “Al Qaeda affiliate” and stated it was a real threat, more like the Taliban in the 1990s than Al Qaeda now (*Dabiq*, Issue 1). There are many possible reasons ISIS chose to include this in their publication. One possible reason would be to show its power in the

² See Appendix, Table 1 for findings from *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*

Western world, and another possible reason would be to show that it actually is not as much like AQ than we would like to think. While there are many explanations, these seem to be the most salient in regards to the literature on both organizations.

AQAP, which stands for AQ in the Arabian Peninsula, was also mentioned only a handful of times. Throughout all of the publications, there were only four results for AQAP and all four were in the tenth issue of *Dabiq* in the “Words of the Enemy Section”. These mentions, however, focus specifically on the confrontation in Syria and who is aligned with ISIS and who is against them. A part of the excerpt reads,

“Much of the Arab world is now essentially siding with AQAP in a Saudi-led war against Houthi rebels in that country. ... The truth is that AQ has evolved in profound ways since the death of Osama Bin Laden and the emergence of ISIS. ... It also has increasingly set itself apart from ISIS in strategy and aims on battlefields in both Syria and Yemen...”

“In this war the Arab states openly avoid bombing or attacking al-Nusra and AQAP, and in fact now provide both with financial support and weapons [indirectly, through the factions allied with them]. This is because both groups have now declared aims that are shared by the Arab states. ... So al-Nusra and AQAP have become allies and not enemies of the Arab states, despite the fact that AQ itself once sought to overthrow these same regimes...” (*Dabiq*, Issue 10, p. 68)

Judging from this section, it seems that AQ and its branches have broken away from ISIS and are now considered allies to the Arab states, who they once sought to overthrow. Although this discusses the clear differences between the groups and the ways in which their tensions are playing out on the ground in Syria and Yemen, it is all quoted from an author and apostate

journalist who wrote an article in the NYTimes titled “Why We Need AQ!” Therefore, although it is important enough for ISIS to put into its publication, it is still not directly what ISIS thinks of its now enemy, AQ.

Both of AQ’s main leaders, Bin Laden and Zawahiri, were also seldom mentioned in ISIS’s publications. Bin Laden was only mentioned 6 times in 3 *Dabiq* publications, and Zawahiri was mentioned 8, across two *Dabiq* issues. All mentions of both leaders were again in the sections “The Words of the Enemy”. One of the most interesting matches for Bin Laden came from *Dabiq*’s issue 9, in which ISIS states,

Worst of all, Barak Mendelsohn wrote an article titled “Accepting Al Qaeda – the Enemy of the United States’ Enemy” for Foreign Affairs on “9 March 2015.” In it, he said, “Since 9/11, Washington has considered al Qaeda the greatest threat to the United States, one that must be eliminated regardless of cost or time. After Washington killed Osama Bin Laden in 2011, it made Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s new leader, its next number one target. But the instability in the Middle East following the Arab revolutions and the meteoric rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al- Sham (ISIS) require that Washington rethink its policy toward al Qaeda, particularly its targeting of Zawahiri. Destabilizing al Qaeda at this time may in fact work against US efforts to defeat ISIS.” (*Dabiq*, Issue 9, p. 62)³

This passage is interesting because ISIS states this as the “worst of all” in regards to what their enemy has said. Clearly, the thought of the US accepting AQ as well as Zawahiri, after the killing

³ See Appendix 2 for extensive notes and more quotations on mentions of AQ in *Dabiq*

of Bin Laden, is repulsive to the organization. Again, however, all but one of these mentions are not in ISIS's own words or thoughts, yet they still are important enough for them to include.

AQ had the second most mentions across ISIS's publications, with a total of 25. Out of the 25, however, 19 of them were again in the "Words of the Enemy" sections of the publications. Overall, "AQ" was only mentioned in four out of 22 publications. The other 6 mentions of AQ came from Issue 10 of *Dabiq* in the section titled "The Allies of Al-Qā'idah in Sham". In particular, they are mentioned in an interview with a man who is now part of a group known as Ahrar al-Sham. Part of his interview reads,

"The group to which I belong, Ahrar al-Sham, is one example. Our name means 'Free Men of Syria.' We consider ourselves a mainstream Sunni Islamic group that is led by Syrians and fights for Syrians. We are fighting for justice for the Syrian people. Yet we have been falsely accused of having organizational links to AQ and of espousing AQ's ideology." So he disavows "AQ" and its so-called "ideology" and announces they are willing to cooperate openly now with the crusaders against the Islamic State after almost two years of indirect cooperation through their tāghūt allies. And this faction was supposedly the most "Islamic" faction according to the Jawlānī front, who themselves aided them against the Islamic State despite their extreme deviance! (*Dabiq*, Issue 10, p. 13)

The inclusion of this part of the interview in ISIS's publications shows how those affiliated with ISIS disagree with AQ's ideologies. Similarly, it shows ISIS's disapproval of anyone and any group that has been in association with AQ or has helped AQ move against ISIS.

The other mentions of AQ in “The Words of the Enemy” sections included mentions from US officials who discuss links between the two organizations as well as their now increasing differences. Some quoted passages included sentences such as, “Islamic State threatens AQ as well as the West, meaning that, in fact, AQ and the US now have a shared enemy” (*Dabiq*, Issue 9, p. 60), “the administration’s cautious approach to military intervention makes al Qaeda – which views ISIS as a renegade off shoot – an important player in curtailing ISIS’ growth” (*Dabiq*, Issue 9, p. 62), as well as “this former Al Qaeda affiliate holds territory, provides limited services, dispenses a form of justice (loosely defined), [and] most definitely has an army” (*Dabiq*, Issue 1, p. 32).⁴ Although these passages are quoted from US officials, ISIS still saw them as important enough to include. Similarly, the majority of quoted passages include the growing differences between the two groups and the relationship AQ now has with the US, another factor that makes the group less legitimate in ISIS’s eyes.

The term with the most mentions in all issues of *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* was “Al-Qā’idah” with a total of 118 mentions across 9 out of 22 issues. The issue with most of these mentions is issue 6 of *Dabiq* with 36 mentions. Most of these mentions come from the title of the publication “Al-Qā’idah of Waziristan: A Testimony From Within” as well as the specific section with the same name. The issue focuses on criticizing those who detract from ISIS or interfere with their goals of cleansing the world of non-Muslims. The section goes on for 15 pages discussing one man’s journey within different jihadist movements. The most mentions of Al-Qā’idah come from his brief meetings with members of the organization or offshoots of the organization, but he also briefly mentions the attack on the Twin Towers and how AQ has since

⁴ See Appendix 2

strayed from the path of Allah (*Dabiq*, Issue 6). There are also interviews similar to this one briefly mentioned in other issues, such as Issue 2 of *Dabiq*. Similarly, in Issue 7 of *Dabiq* many mentions of Al-Qā'idah appear in a section titled "A Deviant Book Written by a Top Leader of Al-Qā'idah". This heading is one of the clearest descriptions of AQ in ISIS's own words. The words "deviant" followed by "top leader of Al-Qā'idah" suggest the feelings of disgust and disapproval ISIS holds for the terrorist organization. In the section ISIS further shows its disapproval of the organization and the book by stating,

And instead of congratulating the Islamic State on this blessed operation in Iraq executed in revenge for the persecuted sisters, the hizbī 'Azzām al-Amrīkī [the author] began to spew forth in some of his letters what his heart contained of rancor, by defending the Catholics of Europe in the face of the actions of the mujāhidīn! He then strove to act on his personal rancor towards the Islamic State as soon as he became a top leader of al-Qā'idah after the martyrdom of Shaykh Usāmah Ibn Lādin (*Dabiq*, Issue 7, p. 32-33).

Most of the mentions of Al-Qā'idah outside of the "Words of the Enemy" sections of the publications come from the passages of interviews and this section regarding the deviant book. While the number of mentions, 118, is far more than any other key term, it is still only present in nine issues out of 22. Similarly, there are sections in *Dabiq* dedicated to "The Allies of Al-Qā'idah in Sham" which account for the rest of the mentions. These sections, however, deal with different organizations that are considered offshoots of AQ and ISIS is condemning them, rather than AQ, for their ideologies and not following the true path of Allah.

While 118 mentions is substantial, the amount of issues Al-Qā'idah is mentioned in, nine out of 22, is not very substantial, especially not in regards to my original hypothesis based off of the literature. Similarly, the majority of the mentions come from only four issues. Broken down, 24 mentions come from *Dabiq* Issue 12 (Sections "The Allies of Al-Qā'idah in Sham" and "The Allies of Al-Qā'idah in Yemen"), 16 from *Dabiq* Issue 10, 10 from *Dabiq* Issue 8 ("The Allies of Al-Qā'idah in Sham"), and 36 from *Dabiq* Issue 6 ("Al-Qā'idah of Waziristan: A Testimony From Within"). Therefore 86 out of 118 mentions come from only four publications. Similarly, 20 mentions came from the titles of sections as well as footnotes,⁵ totaling 106 out of 118 mentions of AQ.

Overall, all of the key terms mentioned are substantial and there is some information in ISIS's own words about their feelings towards AQ, but it is interesting that the number of mentions on an obvious level is so low. Based off of the scholarly literature surrounding ISIS and AQ's relationship, I assumed I would find more mentions. Perhaps the West dramatizes the tensions, or perhaps it would require a more thorough reading of each issue of the publications to decipher ISIS's true feelings towards AQ. Similarly, other names for AQ could be researched as well. Through the quotations of enemies and interviews of jihadists, however, it is evident that ISIS has strong feelings of disgust and disapproval to the once affiliated terrorist organization.

FINDINGS IN *INSPIRE*

While my findings for mentions of AQ in ISIS's publication were not as substantial as I originally expected, the obvious mentions of ISIS in AQ's publication *Inspire* were almost

⁵ See Appendix 1, Table 1 for more details

nonexistent. The search included 7 key terms and the only terms to yield any results were “Islamic State” with three mentions, “Zarqawi” with six mentions, and “Baghdādi” with one mention. The one mention of Baghdādi came from Issue 12 of *Inspire*. It comes from the section titled, “Why Did I choose AQ?” and reads,

Listen to the Amir of the ‘Islamic State of Iraq’, Sheikh Abū ‘Omar Al-Qurashi Al-Baghdādi – may Allāh accept him, as he addressed his soldiers, a speech which terrorizes the enemies of Allāh. He said: “Erupt the volcano of anger. Burn the ground under the feet of the Jews and their supporters, wipe out their armies, destroy their vehicles, shoot down their planes, and prepare for them each and every ambush, ambush them in their homes, valleys and corners. Make your nights a cover (for you), change their days to fire. Grill their flesh by car bombs, cut off their limbs by mines and take off their hearts by inflicting panic with snipers” (*Inspire*, Issue 12, p. 33).

Judging by this excerpt and the rest of the section, it seems that the person speaking chose AQ because they terrorize all who are enemies of Allah and not just the Jews. This section seems to be in conflict with the more recent literature that states AQ is more moderate than ISIS and has become less violent. Similarly, the mention of ISIS and Baghdadi seems to be more of an almost accepting rather than condemning tone. The other mentions of ISIS throughout the *Inspire* publication, however, seem to be somewhat more condemning even though they are scarce.

Although the term “Islamic State” brought up a total of 14 matches, only four of them were in regards to ISIS. The other ten matches were in regards to building a pan-Islamic State more generally. Of the four matches that were in regards to ISIS, they were across three out of 17 publications (one per issue) and there was also a footnote, which appears to be speaking

more generally to an Islamic state rather than ISIS. The footnote comes from *Inspire* Issue 9 and is speaking to the *jizyah* tax. The footnote reads, “A tax required of non-Muslims exempting them from military service and entitling them to the protection of the Islamic state.

Concurrently, zakah is not taken from them, being an obligation only upon Muslims” (*Inspire*, Issue 9). Upon further research, the jizya tax is taken from most Islamic states and is not in regards to ISIS.

The mentions of an Islamic State that do pertain to ISIS come from Issues 11, 12, and 16. The match for Islamic state in Issue 12 is the same quotation that is referenced above of the jihadist who chose to be a part of AQ and is quoting Baghdadi and mentions him as the leader of the Islamic state. The mention of ISIS in Issue 11 comes from a section titled, “Allah Will Restrain the Evil of Those Who Do Not Believe”. This section discusses how every Muslim who can join the *muhahideen* should and that it is their obligation to fight in the Way of Allah (*Inspire*, Issue 11, p. 15). The specific excerpt reads, “At the same time they watched our brothers in Somalia establishing the pillars of an Islamic State, they cannot even think of an invasion, instead they are satisfied with sending spies” (*Inspire*, Issue 11, p. 15). The “they” referenced here is the US and all other countries at war with terrorist organizations. Although the literature speaks of the condemnations of ISIS by AQ, this excerpt like the previous one seems to be less condemning and more accepting. It is a brief mention, but it seems as if the establishment of the Islamic State in Somalia is in fact a good thing that all Muslims should be participating in.

The third mention of ISIS comes from Issue 16 and seems to be the most ambivalent of all three references. The section is titled “Echoes of Events” and has various excerpts from the

New York Times, CNN, and others about recent terrorist attacks. This specific excerpt is from Philadelphia Media Network and reads,

The references in Rahami's note to Bin Laden, Awlaki, and attacks such as the Boston Marathon bombing and the absence of any mention of the Islamic State raise the possibility he was inspired by al-Qaida, analysts said. If anything, said Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown University, this may be "an al-Qaida-inspired or al-Qaida-linked connection." Even after Awlaki was killed in a 2011 drone strike in Yemen, his rhetoric continues to resonate online. His teachings have been implicated in numerous terrorist attacks, including the Fort Hood shooting in 2009 and the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013. Authorities say the gunman in Orlando earlier this year and one of the attackers in San Bernardino, Calif., last year had also viewed Awlaki's lectures (*Inspire*, Issue 16, p. 22).

This excerpt makes it unclear as to AQ's feelings towards the Islamic State. The fact that they have chosen this excerpt to include in their section could be because they are proud of the terrorist that he was probably inspired by AQ, or that they are showing a terrorist that may be linked to them rather than ISIS (who has taken credit for most terrorist attacks in the West recently). It is still hard to speculate, however, what the implications of this excerpt are in regards to AQ's feelings towards ISIS. While the other two mentions were mostly in AQ's words and did not seem very condemning, this piece is quoted from an online news source and creates an unclear image of the relationship between the two groups.

Zarqawi, ISIS's current leader, had the most mentions of all the terms at a total of six mentions across two issues of *Inspire*. Two mentions come from Issue 8 of the publication and

are in a Q&A section. The question was asked to the *Inspire* magazine via email and read, “What is your take on al-Jazeera’s series “9/11 Decade”? Do you agree to everything stated in it?” (*Inspire*, Issue 8, p. 8). *Inspire*’s response included two mentions of Zarqawi and reads,

There were a few things we disagreed with. For example, their equating of al-Zarqawi’s decapitation of “civilians” with America’s helicopter incident leaked by Wikileaks, suggesting that both sides lost the media war in Iraq, is not politically correct. Firstly, the prisoners in al-Zarqawi’s hands were not “civilians” but those who were actively participating in the building of America’s empire. The ones killed by America however, had nothing to do with anything. Secondly, there is no statistic evidence to suggest that al Qaeda’s support waned after the decapitations. As a matter of fact, al Qaeda’s support has only grown throughout the past few years.

This excerpt seems more ambivalent than condemning or accepting. It states how AQ disagrees with al-Jazeera equating the decapitation of civilians by Zarqawi with America’s helicopter incident. If anything, the answer is more condemning of America and the helicopter incident than it is of Zarqawi’s decapitating “civilians” because those killed by Zarqawi were not innocent, while those killed by America were. At the same time, AQ seems to think that Zarqawi’s actions have worked in their favor, stating that their support has only grown throughout the past years.

The other four mentions of Zarqawi come from Issue 2 of *Inspire*. Three of the mentions come from a section titled “My life in Jihad: The Story of Commander Uthman al-Ghamidi”. This section, as noted by the title, is a story of a jihadist’s life. His mentions of Zarqawi come

towards the end of his narrative and speak more kindly towards Zarqawi. He mentions the power Zarqawi's name carries and how he used that to his advantage both in training and again when he was in prison at Guantanamo Bay. The specific excerpts from his narrative read,

However, their dreams were shattered by the real men of the ummah such as Abu Mus'ab al- Zarqawi. We used to threaten them and anger them with the name of al- Zarqawi to the extent that some of them would return to apologize to us for what they had done. There were some soldiers who committed suicide before being deployed to Iraq because of their fear of Abu Mus'ab and the mujahidin....

The sacrifices of the mujahidin played a role in our release from Guantanamo. In fact they are the main reason behind our release as one of our lawyers said: "The path of the legal system is a long one and it will not get you out of here any time soon, but the knife of Abu Mus'ab al- Zarqawi would." After spending five years at Guantanamo, I was told that I would be released. But my release was delayed for a month because I told them as soon as I am released I would join the mujahidin again (*Inspire*, Issue 2, p. 15).

Both paragraphs from al-Ghamidi's story show the powerfulness of Zarqawi's name and the implications it holds in the world for jihadists. Rather than condemning Zarqawi for his actions, he tells of how powerful he is, almost as if Zarqawi is an inspiration to jihadists everywhere, regardless of their affiliation. These particular mentions of Zarqawi are interesting because it is from a story in AQ's magazine and do not seem condemning. Rather, they seem to be admiring his power and strength, as well as the fear he invokes even amongst those training to be like him.

The final mention of Zarqawi comes from Issue 8, which is mentioned above in response to the emailed question regarding al-Jazeera. While it seems from the excerpt that Zarqawi's violent actions have actually worked in favor of AQ and increased their popularity, they still do not condemn his actions and state that the people he killed were not innocent, therefore alluding to the idea that those "civilians" deserved their punishment. It is worth mentioning, however, that as stated previously in this paper, Zarqawi pledged allegiance to AQ before his death. Therefore, even though Baghdadi and ISIS have split drastically from AQ, the feelings towards Zarqawi himself may be more accepting.

Even though these mentions of Zarqawi and ISIS allude to a more ambivalent or even accepting feeling towards ISIS, the mentions in total are very scarce. Similarly, based on the literature I expected what mentions arose to be more condemning of ISIS rather than ambivalent or almost accepting. Overall, the mentions were scarce and do not give very much insight into AQ's feelings towards the organization.

WHERE TO GO NEXT

Overall, the content analysis of *Dabiq*, *Rumiyah*, and *Inspire* revealed significantly less information than I hypothesized. While *Dabiq* had a substantial amount of references to AQ, *Rumiyah* held almost none and *Inspire* held barely any mentions of ISIS as well. Based off of the scholarly literature surrounding the growing tensions and differences between the two organizations, I expected the results to be substantially greater in number. This number, however, could increase with inclusion of other names and spelling, as well as a thorough reading of each publication to see if they mention one another indirectly.

The results did reveal, however, that although the scholarly literature seems to exaggerate the tensions to some extent, there is clearly a relationship between the two. For example, the mentions of Al-Qā'idah in *Dabiq* reveal hostilities towards AQ, especially towards their allies who are complicating ISIS's mission. *Dabiq* also revealed the importance ISIS places on quoting "enemies" who view the two groups as similar, or who think AQ may be the only option for stopping ISIS. The most obvious mentions of ISIS's feelings towards AQ involved words such as "deviant" and "worst of all", showing the disgust ISIS feels for AQ and the belief that they are not following in the true path of Allah. The main focus and source of tension for ISIS, however, still seems to be on the smaller factions of AQ, or allies of AQ.

Similarly, the few mentions of ISIS in *Inspire* reveal a more ambivalent attitude than those evident towards AQ in the issues of *Dabiq*. The comments about Zarqawi reveal an attitude resembling that of enchantment with his power and his life as a jihadist, rather than condemnation. Similarly, the direct mentions of ISIS seem to be ambivalent rather than of acceptance or condemnation. It is unclear their feelings towards ISIS, even within the passages where they explicitly mention the organization. While there are multiple reasons as to why AQ may publish things that seem to be accepting of Zarqawi and indifferent towards ISIS, it seems their condemnation of the group is not more important than their war against non-Muslims. For example, most references to ISIS place the prioritizing of "terrorizing all non-Muslims" and the killing of innocents by America as more important than any tension they may have with ISIS. This is just a hypothesis, but the mentions of ISIS that were present in *Inspire* did not reveal the condemning tone I expected after conducting a review of the scholarly literature on the organizations' relationship.

Although AQ did not seem too condemning of ISIS, the mentions of AQ in *Dabiq* that were in ISIS's words were certainly more of a condemning nature. It seems as if the literature is backwards in its focus on AQ's condemnation of ISIS. Perhaps the Western news outlets and politicians/security officials' statements about AQ being a saving grace for the fight against ISIS has driven their anger towards AQ. This hypothesis, however, does not align with the chronology of the findings in *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*. The west has only more recently looked to AQ as an ally in stopping ISIS, and the most mentions of AQ come from their earlier issues. Most mentions were in *Dabiq* and they have since published 7 more magazines under *Rumiyah*.

There is obviously more to the story. In order to find out what exactly is going on with the relationship between the two, especially in regards to their magazines, we need to look deeper into the publications and do more than a content analysis of key terms. Perhaps the most important information does not explicitly mention the opposing organization. Further research should be done with perhaps more key terms, but most importantly we need to complete a more in-depth reading of each publication. Based off the explicit mentions of one another, however, their tensions do not seem to be as important as the literature appears.

Although the organizations may differ in organization, tactics, and ideologies, they still share a common enemy of non-Muslims. While this seems to be enough in AQ's publication to keep a civil relationship or "marriage of convenience", ISIS seems less interested in being allied with AQ. Overall, the mentions of one another were few and far between compared to my original hypothesis, and it appears that they do not explicitly reference one another frequently or mention their tensions in their very detailed publications.

These findings led me to look further into the organizations' publications and conduct a close reading of all three publications. *Dabiq*, *Rumiyah*, and *Inspire* all focus specifically on millenarian ideology, as mentioned in the introduction. This ideology is consistent with the overall ideologies of both ISIS and AQ and focuses on a new world in which "the forces of evil will gather themselves up in a last bid for victory. But the good will triumph. The new era – the millennium – will be a time of peace, plenty, and righteousness" (Kumar, 7). This period of time will also reward the virtuous for their strength, which in terms of ISIS and AQ means those who follow their organizations will be rewarded once the new era arrives. The millenarian ideology also represents and reveals the completion of God's purpose in relation to man, or the purpose of Allah in relation to ISIS and AQ's followers and soldiers.

A closer reading of the publications also highlights one of the main reasons why there are few mentions of the opposing organizations in each publication. It is evident both through specific mentions (like those mentions to specific countries) as well as more indirect cues (such as ways to act) that the audience of all three publications is not the opposing terrorist organization. Their audiences are specific countries, those persons who already believe in and follow their organizations, and the people they are wishing to influence. The magazines are not directed towards the followers, soldiers, and/or leaders of the opposing terrorist organization, therefore explaining why the mentions of one another come so few and far between, despite ISIS and AQ's growing tensions and violence towards one another.

THE AUDIENCE OF *DABIQ* AND *RUMIYAH*

Dabiq and *Rumiyah* seem have many different audiences, audiences that include most of the world, which is evident by the abundance of languages the magazines are published in,

such as Arabic, English, Turkish, French and Russian to name a few. The magazines also make explicit references to their audience in certain sections where they discuss calls to action, on-going conflicts, ways to perform jihad, and targets. One of the most prominent references to their audience appears in a section that occurs in every issue of *Dabiq* and some issues of *Rumiyah*, known as “In the Words of the Enemy”. While most of the sections concentrate on US officials (such as senators and the president), there are other audiences as well, including one reference in Issue 6 of *Dabiq* where the head of the Jewish state is quoted.⁶ These sections give reference to two different types of audience, one audience is those who consider the United States and the Jewish state to be enemies, and the other audience is the Jewish State and the US themselves. While it is obvious why the enemies of the US and Jewish state are one audience, both the US and the Jewish state are interested in what ISIS has to say about them as well as what they pay attention to. Whenever they are quoted in the sections known as “In the Words of the Enemy”, it creates a window to see not only if ISIS is focused on what these countries have to say, but also what parts they find most threatening, powerful, or obnoxious.

Other references to potential audiences also occur in these sections, such as figures from the United Nations and the Pope of Rome.⁷ This shows ISIS’s inferred audience to be much larger, focusing on specific people such as the Pope of Rome, as well as entire organizations such as the UN. In regards to the UN, ISIS does more than simply quote what was said at the UN meeting, they also state

“And thus, after the Riyadh Conference of the Saudi tāghūt concluded, the Nusayriyyah and their atheist allies in the Democratic Forces of Syria – with Russian support and

⁶ See Appendix 3, Figure 1 for the excerpt

⁷ See appendix 3, figures 2 and 3

American consent – blitzkreiged across regions held by the murtadd sahwāt, taking many major cities and towns through mere ‘negotiations’ with sahwah leaders who were part of the conspiracy to achieve a ‘political resolution in the Syrian conflict.’ Is it not time the naïve soldiers of the sahwah realize the evil of the plot in which they have served, repent from their apostasy, and join the ranks of the Khilāfah?” (*Dabiq* Issue 14, p. 57).

This is a more explicit example of why ISIS quotes their enemies as well as why those deemed as ISIS’s enemies would be interested to read what the magazines state. This quote also points to the other potential audience in these sections, which are those people affiliated with ISIS and/or those who believe the UN, the Pope of Rome, the US, the Jewish State, and others to be their enemies.

Rumiyah focuses more on the current areas of conflict and targets ISIS is concerned with. In each issue, there is a section titled, “News: Military Operations” in which ISIS has propaganda which shows statistics for their areas of conflict. The propaganda looks like an advertisement with survey data on it, but actually states things such as covert operations, casualties, destroyed vehicles, explosive devices, etc.⁸ One specific example is titled “More Than Two Months of Battles in the City of Raqqah” and gives statistics from the residents of the city since the battle began.⁹ Essentially, ISIS is bragging about their devastation of the city, including more than 1000 killed and more than 70% of the buildings in the city are damaged or destroyed. This references many audiences, including those who wish to defeat ISIS and want to know what damage they have done so far, as well as those who are a part of ISIS and/or

⁸ For examples, see Appendix 3, Figures 4 - 6

⁹ See Appendix 3, Figure 4

rooting for them and want to know how well they are doing. Regardless of which potential audience is reading the propaganda, they are created in order to brag about what ISIS has accomplished thus far and what areas of conflict they are focusing on when each issue is published.

Other references to hypothetical audiences appear outside of these sections as well, in sections that seek to get others to join ISIS's movement. One example that stands out the most appears in Issue 9 of *Dabiq* and is titled "Healthcare in the Khilāfah".¹⁰ The section highlights different aspects of healthcare and hospitals ISIS owns, but also explicitly targets a specific audience of Muslim medical professionals who should join ISIS and their cause. On page 26 the article ends on a section titled "A Call to Action" and states these images, information, and statistics should "be received as a wake up call for the many Muslim students... that remain in those lands, chasing after worldly pleasures instead of performing hijrah to the Islamic State" (*Dabiq*, Issue 12, p. 26). While this section appeals to many potential audiences and appeals to a person's sense of compassion through images and healthcare, it is very clear that there is a specific audience of Islamic medical professionals and students that ISIS wishes to recruit.

The publication is also written as if to target an audience that already supports ISIS or is leaning towards supporting ISIS that includes calls to action and specific ways to perform jihad, as well as how to correctly follow Allah. Although these sections are clearly written to target people who are already a part of, or leaning towards ISIS, other possible audiences for these sections could be scholars seeking to understand more about ISIS, and government officials who not only wish to understand the organization better but also wish to defeat them. Specific

¹⁰ For entire section, see Appendix 3, Figure 7

sections include titles such as “10 Days and Acts of Worship”, “Don’t Weaken in Pursuing the Enemy”, and “Worship Your Lord to Death”. These sections highlight specific ways to perform jihad and ways to follow ISIS on their path to Allah and a new world.

The section “Don’t Weaken in Pursuing the Enemy” comes from Issue 6 of *Rumiyah* and also includes a piece of propaganda discussing the effects of attacks on the economy of the Mushrikin. There is a call to action explicit in this section, as well as figures stating the effectiveness of their campaigns.¹¹ In the article there is a call to action, but also statements that show how all of ISIS’s triumphs have been through Allah himself and how the wars will continue to go on until “Allah breaks them just as He broke those before them” (*Rumiyah*, Issue 6, p. 10). Similarly, throughout the section there are mentions of the soldiers who are performing these duties in order to stay close to Allah, which hints at a more implicit call to action.

Also implicit in this section is another inferred audience, which is the enemy, specifically in this section they title their enemies as the Mushrikin. It is a message to them that they will not give up fighting and will continue to do so. Similarly, the propaganda sends a message that they consider themselves to be more victorious than anything in what they have done thus far. The messages to their enemies are evident in most of the sections of *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*, whether it is through propaganda, the words of the enemy, or the tales of Jihad, ISIS is sending a message to their enemies that they are steadfast in their missions and wars and consider themselves victorious to this point but will not stop until their enemy is completely destroyed. Therefore, *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* seem to focus on an audience that includes their enemies as

¹¹ See Appendix 3, Figure 8 for the propaganda in this section of *Rumiyah*

well as those who wish to follow them or are already following them. In other words, ISIS's implied audience in their publication seems to be aimed at almost everyone, since their list of enemies and targets covers most of the world, and what their enemies do not include are those persons who support ISIS, which can be found in the calls to jihad, ways to follow Allah, and specific mentions of young Muslims who should join their cause.

ISIS also specifically mentions their enemies in multiple sections, other than "In The Words of the Enemy". One such section appears in the last issue of *Dabiq* in an article titled, "Why We Hate You and Why We Fight You" (*Dabiq*, Issue 15, p. 30). In this section ISIS very explicitly draws the attention of their enemies and holds them as their direct audience.¹² In the section they specifically mention Western politicians and state that their labeling of ISIS's attacks as senseless and constantly questioning them is simply a political act and a propaganda tool (*Dabiq*, Issue 15, p. 30). ISIS states that Western politicians will always call their acts senseless regardless of how much it stands in opposition to facts and/or common sense. Similarly, journalists will call these acts senseless as well in order to not become a target for saying something that is politically incorrect. They also state their reasoning for hating the West because they feel it is important to clarify to the West in "unequivocal terms – yet again – why we hate you and why we fight you" (*Dabiq*, Issue 15, p. 31). Their reasoning includes most importantly that the West is full of disbelievers, and their secular, liberal societies permit things Allah has prohibited while banning many of the things He permitted. ISIS is not singling out any Western countries or politicians, rather their inferred audience in this section is the West in general and anyone who opposes their organization and what they stand for.

¹² For an excerpt, see Appendix 3, Figure 14

THE AUDIENCE OF *INSPIRE*

Inspire's audience appears similar to those found in *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*, but has more of a focus on jihadists and those who already follow their organization. *Inspire* does feature a section similar to *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah's* "In the Words of the Enemy", but it also includes positive quotes about AQ. The section appears in most issues of *Inspire* and is titled "A Collection of Quotes from Friend and Foe".¹³ Similar to ISIS's magazines, *Inspire* has two different inferred audiences in these sections; one of which is the people who already support AQ and some of them are mentioned and commended, and the other potential audience is AQ's enemies who are mentioned for the things they say that are detrimental or threatening towards AQ. Also mentioned in the quotes from those AQ considers "friends" is how they perform jihad for Allah and the attacks or damage they have done were for him, which is also explicit in ISIS's publications.

The majority of *Inspire's* articles are focused around ways to perform jihad, which references a more specific audience that is or wishes to be a part of AQ. Many of them concern tactics such as how to shoot an AK-47, how to make car bombs, and how to derail a train. There is a very clear message in these sections that if a person is or wishes to be a part of AQ, they should do these things in order to help eliminate the enemy. The abundance of articles like these not only show *Inspire's* strong leniency towards those who support their mission, but also the ways in which they can/should. These sections are created like a manual for IKEA furniture, with pictures and step-by-step instructions. The purpose is not only to teach people how to defeat the enemy, but also make it known to them that they have a duty to do so.

¹³ For an example, see Appendix 3 figure 9

These sections also feature explicit references to an audience. One such example appears in *Inspire* Issue 12.¹⁴ The section is titled, “Car Bombs Inside America” and states that “*Inspire* magazine’s goal is to empower Muslim youth. And what is empowerment without being strong, intelligent, and powerful? In this section we give you strength, power, and intelligence” (*Inspire*, Issue 12, p. 64). Similarly, a section dedicated to training with an AK starts with a page dedicated to what open source jihad is.¹⁵ Their definition for open source jihad reads,

An open source manual for those who loathe the tyrants; includes bomb making techniques, security measures, guerilla tactics, weapons training and all other jihad related activities. A disaster for the repressive imperialistic nations: The open source jihad is America’s worst nightmare. It allows Muslims to train at home instead of risking a dangerous travel abroad: Look no further, the open source jihad is now at hands reach. (*Inspire*, Issue 6, p. 36)

Most of *Inspire* reads as an open source manual for jihad, which references two possible audiences. As mentioned previously, one audience explicitly referenced is those who are thinking about joining AQ, or already a part of it (such as the Muslim youth and any other jihadists), and another audience would be the US (who is specifically mentioned here) and other enemy countries. The primary focus on jihad and ways to train and/or prepare for an attack on the enemy is more pronounced in *Inspire* than it is in *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*.

Continuing on their trend of open source jihad manuals, the most recent issue of *Inspire*, Issue 17, focuses primarily on ways in which to derail a train and it is even the title of the issue.

¹⁴ For an excerpt from the article, see Appendix 3, Figure 10

¹⁵ See Appendix 3, Figure 12

In the issue, it states, “In this edition, we will – by the will of Allah – present a simple method for targeting trains” (*Inspire*, Issue 17, p. 70). Again the implied audience in this issue is those who are already connected with AQ or already wish to be. There is another potential audience, however, throughout the section. The last page of the issue features a map of all US railways and who owns them.¹⁶ Therefore this is an important issue and section, written as if specifically towards the US, their government, and national security. Similarly, although only the US map is given, these tactics are meant to be applicable anywhere, so any country that has been targeted by AQ before would be interested in the tactics in order to hopefully prevent this from happening to their trains.

In a separate and more recent issue (Issue 14) there is a very different implied audience as well as a very different message that appears in a section titled “The Blacks in America”.¹⁷ The issue begins with pictures of African Americans in the US being beaten and it discusses the issues they still face in America today, specifically the killing of African Americans by police officers. The potential audience in this article is different than the audience throughout the rest of *Inspire*, for it focuses primarily on oppressed African Americans in the US. On the last page of the article AQ makes it a point to say any black person killed in jihadi operations is justified according to them because they are defensive, not offensive. Similarly, they state they are against the oppression and injustices directed against African Americans and AQ wishes to hear their voices and hear the oppression they have faced so the African Americans and AQ can lift the oppression against black people in America and end the aggression towards Muslims.

¹⁶ See Appendix 3, Figure 11

¹⁷ For excerpts, see Appendix 3 Figure 13

AQ seems to move back towards the general idea of jihad, however, in that the organization also states towards the end of the article, “Rights cannot be earned except by force, your own history is a witness to this. With that, we advise you to confront this issue” (*Inspire*, Issue 14, p. 23). They offer African Americans two approaches – one is a civil open approach, and the other is very violent and consists of killing racist politicians and advises African Americans to use AQ’s military ideas. This entire section is interesting not only because it is targeting African Americans in the US and discussing in depth a US political problem of injustice, but also because there seems to be a mixed message. On one hand the message is that injustice is wrong and to go about things civilly, while on the other hand the message is to take up arms against them using AQ’s tactics and trainings. There is a call to action for African Americans to join AQ and work with them to defeat the US government, but there is also an appeal to compassion, humanity, and civil rights in that AQ states it does not support their oppression. The latter seems counterintuitive to the organization because of the many casualties they have caused, but they justify this by stating their tactics are defensive against the US. Regardless, this section offers a radical difference from the earlier calls to action and manuals for AQ’s followers to make bombs, shoot AIs, and derail trains. Similarly, the direct advice given to African Americans in the US is an explicit reference to an audience of African Americans in the US who are still being oppressed.

AQ is also known for including scholars and activists as their enemies, not just specific countries and organizations. Some scholars and activists they quote as enemies include an “Expert on Counter Terror” and an “American Scholar and Civil Rights Activist” (*Inspire*, Issue 12, p. 4-5). The focus on scholars in AQ’s magazine is interesting, because it also highlights their

focus on things that are happening around the world other than terrorism. ISIS has a few mentions of scholars in their publications, but they mostly focus around the scholars who are part of ISIS or should be, such as the call for more medical professionals in ISIS's ranks. On the other hand, AQ gives more specific attention to the role of scholars and activists they consider to be their enemies in their publication. The reasoning behind the differences in implied audience here comes partly from the fact that AQ and its leaders tend to come from a more educated and elite background, whereas ISIS's leaders usually have less education and are middle to lower class. This highlights a difference between the publications too, in which AQ is more selective in both their inferred audience and their targets, whereas ISIS's potential audience(s) and targets are more focused on anyone and everyone who disagrees with, or stands in the way of their organization and goals.

UTOPIAN IDEOLOGY IN *DABIQ* AND *RUMIYAH*

ISIS's publications focus primarily on the building of the Islamic State and how a person should follow Allah's path. This focus revolves around a type of utopian ideology known as millenarianism. As noted earlier in the paper, millenarian ideology focuses on a new world in which "the forces of evil will gather themselves up in a last bid for victory. But the good will triumph. The new era – the millennium – will be a time of peace, plenty, and righteousness" (Kumar, 7). One of the strongest components of this ideology is also prominently featured in *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* that the new world will hold a period of bliss for those who are faithful to ISIS and their missions. Once they are victorious, they will enter a period of bliss that will come from God (or Allah) as a reward for their strength and dedication. This belief of a new era of bliss and glory is also referred to as "heaven on earth" (Kumar, 9). The millenarian ideology

differs from other utopian ideologies in that it adds an account of how it will be achieved and the sense of an ordered or preordained history that involves a beginning, a middle, and an end. One of ISIS's main objectives in creating the Islamic State and the destruction they have caused in trying to do so, is in order to create this millenarian utopia, also referred to as the millennium. Similarly, their publications focus primarily on how it will be achieved and the ways in which those who were faithful and victorious will be rewarded when the new era arrives.

Featured in every issue of *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* is at least one article that relates to the correct way to follow Allah, in order to be rewarded in the new era, and/or the things one should do in order to support ISIS and work towards the goal of the millennium. It is also very clear in the military propaganda as well as the stories of war that Allah blesses all of their operations, wars, and destruction. This is evident not only in the articles themselves, but even the name of the article expresses this belief. One example would be from Issue 6 of *Rumiyah*, which features an article titled "Shedding Light on the Blessed Operations in Istanbul". Both the title and article itself focuses on the idea that the destruction ISIS is causing in Istanbul is through Allah and for his purpose in order to reach the millennium.

The most prominent example of ISIS's purpose and the establishing of the Islamic State appears across four issues of *Rumiyah* in four different sections, all titled "Establishing the Islamic State". One of the most important aspects of what they call this "series" is that it gives a clear history and origin of how the establishment of the Islamic State came about, as well as the next steps to take in order to create it. This highlights part of the millenarian ideology of a specific history with a beginning, a middle, and an end, in which ISIS is currently in the middle looking towards establishing the Islamic State as their end. Similarly, the fourth installment,

which is featured in the 10th Issue of *Rumiyah*, states that there will be more installations that will go beyond the history and speak of the establishment of the Islamic State in today's reality.

The series also appeals to an overall utopian ideology. In the second installment it states, "The bulk of human beings are all the same in desiring the establishment of justice in the society in which they live, and they see this as a means to warding off the oppression that might be committed against them by others and as a means to opening the way for them to live their worldly lives in greater happiness and security" (*Rumiyah*, Issue 8, p.9). This appears after the mention of other failed attempts to establish an Islamic State in the first installment of the series.¹⁸ They begin the series by noting there have been hundreds of movements claiming to be working for the return of the khilafah, but that they have all failed and only the Islamic state has achieved this aspiration, but that their virtue has and always will belong to Allah (*Rumiyah*, Issue 7, p.7). Unlike the others, the article states ISIS has remained on the straight path and never strayed from the upright methodology for establishing the religion. The organization also mentions the millenarian principle that they will be rewarded for their victories, and states, "This means bearing a high cost for the sake of reaching the desired goal, in addition to bearing the heavy losses that can be expected" (*Rumiyah*, Issue 7, p.7).

Although this strays slightly from the millenarian ideology being explored, it is worth mentioning here because of the aforementioned lack of mentions of AQ in ISIS's magazines. This initial section notes that one of the downfalls of the previous movements who tried to establish a khilafah was the abundance of in-fighting. As opposed to fighting the taghut regimes they originally came out to oppose, these past movements typically devolved into in-fighting

¹⁸ For the first page of the first installment, see Appendix 3, Figure 15

and eventually lost not only their movement but also the religion itself. One reasoning for this is not only because their audience is not AQ, but also as mentioned here that in-fighting between jihadist groups will only lead to the demise of both organizations. ISIS would rather spend their time as well as the articles of their publication addressing the ways in which to achieve the millennium and establish the Islamic State. This means dealing with their most important enemies, the West, as opposed to addressing their tensions with AQ.

Other sections of *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* reiterate the ideology of the millennium, although in more implicit ways. Typically these implicit messages occur in sections dedicated to certain operations and targets. One such example is from *Rumiyah*, Issue 8, in the section “Fight the Mushrikin Collectively”. The very beginning of this article states, “For years following its establishment, the Khilafah has called on Muslims around the world to rise up and wage jihad against the enemies of Allah in order to raise high His word” (*Rumiyah*, Issue 8, p. 39).¹⁹ The article then goes on to describe the areas and ways in which the many mujahid factions have helped to create the Islamic State through Allah. The article is a call to action to continue fighting ISIS’s enemies, but it also reiterates the reasoning behind doing so – in order to establish a new world where the victorious and faithful will live blissfully.

There are also sections dedicated as advice to those fighting for ISIS’s cause that also reinforces the millenarian ideology. These sections are meant to remind the fighters to stay strong and persist for the new era will be the best possible. “Important Advice for the Mujahidin” is one example, in which ISIS tells their fighters to remember those who criticize them are disbelievers and will not be welcome in their new world or rewarded by Allah

¹⁹ See Appendix 3, Figure 16

(*Rumiyah*, Issue 13, p. 23). The section also focuses on the history of the Islamic State and the Khilafah to highlight the importance of what is done today. Similarly, there are ample mentions of Allah as the great and merciful who will reward those embarking on jihad once their mission is complete. The article is also meant to remind those facing doubts and disbelievers that Allah has abandoned those who do not believe in Him and will not stay true to Him or His word. This is reiterated in other sections as well including sayings such as, “Allah will bring forth a people He will love and who will love Him, humble toward the believers, powerful against the disbelievers... Whoever is an ally of Allah and His Messenger and those who have believed – indeed, the party of Allah, they will be the ones who will prevail” (*Rumiyah*, Issue 6, p. 6).

Millenarian ideology mentions what ISIS is considering itself to be facing now, which is a last bid at victory over evil before the new era of bliss. *Rumiyah* and *Dabiq* focus primarily on their targets, tactics, and operations in order to emphasize how important it is for them to be victorious over evil in order to have the new world in which they are striving for. Only through their operations and wars is this new era possible, therefore making “the middle” of wars and duties for Allah which they find themselves in now more important than ever. This is also one reason as to why their military propaganda focuses on the areas in which they have been victorious, such as car bombs detonated, casualties, buildings destroyed, and many others. Whenever there is a terrorist attack committed by anyone who is a part of ISIS, it is mentioned and publicized in their magazines, even the terror attacks that took place in London.²⁰ *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*’s focus on military propaganda such as this plays a huge role in their millenarian ideology in that they are in a final bid for victory over evil in order to usher in the new era.

²⁰ See Appendix 3, Figure 17 for London Attack Propaganda

These battles symbolize a path to the establishment of the Islamic State in which all who were victorious and faithful to ISIS will live peacefully without oppression and in Allah's vision.

UTOPIAN IDEOLOGY IN *INSPIRE*

Inspire features the same millenarian ideology as *Rumiyah* and *Dabiq*, but it focuses more on the military and target operations that need to/are-taking place today. While ISIS's publications very explicitly speak of the future of establishing an Islamic State, AQ focuses more on the middle point that they are currently in. While they still have the same goals of a new era that will reward those who are victorious, the most important feature in *Inspire* is the ways in which jihadists can help them accomplish this goal. The ideology is the same as ISIS, but it constructs itself differently in *Inspire* with a stronger focus on the middle period AQ is in now, with only brief mentions of the history and how blissful and righteous it will be once they are victorious. The brief mentions of the new era are typically mentioned in the calls to action, in which AQ explains that the disbelievers will be left behind and the believers and those who fought will enjoy the millennium. The most in-depth histories *Inspire* offers are the goals/strides AQ has made in the past 20 years.²¹ These brief histories, however, still focus on what would be the middle section of the history that is evident in all millenarian ideologies.

Following along with the millenarian ideology that they are in a last bid for victory, AQ also discusses briefly the Department of Homeland Security that deals with both natural disasters and terrorist attacks. While AQ takes pride in being responsible for the terrorist attacks, they also note how natural disasters are another step in the right direction. Natural

²¹ For an example, see Appendix 3, Figure 18

disasters, *Inspire* states, “are calamities inflicted upon them by Allah” (*Inspire*, Issue 15, p.48).²²

The natural disasters mirror a verse from Allah in which he states that Allah will afflict you with a punishment Himself, or at our (jihadists’) hands. “Therefore this department has been established in sequence with the ambushes of the truthful believers towards the kufar. It is a punishment from Allah, and these are the natural disasters, or a punishment in the hands of believers, and that is through the Jihadi operations against America” (*Inspire*, Issue 15, p.48). There are two features of the millennium present in this article. One of which is that jihadists should work to not only inspire one another but also destroy the disbelievers in order to clear a way to the new era. The other feature is that everything is in fact of God (or Allah’s) will and that good will eventually triumph over evil.

Inspire also focuses heavily on the need to persevere in the face of disbelievers in order to attain the new era. In one section, “24/7 Terrorism” AQ highlights why American’s fear AQ and states it is because AQ is following the Prophet Muhammed who said “Allah made me victorious by terror for a distance of on month’s journey.”²³ AQ goes on to repeat the words of their military commander, who states “any Muslim following the way of the Prophet will be feared by the enemies of Islam” (*Inspire*, Issue 12, p. 37). This section depicts not only that perseverance makes AQ strong in the face of its enemies but also reiterates that they will be victorious because they follow the true path of Allah and His Messenger.

Inspire’s primary focus on what is currently happening, or what needs to happen in order to usher in the new era, is evident in almost every issue of *Inspire* through their very detailed manuals on how to make acetone peroxide, car bombs, derail trains, and others. Also

²² See Appendix 3, Figure 19

²³ See Appendix 3, Figure 22

inherent in these sections is a call to action of Muslims to follow AQ and perform these things for the greater good. For example, in “Car Bombs Inside America”²⁴ AQ states plainly that their goal is to empower Muslim youth and that every Muslim who loves Allah and wants to accelerate Islam’s victory must prepare to make these bombs even if they have never done so before (*Inspire*, Issue 12, p. 64). Similarly, there is an image in Issue 14 of *Inspire* that is meant to discuss why it is important to defeat America, but the end goal in the picture is the new era of the virtuous religion of Islam, in which they have established the Khliafa and those who have fought with them will enjoy the benefits.²⁵ The few direct mentions of Islam’s victory and the millennium throughout *Inspire* come primarily from these sections in order to motivate other Muslims to join the cause and be victorious, as well as to enjoy the peace and righteousness once victory has been achieved.

Inspire reiterates this call to action with millenarian ideology in a section dedicated to lone Jihad operations, in which they analyze the country, the target priority, and the means of targeting including which issue of *Inspire* contains the guidelines for the means of targeting.²⁶ In this section they also commend their actions and state, “Hope for the best from Allah, for you are the Army of the Beneficent, heading to meet the Almighty, the Giver. He has promised you the highest gardens of Paradise... Your virtuous actions are for the sake of Allah, and from Allah is your reward” (*Inspire*, Issue 17, p. 16). This section is not only meant to praise the victories thus far for AQ, but also to inspire other Muslims to do the same. Similarly, aside from the millenarian ideology, it also shows real life operations that originated from the manuals found

²⁴ Appendix 3, Figure 10

²⁵ For this image, see Appendix 3, Figure 23

²⁶ See Appendix 3, Figure 20 for the article

throughout different issues of *Inspire*. This also sheds light on the choice of name for the magazine, in that the articles found within are meant to inspire others to join AQ's movement and help them in defeating their enemies and ushering in the new era that comes from the victory of Islam.²⁷

CONCLUSION

This paper has analyzed the literature written on ISIS and AQ as well as there well-known magazines. There is a growing tension between the groups that has been well documented in scholarly articles, such as a competition over the global jihadist movement and the problems each faces at the hands of one another (Byman and Williams). In ISIS's publications, prominent government officials (such as John McCain) are even quoted relating the two groups together and discussing which organization is more of a threat throughout the "In The Words of the Enemy" sections. Similarly, the organizations' struggles over territory continue to spiral in the Middle East and North Africa. Therefore, it seemed clear they would mention one another in their extremely detailed publications. After conducting my content analysis, however, this hypothesis was disproved. A closer reading of the publications as a whole revealed the publications are meant to serve a very different purpose. Regardless of any on-going tensions between ISIS and AQ, they are both racing to establish a Khilafa, or a new era in which the religion of Islam will be victorious. Because of this, their publications appear to be focused on other audiences and on achieving their goals, rather than dedicating time to discussing one another.

²⁷ For a direct mention of inspiration see Appendix 3, Figure 21

While *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* have a larger audience that includes almost everyone, *Inspire* is focused primarily on inspiring others to join their cause and take up arms against their enemies, with little time spent discussing or dedicating too many articles to said enemies. Both magazines focus heavily on millenarian ideology, or the establishment of a new era in which good will triumph over evil and those who have helped usher in this victory will be rewarded in a type of utopia of righteousness, peace, and bliss. The millenarian ideology plays out primarily through the current day events of what has been done or needs to be done to establish the new era in *Inspire*. *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah* also give the current strategies and operations through military propaganda, but they also devote more attention to the history of establishing the Islamic State and the end goal.

Overall, AQ is more selective in who they seem to choose as their target audience for their publications – such as followers of AQ and specific countries and officials, while ISIS appears to target almost everyone – enemies, friends, followers, and most of the world. Both publications focus primarily on the establishment of a Khilafah and how to obtain victory for the religion of Islam. The publications are written as if their primary goal, aside from inspiring people to join their cause and fight their enemies, is to show both ISIS and AQ's enemies that they will persevere in the face of any obstacle because they have God (or Allah) on their side. The inferred audiences and focus on how to make their utopia a reality, leaves no room for the publications to focus specifically on other terrorist, or jihadist, organizations. Similarly, this would even be counterintuitive because each organization was created to fight the enemy, which does not seem to include one another, at least not right now.

APPENDIX 1

Table 1 – Findings for AQ across 15 issues of *Dabiq* and 5 issues of *Rumiyah*

Key Word	Overall Mentions	Mentions in <i>Rumiyah</i>	Mentions in <i>Dabiq</i>	Mentions in “In the Words of the Enemy”	Mentions in “Allies of Al’Qā’idah”	Mentions in Foot notes	Mentions in Titles of Sections	Mentioned in how many issues (out of 22)
Al-Qā’idah	118	0	118	6 in <i>Dabiq</i>	30	16	12	9/22
AQ	25	0	25	19 in <i>Dabiq</i>	0	0	0	4/22
Al Qaeda	3	0	3	3 in <i>Dabiq</i>	0	1	0	2/22
AQ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0/22
AQAP	4	0	4	4 in <i>Dabiq</i>	0	0	0	1/22
Bin Laden	6	0	6	6 in <i>Dabiq</i>	0	0	0	3/22
Zawahiri	8	0	8	8 in <i>Dabiq</i>	0	0	0	2/22

Table 2 – Findings for ISIS across 17 issues of *Inspire*

Key Word	Overall Mentions	Mentions not in reference to ISIS	Mentions in Titles	Mentions in Footnotes	Mentioned in how many issues out of 17 (specifically in reference to ISIS only)
ISIS	0	0	0	0	0/17
ISIL	0	0	0	0	0/17
Islamic State	14	11	0	1	3/17 (1 mention per issue)
Zarqawi	6	0	0	0	2/17
Baghdadi	0	0	0	0	0/17
Baghdādi	1	0	0	0	1/17

APPENDIX 2

Detailed notes on findings in *Dabiq* and *Rumiyah*

Rumiyah Issue 7:

- “Between the Prophetic Mythology and the Paths of Deviants”
- Summary from Clarion –
 - “The seventh issue of the Islamic State’s propaganda magazine Rumiyah breaks with the others in having a title “Establishing the Islamic State Between the Prophetic Methodology and the Paths of the Deviants.” It asks why the other Islamist movements failed to establish Caliphates despite claiming to want to do so and sets out why they feel the Islamic State is the only true [Caliphate](#). The issue also calls on its fighters to trust in [Allah](#) alone and also takes time to criticize the hypocrisy of western powers allying with the Assad regime despite claiming to oppose him.”
- No results for AQ
- No results for Al Qaeda
- No results for AQ
- No results for Zawahiri
- No results for AQAP

Rumiyah Issue 6:

- Summary from Clarion –
 - “The sixth issue of the Islamic State’s propaganda magazine Rumiyah mocked and criticized the ceasefire negotiations which took place between various armed Syrian opposition factions and the Assad regime. It praises the terrorist attack on a nightclub in Istanbul that killed 39 people on New Year’s Eve. It continues to disparage the idea there is any place that is safe from attacks by ISIS and that Muslims and non-Muslims can ever coexist. Loyalty and unity with ISIS are the central themes of this issue.”
- No results for AQ
- No results for Al Qaeda
- No results for AQ
- No results for Zawahiri
- No results for AQAP

Rumiyah Issue 5:

- Summary from Clarion –
 - “The fifth issue of the Islamic State’s propaganda magazine Rumiyah attacks the Muslim enemies of the Islamic State for forming alliances with non-Muslim powers, in particular highlighting relations between Russia and Turkey. It launches into an explanation of why it is permissible to kill civilians in the cause of [jihad](#), including women and children. Other sections included instructions on how to make a Molotov cocktail and a brief history of the Murabitun Empire in medieval Islamic North Africa. Women are also exhorted to bear children to bolster the size of the ISIS population.”
- No results for AQ
- No results for Al Qaeda
- No results for AQ
- No results for Zawahiri
- No results for AQAP

Rumiyah Issue 4:

- Summary from Clarion –
 - “The fourth issue of the Islamic State’s propaganda magazine *Rumiyah* called on supporters to migrate to Islamic State held territory despite the losses suffered by the group in its wars. It boasts about military exploits and interviews the “Wali” (governor) of Tarabulus in Libya. It also includes an explanation of which Islamic scholars are deemed acceptable to follow, particularly citing Salafi favorites Ibn Taymiyya and Al-Wahhab. An extract from Ibn Taymiyya’s writings is reprinted. The theme of patience and waiting for an eventual victory runs throughout the issue.”
- No results for AQ
- No results for Al Qaeda
- No results for AQ
- No results for Zawahiri
- No results for AQAP

Rumiyah Issue 3:

- Summary from Clarion –
 - “The third issue of the Islamic State’s propaganda magazine *Rumiyah* attacks as traitors to Islam the [Muslim Brotherhood](#) and Turkey. The issue includes a written message by ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and detailed instructions about the best way to carry out a terrorist attack with a truck. *Rumiyah* continues with an obituary for a dead fighter and exhortations to monotheism and obedience to the Islamic State. They also chronicle the career of the medieval Iranian monarch Sultan Mahmud al-Ghaznawi, praising him for his invasions of Hindu India.”
- No results for AQ
- No results for Al Qaeda
- No results for AQ
- No results for Zawahiri
- No results for AQAP

Rumiyah Issue 2:

- Summary from Clarion –
 - “The second issue of the Islamic State’s new propaganda magazine *Rumiyah* boasts about terrorist attacks in Kenya and Bangladesh, while explaining to supporters in the West the best way to carry out a knife attack. Other articles continue with the Islamic State’s traditional themes of slaughtering the unbelievers and submitting to their self-proclaimed [caliphate](#).”
- No results for AQ
- No results for Al Qaeda
- No results for AQ
- No results for Zawahiri
- No results for AQAP

Rumiyah Issue 1:

- Summary from Clarion –

- “The first issue of the Islamic State’s new propaganda magazine *Rumiyah* focuses on the group’s concept of monotheism, explaining why they regard any deviation from their strict code as a betrayal of Islam punishable by death. An interview with the “amir” of ISIS’ Central Office for Investigating Grievances in an attempt to portray the group as sincerely concerned with law and order and with providing those under its rule an avenue to appeal to the Islamic State for redress should citizens be mistreated by their soldiers.”
- No results for AQ
- No results for Al Qaeda
- No results for AQ
- No results for Zawahiri
- No results for AQAP

Dabiq Issue 1:

- “The Return of the Khilafah”
- Summary from Clarion –
 - “The first issue of *Dabiq*, “***The Return of Khilafah***” is focused on the declaration of the [caliphate](#) and what that means. Some of the ideology behind the group is explained in an attempt to persuade more Muslims to join. It also explains the name of the magazine, and boasts of ISIS’ victories. It also talks about efforts made to build support among local tribal groups, reporting their pledges of loyalty to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the self-appointed caliph of the Islamic State.”
- No results for AQ
- 2 matches for Al Qaeda
 - “The Islamic State in the Words of the Enemy” – p. 32
 - Douglas A. Ollivant, former Director for Iraq at the US National Security Council, and Brian Fishman former Director of Research for the Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point – two American crusaders – wrote an article titled “The Reality of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” a short time before the Islamic State’s liberation of Mosul as well as other important cities and towns in Iraq. Here are excerpts from the article.
 - ““Out of the crucible of the Syrian civil war and the discontent in the Iraq’s Sunni regions, something new is emerging. The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is no longer a state in name only. It is a physical, if extra-legal, reality on the ground. Unacknowledged by the world community, ISIS has carved a de facto state in the borderlands of Syria and Iraq. Stretching in a long ellipse roughly from al-Raqqah in Syria to Fallujah in Iraq (with many other non-contiguous ‘islands’ of control in both Iraq and Syria), this former Al Qaeda affiliate holds territory, provides limited services, dispenses a form of justice (loosely defined), most definitely has an army, and flies its own flag”
 - “Finally, this new reality presents a challenge that rises above a mere counter-terrorism problem. ISIS no longer exists in small cells that can be neutralized by missiles or small groups of commandos. It is now a real, if nascent and unrecognized, state actor – make akin in organization and power to the Taliban of the late 1990s than Al Qaeda”
- no results for AQ
- no results for AQAP
- no results for Zawahiri
- no results for Bin Laden
- No results for Al-Qa’idah

Dabiq Issue 2:

- “The Flood”
- Summary from Clarion –
 - “The second issue of *Dabiq*, “**The Flood**,” uses the metaphor of the story of Noah to put across a stark message: you are either with the Islamic State, or against them and doomed to be destroyed. It calls on all Muslims around the world to pledge loyalty to the Islamic State and to move there immediately. There is also a section on the attempts to resolve the disputes between the Islamic State and other Jihadi factions such as Jabhat al-Nusra by means of *mubahah*, an Islamic religious arbitration process.”
- No results for AQ
- No results for Al Qaeda
- No results for AQ
- No results for AQAP
- No results for Zawahiri
- No results for Bin Laden
- 3 results for Al-Qa’idah
 - This report was strengthened by al-Harārī’s twitter “apology” to the people of Iraq, where he claims he had wronged them by labelling the treacherous apostate parties as sahwāt! In addition to all this, the words of the Jawlānī leadership are lled with implied and indirect slandering of Abū ‘Umar al-Baghdādī and Abū Hamzah al-Muhājir, for no one fought the sahwāt of Iraq except the Islamic State under the leadership of these two men. And these two men and the state that they established were praised by Shaykh Usāmah Ibn Lādin (rahima- hullāh) as well as the rest of the former al-Qā’idah leadership – p. 25
 - In contrast, despite what the Islamic State faces of economic, military, political, and media war, and despite all the different parties unified against it – from the new al-Qā’idah leadership in Khurāsān, to the safawis in Tehran, and all the way to the crusaders in Washington – it advances from victory to victory. It liberated all the eastern region of Syria from the sahwāt. It liberated the wilāyāt of Nīnawā and al-Anbār as well as vast regions of other wilāyāt. It caused the safawi army to disband, disperse, and disappear. It killed rā dah (“Muslims” according to the new al-Qā’idah leadership) by the thousands. It kept to its promise and destroyed the border obstacles that formerly separated the lands of Iraq from Shām. Its numbers con nue to grow. It announced the Khilāfah and people have begun to pledge allegiance to it in Algeria, Sudan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Waziristan, and other places. All this is from Allah alone, for the Islamic State would be nothing if le to itself. And yet the sahwah allies insist that division is be er for the Ummah while having no practical political aspirations for Islam! Wallāhul musta’ān. – p. 26

Dabiq Issue 3:

- “The Call to Hijrah”
- Summary from Clarion –
 - “The third issue of *Dabiq*, “**The Call to Hijrah**” focuses on the jihadists’ call to Muslims worldwide to move to Iraq and Syria to join the [caliphate](#) as soon as possible. *Hijrah* is Arabic for ‘migration’ and refers to the journey of the founder of Islam, Mohammed,

and his companions from Mecca to Medinah in 622 C.E. The comparison is very deliberate and intended to invoke religious nostalgia.”

- No results for AQ
- No results for Al Qaeda
- No results for AQ
- No results for AQAP
- No results for Zawahiri
- No results for Bin Laden
- No results for Al-Qa'idah

Dabiq Issue 4:

- “The Failed Crusade”
- Summary from Clarion –
 - “The fourth issue of *Dabiq* is entitled “**The Failed Crusade.**” It focuses on the attempts by the U.S.-led coalition to counter the Islamic State and mocks what the Islamists regard as a campaign doomed to fail. They express their certainty saying “This religion is the one promised with victory.” The picture on the cover is of the iconic St. Peter’s Square in Rome, displaying the group’s ambitions of world conquest.”
- No results for AQ
- No results for Al Qaeda
- No results for AQ
- No results for AQAP
- No results for Zawahiri
- No results for Al-Qa'idah
- Two results for Bin Laden – In the Words of the Enemy
 - P. 39 - Henry Kissinger also said, “There [has] come into being a kind of a Shia-belt from Tehran through Baghdad to Beirut. And this gives Iran the opportunity to reconstruct the ancient Persian Empire, this me under a Shia label. From a geo-strategic point of view, I consider Iran a bigger problem than ISIS. ISIS is a group of adventurers with a very aggressive ideology. But they have to conquer more and more territory before they can become a geo-strategic, permanent reality. I think a conflict with ISIS – important as it is – is more manageable than a confrontation with Iran” [NPR Interview]3. Again, his underestimation of the Islamic State is due to a materialist analysis believing that power is in weaponry and technology, forgetting that true power relies in the creed of tawhīd, which liberates one from any fear save the fear of his Lord and grants him the support of his Lord. Therefore, Iran will never be “a bigger problem than ISIS” unless the West enters into a truce with the Islamic State involving the halt of all attacks against the Muslims. **Former CIA Chief of “the Bin Laden Issue Station,” Michael Scheuer, said, “For now, however, the beginning of wisdom is to look at what is going on in Iraq and Syria and see it clearly. In both places all of those folks that multiple US administrations have identified as enemies of America are killing each other. In Syria, the Assad regime, Iran, and Lebanese Hizballah are killing Sunni mujahedin from all over the world, as well as their local allies and supporters. In turn, the Sunni Islamists in Syria are killing Assad’s troops, Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and Hizballah fighters. This is a perfect circumstance for the United States, all our enemies are killing each other and it is not costing us a cent or a life.”**

- P. 46 – “American crusader and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel tested before the US Senate Armed Services Committee in support of the crusade – headed by Barack Obama – against the Islamic State. Hagel had the following to say: ISIL has been very adept at deploying technology and social media to increase its global profile and attract tens of thousands of fighters. Its goal is to become the new vanguard of a global extremist movement and establish an extremist Islamic caliphate across the Middle East. It considers itself the rightful inheritor of Osama Bin Laden’s legacy. While ISIL clearly poses an immediate threat to American citizens in Iraq and our interests in the Middle East, we also know that thousands of foreign fighters, including Europeans and more than 100 Americans have travelled to Syria. With passports that give them relative freedom of movement, these fighters can exploit ISIL’s safe haven to plan, coordinate and carry out attacks against the United States and Europe.

Dabiq Issue 5:

- “Remaining and Expanding”
- Summary from Clarion –
 - The fifth issue of *Dabiq* is named after the Islamic State slogan, ‘**Remaining and Expanding.**’ In this theme, it announces the expansion of the Islamic State into Sinai, Libya, Yemen, Algeria and the Arabian Peninsula after accepting pledges of loyalty (bay’ah) from terrorist groups there. It also announces the minting of gold dinars and silver dirhams in order to separate it from the international fiat currency markets and build the economy of the Islamist state.
- No results for AQ
- No results for Al Qaeda
- No results for AQ
- No results for AQAP
- No results for Zawahiri
- No results for Bin Laden
- No results for Al-Qa’idah

Dabiq Issue 6:

- “Al-Qa’idah of Waziristan: A Testimony From Within”
- Summary from Clarion –
 - “The sixth issue of *Dabiq* is called “**Al-Qa’idah of Waziristan: A Testimony From Within.**” This issue begins by taking responsibility for the terrorist attack in Sydney that killed two at St. Martin’s place and again calls on the Islamic State’s supporters worldwide to carry out killings of Westerners whenever and wherever they can without revealing their intentions by discussing them. Most of the rest of the magazine focuses on internal jihadi disputes, criticizing the Islamic State’s detractors from within the jihadi movement.”
- No results for AQ
- No results for Al Qaeda
- No results for AQ
- No results for AQAP
- No results for Zawahiri
- No results for Bin Laden
- 36 results for al-Qā’idah

- “al-Qā'idah of Waziristan – a testimony from within”

Dabiq Issue 7:

- “From Hypocrisy to Apostasy”
- Summary from Clarion –
 - “The seventh issue of the Islamic State’s *Dabiq* magazine is entitled ***From Hypocrisy to Apostasy***. It begins with a declaration of war against Japan. Dabiq then boasts about the murder of the Jordanian pilot by immolation, before going on to give advice for would be leaders within the Islamic State. It reiterates their commitments to war, arguing that “Islam is the religion of the sword.” It then proceeds to tout its successes in Egypt and Libya. It reiterates its division of the world into two camps and includes interviews with jihadists and hostage John Cantlie.”
- No results for AQ
- No results for Al Qaeda
- No results for AQ
- No results for AQAP
- No results for Zawahiri
- No results for Bin Laden
- Al-Qa'idah – 4 matches (1 in footnotes)
 - “A Deviant Book Written by a Top Leader of Al-Qa'idah”
 - pg. 25
 - “Despite these words clearly describing the good opinion that the Islamic State leadership has of the reviver of the era and crusher of the Americans, the man equal to an ummah, Shaykh Usāmah Ibn Lādin (rahimahullāh), some of those blinded by partisanship attributed the opposite to the Islamic State. They did so by distorting the article titled “Al-Qā'idah of Waziristan – A Testimony from Within” according to their hizbī whims, although its contributor, the muhājir from Waziristan, Abū Jarīr ash-Shamālī was explicit in that his criticism of al-Qā'idah referred to adh-Dhawāhirī’s reverting of the Tandhīm to former mistakes that had been corrected by Shaykh Usāmah (rahimahullāh). Thus, adh-Dhawāhirī had abandoned the pure heritage led by Shaykh Usāmah (rahimahullāh) for the Muslim Ummah when he was martyred.”
 - Pg 31-32
 - “And instead of congratulating the Islamic State on this blessed operation in Iraq executed in revenge for the persecuted sisters, the hizbī ‘Azzām al-Amrīkī began to spew forth in some of his letters what his heart contained of rancor, by defending the Catholics of Europe in the face of the actions of the mujāhidīn! He then strove to act on his personal rancor towards the Islamic State as soon as he became a top leader of al-Qā'idah after the martyrdom of Shaykh Usāmah Ibn Lādin (rahimahullāh).”
 - pg. 33-34
 - “A similar scenario occurred in Yemen when the local branch of al-Qā'idah, deeming it incorrect to make takfir of the Rā dī Houthis on an individual level, allowed their softened stance on matters of īmān and kufr to get in the way of properly defending the lives and lands of the Muslims. The result? Yemen’s largest city was blitzed by the Houthis and captured in one fell swoop, placing the lives of countless Muslims under the authority of a people whose religion it

is to slander and abuse the wives and companions of Rasūlullāh (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam). Ironical that these jihād claimants were previously reluctant to make takfir of the Ithiyā Rā dah, knowing that these same Rā dah do not hesitate to make takfir of Rasūlullāh’s companions (radiyallāhu ‘anhum).”

Dabiq Issue 8:

- “Shari’ah Alone Will Rule Africa”
- Summary from Clarion –
 - “The eighth issue of the Islamic State’s *Dabiq* magazine is called ***Shari’ah Alone Will Rule Africa***. Like other issues of *Dabiq* it focuses on Islamic State successes, leaving out the group’s defeats in strategic areas of Iraq and Syria to focus on Africa. It emphasizes the pledge of allegiance from Boko Haram in Nigeria and terror attacks in Libya and Tunisia. It tries to portray an organization with a future by glorifying its child soldier program and undermining the legitimacy of AQ affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra by attacking its allies as ‘nationalists’ and therefore un-Islamic.”
- Al-Qa’idah – 10 matches (6 just come from the title of the section)
 - “The Allies of Al-Qa’idah in Sham”
 - Pg. 11
 - “That ends his deviant words... So, according to the allies of al-Qā’idah in Syria, there is no difference between Muslim, Christian (Assyrian/Syriac), and Nusrayrī, Rā dī, Durzī, and Ismā’īlī; Syria is a country for all of them! According to the allies of al-Qā’idah in Syria, the Syrian National Coalition, the Syrian Interim Government, and the regimes of Turkey, Āl Saud, and Qatar are all their Muslim brothers! According to the allies of al-Qā’idah in Syria, it is more important to unify upon nationalism and revolution than to divide for the sake of tawhīd and the truth! And they make these deviant statements while standing under the erected flag of nationalist jāhiliyyah, the flag of the two crusaders – Sykes and Picot!
 - Moral questioning of those who are aligned with AQ
 - Pg 19 –
 - “On the heels of this blessed opera on in Sanaa and Sa’dah, the Yemenī branch of al-Qā’idah came out and exposed its two-faced nature by denouncing the attack and reaffirming their adherence to Dhawāhiri’s guidelines, as if to imply that the Islamic State’s opera on was carried out against Sunnis in a public place of gathering not specific to the Houthis, when in reality the opposite was true. When one contrasts this blessed opera on with al-Qā’idah’s attack on a Houthi rally in Tahrir Square in Sanaa last fall, the blatant hypocrisy becomes evident: Is it permissible for Al-Qa’idah – according to Dhawāhiri’s feeble guidelines – to bomb a Houthi rally in a public square, but forbidden for the Islamic State to bomb a Houthi gathering in a Houthi temple? Or is this distinction based on blind partisanship?”
- No results for AQ
- No results for Al Qaeda
- No Results for AQAP
- No results for AQ
- No results for Zawahiri
- No results for Bin Laden

Dabiq Issue 9:

- “They Plot and Allah Plots”
- Summary from Clarion –
 - “The ninth issue of the Islamic State’s *Dabiq* magazine is called ***They Plot and Allah Plots***, referring to the central feature of the magazine which argues that Islamic State supporters should not fear any plans to defeat them since [Allah](#) controls the world. The issue focuses on legitimacy – both attacking that of its enemies in Syria and the surrounding Arab nations, and in building up its own, with pieces on the importance of [jihad](#). Most shockingly this issue ran a lengthy segments admitting to and justifying sex slavery. It threatens to sell US first Lady Michelle Obama into sexual slavery for a third of a dinar.”
- Bin Laden – 2 matches – “In the Enemy’s words”
 - “In the Words of the Enemy” Section
 - p 62 –
 - Worst of all, Barak Mendelsohn wrote an article titled “Accepting Al Qaeda – the Enemy of the United States’ Enemy” for Foreign Affairs on “9 March 2015.” In it, he said, “Since 9/11, Washington has considered al Qaeda the greatest threat to the United States, one that must be eliminated regardless of cost or time. After Washington killed Osama Bin Laden in 2011, it made Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s new leader, its next number one target. But the instability in the Middle East following the Arab revolutions and the meteoric rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al- Sham (ISIS) require that Washington rethink its policy toward al Qaeda, particularly its targeting of Zawahiri. Destabilizing al Qaeda at this time may in fact work against US efforts to defeat ISIS.”
- AQ 15 matches – in the words of the enemy
 - “In the words of the enemy” Section
 - pg. 62 - 63
 - Worst of all, Barak Mendelsohn wrote an article titled “Accepting Al Qaeda – the Enemy of the United States’ Enemy” for Foreign Affairs on “9 March 2015.” In it, he said, “Since 9/11, Washington has considered al Qaeda the greatest threat to the United States, one that must be eliminated regardless of cost or time. After Washington killed Osama Bin Laden in 2011, it made Ayman al-Zawahiri, al Qaeda’s new leader, its next number one target. But the instability in the Middle East following the Arab revolutions and the meteoric rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al- Sham (ISIS) require that Washington rethink its policy toward al Qaeda, particularly its targeting of Zawahiri. Destabilizing al Qaeda at this time may in fact work against US efforts to defeat ISIS.”
 - “... Today, al Qaeda, although still a grave threat, is only one of several emanating from the Middle East. Washington must not only contain Iran’s hegemonic aspirations, which threaten US allies, but also fight ISIS’ expansion. Washington’s failure to balance these diverging interests became apparent when it made the mistake of coupling the bombing of ISIS targets in Syria with attacks on al Qaeda’s Khorasan group ...”
 - “In order for US President Barack Obama to fulfill his promise to ‘degrade and ultimately destroy’ ISIS, he must weaken ISIS’ control of Mosul, Raqqa, and other large population centers, as well as stop its expansion. Inadvertently, the administration’s cautious approach to military intervention makes al Qaeda –

which views ISIS as a renegade off shoot – an important player in curtailing ISIS' growth."

- "... As long as Zawahiri is alive, the leaders of al Qaeda's branches who are beholden to him by personal oath are less likely to shift allegiances and join ISIS. But if and when Washington succeeds in killing Zawahiri, the leaders of al Qaeda's branches would have the opportunity to reassess whether to remain with al Qaeda or join Baghdadi's caliphate ..."
- "More so than during the Bin Laden era, al Qaeda's cohesiveness depends on the ability of its leadership to hold the various franchises together, and it is unclear whether al Qaeda can endure another succession since al Qaeda's veteran leaders have dwindled considerably in recent years, making it more dependent on old guard figures such as Zawahiri to maintain unity. As such, the group's fate may depend on Zawahiri's personal survival. It is certainly ironic that at this point, when the United States is the closest it has ever been to destroying al Qaeda, its interests would be better served by keeping the terrorist organization afloat and Zawahiri alive."
- Al-Qa'idah – 5 matches, 3 in footnotes
 - 1 in the enemy's words – photo of McCain and Lindsey Graham "calling for protective zones to defend al-qa'idah and its allies against the Islamic State" p. 64)
 - P. 7
 - "May Allah expose the hypocritical and apostate allies of "al-Qā'idah" in Shām"
- AQ
 - P. 60 "Enemy's Words"
 - "This concept was graphically mapped out by the crusaders of the Wall Street Journal on "29 August 2014" in a piece titled "United Against Islamic State." ey explained the map by briefly saying, "Fear over the spread of Islamic State means parties often at odds now share a common enemy... Parties that display friction or outright aggression toward one another are finding themselves aligned in a desire to counter Islamic State... the greatest odd bedfellow of all: Islamic State threatens AQ as well as the West, meaning that, in fact, AQ and the US now have a shared enemy."
 - Pg. 64 "Enemy's Words"
 - "The crusaders John McCain and Lindsey Graham call for protective zones defending al-Qā'idah and its allies against the Islamic State!"
 - Pg. 60
 - US official – "...based and include a healthy dose of Al-Qaida – our sworn enemy in Ira[q] and Afghanistan has somehow managed to be on our side in Syria."
- No results for AQ
- No results for AQAP
- Zawahiri – 7 mentions in "in the Enemy's words"

Dabiq issue 10:

- Summary from Clarion
 - "The tenth issue of the Islamic State's *Dabiq* magazine is called ***The Laws of All or the Laws of Men***. It opened by praising the deadly simultaneous [terror attacks in Tunisia, Kuwait and France](#) and the massive casualties caused. It calls on children to obey [Allah](#) (ie. ISIS) before their parents and wives to leave their husbands who fight ISIS. It also

boasts of expansions in the Caucasus and recruitment in Afghanistan. Since it is the Ramadan issue, it discusses the historical victories of some of the early Muslim armies during Ramadan as well as expounding on the holiness of the month.

- AQ (7 matches) – 4 in the enemy’s words
 - From “The Allies of Al-Qa’idah in Sham”
 - “The group to which I belong, Ahrar al-Sham, is one example. Our name means ‘Free Men of Syria.’ We consider ourselves a mainstream Sunni Islamic group that is led by Syrians and fights for Syrians. We are fighting for justice for the Syrian people. Yet we have been falsely accused of having organizational links to AQ and of espousing AQ’s ideology.” (13)
 - So he disavows “AQ” and its so-called “ideology” and announces they are willing to cooperate openly now with the crusaders against the Islamic State after almost two years of indirect cooperation through their tāghūt allies. And this faction was supposedly the most “Islamic” faction according to the Jawlānī front, who themselves aided them against the Islamic State despite their extreme deviance! (13)
 - In the words of the Enemy-
 - We Need AQ! Some of what he said was, “Could the group long considered the most lethal terrorist organization in the world be the best option left in the Middle East for the US and its allies? ... [M]embers of the US-led coalition against ISIS, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia, are actively supporting al-Nusra with arms and money [indirect support, through opposition joint operations chambers and military, civilian, and local councils, and with the approval and awareness of the aid-providing countries]. ... [M]uch of the Arab world is now essentially siding with AQAP in a Saudi-led war against Houthi rebels in that country. ...the truth is that AQ has evolved in profound ways since the death of Osama Bin Laden and the emergence of ISIS. ... It also has increasingly set itself apart from ISIS in strategy and aims on battlefields in both Syria and Yemen...” (pg. 68)
 - “In this war the Arab states openly avoid bombing or attacking al-Nusra and AQAP, and in fact now provide both with financial support and weapons [indirectly, through the factions allied with them]. This is because both groups have now declared aims that are shared by the Arab states. ... So al-Nusra and AQAP have become allies and not enemies of the Arab states, despite the fact that AQ itself once sought to overthrow these same regimes...”
 - “[T]he Arabs are justified in concluding that AQ may be evolving. Both groups have now taken over cities and towns in their respective states ... And both have set out policies of local control that differ markedly from those of ISIS.” (68)
- AQAP – 4 mentions
 - “In the words of the enemy” p. 68
 - (continued from above)
 - “Consider al-Nusra, ISIS’s primary rival in Syria. Unlike ISIS, ... al-Nusra is cooperating with other anti-Assad groups and recently joined the “Army of Conquest” alliance of rebel militias in northern Syria. Moreover, in contrast to ISIS’s largely international and non-Syrian fighting force, al-Nusra’s fighters are almost wholly Syrian, making them both more reliable and more committed to Syria’s future. Meanwhile, in interviews with Al Jazeera, al-Nusra leaders have vowed not to attack targets in the West, promoting an ideology that might be called ‘nationalist jihadism’ rather than global jihad. In recent

months, al-Nusra's leaders have toned down the implementation of their own brutal version of Islamic law, while putting on hold their own plans of building a caliphate."

- "Many of these same changes have been evident with AQAP in Yemen. ... e group seized the capital Mukallah, robbed the bank, and then retreated, declining to run the government themselves or impose sharia law
- No results for AQ
- Bin Laden – 1 mention
 - In the words of the enemy – p. 68
 - "We Need AQ"! Some of what he said was, "Could the group long considered the most lethal terrorist organization in the world be the best option left in the Middle East for the US and its allies? ... [M]embers of the US-led coalition against ISIS, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia, are actively supporting al-Nusra with arms and money [indirect support, through opposition joint operations chambers and military, civilian, and local councils, and with the approval and awareness of the aid-providing countries]. ... [M]uch of the Arab world is now essentially siding with AQAP in a Saudi-led war against Houthis rebels in that country. ... the truth is that AQ has evolved in profound ways since the death of Osama Bin Laden and the emergence of ISIS. ... It also has increasingly set itself apart from ISIS in strategy and aims on battlefields in both Syria and Yemen..."
- Zawahiri – 1 match
 - In the words of the enemy – p. 69
- Al-Qa'idah – 16 mentions
 - "The allies of Al-Qa'idah in Sham"
 - That ends the words of Alloush's allies. To summarize: He believes in self-determination, a cornerstone of democracy. He believes in freedom of religion and religious coexistence, a cornerstone of secularist nationalism. And he compromises religious fundamentals, meets with Jewish leaders part of the crusade against Islam, and raises banners of secularist jāhiliyyah for the sake of obtaining aid. And yet, Alloush has been one of the top allies of "al-Qā'idah" in Syria (the Jawlānī front) – openly having praised both Jawlānī and al-Harārī (a major leader of the Jawlānī front) in interviews released o cially by his "Army of Islam." He himself has been praised by al-Harārī via internet tweets. – p. 7
 - 8 mentions in footnotes
 - "Among the Believers are Men" (story)
 - He arrived in northern Afghanistan where he fought with its knights, taught them the religion, and judged between them in accordance with what Allah had taught him. He lived amongst them as a beloved person, whose word was respected, and remained working as a judge there for four years. When the spark of tawhīd was lit in Iraq and Shām, he and a group of muhājir brothers rushed to support the Islamic State, visiting al-Qā'idah's leadership on the way
 - He had headed the problem which burdened al-Qa'idah's back, as he was up for it, and he judged with allah's law impartially and thereby opposed the desires of many of them. (both quotes p. 40)
 - In the words of the enemy –
 - This might be the beginning of the implementation of proposals made by crusader think tanks, some of which were quoted in the last issue of Dābiq, in the section titled "In the Words of the Enemy." The matter might have depended on the crusaders' killing of leaders in al-Qā'idah so that the

organization submits fearfully alongside their brothers in the Tālibān emirate to American politics. Now just as the Tālibān do not pose a threat towards the safety and security of the crusader homeland, al-Qā'idah no longer poses a threat. It became the case after Dhawāhirī adopted new policies opposing the policies of the mujāhid Shaykh Usāmah Ibn Lādin (p. 67)

- In light of the policies of the tawāghīt towards al-Qā'idah in Syria, the author and apostate journalist Ahmed Rashid wrote in "New York Review of Books" on "15 June 2015" an article clarifying the condition of rapprochement and reconciliation between the tāghūt regimes and al-Qā'idah. The title of the article was... (p. 68)
- Disregarding their news and analysis, still the matter has become the opinion most proposed by the crusaders and apostates to the American administration! So when will the soldiers of the Jawlānī front repent and realize that their war against the Islamic State only serves the interests of their allies in the Sahwah Coalition that they belong to and the allies of their allies (the Crusader Coalition)? And when will the "rational minds" in al-Qā'idah repair the condition of their organization before al-Qā'idah – with all of its branches – becomes a sahwah led by its spite, envy, partisanship, and by the sorcery of the media, in the war against the revived Khilāfah? (p. 69)

Dabiq Issue 11:

- Summary from Clarion
 - "The eleventh issue of the Islamic State's propaganda magazine is called ***From the Battle of Al-Ahzab to the War of Coalitions***. Al-Ahzab refers to a battle in the [Quran](#) between a coalition of Meccan tribes and the nascent forces of Islam. ISIS attacks AQ and castigates the Taliban for concealing the death of Mullah Omar. ISIS also accuses the Shiite messiah ([Mahdi](#)) of being the dajjal (devil) in league with the Jews. More is directed at women, who are urged to have children and care for their jihadi husbands. ISIS also tout their establishment of gold dinars as currency and boast of having captured a Norwegian and a Chinese hostage, who are offered up for ransom in full page adverts."
- AQ – 1 match
 - In the words of the enemy – p. 56
- Al Qaeda – 1 match in footnotes
- No matches for AQAP
- No results for AQ
- Bin Laden – 1 match
 - In the words of the enemy – p. 56
- No results for Zawahiri
- Al-Qa'idah – 8 matches (3 in footnotes)
 - "The allies of Al-Qa'idah in Sham"

Dabiq Issue 12:

- Summary from Clarion
 - "The twelfth issue of the Islamic State's propaganda magazine is entitled ***Just Terror***. It boasts about the terrorist [attacks in Paris](#), the [double-bombing in Beirut](#), and the [downing of a Russian plane in Sinai](#) among other attacks. It spins terrorism in the language of a fairy story, referring to terrorists as "knights," acting to defend Muslim

honor. This issue is also striking for the high number of Islamic State propaganda videos it advertizes, a sign of increased output in that area. Other pieces continue long-running themes, including attacking the legitimacy of other Islamist factions, recounting its military victories and attacking women who oppose polygyny as opposing Islam.”

- Al-Qa’idah - 24 matches
 - 2 in title, 1 in footnotes
 - “The allies of Al-Qa’idah in Yemen” – 12 mentions
 - “The allies of al-Qa’idah in Sham: The End” – 11 mentions
- No results for AQ
- No results for Al Qaeda
- No results for AQ
- No results for AQAP
- No results for Bin Laden
- No results for Zawahiri

Dabiq Issue 13:

- Summary from Clarion –
 - “The thirteenth issue of the Islamic State’s propaganda magazine is called ***The Rafidah: From Ibn Sa’ba to the Dajjal***. Rafidah is a pejorative term for Shi’ite while the Dajjal is an antichrist figure in Muslim eschatology. The magazine opens by praising the San Bernardino attacks which killed 14 people in California. It goes on to attack Saudi Arabia’s legitimacy and heavily criticize the history of Shiite Islam in Iran. Jihadi John received a full two page obituary in the recurring section ‘Among the Believers are Men’ and the ‘To Our Sisters’ section provides advice on the correct way to mourn a martyred husband.”
- 3 results for Al-Qa’idah
 - Interview with The Wali p. 53
 - **Dābiq:** Does al-Qā’idah have any presence in Khurāsān following the deaths of most of its leadership? What is the organization’s role in the war against the Khilāfah inside and outside Wilāyat Khurāsān?
 - **The Wālī:** Al-Qā’idah no longer has a real presence in Khurāsān apart from the presence of only a few of its members. They are individuals who have no ability to fight the Wilāyah, but spare no effort in spreading misconceptions against the Khilāfah and against its Wilāyah in Khurāsān and inciting the people against giving bay’ah and supporting the Khilāfah. Al-Qā’idah has collapsed in a very big way here in its center and former stronghold. There no longer remains any difference between it and the Pakistani intelligence-affiliated Taliban “Afghanistan,” as the organization’s leader Ayman adh-Dhawāhirī has given bay’ah to Akhtar Mansour recently. As such, Akhtar Mansour became a leader issuing orders and Ayman adh-Dhawāhirī became a follower receiving orders. There is no difference between the two groups. Both ultimately fall under the authority of the Pakistani intelligence, and both are against the Khilāfah and its Wilāyah in Khurāsān, and in reality, against Islam.
- 2 results for AQ in “The words of the enemy”
- No results for Al Qaeda
- No results for AQ
- No results for AQAP
- No results for Bin Laden

- No results for Zawahiri

Dabiq Issue 14:

- Summary from Clarion –
 - “Issue fourteen of the Islamic State’s magazine is entitled ***The Murtadd Brotherhood***, referring to the Egyptian Islamist group the [Muslim Brotherhood](#) as apostates. In addition to sections praising the terrorists who carried out the attack on Brussels airport on March 22, *Dabiq* features a section attacking the legitimacy of the [Muslim Brotherhood](#). It also exhorts ISIS supporters to kill a slew of Muslim leaders living in the West, some of whom are linked to the Brotherhood or hold Islamist views. Regular features boasting of alleged military victories, praising departed fighters and advertising ISIS videos are also included.”
- 1 result for Al-Qa’idah
 - This attitude towards the Ikhwān was repeated in the official media of al-Qā’idah under the leadership of adh- Dhawāhirī, most famously in “The General Guidelines for Jihādī Activity” and “The Pact to Support Islam.” is attitude led the jihād claimants not only to call for greater cooperation between themselves and the Ikhwān, but even to criticize those who pronounced takfīr upon the Ikhwān. – p. 42
- No results for AQ
- No results for Al Qaeda
- No results for AQ
- No results for AQAP
- No results for Bin Laden
- No results for Zawahiri

Dabiq Issue 15:

- Summary from Clarion –
 - “The fifteenth issue of the Islamic State’s *Dabiq* magazine is called ***Breaking the Cross*** and is targeted at discrediting Christianity and Western secularism. Unlike previous issues which have primarily been directed at Muslim majority societies, this issue is full of propaganda aimed at converting non-Muslims to Islam. Sections include “Why we hate you and fight you” along with a conversion story “Why I came to Islam” from a former Christian woman from Finland. The main feature “Breaking the Cross” is an extended rebuttal of Christian and Jewish theology which sets forth the arguments to believe in Islam.”
- No results for Al-Qa’idah
- No results for AQ
- No results for Al Qaeda
- No results for AQ
- No results for AQAP
- No results for Bin Laden
- No results for Zawahiri

APPENDIX 3

Specific references from *Dabiq*, *Rumiyah*, and *Inspire* mentioned in sections 10-13


Figure 1 – Excerpt from *Dabiq* Issue 6, “In The Words of the Enemy” p. 56



Figure 2 – Excerpt from *Dabiq* Issue 15 on the Pope of Rome, p. 74



Figure 3 – Excerpt from *Dabiq* Issue 14 on the United Nations, p. 56-57





of its operations to other regions. The terrorist attacks carried out in the final months of 2015 demonstrate that it is capable of committing attacks on...targets outside the territories under its control. The extent of its reach was notably demonstrated by the suicide bombings in Beirut on 12 November 2015, the coordinated attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015 and the attacks in Jakarta by an ISIL affiliate on 14 January 2016, which closely resembled the Paris attacks...

"The recent expansion of the ISIL sphere of influence across West and North Africa, the Middle East and South and South-East Asia demonstrates the speed and scale at which the gravity of the threat has evolved in just 18 months. The complexity of the recent attacks and the level of planning, coordination and sophistication involved raise concerns about its future evolution. Moreover, other terrorist groups...are sufficiently attracted by its underlying ideology to pledge allegiance to its so-called caliphate and self-proclaimed caliph. ISIL has also benefited from the arrival of a steady stream of foreign terrorist fighters, who continue to leave their communities to replenish its ranks. The return of these fighters from the battlefields of Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic and other conflict zones is a further major concern, as returnees can extend the presence of ISIL to their States of origin and use their skills and combat experience

to recruit additional sympathizers, establish terrorist networks and commit terrorist acts..."

The report then goes on to detail how the Khilāfah implements the Shari'ah of zakāh, da'wah, jihād, jizyah, hisbah, slavery, and hudūd – referring to all these laws with terms of mockery – and how this Shari'ah poses a threat to "international peace and security," AKA the "new world order." Instead of yielding by realizing that the Khilāfah is here to stay and will continue ruling by the Shari'ah and terrorizing its enemies, he recommended the following to the tawāghīt of the divided "United Nations":

"The resolution of ongoing conflicts, including the Syrian conflict, would have a direct impact on the driving forces behind the recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters by ISIL ... In order to address the grave threat posed by ISIL, including the influx of foreign terrorist fighters to Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic and ISIL's extensive financing activities, it is essential to identify a political resolution to the Syrian conflict. This process will require sustained and determined international commitment and effective implementation of Security Council resolution 2254 (2015), which sets out a path towards formal intra-Syrian negotiations on a political transition process pursuant to the 2012 Geneva communiqué and a parallel nationwide ceasefire."

And thus, after the Riyadh Conference of the Saudi tāghūt concluded, the Nusayriyyah and their atheist allies in the Democratic Forces of Syria – with Russian support and American consent – blitzkrieged across regions held by the murtadd sahwāt, taking many major cities and towns through mere "negotiations" with sahwah leaders who were part of the conspiracy to achieve "a political resolution to the Syrian conflict."

Is it not time the naive soldiers of the sahwah realize the evil of the plot in which they have served, repent from their apostasy, and join the ranks of the Khilāfah?

Figure 4 – Military Propaganda excerpt from *Rumiyah* Issue 13, p. 13





Figure 5 – Military propaganda excerpt from *Rumiyah* Issue 7, p. 25

Figure 6 – Military propaganda excerpt from *Rumiyah* Issue 4, p. 39

Figure 7 – “Healthcare in the Khilāfah” from *Dabiq* Issue 9, p. 24-26



The Current Health Infrastructure

The Islamic State provides the Muslims with extensive healthcare by running a host of medical facilities including hospitals and clinics in all major cities through which it is offering a wide range of medical services, from various types of complicated surgery to simpler services such as hijāmah. This infrastructure is aided by a widespread network of pharmacies run by qualified pharmacists and managed under the supervision and control of the Health Dīwān. Just as the medical staff in the hospitals and clinics are made up of qualified, trained professionals, the pharmacies are likewise only run by qualified and certified pharmacists.

Preparing for the Future

In order to ensure a steady supply of qualified medical personnel in the future as well as expanding and enhancing the current medical services from a professional as well as Islamic point of view, the Islamic State recently opened the Medical College in ar-Raqqah as well as the College for Medical Studies in Mosul.

Category	Amount
Outpatients	6711
Emergency Patients	4289
Lab Tests	15688
Minor X-Rays	2384
Kidney Dialysis Sessions	442
Physiotherapy Sessions	233
Children Admitted	170
Blood Donors	1151
General Surgeries	140
Bone Surgeries	261
Urinary Surgeries	18
Nerve Surgeries	15
Ear Surgeries	3
Gynecological Surgeries	47
Emergency Surgeries	16
Births	576
Audiometric Tests	45
Brain Stem Scans	11
Ultrasound Exams	400

ONE-MONTH COMBINED STATISTICS FOR AL-FĀRŪQ AND 'ĀTISHAH HOSPITALS (WILĀYAT HALAB)



The pediatric wing of ar-Raqqah's main hospital

To achieve the stated aims, a new 3-year/6-semester curriculum was developed by senior medical experts. It consists of both intensive theoretical study in the first year with a gradual introduction to practical work under tutelage in the second and third years. This new practice-oriented curriculum is in stark contrast to previous curriculums that would include tāghūt-sponsored pseudo-sciences such as “culture” (i.e. secular nationalism) or superfluous subjects that are irrelevant to a physician’s day-to-day work. The new curriculum covers specialties such as general surgery, fracture and orthopedic surgery, trauma surgery, gynecology and obstetrics, cardiology, pediatric and medical emergency, ophthalmology, urinary surgery, neurosurgery, thoracic surgery and vascular surgery.

The teaching staff consists exclusively of degree holders. Entrance is open to both females and males, with a dedicated school building, hospital, and female teaching staff for the female students. To support the students in their efforts the Islamic State does not charge any fees and provides the students with all that is necessary in terms of food, clothing, housing, transport, and books. For further encouragement high-achievers are granted rewards.

A Call to Action

A senior medical worker in the Health Dīwān in ar-Raqqah explained to Dābiq that the Medical College attracted more than 300 applicants, of which 100 were accepted, half of whom were muhājirīn. He also mentioned that the student body is highly motivated and achieved good results in the first months, but that the staff wishes for support from additional teachers, preferably muhājirīn with experience in the medical field. He also indicated that a practical laboratory will soon be opened for the students.

This should be received as a wake-up call for the many Muslim students in the lands of kufr who claim to study medicine to “benefit and support the Muslim Ummah,” but then remain in those


lands, chasing after worldly pleasures instead of performing hijrah to the Islamic State – and this despite hijrah being an undeniable Islamic obligation, in addition to the fact that hijrah was and still is relatively easy. The Islamic State offers everything that you need to live and work here, so what are you waiting for?





Figure 8 – Military Propaganda, “Do Not Weaken In Pursuing the Enemy” *Rumiyah* Issue 6, p. 11





Figure 9 – Excerpt from *Inspire* Issue 12, “A Collection of Quotes from Friend and Foe”, p. 4-5


 **@heartheworld**
A collection of quotes from friend and foe

 **MAJOR NIDĀL HASSAN, Soldier of Allāh - Fort Hood Shooter** (Court Statement):
I am the Shooter. ... The evidence will show I was on the wrong side. The evidence will also show that I then switched sides. The evidence will show we Mujahideen are imperfect soldiers trying to establish a perfect religion in the Land of the Supreme God.

 **ROBERT MUELLER, Former FBI Director** (AFP):
Lone wolf or solo terrorists are much more difficult for us to identify and to disrupt for an attack to take place. It's hard to quantify (the threat) because you have one metric and that is preventing all attacks. If there's one attack, you're unsuccessful ... It (Fort Hood shooting) is part of a pattern we've seen recently but a pattern that probably will be replicated in the future. The existence of 'lone wolves' is why telephone and Internet surveillance programmes are 'tremendously important'.

 **BARACK OBAMA, US President** (CNN):
Across the political spectrum, Americans recognize that we had to adapt to a world in which a bomb could be built in a basement. (In a recent speech of his justifying NSA's mass surveillance.)

 **DR. CORNEL WEST, American Philosopher & Civil Rights Activist** (Huffington Post):
I think we have to acknowledge that President Obama has very little moral authority at this point, because we know anybody who tries to rationalize the killing of innocent people, a criminal - George Zimmerman is a criminal - but President Obama is a global George Zimmerman (pointing to Obama's attempt to rationalize the killing of innocent children in U.S. drone strikes).

 **JEREMIAH ADEBOLAJO, Brother of the Woolwich Mujahid** (Aljazeera International):
People may say, "Well, he (Woolwich Mujahid) is a violent individual, and he proved that on the day of Woolwich." But I would say, "Was Lee Rigby a violent individual? Are other British soldiers, who go to Afghanistan and Iraq and kill, violent individuals?"



@heartheworld

A collection of quotes from friend and foe




ĀDAM GADAHN, Al-Qāeda Mujahid (As-Sahāb Media):

Stand, revenge on America the enemy of Islam and Muslims. Remind us of the glories of Nairobi, Dar-es-salam, Aden, New York, Washington, Fort Hood, Benghazi and Boston. Defend your religion, Ummah and honors from America and the crusaders, by hitting their interests in our countries and theirs. The war with the crusaders and Jews is global; it does not acknowledge boundaries and there are no restrictions except those brought by the just Shari'ah or those advantageous to Islam and Muslims as seen by the trusted Ummah scholars and Mujahideen leaders.



MUSTĀFA QADRI, Amnesty International, Researcher (France 24):

We're really concerned about the US drone program. Because it claims it can use them anywhere in the world because it has a global war against Al-Qāeda and its allies. But we have to take the US on its word, because it has provided us with no information. This is a secret program. In fact, in our case we've found at least in some cases they've clearly killed civilians, and some of these cases might be war-crimes.



REP. TOM COTTON, Former Soldier in Iraq and Afghanistan (American Enterprise Institute):

The president likes to say that Al-Qāeda is on the run, maybe so. But only in one regard. As for many have learned the basic infantry doctrine, the infantry is on offense when it is moving, and is in defense when it is not moving. Al-Qāeda is only on the run in the sense that Al-Qāeda is on the offense around the world.



ERROLL G. SOUTHERS, Expert on Counter-terrorism (Interview with Hienz):


Homegrown actors can successfully attack a U.S. target with little or no resources. We have always known this was a possibility, but Boston reminded us of the adaptive nature of the threat we face. The Tsarnaevs chose to attack a marathon - a particularly difficult target to secure. This speaks to the issue of soft targets and their relative vulnerability, and the fact that violent actors seek out public gatherings that, by their nature, cannot be made totally secure.



SUHEIB AMÍN, Former Brooklyn College Student (Aljazeera America):

I remember we had, you know, a political discussion in class that I really didn't want to get involved in. I remember I had one professor that said that if he was in Iraq, he'd probably be on the other side. And I remember I was just looking at him thinking I'll be in jail if I thought (of) that.

Figure 10 – Excerpt from “Car Bombs Inside America” *Inspire*, Issue 12, p. 64-67



REQUIRED COMPONENTS

- Cooking Gas Cylinders (6 or more)
- Oxygen Gas Cylinder (full)
- Barometer (suiting the Cooking Gas Cylinder)
- Connecting nut and pipe
- 6 Decoration lamps
- Match
- Epoxy
- Tissue
- Battery (12v or more)
- Wire

CAR BOMBS INSIDE AMERICA

w/ AQ Chef

Inspire Magazine's goal is to empower Muslim youth. And what is empowerment without being strong, powerful and intelligent? In this section, we give you strength, power and intelligence. Believe me, using car bombs gives you all that.

It is absolutely simple. And we will make it simpler for you, *biidhniilah*, so that every Muslim, who loves Allah and His Messenger, and wants to accelerate Islam's victory, becomes prepare to make, even if this is the first military material his eyes has set on.


This recipe gives you the ability to make a car bomb even in countries with tight security and surveillance. The reason is: primary materials easily available and they do not raise suspicion. These materials are not explosives in nature. But after you have assemble and prepare them, they become a bomb ready for destruction, *biidhniilah*.

This type of car bomb is not usually used to destroy buildings, but is very effective in killing individuals.


The merit of this method is that you can prepare a car bomb in a few hours during the availability of the primary materials. So there is less worry about your personal security.

My Muslim brother, before you start reading the instructions, remember that this type of operation if prepared well and an appropriate target is chosen and Allah decrees success for you, history will never forget it. It will be recorded as a crushing defeat on the enemies of Islam.


OSI BOMB SCHOOL




Epoxy




Decoration Lamp




Barometer



Connection Nut



Cooking Gas Cylinder



Oxygen Gas Cylinder



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OPERATIONAL IDEA:

- Pure 'Oxygen' was used as the oxidizing gas, cooking gas 'Propane' as the fuel, and Cooking Gas Cylinder as the sealed container.
- An amount of gas was discharged from the Cooking Gas Cylinder.
- The highly pressurized Oxygen Cylinder was connected to the Cooking Gas Cylinder.
- When the safety valves of both the cylinders were opened, Oxygen Gas moved into the Cooking Gas Cylinder directly. This was caused by pressure difference.
- The pressure inside the Oxygen Cylinder was very high compared to that inside the Cooking Gas Cylinder. We know that gas moves from a high pressure region to a lower pressure region.

PRESSURE DIFFERENCE:

While the tap is closed, the pressure in the yellow balloon is zero, while the pressure in the red balloon is one.

But when we open the tap, gas moves from the high pressure region (red balloon) to the low pressure region (yellow balloon) in such the pressures in the two balloons become equal.

BAROMETERS:

Pressure measuring instruments are called 'barometers'.

There are different types of barometers, some measure up to 11 bars, others up to 280 bars, and others in between. Barometers used to measure tire pressure usually measure up to 11, 12 or 16 bars.

Barometers used for gas cylinders differ as per the type of the cylinder. For example, large Oxygen cylinders use barometers of 240 bars or 280 bars. Medium cooking gas cylinders use barometers of 34 or 36 bars. There are also many other types of barometers.

Barometers use different units, some use 'atm', others 'pound per square inch (psi)', Pascals (Pa) or millimeter of mercury (mmHg).

Here are some barometers:

1. This barometer is sometimes called a 'regulator'. We will use it in these instructions. The meter on the right measures the pressure in the oxygen cylinder - its maximum measurement is 28,000 kilopascals (kPa), equivalent to 280 bars. While the meter on the left measures the cooking gas cylinder - its maximum measurement is 1400 kPa, equivalent to 14 bars.

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HINT

- You can use oxygen from medical or welding cylinders.
- You can also use other fuels instead of propane, e.g. hydrogen, methane or acetylene.
- These fuels give better results, if security measures allow you to buy.




DID YOU KNOW?

that you can mix the two gases in one Welding-Oxygen Cylinder? An oxygen cylinder can sustain more than 12 Cooking Gas Cylinders of 25-liters. BUT do not forget the balloon principle.

2 - Connect the Oxygen Cylinder to the Cooking Gas Cylinder.

Note: to be able to insert Oxygen Gas into the Cooking Gas Cylinder, you should have the connecting nut illustrated in the photo.


If the connector is unavailable, or buying it may draw attention to you, you can use a normal cooking gas regulator with a bit of modification. You will have to drill a hole from the inside to let Oxygen Gas pass into the cylinder.

3 - Insert 9 bars of Oxygen Gas into the Cooking Gas Cylinder.

This will make the total pressure inside the Cooking Gas Cylinder 12 bars. (fig 2-3)

Avoid heat and fire sources while inserting or discharging gas!




SECURITY MEASURES:

- If you are planning to hide your identity and cover your trail during the operation, begin from the time you set your feet to purchase the ingredients.
- Wipe your fingerprints.
- Use a car that will not reveal your identity.
- Avoid CCTV cameras.


FIG : 2.1 & 2.2

The spot to be drilled.


1.1. Tire Barometer




1.2. Cooking Gas Regulator



1.3. Nut and Valve




1.4. Final Result




4 - Preparing the ignition lamp:

- The ignition lamp is the tool that emits a flame into the mixed gas inside the Cooking Gas Cylinder, to detonate the bomb.
- Break the top of the decoration lamp by heating it. Make sure the filament does not break.
- Fill the lamp with match (from matchstick heads). (fig 3-1)
- Seal it with a tissue. (fig 3-2)

3.1. Match In Lamp



3.2. Sealing



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Figure 11 – “A Map of US Railroad Lines by Ownership” *Inspire*, Issue 17, p. 96-97




Figure 12 – Prelude to “Training with the AK”, *Inspire*, Issue 6, p. 36-37

Open Source Jihad

o·pen |'ōpən| source |sōrs| ji·had |ji'hād|

A resource manual for those who loathe the tyrants; includes bomb making techniques, security measures, guerrilla tactics, weapons training and all other jihād related activities.

- informal A disaster for the repressive imperialistic nations: *The open source jihād is America's worst nightmare.*
- It allows Muslims to train at home instead of risking a dangerous travel abroad: *Look no further, the open source jihād is now at hands reach.*

TRAINING with the AK
 abu saleh

Okay, I promise this will be the last one! Today I will be showing you all of the important shooting stances that the mujahidin adopt.

A lot of this is all about imitating what you see in the images. The steps will be explained.

OSJ GUN SCHOOL

1. Standing

- Point your gun at the target by resting the butt stock of the rifle on your right shoulder (if you're a righty of course)
- Lean your back forward slightly.
- Your feet should form a somewhat L-formation but a 45 degree angle. The back foot is sticking out while the front is pointing at the target
- Bend the knees slightly

2. One knee

- Get on one knee
- Keep back straight

3. Kneeling

- Sit back and bring the knee forward. Rest either on the ankle or toes

4. Sitting

- Sit down
- Rest non-trigger arm on your thigh for maximum accuracy

Figure 13 – Excerpt from “The Blacks in America”, *Inspire*, Issue 14, p. 18-19, 22-23




THE BLACKS IN AMERICA

The Rights of Blacks: Their State and Challenges

Those who live and travel between the different states in America and interact with people in their daily lives, will discover that racism and discrimination still exist in the minds of the white. If you take a look at the educational opportunities, economic growth, political representation and job opportunities, you will find that most of the Afro-Americans are deprived from these basic benefits. Insufficient healthcare system, discrimination in housing benefits, law-enforcement injustices. The Afro-Americans are the main victims of these injustices. Thus we are not surprised when we see a series of criminal aggression against them occurring frequently in such a pace. But what is surprising is the continual high support of the Black-Africans towards the democrats in elections. The same party in power as before, and the same oppression and injustices towards the Black continue to repeat themselves. What is more unfortunate is that the President is of the same race, who does not pay any attention to the injustices of his own people. Rather his greatest fear is his political position and his clinging to power.

The current Anglo-Saxon generation has been raised with this kind of arrogance mentality, arrogance towards all kinds of people – especially the Black Americans. And history will never forget their past sufferings. Therefore, when we read about the killings of Black youth by the police or the white supremacists, we have to examine – as they say in criminology – the objectives and psychological motives to these crimes. From here we can say that the main motives to these crimes is not gun violence, as Obama tries to portray. But the reality is that we cannot separate this violence with the fanatic white racists supremacists, which must be stopped by all means possible.

The solution to this fanaticism should not only be confined to America. This is because the same American oppression towards the Blacks today, is practiced towards other communities around the world. The same level of oppression is exercised against the Muslims today. Exercised by these racist white politicians, among them are Black politicians who are not real representatives of their community. And if they are not able to uphold their rights, then how can




THE BLACKS IN AMERICA


THE BLACKS IN AMERICA

Abu Abdillah Almoravid

The killing of Michael Brown, American of African descent, incited wide demonstrations all over the United States. As news resonated across the global media, in America the media was contradicting and having different point of views regarding this tragedy. At first many channels portrayed the incident as it was, but later on presented the event to the viewer as a mere daily criminal incident. And that the victim was a person who deserved to be stopped and imprisoned. And that the crime of the officer was nothing but a general mistake that had nothing to do with racism or religion. Examples of such a channel is the 'Fox News' that has always been supporting the Anglo-Saxon community, no matter the case. The same channel that supports the existence of a Zionist state in occupied Palestine. While some channels, for example 'TV ONE', exposed the reality on the ground. Condemning and criticizing the actions of the police. They focused on presenting the problem as it was, and that it is a result of a much wider deep-rooted problem. The demonstrations against racism continued for some time, but eventually died down. During that time, I wanted to write about this event, talk about the essence of the problem from the perspective of Muslims and Mujahideen. But circumstances did not allow me to do so. And in reality I didn't anticipate that the incident will take this toll, and the problem to be this deep. Within a short period, a similar incident occurred, the brutal killing of Freddie Gray. This made me research more on the subject of racism in America, and with that I write seeking assistance from Allah.



Michael Brown



Freddie Gray

The killing of Gray shocked the Afro-American community. This is mainly because, it occurred while they were still mourning Michael Brown's death, and the manner in which Gray was killed. The incident was shocking. How do five police officers attack an unarmed person in such a manner? Hitting and strangling him to death. How can they say that the killing was not intentional, when the place and manner indicated clear intent? The Baltimore community was shocked; widespread demonstrations began across

Qitadatul Jihad in the Arabian Peninsula | 19

they defend the rights of others?

The American leaders, through their media, always try to display their innocence against racism. Being in the forefront in describing others as racists, e.g. the Nazi and the Aryan racists. But the fact is that they cannot escape from their past and present crimes. The Fanaticism and the American people's sense of dominance and subjugation towards other communities can never be censured by the American media. They instead resorted to changing terminologies: calling discrimination, caste, superiority over the people as political and military domination, but the result is all the same. And as Michael Brown and Freddie Gray were killed, then we have thousands of Muslims killed in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Yemen. And the continuous killing of hundreds of Palestinians using weapons from the racist Americans.

O Afro-Americans, it is a pity that you play a part in this oppression against Muslims. You are the ones who elect those who promise to continue waging war with us in our lands. You are the ones who elect those who promise to protect Israel, who aggressively and unjustly occupy our lands. This is a historic chance for you to review your actions, and to take a stand against these crimes in the face of these fanatics. As you condemn you will be condemned. And as the say, whoever accepts injustice will be the first to be burnt by its fire.

A Bright Future and Hope.

Islam prohibits discrimination, demolishes social castes and unites Muslims as a single body. There is no distinction between Black and White, Arab and non-Arab except through *taqwa* (God fearing). These are the principles of Islam that we call the people to. In reality, I came across American demographic statistics and found out that a third of Muslims in America are Afro-Americans. And that Islam spreads fast among this community. Hence, we invite them to this religion, a religion that practically gives them justice from racial segregation. As it was just to Bilal bin Rabah, the Black *habashi* (Former Ethiopian slave), who became a master among the masters of Islam, and a commander among the commanders of Islam. Whoever lives in the American society will find that Afro-Americans are much better than the whites in

terms of morals and family responsibility. And this gives glad tidings and hope of changing the American reality.

From here we continue to send important messages, hoping they will change their situation and raise oppression over all:

- Firstly: Qitadatul Jihad and the entire Muslim Ummah are against the oppression and injustices directed towards you. And whoever is killed among you in our Jihadi operations, is justified according to us. This is because our Jihadi operations are defensive, even though they seem to be offensive as in September 11 – which in context is a general defense on our Ummah, that has been assaulted by the Jews and supported by America.
- Secondly: we want to hear your voices against the crimes committed by your government. We encourage you to form political groups in order to pressurize your government to lift the general oppression against you and to stop aggression towards Muslims. And condemn the support your government gives to Israel. From there we will take practical steps to avoid targeting you in our operations.
- Thirdly: Adding to the second point, we advise you to move out of big cities that represent the economy, politics or military strength of America like New York and Washington.
- Fourthly: Rights cannot be earned except by force, your own history is a witness to this. With that, we advise you to confront this issue in two directions.
 1. The first is a civil open approach, not military. Demanding your total rights, by pressuring your government using a soft approaches like: demonstrations, stage sit-in and civil disobedience.
 2. The second approach is by forming small groups that will be responsible for assassinating, targeting these racist politicians.
- Fifth: we at Inspire bring to you military consultation, one may refer back to the previous issues to find appropriate military ideas.

Figure 14 – Excerpt from “Why We Hate You and Why We Fight You” *Dabiq*, Issue 15, p.30



Figure 15 – The beginning of the series “Establishing the Islamic State” *Rumiyah*, Issue 7, p.7

We would not be exaggerating if we were to say that hundreds of movements, parties, and factions have arisen over the course of the past century claiming to be working for the return of the khilafah, the implementation of the Shari’ah, and the establishment of the religion on the earth. However, they all failed to achieve that, despite some of them having reached a stage of either actual consolidation or pseudo-consolidation. Among them were those who even managed to establish some of the rulings of the Shari’ah, but the aforementioned aspirations were never achieved in their entirety except by the Islamic State, and virtue has and always will belong to Allah.

If we were to look at the condition of those movements we would find that most of them created obstacles and obstructions for themselves that either blocked the path in front of them or forcefully pushed them to deviate from the single, true path that would lead to the lofty goal to which they aspired. They burdened themselves with that which Allah had not burdened them with and obligated upon themselves that which Allah had not obligated upon them, regardless of whether they were those who tread the path of harshness, ghuluww (extremism), and imposing that which Allah had not obligated on them, or those who tread the path of fleeing from the shar’i rulings. In both cases, they became distant from the straight path and the upright methodology for establishing the religion.

Corrupt Absolutes

One of the main things that they burdened themselves with is that which they innovated of work methodologies which their leaders, theorists, and scholars put in place for them, giving them names such as political theories, movement methodologies, or the likes of that, referring to what they’ve imposed of pre-requisites that are necessary for achieving the results that they aim for with their work and their movement, such that their perceptions and desires inspired to them methods of work that should be followed in order to reach the desired goal – the establishment of Allah’s religion on the earth. And they were not content with merely putting forth these theories or hypotheses. Rather, they made them out to be equal to the straight path with respect to working for the establishment of Allah’s religion, as it was incorrect – in their view – to follow anything else in order to reach the goal. As a result, they tread the path of absolutes

and burdened themselves and their followers with that which they could not bear and that which had not been obligated on them. Thus, they increased in misguidance, and Allah does not guide the defiantly disobedient people.

These suppositions were based on the notion that the path towards establishing the religion should involve reaching a level-based goal or surmounting a major obstacle, and that without achieving either one or the other it wouldn’t be possible – according to them – to establish the religion or to speak of an Islamic state, let alone establish a khilafah upon the prophetic methodology and a greater imamah for a unified ummah.

The biggest problem with their hypotheses is that it generally isn’t possible to establish the correctness or incorrectness of a hypothesis without first putting it to the test. So if the result of the experiment backs up the hypothesis, then it has thus been proven and can be considered a correct theory. And if the theory is repeatedly successful in varying circumstances, it becomes an established formula through which one can gauge the results of any action or the future of any situation if the elements of that action and its situation correspond with the formula’s pre-requisites. And this is where the trouble lies for those movements, because they would treat their hypotheses as if they were theories that had proven to be correct, or they would treat the theories of other groups – which those groups believed to be correctly applicable to their specific situations – as if they were established formulas that should be adhered to in every situation, era, and place.

Experiments Whose Price Was Blood

The only way to test theories and hypotheses that concern humans – or a subsection of them – and everything related to their lives is for them to turn themselves into a field of experiment, by pushing themselves to apply their hypotheses, waiting for the results to appear in the real world, recording the results, and then making a judgment based on the results as to the correctness of the hypothesis based on real world evidence. This means bearing a high cost for the sake of reaching the desired goal, in addition to bearing the heavy losses that can be expected if the basis of the hypothesis is mistaken, or if it is applied in an incorrect manner, or even if an influential variable or factor that wasn’t previously anticipated enters the field of

Figure 16 – “Fight the Mushrikin Collectively” *Rumiyah*, Issue 8, p. 39

For years following its establishment, the Khilafah has called on Muslims around the world to rise up and wage jihad against the enemies of Allah in order to raise high His word, and to unite under the banner of the jama'ah of the Muslims. This call was met with a forceful response as several groups of mujahidin around the world quickly closed ranks and declared their bay'ah to Amirul-Muminin, with some of them uniting with other mujahid factions in their region and nominating an individual from among themselves to be appointed by the Khalifah as their amir.

Thus, the Khilafah quickly expanded beyond its territories in Iraq and Sham, two lands from the lands of the Muslims that had been usurped by the Crusaders and carved up among themselves through the use of artificial borders that were upheld throughout the rule of their taghut puppets. The Khilafah expanded beyond Iraq and Sham after destroying their artificial border, uniting their territories, and establishing the Shari'ah therein, thereby demonstrating that the Ummah's unity was not beyond reach, as long as it was pursued on the basis of the tawhid of Allah. It was this form of unity to which the Islamic State called the mujahidin – a form of unity that gave tawhid its proper due, as opposed to sacrificing it for the sake of temporary political gain – and it was this form of unity that the truthful mujahidin around the world had long awaited. So when the Khilafah made its call, the response echoed from every direction... from Sinai, Libya, Jazair, Yemen, and the Arabian Peninsula.

The mujahidin were being mobilized to unite upon tawhid and to form a unified front against every mushrik in every corner of the earth, just as Allah ﷻ had commanded them, “And fight the mushrikin collectively just as they fight you collectively” (At-Tawbah 36). The war against kufr soon intensified as the mushrikin rallied in an attempt to stop the Islamic State's expansion and bring an end to the threat it posed. But one after another the mujahid factions continued to unite under the Khilafah's banner. Khurasan, West Africa, Somalia, East Asia, Mali... the phenomenon swept through the lands of the Muslims, and in every region where bay'ah was given, attacks would follow. The mujahidin marched forth and struck the kuffar wherever they found them, not differentiating between a Crusading mushrik and a murtadd puppet.

Such was the case when eight inghimasi soldiers of the Khilafah set out to raid a Russian National Guard base near the village of Naurskaya, northwest of the Chechen city of Grozny in Qawqaz Wilayah. They

used the foggy weather and the darkness of night to their advantage, advancing towards the military base, and the fact that they were armed with nothing but knives didn't make them hesitant in fighting the disbelieving enemies of Allah. Rather, it served as a sign of their truthfulness to Him. This small group of mujahidin – who spent ten days training for the operation – then attacked the soldiers in the base with their knives and seized their weapons. They then clashed with them for several hours, killing at least six of them and injuring three others. Six of the mujahidin attained shahadah during the course of the operation, and the remaining two returned safely back to their locations.

The daring raid on the Russian base in Chechnya coincided with another operation by the soldiers of the Khilafah several thousand kilometers away in Bengal. The istishhadi Abu Muhammad al-Bengali ﷻ made his way towards one of the checkpoints of the international airport in the city of Dhaka, where he entered into the midst of a group of murtadd Bengali policemen and detonated his explosive vest, killing at least three of them and injuring a number of others. Just one day later, dozens of murtadd Bengali forces personnel were killed and wounded when an explosive device was detonated on a group of them in the region of Sylhet as they were attempting to raid one of the mujahidin's bases. The soldiers of the Khilafah also carried out an operation a week prior, with one of the mujahidin targeting a special forces base in the area of Ashkuna located in Dhaka with an explosive vest.

The operations in Bengal and Qawqaz shook the ranks of the murtaddin and Crusaders, with the mujahidin in Bengal establishing their ability to confront and bleed the capabilities of the murtadd forces and target their most prominent commanders, as occurred in the operation in Sylhet, which resulted in the killing of the murtadd officer, Lieutenant Colonel Abul Kalam Azad, Director of Intelligence in Rapid Action Battalion. Likewise, the mujahidin in Qawqaz established their ability to target Russian Crusader forces and take them by surprise even in their military bases. These operations thus reminded all the sects of kufr that the battalions of the Islamic State in all corners of the earth will persist in their campaign to uproot their armies' forces wherever they're found, until the word of Allah is the highest and the word of the disbelievers is the lowest.

May Allah accept our shuhada and replace them with those who will continue to carry the banner of tawhid after them. Amin.

Figure 17 – “Just Terror in London” *Rumiyah*, Issue 8, p. 33




Figure 18 – Example of brief histories given by AQ, “Timeline”, *Inspire*, Issue 14, p. 48-49Figure 19 – “Natural Calamities or Terror” *Inspire*, Issue 15, p. 48-49

Figure 20 – “Analyzing Lone Jihad Operations” *Inspire*, Issue 17, p. 16-17

in Chechnya and Afghanistan, and has returned once again to interfere in matters concerning Islam, do not exclude it from your targets of priority. Give Russia a pertinent reminder of the days of your predecessors.

I strongly advise that the message you intend to convey through your blessed operation must be explained unequivocally in the media. It is absolutely imperative that people should know the objective of your operation.

We in al-Qa'eda emphasize the importance of conveying the following messages to Western states, and we advise you to do the same:

1. Our Religion and our Prophet (ﷺ) are RED LINES. Let those who cross these lines take heed from Charlie Hebdo.
2. Palestine is a cause of our Islamic Ummah. And anyone who supports Jewish occupiers shall never dream of peace, with the permission of Allah.
3. Shaam is a cause of our Islamic Ummah. Our people in Shaam are faced with genocide. And everyone who participates in tormenting them with bombings or by aiding Bashaar and his allies shall not escape punishment.
4. Our lands are occupied. The Land of the Two Sanctuaries is occupied. We shall continue to target you until you withdraw your forces from the Arabian Peninsula and from every single land of Islam.
5. Our airspace is violated by your aircrafts which unleash their deadly payload on our children. Our wealth and resources are expropriated every single day.

And thus we shall deal with you reciprocally until you stop interfering in our affairs.

These messages must be conveyed with our operations.

Once you have selected your target, engage in its reconnaissance. Gather as much information about your target as possible, and adopt an appropriate cover for this work. Your reconnaissance should not arouse the least suspicion, so that you may silently observe the enemy's forces and its weak points. Know your target inside out, so that you may inflict damage far beyond anything the enemy has ever imagined.

Take care of yourself. Take time to relax sufficiently before the operation, so that your performance is optimum and your alertness level high, for excessive thoughts and spending nights awake hamper one's abilities in the field.

If Allah gives you the chance to overcome your enemy, make appropriate use of the element of surprise. Take lead in inflicting losses, attacking the jugular of the enemy and hitting its joints. The greatest gains are made in the opening salvo, so make best use of it.

Having read these instructions, be self-assured, composed. Hope for the best from Allah, for you are from the Army of the Beneficent, heading to meet the Almighty, the Giver. He has promised you the highest gardens of Paradise, and can there be any reward for your beneficence except Beneficence?

Put your trust in Allah. You are on the Truth if you abide by the judicious Shariah. Set out in the name of Allah, with the blessings of Allah, for you are amongst the successful ones, with His permission.

Your virtuous actions are for the sake of Allah, and from Allah is your reward.

Be generous with your life, even if the miser is stingy with it

For giving one's life is the zenith of generosity. May Allah give victory to you, assist you, guide you and be with you, for He is your Patron, and from Him help is sought.

The meeting is in Jannah, Allah-willing.

And our last prayer is that all praise belongs to the Lord of the Worlds.

As-Sahab Media

ANALYZING LONE JIHAD OPERATIONS

	ORLANDO OPERATION	NICE OPERATION	9/17 OPERATIONS	WESTMINSTER OPERATION
Country	America	France	America	Britain
Name of Executor	U'mar Sideeq Mateen	Muhammad Al-Huwayj	Ahmad Khan Raheemy & Dhahir A'dan	Khalid Masoud
Target Priority	First Priority.	Third Priority.	First Priority.	Second Priority.
Inspire Guide Edition	1 st	2 nd	4 th	5 th
Means of Targeting	Firearm	Truck & Firearm	Explosives & Knife	Car & Knife
Fatalities	50	84	---	5
Strengths	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Using means available at hand. 2. Simple Operation 3. Operation was performed on an enclosed area, thus favouring taking hostages. 4. Killed many of the trapped hostages, due to the enclosed space. 5. The executor was proficient in using firearms. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The executor used a new means to execute the operation, and thus had the element of surprise. 2. His means of execution resulted many fatalities. 3. He incorporated two means of attack; ramming a truck in the crowd & a firearm. 4. Selected appropriate place and time for the operation. 5. Prepared his operation well. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Many operations were performed on the same day. 2. The operation occurred immediately after the 9/11 remembrance ceremony. 3. Using explosives as a weapon to terrorize the enemy. 4. In Minnesota, the executor's cover was well chosen - dressed as a police officer. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. He used the weapon which was readily available at hand. 2. He had courage and strong-will. 3. Chose a place where the authority of the country is found.
Weaknesses	Targeting a specific group of people, this deviates from the actual intended message from the operation.	---	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The bomb was not placed in an area where it could have inflicted great damage to the enemy. 2. The aftermath of the operation was not properly planned. 	Executing both operations at the same time - it could have been that the ramming operation on the bridge could have jeopardized the operation in parliament.

Figure 21 – Example of inspiration, where the name of the magazine originated, *Inspire*, Issue 12, p. 50-51




Figure 22 – “24/7 Terrorism” *Inspire*, Issue 12, p. 36-37

"We have an enemy that is 24/7 trying to find ways to kill us in many forms."
- Rep. Peter T. King

24/7 TERRORISM
Muhannad J.S.

A couple of months ago, I had a conversation with AQAP's military commander, Sheikh Qasim Ar-Reimy, on the ongoing conflict between the Mujahideen and America. I asked him: Why do you think the Americans fear Jihad and Mujahideen that much? "Because the Mujahideen follow the *manhaj* of the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ who said, 'Allah made me victorious by terror (by His frightening my enemies) for a distance of one month's journey.'" Therefore, any Muslim following the way of the Prophet ﷺ, will be feared by the enemies of Islam."

"We have an enemy that is 24/7 trying to find ways to kill us in many forms." This is the way Rep. Peter King* put the threat he feels posed by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to his country's homeland security. This statement was declared in a Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence's (SoCI) hearing "Understanding the Threat to the Homeland from AQAP" It was held on September 18, 2013 in the House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

The significance of this hearing lies in both of its objectives and timing. It took place a week after the 12th anniversary of the September 11 attacks and a month after the closure of 22 American embassies and consulates in the Middle East and North Africa due to what America referred to as 'AQAP's imminent threat to US interests in the region'.

The hearing – according to King – had three purposes:

- Evaluating AQAP's intent and capability to attack the U.S.
- Reviewing the US counterterrorism policy towards the group.
- Reviewing the lessons learned from the August embassies closure.

Apart from King, four other participants took part in the session: (D) Brian Higgins, NY, member of the House Committee on Homeland Security, and three expert witnesses in the field of counterterrorism, Frank J. Cilluffo*, Katherine Zimmerman* and Brian Katulis*¹⁻⁴.

Figure 23 – “A Simple Equation” *Inspire*, Issue 14, p. 42-43

CHARLIE HEBDO | A MILITARY ANALYSIS

Koachi, training and preparation were among the reason for the operation to delay. And the reason as to why the operation was a success.

As for the type of the operation – basing on the location – was at a workplace. The planning of this type of operation is wide and complicated, this is because a workplace is often in a confined closed environment. And the surrounding area is under security watch, guarded by individual soldiers scattered all over the premises and this differs from building to building. And this was the situation in the case of the Charlie Hebdo building. Because of this, Koachi chose a rapid room-clearance approach. This tactic requires a firearm in order to pinpoint a specific target and a weapon that will instill fear, provide cover and room for maneuvering and to randomly cleanse a target – using a grenade. Our brother Koachi used only a firearm, because the situation he was in dictated his choice of weapon. The Koachi brothers broke the

security parameter by using an open assault strategy. Using this tactic so as to quickly arrive to the intended target. And quickly eliminating the target. And their retreat was open and loud. The brothers at 'Open Source Jihad' will give technical details as how to execute an operation similar to this, and in a manner that is convenient for a 'Lone Mujahideen'. Until he is able to execute a similar operation, that has made pleased the Muslims and angered the disbelievers.

And to Allah belong All-Power, to His Prophet and the believers.



A SIMPLE EQUATION

AMERICA'S DEFEAT
This simple and understandable equation. The existence of America, policing the world vanishes any hope for the Mujahideen conquering any part of this earth. This is because America is the one that unites coalitions, plans plots and trigger strikes against the Mujahideen. They do not want the Laws of Allah to remain on Earth. That is why we have to converge all our efforts in defeating America. And place plans and efforts to destroy the American Economy, which is the main reason for America's power and dominance.

DA'AWAH
When America is defeated, then it is important that our call towards the people has spread all over the globe. As was done by the Prophet (ﷺ) in Medina. Setting a conducive environment for establishing oneself and establishing the Khilafah.

DEFENSE
Defending against an aggressive enemy backed by America is obligatory. And this should not divert us from fighting the main enemy, America.

OPERATION HEMORRHAGE
OPERATION KARBALA
OPERATION KARBALA
OPERATION KARBALA
OPERATION KARBALA
OPERATION KARBALA
OPERATION KARBALA
OPERATION KARBALA
OPERATION KARBALA
OPERATION KARBALA

THESE ARE THE TYPE OF OPERATIONS THAT WILL DEplete AMERICA'S ECONOMY

AND WHAT FOLLOWS IS MUCH SEVERE BY THE WILL OF ALLAH

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