

The Philosopher and the Farmer: Spatial metaphor in three conversations in
Euripides, Plato, and Xenophon

Sarah Elizabeth Herbert
Charlottesville, Virginia

B.A., Rice University, 1983
M.A., University of Virginia, 2009

A Dissertation presented to the Graduate Faculty
of the University of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Classics

University of Virginia
August, 2017

Abstract

In this dissertation, I examine the conversation between the farmer and the philosopher, a trope used to explore the relationship of philosophy to practical action and rhetoric throughout a long sequence of ancient works that include Euripides' *Antiope*, Plato's *Gorgias*, Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, Cicero's *de Oratore*, and Vergil's *Georgics*. My dissertation looks at the first three of these works, each of which offers a different view of that relationship. In Euripides' *Antiope*, philosophy initially looks above or beyond merely practical concerns; however, the philosopher is ultimately made to abandon his philosophizing in favor of practical action, an outcome that will lead to later tragedy. In Plato's *Gorgias*, which extensively references Euripides' play, philosophy also has a superior perspective that looks above or beyond the mere earthly concerns of the practical man to the welfare of the soul; there is tragedy here as well, but only for the man who fails to adopt the philosophical perspective. In Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, however, there is no talk of philosophical perspectives that are metaphorically above or beyond those of practical action and discourse. Instead, philosophy is the complement of practical action, in large part because the philosopher is the one who can show the practical man how metaphor and imagery (especially spatial metaphor and imagery) shape our concepts and our world—and can potentially reshape them and the life we choose to live.

Table of Contents

General Introduction.....	1
Chapter 1: Euripides' <i>Antiope</i>	36
A. An overview of the plot and setting.....	38
B. The ἀγών.....	41
C. The debate and the rest of the play.....	99
D. Concluding thoughts: a space for argument.....	112
Chapter 2: Plato's <i>Gorgias</i>.....	116
A. A brief overview of the dialogue.....	119
B. Disorientation.....	120
C. Gorgias and Polus—the bad farmer and his untrained colt.....	126
D. Callicles: a Zethus who does not farm.....	136
E. The above-beyond perspective of the underworld.....	178
F. Being ἄτοπος; the philosopher's Amphionic perspective.....	184
G. Conclusion: Plato's farmer and philosopher.....	199
Chapter 3: Xenophon's <i>Oeconomicus</i>.....	201
A. An overview of the dialogue.....	202
B. The conversation with Ischomachos.....	213
C. The conversation with Critoboulos.....	306
D. Xenophon's <i>Oeconomicus</i> : A Conclusion.....	344
Bibliography.....	349

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to the members of my committee, Sara Myers, John Dillery, and John Miller, for many reasons; but I am especially grateful to Sara Myers for her patient and wise supervision throughout, to John Dillery for his invaluable guidance (especially on Xenophon!), and to John Miller for his thoughtful and precise comments. Walter Jost's comments on rhetoric and metaphor were much appreciated. Jon Mikalson, David Kovacs, and Jenny Clay were generous with their time in reading and giving helpful comments on earlier drafts of these chapters.

I could not have finished this dissertation without the encouragement of my friends Melissa Plotsky and Alison Bober. Finally, this dissertation would not have been possible at all without the unwavering love and support of my family: my parents Curtis and Mary Lou Herbert, my brother and sister-in-law Curtis and Karen Herbert, and my nieces and nephew KT, Curtis, and Mary Herbert.

General Introduction

Αἰθέρα καὶ Γαῖαν πάντων γενέτειραν αἰίδω (E. *Ant.* Fr. 182a)

I sing of Aether and Gaia, the mother of all.

Amphion, in Euripides' Antiope.

... τοιαῦτ' αἶδε καὶ δόξεις φρονεῖν,
σκάπτων, ἀρῶν γῆν, ποιμνίοις ἐπιστατῶν,
ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφείς σοφίσματα,
ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις. (E. *Ant.* Fr. 188)

... sing these sorts of things and
you will seem to be intelligent—
digging, plowing the earth, taking care of livestock—
leave to others these refined sayings from which you furnish an empty house.

Zethus, in Euripides' Antiope, to his brother, the poet Amphion.

The conversation between the farmer and the philosopher is a trope used to explore the relationship of philosophy to practical action and rhetoric throughout a long sequence of ancient works that include Euripides' *Antiope*, Plato's *Gorgias*, Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, Cicero's *de Oratore*, and Vergil's *Georgics*. In this dissertation I will examine the first three of these works, each of which offers a different view of that relationship. In Euripides' *Antiope*, the poet-philosopher Amphion initially looks above or beyond merely practical concerns but is ultimately made to serve the demands of practical action, an outcome that will lead to later tragedy. In Plato's *Gorgias*, which extensively references Euripides' play, philosophy also has a superior perspective that looks above or beyond the mere earthly concerns of the practical man to the welfare of the soul; there is tragedy here as well, but only for the man who will not adopt the philosophical perspective. In

Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, however, there is no talk of philosophical perspectives that are metaphorically above or beyond those of practical action and discourse. Instead, philosophy is the complement of practical action, in large part because the philosopher is the one who can show the practical man how metaphor and imagery (especially spatial metaphor and imagery) shape our concepts and our world—and can potentially reshape them and the life we choose to live.

Euripides' *Antiope*, Plato's *Gorgias*, and Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* share a number of common features. In *Antiope*, Euripides examines the relationship between the farmer and philosopher in a famous argument (ἀγών) between twin brothers: the practical farmer Zethus, who complains that Amphion's intellectual activities cannot create or sustain a home or place in society; and his brother Amphion, who is devoted to cosmogonic poetry and rejects Zethus' way of life as materialistic and insufficiently reflective. In Plato's *Gorgias* and Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* a philosopher (Socrates) also converses with a farmer (or a conventionally successful man who is associated with farming and rhetoric) who denigrates philosophy's seemingly less practical focus. In each, the clash of views is expressed through contrasting spatial imagery. And in each, the conversation between the philosopher and the farmer fails to reach a positive resolution and has to be redone or recast. In *Antiope*, after the brothers abandon their ἀγών in favor of vengeance, Hermes appears at the end of the play to impose a new order whose instability is signaled by the figure of Tantalos; in the *Gorgias*, Socrates cannot reach agreement with his primary interlocutor Callicles, and ends with an account of the underworld in which Tantalos appears. In the *Oeconomicus*, however, although Socrates and the farmer Ischomachos end the dialogue with a disagreement that has Ischomachos invoking Tantalos' punishment in the underworld, Xenophon has framed that disagreement with a later, successful conversation between Socrates and a young would-be farmer, Critoboulos.

I will argue that in each work, the relationship between the reflective philosopher and the practical farmer is highlighted by the author's use of spatial metaphor. In Euripides' *Antiope* and Plato's *Gorgias*, the practical man is marked by a horizontal, "ground-level" perspective that focuses on the space of political

discourse and is associated with farming or images of farming; the philosopher is marked by a perspective that metaphorically looks above and beyond a merely earthly perspective to the cosmos as an ordered whole as well as (in the case of the *Gorgias*) to the afterlife of Hades and the Isles of the Blessed. As I discuss later in this introduction (section A), these metaphorical associations, of the ground-level with the practical man and the above-beyond with the philosopher, are quite similar to the imagery of earlier Greek literature. Euripides' *Antiope* and Plato's *Gorgias* both take these perspectives and contrast them, but each work handles that contrast in a different way. In *Antiope*, the original tension between Amphion's elevated, cosmogonic perspective and Zethus' ground-level, agricultural and political perspective is aligned with Athenian discourse (and is potentially constructive); but when the brothers abandon their respective intellectual positions in order to seek vengeance for their mother, the tension fails to reach a constructive resolution and ultimately flattens out in a tragic Theban ending that signals a continuing cycle of violence. In the *Gorgias*, an Amphionic Socrates holds fast to his philosophical perspective and urges a Zethian Callicles to abandon his attempt to use political rhetoric to protect his earthly well-being and political position. Socrates urges Callicles instead to focus on the order and health of his soul by looking above his material concerns to the order of the cosmos as a whole, or at least beyond to the soul's well-being in the underworld. But ultimately Socrates' attempt fails, as Callicles cannot give up his angry fear of being unjustly stripped of his position in the city, and perhaps even killed—as will indeed ultimately happen to Socrates, whose death is heavily foreshadowed in the *Gorgias*. The ending of the *Gorgias* is also a tragic one, at least for Callicles and all others who cannot abandon their fear and anger over earthly existence in favor of the Platonic Socrates' difficult and sometimes strange-seeming above-beyond perspective. In both *Antiope* and the *Gorgias* it is the philosophical perspective whose absence is the most important factor in tragedy.

In the *Oeconomicus*, however, Xenophon's Socrates takes a completely different approach. This Socrates rejects the idea of being a "head-in-the-clouds" philosopher (e.g., of the sort satirized by Aristophanes in his *Clouds*). He instead

shows both how his own philosophy is rooted in the practical farmer's thinking and concerns, and how as a reflective philosopher he can help the farmer by using philosophy to examine the effect of *different* "ground-level" perspectives and spatial metaphors on human life. In the *Oeconomicus*, the conversation between the philosopher and the farmer has its difficulties, but it ultimately ends in a successful conversation. The reflective philosopher is a complement to the practical farmer—in large part because he understands the importance of metaphor and imagery to how we choose to live our lives.

This study is intended to contribute to a larger discussion of the importance of imagery and metaphor in ancient philosophy,¹ especially spatial metaphor, and

¹ I use the term "metaphor" broadly, as a generic term for different kinds of figurative speech that can rely on an underlying conceptual metaphor (such as *THE DIVINE IS UP*, as discussed in section A). This usage is consistent not only with many modern theorists of cognitive metaphor, but also with Aristotle and Cicero, who at times used the term "metaphor" to include a wide variety of forms of figurative speech. See, e.g., Arist. *Rhet.* 1406b20-6 (classifying similes as a type of metaphor); *Rhet.* 1413a17-24 (classifying proverbs and hyperboles as metaphors); Cic. *de Orat.* 3.166-9 (grouping metaphor with allegory, metonymy, synecdoche, and catachresis, and stating in 3.169 that these are also metaphorical in a way, *sunt translata quodam modo*); Cic. *Or.* 92-4 (stating that Aristotle correctly classifies metonymy, catachresis, and allegory as metaphors). As Wisse notes, although the correspondence between Cicero's claim in the *Orator* and our texts of Aristotle is not precise, Cicero's claim is in general agreement with the broad description of metaphor at *Poet.* 1457b6-33 (categories of metaphor include species-to-species, species-to-genus, genus-to-species, and analogy); *Rhet.* 1405b3-5 (stating that metaphors are made like riddles, which Wisse notes were often linked to allegory). See discussion in Wisse, Winterbottom, and Fantham 2008, 5: 178, 184-5; Franke 2000, 138-39 (commenting on the modern tendency to treat metaphor as the name for figurative language in general, and arguing that Aristotle at *Poet.* 1457b6-9 was the first to treat metaphor in this way). Vickers complains of the "modern tendency"

especially images of farming as potentially far more than stock images for rural honesty or cultural education.² I think that in many ancient authors—and in this study, in Xenophon in particular—we can see an appreciation of the cognitive importance of metaphor that anticipates the emphasis placed on it in modern thinking.³

to reduce all rhetorical tropes to metaphor, in particular Jakobson and his reduction of the tropes to a binary opposition of metaphor and metonymy, but notes that ancient theorists recognized that all of the tropes “work by a form of substitution based on resemblance and difference. . . .” Vickers 1988, 439-53, quote at 444.

² Or, as Kronenberg would have it, a subversion of such images. Kronenberg 2009, 23. I reject this sort of ironic reading for Xenophon; see Chapter 3 (Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus*), section A.3.

³ There is no cognitive or other theory of metaphor present in Plato’s *Gorgias*, and I will not examine whether it is present in other Platonic dialogues. Plato is often said to have no explicit discussion of metaphor. Kirby 1997, 528-31; Johnson 1981, 4; Stanford 1936, 4 (noting even in *Theaetetus* 180a, Plato’s discussion of metaphor is only in passing). However, as Pender has noted, although Plato does not use the term μεταφορά, he does discuss imagery by using terms such as εἰκών, which at times (e.g., *Meno* 72a and *Republic* 531b) means “metaphor,” or by discussing what something “is like,” (e.g., ὥ ... ἔοικεν, *Phaedrus* 246a5). Pender concludes that for Plato, although an image used as a model can aid in understanding, ultimately such images are merely heuristic devices for accessing an independent reality rather than being inseparable from our understanding of reality. Pender 2003, 56-7, 72-81. Note that Pender earlier argued, however, that some of Plato’s theories are inseparable from his imagery. Pender 2000, 76-8. Cf. Allen 2000, 134 (arguing that Plato shared Aristotle’s views on the power of images to make abstract ideas conceivable, and that he constructs images and symbols meant to effect cultural transformation; she gives the example of Socrates’ story of Leontius in *Republic* 4, where Leontius gives in to his desire to look at corpses of the executed, but in an atypical Athenian

In the traditional view (often attributed to Aristotle and other ancient theorists—mistakenly, as I argue below), metaphors were seen as deviations from ordinary word usage that were ornamental substitutions for more literal terms.⁴ When so understood, metaphor was often considered not only a superfluous, but a deceptive usage that interfered with the precise and literal description of reality required for philosophy, science, and other forms of serious thought.⁵

Beginning in the 20th century, however, some thinkers began to argue that a literal description of reality was impossible on the grounds that there is no reality that is directly accessible or describable, but only a cultural and linguistic construct

reaction condemns himself for doing so); Gordon 1999, 141-3, 152-4 (Plato's images are a way of coping with our limited and embodied knowledge).

⁴ Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 121-22 (Aristotle saw metaphor as a common variation on more basic and always available literal expressions, and did not acknowledge that metaphor was a necessary part of human thinking); Moore 1982, 1-2; Black 1981, 70-7. Although Nietzsche and a few other 18th and 19th century thinkers took a more expansive view of metaphor, the 20th century I. A. Richards and Max Black were the first to systematically challenge the traditional view, by arguing that metaphor did not merely substitute for literal meaning, but created a combination of concepts that expressed what could be expressed in no other way. Martin and Harré 1982, 90-5 (reviewing the theories of Richards and Black); Johnson 1981, 14-6 (discussing Kant, Rousseau, and Nietzsche), 17-42 (reviewing the beginnings of cognitive metaphor theory from Richards and Black through the 1970s).

⁵ Soslke 1985, 3-13, 67; Johnson 1981, 11-8; Lakoff and Johnson 2003, 190-2; Ortony 1979, 1. Johnson and Soslke both argue that the characterization of metaphor as a *strictly* decorative (and often deceptive) substitution for literal meaning is best attributed not to ancient theorists but to the modern era, e.g., the empiricists of the eighteenth century (Soslke) and the logical positivists of the early twentieth century (Johnson).

that we have created⁶—in part through our choice of metaphor and other imagery.⁷ This approach too has its associations with ancient thought, for example in the relativism and epistemological skepticism advocated by Protagoras and some of the other presocratic thinkers called “sophists.”⁸

In their absolute forms, both realism and constructivism are very difficult to hold. It is difficult to deny that our language deeply influences how we think; it is also difficult to actually live as though there is no shared reality that anchors discourse and communal values.⁹ The approach I find most helpful in mediating

⁶ Ortony 1979, 1-2. Cf. Lakoff and Johnson 2003, 223-5 (describing what they call the “myth of subjectivism” that experience has no natural structure and therefore there are no natural external constraints on meaning and truth). See also Kennedy’s description of the opposition between “scientific realism” and “antirealism.” Kennedy 2002, 12-9, 84, 91-2 (in his study of Lucretius’ *de Natura Rerum*). Eagleton describes postmodernism and “neo-pragmatism” (e.g., Rorty) as the “anti-foundationalist” view that our forms of life are mere convention, truth is mere interpretation and facts are constructs of discourse, and objectivity is whatever discourse is currently in power. Eagleton 2008, 201-4. Cf. views of literary critics like Fowler 2000, 4 (literary interpretation is “made up,” but not random or in isolation from an interpretive community).

⁷ For general discussions of the cognitive turn in modern metaphor theory, see Boys-Stones 2003, 1-5; Steen 1994, 3-10. See also Pender 2003, 75-6 (in a study of Plato; Pender concludes that this is not Plato’s approach).

⁸ Guthrie 1962-1975, 3: 164-218.

⁹ See, for example, Lehoux’s description of the problems inherent in both strict realism and strict relativism. In his effort to reach an understanding of Roman science comprehensible in modern terms, he adopts what he calls a “weak realism” and a pragmatist theory of truth, in which the world “pushes back,” that reaction is understood (only) through preexisting cultural constructs, and truth is what we can verify within the world of our (mostly) coherent beliefs. Lehoux 2012, 224-33, 236-42.

between these extremes draws heavily from two prominent modern theorists, Lakoff and Johnson. Lakoff and Johnson reject the idea (and metaphor) that language is transparent, a mere conduit for reality.¹⁰ Instead, they argue that language is composed largely of conceptual metaphors based on our primary experiences. For example, in ordinary experience we are standing up when we are awake and healthy, but lying down when asleep or dead; a pile of items is higher when it contains more; bigger and taller people can often physically control smaller and shorter people; more can be seen from a higher vantage point; and powerful weather such as lightening, thunder, hail, and snow comes from the sky.¹¹ Thus one common conceptual metaphor is that POWER/CONTROL/THE DIVINE IS ABOVE, which produces imagery and metaphors such as “top-down” organization and “oversight”—which like many of our most common metaphors can be too familiar to feel metaphorical.¹² By building on these familiar, fundamental physical experiences through images and metaphor, we are able to construct more abstract concepts; our thought is thus inescapably metaphorical.¹³ Spatial metaphor is particularly prominent in conceptualization, as in our experience as embodied entities we are

¹⁰ Lakoff and Johnson 2003, esp. 206-222.

¹¹ Lakoff and Johnson 2003, 15-7. Note that their argument that conceptual metaphor (and thus abstract thinking) originates from our embodied experience was anticipated by Vico, who argued that the “corporeal imagination” of *primaeval* man identified the divine with the sky above on the basis of the experience of violent weather. Vico 1968 [1744], 117 (§376). See also discussion in Pettazzoni 1956, 22-3.

¹² In addition, the conceptual metaphor POWER/CONTROL/THE DIVINE IS ABOVE yields not only the sort of imagery discussed in A.1 below, but also common metaphors such as “superior position,” “rose to power,” “high moral standards,” “heavenly beauty.” Lakoff and Johnson 2003, 15-7. The use of a special font to describe conceptual metaphors is adopted from Lakoff and Johnson.

¹³ Lakoff and Johnson 2003, esp. 3-13, 56-8, 246-52; Lakoff and Johnson 1999, 45-59.

constantly aware of spatial orientation: up or down, inside or outside, such that many of our primary metaphors are based on spatial orientation.¹⁴ Lakoff and Johnson argue for a qualified realist and pragmatist approach that rejects the idea of absolute and objective truth, but still finds a real constraint on our understanding in our physical interaction with our physical and cultural environment.¹⁵

This “middle way” has ancient antecedents.¹⁶ As a number of recent scholars have argued, ancient rhetorical theorists like Aristotle and Cicero were aware that metaphor often had cognitive importance, and could be something more than merely an attractive but optional decoration substituting for a literal usage.¹⁷ For example, Aristotle points out that metaphor is not some special poetic or rhetorical device, but is ubiquitous in ordinary conversation:

¹⁴ Lakoff and Johnson 2003, 14, 56-7, 264.

¹⁵ What they call the “experientialist myth” as opposed to the “myths of objectivism and subjectivism,” Lakoff and Johnson 2003, esp. 226-31.

¹⁶ Lakoff and Johnson themselves have insisted on the novelty of their views as well as a complete distinction between their theories and those of ancients such as Aristotle. Lakoff and Johnson 2003, 189-192. As I argue below, I believe they are mistaken with respect to Aristotle; furthermore, as Soskice points out, there are earlier modern thinkers who argued for what she calls “strong metaphor theory”—such as Vico and Nietzsche. Soskice 1985, 74-83.

¹⁷ See, e.g., Wood 2017, 83, 86-8 (arguing that Lakoff and Johnson are mistaken in calling Aristotle a “traditional” theorist of metaphor, but warning that a direct comparison is difficult due to the differences in intellectual context); Boys-Stones 2003, 1-5 (noting that rhetorical handbooks naturally focus on an orator’s practical needs, and arguing that the ancient appreciation of the cognitive importance of metaphor is particularly clear in philosophical discussions of allegory); Kirby 1997, 538-9 (arguing that Aristotle’s understanding of metaphor is consistent with the cognitive Lakoff approach); Soskice 1985, 3-13, 67 (Aristotle and Quintilian should be credited with understanding the connection between metaphor, and the understanding of the relationship between language and the world).

πάντες γὰρ μεταφοραῖς διαλέγονται καὶ τοῖς οἰκείοις καὶ τοῖς κυρίοις (*Rhet.* 1404b34-5).

For all people carry on their conversations with metaphors and with words in their own dialect and in the prevailing meanings.

He also comments that the ability to create and understand metaphors is based on the intellectual ability to recognize similarities (*Rhet.* 1412a11-13), so that metaphor creates pleasure and brings about learning when the listeners recognize a similarity that is new to them (*Rhet.* 1410b13-5).¹⁸ As Ricoeur elaborates, this recognition of similarities is a cognitive act that assigns to a new category things that had previously been allocated to different categories. In other words, Aristotle is arguably recognizing that the creative act of metaphor is at the root of language's ability to conceptualize and order conceptualizations.¹⁹ Indeed, Aristotle arguably recognizes that metaphors are sometimes unavoidable when he comments that metaphors ought to be used in naming things that do not have proper names of their

¹⁸ See also Arist. *Poet.* 1459a7-8, where Aristotle also notes that metaphor depends on the perception of similarity. Wood points out that Aristotle had a sophisticated understanding of the similarity underlying a metaphor as including not only similarities between things, but between relationships, as when he commenting that calling old age "life's sunset" was based on recognizing that old age was to life as the sunset was to the day. Arist. *Poet.* 1457b, as discussed in Wood 2017, 83-6 (noting that many modern theorists also stress the importance of difference in metaphors). See discussion in Kirby 1997, 546.

¹⁹ Ricoeur 1996, 335-36.

own (*Rhet.* 1405a34-b5).²⁰ Although Aristotle never says explicitly that speech is *necessarily* metaphorical, he does acknowledge its cognitive significance.²¹

These ancient theorists did not discuss spatial metaphor explicitly, although it is striking that some critical rhetorical terms are, in fact, spatial metaphors: the term *locus* (literally “place”—τόπος in Greek), for example, as well as the term “metaphor” itself.²² But the conversation between the philosopher and the farmer itself necessarily invokes spatial imagery. It lends itself naturally to the contrast seen in Euripides’ *Antiope* and Plato’s *Gorgias*, between the practical man’s horizontal, grounded perspective and the philosopher’s “above-beyond” perspective. Yet it also lends itself to the rather different way in which Xenophon’s

²⁰ See discussion in Kirby 1997, 542. Cicero says explicitly that metaphor is not only common but sometimes necessary to express a thought. See *de Oratore* 3.155, where his character Crassus says “That third manner of speaking, that of the transferred [metaphorical] uses of a word, is widespread, which necessity birthed because of its poverty and narrow constraints, but which afterwards rhetorical charm and delight flocked around.” (*Tertius ille modus transferendi verbi late patet, quem necessitas genuit inopia coacta et angustiiis, post autem iucunditas delectatioque celebravit.*)

²¹ Cf. Wood 2017, 83, 86-8 (arguing that Lakoff and Johnson are mistaken in calling Aristotle a “traditional” theorist of metaphor, and that Aristotle’s remarks are consistent with a cognitive approach).

²² Innes notes the metaphorical nature of “metaphor,” from the Greek μεταφορά, a “carrying from one place to another,” or in Aristotle’s definition, “a bringing-upon of a foreign name,” ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορά, *Poet.* 1457b7. She argues this definition reflects the traditional view discussed above, where metaphor is a form of ornamentation independent of content; however, she agrees that in Aristotle metaphor has some cognitive status. Innes 2003, 7, 12-4. However, as Wood notes, Aristotle’s definition identifies metaphor not so much with the transposed word as with the transposition itself. Wood 2017, 71 (also citing Ricoeur); Soskice 1985, 6-8. Note that Latin terminology for metaphor is based on the Greek: thus *translatio*, from the Latin verb *transfero*.

Socrates invokes spatial imagery. His Socrates takes farming—seen as the human knowledge most essential to communal survival—as the context in which an agricultural society first develops the metaphors that allow it to create a world. It is the farmer who above all shapes the ground on which we live, literally and conceptually. In this world, the imagery and metaphor basic to thought is seen as influenced and constrained by an external reality: how the farm grows and responds to the farmer’s care. Thus in the conversation of the farmer and the philosopher there is an implicit argument against an endless circle of constructivism. Philosophical thought may proceed only through metaphor, but at its root metaphor is well-grounded; however mediated by language, the world still pushes back.²³

A. Background

Although Euripides appears to be one of the first to put the perspectives of the farmer and the philosopher into direct competition, he did not originate the associations between the above-beyond metaphorical perspective and the claim of superior insight or knowledge, or those between the grounded perspective of farming and the knowledge available to ordinary men.

A.1. Superhuman knowledge and the “above” and/or “beyond”

Euripides’ ἀγών between the philosopher and the farmer, and the adaptation of that trope by Plato and Xenophon, all draw from well-established Greek conceptual metaphors the DIVINE IS ABOVE AND/OR BEYOND (and the corollary MORTAL IS DOWN/AT GROUND LEVEL) that from the beginning had proto-epistemological connections. The connection between a vantage point “above” and divine knowledge or wisdom is marked in both Homer and Hesiod. Both locate the gods outside

²³ Lehoux 2012, 232- 33.

normal human space,²⁴ and accord gods a (qualified)²⁵ omniscience often connected to a superior vantage point: thus Zeus (on a mountain, or more generally in the sky) and Helios (the sun in the sky) are said to “know all things,” and for that reason are particularly appropriate gods to witness an oath.²⁶ This connection between divine

²⁴ As Homer’s Poseidon points out, he and Hades and Zeus—the three senior brothers—had divided space among themselves. *Il.* 15.193. Poseidon governed the sea, Hades governed the underworld, and the king of the gods, Zeus, governed the heavens (including the gods’ home above on Mt. Olympos). This association between the gods and the heavens is not limited to Homer and Hesiod. Rehm 2002, 294 points out the common association in Greek thought of “empty space” with air, and air with the gods. Anaximenes is said to have thought of air as divine. Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983, 150-1. Similarly, Diogenes of Apollonia also thought of air as the primary substance, the origin of all things, and the element of soul in the universe. Guthrie 1962-1975, 1:129-30; Pettazzoni 1956, 10, 153-4. See also Vico 1968 [1744], 159-61 (§§ 473-82) (heaven taken for god in many cultures).

²⁵ The Homeric gods’ omniscience is not immediate and absolute knowledge; gods can be deceived, at least by other gods (e.g., Hera borrows Aphrodite’s girdle to deceive Zeus, *Il.* 14.352ff), and at times their attention must be directed to an event (e.g., Helios is informed by a nymph of the slaughter of his cattle on the otherworldly island of Thrinakia, *Od.* 12.374). See discussion in Clay 1983, 15, 149 (noting the Greek emphasis on knowledge as sight). Note that later Greek thinkers, such as Xenophon, *did* attribute omniscience and omnipresence to the gods. Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.19; see discussion in Dillery 1995, 36-7, 184-9. Xenophon also shows the usual metaphorical association of the divine with the “above or beyond”; in *Mem.* 4.3.14, Socrates advises a friend to honor the gods even though they are unseen by giving the analogies of the sun, which is too bright to look at directly, the thunderbolt that falls without being seen, and the invisible winds.

²⁶ E.g., *Il.* 3.276-80 (Agamemnon swears by Zeus who rules from (Mt.) Ida and by Helios who sees and hears all things, as well as by unnamed rivers, the earth, and the Furies). See discussions in Purves 2010, 33, 53-4 (on the gods’ “synoptic

knowledge and a vantage point “above” extends to the Muses, the goddesses who occupy a special place as both the repository of divine knowledge and as communicators of that knowledge to the human world.²⁷ In Hesiod, the Muses are expressly associated with the heights, as the first words of Hesiod’s *Theogony* are “the Heliconian Muses” (Μουσάων Ἑλικωνιάδων, *Theog.* 1), who inhabit and do their dances on the great and holy Mt. Helicon (*Theog.* 2, 7). These are the Muses who taught Hesiod “beautiful song” when he was a shepherd at the foot of Mt. Helicon (*Theog.* 22-3).

Of course, it is not only sky or mountain gods who can be associated with superior knowledge; other beings can be as well, such as the spirits of the underworld and various water deities, particularly sea gods like Proteus who “know the depths of every sea,” *Od.* 4.385-6. In the *Odyssey* we even see a parallel between Menelaus’ being advised by the nymph Eidothea to consult Proteus, and Odysseus’ being advised by the nymph Circe to consult the dead seer Teiresias.²⁸ It has been argued that these beings do not have the same kind of knowledge that characterizes the divine sight of the sky gods, but rather a more magical and prophetic kind of

perspective” when they watch the action of the *Iliad* from Mt. Olympos or other hilltops; and noting Achilles’ being lifted briefly above the ground when he sees the shield created by Hephaestos); Clay 1983, 13-5 (on divine omniscience and superior vision); Pettazzoni 1956, 5-12, 22, 145-7 (on the omniscience of sky gods).

²⁷ Clay 2011, 15-7 (Homer’s Olympian Muses are the repository of “a special kind of knowledge, visual in its immediacy, not normally accessible to . . . human beings”); Most 1999, 343 (the epic Muse guarantees a superhuman knowledge); Clay 2003, 20 (the Muses know because they have seen; by comparison mortals have mere hearsay); Detienne 1996 [1967], 39-52 (on the Muses as memory).

²⁸ *Od.* 4.365ff (Proteus); *Od.* 10.490-540, 11.23ff (Teiresias). The parallel has often been noted; see, e.g., Heubeck and Hoekstra 1989, 69 ad *Od.* 10.496-9.

insight.²⁹ In any case, these beings are also associated with space “beyond” normal human space, if not “above” it.³⁰

These early works show a sort of proto-epistemology, with both Homer and Hesiod concerned to establish the source of their knowledge through the invocation of the Muse.³¹ In both Homer’s *Iliad* and Hesiod’s *Theogony*, the poet emphasizes his access to the Muses’ divine knowledge, associated with the “above”; this emphasis decreases in both the *Odyssey* and the *Works and Days*, which deal with more human matters.³² Hesiod’s first-person reflections on the nature of his relationship with the Muses suggests a particular degree of epistemological self-consciousness.³³ It is not surprising that when early Greek philosophy turned to poetry to explore philosophical issues such as epistemology explicitly that we again see the figure of the Muse associated with the above-beyond.³⁴

The associations of a Muse-like figure with this epistemological space of the above-beyond also appear in the philosophy of Parmenides.³⁵ In the opening of his

²⁹ Pettazzoni 1956, 4. Cf. Detienne 1996 [1967], 53-67 (Proteus and other Old Man of the Sea figures as possessing the power of just and prophetic ἀλήθεια, understood in this context as powers of divination by ordeal that produce justice).

³⁰ Note that rivers too can have an association with these otherworldly spaces, as they are often described as originating in a space below the earth. See Plato’s *Phaedo*, 111d; and Vergil’s description of how the nymph Cyrene welcomes her son Aristaeus under the waves to the origin of rivers and to her home, advising him to seek counsel from Proteus. *Geo.* 4.332-414. Cf. the discussion of Parmenides, below.

³¹ Clay 2015, 106-9.

³² See discussion in section A.3 of this introduction.

³³ Boys-Stones 2010, 31-2.

³⁴ The early Greek philosophers known for using poetry are Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Empedocles (and, in some reckonings, Heraclitus, who used poetic language although not metrical verse). Most 1999, 335, 347, 350-3.

³⁵ Empedocles also invokes a Muse-like figure, or rather the Muse Kalliopeia herself (B 3.3-5; B 131.3, specifically identifying the Muse as Kalliopeia). The location and

first-person account, the narrator³⁶ describes how a chariot bore him on the “road of the god” (ὁδὸν . . . δαίμονος, B 1.2-3), through the gates in the aether (πύλαι . . . αἰθέριαι, B 1.11-3) of the paths of Night and Day. There he was met by an unnamed³⁷ goddess who promised he would learn all things, both the “unshaken heart of persuasive Truth, and the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true

perspective of Empedocles and/or the Muse are not clear in the fragments.

However, the poorly preserved lines B 3.6-8 may indicate that Empedocles also specifically used above-beyond metaphor. These lines are an exhortation from one speaker to another, with one of the speakers presumably being Empedocles as first-person narrator, and the other either Pausanias (a student addressed in the poem, e.g., B 1.1) or the Muse. Adopting Trépanier’s suggested emendations of the Diels and Krantz text, line 8 (θάρσει, καὶ τάδε τοι σοφίης ἐπ’ ἄκροισι θόαζε) can be translated as “take heart, and revere these things upon the peaks of wisdom.”

Trépanier 2004, 63-5. See also Clay 2015, 130 (adopting different emendations, and translating “with boldness—and then indeed to sit upon the peaks of wisdom”); Hardie 2013, 237-9 (“take heart and then speed upon the heights of wisdom”); cf. Inwood 2001, 216-7. Empedocles also claimed that he himself was a god, though scholars differ on whether the claim should be taken at face value. Clay 2015, 126-7.

³⁶ Although the narrator is closely identified with Parmenides, it is not clear from the fragments we possess whether he is Parmenides himself. The narrator is addressed as κοῦρος (“youth”) in B 1.24. Mourelatos points out that Parmenides avoids giving any biographical or other details that might connect the κοῦρος to himself, and suggests that Parmenides, although doubtless identifying himself with the κοῦρος, wishes the readers to do so as well. Mourelatos 1970, 16.

³⁷ Scholars argue over whether this divinity is identified elsewhere in the poem, e.g. Palmer 2009, 58-62 (arguing she is most plausibly identified as Nyx, but declining to interpret her significance); Popper 1998, 268-9 n. 4 (as Dike); Coxon 1986, 14, 163 (as Aether); Mourelatos 1970, 25-9 (as appearing at various points in the poem as Dike, Anagke, Moira, Peitho, and Themis).

assurance" (B 1.29-30).³⁸ After this introduction, the goddess gives the narrator two phases of instruction. In the first phase, she warns the narrator that it is impossible to know or say "what is not," (B 2.7-8).³⁹ The corollary to this insight is that reality, "what is" (ἐόν), must be ungenerated, deathless, whole, unshaken, and perfect (B 8.1-4), as otherwise "what is" would have to be thought of as coming into being, i.e., as being "what is not" at some point—which is impossible (B 8.19-21). The goddess then instructs the narrator in mortal opinion (of cosmology) through what she calls "a deceptive composition of my words" (κόσμον ἐμῶν ἀπατηλόν), though she also calls her account "likely" (ἐοικότα) and superior in terms of mortal judgment (B 8.52, 60). What follows is a cosmology that delivers important discoveries (possibly originating with Parmenides himself) on such matters as how the moon's light originating from the sun.⁴⁰ Precisely what Parmenides means by all this is disputed (and beyond the scope of my study), but it is clear that his philosophical conception of "what is" is in some sense counter to the world we perceive and ordinarily think we know as being made of diverse and changing elements.

Some scholars have argued that Parmenides' contact with the above-beyond is a claim of divine revelation from an actual goddess comparable to Hesiod and Homer's claiming to receive information directly from the Muse.⁴¹ More scholars, however, argue that Parmenides' teachings on "what is" are an extended metaphysical enquiry springing from Parmenides' intellectual insight into the

³⁸ ἡμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐπειθέος ἀτρεμέες ἦτορ | ἡδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθείης. Note there is substantial variance in the manuscripts, particularly in εὐπειθέος, line 29, where εὐκυκλέος (well-rounded) is preferred by Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983, 254-5.

³⁹ οὔτε γὰρ ἂν γνοίης τό γε μὴ ἐόν (οὐ γὰρ ἀνυστόν) | οὔτε φράσαις (DK 2 = Coxon 3).

⁴⁰ Mourelatos 2013, 94, 98-104; Popper 1998, 68-145.

⁴¹ E.g., Trépanier 2004, 37, 49 (comparing Parmenides' passive receipt of a divine revelation to Empedocles' various claims to be divine).

impossibility of conceiving “what is not.”⁴² The image of the narrator’s otherworldly travels to be instructed by a goddess would thus be a metaphor of the above-beyond used to convey the specialness of philosophical human knowledge of “what is” that is not and cannot be derived from ordinary human experience. As does Hesiod,⁴³ Parmenides’ narrator describes at the outset how he met his divine teacher; but instead of the teacher coming down from above as in Hesiod, in Parmenides the human student goes to the divine teacher. The reference to the aether suggests that the narrator has traveled above normal human space, as aether is associated with the heavens in both Homer and Hesiod.⁴⁴ However, as Mourelatos has pointed out,

⁴² Hussey 1990, 37 (for Parmenides, the knowledge revealed by human reason is divine, and is contrasted with ordinary human knowledge); Kirk, Raven, Schofield 1983, 244 (poetic motifs convey the immense gulf between the counterintuitive results of rational enquiry and common human understanding); Mourelatos 1970, 44-5 (Parmenides is drawing on imagery of cult, but no hint of worship or translogical mysteries).

⁴³ Morgan points out that in Hesiod, the goddess invests the poet with an ability to sing, whereas in Parmenides the κοῦρος passively listens to the goddess’ narration. Morgan 2000, 74. Clay notes that in Hesiod the Muses address the poet, and only briefly; in Parmenides the goddess speaks continuously to the κοῦρος, who in being addressed as “you” is a stand-in for the audience. Clay 2015, 118-9. Note that in Hesiod, the Muses can say things that are true, and things like the truth (*Theog.* 27-8), while Hesiod vouches for the truthfulness of his own account of mortal things in the *Works and Days* (see discussion in A.3). In Parmenides, however, the goddess gives the κοῦρος both a true account of reality and an account of mortal opinion that she warns is deceptive. Clay 2015, 118-9; cf. Mourelatos 1970, 33.

⁴⁴ Clay 2015, 117. Thus in both Homer and Hesiod, Zeus is said to dwell in the aether. *Works and Days* 18; *Il.* 2.412. In the natural philosophers, aether (like air) was not necessarily “up,” as it could be imagined “beyond,” as embracing the earth or the cosmos. See Kingsley 1995 (discussing aether in Empedocles and Anaxagoras).

Parmenides' topography appears deliberately obscure, as in Hesiod the paths of Night and Day are associated with the underworld—which would suggest that the narrator has traveled below.⁴⁵ But in any case, what is clear is that the narrator has (metaphorically) traveled *beyond* normal human space to receive true and certain knowledge imparted by the goddess, so that his insights are associated with contact with the above-beyond.⁴⁶

Like a number of other famous early Greek philosophers, Parmenides chose to write in verse, despite the availability of prose as a medium.⁴⁷ Although verse

⁴⁵ In Hesiod's *Theogony*, Night and Day greet one another on their daily journey in a place in Tartaros (*Theog.* 748-50). Mourelatos also notes that in Homer's *Odyssey*, the paths of night and day are in the land of the Laistrygonians (*Od.* 10.86), which is in the same otherworldly seas as the Kimmerian land where the entrance to the Underworld is located (*Od.* 11.14ff). Mourelatos 1970, 14-6. See also Palmer 2009, 54-8 (like Hesiod, Parmenides is elaborating an old motif rooted in Babylonian mythology of the soul's travel to the world of the dead where it will be judged). Cf. Coxon 1986, 13-7, 161-5 (noting phraseology reminiscent of epic allusions to Tartarus, and suggesting that Parmenides is describing the journey of the soul from an earthly Tartarus to the aether).

⁴⁶ Perhaps the one point on which all Parmenidean scholars agree is that he is difficult to understand. For example, Parmenides is sometimes thought of as a strict monist who held that our perceptions of change and movement are illusory, and that the only reality is an unchanging "what is." Other scholars, however, have read Parmenides as focusing not on "what is" in fact, but rather as focusing on ontological issues such as what it is to be the nature or essence of a thing (e.g., Mourelatos, Curd) or on the modal distinctions between what must be, what must not be, and what is but need not be (Palmer). Palmer 2009, 26, 47-49 (reviewing the history of Parmenidean interpretation).

⁴⁷ In the extant fragments, Xenophanes does not employ a metaphor of "above or beyond" to represent divine or extraordinary knowledge. He is usually understood as asserting the impossibility of human access to divine knowledge in the famous

arguably provided these philosophers with the sort of superior authority claimed by the poets, surely part of the attraction was that a rich store of poetic metaphor could be adapted to express new philosophical concepts.⁴⁸ As Reinhardt suggests, perhaps the goddess was the best available way for Parmenides to express his idea of a transcendent viewpoint from which the evidence of all ordinary human experience would disappear⁴⁹ —indeed, perhaps the only way, given that much of the technical

fragment B 34, which asserts that no man will know the clear truth (τὸ . . . σαφές, B 34.1) about the gods and everything he speaks of, and could not recognize it even if he happened to speak it, “but seeming is wrought over all things” (αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε· δόκος δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται, B 34.4, translation by Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983, 179. See also Popper 1998, 46-7 (finding a weaving metaphor in the passage). If Xenophanes is in fact using a “horizontal” metaphor, it would provide an interesting contrast to the “vertical” metaphor used by Parmenides to describe the receipt of certain knowledge.

⁴⁸ Most 1999, 347.

⁴⁹ Reinhardt 1974, 301. Mourelatos also notes the importance of metaphors adapted from poetry for Parmenides’ development of thought. Mourelatos 1970, 39, 45. Note that Reinhardt argues that Parmenides’ goddess describes our mortal world of appearances as a human representation, a creation of (linguistic, presumably) conventions that are based on the fundamental error of seeing plurality rather than the transcendent unity that is the truth. Reinhardt 1974, 297, 311. In a later work, Mourelatos argues that Parmenides resembles the modern philosopher Sellars, who distinguishes between a superior “Scientific Image” that postulates imperceptible objects and events (like electrons) as explanations for what we perceive, and a “Manifest Image” that relies upon our ordinary experience. Mourelatos 2013, 107-112. Morgan takes the linguistic approach further in arguing that Parmenides’ mythical figures deliberately introduce intentional contradiction into the narrative (e.g., a dialogue between mortal and goddess when Parmenides’ doctrine insists on the unity of reality) in order to signal a problem with human language itself. Morgan 2000, 81-7 (but see Curd’s negative review, Curd 2003).

vocabulary of ontology, metaphysics, and epistemology remained to be developed by Parmenides' successors.

A.2. The well-grounded knowledge of farming

Just as the metaphorical association between space above-beyond and divine or super-human knowledge was well-established before Euripides' *Antiope*, so was the corollary association between ordinary human space and ordinary human knowledge.⁵⁰ In the agricultural society of ancient Greece, farming was considered one of the most important markers of human life. Thus in Hesiod's *Myth of the Races*, it is the need to work without ceasing at farming above all that marks out the current iron race of humanity;⁵¹ the earlier races of man do not seem to have farmed at all—the first, golden race of man enjoyed rich harvests without toil (117-179); the second, silver race had a short and violent adolescence after a long childhood; the third, bronze race, “ate no grain” (146-7) and focused on war; the fourth race of demigod heroes were also wiped out by war, although Zeus settled some of them in the Islands of the Blessed, where the earth brings forth crops three times a year.⁵² The same emphasis on farming is found in the anthropological theories of progress that began to find currency in the fifth century, where farming is associated with the

⁵⁰ Cf. Ludwig on the “opposition between the horizontality of Aristophanes' *eros* in the *Symposium* and the verticality of Diotima's.” Ludwig 2002, 106, 109, 215-9; noted in Montiglio 2005, 169.

⁵¹ *Works and Days* 42-4 (Zeus hid the means of making a living from man); 289-320 (Hesiod orders his brother to work as the gods command so that his barn will be full and he will have flocks of sheep)

⁵² See discussion in Haubold 2010, 18-9 (also noting that man in early epic is often described as an eater of grain e.g., *Od.* 8.222, or of the crops of the field, *Il.* 6.142). Cf. Shaw 1982-3, 20-4 (arguing that the Cyclopes in book 9 of the *Odyssey* represent the polar opposite of (agricultural) civilization, as they are pastoral nomads who do not eat grain or farm, despite possessing good agricultural land).

beginning of civilized life in communities.⁵³ Indeed, farming was sometimes considered *the* marker of human civilization, as in the Attic/Eleusinian myth of Triptolemos, the Eleusinian who was said to have been the first to have been taught the secrets of agriculture and the rites of Eleusis by the goddess Demeter.⁵⁴ Thus in his *Panegyricus*, Isocrates praises Athens for having shared with the rest of the world these two greatest gifts, the crops without which humans would live like beasts, and the rite that teaches its participants about the afterlife (*Panegyricus*, 28-9).⁵⁵

A.2.a. The farmer's authority

Given the importance of farming in an agricultural society, and its status as a fundamental form of socially useful knowledge, it is not surprising that as Murnaghan has demonstrated, Greek poets found it useful to appeal to the “nuts and

⁵³ E.g., Aes. *Prometheus Bound*, 454-58, 462-3 (Prometheus taught man to understand the agricultural seasons and to yoke animals for work); Soph. *Ant.* 337-41 (praising man for his devices, including agriculture); E. *Supp.* 201-13 (Theseus praises the gods who gave man such things as intelligence, speech, crops, defenses against the cold, and sea voyages); Pl. *Protagoras* 322a6-7 (Protagoras describes how early man learned such things as speech, housebuilding, and farming). See discussion in Guthrie 1962-1975, 3: 60-84; Cole 1967, 1-10, 25-46.

⁵⁴ Apollodorus 1.5.2. See discussion in Richardson 1974, 77-86, 194-6 (on the preservation of the Attic/Eleusinian version of the myth in Orphic sources and the development of Triptolemos as an Attic cultural hero).

⁵⁵ In his *Hellenica*, Xenophon also records that Callias urged peace between Athens and Sparta, in part because it would be wrong for Sparta to raise its hands against the descendants of Triptolemos, who taught them how to grow crops. Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.6. See discussion in Matheson 1994, 368-72 (arguing that the Mission of Triptolemos played a particularly important part in fifth-century Athenian propaganda).

bolts of farming” as a way to adopt the authority of the honest farmer.⁵⁶ For example, Hesiod’s poetic persona relies upon the discourse of farming to challenge an idle usurper: his own brother, Perses. By singing of farming as the most reliable and honorable way to earn a living,⁵⁷ and as one that requires a wise understanding of the signs given by Zeus, Hesiod portrays himself as singing words that are truthful and substantive (*Works and Days* 10), and able to give wise counsel to his erring brother. The poet’s use of the discourse of farming is thus a way of claiming that he speaks for the true community constituted and sustained by the farmers, and that he is allied to the farmer’s settled existence as a property owner, rather than to the unreliable wandering trader or beggar.⁵⁸ Thus demonstrating knowledge about

⁵⁶ The farmer was sometimes a figure of unschooled rusticity, to the point that ἄγροικος—“rustic”—was a common term for someone awkward and uncultivated. (See discussion in Chapter 2 (Plato’s *Gorgias*), section C.2). But in part because of this lack of rhetorical schooling and experience in the public arena, he also often represented a way of life that was more simple, manly, and honest than the corrupt world of urban politics and the agora. See discussions in Worman 2014, 204-5 (linking this point to the poetic and ritual traditions that locate inspiration in the pastoral world outside of the city); Murnaghan 2006, 104-7; Konstantakos 2005; Carter 1986, 91-8. See also Connors 1997, 72-6 (on the Roman version of this trope).

⁵⁷ In emphasizing the importance of hard work, Hesiod stresses the example of farming; indeed, as Murnaghan points out, the nuts and bolts of farming are the primary focus of the entire poem. See, e.g., *Works and Days* 21-4 (Hesiod’s example of good strife is a man competing with another who hurries to plow and plant); 27-32 (Hesiod advises his brother not to waste time listening to debates, but to focus on storing up grain); 228-37 (Hesiod praises an ideal community, where just men rely on farming rather than sea-trading). See discussion in Murnaghan 2006, 102-4.

⁵⁸ See *Od.* 8.165-77, where Odysseus angrily rejects the accusation of being a wandering, profit-grasping sea trader, as discussed in Chapter 3 (Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus*), section B.9.

farming could also be a way for a poet to portray his own physical and/or intellectual wandering as the itinerant sage's search for knowledge and truth,⁵⁹ rather than the deceptive and self-interested speech of the vagrant.⁶⁰

Homer's Odysseus uses this technique in the *Odyssey*, when he is visiting Ithaca in disguise, testing the goodness and loyalty of his family, his servants, and the young suitors who have been camping out on his property while he was away at Troy, courting his wife, threatening his son, and devouring his household goods and livelihood. Odysseus is disguised as a beggar rather than a bard; but those in Ithaca who have discerning hearts see that the disguised beggar is someone who tells amazing stories that are (mostly) truthful—just as a poet does. Thus because his loyal servant Eumaios recognizes the nobility of Odysseus' mind from the quality of his stories (albeit with some doubt as to their literal truth), Eumaios introduces him to Penelope by praising his stories as being as enchanting as those of a gifted singer (*Od.* 17.518-20). The disguised Odysseus does not tell Penelope the literal truth either; but he tells her fictions that are *like* the truth (ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγων ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα, *Od.* 19.203). It is these stories that lead Penelope to agree with the disguised Odysseus that the following day will see the contest of the bow, a contest that will result in Odysseus' triumphant self-revelation (*Od.* 19.570-87). And when Odysseus does finally string the bow in preparation for the slaughter of the suitors, Homer compares him to a singer stringing his lyre (*Od.* 21.406-409).

Odysseus gives the suitors the opportunity to see him in this way as well. He offers to give Antinoos, the most violent of the suitors, fame (κλέος)—a key function of the poet—if only Antinoos will listen to his story of nobility fallen on hard times, and offer him some food (*Od.* 17.415-419; see also *Od.* 1.337-8). But Antinoos can only see him as a lowly beggar. Odysseus tells Amphinomos, the best of the suitors, a similar story—but Amphinomos does not heed the warning (*Od.* 18.125-157).

⁵⁹ Acceptable wanderers included seers, doctors, skilled artisans, and poets. *Od.* 17.380-6. See discussion in Dillery 2005, 177 (itinerant seers); Montiglio 2005, 98.

⁶⁰ Murnaghan 2006, 98-107.

Thus when the disguised Odysseus is taunted as a beggar by Eurymachos, the most devious of the suitors, who claims that Odysseus is too lazy to do farm work, Odysseus continues to present himself as a truth teller—for those with ears to hear—by not merely responding to Eurymachos’ mention of farm work, but by describing in knowledgeable detail exactly what sort of “contest in farming,” (ἔρις ἔργοιο) he could undergo to prove his worth: cutting grass, plowing a straight furrow with a strong ox team.⁶¹ In the alternative, Odysseus offers a battle that would give him the opportunity to show his endurance and courage. (*Od.* 18.366-386). Odysseus’ combining an aristocratic prowess in battle with superior knowledge of farming asserts his true identity as a man of honor and worth superior to any wandering beggar—or to Eurymachos, who is destroying a property not even his own.⁶²

A.2.b. Farming as (rhetorical) acculturation

For Euripides and his contemporaries, farming could not only be a paradigm for human knowledge, but it could also represent the education or cultivation of the next generation. Thus we see images based on the conceptual metaphor PEOPLE ARE PLANTS portraying human nature as soil or as a seed planted in soil, as well as images based on the metaphor PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS, where human nature is portrayed as an animal (e.g., a lion or a horse).⁶³ These common images could be deployed on both

⁶¹ Murnaghan 2006, 96. Dougherty notes that in Odysseus’ return to Ithaca there is a recurrent motif of agricultural themes replacing those of the sea. Dougherty 2001, 173-4.

⁶² See the discussion in Murnaghan 2006, 94-96. Murnaghan further points out that Odysseus’ identity is similarly bound up with knowledge of farming in the *Odyssey*’s final recognition scene, where Odysseus proves his identity to his father in part through his knowledge of the trees in the orchard.

⁶³ There are too many examples of the metaphors PEOPLE ARE PLANTS and PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS in Homer to count, e.g. *Od.* 6.163-7 (Odysseus compares Nausikaa to a young

sides of the competing commonplaces that inborn nature trumped nurture and education (cultivation), or vice versa.⁶⁴ Thus on the one hand, the conservative idea that human excellence was fundamentally a matter of an aristocratic nature (though perhaps enhanced by education),⁶⁵ could be expressed through a metaphor portraying human characteristics as inherent in the same way a plant's characteristics are inherent in the seed.⁶⁶ Similarly, the importance of education, an

palm tree); *Il.* 18.56-7 (Thetis compares her son to a young tree); *Od.* 18.70 (Odysseus described as "shepherd of the people," a common epithet for Homeric leaders). See also Pindar *Nem.* 6.8-11 (humans and fields experience seasonal exertion and repose) and *Nem.* 11.39-42 (humans, fields, orchards all bear differently in different years); Soph. *OC* 610 (the earth and the body both lose vigor). See discussions in Gregory 1999, 117; Michelini 1978 (examining examples of plants said to be acting with ὕβρις); Guthrie 1962-1975, 3: 256 (commenting on the use of agricultural images in the sophistic teaching of virtue).

⁶⁴ Dover 1974, 88-95 (noting competing commonplaces: that Nature is all, and that upbringing is all).

⁶⁵ See discussion in Guthrie 1962-1975, 3: 250-60 (giving examples from Theognis and Pindar).

⁶⁶ See, e.g., E. *Hecuba* 592-602 (Hecuba observes that while the wicked are always wicked, and the good always good, soil is different in that poor land in a good season can bear well, while good land lacking what it needs gives worthless fruit; she continues to ponder on the relationship between parents and upbringing, observing that being well brought up can also teach nobility); E. *Andromache* 636-41 (in preferring Andromache for his grandson rather than Menelaus' daughter Hermione, Peleus tells Menelaus that there are many bastards who are better than true-born, just as often dry land conquers deep earth in its produce. While Stevens argues that these lines mean that poor ground well cared for may be superior to good soil neglected, Kovacs says that Peleus' point is that the seemingly worse and neglected land (i.e., Andromache) may in fact have better inherent qualities and offspring than

issue affected by the increasing prominence of sophistic education, was reflected in images of cultivation to make plants productive or training to make animals useful.⁶⁷ This sophistic education was above all rhetorical.⁶⁸ By the Hellenistic and Roman eras, rhetoric would be the most prominent part of education, and—at least for the Romans—the human culture created by rhetorical education was closely linked to images of agriculture.⁶⁹

A.3. *Early examples of comparing intellectual views via spatial metaphor*

Euripides is among the first to clearly contrast the views of the philosopher and the farmer through contrasting spatial metaphors. But if we compare Homer's

land that looks more promising (i.e., Hermione). Stevens 1971, 172-3; Kovacs 1980, 101 n. 25.

⁶⁷ See discussion in Guthrie 1962-1975, 3: 168-9, 256 (noting the use of agricultural imagery in Antiphon, the Hippocratic Law, and Demokritos). Plato's Protagoras uses similar images in *Theaetetus* 167b-c (good orators can make cities healthier just as doctors do for bodies or husbandmen for plants) and *Protagoras* 333e-334c. See also the discussion of the *Phaedrus* in Chapter 2 (Plato's *Gorgias*), section F. Animal training metaphors are particularly prominent in both Plato and Xenophon. As Dodds concedes in his commentary on the *Gorgias*, Plato's focused comparison of a statesman not only to a herdsman, but to one involved in training his animals, seems "especially Socratic." Dodds 1959, 358 ad *Gorgias* 516a5. See also the discussions in Chapter 2 (Plato's *Gorgias*), sections D.8 and F.3, and Chapter 3 (Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*), section B.6.

⁶⁸ Kennedy 1980, 18-9, 25-40 (on the development of oratory as a subject taught via handbook and especially by traveling teachers known as sophists, as satirized in Aristophanes' *Clouds* and other comedies).

⁶⁹ On rhetoric as the focus of ancient education, see Kennedy 1963, 7. On the special prominence of agricultural images in Roman rhetorical education and practice, see Connors 1997, 79-81; Fantham 1972, 145.

Iliad with his *Odyssey*, and Hesiod's *Theogony* with his *Works and Days*, we can see some early antecedents to this use of contrasting spatial metaphor to express different intellectual views.

As I discussed above,⁷⁰ in the *Iliad* the poet's connection to the Muses gives him some access to the gods' comprehensive and above-beyond view, as when he relies upon the Muses to enable him to recount the Catalogue of Ships, saying "for you are goddesses, you are present and know all, but we hear only report and know nothing" (ὕμεῖς γὰρ θεαί ἐστε, πάρεστε τε, ἴστέ τε πάντα, | ἡμεῖς δὲ κλέος οἶον ἀκούομεν οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν, *Il.* 2.485-6).⁷¹ But although Homer's *Odyssey* also invokes the Muses and their knowledge, their role there is reduced in favor of a greater emphasis on human knowledge.⁷² There are still moments where the story is told from a god's above-beyond viewpoint⁷³ or where a human figure is given access to knowledge from the above-beyond.⁷⁴ However, the poet's own workings are represented by the human figure of Demodocos, who has been taught the "paths of

⁷⁰ See discussion in section A.1.

⁷¹ Clay 2011, 3-6 (the gods' panoramic view), 22-6 (the poet gives his audience access to the clear vision of the heroic world granted him by the Muses). Cf. Purves 2010, 2-5, 11-6 (on Homer's emphasis on the "synoptic view" in the *Iliad* through his relationship with the Muses, description of Achilles' shield, and "the contained spatial and temporal dimensions of its plot."), 32-8 (on Homer's "eusynoptic" vision in the *Iliad*). Cf. Porter 2016, 379 (noting that in antiquity the *Iliad*, as an epic turning on an approach to the divine via immortality, was considered more "sublime" than the *Odyssey*, which focused on a quest for the human).

⁷² Clay 2011, 17 n. 6 (noting the possibility that the *Odyssey* reflects a different relation with the Muses); Purves 2010, 16, 66.

⁷³ E.g., the complaint of Athena to the gods on Olympus and Hermes' flight to Kalypso's island at the start of *Od.* 5. Purves 2010, 68.

⁷⁴ E.g., Odysseus' being advised by the underworld spirit Teiresias. See Purves 2010, 69.

song” by the Muse rather than given access to their synoptic view,⁷⁵ or through the voice of Odysseus himself (particularly in books 9-12, Odysseus’ telling of his story to the Phaeacians).⁷⁶ As discussed above,⁷⁷ the discourse of farming is one way in which the disguised Odysseus supports his own reliability (and perhaps Homer’s as well).

Similarly, Hesiod’s young shepherd-poet of the *Theogony* is a student of “the Heliconian Muses” (*Theog.* 1), who as described in section A.1 are represented as inhabiting the heights and are associated with the divine above-beyond view. Hesiod begins his poem with a long invocation of the Muses (*Theog.* 1-115), and credits his account of the gods to what they have told him (*Theog.* 114-5)—although Hesiod’s Muses are enigmatic creatures who know not only how to tell the truth, but how to tell lies like the truth (*Theog.* 27-8).⁷⁸ But the poet becomes a different figure

⁷⁵ *Od.* 8.481. See discussion in Purves 2010, 66-7, esp. 68-9. Purves argues that the *Odyssey* represents a move to a different way of seeing that she calls “countercartographic,” as opposed to the *Iliad*’s more synoptic or “proto-cartographic” vision. Although I find her description of the contrast between the two epics useful, I do not adopt her emphasis on cartography as a way of describing the difference. Cf. Dougherty, who points to Odysseus’ sailing by the Sirens and their offer to tell all that happened at Troy as representing a contrast between two different notions of poetic truth: the Iliadic, where poetry is a well-known narrative of the past, and the Odyssean, where the narrative travels far and wide, like an Odysseus tied to the mast of his ship. Dougherty 2001, 72-3.

⁷⁶ Clay argues that Odysseus is not presented as a Muse-inspired poet (despite the Phaeacians’ comparing him to one, *Od.* 11.368), as—unlike Demodocos—he offers no insight into divine activities. Clay 1983, 24-5. I would argue that it is then all the more striking that so much of the *Odyssey* is told through Odysseus’ voice.

⁷⁷ See discussion in section A.2.a.

⁷⁸ Clay 2015, 108-14 (Hesiod’s *Theogony* represents the universe from the perspective of the gods; his *Works and Days*, from the human perspective; Hesiod’s Muses as more cryptic than Homer’s, declaring their ambiguity).

in the *Works and Days*; although he does briefly invoke the Muses at the beginning of the poem (*Works and Days*, 1-2),⁷⁹ he relies upon his own authority for the truth (ἐτήτυμα, *Works and Days* 10) he will tell his brother about how a man should conduct himself in human affairs, and he presents himself as an assured, mature poet with a depth of farming expertise who asserts control of his own text through repeated interjections and reflections.⁸⁰

B. Chapter Overviews

Chapter One: Euripides' Antiope: a debate between perspectives

In the fifth century, the figures of the poet and the farmer were put into opposition by Euripides in *Antiope's* ἀγών between the poet Amphion and his twin brother, the farmer Zethus. This ἀγών, which put the life of poetry and philosophy into direct conflict with the life of farming, war, and politics, would become well-known and a touchstone for later works on rhetoric such as the *Rhetoric for Herennius* and Cicero's *de Inventio* and *de Oratore*. I argue that the ἀγών includes an implicit contrast of spatial perspectives: the poet Amphion looks beyond the earth and upwards to the aether as he investigates cosmogonic questions; the farmer Zethus concerns himself with the honor and success that can be gained within his community at the "ground level," through farming and fighting. In the play's fragmentary state much is not clear; scholars debate who (if anyone) won the ἀγών, and how the ἀγών is related to what we know of the plot: Amphion and Zethus discover that their mother is the royal Theban princess Antiope, rescue her from danger, and avenge her ill treatment. I argue that the ἀγών becomes moot when

⁷⁹ Hesiod also credits the Muses for setting him on the path of song (ἐνθά με τὸ πρῶτον λιγυρῆς ἐπέβησαν ἀοιδῆς, *Works and Days*, 659).

⁸⁰ See discussion in Clay 2015, 114-7 (in *Works and Days*, Hesiod's authority to speak on human matters does not depend on the Muses); Haubold 2010, 19-23. See also discussion in A.2.a.

both brothers abandon their characteristic activity—for Amphion, philosophic poetry; for Zethus, farming and political discourse—in favor of a brutal vengeance on Antiope’s tormentors that includes tying their aunt to a wild bull that tears her to pieces. That vengeance traps the brothers in a cycle of Theban family violence that is stayed only by the intervention of the god Hermes as *deus ex machina*. In the close of the play, Hermes orders that the brothers go to Thebes and rule and that Amphion use his lyric poetry to magically build the walls of Thebes in cooperation with his brother. But the cost of abandoning their original positions will be especially high for Amphion, who gave up his praise of an aetherial Zeus in exchange for accepting that he was the son of a bestial Zeus; Hermes also reveals that Amphion will marry the daughter of Tantalos, that is, Niobe—a reminder to the audience that the cycle of violence will continue when Niobe insults the goddess Leto, mother of Apollo and Artemis. Just as the twins Amphion and Zethus killed Dirce to avenge the injury of their mother Antiope, so the twins Apollo and Artemis will kill all of Amphion and Niobe’s children to avenge the injury to their mother Leto—leading to the deaths of Amphion and Niobe as well.

Chapter Two: Plato’s Gorgias and the “above-beyond” perspective

The conflict in Euripides’ play between Amphion and Zethus over the life of the philosophical poet versus that of the political farmer made it a natural choice for Plato to adapt when he wrote the *Gorgias*, a philosophical drama in which the most important conversation is that between the angry young politician Callicles, who compares himself to Zethus, and Socrates, whom Callicles compares to Amphion. The dialogue directly takes on the question of what sort of life is better, that of the orator active in Athenian politics, or that of the philosopher who has little involvement in city affairs. As in *Antiope*, a contrast in spatial perspective is used to express a contrast in intellectual perspective. The rhetoricians, especially Socrates’ primary interlocutor Callicles, have a “ground-level” or horizontal perspective, locating themselves in the public spaces of politics—like Zethus in his debate with Amphion. The philosophical Socrates, however, like Amphion in the debate, has a

more vertical perspective that looks “above or beyond” the concern for position in the city pursued by the rhetoricians. But in the *Gorgias*, Socrates is an Amphion who never abandons the above-beyond perspective of philosophy—unlike the Amphion of Euripides, who abandoned it first in favor of revenge, and then (at Hermes’ orders) in favor of the practical activity of building the walls of a city in cooperation with his brother. Furthermore, in Socrates’ view, Callicles should be a Zethus who understands the philosophical perspective well enough to be a good “farmer”—that is, educator, in the imagery of the *Gorgias*—rather than a Zethus so enmeshed in his own vengeful anger over the city’s injustice that he claims to believe a doctrine of “might makes right” that he describes through a famous image of the lion-like man who does what he wills.

Socrates attempts to persuade Callicles through what he calls a “speech of Amphion” that urges Callicles to focus on the order of the cosmos and the way in which that order should be reflected in the soul. But Callicles feels that Socrates’ arguments are “upside-down” and ἄτοπος, strange—an important word in the *Gorgias* that literally means “out of place” and is characteristic of Plato’s Socrates and his above-beyond perspective. Socrates attempts to show him that on the contrary, it is only the ἄτοπος and above-beyond philosophical perspective that can save him from his anger and fear. When that attempt fails, Socrates resorts instead to a final account that takes a different above-beyond perspective, that of the soul’s being judged in the underworld. However, the dialogue ends with the same tragic air as does *Antiope*, at least for Callicles and for all those who fail to abandon their anger and fear over earthly injustice in favor of Socrates’ philosophical perspective.

In the *Gorgias*, Socrates does not formulate technical arguments of his own, but primarily relies on pointing out the inadequacy of his interlocutors’ arguments and on appealing to their preexisting (if often suppressed) sense of what is good and honorable. His metaphorical description of the philosophical perspective as above or beyond the merely earthly perspective similarly appeals to the well-established Greek conceptual metaphor THE DIVINE IS UP AND/OR BEYOND, which associates superior insight with what is metaphorically above or beyond (as described in section A.1 and developed in the discussion of *Antiope*). However, as I note at the

end of Chapter Two, Socrates' metaphorical system is consistent with the imagery used by Plato in the *Phaedrus*, where the objects of true knowledge—the Forms—are metaphorically located above and beyond human space.

Chapter Three: Xenophon's Oeconomicus and making a place

In Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, the philosopher Socrates talks to two farmers: the earlier and less successful conversation (repeated later in the dialogue) is with Ischomachos, an older gentleman-farmer; the later conversation (which begins the dialogue) is with Critoboulos, a young friend who wishes to learn to how to make a living and who is convinced by Socrates that farming is the best way to do so. Xenophon's Socrates rejects being a head-in-the-clouds thinker (11.3); unlike Plato's Socrates, he does not have or seek a "higher" perspective on knowledge or the needs of the soul, nor is he "out of place" (ἄτοπος). He instead in his conversation with Critoboulos focuses on contrasting views of farming that envision space in different ways with different philosophical implications. It is this contrast of spatial imagery that enables his friend Critoboulos—and his readers—to examine critically the views of the successful farmer Ischomachos.

The dialogue begins with Socrates attempting to teach his younger friend about creating and managing a home and a place in society. Socrates persuades Critoboulos that farming is the best knowledge for him to pursue in order to make an honorable living, as it is not banausic—an important term in the dialogue that for Socrates means an "inside" occupation that ruins the soul and body and that leaves a man no time for his friends and the city (4.2-4, 6.4-10). As Socrates claims that he does not himself know much about farming, he spends most of the dialogue relating his earlier conversation with the gentleman farmer Ischomachos.

But before Socrates repeats the conversation with Ischomachos, he shows Critoboulos that the knowledge of farming involves far more than a collection of technical details about when to plow, or even how to govern men. What most distinguishes the philosopher from the practical farmer is the fact that the philosopher understands that there are different kinds of farming to know. As

Socrates demonstrates, the King of Persia has one understanding of how agricultural space and the people within it are organized, a hierarchical, top-down structure in which all authority flows from the King and inside which the King himself risks becoming trapped. But Greek farmers (at least in this idealized Socratic view) have a very different understanding, one that imagines farmers as a cooperative community of free men working in partnership with a personified nature (4.5-5.17). Socrates presents this vision as more attractive than the Persian—but also as perhaps somewhat utopian. Critoboulos’ ability (and the reader’s ability) to analyze Ischomachos’ views of farming (and of life) will ultimately depend on how well this insight is understood, that different perspectives on farming depend on different rhetoric—in particular, different spatial imagery—and have very different philosophical implications for the kind of world and home created.

As Socrates relates his earlier conversation with Ischomachos, we see that Ischomachos says much that Socrates (and Xenophon) seem to approve about the importance of self-control, order, and leadership ability. But Socrates is more critical when Ischomachos talks about farming, which takes place in the “outside” realm of male activity. Ischomachos sees farming as a simple matter of observing the natural world and its reactions, and sees the natural world as providing arguments that support his understanding of basic social structure, such as the masculine “outside” and feminine “inside.” But Socrates repeatedly offers critiques of Ischomachos’ imagery that suggest that what Ischomachos thinks he knows about the natural world, farming, and domestic (and political) organization is actually mediated by Ischomachos’ choice of metaphor. It also becomes clear (especially after Socrates’ earlier lesson on spatial imagery) that the inside-outside distinction itself, on which so many of Ischomachos’ social views depend, is another metaphorical choice. Ischomachos becomes angry at Socrates’s repeated critique of his imagery, and concludes the dialogue by describing the punishment of Tantalos—who here represents, I will argue, a sophistic figure meant as Ischomachos’ criticism of Socrates.

Although the *Oeconomicus* ends in a failed conversation and with a reference to Tantalos that recalls both the *Gorgias* and *Antiope*, Xenophon’s opening frame

reminds the reader that the conversation with Ischomachos will be followed by a later, successful conversation with the would-be farmer Critoboulos. Socrates' respect for the conventional gentleman Ischomachos will be demonstrated by his report of their conversation; but Socrates will also show his young friend that he can improve on Ischomachos' thinking by understanding how Ischomachos' views are actually a confused mix of what Socrates will present to Critoboulos as the Persian and the Greek perspectives on farming. In the *Oeconomicus*, the philosopher is not subordinated to the projects of the practical man as in *Antiope*, nor is the practical man subordinated to the higher wisdom of the philosopher, as in the *Gorgias*; rather, the philosopher and the practical farmer both play necessary and complementary roles in attempting to understand and to shape a better world.

Chapter 1: Euripides' *Antiope*

Introduction

As discussed in the General Introduction, the relationship between the (intellectual) poet, the (practical) farmer, and some sort of knowledge or truth goes back at least as far as Homer and Hesiod.⁸¹ In Euripides' *Antiope*,⁸² their approaches to human understanding are not only characterized as different, but they are explicitly contrasted in the ἀγών between the philosophical poet Amphion and his brother, the rhetorical farmer Zethus. This ἀγών was famous in antiquity, being

⁸¹ See General Introduction, part A.

⁸² Dating *Antiope* is controversial. Until the 1990s, scholarly consensus was that the play was written towards the end of Euripides' career (around 406 BCE), based primarily on the Scholiast to Aristophanes' *Frogs*, which refers to *Hypsipyle*, *Phoenician Women*, and *Antiope*, as "recently produced" and eight years later than the *Andromeda* mentioned by the play. Zeitlin 1993, 172. However, the metrical analysis of Cropp and Fick has found that the fragments resemble plays of an earlier date (c. 425-15) both in number and type of resolution; scholars who now argue for this earlier date suggest that the scholiast's *Antiope* may be an error for *Antigone*. Cropp and Fick 1985, 20-2, 70, 75-6. See Gilbert 2009, 25; Huys 1995, 73-4 (ditto). Some scholars prefer the later date on the basis of thematic resemblances with later plays. Zeitlin has pointed out that like *Hypsipyle* and *Phoenician Women*, *Antiope* involves pairs of brothers (in *Hypsipyle*, one brother who is a poet-musician, the other is a man of war) and pronounced Dionysiac references. Zeitlin 1993, 174-5. Collard also favors the later date, based on thematic similarities with later Euripidean plays such as *Ion*. Collard 1995, 269.

extensively mentioned in Plato's *Gorgias*,⁸³ as well as in later works on rhetoric such as the *Rhetoric for Herennius* and Cicero's *de Inventione*.⁸⁴

Despite the fragmentary nature of the play, there is general agreement on its plot (outlined in more detail below in part A). The brothers' debate over the value of their different ways of life probably occurs near the beginning of the play. The rest of the play is a working out of the implications of their parentage: although unaware of the fact, they are the sons of Antiope, a Theban princess who fled her homeland after being raped by Zeus and bore and abandoned the twins on Mt. Cithaeron to be raised by a herdsman. The brothers encounter Antiope, who has fled to Mt. Cithaeron after escaping her persecutors, the brothers' aunt and uncle. The brothers learn their parentage, rescue Antiope from her persecutors, and avenge her injuries by having their aunt torn limb from limb by a bull. At the end of the play, Hermes appears to prevent them from murdering their uncle as well, and orders the brothers to work together to rule Thebes and build its walls—a task that Amphion will aid in by taking up his lyre and using his poetry to sing the walls into place.

The debate between the brothers is often characterized as one between the contemplative life (the poet Amphion) and the active life (the farmer Zethus).⁸⁵ But the brothers' debate is actually a complex interchange between distinct intellectual views. Both at times invoke traditional (and often aristocratic) values, and at other times offer views that recall some of the more controversial thinkers of the Greek

⁸³ See discussion in Chapter 2 (Plato's *Gorgias*).

⁸⁴ *Rhet. Herenn.* 2.27.43; *Cic. de Inventione*, 1.94; *Cic. de Oratore*, 2.155. Although Cicero's *de Inventione* mentions both Euripides' play and Pacuvius' adaptation of *Antiope*, the *Rhetoric for Herennius* and Cicero's *de Oratore* mention only Pacuvius' version. Their allusions as well as the existing fragments of Pacuvius' play indicate that it was similar to Euripides' version, as does Cicero's complaint about those who would spurn the *Medea* of Ennius or the *Antiope* of Pacuvius because they are in Latin, even though they enjoy the same stories of Euripides (*de Fin.* 1.2.4). See also Podlecki 1996, 131 on the popularity of the play.

⁸⁵ See, e.g., Nightingale 1995, 69; Duchemin 1968, 118; Snell 1964, 70.

enlightenment. For example, Amphion's cosmogonic poetry can be compared to the speculations of Presocratic natural philosophers like Anaxagoras. Zethus' side of the debate has received less attention, but his emphasis on farming is combined in a striking way with an emphasis on rhetoric that recalls sophistic teachings on what is probable and persuasive. In addition, I will argue that in this dispute we see a precursor to the contrasts in spatial metaphor that will become more apparent in Plato and Xenophon, which I discuss in chapters 2 and 3: Amphion's focus on cosmogonic poetry (in particular about the divine Aether) suggests a vertical focus on what is "above or beyond" earthly matters, while Zethus' focus on farming and political discourse suggests a more grounded, horizontal focus; at the same time, Amphion's intellectual pursuits place him more "inside," while Zethus' farming, fighting, and politics place him "outside."

This interpretation of the debate recognizes that although Amphion is ultimately the more important brother (as marked by his being the only speaking role at the end of the play), Zethus' views are also intellectually important. I will argue that this interpretation receives additional support from the debate's relationship to the rest of the plot, which has been the subject of much scholarly controversy. I will argue that the brothers' brutal revenge on Dirce is a subversion of the brothers' debate: their vengeance is consistent with neither Zethus' focus on public governance and communal discourse, nor Amphion's focus on poetic philosophy and governance by the wise. In this reading, when Hermes appears at the end of the play to reimpose order, he imposes a new order that is Theban rather than Athenian and is meant to be understood as problematic.

A. An overview of the plot and setting

Euripides' *Antiope* survives only in fragments, though extant summaries preserve an overview of the plot. The precise ordering of the surviving fragments is sometimes controversial; I follow the reconstruction adopted by Collard and Cropp,

who rely upon the numbering of the fragments given by Kannicht's *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta* (TrGF) and for the most part follow that ordering.⁸⁶

The play is set on Mt. Cithaeron near Eleutherai, at the border of Athens' Attica and Thebes' Boeotia—a site significant as the cult site of Dionysos-Eleuthereus, whose wooden image was brought to the theater in Athens at the start of every year's Great Dionysia.⁸⁷ As we will see, Dionysiac references permeate the play and are important to the plot.⁸⁸

As we know from Hyginus' *Fabula* 8, Euripides' *Antiope* tells the story of Antiope, daughter of the Theban king Nykteus,⁸⁹ who flees her angry father after being raped by Zeus (in the form of a beast, possibly a satyr—a detail not in Hyginus). As he is dying, Nykteus asks his brother Lycus to pursue and punish her. She flees to Mt. Cithaeron near Eleutherai; here her uncle Lycus recaptures her and drags her back to Thebes, but not before she gives birth to Zeus' twin sons, Amphion and Zethus. Abandoned on the mountain, Amphion and Zethus are rescued and raised by a herdsman. Meanwhile, in Thebes, Antiope is tormented by her aunt

⁸⁶ For a detailed description of the reconstructed plot see Collard and Cropp, 2008, 7: 171-5. Although Euripides' play is the earliest extant source for the myth as a whole, the *Odyssey* mentions Amphion and Zethus as builders of the walls of Thebes, together with their mother Antiope (*Od.* 11.260-5), and mentions Zethus' unfortunate marriage (*Od.* 19.518-23). The general outlines of the play can be reliably reconstructed through three accounts dependent on a lost hypothesis, Hyginus *Fab.* 8 (referring explicitly to Euripides), Apoll. 3.5.5, and Schol. on Apollonius of Rhodes 4.1090. These three accounts are reprinted in TrGF as test. iii (a), (b), and (c). In addition, Hyginus *Fab.* 7 also discusses the myth of Antiope and her sons, and fragments exist of a Roman adaptation by Pacuvius.

⁸⁷ Collard 1995, 298 (ad Fr. 179).

⁸⁸ See my discussion of Bacchic elements in section C.

⁸⁹ Euripides has set the dramatic date of the play in some unspecified interval in the Cadmean royal line after Cadmus, as is clear from the references to Thebes as "Cadmus' city" in the final scene, e.g., Fr. 223.86.

Dirce, Lycus' wife. Antiope escapes after many years and returns to Eleutherai, where the twins have grown up as sons of the Herdsman, unaware of their parentage. Here the play begins, with the Herdsman praying for the blessing of Dionysos, having apparently given the necessary background in his prologue.⁹⁰

As discussed below (in section B), the famous *ἀγών* between Amphion and Zethus regarding their very different ways of life probably takes place near the beginning of the play. Amphion appears singing a hymn to Gaia and Aether; he and his brother Zethus argue the relative merits of a life engaged in the community through farming, military service, and politics (Zethus) versus a more retired life of philosophical poetry and private advice to the powerful (Amphion). Based on Hyginus and other later sources that supplement the fragments, we know that the remainder of the play is a revenge plot that probably takes place after the *ἀγών* (discussed in section C). Antiope appears on the stage, having escaped from Thebes and her painful captivity by her uncle Lycus and his wife Dirce. Amphion and/or Zethus at first disbelieve her story, and refuse to assist her; Amphion in particular does not credit her story that she was raped by a bestial Zeus. Antiope is found and captured by Dirce, who has arrived in Eleutherai with a troop of bacchantes. Dirce attempts to have Antiope killed; but the herdsman alerts Zethus and Amphion to their mother's identity, and they pursue Dirce and rescue Antiope. They take a dreadful revenge on Dirce by tying her to a bull that drags her until she dies, torn to pieces. As the play draws to an end, Amphion acknowledges that the vengeance on

⁹⁰ Most scholars agree that the herdsman foster-father spoke the prologue. Huys 1995, 313-4 (commenting on the possible state of the Herdsman's knowledge of the boys' parentage and referring to Kambitsis 1972, ix-xii for detailed discussion); Snell 1964, 71 n.2. Snell comments that the Herdsman, at least, presumably knew of the boys' royal birth. Snell 1964, 71-2, n. 3. As infants of royal birth, abandoned to be raised by a herdsman or some other lowly parent, Amphion and Zethus are part of an ancient folkloric tradition extensively referenced in Greek myth. See Binder 1964, 76-7, 147. See also Huys 1995, 72-4, 104-7, 150-1, 177-181, 252-3, 313-6, 346-8 (discussing the motif in Euripides, including *Antiope*).

Dirce will require that either he and Amphion kill their blood relative Lycus, or be killed themselves. Amphion is no longer insisting that it is impious to claim that Zeus raped Antiope; he claims that if he and Zethus are Zeus' sons, they have a right to his help as they hunt for Lycus. He and Zethus capture Lycus and are about to kill him (continuing yet another Theban chain of family violence) when the god Hermes suddenly appears, orders them to spare Lycus, and to take up the rule of Thebes. They will build the walls of Thebes together, with Amphion's poetry providing magical assistance.

B. *The ἀγών*

B.1. *Background and overview of the ἀγών*

We do not know for sure where in the play the ἀγών took place, nor its relationship to the revenge plot, nor the cause of the debate. Yet it is clearly a serious argument over what kind of life is best.⁹¹ On the basis of the fragments, Zethus is a farmer and soldier who is active in politics; Amphion, on the other hand, is a poet who values the individual intellect over physical strength or political popularity.⁹² Later authors, probably in part based on Euripides' portrayal, consistently describe Zethus as rougher and more physical, Amphion as more refined and intellectual.⁹³

⁹¹ Harbach notes that the first time the lifestyles of Amphion and Zethus were put into explicit contrast is in Euripides' play. Harbach 2010, 78.

⁹² For a detailed discussion of the arguments of Zethus and Amphion see sections B.2-B.5 below.

⁹³ Thus in Euboulos' comic *Antiope*, Fr. 10 (Hunter), Hermes orders Zethus to go to Thebes, because he is greedy and the food is better/cheaper (ἄξιοτέρους) there, and orders the "most poetic" Amphion to go to Athens, where young men, gulping down the breezes, feed on expectations and are always hungry. As Hunter notes, Euboulos' primary source—especially for the appearance of Hermes—was probably

As I discuss in more detail below, in the ἄγων Zethus attacks poetry and poets as lazy, wine-loving, and pleasure-seeking; he extols hard work (especially farming), civic engagement and discourse, and the protection of the material well-being of household and community. At times his language recalls the emphasis on persuasion and probability characteristic of the new forms of rhetoric being taught by the sophists.⁹⁴ Amphion defends his more intellectual way of life as valuing beauty over money, yet as ultimately more useful because one intelligent man, even if physically weak, can lead the foolish many. At times his poetry recalls the new natural philosophy of the Presocratics.⁹⁵ None of the surviving fragments suggest any awareness of the problems that will preoccupy the brothers for the bulk of the play: their recognition of their mother Antiope and of their own divine birth, her rescue from her persecutors, their bloody revenge for her mistreatment, and their fear of retaliation. Even interpreted as broadly as possible, Zethus' remarks on the

Euripides' play. Hunter 1982, 96-7. See also Horace *Epist.* 1.18.42 (Zethus as *severus*); Propertius 3.15.29 (Zethus as *durus*, Amphion as *mollis*); Seneca, *Hercules Furens* 916 (Zethus as *trux*).

⁹⁴ In modern scholarship, "sophists" (or "Older Sophists") refers to a group of fifth century intellectuals such as Gorgias, Protagoras, and Prodicus, who were all interested in language and taught public speaking (usually for expensive fees). Guthrie 1962-1975, 3: 261-80; Kennedy 1963, 13-4, 26-70. Schiappa has argued that the sophists did not teach "rhetoric," as rhetoric did not become established as a separate field until the time of Plato and Aristotle. Schiappa 1999, 10, 48-53. Whether Schiappa is right or not, the Athenians were sufficiently conscious that there was something new about the sophistic teaching on public speaking for it to be satirized by Aristophanes in his *Clouds*, as I discuss in section B.5. Note that the Greek word σοφιστής originally referred to a broad range of men who had and could teach specialized forms of knowledge (e.g., poets), though by Plato's time (and partly because of Plato) it had narrowed to something close to the modern meaning of "sophist." Guthrie 1962-1975, 3: 28-31, 35-41.

⁹⁵ For a discussion of the term "Presocratic," see discussion below.

folly of Amphion's poetry and the superior merits of his own more practical life, do not include the sorts of exhortations one would expect if the debate were an intimate part of a recognition and revenge plot, i.e., exhortations to defend family honor or seek justice for a wronged mother. The debate is thus probably near the beginning of the play.⁹⁶

The immediate outcome of the brothers' debate (like the relevance of the debate to the plot) is controversial. Based largely on the evidence of Horace, who says that Amphion "is thought to have yielded to his brother's ways" (. . . *fraternis cecisise putatur | moribus Amphion*, Hor. *Ep.* I. 18.43-4), it seems that Amphion defers to Zethus' wishes, puts aside his poetry, and joins him in some activity—possibly hunting, as suggested in Horace's poem.⁹⁷ Some scholars interpret this as meaning that Zethus and the active life wins the debate outright;⁹⁸ others, that Amphion agrees to moderate his contemplative preferences;⁹⁹ still others, that Amphion merely graciously yields to Zethus on this occasion, without abandoning his intellectual commitments.¹⁰⁰ It has even been argued that Amphion's quietude won the argument, as he dominates the action later in the play;¹⁰¹ however, Amphion's dominance is more likely due to the convention that in Greek tragedy,

⁹⁶ See Collard and Cropp 2008, 7: 172.

⁹⁷ See, e.g., Gilbert 2009, 24; Ritoók 2008, 34; Podlecki 1996, 140. Note that Horace is lecturing a friend on relationships with a patron; the comparison to Amphion is followed by the advice to put down his poetry and accompany his patron hunting when the patron so wishes.

⁹⁸ E.g., Nightingale 1995, 80.

⁹⁹ E.g., Snell 1964, 92.

¹⁰⁰ E.g., Natanblut 2009, 137 (though note that Natanblut's argument here is unclear; he may be saying that Amphion gave up music and the lyre entirely, without giving up his commitment to apolitical philosophy and intellectual investigation. I do not think that the separation of philosophy and poetry in this way would have been seen as an option for a mythological character like Amphion.)

¹⁰¹ Collard and Cropp 2008, 7: 172.

only three speaking parts could be present on stage at any one time.¹⁰² In the long fragment (Fr. 223) that preserves the end of the play, Amphion seems to speak for both brothers, with Zethus becoming a silent presence on stage.¹⁰³

It seems most likely that Amphion reaches a temporary accommodation with Zethus that does not resolve the debate. An equally balanced, unresolved debate would be consistent with the majority of Euripidean ἀγῶνες, which tend not to have an unambiguous outcome.¹⁰⁴ It would also be consistent with Fragment 189, which emphasizes the possibility of argument and counterargument on any topic; this fragment is usually attributed to the chorus, speaking at the end of the debate between Zethus and Amphion:¹⁰⁵

¹⁰² See Pickard-Cambridge 1968, 135-49 (on Greek tragic conventions).

¹⁰³ Thus at the end of Fr. 223 (lines 88-end) one of the brothers is speaking with Lycus; because Hermes appears and addresses Amphion directly, suggesting he was the speaking brother (line 97), it appears that Zethus was being played by a fourth, silent, actor. Collard and Cropp 2008, 7: 207; Collard 1995, 285; Snell 1964, 74. (See discussion of the end of *Antiope* in section C).

¹⁰⁴ Wilson 1999-2000, 446 (even if Amphion yielded to Zethus, there are few unquestionable victories in Euripidean ἀγῶνες); Lloyd 1992, 15-18 (the ἀγών in Euripides rarely achieves a speaker's goal; arguing that the only two clear exceptions are in *Hecuba* and *Heraclidae*).

¹⁰⁵ Collard and Cropp 2008, 7: 189; Kambitsis 1972, 65-6; cf. Kannicht ad Tr GF 189 (attributing the fragment to Amphion at the start of his response to Zethus).

Fragment 189 recalls a famous remark by Protagoras, one of the most important sophists, that there are two opposite arguments on every subject. Guthrie 1962-1975, 3: 182 (citing DK A 21). Kambitsis even thinks it likely that the unknown author of the sophistic treatise *Dissoi Logoi* had these lines in mind when composing his treatise. Kambitsis 1972, 65. Note that there are several *Antiope* fragments that question the value of speech, especially persuasive speech: Fr. 219 (the value of silence, tentatively attributed to Zethus or the Herdsman by Collard and Cropp); Fr. 220 (sensible resolve often overcome by friends, tentatively attributed to Amphion

ἐκ παντὸς ἄν τις πράγματος δισσωὺν λόγων
 ἄγωνα θεῖτ' ἄν, εἰ λέγειν εἴη σοφός (Fr. 189)

One could make from every matter a contest
 Of argument and counterargument, if one were wise in speaking.

It is not surprising to find an abstract debate about the relative merits of poetic philosophy and practical discourse in Euripides; Euripides was noted in antiquity for the prominence of rhetoric in his plays, including self-conscious musings on the nature of speech by his characters and explicit pro- and con- debates on contemporary intellectual issues.¹⁰⁶ Indeed, Euripides' characters are sometimes accused by critics of being too rhetorical, in the sense of engaging in abstract debate that goes beyond the situation in which they find themselves or the needs of the plot.¹⁰⁷ Even by Euripidean standards, however, Amphion and Zethus' debate seems removed from the practical questions facing the brothers.¹⁰⁸ In Euripides' *Hippolytos*, Theseus and Hippolytos may have debated the value of Hippolytos' way of life, but there it was directly relevant to Theseus' evaluation of the truth of

by Collard and Cropp); Fr. 206 (deeds are better than words, tentatively attributed to Antiope by Collard and Cropp).

¹⁰⁶ See, e.g., Scodel 1999-2000, 130; Lloyd 1992, 19-20, 24-36 (discussing Euripides' speeches in terms of contemporary rhetorical practice); Duchemin 1968, 132-4 (Euripides adapted the tragic ἄγών to expound contemporary ideas in a sophistic fashion). Duchemin observes that not one of his extant plays is wholly free from something resembling an ἄγών. Duchemin 1968, 117.

¹⁰⁷ For example, Mastronarde 2010, 209-11 (arguing that Euripidean characters display a self-conscious level of rhetorical skill that is not socially or culturally realistic).

¹⁰⁸ Duchemin 1968, 85, 132-3 (seeing only a tenuous link between the ἄγών and the need to take action in the revenge plot); Snell 1964, 97.

Phaedra's accusation against Hippolytos.¹⁰⁹ And although the debate between Theseus and the Herald in Euripides' *Suppliants* (lines 409-55) over the merits of democracy and oligarchy is arguably even more abstract,¹¹⁰ in that case the relative abstraction of the debate is consistent with the Herald's being an unnamed character without an active role in the play's action.

The debate's connection to the revenge plot that occupies the bulk of the play thus is controversial. Some scholars have concluded that the debate has little connection to the play as a whole, and is included by Euripides primarily to explore a contemporary debate (e.g., that over the active political life versus some sort of quietism).¹¹¹ This seems unlikely; more recent scholarship suggests that Euripides' *ἀγῶνες* generally represent a significant conflict in the play, even though their relationship to the development of the plot is sometimes obscure.¹¹² A debate as

¹⁰⁹ Mastronarde 2010, 222-6 (stressing the relevance of the *ἀγών* to the theme of mistaken assumptions and the gulf between father and son); Conacher 2003 [1978], 92 (stressing the relevance of Hippolytos' arguments to the larger themes of the play).

¹¹⁰ Conacher 2003 [1978], 100-1 (arguing that the passage has only "the most general kind of connection with the dramatic situation"); Scodel 1980, 81. For a further discussion of *Suppliants* in connection with *Antiope*, see section B.3 below.

¹¹¹ E.g., Carter 1986, 163-4 (discussing the *ἀγών* without reference to the plot). Podlecki lists other scholars of this opinion, although he himself thinks the dating of the play is too uncertain to connect it to any particular contemporary issue. Podlecki 1996, 135, 143. See the further discussion of quietism below in section B.4.

¹¹² Lloyd examines the set of *ἀγῶνες* in the non-fragmentary plays that in his view meet certain formal qualifications (e.g., balanced speeches). He argues that in these plays, the *ἀγών* expresses the play's central conflict, though it is often detached from how that conflict develops (note that he sees Thucydides as offering a parallel). Lloyd 1992, 13, 54, 132. Collard examines a more broadly defined set of arguments in the plays, also finding that the *ἀγών* usually has an important relationship to the dramatic setting. Collard 2003 [1975], 68-9. Conacher similarly warns that we

prominent as *Antiope's*, between two main characters, would therefore probably have some relation to the action. One could argue that the debate foreshadows Hermes' commands at the end of the play: that the brothers work together to rule and build the walls of Thebes, which will validate Zethus' insistence on the importance of community participation; and that Amphion use his poetry to help build the walls of Thebes, which will validate Amphion's praise of poetry. However, I will argue in section C that the debate is more tightly connected to the plot itself precisely because the brothers' revenge subverts their intellectual debate, and that this subversion is recognized in a problematic ending imposed by Hermes' orders.

The state of the fragments does not allow us to know exactly how the debate progressed. For ease of analysis, I will first examine Amphion's poetry (section B.2), then Zethus' criticisms of Amphion's poetry and his recommending instead farming, fighting, and political speech (section B.3), and then Amphion's responses to those recommendations (section B.4).

B.2. *Amphion the cosmogonic poet*

Amphion, of course, is the famous poet whose music will one day be powerful enough to build the walls of Thebes (as Hermes will order him to do at the end of the play). But when he first appears at the beginning of the play¹¹³ together with the

should not assume that the *ἀγών* is "dramatically inorganic," and that it often has real relevance to themes and character. Conacher 2003 [1978], 101. See also Duchemin 1968, 124 (many Euripidean *ἀγῶνες* have only a vague relationship to the action).

¹¹³ It is not clear whether Amphion's song followed the chorus' entrance or vice versa. See discussion in Podlecki 1996, 134; Collard 1995, 262. It seems most likely that Amphion's song came first; as Ritoók points out, *Ion* begins with Ion singing a hymn to Apollo, followed by the chorus. Ritoók 2008, 31.

chorus,¹¹⁴ he is a young man who has just taken up something new: the lyre.¹¹⁵ Of course, for Euripides' audience the lyre was a familiar and traditional instrument; Amphion's use of the lyre connected him to the ancient tradition of epic poetry, which was a key part of contemporary Greek education.¹¹⁶ But Euripides makes a point of reminding the audience that this tradition does not yet exist in the world of the play. In several fragments usually placed right after Amphion's opening hymn, Amphion explains Hermes' invention of the lyre to a chorus that has apparently never seen the lyre or heard such poetry before, describing the lyre as "recompense for the cattle" (λύρα βοῶν . . . ῥύσι', Fr. 190), as does the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes*, where Hermes invents the lyre from a tortoise shell and gives it to Apollo in exchange for Hermes' theft of his cattle.¹¹⁷ Amphion also feels it necessary to give a description of his art (presumably to the chorus), as a combination of developed skill, divine inspiration, and personal joy in its practice:

¹¹⁴ The chorus was probably made of old men from Attica, though it is not clear that the chorus is Attic rather than Boeotian. Cicero calls them Attic (*Div.* 2.133), but is referring to Pacuvius' adaptation. Kambitsis 1972, xiii-xiv; see also Podlecki 1996, 133. There was also probably a secondary chorus of Bacchantes with Antiope, as discussed below in section C.

¹¹⁵ In his *Imagines*, Philostratus says that Hermes gave Amphion the lyre after Apollo and the Muses (Philostr. *Im.* 1.10.1); Pausanias also says that Amphion was the first to play the lyre, having been given it by Hermes (Paus. 9.5.8). See also discussion in Kambitsis 1972, 124 ad Kam. Fr. XLVIII, lines 96-7.

¹¹⁶ Tragedy is normally accompanied by the aulos and mostly relies upon spoken iambic trimeters and anapests, together with complex lyric meters for choruses as well as the sung arias that were a Euripidean speciality. Wilson 1999-2000, 432-3, 444-5.

¹¹⁷ This is further supported by Pacuvius Fr. IV R.³ (Tr GF *Antiope* Test. vii b 2) where Pacuvius has someone (presumably Amphion) ask a riddle about a tortoise, the answer to which is *testudo* (tortoise or lyre). For a further discussion of the *Hymn to Hermes*, see section B.5 below.

χρόνος θεῶν <τε> πνεῦμ' ἔρωσ θ' ὕμνωδίας (Fr. 192) ¹¹⁸

time, and the inspiration of the gods, and the love of hymnsinging.

The subject of Amphion's opening hymn with his lyre is also striking: he sings (in hexameter) ¹¹⁹ about the gods and their role in the origin of the cosmos:

Αἰθέρα καὶ Γαῖαν πάντων γενέτειραν αἰίδω (Fr. 182a)

I sing of Aether and Gaia, the mother of all.

Amphion's singing a cosmogony recalls both Hermes and Apollo in the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes*; Hermes because he invented the lyre, and Apollo because he adopted the lyre as his particular instrument after Hermes played him a song about the coming to be of gods and the earth—a song rather different from the first song Hermes played for himself, about his own domestic matters.¹²⁰ But Euripides' Amphion received the lyre from Hermes, not from Apollo;¹²¹ and over the course of the play Amphion's interests will change away from cosmogony and philosophy, towards his own parentage and its demands for vengeance. As we will see, by the

¹¹⁸ I follow Collard's placement of Fr. 192, as well as Fr. 190 (invention of the lyre) in Amphion's monody. See discussion in Natanblut 2009, 133 (also following Collard).

¹¹⁹ As Wilson points out, lyric hexameter is rare in tragedy. Wilson 1999-2000, 441. On dactylic hexameters in tragedy, see Collard 1995, 299 ad 182a.

¹²⁰ See discussion of the *Hymn to Hermes* and the relationship between Hermes and Apollo below in Section B.5, especially B.5.b.

¹²¹ Hermes declares at the end of the play (Fr. 223.96-7) that "Zeus grants you this honor [of building the city walls through his magical poetry], as do I as well, I from whom you had this invention" (Ζεὺς τήνδε τιμὴν σὺν δ' ἐγὼ δίδωμί σοι | οὔτερ τόδ' εὐρημ' ἔσχες). Kambitsis notes some variance in the tradition of which god gave the lyre to Amphion, and says that the versions in which it is Apollo or the Muses rather than Hermes probably date from after *Antiope*. Kambitsis 1972, 124, ad Kam. Fr. XLVIII.96-7.

end of the play it will be Hermes who restores Amphion to poetry, telling Amphion to arm himself with the lyre and help build the walls of Thebes (Fr. 223.119-24); the associations with Apollo will become negative as Hermes foreshadows Apollo's vengeance for the insult Amphion's wife Niobe will visit on Apollo's mother Leto (Fr. 223.129-32).¹²²

The type of cosmogony Amphion is singing is also significant. Its content has a radical flavor because, as I will argue, Amphion's reference to aether recalls some of the Presocratic¹²³ philosophers who presented more naturalistic explanations of celestial phenomena and more abstract descriptions of the divine—in the case of Xenophanes, even directly criticizing the traditional anthropomorphic descriptions of the gods.¹²⁴ This is a philosophical position that Amphion will have to abandon once he accepts that his mother bore him as a result of being raped by Zeus, and joins with Zethus in slaughtering Dirce.¹²⁵

Cosmogony, of course, was a traditional topic of epic poetry such as Hesiod's *Theogony*. But in the *Theogony*, as in contemporary Greek religion, the sky-god and

¹²² See further discussion in section C.

¹²³ "Presocratic" is a loose modern term for the Greek philosophical tradition as it existed before Socrates and Plato. It includes such diverse thinkers as the Milesian natural philosopher Anaximenes (fl. 546-526), who thought the primary cosmic element was air, which supported the earth and was (apparently) divine; the three philosophers discussed in the General Introduction, Xenophanes (b. 570), Parmenides (515-c. 440), and Empedocles (492-432); and Anaxagoras (500-428) and Diogenes of Apollonia (b. 460), discussed in the text below. McCoy 2013, xiii-xxv. Euripides (c. 480-406) would have had access to these thinkers; Anaxagoras in particular would have been a prominent Athenian figure during Euripides' lifetime (see discussion in section B.3 of his connection with Pericles).

¹²⁴ See discussion in Guthrie 1962-1975, 1: 370-3 (of Xenophanes Frs. 11, 14, 15 in particular). Walsh also sees this as Amphion's replacement of the anthropomorphic gods. Walsh 1984, 110.

¹²⁵ See discussion in section C.

earth-goddess named as the parents of humanity (and all else) are roughly anthropomorphic; for example, after Gaia has given birth to the sky-god Ouranos, they mate and have children. These gods are as intent on power and vengeance as any human; their child, the next-generation sky-god Kronos, castrates his father Ouranos in vengeance for his ill-treatment and takes over the rule of the gods—only to be deposed in his turn by his son, the sky-god Zeus, who is also often called “father of gods and mortals.”¹²⁶ Although Amphion’s reference to Gaia as “mother of all” sounds as though it could be referring to an anthropomorphic Hesiodic deity,¹²⁷ his reference to Aether does not.

The word “aether” (αἰθήρ) refers to the heavens; it was associated by some thinkers with the element of air (ἀήρ, or *aer* in Latin),¹²⁸ and by others with fire.¹²⁹

¹²⁶ *Theog.* 126-7, 176-82, 453-506. For references to Zeus as “father of gods and mortals,” see, e.g., *Od.* 1.28.

¹²⁷ E.g., Hes. *Works and Days* 563.

¹²⁸ Air (ἀήρ) in Homer and Hesiod generally refers to air that is misty or hazy or otherwise visible, e.g., *Il.* 14.288. In post-Homeric works, ἀήρ (as the lower heavens) is often distinguished from αἰθήρ (as the bright, pure upper heavens). Empedocles conflates aether and air in his Fr. 100.5 (aether as the air breathed by humans and animals). See e.g., Curd 2007, 35 (commenting on Anaxagoras Fr. 1); Dover 1968, 134-5 ad *Clouds* line 264-5 (commenting on the sometimes unclear distinction between air and aether); Guthrie 1962-1975, 2: 185, 2: 262 n.3.

¹²⁹ Aristotle says that Anaxagoras incorrectly used “aether” instead of fire. Aristotle *de Caelo*, 270b20-5. However, Anaxagoras’ views on air and aether (or fire) are not clear, though aether is associated with the rare, hot, and dry rather than the cool and moist in his Fr. 15. Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983, 372-3; Guthrie 1962-1975, 2: 273 n.4, 295. Ultimately aether was established as a fifth element, separate from both air and fire. See generally Guthrie 1962-1975, 1: 270 ff; 2: 185. See also Cicero’s *de Natura Deorum*, 2.91-2 (Cicero describes how the earth is surrounded on all sides by the *aer*, and that this is all again surrounded by the immense aether where the fire of the stars and sun reside).

Aether was not a god of civic cult;¹³⁰ although a personified Aether appears in Hesiod's *Theogony* at line 124, it does so only in passing as the offspring of Night and Erebus (together with Day). In Homer, aether is simply the atmosphere or the home of Zeus.¹³¹ But one place where aether and air do become important as more than part of the atmosphere is in the contemporary speculations of Presocratic philosophers such as Anaxagoras and Diogenes of Apollonia. For Anaxagoras a multitude of basic elements, including aether, were put into motion by the operation of mind; for Diogenes of Apollonia, air itself was the primary principle, possessing mind and having power over all things.¹³²

¹³⁰ Dover notes that Aether as a god does not appear in the fifth century outside of Euripides' Frs. 941 and 839 (both discussed below; note that Dover does not consider Fr. 877, also discussed below). Dover 1968, 173 (ad *Clouds*, 570). Mikalson comments on Aether as a philosophical conception to which Euripides turned several times. Mikalson 1991, 235. Note that Aether does appear in the Orphic hymns as something like a "world soul." Roscher 1993 [1884-1937], vol. 1.1: 199 (giving the example of Hymn 5). Most authorities, however, date these hymns much later, perhaps even after the beginning of the common era. Athanassakis 1977, vii-viii.

¹³¹ E.g., *Il.* 2.412, *Il.* 14.288.

¹³² For Anaxagoras, see Curd 2007, 6-7, 56-67 (on Fr. 12); for Diogenes of Apollonia, see Kirk, Raven, and Schofield 1983, 441-5 (on Fr. 5). Guthrie states that the identification of divinity with air or aether was the most popular philosophic theology of Euripides' time. Guthrie 1962-1975, 3: 232.

Euripides is fond of invoking Aether,¹³³ to the point that Aristophanes uses it to caricature him.¹³⁴ Some scholars have attempted to argue that this and other Euripidean references to a divine Aether are simply a poetic way of referring to a traditional, anthropomorphic version of the sky-god Zeus. Thus Matthiessen points out that several Euripidean fragments from unidentified plays connect an apparently personified Aether to Zeus.¹³⁵ In Fr. 877, for example, an unnamed character says:

ἀλλ' αἰθήρ τίκτει σε, κόρα,
 Ζεὺς ὃς ἀνθρώποις ὀνομάζεται

But Aether gave birth to you, maiden,
 Who is named Zeus by men

Similarly, in Fr. 941 a character says:

¹³³ For a discussion of additional Euripidean fragments referencing Aether or aether but not discussed here, see Yunis 1988, 85-6 (on Hecuba's prayer in *Trojan Women*); Matthiessen 1969. Note the associations in Euripides between the aether and deception or poetic fiction, e.g., in *Helen* (Helen's image is fashioned from the sky in line 34; from the aether in line 584). See also Walsh 1984, 100-4; Guthrie 1962-1975, 3: 231-4.

¹³⁴ See, e.g., Ar. *Frogs* 100 (Dionysos praises "aether, the little house of Zeus" as a characteristic Euripidean phrase), 892 (the character Euripides prays to Aether as his "pasture," as well as to other idiosyncratic gods). See also the discussion in Mikalson 1991, 235. Note that Aristophanes similarly satirized Socrates, whom he linked to Euripides as an example of a radical intellectual in *Frogs* 1491-9. See Ar. *Clouds* 264-5 (Socrates prays to a variety of unusual gods: the Air that holds the earth aloft, the Aether, and the Clouds); 570 (the chorus of Clouds hails their "father Aether," who is distinct from Zeus, the leader of the gods); 627 (Socrates swears by Breathing, Chaos, and Air).

¹³⁵ Matthiessen 1969, 700-1.

ὄραῖς τὸν ὑψοῦ τόνδ' ἄπειρον αἰθέρα
καὶ γῆν πέριξ ἔχονθ' ὑγραῖς ἐν ἀγκάλαις;
τοῦτον νόμιζε Ζῆνα, τόνδ' ἡγοῦ θεόν.

do you see this boundless aether on high,
and holding the earth all around in its moist embrace?
This call Zeus, this consider to be god.¹³⁶

But although Frs. 877 and 941 connect Zeus and Aether, they do not show that this Aether-Zeus is the lustful, adulterous Zeus that we see in Homer; indeed, the reference in Fr. 941 to “this boundless aether on high” suggests that this is a more abstract, less anthropomorphic deity. Euripides’ *Trojan Women* offers a useful parallel. In a famous passage,¹³⁷ Hecuba prays to a Zeus who is the “support of earth,” “hard to understand,” and “the necessity of nature or the understanding (νοῦς) of mortals”:

ὦ γῆς ὄχημα κάπῃ γῆς ἔχων ἔδραν,
ὅστις ποτ' εἴ σύ, δυστόπαστος εἰδέναι,
Ζεὺς, εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος εἴτε νοῦς βροτῶν,
προσηυξάμην σε· πάντα γὰρ δι' ἀψόφου
βαίνων κελεύθου κατὰ δίκην τὰ θνήτ' ἄγεις. (*Tro.* 884-8)
support/chariot of earth and having a seat upon earth,
whoever you are, most hard to understand through speculation,

¹³⁶ Dillon takes this to be from *Antiope*. Dillon 2004, 54-5. He makes an argument similar to mine, that Amphion has adopted an idealistic notion of Zeus-Aether that will be undercut by the end of the play (see my discussion below and in section C).

¹³⁷ Hecuba loses her argument when Menelaus decides to take Helen with him, rather than executing her at Troy. Hecuba then tends the corpse of her grandson Astyanax, executed by Odysseus, before she is led off to be Odysseus' slave. At the end of the play, she complains that her sacrifices were futile (*Tro.* 1242) and wonders why she calls upon the gods, who did not listen to her before (*Tro.* 1280-1).

Zeus, whether you are the necessity of nature or the understanding of mortals, I pray to you; for traveling all places on a silent road you lead human affairs according to justice.

The prayer combines a traditional form with philosophical content in a way that—as the character Menelaus tells her—is strange and new (*Tro.* 889).¹³⁸ Like Amphion in *Antiope* Fr. 182a, Hecuba's references to deity have a Presocratic flavor: her reference to Zeus as the support (or chariot) of earth recalls Anaximenes, for whom the element air supports the earth¹³⁹—or perhaps Euripides' Fr. 941, where it is Aether that supports the earth. Similarly, her suggestion that Zeus might be the *voûς* of mortals recalls the Anaxagorean focus on mind as a cosmic principle¹⁴⁰—or even some cosmological theory of Euripides' own, perhaps invented for the purposes of his play.¹⁴¹ In the argument that follows her prayer, Hecuba makes it clear that her conception of the gods is not entirely traditional. She rejects the Helen's story of the Judgment of Paris,¹⁴² which Helen has cited in her own justification; Hecuba insists that Hera and Athena did not irrationally and frivolously come to Ida for games and

¹³⁸ Scodel 1980, 94 (with additional cites).

¹³⁹ For Anaxamines, see discussion above.

¹⁴⁰ As Scodel notes, the passage may be even closer to the thinking of Democritus, who seems to have made human intelligence divine. Scodel 1980, 94-5.

¹⁴¹ Mikalson argues that Euripides has created a cult of Aether/Ouranos for his *Helen*, grafted onto the traditional Olympian religion, that “casts a unifying but exotic aura over the whole play.” Mikalson 1991, 96-9, 235. (Note that Mikalson's argument is based in part on his interpretation of *Helen* 866, *θείου δὲ σεμνὸν θεσμὸν αἰθέρος μυχούς*, “cleanse the recesses according to the institution of solemn aether.” Kovacs, however, takes *αἰθέρος μυχούς* together, translating “as holy ordinance decrees, cleanse the sky's recesses with sulfur.” Kovacs 2002, 113.

¹⁴² The story of the Judgment of Paris is referred to only once in Homer, at *Il.* 24.27-30, which says only that Troy became hated because of the Paris' folly in insulting certain unnamed goddesses in favor of another who furthered his lust.

a beauty contest (*Tro.* 971-82). Hecuba's gods may be somewhat anthropomorphic, but Hera and Athena, at least, are more loyal to their worshippers and more rational than their traditional depictions—a conception that can be connected to the Presocratic flavor of her earlier prayer.¹⁴³

We see a similarly anthropomorphic but nontraditional conception of Aether in a long fragment (Fr. 839) preserved from Euripides' *Chrysippus*, where we again see the pairing of a divine Earth and Aether. In the *Chrysippus* fragment, Earth is portrayed as mating with Διὸς Αἰθήρ—literally, “Aether of Zeus”—the “father of men and gods,” so that she becomes “mother of all.”¹⁴⁴ Aether here seems to be a divinity separate from Zeus, and is probably best translated as “Realm of Zeus.”¹⁴⁵ Although these gods are personified, their action is more abstract than that of the Homeric or Hesiodic gods: the passage describes how Earth's progeny returns to earth, Aether's progeny returns to the heavenly pole, and “nothing dies that has become, but rather reveals a different shape after a process of separation.”¹⁴⁶ Such gods recall Anaxagorean and similar arguments that nothing truly comes to be or passes away, because coming to be is a matter of mixing elements, while passing away is a matter of separating them.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴³ See also Lloyd 1992, 106-8, 101-112 (Hecuba's prayer to Zeus suggesting that he might be the aether, or natural law, or mind, and reflecting an idealistic view of the gods). Lefkowitz, however, argues that Hecuba is referring to a personified Zeus with the traditional anthropomorphic attributes. Lefkowitz 2016, 35-6.

¹⁴⁴ E. *Chrysippus*, Fr. 839.1-7 (as printed and translated in Collard and Cropp, 2008). Discussed in Collard 1995, 299 ad *Antiope* 182a.

¹⁴⁵ Thus Collard and Cropp, 2008, 7: 467; see also E. *Melanippe Wise*, Fr. 487 (a character swears by the “holy aether, the habitation of Zeus”).

¹⁴⁶ E. *Chrysippus*, Fr. 839.8-14.

¹⁴⁷ Anax. Fr. 17 (DK 59 B 17). See commentary in Curd 2007, 72-3. Guthrie, however, argues that Euripides is more likely modeling his thought on Empedocles. As Guthrie notes, it is often difficult to trace Euripides' allusions to the physical theories of his time to one particular philosopher. Guthrie 1962-1975, 2: 262, 324.

Thus it makes sense to take Amphion's cosmogonic song, addressing Aether and Gaia, as indicating a philosophical interest in cosmogony; as Snell notes, a song about cosmogony goes as far in the direction of philosophy as is possible for a mythical figure like Amphion.¹⁴⁸ Certainly later commentators saw Amphion as interested in philosophic thought.¹⁴⁹ As I discuss in Chapter 2, Plato took Amphion as a sort of proto-Socrates—one who made mistakes that the real Socrates would avoid. In addition, Cicero and other commentators on rhetoric noted Amphion's focus on wisdom rather than aesthetics in his response to Zethus (discussed below in section B.4).¹⁵⁰

These identifications of Amphion with philosophy support the attribution of a famous Euripidean fragment, Fr. 910, to *Antiope*.¹⁵¹ In this fragment, the speaker

¹⁴⁸ Snell 1964, 73. See also Nightingale 1995, 74; Slings 1991, 147 (it is a fair inference that Amphion indulged in cosmogonical speculation). Note that Amphion's cosmogonic song would be followed by many other poet-philosophers, such as the Orpheus of Apollonius and of Vergil. La Penna 1995, 323-5.

¹⁴⁹ In a comment on Vergil's *Ec.* 6.31 that probably applies to Fr. 182a of *Antiope*, Valerius Probus, the 1st century CE grammarian, argued that Euripides (presumably, via Amphion) was presenting his own theory of the elements.

¹⁵⁰ In his *de Inventione*, Cicero complains that in both Euripides' and Pacuvius' versions of *Antiope*, Amphion "praises wisdom when it was music that was being attacked" (*qui vituperate musica sapientiam laudat*, Cic. *De Inv.* I.94). The *Rhetoric for Herennius* makes a similar complaint, though it references only Pacuvius' version of the play. *Rhet. Herenn.* 2.27.43. In addition, note that in his Latin adaptation Pacuvius has a character who is probably Zethus proclaim that he hates men of lazy work and philosophic talk (*odi ego homines ignava opera et philosopha sententia*, Pacuvius Fr. II R³, reprinted as E. *Antiope* test. vii b 5).

¹⁵¹ Kannicht's Tr GF classifies Fr. 910 as being from an unknown play. Many scholars attribute it to *Antiope*, often suggesting a placement shortly after the debate, where it responds to Amphion's opening cosmogonic song and foreshadows his later use of the word ὄλβιος (Fr. 198, discussed below in section B.4). This characterization of

(probably the chorus) praises the character (possibly Amphion) as a disinterested, philosophical investigator in a *makarismos* that calls the character “blessed” (ὄλβιος), in part because of his contemplation of “the ageless cosmic order of deathless nature.”¹⁵²

ὄλβιος ὅστις τῆς ἱστορίας
 ἔσχε μάθησιν
 μήτε πολιτῶν ἐπὶ πημοσύνην
 μήτ’ εἰς ἀδίκους πράξεις ὀρμῶν,
 ἀλλ’ ἀθανάτου καθορῶν φύσεως
 κόσμον ἀγήρων, πῇ τε συνέστη
 χῶθεν χῶπως:
 τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις οὐδέποτ’ αἰσχροῶν
 ἔργων μελέδημα προσίζει. (Fr. 910)

blessed is he who has knowledge from investigation,
 striving neither for harm to the citizens nor for unjust deeds,
 but contemplating the ageless cosmic order of deathless nature, and in what
 way and whence and how it came to exist;
 to such as these never does an interest in shameful actions cleave.

The suggestion that Amphion is invoking an Aether that recalls Presocratic theories, as part of a vision of the gods that is less like Homer’s misbehaving

Amphion is also consistent with his self-portrayal as a disinterested intellectual in Frs. 200, 201. See discussion in Collard and Cropp 2008, 7: 172-3; Collard 1995, 324-5 ad Fr. 910; Kambitsis 1972, 130; La Penna 1995, 322.

¹⁵² Collard notes that “blessed who” is a formula for praising those with insight into the world’s truths through divine revelation (e.g., Empedocles) or initiation into the mysteries. This praise is often associated with Anaxagoras. Collard 1995, 325 ad Fr. 910. See also Snell 1964, 90 (noting that Anaxagoras is said to have praised θεωρία as the goal of a man’s life).

divinities and more like the abstract cosmic principles of Anaxagoras, is further borne out by Amphion's reaction to Antiope's claim that she was raped by Zeus.¹⁵³ Amphion—initially, at least—strenuously resists Antiope's claim that she bore him and Zethus after being raped by Zeus, saying that he does not believe that Zeus imitated the “form of an evil beast” (θηρὸς κακούργου σχήματ') and came into her bed as a man would (Fr. 210).¹⁵⁴

Amphion's rejection of the traditional depictions of the sky-god Zeus as a being capable of adultery and rape is potentially controversial for the Athenian audience.¹⁵⁵ Although Amphion's lyre will come by Euripides' own time to be associated with traditional education and culture,¹⁵⁶ at the dramatic date of the play it is something new. As we know from Anaxagoras' reported exile and Socrates' conviction and execution, this kind of theological speculation could be controversial, and even dangerous.¹⁵⁷ Amphion's activities are also controversial for Zethus. As we

¹⁵³ Dillon 2004; Walsh 1984, 109-111. Walsh also argues that Amphion is a poet “of enchantment” who entirely rejects mundane things such as war and politics; this is an oversimplification, as I argue below in section B.4.

¹⁵⁴ See my discussion below in section C.

¹⁵⁵ Ritoók 2008, 31 (describing Amphion's words as potentially shocking, without much discussion); Dillon 2004, 54-7 (arguing that Amphion has adopted an idealistic notion of Zeus-Aether that will be undercut by the end of the play; see my discussion in section C).

¹⁵⁶ Wilson 1999-2000, 444-5 (noting that conservative quietists, whom I discuss in section B.4, were particularly associated with the lyre). See also Dover 1968, lix (commenting on how the Better Argument favors education based on traditional music and poetry, Ar. *Clouds* 964ff).

¹⁵⁷ Anaxagoras' teachings included the rejection of the traditional view that the sun and moon were gods; he held that celestial bodies were blazing stones and red-hot metal, and this seems to have been what led to his being charged with impiety and (according to most testimonies) exiled. Curd 2007, 136. At Socrates' trial, one of the accusations against him was that he taught similar doctrines. Pl. *Ap.* 26d1-e2.

will see, the problem for Zethus is that Amphion's poetry is an individual indulgence that interferes with what is truly important: the ability to make and keep an (honest) living, to defend the city militarily, and to participate in the city's politics. Amphion, however, characterizes himself as a good citizen precisely because he does not spend his time on material acquisition or in the rough and tumble of democratic politics, but rather in the poetry and philosophy that make him wise enough to advise the city well.

B.3. *Zethus the politician, farmer, and rhetorician*

B.3.a. *The self-indulgence of poetry*

Zethus places little value on Amphion's poetry. In fact, he thinks Amphion is introducing (εἰσάγων)¹⁵⁸ something positively dangerous:

¹⁵⁸ Literally, the verb εἰσάγω means "to lead in." It could be used in the context of "introducing new customs," (LSJ εἰσάγω I: 5) as here, with new customs often being dangerous or bad; it was also often used to describe leading a defendant into a courtroom, i.e., into an ἄγών (dispute). Here as in the other extant Euripidean uses of this participle, the speaker is describing the introduction of something that the speaker rightly considers dangerous, but that will turn out to be even more dangerous if excluded or denied. For example, there are some similarities between Zethus' rejection of Amphion's "wine-loving muse" and Pentheus' attempt to reject the worship of the new god Dionysos in Euripides' later play *Bacchae* —particularly when Pentheus tells the prophet Teiresias that only his old age saves him from being punished for introducing worthless mysteries (τελετὰς πονηρὰς εἰσάγων, *Bacc.* 260), Collard notes this is the εἰσάγων of innovation, and both he and Kambitsis give this example. Collard references Aristophanes' parody of this Euripidean usage in *Frogs*, 959. Collard 1995, 300 ad Fr. 183. A search of the TLG also produced an example from *Hippolytos*, where the chorus responds to Phaedra's self-loathing confession of her love for her stepson, Hippolytos, with a hymn that

κακῶν κατάρχεις τήνδε Μοῦσαν εἰσάγων
 ἀργόν, φίλοινον, χρημάτων ἀτημελῆ. (Fr. 183)

You are beginning evils introducing this Muse,¹⁵⁹
 a Muse lazy, wine-loving, and careless of property.

All of the evils mentioned here by Zethus relate to forms of self-indulgence. Wilson has argued that Zethus is complaining that Amphion is ignoring traditional religious poetry in favor of music for private pleasure (such as symposiastic music).¹⁶⁰ But

speaks of the god Eros' frightening and destructive power when he "introduces sweet delight" to the soul of those he attacks (εἰσάγων γλυκεῖαν ψυχᾷ χάριν, *Hipp.* 526). (Phaedra's suicide will lead to the death of Hippolytos, who had attempted to deny the power of Aphrodite.)

¹⁵⁹ Collard and Kambitsis note that it was characteristic of Euripides to use *μοῦσα* without a defining adjective to mean "music / poetry," e.g., at *Bacc.* 563. Collard 1995, 300 ad loc; Kambitsis 1972, 34. Zethus' characterization of the *μοῦσα* (rather than Amphion) as lazy and wine-loving suggests some degree of personification; I thus follow Snell and Wilson in translating as "Muse" rather than "music." Wilson 1999-2000, 442; Snell 1964, 82.

¹⁶⁰ Wilson 1999-2000, 442-3. Wilson also discusses the existence in Euripides' time of an aggressive and often metapoetic debate over a more sensual and virtuosic "New Music" led by practitioners such as the famous lyre player and dithyrambic poet Timotheus, which is often thought to have influenced Euripides, an acknowledged innovator in the use of music in tragedy. Wilson argues the figure of Amphion must have engaged with this debate. Wilson 1999-2000, 431, 443-5. See also Csapo 1999-2000, 405-415 (arguing that the experiments of Euripides and other dramatists with the New Music were not derivative of Timotheus and other composers of the New Dithyramb). Note that Timotheus and his "New Music" were especially associated with lyres that had more strings than the traditional seven-string lyre; Timotheus is often credited with inventing the eleven-string lyre. See,

there is testimony that Zethus told Amphion to throw away his lyre and take up ὄπλοι (weapons or tools, Fr. *187a(i)), as well as Zethus' advice to Amphion to farm instead of sing in Fr. 188, which I will discuss at some length below.¹⁶¹ Zethus would not have advised Amphion to throw away his lyre and take up weapons or tools if he were attempting to convince him to play more traditional religious music.¹⁶²

In Fr. 187, Zethus repeats the accusation of self-indulgence and laziness, and says that a lazy man (ἀργός, line 4) who prefers the pleasure of song to hard work is no use to either himself or his community:

ἀνήρ γὰρ ὅστις εὖ βίον κεκτημένος
τὰ μὲν κατ'οἴκους ἀμελίας παρείς ἔῃ,
μολπαῖσι δ' ἡσθεὶς τοῦτ' αἰεὶ θηρεύεται,

e.g. West 1992, 356-7, 361-4. See also Harmon 2003, 383-4 (gathering citations on Platonic and other aspersions against Timotheus and the increased number of lyre strings); Levin 1961, 300-1.

¹⁶¹ Note that the pleasure about which Zethus warns Amphion is not limited to sensual indulgence. In a fragment that Kannicht, Collard and Cropp, and Kambitsis all assign to Zethus, the speaker says that each man prefers to spend his time where he can shine and be at his best (Fr. 184). This attribution seems reasonable, given that when Callicles paraphrases the lines in Plato's *Gorgias* (at 484e4-7), it is shortly before he gives Socrates what he calls the advice of Zethus, to practice more practical forms of speech; Callicles' point is that philosophers criticize public speaking because they are not very good at it. Kambitsis notes the possibility that Callicles might have been quoting more generally from *Antiope*. Kambitsis 1972, 67 ad Kamb. Fr. XXIII.

¹⁶² As Clay notes, the lyre enabled a poet to accompany his own singing, so that he controlled his entire performance without having to depend on another musician's accompaniment. Clay 1989, 108-9. The lyre would thus also make individual composition easier and more attractive.

ἀργὸς μὲν οἴκοι κᾶν πόλει¹⁶³ γενήσεται
 φίλοισι δ' οὐδεῖς · ἡ φύσις γὰρ οἴχεται,
 ὅταν γλυκείας ἡδονῆς ἥσσω τισ ᾗ. (Fr. 187)

Any man who has a good living,
 But lets the things of his household go in neglect
 And delighted by songs is always hunting after this delight,
 Will be an idler at home and in the state,
 and a nobody for his friends; for a man's nature is ruined,
 whenever he is weaker than sweet pleasure.

Zethus rejects Amphion's claims that his poetry is associated with wisdom: "How can it be a wise thing," he asks Amphion, "if an art takes a man (like Amphion) who is good by nature and makes him worse?" (καὶ πῶς σοφὸν τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ἥτις εὐφυᾶ | λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτ' ἔθηκε χείρονα; Fr. 186).¹⁶⁴

B.3.b. *The importance of making a living through farming*

The lazy intellectual is a stereotype that we find in Aristophanes' *Clouds*, where his Socrates describes his Cloud-goddesses as "the great goddesses for lazy men" (μεγάλαι θεαὶ ἀνδράσιν ἀργοῖς), who offer him and his students insight,

¹⁶³ Both Kannicht and Kambitsis have the dative phrase οἴκοις καὶ πόλει. I follow Collard and Cropp, who find datives awkward with ἀργός and adopt Diggle's conjecture of the locative phrase. (In their 2008 text, Collard and Cropp have the misprint οἴκοι κᾶν πόλει, as David Kovacs kindly pointed out to me).

¹⁶⁴ Zethus' emphasis on nature is sometimes seen as portraying Zethus as an aristocrat; the political alignments of both Amphion and Zethus, however, are more complicated. See discussion in sections B.4 and B.5 below.

argument, circumlocution, and similar gifts (*Clouds*, 316-8).¹⁶⁵ These accusations of laziness also recall those that Eurymachos in the *Odyssey* leveled against Odysseus when disguised as a poor wandering man: that he was controlled by his appetites, and too lazy to work and to earn an honest living (*Od.* 18.356-64).¹⁶⁶ In Fragment 188, Zethus urges Amphion to farm and to abandon the “fine sentiments” (τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ’ . . . σοφίσματα) of poetry.

... ἀλλ’ ἐμοὶ πιθοῦ:
παῦσαι ματάζων καὶ πόνων εὐμουσίαν
ἄσκει: τοιαῦτ’ ἄειδε καὶ δόξεις φρονεῖν,
σκάπτων, ἄρῶν γῆν, ποιμνίοις ἐπιστατῶν,
ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ’ ἄφεις σοφίσματα,
ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις. (Fr. 188)

... but obey me;
cease being foolish and practice the
beautiful music of labor; sing these sort of things and
you will seem to be intelligent –
digging, plowing the earth, taking care of livestock—
leave to others these refined sayings from which you will furnish an empty
house.

Although some scholars translate this as though Zethus is recommending georgic poetry to Amphion,¹⁶⁷ advising georgic poetry would not fit Olympiodorus’

¹⁶⁵ For a discussion of *Clouds*, see B.5. Collard points out a similar use of ἀργός for intellectuals also at E. *Oed.* Fr. 552.4. Collard 1995, 300 ad Fr. 183. Note that the adjective ἀργός is given a political content in Euripides’ *Melanippe Wise* Fr. 512, ἀργὸς πολίτης κεῖνος, ὡς κακὸς γ’ ἀνήρ.

¹⁶⁶ See General Introduction, section A.

¹⁶⁷ E.g. Snell 1964, 86. In his commentary on Plato’s *Gorgias* 486c4-8, Dodds discusses the reconstruction of this fragment, which Callicles partly quotes and

testimony that Zethus told Amphion to use ὄπλοι (weapons or tools) and throw away his lyre (Fr. *187a). Zethus is not recommending mere landowning to Amphion; he is urging Amphion to do his own digging, plowing, and caring for livestock. Zethus is urging the idealized image of the yeoman citizen farmer known as an αὐτουργός that is discussed further in section B.5.a.

B.3.c. *The importance of political rhetoric*

But the problem is not just that Amphion is being lazy and neglecting his own living by failing to be a farmer. Zethus also criticizes Amphion for failing in his public role as a citizen by being unable to fight for his country—and, what is more, for being unable to participate in its political discourse. This latter criticism is somewhat surprising; as we will see in section B.5.a below, in contemporary Athenian discourse the farmer was often stereotyped as a man too busy with honest labor to spend time in urban politics. And contemporary politics is definitely relevant here; Zethus is using terms that resonate with Athenian democratic politics, and he receives a response from Amphion (discussed in B.4) that resonates with contemporary anti-democratic thinking.¹⁶⁸

partly paraphrases to fit it to the non-agricultural Socrates as part of his “advice of Zethus” to Socrates (ἀλλ’ ὦγαθέ, ἐμοὶ πείθου, παῦσαι δὲ ἐλέγχων, πραγμάτων δ’ εὐμουσίαν ἄσκει, καὶ ἄσκει ὁπόθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν, ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ’ ἀφείς, εἴτε ληρήματα χρηὴ φάναι εἶναι εἴτε φλυαρίας, ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις). Dodds 1959, 278-9 ad *Gorgias* 486c4-8. Note that Callicles advises Socrates to “practice the beautiful music of affairs, πραγμάτων” rather than line 2’s πόνων. While most of this fragment is attested from other sources, line 2 is a reconstruction by Borthwick correcting Olympiodorus’ unmetrical πολέμων. Borthwick 1967, 41-2.

¹⁶⁸ As Carter notes, it is not unusual for Euripides to discuss democracy and related issues in his plays, as in *Suppliants*, *Orestes*, *Antiope*, discussed in text below. Carter 1986, 55.

In Fragment 185, Zethus describes Amphion as a physical and rhetorical weakling who cannot fight for his country or participate in its political activities.

(ἀμελεῖς ὧν δεῖ σε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι)
 ψυχῆς φύσιν <γάρ> ὧδε γενναίαν <λαχὼν>
 γυναικομίμῳ διαπρέπεις μορφώματι
 κοῦτ' ἂν δίκης βουλαῖσι προσθεῖ' ἂν λόγον
 οὔτ' εἰκός ἂν καὶ πιθανὸν <οὐδὲν> ἂν λάκοις
 κοῦτ' ἂν ἀσπίδος κύτει
 <καλῶς> ὁμιλήσει<α>ς οὔτ' ἄλλων ὕπερ
 νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλευσαιο <τι> (Fr. 185)

(you do not care for the things you ought to care for)
 <although you have been allotted> a noble nature of soul,
 you are outstanding for looking like a woman,
 and would never be able to add an argument in deliberations on justice
 or speak out anything probable (εἰκός) and persuasive (πιθανόν)
 . . . or in the hollow of a shield
 join battle <bravely> or on behalf of others
 give <some> high-spirited counsel.

Zethus' references to deliberations, argument, and counsel recall various spheres of public Athenian activity where public speaking was important. The first phrase δίκης βουλαῖσι (line 4), which I have translated as “deliberations on justice,” could also be translated as “deliberations on a court case.” The latter translation points directly to some kind of judicial procedure,¹⁶⁹ where in Athenian practice

¹⁶⁹ Kambitsis 1972, 40. The word δίκη has a broad range of meanings that includes “justice” and “court,” as well as “lawsuit” or “trial.” See the discussion in Burnet 1924, 8 ad Pl. *Euthphr.* 2a5 (observing that δίκη is the general term, though more precisely in Athenian law a public case was δημόσια δίκη or γραφή, while a private case was ἴδια δίκη or simply δίκη).

there would be arguments for both prosecution and defense; the broader “deliberations on justice” could refer either to a court case, or to a discussion in the Counsel or Assembly of the justice of some proposed political action.¹⁷⁰ In either case, the argument would need to be, in the words of line 5, something “probable and persuasive” (εἰκός . . . καὶ πιθανόν).

The phrase εἰκός . . . καὶ πιθανόν is worth closer examination (and despite some textual issues, either or both εἰκός and πιθανόν must have appeared in Euripides’ text).¹⁷¹ Although both words have a broader range of meaning, both are

¹⁷⁰ For example, the debate over the punishment of Mytilene in the Athenian Assembly in Thuc. 3.36-49 (framed by Diodotus as an argument between the vengeful justice urged by Cleon and his own argument for expedient mercy, Thuc. 3.44).

¹⁷¹ Fragment 185 is a reconstruction primarily based on an extended quotation in Plato’s *Gorgias*, where Callicles gives Socrates what he calls the “advice of Zethus to Amphion”:

ἀμελεῖς, ὦ Σωκράτες, ὧν δεῖ σε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ φύσιν ψυχῆς ὧδε γενναίαν <λαχών> μειρακιώδι τινὶ διαπρέπεις μορφώματι κοῦτ’ ἂν δίκης βουλαῖσι προσθεῖ’ ἂν ὀρθῶς λόγον, οὔτ’ εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ πιθανὸν ἂν λάκοις, οὔθ’ ὕπερ ἄλλου νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλευσαιο. (485e6-486a3)

Although there are other witnesses for most of lines 2-3 and 6-7, Plato’s quotation is our only source for lines 4, 5, and 8. We must therefore consider the possibility that these are Plato’s words rather than Euripides. Line 8 is generally accepted, despite the use elsewhere in the dialogue of words from the νεανικόν family (e.g., *Gorgias* 482c4, 508d1, 509a3); as I argue in the text, Zethus’ νεανικὸν βούλευμα is opposed by Amphion’s σοφὸν . . . βούλευμα (Fr. 200.3), and the contrast between youthful daring and wise restraint has parallels elsewhere in Euripides. Lines 4 and 5 are a reconstruction by Dodds (Dodds 1959, 277 ad *Gorgias* 486a1-3); these are more controversial, particularly as Plato’s later dialogue *Phaedrus* problematizes the relationship between what is plausible (εἰκός) and what is persuasive (πιθανόν),

also used as specifically rhetorical terms, where they are closely related in meaning: *πιθανόν* can mean “persuasive” or “plausible,” and in the latter sense it can converge with the “likely or probable” sense of *εἰκός*.¹⁷² As rhetorical terms, both *εἰκός* and

e.g., *Phaedrus* 272d6-273a2. The word *εἰκός* is treated by Kannicht’s TrGF as a likely addition by the sophistic Callicles, rendering the end of the fragment as:

οὐτ’ ἂν δίκης βουλαῖσι πιθανόν ἂν λάκοις
 κοῦτ’ ἂν ἀσπίδος κύτει
 ... ὁμιλήσεας οὐτ’ ἄλλων ὕπερ
 νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλεύσαιο <τι>.

This reconstruction, as Collard points out, neglects too much of Callicles’ paraphrase. Collard 1995, 302 ad loc. As Callicles claims to be repeating Zethus’ remarks, they must be fairly close to Euripides’ original, even though we know from Olympiodorus and other commentators that he has substituted *μειρακιώδι* (childish) for Euripides’ *γυναικομίμω* (womanish), and has omitted Euripides’ military references in lines 6-7—presumably to fit the hardy military veteran, Socrates. From the context, Zethus must have remarked on the strength lacking in Amphion’s rhetoric; *εἰκός* and *πιθανόν* both make sense, and as I argue in the text, are used elsewhere by Euripides as rhetorical terms, at times in contexts that acknowledge the controversial nature of the increased emphasis on rhetoric in the late fifth century. I therefore follow Collard, Cropp, and Kambitsis in accepting Dodd’s reconstruction. Collard and Cropp 2008, 7: 184-5 (Fr. 185); Kambitsis 1972, 3-4 (Kam. Fr. IX).

¹⁷² Herodotus sometimes uses *πιθανός* in this way, e.g., Hdt. 1.214.5 (Herodotus has reported the version of the death of Cyrus that seems most plausible, *πιθανώτατος*, to him). See also Hdt. 1.123.1; 3.9.1-2. For *πιθανός* and *εἰκός* as rhetorical terms, see, e.g., Arist. *Rhet.* 1355b15-7 (the function of rhetoric is to discover τὸ πιθανόν); Arist. *Rhet.* 1357a22-b1 (discussing the importance of what is *εἰκός* for rhetorical argument); *Rhet. Alex.* (1428a27-31) (discussing *εἰκός* as a mode of proof). See also the discussion of probability below. Note that both terms also had a broad range of

πιθάνον are associated with the rhetorical skill that had become critical to political success in democratic Athens in the last quarter of the fifth century¹⁷³ and that was taught by the teachers known as sophists.¹⁷⁴ Both can thus be associated positively

ordinary meaning. The word εἰκός (and its related verb, ἔοικα) is common from Homer through Euripides and beyond, covering a range of meanings that includes “to be like or similar,” “to be fitting or appropriate” (i.e., similar to what is normative), and “to be likely or probable” (i.e., similar to an accepted narrative or stereotype). Hoffman describes the relationships between these different meanings, and describes how the senses “to be similar or like” and “to be fitting”—common in Homer—were dominated in the fifth century by the senses “to be fitting” and “to be likely or probable.” Hoffman 2008. The word πιθάνος always has something to do with plausibility or persuasiveness, though sometimes it has a passive meaning (persuadable, obedient) rather than an active one (persuasive). Interestingly, Xenophon seems to use the word more often in its passive sense (persuadable or obedient), which Dodds describes as “rare.” See, e.g., Xen. *Oec.* 13.9; Dodds 1959, 301 ad *Gorgias* 493a6.

¹⁷³ In the mid-fifth century, a series of constitutional reforms decreased the institutional power of the Athenian elite, including the freeing of the democratic Assembly of any supervision by a more elite body, the Areopagus. Ober 1989, 77-8. With the increased importance of Assembly decisions, skill in public speaking became increasingly important for Athenian politicians. Ober 1989, 79. In the last quarter of the fifth century, a new style of democratic politics developed, led by popular orators such as Cleon (though anticipated to some extent by Pericles) who amassed political power by a direct appeal to the people without relying on more elite influence. Connor 1971, esp. 87-91, 119-136; Ober 1989, 86-93.

¹⁷⁴ As noted above in section B.1, the term “sophist” in the late fifth century is roughly equivalent to its modern use, although modern scholarship tends to put Socrates in a separate category. Connor has argued that most of the popular democratic politicians of the fifth century (like Cleon), who often presented themselves as anti-intellectual, probably did not formally study with the sophists.

with a sophisticated, successful argument (as they are for Zethus). But both can also be associated with the negative attitudes towards this rhetorical skill, which was sometimes accused of making the worse argument prevail over the better. For example, in Euripides' *Orestes*, *πιθανός* characterizes the mob orator who is giving the crowd bad advice (advice that will be unsuccessfully opposed by a sensible farmer, as I discuss below): the orator is described as *πιθανὸς ἔτ' αὐτοὺς περιβαλεῖν κακῷ τινι* (persuasive in involving them [the crowd] in some evil, 906).¹⁷⁵

Connor 1971, 163-7. Even if we assume this is the case, the political arena was being exposed to sophistic ideas and techniques; Pericles was associated with the noted intellectuals of his day, including not only the natural scientist Anaxagoras (discussed above at B.2), but also the sophist Protagoras. Schiappa 2003, 178-80; Kerferd 1981, 18-9. Sophists like Gorgias earned their high fees largely because they claimed to teach rhetoric that would enable political success (e.g., Plato, *Gorgias* 452e, where Gorgias stresses the power to convince courts, the Council, the Assembly, and other citizen gatherings). Socrates himself was blamed for having taught the politicians Alcibiades and Critias. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.12-47. And by the fourth century, probably most students of rhetoric studied the subject because of their political ambitions. Ober 1989, 115. See generally Kennedy 1963, 28-51.

¹⁷⁵ In the mob orator's speech in *Orestes*, most scholars accept line 906, but deem the following lines 907-13 an interpolation. Kovacs 1982, 31-50. Willink, however, agrees with those who would omit 904-906 as well. Willink 1986, 232 ad loc. There seems to be only one other use by Euripides of *πιθανός*, in *Thyestes*, Fr. 396, where what is *πιθανός* is associated with lies. Note that *πιθανός* also appears with a demagogic connotation in Thucydides, e.g. 3.36.6 (describing Cleon as the most persuasive, *πιθανώτατος*, to the people at that time); 4.21.3 (Cleon as *πιθανώτατος* to the multitude); 6.35.2 (Athenagoras as *πιθανώτατος* to the Syracusan multitude). See also the discussion in Kambitsis 1972, 40-1. The term is also potentially pejorative in Plato's *Gorgias*, e.g. 456c5; 457a6 (Gorgias describes the man who knows rhetoric as more persuasive, *πιθανώτερος*, on any subject, even on one where he is not expert).

The term εἰκός has similarly ambiguous overtones. Although the argument from probability must have existed much earlier, its systematic teaching was an essential and characteristic element of the new rhetorical learning.¹⁷⁶ In the argument from probability, even if available proof was weak or absent, the orator could argue that it was “likely” (εἰκός) or “not likely” that something would have happened.¹⁷⁷ For example, in the Homeric *Hymn for Hermes*—often considered our first extant example of the εἰκός argument¹⁷⁸—Hermes defends against the accusation of having stolen Apollo’s cows by arguing that he is not *like* the sort of person who could steal a herd of cows (οὔτε βοῶν ἐλατῆρι κραταιῷ φωτὶ ἔοικα, 265),¹⁷⁹ being but a newborn infant still in swaddling clothes. Hermes is, of course, lying; as Amphion explained near the beginning of *Antiope*, Hermes gave his invention, the lyre, to Apollo as recompense for those cows (Fr. 190). Not that the εἰκός argument was used only in defense of lies; it was particularly useful in any

¹⁷⁶ The formal development of the εἰκός argument is attributed by Plato and most later scholars to the Sicilians Tisias and/or Corax, c. 466 BCE. Pl. *Phaedrus* 267a5, 273a7-b1 (Tisias); Arist. *Rhet.* 1402a18 (Corax). See discussion in Kennedy 2007, 302-3 (giving a brief overview of the rhetorical handbook); Kennedy 1963, 60-62 (discussing the possible relationship between Corax and Tisias). According to Lloyd 1992, 29, the argument from probability “was almost a hallmark of rhetorical sophistication, and one of the features which marked the Sicilian rhetoric as something new and different.”

¹⁷⁷ Gagarin 2014, 15-29, 25, 28-9 considers the use of εἰκός arguments in Athenian forensic oratory, arguing that although courts valued evidence of truth or law over probability arguments, often probability was needed to assess the offered evidence, so that the distinction between fact and probability argument tended to collapse.

¹⁷⁸ See, e.g., Wohl 2014, 6 (accepting a date for the *Hymn* in early fifth century); Schmitz 2000, 49 (early fifth century); Kennedy 1963, 40 (sixth century). (The dating of the *Hymn* is discussed below in section B.5.b.)

¹⁷⁹ Hermes repeats this claim at *h. Hermes* 377 (οὔ τι βοῶν ἐλατῆρι κραταιῷ φωτὶ εἰκώς).

situation where definitive proof was lacking.¹⁸⁰ Indeed, in Euripides it is often used by characters who ought to prevail but are unable to otherwise prove their case.¹⁸¹ But its ability to make a claim persuasive in the absence of any accepted proofs, as well as its appeal to the audience's pre-existing conceptions of what was probable,¹⁸² added to the fear that the new rhetoric could be misused.¹⁸³

¹⁸⁰ Thus Farenga has argued that εἰκός arguments were an important tool for citizens seeking to contribute their own (necessarily limited and imperfect) personal perspective to the formation of communal knowledge. Farenga 2014, 84-5.

¹⁸¹ According to Lloyd, in the ἀγῶνες of extant Euripidean plays the argument from probability is often used to analyze possible motives, usually when the speaker has weak evidence and thus needs to use every means of persuasion—though in many of these cases, the speaker (e.g., Hippolytos, as described in the text below) ought to win the argument. Lloyd 1992, 29 (with additional examples, including E. *Tro.* 976-82, where Hecuba argues that it is not likely goddesses would have competed in a beauty contest, and that Helen must be lying).

¹⁸² The concept of probability can mean different things: that objectively something is likely or probable (with a frequency that is perhaps even calculable, as in the probabilities of a coin toss); or that subjectively something is accepted as likely or probable in light of past experience, i.e., it is “like” something known to be true. Wohl argues that the ancient Greeks had a sophisticated understanding of probability in both senses (albeit perhaps not a mathematically calculable one), offering Aristotle's understanding of rhetorical εἰκός as an example. Wohl 2014, 5; cf. Hoffman 2008, 5-7, 23 (reviewing the usage of εἰκός). However, in the fifth and fourth centuries the εἰκός argument was often described in terms of the audience's own accepted opinions. Hoffman explains that this is how it is characterized in Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* (70a1-10) and in the *Rhetoric for Alexander* (1428a27-31); this is also how Plato's Socrates characterizes the teachings of Tisias in the *Phaedrus* at 273b. Hoffman 2008, 7-9; Kraus 2007, 5-6; Goebel 1989, 42-3.

¹⁸³ In particular, both it and πιθανός were suspect to Plato, whose Socrates repeatedly charged that teachers like Gorgias taught their students to be persuasive

The εἰκός argument appears repeatedly in Euripides in contexts that show his awareness of its potentially problematic nature. For example, in *Cretans* he put the term εἰκός into the mouth of the notorious Pasiphae, who (unsuccessfully) attempts to defend herself against the charge that she had had sexual relations with Minos' bull by arguing that she did so involuntarily, because of a god-sent madness; "it is not likely" (ἔχει γὰρ οὐδὲν εἰκός, E. *Cretans* Fr. 472e11), she points out, that in her right mind she would have found a bull attractive. More often, however, the εἰκός argument is simply made by Euripides' characters without formally invoking the term, as when Hippolytos—who is innocent, but cannot prove that he did not rape his stepmother Phaedra—argues (in effect) that given his chaste nature, it is not plausible to think he would have committed the crime (E. *Hipp.* 1008-20). His father Theseus responds by describing Hippolytos as a spell-caster and magician (ἐπωδὸς καὶ γόης, 1038)—terms sometimes applied pejoratively to practitioners of the modern rhetoric.¹⁸⁴

Zethus offers one final example of the need for public speaking at the end of Fr. 185, where he complains about Amphion's inability to give "high-spirited counsel" (νεανικὸν βούλευμα, line 8) on behalf of others. The idea of counsel on behalf of others suggests advising a particular action or offering a resolution to a

(πιθανός) by arguing what was probable (εἰκός), rather than by arguing what was true. See, e.g. *Phaedrus* 272d6-273a2. Gorgias' *Helen* is in fact an extended εἰκός argument; Gorgias lists the four likely or reasonable (εἰκός, *Helen* § 5) explanations for Helen's going to Troy and argues that in each case, she should be exonerated. See also Woodruff 1999, 296-300 (Gorgias' *Helen* and *Palamedes* depend on the εἰκός argument, although Plato wrongly accuses Gorgias and other sophists of substituting what is εἰκός for what is true).

¹⁸⁴ de Romilly discusses the comparison of rhetoric to a magic spell exploited by Gorgias and criticized by Plato (e.g., in his *Euthydemus*, describing sophists as imitating the Egyptian Proteus and using witchcraft, γοητεύοντε, 288b7-8). de Romilly 1975, 15-43.

body such as the Athenian Council or Assembly.¹⁸⁵ As Collard has noted, Zethus' urging the ability to offer counsel on behalf of others recalls how in Euripides' *Suppliants* Theseus praises Athenian democracy for asking all citizens to bring forward their counsel: "who has and wishes to bring into the middle [of public debate] some *counsel beneficial* to the city?" (Τίς θέλει πόλει | χρηστόν τι βούλευμ' ἐς μέσον φέρειν ἔχων; *Supp.* 438-8).¹⁸⁶

Fragment 185 thus describes several forms of public activity that stress both public speech and public deliberation, as emphasized by Zethus' repeated use of

¹⁸⁵ Kambitsis argues that Zethus' βούλευμα probably refers to a different form of speech than what was εἰκός . . . καὶ πιθανόν, such as discussions within the smaller Council (βουλή) that generated proposals that were then put before the Athenian Assembly for discussion and vote. Although the noun βούλευμα also has a broad range of meaning, its frequent sense of a particular purpose, piece of advice, or proposal lends itself to Kambitsis' interpretation. See Mastronarde 2002, 393-7 (βουλεύματα as referring to specific plans or to the process of deliberation more generally). Thus in the constitutional debate in Herodotus, the participants argue (in part) over which form of government has the best approach to βουλεύματα; Otanes argues that one benefit of democracy is that all its βουλεύματα must be submitted to the community for judgment, while Megabyzus argues that in an oligarchy the best men will provide the best βουλεύματα (Hdt. 3.80.9, 3.81.3). Kambitsis acknowledges, however, that the verb βουλεύω can be found in the context of both the Council and the Assembly. Kambitsis 1972, 41-2.

¹⁸⁶ Collard sees in both the *Antiope* and the *Suppliants* passages an allusion to the formulaic proclamation in the Athenian assembly, Τίς ἀγορεύειν βούλεται; Collard 1995, 302 ad *Ant.* 185; Collard 1975, 2: 228 ad *Supp.* 438-41. See also Michelini 1994, 233-4, 247-50 (noting the importance of persuasion and argument to Theseus in *Suppliants*, as when he intends to attempt to persuade the Thebans before using force at *Supp.* 347, and when he explains that he will persuade the Athenian citizens to vote for his plan at *Supp.* 355.)

words related to βουλευώ, “to deliberate” (βουλαῖσι, βούλευμα, βουλευσαιο).¹⁸⁷ Gilbert, however, has attempted to argue that these are not references to political deliberation, but are confined to private lawsuits (δίκης βουλαῖσι, line 4) and military councils (line 8).¹⁸⁸ But a look at Amphion’s corresponding argument precludes an apolitical interpretation. We will see in section B.4 that Amphion discusses “bad citizens” (Fr. 201.3) and city management (Fr. 200.1); invokes terms important in contemporary Athenian discussions of political participation (πολυπραγμοσύνη, ἀπραγμοσύνη, Fr. 193); and implicitly opposes his own idea of “wise counsel” (σοφὸν . . . βούλευμα, Fr. 200.3) to Zethus’ “high-spirited counsel” (νεανικὸν βούλευμα, Fr. 185.8).

In addition, Zethus’ νεανικὸν βούλευμα itself has a democratic flavor, one that is both positive and negative; as Gilbert points out, it is different from the unambiguously public-spirited “beneficial counsel” (χρηστὸν . . . βούλευμα) that Theseus in *Suppliants* praises Athenian citizens for giving.¹⁸⁹ The word νεανικόν, which I have translated as “high-spirited,” literally means “youthful.” It can refer to youthful vices such as brashness or recklessness (the connotation that Amphion

¹⁸⁷ As Wilson notes, Zethus seems to be drawing on some theoretical definition of participatory citizenship. Wilson 1999-2000, 443.

¹⁸⁸ As noted above, in Athenian terminology the word δίκη in a technical sense referred to a private lawsuit as opposed to an action on the public behalf. Gilbert 2009, 26-7 (ignoring line 5 on the grounds of the textual problems described above).

¹⁸⁹ Similarly, Gilbert argues that that Zethus’ condemnation of Amphion’s being “lazily useless at home and in the city, and a nobody for his friends” (Fr. 187) could mean simply that Amphion is not useful to his immediate circle of family and friends. (Note that Gilbert’s argument relies upon replacing the dative οἴκοις καὶ πόλει in Fr. 187.4 with the locative phrase.) Gilbert 2009, 27-8. Carter makes a similar point with reference to Zethus’ νεανικὸν βούλευμα, arguing that Zethus is urging Amphion to adopt the brashness necessary to survive in democratic debate, even if it violates the principles of aristocratic behavior and self-control. Carter 1986, 166.

counters with his “wise counsel”), or it can have the more positive associations of vigor and daring.¹⁹⁰ In Euripides’ *Suppliants*, youthfulness is explicitly associated with democracy; when Theseus defends democracy to the pro-monarchy Theban Herald, he praises democracy’s ability to value its young citizens (ἄστοις . . . νεανίαις, *Supp.* 443), where a monarchy would fear them and seek to pluck out the daring youth (τόλμας . . . νέους, *Supp.* 448).¹⁹¹ Similarly, the Herald attempts to

¹⁹⁰ The only other Euripidean example I have found is *Hipp.* 1204, φόβος νεανικός (the messenger’s “intense fear”). For the clearly negative connotation, see Plato’s *Gorgias* 508d1 (Socrates refers to Callicles’ “brash” assertion (τὸ νεανικὸν δὴ τοῦτο τοῦ σοῦ λόγου) that anyone could box Socrates’ ears, as though he were ἄτιμος, someone deprived of the protections of citizenship). Note that Socrates’ use of νεανικὸν picks up not only on Callicles’ earlier quotation of E. *Ant.* Fr. 185, but also on Callicles’ still earlier claim that Socrates seemed to “have a brash swagger in your arguments, like a true orator” (δοκεῖς μοι νεανιεύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος ὢν, 482c4-5), when Socrates argued rhetoric was useless for the man who intended no wrong. (In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates uses a similar expression in describing Lysias’ ability to say the same thing twice in different words, Pl. *Phdr.* 235a5-6). For more positive connotations, see Pl. *Rep.* 503c1-4 (Socrates notes that qualities such as quickness in learning, spirit (νεανικοί), and magnificence are rarely combined with quietness (ἡσυχία) and stability). Note Demosthenes: ἔστι δ’ οὐδέ ποτ’, οἶμαι, μέγα καὶ νεανικὸν φρόνημα λαβεῖν μικρὰ καὶ φαῦλα πράττοντας, 3.32. Micheleni discusses the relationship between νεανικὸν and daring or hubris in connection with *Suppliants*, e.g., *Supp.* 190, 580 (Theseus is called νεανίας); she argues that youthful hubris is natural, though it needs constraint, and that the daring of the young may be necessary for cities’ survival. Micheleni 1994, 221-2, 237-8. See generally Dover 1974, 102-6.

¹⁹¹ Micheleni discusses the opposition of youth/rashness and age/quietude as a theme in *Suppliants*, arguing that hubris was seen as a potential danger in the fortunate and beautiful young. Micheleni 1994, 220-1. Note that Kovacs suggests that lines 442-55 are an interpolation. Kovacs 1982, 36-9.

dissuade Theseus from acting against Thebes by warning him about the perils of bold generals and young sailors (σφαλερὸν ἡγεμῶν θρασὺς | νέος τε ναύτης· ἥσυχος, καιρῷ σοφός, *Supp.* 508-9);¹⁹² but Theseus ignores the warning and takes the risk of helping the suppliants, thus undertaking the kind of toils (πόννοι, *Supp.* 323)¹⁹³ on which (as his mother points out) Athens thrives. And Theseus is a young man himself, as the monarchic Herald disdainfully points out (*Supp.* 580).¹⁹⁴

These “youthful” qualities of hard work, boldness, activity, achievement, and glory recall the ideal of Athens that is most famously praised in Pericles’ Funeral Oration, as reported by Thucydides.¹⁹⁵ Pericles praised Athens as a community made and governed by active citizens who resemble Zethus’ ideal, in that each man

¹⁹² I rely on Collard’s text here, which follows the majority of editors in the emendation νέος for the redundant νεώς. Collard 1975, 2: 244-5 ad *Supp.* 508b-10.

¹⁹³ Toil (πόννος) itself can be associated with youth and boldness, as in E. *Archelaus*, Fr. 237.1 (it is right that a young man should be bold; it is toil that brings about achievement and glory). See Michelini 1994, 231-2 (noting the correspondence between Theseus’ undertakings and Athenian imperialism in *Suppliants*, but noting that the most unambiguous defenses of aggressive action are given to other speakers).

¹⁹⁴ As Michelini argues, although youth and democracy are given a favorable treatment in the person of Theseus—a young leader presiding over a democratic state—and although the play appears to enact the traditional contrast between Athenian enlightenment and Theban error, Euripides also problematizes democracy’s self-congratulatory tropes. For example, Theseus himself expresses concerns about the rashness of youth and the dangers of trusting the masses, e.g., *Supp.* 243. Michelini 1994, 230.

¹⁹⁵ Parallels between *Suppliants* and Thucydides are also discussed in Michelini 1994, 232 (parallels between Herald/Theseus debate and that of Nicias/Alcibiades in Thucydides Book 6); Rusten 1989, 143 (the Funeral Oration and *Suppliants*). See also Carter 1986, 99-100 (ἀπραγμοσύνη and the debate between Nicias and Alcibiades in Thucydides).

is capable of combining attention to his own business with military service and with active involvement in politics (Thuc. 2.39-40). Pericles declared that only the Athenians regarded the apolitical man as not quiet, but useless; and that only the Athenians saw public discourse as a prerequisite to good political decisions.¹⁹⁶ Where others might be daring (τολμᾶν) because they were ignorant, he said, the Athenians were daring in both thought and deed (Thuc. 2.39-40).¹⁹⁷

Zethus thus emerges as a young man who favors vigorous action in a type of politics that recalls the Athenian political situation, where arguments could be communicated to a mass audience only through the rhetorical skill of making arguments that seemed likely and persuasive (εἰκός . . . καὶ πιθανόν) in light of the audience's current beliefs and knowledge. These rhetorical skills may be used more to further his own interests and status than the city's interests; Olympiodorus paraphrases Zethus' advice as "go out; live a soldier's life, be well-provided for, and

¹⁹⁶ Collard has argued that the only fifth century passages extant that treat offering public counsel as a duty rather than a privilege of free speech are this speech of Pericles, Otares' argument in the constitutional debate in Herodotus at Hdt 3.80.6, and two passages from Euripides—Theseus' remarks cited above at *Supp.* 438-41, and *Pho.* 1015-6. Collard 1975, 2: 228 ad *Supp.* 438-41.

¹⁹⁷ Thuc. 2.40.3: διαφερόντως γὰρ δὴ καὶ τόδε ἔχομεν ὥστε τολμᾶν τε οἱ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα καὶ περὶ ὧν ἐπιχειρήσομεν ἐκλογίζεσθαι· ὁ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀμαθία μὲν θράσος, λογισμὸς δὲ ὄκνον φέρει. The word τόλμα, daring, has much the same ambivalence as νεανικόν, with which it is sometimes associated; it can be a positive and creative form of daring, as in the speeches of Pericles and Theseus (E. *Supp.* 443-8, discussed above), or it can be a willingness to run unreasonable risks, as in the Corinthians' description of the Athenians (οἱ μὲν καὶ παρὰ δύναμιν τολμηταὶ, Thuc. 1.70.3). See Carter 1986, 11-12 (describing the ambivalence as an expression of the tension between the traditional regard for prowess, and the need for civic virtue). Collard comments on Euripides' fascination with τόλμα as the supreme virtue of youth. Collard 1975, 2: 230 ad *Supp.* 447-9. See also Carter 1986, 45 (daring as the central characteristic of the fifth century Athenians).

rule” (ἔξελθε· στρατιωτικὸν βίον ζῆσον καὶ <εὐ>πόρησον καὶ τυράννησον, Fr. *187a (ii)).¹⁹⁸ Amphion’s response, at least, will suggest that Amphion believes this to be so. But as I discuss further in B.5.a, Zethus’ emphasis on farming also serves to rehabilitate his emphasis on rhetorical skills and to suggest that like farming and fighting, they are at least potentially part of an honest contribution to city life.

B.4. *Amphion’s Response: an elitist politics*

Strikingly, Amphion does not quarrel with Zethus’ characterization of him as unable to fight or to persuade a crowd. Where in Hesiod and Homer a man should be able to both fight well and speak well, with the ability to persuade the public being related to the poet’s Muse-given power,¹⁹⁹ for Amphion neither physical nor

¹⁹⁸ Olympiodorus, *On Plato’s Gorgias*, 34.4 (commenting on *Gorgias* 503d), as emended by Borthwick 1967, 43. I take this as a summary of Zethus’ advice both in Fr. 185 (to participate in politics and fight, as transmitted in part by *Gorgias* 485e-6a) and in Fr. 188 (to earn a living by farming, as transmitted in part by *Gorgias* 486c). However, as Borthwick has pointed out, Olympiodorus seems to have had a fixation on military matters that was not present in the play, and may have had access to the play only through Plato scholia. Borthwick 1967, 43. (These fragments are further discussed above). Note that although Olympiodorus’ verb τυράννέω can mean “to be a despot,” in other contexts it can mean more generally “to rule / be powerful.” See, e.g., E. *Med.* 967 (Medea describes Jason’s new young wife as holding power, νέα τυράννεϊ); cf. *Hdt.* 7.99.1 (Artemisia described as holding a tyranny). As Borthwick notes, Amphion seems to respond to this point in Fr. 194.4 when he declares he does not care for an over-daring “leader of the land,” προστάτην χθονός. Borthwick 1967, 43-4.

¹⁹⁹ Thus in the *Theogony*, Hesiod describes wise and prudent kings as honored by the Muses, who pour “sweet dew” upon their tongues. *Theog.* 81-93. In the *Iliad*, Phoinix’s mission is to instruct Achilles in speaking in the assemblies “where men

retorical strength is even desirable. As we will see, Amphion argues that it is his intellectual focus that makes him a good citizen, able to give wise advice that is not influenced by a desire for material things and is superior to communal deliberations.

Amphion does not merely insist that intelligence is better than physical strength, which was a Greek commonplace from the time of Homer's Nestor and Odysseus.²⁰⁰ He goes much further by saying that that his effeminate body and physical weakness are irrelevant if he can "think well":

τὸ δ' ἄσθενές μου καὶ τὸ θῆλυ σῶματος
κακῶς ἐμέμφθης· εἰ γὰρ εὖ φρονεῖν ἔχω,
κρεῖσσον τόδ' ἐστὶ καρτεροῦ βραχίονος. (Fr. 199)

You wrongly blame my weakness and feminine body;
For if I am able to think well,
This is better than a strong arm.

Physical strength can even be harmful, Amphion argues; it gives rise to the habit of an insatiable stomach, which will turn those who cultivate strength into bad citizens (πολῖται) if they lose their money (and thus the ability to satisfy those appetites lawfully).

Καὶ μὴν ὅσοι μὲν σαρκὸς εἰς εὐεξίαν
ἀσκοῦσι βίοντον, ἥν σφαλῶσι χρημάτων,
κακοὶ πολῖται· δεῖ γὰρ ἄνδρ' εἰθισμένον
ἀκόλαστον ἦθος γαστρὸς ἐν ταύτῳ μένειν. (Fr. 201).

and surely those who direct their resources

become distinguished" as well as in the deeds of war (*Il.* 9.441). See also General Introduction, Section A.

²⁰⁰ Snell 1964, 89. I must therefore disagree with Carter's argument that Amphion's attitude is somehow "traditional." Carter 1986, 170.

towards the vigor of their muscles, if they lose their fortune,
become bad citizens; for inevitably a man accustomed to
an uncontrolled habit of the stomach remains in that condition.

Amphion's comment implies that he does have control of his appetites, in part because he has fewer material needs than does someone like Zethus.²⁰¹ Amphion has thus turned the accusations of self-indulgence and of poor citizenship back on Zethus; it is not Amphion's physical weakness and lack of a conventional occupation that are dangerous, but Zethus' materialistic focus.

Amphion and Zethus' different attitudes towards the relationship of material body to immaterial mind are reinforced by the way in which Zethus and Amphion speak about what they value. Both Zethus and Amphion talk in terms of what a man "hunts"—a significant turn of phrase given their hunt for vengeance later in the play.²⁰² Thus when Zethus praises the acquisition of a material livelihood, he denigrates the man who "delighted by songs is always hunting after this delight" (μολπαῖσι δ' ἡσθεῖς τοῦτ' ἀεὶ θηρεύεται, Fr. 187). In turn, Amphion adapts this language to praise hunting what is beautiful:

εἰ δ' εὐτυχῶν τις καὶ βίον κεκτημένος
μηδὲν δόμοισι τῶν καλῶν θηράσεται
ἐγὼ μὲν αὐτὸν οὔποτ' ὄλβιον καλῶ,
φύλακα δὲ μᾶλλον χρημάτων εὐδαίμονα (Fr. 198)

if anyone luckily possessing a living,
hunts after nothing of what is beautiful in his home²⁰³
I will never call him blessed,
but rather a fortunate guard of property.

²⁰¹ Cf. the portrayal of Socrates as Amphion in Plato's *Gorgias*, as discussed in Chapter 2.

²⁰² The hunt for vengeance is discussed in section C below.

²⁰³ I follow Collard in taking δόμοισι as a locative. Collard 1995, 306.

Amphion does not despise material goods; he concedes that it is “lucky” to possess enough for a living, but argues that by itself this merely makes a man the “guard of property.” What makes the possession of property meaningful is that it enables a man to pursue something beautiful (τὰ καλὰ) “in his home”—in response to Zethus’ assertion that he was “lazy at home,” and to Zethus’ preference for public, outdoor activities such as farming, fighting, and speechmaking.²⁰⁴ Amphion’s “beautiful things” are not specified, but as they are in contrasted to the notions of a material living and property, presumably they are intellectual and spiritual goods, the result of his individual, Muse-assisted investigations.²⁰⁵ This emphasis on the immaterial, and the idea that the hunt for what is beautiful is related to being “blessed” (ὄλβιος), in turn suggests that the chorus was indeed praising Amphion when it praised the man “blessed (ὄλβιος) for having knowledge from investigation and for contemplating the cosmic order,” Fr. 910.²⁰⁶ Amphion’s preference for the immaterial over the material perhaps foreshadows the radical distinction between body and mind that would become so prominent in Plato.²⁰⁷

Amphion has a similar attitude towards the body politic: what is most important is a city’s intellectual direction, not the tangible involvement of its citizens in such activities as farming, fighting, or political discussion. He wants to

²⁰⁴ See further discussion in section D of Zethus as preferring the outdoors.

²⁰⁵ Nightingale 1995, 76 (citing Kambitsis 1972, 53-4 and Snell 1964, 87-8); La Penna 1995, 323-4. The idea that there is something more important than worldly goods is also found in another fragment usually attributed to Amphion that speaks of κρείσσον ὄλβου κτῆμα, “a possession more important than worldly goods” (Fr. 191). Note the difference in valence between ὄλβος (worldly goods) and ὄλβιος (blest by the gods with worldly goods—and with what makes them significant). See Fr. 196 (why not live without pain if prosperity (ὄλβος) is insecure); thus also at Hdt. 1.32.9 (πολλοῖσι γὰρ δὴ ὑποδέξας ὄλβον ὁ θεὸς προορίζους ἀνέτρεψε).

²⁰⁶ See discussion above in section B.1.

²⁰⁷ Snell sees it as the first instance of that distinction. Snell 1964, 89.

contribute to the city by saying “something wise” (τι σοφόν, Fr. 202) that will not stir up any (political) sickness for the city. The ability to give such wise advice is far more important than Zethus’ physical strength or rhetorical ability to persuade crowds:

γνώμαις γὰρ ἀνδρὸς εὖ μὲν οἰκοῦνται πόλεις,
 εὖ δ’ οἶκος, εἷς τ’ αὖ πόλεμον ἰσχύει μέγα ·
σοφὸν γὰρ ἓν **βούλευμα** τὰς πολλὰς χέρας
 νικάῃ, σὺν ὄχλῳ δ’ ἀμαθία πλεῖστον κακόν. (Fr. 200)

For cities are well managed by a man’s judgments,
 And so is a household, and moreover he is very strong in war;²⁰⁸
 For one **wise counsel** conquers many hands,
 And stupidity on the side of a crowd is the greatest evil.

Just as Amphion’s use of hunting terminology in Fr. 198 echoes Zethus’ use of it in Fr. 187, so Amphion’s use of σοφὸν . . . βούλευμα in Fr. 200.3 echoes Zethus’ νεανικὸν βούλευμα (Fr. 185). As I discussed above, νεανικὸν βούλευμα is associated with the “youthful,” bold, and sometimes rash qualities of democratic Athens. Amphion, however, prefers governance by the “wise counsel” of one man, which “conquers many hands.” Gilbert has argued (as he did with Zethus’ remarks in Fr. 185) that Amphion’s counsel refers to a strictly military context, wherein a wise general can conquer a crowd of foolish soldiers.²⁰⁹ It is true that words like “conquer” (νικάω), “hands” (χέρες / χεῖρες), and “crowd” (ὄχλος) can appear in a military context: a wise military decision can defeat a superior military force, which

²⁰⁸ The subject of ἰσχύει could be the man of the first line (as I have taken it), or a singular “city” adapted from the plural cities of the first line, or the οἶκος of the second line. I have chosen “man,” as the passage seems to focus on the wise judgment of one being more powerful than the stupidity of many.

²⁰⁹ Gilbert 2009, 27 & n. 5.

can be described as (fighting) hands or as a crowd.²¹⁰ But these same words can also appear in a civil context, where political proposals can “conquer”²¹¹ and a vote can be taken by a show of the hands²¹² of the “crowd” of voters. Amphion’s reference to “stupidity (ἀμαθία) on the side of a crowd” sounds particularly like contemporary criticism of democratic government; the democratic mob could be described as an ὄχλος, and its actions and leadership were often associated with ἀμαθία.²¹³ As

²¹⁰ We see a similar sentiment and vocabulary in Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus*, 21.8, where Ischomachos is explaining to Socrates the importance of a general’s being able to instill in his soldiers that he must be followed even through great dangers. A general who can so inspire his men could reasonably be said to proceed “with a great *band* [of soldiers]” (μεγάλη χειρὶ), and “many *hands* are willing to serve his judgment” (τῇ γνώμῃ πολλὰι χεῖρες ὑπηρετεῖν ἐθέλωσι). Ischomachos says that such a man, able to do great things through his judgment rather than his physical strength, is truly great. But note that immediately afterwards, Ischomachos states that the same principle holds in private matters, such as overseeing an agricultural estate. *Oec.* 21.9. The word ὄχλος can be used in a neutral sense to describe a mass of people, including soldiers (e.g., *E. Supp.* 756); for ὄχλος as describing an unruly mob of soldiers, see *E. Hecuba* 605-8.

²¹¹ The verb νικάω is often used to describe a political win, e.g. *E. Orestes* (the evil demagogue *wins* his argument, νικᾷ δ’ ἐκεῖνος ὁ κακός, 944); Plato, *Gorgias* 456a3 (Gorgias tells Socrates that the orators are the ones who give advice and *carry* their proposals, οἱ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ οἱ νικῶντες τὰς γνώμας).

²¹² Collard suggests that this passage refers to a vote by a show of hands, as in a primitive assembly. Collard 1995, 307 ad loc (citing Aesch. *Supp.* 607, Ar. *Eccl.* 264 for this use of the noun).

²¹³ For ἀμαθία and the related adjective ἀμαθής used to describe democratic crowds or leaders, see, e.g., Ar. *Eq.* 193 (Paphlagon, a stand-in for the demagogue Cleon in real life, as noted by Connor 1971, 163); *E. Or.* 905 (line questioned by Willink 1986, 232—see discussion in section B.3.c); cf. *E. Supp.* 421 (the monarchic Theban Herald objects to democracy on the grounds that some poor farmer could not possibly have

Kambitsis argues, Euripides' opposition between the good judgment of one man and the stupidity of many suggests that Amphion's comment should be taken broadly to refer to the civil context of the beginning of the passage as well as to the military context at the end of the passage.²¹⁴ Just as Zethus' arguments recall those of Theseus in Euripides' *Suppliants*, so Amphion's arguments recall those of the anti-democratic Theban Herald, who as we saw above warned Theseus of the dangers of bold generals and young sailors, and praised the quiet (ἥσυχος) man as the one wise in a crisis (ἥσυχος, καιρῷ σοφός, *Supp.* 509).

Amphion, however, has no desire to be a ruler himself. He prefers, as we have seen, to spend his time in poetry, hunting for what is beautiful; like the Theban Herald, he praises quiet. In Fr. 193 he comments that the man is a fool who busies himself in affairs (literally, "does many things," πράσσει πολλά) when it is possible not to do so but rather to live pleasantly in retirement (ἀπράγμων). The quiet (ἥσυχος) man, he argues, is safer and therefore better not only for his friends but also for the city.

ὁ δ' ἥσυχος φίλοις τ' ἀσφαλὲς φίλος
 πόλει τ' ἄριστος· μὴ τὰ κινδυνεύματα
 αἰνεῖτ'· ἐγὼ γὰρ οὔτε ναυτίλον φιλῶ
 τολμῶντα λίαν οὔτε προστάτην χθονός.

The quiet man is both a safe friend to his friends

time to look after the common interest—even if not ἀμαθής). For ὄχλος used to allude pejoratively to a political crowd, see, e.g., *E. Supp.* 411 (the Theban Herald disdainfully remarks that Thebes is ruled by one man, not some (Athenian) ὄχλος); *E. Hipp.* 986-9 (Hippolytos claims that he can speak well among the wise, but is no popular speaker able to argue artfully before a crowd, ὄχλος). See Ober 1989, 11 (noting that ὄχλος was one of the more insulting terms for the Athenian masses, which could also be described as τὸ πλῆθος and οἱ πολλοί). For further discussion of the passage, see Kambitsis 1972, 59-62.

²¹⁴ Kambitsis 1972, 59-60.

And the best man for the city; do not praise adventures;
 For I do not love the over-daring sailor
 or leader of the land. (Fr. 194)

Amphion evidently sees himself as an advisor who can help both the city and his friends through “wise counsel,” rather than by Zethus’ active participation in public affairs.²¹⁵

²¹⁵ Wilson 1999-2000, 443. Note that Amphion’s rejection of the “over-daring sailor” and “leader of the land” is part of his general disapproval of radical democracy. In the second half of the fifth century, the word *προστάτης* (“leader” or “protector”), particularly in the phrase *προστάτης τοῦ δήμου*, came to be used to refer to a leading politician—such as Pericles, for example (*προύστη τῆς πόλεως*, Thuc. 2.65.5; Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.40). Although the term is not necessarily pejorative, it could be used in contexts that suggest the leader in question is a demagogue or is seeking to accumulate tyrannical power. For example, in Herodotus’ constitutional debate, Darius supports his claim that monarchy is the best form of government by arguing that in a democracy factions tend to form until “someone being a protector of the people” (*προστάς τις τοῦ δήμου*) puts the factions down and emerges as a sort of monarch (Hdt. 3.82.3-4). Euripides’ characters use it in a pejorative sense at *Supp.* 243 (Theseus praises the middle class of citizens, describing the poorer class as fooled by “wretched leaders” (*πονηρῶν προστατῶν*)); *Or.* 772-3 (Orestes complains that the people are terrible whenever they have rascally leaders, *κακούργους ... προστατάς*, but his friend Pylades responds that they do good things when they have good (*χρηστούς*) ones)(note that Willink argues these lines are interpolated, Willink 1986 ad *Or.* 772-3). See discussions in Ober 1989, 316-7; Connor 1971, 110-5. Similarly, the reference to the “over-daring sailor” recalls how the monarchist Theban Herald warns the democratic Theseus that it is dangerous when the “bold general and young sailor” (*ἡγεμῶν θρασὺς | νέος τε ναύτης*, E. *Supp.* 508-9) take action (see discussion in B.3.c above). The Athenian navy in particular had a

As is often noted, Amphion's speech is full of terms that Euripides' audience would have associated with contemporary debates over the purpose and proper conduct of Athenian politics: ἥσυχος and ἀπράγμων (characterizing himself) and πράσσει πολλά (characterizing Zethus). The phrase πράσσει πολλά is related to πολυπραγμοσύνη,²¹⁶ a word that usually has the negative connotation of busy, meddlesome activity in affairs that are not properly one's own.²¹⁷ The aggressive pursuit of individual power by Athenian politicians, or the Athenian democracy's aggressive deployment of military might in order to win wealth and empire, could all be characterized as πολυπραγμοσύνη.²¹⁸ This is the negative side of the

democratic flavor, as it was manned by members of the lowest classes who were too poor to purchase hoplite armor. Strauss 1996, 313-4; Ober 1989, 83.

²¹⁶ E.g., *E. Supp.* 576-7, where as Ehrenberg notes the monarchic Herald accuses Theseus and Athens of being accustomed to be busybodies (πράσσειν ... πόλλα), and Theseus responds that yes, performing many labors (πονοῦσα πολλά) leads to much well-being. Ehrenberg 1947, 53-4. See also Podlecki 1996, 138 (with additional citations).

²¹⁷ For general discussion of the term, see Dover 1974, 188-90; Ehrenberg 1947, 46-7, 56.

²¹⁸ See, e.g., Thuc. 6.18.6 (Alcibiades, urging the (disastrous) Sicilian expedition, argues against what he calls the ἀπραγμοσύνη of Nicias and Nicias' warnings about the enthusiasm of youth, Thuc. 6.12.2-6.13.1); Thuc. 6.87.3 (The Athenian ambassador tells the Camarinaeans to trust Athens rather than Syracuse, and advises them to make use of Athens' πολυπραγμοσύνη in international affairs). Ehrenberg 1947, 47-52 (noting that in Thucydides, Pericles, Cleon, and Alcibiades all denounce πολυπραγμοσύνη, though with rather different implications). Michelini 1994, 228-9, 240 describes how Athenian domestic and political hyperactivity were described by πράσσει πολλά and πολυπραγμοσύνη (though these are more informal, colloquial terms that are rarely at home in serious literature), and notes potential parallels between Theseus' active intervention in Theban affairs and Athenian imperialism.

characterization of Athens as energetic and daring (e.g., νεανικός), the quality valued by Zethus. Amphion's preference for the quiet life (ἡσυχία) and retirement (ἀπραγμοσύνη) echoes the position of those Athenians—mostly from the upper classes—who disapproved of a risky, violent imperialism and who avoided a democratic process often hostile to wealthier citizens without the popular touch.²¹⁹ Such men, with oligarchic or even moderate democratic points of view, favored a

²¹⁹ Michelini 1994, 227-9 (discussing the association between elite politics' use of hubris ideology to support pacifism and an attack on democracy's πολυπραγμοσύνη); Carter 1986, 39-51, 104-30 (ἀπραγμοσύνη could encompass both elite quietists who wished to avoid politics, and those who pursued a conservative, peace-oriented politics. Connor argues a decline in elite political participation (and rise in elite ἀπραγμοσύνη) increased throughout the last quarter of the fifth century due to the rise of popular orators such as Cleon. Connor 1971, 175-94; cf. Lateiner 1982 (arguing that elite participation in non-military government service did not decline but rather continued to be relatively insignificant). As noted in this chapter's introduction, although scholars have disagreed on the dating of *Antiope*, metrical evidence places it closer to 425 rather than towards the end of Euripides' career in approximately 406. Collard assigns a similar date (423) to *Suppliants* based on both internal and metrical evidence. Collard 1975, 1: 8-9. The Euripidean evidence that the debate over ἀπραγμοσύνη and πολυπραγμοσύνη would have been familiar to Athenian audiences includes not only *Antiope* and *Suppliants*, but also the characterization of Hippolytos in *Hippolytos* (428 BCE) as a young man who has no interest in political power or public speaking (E. *Hipp.* 986-9, 1013-20). (For a discussion of Hippolytos as ἀπράγμων, see Carter 1986, 70-5). As Connor notes, Pericles' Funeral Oration (Thuc. 2.40.2, discussed in text above) also suggests the ἀπράγμων was already a recognizable type in the last years of Pericles (d. 429). Connor 1971, 180. Cf. Podlecki 1996, 143 (arguing that is difficult to know to what extent and with what nuance these political terms were being used at any particular point, a problem compounded by difficulties in dating *Antiope*).

traditional, conservative politics that avoided frequent meetings of an Assembly where orators could use their persuasive powers to sway the people in favor of new and perhaps risky proposals.²²⁰

From this perspective, the philosophical poet Amphion would appear to be, in contemporary Athenian terms, an oligarch or moderate democrat who is suspicious of popular rule and willing to participate in political life only to the extent of giving wise advice to a few leaders.²²¹ He expresses no interest in becoming any kind of political leader himself, much less any kind of popular leader.²²² Indeed, in many ways he resembles Anaxagoras, who was reported to have abandoned his family house and land in favor of cosmological investigations, and to have been an advisor to Pericles.²²³

²²⁰ Also comparing Zethus to a “busybody” democrat, Amphion to a quietist anti-democrat, is Ehrenberg 1947, 53-4 (also noting the theme in *Suppliants*, as well as *Heracleidae* and *Ion*). See also Wilson 1999-2000, 445 (Amphion as having conservative, anti-demotic views); Carter 1986, 172-3 (Amphion as an ἀπράγμων moderate democrat or oligarch). Podlecki provides a useful summary of scholarship on the relationship of the debate to contemporary Athenian politics (which he doubts). Podlecki 1996, 135-43. I argue that the political positions of the brothers are more complex than simply pro- vs. anti-democracy in section B.5.

²²¹ Here I agree with Slings. Slings 1991, 147-50 (referring to the Hesiodic relationship between poets and kings as both inspired by the Muses, *Theog.* 81-4). I cannot endorse Walsh’s interpretation of Amphion as exclusively “a poet of enchantment” who avoids all human concerns. Walsh 1984, 109-10.

²²² I must therefore disagree with Carter, who sees Amphion as a man “naturally accustomed to govern” who has been forced into inactivity by the (democratic) political climate. Carter 1986, 170.

²²³ Podlecki 1996, 142; Carter 1986, 163-4. Of course, as a non-Athenian, Anaxagoras could not have participated publicly in Athenian politics even if he had wished to do so. But the reports of his life portray him as having no such interest, despite his association with Pericles; he was said to have abandoned his house and

B.5. *Analyzing the ἀγών*

The debate between Amphion and Zethus, however, is anything but a straightforward contrast between conservative tradition and vigorous democratic rhetoric. A useful comparison is the ἀγών in Aristophanes' *Clouds* between personified Better and Worse Arguments.²²⁴ Better Argument sounds rather like Amphion as he extols the virtues of a traditional elite education, which inculcates self-control and just speech through traditional musical instruction (*Clouds* 961-72); Worse Argument sounds more like Zethus when he brags about his (sophistic) abilities to prevail over the better argument (*Clouds* 1036-42). But Worse Argument also brags about his ability to overturn traditional views (*Clouds* 1060-82)—which sounds like Amphion and his “new muse,” the lyre criticized by Zethus (*Ant. Fr.* 183). And Better Argument praises healthy, hardy outdoor activities (*Clouds* 1002-8)—

land to pursue philosophy, and even to have been the teacher of Euripides. Plato, *Phaedrus* 269e-270a (his association with Pericles); Curd 2007, 129-32 (drawing also on testimonies that include A 1 from Diogenes Laertius and A 13 and 32 from Plutarch's *Life of Pericles*). See also the discussion in Carter 1986, 141-7 (Anaxagoras as a model for the ἀπράγμων and an early version of the contemplative life).

²²⁴ In *Clouds*, a farmer seeks to learn how to evade his creditors by learning the sophistry and natural philosophy taught by Socrates (whom Aristophanes depicts as a catch-all caricature of the New Learning), only to reject it in the end. Segal 1969, 145 (discussing the antithesis in *Clouds* between old and new); Carter 1986, 46 (Better Argument as a more traditional, Spartan-style education); Dover 1968, lviii-lx (the ἀγών between Better and Worse Argument as one between the old system of education and the new). Podlecki notes the similarity between the debates in *Clouds* and *Antiope*. Podlecki 1996, 135. See also the discussion of *Clouds* in Chapter 3 (Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*).

which sounds far more like Zethus, especially as Amphion decried even the value of manly strength in *Ant.* Fr. 199.

Thus from a different perspective, Zethus is the one who seems more traditional and aristocratic.²²⁵ When Zethus criticized Amphion's introduction of the lyre and his poetry, he warned him of the risk posed to Amphion's inborn good nature (Frs. 187, 188), which suggests older, traditional and aristocratic views that saw fitness for leadership as originating in good blood (and a proper aristocratic upbringing).²²⁶ He also advised Amphion to take up ὄπλοι, weapons or tools (Fr. *187a(i)), the implements for the two acceptable occupations for a member of the Athenian elite: farming and fighting.²²⁷

B.5.a *Farming rehabilitates rhetoric*

The role of farming in the debate is particularly significant. Agriculture, rather than commerce, trade, or artisanal work, was the most acceptable source of

²²⁵ Note that the confusion between what is new and "radical" and what is old and "traditional" is something Euripides will revisit in his *Bacchae*, where the worship of Dionysos is both being "introduced" as something new and radical, and at the same time is hailed as an age-old tradition that qualifies as "natural." See, e.g., *E. Bacc.* 890ff.

²²⁶ Nightingale 1995, 75; Carter 1986, 171; Snell 1964, 83-4. Nightingale argues that Zethus shows that he "believes in the virtues and status conferred on individuals by nature rather than those developed through self-cultivation," and that this belief shows his aristocratic nature. But what Zethus is objecting to is not self-cultivation, but self-harm through Amphion's *new* methods of intellectual investigation and expression. See also Huys, arguing that the natural excellence of both brothers is revealed through the action of the play, but that their excellences are very different. Huys 1995, 346.

²²⁷ See the discussion in Chapter 3 (Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*), section B.4, of banausic labor.

wealth for the elite. In contemporary Athenian politics, it was the elite quietists as described in the previous section, who aligned themselves with an idealized image of the citizen farmer who lived in the country and did (mostly, at least) his own agricultural work: an αὐτουργός, literally, “one who does his own work.”²²⁸

²²⁸ In a society dependent on agriculture, “doing one’s own work” above all meant working one’s own land; thus αὐτουργός in most contexts means a small farmer, not one of the leisured rich but not necessarily impoverished. See, e.g., E. *Orestes* 917-22 (although the economic status of the αὐτουργός is not stated, the description of αὐτουργοί as “those who alone protect the land,” οἵπερ καὶ μόνοι σῶζουσι γῆν, suggests he is not impoverished); Thuc. 1.141.3 (Pericles describes the inhabitants of the Peloponnese as αὐτουργοί without resources to carry out a long war, i.e., not impoverished but tied to agricultural concerns). Cf. E. *Supp.* 244, declaring “the sort in the middle (i.e., neither rich nor poor) saves cities,” ἡ ’ν μέσῳ σῶζει πόλεις (a line questioned as an interpolation by Kovacs 1982, 34-5). It can also, however, refer to other sorts of self-employment, as in Arist. *Rhet.* 1381a21-3 (Aristotle says that among the men generally praised are those who live by working rather than off of others, especially those who live from farming and those who are self-employed in other areas (οἱ ἀπὸ γεωργίας καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ αὐτουργοὶ μάλιστα). See discussion in Burford 1993, 167-71; Ober 1989, 277-8; Carter 1986, 77, 88-92. Cf. Socrates’ describing himself and his friends as αὐτουργοί of philosophy at Xen. *Sym.* 1.5. Note that farmer (γεωργός) is a broader term that can include both the farmer who does his own work and the farmer who supervises laborers. See, e.g., Ar. *Peace* 296 (γεωργοί included in a list of common occupations with merchants and craftsmen); Xen. *Oec.* 5.4 (In his praise of farming, Socrates says that the earth makes strong those who work the land themselves (τοὺς μὲν αὐτουργοὺς διὰ τῶν χειρῶν) and makes manly those who work the land “with care” (presumably, by supervision) (τοὺς δὲ ἐπιμελεία γεωργοῦντας) by getting them up early and forcing them to move about vigorously). Although the extent of agricultural slaveholding in Attica is disputed, it is probable that many αὐτουργοί were well-enough off to own a few slaves. See Hanson 1996, 291-2 (hoplite farmers often owned a few slaves); Ober

The αὐτουργός, the honest yeoman farmer, was a familiar and admired stereotype in Euripidean (and Aristophanean) plays, but not as a public speaker; although he was capable of speaking well (if perhaps unpolished), he was admired both because his hard outdoor labor made him capable of defending the city,²²⁹ and because that labor left him little time for corrupt urban politics.²³⁰ For example, in

1989, 24-7 (rejecting arguments in favor of broad-based agricultural slave owning); Wood 1988, 78-9, 188 n. 10 (rejecting arguments in favor of broad-based agricultural slave owning, though noting that some small farmers might have been able to afford a slave or two, mostly for house work).

²²⁹ As Carter notes, this farming “middle sort” was favored by the oligarchs and seems to correspond to another contemporary ideal, the Greek hoplite, a citizen infantry soldier. Carter 1986, 92-4. The hoplite was traditionally well enough off to own his own armor, though probably not wealthy enough to maintain the horses needed for cavalry service; as a relatively well-to-do but not wealthy Athenian, he would probably have been a landowner whose income came primarily from farming. However, by the last quarter of the Peloponnesian War, at least, many hoplites must have been from the lowest socio-economic class, the *thetes*, using armor provided by the state. Pritchard 2010, 23-4; Vidal-Naquet 1986 [1981], 89-95. Cf. Hanson 1996, esp. 297-308 (arguing for a diminishing but still important role for yeoman hoplite farmers in the late fifth century).

²³⁰ There is limited evidence on fifth century political participation. However, based in part on literary evidence such as that discussed in the text and in part on fourth century evidence, many scholars agree that Attica’s small farmers would have had limited ability to regularly attend Assembly meetings and serve as a jury member in Athens, particularly if they lived in villages some distance from Athens. Manville 1990, 17-20 (with additional authorities cited); Osborne 1987, 128-32 (noting that Attica’s political organization ensured that the countryside was represented via the requirement that the village demes send representatives to serve a term in the Boule); Carter 1986, 78-88 (including a discussion of the evidence from Aristophanes). Cf. Wood 1988, 109 (arguing that peasants in Attica were relatively

Euripides' *Orestes* we have already seen how an untrustworthy mob orator was characterized as *πιθανός* (*Or.* 906). In response, better advice is offered by a farmer, an *αύτουργός*—one of those “who alone are saviors of the land” (*Or.* 920):

μορφῇ μὲν οὐκ εὐωπός, ἀνδρεῖος δ' ἀνὴρ,
 ὀλιγάκις ἄστῳ κάγορ᾽ ἀσ χραίνων κύκλον,
 αὐτουργός—οἵπερ καὶ μόνοι σῶζουσι γῆν—
 ξυνετός δέ, χωρεῖν ὁμόσε τοῖς λόγοις θέλων,
 ἀκέραιος, ἀνεπίπληκτον ἡσκηκῶς βίον . . .

...

καὶ τοῖς γε χρηστοῖς εὖ λέγειν ἐφαίνετο.

...

νικᾷ δ' ἐκείνος ὁ κακὸς ἐν πλήθει λέγων . . . (*Or.* 918-22, 930, 944)

not handsome in appearance, but a manly man,
 seldom sticking his head into the town and the circle of the agora,
 a yeoman farmer—those very ones who alone are saviors of the land—
 but intelligent, when wishing to join in arguments,
 uncontaminated, having fashioned a blameless life . . .

...

he seemed to speak well, at least as far as the better classes were concerned.

....

But the other evil man prevailed, speaking to the crowd

Where the mob orator was characterized as persuasive (*πιθανός*, the first word in line 906), the farmer is characterized as intelligent (*ξυνετός*, the first word of line 921). The “better sort,” aligned with the farmer, think he speaks well; but the crowd is persuaded by the persuasive (*πιθανός*) orator, who urges killing

unburdened by elite demands, but conceding that farmers were probably more active in local politics than in those of the city center).

Orestes.²³¹ This characterization of the small farmer who is neither rich nor poor, who is intelligent enough to speak well but who rarely comes to town to participate in public discussions, is similar to the portrayal we have seen in Euripides' *Suppliants*. Theseus praises the "middle sort," neither rich nor poor, who save cities because they guard the order established by the city (κόσμον φυλάσσουν ὄντιν' ἂν τάξῃ πόλις, *Supp.* 245). This "middle sort" would have been primarily small farmers.²³² When the Theban herald complains that a poor farmer (γαπόνος . . . πένης, *Supp.* 420) has no time for public affairs, Theseus does not directly contradict him, but instead stresses the dangers of tyranny and the importance of equality under the law (*Supp.* 429-55).²³³

But in *Antiope* it is not the ἀπράγμων Amphion who is associated with farming, but rather the politically minded Zethus, who urges the importance not only of farming and fighting, but also participation in public discourse. Granted, this is an ideal present in Homer; as we saw in the General Introduction, Odysseus was perhaps the ultimate representative of the Homeric man skilled both in fighting and speaking—and able to use his knowledge of farming to defend himself against the charge of being some lazy, tricky vagabond. But as described in section B.3.c, by the

²³¹ Carter 1986, 91-2 (discussing passage, and pointing out that Euripides emphasizes that the "better classes" particularly approve of the αὐτουργός).

²³² Michelini 1994, 226-7; Carter 1986, 88 (discussing passage).

²³³ Michelini 1994, 234-8 (arguing that Theseus' attack on tyranny is stronger than his intellectual defense of democracy). Note that the favorable portrayal of the αὐτουργός in Euripides' *Orestes* is also qualified by the fact that it is spoken by the Messenger, who identifies himself as a poor man (πένητα, 870), but one loyal to Electra and Orestes' family. The advice of the αὐτουργός to reward Orestes for murdering Clytemnestra (under Apollo's orders) is better than the advice of the persuasive orator to kill him, but it ignores the real problems with Orestes' action; the best advice is arguably that of Diomedes, who advises exile (898-902). See also the favorable portrayal of the poor (but noble) farmer in Euripides' *Electra*, e.g. at 31-53, 77-81, 253-62.

late fifth century, public political speech and leadership had become increasingly dependent on the sort of professionalized rhetorical skill taught by the sophists, a skill that often came under suspicion precisely because it was powerful; Odysseus himself, at least in tragedy, often was negatively portrayed as a sophistic political type.²³⁴ It is thus somewhat surprising to see Zethus urge the importance of public speaking as well as farming. Indeed, Zethus places even more importance on farming than did Odysseus; where Odysseus and other Homeric and Hesiodic speakers used farming to make their statements appear more honest and trustworthy, Zethus uses farming to rehabilitate public speaking itself as an activity worthy of the “honest farmer”—and not just any public speaking, but speech that is εἰκός . . . καὶ πιθανόν, the sophisticated and sometimes suspect public speaking taught by the sophists.

B.5.b *Rhetoric as a gift of Hermes*

Also tending to rehabilitate rhetoric is the often over-looked connection between Zethus’ rhetoric and Amphion’s lyre. Amphion’s lyre is a gift from Hermes, who appears to restore order at the end of the play as *deus ex machina* (as discussed in section C). Hermes is a god of μῆτις, the flexible situational intelligence identified with Odysseus that can always find through difficult circumstances,²³⁵ characteristic of the Greek sophist and politician.²³⁶ He is not only is the inventor of the lyre, he is also a god of speech²³⁷—in particular the very kind of speech being urged by Zethus,

²³⁴ Knox 1964, 124; Stanford 1963, 100-117 (discussion includes Sophocles’ *Philoctetes* and Euripides’ *Hecuba*, *Trojan Women*, *Iphigeneia at Aulis*, and *Philoctetes*).

²³⁵ See also Detienne and Vernant 1991 [1974], 33, 282-3, 302-15 (Hermes as a god of the binding and twisting of μῆτις, unlike Apollo).

²³⁶ Detienne and Vernant 1991 [1974], 39, 41, 313.

²³⁷ Plato’s Socrates describes him as inventing language and speech (τὸ λέγειν τε καὶ τὸν λόγον, *Crat.* 408a5-b3).

speech that does something more than represent some preexisting truth: speech that persuades, bargains, or even lies.²³⁸ As Clay has described,²³⁹ we see this quality in the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes*, which tells the same version of the invention of the lyre that Amphion does—and may very well be Euripides' source.²⁴⁰ In the *Hymn*, the newborn Hermes has a very busy first few days exhibiting his characteristic μῆτις: inventing the lyre from a tortoise shell, stealing and sacrificing Apollo's cattle, inventing the fire-drill (*h. Herm.* 111), and defending himself against the accusation of having stolen Apollo's cows.²⁴¹ In what is often called the first literary example of the εἰκός argument (the argument from probability praised by Zethus), Hermes argues that he should not be suspected because his infant self is not the sort of person who could steal a herd of cows (*h. Herm.* 265, 377).²⁴² Hermes is lying, of

²³⁸ Thus in Plato's *Cratylus*, Socrates specifies several different types of speech he associates with Hermes: that of the messenger, the thief, the deceiver, and the bargainer in the *agora*. 407e5-408a2.

²³⁹ Clay 1989, esp. 106-7; 110-111; 134-6.

²⁴⁰ The *Hymn* is the best and earliest source for this origin story. Its dating is uncertain; Vergados argues for the second half of the sixth century, though other scholars place it later, towards the beginning of the fifth. Vergados 2013, 131-47. Although it is possible that Euripides was looking to some other source that no longer survives, Euripides must have been familiar with the hymn. His contemporary Sophocles' satyr play, *Ichneutae*, appears to follow the *Hymn* closely, although there Hermes steals the cattle first, and then uses the slaughtered cattle to help make the lyre. Vergados 2013, 79-86; Clay 1989, 105 n. 35.

²⁴¹ Note that although Hermes does not make the primary discovery of music or fire, his inventions give individual control over those discoveries: with the lyre, one person can control both song and melody (Clay 1989, 108-9); with the fire-drill, one person can make fire at will. Similarly, in the *Hymn* Hermes is not the inventor of speech, but rather the god who is able to use the εἰκός argument to bend speech to his needs of the moment.

²⁴² See discussion of εἰκός in section B.3.c.

course; ultimately, Hermes uses his lyre to complete a cosmogonic song that enchants Apollo and persuades him to accept the lyre in recompense for the stolen cattle,²⁴³ a song that describes how the gods came to be “in due order,” κατὰ κόσμον (*h. Herm.* 423-433).²⁴⁴

When we consider both Zethus’ rhetoric and Amphion’s lyre as gifts from Hermes, we can see that the relationship between the brothers resembles that between Hermes and Apollo in the *Hymn*. Zethus prefers speech that is, like Hermes’, plausible and persuasive (εἰκός . . . καὶ πιθανόν). Zethus emphasizes the mundane requirement of making a living; Hermes also focuses more on the mundane than does his brother. The very first poetry sung with the lyre is Hermes’ own improvisation (sung for himself, and perhaps for his household) about domestic matters—first his own birth from the love affair between Zeus and Maia, and then his mother’s servants, home, and household equipment (*h. Herm.* 54-61). In contrast, Amphion, who devotes little attention to material matters, uses his gift of the lyre to sing a cosmogony, the sort of song that enchanted Apollo in the *Hymn*.²⁴⁵ And just as Apollo is a god of poetry, order, and oracular truth,²⁴⁶ so

²⁴³ *Antiope* Fr. 190.

²⁴⁴ Vergados 2013, 5-9, discusses the second performance as a cosmogonic and theogonic. Vergados emphasizes that Hermes is described as “completing” (κρᾶίνων) the song, as it ends with his own birth—the last of the Olympian gods to receive his divine honors and complete the Olympian cosmos. Vergados 2013, 507-9 ad *h. Herm.* 427. Cf. Detienne 1996 [1967], 15-8, 70-4 (treating the *Hymn* as part of an archaic tradition that treats truth as efficacious, sacred speech that can create reality but was gradually supplanted after about 650 BCE by conceptions that separated rhetoric as a means of social persuasion from philosophical language as a means of knowing reality).

²⁴⁵ As Zeitlin notes, there are significant associations between Amphion and Apollo, Zeitlin 1993, 179. See discussion below in section C.

²⁴⁶ Clay 1989, 37, 101 (Apollo as the god who maintains order and observes hierarchy and distinctions).

Amphion is a man of beauty and of wise political order imposed by superior authority. Hermes and Apollo end the hymn with their characteristic differences intact, but as fast friends forever; they both serve necessary, complementary purposes within the Olympian order. So too Euripides may here be signaling that the differences between Amphion and Zethus in their original ἀγών would not have to be eliminated for the brothers to be able to work together for their own good and for the good of their community.²⁴⁷

C. The debate and the rest of the play

As I discussed in section B.1, the ἀγών between the brothers probably ended with Amphion agreeing to join Zethus on a hunt but with their contrasting intellectual positions not otherwise resolved. Nothing in the ἀγών connects it directly to the plot, where the brothers rescue their mother, punish Dirce, and then are ordered by Hermes to spare Lycus and take up rule in Thebes; there is nothing in the fragments about the duty to aid family, punish wrong-doing, or defend family honor, but only abstract ruminations. Some have argued that Hermes' appearance provides a happy ending that reconciles the brothers into cooperative builders of Thebes' walls and rulers of Thebes. But as I will argue, a closer examination of the ending shows that it is not entirely happy, and that the problem is that the brothers' intellectual debate is abandoned and subverted by what they do to avenge Antiope. At the end of the play, order is restored by the orders of Hermes—but it is a very different sort of order.

As I outlined in the overview (section A), at some point after the brothers' debate, Antiope appears on the stage, having escaped from her painful captivity in Thebes at the hands of her uncle Lycus and his wife Dirce. Amphion and/or Zethus

²⁴⁷ Cf. Zeitlin 1993, 180 (arguing that the twins are reestablished in their “profitable differences” by Hermes at the end of the play; she disregards the implications of Hermes' reference to Niobe, discussed in section C).

at first disbelieve her story, and refuse to assist her;²⁴⁸ Amphion does not credit her story that she was raped by a bestial Zeus.²⁴⁹ Antiope is found and captured by Dirce, who has arrived in Eleutherai with a troop of bacchants.²⁵⁰ Dirce attempts to have Antiope killed; but the herdsman alerts Zethus and Amphion to their mother's identity, and they pursue Dirce and rescue Antiope.²⁵¹

Dirce has injured Antiope by keeping her in captivity, mistreating her, and attempting to kill her. The revenge the brothers take on Dirce for these actions is not only brutal, but it goes beyond Dirce's actions in that it results in Dirce's mutilation and death: they tie her to a bull, and she is (as Amphion will boast to Lycus) torn apart by the bull ("torn by the bull-tracks," ὀλκοῖς γε ταυρείοισι διαφορουμένη, Fr. 223.62), having being dragged together with oak and rock (Fr. 221.3), so that her body has to be gathered together (Fr. 223.81). It is possible to see this brutality as a fundamental abandonment of both brothers' positions in the debate. Although revenge was more accepted in ancient Greek thought than in our own and was a common plot device in tragic poetry,²⁵² it was also acknowledged that revenge could

²⁴⁸ In Hyginus, only Zethus is said to have rejected her. TrGF *Antiope*, Test. iii(a)[6] (Hyginus, *Fab.* 8).

²⁴⁹ Fr. 210; see further discussion below.

²⁵⁰ TrGF *Antiope*, Test. iii(a)[7] (Hyginus, *Fab.* 8); see further discussion below.

²⁵¹ TrGF *Antiope*, Test. iii(a)[7] (Hyginus, *Fab.* 8).

²⁵² Dover 1974, 182-4. Thus some scholars have argued that in Euripides' *Hecuba*, the audience is expected to approve more than disapprove of the revenge Hecuba takes on Polymnestor for his murder of Hecuba's son Polydorus: through a trick, she blinds him and kills his children. Hecuba is then transformed into a dog and drowns herself. McHardy 2008, 43-44 (pointing out that Polymnestor had effectively ended Hecuba's family line, often considered worse than murder in Greek thought, and that Hecuba is ending Polymnestor's family line in return); Mossman 1994, 190-203 (acknowledging that the mutilation of Polymnestor by blinding would have shocked the audience, as mutilation was considered a barbarian practice). Cf. Kovacs 1987, 99-100 (discussing Euripides' *Hecuba* and pointing out that avenging a terrible

go too far. Mutilation in particular was generally considered an un-Greek form of reprisal.²⁵³ Thus in Herodotus, Pheretima the queen of Cyrene died, eaten by worms, after having avenged the death of her son by capturing the responsible city, impaling the most guilty of the citizens on the city walls, and cutting off the breasts of their wives and displaying those on the walls (4.202). Herodotus offered this example to show that excessive revenge was odious to the gods (ὥς ἄρα ἀνθρώποισι αἱ λίην ἰσχυραὶ τιμωρίαι πρὸς θεῶν ἐπίφθονοι γίνονται, Hdt. 4.205).²⁵⁴

injury to oneself was a duty according to ordinary Greek morality). However, others have pointed out that Hecuba is Trojan, that is, not-Greek, so that the audience would have taken that into account in evaluating her actions. Hall 1989, 159 (describing the blinding of Polymnestor by the Trojan Hecuba as an example of barbaric justice). For a recent examination of vengeance in Athenian culture, see McHardy 2008. McHardy stresses that the acceptability of revenge depends heavily on the circumstances, including the genre of literature at issue. She compares the (Theban) Oedipus and his lethal response to an insult by the man who turns out to be his father (Soph. *OT* 800-12), to the (Athenian) Theseus, who refuses to respond violently to Creon's insults but says he will confine himself to law (Soph. *OC* 904-18). McHardy 2008, 100-2. Herman argues that in actual Athenian practice, as judged by forensic speeches of the early fourth century, Athenians prized self-restraint and recourse to law in response to insult or violence. Herman 2006, 167-215; similarly Dover 1974, 190-5 (despite the Greek frankness in admitting that revenge was enjoyable, the Greeks also valued magnanimity, even in dealing with enemies; thus there was inducement to avoid imputation of overreaching in seeking revenge from an enemy).

²⁵³ Hall 1989, 105, 158-9, 205; see also Dodds 1944, 95 ad E. *Bacc.* 241 (noting the brutality of Pentheus' threat to cut off the head of the stranger Dionysos, a mutilation eventually inflicted on Pentheus himself).

²⁵⁴ Pheretima was a queen of Cyrene who avenged the death of her son at the hands of the Barcaeans by capturing the city (with the help of a Persian trick), impaling the most guilty of the citizens on the city walls, and cutting off the breasts of their wives

Another problem of revenge was that it could raise intractable problems of endless cycles of violence.²⁵⁵ As Amphion acknowledges in the final scene, he and Zethus cannot escape the penalty for having slaughtered Dirce; they must kill their blood-relative Lycus or be killed themselves (Fr. 223.4-6). Only the appearance of Hermes ends the violence. There is also a certain irony in seeing the philosophical Amphion, who began the play like a lyre-playing Apollo to Zethus' Hermes, who sang of Aether (Fr. 182a), praised a life of quietude (Frs. 193, 194), and refused to believe that his mother mated with a beast-Zeus (Fr. 210), by the end of the play being prepared to accept his divine parentage (Fr. 223.2) and using a bull to tear Dirce to pieces. Nor is the savagery of the brothers' revenge any closer to the intellectual position of the agricultural Zethus who praised public legal and political engagement at the start of the play. Indeed, there is a troubling resemblance between Dirce's being torn to pieces by Amphion and Zethus for torturing their mother, and Pentheus' being torn to pieces by Dionysos for a blasphemous rejection

and displaying those on the walls (4.202). The example is discussed in McHardy 2008, 38-9 (arguing this is an example of desire for revenge being portrayed as a female characteristic). Cf. *Il.* 24.33-54 (Apollo complains to the gods that Achilles has lost pity and shame in his abuse of the body of Hector for killing his friend Patroclus); Hall 1989, 25-8 (arguing that epic portrays forms of Greek behavior later regarded as primitive or barbaric by the Greeks).

²⁵⁵ Thus at the end of the *Odyssey*, when Odysseus' fellow Ithacans have roused themselves to take vengeance on Odysseus' family for his killing of the suitors (their kin), Athena appears to end the quarrel and restore peace (*Od.* 24.528-548). Dunn 1996, 39-40 (comparing the end of the *Odyssey* to a Euripidean *deus ex machina*). And of course the entire plot of Aeschylus' *Oresteia* culminates in Athena's vote to acquit Orestes in a new court of law of the murder of his mother Clytemnestra, despite the Furies' call for vengeance, and in her persuading the Furies to transform their role in Athens from goddesses of vengeance to goddesses who protect the just. Aesch. *Eumenides*, 681-2, 752-3, 910-2.

of the god in Euripides' *Bacchae* that included an insult to Dionysos' mother Semele.²⁵⁶

Dionysos has been present in the background of *Antiope* from the beginning of the play.²⁵⁷ The Herdsman invoked him in the prologue (Fr. 179); the play's setting on Mt. Cithaeron near Eleutherai is one of his cult locations;²⁵⁸ there is a pillar dedicated to Dionysos in the Herdsman's cave (Fr. 203), which may be meant to represent the cult-site.²⁵⁹ According to Antiope, Zeus appeared to her as a beast (Fr. 210); although the fragments do not specify the kind of beast, scholia suggest that it was a satyr, a creature associated with Dionysos.²⁶⁰ The revenge plot itself

²⁵⁶ For Pentheus' rejection of Dionysos, see, e.g., E. *Bacc.* 232-48; lines 245-6 allege that Dionysos' mother Semele lied when she claimed to have had sex with Zeus. For Pentheus' dismemberment, see E. *Bacc.* 1109-1139; 1137-8 describes parts of his torn body as lying under rocks, other parts as lying deep in the forest. Cf. *Antiope* Fr. 221, where the messenger reports how the bull dragged Dirce together with rock and oak. See Dodds 1944, xxix (arguing that Euripides' *Bacchae*, like many of his plays, calls attention to the discrepancy between the moral standards implied in myth and those of civilized humanity). See also Michelini 2005, 63-6, 317-8 (arguing that Euripides stresses the play of critical or moral ideas over immersion in the world of myth).

²⁵⁷ Zeitlin discusses the Dionysiac elements in *Antiope* together with *Hypsipyle* and *Phoenician Women*, each of which features two brothers antithetically opposed to each other, in significant relation to their mother. Zeitlin 1993, 171-7.

²⁵⁸ See discussion in section A.

²⁵⁹ Collard 1995, 268. Huys discusses the possibility that Antiope gave birth to the twins in this cave. Huys 1995, 178.

²⁶⁰ When Amphion rejects his mother's story in Fr. 210, he says that he doubts Zeus imitated the "form of an evil beast" (θηρὸς κακούργου σχήματ'); scholia say that Zeus raped her in the form of a satyr. TrGF *Antiope*, Test. iii (c)[1] (scholia Apoll. Rh. 4, 1090). See also Ovid *Met.* 6.109-11. Collard offers other instances of θήρ being

also has obvious associations with Dionysos. According to Apollodorus, Antiope escapes from Thebes when her bonds miraculously loose themselves;²⁶¹ miraculous liberation is one of Dionysos' attributes.²⁶² According to Hyginus, her persecutor Dirce comes to the same place in Eleutherai through possession by Dionysos (*per baccationem Liberi*), apparently accompanied by a secondary chorus of bacchantes.²⁶³ The twins describe their pursuit of Lycus after they have killed Dirce as going "on a hunt" (Fr. 223.15, πρὸς ἄγρᾱν), which echoes the hunting language used in the opening ἄγών in Frs. 187.3, 198.2; it seems likely that similar language would have characterized their pursuit of Dirce as well. Hunting down and tearing a victim to pieces recalls the maenadic *spargasmos*, as in the hunting and dismemberment of

used for a satyr. Collard 1995, 310, ad loc. As Zeitlin notes, Euripides' play is our first evidence for this detail of the *Antiope* myth. Zeitlin 1993, 176.

²⁶¹ TrGF *Antiope*, Test. iii (b)[6] (Apollodorus 3,5,5).

²⁶² In *Bacchae* 616-34, Dionysos describes how Pentheus only imagined that he was binding Dionysos, and instead attempted to bind a bull, and how Dionysos freed himself by destroying Pentheus' entire palace.

²⁶³ TrGF *Antiope*, Test. iii(a)[7] (Hyginus, *Fab.* 8). Scholia on Euripides' *Hippolytos* state that *Antiope* had a second chorus that accompanied Dirce; as Collard and Cropp note, these were almost certainly Dirce's women, who were, like her, under Dionysiac possession. TrGF *Antiope*, Test. v; Collard and Cropp 2008, 7: 173. Note also that in Pacuvius' *Antiope*, someone (presumably Dirce) advises someone else (presumably a bacchant) to *cervicum floras dispendite crines*. TrGF *Antiope* Test. vii b 12 (= Pacuvius R³ Fr. XII).

Pentheus.²⁶⁴ And of course the bull Amphion and Zethus use to kill Dirce is a well-known symbol of Dionysos.²⁶⁵

This emphasis on the Bacchic element in the vengeance taken by Amphion and Zethus on Dirce suggests that it could be seen as excessive, at least by mortal standards—or at least by Athenian standards. The punishment is disproportionate to the crime; Dirce imprisoned, threatened, and probably tortured Antiope, but did not kill her.²⁶⁶ Yet the twins do not merely kill their uncle's wife, they tie her to a bull that drags her until she dies, torn to pieces. Nor is there any indication in the fragments that Amphion (and the silent Zethus) are ever in any sort of Bacchic

²⁶⁴ Amphion and Zethus describe their pursuit of Lycus as going on a hunt (*Ant.* Fr. 223.15); similar language was probably used for their pursuit of Dirce, particularly given the language of the hunt in fragments 187 and 198. Both *Antiope* and *Bacchae* describe Dirce and Pentheus as dismembered (διαφορέω, *Ant.* Fr. 223.62, *Bacc.* 739, 746). Collard 1995, 315-8; Kambitsis 1972, 113.

²⁶⁵ Dodds 1944, 146 ad *Bacc.* 618-21 (noting the substitution of a bull for Dionysos when Pentheus attempts to bind the god).

²⁶⁶ Note that in scholia to Euripides' *Phoenician Women*, line 102 (which refers to the famous Theban river, Dirce), the scholiast says that Dirce attempted to kill Antiope by handing her over to the twins to be torn apart by bulls, but that the twins recognized their mother, freed her, and had Dirce torn apart by the bulls instead. If the twins were simply treating Dirce as she attempted to treat Antiope, then their actions might be more understandable, particularly if Dirce was not acting in the grip of Dionysiac possession. But even so, the twins' action would be an imitation and reversal of *female* violence, and for that reason could still seem excessive. See McHardy 2008, 38-9 (discussing how a desire for bloody revenge was often portrayed as a female characteristic in tragedy). In any case, we would expect such a vivid detail to be included in the extant summaries, and it is not. Cf. Ritoók 2008, 35 (accepting the detail as part of the plot).

possession.²⁶⁷ And if Collard and Cropp (and other scholars) are correct in attributing Fr. 175 to *Antiope*, then Euripides has Dirce remind the audience before her death that she is courageous and of free and noble birth (Fr. 175.9-15).²⁶⁸

Dirce's importance is also reinforced at the very end of the play, when Hermes stops the twins from killing their uncle Lycus, and orders that Dirce's remains receive a form of burial in the river, which will be named Dirce after her (Fr. 223.112-5).²⁶⁹

When Hermes appears at the end of the play, the twins are on the point of killing their uncle Lycus (and continuing yet another Theban chain of family

²⁶⁷ Cf. Natanblut 2009, 139 (Amphion's reference to honor in Fr. 223.14, when he and Zethus are hunting Lycus, shows his rationality).

²⁶⁸ What appears to be the last two lines (14 and 15) of Fr. 175 were attributed to Euripides' *Antigone* by Stobaeus, leading Kannicht in TrGF to accept this attribution. However, the fragment refers to a fawn-skin (νεβρίδος, line 7), one of the markers of a bacchant; Collard and Cropp follow Luppe and Diggle in attributing the fragment to *Antiope*, with its plethora of Dionysiac references, rather than *Antigone*. In this fragment, one character (Collard and Cropp argue that Amphion is the most likely speaker) is ordering another to leave some place of safety under a threat of being forced to do so. In the reply, the female character scorns the woman who is harsh in difficulties, and praises the person who bears fate with a gentle temper. Collard argues that this is where Dirce consents to leave the sanctuary of Dionysos' column in the Herdsman's cave and to face her death. However, the female character also says something about "to die with" (συνθανεῖν, line 9), the context of which is unclear; as Collard and Cropp point out, this makes attribution to *Antiope* more difficult, as Dirce presumably is alone, except for her chorus of women. Collard and Cropp 2008, 7: 204-5; Collard 1995, 263-4, 282-5, 311-4. See also Natanblut 2009, 138-9, Ritoók 2008, 37-8 (favoring the attribution to *Antiope*).

²⁶⁹ Cf. Ritoók 2008, 40 (arguing that the implication is that murderous revenge is not the way to resolve a crisis).

violence).²⁷⁰ Amphion has acknowledged that their vengeance on Dirce will require that either he and Zethus kill their blood relative Lycus, or be killed themselves (Fr. 223.1-9). He is no longer insisting that it is impious to claim that Zeus raped Antiope in the form of a beast; instead, he claims that if he and Zethus are Zeus' sons, they have a right to his help as they hunt for Lycus (Fr. 223.10-4).

As often happens when a god makes an appearance at the end of a Euripidean play, Hermes reveals truths and reestablishes order²⁷¹— though, as I will argue, not the same order as that existing at the start of the play. He is a logical choice for Euripides' *deus ex machina*, as Hermes is the messenger of the twins' father Zeus, as well as the inventor of Amphion's lyre. As I will discuss below, however, it is also significant that Hermes is a god of borders and transitions.

Hermes confirms that Zeus is indeed the twins' father. His intervention has prevented the twins' murder of Lycus; he orders Lycus to yield his rule over Thebes to them, and orders him to gather Dirce's remains, cremate them, and throw her ashes into the spring of Ares that waters the Theban plain, which will henceforth be called the Dirce (Fr. 223.80-5).²⁷² He orders Zethus and Amphion to build Thebes' famous seven-gated wall; Amphion's part is to "arm himself" with his lyre to sing of the gods, which will cause rocks and trees to leave the earth and make easy work for

²⁷⁰ Most of the end of the play is provided by a surviving fragment (Fr. 223). Here Zethus has become a silent character, and Amphion appears to speak for both, as discussed in section A above. For more on Theban family violence, see discussion below.

²⁷¹ Dunn 1996, 36, 39-40 (comparing the final appearance of Athena in the *Odyssey* to a Euripidean *deus ex machina*).

²⁷² The Dirce is an important Theban spring often used to represent Thebes itself. According to Berman, who has surveyed both Athenian and Theban texts, there is no extant pre-Euripidean reference to Dirce as a person or character giving her name to the river. Berman 2007, 27, 31-4 (also arguing that if the later dating of the play is accepted, some references in other Euripidean plays show some awareness of the Dirce narrative).

the builders. (Fr. 223.90-5). The brothers are to be greatly honored: Zethus will have a “Theban bride,” and Amphion is to marry the daughter of Tantalos—whose name, as the audience would have known, was Niobe.²⁷³

In one common interpretation, this is a relatively happy ending.²⁷⁴ Although the audience knows that all of Amphion’s children will be killed by Artemis and Apollo when Niobe insults Leto,²⁷⁵ and that Amphion himself will die,²⁷⁶ all that is in the Theban future. Here on the borders of Attica the brothers have saved their mother and discovered their royal identity, with the normal Theban dysfunctionality apparently replaced by family union and constructive activity.²⁷⁷ Hermes validates Zethus’ preference for the active, political life by ordering Amphion to help in building (and ruling) Thebes; but he also validates Amphion’s preference for poetry, as he orders Amphion to help by taking up his lyre and using his poetic powers to build the city walls.²⁷⁸

²⁷³ Soph. *Ant.* 823-3 (Niobe as daughter of Tantalos). See discussion in Gantz 1993, 537.

²⁷⁴ See, e.g., Natanblut 2009, 139-40; Wilson 1999-2000, 447 (Thebes will be healed of its sickness by Amphion’s lyre); Collard 1995, 314-22; Nightingale 1995, 80, n. 52; Zeitlin 1993, 175 (comparing the mother-son motif to Dionysos’ rescue of Semele); Carter 1986, 163; Snell 1964, 79, 92.

²⁷⁵ *Il.* 24.602-617.

²⁷⁶ For extant versions of Amphion’s death, see Rutherford and Naiden, 1996. According to Hyginus, Amphion was killed by Apollo when Amphion attempted to sack Apollo’s temple after the death of his children. (Hyginus *Fab.* 9, on the myth of Niobe).

²⁷⁷ Zeitlin 1993, 180. She argues that *Antiope* has a happy ending, and does so because it is set not in Thebes but on the border with Attica, where Athena and Demeter stabilize the potentially dangerous effects of Dionysos. Zeitlin 1993, 163.

²⁷⁸ Most scholars on this and other points focus on Amphion’s role. See Natanblut 2009, 139-40 (Hermes’ orders validate Amphion’s preference for a life combining contemplation, music, and advising); Ritoók 2008, 40 (poetry is confirmed to be part

But we must pay particular attention to Amphion's fate, as by the end of the play he speaks for the now-silent Zethus.²⁷⁹ Euripides could simply have said that Amphion and Zethus made noble marriages. Instead, his explicit mention of Tantalos both evokes the image of the great sinner condemned in Hades²⁸⁰ and reminds the audience of Amphion's own fate in marrying Niobe. This reminder that Amphion is doomed, despite his present good fortune, would have had a bigger impact on the audience than the "happy ending" interpretation allows. Both Amphion and Zethus, in their hunt for a Dionysian vengeance, have turned their backs on their complementary allegiances to poetry and philosophy, rhetoric and farming. In doing so, they succeed, saving their mother and becoming rulers of Thebes; but Hermes' final speech suggests that their success has been poisoned and that the brothers are still trapped in a cycle of family destruction.²⁸¹

As I discussed above (in section A), the play's setting at Eleutherai is not only a Dionysian cult location, it is also on the border of Athens' Attica and Thebes' Boeotia. As Zeitlin has argued, there is often in tragedy an implicit contrast between Thebes and Athens, with Thebes serving as the "other" place where troubling

of the whole of human life); Wilson 1999-2000, 440; Nightingale 1995, 80 (Hermes' orders validate Amphion's preferences). Cf. Zeitlin 1993, 180 (arguing that the play ends with the twins continuing their "profitable differences").

²⁷⁹ Euripides does not specify whom the now-silent Zethus marries—just that she is Theban—but it is possible that his marriage would have been understood to have tragic implications similar to Amphion's. In some traditions, Zethus is implicated in a version of the nightingale myth, with his wife killing their son. *Od.* 19.518-23, discussed in Gantz 1993, 488.

²⁸⁰ Tantalos and the explanations for his punishment are discussed further in Chapter 3 (Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*), section B.10.

²⁸¹ For a discussion of the way in which Euripides' plays use the *deus ex machina* to provides a specious closure while indicating that the plot is part of a larger narrative continuum, see Dunn 1996, 41-2, 76-83.

themes of civic stasis and family violence can be explored.²⁸² This contrast extends to the cities' different relationships with Dionysos, the god of tragedy. In Thebes, the wildness of the stranger-god Dionysos is manifested; Athens, in contrast, often finds Dionysos to be more benign because his power is "stabilized" by its patron goddesses Athena and Demeter.²⁸³ At the beginning of *Antiope*, Amphion and Zethus are on the border between Athens and Thebes, although their opening ἀγών, with

²⁸² Oedipus and his family are the most famous examples, e.g. as recounted in Aeschylus' *Seven against Thebes*; in Sophocles' *Oedipus the King*, *Antigone*, and *Oedipus at Colonus*; and in Euripides' *Phoenician Women*. Euripides' *Bacchae* also deals with family violence, as discussed below. In addition, Thebes and Athens are put into direct opposition in Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus* (where the Athenian Theseus grants Oedipus sanctuary at the Athenian region of Colonus) and in Euripides' *Suppliants* (where the Athenian Theseus grants the supplication of the women who seek the return of the bodies of their dead sons who fell in an attack on Thebes; see discussion above in section B.3). See discussion in Zeitlin 1993, 149-53. See also Pelling 1997, 224-35 (accepting Zeitlin's general thesis that Thebes is often "the perversion and reverse of the preferred patterns of Athens," although noting the qualifications in Croally 1994); Croally 1994, 38-42 (pointing out that any fictional city can become "an exemplary other-scene," not simply Thebes); Vernant and Vidal-Naquet 1988 [1972-86], 332-8 (Thebes contrasted to Athens as the paradigm of the divided city).

²⁸³ The most famous example of the wild Theban Dionysos would be Euripides' play *Bacchae*, which ends in Pentheus' dismemberment by his mother in the throes of Bacchic possession. Zeitlin 1993, 154-64. As examples of the more domestic Athenian Dionysos, Zeitlin discusses Sophocles' *Oedipus at Colonus*, where the famous nightingale chorus praises the Athenian Colonus as a place frequented by Dionysos and his nymphs (Soph. *O.C.* 678-80); and Euripides' *Ion*, where Dionysos is mentioned repeatedly, e.g., as appearing with Athena on the temple façade described by the chorus (E. *Ion* 211-8), and whose joyful ending includes Ion's assumption of Athenian rule.

its emphasis on abstract intellectual exploration, seems almost stereotypically Athenian. Indeed, when the playwright Euboulos writes his comic *Antiope*—probably intended as a parody of Euripides’ play—he has Amphion at the end go to Athens (to feast on airy expectations), while Zethus goes alone to Thebes (where the food is better).²⁸⁴ But in *Antiope* Dionysos’ violence is not tamed by Athenian practices. Instead, Amphion and his brother give in to that violence, and are saved from the effect of their actions only by the intervention of Hermes, the god of borders²⁸⁵—who sends them to Thebes. In dysfunctional Thebes, where the brothers end the play, it would not be surprising for this bloody vengeance to repeat itself in the next generation.²⁸⁶ And so it does: Amphion will marry Niobe, a daughter of Tantalos, and Niobe will insult the goddess Leto, mother of the twins Apollo and Artemis. Once again, a mother’s twin children will avenge an insult many times over, when Apollo and Artemis kill all of Amphion and Niobe’s children. Amphion will die as well, and Niobe too will be killed; she will be transformed into an endless stream of water (like Dirce), weeping from a stone.²⁸⁷

²⁸⁴ Euboulos, *Antiope*, Fr. 10 (Hunter). As Hunter notes, Euboulos’ primary source—especially for the appearance of Hermes—was probably Euripides’ play. Hunter also comments on the comic tradition of Athenians being great talkers. Hunter 1982, 96-7, 102.

²⁸⁵ Hermes as god of borders is discussed in section D. Also stressing the importance of Hermes in *Antiope* as god of borders is de Polignac 2010.

²⁸⁶ Cf. Zeitlin 1993, 164-71. Zeitlin argues that *Antiope* has a happy ending because Attica’s influence at the border outweighs that of Thebes, leading to a positive resolution that would have been impossible in Thebes. She does not consider the impact of Hermes’ final reference to Niobe. Zeitlin 1993, 178-182.

²⁸⁷ See Soph. *Ant.* 823-33 (Antigone compares herself to Niobe, daughter of Tantalos, turned into a weeping stone); *Il.* 24.617.

D. Concluding thoughts: a space for argument

The contrasting intellectual positions in the *ἀγών* of the philosophical poet Amphion and the rhetorical farmer Zethus correspond to contrasts in spatial orientation. One contrast that assumes a particular importance in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* (Chapter 3) is between outside and inside. Zethus is associated with activities that take place outside: farming, fighting, and politics.²⁸⁸ The “womanish” appearing (Fr. 185) Amphion, however, whom Zethus bids to farm (Fr. 188) and to “go out” (ἐξέλθε) and be a soldier and a ruler (Fr. *187a(ii)), is associated more with the indoors.²⁸⁹

Another contrast that is particularly important for Plato (Chapter 2) is between up and down. Amphion began the play with an Apolline philosophical orientation that led him to look up towards the aether in order to understand the nature of the cosmos, and to think it the height of impiety to conceive of the gods as being in any sense bestial; Zethus began with a more grounded, “horizontal” focus on farming, fighting, and Hermes-like political discourse. Both abandon their positions exacting a bestial revenge on Dirce. Most commentators focus on Amphion, the more famous brother and the twin who carries the dialogue at the end of the play; as we will see in Chapter 2, this is particularly true for Plato, who makes Socrates into a sort of Amphion who does *not* abandon his philosophical commitments. But what Zethus abandons is important, as well.

While Amphion looks upwards to the aether as he seeks to understand the nature of the cosmos as it exists, Zethus looks downwards, to the farmlands and to political space, as he seeks to create a place where he can flourish. The creative aspect of Zethus' grounded viewpoint is particularly apparent in his advice to Amphion to take up farming in Fr. 188.4:

²⁸⁸ The Athenian Assembly met outside, on the Pnyx, a hillside.

²⁸⁹ As I will discuss in Chapter 3 (Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*), sections B.3 and B.5, the indoors was associated with the feminine, the outdoors with the masculine.

σκάπτων, ἄρῶν γῆν, ποιμνίοις ἐπιστατῶν
digging, plowing the earth, taking care of livestock

This ascending tricolon includes different types of agricultural labor: digging, which is associated with vineyards, orchards, and gardens; plowing, for grain agriculture; and livestock care. The placement of “digging” (σκάπτων)²⁹⁰ first in the line emphasizes the creation of the longer-lived plantations, which if carefully planted and cultivated could survive for years and even generations.

The link between Zethus and Hermes can help us understand the significance of Zethus’ farming, and especially his digging. In the *Hymn*, both Hermes and Apollo speak with an old man digging (σκάπτω) in his vineyard.²⁹¹ The episode has puzzled scholars, as it has nothing to do with the rest of the plot.²⁹² Shelmerdine argues that

²⁹⁰ The verb σκάπτω can refer to digging holes or trenches, but it more often refers to the lighter sort of digging associated with hoeing weeds. In addition to its use in the *Hymn to Hermes*, see also *Oec.* 16.15 (hoeing weeds in a fallow field); 20.20 (hoeing weeds in a vineyard). Vergados 2013, 303 ad *h. Herm.* 90 has additional citations. The importance of digging will also feature in the discussion of Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus*, Chapter 3.

²⁹¹ Hermes passes the old man as he is stealing Apollo’s cows, and warns him not to tell Apollo. *h. Herm.* 87-93. Hermes addresses the old man as “Old man, you who are digging around [or hoeing] your (vine)plants” (ὦ γέρον ὃς τε φυτὰ σκάπτεις, *h. Herm.* 90). When Apollo is searching for the cows, he asks the old man, who tells him that he saw a child driving the cattle as “I was digging around the hill of my vineyard” (ἔσκαπτον περὶ γουνὸν ἄλωϊς οἶνοπέδοιο, *h. Herm.* 207). *h. Herm.* 185-211. As Vergados notes, περὶ/ἀνὰ/κατὰ γουνὸν ἄλωϊς οἶνοπέδοιο is used elsewhere only at *Od.* 1.193 and 11.193 when Laertes’ activities are being described. Vergados 2013, 392 ad *h. Herm.* 207.

²⁹² Although the old man tells Apollo he saw a child driving the cattle, he does not identify that child as Hermes; Apollo learns the identity of the thief from a bird sign (*h. Herm.* 213-4). The old man does not appear again in the *Hymn*, either to be

the episode is an allusion to the *Odyssey's* Laertes, whom Odysseus found digging in his orchard (*Od.* 24.226-7),²⁹³ and that the *Hymn* is attempting to claim the literary fame of the *Odyssey's* wily and persuasive hero for itself by modeling Hermes' struggle to gain his rightful place among the gods on Odysseus' struggle for his heroic identity and homecoming.²⁹⁴ But the episode also marks an important difference between Hermes on the one hand, and Odysseus (and Zethus) on the other. The persuasive and practical god Hermes is not interested in farming, at least not beyond the cattle he steals and the other herd animals. Hermes crosses boundaries (and by doing so, reaffirms them);²⁹⁵ he is the god of motion through the ordered space of the cosmos, just as his brother Apollo is the divine defender of that order.²⁹⁶ But neither Apollo nor Hermes is responsible for creating the order that they inhabit. In contrast, the mortal Odysseus may wander, but he returns to a home that he and his family built, a home represented by the trees and vines his father Laertes had once given him and that served as proof of Odysseus' identity when he remembered and named them to his father (*Od.* 24.336-344).²⁹⁷

punished by Hermes or rewarded by Apollo. Shelmerdine 1986, 59. Clay also calls the episode "puzzling." Clay 1989, 114 (arguing that the old man, the only human in the hymn, represents a preagricultural and brutish phase of human existence that will be ameliorated by Hermes).

²⁹³ Shelmerdine 1986, 59-61.

²⁹⁴ Shelmerdine 1986, 50, 62-3.

²⁹⁵ See discussion in Clay 1989, 146-8 (Hermes as mediating the boundary between gods and men, waking and sleeping (e.g., *Od.* 24.1-5), life and death (e.g., *h. Herm.* 572), male and female).

²⁹⁶ Clay 1989, 98-9, 151 (comparing the relationship of Apollo and Hermes to that between Hestia and Hermes).

²⁹⁷ And of course, his ultimate proof of identity is the one he gave to Penelope: the olive tree that he crafted into a post of the bed at the center of their bedchamber (*Od.* 23.190-204).

The kind of practical, εἰκός . . . καὶ πιθανὸν rhetoric favored by Hermes can sometimes be troublingly mobile and evanescent, offered for some particular purpose and not necessarily consistent with other speech offered for other purposes. But as a farmer who digs, Zethus both produces what other members (like Amphion) need for their survival and shapes the very space that the community inhabits; similarly, as a rhetorician, Zethus has the capacity to give constructive shape to the community's political space —what the Greeks called τὸ μέσον, literally “the middle,” and both literally and metaphorically, the space for argument and discussion.²⁹⁸

In *Antiope*, Amphion is the superior twin, just as Apollo is superior to Hermes. He speaks for both brothers at the end of the play; in giving up his philosophical poetry for the poetry of wall-building, he gives up more than does his practical brother Zethus; and his tragic fate is the one specified by Hermes. But just as Hermes is the inventor of Apollo's lyre, so Zethus' rhetoric and farming is at the foundation of anything Amphion is able to accomplish. When the twins are forced into an unstable Theban unity of royal wall-building rather than their proper complementary relationship of grounded political debate and (or sometimes versus) philosophical reflection, then they are doomed as members of the family of Tantalos—a figure who will reappear in both Plato's *Gorgias* (Chapter 2) and Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* (Chapter 3) as a symbol of a corrupted relationship between speech and thought.

²⁹⁸ The importance of τὸ μέσον is discussed further in Chapter 3 (Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*), section C.4. Note that Vernant sees a parallel between the space of the cosmos as conceived by Anaximander and other Presocratic philosophers, and the space of the democratic polis as conceived by Cleisthenes; each is imagined as a central point surrounded by a circle in which the different elements have symmetrical, reversible, and egalitarian relationships. Vernant 2006 [1965], 244-59.

Chapter 2: Plato's *Gorgias*

Introduction

Plato's *Gorgias* can be thought of as falling into two parts, each of which involves a conversation between a philosopher (Socrates, of course) and one or more figures whom Plato links to farming. In the first part, Socrates talks to the famous teacher of rhetoric, Gorgias (which I will argue is a pun on γεωργός/γεωργία, farmer/farming) and Gorgias' brash young friend Polus (a pun on πῶλος, colt); in the second, Socrates talks to the angry young politician Callicles, who compares himself to Zethus, Euripides' rhetorical farmer, and Socrates to Amphion, Euripides' philosophical poet. The dialogue directly takes on the question of what sort of life is better, that of the orator active in Athenian politics, or that of the philosopher who has little involvement in city affairs. Plato makes it clear that the stakes are high, with the dialogue's setting and conversation foreshadowing the fall of Athens in the Peloponnesian War, the potential exile and death of Callicles, and finally the trial and unjust execution of Socrates by the Athenian citizenry.

The *Gorgias* is the only Platonic dialogue that uses an entire tragedy as its subtext.²⁹⁹ Trivigno has argued Plato did so because he admired *Antiope* as endorsing the intellectual life and thus potentially playing the same positive role in educating the audience's souls that a philosophic and non-Gorgianic rhetoric should play.³⁰⁰ In contrast, Nightingale has argued that Plato did so in order to parody the

²⁹⁹ However, the *Gorgias* is not the only Platonic dialogue where allusions to Euripides appear to play an important role in unfolding Plato's thought. See Sansone 1996, 37, 42, 49-53. One of Sansone's examples is the way in which Socrates' bath, composure in the face of death, and belief in the immortal soul in the *Phaedo* are illuminated by what Sansone convincingly identifies as allusions to Euripides' *Alcestis*.

³⁰⁰ Trivigno 2011, 132-6; Trivigno 2009, 74-5 (arguing that Plato's use of *Antiope* is not parody but "paratragedy").

tragic genre, in order to make a hero not out of the powerful man of high status who suffers and (in Plato's view) does not know the truth about himself and his opinions, but rather out of the good man and philosopher, Socrates, who sees the philosophic life as happy even when he is unjustly put to death.³⁰¹ Like Trivigno, I see Plato as not parodying tragedy as a genre but as engaging constructively with the specific dramatic situation and imagery of Euripides' play. However, like Nightingale, I will argue that Plato's adaption of *Antiope* is more complex than simply "endorsing the intellectual life," and that the distinctions between his plot and characters and those of Euripides are significant.³⁰²

³⁰¹ Nightingale 1995, 88-92. Nightingale is the most influential of the scholars who have recently explored this relationship between the *Gorgias* and Euripides' *Antiope*, and my discussion is indebted to hers in many respects. For an additional discussion, see also Arieti 1993, 200-1 (arguing that the *Gorgias* is like *Antiope* in rejecting extreme forms of both the practical and the contemplative life).

³⁰² My dramatic focus means that necessarily I will spend less time on the details of the dialectical arguments. However, many scholars have noted that the tremendous dramatic and psychological impact of the *Gorgias* does not seem to be matched by its technical philosophical argumentation; although Socrates effectively highlights the ignorance and self-contradictions of his interlocutors, the arguments he offers in support of his own propositions not only fail to convince his audience, but have seemed incomplete or flawed to many scholars. See, e.g., Stauffer 2006, 5-6 (even more than other Platonic dialogues, the *Gorgias* is full of strange and questionable arguments); Nightingale 1995, 81-2 (noting that Socrates fails to persuade anyone); Klosko 1984, 132-7 (arguing that Plato gives Calicles extreme and too easily refuted arguments on hedonism); Dodds 1959, 30 (the formal arguments sometimes "transparently fallacious"). Some of these scholars have argued that Plato is deliberately directing our attention to the dramatic and psychological aspects of the dialogue. See, e.g., Kahn 1996, 133-4, 142-4 (Socrates' elenchus in the *Gorgias* tests each interlocutor to see whether his life is consistent with his avowed principles, bringing to light an inherent desire for the good; but Socrates' logical arguments are

As in *Antiope*, a contrast in spatial perspective is used to express a contrast in intellectual perspective.³⁰³ The rhetoricians, especially Socrates' primary interlocutor Callicles, have the same sort of "ground-level" or horizontal perspective, locating themselves in the public spaces of politics, that the political farmer Zethus had in his debate with Amphion. The philosophical Socrates, however, like Amphion in the debate, has a more vertical perspective "above or beyond" the rhetoricians' concern for position in the city that is related to the well-established conceptual metaphor THE DIVINE IS ABOVE AND/OR BEYOND.³⁰⁴ Thus in his "speech of Amphion," Socrates connects this perspective to the order of the cosmos as a whole; in his final speech, he connects it to the judgment of the underworld. But in the *Gorgias*, Socrates is an Amphion who never abandons the above-beyond perspective of philosophy—unlike the Amphion of Euripides, who abandoned it first in favor of revenge, and then (at Hermes' orders) in favor of city building. Furthermore, in Socrates' view, Callicles should be a Zethus who understands the philosophical perspective well enough to be a good "farmer"—that is, educator, in the imagery of the *Gorgias*—rather than a Zethus so enmeshed in his own vengeful anger that he claims to believe a bestial doctrine of "might makes right."

Socrates makes several attempts to give Callicles this philosophical perspective. In his first effort, what he calls his "speech of Amphion," Socrates attempts to direct Callicles' attention to the order of the cosmos. This effort fails, as

insufficient and have to be revisited in the *Republic*); McKim 1988, 34-6 (Socrates is not trying to give logical proofs, but to show that everyone at some level intuitively believes his arguments).

³⁰³ See discussion in Chapter 1, especially section D.

³⁰⁴ Although Socrates' metaphorical perspective in the *Gorgias* at most invokes the same kind of proto-epistemological association between superior knowledge and the above-beyond perspective discussed in the General Introduction, section A.1, note that it is consistent with the imagery Plato uses in the *Phaedrus* to describe human access to the true objects of knowledge, the Forms. See the (brief) discussion in section F.

Callicles is too angry and too afraid to change his perspective. As his conversation with Socrates shows, the real reason he pursues rhetoric and the political life is not as a means to power and pleasure, but rather as a way to protect himself from the injustice of an Athenian citizenry he fears will drag him into court and strip him of his position and perhaps even his life. His greatest longing is to be secure in his position in the city; his greatest fear is being unjustly treated like an ἄτιμος, a man cast out of his place as a citizen. His love-hate relationship with the city leads him to think of himself as on a battle footing, to be infuriated at the way the city works and the way he has to live, and (like Gorgias and Polus) to consider Socrates' philosophical perspective "ἄτοπος," strange—an important word in the *Gorgias* that literally means "out of place" and is characteristic of Plato's Socrates.³⁰⁵ Socrates attempts to show him that on the contrary, it is only the ἄτοπος and above-beyond philosophical perspective that can save him from his anger and fear. When Socrates fails, Socrates tries instead an account of the soul's being judged after death in the court of the underworld. However, the dialogue ends with Callicles seemingly permanently mired in his resistance; just as in *Antiope*, we have a sense that the ultimate ending will not be a happy one.

A. A brief overview of the dialogue

In the first half of the *Gorgias*, Socrates converses with the gentlemanly Gorgias, the famous teacher and practitioner of rhetoric from Sicily, and then with

³⁰⁵ In its normal classical usage, the metaphor of place is often latent in ἄτοπος and it is better translated less literally, as "strange" or "unconventional." The word is not a Platonic coinage; Arnott gives a few late fifth century examples, e.g., Thuc. 2.49.2, where the plague odor is described as ἄτοπον. Arnott 1964, 119-121. However, according to Eide "it is not too much to say that Plato established the use of ἄτοπος in Greek literature." Eide 1996, 60. According to Eide, Plato used the adjective (ἄτοπος) about 230 times, though the noun (ἀτοπία) is rare in Plato (its appearances including *Phaedrus* 229e1, 251d8). Eide 1996, 59-62. See section F.

Gorgias' spirited young friend, Polus.³⁰⁶ In the second half, he talks with the angry young politician Callicles.³⁰⁷ In both parts the rhetoricians praise the practical usefulness of their discipline, though each has a slightly different conception of that usefulness. For the gentlemanly academic Gorgias, rhetoric is a tool useful for persuading others, often to their own benefit. For the brash Polus, rhetoric offers the ability to do anything the orator wants, even injustice, and to escape punishment for it. But for Callicles, rhetoric is primarily a means of self-defense. We will mostly be concerned with Socrates' discussion with Callicles, as it is Callicles who invokes Amphion and Zethus from Euripides' *Antiope*.

B. *Disorientation*

Callicles is the most important of Socrates' interlocutors. The account of the underworld that closes the dialogue is primarily addressed to him; his name is the

³⁰⁶ Polus is a historical character born in Sicily who taught rhetoric and wrote a handbook on rhetoric (*Gorgias*, 462b11). We know from various remarks in the dialogue that he is a young man at the time of his conversation with Socrates (e.g., 461c5-8). See discussion in Dodds 1959, 11. Although the dialogue does not define Polus' relationship to Gorgias, he and Chaerephon converse at the beginning of the dialogue before Gorgias and Socrates pick up the conversation (447d6-448d6); he seems to have the same relationship to Gorgias as Chaerephon does to Socrates—that of a friend and student. Polus acts as though he has the right to speak for Gorgias at 448a6, when Polus asks Chaerephon to talk to him rather than to Gorgias, whom Polus claims is tired from his recent display; he does so again at 461b3-c4, when he berates Socrates for asking questions that embarrass Gorgias. And as Dodds notes, when Polus responds to Socrates' request to define rhetoric at 448c4-9, his answer is "Gorgian to the point of grotesqueness" in its balanced phrases and emphatic repetitions. Dodds 1959, 192 ad *Gorgias* 448c4-9. Polus' conversation with Socrates is treated further in section C, especially C.2.

³⁰⁷ See discussion in section D.

very last word. His words also open the dialogue, and with them a theme of disorientation that is both reflected in the dialogue's dramatic setting and that runs throughout the rest of the conversation.

When Socrates and his friend Chaerephon arrive late to a performance by Gorgias, Callicles greets them with the comment that "War and battle (πολέμου καὶ μάχης, 447a1), Socrates, they say that it is right to have a share in them in this way." Socrates in turn responds: "Well then, according to the saying, have we come behind the feast and are we too late?" (447a3-4). Callicles is pointing out that Socrates has arrived late—i.e., at the safest time to arrive at a fight (especially for a coward). Socrates, however, sees the missed performance as a feast—with late being the worst time to arrive.³⁰⁸

As often in Plato, these opening words reflect the dialogue's themes.³⁰⁹ Callicles feels, as his later conversation with Socrates will show, politics is war and rhetoric a necessary weapon of self-defense.³¹⁰ In contrast, for Socrates, rhetoric—at least as practiced by Gorgias and his students—is merely a matter of giving an audience what it wants instead of what is good for it, more like cookery for a feast than healing medicine from a doctor.³¹¹ The reference to war also signals a deliberate oddity in the dramatic date of the *Gorgias*: the dating is not only

³⁰⁸ Dodds 1959, 188 ad *Gorgias* 447a2.

³⁰⁹ Yunis 2011, 85 ad *Phaedrus* 227a1 (on the thematic significance of the opening of the *Phaedrus*, which is further discussed in my section F.1); Clay, D. 1992, 119-29 (arguing for the importance of the openings of the *Phaedo* and the *Republic* for an understanding of the dialogue as a whole).

³¹⁰ The importance of the opening for signaling a theme of war in the dialogue has been noted by other scholars, including Schlosser 2014, 85 (the *Gorgias* is a struggle between Socrates and his interlocutors) and Saxonhouse 1983, 163-4.

³¹¹ Sansone 2009, 633 makes the point that the opening anticipates Socrates' later analogy between rhetoric and cooking.

unclear,³¹² but the events referenced in the dialogue are spread out over the course of the Peloponnesian War.³¹³ Gorgias' first and only attested visit to Athens was in 427 BCE, when he came as an ambassador from the Sicilian Leontines, asking for Athenian help against the Syracusans.³¹⁴ This would fit roughly with the dialogue's reference to the death of Pericles in 429 BCE as "recent" at 503c2. And in 519a, Socrates will predict that Callicles and Alcibiades will be attacked by the Athenian δῆμος in the future—which would suggest a dramatic date before 415 BCE, the first time that Alcibiades was forced to flee Athens under threat of prosecution.³¹⁵ But in 470d1-6, Polus refers to the tyrant Archelaus as having come to power recently—which would place the date in 413 BCE, or soon thereafter.³¹⁶ The dialogue also

³¹² Its date of composition is similarly uncertain. It is, however, generally agreed that the *Gorgias* is one of Plato's early dialogues. Dodds argues that its foreshadowing of Plato's full-blown philosopher-king conception and theory of the Forms makes it one of the later early dialogues, and suggests a date of about 387-385 BCE. Dodds 1959, 19, 21, 24. He also argues that the *Menexenus*, which also deals with rhetoric and criticizes Athenian democracy and foreign policy, seems to be the "satyr play" appendix to the tragic *Gorgias*. The *Menexenus* cannot date before 386, and probably was not composed much later. As he notes, some scholars prefer an earlier date of about 390-388.

³¹³ Dodds 1959, 17-8 & n. 1. According to Benardete, no other Platonic dialogue is as saturated with allusions to events spanning the Peloponnesian War. Benardete 1991, 7.

³¹⁴ Diodorus notes that the Athenians agreed to the alliance and sent assistance, although in the end the Leontines settled with the Syracusans and became Syracusan citizens. Diodorus Siculus 12.53-4. Cf. the account in Thucydides at 3.86, 4.65, and 5.4. As Dodds notes, Gorgias may well have made later visits. Dodds 1959, 17 n. 2.

³¹⁵ See further discussion in section D.2.

³¹⁶ Note also the date of Euripides' *Antiope* itself, which has been placed as early as 425 and as late as 406, as discussed in the introduction to Chapter 1.

seems to refer to the trial of the generals after Arginusae as having taking place “last year” at 473e6, which would make the dramatic date 405 BCE—at almost the very end of the war.³¹⁷

Even odder than the confused dramatic date is the obscurity of the dialogue’s dramatic setting. When Plato specifies a dramatic setting for his dialogues, that setting has a role to play in revealing the dialogue’s overall themes. For example, in the *Phaedrus* the beautiful setting outside the city walls reflects not only the importance the dialogue places on beauty, but also Socrates’ ἀτοπία, his “being out of place” in the city and its environs.³¹⁸ But in the *Gorgias*, the place where the dialogue occurs is like the time—not just unspecified, as in some other Platonic dialogues, but oddly and obviously obscured.³¹⁹

³¹⁷ In 473e6-474a1, Socrates comments that “last year” his tribe was presiding over the Council, and that he was laughed at when it was his duty to put a question to the vote, because he did not know how to do so. From Hellenistic times, many scholars have taken this to allude to the famous decision in 406 to put eight Athenian generals on trial all together for their failure to rescue survivors after the naval battle of Arginusae. As Plato recorded in his *Apology* at 32b, and Xenophon in the *Memorabilia* at 1.1.18, 4.4.2, Socrates opposed the decision as an illegal mass trial. Dodds discusses the questions raised by some modern scholars, but accepts the allusion. Dodds 1959, 247-8 ad *Gorgias* 473e7.

³¹⁸ See discussion in section F. See also Strauss 1989, 155 (the thematic importance of the setting of the *Republic*).

³¹⁹ For example, in the *Cratylus*, *Cleitophon*, and *Philebus*, Plato does not specify the dramatic setting or describe how the characters arrived at the place of the dialogue; nor does he do so in the *Meno* and *Ion*, where the setting seems to be an unspecified public place. In the *Menexenus*, Menexenus tells Socrates he has just arrived from the Council in the ἀγορά, but there is no description of where he and Socrates are meeting. For brief lists of the place of each dialogue, see Nails 2002, 319ff; Hyland 1995, 15-6. Note that neither Nails nor Hyland discusses the dialogue settings; Hyland incorrectly describes the *Gorgias* as taking place in the ἀγορά.

As described above, at the dialogue's opening Socrates and his friend Chaerephon have encountered Callicles right after Gorgias has finished a display of his rhetorical skill. Socrates blames Chaerephon for their having missed the display, because Chaerephon forced him to linger in the marketplace (ἀγορά) (447a7-8). After some banter over their lateness, Socrates asks Callicles whether Gorgias would be willing to have a conversation; Callicles tells Socrates to ask him, saying that Gorgias had promised to answer any question asked by any one "of those within" (τῶν ἐνδον ὄντων, 447c7). The dialogue thus seems to begin right outside of the building in which Gorgias has been speaking.³²⁰ Immediately afterwards, the conversation has apparently moved inside, as Socrates is directing Chaerephon to ask Gorgias a question (447c9). Benardete observes that "nowhere else in Plato does anyone walk without its being noted in some way, but here they proceed as if to will was to act and walls vanish at one's pleasure."³²¹ Yet we cannot be entirely sure that they *are* inside; shortly thereafter, Socrates claims to be asking questions on behalf "of those within" (τῶν ἐνδον ὄντων, 455c6) who may be interested in becoming students of Gorgias. It is not clear that Gorgias, Socrates, and the other speakers are in the same space as the audience until Gorgias responds by recommending that they consider the audience "of those present" (τῶν παρόντων, 458b6) in deciding whether to continue into a lengthier discussion. This audience produces a θορύβος (hubbub or applause, 458c3) to encourage Socrates and Gorgias to continue the conversation, but is otherwise silent and almost invisible,

³²⁰ Dodds 1959, 188 ad *Gorgias* 447a-449c. The building is not the house where Gorgias is staying, as Callicles tells Socrates that Gorgias is staying with him and that Socrates should feel free to visit (447b7).

³²¹ Benardete 1991, 9. Dodds compares the move inside to that in *Lysis* 203-204a, 206d-e and *Theaetetus* 143b; however, as Fussi notes, in the *Lysis* the progression into the palaestra is clearly described, as is the progression into the house in the *Theaetetus*. Dodds 1959, 188; Fussi 2000, 45-6.

although from time to time a speaker will refer to its presence.³²² In fact, the only place in the dialogue that *is* specifically described is one detailed in Socrates' final speech, the "meadow of the three ways" where the court of the underworld will judge the soul after death.³²³

The dramatic setting thus makes the reader uncertain about where she is, both in time and space.³²⁴ The reader's sense of disorientation merges into the intellectual disorientation that I argue is one of the themes of the *Gorgias*; as Turner has said, the dialogue as a whole seems strange (ἄτοπος), ending abruptly in the

³²² The audience is also referred to at 473e5 (by Polus, described as "any of these [present], τινὰ τουτωνί); 487b4 (by Socrates, as [έναντίον] πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων); 490b2 (by Socrates, as many people gathered in the same place, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ . . . πολλοὶ ἄθροοι); 506b2 (Gorgias refers to "the others" (τοῖς ἄλλοις) who seem to wish to hear Socrates complete the argument, presumably referring to the audience). See discussion in Dodds 1959, 188 ad *Gorgias* 447a-449c. Note that Callicles also refers to Socrates at 482c5 and 494d1 as a "mob-orator" (δημηγόρος), although there is no indication at these points that Socrates is appealing to the audience. At 519d5-6 Socrates says that Callicles' failure to answer has forced him "to mob-orate" (δημηγορεῖν).

³²³ See discussion in section E.

³²⁴ Fussi 2000, 50. Fussi also argues that the uncertainty of the dramatic setting in the *Gorgias* is thematically important and critical to what she sees as a strange and "bitter" tone. Focusing on the uncertainty of when or whether the dialogue takes place "inside" a building, as well as on Plato's metaphors of the jars and of the souls in the afterlife being stripped of their clothing, she argues that the thematic spatial metaphor of the dialogue is a distinction between what is outside (or surface) and what is inside (or depth), with "surface" being associated with rhetoric, and "depth" with philosophy. I argue that the *Antiope* references are more prominent, and oppose what is at ground-level, or "horizontal," and what is above-beyond, "vertical." Fussi 2000, 47-8.

underworld with no agreement among any of the participants.³²⁵ We will see repeated references to being out of place or to losing place; for example, both Polus and Callicles call Socrates' arguments ἄτοπος, literally, "out of place." Callicles even repeatedly calls them "upside-down."³²⁶ As I noted in the introduction, we will see that Callicles' greatest longing is to be secure in his position in the city; his greatest fear is being made ἄτιμος, unjustly cast out of his place as a citizen by false and unworthy litigants. Callicles will repeatedly warn Socrates that he would be disoriented in a city court, "dizzy" and unable to defend himself; Socrates in turn will warn Callicles that he would be disoriented in the court of the underworld where souls are judged, "dizzy" and unable to defend himself.³²⁷

C. Gorgias and Polus—the bad farmer and his untrained colt

The dialogue begins when Socrates and his friend Chaerephon arrive late at a performance by the famous Sicilian rhetorician, Gorgias. As discussed in section B, Callicles greets them with a joke about being late to a war; Socrates responds with one about being too late for a feast. We are left to wonder just where and when this meeting is taking place—and, as discussed above, we will be left uncertain, as Plato leaves the dramatic setting oddly obscure.

C.1. Gorgias

The philosophical conversation opens when Chaerephon, at Socrates' suggestion, attempts to question Gorgias about the nature of his art.³²⁸ He does not

³²⁵ Turner 1993, 71.

³²⁶ For a general discussion of ἀτοπία, see section F.

³²⁷ See discussion in section E.

³²⁸ Chaerephon's question assumes that what Gorgias teaches is a τέχνη, an art or skill that is rationally based and can give an account of its procedures. But as discussed below in C.2, Socrates will tell Polus that in his opinion Gorgias' rhetoric is

have a chance to ask the question, however, as Gorgias' young friend, Polus, snappishly interrupts and asks that the questions be directed to him, because he thinks Gorgias is tired from his long display (448a6-8). Chaerephon therefore directs the first question to Polus: just what is this art (τέχνη) that Gorgias knows, and what should Gorgias be called? For example, says Chaerephon, if Gorgias knew the same art as his brother Herodicus, then he would be a doctor (448b4-c3).³²⁹ Polus replies with a long-winded and florid answer that, as Socrates says, praises the art that he says Gorgias has (rhetoric), rather than explaining what it is (448c4-9, 448e2-4). These interchanges between Polus and Chaerephon establish what will be borne out by the rest of the dialogue: Polus lacks both the self-control and the intellectual acumen to hold an intellectual conversation. Socrates therefore takes over the questioning and directs it to Gorgias.

Plato portrays Gorgias as a calm and gentlemanly academic. Gorgias (unlike Polus and Callicles) is very polite to Socrates throughout the conversation, offering what he obviously considers constructive examples of the power of rhetoric, as when Themistocles and Pericles persuaded the Athenians to build dockyards and walls (455d-e),³³⁰ or when he persuades doctors' patients (including his brother's patients) to accept beneficial but painful medicine (456b1-5). Unlike Polus and Callicles, he displays no desire to use rhetoric to acquire power for himself, or even to dominate the conversation; although he attempts near the beginning to exit the conversation gracefully on the plea of a tired audience when Socrates declared an

not an art, but merely a form of flattery (κολακεία, 464e2) and a knack or practice (έμπειρία, 465a3). In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates will describe a form of rhetoric that is a τέχνη, because it is governed by the rationality of Socratic philosophy, with its upward gaze toward the Forms and truth. (See discussion below in section F.3).

³²⁹ As Weiss has noted, this is the first introduction of the theme of brotherhood, which runs throughout the rest of the dialogue, culminating in Callicles' example of Amphion and Zethus. Weiss 2003, 196. See further discussion in section D.3.

³³⁰ Gorgias clearly considers these to be good things vital to Athenian power and defense. Socrates will describe them as "rubbish" later, at 519a3.

intention to examine his ideas more closely, he yields when the audience (including Chaerephon and Callicles), express their enthusiasm for more (458b4-e2), and even speaks up later to save the conversation when Socrates is talking with Callicles and an angry Callicles has threatened to abandon it (497b4-10).³³¹ Socrates shows that faced with such courtesy he can be equally polite in return, at one point giving an elaborate apology for his questioning as not intended rudely but rather to help clarify what people think and to correct it as necessary (457e1-458b3).³³²

However, Gorgias seems to be at something of a loss (ἀπορέω) about exactly what rhetoric is.³³³ Under Socrates' questions, he retreats from his first position that rhetoric is the art that uses words, to a more limited position that rhetoric is the power of persuasion in political gatherings such as the court, Council, and Assembly (452e1-4). He then narrows his description even further, saying that rhetoric is the art of persuasion about what is just and unjust (δίκαιά τε καὶ ἄδίκᾳ) among courts

³³¹ Stauffer argues that Socrates' courtesy is a signal that throughout the dialogue he is attempting to form an alliance between his philosophy and a nobler version of Gorgias' rhetoric. Stauffer 2006, 37-8, 120-2. Fussi makes a similar argument, that Gorgias' being the titular figure and responsible for the continuation of the dialogue shows that Plato did not completely endorse Socrates' attack on Gorgianic rhetoric. Fussi 2000, 55. I would say, rather, that it is Plato's attempt to characterize Socrates as a reasonable man able to meet courtesy with courtesy, rather than as the troublemaker he would be portrayed as during his trial, which is foreshadowed multiple times in the dialogue (see, e.g., the discussion in D.9).

³³² This is an unusually lengthy discussion by Socrates of what his questioning is trying to do; according to Guthrie, only in this dialogue does Plato describe his aims in general terms. Guthrie 1962-1975, 4: 297-8. Note that in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* we will also see a discussion between a philosopher (Socrates) and a farmer (Ischomachos) on the nature of Socratic questioning. See discussion in Chapter 3, section A.

³³³ Neither Polus nor Gorgias admits this, but Polus claims that Socrates *thinks* Gorgias is at a loss (ἐπειδὴ Γοργίας ἀπορεῖν σοι δοκεῖ περὶ τῆς ῥητορικῆς, 462b4-5).

and other crowds (ὄχλοις, 454b5-6).³³⁴ Gorgias thinks of rhetoric as such a great power that it can overcome even expert knowledge, and make those who do possess expert knowledge the orator's "slaves" (452e4-7)—or at least, as he and Socrates agree, the orator is more persuasive (πιθανώτερος) than the expert among crowds, who do not know about the subject under discussion (459a3-5). Gorgias acknowledges that rhetoric can be misused, but he argues that it would be unfair to blame his teaching, any more than one would blame a teacher of boxing for a blow struck by one of his students (456d1-457c3).

But though Gorgias initially presents his rhetorical teaching as distinct from substantive morality, Socrates exploits Gorgias' sense of shame (as Polus will note later, 461b5) to lead Gorgias to acknowledge that he would also teach his students about basic moral concepts—the just and the unjust, the shameful and the fine, the good and the bad (περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν, 459d1-2)—at least if they did not already know them when they come to him. As is often noted, Socrates is playing fast and loose here with the philosophical arguments; he and Gorgias do not explore the considerable difference between teaching someone about the moral norms held in a society, and the much more difficult task—if indeed, it is possible at all—of teaching someone to understand moral concepts to the point that they internalize and follow them.³³⁵ Instead, Socrates leads Gorgias simply to assent the Socratic principle that just as someone who has learned medicine is a doctor, so someone who has learned just things is necessarily just (460b6-7).³³⁶ But in that case, Socrates points out, Gorgias

³³⁴ Gorgias does not seem to notice that this narrowed definition is inconsistent with his earlier description of how he could use rhetoric to persuade reluctant patients to take their medicine. Fussi 2000, 54-5 (arguing that rhetoric and philosophy need each other more than Socrates acknowledges here). In the *Phaedrus* Socrates will re-expand the definition of rhetoric. See the discussion in section F.1.

³³⁵ Irwin 1979, 125-8 ad *Gorgias* 460.

³³⁶ For a discussion of the Socratic principle that "virtue is knowledge," sometimes called the "Socratic paradox," see Guthrie 1962-1975, 3: 450-9 (noting that the

is being inconsistent; if he understands and teaches basic morality, then it ought to be impossible for his students to use their oratorical skills unjustly (460e5-461b2).

It isn't clear why Gorgias has allowed Socrates to box him into this inconsistency. Pangle argues that Gorgias' assent to the Socratic principle is sincere, out of a "pervasive overestimation of the powers of reason,"³³⁷ and that he simply did not see the inconsistency until Socrates pointed it out to him. Given that Gorgias attempted earlier to exit the conversation, however, it seems more likely that Gorgias knew then that he would have difficulty debating Socrates, and he prefers to yield now rather than risk portraying his profession of rhetoric as inimical to conventional morality.³³⁸

C.2. *Polus and puns*

With a rude demeanor in sharp contrast to Gorgias' courtesy and reticence, Polus erupts in defense of Gorgias, saying that Socrates is engaging in "hick

broad usage of the word virtue (ἀρετή) might have made the principle less paradoxical to Socrates' contemporaries than it does to us); Dodds 1959, 218 ad *Gorgias* 460a5-c6. However, the full weight of the Socratic principle, that virtue is a τέχνη like medicine such that one who knows that virtue (e.g., justice) has that virtue (e.g., is just), runs counter to another common belief, that a man could act contrary to his judgment. Dover 1974, 124-6. Thus Irwin seems to me correct, that Socrates' principle offends common beliefs and needs more of a defense than Gorgias requires. Irwin 1979, 127 ad *Gorgias* 460b. The question is particularly problematic for Gorgias, as the rhetoric he teaches is not merely a τέχνη like boxing that must be used within or without moral norms, but is rather something that can be used to evade, attack, or change the moral norms themselves; note that Socrates has Gorgias admit that its subject matter is the just and unjust itself (460e4-5).

³³⁷ Pangle 2014, 45-8.

³³⁸ Note that Gorgias is said in Plato's *Meno* (95c) to have ridiculed other sophists for claiming to teach virtue (ἀρετή). Dodds 1959, 26 ad *Gorgias* 459c6-460a4.

behavior” (ἄγρουκία) for raising the question of morality and exploiting Gorgias’ sense of shame in order to lead Gorgias into a contradiction (461b5-c4). Socrates picks up Polus’ reference a bit later, apologizing for perhaps seeming “too hick” (ἄγρουκότερον) for devaluing rhetoric in front of Gorgias (462e6).³³⁹ The word ἄγρουκία and its cognates derived from ἄγρός (field) and οἰκέω (to dwell), literally “country dwelling”; however, as Dodds points out, they would not necessarily make the reader think of farming, as these were the conventional way of describing expressions that might be perceived as rude or boorish.³⁴⁰ But as Polus takes over the conversation, the motif of farming will become more obvious—particularly in Polus’ likeness to a poorly trained colt.

As a participant in the dialogue, Polus is like the colt who kicks or bites; Socrates has to explain to him how to engage in a dialogue, to “ask and answer in turn” as he and Gorgias were doing (462a3-5). Even so, Polus still has difficulty with the concept, at times breaking out into open rudeness, as when he accuses Socrates of “hick behavior,” above, or laughs at Socrates and says that no one could possibly agree with him (473e2-5, 474b6), or says that even a child could refute Socrates (470c4-5). As Dodds says, he is “intellectually and morally vulgar.”³⁴¹ And not only is Polus ignorant of the conventions of dialogue, but he displays positive glee at the prospect that a skillful orator could violate social norms at will, committing even the grossest injustice, and escape punishment. He rejects Socrates’ opinion, that rhetoric is not an art (τέχνη), but merely a knack that cannot give a rational account of its

³³⁹ Callicles uses the same expression at 486c2-3 to excuse his remark that someone (like Socrates) who practices philosophy but ignores rhetoric, could be boxed on the ears with no fear of punishment. Socrates turns the expression back on him at 509a1, to excuse his remark that his conclusions are bound by “iron and adamantine arguments.”

³⁴⁰ Dodds 1959, 224 ad *Gorgias* 462e6. Dover notes some instances where ἄγρουκία and similar terms are still associated with the country, as in *Ar. Clouds* 628. Dover 1974, 113.

³⁴¹ Dodds 1959, 11.

actions, and a flattering form of (corrective) justice, just as cooking is a flattering version of medicine (465a).³⁴² Orators, maintains Polus, are not worthless (φαῦλοι) flatterers (466a10); they are like tyrants who can at will kill, exile, and take property (466b11-c2)—without fear of punishment. Isn't Socrates envious, Polus asks, whenever he sees that someone has managed to do these things to anyone he sees fit? (468e6-9). Certainly Polus is envious of the tyrant's ability to do great wrong without punishment, even while at the same time he seems indignant at the tyrant's injustice.³⁴³

Socrates makes the connection between Polus and a farmer's poorly trained animal explicit at 463e2, when both Gorgias and Polus are having difficulty with his description of rhetoric as a form of flattery. Socrates wryly comments to Gorgias that "this Polus is fresh and frisky," (Πῶλος δὲ ὁδε νέος ἐστὶ καὶ ὀξύς) punning on his name, πῶλος, which also means "foal" or "young animal" in Greek.³⁴⁴ It also seems likely that Plato intended a pun on Gorgias' name (Γοργίας) with the Greek words for "farmer" and "farming" (γεωργός, γεωργία); not only are puns common in this as in other Platonic dialogues,³⁴⁵ but a generation later the playwright

³⁴² Socrates' comparison of rhetoric to cookery is part of a famous and complex analogy in which he distinguishes between arts caring for the soul (which he calls politics) and arts caring for the body. The body-art that makes the body in better condition is gymnastics; that which corrects its ill-health is medicine. The soul-art that makes the soul in better condition is legislation; that which corrects its problems is justice. A type of pleasing flattery corresponds to each art: cookery to medicine, cosmetics to gymnastics, sophistry to legislation, and rhetoric to justice. 464b-465e.

³⁴³ Polus is very clear that the tyrant Archelaus (discussed below) is unjust (471a4). Pangle 2014, 62.

³⁴⁴ The translation is adapted from Irwin 1979, 32. The probable pun is often noted. See, e.g., Dodds 1959, 226 ad *Gorgias* 463e2.

³⁴⁵ For example, later in the dialogue Socrates will tell his story of the jars, in which he notes the play on the word "jar" (πίθος) used as an image for the "persuadable"

Menander will use “Gorgias” as a name for several characters to indicate that they are farmers.³⁴⁶ If Polus is Gorgias’ student or disciple, as seems likely,³⁴⁷ then Polus would be a poor example of Gorgias’ training—a theme that becomes important when Socrates later talks with Callicles and argues that a politician who makes

(πιθανόν) soul (493a6-7). The same passage also uses the word “uninitiated” (ἀμύητος) to refer to the souls who are like the “leaky jars” in that they lack self-control and cannot be filled (satisfied); this may be a further pun on the word for “to close/stopper” (μύω), i.e., that the uninitiated are like unclosed or unstopped, leaky jars (493a7). See discussion in Sissa 1990, 157; Dodds 1959, 301-302 ad *Gorgias* 493a6-7 (doubting the pun on ἀμύητος). Cf. Ziolkowski 1999, 24 n. 13 (discussing puns and near-puns in Plato’s *Symposium*, a dialogue particularly rich in wordplay). The story of the jars is discussed in section D.4.

³⁴⁶ The name “Gorgias” is used for a character who is a poor boy working on the land in Menander’s *Dyskolos*, *Heros*, and *Georgos*. In *Dyskolos* he owns some land, and by the end of the play has become well-to-do. In *Georgos* he is a poor boy working on the farm of a well-off elderly neighbor; in *Heros* he is being fostered by a shepherd. The endings of *Georgos* and *Heros* may well have resembled *Dyskolos* in that Gorgias becomes a well-to-do landowner or heir to a landowner, but the plays are too fragmentary to know. As Gomme and Sandbach note, Menander often used the same names in his plays to indicate something about the character, e.g. the name *Daos* as an ethnic name indicating a slave. They comment that in view of the Greek fondness for etymology (and pseudo-etymology), “one may guess that Gorgias was associated with γεωργός.” (They also suggest that a more accurate etymology would be from γοργός, which they translate as “active or strenuous,” although “grim, terrible, vehement” are its more common meanings.) Gomme and Sandbach 1973, 131-2 ad *Dyskolos*. Note that Plato does pun on Gorgias’ name in the *Symposium*, a dialogue particularly rich in wordplay, with Γοργίου κεφαλήν, “head of Gorgias / of the Gorgon,” *Symp.* 198c1-3.

³⁴⁷ The relationship between Polus and Gorgias is discussed in section A.

citizens wilder and less domesticated is like a bad farmer who does not properly train his animals (516a5-8).³⁴⁸

Socrates attempts to lead Polus through the analysis of the supposed power of the orator towards the conclusion that it is better to suffer injustice than to do it, and that the unjust man is wretched, especially if he escapes punishment. But Polus, the untrained colt, repeatedly balks; he insists that Socrates' arguments are "out of place," ἄτοπος, and repeats that assertion at the end of their discussion (473a1; 480e1-2). Polus offers the Macedonian ruler Archelaus (who killed his younger brother) as proof of the proposition that the unjust tyrant is happy (471a1-d2)—saying that any Athenian would agree with him. Socrates scolds him for offering popular opinion as support rather than sound reasoning; Polus is acting like a fraudulent litigant, he says, offering many false witnesses in an effort to drive

³⁴⁸ See discussion in section D.8. This association between the name "Gorgias" and "farming" may in fact be why Plato chose Gorgias as the title character of his dialogue, despite the greater prominence of Calicles. Dodds notes a third century CE list that seems to refer to the *Gorgias* as πρὸς Καλλικλέα γ', "Against Kallikles." Dodds 1959, 15 n. 3. Plato is thought to have chosen the titles of the dialogues, although there is some controversy over whether the descriptive subtitles (e.g., for the *Gorgias*, ἡ περὶ ῥητορικῆς) are Platonic or later additions. Dodds 1959, 1. There is some contemporary witness for the titles; e.g., the *Meno* is referred to as such in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* I, 71a29. Later ancient commentators also refer to the titles; for example, the *Gorgias* is referred to as such by Cicero in the *de Oratore* at 1.47. As Hoerber notes, the titles do not necessarily reflect the dialogue's primary theme. Hoerber 1957, 10. But if Plato chose the titles, it is reasonable to think they had some significance. Note that the title of the *Philebus*, the one dialogue that is named after an individual person who is not known to be a historical figure, is arguably also based on the pun φίλος-ἡβος, "lover of youth"; Philebus asserts that pleasure is the good, but otherwise participates little in the dialogue. Guthrie 1962-1975, 5: 198 & n. 2 (noting, however, that a lover of youth—like Socrates himself—is not necessarily a hedonist).

Socrates out of his property and the truth (ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, 472b6).

It is worth noting Socrates' imagery here. Although the word οὐσία as "property" means "substance" generally (and not necessarily land), Socrates' use of the verb ἐκβάλλειν, to "throw or cast out," suggests the image of throwing a man out of a place; Socrates also used the word in this way earlier (468d2) to describe a tyrant expelling a man from the city. Polus may call Socrates "out of place," ἄτοπος, meaning out of place in the city's intellectual life; but for Socrates, his "place" is not the city, but the truth.³⁴⁹

Because Polus bases his intellectual judgments on what the majority thinks, he judges that suffering injustice is worse (κάκιον) than doing injustice (474c5-6). But it then follows, as Socrates shows, that he accepts the social judgment that doing injustice is more shameful (αἰσχίον, 474c9). From here Socrates leads Polus to the conclusion that if doing injustice is more shameful than suffering injustice, then it must exceed suffering injustice in evil (τῷ κακῷ, 475c7); therefore, doing injustice is more evil (κάκιον) than suffering it—that is, it is worse than suffering it (475e3-6). Again, Socrates is playing fast and loose with the argument; rather than defining terms, he is exploiting the ordinary meanings of the Greek κακός, which include "bad, evil, ugly, shameful," implications brought to the fore when Socrates brought out Polus' acceptance of the basic social principle that being unjust is shameful.³⁵⁰ But Polus is unable or unwilling to debate these points any further, or the argument that the greatest evil is being unjust and not being punished (479b); he easily agrees that punishment is a kind of medicine for the soul that makes it better (477a).³⁵¹ It

³⁴⁹ Further discussion in section F.

³⁵⁰ Dodds makes essentially this point, though he puts in in terms of Socrates' playing fast and loose with the word "beneficial" (ὠφέλιμον), and obscuring whether something is beneficial to the agent or to the community. Dodds 1959, 248-9 ad *Gorgias* 474c4-476a2.

³⁵¹ McKim argues that Plato has Polus refrain from attacking Socrates' obviously flawed logic because Plato wants Socrates to show through Polus' shame that all

seems, Socrates concludes, the only use of rhetoric is to seek out punishment where it is deserved, and that for a man who intends to do no wrong, rhetoric is of little or no use, as its primary purpose is to help a man evade punishment (480e5-481b5).³⁵² Polus once again states that Socrates' conclusions are "out of place" (ἄτοπος), but he agrees that it is consistent with the rest of the argument (480e1-2). He will remain silent for the rest of the discussion.

D. Callicles: a Zethus who does not farm

Socrates' first conversation was with Gorgias and Polus. Socrates led Gorgias to admit that yes, he should educate his students in justice; Polus, however, is a colt who has been poorly trained in both the rules of dialogue and the need to practice justice within the city. He sees rhetoric as a way to do whatever he wants, even great injustice, without being punished. But because Polus shares the social understandings of what is just and unjust, shameful and not shameful, Socrates could lead him to the conclusion that being unjust and not being punished for injustice is shameful and thus worse than suffering injustice—even if Polus considers Socrates' conclusions ἄτοπος, "out of place," and will not quite assent.

Socrates' next interlocutor, Callicles, is a young man who has just begun a political career (515a1-2). Callicles also has a connection with farming, or at least to a famous farmer; early in the discussion, he will identify himself as a Zethus who recommends the practical, worldly activity of rhetoric to a Socrates identified as an

men intuitively believe that injustice and vice are harmful to the actor. McKim 1988, 46-7. McKim does not discuss Polus' later remarks that Socrates' conclusions are "strange"; it seems closer to the truth that Polus' assumptions and intuitions point in different directions, and that Polus is not clear on what he thinks or why.

³⁵² As is often noted, Socrates is again playing fast and loose with the argument, ignoring beneficial uses of rhetoric such as defending the innocent. See e.g., Irwin 1979, 168 ad *Gorgias* 481b.

impractical Amphion.³⁵³ Callicles claims to reject the social understandings accepted by Polus. With eloquence Callicles asserts that what most men call justice is merely conventional; a real man would pursue the true justice of nature, where the stronger and better rule over the worse and weaker, having shaken off the bonds of convention to take whatever he wants just as a lion does, with no restraint on his desires. It is often noted that nowhere else does Plato give a critic of the philosophical life such a memorable portrait.³⁵⁴ But Callicles ignores Zethus' role as a farmer, together with any implication that rhetoric should be used to educate or domesticate his audience.³⁵⁵

Socrates, however, in a passage replete with references to music and the lyre, warns Callicles that he is at risk of being out of tune with himself.³⁵⁶ As we will see, what motivates Callicles is not really the lust for unlimited power or pleasure, despite his dramatic claims. His true motivation is rage and fear over the fact that in Athenian society, someone he considers an inferior is likely to exploit unjustly democratic process in an attempt to rob him of his place within the city and perhaps even his life. Where Polus is excited by rhetoric's potential power to immunize the unjust man from punishment, Callicles is furious at the potential of this power being unjustly used against him, and terrified at the idea of losing his position in the city, and even his life. He is so bitterly disappointed by Athenian injustice that he attempts to convince himself that justice does not exist, except as the natural justice of "the right of the better and stronger," with rhetoric as part of the weaponry of the strong.³⁵⁷ But as Socrates will show him, his ideas of the "better" contain within them some allegiance to the morality that he has affected to despise. Callicles is not really Zethus, or at least not the Zethus of the brothers' debate; he more resembles the brothers when they were driven by rage to abandon the conventions of civilized

³⁵³ See discussion in D.3.

³⁵⁴ See, e.g., Stauffer 2006, 83; Kahn 1996, 126.

³⁵⁵ See discussion in section D, especially D.8.

³⁵⁶ See discussion in D.1.

³⁵⁷ See discussion especially in D.7-9.

behavior in favor of a bestial violence seeking revenge on those who had treated them unjustly. Socrates' myth of the afterlife at the end of the dialogue will attempt to restore moral order, much as Hermes did at the end of *Antiope*; but as in *Antiope*, we will be left with a sense that this order will not hold.³⁵⁸

D.1. A Callicles who lacks internal harmony

Callicles has been listening in silence to the conversation between Socrates and Polus. When Polus grudgingly agrees that it is consistent with the rest of the argument—although strange (ἄτοπος)—that it is better to be punished for one's injustice than to escape punishment, Callicles steps in—though less abruptly than did Polus. He asks Chaerephon whether Socrates can possibly be serious; Chaerephon tells him to ask Socrates. Callicles does so:

εἰπέ μοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερόν σε θῶμεν νυνὶ σπουδάζοντα ἢ παίζοντα; εἰ μὲν γὰρ σπουδάζεις τε καὶ τυγχάνει ταῦτα ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγεις, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν ὁ βίος ἀνατετραμμένος ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πράττομεν, ὥς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἂν δεῖ; (481b10-c4)

Tell me, Socrates, whether we should take you as being serious just now or as playing around? For if you are serious and the things you say are in fact true, then wouldn't our human life be [turned] upside down and aren't we doing all the opposite things, probably, to what we should be doing?

Callicles' comments resemble Polus' insistence that Socrates' arguments are "out of place," ἄτοπος,³⁵⁹ but Callicles sees an even more profound disorientation: he thinks Socrates' arguments would turn life upside-down (ἀνατρέπω). This

³⁵⁸ See discussion in E.

³⁵⁹ See discussion in C.2.

disorientation will be re-emphasized when Callicles re-enters the conversation with Socrates and remarks again on Socrates' arguments being upside-down.³⁶⁰

Socrates does not respond to Callicles in the same way he did to Polus. Socrates instead compares himself and Callicles. They have something in common, he says; they are both lovers of two beloveds. Socrates loves Alcibiades and philosophy; Callicles loves the Athenian public (δῆμος) and (punningly), the young man Demos.³⁶¹ Callicles, says Socrates, is incapable of opposing what his beloveds say, and so whenever the public changes its opinions he changes and says whatever the public wants, and similarly with the beautiful Demos. And if someone thought what he was saying was strange or out-of-place (ἄτοπος, 481e7), Socrates says, then if he were truthful he'd tell them to stop his beloved from saying such things, because otherwise he would not stop.

When Socrates uses ἄτοπος here, he seems to be referring to the fact that Callicles will say one thing at one time, and then another thing at another time, depending on what the public (or Demos) wants. Socrates' use of the term ἄτοπος thus differs from Polus' use (and Callicles', as we will see); they use ἄτοπος to describe opinions or arguments that are unconventional and out of place in

³⁶⁰ 511a4-5; see further discussion in D.6.

³⁶¹ As we will see, Callicles' intense anger at the possibility that he might be treated unjustly by men he considers inferior and lose his position in Athens suggests that he does not think highly of the Athenian public (see also his remarks discussed in section D.4). If it then seems odd to ascribe erotic love of the δῆμος to Callicles, we should recall that Plato was familiar with unphilosophical forms of love that focused on the secure possession of someone beloved solely for their physical or material nature, without reference to the beauty of their soul—and with the jealousy, anger, and damage to the soul likely to result. See, e.g., *Phaedrus* 239-40. Austin makes a similar point, that Callicles' erotic love for the δῆμος is motivated by a desire for security. Austin 2013, 46. Socrates will later recognize that Callicles' love of the δῆμος is a barrier to his philosophical understanding; see further discussion in section D.7.

Athenian thought, which is not something that concerns Socrates. Socrates uses ἄτοπος instead to refer to unphilosophical arguments that ignore their own intellectual inconsistency;³⁶² as we will see, for Socrates what is important is not whether he is ἄτοπος in the city, but whether he is in the “place” of philosophy.³⁶³

It is the same with him, Socrates says; he is only repeating what his beloved, philosophy, says—although *his* beloved always says the same thing. It is philosophy that Callicles has to refute.

ἢ οὖν ἐκείνην ἐξέλεγχον, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἔλεγον, ὥς οὐ τὸ ἀδικοῦν ἐστὶν καὶ ἀδικοῦντα δίκην μὴ διδόναι ἀπάντων ἔσχατον κακῶν· ἢ εἰ τοῦτο ἐάσεις ἀνέλεγκτον, μὰ τὸν κύνα τὸν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν, **οὐ σοι ὁμολογήσει Καλλικλῆς, ὦ Καλλίκλεις**, ἀλλὰ διαφωνήσῃ ἐν ᾧ πάντι τῷ βίῳ. καίτοι ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ὦ βέλτιστε, καὶ τὴν λύραν μοι κρεῖττον εἶναι ἀναρμοστεῖν τε καὶ διαφωνεῖν, καὶ χορὸν ᾧ χορηγοίην, καὶ πλείστους ἀνθρώπους μὴ ὁμολογεῖν μοι ἀλλ’ ἐναντία λέγειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἓνα ὄντα ἐμὲ ἐμαυτῷ ἀσύμφωνον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντία λέγειν. (482b2-c3).

Or then refute her [philosophy], with respect to what I was saying just now, showing that being unjust and not paying a penalty while being unjust is not the most extreme of all evils; or if you let this go unrefuted, by the dog that is the god of the Egyptians, **Callicles will not agree with you, Callicles**, but all your life will be dissonant. And indeed I think, noble friend, that it would be better for me that my lyre be discordant and dissonant, and the chorus that I am chorus-leading, and that most men disagree with me but say the opposite thing, rather than that my one self be unharmonious with myself and say opposite things.

³⁶² Turner 1993, 73-4.

³⁶³ For further discussion of ἀτοπία, see section F.

This warning about the importance of intellectual integrity is striking on several counts. Socrates again compares himself and Callicles, this time comparing both of their lives to a lyre, which can either be in tune with itself or not—although it is far more important that a life be in tune than a lyre. Socrates calls attention to the appropriateness of this analogy for Callicles by addressing him in the second person vocative even as he also refers to him in the third person nominative: “Callicles will not agree with you, Callicles.” This locution calls attention to Callicles’ name, suggesting that like the names of the other two interlocutors, Gorgias (γεωργός/γεωργία, farmer/farming) and his friend Polus (πῶλος, colt), it has some significance to the dialogue.³⁶⁴ In this light, we see Callicles’ name as something like “famous for beauty,” from the Greek words for “beauty” (τὸ κάλλος) and “to name/call” (καλέω).³⁶⁵ Callicles, more like Socrates than he is willing to admit, is associated with beauty—not only the beautiful young man Demos, but also, as we will see, of some notions of fineness or nobility that are wrapped up in his incoherent concept of what is “better.”³⁶⁶

³⁶⁴ See discussion in section C.2.

³⁶⁵ As Benardete notes, -κλῆς is a suffix from the same root as the word for glory (κλέος), contaminated from an early stage with καλέω. Benardete also notes that Socrates earlier punned on “to call” (καλέω) and “beautiful” (καλός) at 474d5, when he asked Polus, “do you look towards nothing when you call some things beautiful?” (εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἐκάστοτε καλά;) Benardete 1991, 49, 63. Cf. Plato’s *Cratylus* 416b-d. Given Socrates’ focus on the lyre in this passage, it is tempting to also see a pun on the word χέλυς, which can mean “tortoise” or “lyre,” referring to Hermes’ creation of the lyre from a tortoise-shell, as related in Euripides’ *Antiope*. See discussion in Chapter 1, especially B.2 and B.5.b.

³⁶⁶ See discussion in D.4. Other scholars seeing Callicles as a somewhat sympathetic character with whose elitist ideals Plato identifies include Klosko 1984, 134; Dodds 1959, 14. Turner connects the lack of harmony in Callicles to the lack of harmony between deeds and words, and thus to the “strangeness” of the dialogue that he identifies with ἀτοπία. Turner 1993, 74.

D.2. Callicles the lion

Socrates' discourse with Callicles has stressed what they have in common: not only do they share the experience of having two loves, but Socrates' remarks about internal harmony and the lyre have suggested that Callicles' thinking is internally discordant because he shares more of Socrates' thinking than he is willing to admit. It is as though Socrates and Callicles are brothers; as Weiss has pointed out, the theme of brotherhood runs throughout the dialogue, with some brothers having a supportive and helpful relationship, others having a murderous one.³⁶⁷ But where Socrates suggests they are like brothers who are lovers of beauty and of the lyre, Callicles will shortly compare himself and Socrates to a famously opposed pair of twin brothers—respectively, Zethus and Amphion of Euripides' *Antiope*. Socrates will accept the analogy, and will carry it through the rest of his conversation with Callicles. But both Callicles and Socrates make some alterations to Euripides' characters. Socrates' Amphion will be one who never abandons philosophy in favor of building city walls; Callicles' Zethus is one who does not farm, but who seems permanently mired in a bestial, vengeful fury over the threat of being treated unjustly.

Callicles responds to Socrates' warning of the dangers of internal disharmony by saying that Socrates seems "to have a boyish swagger in his arguments, like a real mob orator" (νεανιεύεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὡς ἀληθῶς δημηγόρος ὢν, 482c4-5). Socrates might have been able to demagogue Gorgias and Polus into admitting that

³⁶⁷ We saw the theme of brotherhood begin near the start of the dialogue, when Chaerephon referred to Gorgias' brother the doctor—whom Gorgias also mentioned at 456a when he was describing how he used rhetoric to persuade his brothers' patients to take their medicine. Weiss collects these and other examples. Weiss 2003, 196 (arguing that the brothers of the *Gorgias* suggest a fraternal relationship between rhetoric and philosophy).

they cared about conventional notions of justice and honor, Callicles says, but he himself understands that law and convention are opposed to nature. Law is something made by the weak majority to frighten the strong few; but according to Callicles, among all animals and among many peoples it is deemed just for the superior to rule over the inferior (τὸν κρείττω τοῦ ἥττονος ἄρχειν)³⁶⁸ and to have more (483d5-6). He offers the examples of Xerxes marching on Greece and his father (Darius) marching on Scythia—what sort of justice were *they* using, he asks (483d6-7).

Callicles' examples of the Persian kings Xerxes and Darius are revealing. Callicles could easily have offered examples of successful Persian aggression; but instead he offers Darius' attack on Scythia and Xerxes' attack on Greece—both of which failed.³⁶⁹ Xerxes was in fact repelled by the devices of Themistocles, one of the famous orators of old whom Callicles will later admit he admires (503c1).³⁷⁰ Perhaps Callicles would say that Athens (and Scythia) simply proved itself the stronger; but it is revealing that he chooses as examples instances of foreign aggression that most Athenians would agree were justly defeated. This signals that as Socrates has warned, Callicles is dangerously out of tune with himself; he may

³⁶⁸ In the same passage Callicles also opposes τὸν ἀμείνω τοῦ χείρονος (the better than the worse) and τὸν δυνατότερον τοῦ ἀδυνατωτέρου (the more powerful than the less powerful) (483d1-2). As we will see (section D.4), Callicles suffers from some confusion over what he really values as "better."

³⁶⁹ See Herodotus' accounts in Books 7 (especially 7.18.2) and 9. Note that both Darius and Xerxes did actually offer a sort of justice as a partial pretext for their aggression; at least, if we believe Herodotus, Darius invaded Scythia in part to avenge their earlier invasion of Media (Hdt 4.1.1, 7.20.2; 1.103.3-1.106), and Xerxes invaded Greece in part to avenge the injuries Athens had done to Persia (Hdt. 7.5.2-3, 7.8.β).

³⁷⁰ Stauffer 2006, 88-9 (arguing that Callicles' admiration of famous Athenians suggests he does not truly admire tyrants overthrowing the weak).

claim to believe in what he calls the justice of nature, but what he really *wants* is to be able to defend himself from the unjust attacks of others.

Callicles now offers a famous and vivid image: the lion who pursues the justice of nature, taking whatever he wants from the weaker because he is stronger.

ἀλλ' οἷμαι οὔτοι κατὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου ταῦτα πράττουσιν, καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία κατὰ νόμον γε τὸν τῆς φύσεως, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως κατὰ τοῦτον ὃν ἡμεῖς τιθέμεθα· πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐρρωμενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ λέοντας, κατεπάδοντές τε καὶ γοητεύοντες καταδουλούμεθα λέγοντες ὡς τὸ ἴσον χρὴ ἔχειν καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον. ἐὰν δέ γε οἷμαι φύσιν ἱκανὴν γένηται ἔχων ἀνὴρ, πάντα ταῦτα ἀποσεισάμενος καὶ διαρρήξας καὶ διαφυγὼν, καταπατήσας τὰ ἡμέτερα γράμματα καὶ μαγγανεύματα καὶ ἐπωδὰς καὶ νόμους τοὺς παρὰ φύσιν ἅπαντας, ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπότης ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξέλαμψεν τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον. (483e1-484b1).

But, I think, these men [conquerors like Xerxes] do these things according to the nature of the just, and by Zeus according to the law of nature, and not probably according to this thing that we enact; shaping most excellent and strongest of us, taking them from youth like lions, charming and enspelling them, we enslave them, saying that it is right to have equality and that this is the fine and the just. But if, I think, a man is born who has a strong enough nature, then after shaking off all these things and breaking them utterly and escaping, and after trampling down our sayings and sleights of hand and incantations and all the laws against nature, then rising up the slave reveals himself as our master, and the justice of his nature then shines out.

This passage is the chief basis for Callicles' reputation as a sort of anti-Plato who championed the doctrine of might makes right.³⁷¹ However, a close consideration of the image in context suggests that Callicles' feelings are more complex, and that he has spouted off a doctrine that for him is more theoretical than an actual commitment—not surprising in a young man who as yet has limited practical experience.³⁷²

The image of the lion recalls the familiar Athenian fable of the Lion's Cub. The fable is told in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*: the lion cub, hand-reared and so gentle young, eventually becomes a wild adult lion whose nature leads it to kill.³⁷³ The chorus in Aeschylus is referring to Helen of Troy (notoriously the subject of Gorgias' encomium). But Plato's audience would probably have thought first of Aristophanes' *Frogs*, where the lion cub is Alcibiades—the young, beautiful, and brilliant aristocrat whom Socrates earlier described as his “beloved.”

Aristophanes' *Frogs* was first performed at the beginning of 405 BCE, in the winter Lenaia festival. Although Athens would soon suffer its final defeat in the Peloponnesian War, at that point Athens still had some hopes of victory that at least for some Athenians were pinned on a return of Alcibiades. Alcibiades had played a

³⁷¹ See discussion in Dodds 1959, 266-7 ad *Gorgias* 483c7-484c3, 387-91 (on Callicles and Nietzsche). Note that this does not seem quite the same as the famous antithesis of νόμος (convention) and φύσις (nature) explored by Greek thinkers like Herodotus, which is devoted to examining what in a particular aspect of human behavior is required by nature, and what has been created by human convention. Callicles is asserting that human nature can exist independent of law or convention, and that human nature at its “best” is weakened by it. Dodds says that the nearest approach in earlier literature to Callicles' paradoxical phrase “law of nature” is Thucydides 5.105.2. Dodds 1959, 268 ad *Gorgias* 483e3.

³⁷² At 515a1-2 Socrates will comment that Callicles is just beginning to enter into public affairs.

³⁷³ Aesch. *Ag.* 717-36; See also Hdt. 5.92β. See discussion in Dodds 1959, 268 ad *Gorgias* 483e5.

prominent role in the war; he had been one of the leading voices in urging the expedition to Sicily in 415,³⁷⁴ which proved to be a disaster for Athens. Even before its failure, however, the Athenians had turned on him with allegations of impiety, causing him to flee and transfer his allegiance to Sparta. Athens eventually recalled him, trusting in his remarkable military capabilities, but then in 406 rejected him again for his failures.³⁷⁵ At the time of *Frogs*, Alcibiades had withdrawn to his estate on the Hellespont, where he would be in position six months later to be rebuffed in his attempt to assist the Athenians at Aigospotamoi—a battle the Athenians lost, leading to subsequent surrender to Sparta.³⁷⁶ By 404/3, Alcibiades himself would be dead at Persian hands.³⁷⁷

In *Frogs*, Dionysos encounters Euripides and Aeschylus in Hades, and judges between them. His final test is the advice each poet will give about the problem of Alcibiades. Euripides says he hates a citizen slow to help his country but quick to do great harm (*Frogs* 1427-8); he does not seem to recommend Alcibiades' recall. But although Aeschylus agrees that Alcibiades is dangerous—it is better not to rear a lion in the city, he says—he warns that once you have raised the lion, you must comply with its ways (*Frogs* 1431-2). His suggestion seems to be that Athens, having accepted Alcibiades' advice to pursue the war aggressively (i.e., through the Sicilian expedition), should retain him as the leader to finish it. After some additional discussion, Dionysos awards the prize to Aeschylus, and returns with him to Athens.

Callicles' lion image thus calls up a host of associations. In particular, it suggests an identification between Callicles and Socrates' beloved Alcibiades. This identification will be reinforced near the end of the dialogue, when Socrates warns Callicles about the citizens he and the other politicians have failed to educate and train—they may attack you, and my companion Alcibiades, Socrates warns, if things

³⁷⁴ See discussion in chapter 1, section B.4.

³⁷⁵ Kagan 2003, 432-6, 442-7.

³⁷⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.25-6. See discussion in Kagan 2003, 473-4.

³⁷⁷ Diodorus Siculus 14.11.1-4.

go badly (519a7-b2).³⁷⁸ And as Plato's readers would know, things *did* go badly.³⁷⁹ Alcibiades was attacked by the Athenian δῆμος in 415 BCE, probably (for the most part) unjustly;³⁸⁰ he took his revenge by fleeing to Sparta and "shaking off" the obligations of Athenian citizenship, giving the Spartans advice that badly damaged Athenian interests.³⁸¹ Yet Alcibiades attempted to return to the life of an Athenian citizen, and even when rejected again, tried to give it good advice. Although Callicles does not seem to be a historical character, Plato invites us to imagine that he will suffer a similar fate at the hands of the Athenian public, the δῆμος that Socrates called Callicles' inconstant "beloved."

The image of a lion "shaking off all these [bonds] and breaking them utterly and escaping" is thus at least in part about vengeful anger over unjust mistreatment. As such, it foreshadows the *Antiope* theme that Callicles is about to raise (discussed in the next section). The vengeful lion who "shakes off" his bonds in an epiphany of

³⁷⁸ As Dodds notes, Socrates is turning Callicles' earlier warnings back against him. Dodds 1959, 365 ad *Gorgias* 519a7-8. See discussion in D.8.

³⁷⁹ As we recall from the discussion of the dialogue's dramatic date (in section B), Socrates will refer to Alcibiades' political disgrace as being in the future, suggesting a date before 415; other references, however, seem to be to dates much late in the war, up to 406.

³⁸⁰ Although the Sicilian expedition urged by Alcibiades would later end in disaster, long before the disaster occurred Alcibiades was accused of participating in acts of impiety: mutilating statues of Hermes and profaning the Eleusinian Mysteries (Thuc. 6.27-8). He fled to Sparta under threat of execution (Thuc. 6.61.6-7). He denied the allegations, which were politically motivated (as Thucydides notes) and probably false at least with respect to the statue mutilation. See discussion in Kagan 2003, 262-7, 273.

³⁸¹ For example, it was Alcibiades who urged the Spartans to fortify and occupy Decelea in Attica, allowing the Spartans to damage farmland and flocks continuously, putting heavy pressure on Athenian defensive abilities (Thuc. 7.18.1; 7.27). See Kagan 2003, 281-2.

wild nature recalls the vengeful Zethus and Amphion, who cast off their own bonds of civilized behavior to avenge their mother's harms by tying Dirce to the wild bull that tears her to pieces. The bull in *Antiope* was a symbol of Dionysos; the lion also can be a symbol of Dionysos,³⁸² as is the release of bonds³⁸³ and the idea of a shining epiphany.³⁸⁴

For Callicles, unjust mistreatment by the δῆμος is still only potential. But he fears it, and he is angry at having to fear.³⁸⁵ We will see as the dialogue progresses

³⁸² For a discussion of the bull in *Antiope*, see Chapter 1, section C. The lion is one of the animals Dionysos sometimes manifests as, e.g., *h. Hymn 7 Dionysos* 44-5 (Dionysos turns into a lion); *E. Bacc.* 1017-8 (chorus urges Dionysos to appear as a bull or many-headed snake or fire-breathing dragon). Note also that in Euripides' *Bacchae* the chorus urges the death of Pentheus, imagined as a lion's whelp, and his mother Agave kills him and brings his head to court thinking that she is holding the head of a lion (*E. Bacc.* 989ff, esp. 1139-3). See Otero 2013, 333-5. See also Jacome 2013, 530 (compiling tables of Dionysos' representation as a feline in Roman art, and observing that the lion is the most common feline in Greek iconography).

³⁸³ There is some testimony that in Euripides' play, *Antiope*'s chains were miraculously released, enabling her to escape to Eleutherai (see Chapter 1, section C). See also *h. Hymn 7 Dionysos* 12-4 (bonds miraculously release themselves from Dionysos); Euripides' *Bacchae* (the chains Pentheus places on the Bacchantes miraculously release themselves, 447-8; Dionysos escapes his bonds during an earthquake 615-22).

³⁸⁴ In Euripides' *Bacchae*, Dionysos' epiphany at Pentheus' palace is marked not only by an earthquake, but by lightning and fire (594-9).

³⁸⁵ Cf. Buzzetti 2005, 44-5 (Callicles is indignant at evil triumphant). Pangle focuses on Polus' discussion with Socrates in the *Gorgias*, and she makes a similar argument about Polus, that Socrates sees that Polus is suffering from a confusion of envy and anger over the tyrant's injustice that could be cured only by understanding that the unjust soul is diseased and pitiable—one of which Polus is not currently capable. Pangle 2014, 77-80. (For more on Polus, see discussion in C.2).

that this anger is actually Callicles' chief motivation for pursuing politics, rather than some desire for power or pleasure. Socrates' later warning that the Athenian δῆμος might unjustly attack Callicles is Socrates' reversal of a warning that Callicles will give Socrates three times at critical points in their discussion: in the very next part of their discussion (D.3), when Callicles introduces the *Antiope* theme; when he resumes his conversation with Socrates after briefly abandoning it;³⁸⁶ and at the very end of that conversation.³⁸⁷ The fear of unjust attack by the δῆμος, and the need to pursue aggressive self-defense, will never be far from Callicles' mind.

D.3. Callicles and Zethus: the first warning

At times Callicles' language towards Socrates is insulting. He has asked whether Socrates is serious, called him a "mob-orator," and will shortly accuse philosophers (like Socrates) of avoiding adult life, acting childish, and deserving a beating (485a4-e2). Yet he also maintains that he is friendly towards Socrates (485e3). Whether this is true or not, he is at least genuinely indignant about the possibility he will repeatedly point out to Socrates, that Socrates might be unjustly attacked and condemned by the δῆμος. In any case, perhaps sparked by Socrates' earlier musical imagery, he now initiates an extended comparison of himself and Socrates to the twin brothers of Euripides' *Antiope*, Zethus and the lyre-playing Amphion.

Callicles is not wholly opposed to philosophy; he merely thinks it should be confined to an early stage of a citizen's development. As he tells Socrates, while philosophy is fine and even beneficial for the young, it is a childish activity for an adult, because it discourages participation in public affairs.

ὁ γὰρ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ὑπάρχει τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, κἂν πάνυ εὐφυῆς ᾗ
ἀνάνδρῳ γενέσθαι φεύγοντι τὰ μέσα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὰς ἀγοράς, ἐν αἷς ἔφη

³⁸⁶ See discussion in D.7.

³⁸⁷ See discussion in D.9.

ὁ ποιητὴς τοὺς ἄνδρας ἀριπρεπεῖς γίγνεσθαι καταδεδυκότι δὲ τὸν λοιπὸν
βίον βιῶναι μετὰ μειρακίων ἐν γωνίᾳ τριῶν ἢ τεττάρων ψιθυρίζοντα,
ἐλεύθερον δὲ καὶ μέγα καὶ ἱκανὸν μηδέποτε φθέγξασθαι. 485d3-e2.

For what I was saying just now, it happens to this [adult] man, even if he has
a very good nature, to become unmanly, because he flees the middle spaces
of the city and the *agorai*, in which the poet said that men become
distinguished, sinking down to spend the rest of his life whispering with
three or four boys in a corner, and never saying anything worthy of a free
man and great and effective.

“The poet” is, of course, Homer; Callicles is recalling Phoinix’s mission to instruct
Achilles in speaking in the assemblies “where men become distinguished” as well as
in the deeds of war (*Il.* 9.441). As Dodds notes, in Homer the word ἀγορά refers to a
place of public assembly rather than to the marketplace (ἀγορά)³⁸⁸ from which
Socrates has just come. But although Socrates does avoid the public political life that
Callicles favors, he can hardly be said to spend his life “whispering . . . in a corner.” If
he had, he would have been much less exposed to the Athenian injustice that
Callicles constantly warns him about, and that ultimately led to his execution. But
Callicles wants to characterize the warfare of political life as brave and lion-like, and
Socrates’ philosophical life as lacking manly courage. Thus just as at the opening of
the dialogue he commented that Socrates had arrived late to the battle (the
preferred time for a coward),³⁸⁹ he now claims that the philosopher philosophizes
because, “as Euripides says,” each man spends his time where he can shine and be
his best, and flees where he is worthless (φραῦλος) (484e3-485a3).³⁹⁰ But as Callicles

³⁸⁸ Dodds 1959, 274 ad *Gorgias* 485d5.

³⁸⁹ See discussion in section B.

³⁹⁰ Callicles is quoting *Antiope* (Fr. 184), although he does not name the play. His
remarks here also recall Zethus’ advice to Amphion to abandon the art of poetry,
which takes a good man and makes him worse (Fr. 186), in favor of practical affairs

will effectively admit at the end of the dialogue, Callicles has entered politics not out of some lion-like will to take what he wants, but out of a desire to save his position and his skin; he is no Achilles. Indeed, the one who can compare himself to Achilles is Socrates.³⁹¹

As Callicles says, he seems to feel towards Socrates much as Zethus did towards Euripides' Amphion (κινδυνεύω οὖν πεπονθέναι νῦν ὅπερ ὁ Ζῆθος πρὸς τὸν Ἀμφίονα ὁ Εὐριπίδου, οὗπερ ἐμνήσθην, 485e4-5)—to whom he had just alluded (at 484e3-485a3) when advising Socrates to abandon a childish philosophical art that he practiced only because he could shine in philosophy more than in practical affairs. In a friendly spirit (so he says), he now says to Socrates “the sorts of things that Zethus said to his brother” (οἷάπερ ἐκεῖνος πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν, 485e6) modified slightly to fit Socrates:

ἀμελεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὧν δεῖ σε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ φύσιν ψυχῆς ὧδε γενναίαν <λαχὼν> μαιρακιώδει τινὶ διαπρέπεις μορφώματι καὶ οὐτ' ἂν δίκης βουλαῖσι προσθεῖ' ἂν ὀρθῶς λόγον, οὐτ' εἰκὸς ἂν καὶ πιθανὸν ἂν λάκοις, οὔθ' ὕπερ ἄλλου νεανικὸν βούλευμα βουλεύσαιο. (485e6-486a3).

Socrates, you do not look after the things you ought to look after, and 'although you have as your lot a noble nature of soul, you are outstanding for your childish appearance, and you could never correctly add an argument to deliberations on justice, or chant anything reasonable and persuasive, or on behalf of anyone else give high spirited counsel.'

(Frs. 185, 188). See discussion in Chapter 1, section B.3. Callicles will soon quote Zethus more directly, in 485e.

³⁹¹ In Plato's *Apology*, Socrates compares himself to Achilles (*Ap.* 28c-d). See discussion in section D.7.

Callicles has substituted μειρακιώδει for Zethus' γυναικομίμω, in order to fit his thesis that philosophy is fine for young men, but not for adults.³⁹² Significantly, he has also omitted Zethus' claim that the philosopher-poet could not fight well (Fr. 185.5-6). As Plato has Alcibiades say in the *Symposium*, Socrates was known for his courage in battle;³⁹³ Callicles is confining his attack to some idea of political courage.

The nature of Callicles' real fear is revealed in what he says next, in the first of three warnings that he will give Socrates. Callicles' imagery has described the philosopher as removing himself from the "center" (τὰ μέσα 485d5).³⁹⁴ Callicles now adds that men like Socrates and the others who "drive ever further into philosophy" (τοὺς πόρρω ἀεὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐλαύνοντας, 486a5-6),³⁹⁵ have made themselves helpless and "dizzy."

νῦν γὰρ εἴ τις σοῦ λαβόμενος ἢ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν τῶν τοιούτων εἰς τὸ
δεσμωτήριον ἀπάγοι, φάσκων ἀδικεῖν μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντα, οἷσθ' ὅτι οὐκ ἂν
ἔχοις ὅτι χρήσιον σαυτῷ, ἀλλ' **ἰλιγγιώης** ἂν καὶ χασμῶ οὐκ ἔχων ὅτι
εἴποις, καὶ εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον ἀναβάς, κατηγοροῦ τυχὼν πάνυ φαύλου καὶ
μοχθηροῦ, ἀποθάνοις ἂν, εἰ βούλοιτο θανάτου σοι τιμᾶσθαι. (486a6-b4)

For now if someone should seize hold of you or anyone else of this
[philosophic] sort and should drag you off to prison, saying that you were
acting unjustly although you were doing nothing of the kind, you know that
you would not know how to comport yourself, but **would be dizzy** and gape,
not knowing what to say, and after being put on trial before the court, with

³⁹² See discussion in Chapter 1 (Euripides' *Antiope*) at B.3.

³⁹³ See Plato's *Symposium*, 219e-221b.

³⁹⁴ "The center" (τὸ μέσον) was a common name for the public spaces of Greek life. See Chapter 1 (Euripides' *Antiope*), section D; further discussion in Chapter 3 (Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*), section C.4.

³⁹⁵ Burnet gives further examples of this metaphor in Plato and Xenophon. Burnet 1924, 21-2 ad *Euthphr.* 4b1.

your accuser being an entirely worthless and wretched person, you would be put to death, if he wanted to punish you with death.

How is this wise, Callicles says, again quoting *Antiope*, this art that takes a good nature and makes it worse? (ἥτις εὐφυῇ λαβοῦσα τέχνη φῶτ' ἔθηκε χείρονα, 486b4-5, citing E. *Ant.* Fr. 186). Such a man, says Callicles, cannot save himself or his friends from danger, will end stripped of all his substance (περισυλᾶσθαι πᾶσαν τὴν οὐσίαν),³⁹⁶ and will “live in the city as a man utterly without citizen rights” (ἀτεχνῶς δὲ ἄτιμον ζῆν ἐν τῇ πόλει, 486c1-2), such that someone could even box him on the ear without penalty.

Quoting and closely paraphrasing Zethus (E. *Ant.* Fr. 188), Callicles therefore advises Socrates to cease his questioning, and “practice the music of affairs,” leaving the “fine sayings” to others.

ἀλλ' ὦγαθέ, ἐμοὶ πείθου, παῦσαι δὲ ἐλέγχων, **πραγμάτων** δ' εὐμουσίαν ἄσκει, καὶ ἄσκει ὁπόθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν, ἄλλοις τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτ' ἀφείς, εἴτε ληρήματα χρὴ φάναι εἶναι εἴτε φλυαρίας, ἐξ ὧν κενοῖσιν ἐγκατοικήσεις δόμοις· ζηλῶν οὐκ ἐλέγχοντας ἄνδρας τὰ μικρὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλ' οἷς ἔστιν καὶ βίος καὶ δόξα καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ. (486c4-d1)

“ ‘But, good man, obey me; cease your questioning, and practice the beautiful music of **affairs**,’ and practice that from which you will seem to be intelligent, leaving to others these refined sayings (whether it is right to call them babblings or rubbish), ‘from which you furnish an empty house,’ not seeking to compete with men questioning these petty things, but those for whom there is a living and good reputation and many other good things.”

³⁹⁶ At 508d2 Socrates acknowledges the danger even to his life, but characterizes the danger to his property as mere χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι –for him, the true οὐσία is philosophy, as he said to Polus at 472b6 (see discussion in section C.2).

Again, although Plato is our best witness for Euripides' text, it is evident that he has made some changes; the insistence on "questioning" is surely an addition that refers to Socrates.³⁹⁷ Callicles is advising that Socrates take up the *πρᾶγμα* of *πολυπραγμοσύνη*—public, political involvement, that by necessity is highly competitive.³⁹⁸

At first glance, Callicles' "advice of Zethus" to Socrates' Amphion is what we might expect from someone who admires the lion-like man. Significantly, Callicles has omitted from Zethus' advice to Amphion not only the references to warfare discussed above, but also any reference to farming. In chapter 1 we saw that when Zethus scolded Amphion, he not only advised participating in public political discourse, he also associated that advice with the advice to farm: to dig, and plow, and to "take care of the herds/flocks" (*ποιμνίοις ἐπιστατῶν*). It was the practical activities of farming, Zethus said, that would "make [him] seem intelligent" (*E. Ant.* Fr. 188.4).³⁹⁹ But here Callicles has removed any association between political rhetoric and cooperative, constructive activity, making it solely a way for one individual to do battle with others.⁴⁰⁰ In his later critique of Callicles' thinking, Socrates will add back in the imagery of farming.⁴⁰¹

Yet at no point do we see Callicles slaver over the concrete rewards of power in the way that Polus did. The most personal and emotionally vivid part of Callicles' "advice of Zethus" is instead his warning to Socrates of the risk Socrates is running of being hauled into court and possibly even put to death—something that the

³⁹⁷ See the discussion of this fragment in Chapter 1, especially section B.3.b.

³⁹⁸ See discussion in Chapter 1, section B.3.c.

³⁹⁹ See discussion in Chapter 1, section B.3.b.

⁴⁰⁰ Nightingale also argues that Plato is distinguishing Callicles from Zethus here; she points out that Callicles aims at not just political distinction, but absolute power. She does not note the significance of Callicles' omission of farming or the indications I discuss below that power and pleasure are not Callicles' true motivations. Nightingale 1995, 78.

⁴⁰¹ See discussion in section D.8.

reader would know would indeed be Socrates' eventual fate.⁴⁰² Notable in this warning and its repetitions is Callicles' anger over the sheer unfairness of it all. Some worthless and wretched (φαῦλος καὶ μοχθηρός) person who could not defeat Socrates in a fair fight could destroy him with a false accusation—like some Agamemnon taking an Achilles down with a trumped-up charge.⁴⁰³ For *that* reason, a man must learn how to defend himself and his position in the city's public spaces.⁴⁰⁴

Callicles' emphasis on the unfairness of the potential attacks on Socrates shows that he is not making threats against Socrates, but rather projections of something he fears for himself as well. His later warnings will make particularly clear that the prospect of being treated unjustly by the δῆμος "rubs him raw" (511b6)⁴⁰⁵ and that he cannot understand why Socrates does not share the same fears. Callicles' focus is constantly on his position within the city: staying in "the center" rather than "driving out further into philosophy," studying rhetoric so that he does not become "dizzy" and disoriented and unable to defend himself in court, not being treated as an ἄτιμος, a man without citizen status unable to participate in

⁴⁰² The foreshadowing of Socrates' death is even more vivid later in the dialogue. See discussions in section E.

⁴⁰³ For Achilles' reaction to Agamemnon's treating him as ἄτιμος and to Agamemnon's deceptions, see *Il.* 1.149-71, esp. 171; 9.307-45, esp. 345. See also Irwin 1979, 181 ad *Gorgias* 486b3.

⁴⁰⁴ My argument that Callicles is motivated by his fear has been anticipated to some extent by Austin and Buzzetti. However, Austin argues that Callicles is governed primarily by an existential fear of death that has sent him into politics (and hedonism). Austin 2013, 33-4. I see Callicles as governed by a realistic fear of the *unjust* loss of civic position and identity (including death) *and* by his anger over that prospect. Buzzetti does take account of Callicles' anger over injustice as well as his fear, but argues that Callicles is in fact a genuine immoralist who seeks tyrannical gain. Buzzetti 2005, 44-5.

⁴⁰⁵ See discussion in section D.7.

the city's "center" (τὸ μέσον), its public spaces: the ἀγορά, the Assembly, the Council, the courts, public religious ceremonies.⁴⁰⁶ In short, Callicles is afraid of being unjustly made ἄτοπος, "out of place," in the city.⁴⁰⁷

D.4. Callicles: politics, not pleasure

Socrates responds to Callicles' claims that justice is merely the natural victory of the stronger, and to his warnings that Socrates himself could be attacked, by saying that Callicles is a "lucky find," literally, a "Hermes-gift" (ἑρμῆαιον, 486e3), because his disagreement will serve as a touchstone to ensure that Socrates' soul is in good condition and that his arguments are sound.⁴⁰⁸

⁴⁰⁶ Harrison notes that ἀτιμία has multiple meanings; the "primitive" or extreme kind is outright outlawry, in which a man theoretically could even be killed without his killer suffering penalty. There was also a less extreme version in which a citizen would be excluded from the marketplace, deprived of the procedural protection of citizen rights (e.g., be unable to defend himself in court), banned from addressing the Assembly and Council, and attending holy places and participating in public rites. Irwin 1979 180-1, ad *Gorgias* 486a-c; Harrison 1971, 2: 169-72 (discussing fourth century Athenian law). The word ἄτιμος can also be used more generally to signal a complaint that someone has not received his due and is entitled to redress, as Achilles uses the term at *Il.* 1.171. Blok 2017, 226 n. 146.

⁴⁰⁷ See further discussion of ἀτοπία in section F.

⁴⁰⁸ Callicles has the three requirements for such an intellectual touchstone, Socrates says, in that he has knowledge, good will, and the ability to speak freely without shame (486e5-487e3). Thus if he and Socrates can reconcile their opposing views, it must be that they have reached the truth (487e6-7). As they do not reach agreement, and Socrates has to end the dialogue with his own rhetorical flight on the underworld, in a sense the dialogue is a failure (see section E). McKim argues that Callicles is a touchstone because Socrates is attempting to show that all men really believe that virtue is preferable to vice, even if they do not acknowledge it to

Socrates' reference to a ἔρμαιον continues both his earlier reference to the lyre and Callicles' introduction of the *Antiope* theme—a theme that Socrates explicitly accepts, swearing “by Zethus!” (489e2) and later (506b5-6) saying he would like to return the speech of Amphion in exchange for Callicles' Zethus-speech.⁴⁰⁹ The ἔρμαιον may even recall Hermes' invention of the lyre upon discovering the tortoise, his own lucky find, an event to which Euripides' Amphion referred.⁴¹⁰ As I noted in Chapter 1, part of the lyre's importance is that it is a solo instrument; in this image of the touchstone, Socrates is explicitly stressing that he is testing his *own* soul. This is in contrast to the more usual literary references to a touchstone that could be used to test the souls of others.⁴¹¹ Where Callicles is concerned about the falsity and injustice of others who might try to take his position in the city, Socrates is attempting to persuade him to shift his perspective to the condition of his own soul and to *its* proper place.

Socrates now leads Callicles through a discussion of who Callicles considers superior and therefore entitled by natural justice to take what they want, starting from the assumption (which Callicles grants) that Callicles means the stronger (τοὺς ἰσχυροτέρους κρείττους καλεῖς, 488c2). But Callicles will not concede that the δῆμος is the stronger, which would imply that democratic equality is therefore naturally just (488e7-489e1). He snaps that Socrates won't stop talking rubbish (οὐ πάύσεται φλυαρῶν, 489b7), and is treating Callicles' mistake over a word as a lucky find (ἔρμαιον, 489c1). Of course Callicles doesn't think a democratic rabble is superior, he says; he thinks the “more excellent” (βελτίων, 489c2) man is superior. Under

themselves; if Socrates can get Callicles, who claims to believe in an extremely anti-Socratic philosophy, to agree, then he must be right. McKim 1988, 43.

⁴⁰⁹ For a discussion of Socrates' “speech of Amphion” see section D.6.

⁴¹⁰ See discussion in Chapter 1, section B.2 and B.5.b. Nightingale 1995, 84 (also arguing that this reference to the ἔρμαιον recalls *Antiope*). See also 489c1, where Callicles angrily claims that Socrates pounces upon his mistake as a ἔρμαιον.

⁴¹¹ Dodds gives the examples of Theog. 119ff, E. *Medea* 516ff. Dodds 1959, 280 ad *Gorgias* 486d3.

pressure from Socrates, he first identifies the “more excellent” with the “better,” (ἀμείνων, 489e5), and then (at Socrates’ suggestion) with the “more intelligent,” (φρονιμώτερος, 489e8). Socrates swears “by Zethus” (489e2) that he is not being ironical—but by getting Callicles to shift to the position that the “superior” who should rule are the more intelligent, such that, as Socrates suggests, one intelligent man should rule a mob of fools, he has gotten Callicles to shift to something closer to Amphion’s position that the intellectual is better for the city (490a1-5; *E. Ant. Fr* 200).⁴¹²

Callicles continues to insist that his “more intelligent” men are entitled to rule and to have more than the people they rule. But Callicles’ discussion of just what these men are more intelligent about and what they should take more of is entirely abstract. Socrates offers some specific examples—food and drink and cloaks and shoes, and finally seeds. Socrates asks: Should a farmer who was intelligent (φρόνιμος) about the land and καλός καὶ ἀγαθός claim a larger amount (πλεονεκτέω) of seed than others and use the greatest amount possible on his land? (490e5-8).⁴¹³ Socrates’ point, of course, is that it would be silly for a farmer to seek to get more seed than would be needed given the condition of his land—and just so, a politician should aim at what is good for the city, a point that he will return to later in the discussion.⁴¹⁴ But Callicles impatiently insists that he isn’t talking about such

⁴¹² Socrates is thus adapting Amphion’s claim that the quiet man who pursues wisdom is better for the city than the Zethus-like politician (see discussion in Chapter 1, section B.4). Similarly, later in the dialogue, Socrates will claim that he alone attempts to practice the true political art (521d6-8). Austin 2013, 83-4; Trivigno 2009, 90-1; Nightingale 1995, 78-9. The Amphionic Socrates, however, unlike Amphion, also sees a place for the true farmer-rhetorician who can properly cultivate and train the people. See discussion in D.8.

⁴¹³ Cf. Xen. *Oec.* 17.8-9, where Socrates and the gentleman farmer Ischomachos will discuss the way in which the proper amount of seed to use depends on the nature and characteristics of the land. See discussion in Chapter 3, section B.8.

⁴¹⁴ See discussion in section D.8.

trivia (490b-491a), and finally states that his “more intelligent” men who should rule and have more are those who are intelligent (φρόνιμος) in the city’s business and manly (ἀνδρεῖος)(491b1-2).

Callicles has seemingly come some way from his praise of the lion-like man who shakes off conventional bonds to take what he wants. So Socrates asks: would Callicles’ intelligent ruler be what is conventionally called temperate and self-controlled (ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, σώφρονα ὄντα καὶ ἐγκρατῇ αὐτὸν ἑαυτοῦ, 491d11-2)? Callicles does not agree; instead he vigorously reiterates the superior man’s freedom from conventional bonds: he follows what is fine and just according to nature (491e7), having the intelligence, ability, and manliness to indulge his appetites to the fullest extent without restraining (κολάζειν, 491e9) them, and without making the laws and arguments and noise of the mass of men a master over himself (492a2-b8).⁴¹⁵ This, Callicles declares, is virtue and happiness—luxury and intemperance and freedom—and the conventional agreements (συνθήματα) of men contrary to nature are rubbish (φλυαρία) and worth nothing (492c7-8).⁴¹⁶

One might well ask why Callicles insists that his lion-man adopt such an extreme version of hedonism—one that, as we will see, Socrates will have little

⁴¹⁵ Callicles’ insistence here on limitless pleasure may also be a way in which Plato is distinguishing him from Zethus, as in *Antiope* part of Zethus’ complaint about poets was that they “hunted after pleasure” (E. *Ant.* Fr. 187). Nightingale 1995, 77 n. 44. However, as I argued in Chapter 1, Zethus seemed to be referring to what he considered intellectual self-indulgence; Amphion in his turn criticized more physical forms of self-indulgence as characteristic of practical men like Zethus (see Chapter 1, sections B.3-4). As Sommerville points out, Socrates here opposes Callicles’ praise of sensual pleasures with a praise of the pleasure of temperance. Sommerville 2014, 246. Thus this seems to continue Plato’s adaptation of Euripides’ oppositions.

⁴¹⁶ Socrates will turn this remark around on Callicles at the very end of the dialogue, when he tells Callicles that these values of his are worth nothing (527e7).

difficulty attacking.⁴¹⁷ But just as Callicles' earlier praise of the lion-like man was more abstract than his vehement and specific warning to Socrates of the need to protect himself from injustice, so we now see that his praise of unrestrained indulgence has a similarly abstract quality that does not carry over into any concrete praise of actual appetite. For example, Socrates offers Callicles his famous comparisons of intemperate souls to leaky jars that can be filled only with endless pain and struggle.⁴¹⁸ Socrates admits these images are strange (ἄτοπος, 493c4); indeed, they are literally "out of place," in the sense that as Socrates notes, they are related to a famous punishment for souls in the underworld who are condemned to endlessly fill leaky jars with a sieve (493b3-7). But Callicles does not object to the image or offer a counterimage; and though he continues to insist that an endless influx of pleasure is what he values as good, he offers no specific examples of pleasures that a real man would pursue. Nor does he ever attack Socrates' notorious temperance as childish or foolish.⁴¹⁹ When Socrates offers specific examples of pleasures considered trivial or degrading—scratching an itch or the life of a catamite—he does object, calling Socrates ἄτοπος and δημηγόρος (494d1); but when Socrates says that he is too brave to be shamed the way Gorgias and Polus were, Callicles does not reject the examples (494d-e)—and offers no counterexamples of his own. There are no outbursts that parallel his heated denunciations of the worthless men who dare to haul their superiors into court, where Callicles' real feelings flare out.

⁴¹⁷ See, e.g., Klosko 1984, 128-38 (arguing that there is no philosophical connection between Callicles' rejection of moral convention and his hedonism, and that Plato gave him an easily refuted position in order to focus on other questions).

⁴¹⁸ Note Xenophon uses similar imagery in the *Oeconomicus*, as discussed in Chapter 3, section B.5.

⁴¹⁹ For example, although Alcibiades doesn't exactly mock Socrates for his temperance, he does marvel at length at his inability to seduce Socrates. Pl. *Symposium*, 216b-219e.

Callicles' real feelings do not emerge in the discussion of pleasure until Socrates argues that fools and cowards can have as much pleasure—for example, at the withdrawal of an enemy—as intelligent and manly (άνδρεϊος) men (497e2-498c5). Thus if undifferentiated pleasure is the only good that Callicles' lion-like man aims at, then he would not really be any better than the fools and cowards (499a7-b3). And now Callicles gives the same kind of response that he gave at the beginning of their discussion over what was “superior,” when he snapped that Socrates was treating Callicles' mistake over a word as a lucky find (έρμαιον, 489c1). He scornfully says that Socrates is childishly grasping at something he said as a joke: surely Socrates knows that Callicles, like anyone else, thinks that some pleasures are better than others:

Πάλαι τοί σου άκροῶμαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, καθομολογῶν, ένθυμούμενος ὅτι, κἂν παίζων τίς σοι ένδῶ ὀτιοῦν, τούτου ἄσμενος ἔχη ὥσπερ τὰ μειράκια. ὥς δὴ σὺ οἶεi ἐμέ ἢ καί ἄλλον ὄντινοῦν ἄνθρώπων οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι τὰς μὲν βελτίους ἡδονάς, τὰς δὲ χείρους. (499b4-8).

For a long time I have been listening to you, Socrates, agreeing, thinking that even if as a joke someone gives in to you in any way at all, then well-pleased you hold onto it just like boys do. As if you really think that I or anyone else at all does not hold that some pleasures are more excellent, others worse.

From here Socrates will have little difficulty getting Callicles to agree that we should pursue beneficial and worthy pleasures because we are acting for the sake of what is good, rather than merely pleasant (500a2-4).

Thus it seems that Callicles is not deeply committed to his hedonism; he cares far more about ideas of intelligence and manliness.⁴²⁰ His hedonism instead seems to be an extension of his elaborate and eloquent theory that the superior

⁴²⁰ Cf. McKim 1988, 40-3 (arguing that Socrates is exploiting Callicles' sense of shame to show that Callicles does not really believe in his hedonism).

man, the lion-man, should be free from all social conventions.⁴²¹ As I argued above, Callicles' eloquence seems to have blinded many readers to the fact that what Callicles really cares about is Athens' being structured so that people he considers unworthy can and probably will treat him unjustly and strip him of his position in the city. These theories are "sour-grape" abstractions of a young and angry man; if Athenian conventions are unjust, then Callicles will try to convince himself that it does not matter, because there is no real justice or morality anyway—only the natural right of the superior man. It is an extreme form of moral skepticism that Socrates repeatedly shows Callicles he is not able to live.⁴²²

Socrates has known all along that what Callicles really values is not a life dedicated to the pursuit of unlimited pleasure. The real question, he says, that they are debating is which life is better: the life of the successful politician, or the life in philosophy that Socrates practices.

ὄντινα χρή τρόπον ζῆν, πότερον ἐπὶ ὃν σὺ παρακαλεῖς ἐμέ, τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ταῦτα πράττοντα, λέγοντά τε ἐν τῷ δήμῳ καὶ ῥητορικὴν ἀσκοῦντα καὶ πολιτευόμενον τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν ὑμεῖς νῦν πολιτεύεσθε ἢ [ἐπὶ] τόνδε τὸν βίον τὸν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ (500c3-8).

⁴²¹ Irwin 1979, 192 ad *Gorgias* 491e-492a (Callicles rejects in principle the idea that convention could bind the superior man, so he needs a reason to claim such interference is always bad).

⁴²² Cf Stauffer 2006, 116-7 ("Callicles' hedonism is ... part of a serious effort by Callicles to deny, even to himself, that he is concerned with any kind of virtue. ... For to admit that one is concerned with virtue ... is to open oneself to sorrow and anger when virtue fails"). Austin argues that Callicles' hedonism is motivated by his fear of death, which she argues is also the true basis for his pursuit of rhetoric and the political life; although this may be part of the explanation, I think she neglects the important role played by Callicles' anger over the injustice of the Athenian δῆμος. Austin 2013, 37. See also discussion in D.7.

what sort of way to live, whether in the way to which you call me, practicing these activities of a man, both speaking among the people and practicing rhetoric and engaging in politics in this way that you are now engaged, or this life in philosophy....

In other words, this is much like the debate of Amphion and Zethus—though Callicles is a Zethus who does not farm, for whom politics is defensive war rather than a constructive activity.

D.5. *Callicles' departure from the argument*

Although self-defense is the reason Callicles values the political life for himself, Socrates is about to demonstrate that politics as war is not the form of political life that Callicles really admires. Socrates turns to comparing rhetoric to music and poetry (particularly tragic poetry) (502b1-2), suggesting that orators, like poets, attempt only to entertain and flatter with no intent to improve and benefit the citizens (502d10-503e1).⁴²³ But Callicles, after a long string of grudging or pro-forma agreements with Socrates' statements (e.g., 501c7-8), balks. He cannot agree that that orators are *necessarily* pandering entertainers seeking their own advantage, even if contemporary politicians (like himself, presumably) are nothing more (503b4-5). It turns out that the kind of men he really admires are the great orators and politicians of the past, men like Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and Pericles (503c1-3), whose benefits to Athens were too well known for Plato to rehearse: Miltiades and Themistocles played critical roles in repelling the Persian invasions; Cimon was instrumental in building the power of the Athenian naval empire; Pericles rebuilt and fortified the city, and led it to the height of its imperial

⁴²³ See the further discussion in section E of how the *Gorgias* engages with Euripides' *Antiope* as a tragedy. See, e.g., Trivigno 2011, 135-6 (arguing that Plato saw *Antiope* as a good tragedy); Trivigno 2009; Nightingale 1995, 60-92, esp. 89-92 (arguing that Plato was parodying *Antiope*).

wealth and power.⁴²⁴ Callicles' ideal is perhaps closest to the end of *Antiope*, with Zethus and Amphion, having been granted royal power, working together to build the walls of Thebes and no longer engaging in their characteristic activities of political rhetoric and farming (for Zethus), or philosophical poetry (for Amphion).

But Socrates cannot concede that any of the great men named by Callicles fulfills his prime requirement: to have made the public better, instead of worse. (503c4-d3). Indeed, he will later call Pericles' famous fortification of Athens "rubbish"; Socrates may be an Amphion, but he is an Amphion who never abandoned philosophy for city-building.⁴²⁵ What makes a soul orderly (and thus better), says Socrates, is justice and temperance—and this is what a good statesman and orator would look towards (ἀποβλέπω, 503e1; βλέπω, 504d5) (503e1-505b12).⁴²⁶ Just as a household must have structure and order (τάξεως ... καὶ κόσμου 504a8) to be beneficial, so must a ship, a body, and above all, a soul.⁴²⁷ "And so being kept within bounds is better for the soul than boundless intemperance, as you were thinking just now," Socrates concludes (505b11-2).

⁴²⁴ Yunis argues that Plato here is referring to Thucydides' image of Pericles and his rhetoric. Yunis 1996, 142-6 (note that Yunis seems to think Thucydides' opinion of Pericles was uncomplicatedly positive).

⁴²⁵ Nightingale 1995, 90-2.

⁴²⁶ Dodds notes that the phrase "looking towards something" (Dodds translates, "Keeping his eye on something," ἀποβλέπων πρὸς τι, 503e1) is reminiscent of the language Plato will later use in other dialogues to describe looking towards the Platonic Forms. Dodds 1959, 328 ad *Gorgias* 503e1; similarly Irwin 1979, 214 ad *Gorgias* 503de. The language reappears in Socrates' speech of Amphion; see discussion in section D.6.

⁴²⁷ As Pontier points out, in the *Oeconomicus* Xenophon's characters will also praise the order of the household and of the soul, using imagery and vocabulary that is both similar to and different from Plato's. Pontier 2006, 235-52. See further discussion in Chapter 3, especially section B.5.

At this point Callicles, who has been participating in the dialogue with increasing reluctance, protests that he does not know what Socrates means, and asks Socrates to continue the dialogue with someone else (505c1-2). “This man will not endure being benefited and experiencing the subject of the discussion, being restrained within bounds,” Socrates says (οὗτος ἀνὴρ οὐχ ὑπομένει ὠφελούμενος καὶ αὐτὸς τοῦτο πάσχων περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστί, κολαζόμενος, 505c3-4). Socrates expresses regret, as he would like to have continued until he gave Callicles “the speech of Amphion in return for that of Zethus” (506b5-6). At Gorgias’ urging, however, he continues, going through the argument by himself (though he emphasizes at 506a1-7 that he too is still searching and is happy to be refuted), giving in effect his “speech of Amphion.”

D.6. Socrates’ speech of Amphion: the perspective of cosmic order

Amphion’s opening song was a hymn to heaven and earth (Aether and Gaia, *E. Ant.* Fr. 182a); the chorus called him “blessed” (ὀλβιος) because of his disinterested investigation of the “ageless cosmic order of deathless nature” (ἀθανάτου ... φύσεως | κόσμον ἀγήρων, *E. Ant.* Fr. 910.5-6).⁴²⁸ Later in his debate with Zethus, Amphion warned that men with “an uncontrolled habit of the stomach” (ἀκόλαστον ἦθος γαστρός) could turn into bad citizens (*E. Ant.* Fr. 201.4, B4); he praised “hunting what is beautiful” (*E. Ant.* Fr. 198), the ability to give wise advice (*E. Ant.* Fr. 200), and the quiet life of the ἀπράγμων who avoids busying himself in public affairs (*E. Ant.* Frs. 193, 194).⁴²⁹

Socrates has already emphasized the importance of avoiding “uncontrolled habits,” or intemperance. His “speech of Amphion” now elaborates on this by describing how the excellence of a soul—or a body, or anything else—depends on

⁴²⁸ Although the attribution of Euripides’ Fragment 910 is disputed, many scholars attribute it to *Antiope*. For further discussion, see Chapter 1, section B.2.

⁴²⁹ See Chapter 1, section B.4.

structure and order, which makes the soul temperate (σώφρων) and good, rather than intemperate (ἀκόλαστος) and bad (507a1-2, 6-7). As Socrates asks himself:

Τάξει ἄρα τεταγμένον τι καὶ κεκοσμημένον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἐκάστου;

So the excellence of each thing is something that has been structured according to its structure and put into order? (506e1)

The soul is good, says Socrates, if it has its own order and structure, which means it will be temperate and just, and will therefore do whatever it does well, and will therefore be blessed and happy (μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα, 507c4). Therefore, the goal (σκοπός) to which they must look (βλέπω, 507d6-7) is that justice and temperance be present in everyone who is to be blessed.⁴³⁰ An intemperate man, says Socrates, is incapable of the community and friendship that permits existence (507e3-6).

Socrates' argument then reaches its conclusion in a passage that recalls Amphion's praise of the union of Aether and Gaia. Socrates invokes the union of heaven and earth (οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν) — and gods and men—the “cosmic order” (κόσμος) that “wise men say”⁴³¹ is created by virtue of the principles he has outlined:

⁴³⁰ See discussion of βλέπω (503e1) in section D.5.

⁴³¹ Some scholars have argued that Socrates is specifically referring here to Pythagorean doctrines. Dodds 1959, 338 ad *Gorgias* 508a3; see also Guthrie 1969-75, 1: 208-12. However, even if Pythagoras was the first to use κόσμος to refer to the “cosmic order,” by Plato's time this usage had spread beyond a strictly Pythagorean context, e.g., E. Fr. 910, discussed in Chapter 1, section B.2. See Irwin 1979, 226 ad *Gorgias* 507e-508a; Vlastos 1975, 4-10 (discussing Heraclitus' use of the term). Cf. Plato's *Republic* 500b8-d2, where Socrates argues that the philosopher, whose mind is fixed on reality, has no leisure to look downwards to human affairs, but looking at the things that are always in order (εἰς τεταγμένα ἅττα

φασὶ δ' οἱ σοφοί, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θεοὺς καὶ
 ἀνθρώπους τὴν κοινωνίαν συνέχειν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ κοσμιότητα καὶ
 σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην, καὶ τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο διὰ ταῦτα κόσμον καλοῦσιν,
 ὦ ἑταῖρε, οὐκ ἀκοσμίαν οὐδὲ ἀκολασίαν (507e6-508a4).

Wise men say, Callicles, that the principles of community and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice hold together heaven and earth and gods and men, and for these reasons they call this whole a cosmic order, my friend, not a cosmic disorder or intemperance.

Thus, says Socrates, the most important help for a man to be able to give himself or his friends is the ability to protect the soul in its possession of justice and temperance by avoiding wrongdoing, or failing that, by seeking to be restrained (τοῦ κολάζεσθαι, 507d3).

D.7. Callicles' reentry into the discussion: his second warning

Socrates has been going through the argument by himself. But Callicles will now rejoin the discussion, as Socrates is taking on what, as he says, Callicles has been abusing him for—and what has been closest to Callicles' heart all along—the importance of self-defence.

Socrates details Callicles' warnings of the dangers of a philosopher's powerlessness at even greater length than had Callicles himself.

... ὥς ἄρα ἐγὼ οὐχ οἷός τ' εἰμὶ βοηθῆσαι οὔτε ἑμαυτῷ οὔτε τῶν φίλων οὐδενὶ
 οὐδὲ τῶν οἰκείων, οὐδ' ἐκσῶσαι ἐκ τῶν μεγίστων κινδύνων, εἰμὶ δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ
 βουλομένῳ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄτιμοι τοῦ ἐθέλοντος, ἅντε τύπτειν βούληται, τὸ

καὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' αἰεὶ ἔχοντα) and observing (θεάομαι) that they are all in harmonious order according to reason (κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα), he will imitate those and himself become as orderly and divine (κόσμιός τε καὶ θεῖος) as possible.

νεανικὸν δὴ τοῦτο τοῦ σοῦ λόγου, ἐπὶ κόρρης, ἔαντε χρήματα ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, ἔαντε ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, ἔαντε, τὸ ἔσχατον, ἀποκτεῖναι· καὶ οὕτω διακεῖσθαι πάντων δὴ αἴσχιστόν ἐστιν, ὥς ὁ σὸς λόγος. . . . οὐ φημι, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, τὸ τύπτεσθαι ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀδίκως αἴσχιστον εἶναι, οὐδέ γε τὸ τέμνεσθαι οὔτε τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐμὸν οὔτε τὸ βαλλάντιον, ἀλλὰ τὸ τύπτειν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ ἀδίκως καὶ τέμνειν καὶ αἴσχιον καὶ κάκιον, καὶ κλέπτειν γε ἅμα καὶ ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι καὶ τοιχωρυχεῖν καὶ συλλήβδην ὁτιοῦν ἀδικεῖν καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ τῷ ἀδικοῦντι καὶ κάκιον καὶ αἴσχιον εἶναι ἢ ἐμοῖ τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ. (508c5-e6)

. . . that I am not able to help either myself or any of my friends or household, nor to save them from the greatest dangers, and that I am at the mercy of anyone's whim, just like someone without the protection of citizen rights, whether that someone wishes to box me—in the brash expression of your argument—on the ear, or to take away my property, or to throw me out of the city, or—at its full extent—to kill me; and to be in such a state is the most shameful thing of all, in your argument . . . I say, Callicles, that being boxed on the ear unjustly is not the most shameful thing, or having my body or purse cut, but rather striking and cutting me and mine unjustly is more shameful and worse, and indeed stealing from me and enslaving me and breaking into my house and in a word being unjust in any way at all both to me and mine is worse and more shameful for the one being unjust than for me, who is suffering the injustice.

Socrates flatly asserts that his arguments that doing injustice is worse than suffering injustice are “bound down—even if it is rather rude (ἀγρουκότερον) to say so—by iron and adamant arguments . . . or at least they seem to be, unless you or

someone brasher release them” (508e7-509a3).⁴³² No one he has ever met can say something else without being ridiculous, Socrates says. The question thus must be not how can a man defend himself from suffering injustice, but rather how can a man defend himself *both* from not doing injustice, and from not suffering injustice?

Now that the issue of self-defense has come to the fore, Callicles reenters the discussion, agreeing with Socrates’ proposal that the fineness (κάλλος) of being able to defend oneself (or the shame of not being able to do so) increases as the extent of the harm (κακόν) increases (509c2-5). And he agrees with great enthusiasm when Socrates suggests that the power to avoid suffering injustice comes from either being the ruler, or the ruler’s ally (510a6-b1):

‘Ορᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγὼ ἔτοιμός εἰμι ἐπαινεῖν, ἂν τι καλῶς λέγῃς; τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖς πάνυ καλῶς εἰρηκέναι. (510a11-b1)

You see, Socrates, how I am ready to praise you, if you speak well? To me you seem to have said this very well.

But Callicles has not, after all, found a way out. Being a friend to an unjust ruler, Socrates points out, would mean imitating him and thus being unjust oneself—and wouldn’t that mean that the ruler’s friend would be wretched (μοχθηρός)? Socrates asks (511a1-3).

The discussion with Callicles has thus returned to where it began. Just as he did at the conclusion of his dialogue with Polus, Socrates has suggested that doing injustice makes one wretched (i.e., that it is worse than suffering injustice). And just as Callicles there accused Socrates of making arguments that would turn life upside down (ἀνατρέπω) and that suggest that men are doing everything opposite to what they should be doing (τὰ ἐναντία) (481c3-4), now he does so again.

⁴³² Socrates’ arguments here again are “fast and loose,” as he is arguing mostly from analogy, hardly the “iron and adamant” chains of argument claimed by Socrates in 509a1.

οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπῃ στρέφεις ἐκάστοτε τοὺς λόγους ἄνω καὶ κάτω, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι οὗτος ὁ μιμούμενος τὸν μὴ μιμούμενον ἐκεῖνον ἀποκτενεῖ, ἐὰν βούληται, καὶ ἀφαιρήσεται τὰ ὄντα (511a4-7).

I do not know how you always turn the argument upside and down, Socrates; or do you not know that the one imitating [the tyrant] will kill the one who doesn't, if he wants, and take away his property.

And just as he did before (486b-c), Callicles warns Socrates of what is at stake.

Socrates responds to Callicles' warning with an understandable impatience; not only did Callicles warn Socrates earlier, but Socrates has just rejected the warning at some length. Yes, says Socrates, I know; you and Polus, and just about everyone else in the city, have often said so. But he would be a base (πονηρός) man killing one who is καλὸς κάγαθός in fact. And isn't this just the thing that rubs you *raw*? Callicles fumes (Οὔκουν τοῦτο δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀγανακτητόν; 511b6).⁴³³

And there it is again, the point that always makes Callicles protest that Socrates' arguments are not just out of place, ἄτοπος, but upside-down. Callicles can go no further with Socrates' argument because he is infuriated at the idea that he must accept the risk of losing his position in the city and perhaps even his life to the injustice of base and lying men. Callicles is so infuriated that he is even willing to bluntly confirm, in response to Socrates' next question, that yes, he thinks a man should attempt to live as long as possible, practicing the crafts that save him from danger—such as the rhetoric that can save men like Socrates in the court system (511b7-c2). It is as though an Achilles, infuriated at the political power of his

⁴³³ Socrates uses the verb ἀγανακτέω against Callicles at 522d7; see discussion in section D.9.

inferiors to take away his rights, decided to protect his life and wealth through politics instead of risking his life for κλέος.⁴³⁴

But as we know from Plato's *Apology*, Socrates is the real Achilles. In his final speech before the Athenian court that would put him to death, Socrates there describes Achilles as one who made light of death and danger, being more afraid of an ignoble life and of failing to avenge his friends—especially Patroclus. Like him, Socrates continued to take risks, questioning the citizens of Athens despite the danger he faced.⁴³⁵ Now in the *Gorgias*, Socrates attempts to induce Callicles to adopt a similarly heroic perspective.⁴³⁶ He describes other crafts that can protect men from death as not being particularly noble or impressive, concluding with the example of military machine-making—an artisanal, banausic activity that Socrates knows an aristocrat like Callicles would consider beneath him.⁴³⁷ As Socrates says, Callicles considers the machine-maker the inferior of the court advocate (512b7), and would never marry into his family (512c6-7). Surely, he tells Callicles, a real man should not be concerned about living a long life, but about living in the best way (512d7-e5). And attempting to protect himself by pursuing the favor of the

⁴³⁴ Recall that Callicles quoted Phoinix, Achilles' tutor, above at 485d3-e2 (see discussion in section D.3).

⁴³⁵ *Apol.* 28c-d. Socrates is not praising Achilles' desire for vengeance, but rather his desire to do what he thought right even in the face of death. Note that in the *Symposium*, Socrates' friend Phaedrus describes Achilles as acting out of the love for his friend Patroclus—a sentiment Socrates could be said to share. *Symposium* 180a-b.

⁴³⁶ Dodds notes that a gentleman does not value life purchased at the price of self-respect; though it is not entirely clear whether Dodds is talking about Athenian or English gentlemen, the Homeric principle embodied in Achilles' choice of honor and fame rather than life with dishonor would have been familiar to any Athenian. Dover 1974, 226-42; Dodds 1959, 346 ad *Gorgias* 511a4-513c3.

⁴³⁷ See discussion of banausic labor in Chapter 3 (Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*), B.4.

Athenian δῆμος, Socrates warns, will only make him like the δῆμος—the mob that Callicles despises, even as he courts it.

Callicles responds to Socrates' call to value mere life less than what is noble and good (τὸ γενναῖον καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, 512d7) with perplexity, in the closest approach to real agreement he has given Socrates:

Οὐκ οἶδ' ὄντινά μοι τρόπον δοκεῖς εὖ λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πέπονθα δὲ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν πάθος· οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθομαι (513c4-6).

I do not know exactly how you are seeming to me to speak well, Socrates, but I feel what many feel: I am not entirely persuaded by you.

Socrates responds that Callicles is resisting Socrates due to the love of the δῆμος in his soul, and that he will be persuaded if they “**consider** these same issues **in different ways** often and better” (ἀλλ’ ἐὰν πολλάκις [ἴσως] καὶ βέλτιον ταῦτά ταῦτα **διασκοπώμεθα**, 513c7-d1). It is not the logic of Socrates' arguments that causes Callicles problems, but rather the disharmony in his own soul that Socrates noted at the beginning of their conversation.⁴³⁸ Callicles has an erotic longing to be securely accepted by the δῆμος and free of his fear of being cast out of any position in the city,⁴³⁹ and a corresponding anger at the δῆμος for its injustice to men like Callicles and Socrates. Yet at the same time, he longs to be one of the “better” men, a concept he cannot define but, under pressure from Socrates, admits has something to do with qualities like wisdom and courage and something other than the mere desire to preserve life at all costs. He therefore cannot refute Socrates' assertion that it is better to suffer injustice than to do it. And the cure for this disharmony is not simply more logic, but for Callicles and Socrates together to consider these questions again

⁴³⁸ See discussion in section D.1.

⁴³⁹ See Austin 2013, 41-2 (pointing out how Callicles' desire for security conflicts with his desire for exceptionality, and emphasizing the importance of Callicles' concession at 513c4-6).

in different ways, from different perspectives, διασκοπέω. At the end of their conversation, Socrates will attempt to give Callicles just such a different perspective, in his account of the court of the afterlife.

D.8. Socrates on the relationship between farming and rhetoric

In his “speech of Amphion,” Socrates had asserted that the most important help for a man to be able to give himself or his friends is the ability to protect the soul in its possession of justice and temperance by avoiding wrongdoing, or failing that, by seeking to be restrained (κολάζεσθαι, 507d3).⁴⁴⁰ He now returns to that point by arguing that the blessed and happy man is one who pursues temperance both for himself and for all that are his, including his city. To do this for a city requires practices that aim at what is best for the citizens rather than merely at pleasing and flattering them (513d1-514a3). But Callicles’ fear and anger over the threat of injustice from the δῆμος was too great for him to be able to listen to this argument. Socrates now tries a slightly different perspective—something more farming oriented (more Zethian, we might say) and something that takes account of Callicles’ fears.

Socrates considers the great politicians of the past, like Pericles and Themistocles, who Callicles had earlier (503c1-3) argued did benefit the citizens. But, says Socrates, these statesmen must have made the citizens worse—because all of these supposedly good statesmen wound up being attacked by their own citizens, who ostracized them or exiled them or threatened them with death (516a, 516d-e). If the care given by a keeper of donkeys or horses or cattle makes them more likely to kick, butt, and bite, Socrates argues, then isn’t he a bad keeper?

ὄνων γοῦν ἂν ἐπιμελητῆς καὶ ἵππων καὶ βοῶν τοιοῦτος ὢν κακὸς ἂν ἐδόκει
εἶναι, εἰ παραλαβὼν μὴ λακτίζοντας ἑαυτὸν μηδὲ κυρίττοντας μηδὲ
δάκνοντας ἀπέδειξε ταῦτα ἅπαντα ποιοῦντας δι’ ἀγριότητα. (516a5-8).

⁴⁴⁰ See discussion in section D.6.

And so such a man, if a caretaker of asses and horses and cattle, would seem a bad one, if he got them not kicking or butting or biting him and then produced them doing all these things because of their wildness.

Similarly, says Socrates, a politician who makes citizens more wild and uncultivated is a bad statesman. If a good charioteer is going to be thrown by his horses, says Socrates, it will not be *after* he has trained and raced them (516e3-7).⁴⁴¹ Socrates grants that these politicians were good servants of the city, who ably provided city walls, dockyards, and other instruments of Athenian power (517b2-c4). But compared to the value of the immortal soul, Socrates sees little value in all of this; these politicians were merely filling the city with rubbish so that it swells and festers (519a3). And in the crisis of the disease, Socrates warns, they will attack their advisors—perhaps even Alcibiades and Callicles himself, if they are not careful, even if they are not wholly responsible for the city’s problems (519a7-b2).⁴⁴²

Socrates’ animal training metaphor thus has returned us to the earlier motif of the farmer (Gorgias) and his untamed colt (Polus), as well as to Callicles’ opening celebration of the “natural man” who throws off the shackles of convention in order to do as he wills, like the wild lion—an image that also recalled Alcibiades

⁴⁴¹ As Dodds points out, the comparison of a good ruler to a herder (“shepherd of the people”) is as old as Homer. He says that this particular use, where the ruler is the trainer, seems “particularly Socratic.” He collects other uses, including *Oec.* 3.11 (see discussion in Chapter 3). Dodds 1959, 358 ad *Gorgias* 516a5.

⁴⁴² Socrates himself was often criticized on the grounds that some of his students later behaved badly (with one of the leading examples being Alcibiades). Plato’s argument here suggests that it was the teachings of men like Gorgias that did the damage, and not those of Socrates. Note that Socrates is (again) turning Callicles’ words (486a7) back on him, suggesting that Callicles too might be subject to attack by the citizenry. Dodds 1959, 365 ad *Gorgias* 519a7-8.

(483e6).⁴⁴³ Socrates' point is that politicians who do not try to inculcate temperance are not only like the bad farmers who make their animals worse, but they are likely themselves to lose the very security for which Callicles so longs. Socrates' critique of Callicles is thus in large part that Callicles omitted that part of Zethus' advice to Amphion that included farming, part of which was "caring for flocks" (E. *Ant.* Fr. 188.4).⁴⁴⁴ Socrates adds this discourse back in, arguing that true rhetoric (517a5) would make citizens better rather than worse, just as good farming cares for cattle or sheep or horses.⁴⁴⁵

D.9. *Callicles' fear: his third and last warning, and the end of the discussion*

Throughout Socrates' comparison of politics and animal training, Callicles has given Socrates formal assents that kept the conversation going. But now Socrates presses him for a frank response to the argument that a politician should inculcate temperance in the citizens rather than serve and flatter them. Callicles' response shows that he is still afraid, and that Socrates' more Zethian argument has had no effect. Yes, he answers Socrates, you should serve the city—call it flattery if you must (521a8-b3). And once again, for the third and final time, he starts to remind Socrates of what could happen to him if he refuses to flatter the city—only to be interrupted by Socrates, who doesn't need to hear *again* that some base man could kill him or take what he has. Socrates is well aware of the risk his sort of political involvement poses.

Οἶμαι μετ' ὀλίγων Ἀθηναίων, ἵνα μὴ εἶπω μόνος, ἐπιχειρεῖν τῇ ὥς ἀληθῶς
πολιτικῇ τέχνῃ καὶ πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ μόνος τῶν νῦν· ἅτε οὖν οὐ πρὸς
χάριν λέγων τοὺς λόγους οὓς λέγω ἐκάστοτε, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον, οὐ

⁴⁴³ Dodds 1959, 358 ad *Gorgias* 516a5.

⁴⁴⁴ See discussion in section D.3.

⁴⁴⁵ For a discussion of how the *Phaedrus* also associates farming and rhetoric, see section F.3.

πρὸς τὸ ἡδιστον, καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων ποιεῖν ἃ σὺ παραινεῖς, τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα, οὐχ ἔξω ὅτι λέγω ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ. (521d6-e2)

I think that I am among the few Athenians, not to say the only one, to attempt the political art in truth and to practice politics—though the only one of people now; making the arguments I make each time not with the aim of gaining favor, but with the aim of the most excellent and not the most pleasant. And not being willing to make “these refined sayings” that you advise, I will not know how to speak in court.

Thus, says Socrates, in court he would be judged the way a jury of children would judge a doctor who was accused of ruining the children by cutting and burning, giving them bitter medicine and making them confused (ἀπορεῖν, 522b7) (521e3-522c2). He wouldn’t be able to defend himself; “and it would be nothing out of place if I should be put to death,” he says (καὶ οὐδέν γε ἄτοπον εἰ ἀποθάνοιμι, 521d3).⁴⁴⁶

As we have seen, Callicles’ warnings that Socrates could be stripped of his civic rights or even killed if he continues to philosophize and refuses to flatter the city, punctuate this second, Calliclean, half of the *Gorgias*. Callicles gave his first warning near the beginning of his conversation with Socrates;⁴⁴⁷ he gave the second warning when he reentered the conversation;⁴⁴⁸ and now he gives the third and last here, where his conversation with Socrates will end. Callicles has associated his fear

⁴⁴⁶ Note that when Socrates says that he is not willing to make “these refined arguments” (τὰ κομψὰ ταῦτα) that Callicles advises, he is quoting Callicles’ quotation of Zethus at 486c6. There Callicles had advised Socrates to leave the refined arguments to others—meaning the subtle and impractical arguments of philosophy. Socrates now makes “these refined arguments” a marker of Gorgianic rhetoric, which he has argued is impractical in the sphere that matters most—care for the soul.

⁴⁴⁷ See discussion in section D.3.

⁴⁴⁸ See discussion in section D.7.

of being attacked by the δῆμος with Socrates' inversion of conventional argument, his strangeness and his seeming "out of place," his ἀτοπία.⁴⁴⁹ The city also fears Socrates' strange out-of-placeness on the philosophic fringes, as Socrates knows; once again, he describes what might happen at his trial, saying again that he might be accused of corrupting the young by making them intellectually disoriented, "at a loss for how to proceed" (ἀπορεῖν, 522b7). And indeed, corrupting the young will be one of the accusations levied against Socrates at his trial.⁴⁵⁰

A still incredulous Callicles asks: And does that seem to you, Socrates, that a man is doing well in the city if he is in such a state and unable to help himself? (522c4-6). Yes, says Socrates (again)—if he had the most important form of self-defense, that of being able to show he had never done injustice. And referring back to Callicles' earlier remarks about being "rubbed raw" at the injustice of the δῆμος (511b6),⁴⁵¹ Socrates adds: "and if I should be put to death on account of lacking *this* ability, then I would be rubbed raw (ἀγανακτοῖν, 522d7)."

Like Euripides' Amphion in his debate with Zethus, Socrates maintains that the quiet intellectual is actually the better citizen.⁴⁵² But unlike Amphion, Socrates also understands the importance of a more Zethus-like role for a true rhetoric that would cultivate the citizenry just as a farmer cares for and domesticates his flocks. And unlike Amphion, Socrates never abandons the philosophical perspective.⁴⁵³ Where Amphion pursues a revenge whose destructive effects have to be set right by Hermes' orders that Amphion turn his poetry towards building the walls of Thebes, Socrates utterly rejects the importance of walls and dockyards and the other instruments of Athenian power, insisting instead on the importance of philosophically nurturing the citizen's souls. But Socrates is unable to shift Callicles

⁴⁴⁹ For more on ἀτοπία, see discussion in section F.

⁴⁵⁰ See *Apology* 23d.

⁴⁵¹ See discussion in section D.7.

⁴⁵² Cf. Amphion's argument as discussed in Chapter 1, section B.2. See Trivigno 2009, 83, 90-1; Nightingale 1995, 78-9.

⁴⁵³ Nightingale eloquently makes this point. Nightingale 1995, 90-2.

from his overmastering fear of suffering injustice at the hands of the δῆμος and the consuming indignation that results from that fear. His “speech of Amphion,” praising the cosmic order that should be reflected within the soul, did not work; nor did his more Zethian arguments about the benefits of a domesticated citizenry. Socrates and Callicles are at an impasse, and can go no further in their discussion.

E. *The above-beyond perspective of the underworld*

Socrates and Callicles are unable to move any further forward in their argument. In his “speech of Amphion,” Socrates attempted to give him a different perspective, one that focused not on position within the city or worldly affairs, but on a cosmic order of friendship, temperance, and justice that should be reflected in the soul—a perspective that looked above or beyond earthly affairs much as Amphion sang of Aether and Gaia and investigated the cosmic order.⁴⁵⁴ Callicles thought Socrates’ arguments that doing injustice was worse than suffering it were “upside down,” but he was sufficiently attracted by Socrates’ arguments that what is noble and good is worth more than mere life to say that Socrates seemed to speak well—even though he was not quite persuaded.⁴⁵⁵ But in the end, Callicles could not release his fear and his anger over the threat of being dragged into court and stripped of his position in the city—and perhaps even his life—by an unjust δῆμος that could reject him on a whim.

Callicles thus resembles Zethus at the end of *Antiope* once he and his brother Amphion had taken their furious revenge on Dirce. Unable to stop the cycle of vengeance, they were faced with their own death and were saved only by the sudden intervention of Hermes as *deus ex machina*, who restored a form of order by having them work together to build the walls of Thebes. But as we saw, there were clues in Hermes’ prophecies that signaled this order would be unstable, and that the ultimate ending for the brothers would not be happy. Socrates will now attempt, like

⁴⁵⁴ See discussion in section D.6 and (for Amphion) in Chapter 1, section B.2..

⁴⁵⁵ See discussion in section D.7.

a Hermes making a last-minute appearance, to impose closure on the dialogue.⁴⁵⁶ If he is so trapped by his fear of being unjustly dragged into court and by his resulting anger that he cannot lift his eyes to a cosmic perspective, then perhaps a different above-beyond perspective will work: an eschatological perspective that considers the fate of the soul as it faces judgment in the underworld.⁴⁵⁷ But we sense that this ending as well will not be a happy one for all of its participants.

Socrates offers Callicles what he says he believes is a true account (λόγος)—not a myth (μῦθος) (523a1-2)—of how it is that the ultimate evil is for the soul to be burdened by injustice when it arrives in Hades.⁴⁵⁸ Callicles does not seem to be eager to hear the account, but he says that Socrates might as well go ahead, as he has finished everything else. Callicles will not speak again in the dialogue.

Socrates describes how the souls are judged after death stripped of the ornament of physical beauty, family status, and wealth by judges who are similarly dead and naked, so that soul observes (θεωρέω, 523e4) soul, with the just being sent to the Isles of the Blessed, and the unjust to Tartarus for punishment. These judges are sons of Zeus, two from Asia (Minos and Rhadamanthys), and one from

⁴⁵⁶ See Trivigno 2009, 85; Nightingale 1995, 85-7. Both argue that Hermes in *Antiope* vindicates Amphion's intellectual life; I argue that Plato is well aware that the status of Euripides' Amphion is complicated by the problems of anger and vengeance.

⁴⁵⁷ Cf. Austin 2013, 47-51 (arguing that Socrates ends with a myth about the afterlife to respond to what she sees as Callicles' primary motivation, a fear of death).

⁴⁵⁸ Socrates can fairly call his account of the underworld a λόγος in the sense that his description of the punishment of vicious souls is consistent with his arguments earlier in the dialogue: that vice itself hurts the soul, and that the soul who is willing to submit to correction for vice can still become happy and healthy. As Socrates notes near the end, only his account is stable; his interlocutors have not been able to show that any other life is better (527b2-c4). Rowe 2012, 192-8 (though Rowe also argues that by "punishment" Socrates means only dialectical correction, as at 505c3-4).

Europe (Aeacus); Rhadamanthys judges those from Asia, Aeacus those from Europe, and Minos makes the final judgment if necessary (523a1-524a1). The judges give their judgment in a meadow from which two roads depart:

... δικάσουσιν ἐν τῷ λειμῶνι ἐν τῇ τριόδῳ ἐξ ἧς φέρετον τὼ ὁδῶ, ἡ μὲν εἰς μακάρων νήσους, ἡ δ' εἰς Τάρταρον. (524a2-4).

... they will judge in the meadow at the meeting of three roads from which two roads bear, the one into the Islands of the Blessed, the other into Tartarus.

Notably, this is the most specific description of place given in the *Gorgias*.

Socrates then tells Callicles that he infers from this account that the soul is marked by its behavior in life, so that once stripped of its body, the judges can correctly assess where it should go. Those who are sent to punishment mostly become better; but those who have committed the ultimate injustices and are incurable, those such as Tantalos, Sisyphus, and Tityus, are hung up there in the prison of Hades as examples for others (525b1-e2). But good men, a group that includes particularly philosophers who have minded their own concerns and did not meddle in public affairs (φιλοσόφου τὰ αὐτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος, 526c2-3), are sent to the Isles of the Blessed.⁴⁵⁹

Being persuaded that these accounts are true, Socrates tells Callicles, he considers how best he can present a healthy soul to the judges, and he dismisses the honors (τὰς τιμὰς, 526d5) given by many. But he warns Callicles that for him, it will be more dangerous.

Καὶ ὀνειδίζω σοι ὅτι οὐχ οἷος τ' ἔση σαυτῷ βοηθῆσαι, ὅταν ἡ δίκη σοι ᾗ καὶ ἡ κρίσις ᾗ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ἀλλὰ ἐλθὼν παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν ἐκείνον, τὸν τῆς

⁴⁵⁹ Note that in Phaedrus' account, Achilles is sent to the Isles of the Blessed. Pl.

Symp. 180b5.

Αίγινης ὑόν, ἐπειδάν σου ἐπιλαβόμενος ἐκεῖνος ἄγη, χασμήσῃ καὶ
ἱλιγγιάσεις οὐδὲν ἥττον ἢ ἐγὼ ἐνθάδε σὺ ἐκεῖ, καὶ σε ἴσως τυπτήσῃ τις
 [καὶ] ἐπὶ κόρρης ἀτίμως καὶ πάντως προπηλακιεῖ. (526e4-527a4).

And I throw the reproach on you that you will not be able to help yourself whenever the case is against you and the judgment that I was describing just now, but coming before that judge, the son of Aigina, when having seized you he hauls you into court, you will gape and **be dizzy** there no less than I here, and probably someone will box you dishonorably on the ear and completely spatter you with mud.

Therefore, says Socrates, this account alone is stable, that they must beware of being unjust rather than suffering injustice, and as a second best to being just, they must be justly punished, avoiding flattery, and this is how they should use rhetoric and all other activities—always towards what is just (527b2-c4).⁴⁶⁰

Socrates closes with a plea for Callicles to join him in the place where he will be happy:

Ἐμοὶ οὖν πειθόμενος ἀκολούθησον ἐνταῦθα, οἱ ἀφικόμενος εὐδαιμονήσεις καὶ ζῶν καὶ τελευτήσας, ὥς ὁ λόγος σημαίνει. (527c5-6)

And so being persuaded by me, follow me to that place where, once you have come you will be happy both living and dying, as the account shows.

Let someone consider you foolish and spatter you with mud, Socrates urges, and even strike that citizenship-negating (ἄτιμος) blow; if you are in reality a fine and

⁴⁶⁰ Note that I have translated ἀτίμως as “dishonorably” rather than something like “as if without citizen rights.” As noted above in section D.4, the word ἄτιμος can also be used in a more general and less legal sense; given that Socrates is talking about Hades and not Athens, the more general sense seemed appropriate.

good man (καλὸς κάγαθός), then you will suffer nothing terrible (527c7-d2). And then, says Socrates, once they have practiced these things together, perhaps they could try politics or some other deliberations. But as it is, it is shameful for them to swagger brashly (νεανιεύεσθαι) when their opinions are constantly changing about the most important things; they should follow Socrates' account, and not that which Callicles urges—"for it is worth nothing, Callicles" (ἔστι γὰρ οὐδενὸς ἄξιον, ὦ Καλλίκλεις). And here the dialogue ends.

Socrates' account of the underworld is Plato's final counterpoint to Euripides' *Antiope*.⁴⁶¹ In *Antiope*, Hermes suddenly appeared to save the brothers, Amphion and Zethus, from the otherwise inevitable violence that would have followed their bloody vengeance on Dirce; he restored order by sending the brothers to Thebes. This was not the same order that had existed earlier in the play, when the brothers lived on the frontiers of Attica, debating the merits of his philosophical poetry versus farming and political activity. In Thebes, they would rule, build city walls, and marry famous brides—and as the audience would have known, Amphion's bride, the daughter of Tantalos, was Niobe, whose insult to Leto would result in the death of all of her and Amphion's children. Hermes brought an end to the immediate conflict, but the order he restored was unstable and contained within it the seeds of future tragedy.

In his final account of the underworld, Socrates acts as a sort of Hermes (whose roles included conducting souls to the underworld) to bring an end to the unresolved argument between him and Callicles. Like Hermes' speech, Socrates' account has something of the forced air of a *deus ex machina*. Callicles' anger and fear were too great to permit him to respond to the cosmic perspective of Socrates' "speech of Amphion"; it seems unlikely that he will respond to the eschatological perspective of Socrates' underworld. Just as in *Antiope*, the figure of Tantalos marks the potential for future disaster—although in Socrates' underworld, that disaster threatens only those who refuse to pursue justice and accept correction for their injustice.

⁴⁶¹ As Trivigno and Nightingale argue. Trivigno 2009, 85; Nightingale 1995, 73.

In Socrates' account, there is no tragedy in being hauled before an unjust earthly court—provided that one is a just and good man. Even being unjust and being condemned by the court of the underworld does not lead to disaster if the unjust man accepts punishment and becomes better. The only fate truly to be feared is that of being an incurable sinner, like one of the famous sinners “hung up” in Hades as examples: Sisyphus, Tityus ... or Tantalos.⁴⁶² Callicles, who constantly balks in his discussion with Socrates and who resists “being restrained,” is risking this fate, as do all those who follow the doctrines he has been incoherently preaching.

Euripides' *Antiope* suggested that the brothers, sons of a bestial Zeus, were tragically trapped in an inherited cycle of Theban violence that ultimately they could not escape.⁴⁶³ But in the *Gorgias*, a man's life depends not on fate or the gods, but on his own choice. Even Callicles can be happy, if he can give up his anger and fear and see things the way Socrates sees them. The *Gorgias* thus rejects the tragic worldview of Euripides' play.⁴⁶⁴ But Plato's Socrates does not underestimate the difficulty of a change in perspective.⁴⁶⁵ Although Callicles' arguments about morality as a mere

⁴⁶² Tantalos also makes a significant appearance at the end of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, discussed in Chapter 3, section B.10.

⁴⁶³ See discussion in Chapter 1, section C.

⁴⁶⁴ Nightingale also argues that Plato is rejecting Euripides' tragic worldview, but she sees Plato's adaptation of *Antiope* as a parody that mocks nonphilosophers as silly (e.g., Callicles' portrayal at 527a). However, she also thinks that Plato follows the ending of *Antiope*, which in her view is a straightforward reaffirmation of the value of Amphion's poetry. Nightingale 1995, 87-92.

⁴⁶⁵ Trivigno argues that Plato does engage with Euripides' tragic worldview, which he defines as the view that there are obstacles to the best life that can be surmounted only by the divine intervention of a god like Hermes. Trivigno 2009, 93. See also Arieti 1993, 201 (observing that in ordinary life, there is no such divine intervention). Trivigno appears to see these obstacles in *Antiope* as being specifically the ability of the intellectual life to be valued over the practical life. In his reading, for Plato the obstacles are the obstinate resistance of human nature to

construct and pleasure as the highest good are poorly thought out and easy for Socrates to refute by appealing to Callicles' deeper intuitions about what is noble and good,⁴⁶⁶ Callicles' underlying fear of being treated unjustly and his anger over that injustice are, in their way, understandable. Socrates cannot refute this fear and anger; he can only try to get Callicles to look at things in a different way, to look at life from the perspective of the ordered nature of the cosmos—or at least from the perspective of life after death in the underworld. From that perspective, what is important is the “place of happiness” (527c5-6) for the soul, which might even be called the “Islands of the Blessed,” and not life and position in Athens.⁴⁶⁷

F. Being ἄτοπος: the philosopher's Amphionic perspective

The theme of disorientation runs throughout the *Gorgias*, of being dizzy, out of place, or cast out of one's place. The theme starts with the setting of the dialogue, which begins in a setting never quite clear, in front of an audience never quite heard. The setting is almost literally a strange not-place, ἄτοπος.⁴⁶⁸ At the beginning of the dialogue, the two primary interlocutors—Socrates and Callicles—cannot even agree

reason and—above all—the imperfection of human reason itself. In his view, Socrates somehow simply transcends these tragic obstacles. Trivigno 2009, 93-7, 99.

⁴⁶⁶ A number of scholars stress that Socrates is relying less on logic in the *Gorgias*, and more on bringing to light moral intuitions that his interlocutors have had all along. See, e.g., Pangle 2014, 49 (focusing on Polus); Stauffer 2006, especially 115-122 (focusing on Callicles); McKim 1988, 34-5, 40, 46.

⁴⁶⁷ Dodds puts it well when he remarks that for Plato, “morals can be securely based only on a certain insight into the nature of the world and man's place in it, which enables a man to see what his true ‘interest’ is; and this insight can be attained only by an adjustment of the entire personality.” Dodds 1959, 218 ad *Gorgias* 460a5-6.

⁴⁶⁸ See discussion in section B.

on whether they have arrived at a battle or a feast.⁴⁶⁹ Under pressure from Socrates' questioning, Gorgias cannot define his own subject, rhetoric; Gorgias' friend Polus says Socrates thinks he has made Gorgias at a loss for how to proceed (ἀπορέω) in the question, and demands that Socrates define it. Polus is envious of the tyrant who can kill or exile at will, with no risk of punishment, and he sees rhetoric as the tool that can help him emulate that power. Socrates grants that most Athenians would agree with Polus, but says that popular opinion is merely a false witness that Polus offers "to drive me out of my property and the truth" (472b6). But Polus rejects Socrates' claim that rhetoric is mere flattery useful for nothing except getting away with injustice, and repeatedly calls Socrates' arguments that suffering injustice is better than doing injustice strange or out-of-place, ἄτοπος (473a1, 480e1-2)—and this is the conclusion on which Polus ends his part of the discussion.⁴⁷⁰

Callicles also calls Socrates' arguments ἄτοπος. But he opens and reopens his discussion with Socrates with the even stronger statement that Socrates' arguments are "upside-down" (481c1-4, 511a4-5). As we have seen, Callicles is dominated by his fear and anger over the possibility that as an elite Athenian, he could be unjustly dragged into court and stripped of his position in the city and perhaps even his life by some member of the δῆμος, just as though he were some ἄτιμος, a man deprived of the privileges of citizenship and participation in the city's public spaces. Comparing himself to a practical Zethus, and Socrates to an impractical Amphion, repeatedly he warns Socrates of the risk that by foregoing rhetoric and politics in the "center spaces" of the city, Socrates will "be dizzy and gape" in court, too

⁴⁶⁹ See discussion in section B.

⁴⁷⁰ See discussion in section C. Note that Turner argues that what motivates the transitions from one interlocutor to another in the *Gorgias* is the ἄτοπος nature of Socrates' arguments; Polus jumps in when Socrates claims that the arguments lead to the conclusion that the rhetorician cannot use his rhetoric unjustly (although there is no use of the term ἄτοπος), and Callicles jumps in after Polus has proclaimed Socrates' arguments ἄτοπος. Turner 1993, 71.

disoriented to be able to defend himself.⁴⁷¹ Socrates acknowledges that this might be true, but portrays his being disoriented in the city court as unimportant. He attempts twice to change Callicles' perspective from his focus on his position in the city to something more elevated. First, in the "speech of Amphion," he describes how heaven and earth were held together in a cosmic order (κόσμος) by the principles of community, friendship, orderliness, temperance, and justice.⁴⁷² When Socrates' cosmic Amphionic speech fails to conquer Callicles' focus on self-defense in an Athenian court,⁴⁷³ Socrates gives Callicles a final account of the soul's being judged after death in the meadow court of the three ways, where it is Callicles who will be dizzy and disoriented, and unable to defend himself.⁴⁷⁴

Thus we can see that although both Socrates and his interlocutors are concerned about disorientation and about losing their position, it means something quite different for each. For Polus and for Callicles in particular, the concern is over their position within the city and its worldly affairs; thus Callicles warns Socrates he

⁴⁷¹ Schlosser also connects Socrates' ἀτοπία to the idea of space, and argues that Socrates' ἀτοπία, his strangeness or out-of-placeness, is connected to his avoiding the spaces of conventional political participation—e.g., the Assembly, where the δῆμος meets as a whole—in favor of the spaces of individual political and philosophical discussion, e.g., the marketplace, gymnasia, private houses. Schlosser 2014, 12, 152-3. His focus is on the way in which Socrates' ἀτοπία potentially reshapes the space of democratic political participation by empowering individuals to resist the manipulation of professional politicians such as those represented in the *Gorgias*. Schlosser 2014, 97, 145-7. But although Socrates at the very end of the *Gorgias* does tell Callicles that once they become better informed they might consider politics or deliberations (see discussion in section E), the prerequisite is first realizing that the soul's true place is not in the material and political world at all, and that is the focus of their conversation.

⁴⁷² See discussion in section D.6.

⁴⁷³ See discussion in D.7.

⁴⁷⁴ See discussion in E.

will be “dizzy” in a city court, and both Polus and Callicles consider Socrates ἄτοπος in the sense of “strange” or “unconventional” (i.e., “out of place in Athenian thought”)—all common meanings for ἄτοπος.⁴⁷⁵ Socrates accepts this criticism, but regards the philosopher’s disorientation within the city as unimportant; for him, the important orientation is above or beyond, towards a place of truth where the soul can flourish.

F.1. *The philosopher’s ἀτοπία in the city*

Of course, Socrates is famous for creating the sense of intellectual disorientation known as ἀπορία—that sense of being literally “without a way out” in an argument,⁴⁷⁶ a state of perplexity that reveals to the thinker that he is in a state of ignorance—a state that often distresses Socrates’ interlocutors.⁴⁷⁷ Thus in the *Gorgias*, as we saw, Gorgias’ friend Polus accuses Socrates of thinking he has made Gorgias at a loss for how to proceed (ἀπορέω) in defining rhetoric (as indeed Socrates surely does). Similarly, Socrates acknowledged that at a trial he might be accused of corrupting the young by making them intellectually disoriented, “at a loss for how to proceed” (ἀπορεῖν, 522b7)—as in fact he was.⁴⁷⁸ Callicles in particular appears to be in ἀπορία towards the end of his conversation with Socrates, when he begins to balk at continuing the conversation and even claims not to understand what Socrates is saying.

This sense of intellectual disorientation is related to Socratic arguments that seemed ἄτοπος (as Polus and Callicles said)—or even “upside down,” as Callicles

⁴⁷⁵ Eide 1996, 59-60; Turner 1993, 73; Arnott 1964, 119-121. Arnott points out that in the later usage of the κοινή, the word was a strictly pejorative synonym for words like κακός. Arnott 1964, 121-2.

⁴⁷⁶ Miller describes ἀπορία as the state of having no πόρος “between the topoi that constitute Athenian life.” Miller 2015, 320 n. 10.

⁴⁷⁷ E.g., *Meno* 80a-b.

⁴⁷⁸ See discussion in D.9.

repeatedly said. It is a term especially applicable to Socrates and his arguments,⁴⁷⁹ and is a part of his reputation—as Socrates himself is well aware, asking in the *Theaetetus* whether his friend has heard that “I am **very out of place** and I make men at a loss for how to proceed” (ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν, 149a8-10ish).⁴⁸⁰

⁴⁷⁹ Hadot 1995, 158. In Plato’s *Symposium* (215a2, 221d2) Alcibiades uses ἀτοπία to characterize Socrates; Eide argues that Socrates’ strange behavior (ἀτοπία) causes Alcibiades’ bewilderment (ἀπορία), and that for Alcibiades Socrates’ ἀτοπία lies in the apparent contrast between Socrates’ sexual rejection of him and Socrates’ having rescued him on the battlefield. Eide 1996, 64-6. Note that most of the uses in the *Gorgias* (including the first and last use) refer to Socrates or his arguments: 465e2 (Socrates acknowledges that his speaking at length after asking for short speeches may be ἄτοπος); 473a1 (Polus calls Socrates’ argument that a wicked man is less unhappy if punished ἄτοπος); 480e1 (Polus says that Socrates’ arguments seem ἄτοπος); 481e7 (Socrates comments on the possibility that Callicles makes ἄτοπος arguments when trying to please the δῆμος); 493c4 (Socrates acknowledges to Callicles that the image of the leaky jars may seem ἄτοπος); 494d1 (Callicles calls Socrates ἄτοπος and a mob-orator for suggesting that Callicles’ argument that happiness consists of fulfilling intense desires would apply to scratching an itch); 519c4 (Socrates tells Callicles that the sophists do something ἄτοπος when they claim to teach virtue yet accuse their pupils of mistreating them); 519d5 (Socrates repeats that these sophistic arguments seem ἄτοπος); 521d3 (Socrates acknowledges that it would not be ἄτοπος if he were to die because of the accusations of some wretched man). Turner 1993, 77 n. 15 (verified by my Perseus search).

⁴⁸⁰ Eide 1996, 63 (with additional examples of Plato’s connecting ἀπορία and ἀτοπία). See also Miller 2015, 319-20 (the corollary of Socratic ἀτοπία is the ability to provoke ἀπορία). Nightingale also notes that ἀτοπία and ἀπορία are characteristic of the Socratic philosopher; although she does not examine the term ἀτοπία in any detail, she associates it with the “philosophic *theoros* who detaches

Although Socrates in the *Gorgias* does not acknowledge his reputation for ἀτοπία as bluntly as he does in the *Theaetetus*, he does not quarrel with Polus' and Callicles' description of his arguments as ἄτοπος or upside down, or with his being “dizzy” in the political atmosphere of an Athenian court. But he is not concerned with being intellectually out of place in the city's usual way of thinking, or with the risk that this poses (as Callicles keeps reminding him) to his position in the city or his life. His understanding of what is ἄτοπος in a bad way is thus different from that of Callicles and Polus; when Socrates uses the term pejoratively, it means not “unconventional,” but “illogical” or “unphilosophical,” as when he describes the sophists' arguments as ἄτοπος when they claim to teach virtue yet accuse their students of unvirtuously mistreating them (519c4, 519d5).⁴⁸¹ Similarly, in his account of the underworld he will warn Callicles that Callicles is the one who will be “dizzy,” disoriented and out of place when trying to defend his own soul in the court of the underworld—a dizziness that flows largely from Callicles' inability to be intellectually consistent.⁴⁸²

There is a similarly positive portrayal of Socratic ἀτοπία in the city and its environs as the philosopher's natural state in the *Phaedrus*, Plato's other great dialogue on rhetoric.⁴⁸³ In the first part of the *Phaedrus*, the young Phaedrus enthuses to Socrates about a speech on love written by the orator Lysias—a speech urging the merits of the lover who is not really in love. Socrates criticizes the speech, and offers his own version—only to recant in a “palinode” that praises love and the winged soul that travels upwards towards the Forms. In the second part, Socrates

himself from the social world and ‘journeys’ to see the divine Forms.” Nightingale 2004, 36, 105-7.

⁴⁸¹ Turner 1993, 73-4 (arguing that for Socrates, true ἀτοπία is acknowledgment of the gap between word and deed).

⁴⁸² See discussion in section E.

⁴⁸³ The *Phaedrus* is later than the *Gorgias*, placed by most scholars late in Plato's middle period (i.e., c. 360 BCE). Yunis 2011, 23-24; Guthrie 1962-1975, 4: 396.

and Phaedrus discuss rhetoric more generally, with Socrates giving a positive vision of rhetoric as properly subordinate to philosophy.⁴⁸⁴

The dialogue opens with a question about locations: Socrates asks Phaedrus “where do you come from, and where are you going?” (ποῖ δὴ καὶ πόθεν; 227a1), initiating one of the dialogue’s key themes, the journey of the soul (metaphorically) upwards towards the heavenly Forms (further explored in next section).⁴⁸⁵

Phaedrus responds that he is planning a walk outside the city wall, and invites Socrates to join him. He and Socrates wind up wading the Ilissus river, said to be not far from the scene of Boreas’ abduction of Oreithyia.⁴⁸⁶ In discussing the truthfulness of this myth, Socrates twice uses ἄτοπος and the related ἀτοπία: once when noting that it would not be “out of place” (ἄτοπος) for him to disbelieve the story, as clever people have been able to rationalize it, and again when explaining that this sort of rationalization is a waste of time, as it would require him to explain a whole host of monsters and “outlandishnesses that consist of assorted fantastic creatures” (ἀτοπίαι τερατολόγων τινῶν φύσεων, 229e1-2).⁴⁸⁷ More important than being able to explain outlandish monsters, says Socrates, is “knowing himself” (as the Delphic oracle commands) by finding out what kind of creature he is. Specifically, says Socrates, he needs to know whether he is a “beast more tangled and inflamed than a Typhon” or something tamer and simpler, “sharing by nature in

⁴⁸⁴ See discussion in section F.3.

⁴⁸⁵ The last word of the dialogue repeats the theme: ἴωμεν. See, e.g., Werner 2012, 20; Yunis 2011, 85-6 ad *Phaedrus* 227a1; Lebeck 1972, 280-1, 284-5 (also noting Socrates’ revival of implicit metaphors in motion words).

⁴⁸⁶ Werner notes that this is an area where the Lesser Mysteries of Eleusis were performed, and that aspects of the Mysteries are thematic in the dialogue (e.g., 249c-d). Werner 2012, 22-23, 200-2; see also Yunis 2011, 91-2 ad *Phaedrus* 229c1-2; Lebeck 1972, 272-3.

⁴⁸⁷ Adapted from Yunis’ translation. Yunis 2011, 93 ad *Phaedrus* 229e1-2.

some divine and non-Typhonic (ἄτυφος)⁴⁸⁸ portion” (230a3-5). Thus, as in the *Gorgias*, Socrates is not interested in whether he is ἄτοπος, “out of place” in the world of Athenian thought; he is interested in whether he is ἄτυφος.

Socrates and Phaedrus select a shady seat on the grass underneath a plane tree resounding with cicada song (229a1-230c4)—as often noted, a paradigmatic instance of the classical *locus amoenus*.⁴⁸⁹ Although this setting is often characterized by scholars as “untouched nature,”⁴⁹⁰ it is only a short distance from the city walls and is full of images venerating the river god and the nymphs. It is distinct both from Attic farmland and from the urban scenes that are Socrates’ usual setting; this is in fact the only dialogue that Plato sets outside the city.⁴⁹¹ This may be why, when Socrates congratulates Phaedrus for having found the perfect spot, he says that Phaedrus has done an excellent job “guiding a stranger” (ἐξενάγηται, 230c4). Phaedrus responds that Socrates is “most outlandish” (using the superlative form of ἄτοπος), as Socrates’ comment suggests that he has never even been outside the city walls (230c5-d2). Socrates responds that indeed, he finds the city the best place for his philosophical work; despite his obvious delight in the beauty of the setting, he says that locales and trees (τὰ ... χωρία καὶ τὰ δένδρα) tend not to teach him anything (230d3-4). Thus even in this *locus amoenus* outside the city, Socrates is still “out of place” and unconventional.

⁴⁸⁸ There is an untranslatable pun here in ἄτυφος, which literally means “not puffed up” but also reads as “not Typhonic.”

⁴⁸⁹ Lebeck notes that the elements of heat, flowing liquid, and vegetation will repeat in the later description of the soul’s regrowth of its wings. Lebeck 1972, 280.

⁴⁹⁰ E.g., Griswold 1996, 35-6 (arguing that Socrates as a philosopher needs both nature and city, but is out of place in both); Vasaly 1993, 28.

⁴⁹¹ The space seems to be a sort of neutral zone where Socrates and Phaedrus can take a holiday in their actual and metaphorical journey from the human business of speech and thought that dominates in farmland, political space, and the space of philosophical conversation.

F.2. *The philosopher's above-beyond perspective and ἀτοπία*

In the *Gorgias*, Socrates attempted to give Callicles a different perspective, a more philosophical one removed from the focus Callicles had placed on city affairs in a desperate attempt to avoid losing his position in the city. In Socrates' spatial imagery, this perspective was a more "vertical" one that looked above or beyond Callicles' "horizontal" focus on the city's public spaces. Socrates first attempted in his "speech of Amphion" to direct Callicles' attention to the ordered cosmos; when that failed, he offered him an account of the soul's judgment in the underworld, at the meadow of the three ways.⁴⁹²

Socrates' above-beyond philosophical perspective is directly related to his being disoriented in the city and seeming ἀτοπος to men like Polus and Callicles. As he tells Callicles, in the court of the underworld it is Callicles who would be "dizzy" and unable to defend himself. Similarly, in the *Theaetetus*, Socrates will describe the philosopher as a man whose body lives in the city, but whose thought flies up to the sky; he therefore looks a fool when dealing with everyday affairs (one particular reason being that he considers tyrants nothing more than boorish herders of difficult flocks). But if a nonphilosophical man is dragged "upwards" to consider

⁴⁹² Note that Nightingale has adapted Bakhtinian theory to discuss what she calls the "eschatological chronotope" found in those Platonic dialogues that feature mythic accounts of the soul's progress in the before-and-afterlife, e.g. in the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedrus*. She makes the point that the eschatological chronotope is a way of examining and negotiating the "limits of the human" by contrasting it with the "other" associated with the *eschata*, the uttermost boundaries of human life, and she argues that Plato's eschatology shares this chronotope with the geographic and ethnographic discourse of *eschata*, in the sense of the physical boundaries of the known world. Nightingale 2002, especially 240-2. I am of the opinion that Bakhtinian theory would obscure my project more than help it, as I focus more on spatial metaphors than on temporal constructions.

philosophy, then looking down from the skies *he* will be the one who looks ridiculous.⁴⁹³

We also see a similar association between Socratic ἀτοπία and the vertical above-beyond perspective in the *Phaedrus*.⁴⁹⁴ In the great palinode of the *Phaedrus*, Socrates begins by praising the madness of the lover: great blessings come from madness (μανία), says Socrates, where it is heaven-sent (244a6). Socrates reviews the different forms of madness: prophetic, divinatory, and poetic. Socrates sets out to prove that the madness of love is a divine gift, which requires understanding the nature of the soul, which is immortal and has as its essence self-motion (245e). It would take a god to describe its nature; but says Socrates, it would be humanly possible to say what it is *like*. Therefore, that is how he will proceed.

Socrates imagines the human soul as a team of winged steeds pulling a winged charioteer. One of the horses is καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθός (246b2); the other is the opposite. The soul's wings are nourished (τρέφεται) by excellence, destroyed by evil (246e2). The proper nourishment of the immortal soul is to follow the gods upwards to observe the things "beyond the heavens" (αἱ δὲ θεωροῦσι τὰ ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, 247c2-3), that is, the Forms, the only true knowledge. Human souls strive to do this, but their mismatched horse teams make it difficult; even the best have difficulty seeing what is above. Many are lamed and have their wings broken as they strive to rise (248a1-b5).

οὗ δ' ἔνеч' ἡ πολλή σπουδὴ τὸ ἀληθείας ἰδεῖν πεδίον οὗ ἔστιν, ἢ τε δὴ

⁴⁹³ *Theaet.* 173e-175d. For this reason I disagree with those who think that Plato does not mean this as a portrayal of a real philosopher like Socrates. See, e.g. Schlosser 2014, 136-7; Nightingale 2004, at 23-4. It is a comically exaggerated portrait, true; but though Socrates does interest himself in practical affairs, the way in which he does so often strikes others as ἄτοπος.

⁴⁹⁴ Makowski 1994, esp. 135, discusses the association between Socratic ἀτοπία and the "vertical perspective" of philosophy, focusing on the *Symposium* and especially the *Phaedo*, but also mentioning the *Phaedrus* and the *Timaeus*.

προσήκουσα ψυχῆς τῷ ἀρίστῳ νομῇ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκεῖ λειμῶνος τυγχάνει οὔσα, ἢ τε τοῦ πτεροῦ φύσις, ᾧ ψυχὴ κουφίζεται, τούτῳ τρέφεται. (248b5-c2).

The reason why there is much eagerness to see where the plain of truth is, is that the appropriate pasturage for the best part of the soul is from the meadow there, and the nature of the wings with which the soul is lifted up is nourished by this.

When a soul fails to follow the gods it falls to earth and is “planted” (φυτεῦσαι) in a body whose nature depends on how much of truth the soul had managed to see while winged, ranging from the highest—a philosopher/lover/follower of the muses—to the ninth and lowest, tyrant (248d2-e3).⁴⁹⁵ Socrates describes how these souls go through their cycles of rebirth, warning that only a soul that has seen truth, “having lifted its head up into what really is” (ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸ ὄντως, 249c3) may enter again into the human form. He adds that for this reason, the philosopher’s thought alone becomes winged, because it is always next to the Forms in memory, as much as it can. A man (such as a philosopher, presumably) who properly uses these recollections of divinity, is the true initiate; but standing apart from human

⁴⁹⁵ Here statesman / household manager / moneymaker (third) outranks artisan and farmer (seventh). Plato does not accord a high status to actual farmers, classifying them with artisans, elsewhere considered practitioners of “banausic” or servile labor that makes body and soul unfit for the life of a free man. Nightingale discusses how Plato at times seems to devalue this sort of labor, while at other times describing all non-philosophical activity as “banausic” because encouraging self-interest and servility to the crowd. Nightingale 2004, 123-7. For a discussion of Xenophon’s different views on farming and banausic labor, see Chapter 3, section B.4.

concerns and being next to the divine, he is thought by many to be disturbed (παρακινέω), not realizing that he is divinely inspired (ἐνθουσιάζω, 249c3-d3).⁴⁹⁶

The association between philosophy and the vertical, above-beyond perspective is amplified in Socrates' beautiful description of the divine madness of love, in which the beauty of the beloved causes the philosophical soul to recollect the true beauty he once saw above, and to grow wings; unable to leave the ground, but gazing upwards and ignoring things below, he is (like the philosopher) regarded as mad. (249d4-252d7).⁴⁹⁷ His soul loses her concern for ordinary affairs and is distressed at being "out of place," in a strange situation (τῇ ἀτοπίᾳ, 251d7) and is at a loss in its frenzy (ἀποροῦσα λυττᾷ, 251e1), with only the sight of the beloved able to give relief. Socrates closes the palinode by concluding that if the lovers are drawn to philosophy and a well-structured (τεταγμένην) life, being self-controlled and orderly (κόσμιοι), then they live happily and become winged after death (256a6-b7).

Thus, as in the *Gorgias*, we see that Plato's Socrates in the *Phaedrus* has established a connection between philosophy and an above-beyond perspective

⁴⁹⁶ This is a version of Plato's doctrine of anamnesis. Plato's reasoning seems to be not just that human reasoning depends on the ability to categorize, but that the ability to categorize coherently depends on having seen enough of the Forms to be able to recollect them, i.e., to have stable reference points for verbal formulations and images. Plato does not seem to think that the common experiences of a discourse community could create such stable reference points. Yunis 2011, 146 ad *Phaedrus* 249c1-2.

⁴⁹⁷ Note in particular 251b2-7: as Yunis notes, the wings' growth is described in part through a botanical metaphor wherein the quills begin to grow from their roots under the influence of the irrigating stream of beauty and erotic warmth. Yunis 2011, 152-3 ad *Phaedrus* 251b1-7. See also *Phaedrus* 251e; 255c-d (though in some of these passages the images of flowing liquid and swelling wing seem related to animal sexuality more than botanic.) See the discussion in Lebeck 1972, 273-5, 278-80.

that is removed from ground-level human concerns. The embodied soul is described as “fallen” to earth; a love of the beauty that the soul sees on earth can potentially spark its recollection of the transcendental truth that it saw “above,” before embodiment, when it was winged. The *Phaedrus* also establishes a connection between philosophy and ἀτοπία. In the opening, Socrates’ being ἄτοπος was a mark of his being a philosopher—unconventional, out of place within the city and its environs—and was thus not a concern, in contrast to the important question of whether he was ἄτυφος. The ἀτοπία of the soul in love in the palinode is similarly connected to philosophy, as the soul in love is drawn away from its earthly concerns towards the beauty that it recalls. Here, however, the soul’s ἀτοπία is distressing, as its being “out of place” marks not only its separation from earthly affairs, but also its awareness of separation from the beauty that it once saw above; it can find relief only in the beloved.⁴⁹⁸

F.3. *The philosopher’s perspective and rhetorical cultivation*

Euripides’ *Antiope* contrasted the grounded perspective of the political farmer Zethus with the above-beyond perspective of the philosophic poet Amphion. The *Gorgias* similarly contrasts the grounded, city-oriented view of the rhetoricians and politicians with the above-beyond perspective of the philosopher through puns and literary references to farmers.⁴⁹⁹ It may seem strange that a dialogue in which disorientation is a theme features farming in this way—surely the most well-grounded of occupations. But as Socrates points out, these farmers of rhetoric are bad ones; they do not train and domesticate their audiences in the way that good farmers do their animals.

⁴⁹⁸ Makowski 1994, 145, 151-2 (describing the philosopher’s ἀτοπία as a tension between spatial antitheses that he can never reach: the material χώρα on the one hand, and the heavenly place of ideas on the other).

⁴⁹⁹ See sections C.2 and D.3 in particular.

Again, the *Phaedrus* provides a useful point of reference. As discussed in the previous section, the first half of the *Phaedrus* illustrates the journey of philosophy through the image of the upward-traveling winged soul.⁵⁰⁰ In its second half, the process of rhetoric (and its relationship to philosophy) is compared to the more grounded activity of farming.⁵⁰¹

The second half of the *Phaedrus* begins at about 260a, after a short interlude that includes another reference to the cicada song of the opening.⁵⁰² Socrates starts his examination of the nature of good and bad speaking and writing with the example of an orator trying to persuade someone in a subject where he has no real knowledge: horses (260b1-c3). Plato then has Socrates deploy farming imagery that is similar to we saw in the *Gorgias*, where rhetoric ought to be (but is not) a sort of (agri)culture that improves and educates its listeners,⁵⁰³ asking Phaedrus what sort of harvest rhetoric will reap if ignorant of the truth of good and bad:⁵⁰⁴

ποῖόν τινα οἶει μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν ῥητορικὴν καρπὸν ὧν ἔσπειρε θερίζειν; ΦΑΙ.

⁵⁰⁰ Werner gives a useful survey of the scholarly debate over whether or how the more technical and rhetorical second half of the dialogue is related to the more poetic and philosophical first half. Werner 2012, 236-58.

⁵⁰¹ Mentioning Plato's use of agricultural imagery in the *Phaedrus* are Werner 2012, 242-3; Freeland 2010 (focusing on image clusters of nourishment, gardening, and vision); Lebeck 1972, 287. These authors do not mention what I see as the use of farming to create a frame for the second half of the dialogue, or the spatial contrast carried over from the *Gorgias*.

⁵⁰² The story Socrates tells is that the cicadas originated in men so struck by pleasure in song when the Muses first were born, that they forgot to eat and drink, and died (259b-d; also a brief mention at 262d).

⁵⁰³ See discussion in D.8.

⁵⁰⁴ As Yunis points out, the idea that you reap what you have sown was proverbial. Yunis 2011, 180 ad *Phaedrus* 260c10-d1.

Οὐ πάνυ γε ἐπιεικῇ. ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν, ὦ ἀγαθέ, ἀγροικότερον⁵⁰⁵ τοῦ δέοντος
λελοιδορήκαμεν τὴν τῶν λόγων τέχνην; (260c10-d4)

What sort of fruit do you think after these things the rhetorical art will
harvest from what it sowed? [Phaedrus]: Nothing very suitable, you're right.
[Socrates]: So, my good friend, have we abused the art of words in a more
hick fashion than necessary?

The motif of farming also closes the discussion of rhetoric, and the dialogue's
discussion. (Although the dialogue continues for a few more pages, what follows is a
wrap-up and a closing prayer to Pan, who has himself connections to agriculture.⁵⁰⁶)
Socrates and Phaedrus agree that the philosopher is like a serious farmer who
plants seeds in the right soil,⁵⁰⁷ but grows a temporary garden of Adonis only as a
recreation.⁵⁰⁸ Similarly, they agree, a philosopher might "sow his seeds" for

⁵⁰⁵ Werner notes that words with an αἴψ- root occur several times in the dialogue as
part of a broader contrast between something that is "hick" or uncivilized, and
something that is refined or urbane (commenting on 229e3, where Socrates
describes the allegorist as having a "hick wisdom" that contrasts with true
philosophical understanding). Werner 2012, 34.

⁵⁰⁶ Pan was associated with herd animals and known as the god of shepherds. *h.*
Hymn Pan. Pan is also the son of Hermes, who appeared as *deus ex machina* at the
end of *Antiope*; in his capacity as guide of souls to the underworld, Hermes is also
recalled at the end of the *Gorgias* by Socrates' account of the underworld.

⁵⁰⁷ These seeds of philosophic rhetoric that sprout in the student's soul have an
obvious relationship to the sprouting of the lovers' wings in the palinode. Lebeck
1972, 287-8.

⁵⁰⁸ The Adonis-garden was a seed-sprouting intended to grow green and then die
over the course of the Adonis festival. Yunis and Werner both note that the Adonis
gardens were sown by women; Werner describes them as a kind of "anti-farming."
Yunis 2011, 232; Werner 2012, 201-2.

relaxation in a literary garden, i.e., write out a dialogue, but his serious work would be planting the right sort of words in the right sort of soul through the give and take of dialectic, where they could grow up and bear fruit (276d1-277a4).

In the discussion of rhetoric that is framed by these images of farming, Socrates gives a broad definition of rhetoric that includes all speech, both private and public (261a7-b2).⁵⁰⁹ In the *Gorgias*, Socrates had described Gorgianic rhetoric as an unscientific knack that is for the soul just like cookery is for the body—a flattering version of the art (medicine) that can genuinely heal the body.⁵¹⁰ In the *Phaedrus* he refers twice to such an understanding of rhetoric in what appear to be allusions to the *Gorgias*, once at 260e4, and again at 270b4-5, opposing his own view of rhetoric as something that could treat the soul as medicine treats the body if based on solid philosophical understanding.⁵¹¹ Thus most readers see the *Phaedrus* as Socrates' correction of Gorgianic rhetoric with a more positive vision of rhetoric⁵¹²—one that *can* cultivate its audience, like good farming, if it is governed by philosophical understanding.

G. Conclusion: Plato's farmer and philosopher

In the *Gorgias*, Socrates critically portrayed the rhetoricians as bad farmers who failed to properly care for and domesticate their animals; in the *Phaedrus*, he gives a positive description of a philosophical rhetoric that is like a farmer's sowing

⁵⁰⁹ Socrates thus re-expands the definition of rhetoric that he had forced Gorgias to narrow in the *Gorgias* (as discussed in section C.1 above). Yunis 1996, 178.

⁵¹⁰ See discussion in section C.2.

⁵¹¹ The rhetoric described in the *Phaedrus* is based on a more complete philosophical understanding of the ordered soul that includes psychological theory, a theory of knowledge, and a theory of the objects of knowledge (the Forms). See, e.g., Kahn 1996, 142-7, 373 (these elements lacking in the *Gorgias*); Guthrie 1962-1975, 4: 413-7.

⁵¹² See Yunis 2011, 24.

seeds.⁵¹³ In both cases, Socrates' use of the farming metaphor is limited to describing rhetoric's proper function of educating the listener; this education is possible only if the rhetoric is governed by philosophy, portrayed in the *Gorgias* as starting from an Amphionic above-beyond perspective and in the *Phaedrus* as starting from the upward gaze of the winged soul. The philosopher with such an above-beyond philosophic perspective is necessarily ἄτοπος in the city—strange, or more literally, “out of place.”

In the next chapter, we will examine the rather different ways in which Xenophon in his *Oeconomicus* treats the conversation between the philosopher and the farmer. Xenophon's Socrates is not focused on contrasting some above-beyond philosophical perspective to more mundane ways of thinking; he is never ἄτοπος, either in the *Oeconomicus* or in Xenophon's other Socratic dialogues. Although he is also interested in contrasts in spatial perspective, he focuses on contrasts in ground-level perspective, examining how different understandings of farming are based on different rhetoric—in particular, different spatial imagery—and have different philosophical implications for the kind of world and home created.

⁵¹³ Note that the kind of education Socrates has in mind is evidently one-on-one, the sort of conversation that he is having with his friend Phaedrus. Thus the kind of mass oratory criticized in the *Gorgias* is still problematic, even if the orator is now trained in Socratic dialectic, because it does not permit this kind of interaction.

Chapter 3: Xenophon's Oeconomicus

Introduction

Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, like Plato's *Gorgias* and Euripides' *Antiope*, also features a series of conversations between a philosopher (Socrates) and a farmer (the older gentleman-farmer Ischomachos, and the young would-be farmer Critoboulos). As in the *Gorgias* and *Antiope*, the earlier conversation (with Ischomachos) is not entirely successful, ending with Ischomachos' anger at Socrates, and is recast in a later conversation (with Critoboulos). And as in the *Gorgias* and *Antiope*, the dialogue ends on an ominous note, with a reference to the great sinner Tantalos.

In the *Oeconomicus*, however, Xenophon structures the dialogue so that although it ends with Ischomachos' reference to Tantalos, it begins with the later conversation with Critoboulos, a successful conversation in which Critoboulos is able to learn from his philosopher friend—something that does not happen in the *Gorgias* and *Antiope*. In his conversation with Critoboulos, Socrates repeats his earlier conversation with Ischomachos, showing his respect both for Ischomachos as an Athenian gentleman Ischomachos and for the practical occupation of farming. This Socrates is a down-to-earth thinker who encourages his young friends to pursue socially respected activities like farming. He is not radical, and he is not ἄτοπος; in fact, he not only refrains from urging an above-beyond perspective on his friend Critoboulos, he focuses on different earth-bound philosophical perspectives on farming, each based on different conceptions of human space that have profoundly different philosophical implications.

In this chapter I will examine first the earlier conversation between Socrates and Ischomachos, even though it is placed second in the dialogue. I do so because it is important to understand how Socrates' earlier conversation with Ischomachos becomes the foundation for his later conversation with Critoboulos. Ischomachos has different and not entirely compatible views of order; when Socrates talks with Critoboulos, he disentangles these different views to provide Critoboulos with an

analytical framework with which to understand Ischomachos' conversation. Socrates' conversation with Critoboulos is thus in many ways a meditation on the significance of Ischomachos' remarks.

A. *An overview of the dialogue*

A.1. *Date of Composition*

It is difficult to assign a precise date of composition to the *Oeconomicus*, as is the case with most of Xenophon's works.⁵¹⁴ Most scholars assume that Xenophon's literary output began after the military adventures he describes in the *Anabasis* and the *Hellenica*, and after his exile from Athens sometime between 401 and 394.⁵¹⁵ According to Diogenes Laertius, Xenophon wrote his histories in Scillus, where Sparta had granted him an estate (roughly 393-371).⁵¹⁶ Xenophon's Socratic *Memorabilia* seems to have been composed at least in part after the battle of Leuctra in 371.⁵¹⁷ Some scholars have argued that Xenophon wrote his first draft of the *Oeconomicus* during his time in Scillus, and then revised it at least once before his

⁵¹⁴ Hobden 2017, 152-3 (declining to assign a date to the *Oeconomicus*). See also Dillery 1995, 14-5 (suggesting the *Hellenica* was composed over a thirty-year period).

⁵¹⁵ For a discussion of the uncertain circumstances of the exile, see Dorion 2000, 1: xxx-xxxi; Pomeroy 1994, 4-5 (arguing for an exile in 395/4 for his having sided with the Spartans at Coronea).

⁵¹⁶ Diogenes Laertius 2.52.

⁵¹⁷ *Mem.* 3.5 seems to assume the dominance of Theban power, i.e., sometime after the battle of Leuctra in 371. See Dorion 2011, 2.1: 292 ad *Mem.* 3.5.1.

death,⁵¹⁸ which was sometime after 354.⁵¹⁹ The *Oeconomicus* would then have been first composed at about the same time as Plato's early dialogues, such as the *Gorgias*, but finished later.⁵²⁰

The dramatic dates of the dialogue's two conversations are also uncertain, perhaps deliberately so. If we take seriously Socrates' reference to the death of the younger Cyrus in *Oec.* 4.18-19, then the dramatic date of the framing dialogue must be shortly after the Battle of Cunaxa of 401—not long before Socrates' own death in 399. But Xenophon was present at Cunaxa and was still in Asia Minor when Socrates was executed; as Pomeroy points out, he could therefore not have been present to hear this dialogue as he claims at *Oec.* 1.1, if this were the dramatic date.⁵²¹ A dramatic date of about 400 would also make Critoboulos a little old for a discussion of the basics of household management; he is well-attested as one of Socrates' young interlocutors in both Plato and Xenophon, and in the *Symposium* Xenophon describes him as newly married in 422.⁵²²

The dramatic date of the earlier conversation with Ischomachos is similarly unclear. As I will discuss below, I favor the theory that Xenophon's Ischomachos is meant to be identified with a historical Ischomachos who lived c. 460-404.⁵²³ As the dialogue's Ischomachos appears to be a mature man in the prime of life, that would place the discussion in 425 or so, which would be compatible with Socrates'

⁵¹⁸ Pomeroy 1994, 4-8. Note also that the painting of Gryllus fighting in the Battle of Mantinea may have been another reason for Xenophon to set Ischomachos' conversation in the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios; if so, that would place the completion of the *Oeconomicus* after 362. Pomeroy 1994, 265 ad *Oec.* 7.1.

⁵¹⁹ In *Poroi* 5.9, Xenophon refers to the Sacred War, showing that he lived at least until 355/354. Gray 2007, 15.

⁵²⁰ The composition date of the *Gorgias* is discussed in Chapter 2, section B.

⁵²¹ Pomeroy 1994, 18-9; 250.

⁵²² In addition, his father Crito consults with Socrates about his education in Plato's *Euthydemus*, 306d5.

⁵²³ Davies 1971, 267-8; see further discussion in section A.3.

reference to the *Clouds*, first produced in 424/3. However, an earlier date is suggested by what seems to be Socrates' apparent discovery of a new interest in the meaning of καλοκάγαθία, which would place the conversation not long after he abandoned the early interest in natural science described in Plato's *Phaedo*⁵²⁴ (and satirized in the *Clouds*), perhaps in about 440.

In any case, as Pomeroy points out, anachronisms in the dialogues of both Plato and Xenophon are common; the authors were often not concerned about fixing a precise date.⁵²⁵

A.2. *Xenophon and Plato*

In this dissertation, I will sidestep the question of whether Xenophon had Plato's *Gorgias* in mind when he created his own version of the dialogue between the farmer and the philosopher. It is certainly possible that Xenophon was alluding to Plato—or vice versa. They must have been aware of each other; Xenophon does refer to Plato, once, as a follower of Socrates (*Mem.* 3.6.1). Plato, however, never explicitly refers to Xenophon, as a follower of Socrates or otherwise.⁵²⁶ There are some remarks in Plato's *Laws* (3.694c-695b) that are often taken as a criticism of Xenophon's description of Cyrus' education in the *Cyropaedia*, but Xenophon's name and work are not mentioned.⁵²⁷

A number of scholars have argued for instances of intertextuality between Xenophon and Plato. Waterfield and Kahn, for example, both argue that various

⁵²⁴ Plato, *Phaedo* 96a-99d. See discussion in Vander Waerdt 1994, 49-50; 54 (arguing that Xenophon portrays Socrates as developing his mature position in response to Aristophanes' charges). See further discussion in section B.6.

⁵²⁵ Pomeroy 1994, 18-9. See also discussion in Chapter 2, section B (on uncertainty in the dramatic date of Plato's *Gorgias*).

⁵²⁶ As noted by Pomeroy 1994, 27.

⁵²⁷ Pomeroy 1994, 26-7; Tatum 1989, 216, 225-34 (arguing that Plato's Athenian is engaging in a critique of the *Cyropaedia*).

passages in Xenophon's Socratic writings respond to or correct Plato's arguments or version of events in various dialogues.⁵²⁸ Vander Waerdt has even argued that Xenophon's *Apology* is a direct reply to Plato's work of that name.⁵²⁹ All three of these scholars assume, as most scholars do, that where correspondences do exist, Xenophon must be referring to Plato.⁵³⁰ This may be in part due to Xenophon's

⁵²⁸ For example, Waterfield argues that Xenophon adapted Plato's story of the oracle to make Socrates a Xenophontic καλὸς κάγαθός rather than a Platonic wise man. Waterfield 2004, 93-5. Waterfield also argues that *Oec.* 1.7-23 is a response to Plato's *Euthydemus* 280b-281e. Xenophon's Socrates argues that only beneficial things are property, and that things are beneficial only if one knows how to use them and has sufficient self-control to deploy that knowledge (see discussion in section C.1); Plato's Socrates argues that knowledge is the only good thing, as it is only knowledge that enables one to make good use of anything else, even wealth and health. Waterfield argues that while Plato's argument is a protreptic to philosophy, Xenophon's is a protreptic to good estate management—which inculcates morality. Similarly, Waterfield argues that the *Oeconomicus* pointedly and repeatedly responds to Plato's doctrine of recollection, correcting Plato's abstract theories of prenatal knowledge and reincarnation with a common-sense emphasis on how questioning *can* lead to knowledge (see discussion in section B.8.b). Waterfield also points out various instances where the *Memorabilia* seems to be responding to Platonic arguments. Waterfield 2004, 102-4, 107-10. See also Kahn 1996, 393-9 (listing instances in the *Memorabilia* where dependence on Plato seems probable).

⁵²⁹ Vander Waerdt 1993, 1. Kahn has also claimed that Xenophon's *Symposium* has a complex polemical relationship with Plato's dialogue of that name and even refers to Plato's text directly. Kahn 1996, 398-401.

⁵³⁰ As Waterfield notes, most scholars assume that Xenophon is drawing from or responding to Plato, rather than the reverse. Waterfield 2004, 93 n. 50. Pomeroy, however, points out that Diogenes Laertius (2.48) says that Xenophon was the first to write down Socrates' words, and argues that Xenophon was the more innovative

willingness to acknowledge Plato but not vice versa, or to assumptions about Xenophon's circumstances;⁵³¹ but it probably owes more to the assumption that Xenophon was simply too inferior to Plato for Plato to have bothered to engage with him.⁵³² I believe this is a mistake, and hope to contribute to the growing strand of scholarship that views Xenophon as a significant thinker in his own right;⁵³³ but in any case, it does not seem possible to establish definite connections between the *Oeconomicus* and the *Gorgias* one way or the other.

I argue only that the correspondences between the *Oeconomicus* and Plato's *Gorgias* are significant enough that it is profitable to consider them together. Not only do both dialogues concern the conversation between the farmer and the philosopher, but they share some common concerns and imagery. Both use the image of the leaky jar to discuss self-control, the *Gorgias* extensively (Chapter 2, section D.4), the *Oeconomicus* briefly (B.5.a); both use the images of the house and

in his use of genres, Plato in some cases may have been borrowing from Xenophon. Pomeroy 1994, 26.

⁵³¹ For example, Kahn has argued that Xenophon's long absence from Athens meant that he relied extensively on other Socratic writers (like Antisthenes and Aeschines, as well as Plato) who knew Socrates better, had been with him at his death, and had remained in contact with the Socratic community afterwards. Kahn 1996, 76.

⁵³² See, e.g., Flower 2017, 2 (commenting on how Xenophon's reputation suffered during much of the twentieth century); Patzer 2010, 232-3 (the *Oeconomicus* represents the interests of Xenophon, a thinker of striking unoriginality, and not of Socrates); Tuplin 2004, 23-4 (commenting on the devaluation of Xenophon as a Socratic author); Kahn 1996, 393, 400; Guthrie 1962-1975, 3: 335 (Xenophon had little sign of any capacity for profound philosophical thought).

⁵³³ See, e.g., Dorion 2017, 46, 55-6 (arguing that Xenophon is not a critical or speculative philosopher, but that he is worth taking seriously as a philosopher who studied how to live one's life); Hobden and Tuplin 2012, 31-9; Waterfield 2004, 93 n. 50 (emphasizing that he sees Xenophon as engaging with Plato in a substantive philosophical way).

ship to discuss the importance of order, the *Gorgias* briefly (Chapter 2, section D.5), the *Oeconomicus* extensively (section B.5.b-c). Both discuss the amount of seed a farmer should use; in the *Gorgias*, it is Socrates' final example of the absurdity of Callicles' insistence that the "better" man should have and consume more (Chapter 2, section D.4); in the *Oeconomicus*, it is Socrates' most detailed inquiry into Ischomachos' metaphors (section B.8.a below). Both discuss the nature of Socratic questioning. In the *Gorgias*, Socrates explains that it is intended to help clarify what people think and to correct it as necessary (Chapter 2, section C.1); in the *Oeconomicus*, Socrates discovers from Ischomachos' questioning that questioning is also a form of teaching (section B.8.b below). Finally, the *Gorgias* is in part about rhetoric; and as I am arguing, the *Oeconomicus* is in part about the importance of understanding metaphor and imagery and how they shape our thought.⁵³⁴

A.3. *My approach; not the ironic reading*

As the introduction above suggests, my approach takes the *Oeconomicus* seriously as a Socratic dialogue that puts forward serious philosophical points. It is more than simply a practical treatise on household management,⁵³⁵ and more than an attempt to rehabilitate Socrates as a conventional teacher of morality and the respectable occupation of farming. But I do not follow those who take the *Oeconomicus* seriously, but as an ironic Socratic dialogue that presents the conversation with Ischomachos as a satire meant to undermine Ischomachos'

⁵³⁴ Cf. the discussion in Pontier 2006, 252 (comparison is useful, but the dialogues are too far apart in their handling of their common themes for us to see one as alluding to the other).

⁵³⁵ Guthrie 1962-1975, 3: 335-6 (describing the *Oeconomicus* as a highly practical treatise on estate management, put in the form of a Socratic dialogue in compliment to Socrates).

conventional and materialistic Athenian values in favor of a truer life of philosophy.⁵³⁶

For most of these authors, what sets the scene for this supposed satire is the identification of Xenophon's Ischomachos with a historical Ischomachos who lived c. 460-404, married a woman named Chrysilla, and had a daughter who married a man named Callias.⁵³⁷ As we learn from Andocides' *On the Mysteries* (1.124-29),⁵³⁸

⁵³⁶ E.g., Kronenberg 2009, 37-8, 46-65 (arguing that *Oeconomicus* attacks the conventional life of materialism and politics, as exemplified by Ischomachos); Nee 2009, 266-70 (Xenophon's presentation of the "perfect gentleman" Ischomachos is ironic; his way of life feeds insatiable appetite and is not defensible); Too 2001, 78-9 (following Stevens in arguing that Xenophon's Socrates implicitly critiques Ischomachos as teaching his wife materialism rather than virtue); Ambler 1996, 131 (Xenophon's Socrates esteems Ischomachos but rejects his way of life); Stevens 1994, 226-9. Cf. Danzig 2010, 239-63 (arguing that Xenophon shows conventional estate management as better than prodigality but inferior to philosophic life).

⁵³⁷ This Callias appears to be the man known for his patronage of the sophists who was the host of Xenophon's *Symposium*. Davies 1971, 254. According to Stevens, this Callias also appears in Plato's *Apology*, where Socrates alludes to the scandal by referring to Callias' two sons—the second being the product of the scandal. Socrates there distinguishes training the sons from horse training (Pl. *Ap.* 20a-b). Stevens 1994, 226-9.

⁵³⁸ Andocides was the man who confessed to involvement in the mutilation of the Hermes statues on the eve of the Sicilian expedition (but not to the actual mutilation or profanation of the mysteries) in exchange for immunity from prosecution, implicating other members of his social group in the process. *On the Mysteries* was a later attempt to release himself from the decree that had been aimed at him in particular, forbidding those who had committed impiety to enter temples or the *agora*. He recounts the accusations made against various parties by others (including against Alcibiades); his focus is on clearing himself from the accusation of impiety, including that of having informed against his own father. Andocides brings

Chrysilla was the widow (or perhaps divorced wife) of one Ischomachos, became the live-in mistress of her daughter's husband Callias, and as a result her daughter attempted suicide. Nor was this the end of the scandal; Callias threw Chrysilla out, but later took her in again, and acknowledged her out of wedlock son as his own.⁵³⁹ It would be hard to find a better example of the failure of wifely education.

Many scholars accept the identification of Chrysilla as Ischomachos's wife.⁵⁴⁰ These scholars argue that Xenophon's contemporary audience could not have forgotten such a juicy bit of gossip, and that Ischomachos' detailed advice on the training of a wife would have marked him as a figure of satire from the beginning.⁵⁴¹ It does seem likely that Xenophon intended his readers at least to recall the notorious case.⁵⁴²

up the scandal of Ischomachos's wife in order to discredit Callias, who had accused him of committing an act of impiety (And. *On the Mysteries*, 1.124-7).

⁵³⁹ Davies 1971, 248, 264-8; commented on in Stevens 1994, 218-9 n. 20

(substantially agreeing with Davies but noting some inconsistencies). See also the account in Pomeroy 1994, 259-264 ad *Oec.* 6.17.

⁵⁴⁰ See, e.g., Danzig 2010, 258-9; Stevens 1994, 217-220; Cartledge 1993, 9; Too 2001, 72 (inclined to accept the possibility). But see also Pomeroy 1994, 263 ad *Oec.* 6.17 (rejecting the association on the grounds that it would make Ischomachos a tragic figure whose misfortune was not due to any deliberate evil, which she finds inappropriate for "a work that combines features of a philosophical dialogue with that of an agricultural treatise").

⁵⁴¹ Stevens 1994, 223, 237.

⁵⁴² Note that although Ischomachos mentions his father several times in the *Oeconomicus*, he never gives his name, which could have made a firm identification of Ischomachos more difficult for Xenophon's readers. *Oec.* 7.3; 20.22-9. Hobden argues that the accusations against Chrysilla were a minor part of a lengthy forensic oration that might have been unfamiliar to Xenophon or to many of his readers, or never taken seriously; in her view, there is insufficient evidence to assume Xenophon or his readers would have had the scandal in mind when reading the

But I disagree with those who think that the identification signals that Xenophon is treating Ischomachos' advice satirically. Ischomachos would not be the only teacher in this dialogue with a young student who in later life abandoned his teachings; as we saw in the discussion of Plato's *Gorgias*, Socrates himself was accused of corrupting the young, being blamed in particular for the scandalous career of Alcibiades.⁵⁴³ As Xenophon says in the *Memorabilia* (1.2.24), men like Alcibiades were good while they were Socrates' students and under his influence. In the *Gorgias*, Plato suggests that teachers of rhetoric (like Gorgias), although perhaps well-intentioned, were the true corrupters of young men like Callicles; in the *Oeconomicus*, Xenophon similarly shows how the conventional education from a gentleman like Ischomachos could fail.⁵⁴⁴ The future scandal of Ischomachos's wife would then be no more a part of any satire than the fate of Socrates himself.

I thus follow those scholars who read the *Oeconomicus* without an ironic lens.⁵⁴⁵ Although Socrates does disagree with Ischomachos at several points, those

Oeconomicus. Hobden 2017, 168-73. Similarly, Pomeroy suggests that Xenophon might not have been fully aware of the scandal due to his absence from Athens and mainland Greece at the time of Andocides' trial in 399. Pomeroy 1994, 263-4 ad *Oec.* 6.17.

⁵⁴³ See discussion in Chapter 2, sections D.2 and D.9.

⁵⁴⁴ Making the assumption that Ischomachos's advice is not offered for any satiric purpose also puts us in company with readers like Cicero. In his *de Officiis*, he advises his son that Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* explains most helpfully (*commodissime*) how property can be preserved and even increased by diligence and thrift (*de Off.* 2.24, 87). And in his *de Senectute* he approves the eloquence with which Xenophon's Socrates praises agriculture, citing the story of the Persian King and his garden (*de Sen.* 27, 59)(discussed below in section C.3).

⁵⁴⁵ Xenophon and Xenophon's Socrates are certainly capable of irony. However, his Socrates makes a more limited use of irony and/or the elenchus as compared to Plato's Socrates. In *Mem.* 1.4.1, Xenophon describes him as using cross-examination on those who thought they knew everything, but not with his friends in daily

points are flagged for the reader (and for Ischomachos). In my view, Xenophon's Socrates never presents a bad argument and calls it good. Instead, what he expects Critoboulos (and us, as readers) to do is to compare different points of view—each of which has some merit—and determine for ourselves which is better, or how we can use these perspectives to fashion something closer to the truth.⁵⁴⁶

A.4. *A brief overview of the dialogue's construction and an outline*

The *Oeconomicus* takes place primarily on two levels: first, a conversation between Socrates and a young friend, Critoboulos; and second, an earlier conversation between Socrates and an Athenian gentleman-farmer, Ischomachos, which Socrates repeats to Critoboulos. But within this basic framework there are additional complexities. The entire dialogue, as the first (and only the first) sentence reminds us, is a result of Xenophon's hearing and retelling this discussion between

conversation. See discussions in Gray 2011, 330-5; Danzig 2010, 196; Dorion 2000, cxxvi-clxxxii.

⁵⁴⁶ Thus Hobden, for example, sees the *Oeconomicus* as a serious exploration of household management, which is also training for leadership, as well as the process of learning itself; although Socrates critiques Ischomachos on some points, he also treats his advice with respect. Hobden 2017, 162-3, 165. Gray also rejects the darker, ironic readings of Xenophon's works (including the *Oeconomicus*); she points out that Xenophon repeatedly supports the superiority of a protagonist's example (Cyrus, Lycurgus, Socrates) by portraying the decline that came about when their example was abandoned. Gray 2011, 246-63, 353-4. See also Ferrario 2017, 60, 73; Danzig 2010, 239 (*Oeconomicus* as nuanced rather than ironic; Ischomachos has good advice, if not the best); Dorion 2008, 268-9, 275 (Socrates and Ischomachos agree on many points; the city needs both); Pontier 2006, 236-7 (Ischomachos' praise of order is consistent with other Xenophontic Socratic writings, although Ischomachos lacks Socrates' deep understanding); Dillery 1995, 242 (Ischomachos as teaching sound elements of leadership).

Socrates and Critoboulos. Furthermore, the first half of the discussion between Ischomachos and Socrates is almost entirely Ischomachos' own retelling of earlier conversations he had with his wife; the dialogue reaches a high point of narrative complexity when Ischomachos interrupts this retelling to address the anecdote of the Phoenician merchant ship directly to Socrates. And finally, the dialogue ends with Ischomachos' remarks about Tantalos; there is no return to the original conversation with Critoboulos (or indeed to Xenophon himself).

This complex construction permits Xenophon to show how one speaker reshapes and reflects on what has been said by other speakers.⁵⁴⁷ As my focus will be on how Socrates uses what he learns through his earlier conversation with Ischomachos in his later conversation with Critoboulos, my analysis will begin with the *second* part of the dialogue, the earlier conversation with Ischomachos. However, as it will still be necessary from time to time to refer to the dialogue's overall structure, I will first give a detailed outline of that structure.

Xenophon says that he once heard Socrates one day raise the topic of household management with Critoboulos—a young friend who was having some difficulty managing his estate, judging by Socrates' comments on some of his more expensive activities. Socrates introduces Critoboulos to the idea that a person's estate does not consist of the land, objects, and money that he owns, but rather

⁵⁴⁷ As Hobden calls it, "a multi-vocal interrogation of the *oikonomia* in which Socrates fluctuates between the roles of chief inquisitor and respondent, teacher and pupil, expert and novice." Hobden 2017, 154, 162. See also Rood 2017, 265-7 (commenting on the complexity of the structure of the *Oeconomicus*, which raises questions about the power relations between the speakers and the different types of managerial control they practice or discuss); Too 2001, 66-7 (the work's complex, embedded structure suggests that some of its "discursive spaces" may be privileged over others). Cf. Baragwanath 2012, 633, 646 n. 40 (noting how Xenophon's *Symposium* uses the staging of in-text responses to construct various perspectives; and how the elaborate layering of the framing of the *Oeconomicus* may translate the dialogue into "the realm of the wondrous").

those things that he knows how to use in a way that benefits him. Although Critoboulos readily agrees, he nevertheless insists on having Socrates teach him something concrete about “increasing his estate” (2.1), by which he means wealth as it is conventionally understood. Socrates agrees to help him learn estate management (3.1), though by the end of their discussion he has reshaped this goal into that of learning how to farm as the best way of making a living (6.4-10). Socrates cautions that he personally does not know estate management; however, he can lead Critoboulos to others who do, and these are performances that Critoboulos must watch (θεάομαι) carefully (3.7-9).⁵⁴⁸

Critoboulos enthusiastically agrees—though unsurprisingly he wishes to learn only what is suitable for a man of his social position, declaring to Socrates that he wishes to increase his wealth only through the most honorable (κάλλιστος) branches of knowledge (4.1). Socrates praises him, and responds by excluding a category of activities that the cities reasonably think poorly of: those called “banausic” (βαναυσικός, 4.2). What Critoboulos should learn about, he says, is farming—something that the even decidedly royal and non-banausic King of the Persians values. After describing how Persian royalty values farming (and gardening) (4.5-25), Socrates then offers a remarkable encomium of farming (5.1-17).

Convinced that farming is the best, noblest, and most pleasant way to make a living, Critoboulos asks Socrates to explain why some farmers succeed, and others do not (6.11). Socrates therefore goes back to the beginning in order to tell Critoboulos about how he once met a man justly called by the name καλός τε κάγαθός (6.12)—a phrase that conventionally means “gentleman,” but literally, “beautiful and good.” Critoboulos, who is eager to be called a gentleman himself, agrees.

Socrates recounts at length his conversation with Ischomachos. The first part of this conversation deals with the ordering of the interior space of Ischomachos’ home, and is delivered almost entirely as Ischomachos’ retelling of conversations he

⁵⁴⁸ See discussion of θεάομαι and related terms in section C.2.

once had with his wife (7.4-10.13). Ischomachos sees a natural and god-ordained division of labor; the gods made woman's sphere inside the home, and man's sphere outside. Ischomachos uses the image of the wife as "queen bee" to describe how the woman's sphere is naturally confined to the home (7.17-40). However, within this basic natural division, the specific order of the home (as with other "interior" spaces) is a matter of human needs and choices. Accordingly, he taught his wife to stay within the home and keep their possessions in order. Ischomachos stresses that this spatial order is both beautiful and the prerequisite for their being able to find and use anything to their benefit (8.1-9.10). Ischomachos also worked with his wife to train their housekeeper and taught his wife to consider herself a guardian of the household laws (9.11-19). Finally, he told Socrates how he had explained to his wife that cosmetics were an unnatural and deceptive counterfeit of good health (10.1-13).

The second part of the discussion focuses first on Ischomachos' routine and his teaching (some of) the farm servants to be loyal, careful, able to govern others, and honest (11.12-15.1), and then switches to Ischomachos' teaching Socrates (via Socratic questioning) about farming (15.1-20.29). However, there is a brief interlude between the two sections marked by theatrical references, emphasizing again that Critoboulos (and we readers) must observe closely; Ischomachos' views are open to question (11.1-11).

Ischomachos portrays farming as primarily a matter of learning from the nature of the earth, which is divine. Divine nature "does not lie"; her response to careful effort will be apparent (19.17-9, 20.13-5). He can therefore use leading questions to teach Socrates that he already knows something about farming, simply by applying basic skills of human thought to his observations of natural processes and his background cultural knowledge (16.1-19.19). During his discussion with Ischomachos, Socrates not only comments on Ischomachos' use of metaphor, but he repeatedly brings up comparisons of his own that suggest that people have a choice of imagery that is strongly related to what we value and see as beneficial (11.3-8, 17.8-11, 17.15). These comparisons surprise and sometimes offend Ischomachos, culminating in an exchange where each metaphorically characterizes the other as an

“unreliable wanderer”—i.e. the opposite of the trustworthy farmer who is firmly rooted in his community (20.15-20, 20.27-29). The conversation closes with Ischomachos reiterating that although farming may be easy, inculcating the cooperation it requires is difficult, and requires what he calls a “divine” talent of leadership that can inspire men with the love of labor and of honor from their fellows, bestowed only on those who have been initiated into prudence (21.1-11). Ischomachos closes by saying that “but the gods give tyrannic rule over the unwilling, it seems to me, to whomever they think deserves to live just as Tantalos is said to spend eternity in Hades, fearing lest he die twice” (21.12). Here the dialogue ends, with no return to the Critoboulos frame or to Xenophon’s own voice.

B. The conversation with Ischomachos

In the earlier conversation with Ischomachos (as he relates it to Critoboulos), for the most part Socrates listens respectfully, particularly to Ischomachos’ praise of creating order inside his household. But several times Socrates calls attention to his disagreement with some of Ischomachos’ views, particularly those on the possibility of understanding nature directly without the mediation of communal speech or culture, on the “natural” ordering of the world into a (male) outside and (female) inside, and on Ischomachos’ conventional desire for wealth and thus profit. Socrates does so largely by calling attention to Ischomachos’ choices of metaphor and imagery. In the end this irritates Ischomachos to the point that he responds by denigrating the man who cannot lead by persuasion with an image related to “up in the air” sophistry: Tantalos.

B.1 Where Socrates started: the social meaning of the expression καλὸς κάγαθός

As Socrates tells Critoboulos, he will go back to the beginning in order to tell Critoboulos how he met the gentleman (καλὸς κάγαθός) Ischomachos. In the beginning, he tells Critoboulos, he went around to the good (ἀγαθός) artisans, “observing” (θεάομαι, an important term discussed in C.2) those of their works that

were considered beautiful (καλά). Although Socrates does not specify exactly what he was investigating, it was apparently the question of what good (ἀγαθός) and beautiful (καλός) meant; for artisans, he apparently found they meant something like “capable” and “fine work.” (As we will see, the possibility that the artisans themselves could be beautiful does not arise because theirs is a form of labor called “banausic” that was held to damage both body and soul.)⁵⁴⁹ This obviously did not satisfy Socrates, as he notes that it did not take him much time, and he next began to investigate (ἐπισκοπέω) what people did to be considered both καλός and ἀγαθός, that is, καλός τε κάγαθός (6.13-4).

To Socrates’ (and Xenophon’s) contemporaries, καλὸς κάγαθός was a set phrase that as applied to people conventionally meant something like “gentleman.”⁵⁵⁰ It was a term that could be used to describe an elite social class; but that use itself often had moral connotations that could be adapted to describe moral rather than social excellence,⁵⁵¹ or even worth in a more general, democratic sense.⁵⁵² Xenophon’s Socrates generally uses it with these moral connotations; in

⁵⁴⁹ See discussion at B.4.

⁵⁵⁰ Socrates and the other characters in the dialogue seem to use καλός τε κάγαθός and καλὸς κάγαθός indifferently; compare 6.17 and 7.2-3.

⁵⁵¹ As a phrase, καλὸς κάγαθός is first recorded in Herodotus 1.30.4, where one of the elements that made Tellus the Athenian the most blessed of all men according to Solon is that his sons were καλοί τε κάγαθοί; here the phrase seems to have mostly a moral connotation, as Solon stresses that Tellus died fighting courageously in battle, for which he was honored by the Athenians. However, there are some similar combinations of adjectives that go back as far as Homer that reflect a connection between beauty and other forms of worth, e.g., *Il.* 6.156-7, 24.52. See discussion in Donlan 1973, 369-70, 374; cf. Wankel 1961, 16, 23 (arguing that the concept καλὸς κάγαθός itself thus also must go back to Homer).

⁵⁵² Donlan argues convincingly that the phrase was coined in the fifth century as a value term by a social elite seeking a new way to distinguish itself once the term ἀγαθός had been appropriated by the non-elite classes. However, like the term

the *Memorabilia*, for example, Xenophon says that Socrates thought knowing such things as what was fine or shameful, just or unjust, made a man a gentleman (καλὸς κάγαθός).⁵⁵³ In the *Oeconomicus*, Socrates also so uses it in his conversation with Critoboulos when he remarks that people may be better off as slaves, if their masters are the sort of gentlemen (καλοὶ κάγαθοί) who make their servants better people (1.23). We will also see that Ischomachos himself says that he treats his slaves like free men and gentlemen (καλοί τε κάγαθοί, 14.9) if they are honest not only out of a desire for gain but because they are eager to be praised by him.⁵⁵⁴

Socrates tells Critoboulos that in these earlier investigations, at first he took the phrase literally; he investigated beautiful (καλός) men, expecting from the verbal structure of the phrase to find that they were good (άγαθός as well)—only to be disappointed (6.15-6). As Socrates describes it, he seems never to have thought about the common phrase καλὸς κάγαθός before, implying that this focus on the human and on basic social concepts is a new concern. This seems to be a Socrates who has only recently abandoned the concern with natural philosophy mentioned in Plato's *Phaedo* and parodied by Aristophanes' *Clouds*—a parody that he later deprecatingly alludes to at 11.3.⁵⁵⁵

άγαθός, the phrase was later appropriated by the non-elite to describe good citizens more generally. Donlan points to Aristophanes as offering examples of this use (e.g. *Clouds* 101). Donlan 1973, 373-4 & n. 25. See also Dover 1974, 41-5 (the phrase was applied to any man who had what the speaker valued; it could be used by anti-democratic writers to designate the elite, but was also used by more democratic authors to express general worth); Dover 1968, 107 ad *Clouds* 101.

⁵⁵³ *Mem.* 1.1.16.

⁵⁵⁴ See discussion in B.7.

⁵⁵⁵ Vander Waerdt 1994, 53-4 (Xenophon is suggesting that Aristophanes' satiric portrayal of Socrates in the *Clouds* led Socrates to take Aristophanes' advice and enquire into human virtue instead); Stevens 1994, 213. See further discussion in section B.6.

Recognizing that καλὸς κάγαθός was an expression to be examined rather than a phrase to be taken literally, Socrates therefore sought out a successful and wealthy Athenian farmer, Ischomachos. Socrates stresses that his interest was due to Ischomachos' reputation; he describes Ischomachos to Critoboulos as a man "who seemed to me to be in reality one of those to whom this title is justly given which is called 'gentleman,'" (ὃς ἐμοὶ ἐδόκει εἶναι τῷ ὄντι τούτων τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐφ' οἷς τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα δικαίως ἐστὶν ὃ καλεῖται καλός τε κάγαθός ἀνὴρ, 6.12), and says that Ischomachos was called "gentleman" by everyone (6.17).⁵⁵⁶

B.2 *The setting of the conversation with Ischomachos*

The conversation between Socrates and Ischomachos occurs in a popular meeting place in the Athenian agora, the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios ("Zeus the Deliverer" or more literally, "Zeus the Free," 7.1). The location places the dialogue in the heart of the *agora*: a familiar Athenian urban context. Ischomachos is taking a break from his usual purposeful activity because he is waiting for some (foreign) guests (7.1-2); Socrates is engaged in his usual activity of walking about the city and talking to people.⁵⁵⁷ The contrast is immediately apparent between Socrates'

⁵⁵⁶ It is often pointed out that Socrates does not say that Ischomachos *is* a gentleman, but only that he is justly *called* a gentleman, and argued that this shows that Socrates does not approve of Ischomachos and is treating him ironically. See, e.g., Danzig 2010, 251 & n 25 (Socrates' initial reference to Ischomachos as one who deserved to be called καλὸς κάγαθός was ironic); Stevens 1994, 212; Pangle 1994, 130 (Socrates intends to teach Critoboulos the difference between conventional Ischomachean and true Socratic virtue). I think that Gray is correct that we cannot ignore the impact of Socrates' choice of the word δικαίως here. Gray 2011, 354. Although Socrates will not fully endorse Ischomachos and his way of life, he will encourage Critoboulos to build on it rather than reject it.

⁵⁵⁷ For example, this is what Socrates is doing in *Oec.* 6.13-7 when he is investigating καλός, ἀγαθός, and finally καλὸς κάγαθός; see discussion in B.1. In the *Memorabilia*,

philosophical way of life, which produces no tangible product, and Ischomachos' traditional, active, farming-based life. But as we will see, for Xenophon, the philosopher and the farmer offer ways of life that are not opposed to each other.⁵⁵⁸

Xenophon's choice of the Stoa is itself significant on several levels. The Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios celebrated Athens' successful resistance to Persian conquest in the Persian War, and featured paintings of gods and Athenian heroes—including, at a point after the dramatic date of this conversation, a painting that depicted the heroic actions of Xenophon's son Gryllus during the Battle of Mantinea.⁵⁵⁹ Thus when Critoboulos later hears Socrates repeat this conversation, he will hear it almost immediately after Socrates' praise of royal Persian gardening and farming (4.4-25), and be reminded that Greece is not Persia.⁵⁶⁰ Also significant is the name of the Stoa, as the word ἐλευθέριος in this period in some contexts had connotations

Xenophon says that Socrates was always "in the open," ἐν τῷ φανερῷ, going about to the *agora* and to other places where people gathered (*Mem.* 1.1.10). In *Mem.* 1.6.4-10, Socrates defends his way of life to Antiphon, including his failure to work for pay; because he does not take payment, he points out, he is not obligated to talk to anyone unless he wants to do so. Socrates stresses the pleasures of hardiness and of having few wants, and the leisure he has to help friends and the city. Cf. Callicles' portrayal of Socrates as an impractical Amphion in Plato's *Gorgias*, discussed in Chapter 2, section D.

⁵⁵⁸ See discussion in section D.

⁵⁵⁹ Pomeroy 1994, 264-5, ad *Oec.* 8.1. Kronenberg suggests that the highly decorated setting also raises a theme of the dichotomy between appearance and reality, although Xenophon makes no reference to the Stoa's decorations, or to anything beyond its name. Kronenberg 2009, 54.

⁵⁶⁰ Cf. Kronenberg 2009, 54 (the setting emphasizes the difference between Greece and barbarian Persia); Ambler 1996, 115-6 (the setting is a reminder of delivery from Persia and perhaps also from barbaric notions that fail to support Greek liberty; there is a possible contrast with Socrates' emphasis on the liberty of the soul in 1.17-23). See further discussion in section C.3.

directly linked to Ischomachos' conventional system of spatial metaphor stressing "interior" vs. "exterior," as discussed in the next sections.

B.3 *Interior vs exterior space*

Fresh from his conversations with the artisans, Socrates begins his conversation with Ischomachos by noting how odd it is to see him sitting at leisure in the marketplace. Ischomachos agrees that he's usually busy, and explains that he is waiting for some foreign friends he has agreed to meet there (7.2). "When you're not doing that," says Socrates, "by the gods, where do you spend your time and what do you do? For I very much want to learn from you by asking what exactly you do to be called καλὸς κάγαθός, since you certainly do not spend your time inside nor is such a poor physical condition manifest in your body" (7.2). Ischomachos laughs (but seems pleased) at the suggestion he is called καλὸς κάγαθός, and agrees that he does not spend his time inside—for his wife, he says, is entirely capable of managing things inside the house (7.3-4).

The importance of spatial location, and the accompanying contrast between inside and outside, is stressed in Socrates' first specific question to Ischomachos: "*where* do you spend your time (ποῦ διατρίβεις; 7.2)?" To fully understand the context, we must understand contemporary attitudes towards the form of artisanal labor or handwork called βαναυσία, as well as Xenophon's characterization of it.

B.4 *Βαναυσος and ἐλευθέριος*

As Socrates is repeating this part of his conversation with Ischomachos to Critoboulos, Critoboulos will be remembering that Socrates has just rejected as suitable for Critoboulos any form of "banausic" labor:

Ἀλλὰ καλῶς, ἔφη, λέγεις, ὦ Κριτόβουλε. Καὶ γὰρ αἱ γε βαναυσικαὶ καλούμεναι καὶ ἐπίρρητοί εἰσι καὶ εἰκότως μέντοι πάνυ ἀδοξοῦνται πρὸς τῶν πόλεων. καταλυμαίνονται γὰρ τὰ σώματα τῶν τε ἐργαζομένων καὶ τῶν

ἐπιμελομένων, ἀναγκάζουσαι καθῆσθαι καὶ σκιατραφεῖσθαι, ἔνιαι δὲ καὶ πρὸς πῦρ ἡμερεύειν. τῶν δὲ σωμάτων θηλυνομένων καὶ αἱ ψυχαὶ πολὺ ἄρρωστότεραι γίνονται. Καὶ ἀσχολίας δὲ μάλιστα ἔχουσι καὶ φίλων καὶ πόλεως συνεπιμελεῖσθαι αἱ βαναυσικαὶ καλούμεναι. ὥστε οἱ τοιοῦτοι δοκοῦσι κακοὶ καὶ φίλοις χρῆσθαι καὶ ταῖς πατρίσιν ἀλεξητῆρες εἶναι.
Oec. 4.2-3.

You speak well, Critoboulos, [Socrates] said, for indeed the [arts]⁵⁶¹ called banausic are cried out against and are—entirely reasonably, you know—held in ill repute by the cities. For they injure the bodies of those working and supervising, forcing them to sit and stay under a roof, some even forcing them to spend the day by the fire. With their bodies being made effeminate, their souls also become much weaker. And in particular the [arts] called banausic have no leisure to participate in the care for friends and for the city, so that these sorts of [workers] seem bad in their treatment of friends and in being defenders of their fatherland.

The banausic occupations are those that require manual labor, often in a workshop, producing objects for sale: a potter, an armorer, a smith.⁵⁶² Socrates is

⁵⁶¹ The unspecified noun could be either ἐπιστήμη (branch of knowledge) or τεχνή (art, skill); I have chosen τεχνή, on the grounds that in the next sentence after the end of the above passage, Socrates refers to banausic arts (βαναυσικὰς τέχνας, 4.3).

⁵⁶² The term βαναυσία was relatively rare until the fourth century. In one of its earliest appearances, Herodotus notes that no Egyptians from certain provinces have learned artisanal trades (βαναυσίη), but only practice soldiering; Herodotus says that does not know whether the Greeks learned it from the Egyptians or not, but all Greeks look down on handiworkers (χειροτέχναι), the Spartans the most, and the Corinthians the least. Hdt. 2.165.1, 2.167.2. See also Arist., *Eth. Eud.* 1215a30-32 (the “banausic” are the sitting and wage-earning pursuits), and other examples from

distinguishing these occupations from farming, which Critoboulos will come to hail as the noblest of occupations (*Oec.* 4.4, 6.11).

In this period it is Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle who “virtually monopolize” the pejorative terms βάνανσος and βανανσία to describe artisans and their labor.⁵⁶³ Their views were probably harsher than those of the majority of Athenians,⁵⁶⁴ as Athens admitted artisans to all the privileges of citizenship⁵⁶⁵—which both Plato and Aristotle thought less than ideal.⁵⁶⁶ As Xenophon’s Socrates notes in the *Memorabilia*, it is the artisans and traders, together with the farmers, who make up the bulk of the assembly (*Mem.* 3.7.5-6). But although these authors were the ones who theorized βανανσία, there are traces elsewhere of the view that artisanal work was the mark of a lower status. In the rhetoric of democratic Athens, it was a common term of reproach against politicians and other prominent men that they or

Aristotle discussed below. For a general discussion of the use of βανανσία, see Rössler 1981, 203-43.

⁵⁶³ Nightingale notes a few earlier works employing the term, e.g., *Soph. Ajax* 1121; *Hdt.* 2.165.1, 2.167.2 (discussed above). Nightingale 2004, 120. See also Rössler 1981, 203-4.

⁵⁶⁴ Balme 1984, 144-8; Ehrenberg 1943, 111 (the distinction between “banausic” professions and those of the “liberally educated” was more important to a small upper class than to population as a whole).

⁵⁶⁵ In Athens, practicing a manual craft did not prevent exercise of full citizen rights; a law attributed to Solon attacked the problem of idleness by encouraging fathers to teach their sons a trade. Austin & Vidal-Naquet 1977, 107; see also Ehrenberg 1943, 114. Other Greek states were less liberal. Austin & Vidal-Naquet 1977, 17-8.

⁵⁶⁶ Plato, *Laws* 8.846d (artisans (δημιουργοί) cannot be citizens); Aristotle, *Pol.*, 1278a6-11 (the banausic man should not be a citizen); cf. *Pol.* 1328b33-1329a3 (distinguishing the farmer from the artisan, but concluding the farmer also lacks leisure and therefore is unsuited to citizenship in the best form of the state). See discussion below.

their family had engaged in artisanal occupations such as knife-making⁵⁶⁷ or (even worse) retail trade, a designation that would include many artisans who also sold their own wares.⁵⁶⁸ And the deleterious effects of artisanal work on the body also does not seem to be an invention of the Socratic authors; for example, in Aristophanes, shoemakers are characterized as having a feminine pallor, presumably from their working all day indoors.⁵⁶⁹

Aristotle's discussions of βαναυσία are the most comprehensive. Like Xenophon, Aristotle criticizes banausic labor on the grounds that it ruins mind and body, and does not leave the worker with enough leisure to participate in public

⁵⁶⁷ For example, Demosthenes accused Aeschines of low-class occupations such as manual labor in his father's school (Dem. 18.257-65 "On the Crown") and called Androtion a goldsmith (Dem. 22.70 "Against Androtion"). Similarly, Andocides sneeringly called Cleophon a "lyre maker" (And. 1.146). We also see an orator referring to various unnamed politicians as coppersmiths and tanners (Ps. Dem. 25.38 "Against Aristogeiton"). Although Aristophanes reserves his most pointed blows for the sellers of goods (see below), he does call Hyperbolus a lampmaker in *Peace*, 690. See discussion in Ober 1989, 272-277; Austin & Vidal-Naquet 1977, 108.

⁵⁶⁸ Ehrenberg 1943, 94-9 (most artisans would also have sold their own wares). On the dishonesty of small-scale retailers (as opposed to traders), see Ehrenberg 1943, 87-91, 110-1 (describing the prejudice against the retailer). See also Austin & Vidal-Naquet 1977, 11-4 (war and politics in contrast were respectable modes of acquisition); Dover 1974, 40 (giving examples from comedy and oratory). Connors points out that when Aristophanes mocks politicians like Cleon, he usually makes them not artisans, but peddlers. Thus his Sausage-seller describes Paphlagon, a recognized caricature of the politician Cleon, as surrounded by "leather sellers ... honey sellers and cheese sellers." Ar. *Knights* 852-7. Cleon was in fact the son of a man who owned a profitable tannery. Connors 1971, 151, 171-2.

⁵⁶⁹ Ar. *Assembly Women*, 385.

life;⁵⁷⁰ in addition, he stresses that it makes the worker dependent on the demands of the market or of an employer.⁵⁷¹ For these reasons, even though the βάνανσος may be legally free, Aristotle does not consider him to be a man fit to govern and to be a true citizen (*Pol.* 1277b35-8). Thus in his *Politics*, Aristotle argues that in the most excellent states the βάνανσοι are not citizens; and in states where they are citizens, the excellence (ἀρετή) of a citizen belongs not to all free (ἐλευθέρος) men, but only to those who are released from constraining occupations such as those of slaves, βάνανσοι, or hired laborers (θῆτες) (*Pol.* 1278a8-13), and goes on to say that those living a banausic or thetic life cannot practice the pursuits of ἀρετή (*Pol.* 1278a21-2). Similarly, when Aristotle discusses forms of education that are suitable for a free man and noble (ἐλευθέριον καὶ καλὴν, *Pol.* 1338a32), he specifies that the occupations fit for free men must be distinguished from those which are not fit (διηρημένων τῶν τε ἐλευθέρων ἔργων καὶ τῶν ἀνελευθέρων, *Pol.* 1337b6-7) and

⁵⁷⁰ Thus Aristotle comments at *Pol.* 1258b35-7 that the most banausic (βανανυσόταται) occupations are those in which the body is most ruined (while the most servile are those that make the greatest use of the body, and the most ignoble those that require the least ἀρετή).

⁵⁷¹ Thus in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle says that it is characteristic of a free man not to live in dependence on another, and therefore it is honorable not to work at a banausic trade. Arist. *Rhet.* 1367a32-3. Similarly, Aristotle notes in the *Politics* that it makes a difference why something is studied or practiced; if for the sake of oneself, one's friends, or ἀρετή then it is not unsuitable for a free man (ἀνελεύθερος), but the same thing done for the sake of others often seems thetic or slavish (Arist. *Pol.* 1337b18-22). See discussions in Nightingale 2004, 120-1; Raaflaub 1983, 531. Cf. the point made by Xenophon's Socrates to Antiphon the Sophist, that he is free to talk to whomever he likes (presumably, unlike Antiphon) because he does not take payment for his conversation. *Mem.* 1.6.4-10.

that the young should not have a share in those that make the participant βάνανυσος (*Pol.* 1337b9).⁵⁷²

Βάνανυσον δ' ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ τὰς τε τοιαύτας τέχνας ὅσαι τὸ σῶμα παρασκευάζουσι χεῖρον διακεῖσθαι βαναύσους καλοῦμεν καὶ τὰς μισθαρνικὰς ἐργασίας· ἄσχολον γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ταπεινὴν. 1337b8-15.

It is necessary to consider the task and art and study banausic if they make the body or soul or understanding of free men useless for the employments and practices of virtue. For which reason, all the arts that put the body in a worse state we call banausic and also the wage-earning occupations; for they make the understanding without leisure and base.

Plato has the same general conception of βανανυσία, similarly emphasizing that artisanal labor ruins the mind and body, and agreeing that in an ideal state artisans would not be citizens.⁵⁷³

⁵⁷² Raaflaub has argued that by the fourth century, as evidenced by writers such as Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, and Isocrates, members of the wealthy and noble class (i.e., those like Ischomachos) had adapted the democratic ideology of the free citizen (ἐλεύθερος) to the concept of a “truly free” (ἐλευθέριος) man, one who had the leisure to pursue politics and public service without the burden of having to make a living, in contrast to those who were perhaps legally free, but still bound by economic necessity—for example, the artisans (βάνανυσοι). Raaflaub 1983, 528-9, 531.

⁵⁷³ *Pl. Rep.* 495d4-e8 (describing men unfit for philosophy because their bodies have been ruined by their craftwork (δημιουργία) just as their souls have been damaged on account of their βανανυσία, like a bald tinker who is planning to marry his

But in the *Oeconomicus*, Xenophon emphasizes what Aristotle and Plato do not: that banausic labor is physically confined to interior space. The word chosen by Xenophon, σκιατραφεῖσθαι, literally means “to dwell or be raised in shadow.” Its more imagistic usages often imply more of an effeminate luxury than a laborer’s workshop.⁵⁷⁴ Thus in Xenophon, the banausic arts are not only sedentary practices that damage the body (a point made by both Aristotle and Plato). They are specifically imagined as practices that require the worker to sit *inside*, and make the workers’ bodies not just weak, but womanish. Xenophon emphasizes this spatial aspect of *where* banausic labor is done—just as his opening question to Ischomachos was *where* Ischomachos spends most of his time.⁵⁷⁵

master’s daughter); Pl. *Laws* 8.846d (δημιουργοί cannot be citizens). See discussion in Vidal-Naquet 1986, 224-6, 233-6, where he notes that in the *Laws* Plato avoids the most pejorative term for artisans, βάνανσοι, and recognizes artisans as necessary and as more honorable than retailers. Vidal-Naquet argues for a suppressed Platonic value system that regarded artisanal activity as the highest exemplar of human action. Nightingale also notes that Plato’s most potent deployments of the rhetoric of βανανυσία are in reality directed at *all* activity other than philosophy, not just artisanal activity—and especially that of the sophists and rhetoricians. Nightingale 2004, 118-124, discussing Pl. *Theaet.* 176c-d (Socrates says that true wisdom is understanding that to be just is to be like the divine, and that all other forms of cleverness are vulgar or banausic) and Pl. *Rep.* 495-6 (above).

⁵⁷⁴ See, e.g., Hdt. 3.12.4 (the Persians have brittle skulls because they keep their heads from childhood in the shade of caps); Pl. *Rep.* 556d2-5 (the hardy sunburned pauper compared to the helpless shade-bred rich man).

⁵⁷⁵ Aristotle and Plato may also have had a pragmatic reason for deemphasizing the association between βανανυσία and inside labor; at least judging from Aristophanes’ *Clouds*, a feminine lack of a suntan could be taken satirically as one of the marks of an intellectual (or of his students). *Clouds*, 1017 (Just Speech describes his sophistic opponents as having χροιάν ὥχραν, pale skin). This would not have been a concern of the old campaigner, Xenophon.

We can now see the full significance of the conversation's being located in the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios. As I noted above, one effect of this location is to remind Critoboulos of the difference between Greece and Persia. But in the context of Socrates' concern about banausic labor, which he and Critoboulos discussed as part of a prelude to Socrates' recounting his meeting with Ischomachos, the adjective ἐλευθέριος also suggests a man who is not only legally free, but who behaves *like* a free man,⁵⁷⁶ that is, in the way a free man should behave: one who does not engage in a banausic occupation that ruins his mind and body, makes him economically dependent on others, leaves him without the leisure necessary to be a good friend and citizen—and that, as Xenophon emphasizes, is typically practiced *inside*.

Some scholars have suggested that Socrates' concern about banausic labor is meant to be ironic,⁵⁷⁷ pointing to passages in the *Memorabilia* where Socrates

⁵⁷⁶ Raaflaub notes that ἀνελεύθερος and ἀνελευθέριος became practically interchangeable, as did ἐλευθέριος and ἐλεύθερος for the most part (although ἐλευθέριος retained the special meaning of “generous”). Raaflaub 1983, 544 n. 88, 95.

⁵⁷⁷ Kronenberg 2009, 42 n. 6. See also Strauss 1970, 115 (arguing that banausic arts like smithing do not make the body soft; Strauss does not consider that Hephaistos, the god of smithing, is often portrayed as lame precisely because smithing does not require that the *entire* body be fit). Kronenberg also points to Socrates' choice of language in a later passage where (in the text she prefers) Socrates says that he agrees with the cities in rejecting “the arts called banausic, because they *seem to utterly ruin the body and enervate the soul*” (τὰς βαναυσικὰς καλουμένας τέχνας, ὅτι καὶ τὰ σώματα καταλυμαίνεσθαι δοκοῦσι καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς καταγνύναι. 6.5-6). I am relying on Pomeroy's edition of the text, which is essentially that of Marchant's Oxford edition (Pomeroy 1994, 95); Pomeroy has καταγνύουσιν, which would make the relevant part of the translation “because they seem to utterly ruin the body and *they enervate* the soul.” But even if we assume Kronenberg's preferred text, Socrates' language in the above-quoted passage at 4.2-3 is too strong to be intended

praises banausic work or urges working for wages.⁵⁷⁸ But although Socrates praised honest work to his friends (*Mem.* 1.2.56-7), he nowhere recommends banausic labor to a free man who has some other choice of an honest living. Socrates' warnings

ironically; the word δοκοῦσι in 6.5-6 at most is an acknowledgment that Socrates and Critoboulos have not discussed the matter in great depth.

⁵⁷⁸ In one anecdote, Aristarchos complains to Socrates that he is at a loss how to care for a large contingent of female relatives; his revenues from property have dried up, he cannot find buyers for his personal property, and it is impossible to take out a loan (*Mem.* 2.7.2). The idea that Socrates suggests—that the women should make and sell clothing—has never occurred to him, because they are free (ἐλεύθεροι) rather than slaves, and have been educated liberally (ἐλευθερίως) rather than as artisans (τεχνίται) (*Mem.* 2.7.3-4). Socrates, however, has a different understanding of what it means to be “free” and to have had a “truly free education,” one that stresses not freedom from economic constraints, but rather freedom from unnecessary desires. He points out that having a care for useful things is more conducive to self-control (σωφρονίζω) than is idleness (*Mem.* 2.7.8), and that weaving and making clothing is something the women understand and is what is considered the most honorable and suitable for women in any case (*Mem.* 2.7.10). Needless to say, Aristarchos takes Socrates' advice and finds that his household not only can support itself, but is now happy because it is productive. It should be noted, however, that Socrates does not suggest that Aristarchos *himself* take up banausic work, a suggestion that Aristarchos would probably have rejected. Rather, Socrates is making a connection between the conventional ideas of banausic labor and female labor, and this is what Aristarchos finds persuasive. In another anecdote, Eutheros has been forced to do physical labor after losing his property, and Socrates urges him to find a position as property manager instead, as he'll be able to sustain that physically for longer. Eutheros is resistant to the idea of having to be responsible to someone else; but Socrates points out that those who manage a city's affairs are thought to be “more like free men,” ἐλευθεριώτεροι, and not more slavish. *Mem.* 2.8.4.

about the dangers of banausic labor are real. But as we will see, especially when he talks to Critoboulos about the Persian King, his emphasis on the “insideness” of banausic labor will suggest that being *metaphorically* inside an authoritarian structure like a kingdom—or an estate—poses its own dangers.

Ischomachos most definitely is *outside*. He is meeting Socrates outside, in the *agora*; his work as a gentleman farmer is done outside. Xenophon does not share Aristotle’s (and Plato’s) ambivalence about farming,⁵⁷⁹ which Socrates will lead Critoboulos to call the noblest of occupations (*Oec.* 6.11).⁵⁸⁰ Yet Ischomachos’ focus

⁵⁷⁹ For example, in *Politics* 1328b33-1329a3, Aristotle distinguishes farmers from artisans, but concludes the farmer also lacks leisure and therefore is unsuited to citizenship in the best form of the state, even though he considers farmers to be the best form of the δῆμος (*Pol.* 1318b10). Similarly, in the *Laws*, Plato’s Athenian specifies that the work of farming will be done only by slaves (806d-e). Cf. Plato’s *Phaedrus* 248d2-e3, where Plato’s Socrates describes how souls become embodied according to how much of truth the soul managed to see while winged, with the philosopher in the first class, having seen the most, the tyrant in the last and ninth, and the artisan and farmer together in a lowly seventh class.

⁵⁸⁰ In Greek thought, agriculture was generally distinguished from other economic activities, holding a place of its own at the top. Austin & Vidal-Naquet 1977, 11; Dover 1974, 112-4 (moral qualities of farmers favorably contrasted to those of townsmen, although farmers often portrayed as rustic); Ehrenberg 1943, 56-73 (describing the favorable view of (small) farmers in Aristophanes, as contrasted to idlers and sycophants of the town). Of course, the small farmer, the αὐτουργός who did all or most of his own manual labor, was by definition poor, rustic, and nonelite; a gentleman-farmer like Xenophon’s Ischomachos supervised slaves who did most of the heavy work (e.g., *Oec.* 12-14), although Socrates’ praise of the strength-giving aspects of farming (e.g., *Oec.* 5.1), as well as the praise of the Persian King who did some of his own gardening (*Oec.* 4.24-5, discussed in C.3), suggest that even gentlemen farmers were capable of lending a hand on occasion. Most of the population of Attica probably were small farmers, if not necessarily the majority of

on wealth and profit gives his farming one type of resemblance to that of the banausic man, which Socrates will later criticize. In addition, his authoritarian leadership of his slaves and household servants gives him a strong resemblance to the Persian King—and the King’s labors *inside* his kingdom.

B.5 *A conversation with Ischomachos’ wife*

We can now see that Socrates’ opening question to Ischomachos, “where do you spend your time and what do you do? For I very much want to learn from you by asking what exactly you do to be called καλὸς κάγαθός, since you certainly do not spend your time inside . . . ” is, for the reader, heard in the context of the conversation between Socrates and Critoboulos on banausic work, which Xenophon characterizes as “inside.” It is thus unsurprising that Ischomachos immediately confirms to Socrates that he does *not* spend his time inside—his wife, he says, is entirely capable of managing things inside the house (7.3-4)⁵⁸¹—which Ischomachos sees as the natural place for women, just as the outside is for men. Socrates then asks whether Ischomachos himself taught his wife how to manage her duties, or whether she learned that from her parents. Ischomachos at first says only that although his wife came to him well-taught in self-control, she did not know more than the basic aspects of spinning and weaving. But when Socrates asks him again, he confirms that he did indeed teach her himself about household management—after they both had made the appropriate prayers to the gods that the teaching would be successful (7.4-8). In what follows, Ischomachos explains how

the Assembly at any given time. Balme 1984, 144, 146 (citing Thuc. 2.14). See also the general discussion of farming in the General Introduction, section A.2; the discussion of Persian vs. Socratic Greek farming in the *Oeconomicus* in sections C.3-4.

⁵⁸¹ Note that although Ischomachos is happy to answer Socrates’ question about his daily activities, he resists the idea that all call him καλὸς κάγαθός.

he trained his wife (who is never named)⁵⁸² to be a good manager.⁵⁸³ He does so by relating a series of conversations he once had with his wife in which he described the ordered household as a matter of both divine nature and human choice: divine nature has placed men outside and women inside the home; within that interior, man and wife work together to create an order based on their analysis of their needs and property.

Ischomachos' description of the ordered household (as well as his subsequent description of farming practices) makes heavy use of rhetorical techniques such as metaphor, imagery, repetition, and ring composition, especially when he is describing how he and his wife chose to order the interior of their home. As we will see, Socrates does not call attention to or otherwise criticize the images used by Ischomachos to describe this ordering, many of which are in fact used elsewhere by Xenophon. What Socrates *does* call attention to are those images that Ischomachos uses to claim that certain conventional forms of social organization or understanding are "natural."

B.5.a *By nature, the woman's place is inside, the man's place is outside*

We will see in the next section that Ischomachos sees the ordering of a household as based on the householders' choices about how to respond to their

⁵⁸² See discussion of the identity of Ischomachos' wife in A.3. Note that Ischomachos does not name his father, either. See discussion in B.9.

⁵⁸³ Ischomachos does not claim an absolute ability to train others. As noted in the text, he and his wife both pray to the gods that Ischomachos' teaching will be successful. When Ischomachos discusses training his servants to exercise careful diligence, he will admit to Socrates that not all of them are teachable (*Oec.* 12.9-15, discussed in section B.7). At the very end of Socrates' conversation with Ischomachos, Ischomachos will state that although there are aspects of leadership that can be learned, ultimately the ability to inspire willing followers is a divine gift.

needs. However, as he explains to his wife,⁵⁸⁴ he sees this ordering as occurring within a divinely ordered natural framework that relies upon the distinction between “inside” and “outside.”⁵⁸⁵ Ischomachos explains that the gods had put male and female into a yoked pair (7.19) in which they had designed the man’s body and mind to be stronger and hardier and thus best suited to work outdoors, while the woman’s nature was weaker, more cautious, and more attentive to children, and thus more suited to work indoors caring for house and children (7.20-5). This natural division is approved by society’s law, making it more noble (κάλλιον) for the woman to stay inside than to dwell out of doors, and for the man more disgraceful (αἰσχιον) to stay inside than to care for things outside (7.30).⁵⁸⁶ But their essential duty is the same: to practice prudence (σωφροσύνη, 7.15).

⁵⁸⁴ Ischomachos holds this conversation with his wife once she was tamed and domesticated enough to converse, διαλέγεσθαι, 7.10.

⁵⁸⁵ Ambler characterizes Ischomachos’ teachings as mostly a “natural theology.” He does not discuss the extent to which Ischomachos alters the conventional meanings of the natural imagery he uses (see discussion of the bee, below), or Ischomachos’ emphasis on the matter of human choice in creating household order. Ambler 1996, 117-20.

⁵⁸⁶ Much of the recent scholarly discussion of the *Oeconomicus* has focused on the importance of this part of the dialogue for our understanding of gender roles in ancient Athens. See, e.g., Lu 2015, 217-20 (Xenophon elevates the domestic sphere by taking it as an extension of the public sphere, but gives an unrealistic construction of the housewife and household management from the male point of view); Glazebrook 2009, 238-47 (the *Oeconomicus* portrays a new kind of woman who is trained to be productive and a manager and to converse, rather than the old feminine stereotype of unproductive and deceptive); Too 2001, 71-2, 79 (Ischomachos socializes his wife into a role he sees as productive and unlike the misogynistic Hesiodic view, but his teachings do not lead to real wealth; Socrates’ remarks show him up as a “babbling fool”); Scaife 1995, 231-2 (Ischomachos gives his young bride a gentle, reassuring, and non-misogynistic description of her new

Σωφροσύνη is an important concept that we have already seen in Plato's *Gorgias*, where Socrates responded to Calicles's praise of fulfilling boundless desires by emphasizing the importance of σωφροσύνη, which there I translated as "temperance."⁵⁸⁷ But it can also be translated by English words such as "prudence," where it implies a more active virtue.⁵⁸⁸ However, for a woman σωφροσύνη often had a more limited and negative sense: the control of sexual and other appetites above all, as well as staying indoors and being obedient to her husband.⁵⁸⁹ But as Ischomachos tells his wife, σωφροσύνη for *both* men and women is the positive virtue of acting so that "our estate will be in the most excellent condition possible,

duties as a part of the welcome to her new home); Gini 1993, 484-5 (arguing that wife's responses to Ischomachos show critical intelligence at work); Murnaghan 1988, 13-8 (Xenophon aims to eliminate male/female difference, just as he seeks to eliminate that between public and private; the wife becomes a quasi-male subordinate freeing Ischomachos to spend time outside, the desirable place to be).

⁵⁸⁷ See, e.g., Pl. *Gorgias* 503e1-505b12, and discussions in Chapter 2, esp. sections D.5 and D.6.

⁵⁸⁸ Thus in the *Memorabilia*, when Xenophon describes how Alcibiades and Critias ceased to be σώφρων when they left Socrates, he says that Socrates should have credit for controlling them when they were young, when they were the most unprudent (ἀγνωμονεστάτω) and untemperate (ἀκρατεστάτω) (*Mem.* 1.2.23-4, 26). See discussion in North 1966, 123-4 (noting that Xenophon refers to σωφροσύνη more than any writer before him, with the possible exception of Euripides); Dodds 19, 336 ad *Gorgias* 507a7 (noting that Plato here uses twoonyms to σώφρων, ἄφρων (not sensible) and ἀκόλαστος (not self-controlled)).

⁵⁸⁹ North 1977, 36-40 (temperance (σωφροσύνη) for women was mostly thought of as being chaste, obedient, and staying inside). See also Rademaker 2005, 260-1, 263-5 (chastity as the prototypical sense where women were concerned, as well as obedience); Dover 1974, 98 (discussing the seclusion of Athenian women). Cf. Cohen 1989 (pointing out that an ideology that placed women "inside" the home did not mean that they had no activities or relationships outside the home).

and other things will be added to it to the greatest extent possible from fine and just [action]” (τὰ τε ὄντα ὡς βέλτιστα ἔξει καὶ ἄλλα ὅτι πλεῖστα ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ δικαίου προσγενήσεται, 7.15). The idea that for *both* men and women, σωφροσύνη is not only an active virtue, but is connected to the improvement of the household, appears to be an innovation introduced by Xenophon.⁵⁹⁰ Ischomachos therefore stresses that the god, knowing that it was necessary for both man and woman to give and to take, made memory, diligent care (ἐπιμέλεια), and self-control common to both male and female (literally, placed them “into the middle common area for both”):

ὅτι δ’ ἀμφοτέρους δεῖ καὶ διδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν, τὴν μνήμην καὶ τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀμφοτέροις κατέθηκεν. ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἔχοις διελεῖν πότερα τὸ ἔθνος τὸ θῆλυ ἢ τὸ ἄρρεν τούτων πλεονεκτεῖ. καὶ τὸ ἐγκρατεῖς δὲ εἶναι ὧν δεῖ εἰς τὸ μέσον ἀμφοτέροις κατέθηκε.... (7.26-7).

Because it is necessary that both [male and female] give and take, [the god] put memory and diligent care into the middle common area for both. Thus you could not choose which class, the male or female, has a larger share of these things. And [the god] put into the middle for both the ability to be self-controlled in what is necessary. . . .

To persuade his wife that the arrangement he has described is both natural and desirable, Ischomachos deploys an image from nature: the bee. His wife is, he tells her, like a “queen bee” (ἡ τῶν μελιττῶν ἡγεμὼν 7.32; cf. 7.18) who remains in the hive and supervises it, sending other bees to their jobs outside, keeping account

⁵⁹⁰ Glazebrook 2009, 240-1 (describing this characterization of female σωφροσύνη as “truly novel”); Pomeroy 1994, 275 ad *Oec.* 7.15; North 1977, 46-7 (identifying Xenophon as apparently the first to define both masculine and feminine σωφροσύνη in relationship to household management, as opposed to treating female σωφροσύνη as primarily a matter of continence).

of what is inside and justly distributing it as necessary (7.33). She supervises both the rearing of the children and the “weaving of the wax combs inside, so that the weaving may be done finely and quickly” (τοῖς ἔνδον δ’ ἐξυφαινομένοις κηρίοις ἐφέστηκεν, ὥς καλῶς καὶ ταχέως ὑφαίνεται, 7.34). Similarly, his wife will stay inside, supervising the slaves working indoors and sending other slaves to work outdoors; will properly store and manage the provisions brought inside; will oversee the production of clothing; and will nurse those who are ill. (7.35-7). Such a queen earns the loyalty of the hive, such that if she left, all would follow her (7.38).⁵⁹¹

Ischomachos’ interpretation of the bee image departs from traditional understandings of it. Although good women (i.e., good housewives) had long been compared to the worker bee in Greek literature,⁵⁹² the ruling bee of the hive was

⁵⁹¹ Xenophon uses the same image in the *Cyropaedia*, where Cyrus is called a born king just like the king bee whom the other bees will follow. *Cyr.* 5.1.24.

⁵⁹² As many scholars note, the bee is an old image in Greek literature for the female domestic virtues, as the bee was thought to be hard-working, chaste, and to hate all impurity. Aristotle, *Hist. Anim.*, 5.21 §553a (noting there is no agreement on the generation of bees and that some say bees do not copulate or bear young); 9.40, §623b ff (describing bees as hard-working and thrifty); *Gen. Anim.* 3.10, § 759b-760a (the generation of bees is a great puzzle, but it seems to occur without copulation). See discussion in Detienne 1981 [1974], 98-9. Thus in Semonides’ notorious misogynistic tirade, the best and only good kind of woman is the bee-woman (Semonides Fr. 7.83-93). The lawful wives who celebrated the festival to Demeter, the Thesmophoria, were known as “bees,” Μέλισσαι; as Detienne has noted, the “the sexual and dietary abstinence of the Μέλισσαι during the festival marked them out as exaggerated versions of the female domestic virtue represented by the bee.” Detienne 1981 [1974], 102; see also Versnel, 1992, 42. For a general discussion, see Pomeroy 1994, 277-80 ad *Oec.* 32.

considered to be a male king.⁵⁹³ Thus Ischomachos' wife questions the image, suggesting that perhaps Ischomachos is really the lead bee, as he is the one who provides what she will guard (7.39). But Ischomachos reaffirms his interpretation, saying that it would be ridiculous (γέλοιος) for him to bring things into the household if there were not someone to care for them. "Do you not see how they are pitied, those people who are said to draw water into the holey jar (τὸν τετρημένον πίθον), because they seem to labor in vain?" (7.40).

Certainly much of what Ischomachos has to say is conventional. The queen bee recalls the most important aspect of traditional feminine σωφροσύνη, which was chastity above all; his identification of a household well-managed by the wife with an unpierced jar may also emphasize the importance of women controlling their sexual and other appetites, as it recalls the image of a jar for the female womb.⁵⁹⁴ Purves has argued that Ischomachos is suggesting that the wife's duties to order and control the interior space of the home are related to the need to control the interior of the body⁵⁹⁵—something that the Greeks found particularly important for women, as they feared the illicit opening of female bellies and wombs to wasteful consumption or to lovers.⁵⁹⁶ Ischomachos' reference to those "who are said" to carry

⁵⁹³ Pomeroy 1984, 104. As she notes, Aristotle consistently refers to "king" bees (ὁ ἡγεμὼν or ὁ βασιλεύς), though he comments on the scientific confusion over the gender of the drones and the leader. Arist. *Hist. Animal.* 5.21, § 553a-b. Plato and Xenophon (elsewhere) both refer to "king" bees, e.g., Plato *Rep.* 7.520b7 (ὁ ἡγεμὼν and ὁ βασιλεύς) and Xen. *Cyr.* 5.1.24 (ὁ ἡγεμὼν), *Hell.* 3.2.28 (ὁ ἡγεμὼν). See Hudson-Willians 1934, 2-4 (collecting ancient examples).

⁵⁹⁴ See, e.g., Hipp. *Gen.* 9, § 482 (the womb compared to an ἄγος); Sissa 1990, 154-6, 158-64.

⁵⁹⁵ Purves 2010, 207-8 & n. 18.

⁵⁹⁶ For example, Semonides, whose misogynistic poem was mentioned above, complains about the earth-woman who understands nothing but how to eat (Sem. Fr. 7.25), and the donkey-woman who eats all day and night and sleeps with anyone who comes along, (Sem. Fr. 7.46-9). See also Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 703-5 (a bad

water in “the” holey jar is also often thought to recall the Danaides, the women punished for murdering their new husbands by being condemned to carry water in holey jars in the underworld—another image of female misbehavior to be avoided.⁵⁹⁷

But Ischomachos’ alteration of the conventional bee image signals his alteration of those conventional ideas. He insists that his wife is a “queen bee,” the productive leader of an orderly household, who not only rules but even works to “weave” the fabric of the household itself. Ischomachos will repeat (at length) this conception of household order as something that has to be created when he explains to his wife how to organize the household (see discussion in next section). Nor, for that matter, does Ischomachos identify the holey jar with the story of the Danaides; after all, in his use of the image, *he* is the one trying to fill the jar. When the Platonic Socrates uses the myth of the underworld Watercarriers in the *Gorgias* to describe souls who are foolish and lack temperance, the Watercarriers are men described as “uninitiated” (ἀμύητοι, Pl. *Grg.* 493b5).⁵⁹⁸ Significantly, at the very end of the

wife described as a parasitic dinner guest); *Theog.* 594-602 (men are like bees who labor to feed women, the descendants of Pandora, who are like drones who eat what others produce). See discussion in Dover 1974, 101-2 (women thought to be more licentious than men).

⁵⁹⁷ See, e.g., Too 2001, 71; Gini 1993, 485. Although this may well be *an* image that Xenophon means to evoke here, I argue below that it is not the only image. Dodds and Sissa note that the identification of the underworld Watercarriers with the Danaides is not securely attested before the pseudo-Platonic *Axiochus* (371e) and Plutarch, *Sept. Sap.* 160b. Sissa 1990, 150-1; Dodds 1959, 298 ad *Gorgias* 492d1-493d4. As Pomeroy points out, carrying water in a leaky jar was a proverbial expression for wasted labor, used for example by Aristotle at *Pol.* 1320a31-2 to describe the futility of trying to help the poor through doles without specific reference to women, the Danaides, or Hades. Pomeroy 1994, 283-4 ad *Oec.* 7.40.

⁵⁹⁸ Plato’s Socrates uses this image when attacking Callicles’ early contention that the good is the same as the pleasant, and that happiness is therefore the ability to

Oeconomicus, Xenophon's Ischomachos will describe men who have the divine gift of being able to lead willing followers as "initiate" (τετελεσμένοι, 21.12) into σωφροσύνη; immediately afterwards he will make the only other reference to the underworld in the *Oeconomicus*, the figure of Tantalos, who is the model for those forced to lead the unwilling.⁵⁹⁹

Ischomachos' wife is thus more than simply a passive vessel with the duty of remaining enclosed to protect whatever her husband puts inside;⁶⁰⁰ as the possessor of σωφροσύνη, she also exercises the sort of active self-control that makes her a creator of order and a leader.⁶⁰¹

Some authors have argued that the wife's questioning Ischomachos' bee image is meant to show that Ischomachos is misapplying an animal image to the

have and fulfill endless, intemperate desires (*Grg.* 492a-c). Socrates compares such a soul to a holey jar (τετρημένος . . . πίθος, *Grg.* 493b2-3) that can never be filled up, and argues that a life of nothing but inflow and outflow is essentially the life of an animal. See discussion in Chapter 2, section D.4. See also Plato's *Republic* 363d7-8 where Plato's Socrates describes the "impious and unjust" as being said to be buried in mud in Hades and compelled to fetch water in a sieve.

⁵⁹⁹ See further discussion in section B.10.

⁶⁰⁰ Glazebrook 2009, 240-1; North 1977, 46-7 (identifying Xenophon as apparently the first to define both masculine and feminine σωφροσύνη in relationship to household management, as opposed to treating female σωφροσύνη as primarily a matter of continence).

⁶⁰¹ Pomeroy 1984, 103 (Xenophon identifies the "queen bee" wife with the Persian King). Ischomachos' bee analogy also includes sending the young out to found a new colony. When his wife asks whether she will have to do that, he tells her that yes, she will send the slaves out to work (7.34-5). Gini argues that the wife's questions (at 7.34 and at 7.39 on whether Ischomachos is the leader bee) show that she understands that Ischomachos' bee analogy is faulty. Gini 1993, 484-5. For a further discussion of the connection between Ischomachos' wife and the Persian King, see section C.3.

more complex human realm.⁶⁰² But given Ischomachos' stress on the importance of both men and women exercising σωφροσύνη and self-control, it seems unlikely that he does not understand that there are differences between bees and people. But what he *is* missing is that he is not simply (mis)applying a natural image, but is rather making a rhetorical choice about how to interpret and employ the image. His wife implicitly points this out when she refers to the more traditional way of interpreting bee imagery; and Socrates will bring it up again, to Ischomachos' irritation, in the second half of their discussion.

B.5.b *Teaching the order of the household: the Greek civic model*

In his conversation with his wife, Ischomachos used images of jars and queen bees to characterize her as a possessor of the sort of σωφροσύνη that allowed her to be an active ruler and “weaver” of the household. Ischomachos now explains to Socrates that he taught his wife explicitly about the importance of creating an orderly household because on one occasion she was upset that she could not find a household item Ischomachos requested (8.1-2).

Ischomachos begins by giving his wife a lengthy (and in some ways comic) encomium of order (τάξις) (8.3-20). The encomium is highly rhetorical,⁶⁰³ featuring devices such as rhetorical questions, alliteration, and a skillful use of repetition that extends to its structure: a ring composition. Ischomachos' encomium both begins and ends with the image of a choral dance that at the end is specifically a *circular* choral dance (8.20)—turning Ischomachos' speech itself into a metaphorically circular performance that calls attention to its own ordering.⁶⁰⁴ The opening of the

⁶⁰² See, e.g., Ambler 1996, 118.

⁶⁰³ As Pomeroy notes, the chapter contains some of the most elaborate prose in the *Oeconomicus*. Pomeroy 1994, 285 ad *Oec.*, Ch. 8. Cf. Socrates' own highly rhetorical praise of farming, discussed in section C.4.

⁶⁰⁴ Note that in 8.3, Ischomachos stresses that the onlookers observe (θεάομαι) the choral dance, not just passively watch it as entertainment; in 8.20 he uses a related

ring-composed encomium emphasizes that order is the most useful (εὐχρηστος) and beautiful thing for man:

ἔστι δ' οὐδὲν οὕτως, ὧ γύναι, οὔτ' εὐχρηστον οὔτε καλὸν ἀνθρώποις ὡς τάξις.
καὶ γὰρ χορὸς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων συγκείμενός ἔστιν· ἀλλ' ὅταν μὲν ποιῶσιν ὃ τι
ἂν τύχη ἕκαστος, ταραχὴ τις φαίνεται καὶ θεᾶσθαι ἀτερπές, ὅταν δὲ
τεταγμένως ποιῶσι καὶ φθέγγωνται, ἅμα οἱ αὐτοὶ οὔτοι καὶ ἀξιοθέατοι
δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀξιόκουστοι. (8.3)

There is nothing, wife, as useful or as beautiful for people as order. For indeed a chorus is formed from people; but whenever they do whatever each one happens to do, some sort of disorder appears and it is unpleasant to observe, but whenever they act and speak in an ordered fashion, they seem worthy of observation and of hearing.

This opening image of choral dance and song portrays τάξις as a dynamic, human-created order.⁶⁰⁵ Without τάξις, a moving chorus is only an unpleasant confusion; with τάξις, it is “both worthy to be observed (ἀξιοθέατοι) and to be heard (ἀξιόκουστοι, 8.4).”

The image of the choral dance reappears at the close of the encomium, which is also the rhetorical height of Ischomachos' praise of order, after his famous exclamations on the beauty of well-ordered household shoes (and clothing, and linen. . .): “how beautiful it appears whenever shoes are arranged in rows!” (ὡς δὲ καλὸν φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴν ὑποδήματα ἐφεξῆς κέηται, 8.19). Even cooking pots are graceful (εὐρυθμος) when arranged with discrimination, something that a refined fancy-talker (κομψός) might laugh at, but a serious man (σέμνος) would not (8.19).

word θέαμα (“sight”) to describe the choral dance. This recalls Socrates' warnings to Critoboulos to observe (θεάομαι) and examine critically what Socrates will relate to him. See discussion in section C.2.

⁶⁰⁵ Cf. the static τάξις of the Persian garden, discussed in section C.3.

Ischomachos compares these orderings to the dithyrambic chorus, where a group of men would sing and dance in an ordered circle around a central space such as an altar.⁶⁰⁶

τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἤδη που ἀπὸ τούτου ἅπαντα καλλίῳ φαίνεται κατὰ κόσμον
 κείμενα· χορὸς γὰρ σκευῶν ἕκαστα φαίνεται, καὶ τὸ μέσον δὲ πάντων τούτων
 καλὸν φαίνεται, ἐκποδῶν ἑκάστου κειμένου· ὥσπερ καὶ κύκλιος χορὸς οὐ
 μόνον αὐτὸς καλὸν θέαμά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ μέσον αὐτοῦ καλὸν καὶ
 καθαρὸν φαίνεται. (8.20-1)

And all the other things somehow, from this principle, seem more beautiful laid in order: for each [grouping] seems a chorus of household objects, and the empty space between all these seems beautiful, with each item laid out of the way; just as a circular chorus dance is not only itself a beautiful sight, but also its empty space seems beautiful and clean.

In between these images of choral dance that open and close Ischomachos' encomium of order are two additional images: an army on the move (8.4-7) and a military ship (8.8). When an army moves in order (τάξις), says Ischomachos, even if there are many ten thousands of men, all of them move like one, smoothly (καθ'

⁶⁰⁶ Pomeroy explains that this is "the dithyrambic chorus of fifty people who danced in a circle around an altar, rather than of a smaller group such as performed in tragedy and comedy, which danced in patterns of right angles." Pomeroy 1994, 291 ad *Oec.* 8.20. Raaflaub notes that the elite education that included training in dance, music, and poetry, the ἐλευθέριος παιδεία of Plato and Aristotle and other writers—that is, the education of those who were ἐλευθέριος and not banausic—was also known as ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία: a term that may well derive from ἐν κύκλῳ παιδεύειν, to educate in the circle of the chorus dance. Raaflaub 1983, 529-30 (see discussion of βαναυσία in section B.4).

ἡσυχίαν), as those behind are always going forward into the empty [space] (εἰς γὰρ τὸ κενούμενον ἀεὶ <οἱ> ὀπίσθεν ἐπέρχονται, 8.7-8). Similarly, the trireme is a worthy sight (ἄξιοθέατος) for its friends, as its rowers sit and move backwards and forward together, doing everything in order (ἐν τάξει) (8.8-9).⁶⁰⁷

Some scholars have looked at Ischomachos' lengthy praise of order, and in particular at his praise of ordered rows of humble objects like shoes (and clothing and linen and pots), and concluded that Xenophon is signaling that Ischomachos is a pedantic fool whose discourse is not to be taken seriously.⁶⁰⁸ There is something amusingly over-the-top about Ischomachos' praise of shoes and pots—and Ischomachos' insistence that it isn't funny, at least not to a serious man (8.19), suggests that he does not have much of a sense of humor. But Homer's Nestor can also be amusingly long-winded, yet he is still recognized as a source of good advice.⁶⁰⁹ Xenophon's witty characterization of Ischomachos should not obscure for us the fact that his opinions on the importance of order are consistent with those expressed by other heroes of Xenophon (including Socrates himself), and thus presumably held by Xenophon as well.

For example, in his encomium, Ischomachos declares that what is beautiful is useful (εὐχρηστος, 8.3). This is an equivalence made elsewhere by Xenophon's Socrates. In the *Memorabilia* Socrates tells Aristippos that all things are good and beautiful (καλά τε κάγαθά) in relation to that for which they are useful (εὐχρηστα,

⁶⁰⁷ Note that the trireme is a particularly Athenian image; the Athenians prided themselves on their triremes. See, e.g. Ar. *Birds* 108.

⁶⁰⁸ For example, Too argues that Ischomachos' rhetoric is verbose and disorganized, and meant to show that Ischomachos is an intellectually disordered fool. Too 2001, 74-6.

⁶⁰⁹ E.g., *Od.* 15.193-201, where Telemachos asks Peisistratos' help in leaving without another encounter with his father, the "kindly, garrulous, Polonius-like" Nestor. Stanford 1965, 2: 247, ad loc.

Mem. 3.8.5).⁶¹⁰ Socrates also makes clear in the *Memorabilia* that something can be useful only when placed in order. For example, he notes in *Mem.* 3.1.7 that armies are like houses: there is a vast difference between one in good order and one in disarray (πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρει στράτευμα τεταγμένον ἀτάκτου), with the latter not being useful (οὐδὲν χρήσιμα), and only the former having value.⁶¹¹ As Dillery has pointed out, in Xenophon's other works we see the same insistence that the capacity to be good or useful is not realizable unless first placed in a context of order.⁶¹² Similarly, both Socrates and Ischomachos stress that the capacity to be virtuous is not realizable without self-control (ἐγκράτεια) and prudence (σωφροσύνη), i.e. internal order.⁶¹³ Thus Ischomachos' praise of order, if at times comic, should not be

⁶¹⁰ See also *Mem.* 4.6.8-9. For discussion and additional examples, see Pontier 2006, 241-2. For a philosophical critique of this position and contrast to Plato's, see Dorion 2011, 194-6, ad *Mem.* 4.6.8-9.

⁶¹¹ Dillery notes the similar remarks by Cyrus the Great in *Xen. Cyr.* 8.5.7, although Cyrus there calls the order (εὐθημοσύνη) of a military unit finer (κάλλιον) than the order of a household, which is only fine (καλόν). Note that εὐθημοσύνη does not appear in Xenophon's Socratic writings, according to López and García 1995. See discussion in Dillery 1995, 32.

⁶¹² For example, in *Mem.* 3.5.18, Socrates comforts a Pericles distraught over Athenian discord by pointing to how orderly (εὐτακτοί) the Athenians are in their naval and gymnastic exercises. Similarly, Xenophon praises Socrates himself for being helpful to all and obeying the laws so that he stood out as well-ordered in comparison to others (ὥστε διάδηλος εἶναι παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους εὐτακτῶν, *Mem.* 4.4.1). See also discussion in Dorion 2011, 2.2: 134 ad *Mem.* 4.4.1; Dillery 1995, 32-5.

⁶¹³ References in the *Oeconomicus* include: *Oec.* 1.19-2.1 (Socrates warns Critoboulos of the dangers of vices, but Critoboulos asserts his are under his self-control); 7.14-5 (Ischomachos characterizes the fundamental duty of being prudent for both men and women as ensuring that their property is in the best possible condition and increasing honorably); 21.12 (Ischomachos tells Socrates that the

read through an ironic lens. It is not surprising that Socrates does not critique the imagery and rhetoric of this encomium.

The practical flavor of Ischomachos' praise of order is connected to his choice of the word for "order": τάξις, supplemented by a plentiful use of forms of the related verb τάττω (e.g., τεταγμένως, 8.3). Words in the τάξις family offer a more concrete way to envision order, as the sense of military order is always one of the primary meanings.⁶¹⁴ As we have seen, in Xenophon even its nonmilitary uses retain many of the connotations of military order, as when Ischomachos compares the good order of a choral dance to the good order of an army unit or a trireme of rowers.⁶¹⁵ As a term describing order, τάξις is more concrete than the word κόσμος, which also means "order" but has more of the sense of order that is beautiful and well-crafted—thus the common use of κόσμος to mean "ornament," and its more

divine gift of being able to rule the willing is given only to those initiated into prudence, σωφροσύνη). See discussion in Dorion 2000, ccxvii ff; Dillery 1995, 134-8, 154-8 (σωφροσύνη and ἐγκράτεια are the foundation of the other virtues in Xenophon, and are closely related to self-knowledge). Note that Plato's Socrates also prizes order, associating it with self-control as well as prudence and temperance (σωφροσύνη), e.g. in the *Gorgias* 493d1-2 (Socrates attempts to persuade Callicles that the orderly (κόσμοι) are happier than those who lack self-control). See discussion in Pontier 2006, 244-6.

⁶¹⁴ See the entry for τάξις in the LSJ, section I (to arrange in a military sense); for τάσσω, section I (to draw up in order of battle, form, array, marshal; to post, station). See discussion in Pontier 2006, 225 (the first sense of τάξις as military order). See also Pontier 2006, 231; Dillery 1995, 33, 86 (both arguing that Xenophon's idea of order is based on the military).

⁶¹⁵ See also Dorion 2011, 2.1: 285 ad *Mem.* 3.3.12; Dillery 1995, 260 n. 43 (noting the abundance of passages in Xenophon suggesting a close relationship between the chorus and army).

technical use to mean the world or universe in its aspect as an ordered structure, a “world order.”⁶¹⁶

As Pontier has noted, Xenophon prefers to describe order through the word family τάξις, avoiding Plato’s freer use of the more abstract family κόσμος.⁶¹⁷ We

⁶¹⁶ Xenophon uses it in this sense in *Mem.* 1.1.11, when saying that Socrates did not examine how the “‘cosmos,’ as it is called by the sophists, was by nature” (ὅπως ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος ἔφυ). See discussions in Pontier 2006, 219-221 (discussing history of the term); Vlastos 1975, 3-9 (tracing the development of κόσμος in the sense of world-order from the fifth century Presocratics through Plato); Dodds 1959, 338 ad *Gorgias* 508a3 (arguing that for Plato and Xenophon this use of κόσμος was still felt to be technical but was not novel). Cf. Dillery 1995, 35-7 (evolution during Xenophon’s life of the idea that the divine was the protector of order).

⁶¹⁷ Pontier 2006, 222-4, 231-5 (discussing Plato’s more extensive use of words in the κόσμος family to describe order, as opposed to Xenophon’s preference for words in the τάξις family). The noun κόσμος appears rarely in the *Oeconomicus*, with the exception of the above-cited example always referring to adornment rather than to order, as in the following: 4.23 (Lysander is looking at Cyrus’ fine jewelry and other “adornment”); 9.6 (Ischomachos and his wife separate the “adornment” women wear at festivals). Pontier argues that the verb κοσμέω has nearly a pejorative implication in Xenophon. Pontier 2006, 242 (*Oec.* 9.2, where Ischomachos says they do not need a showily “adorned” house). Although this is not always true in the *Oeconomicus*, it is true that the verb is used to describe “adorning” rather than “ordering,” as in the following additional examples: 4.8 (the Persian King “adorns” good governors with gifts); 5.3 (Socrates praises farming for supplying what is needed to “adorn” altars and that with which people “adorn” themselves); 11.10 (Ischomachos tells Socrates he tries not to leave the city “unadorned,” ἀκόσμητος, through a lack of money; Socrates says that men able to “adorn” the city are flourishing and strong); 10.3 (Ischomachos warns his wife that women who sit around may be compared to women who “have adorned themselves” and are

will recall that in the *Gorgias*, in his “speech of Amphion,” Plato’s Socrates attempted to convince Callicles that the world was held together by principles such as justice, and therefore men called it a “cosmic order,” κόσμος, and not a “cosmic disorder” ἀκοσμία (Pl. *Grg.* 507e6-508a4).⁶¹⁸ Only once in the *Oeconomicus* is κόσμος the word used for “order,” and then it is in Ischomachos’ encomium as the common phrase κατὰ κόσμον (“duly” or “in order”) (*Oec.* 8.20).⁶¹⁹

The military flavor of τάξις thus suggests an order that is both human led and created and capable of disciplined movement, as in the examples that Ischomachos gives his wife. These examples—the choral dance, the military troop, and the rowing trireme—all emphasize that this disciplined movement is based on an abstract system of spatial relationships. Ischomachos stresses the importance of the empty space (τὸ μέσον) that lies between the moving elements of the ordered chorus (8.21), and points out how marching men are always going forward into the “empty [space]” (τὸ κενούμενον, 8.7-8). Similarly, as the rowers move forwards and backwards “in order” (ἐν τάξει, 8.8), we see the same image of the rowers who move forwards into the space formerly occupied by the man in front, and backwards into the space formerly occupied by the man in back. Different speeds, different maneuvers—all are possible if and only if there is order, a place (χώρα, 8.10) for everything or everyone, not in the sense of a permanently fixed position but in the sense of a stable relationship to all of the other elements. A place thus exists even when the object or person that normally occupies it is absent—indeed, it can be seen best when there is an absence, with the place “yearning” (ποθέω) for what is missing (8.10).⁶²⁰ The empty spaces between the elements that are, as Ischomachos

deceivers). Pontier also comments that for Plato, τάξις is more the order of the body, κόσμος the order of the soul. Pontier 2006, 248.

⁶¹⁸ See discussion in Chapter 2, section D.6.

⁶¹⁹ See, e.g., Puhvel 1976, 154 (commenting on its frequent use in Homer).

⁶²⁰ Purves argues that Ischomachos’ description of the τάξις of his house portrays it as a “perfectly mappable space” that corresponds to the well-organized garden of the Persian king, and compares his system of organization to the ancient systems of

says, “pure and clean” are critical to creating the distinctions necessary to have an ordered set.⁶²¹

Creating this orderly system of spatial relationships requires distinguishing between the different elements of the system. Thus when Ischomachos teaches his wife how to create this τάξις for the household objects within the home, he describes it as a process of intellectual separation (and the corresponding process, collection). He describes how they analyzed the topography of their house together, with an eye towards making its organization convenient and useful; they had no interest in having a house that is “showily arrayed” (ποικίλμασι κεκόσμηται, 9.2), and just for display.⁶²² They then gathered up (ἄθροίζω), separated (διαϊρέω), and divided (διαχωρίζω, χωρίζω) their household objects by “tribes” (κατὰ φυλάς, 9.6, 9.8)⁶²³ according to occasion (e.g., festivals and daily use); the gender of the user; and function (e.g., clothing, shoes, weapons). After this sorting, they took everything to its appropriate place (9.6-9).

As other scholars have noted, this process of categorizing and placing objects in order strongly resembles intellectual processes elsewhere called “dialectic” or “dialectical” by Xenophon’s Socrates.⁶²⁴ In the *Memorabilia*, for example, Xenophon’s Socrates derived the term “to engage in dialectic” (τὸ διαλέγεσθαι) from the practice

memory palaces. Although there is a correspondence between the Persian garden and the Greek house, she underestimates the importance of the dynamic images that Ischomachos uses for τάξις. Purves 2010, 197-9, 216-22. See discussion in sections C.3-4.

⁶²¹ Purves 2010, 214-6 (it is the process of dividing, of creating spaces between things, that creates order and meaning); Murnaghan 1988, 16 (even the empty space between objects is controlled).

⁶²² Thus they considered which rooms were sunny in winter and shady in summer, as well as the design of the house (9.2-3).

⁶²³ Though φυλή can also mean “race” or “type,” Pomeroy notes that Xenophon much more often used it to mean “tribe.” Pomeroy 1994, 301 ad *Oec.* 9.6.

⁶²⁴ See, e.g., Strauss 1970, 147-50 (pointing out the description in *Mem.* 4.5.12).

of coming together to take counsel by classifying and discussing matters “according to their type” (διαλέγοντας κατὰ γένη, *Mem.* 4.5.12).⁶²⁵ There Socrates stresses that the ability to create intellectual order depends on self-control and prudence. Only the man not enslaved to his desires is able to analyze accurately what is good and what is bad. And therefore, only he is able to choose good things, and avoid the bad—or, more literally, “grasp good things before [other things],” and “hold away from bad things” (τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ προαιρεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀπέχεσθαι, *Mem.* 4.5.11).

Ischomachos’ lesson on household organization thus resembles a demonstration of dialectic at its most concrete, carried out by two people⁶²⁶ who have the sort of active self-control that enables them to examine their house and their needs, decide what the most useful and beneficial organization would be, and then create that order. Ischomachos’ use of the word “tribe” (φυλή) and his examples of τάξις drawn from Athenian public and military life also suggest that this model of τάξις has broader implications for how Ischomachos thinks of ordering communities and people more generally—that is, politics. Ischomachos does not think of his wife or his household as a passive, static jar whose primary duty is to

⁶²⁵ Some scholars have argued that Xenophon here not only has lifted the notion of dialectic from Plato (e.g., τὸ κατὰ γένη διαίρεισθαι, *Pl. Sophist* 253d1-3), but has fatally misunderstood it by converting a technical conception of Platonic philosophy “into a mundane conception of practical wisdom,” Kahn 1996, 77. See also Patzer 2010, 236-55. In contrast, Dorion argues that the Xenophontic conception should be understood on its own terms. Dorion 2011, 180-1 ad *Mem.* 4.5.12. Dorion’s approach seems wiser to me, particular given that (as Nightingale notes), in Plato “dialectic” is a loosely defined term that seems to mean the ideal philosophic method, whatever that may be. Nightingale 2004, 109 n. 20. See discussion in section D.

⁶²⁶ Διαλέγεσθαι is the verb used to describe Ischomachos’ conversation with his wife at 7.10. See also Glazebrook 2009, 238-9, 243 (pointing out that διαλέγεσθαι is the first verb associated with Socrates in the *Oeconomicus*, at 1.1).

contain and preserve what is put inside it. Instead, he sees the household as something like a chorus, troop, or trireme: a dynamic set of relationships between discrete places occupied by different elements that mutually coordinate.

Developing and maintaining dynamic, coordinating relationships depends on a leader; in the case of a chorus, troop, or trireme, this leader would presumably be (or would be overseen by) a wealthy elite man like Ischomachos for the benefit of the Athenian democracy,⁶²⁷ and in the case of the household interior it would be the queen bee, Ischomachos' wife. This leader's responsibility is far more than merely assigning followers to set places; he or she must also encourage the followers to adopt a coordinated understanding and commitment to the common project—whether it is a household, choral dance, organized troop, or a trireme—in which individuals consider not just their own position, but their own position in relation to others, so that they can move and act as an orderly community. In Greek thought,

⁶²⁷ Athens imposed certain “liturgies,” i.e., public services, on its wealthy men, in effect a form of taxation. These liturgies included being a χορηγός, a patron responsible for selecting, outfitting, and training a chorus to perform at a religious festival such as the City Dionysia or being a τριήραρχος, in charge of maintaining a warship (such as a trireme) for a year. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 56.3 (χορηγός), 61.1 (τριήραρχος); Ps. Xen. *Const. Ath.* 1.13. Although being a general (στρατηγός) in Athens was an elected position (Arist. *Ath. Pol.*, 61; Ps. Xen. *Const. Ath.* 1.3) rather than a liturgy, the men elected as generals typically came from the same elite class. In the *Memorabilia*, Socrates talks with one Nicomachides who is complaining that the Athenians have elected a successful businessman as general rather than a military veteran like himself; Socrates argues that his success in business as well as in being a χορηγός shows that he understands how to pursue victory by hiring the right experts, managing people and overseeing the process, and spending money effectively. *Mem.* 3.4.1-12. See discussions in Pomeroy 1994, 225-8 ad *Oec.* 2.6 (on liturgies generally); Johnstone 1994, 231-2 (noting that the sponsor of a chorus or trireme was considered to be in ultimate command).

this kind of cooperation could only be truly found among the free, whose military and political order was stronger than that of the enslaved.⁶²⁸

By comparing the τάξις of the household to the system of spatial relationships that underlies public Greek institutions like the chorus, Ischomachos' encomium of order portrays the well-run household as something like a well-run, free polis that rules willing inhabitants and shares a common political discourse.⁶²⁹

⁶²⁸ Thus in Herodotus, the Spartan Demaratus warns Xerxes that the Greeks have the courage to fight off despotism, and that the Spartans above all will fight no matter how much larger the Persian army is (Hdt. 7.102). When Xerxes responds that an army might attempt to fight against overwhelming numbers if compelled by the lash (as the Persian army is compelled—see Hdt. 7.56) (Hdt. 7.103), Demaratus replies that the Spartans are the best of men, because they are free (ἐλεύθεροι), yet subject to the law, which will bid them to conquer or die (Hdt. 7.104.4-5). See also discussion in Dillery 1995, 60 (Greek freedom in the *Anabasis* contrasted to Persian subjection to despotism). See also discussion in sections C.3-4 below.

⁶²⁹ Murnaghan also argues that Ischomachos' household is comparable to a well-run polis and points out that the servants are invited to share in the couple's conception of justice. However, her argument is that Xenophon is portraying the elimination of any difference between the public interest and the potentially subversive private interests of the elite, with the differences between husband and wife, master and servant being eliminated just as the potentially subversive private space of the οἶκος is eliminated. Murnaghan 1988, 15-8. But though I agree that part of Xenophon's project is to portray elite interests and social organization as aligned with those of the public, I disagree that private interests are eliminated. Rather, I argue that Xenophon's Socrates is examining the relationship and tension between the interests in private profit, in personal philosophical development, in communal life, and command. See discussions in sections B.7, B.9, C.1. Note that there is also a relationship between how Ischomachos and his wife manage their household and the way the Persian King manages his kingdom, as discussed further in sections C.3-4.

This “rule of the willing” is something that Ischomachos will later insist is the most important and difficult part of managing a household.⁶³⁰ The obvious dissonance here is with the fact that most or all of the workers on any estate like Ischomachos’ are enslaved. Although Ischomachos will later tell Socrates that he and his wife attempt to encourage their servants to share their concepts of καλόν and ἀγαθόν and themselves become καλοὶ κάγαθοί (as Ischomachos conceives it) (14.9), we will see that many of his methods of management are closer to a hierarchical “Persian” model than to the cooperative “Greek” model of τάξις that has been his focus here.⁶³¹

B.5.c *The profit-seeking Phoenician ship: a very different model*

Among the images of τάξις that Ischomachos gives (the chorus, troop, and trireme), there is one that is different: the τάξις of the equipment on a Phoenician merchant ship. But although we know that Ischomachos at least mentioned the merchant ship to his wife (8.17), Ischomachos interrupts the description of his wife’s education to address the full example directly to Socrates. Ischomachos even uses Socrates’ name to further illustrate his point, further highlighting that there is something significantly different about this particular example.

Ischomachos does not say why he directs this particular example directly to Socrates. What he tells Socrates is that the ship had the most beautiful and precise ordering that he had ever seen (8.11), not only of the necessary equipment but also of the cargo needed for the shipowner’s profit; he talked to a sailor who knew the order of the equipment, Ischomachos tells Socrates, in the same way that “someone knowing letters could say how many letters there were in ‘Socrates’ and where each one is set in order (8.13).”⁶³² As the sailor told Ischomachos, a well-organized ship

⁶³⁰ See discussion of *Oec.* 21 below in section B.10.

⁶³¹ See especially discussion in sections B.7 and C.3.

⁶³² See also *Oec.* 15.7 (discussed in section B.8), where Ischomachos implicitly rejects Socrates’ comparison of farming methods to the (arbitrary) symbols of the alphabet, and shows Socrates that he does not need to be taught these methods

might survive a storm at sea where a disorganized one would founder, because the gods punish the lazy, but—sometimes—spare the innocent, skillful, and hard-working.

As Pontier points out, Xenophon must intend to call attention to the complex narrative posture of this anecdote, the most complex posture in the entire dialogue: Xenophon is describing a conversation by Socrates with Critoboulos in which Socrates is describing a conversation with Ischomachos in which Ischomachos described a conversation with his wife that he interrupted at this point to address Socrates directly.⁶³³ We are being asked to notice that Ischomachos speaks differently to his wife than to Socrates, and also to remember that Critoboulos has been told to observe critically Ischomachos' remarks, as reported by Socrates. One possibility is that Ischomachos directed the anecdote to Socrates because he did not wish to tell his wife his doubts about divine justice.⁶³⁴ The Phoenician ship, described as exposed to the ocean storms, presents a particularly pointed example of order that is human-created, rather than divine.⁶³⁵ But Ischomachos' other

because he already knows them. Cf. the discussion in *Mem.* 4.4.7, where Socrates offers, as an example of a question where saying something new would be senseless, the question of how many letters there were in 'Socrates' and how it was spelled. Pontier argues that Xenophon's using Socrates' name marks a significant allusion in this passage to Socratic dialectic as a method of order. Pontier 2006, 240-1. But see my argument in the text.

⁶³³ Pontier 2006, 239 (also noting that this seems to be the only place where Ischomachos learns something from someone else (the sailor)). See also the general discussion in section A.4 of the narrative complexity of the *Oeconomicus*.

⁶³⁴ Nee 2009, 263.

⁶³⁵ Nee argues that Ischomachos is directing his wife's attention to the household as an ordered whole that is most "useful and beautiful" (8.3) because, like the Phoenician ship, it is set apart from the disorderly natural world, and that this picture of the cosmos contradicts an earlier portrayal of the gods as beneficent. Nee 2009, 262-3. See also Strauss 1970, 143 (the sailor's statement presents order as of

examples of order were also human-created, and the sailor's remark is compatible with a traditional Greek worldview that presented divine justice as more of an elemental force than a personally directed divine providence,⁶³⁶ and is not inconsistent with Ischomachos' own earlier remarks.⁶³⁷ Another possibility, that comparing the τάξις of the ship to the letters in Socrates' name portrays the ship's τάξις as a human-created order operating within a particular cultural context, seems correct, but is too similar to the points Ischomachos has already made to his wife

human origin, and the gods as disturbers of order). But see the comments in the footnote below on divine justice.

⁶³⁶ Thus Hesiod in the *Works and Days* maintains that Zeus sees all (267) and grants good fortune to the just man while punishing the family of the unjust (280-5), but also says that one man's wickedness can lead Zeus to destroy an entire city, army, or ship (240-7). Similarly, Solon says that Zeus does not become angry like a mortal does, at particular deeds, but in the end his judgment will fall like a spring storm (Solon 1.17-32). The Socrates of both Xenophon and Plato saw the gods as a force providing and protecting order. See, e.g., Xen. *Mem.* 1.4.13 ("First of all, the soul of what other animal can perceive that the gods are, who have collected into order the greatest and most beautiful things?" Τίνος γὰρ ἄλλου ζώου ψυχὴ πρῶτα μὲν θεῶν τῶν τὰ μέγιστα καὶ κάλλιστα συνταξάντων ἤσθηται ὅτι εἰσί;); Pl. *Grg.* 507e6-508a4 (universe is a "cosmic order," κόσμος, and not a "cosmic disorder" ἀκοσμία). But Socrates' divine justice (e.g., as we see it described in the account of the underworld in Plato's *Gorgias*) does not guarantee earthly success, but only the more important matter of justice for the soul. Cf. the discussion in Dillery 1995, 36-7.

⁶³⁷ For example, at *Oec.* 7.31 Ischomachos tells his wife that if someone violates the gender rules set by the gods, that *probably* (ἴσως) his being disorderly (ἀτακτῶν) will not escape the gods' notice and he will be punished. At *Oec.* 11.8, Ischomachos says that the gods think men should be intelligent and careful, but does not say that the gods *always* favor such men. Similarly, at *Oec.* 5.18-20 Socrates and Critoboulos agree that disaster in farming is always possible, requiring consultation and propitiation of the gods just as in war.

through the images of troop, trireme, and chorus, to explain why this would be directed specifically to Socrates.

It makes more sense to assume that what distinguishes the Phoenician merchant ship from Ischomachos' other examples also explains why it was directed to Socrates and why our attention is being called to this particular illustration: this is not an example of an important Athenian democratic institution, but rather an example of a non-Greek enterprise directed at pure market-based profit seeking, unconstrained by democratic or communal concerns. As such, it is not a topic that a good Athenian wife should be interested in. It is, however, a topic—at least as far as Ischomachos is concerned—that an Athenian man should be interested in.

It is also significant that the spatial organization of the Phoenician ship is different from that of the public Greek institutions earlier described by Ischomachos to his wife—although Ischomachos does not seem to be aware of the difference, or at least he does not comment on it. We will see a similar contrast in spatial organization when Socrates discusses with Critoboulos the difference between the political organization of Persian space (top-down and fixed) and Greek space (bottom-up and dynamic).⁶³⁸ Like the chorus, troop, or trireme, the Phoenician ship moves; but the ship is organized in a fixed order, with every item in a set place (like the letters of Socrates' name). There is no need to maintain an orderly dynamic relationship, as there is between the members of a chorus or troop—or between the farmers who constitute Socrates' ideal Greek farming community. In this sense, the ship's fixed elements have a greater resemblance to the static, top-down ordering that characterizes the Persian empire and garden. But as we will see, in the Persian empire and garden, the governing image is one of trees that are fixed in place and nurtured by the King as the ultimate farmer, gardener, and protector. In contrast, the Phoenician ship is mobile, and aims solely at the goal of making a profit. Socrates will call attention to the problematic nature of this profit-seeking model in 20.27-8, in a comment that will anger Ischomachos and lead to the failed conclusion of their

⁶³⁸ See discussion in sections C.3-4.

conversation.⁶³⁹ As we will see, money and profit-seeking are where the wealthy gentleman-farmer Ischomachos and the relatively poor philosopher Socrates have their sharpest disagreements.

B.5.d *Adornment*

In speaking of his house, Ischomachos stressed that it was beautiful in its usefulness rather than in any complex adornment (ποικίλμασι, 9.2). He takes the same approach in advising his wife on her adornment: as he tells Socrates, he advised her to avoid the powder and rouge that attempted to make skin look more attractive, on the grounds that the human body is most attractive when presented in good health as the gods had made it, rather than altered by attempts to deceive (10.7-8).⁶⁴⁰ In an analogy that his wife might not have found flattering, Ischomachos told her that as the gods made horses the most attractive thing for horses, cattle for cattle, and sheep for sheep, so men consider the pure or unpainted (καθαρός) human body the most attractive thing (10.7-8). It is only the lazy women who do not exercise themselves in supervising the household who suffer in comparison to those who are deceptively made-up with cosmetics (τὰς κεκοσμημένας καὶ εξαπατώσας, 10.13).

Ischomachos' point is that as utility (in this context, natural health) is what is beautiful, any adornment (κόσμος) that attempts to disguise nature is unattractive. A similar point of style obscuring true and natural substance seems to lie behind the

⁶³⁹ See discussion in section B.10.

⁶⁴⁰ Glazebrook argues that moderate use of certain cosmetics was acceptable for citizen women in Athens, and that Xenophon is showing how Ischomachos is remaking his wife in a new and more masculine mode, in part by teaching her to converse (διαλέγεθαι) in the same way that Socrates encouraged his companions. Glazebrook 2009, 238-9, 243-7. For Glazebrook, this is a radical elevation of female status; but cf. Murnaghan's argument that Xenophon is assimilating female to male and thus erasing the wife as a distinct individual. Murnaghan 1988, 13.

disdain he will later express to Socrates of farming handbooks that make overly complex (ποικίλος) the straightforward matter of simply observing (perhaps with some investigation) the nature of the soil (16.1).⁶⁴¹ These same views reappear when Ischomachos discusses rhetoric, where κόσμος was a standard term for rhetorical ornamentation.⁶⁴² As a wealthy Athenian always at risk of being dragged into court, Ischomachos does practice rhetoric in defense and prosecution (11.23-5), though he does not seem to be a man who takes public rhetoric seriously as a path to success.⁶⁴³ But his goal is a plain truth: his primary self-defense resembles that which Socrates will one day claim, that of wronging no one and of benefiting others as best he can (11.22).⁶⁴⁴ He denies being able to make the worse cause a better (11.25).

⁶⁴¹ See discussion in section B.8.

⁶⁴² E.g., Pl. *Apology* 17c1 (Socrates rejects orators' highly decorated speaking, κοσμέω). See discussion in Lausberg 1998, 242-3, § 538 (κόσμος corresponds to the Latin *ornatus*); Fantham 1972, 166-7 & n. 27 (describing the history of the association of κόσμος with Greek rhetoric).

⁶⁴³ Notably, the activities and concerns Ischomachos lists for Socrates in response to Socrates' question at *Oec.* 11.1 do not include seeking political power. Although he also says in this section that he and his friends sometimes criticize a general or defend someone unjustly accused (11.24), these may be merely mock litigation, as he adds that sometimes he himself is convicted by his wife (11.25).

⁶⁴⁴ Xenophon's Socrates says something very similar about how he has been preparing all of his life to defend himself, by considering what is just and unjust, and practicing what is just and avoiding what is unjust (*Mem.* 4.8.4). He also adds that his friends think they become most excellent by associating with him (*Mem.* 4.8.7-8). Similarly, Plato's Socrates in the *Gorgias* tells Callicles that a man should secure his own defense not by preparing flattering rhetoric, but by not doing anything unjust (Pl. *Grg.* 522c8-d2, d7-8). See also Dorion 2011, 2.2: 243-50, Annexe 6 (comparing *Mem.* 4.8 and Xenophon's *Apology*).

Socrates does not express disagreement with Ischomachos' views on cosmetics and ornamentation—and it is unlikely that he does disagree.⁶⁴⁵ But as we will see in the next section, what he *will* criticize is the suggestion contained in Ischomachos' use of images that compare his wife to a horse (and other animals): that the problem with cosmetics is that they are “unnatural.”

B.6. *A central interlude of head-in-the-clouds comedy: Socrates' first dialogue?*

Having heard enough (for now) about the education of Ischomachos' wife, Socrates returns to the original topic: Ischomachos' own activities (11.1). But before they actually reach this subject, Socrates and Ischomachos engage in a comic exchange that explicitly recalls Aristophanes' *Clouds*, where another ragged, head-in-the-clouds philosopher (Socrates) verbally jousts with a farmer (Strepsiades) who had come to him for instruction. Aristophanes' play was a powerful enough caricature of Socrates that Plato's Socrates felt compelled to respond to it in his *Apology*.⁶⁴⁶ Xenophon's Socrates does not. Instead, we see his response here: a

⁶⁴⁵ See, e.g., *Mem.* 3.8.10 where Socrates praises the house that is pleasant in all seasons and safe, and comments that paintings and showy decorations (ποικιλία) take away more pleasure than they give.

⁶⁴⁶ *Pl. Ap.* 19c. Some scholars have argued that Aristophanes' Socrates was not meant as a particularized caricature of Socrates but as a particularly colorful stand-in for the whole tribe of fifth-century intellectuals sometimes called “sophists,” a group that included natural scientists, teachers of virtue, and teachers of rhetoric. Indeed, Aristophanes' Cloud chorus slyly acknowledges that Socrates was not the only intellectual being satirized; Prodicos is the other “meteorosophist” they say they admire, albeit for his “wit” rather than his barefoot pride (Socrates, unlike Prodicos and the other sophists, took no fees) (*Clouds* 360-3). Although Prodicos was regarded as one of the most distinguished intellectuals of his day (Dover 1968, lv), he still came in for criticism as a “corrupting babbler” (*Ar. Fr.* 490 Edmonds, as cited by Natali 1987, 235). And later antiquity, at least, saw Prodicos as a natural

comic portrayal of the philosopher Socrates as a student of the farmer Ischomachos⁶⁴⁷—a rather cheeky student of a rather sententious teacher, but a student who valued his instruction enough to relate it in turn to his pupil, Critoboulos. Indeed, as I will discuss below, there are hints that this may be Socrates' first truly Socratic discussion.

The thematic importance of this exchange is emphasized by its placement: the midpoint of the conversation between Ischomachos and Socrates.⁶⁴⁸ The theatrical elements in the exchange remind Critoboulos (and the reader) of Socrates' earlier discussion of theater, and that Socrates is repeating the discussion for

scientist who, like Anaxagoras, could be accused of atheism. See Willink 1983, 27-8. But whatever Aristophanes' intent, Socrates was the philosopher named, and he felt the association enough to respond to it. Note that we will encounter an association between Prodicos and Socrates as “up in the air” (or “down in the underworld”) thinkers again at the end of Ischomachos' discussion (see section B.10).

⁶⁴⁷ A number of scholars have argued that the *Oeconomicus* is Xenophon's response to Aristophanes' play. See, e.g., Kronenberg 2009, 41 n. 5, 57 n. 9 (the *Oeconomicus* is philosophical comedy that appeals to the soul and not just the senses); Stevens 1994, 213 (arguing that the plot of the *Oeconomicus* is adapted from *Clouds* and that Xenophon responds to *Clouds* by having Socrates investigate καλοκάγαθία); Strauss 1970, 163-4 (Xenophon shows Socrates turning to human things in response to Aristophanes' attack). Note that some of Xenophon's other works have also been associated with *Clouds*. See, e.g., Buzzetti 2014, 117-122, 292 (arguing that Xenophon's *Anabasis* shows Socrates as usurping the place of Xenophon's father in a way meant to recall Aristophanes' *Clouds*, and that the final chapter of the *Anabasis*, 7.8, is in fact a sort of parody of the play).

⁶⁴⁸ Cf. Ambler 1996, 120-1, who observes that it “has a good claim to being the dramatic center,” as this is where Socrates asks directly about how Ischomachos, as a gentleman, spends his time, and calls attention to his own choice of a different way of life.

Critoboulos as a performance that Critoboulos must critically observe.⁶⁴⁹ Much of Ischomachos' praise of σωφροσύνη and household order, although comically elaborate, agrees with what Socrates (and Xenophon) say elsewhere; much of what he says in the following discussion of his own activities will do so as well. But as Socrates will shortly remind us, his thinking may begin with ideas similar to Ischomachos', but they do not end there.

Socrates could have simply repeated his straightforward opening question to Ischomachos ("where do you spend your time, and what do you do?", 7.2). But instead he launches into a long and florid request that Ischomachos explain what he does "so that you may have the *pleasure of giving a full explanation* of the basis of your good reputation, and so that I, having heard through and understood completely (if I am able) the work of the *fine* and good man, may be very grateful to you" (ἵνα σύ τε ἐφ' οἷς εὐδοκιμεῖς διηγησάμενος ἡσθῇς κάγω τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ κάγαθοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἔργα τελέως διακούσας καὶ καταμαθὼν, ἃν δύνωμαι, πολλήν σοι χάριν εἰδῶ, 11.1). Ischomachos seems to suspect that Socrates is poking fun at his lengthy praise of order and his description of female education, as he responds in kind, repeating both Socrates' word choice and offer to be educated, saying "I will *explain fully* to you, Socrates, with great *pleasure*, the things I regularly accomplish—so that if I do not seem to you to be acting in a *fine* way, you can reform me (καὶ πάννυ ἡδέως σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, διηγῆσομαι ἃ ἐγὼ ποιῶν διατελῶ, ἵνα καὶ μεταρρυθμίσης με, ἐάν τί σοι δοκῶ μὴ καλῶς ποιεῖν, 11.2).

The verb μεταρρυθμίζω is the same word Ischomachos will use shortly after this to express how he reforms his slaves in their work (11.16). Given that Ischomachos is clearly in the teaching role in this dialogue, his use of μεταρρυθμίζω is perhaps a little pointed, as if Socrates were some meddlesome and pedantic intellectual eager to set others straight—such as the Socrates in Aristophanes' *Clouds*. Aristophanes caricatured Socrates as an annoying "head in the clouds" intellectual who literally suspended himself aloft in a basket to "traverse the air" at the start of the play in order to speculate about the sun (ἀεροβατῶ καὶ περιφρονῶ

⁶⁴⁹ See discussion at C.2.

τὸν ἥλιον, *Clouds* 225). This Socrates is greeted by his patron divinities the Clouds as a “meteorosophist” (*Clouds* 360), that is, an “up in the air intellectual” (literally, a “man wise about matters above the ground”—although Socrates and his followers investigate the underworld as well as the heavens, e.g., *Clouds* 192).⁶⁵⁰ In the *Clouds*, these studies of natural science are not only portrayed as useless (and ridiculous), but they lead to blasphemous reformulations of the traditional understandings of the divine.⁶⁵¹ The Aristophanic Socrates also teaches an art of public speaking that stresses an often rude correction of verbal distinctions as a prerequisite (*Clouds* 658-9) for learning how to make the worse argument seem to be the better one—which is the reason Strepsiades has sought out Socrates. Thus Aristophanes’ Socrates, calling Strepsiades a yokel (ἄγροικος, *Clouds* 646), insists that he learn to make newfangled verbal distinctions between a “fowl” and a “fowlette” (*Clouds* 666-7) before he learns to twist his courtroom arguments.⁶⁵² At the end the image of the head-in-the-clouds intellectual reappears, as the now-disillusioned farmer Strepsiades, mockingly repeating Socrates’ opening claim that he “traverses the air to speculate about the sun,” climbs the roof of Socrates’ school, the “house of babblers” (ἡ οἰκία τῶν ἀδολεσχῶν, *Clouds* 1485) to burn it down (*Clouds* 1503).

Socrates explicitly acknowledges the Aristophanic stereotype lurking behind Ischomachos’ ironic request. How could he possibly reform a man finished as a καλὸς κάγαθός, he says, particularly given that he himself is a man reputed “to

⁶⁵⁰ Note that Segal argues that the antitheses in *Clouds* can be reduced to outside (good, old, country, farming) vs. inside (bad, new, city, rhetoric), with Socrates and his students being mostly “inside” (the city and the school) and Strepsiades being mostly “outside” (as a farmer in the country—a status reaffirmed by the end of the play) Segal 1969, 145-7. However, in *Clouds*, Socrates seems to be associated with the “above” or “below” (in the underworld) as much as the “inside.”

⁶⁵¹ E.g., there is no Zeus, but only the aetherial vortex, *Clouds* 379-80. See discussion of aether in Chapter 1, section B.2.

⁶⁵² As Dover notes, the word “fowlette,” ἀλεκτρύαινα, had been coined by Aristophanes for the occasion. Dover 1968, 182 ad *Clouds* 666.

babble (ἀδολεσχέω) and to measure (ἀερομετρέω) the air,” and, in what Socrates calls the most senseless accusation of all, called “a poor man to boot” (11.3-4). Socrates’ reference to his alleged “measuring the air” is a prosaic version of the Aristophanic image of Socrates “traversing the air” in a basket.

Socrates’ immediate reference to the Aristophanic allusion suggests that it was on his mind at the time, as though the play had been performed recently. According to Plato’s Socrates in the *Phaedo*, Socrates did once have an interest in natural science, when he was younger; he studied both heavenly and earthly phenomena in an effort to understand the material causes of all things, with a particular interest in the theories of Anaxagoras. But in the end he gave up those physical investigations in favor of investigations through intellectual hypothesis and argument that would focus on ethical questions⁶⁵³—such as the nature of καλοκάγαθία, being a perfect gentleman. Socrates’ disavowal of being a “head-in-the-clouds” philosopher, coupled with the seemingly naïve enquiry into καλοκάγαθία that led to his conversation with Ischomachos, all suggest that he has only recently turned from these meteorosophistic studies to focus on questions of human knowledge and ethics, and that this conversation with Ischomachos is being portrayed as one of his first serious forays into the field that would occupy the rest of his life.⁶⁵⁴

⁶⁵³ As Vander Waerdt points out, the description in Plato of how Socrates came to abandon natural science (*Phaedo*, 96a-99d) does not connect that abandonment to Socrates’ characteristic interest in human, ethical questions (e.g., as described in Plato’s *Apology* 23b as a result of the Delphic oracle’s pronouncement; see also 29d-30b, 36c). A connection is made in the *Memorabilia* (1.1.11-6) between Socrates’ interest in human matters and his disdain for speculation about “divine matters” such as the nature of “what was called the cosmos (κόσμος) by the sophists” and the causes of celestial phenomena, which he regarded as beyond human discovery. See discussion in Vander Waerdt 1994, 67; 49 n. 6 & 81ff.

⁶⁵⁴ Vander Waerdt 1994, 51-2, 81 n. 90 (the dramatic setting of *Oeconomicus* indicates (perhaps ironically) that Aristophanes’ play was the critical factor leading

But although Xenophon's Socrates has abandoned the scientific studies mocked by Aristophanes, he still has one important similarity with Aristophanes' Socrates: he is very interested in the way people talk. Xenophon's Socrates does not engage in the fine-grained correction of near synonyms,⁶⁵⁵ nor does he ever outright correct Ischomachos. But he does raise pointed comparisons that bring Ischomachos' speech into question. For example, Ischomachos has just described how he warned his wife (the "queen bee") against deceptive cosmetics, on the grounds that the unadorned human body was the most attractive thing for other humans, just as horses are the most attractive thing to other horses. Matching this comparison of a wife to a horse, Socrates now compares *himself* to a horse. His only consolation, he says, for being "senselessly" accused of being poor is that even a horse with no money has the potential to become good.

Socrates says that he learned this when he one day encountered a fine horse, and asked its groom whether the horse had much money (11.4-6). The groom stared, and responded that of course, a horse could not have money. Socrates said that he was pleased, because if it was lawful (θεμιτόν) for a poor horse to become good (αγαθός) if it had a soul good by nature, then it was proper for him, a poor man, to become a good man—something he hopes that Ischomachos' discourse will help him with—starting from tomorrow, the best time to begin being good (11.6).

Socrates to escape from his Aristophanic reputation through enquiry into καλοκάγαθία); Stevens 1994, 213. Note that the first version of *Clouds* was produced in 424/3; The second version, the one we have, was probably completed between 420 and 416. Dover 1968, lxxx. Even if we assume the earlier version is the one meant, by 424 Socrates would have been about 45, no longer a "young" man as he says in the *Phaedo*. Age is relative, however, and in any case both Plato and Xenophon often ignore anachronism. See discussion in section A.1, as well as Chapter 2 (Plato's *Gorgias*), section A.

⁶⁵⁵ Fine distinctions between near synonyms were particularly characteristic of Prodicos—as Plato shows in his characterization of Prodicos in the *Protagoras*, e.g., 337a-c.

At one level, Socrates' point is similar to one he makes in other contexts: to some extent, because people have some characteristics in common with animals, the training and education of a person can be compared to the training or domestication of an animal.⁶⁵⁶ Socrates is arguing that possessing money has nothing to do with whether an individual has the capacity for such training or education—perhaps part of the reason that he never charged fees for the instruction he offered to others.⁶⁵⁷ But at another level, Socrates' comparing himself to a horse calls attention to its own absurdity; he attributes human characteristics to the horse that, as the groom notes,

⁶⁵⁶ Socrates makes these comparisons in both Plato and Xenophon, but especially in Xenophon. See, e.g., Bell 2015, 119 (training horses as a Platonic image for educating the young); Dorion 2011, 2.2: 62-4 (discussing the relatively greater use of this imagery in Xenophon). Socrates listens in apparent approval to Ischomachos' comments on the use of reward and punishment both in training animals (*Oec.* 13.6-8) and people (*Oec.* 13.5-9). When Socrates is talking to Critoboulos, he comments that if a horse behaves badly (κακουργέω), we blame the horseman; similarly, if a wife manages badly because she has not been taught, we should blame the husband (*Oec.* 3.11). Similarly, in the *Memorabilia*, Socrates says that the better the nature, the greater is the need for education, for men as well as for well-bred and spirited horses and dogs (*Mem.* 4.1.3). But the analogy is taken only so far; as Ischomachos says, in the case of people sometimes talking to them is sufficient (*Oec.* 13.90). And as Socrates notes in the *Memorabilia*, it is easier to find teacher for a horse or an ox than a teacher of justice (*Mem.* 4.4.5). (And if the student *has* been taught, but has abandoned or forgotten the instruction, from failure to maintain good habits or from falling into bad ones, then the earlier teacher should not be blamed. Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.21-8, applying the example to the cases of Critias and Alcibiades). Cf. the similar comparison of a bad politician who lets the citizens become worse to a bad herdsman or farmer in *Mem.* 1.2.32 (where Dorion notes a possible play between the words νομεύς and νόμος, Dorion 2010, 1: 101, ad loc.) and Pl. *Gorgias* 516 (discussed in Chapter 2, section D.8).

⁶⁵⁷ See, e.g., *Mem.* 1.6.11.

are impossible.⁶⁵⁸ Because animals by their nature do not possess or use money, money cannot have any reflection on a horse's virtue. Socrates leaves unstated the point that the same could be said of cosmetics, clothing, and all the other means of changing one's appearance. Horses go about "naked" because it is not in their nature to choose to wear clothing or to apply make-up, either to comply with social norms or to make themselves more alluring, any more than it is to possess and use money. The fact that they do not wear make-up or clothing thus has no bearing on the question of whether humans should wear make-up or clothing. Ischomachos may disapprove of make-up, but he does not disapprove of clothing; as he himself says, a wife's appearance is stimulating (κινητικός) because she has a purer complexion *and* is more suitably dressed (καθαρωτέρα οὔσα πρεπόντως τε μᾶλλον ἡμφιεσμένη) than a slave woman, especially if she is willing to please (10.12).

This impression that Socrates' horse is a critique of Ischomachos' image as a "cosmetic" that deceptively makes his argument appear to be from nature will be strengthened the next time Ischomachos uses a bee image, one that compares weeds to lazy and unproductive drones that should be removed from the hive (17.15). Although Socrates does not suggest this use of the image is deceptive, he comments explicitly on its rhetorical effectiveness, and on how Ischomachos' choice to use it makes him angrier at the weeds than he otherwise would be.⁶⁵⁹ The further implication is that Ischomachos' "queen bee" image of the ideal woman, like

⁶⁵⁸ Pomeroy notes that imposing human characteristics on animals is "bizarre and amusing," a feature of comedy or Aesopian fable. Pomeroy 1994, 309-10 ad *Oec.* 11.4-5. Note that in *Mem.* 2.7.13-14 Socrates uses an Aesop-like fable about a dog who tells the sheep that he is their defender, in order to give his friend Aristarchos an argument to justify his nonparticipation in their artisanal work to the women of his household (the episode is recounted in detail in the notes to section B.4). See discussion in Dorion 2011, 2.1: 247 ad *Mem.* 2.7.14. However, in the *Memorabilia*, Socrates frames the story as taking place "when animals could talk," and he does not otherwise attribute comically impossible human traits to the animals.

⁶⁵⁹ See discussion in B.8.a.

Ischomachos' horse image, is a rhetorical choice that helps Ischomachos formulate his argument about male and female nature, rather than a natural exemplum that proves his argument.⁶⁶⁰ Indeed, we can infer that Socrates does not agree that the "queen bee" who stays inside and shuns all public life is the only good model for a woman, because when Socrates later repeats this discussion to Critoboulos, he will offer Pericles' mistress Aspasia as an authority on marriage (3.14).

Ischomachos does seem to understand Socrates is offering him criticism, or at least not assenting, as he responds by saying "You're joking, Socrates, but nevertheless I will go through for you the things with respect to which—attempts to practice them as best I can—I go through life," (Σὺ μὲν παίζεις . . . ἐγὼ δὲ ὁμῶς σοι διηγέσομαι ἃ ἐγὼ ὅσον δύναμαι πειρῶμαι ἐπιτηδεύων διαπερᾶν τὸν βίον, 11.7). Although this does not seem to be a hostile reaction, his use of "but nevertheless" (μὲν . . . δὲ ὁμῶς) indicates a polite lack of appreciation for Socrates' humor. And as the conversation continues, Socrates will make other startling comparisons that Ischomachos describes as jokes,⁶⁶¹ so that by the end of the conversation, Ischomachos (now clearly angry at Socrates' discourse) compares him to another babblers of sophistries alien to well-grounded thought: Tantalos.⁶⁶²

B.7 Ischomachos on seeking wealth and training servants

Socrates' absurd comparison of himself to a horse with no money does not merely highlight the fact that Ischomachos' imagery is a rhetorical choice, but it also highlights a key area of ethical disagreement with Ischomachos: Ischomachos' desire to be wealthy and to add to that wealth (provided he can do so honorably).

⁶⁶⁰ Cf. Too 2001, 78 (Socrates is criticizing Ischomachos' unreasoned use of Hesiodic analogies).

⁶⁶¹ See discussion in sections B.8.a and B.9.

⁶⁶² Tantalos is discussed further in section B.10.

When Ischomachos finally starts to describe his daily activities to Socrates, he says that he starts by serving the gods, and he prays and acts so that he may receive health, strength, civic honor, the good will of friends, honorable survival in war—and honorably increasing wealth (πλούτου καλῶς αὐξομένου)(11.8-9). Socrates does not question Ischomachos’ other goals, but he is concerned about Ischomachos’ desire for wealth. “Is it really a concern for you,” Socrates asks, “to be rich, and in having much property to have many troubles (πολλὰ . . . πράγματα) caring for it?” (11.9). Ischomachos replies that it certainly is; “for it seems pleasant to me to honor the gods magnificently, and to benefit my friends if they need anything, and that the city not be unadorned on my account through lack of funds” (ἡδὺ γάρ μοι δοκεῖ . . . καὶ θεοὺς μεγαλείως τιμᾶν καὶ φίλους, ἄν τινος δέωνται, ἐπωφελεῖν καὶ τὴν πόλιν μηδὲν κατ’ ἐμὲ χρήμασιν ἀκόσμητον εἶναι, 11.9). Ischomachos also argues that good things are interdependent: having enough to eat (i.e., having enough resources) leads to health, thus to strength, thus to survival in war, and thus to the increase of the household (11.12).

Socrates does not give his full approval to these statements, but he calls them “fine” or “honorable” (καλά) and “characteristic of a very powerful man” (11.10). He also describes the wealthy men who can adorn the city and relieve the burdens of their friends as “powerful, abundant, and strong,” and implicitly suggests that some of his friends, at least, have received support from friends with surplus wealth when he adds that “but in fact (ἀλλὰ γὰρ), many of us can praise such men” (11.10-11).⁶⁶³ He is eager, he says, to learn how Ischomachos makes a surplus with which to benefit his friends and his community (11.13). Notably, however, he does not call Ischomachos’ wealthy men “gentlemen,” καλοὶ κάγαθοί.

Some attempt to argue that Socrates’ seemingly favorable remarks about Ischomachos’ statements are meant to be taken ironically, and that Socrates

⁶⁶³ Denniston says that “but in fact” is the meaning in “the great majority of cases” for ἀλλὰ γὰρ, and offers this passage as an example of the particle being used to break off. Denniston 1950, 101, 103.

disapproves entirely of Ischomachos' plans to benefit the city and friends.⁶⁶⁴ But Socrates did not question Ischomachos' taking positive images of order from choral dances, triremes, and military troops; and choral dances, at least, could be considered both "honoring the gods" and "civic adornment," as civic religious institutions funded and/or directed primarily by the well-to-do.⁶⁶⁵ Nor is there any indication elsewhere in the *Oeconomicus* that Socrates disapproved of these institutions, at least to the extent they *were* civic institutions, rather than a means to punish the wealthy or for the wealthy to engage in overspending and "foolish" φιλοτιμία—which was not necessarily all forms of φιλοτιμία (1.22; 2.5-8). Thus this praise is properly understood as qualified, rather than ironic.⁶⁶⁶

What Ischomachos seems to be missing is what Socrates will later discuss with Critoboulos: that one's true estate is not a matter of accumulated money or profit, but rather of what can confer benefit.⁶⁶⁷ Ischomachos' desire to use his

⁶⁶⁴ Cf. Kronenberg 2009, 37-8, 61-4 (Ischomachos is a materialist whose idea of order is confined to images of physical order; his desire for wealth and profit is a false notion of success); Nee 2009, 249, 267-270 (Ischomachos fails to pursue farming philosophically, for its own sake; his way of life is an insatiable working towards increase that serves no purpose); Too 2001, 72, 79 (Ischomachos casts himself as the ideal governor of the household, seen as a political microcosm, but Socrates' remarks show him up as a "babbling fool" who fails to pursue real wealth); Stevens 1994, 233-5 (Socrates focuses on friendship where Ischomachos focuses only on profit). See discussions in A.3 (ironic readings of the *Oeconomicus*) and B.1 (on Ischomachos' being "called" a gentleman).

⁶⁶⁵ See discussion in section B.5.b above.

⁶⁶⁶ As Hobden puts it, Socrates is not negating Ischomachos' advice, but rather exploring the boundaries between utility, profit, and extreme acquisitiveness. Hobden 2017, 162-3.

⁶⁶⁷ See discussion in section C.1. For Socrates' view of the profit-focused man in the *Memorabilia*, see Xen. *Mem* 2.6.3, where Socrates criticizes the businessman who has no leisure for anything except to pursue profit (κερδαίνω); *Mem.* 3.7.6, where

surplus to honor the gods magnificently, to benefit his friends, and not to leave the city unadorned shows a proper desire to confer benefits, and therefore Socrates calls his remarks “fine”;⁶⁶⁸ but it also shows that Ischomachos is not entirely clear on what is most beneficial.⁶⁶⁹ Socrates approved of honoring the gods through

Socrates urges a worthy friend not to be shy about going into the assembly, which is composed of different kinds of artisans, farmers, importers (ἐμποροί), and traders who think of nothing but profit—his inferiors in public affairs. Cf. *Mem* 3.1.10, where Socrates is discussing how to manage and arrange troops with a would-be general, and examining who the “best” men are for particular purposes—e.g., it is best to put the most money-loving men in front when the goal is to get a large amount of money, and the most honor-loving if the task is to face danger. Socrates is not here praising the idea of loving money, but rather showing that a good leader must know and know how to use the characteristics of his followers.

⁶⁶⁸ Gray, Dorion, and Pomeroy argue that Xenophon’s Socrates accepts that Ischomachos’ pursuit of wealth is virtuous. Gray 2011, 354, 357 (Xenophon makes clear in his *Poroi* that Athens needs good wealthy men; although wealth is not virtue, Ischomachos’ wealth is a product of his virtue); Dorion 2008, 273-9 (riches should not be sought for their own sake, but to help the city and friends; although Socrates’ way of life is superior, it is not generalizable; both Ischomachos and Socrates are necessary to the city); Pomeroy 1994, 342 ad *Oec.* 20.27 (Ischomachos’ quest for gain is laudable because he shares his surplus with his community, unlike his father). They do not take into account Socrates’ carefully qualified remarks, as discussed in the text.

⁶⁶⁹ Cf. Danzig 2010, 244, 254, 257-63 (Socrates acknowledges that there is some nobility in Ischomachos’ efforts to use his wealth to accomplish good things for friends and the city, though he does not approve of Ischomachos’ pursuit of profit rather than leisure for philosophy and seeking the truer wealth of wisdom; he sees the *Oeconomicus* as Xenophon’s apology for his own, second-best, way of life); Ambler 1996, 123, 131 (Socrates rejects Ischomachos’ way of life in favor of a life of philosophy; his questions suggest that Ischomachos’ noble uses of his wealth are not

sacrifice, but in the *Memorabilia* he makes it clear that the richness of the sacrifice is unimportant; what matters is the piety of the worshipper, who should give in accordance with his means (*Mem.* 1.3.3). The desire to benefit friends is also praiseworthy, but this also need not require a great deal of money; although Socrates had almost no money, he was a great benefactor to his friends.⁶⁷⁰ And although a desire to adorn the city is praiseworthy, again, it is a matter of what one considers adornment. We have already seen that Ischomachos himself rejects useless and “showy adornment” in houses and disapproves of cosmetics for his wife;⁶⁷¹ although Socrates will praise adorning altars and people in his praise of farming (5.3), we will see that there he is referring to simple, natural adornment (such as flowers), which is being contrasted to the fine clothes, jewelry, and adornment (κόσμος) of the Persian King (4.23).⁶⁷² Like benefiting friends, adorning the city does not require riches; Socrates himself adorns the city by making his associates better men (*Mem.* 1.2.61).

Ischomachos, however, does believe that he is capable of improving others as the master of a well-run household, at least in some cases. His key techniques include sharing his wealth and appealing to what motivates different types of people. He induces goodwill in his servants by doing them kindnesses (εὐεργετέω) whenever the gods have granted him a generous supply of some good thing (12.6-7). He can also teach them to show concern (ἐπιμελέομαι), at least if they are self-controlled in basic areas such as wine, sleep, and erotic passion (12.11-14,16). If they are lovers of profit, he appeals to that love of individual profit and shows them that taking care is profitable (12.15-6); if they are self-controlled (ἐγκρατής) and have only a moderate love of profit, he can teach them to show concern through praise and blame (12.16), i.e., by socializing them into the values of the the

sufficiently rewarding to justify its pursuit); Pangle 1994, 138 (Ischomachos seems to have no clear conception of the common good).

⁶⁷⁰ *Mem.* 1.3.5; see discussion in section C.1.

⁶⁷¹ See discussion in section B.5.d.

⁶⁷² See discussion in sections C.3-C.4.

household. He can even teach his slaves to be leaders of other slaves, by teaching the basic principles of leadership that he himself uses: at the most basic level, this resembles the kind of reward and punishment that one uses to train colts or puppies, satisfying their appetites when they obey and punishing them when they do not—and for some slavish types, this is the most effective form of control (13.6-8).⁶⁷³ But those who naturally love honor, Ischomachos emphasizes, also respond to praise (13.9). Ischomachos also assists his foremen by rewarding better workers more than worse ones, and by praising his foremen when they do likewise (13.10-2). Finally, Ischomachos can teach his servants to be just—at least, some of them—using rules drawn from a combination of Greek law (which penalizes the dishonest) and Persian law (which also rewards the honest) (14.3-7). He can keep many of the profit-loving type just through reward and punishment,⁶⁷⁴ but those who naturally love honor and are just because they value his praise are the best type; these he treats as free men (ἐλεύθεροι), makes rich, and honors—as καλοὶ κάγαθοί (14.9).⁶⁷⁵

For Ischomachos there thus seems to be an equivalence between being καλὸς κάγαθός and being a lover of honor, a φιλότιμος. As he tells Socrates, a φιλότιμος differs from one who loves profit (φιλοκερδής) in that he is willing to labor (πονέω), run risks, and avoid shameful profits for the sake of honor and praise (14.10). This seems to be how he thinks of himself, e.g. in 11.8 as a man who seeks honor in the city, good will among friends, honorable (καλός) survival in war, and honorable

⁶⁷³ Ischomachos' use of the animal analogy does not necessarily mean that he thinks training people is the *same* as training animals; as noted in the above section, Socrates also uses this analogy, which is especially helpful in describing basic forms of education.

⁶⁷⁴ Many of Ischomachos' management techniques resemble those of the Persian King that Socrates will describe to Critoboulos. See discussion in section C.3.

⁶⁷⁵ Cf. Socrates at *Mem.* 2.3.16 (inferior men respond to gifts, but gentlemen to being treated like friends).

increase of wealth, and it also explains his own concern to have a surplus so that he can be magnificent in honoring the gods and be able to adorn his city.⁶⁷⁶

As he did with Ischomachos' earlier desire to increase wealth, Socrates responds to Ischomachos' description of how he trains his servants with qualified approval. He agrees that a fully trained servant would be a very valuable foreman (ἐπίτροπος); but his description of this servant is a little different from the one Ischomachos has described. Ischomachos has stressed that the best servants desire his praise, and are therefore just; in contrast, Socrates stresses that the valuable servants have been led to desire Ischomachos' welfare and the flourishing of the farm as if it were their own.

ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἐπειδάν γε ἐμποίησῃς τινὲς τὸ βούλεσθαί σοι εἶναι τάγαθά,
ἐμποίησῃς δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ τούτῳ <τὸ> ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὅπως ταῦτά σοι ἐπιτελῇται,
ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ἐπιστήμην κτήσῃ αὐτῷ ὥς ἂν ποιοῦμενα ἕκαστα τῶν
ἔργων ὠφελιμώτερα γίγνοιτο, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄρχειν ἱκανὸν αὐτὸν ποιήσῃς,
ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις πᾶσιν ἤδηταί σοι τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς ὠραῖα ἀποδεικνύων ὅτι
πλεῖστα ὥσπερ σὺ σαυτῷ, οὐκέτι ἐρήσομαι περὶ τούτου εἰ ἔτι τινὸς ὁ
τοιούτος προσδεῖται (15.1)

but indeed when you instill in someone the wishing of good things for you, and you instill in the same man the care that these things come about, and in addition you procure knowledge for him of how each of his tasks may be done more beneficially, and in addition you make him capable of ruling, and above all these things he takes pleasure in showing you that the seasonal production of the earth is as great as possible, just as you would to yourself, I will no longer ask if this sort of servant lacks anything.

⁶⁷⁶ Similarly, Ischomachos tells his wife that the better she fulfills her duties, the more honored she will be in the household (7.42).

The reason for Socrates' qualified praise is not that he disapproves of the inculcation of group spirit, or of a leader's use of punishment and reward, and praise and blame,⁶⁷⁷ or of an appeal to φιλοτιμία, which Socrates (and Xenophon) also think can be a valuable quality.⁶⁷⁸ A desire for honor and praise always raises the question of whose approval is being sought, and for what; Socrates, who had experience resisting unjust action when it was being urged by the majority, knew

⁶⁷⁷ Ischomachos recommended similar techniques for the wife to use in training the housekeeper, at 9.12-3; Socrates in the *Oeconomicus* will also describe similar techniques as being used by the Persian King (4.5-16, as discussed in section C.4). Socrates in the *Memorabilia* also describes similar training techniques, e.g. *Mem.* 3.3 (Socrates urges a cavalry commander to learn his subject, especially the inculcation of obedience, by showing that he knows horsemanship best and that it is more honorable and safer (κάλλιον τε σωτηριώτερον) to obey him (3.10), as well as by appealing to the men's φιλοτιμία). See discussion in Hobden 2017, 159-63.

⁶⁷⁸ See, e.g., *Mem.* 3.3.11-5 (Socrates explains that a good cavalry leader must be a good speaker who can communicate a love of honor, φιλοτιμία, to his men); Xen. *Symp.* 8.38-40 (Socrates tells Callias he should be grateful for being inspired to love Autolycos the φιλότιμος athlete; to win his favor, he must consider what knowledge enabled Themistocles to liberate Greece, Pericles to advise Athens, Solon to give it its legal code, Sparta to be the best leaders; he also praises Callias for being a most distinguished (ἱεροπρεπέστατος) holder of a priesthood). See discussion in Dillery 2016, 260 (noting that in Xen. *Hiero* 7.3, Simonides points out that φιλοτιμία distinguishes men from animals, though it is not inherent in all men); Dorion 2011, 2.1: 286 ad *Mem.* 3.3.13, 324-5 ad *Mem.* 3.7.1 (offering additional citations; holding that this is a distinction between the Platonic and Xenophantic Socrates). See also Seager 2001, 387-8, 392-3 (discussing how Xenophon's Socrates and other characters encourage the pursuit of civic honor by being useful to friends and to the city).

that justice and a desire for praise were not always the same thing.⁶⁷⁹ Socrates always stresses that honor must be earned⁶⁸⁰ and that φιλοτιμία must be a love of the right kind of honor, rather than “foolish and expensive desires for honor” (φιλοτιμιῶν τινων μώρων καὶ δαπανηρῶν, 1.22) that can lead to disaster. When Ischomachos praises his workers, he is linking that praise to constructive behavior that ultimately depends on the virtue of self-control (12.11-4); his servants are better off for seeking his praise, even if they are not receiving the best possible education in justice itself.⁶⁸¹ In his own behavior of seeking surplus wealth,

⁶⁷⁹ See, e.g., *Mem.* 4.4.2-4 (Socrates would not permit an illegal vote in the Assembly; refused to obey an illegal command by the Thirty; refused to make illegal appeals to the jury that convicted him).

⁶⁸⁰ Thus in *Mem.* 3.6.1-9, Socrates takes Glaucon in hand, who is eager to lead the city although he is only about twenty years old. Socrates first gets his attention by praising him for his fine (καλόν) goal (3.6.2). He then asks Glaucon how he will benefit the city, since he wishes to be honored (τιμᾶσθαι, 3.6.3). Socrates has to prompt him on a list of topics, none of which Glaucon knows anything about (e.g., revenue, expenses, defence, grain supply), and ends by encouraging him to learn his subject (3.6.18).

⁶⁸¹ Many scholars have argued that Socrates is criticizing Ischomachos for failing to give his servants (or his wife) a moral education. They argue that Ischomachos is focusing only on material goals, and is using reward and punishment, praise and blame, solely to appeal to self-interest. See, e.g., Kronenberg 2009, 58-60 (just as political entities give citizens a self-interested motivation for actions that benefit the group, so Ischomachos uses similar methods to teach wife and servants, without regard to any value of justice or morality beyond the material); Nee 2009, 265; Ambler 1996, 124 (Socrates shows that he regards Ischomachos' instruction of his servants as superficial by not describing it as “teaching” or “education”); Stevens 1994, 232 (there is no hint of Ischomachos giving either his wife or his servants a moral education; he relies on money and praise to win the obedience of those who are not free to disobey). But as Ischomachos is answering Socrates' question about

however, Ischomachos is not taking such good care of himself. At best he is seeking to win praise and honor for using his money to be magnificent and generous, rather than to confer what would be truly beneficial to himself, his friends, and his city. And a true gentleman is beneficial to himself, as well as to his family, friends, and city.⁶⁸²

We have already seen a distinction between Ischomachos' descriptions of household order according to Greek civic models, based on a dynamic and cooperative form of order, and according to the profit-oriented model of the Phoenician ship, which was more static and hierarchical (and which was directed primarily to Socrates). We see another distinction developing here in the laws Ischomachos uses to encourage justice among his servants, the Greek laws that require it (and punish its lack),⁶⁸³ and the royal Persian laws that appeal more

how he trains his household servants, a focus on material goals is understandable; his encouraging his servants to practice self-control and diligent care is an encouragement to practice the basic forms of virtue needed for all the rest. Furthermore, Socrates too used praise, at least in order to get a student's attention, and recommended the use of appeals to self-interest in appropriate circumstances, such as the training of a military troop (*Mem.* 3.1-4, 3.6). In my view, Socrates does disapprove of what Ischomachos teaches, but rather is simply not willing to concede that it is everything necessary for true gentlemanship.

⁶⁸² *Mem.* 1.2.48 (Xenophon states that Socrates' friends associated with him not to become politicians, but so that they could become gentlemen and treat their household, household members, relatives, friends, city, and fellow-citizens well). See discussion in Dorion 2000, 1: ccxv-ccxviii (self-control is the basis of virtue and thus of being useful to self and to others and to the city—concentric circles of one and the same virtue; offering additional Xenophontic citations on the importance of being useful to friends and city).

⁶⁸³ Kronenberg points out that Ischomachos describes the Greek laws as intending to make the shameful pursuit of profit unprofitable (άλυσιτελής) for the unjust (14.5), and argues that the Greek laws therefore also aim at nothing more than

directly to individual self-interest by rewarding its presence. This difference in organization—which Ischomachos does not acknowledge—will be explored further by Socrates in his conversation with Critoboulos.⁶⁸⁴

B.8 *Farming*

So far Ischomachos has discussed his activities mostly in terms of his personal exercise and his training his farm workers—which does require, as he notes, some continuing supervision. Thus as advertised, his work is indeed in the divinely ordained and manly “outside” sphere, while his well-educated wife handles what is inside the home. But Ischomachos’ supposedly natural and divinely-ordained division between inside and outside has run into some metaphorical trouble, with Socrates’ hinting that some of Ischomachos’ images, such as the queen bee and the cosmetic-less horse, do not support Ischomachos’ assertions that his arguments are based on nature.

In this next part of the discussion, Socrates presses Ischomachos to discuss the technical details of the art of farming. Ischomachos is initially reluctant, as in his view farming is noble precisely because it is not a complicated social creation that requires technical instruction: it is simply a matter of paying attention to what nature teaches. Ischomachos will make even Socrates realize that he knows basic elements of farming by leading Socrates to reflect on his observations and experience of nature.

As he and Ischomachos discuss grain agriculture (B.8.a), Socrates will concede that his past experience of nature does entail that he has some real knowledge of farming. But he will continue to question Ischomachos’ imagery in a way that suggests that the choice of images and metaphors plays a greater role in

material self-interest. Kronenberg 2009, 59. However, it more likely represents the fact that the Greek lawmakers (in this characterization by Xenophon) thought that the unjust would be more responsive to the profit-motivation than the just.

⁶⁸⁴ See especially sections C.3-4.

the creation of our knowledge and social understanding than Ischomachos is inclined to allow. Socrates will develop this theme of the human construction of increasingly complex forms of knowledge and understanding as he and Ischomachos discuss the planting of trees (B.8.b) into some sort of orchard or garden.

B.8.a *Grain agriculture: metaphor and the teaching of nature*

Although Ischomachos has noted in passing that it is important that his servants know what they need to do on the farm, he has not actually discussed any farming techniques.⁶⁸⁵ It is thus not surprising that Socrates now says that Ischomachos has glossed over something very important: exactly how to perform this farming work that makes those who understand it rich (πλούσιος, 15.3). Socrates has to ask the question repeatedly, refusing to be put off by Ischomachos' general remarks on how farming is friendly to humanity and on its being "noble" (γενναῖον):

Τὸ γὰρ ὠφελιμωτάτην οὔσαν καὶ ἡδίστην ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ καλλίστην καὶ προσφιλεστάτην θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις, ἔτι πρὸς τούτοις καὶ ῥάστην εἶναι μαθεῖν πῶς οὐχὶ γενναῖόν ἐστι; (15.4)

For how is [farming] not noble, being most beneficial and pleasant to work at, and most beautiful and beloved to gods and men, and still in addition to these also very easy to learn?

Socrates tells Ischomachos that he feels like a student who wants to learn to read and write, and in response is merely told that he should learn the alphabet; this

⁶⁸⁵ Ischomachos has already said that of course the servants must know what to do, when and how; otherwise their care would confer no benefit (13.2).

leaves the student no closer to actually knowing the alphabet, Socrates complains (15.7).⁶⁸⁶

What Socrates seems to want is something like an agricultural handbook, a didactic treatise that summarizes an expert's analysis and advice—something more like Ischomachos' description of how he taught his wife to create order (τάξις) inside his house, for example, or even Ischomachos' advice on how to train servants.⁶⁸⁷ But as Ischomachos' remarks on farming's being "very easy to learn" hint, Ischomachos does not think of farming in terms of τάξις, the creative intellectual interpretation and ordering that is so critical in dealing with the household.⁶⁸⁸ As we will see, he sees farming as noble precisely because in his view it is simply a matter of observing what farmers do and what nature teaches.

⁶⁸⁶ Cf. the discussion of the organization of the Phoenician ship (8.13) in section B.5.c, which Ischomachos described as knowable just as were the letters of Socrates' name.

⁶⁸⁷ Pomeroy attempts to argue that handbooks are characteristic of banausic arts, and this is part of the reason Xenophon's Ischomachos does not provide one for farming. Pomeroy 1994, 322 ad *Oec.* 15.3. But Xenophon wrote technical treatises on being a cavalry commander (*Hipparchicus*), on horsemanship (*de Re Equestri*), and on hunting (*Cynegeticus*)—all nonbanausic and rather aristocratic occupations. See, e.g., *Oec.* 5.5-6 (Socrates associates hunting with farming); 11.17-8 (Ischomachos describes how he practices cavalry maneuvers). As Pomeroy notes, horse-ownership was the mark of wealth, and the cavalry was associated with wealthy citizens. Pomeroy 1994, 219 ad *Oec.* 1.8. Although Xenophon's treatises vary in their literary approach, each offers a significant amount of practical advice. See discussion in Dillery 2017, 209-16.

⁶⁸⁸ Danzig argues that Ischomachos' reluctance to give details is due to his embarrassment at the untiring hard work farming requires, which leaves him with no real leisure of the sort Socrates enjoys. Danzig 2010, 255-6 (comparing Ischomachos' reluctance to give details to Polus' attempt to get away with praising rhetoric instead of defining it in the *Gorgias*, as discussed in Chapter 2, section C.2).

Ischomachos therefore begins his explanation of how easy farming is to learn by dismissing the sort of very complex (ποικιλώτατος)⁶⁸⁹ handbook explanation that Socrates had been requesting and arguing that even what is said to be the most complex subject—understanding the nature of your soil—is quite easy to understand simply by looking (ὁράω) at what the land bears and “enjoys” (ἡδοίτο) producing and nourishing (16.3-4). Even waste land shows its particular nature (καὶ χερσεύουσα δὲ ὁμῶς ἐπιδείκνυσι τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν, 16.5); as he will insist later, the earth is much easier to test than another man, and does not deceive:

Οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ὃ τι ἐπὶ ἀπάτῃ δείκνυσιν, ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς ἃ τε δύναται καὶ ἃ μὴ σαφηνίζει τε καὶ ἀληθεύει (20.13).

It could also be argued that as a gentleman farmer who supervised slaves rather than doing much agricultural work himself, Ischomachos avoided describing specific agricultural techniques to Socrates because he didn’t know them. However, Ischomachos said at 11.16 that he was capable of giving his workers advice on technique; and I think we have to take seriously the point of view expressed elsewhere in Xenophon’s work that a good leader has to know how the work should be done (e.g., *Mem.* 3.3.9). It would make sense for an experienced farmer in a relatively short conversation with a novice in the marketplace to focus on the “alphabet” that a novice could be expected to pick up immediately.

⁶⁸⁹ As we saw in the earlier discussion of adornment at B.5.d., ποικίλος and related words often have a pejorative connotation, as in *Oec.* 9.2 when Ischomachos stressed that his house was beautiful in its usefulness rather than in any showy adornment (ποικίλμασι κεκόσμηται). Here it suggests that the handbook writers have made this subject far more elaborate than it truly is, presumably for the purpose of impressing their readers. Cf. *Oec.* 17.7, where Socrates asks Ischomachos if sowing seed is a ποικίλη τέχνη (and gets an evasive answer). See discussion in text below.

For there is nothing about which [she] makes a show in order to deceive, but in a simple manner she makes clear and states truthfully what she can and cannot do

Nor is the process of observation hindered by human efforts, as farmers do not attempt to conceal their work (15.11-12). Socrates agrees that ignorance of the soil should be no barrier to his farming, as he now remembers how fishermen generally reach the same opinion about soil as farmers do, just from looking at the crops as they pass them on the shore (16.6-7).

As Ischomachos continues his explanation of basic farming activities such as sowing, reaping, and winnowing, he uses Socratic-style questions to show Socrates that he already knows more than he realizes if he applies basic reasoning to his own observations. After they discuss the need for making fallow land clear of weeds (ὅλης τε καθαρὰν αὐτήν, 16.13),⁶⁹⁰ Ischomachos leads Socrates to the correct conclusion that because experience shows that the god does not lead the year in an orderly fashion (τεταγμένως), with the rain coming at different times, it's best to sow throughout the season (17.4-5). Ischomachos praises Socrates' coming to the right conclusion without being told it by Ischomachos; it seems that Ischomachos is correct that Socrates knows about farming simply because he has observed farmers and the earth itself, with no complex handbook needed.

But as Socrates and Ischomachos continue their discussion of sowing, Socrates once again calls attention to Ischomachos' language, and suggests that things are not as simple and "natural" as Ischomachos claims. Socrates asks Ischomachos if sowing seed is a ποικίλη τέχνη, a complex art (17.7); Ischomachos concedes that it requires practice, but evades the question by asking Socrates a series of questions designed to reinforce his argument that sowing is also primarily a matter of observing nature. What if, Ischomachos asks, some of the earth is thinner (λεπτοτέρα) and other part thicker (παχυτέρα)? Would Socrates sow more, or less

⁶⁹⁰ Note the similarity to Ischomachos' preference for his wife's being pure or clear (καθαρός) of cosmetics (11.9).

seed? (17.8) Although these terms “thinner” and “thicker” were conventional metaphors for “less fertile” and “more fertile” land,⁶⁹¹ Socrates attempts to clarify the image: does Ischomachos mean “weaker” (ἀσθενεστέρα) versus “stronger” (ἰσχυροτέρα)? (17.8). These terms “weaker” and “stronger” form a different set of metaphors, which Socrates proceeds to explore. He would add more water to stronger wine, he says, put more weight on the stronger man, and if it were a question of nourishing people, he would assign it to (προσάττω) the most powerful men to nourish the most people.⁶⁹² Does it then follow, he asks, that weak land would become stronger if you put more produce (καρπός) into it, just like yoke animals would? (17.9).

At one level, Socrates’ fine distinctions between similar metaphors seem almost like sophistic quibbling—like the behavior of Prodicos that Plato poked fun at in the *Protagoras*, or the distinction made by Aristophanes’ Socrates between “fowl” and “fowlette.”⁶⁹³ It makes Ischomachos laugh and say that Socrates is joking—still in apparent good humor, although that will change as Socrates continues to joke.⁶⁹⁴ Just as when he compared himself to a horse without money in *Oec.* 11.4-7, Socrates has called attention to Ischomachos’ choice of imagery by

⁶⁹¹ Pomeroy notes that Theophrastus uses similar metaphorical terms to describe soil, as do many Roman authors. See, e.g., Theophrastus, *Inquiry into Plants*, 8.6.2, 8.7.6 (describing good soil as “fat” (πίερα) and poorer soil as “thin” (λεπτή)). Pomeroy 1994, 330 ad *Oec.* 17.8.

⁶⁹² Note the implication in Socrates’ choice of examples that the powerful (who presumably have more resources) should benefit those who are less so. Cf. *Mem.* 2.10 (Socrates advises a wealthy man to make an investment in friendship by helping a poor acquaintance).

⁶⁹³ For a discussion of Aristophanes’ mockery of Socrates (and Prodicos), see section B.6. For a further discussion of Prodicos as a quibbling sophist, see section B.10.

⁶⁹⁴ See section B.6 (Socrates jokingly compares himself to a horse with no money) and section B.9 (Socrates jokingly compares Ischomachos’ father to a profiteering merchant ship).

offering a different image that juxtaposes surprising categories: here, land to yoke animals (and wine and people). But although Ischomachos laughs Socrates' point away, Socrates' new metaphor has predicted Ischomachos' next choice of metaphor and his conclusion. One should, Ischomachos says, plow in the sprouted seed again to be food (σῖτος) for the soil while there is still abundant rain, so that strength (ἰσχύς) can come to it just as it would from manure; if the earth nourishes the plant until it sets fruit, then it will be hard for weak (ἀσθενής) soil to produce much fruit in the end—just as it would be hard for a weak (ἀσθενής) sow to raise many well-grown (ἄδρoί) piglets (17.10). In Socrates' image of personified land that can be “strong” or “weak,” that would mean that more seed is good for weaker soil if it sprouts and becomes food for the soil, but less seed is good if the seed is intended to grow to fruition. Socrates thus draws the correct conclusion to Ischomachos' original question: that you should sow less seed into weaker (ἀσθενεστέρα) soil (17.11). But this time, Socrates' correct conclusion is not a result solely of his looking at the earth, but also of his having recognized the more useful metaphor: STRENGTH IS FERTILITY / WEAKNESS IS INFERTILITY.⁶⁹⁵

Perhaps stimulated by this metaphorical success, Socrates explicitly addresses the importance of imagery and metaphor in the next topic he asks about, hoeing the sprouted grain. If a flood covers the grain with mud or exposes its roots, says Ischomachos, then doesn't the grain need help (ἐπικουρία, 17.13)? Yes, says Socrates; people can help the grain by removing or adding soil. What about the weeds that choke the grain, says Ischomachos, just as useless drones snatch the nourishment the bees worked to store up? Well, says Socrates, by Zeus, it is necessary to cut the weeds (ῥῆ), just as it is to take the drones out of the hive. He can see now, as Ischomachos suggests, that it is necessary to send men in to hoe. But it is the importance of Ischomachos' imagery that really strikes him.

⁶⁹⁵ Cf. Alderman 2005, 208-9 (arguing that Socrates' shift in metaphor is intended to show the limits of argument by analogy).

ἀτὰρ ἐνθυμοῦμαι . . . οἷόν ἐστι τὸ εἶ τὰς εἰκόνας ἐπάγεσθαι. πάνυ γὰρ σύ με
ἐξώργισας πρὸς τὴν ὕλην τοὺς κηφῆνας εἰπών, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ ὅτε περὶ
αὐτῆς τῆς ὕλης ἔλεγε (17.15).

But I really lay to heart . . . what it is to bring in images well. For you entirely
stirred me up against the weeds when you spoke of the drones, much more
than when you were talking about the weeds themselves.

The discussion of grain culture concludes by Ischomachos' showing Socrates that he similarly understands reaping, threshing, and winnowing (*Oec.* 18). Again, by asking the right questions, he leads Socrates to reach the correct answers. At the end of section 18, Socrates admits that "I hadn't realized that I knew all that" (about winnowing) (18.9), agrees with Ischomachos that farming is the most noble art because it is the easiest to learn, and ends the discussion of grain culture in a tone of surprise, harking back to his earlier questions about sowing: "And indeed, I hadn't realized I knew the facts about sowing!" (τὰ μὲν δὴ ἀμφὶ σπόρον ἐπιστάμενος ἄρα ἐλελήθην ἐμαυτὸν ἐπιστάμενος, 18.10).

At the end of the discussion of grain agriculture, it thus seems to have been established that Socrates does indeed know the basics of farming, once he has reflected on what he already knows and applied basic reasoning. In Ischomachos' view, this is due to farming's being "most noble" and easy to learn precisely because it is not a matter of complex human social decisions: it is simply a matter of observing nature, which is straightforward and does not deceive.⁶⁹⁶ Vernant has argued that this is a view of farming that is still closely integrated with religious thinking; as in Hesiod's *Works and Days*, farming was a way of entering into direct contact with divine power through hard work, prayer, and strict attention to divinely given natural signs and times.⁶⁹⁷ And indeed, Ischomachos' stress that

⁶⁹⁶ Vernant ascribes this view to Xenophon himself. Vernant 2006 [1965], 280-1.

⁶⁹⁷ Vernant 2006 [1965], 277-9. Vernant points to the close connection between the Greek agricultural festivals and the religious calendar, as well as to remarks such as

farming is “most beautiful and most dear to gods and men” (καλλίστην καὶ προσφιλεστάτην θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις, 15.4) suggests that he sees farming as bringing man closer to the divine—albeit to a divine that is more straightforward than Hesiod’s gods, who hid the means of making a living from men (*Works and Days*, 42). As Ischomachos says at 20.13, the earth communicates simply and directly, without engaging in deceptive displays; it only requires looking and listening to understand farming, as she herself is the teacher.⁶⁹⁸

ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ καὶ πάλαι σοι ἔλεγον ὅτι ἡ γεωργία οὕτω φιλάνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ πραεῖα τέχνη ὥστε καὶ ὁρῶντας καὶ ἀκούοντας ἐπιστήμονας εὐθὺς ἐαυτῆς ποιεῖν. πολλὰ δ’, ἔφη, καὶ αὐτὴ διδάσκει ὥς ἂν κάλλιστά τις αὐτῇ χρῶτο. αὐτίκα ἄμπελος ἀναβαίνουσα μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ δένδρα, ὅταν ἔχη τι πλησίον δένδρον, διδάσκει ἰστάναι αὐτήν· περιπεταννύουσα δὲ τὰ οἴναρα, ὅταν ἔτι αὐτῇ ἀπαλοὶ οἱ βότρυνες ᾧσι διδάσκει σκιάζειν τὰ ἡλιούμενα ταύτην τὴν ὥραν· ὅταν δὲ καιρὸς ᾗ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἤδη γλυκαίνεσθαι τὰς σταφυλάς, φυλλορροοῦσα διδάσκει ἐαυτὴν ψιλοῦν καὶ πεπαίνειν τὴν ὀπώραν, διὰ πολυφορίαν δὲ τοὺς μὲν πέποντας δεικνύουσα βότρυν, τοὺς δὲ ἔτι ὠμοτέρους φέρουσα, διδάσκει τρυγᾶν ἐαυτήν, ὥσπερ τὰ σῦκα συκάζουσι, τὸ ὀργῶν ἀεί. (19.17-19).

but I indeed was telling you earlier that farming is such a human-loving and gentle art that it can make those seeing and listening to her immediately knowledgeable. And she herself (he said) teaches many things about how someone might best treat her. For example, the grape, climbing up the trees whenever a tree is relatively close, teaches [us] to prop it up; and spreading out her leaves, whenever her clusters are tender, she teaches us to shade

those at *Oec.* 5.20, where Socrates urges prayer for success in farming, just as one prays for success in war. Vernant 2006 [1965], 281-2.

⁶⁹⁸ And thus failure in farming is also proof of a bad soul. See 20.15, discussed in section B.9 below.

those exposed to the sun during this time; and whenever it is just the right moment for the bunches to become sweetened by the sun, shedding her leaves she teaches us to strip her and to ripen the crop, and through its productiveness pointing out that some clusters are sweet, but bearing others still tart, she teaches us to gather her, just as they gather figs, as each one becomes ripe.

Ischomachos will therefore refuse to let Socrates compare farming to artisanal fields (18.9), arguing that he would not be able to persuade Socrates that he knew about those fields simply by questioning him; questioning is a method of teaching only because farming is such a human-loving and gentle art (19.17), he says, returning to the point he made at the beginning of the discussion of farming (τὴν φιλανθρωπίαν ταύτης τῆς τέχνης, 15.4). Although Ischomachos does not go into detail about why the artisanal fields are different, he gives a clue by changing Socrates' original examples of gold-smelting, flute-playing, and painting (18.9) to the identification of counterfeit money (τὰ κίβδηλα ἀργύρια), and flute-playing and painting (19.16). Both the existence and identification of counterfeit money depend not just on the properties of metals and their understanding, but on the existence and understanding of social conventions: what metals in what concentrations are used in genuine currency, what the engraving means on the coins, what coinage is and how it is used, and so forth.⁶⁹⁹ Similarly, in flute-playing and painting what is considered good or bad, appropriate or inappropriate, depends heavily on an understanding of such things as social and artistic context as well as of the elements of artistic composition. Ischomachos is suggesting that in such fields, observation alone is not enough to convey knowledge, not even if prompted by Socratic questioning; an in-depth understanding of social conventions is required, as is the ability to detect the false representations that are possible in the human world, as opposed to the divine and natural one. And although Socrates has been suggesting in response that even in farming we rely more on social conventions such as metaphor

⁶⁹⁹ Wellman 1976, 317.

and imagery to construct knowledge than Ischomachos has allowed, he does concede that farming is indeed the easiest of all occupations to learn (19.16, 21.1).

As other commentators have noted, Ischomachos' approach is similar to a variant of a doctrine better known from Plato called "recollection" (or anamnesis). Ischomachos has suggested that Socratic-style questioning can trigger the recollection of forgotten or unrealized knowledge; he even asked Socrates at the beginning of this conversation where he should begin to remind him (ὑπομνήσκω) about farming, as Socrates obviously knew about it already (16.8).⁷⁰⁰ Ischomachos is presenting a sort of earthy version of recollection, in which concrete farming knowledge can be recognized when sparked by a contemplation of the nature that is (literally) at ground-level,⁷⁰¹ in contrast to Platonic recollection, where abstract concepts such as justice, beauty, and geometry can be (to some extent) recognized from a recollection of the soul's contemplation of the Forms from

⁷⁰⁰ Waterfield 2004, 102-4 (arguing that Xenophon is explicitly alluding to the Platonic doctrine). See also discussions in Hobden 2017, 167 (recalled knowledge in the *Oeconomicus* is based on prior viewing, in distinction from Platonic recollection, based on remembering the Forms known inherently by the immortal soul); Purves 2010, 229-30 (Xenophonic recollection similar to Platonic anamnesis); Wellman 1976, 311-7 (arguing that anamnesis is a Socratic, rather than a Platonic, doctrine).

⁷⁰¹ Waterfield argues that Xenophon is correcting Plato by rejecting Plato's "hifalutin" theories of reincarnation and prenatal knowledge. Waterfield 2004, 104; see also Alderman 2005, 208-9 (Xenophon makes Ischomachos' use of recollection deliberately bathetic, to undermine the Platonic claim that recollection is a proof of eternal knowledge). I express no opinion here on whether Xenophon is disagreeing with Plato, or is simply focusing on another important method of gaining knowledge, the interaction of metaphor and other cultural structures with our (literally) ground-level experience (see also discussion in next section).

its ascent above-beyond ordinary life in its previous winged and immortal existence.⁷⁰²

But although Socrates acknowledges his “recollection” of farming, he has continued to highlight the importance of metaphor and imagery in constructing useful knowledge about farming. Although occupations like flute-playing may require a more specialized set of cultural knowledge, practice, and vocabulary than does farming, understanding and performing the work of farming still requires some form of rhetorical shaping. It is important to note, however, that Socrates is not claiming that the observation of nature is unimportant. Ischomachos’ own praise of farming’s simple and direct communication is a good example; based on a close observation of how the grapevine grows and responds to cultivation, it nevertheless relies upon the rhetorical technique of personification, reinforced by his steady repetition of the verb “teaches”: the grapevine *teaches* (διδάσκει) us to prop it up, *teaches* us to shade her tender grapes, *teaches* us when to strip away her leaves, *teaches* us to gather her in.⁷⁰³ Ischomachos’ description portrays each step so that we seem to see the vine growing and unfolding its leaves in front of us. Socrates observed at 17.14-5 that Ischomachos’ comparison of weeds to lazy drones made

⁷⁰² Plato’s doctrine of recollection is discussed in the *Phaedrus*, as briefly set out in Chapter 2, section F. For additional general discussion, see Guthrie 1962-1975, 4: 426-8, 511; Sayre 1969, 40-56 (discussing the “upward way” of Plato’s dialectic).

⁷⁰³ Personification was a common feature of ancient literature, often discussed by ancient rhetoricians under the name προσωποποιία, although this term could include the imagined speech and behavior of the dead as well as of abstractions or other nonpersonal things. See Quint. *Inst.* 9.2.31; cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1411a-b (describing metaphors that personify Greece as “bringing before the eyes,” πρὸ ὁμμάτων ποιεῖν). For general discussion, see Stafford 2000, 5-9; Lausberg 1998, §§ 559 (the personalized metaphor), 827-8 (*fictio personae*); Paxton 1994, 8-20 (the first definitive description of προσωποποιία in the treatise *On Style*, attributed here to Demetrius of Phaleron). (For a discussion of the personification of plants as hubristic, see Michelini 1978).

him much angrier at weeds; here we see how Ischomachos' personification and description of the vine's growth make us love the vine and the idea of farming and feel that we are in a cooperative partnership with the vine. These are rhetorical techniques that Socrates himself will use in his praise of farming later to Critoboulos.

B.8.b *Planting trees and constructing social knowledge*

It seems that Ischomachos' discussion of farming techniques could have ended here if Socrates' (or Xenophon's) sole purpose had been to demonstrate one or more of the following: that Socratic questioning was an effective way to teach others (rather than merely an annoying attack on established beliefs);⁷⁰⁴ that Socratic questioning taught by "recalling" knowledge based on common sense applied to a direct observation of the natural world;⁷⁰⁵ or that Socrates learned Socratic questioning from an eminently respectable Athenian gentleman.⁷⁰⁶

But the discussion does *not* stop here. Socrates finds it necessary to continue the discussion for an entire chapter into yet another agricultural topic, planting trees and vines (19.1-2),⁷⁰⁷ going through a similar process of Socratic questioning by Ischomachos on topics such as digging holes for trees. Only *after* that discussion

⁷⁰⁴ Waterfield 2004, 102-4.

⁷⁰⁵ Waterfield 2004, 104 (noting Wellman, but disagreeing there is evidence of recollection as a doctrine in the *Memorabilia*); Wellman 1976, 317-8 (arguing that the *Oeconomicus* and *Memorabilia* show that anamnesis is Socratic in origin rather than Platonic).

⁷⁰⁶ Strauss 1970, 147-8, 194.

⁷⁰⁷ Socrates asks Ischomachos about "tree" (δένδρον) planting, but the grapevine (ἄμπελος) was routinely classified as a tree (δένδρον) in the ancient world. At the end of the chapter, Ischomachos specifically praises the grapevine as a teacher (19.18-9). See, e.g., Theophrastus *Inquiry into Plants*, 1.3.1 (listing as examples of a tree the olive, fig, and grapevine). See also Pomeroy 1994, 333 ad *Oec.* 19.

is completed will he ask whether Ischomachos' questions are a method of teaching (διδασκαλία):

ἄρτι γὰρ δὴ . . . καταμανθάνω ἧ με ἐπηρώτησας ἕκαστα· ἄγων γάρ με δι' ὧν
ἐγὼ ἐπίσταμαι, ὅμοια τούτοις ἐπιδεικνὺς ἃ οὐκ ἐνόμιζον ἐπίστασθαι
ἀναπείθεις, οἶμαι, ὥς καὶ ταῦτα ἐπίσταμαι (19.15).

For I just now am understanding the way in which you were asking me each thing; because leading me through the things I know, pointing out that they are the same as these things which I thought I did not know, you persuaded me, I think, that I also know these.

There must, therefore, be something about planting trees and vines that contributes something new and important. From an agricultural perspective, what most distinguishes planting trees from growing grain is that orchards and vineyards are more complex, longer-lasting constructions than grain fields.⁷⁰⁸ Each tree or vine must be planted in a particular spot, chosen by the grower; it requires time (sometimes years) to grow until old enough to bear fruit; it requires the farmer's continuing care to maintain its productivity; and once established, it will produce fruit year after year, living and bearing over a much longer period of time than a grain field.⁷⁰⁹

⁷⁰⁸ Orchards and vineyards were longer-term, more labor intensive, and riskier investments that were a more profitable and prestigious type of agriculture, of greater interest to gentlemen farmers like Ischomachos, Critoboulos, and presumably Xenophon and many of his contemporary readers. Pomeroy 1994, 333-4 ad *Oec.* 19.

⁷⁰⁹ Vernant argues that the cultivation of fruit trees differed from grain agriculture for the Greeks primarily because it involved gathering produce that appeared as a gift from divine nature that the farmer celebrated through religious festivals, rather than by virtue of the farmer's own labor. Vernant 2006 [1965], 277. As I argue

What is so interesting about Ischomachos' teaching Socrates about tree-planting is that Ischomachos and Socrates do not even mention most of these more complex features of tree and orchard planting (such as creating an ordered pattern (τάξις) for the trees), although in his discussion of Persian gardening with Critoboulos, Socrates will show that he is well aware of them.⁷¹⁰ Instead Ischomachos and Socrates embark on an extended discussion of digging holes—not an expected topic in a philosophical dialogue. The discussion is practical and detailed: How deep should the holes be for trees, and should they be in wet or in dry soil? Should the cutting be put in upright or sideways? Should the earth be packed firmly around the transplant? Is it the same for vines, fruit trees, and olive trees? (19.1-14). In each case, Ischomachos shows Socrates that based on what he has seen of hole-digging in the past, and on what he already knows about soil and how plants grow, he already knows how to plant trees and vines—and this is what finally leads to Socrates' epiphany about recollection (as well as Ischomachos' warning that recollection does not apply to arts less human-loving than farming, and his closing tribute to the teaching of the vine).

It seems that there is something about Ischomachos' discussion of hole-digging that allows Socrates finally to understand how Socratic questioning can enable him to "remember" what he knows, something that was missing from the discussion of grain agriculture. As Purves has noted, there is another famous Greek literary work that connects trees, digging, and memory: the *Odyssey*.⁷¹¹ At the end of

below, Ischomachos does seem to celebrate a relationship with the vine (in 19.17-9) that exceeds anything he expresses in his discussion of grain agriculture; but for Ischomachos farming is a human-loving art whether the farmer is cultivating grain or trees, and his labor is necessary for both.

⁷¹⁰ See discussion at C.3-4.

⁷¹¹ Purves 2010, 228-33. Purves argues that through the discussion of hole-digging, Xenophon's Ischomachos presents memory as pictures stored in the mind (e.g., a picture of a hole dug for planting). These pictures can be arranged in an order, like τάξις of the Persian garden (described in C.3), that enable new abilities. Purves

the *Odyssey*, Odysseus finds his father Laertes in their orchard, where he is busy digging around a tree (λίστρειόντα φυτόν, *Od.* 24.227; φυτόν ἀμφελάχαινε, *Od.* 24.242).⁷¹² After some initial deceptive remarks, Odysseus finally reveals his identity and proves it (in part) by naming the trees and vines that his father had shown and given him as a child (*Od.* 24.336-344).⁷¹³

Odysseus' recollection of the ordered list of the trees and vines that his father had once shown and given him is quite different from Ischomachos' talk of planting trees as though it involved primarily digging random holes, rather than selecting the right plants for the needs of the farmer (and his descendants), planning their most useful placement, and creating a long-lived orchard or vineyard. This connection to Odysseus' recollection seems to be the reason that Socrates insisted on a discussion of tree planting, as it provides the missing link for Socrates to appreciate how Socratic questioning can create knowledge.⁷¹⁴ Knowledge begins, as Ischomachos

argues that this technique enables a static but “‘complete’ and muselike view of space” that has been ordered in the way Ischomachos' household has been ordered. However, Purves ignores the fact that Ischomachos and Socrates pointedly do *not* discuss how the tree-holes should be ordered. Cf. Totelin 2012, 125 on trees as “biographical objects” in the ancient world.

⁷¹² Note that the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes* also arguably alludes to these Odyssean scenes, and does so in order to contrast the human-created order of the vineyard to the divine order that Hermes inhabits but does not create. See discussion in Chapter 1, section D.

⁷¹³ The importance of Odysseus and Laertes' meeting in the garden is signaled by the many earlier references that lead up to it, e.g. *Od.* 1.193=11.193; 23.139, 359. See Russo et al, 1992, 399 ad *Od.* 24.336-44. A tree is also critical to Odysseus' proof of his identity to Penelope: the olive tree that Odysseus built his chamber around and made into his bedpost. (*Od.* 23.190-204).

⁷¹⁴ Note that in the *Memorabilia* Xenophon links Socrates to Odysseus several times: *Mem.* 1.3.5-7 (Xenophon praises Socrates' frugality and self-control, in part by reporting how Socrates praised Odysseus' self-control in Circe's house); *Mem.* 4.6.15

insists, with the observation of nature. As Socrates pointed out (to Ischomachos' mild irritation) in the discussion of grain agriculture, it also requires that those observations be processed through rhetorical choices, e.g., of metaphor and imagery. And finally, as the discussion of planting trees suggests, these individual insights must be placed into a larger, human-created context or τάξις that links the different things that have been learned into a useful and lasting structure.

Ischomachos is not willing to admit that so much human mediation is necessary to create farming knowledge, which he regards as a simple matter of observing nature. But in his later discussion with Critoboulos, Socrates will display two different forms of agricultural τάξις—the Persian and the Socratic Greek—that attempt to teach Critoboulos this lesson.

B.9. *Carefulness; the art of rule*

Socrates now asks Ischomachos why—if farming is so easy to learn—some succeed in farming, and some do not (20.1). Ischomachos will respond with a lecture that stresses not only the importance of careful diligence (ἐπιμελεία) but also asserts that the only kind of careful diligence that counts is that which results in making money. His not so veiled implication will be that a philosopher like Socrates, who walks about and thinks (and talks) all day and has little or nothing to do with money, is not a useful member of a community—unlike the active and productive farmer. Socrates will respond with his own jabs about profit-seeking, in the form of a pointed image of a profit-seeking merchant ship, which will cause Ischomachos finally to become openly angry and to lecture Socrates on leadership, and will lead to their conversation ending in failure.

Ischomachos explains to Socrates that it is not farming knowledge that makes farmers successful, but careful diligence (ἐπιμελεία). He compares farming to

(Xenophon praises Socrates' ability to gain agreement in part by reporting how Socrates praised Odysseus as an "unstumbling speaker" who proceeded through discussion via agreed-upon steps).

generalship: all generals and most citizens know the importance of basic techniques like posting guards and seizing advantageous positions, he says, but only careful generals actually do these things (20.6-9).⁷¹⁵ Similarly, everyone knows that fertilizer is important in farming and how to collect it or make it by composting, and everyone knows how to correct excess moisture or saltiness in soil—but not everyone takes care (ἐπιμελέομαι) to do it (20.12). And this is where Ischomachos makes the point discussed earlier, that testing the soil is easier than testing a man, because the earth does not deceive (20.13-4).⁷¹⁶ It is for this reason, he says, that the earth is the best test of evil and lazy men (20.14); everyone knows that it does well if treated well. And now Ischomachos goes a step further: if someone isn't willing to farm, he proclaims, and doesn't know any other money-making art, then he must be a thief, beggar, or entirely heedless (ἀλόγιστος) (20.15-6).

Socrates, of course, is no farmer, nor does he pursue any other money-making art. As Danzig has pointed out, there is an implication that he is then a thief, beggar, or just plain silly, which is uncomfortably close to the Aristophanic stereotype Socrates attempted to reject at the start of the discussion of farming.⁷¹⁷ And although Ischomachos does not connect these remarks directly to Socrates, he does underline the point by giving an analogy that recalls one of the stereotypes of the impractical philosopher. He gives the examples of two men setting out to walk two hundred *stadia*; one walks along and does what he set out to do, but the other one is idle and pauses near streams and under shade and is observing his

⁷¹⁵ Note that Ischomachos does not claim that military tactics are, like farming knowledge, a matter of recollection, i.e., natural intelligence applied to observation of nature; he merely says that all *generals* know basic tactics (and most citizens), such that the difference between them is mostly a matter of care or diligence (ἐπιμελεία).

⁷¹⁶ See discussion in section B.8.a.

⁷¹⁷ Danzig 2010, 261-2. For a discussion of the Aristophanic stereotype, see section B.6.

surroundings thoughtfully (θεάομαι)⁷¹⁸ and hunting for soft breezes (20.18). The first man knows where he is going, and does not dawdle in getting there; the second man, wandering about and observing his surroundings, almost irresistibly conjures up the image of the wandering poet or philosopher. Indeed, he seems very similar to Plato's Socrates in the *Phaedrus*, who wandered outside the city as he looked for the perfect *locus amoenus* for a philosophical conversation.⁷¹⁹

Ischomachos increases the negative force of the comparison between the active and lazy man by equating laziness to the sort of bad work that clears vines of weedy material (ῥλη) in such a way that the weedy material increases (20.20). He also seems to be reaching back to his earlier comparison of weeds to lazy drones (17.14-5), one that Socrates noted and praised, which further increases the sense that Ischomachos is comparing idle wanderers (such as philosophers) to drones, whereas organized, careful farmers like himself are the productive bees. We might almost be listening to Zethus, scolding Amphion for not paying attention to the "music of labor" (E. *Ant.* Fr. 188).⁷²⁰

Ischomachos also compares the first, energetic and careful man to his father. Ischomachos praises his father's careful farming, which enabled him to treat farming as an effective way to make money (20.22). Ischomachos' father made a practice of buying unproductive, poorly farmed land, and then making it productive through good farming. Seeing them improve gave him great pleasure, says Ischomachos, whereas a farm already in good shape was both expensive, and less pleasureable to farm. His father didn't learn this from someone else or discover it by hard thought (μεριμνάω), but on account of his φιλογεωργία and φιλοπονία (20.25); indeed, Ischomachos says, his father seems the most φιλογεωργός of the

⁷¹⁸ The word θεάομαι has philosophical connotations, as discussed in section C.2.

⁷¹⁹ See discussion in Chapter 2, section F. He also sounds similar to Socrates' ideal farmer; see discussion in section C.4.

⁷²⁰ See discussion in Chapter 1, section B.3.

Athenians (20.26).⁷²¹ And yes, he tells the questioning Socrates, his father sold the land, if he could get a good price, and then bought another plot on account of his love of work.

After Ischomachos' jab about idlers, it is now Socrates' turn to prod Ischomachos. Socrates asks whether Ischomachos' father was φιλογεωργός in the same sense that grain importers (ἐμποροί) are lovers of grain (φιλόσιτοι), sailing wherever there is lots of grain, and then unloading it again wherever it has the highest value (20.27-8). Socrates' image of the profit-seeking grain trader recalls Ischomachos' earlier image of the well-organized Phoenician merchant ship (8.11-7), a barbarian example of the profit motive that was in contrast with the Greek civic models of order that he emphasized in his conversation with his wife.⁷²²

Socrates' comparison is insulting.⁷²³ The sea trader was an ambiguous figure, potentially beneficial but also open to the charge of being an untrustworthy wanderer, dishonest and exploitative.⁷²⁴ Thus when the Phaeacian Euryalos accused Odysseus of being a profit-grasping sea trader rather than an athlete (i.e., a

⁷²¹ Notable in this section is the heavy use of φιλο- compounds, e.g., φιλογεωργία, φιλοπονία, φιλογεωργός, φιλόσιτοι. Such compounds are particularly characteristic of Xenophon's style. Gautier 1911, 157-8. It is even possible that Xenophon originated φιλογεωργία, as it appears nowhere else than here in a search of the TLG corpus, although φιλογεωργός does appear in Hecataeus of Abdera, *FGrH* 264 F 25 = Diod. 1.15.6, as well as in later authors.

⁷²² See discussion of the Phoenician ship in section B.5.c.

⁷²³ Also seeing Socrates' remark as insulting are Danzig 2010, 245, 262 & n. 43 (Socrates is insulting Ischomachos' father by accusing him of the ulterior motive of profit, in return for Ischomachos' linking Socrates to thieves and beggars with no occupation); Pomeroy 1994, 340-2 ad *Oec.* 27. For an opposing view, see Hobden 2017, 162-3 (Socrates' joking comparison is ameliorated when he later agrees that men love whatever they believe to be useful).

⁷²⁴ Montiglio 2005, 105-17 (profit-seekers); Murnaghan 1988, 97-8 (discussing the stereotype of the dishonest trader in the *Odyssey*).

gentleman), Odysseus angrily called Euryalos a disorderly speaker and one who seemed reckless (ἀτάσθαλος).⁷²⁵ In addition, in Athens, grain trading was a particularly sensitive area; Athens was conscious of the need to secure its food supply,⁷²⁶ and heavily regulated dealing in grain, requiring Athenian importers to sell their grain within the city.⁷²⁷ An importer or shipowner could be praised for bringing grain into the city or blamed for failing to do so; when the wealthy and politically prominent shipowner Andocides attempted to return to Athens after exile, one of the points of argument was whether he had helped Athens by importing grain or ensuring its importation.⁷²⁸

Thus by comparing the father's attitude towards farming (with its production of grain) to a greedy grain importer's desire for profit, Socrates comes close to

⁷²⁵ *Od.* 8.165-77.

⁷²⁶ Thus at *Mem.* 3.6.13, Socrates encourages a young would-be politician to first gain knowledge of essential subjects—including how much grain the city needs over and above what it can grow. Aristotle similarly lists imports and exports of food as among the essential political subjects. *Arist. Rhet.* 1360a.

⁷²⁷ Athenian citizens were barred by law from engaging in or lending money on any grain shipment not destined for Piraeus (*Dem.* 34.37 ("Against Phormion"), 35.50-1 ("Against Lacritos")). Grain shipments were also required to be unloaded at a specific place in the Piraeus, with two-thirds of the shipment being brought to the city (*Arist. Ath. Pol.* 51.3-4). See discussion in Moreno 2007, 334-5; Pomeroy 1994, 341 ad *Oec.* 20.27.

⁷²⁸ Moreno 2007, 245-51. This is the same Andocides who in his speech "On the Mysteries" told the story about the misbehaving former wife of one Ischomachos (see discussion in section A.3). Moreno states that Andocides is the only politically important Athenian speaker who acknowledged he was a powerful actor in the grain supply, arguing this is because the power, wealth, and international connections implied by such a claim could too easily be taken as a threat to the demos, even as these same qualities enabled their holder to claim that he was in a position to benefit the δῆμος. Moreno 2007, 258-60.

accusing him (and by extension, the approving Ischomachos) of caring for profit more than his fellow Athenians.⁷²⁹ And for the third and last time, Ischomachos responds to Socrates' odd, out-of-category comparison by saying that Socrates is joking. Ignoring the remark about grain importers, he says that he personally thinks that men who build houses to sell and then build others are no less lovers of housebuilding—or in other words, that his father was no less a lover of farming as Ischomachos understands it just because he was buying and then reselling farms for profit (20.29).

After their exchange of pointed remarks, Socrates attempts to close the discussion by offering Ischomachos what sounds (at least at first hearing) like agreement:

ἐγὼ δέ γε σοι, . . . ὦ Ἰσχόμαχε, ἐπομόσας λέγω ἢ μὴν πιστεύειν σοι φύσει [νομίζειν] φιλεῖν ταῦτα πάντας ἀφ' ὧν ἂν ὠφελεῖσθαι νομίζωσιν. 20.29

I give my oath to you, Ischomachos, I trust you that by nature all men [think they] love what they think benefits them.⁷³⁰

In addition, he says that he is now completely convinced of what Ischomachos said earlier: that farming is indeed easy to learn (20.29-21.1).

Socrates has now brought the conversation back to the beginning of Ischomachos' discussion of farming, where Ischomachos insisted that farming is easy to learn (15.4). This would have been a logical place for their conversation to end; and if it had ended here, then Ischomachos' example of housebuilding would

⁷²⁹ See, e.g., Xen. *Mem.* 3.7.6, where Socrates urges a worthy friend not to be shy about going into the assembly, which is composed of different kinds of artisans, farmers, importers (ἐμποροί), and traders who think of nothing but profit—his inferiors in public affairs.

⁷³⁰ The first νομίζειν is bracketed in the Oxford text; Strauss accepts it in his translation, but Pomeroy omits it in hers. Pomeroy 1994, 207; Strauss 1970, 78.

have been the dialogue's last example of household management—corresponding to the dialogue's first aspect of household management mentioned by Socrates to Critoboulos (1.4, 3.1). Within the structure of the dialogue as a whole, housebuilding would thus have framed the entire discussion,⁷³¹ reflecting Socrates' emphasis in his conversation with Critoboulos on household management as a way to create the right kind of place in the world,⁷³² the kind of place that is a true benefit (and is not merely thought to be a benefit).

But it would be going too far to say that Socrates is treating Ischomachos and his advice ironically. As we have seen, many of Ischomachos' points about the importance and beauty of order, the need for self-control and prudence, the importance of diligent care, and the way in which people can be taught and led, are consistent with what Xenophon's Socrates (and Xenophon) say elsewhere. Nor is it a matter of Ischomachos' being a bad materialist instead of a good philosopher; Xenophon's Socrates is clear that a young man like Critoboulos needs to make an honorable living, that the city needs resources, and that it is admirable for a well-off man like Ischomachos to prepare himself to defend the city (11.17-8) and to contribute to the needs of his city and his friends (11.9).⁷³³ But as noted above, the point of conflict is Ischomachos' insistence on increasing wealth by focusing on profit, which leads him to characterize Socrates' sort of life as the life of a beggar, thief, or wastrel, and to overvalue the benefits that his money can convey to others.

⁷³¹ It would also answer the question raised at 6.11 that began this part of the discussion with Ischomachos, of why some succeed and others do not, by pointing to the importance of care.

⁷³² Thus in *Xen. Symp.* 8.25, Socrates compares a lover who cares about nothing but beauty to someone who rents land aiming only for the biggest possible harvest for himself, rather than for its becoming worth more over the long term. Noted at Pomeroy 1994, 340 ad *Oec.* 20.23.

⁷³³ As Hobden puts it, Socrates is not negating Ischomachos' advice, but rather exploring the boundaries between utility, profit, and extreme acquisitiveness. Hobden 2017, 162-3. See discussion in sections B.7 and B.9.

As much as Ischomachos praises self-control, he does not seem to be able to imagine the sort of self-control or independence from desire that characterized Socrates, who lived a life that liberated him almost entirely from the need for making or having money⁷³⁴ and gave him the kind of leisure required to practice philosophy. Nor does Ischomachos value leisure for philosophical discussion; when Socrates first met Ischomachos he commented that he rarely saw him at leisure (σχολάζω) in the *agora* (7.1), and Ischomachos agreed that it was a rare event explained by his waiting for some visitors (7.2).⁷³⁵ Both Ischomachos and Socrates agree that careful diligence should be directed towards the continuing increase of one's estate. But for Ischomachos, that means what he *thinks* is most beneficial—increasing wealth (provided that it is honorably acquired). But for Socrates, that means what *is* most beneficial, which requires philosophical understanding, which in turn requires a life that values leisure for philosophy more than does Ischomachos'. Indeed, Ischomachos in this sense seems only a little better off than the banausic man,⁷³⁶ who has no leisure to spare from his task of making a living—a point that we will return to in section C.

B.10 *Tantalos and the rule of the willing*

By bringing the conversation back to the ease of learning farming, Socrates has brought the dialogue to a logical place for its conclusion. But Ischomachos refuses to end here. Instead he launches into a more general discussion of the importance and difficulty of being a good leader. And he ends with an emphatic warning of the dangers of being a bad one, invoking the figure of Tantalos, one of the most famous of the great sinners. It is a strange, negative conclusion from a speaker

⁷³⁴ *Mem.* 1.3.5. See discussion in section B.7.

⁷³⁵ What time Ischomachos can spare from supervising his farm goes to keeping himself healthy and fit for cavalry service and to practicing public speaking with his friends (11.23-5). See discussion of leisure in section D.

⁷³⁶ See discussion of Ischomachos as arguably a materialist in section B.7.

who until this point has mostly been positive—as though Ischomachos’ anger over Socrates’ insult of his father had suddenly turned him into someone like Calicles in Plato’s *Gorgias*, whose focus is always on the fear of being rejected by the city and who repeatedly warns Socrates of that danger.

Ischomachos agrees with Socrates, that farming itself is easy to learn. But, he says, the ability to inspire the collaboration needed to farm on any scale is a different matter. Ischomachos has already discussed the importance of attempting to teach leadership (13); what he adds in this final discussion is an emphasis on leadership’s being a gift of the gods given to those with prudence—rather than something like farming, which can be learned (in Ischomachos’ opinion) simply by observing nature—even by someone like Socrates. The implication is that leadership is a skill that has *not* been learned by Socrates, who has been laughing at his imagery and who finally even insulted his father. It is on *this* point that Ischomachos chooses to end the discussion (and thus the *Oeconomicus* as a whole).

Men differ greatly, Ischomachos advises, in the intellect of command that is common to farming, politics, household management, and war (21.2). Some men, he says, can speak and act so as to inspire men to work enthusiastically in collaboration, whether they are directors of a trireme or generals of a troop or foremen on a farm (21.3-10)—and implicitly, some cannot. This ability to command requires knowledge (21.5), but also something more; it is a gift of the gods, something marking a royal nature, something given to those accomplished in prudence (σωφροσύνη)(21.12). It is this man, Ischomachos says, you could reasonably call “greatminded,” who “would be said to go with a great hand wherever many hands wish to serve his intellect, and indeed, great in reality is this man who can do great things through intellect rather than strength” (. . . καὶ μεγάλη χειρὶ ... οὗτος λέγοιτο πορεύεσθαι οὗ ἂν τῇ γνώμῃ πολλὰι χεῖρες ὑπηρετεῖν ἐθέλωσι, καὶ μέγας τῷ ὄντι οὗτος ἀνὴρ ὃς ἂν μέγала δύνηται γνώμῃ διαπράξασθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ῥώμῃ, 21.8).

Ischomachos’ ideal man is thus very much the sort of man the poet Amphion claimed to be, the man who could through his wisdom command assent and

obedience (E. *Ant.* Fr. 200).⁷³⁷ Thus far, his high opinion of the importance of leadership ability matches what Socrates (and Xenophon) say elsewhere.⁷³⁸ But Ischomachos goes considerably further; his focus on leadership and his own lack of interest in Socratic leisure suggest that in his view, the intellect is efficacious *only* where it is able to persuade others and lead them in a cooperative enterprise. And failure to do so is dangerous. He ends the conversation and the dialogue with these final words: “The gods give rule over the unwilling, as it seems to me, to whomever they think deserves to live like Tantalos, who is said to spend all of time in Hades fearing a second death” (*Oec.* 21.12).

There are various interpretations of this striking reference to the famous sinner Tantalos, an Eastern monarch who was one of the stock sinners displayed to any hero visiting Hades, as we saw at the end of *Antiope* and the *Gorgias*. Some scholars attempt to argue that a reference to the punishment of one of the great sinners is a warning for those who ignore the teachings of the *Oeconomicus*.⁷³⁹ But Ischomachos refers to Tantalos specifically; there must be something about *his* crime and/or punishment that explains the reference.⁷⁴⁰

⁷³⁷ See discussion in Chapter 1, section B.4.

⁷³⁸ See, e.g., Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.1-34 (Socrates exhorts a young man who prefers what he calls freedom to the hard work and self-control of ruling not to fear the hard work of virtue by recounting Prodicos’ story of Heracles’ choice between Virtue and Vice); *Mem.* 3.1-3.4 (Socrates gives advice to a would-be general, to a recently elected general, to a recently elected cavalry commander, and to a man upset at not having been elected as general). See discussions in Dillery 2016; Gray 2011, esp. 7-12.

⁷³⁹ Pomeroy 1994, 345.

⁷⁴⁰ Some, particularly those who argue for the ironic reading of the dialogue, have even argued that the punishment of the proverbially wealthy Tantalos foreshadows later failure in the wealthy Ischomachos’ life. Stevens 1994, 235-6. On the proverbial wealth of Tantalos, see Plato, *Euthyphro* 11e1 (Socrates would rather see the argument stand fast than to have the wealth of Tantalos in addition to the wisdom of Daedalus). Willink notes that his name was often associated with the etymology

One point of connection is obviously Tantalos' punishment. Ischomachos' statement that Tantalos spends all of his time "fearing a second death" is a warning that any attempt to rule an estate without self-control and leadership ability will result in the tyrant's fate described in Xenophon's *Hiero*: to perpetually fear those he rules.⁷⁴¹ Constant fear was a feature of one common version of Tantalos' punishment related by both Euripides and Pindar, where Zeus suspended a stone hanging over his head that could fall at any moment.⁷⁴²

But another point of connection is also Tantalos' crime. One version of Tantalos' crime has Tantalos punished by the overhanging stone because he said something outrageous to the gods. Although most of the extant works that describe Tantalos' crime as some sort of blasphemy or hubristic statement postdate Xenophon, Xenophon would have had access to at least one work representing Tantalos in this way: Euripides' *Orestes*.⁷⁴³ Electra says in the prologue that her ancestor Tantalos is being punished because of his "uncontrollable tongue"

τάλαντα (riches), and that he was usually described as a Phrygian or a Lydian whose wealth was associated with oriental luxury. Willink 1983, 30.

⁷⁴¹ Xen. *Hiero* 7.10. See Strauss 1970, 208-9.

⁷⁴² Pindar, *Ol.* 1.46-66; E. *Or.* 7 (discussed below). The "stone of Tantalos" was a well-known metaphor for a cause of prolonged anxiety. O'Brien 1988, 33, 42-3 (noting Pindar *Isth.* 8.9-12, where the "stone" is the threat of Persian invasion). Cf. the *Odyssey*'s version, where Odysseus sees Tantalos for some unspecified crime standing in a tree-shaded lake, unable to satisfy his hunger or thirst because the water below and the fruit trees above ever withdrew from his reach (*Od.* 11.582-92). See also discussion in Pomeroy 1994, 344 ad *Oec.* 21.12.

⁷⁴³ Euripides' *Orestes* was first produced in the spring of 408 BCE. Willink 1986, xxii. Scodel notes that Euripides is the first author known to have characterized Tantalos' crime this way. Scodel 1984, 16.

(ἀκόλαστον ... γλῶσσαν, E. *Or.* 10) by having to fear a rock perpetually hanging over his head as he “flies in the air” (ἄερι ποτᾶται, E. *Or.* 7).⁷⁴⁴

Euripides does not specify precisely what Tantalos said to offend the gods. Later scholia argued that Tantalos was a blaspheming natural scientist who anticipated Anaxagoras’ blasphemy that the sun was a stone, and not a god—or in other words, that Tantalos was a blasphemous natural philosopher like the Socrates satirized in the *Clouds*. Although these sources may depend on Euripides, Scodel has argued that Euripides’ description of Tantalos’ rock as both a stone and a “clod,” βῶλος, suggests that Euripides was in fact adapting an allegorized myth from Anaxagoras’ circle that involved Tantalos.⁷⁴⁵ In addition to this potential connection to the natural scientists, Euripides’ phrase ἀκόλαστον ... γλῶσσαν would also have

⁷⁴⁴ In most versions, Tantalos is an Eastern king who is greatly honored by the gods, even to the point of being allowed to dine with them, but who betrays their trust in some way. In one version, he is punished for killing his own son, Pelops, and serving him up to the gods. Pindar reports this version, though he rejects it as impious. Pindar, *Ol.* 1.46-66; Euripides also has Iphigeneia reject it at *IT* 386-88. In Pindar’s version, Tantalos is punished by an overhanging stone because he has stolen the gods’ nectar and ambrosia and given it to his friends in an attempt to confer immortality upon them. In the version reported by Athenaeus, Zeus asks Tantalos what luxury would please him, and Tantalos asks to be able to live like the gods. Zeus fulfills his request, but angered by the presumption ensures that he should not be able to enjoy it—by adding the overhanging stone. Ath. 7.281B. See also O’Brien 1988, 32 (listing additional ancient sources). See discussion in Pomeroy 1994, 344 ad *Oec.* 21.12.

⁷⁴⁵ Scodel 1984, 14-5; see also Willink 1983, 32. O’Brien cites Scodel in arguing that it is unlikely Euripides was the first to put Tantalos in these “palpably Anaxagorean surroundings.” O’Brien 1988, 37, 41.

recalled other elements of the popular image of intellectualism satirized by Aristophanes—babbling, fee-taking, and language quibbling.⁷⁴⁶

⁷⁴⁶ Willink 1983, 26, 32-3; see discussion of Socrates and Prodicos in Aristophanes' *Clouds* in section B.6. This suggestion there was a contemporary connection between Tantalos and sophistry—and perhaps especially Prodicos and/or Socrates—finds additional support in Plato's *Protagoras*. In the *Protagoras*, Socrates is portrayed as a hero descending into the underworld, where he sees Protagoras, Prodicos, and other sophists portrayed as figures in the underworld, and describes Prodicos as "Tantalos" (*Prot.* 315d1). Some scholars argue that Prodicos probably had some physical disability that made it reasonable to think of him as "most wretched" (ταλάντατος), one of the common etymologies for the name Tantalos. Guthrie 1971, 274. Cf. Plato, *Cratylus* 395d-e. But Plato's Prodicos is comfortably wrapped up in bed; he seems more like the Vice that Prodicos' Heracles rejected, which was fond of a comfortable bed, than a sick and miserable man (see Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.24). Willink 1983, 30. It seems more likely that the comparison of Prodicos to Tantalos in Hades come not from Tantalos' punishment, but from his crime. And in that case, the Euripidean ἀκόλαστον ... γλῶσσαν would be a particularly good fit for a sophist known not only for a potentially heretical interest in natural science, but also for a tendency to split hairs about the meaning of words. Willink has argued that Plato is in fact deploying what would have been by this time a well-established popular association between Tantalos and Prodicos, whose high fees and origin in the more "Eastern" Ionia would have made a particularly good fit for the eastern ruler Tantalos. Willink 1983, 33. O'Brien, however, finds Willink's argument that there was a well-established popular association between Prodicos and Tantalos to be highly speculative. O'Brien 1988, 31-2, n. 4. In any case, it could be that any popular association was between Tantalos and sophists more generally, with Plato attempting to restrict the image to Prodicos by emphasizing a luxury and wealth that could not apply to Socrates.

It is useful here to think again about Callicles in Plato's *Gorgias*. Callicles so feared being stripped of his position in the city by the unjust lies of the δῆμος that he decided to devote his energies to persuading that δῆμος to do as he wished—and he constantly warned Socrates that his failure to do so would lead to his death.⁷⁴⁷ Callicles' tool of choice was Gorgianic rhetoric. Ischomachos' tool, the leadership ability that can encourage others to join in some communal enterprise, is far more constructive: it requires a leader who knows what must be done, who has the necessary self-control, and who can inspire by example. But as we have seen in Ischomachos' jabs at Socrates, Ischomachos—like Callicles—thinks that Socrates has failed to lead the right kind of life. And just as for Callicles part of that failure was the inability to persuade the δῆμος (and secure safety), for Ischomachos part of that failure is the inability to lead and inspire others, as marked by Socrates' failure to persuade Ischomachos or to take a leading role in Athens.

If Ischomachos' reference to Tantalos is an allusion to what he sees as Socrates' "unbridled tongue," and in particular to Socrates' final insult of Ischomachos' father, then that supports the argument that Ischomachos is classifying Socrates with those who lack the divine gift of persuasive leadership. Ischomachos has thus created a frame with the opening of their discussion of Ischomachos' activities, where Socrates attempted to disclaim the Aristophanic accusation that he is an idle chatterer who "measures the air" (*Oec.* 11.3)—a phrase that now suggests a Tantalos always looking up at the stone hovering above his head.⁷⁴⁸

⁷⁴⁷ See discussion in Chapter 2, esp. section D.9.

⁷⁴⁸ It may be objected that Ischomachos' reference to a Tantalos in Hades cannot be connected to a Euripidean Tantalos who "flies in the air." But note that Plato's Socrates in the *Gorgias* describes the great sinners as having been "literally hung up there in the prison of Hades as examples" (ἀτεχνῶς παραδείγματα ἀνηρτημένους ἐκεῖ ἐν Ἅιδου δεσμωτηρίῳ, 525c6-7); Tantalos is among those sinners (525e1). In any case, Aristophanes' Socrates both "walks the air" and is imagined as being in the

B.11 *The conversation with Ischomachos: A conclusion*

Socrates' and Ischomachos' discussion ends with Ischomachos' angry lack of agreement with Socrates. Their conversation's failure is marked by a reference to Tantalos—just as was the conversation between Calicles and Socrates in Plato's *Gorgias*, and the ἀγών between Amphion and Zethus in Euripides' *Antiope*. Ischomachos is annoyed at Socrates' picking apart of his imagery and language, and he is angry at Socrates' applying the image of the profiteering merchant ship to his father's purchase and resale of farms. Ischomachos claims that farming knowledge is a simple matter of observing a transparently honest nature; he does not appreciate Socrates' suggestions that his metaphors are his choices of how to interpret those observations, as in the case of "thick" or "thin" soil, which Socrates replaced with the more productive metaphor "strong" and "weak." Nor does he appreciate Socrates' suggestions that the nature-based images he uses to support his understanding of social structure, such as the division between the masculine "outside" and female "inside," or the appropriateness of female cosmetics, are similarly a matter of rhetorical choice. And although Ischomachos understands that the order inside his household is a matter of human choice (made by himself and his wife together), even there he does not see that he is actually working with a variety of models which are not entirely consistent: the Greek civic models such as the chorus, based on dynamic, cooperative relationships; the static, hierarchical ordering of the profit-seeking Phoenician merchant ship; and a third model that is dominant in his governance of his slaves. This third model is hierarchical, based on reward and punishment, and will turn out to resemble most closely that of the Persian King in the analysis Socrates later gives Critoboulos, where the King is the gardener who secures the well-being of his garden, i.e., the subjects he has arranged into a fixed order. But as we will see when Socrates analyzes the King's rule, in a

underworld; the two positions are equivalently "above-beyond," apart from the mortal earth. See discussion in B.6.

way the King is trapped “inside” the structure of his own authority as he labors for the well-being of his subjects. The King—and Ischomachos—have some similarity after all to the banausic man.⁷⁴⁹

Although Ischomachos ends in anger with Socrates, we know from the dialogue’s frame that the reverse is not true. Xenophon has presented Socrates’ conversation with Ischomachos as though it occurred near the beginning of Socrates’ career as a Socratic philosopher. Given the coincidence between Socrates’ mature views and Ischomachos’ views on the importance of prudence and self-control, the need for order, the importance and nature of leadership, and the mind’s ability to be stimulated into “recollection” through questioning, there is also the suggestion that Socrates’ views were a development of what he learned from the gentleman Ischomachos—making Socrates a respectable Athenian thinker, rather than the radical that his accusers would claim him to be. As we will see in the next section, Socrates will take what he learned from Ischomachos and will present it to the young Critoboulos in a way that both enables Critoboulos to profit from Ischomachos’ valuable advice on household management and farming, and to improve on his thinking, in part through a better understanding of imagery and metaphor.

C. The conversation with Critoboulos

The *Oeconomicus* begins with Socrates’ introducing the idea of estate management to his young friend Critoboulos, affirming that Critoboulos should not pursue banausic ways of increasing his property, and persuading him that farming is the best occupation to pursue in order to increase his estate.

Most of the practical advice that Socrates gives Critoboulos will be presented through his retelling of his earlier conversation with Ischomachos. As we saw in section B, Ischomachos’ conception of himself as having constructed a well-ordered household and farm is echoed in many ways by what Xenophon’s Socrates or

⁷⁴⁹ See discussion in sections C.3-4.

Xenophon himself says elsewhere; Socrates approves of Ischomachos' advice, for the most part. But where the conversation between Ischomachos and Socrates broke down was over Socrates' suggestions that the farming knowledge Ischomachos conveys and the social ordering he approves are influenced by his rhetorical choices of metaphor and imagery and require additional reflection—particularly when it comes to Ischomachos' attention to individual self-interest and profit.

Thus before Socrates repeats his conversation with Ischomachos, he will first equip Critoboulos to recognize that there are actually several different conceptions of order running throughout Ischomachos' discourse. Socrates will do this by giving Critoboulos two descriptions of good farming, each based on one of those conceptions, each with its own strengths and weaknesses. First, Socrates gives a description of Persian farming, which Socrates will characterize as a matter of land and occupational areas (farming or military service) divided and overseen by the sole authority of the Persian King through a system of rewards and punishments.⁷⁵⁰ The King is a disciplined manager who aims at and secures a peaceful productivity for his kingdom, but as the only free Persian man, he has no peers to converse or compare himself with, and no deeper philosophical sense of εὐδαιμονία. Although the King is not a conventionally banausic man, Socrates will show Critoboulos that the King is in a sense confined "inside" the structure of his own authority as he labors for his kingdom's material well-being. Second, Socrates praises a different, idealized system of (implicitly) Greek farming that he describes as arising from the existence of open agricultural land that requires political cooperation for its farming and defense.⁷⁵¹ This farming is performed by individual households headed by free men who each have the opportunity as they farm to learn and practice the virtues of free men, including philosophy; however, there is no guarantee that every farmer can or will take advantage of these opportunities.

⁷⁵⁰ See discussion in section C.3.

⁷⁵¹ See discussion in section C.4. Cf. Rood 2014, 66-78 (discussing the connection that Xenophon makes between finding a way through physical space and finding a "way out" of problems in the *Anabasis*).

C.1. *Making a profit or making a place?*

Some years after Ischomachos' conversation with Socrates, Socrates is conversing with his friend Critoboulos, a young man who does not seem to be managing his resources well, judging from Socrates' chiding comments on his spendthrift ways (2.7), and the fact that Socrates brings up the topic of household and estate management, οἰκονομία:

Εἰπέ μοι... ἄρά γε ἡ οἰκονομία ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ὄνομά ἐστιν, ὥσπερ ἡ ἰατρικὴ καὶ ἡ χαλκευτικὴ καὶ ἡ τεκτονικὴ; (1.1)

Tell me ... is estate management the name of some branch of knowledge, like medicine and smithing and carpentry?

If so, Socrates says, then presumably he could practice it for someone else as well as for himself, just he could build a house (οἰκοδομέω) for someone else (1.3-4).⁷⁵² Critoboulos immediately agrees, observing that someone could make a lot of money by managing someone else's estate.

For the reader aware of Socrates' earlier conversation with Ischomachos, this talk of housebuilding for money recalls Ischomachos' insistence that his father truly loved farming, improving and then selling the farms just as a house builder who builds (οἰκοδομέω) and sells houses loves housebuilding (20.29). As we saw, Socrates had insultingly compared Ischomachos' farm-flipping father to a grain trader who ignored the needs of his Athenian fellow citizens in his focus on financial profit—a key point of disagreement between Ischomachos and Socrates. Socrates' conclusion, that everyone thinks they love what they think benefits them, implied

⁷⁵² Housebuilding is a key part of estate management for Socrates; it is the first item on the list of topics he promises to show Critoboulos (3.1-6). Cf. 9.2 (Ischomachos discusses how his house is constructed).

some doubt on Socrates' part that it was in fact beneficial for the father to buy and resell farms in search of profit, as opposed to the creation and long-term improvement of his own farm and household.⁷⁵³

Socrates now explicitly develops these concerns about financial profit and true benefit with Critoboulos by asking him what counts as an estate (οἶκος)(1.5). He leads him to agree that a person's estate does not consist of the land, objects, and money that he owns, but rather those things that he knows how to use in a way that benefits him (1.6-15)—assuming that he has the self-control to deploy his knowledge (1.16-23).⁷⁵⁴ Thus in building a house or in managing an estate (οἰκονομέω), the broader goal should be what is beneficial, rather than making money that is a benefit only if one knows how to use it.

We also saw with Ischomachos some doubt on Socrates' part over whether having great wealth was itself important. Again, Socrates now develops this point explicitly with Critoboulos. When Critoboulos declares that he is confident in his own self-control (ἐγκράτεια) and insists on having Socrates' advice about increasing his estate, Socrates points out that Critoboulos' need for wealth arises from the need to maintain his reputation and social position ("the social posture/form of life you have assumed," τὸ σὸν σχῆμα ὃ σὺ περιβέβλησαι, 2.4), by offering lavish sacrifices, entertaining foreign guest friends, providing choroi for festivals, maintaining his own cavalry horse, and fitting out warships. In other words, as we saw from Socrates' discussion of similar points with Ischomachos, Critoboulos needs a great deal of money to purchase status—which may or may not provide a benefit to himself or to others.⁷⁵⁵ In contrast, someone like Socrates who does not participate

⁷⁵³ See discussion in sections B.7, B.9.

⁷⁵⁴ See discussion of the importance of self-control in Xenophon at section B.5.a. Waterfield comments on Xenophon's play here between χρῆσθαι (to make use of), χρήσιμος (useful), and χρήματα (assets or property). Waterfield 2004, 101-2.

⁷⁵⁵ See discussion in section B.7 of Ischomachos' desire to adorn the city. Goldhill comments on the range of sense of σχῆμα. Goldhill 1999, 4 (as applied to a man's physical person, σχῆμα is the "physical appearance presented to the gaze of the

in this elite economy needs very little money. Socrates has enough with his house (οἶκία) and other limited resources (2.3) for his material needs; and if he ever did need more, then he has friends willing to help (2.8, 11.11).⁷⁵⁶

Again, as in the conversation with Ischomachos, Socrates does not deny that it is a good thing to help friends or to fulfill civic and military obligations to the community, or that resources are needed to fulfill those obligations. But he does raise the question of the value of status purchased through vast expenditure. Although Socrates does not define the καλοὶ κάγαθοί in the *Oeconomicus*, they are clearly not simply the wealthy, but rather those who can benefit themselves, their families, their friends, and the city—the greatest benefit being the ability to make themselves and others better. As he tells Critoboulos, the καλοὶ κάγαθοί are capable of making their slaves more excellent (βελτίος) by requiring them to learn prudence (σωφρονίζω)—a better fate than being legally free but enslaved to a lack of self-control (1.23).⁷⁵⁷

C.2. Careful observation

When Critoboulos continues to insist that Socrates give him some kind of practical help, Socrates agrees, but does not offer his own advice because, as he tells Critoboulos, he personally does not have enough experience with income-producing property to know how to manage it (any more than he knows how to play the flute

citizens—appearance which may be simply what is seen, a ‘form,’ but which also may be a mere appearance”; also pointing out that it is the rhetorical term for “figure of speech”).

⁷⁵⁶ Note that Socrates doesn’t say that he ever *has* needed financial support from others. In *Mem.* 1.3.5, Xenophon says that Socrates was so frugal that he cannot imagine anyone doing so little work that he could not satisfy Socrates’ needs. See discussion in section B.7.

⁷⁵⁷ See discussion of καλοκάγαθία in section B.1.

or lyre).⁷⁵⁸ What he can do is show Critoboulos certain points of estate management through individuals and places who can illustrate those points that are worthy of being observed (ἀξιοθέατος, 3.4) (2.16-3.6).

We have seen ἀξιοθέατος used before, by Ischomachos in his praise of order when he was describing a well-ordered chorus as worthy of observation (ἀξιοθέατος) but a poorly ordered one as unpleasant to observe (θεᾶσθαι ἀτέρπετος) (8.3). Ischomachos went on to use similar words in describing an army marching in order (έν τάξει) as something a friend would gladly observe (ἡδέως θεάσαιτο) (8.6), a well-ordered trireme as worthy of observation (ἀξιοθέατος) by its allies (8.8), and a circular chorus as a beautiful spectacle (καλὸν θέαμα) (8.20).

The verb θεάομαι and related words such as ἀξιοθέατος, θέαμα, θέα (sight), and θεατής (spectator) signal not just a casual gaze, but some sort of significant viewing that I translate here as “observation.” Significant viewing can take place in the context of spectacle that is important for its religious, cultural, or philosophical significance;⁷⁵⁹ it can also be merely voyeuristic, as when the spectator pays

⁷⁵⁸ Cf. the discussion in section B.8.b, where Socrates and Ischomachos agree to distinguish farming from flute-playing and similar arts that depend on more complex human cultural constructions.

⁷⁵⁹ The verb θεάομαι was used to describe attendance at public rituals such as dramatic festivals, an important religious and cultural practice in Athens, with performances at the great festivals in the city in honor of the god Dionysos as well as at the lesser festivals in the country. By the 350s, an Athenian would even be paid by a special public fund to enable him to be a spectator (θεατής) at these theatrical festivals. The name of this fund, the Theoric (θεωρικόν) Fund, was drawn from a word family (θεωρέω, to observe or contemplate) whose meanings and probably etymology overlap with θεάομαι and its cognates. A particularly important type of spectation was θεωρία, which in its most precise usage involved the spectator (θεωρός), acting on his own behalf or as a representative of his city leaving home in order to witness a foreign spectacle—traditionally a religious festival or an oracle, though the term could also be applied more broadly to travel for the sake of

inordinate attention to a sight that he has no right to see or that is not beneficial to him.⁷⁶⁰ A number of scholars have stressed how Xenophon often engages with this vocabulary of significant viewing by examining the importance of spectacle and spectation within the narrative.⁷⁶¹ Gray in particular has argued that Xenophon positions the reader as a spectator of the events of the narrative able to make judgments on the basis of what he has observed, at times by stepping into the position of one of Xenophon's characters who is engaged in significant viewing.⁷⁶²

As Gray has pointed out, Socrates' providing Critoboulos with examples of estate management employs this idea of significant viewing for the purpose of

philosophical enquiry or learning. In Plato and Aristotle, the term θεωρία also comes to signify philosophical contemplation, as when Plato in the *Phaedrus* 247 describes how the immortal souls contemplate the forms. See Dillery 2008, 246-9 (examples of θεάομαι describing significant viewing, especially in Xenophon); Nightingale 2004, esp. 40-93 (focusing on θεωρία and its extension to philosophy); Goldhill 2000, 167-8 (discussing the overlapping vocabulary of θεάομαι and θεωρέω as applied to attendance at the Great Dionysia), 171-3 (discussing the use of θεάομαι and θεωρέω in oratory to encourage reflection and evaluation); Rutherford 2000, 136-142 (arguing the original sense of θεωρέω is probably "to watch a spectacle of religious significance," deriving from the same proto-Indo-European root that produced θεάομαι). Note that according to Lopéz and García 1995, in Xenophon's Socratic writings θεωρία appears only at *Mem.* 4.8.2, to refer to the official delegation from Athens to Delos, and θεωρέω only at *Symp.* 7.3, to refer to observing young dancers. However, note παραθεωρῶν, *Mem.* 4.8.7.

⁷⁶⁰ Dillery 2008, 243-5, 250; Dillery 2004, 240, 245-50.

⁷⁶¹ Harman 2012, 432-51 (with additional citations); Baragwanath 2012, 633-4 (with additional citations); Gray 2011, 187-93; Dillery 2008, 247-8 & n. 19 (noting *Oec.* 8.3).

⁷⁶² Gray 2011, 187-90 (focusing on instructive scenes of "willing obedience" in the *Hiero* and *Cyropaedia*). See also Harman 2012, 432-42 (focusing on the *Agesilaus*, which describes itself as a display, ἐπιδείξειεν, 1.9).

instructing Critoboulos.⁷⁶³ Just as Ischomachos offered his wife examples of order that were worthy of careful observation, so Socrates now promises to show Critoboulos points of estate management that ought to be observed carefully.⁷⁶⁴ Thus Socrates repeatedly describes himself as “displaying” (δεικνύω, 2.16, ἀποδεικνύω 3.1, ἐπιδεικνύω 3.2, 3.4) these points of estate management to Critoboulos.⁷⁶⁵ He invokes the idea of theater explicitly when he observes that Critoboulos is willing to walk a long way to observe (θεώμενον) a comic spectacle (κωμῳδῶν θέαν) (3.7), and to warn Critoboulos that in the past he has observed (θεάομαι) examples of household management in the same way he has watched tragedies and comedies—simply for the pleasure of seeing and hearing (ιδὼν τι ἢ ἀκούσας, 3.9), rather than to learn to be a maker (ποιητής) (presumably, of plays) himself. Thus in the past, Critoboulos has been a spectator merely in the negative sense of being a voyeur. That was fine for plays, Socrates says, as Critoboulos is not

⁷⁶³ Gray 2011, 190-3.

⁷⁶⁴ In the *Oeconomicus*, the two greatest concentration of words from the θεάομαι family (ἀξιοθέατος, θεάομαι, θέα, θέαμα, θεατής) are those examined here from Ischomachos’ praise of order and from Socrates’ showing Critoboulos examples of estate management. According to López and García 1995, additional examples are found at 5.3 (the earth provides adornments with the sweetest sights (θέαμα) and smells; 6.13 (Socrates goes about to observe (θεάομαι) the artisans’ works); 11.4 (spectators (θεατής) observing the horse to which Socrates was comparing himself); 15.11 (the best farmers would be pleased if someone observed (θεάομαι) what they were doing); 16.7 (fisherman on the sea do not stop for a view (θέα) of the land before they evaluate it); 20.18 (the idler looking about thoughtfully (θεάομαι)).

⁷⁶⁵ Harman notes the ambiguity of the language of display (particularly ἀπο/ἐπιδείκνυμι and related words), whose claims that “seeing is believing” can also be undercut by its frequent use by sophists and in epideictic and forensic oratory. Harman 2012, 434-6. See also Goldhill 1999, 3 (commenting on ἐπιδείκνυμι as associated with sophists and rhetoricians).

interested in being a ποιητής. But he cannot afford to be inexpert (ιδιώτης) in the work that he takes up (3.9), that of household management. As Gray has pointed out, Xenophon here is playing with the word ποιητής, which can mean a maker of plays (i.e., a poet) as well as a “maker” in a more concrete sense.⁷⁶⁶ Critoboulos *does* wish to earn a living by making a farm—literally, by making a place for himself. Socrates is warning him that he cannot do so through mere voyeurism.⁷⁶⁷

As Socrates tells Critoboulos, there is no substitute for a critical look into things (Οὐδὲν οἷον τὸ ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι, 3.14).⁷⁶⁸ Critoboulos must therefore be a careful observer of the descriptions Socrates gives, in order to learn how to be a “maker,” rather than merely watching in order to feel pleasure. Critoboulos will have to construct his own perspective on what he sees and hears, and not accept the speakers’ opinions with uncritical admiration. As Socrates tells him:

⁷⁶⁶ Gray 2011, 192 (arguing that the amateur cannot write a good play or create willing obedience).

⁷⁶⁷ Cf. Thuc. 3.38 (Cleon accuses the Athenians of merely being spectators of speeches, instead of deliberators and actors).

⁷⁶⁸ See also *Oec.* 2.17. Note that the theatrical motif is also used in Socrates’ conversation with Ischomachos, to mark a major shift in the conversation (*Oec.* 11.3, discussed in section B.6). Note that Goldhill argues that both θεάομαι and θεωρέω are often used in oratory in parallel with verbs like ἐξετάζω, σκοπέω, λογίζομαι to indicate or encourage a process of (democratic) evaluative judgment. Goldhill 2000, 171-3. Some scholars have taken this to mean that Socrates is staging a comedy for Critoboulos, and that what follows must be read as if Aristophanic satire—particularly given that later in the dialogue Socrates will refer to Aristophanes’ *Clouds* directly. As I argue in section A.3, I think Xenophon’s Socrates is presenting a serious and nonironic set of arguments, albeit at times with humor or with the awareness that Ischomachos’ arguments in particular are the beginning and not the end of analysis.

Οὐκοῦν χρὴ θεώμενον σαυτοῦ ἀποπειρᾶσθαι εἰ γνώσῃ.

And so as you observe (θεώμενον) [these examples of household management] you must test yourself to see if you will learn [the reasons for their success or failure] (3.7).

C.3. *The King of Persia*

Socrates begins his discussion of farming with what seems the least banausic figure possible: the King of Persia.⁷⁶⁹ Persian farming, as Socrates describes it, takes place within a τάξις that consists of centralized, hierarchical, one-man rule. The King divides the space of the kingdom into provinces, and assigns his governors to particular provinces and spheres of activity; he constantly supervises and inspects his kingdom; he encourages willing obedience through the use of rewards, punishments, and honors. Like Ischomachos' household, which in some ways it resembles, the Persian kingdom is admirable in many respects. But a garden dialogue between Lysander and Cyrus shows us that the King's understanding of "happiness" is confined to the peace and prosperity he creates for the kingdom that he tends so assiduously. As we will see, especially when Socrates offers his praise of Greek farming for comparison, the noble Persian may not be conventionally banausic, but he is constantly laboring "inside," within his garden and within his

⁷⁶⁹ Socrates' Persian description has an ethnographic flavor; it is worth noting that ethnography also requires "significant viewing" in that it requires the spectator to describe what she is observing by comparison to and in terms of what she already knows—in the process, often illuminating that certain customs or intellectual structures are a matter of human choice rather than being dictated by nature, and thus open for reconsideration. Cf. Harman 2008, 71-3, 86 (Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* can be read as an ethnography for Greek readers, who are made into literary viewers of Cyrus and the Persians); Nightingale 2004, 68-9 (traditional θεωρία as a contact with foreign otherness that can transform a world-view).

kingdom, with no peers with whom he might discuss the nature of any happiness that goes beyond the material well-being of his subjects.

It must be noted that the Persian “King” described by Socrates is in fact a loose conflation of two different Cyruses. A reference to Cyrus the King in 4.16 connects the general description of King’s governance of the realm to Cyrus the Great, a king widely admired by both Greeks and non-Greeks and the subject of Xenophon’s mostly laudatory biography *Cyropaedia*.⁷⁷⁰ The dramatic dialogue in the garden that follows, however, is specifically about the Spartan leader Lysander and Prince Cyrus, with whom Xenophon had served in 401, when Cyrus was contending with his brother for the Persian throne. As he has Socrates say in the *Oeconomicus*, Xenophon regarded Prince Cyrus as being in many respects a good leader (4.18-9). Xenophon’s deliberate elision of the distinction permits him to focus less on historical personalities, and more on the nature of the organization of Persian space.

In describing how the King orders and rules his kingdom, Socrates focuses on the organization of Persian space—both geographical space, and the metaphorical “space” of the functional areas, agriculture and war (4.4). Socrates explains how for each geographical unit, the King has commanders “separately ordered” (διατεταγμένοι),⁷⁷¹ so that some are in charge of agricultural matters, others over military matters. In the Greek participle διατεταγμένοι (from διατάττω, “to appoint

⁷⁷⁰ See discussion in Pomeroy 1994, 248-50, ad *Oec.* 4.18.

⁷⁷¹ Pontier argues that Xenophon presents the organization of space as an important part of Cyrus’ securing and displaying political power, pointing to both this section of the *Oeconomicus* and *Cyr.* 8.5.2-16, where Xenophon describes how Cyrus valued order (εὐθημοσύνη) in a household but above all in an army (*Cyr.* 8.5.7), as shown by his organizing his camp by assigning (διατάττω) places to each person and function so that everyone knew his place, both in extent and location (ὥστε εἰδέναι ἕκαστον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χώραν καὶ μέτρῳ καὶ τόπῳ, *Cyr.* 8.5.3); Cyrus placed himself in the middle (ἐν μέσῳ), with his tent facing the rising sun, a placement both defensive and symbolizing his function as central and sole ordering authority. Pontier 2006, 374-9, 386-7.

or ordain severally, to dispose, to set an army in array”), the prefix δια- emphasizes that the commanders’ areas of responsibility are being metaphorically described as *separate* spatial locations, as though they were soldiers assigned to different stations; the civil organization of Cyrus’ empire has a strong military flavor.⁷⁷² This is the same word used by Socrates (and later by Ischomachos) to describe how possessions should be set in order inside a house, each in its own separate and proper place (3.3, 9.2); this is also the same word Socrates will use later in this section to describe how Cyrus arranges the trees in his garden (4.21), each in its own separate and proper place.⁷⁷³ The king’s separation of agricultural and military matters is also marked by a distinction in the virtues characteristic of each area; the soldiers are good (ἀγαθός) at war and brave (ἄλκιμοι), while the farmers do the best (ἄριστα) at their tasks and are hard-working (ἐργαζόμενοι) (4.15-16). Only the King is best in both spheres—which Socrates notes was a particular boast of Cyrus the Great (4.16).⁷⁷⁴

The King uses rewards as well as punishment to encourage obedience, rewarding civil commanders for producing an area that is populated, well-cultivated, full of trees and the produce that the land bears; the emphasis is on developing (κατασκευάζειν) the land so that it is productive (ἐνεργός) and can

⁷⁷² Pontier argues that Xenophon’s ideal of order (τάξις) is essentially military, such that as a good leader Cyrus based the order of his empire on a military form of organization. Pontier 2006, 380. My argument (below) is that the hierarchical, top-down military model adapted by Cyrus is merely one form of τάξις recognized by Xenophon, albeit an essential one he found best for many circumstances. Cf. Dillery 1995, 32-5, 90-5.

⁷⁷³ LSJ, διατάσσω I.1-2. See Pontier 2006, 386. See also discussions below and in sections B.5.b.

⁷⁷⁴ Xenophon does have Socrates note in passing that the satraps appointed by the King are, like the King himself, concerned with both areas of activity. The passage’s emphasis, however, is on what is presented as the more usual separation of spheres of authority (*Oec.* 4.11).

support garrisons and pay tribute.⁷⁷⁵ He rewards military commanders correspondingly for security (4.5-11, 4.15), creating a virtuous cycle of productive agricultural development and military defense (4.8-10; 4.15). Although the King delegates power, he also constantly supervises its use, inspecting and evaluating both agricultural and military operations (4.6, 4.8).

Although the King travels as he supervises his subjects, wherever he goes he spends most of his time inside a walled garden called a “paradise” in the Persian language.⁷⁷⁶ As we will see, both in their beauty and in the nature of their order, these gardens represent the Persian kingdom in microcosm.

έν ὁπόσαις τε χώραις ἐνοικεῖ καὶ εἰς ὁπόσας ἐπιστρέφεται, ἐπιμελεῖται
τούτων ὅπως κῆποί τε ἔσονται, οἱ παράδεισοι καλούμενοι, πάντων καλῶν τε
κάγαθῶν μεστοὶ ὅσα ἡ γῆ φύειν θέλει, καὶ ἐν τούτοις αὐτὸς τὰ πλεῖστα
διατρίβει, ὅταν μὴ ἡ ὥρα τοῦ ἔτους ἐξείργῃ (4.13).

⁷⁷⁵ Kronenberg argues that this shows the King aims at the material well-being but not moral improvement. Kronenberg 2009, 42-4. However, Socrates has noted that the King rewards his subjects for being good in their respective spheres, and will portray Prince Cyrus in his garden as enjoying the creation of order and taking care that he remains fit to rule. As Ischomachos points out, a certain amount of self-control is required to exercise diligent care or to teach and encourage servants to exercise diligent care. (See discussion in section B.7). The King is not ignoring morality, although his focus on material well-being raises the question of whether he understands happiness in its fullest sense. (See discussion below).

⁷⁷⁶ The King makes an inspection (ἐπίταξις, *Oec.* 4.6) of his troops each year, but he personally oversees only those near his οἴκησις; he sends trusty overseers for the others (4.6-7). Similarly, he looks over and judges (ἐφοράω, δοκιμάζω) some of his agricultural land (presumably, that nearby), but sends trusty overseers to judge the rest (4.8).

In however many regions he dwells and into however many he travels, he takes care that there will be gardens, those called “paradises,” full of all things beautiful and good, however many the land tends to bear, and in these he spends most of his time, whenever the season of the year does not prevent him.

Socrates gives Critoboulos (and the readers) a description of one such garden through a dialogue that he says took place between (Prince) Cyrus and the Spartan leader Lysander in the royal paradise at Sardis (4.21). This dialogue is strongly reminiscent of the famous conversation in Herodotus between another Eastern ruler, Croesus the king of Lydia, and another Greek, the Athenian lawgiver Solon—a conversation that also took place in Sardis, then ruled by Croesus, but soon to be conquered by Cyrus the Great.

Socrates describes Lysander as reacting with wonder at the beauty and the order of the garden when Cyrus showed the paradise to him:

ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐθαύμαζεν αὐτὸν ὁ Λύσανδρος ὡς καλὰ μὲν τὰ δένδρα εἶη, δι’ ἴσου δὲ πεφυτευμένα, ὀρθοὶ δὲ οἱ στίχοι τῶν δένδρων, εὐγώνια δὲ πάντα καλῶς εἶη, ὅσμαι δὲ πολλαὶ καὶ ἡδεῖαι συμπαρομαρτοῖεν αὐτοῖς περιπατοῦσι, καὶ ταῦτα θαυμάζων εἶπεν· Ἀλλ’ ἐγὼ τοι, ὦ Κῦρε, πάντα μὲν <ταῦτα> θαυμάζω ἐπὶ τῷ κάλλει, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἄγαμαι τοῦ καταμετρήσαντός σοι καὶ **διατάξαντος** ἕκαστα τούτων (4.21).

And when Lysander was wondering at how beautiful the trees were, and at how regularly they were planted, and at how straight the rows of the trees were, and that everything was beautifully [planted] with precise angles, and at many sweet scents following them closely as they walked, he said: “But I tell you, Cyrus, I am amazed at the beauty, but I praise far more the one measuring out and **separately arranging** each thing for you.”

What strikes Lysander is not just the beauty and the sweet scents of the garden, but above all the regular planting of the trees into an array where the distances and angles have been precisely measured and each tree has been set (διατάττω) into its separate and proper place. As noted above, this word διατάττω is the same word used to describe the division of the kingdom into an ordered array of separate geographical and functional areas.

And just as the division of the kingdom was ordered and arranged by the sole authority of the Persian king, so the ordered placement of the trees was similarly arranged (διατάττω) by the sole authority of Cyrus himself.

ἀκούσαντα δὲ ταῦτα τὸν Κῦρον ἡσθίῃναι τε καὶ εἰπεῖν· Ταῦτα τοίνυν, ὦ Λύσανδρε, ἐγὼ πάντα καὶ διεμέτρησα καὶ **διέταξα**, ἔστι δ' αὐτῶν, φάναι, ἃ καὶ ἐφύτευσα αὐτός (4.22-3).

And having heard this [Lysander's praise of the garden's ordered arrangement], it is said that Cyrus was pleased and said: "I tell you, Lysander, I measured out and **separately arranged** everything, and there are some things that I myself planted."

The garden represents the kingdom's order in miniature: beautiful, flourishing, and static. In both the Persian kingdom and the Persian garden, everything is divided and arranged into a fixed pattern determined and ordered by the king.⁷⁷⁷

In many respects, the Persian garden and kingdom are similar to Ischomachos' house, where Ischomachos' authority (and that of his wife) divided

⁷⁷⁷ Purves 2010, 202 (arguing that the Persian garden is a sort of inside-out, microcosmic paradigm of the well-organized οἶκος). Note the contrast with the discussion of tree planting between Ischomachos and Socrates; Ischomachos, who thinks farming is a matter of observing nature with no need for intervening interpretation, does not discuss any particular organization for the planting of his orchard or vineyard.

(διατάττω, 9.1-2) the house into separate spaces and separated and placed in order household goods like shoes and pots.⁷⁷⁸ Like Ischomachos' private household, the Persian kingdom is entirely owned by the Persian king.⁷⁷⁹ Ischomachos (and his wife, the "queen bee") rule their slaves very much as the King rules his subjects, using rewards and honors as well as punishment (Ischomachos even boasted at 14.6-7 that he made use of Persian law) to encourage willing obedience, and carefully supervising the work of their underlings. Indeed, the subjects of the Persian King *are* slaves, or at least they are often so conceived in Greek ideology.⁷⁸⁰

Cyrus also resembles Ischomachos in his focus on keeping physically fit and ready for military service.

καὶ ὁ Λύσανδρος ἔφη, ἀποβλέψας εἰς αὐτὸν καὶ ἰδὼν τῶν τε ἱματίων τὸ κάλλος ὧν εἶχε καὶ τῆς ὁσμῆς αἰσθόμενος καὶ τῶν στρεπτῶν καὶ τῶν ψελίων τὸ κάλλος καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου κόσμου οὗ εἶχεν, εἶπεῖν· Τί λέγεις, φάναι, ὦ Κῦρε; ἢ γὰρ σὺ ταῖς σαῖς χερσὶ τούτων τι ἐφύτευσας; καὶ τὸν Κῦρον ἀποκρίνασθαι· Θαυμάζεις τοῦτο, [ἔφη,] ὦ Λύσανδρε; ὁμνυμί σοι τὸν Μίθρην, ὅταν περ ὑγιαίνω, μηπώποτε δειπνῆσαι πρὶν ἰδρῶσαι ἢ τῶν πολεμικῶν τι ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν ἔργων μελετῶν ἢ ἀεὶ ἓν γέ τι φιλοτιμούμενος (4.23-5).

⁷⁷⁸ Dillery 2016, 270-1 (Ischomachos and the Persian King are ideal leaders of private spaces, the Persian empire and Ischomachos' house); Purves 2010, 202 (the well-run Persian empire is a macrocosmic paradigm for the well-run οἶκος); Pomeroy 1994, 241-2 ad *Oec.* 4.5 (the Persian empire and the private Greek οἶκος are organized on the same principles). See also Rood 2017, 267 (noting the comparison between the Persian king's handling of his empire and the handling of their estate by Ischomachos and his wife).

⁷⁷⁹ Dillery 2016, 270-1 (Ischomachos and the Persian King are ideal leaders of private spaces, the Persian empire and Ischomachos' house).

⁷⁸⁰ Brock 2004, 255-6 (discussing the accuracy of Xenophon's descriptions of the Persian *ba(n)daka*); Pomeroy 1994, 241-2 ad *Oec.* 4.5 (with notes on both Persian and Greek authorities describing the King's subjects as slaves).

And Lysander said, looking at him and seeing the beauty of his clothing and sensing the beauty of his scent and necklaces and bracelets and of the other ornament which he had, said: "What do you mean, Cyrus? did you indeed with your own hands plant any of these?" And it is said that Cyrus answered: "You are amazed at this, Lysander? I swear to you by Mithras, whenever I am healthy, I never dine before sweating at some practice of military exercise or farming work or sometimes doing some one thing, at any rate, that is honor-seeking."

Ischomachos similarly practices cavalry exercises and ensures that he has adequate exercise in the course of his day (11.14-8); and of course, Ischomachos values farming, although as a gentleman farmer it does not seem to form part of his leisure activities.

However, there is one significant respect in which the King resembles Ischomachos' wife more than he does Ischomachos. Ischomachos' "queen bee" wife spends her time inside the house, which according to Ischomachos was the place ordained for women by divine nature. Although the King literally spends much of his time outdoors, in military or farming activities that resemble those of Ischomachos, in a metaphorical sense he spends most of his time *inside*. As noted above, the Persian empire itself is in essence the estate of the Persian king, being entirely his property and under his control just as Ischomachos' household is under his control. And within that estate, the King spends as much time as possible inside his garden, featuring an array of trees ordered by the King that recalls both the order of his kingdom and the beauty of the ordered household equipment inside Ischomachos' house.⁷⁸¹ Just as the wife labors to keep her house in order and to nurture her household, so the King labors to keep his kingdom ordered, peaceful, and

⁷⁸¹ Purves 2010, 214. Purves does not discuss the important point that Ischomachos' images of order (the dancing chorus, the trireme, etc.) are all dynamic, rather than the static ordering of the Persian kingdom.

prosperous.⁷⁸² In some ways the King is presented as being even more firmly inside than is Ischomachos' wife. Her influence as "queen bee" extends beyond the house through her partnership and dialogue with her husband; but for the king, there is no real "outside."⁷⁸³ As the sole source of authority and order, he is always laboring within the structure he has ordered, and he has no peers with whom he can engage in dialogue—at least, no Persian peers that share his own cultural assumptions.

The king's strange "insideness" helps to explain the response Socrates has Lysander give Cyrus—a response that is particularly ambiguous in light of this episode's Herodotean resonances.

καὶ αὐτὸς μέντοι ἔφη ὁ Λύσανδρος ἀκούσας ταῦτα δεξιώσασθαί τε αὐτὸν καὶ εἶπεῖν· Δικαίως μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Κῦρε, εὐδαίμων εἶναι· ἀγαθὸς γὰρ ὢν ἀνὴρ εὐδαιμονεῖς (4.25).

And Lysander hearing these things gave him his right hand and said: Justly you seem to me, Cyrus, to be happy; for being a good man, you are happy.

⁷⁸² Cf. the discussion in Pangle of Cyrus the Great in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* as the "alternative" to Socrates, a great statesman who seeks to benefit all humanity but who only establishes a spiritually hollow imperial order that led him to abandon the good of his own soul. Pangle 1994, 147-50. See Pontier 2006, 376 (in discussing the *Cyropaedia*, notes that the garden was a symbol of the organization of empire, and considered a cosmic model by the Persians).

⁷⁸³ In Herodotus the household of the Persian King reached its ultimate extent in Xerxes' desire to have his kingdom obliterate all boundaries by encompassing the entire earth. Hdt 7.8γ.1-2. Purves compares Xerxes' invasion of Greece to Aristagoras' map, as attempting to eliminate all borders and transform "Persia into a space that is so all-encompassing that it even verges upon a representation of the entire cosmos." Purves 2010, 149.

We will recall that in Herodotus, the Lydian ruler Croesus took the Athenian lawgiver Solon inside his treasuries (θησαυροί, 1.30),⁷⁸⁴ and asked him who was the most blessed and first in εὐδαιμονία of all the men he had seen, never doubting that Solon would name the wealthy and powerful Croesus himself.⁷⁸⁵ Solon did not wonder⁷⁸⁶ at what the Eastern ruler showed him; instead, he warned that it was necessary to examine critically the outcome of every matter (σκοπέειν δὲ χρὴ παντὸς χρήματος τὴν τελευτήν), as the god often ripped blessings up from the root (Hdt 1.32.9).⁷⁸⁷ Much later, the wisdom of these words would be acknowledged by Croesus when his kingdom had fallen to Cyrus the Great (Hdt. 1.86), making Sardis a part of the Persian empire—and the future site of the garden that Xenophon's Prince Cyrus would show to Lysander. And like Croesus, Prince Cyrus himself would fall at the hands of the Persian king, losing his life at the battle of Cunaxa in 401.

Xenophon's Socrates marks Cyrus as superior to Herodotus' Croesus, in that Cyrus does not take Lysander inside his treasuries and arrogantly demand to be called blessed and happy because of his wealth and power. Instead, Cyrus takes Lysander inside his garden and demonstrates his love of order and his willingness

⁷⁸⁴ In contemporary Greek writing, Greeks are often portrayed as carrying out public, governmental activities “outside,” in public spaces, in contrast to Eastern rulers who are more associated with the “inside,” e.g., inside bedrooms (Candaules, Hdt. 1.9-12), inside treasure houses (Croesus) or inside palaces away from the gaze of their people (Deioces, Hdt. 1.98-9). See Rood 2014, 71 (commenting on how Xenophon presents the Persian King in *Anabasis* 3.1.2); Purves 2014, 98 n. 11; 110 n. 31 (arguing that the “normative Greek practice” is to focus the eye on exterior spaces, and that when Herodotus puts the focus on interior spaces they are associated with non-Greeks, and usually tyrants).

⁷⁸⁵ Hdt 1.30.2; 1.32.1.

⁷⁸⁶ Purves points out that in Herodotus' story, Croesus is amazed—at Solon's lack of amazement. Purves 2010, 206 n. 15.

⁷⁸⁷ Xenophon recycles a different portion of the Herodotean episode in his *Cyropaedia*, when Croesus and Cyrus meet each other. See discussion below.

to endure the pains of keeping fit, despite his possession of great luxury. Lysander therefore freely praises Cyrus as “happy” and as a good man. Yet there is an ambiguity over the reason that Lysander thinks Cyrus is happy (εὐδαίμων), a word often best translated as “fortunate” in a material sense, but that in Xenophon’s Socratic writings can also mean happy in a deeper, philosophic sense.⁷⁸⁸ Lysander’s statement could mean that he sees Cyrus as justly happy in that he is a good man, one who is not corrupted by luxury but who pursues activities that make him more fit to fight and to rule—perhaps all the more so, in that he is a good man who also has wealth and power. But Lysander’s remark could also mean that he thinks Cyrus is “happy” in the more conventional sense of having wealth and power, and justly so, because that wealth and power are connected to his having self-control and martial virtues.⁷⁸⁹ Cicero recognized this ambiguity in the dialogue *de Senectute* when his

⁷⁸⁸ The word εὐδαιμονία often means simply prosperity and material well-being. For example, in the *Memorabilia* Socrates asks a general about the duties of a leader, leading him towards the conclusion that it is to make his followers happy (εὐδαίμων). The principal elements of happiness that Socrates lists in this context as the leader’s responsibility are seeing that his men are safe and well-provisioned, and have victory over their enemies (*Mem.* 3.2.14). See also discussion in Dorion 2011, 2.1: 276 ad *Mem.* 3.2.1 (this is εὐδαιμονία as prosperity); Dorion 2011, 2: 104 ad *Mem.* 4.2.35 (wealth, beauty, etc. as the common understanding of εὐδαιμονία). In contrast, when Socrates is talking to his young friend Euthydemus about happiness, he makes clear that it cannot consist of beauty or strength or wealth or reputation or other such conventional goods (*Mem.* 4.2.34-5). Instead, it is based on the supreme virtue of self-control (ἐγκράτεια), which makes all the other virtues possible, by which men become the best and happiest and most capable in discussion (*Mem.* 4.5.1-12). Xenophon calls Socrates himself the “best and happiest” of men (*Mem.* 4.8.11).

⁷⁸⁹ Stevens points out that Lysander calls the King only ἀγαθός, and argues that Lysander withholds the καλός after seeing how elaborately dressed the King is. Stevens also notes that in addition Lysander was known to want money from Cyrus

Cato recycles the anecdote to illustrate how he (like Cyrus) values farming. But Cato has his Lysander depart from Xenophon's text and distinguish Cyrus' virtue, good fortune, and happiness: "Indeed, Cyrus, they rightly say that you are happy, since your good fortune is connected to your *virtus* (*rite vero te Cyre beatum ferunt, quoniam virtuti tuae fortuna coniuncta est*. Cic. *de Sen.* 17.59).⁷⁹⁰ Cato further clarifies that his own good fortune is not luxury or power, but explicitly the ability to take joy in farming—a beneficial natural pleasure similar to those that appear in Socrates' praise of farming.⁷⁹¹

Cyrus gladly accepts Lysander's praise without commenting on the ambiguity, which neither he nor the Spartan Lysander seem to notice. What is missing is the sort of critical perspective that was provided to Croesus in Herodotus by the Athenian Solon, who warned him to look to the end or outcome of his life.⁷⁹²

for his navy, which might be thought to influence his praise. Stevens 1994, 228 & n. 36. This is part of an elaborate argument by Stevens that Socrates is restaging the argument from Aristophanes' *Clouds* between Better and Worse Argument, with the sensuality of farming and gardening being part of the position of the Worse Argument. As I have said earlier, in my view Xenophon's real (if qualified) admiration for both Cyruses militates against such an ironic reading. See also discussion in section A.3.

⁷⁹⁰ Here I must differ from Powell; I do not think that Cicero has made a mistranslation, but rather is introducing a deliberate variation from the original. I think that Cicero's dialogue is deliberately more expository than Xenophon's, and therefore Cicero is clarifying what he sees as the point of Xenophon's anecdote. Powell 1988, ad loc. See Powell's commentary for a more detailed discussion of the variation between the two texts.

⁷⁹¹ Cic. *de Sen.* 15.60; see also *de Sen.* 15.51-4.

⁷⁹² In Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, the question of Croesus' εὐδαιμονία is also paramount, with Croesus asking an oracle how can can live in the greatest happiness. The oracle replies that he must know himself, which Croesus initially thinks is an easy thing to do. Xen. *Cyr.* 7.2.20-1. But after he is conquered by Cyrus,

All of Cyrus' gardening would in the end count for nothing, as he would fall in the attempt to take the throne of his brother, the Persian king. To the extent that wealth and power and successful rule were what constituted happiness for him, Lysander was wrong; Cyrus was not a happy man. But it does not occur to either Lysander or Cyrus to ask the question.

In the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon reports that at the end of his life, Socrates concluded that no one had lived a more excellent or sweeter life than he had, because during his life he realized that he was becoming more excellent, as he conversed with others and compared himself to them (καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ἐντυγχάνων καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους παραθεωρῶν ἑμαυτὸν, *Mem.* 4.8.7). The point is not that Socrates felt a need to be considered superior to others; it simply reflects the Socratic reality that it is through discussion and analysis that men realize whether they know what they think they know, or not (*Mem.* 4.6.1). The problem for the Persian King (or Prince Cyrus) is that as the sole authority and source of order in his kingdom, he has no peers with whom he can converse or to whom he can compare himself.⁷⁹³ Although Socrates' Cyrus is an improvement on Herodotus' Croesus, Socrates shows how his pursuit of secure prosperity neglects any question of what might be beneficial to his subjects beyond the satisfaction of material needs—and perhaps even more to the point (given the limitations on a leader's

he realizes that he did not know himself; he had never been a match for Cyrus. Xen *Cyr.* 7.2.24-5. As Lefèvre has argued, Croesus gained self-knowledge only after being conquered by and comparing himself to Cyrus. Lefèvre 2010, 412. See also Ellis 2016, 89 (arguing that the theological differences between Xenophon and Herodotus account for the changes he makes in Herodotus' account, e.g., his omission of Solon and his view of the gods' jealousy).

⁷⁹³ Cf. Pangle's reading of the *Cyropaedia*, which is that Xenophon is depicting Cyrus as building a spiritually hollow empire that is doomed to collapse after Cyrus' death, and is contrasting that imperial project to the more limited but healthier philosophizing of a Socrates within the confines of republican Athenian life. Pangle 1994, 147-50.

power),⁷⁹⁴ it tends to limit even his own self-cultivation to preserving the ability to rule well.⁷⁹⁵ The Persian kings are always “inside” the world of their own power—a world that they construct from the top down without dialogue with their subjects (or anyone else), a world that lacks any outside where they might find some critical perspective. As Critoboulos considers Ischomachos’ privileging of the “outside” over the “inside,” he will be able to consider to what extent Ischomachos is also trapped “inside” intellectually by his commitment to material profit and his refusal to consider the alternative perspectives that Socrates is suggesting to him.

C.4 Socrates’ praise of farming

Although Socrates’ description of Persian gardening and farming in some respects resembles the way in which Ischomachos manages his household, in other respects it is quite different. The two most important missing elements are Ischomachos’ conception of a personified nature that is connected to the divine, and his conception of the τάξις of the household as a dynamic coordination of independent individuals. Socrates’ praise of farming adapts these elements and constructs a vision of farming that has very different philosophical implications. Although this Socratic farming is not specifically called Greek, we will see that it is

⁷⁹⁴ For example, in *Mem.* 3.2 Socrates talks to a recently directed general about his duty to make his men happy: that is, to keep them well-supplied, safe, and victorious. Socrates is not implying that there is nothing more to happiness, but rather that the general has the ability and the obligation to secure these things for his men. See discussion of εὐδαιμονία above.

⁷⁹⁵ Nee argues that both Cyrus and Ischomachos see farming as a way to fulfill “the insatiable appetite for increase,” rather than as an end in itself that would be an image of philosophy whose pleasures are inseparable from the activity itself. Nee 2009, 269. However, as I argue in the text, for Xenophon’s Socrates the problem is not that these farmers have an “insatiable” appetite, but rather that they do not reflect on what *else* is necessary for true happiness.

based on a cooperative ordering that has a democratic flavor that is quite different from the hierarchical Persian conception.

Ischomachos' conception of a personified nature connected to the divine ran throughout his discussion of household management.⁷⁹⁶ But in Socrates' description of Persian farming and gardening, there is no mention of nature or the gods at all, with the exception of one oath "by Mithras" from Prince Cyrus (4.24); there is not even a reference to prayers for agricultural success or the sacrifices enabled by livestock care.⁷⁹⁷ In Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*, the Persian monarchy is described as pious and heavily involved with state religion;⁷⁹⁸ but here, religion and the divine have been left out in favor of a description of Persian farming that presents the King as the sole source of authority and order in the kingdom.

In contrast, the divine is present throughout Socrates' praise of farming. When Socrates finishes his description of Persian farming, he tells Critoboulos that "I am telling you these things . . . because not even those blessed in every way can keep away from farming" (Ταῦτα δέ . . . ἐγὼ διηγοῦμαι . . . ὅτι τῆς γεωργίας οὐδ' οἱ πάνυ μακάριοι δύνανται ἀπέχεσθαι, 5.1). Although the word μακάριος can (like the word εὐδαίμων) often be translated as "happy" or even simply "rich," in Xenophon's Socratic writings it is best translated as "blessed," as it is associated with the sort of

⁷⁹⁶ See, e.g., *Oec.* 7.22 (Ischomachos' description of how the gods designed women's nature for working inside of the home, men's nature for working outside); 15.4 (his description of farming as most dear to men and gods); 19.18-9 (his description of how the vine taught men how to care for her); 20.13-5 (the earth is truthful, so that farming is the best test of an evil soul). See in particular discussions in sections B.5 and B.8.

⁷⁹⁷ Strauss 1970, 123 (arguing that the silence on the divine in the Persian chapter is related to its silence on justice). Note that in the Persian chapter, both Socrates and Critoboulos do swear by Zeus (*Oec.* 4.14, 4.18).

⁷⁹⁸ See, e.g., *Cyr.* 1.6.1-8 (Cyrus prays to the gods and listens to his father speak about piety); 3.3.21 (Cyrus leads prayers for the army); 8.1.23 (Cyrus' regular prayers and sacrifices, institution of Magi); 8.3.24 (animal sacrifices).

happiness that comes from a life of virtue that approaches the god-like.⁷⁹⁹ Thus when Socrates in the *Memorabilia* tells the story of Zeus' son Heracles and his choice between virtue (Ἀρετή) and Vice (Κακία), Virtue promises Heracles “the most blessed happiness” (τὴν μακαριστοτάτην εὐδαιμονίαν) for choosing a life of virtue.⁸⁰⁰ Socrates himself, who was pious, whose lack of needs approached the divine,⁸⁰¹ and who was guided by signs from his δαίμονιον,⁸⁰² is the only man in the Socratic writings whom Xenophon calls μακάριος.⁸⁰³

Socrates' use of μακάριος thus signals that his praise of Greek farming will place the farmer in the larger context of his relationship with nature and the divine. As such, caring about farming is important even for a μακάριος philosopher like Socrates, who does not farm himself, but who must be concerned with how it is understood.

⁷⁹⁹ Dorion argues that the flavor of divine blessing associated with μακάριος is confirmed by its application to Heracles, who is also associated with Socrates' independence from desires. Dorion 2000, 1: 157, 167 ad *Mem.* 1.6.9-14. See also discussion of εὐδαιμονία in section C.3.

⁸⁰⁰ *Mem.* 2.1.33. Socrates says this story was told by Prodicos, who adorned it with grander phrases (ἐκόσμησε μέντοι τὰς γνώμας ἔτι μεγαλειότεροις ῥήμασιν, *Mem.* 2.1.34). Note that Heracles, although born mortal, was said to have been admitted to the company of gods on Olympos; see, e.g., Xen. *Symp.* 8.29-30.

⁸⁰¹ *Mem.* 1.6.10 (Socrates describes the absence of needs as divine);

⁸⁰² *Mem.* 1.1.2, 4; 4.8.1.

⁸⁰³ *Mem.* 1.6.14 (Xenophon describes Socrates as a blessed (μακάριος) man who led his companions to καλοκάγαθία). According to López and García 1995, in Xenophon's Socratic writings μακάριος and μακαρίζω are used only in the passages cited above and in the following: *Mem.* 1.6.9 (Socrates asks who has more leisure to care for friends and the city, someone who lives as he does, or someone who lives in the luxurious way that Antiphon deems blessed (μακαρίζω)?).

Socrates begins by explaining to Critoboulos that farming is important because it combines pleasure, material benefit, and physical benefit in a way that provides a foundation for being a free man:

ἔοικε γὰρ ἡ ἐπιμέλεια αὐτῆς εἶναι ἅμα τε ἡδυπάθειά τις καὶ οἴκου αὔξησις καὶ σωμάτων ἄσκησις εἰς τὸ δύνασθαι ὅσα ἀνδρὶ ἐλευθέρῳ προσήκει (5.1).

for the concern [for farming] seems to be at the same time some sort of enjoyment, a way of increasing the household, and bodily training for being able to do what is appropriate for a free man.

As discussed earlier, Socrates is concerned with helping Critoboulos learn to do what is appropriate for a free man, which means in particular not engaging in a (characteristically inside) banausic occupation that ruins the mind and body, makes him economically dependent on others, and leaves him without the leisure necessary to be a good friend and citizen.⁸⁰⁴

The world of Socratic farming begins with an emphasis not on surplus production and luxury, but on beneficial natural pleasures that are associated with a relationship with the divine. These are the aims of Socratic farming as well as the production of food and other necessities.⁸⁰⁵

⁸⁰⁴ See discussion in section B.4.

⁸⁰⁵ Some scholars who favor the ironic reading of the *Oeconomicus* that I have rejected (see discussion in section A.3) argue that Socrates means for his encomium to be critiqued on the grounds of sensuality. Stevens, for example, argues that Socrates' praise of farming is meant to recall the Worse Argument of Aristophanes' *Clouds* in its reliance on pleasure, and that Ischomachos is meant to recall the Better Argument who rejected makeup and warm baths. Stevens 1994, 228-9. Note that Stevens agrees that Socrates is not corrupting Critoboulos; he concludes that Socrates is trying to teach Critoboulos that in reality the conventional gentleman Ischomachos is a sort of Tantalos, who will come to a bad end (as Socrates does in

πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἀφ' ὧν ζῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ταῦτα ἡ γῆ φέρει ἐργαζομένοις, καὶ ἀφ' ὧν τοίνυν ἡδυπαθοῦσι, προσεπιφέρει· ἔπειτα δὲ ὅσοις **κοσμοῦσι** βωμοὺς καὶ ἀγάλματα καὶ οἷς αὐτοὶ **κοσμοῦνται**, καὶ ταῦτα μετὰ ἡδίστων ὁσμῶν καὶ θαυμάτων παρέχει· ἔπειτα δὲ ὅψα πολλὰ τὰ μὲν φύει, τὰ δὲ τρέφει· καὶ γὰρ ἡ προβατευτική τέχνη συνῆπται τῇ γεωργίᾳ, ὥστε ἔχειν καὶ θεοὺς ἐξαρέσκεσθαι θύοντας καὶ αὐτοὺς χρῆσθαι (5.2-4).

First of all [says Socrates], the earth bears for those who work the things from which men live—and further, it also bears the things from which they enjoy themselves. And then it bears what they **adorn** altars and votive statues with and what they **adorn** themselves with, and it offers these things with the sweetest scents and sights; and then there are many things in addition to bread, some of which she grows, and others she nourishes; for indeed the art of livestock care is connected to that of farming, such that farmers are able to win over the gods by sacrificing the animals, and also to use the animals.

The emphasis on adornment (*κοσμοῦσι, κοσμοῦνται*) and on “sweetest scents and sights” (*ἡδίστων ὁσμῶν καὶ θαυμάτων*) is a deliberate recollection of the Persian paradise, with its beautiful trees in straight rows and exact angles, its delightful scents (*ὀσμαι δὲ πολλαὶ καὶ ἡδεῖαι*, 4.21), and of its master with his jewelry and other ornament (*κόσμου*, 4.23). But for the Persian king, these sweet odors and well-planted trees and beautiful jewelry are surplus luxuries; even if his well-ordered trees are fruit trees (which neither Lysander nor Cyrus bothers to

Clouds). Stevens 1994, 228, 235-7. But as I discuss below, Xenophon's Socrates is not against pleasure but rather against a lack of self-control.

mention),⁸⁰⁶ they are grown for their aesthetic effects. Lysander is amazed that Cyrus works in his garden *despite* his luxurious clothing and beautiful ornament; the ornaments themselves serve no purpose other than display. The beauty and adornment found in the Persian garden is much like the adornment that Ischomachos wishes to give Athens from his wealth; it is not necessarily what is most beneficial.⁸⁰⁷

In contrast, the beauty and adornment of the Socratic farm is directly related to its benefits. What Socrates is describing are necessary agricultural products, the “things from which men live,” like grain, as well as “the things from which they enjoy themselves,” like wine. There are “things other than bread” (ὄψα), such as meat and vegetables—but these are not complicated delicacies, but things grown or raised on a farm, presumably one’s own. The “sweetest scents and sights” that accompany adornments encourage readers to think not of jewelry but of flowers, like the garlands that Greeks wore at dinner parties, or the first-fruit offerings of seasonal produce made to the gods.⁸⁰⁸ This is the same Socrates who enjoyed what he ate and drank because he did so only when he was hungry or thirsty (*Mem.* 1.3.5, 1.6.5); he was not against the pleasures of enjoying beauty or of satisfying genuine natural needs, but rather in favor of avoiding enslavement to pleasure and of having as few needs as possible, and those simple and easy to satisfy (*Mem.* 1.6.10). Socrates is presenting farming as encouraging this attitude. Furthermore, by personifying the

⁸⁰⁶ According to Socrates, the Persian paradises are full of all the “beautiful and good things” the earth naturally produces, *Oec.* 4.13-4. Although the paradises do seem to be productive, agricultural production is not their purpose.

⁸⁰⁷ See discussion in section B.7.

⁸⁰⁸ E.g., *Pl. Symp.* 212e (Alcibiades arrives at the symposium wearing a wreath of ivy and flowers and ribbons; *Anac.* 396 (the poet bids the boy to bring water, wine, and wreaths of flowers). *Oec.* 5.10, discussed below, praises the farm for its ability to provide first-fruit offerings. See also discussion in Burkert 1985 [1977], 66-8 (on first-fruit offerings of seasonal produce and other foods); Rouse 1902, 286-90 (Greek votive offering depicting worshippers bearing fruit or flowers).

earth and by paralleling divine and human adornment, divine and human use of animals, Socrates is suggesting a beneficent deity satisfied with simple offerings of the same things farmers enjoy—something that will be borne out in the remainder of his praise of farming.⁸⁰⁹

In Socrates' description of farming, the earth not only encourages simple pleasures, but it also teaches farmers to be hardy and enduring (καρτερεῖν). Endurance in the face of pain (καρτερία) is closely related to self-control (ἐγκράτεια) in the presence of pleasure,⁸¹⁰ which as we have seen both Ischomachos and Socrates agree is the foundation of all the virtues.⁸¹¹

παρέχουσα δ' ἀφθονώτατα τάγαθὰ οὐκ ἔᾱ ταῦτα μετὰ μαλακίας λαμβάνειν, ἀλλὰ ψύχη τε χειμῶνος καὶ θάληπθι θέρους ἐθίζει καρτερεῖν. Καὶ τοὺς μὲν αὐτουργοὺς διὰ τῶν χειρῶν γυμνάζουσα ἰσχὺν αὐτοῖς προστίθησι, τοὺς δὲ τῇ ἐπιμελείᾳ γεωργοῦντας ἀνδρίζει πρῶ τε ἐγείρουσα καὶ πορεύεσθαι σφοδρῶς ἀναγκάζουσα (5.4-6).

Although offering good things most unstingily, she does not permit these things to be taken by weakness, but she makes [farmers] accustomed to endure the frosts of winter and the heat of summer. And she gives strength to the farmers who use their own hands by exercising them, and she makes manly those who farm with careful supervision, waking them early and forcing them to go about with vigor.

⁸⁰⁹ In the *Memorabilia*, Socrates says that the richness of the sacrifice is unimportant; what matters is the piety of the worshipper, who should give in accordance with his means (*Mem.* 1.3.3). He also describes the divine as beneficent at *Mem.* 1.4.13-4 (arguing that the gods care for man based on how they designed him); 4.3.3-12 (a similar argument, based on how the gods have designed the world to furnish man with what he needs).

⁸¹⁰ *Mem.* 1.2.1; 1.6.6. See discussion in Dorion 2000, 1: 68-73 ad *Mem.* 1.2.1.

⁸¹¹ See discussion in section B.5.a.

Socrates' emphasis on beneficial natural pleasures is repeated in the series of rhetorical questions that form the climax of his praise of farming, which in its elaboration resembles Ischomachos' praise of the order of the house.⁸¹² With a heavy use of adjectives related to generosity, sweetness, and desirability, Socrates portrays farming as a generous and welcoming host, and then extends that portrayal of hospitality and care for friends and household to the farmer himself:

... τίς δὲ ξένους **ἀφθονώτερον** δέχεται; χειμάσαι δὲ πυρὶ **ἀφθόνῳ** καὶ θερμοῖς λουτροῖς ποῦ πλείων εὐμάρεια ἢ ἐν χώρῳ τῷ; ποῦ δὲ **ἡδιον** θερίσαι ὕδασι τε καὶ πνεύμασι καὶ σκιαῖς ἢ κατ' ἀγρόν; τίς δὲ ἄλλη θεοῖς ἀπαρχὰς πρεπωδεστέρας παρέχει ἢ ἑορτὰς **πληρεστέρας** ἀποδεικνύει; τίς δὲ οἰκέταις **προσφιλεστέρα** ἢ γυναικὶ **ἡδίῳ** ἢ τέκνοις **ποθεινοτέρα** ἢ φίλοις **εὐχαριστοτέρα**; ἐμοὶ μὲν θαυμαστὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι εἴ τις ἐλεύθερος ἄνθρωπος ἢ κτῆμά τι τούτου **ἡδιον** κέκτηται ἢ ἐπιμέλειαν **ἡδίῳ** τινὰ ταύτης ἡῦρηκεν ἢ **ὠφελιμώτερον** εἰς τὸν βίον (5.9-12).

... And what welcomes guest-friends **more unstintingly**? And where is it more convenient to spend the winter with an **unstinting** fire and hot baths than on some estate? And where is it **more pleasant** to pass the summer with water and breezes and shade than in the countryside? And what else offers more appropriate first fruits to the gods or displays **more bountiful** festivals? And what is **more beloved** to servants or **more pleasant** to a wife or **more desirable** to children or **more popular** with friends? To me it seems amazing if any free man possesses anything **sweeter** than this or has discovered some **sweeter** care or one **more beneficial** to his livelihood.

⁸¹² See Pomeroy 1994, 254-5 ad *Oec.* 5.1; Strauss 1970, 121 (pointing in particular to the rhetorical character of the string of rhetorical questions).

Socrates' amazement is at the way in which a farm is both beneficial and pleasant for the free man. This attitude can be contrasted both to Lysander's amazement at the sight of the beautiful Persian garden (4.21)⁸¹³ and to the Hesiodic portrayal of farming as a matter mostly of painful toil.⁸¹⁴ Although agriculture was often portrayed as praiseworthy and as a source of well-grounded virtue and honesty, for the most part it was not portrayed as something that pleasant in itself.⁸¹⁵

Socrates' statement that he would be amazed if any "free man" possessed anything sweeter than a farm harks back to his opening comment that farming was a foundation for life as a free man. He has shown how farming encourages pleasure in satisfying simple needs, hard work, and endurance, and offers the resources needed to live, support a household, and help friends. These statements are also true of Socrates' description of Persian farming, but only up to a point. Persian gardening provides enjoyment for the Persian king; Persian farming increases the wealth and prosperity of his kingdom, which is in effect his household; and Persian gardening provides the King with bodily exercise that helps him stay fit for rule. But all this is true *only* for the Persian king, who has structured the τάξις of the entire empire as a strict hierarchy where he is the sole authority. And even then, although Prince Cyrus enjoys the healthy work of his garden, his luxurious jewelry and rich clothing are as much a part of the display to Lysander as are the trees that he himself planted. Socrates' remarks thus reinforce the point that the King is the *only* man in Persia who could be considered free, and that he has no peers but only

⁸¹³ Cf. Odysseus' admiration of the sight of Alcinoos' flourishing orchard, vineyard, and vegetable garden, which never cease to bear fruit. *Od.* 7.112-33.

⁸¹⁴ See, e.g., Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 42-50 (the gods have hidden livelihood from men, lest they get what they need without work), 397-8 (Hesiod urges his brother to work, which the gods have allotted to men); cf. 588-94 (Hesiod urges the farmer in hot weather to enjoy his wine in the breezy shade).

⁸¹⁵ Pomeroy describes this as the earliest extensive Greek eulogy that we have of the delights of country life. Pomeroy 1994, 254 ad *Oec.* 5.1. See also the discussion of farming in the General Introduction, section A.2.

dependents and subordinates; in that sense, the King is always laboring inside his household, and never at leisure with friends and equals. Thus in that sense the Persian King is like the banausic man who always labors “inside,” and has no leisure to help his friends. Once again we see the significance of Socrates’ meeting Ischomachos at the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios, where being “free” (ἐλεύθερος) in that context was a Greek ideal being contrasted with the idea of the Persian attempt to conquer and enslave the Greeks (7.1).⁸¹⁶

The space of Socratic farming is also constructed and ordered differently than that of Persian farming. The Persian King owns all of Persian space, which he divides into different units of state space (for productive farming and protective military functions) and personal space (his paradises). Socratic farming, in contrast, emphasizes not some individual’s total control over communal space, but rather many different farmers’ participation in that space through religious festivals (5.3, 5.10) and hospitality (5.9).

In fact, as Socrates now explains, farming is what *creates* public and private space—both literally and conceptually—because it requires agreement and cooperation.⁸¹⁷

Παρορμᾶ δέ τι καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀρήγειν σὺν ὄπλοις τῇ χώρᾳ καὶ ἡ γῆ τοὺς γεωργοὺς ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τοὺς καρποὺς τρέφουσα τῷ κρατοῦντι λαμβάνειν. (5.7-8)

And the earth, because it makes its fruits grow in the common area [literally, “in the middle”] to be taken by the powerful, urges farmers into bringing aid to the land with their implements.

⁸¹⁶ See especially discussion of βαναυσία and ἐλευθερία in section B.4.

⁸¹⁷ It is interesting that the phrase ἐν τῷ μέσῳ is literally in the middle between τοὺς γεωργοὺς and τοὺς καρποὺς, as if the middle or empty space (as in a chorus) is permitting both farmers and crops to exist in an ordered relationship.

In farming, the harvest grows “in the common area,” literally, “in the middle,” which makes it vulnerable to being taken by others. Both fighting enemies and working the land requires acting with other men (σὺν ἀνθρώποις); “farming,” says Socrates, thus “teaches the community of farmers to come to each others’ assistance” (συμπαιδεύει δὲ καὶ εἰς τὸ ἐπαρκεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἡ γεωργία, 5.14-16).

The phrase ἐν τῷ μέσῳ—literally, “in the middle”—is reminiscent of a Greek political metaphor for public space: τὸ μέσον, “the middle.” Going back to Homeric society, the community was often envisioned as a circle with a central space, the μέσον, where what was for common ownership, distribution, or discussion was set “in the middle” where it could be seen or discussed by all those standing around the perimeter.⁸¹⁸ We have also seen a similar image in one of the institutions of Athenian democracy that Ischomachos used to describe household τάξις, the choral dance that opened and closed his praise of order. For the choral dance, the beautiful and pure “space in the middle” of the dancers was created by the orderly arrangement and disciplined coordination of the dancing participants. Thus by making the harvest grow “in the middle,” farming requires farmers to develop cooperative political relationships with the same sort of dynamic order possessed by the choral dance, which require in their turn the creation of an orderly “middle” of public space.

Farming is thus the origin of community and political structure, as it creates what is “in the middle”—the harvest-bearing land, which must be bounded into an

⁸¹⁸ See, e.g., *Il.* 7.383-384 (the herald speaks in the assembly ἐν μέσσοισιν); *Il.* 23.704 (Achilles sets up the prize for the loser in the funeral games ἐς μέσσον); *Od.* 2.37 (Telemachos stands to speak in the middle of the assembly, μέσῃ ἀγορῇ). As Vernant argues, the spatial model that dominates these public Greek institutions is that of a circular and centered space. Vernant 2006 [1965], 206-7, 213-4. A similar phrase is used in *Oec.* 7.26 to indicate that the god has given memory and diligent concern and self-control to men and women in common (literally, “has placed [these qualities] into the middle,” εἰς τὸ μέσον . . . κατέθηκεν). See also Xen. *Symp.* 3.3, εἰς μέσον, to put something “before the present company.”

area reserved by one group for its use and benefit, which can then be managed and protected only by the collective action of that group. This in turn requires political organization and effective leadership in both the military and agricultural spheres, such that both the farmer and the military leader (5.15-6) must be able to reward good behavior (and to punish bad behavior—at least in the military sphere).⁸¹⁹ This form of justice as reciprocity is taught by the Earth itself, because she is divine;⁸²⁰ as noted above, she bears generously pleasant and beneficial things, but only for those who work and have become accustomed to enduring the frosts of winter and heats of summer (5.2, 5.4). As Socrates says specifically, the Earth is just in that she gives good for good.

ἔτι δὲ ἡ γῆ θεὸς οὕσα τοὺς δυναμένους καταμανθάνειν καὶ δικαιοσύνην
διδάσκει· τοὺς γὰρ ἄριστα θεραπεύοντας αὐτὴν πλεῖστα ἀγαθὰ ἀντιποιεῖ.

And furthermore, the Earth being a god, she even teaches justice to those able to look closely; because for those serving her the best she does in return the most good things (5.12-3).

It is worth noting that if the Earth is treated badly, she does not “do good things,” but appears to take no other form of revenge—which makes her teachings rather different from the popular Greek understanding of justice.⁸²¹ Socrates seems to be

⁸¹⁹ Socrates also seems to stress that it is more important to give slaves or those under authority, who are less independent, something good to look forward to.

⁸²⁰ Cf. Ischomachos’ teaching vine, discussed in section B.8.

⁸²¹ See discussion in Dover 1974, 180-4; Chapter 1 (Euripides’ *Antiope*), section C. Similarly, Socrates gives a defensive focus to the military actions of farmers, who have been trained by farming to be strong and brave, and able to live free (*Oec.* 5.1, 8). Farmers are able (absent divine intervention), says Socrates, to return the favor of invasion to take what they need; but he does not mention conquest or vengeance (5.13).

portraying the (cultivated) Earth as creating men rather like Socrates himself, one who does only good to others, and teaches students to do likewise.⁸²²

C.5 *The discussion with Critoboulos: a conclusion*

Socrates has followed Ischomachos' lead in using personification to emphasize the farmer's relationship with the earth. The earth "provides" what man needs "generously," she "gives strength" to farmers and "makes them manly" (5.2-4), she "teaches" justice to those who closely observe her.⁸²³ This personification of the earth suggests that *every* farmer has a potential relationship with the divine earth through which he could learn justice, become strong and enduring, be brave in battle, appreciate simple pleasures, and cooperate with others in farming, fighting, and religious observances.⁸²⁴ The Socratic farming community is not one where the King is the only source of order. This gives a democratic flavor to the farming community he describes. But in Socrates' account, although the cultivation of nature creates the space of community, it does not seem to dictate one particular form of political τάξις. At least some of Socrates' farmers appear to be men like Ischomachos, who exercise a diligent care in supervising and leading their workers but do not do all of the tasks of farming themselves; Socrates' farming community could just as well be some sort of moderate oligarchy, or some other structure where power is delegated from the many to the few. His account does suggest that a community will not flourish if it does not follow the earth's lessons of justice; but if Socrates thinks that these lessons can be followed by only one type of polity, he does

⁸²² *Mem.* 4.8.11.

⁸²³ See the discussion of personification as a rhetorical device used by Ischomachos in section B.8. It should be noted that the earth was often thought of as a goddess, e.g., Hesiod *Theog.* 116-8. However, Socrates' divine earth lacks any sort of anthropomorphic personality, and is more in line with Ischomachos' literary personifications, e.g. of farming and the vine.

⁸²⁴ See discussion of the hoplite or citizen soldier in Chapter 1, B.5.a.

not say so here.

Similarly, every farmer has the potential to enjoy the place created by farming.

χειμάσαι δὲ πυρὶ ἀφθόνῳ καὶ θερμοῖς λουτροῖς ποῦ πλείων εὐμάρεια ἢ ἐν
χώρῳ τῷ; ποῦ δὲ ἡδίων θερίσαι ὕδασι τε καὶ πνεύμασι καὶ σκιαῖς ἢ κατ'
ἀγρόν; (5.9)

Where is it more convenient to winter than on your land, with a generous fire and warm baths? and where is it more pleasant to summer, with waters and breezes and shade, than in the country?

Socrates is describing the farm as a *locus amoenus*, the cool and shady place of relaxation and reflection beloved of the poets and philosophers—as, for example, Plato's Socrates in the *Phaedrus*.⁸²⁵ Xenophon's Socrates emphasizes that this place does not exist in nature, but is a created space where the farmer provides order by balancing the bright heat of the summer by cool water and shade as well as the dark cold of the winter by warm water and fire. Although Socratic farming does not require philosophical reflection, it does provide the space for it—a true place for perspective, for the critical examination so important to Socratic thought.

Of course, there is the important qualification that the farmer should have sufficient leisure from farming to enjoy the *locus amoenus*. It has been objected that Socrates' praise of farming ignores the reality of its hard labor, which would leave little time for lying around in the shade—particularly as he seems at times to be imagining a world of small independent farmers, αὐτουργοί, who do most of their own agricultural work.⁸²⁶ Indeed, even wealthy farmers like Ischomachos have to

⁸²⁵ See Chapter 2, section F. For further discussion of the *locus amoenus*, see Myers 2017 (forthcoming), (chapter 10).

⁸²⁶ Some scholars who give the *Oeconomicus* an ironic reading see Socrates' praise of the farmer's life as not candid, just as they see his evaluation of Ischomachos' life as

work hard to be successful; we have already seen how Ischomachos mocked the idler who sought a *locus amoenus* instead of displaying the diligence necessary for success by marching purposefully towards his goal (20.18), in an apparent dig at Socrates' philosophic way of life. But then, at least part of the economic problem stems from the desire to make a surplus over and above what is actually necessary. Ischomachos must labor ceaselessly to make a large surplus to maintain his elite status—something that neither he nor his city actually requires, as Socrates reminded Critoboulos at 2.5-8. A farmer content with the simple pleasures praised by Socrates would require less of a surplus and thus would have more leisure from farming. Note that Socrates does *not* offer Critoboulos the third model of order discussed with Ischomachos, that of the profit-seeking Phoenician ship.⁸²⁷

Yet it must be conceded that Socrates' vision of the ideal farming community is somewhat utopian.⁸²⁸ Although each farmer has the opportunity to learn and practice justice, endurance, courage, leadership, and even philosophy, it is by no means certain that all or even most of them will do so. Even in Socrates' ideal, the hierarchical leadership that marks the Persian model, which pursues its collective goals through not only punishment, but also effective appeals to the individual self-interest of subordinates, cannot be completely absent; and the more the community falls short of the ideal of a virtuous citizenry, the more the Persian model is arguably needed. As Socrates notes to Critoboulos, masters who are gentlemen can make their subordinates better men (1.23). At the same time, the hierarchical nature of the Persian model can deprive subordinates of the opportunity to internalize the practice of virtue for its own sake, and risks trapping the leader in a leadership role that can rob him of the perspective acquired only through conversation with one's peers.

largely negative. See, e.g. Ambler 1996, 112, 120-1, 128, 130-1. See also discussion of the ironic readings in section A.3.

⁸²⁷ See discussion in sections B.5.c and B.9.

⁸²⁸ Cf. the discussion of the ideal community in the *Anabasis*. See Dillery 1995, esp. 77-90.

Farming is thus the foundational art that creates the space for human existence, private economic activity and reflection, public cooperation and dialogue. As Socrates says, it is the basis of all the other arts.

καλῶς δὲ κάκεϊνος εἶπεν ὃς ἔφη τὴν γεωργίαν τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν μητέρα καὶ τροφὸν εἶναι. εὖ μὲν γὰρ φερομένης τῆς γεωργίας ἔρρωνται καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι ἅπασαι, ὅπου δ' ἂν ἀναγκασθῇ ἡ γῆ χερσεύειν, ἀποσβέννυνται καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι τέχναι σχεδόν τι καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν (5.17).

and he spoke well who said that farming is the mother and nurse of the other arts. for if farming is done well, then all the other arts are vigorous, but wherever the earth is forced to lie barren, the other arts are just about extinguished both by land and sea.

Socrates makes the cooperative Greek model more attractive in his praise of farming, but he shows that the hierarchical Persian model has a place as well.⁸²⁹ Critoboulos is now in a position to listen to Socrates' account of Ischomachos' teachings and ponder the relationship between these different visions of farming, and to consider the kind of place that he should make for himself. This ability to consider philosophically one's best form of life is what marks a true καλὸς κάγαθός.⁸³⁰

⁸²⁹ Cf. Dillery 2016, 271-2 (comparing Xenophon's ideal of leadership to the approach of Plato's *Laws*, which he argues was responding to Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*; the *Laws* saw an ideal freedom as reachable either by tempering Persian authoritarian rule with the collegiality of friendship, or by controlling Athenian license through subservience to law); cf. Pontier 2006, 388 (commenting on the democratic optimism that men can control themselves, versus Xenophon's pessimistic but pragmatic focus on vigilance against men moving a way from order).

⁸³⁰ See *Mem.* 1.1.16 (Socrates thought that gentlemen were those knowing such

D. *Xenophon's Oeconomicus: A Conclusion*

Some scholars argue that Ischomachos and/or Socrates are merely mouthpieces for Xenophon's conventional and unoriginal opinions.⁸³¹ But as I have shown, Xenophon has given Socrates and Ischomachos different perspectives that play off of each other in complex ways. Socrates generally approved of Ischomachos' basic ideas on topics like household order, the importance of self-control, and farming, which are presented here as forming the basis of Socrates' own thought, or at least as being consistent with that basis. Although Socrates' criticism of some of Ischomachos' ideas and imagery led to the failure of their conversation, Socrates' retelling of Ischomachos' advice to Critoboulos marks Socrates out as a respectable, well-grounded thinker, and not the religious and social radical that his accusers claimed when procuring his execution.⁸³²

But although Socrates respected Ischomachos' views, he also showed that Ischomachos did not understand that they were in part shaped by his choice of metaphors rather than being based on an unmediated understanding of nature and its requirements. Ischomachos' way of life and farming are choices, not dictates of nature, and in Socrates' eyes they are not perfect choices. Ischomachos, like the Persian King, is a leader who hierarchically orders men in pursuit of a common goal: a productive agricultural estate. He therefore manages his subordinates mostly by

things as what is beautiful, just, prudence, etc.).

⁸³¹ See discussion in section A.3.

⁸³² I thus see no Xenophontic critique of Socrates, despite the failure of the conversation with Ischomachos. As discussed in section A.4, Xenophon describes Socrates as using a harsher tone with those who thought they knew everything, but not with friends like Critoboulos who were receptive to his arguments (*Mem.* 1.4.1). Note that some scholars have thought that Plato's *Gorgias* criticizes Socrates for an overly ironic approach that causes his conversation with Callicles to fail. See, e.g., Tarnopolsky 2010, 136-7.

appealing to their self-interest through rewards and punishments, although he also appeals to the desire for praise and social standing (φιλοτιμία) that exists in his better subordinates. It is not surprising that immersed in this structure, Ischomachos himself adopted the conventional assumption that it is important to pursue profit and become wealthy, rather than pursuing benefit in a larger sense. Yet Ischomachos also has another idea of order, one that is more “Greek” and is based on images of a cooperative coordination of free individuals in relationship with each other. In his conversation with Critoboulos, Socrates disentangles Ischomachos’ thinking to show that he has different and not entirely compatible views of order: one, a hierarchical, static order where all authority flows from one source, envisioned primarily as a territory divided into set places and presented as “Persian”; the other, a cooperative, dynamic order, envisioned above all as a dancing chorus and presented as “Greek.”⁸³³ The first forms a more coherent structure that is perhaps better at pursuing a common goal; however, the subordinates are deprived of a full opportunity to practice virtue, and the leader runs the risk of becoming trapped and laboring like a banausic man “inside” the structure of his authority with no leisure to gain perspective from friends and peers, captive to his goal of making a living for himself (and his followers). The second is presented as a more attractive order that gives all free participants a full opportunity to practice the virtues of a free man “outside” in the public sphere, as well as to philosophize; however, it offers little guarantee that they will do so.

Xenophon’s pro-farming but not-farming philosopher, Socrates, is thus quite different from Euripides’ and from Plato’s philosophers. In *Antiope*, Amphion first abandons his philosophic poetry for vengeance; when Hermes restores his status as a poet, it is not as a philosophic poet but as a practical poet who will help his brother build the Theban walls—and the figure of Tantalos signals the coming disaster that will prove there was no real escape from the cycle of vengeance. In the *Gorgias*,

⁸³³ There is also a third, that of the profit-seeking Phoenician merchant ship, which Socrates does *not* present to Critoboulos as an option. See discussion in sections B.5.c and B.9.

Plato's Socrates is an Amphion who never abandons philosophy for Callicles' anger over injustice, even over the threat of his own unjust execution. When his "speech of Amphion" fails to turn Callicles' attention to the order of the cosmos, Socrates tries a different above-beyond perspective, that of the underworld (with Tantalos); but we are left with the sense that Socrates' views are simply too ἄτοπος for Callicles, too "out of place," and that Callicles will be like Tantalos and the other great sinners—unable to profit from correction. Although Socrates makes it clear that he does not see his end as tragic, we are nevertheless left with a sense of potential tragedy in the end of Callicles and of all those unable to release their anger over injustice—which includes, perhaps, all of the friends of Socrates, and even Plato himself.

In the *Oeconomicus*, however, there is no Amphionic Socrates and no tragic perspective. The dialogue may end with Ischomachos' angry reference to Tantalos, but we know that Socrates will go on to have a successful conversation with Critoboulos, practicing the philosophy that made him, in his own account, the happiest of men. Xenophon's Socrates explicitly denies being the sort of up-in-the-air, babbling intellectual that was the Socrates parodied by Aristophanes in his *Clouds* (and the sort that Zethus accused Amphion of being). Xenophon's Socrates, unlike Plato's, is not ἄτοπος.⁸³⁴ He always seems to know "where" he is, understanding how to meet his interlocutors on (so to speak) their own ground, and to lead them from there to his own position. As Xenophon says in the *Memorabilia*:

⁸³⁴ The only use of ἄτοπα or related words in Xenophon's Socratic writings, according to Lopéz and García 1995, is at *Mem.* 2.3.15, where Socrates urges Chairecrates, a younger brother, to take the lead in his relationship with his older brother—advice Chairecrates calls "strange," ἄτοπα, given the conventional view that the elder should always speak first. As Dorion points out, Chairecrates is replying to Socrates' earlier remark that Chairecrates was saying something surprising (θαυμαστά, *Mem.* 2.3.9) when he claimed not to know how to handle his brother. Dorion 2011, 2.1: 28, ad *Mem.* 2.3.15.

ὁπότε δὲ αὐτός τι τῷ λόγῳ διεξίῃ, διὰ τῶν μάλιστα ὁμολογουμένων
 ἐπορεύετο, νομίζων ταύτην τὴν ἀσφάλειαν εἶναι λόγου. τοιγαροῦν πολὺ
 μάλιστα ὧν ἐγὼ οἶδα, ὅτε λέγοι, τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὁμολογοῦντας παρεῖχεν.
 ἔφη δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρον τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ ἀναθεῖναι τὸ ἀσφαλῆ ῥήτορα εἶναι, ὥς
 ἱκανὸν αὐτὸν ὄντα διὰ τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄγειν τοὺς λόγους
 (*Mem.* 4.6.15).

And whenever he himself was going carefully through something in an argument, he would travel in particular through things that were agreed, thinking that this was the security against the argument's stumbling. And for this reason, of the men I know, whenever he spoke, he was by far the most likely to make his listeners agree. And he also said that Homer attributed to Odysseus the character of being an unstumbling speaker, as he was able to lead his arguments through what seemed right to men.

Xenophon does not show Socrates trying to convey some sort of above-beyond perspective, but rather—especially in the *Oeconomicus*—trying to teach his friends to analyze the different “ground level” perspectives that shape their lives, such as the “Persian” view of farming, versus the “Greek” view, which requires that they understand how metaphor and imagery shapes thought.

Of course, Socrates himself was no farmer, nor a household manager of any kind, as he told Critoboulos at the beginning of the dialogue. But this does not mean that his advice to Critoboulos to take up farming was insincere. The best men and those most beloved to the gods, he says in the *Memorabilia*, are those who do their work well (εὖ πράττειν), whether that is farming or medicine or politics (3.9.15). As Dorion points out, philosophers need farmers to feed them;⁸³⁵ and they also need leaders to lead them in community endeavors like military service—Ischomachos is probably right in his final point to Socrates, that the ability to lead groups of men toward a common goal is not the same thing as the ability to make philosophical

⁸³⁵ Dorion 2008, 273-8.

distinctions. Indeed, to the extent that a philosopher like Socrates teaches friends to reflect on their lives and adopt their own practice of virtue through open conversation, Socrates *cannot* be a leader—at least not in the sense of a politician, estate manager, or general who must work in large part through reward and punishment and appeals to self-interest and the desire for social standing.⁸³⁶ More farmers and leaders are needed than Socratic philosophers—or at least, more farmer-philosophers and leader-philosophers are needed than Socrateses, of whom there could only be one in any case. Although leisure from other labor for philosophy is desirable for everyone, there are few like Socrates, so gifted that they should have no leisure from it.⁸³⁷ For Xenophon, both the farmer and the philosopher are necessary, and they are necessary to each other.

⁸³⁶ Cf. Dillery 2016, 251, 262 (taking issue with the argument that Socrates was a leader, as opposed to a good model for his followers).

⁸³⁷ In *Mem.* 3.9.9, Socrates describes leisure as a relative concept; one can have leisure from a less important occupation (like gambling) for a more important one (like farming), but in this use of the term, one can't have leisure from a more important occupation for a less important one. Thus in *Mem.* 3.11.16, when he jokes with Theodote that it is difficult for him to find leisure because he has much business (i.e., philosophizing), in one sense he is being completely serious.

Bibliography

- Alderman, A. 2005. "Phronesis in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* and Plato's *Politicus*." *Socratica 2005: studi sulla letteratura socratica antica presentati alle giornate di studio di Senigallia*: 205-213.
- Allen, D. 2000. "Envisaging the Body of the Condemned: The Power of Platonic Symbols." *CP* 95: 133-50.
- Ambler, W. H. 1996. "On the *Oeconomicus*." In R. C. Bartlett, ed. *Xenophon: The Shorter Socratic Writings*, 102-31. Ithaca N.Y. and London.
- Anastasiadis, V. I. 2004. "Idealized ΣΧΟΛΗ and Disdain for Work: Aspects of Philosophy and Politics in Ancient Democracy." *CQ* 54:58-79.
- Arieti, J. 1993. "Plato's Philosophical *Antiope*: The *Gorgias*." In G. Press, ed. *Plato's Dialogues: New Studies and Interpretations*, 197-214. Lanham.
- Arnott, W. G. 1964. "The Confrontation of Sostratos and Gorgias." *Phoenix* 18: 110-23.
- Athanassakis, A. 1977. *The Orphic Hymns*. Missoula.
- Austin, E. 2013. "Corpses, Self-Defense, and Immortality: Callicles' Fear of Death in the *Gorgias*." *Anc. Phil.* 33: 33-52.
- Austin, M. M. and Vidal-Naquet, P. 1977 [1973]. *Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece: An Introduction*. Berkeley and Los Angeles.
- Balme, M. 1984. "Attitudes to Work and Leisure in Ancient Greece." *G&R* 31: 140-152.

- Baragwanath, E. 2012. "The Wonder of Freedom: Xenophon on Slavery." In F. Hobden and C. Tuplin, eds. *Xenophon: Ethical Principles and Historical Enquiry*, 631-663. Leiden and Boston.
- Bell, J. 2015. "Taming Horses and Desires: Plato's Politics of Care." In J. Bell and M. Naas, eds. *Plato's Animals*, 115-30. Bloomington and Indianapolis.
- Benardete, S. 1991. *The Rhetoric of Morality and Philosophy: Plato's Gorgias and Phaedrus*. Chicago.
- Berman, D. W. 2007. "Dirce at Thebes." *G&R* 54: 18-39.
- Binder, G. 1964. *Die Aussetzung des Königskindes Kyros und Romulus*. Meisenheim am Glan.
- Black, M. 1981 [1955]. "Metaphor." In M. Johnson, ed. *Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor*, 63-82. Minneapolis.
- Blok, J. 2017. *Citizenship in Classical Athens*. Cambridge.
- Borthwick, E. K. 1967. "Two Textual Problems in Euripides' *Antiope*, Fr. 188." *CQ* 17:41-7.
- Boys-Stones, G. R. 2010. "Hesiod and Plato's History of Philosophy." In G. R. Boys-Stones, and J. H. Haubold, eds. *Plato and Hesiod*, 31-51. Oxford.
- , 2003. "Introduction." In G. R. Boys-Stones, ed. *Metaphor, Allegory, and the Classical Tradition: Ancient Thought and Modern Revisions*, 1-5. Oxford.
- Boys-Stones, G. R and Haubold, J. H., eds. 2010. *Plato and Hesiod*. Oxford.

- Brock, R. 2004. "Xenophon's Political Imagery." In C. Tuplin, ed. *Xenophon and his World: Papers from a Conference Held in Liverpool in July 1999*, 247-57. Stuttgart.
- Burford, A. 1993. *Land and Labor in the Greek World*. Baltimore.
- Burkert, W. 1985 [1977]. *Greek Religion: Archaic and Classical*. Trans. J. Raffan. Malden, Oxford, and Victoria.
- Burnet, J., ed. 1924. *Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates, and Crito*. Oxford.
- Buzzetti, E. 2014. *Xenophon the Socratic Prince*. New York.
- , 2005. "The Injustice of Calicles and the Limits of Socrates' Ability to Educate a Young Politician." *Anc.Phil.* 25: 25-48.
- Carter, L. B. 1986. *The Quiet Athenian*. Oxford.
- Cartledge, P. 1993. "Xenophon's Women: A Touch of the Other." *LCM*: 5-14.
- Clay, D. 1992. "Plato's First Words." *YCS* 29: 113-29.
- Clay, J. S. 2015. "Commencing Cosmogony and the Rhetoric of Poetic Authority." In P. Derron, ed. *Cosmologies et cosmogonies dans la littérature antique*, 105-37. Genève.
- , 2011. *Homer's Trojan Theater: Space, Vision, and Memory in the Iliad*. Cambridge.
- , 2003. *Hesiod's Cosmos*. Cambridge.

———, 1989. *The Politics of Olympus*. Princeton.

———, 1983. *The Wrath of Athena*. Lanham.

Cohen, D. 1989. "Seclusion, Separation, and the Status of Women in Classical Athens." *G&R* 36: 3-15.

Cole, T. 1967. *Democritus and the Sources of Greek Anthropology*. Chapel Hill.

Collard, C. 2003 [1974]. "Formal Debates in Euripides' Drama." In J. Mossman, ed. *Oxford Readings in Classical Studies: Euripides*, 64-80. Oxford.

———, ed. 1995. *Euripides: Selected Fragmentary Plays*, vol. 2. Warminster.

———, ed. 1975. *Euripides: Supplices*, vols. 1 and 2. Groningen.

Collard, C. and Cropp, M., eds. 2008. *Euripides, Fragments*. Loeb Classical Library, Euripides, vols. 7 and 8. Cambridge, MA.

Conacher, D. J. 2003 [1978]. "Rhetoric and Relevance in Euripidean Drama." In J. Mossman, ed., *Oxford Readings in Classical Studies: Euripides*, 81-101. Oxford.

Connors, C. 1997. "Field and Forum: Culture and Agriculture in Roman Rhetoric." In W. J. Dominik, ed. *Roman Eloquence: Rhetoric in Society and Literature*, 71-89. London and New York.

Connors, W. R. 1971. *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens*. Princeton.

Coxon, A. H. 1986. *The Fragments of Parmenides*. Assen.

- Croally, N. T. 1994. *Euripidean Polemic: The Trojan Women and the Function of Tragedy*. Cambridge.
- Cropp, M. and Fick, G. 1985. "Resolutions and Chronology in Euripides: The Fragmentary Tragedies." *BICS Supp.* 43.
- Csapo, E. 1999-2000. "Later Euripidean Music." *ICS* 24-25: 399-426.
- Curd, P. 2007. *Anaxagoras of Clazomenae*. Toronto.
- Danzig, G. 2010. *Apologizing for Socrates: How Plato and Xenophon Created Our Socrates*. Lanham.
- Davies, J. K. 1971. *Athenian Propertied Families, 600-300 B.C.* Oxford.
- de Polignac, F. 2010. "A Religious Landscape between Ritual and Performance: Eleutherae in Euripides' *Antiope*." *RHR* 227: 481-95.
- de Romilly, J. 1975. *Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece*. Cambridge, MA.
- Denniston, J. D. 1950. *The Greek Particles*. London.
- Detienne, M. 1996 [1967]. *The Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece*. Trans. J. Lloyd. New York
- , 1981 [1974]. "The Myth of 'Honeyed Orpheus.'" In R. L. Gordon, ed. *Myth, Religion, and Society: Structuralist Essays by M. Detienne, L. Gernet, J.-P. Vernant, and P. Vidal-Naquet*, 95-109. Cambridge.
- Detienne, M. and Vernant, J.-P. 1991 [1974]. *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society*. Trans. J. Lloyd. Chicago and London.

Dillery, J. D. 2017. "Xenophon: The Small Works." In M. A. Flower, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Xenophon*, 195-219. Cambridge.

———, 2016. "Response and Further Thoughts." *Histos* Supp. 5: 243-77.

———, 2008. "The θεατής: More Texts, Further Thoughts." *CJ* 103: 243-251.

———, 2005 "Chresmologues and *Manteis*." In S. I. Johnston, P. T. Struck, eds. *Mantike: Studies in Ancient Divination*, 167-231. Leiden and Boston.

———, 2004. "The θεατής θεῶν: Josephus CAp 1.232 (FrGrHist 609 F 10) Reconsidered." *CJ* 99:239-252.

———, 1995. *Xenophon and the History of His Times*. London and New York.

Dillon, J. 2004. "Euripides and the Philosophy of His Time." *Classics Ireland*, 11: 47-73.

Dodds, E. R., ed. 1959. *Plato: Gorgias*. Oxford.

———, ed. 1944. *Euripides: Bacchae*. Oxford.

Donlan, W. 1973. "The Origin of καλὸς κάγαθός." *AJP* 94: 365-74.

Dorion, L.-A. 2017. "Xenophon and Greek Philosophy." In M. A. Flower, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Xenophon*, 37-56. Cambridge.

———, 2008. *Socrate Oikonomikos*. In M. Narcy and A. Tordesillas, eds. *Xénophon et Socrate*, 253-81. Paris.

Dorion, L.-A. and Bandini, M. 2000. *Xénophon: Mémoires. Introduction Générale, Livre I*. Paris.

———, 2011. *Xénophon: Mémoires. Tome II: 1^{re} partie, Livres II-III*. Paris.

———, 2011. *Xénophon: Mémoires. Tome II: 2^e partie, Livre IV*. Paris.

Dougherty, C. 2001. *The Raft of Odysseus: The Ethnographic Imagination of Homer's Odyssey*. Oxford.

Dover, K. J. 1974. *Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle*. Berkeley and Los Angeles.

———, ed. 1968. *Aristophanes: Clouds*. Oxford.

Duchemin, J. 1968. *L'ΑΓΩΝ dans la tragédie Grecque*. Paris.

Dunn, F. 1996. *Tragedy's End: Closure and Innovation in Euripidean Drama*. Oxford.

Eagleton, T. 2008. *Literary Theory: An Introduction*. Minneapolis.

Ehrenberg, V. 1947. "Polypragmosyne: A Study in Greek Politics." *JHS* 67: 46-67.

———, 1943. *The People of Aristophanes*. Oxford.

Eide, T. 1996. "On Socrates' ἀτομία." *SymbOslo* 61: 59-67.

Ellis, A. 2016. "A Socratic History: Theology in Xenophon's Rewriting of Herodotus' Croesus Logos." *JHS* 136: 73-91.

Fantham, E. 1972. *Comparative Studies in Republican Latin Imagery*. Toronto.

- Farenga, V. 2014. "Open and Speak Your Mind: Citizen Agency, the Likelihood of Truth, and Democratic Knowledge in Archaic and Classical Greece." In V. Wohl, ed. *Probabilities, Hypotheticals, and Counterfactuals in Ancient Greek Thought*, 84-100. Cambridge.
- Ferrario, S. B. 2017. "Xenophon and Greek Political Thought." In M. A. Flower, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Xenophon*, 57-83. Cambridge.
- Flower, M. A. 2017. "Introduction." In M. A. Flower, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Xenophon*, 1-12. Cambridge.
- Fowler, D. 2000. *Roman Constructions: Reading in Postmodern Latin*. Oxford.
- Franke, W. 2000. "Metaphor and the Making of Sense: The Contemporary Metaphor Renaissance." *Ph&Rh* 33: 137-153.
- Freeland, C. 2010. "Imagery in the *Phaedrus*: Seeing, Growing, Nourishing." *SymbOslo* 84: 62-72.
- Fussi, A. 2000. "Why is the *Gorgias* So Bitter?" *Ph&Rh* 33: 39-58.
- Gagarin, M. 2014. "*Eikos* arguments in Athenian Forensic Oratory." In V. Wohl, ed. *Probabilities, Hypotheticals, and Counterfactuals in Ancient Greek Thought*, 15-29. Cambridge.
- Gantz, T. 1993. *Early Greek Myth: A Guide to Literary and Artistic Sources*. Baltimore and London.
- Gautier, L. 1911. "La langue de Xénophon." Diss. Université de Genève.

- Gilbert, J. 2009. "Euripides' *Antiope* and the Quiet Life." In J. R. C. Cousland and J. R. Hume, eds. *The Play of Texts and Fragments: Essays in Honour of Martin Cropp*, 23-34. Leiden and Boston.
- Gini, A. 1993. "The Manly Intellect of His Wife: Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* Ch. 7." *CW* 86: 483-6.
- Glazebrook, A. 2009. "Cosmetics and Sōphrosune: Ischomachos' Wife in Xenophon's *Oikonomikos*." *CW* 102: 233-48.
- Goebel, G. 1989. "Probability in the Earliest Rhetorical Theory." *Mnemosyne*, 42:41-53.
- Goldhill, S. 2000. "Placing Theatre in the History of Vision." In N. K. Rutter and B. A. Sparkes, eds. *Word and Image in Ancient Greece*, 161-79. Edinburgh.
- , 1999. "Programme Notes." In S. Goldhill and R. Osborne, eds. *Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy*, 1-29. Cambridge.
- Gomme, A. W. and Sandbach F. H. 1973. *Menander: A Commentary*. Oxford.
- Gordon, J. 1999. *Turning Toward Philosophy: Literary Device and Dramatic Structure in Plato's Dialogues*. University Park.
- Gray, V. J. 2011. *Xenophon's Mirror of Princes*. Oxford.
- , 2007. *Xenophon on Government*. Cambridge.
- Gregory, J., ed. 1999. *Euripides: Hecuba, Introduction, Text, and Commentary*. Atlanta.

- Griswold, C. 1996. *Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus*. University Park.
- Guthrie, W. K. C. 1962-1975. *A History of Greek Philosophy*, volumes 1-5. Cambridge.
- , 1971. *The Sophists*. Cambridge.
- Hadot, P. 1995 [1987]. *Philosophy as a Way of Life*. Trans. M. Chase. Malden, Oxford, and Victoria.
- Hall, E. 1989. *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy*. Oxford.
- Hanson, V. D. 1996. "Hoplites into Democrats: The Changing Ideology of Athenian Infantry." In J. Ober and C. Hedrick, eds. *Demokratia: A Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and Modern*, 289-312. Princeton.
- Harbach, A. 2010. *Die Wahl des Lebens in der antiken Literatur*. Heidelberg.
- Hardie, A. 2013. "Empedocles and the Muse of the *Agathos Logos*." *AJP* 134: 209-246.
- Harman, R. 2012. "A Spectacle of Greekness: Panhellenism and the Visual in Xenophon's *Agesilaus*." In F. Hobden and C. Tuplin, eds. *Xenophon: Ethical Principles and Historical Enquiry*, 427-453. Leiden and Boston.
- , 2008. "Viewing, Power, and Interpretation in Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*." In J. Pigón, ed. *The Children of Herodotus: Greek and Roman Historiography and Related Genres*, 69-91. Newcastle.
- Harmon, R. 2003. "From Themistocles to Philomathes: *Amousos* and *amousia* in Antiquity and the Early Modern Period." *IJCT* 9: 351-90.
- Harrison, A. R. W. 1971. *The Law of Athens*, vol. 2. Oxford.

- Haubold, J. H. 2010. "Shepherd, Farmer, Poet, Sophist: Hesiod on His Own Reception." In G. R. Boys-Stones and J. H. Haubold, eds., *Plato and Hesiod*, 11-30. Oxford.
- Herman, G. 2006. *Morality and Behavior in Democratic Athens*. Cambridge.
- Heubeck, A. and Hoekstra, A. 1989. *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey, Vol. 2: Books IX-XVI*. Oxford.
- Hobden, F. 2017. "Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*." In M. A. Flower, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Xenophon*, 152-73. Cambridge.
- Hobden, F. and Tuplin, C. 2012. "Introduction." In F. Hobden and C. Tuplin, eds. *Xenophon: Ethical Principles and Historical Enquiry*, 1-41. Leiden and Boston.
- Hoerber, R. G. 1957. "Thrasyllus' Platonic Canon and the Double Titles." *Phronesis* 2: 10-20.
- Hoffman, D. 2008. "Concerning *Eikos*: Social Expectation and Verisimilitude in Early Attic Rhetoric." *Rhetorica* 26: 1-29.
- Hudson-Williams, T. 1934. "King Bees and Queen Bees." *CR* 49: 2-4.
- Hunter, R. L., ed. 1982. *Eubulus: The Fragments*. Cambridge.
- Hussey, E. 1990. "The Beginnings of Epistemology: from Homer to Philolaus." In S. Everson, ed. *Epistemology*, 11-38. Cambridge.

- Huys, M. 1995. *The Tale of the Hero Who Was Exposed at Birth in Euripidean Tragedy: A Study of Motifs*. Louvain.
- Hyland, D. A. 1995. *Finitude and Transcendence in the Platonic Dialogues*. Albany.
- Innes, D. 2003. "Metaphor, Simile, and Allegory as Ornaments of Style." In G. R. Boys-Stones, ed. *Metaphor, Allegory, and the Classical Tradition: Ancient Thought and Modern Revisions*, 7-27. Oxford.
- Inwood, B. 2001. *The Poem of Empedocles*. Toronto.
- Irwin, T. H. 1979. *Plato's Gorgias: Translated with Notes*. Oxford.
- Jácome, P. M. 2013. "Bacchus and Felines in Roman Iconography: Issues of Gender and Species." In A. Bernabé, M. H. de Jáuregui, A. I. Jiménez San Cristóbal, eds. *Redefining Dionysos*, 526-540. Berlin and Boston.
- Johnson, M. 1981. "Introduction." In M. Johnson, ed. *Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor*, 3-47. Minneapolis.
- Johnstone, S. 1994. "Virtuous Toil, Vicious Work: Xenophon on Aristocratic Style." *CP* 89: 219-240.
- Kagan, D. 2003. *The Peloponnesian War*. New York.
- Kahn, C. 1996. *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form*. Cambridge.
- Kambitsis, J., ed. 1972. *L'Antiope d'Euripide*. Athens.

- Kannicht, R., ed. 2004. *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, vol. 5 (Euripides). Göttingen.
- Kennedy, D. 2002. *Rethinking Reality: Lucretius and the Textualization of Nature*. Ann Arbor.
- Kennedy, G., ed. 2007. *Aristotle: On Rhetoric*. Translated with introduction, notes, and appendices. New York.
- , 1980. *Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times*. Chapel Hill.
- , 1963. *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*. Princeton.
- Kerferd, G. B. 1981. *The Sophistic Movement*. New York.
- Kingsley, P. 1995. "Notes on Air: Four Questions of Meaning in Empedocles and Anaxagoras." *CQ* 45: 26-9.
- Kirby, J. 1997. "Aristotle on Metaphor." *AJP* 118: 517-54.
- Kirk, G.S., Raven, J. E., and Schofield M., 1983. *The Presocratic Philosophers*. Cambridge.
- Klosko, G. 1984. "The Refutation of Callicles in Plato's *Gorgias*." *G&R* 31: 126-39.
- Knox, B. 1964. *The Heroic Temper: Studies in Sophoclean Tragedy*. Berkeley.
- Konstantakos, I. M. 2005. "Aspects of the Figure of the ΑΓΡΟΙΚΟΣ in Ancient Comedy." *RhM* 148: 1-26.

Kovacs, D., ed. 2002. *Helen, Phoenician Women, Orestes*. Loeb Classical Library, Euripides, vol. 5. Cambridge, MA.

———, 1987. *The Heroic Muse: Studies in the Hippolytus and Hecuba of Euripides*. Baltimore.

———, 1982. *Tyrants and Demagogues in Tragic Interpolation*. *GRBS* 23: 31-50.

———, 1980. *The Andromache of Euripides: An Interpretation*. Chico.

Kraus, M. 2007. "Early Greek Probability Arguments and Common Ground in Dissensus," OSSA Conference Archive, Paper 92, <http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA7/papersandcommentaries/92>.

Kronenberg, L. 2009. *Allegories of Farming from Greece and Rome: Philosophical Satire in Xenophon, Varro, and Virgil*. Cambridge.

Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M. 2003. *Metaphors We Live By*. Chicago and London.

———, 1999. *Philosophy in the Flesh*. New York.

LaPenna, A. 1995. "Towards a History of the Poetic Catalogue of Philosophical Themes." In S. J. Harrison, ed. *Homage to Horace: A Bimillenary Celebration*, 314-328. Oxford.

Lateiner, D. 1982. "'The Man Who Does Not Meddle in Politics': A Topos in Lysias." *CW* 76: 1-12.

- Lausberg, H. 1998 [1973]. *Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary Study*. Trans. M. Bliss; D. E. Orton and R. D. Anderson, eds. Leiden, Boston, and Köln.
- Lebeck, A. 1972. "The Central Myth of Plato's *Phaedrus*." *GRBS* 13: 267-290.
- Lehoux, D. 2012. *What Did the Romans Know? An Inquiry into Science and Worldmaking*. Chicago and London.
- Lefèvre, E. 2010 [1971]. "The Question of the ΒΙΟΣ ΕΥΔΑΙΜΩΝ: The Encounter between Cyrus and Croesus in Xenophon." In V. J. Gray, ed. *Oxford Readings in Classical Studies: Xenophon*, 401-17.
- Lefkowitz, H. 2016. *Euripides and the Gods*. New York.
- Levin, F. 1961. "The Hendecachord of Ion of Chios." *TAPA* 92: 295-307.
- Lloyd, M. 1992. *The Agon in Euripides*. Oxford.
- López A. R. and García F. M. 1995. *Index Socraticorum Xenophontis Operum*. Hildesheim, Zürich, and New York.
- Lu, H. 2015. *Xenophon's Theory of Moral Education*. Newcastle upon Tyne.
- Ludwig, P. W. 2002. *Eros and Polis: Desire and Community in Greek Political Theory*. Cambridge.
- Makowski, F. 1994. "Où est Socrate? L'aporie de l'atopie chez Platon." *RPhA* 12: 131-52.
- Manville, P. B. 1990. *The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens*. Princeton.

- Martin, J. and Harré, R. 1982. "Metaphor in Science." In D. Miall, ed. *Metaphor: Problems and Perspectives*, 89-105. Brighton.
- Mastrorade, D. 2010. *The Art of Euripides: Dramatic Technique and Social Context*. Cambridge.
- , ed. 2002. *Euripides: Medea*. Cambridge.
- Matheson, S. 1994. "The Mission of Triptolemus and the Politics of Athens." *GRBS* 35: 368-72.
- Matthiessen, K. 1969. "Zur Theonoeszene der euripideischen *Helena*." *Hermes* 96: 685-704.
- McCoy, J. 2013. *Early Greek Philosophy*. Washington D.C.
- McHardy, F. 2008. *Revenge in Athenian Culture*. London.
- McKim, R. 1988. "Shame and Truth in Plato's *Gorgias*." In C. L. Griswold ed., *Platonic Writings, Platonic Readings*, 34-48. University Park.
- Michellini, A. 2005. *Euripides and the Tragic Tradition*. Madison.
- , 1994. "Political Themes in Euripides' *Suppliants*," *AJP* 115: 219-252.
- , 1978. "Ὑβρις and Plants." *HSCP* 82: 35-44.
- Mikalson, J. 1991. *Honor Thy Gods: Popular Religion in Greek Tragedy*. Chapel Hill.
- Miller, P. A. 2015. "Placing the Self in the Field of Truth: Irony and Self-fashioning in Ancient and Postmodern Rhetorical Theory." *Arethusa* 48: 313-337.

- Montiglio, S. 2005. *Wandering in Ancient Greek Culture*. Chicago.
- Moore, F. C. T. 1982. "On Taking Metaphor Literally." In D. Miall, ed. *Metaphor: Problems and Perspectives*, 1-13. Brighton.
- Moreno, A. 2007. *Feeding the Democracy: The Athenian Grain Supply in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries BC*. Oxford.
- Morgan, K. 2000. *Myth and Philosophy from the Presocratics to Plato*. Cambridge.
- Mossman, J. 1995. *Wild Justice: A Study of Euripides' Hecuba*. Oxford.
- Most, G. W. 1999. "The Poetics of Early Greek Philosophy." In A. A. Long, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy*, 332-62. Cambridge.
- Mourelatos A. P. D. 2013. "Parmenides, Early Greek Astronomy, and Modern Scientific Realism." In J. McCoy, ed. *Early Greek Philosophy: The Presocratics and the Emergence of Reason*, 91-112. Washington, D.C.
- , 1970. *The Route of Parmenides*. New Haven.
- Murnaghan, S. 2006. "Farming, Authority and Truth-telling in the Greek Tradition." In R. M. Rosen and I. Sluiter, eds. *City, Countryside and the Spatial Organization of Value in Classical Antiquity*, 93-118. Leiden and Boston.
- , 1988. "How a Woman Can Be More Like a Man: The Dialogue between Ischomachus and his Wife in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*." *Helios* 15: 9-22.
- Myers K. S. 2017 (forthcoming). "Representations of Gardens in Roman Literature." In W. F. Jashemski, K. L. Gleason, K. J. Hartswick, A. Malek, eds. *Gardens of the Roman Empire*, vol. 1, chapter 10. Cambridge.

- Nails, D. 2002. *The People of Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socratics*. Indianapolis.
- Natali, C. 1987. "Ἀδολεσχία, Λεπτολογία and the Philosophers in Athens." *Phronesis* 32: 232-41.
- Natanblat, E. 2009. "Amphion in Euripides' *Antiope*." *RhM* 152: 133-40.
- Nee, L. 2009. "The City on Trial: Socrates' Indictment of the Gentleman in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*." *Polis* 26: 246-270.
- Nightingale, A. W. 2004. *Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in its Cultural Context*. Cambridge.
- , 2002. "Toward an Ecological Eschatology: Plato and Bakhtin on Other Worlds and Times." In R. B. Branham, ed. *Bakhtin and the Classics*, 220-49. Evanston.
- , 1995. *Genres in Dialogue: Plato and the Construct of Philosophy*. Cambridge.
- North, H. 1977. "The Mare, the Vixen, and the Bee: *Sophrosyne* as the Virtue of Women in Antiquity." *ICS* 2: 35-48.
- , 1966. *Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature*. Ithaca N.Y.
- Ober, J. 1989. *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the Power of the People*. Princeton.
- O'Brien, M. J. 1988 "Tantalus in Euripides' *Orestes*." *RhM* 131: 30-45.

- Ortony, A. ed., 1979. "Metaphor: A Multidimensional Problem." In A. Ortony, ed. *Metaphor and Thought*, 1-16. Cambridge.
- Osborne, R. 1987. *Classical Landscape with Figures: The Ancient Greek City and its Countryside*. London.
- Otero, S. M. 2013. "The Image of Dionysos in Euripides' *Bacchae*: The God and his Epiphanies." In A. Bernabé, M. H. de Jáuregui, A. I. Jiménez San Cristóbal, eds. *Redefining Dionysos*, 329-48. Berlin and Boston.
- Palmer, J. A. 2009. *Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy*. Oxford.
- Pangle, L. S. 2014. *Virtue is Knowledge: The Moral Foundations of Socratic Political Philosophy*. Chicago.
- Pangle, T. L. 1994. "Socrates in the Context of Xenophon's Political Writings," in P. Vander Waerdt, ed. *The Socratic Movement*, 127-50. Ithaca N.Y.
- Patzer, A. 2010. "Xenophon's Socrates as Dialectician." In V. J. Gray, ed. *Oxford Readings in Classical Studies: Xenophon*, 228-56. Oxford.
- Paxton, J. 1994. *The Poetics of Personification*. Cambridge.
- Pelling, C. 1997. "Conclusion." In C. Pelling, ed. *Greek Tragedy and the Historian*, 213-35. Oxford.
- Pender, E. E. 2003. "Plato on Metaphors and Models." In G. R. Boys-Stones, ed. *Metaphor, Allegory, and the Classical Tradition: Ancient Thought and Modern Revisions*, 54-81. Oxford.
- , 2000. *Images of Persons Unseen: Plato's Metaphors for the Gods and the Soul*. Sankt Augustin.

- Pettazzoni, R. 1956 [1955]. *The All-Knowing God: Researches into Early Religion and Culture*. Trans. H. J. Rose. London.
- Pickard-Cambridge, A. 1968. *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens*. Oxford.
- Podlecki, A. J. 1996. "Had the *Antiope* of Euripides Political Overtones?" *AncW* 27: 131-146.
- Pomeroy, S. 1994. *Xenophon, Oeconomicus: A Social and Historical Commentary*. Oxford.
- , 1984. "The Persian King and the Queen Bee." *AJAH* 9: 98-104.
- Pontier, P. 2006. *Trouble et ordre chez Platon et Xénophon*. Paris.
- Popper, K. R. 1998. *The World of Parmenides: Essays on the Presocratic Enlightenment*. London and New York.
- Porter, J. 2016. *The Sublime in Antiquity*. Cambridge
- Powell, J. G. F., ed. 1988. *Cicero: Cato Maior de Senectute*. Cambridge.
- Pritchard, D., ed. 2010. "The Symbiosis between Democracy and War: The Case of Ancient Athens." In D. Pritchard, ed. *War, Democracy, and Culture in Classical Athens*, 1-62. Cambridge.
- Puhvel, J. 1976. "The Origins of Greek *Kosmos* and Latin *Mundus*." *AJP* 97: 154-67.

- Purves, A. 2014. "In the Bedroom: Interior Spaces in Herodotus' *Histories*." In K. Gilhuly and N. Worman, eds. *Space, Place, and Landscape in Ancient Greek Literature and Culture*, 94-129. Cambridge.
- , 2010. *Space and Time in Ancient Greek Narrative*. Cambridge.
- Raaflaub, K. 1983. "Democracy, Oligarchy, and the Concept of the "Free Citizen" in Late Fifth Century Athens." *Political Theory* 11: 517-44.
- Rademaker, A. 2005. *Sophrosyne and the Rhetoric of Self-Restraint: Polysemy & Persuasive Use of an Ancient Greek Value Term*. Leiden.
- Rehm, R. 2002. *The Play of Space: Spatial Transformation in Greek Tragedy*. Princeton.
- Reinhardt, K. 1974. "The Relation between the Two Parts of Parmenides' Poem." In A. P. D. Mourelatos, ed. *The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays*, 293-311. New York.
- Richardson, N. J., ed. 1974. *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter*. Oxford.
- Ricoeur, P. 1996. "Between Rhetoric and Poetics." In A. Rorty, ed. *Essays on Aristotle's Rhetoric*, 324-84. Berkeley.
- Ritoók, Z. 2008. "Problems in Euripides' *Antiope*." *AAnthung* 48: 29-40.
- Rood, T. 2017. "Xenophon's Narrative Style." In M. A. Flower, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Xenophon*, 263-78. Cambridge.

———, 2014. "Space and Landscape in Xenophon's *Anabasis*." In K. Gilhuly and N. Worman, eds. *Space, Place, and Landscape in Ancient Greek Literature and Culture*, 63-93. Cambridge.

Roscher, W. H. 1993 [1884-1937]. *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie*. Leipzig.

Rössler, D. 1981. "Handwerker." In E. C. Welskopf, ed. *Untersuchungen ausgewählter altgriechischer sozialer Typenbegriffe (Sociale Typenbegriffe im alten Griechenland und ihr Fortleben in den Sprachen der Welt, vol. 3)*, 193-268. Berlin.

Rouse, W. H. D. 1902. *Greek Votive Offerings: An Essay in the History of Greek Religion*. Cambridge.

Rowe, C. 2012. "The Status of the Myth of the *Gorgias*, or: Taking Plato Seriously." In C. Collobert, P. Destrée, and F. J. Gonzalez, eds. *Plato and Myth: Studies on the Use and Status of Platonic Myths*, 187-98. Leiden and Boston.

Rusten, J. S., ed. 1989. *Thucydides: The Peloponnesian War, Book II*. Cambridge.

Rutherford, I. 2000. "*Theoria* and *Darśan*: Pilgrimage and Vision in Greece and India." *CQ* 50: 133-146.

Rutherford, I. and Naiden, F. 1996. "Amphion's Paeon: A Note on Propertius 3.115.42." *MD* 37: 231-8.

Sansone, D. 2009. "Once Again the Opening of Plato's *Gorgias*." *CQ* 59: 631-3.

———, 1996. "Plato and Euripides." *ICS* 21: 35-67.

- Sayre, K. M. 1969. *Plato's Analytic Method*. Chicago and London.
- Saxonhouse, A. 1983. "An Unspoken Theme in Plato's *Gorgias*: War." *Interpretation* 11: 139-69.
- Scaife, R. 1995. "Ritual and Persuasion in the House of Ischomachus." *CJ* 90: 225-232.
- Schiappa, E. 2003. *Protagoras and Logos: A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric*. Columbia.
- , 1999. *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece*. New Haven.
- Schlosser, J. 2014. *What Would Socrates Do? Self-Examination, Civic Engagement, and the Politics of Philosophy*. Cambridge.
- Schmitz, T. 2000. "Plausibility in the Greek Orators." *AJP* 121: 47-77.
- Scodel, R. 1999-2000. "Verbal Performance and Euripidean Rhetoric." *ICS* 24-25: 129-44.
- , 1984. "Tantalus and Anaxagoras." *HSCP* 88: 13-24.
- , 1980. *The Trojan Trilogy of Euripides*. Göttingen.
- Seager, R. 2001. "Xenophon and Athenian Democratic Ideology." *CQ* 51: 385-97.
- Segal, C. 1969. "Aristophanes' Cloud-Chorus." *Arethusa* 2: 143-61.
- Shaw, B. 1982-83. "'Eaters of Flesh, Drinkers of Milk': the Ancient Mediterranean Ideology of the Pastoral Nomad." *AncSoc* 13/14: 5-31.

- Shelmerdine, S. 1986. "Odyssean Allusions in the Fourth Homeric Hymn." *TAPA* 116: 49-63.
- Sissa, G. 1990 [1987]. *Greek Virginity*. Trans. A. Goldhammer. Cambridge.
- Slings, S. R. 1991. "The Quiet Life in Euripides' *Antiope*." In A. Harder and H. Hofmann, eds. *Fragmenta Dramatica: Beiträge zur Interpretation der griechischen Tragikerfragmente und ihrer Wirkungsgeschichte*, 137-51. Göttingen.
- Snell, B. 1964. *Scenes from Greek Drama*. Berkeley and Los Angeles.
- Sommerville, B. 2014. "The Image of the Jars in Plato's *Gorgias*." *AncPhil* 34: 235-54.
- Soskice, J. 1985. *Metaphor and Religious Language*. Oxford.
- Stafford, E. 2000. *Worshipping Virtues: Personification and the Divine in Ancient Greece*. London.
- Stanford, W. B. 1967. *The Odyssey of Homer*, vols. 1 and 2. New York
- , 1963. *The Ulysses Theme: A Study in the Adaptability of a Traditional Hero*. Dallas.
- , 1936. *Greek Metaphor: Studies in Theory and Practice*. Oxford.
- Stauffer, D. 2006. *The Unity of Plato's Gorgias: Rhetoric, Justice, and the Philosophic Life*. Cambridge.
- Steen, G. 1994. *Understanding Metaphor in Literature: An Empirical Approach*. London & New York.

- Stevens, J. A. 1994. "Friendship and Profit in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*." In P. Vander Waerdt, ed. *The Socratic Movement*, 209-37. Ithaca N.Y.
- Stevens, P. T., ed. 1971. *Andromache*, with an introduction and commentary. Oxford.
- Strauss, B. 1996. "The Athenian Trireme, School of Democracy." In J. Ober and C. Hedrick, eds. *Demokratia: A Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and Modern*, 313-325. Princeton.
- Strauss, L. 1989. *Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism*. Chicago.
- , 1970. *Xenophon's Socratic Discourse: An Interpretation of the Oeconomicus*. Ithaca N.Y. and London.
- Tarnopolsky, C. H. 2010. *Prudes, Perverts, and Tyrants: Plato's Gorgias and the Politics of Shame*. Princeton.
- Too, Y. L. 2001. "The Economies of Pedagogy: Xenophon's Wifely Didactics." *PCPS* 47: 65-80.
- Totelin, L. 2012. "Botanizing Rulers and their Herbal Subjects: Plants and Political Power in Greek and Roman Literature." *Phoenix* 66: 122-44.
- Trépanier, S. 2004. *Empedocles: An Interpretation*. New York.
- Trivigno, F. V. 2011. "Is Good Tragedy Possible? The Argument of Plato's *Gorgias* 502b-503b." *OSP* 41: 115-38.
- , 2009. "Paratragedy in Plato's *Gorgias*." *OSP* 36: 73-105.

- Tuplin, C. 2004. "Xenophon and his World: An Introductory Review." In C. Tuplin, ed. *Xenophon and his World: Papers from a Conference Held in Liverpool in July 1999*, 13-31. Stuttgart.
- Turner, J. S. 1993. "Ἀτοπία in Plato's *Gorgias*." *ISPh* 25: 69-77.
- Vander Waerdt, P. 1994. "Socrates in the Clouds." In P. Vander Waerdt, ed. *The Socratic Movement*, 48-86. Ithaca N.Y.
- , 1993. "Socratic Justice and Self-Sufficiency: The Story of the Delphic Oracle in Xenophon's *Apology of Socrates*." *OSP* 11: 1-48.
- Vasaly, A. 1993. *Representations: Images of the World in Ciceronian Oratory*. Berkeley.
- Vergados, A. 2013. *The Homeric Hymn to Hermes: Introduction, Text, and Commentary*. Berlin and Boston.
- Vernant, J.-P. 2006 [1965] *Myth and Thought among the Greeks*. Trans. J. Lloyd with J. Fort. Brooklyn.
- Vernant, J.-P. and Vidal-Naquet, P. 1988 [1972-86]. *Myth and Tragedy in Ancient Greece*. Trans. J. Lloyd. New York.
- Versnel, H. S. 1992. "The Festival for *Bona Dea* and the Thesmophoria." *G&R* 39: 31-55.
- Vickers, B. 1988. *In Defense of Rhetoric*. Oxford.
- Vico, G. 1968 [1744]. *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*. Trans. T. G. Bergin and M. H. Fisch. Ithaca N.Y.

- Vidal-Naquet, P. 1986 [1981] *The Black Hunter: Forms of Thought and Forms of Society in the Greek World*. Trans. A. Szegedy-Maszak. Baltimore and London.
- Vlastos, G. 1975. *Plato's Universe*. Seattle.
- Walsh, G. 1984. *The Varieties of Enchantment: Early Greek Views of the Nature and Function of Poetry*. Chapel Hill and London.
- Wankel, H. 1961. "Kalos kai Agathos." Dissertation, Würzburg.
- Waterfield, R. 2004. "Xenophon and Socrates: Xenophon's Socratic Mission." In C. Tuplin, ed. *Xenophon and his World: Papers from a Conference Held in Liverpool in July*, 81-113. Stuttgart.
- Weiss, R. 2003. "Oh, Brother! The Fraternity of Rhetoric and Philosophy in Plato's *Gorgias*." *Interpretation*, 30: 195-206.
- Wellman, R. 1976. "Socratic Method in Xenophon." *JHI* 37: 307-18.
- Werner, D. S. 2012. *Myth and Philosophy in Plato's Phaedrus*. Cambridge.
- West, M. L. 1992. *Ancient Greek Music*. Oxford.
- Willink, C. W., ed. 1986. *Euripides' Orestes*. Oxford.
- , 1983. "Prodikos, 'Meteorsophists' and the 'Tantalos' Paradigm." *CQ* 33:25-33.
- Wilson, P. 1999-2000. "Euripides' Tragic Muse." *ICS* 24-25: 427-49.

- Wisse, J., Winterbottom, M., and Fantham E., eds. 2008. *M. Tullius Cicero, de Oratore Libri III: A Commentary on Book III*, 96-230. Heidelberg.
- Wohl, V. 2014. "Introduction: *eikos* in Ancient Greek Thought." In V. Wohl, ed. *Probabilities, Hypotheticals, and Counterfactuals in Ancient Greek Thought*, 1-14. Cambridge.
- Wood, E. M. 1988. *Peasant-Citizen and Slave: The Foundations of Athenian Democracy*. London and New York.
- Wood, M. S. 2017. "Aristotle's Theory of Metaphor Revisited." *Mouseion* 58: 63-90.
- Woodruff, P. 1999. "Rhetoric and Relativism: Protagoras and Gorgias." In A. A. Long, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy*, 290-310. Cambridge.
- Worman, N. 2014. "Mapping Literary Styles in Aristophanes' *Frogs*." In K. Gilhuly and N. Worman, eds. *Space, Place, and Landscape in Ancient Greek Literature and Culture*, 200-239. Cambridge.
- Yunis, H., ed. 2011. *Plato's Phaedrus*. Cambridge.
- , 1996. *Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens*. Ithaca N.Y.
- , 1988. *A New Creed: Fundamental Religious Beliefs in the Athenian Polis and Euripidean Drama*. Göttingen.
- Zeitlin, F. 1993. "Staging Dionysos between Thebes and Athens." In T. H. Carpenter and C. A. Faraone, eds. *Masks of Dionysus*, 147-182. Ithaca N.Y. and London.

Ziolkowski, J. 1999. "The Bow and the Lyre: Harmonizing Duos in Plato's *Symposium*." *CJ* 95:19-35.