Statebuilding and Ethnic Politics in Africa

by

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Abstract

Why are ethnic cleavages politicized in some African countries but not others? This dissertation draws on evidence from three case studies (Ghana, Botswana and Tanzania) to show that the statebuilding strategies employed by nationalist leaders across Africa, during the periods of transition to independence in the 1950s and 1960s, often have long-term consequences for whether or not ethnic cleavages become politicized in their respective countries. Specifically, it argues that two factors ultimately determine whether or not ethnic cleavages become politicized in an African country: (i) whether or not the country in question had powerful institutions of local control (chieftaincy institutions) at the dawn of independence; and (ii) whether or not the nationalist leaders of said country choose to share power with their hereditary chiefs during the period of transition to independence. The dissertation uses process tracing methods to demonstrate that ethnic cleavages become politicized in countries with both powerful chiefs and nationalist leaders who opt to marginalize the hereditary chiefs. Conversely, ethnic cleavages become relatively depoliticized in countries with either weak chieftaincy institutions or nationalist leaders who choose to share power with their chiefs. The evidence from this dissertation suggests important methodological and substantive revisions to the existing literature on the subject of ethnicity and politics in Africa.

For my wife, Megan Haas

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Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 The Puzzle

Since the late 1980s when Sub-Saharan Africa experienced its third-wave of transitions to democracy, scholars have puzzled over the impact of ethnic identities on electoral outcomes on the continent. It is now firmly established, for instance, that ethnicity greatly influences electoral behavior in many African countries including Benin, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia among others.[1] In other words the ethnic identities of voters are highly predictive of vote choice or party preferences in these countries. However, there is also strong evidence showing that ethnic cleavages remain relatively depoliticized in many other African countries including Botswana, Senegal and Tanzania.[2] These cross-national variations in the relative political salience of ethnic cleavages suggest therefore that ethnically plural societies in Africa do not always infuse their ethnic cleavages with political salience.[3] This

[1] Koter 2016; Fridy 2007; Miguel 2004; Mudoola 1996; Posner 2003.
[2] Koter 2016; Miguel 2004.
[3] Cheeseman and Ford 2007.

then raises the important question of why ethnic cleavages are politicized in some contexts in Africa but not others. This dissertation proposes a new historically contingent explanation for why ethnic differences are highly politicized in some African countries but not others; the argument relies on evidence drawn from three case studies - Ghana, Botswana and Tanzania.

1.2 Existing Explanations for Politicized Ethnic Cleavages in Africa

Although the literature on ethnic politics in Africa is vast there is nevertheless a shortage of systematic explanations for the observable variation in the relative political salience of ethnic cleavages across countries on the continent. What follows therefore is an attempt to glean from the ethnic politics literature plausible explanations to this specific question from the various established 'schools of thought' on the general topic of ethnic politics in Africa. The institutionalist explanation for the emergence of ethnic based politics starts from the assumption that politicians, being rational and instrumental actors, generally mobilize around those cleavages in society which enables them to more easily form minimum winning coalitions.[4] This implies then that ethnic cleavages would become politically salient only within contexts where institutional arrangements make this specific cleavage an optimal axis around which to mobilize. Posner (2005) discovered, for instance, that the specific axis of political competition - whether politics is organized around ethnic differences or broad language groups - shifts in response to the changing institutional context

[4]Posner 2005; Chandra 2004.

in Zambia.[5] The institutionalist argument also implies that we can, in principle, alter institutional arrangements to either emphasize or downplay the political salience of ethnic differences. While this argument clearly has merit, it nevertheless runs against substantial empirical evidence suggesting that ethnic mobilization persists in many African countries even when such a mobilization strategy is sub-optimal for reaching minimum winning coalitions. For instance, ethnic cleavages are highly politicized in Ghana even though mobilization along the country's broad language groups should, in principle, provide an easier pathway for assembling minimum winning coalitions.[6] The institutionalist approach, as I would soon show, often falls short because it ignores the fact that the specific historical context of societies shapes which cleavages are available for mobilization. The underlying institutionalist logic of minimum winning coalitions also assumes a 'top-down' perspective to ethnic mobilization that is also not entirely borne out by the actual historical evidence of how these politicized ethnic cleavages emerge. I show in the third chapter, for instance, that the processes leading to the emergence of ethnic based politics in Ghana were motivated by 'bottom-up' dynamics as they were by the choices of national politicians looking on from the 'top-down.'

Another widely accepted explanation for the persistence of ethnic politics in Africa is the claim that ethnic voting is a rational response of individual voters to the paucity of information about candidates and party platforms. It is further argued that this is especially true for African countries because politics on the continent is defined

[5]Posner 2005.

[6]The single largest ethnic group in Ghana, Ashanti, comprise only 16 percent of the total population. The next four largest ethnic groups, the Ewe, Fante, Brong and Dagomba, also comprise 14, 12, 5, and 4 percent of the population respectively. In contrast, the Akan and Mole-Dagbani language groups, make up 46 and 17 percent of the population respectively. Source: 2010 Housing and Population Census - `http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/nada/index.php/catalog/51`

more by valence issues rather than by sharp ideological or programmatic differences in party/candidate platforms. Ethnicity, the argument continues, therefore functions like an 'information shortcut' or a heuristic device for determining whether or not a particular politician would favor one's group/region in the distribution of a country's scarce national resources. For instance, Conroy-Krutz (2012), in an experimental study in Uganda, found a negative correlation between access to information about candidates and preference for one's co-ethnics in hypothetical election match-ups.[7] This informational approach, while useful for parsing individual level motivations for ethnic voting, nevertheless fails to explain the varying degrees of politicization of ethnic cleavages across and within many countries in Africa. For instance, despite living under similar information environments, the Ashanti and Ewe ethnic identities remain extremely politicized in Ghana but the same is not true for Dagomba ethnic identity.[8] Similarly, the Malinke and Peul/Fula ethnic cleavages are much more politicized in Guinea than the Sussu ethnic cleavage.[9]It is unclear how information scarcity explains these intra-country variations in the relative politicization of ethnic cleavages.

The nation-building policies of Africa's founding leaders has also been used to explain the relative politicization of ethnic cleavages across countries on the continent. Miguel (2004) concludes, for instance, that the different approaches to nation building in Kenya and Tanzania explains why ethnic cleavages are highly politicized in the former but not in Tanzania.[10] Ethnic cleavages are depoliticized in Tanzania, the argument goes, because Julius Nyerere pursued such policies as ensuring the eq-

[7]Conroy-Krutz 2013a.
[8]See chapter 3
[9]See chapter 6
[10]Miguel 2004.

uitable regional distribution of state resources in the immediate post-independence period; adopting Kiswahili as a *lingua franca*; and ensuring a high nationalist content in Tanzania's primary school syllabi. Conversely, ethnic identities are highly politicized in Kenya because Jomo Kenyatta failed to pursue similarly nationalist oriented nation-building policies during the immediate post-independence period. This argument, however, fails to explain why ethnic cleavages remain highly politicized in Zanzibar despite experiencing the supposedly salutary effect of Nyerere's nation building policies. If anything the persistence of ethnic based politics in Zanzibar suggests that Nyerere's nation-building policies, while not unhelpful, are ultimately insufficient in explaining the relative absence of politicized ethnic cleavages on mainland Tanzania (formerly Tanganyika).

The existence or absence of cross-cutting cleavages have also been used to explain the relative political salience of ethnic cleavages across African countries. Dunning Harrison (2010) argue, for instance, that ethnicity is a poor predictor of vote choice in Mali because of the existence of the informal institution of 'cousinage' - a cross-cutting cleavage.[11] This argument is however ultimately insufficient because it fails to explain why some cross-cutting cleavages limit the incidence of ethnic politics in some contexts but not others. For instance, religious affiliations are an obvious cross-cutting cleavage in Ghana and yet ethnic cleavages still remain politically salient in the West African country. A careful reading of Martin Lipset (1960), an original progenitor of this idea, suggests however that cross-cutting cleavages work to dampen the salience of a particular cleavage only when the criss-crossing cleavages are both politically salient.[12] This of course still leaves open the question

[11]Dunning and Harrison 2010a.
[12]Lipset 1960.

of why specific cleavages - ethnic cleavages in this instance - become politicized in the first place.

Finally, Dominika Koter (2015) draws on the differences in political mobilization strategies in Senegal and Benin to argue that the relative strength of local leaders, at the dawn of mass politics in Africa, explains why ethnic cleavages become politicized in some countries but not others.[13] She argues that two kinds of mobilization strategies were available to African politicians during the formative period of coalition building in post-colonial Africa: direct mobilization of co-ethnics or mobilization through local intermediaries. African politicians, the argument continues, preferred to mobilize through local intermediaries where these leaders are strong but 'default' to direct mobilization of co-ethnics where local leaders are weak. Mobilization through local intermediaries, she further argues, produces non-politicized ethnic cleavages because these local intermediaries deliver the votes of their constituents to the highest bidder rather than to their co-ethnic politicians. Ethnic cleavages therefore become politicized in African societies with weak local intermediaries and the opposite is true for those countries with strong local leaders. She further notes that once a particular strategy is chosen, politicians continue to use this tried and tested strategy in subsequent elections leading to the perpetuation of the original dynamic. This argument, while innovative in its acknowledgment of the historical antecedents of contemporary ethnic politics in Africa, however fails to explain why the default opposite of mobilization through local intermediaries would be ethnic mobilization. It also fails to explain why the presence of powerful precolonial chieftaincy institutions in countries as varied as Ghana, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Guinea (Futa

[13]Koter 2016.

Djallon) did not produce depoliticized ethnic cleavages in these countries. In fact, I show in this dissertation that the presence of powerful local leaders, all things being equal, increases rather than reduce the possibility of ethnic based politics in post-colonial Africa.

1.3 The Argument and Plan of Dissertation

This dissertation advances the argument that the specific state-building strategies adopted by Africa's nationalist leaders, during the periods of transition to independence in the 1950s and 1960s, often create the conditions that either thrust their respective countries on a path of ethnic based politics or helps these countries avoid the path of ethnic politics altogether. It also makes the claim that once specific ethnic cleavages get politicized, during the periods of transition to independence, they tend to be reproduced through path-dependent mechanisms in the post-colonial period. The periods of transition to independence in Africa therefore represent an important critical juncture wherein the choices of Africa's nationalist leaders tend to have outsized effects in terms of framing the context of post-colonial political mobilization and contestations.

Because European colonial rule in Africa relied extensively on local intermediaries for control of the rural landscape and for resource extraction, Africa's nationalist leaders, at the dawn of independence in the 1950s and 1960s, were almost uniformly confronted with the unique and difficult challenge of deciding what to do with these local partners of the receding colonial regime. This challenge was also particularly difficult because these local intermediaries often had institutional

sources of legitimacy (and power) that predate the colonial state. The process was also fraught with significant uncertainties because local attachments to the emergent post-colonial states were tenuous. The new class of nationalist leaders could either choose to share power with these local elites in the emergent post-colonial state (inclusionary strategy) or marginalize these local elites (exclusionary strategy). Given the uncertainties surrounding politics during the late colonial period, the decision as to whether to adopt an inclusionary or exclusionary state-building strategy was, more often than not, determined by the ideological commitments and personal idiosyncrasies of the ascendant nationalist leaders rather than endogenously. I argue further that the choice of state-building strategies often have consequences for ethnic politics in countries with highly centralized pre-colonial institutions of local control. In such a context, a strategy to marginalize local elites often provoked a backlash in the form of sub-national anti-nationalist mobilization. I show that the genesis of ethnic mobilization in many African countries can often be directly traced to the internecine struggles for power between exclusionist nationalist leaders and powerful local elites during the periods of transition to independence in the 1950s and 1960s. Finally, these anti-nationalist mobilizations were invariably ethnic in character because the boundaries of local jurisdictions within the colonial state were purposely designed to coincide with pre-existing ethnic boundaries.

The remainder of the dissertation will proceed as follows: the second chapter will present an expanded rendering of the argument of this dissertation. I would then draw on three primary case studies - Ghana, Botswana and Tanzania - in order to demonstrate how the different state-building strategies of their respective nationalist leaders influenced the emergence or absence of politicized ethnic cleavages.

The Ghanaian case (chapter 3) illustrates what happens when Africa's nationalist leaders choose an exclusionary state-building strategy in a society with highly centralized pre-colonial chieftaincy institutions. I show, through careful process tracing, that Kwame Nkrumah's decision to marginalize the Ghanaian chiefs during the late colonial period precipitated chief led anti-nationalist movements that are directly responsible for the emergence of ethnic-based politics in the West African country. I also demonstrate that the ethnic groups that were mobilized to oppose Kwame Nkrumah's Convention Peoples Party (CPP) in the 1950s have also continued to participate in Ghanaian politics, throughout the post-colonial period, as the supporters of political parties tracing their lineage to the anti-nationalist movements of the 1950s.

The Botswana case (Chapter 4) illustrates the alternative path available to Ghana at the dawn of independence in the 1950s. Botswana, like Ghana, had highly centralized tribal chieftaincy institutions. But rather the marginalize the tribal chiefs, Seretse Khama and the leaders of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) instead chose an inclusionary state-building strategy during the independence constitutional negotiations in the 1960s . Consequently, Khama and the BDP managed a peaceful co-optation of the tribal chiefs during the critical phase of the transition to independence and avoided the specter of chief-led tribal mobilization against the BDP. I also leveraged the effect of a change in state-building strategy in Botswana after independence to show that an exclusionary strategy prior to independence would almost certainly have led to the politicization of ethnic/tribal cleavages in Botswana.

The final case study, Tanzania (Chapter 5), leverages the 'natural experiment' provided by the differing trajectories of ethnic politics in Tanganyika and Zanzibar

in order to further demonstrate the reach of the argument of this dissertation. Before joining together to form the union of Tanzania, Tanganyika and Zanzibar were distinct entities although both were British colonies. Both the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) in Zanzibar campaigned on a republican platform of abolishing the institutions of chieftaincy in their respective territories. Tanganyika however differed from Zanzibar in an important respect; the former had weak and highly decentralized chieftaincy institutions whereas Zanzibar had a famously powerful and highly centralized Sultanate. In the event, Nyerere and TANU managed to quickly overwhelm the Tanganyikan chiefs and thus paving the way for a stupendous consolidation of power in the immediate post-colonial period. The strategy of exclusion did however produce intense pushback from the powerful Zanzibari Sultanate which threw its weight behind the pro-monarchy Zanzibar National Party (ZNP). I show that the struggle for power between the republican ASP and the pro-monarchy ZNP politicized ethnic and racial cleavages in ways that continue to define politics in Zanzibar. The Zanzibari example is especially instructive because the politicized cleavages that emerged during the period of transition to independence have persisted despite more than half a century of union with mainland Tanganyika, where ethnic cleavages remain depoliticized.

Chapter 2

Statebuilding Strategies and Ethnic Politics in Africa

2.1 The Argument

Because the typical colonial state in Africa relied extensively on local intermediaries for control of their vast territories and for resource extraction, the nationalist leaders of Africa's independence movements often faced the difficult challenge of deciding how best to incorporate these local elites (chiefs), who had independent sources of legitimacy and authority, into the post-colonial state.[1] The nationalist leaders had two broad sets of strategies at their disposal for dealing with this peculiar challenge: they could either (a) co-opt the chiefs through a power-sharing arrangement or (b) marginalize the chiefs by excluding them from the post-colonial power structure. I term the power-sharing approach 'inclusionary' and the strat-

[1]The local intermediaries in question were almost always hereditary chiefs although there were a few instances, like in Senegal's groundnut Basin, where religious leaders were predominant.

egy of marginalization 'exclusionary.' The inclusionary strategy, viewed from the perspective of the nationalist state-builder, had the advantage of ensuring a smooth and relatively painless transition to independence. It however has the distinct drawback of potentially creating a post-colonial state with a weakened center. On the other hand, a strategy of exclusion held the advantage of potentially leading to a post-colonial arrangement where competing centers of authority are eliminated; the drawback to this approach is that it could complicate the transition process in the event that local elites fought back against their marginalization.

As it turned out, the strategies that different nationalist leaders adopted deferred from country to country although there appeared to be a general preference for the exclusionary strategy. Also, contrary to the suggestion of some scholars, the strategies that the different nationalist leaders adopted do not appear to follow any logic consistent with the demands of the 'political topographies' of their respective societies.[2] It appears, based on the empirical evidence, that the choice of strategy was heavily influenced by the prior ideological commitments of the individual nationalist leaders. Leftist and more 'radical' leaders like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana tended to favor the exclusionary strategy while the more conservative nationalists, like Seretse Khama of Botsawna, were more open to the strategies of inclusion.

In any case, the argument of this dissertation is that irrespective of how individual leaders arrive at their choice of strategies, those strategies nevertheless have consequences for whether or not ethnic cleavages would become politicized in their respective countries. This argument is based on the premise, a valid one to be sure, that politicized ethnic cleavages across African countries date back to the periods of

[2]Boone 2003.

transition to independence in the 1950s and 1960s. I argue that a strategy of co-optation, irrespective of the specific features of the societies in question, should generally lead to non-politicized ethnic cleavages. This is because the co-optation of chiefs, during the periods of transition to independence, tended to foreclose the avenues for successful ethnic mobilization. The effect of an exclusionary strategy is however contingent on the social context of the specific countries. In societies with strong and centralized local authority institutions, a strategy to marginalize local elites (chiefs) should provoke a push-back in the form of chief-led anti-nationalist mass mobilization. I argue further that because local authority jurisdictions in colonial Africa were often purposely designed to coincide with pre-existing ethnic boundaries, these chief-led anti-nationalist movements would also be ethnic-based. This dynamic is further reinforced when nationalist leaders counter-mobilize more pliable/friendly chiefs in order to limit the reach of the chief-led anti-nationalist movements. Thus in societies with strong and centralized chieftaincy institutions, a strategy of exclusion should, all things equal, result in the politicization of ethnic cleavages. Finally, we should expect non-ethnic politics in societies with only weak and decentralized chieftaincy institutions even where nationalist leaders adopt strategies of exclusion.

The above argument can be summarized as follows. Two factors influence whether or not ethnic cleavages are politicized in post-colonial Africa: (i) whether or not the nationalist leaders of a country adopt an 'inclusionary' or 'exclusionary' chiefs strategy at the dawn of independence; and (ii) whether or not said country had strong and centralized local authority institutions (chieftaincy institutions) during the period of transition to independence. Ethnic cleavages should become politicized, all things being equal, in countries that had both exclusionist nationalist leaders

and highly centralized/strong local institutions of control (chieftaincy institutions). Conversely, ethnic cleavages should be relatively depoliticized in countries that either had inclusionist nationalist leaders or had weak and decentralized local authority institutions at independence.

		Strong local elites/chiefs	
		Yes	*No*
Exclusionary strategy	*Yes*	Politicized ethnicity	Non-politicized ethnicity
	No	Non-politicized ethnicity	Non-politicized ethnicity

The claim that the independence transition strategies of Africa's nationalist leaders have enduring effects on the politics of their respective post-colonial states, including determining whether or not ethnic cleavages are politicized, falls within a veritable tradition of scholarship emphasizing the long-term effects of the choices of elites during critical junctures. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) for instance highlight the ''freezing'' effects of founding elections on electoral cleavages.[3] Kalyvas (1996) also explains that the emergence of Christian Democratic parties in Europe are the unintended consequence of political actors making self-interested choices under very constrained conditions.[4] Bartolini (2010) similarly argues that the first wave of mo-

[3]Lipset and Rokkan 1967.
[4]Kalyvas 1996.

bilization during the initial period of extension of the franchise to the lower classes explains the presence or absence of Socialist parties in Europe; this is because the initial periods of mobilization 'set the original opportunity structure' within which subsequent political mobilizations occur.[5] In line with the above authors, I argue that once ethnic cleavages get politicized, during the periods of transition to independence, path-dependent mechanisms set in to ensure their continued reproduction throughout the post-colonial period.

2.2 Research Design and Case Selection

I primarily employ qualitative methods to demonstrate the validity of the argument of this dissertation. Specifically, I make use of process tracing methods in three primary case studies (Ghana, Botswana and Tanzania) in order to demonstrate the causal relationship between the transition strategies of nationalist politicians, the social context of their respective polities and the incidence or absence of ethnic-based politics in post-colonial Africa. The Ghanaian case (chapter 3) illustrates the example of a country with powerful and centralized chieftaincy institutions that also had nationalist leaders who opted to marginalize the local chiefs during the period of transition to independence. I demonstrate, through careful process tracing, that the decision by Kwame Nkrumah and the leaders of the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) to marginalize the chiefs of Ghana, during the period of transition to independence in the 1950s, precipitated the emergence of two major chief-led anti-nationalist movements prior to independence in 1957. These were the Ashanti based National

[5] Bartolini 2000, p. 12.

Liberation Movement and the Mamprusi dominated Northern Peoples Party.[6] I further demonstrate that the struggle for power between Kwame Nkrumah's CPP and the most powerful chiefs, during the late colonial period, directly led to the politicization of specific ethnic cleavages in Ghana.

The Botswana case (chapter 4) is used to demonstrate the alternate path available to Ghana at the dawn of independence. Botswana, like Ghana, had highly centralized chieftaincy institutions during its period of transition to independence in the 1950s.[7] But the nationalist leaders of Botswana, unlike their counterparts in Ghana, opted for inclusionary rather than exclusionary institutions. Seretse Khama and the other leaders of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) therefore managed to successful co-opt the powerful tribal chiefs and avoid the specter of chief-led anti-nationalist mobilization prior to independence. I also demonstrate, using process tracing, that the successful co-optation of the tribal chiefs prevented the emergence of ethnic/tribal politics in Botswana.

The Tanzanian case (chapter 5) exploits the 'natural experiment' created by the differing outcomes in Tanganyika and Zanzibar in order to demonstrate the validity of the argument of this dissertation. Prior to joining together to form the union of Tanzania in 1964 the two territories were separate entities although both were British colonies. Both territories also had nationalist leaders that adopted exclusionary transition strategies during their respective run-ups to independence in the 1960s.[8] The two territories however differed in the strength of their chieftaincy institutions; Tanganyika had weak and decentralized chieftaincy institutions while

[6] Allman 1993; Ladouceur 1979.
[7] L. Hailey 1953a.
[8] J. M.-M. H. Listowel 1965; Lofchie 1965.

Zanzibar had a powerful monarchy.[9] Given the weakness of the chieftaincy institutions in Tanganyika, Julius Nyerere and the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) managed to easily sweep aside the chiefs and consolidate power in the immediate post-independence period.[10] The strategy of exclusion however precipitated a pushback from the powerful monarchy in Zanzibar; the Sultan of Zanzibar threw his weight behind the rival pro-monarchy Zanzibar National Party (ZNP).[11] The ensuing struggle between the republican ASP and the pro-monarchy ZNP has left in its wake a legacy of politicized ethnic cleavages that continue to define politics on the island today.

[9] Iliffe 1979; L. Hailey 1950a.
[10] Iliffe 1979.
[11] Lofchie 1965.

Chapter 3

Exclusionary Strategy and Political Ethnicity in Ghana

3.1 Introduction

Ghana is one of the more stable and free electoral democracies in sub-Saharan Africa. Since transitioning to a democratic system of government in the early 1990s, the country has chalked a number of successes including managing the peaceful alternation of power between an incumbent political party and the opposition on multiple occasions. The first of these power transfers occurred in January 2001 following the defeat of the incumbent National Democratic Congress (NDC) at the November 2000 polls.[1] Since then, there have been two more alternations of power in 2009 and again in 2017.[2] Ghana has, to a large extent, also developed an institutionalized two party system with the NDC and the New Patriotic Party (NPP)

[1] Gyimah-Boadi 2001.
[2] Gyimah-Boadi 2009; Bigg and Kpodo 2016.

being the major parties. Elections in Ghana are, however, characterized by very high incidences of ethnic bloc voting.[3] It is widely known in Ghana, for instance, that members of the Ashanti ethnic group overwhelmingly support the NPP while the Ewe of south-eastern Ghana largely vote for the NDC.[4] The literature on ethnicity and politics in Ghana is however silent on explanations for why specific ethnic groups support either of the two major political parties. This chapter attempts to fill this gap in the literature by providing a historically contingent explanation for the emergence of politicized ethnic cleavages in Ghana. It establishes, first and foremost, that the contemporary politicized ethnic cleavages in Ghana date back to the period of transition to independence in the 1950s. It also demonstrates that these politicized ethnic cleavages are the direct legacies of the struggle for power between the nationalist leaders of Ghana's independence movement and the most powerful hereditary chiefs during the late colonial period. The chapter further shows that the conflict between these two groups of elites centered around deep-seated disagreements over the proper distribution of power in the emergent post-colonial state. The nationalists, led by Kwame Nkrumah and his Convention Peoples Party (CPP), favored an arrangement where power was centralized and the authority of hereditary chiefs was subsumed under that of democratically elected politicians.[5] The hereditary chiefs, on the other hand, preferred a continuation of some version of the colonial system of 'indirect rule' which gave them near complete control of the system local government.[6] The intransigence of Kwame Nkrumah and the CPP on this matter precipitated chief-led anti-nationalist mobilization during the late colonial period.[7] I

[3]Fridy 2007; Bossuroy 2011; Ichino and Nathan 2013; Arthur 2009.
[4]Fridy 2007.
[5]Rathbone 2000.
[6]Rathbone 2000.
[7]Rathbone 2000.

demonstrate in this chapter that these chief-led anti-nationalist movements are primarily responsible for the emergence of politicized ethnic cleavages in Ghana. I also show that the politicized ethnic cleavages that emerged during the late colonial period have largely remained unaltered throughout the post-colonial period. In other words, the ethnic groups that were mobilized to oppose Kwame Nkrumah's CPP in the 1950s are also the staunchest supporters of present day political parties that trace their lineage to the anti-CPP movements of that period. I argue therefore that Ghana's politicized ethnic cleavages must be understood as the enduring legacy of the country's tortuous transition to independence in the 1950s.

The conclusions from this chapter has important methodological and substantive implications for how we study the phenomenon of ethnic politics in post-colonial Africa. It suggests, at the very least, that the issue of politicized ethnic cleavages is intimately connected to the history of the African state as a colonial artifact. It also suggests that the phenomenon of ethnic politics in Africa is, at its core, a story about the long-run effects of the botched attempts at nation-building during the 1950s and 1960s Africa. The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows: first, I demonstrate that the widely accepted explanations for the emergence of politicized ethnic cleavages in Africa fail to adequately account for the specific dynamics of ethnic politics in Ghana; secondly, I offer a brief summary of the core argument of the chapter; third, I supply the evidence in support of the argument ; and finally, I conclude with an explication of the path-dependent mechanisms responsible for the persistence of the politicized ethnic cleavages that emerged in the 1950s.

3.2 Review of literature

The widely accepted explanations for when and why ethnic cleavages become politicized in post-colonial Africa fail to account for the specificities of political ethnicity in Ghana. For instance, the Ghanaian experience directly challenges the argument linking ethnic voting to information scarcity. The claim here is that the ethnic identities of candidates/parties function as 'information shortcuts' for voters in low information environments.[8] In other words, the incidence of ethnic voting should decline where voters have adequate knowledge about candidates and their platforms.[9] This argument however fails to explain the persistence of ethnic voting in Ghana since all ethnic identities are not equally politicized in the country.[10] Given this reality about political ethnicity in Ghana, the argument linking ethnic voting to information scarcity holds up only if we are to assume that members some ethnic groups live in systematically poorer information environments than others. This, of course, is a highly implausible assumption since ethnic voting in Ghana persists even in urban areas where members of different ethnic groups live in close proximity to each other.[11]

The Ghanaian case also challenges some important assumptions of the institutionalist school regarding the phenomenon of ethnic politics in Africa. Posner (2005) argues, for instance, that the relevant axis of political competition - whether politics is primarily organized around ethnic differences or language group differences - shifts

[8]Conroy-Krutz 2013b; Posner 2005, p. 105; Ferree 2011, p. 36.

[9]Conroy-Krutz 2013b.

[10]The empirical evidence in appendix 3 shows, for instance, that the Ashanti and Ewe ethnic identities are highly politicized while the Dagomba and Kokomba ethnic identities are not similarly politicized.

[11]Nathan 2016.

in response to the institutional context of political competition.[12] The important insight of the institutionalist school is that mobilization along ethnic lines in Africa is not inexorable; rather, such mobilization is driven primarily by the desire of instrumentally minded politicians to form the easiest minimum winning coalitions.[13] The implication then is that ethnic cleavages should cease to be politically salient where the institutional context provides no easy pathways towards assembling a minimum winning coalition. This, of course, is welcome news for those who worry about the deleterious effect of ethnic mobilization on the health of polities; it means that we can, in theory, reconfigure political institutions to eliminate the incentive to mobilize around ethnic differences. But the Ghanaian experience suggest that ethnic politics, once primed, tend to be much more sticky than the institutionalist school would have us believe. I show in this chapter that the politicized ethnic cleavages that emerged in the 1950s have pretty much remained unchanged throughout the post-colonial period. This is in spite of the fact that the country moved from operating a westminster style parliamentary system with single member districts (1954-1969) to a two-round presidential system (1979-present). It is also the case that ethnic-based politics has persisted in Ghana despite the fact that broad language groups like Akan or Mole-Dagbani provide an easier pathway toward assembling minimum winning coalitions.[14]

The persistence of ethnic voting in Ghana also challenges the supposed causal

[12] Posner 2005.

[13] Posner 2005.

[14] The single largest ethnic group in Ghana, Ashanti, comprise only 16 percent of the total population. The next four largest ethnic groups, the Ewe, Fante, Brong and Dagomba, also comprise 14, 12, 5, and 4 percent of the population respectively. In contrast, the Akan and Mole-Dagbani language groups, make up 46 and 17 percent of the population respectively. Source: 2010 Housing and Population Census - `http://www.statsghana.gov.gh/nada/index.php/catalog/51`

effect of cross-cutting cleavages in helping reduce the political salience of ethnic identities in Africa. Dunning and Harrison (2010), in an experimental study in Mali, conclude, for instance, that the existence of cousinage ties - a cross-cutting cleavage - helps undercut the political salience of ethnicity in that country.[15] The problem, however, is that Ghanaian society, just like Mali, has multiple cross-cutting cleavages, of which religious identities are perhaps the most obvious, and yet specific ethnic cleavages remain highly politicized.[16] It appears then that cross-cutting cleavages, on their own, may be insufficient in helping to diminish the political salience of ethnic identities. Indeed, a careful reading of Lipset (1960), an original progenitor of the thesis on the salutary effects of cross-cutting cleavages, suggest as much: cross-cutting cleavages, according his original formulation, works to diminish the salience of individual cleavages only when the crisscrossing cleavages are both politically relevant.[17] This, of course, still leaves open the question as to why and how specific cleavages become politicized in the first place.

The argument connecting the emergence of politicized ethnic cleavages to the nation-building policies of Africa's founding leaders also fails to explain why specific ethnic identities are politicized in Ghana. This argument is most explicitly advanced by Miguel (2004) who proposes that ethnic cleavages are depoliticized

[15] Dunning and Harrison 2010b, p. 21.

[16] According to the 2010 Ghana Housing and Population Census, Christians constitute 71.2 percent of the population, 17.6 percent are affiliated with the Muslim faith and the rest of the country are either affiliated with traditional African religions (5.2 percent) or have no religious affiliations at all (5.3 Percent).

[17] Lipset notes :''Where a man belongs to a variety of groups that all predispose him toward the same political choice, he is...much less likely to be tolerant of other opinions. The available evidence suggests that the chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a number of crosscutting, *politically relevant affiliations*. To the degree that a significant proportion of the population is pulled among conflicting forces, its members have an interest in reducing the intensity of political conflict [emphasis mine].'' (Lipset 1960, pp. 88-89)

in Tanzania but not in neighboring Kenya because the former's founding leader, Julius Nyerere, implemented a more nationalist nation-building agenda than did Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya.[18] The trouble with this argument is that Ghana's founding leader, Kwame Nkrumah, pursued nation-building policies that were very similar to Nyerere's in Tanzania. For instance, following independence in 1957, Kwame Nkrumah immediately banned the formation of political parties around ethnic or regional differences.[19] In fact, Nkrumah's decision to move Ghana towards a one-party state in the 1960s was primarily justified on the grounds that it would help forge national unity.[20]Nkrumah's post-independence nation-building policies or lack thereof also fails to explain ethnic politics in Ghana since these politicized cleavages emerged prior to independence in 1957. I show below that ethnic cleavages became politicized in Ghana because the country's powerful chiefs mobilized their respective ethnic groups to oppose Nkrumah's attempts to marginalize them during the late colonial period.

Finally, the Ghanaian case runs counter to the predictions of Koter's (2016) more recent and innovative argument linking the emergence of politicized ethnic cleavages to the relative strength of local elites across African countries.[21] The claim here is that African politicians often choose between two distinct mobilization strategies: a direct mobilization of co-ethnics or mobilization through local intermedi-

[18]Miguel 2004, p. 327.

[19]Rathbone 2000, p. 67; Kwame Nkrumah's views on the formation of ethnic based or regionalist parties is best captured by this excerpt from a legislative debate in 1954, three years before independence:''If we tolerate the formation of political parties on regional, sectional or religious bases, we shall not only be heading for political chaos but, worse still, we shall be sowing the destruction of our national existence. Coming events cast their shadows before them, and the Goverment shall consider what steps should be taken to eradicate this emerging evil in Our national life.'' Brukum 1999, p. 357.

[20]Kilson 1963, p. 273.

[21]Koter 2016.

aries.[22] African politicians, the argument goes, 'default' to ethnic mobilization in societies where local leaders are weak but choose to mobilize through local intermediaries where the latter are strong.[23] It is further claimed that a strategy to directly mobilize one's co-ethnics produces politicized ethnic cleavages whereas mobilization through local intermediaries diminishes the political salience of ethnic differences.[24] However, ethnic cleavages remain highly politicized in Ghana in spite of the existence of historically powerful local chieftaincy institutions in the country.[25] In fact, I argue here that ethnic cleavages are politicized in Ghana precisely because the country had historically powerful chieftaincy institutions during the late colonial period.

3.3 The Argument

The argument advanced here is that Ghana's politicized ethnic cleavages are the direct products of the country's colonial history and its tortuous transition to independence in the 1950s. It specifically makes the claim that the struggle for power between Ghana's nationalist leaders and the country's most powerful local chiefs, during the period of transition to independence in the 1950s, is responsible for the emergence of politicized ethnic cleavages in the country. At the heart of the struggle between these two groups of elites was the issue of the how power was to be distributed in the emergent post-colonial state. The paramount chiefs of the Gold Coast (now Ghana) had a stake in this matter because they controlled large territo-

[22]Koter 2016, pp. 31-43.
[23]Koter 2016, pp. 31-43.
[24]Koter 2016.
[25]Gennaioli and Rainer (2007, p.185) show, for instance, that the level of precolonial centralization in Senegal, Koter's primary case, is quite similar to that of Ghana. Senegal scored 0.694 on a 0-1 scale while Ghana scored 0.651. Ethnic cleavages are politicized in Ghana but they are not in Senegal. Nicola Gennaioli and Ilia Rainer 2007, p. 185.

ries during the colonial period and were also vested with enormous powers under the British system of 'indirect rule'.[26] The chiefs simultaneously wielded executive, judiciary and legislative powers within their respective jurisdictions and were basically mini-despots within a larger system of despotic colonial rule. The emergence of nationalist politics in the late 1940s, however, threatened to upend the system of government that had vested the chiefs with so much power. The predicament of the chiefs was also compounded by the fact that the leadership of the most successful nationalist movement, the Convention Peoples Party (CPP), who were mostly drawn from the commoner class, subscribed to a form of marxist leninist ideology that imbued them with a deep skepticism if not outright hostility towards the institution of chieftaincy.[27] For awhile, these two groups of political elites maintained an uneasy co-existence but soon their mutual suspicions gave way to open conflict following the 1951 legislative assembly elections. Kwame Nkrumah, who became Leader of Government Business, in a system of partial self-governance after the 1951 polls, began to enact a series of policies that were aimed at marginalizing the chiefs. In response, the most powerful chiefs mobilized their subjects to oppose Kwame Nkrumah's CPP. The most successful of these chief-led anti-nationalist movements included the Ashanti-based National Liberation Movement (NLM) and the Mamprusi dominated Northern Peoples Party.[28] These chief-led anti-nationalist movements were invariably ethnic in character because paramount chiefs in the Gold Coast presided over native authority jurisdictions that were purposely designed to coincide with pre-existing ethnic boundaries.[29] The ethnic dimension of these chief-led anti-nationalist

[26] W. M. Hailey 1951.
[27] Rathbone 2000, pp. 21-22.
[28] Allman 1993; Ladouceur 1979.
[29] Allman 1993; Ladouceur 1979.

movements were also heightened because Nkrumah's CPP isolated the opposition chiefs by aggressively highlighting the particularism of their movements; this had the effect of limiting the appeal of these chief-led anti-CPP movements outside of their specific ethnic enclaves.[30] I draw on evidence from the three pre-independence elections from 1951-1956 to show that the chief-led anti-CPP mobilization of the 1950s directly politicized the ethnic identities of the groups under the control of these opposition chiefs. I also employ quantitative data to demonstrate that, once politicized, these ethnic groups have continued to participate in post-independence Ghanaian politics as the supporters of political parties that trace their lineage to the chief-led anti-nationalist movements of the 1950s.

3.4 The Evidence

The evidence in support of the above argument is presented as follows: first, I provide a description of the status and power of chiefs under the British colonial system of 'indirect rule' in Ghana (formerly the Gold Coast). I then detail the steps that Kwame Nkrumah's CPP government took to marginalize the chiefs during the late colonial period. Following that, I describe the response of the chiefs to their marginalization during this period and explain how the resultant chief-led anti-CPP movements politicized specific ethnic cleavages during the late colonial period. Finally, I conclude by showing that the politicized ethnic cleavages of the 1950s have largely persisted throughout the post-colonial period.

[30] Austin 1964.

3.4.1 British 'indirect rule' and the Power of Chiefs in the Gold Coast

The geographical boundaries of present-day Ghana is comprised of four previously distinct territories: the Gold Coast Colony (or the Colony), Ashanti, the Northern Territories, and British Togoland.[31] Prior to 1946, when Ashanti and the Colony formed a single legislative body, the various territories were administered as separate entities although under the control of a single colonial Governor.[32] These territories were also governed through the British system of 'indirect rule' which relied heavily on the institution of chieftaincy.[33] The specific functions of chiefs within the system of indirect colonial rule varied over the course of the colonial period but the system in place during the 1950s was established by the Native Authority Ordinance of 1944.[34] This ordinance established 'native authorities' as the official organs of local government in the Gold Coast.[35] Each native authority had a paramount chief at the helm who was assisted by a designated state council.[36] Apart from functioning as the chief executives of their respective native authorities, the paramount chiefs also doubled as the chief magistrates of the native courts.[37] The chiefs were

[31]British control of the Colony was first formalized in 1844 when the coastal chiefs signed a treaty submitting to British protection against the military incursions of the more powerful inland Ashanti kingdom. The British subsequently defeated and annexed Ashanti in 1901. The Northern Territories also came under the control of the British following negotiations with the neighboring colonial powers, France and Germany. British Togoland, which was originally a part of German Togoland, came under British control following the defeat of Germany in World War I. This territory was administered under a United Nations Trusteeship until 1956 when the majority of the people voted in a plebiscite to join Ghana for independence. See appendix 1 for a map of the respective territories.

[32]W. M. Hailey 1951.

[33]Korsah 1944; Addo-Fening 2013.

[34]W. M. Hailey 1951, p. 204.

[35]W. M. Hailey 1951, p. 205.

[36]W. M. Hailey 1951, p. 206.

[37]W. M. Hailey 1951, p. 205.

also empowered to levy taxes on all adult residents within their native authority boundaries.[38] The native authorities also received additional revenues from fee and fines from the native courts, as well as, rents from communal lands.[39] The chiefs also maintained control over the fiscal budgets of their respective native authorities, including the authority to set the terms of their own emoluments.[40]

Even though all paramount chiefs in the Gold Coast enjoyed the same prerogatives under the British system of indirect rule, the actual power and authority of chiefs varied greatly. This is in part due to the fact that the system of indirect rule, as much as possible, tried to maintain the pre-colonial chieftaincy boundaries; it meant therefore that very powerful and highly centralized pre-colonial chieftaincy institutions continued to remain so as was their weaker and decentralized counterparts during the colonial period. At the apex of chiefly power in the Gold Coast was the king of the highly centralized Ashanti kingdom; he controlled a vast territory that was also richly endowed with natural resources. During the late colonial period, for instance, Ashanti produced half of the cocoa output in the country and was also home to the largest gold mine in Obuasi. The average revenue of the Ashanti territory between 1948 and 1951 stood at £533,104; this was almost five times the revenue stream of the second wealthiest native authority in the entire country.[41]The Ashanti king was also the only traditional authority in the Gold Coast whose subchiefs were also recognized as native authorities.[42] Following on the heels of the Ashanti king was the paramount chief of the highly centralized and wealthy Akyem

[38]W. M. Hailey 1951, p. 209.
[39]W. M. Hailey 1951, p. 241.
[40]W. M. Hailey 1951, p. 239.
[41]Great Britain.1948-1951. *Gold Coast: Annual Report*. London: H.M.S.O.
[42]W. M. Hailey 1951.

Abuakwa kingdom, who was, by far, the most prominent and influential paramount chief in the Colony.[43] Akyem Abuakwa, like Ashanti, was home to prosperous cocoa plantations during the late colonial period.[44] The average total revenues of the Akyem Abuakwa native authority between 1948 and 1951 - £111,925 - was more than three times that of its closest rival in the colony, Manya Krobo, which had an average of £34,654 during the same period.[45] The most prominent chief in the Northern Territories was the paramount chief of the Mamprusi kingdom.[46] Mamprusi was both the largest and wealthiest native authority in the Northern Territories during the colonial period.[47]

Table 3.1: Native Authority Revenue, 1948-1951

Native Authority	**Ethnic Group(s)**	**Region**	**Average Revenue [1948-1951]**
Ashanti	Asante/Ashanti	Ashanti	£533,104
Akim Abuakwa	Akyem	Colony	£111,925
Mamprusi	Mamprusi, Frafra and Kusasi	Northern Territories	£92,116
Dagomba	Dagomba	Northern Territories	£53,524
Manya Krobo	Dangme	Colony	£34,654
Akim Kotoku	Akyem	Colony	£29,278
Anlo	Ewe	Colony	£24,667
Kassena Nankani	Kassena	Northern Territories	£18,843
Yilo Krobo	Dangme	Colony	£13,095
Asogli	Ewe	Colony	£9,650

The table above lists the the top 10 wealthiest native authorities in the Gold Coast between 1948 to 1951. The three most powerful/prominent chiefs, as it turned out, mobilized to oppose Nkrumah's CPP in the 1950s while the other chiefs either acquiesced to Nkrumah's erosion of chiefly privileges or actively jumped on the CPP bandwagon.

[43]W. M. Hailey 1951.
[44]W. M. Hailey 1951.
[45]Great Britain.1948-1951. *Gold Coast: Annual Report*. London: H.M.S.O.
[46]W. M. Hailey 1951.
[47]Great Britain.1948-1951. *Gold Coast: Annual Report*. London: H.M.S.O.

3.4.2 The erosion of chiefly authority during the late colonial period

Because of their entrenched position within the British colonial system of indirect rule, the chiefs of the Gold Coast were slow to catch on to the changing currents of politics during the late 1940s and soon found themselves having to contend with a new crop of nationalist politicians drawn mostly from outside their ranks.[48] The leaders of the Convention Peoples Party (CPP), the most successful of the nationalist movements, were also avowed socialists who viewed the institution of hereditary chieftaincy as incompatible with the march towards a more democratic system of government. Rathbone (2000) explains, for instance, that ''[the CPP] was committed not only to the expulsion of the British but also to the radical re-ordering of Ghanaian society, and this included the complete ending of chiefly authority. It inveighed against chiefs as imperialist stooges, and raged about the arbitrary quality of rural order dominated by those qualified to rule by birth rather than by achievement.''[49] He notes further that the CPP's ''very public hostility to chieftaincy was part ideology and partly the opening shots in a protracted struggle for rural control.''[50] For awhile, the chiefs and the leaders of the CPP managed an uneasy co-existence but matters soon came to a head after the first pre-independence elections in 1951.

The 1951 election, which the CPP overwhelmingly won, ushered in a period of partial self-government in the Gold Coast. Kwame Nkrumah, following his party's triumph at the polls, was appointed Leader of Government Business, a Prime Minister

[48] Austin 1964, p. 27; Rathbone 2000, p. 21.
[49] Rathbone 2000, p. 53.
[50] Rathbone 2000, p. 53.

for all intents and purposes, to head a parallel government which worked alongside the colonial authorities.[51] Almost immediately, the Nkrumah led CPP government began to take steps to undercut the power and position of chiefs in the Gold Coast. Their first major attack against the institution of chieftaincy came with the passage of the Local Government Ordinance of 1951.[52] This legislation, which replaced the native authorities ordinance of 1944, radically transformed the system of local government in the country. It established a new system of local councils that replaced the existing native authorities.[53] These new local councils, which were structured to have two-thirds of their members popularly elected, represented a sharp departure from the practice under the native authority system where local authority was vested in the chiefs and their advisors. The 1951 local government ordinance also placed all lands and other natural resources under the control of the newly established local councils.[54] In addition, the new ordinance dissolved the existing native treasuries and transferred the power to levy local taxes from the chiefs to the local councils.[55] This also meant that the local councils now acquired the authority to vote on any monies that went to the upkeep of the chiefs.[56]

The passage of the Local Authority Police Power Ordinance in 1953 also signaled a departure from the chief-centered system of local government in the Gold Coast.[57] This ordinance disbanded all existing native police forces, which were under the control of the chiefs and transferred the power to establish new police forces

[51] Austin 1964, p. 154.
[52] Allman 1993, p. 20.
[53] Allman 1993, p. 31.
[54] Allman 1993, p. 48.
[55] Rathbone 2000, p. 55.
[56] Rathbone 2000, p. 55.
[57] Killingray 1986, p. 428.

to the newly created local councils.[58] In addition to the above legislative measures, Kwame Nkrumah also employed his vast executive authorities, which were previously vested in the colonial Governor, to weaken the chiefs' grip on the native courts.[59] He used his executive powers to vary the composition of the native courts in order to expunge from the courts register the names of chiefs whom he deemed insufficiently supportive of the CPP.[60] This had the effect of essentially rendering service on the native courts conditional on loyalty to Nkrumah and the CPP.

A final and most devastating attack on the institution of chieftaincy came with the passage of the Gold Coast Constitution of 1954.[61] This constitution, which replaced the 1950 Coussey Constitution, included provisions which effectively shut the door on the continued participation of chiefs in national politics. Whereas the preceding constitution had established a legislature comprising both popularly elected members and representatives of the chiefs, the new constitution scrapped this compromise arrangement by stipulating that ''the Legislative Assembly shall be composed of members directly elected by secret ballot and all members of the Cabinet shall be members of the Assembly and directly responsible for it.''[62] To be sure, there were perfectly legitimate reasons for reforming the local government system of the late colonial period. Nkrumah's CPP government, for instance, justified the curtailment of chiefly authority on the grounds that such a move would help bring the government onto a more democratic footing.[63] As it happened, the CPP government woefully misjudged the strength of attachments to the institution of chieftaincy in

[58]Killingray 1986, p. 428.
[59]Allman 1993, p. 52.
[60]Rathbone 2000, p. 56.
[61]*The Gold Coast (Constitution) Order in Council, 1954*. 1954.
[62]Andoh 1987, p. 173.
[63]Rathbone 2000, p. 55.

territories with long histories of centralized pre-colonial chieftaincy institutions. The most powerful chiefs, feeling buffeted by the CPP government attacks, resorted to a strategy of mobilizing their respective ethnic groups to oppose the CPP during the late colonial period.

3.4.3 Chief led anti-nationalist mobilization of the 1950s

The backlash against the marginalization of chiefs during the late colonial period produced two major anti-nationalist movements in the 1950s. Of these, the Ashanti based National Liberation Movement (NLM) was the most virulent and consequential. But the most successful, electorally, was the Mamprusi led Northern Peoples Party (NPP). The NLM began as an Ashanti separatist movement but later moderated its goals and contested the final pre-independence elections in July 1956 as a regular political party. The NPP, which was founded to represent the interests of the chiefs and peoples of the Northern Territories, also contested both the 1954 and 1956 pre-independence elections. I show below that both movements were motivated by a desire to protect chiefly privileges by fighting against Nkrumah's exclusionary chieftaincy policies during the late colonial period.

3.4.3.1 *The National Liberation Movement*

The immediate spark precipitating the emergence of the NLM was a decision by the CPP government under Nkrumah to set the producer price of cocoa below the world market prices with the intention of using the price difference to finance the government's ambitious development agenda.[64] But the deeper grievance behind

[64]The Cocoa Duty and Development Funds (Amendment) Act of 1954 pegged the producer price of cocoa at 72s. per load of 60 lb for a period of four years; the world market price per load was £12

the emergence of the NLM, as would soon become clear, was the CPP government's attacks on the institution of chieftaincy. Still, the cocoa pricing policy provided an important galvanizing force for the initial NLM mobilization efforts since Ashanti produced nearly half of the cocoa output in the Gold Coast during this period.[65] For the ordinary Ashanti cocoa farmer, who had no particular attachments to the emergent new state, the strategy to squeeze them financially in order to help finance a national development agenda seemed unfair.[66] Farmers groups throughout Ashanti therefore began to organize to protest against the new cocoa pricing policy.[67] Popular protests were also organized by non-farmer groups including the Ashanti Youth Association (AYA).[68] Sensing an opening to mount a pushback against the CPP government, the Ashanti chiefs seized upon the widespread disaffection over the cocoa pricing policy to launch the NLM in September 1954.[69] The Ashanti chiefs in Kumasi, the capital, provided a lump sum of £20,000 as initial seed money to help finance the NLM mobilization efforts.[70] Shortly afterwards, the Ashanti king (Asantehene) also gave the movement his blessings.[71] He is reported to have told his sub-chiefs that in supporting the NLM ''They were performing a duty to their nation [Ashanti nation]. They were saving their nation from destruction...Their forebears through toil and sweat, through bitter experience had erected a Nation which was admired and respected by foreigners. It was the duty of the present generation to see that Ashanti was not lost through an unsuitable constitution for the Gold

20s a load.

[65] Allman 1993, p. 36.

[66] Ashanti did not become colonized until 1901 and it was governed as an independent colonial territory until 1946 when they joined delegates from the Colony to form the first national parliament.

[67] Austin 1964, p. 257.

[68] Austin 1964, p. 258.

[69] Austin 1964, p. 262.

[70] Austin 1964, p. 263.

[71] Austin 1964, p. 264.

Coast.''[72] At the inaugural rally for the NLM on 7 September 1954, the leader of the movement, Bafuor Osei Akoto, who was also the chief *Okyeame* (spokesman/linguist) to the Ashanti king, listed the grievances that necessitated the formation of the NLM in the following order:

> The attitude of the present government to dismember and break up Asante as shown by the following acts:
>
> a. Failure to implement the Coussey recommendations for regional administration;
>
> b. Basing representation in the central legislature (a unicameral legislature) solely on population;
>
> c. Passing of such legislations which make the Asanteman Council of no practical value to Asante and the elimination of the Asantehene and other chiefs from the central constitutional set up of the country;
>
> d. The high handed manner of pegging cocoa prices which affects Asante more than any other group in the country.[73]

It is instructive to note that the cocoa pricing policy was last on the list of grievances listed at the NLM inaugural rally. A resolution addressed to the Queen of England shortly after the inaugural rally pressed for a federal system of government for the Gold Coast.[74] This demand for a federal system of government was subsequently fleshed out in a pamphlet outlining the NLM's vision for the emergent new

[72] Austin 1964, p. 264.

[73] The list of grievances are from the unpublished notes of speech given by Bafuor Osei Akoto at the All-Asante rally, Kumasi, on September 7 1954. Source: A.S.Y. Andoh, 'The Asante National Liberation Movement of the 1950s in Retrospect', in E. Schildkrout (ed.), The Golden Stool: Studies of the Asante Center and Periphery (New York, 1987), p. 174

[74] Austin 1964, p. 264.

state. It read in part:

> The peoples of these territories, belonging as they do to different tribes, have different structures of society, and are at different stages of adaptation and adoption of western culture. In Ashanti the allegiance is to the occupant of the Golden Stool; in other territories there are a large collection of states and allegiances. There is not enough consciousness of national identity to make possible easy and at the same time democratic unitary government. In the absence of this consciousness the safest course is to ensure that not all the powers of government are concentrated at the centre, but that a substantial part of them is retained in the component territories where people have learnt the habits and attitudes of living together for some time...In our opinion it is not possible to secure in a unitary form of government such a division of powers that a despotic group of men cannot prevent the constitution and destroy the liberties of the people.[75]

The quick pivot to making demands for a federal constitution, coupled with the fact that not all cocoa growing areas in the Gold Coast joined the movement suggest that cocoa pricing policy was only the proximate cause for the emergence of the NLM in Ashanti.[76] Allman (1993) notes, for instance, that ''it is obvious that the Movement's roots ran deeper than the demand for a higher cocoa price.''[77]

[75] Proposals for a Federal Constitution for an Independent Gold Coast and Togoland, by Movements and Parties other than the Convention People's Party. Abura Printing Works (1955). Also quoted in Austin, 1964, p. 277

[76] Austin (1964, p.265) writes, for instance, that ''There were many non-Ashanti farmers who would have been glad of more money for their cocoa; there had also been a large number of rebel candidates in the June [1954] election in the southern constituencies; and even the faint-hearted chiefs in the Colony states gave their loyalty to the CPP out of necessity than affection. Except in Akim Abuakwa, however, none of these southern groups was prepared to join the NLM. The explanation was not difficult to find. The fact is, the NLM was a Kumasi-centred, Ashanti movement, which appealed for support in the name of the Asantehene, the Golden stool, Ashanti interests, Ashanti history, and Ashanti rights.''

[77] Allman 1993, p. 18.

Austin (1964) also explains the Ashanti chiefs' motivations for backing the NLM as follows ''...their resentment against the [CPP] government was easy to understand; they saw the power that had been theirs from time immemorial (which had not been greatly disturbed by British rule) now in the hands of their enemies...the substance of their power, including the levying of local rate, passed to the new urban and local councils...In short, they did not like Nkrumah, the CPP, the direction of reform, or the prospect before them.''[78]

The fact that the NLM was fundamentally a chiefs movement is also underscored by its near exclusive reliance on existing chiefly networks to mobilize resources and support for its cause. The following testimony from the Quist Committee inquiry into the NLM uprising after independence illustrates the point:

> Kwame Apawu...a member of the CPP said in December 1955 that a group of NLM Action Groupers came to call him to the [chief]. There he was informed that they had been sent by the Asantehene to assemble all the villagers to discuss with them an important subject...The villagers were told that the Asantehene wanted financial help from the villagers because Kwame Nkrumah wanted to capture the Golden Stool to Accra...He said they were threatened that if they failed to contribute money the Asantehene would send Action Groupers to destroy the village. They became afraid. They collected the amount of £416 and handed it over to the chief.[79]

The NLM activists, with the tacit approval of the local chiefs, also employed outright violence and intimidation in their efforts to deter support for the CPP in

[78] Austin 1964, pp. 259-260.

[79] Austin 1964, p. 273. This account was published in the Ashanti Pioneer, 19 August, 1957. The Action Groupers were the paramilitary wing of the NLM.

Ashanti during this period. The testimony of a local CPP chairman in Ashanti to the Quist Committee is, once again, illustrative here:

> One early morning he was called by one Osei Kwadwo before the [local] Chairman of the NLM, stripped naked and severely canned on the buttocks...The chairman explained to him that he was the one who had diverted the minds of the people from joining the NLM. He was also ordered to pay £8 to those who came to escort him to the chairman. The NLM chairman further invited NLM Action Groupers from Kenyasi who extorted an amount of £45 from him because the chairman said he had seen him, Gyamfi, standing under a CPP flag pole conversing with the CPP elements in the village about the punishment inflicted upon him. He failed to complain to the police because he thought he would be killed.[80]

Kwame Nkrumah's CPP government was mostly helpless in countering the violence and intimidation of the NLM in Ashanti because internal security was still in the hands of the British government during this period.[81] In fact, the security situation in Ashanti deteriorated so much so that most of the CPP activists in the territory fled and lived in exile in Accra.[82] In the end, the colonial government responded to the NLM uprising by calling for a final pre-independence elections in July 1956. The leadership of the NLM seized on this opportunity in the belief, wrongly it turned out, that the various anti-CPP groupings could cobble together a majority in parliament. The CPP also agreed to the 1956 elections in part because they had no other options available to them. The NLM put up candidates in both Ashanti and the Colony and won a majority of the available seats in Ashanti. They

[80] Austin 1964, p. 273.

[81] The contemporaneous records also indicate that the colonial government was mindful not to over-react and bring on another 'mau mau' movement. Source: Allman (1993,p.105)

[82] Allman 1993, p. 18.

were, however, roundly rejected in the Colony save for the powerful Akim Abuakwa kingdom where the paramount chief, Nana Ofori Atta II, embraced the movement.[83]

The CPP, which won 71 out of the available 104 seats in the 1956 elections, led the country to independence in March 1957 without caving to the NLM demands for a federal system of government.[84] Shortly afterwards, the post-independence government also passed the Avoidance of Discrimination Act which banned all ethnic and regional political parties in Ghana.[85] This forced the NLM to merge with other anti-CPP parties to form the United Party (UP) in November 1957.[86] I claim, however, that the legacy of the NLM mobilization of the 1950s continues to loom large in Ghanaian politics because it directly led to the politicization of Ashanti ethnic identity during the late colonial period.

3.4.3.2 *The Northern Peoples Party*

The Northern Peoples Party (NPP), formed in February 1954, provided the stiffest opposition, electorally, to the CPP during the period of transition to independence. It won 15 seats during the 1954 and 1956 elections; this is 15 more seats than the Ghana Congress Party (GCP) obtained in 1954 and two more than the NLM won in 1956.[87] The NPP was, in a technical sense, a regional party since it only fielded candidates in the Northern Territories. Its regionalist vision is also reflected in the party's official constitution which described the party's objectives as including the following:

[83] Allman 1993, p. 78.
[84] Austin 1964, p. 347.
[85] Welch 1978, p. 647.
[86] Austin 1964, p. 384.
[87] Austin 1964, p. 243.

> 1. To ensure, (a) that there is respect for the culture of the people of the Northern Territories (protectorate), (b) their political and social advancement, (c) their just treatment and (d) their protection against abuses;
>
> ...
>
> 4. To ensure that by all legitimate and constitutional means the control and direction of government in the country as a whole shall pass into the hands of the chiefs and their people as soon as they are capable to assume full responsibility and to press for the immediate development and progress of the Protectorate.[88]

In practice, however, the NPP was dominated by the Mamprusi paramount chief (*Nayiri*) and his council of advisors, including the inimitable Mumuni Bawumia. Ladouceur (1979) explains, for instance, that the Mamprusi influence over the NPP was so pervasive that many of the illiterate populations in the region came to believe that ''the hand in the NPP symbol was the hand of the Nayiri.''[89] Mamprusi was also the largest and wealthiest native authority in the Northern Territories during this period.[90] The other paramount chiefs, perhaps fearing retribution from Nkrumah's CPP government, either chose to remain 'neutral' or sided with the more powerful CPP in the struggle for power during the late colonial period. The paramount chief of Dagomba, for instance, chose to remain 'neutral' in the 1954 and 1956 polls although there is ample evidence to suggest he privately preferred the NPP.[91] There

[88]Ladouceur 1979, p. 115.

[89]Ladouceur 1979, p. 119.

[90]The Mamprusi native authority controlled 10 out of the 25 seats in the Northern Territories during the 1954 and 1956 legislative assembly elections. It also had the largest native authority revenue base in the Northern Territories during the late colonial period.

[91]The Dagomba paramount chief (Ya-Na) gave this assurance directly to Nkrumah himself when the latter visited the chief's palace in 1954. Nkrumah also ensured that the Ya-Na's decision was broadcasted on the radio. Paul Staniland (1975, p.140) provides a detailed account of the encounter

is also ample evidence showing that the paramount chiefs of the Gonja, Nanumba and Builsa native authorities also supported the CPP.[92] It is however unclear if the paramount chief of the Wala native authority backed the CPP or NPP although a religious schism between Sunni and Ahmadiyya muslims was a more important factor in the pre-independence election outcomes in this specific territory.[93] The evidence suggests that the many smaller chiefs below the level of paramount chiefs were split between those backing the CPP and the NPP; the reasons for particular chiefs supporting either party were also fairly idiosyncratic.[94]

between the Ya-Na and Nkrumah in 1954.

[92]Ladouceur, p. 119-120 | The brother of the paramount chief of Builsa (Sandemnab), A. Afoko, contested the 1954 elections on the ticket of the CPP and won. This suggest the Sandemnab was favorably disposed to the CPP since its unlikely he would have given his blessings to his brother's candidature otherwise. Similarly, the brother of the Bimbilla paramount chief, Nantogmah Atta, also stood on the ticket of the CPP in 1954.

[93]Ladouceur 1979, p. 120; Wilks 1989.

[94]The chief of Navrongo, for instance, supported the CPP because of his close friendship with L.R. Abavana (a CPP political patron). Source: Ladouceur 1979, p. 119

Table 3.2: Northern territories chiefs and the CPP

Native Authority *Paramount chief*	**Attitude of chief towards CPP** [1]
Mamprusi *Nayiri*	Opposed CPP
Builsa *Sandemnab*	Pro-CPP
Dagomba *Ya-Na*	Neutral
Nanumba *Bimbilla-Na*	Pro-CPP
Gonja *Yagbonwura*	Pro-CPP
Wala *Wa-Na*	Unknown

[1] Ladouceur (1979:119-120) and Staniland (1975:140)

The reasons for the Nayiri's opposition to the CPP are not hard to fathom. Imoru Salifu, a founding member of the NPP, explains, for instance, that the Northern Peoples Party shot down a proposal to merge with the CPP in 1956 because ''[Nkrumah] was against the chiefs and separated the chiefs from the people...So we found it difficult to go with [him].''[95] It appears then that the Mamprusi-led NPP mobilization of the 1950s, like the NLM in Ashanti, was motivated by the anti-chieftaincy attitudes/policies of Nkrumah's CPP. The NPP merged together with the NLM to form the United Party (UP) following the passage of the Avoidance of Discrimination Act (ADA) in December 1957.[96] I show below that the Nayiri's

[95] Ladouceur 1979, p. 136.
[96] Ladouceur 1979, p. 165.

opposition to the CPP in the 1950s continues to impact contemporary politics in Ghana because it has left in its wake a legacy of politicized ethnic identities among the Mamprusi, Frafra and Kusasi; all three groups were under the control of the Nayiri during the 1950s.

3.4.4 Nkrumah's response to chief led anti-nationalist mobilization

Prior to the emergence of the chief-led anti-nationalist movements of the 1950s, the CPP simply cruised from one electoral victory to the other and seemed well on the way to attaining independence without much of a hurdle.[97] The party's large victory margins, coupled with the nationalist fervor of the period, created a sense of complacency which meant Nkrumah and the other CPP leaders were initially caught flat footed by the virulence of the chief-led anti-nationalist mobilization efforts; this was especially true of the NLM and to a much lesser extent the Northern Peoples Party. Once they got over their initial shock, however, the leaders of the CPP proved quite effective in confronting the peculiar challenges posed by chief-led opposition to their cause. In the case of the NLM, the CPP government responded by painting the movement as a selfish attempt by the Ashanti chiefs to undermine the national development agenda. The CPP media, for instance, pointed to Ashanti agitations over the 1954 cocoa pricing policy, the proximate cause of the emergence of the NLM uprising, as evidence of Ashanti particularism. Andoh (1987) writes that ''The CPP was able to portray Asante as selfish; as wanting alone to enjoy the fruits of

[97]The CPP won 34 out of the 38 contested seats in 1951. The party also won 71 out of 104 seats in 1954. The main opposition party in 1951, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) managed to win only 2 seats in 1951. In 1954, the CPP's main opponent, the Ghana Congress Party (GCP) won only a single seat.

the cocoa industry which, though largely located in Asante, was the result of the collective effort of people from all parts of the country.''[98] Nkrumah's government also stoked fears of potential Ashanti hegemony over the much smaller ethnic groups during this period: ''The CPP was able to portray the NLM as an organization which was seeking to restore Asante to the position of dominance which it held over most parts of the country in the precolonial era.''[99] The chiefs of the Colony, through the Joint Provincial Council of Chiefs (JPC), consequently voted to reject the NLM call for a federal system of government.[100]

The strategy to divide the chiefly front by playing on historical fears of hegemonic domination by more powerful ethnic groups was also effectively deployed in the Northern Territories. For instance, when the paramount chief of Mamprusi, under the auspices of the Northern Peoples Party, began organizing to send a delegation to London (prior to the 1956 elections) to plead for a separate independence for the North, the CPP government sent one of its ministers to warn the non-Mamprusi chiefs that the real intentions of the Mamprusi paramount chief was to return the Northern Territories to a bygone era when the Mamprusi dominated the other ethnic groups.[101] Many of the chiefs, as it turned out, found this narrative persuasive and subsequently signed a document protesting the demands for a separate independence

[98] Andoh 1987, p. 178.

[99] Andoh 1987, p. 178.

[100] Andoh 1987, p. 181.

[101] Austin (1964, p.158) writes:''The government sent J.H. Allassani, Minister of Education, to the North to undermine the proposed delegation. He visited a number of chiefs in non-Mamprusi areas and explained to them that the purpose of the delegation was to ask that the Nayiri be recognized as the paramount chief of the Northern Territories with a status similar to that of the Asantehene in Asante. Allassani asked the Northern chiefs to sign documents protesting, through the Prime Minister and the Governor, to the Queen and the Secretary of State for the Colonies against this attempt of the Nayiri to dominate the other paramount chiefs in the North.''

for the Northern Territories.[102]

The CPP government also exploited local chieftaincy disputes and other fissures within the territories of anti-CPP chiefs in order to weaken them. In Ashanti, the CPP government seized on the longstanding aspirations of the Brong (of Western Ashanti) for independence from the Ashanti confederacy in order to undermine and weaken the Ashanti king.[103] In fact, prior to the emergence of the NLM, the CPP government rebuffed entreaties to support the separatist ambitions of the Brong people.[104] Following the emergence of the NLM, however, Nkrumah reversed course and fully embraced the Brong demands for independence from Ashanti. The CPP government subsequently promised to break up Ashanti after independence in order to set up an independent Brong-Kyempem traditional council.[105] Nkrumah's government also announced its support for the establishment of a separate administrative district for the Brong people after independence.[106] Following these promises from the CPP government, the Brong towns in Western Ashanti rebelled against the Asantehene and declared their ''unflinching support to the prime minister and the present government'' and pledged to ''strongly oppose and detest any form of federal government for the Gold Coast.''[107] The resulting schism between the Brong territories and the rest of Ashanti subsequently manifested itself in the outcome of

[102] Austin 1964, p. 158.

[103] The Brong were subjects of the Ashanti state in the early 19th century but then joined the British to defeat the Ashanti in the war of 1900. Afterwards the British awarded the Brong chiefs a separate state in 1901. But in 1935 the British colonial government changed its mind and leaned on the Brong chiefs to rejoin the restored Ashanti confederacy. The Brong chiefs obliged but did so only reluctantly; they had since then sought every opportunity to break away from the Ashanti confederacy.

[104] Austin(1964, p.295) notes, for instance, that: ''The initial reaction of the CPP government to the Brong-Kyempem federation had been one of disapproval. The officials stressed the advantages of retaining Ashanti as a regional unit, the CPP added that it was opposed to tribalism.''

[105] Austin 1964, p. 295.

[106] Austin 1964, p. 295.

[107] Andoh 1987, p. 178.

the final pre-independence elections in 1956.[108]

The tactic of exploiting local fissures to undermine anti-CPP chiefs was also deployed within the Mamprusi kingdom as well. The Mamprusi paramount chief, for reasons of historical accident, came to be in charge of a vast territory which included not only Mamprusi ethnics but also the Frafra and the Kusasi ethnic groups during the colonial period.[109] The Frafra and Kusasi, however, resented being the subjects of the Mamprusi and had, over the period of British colonial rule, sought independence from Mamprusi paramount chief.[110] The CPP government, in an effort to undercut the influence of the Mamprusi paramount chief, backed the Frafra and Kusasi demands for autonomy during the late colonial period.[111] This strategy, as I show in the section below, caused the Frafra and Kusasi to become supporters of the CPP while the Mamprusi ethnics remained staunch opponents of Nkrumah's party.

3.5 Chief-led anti-nationalist mobilization and the politicization of ethnic cleavages

I demonstrate here that the chief-led anti-nationalist mobilization of the 1950s directly politicized the ethnic identities of the groups under the control of the anti-CPP chiefs. I show, for instance, that the National Liberation Movement (NLM) of the 1950s directly politicized Ashanti and Akyem ethnic identities during the

[108] Andoh (1987, p.182) notes that ''The CPP won all the seats in the Brong constituencies but suffered heavy defeats in the remaining parts of Ashanti (save for Obuasi and Asante Akim where the heavy presence of migrant (mining) laborers tilted the balance in the CPP's favor).''

[109] Ladouceur 1979, p. 121.

[110] Ladouceur 1979, p. 121.

[111] Ladouceur 1979, p. 125.

late colonial period. In addition, I demonstrate that the opposition of the Mamprusi paramount chief (Nayiri) to Kwame Nkrumah's CPP similarly led to the politicization of the ethnic groups under his control during the late colonial period.

3.5.1 The National Liberation Movement (NLM) and the politicization of Ashanti ethnic identity in the 1950s

The British colonial government, as part of the process of preparing the Gold Coast for eventual independence, organized three separate elections in the 1950s to determine which of the different nationalist groupings should lead the country to independence. The first of these elections was held in 1951 and this was soon followed by the 1954 and 1956 polls. For the 1951 election, Ashanti was divided into 13 electoral constituencies; 12 rural constituencies and the Kumasi metropolis. Kwame Nkrumah's CPP easily won the Kumasi metropolis seat, the capital of Ashanti, with 8,358 votes compared to the opposition's 570 votes.[112] The CPP also won all 12 rural Ashanti constituencies with relative ease.[113] Three years later and the CPP once again walloped the opposition by winning 18 of the 21 available seats in Ashanti.[114] The CPP's closest competitor in the 1954 elections, the Ghana Congress Party (GCP), only managed to win a single seat and the remaining two seats went to independents.[115]

Support for the CPP in Ashanti, however, took a tumble following the emergence

[112] Austin 1964, p. 142.
[113] Austin 1964, pp. 140-141.
[114] Austin 1964, p. 244.
[115] Austin 1964, p. 244 | Nkrumah's CPP obtained 59% of the votes, the GCP 9% and 29% went to independents. The vast majority of these independents were disgruntled CPP 'rebels' who had deserted the party following their disqualification in the party's botched primaries.

of the NLM in September 1954. The first signs of trouble for the CPP came when one of their incumbent MPs representing an Ashanti rural constituency died in a motor accident and thereby prompting a by-election in July 1955.[116] In the campaign to fill the vacant seat, the NLM decided to put up a candidate and also campaign on an Ashanti nationalist platform. They successfully cast the election as a contest between ''the Ashanti nation and the forces that would like to disrupt the country.''[117] The NLM wound up winning that seat with 69.5 percent of the votes and the CPP candidate got the remaining 30.5 percent of the votes.[118] This was a remarkable outcome because the CPP had won this same seat with 70 percent of the votes only a year before.[119]

The sharp decline in support for the CPP in Ashanti, following the emergence of the NLM in 1954, was further made manifest during the final pre-independence elections in July 1956. In that election, the CPP managed to win only 8 seats (a drop of 10 seats since the 1954 polls), the NLM captured 12 seats and the Muslim Association Party (MAP) took the remaining 1 seat.[120]

Table 3.3: Election results in Ashanti - 1954 and 1956

1954 Elections				**1956 Elections**			
CPP		GCP		CPP		NLM	
Seats	*Votes*	*Seats*	*Votes*	*Seats*	*Votes*	*Seats*	*Votes*
18	95,845 [1] (59%)	1	14,854 (9%)	8	96,968 (43%)	12	119,533 (53%)

[1] The true share of support for the CPP in 1954 was much higher; 37,584 (23%) of the votes went to CPP 'rebel' candidates - i.e. CPP independents (Source: Austin (1976, p.69)

[116] Austin 1964, p. 274.
[117] Austin 1964, p. 275.
[118] Austin 1964, p. 276.
[119] Austin 1964, p. 276.
[120] Austin 1964, p. 354.

The internal variation in the voting patterns within Ashanti suggest that the decline in support for the CPP was driven primarily by a politicization of Ashanti ethnic identity following the emergence of the NLM. As previously noted, Kwame Nkrumah's government responded to the emergence of the NLM with a strategy to weaken the Ashanti king by exploiting pre-existing fissures within the Ashanti confederacy; he promised the Brong of Western Ashanti an independent paramount chieftaincy status in exchange for their support.[121] This strategy appeared to have achieved its intended objective since the 5 Brong constituencies in western Ashanti voted differently than the rest of the region in the critical 1956 pre-independence elections.[122]

Table 3.4: Results of 1956 election in Ashanti

	NLM/MAP		CPP	
	Votes	*%*	*Votes*	*%*
15 Ashanti seats	101,465	63.4	58,597	36.6
5 Brong seats	22,663	38.7	35,806	61.3

The five Brong seats, as the table above shows, largely backed the CPP while the remainder of Ashanti mostly voted for the NLM. A closer examination of the voting pattern within Ashanti proper also indicates that the CPP performed significantly better in constituencies with large non-Ashanti settler populations.[123] Since the 1956 polls, Ashanti has remained a stronghold for political parties tracing their

[121]The Brong, though a part of the Ashanti Confederacy during the late colonial period, had a long-running dispute with the Asantehene over land rights and have sought, in the past, to be rid of Asante domination.

[122]Nkrumah honored his promise to the Brong chiefs by carving out the Brong Ahafo region from Ashanti in 1959. Source: Rathbone 2000, p. 145

[123]Andoh (1978, p.182) notes, for instance, that ''The CPP won all the seats in the Brong constituencies but suffered heavy defeats in the remaining parts of Ashanti (save for Obuasi and Asante Akim where the heavy presence of migrant (mining) laborers tilted the balance in the CPP's favor).'' | Austin 1964, p. 352

linage to the NLM.[124] These parties are collectively referred to as belonging to the so-called 'Danquah-Busia tradition' of Ghana's historical two party system.[125]

Figure 3.1: Support for Danquah-Busia parties, 1954-2016



The figure above tracks the share of votes obtained by political parties belonging to the Danquah-Busia tradition in all competitive elections from 1954 to 2016. It clearly shows that these political parties have consistently outperformed their national averages in Ashanti region since the final pre-independence elections in 1956. The Ashanti region is also home to the vast majority of Ashanti ethnics in the country;

[124]These are the Progress Party (PP) for the 1969 elections; the Popular Front Party (PFP) and the United National Convention (UNC) in 1979; and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) from 1992 to present.
[125]Nugent 1999, p. 290; Martinson 2001; Morrison 2004.

the 1960 census places the share of Ashanti ethnics in the region at 66.3 percent while the recent 2010 census places that number at 62 percent.[126] A more robust quantitative analysis in section 3.6 below confirms that Ashanti ethnic identity is indeed politicized in favor of the Danquah-Busia parties in Ghanaian politics.

3.5.2 Chief-led anti-nationalist mobilization and the politicization of Akyem ethnic identity in the 1950s

The NLM, as previously explained, faced wholesale rejection in the Colony in the 1950s except in Akim (or Akyem) Abuakwa where the paramount chief, Okyenhene Nana Ofori Atta II, welcomed the movement with open arms. In fact, Nana Ofori Atta II's opposition to the CPP predated the emergence of the NLM.[127] Akim Abuakwa was therefore a bastion of opposition politics long before the NLM was formed. The 1951 legislative assembly elections, for instance, saw the opposition United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) win just 2 seats as against the CPP's 34 in the Colony and Ashanti.[128] Both UGCC seats were from the two-member Akim Abuakwa constituency.[129] Three years later the CPP, once again, defeated the opposition United Ghana Convention (UGC) by winning 38 out of the 44 available seats in the Colony.[130] The remaining six seats went to independents and the UGC won zero seats.[131] Still, the opposition's vote share in the five Akim Abuakwa constituencies, during the

[126]Gil, Aryee, and D.K.Ghansah 1964, The intervening censuses did not collect data on ethnicity - this was part of a government strategy to de-emphasize the political salience of ethnic identities in the country.
[127]Rathbone 2000, p. 40.
[128]Austin 1964, pp. 140-141.
[129]Austin 1964, p. 145.
[130]Austin 1964, p. 244.
[131]Austin 1964, p. 244.

1954 contest, accounted for as much as 62 percent of its total vote share in the entire Colony. It is no exaggeration then to suggest that whatever opposition existed against the CPP in 1954, it was definitely centered in Akim Abuakwa and around the personality of the paramount chief, Nana Ofori Atta II.

Table 3.5: The 1954 elections in the Colony

	CPP		GCP		Independents/Other Parties	
	Seats	*Votes*	*Seats*	*Votes*	*Seats*	*Votes*
Akim Abuakwa	5	18,875	0	10,712	0	2,186
Rest of the Colony	33	159,351	0	6,598	0	83,395

The above scenario was once again replayed during the final pre-independence elections in 1956. Even though the CPP won all of the available seats in the Colony, the NLM obtained its most significant support outside of Ashanti in Akim Abuakwa.[132] The CPP polled roughly 20,000 votes in Akim Abuakwa as against the NLM's 13,400.[133] In the rest of the Colony, however, Nkrumah's CPP walloped the opposition by getting nearly 160,000 votes to the NLM's 20,000.[134] The NLM vote share in the five Akim Abuakwa constituencies accounted for 41 percent of its total support in the Colony (which had 44 constituencies of roughly equal sizes).[135]

Table 3.6: The 1956 elections in the Colony

	CPP		NLM		Independents	
	Seats	*Votes*	*Seats*	*Votes*	*Seats*	*Votes*
Akim Abuakwa	5	19,932	0	13,419	0	374
Rest of the Colony	39	159,092	0	19,647	0	9,162

[132] Austin 1964, p. 351.
[133] Austin 1964, p. 351.
[134] Austin 1964, p. 351.
[135] Austin 1964, p. 351.

The NLM's failure to win a plurality of votes in Akim Abuakwa, despite having the support of the paramount chief, is explained, in part, by the fact that Akyem ethnics constituted a minority population in their own territory.[136] The non-Akyem migrant workers on the cocoa plantations constituted a majority in the territory during this period and most of them backed the CPP.[137] The territory has, however, remained a stronghold for political parties belonging to the Danquah-Busia tradition throughout the post-colonial period. The Progress Party (PP), for instance, won all five legislative assembly seats in Akim Abuakwa during the 1969 elections and obtained sixty seven percent of the total votes in the process.[138] In the subsequent election in 1979, the United National Convention (UNC) managed to win 3 of the 5 available seats despite a split in the Danquah-Busia front in that election.[139] Since the return to electoral democracy in 1992, Akim Abuakwa has also continued to remain a stronghold of the New Patriotic Party, the present day representatives of the Danquah-Busia tradition in Ghanaian politics.[140] I show in section 3.6 below that the strong support for Danquah-Busia parties in Akim Abuakwa is explained, in part, by the fact that Akyem ethnic identity has been politicized in favor of that

[136]South Akim Abuakwa L.C had 36.86 percent Akyem ethnics; East Akim Abuakwa L.C. had 40.68 percent; and West Akim Abuakwa had 25.38 percent Akyem ethnics.

[137]Rathbone 2000.

[138]1. *Abuakwa Constituency*: PP - 8191, NAL - 3461, Independent - 128, APRP - 53, UNP - 44; 2. *Suhum Constituency*: PP -7016, NAL - 4364, UNP - 118, APRP - 112 ; 3. *Kade Constituency*: PP - 6598, NAL - 2567, UNP - 96 ; 4. *Asiakwa Kwabeng Constituency*: PP - 5640, NAL - 1247, UNP - 67; 5. *Kroaboa-Coaltar Constituency*: PP - 4728, NAL - 3252.

[139]The Danquah-Busia tradition failed to mount a united front in 1979. They were split between Victor Owusu's Popular Front Party (PFP) and William Ofori Atta's United National Convention. The UNC, however, managed to win the Kade, Abuakwa and Asiakwa Kwabeng seats while the Hilla Limann's Peoples National Party (PNP) won the Suhum and Densuagyaa seats.

[140]During the most recent election in 2016, for instance, the New Patriotic Party Presidential candidate, Nana Akuffo-Addo obtained the following results in Akim Abuakwa constituencies: Abuakwa North - 66%; Abuakwa South 81%; Akwatia - 57%; Atiwa East - 75%; Atiwa West - 80%; Ayensuano - 58%; Fanteakwa North - 56%; Fanteakwa South - 70 %; Kade - 71 %; Lower West Akim - 63%; Suhum - 60%; and Upper West Akim - 47 %

tradition.

3.5.3 The Northern Peoples Party and the Politicization of Mamprusi, Frafra and Kusasi ethnic identities in the 1950s

The Frafra and Kusasi were acephalous groups with no centralized political institutions prior to the arrival of British colonial rule in the late 1800s.[141] The closest thing to a centralized authority institution for these groups was the office of the *tendanaa*, the earth priest, who served as the intermediary between the gods and the people.[142] The British system of indirect rule, however, necessitated the creation of chiefs and so the colonial authorities identified the most influential men within the Frafra and Kusasi towns and made them chiefs.[143] They then placed these two groups under the leadership of the paramount chief of the highly centralized Mamprusi kingdom. The Frafra and Kusasi however resented this arrangement and had, throughout the colonial period, sought to regain their independence from the Mamprusi paramount chief.[144] This fissure within the Mamprusi kingdom became the focus of partisan politics during the period of transition to independence in the 1950s and the ensuing struggle led to the politicization of the ethnic identities involved.

The paramount chief of Mamprusi (*Nayiri*) , as previously explained, was at the forefront of anti-CPP mobilization efforts in the Northern Territories during the late

[141]Ladouceur 1979, p. 31.
[142]Ladouceur 1979, p. 31.
[143]Ladouceur 1979, p. 121.
[144]Ladouceur 1979, p. 121.

colonial period.[145] For instance, he instructed all sub-chiefs within the Mamprusi kingdom to support candidates standing on the ticket of the Northern Peoples Party during the 1954 elections.[146] This, of course, ensured an easy victory for the NPP in the Mamprusi kingdom; they won nine of the available ten seats.[147] This victory was, however, only temporary since shortly afterwards local CPP activists from the Frafra and Kusasi sections of the Mamprusi district began to decry the undue influence of the Nayiri and also started agitating for a dissolution of the colonial arrangement which made them subjects of the Mamprusi paramount chief.[148] The CPP government, seeing an opportunity to undercut the influence of the Nayiri, announced, in September 1954, that it supported 'in principle' demands for separate administrative districts for the Frafra and Kusasi people.[149] The Mamprusi State Council protested by dispatching a petition to the British colonial Governor in Accra. The petition read in part:

> Out of the ten members returned to the Legislative Assembly by the Mamprusi District at the General Elections, nine were non-CPP, the party in power, and this, the Council is convinced, angered the Prime Minister and his Government, and having taken into consideration the Government's threats that districts which did not return CPP candidates into the Assembly would be denied developments and administrative facilities, the Council maintains that this move is more of a political nature than an administrative convenience.''[150]

[145]Ladouceur 1979, p. 118.
[146]Ladouceur 1979, p. 118.
[147]The NPP technically won 8 seats but the victorious candidate for the Bongo constituency, W.A. Amoro, joined the NPP immediately after the elections in 1954. See appendix 4 for full list of the results for the 1954 legislative assembly elections.
[148]Ladouceur 1979, p. 124.
[149]Ladouceur 1979, p. 125.
[150]Ladouceur 1979, p. 125.

The protestations from the Mamprusi chiefs ultimately forced Nkrumah to shelve the plan to break up the Mamprusi district but his tacit backing of the demands of the Frafra and Kusasi people produced immediate political dividends: R.B Braimah (MP, Bolga) and W.A. Amoro (MP, Bongo), both Frafra ethnics, crossed over from the opposition side to join the CPP prior to the next elections in 1956.[151] Support for the CPP also increasingly became fused with the campaign against Mamprusi hegemony within the Frafra and Kusasi territories. The CPP was therefore able to significantly improve on its performance within the Frafra and Kusasi constituencies between the 1954 and 1956 elections: they managed to peel off one more seat from the opposition within the Frafra territories and also picked up two additional seats within the Kusasi territories.[152] Meanwhile the Northern Peoples Party held its ground in South Mamprusi where most of the ethnic Mamprusi resided.

Table 3.7: Support for CPP in Mamprusi, 1954-1956

District	*1954 (% votes)*	*1956 (% votes)*	*% Change 1954-1956*
South Mamprusi	24.8	27.5	+3
Kusasi	34.6	51.3	+16
Frafra	18.6	45.2	+27

The association between Frafra and Kusasi ethnic identities and support for the CPP was further boosted when in January 1958, less than a year after independence, the Nkrumah government broke up Mamprusi and created two new districts for the Frafra and Kusasi people.[153] This decision was quickly followed, three months afterwards, by the creation of a separate and independent Frafra and Kusasi paramount

[151]Ladouceur 1979, p. 133.
[152]See appendix 4 for full results of the 1954 and 1956 election results in Mamprusi.
[153]Ladouceur 1979, p. 169.

chieftaincies in April 1958; this ensured that the Mamprusi paramount chief could no longer appoint chiefs for the Frafra and Kusasi territories.[154] These twin decisions also led to a mini-revolution within the Frafra and Kusasi territories as the newly installed paramount chiefs went about replacing existing sub-chiefs appointed by the paramount chief of Mamprusi.[155]

The Frafra and Kusasi territories experienced yet another leadership convulsion after Nkrumah's overthrow in February 1966. The National Liberation Council (NLC) military government, which deposed Nkrumah's CPP government, passed a decree restoring Mamprusi control over the Kusasi and Frafra territories.[156] This then led to the dismissal of anti-Mamprusi chiefs within the Frafra and Kusasi territories.[157] The meddling of the central government created a situation where national politics was interpreted through the lens of the chieftaincy struggles between the Mamprusi on the one hand and the Frafra and Kusasi on the other. Each side of the conflict also saw their alliance to national political parties as a means to gaining advantage over the other.

In the election to restore civilian rule in 1969 the NLC backed Progress Party (PP), which represented an amalgamation of the anti-Nkrumah movements of the 1950s, was victorious in the South Mamprusi district but fell short in the Frafra and Kusasi constituencies. As the table below shows, PP obtained 30, 40 and 58 percent of the votes in the Frafra, Kusasi and South Mamprusi districts respectively.[158]

[154]Ladouceur 1979, p. 169.
[155]Lund 2003.
[156]Lund 2003.
[157]Lund 2003.
[158]See appendix 4 for the full results of the 1969 election in Mamprusi

Table 3.8: Support for Progress Party in 1969

Territory	*% votes*
Frafra	30.2
Kusasi	39.6
South Mamprusi	57.8
Nationwide	58.0

The PP government under Kofi Busia continued with the policy to recognize the Mamprusi paramount chief as the overlord of the Frafra and Kusasi territories. The National Redemption Council (NRC), which overthrew the PP government in 1972, also refused to re-examine the Mamprusi chieftaincy conflict and preferring instead to let sleeping dogs lie.[159] But the issue was once again revisited by the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) government in 1983. The PNDC, which looked favorably on the Nkrumah era, restored independence of the Frafra and Kusasi from Mamprusi rule.[160] This of course won them enormous favor among the Frafra and Kusasi ethnics. The PNDC was later transformed into the National Democratic Congress (NDC) in anticipation of the change to a democratic system of government in the early 1990s. The NDC is now one of the two major political parties in Ghana; the other major party, the New Patriotic Party (NPP), is a 'linear descendant' of the political movements which opposed Nkrumah's CPP in the 1950s.[161] The empirical evidence, as is demonstrated in the next section, shows that the Mamprusi ethnics mostly vote for the NPP while the Frafra and Kusasi mostly support the NDC. The preceding discussion suggest that this specific dynamic of contemporary Ghanaian politics is directly connected to the struggle for power between Kwame Nkrumah

[159]Lund 2003, p. 594.

[160]The PNDC passed the Chieftaincy Law of 1983 (PNDCL 75) which reversed the NLCD 112 and restored an independent chieftaincy status to the Frafra ad Kusasi. Source: Lund 2003, p. 595

[161]Nugent 1999, p. 221.

and the Mamprusi paramount chief (Nayiri) during the late colonial period.

3.6 Contemporary politicized ethnic cleavages as the after-effects of late colonial chieftaincy politics

In the previous sections, I showed that the struggle for power between Kwame Nkrumah's Convention Peoples Party (CPP) and the most powerful chiefs in the Gold Coast precipitated the emergence of chief-led anti-nationalist mobilization during the late colonial period. I subsequently demonstrated that these chief-led anti-nationalist movements politicized the ethnic identities of the groups so mobilized. I would now draw on empirical quantitative data to show that the politicized ethnic cleavages that emerged in the 1950s have largely persisted throughout the post-colonial period. This analysis is possible, in part, because Ghana has had a historical two-party system that dates back to the period of transition to independence in the 1950s. The New Patriotic Party (NPP), one of Ghana's two major parties in the present era is a 'linear descendant' of the political groupings which opposed Nkrumah's CPP in the 1950s.[162] This section is therefore focused on showing that the ethnic groups which were mobilized to oppose the CPP in the 1950s are also staunch supporters of the NPP six decades later. The 2010 national census together with the results of the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections provide the primary data for the analysis in this section.

[162]The current president of Ghana, Nana Akuffo Addo, and his vice, Mumuni Bawumia, perfectly illustrate the historical linkage between the NPP of today and the groups that opposed Nkrumah in the 1950s. Nana Akuffo Addo's father served as Ghana's president under the Progress Party (PP) government following the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966. Mumuni Bawumia's father was also the State Secretary to the Nayiri of Mamprusi in the 1950s.

Empirical Strategy:

The analysis in this section seeks to estimate the extent to which membership of specific ethnic groups in Ghana influences support for the New Patriotic Party. I conduct these estimates using Goodman's (1953) Ecological Regression method because both the census and elections data are only available in aggregates.[163] The ecological regression method assumes the form of an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression:

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta X_i + \epsilon_i \tag{3.1}$$

In the equation above, the subscript i indexes the various electoral constituencies. X_i is the share of voters in the constituency belonging to ethnic group X and Y_i is the share of the votes in constituency i for the party of interest and ϵ_i is the error term which is assumed to be independent and identically distributed with a mean of 0. The parameters α and β are estimated using ordinary least squares.

Demographic Data:

The 2010 national census provides the key demographic data for the analysis in this section. The census data is aggregated at the administrative district level of which there are 216 in Ghana. Electoral constituencies in Ghana are also demarcated such that each constituency neatly falls within the boundaries of a single administrative district. I therefore assigned the demographic data for each administrative district to its corresponding electoral constituencies for this analysis. Besides providing data for

[163]Goodman 1953.

the ethnic composition of each district, the 2010 census also collected demographic information including data on the share of the rural population, education levels, and employment rates within each census district. The ethnic composition of the districts serves as the primary independent variable for the analysis while the additional demographic information provides non-ethnic covariates for testing the robustness of our ethnic model. The ethnic groups in our model include the Ashanti, Akyem, Mamprusi, Frafra and Kusasi; these are the groups that were successfully mobilized by their respective paramount chiefs to oppose Nkrumah's CPP in the 1950s.

Election Data:

The dependent variable for the analysis in this section is the average vote share for the New Patriotic Party (NPP) during the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections at the constituency level. These two elections were chosen to maximize their proximity to the 2010 census, the source of the ethnic and demographic data. I also chose to use the average share of votes for the two elections in order to minimize the chance effects resulting from the specific dynamics of each election cycle.

Results:

The regression results from the table below indicate that the five ethnic groups under consideration explain over 56 percent of the variation in the vote share of the New Patriotic Party (NPP). The effect of each individual ethnic variable on support for the NPP are also highly significant. The signs of the coefficients also comport with our expectations regarding the historical connection between these groups and the New Patriotic Party. The results suggest that members of the Ashanti, Akyem and Mamprusi ethnic groups generally support the New Patriotic Party while members

of the Kusasi and Frafra ethnic groups mostly vote against the party. Specifically, holding all else constant, increasing the share of Asante, Akyem and Mamprusi voters in a constituency by 1 percent produces 0.58, 0.59 and 0.12 percent increases in the vote share for the NPP respectively. Conversely, increasing the share of Frafra and Kusasi voters in a constituency by 1 percent reduces the share of votes for the NPP by 0.09 and 0.15 respectively.

Table 3.9: Effect of ethnic variables on support for New Patriotic Party

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Asante	0.579***	0.557***	0.569***	0.539***	0.527***
	(0.0233)	(0.0233)	(0.0228)	(0.0255)	(0.0292)
Akyem	0.599***	0.566***	0.604***	0.572***	0.524***
	(0.0491)	(0.0472)	(0.0474)	(0.0468)	(0.0531)
Mamprusi	0.124**	0.144**	0.145**	0.167***	0.159***
	(0.0567)	(0.0570)	(0.0565)	(0.0550)	(0.0574)
Kusasi	-0.145***	-0.0943***	-0.109***	-0.0789**	-0.0784**
	(0.0335)	(0.0342)	(0.0350)	(0.0325)	(0.0327)
Frafra	-0.0985***	-0.0936**	-0.103**	-0.0959**	-0.0826*
	(0.0351)	(0.0419)	(0.0414)	(0.0448)	(0.0419)
ShareRural		-0.0947***			-0.0987*
		(0.0257)			(0.0523)
PostBasicEd			0.228***		-0.418**
			(0.0868)		(0.205)
ShareUnemployed				1.250***	1.499**
				(0.318)	(0.678)
Constant	35.17***	41.15***	31.34***	29.80***	41.97***
	(1.273)	(2.032)	(1.953)	(1.677)	(6.068)
Observations	254	253	253	253	253
R-squared	0.569	0.586	0.576	0.589	0.597

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

These results remain stable and statistically significant even after introducing three different non-ethnic covariates separately and then together. The non-ethnic covariates also barely move the needle on the adjusted R-square scores. These results confirm the fact that a large part of Ghana's politicized ethnic cleavages can be traced to the chief-led anti-CPP mobilization of the 1950s. I already showed in the

previous section that members of the Ashanti, Akyem and Mamprusi ethnic groups overwhelmingly voted against Nkrumah's Convention Peoples Party (CPP) following the emergence of chief-led anti-CPP mobilization in the 1950s. Fast forward to the present period and members of these same groups continue to overwhelmingly back the New Patriotic Party (NPP), a party which traces its lineage directly to the anti-CPP movements of the 1950s. Conversely, the members of the Frafra and Kusasi ethnic groups who , for historically contingent reasons, largely supported the CPP during the late colonial period also continue to oppose the New Patriotic Party (NPP) today. A further examination of the top ten largest ethnic groups in Ghana, using the same data and methods above, reveals that the New Patriotic Party's core ethnic base, with the exception of the Brong, is limited to those ethnic groups whose chiefs opposed Nkrumah's CPP in the 1950s (see appendix 3).

3.7 Path-dependence and the reproduction of politicized ethnic cleavages in post-colonial Ghana

A careful examination of ethnic politics in Ghana suggest that the politicized ethnic cleavages which emerged in the 1950s have persisted throughout the post-colonial period through two specific mechanisms of path-dependence. The first is through a process by which national politics becomes localized and primarily seen through the prism of local disputes. This mechanism of path-dependence is especially responsible for the persistence of the political divide between Mamprusi ethnics on the one hand and Frafra and Kusasi ethnics on the other. As already noted, the Mamprusi paramount chief (Nayiri) used to exercise control over the ter-

ritories inhabited by the Frafra and Kusasi people until 1958 when, in an attempt to undercut the Nayiri, Nkrumah's CPP government granted these two groups their own independent paramount chieftaincy status. Subsequent governments, notably the National Liberation Council (NLC) and the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) have also intervened on separate occasions to favor their allies in this conflict.[164] The conflict over chieftaincy rights within the Frafra and Kusasi territories, as of February 2018, remains unresolved with the Mamprusi paramount chief insisting on his authority to appoint chiefs for the Kusasi and Frafra territories while the latter groups have continued to maintain that they are not subject to the Nayiri's authority. Each faction to this conflict have also sought allies in national politics since only the central government has the authority to make final pronouncements on the matter. The New Patriotic Party, due to their historical linkage to the Northern Peoples Party of the 1950s, are perceived as allies of the Mamprusi whereas the National Democratic Congress, which emerged from the PNDC in the early 1990s, are also perceived as allies of the Frafra and Kusasi people.[165] Members of the Mamprusi ethnic group therefore overwhelmingly support the New Patriotic Party whereas the Frafra and the Kusasi largely back the National Democratic Congress. It is impossible then to understand the persistence of ethnic bloc voting among these groups without a careful appreciation of the historical legacy of the struggle for power between Kwame Nkrumah and the paramount chief of the Mamprusi kingdom in the 1950s.

A second and much more speculative mechanism of path-dependence is the possible cumulative effect of elite self-selection and strategic decision-making in re-

[164] Lund 2003.

[165] It was the PNDC, which in 1983, re-granted the Frafra and Kusasi people independent paramount chieftaincy status in 1983.

sponse to the politicized ethnic cleavages which emerged during the late colonial period. This proposed mechanism assumes that the imperative to win is foremost on the minds of most politicians. It further assumes that Ghanaian politicians, being rational actors, would factor in the historical context of politics in their respective districts/constituencies when deciding which political party to join. This should be especially true in the Ghanaian context since party politics is not motivated by deep ideological divides. It should follow then that the best politicians, all things being equal, would join the party with a history of success in their respective districts. If this is correct then we should, overtime, come to have the best politicians self-selecting to join the political party with a history of success in their respective districts and mostly fringe candidates electing to compete on the platform of the party with little historical success in that district. Similarly, the political parties themselves, for short-term strategic reasons, can be expected to systematically under-invest in opposition districts since the expected returns on investment would be low. But this short-term strategic decision-making at both the candidate and party level can ultimately lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy where small differences get expanded and calcified over-time. This hypothesis is, however, an empirical question that needs to be subjected to scrutiny in future studies.

3.8 Conclusion:

This chapter makes a number of important contributions to the literature on ethnicity and politics in Africa. First and foremost is the finding that Ghana's politicized ethnic cleavages date back to the period of transition to independence in the 1950s. This fact calls into question the tendency to treat the phenomenon ethnic

politics in Africa as though these dynamics are untethered from the specific histories of the respective societies. The findings from this chapter also suggest that, on a very fundamental level, the persistence of ethnic politics in Africa is actually a story about poorly integrated states and botched state-building efforts that date back to the periods of transition to independence in the 1950s and 1960s. It is impossible then to fully understand the phenomenon of ethnic politics in Africa without first grappling with the history of the African state as a colonial artifact and the peculiar challenges that the various sub-nationalisms within the colonial state posed to the process of state building in the 1950s and 1960s.

The findings from this chapter also raise important methodological questions regarding the proper approach to studying the phenomenon of ethnic politics in Africa. For instance, the literature on this subject generally assumes that national political actors are the main drivers of the processes leading to the emergence of politicized ethnic cleavages across sub-Saharan Africa. Scholars therefore excessively focus on studying the motivations of national politicians and their strategies for maintaining ethnic-based coalitions. But the picture which emerges from the Ghanaian context is that the main drivers of the initial process leading to the politicization of ethnic cleavages were not the national politicians but rather the hereditary chiefs (a bottom up process). This is important because an approach which treats the processes leading to the emergence of politicized ethnic cleavages as bottom-up rather than top-down would have fundamentally different assumptions regarding the mechanisms for the persistence of these cleavages.

Finally, the Ghanaian example illustrates the importance of contingent factors in shaping the processes leading up the politicization of ethnic cleavages in post-

colonial Africa. The chapter shows that the processes leading to the emergence of politicized ethnic cleavages in Africa were by no means inexorable; they very much hinged on the strategic choices of the nationalist leadership at the time. For largely ideological reasons, Kwame Nkrumah chose an exclusionary rather than an inclusionary chiefs strategy during the period of transition to independence in the 1950s. This then prompted the emergence of chief-led ethnic opposition mobilization efforts and the politicization of ethnic cleavages in the process. These politicized ethnic cleavages, once activated, have subsequently persisted throughout the post-colonial period through the sheer power of path-dependence.

Chapter 4

Inclusionary Strategy and Depoliticized Ethnicity in Botswana

4.1 Introduction

Botswana is easily recognized as the most successful democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. The literature on politics and development in Africa is therefore replete with studies explaining why Botswana has thrived in a region defined by a history of unstable governments and chronic under-development. These include works explaining the durability of Botswana's democracy;[1] it's escape from the so-called resource curse;[2] and the country's impressive economic growth record among others.[3] The existing literature is, however, quite thin on explanations for why and how Botswana has managed to avoid the trap of politicized ethnic and tribal cleavages in Africa. This chapter aims to fill this gap in the literature by arguing that

[1] DuToit 1995.
[2] Iimi 2007; Lange and Wright 2004.
[3] Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2002; Leith 2005.

Botswana's largely depoliticized ethnic and tribal cleavages are the enduring legacy of the country's peacefully negotiated transition to independence in the 1960s. The periods of transition to independence in the 1950s-1960s, I argue, represented a series of *critical junctures* where the choices of Africa's nationalist leaders helped determine whether or not the pre-existing ethnic and tribal cleavages in their respective countries would become politicized. I specifically argue that the choices of Africa's nationalist leaders, with respect to the critically important issue of finding an appropriate post-independence role for their hereditary rulers, often have long-term consequences for whether or not ethnic and tribal identities became politicized. In this regard, two factors are important in determining whether or not the transition strategies of Africa's nationalist leaders result in the politicization of ethnic and tribal cleavages: (i) whether or not the country in question had *powerful chiefs* during the late colonial period;[4] and (ii) whether or not the nationalist leaders of said country adopt an *inclusionary* or *exclusionary* chiefs strategy during the period of transition to independence. I hypothesize that ethnic and tribal cleavages should become highly politicized in countries that had *both* powerful hereditary chiefs and nationalist leaders who also pursue an *exclusionary* chiefs strategy during the period of transition to independence. Conversely, ethnic and tribal cleavages should become largely depoliticized in countries that either did not have powerful chiefs or which had nationalist leaders who adopt an *inclusionary* chiefs strategy during the period of transition to independence.

Botswana, like many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, had powerful tribal chiefs

[4]Chiefs are considered 'powerful' where there is a tradition of highly centralized chieftaincy institutions. A useful measure of pre-colonial centralization is provided by: Gennaioli, N., & Rainer, I. (2007). The Modern Impact of Precolonial Centralization in Africa.*Journal of Economic Growth*,12(3), 185-234.

during its late colonial period. But, unlike most countries in Africa, its nationalist leaders, led by Seretse Khama, adopted an inclusionary chiefs strategy during the country's transition to independence in the 1960s. I will show in this chapter that Khama's inclusionary and conciliatory approach to the chiefs, during the independence transition period, is *primarily* responsible for the non-emergence of politicized ethnic and tribal cleavages in Botswana. The remainder of this chapter will proceed as follows: (i) first, a review of the existing explanations for Botswana's largely non-politicized ethnic and tribal cleavages in the literature; (ii) secondly, a brief summary of the theoretical argument undergirding this essay; and (iii) finally, evidence in support of the argument that Botswana's non-politicized ethnic and tribal cleavages are the product of Seretse Khama's largely conciliatory and inclusionary approach to transitioning the country's powerful hereditary chiefs into the post-colonial era.

4.2 Review of literature

The most oft-cited explanation for Botswana's non-politicized ethnic and tribal cleavages is the country's supposed relative ethnic homogeneity. Easterly & Levine (1997) declare that ''Botswana has one of the most ethnically homogenous populations in Africa.''[5] Alesina et al. (2003) also claim that Botswana has ''relatively low ethnic diversity for Africa.''[6] The argument here is that ethnic and tribal cleavages are non-politicized in Botswana because the supposed relative ethnic homogeneity of the country renders this particular fault-line a non-viable option for effective political mobilization. This argument is, however, invalid because the underlying claim

[5] Easterly and Levine 1997.
[6] Alesina et al. 2003.

regarding a relatively homogenous Botswana is false. This claim rests on a poor reading of Botswana's history since it conflates the country's success in building a national identity around the dominant Tswana language and culture for the cause of such relative ethnic harmony. Even though the Tswana speaking people of Botswana make up the vast majority of the national population, they nevertheless did not always think of themselves as belonging to a single ethnic or political grouping.[7] In fact, prior to the emergence of British colonial rule and throughout the colonial period, the peoples of the territory now known as Botswana (formerly Bechuanaland) belonged to eight independent and politically distinct 'tribes': the *Bamangwato*, *Bakwena*, *Bangwaketse*, *Batawana*, *Batlokwa*, *Bakgatla*, *Barolong* and *Bamalete*.[8] Each of these tribes, as Proctor (1968) explains, was ''ruled by a powerful hereditary Chief and was politically distinct from the others...and no 'national' consciousness transcended tribal loyalties.''[9] British colonial rule also helped reinforce the 'tribe' as the primary unit of political consciousness by superimposing a native administration system unto the existing tribal boundaries.[10] Both of Botswana's pre-independence censuses in 1946 and 1964, for instance, make no mention of a pan-Tswana identity as an ethnic category.[11] The idea of a pan-tribal Tswana identity, to the extent that it exists, is therefore, at best, a consequence of successful nation-building rather than a cause of it. The experience of neighboring Lesotho also suggests that the shared Tswana culture of the vast majority of the population is an insufficient explanation for Botswana's depoliticized ethnic and tribal cleavages. As Du Toit (1995) explains, the politics of Lesotho is ''dominated by lineage conflict between different chieftaincies''

[7] Schapera 2004.
[8] L. Hailey 1953b.
[9] Proctor 1968, p. 59.
[10] L. Hailey 1953b.
[11] Botswana. 1946; Bechuanaland Protectorate 1965.

in spite of the fact that close to 99 percent of the population are native speakers of the Sotho language.[12]

A second set of explanations centers on the nation-building policies of the founding leaders of Botswana. Some scholars attribute Botswana's relatively depoliticized ethnic cleavages to post-colonial state-building policies, including the scrubbing of official records of any formal acknowledgement of ethnic and tribal differences.[13] Botswana's post-independence language policy is sometimes credited for helping reduce the political salience of ethnic and tribal differences; the immediate post-independence government of Botswana made *Setswana* an official language of Botswana and mandated its teaching in all schools.[14] It is, of course, plausible that these state-building policies were helpful in tamping down rampant tribalism but it is highly unlikely that these policies were anywhere near determinative. This is because the practice of scrubbing ethnic information from official records (the Ostrich strategy) was not unique to Botswana; the government of Ghana, for instance, excluded ethnic information from the country's national censuses from 1960 until 2000 when the policy was abandoned in an apparent acknowledgement of its failure to stem the tide of ethnic-based politics. The experience of other African countries such as Kenya and the semi-autonomous Zanzibar also suggest that the adoption of a *lingua franca* is, by itself, insufficient in preventing the politicization of ethnic and tribal differences in post-colonial Africa.[15]

Botswana's depoliticized ethnic and tribal cleavages are also sometimes at-

[12]DuToit 1995, p. 19.
[13]Mulinge 2008.
[14]Nyati-Ramahobo 2004.
[15]Harries 1969; King'ei 2001.

tributed to the commitment of post-independence governments to the equitable distribution of state resources.[16] The argument here is that ethnic or tribal political mobilization, is at its core, about the struggle to gain access to scarce national resources. Bates (1983) writes for instance that ethnic-based political competition is motivated by ''rational efforts to secure benefits created by the forces of modernization - benefits which are desired but scarce.''[17] All indications are that the post-independence governments of Botswana, starting from Seretse Khama to the current president, Ian Khama, have all been committed to the principle of equity in the distribution of national resources. Tabor (1983), for instance, faults the commitment to equity in the distribution of state resources for the government's failure to effectively target drought relief to especially vulnerable regions.[18] It is worth noting, however, that while a flagrantly unequal distribution of state resources can serve as a basis for political mobilization along ethnic lines, it does not necessarily follow that the absence of such inequities are sufficient to prevent the politicization of ethnic and tribal cleavages.

Finally, some scholars attribute Botswana's depoliticized ethnic and tribal cleavages to the absence of variation in regional development at independence.[19] The claim here is that regional variation in levels of development often form the basis of inter-group resentments which are then exploited by instrumentally minded politicians for ethnic or tribe based political mobilization. Ethnic and tribal cleavages are therefore not politically salient in Botswana, the argument goes, because the British colonial policy of 'benign neglect' ensured uniform poverty at the time of transition

[16] Holm 1988.
[17] Bates 1983.
[18] Tabor 1983, p. 37.
[19] Mulinge 2008.

to independence in the 1960s. This argument is, however, both empirically and conceptually problematic. It is empirically problematic because it is factually inaccurate: there were indeed regional variations in 'development' in the Bechuanaland protectorate at the dawn of independence.[20] The argument is also conceptually problematic because it is not obvious that regional variations in development are sufficient to bring about politicized ethnic and tribal cleavages. Tanganyika, for instance, had regional variations in development that were also mapped onto ethnic differences and yet ethnic cleavages never became politicized in that country.[21]

4.3 Argument

The overarching argument of this dissertation is that the strategies adopted by Africa's nationalist leaders in managing the transition of their respective hereditary chiefs into the post-independence era, holds the key to unmasking why the post-independence politics of some African countries are marked by highly politicized ethnic and tribal cleavages while others are not. The hereditary chiefs of Africa, until the emergence of the nationalist agitations for independence in the 1950s-1960s, often ruled alongside the colonial administrations and were the most powerful local political actors in their respective territories. The transitions to independence in sub-Saharan Africa were therefore as much about the transfer of power from the hereditary chiefs to a new set of nationalist leaders as they were about the removal of European colonial domination. As already noted, I claim that two sets of factors helped determine whether the process of transition to independence in a particular

[20] L. Hailey 1953b.
[21] Iliffe 1999.

sub-Saharan African country lead to the emergence of politicized ethnic and tribal cleavages: (i) whether or not the country in question had powerful hereditary chiefs during its period of transition to independence, and (ii) whether or not the nationalist leaders of said country choose an *inclusionary* or *exclusionary* chiefs strategy when negotiating the future of the chiefs during the transition to independence. The chiefs, being the most important local actors prior to the nationalist period, often preferred a post-independence arrangement that allowed them to continue to wield authority in their respective sub-national polities. The nationalist leaders, on the other hand, tended to prefer an arrangement which reduced the power of chiefs and traditional claims to authority more generally. I hypothesize that where hereditary chiefs are powerful, a strategy to marginalize them during the period of transition to independence - i.e. an exclusionary chiefs strategy - would trigger chief-based (and invariably tribal/ethnic) political mobilization against the ascendant nationalists and consequently lead to the politicization of pre-existing ethnic and tribal cleavages. Ethnic and tribal cleavages should, however, become relatively non-politicized in countries that either did not have powerful hereditary chiefs or where the nationalist leaders chose an inclusionary chiefs strategy during the period of transition to independence.

Botswana, like many countries in sub-Saharan Africa, had highly centralized and powerful pre-colonial chieftaincy institutions.[22] In addition, the hands-off approach of British colonial rule in Botswana ensured that the chiefs continued to rule their respective territories largely unencumbered throughout the colonial period.[23] The tribal chiefs of colonial Bechuanaland (later Botswana) were the most

[22] N. Gennaioli and I. Rainer 2007.
[23] Dale 1995.

powerful local political actors prior to the emergence of nationalist politics in the 1960s.[24] Given their enormous power and influence, the challenge of negotiating an appropriate post-independence role for the chiefs was fraught with significant risk and uncertainty; an outcome which gave the chiefs too much power would not only undercut the democratic foundations of the new state but could also undermine future nation-building efforts through the legitimization of independent sub-national claims to authority. Alternatively, a strategy which sought to sideline the chiefs, during the period of transition to independence, could also imperil the post-colonial state through the emergence of chief-based sub-national challenges to the central government.

In the event, Botswana's ascendant nationalist leaders, unlike their counterparts in Ghana and Tanzania, adopted an inclusive and conciliatory approach to the chiefs during the late colonial period. Seretse Khama and the other leaders of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) helped negotiate an independence constitution which established a *House of Chiefs* and also preserved most of the powers and privileges of chiefs prior to independence in 1966.[25] I argue that Seretse Khama's conciliatory approach to the chiefs, during the period prior to independence, was primarily responsible for thrusting Botswana on a path leading to the non-emergence of highly politicized ethnic and tribal cleavages. Khama's inclusionary pre-independence chiefs strategy, for one, prevented a clash between the ascendent nationalist leaders and the powerful tribal chiefs during the period of transition to independence - arguably the most vulnerable and formative period in the life of the country. It was also important because it won the BDP the support of virtually all of the tribal chiefs during the pivotal

[24] Gillett 1975.

[25] Fawcus and Tilbury 2000.

1965 independence elections; this effectively foreclosed the possibility of successful political mobilization around Botswana's pre-existing ethnic and tribal cleavages during the formative period of political coalition building.[26] Botswana therefore achieved independence in 1966 with virtually every single tribal chief, along with the majority of their subjects, united behind Seretse Khama and the BDP. The chiefs' support helped establish the BDP as the 'dominant party' in Botswana and this dominance, in turn, worked to ensure that the party's grand pan-tribal coalition is largely maintained throughout the post-colonial period. The underlying mechanism of path-dependence is fairly straightforward: the BDP's emergence as the dominant party in Botswana meant that it also became the only realistic vehicle to national power and, as such, elite self-interest has ensured that there are few defections from the party during the post-colonial period (i.e. during the period of 'normal politics').

4.4 Evidence

The evidence presented here focuses on the process tracing of chieftaincy politics in Botswana during the late colonial period and the immediate post-independence period. It shows how the specific choices of Botswana's ascendant nationalist leaders, during the late colonial period, helped thrust the country on the path towards the non-politicization of its preexisting ethnic and tribal cleavages. The evidence is arranged as follows: (i) first, a brief sketch of the nature of British colonial rule in the Bechuanaland protectorate in order to detail the unusually powerful posi-

[26]Successful political mobilization along Botswana's ethnic and tribal cleavages would have required the support of the chiefs. The BDP, for its part, had no incentive to stir the pot of tribalism since it already enjoyed the support of virtually all the tribal chiefs. The opposition parties, on the other hand, could not successfully execute such a strategy since they did not have the backing of the chiefs.

tion of the tribal chiefs throughout the colonial period; (ii) an explanation of why and how Seretse Khama and the BDP leaders chose an inclusionary chiefs strategy during the period of transition to independence in the 1960s; (iii) I subsequently draw on the outcome of the 1965 independence elections to show that the tribal chiefs of Botswana, like their counterparts in Ashanti (Ghana), had the capacity to greatly influence the political behavior of their subjects during the late colonial period; (iv) I then examine the brief episode of chief-based anti-BDP mobilization in the small Bangwaketse tribal reserve during the first post-independence elections in 1969. This will illustrate the fact that Botswana was susceptible to the same forces that created highly politicized ethnic cleavages in Ghana; (v) Finally, I draw on the experience of chief-based anti-nationalist mobilization in Ghana and the specific dynamics of politics in late colonial Botswana to show that ethnic and tribal cleavages would almost certainly have become highly politicized in Botswana had Khama and the BDP leadership pursued an exclusionary chiefs strategy prior to independence in 1966.

4.4.1 British Protection and the Power of Chiefs

The Bechuanaland protectorate (later Botswana) formally came under British control in 1885 after a period of initial hesitation and following requests from the chiefs of the territory for British protection against the marauding Boers of the Transvaal.[27] The initial hesitation of the British came from the fact that the Bechuanaland protectorate was extremely poor and devoid of any known natural resource endowments at the time. The establishment of a German protectorate on the coast

[27]L. Hailey 1953b.

of South West Africa in 1884, however, transformed the once ‘‘worthless strip of territory" into a strategically important piece of land; Bechuanaland now offered the British their only access point to the interior of Africa from the Cape Colony.[28] The High Commissioner to South Africa described British interest in Bechuanaland at the dawn of colonial rule in 1885 as follows:

> ‘‘We have no interest in the country to the north of the Molope [the Bechuanaland Protectorate], except as a road to the interior; we might therefore confine ourselves for the present to preventing that part of the Protectorate being occupied by either filibusters or foreign powers doing as little in the way of administration or settlement as possible.’’[29]

Even after the establishment of formal protectorate relations in 1885, the British government was, for awhile, ambivalent about the colonial project in Bechuanaland. For instance, they briefly considered transferring the territory to the British South Africa Company in 1895 but were forced to abandoned that plan after vehement protestations from the tribal chiefs.[30] But in exchange for continued British protection, the tribal chiefs had to agree to help collect a ‘hut tax’ to help defray some of the costs of administering the territory. It was also agreed that the chiefs would continue to govern their respective tribal territories ‘‘much as at present’’, but under the supervision of a representative of the British queen who would have jurisdiction over matters involving non-natives.[31] This context is important because it led to what most scholars of the period term a ‘benign neglect’ and ensured that the

[28]Sillery 1971; As cited in Wiseman 1976, p. 16.
[29]Picard 1987, p. 36.
[30]L. Hailey 1953b, p. 199; Fawcus and Tilbury 2000, p. 23.
[31]Gunderson 1988.

tribal chiefs of the protectorate remained unusually powerful throughout the colonial period.[32] The limited British involvement in the management of the Bechuanaland protectorate is poignantly underscored by the fact that the colonial headquarters was located outside the protectorate boundaries in Mafeking.[33]

The British divided the Bechuanaland protectorate into eight tribal reserves and the territories falling outside of these reserves became known as Crown lands.[34] The tribal reserves, which were simply a formal codification of pre-existing tribal boundaries, remained under the control of the hereditary chiefs and the Crown lands fell under the direct control of the High Commissioner to South Africa.[35] Each of the tribal reserves comprised of members of a dominant and eponymously named Tswana speaking group, as well as, members of minority or 'affiliated' groups who all pledge allegiance to a single chief.[36]

[32]Dale 1995.

[33]The colonial headquarters was housed in an old 'military station' just outside of Mafeking in the Cape Province of the Union of South Africa. This location was picked to cut down on the cost of administering the Bechuanaland protectorate.

[34]The first 5 tribal reserves (Bakgatla, Bakwena, Bangwaketse, Bangwato and Batawana) were demarcated and recognized by a Proclamation on 29 March, 1899. The Bamalete, Batlokwa and Barolong tribal reserves were subsequently added in 1909, 1933 and 1943 respectively. See appendix 6 for the tribal map of Bechuanaland.

[35]L. Hailey 1953b, p. 206.

[36]It is important to note here the distinction between *ethnicity* and *tribe* in Botswana. The only requirement for membership of a tribe in Botswana is the pledging of allegiance to the tribal chief. Each tribe is therefore comprised of members of multiple of ethnic groups who all pledge allegiance to the same chief. Schapera (2004, p. 116) therefore writes: ''All natives living in a particular Reserve acknowledge the supremacy of the chief of its ruling community and constitute a single political unit under his leadership and authority... such a unit is a tribe.''

Table 4.1: The tribal reserves of the Bechuanaland protectorate

Tribal Reserve[1]	*Area in Sq. Miles*[2]	*Population in 1964*[3]	*% of Population in 1964*
Ngwato	42,080	199,782	36.8
Kwena	15,000	73,088	13.5
Ngwaketse	9,000	71,289	13.2
Kgatla	3,600	32,118	5.9
Tawana	34,500	42,347	7.8
Rolong	432	10,662	2
Malete	178	13,861	2.6
Tlokwa	67	3,711	0.7
Total	*104,857*	*446,858*	*82.5*

[1] See appendix 6 for map of Bechuanaland tribal reserves [2] *Source*: Lord Hailey (1953);
[3] *Source*: Bechuanaland census, 1964

Scholars of pre-independence Botswana often divide the period of colonial rule into two distinct phases: the period of *dual rule* or *parallel rule* where the tribal chiefs were basically left alone to run their respective territories without any interference and the period of *indirect rule* when the colonial authorities attempted to bring the system of native administration in line with the established practice in the other British colonies.[37] The first phase is often dated from 1895 through 1935 while the period of 'indirect rule' is often attributed to the period following until independence in 1966.[38] The important point to note, however, is that the chiefs of the Bechuanaland protectorate jealously guarded their autonomy throughout the colo-

[37] DuToit 1995, p. 24.
[38] Ibid

nial period and resisted the full implementation of 'indirect rule' in Bechuanaland.[39] For instance, the tribal chiefs, led by Thsekedi Khama and Chief Bathoen II, challenged, in the Special Court of Bechuanaland, a 1935 Proclamation which required the chiefs to consult statutory tribal councils in the discharge of their duties instead of the customary practice of consulting the *kgotla*.[40] The chiefs argued that the High Commissioner's proclamation failed to 'respect' Tswana customary law and, in so doing, had violated the terms of their protectorate relations with Britain.[41] Despite losing the court case, the chiefs still refused to cooperate with the colonial authorities and this impasse continued for a few years until after the arrival of a new Resident Commissioner, Charles Arden Clarke, who then managed to negotiate a revised Native Administration Proclamation in 1943.[42] The amended proclamation dropped the requirement for chiefs to consult with statutory councils and instead had the chiefs continue to operate through the traditional *kgotla*.[43] It also, among other things, recognized the tribal chiefs as the *native authorities* in their respective reserves.[44] In effect, this meant that no authority in the tribal reserves was legitimate unless it was deligated by the chief.[45]

Outside of their executive functions, the chiefs of Bechuanaland wielded enormous power through their control of tribal lands[46], the native courts system[47] and

[39]Fawcus and Tilbury 2000, p. 38.

[40]Tshekedi Khama and Bathoen Siepapitso Gazeitsiwe v. The High Commissioner, Lobatsi, November 1936, page 35 of Colonial Reports (B.P.), No. 1908 (1936)

[41]Griffiths 1970.

[42]Griffiths 1970.

[43]Griffiths 1970.

[44]L. Hailey 1953b, p. 224.

[45]L. Hailey 1953b, p. 286.

[46]The chief was the custodian of all tribal lands and because he alone could allocate these lands to members of the tribe, it served as an important patronage resource.

[47]The *Native Courts Proclamation of 1943* granted the chiefs this authority.

the tribal treasuries.[48] The chiefs also had authority to enact laws and regulations necessary for the maintenance of law and order.[49] In addition, the chief retained the right to require his subjects to provide him with periodic unpaid labor including the ploughing of his 'tribute fields.'[50] The 'special court', in the preamble to their ruling in the dispute between the chiefs and the High Commissioner in 1936, described the position of the chief in Bechuanaland as follows:

> ''A Chief resembles a Saxon King more than a constitutional Monarch. He is a representative chief, with wide discretionary powers; he is the legislative, executive and final Court of Appeal. In exercising these functions he takes advice from whom he pleases, but he is to some extent controlled by tribal opinion because he has to make his decisions in public in the Kgotla where he is bound to listen to anyone who cares to speak. In that way he feels the pulse of his tribe, but the decision is his and he can disregard the opinion of the majority. In practice, however, he follows tribal opinion, because the security of his position as Chief to some extent depends on the character of his rule.''[51]

Towards the end of the colonial era, the British colonial authorities attempted to rein in the vast powers of the chiefs but these efforts did very little to reduce the stature of chiefs prior to the onset of nationalist politics in the early 1960s.[52] British colonial rule in Bechuanaland was defined, more so than anything else, by the unusually powerful position occupied by the tribal chiefs. Lord Hailey (1953) writes for instance that: ''it is rare to find in Central or East Africa an instance of Chiefs

[48] L. Hailey 1953b, p. 223.
[49] L. Hailey 1953b, p. 226.
[50] L. Hailey 1953b, p. 214.
[51] L. Hailey 1953b, p. 218.
[52] These reforms included the promulgation of the *African Administration Proclamation* of 1954 and the *African Local Councils Proclamation* of 1957.

who have, as a body, the same measure of authority as those in the [Bechuanaland] protectorate.''[53] Besides the unusual power of chiefs, the British colonial policy of *benign neglect* also ensured that the Bechuanaland protectorate remained ''uniquely backward'' among British colonies in Africa for its lack of national representative institutions prior to the onset of nationalist politics in the 1960s.[54] The absence of any sustained effort at nation-building during the colonial period meant that tribal citizenship remained the primary form of political self-identification for the vast majority of the people.[55] This combination of enormously powerful tribal chiefs, coupled with a lack of national consciousness beyond the tribe, therefore rendered Botswana especially vulnerable to sub-national political mobilization and chief-based challenges to a centralizing authority during its period of transition to independence. The fact that no chief-based anti-nationalist movements emerged prior to independence in 1966 is an event that requires explanation since it was not predicted by Botswana's so-called 'structural endowments'. Fearon and Laitin (2003), for instance, characterize this period in Botswana as having ''the highest likelihood moment of civil war onset (with a probability about fifty percent higher than the world average)."[56] The argument presented here credits Seretse Khama's inclusionary approach to the chiefs for the peaceful transition to independence and the non-emergence of politicized ethnic and tribal cleavages during the post-colonial period.

[53]L. Hailey 1953b, p. 286.

[54]Fawcus & Tilbury (2000, p.36) note: ''the lack of even the most primitive form of devolved legislature in Bechuanaland...made [it] uniquely backward among British African dependencies.''

[55]Proctor 1968, p. 59.

[56]Fearon and Laitin 2003, Botswana Random Narrative, p.2.

4.4.2 The *House of Chiefs* Compromise and the Transition to Independence in Botswana

The march to independence in Botswana began with the promulgation of the country's first pre-independence constitution in 1960.[57] This constitution not only created a Legislative and Executive Councils for the protectorate but it also signaled, for the first time, the intention of the British government to grant independence to Bechuanaland and abandon the long-held plan to eventually hand over the territory to the Union of South Africa.[58] In response to these constitutional changes, three political parties emerged to compete for the opportunity to lead the country to independence. The first of these was the Bechuanaland (Botswana) Peoples Party (BPP) which was followed by the Bechuanaland (Botswana) Independence Party (BIP), a splinter group from the BPP, and finally the Bechuanaland (Botswana) Democratic Party (BDP).

The Peoples Party, which was founded by exiled former anti-apartheid activists in December 1960, hewed to a radical socialist ideology and was closely modeled after the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) in Ghana.[59] In addition to ideological affin-

[57]Bechuanaland. (1961). *The Bechuanaland Protectorate (constitution) order in council, 1960*. London: HMSO.

[58]Kirby 2017, 13 : The plan to transfer the territory to South Africa became untenable following the sharp deterioration of race relations in South Africa in the late 1950s.

[59]The founding leaders of the Botswana Peoples Party (BPP) included Kgalema Motsete (President), Philip Matante (Vice President) and Motsamai Mpho (Secretary General). Motsete, who was born in Serowe (Bamangwato tribal capital), spent most of his career as a school administrator in the Bechuanaland protectorate. Mpho, on the other hand, lived and worked in South Africa where, as a member of the African National Congress (ANC), rose to become branch chairman in Roosepoort before he was arrested in 1956 on treason charges and subsequently deported to the Bechuanaland protectorate in August 1960. Matante also lived in South Africa prior to settling in Francistown; he was also affiliated with the Pan African Congress (PAC) while living in South Africa. According to Kirby (2017, p.8), Matante expressed his admiration for Kwame Nkrumah's pan-African politics by adopting ''a Ghanaian black star as his personal election symbol and led demonstrations in West

ity, the BPP also received substantial material support from Kwame Nkrumah's CPP government in Ghana, as well as, the Tanganyika African Nationalist Union (TANU) in Tanzania.[60] Following in the footsteps of the CPP and TANU, the Peoples Party, among other things, campaigned for ''immediate independence, extensive Africanization of the civil service, *the abolition of the chiefs*, and some nationalization of land [emphasis mine].''[61] The anti-chief posture of the Peoples Party, however, led to the alienation of the chiefly class who then opposed the party at every turn.[62] The BPP was also engulfed by a series of internal leadership struggles which eventually led to the breakup of the party after just 18 months of existence.[63] Philip Matante, founding Vice President of the BPP, managed to expel both Motsamai Mpho (Secretary General) and Kgalema Motsete (President), along with their supporters, from the party in 1962.[64] The faction led by Mpho subsequently formed the Botswana Independence Party (BIP) and contested the 1965 independence elections under the BIP umbrella.[65] Motsete, however, refused to give up the Peoples Party name and so contested the 1965 elections in the Lobatse/Barolong constituency under the banner of BPP (Motsete) in order to distinguish himself from the Peoples Party under the leadership of Matante.[66] Both the Peoples Party and the Independence Party, however, came away from the internal struggles for power seriously weakened and in such disarray that the leaders of both radical leftist parties only played a marginal role in the negotiations leading to the transition to independence in 1966.

African robes.''

[60]Fawcus and Tilbury 2000, p. 90; Makgala 2006, 44:

[61]Fawcus and Tilbury 2000, p. 86.

[62]Polhemus 1983.

[63]Stevens 1967, pp. 142-143.

[64]Ramsay 1993.

[65]Ramsay 1993.

[66]Gossett and Lotshwao 2009.

The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which led the country to independence in 1966, adopted a more nuanced and conciliatory approach to the chieftaincy question during the period of transition to independence.[67] Their conciliatory approach to the chieftaincy question, during this period, is explained by the basic fact that the BDP was formed to represent the more conservative elements of Botswana society.[68]The BDP, for instance, had 10 out of the 12 African members of the Legislative Council (LEGCO) among its founding members; these members were themselves the chosen representatives of the tribal chiefs.[69] The unique biography of Seretse Khama, the founding leader of the Democratic Party, also helps explain the party's pro-chief posture during the late colonial period. Seretse Khama, the firstborn son of Sekgoma II, chief of the Bamangwato, was heir to the largest and most important chieftainship in the Bechuanaland protectorate.[70] His father, Sekgoma II, however died when the young Khama was only four years old and so his uncle, Thsekedi Khama, became regent of the Bamangwato until such a time when he was old enough to assume the chieftainship. The British government, however, prevented Seretse Khama from becoming chief of the Bamangwato because of an unfortunate set of events involving his choice of wife. While a student at Oxford University in the late 1940s, Seretse Khama met and married a white British woman, Ruth Williams, against the wishes of the colonial authorities. The British government, after coming under enormous pressure from the racist apartheid regime in South Africa, exiled Seretse Khama from the Bechuanaland protectorate from 1950 to 1956 and only allowed him to return after he renounced all claims to the Bamangwato chieftainship.[71] Seretse, however,

[67]Selolwane 2002.
[68]Fawcus and Tilbury 2000.
[69]Fawcus and Tilbury 2000.
[70]Williams 2006.
[71]Williams 2006.

enjoyed the support of a vast majority of his fellow tribesmen and so the decision to force his abdication caused a leadership crisis within the Bamangwato tribe. The elders of the Bamangwato tribe refused to select a replacement chief and for the remainder of the colonial period, Seretse Khama, was informally regarded by his people as the *de facto* chief even though he had no *de jure* authority. Benson(1960) describes the mood within the Bamangwato tribe as follows:

> ''unspoken was the knowledge that they would continue to address and respect him as chief... in their hearts it would always be Seretse whom they regarded as the chief, although in fact he would be a private citizen.''[72]

Seretse Khama therefore was unique among the nationalist leaders, as he traversed both the old and new order; he was both a *de facto* chief and a bonafide member of the so-called 'new men' of Africa. Fawcus and Tilbury (2000), for instance, write that Khama enjoyed ''the best of both worlds'' because the chiefs considered him ''as less of a threat than the leaders of the radical parties. The progressive members [also] saw him as one of them...''[73] He was singularly positioned, more so than any other leader during late colonial period, to help bridge the inevitable suspicions and antagonism between the chiefs and the ascendant nationalist class.

Together with his deputy, Quett Ketumile Masire, Khama went on to play an instrumental role in ensuring that the independence constitutional conference, which was held in the town of Lobatse in April 1963, carved out an acceptable post-independence role for the chiefs.[74] The draft constitutional proposals from the

[72]Benson 1960, p. 278.

[73]Fawcus and Tilbury 2000, p. 128.

[74]Peter Fawcus, who was the British Resident Commissioner at the time, had this to say about the pivotal role of the Democratic Party delegation in ensuring the success of the Lobatse constitutional

Lobatse conference included a provision for the creation of a *House of Chiefs* which was to serve as an advisory body to a democratically elected post-independence government.[75] It was also agreed that this body would serve as a forum for the chiefs to discuss matters of national importance and make representations to the Prime Minister and his cabinet when necessary.[76] The chiefs were also to receive monthly allowances for their service in the House of Chiefs.[77] Finally, the draft constitutional proposals left untouched the powers enjoyed by chiefs in their respective tribal reserves including the control of native lands and the native courts system.

Seretse Khama and the Democratic Party leaders were also quite flexible in accommodating additional demands from the chiefs long after the formal conclusions of the Lobatse constitutional conference. For instance, the chiefs, led by Chief Bathoen II, met with the Resident Commissioner, Peter Fawcus, in April 1964, to ask for some modifications to the draft constitutional provisions. The chiefs, it turned out, were not fully satisfied with the fact that the proposed House of Chiefs could only make recommendations on legislative bills to the Prime Minister and only before such bills are sent to Parliament. They instead wanted an arrangement where the House of Chiefs functioned more like a second Chamber of Parliament.[78] They were, however, persuaded by the Resident Commissioner, Peter Fawcus, to drop the demands for a second chamber and instead submit the following revisions to the draft constitutional proposals for the consideration of the other relevant parties:

talks: ''The success of the talks owed a great deal to the negotiating skills of Ketumile Masire who was the main spokesman for the Democratic Party... the two groups of the People's Party who had a lot to say about the defects of the 1961 constitution played only a minor part in the discussions about the new constitution.''[*Source*: Fawcus and Tilbury (2000, p.136)

[75]Proctor 1968.

[76]Proctor 1968.

[77]Proctor 1968.

[78]Fawcus and Tilbury 2000, pp. 138-145.

(i) rather than have the House of Chiefs be limited to making representations to the Prime Minister and his cabinet, the draft proposals should be revised to allow the chiefs to send their views on proposed legislation directly to the Parliament;

(ii) modify the draft constitutional proposals so that the House of Chiefs is given the power to summon Ministers of State to appear before it to answer queries on any matters they deem important.

Seretse Khama and the other Democratic Party leaders readily accepted the suggested modifications and the following clause was consequently added to the draft constitutional proposals:

> ''...the House of Chiefs would be entitled to discuss any other matter within the executive and legislative authority of Bechuanaland which they considered it desirable to take cognizance of in the interests of the tribes and tribal organizations they represent and to make representations thereon to the Prime Minister or through the Prime Minister to the Cabinet or to send messages thereon to the Legislative Assembly. It would be expected that the standing orders to be made by the House of Chiefs...would include provision under which the House of Chiefs would invite a Minister (or his representative) to attend the proceedings of the House for the purpose of taking part in any discussions held in terms of this paragraph (but without a vote) or for answering questions.''[79]

The acceptance of the above modifications to the draft constitutional proposals proved sufficient to pave the way for the first and only pre-independence elections

[79]Fawcus and Tilbury 2000, p. 128.

held in March 1965.[80] However, following that pivotal election and before full independence was granted in September 1966, the chiefs, once again led by Bathoen II, requested that the following additional revisions be made to the draft constitutional proposals: (i) reconstitute the membership of the House of Chiefs so that the four elected sub-chiefs are replaced by five qualified professionals to help the chiefs deal with the technical aspects of governing a modern state, and (ii) include a requirement that any future bills seeking to amend the constitution must first be presented to the House of Chiefs for advice and input.[81] Seretse Khama, who became Prime Minister after the 1965 polls, once again readily accepted the recommendations from the chiefs with only a minor tweak; he suggested that rather than replace the four sub-chiefs, who represented people residing outside the tribal reserves, the House of Chiefs should be expanded to include three additional members.[82] The newly elected national assembly, which was dominated by BDP members, subsequently voted to accept the proposed modifications after which the chiefs representatives, together with the leaders of the various political parties, headed out to the final constitutional talks in London.[83] Once in London, the chiefs again succeeded in getting the House of Chiefs provisions moved from a separate chapter of the constitution to the chapter under the Legislature.[84] It was also agreed, at the instance of the chiefs' delegates, to have legislative bills referred to the House of Chiefs *after* they had been

[80]Proctor (1968) notes that : ''...future historians will probably recall the House of Chiefs as a rather quaint institution which failed to fulfill the hopes of its creators - for, after all, the conflict between the hereditary rulers and the new elite was too profound to be resolved to the satisfaction of both by any kind of constitutional engineering - but nevertheless enabled the political development of Botswana to proceed somewhat more smoothly through a critical transitional phase than would have been possible without it.''

[81]Proctor 1968.

[82]Proctor 1968.

[83]The chiefs were represented by *kgosi* Bathoen II and Leapetswe Khama.

[84]Proctor 1968.

considered by Parliament rather than before as was originally proposed.[85] Each of these modifications were accepted in order to appease the chiefs, who until the very last moments, were still pushing for a House of Chiefs that functioned more like a second chamber of Parliament.[86] The finalized independence constitution came into effect on the same day that the Bechuanaland protectorate became the Republic of Botswana on September 30, 1966.

The process of pre-independence constitutional negotiations in Botswana was therefore starkly different from what transpired in Ghana and Tanganyika. Kwame Nkrumah, for instance, refused to negotiate with the chiefs prior to independence and instead wanted any determinations about the post-independence role for the chiefs to be made by the Minister of Local Government after independence.[87] Julius Nyerere, on the other hand, met with the chiefs of Tanganyika prior to independence only to inform them that he intended to abolish the institution of chieftaincy altogether after independence.[88] Peter Fawcus, who was the Resident Commissioner in Bechuanaland during the independence transition negotiations, describes the House of Chiefs compromise not only as a ''crucially important landmark along the path to independence'' but also that it helped avoid a ''clash between chieftainship and the political leaders such as occurred in Swaziland, which in that country put off any real progress towards democracy for thirty years.''[89] Proctor (1968) also argues that the House of Chiefs compromise ''enabled the political development of Botswana to proceed somewhat more smoothly through a critical transitional phase than would

[85]Proctor 1968.
[86]Proctor 1968.
[87]Gocking 2005.
[88]J. Listowel 1968, p. 321.
[89]Fawcus and Tilbury 2000, p. 144.

have been possible without it.''[90] I will be showing in the next few sections that by helping prevent a ''clash between chieftainship and the political leaders,'' during the run-up to independence, the House of Chiefs compromise also helped thrust Botswana on a path towards the de-politicization of its ethnic and tribal cleavages.

4.4.3 The Politics of Chieftaincy and the 1965 Independence Elections

The colonial authorities organized the first and only pre-independence elections for the Bechuanaland protectorate on 1st March 1965. In preparation for that election a delimitation commission divided the country into 31 constituencies. In defining the boundaries of the various constituencies, the delimitation commission took pains to ensure that they, as much as possible, coincided with the existing tribal boundaries. The commissioners argued that this was necessary because:

> ''it is very evident that tribal loyalty is still a major factor in Bechuanaland, and there was a strong opposition to any division of tribal territory of one tribe which would result in part of the territory of one tribe being linked with part of the territory of another. If boundaries repugnant to feelings and sentiments of the majority of the people were adopted, it might well affect the success of the first elections.''[91]

The decision to draw up constituency boundaries to coincide with existing tribal boundaries, however, strengthened the hands of the chiefs since it effectively placed them in the position to reward their favored political parties with their respective

[90] Proctor 1968, p. 79.
[91] Bechuanaland Protectorate 1964, p. 8.

'tribal' seats and punish the parties they opposed.[92] The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which enjoyed the backing of virtually all the tribal chiefs, therefore went on to win a resounding victory in 1965 elections.[93] The BDP swept 28 out of the 31 available seats and obtained 80 percent of the total votes in the process. The Botswana Peoples Party (BPP) came in at a distant second with three seats and 14 percent of the vote.[94] And in third place was the Botswana Independence Party (BIP) which won zero seats and five percent of the votes.[95]

Table 4.2: Results of 1965 General Elections

Political Party	*Seats*	*% Share of Votes*
BDP	28	80.4
BPP (Matante)	3	14.2
BIP	0	4.6
BPP (Motsete)	0	0.3
Independents	0	0.6

The breakdown of the 1965 election results readily shows that the BDP's victory was almost entirely won on the back of support from the tribal chiefs. The BDP obtained as much as 86 percent of the votes in the constituencies falling within the tribal reserves but received only 32 percent of the votes cast in contested constituencies falling outside of the tribal reserves.[96] The disaggregation of the election results for the tribal reserves also makes apparent the impact of the chiefs' support for the BDP in 1965. The data shows that BDP candidates easily triumphed in constituencies falling within the tribal reserves where their party had the backing of the chief but struggled in the *only* tribal reserve where the chief withheld his support

[92] Mokopakgosi 2008.
[93] Mokopakgosi 2008.
[94] Gossett and Lotshwao 2009.
[95] Gossett and Lotshwao 2009.
[96] See appendix 10 for list of constituencies falling within the different tribal reserves.

- i.e. the Bakgatla tribal reserve.[97]

Table 4.3: Results of 1965 election by tribal reserves

Tribal reserve	*Chief supported* the BDP	*BDP* (%)	Seats won (BDP)	Seats won (BPP)	Seats won (BIP)
Bangwaketse	YES	95.4	4	0	0
Bamangwato	YES	89.9	12	0	0
Bamalete & Batlokwa	YES	85.9	1	0	0
Bakwena	YES	84.7	4	0	0
Barolong	YES	80.2	1	0	0
Batwawana	YES	69.8	2	0	0
Bakgatla	*NO*	*50.2*	*1*	*1*	*0*

[1] See appendix 10 for constituencies falling within respective tribal reserves

The above table indicates that the BDP obtained 95 percent of the votes in the Bangwaketse tribal reserve;[98] 90 percent in the Bamangwato reserve;[99] 86 percent in the Bamalete and Batlokwa reserves;[100] 85 percent in the Bakwena reserve;[101] 80 percent in Barolong reserve;[102] and 70 percent in the Tawana reserve.[103] These were all territories where the party had the backing of the tribal chief. The only chief to withhold support from the BDP in 1965 was Linchwe II of the Bakgatla tribal reserve; he refused to support the BDP because he felt the House of Chiefs compromise did not go far enough.[104] But rather than endorse either of the opposition parties, Chief Linchwe II chose instead to remain 'neutral' during the 1965 contest.[105] In

[97] Chief Linchwe II of the Bakgatla tribe was the only principal chief to withhold support from the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) during the 1965 pre-independence elections. Linchwe chose to remain 'neutral' during that contest because he felt Seretse Khama and the Democratic Party leaders had offered too few concessions during the independence transition negotiations.

[98] See appendices 7 and 10 for the results of the 1965 polls and list of constituencies by tribal reserves respectively

[99] Ibid

[100] Ibid

[101] Ibid

[102] Ibid

[103] Ibid

[104] Mokopakgosi 2008, p. 92.

[105] DuToit 1995, p. 128.

the end, the majority of the voters in and around the tribal capital, Mochudi, were persuaded to vote against the BDP candidate by a peculiar incident involving the chief's sister. Wiseman (1976) offers the following account of the events leading to the Peoples Party's victory in the Mochudi constituency in 1965:

> ''Prior to the 1965 election it was widely understood in Mochudi and, to a lesser extent in the smaller villages of Kgatleng that the chief did not favor the BDP and many of the electorate waited for an indication of which way the chief advised them to vote. Linchwe, however, was unwilling to jeopardize his position as chief by actively supporting a political party and so risking government suspension. In this uncertain situation, it was eventually a fairly trivial incident which swung a majority in Mochudi behind BPP candidate Motlhagodi. On the evening prior to the election the chief's sister, Tshire, who had hitherto shown little interest in politics, decided to throw her support behind the BPP. She toured Mochudi in a loudspeaker van, urging the voters to support the BPP in the election. For many this was taken as the sign from the chief that they had been waiting for and so Motlhagodi was duly returned as M.P. For Mochudi.''[106]

The fact that the BDP won with run-away margins in the tribal territories where it had the backing of the chiefs but struggled to remain competitive in the Bakgatla tribal reserve, where it did not have the backing of the chief, suggests that the tribal chiefs of Botswana did have the power to influence the electoral behavior of their subjects during the late colonial period. Indeed, this fact was not lost on the chiefs who, in a joint letter to the colonial government in 1966, provided the following interpretation of their role in the 1965 elections:

[106]Wiseman 1976, p. 131.

> ''Whatever the interpretation may be put on the last elections, the fact remains that the real issue at stake as understood by the illiterate people, was who had the qualification to be the big Chief...Most of the chiefs of the different autonomous Chiefdoms, naturally sympathized with the choice of Seretse Khama as against the Leaders of the present Opposition Parties. We believed and hoped that the position of Seretse Khama as Chief by tradition would enable him to understand the need for gradual transformation of our traditional customs and ways. Our sympathy with Seretse Khama contributed much to the results of the last election.''[107]

The non-emergence of chief-based sub-national anti-nationalist mobilization, during the late colonial period in Botswana, therefore cannot be explained by a lack of capacity on the part of the chiefs. As the chiefs themselves explained, they actively supported the BDP because they believed Seretse Khama would best protect their interests. I argue that Khama's generally conciliatory approach to the chieftaincy question, which was exemplified by the House of Chiefs compromise, helped win the support of the chiefs and prevent the emergence of chief-based anti-nationalist movements during the late colonial period.

[107]Bechuanaland Independence Conference, 1966, 'Reasons for Rejection in Principle of the Bechuanaland Government's Proposals for Amending the 1965 Constitution', 14 Addendum, 16 February 1966 [Also cited in, Polhemus, J. H. (September 11, 1983). Botswana Votes: Parties and Elections in an African Democracy.T*he Journal of Modern African Studies*,21,3, p. 407]

4.4.4 Post-independence erosion of chiefly authority and the brief emergence of chief-based opposition to the Democratic Party, 1966-1969

Following independence in 1966, Seretse Khama and the Democratic Party leaders quickly abandoned their conciliatory approach to the chiefs and began to enact a raft of legislation aimed at undermining the power and authority of chiefs.[108] The *Customary Court Law of 1966* and the *African Courts (Amendment) Act of 1968*, for instance, revised the existing legal framework for customary courts and placed extensive limits on the powers and jurisdiction of the customary courts.[109] The former limited the kinds of cases that could be considered by the customary courts and the latter further constricted the power of chiefs by making them subordinate to a newly created office of the commissioner of customary courts.[110] The *Matimela Law of 1968* also reduced the power of chiefs by imposing strict restrictions on how they and their subordinates managed stray cattle (*matimela*) within their respective tribal reserves.[111] The chiefs could no longer impose fines for violations of stray cattle ordinances in their tribal reserves nor could they unilaterally dispose of such cattle as was the practice during the colonial period.[112] The *Stray Cattle Law of 1969* subsequently transferred the authority to manage stray cattle to the local government

[108]We can only speculate as to why the change in chiefs strategy since politicians are rarely in the habit of spelling out the *real* reasons behind their choices. It appears, however, that Seretse Khama came to recognize the inherent contradiction involved in having a dual authority structure after independence and so he moved to subsume the chieftaincy powers under the broader authority of the national government. This process was, of course, aided by the fact that the balance of power now favored the nationalists who could now exploit their incumbency to push for their political objectives.

[109]Vaughan 2003, pp. 81-82.

[110]Vaughan 2003, pp. 81-82.

[111]Morapedi 2010, p. 224.

[112]Morapedi 2010, p. 224; Vaughan 2003, p. 79.

district councils and thereby excluding the chiefs altogether.[113] The promulgation of the *Matimela Law* and the *Stray Cattle Law* together amounted to a serious attack on the institution of chieftaincy since fines for violation of *matimela* ordinances and the sale of matimela cattle were a crucially important source of income for the chiefs.[114] But the most devastating assault on the institution of chieftaincy came with the passage of the *Tribal Lands Law of 1968*.[115] The chiefs of Botswana, until the passage of this law, held all tribal land in trust for the community and were singularly responsible for allocating these lands to members of the community. The *Tribal Lands Law of 1968*, however, transferred control of tribal lands to newly established land boards whose members were entirely handpicked by the central government.[116] The government further underscored its changed attitudes towards the institution of chieftaincy when it refused a request by some chiefs to be made the honorary chairmen of the newly established land boards, arguing that such a move would slow down the pace of reforms.[117]

The response of the chiefs to their marginalization during the immediate post-independence period was mostly muted, in part, because the balance of power had radically shifted in favor of the nationalists after the country attained independence in 1966. Seretse Khama and his lieutenants not only now controlled the machinery of state, including its coercive apparatus, but the hands of the chiefs were also significantly tied; the independence constitution required that chiefs must first resign their

[113]Vaughan 2003, p. 79.
[114]Gillett 1975, p. 182.
[115]Vaughan 2003, p. 80.
[116]Vaughan 2003, p. 80.
[117]*House of Chiefs Debate, Official Report*, Gaborone: Botswana, 25 July 1968. [Also cited in Vaughan, O. (2003). *Chiefs, power, and social change: Chiefship and modern politics in botswana, 1880s-1990s*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press. p. 80]

chieftainships before engaging in partisan politics.[118] Still, some chiefs, including Bathoen II of the Bangwaketse tribe, resisted the steady erosion of chiefly authority after independence. In accordance with the requirements of the independence constitution, Chief Bathoen II stepped down from his chieftainship in June 1969 in order to mobilize opposition against Seretse Khama and the BDP in the national elections scheduled for later that year.[119] Following his resignation, Chief Bathoen II joined the opposition Botswana National Front (BNF) and quickly rose to become the party's presidential candidate for the national elections scheduled for October 1969.[120] The National Front, founded in October 1965 under the leadership of Kenneth Koma, was a largely ineffective 'radical, left-wing and keenly Pan-Africanist' party prior to the arrival of Chief Bathoen II.[121] However, the party was quickly transformed to closely champion the institution of chieftaincy: Following Bathoen's arrival, the BNF proposed to change the constitution to grant the chiefs seats in the legislature.[122]

Having recognized the threat posed by chief-based opposition to the BDP, the Seretse Khama government worked to isolate Bathoen II and also limit the political fallout from the post-independence marginalization of the chiefs. They employed a mix of hardball tactics and patronage rewards to prevent other chiefs from joining up with Bathoen II. For instance, the BDP government swiftly suspended and

[118]This was a concession extracted from the chiefs in exchange for the House of Chiefs compromise during the Lobatse constitutional conference in April 1963.

[119]Lord Hailey (1953, p. 272) describes Bathoen as follows: ''Chief Bathoen II is outstanding in the attention which he gives to the detailed working of the administrative and judicial system in his area, and he appears to have the gift (not often to be found in Africa) of asserting authority without becoming authoritarian."

[120]*Botswana Daily News*, 15th September 1969

[121]Wiseman 1976, p. 157.

[122]Parson 1990, p. 110; Picard 1987, p. 158.

ultimately forced the resignation of Chief Neale Sechele of the Bakwena tribe after he challenged the *1968 Tribal Lands Law* and insisted on the customary rights of chiefs to control and allocate all tribal lands.[123] The government also deftly isolated Bathoen II when, out of the blue, they offered Chief Linchwe of the Bakgatla tribe the cushy position of Ambassador to the United States.[124] Linchwe, if you would recall, was the only chief to refuse to back the BDP in 1965 and he also remained a vocal critic of the government's post-independence chieftaincy policies.[125] Wiseman (1976) writes that Linchwe II was well aware of the government's reason for offering him the ambassadorship but he found it too juicy to turn down: ''Having talked with Linchwe on this matter, it is quite obvious that he knew that he was being ''bought off'' and fully accepted the arrangements and their implications.''[126] The BDP, together with the minor political parties, also sought to marginalize the BNF by aggressively defining it as representing 'tribal' rather than the national interests. The BDP manifesto for the 1969 elections for instance stressed: ''The need to defend our unity against a small minority regretting the loss of the privileges of a despotic tribal past.''[127] These isolating tactics, together with the absence of open support from the

[123]Neale Sechele became chief of the Bakwena after the death of Chief Khari Sechele II in 1962. His ascension to the chiefship of the Bakwena was, however, marred in controversy; the British colonial government chose Neale Sechele as successor to chief Khari Sechele even though he was only the son of the divorced first wife of the late chief (his father was Baruti Kgosidinstsi). The Khama government therefore exploited the lingering questions over Neale Sechele's legitimacy and fomented a palace coup against him after he openly declared his intention to defy the Tribal Lands Law of 1968. Neale Sechele resigned after impeachment charges were brought against him in the tribal council (kgotla) in 1970.

[124]Wiseman 1976, p. 184.

[125]Bathoen II and Linchwe II, together with Mokgosi III, represented the chiefs at the Lobatse constitutional conference in 1963. It was also Chiefs Bathoen and Linchwe who represented the chiefs at the April 1964 meeting with the Resident Commissioner where they requested for revisions to the draft constitutional proposals

[126]Wiseman 1976, p. 184.

[127]Botswana Democratic Party. (1969). *Election manifesto 1969: Build Botswana.* Gaborone: Botswana Democratic Party.

other chiefs, ensured that the BNF struggled to expand on its appeal beyond the small Bangwaketse tribal reserve. This was starkly reflected by the results of the 1969 polls.

The BNF contested 21 of the 31 available seats during the October 1969 polls and came in second place with three seats and 14 percent of the national votes.[128] The BDP, on the other hand, retained its dominant position in Botswana politics with 24 seats and 69 percent of the votes.[129] In 3rd place was the BPP which won three seats and obtained 12 percent of the votes; the BIP came in last with one seat and six percent of the votes.[130]

The relative success of the BNF was, however, largely confined to the small Bangwaketse tribal reserve. The BNF not only won all three contested seats in Bangwaketse (Southern District) but the absolute votes obtained by the party in these three constituencies accounted for almost half (47 percent) of the total votes obtained nationwide.[131] The limited appeal of the BNF outside of the Bangwaketse tribal reserve was perhaps best illustrated in the *Nkange* constituency where the party's founding president, Daniel Kwele, came in 3rd with only 11 percent of the votes.[132]

The National Front's victory in Bangwaketse (Southern District) is nevertheless remarkable given that the Democratic Party won these very same seats in 1965

[128]Botswana. (1970). *Report on the general elections 1969*. Gaborone: Government Printer.

[129]Ibid

[130]Ibid

[131]The National Front obtained a total of 4,882 votes in the three contested Bangwaketse tribal reserve constituencies (Kanye South, Kanye North and Ngwaketse/Kgalagadi constituencies) and 10,362 total votes nationwide (21 constituencies).

[132]The results of the 1969 elections in the *Nkange* constituency are as follows: BDP (1,341); BPP (390); BNF (208) and BIP (26).

with an average of 95 percent of the votes.[133] It also underscored the power of chief-based opposition mobilization in Botswana even after independence. Ex-chief Bathoen II himself went head-to-head with the powerful sitting Vice President of the Republic, Quett Masire, and soundly defeated him with 71-21 percent margin of victory in *Kanye South* constituency.[134]

Table 4.4: 1969 general election results in Bangwaketse tribal reserve

Constituency	**BDP**	**BNF**	**% BDP**	**% Change BDP 1965-69**
Kanye South	505	1245	28.9	- 66.8
Kanye North	643	1607	28.6	- 66.7
Ngwaketse/Kgalagadi	1344	2030	39.8	- 55.1

The comparative analysis of the results for the 1966 and 1969 Local Government Elections further confirms the switch in support from the BDP to the BNF in Bangwaketse.[135] The BDP won all available seats during the 1966 Local Government contest in the Ngwaketse District Council; it also obtained at least 76 percent of the valid votes for each of those seats.[136] The BNF, by comparison, fielded only one candidate in the Ngwaketse District and this candidate managed to get only three percent of the valid votes.[137] Fast forward to the 1969 and the National Front, this time with the backing of Chief Bathoen II, won 11 of the 13 contested constituencies

[133]The results of the 1965 elections in Bangwaketse are as follows: 1. *Kanye South*: BDP(3,700), BPP (89), BIP (77); 2. *Kanye North*: BDP(4,483), BIP (134), BPP(85) ; 3. *Ngwaketse/Kgalagadi*: BDP(5,718), BPP(230), BIP(80); and 4. *Moshupa*: BDP(4,463), BIP (106), BPP(90)

[134]The 1969 election results in the Kanye South constituency are as follows: Mr. Bathoen Gaseitsiwe (BNF) - 1,245 and Mr. Quett Masire (BDP) - 505.

[135]The Botswana National Front (BNF) contested the 1966 Local Council elections in June 1966 before drafting ex-chief Bathoen to join the party in July 1966. It is appropriate therefore to compare the the National Front's performance before ex-Chief Bathoen and afterwards to gauge the impact of having the chief's support in 1969.

[136]Gossett and Lotshwao 2009.

[137]Gossett and Lotshwao 2009.

with average of 73 percent of the valid votes.[138] However, the BNF once again struggled to extend its appeal outside the Ngwaketse District Council; it managed to win only 12 out of 108 seats in the remaining 11 districts.[139]

The demographic realities of the Bangwaketse tribal reserve during this period also leads to the inescapable conclusion that Chief Bathoen's defection and his subsequent mobilization of popular opposition to the BDP led to the immediate politicization of Bangwaketse tribal identity in 1969.[140] This fact was also not lost on the BNF's opponents; the BPP leader, for instance, characterized the circumstances surrounding the loss of Vice President Quett Masire's seat to Chief Bathoen as 'feudalistic' and he also introduced a bill in parliament after the election to deplore the 'tribalism' on display in Bangwaketse.[141]

The results of the subsequent elections after the fateful 1969 contest (1974-2009) also indicates that the BNF has continued to outperform its national averages in the Bangwaketse tribal reserve despite the BDP's relative success in clawing back some its support in the Southern District (Bangwaketse).[142]

[138]Botswana. (1970). *Report on the general elections 1969*. Gaborone: Government Printer.

[139]The Botswana National Front (BNF) won 4 out of 8 contested seats in the Gaborone Town Council;1 out of 16 in the Kweneng District Council; 4 out of 8 in the Lobatse Town Council; 2 out of 12 in the South East District Council [Source: Botswana. (1970).Report on the General Elections 1969. Gaborone: G.P.]

[140]According to the 1946 Census, which is the last one to provide data on the tribes, the total number of Africans in the Bangwaketse tribal reserve was 38,557. Of this number, 31,605 or 81.9 percent were ethnic Bangwaketse. The second largest group were the ethnic Bakgatla who numbered 5,382 (14 percent). The ethnic Bakgatla, who mostly resided in the town of Moshupa, had a long history of resistance to being ruled by the Bangwaketse Chief. This dynamic proved important because the BNF refused to field a candidate in the Moshupa constituency in 1969 and thus leaving the BDP candidate to run unopposed. The results of subsequent elections afterwards indicate that Moshupa has since remained a BDP stronghold while the remainder of the Southern District (Bangwaketse tribal reserve) continues to be a stronghold for the opposition Botswana National Front [Source: Botswana. (1946).*Census, 1946*. Mafeking: Bechuanaland Government].

[141]*Botswana Daily News*, 27th November 1969[Also cited in Wiseman (1976, p. 138)]

[142]The Botswana National Front(BNF) joined together with the Botswana Peoples Party (BPP) and

Figure 4.1: Support for the Botswana National Front (BNF), 1974-2009



The internal distribution of support for the BNF within Bangwaketse (Southern District) also follows a pattern which *directly* resulted from the Bathoen led chief-based opposition mobilization in 1969. In that maiden post-independence election, the BNF fielded candidates in all constituencies in the Southern District (Bangwaketse) except in the Moshupa constituency where the BDP candidate was returned unopposed.[143] The BNF leadership ceded the Moshupa seat to the BDP because they figured a movement led by Chief Bathoen II was unlikely to receive a favorable hearing there; the people of Moshupa, who were mostly ethnic Bakgatla,

the Botswana Movement for Democracy(BMD) to contest the 2014 elections under the banner of the Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC).

[143]The Botswana National Front (BNF) fielded candidates in the *Kanye North* (B. Chibana), *Kanye South* (Q. Masire) and *Ngwaketse/Kgalagadi* (P. Sebotho) constituencies but had no candidate contesting in the Moshupa constituency.

had a long history of resisting the rulership of the Bangwaketse chief.[144] The results of the general elections from 1974 through to 2009 indicate that chief-based opposition mobilization in 1969 has created an enduring gulf between the electoral behavior of the people of Moshupa and the rest of the Southern District (Bangwaketse). The Democratic Party has, for instance, consistently won in *Moshupa*, with very comfortable margins, but has struggled to do same for the remainder of the constituencies in Bangwaketse (Southern District).[145]

The preceding analysis indicates that Chief Bathoen's anti-BDP mobilization in 1969 did, in the short-term, politicize Bangwaketse tribal identity and led to the collapse of BDP support in the Southern District (Bangwaketse reserve). The BDP has, however, managed, for reasons I will later explain, to claw back a significant portion of its support in the years since and, in so doing, helped to significantly reduce the contemporary political salience of Bangwaketse tribal identity. Still, the National Front's consistent 'over-performance' in the Southern District (Bangwaketse), coupled with the persistent difference in the electoral behavior of the people of Moshupa and the remainder of Bangwaketse, suggest that the effects of chief-based opposition mobilization in 1969 are not completely erased either.

The above observations lend credence to the argument that Botswana's depoliticized ethnic and tribal cleavages are the product of highly contingent factors and not at all pre-ordained by some deep structural factors. They also show that Botswana was very much susceptible to the same dynamics that produced highly politicized

[144]Lord Hailey (1953, p. 269) notes, for instance, that: ''[the Bakgatla of Moshupa] have on at least two occasions shown a marked spirit of independence or even insurbondination; they do not readily accept the local customs, and many still retain the use of their own dialect (Sekgatla).''

[145] See appendix 9 for full results of national election results in the Southern District (Bangwaketse) from 1974 through to 2009.

ethnic cleavages in Ghana. The key difference between Ghana and Botswana, it appears, is the *timing* of the marginalization of the chiefs and the subsequent emergence of chief-based anti-nationalist mobilization in response to that marginalization; chief-based opposition emerged *after* independence in Botswana whereas Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana had to confront this phenomenon prior to independence when the relative balance of power favored the chiefs. I will be showing in the next section that Botswana almost certainly would have been thrust on a hard-to-reverse path towards the politicization of its ethnic and tribal cleavages had Khama and the BDP leaders pursued a strategy of marginalizing the chiefs prior to independence rather than afterwards.

4.5 Counterfactuals and Divergent Paths in Botswana and Ghana

Ghana and Botswana were both British colonies with powerful chiefs during their respective transitions to independence in the 1950s and 1960s.[146] The ascendant nationalist leaders of both countries were therefore confronted with identical challenges in devising a strategy for incorporating their chiefs into the post-colonial state system. The nationalist leaders of Ghana, led by Kwame Nkrumah and his Convention Peoples Party (CPP), responded to this challenge by adopting an *exclusionary* chiefs strategy during the period of transition to independence. In contrast, the ascendant nationalist leaders of Botswana adopted an *inclusionary* chiefs strategy

[146]Gennailoli & Rainer (2007) gave Botswana and Ghana a score of *0.893* and *0.651* respectively on their measure of pre-colonial institutional centralization in Africa (0-1 scale). Precolonial centralization here represents the ''Share of the Non-European population that had centralized political institutions before colonization.'' [Source: Nicola Gennaioli, & Ilia Rainer (2007). The Modern Impact of Precolonial Centralization in Africa.*Journal of Economic Growth*, 12(3), 185.]

during the run-up to independence in the 1960s. As we already saw in the case of Ghana (see chapter 3), the adoption of an exclusionary chiefs strategy created conditions which directly led to the politicization of the country's pre-existing ethnic cleavages. Ethnic and tribal cleavages in Botswana, by contrast, have remained relatively depoliticized during the post-colonial period.

Table 4.5: Chiefs Strategy and Political Ethnicity in Ghana vs Botswana

	British Colony	*Powerful Chiefs*	*Exclusionary Pre-Independence Chiefs Strategy*	*Politicized Ethnic/tribal Cleavages*
Botswana	Yes	Yes	No	No
Ghana	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

I argue that Botswana's depoliticized ethnic and tribal cleavages are a direct consequence of Seretse Khama's inclusionary chiefs strategy during the period immediately preceding independence in the 1960s. The evidence in support of this claim is the following:

To begin with, the political realities of late colonial Botswana guarantees that a BDP strategy to marginalize the chiefs prior to independence would have resulted in a divided chiefly front and subsequently placed the country's ethnic and tribal differences at the forefront of political mobilization during the formative period of political coalition building in late colonial Botswana. Seretse Khama's position as the *de facto* chief of the largest tribe in the protectorate, the Bamangwato, meant that the BDP was effectively guaranteed the support of his tribe regardless of his party's position on the future role of chiefs.[147] It is also clear from the available historical

[147]Wiseman (1976,p.90) writes: ''In the Central District where, as we have seen, he is still recognized

record that Chief Bathoen II of of the Bangwaketse tribe, as well as, Chief Linchwe of the Bakgatla tribe, would almost certainly have opposed the BDP in 1965 had Seretse Khama opted to pursue an exclusionary chiefs strategy or telegraphed his intention to betray the chiefs after independence.[148] The open rebellion of Chief Neale Sechele of the Bakwena tribe following the passage of the Tribal Lands Law of 1968 also strongly suggest that he would have opposed a Khama led strategy to emasculate the chiefs prior to independence - i.e. when the balance of power clearly favored the chiefs.[149]

It is, however, unclear how the chiefs of the Batawana, Barolong, Bamalete and Batlokwa reserves would have responded to a pre-independence BDP strategy to marginalize the chiefs; they backed the BDP when it was pro-chief and also did not oppose the party when it turned against the chiefs in the immediate post-independence period. The response of these four chiefs is however ultimately immaterial since the four tribes in question only accounted for 13 percent of the total population during the late colonial period and, together, controlled only 4 out of the 31 seats in the National Assembly. Seretse Khama's tribe, the Bamangwato, alone comprised 36 percent of the population and controlled as many as 12 constituencies

as the rightful chief of the Bamangwato, the fact that the BDP is identified with Khama brings almost automatic support for the party at election time. Thus the twelve parliamentary seats of Central District have been won by the BDP in 1965 and 1969 with overwhelming majorities.''

[148]Linchwe, in fact, refused to back the BDP in 1965 because he thought the House of Chiefs compromise insufficiently guarantees the chiefs a place in the political life of post-independence Botswana. Bathoen also defected following the post-independence marginalization of the chiefs; if he would choose to defect when the balance of power favored the nationalists then surely he would have no compunction about defecting when the chiefs were in a relatively more powerful position prior to independence.

[149]Given that Chief Neale Sechele was willing to openly defy the BDP government after independence (i.e. when the balance of power favored the BDP), it must be the case that he would also be willing to do same prior to independence (i.e. when the balance of power favored the chiefs).

during the 1965 and 1969 general elections.[150] The Bangwaketse, Bakwena and Bakgatla tribal reserves also comprised 33 percent of the national population during the late colonial period and together controlled 10 of the 31 constituencies in 1965 and 1969.

Table 4.6: The likely response of chiefs to pre-independence exclusionary strategy

Tribe *Chief*	*% of Population*	*# of Parl. Seats*	*Chief's likely Response to a Pre-independence Exclusionary Strategy by Khama/BDP*
Bamangwato *African Authority*	36.8	12	Support BDP
Bakwena *Neale Sechele II*	13.5	4	Oppose BDP
Bangwaketse *Bathoen Gaseitsiwe II*	13.2	4	Oppose BDP
Bakgatla *Linchwe Kgatela II*	5.9	2	Oppose BDP
Batawana *Letsholathebe Moremi*	7.8	2	Indeterminate
Barolong *Kebalepile Montshiwa*	2	1	Indeterminate
Bamalete *Mokgosi III*	2.6	0.5	Indeterminate
Batlokwa *Kgosi Gaborone*	0.7	0.5	Indeterminate

Given the above demographic realities, a split among the chiefs - in response to their pre-independence marginalization - would almost certainly have placed Botswana's tribal and ethnic differences at the forefront of political contestations during the formative period of political coalition building in 1965. In fact, the Khama led BDP has, from its very founding, had to beat back against the perception that it is a Bamangwato party. As figure 4.2 indicates, this particular charge is not

[150]This effectively meant that the Democratic Party, under Khama's leadership, was guaranteed 12 seats in a legislature of 31 seats irrespective of how the other tribes broke.

entirely without a basis in fact; the BDP has, however, managed to transcend these perceptions, in large part, because it also enjoys significant support among virtually every other ethnic and tribal grouping in the country.

Figure 4.2: Support for the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) in Bamangwato, 1965-2009



Note:*Serowe* is the tribal capital of the Bamangwato reserve (Central district)

However, a divided chiefly front, during the formative period of political coalition building, would have rendered the charges of Bamangwato designs on hegemony through the BDP extremely potent and, as the experience of Ghana suggests, would also have given rise to attempts by the much smaller tribes to ''balance against'' the Bamangwato in the national political sphere. The claim here is that an outcome which pitted the smaller tribes against the Bamangwato, as a

pre-independence BDP exclusionary chiefs strategy would inevitably lead to, would almost certainly have led to the politicization of Botswana's pre-existing tribal fault-lines.[151]

Finally, a divided chiefly front, prior to independence, would also have prevented the emergence of a dominant political party in the mould of the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). As previously noted, the BDP won overwhelming majorities in 1965 largely on the backs of the near unanimous support it received from the tribal chiefs. This ushered the party into the post-independence period as the undisputed dominant party in Botswana. The BDP's dominance then created a path-dependent mechanism whereby political elites, acting in their own self-interest, are compelled to remain within the party's fold, rather than break ranks and alter the BDP grand coalition, because the BDP provided the only realistic avenue to power in a dominant party system.[152] Makgala (2006) writes, for instance, that while internal struggles for power within the BDP often turns acrimonious, with accusations of tribalism being thrown around, it almost never leads to elite defections because ''whatever their differences, contestants seem to be aware that for the time being at least the BDP offers the only viable site from which control of the government structures can meaningfully be attained: thus the internal heat without defections at the top."[153] A divided chiefly front prior to independence would have ushered in a

[151]The evidence for this can be found in the experience of chief-based mobilization in the Bangwaketse tribal reserve.

[152]The defection of Chief Bathoen II to lead the opposition Botswana National Front (BNF) in 1969 represents a rare instance where the non-tribal basis of politics in Botswana almost unravelled but this crisis was easily contained since no other chiefs were willing to absorb the steep costs associated with opposing the incumbent BDP government. And even in Southern District, where the defection of Chief Bathoen II led to the immediate politicization of Bangwaketse tribal identity, the Democratic Party has since managed to regain its foothold since the National Front has offered no viable pathway to gaining control of the state.

[153]Makgala 2006, p. 170.

comparable path-dependent dynamic but producing the opposite effect: elites within each politicized tribal coalition would now have a continued incentive to cultivate and perpetuate these divides during the post-colonial period and,in so doing, prevent the emergence of pan-tribal coalitions during the postcolonial period - i.e short of an external shock to the system. It appears therefore that the *timing* of the decision to marginalize the chiefs explains the different outcomes in Ghana and Botswana. Ghana was thrust on the path towards the politicization of its ethnic cleavages because its ascendant nationalist leaders, led by Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention Peoples Party (CPP), chose to marginalize the chiefs at a time when the chiefs were in a relatively powerful position to mobilize effective sub-national challenges to the centralizing nationalists. In contrast, the nationalist leaders of Botswana, led by Seretse Khama and the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), chose an inclusionary chiefs strategy during the late colonial period and only pursued an exclusionary chiefs strategy after independence when they were in a more powerful position to contain the political fallout from such a strategy.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has successfully demonstrated that the politics of chieftaincy, during the critical period of transition to independence in the 1960s, explains why ethnic and tribal cleavages largely remain non-politicized Botswana. It showed, through careful process tracing, that ethnic and tribal cleavages are relatively non-politicized in Botswana because its nationalist leaders, led by Seretse Khama, chose to be conciliatory towards the country's powerful tribal chiefs during the period of transition to independence in the 1960s. This strategy of inclusion ensured that Botswana

avoided a clash between the tribal chiefs and the ascendant nationalists and, in so doing, placed the country on a path towards the non-politicization of its ethnic and tribal cleavages. Botswana achieved independence in 1966 with virtually all the tribal chiefs united behind the Seretse Khama and the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP). The BDP's dominance has also ensured that the pan-tribal basis of politics is reproduced through a path-dependent process where elites, acting in their own self-interest, voluntarily choose to remain within the BDP fold rather than defect since the party continues to provide the only viable path to gaining national power in Botswana. It means therefore that Botswana's non-politicized ethnic and tribal cleavages were by no means pre-ordained; the country could easily have fallen on a similar path as Ghana did if *only* its ascendant nationalist leaders had chosen to pursue an exclusionary rather than inclusionary chiefs strategy during the period of transition to independence in the 1960s.

Chapter 5

Tanzania: A Natural Experiment

5.1 Introduction

Scholars of ethnicity and politics in Africa have offered many explanations for why ethnic cleavages are relatively non-politicized in Tanzania (Barkan 1994; Hyden 1994; Glickman 1995; Miguel 2004; Weber 2009; Boone and Nyeme 2014). This chapter argues however that the existing explanations are inadequate because they fail to account for a crucial internal variation in the political salience of ethnicity in the East African country. Whereas ethnic cleavages are non-politicized on mainland Tanzania (formerly Tanganyika) the opposite is true for the semi-autonomous island of Zanzibar where ethnic and racial tensions have defined politics since the late 1950s. It further argues that key differences in the politics of the terminal colonial period within the two territories helps explain why ethnic cleavages became politicized in Zanzibar but not on the mainland. I employ qualitative data to show that the mainland had weak traditional rulers (chiefs) who readily abdicated rather than fight the ascendant nationalist leaders on the eve of independence. I argue that this abrupt

and peaceful abdication by the Tanganyika chiefs paved the way for Julius Nyerere and the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) to quickly consolidate power and nurture the development of a cohesive national identity. Conversely, I show that Zanzibar's highly politicized ethno-racial cleavages are directly traceable to the bitter and acrimonious struggles over the future of the powerful Zanzibari sultanate during the island nation's transition to independence in the early 1960s.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 establishes that Tanganyika indeed had weak and highly decentralized local authority institutions. It then draws on the examples of the Chagga and Sukuma, the most prosperous and most populous ethnic groups respectively, to illustrate the various attempts by the British colonial authorities to shore up the chieftaincy institutions in Tanganyika and how ultimately these efforts were insufficient in making the chiefs strong enough to withstand the political challenge from the nationalists in the 1950s. Tanganyika therefore achieved independence with TANU being a singularly dominant and a largely unchallenged political force; this gave Julius Nyerere the political space to fashion a national identity for Tanganyika. Section 5.3 examines the counterfactual case of Zanzibar to show how disagreements over the future of the powerful sultanate on the eve of independence led to the emergence of politicized ethnic cleavages on the island nation. Section 5.4 establishes that mainland Tanzania (Tanganyika) and Zanzibar were exposed to very similar nation-building policies after independence. Section 5.5 considers rival explanations for Tanzania's relative ethnic peace.

5.2 Decentralized Chieftaincy Institutions and the Politics of Detribalization in Tanganyika

The precolonial chieftaincy institutions in Tanganyika were diffused and highly decentralized.[1] These institutions were further weakened during the period of German colonial rule, which lasted from the 1886 to 1919.[2] The Germans, unlike the British, ruled through a system of direct administration that relied heavily upon non-local administrators.[3] Even in the few places where the Germans instituted some form of 'semi-direct' rule they insisted upon the local chiefs adopting foreign administrative structures and titles.[4] Following Germany's defeat in the first world war, the British took over the administration of Tanganyika, first under a mandate of the League of Nations (1920-1946) and thereafter under a United Nations Charter.[5] Eager to implement an effective system of indirect rule, the British colonial authorities attempted to rehabilitate and reorganize the traditional political institutions in Tanganyika but these projects achieved only minimal success. Thus when these chieftaincy institutions faced the nationalist challenge in the late 1950s they quickly buckled.

In the next sections, I draw on the independence transition politics within the Chagga and the Sukuma territories to illustrate the status of the chieftaincy institutions in Tanganyika during the late colonial period and describe how the chiefs were overawed by the nationalists in the 1950s. The Chagga were in the words of

[1] Iliffe 1979.
[2] L. Hailey 1950b.
[3] L. Hailey 1950b, p. 212.
[4] L. Hailey 1950b, p. 213.
[5] L. Hailey 1950b, p. 212.

Iliffe (1979:493) Tanganyika's ''most prosperous peasant society'' whiles the the Sukuma were the largest ethnic subset of the population.[6] These two ethnic groups were therefore among the most likely candidates for any credible chief-based sub-national opposition mobilization against the nationalists. The failure of their chiefs to mount a credible resistance to Julius Nyerere and the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) illustrates the fundamental weakness of the chieftaincy institutions in Tanganyika more generally.

5.2.1 Chagga Chiefs and the Politics of Decolonization

The Chagga are the primary inhabitants of the very fertile slopes of mount kilimanjaro. The moderate climate of their territories enabled them to become some of the largest coffee growers in colonial Tanganyika.[7] The Chagga were also among the earliest groups to have access to western education because European missionaries found the climate of their territories more tolerable than other parts of Tanganyika.[8] Thus by the end of the colonial period the Chagga were by all accounts among the most prosperous ethnic groups in Tanganyika.[9] Why no sub-national opposition emerged in Chaggaland to challenge the centralizing national agenda of Julius Nyerere and the Tanganyika National African Union (TANU) is the subject of the analysis in this section.

The Chagga ethnic group, like the rest of Tanganyika, had no centralized pre-colonial chieftaincy institutions. For instance, the Chagga were ruled by as many

[6] East Africa High Commission. 1958.
[7] Hunter 2015, p. 109.
[8] Fisher, Barnard, and Thomas Molony 2012, p. 72.
[9] Iliffe 1979, p. 493.

as nineteen independent chiefdoms prior to a major local government consolidation exercise in 1946.[10] This administrative decentralization also reflected deep divisions within the ethnic group; the chagga, for instance, speak four different dialects with such significant variations that speakers of one dialect often cannot understand the other.[11] The 1946 Native Authorities Order consolidated the nineteen independent chiefdoms into three main divisions, Ha on the West, Vunjo in the Center and Rombo in the east, each with a Superior chief (Mwitori, plural Waitori) and a deputy chief (Aganyi).[12] The Native Authorities Order also established a new Chagga Council of Chiefs which was comprised of the three waitori and their deputies, as well as, six additional councillors, two each from the three divisions.[13]

The move towards a more consolidated chiefly system however met significant resistance from the chiefs. For instance, the Chagga chiefs refused to elect the three waitori (divisional chiefs) for the newly constituted divisions.[14] The colonial government waited for two years after which the provincial commissioner appointed the three divisional chiefs without any input from the hereditary chiefs.[15] The Chagga divisional chiefs therefore assumed their new offices without much popular legitimacy and were generally regarded as western impositions.

The festering discontent over the newly consolidated chieftaincy structure, as well as, disagreements over the decisions of the Chagga Chiefs Council with respect

[10] L. Hailey 1950b, p. 283.

[11] Fisher, Barnard, and Thomas Molony 2012, p. 17.

[12] These chiefs were to be elected from their respective districts and subject to the approval of the provincial commissioner. Source: The Establishment of Native Authorities (Northern Province) (Consolidation) Order, 1948, Government Notice 191, October 29th, 1948

[13] L. Hailey 1950b, p. 283.

[14] Iliffe 1979, p. 491.

[15] Iliffe 1979, p. 491.

to the allocation of lands recently returned to the Chagga people led to the formation of the Kilimanjaro Chagga Citizens Union (KCCU) in 1949.[16] The KCCU made an indelible mark on Chagga politics when it seized upon proposals by the colonial government for the election of a paramount chief from among the three divisional chiefs, who would merely serve as the chairman of the Chiefs Council, to instead campaign for the creation of the office of a popularly elected Chagga paramount chief who would be vested with real executive authority.[17] Sensing an opportunity to diffuse tensions over the newly consolidated chieftaincy structure, the colonial authorities yielded to the demands of the KCCU. The KCCU then drafted Thomas Marealle, a graduate of Makerere University and grandson of a popular chief during the German colonial era, as their candidate for the paramount chieftaincy position, with the understanding that he would abolish the waitori system once elected into office.[18] Marealle easily won the elections and became the first Paramount Chief of the Chagga people on January 14 1952.[19] He then embarked on a vigorous Chagga nation-building project. For instance, he helped established a newspaper, Komkya, to propagate a new Chagga nationalism.[20] He also commissioned a Chagga anthem and also started a project to document the history of the Chagga people.[21] The day of his inauguration as the first Paramount Chief also became a Chagga national holiday. According to Marealle, the day commemorated the moment when ''the Chagga

[16]The lands in question were seized during German colonial rule and returned to the Chagga people by the British colonial government. Source: Iliffe (1979, pp.490-494

[17]Iliffe 1979, p. 492.

[18]Iliffe 1979, p. 493.

[19]Thomas Marealle stood against the three waitori: Chief Petro Itosi Marealle of Marangu, Chief Abdiel Shangali of Machame and Chief John Maruma of Rombo. P.I. Marealle later withdrew from the race and Abdiel Shangali won Machame but Thomas Marealle won the overall contest with 15,661 votes out of the total of 24,002 votes cast. Source: Iliffe (1979, p. 493

[20]Hunter 2015, p. 165.

[21]Stahl 1964.

tribe miraculously came together in unity which has surprised many people...[and managed to] elect one ruler for the whole tribe.''[22] He also moved to make his position hereditary after his election.[23]

Thomas Marealle's stature grew nationally and the colonial authorities began to see in him a potential figure around which a more conservative Tanganyikan nationalism could be built. For instance, he was chosen to speak on behalf of the Tanganyika natives, alongside Julius Nyerere, at the United Nations Trusteeship Council in New York in 1957.[24] A Foreign Office brief remarked after his presentation to the trusteeship council that ''Marealle may well have a great future as the leader of moderate conservative nationalism drawing its strength from the chiefs and the peasants''.[25] But Marealle's rising national stature and his efforts to nurture a new Chagga nationalism were ultimately insufficient to overcome the deep divisions within Chagga society.[26] Thus, when he finally came in the crosshairs of the Tanganyika Africa National Union (TANU), these divisions were readily exploited, leading to his precipitous fall from power.

The beginning of the end of Thomas Marealle's reign as paramount chief of the Chagga people started with the formation of the Chagga Democratic Party (CDP) in 1958. CDP was formed, with Julius Nyerere's approval, to mobilize opposition

[22]'Chagga Day Speech at the Sundowner - 10th November 1952 - by the Mangi Mkuu of the Wachagga, Marealle II,' TNA 12844/3: Mangi Mkuu to Colonel Hay, Government House, Dar es Salaam, 24th November 1952, 12844/3, f.459. Also cited in Hunter, Emma (2015:165).

[23]Hunter 2015, p. 167.

[24]J. Listowel 1968, p. 294.

[25]Brief for Secretary of State's meeting with members of the Labour Party on tanganyika, TNA UK, CO 822/1319. Also cited in Hunter, Emma (2015:166)

[26]Marealle had tried unsuccessfully to remove the three waitori from office. These chiefly rivals were therefore willing agents to be used to undermine his rule.

against Marealle within the Chagga territories.[27] Marealle had by this time established his reputation as an anti-TANU chief.[28] Nyerere was also keen to see the Chagga paramount chieftaincy project fail because other ethnic groups were beginning to look to the Chagga project as an example to emulate.[29] The CDP was led by Solomon Eliufoo, a TANU man from Machame, who was also the son-in-law of Abdiel Shangali, a chiefly rival to Marealle.[30] Indeed, the link between TANU and the CDP was so close that one commentator labelled the party ''TANU dressed in tribal robe.''[31] The leadership of CDP set out to oppose not just Marealle but also undermine the paramount chieftaincy institution itself. They accused Marealle of corruption, authoritarianism, moral turpitude and collusion with the colonial authorities.[32] The CDP campaigned for the abolition of the institution of paramount chieftaincy (which had become de facto hereditary) and instead wanted an elective position of President of the Chagga Council.[33] Marealle had by this time also become unpopular and politically exposed after his attempts to oust the divisional chiefs failed. The colonial government therefore acquiesced to the demands of the CDP and called for a referendum on the status of the paramount chieftaincy institution in Chaggaland. In the referendum of February 4, 1960, the Chagga people voted to discontinue the institution of the paramount chieftaincy.[34] With Marealle out of

[27]Iliffe 1979, p. 568.

[28]He was a leading figure in the 'Chiefs Convention' which the colonial authorities established to serve as counterweight to the emergent African nationalism championed by TANU. [Hunter, Emma (2015;166)]

[29]Iliffe 1979, p. 569.

[30]Iliffe 1979, p. 569.

[31]Mramba, Basil P. 'Some notes on the political development of the Chagga of Kilimanjaro.' B.A. Research Paper, Makerere University College, 1967. Cited in Iliffe (1979:568).

[32]Iliffe 1979, p. 568.

[33]Iliffe 1979, p. 568.

[34]A.R. Denny, 'A note on Chagga Tribal Politics prior to referendum in Jan. 1960', TNA UK, FCO 141/17864, 4 January 1960, p.3, f. 55A.

power, the path was cleared for TANU's domination of politics in Chaggaland.[35] The CDP was subsequently disbanded that same year and its leadership joined TANU.[36]

The architects of Marealle's ouster were handsomely rewarded with positions in the post-independence TANU government. Solomon Eliufoo, leader of the CDP, became Minister of Education in 1962 and held that post until ill-health forced him to resign six years later.[37] The three divisional chiefs (waitori) in Chaggaland were also given jobs within parastatal organizations: Chief Petro Itosi Marealle of Marangu was made Chairman of Tanganyika's Local Government Services Commission. He subsequently served as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and was later made head of the Local Government.[38] Chief Abdiel Shangali of Machame was made the Executive Chairman of the Tanganyika National Tourist Board.[39] And Chief John Maruma of Rombo was made the Chairman of Tanganyika's Transportation Licensing Authority.[40] According Moore (1996) Petro Itosi Marealle believes Nyerere gave him high positions in the government so he would move to Dar es Salaam and be watched closely by the government rather than remain on mount Kilimanjaro where he could potentially mobilize tribal opposition to the TANU government.[41]

Thomas Marealle's response to his ouster underscores the fundamental weakness of the chieftaincy institution in Chaggaland. Rather than attempt to mobilize

[35]For instance, in the the 1960 independence elections, the TANU candidate S.N. Eliufoo obtained 97.1 percent of the total votes in the Moshi district (home district of the Chagga people) and independent candidate Paul Lemama obtained the remaining 2.9 percent of the votes. Source: Tanganyika African Standard Newspaper, September 1 1960, p. 1

[36]Iliffe 1979, p. 569.

[37]Kurtz 1978, p. 53.

[38]Kurtz 1978, p. 119.

[39]Fisher, Barnard, and Thomas Molony 2012, p. 146.

[40]Kurtz 1978, p. 119.

[41]Moore 1996, p. 590.

local opposition to TANU, as powerful chiefs in other African countries were wont to do in similar circumstances, he instead sued the Kilimanjaro District Council for lost wages resulting from the abolition of the office of the paramount chief in Chaggaland.[42] A high court awarded him monetary damages calculated on a lifetime's future earnings.[43] Nyerere's government, however, intervened and passed a retroactive legislation to deny any compensation to deposed chiefs.[44] Bitter but powerless, Thomas Marealle accepted a job with the United Nations in Rawalpindi and remained with the UN in various capacities and only returned to Tanganyika several decades later.[45] That TANU could so easily engineer the ouster of Thomas Marealle, a leading chiefly figure in Tanganyika, underscores the fundamental weakness of the chieftaincy institutions in the country during the terminal colonial period. To recap, Chaggaland had no paramount chief until 1951, just a decade prior to independence in 1951. The entire process of the consolidation of traditional political authority did not commence until 1947. The institutions of chieftaincy in Chaggaland therefore did not have the longstanding legitimacy derived from tradition and practice. The successful co-optation of the Chagga divisional chiefs by TANU further supports this thesis. In an alternative universe with strong and powerful chieftaincy institutions, the struggle between TANU and Thomas Marealle would have almost certainly led to the emergence of sub-national chief-based opposition mobilization against the former.

[42] Eckert 2006.
[43] Fisher, Barnard, and Thomas Molony 2012, p. 147.
[44] McAuslan and Ghai 1966.
[45] Kurtz 1978, p. 118.

5.2.2 Sukuma Chiefs and the Politics of the Terminal Colonial Period

The Sukuma are the most populous single ethnic group in Tanganyika. According to the 1957 census, they numbered about 1.9 million and constituted 12.6 percent of the national population.[46] Traditional political authority among the Sukuma, like the rest of Tanganyika, was highly decentralized. The Sukuma had as many as fifty-two independent chiefdoms during the late colonial period.[47] By comparison, the Ashanti, who constituted 13 percent of the population of Ghana had a centralized political system with one recognized leader.[48] The British colonial authorities found the fragmented system of political authority unwieldy and inefficient but their efforts to consolidate the Sukuma political system were largely unsuccessful. For instance, in 1926 the British colonial authorities grouped the Sukuma chiefs into seven federations; four in the Mwanza district and one each in the Kwimba, Shyiyanga, and Maswa districts.[49] But the individual chiefs continued to retain significant autonomy because the federations could only act on the basis of a consensus among the chiefs.[50] A further move towards a consolidated political structure was attempted through the establishment of the Sukuma Federal Council in October 1946.[51] But the federal council became no more than an organization that merely rubber-stamped policies originating from the colonial authorities.[52] Thus by the late 1950s, when the nationalist struggle hit its zenith, the Sukuma had no centralized political authority.

[46]East Africa High Commission. 1958, p. 20.
[47]Maguire 1969, p. 20.
[48]Ghana 1964.
[49]L. Hailey 1950b, p. 229; Maguire 1969, p. 8.
[50]L. Hailey 1950b, p. 230.
[51]L. Hailey 1950b, p. 232.
[52]Maguire 1969, p. 21.

The decentralized leadership structure ensured that the Sukuma chiefs faced difficult collective action challenges and were therefore easily overawed by TANU.

To be sure, Nyerere himself recognized the political advantage of having a highly diffused tribal authority structure in Sukumaland. During the late 1950s, some Sukuma elites within TANU began discussing the possibility of reviving the moribund Sukuma Federal Council in order ''to catch up with other tribes which have made great progress such as the Chagga''.[53] Nyerere summarily dismissed the idea and personally asked the provincial commissioner to formally disband the federal council ''You must break the Sukumaland Federal Council. We can't have another another Katanga here.''[54] Nyerere's invocation of Katanga is proof that he considered a centralized tribal system a potential source of sub-national mobilization or even separatist aspirations. His high-handed response to Chief Kidaha Makwaia's declared support for the opposition around the time of independence also underscores his fear of chief-based opposition mobilization.

David Kidaha Makwaia, the chief of Usiha, was the preeminent chiefly figure in Sukumaland during the late colonial period. Makwaia had gained enormous national prestige through his service as one of the first Africans nominated to the Legislative Council and also becoming the first African appointed to the Executive Council of the colonial government.[55] A graduate of Makerere University, he was widely considered a possible future president of Tanganyika prior to the emergence of TANU.[56] Maguire (1969) indicates, for instance, that Nyerere himself asked Kidaha Makwaia

[53]Maguire 1969, p. 281.
[54]Maguire 1969, p. 282.
[55]Kurtz 1978, p. 115.
[56]Maguire 1969, p. 53.

to become leader of the newly-formed TANU but he declined for unknown reasons.[57] Chief Makwaia refused to take up TANU membership and instead became one of the founding leaders of the failed United Tanganyika Party (UTP).[58] He later joined the opposition Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) in 1962.[59] One of his primary grievances against TANU was the denigration of the chiefs.[60] But just a week after declaring support for the PDP, Nyerere's government invoked an old colonial law to deport him, together with his brother Chief Hussein Makwaia, from Sukumaland to a remote part of Southern Tanganyika (Tundra and Chunya respectively) on the charge of ''using their position as ex-chief and Chief not only to stir up opposition to government's policy with regard to chiefs but to inflame local feelings by conduct calculated to endanger peace and good order in Shinyanga district.''[61] Makwaia had earlier resigned his chiefship in 1954 and handed over power to his brother Hussein.[62] Another Sukuma chief, Francis Masanja, was also placed under house arrest in Geita following his involvement in opposition politics.[63] The remaining Sukuma chiefs either joined the TANU bandwagon or returned to their villages to farm after the chieftaincy institution was officially abolished in 1961. Kidaha Makwaia would himself later joined TANU in 1964 and thereby underscore the complete capitulation of the Sukuma chiefs.[64] The effective neutralization of chief-based opposition in Sukumaland paved the way for TANU's complete political dominance in the region.

The crucial point to note here is that Nyerere and TANU easily quashed the

[57]Maguire 1969, p. 54.
[58]J. Listowel 1968, p. 279.
[59]Maguire 1969, p. 354.
[60]Maguire 1969, p. 354.
[61]Maguire 1969, p. 355.
[62]Maguire 1969, p. 55.
[63]Maguire 1969, p. 352.
[64]Kurtz 1978, p. 116.

embryonic chiefly opposition in Sukumaland in large part because the chieftaincy system in Sukumaland was too diffused and weak. It is almost certainly the case that Makwaia (and the other Sukuma chiefs) would have had a better shot at mounting a credible resistance to the TANU onslaught had the Sukuma had a highly centralized kingdom like the Ashanti or Buganda. The chiefs clearly had a credible motive to oppose TANU but their ultimate capitulation and acquiescence suggest that they did not have the institutional resources to mobilize local opposition to TANU.

5.3 Zanzibar: A Counterfactual Case Study

The evidence presented above clearly demonstrates that the highly fragmented and decentralized nature of the institutions of chieftaincy in Tanganyika ensured that the individual chiefs were too weak to mobilize their co-ethnics to oppose the nationalist attacks on the institution of chieftaincy. The above evidence is however insufficient to support the thesis that Nyerere's assault on the institution of chieftaincy would have led to chief-based ethnic opposition mobilization and the subsequent emergence of politicized ethnic cleavages had there been more centralized/powerful chieftaincy institutions present.

The first challenge is one of endogeneity; it is possible that Nyerere chose to attack the chieftaincy institutions because he realized the chiefs were weak. This challenge is however easily resolved since there's evidence that Nyerere was motivated by a strong conviction that powerful chieftaincy institutions posed a threat to his unifying national agenda. His invocation of the Katanga secessionist movement in response to attempts to revive the Sukuma Chiefs Council is instructive here.[65]

[65] Maguire 1969, p. 282.

Given his fear of a possible Katanga-like situation emerging in Tanganyika, it seems unlikely that the presence of strong chieftaincy institutions would have engendered a more accommodationist strategy from Nyerere; it would almost certainly have heightened those fears. There's also an ideological dimension to Nyerere's attitude to the chiefs (Nkrumah of Ghana shared similar attitudes despite having strong chiefs); TANU was a nominally socialist party. This implies that the accommodation of a feudalist chiefly system would be considered anachronistic irrespective of whether or not those systems are decentralized. As Molony (2014,41) explained Nyerere considered the chieftaincy institutions to be ''ridiculous'' and ''almost feudal'' relics of the past.[66]

The second challenge is one of counterfactual examples: evidence that a country/territory with similar characteristics as Tanganyika would produce political ethnic cleavages if we kept all relevant variables constant but changed the type of pre-colonial political institutions from a highly diffused one to a highly centralized political structure. For this, we turn to the example of Zanzibar. Tanganyika and Zanzibar were both British colonies. They gained independence within 2 years of each other; Tanganyika in December 1961 and Zanzibar in December 1963. On 4th April 1962 the two territories joined together to form the United Republic of Tanzania. Whereas ethnic and racial cleavages remain non-politicized on the mainland, the opposite is true for the island of Zanzibar.[67] Electoral politics on the island is marked by deep racial and ethnic divides that date back to the struggle for power during the transition to independence in the early 1960s.[68] This remains so even after two

[66]Tom Molony 2014.
[67]Brown 2010.
[68]Lofchie 1965.

decades of one party rule following the union with Tanganyika. I demonstrate in the next section that politicized ethnicity emerged in Zanzibar as a direct consequence of the struggles over the future role of the powerful Sultan in a post-independence Zanzibar.

5.3.1 The Sultan and the Emergence of Ethnic Politics in Zanzibar

Zanzibar, unlike Tanganyika, had a highly centralized pre-colonial political institution at independence. The Busaidi sultanate, originally from Oman, ruled Zanzibar from around the 1830s until they entered into a protectorate relationship with Great Britain in 1890.[69] At the height of its power, the Zanzibar sultanate controlled large territories including Mombasa in Kenya and parts of the coastal belt of mainland Tanzania.[70] British colonial rule in Zanzibar took the form of a ''dual mandate'' in which the Sultan ruled alongside the British Resident.[71] For instance, the Sultan served as the President of the Zanzibar Executive Council during the colonial period and his assent was required for any legislation to become law in the territory.[72] He also retained the power to appoint all the Mudirs (District Officers) of Zanzibar, with the advice of the British Resident.[73] Thus, the position of the Sultan of Zanzibar was the polar opposite of the fecklessness that characterized the chieftaincy institutions in Tanganyika. I show here that the struggle over the future status of this powerful sultanate, during the transition to independence in the 1950s, politicized

[69]Thompson 1986; L. Hailey 1950b.
[70]L. Hailey 1950b.
[71]Lofchie 1965, p. 57.
[72]L. Hailey 1950b, p. 7.
[73]L. Hailey 1950b, p. 9.

ethnic cleavages in ways that still fundamentally shape politics on the island.

Three major political parties emerged during the transition to independence in Zanzibar: the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP), the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) and the Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples Party (ZPPP). Of these three parties, the ZNP was the most steadfastly pro-monarchy.[74] As Lofchie (1965, 229) explains, the ZNP styled itself as the ''guardians of the Sultanate.''[75] The Afro-Shirazi Party, which enjoyed the support of Julius Nyerere and TANU on the mainland, favored a republican constitution after independence.[76] The ZPPP, a splinter group from the ASP and mostly regionalist in its ambitions, rejected the anti-monarchy and anti-Arab politics of the ASP and joined forces with the ZNP to contest the final pre-independence elections.[77] Even though the monarchy tried to maintain a public posture of neutrality in the struggle for power, their preference for the ZNP/ZPP coalition was common knowledge. Clayton (1981) notes for instance that Sultan Seyyid Abdullah was often greeted with ZNP demonstrations and party songs on visits to rural parts of Zanzibar.[78] His successor, Sayyid Jamshid, is also described as having ''a known strong personal sympathy for the views of [Ali] Mushin and the ZNP.''[79] In fact, Sultan Jamshid saw his future so tied to the fortunes of the ZNP/ZPPP coalition that he reportedly made secret plans to leave the country in the event of ASP victory in Zanzibar.[80] The evidence also suggest that close allies of the

[74]The original name of the ZNP in Swahili was Hizbu l'Watan l'Raiaia Sultan Zanzibar (National Party of the Subjects of the Sultan of Zanzibar).

[75]Lofchie 1965, p. 229.

[76]The Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) initially maintained an official doctrine of loyalty to the Sultan but this facade soon fell off when in campaign speeches they vowed never to accept either British or Arab rule (a reference to the Sultan) [Lofchie (1965, p.199]

[77]Lofchie 1965, p. 199.

[78]Clayton 1981, p. 43.

[79]Clayton 1981, p. 46.

[80]Clayton 1981, p. 47.

monarchy were crucial backers of the ZNP. For example, the fateful meeting which sealed the ZNP/ZPP alliance was held in the house of Seyyid bin Hamoud bin Feisal, a son-in-law of the Sultan.[81]

To be sure, the politics of this period also had deep racial and class undertones, with the privileged Arabs, Asians and Comorians almost exclusively supporting the ZNP.[82] But race, while a crucial component of Zanzibari politics, fails to fully explain the deep and enduring ethnic divide which emerged among the majority African population of Zanzibar. It is this divide among the African populations which helps shed light on the role of the powerful monarchy in the emergence of ethnicized politics in post-independence Zanzibar. Prior to the arrival of the Busaidi dynasty, three distinct African tribes had emerged on the islands of Zanzibar: the Hadimu, the Tumbatu, and the Pemba.[83] The Hadimu are indigenous to the island of Unguja (also called Zanzibar island); the Pemba primarily resided on the Pemba island; and the Tumbatu are native to the island of Tumbatu.[84] Apart from these three ethnic groups, there was also a sizable migrant African population in Zanzibar by the late 1950s.

During the struggle for independence, the Hadimu and the immigrant mainland African community primarily backed the Afro-Shirazi Party while the Tumbatu and the Pemba Africans mainly backed the ZNP/PPP coalition.[85] This political division between the Zanzibari African populations over the status of the monarchy also mapped onto differences in relative modernization of the different Zanzibar territories

[81]Great Britain. 1961.
[82]Lofchie 1965, p. 241.
[83]Prins 1961.
[84]Lofchie 1965, p. 38.
[85]Lofchie 1965, pp. 240-242.

at the time. Zanzibar island, where the Hadimu and the immigrant African populations primarily resided, was much more urbanized than the Tumbatu and Pemba islands, where the Tumbatu and the Pemba primary resided. As Lofchie (1965) describes it, the relative modernization of Zanzibar island (Unguja island) enabled these Africans to be ''absorbed into the modern occupational sector of the Zanzibar economy and [were] brought into intense contact with a new, secular political culture.''[86] As a result, the Hadimu and the immigrant African communities were ''available for recruitment into African mass movements seeking a major political reconstruction of Zanzibar society.''[87] The Tumbatu and Pemba peoples by comparison lived in rural territories that were ''geographically and culturally remote from the forces of secular modernization which mobilized Africans of Zanzibar.''[88] They therefore generally found the ZNP/ZPPP coalition campaign for a future Zanzibar united around islam and loyalty to the Sultan much more appealing.[89]

Following the 1964 revolution in Zanzibar and the union with Tanganyika, the ASP joined together with TANU to form the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM). The CCM coalition ruled Zanzibar under a one-party regime from 1977 until the return to multiparty democracy in 1995.[90] Following the return of multi-party rule in 1995, elements of the old ZNP/ZPPP coalition came together to form the Civic United Front (CUF) to oppose the CCM in Zanzibar.[91] They have since revived the old politicized

[86]Lofchie 1965, p. 17.
[87]Lofchie 1965, p. 17.
[88]Lofchie 1965, p. 18.
[89]Lofchie 1965, p. 18.
[90]ASP and TANU joined together to form the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in 1977.
[91]Omar Mapuri (1996:75) had this to say about the relationship between pre-revolution politics of the 1950s/1960s and the alliances of the present period:'' history seems to have repeated itself through the re-emergence of the pre-revolution political camps whereby with some few exceptions, the former members of the defunct ZNP/ZPP alliance and their children have joined the newly formed CUF while the former members of the ASP and their offspring have generally remained in CCM.''

ethnic cleavages in Zanzibar. Pemba, for instance, remains the stronghold for CUF while the CCM is much more successful on the Zanzibar island.[92] The ethnic/racial antagonisms which characterized the contests of the late 1950s have also reemerged with full force.[93]

5.4 Post-independence nation-building in Tanganyika and Zanzibar

Scholars of ethnic politics in Africa often point to the nation-building policies and unifying character of Tanzania's founding leader, Julius Nyerere, as the source of the East African country's national unity and non-politicized ethnic cleavages.[94] However, this argument appears to be undermined by the persistence of politicized ethnic cleavages in Zanzibar even after half-a-century of union with the mainland (formerly Tanganyika). Given this disjuncture in the political salience of ethnic cleavages in Zanzibar and mainland Tanzania, the argument attributing the country's relatively depoliticized ethnic cleavages to Nyerere's post-independence nation-building policies would remain plausible only if the mainland (Tanganyika) and Zanzibar were exposed to radically different nation-building policies in the immediate post-independence period. I however show below that despite the semi-autonomous status of Zanzibar, the nation-building policies adopted on the island archipelago, following its merger with Tanganyika in 1964, were remarkably similar to those supposedly responsible for depoliticized ethnics cleavages on the mainland.

[92]Brown 2010.
[93]Brown 2010.
[94]Miguel 2004.

In other words, given that both mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar were exposed to very similar post-independence nation-building policies, the causes of any differences in the relative politicization of ethnic differences in the two territories must predate the formation of the union.

The nation-building policies supposedly responsible for the non-emergence of politicized ethnic cleavages on the mainland (Tanganyika), as summarized by Miguel (2004), are as follows: (i) the adoption of Kiswahili as a national language; (ii) the nationalist content of public school curricula after independence; (iii) the abolishing of traditional rural authorities (chiefs) after independence; (iv) the equitable distribution of national resources; and (v) Julius Nyerere's personal commitment to downplaying ethnic affiliations in favor of a national identity in the post-colonial period.[95] I demonstrate below that the nation-building policies implemented on the mainland were nearly identical to those pursued in Zanzibar:

1. *The adoption of a national language* : Miguel (2004) writes that a major reason why ethnic cleavages are depoliticized in Tanzania (Tanganyika) but not in neighboring Kenya is that the former adopted Kiswahili as a national language.[96] This argument however fails to explain the disjuncture between mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar with respect to the relative political salience of ethnic cleavages since Swahili was similarly adopted as both the official language of government business and the language of instruction for public primary schools in Zanzibar as early as 1965.[97] It also means that on this very score, we can effectively treat the approaches to post-independence nation-building in both territories of Tanzania as identical.

[95] Miguel 2004.
[96] Miguel 2004, p. 10.
[97] Clayton 1981, p. 144.

2. *The overhaul of local government institutions after independence*: The argument here is that ethnic cleavages are depoliticized on mainland Tanzania (Tanganyika) because Julius Nyerere took the extraordinary step of abolishing Tanganyika's institutions of chieftaincy after independence ''traditional rural authorities and customary tribal law inherited from the colonial period were completely dismantled upon independence, and this may have played a role in further diminishing the role of ethnicity in Tanzanian public life relative to Kenya, where tribal chiefs remained in office.''[98] Once again, this specific policy fails to explain the differing outcomes between the mainland and Zanzibar since an identical policy was pursued after independence in Zanzibar. The Zanzibari revolution was fought precisely to topple the island nation's powerful monarchy.[99] The revolutionary government under Abeid Karume was therefore quite assiduous in their efforts to wipe out all vestiges of the monarchy in the immediate post-independence period in Zanzibar.

3. *The equitable distribution of national resources*: The claim here is that the absence of politicized ethnic cleavages on the mainland (Tanganyika) is explained in part by Nyerere's commitment to the equitable distribution of national resources after independence.[100] This of course raises the important question as to whether or not the differences in the relative political salience of ethnic cleavages between mainland Tanzania and the island of Zanzibar are explained by differences in the commitment of their respective post-independence governments to the equitable distribution of national resources. The available evidence suggests however that the opposite is true; the semi-autonomous Zanzibari government under Abeid Karume, just like its coun-

[98] Miguel 2004, p. 12.
[99] Lofchie 1965.
[100] Miguel 2004, p. 12.

terpart on the mainland, was not only committed to the equitable distribution of national resources among its majority African population but it also expressly pursued policies that aimed to reverse the historical racial inequities resulting from the systematic discrimination against the African population during the pre-revolutionary period. For instance, the post-independence government of Zanzibar issued a decree ordering that admissions to the territory's secondary schools, which were previously reserved for the Arab and Asian minorities, should now be based on a quota system which corresponded to the share of the different racial groups on the island.[101] Between 1965 and 1974 the government of Zanzibar also embarked on a massive effort to redistribute expropriated lands to the landless indigenous African populations. The data from that exercise does not betray any systematic discrimination between the two politically salient ethnic groups - the *Wahadimu* and *Wapemba*, residents of the islands of Unguja (Zanzibar) and Pemba respectively.[102]

It is true that the effort to reverse the historical imbalances between the different races in Zanzibar often led to systematic discrimination against the Arab and Asian minorities, groups that vehemently opposed the revolution, but there is no evidence of discrimination along ethnic divides within the majority African population. If anything the Afro-Shirazi party, which led the Zanzibari revolution against Arab domination of the majority African population, went out of its way to emphasize a collective African identity against the Arab and Asian immigrant populations. It is defensible therefore to attribute the racial dimension of politics in Zanzibar in part to the divisive politics of the post-evolutionary period. But the persistence of the politicized ethnic divides within the majority African population (Wahadimu vs

[101]Clayton 1981, p. 143.
[102]Shao 1992, p. 52.

Wapemba cleavage) - the focus of this study - exists in spite of the efforts of the post-independence government to minimize this cleavage. The persistence of politicized ethnic cleavages in Zanzibar therefore cannot be attributed to the distributive policies of the post-independence government.

4. *Nationalist content of public school curricula*: the argument here is that ethnic cleavages are depoliticized on mainland Tanzania (Tanganyika) because Nyerere's government used the school curriculum to push a nationalist message which emphasized ''[a] common Tanzanian history, culture, and values, and inculcate[d] students with a strong sense of national and Pan-African identity.''[103] The available evidence suggests that the post-independence government in Zanzibar similarly employed the medium of formal education as well as labor camps to inculcate nationalist spirit among the youth. The post-independence youth camps were designed '' to function as spaces of social integration, where young Zanzibaris shared common living conditions and worked and sang together."[104] Burgess (2010) explains further that ''Political lectures formed an integral part of the Camp routine. Initially the need for national security was emphasized, though over the years instruction grew more sophisticated and elaborate. In 1976 the program for daily instruction at camps in Unguja Ukuu and Pete extended to the following topics: The History of the ASP; The Problem of Inequality; Opposing Foreign Attacks and Subversion and How to Keep Party Secrets; The Politics of Capitalist Nations Towards Africa; First Aid; The Meaning of Leadership; The Discipline of a Leader; Guarding the Nation; the Importance of Living in a Socialist Way; Traditions and Customs; The Politics of Socialist Nations; The Difference Between the Thoughts of the Leaders of Socialist Nations

[103] Miguel 2004, p. 10.
[104] Burgess 2010, p. 226.

and Capitalist Nations; Why the Zanzibari Revolution Took Place."[105] It appears therefore that the concerns of the nation-builders in post-independence Zanzibar, with respect to the education of the youth, were not dissimilar to those employed on the mainland in the immediate post-independence period.

5. *Nyerere's pan-Africanist and socialist ideology*: the claim here is that ethnic harmony on mainland Tanzania is attributable in part to Nyerere's pan-Africanist and socialist ideology which led him to downplay ethnic differences during the post-independence period and instead emphasize a unified Tanzanian identity.[106] The available evidence indicates that the post-independence government of Zanzibar was similarly concerned about overcoming ethnic and racial differences on the island. For instance, the government '' banned all the ethnic associations that in previous decades had played such a prominent role in Zanzibari social and political life.''[107] They even went to the extreme end of passing laws to specifically encourage inter-racial marriage in order to overcome the island's history of racial stratification ''In 1966 a presidential decree, the purpose of which was explicitly to encourage inter-racial marriage, had forbidden any attempt to oppose an intended marriage except on medical grounds or because of a party having a criminal record. In a crude and confused way, Karume believed he was moving towards an ethnic reconciliation. As part of this ideal he himself took, as what can best be described as custom-law wives, girls from several communities, including one Arab, reported to be a Manga."[108] This measure, while extremely deplorable because it led to forced marriages and rape

[105]Burgess 2010, p. 228.
[106]Miguel 2004, p. 9.
[107]G. Thomas Burgess, The Zanzibar Revolution and Its Aftermath - http://africanhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-155
[108]Clayton 1981, p. 124.

of young girls, nevertheless betrays an awareness and a desire on the part of the leaders of post-independence Zanzibar to transcend the island nation's racial and ethnic divides.

To summarize, the foregoing exposition is important for two reasons: first, it indicates that the differences in the relative political salience of ethnic cleavages between mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar cannot be explained by differences in post-colonial nation-building policies. The finding that the semi-autonomous government in post-independence Zanzibar pursued remarkably similar nation-building policies as those attributed to Nyerere on the mainland (Tanganyika) is also important because it enables us, for strictly analytic purposes, to bracket off the legal distinctions between the two governments in the immediate post-independence period.

5.5 Other Rival Explanations

Scholars such as Barkan (1994),[109] Hyden (1994)[110] and Glickman (1995)[111] emphasize Tanzania's highly fragmented ethnic cleavages to claim that ethnic mobilization in Tanzania was always doomed to fail since no single group is large enough to dominate the others or form a minimum winning coalition.[112] While this structuralist argument has some merit, it ultimately falls apart once you consider the possibility of alliances between ethnic groups. Weber (2009), for instance, points to ethnic alliances in Kenya to show that successful ethnic mobilization does not

[109] Barkan 1994.
[110] Hyden 1994.
[111] Glickman 1995.
[112] Tanzania has as many as 120 different ethnic groups, of which the largest, the Sukuma, only constitute about 13 percent of the total population.

require any one group to form a minimum winning coalition.[113] The example of Ashanti ethnic mobilization in Ghana, in the 1950s, also indicates that the size of ethnic groups are determinative only when you conceptualize ethnic mobilization as a top-down phenomenon.[114] Otherwise, the size of groups are not that crucial in determining the effectiveness of sub-national movements.

Boone & Nyeme (2014) also propose that the non-politicization of ethnic identities on the mainland is best understood as a consequence of the country's statist land tenure system.[115] They argue that ethnic identities become politicized when access to land is mediated through neo-customary institutions (i.e. Chieftaincy institutions). According to this argument, mainland Tanzania has non-politicized ethnic cleavages because statist land tenure institutions reduce the value of neo-customary institutions and their associated ethnic categories in the everyday lives of citizens. But this argument, like the preceding ones, runs into a glaring challenge; mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar both have statist land tenure institutions and yet the latter has highly politicized ethnic cleavages.[116]

5.6 Conclusion

Tanzania presents us with the closest example of a 'natural experiment' for understanding the long-term effects of the politics of the terminal colonial period on the subsequent relations between ethnic groups in post-colonial Africa. Tanganyika and Zanzibar were independent British colonies that attained independence within

[113]Weber 2010, p. 7.
[114]The Ashanti constituted 16 percent of the Ghanaian population in 1960.
[115]Boone and Nyeme 2015.
[116]Shao 1992.

two years of each other. They subsequently joined together in April 1964 to form the present-day Tanzania. Despite the over half-century of union between these previously autonomous territories, the relations between ethnic groups within the two territories are remarkably different. Ethnic cleavages remain non-politicized on the mainland (formerly Tanganyika) whiles the opposite is true for Zanzibar. This chapter demonstrated that ethnic cleavages remain non-politicized on the mainland because Tanganyika had highly decentralized and weak chieftaincy institutions at independence. This allowed Julius Nyerere and the Tanganyika African Nationalist Union (TANU) to quickly consolidate power and nurture a cohesive national political culture. Conversely, Zanzibar had a highly centralized and powerful Sultan that fought to remain in power after independence. The attendant struggle between the pro-monarchy and republican factions split the Zanzibari population along ethnic and racial lines. Those cleavages largely continue to define politics on the island today. Thus this chapter demonstrates not only that the politics of the terminal colonial period matters but also that the nature of pre-colonial political institutions can fundamentally impact whether or not ethnic cleavages become salient in post-colonial Africa.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

The argument of this dissertation, as outlined in the preceding chapters, is that the state-building strategies employed by nationalist leaders across Africa to transition their hereditary chiefs into the post-colonial period often have consequences for whether or not ethnic cleavages become politicized in their respective countries. Specifically, I argue that two factors are crucial for explaining whether or not ethnic cleavages become politicized in an African country: (i) whether or not the country in question had strong institutions of local control (highly centralized chieftaincy institutions) during its period of transition to independence; and (ii) whether or not the nationalist leaders of said country choose to share power with their hereditary chiefs during the period of transition to independence. I term the strategy to share power with the chiefs 'inclusionary' and the strategy to marginalize them 'exclusionary.' I further hypothesized that ethnic cleavages should become politicized in countries that had both strong chieftaincy institutions (powerful chiefs) and exclusionist nationalist leaders during their periods of transition to independence. Conversely, ethnic cleavages should become relatively depoliticized in countries that

had either weak chieftaincy institutions or nationalist leaders who chose to share power with the hereditary chiefs during the periods of transition to independence.

I demonstrated the validity of the above argument by drawing on the independence transition experiences of three countries - Ghana, Botswana and Tanzania. In the chapter on Ghana (chapter 3), I showed that the West African country had both strong chieftaincy institutions and a nationalist leadership that sought to marginalize the chiefs during its period of transition to independence in the 1950s. I used the method of process tracing to show that Kwame Nkrumah's decision to marginalize the chiefs of Ghana precipitated the emergence of chief-led anti-nationalist movements that ultimately led to the politicization of specific ethnic cleavages in the country. I also demonstrated that, once activated, these politicized ethnic cleavages have persisted throughout the post-colonial period.

		Strong local elites/chiefs	
		Yes	*No*
Exclusionary strategy	*Yes*	**Politicized cleavages (GHANA)**	Depoliticized cleavages (Tanzania)
	No	Depoliticized cleavages (Botswana)	Null

The experience of Botswana, as detailed in the fourth chapter, demonstrated the alternate path available to Ghana at the dawn of independence. Ghana and

Botswana were both British colonies with strong chieftaincy institutions.[1] Botswana however differs from Ghana with respect to the transition strategies adopted by its founding leaders, during its period of transition to independence in the 1960s. Seretse Khama and the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), unlike Nkrumah and his Convention Peoples Party (CPP) in Ghana, adopted a strategy of inclusion with respect to the tribal chiefs in the Southern African country.[2] This approach to state-building enabled Seretse Khama to successfully co-opt the tribal chiefs, who still held sway in their respective territories during the late colonial period, and thus eliminating the potential source of ethnic/tribal mobilization against the BDP.[3] The support of the tribal chiefs also gave the BDP overwhelming electoral majorities which enabled Seretse Khama to quickly consolidate power in the immediate post-independence period.[4] The political dominance of the BDP in the post-independence period has also meant that its pan-tribal coalition has remained intact since the party continues to provide the only realistic pathway to power.

Finally, I examined the consequences of state-building strategies in Tanzania which, like Ghana, had nationalist leaders who chose to marginalize their country's hereditary aristocracy during the late colonial period.[5] The experience of Tanzania is also particularly instructive because it presents something of a natural experiment for testing the argument of this dissertation. Before merging to form the country of Tanzania in 1964, the mainland Tanganyika and the island of Zanzibar were distinct entities although both were British colonies. The two regions also differed

[1] L. Hailey 1953a; Nicola Gennaioli and Ilia Rainer 2007; Austin 1964; Allman 1993.
[2] Fawcus and Tilbury 2000; Proctor 1968.
[3] Fawcus and Tilbury 2000.
[4] Mokopakgosi 2008.
[5] J. M.-M. H. Listowel 1965; Maguire 1969.

with respect to the strength of their respective precolonial/colonial chieftaincy institutions. Tanganyika had weak and highly decentralized chieftaincy institutions.[6] The Tanganyikan chiefs were therefore easily overawed by Julius Nyerere and his Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) who ultimately abolished the institution of chieftaincy after independence.[7] Julius Nyerere therefore managed, like Seretse Khama in Botswana, to quickly consolidate power and thus enabling his nationalist party to remain the dominant force in Tanganyikan politics throughout the post-colonial period.[8] Ethnic cleavages never became politicized in Tanganyika because the nascent attempts at chief led anti-nationalist mobilization faltered since the chiefs lacked the institutional resources necessary to sustain such movements.[9] The independence transition process in Zanzibar, on the other hand, was exceedingly acrimonious and ultimately led to the politicization of ethnic cleavages on the island archipelago.[10] Zanzibar, unlike mainland Tanzania (Tanganyika), had a highly centralized Sultanate that dated back at least two centuries before the establishment of a British protectorate in 1890.[11] Thus, when confronted with the demands for a republican constitution by the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), at the dawn of independence, the Sultan of Zanzibar had the institutional resources available to resist the attacks on his aristocratic privileges. In the event, the Sultanate of Zanzibar threw its weight behind the pro-monarchy Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP).[12] The struggle between the republican ASP and the pro-monarchy ZNP resulted in the politicization of ethnic and racial cleavages that have persisted throughout the post-colonial period. This

[6] Iliffe 1979.
[7] J. M.-M. H. Listowel 1965; Iliffe 1979.
[8] Iliffe 1979; J. M.-M. H. Listowel 1965.
[9] Lofchie 1965.
[10] Lofchie 1965.
[11] L. Hailey 1950a.
[12] Clayton 1981.

means therefore that the merger of Tanganyika and Zanzibar and over half a century of single party dominance has done little to alter the politicized ethnic cleavages that first emerged during the period of transition to independence in the 1960s.

6.1 Theoretical and empirical limitations of the dissertation:

My strategy for demonstrating the empirical validity of the argument of this dissertation has relied exclusively on three case studies using process tracing methods.[13] This approach has the distinctive advantage of enabling me to 'open the black box' of causality and demonstrate the specific processes and mechanisms through which my hypothesized causes produce the effects of interest.[14] In other words, the qualitative method of process tracing enabled me to offer a fully developed causal explanation for why ethnic cleavages become politicized in some African countries but not others. But this approach, while extremely powerful for theory building and for demonstrating causal mechanisms, is nevertheless limited in its ability to conclusively establish external validity. I attempted to somewhat mitigate this limitation of the case study method through my approach to case selection. I specifically chose cases that cut across the breath of the different sub-regions of Africa - West, East and Southern Africa (Ghana, Tanzania and Botswana respectively). I was also mindful to choose both *typical* cases (Ghana) as well as *crucial/exceptional* cases (Tanzania and Botswana) in order to increase the potential external validity of the argument of

[13]Gerring 2007, pp. 172-185.
[14]Gerring 2007, pp. 172-185.

this study.[15] Tanzania and Botswana are 'crucial/exceptional' cases because they are among only a handful of cases on the continent where ethnic cleavages are generally depoliticized. Ghana is 'typical' in the sense that its ethnic cleavages are politicized, just like most countries on the continent, but the extent of this politicization is not on the extreme end (think Rwanda, Burundi or even Kenya). The claim here is that we should have much more confidence in an explanatory framework which simultaneously explains both a typical case like Ghana as well as the crucial/exceptional cases like Tanzania and Botswana. This notwithstanding, the evidence supplied here still fails to conclusively demonstrate external validity.

The dissertation, as it stands, could also profit from a more detailed demonstration of the path-dependent mechanisms ensuring the persistence of the politicized ethnic cleavages that first emerged during the periods of transition to independence in the 1950s and 1960s. In the chapter on Ghana, for instance, I demonstrated that the emergence of chief-led anti-nationalist mobilization against Kwame Nkrumah and his Convention Peoples Party (CPP), during the period of transition to independence in the 1950s, directly resulted in the politicization of specific ethnic cleavages. I also showed that the same cleavages that were first politicized during the late colonial period continue to structure politics in the West African country six decades later. I offered two sets of explanations of path-dependence which basically amounted to an exposition of a 'lock-in effect' where the initial period of ethnic mobilization shapes subsequent coalition building strategies by constricting the choices available to future political entrepreneurs and voters alike. This mechanism of reproduction, while very plausible, still remains only a hypothesis which future scholarship using this

[15] Gerring 2007, p. 89.

framework must put to the test.

The third limitation of this dissertation relates to its deployment of the concept of critical junctures.[16] It argues that the periods of transition to independence in Africa represent important critical junctures where the choices of Africa's nationalist leaders tended to have outsized effects on the post-independence trajectory of their respective countries. The emphasis on the periods of transition to independence in the 1950s and 1960s is understandable given the fact that they also represent the birth periods of almost all of the countries on the continent. Even then the explanation as to why other momentous events, like extended periods of military rule or even civil wars, would not open up similar spaces for a radical remaking of the political landscapes remain under-theorized. The current explanatory framework would therefore need further theorizing to account for the effect (or lack thereof) of other major events during the post-colonial period.

Finally, future extensions of this study could use a more detailed explication of what roles chiefs continue to play in either helping to sustain or disrupt the ethnic coalitions that first emerged during the late colonial period. The present framework, as it stands, also has little to say about how politicians work to maintain their ethnic-based coalitions in the post-colonial period.

6.2 Contributions of the dissertation:

The above limitations notwithstanding, this dissertation makes important contributions to the literature on ethnicity and politics in Africa. This is the first work,

[16]Capoccia and Keleman 2007.

as far as I know, which conclusively demonstrates that the politicized ethnic cleavages in contemporary Africa date back to the periods of transition to independence in the 1950s and 1960s. Aside from this being an important finding in and of itself, it also suggests that approaches to the study of ethnic politics in Africa that fail to take into account the prior histories of the respective societies would necessarily remain incomplete. For instance, the institutionalist approach simply assumes that ethnic politics/mobilization is driven by the need of instrumentally minded politicians to form minimum winning coalitions.[17] This means therefore that politicians would only mobilize along ethnic cleavages where the institutional context makes such an approach optimal. Thus, in principle, we should be able to change the axis of political competition by altering the institutional matrix within which such competition occurs. The findings from this dissertation suggests however that, once primed, politicized ethnic cleavages tend to be much stickier than the institutionalist approach would predict. The persistence of the politicized ethnic cleavages, which first emerged during the transitions to independence in the 1950s and 1960s, further indicates that the antecedent histories of societies often shape which cleavages are available for mobilization. It is therefore categorically not the case, as is implied by the institutionalist school, that all cleavages are available at all times for mobilization by political entrepreneurs.

This dissertation also challenges the dominant perspective which treats ethnic politics/mobilization as a 'top-down' phenomenon driven primarily by national politicians. Given this bias in the literature, much of our theorizing has been focused on explaining the motivations of national politicians and their strategies for maintain-

[17]Chandra 2004; Posner 2005.

ing their ethnic-based coalitions. The findings from this dissertation shows however that the initial processes of ethnic mobilization were led by local elites (chiefs) - a 'bottom-up' phenomenon. This is an important corrective to the existing literature since an approach which takes seriously the motivations and strategies of local elites would generate fuller insights that one focused solely on top-down processes.

Finally, the dissertation's emphasis on the contingency of the factors responsible for the emergence of politicized ethnic cleavages in Africa is important because it demonstrates that this outcome was by no means preordained; instead they were unleashed by the strategic choices of nationalist leaders acting within highly constrained environments. It means therefore that the phenomenon of ethnic politics must be properly understood as the long-term bye-product of the botched transitions to independence in the 1950s and 1960s rather than, as some have suggested, the necessary consequence of the strategies of European colonial domination in Africa.[18]

[18]Herbst 1989; Young 1976.

Appendix 1

Figure .1: Administrative Regions of Ghana before Independence



Adapted from Gold Coast Survey Department, *Atlas of the Gold Coast*, Accra, 1949

Appendix 2

Figure .2: Ethnic Groups in Ghana



Source: Kelly, B., & Bening, R. (2007). Ideology, Regionalism, Self-Interest and Tradition: An Investigation into Contemporary Politics in Northern Ghana. A*frica: Journal of the International African Institute*, 77(2), 180-206.

Appendix 3

Table .1: Effect of ethnic variables on support for New Patriotic Party

Table **: Effect of ethnic variables on support for NPP

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Asante	0.497***	0.472***	0.480***	0.438***	0.425***
	(0.0309)	(0.0317)	(0.0318)	(0.0352)	(0.0354)
Akyem	0.545***	0.518***	0.548***	0.520***	0.496***
	(0.0572)	(0.0564)	(0.0557)	(0.0543)	(0.0562)
Ewe	-0.339***	-0.347***	-0.346***	-0.357***	-0.358***
	(0.0269)	(0.0270)	(0.0274)	(0.0281)	(0.0282)
Fante	0.104**	0.0801*	0.0910**	0.0541	0.0413
	(0.0420)	(0.0409)	(0.0418)	(0.0435)	(0.0435)
Brong	0.126***	0.101***	0.117***	0.105***	0.100***
	(0.0369)	(0.0380)	(0.0367)	(0.0348)	(0.0356)
Dagomba	-0.0661	-0.0849*	-0.0792*	-0.0815*	-0.0753
	(0.0429)	(0.0449)	(0.0453)	(0.0487)	(0.0478)
Dangme	-0.117**	-0.122**	-0.116**	-0.147***	-0.164***
	(0.0519)	(0.0503)	(0.0516)	(0.0507)	(0.0514)
Dagarte	-0.217***	-0.205***	-0.217***	-0.201***	-0.190***
	(0.0400)	(0.0397)	(0.0392)	(0.0383)	(0.0397)
Kokomba	-0.00863	-0.00112	0.00242	0.0490	0.0634
	(0.0472)	(0.0465)	(0.0470)	(0.0431)	(0.0419)
Ga	0.277**	0.101	0.0928	-0.00614	0.0735
	(0.121)	(0.114)	(0.125)	(0.116)	(0.120)
ShareRural		-0.0707***			-0.0185
		(0.0232)			(0.0372)
PostBasicEd			0.225**		-0.322**
			(0.0928)		(0.157)
ShareUnemployed				1.496***	2.229***
				(0.339)	(0.568)
Constant	40.70***	46.16***	37.68***	35.83***	39.21***
	(2.195)	(2.850)	(2.456)	(2.101)	(4.681)
Observations	254	253	253	253	253
R-squared	0.761	0.768	0.766	0.781	0.784

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix 4

ELECTION RESULTS IN MAMPRUSI - JUNE 1954

Frafra District

Bolga:		
	CPP	1564
	NPP	**3997**
Talensi:		
	CPP	625
	NPP	**2042**
	Ind.	1137
	Ind.	984
	Ind.	535
Bongo:		
	CPP	317
	NPP	1846
	Ind.	**2201**
Frafra East:		
	CPP	1369
	NPP	**4224**

Kusasi District

Bawku:		
	CPP	1194
	NPP	**3118**
	Ind.	624
Kusasi Central:		
	CPP	1139
	NPP	**6349**
Kusasi East:		
	CPP	2558
	NPP	**3029**
	Ind.	1160
Kusasi West:		
	CPP	**4366**
	NPP	2792
	Ind.	404

South Mamprusi District

South Mamprusi East:		
	CPP	2315
	NPP	**6107**
	Ind.	970
	Ind.	710
South Mamprusi West:		
	CPP	1311
	NPP	**1384**
	Ind.	911
	Ind.	918

Source: *Ashanti Pioneer*, June 19, 1954

ELECTION RESULTS IN MAMPRUSI - JULY 1956

South Mamprusi District		
South Mamprusi East:		
	CPP	1592
	NPP	**4177**
	Ind.	500
South Mamprusi West:		
	CPP	1248
	NPP	**1407**
	Ind.	1067
	Ind.	326
Frafra District		
Bolga:		
	CPP	1629
	NPP	**2018**
Talensi:		
	CPP	**1092**
	NPP	1005
	Ind.	925
	Ind.	322
Bongo:		
	CPP	**1760**
	NPP	1225
Frafra East:		
	CPP	1649
	NPP	**1926**
Kusasi District		
Bawku:		
	CPP	**1884**
	NPP	1650
Kusasi Central:		
	CPP	1800
	NPP	**2783**
Kusasi East:		
	CPP	2231
	NPP	**2618**
Kusasi West:		
	CPP	**4602**
	NPP	2939

Source: *Daily Graphic*, July 19 1956

ELECTION RESULTS IN MAMPRUSI - AUGUST 1969

Frafra District

Bolgatanga:

PP	**3047**
NAL	2658
UNP	1155
PAP	939
APRP	365

Talensi-Nabdam:

PP	**2922**
APRP	858
NAL	2040
PAP	583
Ind.	2443
UNP	1107

Bongo:

PP	**2393**
APRP	394
NAL	1954
PAP	1749
Ind.	2346
UNP	729

Kusasi District:

Tempane-Garu:

PP	**3437**
NAL	3372
PAP	698
APRP	323

Bawku West:

PP	1635
NAL	**5384**
UNP	112
Ind.	109

Bawku East:

PP	**7102**
NAL	5872
PAP	221

Zebilla:

PP	1607
APRP	223
NAL	**3752**
UNP	963

South Mamprusi District:

Walewale:

PP	**2876**
NAL	1666
APRP	827

Nalerigu:

PP	**3358**
NAL	1611
PAP	446

Source: Danquah, M. (1969). *The birth of the Second Republic*. Accra, Ghana: Editorial and

Pub. Services.

Appendix 5

Figure .3: Post-independence Botswana - Districts[19]



[19]Morton, F., Ramsay, J., Mgadla, P. T. (2008). *Historical Dictionary of Botswana* (4th ed.). Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press.

Appendix 6

Figure .4: The Bechuanaland Protectorate [20]



[20] Morton, F., Ramsay, J., Mgadla, P. T. (2008). *Historical Dictionary of Botswana* (4th ed.). Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press.

Appendix 7

GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS - March 1965

1. Maun/Chobe			
	D. Monwela	(BDP)	2,446
	T. Mmusi	(BPP-Matante)	1,599
	B. Sethoko	(BIP)	1,099
2. Okavango			
	T. Tsheko	(BDP)	1,929
	M. Mpho	(BIP)	1,666
3. Ngami			
	J. Mhapha	(BDP)	2,054
	J. Magagani	(BPP-Matante)	54
4. Ghanzi			
	N.S. Sekga	(BDP)	Returned Unopposed
5. Kgalagadi			
	B.M. Moapare	(BDP)	Returned Unopposed
6. Tati West			
	K.M. Nkhwa	(BPP-Matante)	2,006
	J. Anderson	(BDP)	1,013
	G. Mannathoko	(Ind)	789
	A. Tshepe	(BIP)	76
7. Francistown and Tati East			
	P. Matante	(BPP-Matante)	4,415
	O. Segopolo	(BDP)	1,214
	R. Sewela	(BIP)	85
8. Sebina and Gweta			
	M. Maswikiti	(BDP)	3,712
	M. Nyadza	(BPP-Matante)	1,552
	E. Mokobi	(BIP)	59
9. Nkanga			
	O. Chilume	(BDP)	4,193
	O. Sinombe	(BPP-Matante)	580
10. Botletle			
	B. Steinberg	(BDP)	5,451
	R. Ntebele	(BIP)	103
	G. Nthomiwa	(BPP-Matante)	57
11. Tonota			
	L. Makgekgenere	(BDP)	3,291
	L. Senthufhe	(BPP-Matante)	2,044
	M. Ngwako	(BIP)	73

12. Mmadinare			
	A. Dambe	(BDP)	6,144
	G. Lejowa	(BPP-Matante)	163
	M. Mabengano	(BIP)	116
13. Bobirwa			
	A. Tsoebebe	(BDP)	5,382
	J. Sechele	(BPP-Matante)	62
	B. Ngwako	(BIP)	41
14. Serowe North			
	S. Khama	(BDP)	5,909
	K. Motshididi	(BIP)	53
	K. Moletsane	(BPP-Matante)	39
15. Serowe South			
	B. Kgari	(BDP)	4,808
	M. Seretse	(BIP)	110
	D. Ontumetse	(BPP-Matente)	55
16. Tswapong North			
	M. Nwako	(BDP)	4,948
	O. Motswane	(BIP)	680
	C. Tladi	(BPP-Matante)	53
17. Tswapong South			
	G. Sebeso	(BDP) 5,118	
	D. Koloi	(BIP)	229
	P. Pudiephatshwa	(BPP-Matante)	59
18. Shoshong			
	G. Mosinyi	(BDP)	6,295
	M. Tlale	(BIP)	298
19. Mahalapye			
	G. Koma	(BDP)	6,271
	O. Menyatso	(BIP)	377
	J. Kwape	(BPP-Matante)	131
20. Kgatleng and Tlokweng			
	M. Segokgo	(BDP)	2,814
	T. Ratsheko	(BPP-Matante)	1,377
	M. Pilane	(BIP)	115
21. Mochudi			
	T. Motlhagodi	(BPP-Matante)	2,163
	R. Molefe	(BDP)	1,278
	S. Tladi	(BIP)	407
22. Molepolole North			
	S. Thobega	(BDP)	2,933
	G. Kgakke	(BPP-Matante)	664
23. Molepolole East			
	E. Kgabo	(BDP)	3,555
	P. Kgosidintsi	(BPP-Matante)	813
	P. Molefhe	(BIP)	132
24. Kweneng South			
	J. Nkoane	(BDP)	5,321
	V. Segokotlo	(BPP-Matante)	527

25. Kweneng West			
	E. Reokwaeng	(BDP)	Returned Unopposed
26. Gaborone and Ramoutsa			
	N. Molomo	(BDP)	4,069
	V. Busang	(BPP-Matante)	453
	A. Motsumi	(BIP)	210
27. Moshupa			
	E. Masisi	(BDP)	4,463
	J. Kalan	(BIP)	106
	M. Mosielele	(BPP-Matante)	90
28. Kanye South			
	Q. Masier	(BDP)	3,700
	P. Maruping	(BPP-Matante)	89
	M. Ketshabile	(BIP)	77
29. Kanye North			
	B. Chibana	(BDP)	4,483
	P. Tshane	(BIP)	134
	L. Tsotetsi	(BPP-Matante)	85
30. Ngwaketse/Kgalagadi			
	P. Sebotho	(BDP)	5,718
	D. Siele	(BPP-Matante)	230
	J. Melate	(BIP)	80
31. Lobatse/Barolong			
	B. Thema	(BDP)	4,655
	M. Manakwe	(BPP-Matante)	604
	K. Motsete	($BPP_{M}otsete$)	377
	S. Mookodi	(BIP)	165

Summary of 1965 General Election Results

Seats won:

BDP	28
BPP(Matante)	3
BIP	Nil
BPP (Motsete)	Nil
Independents	Nil

Votes won:

BDP	113,167
BPP(Matante)	19, 969
BIP	6,491
BPP (Motsete)	377
Independents	789

Source: Gossett, C. W., Lotshwao, K. (January 01, 2009). Report on the 1965 General Election and the 1966 Local Government Election. *Botswana Notes and Records*, 41, 47-63.

Appendix 8

GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS - October 1969

1. Maun/Chobe			
	D. Monwela	(BDP)	1,578
	L. Sethoko	(BIP)	1,390
	J. Moeti	(BPP)	987
2. Okavango			
	M. Mpho	(BIP)	1,923
	T. Tsheko	(BDP)	1,500
3. Ngami			
	G. Kwerepe	(BDP)	1,022
	J. Gugushe	(BIP)	652
4. Ghanzi			
	H. Jankie	(BDP)	873
	W. Keakopa	(BPP)	260
	G. Kgasa	(BNF)	46
5. Kgalagadi			
	B. Moapare	(BDP)	2,131
	A. Molatole	(BNF)	199
	F. Stegling	(BPP)	130
6. Tati West			
	K. Nkhwa	(BPP)	1,604
	C. Mannathoko	(BDP)	1,018
	K. Maripe	(BNF)	78
7. Francistown and Tati East			
	P. Matante	(BPP)	2,361
	P. Maruping	(BDP)	1,265
8. Sebina and Gweta			
	M. Maswikiti	(BDP)	1,321
	M. Nyadza	(BPP)	508
	S. Mathangwane	(BNF)	140
	E. Mokobi	(BIP)	41
9. Nkanga			
	O. Chilume	(BDP)	1,341
	B. Duna	(BPP)	390
	D. Kwele	(BNF)	208
	M. Lowane	(BIP)	26
10. Botletle			
	B. Steinberg	(BDP)	Returned Unopposed
11. Tonota			
	L. Makgekgenere	(BDP)	1,683
	P. Kgamane	(BPP)	673
	W. Gulubane	(BNF)	152

12. Mmadinare			
	A. Dambe	(BDP)	4,222
	M. Mabengano	(BIP)	82
	L. Sentufhe	(BPP)	72
13. Bobirwa			
	A. Sikunyana	(BDP)	3,243
	M. Malema	(BNF)	152
14. Serowe North			
	S. Khama	(BDP)	Returned Unopposed
15. Serowe South			
	B. Kgari	(BDP)	2,438
	K. Mathwane	(BNF)	34
16. Tswapong North			
	M. Nwako	(BDP)	2,921
	O. Mofswane	(BIP)	228
17. Tswapong South			
	G. Sebeso	(BDP)	2,998
	O. Menyatso	(BNF)	112
18. Shoshong			
	G. Mosinyi	(BDP)	4,274
	M. Tlale	(BIP)	184
19. Mahalapye			
	G. Koma	(BDP)	3,224
	O. Ontumetse	(BNF)	83
	M. Semetsa	(BIP)	75
	J. Kwape	(BPP)	26
20. Kgatleng and Tlokweng			
	M. Segokgo	(BDP)	1,995
	T. Ratsheko	(BPP)	917
	L. Kgang	(BNF)	298
21. Mochudi			
	T. Motlhagodi	(BPP)	993
	N. Molomo	(BDP)	666
	K. Mogotsi	(BNF)	290
22. Molepolole North			
	D. Kwelagobe	(BDP)	881
	G. Kgakge	(BNF)	315
23. Molepolole East			
	E. Kgabo	(BDP)	2,095
	V. Busang	(BNF)	538
24. Kweneng South			
	J. Nkoane	(BDP)	2,203
	J. Sekgwa	(BNF)	212
	G. Sejabodilo	(BPP)	174
25. Kweneng West			
	E. Reokwaeng	(BDP)	1,364
	E. Sebele	(BNF)	390

26. Gaborone and Ramoutsa			
	W. Seboni	(BDP)	1,784
	P. Motsumi	(BNF)	1,255
	D. Otsheleng	(BPP)	105
27. Moshupa			
	E. Masisi	(BDP)	Returned Unopposed
28. Kanye South			
	B. Gaseitsiwe	(BNF)	1,245
	Q. Masire	(BDP)	505
29. Kanye North			
	M. Yane	(BNF)	1,607
	B. Chibana	(BDP)	643
Ngwaketse/Kgalagadi			
	P. Tshane	(BNF)	2,030
	P. Sebotho	(BDP)	1344
31. Lobatse/Barolong			
	B. Thema	(BDP)	1,886
	O. Marumoloa	(BNF)	1,026
	J. Kgaboesele	(BPP)	129

Summary of 1969 General Election Results

Seats won:

BDP	24
BNF	3
BPP	3
BIP	1

Votes won:

BDP	52,859
BNF	10,362
BPP	9,239
BIP	4,601

Source: Botswana. (1970). *Report on the general elections 1969*. Gaborone: Government Printer.

Appendix 9

Table .2: Election Results for Bangwaketse Tribal Reserve, 1965-2009

Year	*Constituencies*	*BDP (%)*	*BNF (%)*	*Total valid votes*
	Moshupa	4463 *(95.8)*	– –	4659
1965	Kanye South	3700 *(95.7)*	– –	3866
	Kanye North	4483 *(95.3)*	– –	4702
	Ngwaketse Kgalagadi	5718 *(94.8)*	– –	6028
	Moshupa	BDP Unopposed		
1969	Kanye South	505 (28.9)	1245 (71.1)	1750
	Kanye North	643 (28.6)	1607 (71.4)	2250
	Ngwaketse Kgalagadi	1344 (39.8)	2030 (60.2)	3374
	Moshupa	2800 (75.6)	906 (24.4)	3706
1974	Kanye South	958 (33.6)	1889 (66.4)	2847
	Kanye North	910 (37.2)	1537 (62.8)	2447
	Ngwaketse Kgalagadi	1738 (67.3)	845 (32.7)	2583
	Moshupa	3800 (67.7)	1810 (32.3)	5610
1979	Kanye South	2175 (31.0)	4831 (69.0)	7006
	Kanye North	1893 (47.1)	2130 (52.9)	4023
	Ngwaketse Kgalagadi	2891 (67.8)	1371 (32.2)	4262
	Mosopa	4745 (63.9)	2672 (36.0)	7417
1984	Kanye	3747 (41.1)	5380 (58.9)	9127
	Ngwaketse South	3198 (42.7)	4283 (57.1)	7481
	Ngwaketse West	4170 (56.2)	4170 (56.2)	7419
	Mosopa	4469 (71.2)	1807 (28.7)	6276
1989	Ngwaketse South	3628 (50.0)	3464 (47.8)	7253
	Kanye	4659 (46.4)	4178 (41.6)	10039
	Ngwaketse West	4933 (59.8)	3320 (40.2)	8253
	Moshopa	4814 (64.1)	2384 (31.7)	7513
1994	Ngwaketse West	4024 (49.3)	3622 (44.4)	8164
	Kanye	3204 (36.8)	4787 (54.9)	8711
	Ngwaketse South	3066 (43.7)	3742 (53.4)	7011
	Moshopa	4157 (51.8)	2434 (30.3)	8023
1999	Ngwaketse West	4615 (47.8)	4602 (47.7)	9645
	Kanye	3927 (38.7)	5331 (52.6)	10141
	Ngwaketse South	3771 (45.2)	3935 (47.2)	8344
	Moshupa	4594 (66.8)	1059 (15.4)	6876
2004	Ngwaketse South	4994 (48.7)	4215 (41.1)	10254
	Kanye North	4602 (45.3)	5331 (52.5)	10162
	Kanye South	3120 (36.9)	4505 (52.9)	8502
	Ngwaketse West	5601 (42.9)	7050 (54.1)	13026
	Moshupa	6374 (68.9)	1219 (13.2)	9244
2009	Ngwaketse South	6979 (54.5)	4925 (38.5)	12798
	Kanye North	7004 (54.2)	5601 (43.4)	12914
	Kanye South	4716 (44.3)	5303 (49.79)	10651
	waketse West	7283 (46.9)	7765 (49.99)	15531

[1] Find 1965 and 1989-2009 general election results at: Elections passport: `http://www.electionpassport.com/` [2] 1969 general election results from: Botswana. (1970). *Report on the general elections 1969*. Gaborone: Government Printer. [3] 1974 general election results from: Botswana., Steenkamp, P. L. (1974). *Report to the Minister of State on the general elections, 1974*. Gaborone: Govt. Printer

[4] 1979 general election results from: Botswana., Steenkamp, P. L. (1979). *Report to the Minister of Public Service and Information on the general election, 1979*. Gaborone: Republic of Botswana.

[6] 1984 general election results from: Botswana. Supervisor of Elections, Mogae, F. G. (1984). *Report to the Minister of Public Service and Information on the General Election, 1984*. Gaborone: Government Printer.

Appendix 10

Table .3: Tribal Reserves and Corresponding Constituencies,1965-1969

Tribal reserve	*Constituencies*
Bamangwato	Sebina and Gweta Nkange Botletle Tonota Madinare Bobirwa Serowe North Serowe South Tswapong North Tswapong South Shoshong Mahalapye
Bakwena	Molepolole North Molepolole East Kweneng West Kweneng South
Bakgatla	Kgatleng and Tlokweng Mochudi
Batawana	Okavango Ngami
Bamalete & Batlokweng	Gaborones and Ramoutsa
Barolong	Lobatse and Barolong
Bangwaketse	Kanye South Kanye North Ngwaketse Kgalagadi Moshupa
Non-Tribal Reserves	Ghanzi Tati West Kgalagadi Francistown & Tati East Maun and Chobe

[1] Source: Bechuanaland Protectorate., Forbes, A. G. (1964). *Report of the Delimitation Commission: Appointed in pursuance of section 3 of the Bechuanaland (Electoral provisions) order, 1964*. Gaborone: Bechuanaland Protectorate.

Appendix 11

Figure .5: The 1969 General Election



1. Maun/Chobe 2. Okavango 3. Ngami 4. Ghanzi 5. Kgalagadi 6. Tati West 7. Francistown/Tati East 8. Sebina/Gweta 9. Nkange 10. Boteti 11. Tonota 12. Mmadinare 13. Bobirwa 14. Serowe North 15. Serowe South 16. Tswapong North 17. Tswapong South 18. Shoshong 19. Mahalapye 20. Kgatleng/Tlokweng 21. Mochudi 22. Molepolole North 23. Molepolole East 24. Kweneng South 25. Kweneng West 26. Gaborone/Ramotswa 27. Moshupa 28. Kanye South 29. Kanye North 30. Ngwaketse/Kgalagadi 31. Lobatse/Barolong

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