STUDIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ROYAL AUTHORITY IN ARGEAD MACEDONIA

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the elements which defined Argead kingship from the mid-seventh until the late fourth centuries B.C. It begins by reviewing the Argead king list where it is argued that the official reckoning of the dynasty's past was exploited in order to secure the throne against rivals, including those who were Argeads. Chapter Two analyzes the principles of Argead succession and concludes that the current theories on the subject are unsatisfactory in face of the evidence. Rather, the sources suggest that Argead succession was a function of status where many ingredients were considered before a candidate legitimately assumed the throne. Among the factors influencing the selection were, the status of a potential heir's mother, age, competence, order of birth, and in lieu of father to son succession, relation to the late monarch. Chapter Three outlines the development of the king's military, judicial, economic, and social responsibilities from the personal monarchy of the early period to the increasingly centralized realm of the fourth century. Chapter Four concentrates on the religious aspects of Argead kingship, reviewing the monarch's religious duties and interpreting a widespread foundation myth as an attempt to distinguish Argead status by its divine origin and its specific cult responsibilities. It
is concluded that religious factors played an essential role in the justification of Argead power. The last chapter focuses on Macedonian reaction to Argead authority, especially after Alexander the Great's death. Here it is argued that the Macedonians maintained a consistent loyalty for the ruling family because of its ancient heritage of royal status, because of the prestige it had accumulated under Philip II and Alexander III, and because there was no recognized method by which the Argeads could be replaced in their duties. Finally, a combination of incompetent kings, feuding factions, and the size of Alexander's empire forced the Macedonians to redefine the political structures under which they lived. In addition to the body of this dissertation there are two appendices: one on Arrhidaues (Philip III) until his accession, and the other on the major source problems which confront a study of this type.
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Acknowledgements of gratitude ought to be brief and sincere. Mine will be both. First, I would like to thank my wife, Judy, for bearing with the time it has taken to complete my formal education. I certainly could not have accomplished this feat without her support. Next, I wish to thank J.P. Adams for his guidance and friendship throughout the last ten years, although I would not like to burden him with any of the errors contained in this work. I also owe an enormous debt to both W.L. Adams and R.B. Hitchner for undertaking the direction of this dissertation and for their many helpful suggestions on its organization and content. Of course, I must be held fully accountable for its present form. My penultimate expression of recognition concerns my colleagues at the University of Santa Clara, who have encouraged the completion of this dissertation, and who have provided me with the time to do so. Last, I wish to thank posthumously my friend and mentor, Harry J. Dell. I have never met a man better suited to being a teacher, nor one more full of the spirit of life. Perhaps the two traits are indistinguishable.
INTRODUCTION

The northern Balkans are lands of passage and transition. Long before the historical Macedonian kingdom had been founded, whole nations had entered and exited the region, while others of varying origin settled more or less permanently. The end of the Bronze Age (ca. 1200 B.C.) especially saw immigrants from the north move down geographically determined natural highways to the central and southern Pindus highlands and the central Macedonian plain. The relative wealth of the area's mineral and forest resources was substantial, and together with the size of the Macedonian plain and an access to the Aegean Sea, proved irresistible to migrant folks seeking new homes.¹

The earliest dominant nation in the Iron Age was that of the Bryges, which settled the central Macedonian plain sometime about 1150.² The Bryges remained in the region for about 350 years, after which time they emigrated to Asia Minor for unknown reasons and became the historical Phrygians. Their departure from Macedonia, perhaps stimulated by a growing Illyrian presence, opened the northern Balkans to the mixed settlement which existed in the historical period.³

Peoples in the area who began to play increasingly
important roles with the departure of the Bryges included the Illyrians, Thracians, Paeonians, Macedonians, and increasingly, colonists from the Greek south. Probably the most powerful of these from about 800 to about 650 were the Illyrians. Their dominance, however, was checked by the latter date when a chain reaction of disturbances was ignited, probably by an offshoot of the Cimmerian invasion of Asia Minor (where these steppe nomads destroyed the power of the Phrygians). The subsequent decades of confusion in the Balkans provided the opportunity for one group--from the piedmont district of Macedonia known as Pieria and led by the Argead royal house--to expand its influence and to found a kingdom which in the fourth century B.C. would produce an era of Macedonian greatness.4

In this dissertation I will concern myself with the role of the Argeads in the formation and history of the kingdom which came to be identified simply as "Macedonia". The Argead dynasty came to rule a portion of what is today Macedonia in the middle of the seventh century before Christ.5 From that time until the death of the last Argead king more than three hundred years later, the fortunes of the dynasty fluctuated dramatically, but never throughout this period did any domestic faction challenge the legitimacy of the Argead right to rule. This is not to say that there were no disputed successions during the Argead era--in fact, our evidence suggests that this was a recurring problem for the dynasty. As we will see
however, what challenges arose invariably came from other members of the royal family. In the minds of the Macedonians, the Argeads were somehow distinguished from everyone else within the kingdom, and somewhere amid the recognized distinctions lay the justification for their royal status.

The preservation of the Argead dynastic tradition for over three hundred years, however impressive it was at times considering the problems the Macedonian kingdom faced, was not unique in the northern Balkans during the period of this study since ruling houses were common in the region. Thus, what makes the role of the Argeads in Macedonia worthy of study is not the peculiarity of their system which was idiosyncratic to the place and time, but rather the fact that Argead-led Macedonia ultimately exploded out of the Balkans and conquered all of the lands between Greece and India. Although much scholarship has been concentrated upon the two most famous Argead kings, Philip II and his son Alexander the Great, and although the kingdom has recently been much in the news thanks to the stunning discovery of two un plundered royal tombs, no study of Macedonian kingship has done justice to the office which did much to alter the direction of the Greek world in antiquity.

The reader must bear in mind in what follows that for much of the period between the middle of the seventh and
the end of the fourth century before Christ "Upper Macedonia" lay beyond the control of the Argead kings, whose capital was first at Aegae and then at Pella. Thus, the customs and loyalties which will be described for the most part did not apply in the mountain cantons, and when they did, never with the same intensity as was found in "Lower Macedonia." The cantons of Elimea, Tymphaea, Orestis, and Lyncus mostly maintained their independence and traditional ruling houses until the reign of Philip II, even though the inhabitants of these areas were ethnically and socially related to the Macedonians who acknowledged Argead authority. The main reason for the failure of the Argeads to control these areas was military weakness. The various powers to the west, north, and east of the center of Argead power may not always have been formidable throughout this era, but their cumulative force more than equalled what the Argead king could muster especially when the domestic affairs of the Argead kingdom were chaotic.

Exceptions to the impotence of Argead authority exist. For instance, the reign of Alexander I saw a successful consolidation of authority and an expansion of the kingdom to the west and east. Largely thanks to the Persian intervention of the late sixth century which preceded their invasion of the southern Balkans, Alexander was able to subdue the upland Macedonian cantons. Argead control of these regions, however, was
temporary. The long periods of independence which these Macedonians enjoyed allowed them to create autonomous power structures and prevented the total integration of their peoples into the kingdom of the Macedonian lowlands. Unless otherwise noted in the following discussion, therefore, my references to Macedonians and their loyalty to the Argeads will be limited to that group which by the end of the sixth century had moved first out of Pieria into Bottiaea, and then expanded further to control the districts of Almopia, Eordaea, Amphaxitis, and Anthemus.\textsuperscript{12} After this time these Macedonians under their Argead kings pressed further eastward when they could to settle and control previously foreign territory.\textsuperscript{13} For reasons of geographical access, border defense, and ethnic affinity not important here, the Argead kings pursued a different kind of expansion in the east than they did in the west.\textsuperscript{14} When the Upper Macedonians were forced into the political orbit of the Argead kings, their social systems tended to be absorbed whole, while maintaining their traditional forms.\textsuperscript{15}

This study of Argead kingship is divided essentially into five parts (Chapters One through Five), with the second through the fifth relying on arguments previously covered. It attempts to deal as impersonally as possible with the institution of kingship in Macedonia in order that we may better understand how each monarch customarily
related to those he ruled. An absolute distinction between the king and his office, however, is impossible for reasons which we will consider. In order to provide the most accurate description of the Argead kingship possible, we will find it necessary to explore how the ruling house justified its unique authority to the subject population, as well as how it served the interests of its constituents in a variety of ways. To this end Chapter One is devoted to a review of the king list in order to establish without question that the one prerequisite for kingship in Macedonia was an Argead heritage. In this discussion will be introduced certain problems concerning the official reckoning of the Argead kings. Building upon this beginning, Chapter Two studies the forms of Argead succession and endeavors to describe more completely than has been done to date the mechanism which decided which member of the ruling house should succeed to the throne. Thereafter, Chapter Three will outline the political, social, and economic duties of the king, and Chapter Four will review how the Argead house was able to hold onto royal authority exclusively until its demise near the end of the fourth century B.C. Chapter Five will detail as much as possible the loyalty exhibited for the Argeads by their subjects, and will offer some suggestions as to why the Macedonians felt it necessary to follow their ancient ruling dynasty until circumstances arose which made change desirable.
NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

1 S. Casson, *Macedonia, Thrace, and Illyria* (London, 1926) 52-101; N.G.L. Hammond, *A History of Macedonia* (London, 1972) 3-19, 205-211 [hereafter referred to as *Mac I*]. On the nature of the ancient Macedonian plain and the wealth of the region see, E.N. Borza, "Some Observations on Malaria and the Ecology of Central Macedonia in Antiquity," *AJAH* 4 (1979) 102-124; and "The Natural Resources of Early Macedonia," *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage*, eds. W.L. Adams and E.N. Borza (Washington, 1982) 1-20. I wish to express my gratitude to the work of Hammond at the outset. Although I do not always agree with his conclusions, his work has set the standard for modern Macedonian studies, and the monumental scholarship inherent in *Mac I* (as well as in the second volume cited below) will provide the foundation for all subsequent work in Macedonian history. I will use Hammond as a point of reference in this dissertation, and will often make reference to his conclusions without expansion on matters (such as chronology) which have no direct bearing upon my conclusions.

There are many reasons for identifying the Bryges with the historical Phrygians, not the least of which were the lingering stories in Macedonia that the famous king Midas (whom the Greeks identified with the Phrygians of Asia Minor) had at one time ruled in Macedonia (where, for example, he was associated with the famous "Gardens of Midas" [Hdt. 8.138.2], probably located near modern Naoussa). It is doubtful that the forefathers of the historical Macedonians had anything to do with the migration of the Phrygians since the various Macedonian groups seem to have become important in the region long after the Phrygians had left Europe.

Mac I, 427-441 provides a discussion of the early migrations which affected Macedonia and Hammond's reasons for occasionally differing with previous work. His arguments (based upon an intimate knowledge of the archaeological evidence from Greece, Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria) are necessarily interpretive. I accept his reconstruction of this very early evidence as a convenient point of departure.

This date derives from the information provided by Herodotus (8.137.1) where he names Alexander I as the seventh Macedonian king. Since Alexander reigned in the
early fifth century, if one assumes an average reign of about 30 years for each of these Macedonian monarchs [as does N.G.L. Hammond in N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, A History of Macedonia, vol. II (London, 1979) 4 (hereafter referred to as Mac II)] one would have a date near 650 B.C. for the founding of the dynasty. This may seem a long period for an average reign, but it is by no means in conflict with the calculations of other scholars (see esp. Mac II, 4 note 2). Such a date for the origins of the dynasty is compatible with the little we know of Macedonia in the middle of the seventh century, but since this is minimal we cannot push such an argument too far (Mac I, 420-429). In light of the length of the average reign in the period 650-500, it seems likely that the extant record was doctored at an early date and some kings forgotten. This is unimportant for the present work because—as will be argued below—the perception of the past was more important than its reality. If in fact such a manipulation occurred in this early period, it was not unique in Macedonian history (see the below argument concerning Caranus).

My use of the term Argead to describe the dynasty in question must remain undefended at this time. I am aware that Hammond has argued that a more proper designation would be "Temenid" and will discuss the point at length elsewhere (see below, Chapter Four). Hammond (Mac I, 430 ff.) argues that the name Argead in fact applied not to the
ruling dynasty, but to the specific segment of the Macedonians over which they ruled. He derives the name from "Argestia" meaning "plain" and thinks the term came to be applied to the group which eventually settled in northern Pieria because previous to their occupation of that territory, they had lived in the area later known as Pelagonia. The name Argestia would describe well a people with such origins since a plain setting is characteristic of Pelagonia, and it is because of this suitability that Hammond feels justified in amending a passage from Strabo to provide the precise word form necessary to argue as he does (Mac I, 431). This point has been contested by scholars who doubt the validity of the persistent ancient tradition which ascribed a southern origin to the Macedonian royal house: see E. Badian, "Greeks and Macedonians," Macedonia and Greece in the Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times, ed. Beryl Barr-Sharrar and Eugene N. Borza (Washington, 1982) 33-51, and Eugene N. Borza, "Athenians, Macedonians, and the Origins of the Macedonian Royal House," Studies in Attic Epigraphy, History, and Topography presented to Eugene Vanderpool (Princeton, N.J., 1982) 7-13.

6 We have no need to investigate kingship in the Balkans at length here. Little has been done to investigate the king's role in the Macedonian area, but
what evidence exists suggests that early examples from the
south provide a model for the office in the north at a
later date. On early Greek kingship see, M.I. Finley, The
Starr, "The Decline of the Early Greek Kings," Historia 10
(1961) 129-138. For a new appraisal of this early period
see R.H. Drews, Basileus: The Evidence for Kingship in
Geometric Greece (New Haven, 1983).

For our present purposes it is enough to note that the
Argead kings were typical of the northern Aegean in the
period we will discuss. For a description of the Argead
house, see Mac II, 3-14. For a description of the royal
houses of Upper Macedonia, see Mac II, 14-22. The
situation of the Aeacidae among the Molossi was originally
similar to that of the Argeads among their group of
Macedonians, but this changed as the Epirotes developed a
more or less federal state. Whereas the Argeads eventually
were able to suppress the independence of rivals and so
rule a kingdom with few constraints upon their authority,
the various elements which politically associated with the
Aeacidae maintained a relative degree of equality and so
could demand political concessions. See, N.G.L. Hammond,

Even nations which had no ethnic or linguistic
relation to the Greek world had similar royal houses. For
the Illyrians see Harry J. Dell, The Illyrian Frontier to
229 B.C. (Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1964) 147-
Although Dell thinks that the Illyrians were unique in terms of political structure, his description of their organization (168), "the king was the chief of the ruling tribe (as the kings of the Molossi had been in Epirus) and he maintained control only so long as he was able to keep the great dynasts satisfied" could very well apply to the Argeads, their control of their homeland, and their influence upon Upper Macedonia until the reign of Philip II (despite some early attempts to impose a more direct control upon the area). Although there undoubtedly existed some minor differences among the royal houses of the region, it seems clear that they all claimed a special status within their own dominions, and could trace their uniqueness dynastically to some important ancient or mythological figure—-as did, for example, the Molossian Aeacidae when they claimed descent from the famous Achilles' son Neoptolemus.

For an anthropological investigation of the possible methods of royal succession, with examples from many times and places but with an emphasis upon African data, see J. Goody (ed.) *Succession to High Office* (London, 1966) and R. Burling, *The Passage of Power* (New York, 1974). Both of these works examine hereditary succession extensively, for specific examples see the citations in Chapter Two.
Philip II and Alexander III would be very long, and is unnecessary here. Please see the subsequent chapter notes for references important to this dissertation. M. Andronikos, the excavator of ancient Aegae, has not yet published his final report of the royal tomb discovered in 1977. His most complete publication on this find to date is *The Royal Graves at Vergina* (Athens, 1980). Other articles will be noted below as appropriate. For descriptions of Macedonian kingship which do not fully explore the king’s role in society, see H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage*, I (Munich, 1926) 10-24, and F. Hampel, *Der König der Makedonen* (Weida, 1934).

8 *Mac* II, 14-31 and 55-69.

9 As Hammond (*Mac* II, 64) writes: "it was probably with Persian aid and as a Persian vassal that Alexander established his suzerainty over those peoples and named the region for the first time 'Upper...Macedonia' and the various peoples--Elimiotae, Tymphaei, Orestae, Lyncestae, and Pelagones--'Macedonians'". Regardless of this expansion, Macedonia did not have the developed institutions which would allow her to keep firm control of these areas. Nor did Macedonia have the financial capacity to build forces superior to her neighbors throughout most of the Argead period. Alexander I for one
had difficulty protecting areas crucial to the strength of his kingdom, especially the region of the Bisaltic mines which rendered him so much silver [see, *Mac II*, 104-115; Doris Raymond, *Macedonian Regal Coinage to 413 B.C.* (New York, 1953), and Martin Price, *Coins of the Macedonians*, (London, 1974) esp. 19 for a summary of Alexander's bullion woes. After Alexander I, dynastic problems, and foreign powers such as the Athenians, Spartans, Thebans, Thracians, and Illyrians stunted Macedonia's ability to organize a powerful kingdom.

10 Thuc. 2.99.

11 See note 9 (*supra*) for a beginning bibliography which highlights the problems faced by Argead kings. See also Thucydides (4.124f. among others), where Perdiccas II, the son of Alexander I, had difficulty controlling the upland cantons.

12 *Mac II*, 64-69.


This occurred even under the most intensive organization of the kingdom in Macedonian history— that of Philip II. *Mag* II, 650-651: "But the [upper] tribal states continued in existence, administering their own affairs and maintaining their identity and self respect. They certainly organized and trained their own men for defense against the Illyrians and the Dardanians.... Philip chose deliberately to encourage local loyalties and arranged his army on the territorial system." See also Bosworth, "Philip II and Upper Macedonia," 100-102.
CHAPTER ONE
THE ARGEAD KING LIST

The first task in exploring the relationship between the kings and their subjects is to establish the dynastic prerequisite for royal authority. This will be done by reviewing the Macedonian king list through Alexander IV, and by considering the origins of all royal pretenders. Only after such a start can we consider the elements which supported the Argead's royal status.

Herodotus is our earliest source on the Macedonian royal house. He claims that Alexander I, the first historically notable Argead king, was the seventh Argead monarch, with his predecessors being: Perdiccas (the dynasty's founder), Argaeus, Philip, Aeropus, Alcetas, and Amyntas. Herodotus adds that each king through Alexander had been the son of the previous monarch. Whatever the historical merit of this list, it appears based upon an official register of the Argead house since Thucydides presents information compatible with Herodotus' evidence. Specifically, Thucydides refers to Perdiccas II (the son of Alexander I) as the eighth of his line. This suggests that our two sources, both of whom had an interest in (and personal contact with) the north Aegean, reflect an official fifth century account of the Argead heritage probably approved by the royal house itself.
This conclusion has been accepted by the two most recent scholars to deal extensively with the origins of the Argeads and the Macedonians, N.G.L. Hammond and E. Badian. We can assume with relative certainty, therefore, that by sometime in the fifth century, the Macedonians perceived their kingdom as the product of the Argead house and that the royal status of this family extended backwards in time through six generations before Alexander I. This is about the extent of our knowledge concerning the history of the Argeads before the reign of Alexander I. Herodotus does mention a foundation myth which we will return to later, but the absence of precise information concerning the domestic affairs of the Argead kingdom before the lifetime of Alexander seems to indicate that Herodotus had little access to this kind of material for the earliest period of the dynasty. As such we perhaps cannot place much weight upon Herodotus' claim that each Argead king through Alexander had succeeded his father directly without variation. It is reasonable to suppose that the dynastic principal lay behind Argead successions through this period--Herodotus' sources should certainly have been correct upon that score--yet whether or not each son (the eldest?) stepped easily into his father's office cannot be known. Later Macedonian history would suggest that such a string of uncontested successions did not occur, and thus that Herodotus had been misled by his informants.
is, however, the possibility that the smaller Macedonian kingdom of the pre-Persian era fostered a unity within the royal family not found at a later date. We can only regret that Herodotus does not detail the procedures utilized in the succession.

During the reign of Archelaus (ca. 413-399) the Macedonian king list began to undergo revisions. The first of these appears to have been the work of Euripides, and is the most easily dismissed intrusion into the historical list. In his play, Archelaus, Euripides refers to a son of Temenus named Archelaus and attributed to this figure the foundation of the Macedonian royal line. That this invention was intended to flatter the historical Archelaus, and thus that there never was an earlier king of that name, is obvious. The Argeads, of course, did ultimately trace their origins back to the royal line of the city of Argos and therefore to Temenus. This does not mean, however, that an earlier Archelaus had somehow been forgotten until Euripides reintroduced him. Rather, Archelaus was fond of Greek culture generally, and had specifically been generous to Euripides, so that this manipulation should be interpreted as the product of a grateful artist thanking his patron.

Soon after the beginning of the fourth century, however, there were permanent changes in the official record of the Argead kings. Two sources, Justin and Satyrus, deny the role of Perdiccas as the traditional
founder of the Macedonian kingdom and its royal house. Justin instead records a king named Caranus as the father of Perdiccas and as the founder of the dynasty. Satyrus agrees with Justin that Caranus had founded the royal house, but adds two kings, Coenus and Tyrimmas, after Caranus and before Perdiccas. Even though these kings had been unknown to Herodotus, Thucydides, and Euripides, it seems certain that at least Caranus was firmly in place by the middle of the fourth century. Plutarch writes that all of his sources for his biography of Alexander agreed that Caranus had founded the Argead line in the same way that Neoptolemus had founded the Aeacid dynasty in Epirus. Such unanimity implies that Plutarch's various sources for Alexander III's career referred to Caranus as the established founder of the Argead line. This in turn suggests that Alexander the Great himself accepted this version of his lineage. Yet, why would the Macedonians improvise their king list in this way and then officially accept the revision in so short a time? Beyond the question of why change the list at all is, why choose the name Caranus for the newly "rediscovered" founder of the kingdom? The answers to these questions will not alter a final list of the early Argead kings, since the addition of Caranus can in no way be considered historical. Nevertheless, a consideration of the implications behind the change will be valuable as we turn to the family
background of certain fourth century Macedonian kings.

Hammond attributes the widespread popularization of the king list which included Caranus to Theopompus. This, however, is a bit misleading since the overwhelming acceptance of the revisions could only have occurred if subsequent Macedonian kings fostered their orthodoxy. Hammond believes that these changes became acceptable to the Argeads only after Euripides showed them how to make political points by manipulating their heritage. Whether or not Euripides would have had to teach the Argeads such a lesson is debatable. Even if this point is accepted, Hammond is not clear about how the addition of Caranus (let alone the other two possible kings) would enhance the royal family's prestige. The name brought with it no important set of associations which could be especially beneficial to the Argeads either inside or outside of their kingdom.

As Hammond indicates, the word karanos ("lord", see below) would have conjured up images of leadership in the early fourth century, and indeed the word had recently been used as an honorific title in a Persian context. But a name which appealed to authority in a somewhat generic fashion, or which had been broadcast by the Persian king would not have brought immediate and concrete benefits to Macedonia in a way which might have justified its use as the name of a newly recognized dynastic founder. Hammond misses the point of the change because
he is convinced that the adoption of Caranus must have occurred during the reign of Archelaus. He bases this assumption upon an extant Delphic oracle which ordered Caranus to leave Argos (in the Peloponnesus) and settle by the Haliacmon River at the location where he first saw goats grazing. Hammond argues that such a response must have been offered before the capital of Macedonia was moved from Aegae to Pella, which almost certainly occurred late in the reign of Archelaus. Such a reading of the oracle is not justified, however, as Badian has pointed out already. Aegae did not lose all of its importance after the royal residence shifted to Pella. Indeed it remained a religious center of some importance throughout the rest of the Argead period. As the burial site for the Argead family until the reign of Alexander III, Aegae remained the ancestral heart of the kingdom, and its importance as the kingdom's original capital would not have been forgotten. A reference to Aegae in the context of a dynastic foundation myth, therefore, would not be out of place even after Pella had been established.

Badian's suggestions concerning the importance of Caranus, however, are no more convincing than Hammond's. As part of a larger argument in which he attempts to show that the Greeks with few exceptions continued to view the Macedonians and their kings as barbarians throughout the classical period, Badian points to the adoption of Caranus.
as an attempt (probably by Archelaus) to increase the prestige of the Argead house and improve its case concerning its southern origin. Badian believes that the addition of names to the official king list around 400 B.C. was intended to push back the founding of the dynasty to the time of Midas and thus gain the enhanced dignity of a more ancient heritage. This desire to push back the date of the dynasty to the time of Midas is by no means certain, however, especially since the number of kings added to the official list is unknown.

The Caranus myth as it appears in the above mentioned Delphic response links the dynasty closely with a Dorian emigration from Argos, but in the aspect of the myth which concerns the origins of the Macedonian royal family the name of the king plays little importance. There is no internally significant reason why the name Perdiccas should not have appeared in the Delphic record instead of Caranus except that by the time the oracle was rendered, Caranus was the accepted founder of the dynasty. Thus, Badian's contention that the name Caranus was invented to somehow tie the Argeads closer to the Peloponnesian city of Argos (and therefore to supplement the claims to Hellenic ancestry) is not convincing. If this were in fact the case, one would expect the choice of a name which had established significance in the south and thus whose repetition would conjure up associations desired by the dynasty. That "Caranus" could not serve such a purpose
becomes obvious after one searches in vain for a prominent mythological or historical predecessor of that name. If Caranus had no important connotations, why did the Argeads adopt it and use it for such an important purpose?

Hammond and Badian both misunderstand the importance of the introduction of Caranus because both want to interpret his invention as an attempt by the Macedonians to draw closer to the Greek world to the south. It seems, rather, that to understand the significance of this whole episode we must remain in the north and understand the manipulation of the royal ancestry as the product of domestic affairs.

The following arguments are beyond proof because of the dearth of evidence. Nevertheless, I offer them because they interpret our sources in a more meaningful way than previous arguments, and because their implications are important for an assessment of how the Argeads justified their possession of the throne. The word karanos means "chief" or "lord", and although the word denotes authority, it does so passively as a name since it carries few concrete associations which would appeal to a wide audience. That is, not only is there no evidence that the name would mean something to the Greeks of the south, but also we know of no Macedonian context which would enhance its usefulness as an addition to the king list. Perhaps the importance of the choice, therefore, was the
fact the Caranus was a fairly neutral word, but at the same time one which pointed towards authority. Its insertion into the king list thus would be important if its purpose was not to add to the prestige of the dynasty, but rather to detract from the status of the previously accepted founder--that is, Perdiccas.

Why would such a change be desirable? The answer to this lies in the first decade of the fourth century, after Archelaus had died (399), but only shortly after the time when Euripides had introduced an invented Archelaus into the king list as the first of the Argeads. Whatever the historical reality of Argead succession had been before Alexander I, his son and grandson, Perdiccas II and the historical Archelaus respectively, succeeded their fathers in turn and became kings. Although Perdiccas II had some difficulty in establishing himself upon the throne, after he did so he "enjoyed" a long reign.24. His accession and that of Archelaus, therefore, reinforced the traditional pattern of dynastic succession whereby the son of the reigning monarch succeeded the latter upon his death. After Archelaus died in 400/399 B.C., several kings followed upon one another quickly. Hammond's account of the order of succession throughout the 390's (see the discussion below) repeats Diodorus with one addition and reads: Orestes (399-398), Aeropus (398-394), Amyntas II (394/3), Pausanias (394/3), and Amyntas III (393-369)--whose reign brought back longevity, if not stability, to
We should note at once that neither Amyntas II nor Amyntas III was a direct descendant of Archelaus or his father Perdiccas II. Amyntas II was the cousin of Archelaus and of the dead king's generation. His father was Menelaus, whose father in turn was Alexander I. For his part, Amyntas III was the son of Arrhidaeus, the grandson of Amyntas, and the great-grandson of Alexander I. Thus, he was a cousin once removed of both Archelaus and of Amyntas II. Both of the kings named Amyntas, therefore, were Argeads, but they were products of collateral branches of the family. The last common ancestor of Archelaus, Amyntas II, and Amyntas III was Alexander I.

Perdiccas II, therefore, had been the first Macedonian king who had not been a direct ancestor of either Amyntas II or III. The rivalry between these three branches of the Argead family, each of which could trace its ancestry back to a different son of Alexander I, was intense in the 390's and undoubtedly each found it necessary to justify itself in the strongest possible terms in order to claim the throne ahead of its rivals. Since the ancestry of all the contenders could provide valuable ammunition in the propaganda campaigns which would follow, any advantage to be gained from a favorable interpretation of the king list would be checked as effectively as possible by the opposition. All of the contending factions
in the 390's were Argeads whose blood was thought to run blue through Alexander I, but both Amyntas II and Amyntas III might have found it expedient to mitigate the importance of the accession of Perdiccas II over their own respective ancestors, Menelaus and Amyntas (Perdiccas' brothers). In a war of words, the descendants of Perdiccas II might very well have noted the importance of the first Perdiccas as the founder of the Argead dynasty, and then have used this namesake of their forefather to justify a superior claim to royal authority. Such would not have constituted their entire case, nevertheless, any parallel established between the importance of Perdiccas I and II would have been harmful to the claims of Amyntas II and III. The special bite of such a linkage would have been the original Perdiccas' significance as the first of the Argead rulers in Macedonia. If this accepted status could be changed by interpolating a king with a strong but innocuous name like Caranus as the founder of the dynasty, then the priority of Perdiccas II could be all the more effectively challenged while not hurting the prestige of the entire family.

If I am correct here, then the eventual victory of Amyntas III would have guaranteed the establishment of Caranus, even if Amyntas III had not actually invented the new founder. In addition, we can understand why Caranus had become so entrenched by the time of Alexander III, since the legitimacy of his branch of the family would
depend in part upon the acceptance of Caranus as the founder of the Argead's royal authority. Where this places the two additional kings mentioned by Satyrus I cannot say. Their names do not give much of a hint as to their propaganda value and, in any case, they might have been added simply to emphasize the "demotion" of Perdiccas I. Perhaps the reason why their names appear only once throughout our sources is that later kings found little value in pressing for their institutionalization since one interpolation was enough to deflate the importance of the first Perdiccas. Or perhaps, few cared to flog the claims of Perdiccas II's branch of the family after the successes of Philip II and Alexander the Great legitimized their branch in a practical way.

However the changes in the king list are interpreted, the fact that they occurred and became official indicate that the kings of the fourth century were concerned with the perception of early Macedonian history. Undoubtedly, this interest derived from a desire to strengthen claims of authority by appealing to the past. This suggests that these kings hoped to underscore their own unique status by glorifying their royal heritage as much as possible. I will return to this point below, but in the meantime we must complete the survey of Argead kings.

As mentioned, Alexander I was the first Macedonian king of what may be called the historical epoch. When and
how he died, however, is unknown. Curtius alludes to the death of a royal namesake of Alexander the Great which was violent but which went without retribution. Since Curtius could only have been referring to one of two kings, and since we know that the second Alexander's death was avenged by his brother, this suggests that Curtius was referring to the death of Alexander I. Like so many other Macedonian kings, Alexander the "Philhellene" seems to have met a sudden and perhaps unexpected end at the hands of an unknown adversary.

We know of five sons of Alexander: Perdiccas, Philip, Alcetas, Menelaus, and Amyntas—the first of whom eventually secured the throne. Unfortunately, we have no idea of these siblings' relative ages, although Hammond believes Philip and Alcetas to have been older than Perdiccas. We will return to this problem below when we consider how Macedonian kings were selected, suffice it to say here that Perdiccas' accession may have been challenged by Philip for reasons which must remain conjecture, and that Alcetas may have had a better claim to the throne upon Perdiccas' death than Perdiccas' son, Archelaus. Regardless, Perdiccas (ca. 452-413) maintained control of the throne until he died and was able to select Archelaus as his political heir. As was the case with Perdiccas, we do not know whether Archelaus was the eldest son. Indeed, the number of Perdiccas' sons is debatable. Hammond thinks there probably were three: Archelaus,
Alcetas, and Aeropus (or Meropus). To these we may add a possible fourth in Iolaus, whom Thucydides reports Perdiccas made regent at Aegae in 432 B.C. while the king himself was at Potidaea. Whoever this Iolaus was, however, he apparently died shortly thereafter since he falls out of our record. Not only is he not mentioned elsewhere in our literary sources, but also an important inscription of disputed date marking an alliance between Perdiccas and Athens (although incomplete) omits his name. This inscription lists several members of the Argead family obviously in order of court precedence (at least at the time of the treaty). If Iolaus was the son and chosen successor of Perdiccas at the time of the alliance he should have appeared on our stone before any other prince of the younger generation. Yet, it is Archelaus who is in this position in this document. In fact, Archelaus' name appears third behind only Perdiccas and his brother (Archelaus' uncle) Alcetas.

Archelaus (ca. 413-399) followed his father to the throne, although it appears that his accession did not go uncontested. We are told by Plato that his first royal acts were the murders of his uncle Alectas, his cousin Alexander the son of Alcetas, and his own seven-year-old brother. (Again, we will return to this important evidence when we consider the principles of succession.) Even though Plato thought Archelaus an illegitimate who
murdered his way to the throne, Archelaus was a ruler of some quality whom Thucydides thought did more for his kingdom than any of his predecessors. He was, however, assassinated in 399. The facts surrounding Archelaus' death were murky even in antiquity. He died by the hand of an attendant page while on a hunting expedition. Whether it was accidental, a political act, or a personal conspiracy is unknown.

The death of Archelaus brought on the most confused decade of Macedonian history as far as royal succession was concerned. Archelaus' immediate successor was Orestes (399-398). He is thought to have been Archelaus' son because of the testimony of Diodorus. Diodorus (14.37.6) describes Orestes as a minor who assumed the throne, but who was killed by his epitropos (i.e., "guardian") Aeropus. This same Aeropus succeeded Orestes to the throne (398-394) which would indicate that Aeropus' ambitions were realized by his treachery. How Aeropus might have murdered his charge and then justified his own accession is unknown. Hammond for one reserves judgment concerning his complicity in the murder.

Who was this Aeropus? Since Diodorus suggests that he was the guardian of Orestes, he almost certainly was a prominent Argead. We know, after all, of other Argead regencies, and although our evidence leaves many unanswered questions, it seems that the Argeads preferred someone from within the family for such an important position. We also
know that there were several adult Argeads alive at the
time of Archelaus' death, and this alone would have made
the choice of a non-Argead as Orestes' guardian difficult.
Hammond has ingeniously proposed that this Aeropus is
indeed attested from our sources as the son of Perdiccas
II, and thus that he was the brother of the late
Archelaus.\(^{43}\) Hammond strengthens his argument by restoring
a lost segment of the above mentioned treaty between
Perdiccas and Athens in part with the name Aeropus followed
by his patronymic. Since Aeropus as an Argead fits what we
know of the historical record, and since Hammond's
reconstruction of the inscription provides the exact number
of letters necessary to fill the lacuna in the text of the
inscription, his case that this Aeropus was the son of
Perdiccas II is a plausible one. It follows, then, that
the murder of Orestes and Aeropus' accession elevated a
collateral branch of the royal house to the kingship (with
the change perhaps justified by an emphasis upon the
inadequacy of child rule in Macedonia).\(^{44}\)

Aeropus died late in 394 B.C. of an unknown disease.\(^{45}\)
Before then, Aelian records that he had been somehow
betrayed by an Amyntas.\(^{46}\) In all probability this Amyntas
was the same individual who followed Aeropus to the throne
as Amyntas II, the son of Menelaus.\(^{47}\) It is almost certain
that this Menelaus was himself a son of Alexander I. He
remained prominent through the reign of Peridccas and was
included in the treaty between Perdiccas and Athens. The identification of Amyntas II's father as a son of Alexander I is strengthened by Aristotle, who reports that Archelaus as king had married one of his daughters to a son of this same Amyntas. Given the problems which Perdiccas II and Archelaus both had faced upon their respective accessions, a marriage alliance with another branch of the royal family would have been advantageous to Archelaus as a bond working towards greater stability, and by placating possible contenders for the throne. If such were Archelaus' intention, it seems to have worked because Amyntas remained loyal to Archelaus and to Orestes. His ambition seems only to have surfaced after Aeropus had removed Orestes. It is in this context that we should read the betrayal of Aeropus by Amyntas: if Amyntas remained loyal to the memory of the exterminated line, he might have justified his opposition to Aeropus by claiming the role of an avenger. If so, the accession of Amyntas II did not settle royal accounts, but instead promoted more political instability. His reign lasted less than a year. Sometime in 394/3 B.C. he was replaced by a certain Pausanias, the son of the dead Aeropus. Pausanias also enjoyed but a short rule, being killed in his first year and replaced by Amyntas III (393-369). It would appear that once the succession had begun to move across the Argead family horizontally instead of vertically, a consensus concerning legitimacy was difficult to obtain.
The last royal ancestor common to Amyntas II and Amyntas III was Alexander I, whereas Archelaus, Orestes, Aeropus, and Pausanias all traced their ancestry through Perdiccas II. Amyntas III, however, was no more closely related to his namesake than he was to the other kings of the 390's, since he was the son of Arrhidaeus, grandson of Amyntas, and great-grandson of Alexander I. Amyntas was undeniably an Argead, but there had been two non-royal generations between him and Alexander I—a fact which would not have been missed by any Macedonian. In addition, Amyntas III's immediate forefathers seem not to have remained politically significant. Neither Amyntas nor Arrhidaeus (the son and grandson respectively of Alexander I) appear in the treaty between Perdiccas and Athens. It is true that the inscription as we have it is incomplete, nevertheless, no reconstruction of its contents has yet offered these names for the lacunae. Further, the list as we have it includes non-Argeads after members of the royal family. If Amyntas III's ancestors retained their political importance they should have appeared with other members of the royal family at the head of this register.

Amyntas III, therefore, was some distance from the throne in the 390's, a fact which might have precipitated a propaganda blitz including a reorganization of the king list and the promotion of his legitimacy upon his coinage. We know little of Amyntas' status before his
accession, but the above observations seem to imply that his prominence was enhanced by the disturbances over the disputed succession which troubled the Argeads at the time. Perhaps an adept political performance during the 390's both made him a candidate for the throne and also tempered any bias which might have impeded his political progress. I recognize that this argument is speculative, but given the usual Macedonian preference for direct father-to-son succession, it suggests how Amyntas III was able to overcome his immediate heritage in order to consolidate his authority. Regardless of the suddenness of his rise, Amyntas' long reign amid troubled times was remarkable. Indeed, his resilience and longevity established the pre-eminence of his branch of the Argead family and laid a foundation strong enough to weather another decade of successional instability.

The unsettled Macedonian situation during the 390's was by no means unique in the Balkans at the time. By the time Amyntas III came to the throne, Greece was in the throws of the Corinthian War, and this conflict at times touched the north Aegean. Even more menacing to Amyntas was the formation of a large Illyrian coalition to the northwest of Macedonia. The combination of growing Illyrian power, war in Greece which overflowed into Macedonia, and Macedonian weakness led to a large scale Illyrian invasion of Macedonia in 393/2. Led by their war leader Bardylis, the Illyrians penetrated into
Macedonia as far as the Thermaic Gulf, and the forces defending Macedonia simply folded. The situation was so hopeless that Amyntas fled his kingdom for the protection of Thessaly, but not before he did what he could to protect at least a part of his kingdom. The easternmost regions of Macedonia remained free of Illyrian domination because Amyntas negotiated an agreement with the citizens of Olynthus (on behalf of the Chalcidic League) which placed these areas under League protection. While in Thessaly (probably at the court of Jason, the powerful tyrant of Pherae), Amyntas began to seek military support for his return to Macedonia.

In Amyntas' absence Macedonia was ruled by a puppet-king named Argaeus. We do not know much about this man other than he was not universally recognized either in his own time or later, and that he appears from his name to have been a member of the Argead family. Hammond, based on a textual emendation of Harpocration, argues that Argaeus was a son of Archelaus, the one time king. If so, Bardylis' choice made good sense. Argaeus would have had strong claims to the throne, but the fact that he achieved royal status through Illyrian intervention surely would have detracted from his popularity. At this time Bardylis seems to have had visions of controlling Macedonia, and--astutely--seems to have reasoned that real authority there would be more easily maintained if he ruled...
through a member of the established royal family than if he disbanded the traditional monarchy altogether. The legitimacy of Argaeus, however, was never widely acknowledged. Some later sources even refused to credit him with a reign at all. The reality of Illyrian strength pressing ever more closely upon the south was not a pleasant one, and undoubtedly helped Amyntas to stitch together enough of a coalition to return him successfully to his homeland.

Rebuffed by the Macedonians in 391, the Illyrians occupied themselves elsewhere until 383/2 at which time a second major invasion of Macedonia took place. Amyntas again was pushed back quickly and he again took measures to insure the safety of the lands nearest the Chalcidic League. This time, however, Amyntas was not completely driven from his realm. He was able to retreat to some unknown stronghold to recoup his strength, and to recapture all of his kingdom in three months. After this threat Amyntas ruled over Macedonia until his death in 370/369 B.C., but it was a kingdom weakened by domestic disturbances and foreign wars. To make matters worse, the Chalcidic League was growing in strength and proved a potent rival to the Macedonian king's authority.

A disagreement over the return of portions of eastern Macedonia led to war between the two powers. Amyntas was on the losing end of this conflict until appeals for help gained the intervention of Sparta and perhaps some aid from
The subsequent war saw Amyntas and at least one other "king", Derdas of Elimaea (who seems to have been on a par with Amyntas) fighting as subordinate allies of various Spartan commanders. Although the Spartans did not remain ascendant throughout Greece until the end of Amyntas III's reign, Macedonia did not regain her total freedom of action. The great powers to the south, especially Athens, continued to exercise great influence over Macedonia. It was under this umbrella of power that Amyntas was able to secure his position within his kingdom so that when he died of old age (a rare achievement for an Argead king), his authority passed easily to his son, Alexander II.

Amyntas had six sons by two wives: Alexander, Perdiccas, and Philip by Eurydice, and Archelaus, Arrhidaeus, and Menelaus by Gygaea. Justin and Diodorus tell us that Alexander was the eldest of Amyntas' sons—whether they mean all of Amyntas' sons or only those by Eurydice it is impossible to say. Nevertheless, age seems to have been the factor which marked Alexander (369–367) as heir—a fact which will be considered in Chapter Two. He did not succeed his father without some difficulty, however. A certain Ptolemy, whom Hammond identifies as a son of Amyntas II, provided opposition to Alexander, the grounds of which were almost certainly dynastic. As had been the case in the past, foreign
powers continued to influence Macedonia's domestic situation in the 360s. The Illyrians especially posed sufficient threat as to cause Alexander to render his youngest full-brother, Philip, to them as a hostage in order to guarantee peaceful relations.\textsuperscript{70}

Despite his insecure northern frontier, Alexander dabbled in Thessalian affairs (even at one point attempting to garrison some cities there) and this intervention precipitated additional foreign pressure. Responding to Thessalian appeals for help, Thebes under Pelopidas invaded Macedonia and arranged political affairs there to Theban satisfaction.\textsuperscript{71} The settlement included a forced reconciliation between Alexander II and the above mentioned Ptolemy.\textsuperscript{72} Whatever the terms of the reconciliation between Alexander and Ptolemy were, the resulting peace was short-lived. After a reign of only about two years, Alexander was assassinated while performing a ceremonial dance.\textsuperscript{73} Although it is doubtful that anyone could prove Ptolemy's complicity in the murder, it is certain that many at the time and later suspected his involvement.\textsuperscript{74}

Suspicion, however, did not prevent Ptolemy (367-365) from assuming a status of great importance after Alexander died. It is unlikely that he claimed the throne in his own name, perhaps reasoning that such a move would convince his countrymen that he had masterminded Alexander's death for the throne.\textsuperscript{75} Whatever his personal desires might have been, Ptolemy probably limited himself to the role of
guardian for Alexander's brother and successor, Perdiccas III. Even though Ptolemy probably never became king, he seems to have wielded his authority in such a way that he could be described by some later sources as a monarch. The confusion inherent in the situation provided the opportunity for another royal pretender, a Pausanias, to seek the kingship. This claimant was probably a brother of Argaeus (the still living Illyrian puppet of the 390's) and therefore probably another son of Archelaus, the king for whom Thucydides had so much praise. If Pausanias were the son of Archelaus, he would have been too young to figure into the successional crisis of the 390's. He seems, however, to have agitated for royal status earlier than the 360's since Amyntas III at some time had found it necessary to drive him from Macedonia.

Pausanias collected much support within the kingdom, perhaps as much against Ptolemy as for himself, but his bid for the throne fell short thanks to the intervention of the Athenian, Iphicrates. Iphicrates already had close ties with Amyntas III's branch of the Argead family—in fact, Amyntas may have adopted Iphicrates for service on the king's behalf. However close the tie, Eurydice (the mother of the dead Alexander, Perdiccas, and Philip) entreated Iphicrates to save the throne for her children, which he did by driving Pausanias off and securing Ptolemy as the guardian of Perdiccas. This alone seems to
indicate that Ptolemy at that time was not a proclaimed enemy of Amyntas III's sons and perhaps exonerates him of any guilt in the murder of Alexander II. The stories, therefore, which appear in our sources and which describe a monstrous collusion between Ptolemy and Eurydice for the purpose of murdering all of Amyntas III's line must have been the product of a subsequent propaganda mill.\textsuperscript{82} Be that as it may, Ptolemy maintained his influence for only a brief period before Perdiccas oversaw his assassination.\textsuperscript{83} Many different reasons can be given for this murder, but the truth of the situation is that we do not know the circumstances of their disagreement.\textsuperscript{84}

Perdiccas (365-359) seems to have assumed the throne as soon as he was thought old enough to manage his own affairs. Despite problems with Thebes and Athens, he maintained power until his death in battle against the Illyrians. The disastrous circumstances of Perdiccas' death left the royal succession in a shambles. His son Amyntas was only an infant and was clearly incapable of providing the leadership necessary to weather the emergency. Besides Amyntas, Perdiccas was survived by many other Aregeads, all of whom jumped at the chance to claim the throne: Philip (Perdiccas' full brother), Archelaus, Arrhidaeus, and Menelaus (their three half-brothers), and Argaeus and Pausanias (the two probable sons of Archelaus).\textsuperscript{85}

To say that the situation was chaotic and dangerous in
359 would be an understatement. The Illyrians threatened not only the future of the Macedonian kingdom but also the life and well-being of every Macedonian. What the kingdom needed more than anything was a strong king, but that was exactly what it did not have. Necessity thus seems to have sparked the ambitions of every possible pretender. Pressing old claims, Argaeus and Pausanias sought the help of Athens and the Thracian king Berisades respectively, but Philip effectively sapped their support and thwarted their royal dreams. Archelaus apparently fought for authority within Macedonia itself until Philip captured and executed him. Whether or not Arrhidaeus and Menelaus pressed their claims to the throne at this time is unclear. At some time, however, they did so and were forced to flee Macedonia for the security of Olynthus—an attempt which proved fruitless in the end.

In a confusing passage, Justin reports that Philip was originally established not as a king, but as the guardian for Amyntas. This point has been studied closely by many scholars and their points need not be reiterated here. In the end the argument boils down to whether or not one chooses to believe Justin. For our purposes suffice it to say that if Philip were at first a guardian for Amyntas in the way that Ptolemy probably had been for Perdiccas III, this situation changed very soon after Perdiccas' death. Most historians would agree upon this
point, and would point to the extraordinary circumstances of the moment to justify Philip's elevation.\textsuperscript{91} It seems, however, that the main reason for the change in Philip's status was not the Illyrian threat. Although this was a pressing danger, there was no reason why a guardian could not have organized a defense of the realm.

The confused nature of the conflicting claims to the throne, however, is another story altogether. With so many pretenders around, it is obvious that the only way for Macedonia to guarantee the stability necessary to regroup and effectively resist the Illyrians, someone would have to lay a secure hold upon the throne and defend it against all others. Since Amyntas could not do this, Philip did. Undoubtedly, it was his speed in establishing his own ambition and his brilliance in defending the interests of Macedonia against a variety of threats that obtained for him the throne (as we will discuss in the next chapter). Whatever the truth behind his accession, Philip established himself so strongly that he found no need to eliminate Amyntas as a threat to his power. In fact, Philip (359-336) brought Amyntas up at the Macedonian court with all of the appropriate honors.\textsuperscript{92} In part this behavior would guarantee that Amyntas would not act as a focal point of opposition, but Philip could have achieved the same effect by killing his nephew. That he did not take such a step speaks well for Philip.

We can deal with the remainder of the dynasty
summarily since the relations of the rest of its members are so well known. Philip had two sons: Alexander the Great and Arrhidaeus. Unfortunately, we do not know the relative ages of Alexander and Arrhidaeus (see the appendix on Arrhidaeus), but it seems clear that Alexander (336-323) was always considered Philip's heir. When Philip died Alexander had little difficulty in securing the kingship, but he did guarantee his throne by the murder of his cousin Amyntas. Others, such as Alexander the Lyncestian, were reported to have been related to the Argead house, but how much Alexander worried about these distant relatives is debatable. One thing is clear: Alexander never feared Arrhidaeus as a possible rival. This, however, seems to have been the result of Arrhidaeus' mental handicap.

Alexander III did his country a great disservice by not securing the succession before attending to his Persian conquest. His only son, Alexander IV (I am disregarding Heracles in this discussion since Alexander obviously never recognized his paternity of this child) was born several months after the great Alexander died in the summer of 323. The Macedonian army at Babylon was faced with the unenviable situation of having to choose between two undesirable possibilities: the mentally deficient Arrhidaeus, or the unborn child of the dead king. Only the end result of the dilemma is important to us here; a joint kingship was agreed upon as long as Alexander's child was
male. This, of course, turned out to be the case and the first dual monarchy in Macedonian history was created. Arrhidaeus was elevated under the name Philip III and ruled until his death in 317. Alexander IV joined his "colleague" upon the throne until 317, after with time he "ruled" alone until his own murder in 311(?). With the passing of Alexander IV there were no more male scions of the Argead family. Cassander, of course, married Thessalonike, the half-sister of Alexander III, and by her had children who could lay claim to the remnants of the Argead heritage.

This discussion has taken us to the end of the Argead period, and whatever else comes out of it, it should be obvious that a membership within the royal family was considered essential for any aspiring Macedonian king. We may not always be able to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that every figure mentioned had a secure connection with the Argead house, but in every case where doubt is possible there is evidence which suggests that they were in fact Argeads of good standing. The pattern in any case is clear: at least until the death of Alexander IV, the Macedonians believed that an Argead king was a necessity. In the pages to come we must ask, why? Before proceeding to this question, however, we still must first consider how Macedonian kings were chosen. For, if anything emerges from this brief outline of the dynasty, it is that succession was often disputed.
NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1 Hdt. 5.22.1, 8.137.1.


3 Thuc. 2.100.2. It is possible that Thucydides obtained his information on this point directly from Herodotus, which may or may not say something about Herodotus' reliability. Thucydides had personal experience in the north Aegean as a commander of Athenian troops and as a land owner (Thuc. 4.105.1 ff.), and a fair amount of detailed knowledge concerning domestic Macedonian affairs (as the praise of Archelaus implies). One would think that Thucydides would have contradicted Herodotus upon the king list if he had evidence that Herodotus was misleading. Wherever Thucydides got his information—-from Herodotus or from another source which reflected Argead propaganda—the fact that he is compatible suggests that this foundation account was widespread and well known in its details.
4 Hdt. 5.22.1 reveals that Herodotus had a personal acquaintance with those who would have known about the Argead ancestry, i.e. the Argeads themselves or someone close to the royal family. (See also Hdt. 7.73 and 8.138 where Herodotus claims an intimacy with some Macedonian source.) For Herodotus travels, see John L. Myres, *Herodotus: Father of History* (Chicago, 1971) 4-9. Herodotus probably gained his knowledge while in Macedonia. Thucydides, of course, served Athens in the Peloponnesian war by commanding the force which failed to save Amphipolis from Brasidas in 424 (Thuc. 4.105.1 f.) This same passage reports that Thucydides owned property and had influence throughout the northern Aegean. One would think that his professional and personal interests would have made him familiar with certain well-publicized aspects of the Macedonian kingdom.

5 *Mack II*, 4; E. Badian, "Greeks and Macedonians," 33-51, and Borza, "Athenians, Macedonians, and the Origins of the Macedonian Royal House," 7-13. The accepted king list must have been in place by the time Alexander I's ancestry was investigated so that he could compete in the Olympic Games (Hdt. 5.22). At that time Alexander was accepted officially as a Greek whose ancestors had been Temenids from the Peloponnesian city of Argos. Since Thucydides
(2.99.3) also refers to the Macedonian kings as Temenidae, this again suggests that Thucydides and Herodotus reflect the official Argead account of the dynasty previous to Alexander I's reign.

6 Although Badian, "Greeks and Macedonians," 33 has a different end in mind, he points out quite correctly that often the perception of reality is more important than reality itself.

7 Hdt. 8.137.1 ff. If Hammond (*Mac II*, 3) is correct when he assumes that Herodotus had spoken directly to some "descendants of Perdiccas" concerning early Macedonia, he might well have received vague or touched up replies which were tuned to underscore Macedonia's then current relations with southern Greece, and thus which would have glossed over events and times which saw little contact between the two areas. Regardless, a source close to the royal house would have omitted facts detrimental to the dynasty's image.

8 It is generally assumed by modern scholars that the king was succeeded by his eldest son (for example, Griffith,*Mac II*, 699-701). Although probable, this is by no means certain as I will discuss in Chapter Two. Other arrangements possible include: the eldest son born after the accession of the father, the eldest son of a particular
queen, or even the youngest son of any of the above categories. It cannot be forgotten that Herodotus (8.137.1 f.) provides us with our earliest foundation myth of the dynasty and he pointedly states that Perdicas, the founder of the dynasty, was the youngest of three brothers.

See pp. 29-43 with notes below.

Mac II, 5; Badian, "Greeks and Macedonians," 34 and 45, note 12.

Hdt. 5.22; Thuc. 2.99.3.

Mac II 5, 11; Badian, "Greeks and Macedonians," 45, note 12. Both have rightly rejected the historicity of the early Archelaus as the product of artistic license perpetrated by then current propaganda.

Just. 7.1.7 f.; Satyr. FGrH 630 F1. For a discussion of these sources see Mac II, 12-14.

Plut. Alex. 2.1.

Mac II, 12.

Mac II, 11.
17 *Mac* II, 11-12; X. *HG* 1.4.3 records that the Persian king sent Cyrus to Asia Minor as *karanos* to mobilize the king's forces. Seemingly, this title/office elevated Cyrus to a position of overlordship over other Persian officials in the area.

18 *Mac* II, 9; H.W. Parke and D.E.W. Wormell, *The Delphic Oracle* (Oxford, 1956) 1.63. In this discussion I have omitted a reference to an oracle pertaining to Perdiccas' foundation of the kingdom (Diod. 7.16) since it does not directly affect my focus upon the introduction of Caranus. Such an oracle obviously reflects a version of the king list which recognized Perdiccas as the kingdom's founder. See *Mac* II, 7-8 for Hammond's discussion of this evidence. See pp. 23-26, with notes (below) for my argument concluding that the version of the list which acknowledged Perdiccas as the first Argead prevailed until the 390's. The existence thereafter of an oracle naming Perdiccas in this way almost certainly is but an echo of earlier orthodoxy.

19 *Mac* II, 5-6.


21 Badian, "Greeks and Macedonians," 34-35.

23 I use the word passively here on purpose. Manipulations of established lists such as the one we are discussing do not occur without reason. For them to succeed they must respond to a perceived problem and offer a solution which is generally considered a favorable alternative. A generic word like karanos can be received either positively or negatively depending upon the immediate context and the background of the group it is meant to influence. Obviously, the more fraught with connotations a word is, the more it will influence its audience one way or another. If it has no, or a limited, emotional impact upon those for whom it is primarily meant, it is essentially passive and functions not so much on its own accord but to amend a situation thought undesirable. Since at the beginning of the fourth century Caranus appears to be a name with no important precedent, I conclude that its function was a passive one. It seems to have been chosen not for the images it conjured, but for its innocuous reference to authority.

24 Perdiccas' difficulty in securing his throne is not directly attested in our sources, but some such trouble would explain the discrepancies in our sources concerning
the length of his reign. For a discussion and a summary of
the sources see Mac II, 103-104.

25 Mac II, 167-172; Diod. 14.37.6, 14.84.6, 14.89.2,
15.60.3.

26 See pp. 33-35 with notes below.

27 Curt. 6.11.26. On Alexander I see, J. Kaerst,
"Alexandros (8)," RE 1.1, cols. 1411-1412.

28 Mac II, 103. See Badian, "Greeks and Macedonians,"
35, where he makes the interesting observation the
"Philhellenes" is a curious name to apply to someone
considered a Greek.

29 Mac II, 115 f. provides discussion and sources. On
Perdiccas II, see F. Geyer, "Perdikkas (2)," RE 19.1, cols.
590-602.

30 Ibid. Hammond's argument centers upon the disputed
lengths of Perdiccas' kingship and the troubles he had
during his reign with Alcetas and especially Philip (122
f.) Hammond pieces shreds together and concludes that the
reason for Alcetas' and Philip's disenchantment with
Perdiccas was their claim to the throne, which Hammond
assumes must have been based upon the fact that they were
older. Hammond also believes that the army assembly chose Perdiccas over his brothers and thus stimulated their hostility. That such a crisis was fostered by the choice of the army assembly is unlikely (see Chapter Two) but the likelihood that Alcetas and Philip remained rivals for the throne remains.

31 Pl. Gorg. 471b; Thuc. 2.100.2. On Archelaus see J. Kaerst, "Archelaos (7)," RE 2.1, cols. 446-448.

32 Mac II, 135-136.

33 Thuc. 1.62.2. It is possible that this Iolaus was of a different family, and if so, it is unlikely that his position had any dynastic significance. Later Argead kings made it a practice to employ hetairoi to perform specific tasks while the ruler himself was busy elsewhere (see Chapter Three, section two). Antipater's (J. Kaerst, "Antipatros (12)," RE 1.2, cols. 2501-2508, and H. Berve, Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage, II (Munich, 1926) #94) father's name was Iolaus, as was that of one of his sons. If the Iolaus mentioned in Thucydides was in fact from this family, it is the first evidence we have for such an assignment for an hetairos.

34 Mac II, 134-136; ATL 3.313.
35 ATL restores the inscription: ...
"Περσίκκας [Αλέξανδρο] Αλκητες Αλέξανδρο Αρχελάς Περσίκκο φιλιττος Αλέξανδρο Αμνττας φιλιττο] Μενελας Αλεξα [νσρ] Α[ελας Α[........] υρος Αλκητο Βυργινος Κραστονο [e].
Hammond restores it (Mac II, 136): "Περσίκκας [Αλέξανδρο] Αλκητες Αλέξανδρο Αρχελάς Περσίκκο Άρποτος Περσίκκο Αλέξανδρος Αλκητο] Μενελας Αλεξα [νσρ] Α[ελας Α[λκητο....] υρος Αλκητο Βυργινος Κραστονο [e]. Although this inscription is incomplete, if Iolaus were a brother of Archelaus and the heir at the time of this inscription, he should have appeared in the section of the document which is undamaged before Archelaus' name.

36 See notes 33-35.

37 Pl. Gorg. 471b.

38 Thuc. 2.100.2.

39 The assassin's name was probably Craterus: Mac II, 167-168; Diod. 14.37.6; Aris. Pol. 1311b8-35; Ael. VH 8.9.


41 Hammond (Mac II, 168 f.) seems to confuse the matter by interposing the army assembly into our sources. J.
Kaerst, "Aeropos (5)," RE 1.1, col. 679.

42 Ibid.

43 Mac II, 170. If Hammond is correct Aeropus is to be read for Meropus in the scholiast of Aelius Aristides (135), and his reconstruction of the Perdiccas/Athens treaty should include Aeropus and not Meropus (136 and note 35 above).

44 Just. 7.2.5-12 portrays the Macedonians dutifully following their infant king, but the king's duties were such as to make such a situation difficult at best. The disposal of Orestes is the first known instance which involved a succession other than father to son in Macedonia.

45 Diod. 14.84.6.

46 Ael. VH 12.43.


48 See note 35.

50 Diod. 14.84.6.


52 Mac II, 170-172. See also note 35 above.

53 For the king list, see above pp. 24-26, with notes. In addition, Amyntas III was the first Macedonian king to stamp his coins with a portrait of Heracles (B.V. Head, BMC: Macedonia (London, 1879) 171 f.; H. Gaebler, Die Antiken Münzen von Makedonia und Paonia, vol. II (Munich, 1935) 159 f.; Mac II, 171. This certainly was an attempt by Amyntas to emphasize his Argead heritage by referring to the heroic ancestor of his house, probably because their was some question in peoples' minds. Is it too much to see a pattern in these two occurrences? A king who found it important to publicize his distant heritage to promote his legitimacy could easily have manipulated that heritage for his own interests.

54 Mac II, 172 ff.

55 Dell, The Illyrian Frontier to 229 B.C., 39 f.
As noted already, the name had figured in the early Macedonian king list. Hammond argues (I think correctly) that the discrepancies in the length of Amyntas' reign as recorded in Diodorus can be explained by the fact that one of his sources recognized Argaeus and another did not. The ability of Amyntas to come back to Macedonia, although he was aided by foreign powers, must have rested somewhat upon domestic support. This Argaeus is almost certainly the same man who appears as a royal contender in 359 (see below p. 40 and note 85), and this reinforces his membership in the Argead house. See also, J. Kaerst, "Argaios (6)," RE 2.1, col. 685.

This is inferred from the fact that Diodorus listed Amyntas' reign as beginning in 394/3 and ending in 370/69. Since there is no break, at least one of Diodorus' sources refused to recognize the validity of Argaeus.

The military force behind Amyntas was
Thessalian, but the city of Olynthus and others in the north would have cooperated.

62 They attacked Epirus (Diod. 15.13.1-2). Hammond (Mac II, 173-175) argues against earlier opinions that these two Illyrian invasions constitute a double entry for one event in Diodorus.

63 Diod. 15.19.2; Isoc. 6.46.

64 Mac II, 176-178.

65 Mac II, 178. On the independence of Upper Macedonia during the reign of Perdiccas II see, 136, 165-166.

66 Mac II, 178-180.

67 Just. 7.4.5.

68 Just. 7.4.8; Diod. 16.2.4. On Alexander II, see J. Kaerst, "Alexandros (9)," RE 1.1, col. 1412.

69 Mac II, 182. Ptolemy, as a member of the royal family and on account of past loyalty, may have served Amyntas III as an envoy to Athens (178). On this Ptolemy, see H. Volkmann, "Polemaios (4)," RE 23.2, cols. 1592-1594.
70  Just. 7.5.1. Diod. 16.2.2 compacts Philip's two duties as a hostage by having the Illyrians turn him over to the Thebans.

71  Plut. Pelop 26; Diod. 15.67.3-4.


73  Diod. 15.71.1.

74  Diod. 15.71.1. and Just. 7.4.4-7.5.10 condemn Ptolemy's union with Eurydice without naming him. Mac II, 183-184 rightly rejects most of Justin as ridiculous (such as the murder of Perdiccas III by his mother). Hammond thinks the fact that Ptolemy could be "elected" regent by the army assembly meant that his guilt was not as obvious as our sources contend. We will deal with the army's role in such matters in Chapter Two. It is doubtful whether the army had any official role in this matter. Perdiccas' violent reaction and murder of Ptolemy may imply that Ptolemy had more than just an interest in Alexander II's death.

75  Mac II, 183-184 for a discussion and summary of our divided sources. I incline to Ptolemy's regency because Aeschines 2.29 refers to him in this capacity about 20
years after the act.

76 Diod. 15.71.1, 15.77.5.

77 Aesch. 2.27.

78 Mac II, 184.

79 Suid., Caranus.

80 Aesch. 2.28. There is no hint in our sources that this adoption made Iphicrates a candidate for the Macedonian throne. It was an honor for the great soldier—but one which also acted to secure his friendship and that of his city in the future.

81 Aesch. 2.27-29.

82 Just. 7.4.4-7.5.10.

83 Diod. 15.77.5; Mac II, 185. On Perdiccas III see, F. Geyer, "Perdikkas (3)." RE 19.1, cols. 602-604.

84 Perdiccas might have been seeking revenge for his brother, Ptolemy might have been acting too much like a king, Ptolemy might have made advances to Eurydice (with political ramifications), and Perdiccas might have had a
private dispute with Ptolemy; other possibilities exist.


86 Diod. 16.2.6.

87 Just. 8.3.10; Griffith, Mac II, 699-701.

88 Mac II, 699-701.

89 Just. 7.5.9-10.


91 A consensus seems to have been reached that Philip was not regent for a long time, if he ever was. If he had been, Demosthenes certainly would have used the question of legitimacy against Philip at every opportunity in his effort to fortify Athenian resolve in the north (since he often attacked Philip's position in Macedonia for this purpose). M.B. Hatzopoulos, "The Oleveni Inscription and the Dates of Philip II's Reign," Philip II, Alexander the Great, and the Macedonian Heritage, ed. W.L. Adams and E.N.
Borza (Washington, 1982) 21-42, argues that Philip's rise to power came in the late summer of 360—not a year later as is usually accepted. This is based upon an inscription which Hatzopoulos dates to 345 and which refers to Philip's sixteenth regnal year. Hatzopoulos makes no assumptions concerning the regency of Philip, since he assumes once Philip was king that he would have dated his reign from the death of Perdiccas. I have relied upon the traditional chronology mainly as a matter of convention since this point makes no difference in this discussion.

92 See especially Arr. succ. Alex. 1.22; Berve, Das Alexanderreich II, #61.

93 Olympias of Epirus was Alexander's mother and Philinna of Larissa, Arrhidaeus'. The sex of Philip's third child by the Macedonian Cleopatra is unknown, but was probably female. On Alexander the Great see, J. Kaerst, "Alexandros (10)," RE 1.1, cols. 1412-1434.

94 Curt. 6.9.17, 6.10.29; Just. 12.6.14; Arr. succ. Alex. 1.22.

95 Berve, Das Alexanderreich II, #37.

96 Although we cannot be exactly certain what was wrong with Arrhidaeus, he appears to have been either retarded or
mentally ill. For a complete discussion of Arrhidaius' physical problems and the pertinent sources, see Appendix One. See also, J. Kaerst, "Arrhidaios (4)," RE 2.1, cols. 1248-1249 and F. Geyer, "Philippos (8)," RE 19.2, col. 2302.


98 Curt. 10.6.1-10.10.20; Diod. 18.2.1-18.4.8; Just. 13.1.1-13.4.25; Plut. Alex. 77.6-8.

99 Diod. 19.11.5.

100 Diod. 19.105.2.

101 Diod. 19.52.1.
CHAPTER TWO
MACEDONIAN ROYAL SUCCESSION

The standard view of succession to the Macedonian throne [that the king was elected by some body of citizens—for a more detailed summary of the various arguments see section one below] has for some time been closely associated with arguments concerning the overall form of the ancient "constitution" which established for the Macedonians the relationship between king and society. In this chapter we will look at the Macedonian constitution only as it pertained to royal succession. The reason for doing so is that the process by which succession was determined is crucial to an appreciation of the Argead family's relationship to the kingship of Macedonia. The other elements of the Macedonian constitution—the existence of which have been debated by scholars—will be examined in Chapter Three.

Since historians have covered some of this ground before, we must fashion the following discussion initially along the lines already laid out. This includes the use of distinctions established in the terminology employed by scholars to argue their cases. Historians have been conservative in their definition of the concepts that have been used to describe the Macedonian system. For example,
both sides in the debate over the existence of a constitution in Macedonia seem to have accepted that the presence of a constitution implies a well defined set of legal arrangements which clearly delineated the political roles of the king and the people over whom he ruled. Both also appear to hold that if there were no openly understood and exercised legal restrictions upon royal authority, then the king could do virtually anything he wanted to at any given moment, that is, that he could rule in a despotic manner. In contrast, neither for the most part seems to credit informal or flexible constraints upon royal power with being very effective in the long run, and neither (with few exceptions) would define the social bonds which made such restrictions possible as being important to the presence of a constitution [again, for specific references, see below section one, with notes 2-7].

The somewhat static conception of what a constitution is, and what it does for a society, which has been employed by those who have studied Macedonia heretofore establishes at least one useful distinction between different kinds of states. Although every organized society must have some rules in order to survive, there is a difference between those which define their rules by folk custom or tradition and those which develop more formal legal arrangements with closely demarcated procedures for implementation or change. In terms of the fourth century B.C., for example, it seems ill-conceived to understand both the Athenian and
the Macedonian political systems as being in the same sense "constitutional" (even though many of the same social problems were handled by both), since Athens was far more advanced than Macedonia when it came to questions of law and society.¹ We should keep in mind, however, that what is important in the following is not the semantic argument over whether or not the Argeads ruled their kingdom in a constitutional manner, but rather how the Macedonians worked out the problems which they collectively faced.

¹

For the better part of the last half-century, the views of F. Granier--adjusted slightly but reaffirmed strongly by the more recent work of A. Aymard--has commanded the ground of Macedonian constitutional history.² Amid the general acceptance of Granier's belief that the Macedonians lived within a state which clearly defined certain limits to royal authority, there has always been a certain element which has found such a thesis difficult to accept.³ Nevertheless, the majority of scholars, reassured by Aymard's restatement of the case, has accepted at least the conclusions of this constitutionalist approach: that the king may not have had many restraints upon his authority, but those that did exist were significant and respected by the king himself. Within the last decade a
re-evaluation of the evidence upon which this argument is based has forced everyone interested in the Macedonian kingship to re-assess his support for the standard view. R.M. Errington has launched a devastatingly effective attack upon the conclusions of Granier and Aymard by essentially proving that our sources cannot bear the weight thrust upon them by the demands of a "constitutionalist" approach. Yet, although Errington has provided a valuable revisionist service, the concept of a functioning constitution, understood and recognized by all Macedonians, continues to permeate the work of important Macedonian scholars. Since the issue of a Macedonian constitution is central to the question of royal succession, a summary of some of the main points of this larger debate is included below.

Put most simply, the standard view of Macedonian succession holds that a citizen body usually (but not always) thought to be represented by the army assembly, had the right to elect its king. Some carry this point forward logically to argue that such a sovereign body had the right to rescind its original approval, thus giving it the power to depose as well as elect kings. In order to support these contentions, the standard argument points to evidence from the Argead period and later, since the traditions of the Argead era are presumed to have been implemented fully in subsequent periods [the latter assumption is as yet unproven in my opinion]. There are
several reasons why later evidence might not be appropriate for the Argead period, as will be argued below. For the time being, this discussion will be limited to evidence which directly pertains to the Argead dynasty.

The earliest evidence adduced to support the constitutional theory comes rather late in the period of the Argead dynasty and concerns the checkered career of Amyntas III. Syncellus has saved a scrap from Porphyry which reports that Amyntas was overthrown by "the Macedonians" after only one year's rule. It should be noted from the start that there is no mention in Porphyry of selection at all, only of deposition. Unless one is willing to take the logical step and assume that the latter proves the former, no case can be made at all on the basis of this evidence that there existed a constitutional right to elect the Macedonian king. Presumably, the collapse under Amyntas in the face of the first Illyrian invasion of his reign precipitated a strong feeling against maintaining Amyntas in the kingship. Some scholars (including Hammond) have taken this reference to "the Macedonians" to mean that the army assembly formally deposed Amyntas and elevated Argaeus in his place. Whatever may lie behind this intriguing situation in a constitutional sense, it is dangerous to infer that our source really meant "the army assembly" when our source uses the term, "Macedonians". The term is broad enough to cover several possible
constituencies, and without more complete details about the process, an identification of "the Macedonians" with the army assembly remains arbitrary. Even if the army assembly were meant by the original source behind this passage, it would be dangerous to extract an electoral principle from this episode since the nature of the emergency was severe enough to warrant extreme, or unprecedented, action.\(^{10}\) To deny that Amyntas' initial expulsion can be interpreted as evidence for a constitutionally potent army assembly, however, does not mean that factions could not have acted to influence the selection of a king who could more effectively confront the existing crisis.\(^{11}\) Indeed, "the Macedonians" could be more plausibly construed to describe broad disaffection which crystallized as Amyntas was seen helpless before his enemies. That such a deposition could have occurred at this moment is not surprising once Amyntas' situation is recalled. He was not firmly settled upon the throne at the time since he had just taken it from the hands of a relative.\(^{12}\) Because Amyntas had recently elevated a collateral branch of the royal family to the throne, his claims were open to challenge from other Argeads. Under the dual pressure of Amyntas' questionable legitimacy and the advancing Illyrian army, a majority of the population decided to follow another pretender who showed more promise of mitigating the destructive pressure of the enemy. Such a reaction, of course, is not one which would have relied necessarily on a "constitution" to
justify itself. To be specific about the make-up of the body which helped to expel Amyntas forces one to impose a preconceived notion of the Macedonian constitution upon one word from an odd source for such matters.

Another piece of evidence used to support a constitutional role for the people in the selection of kings is the accession of Philip II. Justin, in a much discussed passage, reveals that after the death of Perdiccas III, Philip remained for some time the guardian of his nephew, the son of Perdiccas, until forced by the populus to assume the throne. This passage has always presented difficulties, especially with reference to Justin's comment concerning the length of Philip's guardianship ("Itaque Philippus diu [my underline] non regem, sed tutorem pupilli egit."). Most scholars find it difficult to accept that Philip did not become king shortly after Perdiccas' death, and thus, most argue away Justin's vague temporal reference. Some do so by denying Philip's guardianship altogether, others have shortened the length of the regency to have Philip in control of the throne within a year or so of his brother's disastrous end. Indeed, as has been pointed out, it is difficult to understand how Demosthenes later could have overlooked Philip's usurpation of his nephew's authority, when he otherwise was using every argument available to belittle Philip's accomplishments and legitimacy.
Yet, if Justin is incorrect regarding the length of Philip's guardianship, could he also have been mistaken as to the guardianship itself? Justin's record for accuracy in this section of his work is not good: he was of the opinion that Perdikkas III had died not on the battlefield against the Illyrians, but at the hands of his own mother—a point which is manifestly wrong. Most, however, have been reluctant to disregard Justin entirely on the point of the regency, given that a tradition of guardianship would more easily have fallen out of other sources than it would have fallen into Justin. Whatever the truth of Philip's accession, it implies that some process was invoked to elevate him over his young nephew, Amyntas. Most scholars since Granier have assumed that this process was regulated and directed by the army assembly, which amid the collapse of the state used its sovereign power to elevate Philip.

But, we may ask, what does Justin's reference to a populus mean? Is he referring to a constitutionally empowered army assembly? Or some civilian body with the authority to depose and elevate kings? Considering Justin's overall reliability, can the word populus here be defined any more technically than "the Macedonians" encountered above? Since no other source provides a parallel for "the people's" electoral function at Philip II's elevation, it is dangerous to read too precise a meaning into Justin's word—especially since it is found surrounded by inaccuracies, and with little in the immediate context to
lead us to the assumption that this reference had larger constitutional ramifications.

The accession of Alexander III has also been used to argue an electoral function for the army assembly. Justin and Diodorus both record scenes in which Alexander confronted an assembly of his countrymen shortly after the death of his father. To be sure, our sources are not precise as to how long after the death of Philip the meeting so described took place (a real problem if it is assumed that this was an assembly to elect the king): perhaps it occurred at Aegae, and perhaps it did not. Regardless of this uncertainty, some scholars have argued that this was an electoral assembly in which the Macedonian people exercised their right to choose their king. It is difficult to understand how this assembly was ever so interpreted, since neither source says or hints as much. Rather, both imply that this was a meeting held after Alexander already was king which was intended to solicit the army's loyalty for the new monarch. In Justin the assembly is called a contio, which may well hint that it was a meeting in which the audience listened, but did not participate in any decision. Once again, whatever the process involved in Macedonian succession, such an assembly in which the king had the opportunity to say the right things to those upon whom he would depend, and for them to pledge themselves in return, would have been necessary for
the reign to begin correctly.\textsuperscript{24} Since the meeting is perfectly understandable in the way presented by our sources, it appears unnecessary to invent for it additional electoral functions, or to argue that it represented a traditional power exercised by the people.

Another problem with interpreting this meeting as an electoral assembly is that we do not know who attended. It is likely that Alexander used this opportunity to appeal to as many influential groups within his kingdom as possible and to solicit their support. Yet, exactly who was in these groups cannot be recovered. Although almost certainly elements of the army were included, it is not known whether the full army attended, or whether Alexander was more selective in his appeal.\textsuperscript{25} With all of these uncertainties considered, it is impossible to attribute any constitutional significance to this episode.

This is not the only episode from Alexander's career which has been referred to as indicating that the Macedonians elected their kings. Plutarch reports that after the battle of Gaugamela, Alexander's army hailed him as the king of Asia.\textsuperscript{26} This too has been taken to have had constitutional significance as a clear example of the army acting to define the authority of Alexander. R. Lock, however, has pointed out the most glaring problems with using this episode in this way: there is no indication in our source that the troops involved were entirely Macedonian, and there is no hint that the event represented
anything more than the emotions of a victorious army.27

All of the above evidence adduced on behalf of the constitutional importance of the Macedonian citizen body suffers from the inadequate nature of our sources. None of them overtly mentions the people functioning as many scholars would like to believe they functioned. Indeed, to use the above episodes as proof that some body elected the king one must assume that such an organ existed and then interpret our sources to support the contention. To escape the circular nature of the resulting argument we must concentrate our attention on the one successional process fully described in our sources—that which jointly elevated Philip III and Alexander IV. Granted there are problems inherent in using this example as illustrative of the norm (i.e., its setting in Babylonia and the unique compromise which resulted in the unprecedented dual monarchy), however, there is no reason to assume that the extraordinary circumstances surrounding this episode would have altered the succession process. In fact, it can be argued that if there had been a customary role in the succession for any part of the army, it would have become manifest amid the uncertainties of 323 B.C. as the Macedonians sought comfort from the adverse situation in
which they found themselves.

Our consideration of the events at Babylon must be prefaced with a brief mention of our sources. By far our most complete account of the Macedonian dilemma after Alexander's death comes from Quintus Curtius, the maligned but frequently mined biographer of Alexander. Curtius chose not to end his history with the demise of his protagonist, but carried his account forward to include the general settlement of the Macedonian Empire based upon the joint accession of Philip III and Alexander IV. In the main, Curtius' detailed record for these events appears reliable, in part because his account is supported by the abbreviated versions of our other sources for this period. Curtius' source for this material probably is the source upon which he relied for the bulk of his work—that is, Clitarchus. If Clitarchus is behind Curtius, it follows that there are two independent, and for the most part complimentary, traditions for this material, since the account of Arrian (at least) is built upon the history of Hieronymus of Cardia.

Alexander's death in mid-June 323, after an illness of ten days, stunned the ill-prepared Macedonian Empire. Few who had seen Alexander survive the rigors of his *anabasis* and continue to plan for the future could have been psychologically prepared for the king's submission to a fever made fatal by extended drinking. Devastating as the loss of Alexander was, the situation at Babylon was all
the worse for the lack of an obvious successor. Alexander's wife, Roxane, was several months pregnant when he died, but there was no guarantee that the child would be male. Beyond this possibility, the options were limited. The only generally recognized surviving male Argead was Arrhidaeus. The only other possible candidate was Heracles, the son of Barsine and perhaps of Alexander. If Heracles was Alexander's child, however, he had never been acknowledged as such. Concern over the succession after Alexander had perhaps emerged as early as 334, but the problem became more acute with each day he passed in Asia without issue. One tradition has it that anxiety led a group of Macedonians to ask Alexander upon his deathbed to whom he would leave his kingdom, at which time he replied, "to the strongest" (or "the best"). If this episode happened as recorded, it may have importance in the debate over the method of selecting Macedonian kings.

The lone visible token of Alexander's wishes came when he handed to Perdiccas (who was not an Argead) the royal signet ring. Yet, the significance of this transaction is difficult to assess. Since those present did not know the importance of the gesture, we have no way of determining what Alexander meant by it. Several possibilities exist: Alexander might have desired Perdiccas as his heir; as a regent until a competent Argead arose; or as an agent to oversee a peaceful succession.
It seems clear that Alexander never considered Arrhidaeus as a possible successor. Although Alexander had previously associated with Arrhidaeus in public, and although Arrhidaeus should have participated in the ceremonies surrounding Alexander's death, he does not appear in our sources at Alexander's deathbed. Such an absence more likely would have resulted from the wishes of Alexander than from an omission in our sources, and along with the transfer of the signet ring to Perdiccas, this would have constituted a powerful symbol of the king's intentions to exclude Arrhidaeus from consideration.

The news of Alexander's death spread from the palace quickly and had a profound effect. Love, anger, veneration, honor, and fear all mingled to create a confused, emotional response to the situation. Chief in the minds of the Macedonian officers and soldiers was their predicament: far from home, without a king, and without an obvious candidate to assume the royal duties. As the army mulled over its dilemma, worry came to replace mourning. A quick decision concerning the future of the kingdom was of paramount importance. Work toward such a resolution began immediately after Alexander died when his Bodyguards called a private meeting of the most important commanders in the city. There apparently was no attempt to keep this meeting a secret since a throng of soldiers (who could not have expected to gain entrance to the discussion) followed their officers as a matter of curiosity. It is
important to note here that Curtius originally records no role for the Macedonian army as a whole in these deliberations.

Exactly what qualified an officer to be invited to this meeting is, and was, generally unknown since many commanders who sought admittance were initially denied. There appears, however, to have been no recognized authority for organizing such a limited and private meeting. The confusion generated by a growing mob in front of the royal quarters caused the barriers to the discussion to be removed, subsequently opening the meeting to all Macedonians who wished to attend. Perdiccas, as the bearer of the signet ring, called the assembly (in Curtius those present were referred to merely by the indefinite "omnibus") to order by appealing to the authority still vested in the physical tokens of Alexander (including his throne, diadem, robe, and weapons). He is reported then to have proposed among other things that the army await the birth of Roxane's child before arranging any political settlement.

The first response to Perdiccas' speech reflected the army's primary concern. Nearchus arose and argued that it was indeed proper for a son of Alexander to inherit the kingdom, but insisted that son should be Heracles. This alternative met with instant rejection by most of those present, and when pressed by Nearchus, the opposition
almost reached the point of violence. The case of Heracles will not be argued here at length, but if he was offered as a possible successor, his rejection might have resulted from Alexander's failure to recognize him, or it might have come from objections to his oriental mother. Whatever the historicity of Nearchus' suggestion, it confirms our sources' opinion of the high level of emotion present at this meeting and supports their seemingly intentional impression that the Macedonians had no idea of what to do or how to proceed.

Ptolemy offered another alternative to the problem of succession: that a group should somehow be selected to meet in the presence of the dead king's regalia to do what was necessary to promote order. Whether Ptolemy thought that such a council should rule in this manner forever, or whether he thought that it should select a successor and then disband, we are not told. If Ptolemy meant the latter, this was not a solution at all, but a continuation of the present meeting without the pressure of an emotionally charged rank and file to meddle in the outcome. If the former, this truly was a radical solution to the problem of succession but one which was quickly discarded.

Amid the following discussion an officer named Aristonus spoke in favor of elevating Perdiccas to the throne. This was the first, and only, suggestion to look beyond the Argead house for a king—even Ptolemy's idea most radically interpreted continued to recognize the
necessary authority of the royal family if only in the tokens of its last king. We are told that the majority present began to incline toward Aristonus' solution, swayed by the honor which Alexander had bestowed upon Perdiccas when he entrusted to the chiliarch the royal ring. Perdiccas, however, hesitated to accept the legacy, either truly worried about his right to accept such power or from a desire not to appear too ambitious for the throne.51

Not everyone was pleased with the possibility of Perdiccas' accession, and Meleager (a taxiarch [phalanx commander]) took advantage of the indecision to attack Perdiccas' aspirations. Meleager's scathing assault produced the desired effect and the meeting became chaotic.52 In the middle of the following confusion, Arrhidaeus' name was offered for the first time as a possible candidate for the throne. We are not told who injected Arrhidaeus into the discussion, but the idea caught the imagination of the rank and file, who began to shout that Arrhidaeus belonged at the meeting.53 The officers were shocked at the insubordination of their troops and at the candidacy of the previously forgotten half-brother of Alexander. Pithon is reported to have arisen with tears running down his face to chastise this independence of spirit (it would be interesting to know whether this is an accurate account of the scene, or whether Pithon's open emotion is evidence of Curtius'
rhetorical elaboration), but what effect he might otherwise have had was negated by the abuse he heaped upon Arrhidaeus. Once Pithon finished speaking, the army shouted all the louder for Arrhidaeus. At that moment, Meleager saw to it that the prince was escorted into the meeting where a majority hailed him as king and renamed him Philip in honor of the occasion.54

The elevation of Arrhidaeus split the Macedonians into two factions. In the face of losing control of the situation, the officers began to pull together in their support of Roxane's unborn child.55 Although they were able momentarily to check the enthusiasm for the new Philip, it is noteworthy that none of our sources in any way implies that their fleeting success was founded upon any traditional right to direct the succession process. Rather, we are left with the impression, reinforced by the events to follow, that it was the combined prestige of the most important officers which caused the phalanx to reconsider its decision. The moment of hesitation was brief, however, and disappeared after Meleager rekindled the enthusiasm for Arrhidaeus by bringing the prince before the assembly and by begging the phalanx to trust in his Argead heritage above every other consideration.56 Meleager's success in elevating Arrhidaeus, it is clear, grew not from a traditional right of the phalanx—for as with the officers, the army made no claims to have such power—but from the strength of numbers in a potentially
violent, near riot situation.  

Whatever confusion existed up to this point became even more marked. Meleager managed to mitigate the fears of Philip and got him to don the robe of Alexander. Once suitably attired, the phalanx acclaimed Philip and rejoiced that the kingship would remain in the Argead house. In the meantime, Perdiccas, Ptolemy, and some other officers withdrew from the scene, obviously refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of what they were seeing, and fled to the room which held Alexander's body. They proceeded to barricade themselves in, and when the new king and his supporters attempted to gain access to Alexander's body, a brawl ensued before Perdiccas and the dissenters grudgingly accepted Philip to save their lives. Although they had acted expeditiously, they did not end their opposition to Philip's accession, as was made manifest when all but Perdiccas fled the city at the first opportunity.

From this moment the cavalry units stationed in the countryside supported Perdiccas and began to pressure the infantry in the city by cutting off supplies. Perdiccas remained in Babylon in the hopes of negotiating some solution to the stasis, but even he was forced to flee after Meleager tried unsuccessfully to have him assassinated. Although the phalanx did not support this attempted murder, neither Perdiccas' opposition to Philip, nor the increasing pressure from the cavalry could shake
its loyalty to the new king.61 This dedication even outlasted the first feeble attempts by Philip to exercise his new authority. Once the intensity of this loyalty to Philip personally became apparent to those in the countryside, a new approach became necessary. Perdiccas, after one aborted attempt to gain a complete victory, proposed that he, Leonnatus, and Meleager be recognized as ducès of equal status under the authority of Philip.62

Perdiccas, of course, did not accept this compromise for long, but he at last had come to realize that whatever else might happen, the phalanx was not going to abandon its support for Philip. Perdiccas' offer, implying the recognition of Philip, coupled with a concession from the rank and file that Roxane's child, if male should share the kingship, brought the two factions together.63 Any future political maneuvering would have to consider the theoretical authority of a mental incompetent and an infant.

Perdiccas proceeded to take advantage of the situation, but never challenged the authority of the kings.64 Indeed, Perdiccas had not disputed the role of the royal family in the previous disturbances, but only the elevation of Arrhidaeus. In this he was almost certainly in agreement with Alexander, who might have stimulated Perdiccas' resistance to Arrhidaeus in the first place. Despite what others might have proposed for Perdiccas (or what our sources might have thought lay hidden in
Perdiccas', heart), he had operated quite properly in his support of the Argead house. The role of Meleager, however, was another problem. Our sources bear out that Perdiccas never considered a reconciliation with the man who, more than any other, had checked Perdiccas' dominant role after the death of Alexander. Perdiccas may have been loyal to the long term interests of the Argeads, but he would not permit a rival to disrupt his own authority as the foremost of the kings' hetairoi. In accordance with his personal ambition and the need to unify the fractured army, he arranged a traditional ceremony of purification in which he took his revenge upon those who had promoted Arrhidaeus, even though he accepted Alexander's half-brother as king. By acting decisively, Perdiccas cemented his control of both kings.  

His opposition crushed, Perdiccas assumed full command of events. In order to discuss the affairs of empire, he arranged a meeting of a few chosen commanders—perhaps in part as a vindication for the aborted meeting which had led to Philip's acclamation. Following this private discussion came a general assignment of the satrapies. Officially, all decisions were rendered in the name of Philip with Perdiccas acting in his reassigned capacity of chiliarch. Unofficially, all knew that Perdiccas as the second in command to an ineffective king held the reigns of power.

I have taken the time to outline in some detail these
events which led to the unique compromise of the dual monarchy because scholars continue to point to this episode to support arguments that the army assembly had the right to elect the king.\textsuperscript{67} There is much in this evidence, but regardless of how much stock one wants to place in it, there is nothing here which indicates any kind of strict constitutional process. Further, there is nothing here which indicates that any recognized group had the right to influence the course of succession. Quite to the contrary, implicit in all of our sources and explicit in Curtius, is the confusion which met the concerned parties at every turn as they sought to come to a quick decision in this matter before all of Asia took the opportunity to challenge Macedonian authority.

The only possible indication that the army held electoral power is found in a speech of Perdiccas where he is portrayed relinquishing the signet ring to those assembled with the statement, "Capite opus est; hoc nominare in vestra potestate est."\textsuperscript{68} But what did Curtius, in the middle of a speech, mean by the phrase "in vestra potestate est"? Even if he knew the exact words of Perdiccas at that moment and translated them precisely into technical Latin, it is not possible to read into this phrase that the army had the traditional right to determine its next king. One legal scholar has written, "in its broadest sense \textit{potestas} means either the physical ability (=\textit{facultas}) or the legal capacity, the right (=\textit{ius}) to do
something." We must rely upon the context to reveal which meaning applies, and it seems clear from the complete absence of any claim of "rights" and from the confusion which abounds in the narrative, that Curtius meant the former at this point. What Curtius probably meant by having Perdiccas speak as he does, is what he portrays throughout this section—that the army had the right to enforce militarily a solution to the succession problem since there was no obvious heir to the authority of the royal family. There had been disputed successions before in Macedonian history, but there had never been a situation where there was no good candidate available from the royal house. Thus, our sources portray the Macedonians groping through an unprecedented situation, far from home and amid potentially hostile peoples. The result was confusion, conflict, and ultimately, consensus. If our most detailed source for these events can be trusted, we must deny any traditional role for the army in the selection of the king in 323.

The lack of a clearly defined constitutional process does not mean that the army was not interested in the outcome of this particular succession. Given the alternative of anarchy, it was natural for those elements which could effectively organize to do so to seek a solution to the crisis. At first it was the leading commanders on the scene who decided to discuss the options,
as again would be natural since they were accustomed to take the lead. It is interesting to note that however individuals might disagree upon the candidates, the discussion almost entirely was concerned with how best to use the Argeads available at the time. The officers might not have been pleased with a solution which sought the birth of Alexander's son, but it certainly was superior to other available options.  

Those less familiar with Arrhidaeus' mental deficiencies, of course, did not see things the same way, and felt it dangerous to await the possible birth of a boy as long as Arrhidaeus was around. After all, had not he publicly associated with Alexander in various religious ceremonies? The rank and file probably knew that Arrhidaeus had some drawbacks since he had not participated militarily in the expedition, but they had seen him providing for some of the royal duties and certainly such a king was better than none at all. The officers refused to endorse Arrhidaeus, and thus began the conflict which resolved itself in accepting both as co-monarchs. The compromise was unique and perhaps unworkable, but to the Macedonians of the time, who did not know the future, it represented only a ripple in the long history of the Argead house. We should take our sources seriously, therefore, when they report that the Macedonians expected Alexander to provide an heir for the kingdom.  

When he did not, some *ad hoc* solution had to be found.  

One further, and equally important point, concerning
this evidence must be made. Despite the assumptions of many historians to the contrary, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that the Macedonians remained loyal to their royal house through the arrangements at Babylon. It is a mistake to read the future breakup of the Macedonian empire into the ambitions released upon the death of Alexander. Some maneuvering for position existed, but this was played out against the rivalries of the aristocracy under the authority of the Argeads. Such ambition and competition was in no sense new to this period. Whatever the Macedonians might have felt about individual members of the royal family, the Argead house as a whole maintained its aura of kingship, and thus remained the force to organize and rule the huge new empire.

iii

If we combine the fact that no source for the Argead period openly refers to any body of citizens with electoral rights with the confusion revealed in the one succession which is well documented, we are forced to admit that our sources do not reveal the existence of a constitutional organ which oversaw the selection of Argead kings. What, then, do our sources reveal about the means of Argead succession? Obviously the dynastic principle played a large part in this process, but we must investigate further in
order to determine how individual Argeads came to establish their claims over those of other family members. Errington is the first scholar to have ventured comprehensively beyond the army assembly in his search to discover the method of selection. He judges the "normal" succession to have been that of father to son, but admits that this procedure was not so well established as to prevent other Argeads from aspiring to the throne.\textsuperscript{74} This is an important point which will be returned to below. Before doing so, however, we must consider the unique arguments of Errington upon this matter.

Since Argead succession was often disputed, Errington argues the need to identify the groups which had the power to influence which rival should in fact rule. The evidence which Errington finds the most compelling in unlocking a solution to the succession comes not from the period of Argead rule, but from the time of Antigonus Doson, some three quarters of a century after the last Argead king.\textsuperscript{75} Plutarch reports that Doson was elevated to the throne by \textit{of πρῶτοι Μακεδόνων} after first serving as a regent.\textsuperscript{76} Here, thinks Errington, is a principle that can be read back into the Argead epoch: "what mattered was the support of \textit{of πρῶτοι Μακεδόνων}, which we can reasonably interpret as a consensus of the nobles."\textsuperscript{77} Although Errington recognizes that Plutarch alone is not enough to prove that the nobility controlled the process of succession throughout Macedonian history, he contends that earlier
evidence is consistent with such an interpretation. Of the four examples appealed to by Errington, two come from the Argead period—the accession of Alexander III and the joint elevation of Philip III and Alexander IV. Since Errington acknowledges that the first of these is of lesser importance to his thesis, let us consider it first.

As already noted, Errington argues convincingly that the assembly mentioned in our sources after Philip II's death was not an electoral assembly since Alexander was acting as king already when it met. He insists, however, that we can still see a reflection of the nobility's crucial role in the succession in the prominent activity of the hetairoi shortly after Philip's murder. Errington refers to such men as Alexander the Lyncestian, who quickly acknowledged Alexander III as king, and Antipater, who appeared to smooth over the dramatic shift from Philip II to Alexander III, as significant brokers whose actions secured Alexander's place as Philip's heir. This is at best a weak argument as Errington realizes, since our sources do not credit this activity as the cause of Alexander's elevation. Indeed, the sources portray these hetairoi not so much acting upon Philip's death as reacting to the circumstances which they hoped to exploit in order to secure their positions under the new king. That certain hetairoi rose to the occasion to insure their personal safety or the interests of the state does not mean
that individually, or as a group, these men had the right to determine the succession. It, rather, points to the political sagacity of those who saw potential benefits in a transition of power and their own association with the ease of the process.80

More important to Errington is the evidence from Curtius (detailed above) concerning the affairs at Babylon after Alexander the Great's death. Errington interprets the meeting of officers upon the problem of succession (whom Curtius describes as "princeps amicorum ducesque copiarum"81) as an example of an attempt to organize a consensus among the nobility, and even goes so far as to argue that the "participants in this meeting fully expected to be able to arrange the succession among themselves and would indeed have done so, had not Meleager's rabble-rousing created a riotous situation in which the nobles' meeting lost control of affairs."82 There is no need to underestimate the importance of the hetairoi during moments of crisis, but what is not clear at all from Curtius is whether this meeting was traditional, whether those who originally attended expected to arrange the succession, or whether they were expected by others to do so. Although the meeting occurred under Perdiccas' supervision, nowhere in Curtius is there any indication that this was "standard procedure." In fact, the situation and Curtius' account suggest otherwise. Certainly, it is misleading to remark as Errington does that, "it is reasonable to regard this
meeting as the normal machinery for appointing a successor king." Consider Curtius' evidence for a moment: the one thing lacking from his discussion is anything approximating a well-ordered procedure. Upon learning that the Bodyguards had organized a discussion, many of the rank and file Macedonians proceeded to create such a disturbance that the private meeting had to be opened generally to those Macedonians present. Not only was the phalanx uncertain about a traditional right of the nobility to talk over such things in private--such a procedure also upset the officers who sought admittance to the meeting but who were originally denied entrance. If there had been a traditional way to handle such business, it seems implausible that there would have been so much confusion about who should be involved. It also appears ill-founded to talk about a consensus of officers, as Errington does, while so many felt slighted by being excluded from the initial proceedings, and while two of the most important *hetairoi*, Antipater and Craterus, were not even present. Could a meaningful discussion concerning succession proceed without such men even at Babylon? Would an argument of expediency satisfactorily negate the need to consult nobles not present? If the make-up of Errington's "consensus" was fluid and dependent upon the immediate circumstances, how valid was the resulting consensus? Beyond the problems these questions suggest, there is no evidence that the
commanders at Babylon made a claim to be acting according to ancient custom when they were challenged. Instead, they relied upon their collective prestige to dispense with the opposition, unsuccessfully as it turned out.

Rather than describing the process by which kings normally were selected, Curtius details a confused groping by men who had little idea of how to proceed and maintain order. The situation demanded extraordinary activity since the danger facing the Macedonians was so great and so near. With no clear heir to the throne, something had to be done to guarantee that Macedonian unity would be maintained. It is ironic that the effort to maintain unity actually fostered dissent because few could agree upon how to proceed. Regardless, the outcome of the attempt dispels any faith in the "traditional" nature of the proceedings: as far as we know they were unprecedented and unique to the setting at Babylon in the summer of 323 B.C.

Errington also misleads when he argues that it was Meleager who derailed the meeting when he began to rabble-rouse. Discord was present in the meeting from the moment that Nearchus and Ptolemy stood up to challenge Perdiccas' suggestions for the succession, and it was this dissention among the prominent officers which set the stage for the subsequent involvement of the rank and file. In fact, nowhere does Curtius state that Meleager instigated the dissent, only that he used it for his own purposes. Thus, the confusion of the moment was deeply set into the
entire process and was not the result of a demagogue's speech. With no model for action, unanimity broke down in the face of personal considerations.

There is one more point which should be addressed regarding the question of the constitutional significance of the *hetairoi* and it concerns the shock with which they took the rank and file's interference in their debate while it was still in progress. If one accepts Errington, such a reaction would be understood as the result of the army's projecting itself into a process which traditionally was the province of the nobility. Yet, there was another and more immediate concern which would have stimulated the same reaction. The army's interruption of the debate marked a breach of discipline which was especially dangerous now that there was no king. How could the Macedonians survive leaderless, so far from home, if strict discipline was not maintained? Regardless of the unprecedented nature of their discussions, the officers expected to lead and have their men follow orders. That this pattern was upset did not bode well for the future safety of the Macedonian army, and the fear of a total breakdown must have shocked the officers at that moment.

At least as far as the Argead period is concerned, therefore, there appears nothing in our sources which supports Errington's theory concerning a consensus of nobles. His examples show aristocratic interest in the
succession and attempts to construct bridges of a sort which might prove strong enough to stabilize the kingdom until the coming of a qualified Argead, but even though these efforts were to a large degree self-serving they are hardly surprising. With or without constitutional sanction such activities as described above would have been in the interests of a nobility seeking to dispel chaos and to insure their own importance. With no source portraying a more structured role for the *hetairoi*, it is risky to read such authority into the Argead period. Since our sources tend to portray aristocratic participation in successions as *ad hoc*, we should acknowledge that while the *hetairoi* constituted a powerful segment of Macedonian society, their influence never crystalized into a body which could regulate the course of succession. We must also deny Errington's claims that for the Argead period "there is no evidence for any formal continuing body which existed for purposes other than [my emphasis] acknowledging a new king" because there is no evidence that an aristocratic organ functioned in this way either.\(^90\) Since these criticisms amount to but a small part of Errington's overall handling of the constitutional importance of the army assembly, it should be reaffirmed that he has done a great service in shattering the myth that this body ever functioned as its proponents would have us believe. He has, nevertheless, over-reacted to the misjudgements of the past by postulating a significance for the *hetairoi* which is no
better attested in our sources than what he attacks.

iv

If we are going to come to grips with the transition of power in Macedonia under the Argeads it will be necessary to consider all of the known successions outlined in Chapter One. There are problems with such an approach, not the least of which is the suppression of a chronological perspective. This cannot be avoided, however, since our sources are seldom detailed enough to be illustrative on a succession by succession basis. In addition, what makes such a procedure not undesirable as an historical exercise is that we have little evidence that much change occurred in the way Argead kings were chosen. In particular, the joint elevation of Philip III and Alexander IV suggests that no generally accepted procedural framework had developed as late as the end of the dynasty. The confusion and dissension at Babylon, which ultimately resulted in the unique compromise of the dual monarchy, imply that constitutional development within Macedonia had been somewhat retarded, and that the means by which such transactions came to pass remained essentially primitive—influenced more by the shifting nature of the immediate circumstances than by a procedure or theory. As such we must avoid creating a model of a "normal" succession.
There are illuminating trends which become obvious as one looks down the king list, but enough variables existed in the amount of domestic and foreign pressure, so as to make it difficult to speak of any succession in terms of normality. Things simply were seldom regular or peaceful enough in Macedonia for us to establish a principle which functioned in the absence of extenuating circumstances.

Even with these problems, we can say certain things about Macedonian royal succession. If we accept Herodotus for the moment on the king list prior to Alexander I, and use his list in conjunction with the historical record of the dynasty, the predominant form of succession was from father to son. The first nine successions, from Perdiccas I to Orestes, were of this type and even after Aeropopus managed to break the pattern, it soon reemerged. The totals are clear: of the twenty-two transitions of power from Perdiccas I to Alexander IV, thirteen involved direct father to son succession; two the accessions of sons but not immediately upon the death of their royal fathers; five the elevation of royal cousins of varying degrees; and two the uncles of the royal predecessor.91 These figures may be somewhat misleading because they count transitions not universally accepted at the time (that of Argaeus splitting the rule of Amyntas III and providing two "accessions" for the latter), successions debated today (the accession of Perdiccas III's son Amyntas), and another probably not involving royal authority (the rise of Ptolemy between
Alexander II and Perdiccas III). Nevertheless, the overall impression is that the preferred form of succession involved a son's assumption of his father's status.

Succession of this type has been common in many places, and if one accepts that this process is merely the extension of principles which governed the inheritance of private property, it was the predominant system throughout the Greek world as well. But which son would follow a royal father? Our evidence upon this point is vague and at first consideration, contradictory. If we can accept Herodotus' evidence embedded in his foundation myth for the Argead dynasty, we might think that they practiced ultimogeniture (the succession of the youngest son) since Perdiccas, the youngest of three brothers, is there shown establishing the dynasty over his elder brothers Gauanes and Aeropus. Such a method of succession, however, is unlikely. First of all, Herodotus' myth is a piece of folklore which is not unique in its essentials, since he also records a similar story—where the youngest of three brothers secures a throne—in connection with the Scythians. How and Wells point out that the whole incident probably had symbolic overtones which can be reconstructed. They suggest that the names of the three brothers represented the importance of certain domesticated animals crucial to the life-style of the early Macedonians; Gauanes standing for oxen or cattle, Aeropus for horses,
and Perdiccas for goats since he founded Aegae, the name of which connoted an association with goats. Given the problems with this passage (which will be examined more fully in Chapter Four, section two), and given that no source dealing with succession actually refers to ultimogeniture as being an Argead custom --Herodotus does not have Perdiccas actually succeeding to the throne, only establishing it--we can safely disregard it in the context of Argead succession.

On the other hand, primogeniture is also not well attested in our sources, although Justin and Diodorus record one example when they reveal that Alexander II was the oldest son and successor of Amyntas III. It has usually been assumed, probably correctly, that the throne subsequently descended from Alexander II to Perdiccas III to Philip II according to their ages. Such a method of succession would have made better sense in Macedonia than ultimogeniture for the obvious reason that if any son of a former king would have been old enough to inherit his father's kingdom, it would have been the oldest. This is not a small consideration in a land where few kings died of old age. There are enough documented irregularities, however, to cast some doubt upon the strict adherence of primogeniture in matters of Macedonian succession. The accession of Archelaus in 413 provides a good example. As mentioned in Chapter One, Plato reports that this transfer of power occurred only after the murders of Archelaus'
uncle, his cousin, and his seven-year-old brother, whom Plato refers to as the "legitimate" heir of Perdiccas. If Archelaus was Perdiccas' oldest son, or his oldest surviving son, why would he find it necessary to kill a younger brother in a context which looks suspiciously dynastic? Indeed, if primogeniture determined royal succession, why did Plato think the seven-year-old Perdiccas' legitimate heir? Any answers to the uncertainties surrounding Archelaus' accession must be conjectural, but if we consider two other relevant episodes perhaps we can begin to understand the importance of this evidence.

The first of these concerns the relationships which governed the status of Amyntas III's sons. We know that Alexander II, Perdiccas III, and Philip II established their claims to the throne successively, but they did not do so unchallenged. Not only did Ptolemy maintain some claim to authority which saw an expression in his guardianship of Perdiccas III, but also Pausanias openly attempted to seize the throne. Again, the sons of Gygaea (Archelaus, Arrhidaeus, and Menelaus) seem to have become involved in an attempt to control the throne after the death of Perdiccas III--almost ten years after the death of their father, Amyntas III. Although Justin's reference to this rebellion (our only record of the incident) is vague, and although the three half-brothers of
Philip involved go unnamed at this point, it is certain that Archelaus, Arrhidaeus, and Menelaus are meant since they alone had been previously identified by Justin as Philip's half-brothers.101 There has been some debate as to the date of their rebellion, but regardless of the exact moment when Philip found it necessary to neutralize their claims, the fact that their threat did not surface until the 350s--after apparently lying dormant throughout the previous decade--needs an explanation.102 Was the delay a result of the inferiority of their claim, the viability of which was resurrected only because of the desperation in Macedonia following Perdiccas' death? Can it be only a coincidence that the sons of Eurydice seem to have had a superior claim to the throne over the sons of Gygaea?

The third piece of evidence which we must consider involves the insecurity apparent in Alexander III before his father died. There is no need to review at length the complicated relationship between Philip II and Alexander the Great, but it is clear from incidents such as the Pixodarus affair and the wedding of Philip to his last wife that Alexander felt his status as Philip's heir in jeopardy late in Philip's reign.103 In addition to Alexander's fears, at the wedding feast honoring Philip's marriage, Attalus, a relative of the bride, toasted the groom by expressing the hope that the new marriage would produce a "legitimate" heir for the kingdom.104 Scholars have long debated this episode, but for our purposes it is important
only to consider what could have motivated Attalus to speak in this fashion. He, of course, had a vested interest in the marriage and its potential offspring, but would he have publicly questioned Alexander's legitimacy, even under the influence of wine, without some justification? It seems impossible that Philip could continue an association with Attalus, even considering his role in the upcoming Asian campaign, if there had not been something underlying Attalus' crude innuendo.

None of this evidence is conclusive in its own right, but the three incidents together can be interpreted as part of a pattern, albeit one which is currently unfashionable among Macedonian scholars. That is, the eligibility of an heir to the throne might have depended to some degree upon the status of his mother, if his father had more than one wife.\textsuperscript{105} Even though we are dealing with evidence connected with only a small proportion of all Argead successions, there are inferences which can be drawn from the evidence which have important ramifications for our understanding of the political dynamics of the kingdom.

The insecurity of Archelaus is a case in point. He seemingly found it politically expedient to liquidate a much younger brother in order to secure the throne for himself. Obviously, either a weakness in his own claim existed, or else some merit lay in that of the boy. We cannot consider Archelaus in any sense illegitimate since
his status had been verified in his father's Athenian treaty, so his action must have been stimulated by the status of the boy and not by some weakness in his own background. One might hypothesize that the murder was simply a pre-emptive strike to snuff out a potential rival, but if so, we must consider why Archelaus struck immediately upon the death of Perdiccas, when such an action would have attracted a maximum amount of attention, and why Plato would refer to the youth as the legitimate heir of Perdiccas.

It seems that Archelaus' murder of the youth verifies Plato's remark, at least to the extent that the boy could be considered a viable rival to Archelaus' authority. Since both Archelaus and the child were sons of Perdiccas, two possible explanations for the youth's significance come to mind: either his mother was of such a status that he would be considered an eligible heir regardless of Archelaus, or the Macedonians placed some importance upon the timing of his birth.

Taking the latter point first, there are but a few ways to manipulate birth order in terms of succession. We have mentioned two (primogeniture and ultimogeniture) and have seen that our only Macedonian evidence indicates that if either operated in the kingdom, it was primogeniture.\textsuperscript{106} Since Archelaus was the older of the two princes, primogeniture should have favored him and eliminated the need to kill the youth. There is another possibility
beyond these, however, which involves the relative order of Perdiccas' accession and the birth of his sons. Some societies hold succession to royal authority to be limited to those sons born after their fathers were already kings. In this case, we know that the boy was born after Perdiccas was king, but we do not know whether Archelaus was or not. If Archelaus' birth was before Perdiccas' elevation, perhaps such a rationale could have supported the boy's claim. If post-accessional birth did influence the selection of a royal heir, it would imply that the youth would have succeeded Perdiccas had he been old enough to protect himself from Archelaus. That Archelaus could murder a legitimate heir and then rule, of course, signifies that such a system also made allowances for the interests of the kingdom in cases of an heir's minority. We cannot disregard the possibility that such a system existed in Macedonia based upon this episode alone, but when other incidents are considered, as below, it becomes less likely that such was the case.

The other possibility referred to above—that the mother's status influenced that of her offspring—has more promise. It is clear from Plato that Archelaus and his younger brother, really half-brother, had different mothers. The youth's mother was named Cleopatra, and Plato's impression of her relationship with Archelaus clearly was not that of mother to son. Indeed, Archelaus
is portrayed as illegitimate—the offspring of a union between Perdiccas and the slave of Perdiccas' brother Alcetas (Archelaus' uncle, whom he murdered upon his accession). The illegitimate status of Archelaus and the legitimacy of the boy necessarily excludes the possibility that they were full brothers. I do not wish to judge the absolute historicity of Plato's account since that is not necessary for the present discussion. The relationships between the parties involved, however, would have been known to Plato's audience (or could have been discovered by anyone interested) so that regardless of how the affair might have been bent, it must have reflected accurately the basic relationships of those involved.

It is possible that the reference to Archelaus' mother as a slave might mean merely that her association (probably marriage) with Perdiccas was not accepted by Plato as legal, regardless of its acceptability in Macedonia. Whether or not this was the case, Plato clearly thinks Cleopatra to have been of higher status than Archelaus' mother. Although we have every reason to believe that it was the father who ultimately defined the status of his offspring in Macedonia, it is not inconceivable that the mother's origin and status might have had an effect upon the status of her sons. If the relative status of different wives could affect that of their respective children, we can understand from Plato why Archelaus would fear his half-brother, and why he would find it expedient
to remove the boy from the scene as quickly as possible in order to secure the throne. I do not wish to suggest that the relative importance of the royal wives was mirrored absolutely in their children. Instead, I think such associations might have influenced the king when he was selecting an heir, since his wives had connections of their own thus making them important in securing the loyalties of their kin. The more elevated the status of the wife, therefore, the more she could offer a king in terms of support. It would have been foolish for a king to alienate such a group, increasingly so the more powerful it was. Practicality would lead him to most honor his wife with the highest rank (or most potent support) by selecting his heir from her children. Although such a reconstruction is speculative, it is supported by the other two episodes to which I have already alluded in this connection.

It is well known that the three sons of Amyntas III and Eurydice each became king in turn. Why their claims were superior to those of their three half-brothers, the sons of Amyntas and Gygaea, however, is a matter for debate. It would help if we knew the relative ages of Amyntas' sons, but our only aids in this are the statements of Justin and Diodorus to the effect that Alexander was the eldest. If we can trust Justin and Diodorus on this point—and I see no alternative to accepting that Alexander was at least Eurydice's first son—we are dealing with a
form of primogeniture. But since we cannot be certain whether they meant to include Gygaea's children as well, we cannot be sure whether any other factors came to play in Alexander's accession.

Even with this impediment, we can deduce certain things of interest concerning these individuals. Since Eurydice was still a wife of Amyntas when he died, either Gygaea was an earlier wife of Amyntas, or Amyntas was married to both women simultaneously. If the former, then Alexander could not have been the oldest of Amyntas' sons and his accession would not have been a pure example of primogeniture. This would mean that some other factor was important in the selection of Alexander over Gygaea's oldest son. Since Alexander was followed to the throne by his two full brothers, it would seem that the factor in Alexander's favor had less to do with himself personally and more to do with his heritage (i.e., the status of Eurydice) or the timing of his birth (i.e., after Amyntas' accession).

If, on the other hand, Gygaea and Eurydice were both wives of Amyntas at the same time, then it is extremely unlikely that all of Eurydice's sons were born before all of Gygaea's.' This would mean that the succession did not pass through Amyntas' sons strictly on account of their age and again, that the status of the mothers bore some significance upon the eligibility of their offspring. Having mentioned these possibilities, it is important to
note my inclination to accept Justin and Diodorus at their word when they refer to Alexander as Amyntas' oldest son without condition. This would mean that Eurydice and Gygaea were both wives of Amyntas at the same time and that their sons probably overlapped in age. This, in turn would imply that Eurydice's children had an edge in terms of succession. With all other things roughly equal (such as mental competence) the significant difference could only have been the relative status of the two mothers.\textsuperscript{112} Again, our evidence upon these matters is not conclusive, but it is suggestive.

This brings us to the evidence pertaining to Alexander the Great. No source ever hints that any son of Philip II other than Alexander was ever considered as Philip's heir (see the appendix on Arrhidaeus). Whether this was due to the fact that Alexander was Philip's first son, or for some other reason is not revealed. Some might argue that the recognition of Alexander as Philip's heir from birth is what we should expect from our sources, all of which date from long after Alexander had become a god and had acquired a certain mystique. What is not clear is why such a transformation would necessarily strike from the record a mention of another heir of Philip, had one existed.\textsuperscript{113} After all, Philip's career, although somewhat eclipsed by Alexander's, had been brilliant in its own right--yet our sources did his prestige no harm by revealing that he had
not been the first heir of Amyntas III. Regardless, Alexander's position as Philip's heir at latest was secured by 342 when Isocrates addressed him as such, and his status was reinforced in the following years as Philip increasingly provided Alexander the opportunity to gain experience in ways which would be valuable to a future king. Yet, despite all of these public assurances of Philip's intent, Alexander subsequently felt his status threatened.

Our sources portray Alexander's emotional distress as bound to the deteriorating relationship between Olympias and Philip, and they are probably correct that Alexander's emotional attachment to his mother harmed his relationship with his father. Nevertheless, we should not jump to the conclusion that Alexander's insecurities emanated from anything other than self interest. Alexander's relationship with Olympias after Philip's death, although close, was not of such a nature to affect Alexander's political judgement. Alexander, for example, was forced to warn his mother against her continual meddling in politics while he was away from home. Further, the animosity between Olympias and Antipater put much emotional pressure on Alexander to remove Antipater from his European responsibilities, yet Alexander refrained from acting rashly and allowed his mother to flee Macedonia rather than give in to her interference or remove Antipater from his position as strategos. Although Alexander later called
Antipater to Babylon—an order which was invalidated by Alexander's death, but which has led to much speculation about Antipater's intended fate—we will never be certain whether Alexander intended to reprimand his general by this move, and if so, precisely for what. The point is not that Alexander was untouched by Olympias' trials, but that his emotions did not control his political judgement. Alexander ignored his mother's frustration for the most part and at most, in Antipater's case, only decided to act at a convenient moment. An Alexander rational enough to put Olympias into a political perspective should have been able to separate her alienation from Philip from his own—unless the former affected the latter in some way. Why should we assume, therefore, that Alexander was misled by Philip's rejection of Olympias to think his own inheritance in danger, unless there was something personally threatening in Olympias' loss of favor? Since we can reasonably assume that Philip did not mean to disinherit Alexander on the eve of his Persian invasion, it seems apparent that Alexander misunderstood for a time Philip's attitude toward Olympias and Philip's last marriage to the fully Macedonian Cleopatra. Lest we accuse Alexander of over-sensitivity, it seems that others also misunderstood Philip's plans at the time: why else would Attalus go on record as hoping for a new, legitimate heir to Philip's authority?
These three episodes together give us perhaps the best clues we possess for cracking the puzzle of Argead succession, but they must be read in conjunction with other hints strewn throughout the sources. The following reconstruction attempts to collate all of the evidence for Argead succession and present it as support for a unified account of the expectations involved in the process. Throughout, we must suspend notions of a well-defined hierarchy into which each potential heir was placed by a rigid order of precedence. The strength of a claim, rather, seems to have rested upon a number of factors, the sum of which made it a viable alternative depending upon the moment. It is doubtful whether the Macedonians ever attempted to rate the importance of most of these factors under peaceful circumstances, but when breaks did occur, then factions would coalesce, evaluate the situation (most probably by considering their own best interest), and support the candidate whose claims seemed strongest and best able to stabilize the situation. Such a system fit the Macedonians better than others, since the kingdom lacked political structures which would help it to weather times of crisis. Without the buffer of political institutions, the character of the king set the tone for the effectiveness of his reign. As such, the Macedonians needed capable monarchs and they could not afford to place their faith in an overly restrictive process which would prevent the bypass of an incompetent candidate to the
throne when the times called for such action.

The one absolute requirement for Macedonian kingship (until the death of Alexander IV brought the line to an end) was membership in the Argead family. In a sense there was an aura surrounding the whole royal family (see Chapter Four) which distinguished it from all others and provided the continuity necessary for the Macedonians to maintain their collective identity from generation to generation. For a male, being an Argead meant having an Argead father, whose relative proximity to the reigning king significantly influenced his chances or those of a son for royal authority. If a king was competent—that is, if he provided the security basic to the needs of his kingdom and effectively controlled the various factions which comprised it—then he was in a position to select an heir to the throne, and afterwards, through a variety of signs, to indicate clearly who that heir was to be. To reign over the turbulence of domestic politics, however, was not as easy as it might appear, especially since polygamy was often practiced at the royal level (probably to insure the birth of enough sons so that at least one surviving son would be qualified to rule). The sons of different wives provided the ideal opportunity for factionalism within the innermost core of the royal family as the offspring and their supporters competed for the king's favor.

How the king decided which of his sons would become
the royal heir depended upon a number of factors. First in terms of consideration came the status of a son's mother, with a close second and third being the order of birth and the offspring's capacity. Considering the mother's status first, the relative order of the importance of the king's wives probably was often difficult to establish. A wife initially could be judged important for many reasons: her ethnic background, the status of her family, the immediate political situation, or even personal affection. How these variables combined would depend in part upon the king's ability when confronting and mastering the situation in which he found himself. An adept king would indicate the prominence of a wife based upon her usefulness in establishing firm bonds between the king and the most powerful support possible. Since a king's security most frequently would depend upon the domestic situation, domestic allies would most often be the most important to a king struggling to dominate his realm. Hence, Macedonian wives probably had the edge over foreign spouses when it came time to determine relative orders of status. Although it can only remain an hypothesis, this trend over time might have created the expectation that the favored queen should be a Macedonian woman. Our sources do not explicitly indicate a prejudice against foreign queens and their sons when it came time to choose a royal heir, but there is enough latent hostility portrayed to suggest that the Macedonians expected their kings to be fully Macedonian
if at all possible. 

Children, especially sons, complicated the issue of status among royal wives even more. No matter how prestigious the heritage of one might have been, if she did not produce an heir, then her stock would fall by necessity for the good of the kingdom. Or again, if the queen initially given precedence did not give birth to a son until long after another had done so, then the king could have been forced to honor the older boy to guarantee the succession. In these cases, the queens' status could become inverted, and instead of endowing their offspring with rank, their children's importance could cast a shadow upon them. In such a climate, status would remain a fluid thing dependent upon the needs of the dynasty to survive. The king's sons, therefore, were not necessarily ranked by the importance of their mothers.

Our sources do not often detail fully the number of royal wives or sons at court, but unless they are misleading in the main, any problems generated among royal siblings by the choice of an heir seem to have been contained reasonably well while the king was living. As mentioned above, however, considerations beyond the ranking of royal wives might affect the succession. Two are worthy of mention here: personal capacity and age. If a prince had some mental or physical handicap which would impair his effectiveness as a king, practicality would
demand that he lose his standing to a more capable rival. The demands upon a king were so great, and the health of the kingdom so dependent upon the king's ability to handle a variety of problems, that any obstacle to a candidate's efficient leadership would disqualify him from royal authority.

Age could also be an impediment for a prince since Macedonia was seldom secure enough to permit the luxury of minority rule. If there were alternatives to the prospect of a long regency, then suitable arrangements could be made to correct the situation and elevate immediately one suited to rule. This could involve the selection of a brother or a more distant relative depending upon who was available. In such a case, the former king might not have made alternative plans for the throne before his death (not expecting to die until his heir was old enough to fend for himself). In this situation, a new king might find his authority contested, and the potential for civil war existed as others promoted their individual claims and canvassed support. If this happened, then ultimate legitimacy would depend upon the ability of one Argead to command the loyalties of the most powerful elements in the kingdom. At such moments, the aristocracy would have had a strong voice in the succession process, but it would have been an ad hoc voice and it would not have established a right for the aristocracy to intervene in every case.
Herein lies the principle involved in the breakdown of direct father to son succession: the practical need to have a strong leader as king combined with the dangers inherent in not having one. One point to note here is that instability could breed further instability unless some function of status and talent gave backbone to an acknowledged hierarchy. The longer it took to re-establish a father to son inheritance, the more likely it would be that any adult Argead male with ambition would stake his claim, and the more likely it would be that the kingdom would suffer the adverse effects of prolonged civil war.\textsuperscript{131} Such uncertainty worked in the favor of the more distant family relations. If candidates closer to the late king proved unable to secure authority, then others further afield would begin to look more attractive, especially to aristocratic allies who would seek concessions for their support.\textsuperscript{132}

Everything considered, the procedure which determined who would be king remained relatively undeveloped, yet practical as it followed the path of least resistance to a man who had the talent to live up to the demands of the office. Power brokers from among aristocratic factions could play some role in the process, but when and how great such a role might be was determined by the immediate state of the Argead family. Theoretically, if the king could clearly establish an heir, or in lieu of this, if the royal
family could settle the issue among themselves and still provide a viable ruler, then no other group would interfere. Realistically, however, such possibilities often were not realized. In fact, competition from within the royal family ultimately would mean its final destruction as it provoked a civil war when there was no Argead available to command the loyalties of the people so unleashed. 133

Before concluding, it is necessary to comment briefly upon the status of royal daughters. The fact that there never was a woman ruler of Macedonia indicates that males alone were eligible for royal authority. Beyond this, the offspring of royal princesses were also ineligible for the throne. Once again, the fact that no son of an Argead daughter ever ruled until the male line was extinguished is suggestive, but even stronger support can be found in the actions of Cassander after the death of Alexander IV. We will look at this evidence more fully below, but we should at least recognize here that Cassander acted very gingerly when he seized power in Macedonia, even though he was married to Thessalonike, the last surviving daughter of Philip II. Although he used this marriage to associate himself closely with the defunct royal house, he never used the marriage as an open justification for his authority or his eventual elevation. And when Cassander did make the first tentative claims upon the throne, he appealed to the status of his wife only by association and not by an open
claim that she raised him and his offspring to royal rank. The fact that Cassander justified his authority in a different way means that the heritage of Thessalonike was important, but not essential to Cassander's control of Macedonia. The Macedonians apparently quickly realized that once the Argeads were gone, a new family would have to take their place.

The "corporate" nature of the Argead dynasty—corporate in the sense that all of its members were heirs to the royal authority which, although exercised by only one at a time, was the common property of their line—was not unique. Anthropologists have found similar political structures around the globe (including Europe), each with individual characteristics, but all making allowances within their scheme of succession for both the claims of a king's closest relatives and the needs of the dynasty for effective rule. Despite the achievements of Philip II and Alexander the Great, in the level of its political development, Macedonia was no more advanced than many traditional tribal societies in Africa. The reasons for this undoubtedly were Macedonia's geographical location and the wealth of its countryside which together attracted invasion. Regardless, the primitive nature of its political institutions was a fact throughout the Argead period. We must now turn our attention to the reasons why the Argeads came to be distinguished from other families in
their area, and how they maintained their unparalleled rank for over three hundred years.
NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1 The bibliography on the Athenian constitution and its development is large. For a convenient one volume history of the growth of Athenian institutions until the fourth century (although it is controversial at times) see, C. Hignett, A History of the Athenian Constitution (London, 1952).


6 P. Briant especially argues that a civilian assembly of the Macedonian people was sovereign, not the army assembly ([*Antigone le Borgne* (Paris, 1973) 237-350], but see Errington's decisive case against the civil assembly ("The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy", 91-99).

7 Hammond, *Mac* II, 158; "Once he [the king] was chosen, he governed by consent, but if he lost that consent he was deposed by the body which had created him king." (See note 9 below.)

8 *FHG* 3.691, Porphyry fr. 1.

9 Hammond, *Mac* II, 175: "Amyntas was expelled by the Macedonians...in other words, he was formally deposed by
the Macedonians...[in the] Assembly and Argaeus no doubt was elected king in his place."

10 I find it difficult to believe that many would have been interested in constitutional niceties while the Illyrians threatened every household in the kingdom, especially since the original language used, "Ὅπο Μακεδόνων ἐξεβλήθη", means primarily to reject or expell and only secondarily to remove from office. Under circumstances of dire necessity, it is not difficult to understand how, constitution or no, the Macedonians would have shifted their allegiance—especially if it were broadcast that widespread support for Argaeus could avert the worst of the destruction.

11 Our sources imply that Argaeus entered Macedonia only because of Illyrian arms, but we cannot overlook the probability that he had a claim to the throne. Amyntas had no lock upon the throne, that is certain—his recent elevation had come after a period of unrest, and it seems that his chief qualification for the job rested in the fact that he was an Argead (a characteristic shared by Argaeus). Many Macedonians could have made their initial choice between backing a seemingly broken Amyntas or his powerfully supported rival based upon their immediate situation without worrying whether the were acting
constitutionally or not. Why Argaeus in turn lost his popularity can only be hypothesized, but ineptitude coupled with his association with a destructive enemy probably set his fate.

12 That is, Pausanias: Diod. 14.89.2.

13 Just. 7.5.9-10. Here Justin is at odds with the evidence of Diodorus (16.1.3, 16.2.1), where Diodorus recognizes Philip as the immediate royal successor to Perdiccas. Justin has been generally accepted, however, in part because there exists an inscription of unknown date which refers to Amyntas as king (IG 7.3055). I do not wish to become embroiled in the significance of this inscription and its implications for the Macedonian king list, but only to mark its affect upon the evidence of Justin. Griffith *Mac* II, 702-704 prefers to reject Justin at this point and count Philip as king from the death of Perdiccas.

15 As Griffith has noted (*Mac* II, 703) it seems odd that Demosthenes would have missed the opportunity to attack Philip's legitimacy by referring to the displaced Amyntas, if indeed, he could have done so with credibility. This would imply that the Philip's accession was accepted long before Demosthenes was challenging Philip at every turn. It seems safest to agree with Griffith that Philip was king at latest by 356 when the town of Crenides was refounded as Philippae.

16 Just. 7.5.4-8.

17 This is, of course, an entirely subjective approach to our sources. Neither Justin nor Diodorus is detailed enough to put exclusive faith in the completeness of his testimony concerning Amyntas' status in 359.

18 Notable exceptions to such thinking included Ellis and Griffith in their works cited in note 14. On this see also Errington, "The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy," 96-97.

19 Just. 11.1.7-10; Diod. 17.2.1-2.


22 Just. 11.1.7-8: "Quis rebus veluti medela quaedam interventus Alexandri fuit, qui pro contione its vulgus omne consolatus hortatusque pro tempore est, ut et metum timentibus demeret et im spem omnes inpelleret." Diod. 17.2.2: "νέος γὰρ ἄν παντελῶς καὶ διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ύπὸ τίνων κατέφρονομενός πρῶτον μὲν τῇ πλήθῃ οἰκείοις λόγοις παρεστήκατο πρὸς εὖ νοιαν."

23 Just. 11.1.7; Errington, "The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy," 95-96. Whether or not Justin used the term contio in a technical way is a matter for debate. If he was being legally precise, then he was referring to an informal assembly organized by one empowered to do so in order to communicate information to those present. In a Roman context, the assembly would have had a military undertone, see W. Liebenam, "Contio," RE 4.1, cols. 1149-1153. Since Justin probably dates well into the imperial period (see Appendix Two) long after such assemblies had lost their significance, however, he might have had little understanding of their legal roles. Already in the first century A.D. the term contio seems to have been used loosely in connection with Macedonian
affairs. Curtius (9.2.12) uses the term in connection with the Hyphasis incident where Diodorus (17.94.5) uses "εξκλεκτή" and Arrian (Anab. 5.25.2) employs "ξύλοχοιοι". Curtius also uses contio in connection with the mutiny at Opis (10.2.18). Since the ambiguity is real, with none of the sources well placed enough either in time or rank to speak authoritatively on such matters, the difficulties inherent in determining exactly what each author thought he was writing are enormous. This problem is all the more irksome since Curtius (10.7.11) uses a word which might be translated as "a mob" when describing a situation similar to those in which he has used contio: "Nullum profundum mare, nullum vastum fretum et procellosum tantos ciet fluctus, quantos multitudo motus habet, utique si nova et brevi duratura libertate luxuriat."

24 There are echoes here of a "Homeric" society, see M.I. Finley, The World of Odysseus, revised ed. (New York, 1977) 80-83. I do not wish to overdo the parallels between fourth century Macedonia and Homeric Greece since there are obvious differences (e.g., the relation of the many "kings" in Homeric society to one overlord--see R.H. Drews, Basileus (New Haven, 1983) 98-131), but there are similarities. For a more complete consideration of the parallels, see Chapters Three and Four.
25 See note 23 above and Liebenam's article cited therein for the aura surrounding the contio. To be an influential group in Macedonia almost always meant to be militarily organized—as I will argue in Chapter Three.

26 Plut., Alex. 34.1.

27 On the use of this evidence by Granier (Die makedonische Heeresversammlung, 29) and the argument against it see, Lock, "The Macedonian Army Assembly in the Time of Alexander the Great," 100-101.

28 Curt. 10.5.1-10.10.20.

29 Arr., succ. Alex. 1.1-8; Diod. 18.1.1-18.4.8; Just. 13.1.1-13.4.25; Plut., Alex. 77.6-8, Eum. 3.1-2; App., Syr. 52.

30 In this I disagree with Errington ("From Babylon to Triparedeisos, 323-320 B.C.,” JHS 90 (1970) 49-77, esp. 72-75), who thinks the source for this section is Hieronymus. Since we do not know when Clitarchus ended his biography of Alexander, there is no need to assume that Curtius had to seek another source for his concluding chapters. Indeed, there is some evidence which suggests that Clitarchus concluded his history with the burial of Alexander, not his death. J. Hornblower, Hieronymus of Cardia (London, 1981)
92ff., argues that Diodorus did not pick up with Hieronymus until 18.5, which means that the first four chapters of book 18 come from another source. Based upon comparisons with Diodorus Book 17, Hornblower suggests that this material is from the same source that was used predominantly in the previous book—that is, Clitarchus. This is interesting, since 18.4 includes material which is roughly equivalent with material included in the very last chapters of Curtius. The implication is that both Curtius and Diodorus used Clitarchus in their accounts through the burial of Alexander. Although it is only conjecture, the burial of Alexander in Egypt might well have appealed to an Alexandrian as a fitting end to his work. It is possible, therefore, that Clitarchus carried his account beyond the death of Alexander to his burial, which in turn allowed Clitarchus to use the growing disunity of the Macedonians as a fitting postscript to the achievement of Alexander. One further problem results from attempting to argue that Hieronymus lies behind the last chapters of Curtius, and that is the characterization of Arrhidaeus. Arrian, and those sections of Diodorus based upon Hieronymus, portrays Arrhidaeus as a faceless pawn, often not even referring to him by name, instead using the phrase, "the kings." It seems as if Hieronymus had little interest in Arrhidaeus or what he stood for. Curtius, however, spends some time personalizing the king. It is quite possible that this
characterization is not merely the product of Curtius' rhetoric, but at least in part the result of Clitarchus' account. The possibility that this material depends upon Clitarchus than upon Hieronymus, does not mean that we should discard its importance—especially if E. Badian ("The Date of Clitarchus," *PACA* 8 (1965) 5-11) is correct when he conjectures that Clitarchus came to Alexander at Babylon. If true, Clitarchus might be most valuable (as an eye-witness) for his final chapters, which of course, is where the material pertinent to this discussion is found.

31 This is the predominant opinion of modern scholarship, although some [e.g. P.A. Stadter, *Arrian of Nicomedia* (Chapel Hill, 1980) 148ff.] would add other influences (e.g. Ptolemy) upon slim evidence.

32 The Macedonian date of Alexander's death was 28 Daeus. Plut. *Alex.* 76; Arr., *Anab.* 7.25.

33 One story had it that Alexander had been poisoned by the family of Antipater (Arr. *Anab.* 7.27.1-3; Curt. 10.10.14-17; Diod. 17.117.5-118.2; Plut. *Alex.* 77.1-5; Just. 12.13.10). Of the ancient sources for Alexander, only Justin accepted this manner of death as the true one. Arrian plays down the notion that Alexander was poisoned, but explains along with the others that in one version Antipater was thought to have given Cassander the potion,
which he carried to his brother Iollas (a royal cup-bearer) in a mule's hoof (the only vessel strong enough to contain its contents!). Whatever the real reason of Alexander's death, Antipater did not lose credit in the eyes of the Macedonians after 323, and thus they did not think Antipater's family in any way involved in Alexander's demise. It seems certain that this story came from propaganda aimed at Antipater and Cassander, probably invented by the faction of Olympias (see Chapter Five for a closer consideration).

34 Arr., succ. Alex. 1.1; Curt. 10.6.9; Plut. Alex. 77.6.

35 Curt. 10.6.11; Just. 13.2.7; Plut. Eum. 1.3; Paus. 9.7.2. Berve, Das Alexanderreich II, numbers 206 and 353. See also, W.W.Tarn, "Heracles, son of Barsine," JHS 41 (1921) 18-28, and Alexander the Great II (London, 1948) 330-337; and Errington, "From Babylon to Triparadeisos," 74.

36 Diod. 17.16.2.

37 Arr., Anab. 7.26.3. It is clear that neither Ptolemy nor Aristobulus recorded this episode. Other references include: Diod. 18.1.4, "τῷ ἄριστῳ"; Curt. 10.5.5, "ei qui esset optimus"; Just. 12.15.9, "dignissimum".
38 Diod. 17.117.3; Curt. 10.5.4; Just. 12.15. On Perdiccas see, F. Geyer, "Perdikkas (4)," RE 19.1, cols. 604-614 and Berve, Das Alexanderreich II, #627.

39 Curt. (10.6.2) shows that Arrhidaeus was at Babylon before Alexander's death. We do not know where he might have been when Alexander was dying, but since Alexander's fatal illness lasted the better part of two weeks and since we know of no official duty performed by Arrhidaeus, he should have had no trouble in reaching his brother. We do know that Arrhidaeus was quickly produced once the army began to consider his rights (Curt. 10.7.3-7) which indicates that he was near at hand throughout the entire period.

40 I think it likely that given Arrhidaeus' role in the following events (and since he was a perfect foil for Alexander), if he were present at the death of Alexander he would have been mentioned. Of course, this can only be a guess, but it seems reinforced by the fact that Arrhidaeus was forgotten for a brief time while the options of succession were being discussed--this would have been difficult if Arrhidaeus had been prominent in the ceremonies of Alexander's last days. For Greek burial traditions see, W.K. Lacey, The Family in Classical Greece (Ithaca, 1968) esp. 47-48, and D.C. Kurtz and J. Boardman,
Greek Burial Customs (Ithaca, 1971) esp. 142-161.

41 Curt. 10.5.11 ff.; Just. 13.1.

42 Curt. 10.5.15-16.

43 These Bodyguards ("custodes") were the honorary attendants of the king and were all men of great status, not palace guards who would not have had the authority to call together such a meeting. This was a select group whose Greek name was "κυράτοφιλάκες". For another reference in Curtius see 6.11.8. On the Bodyguards as an institution see Hammond, Mac II 403,409. As to who was included in Curtius' "principer amicorum ducesque" (10.6.1) we can only guess—see, however, Arr. succ. Alex. 1.2 and Just. 13.2 for help.

44 Curt. 10.6.2: "Multi duces, frequentia militum exclusi, regiam intrare non poterant, cum praeco exceptis qui nominatim citarentur adire prohiberet."

45 Ibid: "Sed precarium spernebatur imperium". This does not explicitly mention the lack of an established authority behind this meeting, but if such a power existed, it is curious that it did not manifest itself and demand obedience to legitimate authority.
46 Curt. 10.6.1-9; Just. 13.2.5; Arr., succ. Alex. 1.1.

47 Curt. 10.6.10-12; Just. 13.2.6-8 (although Justin here confuses Nearchus with Meleager). On Nearchus see, W. Capelle, "Nearchos (3)," RE 16.2, cols. 2132-2154 and Berve, Das Alexanderreich II, #544.

48 Curt. 10.6.12-15; Just. 13.2.11-12. Nearchus had married Barsine after Alexander had known her (Arr., Anab. 7.4.6; Berve, Das Alexanderreich II, #206) and thus Heracles' candidacy would have served his interests very well. Whether this self-interest had an influence upon the discussion we cannot say--certainly, none of our sources mention it in connection with the incident.

49 Ibid. It is possible that Ptolemy did not really care about such a council, but that he used the suggestion to challenge Perdicas--reasoning that Perdicas' control of the situation should be replaced with a collective "regency" (out of rivalry? jealousy? fear?). If this was the case then this suggestion should be understood as a means by which the waters of loyalty could be tested while at the same time implying that Perdicas should not be allowed to railroad the assembly into thinking his solution the only possible alternative. On Ptolemy see, H. Volklmann, "Ptolemaios (18)," RE 23.2, cols. 1603-1645 and
Berve, *Das Alexanderreich II*, 668.

50 Curt. 10.6.16-18; Just. 13.2.13. On Aristonus see J. Kaerst, "Aristonous (8)," *RE* 2.1, col. 967-968 and Berve *Das Alexanderreich II*, #133.

51 Curt. 10.6.19.

52 Curt. 10.6.20-21. See also Diod. 18.2.3-4. On Meleager see, F. Geyer, "Meleagros (2)," *RE* 15.1, cols. 478-479 and Berve, *Das Alexanderreich II*, # 494.

53 Curt. 10.7.1-4; Diod. 18.2.4; Just. 13.3.1-6. Although we do not know who first proposed Arrhidaeaeus, he appears to have been of lowly status. The reasoning for supporting Arrhidaeaeus was simple, and amply summarized by Curtius, "Si Alexandro similem quaeritis, numquam reperietis: si proximum, his solus est."

54 Curt. 10.7.4-7; Diod. 18.2.4; Just. 13.2.8, 13.3.1; *Arr. succ. Alex.* 1.1. Coronation names were not common in Macedonia, so that the choice of Philip here might imply a recognition of Arrhidaeaeus' deficiencies (and an attempt to recitify the problem by evoking the name of Arrhidaeaeus' beloved father?) See, E. Badian, "Eurydice," *Philip II. Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage*, 99-110.
In any event, this name change indicates what image Arrhidaeus conjured in the minds of the rank and file.

55 Curt. 10.7.8-9; Just. 13.3.3-7.

56 Curt. 10.7.10.

57 Curt. 10.7.11: "Nullum profundum mare, nullum vastum fretum et procellosum tantos ciet fluctus, quantos multitudo motus habet, utique si nova et brevi duratura."

58 Curt. 10.7.13-15.

59 Curt. 10.7.16-21; Just. 13.3.5.

60 Curt. 10.8.1-4; Just. 13.3.7, where Attalus is confused with Meleager.

61 Curt. 10.8.5-6; Just. 13.4.1.

62 Curt. 10.8.7-23. The indefinite "duces" tells us little of the actual powers proposed. Later, Curtius (10.10.5) describes Perdiccas' authority: "Perdicca ut cum rege esset copiisque praeesset quae regem sequabantur." Exactly what this meant in terms relative to the other officers is open to debate, but it seems clear that he was not exactly a "regent" or a "guardian" of the king. Other
sources refer to the power of Perdiccas in various ways. Arrian (succ. Alex. 1.3) refers to him as "χιλιαρχεῖν χιλιαρχίας ἅπαν ἡμελεῖτον" and to Meleager as "ὑπαρχον περδίκκον." Diodorus (18.2.4) refers to Perdiccas as "ἐπιμελητὴν ἤτο τῆς βασιλείας," and (18.3.1) mentions that he assumed the supreme command, "παρακαμήν τῆν τῶν δικών ἡγεμονίαν." It is clear from the arrangements and from the opposition among the officers that Perdiccas stimulated later, that no one imagined his authority to be above that of the kings. He thus became a "second in command" with the understanding that his was not an absolute authority even though the kings were not in a position to exercise their superior power. Perhaps the most baffling (then and now) position was held by Craterus, whose title, "προστάτης" was unprecedented and left vague (Arr. succ. Alex. 1.3). Justin's titles (13.4.5) confuse more than help, as do those found in Dexippus (100.8.4).

63 Arr. succ. Alex. 1.1; Just. 13.4.3. The agreement recognizing a dual kingship is more likely placed before the reconciliation of the army as reported by Arrian and Justin, than afterward as in Curtius (10.10.1) because it is difficult to see how the officers otherwise would have been mollified enough for a compromise.

64 We must not be overinfluenced by what our sources hint
about the ambitions of these commanders at this time. Rivals might have accused Perdiccas of unfettered ambition (Curt. 10.6.21-23, 10.8.1) but their actions show no hint of revolutionary activity. Regardless of what lay hidden in their hearts, perhaps it is more important to realize that the commanders had to display their loyalty for the royal family in order to guarantee the support of the troops.

65 Curt. 10.8.22, 10.9.7-21; Just. 13.4.7-8. See also Livy 40.6.1-5. Perdiccas' revenge took the form of the Macedonian elephant corps trampling all of those who led the support for Philip III except Meleager, who died later out of sight of the army.

66 Curt. 10.10.1-4; Diod. 18.3.1-5; Just. 13.4.9-25; Arr. succ. Alex. 1.2-8.

67 Most recently by Hammond, Mac II, 153.

68 Curt. 10.6.8.


70 Even if Aristonus' suggestion that Perdiccas should rule as a king was made as reported (Curt. 10.6.16) it is
unclear that the support thereafter registered for Perdiccas was for his assuming the throne. We are told (10.6.18) that Perdiccas was asked to take up Alexander's ring, which he had just surrendered to the Macedonians, but if we cannot argue that this ring was meant to indicate the succession earlier, we cannot do so here. It is clear that Perdiccas was the dominant figure at this meeting, but the support that he held could have been for his original suggestion that Roxane's child should be awaited. Regardless, the hearty support for Arrhidaeus, once he was "rediscovered", portrays the depth of emotion which the Macedonians felt for their royal family.

Ptolemy in particular presents an interesting problem when it comes to understanding the loyalties of the officers involved. He clearly opposed Perdiccas, yet he is seen with Perdiccas once Arrhidaeus had the support of the phalanx. It appears that the officers were not so concerned with who would be king from the royal family as they were with who would gain the most by an implemented solution.

71 Curt. 10.7.2.

72 See note 37 above.

73 The world changed quickly after the death of
Alexander, and with each new twist the old loyalties died a little. At least as late as 315, Antigonus in Asia found it expedient to publicize his loyalty to the royal family (Diod. 19.61.1-4). If this posture was necessary at this date, would not it have been even more important immediately after the death of Alexander? Whatever one might think of Perdiccas, to maintain his command he would have to proclaim his loyalty to the Argeads. Since the Macedonians still believed in the unity of their dominion, we should not hurry to condemn individuals of aspiring to overturn their ancestral kingdom's traditions.

Factional rivalries permeated the reign of Alexander and earlier kings. Such competition did not imply disloyalty to the king, but rather was an important way to advance a career in relation to the other hetairoi. Thus, at Babylon, such activity should be seen as "business as usual".


75 Ibid. 100.


77 Errington, "The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy," 100.
On Alexander's accession: Arr. *Anab.* 1.25.2; Diod. 17.80.2; Just. 11.2.2; Curt. 7.1.6. For Antipater's reported importance in the proceedings we must rely upon Ps. Callis. 1.26—a difficult source at best. All in all, the importance of the aristocracy to Alexander's accession is not manifest in our sources.

Alexander's liquidation of "conspirators" (Arr. *Anab.* 1.25.1; Diod. 17.2.1; Just. 11.2.1) after the death Pausanias, the actual murderer of Philip II, had already occurred indicates that there might have been widespread unrest in the kingdom immediately after Philip's demise. The exact nature of this trouble is not revealed—whether there was a conspiracy or whether Alexander merely used the murder as an excuse to rid himself of undesirables is unknown. Whatever the reason for the problems, it was an uneasy period which provided the opportunity for gain to those who would seize the opportunity and back Alexander without reservation. See, A.B. Bosworth, "Philip II and Upper Macedonia," *CQ* 21 (1971) 93-105, esp. 93-95 for a convenient discussion.

83 Ibid. 101.

84 Curt. 10.6.1-2.

85 Any political solution ultimately would need the consent of both absent *hetairoi*, even if Cassander (who was present) spoke for his father, Antipater. Perdiccas probably sought an agreement in his favor at Babylon in order to put pressure upon his powerful rivals and force them to recognize his position. Such a move, however, would not have to be anchored in a traditional right in order to be effective.

86 Errington, "The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy," 100.

87 Curt. 10.6.10 ff.

88 Curt. 10.7.4-7.

89 My differences with Errington may appear slight, since I accept his argument that the aristocracy was important to the process of succession, at least on an *ad hoc* basis. If
that were all that he meant, this lengthy discussion would not have been necessary. Errington, however, goes beyond the evidence when he suggests that this importance was given a definite form, and when he does so, he threatens to postulate a structure to the Macedonian state which was not there.

90 Errington, "The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy," 100, note 82.

91 Sons who directly succeeded their fathers: Argaeus, Philip I, Aeropus, Alcetas, Amyntas I, Alexander I, Perdiccas II, Archelaus, Orestes, Alexander II, Amyntas IV (?), Alexander III, and Alexander IV. Sons who did become kings, but not directly after their fathers: Pausanias, Perdiccas III. Cousins elevated: Amyntas II, Amyntas III (1st), Argaeus II, Amyntas III (2nd), and Ptolemy (?). Uncles: Aeropus II, Philip II.

92 See Chapter One pp. 28-44 for more detail.

93 Lacey, The Family in Classical Greece provides a detailed background. A brief introduction is provided by A. Berger and B. Nichols in the Oxford Classical Dictionary 2nd ed. (London, 1972) under the heading "Inheritance", 546. For the anthropological perspective see: J. Goody
(ed.) Succession to High Office, esp. 1-56; and R. Burling, The Passage of Power.

94 Herodotus 8.137.1 ff.

95 Herodotus 4.5.


97 Just. 7.4.8; Diod. 15.60.3.

98 During the historical period only Alexander I, Perdiccas II, and Amyntas III died at advanced ages—and at that it appears that Alexander I died violently (see Chapter One).


100 Diod. 15.71.1, 15.77.5; Plut. Pelop. 27.3; Aeschin. 2.27-29.

101 Just. 7.4.5, 8.3.10.

102 For an introduction to the discussion see, J.R. Ellis, "The step-brothers of Philip II," Historia 22 (1973) 350-354; and Griffith, Mac II, 699-701.
103 Pixodarus: Plut. *Alex.* 10.1-5; Philip's marriage to Cleopatra: Plut. *Alex.* 9.4-14; Diod. 10.93.9; Just. 9.7. See also Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* II, #434 (Cleopatra); and M.B. Hatzopoulos, "A Reconstruction of the Pixodarus Affair," *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times*, 59-66 (where the incident is questioned). Even if the specifics are confused and in some cases wrong, Alexander's alienation from his father for a time is certain. It is possible that the gossip which circulated for some time and which hinted that Zeus was Alexander's true father (e.g., Plut. *Alex.* 2.6 and 3.4) was in fact intended to cover a potential scandal involving Alexander's birth. Unfortunately, this is not otherwise supported in the sources and neither Philip II nor Alexander seem much bothered by these references to divine paternity.

104 Plut. *Alex.* 9.7.

105 Although Persian parallels are probably of little significance to Macedonia, before the reign of Xerxes, children by all of the king's wives were legitimate, but if Darius the Great represented what was usual, his wife Atossa (the daughter of Cyrus the Great and the mother of Xerxes) held a special status as did her son. After

106 See the discussion above and note 97 for the sources referring to Alexander's accession.

107 Goody, *Succession to High Office*, 33, where African examples are produced. I mention this possibility not because it is firmly attested in the ancient Balkans, but because it is a possibility. M.B. Hatzopoulos, "Succession and Regency in Classical Macedonia," forthcoming *Arc Mak* 4, argues that Macedonian succession was determined by the birth of a son after the accession of his father to the throne. When the entire Argead king-list is considered, however, the evidence for such a system is not overwhelming.

108 Every piece of evidence concerning the succession in Macedonia suggests a patrilineal system, but in a state which had so little permanent structure, the king's ability to marshall support would depend upon his skills as a "persuader". One way to establish firm support would have
been to promise that the blood of certain powerful aristocrats would flow in future kings.

109 Just. 7.4.8; Diod. 15.60.3.

110 We know that Eurydice was in favor when Amyntas III died because of her influence throughout the 360s, when she played an important role in securing the throne for her sons. See Chapter One pp. 37-40 with the attendant notes for the reigns of Alexander II and Perdiccas III.

111 I am assuming a truly polygamous situation at Amyntas' court in which neither wife suffered the disgrace of being denied the king's bed. I think such a possibility of disgrace unlikely because it would have soured relations with the wife involved and probably would have influenced her children (in the manner of Alexander). Since we have no indication that Gygaea's sons suffered any loss of status (they did, later, generate some support for their royal claims) it seems best to believe that both Eurydice and Gygaea shared their husband's affections. Biological factors accordingly would not favor the birth of three sons by one wife, and then three by the other. Again, when conclusiveness is impossible, probability must reign.

112 There is no evidence that any son (or sons) suffered
any handicaps which might impede access to the throne. A condition in which Eurydice's sons were all more talented than Gygaea's is unlikely.

113 Since Alexander was born in 356, an older brother must have been born between 359 and 356. This is possible, but a son other than Arrhidaeus from this period is unlikely, and in a polygamous situation, we cannot judge the relative order of birth by the order of marriage. See the appendix upon Arrhidaeus for a more detailed consideration and P. Green, "The Royal Tombs of Vergina: A Historical Analysis," *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage*, eds. W.L. Adams and E.N. Borza (Washington, 1982) 129-151.

114 Isoc. *Epist* 5. Among Alexander's experiences suggesting the Philip was grooming him for the throne were, his regency in Pella while Philip campaigned against Byzantium and Perinthus (340), Alexander's involvement in Philip's Scythian campaign (339), the battle of Chaeronea and Alexander's trip to Athens as Philip's envoy (338).

115 Esp. Plut. *Alex.* 9.11, where Alexander is recorded as having established Olympias in Epirus (away from Philip) while he fled to Illyria.

116 See Berve, *Das Alexanderreich II*, # 581 (Olympias) and
G.H. Macurdy, *Hellenistic Queens* (Baltimore, 1932) 31-36 for convenient summaries of these events and the ancient sources.

117 On Antipater see, J. Kaerst, "Antipatros(12)," *RE* 1.2, cols. 2501-2508 and Berve, *Das Alexanderreich II*, #94.

118 Philip was nothing if not a realist. Alexander's age, his experience, and the possibility of Philip's death in Asia would have made the disinheritance of Alexander on the eve of the Persian expedition sheer madness, and a threat to all Philip had done throughout his reign.

119 See Chapter One and Chapter Two, note 91 for a summary of the relationships between a king and his successor.

120 Arr. *Anab.* 7.26.3; Curt. 10.5.5; Diod. 18.1.4; Just. 12.15.9 all describe one incident when the Macedonians asked Alexander to whom he would leave his kingdom. The obvious conclusion is that it was Alexander's right and duty to choose a successor to prevent civil war.

121 Alexander's failure to provide for the succession perhaps implies that such decisions were occasionally postponed (although such a decision might cause legitimate worry—Diod. 17.16.2). Until a decision was made and
broadcast, we can be sure that all possible candidates did what they could to attract attention and to discredit rivals.

122 It would seem obvious that a king would use the declaration of an heir to secure the most potent support possible for his decision. By recognizing the candidate with the most confirmed backing, a king in addition would secure his own control over the kingdom's internal factions.

123 I do not wish to make light of the importance of foreign powers and their influence upon a king (given Philip II's experiences in the early 350s this would be foolish), rather, I wish to point out that kings with primarily foreign support would find it difficult to rule, as was the case with Argaeus in the 390s.

124 The origins of the mothers of most Macedonian kings are unknown. At one time scholars downplayed the existence of prejudice against foreign queens, using the example of Eurydice, the wife of Amyntas III, to show that foreign (in this case, Illyrian) queens could produce royal offspring (Ellis, *Philip II*, 42 (with note 98) and 215 (with note 23); and Badian, "Eurydice," 103-104). Recently, however, inscriptional evidence tends to favor a Macedonian origin for Eurydice (A.N. Oikonomides, "A New Inscription from
Vergina and Eurydice the Mother of Philip II," *AW* 7, (1983) 62-64). Attalus' slanderous reference to Alexander, therefore, might have rested upon the Epirote origin of Olympias. Further evidence of a prejudice is found in Curtius (10.6.13-14) where Ptolemy is shown objecting to the candidacy of Heracles and Roxane's unborn child because of the foreign origins of the women involved. Since Alexander IV did become king, his mother's Iranian ancestry did not pose an insurmountable obstacle. This accession, however, was extraordinary, and the Macedonians did go out of their way to guarantee that Roxane would not be in charge of the boy's education (Diod. 18.49.4)—perhaps as a necessary condition to make the best of a bad situation.

125 Consider the accession of Archelaus and the murder of his younger brother.

126 Such a situation would give credence to Goody's quote (*Successions to High Office*, 25) that "clear and simple rules indicating a single prince as the true heir are in fact rare throughout the world."

127 Major dynastic convolutions occurred when a king died suddenly or without issue (Chapter One), thus suggesting that open rebellion was most likely when no heir had been named.
128 Arrhidaeus is the best example we have concerning a prince incapable of living up to the demands of the royal office; see Appendix One.

129 Minority rule is inherently destabilizing, either promoting factionalism within the royal family, or placing the kingship into the control of a non-royal family whose status would most often not go uncontested.

130 Macedonian examples of this principle include the elevations of Archelaus, Aeropus, Philip II and (although other factors complicated the issue) Cassander.

131 Such as the civil disturbances which broke out in the 390s and to a lesser extent in the 360s.

132 We have no evidence that the aristocracy ever sought institutional changes, however—merely personal ones which could elevate the status of one family in relation to the rest of their class.

133 For a more detailed study of the end of the Argead dynasty, see Chapter Five, sections 3-6.

134 Cassander married Thessalonike in 316 (Diod. 19.52.1), murdered Alexander IV at latest in 310 (Diod. 19.105.2),
but did not assume the title of king until after 306 (see, M. Fontina, *Cassandro: Re di Macedonia* (Palermo, 1965) 95 (with note 60), and W.L. Adams, *Cassander: The Policy of Coalition* (University of Va. Diss., 1975) 161-163; and "The Dynamics of Internal Macedonian Politics in the Time of Cassander," *Arc Mak* 3 (1983) 24f. for a discussion of the evidence and further bibliography). Thus, Thessalonike alone did not give Cassander the throne.

CHAPTER THREE
THE ARGEADS, ROYAL STATUS AND MACEDONIAN SOCIETY

Monarchy was the established form of government in the northern Balkans of antiquity. For example, until well into the second century B.C.—long after the dislocation stimulated by the end of the Argead dynasty—the Macedonians preferred the rule of kings to any alternative, including the republican system imposed by the Romans after their conquest of Macedonia in 168. This preference for monarchy was finally suppressed only when Rome forced a provincial system upon the land in the wake of the rebellion which resulted in the Fourth Macedonian War. The reasons for the longevity of monarchies in the north after most Greek states to the south had evolved beyond them are not within the scope of this discussion. Generally speaking, however, northern communities—dominated by different geographical factors and by more pressing threats to their collective securities—retained the need to concentrate authority so that what strength they possessed would not be squandered by the rivalries of powerful factions. If the Macedonians were to survive the pressing dangers of their region, a concentration of administration and political power was essential. What ultimately resulted was the greatest state of the Greek world to that time. This chapter and the next will trace the development of Argead kingship through its significant
states: here, the secular duties of the monarchy will be
outlined; in Chapter Four the religious responsibilities of
the king and the use of religion to justify the rule of the
Argead family will be reviewed.

The original Pierian realm of the Argeads had certain
unique geographical advantages. Not only did Pieria abound
in important natural resources, it also straddled two
important routes of communication and trade which had the
potential to elevate the importance of those who controlled
them above other powers in the region. The first of these
passages to be controlled by the Argeads was the east-west
route through the Macedonian plain which gave the upper
Macedonian cantons access to the Aegean. The Argead
conquest of the Macedonian plain accomplished by the end of
the sixth century not only brought mastery over valuable
agricultural land, it also effectively denied those in the
Macedonian highlands and beyond access to the better
developed east unless pains were taken to maintain good
relations with the Argeads, or to overpower them. The
Argead control of the Macedonian plain proved to be even
more valuable once the Aegean was organized and united in
the late sixth and fifth centuries.

The second route of importance which skirted the
Argead homeland was the north-south road along the western
shore of the Thermaic Gulf. Although the Argeads found this passage somewhat more difficult to control until the fourth century, the existence of the Argead kingdom on the flank of this route undoubtedly influenced the Persian decision (see below) to operate in the northern Balkans chiefly through their Argead clients. Thus, the geographical location of Pieria was a valuable asset to the Argeads. The blessings inherent in the location of the Argead homeland, however, were mixed—at least to the extent that they attracted the interest of other powers ambitious to control the region. For much of its history, the Argead dynasty found it difficult to free itself from foreign interference, which in turn made it hard to exploit the strength of its geographical setting. Ironically, although foreign pressure for a long time checked the growth of Argead strength, it ultimately had much to do with establishing the Argead family as the most important of several powers in the northern Aegean. Yet before tracing the development of the Argead state, we must reconstruct the relationship which almost certainly existed between the earliest Argead kings and those they ruled.

The evidence for how the first Argeads ruled their kingdom comes almost exclusively from sources dealing with later periods. Nevertheless, since many of the duties associated with the Argead throne were similar to characteristics of Homeric kingship, it is not unreasonable
to assume that they were current much earlier. The problem with using Homeric kingship as a guide, however, is that it is not completely understood, and thus at best provides an incomplete model.\(^7\)

In part, to be an early Argead king meant to be a war-leader. Even those monarchs who were militarily unfit (like the shadowy infant king Aeropus, the incapable Philip III, or the young Alexander IV) were required to accompany their armies on campaign, both to share the risks involved, and to justify the expected fighting.\(^8\) How much kings participated in battle is not always clear. The number of wounds received by Philip II and Alexander III in battle attests to their willingness to participate directly in war, but even the death of Perdiccas III at the hands of the Illyrians does not prove that other Argead kings expected to exchange blows with the enemy.\(^9\) Unless the Argeads were uncommonly skilled warriors, the fact that those kings whose deaths are known tended to die more often off the battlefield than on seems to indicate that everything possible was done to shield them from actual contact with the enemy.\(^10\)

The king's military duties initially sprang from his responsibility to enrich his followers through the procurement of booty and land. Indeed, built into the account of the historically uncertain reigns of the early kings is the sense that wars (perhaps better called "raids" in the earliest period) were not only tolerated, but in
fact were encouraged and divinely ordained.\textsuperscript{11} Two important fragments suggest that Homeric attitudes towards raiding and the warfare it generated continued to exist until quite late: Alexander II was assassinated while performing a ritualistic war-dance; and there lingered for some time another ceremony in honor of cattle rustling.\textsuperscript{12} The fact that such primal acts of aggression could still be glorified as late as the 360's implies that the worth of every Argead king at least to that time was reckoned in part by his abilities to enhance the economic well-being of his following. Largesse (especially that extracted artfully or manfully from an enemy) oiled the wheels of loyalty, established claims on its recipients (see below), and increased the reputation of its procurer. Although the evidence which suggests it is late, the monarch's personal association with the successful expansion of the Early Argead kingdom probably had the extra benefit of generating a feeling of comradery between king and army.\textsuperscript{13} Although the Argead king's military duties consistently dominate the sources, we may presume that non-military responsibilities occupied more of his time on a daily basis. The various non-military functions of the monarch can be described as political, social, economic and religious in nature, but it would be a mistake to distinguish these categories too rigidly, to isolate the king's military role from the rest of his responsibilities,
or even to imagine his duties as defining an inflexible relationship with those he led. It was the sum total of the monarch's overlapping duties which marked him as the protector of his subject's interests and which legitimized his status as the leader of his people.\textsuperscript{14}

The king, of course, sat atop the Macedonian social hierarchy. Exactly how his position evolved, however, is often difficult to trace. Before the Argeads began the systematic conquest of lower Macedonia, there appears to have been no centralized socio-political structure of any consequence to their realm. It is most likely that the king controlled the Argead family and its possessions, and that he was established as the \textit{primus inter pares} among those who held similar positions in the other families of the realm.\textsuperscript{15} These other heads of families almost certainly constituted the core of the original \textit{hetairei} (companions) of the king, but the exact nature of the relationship between the monarch and the \textit{hetairei} is unknown.\textsuperscript{16}

One important duty which had a major impact on the king's ability to keep the peace at home, and thus which must have dated from the origins of the dynasty, was the royal responsibility to dispense justice. The king was obligated to oversee the establishment of justice, and could be judicially petitioned by every one of his subjects.\textsuperscript{17} Royal justice dealt with a wide variety of cases and could be demanded in the most informal of environments.\textsuperscript{18} As the kingdom grew it became impossible
for the king to hear every dispute arising under his authority. Accordingly, it became essential to delegate judicial authority to *hetairoi* to meet out justice in the king's name.\(^{19}\) The authority inherent in these positions remained that of the king himself, and we have evidence to suggest that the quality of the royally appointed judges was closely scrutinized.\(^ {20}\) Because of the spotty nature of the sources, we cannot definitely state that these assignments were regular or widespread enough as to constitute a systematic approach to the dispensing of justice. Yet this probably was the case by the historical period. The king would have heard appeals and most often would have participated from the start only in important cases. Regardless of who heard the cases, our sources leave little doubt that Macedonian kings devoted much of their energy to the maintenance of a just realm.\(^ {21}\)

The law was based upon tradition and custom. Consequently, room must have existed for interpretation and application. Regardless of the diligence or nobility of the king, it is likely that some judicial advising must have existed, although none is recorded, both to direct the king through unusual cases and to make sure that the law was more or less consistently applied.\(^ {22}\)

Although we are anticipating later developments, we cannot leave a discussion of the legal system without making reference to the supposed power of an assembly
(however defined) to judge capital cases, since any authority vested in the people must have limited the power of the king. Many scholars have argued that the king had no right to put a Macedonian to death without the approval of the people, usually thought formally expressed through the army assembly. At issue here is not whether the king (or one of his officers) ever convened an "assembly" of Macedonians in order to argue before it that someone had committed a crime worthy of capital punishment, for this is attested several times. Rather, what we must consider is whether those so called had the power and right to determine the fate of the accused, and whether the king was bound to bring before a representative group of his subjects those cases which had the potential to extract the supreme penalty.

Two frequently discussed episodes have the greatest bearing upon this problem: the trial of Philotas for treason against Alexander the Great, and the case involving an officer named Leontius during the reign of the later Antigonid king, Philip V. Both are well known incidents and will only be summarized here in order to challenge their relevance as evidence to the supposed legal power of some assembly.

The first occurred in 330 while Alexander's army was in what is today eastern Iran. Philotas, the well placed son of Parmenion and the commander of the Companion Cavalry, was suspected of having endangered the king by not
passing on word of a plot against his life. Although it seems clear that Philotas' role was not so much treasonous as negligent, his personal enemies took the opportunity to attack him before the king. Whether Alexander thought Philotas guilty, or merely twisted the affair to discard a commander whom Alexander found increasingly arrogant and undesirable, is unimportant for the present discussion. What does concern us is that the king accused Philotas before the army and apparently offered Philotas that forum to establish a defense. These points have caused some to accept that this meeting functioned as a court. As Errington has already noted, however, Curtius (our most detailed sources for the affair) fails to portray the action before the army in such a light, since he describes the assembly as a contio, and thus (according to Errington) not empowered to make any binding decision concerning the information brought before it. Whether or not we can use his terminology in a technical sense, Curtius reports neither that Alexander threw the decision to the assembly, nor that those present expected to render a decision. Rather, he portrays the army as a sounding board for Alexander to test the strength of his popularity against the planned execution of Philotas. In the context of Curtius, it appears that the king found it necessary to act with circumspection because of the situation in which he found himself at that moment. Whatever the merits of his
case, for Alexander to have acted rashly without the support of the army would have jeopardized his success in the Persian war down to that moment in time. Only after successfully testing the waters could Alexander feel secure enough of the army's loyalty to execute Philotas, as a council composed of the king's closest supporters had already recommended.31

The second case provides even less support for the assembly's role in capital cases. In 218 B.C., Leontius found himself in trouble with Philip V because he and two of his friends were threatening Aratus of Sicyon, one of the king's advisors.32 For their stubborn insistence that they would get Aratus, Philip fined and jailed Leontius' friends. Over the opposition of Leontius and some of the men under his command, Philip subsequently held a trial of the incarcerated officers to confirm his original verdict and at that time Leontius was implicated fully in the persecution of Aratus. The "court" upheld Philip's original decision, but allowed one of Leontius' friends to leave jail after Leontius pledged his life that his fine would be paid. When the friend fled to Athens Philip arrested Leontius, who thereafter sent a letter to his sympathizers telling them of his plight. These troops subsequently sent a delegation to the king to ask that Leontius not be tried in their absense, that they be allowed to pay the fine for their commander, and to state that if Philip acted otherwise, they would take offense.
Philip, inclined to exact the death penalty in Leontius' case and angered by the tone of the peltast's request, went so far as to execute Leontius even before he had originally intended.

Whatever this incident might say about the use of free and open speech by those under Leontius, it says nothing about the power of the army to try capital cases. Indeed, the trials of Leontius and his friends were held at the convenience of the king or not at all. When Leontius' troops make their appeal to Philip, they do not ask him to convene a trial, but to await their arrival and influence. Thus, they imply that there was nothing between Leontius and his fate other than the whim of Philip. Regardless, Philip's response to the whole affair denies a constitutional role for the assembly as a court: he simply executed Leontius without trial, and suffered no ill-effects for doing so. The obvious inference arrived at from the episode is that Philip was within his legal rights to have acted as he did, but that at an earlier point in the proceedings he felt a need to justify his behavior by having a group of friends confirm his initial judgment.

It must be admitted that merely because neither of these episodes shows the assembly as a decisive factor in capital cases, no assembly in Macedonia ever had such a role. It might be argued, for example, that Alexander's and Philip's autocratic exercises of authority were the
result of the evolution of the Macedonian system, and that at some earlier date a body of Macedonians had such power. If this is the case, however, it is unattested, and against such an argument must be placed the evidence (admittedly late) which portrays the king occasionally executing Macedonians without permission, while not suffering adversely. 35

Yet, if the king had the power to put Macedonians to death under any circumstance, why did certain occasions arise where he obviously felt the need to justify himself to his subjects, and what can Curtius (in particular) be referring to when he reports that it was customary for the people to participate in the judgments of certain cases? 36

Here, it seems best to make reference to Homeric parallels which probably would have been as relevant to the early dynastic period as it was to the time of Alexander. 37 Assemblies are known from the Homeric epics in which the king presented what he thought might be controversial solutions to looming problems, or in which he truthfully sought the guidance of his people. 38 At these moments the people (or at least powerful elements within that larger group) had the right to hear what the king had to say, and in turn if asked, had the right to express its opinion. 39 The king having made his case and having listened to what others had to say, thereafter had the right to do as he pleased, being in no way bound to proceed according to the wishes of those who had spoken. In short, the king's
customary responsibility was primarily to **state his case before** his subjects. If he chose to proceed with an unpopular decision, he had the right to do so with the understanding that it might serve to alienate his people unless other events mitigated in his favor. Those who had been "rebuffed" had no right to object to the policy implemented, and they certainly had no grounds to complain that their rights had been violated. In short, there appears to have been no formal procedure, but the monarch could choose to act according to his subject's wishes in order to avert the threat of protracted unpopularity.

The Macedonian assemblies which met in conjunction with capital trials seem to have been of this type. The king (or again, perhaps one operating under his authority) called them in order to meet the peculiar needs of the moment. When the situation was dire, or when the principles involved were major figures, it became important for the king to maintain close contact with those whose animosity could pose problems to his effective rule. Thus, it appears that the traditional rights referred to by our sources in connection with isolated capital cases were not those of deciding the verdict, but those of having the opportunity to participate in the process, and of expressing opinion (**i.e.,** "free speech"). If this line of reasoning is valid, then the king as the personification of justice in his realm had the power (within vague limits) to decide
cases. The prudent monarch would see to it that in so doing he did not disregard the feelings of those from whom he expected loyal service, without himself first being in an inassailable position.

Questions arising from this discussion of Macedonian justice, including those concerning the relationship of the Macedonian king and people, the people's access to their leader, and the extent of "free speech", are important for an understanding of how the kingdom was run from its earliest days until the end of the Argead dynasty. Thus, they should be considered here in the context of outlining the nature of royal power in its initial phase. The official relationship between the king and the Macedonian people began at his accession when a representative group of Macedonians swore loyalty to his authority. Although it has recently been suggested that the king reciprocated with an oath of his own at that time, we have no evidence that such was ever the case even in the detailed record of the accession of Philip III where an oath to the king is recorded. The probability that the people pledged a unilateral oath upon a king's accession suggests that there was no balance of power in Macedonia between the ruler and the ruled. This is not to say, however, that the king did not recognize a reciprocal, if unequal, obligation to his subjects. Rather, the monarch's expression of good faith seems to have taken other forms. In those reigns where our sources are detailed enough to be illustrative, kings
called assemblies more frequently immediately after their accession than later. Such assemblies provided the first official opportunities for kings to present themselves publicly and to open avenues of communication to those who were called to attend.

Although evidence for a rigidly defined constitutional relationship between the king and his subjects is absent from our sources even as they deal with later periods, there are indications that the Macedonians felt themselves free and ruled over by a king who was in no sense an absolute ruler. It is nevertheless clear that powerful kings, like Alexander the Great, could essentially do what they desired.

We must confront at this time the current debate over whether or not the Macedonians had a "constitution" which effectively limited royal authority since it has ramifications for an understanding of the early Argead state. Errington has demonstrated that the constitutional rights most commonly attributed to an "assembly" cannot bear a close scrutiny of the sources. But to accept his conclusion—that there existed no consistently effective check to royal authority—means that we must ignore the scattered references in the sources which suggest otherwise.

Macedonia was under foreign pressure for all of its history. This helped to unify the Macedonian people and
reinforced their support for one dominant leader because individual safety depended upon such unity, and because foreign enemies tended to overshadow domestic squabbles. For the very reasons that trouble from abroad could appear at almost any moment, and that rebellion at home could help to invite attack, the monarch had to have wide ranging discretionary powers to handle any situation which might arise. Regardless of "rights", practical considerations prevented the Macedonians from being at the mercy of their kings--as everyone understood. If a monarch expected to hold his throne in the face of foreign pressure, he had to consider the well-being of his subjects, lest they fail to support him wholeheartedly when it came to war (as it always did). Effective kings (and judging from the territorial expansion of the Argead realm, this included most), maintained close contact with their subjects, especially those of them who were organized into powerful military units. Those monarchs who did not suffered the consequences.\footnote{49}

The only check necessary upon the arbitrary exercise of royal power was open communication between the king and his citizens in arms. In Homeric fashion, such exchanges could take place in open "assembly" (similar to those described above in conjunction with capital cases) where the king gave his most important subjects the opportunity to state candidly what they thought. Yet, they did not have to occur in such formal circumstances. In fact, issues
which had the potential to be openly divisive were better faced in another forum, where public perceptions of honor would not impede the process of coming to an understanding.50

Virtually everything the king did (whether eating, drinking, hunting, or fighting) he did surrounded by some group, most often the hetairoi.51 Since the king lived with little privacy, he found it difficult to distinguish his public from his private life. Every action of the monarch was thus to an extent politicized, a situation not lost upon the king himself.52 Ideally, he strove to make others see him as a familiar figure—a generous lord, father, friend, confidant, or comrade depending on the status of the subject. Regardless of the relative importance of the person with whom the king found himself engaged, the one thing that he could do only at the risk of becoming unpopular was to ignore whatever problem demanded royal attention.53 His interest in the proceedings, of course, duly increased with the status and influence of the person with whom he was dealing.

In a very real sense the king’s traditional social responsibilities circumscribed his ability to do whatever he wanted. It was not that change was impossible or even forbidden. Rather, the weight of royal authority always had to be set against the customary functioning of society, with the king advancing at his own peril when dispute was
possible. Tradition could effectively temper royal ambition and reform, even if it could not force him to acknowledge a limit to his authority. It was the dynamic balance between the practical and the theoretical limits of royal power which creates so much confusion today over the Macedonian constitution. 54

Since social contacts served to head off political problems, the ability of the king to turn such moments to his benefit went some way in establishing his effectiveness as a monarch. Practicality mandated that the monarch extract as much gain as possible out of every relationship which he maintained, and this generally meant that the king attempted to influence those who had the most social clout, that is, the hetairoi. 55 It was as much in the king's interests as it was in the Companions' to cultivate a close relationship: the king extracted loyalty thereby, as well as a working knowledge of his Companions' talents, while for their part the hetairoi gained prestige, status, and material favors. 56 The degree of intimacy which existed between the king and those who where his most frequent associates can be found in their very name, hetairoi ("Companions"). This term implies a closeness which is found in Macedonian society at both the physical and social levels, but it also implies an inequality in the king's favor. 57 To have been a Companion was to have been an associate of the king through virtually every activity, every hour of the day. The king would delegate hetairoi
for service, usually of a military nature. Those thus appointed would have been chosen on the basis of family, the quality of his relationship with the king, and his ability. How each of these factors influenced the king depended on the nature of the duty and the immediate circumstances of the appointment.

Status and honor might generate loyalty, but to be certain that this precious commodity would not disappear at inconvenient moments, the king went further to invest in more concrete tokens of his appreciation. To be king meant to dispense largesse. The kind of gift offered by the monarch depended upon the moment, the status of the recipient, and how much of a debt the king hoped to establish by his generosity. The evidence on this point is clear if scattered—relatively minor items could be offered for past accomplishments, but generally speaking, the king established certain claims on the person he favored with material profit.

Our evidence for the importance of largesse is late but almost certainly a reflection of ancient practice: Philip II was known to have been a prolific gift-giver to the point where he was criticized. But it can have been no coincidence that he was also one of the most successful and popular of Macedonian kings. Alexander III was also famous for his generosity, as the men who accumulated wealth on the anabasis knew. But even before war gave
Alexander the unbounded resources of Asia, he was known to dispense unheard of largess. As he was leaving Macedonia, Alexander surrendered what land he personally owned to his chief supporters. The degree of his generosity shocked some, but most eagerly took what was offered. The symbolic importance of this transaction should not be overlooked. By dispensing of most of his earthly possessions, Alexander declared that the success or failure of his reign would depend entirely upon the success of his Persian War. Yet such burning of bridges was not done rashly. Alexander knew that he was about to challenge his Macedonians as never before—to insure that they would respond with total dedication it was important that they be rewarded in like fashion.

These bonds between the ruler and ruled remained active in large part until the end of the Argead dynasty, but the expansion of the Argead state must have had an impact on the structure of the kingdom since the king had greater resources under his control and more demands upon his time. Probably from its annexation, the Macedonian plain was organized by geographical regions defined by the cities located therein. It seems most likely that the this system originated at the time of the Argead conquest, since Philip II's attempt to reorganize the upper cantons
as soon as they were firmly under his control in the 350's parallels this organizational structure to a certain extent. Indeed, there is an internal logic which would have made the restructuring of the conquered districts desirable: not only would their reorganization help to break up the traditional power of their native aristocracies, it would also facilitate the funneling of resources to the new Argead overlord.

As the Argeads sought ways to make their new subjects loyal, they both innovated and looked to established custom. At least some of the newly subordinated aristocrats seem to have been honored with hetairoi status. Such additions to the Companion class had the effect of moderating the influence of those who could claim the designation by right of tradition. In addition, they elevated the relative importance of the monarch, since it appears that henceforth the king had the right to increase the roles of the hetairoi at will. Whether or not the hetairoi of the period were tied to the throne through some sort of feudal land exchange is unknown but quite possible, since later evidence seems to indicate that Macedonian kings realized the potential to be gained from granting land in newly acquired areas to loyal supporters.

Although we cannot be certain, it is probable that important political innovations should be dated to the sixth century as the Argead kings sought to incorporate new
territory to their realm. The first of these concerns the institution of the royal pages ("Βασιλικοὶ παιδευταῖοι"). These pages were the sons of ἕταιροι, and were invited to court where they served in part as hostages to insure their families' loyalties. In the process they also learned what was necessary to assure prominence in later life. By the fourth century they were provided a good Greek education with the king's sons, elevating them above the cultural level of their less fortunate countrymen. Such an experience also provided them with the skills which could make them effective servants of the king. In addition to whatever cultural education the boys received, they also were subjected to military exercises including the hunt, and even more importantly, to the realities of their dependent relationship with the king. Perhaps to drive home clearly this latter point, the Macedonian court seems to have kept no slaves, with the most menial tasks being performed by the pages. Indeed, the symbolic nature of the page's servile status could be reinforced through corporal punishment usually saved for social inferiors.

The result of this experience was that the pages became attached at an early age to the royal dynasty at least as much as they were to their own families. At the same time they were prepared for state service and introduced to the individuals under whom they would serve. Despite the sometimes rough treatment they received, the
pages and their families were much honored by comparison with the society at large: for example, they carried weapons in the presence of the king which they wielded during hunts and when called upon to guard the king's person. Thus, the relationship between the king and the hetairoi developed relatively early in Macedonian history. As the royal pages represented potential hetairoi, no group was to be so close to, or honored by, the king, and no group would as a consequence be more at his summons, or subject to his punishment if expectations were not met.

Another probable innovation connected with Argead expansion was the harnessing of aristocratic families through the creation of new cities or through the development of towns which already existed. The aristocratic houses thereby continued to retain importance, but in a way which secured their services for the king. These urban centers differed from those further south in their lack of autonomy, but they served as centers of administration, and as focal points of loyalty and legal privilege for their inhabitants. Ancestry continued to be a source of pride, but primary legal identity was to be determined by citizenship in a particular region dominated by its main town. The advantage gained by forcing geographically defined legal status upon the newly won cantons was important to the Argeads as they strove to subordinate traditional structures of loyalty to the
dynasty itself. Although the specific responsibilities of cantons are mostly lost to us, it can be safely assumed that *hetairoi* acted on the king's behalf in the various regions. To the best of our knowledge royal appointments were *ad hoc* and not hereditary in nature. For the sake of convenience, however, the king probably relied on local families to act as his representatives when their royally determined duties did not require their presence elsewhere. This system probably was in place in Lower Macedonia by the reign of Alexander I, by which time the right of coin in the area had been restricted in favor of the Argead throne.

The newly defined regional organization of the lowlands appears to have been tied to the Argead throne through the institution of "Macedonian" citizenship. It is not known how widespread this kind of citizenship was, whether it corresponded in full or part to the designation of *hetairoi* status, or whether it was linked to military service. It is apparent that "Macedonian" citizenship complimented that associated with the various cities, with a holder of both having responsibilities at the local and national levels. The integrated nature of the realm as it was maturing in the sixth century is at least hinted at in the subsequent organization of the Macedonian army, which although national in scope, was mostly organized into units by region.

By the initial phase of Argead expansion (sixth
(century) there must have evolved a multi-faceted system of finance to balance the maturing administrative structure of the realm. We will discuss taxation, coinage, and trade below, but what probably constituted the oldest elements of the system should be mentioned here. The most basic source of revenue for the dynasty was royal land, but beyond the fact that it existed very little can be said. The king owned "spear won" property, but since he parcelled much of this land to his supporters, exactly how much of this was kept for his personal use is unknown. It is probable even after sharing the spoils of victory with his loyal subjects that the king was the realm's largest landowner. A large part of what constituted royal land were the realm's forests and mines, and they provided a significant share of the kingdom's revenues. However, Argead control of many areas rich in resources, especially those east of the Strymon River, was not secure until the fourth century.

Until the Persians arrived in the northern Balkans in the last quarter of the sixth century, the most important resources consistently available to the Argeads were the forests on the slopes of the mountains which ringed the central Macedonian plain and the gold recovered from the waters of the Axios River.

Although it is unlikely that the early Argead kings commanded great revenues, their problems in harnessing wealth were to an extent mitigated by the fact that their
subjects owed them service, possibly in return for land and seemingly for as long as the kings demanded. Thus, the expense of maintaining an army, undoubtedly the greatest faced by the Argeads, was lessened. As long as the kingdom remained small, with its interests limited in geographical range so that the army could fight wars of short duration and be fed without the expense of elaborate preparations, the need for a well-developed system of taxation was minimal. Indeed, most taxes were probably paid in kind until the reign of Alexander I.

iii

The arrival of the Persians in Macedonia (ca. 510) increased the power of the Argeads many times. The Persians initially crushed the Paeonians, and then elevated Amyntas in importance. Realizing the futility of resistance, Amyntas openly collaborated with the Persians. As a result, Amyntas gained a foothold in the lands to the east of the Axius River, and became the chief Persian agent in the area. Amyntas therefore ruled the most extensive realm in the region. Indeed, Amyntas' realm was vital to the increasing Persian involvement in the world of the European Greeks. Moreover, the Persians secured portions of upper Macedonia for Amyntas and his son Alexander I, realizing fully that Macedonia was vital to their European lines of supply and communication.
With the Persians came a significant change in Macedonia's economy. By the end of the sixth century there had long been a Greek interest in the northern coast, as well as established trade routes northward along the rivers which provided access to central Europe. The Persians markedly improved the area's potential by establishing a political and economic unity where the multitude of local powers had once impeded the efficient exploitation of the region's resources and trade. In addition to providing a stimulus for growth and orienting the area southward and eastward, the Persian threat to Greece caused Athens to plan for defense at a level hitherto unheard of. The result, of course, was the development of the Athenian navy which supplied itself from the north, and which correspondingly increased the demand for northern resources.

The first evidence that the Argeads attempted to take advantage of the geographical setting of their kingdom as well as their Persian connections presents itself during the reign of Alexander I, when the various city and tribal coinages minted within the Argead kingdom gave way to a national coinage authorized by Alexander alone. The new royal coinage had the advantage not only of imposing a comprehensive system, it also had the eventual effect of producing mint revenues for the throne. Alexander's coinage seemingly was intended from the first to facilitate
trade because it was produced on two standards: one aligned with the system in Thrace, and the other with Athens. Thus, Alexander appears to have seen the potential in exploiting his realm's location between central Europe and the Aegean. He undoubtedly hoped to benefit from the taxes he could impose on trade through his kingdom as much as he hoped to secure minting revenues.

Although we know very little about how Macedonian subjects were taxed, we know that they were by the time of Alexander III to the extent that the remission of taxation could be considered a significant reward for exceptional service in times of war. With the growing exploitation of Macedonia's economic potential, and with the increased interest in financial management apparent, it seems likely that by the reign of Alexander I at least some of the dues owed to the king became payable in money. The importance of such revenues cannot be calculated, but given the unstable political situation in the land by the middle of the fifth century, it is unlikely that the throne was secure enough to impose significant taxes on the Macedonian aristocracy and people.

The evidence suggests that Alexander I attempted to establish himself as the most important power in Macedonia with the withdrawal of Persian authority from Europe after 479. Two things, however, checked his ambition: the Delian League and the under-developed nature of the Argead state. Not only did Alexander find it impossible to
maintain control of the region near Mt. Pangaeon with all of its great natural wealth, he increasingly found it difficult to control the cantons of upper Macedonia.\textsuperscript{106} Since the Argead presence in Upper Macedonia was relatively recent and not well rooted, and since access to this area was difficult, for the time being this region could not be retained by the Argead kings.

The effect of these losses were dramatic. By Alexander's death, the wealth and power of Argead Macedonia was but a fraction of what it had been when the kingdom had been protected by the Persian umbrella.\textsuperscript{107} We need not trace Argead relations with the south here. Suffice it to say that until the late 360's, Macedonia was beholden to a string of southern powers: first Athens, but eventually Sparta and Thebes as well.\textsuperscript{108} The second-rate status of the kingdom through the fifth century and into the fourth did not prevent Alexander I's successors from attempting to reconstruct his dream of regional domination. Indeed, the model of political centralization provided by the Persians did not go unrecognized. Although the Argeads before Philip II never could quite free themselves long enough to accomplish an effective consolidation of power, the tendency of the various Greek powers to intervene in the north made it possible for the Argeads to reemerge as a major force in the region's interior.\textsuperscript{109}

As Thucydides recognized, the most remarkable
successor of Alexander I until Philip II was Archelaus. He attempted to take advantage of declining Athenian power at the end of the fifth century to reconstruct Argead Macedonia on a far more sound basis than it had ever been. The most visible manifestations of Archelaus' ambitions were the roads and fortresses he constructed throughout his kingdom. This effort had the effect of unifying the realm, but it was only possible because he instituted various economic reforms which strengthened his position at home. Archelaus, for example, was the first Argead king to mint bronze. Although it is difficult to pinpoint his exact reasons for doing so, it is likely that he hoped by this innovation to increase broadly his kingdom's cash economy in order to tax its wealth more efficiently through new duties. Although this conclusion is speculative, it is supported by other reforms almost certainly attributable to Archelaus. For example, he seems to have had an interest in the foundation of cities, at least one of which, Pella, was located in such a way as to take advantage of the trade available to a port city on the Thermaic Gulf. Again, he redefined the standard of Macedonian coinage to fit the Persian standard. This latter reform seems to have either been effected by a strong trade with the east, or to have created the same. It would have been strange if Archelaus did not have his own financial welfare in mind by these moves.

Archelaus' career was a watershed in Macedonian
history, for although it was another fifty years before his kingdom could take full advantage of what he had accomplished, he brought to his land an organization which laid the political, military, and economic foundations necessary for it to live up to possibilities first awakened by the Persians. The wealth of the northern Balkans during this period is now evident from archaeological discoveries, it would only take the steady expansion of Argead authority to make them the equals of other Aegean powers.116 Unfortunately, Macedonia was hit hard in the 390's by a devastating round of civil war, as the royal succession was contested by various Argead rivals.117 Civil war almost destroyed the Argead state, but in the end it was saved by the capable Amyntas III.118 Even with his careful husbanding of his resources, however, Amyntas found it difficult to do anything but hold on.119

An attempt to build on the institutions in place after Archelaus was initiated by Alexander II, when he attempted a military reform designed to create a more effective infantry than had existed in Macedonia before.120 This was possible in the 360's thanks to the increase in urbanization which had occurred since the time of Archelaus.121 Beyond the obvious military benefits to be realized by a more powerful army, the existence of an organized infantry altered the social balance of the kingdom. With an increase in importance of non-aristocrats
to the army, the king could be counted on to give their concerns more weight than before. Such could only detract from the pre-eminence of those who fought in the cavalry units which had previously been the backbone of the Macedonian army. It should come as no surprise that the Macedonian infantry began to play an increasingly important political as well as military role during the reigns of Philip II, Alexander III, Philip III, and Alexander IV. Although it is not provable, it seems likely that the political impact of this reform was anticipated by Alexander II, and welcomed as he strove to free himself from the undue influence of aristocrats who had almost certainly used the problems of the 390's and the insecurity of Amyntas III to extract concessions for their loyalty.

iv

Alexander II's assassination delayed the impact of his probable military reforms, as did the insecure authority of his successor, Ptolemy, and the renewed Illyrian pressure felt most heavily following the accession of Perdiccas III. It was not until Philip II began to reassemble the pieces of his realm in the wake of Perdiccas' disastrous defeat that the ground prepared as early as Archelaus could be properly cultivated. Philip II was a gifted leader whose hard work and keen perception concerning what was essential for success enabled him to create a Macedonia
unlike any realized before.

Philip worked quickly to regroup the Macedonian army, and to restore its confidence on the battlefield, but he was far more than just an efficient general.¹²⁵ His real genius was demonstrated by his ability to integrate fully into the Argead realm many areas once generally beyond his family's control, but which his invigorated army was able to overrun.¹²⁶ The organizational accomplishments of Archelaus provided the model. Philip merely annexed securely newly acquired resources (both natural and human) which for the first time since the failures of Alexander I had come under the authority of an Argead king.¹²⁷

Philip's most important efforts were directed at Upper Macedonia, where he wanted to break-down the established social patterns which, along with geographical isolation, had been enough for the most part to insure independence from Argead overlordship. Philip accomplished this by physically relocating whole populations, both to bring loyalists to his new frontiers and to reposition newer subjects in less strategic locations.¹²⁸ His efforts brought a more secure frontier and also relocated a fair number of Upper Macedonians (especially the native nobility) in the plain where they received citizenship of the regional and national types discussed above.¹²⁹

The second part of Philip's plan involved a forced change in lifestyles for many, if not most, of those who
continued to live in the west. The cities he founded had an effect on the economic patterns of upper Macedonia, which in turn helped to disrupt the social organizations of the ethnos previously enjoyed by the region. With the political shackling of the western aristocrats coupled with the social changes in the lands they once controlled, Philip had gone a long way towards reorienting the loyalties of upper Macedonia away from traditional lords to the Argead house. The process begun by Philip was not completed by the end of his life, but significant inroads were made. Alexander III reaped the benefits of his father's labor and continued the process of unification during his conquest of Persia. The successful military campaigns of Philip II permitted him to absorb the Greek cities along the Aegean coast and to annex large chunks of Thrace. As the military juggernaut added territory to Philip's domain, he was able to tap into the wealth these areas offered.

The organization needed to tie the expanded kingdom together was military in nature. With this growth spurt began (as far as we know) the delegation of military and civil commands independent of the king himself. Those who so served, did so at the grace of the king, and held only delegated authority. Those who gained the king's absolute trust (like Parmenion and Antipater) however, found their talents consistently employed and their efforts fully appreciated by the king.
It was probably as a result of the growth in the number and kinds of troops used effectively by Philip that the institution of the *hetairoi* was extended and to a certain extent redefined. The number of *hetairoi* of the traditional sort under Philip and his son was about 800.\(^{138}\) Appointment to this group (which included non-Macedonians) was at the discretion of the king, but as with so much in Macedonian society, unless the king wanted to burden himself with impossible morale problems, he was forced to deal with the *status quo* at his accession and generally confirm this rank for those who had previously held it.\(^{139}\) It is doubtful that every member of this body was a personal friend of the king or had equal access to him. It seems likely that the number of *hetairoi* demanded a further stratification, so that those from this group who were designated to hold greater honor could be easily recognized. Thus, it appears that titles such as *somatophylakes* (bodyguards) and *philoi* (friends) began to take on more significance.\(^{140}\)

In addition, the term *hetairoi* was extended more widely than before, becoming associated with everyone who served in the cavalry side by side with those who had long held the title, and also with an elite infantry force.\(^{141}\) Such distinction was important for Macedonian society, and its prudent distribution helped to tie the loyalties of those most relied on in wartime directly to the royal
family.

Philip II's greatest military concerns came on his northern frontier, because the greatest threat to the well-being of his kingdom came from this direction. Whether because of the number of his northern campaigns, or because of he hoped to remove obstacles and establish a community of economic self-interest with those to his north, Philip placed his coinage on the Thracian standard.\(^{142}\) Philip commanded great income from his expanded realm, but he also knew great expenses from his constant campaigning and efforts at diplomacy.\(^{143}\) When Alexander III came to the throne in 336, he inherited but a small surplus from his father.\(^{144}\) Alexander's Asian conquests took care of his financial needs, but they also caused him to rely more upon the taxation structure of the Persian Empire than upon what he had inherited to pay his bills, thus the traditions of Macedonia were swamped by the superior resources of the east.\(^{145}\)

In summary, this chapter traces the emergence of the Macedonian state under the Argead kings. What began relatively humbly developed over time with the efficient use of geographical location, natural resources, and foreign help. As the Argead realm grew in size, it was governed by a combination of traditional perogatives and innovations made necessary by the physical extention of the king's authority. It was perhaps unfortunate that the kingdom did not have the opportunity to consolidate its
growth and to institutionalize its expanded structures before the dynasty floundered. Nevertheless, what the Argeads were able to accomplish set the stage for the greatest military achievement the Greek world was ever to know.
NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE


2 After their victory over Perseus in the Third Macedonian War, the Romans split the traditional heartland of the Macedonian kingdom into four separate republics, and further restricted relations among the new states. The Roman aim was to destroy the ties that had held the kingdom together for centuries, but in so far as they hoped to institute new loyalties in the then disunited Macedonia, they failed (as the Fourth Macedonian War proves, see note three below). On the peace terms for the Third Macedonian War see Livy 45.18 and 45.29. For modern surveys of the war and further bibliography see, E. Will, *Histoire Politique Du Monde Hellénistique* II (Nancy, 1967) 228-238; and even more recently, Erich S. Gruen, "Macedonia and the Settlement of 167 B.C.,” *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage*, 257-267, and *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome* vol. II (Berkeley, 1984), 423-429.

3 The revolt of Andriscus, who claimed to be the son of
Perseus and the heir to the disbanded Macedonian throne, rallied most Macedonians around the memory of the traditional monarchy (150-148 B.C.). Rome had little difficulty in crushing this uprising, but recognized the Macedonian desire for unity by reuniting the four regions under a Roman provincial administration. Will, Ibid., 326-328; Jean M. Helliesen, *Andriscus and the Revolt of the Macedonians* (Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1968), and "Andriscus and the Revolt of the Macedonians, 149-148 B.C.," *Arc Mak* 4, forthcoming; and Gruen, *The Hellenistic World*, 429-436.

4 Although the social and political structures of the peoples of the northern Aegean area resembled each other's, the number of different folk with distinct identities in the region (e.g. the Thracians, Illyrians, Paeonians, Macedonians, and Greeks) did nothing to ease the tensions of the area. Other factors promoted instability in the region. These include its relative ease of access from both north and south and its natural wealth (e.g. abundant forests, large plains, and mineral resources, see. S. Casson, *Macedonia, Thrace, and Illyria*, (London, 1926) 52-101: Hammond, *Mac I*, 3-18 and above *Introduction*, 1-2). Another disruptive factor was that despite the invasion routes which were available along the coast and down the major river valleys such as the Axios, the area also
abounds in upland valleys which, though not entirely isolated, nevertheless posed certain problems of entrance from most directions. The result of this last geographical item was that independent groups could develop with independent political traditions. All in all, there were enough groups in the area with similar yet independent systems to contend regularly for the wealth to be found there. The success of any one element depended a great deal upon internal cohesion.

5 Thucydides (2.99) attributes the conquest of lower Macedonia to Alexander I and his predecessors. For a close look at this passage, see Mac I, 436-440. The Macedonian plain in antiquity was large by Greek standards of the time, but it was not as large as it is today and its exploitation was somewhat restricted by the endemic presence of malaria (see E.N. Borza, "Some Observations on Malaria and the Ecology of Central Macedonia in Antiquity," AJAH 4 (1979), 102-124; and "The Natural Resources of Early Macedonia," Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage, eds. W.L. Adams and E.N. Borza (Washington, 1982), 1-20.)

6 The easiest land route into the Balkan peninsula from the north hugged the Pierian coast of the Thermaic Gulf. But whether this passage was used, or the longer and more difficult route via the Halicmon River, the Volustana
Pass, and Perrhaebia (in order to bypass the narrows at the Vale of Tempe), the oldest portion of the Argead realm still had to be controlled to safeguard lines of communication and supply.

7 It is, however, impossible to draw too close a parallel between Homeric kingship and that of the Argeads largely because our knowledge of the former is so fractured.

8 For the presence of these kings, two infants and a mental incompetent, upon the battlefield: Just. 7.2.6; Diod. 18.22.1-8, 18.33.1-36.1, 19.11.2-3; Arr. succ. Alex. 1.28-29; and Plut. Eum. 4.1.

9 Not only are the sources consistent that both Philip and Alexander personally led their troops into battle, they also prove that both kings fought by noting their battle wounds. Philip was seriously wounded at least four times (see esp. Demos. 18.67, Didymus In Dem. 12.63-65, 13.1-7) including the loss of an eye, a broken collar-bone, a serious wound in the upper thigh, and a hand injury. Beyond the incident upon the Granicus where Alexander would have lost his life had not Clitus severed the arm of a Persian about to strike the king down, Alexander was wounded at the Battle of Issus, at the seige of Gaza, and
most seriously, in India (Arr. *anab.* 1.15.8, 2.12.1, 2.27.2-3, 6.10.1 f.). On the fate of Perdiccas, see Diod. 16.2.4.

10 Of the kings from Alexander I until the reign of Philip II: Perdiccas II, Amyntas II, and Pausanias died of unknown causes; Alexander I, Archelaus, Alexander II, and probably Orestes died of assassination; Aeropus died of disease; and Amyntas III died of old age. Only Perdiccas III is known to have died in battle, and since the slaughter was so great at that time, he might have been killed not in the front ranks, but in the general collapse of the Macedonian army. Perhaps some indication of what was expected of the king can be found in Arrian (*Anab.* 6.13.4) where Nearchus scolds Alexander after the severe wound in India for running exceptional physical risk as if he were a common soldier. If this were the case, then Philip II and Alexander III were exceptional in their willingness to engage personally in battle. Conclusions on this point, however, are tentative since Nearchus' reaction is an isolated one in the sources, since he was not a Macedonian by birth, and since his advice seemingly was ignored.

11 Justin (7.1.7-9) reports that Caranus led goats before his attacking armies to invoke the same divine sanction that led him to found Aegae. No doubt the appeal to the
divine helped to foster support for warfare among those who would fight, but such propaganda would not have been effective if the Macedonians held the notion that their gods forbade such enterprises.

12 On Alexander's death while dancing the telesias (war-dance) see Athen. 14.629b (and also Diod. 15.71.1). For a commentary on this tradition and on that of the karpaia (cattle rustling ceremony), see J.N. Kalleris, Les Anciens Macedoniens (Athens, 1954) pp. 271 and 202 respectively.

13 Certainly the ability of soldiers to boast of their exploits directly to the king (Arr. Anab. 1.16.5) acted as a bond between the monarch and those who made up his army; as did the public recognition of bravery in battle, along with the increase in booty granted to those so honored (Arr. Anab. 2.12.1).

14 Hammond and Griffith, Mac II 150-156, 383-404, and 647-674 provide the only discussion to date on the king's role in Macedonian society. Their discussions, however, are affected by their acceptance of the existence of a well defined constitution in which the people regularly exercised important rights. On the proposed electoral and judicial rights see Chapter Two and below p. 158f. with notes, respectively.
15 Although direct evidence is difficult to come by, we have no reason to believe that non-Argead families in Macedonia were unique in their structure. Indeed, in many ways the Argeads closely resemble what is known of the royal houses of Upper Macedonia from the earliest times (Mac II, 14-22). It would not be far-fetched to suggest that the families of Lower Macedonia were similarly organized. The pattern of well developed houses operating foremost in their own best interest seems well established during the reigns of Alexander III and his successors (see Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* II, 439-441 for a summary of well-known relationships). The discussion of W.K. Lacey (*The Family in Classical Greece* (Ithaca, 1968) 33-50) concerning the family in Homeric society provides a good introduction to the probable situation in Macedonia.

16 We have no way of determining how *hetairos* status was originally defined, but if Herod. (8.138.1) can be interpreted to mean that the institution was an ancient one by the fifth century, it seems likely that the class was firmly distinguished at least by that date.

17 Plut *Mor* 178 A (#12), 178 F (#23, 24), 179 A (#25), and 179 D (#31) all show Philip II and his judicial responsibilities. Plut *Alex.* 42.2 reveals Alexander in the same capacity. The same concerns are shown under
Antigonus, 182 C (#9). The most dramatic of these episodes in 179 D (#31) in which an old woman approached Philip obviously away from a courtroom setting. When he tried to ignore her, she told him to stop being king. Shamed, Philip heard her case and others. Although not an Argead, the later Antigonid king, Demetrius, ran into trouble for not responding to his legal responsibilities (Plut., Dem. 42.2-3; on this point see, W.L. Adams, "Macedonian Kingship and the Right of Petition." As the king derived his authority from the gods, and as they came by the time of the Odyssey to stand for universal justice, the king began to be held responsible for the just order of his realm. On the evolution of justice as a social concept in the works of Homer, see M. Finley, The World of Olyssesus rev. ed. (New York, 1978), 140-141.

18 Judicial matters could be heard anywhere (Plut Mor 182 C (#9)), but often were held in public so that all could see justice dispensed. The king could also be rebuked if his mind wandered during judicial business (178 F (#24)).

19 This was done surely by the reign of Philip II (see note 17 for references), but probably existed to some degree from the earliest period of Argead expansion beyond Paeonia.
20 Plut Mor 178 F (#23).

21 For a good discussion of this royal duty see, Griffith Mac II 392-395.

22 Ibid.

23 Aymard, "Sur L'Assemblée Macédonienne," Études D'Histoire Ancienne, 156 f; Briant, Antigone le Borgne, 287 f. (where it is argued that this right was invested in the whole people during times of peace [based upon Curt. 6.8.25]), and Hammond and Griffith Mac II 160-162, 389-390.

24 See below, with notes 25-31.

25 Curt. 6.8.23-6.11.11; Poly. 5.15.1-5.16.10, 5.25.1-5.27.8.

26 Philotas (Berve, Das Alexanderreich II, #802). For the best handling of the Philotas affair in print see, W. Heckel, "The Conspiracy against Philotas," Phoenix 31 (1977) 9-21, which is much more plausible than Z. Rubinson, "The Philotas Affair--A Reconsideration," Arc Mak 2, (1977) 409-420. See also, E. Badian, "The Death of Parmenio," TAPA 91 (1960) 324-228. I have offered my reading of the incident in, The Philotas Affair, (Master's Thesis, University of Virginia, 1978). It is important to
note that while the Philotas affair is the best attested trial, it was not the only one to surface under Alexander's reign. At least four others occurred within three years of Philotas' death: those involving Alexander the Lyncestian, Demetrius the Bodyguard, Amyntas and his three brothers, and the conspiracy of the Royal Pages (see Berve, *Das Alexanderreich II*, #'s 37, 260, 57, and 305 [Hermolaus] respectively for summaries and sources). It is impossible to conclude much from the procedures used in each of cases since they are not fully detailed, but at least Amyntas and his brothers were fully acquitted, proving that public accusation did not necessarily lead to condemnation. Demetrius apparently was acquitted of formal charges, but was soon thereafter relieved of his duties as Bodyguard and vanished from the record. The number of well-known men to face charges apparently in public suggests that Alexander felt insecure at this time, probably as a result of the tensions growing out of his policy of "orientalization" (Curt. 6.6.9 f., Plut. *Alex.* 47.10, Diod. 17.78.1 f., Just. 12.4.1).


28 Alexander's role in this affair is by no means
certain. It seems that a dislike for Philotas had been growing at least since the Macedonian conquest of Egypt (Arr. Anab. 3.26.2; Plut Alex. 49.1). Whether Alexander used Philotas' failure to reveal the plot to ruin the cavalry commander while his important father, Parmenion, was away is unknown but a possibility. Equally possible, however, is that Alexander was used by others who created a doubt about Philotas' loyalties in order to see him removed so that they could be promoted.

29 Errington, "The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy," 86-91, esp. 89. The same cautions involving the precision of Curtius' usage of contio as were noted above with Justin (Chapter Two, p. 71 with note 23) apply here. It is difficult to know how legalistic the sources were in their references to Roman customs.

30 Parmenion was at that time at Ecbatana, to Alexander's west, astride his communication lines to the Aegean, with troops, and with a royal treasury. If he had learned of his son's fate, his reaction might have been violent. Alexander clearly needed the troops with him on his side in case of civil war, and operated accordingly. Alexander had Parmenion assassinated before news of Philotas' fate reached Ecbatana.

31 Few Macedonians seem to have objected to Philotas'
death, perhaps because he was not personally popular. Many did grumble after the news of Parmenion's fate became known.

32 Poly. 5.15-16.10, 5.25.1-5.27.8.

33 Poly. 5.27.5-6. On the implications of this episode see, W.L. Adams, "Macedonian Kingship and the Right of Petition," Arc Mak 4, forthcoming.

34 Errington, "The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy," 83-85, although here Errington is more concerned with the incident's pertinence to the issue of "free speech" (see A. Aymard, "Sur l'assemblée macédonienne," REA 52 (1950), 129 f.).

35 It is almost certain that several supposed murderers of Philip II were executed by Alexander III shortly after the latter came to the throne (Curt. 6.9.17, 6.10.24; Diod. 17.2.1; Plut. Alex. 10.4; On the Fortune of Alex. 1.3.327 c; and esp. Just. 11.2.1; 12.6.14). Here, there is no indication of the people in any form acting in a legal capacity, and Alexander certainly suffered no ill effects after the business was completed.

There are other references in our sources concerning Cassander which mention capital trials in the presence of
"Macedonian" assemblies. Before he was king, Cassander tried on the spot before the troops present his suspected governor of the Munichia, one Nicanor, for disloyalty (Polyaen. 4.11.1). Again, Cassander had Olympias tried for her conduct after her victory over Philip III and Eurydice (Diod. 19.51.1 f. and Paus 9.7.2--see also below Chapter Five, section 4). These incidents, however, do not apply to the debate over a traditional right of the Macedonian people to hear capital cases because Cassander was not king when they occurred, and thus he was on shakier ground when he wanted to do away with his opponents. Even if he had been king, these trials occurred during times of duress for Cassander (even greater in magnitude than that which faced Alexander III, when Philotas was accused of treason). He certainly wanted to do nothing unpopular which might rebound upon his newly won success, and one way to dilute any potential animosity the deaths of Nicanor and Olympias might have caused was to share the responsibility for their fates as widely as possible.

36 Curt. 6.8.25.

37 On the nature of the Homeric assembly see, Finley, World of Odysseus, 80f. In Finley's words (80), "The assembly neither voted nor decided. Its function was two-fold: to mobilize the arguments pro and con, and to show the king or field commander how sentiment lay....The king
was free to ignore the expression of sentiment and go his way."

38 Perhaps the most famous being that called to avert the anger of Apollo (*Il.* 1.57ff.) which resulted in Achilles' grudge against Agamemnon.

39 The right to speak was reserved for the Homeric aristocracy. In the one scene where Homer presents a commoner addressing the assembled (Thersites, *Il.* 2.211-277), he was dealt with harshly by Odysseus.

40 As especially was the case during the Philotas affair, see above this chapter, with notes 25-31.

41 Curt. 10.7.9.

42 Griffith *Mac* II 387. Griffith's argument rests on his acceptance that the army had a right to select its king, thus he believes that the king was bound to acknowledge those who elevated him in a way which paralleled the known tradition of Epirus. Griffith's Epirote parallel, however, probably is invalid for Macedonia, because it is clear that the kingdom of Epirus developed more rigorous restraints upon royal authority than had developed in Macedonia by the end of the fourth century; see N.G.L. Hammond, *Epirus*
43 Philip II: Diod. 16.3.1 f.; Alexander III: Diod 17.2.2, Just. 11.1.7-10; Philip III and Alexander IV: see above Chapter Two, section two, and below Chapter Five.

44 See: Arr. Anab. 4.11.1-4.11.9, 5.27.2-9, 7.8.3; Curt. 6.8.25, 9.4-15; Plut., Mor. 178F-179A (#24), 179C (#31); Polyb. 5.27.6.; Polyaen. 4.2.6. Most of the time an effective king would wield his influence to get his own way, but at times when the people remained adamantly even the greatest kings had to bend, or get around the problem through evasion. Even Alexander the Great found it necessary to change his plans on occasion rather than press an unpopular decision upon his countrymen, as the incidents concerning proskynesis, his wished for conquest of India, and the Opis affair clearly prove.

For a discussion of proskynesis, see J. Seibert, Alexander der Grosse (Darmstadt, 1972) 192-206. With the introduction of proskynesis Alexander was trying to alter Macedonian custom by forcing his countrymen to bow before him, and the newly implemented ceremony created great dissention. Although resentful, Alexander withdrew his request and bided his time to punish those most influential in forcing the issue (e.g. Callisthenes--note his fate Arr. Anab. 4.12.7-4.14.4). For the events on the Hyphasis River in India, see Arr. Anab. 5.16-25, Curt. 8.14.15-9.2.10, and
Diod. 18.89.1-18.94.2; see also F.L. Holt, "The Hyphasis Mutiny: A Source Study," AW 5 (1982) 33-59. For the Opis incident see: Curt. 10.2.12 f., Just. 12.1.7-8, and Plut. Alex. 71.1-5. It is possible but unlikely that the events from Asia were unique because of the situation in which the Macedonians found themselves, and that perhaps a different relationship would have existed in Macedonia itself. My reason for doubting that the army took greater liberties on campaign than allowed at home stems mostly from a concern for discipline in the face of the enemy. How could the Macedonian army function efficiently if the army knew it could use its leverage in the field to extort uncostomary freedoms?

45 At the least Alexander had several Macedonians killed including many powerful hetairoi: Amyntas (Berve, Das Alexanderreich II, #61), Alexander the Lyncestian (Berve, #37), Attalus (Berve, #182), Clitus (Berve, #427), and Parmenion (Berve, #606). Yet, whatever animosity such assassinations created was short-lived and such indiscretions seem to have been accepted as a fact of life.

46 As I will argue below, the Macedonian state evolved with changing circumstances. Although the evidence here adduced is late and thus subject to influence from subsequent developments, it is possible to recognise what
almost certainly were archaic traditions in later forms, and thus a consideration of the following arguments has a bearing on early Macedonia.

47 For the chief proponents of the Macedonian constitution see this chapter note 23 and Chapter Two, notes 2,3,5,6. For arguments against the Macedonian constitution see Errington, "The Nature of the Macedonian State under the Monarchy," 77-131, R. Lock, "The Macedonian Army Assembly in the Time of Alexander the Great," 91-107, and Chapter Two, sections 2,3,4 above. Those who defend the Macedonian constitution claim that an assembly (according to all but Briant an army assembly) elected the king and presided over treason trials. In addition, they argue that the Macedonians traditionally enjoyed free speech. On this last point see Adams, "Macedonian Kingship and the Right of Petition" and my own discussion below.

48 See especially above note 44.

49 As was the case with Alexander III in India and at Opis (see this chapter, note 44 for references), and especially the later Antigonid king Demetrius, who was expelled for his constant disregard of his subjects feelings and for his extravagant lifestyle (Plut., Dem. 44.6—although, admittedly, his case was compounded by the joint invasion of Macedonia by Lysimachus and Pyrrhus).
50 Where animosities were presented openly as in the Philotas affair (Curt. 6.8.1 f.), the king was likely to press his advantage as much as possible so as not to lose face. When prestige was diminished openly, as in the proskynesis affair, the king could hold a grudge and eventually punish his opponent (above, note 44).

51 The relationship between the king and his hetairoi was a Homeric one—the Il. (1.179) uses the term to describe Achilles' war companions (who doubled as his closest friends and associates, see also M.I. Finley, World of Odysseus, 83f.). Curtius (8.1.18) describes well the role of the Macedonian king's Companions when he writes, "...Ceterum Macedones...tamen scivere gentis suae more, ne aut pedes venaretur aut sine delectis principum atque amicorum." Aelian (VH 13.4) further mentions the close association of the king and the hetairoi while dining. On the importance of ceremonial feasts to the operation of the Macedonian court see, E.N. Borza, "The Symposium At Alexander's Court," Arc Mak 3 (1983) 45-55.

52 At least by Alexander III's reign, even the king's most intimate affairs were subject to scrutiny. For example, Plutarch (Alex. 39.8) notes that on one occasion a private letter from Olympias to Alexander was read by
Hephaestion. Hephaestion, of course, was Alexander's closest friend, but Alexander proved that he understood the possible political ramifications of his friend's knowledge when he pledged Hephaestion's silence concerning what he learned from Olympias' correspondence.

53 As proven best when Philip II realized the need to respond to an old woman--perhaps as unimportant a petitioner as could be found within the kingdom (Plut. Mor 179D (#31)).

54 For the sources and literature for and against the Macedonian constitution see above Chapter Two and this chapter note 47.

55 As much for political as social reasons, the king lived amid his hetairoi. On the importance of the Companions see, Griffith Mac II, 395-404 and note 51 above. The king's immediate contact with less prominent Macedonians was suitably less frequent, but not lacking.

56 See below pp. 170f.

57 Griffith, Mac II, 395-404.

58 Hammond Mac II 164. One has only to look at the careers of a number of these men under Alexander III for
proof of their service in this manner—representatives include: Parmenion (Berve, Das Alexanderreich II, #606), Antipater (Berve, #94), Ptolemy (Berve, #668), Craterus (Berve, #446), Hephaestion (Berve, #357), and Antigonus (Berve, #87).

59 The service of Philotas (Berve, Das Alexanderreich II, #802), the son of Parmenion, is evidence that family ties could promote careers. This would hardly have been possible, however, if the sons of prominent hetairoi had not themselves been relatively competent. Hephaestion (Berve, #357) is a good example of a close personal friend of the king being promoted beyond what others thought of his talents.

60 Plut Mor 177 A (#1) shows Archelaus giving Euripides a gold cup for his artistic genius. Other examples of gifts include: Plut. Mor. 177 B (#4), 177 D (#6), 178 C (#18), 179 F (#6), Plut Alex. 15.4, 29 and especially 39.1-12. For later kings: 182 E (#15), 183 F (#2). The dispensing of largess was another trait that the Macedonian king held in common with Homeric monarchs—see, Finely, The World of Odysseus, 61f., 95f., 120f. On the social importance of these transactions in terms of status and obligation see, M. Mauss, The Gift, translated by I. Cunnison (New York, 1967) passim. Mauss does not make reference to Greece in
his analysis, but his interpretation of the gift as social bond is consistent with the evidence from the Balkans—see Finley, 145-146.

61 Diod. 16.3.3. Also, Theopompus (FGrH 115 F 224, 225) reports that there were 800 *herairoi* under Philip II with the wealth of 10,000 Greeks, and further implies that this number was greater than it had been before Philip's reign. Thus, however many received this honor presumably received their estates from the king as gifts (Demos. 6.20; Thuc. 1.58.2). This constituted an efficient means of strengthening the support for royal authority.

62 Eumenes (Plut *Eum. 2.2*), for example, is said to have accumulated 300 talents of silver by the time the expedition returned to Babylonia.

63 Plut *Alex. 15.4*. Although no source says so, there probably was a distinction between lands linked directly to the throne, and others possessed as the personal estates of individual kings. It appears impossible, for instance, that Alexander at this time could have surrendered title to those forests and mines which constituted a royal monopoly in his realm.

64 Perdiccas refused his portion in an obvious play for favor (*Ibid. 15.5*).
In the words of Mauss (*The Gift*, 72): "To give is to show one's superiority, to show that one is something more and higher... To accept without returning or repaying more is to face subordination, to become a client and subservient...."

Our earliest evidence to suggest that lower Macedonia was organized by city comes from Arrian (*Ind.* 18)—who lists trierarchs assigned by Alexander to Nearchus' command by their cities when they come from the area of the plain. It appears that the early Argead kings expanded their realm, not by eliminating powerful rivals, but by incorporating them into the expanded state where they formed the basis of the early army and local rule. It seems that each city had local administrative and financial responsibilities, see Hammond *Mac* II 648-649.

Arr., *Anab.* 7.9.2-3; Just. 8.5.7, 8.6.1-2. (Alexander's Opis speech). Such a reorganization not only improved the defense of the realm, it also made the locals more responsive to central authority. The incorporation of upper Macedonia never advanced as far as that of lower Macedonia under the Argead kings, however, since the regional ethnic is used to locate the origins of Nearchus' officers from the west (*Arr. Ind.* 18). To a certain extent
this was due to the relatively recent annexation of the region, and the preoccupation of the Argead kings after Philip II with other problems. See also, Hammond Mac II, 657-662; Harry J. Dell, "Philip and Macedonia's Northern Neighbors," Philip of Macedon, eds. M.B. Hatzopoulos and L.D. Loukopoulos (Athens, 1980), 90-99.

68 Although this is unprovable, it is probable since this is what happened when upper Macedonia was annexed at a later date. Examples of aristocrats given hetairos status as they were transported to the plain include, Alexander the Lyncestian (Berve, Das Alexanderreich II, #37), Leonnatus also from Lyncus (Berve, #466), and Aristonous from Eordaea (Berve, #133), all of whom gained citizenship at Pella. If the family of Antipater was originally from Upper Macedonia, its association with Poliysiros provides another example.

69 This was the case at least by the reign of Archelaus when Greeks are known to have been elevated to hetairos status. Among these was Euripides (Ael. V.H. 13.4, and the Macedonian poet, Adaeus, Acta Philologica 7.51.4; see also C.F. Edson, "Early Macedonia," Ark Mac 1 (1970), 39, note 145). For an indication of Greeks among Philip II's hetairoi see, Isoc. 5.19. For Alexander III's reign see Berve, Das Alexanderreich II, numbers 17, 139, 253, 258, 292, 302, 308, 317, 464, 521, 544, 719, and 788.
Here, Cassander's gift of land upon his accession to a Perdiccas (Berve Das Alexanderreich II, 626), son of Coenus, from Cassandreia (Ditt. Syll3 332) is valuable. Here Cassander grants a renewed title to some land which had been held by Perdiccas' family in previous generations. Although the situation must have been affected somewhat by the change in royal dynasties making Perdiccas nervous for his holding, it seems that such reaffirmations were essential for the transfer of old loyalties to new kings at all times (see E.R. Errington, "Macedonian Royal Style and Its Historical Significance," JHS 94 (1974) 20-37, esp. 23 f.). Cassander could not have dispossessed many such aristocrats without fearing for his power, and to a certain degree a similar situation would have faced all new kings. On the implications of this grant upon the king's status as a "feudal" lord see, F. Hampl, Der König der Makedonen (Leipzig, 1934) 66-77.

Hammond Mac II, 158-159 argues that the betairoi composed a council at latest by the early fifth century, based upon Hdt. 8.138.1. See my discussion of this passage in Chapter Four, section two—since this reference occurs in the middle of a folk story, it seems that Hammond's constitutional conclusions are unfounded. Griffith Mac II 395-404 (esp. argues against the existence of an advising council in Macedonia. Rather, he believes, any advising
sought by the king was met when the Macedonians informally communicated with the monarch, and thus with such open access, the formal council did not need to function.

71 Hammond and Griffith *Mac* II 154, 401-402. Philip seems to have expanded the institution. His reign, having overseen the incorporation of Upper Macedonia, would have had a use for such methods of coercion far beyond earlier reigns. Arrian (*Anab.* 4.13.1) reports that Philip established the Royal Pages, probably a mistake for its increased importance during his reign.

72 As was certainly the case with the contemporaries of Alexander III who "enjoyed" the tutorship of Aristotle for three years (*Plut* *Alex.* 7.1 f.).

73 The Athenians admired the rhetorical abilities of Philip II if little else. No doubt the same skill came in handy as others, especially Antipater, were used diplomatically (*Diod.* 19.69; *Polyb.* 5.10.4; *Plut* *Dem.* 22; *Just.* 9.4.5).

74 Hammond *Mac* II 155-156.


76 *Curt.* 8.8.3.

78 See above note 66.

79 This is an inference, but it seems unlikely that the Argeads at any time completely replaced a local aristocracy after the conquest of a new region. Rather, what occurred in Asia was probably what had occurred in Macedonia earlier—that is, certain families were kept on, while others (the most adament foes of the new house, surely) were replaced by men already in the service of the Argeads.

80 "Macedonian" towns should not be confused with the Greek cities along the coast originally independent of royal authority. These Greek towns were added mostly by Philip II (Griffith, *Mac* II 348-382), at which time some were allowed to maintain themselves without autonomy (like Pydna), and others were forced to disperse (like Methone) with their land distributed to Macedonians.

81 Hammond, *Mac* 647-649, argues persuasively that citizenship in lower Macedonia existed on two levels: a man could be a citizen of a city as well as of the realm at large. To be a citizen of Pella, however, did not necessarily make someone a "Macedonian". The latter status
was probably distributed by the monarch, but its precise relationship to localities is unknown.

82 We know of no inherited offices in Macedonia, nor do we know of an official *cursus honorum* which graded those who served the king. It seems that the *hetairoi* class provided the king with a pool of talent from which he drew to fit his needs. Undoubtedly there was an unofficial pecking order among the *hetairoi*, but it appears that appointments were made on the basis of what had to be done, and that they had no chronological limit. The best examples of how an *hetairos* could be used, are those of Parmenion (Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* II, 606) and Antipater (94). 83 Hammond *Mac* II, 69-91, 104-115; M. Price, *The Coins of the Macedonians* (London, 1974), 11-19.

84 Above, note 81. Polyperchon (Berve *Das Alexanderreich* II, #654) of Tymphaea, Perdiccas (Berve II, #627) of Orestis, and Leonnatus (Berve II, #466) of Lyncus were all singled out as Macedonian in status. As any citizen of the United States should recognize, multiple citizenships (county, state, national) can be an effective way to large numbers of people. The levels need not be exclusive, however, and although I think Hammond right when he denies that all dwellers of a district or town were also
"Macedonians", our sources are inconclusive on this point.

85 It seems certain that at least some of the men listed in note 68 were "Macedonians", as it also appears sure that those in note 84 held local citizenships.

86 Arr. Anab. 3.16.11; Diod. 17.57.2. Certain units (e.g. the agema), however, were recruited for talent, regardless of origin. See Griffith, Mac II, 408-428 for a convenient summary of military organization.

87 A part of these almost certainly extensive estates could be granted to whomever the king desired, including foreigners (Diod. 6.20, Thuc. 1.58.2). Philip II received a grant of land from his brother Perdiccas in the 360s (Caryst. Perg. F 1 FHG 4.356) large enough to maintain troops of his own. For the importance of gifts, see this chapter, section four. See also Thuc. 2.100.3 and Pl. Gorg. 471b, where two brothers of Alexander seem also to have held land from the king.

88 Diod. 6.20; Thuc. 1.58.2, 2.100.3; Caryst. Perg. F 1 FHG 4.356; Pl. Gorg. 471b; Plut. Alex. 15.4, 39.10; and Ditt. Syll\(^3\) 332. On "spear won" land see Hammond, Mac II, 156.

90 *Ibid.* 102-103; 113-115; see also pp. 180 f. below. Although he had captured the important ford at Nine-Ways in the 470s, by the mid-460s Alexander had lost control of the Strymon River and the lands to its east to the Edoni (Thuc. 1.100.3). The ultimate establishment of Amphipolis as an Athenian colony in 437/36 made Argead control of this area even more difficult (see R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* corrected edition (London, 1973) 195 f.).


92 See above, p.169 with notes 55f.

93 Especially since no national coinage existed until the time of Alexander I. Since the establishment of one system did not occur before the early fifth century, the kings were either unable or unwilling to simplify the coinages under their authority before that time. The multiplicity of issues in Macedonia until Alexander may imply that
currency did not play much of a role in the early kings' financial affairs.


95 Hdt. 5.18.1-21; Just. 7.3.9. Since Amyntas married his daughter Gygaea to the Persian Bubares, and since Alexander I served the Persians well until 479 (see below, Chapter Four, notes 44 and 45), it seems most likely that the story about the murder of the Persian envoys recorded in this passage of Herodotus must be rejected as a later invention to put distance between the Argead house and the Persians in Europe. What remains of Herodotus' account of the arrival of the Persians in Macedonia after this is done, is that Amyntas quickly medized without incident.

96 The Persians must have given Amyntas part of Mygdonia to assure his loyalty since Amyntas had Anthemus in hand by the time that Hippias was exiled from Athens (5.94.1). See Hammond, *Mac II*, 59-60.

97 Hdt. 7.131; Just. 7.4.1.

98 A convenient table summarizing Greek colonization of the northern Aegean can be found in N.G.L. Hammond, *A History of Greece*² (London, 1967), 658. An indication of
the importance of these cities to Athens during the tribute bearing years of the fifth century can be found in Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire*, corrected ed. (London, 1975), 529-530. Of the five Delian League districts (Ionia, Hellespont, Thrace, Caria, Islands) that called Thrace (which includes the cities along the coast of the northern Aegean) consistently provided the largest amount of tribute. For a more complete list see Meiggs pp. 546-551. This surely is an indication of the region's relative wealth. Further proof of this is found in the recent discoveries from the Macedonian plain just to the west of Thessaloniki, now on exhibition in the archaeological museum in Thessaloniki but as yet unpublished. There an ancient burial ground, probably from the not very important city of Sindos, has rendered a considerable quantity of gold from the period ca. 550-450. This find, suggests that the area's larger cities would have been even better endowed. It is little wonder, then, that Athenians such as Pisistratus and Thucydides found it worthwhile to preserve large estates in the north.

On the routes north-south through Macedonia see, especially that along the ancient Axios River see, N.G.L. Hammond, *Migrations and Invasions in Greece and Adjacent Areas* (Park Ridge, N.J., 1976) 21-29. These same highways were used to convey trade—Hammond, *Mac I*, passim.

99. After the establishment of the Delian League,
Thucydides reports (1.98.1) that the first action of its forces was to capture Eion (at the mouth of the Strymon) from the Persians—a testimony to the priority of Athenian need for the resources of the north. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire*, passim., esp. 524-530 and 546-551. The importance of the growing economic relations between Macedonia and Athens is indicated when Herodotus (8.136.1) refers to Alexander I as an Athenian proxenos. This title was bestowed upon benefactors of the city, and in this case was warranted because of the northern origin of stores essential for the maintenance of the Athenian navy.


102 See above note 100.

103 The king could render favor to dead comrades by remitting the taxes and services owed by their descendants (as Alexander did after the Battle of the Granicus River, Arr. *Anab.* 1.16.5, 7.10.4). See also, Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary On Arrian*, 126.
104 The Athenians, for example, were able to colonize the site of Nine Ways on the Strymon River in 465 (Thuc. 1.100.3), which cut Alexander off from the mines near Mt. Pangaeon. Alexander's financial troubles late in his reign are borne out by the diminishing output of his mints, both in terms of the quantity of coins issued and their weight: Price, *The Coins of the Macedonians*, 19.

105 Hammond *Mac* II, 102-103.

106 See note 104. In addition, Elimea certainly had gained a degree of independence by the early reign of Perdikkas (Thuc. 1.57.3). It would have been extremely difficult for the Argeads to have maintained control of the rest of upper Macedonia when the strategic canton of Elimea and the access it provided to the west was not in their control.

107 This is shown best by the decline of Alexander's coinage. Raymond, *Macedonian Regal Coinage*, 126-135; Price, *The Coins of the Macedonians*, 19; Hammond, *Mac* II, 114. It is quite possible that Alexander lost the source of his bullion (especially that extracted from his mines near Lake Prasias—Hdt. 5.17.2) by the end of his reign.

108 For the best available political summary of Macedonia
in the fifth and early fourth centuries, see Hammond, Mac II, 98-104, 115-141, 167-188.

109 After the withdrawal of the Persians, no Aegean power had the resources to intervene inland more than temporarily. The Athenians in the fifth century constituted the greatest threat to the Argead realm after the Persians, but they remained most effective when they concentrated their efforts on their sea empire, as the disastrous attempt to control Boeotia in the 450's proves (Meiggs, The Athenian Empire, 92-128).

110 Thuc. 2.100.2.

111 Ibid.


113 Hammond, Mac II, 139-140 outlines the reasons why it is thought that Archelaus established Pella. Whether Archelaus actually established a city on the cite in the plain, Xenophon (HG 5.2.13) could write of Pella in 382
that it was the most important city in Macedonia, whereas Thucydides does not mention it. Since Thucydides praises Archelaus for his industry in updating his kingdom (2.100.2) it appears logical to attribute at least the expansion of Pella to this king.


115 Although in the fourth century the production of metal vessels for use in Macedonia was most heavily influenced by artistic developments in Athens (B. Barr-Sharrar, "Macedonian Metal Vases in Perspective: Some Observations on Context and Tradition," *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times*, eds. B. Barr-Sharrar and E.N. Borza (Washington, 1982), 123-139), other regions which had an impact on items being produced for Macedonian consumption lay within the boundaries of the Persian Empire (B. Barr-Sharrar, "Observations on the Eastern Influence on Fourth-Century Macedonian Toreutics Before the Conquest of Alexander," *Ark Mac* 4, forthcoming). It seems that there was a close collaboration between Macedonia and the Greek workshops of the eastern Aegean: with either ideas passing freely back and forth, or actual merchandise. In light of the standard of Archelaus' coinage and his probable interest in founding a port city which could easily tap eastern trade, it seems likely that this contact assumed an economic level of some importance. Thus, even with the
retreat of Persia from Macedonia, continued influences were felt in the Argead realm. It can be argued that the Persian control of Macedonia from ca. 510-479 had the effect of drawing the region securely within the economic patterns of the east and south, thereby creating new sources of wealth and enabling astute Argead kings to profit.

116 Some testimony of the wealth available to the kings at the end of the fourth century is found in the artifacts discovered recently in the un plundered royals tombs of Aegae. See M. Andronikos, *The Royal Graves at Vergina* (Athens, 1978), and Appendix Two for a more complete bibliography. In addition to Andronikos' finds at Vergina (Aegae), there is abundant evidence from tombs all over Macedonia that many were wealthy enough to provide themselves with well endowed grave accommodations—both in terms of the expensiveness of the tombs and the contents found therein. On the remains recently discovered in Macedonia see, K. Ninou (ed.), *Treasures of Ancient Macedonia* (Thessaloniki, 1978) and *The Search for Alexander: An Exhibition* (Boston, 1980), which are catalogs of shows presented in Greece and the United States. On the lavishness of Macedonian tombs and their proliferation in the fourth century see, S.G. Miller, "Macedonian Tombs: Their Architecture and Architectural
Decoration," 153-171; on the importance of the metal vases found in many Macedonian graves see, B. Barr-Sharrar, "Macedonian Metal Vases in Perspective: Some Observations on Context and Tradition," 123-139; and on the wealth in jewelry also found in Macedonia see, R.A. Higgins, "Macedonian Royal Jewelry," 141-151, all of which are published in Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times, eds. B. Barr-Sharrar and E.N. Borza (Washington, 1982). The amount of money invested in making the after-life as comfortable as possible for members of many social classes proves that Macedonia was a land of relative abundance. Also, the technical and artistic expertise exhibited in the articles buried suggests that not only were precious metals in good supply, but also that Macedonians were willing to spend heavily to import the very best that the Greek world had to offer in terms of craftsmanship.

117 See above, Chapter One, pp. 30-34.

118 Ibid., 34-37.

119 Amyntas had to contend with two Illyrian invasions (the first of which drove him from his kingdom, while during the second he was able to hold on in some unnamed fortress (Diod. 15.19.2; Isoc. 6.46), perhaps the creation of Archelaus), the growing power of the Chalcidic League,
interventions from both Sparta and Thrace, and the renewed threat of the Second Delian League.

Exactly when an effective infantry began to develop in Macedonia is difficult to state exactly. Thucydides (2.100) mentions an unorganized and ineffectual Macedonian infantry, but there is no important infantry force evident in our sources until the reign of Philip II (although the number of dead [ca. 4000] at the hands of Illyrians when Perdiccas III died implies an attempted use of an infantry force). Philip had not only an infantry, but also an elite force culled from the various local militias because of talent (Theopompus FGrH 115 F 348) which was called the pezhetairoi—at least this is the assumption which is usually made (Griffith, Mac II, 405-408; 705-713). Theopompus does not mention Philip when he describes the pezhetairoi, but since he was a figure at Philip's court the association between Philip II and infantry reform has been made (Griffith, Mac II, 405-406). If this assumption is correct then it is possible that Philip took some interest in reforming the infantry system to make it more effective than it had been under his ill-fated brother. Whether or not he took the step to widely draft middle class soldiers for his army (with a corresponding impact upon the political and social system of Macedonia) is unknown.
The issue is clouded by a reference from Anaximenes (FGrH 72 F4) which refers to an Alexander as having organized the mass of Macedonians into a force known as the pezhetairoi. Is Anaximenes right to attribute the creation of the pezhetairoi to an Alexander, or has he confused a reform of the corps under Alexander III with its foundation (as thought probable by Griffith, Mac II, 707)? If Anaximenes is to be taken literally in this passage, the Alexander referred to as the first to organize the pezhetairoi must have been Alexander II, since no organized infantry is known in Macedonia for almost one-hundred years after Alexander I's death. Regardless, the institution of a viable infantry seems to have dated from the 360s or 350s under either Alexander II or Philip II, after which time the class who made up the pezhetairoi held greater political influence than ever before.

121 See notes 67, 113 above, and Chapter Four, notes 10 and 11 below (on the foundation of Dium) and Thuc. 1.58.2 for probable evidence of urbanization down to the early years of Philip II's reign. Among Philip's foundations was Philippae on the site of Crenides: on this foundation and Philip's policy towards other cities in the north, see Griffith, Mac II, 348-382.

122 Such a change occurred in Macedonia after the mid-fourth century once the Macedonian infantry became
integrated into the military systems of Philip II and Alexander III. For expressions of lower class influence upon Philip during the Third Sacred War (perhaps in part stimulated by Philip's calling out the army in the month of Daeseus [May/June] when it was not customary to do so [Plut Alex. 16.2]): Diod. 16.35.2 f. See also Griffith Mac II 267 f. Also note the infantry's influence at the Hyphasis (Arr. Anab. 5.25.2f.; Curt. 9.2.12f.; Diod. 17.94.12f.) and at Opis (Arr. Anab. 7.8.1f.; Curt. 10.2.12f.; Diod. 17.109.2f.; Just. 12.11.7), and upon the death of Alexander (Chapter Two, section two above). This rather new development was not pleasing to the aristocrats who noted the mitigation of their own influence. For their reaction at Babylon see Chapter Two, section two with the notes.

123 It is probable that Ptolemy's power in the 360's (Chapter One, pp. 38-40) rested upon concessions. Evidence of the hetairoi stepping in to influence the course of events is found immediately after Alexander III's accession (Arr. Anab. 1.25.2; Curt. 7.1.6-7; Just. 11.2.2; Ps. Call. 1.26) and after his death (Curt. 10.6.1f. and above Chapter Two, section 2). Both of these incidents indicate that the emergence of the infantry did not alter the expectations of the aristocrats in terms of their ability to wield influence, but as the joint elevation of Philip III and Alexander IV proves, they were no longer free to force
their perspective upon the lower social orders.

124 See Chapter One, pp. 37-41.

125 Diod. 16.3.1-2.

126 Diod. 16.4.3f.; Arr. Anab. 7.9.2-3; Just. 8.5.7, 8.6.1-2.

127 Hammond Mac II, 661 thinks that Amyntas I and Alexander I also engaged in the transplanting of populations ca. 500 (e.g., the settlement of Eordaea after the original inhabitants were expelled, Thuc. 1.58.2). This probably was an established policy to some extent from the early days of the dynasty. Whether or not there was at the same time an attempt to urbanize these regions, however, is doubtful. It seems that Argead control especially of upper Macedonia depended on the establishment of new life-styles coupled with the construction of forts and roads, as much as on the wholesale shifting of populations.


129 I think Hammond's (Mac II, 647-648) reconstruction of the multiple layers of Macedonian citizenship to be sound:
with those from lower Macedonia eligible for local and national status, while those from upper Macedonia after Philip II could hold an ethnic citizenship in their native canton along with the two kinds open to those of lower Macedonia.

130 The tribal systems of upper Macedonia were reinforced by the practice of transhumance (the migrating of herds on a seasonal basis; see Hammond, *MaC II*, 23). When Philip altered the predominant economic structure of the region, he at the same time attacked its prevailing kinship organization, and thus eroded the strength of his most important local rivals.

131 Str. 7.7.8, 9.5.11; a manumission decree of the second century B.C. (Evangelides, *Ep. Chron.* (1935), 248.3); and Polyb. 18.47.6 all prove that upper Macedonia did not remain under the authority of later Macedonian kings. The reason that Philip's annexation did not last is that his attention, and that of his Argead successors, was directed to larger ambitions. As long as Philip and his son were successful in their endeavors, the incorporation of these districts remained solid. But when troubles beset Macedonia, the incomplete urbanization of the area permitted the eventual break-away.

133 Diod. 16.3.7, 8.6-7; App. *Civil Wars* 4, 105: perhaps the greatest addition to Philip's kingdom was the region around Mt. Pangaeon.


135 Parmenion is the first non-Argead to be identified as having held an independent military command (Plut. *Alex.* 3.8), although it is possible that the Iolaus mentioned by Thucydides (1.62.2) was not of the royal family (see above Chapter One, p. 29 with notes). Iolaus was a name commonly found in the family of Antipater, whose father and one of whose sons was so called (Berve, *Das Alexanderreich II*, #94; "Parmenion (1)," *RE* 18.4, cols. 1559-1565), and thus Thucydides might be referring to an ancestor of Antipater who held a post similar to that held by the later *hetairos* (I thank W.L. Adams for this suggestion).

Parmenion is reported to have commanded against the Illyrians while Philip II was busy attacking the city of Potidaea. Parmenion, of course, continued such commands both under Philip and Alexander III (Berve *Das Alexanderreich II*, #606). Even if unknown commanders
preceded Parmenion with independent commands, the point still holds—that such appointments were allocated only when the king was busy elsewhere.

136 See above, pp. 18f. with notes.

137 Berve, *Das Alexanderreich* II, #'s 94, 606. On Philip's trust and regard for each *hetairos* see especially, Plut. *Mor.* 177C (# 2) and 179B (# 27).

138 Theopompus *FGrH* 115 F 224, 225.

139 As was the case under Cassander: Ditt. *Syll* 3 332.

140 *Somatophylakes* were honorary guards, customarily seven in number, who did no real duty guarding the king. They attended upon him ceremoniously and received status as a result of their appointment (Berve *Das Alexanderreich* I, 25-30; Griffith *Mac* II 403; and esp. Arr. *Anab.* 6.28.3—see also W. Heckel, "The *Somatophylakes* of Alexander the Great: Some Thoughts," *Historia* 27 (1978) 224-228 on the individuals elevated to this rank). As Griffith notes, generally speaking rank was expressed via special hats and cloaks which were gifts from the king (Plut *Eum.* 8.7). Some *hetairoi* were employed much more often than others, as were Antipater and Parmenion, to name but the two most
famous. These two numbered among the kings *philoi* (friends), probably a term which designated a rank relatively more exclusive than that of the *hetairos*, despite the unproven presumption of some scholars (e.g. G.S. Stagakis, "Observations on the *Hetairoi* of Alexander the Great," *Aeg Mak* 1 (1970) 86-102, esp. 92f.) that the terms *hetairos* and *philos* were interchangable in the Argead court. Perhaps the same tendency helps to explain the institutionalization of the term *hypaspists*: once meant literally as "shield bearer" (to the king?), but eventually designating a unit composed of soldiers of a particular status.

Certain men owed their status less to service and more to the king's personal friendship (as was the case of Hephaestion, Berve *Das Alexanderreich* II, #357). Regardless, no apparent distinction in prestige seems to have existed. For a discussion of the importance of "friends" in the Hellenistic kingdoms see, G. Herman, "The 'Friends' of the Early Hellenistic Rulers: Servants or Officials?," *Talanta* 12/13 (1980/81) 103-127. Herman believes that the Hellenistic period saw the increasing legitimation of those so-described with the eventual result that *philos* status became recognized officially in the hierarchies of court titulature.

141 For the infantry see Theop *FGrH* 115 F 348, and this chapter note 120. The Macedonian cavalry was called the
"Companion Cavalry" under Alexander. There were more than 800 of these troops at that time (Griffith Mac II 408-414) which perhaps was the result of an expansion of the group under Alexander. This is uncertain, however, and I think it unlikely that the *hetairoi* in the original sense was quadrupled in size at any time. If a reform of this scope had been effected, some mention of it would be expected in our sources. Considering Philip's military activity, especially culminating in the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 which was won by a decisive cavalry charge (N.G.L. Hammond, "The Two Battles of Chaeronea 338 and 86 B.C.,” *Klio* 31 (1938) 186-218; Griffith Mac II 596-603) it seems likely that there were also more than 800 Macedonian cavalry troops under Philip. Thus, it seems that the term *hetairoi* could apply not only to what we may call the true aristocracy, but also to a broader body consisting of everyone who fought on horse—-one having social and political importance, and the other a military one. The aristocracy would have constituted the core of this force, but they probably had fighting retainers who enjoyed the prestige of a lesser *hetairos* status as it applied to their cavalry units. We probably have some indication of how such units were formed in Caryst. Perg. F 1, *FHG* 4.356 where Philip II before his accession is shown raising troops and supporting them on his own.
142 Price, *The Coins of the Macedonians*, 20-24. It again was altered under Alexander III to conform to the Attic standard.

143 Diod. 16.8.6 mentions an income from the gold mines near Philippae alone on 1,000 talents. See Bellinger, *Coins of Alexander*, 35-36. In addition to the income Philip enjoyed through the exploitation of Macedonian resources, taxes, the lands annexed through expansion, and the spoils of war, Hammond (*Mac II*, 659-660) believes a vast expansion of arable land took place at the time, in part the result of the draining of the swampy Macedonian plain. Borza, however, ("Some Observations on Malaria and the Ecology of Central Macedonia in Antiquity," 114-115 questions whether the technology of the period would have allowed so large an engineering feat.

The widespread dispersion of Philip's coinage is a testament to the amount of money at his command (on Philip's coinage see, G. Le Rider, *Le Monnayage D'Argent et D'or de Philippe II* (Paris, 1977)).

144 On the state of the Macedonian treasury upon the accession of Alexander, however: Plut., *Alex.* 15.1-3, *On the Fortune of Alexander II*, 2; Curt. 10.11; Arr., *Anab.* 7.9.6.

The preceding chapter outlined the Argead kings' military, political, social, and economic responsibilities. Although these secular duties were vital for the functioning of Macedonian society, they did not constitute all of the obligations associated with royal authority. The Macedonian king was also the most important religious figure of his realm—with sacred duties running the spectrum from discovering the will of the gods to placating whatever divinities might threaten the welfare of the state. The religious element of Macedonian kingship has long been recognized by scholars, but it has yet to be integrated into the mainstream of historical reconstruction, and it has not been seen as a major influence on royal actions and attitudes—this, despite the fact that these functions were interwoven intimately with the royal duties already considered.\(^1\) Religion was vital to the kings for two reasons: on the one hand, the monarch's religious obligations seem to have built up his people's expectations concerning their welfare, thus tending to influence what he must do before taking any action; and on the other, it also strengthened the legitimacy of royal authority, as well as that of the house
which claimed exclusive right to the kingship.

That the Macedonian kings carried out several kinds of religious functions is certain. These included: participation in cult sacrifices of both national and familial importance; organization of national festivals; association with sites of important regional cults; intercession with divine powers on behalf of the Macedonian people especially before military conflict; consultation with divine authority concerning the future; presiding over funerals of those who died in battle and royal predecessors; and purification of those who returned from war (for the relevant citations, see the following). The combination of these functions made the king the most important religious figure of the realm.

The royal interest in cult participation is outlined in three references from the reign of Alexander, which in this regard, as in so many others, provides an abundance of detail absent from our surviving accounts of earlier reigns. Curtius mentions that Arrhidaeus, the later Philip III, was associated with his half-brother in certain sacrifices performed before a Macedonian audience.² Athenaeus, in turn, records a second incident in which Olympias wrote to Alexander to urge him to buy a certain slave who possessed special skills in religious ceremonies
including those important rites which she called "Argead".3 The third is provided by Arrian, who reports that in 323, as Alexander was succumbing to the fever which was soon to kill him, he took care to attend to his routine sacrificial duties.4

These brief references carry much importance. It seems clear from the last that certain sacrifices were of such importance that even an extremely ill king could not feel at ease if he failed to perform them. The first two link another family member with sacrificial ceremonies performed publicly, and refer to apparently official rites by the name of the royal house. Taken together such duties suggest that the monarch maintained a kind of pax deorum, an impression fortified by other incidents recorded in our sources.5 That the private and public aspects of the Argead's religious responsibilities were so intertwined as to be inseparable should come as no surprise in light of the discussion in Chapter Three which underscores the link between the king's private and public lives in the social and political spheres. Exactly what gods were so placated, however, cannot be identified. Probably, many gods were so honored by the king, with his priorities dictated by time and place.6 Zeus in several forms certainly was included (perhaps especially as he was associated with the sun-fire-hearth cult, as discussed in section two of this chapter), as was Heracles the ancestor
of the royal line. 7

It is probable that the religious duties of the king over time went far to distinguish the Argeads from all other Macedonian families. If there once had been separate rites associated with the Argead family on the one hand, and the kingship on the other (perhaps a big "if"), they almost certainly would have merged over time to incline every Macedonian to think only an Argead capable of adequately performing those ceremonies related specifically to the throne. It is possible that the cult of Zeus Hetaireios implies just this sort of increasing identification, since the relationship between the king and his companions thus respected, was that between the Argead monarch and his closest associates. 8

Concerning the realm's national festivals, we can say very little beyond that we know some were held. By the fourth century the most important was the celebration in honor of Olympian Zeus held each October (the beginning of the Macedonian year) in the month dedicated to Zeus (Dios), at the site dedicated to the same god (Dium). 9 Yet another festival to Olympian Zeus seems to have been celebrated at Aegae during the same month but probably not on the same days. 10 The festival at the ancestral residence of the Argead house was undoubtedly the older of the two, but with the historical shift away from Aegae (represented politically and economically by the establishment of Pella as the Macedonian capital around 400), a stimulus for
similar celebrations elsewhere was provided.\textsuperscript{11} A different figure, Xanthus, was honored in the spring of the year.\textsuperscript{12} Xanthus was a hero with strong military associations, and his festival, coming as it did at the beginning of the campaigning season, probably attempted to evoke his protection in the warfare sure to come.

As to the king's association with important religious sites, this seems to have developed concurrently with the expansion of the Argead realm. With the increasing importance of Dium (at the base of Mount Olympus) as the religious center of the kingdom in the fourth century, the Argeads confirmed their patronage of religious rites whose fame far transcended the local area.\textsuperscript{13} A similar policy to dominate the well known mysteries celebrated on the island of Samothrace was instituted by Philip II, who was the first king to bring the Thracian coast of the northern Aegean firmly under Macedonian control.\textsuperscript{14} Thereafter, both Dium and Samothrace flourished as religious sites of national significance, as subsequent Argeads preserved an association with their religious rites. Even the Hellenistic houses (in order to justify new dynastic foundations) appealed to their fame and popularity.\textsuperscript{15} It seems evident that this kind of royal patronage was an attempt by Macedonian monarchs to tap the strong religious feelings of their subjects, and thus to strengthen control of the throne.
The king also marshalled the religious loyalty of his people by acting as a general intercessor between them and the realm of the gods at times when divine protection was most crucial. The religious inclination of each king probably determined which gods would be most called on during his reign—much as Alexander was known to have had favorites. Heracles, the mythical ancestor of the Argead house and a figure of physical prowess, was perhaps most often approached. Nevertheless, perhaps the most famous appeal of this sort came in 331 at Gaugamela, where Alexander raised his lance to the sky and shouted something to the effect that if he really were a scion of Zeus, then Zeus should defend and fortify his army in its battle against the Persians. Another well known incident involving an appeal for protection came after two defeats in the Third Sacred War, when Philip II decked his army with garlands sacred to Apollo in order to invoke the god's aid as the Macedonian army fought to defend his Delphic shrine.

Another important duty of the Macedonian king was to ascertain the will of the gods concerning the future. This was done in several ways. Omens could be discovered accidentally, or sought through the use of manteia. As is evident from several incidents during Alexander III's lifetime any unnatural occurrence was cause for interpretation—including unusual winds, strangely marked animals or sacrificial victims which behaved in ominous
ways, idiosyncratic springs, the discovery of unusual substances such as oil, the flight of birds, the turnabout of the natural order of beasts of prey and their victims, and astronomical phenomena. In these cases, specially trained experts would go to work in order to soothe the fears of the king and his army. Although favorable interpretations of such occurrences often resulted, this was not always the case.

Beyond accidentally sighted omens, formal ceremonies were often held in public to seek what the future might hold. At certain moments such rites seem to have been expected and were provided to reinforce the feeling that the gods' will was being met. In the event that the resulting omens did not bode well, as with the accidental signs, they were disregarded to the peril of all concerned. The king had difficulty in overruling a bad sign, and most often probably avoided doing so because to a certain degree his ability to lead successfully depended upon the enthusiasm of his people who were always interested in what the gods had to say.

In addition to these duties, the king had to preside over ceremonies dedicated to the recognition and appeasement of those who had died fighting. Loosely associated with this obligation was the monarch's concern over the health of those under his authority who were sick or wounded. A similar attitude of concern also had to be
preserved towards his predecessors, and this made the burial of the dead king an important part of the process which transferred authority to the new ruler.\textsuperscript{28} The need to placate former monarchs gone to the netherworld also caused the Argeads to institute hero worship in their memory—an important safeguard for those left living.\textsuperscript{29}

Beyond the duties described above, there were others which continuously reaffirmed the monarch's special religious status. These included the organization of purification rites, the stewardship of the cults honoring the royal relationship with the \textit{hetairoi}, the sacrifices to local deities before entering towns, the dedication of cities, and the participation is ritualistic dances.\textsuperscript{30}

The religious element of Macedonian kingship not only arose every day, but many times a day, and in many different ways. The total accumulation of religious tradition acted as both a spur and a check to authority, with the worst of all possibilities resulting if sacred traditions were not respected.\textsuperscript{31} It seems, however, that these responsibilities did not constitute for the most part an excessive burden on the Argead kings, because they seem to have possessed a reverence for religious custom common to their countrymen.\textsuperscript{32}

Religious authority was extremely important for the preservation of a marked distinction between the kings and the rest of Macedonian society. As long as the monarch could practice and control religious institutions and
rituals, and as long as the maintenance of these affairs was deemed essential by the population over which he ruled, then it would be construed as dangerous to alter social arrangements in such a way as to abolish the monarchy. But, as with the king's secular responsibilities, there is no absolute reason why such duties could not have been performed by non-Argeads. The complete identification of the Argead family with the obligations of the kingship, however, was not left to chance by the Argeads themselves. From as early as we are able to determine, and probably from the very beginning of their dynasty, the Argeads took pains to establish their unique sacred status. It is to these attempts that we now must turn.

How did the Argead dynasty manipulate its religious authority in order to justify a qualitatively different and superior political power? Before the reign of Alexander I (but probably ancient already by the fifth century) the royal family's cult duties were woven into a mythological foundation which operated as propaganda to promote its interests. Although the specifics of this foundation myth changed over time (see Chapter One, pp. 16-27 and below), the dynasty was consistently portrayed by its scions, and
almost certainly by all Macedonians, as specially chosen by
the gods to rule over a kingdom which, with continual
divine support, would prosper. Other aristocratic
families, especially in the mountainous west, might have
resisted Argead encroachment on their independence, but
none in the historical period challenged the higher
religious prestige of the Argeads. Surely, other factors
such as geographical location and greater material
resources played a deciding role in the ultimate Argead
success in the unification of Macedonia, but it was the
religious justification of that family's authority which
seems to have secured a place for the Argeads at the apex
of the social order.

The first evidence to consider in this regard comes
from Herodotus, who tells the story of three brothers,
Gauanes, Aeropus, and Perdiccas.35 These youths were the
descendants of the mythological founder of the
Peloponnesian city of Argos, Temenus. These emigrants fled
their home and by way of Illyria travelled to the town of
Lebæa (of unknown site) in Upper Macedonia. There the
three brothers hired themselves out to a king who employed
them to herd respectively his horses, cattle, and lesser
animals (i.e., sheep and goats).36 As Herodotus tells us,
theirs was a simpler age and the king himself was poor.
His wife cooked for the household, and as she did so, she
noticed that the bread she baked for Perdiccas always rose
to double its expected size. Upon mentioning this fact to
her husband, he thought that something odd indeed was afoot and called before him the three youths. At that time he dismissed them from his service and his kingdom. They, in turn, requested the wages they had earned, and once paid, agreed to leave. The king then thought he could cheat his workers out of their due and (temporarily losing his senses), looking on the sunlight which fell on his hearth, told them that it would be the only pay they would receive. The two eldest brothers, Gauanes and Aeropus, were not pleased with this development, but Perdiccas took his knife, encircled with it the ground illuminated by the sunbeam, and agreed to accept the king's offer of compensation. He then embraced the light three times and left with his older siblings.

After they had left, an hetairos of the evil king suggested that Perdiccas' display had not been without meaning, and this worried the king. In order to avert any possible negative repercussions, he sent men after the youths in order to kill them. This plot failed, however, when a river overflowed and protected the brothers by cutting off their pursuit. So crucial was this flooding to their safety that in later periods, the Argeads sacrificed to the river as their savior. The area to which the brothers escaped was a land near the fabled Gardens of Midas and the nearby Mount Bermium. In their new home they established the city of Aegae, from which their power
spread until eventually they had conquered all of Macedonia. Therefore, the destiny foretold by the miraculous events begun in Upper Macedonia was fulfilled.

An interpretation of this myth must first consider its historical content. Hammond believes that its accuracy is quite high—in fact, he argues that this story broadly outlines how the family of Perdiccas came to Macedonia and began its conquest of that region. Hammond is convinced that the Macedonian royal family could confirm its Temenid heritage, not only because Herodotus says so at this point, but also because he provides corroborating evidence elsewhere, and because Thucydides reports as much as well.

Considering the additional evidence in Herodotus first, he records an episode in which Alexander I successfully applied to compete in the Olympic Games. When his Hellenic credentials were challenged by some who doubted his Greek ancestry, Alexander argued the case for his descent from Temenus before the proper authorities. These judges are said to have heard the evidence and objectively pronounced Alexander eligible to compete, thus acknowledging his "Greekness" at the most important of the pan-hellenic sporting festivals. Hammond argues that this verification alone confirms the Temenid roots of the Macedonian royal house, and further, that after this episode its heritage would have been widely accepted throughout the south. As for the testimony of Thucydides,
Hammond thinks it (in conjunction with Herodotus) to be unassailable proof that the origin of the Macedonian royal house was indeed in the Peloponnesian city of Argos. Since Hammond accepts this ancestry, his need to trace the route by which the family came to Macedonia leads him to the above myth with its itinerary. He, therefore, accepts its story-line as essentially historical.

Hammond's case, however, is not as open and shut as he contends. First of all, it is very possible that Thucydides' reference to the Temenids is not independent of Herodotus' testimony. Even if Thucydides did not directly rely upon Herodotus for this information, it is certain that both drew upon the official version of the royal genealogy sanctioned by the Argeads themselves. Thus, regardless of the immediate source of Thucydides' information, he probably drew on the same tradition as Herodotus, which, as it happens, is at the very least a suspect one. Badian and Borza have both recently doubted the accuracy of the information which Herodotus received concerning the Macedonian royal family in general, and Alexander I in particular. Essentially, their scepticism is stimulated by the pro-Hellenic portrayal of Alexander in Herodotus while the king in reality continued to be a favored ally of the Persian king, Xerxes. This apparent incongruity is best explained by seeing the manifestations of Alexander's philhellenism before the final Persian
defeat in 479 as the product of later invention. It is difficult to understand how Alexander could have hidden from Xerxes any philhellenic tendencies as long as the Persian king had interests in Europe. Since Xerxes, who was not known for his magnanimity towards those who were the friends of his enemies, never treated Alexander as a traitor, it seems most likely that the Macedonian king had not engaged in treasonous activities.

With such suspicion thrown upon the stories circulated by the ruling Argead king, we should approach other statements in his interest with caution. In this light we must consider the judgment at Olympia that Alexander was of Greek ancestry. Unfortunately, we have no independent confirmation that Alexander competed in these games, so that even the year in which he might have done so is not known. Borza for one doubts that Alexander competed in the Games at all, but even if he did, it is uncertain whether his acceptance was generated out of a regard for his "Greekness" or out of an astute sense of political priority. If Alexander's appearance at Olympia dated to the 470s as Badian believes, then he had already served the Greek cause against the Persians, albeit, only after it was obvious that the Persians would be beaten. In this case, his recognition as a Greek by the Olympian judges could have served well as a reward for his change of heart. Even more importantly, however, would have been Alexander's potential usefulness for the future. If the
Persians were to return across the northern Aegean (which they never did, but which remained a possibility in the 470s), a pro-Greek Macedonian king could have provided an important buffer for the south. What better way was there to drive a permanent wedge between Alexander and his former Persian masters than to embrace him as a fellow Greek and then to celebrate this recognition shortly after the Greek victory at an event which would be well publicized? From Alexander's perspective, what better way was there to improve his standing with the new powers of the region than to appeal to their beloved cultural heritage, recently vindicated in their struggle with an overwhelmingly powerful barbarian foe?

With so many doubts existing about Alexander's visit to Olympia, Hammond's claim that the incident settles the argument over his family's origins cannot be accepted. With our best evidence on behalf of the Greek origins of the Macedonian royal house thus of dubious quality we must ultimately evaluate the Temenid ancestry issue based upon other considerations. In this light, it is instructive to recall that for decades after Alexander I, many southern Greeks continued to consider the Macedonian royal house barbarian. In addition, we must remember that many nations throughout antiquity (most of manifestly non-Greek origin) claimed a mythological connection with the Greek world. Once the shakiness of the Argead ties to the
Peloponnesian Argos is seen next to the tendency of many non-Greeks to associate themselves mythologically with the Hellenic world, the historicity of the Temenid connection with the Argead dynasty is cast into doubt. It seems more reasonable to suggest that the Macedonian royal family was northern in origin, that it was known as the Argead (and not the Temenid as Hammond contends) royal house, and that there was no journey from Argos via Illyria as Herodotus reports.

This does not mean that the myth was unimportant for the Argeads. Hammond has already hinted at the religious importance which lay hidden beneath its mythological mantle and which more than justified its broadcast in and beyond Macedonia. Considering the story from this perspective, if we dissect Herodotus' account, there are two points which depict divine favor and which mark Perdiccas as unique among all Macedonians, including his brothers. A third changes the point of view slightly, so that the favor showered upon Perdiccas descends upon him in conjunction with his siblings.

The first of these incidents involves the "miracle of the loaves" by which an undefined divine power hallmarks Perdiccas' special destiny. The means by which this distinction comes to Perdiccas is very revealing—the doubling of his meal portion bespeaks of an association with fertility which would be especially important to a monarch whose job would involve the nurturing of fecundity.
within his kingdom. On another level, this symbol heralded the political growth and success of the kingdom which Perdiccas would found.

The second point to note concerns Perdiccas' embrace of the sunbeam on the evil king's hearth. Here again Perdiccas is distinguished from his brothers, but here he plays an active role in the process, perhaps in part justifying his uniqueness among the members of his family. As How and Wells have noted, the hearth here represents the focal point of the king's oikos, and by extension, his kingdom. By accepting these as payment, Perdiccas lays claim not only to what the king possessed, but also to his status. In this regard the sun is a symbol of great significance and was far more important to the general recognition of Perdiccas' claims than How and Wells realized. Certainly, by embracing the light as he does, Perdiccas claims the sun as his witness and demands that it uphold the validity of his royal claim, but the episode had even greater symbolic value in Macedonia. Diodorus reveals that Aegae bore the nickname of the "hearth of the kingdom" ("εἰκὸς ἡ Μακεδονίκη βασιλεία") in the third century B.C. This label was ancient by that date, so that by embracing the light upon the mythological hearth Perdiccas seems to have laid claim to Aegae, the original capital of the Argead dynasty.

To make the symbolism behind this image even more
significant, it is known that a sun-fire-hearth cult was probably the single most important form of religious expression in the Thracian areas of the north Aegean from the Neolithic period onward.\textsuperscript{56} Aegae itself lay in the region called Pieria—so named from the Thracian tribe which originally controlled the area until the Argeads displaced them and established their own authority.\textsuperscript{57} Thus, this myth almost certainly was very old by the time of Alexander I, and represented the Argead assumption of an indigenous cult formerly maintained by the displaced rulers of the territory.\textsuperscript{58} There appears no escaping the recognition that the memory of this transition remained powerful to the Macedonians as the Argeads claimed an intimate association with the gods of the lands they afterward controlled.

Besides the notice in Diodorus which implies that a hearth cult remained important throughout the Argead period, we may have an indication that the scene from Herodotus was ceremoniously reproduced in the historical period because of his reference to a "μάθημα" at this point\textsuperscript{59}—a kind of knife often used in cult ceremonies. Herodotus presents this kind of implement in two other sacred contexts, but since he also uses the term at least once in a non-religious sense, certainty upon this point cannot be maintained.\textsuperscript{60}

The third religious aspect of this story concerns the miraculous overflowing of the river which saved the
brothers from capture and death. Herodotus specifically mentions that the Argeads continued to worship the river in his own time, and it is this confirmed cult practice which reinforces the impression that the other religious elements in this myth maintained their potency into the fifth century, at which time their appeal still reinforced Argead prestige. Since this salvation continued to be celebrated, it is certain that it too reaffirmed the Argead's special status, as it reinforced their ability to defend what the gods had given.

Considering all of the aspects of this myth, it is safe to say that not only Perdiccas' direct descendents, but all of the Argead family to some degree shared a special religious status in Macedonian society. It is also possible that the myth in a general way records the migration of an upland people to the Macedonian piedmont on the edge of the great plain, where they began an important era of expansion. Since this settlement pattern was reproduced often in later times this would be hardly surprising. This, however, does not take us very far historically, and should not lead us back to Hammond's position. Regardless of the degree of its historicity, the religious content of this tale should not be underestimated, as its legitimization of the Argeads more than justifies the myth's power and repetition. As long as the link between divine authority and the inheritance of
the dynasty's founder was accepted, it provided an almost insurmountable obstacle to any non-Argead with designs upon the throne of Macedonia. That the Argeads were continuously careful to cultivate their politically potent religious associations is evident even after Caranus replaced Perdiccas as the dynasty's founder, since we know of Delphic oracles which established for Caranus a similar justification for his authority. Thus, myth reflecting cult practice helped to prevent a shift in the existing Macedonian power structure out of the fear that any change might affect the religious health of the kingdom.

Although this story is the most important evidence we have for the Argead manipulation of divine association, it does not stand alone. Reference has already been made to alternative versions of the foundation myth. Whether or not my arguments in Chapter One concerning the dating of the invention of Caranus are correct, the fact that Caranus replaced Perdiccas in the king list and that Delphic oracles at different times commanded both Caranus and Perdiccas to found the historical Macedonian kingdom, confirm a consistent appeal to mythological propaganda by the royal family. In addition, the use of early Macedonian kings in this way was not limited to foundation tales. Justin in his brief summary of early Macedonian history mentions two episodes which were used by the Argeads of the historical period to cement the association between their ancestors and divine favor. Caranus is
depicted as having driven goats before his armies so that these beasts would precede his military enterprises just as they had his foundation of Aegae—an obvious appeal to the divine sanction for his reign.\

A second incident refers to the reign of Aeropus, who was thought to have come to the throne as an infant. Legend had it that a battle had been fought and lost by the Macedonians without the young monarch being present. When the young king was produced, a second engagement ensued which reversed the initial defeat. Justin explicitly states that the Macedonians brought Aeropus to the battlefield in order 1) to put him in physical peril and thus cause the Macedonians to fight harder, and 2) to tap the religious power inherent in his person in order to make victory possible. No more explicit example of the coupling of divine and royal power is available. The broadcast of these associations certainly would have reinforced in the minds of the Macedonians the importance of the Argead heritage to the throne of Macedonia.

Argead kings also manipulated the religious importance of their family on their coinage. From the first royal issues of Alexander I, the types produced were exclusively religious. Whatever else the Argeads meant to accomplish by the choice of their coin-types, they at least meant to benefit by their association with well-known religious symbolism. For the most part, however, the types upon
fifth century coins were not exclusive to the Argead kingdom. Rather, the types which resemble those issued by other authorities undoubtedly indicate how closely akin, in a religious sense, the Macedonians were with their neighbors.

Since Argead coins often carried images which were common throughout the north beyond Macedonia, fifth century Argead coinages did little to distinguish the status of the royal family within their kingdom. By the end of the century, however, this had begun to change, as specific references to Heracles (at first limited to the reverse and to symbols which only suggested the progeniture of the Argeads, including clubs, quivers, and bows) began to circulate with increasing frequency.68 Late in the reign of Perdiccas II, a bust of Heracles was placed on the obverse of coins, where the type became even more frequent during the reign of Amyntas III.69 The references to Heracles, unlike the other religious motifs employed by the Argeads, were designed to remind everyone of their origin in the Peloponnesian city of Argos, and hence their history which led to the foundation of their kingdom.

Philip II and Alexander III continued their family's manipulation of religious symbolism to the point where it becomes difficult to determine whether they intended to profit merely by an association with the gods, or whether they planned to claim divine status for themselves.70 During Philip's reign, for example, probably sometime in
the 350s when it would have been politically useful, an oracle was broadcast which foretold that a son of Amyntas would lead the Macedonian kingdom to unprecedented heights of success.\textsuperscript{71} Since Philip was the last living son of Amyntas III, such a prophesy would have increased his popularity, especially after his policies began to look as if they would be successful. Also, as previously mentioned, Philip played with divine favor in a different way in the middle years of his reign, when he turned defeat into success in the Third Sacred War. Having been defeated twice by the Phocians, Philip revitalized his army's flagging morale by making it assume crowns of laurel as it proceeded to a third engagement.\textsuperscript{72} This appeal to the Delphian Apollo almost certainly would have conjured up the oracles provided by the same god concerning the foundation of Argead Macedonia.

Philip's precise intentions concerning his relationship to divine authority are difficult to pinpoint by the end of his reign. In a famous episode difficult to interpret in its entirety, Philip had his image carried with those of the twelve Olympian gods immediately before his assassination. It seems clear that he intended to benefit by a close identification with these important divinities, but whether by having his image paraded on a par with those of the gods he meant to say more, is unknown.\textsuperscript{73}
Alexander's religiosity has received much scholarly attention and needs no detailed review at this point. I merely wish to point out here that however deeply personal Alexander's religious emotions might have been, he certainly understood their value as propaganda. Alexander was careful to cultivate a proper relationship with the gods, but he was equally concerned with publicizing this image. This led him not only to select Callisthenes (who was inclined to depict him as divinely favored) as his court historian, but also to model his career upon the mythological adventures of especially Heracles and Dionysus. Indeed, Alexander went out of his way to create propaganda showpieces which not only facilitated his conquest of Persia, but which also played upon the emotions of his Macedonian troops. In this regard, the episode at Gordium is perhaps the most important. By loosening the famous Gordium knot Alexander laid claim to the mastery of Asia in accordance with an ancient prophecy associated with the establishment of the family of Midas, the mythical king of the Phrygians. In addition, however, this feat also reminded the Macedonians of the widely accepted association of Midas with Macedonia, for it was believed—with some basis in truth—that Midas and his Phrygians had once ruled that land. In effect, Alexander's victory over the knot had a special significance: he could not only claim to have solved its riddle, he could also claim to be following directly in the footsteps of Midas, who
represented an earlier migration from Macedonia to Asia.

As with Philip II, however, it is not known whether Alexander by the end of his life aspired to be recognized personally as divine. This is not the place to open the long standing debate over Alexander's intentions along these lines. He did, in fact receive divine honors, some seemingly before his death. Yet it must be admitted that these might have been unsolicited. In any event, after his death Alexander was generally honored as a god, but—and this is all that needs concern us now—this honor was not delegated to the rest of his family.

All of the above evidence indicates that the Argeads had a long standing tradition of enhancing their associations with divine authority. This policy operated at several different levels, but it consistently pointed to a unique status within the Macedonian kingdom for the royal family. In a society as flexible as the Macedonian, the manipulation of religious propaganda along with the due maintenance of traditional military, political, social, economic and religious responsibilities, significantly distinguished the Argeads from other important families, and guaranteed their monopoly on royal power.
NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1 Representative of modern scholarship are: F. Hampl, Der König der Makedonen (Leipzig, 1934), 15 (who after his brief acknowledgment pays little attention to this function of Macedonian kingship, despite the title of his work); C. Edson, "Early Macedonia," Arc Mak 1 (1970) 23-24; and Hammond Mac II, 155-156, 164-165.

2 Curt. 10.7.2.


4 Arr. Anab. 7.25.3-6.

5 Arr. Anab. 1.11.1; Plut Alex. 23.3; Diod. 16.91.4 and Just. 9.4.1 to cite but four sources who note the king's public responsibilities of a religious nature. See also Berve Das Alexanderreich I, 85-87.

6 Alexander III's religiosity and openness to foreign religious influences were famous, and he sacrificed to many gods in his travels (see L. Edmunds, "The Religiosity of Alexander," GRBS 12 (1971) 363-391).
Zeus Hypsistos was worshipped at least at Aegae and Dium at which annual festivals were held (Hammond Mac II 164, note 2; M. Hatzopoulos, "The Oleveni Inscription and the Dates of Philip II's Reign," Philip II. Alexander the Great, and the Macedonian Heritage, 21-42, esp. 39-42). Zeus Hetaireios was also honored with a festival (Hammond Mac II 158 where his widespread worship implies an ancient cult). Heracles Patrous, Heracles Cynagidas, Heracles Phylacus, and Heracles Propylaeus also had cults (Hammond Mac II 155, 165 with notes for epigraphical references pertaining to sites all over the kingdom). See also T.H. Price, "An Enigma in Pella: The Tholos and Herakles Phylakos," AJA 77 (1973) 66-71; and especially W. Baege, De Macedonum Sacris (Halle, 1913) passim for the collection of ancient evidence relating to this cults. In addition, Livy (42.51.2) mentions the worship of Athena Alcidemus in 171 B.C., but when it was introduced is unknown. The natures of these cults seemingly can be gleaned from the aspects of the gods specifically honored—that is Zeus Hypsistos, "the highest" (probably closely identified with the Olympian Zeus); Zeus Hetaireios, he who oversees "the bonds between king and Companion"; Heracles Patrous, "the founder of the royal family"; Heracles Cynagidas, "overseer of the hunt"; Heracles Phylacus, "the guardian" (overseeing the somatophylakes?); and Heracles Propylaeus, "the guardian of the gate." Some of these obviously honor social bonds
essential to the tranquility of the kingdom.

8 Hammond *Mac* II, 158-159.


10 *Ibid.* Badian, "Greeks and Macedonians," *Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times*, eds. B. Barr-Sharrar and E.N. Borza (Washington, 1982) 36, suggests that the athletic contests held at Diium in honor of the Olympian Zeus and founded during the reign of Archelaus were a kind of "counter-Olympics...[where] Macedonians were free to indulge their competitive ambitions without undergoing the scrutiny of the *Hellanodikai.*" No Macedonian between the time of Alexander I and Philip II is known to have participated in the great Olympic Games, thus leading Badian to conclude that as non-Greeks, Macedonians were not welcome at Olympia. For further consideration of these points, see below this chapter, section 2, pp. 219-221.

11 Since Dion was built directly under Olympus and took Zeus' name, a cult to this god at this site came to surpass that already established at the older Aegae.
12 Held during the month Xanthicus, the festival involved a procession of royal arms dating back to the dynasty's origins, and a mock battle between elements from the army (HSCH Xanthika, SEG 24.502). After the battle, the army ritually cleansed itself by marching between the severed parts of a dog in the fashion described by Curtius (10.9.12) and Livy (40.6). This purification rite was repeated at the end of campaigning seasons (Curt. 10.9.12), and was very important as a means of grooming the soldiers for peacetime after a close contact with potent, destructive forces. This particular ritual of purification is almost certainly much older than the Argead dynasty. For the importance of purification in general and the logic behind its use, see M.P. Nilsson, A History of Greek Religion (New York, 1964) 84f. On the probable origin of this Macedonian custom in human sacrifice, see Nilsson, Griechische Feste von religiöser Bedeutung mit Ausschluss der Attischen (Leipzig, 1906) 405.

13 Dium was an unimportant Macedonian town in the time of Thucydides (4.78.6). It was not until the fourth century that Dium became a site of national importance. The recent excavations of D. Pandermalis have yet to be fully published, but see his introductory pamphlet on the city, Dion (Thessaloniki, 1983). See also above this chapter, note 7.
14 Philip II's earliest known association with Samothrace is recorded by Plutarch (Alex. 2.2). On his subsequent interest, reflected primarily in a building program see, S.G. Cole, The Samothracian Mysteries and the Samothracian Gods: Initiates, 'Theoroi' and Worshippers (Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1975) 90-94; A. Frazer, "Macedonia and Samothrace: Two Architectural Late Bloomers," Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times eds. B. Barr-Sharrar and E.N. Borza (Washington, 1982) 191-203; and below, the appendix on Arrhidaeus.


17 Especially in the form of Heracles Patrous (AD 25 B2.394).

18 Plut *Alex.* 33.1.

19 Just. 8.2.3.


22 For examples from Alexander's reign, including dreams: Arr. *Anab.* 1.11.2, 1.25.6-8, 1.26, 2.18.1, 2.26.4-24, 3.76, 4.15.7-8; Plut *Alex.* 2, 17.4, 24.8-9, 31, 33, 50.4-52.1, 57.4-9; Curt. 4.6.12, 4.10.1, 4.15.27; Pliny *NH* 2.180, 2.228.
The most famous of these seers was named Aristander from the Anatolian city of Telmessus, but he was not alone. Aristander served not only Alexander the Great, but also his father, and thus was a fixture at the Macedonian court in the mid-fourth century. See my article, "A Macedonian Mantis," 17-25.

24 Arr. Anab. 3.2.2, 4.4.2-3; Plut Alex. 33.1; Curt. 4.15.27, 7.7.8. Pritchett, Greek State at War: Religion, 83-90.

25 Arr. Anab. 4.4.3, and esp. 5.28.4 (Here Arrian records Ptolemy to the effect that Alexander sacrificed to cross the Hyphasis River in India in the face of his troops' opposition. When the omens were seen to be unfavorable, Alexander yielded to his men's reluctance to advance. Although many have argued that this was merely a facing saving devise for Alexander [which it in part probably was], it also suggests that public ceremonies of this type could only be disregarded with peril); Curt. 5.4.2, 7.7.22.

26 See especially Curt. 5.4.3; Arr. Anab. 1.16.5, 2.12.1. This, of course, was not a rite restricted to Macedonia.

27 On the royal interest in health, in part "scientific"
and in part magical, see my article, "Macedonia's Kings and the Political Usefulness of the Medical Arts," Arc Mak 4, forthcoming.

28 Diod. 19.52.5. See also below, Chapter Five, note 146. On the Homeric nature of such a practice see and least in the realm of private inheritance see, W.K. Lacey, The Family In Classical Greece (Ithaca, 1968) 47-48.

29 M. Andronikos, "The Royal Tombs at Aigai (Vergina)," Philip of Macedon, eds. M.B. Hatzopoulos and L.D. Loukopoulos (Athens, 1980) 204-205 feels strongly that a rectangular building found under the tumulus along with the royal graves is in fact a heroon, used to appease the dead. A scholion of Dem. 1.5 and a reference in Aris. Or. 38 suggest that Philip II's father was worshipped as a god during Philip's lifetime, but this is very uncertain (see E. Badian, "The deification of Alexander the Great," Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honor of Charles Edson ed. Harry J. Dell (Thessaloniki, 1981) 27-71, esp. 39f. for a discussion and bibliography. Perhaps the ancient references in fact refer to the cult of the dead.

30 Ath 572 E; PAR 1912: 240, 267; BCH 1923: 291; REG 1930: 361, 368; Ditt. Syll3 459; Arr. Anab. 3.2.2; Diod. 15.71.1; Just. 13.4.7; Curt. 10.10.9.
31 As Alexander III realized on the Hyphasis (Arr. *Anab.* 5.28.4).

32 See above this chapter note 16.

33 Although the king is portrayed often in a religious capacity, we only have one brief notice that the Macedonian aristocracy also had some religious duties: Ath. 467C mentions that Marsyas of Pella (a relative of Antigonus the One-Eyed) was a priest of Heracles in his home town. It is almost certain that Marsyas was not alone of his class to have had religious duties, since throughout Greece noble houses commonly held such obligations, but it surely must be revealing that we know relatively so much about the king's sacred responsibilities and so little about those of the *hetairoi*. The obvious conclusion to be drawn from the evidence is that the king dominated religious affairs in Macedonia.

34 Antipater (Berve *Das Alexanderreich* II, #94) is a good example of a non-Argead exercising delegated authority. As Alexander attacked Asia, Antipater was left behind with virtually full control of the Balkans. The absolute dependence of Antipater's authority upon Alexander's is brought home by Alexander's order for Antipater to join the royal army in Asia (an order which was precluded because of
Alexander's death).

35 Hdt. 8.137-139.

36 How and Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus* corrected ed. (London, 1975) 283, suggest that the three brothers respectively oversaw significantly the three groups of animals which were of the greatest importance to Macedonian society. This three-part division, deeply imbedded in an ancient myth, might harken back to the Indo-European tradition which placed great emphasis upon the three-fold division of society. The chief proponent of this Indo-European organization is G. Dumezil, whose anthropological approach to comparative mythology is best summarized in C.S. Littleton, *A New Comparative Mythology* (Berkeley, 1973). If this appearance is in fact an occurrence of the Indo-European legacy (which it well could be since Herodotus notes the significance of the number three elsewhere in the region (5.7-8) and again in this same myth (8.137.5)) then it could be a link between that tradition and the Greek world where it is not well represented.

37 This mention of an "advisor" (the word *hetairos* not actually appearing in Herodotus) alone allows Hammond (Chapter Three, note 98) to argue the existence of a formal advisory council in the early fifth century. Such a conclusion, however, is hardly merited from the context.
38 There was an Argos in Orestis which has led some to assume that this rather than the Peloponnesian Argos was the original home of the Argead dynasty. Hammond (erroneously) rejects this notion (Mac II 3-14). See the following notes 39-62 and my discussion for a refutation of Hammond and further bibliography.

39 Hammond Mac II 10-11.

40 Hdt. 5.22. See also 9.45 where Alexander again refers to his Hellenic ancestry.

41 Thuc. 2.99.3, 5.80.2.


43 Ibid. 7-13; Badian, "Greeks and Macedonians," Macedonia and Greece in the Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times, 34-37.

44 Alexander probably did "warn" the Greeks against holding Tempe (Hdt. 7.173) that Xerxes was preparing to
outflank that position through Perrhaebia (again 7.128, 131). But such a warning was in the Persian interests since if the Greeks retreated from Tempe, Xerxes' route south would be more direct and less time consuming. Alexander, again the good client, approached Athens upon the orders of the Persian satrap, Mardonius, to try to bribe that city away from the Greek alliance (Hdt. 8.136, 140). Also, Alexander's claim that he garrisoned Boeotian cities (Hdt. 8.34) not because of Persian orders, but in fact to protect these cities from Persian abuse, is absurd. In the light of such activity and his continued prominence in Persian eyes, the earlier recorded episode of Alexander's murder of the Persian envoys (Hdt. 5.18-21), and the attempted warning of impending attack before Plataea (Hdt. 9.45) are highly unlikely. After the Persian defeat, however, these incidents could either be interpreted in a favorable light, or invented to strengthen Alexander's ties with Greece. The invented stories would have been difficult to check under any circumstances. Hammond (Mac II 99-101) recognizes that Alexander remained a favored Persian ally through the Battle of Plataea in 479, but accepts his pro-Greek sentiments anyway--attributing the apparent difficulty to Alexander's skill at double diplomacy.

45 An example of Xerxes' cruelty to a one time friend turned enemy is found in the logos about Pythius the Lydian
(Hdt. 7.27-29, 38-39) who was once honored, but who angered Xerxes and suffered the dismemberment of one of his sons.

46 Not even in the victor lists, although Hdt. 5.22 seems to indicate that he won. Most assume that Alexander would have entered as a young man, probably in the 490s, before he came to the throne, but this cannot be confirmed. For a late sixth century date for Alexander's Olympic competition, equally unconfirmable, see J.W. Cole, "Alexander Philhellene and Themistocles," AC 47 (1978) 37-49. This argument rests on the assumption that Alexander and Themistocles were almost the same age.


48 At least in the sense that he did not remain faithful to Persian rule after 479.


50 Badian, "Greeks and Macedonians," 36-37, with the best example being that of Rome and its inclusion of Aeneas in its foundation myth.
The symbolism here is obvious. Perdiccas alone knew the significance of the evil king's error and ritually acknowledged the importance of the sun by clasping it to his breast, not once but three times. This appears to mark the ritual theft of an important cult from the people whom the Argeads replaced as masters of the land of Pieria.

Aegae was established under the auspices of divine authority as Herodotus clearly shows. Additional support for such sanction is found in subsequent Delphic oracles: schol. Clem. Alex. Protr. 2.11, Diod. 7.16, Just. 7.17, and Syn. 373. The process described here was the geographical transfer of a sun-fire-hearth cult from a Thracian site to nearby Aegae, especially selected for the Argeads by divine authority.

58 Such transfers of religious sovereignty were not unknown to the Greek world. Perhaps the most famous example involved the victory of Apollo over an indigenous chthonic cult at Delphi with the coming of the Greeks (Aesch. Eum. 1 f.)

59 Hdt. 8.137.5.

60 Hdt. 2.61, 6.75, 7.225. Regardless of its possible cultic significance, it was a ritualistic weapon of Homeric antiquity: see, I.L. 11.844, 18.597, 19.252 (I thank W.L. Adams for pointing out these references to me).

61 Hdt. 8.138.1.

62 Schol. Clem Alex. Protr. 2.11, Just. 7.17, Sync. 373.

63 See above Chapter One, pp.18-26 for a discussion of this material.

64 Just. 7.1.8-9.

65 Just. 7.2.7-12.

66 D. Raymond, Macedonian Regal Coinage to 413 B.C. (New
York, 1953) 43-60; B.V. Head, British Museum Catalog of Greek Coins, Macedonia, Etc. (London, 1879) 156-170; M. Price, Coins of the Macedonians (London, 1974) 18-20. The most common fifth-century type portrayed an "Ares" figure (warrior/hunter [Thracian rider?]) in different poses, but also portrayed were the caduceus of Apollo-Hermes and a goat of special significance to the foundation of Aegae.

67 It is difficult to understand exactly what was being appealed to on Argead issues of the fifth century. Hammond (Mac II 109) suggests that Alexander's mounted rider coins offer a portrait of Alexander himself--this is possible, but not at all certain since the type is not unique to Argead Macedonia but had antecedents in the tribal coinages of the region (see Price, Coins of the Macedonians, 7-11). The preponderance of warrior/hunter figures might well signify the well known hero figure so common to Thrace ("Thracian rider"). See, Hoddinott, The Thracians, 169-175.

68 Head, BMC Coins of Macedonia 156-171; Raymond, Macedonian Regal Coinage to 413 B.C., 60.

69 Ibid.; Hammond Mac II 192.

70 Diod. 16.92.5 perhaps can be interpreted that Philip was aspiring to divine status. The

71 Just. 7.6.2. This would have been most helpful during the late 350s when Philip had removed his half-brothers as rivals for the throne.

72 Just. 8.2.3.

73 Diod. 16.92.5.

74 The individual episodes of Alexander's life (e.g. Siwah, proskynesis, deification) have received much attention, see Badian, "Alexander the Great, 1948-1967,"


77 Hammond Mac I 300–312, 407–414.

78 See above note 70 for bibliography. There appears to have been discussion at Athens and Sparta (and perhaps elsewhere) in 324 over proposals to grant Alexander divine honors: Plut. Mor 219E–F; 804B; 842D; Ael. VH 2.19; 5.12; Athen. 6.251B; Polyb. 12.12b.3; Hyp. Dem. 31–32.

79 Nowhere are any living Argeads after 323 B.C. noted as gods. In fact (see Chapter Five) the treatments allotted to Philip III and Alexander IV clearly indicate that they were not seen as gods, except among those peoples who were accustomed to thinking of their rulers as divinities (e.g., Egypt).
We have now come to the point where it is possible to measure how successful the Argeads were in securing the loyalty of the Macedonian people. To do so we must look for the most part to the period between the deaths of Alexander III and Alexander IV. At first glance it may seem curious to evaluate this ancient dynasty by the reigns of two undistinguished monarchs who furthermore presided over a kingdom in many ways different from that of their predecessors, but for several reasons explained below, theirs was an illuminating era.

One reason for the following concentration upon the reigns of Philip III and Alexander IV in the evaluation of Macedonian loyalty for the royal dynasty concerns the minimal amount of evidence we have on this point from earlier times. It is not that such evidence is entirely lacking from our sources, although it is scarce, but rather that what exists is focused on Philip II and Alexander III. During these reigns it is difficult to determine whether the loyalty expressed had its origin in the success of the kings, or in their Argead heritage. To a certain
extent this is an artificial distinction in that the king's family ties and his triumphs complemented each other in a way as to generate loyalty in his people. It is useful to remember especially as one turns to the Macedonian kingdom after 323, however, that Philip II and Alexander the Great did not create the loyalty which maintained their incompetent successors on the throne for a time, but merely enhanced an allegiance to the dynasty which had been building since the seventh century.

The king list as reviewed in Chapter One makes two things clear: 1) that the legitimacy of an individual king could be challenged, 2) but that any replacement had to be an Argead.\(^1\) Thus, although acts of disloyalty to reigning kings were fairly common, there was an over-riding dedication to the preservation of the royal house. As deficient as our sources for Macedonian affairs prior to 360 might be, in outline the crucial importance of the royal family is evident. To understand why this loyalty persisted one must bear in mind the responsibilities of the king as noted in Chapters Three and Four, and also consider the kinds of political realities which are detailed in our sources only after 323 which will be discussed below.

Despite the relatively abundant information on Philip II and Alexander III, we have little from their reigns concerning loyalty which adds to the impressions distilled from the entire king list. Both monarchs faced occasional opposition on a massive scale--Philip in the Third Sacred
War after being defeated twice by Phocian armies, and Alexander several times including the problems of his "orientalization", the ill-feelings over proskynesis, the unpopularity of Parmenion's assassination, the "mutiny" in India, and the open discontent at Opis. Nevertheless, it is clear that as serious as these incidents were to both Philip II and Alexander III, at no time did those in opposition to the kings call for their overthrow, let alone the downfall of their house. Philip II and Alexander the Great remained for the most part popular with the Macedonians at large, a fact which must be attributed largely to their political and military talents, and to their abilities at defusing potentially volatile situations. It should not be forgotten, however, that their family's heritage was well established long before they came to power and that it provided the foundation without which their remarkable careers would not even have been possible.

Before exploring the relationship between the Macedonian people (as represented by the commanders and army which dominate our sources) on the one hand, and the two kings Philip III and Alexander IV on the other, we must establish how useful such a description will be for the
Alexander III's conquest of Asia had increased the size of his kingdom enormously, and in so doing added scores of peoples to his realm whose societal structures had little in common with that of Macedonia. Obviously, the different traditions of the enlarged empire would come to influence the relatively few Macedonians who undertook to rule it, especially since the kingdom of Macedonia had only relatively recent experience with ruling foreign lands, and none whatsoever with the problems arising from a territory the size of the old Persian Empire. Alexander the Great had recognized the practical problems of handling the immenseness of Asia, and this in part had stimulated his attempt to move closer to Persian ideas of kingship. As the _proskynesis_ episode proves, however, his compatriots were unwilling even for Alexander to see the traditions of their homeland altered in such a way as to redefine the essence of Macedonian kingship. Eventually, the Macedonians would have to adapt their political structures in order to maintain control of their huge empire, but these would only come about when the need to do so became evident. Such a shift in attitude was much easier for those whose careers began and continued largely beyond Macedonia where the ancient traditions remained most powerfully in place. Those Macedonians who ran the kingdom under Philip III and Alexander IV were not, generally speaking, of this type. Perdiccas, Antipater, Ptolemy, Craterus, Antigonus, Eumenes, Polyperchon, and
Cassander--to name only the most important--are attested
either to have resented Alexander III's "orientalization"
or to have championed the cause of the ancient Argead house
along with its traditional rights after this Alexander was
gone.\(^9\) Thus, the period from 323 B.C. until the murder of
Alexander IV must be understood to have been dominated by
men whose backgrounds were molded by a traditional
Macedonian perspective. Since the reigns of Philip III and
Alexander IV span at most thirteen years, and since those
who wielded political influence during this period were
individuals who grew up in Macedonia, it should come as no
surprise that their outlook was molded by a memory of
Argead authority.\(^10\) As these men and others grappled with
the problems which beset them, they offered solutions which
tried to be consistent with the past. It was only when
traditional solutions could no longer serve as a viable
foundation for the preservation of Macedonian authority
over the vast empire that new solutions were introduced--
albeit reluctantly and while attempting to conserve as many
ties as possible with the old order for the sake of
legitimacy.

A difficulty with trying to handle the kingdom of
Philip III and Alexander IV as if it were merely a
continuation of the Macedonia before the Persian conquest
is seen in the innovation of the dual-monarchy. Never
before 323 had Macedonia been ruled by two kings at the
same time, so that at the very least we know that the Macedonians were willing to experiment with their customs when necessary. Yet, despite the fact that the dual-monarchy was an anomaly, its implementation resulted from traditional loyalties: i.e., the need for the unusual double kingship arose not because of the conquest of Asia or the size of the new Macedonian Empire, but from the fact that there was no obvious, or even potentially competent, heir to Alexander the Great at the moment of his death.\textsuperscript{11} Had Alexander IV been born before his father died, undoubtedly he would have assumed his father's status, unanimously supported by the factions within the army. Because he was not, and because those less familiar with Philip III's mental affliction demanded that Philip assume royal authority in order to conserve the dynasty's continuity, the unusual compromise resulted. Had Philip been mentally competent (and had his half-brother allowed him to live if he were so\textsuperscript{12}) undoubtedly he would have been a realistic rival to Alexander's son for the loyalty of the army—much as Philip II was to Amyntas upon the death of Perdiccas III.\textsuperscript{13} But again Philip III was not such a man, and the aristocracy, realizing the danger of handing him the throne, demanded that the rights of kingship be reserved for Alexander's child if it turned out to be male. The dual-monarchy, therefore, was not instituted in order to innovate, but in order to preserve Argead rights. The compromise was necessary because each faction saw the
situation from a different perspective. The unique solution resulted from a unique situation.

The compromise which produced the dual-monarchy is indicative of the Macedonian state of mind in the period of uncertainty when neither Philip III nor Alexander IV could truly rule. As confusion arose and insecurity mounted, the initial Macedonian reaction was not to reform their system, but to appeal as much as possible to ancient tradition. Doing so maintained legitimate avenues of authority by which the Macedonians could save their position as world conquerors. This inclination to appeal to the Argead legacy was not merely a matter of sentimentality. Without such a dedication to tradition, debate and conflict were sure to arise. Along with the split which would follow such dissention, would come the collapse of what the Macedonians had only recently claimed through the force of arms.

Not only do the reigns of Philip III and Alexander IV provide evidence for the conservation of traditional loyalties and perceptions of political order (see below for specifics) they do so in a manner superior to any other period. Although the surviving sources which pertain to the events after 323 are not as voluminous as those for the life of Alexander the Great, the amount of information which they contain pertaining to non-royal Macedonians is much greater than from any other period. Thus, we can make
more informed judgments about the loyalties of the Macedonians at this time than about most others under the Argeads.

The reigns of Philip III and Alexander IV are important in another way already alluded to in the previous section. In dealing with the institution of kingship it is important to separate as much as possible the man who held the office from the office itself. This can never be done completely in Macedonia, since the flexibility built into Macedonian custom allowed kingship to expand or contract depending upon the talent of the man who occupied the throne. Nevertheless, Macedonian kingship was one of service, and the Macedonian people expected their kings at least to provide for certain essential duties. Since loyalty depended on the monarch's ability to meet at least minimum expectations, it is important to establish what these were. For any progress to be made on this point we must look to the reigns of Philip III and Alexander IV. The reasons for this are simple: first, we do not have enough detail about any king prior to Philip II to make such an evaluation, and second, Philip II and Alexander III cannot define the lower end of expectation since they were so successful. It is just because Philip III and Alexander IV were so lackluster themselves that we know their prominence was the result of their being Argeads. Therefore, any loyalty expressed for these kings reflects feeling for the dynasty they represented as shadow figures.
In the following discussion two things should be kept in mind. First, it is not an attempt to cover fully the political history of the Macedonian kingdom as it stood under Philip III and Alexander IV, but an attempt to portray the amazingly consistent loyalty exhibited by the Macedonians at that time for their kings and the royal family. Second, the loyalty thus documented need not be understood as absolutely sincere in every Macedonian who found it expedient to voice his dedication to the Argead kings. We will never be able to read the minds of the era's major figures in order to evaluate their genuine interest in the preservation of the Argead monarchy. Such studies would only be of secondary interest even if they could be made. What is far more important to an evaluation of the ruling family's significance to its countrymen is the fact that even if insincere, professions of loyalty were required out of leading commanders before they could secure the devotion of enough Macedonians to remain politically prominent. Had this not been the case, and had the commanders truly been disloyal, there would have been no need for them to promote their dedication to the royal family which in fact they did for years after Alexander the Great's death. It is not only the consistency of these
public proclamations of loyalty, but also how widespread they were which compels us to accept that most, if not all, Macedonians expected the Argead family to weather the troubled times of the dual-monarchy and re-establish itself as the effective head of the Macedonian political and social order. Most Macedonians initially saw nothing radical in the environment after the great Alexander's death and did their best to see that the ancestral monarchy would continue as it had for centuries. For reasons that will be argued at the end of this chapter, in this group probably numbered most of Alexander III's most distinguished hetairoi.

Virtually every historian of the period after 323 has concentrated upon the rise of the "Successor" kings, with the assumption that they were eager to establish their independent authority either over the entire empire (e.g. Perdiccas and Antigonus) or over a part of it (e.g. Ptolemy).¹⁴ We can outline the problems facing the Macedonians upon the establishment of the dual-monarchy by reviewing briefly the career of Perdiccas from his rise at Babylon until his death two years later. A review of this kind will also define a pattern by which to counter the arguments of scholars who see the hetairoi in Alexander the Great's wake as anxious to overthrow Argead authority.

As noted above (Chapter Two, section two) Alexander gave his signet ring to Perdiccas for safekeeping shortly before he died. Although Alexander's intent by this
transfer was never clear, his trust in Perdiccas—made manifest by the possession of the valuable symbol of royal authority—was. From that moment Perdiccas became the central figure in the political maneuvers which resulted in the joint accession of Philip III and Alexander IV. From that moment also he became the object of controversy and jealously, for although Alexander's token marked Perdiccas as a man to be reckoned with, it did not give him any concrete authority, nor could it alone generate enough prestige to catapult Perdiccas above his fellow hetairoi. This did not stop Perdiccas from attempting to use his good fortune for his own political benefit, however, and therein lay the foundation for future conflict.

From the very start, men like Ptolemy objected to Perdiccas' direction of the subsequent discussions concerning the future because it implied that the fortuitous reception of the ring marked Perdiccas as significantly more important than other officers whether they were at Babylon or not. Indeed, Perdiccas would undoubtedly have liked his reception of the signet to have been perceived in just this way by a majority of Macedonians, since he thereby would gain status relative to his peers. That there were other officers—like Antipater or Craterus—more worthy of such elevation, however, few would argue. But these two men in particular were not in Mesopotamia when Alexander III died and thus were not in a
position to gain (as did Perdiccas) from an intimate association with Alexander upon his deathbed. 17

This is not to say that Ptolemy or others with his concerns objected to Perdiccas' hubris simply on behalf of Antipater and Craterus. Rather, they were concerned for all of the hetairoi (of course including themselves) to have a voice in the settlement which would put Alexander the Great's affairs in order. Had there been an established hierarchy of commands within the hetairoi class, then there would have been no need for the maneuvering perpetrated by Perdiccas' assumption of authority. As it was, whatever order existed was based upon relative prestige accumulated by years of visible service. Perdiccas' possession of the royal ring enhanced his standing certainly, but it alone could not upset entirely the order of prestige which had developed during the anabasis. That Perdiccas was not the most outstanding of the hetairoi under Alexander III is obvious in view of his early career. 18 For Macedonia to remain well-governed in the absence of an effective king, those who had the greatest prestige would have to participate according to their status in the decisions affecting the kingdom. For Perdiccas to assume these duties by himself would have been impossible, as indeed he to a certain degree admitted when he began to organize meetings among the hetairoi. 19 It was amid these talks, that some (e.g. Ptolemy) challenged not the process, but Perdiccas' place in it, since his role had
been dictated more by historical accident that by any other factor.

However Perdiccas was challenged, his effective elimination of Meleager and his subsequent stewardship over the fair distribution of authority throughout the empire established him as the most important *hetairos* at Babylon.\(^{20}\) This standing became generally recognized after Antipater and Craterus accepted the partition of command organized by Perdiccas, but issued under the authority of the kings.\(^{21}\) Even though Perdiccas could not have been perceived by others to have exhibited undue or unexpected ambition, since all agreed to accept his plan, our sources almost immediately claim to know that what Perdiccas secretly had in mind was a coup by which he would eliminate the kings, replace the ancient Argead heritage so fundamental to the Macedonian social order, and elevate himself to the throne.

Curtius is the first (in terms of the order of events after Alexander's death) to note these intentions.\(^{22}\) Amid the talks about who should occupy the throne, he notes that Perdiccas proposed to the Macedonians that they await the birth of the unborn child of Alexander before making any decision. An Aristonus, however, is reported to have nominated Perdiccas as a candidate as well, a suggestion which Curtius records as popular with those Macedonians present. Curtius then tells us that Perdiccas secretly
coveted the kingship, but that he hesitated to accept the offer lest he seem too eager in his ambition. It was during this break, says Curtius, that Meleager accused Perdicas of vile indiscretions and counter-proposed the name of Arrhidaeus for the throne. Whatever the truth about Aristonus' nomination of Perdicas for the kingship (and I for one doubt its historicity) it must be realized that Perdicas made no open move whatsoever to violate the prerogative of the royal family. How Curtius came to know what was in Perdicas' heart, therefore, is something of a mystery.

Diodorus (and perhaps Justin, although his language seems to offer an alternative explanation) also records Perdicas as ambitious for the throne.\(^{23}\) Unlike Curtius, however, Diodorus reports that Perdicas only began to aspire to this dream after the hetairōn had control of both the kings and the army's loyalty.\(^{24}\) To understand the events which stimulated Diodorus to render his judgement about Perdicas' ambitions (almost certainly taken directly from his source for this material) some background is necessary.

By assuming the position of chiliarch for the two helpless kings—a position accepted and ratified by the Macedonians at Babylon and confirmed by Antipater and Craterus later—Perdicas began to issue orders in the kings' names which were initially obeyed. While still at Babylon, Perdicas ordered that Alexander's funeral
arrangements be organized and that a rebellion of Greek mercenaries in the East be crushed. As these commands were obeyed, it must have seemed to Perdiccas that his compatriots recognized the need for his status as second-in-command to the kings, which, since they could offer no leadership themselves, really meant that it was his duty to organize affairs in order to conserve the empire's unity.

If Perdiccas thought that his authority was beyond dispute, however, he was mistaken. As part of the attempt to bring complete Macedonian control to those parts of Asia which Alexander had bypassed in his hurry to defeat Darius, Perdiccas ordered two Anatolian satraps, Leonnatus (Hellespontine Phrygia) and Antigonus (Pamphylia, Lycia, and Greater Phrygia) to help a third, Eumenes, secure control of Cappadocia and Paphlagonia which were still under the control of a local dynasty. Upon receiving his orders, Leonnatus began to comply when he got word from Antipater in Europe that his aid was required to help defeat a growing Greek rebellion, henceforth known as the Lamian War. Judging Antipater's request the more urgent, Leonnatus decided to turn his organized force westward, a decision which probably did not dismay Perdiccas after he learned of the hostilities in Europe, although our sources mention nothing of his reaction.

Antigonus, however, refused to obey Perdiccas' command. Why he did so can only be surmised. Since he
was able to justify his action to Antipater, the most strident of Argead supporters (see below), Antigonus could not have challenged the authority of the kings. Rather, he must have justified his disobedience by attacking the right of the chiliarch to order about another *hetairoi*. The chiliarchy was not a traditional Macedonian office, having only been introduced by Alexander III while in Asia.\(^{30}\)

Although during Alexander's lifetime it had begun to fulfill important functions under the authority of the king, it had not been clearly aligned to the other commands which were delegated by the monarch. Thus its precise authority could be questioned. Although the office was assuming some of the perogatives of royal authority in lieu of an effective king, and although there had been an implicit acceptance of its superior authority under Perdiccas, its institution was an innovation and the precise limits of its authority were undefined.

There is no question about Antigonus' ambitious nature, first made manifest by his refusal to obey Perdiccas. Yet, Antigonus gave vent to his aspirations not against the legitimacy of the ancient dynasty, but against the illegitimate exercise of authority underneath the umbrella of the royal house. In other words, there were ways to interpret the agreement reached at Babylon other than that used by Perdiccas—and as we will see, Antigonus was not alone in his objection to a Perdiccas elevated to a position of authority over the rest of the *hetairoi* class.
To emphasize the importance of his orders being obeyed, Perdiccas marched against the disloyal commanders in Asia Minor with his army and the two kings. There he campaigned to install Eumenes, and while in the region he attacked as well other hostile native groups. Also while there, he ordered Antigonus to present himself at court and explain his disobedience. Were Antigonus to comply with this demand, he not only would have put himself in personal jeopardy, he would also have recognized Perdiccas' right to command his obedience in the first place and thereby would have tacitly admitted his original mutiny. Rather than report to Perdiccas and the kings, Antigonus fled to Antipater and Craterus in Europe where he had shocking tales to tell. Diodorus reports that Antigonus revealed to his hosts three pieces of information guaranteed to capture their attention: that Perdiccas was considering marriage with Cleopatra, the full sister of Alexander III and thus the daughter of Olympias; that Perdiccas would use this union to claim the throne; and that he would be coming to Europe to deprive Antipater of his command. The impact of what Antigonus had to relay was electric: Antipater and Craterus arranged a peace with the Aetolians (with whom they were fighting upon Antigonus' arrival) and began preparations to war upon Perdiccas. It is almost certain that Diodorus accurately reproduced his source on these points, but in order to see how Antigonus truly affected
Antipater and Craterus we must review the relationships of the people involved in this episode and then consider why the incident was reported as it was.

Cleopatra's first husband was Alexander, the king of Epirus and the brother of Olympias. This marriage had been arranged by Philip II in order to secure the loyalty of Epirus while he was engaged with his Persian war. It was immediately after this union was celebrated, however, that Philip was assassinated, bringing Alexander the Great to the throne of Macedonia. As the son of Philip went east to his destiny, so did the son-in-law decide to secure his fame by an attack to the west where he intended to subdue Italy. Unfortunately for the Epirote king, however, his major accomplishment upon Italian soil was his own death. Thus, he left his recent bride alone in Epirus and the succession there in a disordered state.

Olympias, in the meantime, was forced to take up residence in Epirus with her daughter, whom the elder queen dominated. While the Macedonian Alexander was in Asia, Olympias had attempted to parley her close relationship with her son into the political control of Macedonia. Alexander, however, had chosen Antipater to act as the epitropos in Europe while he engaged in the conquest of Persia, realizing well that there was no precedent in Macedonia for a woman regent. Alexander's choice did not prevent Olympias from agitating for influence over Macedonian affairs, with the result that a great hostility
arose between her and Antipater. Both Olympias and Antipater had cause to write Alexander denouncing the other before the king—letters which apparently annoyed Alexander, but which did not alter his political arrangements for Europe.39 Naked hatred eventually forced Olympias to flee to Cleopatra where she continued her campaign against Antipater.40 She was given the opportunity to do so since the uncertain state of the Epirote throne allowed her to assume authority as the guardian of her young grandson, Neoptolemus. Olympias apparently behaved arrogantly in Epirus, but her well known intimacy with her son prevented any thought of her deposition.41

Diodorus records that it was Olympias who masterminded the offer of Cleopatra to Perdiccas.42 The motive behind this move was complex and certainly dynastic. Perdiccas had control at the time of Alexander IV, who was of course Alexander III's son and Olympias' grandson. It is certain that Olympias did not trust the *hetairoi* in general, and Antipater in particular, to look out after what she thought was in the best interest of the dynasty (and not coincidentally her own best interest as well) which was the sole kingship of the young Alexander.43 By arranging a marriage between her daughter and Perdiccas, Olympias hoped to associate herself more closely with her grandson, and consequently to propel herself into the thick of the
political world—a role which had been denied to her by Antipater. Her calculations were also suited to diminish the authority of Antipater, whom she undoubtedly knew also had marriage plans for Perdiccas with his own daughter.44

The offer of Cleopatra presented a real dilemma to Perdiccas. Such a marriage under normal conditions would elevate his prestige considerably, and even under the existing conditions it was tempting. It would mark him as unique among the hetairoi in that no other man beyond the Argead family itself could claim so close an association to both Philip II and Alexander III.45 Such a status, provided the fact that no important objections were raised to the marriage which would produce it, would elevate his political strength beyond what had been arranged at Babylon and go a long way to establish a hierarchy of prestige among the hetairoi which could potentially lead to a greater effectiveness in the conservation of central authority. Many, such as Antigonus, might question the power of a chiliarch, but in lieu of an effective Argead king, the next best thing might have been a leader who might act as regent in the interest of his wife's family. It was just such a consideration which caused Eumenes, a commander who was widely known as an avid supporter of the maintenance of the Argead house, to advise Perdiccas to accept Cleopatra.46 A recognition of his role as the most important hetairos, however, was all that Perdiccas could hope from this marriage despite the claims to the contrary
found in Diodorus. That the marriage could not have brought the throne to Perdiccas as Diodorus states is proven both by Olympias' role in the offer (she had nothing to gain and much to lose if Perdiccas became king in the place of Alexander IV), and by the support that the offer received from Eumenes (whose consistent dedication to the Argead house will be noted below).  

Not only would the marriage to Cleopatra generate hostility in Antipater because of the hatred he held for Olympias, it would also enrage him because it was Perdiccas himself who had first suggested the idea of joining their two houses through a matrimonial union. Before the compromise which had led to a general reconciliation of the Macedonians at Babylon had been arranged, Perdiccas had sought to secure his place by a marriage to one of Antipater's daughters. Such an idea appealed to Antipater, who sought to secure the peace so fashioned not only through a marriage alliance with Perdiccas, but also with similar arrangements with Craterus and Ptolemy. By binding those important commanders together, Antipater hoped to avoid any further cracks in Macedonian unity and thus to save the ancient kingdom for the rise of a competent Argead. For Perdiccas to renege on this arrangement would convince Antipater and the others involved that he was having second thoughts about the compromise arranged at Babylon now that he had a firmer
control of the situation, and that he was hoping to elevate himself above the rough equality they thought inherent in the initial agreement. A marriage to Cleopatra would also clearly indicate to all that Perdiccas was attempting to gain by marriage what he had been forced to surrender by compromise at Babylon—that is, the sole royal appointment of Alexander IV. Such could only have been the result once Olympias had been drawn directly into the political process as a marriage broker. Many of the *hetairoi* probably did not care much for the rights of Philip III, but Perdiccas' alliance with Olympias would suggest that the compromise worked out among the Macedonians in good faith meant little to Perdiccas. They could only wonder how such ambition and such a cavalier attitude to carefully manufactured agreements would bode for the future.

It was not Antigonus' dire report that Perdiccas hoped to become king which worried Antipater and Craterus, therefore, but rather what a consideration of a marriage to Cleopatra and an alliance with Olympias might imply about his future intentions. This was an especially crucial point considering the fact that Perdiccas had in his control the persons of the two kings. Nevertheless, Perdiccas decided to reject Cleopatra in favor of Antipater's daughter, Nicaea. Thus he showed his awareness of the situation and admitted that he was not in a position to order the Macedonian world in his favor as he might have liked. Although his decision to bypass
Cleopatra proved his willingness to conserve the Babylonian compromise which recognized the technical rule of the two kings, his hesitation before making this choice hinted at a state of mind not appreciated by other aristocrats.

Despite what our sources offer as their understanding of existing motivations, neither Perdiccas nor those with Antipater revealed any disloyalty to the Argead house in this incident—both rather were jockeying for position within the bounds of Argead authority. The situation revealed, however, different conceptions of the nature of the empire for the foreseeable future: Antipater, Craterus, and Antigonus wanted it understood that all would abide by the agreement forged at Babylon with the authority necessary to keep the state together being shared equally among their class; Perdiccas, on the other hand, hoped to arrange a somewhat more rigidly structured kingdom, with his own power deemed superior to that of the other hetairoi. Undoubtedly, Perdiccas was ambitious. But his ambition was constrained both by the present anxiety of his fellow commanders, and by Macedonian tradition. Perhaps he foresaw the breakup of the empire if he did not attempt to assert the superiority of his office (seemingly acknowledged by the Macedonians themselves in their acquiescence to his orders at Babylon) but he realized that to do so without the support of other hetairoi would be counter-productive. Hence, Perdiccas decided on Nicaea,
not knowing that his delay had already convinced Antipater and Craterus that he could not be trusted.

Since Antipater, Craterus, and Antigonus knew that Cleopatra could not bring the throne to Perdiccas, we must consider why Diodorus reports otherwise. Diodorus' source for this material is the Hellenistic historian, Hieronymus of Cardia. Although Hieronymus began his career in the service of his compatriot, Eumenes, when Antigonus finally defeated Eumenes (see below), Hieronymus joined the retinue of his former enemy. He composed his history of the world after Alexander long after the events in question while under the patronage of Antigonus' house, and it is clear from an analysis of Diodorus that he wrote from a perspective consistently favorable to his patrons. Thus, Diodorus' account of Antigonus' flight to Europe probably came from Hieronymus, who undoubtedly received his information directly from Antigonus. We can be certain that what Diodorus relates on this point is exactly what Antigonus wanted recorded since it served to justify his opposition to Perdiccas without violating the loyalties of those who took their allegiance to the Argead kings seriously.

If we approach the problem facing Antigonus and his allies from the perspective of their growing suspicion of Perdiccas, it becomes evident that this version of their declaration of war originated at the time and not later. Once they had decided that Perdiccas no longer could be
trusted to respect the corporate sharing of authority, the job of Perdiccas' opponents was to make his position appear as illegitimate not only to a majority of the hetairoi, but also to as many of the Macedonian lower classes as possible. Thus, it was not enough merely to represent themselves as wronged by Perdiccas, because the phalanx might interpret such a charge as the result of aristocratic rivalries, the likes of which had been known even under Alexander III. If most Macedonians perceived this as a power struggle which would affect the Macedonian state not at all beyond the reshuffling of authority among individual commanders, they might not feel it urgent to take sides against Perdiccas. If Antigonus, along with Antipater and Craterus, could successfully link Perdiccas with an ambition which threatened the traditional order, however, then those who made up the majority of the Macedonian armies would deem it a much more serious matter which called for the removal of Perdiccas from his position of authority. Thus, Perdiccas' marriage deliberations and his threat to the widely respected Antipater had to be interpreted as a lust for the throne, and had to be broadcast as such. This propaganda fell on receptive ears, and was amplified by other developments (see the following). An approach of this kind worked doubly in Antigonus' favor since it justified his open break with Perdiccas which otherwise might have been interpreted as a
disrespect for the kings. When Hieronymus took pen in hand, therefore, he seems to have recorded what had become the standard account of Perdiccas' "crimes", and the reaction taken to check his audacity before it destroyed the Argead legacy.

A second incident occurred at about the same time which eroded confidence in Perdiccas still further, but in this instance those who were primarily affected were the troops under his direct command. It concerned the marriage of Philip III to an Adea (or Hadea), renamed Eurydice upon their union. Eurydice had an impressive pedigree. Her father was Amyntas, the son of Perdiccas III and nephew of Philip II, whom the latter replaced as king. Amyntas grew up at the Macedonian court, raised by Philip who felt no dynastic threat from the youth. When Amyntas came of age, Philip arranged his marriage to Cynanne, Philip's own daughter by his Illyrian wife, Audata. Amyntas and Cynanne in turn had a daughter sometime in the early 330s, who was the Adea in question. Alexander III had Amyntas killed to secure his succession in 336, but the subsequent careers of Cynanne and Adea proved that the Argead prince was not forgotten. Both mother and daughter maintained an active lifestyle even to the degree that they trained beyond the custom of their sex as warriors. Their opportunity to play a role in the history of their family, and to revenge the murder of Amyntas by Alexander came when Adea became betrothed to Philip III. This marriage did not create
great joy in the hearts of some, which was first indicated when Antipater tried to prevent the women leaving Macedonia for Asia Minor where Philip was with Perdiccas engaged in the affairs discussed above. Antipater failed to stop them, however, and upon their arrival in Asia they received another warning, this time from Perdiccas. He sent his brother Alcetas to keep the women from reaching Philip III, but again the result was failure. Our sources are vague on what happened when Alcetas confronted the princesses, but the result was the murder of Cynanne over the objections of the Macedonian troops which Alcetas had under his command. When Adea reached Perdiccas' army and the troops learned of her mother's fate, they mutinied and forced Perdiccas to allow Philip to receive his bride.

The reaction of the army not only reveals the distaste felt for the murder of a daughter of Philip II, it also seemingly indicates the recognition that the problem of succession, which had plagued the Macedonians since Alexander the Great's death, should be dealt with as soon as possible for the next generation. Who knew what might befall Philip III or his infant colleague before the latter would be old enough to reproduce? Since it would be wise for Philip to produce offspring in order to insure that the Argead house would continue, who could he better marry than an Argead princess? In light of the emotions running high in camp, Perdiccas found it expedient to arrange quickly
for the nuptuals.\textsuperscript{66} His role in the death of Cynanne, however, was not forgotten as many wondered how much it revealed Perdiccas' intentions. The intensity of Perdiccas' original opposition to the marriage of Philip III and Adea indicated his continued opposition to Philip's kingship since once the union was celebrated it would be virtually impossible to deny Philip his royal standing.\textsuperscript{67} This fact was almost certainly not lost on the Macedonian infantry which had supported the candidacy of Philip III in the first place.\textsuperscript{68} At that time it was not only some of the \textit{hetairoi} who questioned Perdiccas' plans, but also those upon whom the chiliarch relied for his military power. Perdiccas' turnabout on this marriage had saved his command for the moment, but his troops subsequently were susceptible to attacks upon his loyalty.

Immediately following these incidents, Perdiccas faced another blow: news reached his camp that Ptolemy had stolen Alexander's body.\textsuperscript{69} It is unclear whether or not Alexander wished to continue the unbroken tradition of his house and be buried at Aegae—\textit{which is where the ancient travel guide of Pausanias reports Alexander's remains bound when Ptolemy diverted them}.\textsuperscript{70} Diodorus and Justin, however, state that Alexander had decided to break with the custom of earlier Macedonian kings and be entombed at Siwah, the Egyptian oasis which boasted the famous oracle of Ammon.\textsuperscript{71} If Siwah was Alexander's preference it would have been a radical break with the past, but perhaps one
not beyond the vision of Alexander. In keeping with his attempt to decrease the Macedonian orientation of his kingdom, he might well have desired to inaugurate a new burial ground at a personally significant site beyond the Balkans. Nevertheless, if this were the case, then it becomes difficult to understand why Ptolemy's meeting of the funeral procession in Syria, since Ptolemy almost certainly would not have broadcast his intentions to betray the arrangements made under Perdiccas' orders. Thus, even as Ptolemy travelled with the corpse back to Egypt Perdiccas could not have known that Ptolemy would alter the arrangements until the body reached Egypt and the original plan was not implemented.

Regardless of the funeral train's original destination, its lavishness was epic, on the orders of Perdiccas. The usual custom in such matters was that the new king would oversee the internment of his royal predecessor. Yet, since neither Philip III or Alexander IV was able to handle the planning of the arrangements, Perdiccas turned them over to an officer named Arrhidaeus. Despite the fact that his name was the same as Philip III's before his accession, it is not known why this officer was chosen to handle these responsibilities. Arrhidaeus took great care preparing this funeral to the extent that he spent two years and huge amounts of money before even leaving Babylon for the trek west. With the progress of
the train slow and the itinerary published beforehand, throngs of spectators lined the route. Until Alexander's body reached the coast the procession was a carefully orchestrated display of political propaganda, but once it had arrived at the Syrian shore Perdiccas' control of it evaporated. Ptolemy met Arrhidaeus and, either detouring the remains or accompanying them south, he took control of the situation. He had thrown down the gauntlet and had challenged Perdiccas publicly for at least the second time, but this theft was far more serious than the disagreement at Babylon. Alexander's body was a valuable token, venerated by the Macedonians and capable of bringing great honor to him who showed it the proper respect. Much to Perdiccas' annoyance, Ptolemy made sure that he treated the remains in a manner which won him credit. So important did Perdiccas consider the possession of Alexander's body that he decided to leave for Egypt almost at once even as Antipater, Craterus, and Antigonus were about to assault Asia Minor. Ptolemy arranged a quick alliance with this group for the defeat of Perdiccas and so the hostilities began. In order to protect himself from a northern attack as he tried to enter Egypt, Perdiccas split the troops at his command, and ordered Eumenes to do battle with the Macedonians from Europe.

Even amid the deterioration of his position, Perdiccas let it be known that he was fighting for the royal cause: the object of his crusade in Egypt was the great
Alexander's corpse, and he still treated the two living kings as befit their station. His Macedonian force, although perhaps more open to charges against Perdiccas' loyalty to the kings than it had been before the death of Cynanne, nevertheless was convinced to march on Ptolemy, because from an objective perspective he appeared guilty of impious piracy. It was only after it was subjected to Perdiccas' military failure and Ptolemy's viewpoint that the army began to reconsider who had the best interests of the Argead house in mind.81

Eumenes successfully met half of the army from Macedonia, defeating it in battle and killing its general, Craterus.82 Antipater, however, was able to slip by Eumenes' defenses in order to move south as quickly as possible to relieve Perdiccas of the kings. Unfortunately for Perdiccas, he met with less success than his lieutenant. After two efforts to break Ptolemy's defense of the Nile were aborted with a seemingly needless loss of life, Ptolemy bombarded Perdiccas' army with an effective propaganda campaign defending his seizure of Alexander's body and his loyalty to the kings.83 As proof of his sincerity, Ptolemy undoubtedly made it known that the respected Antipater was his ally in this conflict. Ptolemy's efforts built upon the army's earlier doubts and combined with Perdiccas' military failure to stimulate a mutiny in the royal camp. A group of officers led by
Pithon assassinated Perdiccas, and although many troops probably disapproved of this murder, all acquiesced to the new reality and sought their peace with Ptolemy. Thus ended Perdiccas' attempt to elevate himself to a position of authority between that of the kings and that of his peers. Although accused of having coveted the throne, he never openly broke with the arrangement which was fashioned two years before his death at Babylon and which recognized all commands as subordinate to royal authority. The circumstances surrounding Perdiccas' death reveal a competition for power among the hetairoi, but they also depict the continued strength of the loyalty felt by the Macedonians for their royal house.

The officers and men once under Perdiccas' command knew that neither king was in a position to assume political responsibility, so a discussion of how to proceed was held to which Ptolemy was invited. There Ptolemy reaffirmed the defense of his actions and emphasized the peacefulness of his intentions by extending every courtesy to all the Macedonians in Egypt. The royal army accepted Ptolemy's good-will and, with the memory of Perdiccas still fresh in their minds, they offered the Egyptian satrap the position of chiliarch.

Ptolemy refused the office, but nominated in his stead two men: Arrhidaeus, who had organized the funeral arrangements, and Pithon, who had led the mutiny against Perdiccas. It should not pass without note that these
discussions confirm the army's refusal to consider the creation of a system to replace the two Argead kings with someone else, or some other office, and depict Ptolemy as operating within the bounds of the prevailing point of view as of 321. Ptolemy's reasons for refusing the chiliarchy may be guessed. He probably realized that once Antipater reached the kings the value of the agreement reached in Egypt would be slight. Also, the chiliarchy was a dangerous office which in all likelihood would continue to stimulate the jealousy of ambitious aristocrats. Rather than accept such a position, Ptolemy remained satisfied with the blessings a control of Egypt provided. In order to insure that a chiliarch could not cause any trouble until Antipater could gain control of the situation, however, Ptolemy split its authority between two men who would keep an eye on each other.

The first act of the two chiliarchs was to condemn Eumenes. After this was proclaimed, the royal army took its leave of Egypt (undoubtedly to Ptolemy's satisfaction) and moved north to meet Antipater at a place called Triparadisus in Syria. Before the arrival of Antipater Philip III's wife, Eurydice, seized the opportunity of the joint chiliarchy under commanders of the second rank to stir up controversy and to become herself the legal guardian of her husband. Her efforts to marry Philip had already proven her ambition to exercise
more authority than women were traditionally allowed at the Macedonian court. Moreover, she knew from the example of Olympias that she would have little chance to assert her influence once Antipater had the kings in his possession. Eurydice obviously was attempting to free her husband from the power of his officers in order that she might gain the same control for herself. Her efforts in this regard were momentarily successful. The chiliarchs appointed in Egypt were forced to resign, and Antipater's arrival at the royal camp came amid riot conditions. The old general and the prominent commanders who arrived with him were more than a match for the young queen, and they were able to restore order by reducing Eurydice to her "proper place."

Had Eurydice been able to wrest control of Philip III, she probably would have made short work of his young colleague and seen to it that real power was exercised by herself. Although we cannot be certain, such might have been pointed out by Antipater to convince the army that it was in the best interests of the dynasty to keep the balance of arrangements as they were. Although the army rebuffed Eurydice at this time, she was not dissuaded from asserting the primacy of her own and her husband's joint Argead heritage in the future. Her open ambition to secure the throne for herself through her husband and for whatever children they might produce could only serve to antagonize Olympias and the supporters of Alexander IV. The conflict which would result would have a devastating effect on the
loyalties of the Macedonians about to be torn in another way as well.

Once in control of Eurydice, Antipater distributed the satrapies anew, but with the same understanding of the role of the kings which had existed at Babylon: the kings remained the nominal heads of the empire until an effective Argead could obtain real authority. In the meantime Antipater was to return with them to Macedonia, "κατάγων τοῦ βασιλέως ἐπὶ τὴν πατρίδα" ("in order to restore the kings to their native land"). Another command of note was that of Antigonus who became the strategos of the royal army, empowered by the kings to defeat the rebellious remnants of the Perdiccan faction. Specifically, this authorized Antigonus to use whatever force necessary to defeat Eumenes.

There is no need to continue a discussion of the events between 321 and 317 (the year in which Philip III died) with the detail provided above since the leading commanders (including Ptolemy, although he presents more difficulty than most) concentrated on by our sources portray attitudes similar to those outlined. Hence, rather than extend this review unnecessarily, only a summary of how these men related to the kings will be offered until we
reach the breakdown which led to Philip's death.

Antipater returned to Macedonia with the kings and made certain that neither was used in any way which might undermine the assignments issued at Triparadisus. He apparently remained a model of discretion once he took the kings under his protection since not even his public and private enemy, Eumenes, accused him of manipulating his position for his own benefit. By acting the part of a strict guardian, he prevented ambitious commanders from further disturbing the fabric of the kingdom and also checked the ambitions of Olympias and Eurydice, whose hopes centered in Alexander IV and Philip III respectively could split the unity of the realm. Had Antipater lived beyond 319, the stability he brought to the existing political arrangement might have lasted until an Argead (probably Alexander IV in Antipater's estimation) could assume full power. As it was his death precipitated the crystalization of factions behind both kings.

Antigonus through this period lived up to his responsibilities as the kings' general in Asia by bringing war directly to Eumenes and the other remaining fragments of the Perdiccas faction. In this conflict he was generally successful in defeating Eumenes and forcing the proclaimed outlaw to seek refuge further eastward. The first major battle fought between Antigonus and Eumenes came in Cappadocia and resulted in Eumenes flight to a well-defended citadel by the name of Nora. Diodorus
claims that after this victory Antigonus (as with Perdiccas) began secretly to aspire to an absolute control of Asia and to a rejection of Argead authority. The crucial word in Diodorus' account of Antigonus' intentions is "secret," because if Antigonus harbored such dreams at this early date they were well hidden. Outwardly, he remained a trusted servant of the kings and Antipater.

Proof of this came at Nora where Antigonus hoped to cut short his seige by negotiating with Eumenes. When the two could not agree to terms, both agreed to refer their dispute to Antipater—a curious gesture if Antigonus at the time was hoping to free himself from Antipater's influence. This arbitration never bore fruit because Antipater died. In the wake of Antipater's death, Antigonus (who was no longer present at Nora) attempted to end the war with Eumenes by getting the trapped commander to swear an oath of loyalty which mentioned the kings at the beginning of the oath, but thereafter referred exclusively to himself. Apparently, Eumenes altered the oath by introducing Olympias' name and thereafter swearing allegiance to her and the kings every time a mention was made of Antigonus. These changes were not objected to by Antigonus' envoys and thus Eumenes was freed. That Antigonus' own men saw nothing wrong in these alterations says something about the expectations current at that time. At the very least the fact that the royal family
could provide the common ground necessary to end this war indicates that both commanders (as well as Antigonus' officers who must have been briefed to some degree on their commander's intentions) thought it important to profess public loyalty to Argead authority. Although the form of the oath which released Eumenes did not please Antigonus to the degree that he rejected it and began hostilities anew, the fact that he and Eumenes mentioned the kings put them both on record as acknowledging the continuing authority of Philip III and Alexander IV.\textsuperscript{102}

Ptolemy presents the first impediment to interpreting the hetairoi as being universally loyal to the Argead throne. Before Antipater died, and without known authorization, Ptolemy attacked a group of independent Greek cities around Cyrene, and also the area of Phoenicia and Coele-Syria where he displaced the satrap, Laomedon, who had been given this territory at Triparadisus.\textsuperscript{103} Together, these two aggressions might have been interpreted as an attempt to secure the routes of access to Egypt in preparation for a declaration of independence. Yet, it is doubtful that the Macedonians would have thought both equally serious. It is possible that the attacks on the Greeks could have been promoted as necessary to secure Macedonian control of an area which had submitted to Alexander but which had not been brought fully under Macedonian military control, and as such, not disloyal to the kings in any way.\textsuperscript{104} But if this were so, how could
Ptolemy justify an attack on a Macedonian satrap appointed by the kings' authority? Before jumping to the conclusion that Ptolemy had separatist motives for his attack, we should admit that our sources for the war's cause are sketchy and that we do not know that it was begun without the technical approval of the kings. One striking omission from our sources in connection with this conflict is a condemnation of Ptolemy's aggression from any Macedonian source. This seems an odd gap if the Macedonians beyond Egypt perceived Ptolemy's action as a breach of the kingdom's unity. Since evidence from all over the realm continues to indicate that the Macedonians continued to work strenuously for the unity of their kingdom, we perhaps should hesitate before accusing Ptolemy of an open break with the Argead throne. This is especially true since evidence from within Egypt itself proves that the kings continued to be accepted as the legitimate rulers of the land, hardly what we would expect if Ptolemy were busy usurping their power in order to replace it with his own.105

Before he died, Antipater named Polyperchon to guard the kings as his successor.106 From our perspective this must be considered a surprising choice. Polyperchon had served in the army of Alexander the Great as a taxiarch after the Battle of Issus, but before that time he seems to have held no important post.107 Moreover, Polyperchon did
not subsequently climb rapidly through the ranks. His last assignment under Alexander was to serve under Craterus as the latter led a contingent of Macedonian veterans back to Europe in 323.\textsuperscript{108} From there Polyperchon passed into the service of Antipater, who came to trust Polyperchon enough to leave him in control of Macedonia while Antipater and Craterus crossed to Asia to fight Perdiccas.\textsuperscript{109} Seemingly Polyperchon exercised his authority competently and within the guidelines laid out by Antipater, or else he hardly would have been Antipater's choice in 319.

Polyperchon's appointment, however, greatly distressed Antipater's son. Cassander, who in his thirties was no youth, had probably not seen as much service as Polyperchon, but then again, neither was he a novice when it came to public affairs.\textsuperscript{110} Antipater did not overlook Cassander entirely since he designated his son as Polyperchon's second-in-command.\textsuperscript{111} For some reason Antipater did not think Cassander fit to bear the responsibility he thrust upon Polyperchon, but in acting as he did, Antipater operated contrary to Macedonian tradition. Politics in Macedonia had always been defined in terms of families (hardly unique in classical antiquity) and sons expected to assume the status of their fathers when the older generation passed away.\textsuperscript{112} At the very least, such seems to have been Cassander's assumption. Polyperchon had a full grown son of his own (named Alexander) when Antipater died: when it came time to
transfer his authority (Polyperchon's age was closer to Antipater's than it was to Cassander's) what would prevent Polyperchon from selecting his successor in a more traditional manner? Long term authority was at stake, and since Cassander was not a youth and had no blot on his reputation which spelled ruin, he, rightfully or not, decided to agitate for the downfall of Polyperchon. This proved a disastrous confrontation, because it was to link with the war still being fought in Asia between Eumenes and Antigonus, as well as with the rivalry between Olympias and Eurydice, to destroy the possibility that the Macedonians could preserve their loyalties to both kings at the same time.

Cassander hid his dissatisfaction until he could plan an escape from Macedonia. This was accomplished under the guise of a hunting trip which covered his flight long enough for Cassander to reach Asia. Cassander approached Antigonus, the political ally of his dead father and his own one-time commander, in the hopes of cultivating his support. In addition, some of Cassander's friends travelled as envoys to the garrisons which Antipater had established throughout Greece and to Ptolemy in Egypt to petition support.

We are told that Antigonus received Cassander well, thereby reaffirming his standing friendship with Antipater's family. Antigonus' motive for doing so is
portrayed as a desire to create problems for Polyperchon so that the Asian strategos would not need to fear Polyperchon's influence. As far as this goes it accurately reflects the precautions of an ambitious man, but there is no reason to think that Antigonus' affection for Antipater's memory was feigned, or that his allegiance to the kings had changed in any way. Antigonus was an astute politician who had much to gain from a conflict between Cassander and Polyperchon. With Antipater gone, Antigonus rightfully might believe that no one was more qualified than himself to take control of the empire's affairs. This ambition would be more easily gained once Polyperchon was proven no more than a match for Cassander. This need not lead us, however, to assume that Antigonus wanted to replace the Argead kings upon the throne—especially since the kings remained an effective way to appeal to the loyalties of troops useful to Antigonus.

Polyperchon reacted to Cassander's flight with alarm, especially after it became clear that Cassander was having great success in attracting allies. Upon consultation with his officers, Polyperchon decided to fight the growing tempest by acting in three ways. First, he issued under royal authority a general proclamation of freedom for all Greek cities and promised to overthrow the oligarchies which had been supported in many towns by Antipater, and which were now under the military control of Cassander. Second, he asked Olympias to return to Macedonia from
Epirus so that she might assume responsibility for the upbringing of her grandson. And third, he appealed to Eumenes to come to the aid of the kings.

Concerning this third point, in effect, Polyperchon was overturning the condemnation of Eumenes which had stood officially since the death of Perdiccas. He obviously did so in order to give Eumenes the legitimacy necessary to organize a force in Asia to challenge the authority of Antigonus. The result would have been comic if the circumstances had not been so dire: after the rehabilitation and legitimation of Eumenes, the Asian war pit him as the kings' champion against Antigonus, who had the command of a royal army and who had been commissioned in the kings' name to defeat this same Eumenes. The result of the twists and turns of the policies issued in the kings' names was to make it difficult for the Macedonians anywhere to distinguish how best to serve the Argead house. Since both sides could argue that theirs was the faction operating in the interests of the kings--(and since both had the properly drafted orders to prove it!)--it was left to individual commanders to decide however they liked which side they would support.

The ever widening conflict generated a flood of propaganda from both sides as justification was sought for political standing. The position of Polyperchon and Eumenes was especially weak since the former was new to his
role and the latter only recently rehabilitated. Their efforts to compensate for the relatively more secure reputations of Antigonus, Ptolemy, and Cassander's father Antipater included: the frequent display of the kings' names to marshall political support, troops, and funds especially on behalf of Eumenes who otherwise found it difficult to overcome the prejudice against his former condemnation (and possibly his ethnic origin\(^24\)); the interpretation of every incident possible to convince the undecided that their enemies were illegitimate; and even the manipulation of mystical associations with Alexander the Great and the regalia of the Macedonian kings.\(^{125}\) Olympias helped in this effort, even though she judiciously refused for the moment to accept Polyaeres' invitation to return to Macedonia. She did her best to wield whatever influence she possessed to defeat the efforts of Cassander and his allies.\(^{126}\) This included especially a correspondence with Eumenes in which she requested that he rally to the cause of Alexander IV.\(^{127}\) Appeals of this type from a member of the royal family played well into the hands of Eumenes who published the communications to overcome obstacles to his political comeback.

The most important development in the war fought concurrently in Europe and Asia occurred in 317 when Polyaeres, campaigning unsuccessfully in the southern Balkans, allowed Philip III to return to Macedonia unattended.\(^{128}\) Whatever possessed Polyaeres to commit
such an extraordinary error in judgment is unknown, but upon his return to Macedonia Philip came under the control of his unchaperoned wife and she used the opportunity to strive for the prominence she had been denied by Antipater at Triparadisus. In Philip's name, Eurydice proclaimed that Polyperchon was no longer empowered to act in an official capacity, thereby declaring the political independence of her husband. Eurydice undoubtedly acted when she did because she had an unexpected opportunity and because the invitation to Olympias extended by Polyperchon threatened to prevent another such chance from happening in the foreseeable future. To strengthen her position, she immediately appealed to Cassander for military aid. Once again the wheel of fortune had inverted who was to be construed as legitimate and who was to be an outlaw. The confused effect this event had upon the Macedonians was to be expected.

The initial reaction by the citizens of Macedonia was one of support for Eurydice, but the speed with which Polyperchon and Olympias moved to check this bold move proved how unstable Eurydice's coalition was. Polyperchon disengaged himself from his southern conflict, made his peace with Epirus, gathered an army, and marched upon Macedonia "to restore Olympias and the son of Alexander to the throne." The lines were now strictly drawn—Polyperchon and his allies stood behind the young
Alexander alone, while Cassander (who replied favorably to Eurydice's cry for help, but who was not with her when the final crisis came) aligned with the faction of Philip III. The confrontation between Polyperchon and Olympias on the one hand, and Eurydice and Philip III on the other occurred at an insignificant site in western Macedonia called Euia. We cannot call what happened there a battle because as soon as the two sides met, the forces behind Eurydice transferred their allegiance to Olympias.\textsuperscript{133} It is curious that Polyperchon's influence in the subsequent events faded dramatically—Olympias seized Philip III and Eurydice, and rode the crest of emotion to the control of Macedonia, although it was briefly maintained.\textsuperscript{134}

The frustration which had built up within Olympias over the years exploded on her victory. Instead of handling Philip and Eurydice with discretion, she walled them into a small room and there mistreated them before she ordered their execution at the hands of some Thracian mercenaries.\textsuperscript{135} This act, as well as the fury Olympias subsequently vented on the family and friends of Cassander, appeared to the Macedonians as petty, impious, and outrageous.\textsuperscript{136} Amid the surge of disapproval for Olympias' behavior grew a faction willing to support the return of Cassander.\textsuperscript{137} Realizing that speed was essential, Cassander rushed to enter Macedonia before Olympias could prepare for his coming. When Cassander arrived, Olympias' growing list of opponents rallied around him and brought
him victories against Polyperchon and Olympias, the latter whom he captured after a siege of Pydna. Upon Cassander's victory, Olympias was brought to trial by the relatives of her recent victims at the end of which she was condemned to death and executed by her prosecutors.

Although Alexander IV maintained his status as king for approximately six more years, the period between the deaths of Philip III and Alexander IV saw a change come over the Macedonian world, and it was Cassander who led the way. Consistent with his earlier charges against Perdiccas and Antigonus, Diodorus describes Cassander upon Olympias' death as ambitious to seize the throne. With Cassander Diodorus might have been right, although it is impossible to date precisely when he began to aspire to more than the role of guardian for the young king. Cassander treated Alexander adroitly as long as the king remained but a child. Alexander and Roxane were placed into "protective custody" for their "own safety" at Amphipolis. While there, for a time Alexander was allowed some of the trappings of the ancient kingship including his own royal pages and hetairoi. Amphipolis, however, was little more than a show of deference to the youth's station while he was cut off from as many Macedonians as possible in
order to diminish the effect personal contact with his subjects would have had.

Along with the capture of Olympias and Alexander IV at Pydna, Cassander had taken Thessalonike, the daughter of Philip II and the half-sister of Alexander the Great. To secure the association with the royal family that had hitherto eluded any other hetairos Cassander decided to marry this available princess. This union allowed Cassander to argue that he was then in the position to speak for the royal family as a legitimate in-law, and that his treatment of the king was proper as he sought to look out after the interests of his new "family." An additional benefit secured by this marriage (as Cassander well knew) was that any children he might have by Thessalonike would have the blood of the Argead kings running through their veins—an important point to take into consideration when he reached the decision to seek the throne in his own right.

As noted, it was some time before Cassander was willing to eliminate Alexander and claim his place. But Cassander used this period wisely, not just by moving more closely to the Argead house, but also by doing things traditionally associated with kingship. The first such action came when Cassander assumed the responsibility for the royal burial of Philip III and Eurydice. Another was his foundation of two new cities which he named Cassandreia and Thessaloniki in honor of himself and his
Argead bride.\textsuperscript{147} Never before in Macedonian history had cities been founded and so named except by the king or by his heir.\textsuperscript{148} After acting in this manner, Cassander was then wise enough to be contented with de facto royal authority, giving the Macedonians time to let sink in the import of what he had accomplished. Cassander's dream was ultimately accepted by the Macedonians in Macedonia not because he destroyed the bonds which defined the Macedonian kingship, but because by his clever association with various perogatives of the royal office he substituted himself for a young boy whom few knew.

In Asia, Eumenes and Antigonus continued to issue proclamations of their loyalty to the Argead family, and to collect support by circulating the royal writs which defined their authority.\textsuperscript{149} Eumenes also found it expedient to participate in celebrations honoring Philip II and Alexander III, and to go so far as to forge letters from the royal family in Europe when the morale of his army seemed low.\textsuperscript{150} The culmination of the war between these two commanders came at the Battle of Gabiene in the spring of 316, which ended as Eumenes' Macedonians betrayed their commander to regain the baggage which they had lost in the fighting.\textsuperscript{151} Perhaps this treachery was made easier by their discovery that Eumenes had deceived them months earlier concerning the fates of Olympias, Alexander IV, and Polyperchon.\textsuperscript{152} However despicable their act was, they can
not be accused of having betrayed the kings when it happened since it was easily argued at the time that Antigonus had proven every bit as loyal to the Argeads as had Eumenes.

Antigonus' victory sparked a new round of war. A group of his former allies (including Cassander, Ptolemy, and Seleucus) considered that his reorganization of Asia in his favor brought him too much power to go unchallenged. They demanded that he "share" the spoils of his victory with them or else face the consequences of their hostility. It is clear that Antigonus had assumed a position analogous to that of Perdiccas before his fall and that his peers could not suffer the inequality of their power-bases. We have no need to fight this war blow by blow here, but two points should be made as they pertain to the lingering importance of the Argead royal family.

First, when Antigonus entered Persia after Eumenes' defeat he was hailed as the King of Asia. It is impossible to know what Antigonus thought about the honor but he did not publicly embrace the office. There is a possibility that he allowed the idea of his kingship to circulate without expressing an opinion on the matter one way or the other. If this was the case, however, it did not stop him from bringing serious charges against Cassander's royal ambitions before an assembly of Macedonian troops, and later from publishing them abroad. In part to counter the demands of his former
allies alluded to above, Antigonus condemned Cassander's treatment of Olympias and Alexander IV, his marriage to Thessalonike, his foundation of cities in the manner of the Argead kings, and his other policies which seemed to indicate that Cassander wished to become the king of Macedonia. In short, Antigonus was blasting his new rival for ambitions unbecoming an Macedonian aristocrat, and Antigonus hardly could have done so before his own army and save face if he had been openly guilty of similar ambitions.

The second point concerns the intentions of Ptolemy during this period. There is no doubt that Ptolemy was securing the loyalties of Egypt for himself, but we have good evidence to suggest that he did so only after recognizing the continued authority of the Argead house. At least two items show that Ptolemy not only recognized Philip III as his king, but that he publicized this relationship throughout Egypt. The first comes down to us upon a vase which portrays Philip doing obeisance to the Egyptian god, Min. The second comes in the form of a dedication at the important religious site of Luxor, where some reconstruction was carried out in Philip's name. This same loyalty was rendered to Alexander IV as well, since he was given credit for the later work done on Luxor's inner court. In addition, we have an inscription honoring the deeds of Ptolemy at great length,
but which is dated by the regnal year of Alexander IV. Another shred of evidence from Egypt refers to a proclamation probably issued in the year 311, which is dated by Alexander's reign and by Ptolemy's years as satrap. With this evidence existing as it does, it seems that as late as the last year of Alexander IV's life, Ptolemy was still publicly admitting that he was no more than a servant of the Argead kings.

Even acknowledging the consistent public loyalty to Alexander IV, however, when a general exhaustion brought a temporary cessation to the hostilities in 311, the end of the Argead house was near. The terms of the peace recognized Cassander's position in Europe, Ptolemy's in Egypt, Antigonus' in Asia, the restoration of Seleucus to his satrapy lost in the fighting, and the rise of Lysimachus in Thrace—all of whom were to be secure until such time as Alexander IV came of age. Indeed, since Alexander was twelve at the time, some in Macedonia began to wonder aloud when Cassander would relinquish his control of the king. Rather than jeopardize his control of Macedonia, and perhaps even with the tacit approval of the others who had signed the treaty, Cassander had Alexander murdered. To blunt criticism, Cassander kept the death secret for some time, but even after it became known few seemed upset enough with the accomplished fact to call for his overthrow. With this death, and those of Cleopatra and Heracles (if indeed he was widely accepted as an
Argead), the ancient royal family came to an end and a new era had come to the Macedonians who ruled from Epirus to India.\textsuperscript{166} Even with the Argead house gone, the generals who ruled the various parts of Alexander's empire cautiously bided their time before proclaiming their royal status.\textsuperscript{167}

\textit{vi}

What are we to make of this evidence? Perhaps we should start with the obvious and point out that as much as it might have been desirable for the king to be a great leader, this was not necessary to secure the people's loyalty. The kingdom could function under pressure for some time if necessary with absolutely no leadership emanating from the occupant of the throne--but if our evidence is indicative--not forever. Certainly, the special religious status of the Argeads had something to do with the willingness of the Macedonians to pledge their allegiance to kings otherwise unable to serve actively, but since there was no permanent structure in the kingdom which did not draw its strength directly from the monarch, the state could not function if this situation were extended indefinitely. The Argead king not only inherited a position of religious prominence upon his accession, he also was born into a hierarchy which defined his
relationship with everyone else in his realm. Royal power, therefore, brought with it certain duties which had to be met (noted in Chapter Three). If there was little prospect that a king would mingle with his subjects socially, bestow gifts upon them, listen to their grievances, or dispense justice in addition to fulfilling his contract with the gods on behalf of the nation, then the fundamental bonds which tied subject to king lost their potency, ultimately forcing the search for their replacement.

This, however, created a dilemma. One could not simply replace the king within the system, because there was no system without the king—and he was defined traditionally as a member of the Argead family. At the very least an attempt to elevate a non-Argead to the throne had the potential to destroy all legitimate authority in the kingdom, because there existed no accepted means to transfer royal authority beyond the Argead house. Thus, there would exist no fount from which lesser officials could draw their delegated power.

The decline of Argead Macedonia began not with the reigns of Philip III and Alexander IV, but with that of Alexander the Great. This was so because not even Alexander could have maintained the relationships traditional to Macedonia after the conquest of the Persian Empire. The immense size of the new kingdom would have prevented the preservation of the intimacy needed to make
the old system work—as Alexander himself foresaw. Thus, something was going to happen by necessity: either the structure of the kingdom was going to evolve, the realm was going to break up into more governable parts, or both. Alexander III hoped to accomplish the first of these alternatives, but his death—and the subsequent rule of two kings who could not hope to implement new ideas—eventually led to a combination of the second and the third. The final collapse was helped greatly by the split which developed between the two kings, or rather, by the conflict which enveloped Olympias and Eurydice. The creation of an atmosphere in which fighting one king helped to secure the other—neither of whom had much to offer in victory except the hope that one day a competent monarch would sit upon the throne—could not fail to make the Macedonian people somewhat cynical about the manipulation of their kings, and about the motives of those who claimed to be operating in the "true" long term interests of the royal house. When this split coupled with the wars already being fought among the hetairoi, loyalty suffered even more since the generals could choose which king to back with one eye on their own advancement.

Since a solution depended upon the elevation of someone to the throne who could act in his own right, but in lieu of an Argead who could do so until warfare began to erode the great Alexander's legacy, perhaps the best
compromise was that of Cassander who associated himself as closely as possible with the royal family and then began to act like a king without a title. Over time, the same network of relationships which had defined Argead authority developed around a new royal family which at least could claim to carry a part of the original royal house around in its scions. Such a transfer, however, was bound to create jealousy in those who considered themselves Cassander's social equals. Thus, although Cassander's methods might have made the idea of change palatable, they also guaranteed that the unity of the large kingdom would be shattered. The rise of new leaders who established their effectiveness in providing the basic services sought from kings, in conjunction with their avowed interest in maintaining as much ancient Macedonian custom as possible (in part proven by their open respect for the Argeads long after their usefulness had waned) allowed a shift of loyalty to occur. Of course, new explanations for legitimacy had to arise to secure the new houses. Cassander's methods were one way to accomplish this, but others also were used. In particular, the new kings had to create new religious justifications for their power which was accomplished through the combination of Macedonian customs with those of the land over which they ruled. Also, it was found useful to cultivate the memory of the greatest of all Argead kings, Alexander III, first by elevating him to the status of divinity, and then by
associating themselves as closely as possible with the god so created.\textsuperscript{168}
NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

1 As noted in Chapter One, not all candidates or usurpers to the throne are explicitly referred to in our ancient sources as being Argead. Their Argead lineage is indicated, however, by citations which refer to figures bearing the same names as those in question as being of the royal family (e.g., Amyntas II [394-393] is almost certainly that Amyntas who was the son of a Menelaus and grandson of Alexander I.)

2 Philip's defeats: Diod. 16.35.2. Alexander's difficulties: "orientalization", Diod. 17.78.1f., Curt. 6.6.1f., Plut. Alex. 47.10, Just. 12.41f.; proskynesis, Arr. Anab. 4.12.1f., Curt. 8.5.9f.; Parmenion's murder, Diod. 17.80.3f., Curt. 7.2.35f., Just. 12.5.4f.; opposition in India, Arr. Anab. 5.25.2f., Diod. 17.94f., Curt. 9.2.10f., Plut. Alex. 62.1f., Just. 12.8.1f.; Opis mutiny, Arr. Anab. 7.8.1f., Diod. 17.109.1f., Curt. 10.2.8f., Just. 12.11.1f. For the copious modern bibliography on these incidents under Alexander begin with the appropriate sections of J. Seibert, Alexander der Grosse (Darmstadt, 1972).

3 In addition to Philip's and Alexander's success in
alleviating the hostility inherent in the situations cited in note 2, Polyaeconus (4.2.6) shows that difficult situations could be avoided in a more light-hearted way. Here, Philip II delayed his troops bent on collecting their back pay by clowning before them. His humor prevented an ugly confrontation from escalating to open dissention and points to his brilliance as a leader who understood his men and how to communicate with them.

4 The previous section of this chapter emphasized the difficulties existing in our accounts for the kings prior to 323. Here I will argue the applicability of the evidence subsequent to 323 to a study of Macedonian institutions, even though for this period the problems of the Empire overshadowed those faced in the original Macedonian environment.

5 As far as Greece was concerned, Philip II ruled through the organization of the Corinthian League, over which he presided not as the Macedonian king, but as hegemon. Macedonia had no official part in the confederation other than its king happened also to be the League's most important official. (See Ellis Philip II, 204-120; Griffith, Mac II, 623-646.) Thus, no organization subordinating Greece to Macedonia was imposed upon the south. Not only was the size of Alexander's realm a problem, so also was its diversity. Macedonia was not a
land of ethnic purity, but there were common social, cultural, and religious traditions which bound together the inhabitants of the northern Balkans. Despite the one-time incorporation of Macedonia into the Persian sphere of influence, no such affinity existed among the various parts of Asia and Macedonia.

6 Alexander not only adopted the administrative organization of the Persian Empire wholesale, he also attempted to impose the customs of Persian dress and court ceremony upon his Macedonians. For their bitter reaction see Plut. *Alex.* 47.9; Curt. 6.6.1-6.6.11; Diod. 17.77.4-17.78.1; and Just. 12.3.8-12.4.1. See also C.F. Lehmann-Haupt, "Satrap," *RE*, 2A, 1, cols. 138-161; E. Badian, "The Administration of the Empire," *G&R* 12 (1965), 166-182.


was a "personal" one rather than a "constitutional" one, has been contested by C. Edson's in "Imperium Macedonicum: The Seleucid Empire and the Literary Evidence," CPh 53 (1958) 153-170. Edson argues that ancient writers thought of Asia as a "constitutional state" along the lines which Edson thought could be found in Macedonia [including the rights of the Macedonians to elect their kings, and hear treason trials]. As I have sought to demonstrate in Chapters Two, Three, and Four, Edson's conception of the Macedonian state appears outdated. Thus, although Edson appears right in arguing that the Seleucids harkened back to the examples provided by their Argead predecessors, he is so in a way not originally intended. I do not wish to engage in a discussion concerning the ways that the Successor kingdoms would have to assimulate local customs to those that were exported from Macedonia in order to successfully rule over vastly larger populations. There was a tension involved in the evolution of Hellenistic states as they attempted to maintain the purity of the institutions inherited from their Balkan forefathers, and sought to meet the needs of a different cultural environment. Despite resistance, change to a certain degree was inevitable. One example here should suffice--P.M. Fraser (Ptolemaic Alexandria (London, 1972), 189-190) comments that "although Alexandria had a large native population, this has left virtually no trace in the field of religion....it follows that Alexandrian religion...is
the religion first and foremost of the Greek population of the city." Yet, after spending some time discussing elements of Alexandrian religion inherited from Greece, Fraser (246-276) continues by documenting those cults found in the city of Egyptian ancestry. Hence, the Greek (and Macedonian) population came to grips with its setting and embraced local traditions.

9 Berve Das Alexanderreich II, numbers 87, 94, 317, 414, 446, 627, 655, 668. On the specific reference to Craterus' opposition to Alexander's orientalization see Plut. Alex. 47.9 and Eum. 6.2. On the post Alexander the Great attitudes of the Argead house see sections 2-4 below.

10 We do not know exactly when Alexander IV was murdered at Cassander's command. It came sometime in 311/310 after a peace treaty arranged in 311 (immediately after according to Diodorus 19.105.2), but since Cassander kept Alexander's death secret for a period, we cannot be certain how long it was after the treaty that the last Argead died. The Marmor Parium for 310/9 lists Alexander's death, perhaps only because that is when it became known. See, Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, 4.1, 138; Tarn, CAH 7, 493.

11 See above, Chapter Two, section 2, pp. 67-74.
12 Alexander had Amyntas (son of Perdiccas III and cousin of Alexander, Berve Das Alexanderreich II, #61) killed in 336 in order to secure his accession. There is nothing to indicate that Alexander would not have done the same to his half-brother had he considered it necessary. See E. Badian, "The Death of Philip II," Phoenix 17 (1963) 244-250; J.R. Fears, "Pausanias, the Assassin of Philip II," Athenaeum 53 (1975) 111-135.

13 Just. 7.5.9-10. I do not wish here to get into the question of Alexander IV's half-Iranian ancestry and its impact upon the Macedonians. There may have been some prejudice against an heir who could not trace his heritage on both sides to Macedonian ancestors as I have noted in Chapter Two, but events after 323 indicate that this was generally overcome to an extent where I think Alexander IV's father meant far more to the Macedonians than his mother.

14 For examples of this attitude and the subsequent oversight of the importance of the Argeads during this period, see F. Schachermayr, "Das Ende des makedonischen Königshauses," Klio 16 (1919/20) 332-337, "Zu Geschichte und Staatrecht der frühen Diadochenzeit," Klio 19 (1925) 435-452; F. Geyer, "Die Diadochen," Neue Jahrbücher für Wissenschaft und Jugendbildung v.5 (1929) 137-144; M.J.

15 Curt. 10.6.1-10.10.1; Arr. succ. Alex. 1.1-1.3; Just. 13.2.5-13.4.3; Diod. 18.3.1-5.

16 The most respected living Macedonian at the time, Antipater, was in Macedonia at the time awaiting another, Craterus, who had been ordered by Alexander before he died to go to Macedonia with a group of war veterans and there replace Antipater (Arr. Anab. 7.12.4; Just. 12.12.4). Diodorus (18.4.1) refers specifically to Craterus' reputation at just that time, and Arrian (Anab. 7.12.4) also mentions Alexander's affection for him.

17 Perhaps the best indication of Alexander's growing trust in Perdiccas came when Alexander ordered him to conduct the remains of Hephaestion to Babylon where Alexander planned magnificent funeral arrangements (Diod. 17.110.8).
18 Berve *Das Alexanderreich* II, #627. Perdiccas held a command with Hephaestion but independent of Alexander in India (Arr. *Anab.* 6.6.6); he was close enough to Alexander at the Mallian city to withdraw the near fatal arrow (Arr. *Anab.* 6.11.1); and he was married to the daughter of the Persian satrap of Media on Alexander's order (Arr. *Anab.* 7.4.5). From India on, therefore, Perdiccas seems to have remained close to Alexander and on excellent terms with Alexander's personal friends.

19 Curt. 10.6.1f.


21 We have no actual record of their acceptance of Perdiccas' accomplishment at Babylon. Since both worked closely together between 323-321, however, and since Antipater agreed to a marriage alliance with Perdiccas (Diod. 18.23.1f.; Arr. *succ.* Alex. 1.21; Just. 13.6.4) there can be no doubt that both Antipater and Craterus accepted the assignments issued under Perdiccas' authority.

22 Curt. 10.6.16-19.
23 Diod. 18.23.2-18.25.3. Justin (13.6.4) mentions that Perdiccas desired royal support for his existing power. This appears to mean that he wished only a closer association with the Argeads—and not to replace them.

24 Diod. 18.23.2.


26 Diod. 18.12.1 (where Leonnatus is misnamed), 18.16.1; Plut. Eum. 3.2.

27 Diod. 18.14.4-5; Arr. succ. Alex. 1.9; Plut. Eum. 3.3-4.

28 Perdiccas' orders for Leonnatus were made in the interests of the kingdom and before he heard the news of the rebellion in Greece. Since the uprising in Greece was more dangerous, and since Perdiccas had not shown any open hostility towards Antipater, I conclude that Leonnatus' move would not have angered Perdiccas, especially since Perdiccas and Leonnatus are reported as having been close political allies (Curt. 10.8.7-23; Plut. Eum. 3.3; Nepos Eum. 2.4).

30 The Chiliarchy was originally a Persian office (See, J.M. Cook, *The Persian Empire* (New York, 1983) 143f.) Although the Macedonian use of the term came into use when Alexander reformed his cavalry into eight units of 1,000 each as the designation of the eight commanders of these forces, it did not take on the meaning as "second to the king" until the term was reserved for Hephaestion alone (Arr. *Anab.* 7.14.10). On Alexander's introduction of the rank see Diod. 18.48.5, where it is seen as a part of Alexander's desire to orientalize his extended kingdom—a process not much appreciated by many Macedonian *hetairoi*. Also see P.A. Brunt, "Alexander's Macedonian Cavalry," *JHS* 83 (1963) 27-46; P. Goukowsky, *Mythe D'Alexandre*, 176-178.


32 Diod. 18.23.3; Arr. *succ. Alex.* 1.20-26.

33 Diod. 18.23.4-18.25.3.
We do not know precisely when Olympias fled Macedonia for Epirus. Macurdy (*Hellenistic Queens* (Baltimore, 1932)) believes that this occurred in 331, after her son rebuked her for meddling in politics and attacking his friends in connection with the disputed loyalty of an Amyntas. Diodorus (18.49.4), however, implies that Olympias left Macedonia not after being humiliated by her son, but after her hatred for Antipater made her stay there impossible. If we can trust Plutarch on a matter of chronology (a dangerous thing at times), she seems to have been in Epirus already when Alexander was attacking Gaza (fall 332), because at that time Plutarch (*Alex.*, 25.6) mentions Alexander's gifts of spoils to his mother and sister in such a way as to imply that they were together. Olympias almost certainly was in Epirus by 330, since the contemporary Athenian orator, Hyperides, complained of her arrogance in denying the Athenians access to Dodona and his speech (*Euxen.* 24f.) probably dates to that year (see Macurdy, 33f.).
Alexander is shown once making reference to the unwillingness of the Macedonians to follow a woman (Plut. Alex. 68.5). Also, just before his death, Antipater warned the Macedonians against ever permitting a woman to head the realm (Diod. 19.11.9). He could hardly have done so if there was a precedent for such a role, and he would not have needed to if Olympias and Eurydice had been content to live with tradition.

Arr. Anab. 7.12.6; Plut. Alex. 39.8, Apophtheg. 39.

Diod. 18.49.4; Arr. Anab. 7.12.5; Plut. Alex. 68.4-5; Paus. 1.11.3.

Plutarch (Alex. 25.6) shows that Alexander supplied his mother with money. On Olympias' behavior see Hyperides Euxen. 24 f.

Diod. 18.23.1-3; Arr. succ. Alex. 1.21. Perdiccas was apparently not Olympias' first choice for her daughter. Plutarch (Eum. 3.4.5) and Nepos (Eum. 2.4.5) both drawing upon Hieronymus, report that Leonnatus intended to marry Cleopatra (probably upon her mother's approval) while he was in Europe helping Antipater. Before this could happen, Leonnatus was killed in battle. (Diod. 18.14.5-18.15.3; Arr. succ. Alex. 1.9; Just. 13.5.14-16) Plutarch and Nepos both also state that Leonnatus' reasons for hoping to marry
Cleopatra were the same as those of Perdiccas—that is, to gain the throne. But as such a marriage could not have given Perdiccas the throne, it could not have done so for Leonnatus. Since Plutarch (Eum. 3.3) and Nepos (Eum. 2.4) append this marriage discussion to a confirmation that Leonnatus and Perdiccas were working closely together, it seems that Olympias was attempting to ally herself with a faction to increase her influence at Antipater's expense. The same enemies (see below) who attacked Perdiccas' royal ambition, thus would be in a similar position to assault that of Leonnatus.

43 Olympias had no interest in maintaining Philip III upon the throne and there is also a tradition that she hated this son of Philip II (Plut. Alex. 77.7-8). If she could have assumed a role for Alexander IV similar to the one she was playing for Neoptolemus in Epirus, her power obviously would be greatly expanded. Considering how hated she became in Epirus with its modest potential, and considering her actions after her return to Macedonia (see below after her "victory" at Euia), it seems that Antipater was wise to fear how tyrannical she might become with the immense resources of the Macedonian kingdom at her command.

44 That Olympias knew of Antipater's plan to marry his daughter to Perdiccas is an inference on my part. We know
that she kept abreast of affairs and corresponded widely from Epirus. Since Perdiccas and Antipater had been negotiating a marriage alliance since the death of Alexander the Great (Diod. 18.23.1-2)—almost certainly in an open manner—I think it likely that Olympias would have learned of the negotiations. Nevertheless, Perdiccas was not Olympias' first choice for Cleopatra (see note 42 for sources and discussion). Only after Leonnatus was dead and Antipater's position was becoming more and more secure did Olympias offer Cleopatra to Perdiccas.

Cleopatra, as the daughter and sister of Macedonia's two greatest kings, was certainly a matrimonial catch of great magnitude. Since her father and brother were dead, they could only living in the memories of their subjects and the physical form of near relatives. Above and beyond these charms, Cleopatra married to an hetairos would have been the first of the current crop of Argead princesses to have been so. Cynanne, Adea, and Thessalonike were all unmarried at the time (on these women see below).

Arr. succ. Alex. 1.21. On Eumenes' famous loyalty to the Argeads see Plutarch's Life of Eumenes and Diod. 18.53.7 (also Anson, Eumenes, esp. 208. Even as an outlaw, Eumenes maintained an excellent relationship with the Macedonians under his command (Plut. Eum. 8.6), only possible because of his cultivation of an association with
the Argeads.

47 There was no precedent for the marriage of an Argead woman bringing with it kingship. The union between Ptolemy and Eurydice in the 360s (Just. 7.4.7-7.5.8) did not make him king and only enhanced the status he already possessed as an Argead. This, of course, is exactly what Perdiccas hoped to do. See Chapter One notes 86-88.

48 Diod. 18.23.1-2; Arr. succ. Alex. 1.21, 1.25.2, 1.26; Just. 13.6.4 f.

49 Phila married Craterus (Diod. 18.18.7, 19.59.3) and after his death, Demetrius Poliorcetes, the son of another of Antipater's allies, Antigonus (Diod. 19.59.3-6; Plut. Dem. 14). Eurydice married Ptolemy (Paus. 1.6.8).

50 It does not take much imagination to realize that Olympias would use any increased influence to attempt to get Alexander IV recognized as sole king. Perhaps she would have been helped in such a campaign by the uncustomary, unnecessary, and cumbersome dual-monarchy.

51 Antipater especially did not want to foster the royalty of Philip III's descendants, or else he would not have opposed Philip's marriage, the consumption of which
might have produced children (Polyaen. 8.60 and below). This did not mean, however, that he relished the promotion of Alexander as sole king. I doubt whether Antipater's support for Philip III was sentimental, although his loyalty to Philip II might have played some role in his willingness to see Philip III continue as king. Almost certainly, Antipater realized that Philip III's demotion would have meant the rehabilitation of Olympias.

52 Diod. 18.23.3; Arr. succ. Alex. 1.21. Justin (13.6.7) is wrong in reporting that Perdiccas married neither woman.


54 Hornblower, Hieronymus 5-17.

55 Ibid. 180-233. Diod. 19.44.3. For Hieronymus' hostility for the enemies of his patrons see Pausanias


57 Arr. succ. Alex. 1.22–23.

58 Ibid. Berve Das Alexanderreich II, #61.

59 Just. 7.5.9–10 wrongly implies a hostility between Philip II and Amyntas, as the latter's subsequent career and his ability to travel abroad proves (Ditt. Syll I 3 258; J.R. Ellis, "Amyntas Perdikka, Philip II, and Alexander the Great," JHS 91 (1971) 15–24; Griffith, Mac II, 208–209).

60 Arr. succ. Alex. 1.22; Polyaen. 8.60. On these royal women see P. Green, "The Royal Tombs of Vergina: A Historical Analysis," Philip II. Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage, eds. W.L. Adams and E.N. Borza.
(Washington, 1982), 129-151, esp. 140.

61 Polyaeon. 8.60.

62 Since Cynanne and her daughter were intelligent and determined, they could not have failed to see that a marriage with Philip III would present the opportunity to replace the line of Alexander III in the succession with that of Philip III and, through his wife, Amyntas. What better revenge than to see the "immortal" Alexander's seed denied the throne by the descendants of those whom he had murdered?

63 Polyaeon. 8.60.

64 Arr. succ. Alex. 1.23-24.

65 Ibid. 1.23.

66 Ibid.

67 Perdiccas' policy was consistent as it related to the two kings. Ever since Babylon he had opposed Philip III, and his consideration of marriage with Cleopatra confirms he had not mellowed. If Perdiccas could not marry Cleopatra, at least he could try to make sure that Philip did not marry and have children with claims upon the
throne. Any marriage was dangerous, but that to another Argead would doubly reinforce the legitimacy of any offspring.

68 This supposition is well grounded in our sources. The rivalry in 323 between the phalanx and the cavalry (led by most of the army's officers) over who should occupy the throne (see Chapter Two, section two), had its origin in the fact that the infantry refused to buckle under the opposing faction's pressure. The steadfastness of the phalanx at the time reveals an intensity of devotion to Philip III which might or might not have been regretted after this king became more familiar, yet the confrontation at Babylon had set the opposing positions to a degree which would have made a public reversal by the rank and file an impossibility if it hoped to retain the influence gained by that stance. Thus, support for Philip III not only served as an outlet for dynastic loyalty, it also helped the infantry to balance the authority wielded by their social superiors, and reinforced the political impact of the phalanx' military organization begun in the 360's. Under these circumstances, it behooved the infantry, whose leaders certainly would have reminded them of the issue's importance, to bolster Philip III's claim as much as possible. This could be done in many ways, including a marriage to a woman universally accepted as worthy of the
Argead prince. From this viewpoint, no better bride was possible than an Argead princess. I think that the seriously mutinous environment which existed in Perdiccas' camp once the fate of Cynanthe became known is indicative of how strongly the rank and file felt the need to support Philip, both to fortify the dynasty and to maintain its own political influence, then bound securely to its backing of Philip as king.

69 Diod. 18.25.6, 18.28.2-18.29.1; Arr. succ. Alex. 1.26.

70 Paus. 1.6.3. Arr. succ. Alex. 1.25 is not explicit evidence for either destination.

71 Diod. 18.3.5, 18.28.3; Just. 13.4.6.

72 At Siwah Alexander had received a famous oracle (Arr. Anab. 3.3-4; Diod. 17.49.2-17.51.2; Curt. 4.7.5-32; Plut. Alex. 26.6-27.6; Just. 11.11; Strabo 17.1.43). The episode has been debated, but was clearly an important one in Alexander's life. For modern bibliography see, J. Seibert, Alexander der Grosse 116-125, and now P. Langer, "Alexander the Great at Siwah," AW 4 (1981) 109-127. Whether Siwah or Aegae bound, Alexander's body was temporarily entombed at Memphis (Paus. 1.6.3) and finally at Alexandria (Diod. 18.28.3).
74 Diodorus (19.52.5) explicitly cites this as a duty of the successor to the throne in connection with Cassander's ambitions (for a complete discussion of this material, see below). On the responsibilities of the new king see, Tarn, CAH 6, 482 and W.L. Adams, "The Royal Macedonian Tomb at Vergina: An Historical Interpretation," AW 3 (1980) 67-72.

75 Arrhidaeus was certainly not an Argead, and probably not related to Philip III through his mother. Had this latter been the case, then our sources probably would have mentioned the relation, as they did for Amphimachus (Arr. succ. Alex. 1.35) who played a much smaller role in this period.

76 Diod. 18.28.2.

77 Diod. 18.28.1.

78 Diod. 18.28.3-6. For other examples of how Alexander could be used to manipulate the loyalties of the Macedonians, see below Eumenes' use of his Alexander dreams.
79 Diodorus (18.25.5-6) shows that Perdiccas foresaw the war and that he considered his options carefully after talking them over with his friends.

80 Diod. 18.25.4-6; Plut. Eum. 5.1-2; Nepos Eum. 3.1-2.

81 I do not deny that Perdiccas' lack of success against Ptolemy allowed the latter's propaganda to be successful, since, as Diodorus (18.37.1-2) reports, if Eumenes' victory over Craterus had been known before Perdiccas' downfall, there would have been no mutiny. Nevertheless, Diodorus also indicates (see below) that Ptolemy increased the dissatisfaction felt for Perdiccas by his own army when the Egyptian satrap "corrected" the interpretation of his actions put forth by the chiliarch.

82 Diod. 18.30.1-18.32.4; Arr. succ. Alex. 1.26-27; Plut. Eum. 5.1-7.8; Nepos Eum. 3.3-4.4.

83 Diod. 18.33.1-18.36.3; Arr. succ. Alex. 1.28-29.

84 Diod. 18.36.4-6; Arr. succ. Alex. 1.29. Nepos (Eum. 5.1) mentions that Seleucus and Antigenes played important roles as well. Diod. 18.37.1-2 records that had the rebellious army learned of Eumenes' victory before Perdiccas' murder, events might have had a different turn. That there remained a sizeable group willing to follow
Perdiccas at this late date implies that there was uncertainty as to which faction had the more justifiable position.

85  Diod. 18.36.6-7; Arr. *succ. Alex*. 1.30.


89  Despite his friendliness, Ptolemy probably did not want the royal army, with its recently rebellious officers to stay in Egypt, since the situation was confused enough to threaten anything, even his deposition as satrap of Egypt. In addition, Ptolemy probably did not want Antipater to come to Egypt because he also could threaten Ptolemy's power-base.

90  Diod. 18.39.1.

91  Diod. 18.39.2; Arr. *succ. Alex*. 1.31-33. Eurydice's specific grievance here was the army's pay which apparently was delinquent. This cause was a popular one with the
troops and made her seem to be looking out after their interests in the manner of a king. There can be little doubt that she hoped to generate popularity which could be manipulated to secure for herself her husband's guardianship.

92 Diod. 18.39.2.

93 Diod. 18.39.2-4; Arr. succ. Alex. 1.32-33. The army almost lynched Antipater on his arrival, with only the timely intervention of Antigonus and Seleucus saving the old general.

94 Diod. 18.39.5-7 (translation of R.M. Geer, Loeb edition of Diodorus); Arr. succ. Alex. 1.34-38. The most important individual change of assignment was that of Nicanor for Eumenes in Cappadocia. Which commander of that name received this command is unknown, as Errington, "From Babylon to Triparadeisos: 323-320 B.C.," JHS 90 (1970) 69, n. 140, has already noted. Perhaps this was Antipater's son (Berve, Das Alexanderreich II, #553), but perhaps this was one of the other eight commanders named Nicanor under Alexander III. See also, E. Honigmann, "Triparadisus," RE 7A, 1, cols. 177-178.

95 Plut. Fum. 5.4-5. See also Will, Histoire Politique De Monde Hellénistique I, 45-65.
96 Diod. 18.48.4.

97 On Antigonus' assignment and authority: Diod. 18.39.7; Arr. succ. Alex. 1.44. On the war against Eumenes and the rest of the Perdiccas faction (e.g. Perdiccas' brother Alcetas and brother-in-law, Attalus): Diod. 18.37.4, 18.40-42, 18.44-47, 18.50-53, 18.58-63, 18.73, 19.12-34, 19.37-44; Arr. succ. Alex. 1.39-45; Plut. Eum. 8-19; Nepos Eum. 5-13; Just. 14.1-4. See also, Wehrli, Antigone et Démétrios, 35-40; and Anson, Eumenes, 114-175.

98 Diod. 18.40-18.41.1; Arr. succ. Alex. 1.42-44; Plut. Eum. 9.2-10.1; Nepos Eum. 5.2-3; Just. 14.2.1.

99 Diod. 18.41.4-5.

100 Diod. 18.41.6-7; Plut. Eum. 10.2-4.

101 For Antigonus' campaign in Asia Minor while these negotiations were under way: Diod. 18.44.1-18.47.4; Plut. Eum. 12.1. For the oath and its alteration: Diod. 18.53.5; Plut. Eum. 12.1-2; Nepos Eum. 5.7.

102 Diod. 18.59.1; Plut. Eum. 12.3; Nepos Eum. 7.1. Antigonus' anger at the changes probably came from the fact
that Eumenes' form of the oath made him the equal of Antigonus, not his inferior, even after Antigonus' commission and his victory.

103 Diod. 18.21.7-9, 18.43; Marmor Parium 319/18; App. Syr. 52.

104 Diodorus (17.49.2) and Curtius (4.7.9) mention the submission of Cyrene to Alexander III as he approached Siwah. This satisfied Alexander at the time, but later Cyrene was a problem for the Macedonians. Diodorus (18.19.1-18.21.9) records a widespread stasis in the region of Cyrene stimulated by a Thibron. This man had fled Asia and Alexander III with Harpalus (on this episode see Berve, Das Alexanderreich II, #143; E. Badian, "Harpalus," JHS 81 (1961) 16-43), the king's one-time friend, who had been guilty of maladministration and the theft of royal funds. Although Thibron murdered Harpalus (that is, according to Diodorus--Pausanias (2.33.4) gives another name for the assassin), he did not seek the pardon of legitimate authority. Rather, he took Harpalus' money and mercenary troops, and attacked Cyrene in order to secure a refuge from Macedonian retribution. Whatever lay behind the trouble at Cyrene, Diodorus (18.21.9; on this war, see also Arr. succ. Alex. 1.16-19; Just. 13.6.18)) records Ptolemy's conquest of the area as a reaction to Thibron's activities, and thus Diodorus has Ptolemy reasserting Macedonian
control over the region. If this was the case, or if it at least could be claimed that this was the case, then Ptolemy's Cyrene war would not have been perceived as contrary to the interests of the kings, or the united realm.

105 See below pp. 329f. with notes.

106 Diod. 18.48.4.

107 Berve Das Alexanderreich II, #654; Arr. Anab. 2.12.2, 3.11.9; Curt. 4.13.28; Diod. 17.57.2.

108 Just. 12.12.8. According to Arrian (Anab. 7.12.4) the only reason Polyperechon was sent was because he was second in seniority to Craterus.

109 Diod. 18.38.6.

experience in practical affairs during the Persian War, and that he was certainly serving in some capacity from 334 on. M. Fortina, *Cassandro, Re di Macedonia* (Palermo, 1965) 8f. deals mainly with Cassander's later career as it began to come to the forefront shortly before the death of Alexander the Great.

111 Cassander is called a "chiliarch", and if this is accurate, it shows that the office had become established by this time at least within the framework of the military. Diod. 18.48.4; Plut. *Phoc. 31.1*. See also, Fortina, *Cassandro*, 23. Adams, *Cassander*, 70-73 argues that the main reason for this decision was the "Demades affair" (Diod. 18.48.2-3; Arr. *succ. Alex. 1.13-15*; Plut. *Phoc. 30.4-6*, *Dem. 31.3-4*). Demades, an Athenian politician, had conspired with Perdiccas to liberate Greece from Antipater's control, and in 319 was called to Macedonia to answer charges. Cassander apparently received the accused in anger and had him and his son killed. Cassander's lack of control in this incident may have affected his father's choice as his successor, since the man Antipater chose would have to act more responsibly as he strove to dominate Hellas.

112 Diodorus (18.49.1, 18.54.1) mentions Cassander's expectations based upon his relationship to Antipater. This was especially to be expected if Plutarch (*Phoc. 30.5*)
is right when he says that Cassander took over his father's affairs while the latter was ill but alive. Family politics were so deeply ingrained in Macedonia that there was a law which condemned all members of a family in which one was guilty of treason (Arr. Anab. 3.26.4). The assumption here was that if one were guilty—all had to be. The Philotas/Parmenion affair presents a good case for the political cooperation of families at the highest level (Arr. Anab. 3.26.2 f.; Curt. 6.7.7 f.; Plut. Alex. 49 f.; Diod. 19.79 f.; Just. 12.4 f.).

113 Berve Das Alexanderreich II, #39 (Polyperchon's son Alexander). Alexander was old enough and well placed enough to serve as a somatophylakes of Philip III (Arr. succ. Alex. 1.38).

114 Diod. 18.49.1-3; 18.54.3-4.

115 Diod. 18.49.2-3; 18.54.2.

116 Diod. 18.54.3.

117 Diod. 18.49.2-3, 18.54.2. Cassander's success in Greece was widespread.

118 Diod. 18.54.3-4.
Diod. 18.55.1-2.

Diod. 18.55.2-18.57.1. A fairly detailed text of the decree is recorded 18.56.1-8. A possible corroborating inscription comes from Eresos (I.G. 12.2.526, see A.J. Heisserer, *Alexander the Great and the Greeks* (Norman: 1980) 27-78). K. Rosen ("Political Documents in Hieronymus of Cardia 323-301 B.C.," *Acta Classica* 10 (1967) 41-94) has analyzed the language of the inscription and found it not to be Diodoran. Thus its form is certainly that of Hieronymus, who is known to have relied heavily upon documentary material. The decree was issued in the name of the kings, as its opening lines (18.56.1-3) confirm. This liberalization harkened back to the Corinthian League of Philip II, who did not garrison the south. Antipater had deviated from this policy in the wake of Alexander's expanding status and the revolts of Agis and the Lamian War. The decree, however, also built upon Alexander III's more dominating relationship with Greece, as the willingness to interfere locally to restore exiles and to guarantee Greek neutrality in the coming conflict porves (18.56.4-8). In this decree (as in his other two policies mentioned below), Polyperchon showed his willingness to break with Antipater's policies--which Polyperchon probably had some part in fashioning--to meet his needs of the present.
As Diodorus' reports (18.49.4, 18.57.2), the chronological order of Cassander's flight and the invitation to Olympias is uncertain. Adams, Cassander, 75-83 suggests that Diodorus refers to two different invitations in these two references. Polyperchon might have written Olympias two, or even several, times, but Diodorus almost certainly is referring in both of these citations to the original contact since his account in 18.56.f. reiterates much of what he had reported earlier. Diodorus is forced to repeat because he broke his narrative to report events elsewhere. Both mentions of the invitation to Olympias place it after Cassander's withdrawal into isolation from which he fled to Asia. We cannot know, however, whether or not Cassander had decided to rebel before he received word that Olympias had been invited to return to Macedonia. This is a point of some significance for the light it would shed upon both Polyperchon's and Cassander's intentions. If Polyperchon asked Olympias back before Cassander went into rebellion then Polyperchon's move was a clear indication that he had no intention of working with Cassander who could not have accepted this bitter rival of his family. In such a case, Cassander's future as an influential officer was in great jeopardy (perhaps to be replaced by Polyperchon's son, Alexander?) justifying his revolt. If Cassander moved
first, then Polyperchon's action was a sign that he was breaking sharply with Antipater's faction, which by then had betrayed him, while at the same time Polyperchon was trying to secure as many allies as possible. Whichever is correct, we can be sure that this was not merely a silly mistake since Polyperchon consulted his friends before doing anything. Polyperchon's justification for Olympias' return was to have her look after the upbringing of Alexander IV (although whether or not she could have been kept in that capacity alone is another question). Since the king's mother, Roxane, was Iranian, this was a popular point with the Macedonians who wanted their king to have a sound training in Macedonian customs.

122 Diod. 18.57.4. This invitation, including as it did praise of Eumenes loyalty to the Argead cause, could not have been made had Eumenes been perceived as a rebel against Argead authority. Indeed, he did everything possible during the period of his condemnation to mitigate his unpopularity, including the requisitioning of, and signing for, supplies in the kings' names (which were duly rendered to him, Plut. Eum. 8.3). We need not assume that Eumenes' interest in the royal family was a sentimental one—no doubt he clearly understood the use of such propaganda in fortifying his own position.

123 This was especially true since the royal house was
irreparably split in its support for the kings by this time every bit as much as were the Macedonians themselves.

124 The importance of Eumenes' Greek, as opposed to Macedonian, background has been discussed by Anson, *Eumenes*, 176-202 (where also are provided bibliographical and source citations). As Anson points out, Hieronymus portrayed Eumenes as unable to fully secure the loyalties of his Macedonian troops since he was not from their homeland. Anson, however, downplays this reason for Eumenes' problems with the army, at least in so far as the rank and file was concerned. Such a broad minded acceptance of a Greek as a leader is uncertain, especially since Borza's recent work on the Greeks who served Alexander III seems to indicate a qualitative difference in the responsibilities delegated to the Greeks as opposed to the Macedonians of rank ("Alexander the Great and the Foreigners," forthcoming *Arc Mak* 4).

125 For the use of royal orders to secure support: Diod. 18.58.1-2, 18.59.3, 18.73.4, 19.12.1; Plut. *Eum.* 13.2; Nepos *Eum.* 7.2-3. For the attack on Antigonus' legitimacy: Diod. 18.52.7 For the manipulation of mystical symbolism: Diod. 18.60.4-18.61.3, 19.15.3-4; Plut. *Eum.* 13.3. On this last point, Eumenes claimed that Alexander had appeared to him in a dream with advice on the coming
conflict with Antigonus. In order to secure his position among the Macedonians he was leading, Eumenes decided that a royal tent should be erected, with regalia displayed therein, so that future councils could be held as if in the presence of Alexander. The episode not only shows a veneration for the dead king, but also for the physical symbols of Argead authority. For a description of Philip III's royal accommodations at roughly the same time see Plut. Phoc. 33.5. Antigonus responded by arguing against the rehabilitation of Eumenes and the authority of Polyperchon, as shown in Diod. 18.63.1-5. The troops caught in this propaganda war understandably were confused at times.

126 Diod. 18.62.2, 18.65.1; Nepos Eum. 6.3-5. Olympias wrote letters to Macedonians everywhere urging them to support Polyperchon and Eumenes even though she took Eumenes' advice and remained in Epirus for the moment. As the first citation shows, even Ptolemy ran afoul of the Macedonians in Asia when he pressed the case against Eumenes and against the letters being published in the kings' names.

127 Diod. 18.58.3-4; Plut. Eum. 13.1; Nepos Eum. 6.1.

128 We do not know when Philip returned to Macedonia exactly. He had been campaigning in the south with
Polyperchon (where Plut. *Phoc.* 33.7 presents one of our most vivid descriptions of Philip's capacities) but he had returned to Macedonia before the confrontation of Euia (see below) in which he opposed the forces led by Olympias and Polyperchon. Polyperchon's campaign in the southern Balkans had met with a conspicuous lack of success at Athens (Diod. 18.68.3) and Megalopolis (Diod. 18.70-72.1). In addition, his fleet, although initially victorious in the region of the Hellespont was ultimately defeated by Antigonus (Diod. 18.72.3-9; Polyaen. 4.6.8). His mounting failure was turning the tide in Greece against him.

129 Diod. 19.11.1; Just. 14.5.1-4.

130 Ibid. According to Justin, Eurydice also wrote to Antigonus.

131 Ibid.


133 Diod. 19.11.2; Just. 14.5.9-10. Exactly where Cassander was at the time is unclear, see Adams, *Cassander*, 88-91.
Among the outrages perpetrated by Olympias were the murder of Cassander's brother, Nicanor, and the desecration of another brother's, Iollas, tomb.

Olympias had gained the concession of her personal safety from Cassander before she surrendered Pydna. He both did and did not live up to his promise, because although he did not personally harm her, he made sure that she was executed legally. Upon Olympias' fate see C.F. Edson, "The Tomb of Olympias," Hesperia 18 (1949) 84-95, and Adams, Cassander, 96-98.

The Pages Cassander disbanded while Alexander was in Amphipolis. On Alexander's hetairoi—specifically his
somatophylakes see IG II² 561 and especially S.M. Burstein, "IG II² 561 and the Court of Alexander IV," ZPE 24 (1977) 223-225.

143  Diod. 19.35.5; Just. 14.6.3.

144  Diod. 19.52.1; Just. 14.6.13; Paus. 9.7.3.


146  Diod. 19.52.5. Diodorus presents this as proof of Cassander's royal intentions. The recent excavation of unplundered royal tombs at Aegae by M. Andronikos (one of which may be that of Philip III) has stirred up much controversy as to its inhabitant. The two possible candidates for Andronikos' Tomb II are Philip II and Philip III. A sampling of the ever growing literature upon this debate includes: W.L. Adams, "The Royal Macedonian Tomb at Vergina: An Historical Interpretation," AW 3 (1980) 67-72; M. Andronikos, "Vergina: the Royal Graves in the Great Tumulus," AAA 10 (1977) 1-72 (reprinted as The Royal Graves at Vergina (Athens: 1980)), "The Royal Tombs at Aigai (Vergina)," in Philip of Macedon, eds. M.B. Hatzopoulos and L.D. Loukopoulos (Athens: 1980) 188-231, "The Royal Tombs

147 Diod. 19.52.2-3; Paus. 5.23.3; Athen. 748C; Strabo 7 frags. 21, 24-26; Dion. Hal. 1.49.

148 Except for the founding of Alexandropolis before the death of Philip II (Plut. Alex. 9.1), our evidence indicates that this was the exclusive right of the reigning king.

149 Diod. 18.73.4, 19.12.1-19.14.4 shows Eumenes trying to marshall support in the eastern satrapies. Diod. 19.18.1 depicts Antigonus promoting Seleucus to the status of satrap and Antigonus obtaining money from a royal treasury, which he could not have done without some form of
royal authorization.

150 Diod. 19.22.1-19.23.1; Plut. Eum. 14.3. These were organized by Peucestas to promote his popularity among the Macedonians at the expense of Eumenes. Eumenes participated in their celebration and then took steps to neutralize Peucestas' propaganda (Diod. 19.23.1-3; Polyaen. 4.8.3).

151 Diod. 19.40.1-19.43.9; Plut. Eum. 16.3-18.3; Nepos Eum. 10.2; Just. 14.3.1-4.

152 Diod. 19.23.1-3; Polyaen. 4.8.3 show Eumenes forging a letter which claimed that Olympias had won Macedonia after killing Cassander, and that Polyperchon had crossed to Asia in order to attack Antigonus. The ploy was believed and Eumenes reaped the profits of better morale among his troops. The advantage, however, was short-lived, and the reaction betrays Eumenes' desparation or an error in judgement.

154 Diod. 19.48.1. Diodorus mentions a redistribution of satrapies in connection with this honor, but does not say that Antigonus reorganized Asia by virtue of his royal standing. His orders from Triparadisus gave him great authority in Asia, and since most of the eastern satraps had sided with Eumenes, these would now have to be replaced.

155 An addendum to Antigonus' attack upon Cassander (Diod. 19.61.1-4, see note 156) declared that "the Greeks should be free" (Diod. 19.61.3), which in turn was another attempt to erode Cassander's standing since he controlled most of the southern Balkans through garrisons. An echo of this proclamation is contained in the letter of Antigonus to the city of Scepsis, dating from after the peace of 311 (see C.B. Welles, Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period (London, 1934) 3-12; on Antigonus' propaganda campaign see also Welles, "Greek Liberty," JJP 15 (1965) 29-47.)

156 Diod. 19.61.1-4. The Macedonians with Antigonus voted on these issues and accepted them as valid complaints against Antigonus' enemy.

157 British Museum Dept. of Egyptian Antiquities, cat. #938.

158 E. Bevan, A History of Egypt Under the Ptolemaic

159 Bevan, History of Egypt, 28-29.

160 Ibid., 28-32 translates the long inscription, mentioning Alexander's seventh year (probably of sole royal power) and Ptolemy's status as satrap.

161 P. Eleph 1: Ἀλέξανδρου του Ἁλέξανδρου βασιλεύοντος ἔτει ἐβδομαί, Πτολεμαίου σατράπευοντος ἔτει τεσσαρεκαίδεκτών, μηνοὶ Νίου. Why would Ptolemy, in the most insulated of satrapies, conform to such correct usages unless he was loyal to the Argeads as long as necessary, or found it necessary to do so to keep abreast of the Macedonians under his command, or both?

162 Diod. 19.105.1.

163 Diod. 19.105.2.

164 Ibid.

165 Ibid. No one even used the death later as propaganda against Cassander, see Adams, "The Dynamics of
Polyperchon championed the cause of the Argead pretender, Heracles (alleged son of Alexander by Barsine) in 310/9 (Diod. 20.20.1-4, 20.28.1-2) and had some success in generating support among the Macedonians. Cassander, however, was able to convince Polyperchon that this attempt was futile—and Heracles' death soon followed (Diod. 20.28.2, Marmor Parium 310/9). For his efficiency in dispatching the boy, Polyperchon received a command from Cassander(!). Cleopatra, after her aborted attempt to marry Perdiccas, remained restricted in Sardis. Eumenes had a brief contact with her (Plut. Eum. 8.4; Just. 14.1.7) before he fled east, leaving Antigonus to look out after her "safety." After Alexander IV's death became known, she negotiated with Ptolemy concerning marriage, and he welcomed the idea, provided she could escape Asia Minor to Egypt. Such a union was unacceptable to Antigonus, of course, and upon her attempted flight, Antigonus ordered her murdered. With her death (Diod. 20.37.3-6) went the opportunity for any but Cassander to wed into the royal family since she was the last of the Argeads except Thessalonike. See Macurdy, Hellenistic Queens, 46-48.

Antigonus and his son Demetrius were the first of the Successors to assume the title of kings (Diod. 20.53.2; Plut. Dem.) and they only did so after a major naval
victory off of Cyprus. It appears that a suitable occasion was awaited before taking this giant leap, and if this is so, it is interesting that the new kingships were first justified as if "spear won". Once the dam was broken, others quickly followed suit including Ptolemy, Seleucus, Lysimachus, and according to Diodorus, Cassander (Diod. 20.53.3-4; Plut. Dem. 18.1-2; Just. 15.2.11-15; App. Syr. 54-55). Plutarch (Dem. 18.2) disagrees that Cassander took the title along with the others. Cassander's later elevation is accepted by Adams, Cassander, 161 f., and if true, indicates his greater caution because of the stronger feeling for the ancient ruling house within Macedonia.

One has only to observe the coinages of the Successors (where Alexander portraits dominate) to see their attempts to associate with Alexander. For a very general introduction to Hellenistic numismatics see R.A. Bauslaugh, "The Numismatic Legacy of Alexander the Great," Archaeology 37 #4 (1984) 34-41, and 56 for a beginning bibliography. On the divination of Alexander and his use to justify the new order see Goukowsky Mythe D'Alexandre v.1, 73-147.
Conclusion

The Argead kingdom of ancient Macedonia has left an indelible impression upon history because its two most famous scions undertook the successful unification of the Greek Aegean and the conquest of the Persian Empire. As impressive as these achievements were, however, they would not have occurred had not the predecessors of Philip II and Alexander III manipulated the geographical benefits of their realm, exploited the traditional role of lordship in Macedonian society, and expanded the base of royal authority. To be sure, Philip and Alexander significantly influenced the growth of the kingdom and the balance of its dominant institutions. Alexander in particular was forced to experiment with new ways to rule his empire since success had pushed it beyond its limit: either it had to adapt a structure which would allow one man to rule its huge expanse, or it would break up into smaller realms better suited to the retention of the personal characteristics of Macedonian monarchy.

This dissertation has traced the development of Argead authority insofar as possible from its earliest period until the end of the dynasty. Many traditional elements of authority lingered throughout this period, remaining at the very core of the Macedonian monarchy. Included in these vestiges of the distant past were the king's basic military, judicial, social, and religious rights and
responsibilities. Tradition survived into the historical era of the Argead dynasty in other ways as well, including in particular how the royal family was religiously distinguished from the rest of Macedonian society, and how succession considered many factors in establishing the hierarchy of potential heirs. Perhaps the main reason why ancient custom continued to play an important role in the definition of royal authority throughout the Argead period was the insecurity inherent in the geographic location of the Argead state, a peril which hindered the consolidation and expansion of power by the early kings. Most Argead monarchs found it difficult merely to hold on to what they had inherited. Thus, they had good reason to appeal to the past for the maintenance of their existing authority.

But Argead power did begin to grow, and as it did so, it developed to incorporate its expanded resources. The initial boost came with the Persians, who unified the regions adjoining the central Macedonian plain under one authority to facilitate their advance against the southern Balkans. With the collapse of the European portion of the Persian Empire in the 470's, came the temporary decline of their Argead clients. The model for a northern Aegean kingdom centered on Lower Macedonia, however, stimulated the ambitions of the Argeads even while their fortunes were in decline. The expansion of Argead Macedonia under Philip II beyond the limits established by the beginning of the
fifth century came at a time when the dynasty was far more prepared to integrate foreign regions into its realm. With the expansion of economic, political, and military structures responsible to the king (largely due to the efforts of Archelaus at the end of the fifth century) the Argeads stood poised for expansion, awaiting the proper international climate and a dynamic royal catalyst.

The Macedonian state was crystalizing around the power of an increasingly centralized Argead monarchy when the successful reigns of Philip II and Alexander III fueled the fires of loyalty as they had never been before. The combination of ancient tradition, increased centralization, and unbounded prestige elevated the royal family in the eyes of their subjects so as to make its position inassailable after the death of Alexander III, even though it was obvious that the great king's heirs were not competent to rule themselves, let alone their huge empire. Although the double monarchy of Philip III and Alexander IV strained the political situation as factions developed around the rights of each king, it alone did not bring to a close the Argead chapter of Macedonian history. Alexander's empire was simply too large to be ruled by the monarchy which had evolved in the northern Balkans. Although it had begun to develop better defined internal structures to supplement the personal responsibilities of the king long in custom, these ancient duties still constituted an important aspect of the throne and could not
be abandoned (as would have been necessary if the empire of Alexander were to be governed as one state) without damaging the relationship between the Macedonian people and monarch. Within a few years of Alexander III's death, however, the reality of the situation overcame the reluctance of the Macedonians to abandon their customary royal family and establish a new order. This was only accomplished after much confusion since the new generation of leaders had to work out an acceptable justification for their usurpation of ancient prerogative.
APPENDIX ONE
THE SEARCH FOR ARRHIDAEUS

Who was Arrhidaeus? This question may appear simple, but it is not easily answered. He was the son of Philip II and the half-brother of Alexander the Great—relationships which ironically assured Arrhidaeus' obscurity. In building Macedonia, Philip and Alexander commanded the attention of their contemporaries and of subsequent writers to the virtual exclusion of the less talented Arrhidaeus. Despite the vast difference between Arrhidaeus and his two immediate predecessors, in a way his reign was of significance, since it precipitated the political crisis which eventually caused the demise of the Argead dynasty. His inability to assume royal authority directly upon Alexander's death derived from debilitating handicaps. The subsequently unprecedented dual monarchy created enough tension to split the royal family in a final struggle won by neither faction. To better understand the flow of events generated at Babylon in 323 (and thus to grasp more completely the meaning of the best attested royal accession during the Argead era) we must outline what is known about Arrhidaeus.

Arrhidaeus' youth, perhaps the key to unlocking his character, is virtually lost to us. To make matters worse, his kingship was a failure wedged between the successes of
his half-brother and the foundation of the kingdoms which came to dominate the Hellenistic world. The stark contrast between Arrhidaeus' weakness and the success of others made it easy for historians to overlook his career. The evidence we are left with is not enough to allow definitive judgments concerning his capabilities. The quality of the surviving description of Arrhidaeus should be kept in mind as we attempt to sketch in the background to his life.  

We need not comment upon Philip II to establish Arrhidaeus' ancestry, but his mother, one of Philip's seven wives, is far less known and demands attention. Her name was Philinna and she was from Larissa in northern Thessaly. The family and upbringing of Philinna have long been open to discussion. Plutarch once refers to her as a woman "οὔτος γαρ θάνατος κοινής" ("obscure [disreputable?] and common") and Justin records that Ptolemy described Arrhidaeus as "ex Larissaeo scorto nasceretur" ("given birth by a Larissaean whore")—both slandering Philinna in such a way as to suggest that she was more Philip's concubine than his spouse. Satyrus, however, provides a contrast to these descriptions of Philinna by acknowledging her status as a legitimate royal wife. Although a dearth of information concerning Philinna prevents absolute certainty in this matter, four considerations make it likely that Philinna was a fully recognized, legitimate spouse, and therefore, that Plutarch and Justin are incorrect in their description of her relationship with Philip.
The first concerns Philip's marriage policy as a whole. Leaving Philinna aside for the moment, Philip took his known wives (with the possible exception of his last) in order to secure some political advantage of value at the moment. ⁴ Although the chronology is not certain, it is probable that Philip first became politically interested in Thessaly (of which Larissa was the key from a Macedonian perspective) in 358/7 B.C., or shortly after he came to power. ⁵ It would have fit Philip's known method of operation to secure his influence among the aristocrats who controlled the city by marrying one of their women. Since we know by Satyrus' order of royal wives that Philip almost certainly struck up a relationship with Philinna before his marriage to Olympias in late 357, this would mean that his relationship with Philinna and his first political contact with Larissa coincided exactly. ⁶ It seems a logical conclusion that Philip married Philinna in order to secure his ties with certain Thessalian aristocrats.

The second and third points do not pertain directly to Philinna, but suggest how the relationships between Macedonian kings and their women were generally perceived. After Alexander's death there was some support voiced for the royal claim of Heracles, the son of Barsine and the rumored son of Alexander. ⁷ Whatever the truth behind this relationship, Alexander never acknowledged Heracles as his own and thus eliminated the boy from royal consideration.
If Heracles were Alexander's son through a casual relationship with Barsine, it is interesting that the youth was never recognized and made a part of court life. If (and I stress the tentative nature of this conclusion) Alexander was Heracles' father, then it would seem that Macedonian kings did not always acknowledge their offspring. In light of this, Philip's acceptance of Arrhidaeus may reflect the legitimate status of Philinna. (There is, to be sure, the alternative possibility that Philip II was more broad-minded than Alexander in such matters.)

A third indication—and one which reflects how the Greek world perceived the polygamous situation at the Macedonian court—is found in Plato, where Archelaus' mother is described as a slave who caught the sexual fancy of Perdiccas II. It is quite possible that the Greek world at large refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of more than one royal marriage in Macedonia. Since Olympias generally was recognized as Philip's most important wife, the fact that Philinna was described in somewhat unflattering terms may mean that non-Macedonian prejudice relegated her to a less-than-respectable social status.

The last point which tends to support Philinna's legitimacy can be found in the status of her offspring. Besides Arrhidaeus, Philinna had at least one other son, Amphimachus, who was prominent enough to receive a satrapy in the political realignment of 321 B.C. at Triparadeisas.
Amphimachus was not the son of Philip, or else he would have been a brother of Alexander III and a candidate for the throne in 323—which he was not. Thus, Amphimachus was the child of Philinna by a man other than Philip. Since Amphimachus was given a satrapy, even with his relation to Arrhidaeus, he must have been an aristocrat. It seems unlikely that he could have risen to such a status had his mother been nothing more than Philip's concubine, since the likelihood that her other husband was also of privileged status (like Philip) while she was not, is remote. Considering all of these points, Philinna was almost certainly a member by birth of an important Thessalian family (perhaps the Aleuadae), with Philip's marriage to her constituting a political link between the throne of Macedonia and the aristocratic leadership of Larissa.

If the thrust of this argument is accepted, then the hostile tradition represented by Plutarch and Justin must have been the result of propaganda which became enshrined in the histories of the early Hellenistic period. The source of such hostility is not difficult to discern: the dual monarchy after 323 eventually promoted civil war as the factions supporting each king attempted to secure the throne for their favorite (see Chapter Five). Olympias and Eurydice, as the grandmother of Alexander IV and the wife of Philip III (Arrhidaeus) respectively, dominated the conflict until Olympias put both Arrhidaeus and Eurydice to
The intense hatred generated, especially between these two Argead queens, found expression not only in open warfare—it also was broadcast through propaganda as each side sought to bind the loyalties of the Macedonian people to its cause. One means of attack at Olympias' disposal was to assault the legitimacy of Arrhidaeus by demeaning the status of his mother. Considering Olympias' difficult personal relationship with Philip II in the last months of his life, a slanderous campaign against Philinna might even have offered the additional pleasure of belittling a woman who at one time had rivalled Olympias' status at court (since they alone of Philip's wives had produced sons). Such attacks on Philinna would subsequently have found their place within the larger war of words which pitted Olympias against Cassander, who maintained his father's (Antipater's) antipathy for Olympias. Since Cassander had rallied to Arrhidaeus' banner in this civil war, and since after Arrhidaeus' death Cassander oversaw Olympias' judicial murder (justifying his actions in part by Olympias' vicious abuse of Arrhidaeus and Eurydice), the propaganda associated with the rivalry between the two kings would have passed into the histories of the emerging Hellenistic kingdoms. Once the slander had come this far, the Greek sources which lay behind Plutarch and Justin could easily have immortalized it either through design, or through an ignorance of the polygamous relationships of the Macedonian court.
The date of Philip II's marriage to Philinna is uncertain. If Philinna became Philip's wife in 358/7 it is possible, but not certain, that Arrhidaeus was older than Alexander. Arrhidaeus was almost certainly younger than his half brother, Amphimachus, but since we know virtually nothing of Amphimachus, this provides no guide to Arrhidaeus' birth.\(^{13}\) Besides the relative order of Philip's marriages, which given his polygamy can tell us nothing about the order of his sons' births, only one interpretation suggests that Arrhidaeus was older than Alexander. Plutarch records at the end of his \textit{Alexander} that Olympias had been responsible for Arrhidaeus' handicaps because she had poisoned him as a child.\(^{14}\)

I think, however, that a proper interpretation of this report must take into consideration the immediate context of Plutarch's biography. Immediately preceding the information concerning Olympias and Arrhidaeus, Plutarch repeats a charge, which he admits untrue, that Cassander had been responsible for the death of Alexander the Great. It seems that we have here a charge and countercharge of the type which would have been generated in the above mentioned propaganda war between Olympias and Cassander. With Olympias doing all that she could to undermine Arrhidaeus' popularity, it would have been only natural for a supporter of Arrhidaeus to strike back. Since Alexander IV's heritage could not be challenged without demeaning
Alexander III, an obvious ploy would have been to accuse Alexander IV's most important backer of grave crimes, and so discredit the opposing faction. It appears, therefore, that the historicity of Plutarch's charge against Olympias is questionable, and that in any case, it should not be used to argue that Arrhidaeus was older than Alexander.

I am inclined to accept that Alexander was in fact older than Arrhidaeus. My chief reason for so doing is that our sources mention only one heir of Philip II—and that was Alexander. Despite the assertions of Ellis, who thinks that Alexander's career would have wiped out any memory of a sibling rival to the throne, it is by no means clear that Alexander's amazing life would have forced the alteration of the historical record in this way (see my argument on this point in Chapter Two, pp. 106 and 108).\textsuperscript{15} Alexander's status as Philip's heir is fully illustrated in Plutarch (the one source who reports on Alexander's youth) even to the point where a dream, which supposedly came to Philip on Alexander's conception, prophesied Alexander's glorious career.\textsuperscript{16} Plutarch's anecdotes about the young Alexander no doubt reflect official propaganda manufactured after Alexander had become king, but there is no reason in the light of Macedonian custom to reject the fact that Alexander was heir to the throne from his birth because of the manipulation of some early stories.

Two further points, I believe, reinforce the possibility that Alexander was older than Arrhidaeus. The
first of these had to do with Arrhidaeus himself. If we assume for the moment that Arrhidaeus was older than Alexander, then he was no more than a year so. We will discuss the nature of Arrhidaeus' afflictions below, but for Alexander to have replaced Arrhidaeus as the chosen heir, either Arrhidaeus' handicaps were noted when he was less than a year old—which was unlikely since they seem to have been more mental than physical (and thus probably could not have been discovered in so young an infant)—or else, Alexander replaced Arrhidaeus because Olympias and her son were given precedence over Philinna and hers. Although Olympias' status might have been considered superior to Philinna's (since she was from the royal house of Epirus while Philinna's ancestry was not as lofty), the relative prestige of the two wives probably did not figure in the status of their sons because of the following consideration.

It is well known that Alexander's mother had at least one name before she became generally known as "Olympias". Unfortunately, we are not told when she received her most famous appellation or why.\(^{17}\) It has been argued that the most appropriate moment for the grant of "Olympias" as a name came when Philip had learned of the birth of Alexander.\(^{18}\) Philip's situation when the birth was announced is found in Plutarch and is famous: the king had recently captured Potidaea when three messages arrived at
the same time— one announcing Parmenio's victory over the Illyrians, another revealing that Philip's horses had won at the Olympic games, and the last proclaiming the birth of Alexander. Plutarch continues: "these things delighted him, of course, and the seers raised his spirits still higher by declaring that the son whose birth coincided with three victories would always be victorious." 19 Although this passage appears to have been worked over to emphasize the drama of the moment, it is very possible, perhaps even probable, that Philip would have glorified his string of successes by honoring the woman who had given him the heir he needed for lasting stability in his growing kingdom. 20

Badian has demonstrated that royal Macedonian name changes were not common, which implies that the circumstances which led to the name "Olympias" were extraordinary. 21 Certainly, the events of the summer of 356 could be considered remarkable and worthy of broad publication. The honor of a name like "Olympias", however, went beyond a momentary tribute. The connotations of victory and religion which went along with the name would have brought the bearer great prestige, and as far as we know, its honor was appropriate to Alexander's mother only because she gave him birth. If we assume that Philip already had an heir by Philinna, then Olympias' name becomes a greater puzzle. One wonders how the mother of Arrhidaeus the "heir" would have received the news that Philip's "second" son had brought such an honor to a rival
wife.

Exactly how much younger Arrhidaeus might have been than Alexander is impossible to say. Arrhidaeus was of marriagable age in 337 when he is reported to have been betrothed to the daughter of Pixodarus, and since Macedonian princes apparently did not marry very young this probably means that he was in his middle to late teens at that time.22 This would mean that Arrhidaeus was born no later than the very end of the 350s.23

We cannot speak of Arrhidaeus' youth since it cannot be determined to what extent his mental problems prevented a "normal" childhood. That Arrhidaeus was mentally disabled is evident from the sources, which consistently portray him as incapable of handling his own affairs. Some of the sources which mention Arrhidaeus portray him as merely a puppet, maneuvered by others. Several, however, describe his handicap. These all, except one, speak in terms of mental problems. Unfortunately, the sources are vague and in disagreement regarding the nature of Arrhidaeus' problem. Diodorus reports that Arrhidaeus had an ""ψυχικὰ...ἀνίκατος"" ("incurable mental condition").24 Plutarch describes him three times, twice in his biography on Alexander as, ""οὐ φρενήρης"" ("without reason" or "of unsound mind") and, ""ἀτελῆς...φρονεῖν"" ("half-wit"), and once in the more rhetorical On the Fortune of Alexander where he is said to be, ""οὐδὲν νηπίου Ἀλέξανδρου "" ("in no
way different from a child"). Appian writes that he was "οὐκ ἰμμφρων" ("irrational"), which seemingly is supported by Porphyry's judgment as found in the Armenian version of Eusebius' Chronica. The Heidelberger Epitome labels Arrhidaeus "μωρος" ("slow", "sluggish", or "stupid"), and to round out this survey, Justin refers to him once as beset by "valetudine" ("illness") and again by "valetudo maior" ("great illness").

The characterizations in Plutarch's Alexander, although slightly different, look much like those found in Appian and Porphyry, with all approaching Arrhidaeus' problem from the negative: if a normal man could be called "sensible" ("φρενηρης", "φρονεῖν", or "ἐμφρων"), then he was just the opposite. Whether these sources imagine Arrhidaeus' problem to have been a type of madness or the product of low intelligence cannot be determined from their remarks. Diodorus and Justin, on the other hand, seem more definite in ascribing to Arrhidaeus some mental disorder. If they had any more detailed idea of what the sickness was, however, they hide their knowledge behind vague terminology. The descriptions found in the Heidelberger Epitome and Plutarch's On the Fortune of Alexander appear to differ from the other judgments, but their similarity to each other may be due more to the product of style than adherence to an independent tradition. Yet as they stand, it seems that these last two incline more towards Arrhidaeus being of low intelligence than to his being
mentally ill.

Little can be distilled from this evidence except that our sources tend to identify Arrhidaeus with one of two possible disabilities—retardation or mental illness. None is precise enough to render a more specific description of his incapacities, which is regrettable especially since retardation and mental illness can cover many different levels of functional ability. To compound the problem, Plutarch at one point mentions a physical as well as a mental disability, although he does so in the passage of doubtful historicity which reported Arrhidaeus' handicaps as the product of Olympias' poison. Whatever physical handicap Arrhidaeus might have had seems not to have prevented him from participating in public ceremonies, and one episode—where he is seen jumping up, seizing a spear, and threatening an ambassador—implies that if he was disabled physically, it provided no obstacle at least to brief exertion.29

To understand Arrhidaeus' handicap we must look beyond the brief descriptions presented above. Throughout his life, Arrhidaeus was in the public eye to some extent. He travelled widely in the company of the Macedonian court, participated in religious ceremonies, oversaw army assemblies, and even led an army into battle (although, it is true, when it came time to fight the army decided not to follow).30 All of these indicate that whatever his mental
capacity, Arrhidaeus was able to function at times without causing embarrassment. One incident, already alluded to, perhaps implies more. During the events which led to the death of the Athenian statesman, Phocian, an Athenian political faction approached Polyperchon and Arrhidaeus in Phocis to denounce their opponents. At the audience where charges were laid, Arrhidaeus is shown keeping abreast of the proceedings when he laughed appropriately at an off the cuff remark, and when he threatened a speaker whom Polyperchon had accused of lying. Whatever Arrhidaeus' problem was, it appears that it did not prevent him from interacting with those in his immediate environment.

We can come to a deeper understanding of what our sources thought wrong with Arrhidaeus by comparing the words used to describe him with their appearance in other contexts. Perhaps the closest parallel we have to the case of Arrhidaeus is that of the Persian king, Cambyses, whom Herodotus describes in much the same terms as some of our sources do Arrhidaeus. Although Arrhidaeus appears less in control of his own destiny than Cambyses, the problems of the Persian seem similar in kind if not in intensity. Herodotus describes Cambyses as "οὐ φρενήρης", "οὐ δὲ φρενήρης", and "ἀνδρὸς οὐ φρενήρης" ("without reason", or "an irrational man") in his portrayal of the king's madness which led him to self-destruction. The close parallel between Herodotus' description of Cambyses and our sources for Arrhidaeus (especially Plutarch and Appian) strengthens
an argument for Arrhidaeus' insanity. Mental illness, of course, includes many sicknesses, and is extremely difficult to diagnose even with much more evidence than we possess for Arrhidaeus. 33

Although Cambyses was thought somehow mad, he functioned publicly at times in an intelligible manner. In addition, even though Cambyses' perceptions of reality were often perverse, they proceeded with their own logic—a situation which is perhaps not much different than that in which Arrhidaeus found himself. 34 The Greeks seem to have distinguished between types of madness, and the same terms which describe Cambyses and Arrhidaeus do not apply to other irrational states of mind, as for example, that present during a Dionysian revel, where the frenzy is described as "μενίδα" or "χώκα". 35 As far as we are able to determine, therefore, Arrhidaeus was mentally unfit to bear the responsibility of rule, while at the same time he was aware of his surroundings and could function adequately in some capacities as long as he was helped through them.

Arrhidaeus' first known contribution to the public realm came when Philip arranged his marriage to the daughter of Pixodarus, the satrap of Caria. 36 In 337 the Persian Empire was struck by court intrigue and regional rebellion. The instability throughout Asia presented Philip II with an opportunity to secure a foothold in Asia Minor as a prelude to his long planned eastern conquest. 37
Since the situation in Asia was fluid, and since many satraps (including Pixodarus) could not be sure of their positions if change shook the political organization of the Empire, they sought to protect themselves by making private arrangements where they could.\textsuperscript{38} Thus, at least for a time Pixodarus was willing to contract a marriage between his daughter and the Macedonian royal house.

The episode as reported is straightforward.\textsuperscript{39} Philip and Pixodarus negotiated discretely, and were nearly agreed that Arrhidaeus should marry Ada when Alexander heard rumors of the talks. Alexander, acting upon bad advice offered by his mother and a handful of friends, overreacted to his father's plans and openly sabotaged the arrangements by sending a personal friend to the Carian satrap in order to offer Alexander as the marriage partner for his daughter. The proposed change pleased Pixodarus very much but infuriated Philip—both because Alexander had meddled in the king's affairs and because Alexander had attempted to marry beneath his station. (This latter reason, of course, says something about Philip's estimation of Arrhidaeus.) The plan subsequently fell through and the relationship between Philip and Alexander suffered, especially after Philip punished those who had advised Alexander. In many ways, this episode has more to say about Philip and Alexander than about Arrhidaeus.\textsuperscript{40} It proves, however, that Arrhidaeus, even with his problems, had a role to play in Philip's political vision.
Only two other pieces of evidence hint at Arrhidaeus' activities before the death of Alexander, and both concern religious matters. The first is a dedicatory inscription from the island of Samothrace, the text of which is disputed but which is dated to the fourth century. K. Lehmann, the excavator of the site, restores it to read: "Ἀρριδαίος Κλεοίς Μακεδόν Ἰων Θεοίς ἐκατόβρα". P.M. Fraser, however, argues (because of problems related to the original placement of the many fragments which constitute the entire inscription) the following restoration which has been accepted by L. Robert: "Ἀρριδαίος Κλεούς Μακεδόν Θεοῖς μυθάλοις". Lehmann has defended his original interpretation, and others have accepted his insistence on restoring Arrhidaeus to this dedication since another inscription has been found on Samothrace jointly erected by Philip III (Arrhidaeus' accession name) and Alexander IV. Certainly, the second dedication proves an active interest in the island's mysteries by kings in an official capacity, while the first would point to a more personal association with the site. Whether or not Arrhidaeus' interest in Samothrace preceded his accession is otherwise impossible to determine.

Our present interest in the above inscription hinges solely on the restoration of the name of the dedicator as either "Arrhidaeus" or "Adaeus". Whichever of the two is correct, the date of the inscription (the third quarter of
the fourth century) mandates a royal identification, since until well into the Hellenistic period all known patrons of building construction on the island were associated with some royal family—initially the Argeads, and later several of the Hellenistic royal houses. This alone argues for the acceptance of the restoration of "Ar rhidaeus" because we know of no Adaeus who was closely associated with the Argead family at the time the inscription was erected (and our prosopographical knowledge is fairly complete thanks to the rather extensive source material concerned with the reign of Alexander the Great).

Beginning with the reign of Philip II, the Argead dynasty (and after it, the various Hellenistic houses) began to take a serious interest in the religious mysteries of Samothrace. Philip II's interest was deep and long lasting. He had met and become betrothed to Olympias while attending the mysteries in the early 350's. Archeological evidence points to an ambitious new era of building in the sacred precinct in the 340's, or at the same time that Philip was turning his attention increasingly towards the northern Aegean and Asia Minor. Alexander, too, seems to have maintained an interest in the island, as did later dynasts whose many dedications were monuments to their official piety. The popularity of the site for royal building can perhaps be attributed to many reasons, among them: a genuine religious belief, a desire to influence politically those states which had close ties.
to the island, and/or (after the Argeads) a desire to legitimate power by assuming a patronage known to have been important to the last few Argead monarchs.\textsuperscript{48}

If Arrhidaeus was the dedicator whose name appears associated with the so-called altar court, it must reflect activity on his behalf before the death of Alexander and his accession, because his name was officially changed at that time. The degree to which such a dedication reflects personal piety is unknown, but perhaps Arrhidaeus' association with a religious project of this kind was especially appropriate since the Greeks widely associated religious power with insanity.\textsuperscript{49}

The second reference to Arrhidaeus' activity during the reign of Alexander is found in Curtius where Meleager is quoted as having said, "Arrhidaeus, Philippo genitus, Alexandri paulo ante regis frater, sacrorum caerimonia rumque consors modo, nunc solus heres praeteritur a vobis." ("Arrhidaeus, the son of Philip and brother of the recent king Alexander, and lately [Alexander's] partner in sacred sacrifices and religious ceremonies, the sole heir, is being overlooked by you").\textsuperscript{50} The phrase "sacrorum caerimonia rumque consors modo" is interesting if vague. We have no idea whether these rites were considered family or public business since Alexander had responsibilities in both areas. Moreover, since the business of the royal family had an impact upon the kingdom at large, it is
probably artificial to divorce the two. What is clear is that Arrhidaeus had a role to perform at certain ceremonies which, if not open to the public, were widely publicized, so that the Macedonians were familiar with him in this capacity, while they associated him with Alexander.

The above passage implies that Arrhidaeus was with Alexander at Babylon for a period before the latter's death. How long Arrhidaeus was with his brother is unknown. If his impairments were serious enough, Alexander might have left him either in Europe or at some earlier stage of the conquest so as not to have slowed down the progress of the army. On the other hand, Alexander might also have wanted Arrhidaeus at his side either to defuse any possible political trouble which might exploit Arrhidaeus, or to protect Arrhidaeus from Olympias. Since Arrhidaeus is not mentioned as accompanying Alexander throughout most of the expedition, however, it is best to assume that he remained in Macedonia (under Antipater's care?) until the moment when Alexander decided that it was time to move the official court to Babylon. If this were the case, then the sons of Philip were reunited only after Alexander's return from India.
NOTES TO APPENDIX ONE

1 This appendix is not a biographical survey of Arrhidaeus' life, but rather a review of what little we know about Arrhidaeus and his background down to the time of his accession. Evidence from the period of his reign (323-317) is considered in other contexts, especially in Chapter Five.

2 Plut. Alex 77.7; Just. 13.2.11. See also, Berve, Das Alexanderreich II, #781 (esp. note 4 for a complete list of sources pertaining to Philinna). See also, P. Green, "The Royal Tombs of Vergina: A Historical Analysis," Philip II, Alexander the Great, and the Macedonian Heritage, eds. W.L. Adams and E.N. Borza (Washington, 1982) 129-151, esp. 143 (with note 39). Green strongly rejects the respectibility of Philinna without arguing in detail.

3 Ath. 13.557 b-e; Ellis, Philip II, 211-212.

4 Philip's wives in their probable order of marriage were: Audata (from Illyria), Phila (Elimeia ?), Philinna (Larissa), Olympias (Molossian Epirus), Nicesipolis (Pheraea), Meda (Thrace), and Cleopatra (Macedonia). The first four wives were married by 357 as Philip was
consolidating his initial diplomatic and military success, the fifth probably in 352 as Philip renewed his political ties to Thessaly, the sixth in 342 as Philip was campaigning eastward, and the last in 337 as Philip was planning his Persian invasion. Ellis, *Philip II*, 211 f.; Griffith, *Mac II* 214-215; and Green, "Royal Tombs," 129-151.

5 For the latest discussion on the problems of the chronology of Philip's interventions into Thessaly see, Ellis, *Philip II*, 61; *Mac II*, 220-230, in which it is argued that Philip first moved south in 358/7 (based upon Diod. 16.14.1-2 and Just. 7.6.8). C. Ehrhardt, "Two Notes on Philip of Macedon's First Intervention in Thessaly," *CQ* 61 (1967) 296-301 had argued that Philip's first Thessalian contact did not come until 352, but this idea has now been all but absolutely disproven (*Mac II*, 225).

6 The order in Satryus is not absolutely correct, but his erroneous placement of Nicesipolis between Phila and Philinna can be explained by his coupling of the Thessalian marriages without reference to their actual chronological order. Ellis, *Philip II*, 212.


8 Pl. Gorg. 471 b. See Chapter One, p. 29 and Chapter Two, p. 98 f.

9 Arr. succ. Alex. 1.35. He is also mentioned as a satrap by Diodorus (18.39.6) without further comment, and again (19.27.4) fighting against Antigonus at Gabene in 317.

10 Diod. 19.11.5-6.

11 Plut. Alex. 77.1 f. explicitly accuses Olympias of inventing allegations harmful to her political enemies—in this case the family of Cassander. Arr. Anab. 7.27.3 also denies the charges against Cassander which came from Olympias, but they appear in other sources as well (Curt. 10.10.14-17; Just. 12.14). The heavy use of propaganda among the various parties operating in their own interests after 323 is generally accepted by modern scholarship. See, K.J. Beloch, Greichische Geschichte (2nd. ed.), IV (Leipzig, 1927) 62; Tarn, Alexander II, 116, note 2; J.R. Hamilton, Plutarch's Alexander (London, 1969) 213-217. For a contrasting view see A.B. Bosworth, "The Death of
Alexander the Great: Rumor and Propaganda," CQ 65 (1971) 112-136. Bosworth contends that Cassander's family was possibly involved in Alexander the Great's death, and thus that Olympias' accusations were more than propaganda. Bosworth's arguments are difficult to accept since these charges were first broadcast some five years after Alexander's death, at exactly the same time that Olympias and Cassander were fighting over the control of Macedonia. For a consideration and rejection of Bosworth on this point see, W.L. Adams, Cassander: The Policy of Coalition (University of Virginia Dissertation, 1975) 56-61.

12 Diod. 19.11.1, 19.35, 19.49-52.5.

13 Since Amphimachus was old enough to command a satrapy in 321, he could not have been born after Philip II's death in 336. A post of this rank would demand a man in the prime of life. Even Alexander only received his first command in 340 at age sixteen, and that was as regent for Macedonia when his father was besieging Perinthus and Byzantium. Thus, either Philinna had been married before her association with Philip, or the king divorced her and she remarried early enough to have had a son probably no later than the early 340s. A divorce is nowhere suggested in our sources, despite the eventual elevation of Arrhidaeus which would have made it of some importance (especially since Olympias would have used any damaging evidence at hand to
hurt Arrhidaeus' royal cause). We can safely assume, therefore, that Amphimachus was a product of a marriage prior to 358/7, and that he was older than Arrhidaeus.

14 Plut. *Alex.* 77.8.

15 Ellis, *Philip II* 212 f. Ellis believes that Arrhidaeus was older than Alexander. Others (E.N. Borza, "Philip II and the Greeks--Review Article," CPh 73 (1978) 236-243, esp. 243, note 15) have accepted Ellis on this point. My reasons for not doing so are laid out in the following argument.


18 Macurdy, *Hellenistic Queens*, 24; Heckel, "Polyxena," 84-85. Badian ("Eurydice," 106-107) is reluctant to acknowledge that Olympias was not always so called, but he does not deny that Philip might have been responsible for the name.

19 Plut. *Alex.* 3.8-9 (translation by B. Perrin, Loeb
20 Heckel, "Polyxena," 85 points out that Alexander was born in the second-half of July 356, while the Olympic games were probably not held until August. It thus is unlikely that Philip learned of both at the same time, and likely that the time element is here compressed for effect. There is no reason to disbelieve that the auspicious grouping of these victories stimulated certain seers at the time to prophesize great things for the expected offspring. Macurdy and Heckel both appear correct in attaching the honor inherent in the name "Olympias" to the good news Philip received in the summer of 356.


22 Philip II was born in 383 or 382 and was in his early 20's when he first married. Alexander was born in 356 and first married in 327 (although marriage probably was urged on him by Parmenio as early as 334). Amyntas, the son of Perdiccas II and cousin of Alexander, probably was born shortly before 360 and was married in the early 330's. All of these Argeads were thus married for the first time in their 20's. We must place Philip's marriage plans for Arrhidaeus into a similar framework--an Arrhidaeus too young would have violated Argead custom and probably would have insulted Pixodarus.
On the basis of the figures in note 22, I think a birthdate for Arrhidaeus soon after Alexander's in 356 more likely than as late as 350.

Diod. 18.2.2.

Plut. Alex. 10.2, 77.7; On the Fortune of Alexander 337 d–e.

App. Syr. 52; Porphyry, FGrH 2B, 260, F 3.2. Jacoby's translation of the Armenian into German is "geistlos".

Heidelberger Epitome, FGrH 2B, 155, F 1.2; Just. 13.7.11, 14.5.2.

Hamilton, Plutarch's Alexander, xxiii–xxxiii.

Curt. 10.7.2, 10.9.11–19; Plut. Phoc. 33.5–7.

For Arrhidaeus' travels through Asia Minor to Egypt, and from Syria to Macedonia, see Chapter Four. Religious ceremonies: Curt. 10.7.2, 10.9.11–19; army assemblies: Curt. 10.7.7–10; Diod. 18.4.1–8, 18.39,5; Arr. succ. Alex. 1.4–8, 9.34–38; Just. 13.4; leading armies: Diod. 19.11.2.

32 Herod. 3.25.2, 3.30.1, 3.35.4. See also, however, 3.33 (which describes symptoms similar to Arrhidaeus' and associates them with epilepsy): "Ταύτα μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ὀικητάτους δὲ Καμβύσης ἔξεσάν, εἶτε δὲ διὰ τοῦ Ἀρτεμίδος εἶτε καὶ Ἀλκιαὶ, οἱ πολλαὶ ἐνθε οὐθρώπους κατακαλύβανεν καὶ γὰρ τις καὶ ἐκ γενεῆς νοοῦν μεγάλην λέγεται ἔκειν δὲ Καμβύσης τὴν ἱπην ὁμολογούσα τινες. Οὐ νῦν τοι ἐεἰκές οὐδὲν ἢν τὸν σώματος νοοῦν μεγάλην νοοεύον-ται μὴ τὰς πρεσας ὑμαῖνεν." Whether we can call Cambyses' and Arrhidaeus' illnesses "epilepsy" is unknown. Compare, however, their symptoms with those of Cleomenes (Herod. 6.84) which are seen as different and described in different language. See also Plato's distinctions concerning madness (*Phaedrus*, 244 a-265 b) and Dodds discussion of this material [The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley, 1951) 64-68]. Also see, Euripides, *Bacchae*, lines 196, 332, 850, 851, 947, 948, 1123, and 1301 where terms similar to those used to describe Arrhidaeus are used to describe a type of madness which is not related to religious experience.


34 Herod. 3.35 gives an example of Cambyses' "logic" when
he depicts the king trying to prove his competency by demonstrating his skill with a bow. In fact, however, his insanity is underscored when in the subsequent show he killed the son of the noble whom he was attempting to convince.

35 Simon, Mind and Madness, 68. For an evaluation of the different types of madness from classical antiquity, see Dodds, Irrational, 64.

36 Plut. Alex. 10.1-5. Because of problems in Plutarch's narration, chronological obstacles, and the absence of the affair in Arrian and Strabo, M.B. Hatzopoulos, "A Reconstruction of the Pixodarus Affair," Macedonia and Greece in Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times, 59-66, argues that "the Pixodarus affair, if not simply invented, was completely different from what Plutarch's account would have us believe" (62). This may be the case, but it should not alter greatly the probability that Philip exploited Arrhidaeus for political and diplomatic goals. Most recent scholarship accepts the episode as authentic (e.g. Mac II, 679 f., Ellis, Philip II, 217). G. Cawkwell, Philip of Macedon (London, 1978), however, ignores the affair completely.

37 Dynastic confusion wracked the Persian Empire
beginning with the assassination of Ochus (Artaxerxes III) by his chiliarch, Bagoas, in 338. Bagoas replaced Ochus with the former king's youngest son, Arses, but murdered him in turn when Bagoas discovered that the new king was plotting to kill him instead. Still playing kingmaker, Bagoas raised Darius III to the throne. Darius was the grandson of Ostanes whose brother was Artaxerxes II, the father of Ochus. Bagoas seems to have plotted against Darius as well, but was eliminated before he could strike for a third time (Just. 10, Ael. VH 4.8). These murders and intrigues allowed chaos to flourish throughout the Empire. See also, Diod. 17.5.3-6.2.


39  Plut. Alex. 10.1-5.

40  Many scholars have explored the problems which existed between Philip and Alexander in the last months of the former's reign: Badian, "The Death of Philip II," Phoenix 17 (1963) 244-250; "Kraft, "Der 'rationale' Alexander," (review article)" Gnomon 4 (1975) 48-58; K. Kraft, Der 'rationale' Alexander (Lassleben, 1971) 11-41; A.B. Bosworth, "The assassination of Philip II," Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honor of C.F. Edson (Thessaloniki,

41 K. Lehmann, "Arrhidaios," unpublished article, 1952; "Samothrace: Sixth Preliminary Report," *Hesperia* 22 (1953) 1-24 (esp. 19-20). I wish to thank P. Lehmann for making the unpublished work of her husband available to me. Although I disagree with his attempt to give Arrhidaeus a more active role in (and impact upon) the political events subsequent to 323, I still find Lehmann's approach to and perspective of Philip III's reign an interesting one.


44 Lehmann, *Samothrace 4.2*, 118-122.

45 Plut. *Alex.* 2.2.


47 Alexander: Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* 2.43 records that Alexander in part dedicated his Indian altars to the Samothracian gods; Curtius (8.1.26) quotes a flippant Alexander as saying, "Laude dingos esse, not qui Samothracum initia viserent cum Asiam uri vastarique oporteret, sed eos qui magnitudine rerum fidem antecessissent." Hellenistic age dedications: Fraser, *Samothrace 2.1*; Cole, *Samothracian Mysteries*, 102-103 (where the Ptolemies are especially prominent); H.A. Thompson, "Architecture as a Medium of Public Relations among the Successors of Alexander," and A. Frazer, "Macedonia and Samothrace: Two Architectural Late Bloomers," *Macedonia and Greece in the Late Classical and Early Hellenistic Times*, 173-189 and 191-203. Lysimachus was also closely associated with the island's mysteries.
48 For maps which plot the origins of Samothracian mystai and theoroi see, Cole, *Samothracian Mysteries* 334-335. The areas most affected are there shown to have been the coastal regions of the north Aegean and Asia Minor—the areas which dominated Philip's planning in the late 340's.


50 Curt. 10.7.2.

51 It can only be conjecture, but Olympias' hatred for Antipater might have been enhanced by his guardianship of Arrhidaeus. She had already shown hostility to other members of the royal family, and would show more in the future. See, Plut. *Alex.* 10.8, Paus. 8.7.5, and Just. 12.6.14.

52 For the accession of Arrhidaeus see Chapter Two, for his exercise of certain important royal perogatives see Chapter Four, and for his marriage and royal arrangements see Chapter Five.
APPENDIX TWO
SOURCE PROBLEMS

Where necessary in the text, attention has been drawn to the value of ancient sources on specific points. Here, however, it is necessary to review a few problems inherent in the sources which pertain to this study. First and foremost of these is the lack of a connected account of any kind for Macedonian affairs until the reign of Philip II. Although Herodotus, Thucydides, and others (some roughly contemporary with the evidence they record, others not) refer occasionally to Macedonia before 360 B.C., they do so sparingly and almost entirely from the perspective of the Greek city state.¹ Thus, our information for most of the Argead period is invariably episodic and usually more pertinent to non-Macedonian than Macedonian matters. With the exception of Herodotus—and there only briefly—what might have mattered to the Macedonians or their kings simply was not of much interest to the sources we now possess. There were, of course, authors who wrote about Macedonian customs and traditions but these no longer exist and unfortunately had little direct impact upon those who do.² To make up in part for the lack of a connected account, recourse has been made to a wide range of literary material, as the chapter notes will testify.

Perhaps an even more serious source problem concerns
the lack of primary sources for Macedonian history throughout the entire Argead period. Not even contemporary authors such as Herodotus and Thucydides provide much detail about Macedonia useful in outlining its internal composition.\(^3\) The shadow cast over Macedonian affairs because of the casual interest of such important historians is especially damaging because the earliest of the five major sources for Macedonian history—Diodorus, Curtius, Plutarch, Arrian, and Justin (in their probable chronological order)—wrote some three centuries after the dynasty ended.\(^4\) Thus their accounts are only as valuable as the sometimes inadequate works upon which they are based.

To make matters worse, although we know that Macedonian kings kept official records, we have little enough today to show for their efforts.\(^5\) Some documentary material reaches us to be sure, especially as it was originally recorded by Hieronymus of Cardia, but such information is concentrated at the very end of our period, and this presents its own problems as will be noted below.

We would be blessed indeed if the scanty primary evidence appearing in our literary sources were supplemented by inscriptive evidence. This, however, is not the case since the Argead kings did not erect permanent records of their business.\(^6\) There are a few inscriptions of use in an account of Macedonian kingship (as we have seen), but these do little to fill the gaps, and as often
as not, actually come from beyond Macedonia proper where their erection was generated more to meet local concerns than to illuminate clearly Argead policy. Perhaps the primary evidence most important to this study is the numismatic record of the Argead kings from Alexander I to Alexander IV. Where appropriate for this dissertation, especially in terms of religious symbolism and economics, this material has been referred to.

To this body of physical evidence must be added the artifacts recovered from Macedonia in general, and from the unplundered royal tombs discovered by M. Andronikos at the site of ancient Aegae in particular. Although Andronikos' finds especially have fired the imaginations of scholars, not until he publishes the final report of his work we will be able to evaluate fully its importance to an understanding of royal burials in Macedonia. Hence, it is too early to interpret the religious importance of this evidence, and it would be reckless to attempt an evaluation of its impact upon a consideration of Macedonian kingship at this time.

Even though our literary evidence gets more detailed for the period from Philip II to Alexander IV, it presents a history of Macedonian kingship with a different set of problems. Of the five major sources for Macedonian history listed above, Curtius and Plutarch are most important for their works (the Historiae Alexandri Magni Macedonis and
the *Life of Alexander* respectively) devoted exclusively to Alexander III. Plutarch was unabashedly a biographer with little interest in historical organization, but even Curtius (who had greater historical ambitions) wrote his work almost exclusively from the perspective of Alexander. Curtius was not alone among historians to focus on Alexander's personality rather than on an evaluation of Macedonian society as a whole (see below), and herein lies our problem: how to distill institutional elements out of works devoted to the glorification of individual personalities. We cannot fault entirely our surviving authors for their preoccupation with the cult of personality since in this regard they almost certainly followed the sources which they used as the basis for their accounts. Nevertheless, we are still presented with a somewhat skewed perspective of the Macedonian achievement since so little emphasis is placed upon the system which allowed individual kings to organize their victories.

Curtius and Plutarch, as well as Justin and Diodorus discussed below, primarily used the popular early Hellenistic writer, Clitarchus of Alexandria, as their source for the accounts of Alexander. In contrast to this tradition, Arrian of Nicomedia relied most heavily upon two more sober (and approximately contemporary) authors, Ptolemy and Aristobulus, for his history of Alexander entitled the *Anabasis*. The modern consensus recognizes Arrian as the best of our sources for Alexander,
and this to a large extent is due to the authors upon whom he relies most heavily.\textsuperscript{15} Despite the acknowledged superiority of Arrian, it is nevertheless true that the tradition of the "vulgate" sources based upon Clitarchus has increasingly been used to balance the at times naively favorable portrait of Alexander presented by Arrian.\textsuperscript{16} Whatever the specific virtues or faults of Arrian's \textit{Anabasis}, however, it too focuses heavily upon Alexander, and thus it provides an obstacle for this dissertation similar to that imposed by the "vulgate" tradition—that is, the Macedonian social context is overlooked as Alexander assumes total responsibility for the unfolding of affairs during his reign.

For our purposes it is unfortunate that a second work of Arrian, entitled something to the effect of \textit{Ta meta Alexandron}, comes down to us only in fragments.\textsuperscript{17} Most of what we possess of this ambitious (and in relation to his history of Alexander, much more detailed) account of the Macedonian world after Alexander III derives from the excerpts recorded by Photius, a ninth century A.D. Patriarch of Constantinople.\textsuperscript{18} Although \textit{Ta meta Alexandron} only survives in fragments covering the years 323-321 B.C., what we have is impressive in its scope and perception. If Hieronymus is the source upon which Arrian drew for this work as most scholars believe, the loss of Hieronymus is a great one for the historian of the Hellenistic Age.\textsuperscript{19} We
will return to Hieronymus below in the context of discussing Diodorus. First, however, what is known about the writing habits of Justin and Diodorus must be considered,

These two writers should be considered separately from Curtius, Plutarch, and Arrian (even though they often represent the same source traditions) since their works were not limited to the Macedonian world subsequent to the accession of Alexander the Great. Considering first the most frustrating of the two, Justin (probably of the fourth century A.D.) epitomized the lengthly work of Pompeius Trogus called the Historiae Philippicae. Justin has been justly accused of gross incompetence as a compiler: his lack of interest in historical veracity, coupled with his idiosyncratic methodology when it came to deciding what should be epitomized, what should be ignored, and what should be dramatized, is especially distressing since Trogus seems to have been a source of some quality. A contemporary of Livy, Trogus undertook to write a companion to the former's famous historical survey of Rome, in which Trogus examined the Mediterranean before Rome developed a controlling interest in its different lands. Unfortunately, Justin does little more than tantalize us with Trogus' work. It is clear at times that Justin reflects sources known from other works—including that of Clitarchus for Alexander and Hieronymus subsequent to 323—and this suggests that Trogus was well read in the
standard histories of many periods. At other moments, however, what might lie behind Justin is impossible to determine, with the form as it stands now probably dependent more upon invention and the correlation of previously unrelated information than upon any legitimate source tradition.23

Although seldom as confusing as Justin's work, Diodorus' Bibliotheka is neither a great history nor even the product of an original mind. Ever since scholars in the nineteenth century began to examine systematically the method and sources of Diodorus (the first century B.C. writer from Sicily) he has been criticized for his incomplete synthesis of earlier work, for his seeming inability to rise above conclusions he found in the works he mined, and for his at times very crude transition from one source to another.24 The debate concerning Diodorus in our century has not been so much whether or not he absorbed large sections from earlier works, but how often he attempted to cross-fertilize his account with the works of more than one original source, and to what degree he simply "copied" the source which lay open before him. It was once thought that Diodorus was completely devoid of any independence of composition and that he slavishly reproduced long sections of the work he chose for a time as his source.25 This view has subsequently been modified at least to the extent that Diodorus is now credited which
changing his sources more than was once thought.26

Diodorus' sources and methods have some importance for this dissertation, especially as they pertain to the period after Alexander III's death, and thus must be discussed in brief. Diodorus' chief sources for his books sixteen (concerning Philip II) and seventeen (concerning Alexander III) where he turns his attention to Macedonian affairs, are generally accepted to have been (or at least derived from) Ephorus and Clitarchus respectively.27 The ultimate source behind most of Diodorus books eighteen through twenty as they relate to the eastern Mediterranean (from the death of Alexander III until the end of 302 B.C.) is generally recognized as Hieronymus.28

Since this dissertation has drawn from Diodorus most heavily for the reigns of Philip III and Alexander IV, perhaps a consideration of his record through this period is in order. Hieronymus has been accepted as Diodorus' ultimate source for books eighteen through twenty essentially for three reasons: 1) where Diodorus' history can be compared with Arrian's Ta meta Alexandron the two works are very close in content, 2) it appears that Hieronymus was famous in antiquity for his use of official documents, and Diodorus in eighteen through twenty abounds in this kind of material even though in book seventeen he reproduces nothing based upon official sources, and 3) Diodorus records the struggles of the Successors first from the perspective of the faction of Perdiccas and Eumenes,
and then from that of the Antigonids, while Hieronymus is known to have served first Eumenes and then Antigonid house and to have written favorably about his patrons.29

There are enough peculiarities in these books, however, to suggest that Diodorus did not rely merely on one source. These include the unnecessary repetition of material and a respectful evaluation of Ptolemy, both seemingly out of place in a careful historian writing from a viewpoint first of Eumenes and then of Antigonus.30 Such discrepancies have led especially German scholars to the conclusion that Diodorus—whom they consider incapable of reproducing what was not directly in front of him—must have discovered Hieronymus through an intermediate source who wove Hieronymus into an account which used secondary sources.31 This author is usually described as the historian of the second century B.C., Agatharchides, both because he is known to have been familiar with Hieronymus and because Diodorus is known to have been familiar with Agatharchides.32 Whether or not one accepts that Diodorus used an intermediate source has no bearing on the ultimate origin of much of what he records in books eighteen through twenty, but it does introduce the possibility that some conclusions which we might otherwise attribute to Hieronymus might be from another writer, not as well placed as Hieronymus to interpret the period of the Successors.

Unfortunately, absolute proof concerning the immediate
source of Diodorus' information is beyond our reach. Nevertheless, a recent study of many unrelated sections of Diodorus--where he can be compared with independent fragments from sources he is known to have used--suggests that his method was consistent throughout his work, and that it consisted of faithfully reproducing his sources in terms of subject matter, prejudices, conclusions, and occasionally exactly the same language. Yet it does not appear that he was a mere copyist, since his writing style remains consistent through changes of sources, and since he occasionally inserted passages from different authors which he thought relevant to his purpose. Thus, it seems that Diodorus most often used one main source through a section of his work, but that he would supplement it where he deemed it important. Also, it seems that Diodorus (although he stuck close to his sources) tended to paraphrase his sources rather than merely copy them out. Since Diodorus seems to have been consistent in his methodology, and since we have no reason for thinking that he operated differently in books eighteen through twenty, we can probably explain the material not from Hieronymus in these books without recourse to an intermediate source.

The reason for discussing this point is not to introduce a detailed analysis of the sources for Diodorus in his record of affairs subsequent to the death of Alexander III. Rather, the point is to emphasize that regardless of how it came into Diodorus' hands, the
information regarding the reigns of Philip III and Alexander IV is generally accepted to have been ultimately from Hieronymus. Although the number of fragments firmly attributable to Hieronymus are few, what we can ascertain about his history suggests that the factual accuracy of Diodorus is quite high throughout his eastern sections of books eighteen through twenty. Yet lest we accept the reliability of Hieronymus' general interpretation along with that of his facts, we should consider the perspective from which he was writing.

In every sense of the phrase, Hieronymus was a Hellenistic historian. That is, he not only wrote about the political evolution of the age in which he lived most of his life, he also did so long enough after the crystalization of the kingdoms which structured Hellenistic society through most of the third century to be influenced more by new realities than by the concerns of the period dominated by the extinct Argead dynasty. The fact that Hieronymus knew the fate of the ancient Macedonian ruling house is of some importance, since the natural inference from the pertinent work of Diodorus and Arrian is that Hieronymus took as his central theme the rise of the new political order, especially as it was influenced by the careers of his patrons. With such an end in mind, and with the outcome of the struggles becoming clear as Hieronymus wrote, it was only natural for him to emphasize from the
beginning of his account the royal ambitions of the *hetairoi* class, which at one time had served the Argead house. From his position at the Antigonid court of the third century, what was remarkable was not the longevity of the Argead house or its lingering importance after 323, but rather the rise of new families to royal status. Thus, it is easy to see why Hieronymus paid little heed to the impotent Argead kings Philip III and Alexander IV in the unfolding of his narrative, or to the loyalties which kept them in power for a time.

This discussion underscores the last of the points of difficulty when dealing with our sources for Argead Macedonia—that of interpretation. Even when outstanding historians, such as Hieronymus and Herodotus, have spent some time in detailing events relevant to this dissertation, they still have to be read from a perspective which is seldom the one from which they were written. Attempting to do so can be hazardous with so few guideposts to direct one on his way.
NOTES TO APPENDIX TWO

1 This is not to deny the importance of the isolated but revealing glimpses provided, especially by Herodotus, but the fact of the matter is that no present account provides much information from the Macedonian point of view. Perhaps the best example of this problem is found in Thucydides where he highlights the wartime activity of Perdiccas II. There is no need to revise the somewhat disreputable portrait of this king which is revealed by Thucydides as he undertook to describe the northern theater of the Peloponnesian War. We might, however, conclude that Perdiccas' duplicitous foreign policy had a more reasoned foundation if we had an account of these campaigns from his perspective rather than from those of Athens and Sparta. As things stand, we must conclude that Perdiccas was something of an ill-timed bungler (for an introduction to this problem see, J.T. Chambers, "Perdiccas, Thucydides and the Greek City-States," Arc Mak 4, forthcoming). He might well have been inept, but without knowing what was happening in Macedonia between the king and his hetairoi, or exactly what was happening on all of Macedonia's borders at the time, it is difficult to evaluate Perdiccas' actions effectively. On Herodotus see, W.W. How and J. Wells, A Commentary on Herodotus, vols. 1 and 2, repinted with

2 These authors can roughly be divided into two groups: those who were Greeks who wrote extensively about Macedonia from personal experience, like Theopompus (FGrH 2B, 115), and those who were Macedonians, like the two writers named Marsyas (FGrH 2B, 135 and 136, for a recent evaluation of the fragments of these authors see, W. Heckel, "Marsyas of Pella, Historian of Macedon," Hermes 108 (1980) 444-462). It is, of course, understandable why early Macedonia received so little attention—Macedonia did not have a literary tradition until one began to develop under the influence of the south in the fourth century, and naturally, Greek authors only dealt with Macedonia when it impinged on their world. Since it did not become a major factor in Greek politics until the reign of Philip II, the previous period held forth little interest to southern writers.

3 Another example here should suffice to make this point. Although Pella almost certainly became the chief Macedonian city under the reign of Archelaus (Hammond, Mac. II, 139), and although the move from Aegae to Pella would have had an impact upon the political and economic situation of the Macedonian area, no source mentions the
shift to a new "capital" until Xenophon (HG 5.2.13) refers to Pella as the most important of Macedonian cities in the late 380's. We cannot attribute the gap in our sources to disinterest in internal Macedonian affairs either, since Thucydides (2.100) summarizes Archelaus' achievements in reorganizing his kingdom. Although Herodotus tantalizes us with some important information regarding the Argead house (see Chapter Four), even he does not delve beyond the affairs of the royal family.


5 The Ephemerides (royal journals) of Alexander the Great may or may not lie behind the sources of our sources (especially the history of Ptolemy), but we know that official records were kept by officers such as Eumenes (H. Berve, Das Alexanderreich II (Munich, 1926) #317. See also, L. Pearson, "The Diary and Letters of Alexander the Great," Historia 3 (1954/55) 429-459; A.E. Samuel, "Alexander's Royal Journals," Historia 14 (1963) 1-12; E. Badian, "A King's Notebooks," HSCP 72 (1967) 183-204; K. Rosen, "Political Documents In Hieronymus of Cardia (323-302 B.C.)," Acta Classica 10 (1967) 41-94.)

6 A graphic example of the dearth of epigraphical evidence from the Argead period can be found in IG 10.2.1 (ed. C.F. Edson (Berlin, 1972)) in which are published the inscriptions of Thessaloniki and the surrounding area. Granted the fact that this city was founded by Cassander,
it nevertheless lay on the site of an older city of some importance (Therme). In this collection of 1041 inscriptions only four perhaps pertain to Argead kings (275, 276, 278, and 933) and none of these records any public business. For Macedonian inscriptions see also, M.G. Demitsas (ed.), *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum et Latinarum Macedoniae*, vols. 1 and 2 (Chicago, 1980 [reprint of 1896 edition]) and the forthcoming volume of IG on the area around Beroea edited by J.M.R. Cormack and M.B. Hatzopoulos.

7 IG 7.3055 refers to two versions of a stone now lost from the Boeotian city of Lebadeia, which refers to the kingship of an Amyntas who is almost certainly the nephew of Philip II (J.R. Ellis, "Amyntas Perdikka, Philip II and Alexander the Great," *JHS* 91 (1971) 15-24; Griffith, *Mac II*, 702-704). R.M. Errington ("Macedonian Royal Style and Its Historical Significance," *JHS* 94 (1974) 20-37 (esp. 25-28)) makes the attractive (albeit controversial) suggestion that this inscription does not say anything about the true status of Amyntas in Macedonia, but rather the designation of "basileus" in connection with Amyntas was merely a simple way for the locals to indicate exactly which Amyntas it was they were referring to as a devotee of the local cult. If so, then the shorthand of the Lebadeians was more important locally than it was a proper indication of
Macedonian affairs.


10 In addition to the works cited in note four above, see J.E. Atkinson, *A Commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni: Books 3 and 4* (Amsterdam, 1980)

11 For Plutarch's explicit statement upon his method see Alex. 1.1-3.


16 A bibliography of those willing to rely upon the authority of Curtius at times would include most of the work subsequent to that of E. Badian in the late 1950s (with the possible exception of N.G.L. Hammond, *Alexander the Great: King, Commander and Statesman* (Park Ridge, 1980) 1-6) and is unnecessary here. See appropriate notes for citations. Tarn, reflecting a bias inherited from Arrian writes: "Now while Alexander never cheats in the good tradition--it would be completely at variance with his type of character--in our inferior sources he cheats several times"(!) (Alexander II, 54).

18 FGrH 2B, 156 provides the eleven fragments which make up what is left of this work. Four of these are of some length, and three of these four come to us via Photius (#s 1, 9, 11). Arrian's history of the Successors consisted of ten books to cover the years 323-321. When this is compared to his seven books for the reign of Alexander, one can appreciate the detail which must have been included in the work now largely lost. On Photius see M. Grant, Greek and Latin Authors 800 B.C.-A.D. 1000 (New York, 1980) 328-329.


21 Tarn (Alexander II, 124) characteristically provides the strongest attack upon Justin: "to talk of sources for this mass of rubbish would be idle." Justin (Praef. 4), however, provides us with a statement of his methods. After praising Trogus for having included everything
important concerning Greek history in his work, Justin reveals that he will include only those things most worthy of being known, while rejecting those segments which made disagreeable reading, or which did not provide examples for behavior. As to Trogus' quality, the Prologues provided by Justin, much of which deals with material in Trogus but not epitomized by Justin, seem to indicate that many errors recognizable in Justin came from his own incompetence. For the widespread audience that Trogus enjoyed in antiquity see the various authors included by O. Seel (ed.) Pompei Trogi fragmenta (Leipzig, 1956). See also Edson's review article of Seel's edition (CP 56 (1961) 198-203) where he gives his opinion upon the value of Trogus. Unfortunately, the Christian historian Orosius (fifth century), who obviously relied heavily on Justin for his History Against the Pagans, followed his immediate source all too closely, and thus reflected more the faults of Justin than the virtues of Trogus.


23 There is no need for a litany of Justin's errors at this point. Where pertinent to my argument, I have discussed where he is known to have been wrong in the text. See J. Hornblower, Hieronymus of Cardia (London, 1981) 65-66 where she refers to some sources which appear behind Justin.

25. Hornblower, Hieronymus 27-32 summarizes past scholarship and presents her own views.


28. Hornblower, Hieronymus 32-62 provides an excellent discussion of the possible sources behind Diodorus in this
books.


31 K.J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, IV (Leipzig, 1927) 3f.; Schwartz, "Diodorus," *RE* 5.1, 685. This opinion of Diodorus prevailed at the beginning of the twentieth century, but has been modified in more recent scholarship—see the discussion below, with notes 32 and 33.


33 *Ibid.*, 27-32 with notes for bibliographical references. He also appears to have been independent enough to confuse the probably accurate chronological account found in Hieronymus (see R.M. Errington, "Diodorus Disculus and the Chronology of the Early Diadochoi, 320-311 B.C.," *Hermes* 105 (1977) 478-504).
34 FGrH 2B, 154 lists only eighteen certain fragments. The testimonies of his life number only six—four of which are from Diodorus.

35 On Hieronymus' life see Brown, "Hieronymus of Cardia," 684-696 and Hornblower, Hieronymus 5-17. He seems to have lived to a very old age (FGrH 2B, T2 reports him to have died at age 102), and he is known to have been writing at least as of the late 270s since he dealt with the career of Pyrrhus in that period. By this late date, the balance of power between Macedonia, Egypt, and Seleucid Asia (with accompanying smaller states) had pretty well been established (for a brief summary of the political evolution of the Hellenistic world important here see, W.W. Tarn, Hellenistic Civilization, revised edition by G.T. Griffith (New York, 1952) 1-17.
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