

Becoming Significant: the Development of a Rural Community in the Republican China

Kai-chien Yang  
Pingdong, Taiwan

MA, University of Virginia, 2005

A Dissertation presented to the Graduate Faculty  
of the University of Virginia in Candidacy for the Degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy

Department of History

University of Virginia  
August, 2013

---

---

---

---

©Copyright By

Kai-chien Yang

All Rights Reserved

August 2013

## **Abstract**

This dissertation examines the history of one small town in Sichuan province during the 1<sup>st</sup> half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It focuses on how the local elites transformed the bandit-raid Jialingjiang xiaosanxia community into a model community of modernization. The story of this community also revealed much detail about the Sichuan province during the 1920s and 1930s and the impact of the anti-Japanese war. The history of Sichuan in the 1<sup>st</sup> half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was often defined by struggles among the militarists. The general impression was that the struggle of militarists resulted in extreme destruction of order in the Sichuan society. While the argument is true, by the late 1920s, there was in fact an internal organism of politics which allowed private efforts of modernization to occur. Such an environment was the result of the cooperation between the local elites and the militarists. The changes occurred in Jialingjiang xiaosanxia demonstrated this kind of cooperation between the elites and the militarists. This cooperation created a more or less stable environment for ambitious patriots such as Lu Zuofu to implement his plan of rural reconstruction and modernization. When the anti-Japanese war broke out in 1937, the history of the area was even more significant because of the nationalist government's relocation in Chongqing. The chapter of the Jialingjiang xiaosanxia during the war examines how the war brought changes in industry, political institutions, land and space in the local communities.

## Table of Contents

Table of Contents.....	i
Acknowledgement.....	ii
Abbreviation.....	iv
Map.....	v
Introduction.....	1
Chapter 1: A Place with No Significance.....	24
Chapter 2: Transformation: The Planners and Their Ideas.....	66
Chapter 3: Transformation: The Work and its Meaning.....	100
Chapter 4: The War and its Impact.....	157
Epilogue: The Legacy.....	213
Glossary.....	226
Bibliography.....	228

## **Acknowledgement**

When I first arrived in the University of Virginia in 2002, I did not know my academic pursuit would become a decade-long journey. During the years in preparing this dissertation, I have benefited much from the following people. Any mistake in this dissertation only shows that I did not learn hard enough from them.

I must first thank my adviser, Professor Bradley Reed. During the summer of 2008, he generously spared one afternoon from his tight schedule in Chengdu, China and talked with me about my new thoughts which eventually led to the completion of this dissertation. At every stage of my graduate career, he has provided generous guidance and support and never failed to give me insightful suggestions. I have been very fortunate to work with Professor Ronald Dimberg. He has offered his support in numerous occasions, particularly in my first two years when I was experiencing difficulty of adjusting to life at the university. Professor Brantly Womack has been kind enough to be my committee member and provided support and insightful criticism in both of my qualified exam and final defense. I also must thank Professor Ellen Cong Zhang. She has carefully read the draft of this dissertation and provided valuable comments. Without her connection in China, I would not have been able to begin my research in Chengdu.

I have received support for dissertation research from the East Asian Center at the University of Virginia. Two travel grants were granted in 2007 and 2010 to assist my research in the archives of Sichuan Province. During my stays in China, Professor Zhujie Yuan assisted me to acquire endorsement letters from the History Department at Sichuan University. Without which, I would not be able to survey the documents in both the Sichuan Archive and the Chongqing City Archive. I also would like to thank the staffs in the Chongqing Library. They

were exceptional helpful when locating old documents and made exception for me to survey digital resources.

The help of my friends has been very important during my research in China and writing process. Thanks to Tiri Maha, a friend of Yi minority in Sichuan. I benefited much from his extensive local connection and enjoyed several trips to his hometown. Many, many thanks also to my friends at the university, whose companionship has eased my anxiety and loneliness when writing this dissertation. Special thanks also to my mentor and friend, H. K. Liu, who inspired me to continue graduate study in the United States after graduation from college. Although I did not accomplish my original goal of becoming a historian of European history, I could not have reached this point without his encouragement and emotional support over the years.

I also must thank my partner, Yao-jan Wu. Although we only met two years before the completion of this dissertation, his optimistic and energetic personality gave me strength to finish my writing. My parents, Chi-san Yang and Hui-shu Lin, have provided me unconditional love and financial support at every stage of my study in the United States. My younger brother, Shu-han Yang, has took up the job of looking after our parents and thus allowed me the freedom of pursuing my academic dream.

## Abbreviation

JLJXSX—Jialingjiang xiaosanxia (The three small gorges on the Jialing River)

XFJ—Jiangba bihe xiafang tuanwuju (The Security Bureau of the united militias from Jianbei, Ba, Bishan, and Hechuan,) 1923-1936

MZH—Jiang Ba Bi He Xiaqu Minzhi Cuchenghui (The Society of Promoting People's Governance in Jiangbei, Ba County, Bishan, and Hechuan)

SYQS—Jialingjiang xiaosanxia xiangcun jianshe shiyan qushu (the Jialingjiang Special District Administration of Rural Reconstruction,) 1936-1941

GLJ—Beibei guangliju (Beibei Administration,) 1941-1949.

DAGLJ—Beibei guanliju danan (Chongqing: Chongqingshi danganguan)

CTGMW—Chongqing tushuguan guancang minguo wenxian. Digitized by Chongqing Library.


BBWS—Beibei wenshi ziliao (Culture and History of Beibei). Chongqing, 1984-

SCWS—Sichuan wenshi ziliao (Culture and History of Sichuan), Chengdu,


GZTK—Gongzuo yuekan (The Monthly Journal of Work)

BBYK—Beibei yuekan (The Beibei Monthly)

DAGLJ—Beibei guanliju dangan (Archive of the Beibei administration)







**JLJXSX area in 1942**



## **Introduction**

The fall of the Qing Dynasty, to some extent, was a verdict of failure to the reforms the imperial government had implemented since the mid-nineteenth century. Such failure also further exposed the country's crisis of survival and compelled the subsequent Republican governments to undertake reform programs in the hope of equipping the country to meet the western challenges. However, the political chaos after the 1911 Revolution had compromised the ability of the Republican governments (either the Beiyang government or the Nationalist government) to implement effective reforms. The ineffectiveness of the government thus drove many patriotic individual to engage in the process of modernizing China.

While the crisis China faced was extensive, many considered the rural area as the root of China's weakness. As a result, ideas of how to transform the massive rural villages into communities that embodied modern values and customs were widely discussed. By the early 1920s, such discussions had bred the so-called rural reconstruction movement in rural villages across the country. Among these projects, the most famous ones were the reforms led by Yan Yangchu (James Yan) and Liang Shumin and in the Ding County and Zhouping County.

Regardless of the difference among these reformers, one thing that was common in these programs was the concept of building an ideal, modern community. Such a community should have life style that followed the western customs and modern necessity such as electricity and tap water. In addition, the rural villagers should receive modern education that could eventually erase the backward customs and illiteracy. The modern education would also improve their knowledge about modern world and provide them professional skills that could increase production and generate more material wealth. In short, all these efforts aimed to transform the

rural villages into modern utopias that would become the foundation of a strong Chinese state.<sup>1</sup>

This image of utopia served as the ultimate goal of the Chinese rural reconstruction movement in the 1<sup>st</sup> half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Liang Shumin was perhaps the reformer who presented such a utopian ideal in theoretical writing extensively. In his writing that discussed rural problems and reforms, Liang first compared the strength and inadequacy of both Chinese and western civilization and concluded that to successfully solved rural problems, such as poverty, ill health, and illiteracy, China must look into its past and revive the old social structure based on the concept of “community pact” and village schools. To Liang, the only way to solve the predicament of life in rural villages was to conduct projects within the revived, traditional social structure that stressed proper relation among villagers and cooperation for the public good.<sup>2</sup>

The obvious inadequacy of Liang’s utopian idea (and many others) was the fact that it did not take different local condition, such as geographical location and natural resources, into account.<sup>3</sup> These conditions affected human activities greatly and thus resulted in social problems that required tailored solutions. Yet, because of fame of Liang and Yan Yanchu as well, their ideas and programs were widely studied and copied during the 1920s and 1930s while many others were ignored. The Sichuanese entrepreneur Lu Zuofu and his programs in the Jialingjiang

---

<sup>1</sup> The term “utopia” was made widely known by Thomas More’s *Utopia* in 1516. While over the 17<sup>th</sup> and the 18<sup>th</sup> centuries, the term embodied many meanings, its most popular concept was referred to a “perfectly restructured polity” or simply put, an ideal commonwealth where all lives a life without any sort of evil and inequality. For detail history and evolution of the utopian thought in the western world, see Frank Manuel and Fritzie Manuel, *Utopian Thought in the Western World* (Cambridge, Massachusetta: Harvard University, 1979.) In China, similar concept appeared in the Confucian Classics, *Liji*, which described a harmonious society where residents did not have to lock the door at nights and all had proper professions and relationships with each other.

<sup>2</sup> Liang Shumin acknowledged the advantage of western civilization in terms of science social institutions that stressed participation of citizens. However, he also considered the process of western modernization which emphasized urbanization and material wealth was not applicable in China because it ignored rural areas and resulted in the collapse of social relationships in villages. Many of Liang’s concepts were considered as prelude of the Chinese socialist idea and the Maoism. The Last Confucian: Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity

<sup>3</sup> For discussion on rural reconstruction movement and an introduction and comparison of the reformers’ thought, see Zheng Dahua, *Minguo xiangcun jianshe yundong* ( Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2000)

xiaosanxia area (The three small gorges on the Jialing River, hereafter JLJXSX or the gorge area) were one of such case that received very little attention.

Although Lu Zuofu was widely acknowledged for his achievement in navigation business, his most important legacy should be the reform programs he initiated in the late 1920s in the gorge area. Lu was an avid activist in his youth and never abandoned his reform passion. In fact, one might say that it was such a passion that eventually led him to found his own business which he believed could improve local economy and generate profit for social reforms. Because of such passion, he saw an opportunity to implement his long-held reform ideas when he was presented the position as the head of the security office in the bandit-raid gorge area. His vision for the area was straight forward. In one of his writing published in 1934, Lu described what he envisioned the future gorge area would become:

Economically, there are coal and iron factories. There are large farms, orchards, and forests. There are also a variety of industry, including electricity generating factory, steel factory, paper factory, chemistry industry, and large textile factory. Roads for automobiles will be built across the area. All villages will have telephone, telegram, and postal services.

Culturally, the gorge area will sponsor researches of biology, geography, chemistry, agriculture, medicine, and social science. There will be schools of all level, libraries, and museums. There will also be athletic fields for sports and public events.

All residents will receive good education and have proper employment. They will be educated to serve the public and have no ill customs.<sup>4</sup>

In short, in Lu's vision the future gorge area should be "a clean, beautiful, and orderly place where people can come to visit and live a modern, comfortable life." While this vision no doubt echoed with the utopian concept of the rural reconstruction movement, the details of reform in the gorge area were by no means imitation of other more famous programs. In fact, the rural reconstruction in the gorge area was designed especially to adopt the advantage of the local community to meet the challenges of banditry and social problems. By using the rich natural

---

<sup>4</sup> Ling Yaolun and Xiong Fu, eds., *Lu Zuofu Wenji* (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1999,) 359-360

resources, such as coal, Lu believed that the gorge area could build a strong industrial base that could support the education and social reforms and provide employment to local residents. If the gorge area could implement these projects successfully, it would naturally become a community where people could enjoy a good life.

However, the plan for the gorge area could not be realized due to several historical events. The anti-Japanese war first interrupted the pace of reform in 1937 and the take-over of the CCP in 1950 subsequently overwrought Lu's vision by another kind of utopian ideal—the socialism. In the following decades, the gorge area was ripped off its past honor as a modernized example for other rural villages and was made identical with thousands of rural villages in the country, all devoting the resources to meet the demand of the state. Yet, since the early 1980s when China began economic reform that in many ways followed the foreign examples, the once-forgotten legacy of the gorge area was reclaimed by the local administration to attract tourists and new residents. The image that the modern administration strives to present—a community with clean air, beautiful natural scenery, and modern conveniences—displays much similarity to what Lu Zuofu proposed as described above.

By looking at the development of the gorge area during the 1<sup>st</sup> half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, this dissertation will examine the above process of realizing a utopian concept in a Chinese rural area. Moreover, by studying the gorge area during the 1<sup>st</sup> half of the Twentieth-Century, the current study attempts to look beyond the popular rhetoric that described the Sichuan province as the most barbaric, lawless, and dangerous place in China and understand the effort spent by private individual on the modernization projects in rural society. It will also present that the rural reconstruction movement in China prior to the anti-Japanese war was not a homogenous movement that built on the ideas of a few famous supports; instead, devoted advocates of rural

modernization such as Lu Zuofu took local condition and history into consideration and formulated reform plans that were not identical to the famous Ding County and Zhouping models.

With the above perspectives, this dissertation will contribute to the studies of rural China and also increase our understanding of Sichuan Province as well. In the last two decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, substantial studies have been done on Chinese peasants and rural China. The effort of historians has produced many pioneer works on a wide range of issues, including relationships between rural villages and the central government (the state) and patterns of rural economies. However, the majority of these studies focus on north China and the lower Yangzi Delta.<sup>5</sup> Sichuan province has yet to receive enough scholarly interest. As a result, we still know very little about the society of the province during the 1<sup>st</sup> half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

In recent years, events occurring in China have made such a study of rural communities in the southwestern provinces particularly important. China's coastal economy has slowed down due to factors such as changes of policy and global economic recession. For some labor-intensive industries, such as textiles, the Chinese east coast is losing its advantage due to the fact that economic growth in the coastal regions as of the 1980s has significantly increased the costs of labor which was once China's advantage to attract foreign investments. Moreover, two-decades of economic growth in the east coast have created acute social problems, particularly with regard to the increasing gap between the poor and wealthy, and the different living standards and conditions between cities and rural areas and coastal and inland provinces. While the overall development in the inland provinces, particular those at the western part of China, including

---

<sup>5</sup> To name a few: Prasenji Duara, *Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942* (California: Stanford University, 1988); Philip C. C. Huang, *The Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China* (California: Stanford University, 1985); Philip C. C. Huang, *The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta* (California: Stanford University, 1990); Pauline Keating, *Two Revolution: Village Reconstruction and the Cooperative Movement in Northern Shaanxi, 1934-1945* (California: Stanford University, 1997); Elizabeth Perry, *Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845-1945* (California: Stanford University, 1980); Li Huaiyin, *Village Governance in North China, 1875-1936* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.)

Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Xinjiang, have lagged behind their counterparts on the east coast, the economically prosperous regions of the east coast, including the lower Yangzi and Pearl River deltas, also face severe social problems resulting from the immigration of large numbers of immigrant workers (nongmin gong), who have been the backbone of China's impressive economic growth. Such social problems include housing demands, household registration, unequal social welfare benefits, and transportation needs during holiday seasons.<sup>6</sup> The management of this large number of workers, most of which are away from their families and hometowns, also poses great management challenges to the manufacturing industry. For instance, Foxconn Technology Group, the Taiwanese company which produces most of Apple's iPhone and iPad products, has been criticized for its alleged improper management, which has resulted in a significant number of employee suicides at its Shenzhen factory as of 2007.<sup>7</sup>

To fundamentally balance economic development and address social problems, the PRC government founded a special office to promote economic growth and social progress in the western part of China in 2001.<sup>8</sup> Following the policy outlined by this office, local governments provide advantageous plans, including assistance of land purchase and tax reduction, to attract investments. The ultimate goal of these "into the west" policies is to stimulate economic growth in the western provinces and decrease the gap between China's coastal region and inland societies, and thus prevent deterioration of the existing social problems. By promoting economic progress locally, thousands of local residents will be able to find employment locally, and many

---

<sup>6</sup> There is a large body of literature that discusses China's economic growth and social problems. To name a few: Elizabeth Perry and Mark Seldon eds., *Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance* (New York: Routledge, 2000); Loren Brandt and Thomas Rawski eds., *China's Great Economic Transformation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Chak Kwan, King Lun Ngok, and David Phillips eds., *Social policy in China: Development and Well-being* (Bristol, UK: Policy, 2008); Rachel Murphy, *How Migrant Labor is Changing Rural China* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002.)

<sup>7</sup> Xu Mingtian, *Fushikang zhenxiang* (Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press, 2010.)

<sup>8</sup> Xinhua News, "Guowuyuan guanyu xibu dakaifa ruogan zhengce cuoshe de tongzhi"  
<http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channel3/21/20001228/364518.html>

of the problems associated with them working hundreds of miles away from home can then be eliminated. In 2009, with these strategies, both the Chengdu and Chongqing administrations successfully convinced the Foxconn Technology Group to build production bases in their cities.<sup>9</sup>

Considering the current policies of the PRC as discussed above, the study of rural areas in Southwestern China is above all relevant. Since the social problems in China's vast rural society did not occur overnight, by studying the history and development of the gorge area, on one hand this dissertation will contribute to our knowledge of this less developed, less prosperous place, and on the other hand will provide valuable insight into the origins of social problems in rural China and assist policy makers in addressing these issues.

By focusing on the gorge area during the 1<sup>st</sup> half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, this dissertation also attempts to reexamine the history of the province as well. The significance of the Sichuan province in the history of China could be summed up by the following saying: "Sichuan always rebels before all other places under heaven, but it is usually the last place to be pacified."<sup>10</sup> For its size and rich natural environment, the province was considered to be one of China's great agricultural centers. However, being surrounded by mountains and away from the coast and northern China, the geographical location of the province made the reach of any political authority difficult. Therefore, for centuries, the province was always the last one to be fully controlled by the new dynastic government in northern China. The same situation applied to the rule of the Nationalist government in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. When the Nationalist government completed the Northern Expedition and established itself as the sole ruling power of China

---

<sup>9</sup> The recently disgraced secretary of CCP branch in Chongqing, Bo Xilai, promised the foreign investors advantageous support during his tenure in Chongqing. His policy is called by some scholars as the Chongqing Model. See Bo Zhiyue and Chen Gang, "Bo Xilai and the Chongqing Model," EAI Background Brief, No. 465 (July 2009, National University of Singapore.)

<sup>10</sup> Ouyang Zhigong, *Shu Jing Lu*, in Sichuan University ed., *Zhongguo yeshi jicheng* (Chengdu: Bashu shushe, 1993,) Vol. 29, 555.



(though nominally), Sichuan remained out of its reach until the mid and late 1930s, when the problem of Chinese Communist and the anti-Japanese war opened the doors for the Nationalists to penetrate the province.<sup>11</sup>

In 1938, the province became the beacon of hope for China's survival in the anti-Japanese war. The Nationalist government relocated to Chongqing and thousands of refugees fled there as well. The gorge area, or Beibei as it was often called, was designated as the seat of many government institutions. The war thus dramatically influenced the landscape and history of the JLJXSX gorge area and the whole of Sichuan province as well. However, because of the long-time lack of interest of China during the anti-Japanese war, scholars of Chinese history have yet to produce substantial work. Moreover, it should also be noted that research of Sichuan, regardless of time and area of focus, has never received fervent interest from researchers and thus only a handful of works are published in the English world.<sup>12</sup> As a result, our understanding of the province in no way can compare to our knowledge about other more thoroughly researched places of China.

Due to the short distance to Chongqing, the events in the gorge area were inevitably influenced by the politics in the city which by 1920s had become the target of Sichuanese militarists' battles. Although these battles affected Sichuan society enormously, they did not completely block opportunities of progress of the province, in contrast to what many contemporaries perceived. The rural reform program in the gorge area community serves as an excellent example. Moreover, by focusing on the history of this specific community, this

---

<sup>11</sup> The Northern Expedition was launched by the Guomindang in 1926 to end the independence of the northern provinces. Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 323-330. Donald Jordan, *The Northern Expedition: China's National Revolution of 1926-1928* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976)

<sup>12</sup> Robert Kapp, *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic: Provincial Militarism and Central Power, 1911-1938* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); Joshua Howard, *Workers at War: Labor in China's Arsenal, 1937-1953* (California: Stanford University, 2004); Wang Di, *Street Culture in Chengdu: Public Space, Urban Commoners, and Local Politics* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2003); Kristin Stapleton, *Civilizing Chengdu: Chinese Urban Reform, 1895-1937* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2000)

dissertation will also shed light on the following issues: what were the characteristics of rural reform in the gorge area and how was it carried out? How did the politics in Chongqing and the province influence the development of this community, and what can the history of this specific community tell us about the overall condition of both Chongqing and Sichuan, especially during the anti-Japanese war? What were the relationships between the Sichuanese militarists and local elites and how did they work together to achieve progress and social stability? As this dissertation will demonstrate, unlike the common perception which considered Sichuan in the 1920s as a place without law and order, the province in the mid-1930s did gradually achieve a certain degree of stability, which allowed local authorities, such as the administrations in the gorge area, to focus on improving ordinary peoples' lives. Such stability must contribute to collaboration between the militarists and elites in the province. It should also be noted that because of the strong dominance of local militarists in the province, central authority, whether the Beiyang government or the Nationalist government, was never able to stretch its policy of state-building into Sichuan province prior to the mid-1930s. As a result, the existence of the state-society relationship in the province might be questionable. As this dissertation will demonstrate, prior to the anti-Japanese war, Sichuan society and politics operated within a unique framework that lacked the presence of an authority which was higher than the provincial government, most of the time. Any discussion about political and social change in Sichuan province must first consider this fact.

The fact that Sichuan province operated very much as an independent territory furthermore highlights the nature of Sichuanese gentry (or elites) as the major players of local politics and maintainers of local order, aside from the militarists in the province. The nature of

the Chinese gentry (or elites) is a topic well explored by scholars.<sup>13</sup> Generally speaking, during the imperial era, the term referred to well-educated gentlemen who had acquired a degree in the civil service examination after years of diligent study. By the Qing Dynasty the path of acquiring a degree had become complicated by factors such as economic growth and the diminishing ratio between the total participants in the civil service examination and the actual number of degrees available, yet the examination degrees were still considered the most essential criteria for one to be considered as part of the gentry class. More importantly, such titles guaranteed Chinese gentry access to politics, whether at the national or local level. The importance of examination degrees to Chinese males' claim as gentry was only severely challenged in the late Qing Dynasty, when the whole political, cultural, and social systems of China faced enormous challenges from western civilization. When the Qing Dynasty abolished the civil service examination in 1905, examination degrees lost all value and were no longer indicators of one's social and political status.<sup>14</sup> From that time the nature of the Chinese gentry diversified. While factors such as educational background and family wealth continued to play important roles in one's access to social power and career success, the unstable political environment of the 1920s created a new breed of elite, whose rise to power resulted mostly from their creative application of resources and the cultivation of relationships with already-powerful figures.<sup>15</sup> The story of JLJXSX area in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century is an excellent testimony to how men of diversified background pulled resources from various bases for career achievement and rising to the top of society.

---

<sup>13</sup> The most inclusive work of different perspectives should be Joseph W. Esherick and Mary B. Rankin eds., *Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990)

<sup>14</sup> Henrietta Harrison, *The Man Awakened from the Dreams: One Man's Life in a North China Village* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2005,) 87-88.

<sup>15</sup> Du Yuesheng, the gang boss in Shanghai, might be the most well-known example. Du's career began as a drug dealer in Shanghai. He joined the Shanghai Green Gang and became the gang's most powerful bosses. With his dominance in the Shanghai society, Du eventually formulated a close relationship with Jiang Jieshi. For details, see Brian Martin, *The Shanghai Green Gang: Politics and Organized Crime, 1919-1937* (California: University of California Press, 1996.)

Relationships between local societies, elites, and the state were the foundation on which the vast scholarship of Chinese gentry was built. However, during the 1920s and 1930s, the existence of a relationship between elites in the gorge area and the state was questionable. To begin with, the entire province during this period was practically in a state of anarchy. Consequently, the meaning of “state” in the political context of Sichuan province was almost impossible to define. One can only say that an authority operated at the provincial level existed in Sichuan. Yet, even this form of higher authority was never stabilized and was constantly transferred in the hands of militarists. Therefore, instead of understanding the nature of elites in the gorge area by including a discussion of their relationships with the state, it would be closer to the historical reality to omit this issue and looking at relations between the community, the administrations in the JLJXSX, and the militarists. Because of the absence of a stronger authority above the provincial level in Sichuan, the status of the gentry was almost unaffected by events at the national levels that in other cases challenged the power of the existing gentry.<sup>16</sup>

In addition to discussion of the gorge area in the 1920s and 1930s, this dissertation will also devote a chapter specifically to the gorge area community during the anti-Japanese war. The war brought thousands of refugees to the gorge area and the authority had to make plans to accommodate the needs of the increasing population, particularly the sudden increased demand for housing space. Several heavy industry factories were also relocated to the area and cooperated with existing industries. As a result, the base of heavy industry in the the gorg area saw significant growth. By studying how these external factors influenced the local communities there during the war, this dissertation hopes to increase our understanding of the scale of change inflicted on a rural society by the war.

---

<sup>16</sup> Such as in the Rugao County of Jiansu province where power of existing elites was challenged due to events such as the May thirtieth incident. See Lenore Barkan, “Patterns of Power: Forty Years of Elite Politics in a Chinese County,” in Esherick and Ranin, eds., *Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance*, 191-215.

By studying the history of the JLJXSX area during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, this dissertation hopes to shed new light on wartime China and Sichuan province. Historians of Chinese history have produced an enormous collection of outstanding work on the 20<sup>th</sup> century China. However, the majority of this scholarship has omitted the period of anti-Japanese war.<sup>17</sup> The most studied aspects of the anti-Japanese war relate to issues of the development of Chinese Nationalism and the “Chinese Communists’ victory and the Nationalist’ failure in 1949.”<sup>18</sup> As a result of the strong focus on the above issues and the subsequent civil war after the victory of the anti-Japanese war, scholars have yet to spend sufficient effort on understanding the impact of the war, particularly in terms of social and cultural history. As historian Stephen MacKinnon comments: “the Sino-Japanese War transformed Chinese social, cultural, and political life in a fashion analogous to the impact of World War I on Europe, but the historian has yet to examine how.”<sup>19</sup>

Taking the field of urban history as an example, the efforts of historians in the past two decades has extensively increased our understanding of the development of Chinese cities. This scholarship has covered a large number of market towns which were often the cultural, economic, and political centers of provinces, including Beijing, Tianjin, Nanjing, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Guangzhou, Haerbin, Jilin, and Chengdu. Substantial work is done to understand the significance of their history, culture, and economy. While some of these publications do include the period of anti-Japanese war in their discussion, most conclude in 1937 or mark 1949 as the beginning point

---

<sup>17</sup> A comprehensive work of Chinese history during the war in English is yet to be written. The books mentioned in footnote # 3 above provide primitive knowledge on this topic. During the 1980s, several studies of wartime China were published; however, these studies are often born out of their authors’ interest in the continuing struggle between the Nationalist and the Chinese Communists after the war, such as Chi Hsi-sheng, *Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse, 1937-1945* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1982.)

<sup>18</sup> For studies related to these topics, see Odd Westad, *Decisive Encounter: the Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950* (Stanford: Stanford University: 2003); Susan Pepper, *Civil War in China: the Political Struggle* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Doak Barnett, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover* (New York: Praeger, 1963.)

<sup>19</sup> Stephen MacKinnon, “The Tragedy of Wuhan, 1938,” *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (October 1996,) 931.

of their research.<sup>20</sup> As a result, how these cities and life within them were affected by the war remains under-researched. Such a lack of interest toward Chinese history during the anti-Japanese war is not unique to urban studies, but has remained a norm in other fields for a few decades as well.

In recent years, some scholars have attempted to step outside the framework of “the Chinese Communists victory and the Nationalists’ failure” and study other aspects of the anti-Japanese war. While a comprehensive work of the eight-year war remains to be written, scholarly effort has produced some pioneer studies, particularly on the issue of collaboration between Chinese elites and the Japanese, and the political economy of the Nationalist regime during the war. Several studies have also looked at Chinese Communist led resistance in Japanese occupied areas and thus increase our understanding of the impact brought by the war to those local societies.<sup>21</sup> Trends in China, particularly the Chinese Communist Party’s desire to promote patriotism in order to fill the ideological void left by its abandonment of socialist ideology, also lessen the previous prohibition against discussion of the Nationalist government and the war. As a result, the war has become an important topic not only for academic scholarship but also popular entertainment. The once forgotten war and sufferings have re-entered Chinese society’s memory.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, our knowledge about wartime China is still

---

<sup>20</sup> For a quick view on the scholarship of Chinese urban history, see Joseph Esherick ed., *Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and National Identity, 1900-1950* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000.) For an extensive bibliography on Chinese urban studies, see Lu Hanchao, “Zhongguo chengshishi yanjiu,” *Qinghua daxue xuebao*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (January 2008,) 121-126.

<sup>21</sup> Stephen R. MacKinnon, Diana Lary, and Ezra F. Vogel, eds, *China at War: Regions of China, 1937-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2007), David P. Barrett and Larry N. Shyu, eds, *Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945: the Limits of accommodation* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2002); Parks M. Coble, *Chinese Capitalists in Japan’s New Order, the Occupied Lower Yangzi, 1937-1945* (California: University of California Press, 2003) Christian Henriot and Wen-hsin Yeh, *In the Shadow of the Rising Sun: Shanghai under Japanese Occupation* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009)

<sup>22</sup> Arthur Waldron, “China’s New Remembering of World War II: The Case of Zhang Zizong,” *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (October 1996,) 948-951. My several trips to China since 2007 also confirmed the emergence of films and TV dramas that depict the war as an ultimate act of patriotism. In some of these films and

thin when compared to our knowledge of other time periods of Chinese history. It is the goal of this dissertation to contribute to awareness of this particular aspect of Chinese history.

By studying the gorge area during the war, the current study also provide some glimpse into the nature of the Nationalist government. While fighting the war, the relocated Nationalist government did not abandon its nation-building effort and social reform. During the war, it reconstructed the political institutions of Sichuan province and finally realized the plan of unifying the province with the centralized government of China. Sichuanese militarists, while still occupying many of their important posts in the provincial government, lost their previous independence. It was during the anti-Japanese war that Sichuan once again became part of the Chinese nation. This chapter thus echoes with historian Morris Bain's claim that "the Sino-Japanese War witnessed the most intensive Guomintang efforts of state building characterized by the rationalization of state."<sup>23</sup>

In terms of reform, the Nationalist government, taking advantage of the progress the gorge area had achieved prior to the war, embarked upon another experimental land reform. Although the reform was a great success, it in fact indicated a few difficulties that the Nationalist government would not be able to overcome if it was to promote land reform nationwide after the war. By looking at these wartime policies, this research hopes to provide new perspectives on the Nationalist government during the anti-Japanese war.

---

dramas, the political struggle between the Nationalists and the Chinese Communists was given a more neutral presentation. The Nationalists' contribution to the war was more or less recognized.

<sup>23</sup> Morris Bian, "Building State Structure: Guomintang Institutional Rationalization during the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945," *Modern China*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (January 2005,) 35-71. Bian's conclusion thus is in contrast to many previous scholarships that often considered the state-building effort of the Nationalist government had failed during the Nanjing Decade and the war in no way allow it to continue such effort. Lloyd Eastman, *The Abortive Revolution: China Under the Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1990 ) and *The Nationalist Era in China: 1927-1949* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.) R. E Bedeski, *State-building in modern China : the Kuomintang in the prewar period* (Berkeley: University of California, 1981.)

## **Outlines of chapters**

The first chapter aims to map out the local conditions and history of the object of this dissertation, the gorge area or Beibei as it was often called. While the fertile Sichuan basin has a long history of human activity, the recorded history of the gorge area only began in the reign of the Qianlong emperor (136-1795). In the Qing dynasty this area had only a few human settlements that could be best described as villages. Like thousands of rural villages in imperial China, the gorge area never produced any prominent officials, erudite scholars, or wealthy merchants; hence, its name was hardly mentioned in any written records. Moreover, geographically, the hilly condition of the gorge area was no match to the productive Chengdu plain whose agricultural production enjoyed national fame and earned it the name of “heaven’s storehouse,” or nearby Chongqing which controlled the upstream and downstream navigation routes of the upper Yangzi River. In China’s long history, this place seems to have little significance. It was possibly due to this insignificance that after the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, when China’s local administration as well as the central authority sank into chaos, this area soon became the hotbed of banditry and was not governed by any laws or even a militarists’ army. When looking at the history of this area in the early years of the Republican era, most researchers would probably not choose it as a research topic. Yet, the fate of the gorge area turned in the 1920s when a merchant sponsored militia was formed to eliminate the rampant banditry so to ensure a stable flow of goods on the Jialing River. It was also this historic coincidence that allowed the gorge area to begin the acquisition of its historical significance. This chapter will also attempt to explore the (possible) factors that attributed to the choice of location and decision of embarking the militia organization in the gorge area.



The second chapter will look at how the provincial politics and the administrators, particular Lu Zuofu, worked together to provide the gorge area the possibility of implementing rural reforms. The political chaos that Sichuan province experienced after the fall of the Qing Dynasty compelled many communities to form local militias to ensure local residents' safety. The gorge area was no exception. However, because the area was right on the border of different counties and cooperation between individual militia was difficult to arrange, the gorge area became a bandit base.<sup>24</sup> The rampant banditry eventually compelled a group of merchants and gentry to seek out the militarists' approval and upgrade the independent militias to a unified armed force administrated by the XFJ. Considering the fact that the XFJ had the power to collect river taxes to fund its militia activity, the administrators must have enjoyed the support or at least tolerance of militarists or small military leaders stationed nearby.<sup>25</sup> Sichuan province in the Republican era had notorious fame as the most lawless region, controlled by militarists constantly waging battles against each other. However, XFJ's success in eliminating banditry and gradually establishing local stability should be taken as strong evidence of the positive relationship between the militarists and local elites. Certainly, it is undeniable that Chinese warlords in the Republican era were more interested in maintaining their personal power than improving the welfare of the people in their controlled region.<sup>26</sup> However, an unstable society and local economy that were too damaged by the wars were ultimately not in line with the warlords' interests. Since none of these warlords actually exerted orderly governance over their garrison area, they often had to share political power and control over local finance with

---

<sup>24</sup> Xia Daijun and Zhang Haitao, "Mincu Sanxia jiaofei ji," *Hechuan wenshi ziliao xuanji*, Vol. 7

<sup>25</sup> The militarists that controlled Chongqing and its vicinity when the XFJ administration was founded in fact ordered their troops to stay away from the gorge area. DAGLJ, p1020711.

<sup>26</sup> This characteristic of the militarists' governance is acknowledged by historians in China and the English-speaking world. For scholarship in English, see Chi Hsi-sheng, *Warlord Politics in China, 1916-1928* (Stanford: Stanford University, 1976;) Donald Gillin, *Warlord Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911-1949* (New Jersey: Princeton University, 1967;) Kapp, *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic*.

prominent figures in local societies in exchange for social and economic stability. We still have inadequate knowledge about how warlords worked with the local elites, who probably enjoyed more prestige in the local communities than the warlords themselves. By understanding the relationships between the elites and Sichuan warlords, we can have deeper understandings of the nature of warlord rule, as opposed to simply viewing them as ruthless predators of local resources in Sichuan.

In addition to exploring the issues mentioned above, this chapter will also study the elites involved in the development of the gorge area. In 1924, when the gorge area established the XFJ administration, the administrators seemed to limit their goals to eliminating banditry and restoring local order. However, in 1927, the newly appointed head of the XFJ, Lu Zuofu, saw the gorge area as a place where he could realize his plan of a modernized village. Thereafter, the tasks of the XFJ were expanded. Lu was on that post for only about 5 years; yet, it was his vision that set down another watershed of development in the JLJXSX area. Nevertheless, although Lu's idea of modernization was essential in understanding Beibei's history, one should not overlook the people he worked with. Lu's personal letters testify to his broad social connections with not only Sichuan warlords, but also with a group of merchants, scholars, and administrators. In his letters, he constantly sought advice, funding, and support for XFJ from others. In other words, while most of existing literature on JLJXSX history (most of which has been done by scholars in China) praised Lu as the father of JLJXSX modernization, the work could never have been accomplished without the support of a group of Sichuan elites, including the warlords.

In combination with the discussion of the relationships between Sichuan elites and warlords, this chapter will also explore the vision and ideas of these people on how to implement modernization. The rural reform in JLJXSX was no doubt part of the rural reconstruction

movement that was made famous by the work of James Yan and Liang Shumin. Liang's and Yan's works were considered landmarks in the history of China's rural modernization. Although there were fundamental differences between their philosophical grounds, both considered China's incompetence to have been primarily due to her peoples' ignorance. Hence, the programs in Ding county and Zhouping stressed the improvement Chinese peasants' political consciousness and educational level by means of a series of education programs.

While the administrators in JLJXSX also stressed the importance of education, they considered the economy in the local community as equally important in the process of rural modernization. Such a vision was clearly drawn by Lu Zuofu and was carried out by the administrators who succeeded him after 1932. Consequently, in terms of the range of modernization, JLJXSX distinguished itself from Zhouping in Shangdong and Ding County in Hebei, where Liang Shuming and James Yan experimented with their plans. Some contemporaries criticized that, due to the lack of a clear economic plan, the work in Zhouping in Ding County did not fully address the root of rural problems and did little to improve peasants' lives. For example, sociologist Chen Xujing and economist Qian Jiaju in the Republican era both argue that the rural construction movement led by James Yan and Liang Shuming did not address the economic problems in Chinese villages, and both Yan and Liang seemed to believe that the movement could bypass this problem to address peasants' social problems, such as ignorance and selfishness. Chen further argues that the programs in both Zhouping and Ding County in fact became a financial burden to local governments, as communities could not generate sufficient funds to sustain the reform programs and relied on outside donations and government stipends.<sup>27</sup> Both Chen and Qian made such remarks without personally visiting and observing JLJXSX's work on rural construction. However, because of the emphasis the JLJXSX

---

<sup>27</sup> Chen Xujing, *Chen Xujing wenji* (Guangzhou: Sun Yat-sen University Press, 2004,) 106-112.

administrators placed on the economy, the experience of JLJXSX represents a new perspective to understand and evaluate the movement for rural construction. This chapter will explore this issue not only by looking at Lu Zuofu's vision, but also by comparing it with the experiences of Zhouping and Ding County.

The third chapter will discuss pre-war development of JLJXSX community, focusing on its politics, economy, education, transportation, society, and modern facilities. When Lu Zuofu was appointed as head of the XFJ he pictured the future JLJXSX as a place with convenient railway and highway transportation systems, telephone and telegram facilities, and a postal service. The economy of the JLJXSX would be supported by coal factories, iron factories, and textile and chemical industries, and sufficient agricultural production. Culturally, he pictured the future JLJXSX as a place where research institutions for science and humanity subjects would be established, where schools for basic and higher education would be founded, and where libraries, museums, and sports facilities would be built to support the general education of its residents. In Lu's vision, the future JLJXSX should be a place where all people were educated, had a job, and were devoted to public service. Its environment would also be modernized so to become a place suitable for a modern livelihood. With these ideas in mind, Lu led the JLJXSX to join the movement of rural construction that was first begun by Liang Shumin and James Yan in northern China.

In the process of conducting a series of modernization projects, the nature of the XFJ administration also experienced some fundamental changes. In many ways, the transformation reflected the changes occurring in provincial politics. The discussion of this issue will show that unlike conventional knowledge, which provided a negative image of the province in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, by the early 1930s politics in the province saw some improvement, which in turn

provided enough political stability for the administration in JLJXSX to work on its modernization projects. As a result, JLJXSX was able to showcase the meaning of modernization, which in its case was more about appearance and impression than the actual improvement of living standards and local customs. Nevertheless, the projects, while perhaps falling short of what they were intended to achieve, promoted the reputation of the JLJXSX area as exemplary of rural reform. By utilizing this reputation along with the natural scenery and hot springs of the area, the XFJ administration was successful in bringing in increasing visitors, who ultimately became the judges of JLJXSX's modernization and assisted in spreading its fame.

The fourth chapter will look at the impact of the anti-Japanese war. The anti-Japanese war that began in 1937 marked another watershed of JLJXSX's history. Prior to the war, the finances of JLJXSX had faced serious challenges when Sichuan province underwent a power reconfiguration between the militarists and the Nanjing government in 1935. XFJ's main source of funding, the river tax, was abolished as part of the plan for centralizing Sichuan's revenue. As a result, the XFJ administration faced a severe shortage of funds. To solve this problem and also to finalize the role of the XFJ administration as not only a guardian of local order but also a civil authority, the administration was upgraded to a special office that oversaw rural reform in the JLJXSX area.

However, the upgrade soon proved to be inadequate to meet the challenges brought by the war. From 1938, the war drove the Nationalist government and numerous refugees to retreat to the southwest of China. Chongqing and its vicinity thus became the center of "Free China," not only in terms of politics, but also in terms of wartime culture. More importantly, the war provided a great opportunity for the Nationalist government to finally reconfigure the political institutions of Sichuan province. With its close location to Chongqing, JLJXSX was designated

as the place to relocate many governmental institutions and refugees. To accommodate this sudden increase in population and complexity of administrative responsibilities, the administration was once again upgraded to a special district that would enjoy the same political status as county governments.

Prior to the war, JLJXSX's reputation as a petite, modernized town that was worthy of a visit had attracted a great number of tourists annually. From the mid 1930s, the administration had begun to design a new blueprint of city planning to improve community development in JLJXSX. With the outbreak of the war, the infrastructure of JLJXSX could not accommodate its increasing population. Although during the war years, the shortage of funds and anxiety over Japanese bombing did not create a stable environment for community development, the JLJXSX area still continued the work.

In recent years, historians have begun to study China during the anti-Japanese war. Although the destruction the war brought to China is generally agreed on, the local conditions during the war certainly should not be generalized. For one thing, whether a community was controlled by the Japanese army, the CCP, or the Nationalist government was critical for its access to resources during the war. Therefore, when discussing the impact of the war on China, one should consider this political aspect first. In the case of the JLJXSX, the impact of the war was most apparent in terms of local industry, housing availability, and land use. Moreover, because of the fact that the Nationalist government relocated to Chongqing, the wartime history of the JLJXSX was unique in the sense that the Nationalist government continued its pre-war policy of land reform there. The land reform in JLJXSX also affirmed that during the war, the Nationalist government did not completely abandon its state-building effort.

The epilogue will discuss the significance of the JLJXSX's history of the much needed modernization and economic growth of Southwestern China and the development of the Beibei district in present days. The JLJXSX's experience in improving transportation infrastructure and emphasis on developing local economy as the foundation of social and educational reforms is still valuable lessons to many Chinese rural villages. Moreover, its pre-1949 history is now considered as essential to its modern day urban planning.

Before the anti-Japanese war, the JLJXSX had enjoyed a reputation of being a modernized rural town. Visitors who came to enjoy the hot springs, to attend the JLJXSX's Summer Festival, or to participate in its annual sports events, submitted their journals to newspaper and magazines, in which they praised not only the JLJXSX's natural scenery, but also how its progress of modernization had transformed the community from a backward rural area to a place where a life of modern style could be found. To these writers, many of whom came from larger Chinese cities such as Shanghai, Nanjing, or Chongqing, modernization, although it improved Chinese people's material life, in many ways also eroded Chinese morality. Problems that came with modernization in cities, such as crowded living space, increased crime, exceeded consumption, and indifference in human relationships were a sharp contrast to the image of an ideal Chinese community where people led quiet, simple lives and were closely connected to one another, as is depicted by the fifth century writer Tao Yuanming.<sup>28</sup> To many visitors from the cities, life in the JLJXSX which was equipped with modern necessity such as electricity and tap water and was not far from Chongqing posed was an alternative.

---

<sup>28</sup> Tao Yuanming, a writer in the Eastern Jin Dynasty (317-420) wrote the well-known essay "Peach-Blossom Spring." In the essay he tells a story which goes like this: A fisherman happened to come upon a village called Peach-Blossom Spring. Squeezing through a cave, he found a village, the residents of which were descendants of refugees from the Qin Dynasty (221-206 B.C.E). It was a paradise isolated from the outside world, without exploitation or oppression, and everybody living and working in peace and contentment. Tao Yuanming, *Tao Yuanming quanji* (Shanghai: Zhongyang shudian, 1935,) 76.

This historical reputation is an important asset to the modern Beibei district. As the epilogue chapter will show, the blueprint of the urban planning in the modern day Beibei district is connected directly not only to the development of the greater Chongqing metropolitan, but also to its historical legacy. The district's transformation from a bandit-raid community to a quaint, modernized town in the 1930s and its historical role as a wartime shelter during the anti-Japanese war are appropriate by the current administration to promote the image of the modern Beibei district as a garden-like, family- friendly place. In the logic of the current Beibei administration, the district will certainly benefit enormously from the ongoing economic projects in Chongqing, but it is the pre-1949 history that allows the present day Beibei to distinguish itself from the rest of China.



## Chapter 1: A Place with No Significance

Although geographically the term “Jialingjiang Xiaosanxia” (Three small gorges on the Jialing River) refers to Libi, Wentang, and Guanyin Gorges, where the Jialing River cut through three mountain lines and resulted in deep, narrow valleys, historically the term was used for the alluvial land that surrounded the valleys as well.<sup>29</sup> In the Republican era, this region was on the borders of Jiangbei County, Ba County, Bishan County, and Hechuan County. While the history of the four counties could be traced back to the Tang Dynasty or even earlier, due to the lack of natural conditions that were favorable for agricultural activities, the population of the JLJXSX area had been scarce and the recorded history of the JLJXSX community only began in the early Qing Dynasty when the population in Sichuan gradually recovered from the turmoil during the Ming–Qing transition.

### The Beginning: An Immigrant Society

By the last year of the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644,) Sichuan Province had experienced countless battles for more than half a century. The prolonged wars cost hundreds and thousands of lives and as a result, the population in Sichuan decreased dramatically. In 1578, the province reported a population of about 3 million. However, by the end of the Ming Dynasty, it was estimated that the population in Sichuan decreased by at least two-thirds.<sup>30</sup> Most county

---

<sup>29</sup> Liu Chonglai, *Lu Zuofu yu minguo xiangcun jianshe yundong* (Beijing: Renmin cubanshe, 2007,) 71-72.

<sup>30</sup> Wang Di, *Kuacui fengbi de shijie: changjiang shangyou quyue shehui yanjiu* (Taipei: Wunan cuban gongsi, 2002,) 72-73.

gazetteers recorded a significant decrease of residents. For instance, Hechuan County reported a male population of only 16,096 in 1661, while in the Ming Dynasty, this number was 136,198.<sup>31</sup>

To fill up the empty, unclaimed land and increase the revenue, the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) promoted a series of immigration policies that aimed to recover the productivity of the centuries-old “heaven’s storehouse.” As early as 1654, the imperial government began to encourage people to move to Sichuan and registered the refugees that wandered into the province during the chaotic years of the Ming–Qing transition. To help the immigrants to settle down, in the early years of the Kangxi reign (1662–1722,) the government lightened the tax burden and allowed the newcomers to register for the civil service examination as Sichuan residents. These policies plus the appeal of unclaimed, productive land attracted natives from the neighboring Hubai, Hunan, Jiangxi, Guangdong, and Guangxi provinces. From 1743 to 1748, it was reported that more than 243,000 natives from Guangdong and Hunan provinces traveled through Guizhou province to Sichuan. From 1753 to 1755, about 6,374 households from Guangdong and Hunan provinces relocated to Sichuan. Although the scale of the immigration wave caused concern from local administrators who worried that the increase of population would undermine the stability of local societies in Sichuan, the imperial government regarded the immigration as having more positive effects of relieving the population pressure of neighboring regions (particularly the

---

<sup>31</sup> Zhang Senkai et al eds, *Hechuan Xianzhi* (1916) in *Zhongguo difangzhi jicheng: Sichuan fuxian zhiji*, 70 vols. (Reprint, Chengdu: Bashu shushe, 1996,) vol. 43, 429. The gazetteer compiled in the Ming Dynasty reported that the Hechuan County had a male population of 136,198. Other counties also witnessed a dramatic decrease of population. For instance, the Wenjiang county reported a population of less than one hundred in 1659; the Cangxi county reported only 600 households when the Qing Dynasty crushed the Rebellion of Three Feudatories. Considering that the Qing administration was still in the building process at that time, the reliability of these numbers was questionable. Nonetheless, it still reflected the gravity of chaos that the province experienced in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. See Wang Di, *Kuacui fengbi de shijie*, 57

lower Yangzi Delta and the southeastern coast) rather than the negative influence of disturbing the Sichuan society, and it continued to allow the immigration.<sup>32</sup>

New immigrants thus increased the numbers of settlements. In the JLJXSX region and its nearby area, new villages and townships emerged from the early Qing Dynasty. Although there was no detailed record specifically indicating that these communities first appeared in the Qing Dynasty, given that many villages and townships received their names in the Qing Dynasty, it is reasonable to assume that these communities might have been built or recovered by the new immigrants.<sup>33</sup> Moreover, the local gazetteers recorded that most lineages residing in the JLJXSX region immigrated to Sichuan during the early years of the Qing Dynasty, such as the Li lineage of Maliuping, the Zeng lineage, and the Xiong lineage of Beibei. The Li lineage was native from the Huguang region and immigrated to Sichuan in 1703. The Zeng lineage was originally from Shandong and first moved to Hunan province and then to Sichuan in 1716. The Xiong lineage was native to the Hubei province and also immigrated to Sichuan in the early years of the Qing Dynasty. Both the Zeng and Xiong lineage had descendants that later moved to Beibei and were actively involved in the local politics.<sup>34</sup>

In accordance with the population increase in Sichuan province, by 1812 the population of the Chongqing prefectures also reached 2,034,000 and was estimated to be tripled by 1910.<sup>35</sup> With this significant growth of the population in the Chongqing region, the population of the

---

<sup>32</sup> Wang Di, *Kuacui fengbi de shijie*, 61

<sup>33</sup> For example, Huangjue Zhen, a township of the JLJXSX region was named so during the Kangxi reign because there were a large number of white fig trees. Shuaijiaba, a village of the Huangjue township, received such a name in the Qing because most of its residents were from the Shuai lineage. Maliuping, a village near the Libixia, received its name during the Qianlong reign when its population increased. For more information, see Chongqingshi beibeiqu diming xiaozu ed., *Sichuansheng Chongqingshi Beibeiqu Diminglu* (Chongqing: Beibei renmin zhenfu, 1986.)

<sup>34</sup> “Shizu”, in Zhang Senkai ed., *Hechuan Xianzhi*, juan 8-9, 294-350.

<sup>35</sup> Wang Di, *Kuacui fengbi de shijie*, 68.

JLJXSX community increased to around 100,000 during the early years of the Republican era.<sup>36</sup> Unlike the residents making a living mainly by agriculture in the Chengdu Basin where the land was flat and fertile, the population in Chongqing and its nearby communities had to adjust to the hilly environment and relied on diversified professions for their livelihood. The location of the city resulted in its importance in intra- and extra-provincial trade and thus was advantageous for non-agricultural activities, especially the handicraft industry. Though there were no detailed records about the types of employment in Chongqing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the fact that the city attracted an increasing number of factories and business after it was opened as a treaty port in 1890 indicated that there was a labor force ready for employment.<sup>37</sup>

The population in the JLJXSX community was no exception. Except for the riverbank where the Jialing River, Qu River, and Pei River converged, which produced some grains and vegetables, this area had no favorable condition for agricultural cultivation of a larger scale.<sup>38</sup> Instead, residents ran craft shops, using local clay and stone to make housewares or engaging in other types of craft.<sup>39</sup> Besides being employed in a primitive industry of handicraft, a large portion of the population worked for the mining industry. Historically, the JLJXSX region was famous for its comparatively rich reserves of silver, copper, tin, iron, and coal. The reserve of

---

<sup>36</sup> In 1915, two towns in the gorge area, Longfengzhen and Beibei reported a population of 52341 and 21621 respectively. See Zhang Senkai ed., *Hechuan xianzi*, 430. Baxian zhi, 454.

<sup>37</sup> During the Qianlong reign of the Qing dynasty, it was estimated that several hundreds of thousands of laborers were employed by the water-navigation-related business. It might be reasonable to assume that most of this population concentrated in Chongqing for it was the largest river port on the upper stream of the Yangzi River. Wand Di, *Kuacui fengbi de shijie*, 309-310. Wei Yintao et al., *Jindai Chongqing chengshishi* (Chengdu: Sichuan University Press, 1991,) 189.

<sup>38</sup> It was estimated that the annual agricultural production in JLJXSX could only supply for the local need for three-months. See anonymous, "Jialingjiang sanxia xiangcun jianshe shiyanqu gaikuang," *Nonglin xinbao*, vol. 16, no 26-28 (1939,) 27.

<sup>39</sup> Zhang Senkai ed., *Hechuan Xianzhi*, 596. *Beibei Quzhi*, 197, 200, 204, 215, 220. The locally run craft shops included textile, glassware and pottery, and primitive steel factories.

coal was the largest, and coal mining began as early as the Qing Dynasty.<sup>40</sup> During the Daoguang (1821–1850) and Xianfeng (1851–1861) reigns, it was said that there were about 20 wholesale shops of coal and several thousands of peddlers and workers carrying coal between coal factories, shops, and villages in the JLJXSX region. The daily transaction volume of coal was several thousands of “tiao.”<sup>41</sup> The coal was not only used in ordinary households, but it was also an important raw material in salt yards, where it was burned to brew salt. Among the products that were exported to other places, the amount of coal was no doubt the largest.

In the West, coal was an indispensable element for heavy industry that could drive up the growth of the economy. However, while the mining industry provided employment opportunities to local communities in JLJXSX, the fact that China in the imperial era lacked an industrial base that could maximize the use of coal did not allow the JLJXSX area to enjoy the full benefits of a rich reserve of coal. Therefore, the mining industry attributed very little to the local economy in the area. Regardless of the rich coal mine, the region appeared to be one of the thousands of Chinese communities that could hardly be called prosperous and thus had little political and cultural significance. However, the historical significance of the JLJXSX area lay beyond agricultural, handicraft, and industrial production in the Qing dynasty and only gradually emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Being about 40 kilometers (about 25 miles) from Chongqing and located at the convergence of the Jialing River, Bei River, and Qu River, the JLJXSX region was on the route of water transportation that connected Chongqing and the Yangzi River with the eastern and northern parts of Sichuan. Hence, its development was greatly influenced by the macro-economy of Chongqing and its neighboring areas. To

---

<sup>40</sup> In fact, some of the villages or the streets received their names in the Qing because the mining industry attracted immigration. See *Sichuansheng Chongqingshi Beibeiqu Diminglu*.

<sup>41</sup> Zhang Senkai, *Hechuan Xianzhi*, 612-613. One “tiao” (of coal) equals to 100 Chinese jin (or catty). One Chinese jin is about 1.3 pounds.

understand the importance of such a geographical location, a brief overview of the economy in the Chongqing area is indispensable.

### **The Economy of Chongqing as the Driving Force of Development in JLJXSX**

Chongqing's political importance grew mostly because of its geographical location. The city was located at the convergence of the Jialing River and the Yangzi River, the two main routes of water transportation in the eastern Sichuan province. In the imperial era and early twentieth century, when the railroad and automobiles had yet to become widely available in Sichuan and most parts of China, rivers were one of the most economic ways to transport goods and travelers. Through the Jialing River, Chongqing was connected with the northern and eastern part of the Sichuan Basin. Together with the Bei River, Qu River, and tens of tributaries, the two main streams constituted a large transportation web that covered the eastern half of the province. Those rivers not only bound the Sichuan province tightly as a whole, but also linked the province with southern Shanxi and Gansu and northern Guizhou and Yunnan and even the region along the middle and lower Yangzi River.<sup>42</sup>

The economy of Chongqing and the Sichuan province had steady growth only from the seventh century, when the Tang Dynasty (618–907) established a strong and unified empire that

---

<sup>42</sup> Wei Yingtao, *Jindai Chongqing chengshishi*, 51. Wang Di, *Kuachu fenbe de shijie*, 36-40. The web of water transportation on the upper stream of the Yangzi River was constituted by several main streams and hundreds of tributaries. The Yangzi River cut through the Sichuan Basin. The Qian River from Guizhou converged with the Yangzi River at Peiling. From Xuzhou in the southern Sichuan, one could reach Yunnan through the Jinsha River. The tributaries of the Jialing River stretched into the Shanxi and Gansu provinces. From Chongqing, travelling upstream on the Yangzi River and took route of the Min River at Yibing, one could arrive in the Chengdu Plain. In addition to these water paths, the city was also the end and the beginning of two courier roads which connected Chengdu and Chongqing and Chongqing and Xian.

could more effectively govern the province.<sup>43</sup> In the Tang Dynasty, agricultural production increased as the Han Chinese, bringing more advanced technology with them, immigrated to Sichuan. During the chaotic years of the mid-Tang rebellion, because the province was remote from the political center in north China, it experienced comparatively less destruction and even became the temporary sanctuary for many northern refugees, including the Tang royal house. Being spared from the chaos in the late Tang Dynasty thus gave the province a better chance of maintaining its economic base for later growth. Later in the Song Dynasty, the Sichuan economy was further boosted by the introduction of new rice and agricultural technology. Moreover, as the Chinese economic center moved south to the lower Yangzi Delta in the twelfth century, the transportation convenience of the Yangzi River also opened new markets for Sichuan's handicraft products, tea, and silk.<sup>44</sup>

Sichuan province has long enjoyed a reputation of abundant agricultural production. Although Chongqing and its neighboring area were not famous for a variety of agricultural produce due to the lack of flat and fertile lands, the region had a long history of producing tea, silk, and salt from the Song Dynasty. In the Song Dynasty, the tea produced in the Hezhou (modern Hechuan County) was considered one of the finest teas in China. Merchants from the Shaanxi province traveled back and forth buying tea from local producers there.<sup>45</sup> Hechuan County also had a silk industry of significant size in the Song Dynasty. Moreover, from the late Tang Dynasty, the salt production in not only Hechuan County but several other counties

---

<sup>43</sup> Wei Yingtao, *Jindai Chongqing chengshishi*, 71.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 74-83.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 82. Sichuanese tea and eventually silk and salt were critical items in the trade with the nomadic people during the Song Dynasty. The Song Dynasty was in desperate need of horses which were critical in its defense strategy against increasing threat from the north. Because of the province's location, it was easier for the government to trade Sichuanese tea for horses. See Paul Smith, *Taxing Heaven's Storehouse: Horses, Bureaucrats, and the Destruction of the Sichuan Tea Industry, 1074-1224* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991.)

steadily grew and became an important source of revenue.<sup>46</sup> The flow of these products to the eastern Sichuan and Chengdu area had to go through Chongqing for redistribution. The geographical location of the city thus allowed it to transform itself into an exchange hub of goods.

Compared to the transportation web in the province, Chongqing had limited communication with the world outside of the province. As an old saying went, “the road to Sichuan is arduous and is more challenging than traveling up to heaven” (Shu dao nan, nan yu shang qing tian). The province was confined by several mountain lines, such as Wu Mountain, Daba Mountain, and Qin Ling; the Yangzi River was the only natural path that connected the province with the rest of China.<sup>47</sup> On the one hand, this geographical condition allowed the province to escape from the political turmoil in northern China, but on the other hand, it also limited the contact of the province with other parts of China and its economic development. Although the Yangzi River opened outside markets for Sichuan’s produce, without ships with advanced structure, the river was not a favorable choice for long-distance, extra-provincial trade, unless the trade could bring in lucrative profit. Therefore, before the Qing Dynasty, the production of the Chongqing area, except for tea, silk, and salt, was mostly for local consumption.

The province gradually freed itself from the isolation only from the Qing Dynasty when the new immigrants and the economic development in the lower Yangzi region stimulated its local economy. The Qing immigrants settled on most of Sichuan’s cultivable land and increased Sichuan’s grain production. This increase not only satisfied the need of local markets but also became an important item for export. Part of this increase was exported to the lower Yangzi

---

<sup>46</sup> Wei Yingtao, *Jindai Chongqing chengshishi*, 76.

<sup>47</sup> Tōa Dōbunkai Shina Shōbetsu Zenshi Kankōkai, *Shinshū Shina shōbetsu zenshi* (Tokyo: Tōa Dōbunkai, 1941), vol. 2-3.



Delta, where peasants had abandoned traditional rice production and planted more profitable crops, including cotton and mulberry trees. The once “rice bowl” that supported the eastern half of China was short of grain.<sup>48</sup> In other words, by the Qing Dynasty, the economic growth of the lower Yangzi Delta to some extent relied on the grain exported from Sichuan and other provinces. Instead of buying rice and grain locally, many merchants now traveled to Chongqing and shipped rice downstream.<sup>49</sup>

Along with the trade of rice came new markets for other Sichuanese produce. The increase of extra-provincial trade is evident in the following facts. In the early Qing Dynasty, there were nine tariff stations in Sichuan responsible for collecting taxes. By 1815, this number increased to 22, indicating the increasing volume of goods imported to and exported from Sichuan.<sup>50</sup> In addition to rice and salt, export of other products, such as sugar, herbs, and dried food, also saw significant growth.<sup>51</sup> The trading of these goods was mostly conducted in Chongqing, where the transportation could be easily arranged. In order to accommodate the growing volume of trade in Chongqing, the numbers of navigation guilds that controlled different water paths increased as well.<sup>52</sup> In short, these historical records indicate that the growth of trade and commerce allowed Chongqing and the province to emerge from the century-old isolation in the Qing dynasty.

In the nineteenth century, several historical events further influenced Chongqing’s role as a hub of commercial exchange in southwest China. During the Taiping Rebellion, the rebels controlled the middle and lower Yangzi River. The sale of Huai salt in the Hunan, Hubei, and

---

<sup>48</sup> Wei, *Jindai Chongqing chengshishi*, 113. Philip Huang, *The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta, 1350-1988* (California: Stanford University, 1990,) 47-48.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Wang, *Kuachu fenbe de shijie*, 200-201.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, 204-206.

<sup>52</sup> Wei, *Jindai Chongqing chengshishi*, 111

Jiangxi Provinces was interrupted, for the merchants could not ship the salt upstream on the Yangzi River to the regions that were designated to consume the Huai salt.<sup>53</sup> The shortage of salt in these provinces soon attracted the Sichuanese salt merchants and illegal smugglers to export Sichuanese salt there. To solve the problem of shortage and remap the sales regions of Sichuanese salt for revenue, the Qing government removed the previous restriction on the sale of Sichuanese salt and allowed the licensed salt merchants to export salt from Sichuan. The salt that was designated for sale in the Hubei and Hunan provinces were first transported from numerous Sichuanese salt yards to Chongqing and then redistributed. It was estimated that during the Taiping Rebellion, about 50,962 tons of Sichuanese salt were sold in the Chu region (Hubei and Hunan provinces) annually.<sup>54</sup> By 1860, the volume of salt being redistributed in Chongqing increased the importance of Chongqing as a central port for both domestic and export trade and eventually led to the establishment of the *lijin* collection there.<sup>55</sup>

The Treaty of Tianjin in 1860 (resulted from the defeat of the Qing government in the Opium War in 1840) opened the Yangzi River below Hankou to foreigners. After three decades of negotiation and pressure, foreign merchants and their governments, led by the British, succeeded in forcing the Qing Dynasty to open Yichang in Hubei province as a treaty port in 1872. Although Chongqing still closed its doors to foreign traders, it could not escape the impact of the opening of Yichang, which was the first stop for cargo ships that came from Chongqing. The ambition of the western traders was to control the Yangzi River and all its major river ports so as to maximize their trade profit. In 1890, Chongqing was formally opened as a treaty port, and a British-operated maritime custom was established there. The volume of both imported and

---

<sup>53</sup> Huai salt was the name for sea salt produced on the coastal plain in Jiangsu province.

<sup>54</sup> This number does not include the salt that was not taxed by the government. Wang Di, *Kuachu fenbe de shijie*, 208-209.

<sup>55</sup> Madeleine Zelin, *The Merchants of Zigong: Industrial Entrepreneurship in Early Modern China* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2005,) 143.

exported goods being traded in Chongqing increased significantly after 1890, especially the import of foreign-made merchandise. It was estimated that from 1876 to 1895, the imported foreign goods increased almost 10 times than before.<sup>56</sup> By the early twentieth century, the total volume of trading activities recorded by the Chongqing Maritime Custom bureau was 2.5 times more than the total before 1890.<sup>57</sup> Spurred by the historical events mentioned above, the economy of Chongqing grew rapidly. Its speed and scale of commercialization even surpassed those of Chengdu, which by the end of the Qing Dynasty had to share its long-standing position as the economic center of the upper Yangzi region with Chongqing.<sup>58</sup>

The economic growth of Chongqing had profound meaning to the Jialing River and the communities along it. The Jialing River became the most important route that traders from the north Sichuan and even Shanxi and Gansu must take. Agricultural products such as rice also relied on the Jialing River for transportation to Chongqing and then export out of the province. Communities along the Jialing River thus thrived, and some grew into river ports. During the Qing Dynasty, the growth of commerce and the increase of population at the northern shore of the Jialing River outside of Chongqing led the imperial government to set up a local government independent from Ba County.<sup>59</sup> In 1913, it was formally converted to Jiangbei County, which had jurisdiction over a portion of JLJXSX.<sup>60</sup> This expansion of the administrative office was an affirmation of how the economic growth of Chongqing served as a stimulant to the development of its neighboring area.

---

<sup>56</sup> Wei Yingtao, *Jindai Chongqing chengshishi*, 117

<sup>57</sup> Wang Di, *Kuachu fenbe de shijie*, 280

<sup>58</sup> Ibid, 253-255.

<sup>59</sup> *Jiangbei Tingzhi*, juan 1, 5a-5b (447)

<sup>60</sup> Wei Yingtao, *Jindai Chongqing chengshishi*, 110-111.

## The Hotbed of Banditry

Being only 50 KM away from Chongqing and located at the convergence of the Jialing, Bei, and Qu Rivers, the JLJXSX was on the paths which the goods produced in the areas surrounded by the three rivers and their tributaries must pass to reach Chongqing.<sup>61</sup> In addition to being on the water route to Chongqing, the JLJXSX area was also on the major land route that led to Shaanxi province and Xian.<sup>62</sup> Goods and travelers who wished to reach Shaanxi and Xian had to pass the JLJXSX area either by the Jialing River or a land route and rest in the nearby Hechuan city. As the economy of Chongqing grew, the traffic that passed through the area also increased. Hechuan city, the county seat, thus became the busiest river port and courier station on the Jialing River.<sup>63</sup> However, while the regions surrounding Chongqing as a whole benefited much from the growing economy in the city, the JLJXSX region did not undergo significant changes. The hilly geography of the area was not favorable for transformation that could turn the area into a transportation hub. Hence, even though the traffic through the area increased, commodities exchange of large volumes could not be conducted there. Therefore, before the twentieth century, the area remained backward and isolated.

In the nineteenth century when the Qing Dynasty experienced rebellions and uprisings across the empire, the JLJXSX region seemed to be spared from the bandit raids that might cause concern from the government and the merchants, considering the busy traffic of goods that passed there. Before the twentieth century, we find no records of serious security problems there, while the province as a whole was attacked by the Taiping rebels and encountered a few

---

<sup>61</sup> There were several big salt yard on the upstream area of the Bei River: Shengpeng, Santai, Pengsui, Shehong. See Zelin, *The Merchand of Zigong*, 7.

<sup>62</sup> Tōa Dōbunkai Shina Shōbetsu Zenshi Kankōkai, *Shinshū Shina shōbetsu zenshi*, 244,

<sup>63</sup> Ibid, 297.

rebellions, including the Miao Rebellion and local uprisings.<sup>64</sup> The geographical characteristic of the JLJXSX region might be largely responsible for this seemingly odd picture.

As mentioned above, the JLJXSX region was named so because the Jialing River flowed through the mountains and resulted in deep, narrow valleys. The section of the river path in this area was famous for its unpredictable, strong currents and sharp rocks that were often hidden deep beneath the river's surface. Numerous shipwrecks and cargo lost were reported constantly. To help those who attempted to pass through the JLJXSX, several travel guides were compiled with detailed lists of the location of dangerous currents and rocks. In a time when the modern technology of the hydrographic survey was not yet available, such records were no doubt based on the travelers' experience.<sup>65</sup>

Although the mountains and bushes were great choices as hiding places for bandits, the danger of travel on the Jialing River and the lack of a flat river bank might be important reasons why the area seemed to be an unfavorable target for bandit raids, which often stressed swift movements and actions. The hard-to-control river conditions posed great difficulty for organized, close-up raids. After all, the bandits in the late Qing Dynasty still used traditional weapons such as spears, swords, and arrows, of which the effectiveness was often limited by the distance between the attackers and the attacked.

The arrival of western technology changed the situation. By the end of the Qing Dynasty, the contact with the west and a series of new policies not only had an enormous impact on economy and politics, but also changed the way local security was maintained. Guns, the western invention using the Chinese-invented gunpowder, replaced traditional weapons in the Chinese

---

<sup>64</sup> Baxian zhi, juan 21; Zhang Senkai, *Hechuan Xianzhi*, 641.

<sup>65</sup> *Zhonghua shanshuizhi congan: Shuizhi*, 37 vols. (Reprint, Beijing: Xianzhuang shuju, 2004,) vol. 24.

armies. By the early twentieth century, this new weapon also empowered the bandits. The Hechuan gazetteer of the early Republican era specifically advised the administrators to purchase guns for local militia because the traditional weapons were now insufficient to defend the villages and townships from bandits, whose attack was faster and more fatal with the aid of guns.<sup>66</sup> Interestingly, it was also in the early twentieth century, especially after the fall of the Qing Dynasty, that we find records of the rampant banditry in the JLJXSX area.

The bandits that roamed around the Jialing River were often called “Lao Er” (the number two) and appeared in large numbers only after the 1911 revolution. Most of the “Lao Er” were members of the infamous Society of the Elder Brothers (or the gowned brothers.) On the eve of the 1911 revolution, the Sichuan New Army founded by the Qing Dynasty was largely controlled by members from this secret society.<sup>67</sup> After the 1911 revolution, the New Army was disbanded, and those who had no other means to maintain their livelihood kept the guns and turned to banditry. The western-invented guns were more powerful and suited for long-distance attack. With the guns, the “Lao Er” could hide in the bushes and mountains and fire at the ships that passed the JLJXSX area from a distance. Mozituo, which was located right on the convergence

---

<sup>66</sup> Zhang Senkai ed., *Hechuan Xianzhi*, “juan” 25, 9b-10a (644)

<sup>67</sup> Secret societies had long history in China and because of the secrecy maintained by these organizations, historians has long debated on their nature. Most of these organizations existed as mutual-aid groups while some were appropriated as organizations for specific political causes. One common feature of these secret organizations was that they often had distinct ritual and languages and the members were usually bond by blood oath. The Society of the Gowned brother was part of the Chinese tradition and it’s nature remained unknown to historians till today. It was said that by the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, more than half of the Sichuanese male belonged to this organization. The Society of the Gowned Brother, as many other secret societies, had a set of rules and inner hierarchy between its members. Their branches (of lodges) covered almost every town and villages in the Sichuan province. Because of its ritual and unique language of communication (known to their members only,) in the last years of the Qing Dynasty, this secret society was convenient tools for political society such as the Tongmenghui to promote political causes. For discussion on the language of the Gowned Brothers, see Wang Di, “Mysterious Communication: the Secret Language of the Gowned Brotherhood in Nineteenth Century Sichuan,” *Late Imperial China*, Vol. 29, No.1 (June 2008,) 77-103. Also see Dian Murray and Qin Baoqi, *The Origins of the Tiandihui: the Chinese Triad in Legend and History* (California: Stanford University Press, 1994.)

point of the Jialing, Bei, and Qu Rivers and where the cargos must pass to reach Chongqing or northern Sichuan, became the hotbed of the “Lao Er” bandits.<sup>68</sup>

Yet, perhaps more influential than the geography and the availability of modern weapons that resulted in the growth of banditry in the JLJXSX region was the political background of Sichuan in the early twentieth century. When the Chinese revolution brought down the Qing Dynasty in 1911, it also removed a centralized government that was more or less capable of maintaining order in the vast territory of China. The territory of China was soon divided among the late-Qing military generals. Though a new Republican government was founded soon thereafter, its existence was in name only, and the actual power lay in the hands of regional militarists. In 1912, after Yuan Shi-kai become the president, the country was practically divided into the north and south; Yuan and his Beiyang army had more effective control over the north, while the southern provinces such as Guandong, Guangxi, and Yunnan were pro GMD-Sun Yet-san. When Yuan negotiated a huge loan with the foreign banks without the approval of the national assembly in 1913, many of the southern provinces claimed independence and thus further exacerbated the division of the country.

The stand taken by the Sichuanese militarists after the fall of the Qing Dynasty was not as clear as those of their counterparts in the northern or other southern provinces. Most of the Sichuanese militarists joined the late Qing military schools and enlisted in the late Qing New Army. These militarists rose to their ranks because of the 1911 revolution. However, their roles in the 1911 revolution could hardly be explained as actions that supported the new Chinese Republic; rather, their responses to the call of overthrowing the imperial governments were based on careful calculation of how to maximize their power in the province. In terms of their

---

<sup>68</sup> Zhang Senkai, *Hechuan Xianzhi*, “juan” 62, 19b-21a. (461-463)

personal backgrounds, most Sichuan militarists completed their education in the military academies founded by the Qing Dynasty. In their youth, few of them ever showed extensive interest in progressive ideas and western institutions.<sup>69</sup> The personal backgrounds and the fact that for centuries the Sichuan province was never the center of national politics due to the distance between the province and northern China provided some answers to the militarists' lack of ambition in national politics. While the northern warlords and pro GMD-Sun Yet-sen militarists competed with each other, the Sichuanese militarists were content to keep their base within the province. Yet, this ambiguous attitude did not allow the province to escape from outside intervention. The size and resources of the province made it an ideal ally to any warlord clique. Although Yuan Shi-kai won over the support of a few Sichuanese militarists with monetary support or titles in the Republican government for a brief time, he was not able to claim control of the province.<sup>70</sup> Therefore, before 1913, the Sichuan militarists could more or less maintain their independence. However, the Second Revolution in 1913 changed the game of warlord politics both in Sichuan and at the national level.

The Second Revolution in 1913 had enormous impact to the warlord politics in Sichuan.<sup>71</sup> The revolution allowed Sichuan militarists to declare independence from Yuan's regime and join the call of the Sun-GMD clique to overthrow Yuan's power. However, when Yuan succeeded in quashing the Second Revolution and tightening his control in southern China,

---

<sup>69</sup> For a brief introduction on the Sichuan militarists as a group, see Robert Kapp, *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic*, 11-13, and Kuan Shanji and Yang Guangyan, *Sichuan Junfashi* (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin cubanshe, 1991,) 7-8

<sup>70</sup> Kapp, *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic*, 15.

<sup>71</sup> In March 1913, Song Jiaoren, the chairman of the Nationalist Party, was assassinated in Shanghai by Yuan Shikai's order. At that time, Yuan was also negotiating a large loan with the foreign banks to strengthen his power. Soon after Song's death, Yuan signed the contract with the foreigner banks for a loan of 25 million British pounds without the approval from the parliament. Enraged by Yuan's action, the Nationalist Party and the pro-Nationalist militarists in the southern provinces, such as Guangxi, Guangdong, and Yunnan, began the military campaign to overthrow Yuan's power.



the independence of Sichuan became a perfect reason for him to work with warlords from Guangxi, Yunnan, and Guizhou to attack the province, in the name of defending the Chinese Republic and national unification. From 1913 to 1921, the province thus was afflicted with numerous battles in which the militarists, Sichuan natives or non-natives, struggled to secure their own power bases.

Unlike in northern China, where usually one strong military figure had control over one province, no warlord in Sichuan could claim a strong hold over the entire province. The military leaders in Sichuan were more or less each other's equal, and their fortunes and allegiances shifted frequently according to their personal interest and calculation. The situation was further complicated by the military intrusion from the neighboring Guangxi, Yunnan, and Guizhou provinces. Attempting to diminish the conflicts, Xiong Kewu, who expanded his power in the province due to his allegiance with Sun Yet-sun during the Constitutional Protection Movement in 1917, acknowledged that military commanders occupied certain area as their "garrison" base in 1919.<sup>72</sup> This system of garrisons became the basic structure in which Sichuan's warlord politics developed and operated.<sup>73</sup> Although the garrison territory was remapped several times during a few major wars between the militarists, its structure and nature of function remained unchanged.

By 1921, the Sichuan militarists succeeded in banishing the armies from Guangxi, Yunnan, and Guizhou provinces, and the province finally rid itself of the external influence. Through these battles, five Sichuan militarists, Liu Xiang, Yang Sen, Liu Wenhui, Deng Xihou,

---

<sup>72</sup> The Constitutional Protection Movement (Hufa Yundong) was unleashed by Sun Yet-sun and GMD in 1917. After Yuan Shi-kai's death, his subordinate Duan Qirui became the premier. Duan's action of dissolving the parliament was considered as anti-constitution and enraged many pro-Sun Yet-sen militarists in the southern China. The Constitutional Protection Movement was led by these militarists in the name of defending the parliament and the constitution. Kuan and Yang, *Sichuan junfashi*, 89.

<sup>73</sup> Kuan and Yang, *Sichuan junfashi*, 92-99. Kapp, *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic*, 34-38.

and Tian Songyao, and their subordinate commanders stood out and remapped their garrison areas. The year 1921 hence marked a watershed for the warlord politics in Sichuan, for since then until the mid-1930s, these five militarists operated the politics in the province as if it were an independent territory.<sup>74</sup>

The competition between the militarists left the civil administration in Sichuan paralyzed. With their armies and weapons, the warlords became the dominant players of politics and acted as they pleased with the administration at both the provincial and county levels. In terms of recruiting qualified civil servants in the local governments, the positions were often filled by orders of the militarists. Qualification, ability, and education were never the warlords' concern; instead, favors were given to friends and families so as to stretch their control over political resources. Written laws and regulations often existed in name only, and the militarists could declare order or policies that surpassed these laws and regulations. Local councils, a product of the Chinese constitution, existed often to confirm the militarists' self-claim as democratic administrators. These councils, regardless of their level, never had the power to discuss, approve, or object to policies. Instead, the Sichuan militarists ran the provincial government as they pleased and bypassed the councils to declare outrageous policies. The tax policy best illustrates the above points. Many parts of the Sichuan Province were ordered to pay advance tax for the upcoming years, which sometimes were more than 30 years later.<sup>75</sup> As one historian has commented, these warlords in the Republican era ran the local governments as if the governments were family businesses.<sup>76</sup>

---

<sup>74</sup> Kuan and Yang, *Sichuan junfashi*, 100-117.

<sup>75</sup> Jianbei xianzhi bianzhuang weiyuanhui ed, *Jianbei xianzhi* (Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 1996,) 410.

<sup>76</sup> Chen Xulu, *Jindai Zhongguo shehui de xinchen daixie* (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexue chubanshe, 2006,) 360-361.

The rise of bandits in the JLJXSX region coincided with the breakdown of political order as outlined above. Li Shiyong, one of the compilers of the Hechuan gazetteer and also a resident in the JLJXSX region, reported that the first incident of armed robbery occurred in the spring of 1913. Thereafter, the robbery became out-of-control.<sup>77</sup> The 1911 Revolution brought down any effective administration in Sichuan, and the succeeding warlords had little interest in maintaining social order in their garrison area.<sup>78</sup> More importantly, because of the militarists' interference in civil administration and their excessive claims over tax payments and local resources, the county governments were in no way capable of maintaining order effectively. Consequently, the maintenance of local security and operation of day-to-day affairs relied heavily on the local militias and locally powerful civilians.<sup>79</sup> During the first decade of the Republican era, although local militias were also run by townships in the JLJXSX region, they could not combat with the bandits effectively, for the region was under the jurisdiction of four counties and there was no administrative organ that could oversee and organize a joint military action against the bandits.

---

<sup>77</sup> Zhang Senkai, *Hechuan xianzhi*, "juan" 62, 19b-24a (463).

<sup>78</sup> Kapp, *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic*, 50.

<sup>79</sup> This situation appeared in the late Qing Dynasty and became a norm across China in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Historians of Chinese history generally agree that from the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, Chinese society began the process of militarization as the Qing army was unable to deal with the increasing numbers of local uprisings and large rebellions. Toward the end of the Qing Dynasty, a weakening central government burdened by the demands from the foreign countries worsened the situation and China was on the brink of collapse.<sup>79</sup> The political chaos in Sichuan province was the product of this disintegration. The best scholarship on the militarization of Chinese society is done by Philip Kuhn. See Philip Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980.) For a brief discussion on the militarization of Sichuan, see Kapp, *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic*, 8-11.

## From Merchant-sponsored Militias to XFJ Administration

The great loss suffered by the merchants doing business between northern Sichuan and Chongqing each year due to the rampant banditry compelled their collective action of defense. To protect their trade and profit, some merchants began to fund an armed patrol force to inspect the waterway regularly. In August 1918, the guilds of Hechuan County further decided to establish an armed force with about 80 hired mercenaries who would be supported financially by the guilds and be responsible for merchants' protection when they were traveling on the Jialing River.<sup>80</sup>

The fact that merchants had to hire soldiers for their own protection indicated that the locally-run militias in the JLJXSX area lacked effectiveness. For one thing, the line between armed local bullies and disciplined troops was extremely difficult to define. Since the government was unable to administer the local militias, the management was left entirely in the hands of local civilians.<sup>81</sup> As a result, the composition of this group of people in the local community, their educational background, and the relationship among all villagers were crucial elements to the success of local militia. It was not a coincidence that in southeastern China, where the power of the lineages was strong and the background and occupation of residents displayed strong homogeneity, local militias were often more systematically organized.<sup>82</sup> In contrast, in communities where not only a strong presence of governmental authority did not

---

<sup>80</sup> Zhang Senkai, *Hechuan xianzhi*, "juan" 25, 16a-16b (648).

<sup>81</sup> I intentionally avoid using the terms "gentry" or "elite" here because those terms referred to locally prominent person with a certain level of education and wealth. In many contexts, they referred to someone who enjoyed respect in their community. However, since I could not locate details of militia in the gorge area, I chose to use the term civilians to describe those who might control the militias there. My reason is that those who controlled the local militias were not always prominent figures in local societies. In many cases, they might simply be local bullies who were feared by local residents and by running a local armed force in the name of maintaining local security They utilized such fear to secure their personal interests.

<sup>82</sup> Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies*, ch 3,

exist, but also a homogeneous society with clearly defined social hierarchy, the roles of local militias shifted between guardians of security and predators.<sup>83</sup>

The society in the JLJXSX area was in no way similar to those in southeastern China. Although several lineages had resided there since the early Qing Dynasty, due to the fact of lacking enough wealth and political resources, these lineages were not as strong as their counterparts in southeastern China. Moreover, the unattached and mobile labor force employed by the mining industry and river navigation business had made the social relationships weak. Although the existence of this male population might seem to be favorable for militias, it also had great potential of causing disorder, not to mention the fact that an unattached, poor male population was the ideal pool for banditry recruitment. Under such circumstances, the effectiveness of local militias was questionable, and it was not surprising that merchants traveling on the Jialing River eventually took the matter of securing the cargos into their own hands.

However, the merchants' efforts were inadequate to eliminate the bandits, who often hid in the mountains along the Jialing River. If the overall order in the area along the river where the bandits built their bases was not improved, banditry would never be suppressed. The issue the merchants faced was that they needed a strategy that could engage participation and coordination from local communities. Yet, regardless of the question of whether locally run militias existed in the JLJXSX areas or how their effectiveness was, the political reality in the area was an obstacle that had to be overcome in order to make such coordination possible. As discussed earlier, the JLJXSX area was on the borders of four counties: Jiangbei, Ba, Bishan, and Hechuan. As a result,

---

<sup>83</sup> Elizabeth Perry, *Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845-1945* (California: Stanford University, 1980,) 49-95.

villages in the JLJXSX area had different political mechanisms and received administrative orders or financial support (if any) from different county governments. Because bandits in the JLJXSX area were mobile, moving from village to village, any successful military plan had to include the whole area, instead of covering individual villages only. A prerequisite for this kind of military plan was an agency that could exert command and coordinate cooperation among individual militia. However, before 1920, such agency did not exist there.

The lack of a cross-border agency that could deal with the banditry in the JLJXSX area should be considered a direct result of the administrative incompetence of the county governments. We still know very little about how the county governments were run in the Sichuan province before the anti-Japanese war. However, the appointment of the county magistrate, particularly in Bishan County, which shared part of the jurisdiction over the JLJXSX area, might shed some light on this issue. Between June, 1912 and March, 1935, the Bishan County government had 56 magistrates in total.<sup>84</sup> The average tenure of each magistrate was less than five months; the longest tenure was one year, while the shortest one was only five days. Unlike during the imperial era, when the county magistrates were selected through examination and were subjected to a series of strict evaluations, the magistrates of Bishan came to the office often by the recommendation of gentry or intervention of the militarists. Moreover, without a clear code of evaluation and superior authority to supervise their performance, many magistrates took the office as a temporary measure to realize personal ambition. It was not rare that a Bishan magistrate simply ran off with the government's money after being in the office for a short time.<sup>85</sup> Furthermore, the battles between the militarists added uncertainty to the magistrates'

---

<sup>84</sup> For these magistrates' names and date in the office, see Bishan County, "Minguo shiqi bishanxian xianzhang yilanbiao," Bishan wenshi ziliao, Vol. 4, 147-155.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

position. The Bishan County government often had to replace its magistrate with the candidate the militarists preferred. In 1919, when the militarists from Guizhou, Guangxi, and Yunnan were engaging in battles with the Sichuan militarists, the county government saw 11 different magistrates coming and leaving because the armies that occupied the county seat also changed nine times.<sup>86</sup>

The gravity of the political instability in Bishan County is thus clear. Without a magistrate who could reside in the office long enough to familiar himself with local affairs and how the government functioned and formulate a vision for the whole county, it was no wonder that the county had serious banditry on its border. Moreover, the fact that the armies that came to the county seat in 1919 could easily have the magistrate replaced so often indicated the extent to which the county governments could act independently without proper communication with its residents and the provincial authority (if a well-organized provincial authority did exist.) Without a properly functioning county government, successful actions that could deal with the banditry in the JLJXSX area were no doubt out of the question.

In 1920, the ineffectiveness of local and merchant militias and possibly the lobbying of local gentry and merchants eventually led to the establishment of a security bureau with jurisdictional authority across all four counties in the Three Small Gorges region.<sup>87</sup> The four county governments agreed that the bureau had the authority to organize joint military action against the bandits and recruit new soldiers. In theory, this armed force would be stationed in the town of Beibei and replace the militias run by merchants and villages previously. Its duty included not only the patrol of the waterway but also the inspection of the whole JLJXSX region.

---

<sup>86</sup> *Bishan Xianzhi*, 17.

<sup>87</sup> This security bureau was the predecessor of the XFJ administration and was located in the Beibei Township.

The fund used to run the bureau would be raised by the merchants and the four counties jointly.<sup>88</sup> However, since the county governments were in no way functioning effectively, as demonstrated by the example of Bishan County above, the operation of the bureau was left to its own not long after its establishment. Moreover, the fact that the whole province was full of armies that belonged to different warlords made the establishment of a new armed force redundant. The bureau soon became a name only, while the warlord armies that controlled Chongqing occupied the bureau and took up the responsibility of maintaining the local security in exchange for financial benefits. From 1920 to 1923, the head of the bureau was held by different lieutenants, depending on who had control over Chongqing.<sup>89</sup>

The original purpose of founding the security bureau was to deal with the banditry with a cross-border agency that could form a uniform strategy. While this purpose to some extent was realized by the warlord armies, who did not belong to any county or villages in the JLJXSX area, the frequent change of the troops stationed in the JLJXSX area exposed another problem. By placing a militarist's lieutenants and troops to take charge of the security problem, the effectiveness of their military action against the bandits were still much affected by the political uncertainty that was a norm in the entire province. Whenever the control of Chongqing changed hands, the operation of the bureau was interrupted and could only be resumed after the militarists settled their control in Chongqing. To solve this issue, the security bureau had to rid itself of having the warlord's army running the office.<sup>90</sup>

After the Sichuan militarists secured their power from extra-provincial militarists in 1921, the power struggle among themselves continued. The decade following 1921 witnessed several

---

<sup>88</sup> *Mingguo baxianzhi*, Vol. 5, 2138.

<sup>89</sup> *Beibei Quzhi*, 11-12.

<sup>90</sup> Xia Daijun and Zhang Haitao, "Mincu sanxia jiaofei ji," *Hechuan wenshi ziliao xuanji*, Vol. 7.



major battles in which Sichuanese warlords such as Xiong Kewu and Yang Sen attempted to claim hegemony in the province. By the end of 1923, the struggles had come to a moment when Yang Sen was about to attain the control of Chongqing (although the control would soon prove to be temporary).<sup>91</sup> Yang's arrival would mean another replacement of the army stationed in the JLJXSX region. To guard against the political uncertainty caused by the frequent change of armies, local gentry and merchants of the four counties submitted a petition to the defeated warlord Liu Chengxun, requesting the reorganization of the security bureau.<sup>92</sup> The petition was apparently a nominal gesture to show that the elites had attempted to acquire permission from the above. It was not clear whether Liu ever gave consent to the proposed plan, since he had lost the control over Chongqing to Yang Sen and his orders would soon lose the legitimacy once Yang arrived in Chongqing. Yet, the gentry proceeded with the reorganization anyway, regardless of the expected transition of political power in the city. The warlord army came and went, but the elimination of bandits required familiarity of local conditions and long-term commitment. Since the local elites had their personal interests closely entwined with the security problem of their community, the new office, if well organized, would have a better chance of eliminating the banditry.

### **Local elites: changes and continuity**

The petition submitted to Liu Chengxun raises questions about the nature of the Sichuanese elite and their involvement in politics. Scholars of Chinese history have well explored the concept of "Chinese gentry" who often formed an extensive connection with each

---

<sup>91</sup> Kuang Shanji, *Sichuan junfashi*, 152.

<sup>92</sup> DAGLI, P1020761.

other in their communities. During the imperial era, particularly in the late Qing dynasty, these were all elites who met one or several of the following criteria: hold examination titles, occupied governmental posts, owned comparatively large areas of land, or earned their living in commerce. With the status brought by these criteria, Chinese elites were active participants in local and national politics.<sup>93</sup> While this definition was generally true of Chinese elites as one single class, urban and rural elites did not always have the same political orientation, interest, and goals. Their ideology and behaviors were very much influenced not only by their personal and family backgrounds, but also the social condition, economy, and politics in their communities or even at the national level.<sup>94</sup> After the abolishment of the civil service examination in 1905 and the subsequent fall of the imperial system in 1911, the relationships between local societies, elites, and the state displayed increasing diversity because the nature of Chinese economy, society, and government was fundamentally different from the imperial system.

The abolishment of examinations and the 1911 revolution also had enormous impacts on the nature of Chinese elites, particularly in the urban areas where the western influence arrived early and in abundance. Without the examinations, education in classics and the examination titles completely lost their value. The fundamental changes in China's political system and society in the early twentieth century thus left the previous definition of elite in the imperial era inadequate for elites in the early twentieth century, particularly in the urban centers where the traditions were most easily attacked because of the extensive influence from the west. If we take education as the most essential of elite status, should it mean modern education only or should the traditional education still count? If wealth should be considered, were the newly emerged

---

<sup>93</sup> There is a large body of literature on the nature of Chinese gentry. The most inclusive book of different perspectives should be: Joseph W. Esherick and Mary Backus Rankin, eds., *Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance*.

<sup>94</sup> Mary Rankin, *Elite activism and Political Transformation in China: Zhejiang Province, 1865-1911* (California: Stanford University Press, 1986,) ch 7.

middle-class salaried professionals in the cities not elites? By the early twentieth century, the changes that raised such questions regarding the nature of urban elites also influenced the more remote rural parts of China. Since the urban and rural elites already displayed acute difference during the last years of the Qing Dynasty, these changes further deepened the difference between the urban elites and their rural counterparts.

The difficulty for historians to find a definition for the Chinese elites in the twentieth century thus confirmed their diversity of nature. Instead of using the criteria of elites in imperial China, some historians have defined early twentieth-century elites in terms of their ability. David Strand describes local elites in Republican China as those who were able “to entangle and deflect higher-level power and maintain proprietary control over wealth, status, and position in the community.”<sup>95</sup> Strand’s definition best describes Sichuanese elite not only because it implies that the maintenance of an elite’s power could be done in multiple ways but also because it points out the importance for an elite to work with “higher-level power,” instead of the state authority only. This is particularly true of the position of Sichuanese elites, for the meaning of “state” in the political context of Sichuan province was almost impossible to define. No government at the national level, neither the Beiyang government in the 1920s nor the Nationalist government, could assert any authority there. One can only say that a higher level of governance sustained by military power existed in the province during the 1920s and early 1930s. The above definition will prove to be closest to the historical reality in the following discussion on the elites that were involved in the founding of the armed force, security bureau, and eventually a civil administration in the 1930s.

---

<sup>95</sup> David Strand, “Mediation, Representation, and Repression: Local Elites in 1920s Beijing,” in Esherick and Ranjin eds., *Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance*, 218.

There was little record left about the gentry prior to the establishment of the security bureau in the JLJXSX area. Yet, this lack of record by no means implied that the area had no elites at all. Though peripheral, the area still had comparatively well-off families that produced holders of lower-level degrees in the examination. For example, in the villages near the border of Hechuan County, some families such as the Zengs, Zhangs, Lis, Hus, and Xions continuously invested in their sons' education. Though some of these families had ancestors with the advanced degree (*jinshi*) prior to the Qing Dynasty, thereafter their success in the examination seemed to be curtailed by factors such as the diminishing ratio between the degrees available and the increasing population taking the examination. The ones who received degrees were either students passing the county-level exam or people who purchased their titles. In the Qing Dynasty, none of the members from these families ever passed the prefectural level of the examination.<sup>96</sup> Less prestigious degrees did not imply that the gentry in the JLJXSX area were inactive in the communities. Like their counterparts in the more prosperous parts of China, these gentry might engage in traditional activities of charity, such as lineage school, famine relief, temple repair, and dispute mediation.<sup>97</sup>

In the periods of the "Self-Strengthening Movement" and "the New Policy," when the Qing Dynasty embarked on its modernization projects and had many of the local elites be the managers, the wave of changes seemed to have little impact on the JLJXSX region.<sup>98</sup> Possibly

---

<sup>96</sup> Zhang Senkai, ed., *Hechuan Xianzhi*, 283-290.

<sup>97</sup> *Beibei quzhi*, "Renwu zhi." The Sichuanese gentry's activism was also displayed in their management of the judicial cost. See Bradley Reed, "Gentry Activism in Nineteenth-Century Sichuan: The Three-Fees Bureau," *Late Imperial China*, Vol. 20, No.2 (1999), 99-127.

<sup>98</sup> The Opium War with the British in 1860 exposed China's incompetence when facing external threat. The war thus marked the beginning of the imperial government's modernization effort. The Self-Strengthening Movement began soon after the Opium War and its focus was mainly on the imitation and adoption of western science and technology while leaving China's political institutions unchanged. However, the defeat of China in the first Sino-Japanese war proved the Self-Strengthening Movement could not equip China to resist foreign threat. Many began to advocate a wider reform that should include China's political institutions. The subsequent "New Policy" or "the Reform

due to its lack of political significance in the provincial and even the county levels, the modern projects did not come to the JLJXSX area. Thus, unlike the elite class in the lower Yangzi Delta where modernization projects influenced the way that elites participated in the local affairs, the upper class of JLJXSX experienced little challenge to the way they operated in local societies because of their geographical isolation. Changes in educational choices might be the first to arrive in the JLJXSX area. However, although the gentry families in the JLJXSX area also sent their sons to the modern schools, these native sons often began their careers in the county capital or provincial capitals like Chengdu or Chongqing after finishing school. They were yet to bring modernization back to their hometowns.<sup>99</sup>

The collapse of the Qing Dynasty finally pushed isolated regions like the JLJXSX to join the tide of modernization. The government of the new Republic began its re-organization of institutions, which included the county level administration. In many instances, the county magistrates were no longer the traditional degree holders but people with modern education.<sup>100</sup> The villages and townships elected their representatives of local councils and the heads of administration.<sup>101</sup> However, the set-up of new political institutions did not mean the existing holders of authority were completely replaced by new comers. In many instances, particularly in areas away from China's political and economic centers, the old elites continued to exert their authority, regardless of the institutional and social changes that occurred in their communities.<sup>102</sup>

---

Movement of 1898" attempted to transform Chinese government and society more in line with the western countries. See Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 193-229.

<sup>99</sup> Zhang Senkai, *Mingguo xinxiu hechuan xianzhi*, vol. 1, "Xuanjuzhi," 274-293.

<sup>100</sup> Bishan County, "Mingguo shiqi bishanxian xianzhang yilanbiao," *Bishan wenshi ziliao xuanji*, vol. 4 (1990), 147-155.

<sup>101</sup> Zhang Senkai, *Mingguo xinxiu hechuan xianzhi*, vol. 1, "Zhengfa zhi," 626.

<sup>102</sup> The most recent scholarship on this topic is Li Huiyin's Village governance in north China. The author gives incredible details on the operation of village politics and notes that the players of village politics in the Republican era was still the same group of traditional elites. Li Huaiyin, *Village Governance in North China*, 135-162. Lenore Barkan also discusses this continuity of gentry nature in Rugao County. See Lenore Barkan, "Patterns of Power:

The fact that the local gentry in the JLJXSX area continued their roles as local leaders was best manifested by Xiong Minfu, a village head who was elected by other gentry as the associate director during the reorganization process of the security bureau. Xiong's lineage had moved to the JLJXSX area from Hunan during the early years of the Qing Dynasty and since then had produced quite a few holders of lower degrees and military officers. Though none of the Xionsgs ever passed the metropolitan examinations or played significant roles politically at the county and provincial levels, their achievements were prestigious enough to distinguish themselves from other villagers of more humble origins. Although there was little record left about the details of the family's involvement in the community affairs, Xiong Mingfu's position as the village head implied the status of both himself and his family in the village. In the Chinese context, the heads of the villages or towns were usually people with comparatively well-off backgrounds. Since part of their responsibility was to mediate conflicts between local residents and to take action to guard the interest of his community, the heads of villages and towns must be familiar with local politics and have wide connection with not just local gentry but government officials.<sup>103</sup> Because of this status, Xiong's appointment in the newly reorganized security bureau was a political choice to connect the new administration and the community.<sup>104</sup> However, the interests of many groups that were involved and the complexity of the security problem in the JLJXSX area required more political consideration than just choosing locals as the administrators.

This further highlights another aspect of the challenges that were encountered by the traditional elites in the Republican China. Particularly in remote and backward communities such

---

Forty Years of Elite Politics in a Chinese County," in Esherick and Rankin eds., *Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance*, 191-215.

<sup>103</sup> Duara, *Culture, Power, and the State*, ch 6.

<sup>104</sup> Zhang Senkai, *Hechuan Xianzhi*, 331.

as the JLJXSX area, traditional elites often found themselves working with newcomers and non-local notables with modern education backgrounds or the returned elite members with external resources because the complexity of many modernization projects required resources these local elite could not provide.<sup>105</sup> For a project like reorganizing a new security administration in the JLJXSX that required a cross-border effort, the elites had to look beyond the territory line between towns and villages and work together for a higher purpose. Appointing an administrator who could bridge both local and non-local resources thus was no less significant. The first head of the new administration, Hu Nanxian (1868-1947,) was chosen based on this logic.

Hu Nanxian was born in Yanjing of Hechuan County in 1868. Unlike Xiong Minfu, Hu's career began outside of the JLJXSX area. Prior to accepting the position in JLJXSX, Hu held several posts in the militarists' government and was a member in the provincial council between 1913 and 1915.<sup>106</sup> Hu's experience thus gave him plenty of opportunities to make acquaintance with the Sichuanese militarists and political elites. For a project like building a cross-border administration in the JLJXSX area in 1923 when the political stability in the province was shattered by battles between militarists, Hu's wide political connection was a valuable source for the new administration in acquiring resources and political support. In other words, Hu Nanxian and Xiong Minfu complemented each other. While Xiong was no doubt more familiar with the village politics than Hu, for he had spent years being village leader in JLJXSX, Hu's experience in provincial politics gave him more advantage in negotiations with political authorities that were above the village level.<sup>107</sup>

---

<sup>105</sup> Esherick and Rankin, *Chinese Elites and Pattern of Dominance*, 315.

<sup>106</sup> Zhang Senkai, *Hechuan Xianzhi*, 538.

<sup>107</sup> In her concluding remarks, Mary Rankin concludes that the dominance and status of local elites usually had an "outside dimension," meaning the importance for local elites to bring in external resources to their local community and in turn maintained their status. Esherick and Rankin, *Chinese Elites and Pattern of Dominance*, 314-315.

With Hu's and Xiong's appointment, the reorganization of 1923 set down the administration structure that would last until 1936. The security bureau was renamed as "Jiang Ba Bi He sixian tezu xiafang tuanlianju" (The Security Bureau of the united militias from Jianbei, Ba, Bishan, and Hechuan, hereafter XFJ.) Gentry from the four counties (many of which were members of the Hechuan Commerce Guild and no longer resided in JLJXSX) would elect the head of the XFJ administration in the future, and four administrative consultants would be also be appointed by the gentry (one for each county). Such appointments were to ensure participation and fairness in the process of decision making. The office now also appointed its own militia lieutenants and recruited soldiers.<sup>108</sup> The county governments provided only a very small portion of funding to run the office, and the rest of the XFJ's budget would be collected from the tax imposed on the coal and paper factories in the region.<sup>109</sup>

### **Local Community and XFJ, 1923–1926**

When Hu and Xiong assumed the office in 1923, they faced several urgent tasks. The first one was still the bandit problem. Although the previous administrations had made progress, the fact that the gentry had taken the business into their hands once again in the hope of better improving the communal security indicated that the banditry problem was still rather widespread. To combat the bandits, the XFJ administration sought to reorganize the existing local militias. The militias that originally belonged to the four counties and were stationed in villages there

---

<sup>108</sup> DAGLJ, P1020761

<sup>109</sup> Ibid. The fund provided by the county government was almost nothing when compared to the total amount the administration needed. The administration budget of the first year after the reorganization was 3,202.4 Chinese yuan of which the county governments provided only 200 in total. The administration had to make up the rest of the fund by itself.



would now be reorganized into four brigades. Each brigade had 34 soldiers, and the administration had the power to appoint the captains and lieutenants.<sup>110</sup>

The reorganization of local militias was not simply to replace the captains and lieutenants; in fact, the XFJ administration also attempted to replace the soldiers as well. As stated by Hu Nanxian, prior to the establishment of the XFJ administration, due to the lack of funds, the local militias often recruited their members from the vagabonds who were not attached to any local institution and had very little interest in the well-being of the community. These militia soldiers had questionable loyalty and were prone to bribes from the bandits. Moreover, when not on duty, they were hardly model residents, for they often turned to the warlord armies or joined the bandit groups to make a living. Hu argued that to improve the quality of the local militias, the XFJ administration should select healthy, able male residents from the local households. Such persons would protect the community more effectively, for their personal interest and the well-being of their families depended on the improvement of the local security.<sup>111</sup> To achieve this goal, the new XFJ administration decided that the healthy male residents in the JLJXSX area had the obligation to enlist in the militia and receive its military training.<sup>112</sup> However, the enforcement of this policy soon encountered obstacle. The XFJ administration found itself having to compete with the warlord armies that were stationed around the JLJXSX area for manpower because the militarists paid their soldiers, while the militia of JLJXSX was voluntary work.

The presence of the warlord armies was a problem to not only in regard of manpower but also to the financing to the XFJ administration. To improve local security, the XFJ administration was in desperate need of funds to purchase weapons and pay for the training,

---

<sup>110</sup> DAGLJ, P1020764

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., P1020790.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., P1020791.

boarding, and travel expenses of the soldiers. When the XFJ office was reorganized in 1923, the administration had several sources of income: taxes paid by guilds and paper and coal business, river tax paid by cargo ships on the Jialing River, and small stipends from the four county governments. The XFJ administration estimated an annual budget of about 3,000 Chinese yuan initially; yet, right after assuming his post, the director Hu Nanxian reported that the actual funding the XFJ administration received was no more than 1000 Chinese yuan.<sup>113</sup> Although funding the XFJ administration was part of the responsibility of the county governments, the county magistrates showed very little support. Three of the four counties (except Jianbei County) that had jurisdiction over the JLJXSX region did not even attend the first meeting, which Hu held on December, 4th 1923 to discuss the business as far as the JLJXSX security was concerned.<sup>114</sup> From the beginning, the prospect of more funds from the county governments was already dimmed.

Facing the serious deficit, the XFJ administration had an option of collecting new taxes. Yet, the presence of the warlord armies spoiled any attempt to collect new taxes because the armies had already imposed enough financial burdens on the local residents by extracting multiple taxes and surcharges. It was not rare that cargo ships traveling on the Jialing River to and from Chongqing had to pay taxes several times to different agencies that were often controlled by military leaders. For example, a cargo ship carrying salt had to pay four kinds of taxes to three different agencies when traveling on the Jialing River, all in the name of maintaining security.<sup>115</sup> Under this circumstance, the new XFJ administration would not be able to demand the merchants and local residents to pay any other taxes, in addition to the amount

---

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., p1020695.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., p1020679

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., p1020914

they had already paid to the warlord armies, without opposition. Therefore, the removal of the warlord armies in the JLJXSX area, or at least keeping them from meddling with the collection of taxes, became the priority for the XFJ administration if it was to secure enough funding and drastically decrease the deficit of its budget.

The negotiation for the removal of the warlord armies reflected the chaotic condition the province was in during the 1920s. As summarized above, the 1920s were marked by numerous battles among the Sichuanese warlords; each attempted to secure his power base and authority over the others. Chongqing and its vicinity were the center of the competition if anyone wanted to control the eastern part of Sichuan. The period following the establishment of the XFJ administration was also the time when the warlords Yang Sen and Liu Xiang had temporary control over Chongqing. The XFJ administration submitted petitions to Yang Sen, Liu Xiang, and several other warlords in the province, requesting the removal of armies.<sup>116</sup> These warlords gave consents and ordered their armies to stay away from the JLJXSX area.

However, not all the armies in the JLJXSX area were subordinated to these generals, and some small commanders, such as Liu Zhi, refused the request. In his letter to the administration, Liu Zhi explained that his troops were stationed there by the order of his superior, Chen Guogong, and the troops would not leave without the order from Chen.<sup>117</sup> Chen Guodong was an independent, small warlord in Hechuan County and did not belong to the clique of either Yang Sen or Liu Xiang at that time.<sup>118</sup> Though the administration stated that its request was endorsed by Yang Sen, Liu Xiang, and other generals, the reality was that all these warlords lacked the authority over the whole province and legitimacy as the provincial leader. Their order and

---

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., p1020711.

<sup>117</sup> DAGLJ, p1020708

<sup>118</sup> Kuan and Yang, *Sichuan junfashi*, 161.

protection could not reach down to an area as small as the JLJXSX community, nor could they have any effect on the independent, small militarists whose allegiance did not necessarily lie with the politics in Chongqing.

The fact that Yang Sen and Liu Xiang ordered their troops to refrain from occupying the territory in the JLJXSX area was significant for it indicated their understanding of the benefit from cooperation with the local elites. Under the structure of garrison system, the Sichuanese militarists were able to call a certain place as their garrison area mainly because of their military power. In reality, no militarist had solid claim over administration of civil government in the garrison area. The cooperation with the local elites would create a win-win situation for the militarists' legitimacy in their garrison area and the local elite's participation in politics. Taken the consent of Yang Sen and Liu Xiang as stated in the above paragraph as an example, on the one hand, by ordering their troops to stay away from the affair of the XFJ administration, Yang and Liu indirectly acknowledged the authority of the XFJ and provided it more legitimacy. On the other hand, with support from Yang and Liu to further their purpose of improving local order, the elite in return became patrons to Yang and Liu's power. Such a leverage of patronage between the militarists and the local elites would prove to be critical to the transformation of the XFJ office and the improvement of Sichuan's political stability in the 1930s.

In addition to the lack of support from above and the funding problem, the XFJ administration also faced the delicate issue of local politics. Although the reorganization of the XFJ administration in 1923 was initiated by elites of the four counties, the majority of the gentry who actually resided in the area had little say in the reorganization process. Many of those who lobbied for the establishment of the XFJ administration were merchants doing business on the

Jialing River, while residing in the county capitals or Chongqing.<sup>119</sup> Although the XFJ's goal of improving local security was widely acknowledged, the details of how to achieve this goal mattered more to those who actually lived in the JLJXSX area. In addition to the attitude from the government, the success of the XFJ security administration also depended on the cooperation from the local people.

Although the local communities in the JLJXSX area acknowledged the importance of repelling the bandits, how to achieve this goal was not clearly laid out and discussed at the beginning. The XFJ administration thus lacked legitimacy in many local residents' eyes. The new demands, especially financial ones, caused much friction between the XFJ administration and the JLJXSX communities. Since the administration's plea for removing the warlord armies was not fulfilled effectively, multiple authorities continued to exist. During the first two years after the XFJ administration was founded, control over the Chongqing area shifted constantly between different militarists. Armies came to the JLJXSX area and soon were replaced by others. Regardless of whom they were subordinated to, all these armies demanded financial contribution from the communities. When the XFJ administration attempted to collect its share, it often faced opposition on the grounds that the taxes were paid to certain armies for the security purpose or that the administration lacked the legitimacy to collect taxes. Complaints were then filed at the county magistrates' office, but not much could be done to solve the issue by the already malfunctioning county governments.<sup>120</sup> Though the administration was founded with the consents of the county governments, the chaotic politics in the province at the time prohibited the county governments from playing the role of coordinators among different power holders.

---

<sup>119</sup> The initial plan of setting up the new administration was proposed by the representative of the provincial council, Wang Chengxun. Wang was a native of Hechuan county but was not from the JLJXSX. See Zhang Senkai, *Hechuan xianzhi*, 309.

<sup>120</sup> DAGLJ, p1020618. P1020642

Confusion and competition over the right of collecting taxes and how to use them soon compelled local people's active involvement in the administration. One representative body, Jiang Ba Bi He Xiaqu Minzhi Cuchenghui (The Society of Promoting People's Governance in Jiangbei, Ba County, Bishan, and Hechuan, hereafter MZH) was set up in 1926 for the supervision of the finance.<sup>121</sup> Originally, gentry in the JLJXSX area set up this society in order to recover the right over the taxes collected by "The United Society of Sichuan Militias," an organization also headed by Hu Nanxian.<sup>122</sup> The tax in question was collected to promote coordination among local militias and improve security in the whole province. In theory, all local militias in the province were to pay this tax. However, during the first few years following the founding of the United Society, only tax in the JLJXSX area and a few counties was collected. From 1925–1926, the XFJ administration collected this tax for the society, but it was soon found out that the tax was spent without any supervision. Dissatisfaction was aroused among the gentry in the JLJXSX area, who argued that since the tax was collected in the JLJXSX area, it then should be spent on the improvement of the local security. Moreover, since the society was named as a united body of militias in all the counties of Sichuan, all the militias in the province should then pay this tax. It was not fair that only a few paid such a tax in the name of promoting security of the entire province. The gentry in JLJXSX therefore demanded that the tax be abolished. The

---

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., P1020830

<sup>122</sup> Before taking up the work in XJ administration, Hu Nanxian's career as a politician in the province led him to notice the gravity of bandit problem in the province. He considered the existence of warlords' armies disturbed the not only the political order but also the function of local militias. To solve the problem, in 1923 Hu proposed to set up the Sichuan sheng mintuan lianhehui (The United Society of Sichuan Militias) as a militia organization independent from the warlords' armies for local militias to coordinate with each other in maintaining local order and security. Representatives of local militias from 60 counties joined the initial meeting and elected Hu as the head. When Hu arrived in JLJXSX, he enlisted the XFJ with the The United Society of Sichuan Militias and collected the fees for its operation. *Beibei quzhi*, 538.

amount the administration had already collected but had not transferred to “The United Society of Sichuan Militias” should then be entrusted to the MZH.<sup>123</sup>

Before the XFJ administration and “The United Society of Sichuan Militia” accepted this demand, the MZH soon initiated another negotiation with the administration to set up a financial committee for the purpose of managing the tax collection and spending. The members of the committee would include the MZH members and the administration would also have their representatives to sit in. The tax collection and accounting would be done by the committee, instead of the administration, to eliminate the possibility of fund embezzlement and corruption. All administrative expenses would only be paid after the committee approved.<sup>124</sup>

By setting up these organizations to supervise the new administration and participate in its decision making, the gentry assisted the XFJ administration in consolidating its legitimacy. The legitimacy then enabled the administration to change the power balance in the JLJXSX communities, especially in terms of eliminating the damaging elements of local politics. As discussed above, the area, though it did not produce prominent historical figures, had its own social hierarchy. As in other parts of China, families with comparatively well-off backgrounds or degree holders dominated the stage of local politics.<sup>125</sup> Local economies and societies of townships and villages in the JLJXSX area differed; some might function more like a stable agrarian society, while some might be communities that bred violence and illegal activities. The dominance by a few locally powerful people was not only manifested in the traditional activities such as dispute mediation, but also in manipulation or monopolization of local sources. In other words, in some cases, dominating families sometimes acted not for the well-being of the

---

<sup>123</sup> DAGLJ, p1020821

<sup>124</sup> Ibid, P1020833

<sup>125</sup> The brief introduction of the XFJ’s associate director, Xiong Minfu, in previous paragraph should affirm this point.

community, but for their own interests.<sup>126</sup> Prior to the arrival of the new administration, in some villages of the JLJXSX area, we saw that powerful local families worked with the bandits, sacrificing the well-being of other villagers for their own safety. Although this kind of cooperation was no doubt a survival strategy when the community was not strong enough to resist the looting of the bandits or when no effective government could provide protection, it also caused the ineffectiveness of previous efforts to eliminate the bandit problem in the JLJXSX area.<sup>127</sup>

Considering the above situation, the new XFJ administration, if well run, would have several advantages that could lead to successful suppression of the banditry. First of all, the XFJ administration could be considered as the first institution that approached the security problem there systematically. From the beginning, the administration marked the problems that bred the bandits, such as the sources and quality of militia soldiers and weapons and the funds to support military action, as issues that needed to be addressed before the bandit problem could be solved. Its action in negotiating and collecting taxes, recruiting soldiers, and purchasing weapons promoted more positive participation of local societies. Although many considered the administration to be just another outside intrusion like the previous warlord armies, it actually provided an opportunity for the local residents to work with the authority for their own well-being. Secondly, the new administration was also the first authority that placed itself above any dominant local force in the JLJXSX communities in the Republic era. Because the security of the JLJXSX area depended on the local order of all towns and villages, any sort of cooperation with the bandit in certain villages would jeopardize the security of the entire area.<sup>128</sup> Being an

---

<sup>126</sup> DAGLJ, p1020721

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> Xia Daijun and Zhang Haitao, "Mincu Sanxia jiaofei ji," *Hechuan wenshi ziliao xuanji*, Vol. 7,



institution initiated by outsiders, the new administration thus was more flexible in its involvement of local politics and could negotiate policies that sometimes sacrificed interests of a certain group of people in the JLJXSX community but in return would ultimately improve the overall stability of the local society.

During its first three years, the new XFJ administration mainly dealt with the security problem. All its policies aimed to strengthen the local armed force. The XFJ administration was yet to consider itself as a political institution that had authority over other aspects of life in the JLJXSX area. Yet, the task of improving security alone was not an easy one. The difficulties as discussed above and the accusation of corruption had forced its first head of the office, Hu Nanxian, to resign three months after he took up this post at the end of 1923. However, Hu's resignation was not accepted, and he stayed in the office for another three years. During this time, the security problem in the JLJXSX area saw significant improvement, though the bandits were still not completely eliminated. This limited success had much to do with the shortfall of funding. Although by 1926, the gentry and the administration began to work together to solve the financial problem, they could not resolve the shortage of funding sources. Moreover, the XFJ administration also had to face the constant interference of warlord politics in the province. By 1926, the ongoing shuffle of control over Chongqing and the area along the Jialing River came to a state in which Liu Xiang and Deng Xihou shared dominance in the region. Their subordinated commanders who were stationed near the JLJXSX area engaged in competition of placing their allies to lead the XFJ administration.<sup>129</sup> To avoid the further conflict with these two warlord cliques and maintain the effectiveness and political neutrality of the XFJ administration, the local gentry then proposed to replace Hu Nanxian with Lu Zuofu as the new administrative head. Lu

---

<sup>129</sup> Ibid.

stayed in the office from 1927 to 1933, and his tenure marked not only the final stage of local elite's effort in consolidating control over the JLJXSX community but also a brand new beginning for the XFJ administration in transforming itself from a military agency into an institution that oversaw all affairs of the JLJXSX area.

## Ch. 2 Transformation: The Planners and Their Ideas

When the Jiangba Bihe Xiafang Tuanwuju (The Security Bureau of the united militias from Jianbei, Ba, Bishan, and Hechuan. Hereafter XFJ) of the JLJXSX area was established in 1923, it was simply a policing institution and had no authority over local affairs not directly related to the security problem. After three years of management, by 1926 the security in the JLJXSX area had been significantly improved, though the administration was still in constant struggle with insufficient funding. Since the XFJ administration was unable to receive substantial funds from either the county or the provincial governments, from the late 1923 to 1926, the overall direction of its financial planning was to secure the taxes paid by local communities and merchants to local militias for the security purpose. To achieve this goal, the XFJ administration first had to eliminate any other local power, particularly the warlords' armies, which claimed themselves as having the right of taxing residents. In addition to the negotiation of removing the warlord armies and local gentry's effort in supervising the spending, the XFJ administration also initiated the removal of any private, unauthorized taxation. This policy soon agitated resistance from the existing local power holders.

In the spring of 1926, several local residents from the villages on the border of Bishan county submitted petition to both the county and provincial governments, accusing XFJ director Hu Nanxian of engaging in embezzlement of funds.<sup>130</sup> From the letters between the Bishan county government and the XFJ administration, it was apparent that the cause for this conflict was again the tax issue. These petitioners had set up a private station and taxed the coal merchants that travelled through their communities. Although it was claimed that these taxes were for security maintenances, in reality they were diverted to personal uses. In theory, when

---

<sup>130</sup> DAGLJ, p1020856

the XFJ administration was founded, such tax paid by the coal merchants would become its revenue and no private parties in the JLJXSX area would have the right to collect any tax for security purposes. In responding to the accusation, the XFJ administration claimed that it had received approval from the government (it was not clear which authority gave such approval) as the sole authority of taxation and thus had the power to remove these private taxing stations. Unable to receive resolution from the Bishan County government which was practically not functioning during the 1920s, the enraged residents that operated these stations submitted their complaints to the warlord Lai Xinhui who was the provincial governor at the time. The governor then ordered that the XFJ administration be abolished.<sup>131</sup> This order had little authority in the chaotic political environment of Sichuan province for during the meeting of April, 1926, heads of militias and gentry representatives of the JLJXSX communities voted against the order of abolishing the administration.<sup>132</sup>

The incident once again reinforced Hu Nanxian's decision to leave the office; a decision he had been harboring when he had only been in the office for 3 months in 1924.<sup>133</sup> In the April meeting of 1926, Hu elaborated the reason of his decision. After three years of effort, he lamented that to run the XFJ administration he accumulated a large amount of personal debt. Since the government provided very little support, the XFJ administration had to work on restructuring the local finance so to raise enough funds for its operation. However, the arrival of a bureau that attempted to control all militia units in the JLJXSX area and its financial policy inevitably affected the existing local order and threatened the benefit of some powerful figures in the JLJXSX communities.

---

<sup>131</sup> DAGLJ, p1020858

<sup>132</sup> DAGLJ, p1021951-p1021959

<sup>133</sup> DAGLJ, p1020949

Hu's frustration also resulted from the interference of warlord politics. Because of its short distance to Chongqing and location on the Jialing River, the JLJXSX area had strategic importance to those who wished to control Chongqing. As a result, Hu was never able to shield the XFJ administration from the interference of warlord power. By 1926, the struggle between Sichuanese warlords continued. By strategic cooperation with each other, Liu Xiang and other Sichuanese generals succeeded in destroying Yang Sen's plan of dominating the province with the help from the northern warlord Wu Peifu. Yang was temporary banished from the province and Liu Xiang and Deng Xihou shared the control over Chongqing and its vicinity.<sup>134</sup> The peace between Liu and Deng at the time was superficial and temporary for they only cooperated with each other to maintain the garrison system which Yang Sen attempted to destroy by engaging the military power from the north. Underneath of this fragile alliance, both sides never ceased to compete for resources and territories. Hu Nanxian's resignation was an opportunity for both militarist cliques to place their supporters in the XFJ administration so as to consolidate their control of the area. Because of this competition for power between the militarists, Hu's successor, if not carefully chosen, would greatly compromise the effectiveness of the XFJ administration, something its founders in 1923 attempted to avoid.

To avoid offending the military generals, the local gentry in the JLJXSX area decided to recommend Lu Zuofu as the new head of the XFJ administration. The reason for this choice was Lu's personal prestige as an open-minded enterpriser and his apparently neutral attitude toward politics. The recommendation received no objection from the military generals and Lu started his tenure in February, 1927.<sup>135</sup> It was during his term of office that the XFJ administration was transformed from a security administration to a local office that performed the functions of civil

---

<sup>134</sup> Kuan Shanji, *Sichuan junfashi*, 710. Liu Chonglai, 75.

<sup>135</sup> Liu Chonglai, 75. Xia Daijun and Zhang Haitao, "Mincu Sanxia jiaofei ji," *Hechuan wenshi ziliao xuanji*, Vol. 7

administration that neither the county nor the provincial government was capable of doing in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century.

### **The writer and the educator: the beginning of Lu Zuofu's reform ambition**

Lu Zuofu's life and his achievement in business and public service might be one of the best illustrations of how the collapse of the imperial system and the order of the old society actually opened doors to success for people of diversified background. Lu was born in 1893 to a poor peasant family in Hechuan County. His father was an illiterate peddler of textiles and spent most of his time on the road, selling linen to provide for his family. Although being extremely poor, the father saved enough to send both Lu and his older brother to a private academy where modern subjects were taught. However, Lu's formal education came to an end when he was 14 because his father's poor health made it more difficult to put food on the table, let alone to spend the extra cash on the children's education.<sup>136</sup>

According to Lu's son, Lu Guoji, the education Lu received in the private academy gave him the opportunity to understand the problems China was facing at that time. Like thousands of Chinese youths who were worrying about the fate of China, Lu deeply felt that his responsibility as a patriot was to equip himself with more modern knowledge and seek the opportunity to serve his country. One year after he dropped out from school, Lu finally convinced his father to let him go to Chengdu. During the 6 years he spent in Chengdu (1908-1913,) Lu took up a job as a tutor in a private school and in his spare time educated himself on the modern subjects such as mathematics, physics, chemistry, and geography. Chengdu during the first decade of the 20<sup>th</sup>

---

<sup>136</sup> Lu Guoji, *Wo de fuqin*: Lu Zuofu (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin cubanshe, 2003,) 5-9.

century was a city immersing in the doubt toward the Qing Dynasty and home to many dissidents who were calling of the revolution. Lu eventually joined Tongmenghui in 1910. Lu left no record about his reason and detail of his participation in the revolution. However, the membership in a political organization that advocated radical changes was a strong indication of his opposition toward the imperial government and the old institution it presented.<sup>137</sup> Such opposition might be typical of many young Chinese males. For one thing, the young Chinese males in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century had more choices in education. Education at the time no longer meant attending traditional academies and training in Chinese Classics. New schools teaching modern subjects emerged all across the country, even in Lu's seemingly insignificant and remote hometown, Hechuan County.<sup>138</sup> The emergence of modern education inevitably raised doubts in regard to traditional values such as loyalty to the imperial rulers.

Moreover, when the civil service examination was permanently abolished in 1905, the imperial government and the social hierarchy based on the examination lost their appeal to many educated Chinese males. The influence of the west since the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century had also further convinced a whole generation of Chinese youth that the key of survival for China as a nation laid in its complete abandonment of her old political and social systems. Such a point of view was of course in sharp contrast to many members of the lower gentry whose years of studying in classical education had almost no use in the future that the revolutionaries were promoting.<sup>139</sup>

---

<sup>137</sup> According to Lu's younger brothers, during Lu's stay in Chengdu, he read extensively on the subjects of politics, economy, and international relationships and was greatly influenced by Sun Yet-sen's call of overthrowing the Manchurian government to save the Chinese race from extinction. *Ibid.*, 14.

<sup>138</sup> The academy Lu Zuofu and his older brother attended was a school of modern style, teaching subjects such as mathematics and geography. *Ibid.*

<sup>139</sup> Henrietta Harrison gives vivid accounts of how a Chinese gentry in a remote town felt about and was impacted by the transition from imperial to republican eras. Unlike Lu Zuofu, her protagonist, Liu Dapeng, spent years in classical education and preparation for the civil service examination and took the value of the imperial system and society deeply into his heart. In Liu's view, the new China brought about by the 1911 revolution lacked legitimacy and the modern values it advocated was in deep conflict with the Confucian ideas which Liu regarded as the cornerstone of a great civilization. See Henrietta Harrison, *The Man Awakened from Dreams*.

Yet, for someone who never received classical education like Lu, revolution might be the only logical choice to save the country.

In 1913, Lu took up another job in a middle school near Chongqing. The years he spent in Chengdu and Chongqing was a decisive period for his life and career choices later on. In Chengdu and Chongqing, he saw how an ineffective dynasty was replaced by a weak Republican government and how the hope for a new China was shattered by the political chaos following the 1911 revolution. He was eager to understand what he could contribute to his ailing country and felt that the information he could have in Sichuan was too limited and narrow-minded. Hence in 1914 with these questions in mind and the acknowledgment of his own ignorance he left Chongqing for Shanghai.<sup>140</sup>

Since Shanghai was a metropolis with abundant opportunities and cultural inspiration, Lu Zuofu's departure for Shanghai was not a surprising decision. During his one-year stay in Shanghai, Lu lived on a small portion of money sent by his family and the income from writing articles for magazines. Because he could not afford the tuition of any school, he spent most of his time in the public libraries and the collection room of the publishing house: *Shangwu yinshuguan*, reading books on various subjects.<sup>141</sup> His diligent visits to Shangwu yinshuguan led him to make acquaintance with one of the publishing house's employee, Huang Jingwan. Because Huang's job in the publishing company was to socialize with those who wished to do business with the publisher (in modern days, Huang would be what we call a publicist,) he built an extensive personal network with the elites in Shanghai.<sup>142</sup> It was through Huang's introduction that Lu

---

<sup>140</sup> Lu Guoji, *Wo de fuqin*, 20.

<sup>141</sup> Lu Ziyang and Lu Erqin, "Huiyi Lu Zuofu pianduan," in Chongqing wenshi ziliao xuanji, Vol. 10,

<sup>142</sup> Huang Jingwan was rather well-known in the Shanghai society due to his work at the Shangwu yinshuguan. Many considered him as a master of interpersonal relationship or what we call in modern days—a publicist. Because of such experience, Huang even published several articles, sharing his tips of building one's social network. See



Zuofu met with one of the most famous Chinese educators and the advocate of “vocational education” in Shanghai, Huang Yanpei.<sup>143</sup> This life-long friendship had great influence on Lu’s later involvement in educational reform. More importantly, the two Huangs connected Lu with the Shanghai elites that not only included writers and educators, but also government officials, bankers, and enterprisers. These connections would prove to be enormously useful later to Lu’s career as a local administrator and owner of a steamship company.

In 1915, Lu returned to his hometown Hechuan County and between 1916 and 1919, he taught as a math teacher in several middle schools. In 1919, he took a career turn by joining the newspaper founded by Li Jieren(1891-1962,) a Chengdu native who became one of China’s most famous novelists in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The newspaper, *Chuan Bao* (The Sichuan News,) was famous for its pro-modernity, pro-Republican, and anti-militarist voice. The year when Lu joined the newspaper was the time when China was swept by the May Fourth Movement. Although the movement started in Beijing, its anti-imperialist and anti-Japanese messages received passionate responses from Chinese students all over the country.<sup>144</sup> Chengdu was no exception. Hundreds of college and middle school students walked out of their classrooms and protested against the Beijing government on the streets. Lu covered the movement in Chengdu and other major cities extensively.

---

Huang Jingwan, “Ershinian jiaoji jinyantan,” *Lianyou huabao*, No. 50 (1930); “Wo renshi de pengyou you jishiwan ren,” *Nu sheng*, Vol. 3, No. 6 (1933); “Jingqian zizhuan: sanshinian shejiao jinyantan,” *Zhongxing zaizhi*, Vol. 1 No. 1 (1939)

<sup>143</sup> Huang Yanpei was often considered as a pioneer of vocational education in the Republican China. During the last years of the Qing Dynasty, Huang was a representative of the provincial assembly and an avid supporter of reform. After the fall of the Qing Dynasty, Huang was recruited by the new provincial government of Jiangsu as the head of the education bureau. During his term of office, Huang spent significant time visiting schools of all level in the Jiangsu province. He criticized that the school education at the time did not provide enough practical career training that could equip the students to meet the urgent needs of industrialization. In 1917, Huang founded the Chinese Society of Promoting Vocational Education in Shanghai. With the support of the society’s members (which included many intellectuals, entrepreneurs, and even militarists,) the first vocational school in China—the Chinese Vocational School—was founded in 1918. The curriculum of the school focused on training of handicraft skill, accounting, and engineering. See Wang Huabing, *Huang Yanpei zhuan* (Jinan: Shangdong wenyi chubanshe, 1992.)

<sup>144</sup> Lu Guoji, *Wo de fuqin*, 31.

Shortly after Lu joined the newspaper, he took over the position of the chief editor from Li Jieren who left China for France in the fall of 1919. As the chief editor, Lu frequently published articles, advocating the “New Culture Movement” that promoted the reform of every aspect of Chinese life, from social custom to writing style. Moreover, he often used the newspaper to criticize the chaotic politics and corruption in the province and offered advice to the Sichuan militarists. His progressive opinions and the occasionally sharp criticism caught the attention of many political and military figures in the province. Job offers began to flow in.<sup>145</sup> In 1921, the militarist Yang Sen offered him a position as the director of education in the government he set up to control the South of Sichuan. Yang’s interest was less in educational reform than in building his personal image as a forward-thinking militarist who was capable of bringing modernization and eliminating the evil of old China in Sichuan.<sup>146</sup> Yet, Lu Zuofu accepted the position in the summer of 1921. He had been enthusiastic about educational issues because of his personal experience and the inspiration he received from his trip to Shanghai. The new appointment thus was a great opportunity to put his ideas about popular education into practice. With Yang Sen’s support, Lu began two projects of educational reform. The first one was conducted in Luzhou, from 1922-1923; the second one was conducted in Chengdu, from 1924-1925. However, both projects were cut short when Yang Sen was defeated by other Sichuan militarists in 1925.

In his first education reform in Luzhou, Lu attempted to replace the faculty and the curriculum in the Teacher’s College of Southern Sichuan. He hired faculty members with modern education backgrounds and supported the ideas of the May Fourth Movement. New

---

<sup>145</sup> Ibid., 32-34

<sup>146</sup> Yang Sen’s desire of building a reputation as an able administrator was best illustrated by his urban reform in Chengdu between 1924 and 1925. Stapleton, *Civilizing Chengdu*, 217-249.

textbooks were purchased and western subjects, including mathematics, geography, and foreign language, received more classroom hours. The dress code of the students was also lessened.

Although Lu's intention was to promote western style education and equip students with knowledge that would meet the challenge they were going to face in the new China, his policies threatened the power of old elites, whose privilege laid in the maintenance of old custom and old knowledge. But, as long as Yang Sen was politically strong in the area, the resistance would not hinder the new policies that were to be carried out. However, in 1922, Yang Sen lost Luzhou to another less-progressive warlord, Liu Wenhui. As a result, Lu was dismissed from the office and all the changes that occurred in the Teacher's College were reversed.<sup>147</sup>

In 1924, Yang Sen was back to power again in Chengdu and Lu Zuofu was given the second opportunity of conducting educational experiment. This time, instead of focusing on school education, Lu turned his attention to how to provide popular education that could be accessed by everyone, regardless of their backgrounds. As mentioned above, when Lu travelled to Shanghai in 1914, he met the intellectual circle through Huang Yanpei and was introduced to the idea of saving China by education. In 1922, after being dismissed from his position in Luzhou, Lu visited Shanghai again. During this trip, he was accompanied by Huang to visit the vocational schools he founded and many other educational institutions.<sup>148</sup> Lu's 1924 experiment in Chengdu was no doubt inspired by these experiences. The Museum of Popular Education founded in Chengdu in 1924 aimed to provide introductory knowledge of agriculture, modern industry, and modern history. It included a public library, exhibition rooms, a concert hall, and an athletic court. The museum regularly organized talks, movies, exhibitions, and athletic events. Although in 1925, the Museum was shut down, following Yang Sen's defeat by Liu Xiang, this

---

<sup>147</sup> Lu Guoji, *Wo de fuqin*, 35-42.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., 45.

experience and those Lu had worked with became important support when he later became the head of the XFJ administration.

After two failed attempts of transforming the province through education, Lu came to the realization that it was unrealistic to rely on the support of any politician or military leader to sustain cultural and educational activities in such a chaotic political environment. Any reform project, regardless of its size, required time and steady support from the authority to achieve a positive result. However, in the Sichuan province during the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, reforms often had limited results for as the power of the politicians or warlords waned, the reforms they supported were usually terminated.<sup>149</sup> Though Lu still regarded the cultural and educational reforms were important to China's search of modernization, he came to believe that the sponsorship of these reforms had to be independent from political and military influence so to maintain its purposes and effectiveness. His second trip to Shanghai, especially those visits he paid to a few factories, further inspired him to think that only the industrial modernization was able to produce the material wealth needed to reform the education and the society. From 1925, Lu's career development and professional achievement basically evolved around these beliefs.

### **Lu Zuofu as the enterpriser and the administrator**

In an article published in 1972, the political scientist James Scott summarized the concept of "patron-client" that had been elaborated by anthropologists as "an exchange relationship between roles."<sup>150</sup> Scott elaborates this idea into a conceptual structure that can improve scholars'

---

<sup>149</sup> Lu Ziyang and Lu Erqin, "Huiyi Lu Zuofu pianduan," 150-151.

<sup>150</sup> James Scott, "Patron-Client Policies and Political Change in Southeast Asia," The American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, No. 1 (March 1972,) 92.

understanding about the third-world countries (particularly Southeast Asia) where a weak formal structure of authority failed to provide protection and resources and thus allow an informal patron-client network to fill the void. Although Scott seems to exclude China from his lists of countries where this concept could be applied, the political chaos China experienced in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century was in fact an ideal environment to breed such networks, not to mention that the informal authority and network had had a long history and significance in maintaining order in Chinese society.<sup>151</sup>

Scott's definition covers only one particular form of the informal network which in Chinese terminology could be generally described as "guanxi." This concept of "guanxi" is critical to understand Lu Zuofu's life after he decided to gain financial independence by founding a company. For one thing, Lu's immediate family was too humble to provide the sort of social connection and financial resources that was needed for any advanced education, career, and business venture. When Lu left his family at the age of 15 to go to Chengdu, he had very limited sources of social connection at his disposal. Though he spent one year in Shanghai and did expand his social network through Shanghai intellectuals such as Huang Yanpei, this expanded network was yet to be useful after he left Shanghai. When Lu returned to Sichuan in 1915, he still relied on his old connection with his teachers and friends for employment opportunities. His first full-time job after he returned to Sichuan was a teaching position in the

---

<sup>151</sup> Ibid., 102. Scott seems to regard China (and the Roman) as the exceptional country where "the growth of strong, institutional orders reduce the need for personal alliances." For more discussion, see J. Bruce Jacobs, "A Preliminary Model of Particularistic Ties in Chinese Political Alliances: Kan-ching and Kuan-hsi in rural Taiwanese township," *The China Quarterly*, No. 78 (June 1978,) 237-273. Hwang Kwang-kuo, "Face and Favor: The Chinese Power Game," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 92, No.4 (January 1987,) 944-974.

county middle school of Hechuan, offered by the principle Yang Hegao, who knew Lu through Lu's older brother.<sup>152</sup>

The most influential social connection Lu made in the first 5 years after returning to Sichuan in 1915 was no doubt his relation with the warlord Yang Sen. Though the time Lu spent working for Yang Sen was not long and Yang's influence in the province fluctuated with the swing of the warlord politics, through Yang Sen the access to the society of Sichuanese elites and politically prominent people was opened to him. Because of Yang's sponsorship and his work in the Educational Museum in Chengdu, Lu Zuofu was able to make acquaintance with many of Yang Sen's subordinate commanders who later joined Liu Xiang's clique and hence became handy resources for Lu to get to Liu Xiang.<sup>153</sup> These militarists might not share Lu's patriotism or his reform ideas, but their power proved to be valuable asset when Lu decided to begin his business adventure.

In 1925, Lu Zuofu founded the Minsheng Steamship Company with 12 other co-founders, among whom were his older brother Lu Zhilin and his former teacher Chen Bozun.<sup>154</sup> The thought of becoming an entrepreneur began after Lu lost the political support from the military leaders that succeeded Yang Sen. Without such support, his reform project in Chengdu was aborted. As discussed earlier, these failures led Lu to believe that a successful social or educational reform in Sichuan at that time had to be financially independent so to avoid the interference from the warlords and interruption caused by a socially and politically unstable environment. To achieve such independence, a strong modern industry that could provide sufficient funds was a prerequisite.

---

<sup>152</sup> Lu Guoji, *Wo de fuqin*, 27-29.

<sup>153</sup> Kuan Shanji, *Sichuan Junfashi*, 170-171. Qiao Cheng, *Liu Xiang zhuan*, 289.

<sup>154</sup> Ling Yaolun ed., *Minsheng gongsi shi* (Beijing: Renmin jiaotong chubanshe, 1990,) 13-14.

However, Sichuan in the 1920s lacked an environment for developing modern industry. This disadvantageous situation had much to do with Sichuan's geographical isolation that had hindered the province's contact with other parts of China for centuries. To access the modern technology and ideas that had been disseminated in the coastal region for decades, the province had to first work on its communication and transportation networks. In Lu's opinion, after these networks were improved, new technology and knowledge would naturally flow to Sichuan more easily and created an environment that was favorable for industrial modernization. The Minsheng Steamship Company was thus his first attempt of improving the transportation network that could connect the province with the outside world.<sup>155</sup>

The founding of the Minsheng Steamship Company was an excellent example of what the Chinese "guangxi" could achieve. When Lu and his partners had their first board meeting in 1925, they decided that the company needed an initial fund of 20,000 Chinese dollars to purchase a small steamship. How to raise the needed funds was an issue of great difficulty. The founders of the company all had very little personal or family wealth and could not provide the total amount of the initial fund. The majority of the funds would have to be raised in the form of shareholding. The shareholders were mostly friends and relatives of the founders and they often agreed to invest because of their relationship with the founders, not because of the prospect of the company.<sup>156</sup> In fact, the Minsheng Steamship Company was founded at a time when the Chinese owned navigation business was challenged fiercely by the foreign operated companies.<sup>157</sup> Therefore, although the 20,000 of shares was quickly sold, the actual amount of money the company received was only 8,000 Chinese dollars. When the company tried to collect

---

<sup>155</sup> Lu Guoji, *Wo de fuqin*, 56-57

<sup>156</sup> Lin, *Minsheng gongsi shi*, 14

<sup>157</sup> The first foreign-owned steamship arrived in the upper Yangzi River in 1917 and soon dominated the market. Anne Reinhardt, "Navigation Imperialism in China: Steamship, Semicolony, and Nation, 1860-1937," Ph. D dissertation, Princeton University, 2002. 151- 160

the money it had been promised to, many of those who initially agreed to invest simply withdrew their support due to the risk of losing their investment. The dire situation faced by Chinese operated navigation businesses at the time (because of the competition from companies operated by foreigners) was the major reason that these investors eventually withdrew or withheld the money they had promised to provide.<sup>158</sup>

When Lu's partners strove to raise enough funds, Lu himself was in Shanghai overseeing the making of the first steamship the company had ordered. The 8,000 dollars was far from enough to pay for the total cost of the ship. After diligent negotiation, Lu finally secured further support from Zheng Dongqin and Chen Bozun. Zheng was the magistrate of the Hechuan County and Chen was the head of the education department of the county government. With great personal risk, Zheng and Chen exercised their power in Sichuan politics and removed significant amount of money in the county treasury to help the Minsheng Steamship Company to pay for its first ship.<sup>159</sup> In the spring of 1926, the company received its first steamship, Minsheng, and transportation services between Chongqing and Hechuan soon begun. Later in the summer, additional services were also offered between Chongqing and the town of Beibei.

The Minsheng Steamship Company was the first to offer steamship transportation on the Jialing River. Shortly after its debut of the first trip, significant profit began to flow in and the previous problem of fund shortage was soon resolved by new sales of share holdings.<sup>160</sup> It would not be exaggerating to say that the government fund diverted by Zheng Dongqin and Chen Bozun gave birth to the Minsheng Company. Though the details of how Zheng and Chen succeed in removing the money was not clear, in a province where formal system of law and

---

<sup>158</sup> Ling, *Minsheng gongsi shi*, 14.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid, 15.

<sup>160</sup> Lu Zuofu, "Minsheng shiye gufen gongsi jianshi," in Luo Zhongfu and Li Xuanhua, eds. *Lu Zuofu Wenxuan* (Chongqing: Xinan shifan daxue chubanshe, 1989,) 96.



order was replaced by informal organism that was operated upon negotiation of interests between different group of elites and militarists, such an act must require much negotiation and understanding between various parties, including Zheng Dongqin and Chen Bozun themselves, the county government, and even the militarists. In other words, it was the cooperation of multiple guangxi networks that finalized Lu Zuofu's first business adventure.<sup>161</sup> The company's initial success also indicated that the guangxi network of the company's managers and founders did include Sichuan militarists. The Chinese operated steamship companies often had to deal with the militarists' demand of monetary contribution; yet, the Minsheng steamship company encountered little interference from the militarists and its business ran so smoothly that the interest paid to its shareholders after the first 5 months was as high as 50%.<sup>162</sup> This rate of return would not be possible had the Company did not receive approval and understanding from the militarists, considering the fact that the militarists regarded the control of waterway transportation as crucial to the maintenance of their power.

The success of the Minsheng Steamship Company added more prestige to Lu's personal reputation. When the local gentry in the JLJXSX area were searching for a new leader who was not attached to any warlord clique for the XFJ administration, Lu was their first choice because of his reputation and extensive networks with both the merchants and militarists. In addition to the rigorous persuasion from the local gentry, one can imagine that as someone with a vision of modernization that went beyond commercial enterprise, this administrative position was too good to refuse. It would offer Lu a unique opportunity to realize what he thought to be the

---

<sup>161</sup> It was not clear whether the fund Zheng Dongqin and Chen Bozun removed from the county government was returned when the Minsheng Company started to earn profit.

<sup>162</sup> Ling, *Minsheng gongsi shi*, 18.

solution for China's weakness and backwardness. Therefore, in the spring of 1927, Lu formally accepted the position and became the second head of the XFJ.

By 1927, the security bureau of the JLJXSX area had been working on eliminating banditry for 4 years. Though not without success, the bureau was incapable of completely eliminating the banditry. Lu's predecessor, Hu Nanxian, repeatedly reported the financial inadequacy as the major difficulty faced by the bureau to effectively rebuild the local order in JLJXSX. By the time Lu took up the office, the bureau had been in financial deficit for 4 years.<sup>163</sup> In addition to the financial difficulty, at the beginning of his term as the head of the bureau, Lu identified insufficient communication between the bureau and the local community as another major cause of the bureau's failure in rebuilding the local order. In one of his letter to his assistants, he emphasized the importance of the communication between the administration and local society. If the bureau could not build a close relationship with the local community and educated the local people to understand the policies of the administration in details, it would be regarded by the local people as not much different from the militarist administration. Misunderstanding and conflicts would naturally arise.<sup>164</sup> This statement was in accordance to the surviving documentation of the administration from 1925-1926, during which the administration faced constant challenges from the local community.<sup>165</sup> Lu obviously attributed the challenges to the lack of understanding and support from the local community. How to solve the problem was a matter of utmost importance.

The improvement of communication between the XFJ administration and the local communities was not only critical to the local security, but also to the implementation of Lu's

---

<sup>163</sup> DAGLJ, p1020176

<sup>164</sup> Huang Liren, ed., *Lu Zuofu Shuxinji* (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 2003,) 1, 3.

<sup>165</sup> DAGLJ, p1020631, p1020855

reform plan which covered more than local security. Since 1927, the XFJ administration began a series of reform that went beyond security. While much of its reform programs displayed similiarity to many other programs in China during the 1920s and 1930s, Lu Zuofu's philosophy had fundamental difference with that of other supporters of the rural reconstruction movement, particularly the two most renowned advocates, Yan Yangchu and Liang Shumin. To understand such difference between Lu and other reformers and evaluate the rural reform in the JLJXSX area, a close look at Lu's idea and solutions regarding China's rural problems and the movement of rural reform that was widely spread during the 1930s was indispensable.

### **The rural reconstruction movement**

In one of his articles that discussed the reform in the JLJXSX area, Lu Zuofu pictured a modernized JLJXSX as the following:

In the future, in the gorge area, there will be factories, farms, orchards, and forests; there will be railways and modern roads for automobiles. In addition, every village will have telephone and postal services. Some village will even have telegram service for urgent matters.

Culturally, there will be research institutes conducting researches of biology, physics, chemistry, agriculture, medicine, and social science. There will also be schools of all levels, from elementary school to university. Public libraries, museums, and gyms will provide local residents opportunities of education and exercises.

[And because of these efforts,] residents in the gorge area will all have jobs, education, and will be capable to serve their community and country. There will no longer be banditry and the gorge area will become a clean, orderly, beautiful community that is suitable for living and travelling.<sup>166</sup>

Lu's plan for the gorge area presented his vision of transforming backward villages of China into progressive, modern places on which the modernization of the whole of China could be built. Though not without Lu's own innovation, such a vision of how modernized villages could promote the overall progress of the country was not new in 1920s and 1930s. In fact, during the time, avid patriots were already conducting reform projects all over the country.<sup>167</sup> Among them, the most influential ones were Yan Yangchu (James Yen) and Liang Shumin. In fact the reform program in the JLJXSX area imitated a great deal from what Yan and Liang were promoting in Ding County and Zhouping County.

### ***Yan Yangchu (James Yan)***

Yan Yangchu was born in 1893 to a Sichuanese family of moderate means and completed his education in a missionary school of western style and Yale University in 1918. During the World War I, he joined the War Work Council of the International YMCA in France and assisted

---

<sup>166</sup> Ling Yaolun and Xiong Fu, eds., *Lu Zuofu Wenji* (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1999,) 359-360

<sup>167</sup> Although the education of rural population was considered by the Qing reformers during the period of the "New Policy Reform," it only received wide attention and support during the May Fourth Movement. The advocate of rural education in many newly founded teachers' colleges began to set up schools in rural villages. The discussion of promoting rural education soon expanded to include cultural and economic issues in rural villages and by mid 1920s, the movement was expanded to include projects that targeted other cultural and social issues in rural villages and was called as the movement of "xiangcun jianshe" (rural reconstruction; rural reform; rural development). The majority of these projects were initiated by private sponsors such as Huang Yangpei and Tao Xingzhi or China's new western-style universities and colleges. The government played very little role in initiating the movement. Only in early 1930s when the movement was widely-spread and because of lobbying efforts of renowned advocate such as James Yan did the Nationalist government acknowledged its importance and included in its reform policies. See Zheng Dahua, *Mingguo xiangcun jianshe yundong* (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2000,) 77-122.

the Chinese laborers there. During his stay in France, Yan began a small program of teaching the illiterate laborers basic writing and reading skills. The program soon expanded with voluntary Chinese students studying in Europe and the class included not only how to read and write Chinese but also subjects on politics, economy, and history. A weekly newspaper in Chinese was also published for the workers to submit their opinions.<sup>168</sup>

In 1919, with the end of the World War I, Yan finished his work in France and returned to the United States. As historian Charles Hayford comments, the year Yan spent in France was “the final stage of his social education and led him to his career.”<sup>169</sup> In France, Yan witnessed the disgust foreigners had toward Chinese who were often regarded as uncivilized and having no sense of public order. They talked loudly in public, wore improper clothing, and littered or spit whenever and wherever they wished. In the minds of many foreigners who never went to China or studied Chinese culture and history, these workers were the representation of “how Chinese were like.”<sup>170</sup> Yan attributed these problems to the lack of proper education. Most Chinese people, as those who came to France, were peasants who were often deprived the chance of education because of poverty. However, the experience of working with the Chinese workers in France proved to Yan that: “[my people] were not only eager students but able students... What they lacked was not intelligence but opportunity.” If given the chance, the education would transform these “coolies” (a British terms for the Chinese workers) into a tremendous force of progress.<sup>171</sup> For Yan, the truly ignorant were the educated Chinese, especially the intellectuals, who had very little knowledge about the misery of the peasants and thus provided almost no

---

<sup>168</sup> Wu Xiangxiang, *Yan Yangchu zhuan* (Taipei: Shibao chubanshe, 1981,) 30-31.

<sup>169</sup> Charles W. Hayford, *To the People: James Yen and Village China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990,) 23.

<sup>170</sup> In fact, Yan himself was discriminated when he first arrived in France. See Hayford, *To the People*, 25. Song Enrong ed, *Yan Yangchu quanji* (Changsha: Hunan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1999,) 3 Vols. Vol. 1, 47.

<sup>171</sup> Hayford, *To the People*, 30.

assistance to relive their situation.<sup>172</sup> As a result of his experience in France, Yan decided to devote himself to the service of Chinese people, to educate them and lift them from the burden of poverty and illiteracy. In 1920 after finishing his master degree in history at Princeton University, he returned to China and spent the next three decades on the transformation of Chinese villages.<sup>173</sup>

From 1920, with the help of the YMCA branch in China, Yan Yangchu began several experiments on the Chinese east coast, focusing mainly on mass education.<sup>174</sup> His projects soon attracted enormous attention from politically prominent figures, such as Zhang Xueliang, the militarist governor of the northeastern provinces, and Xiongzhong Qihui, the wife of Yuan Shikai's former prime minister, Xiong Xiling.<sup>175</sup> Yan's increasing fame also brought him into contact with other advocates of mass education, such as Tao Xingzhi, Huang Yanpei, and Hu Shi. With their support, in 1923, The National Association of the Mass Education Movement was formally organized. Its charter stated that the mission of the Association was to promote popular education among Chinese people.<sup>176</sup>

The National Association and many of its prominent members promoted the issue of mass education to the spotlight. Because the object of the movement was to eliminate illiteracy in China, many activists, teachers, students, and administrators travelled to rural areas and set up schools and study groups. A new consensus soon developed among the advocates who by mid-1920s viewed the elimination of illiteracy was only one aspect of rural reconstruction that China needed most for her modernization. A comprehensive plan of rural reconstruction would focus

---

<sup>172</sup> Song, *Yan Yangchu quanji*, Vol. 1, 32.

<sup>173</sup> Wu, *Yan Yangchu zhuan*, 35-36.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid., 53-67.

<sup>175</sup> Ibid., 65-66. Yan convinced Zhang Xueliang to set up a school to educate illiterate soldiers.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid., 67-70.

on three areas: culture, economy, and politics. As an advocate of the rural reconstruction, Jiang Hengyuan, states: “rural reconstruction and mass education share some similarity, but they are not identical. For education is only part of the reconstruction, but reconstruction covers more areas than just education.” He argues that rural reconstruction aimed to promote cultural transformation which was mainly educational projects of improving literacy, health, and local hygiene; to promote economic prosperity and eliminate poverty; to set up public organizations and to raise political consciousness so as to transform villagers into modern citizens.<sup>177</sup> Yan Yangchu shared the same opinion about rural reconstruction with Jiang. In his opinion, focusing only on education would be like treating diseases by fighting the symptoms only. To him, the illiteracy of Chinese people was symptoms of more severe problems which laid also in the culture, economy, and politics of rural area as well. Rural reconstruction was to treat the problems in these aspects of rural life as a whole; in other words, to cure the disease by treating the cause.<sup>178</sup>

From 1926 to 1937, Yan Yangchu and the National Association of Mass Education Movement began what later was called “Ding Xian-ism,” the first comprehensive rural reconstruction project in north China.<sup>179</sup> During the time, Yan and the association implemented

---

<sup>177</sup> Jiang Hengyuan, *Nongcun gaijin de lilun yu shiji* (Shanghai: Shenghuo shudian, 1935,) 1-6.

<sup>178</sup> Song, *Yan Yangchu quanji*, Vol. 1, 565-568. Zheng Dahua, *Minguo xiangcun jianshe yundong*, 72

<sup>179</sup> Hayford, 141. In 1926, an opportunity presented itself to Yan Yangchu when Mi Digang, a rural gentry from Ding County of Hebei Province, invited Yan to his village where his family had once conducted a series of education. Zhai Cheng, the residence of the Mi family, was an ideal choice for Yan to begin his projects for the following reason. First, the Mi family had been working on reform projects since 1902 and though the progress was interrupted in 1916, the family had laid down foundation for Yan’s plan. Second, the Mi family enjoyed tremendous prestige in both Zhan Cheng and the Ding County. It could more easily persuade other more conservative gentry and villagers to support the work of Yan Yangchu and the National Association of Mass Education Movement. The reputation of being a family of progressive perspective also allowed it to pull the resources the rural reconstruction project needed. With these advantages, Yan Yangchu finalized the decision of implementing his project of rural reconstruction in Ding County. Thereafter, the National Association of Mass Education Movement moved its headquarter from Beijing to Ding County and was transformed from a nation-wide union of literacy movement to a rural reconstruction organization. See Wu Xiangxiang, 177-179.

reform projects that went beyond education. When the American journalist, Edgar Snow, visited the county in 1933, what he saw was a model county that was conducting programs of local sanitary and public health, village industry and agricultural cooperatives. Ding County also received the permission from the provincial government to begin its political reform of setting up modern administrative institutions and organization of mass political participation. Because of the results of the reconstruction projects, Ding County became a model that was often followed by other rural reconstruction projects. Though Yan he personally opposed the idea of building a model village or county for he believed that the ultimate goal of the reconstruction movement was to eventually “reform the people, the spirit of the nation, and its culture” in every corner of China, the programs of the Ding County had made it stand out among the thousands of rural communities in China in the 1930s.<sup>180</sup> It was the pioneer characteristic of these programs that led Yan’s contemporaries to call the experience of Ding County the “Ding Xian-ism.”<sup>181</sup>

### ***Liang Shuming***

Liang Shuming was born in 1893 in Beijing to a father who worked as a secretary in the office of the Grand Secretariat. Though being a gentleman of traditional education, the father did not instruct Liang Shuming to take the same educational path which began by learning Chinese classics. Instead, in 1899, when the first western style primary school was opened in Beijing, the father enrolled the son. After he finished elementary school, he continued to attend another

---

<sup>180</sup> Song ed., *Yan Yangchu quanji*, Vol. 1, 293-294, Zheng Dahua, *Minguo xiangcun jianshe yundong*, 137-138.

<sup>181</sup> For details on the reform projects in Ding County, see Hayford, *To the People*, 118-179, and Zheng Dahua, *Minguo xiangcun jianshe yundong*, 197-252.



new-style middle school in Beijing. Therefore, as a result of the father's unconventional choice, Liang never thoroughly studied the Confucian Classics before his adulthood.<sup>182</sup>

Because of the new-style education in the schools he attended, in his adolescent years, Liang Shuming was a fervent follower of the flourishing pro-reform, anti-Manchu movements. He eventually joined the revolutionary Tongmenghui. As the historian Guy Allito comments, during those years Liang Shuming showed very little attachment to the Chinese tradition. In his eyes, Chinese culture was inferior to the western culture and was the main cause of China's weakness when facing the challenge from the west. If China was to become a modern nation, she must follow the path the western countries had taken. The preservation of tradition, especially Confucian tradition, if there was any good of it, was not considered by Liang Shuming as critical for China to survive in the modern world.<sup>183</sup>

Such an indifferent attitude toward Chinese tradition contrasted sharply with Liang's later insistence on the importance of reviving Confucianism. What, then, changed him? On this issue, the father's influence on the son should not be ignored. In 1919, deeply disturbed by the political disorder and social problems in the Chinese Republic, the father committed suicide.<sup>184</sup> Liang personally was also deeply disappointed by the result of the Chinese Revolution in 1911 and his father's death led him to reconsider the value of the Chinese tradition.<sup>185</sup> He eventually concluded that the deterioration of Chinese morality was a result of the influence of the west. He argued that the reform projects of the Qing Dynasty failed because they ignored the fact that

---

<sup>182</sup> Liang Shuming's father, Liang Ji, was much frustrated by the incompetency of the Qing court when it faced the crisis in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and was an advocate of reform. It was reported that Liang Ji once criticized the uselessness of Chinese classics in dealing with the problems brought by China's contact with the west. Guy Allito, *The Last Confucian: Liang Shuming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979,) 20-25.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid, 28-36.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid, 73-75.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid, 47, 59.

Chinese society was fundamentally different from the western society. First of all, there was no concept of “self” and “organization” (or society) in China, instead, the backbone of the Chinese life was “lunli,” “connection” or “relation” between individuals or between individual and organization (lineage, school, government, etc.) Second, unlike the west, there was no strict class boundary in China. Instead, what defined Chinese people’s status was their profession. In addition, unlike in the west where people were often born to their class, Chinese people did not necessarily inherit the status or occupation from their ancestors. Chinese people were allowed to move from one occupation to another and because of such social mobility, there was no chance for China to develop classes which was often a result of the lack of social mobility. Third, like most of his contemporaries, Liang agreed that the essence of the western culture was science and democracy. In his view, the two were products of the western attitude of intellectual calculation toward the satisfaction of human needs (material interest) and desire of obtaining individual’s right. Chinese culture lacked these two essences because unlike the west, Chinese culture seeks to maintain harmony between mankind and the environment, between individual and organizations. Such a harmonious state was a kind of emotional satisfaction which often requires sacrifice of personal interest. Fourth, considering the cultural essence of the west, industrialization, capitalism, and urbanization were the logical products because their ultimate purpose was to satisfy material interest. However, since China lacked such essence, industrialization, capitalism, and urbanization could not occur in China and the whole country remained an agrarian society with over 90% of the population residing in rural villages at the early 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>186</sup>

---

<sup>186</sup> For more detailed discussion on Liang Shuming’s idea on the difference between China and the west, see Alitto, *The Last Confucian*, 83-85, 88-96. Zhu Hanguo, *Liang Shuming de xiangcun jianshe yanjiu* (Taiyuan: Shanxi jiaoyu chubanshe, 1996,) 32-35. Zheng Dahua, *Minguo xiangcun jianshe yundong*, 167-171.

Liang argued that as a result of these differences, projects of westernization, be it moderate reform or radical revolution, all failed to solve China's problems. Instead, these projects brought more destruction to Chinese social structure than improvement.<sup>187</sup> If westernization did not work, what, then, was the solution for China? Liang believed that the answer was the revival of Chinese culture. Since most Chinese resided in rural areas, the revival must start from villages. To Liang, the revival of Chinese culture meant to restore the traditional social order which was based on "lunli" and occupation.<sup>188</sup> It should be noted that although Liang Shuming attributed the disorder of Chinese society to her blind imitation of western example, he did not regard the western experience as completely useless for China. Instead, he argued that the advantage of western culture, such as participation in public affairs and respect of individual rights, would be beneficial for China to eliminate the selfishness and strengthen the individual personality of Chinese people.<sup>189</sup>

In 1929, he joined several advocates of the reconstruction movement and set up a research institute of rural reconstruction in Zhouping County in Shandong province. Using the institute as the training center of cadres, Liang began his experiment. In 1933, with the permission from the provincial government of Shangdong, Zhouping became a special district of rural reconstruction experiment.<sup>190</sup> In Zhouping, every village had its own school. As Liang had mapped out, the school served not only as an educational center but also an administrative office.

---

<sup>187</sup> Zhu, *Liang Shuming de xiangcun jianshe yanjiu*, 41-42.

<sup>188</sup> Lunli 倫理 in Chinese refers to proper relations between Chinese people, society, and the government. In the Chinese context, proper relations were not only defined according to gender and age but also according to occupation as well. This concept was the root of the Confucianism. The advocates of the Confucianism often regarded that the proper relationship promoted proper behaviors of individual and was the foundation of a harmonious society.

<sup>189</sup> Zheng Dahua, *Minguo xiangcun jianshe yundong*, 175-176. Many scholars consider Liang's idea as similar with the late Qing reformer Zhang Zhidong who advocated "Chinese for essence and western for means" during the late Qing Dynasty.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid., 96.

As Liang had stated, the purpose of the village school was to “organize the villages...and to nurture new customs.”<sup>191</sup> Cadres trained by the institute were sent down to every village and were expected to perform not only educational work but also good character and behavior. The school also worked with the Research Institute to organize agricultural co-ops and business of money lending. Although much of work done in Zhouping was similar to Yan Yangchu’s work in Ding County, the stress on moral guidance and improvement was a unique aspect of the Zhouping project. Villagers were encouraged to establish organizations to mediate conflicts and to punish or reward behaviors, according to a set of rules agreed by villagers themselves. Such organization also provided opportunities for villagers to get together and participate in the decision making of community affairs. These organizations were no doubt the best examples of how the ancient system of community contract was appropriated to meet the needs of Chinese villages in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>192</sup>

### **The inadequacy of the Ding Xian-ism and the Zhouping model**

The Ding County and Zhouping programs were only two examples (though the most famous ones) of the hundreds of projects of rural reconstruction in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century China. It was estimated that between 1926 and 1936, more than one thousand organizations, either private or government sponsored, participated in the movement.<sup>193</sup> Yet, because of the fame of both James Yan and Liang Shumin, their programs were often regarded as the pioneer models and followed by many others. Such spotlights also made them the main targets of critics. While the critics generally agreed on the importance of transformation and modernization in the rural

---

<sup>191</sup> Alitto, *The Last Confucian*, 248.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid, 238.

<sup>193</sup> Yu Dingbang and Niu Junkai eds, *Chen Xujiang Wenji* (Guangzhou: Sun Yet-sen University Press, 2004,) 120.

areas, how to realize such goals was an issue that drew much discussion. Many argued that regardless of the contents of the programs, whether the emphasis on education of rural people, as the Ding County and Zhouping programs and many of their followers did, would be effective enough to solve China's rural backwardness and poverty. When evaluating the programs in the Ding County and Zhouping, the economist Qian Jiaju (1909-2002) sharply criticized that the emphasis on education was in fact a kind of denial of the fact that the solution for economic problems must be pursued first before any educational and social reform could take place. He quoted data provided by the sociologist Li Jinghan, who had conducted a detailed investigation of the Ding County, and argued that by focusing on the educational programs, the Ding County program proved to be incapable of improving the living condition of local residents.<sup>194</sup> If the rural people had to struggle to put food on their tables every day, they would have no desire and resource to participate in those projects that aimed to transform them into modern citizens, an goal they might regarded as irrelevant to their daily life. Qian pointed out that while the advocates of rural reforms labeled ignorance, poverty, ill health, and selfishness as the four most urgent problems, in reality, poverty was the root of the other three. Although the Ding County program also included projects of increasing production and the villagers' income, such as the agricultural co-op, the traditional tension between landlords and tenants and the impacts of industrial production from the west aborted any effectiveness these projects might achieve.<sup>195</sup>

---

<sup>194</sup> Li Jinghan investigated the numbers of household with debts, households which could not afford the payment and went bankruptcy, beggars, and population which left the Ding County in search of employment. His conclusion showed that from 1931, the economic condition in the county deteriorated even when James Yan and the National Association of Mass Education Movement had been conducting reform programs for 5 years. Qian Jiaju, "Zhongguo nongcun jianshe zhilu hezai", *Shenbao yuekan* Vol. 3, No. 10 (1934,)105-106.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid, 101-104. Another economists Wu Bannong held similar criticism. He also argued that the main problem of the Ding County program was that instead of promoting programs to eliminate ignorance, selfishness, poverty, and ill health in the rural area, it should ask why these problems existed at the first place. Wu Bannong, "Lun dingxian zhuyi," in Qian Jiaju ed., *Zhongguo nongcun jingji lunwenji* (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1936,) 15-22.

Another sociologist, Chen Xujing, also criticized that the fundamental problem of the theories of the rural movement was a tendency of looking at China's antiquity as the perfect society. Because of such false presumption, those theorists, Liang Shumin included, failed to see the advantage of industrialization and thus their formulas of rural reform were not effective solution of China's rural problems. Taking Liang's theories as an example, he pointed out that Liang dismissed industrialization as western evil that would materialize the rural society, create classes based on material wealth, and further destroyed the proper relation (lunli) in rural villagers. However, in Chen's point of view, Liang Shumin's advocate of agricultural reforms was in fact another kind of materialism whose purpose was nothing more than increasing rural income and improving economic condition of rural areas. Yet, in Zhouping one heard the seemingly contradictory statements in which the leaders on the one hand urged the villagers to participate in programs of agricultural reforms, but on the other hand encouraged the villagers to focus on the spiritual refinement instead of material gain.<sup>196</sup> Such fear of material wealth was in fact an obstacle to capital accumulation which was indispensable for improving rural economy.

Furthermore, Chen pointed out that while the organizations conducting reform programs often attributed their disappointing success to the lack of enough fund, their choices of program locations only added gravity to the issue of funding. Chen argued that the leaders of the rural reform movement intentionally chose backward, remote area to start their projects because such a choice could highlight the urgency of rural problems. However, this choice also made it more difficult to pull resources and talented people who were enthusiastic about the movement toward the rural villages for they mostly concentrated in the cities. As a result, significant cost was spent on gathering these resources and hiring people from the cities. Chen lamented that consequently,

---

<sup>196</sup> Yu and Niu eds., *Chen Xujing wenji*, 117-118

much of the available fund was spent on maintaining the administration instead of the project implementation.<sup>197</sup>

In short, while the importance of rural reconstruction was widely acknowledged, the fact that the programs in the Ding County and Zhouping and many of their followers did not consider the improvement of rural economy as the first priority and their lack of enough funds worried many contemporaries that these programs were doomed to fail from the beginning. Although the program of rural reform promoted by Lu Zuofu in JLJXSX seemed to have much similarity with its counterparts in many other rural villages outside of Sichuan, particularly the Ding County and Zhouping programs, its philosophy differed a great deal from those of James Yan and Liang Shumin. Such ideological difference fundamentally influenced the reform direction the JLJXSX area took and its overall result.

### **The plan for JLJXSX area: imitation and innovation**

As mentioned above, Lu Zuofu was a social activist in his era. In his 20s and early 30s, his attention was primarily on the education reform. During the time when he worked for the militarist Yang Sen and attempted to implement educational reform in the southern Sichuan and Chengdu, he had not developed an extensive reform plan that incorporated more than just education. Such a plan was only gradually formulated after his two projects failed due to the constant change of leadership in the politics of the province.

Lu's life experience, education background, and personality led him to develop another path for China's rural problem. Although Lu might be labeled as an idealist in his youth, his

---

<sup>197</sup> Ibid., 111, 123-135.

relationship and working experience with Sichuanese militarists provided him with a practical perspective on problem solving. When discussing rural problems, he expressed very little interest on philosophical issues. His words were often straightforward and simple. In an article published in the community newspaper of JLJXSX, “The Jialingjiang Daily,” he elaborated his vision of rural reform. Unlike James Yan and Liang Shumin who regarded the cities as either irrelevant or negative influence to the rural reform, Lu began his argument about the importance of rural reform by a discussion of the relationship between the city and the rural villages. He argued that the importance and urgency of rural reform lay not only on the fact that most Chinese population resided in rural villages but also the fact that cities were always surrounded by villages and received supplies of goods and laborers from them. When the rural areas became unstable and bred banditry, the security of cities was often disturbed accordingly. The existence of cities thus depended heavily on the conditions of rural communities. Therefore, successful rural reform was not only crucial to the living quality in the villages but also to the overall development in cities as well. Only when the condition of rural villages improved could the progress and development in the cities also be guaranteed. It was in the rural village where the key to the overall progress of the whole country laid.<sup>198</sup>

Lu then broke down his plan of rural reform into six parts in details: education, economy, transportation, security, health and hygiene, and self-governance. Among these categories, education, health and hygiene followed the programs in the Ding County and Zhouping. As in these two places, the educational reform in JLJXSX targeted both school education (formal) and social education (informal). School education aimed to provide advanced knowledge and training

---

<sup>198</sup> Ling, *Lu Zuofu wenji*, 87-89. Perhaps by coincidence, the importance of cities to the rural reconstruction and the co-depending relationship between cities and rural villages as argue by Lu in 1930 was also considered as critical by Chen Xujing. The two never met but Chen in 1943 also argued that rural reconstruction must rely on the support provided by cities. See Yu and Niu eds., *Chen Xujing wenji*, 122-125.



for talented students and social education aimed to transform people's behavior by providing them an environment of general and volunteer learning, such as library and museum. The health and hygiene programs in JLJXSX included controlling periodical epidemics by vaccination, promoting modern hygienic knowledge so to build a cleaner, comfortable community, and providing basic medical service and facility.<sup>199</sup>

While Ding County reform did not include programs of improving local security, both Lu and Liang Shumin included security reforms in their programs. Their plan for security improvement resulted from the fact that both Zhouping County and the JLJXSX area experienced problems of banditry and disturbance of order by locally powerful civilians. However, unlike Liang who referred to the Chinese antiquity and tradition of “community pact” (xiangyue) as the model for the security program in Zhouping, Lu discussed the security program in practical language with simple and specific goals. The improvement of security in JLJXSX area would began with reorganization of local militias and household registration. The program Lu proposed would also provide vocational training to those without employment so that they would not involve in illegal activities to make a living.<sup>200</sup>

In terms of self-governance, Lu's vision was more in line with the Ding County program. Both designed the details according to the political reform at the county level that promoted by the Nationalist government during the Nanjing Decade. Emphases were placed on setting up local councils and promoting the concept of election and its procedure. In Zhouping, Liang's approach was completely different for he once again designed the details of Zhouping's program

---

<sup>199</sup> Ling, Lu Zuofu wenji, 89-101

<sup>200</sup> Ibid., 96-97. Zheng Dahua, *Mingguo xiangcun jianshe yundong*, 272-275.

on self-governance on the Chinese tradition of community pact and considered moral quality was the most important criteria for a village leader.<sup>201</sup>

Regardless of the similarity, Lu Zuofu's blueprint of rural reform showed significant difference. Lu based his vision of rural reform on the condition of JLJXSX and Sichuan province and his plan was more extensive than what the Ding County and Zhouping programs attempted to do. For one thing, the importance of transportation and communication was left out in the Ding County and Zhouping. Yet, these issues were entwined with the isolation, poverty, and backwardness of rural villages. In Lu's design, a secure and stable rural community was a prerequisite for any reform project to take place and to achieve such stability, the isolation of JLJXSX community must be eliminated first.<sup>202</sup> Therefore, the transportation and communication projects must first be conducted to lay down the modern transportation infrastructure and equipment. With better communication technology, such as telephone and telegram, and transportation infrastructure, such as railways, airport, and automobile routes, information and goods could be exchanged between villages and cities more freely. As he explained, rural residents were often conservative and afraid of unprecedented changes and experiences. Their ignorance and narrow vision often resulted from limited contacts with outside world and were the major obstacles for any reform project.<sup>203</sup> The resources brought by the transportation infrastructure and communication technology would not only in the short term improve the quality of life in the villages but also in the long term would broaden rural residents' vision and contact with the world outside of their communities. They would then welcome reforms and progressive ideas. In fact, Lu had put such emphasis on transportation and

---

<sup>201</sup> Ibid., 262-264, 254-260. Lin, *Lu Zuofu wenji*, 99-100.

<sup>202</sup> Ling, *Lu Zuofu wenji*, 87-88.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid 86

communication into practice by founding the Minsheng Steamship Company prior to his arrival in the XFJ office.

One major reason that Lu changed his career and became an entrepreneur in 1925 was the realization that to succeed any reform must be supported by sufficient funds. In his design, the improvement of transportation and communication infrastructure as discussed above was also crucial in terms of stimulate the growth of rural economy. The new railways and roads would open the door to city markets for rural production. Moreover, particularly in the JLJXSX area, the transportation infrastructure would help the local communities to attract external investments that could utilize the rich reserve of coal in the area to set up a foundation of heavy industry.<sup>204</sup> In addition, the hydrology and geography of the area was also favorable for developing hydroelectric power. By utilizing these resources, the JLJXSX area had a great potential for a variety of factories, such as steel, concrete, pottery production, and Chinese wood oil.

If the above plans for local economy and transportation could be implemented, educational and social reform could receive enough support and sufficient funds. Thus, in Lu's blueprint of reform in the JLJXSX area, stimulation of local economy must be carried out alongside or even before the implementation of any other projects. Only when the local economy was improved to a certain degree could significant progress in other areas be achieved. The emphasis on economic development and material wealth thus distinguished the rural reform program in the JLJXSX area from the ones advocated by both Yan Yangchu and Liang Shumin. Such emphasis also answered to the above critics' call that rural reconstruction could only succeed with support from a strong rural economy.

---

<sup>204</sup> Ibid, 95.

In 1938, when Yan Yangchu visited the town of Beibei for the first time, he claimed that the emphasis on economic growth in the JLJXSX area was valuable experience to all other rural reform programs.<sup>205</sup> While Yan's statement acknowledged the economic achievement the JLJXSX area had accomplished, it by no means indicated the lack of progress in other aspects of rural reform in the JLJXSX area. In Lu's vision, economic reform was not the end result but rather the foundation of meaningful social and educational changes. The following chapter will discuss the detail of rural reforms in the JLJXSX area prior to the anti-Japanese war, how the area was transformed, and its meaning to the history of Sichuan province.

---

<sup>205</sup> Song ed., *Yan Yangchu Wenji*, Vol 2, 123

### Chapter 3: Transformation: The Work and its Meaning

On February, 15<sup>th</sup> 1927, Liu Xiang, who controlled the city of Chongqing and its surrounding region, formally named Lu Zuofu the new head of the XFJ Administration. At the time, Lu's personal career as an entrepreneur had just started (he founded the Minsheng Steamship Company in 1926). Why would someone who had just begun a new business adventure decide to divert his full attention away from his newborn business? Lu's appointment was a result of both personal ambition and the warlord politics in the province. As discussed in Chapter 3, Lu had been a passionate social activist and once devoted himself to educational projects. However, the failure of his reforms in southern Sichuan and Chengdu convinced him to take a different approach. Part his motivation to found the Minsheng Steamship Company was his belief that only financial independence from militarist governments could support reform efforts. Therefore, Lu's appointment presented a great opportunity for him to pursue his ambition as a reformer. According to one of his subordinates in the XFJ Administration, Lu never gave up his reform vision. In fact, before he came to JLJXSX, he had been making arrangements to start rural reform in southern Hechuan County (Nanbai). When he was appointed head administrator of Beibei, his plan for rural reform was conveniently moved to the JLJXSX.<sup>206</sup>

Lu's appointment was also a result of a compromise made by local militarists and gentry. By 1926, the constant war between militarists led Liu Xiang to unite with Yang Sen and permanently expelled the troops of the Guizhou militarist, Yuan Zhuming. Liu secured full control over Chongqing, Jiangbei County, Bishan County, and Ba County. Hence, most of the JLJXSX area was under Liu's control. However, neighboring Hechuan County, which also shared administrative authority over the JLJXSX, was under the command of another Sichuanese

---

<sup>206</sup> Liu Chonglai, *Lu Zuofu yu minguo xiangcun jianshe yanjiu*, 76.

militarist, Deng Xihou.<sup>207</sup> Because of the strategic location of the area and its control over the traffic on the Jianling River, both militarist cliques attempted to acquire control of the XFJ Administration by pressuring the local gentry to support their candidates for the position. As discussed in Chapter 1, the gentry stepped into the administration because the intervention from the militarists only resulted in constant discontinuation and ineffectiveness in security management. To keep the militarists' interference to a minimum and preserve the efficiency of the XFJ Administration, the gentry decided to select someone who did not belong to either Liu Xiang or Deng Xihou's circle as the successor of Hu Nanxian. Neither militarist clique objected to the gentry's selection because of Lu's civilian background and his reputation as an entrepreneur and social activist.<sup>208</sup> In the next decade, Lu and his younger brother, Lu Ziyang, who later was appointed the head of the XFJ Administration in 1935, endeavored to utilize warlord politics to administer the JKJXSX area. Hence, to understand the operation and achievement of the XFJ office after 1927, we must first look at the stories of the militarists, especially Liu Xiang, who held indisputable control over Chongqing until the arrival of the Nationalist government in 1937.

## **Liu Xiang**

Like many of his military colleagues, Liu Xiang's career was only made possible by the fall of imperial government and the disintegration of the traditional social order. Born in 1890 to a landlord family with moderate means, like thousands of Chinese males in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, his education began by attending a traditional private academy. No record indicated that Liu was

---

<sup>207</sup> Kuang, *Sichuan Junfashi*, map 22.

<sup>208</sup> Liu, *Lu Zuofu yu minguo xiangcun jianshe yanjiu*, 75.

an especially talented student in his childhood. In addition to land holding, the family also had a joint grain business with another branch of the Liu lineage.<sup>209</sup> It was very likely that Liu Xiang would simply inherit the family grain business, if not for the rapid changes brought about by events in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. After the Opium war in 1840, the Qing Dynasty faced continuous external and internal challenges that eventually crumbled its hold over China. However, as Qing society and its social order were shaken by these events, new career choices were opened to those with ambition. Many abandoned the traditional path to officialdom by examination and enrolled in a variety of new schools. Liu Xiang was no exception. In 1908, he was enrolled in the Sichuan Rapid Course School of Army.<sup>210</sup>

In his early adulthood, Liu Xiang displayed very few leadership traits that would make him later the most powerful militarist in Sichuan. Many of his acquaintances at that time describe Liu Xiang as a quiet, obedient person who often seemed ignorant about contemporary affairs and politics. No one considered Liu Xiang ambitious about his career advancement in the military. However, it was precisely these personality traits that won over the trust of his superiors, who often feared being replaced by able and ambitious junior officers. With a bit of luck, by 1911, Liu Xiang was already a battalion commander.<sup>211</sup>

From 1911 onward, Liu Xiang engaged himself in the seemingly endless struggle with other Sichuanese military leaders. After 1927, he became the most powerful military leader in Sichuan. His success relied heavily on his control of Chongqing, for the city provided enough resources to maintain the army and fill his subordinate commanders' pockets.<sup>212</sup> More importantly, Liu Xiang

---

<sup>209</sup> Qiao and Yang, *Liu Xiang*, 1.

<sup>210</sup> The Sichuan Rapid Course School of the Army was one of the military schools founded by the Qing Dynasty to train a modern style military. *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*, 4.

<sup>212</sup> Kapp, *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic*, 42-43.

seemed to possess unusual skill at keeping the power of his subordinate commanders in check while at the same time allowing them to pursue their personal ambition. In other words, unlike many militarists, who often feared the extensive access to resources on the part of their subordinates would undermine their own authority, Liu Xiang was more willing to open such access to his subordinate commanders as long as they did not use their talent and resources against him. Hence, by sharing the resources in Chongqing and its vicinity with his commanders, Liu Xiang received their loyalty in return.<sup>213</sup>

Liu Xiang's permissive attitude toward his commanders might also indicate that he was not afraid of cooperating with able commanders as long as he could utilize their ability for his own purposes. According to Zhou Kaiqing, Liu's biographer, who was also a Sichuan native, Liu Xiang "was a true leader who was generous and forgiving toward his subordinates. He paid a great deal of attention to politics and order and was open-minded toward advice from local gentry. He had the unique ability of choosing talented and able persons as local administrators in the area over which he had full control." Liu Xiang's relationship with his immediate family also demonstrated this aspect of his personality. While other Sichuanese militarists often placed their family members in important administrative or military positions, Liu Xiang did not even give his own brothers any position in his government for he did not consider them sufficiently capable.<sup>214</sup>

---

<sup>213</sup> Ibid., 46-47.

<sup>214</sup> Qiao and Yang, *Liu Xiang*, 2. Liu Wenhui, a distant cousin of Liu Xiang and his long-term rivalry, appointed many of his immediate family members to various administrative and military positions. Some of Liu's contemporaries and subordinate administrators also shared a similar observation. For example, Sun Zhen, a general of the National Army under Jiang Kai-shek, also stated that unlike other Sichuanese militarists, Liu Xiang "was an upright military leader, had no ill habits of gambling and prostitution.....and was able to recruit talented people to work with him in the field of finance and politics." See Sun Zhen, *Ba shi nian guoshi chuanshi jianwenlu*, 158-163. Also see Liu Hengcen, preface of *Minguo liu fucheng xiansheng nianpu*, 3-4.



To obtain support from the elite and legitimacy for his leadership, Liu Xiang advocated the idea of self-governance—“Sichuan should be ruled by Sichuanese.” This concept of self-governance or *zhizhi* (自治), as it was called in Chinese, had its roots in the political environment of the late Qing years. The Qing court first institutionalized this idea during the New Policy Reform era by establishing local assemblies and Western-style elections. When the Qing regime collapsed in 1911, the Republic government inherited this institutional design and continued to elect representatives. During the 1920s, labor unions, chambers of commerce, student groups, and many private organizations, tired of a political environment ruled by military strong hands, promoted the popular election of a provincial governor to abolish the military governors (*dujun*).<sup>215</sup> However, in reality, this movement was often appropriated by the military leaders to justify their claims of legitimacy when facing political challenges from their military rivals. In particular, after the death of Yuan Shikai, when his successors in the North attempted to unify the country by force, military leaders in the South advocated that the provinces should have their own constitutions and select their own administrators to resist military intrusion from Northern militarists. On the surface, the idea of self-governance seemed to provide a transitional solution for China’s political chaos before a strong, centralized government could unify the entire country, as many militarists in the South claimed. In reality, it was local separatism in disguise, and such a claim only served to maintain local militarists’ status quo. In Sichuan Province, the presence of Yunnan and Guizhou armies and the threat from the North also resulted in an environment in which the idea of self-governance could be easily appropriated by Sichuanese militarists to expel the challenge from non-Sichuanese power and maintain their own garrison bases. In December, 1920, Xiong Kewu, Liu Xiang, and another 19 Sichuanese military commanders formally

---

<sup>215</sup> Kuang, *Sichuan junfashi*, 129-130, 133.

declared that before a legitimated, unified central government could be established, the province should be self-governed by Sichuanese natives.<sup>216</sup> This statement paved the way for Xiong Kewu and Liu Xiang to eliminate intrusion by Guizhou and Yunnan militarists and the power of other Sichuanese militarists who attempted to dominate Sichuan through support from the North, such as Liu Cunhou.

In seeking the legitimacy and support of Sichuanese people, the propaganda of self-governance had several meanings. On the one hand, it became the theoretical basis for Sichuanese militarists to shield their garrison areas from extra-provincial influence. On the other hand, it also created a positive image for the militarists in the eyes of general population.<sup>217</sup> By 1927, Liu Xiang, along with several Sichuanese militarists, Yang Sen included, successfully eliminated external military intervention in Sichuan and consolidated his base in Chongqing. In addition to the self-governance slogan, he further promoted the unification of the province as the next goal of his government and called for assistance from Sichuanese. Liu Xiang often claimed publicly that in order to maintain stability in the province before the unification of the country was realized, it was a necessary measure for him to rule Chongqing as a military commander. However, the purpose of his government was not to disturb the lives of the people; instead, it aimed to solve the political chaos and economical difficulty caused by Western imperialism.<sup>218</sup> This propaganda became useful tools for Liu to convince the Sichuanese elites to join him in pursuing political stability in the province.<sup>219</sup>

---

<sup>216</sup> Ibid., 128.

<sup>217</sup> Zhang Jing, *Quanli chongtu yu biange: 1926-1937 nian Chongqing chengshi xiandaihua yanjiu* (Chongqing: Chongqing cubanshe, 2003,) 123-124.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid., 124-125.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid., 128-136.

Chinese historian Chen Xulu (1918-1988) once commented that the warlord regimes in the Republic era treated politics as a private-owned business. They controlled every aspect of politics, economy, and social life in their base area by appointing those who had private relationships with them, such as family members, neighbors, friends, students, and former colleagues, to important military and administrative positions. These militarist cliques, regardless of their locations and sizes, displayed strong similarity with the Chinese lineage system in which power and resources were controlled in the hands of the lineage patriarchs.<sup>220</sup> Liu Xiang's clique displayed this characteristic as well. Though he did not deploy much of his immediate family members in his government, he appointed a group of former classmates in the Sichuan Rapid Course School of Army (Sichuan lujun sucheng xuetang) as commanders and administrators. However, Liu Xiang's willingness to work with intellectuals and gentry and his ability to maintain a balance between hegemony and distributing authority to his subordinates attracted a group of elites who had no private relationships with him. Many important administrative positions in the field of finance, trade, and diplomacy were appointed to Sichuanese intellectuals with degrees from China's new-style universities or overseas schools. These administrators enjoyed Liu's full trust, and many of them worked with him until his death in 1938. Much of the stability in Liu Xiang's garrison areas should be attributed to such cooperation between the military regime and local elites.<sup>221</sup>

Considering the quality of Liu Xiang's government, Liu's appointment of Lu Zuofu as the head of XFJ Administration was not a surprising decision. By 1926, Liu Xiang had consolidated his control over Chongqing after Yunnan militarist Yuan Zuming was expelled. To

---

<sup>220</sup> Chen, *Jindai zhongguo shehui de xinchen daixie*, 360-361.

<sup>221</sup> Zhang Jing, *Quanli chongtu yu biange*, 141-145. Liu Xiang not only recruited elites into his government but also worked with Chongqing's entrepreneurs to develop the city's industry. See Mary Lee McIssac, "The Limits of Chinese Nationalism: Workers in Wartime Chongqing," PhD. Dissertation, Yale University, 1994, 25-32.

further improve the stability of his rule, working with the local elites to restore order was an urgent matter. Since the JLJXSX was on the border where the garrison areas of Liu Xiang and Deng Xihou met, choosing a new administrator who was politically neutral was a necessary measure to avoid conflicts between the cliques of Liu and Deng. Lu Zuofu presented himself as an ideal candidate. Though he worked for other militarists before, such as Yang Sen, who was once Liu Xiang's rival, he displayed little interest in advancing his personal fortune through his connection with powerful military leaders. Instead, he made his name known to the elite circle of the Chongqing area through his reform projects. After the business of Minsheng Steamship Company was launched in the summer of 1926, Lu's reputation and connections were further expanded. These personal qualities were decisive factors for the local gentry to recommend Lu as the new leader of the XFJ Administration. Once Lu took up the position, he was eventually recruited by Liu Xiang and was later entrusted with other administrative responsibilities in Liu's government. Because of Lu's later involvement in Liu Xiang's government, the XFJ Administration was able to enjoy support from Liu Xiang and eventually evolved from a local militia organization into an administrative institution. This evolution not only represented how Lu Zuofu and his colleagues in Sichuanese elite circle realized a plan of rural reform; it also shed new light on the rule of Sichuanese militarists, who had been infamous for their indifference toward the province's wellbeing.

### **Laying down the foundation for a small haven of order**

The transformation of XFJ administration evolved between 1927 and 1942. During this period of time, the name of the administration changed twice in accordance with the change of

its administrative territory, focus, and responsibility. These changes also reflected the strong influence from politics at the provincial and national levels.

When Lu Zuofu arrived in Beibei in the spring of 1927, the area under the XFJ Administration had roughly 3,300 households and a population of about 17,000 people.<sup>222</sup> Much of its administrative territory was hilly land. Though agricultural activity produced harvest, it was mainly for local consumption.<sup>223</sup> Since the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, although coal mining was the largest industry in the area, it did not stimulate much growth in the local economy due to the lack of advanced machinery that could expand production. The town of Beibei, where the XFJ office was located, had a small river port and commodity exchanges were often conducted there. The landscape of this central location was described as hilly and small. Small houses, mostly one or two stories, lined the narrow streets. Their roofs often extended above the street, blocking out most daylight. As a result, the streets were always dark and wet. One might feel like he/she is wondering around a basement when walking on the streets.<sup>224</sup>

After a decade of security management, first by a few military commanders and later by the XFJ office, the community saw some progress in its bandit problems. However, the lack of funding and a comprehensive strategy allowed the banditry to linger. Moreover, the soldiers controlled by the XFJ Administration often proved incompetent when battling the bandits. Therefore, upon Lu's arrival, the most urgent issues of the administration were military and finance.

---

<sup>222</sup> Zhou and Tang, eds., *Beibei quzhi*, 52.

<sup>223</sup> Anonymous, "Jialingjiang Sanxia Xiangcun Jianshe Shiyanqu Gaikuang," *Nonglin xinbao* Vol.16, No. 26-28(1939), 27

<sup>224</sup> Sun Chenglie, "Beibei juluo zhi," *Di li*, Vol.5, No.3-4 (1945), 4.

## **Military**

From the time of its founding in 1923, the XFJ recruited its armed force from the male population in the JLJXSX area. In theory, the area patrolled by the XFJ was under the jurisdiction of four counties: Ba, Hechuan, Bishan, and Jiangbei; therefore, initially, the armed force controlled by the XFJ office was recruited with the consent of the county governments. While the training of militia was the responsibility of the XFJ, the county administrations were responsible for providing funds for training and weapons. In addition to carrying out the training, the XFJ Administration acted as a coordinating organization between the four counties when the anti-bandit campaign required further assistance and resources.<sup>225</sup> Like local militias in the late Qing Dynasty, this armed force was not a professional army and only existed because the county and provincial authorities were incapable of dealing with the problem of local security. Aside from poor management, the nature of the militias in the JLJXSX area might have attributed to their ineffectiveness. As Philip Kuhn describes, the existence of local militias presented a kind of militarization process that separated common people from daily routine and occupations. Because such a process was not a complete transformation, the militias often possessed the following characteristics that distinguished them from military professional. Economically, militia members did not change their occupations; instead, their duty as militia members was more like a “side-line” job. Socially and politically, the militia members were not cut off from the life and customs of the local communities. While the military professional in the Qing Dynasty was part of a distinct social class, the local militia still maintained the same identification status or registration records in the local administration. Moreover, militia members were not required to follow the same set of military rules and values as professionals.

---

<sup>225</sup> DAGLJ, P1020681.

Hence, they maintained their old way of life and habits and psychologically did not treat themselves and were not treated as different from ordinary people.<sup>226</sup>

These qualities had some advantages for militia management. By allowing militia members to maintain their ties with their original occupations and their community life, the militia administration would save significant funds, which might otherwise be spent on paying professional soldiers. Furthermore, using local residents to protect the local community also met their best interests since the wellness of their family and property also relied on the order of the community. However, without proper management, these qualities would actually become obstacle to effectiveness. First of all, allowing militia members to keep their original occupations presented the possible problem of training interfering with their routine work, for example, harvest season. Secondly, by giving the militia members military training and arms, they were also given power and authority, which they might abuse and become local bullies. Furthermore, since joining the militia did not bring in any immediate, extra material gains, recruitment could easily attract vagrants who might intend on participating in illegal activities or were simply looking for clothing and food or opportunists who viewed the militia as a path to personal benefits. To solve such problems, sufficient knowledge about the background of militia members and a careful selection process were crucial. However, in areas where agricultural production was insufficient and commerce was not prosperous, problems like these would be more difficult to manage. For in such communities, poverty often resulted in high mobility, which consequently disturbed the stability of social structures and familiarity among local residents. The complicated background of local population thus affected the quality of militia members. As Elizabeth Perry's work on poverty strikes in North China proves, in peripheral areas where poverty

---

<sup>226</sup> Kuhn, *Rebellion and its Enemies*, ch. 3.

resulted in unstable local security, the line between “orthodox” and “heterodox” militias was never clearly defined. A local armed force whose original goal was to protect local resources and order could easily turn to banditry or organized rebellion in response to, for example, heavy taxation, a natural calamity, or a lack of government-approved leadership.<sup>227</sup>

JLJXSX society in the late 1930s was similar to Perry’s description of North China. Geographically, it was not an environment that favored profitable agricultural production or large scale commerce. Though it was close to the confluence point where the Jialing River met the Yangzi River, with hilly land and swift river currents, during the days when ships equipped with modern machinery had not yet arrived, the area never developed into a large river port. As described in the Chapter 2, most residents in this area were involved in the handicraft industry and small scale trades. Life here might not be as grim as in the North China due to the lack of periodical natural calamities, but it was certainly not affluent.

As in North China, a large, mobile population also existed here in JLJXSX lands. These lands possessed rich reserves of coal and were thus actively mined since the early 19<sup>th</sup> century. Although extensive research on the mining industry in this area has not been conducted, records indicate that the mining industry employed thousands of adult and child workers in 1930s, most of which were males.<sup>228</sup> This army of male workers was an ideal pool for both banditry and militia recruitments. If not managed properly, they had the great potential to disturb local order. The political chaos of the province after the fall of the Qing Dynasty only added more stress to the fragile security of the JLJXSX community. Poverty, a mobile population, and the lack of

---

<sup>227</sup> Perry, *Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China*, 48-95.

<sup>228</sup> Anonymous, “Jianglingjiang qu meiyue jinkuang,” *Gongshang xinwen*. CTGMW.



strong government and gentile leadership were factors that bred rebellions in North China and caused security problem in the JLJXSX region as well.

When Lu Zuofu came to JLJXSX as the new administrator, the XFJ office had approximately one hundred militia soldiers. To replace them with professional soldiers immediately was a costly task that the bankrupt XFJ could not afford. Instead, Lu carried out two steps to improve the militia's efficiency. First, he reorganized the existing force. While the number of soldiers was increased to 130, the number of brigades was decreased from around ten to three. A military supervisor was also appointed to supervise the military training. Moreover, the XFJ administration set down clear guidelines of recruitment; only males without criminal records and with regular job were qualified for training. The training program for militia also expanded from military training only to basic education, including career training.<sup>229</sup> In 1928, Lu sought permission from Liu Xiang to begin training a professional armed force. Considering the condition of JLJXSX communities and the characteristics of local militias, Lu's suggestion was logical. In his letter, Lu explained the difficulty of maintaining an adequate number of soldiers, who seemed to come and go as they pleased. His plan was to recruit people with a modern education background and provide them not only with military training, but also courses on subjects such as science and politics.<sup>230</sup> Liu Xiang approved the plan because he agreed with Lu that a professional armed force could eliminate problems brought by the former method of recruiting militia members.<sup>231</sup>

From 1928 to 1934, the XFJ Administration recruited more than 400 males as student trainees. To join this armed force, the student not only was required to have a modern education

---

<sup>229</sup> DAGLJ, P1020089.

<sup>230</sup> Ibid., P1020050.

<sup>231</sup> Ibid., P1020052.

background, but also a guarantor who could attest to his character and ethics. Such a requirement gave the XFJ more control over the selection process and quality of the new armed force. Initially, these students were responsible for assisting the existing soldiers in battles against bandits. After finishing their training, they would become enlisted soldiers. As the XFJ eventually took on the job of a civil administration and began to work on the improvement of quality of life in the JLJXSX area, these soldiers were sometimes entrusted with policing duties.<sup>232</sup>

## **Finance**

The changes implemented to militia organization and recruitment were also part of the financial restructuring plan. Although the XFJ office could be considered a gentry-managed organization, there was no local elite wealthy enough to provide sufficient funds to run its operation. Therefore, since its founding, the XFJ office was constantly on the brink of bankruptcy. The office had the following three income sources: taxes from cargo ships that travelled upstream and downstream on the Jialing River, taxes from the coal and paper factories within 30 miles of the river bank, and a meager stipend for the militia from the four counties administration (about 2,400 Chinese Yuan in total annually.) Taking the years from 1923 to 1926 as examples, the annual total income from the above sources was between 35,000 and 41,000 Chinese dollars. The XFJ administration basically spent every penny of this amount of money on its daily operation. There was no record of financial reports from the years before 1923; however, by 1923, the administration had accumulated a debt of more than 5,000 Chinese dollars and

---

<sup>232</sup> Ibid., P1020539-P1020540. The archive showed that by the early 1930s, the XFJ Administration imposed fine on a variety of misconducts.

could not pay it off.<sup>233</sup> How to reform the administration's finances to achieve an efficient operation was another urgent issue that needed to be solved before Lu Zuofu could implement his vision of rural reform.

The XFJ Administration in the 1930s was merely an institution of security management. Except for the abovementioned taxes, it did not have any fiscal power to collect other types of taxes such as land and property taxes. Those taxes belonged to the four counties. To impose new taxes would surely provoke resistance from the local community and merchants for there were already several agencies collecting taxes in the name of security and protection along the Jialing River in 1920s.<sup>234</sup> Since it was impossible for the XFJ administration to receive new income by taxation, Lu adopted several policies in the hope of improving the XFJ office's financial condition. In addition to reorganizing the militia to cut expenses on its management, office employees were mandated to save part of their monthly income in the small bank set up by Lu. These savings were, in fact, all spent by the XFJ office on its daily operations.<sup>235</sup> Moreover, to decrease the number of tax evasion cases, a new set of regulations was also imposed on tax collection. The taxpayers would now receive receipts for their payments and a duplicate copy would remain with the XFJ office. The new receipt system also aimed to prevent tax embezzlement by tax collectors.<sup>236</sup>

Another approach adopted by Lu Zuofu was to invest in businesses that could bring profits for the XFJ office. In 1928, with help from the Minsheng Steamship Company, the XFJ

---

<sup>233</sup> Ibid., P1020174.

<sup>234</sup> Ibid., P1020914.

<sup>235</sup> In 1928, the XFJ Administration found its first bank, The Beibei Bank of Agriculture. This bank provided monetary services mainly to the employers of the administration. The financial report of the XFJ office showed that the monthly deposits (about 1,000 Chinese Yuan) from the employers were counted as administrative income. Any employer who wished to make withdraw must submit a written request to the head of the Administration. DAGLJ, P1020297 and DAGLJ, P1021812-P1010820.

<sup>236</sup> DAGLJ P1020073, P1020075.

office invested about 50,000 Chinese Yuan to open a textile factory. In addition to the goal of making a profit, the factory also served to occupy the soldiers, making their time and energy productive while not on duty maintaining local security. By giving these soldiers opportunities to make extra income and avoid idleness, the XFJ also hoped to provide them some handicraft training and eliminate the likelihood of these soldiers turning to banditry or becoming local bullies and disturbing the public order.<sup>237</sup> By 1930, the total assets of the textile factory reached more than 60,000 Chinese dollars, and in addition to soldiers, it employed more than 40 female workers.<sup>238</sup> The net profit of the textile business, however, did not go to the XFJ office directly.<sup>239</sup> Since the factory was founded by the Minsheng Steamship Company, the company was entitled to the factory's profits. Nevertheless, with Lu as the executive manager of the company, by helping the company invest, the XFJ office was able to receive loans from the textile factory and Minsheng Company whenever needed.<sup>240</sup>

Although administrative effectiveness was the immediate result, when implementing the financial policies, Lu intended their influence to be more far-reaching, particularly in terms of restructuring local politics. Inherited from the century-old baojia system, the heads of local militia unit were often local residents with certain amount of wealth, education, or connection with authority.<sup>241</sup> As in the imperial era, the responsibility of these leaders in the JLJXSX area during the 1930s included tax collection. If not supervised properly, the power given to these leaders could easily be abused. Local leaders, who were supposed to be the proxy of government, would then turn into bullies and threaten community order. In the late 1910s and early 1920s,

---

<sup>237</sup> Ling, *Minsheng gongsi shi*, 74.

<sup>238</sup> Ibid., 75.

<sup>239</sup> The financial report of the Administration did not include the profit of textile production as its income. DAGLJ,

<sup>240</sup> Huang, *Lu Zuofu Shuxinji*, 21-22.

<sup>241</sup> During the Ming and Qing dynasties, the Baojia was designed as a surveillance system that could detect illegal activities in the local communities. For information on the Baojia system, see Xiao Gongquan, *Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1960), 26-36.

when the security issue became the responsibility of the XFJ, the local society in JLJXSX already had its own social hierarchy with a few militia captains carrying out tax collection and community patrols. During the first year of Lu's tenure, the XFJ Administration still employed many of these heads of the militias as lieutenants. However, as the XFJ administration reorganized its militia force, personnel appointments also had to be rearranged. Moreover, the new receipt system, though intended to make tax collection more effective, also eliminated the direct access the proxy collectors' had to the tax money. In short, the policy implemented by the XFJ office in the first year of Lu's tenure had the effect of transferring power from the existing local leaders to the XFJ office. Since the XFJ, to some extent, was an external intrusion to local politics due to the appointment of both Lu and his predecessor, Hu Nanxian, this restructuring of local politics that came with the implementation of new financial policies was necessary to open up a space where the XFJ office could lay down its authority in the community.<sup>242</sup>

### **Lu Zuofu's growing prestige and the XFJ Administration**

If the XFJ was to succeed in its mission of improving security, a stable provincial political environment that could provide the XFJ administration legitimacy was critical. Under the leadership of Hu Nanxian prior to 1927, the legitimacy of the XFJ Administration in the eyes of local communities was questionable. As a result, Hu was accused of corruption several times

---

<sup>242</sup> Prior to Lu's arrival, in order to clarify how much tax payment the XFJ Administration could use, the XFJ Administration began a series of attempts, including shutting down duplicate, private-run tax stations in the JLJXSX area and ordering the local baojia leaders to submit the tax collected. These policies caused much tension between the XFJ office and the local leaders. DAGLJ, P1020642, P1020627.

by local residents submitting complaint letters to the magistrates' offices.<sup>243</sup> Hu's tenure was also during a time when battles among the militarists in the province were most rampant. Since no militarist was strong enough to claim leadership of the provincial government, the XFJ Administration could obtain little or no political support when facing local challenges. Resistance and argument often occurred when the XFJ administration attempted to carry out its personnel appointments or tax reform.<sup>244</sup> However, by the late 1920s, the political wind in the province was changing as Sichuanese militarists ceased to engage in large scale battles against each other. Stability in their garrison area now became a priority that was closely related to the power of the militarists. Lu's leadership thus enjoyed the advantage brought by such a change in provincial politics.

More importantly, Lu Zuofu's relationship with Liu Xiang was another advantage for the XFJ Administration. Liu Xiang and his government basically did not intervene in the operation of the XFJ Administration. Most of the requests made by the XFJ office, such as militia reorganization and the training of a professional army, received no objection from Liu Xiang's office. A tax exemption was also granted to the textile products of the XFJ Administration's factory.<sup>245</sup> Moreover, Liu Xiang's decision to appoint Lu as the head of the Administration of Sichuan Waterway Navigation Management (Chuanjiang hangyun guanlichu) in 1929 further revealed how Lu was involved in Liu Xiang's regime and how this involvement, in turn, assisted his work in the XFJ Administration.

---

<sup>243</sup> DAGLJ, P1020948. During his term in the XFJ office, Hu Nanxian attempted to abolish private-run tax stations in the JLJXSX area and was eventually accused of corruption by those who ran the tax stations. The incident led to Hu's resignation in April 1926.

<sup>244</sup> Although the XFJ administration obtained approval or supportive documents from provincial authority for its policies, it did not receive much advantage from such endorsement when dealing with the local politics. In addition to the resistance to tax reform, the XFJ Administration often had to negotiate with different parties for appointments of militia lieutenants. DAGLJ, P1020850.

<sup>245</sup> DAGLJ, P1020580.

By the late 1930s, Liu Xiang had consolidated his status and control in eastern Sichuan. By controlling the area, Liu established himself as the most powerful Sichuanese militarist and was now able to begin the realization of provincial unification under his rule. The life line of Sichuan's economy, the Yangzi River, brought enormous profit to Chongqing from the traffic entering and leaving the province. To maintain the stability of his government in Chongqing, it was crucial for Liu Xiang to control the navigation business on the Yangzi River. However, since 1895, when Chongqing formally became a treaty port, the Western- and Japanese-owned steamship companies had monopolized the navigation business on the Yangzi River. To fully control river navigation, such foreign monopolization must be dissolved.<sup>246</sup> Liu's anti-imperialist rhetoric echoed with Sichuanese elite's patriotic sentiment and resulted in a consensus on the termination of foreign monopolization on the Yangzi River. A conference among the steamship companies and Liu's administrators was then held to design the details. The plan was to combine the small Chinese-owned companies into several larger companies to eliminate competition among Chinese. Yet, conflicts of self-interests prevented the participating companies from reaching a resolution. Liu Xiang then hand-picked the Minsheng Steamship Company to carry out the plan, for he acknowledged that Lu Zuofu was the most qualified among the managers of the navigation companies.<sup>247</sup> The purchase plan Liu assigned to the Minsheng Company would not only eliminate competition among Chinese-operated navigation companies, but would also allow the Minsheng Company to grow and compete with Western-owned ventures. Although Lu was one of the founders of the company and its executive manager, his power was limited when implementing the decisions of the board members, for he personally held no share of the

---

<sup>246</sup> Ling, *Minsheng gongsi shi*, 28.

<sup>247</sup> Under Lu's leadership, the business of the Minsheng Steamship Company grew rapidly after Lu introduced novel management of the navigation business and order on the ships. See Anne Reinhardt, "Navigating Imperialism in China: Steamship, Semicolony, and Nation, 1860-1937," PhD Diss., Princeton University, 2002, 253-255.

company. To enable Lu to exert his influence in the decision-making process, Liu Xiang purchased 5,000 Chinese Yuan worth of the company's shares under Lu's name and made him a board member.<sup>248</sup>

In the spring of 1929, Liu Xiang appointed Lu the head of the Administration of Sichuan Waterway Navigation Management. Although Liu Xiang claimed that the ultimate goal of the administration was to diminish foreign control over the navigation business on the Yangzi River, in reality, the administration was a representation of Liu's power over the Yangzi River and aimed to realize the unification of the province by controlling the navigation on the Yangzi River. Therefore, before Lu carried out the merger plan led by the Minsheng Company, the administration established a set of rules, such as all ships, including Chinese- and foreigner-owned ships, were subjected to inspection by the administration. All military personnel were required to purchase tickets or pay for fuel expenses when doing business with any navigation company. The administration also began to monitor the fees imposed by the steamship companies to prevent unreasonable charges. Though the administration encountered resistance, with strong support from Liu Xiang, it successfully brought foreign companies under its control.

In 1930, Lu Zuofu and the Minsheng Company began to purchase other Chinese-owned navigation companies. By 1931, the total number of ships owned by the Minsheng Company increased from 4 to 12.<sup>249</sup> Its size eventually surpassed the Western-run companies. Since many small companies were controlled by small militarists, the business merger eliminated their control over the traffic on the Yangzi River and, consequently, their independence and power. Therefore, through the expansion of the Minsheng Company, Liu Xiang not only achieved his

---

<sup>248</sup> Zhou Kaiqing, *Minguo liu fucheng xiansheng nianpu* (Reprint Taipei: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1981), 4-5.

<sup>249</sup> Ling, *Minsheng gongsi shi*, 33.



goal of controlling the navigation business on the Yangzi River, but also further consolidated his claim of leadership in the Province.<sup>250</sup>

Liu Xiang was certainly not the only beneficiary of the project to reclaim the control over the navigation on the Yangzi River. Although Lu Zuofu was only the head of the Navigation Administration for one year, the connection he built with many administrators in Liu Xiang's government and even Liu Xiang himself would prove crucial for Lu's subsequent work in JLJXSX. As discussed above, by the late 1930s, Liu Xiang had convinced many of Sichuan's best educated elites to join his government. For example, Liu Xiang appointed Liu Hangcen, a graduate from the Department of Economy at Beijing University, to head his financial administration. Liu's classmate at Beijing University, He Beiheng, studied the law and also held several positions in Liu Xiang's government, such as the magistrate of Ba County and the head of the Department of Development (Jiansheting). He also succeeded Lu as the head of Sichuan River Navigation Administration in 1931.<sup>251</sup> Lu's one-year-term in the Navigation Administration provided a great opportunity to build a relationship with these administrators. In the following years, these administrators worked closely with Lu and assisted him in acquiring the resources needed for development in the JLJXSX area.<sup>252</sup>

In addition, the expansion of the Minsheng Company further brought Lu into close contact with finance and banking businesses, both inside and outside of the province. The Sichuanese-operated banks, Chuankang, Meifong, and Juxingcheng, and national banks, such as the Bank of China, all provided financial assistance to the Minsheng Company in its expansion

---

<sup>250</sup> Ibid., 37-38.

<sup>251</sup> He Yimin, ed., *Sichuan jinxindai renwuzhuan* (Chengdu: Sichuan University Press, 1990,) 6 vols, vol. 3 126-131.

<sup>252</sup> Huang, *Lu Zuofu shuxin ji*, 202-206.

process.<sup>253</sup> Lu's relationship with these banks, especially with the Meifong Bank, allowed the XFJ Administration to negotiate donations and loans.<sup>254</sup>

More importantly, cooperation with Liu Xiang and the growth of the Minsheng Company added more prestige to Lu's personal status in the province and the legitimacy of his position in JLJXSX. Since the main responsibility of the XFJ Administration was the maintenance of local security, it technically had no power to intervene in other aspects of community life such as local hygiene and education. However, as Lu's personal reputation grew, so did the legitimacy of the XFJ Administration. In the eyes of the local community, the XFJ office gradually became a representative of county and even provincial authority. The following case is great evidence of this transformation.

In 1929, the leading monks of several temples and local gentry in the JLJXSX area submitted an appeal to the XFJ office, protesting the order from the Bishan County office, which notified the temples of a plan to auction the land surrounding the temples. They argued that these lands had been the property of the temples for centuries and the county government had no right to carry out the auction without consent from the temples. The petitioners urged the XFJ office to protest against the Bishan County Government and address their grievance to Liu Xiang. Using the XFJ office as their political representative, the monks and gentry eventually received confirmation for the ownership of the property from Liu at the end of 1929.<sup>255</sup> What is

---

<sup>253</sup> Ling, *Minsheng gongsi shi*, 46.

<sup>254</sup> The establishment of the Sichuan Meifong Bank had much to do with Liu Xiang's ambition to use banking to provide for his army. The bank was originally owned by both Chinese and American investors. In 1927, Kang Xinru convinced Liu Xiang to purchase the shares of American investors and transformed the Meifong Bank into a completely Chinese owned and operated bank. Since then, with the support from Liu Xiang, the Meifong Bank issued paper money and the government bonds for Liu Xiang's Administration. Because of such cooperation with Liu Xiang, by 1935, the Meifong bank was already the largest bank in the province. See Zhou Benyuan and Zhao Shihou, "Kang Xinru shengping," in Wenshi Ziliao Gongzuo Weiyuanhui, ed., *Chongqing gongshang renwuzhi* (Chongqing: Chongqing cubanshe, 1984), 142-144.

<sup>255</sup> DAGLJ, P1020100.

significant about this case was that in the process, the petitioners completely bypassed the county government and used the XFJ office instead to reach higher authority for a solution. In other words, the petitioners, by 1929, considered the XFJ office to have the same administrative power and status as the county government; it was no longer merely an office of security administration.

### **The Jialingjiang Special District Administration of Rural Reconstruction**

From 1927-1935, though nominally still an office in charge of security matters only, the XFJ Administration had, nevertheless, also been dealing with various issues of civic administration. In 1935, the office was, thus, formally converted into a civil institution for experimenting with rural reconstruction. Although the change might seem to be a long-awaited realization of what Lu Zuofu had been advocating, in reality, it was a direct product of the changing politics at both provincial and national levels.

In 1926, the Nationalist Army under the leadership of Jiang Jieshi embarked on the Northern expedition that aimed to unify the country. The expedition nominally ended in 1928 when the militarist in control of the northeastern China, Zhang Xueliang, declared his allegiance to the Nationalist government in Nanjing.<sup>256</sup> While the Nanjing government declared success in unifying China, Sichuan remained independent and continued to resist political and military penetration from Nanjing until 1935. Although the major military leaders in the province, Liu Xiang, Yang Sem, Liu Wenhui, and Deng Xihou, declared their support of the Nanjing regime, they intended to maximize the benefit brought by the elimination of the Northern militarists' power and maintained their status quo in the province. Consequently, before 1935, the Nanjing

---

<sup>256</sup> Spence, *The Search of Modern China*, 348.

government failed in its attempt to assert authority in the Sichuan Province.<sup>257</sup> However, the re-emerging problem of Chinese communist insurgence forced the Sichuan militarists to seek aid from the Nanjing Government.

The development and activity of Chinese Communists in Sichuan is a topic that has not been well studied. From the biographies of a few Chinese Communist Party (CCP) members, we know that the spread of Chinese communist propaganda in Sichuan began after the party was formally founded in Shanghai in 1921.<sup>258</sup> The pioneer members of the CCP actively organized study societies, newspapers, and labor movements. Yet, since the Sichuan militarists were always on alert for any organization and activity that might undermine their control, the work of the CCP in Sichuan at that time was constantly interrupted by the militarists. The most serious incident occurred in 1927 when Liu Xiang crushed the anti-imperialist protest led by the CCP in Chongqing by force.<sup>259</sup> Many were killed during the incident or after when the authority arrested the leaders. Yang Angong (1898-1927,) the founder of the CCP in Sichuan, was arrested by Liu's troop and executed in that year.

After the crackdown in 1927, the CCP activity in large cities such as Chengdu and Chongqing were under strict surveillance. However, in late 1932, a brigade of the CCP's Red Army in southern Shaanxi secretly crossed the border and built a base area in northern Sichuan. By February 1933, the Chinese Communists successfully established a Soviet-style government at the border region of Sichuan and Shaanxi.<sup>260</sup> Being alarmed by the CCP's advancement in Sichuan, Jiang Jieshi telegraphed the Sichuanes militarists and warned them about the outcome if

---

<sup>257</sup> Kapp, *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic*, 63-86.

<sup>258</sup> He, *Sichuan jinxiandai renwu zhuan*, vol. 1, 8-14; vol. 2, 1-7. Kuan, *Sichuan junfashi*, 180-186.

<sup>259</sup> Kapp, *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic*, 78.

<sup>260</sup> Kuan, *Sichuan junfashi*, 290-291.

they did not stop fighting with each other and instead dealt with the CCP problem.<sup>261</sup> To maintain their power in the province, the Sichuanese militarists negotiated a temporary truce and agreed to work together on the CCP problem. Tian Songyao, the militarist who controlled the Sichuan-Shannxi border thus withdrew his troops from the battle in Chengdu and attacked the CCP base area. However, the result was astonishing to the militarists for Tien's troops were quickly defeated by the CCP. In the following months, other militarists, including Yang Sen and Liu Cunhou, all suffered disastrous losses in their battles with the Red Army. By the autumn of 1934, the gravity of the Red Army's insurgence finally forced Liu Xiang to seek help from Nanjing on the behalf of Sichuanese militarists.<sup>262</sup>

Liu Xiang's trip to Nanjing in 1934 marked the end of Sichuan's independence. In order to secure a loan and military support from Nanjing, Liu Xiang agreed to allow a staff corps under the control of Jiang Jieshi's headquarters to be created in Chongqing. Although the staff corps was to assist Liu in suppressing the Communists, its creation had wider-reaching implications. For the first time, Nanjing was finally able to penetrate into the politics in Sichuan through an institutionalized organization. In addition to the creation of the corps, Liu Xiang also agreed to reorganize the provincial government, also under the advice of a special emissary from Nanjing. Thus, due to the serious challenge from the Chinese Communists, Sichuan militarists exchanged their long-held independence for survival.<sup>263</sup>

---

<sup>261</sup> The war between Liu Xiang and Liu Wenhui, also in late 1932, had occupied the attention of the Sichuan militarists and thus allowed the Red Army to consolidate its control of a few districts in northern Sichuan, which, at the time, belonged to the garrison area of Tian Songyao. Taking the advantage of Liu Wenhui's battles with Liu Xiang, Tian dispatched a large portion of his army to Chengdu, fighting with Liu Wenhui for control over the region surrounding Chengdu. The remaining troops in Tian's army failed to resist the attack of the Chinese Communists.

<sup>262</sup> Kapp, *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic*, 87-98.

<sup>263</sup> Ibid..

In 1935, the advisers from Nanjing arrived in Sichuan and formally began a series of administrative, military, and financial reforms in the name of defending the province from the Chinese Communists. Administratively, the provincial government was reorganized. However, the reorganization of the new provincial government, headed by Liu Xiang, was only a reshuffling of appointments between Liu's close subordinates, who had filled many important positions prior to 1935.<sup>264</sup> Nanjing's plan to keep Liu's power in check and allow the nationalist influence to penetrate the province was to set up eighteen "special inspectorates" at sub-provincial levels. The job of the 18 inspectors was to serve as supervisors over local magistrates and, at times, represent Jiang Jieshi's headquarters in administering martial law. Liu Xiang recommended 12 candidates for inspectors to Nanjing; however, the inspector of the third inspectorate, which was in charge of the districts around Chongqing, was directly selected by Nanjing.<sup>265</sup> The Nationalist government's intention to keep Liu Xiang in check was made crystal clear by this appointment. Although the inspectorates were theoretically also governed by the provincial government, their creations and the appointments of inspectors revealed the attempt from Nanjing to control the sub-provincial politics. Such a system of dual superiors would create many complications in local politics. As Robert Kapp argues, if the orders from both the provincial government and Nanjing were not on the same page, the inspectors would face a dilemma of whose order they should follow.<sup>266</sup> However, since both the Sichuan militarists and the Nationalists could not do without each other on the CCP issue, they had to compromise on this redundant system.

---

<sup>264</sup> Qiao and Yang, *Liu Xiang Zhuan*, 169.

<sup>265</sup> *Ibid.*, 173.

<sup>266</sup> Kapp, *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic*, 111.

The first task of the reorganized provincial government was to eliminate the system of garrison areas in the province. This goal was mainly achieved by restoring the power of tax collection to the provincial government. The militarists could no longer collect taxes, and funds to support their troops would come from the provincial government. Without direct control over tax collection in their garrison areas, the militarists' power inevitably waned. To make the elimination of the garrison system more effective, the provincial government and the staff corps from Nanjing also proceeded to decrease the size of Sichuanese armies. Liu Xiang and the Nationalist government agreed to reduce the size of Sichuanese armies by 1/3 and to decrease military expenses by 20 million per year. Because Liu Xiang converted his own armies into a provincial "peace-preservation" force that was under the direct command of the governor, the size of his army was not significantly affected, while other militarists saw a considerable reduction in troops. Therefore, in terms of Liu's army, the Nanjing government allowed it to remain almost the same.<sup>267</sup>

The cut in military expense was only one part of a policy that aimed to improve the province's disordered financial condition. The Nationalist Government also sent a gold loan to the Sichuan provincial government so that it could repay provincial bonds and loans. Moreover, under the direction of Nanjing, the currency of the central government was issued in Sichuan to replace all other currencies previously issued by private banks or militarists. In addition to these policies, the chaotic taxation system in the province was another major focus of Sichuan's financial reform. Beginning in 1935, three important reform details were carried out in the province. First, the provincial and county administrations immediately ceased to collect multiple land taxes. All land taxes would be collected once a year at the one-year rate thereafter. Second,

---

<sup>267</sup> Qiao and Yang, *Liu Xiang Zhuan*, 179.

all the tax stations along the trade routes were closed. A single import and export tax would then be collected. Third, all local administrations were ordered to prepare a detailed budget report and were forbidden to collect any miscellaneous taxes without approval.<sup>268</sup>

The above policies, especially the abolition of commercial tax collection along the trade route, were a heavy blow to the already insufficient revenue of the XFJ Administration. Since 1927, the XFJ Administration had relied on the river taxes levied on all cargo goods that passed the JLJXSX. This tax amounted to more than 50% of its total revenue each year. Moreover, the river tax was not the only tax abolished in the JLJXSX area. Other sources of revenue, such as the tax paid by the paper and coal factories, were eliminated as well. Thus, as the provincial government abolished the taxes on the trade route and restructured the financial system in the province, the XFJ Administration lost almost all of its major sources of income. Although soon after the abolishment of the river tax, the provincial government agreed to provide a monthly fund of 5,000 to the XFJ, this fund was hardly enough.<sup>269</sup>

Yet, the financial crisis was not the only crisis the XFJ Administration faced. With the arrival of the inspector, the existence of the XFJ Administration was also in question. One of the responsibilities of the inspectorate system was to reorganize the local administration and centralize the administrative power in the county governments only. The autonomous bureaus, many of which existed in the name of maintaining local security, were to be formally shut down and all of their functions incorporated into the county government. The magistrates would become the only local administrators at the county level and control all of the armed forces in the counties.<sup>270</sup> Since administrative power, especially concerning the military and police, was

---

<sup>268</sup> Kapp, *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic*, 113-115; Kuan, *Sichuan junfashi*, 456-457.

<sup>269</sup> DAGLJ, P1010885

<sup>270</sup> Kapp, *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic*, 112.



concentrated in the hands of local magistrates, the existence of the local security offices, such as the XFJ Administration, if continued, would cause great confusion, and the government would waste funds on the maintenance of duplicated offices.

In 1935, Lu's older brother, Lu Zhilin, informed him that in a meeting with local magistrates of the third inspectorate, the inspector, Shen Peng, specifically suggested the elimination of the numerous security bureaus that were administratively independent from the county government. However, regarding the elimination of the XFJ office, this recommendation received strong opposition from the county magistrates and gentry of Ba County, Jiangbei, Bishan, and Hechuan County. Their reason was said to be the preservation of the modernization projects that had been conducted in the JLJXSX area for almost a decade. Such opinions prompted Inspector Shen to request more detailed reports on the condition of the XFJ Administration before a further decision was made.<sup>271</sup>

Meanwhile, as Inspector Shen requested the detailed reports, the XFJ office lobbied the provincial government in Chengdu for the preservation of the administration. By May 1935, its representative had come up with a proposal to change the XFJ Administration into a special district office of rural reconstruction. On the issue of revenue, the plan requested permission from the provincial government to allow the new administration to collect all taxes in its administrative area. The new administration would keep local taxes from the area under its jurisdiction while it transferred the power to levy provincial and national taxes to either the county government or financial department of Sichuan province. If this plan was carried out, the

---

<sup>271</sup> Huang, *Lu Zuofu shuxinji*, 443.

new administration of rural reconstruction was estimated to receive more than 10,000 Chinese Yuan in revenue.<sup>272</sup>

In Lu's personal letters in 1935 and 1936, we find very little communication between Lu and the gentry or administrators on the problem of how to save the XFJ Administration. While he was still the head of the XFJ Administration, his other responsibilities in the Minsheng Steamship Company had occupied most of his time. The day-to-day management of XFJ affairs was entrusted to his younger brother, Lu Ziyong.<sup>273</sup> As a result, the abovementioned plan of administrative transformation was more likely a product of the local gentry's brainstorming. Nevertheless, Lu's connection with all the major political figures in the province must not be overlooked, especially when in October 1935, Lu was named by Liu Xiang to head the new provincial government's Department of Development.<sup>274</sup> Since the focus of this department was to plan and supervise projects concerning, for example, transportation, agricultural production, dikes, and dams, (in short, projects of modernization), Lu's appointment in fact gave him leverage to promote the rural reconstruction plan in the JLJXSX area. With much effort and negotiation, in April 1936, the XFJ Administration formally became a special district of rural reconstruction, "Jialingjiang xiaosanxia xiangcun jianshe shiyan qushu" (The District of Experimental Rural Reform in the Three Small Gorges of Jialing River, hereafter, SYQS.)

Since Lu Zuofu was now the head of the Department of Development, the provincial government appointed Tang Ruiwu the district director and Lu's younger brother, Lu Ziyong, the deputy director. Born in 1901, Tang was a specialist in mining and civil engineering. He was not only one of the major engineers that designed and built the Beichuan Railway, but also the

---

<sup>272</sup> Ibid., 434.

<sup>273</sup> *Beibei Quzhi*, 541.

<sup>274</sup> Qiao and Yang, *Liu Xiang Zhuan*, 304-305.

engineer responsible for the construction of parks, streets, and the Science Academy of West China.<sup>275</sup> In 1936 Tang was the executive manager of the Tianfu Mining Company, which was one of the largest coal mining companies in Sichuan. Although after 1936, he also held the position of director of the SYQS, he continuously focused on his work in the mining industry. Consequently, the operation of day-day administration in the district was still handled by Deputy Director Lu Ziyong.<sup>276</sup>

As Lu Zuofu's youngest brother, from his youth, Lu Ziyong's education and career were influenced by his brother. In 1923, Lu Zuofu sent Lu Ziyong to Shanghai for school. Through the connections of his brother, Lu Ziyong established acquaintanceships with a few leaders of the Sichuanese communists, such as Xiao Chun and Hui Daiying.<sup>277</sup> In 1925, he was admitted to the Huanpa Military School in Guangzhou, but he was dismissed the following year due to illness. In that same year, he became the member of the Chinese Communist Party. When Lu Zuofu became the head of the XFX office in 1927, Lu Ziyong followed him to Beibei and was appointed a captain in the new administration's armed force. After Tang Ruiwu died of typhoid in 1937, Lu Ziyong succeeded him as the director of the SYQS.<sup>278</sup>

As the administrative system was upgraded, the area under the jurisdiction of the SYQS was also remapped. Five towns—Beibei in Ba County, Huangjue, Wenxing, and Eryan in Jiangbei County, and Chengjiang in Bishan County—were now assigned to the SYQS. The

---

<sup>275</sup> The Beichuan Railway was the first railway in the JLJXSX area. In 1927, Lu Zuo and a few investors founded the Beichuan Railway Company and began the construction of the 16.5 KM railroad. The railroad was installed on the northern shore of the lower Jialing River, right across the town of Beibei. The construction was finished in 1934 and solved the transportation problem for the coal factories in that area. See *Beibei Quzhi*, 284-285.

<sup>276</sup> *Beibei Quzhi*, 536.

<sup>277</sup> In 1919, when Lu Zuofu was conducting education reforms with support from Yang Sen, he introduced Hui Daiying to teach in the Southern Sichuan Normal School. After Lu was dismissed by Lai Xinhui, who defeated Yang Sen in Chengdu, Lu returned to Chongqing and taught in the Chongqing Second Provincial Women's Normal School and became friends with Xiao Chun. Both Hui and Xiao were founders of the Communist Party branch in Sichuan. Liu Chonglai, *Lu Zuofu yu minguo xiangcun jianshe yanjiu*, 7-9.

<sup>278</sup> BBWS, vol. 6, 1.

scope of the administrative region was much smaller than in the years of XFJ Administration because the new financial support from the provincial government was no longer enough to include the administration's previous territory into its reform projects. Moreover, since the purpose of the SYQS was to experiment with modernization projects on education, local security, and economic development, it did not have authority over tax collection and legal matters. These administrative responsibilities still belonged to the county governments.<sup>279</sup>

The administrative upgrade also solved the financial crisis of the administration after the river tax was abolished in 1935. In addition to a monthly stipend of 5,000 Chinese dollars from the provincial government, the new SYQS administration would also receive taxes collected by the county governments for the purpose of *baojia* and policing, education, and community development. These taxes were redistributed to the new SYQS Administration specifically to promote rural reconstruction programs, which was, in fact, an augmentation of what the previous XFJ Administration had been doing in JLJXSX communities.

As every other rural reform program in China, the programs conducted by XFJ and SYQS embodied ambitious purpose of transforming the JLJXSX area into a modernized society. However, regardless the details, the process and outcome of these projects were only meaningful products after comparison. As Shao Qin argues, “modernity is a fashion that requires validation—to be modern is to be seen, judged, consumed, and thus legitimized as modern.”<sup>280</sup> To prepare for such validation, the modernization projects in Chinese villages inevitably placed emphasis on activities that could present the communities as “being modern.” The JLJXSX and its reform programs were no exception. Ultimately, the validation of the area's fame as a modern

---

<sup>279</sup> *Beibei quzhi*, 1.

<sup>280</sup> Shao Qin, *Culturing modernity*. 6.

community did not result from the actual changes brought by the reform; instead, such validation came from non-locals who visited the JLJXSX and consumed its reform as tourists.

## **The show of “being modern”**

### **Space and new meanings**

In his introduction to *Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and National Identity, 1900-1949*, Joseph Esherick offered the following remark: “In city after city we see the same menus of reforms, and often the same sequence. The first task was usually to tear down the city walls, inevitably building a wide, paved ring road where the wall had stood.”<sup>281</sup> Such a remark implies the importance of spatial reconfiguration in the history of Chinese urban modernization. For practical reasons, the city walls, built for security reason in the old days, were viewed as an obstacle against the development of a modern city, whose growth now relied heavily on its ability to freely communicate with other places. More importantly, the old-style city walls stood as a symbol of backwardness. Tearing down the walls thus represented a break with the dark, feudal past of the Chinese city. In other words, the spatial reconfiguration, beginning with the destruction of the city walls, was meant to create a visual effect through which the modernists declared the arrival of reform and progress.

As a small rural village that occupied a lower place in William Skinner’s market system of China, there were no grand city walls in the JLJXSX area.<sup>282</sup> Nonetheless, from the beginning

---

<sup>281</sup> Esherick ed., *Remaking the Chinese City*, 7.

<sup>282</sup> Based on the population density, Skinner developed a hierarchical urban system of upper Yangzi region. In his theory, the location of the region’s higher-level economic centers was determined by the convenience of waterway transportation. Beibei’s small population could only qualify the town as a market town. See William Skinner, “Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems,” in William Skinner, ed., *The City in Late Imperial China* (California: Stanford University Press, 1977), 275-291.

years of Lu Zuofu's term in the XFJ Administration, the spatial reconfiguration was as important as in the large cities. In the case of the Beibei Township, the reconfiguration would not only remove the unregulated usage of community space or any usage that was regarded as outdated, but it would also create new meaning for existing spaces. The project of spatial reconfiguration was an ongoing process that continued until the late 1950s. While Lu Zuofu oversaw the administration, the reconfiguration primarily focused on creating new space for modern institutions or new purposes for existing institutions. We might also describe the reconfiguration of space as creating a stage on which a show on "being modern" would be performed.

The Beibei Library, Beibei Museum, and the Science Academy of the West China were examples of new spatial creation. The Beibei Library was the first modern institution Lu Zuofu created upon taking office in the XFJ. In 1927, the library was initially set up in the temple of Lord Guan with a collection of approximately 400 books. By 1929, the number of books collected by the library increased 5 times and several library branches were set up in the JLJXSX area to serve its readers. By the time the Anti-Japanese War broke out in 1937, the library added not only another 10,000 books, but also newspapers, journals, and magazines to its collection. In addition to its branches, the library also launched mobile reading rooms in the JLJXSX community.<sup>283</sup> The function of the library as a place of knowledge assimilation seemed to be well realized in Beibei. Taking the year 1931 as an example, administration records show that more than 60,000 people used the library service in that year. Considering the population of the JLJXSX area (about 65,000 at that time), this number was indeed remarkable.<sup>284</sup>

---

<sup>283</sup> *Beibei quzhi*, 461.

<sup>284</sup> DAGLJ, P1030385.

In 1928, a group of scientists from Academia Sinica in Nanjing arrived in Beibei to investigate the species and plants in the province. The XFJ Administration dispatched about 30 soldiers, led by Lu's younger brother, Lu Ziyang, to protect the scientists. Together with the scientists, Lu Ziyang collected a large number of specimens. In 1930, the administration converted an old temple into a museum, displaying the collection Lu brought back the previous year. Afterwards, the museum collection expanded to include objects donated by the sponsors of the XFJ Administration, such as the Minsheng Steamship Company.<sup>285</sup>

From 1930 until 1942, before the SYQS administration set up another museum to display objects such as art, the exhibition at the Beibei Museum focused only on science. The majority of objects displayed in the Beibei Museum were animal and plant specimens and samples of stone and machinery; objects of humanity and arts were not displayed. This focus revealed Lu Zuofu's personal interest in science and technology, a tendency he had shown in his youth when he was a self-educated mathematics teacher. More importantly, as he belonged to the generation of Chinese who experienced the tremendous changes brought about by China's contact with the West and witnessed the superiority of Western machinery, Lu was a firm believer in the benefit that science and technology would bring to China. Prior to his arrival in JLJXSX, such a belief was most evident in his advocacy of the importance of modern transportation and communication facilities that motivated him to found the Minsheng Steamship Company. The visit of scientists, many of whom were members of the newly founded Academia Sinica in Nanjing, further inspired Lu to build an academy for scientific research.

In 1930, Lu spent a month traveling in North and Northeastern China. The purpose of this trip was to not only study the city administration in the North but also to visit the museums and

---

<sup>285</sup> *Beibei quzhi*, 465.

research institution sponsored by the Japanese, Russians, and Germans. The support these foreign countries invested in science and technology projects and the advancement of their result was a sharp contrast to the lack of such institutions in Sichuan.<sup>286</sup> Upon his return to Beibei, the project to build a research institution soon commenced. Like the museum and library, the first research institution in Southwestern China—the Science Academy of the West China—would not have come into existence without the support of provincial elites. The fund to purchase the land, construction of laboratories, and equipment all came from public donation. Yang Sen personally covered the expenses needed to build the Academy’s main building.<sup>287</sup>

Lu Zuofu explained the purpose of these new institutions was to build a new environment that would exercise an invisible, formative influence over the people. He believed this kind of influence would be best absorbed when it was experienced in recreational and group activities. To provide such opportunities for local population, new meaning was attached to the existing space in JLJXSX. The result was the emergence of public parks that would be designated as recreational space.<sup>288</sup>

It is difficult to say where Lu Zuofu received the inspiration for the subsequent effort to build parks. We find no evidence of his interest in parks and community beautification in his writings published prior to 1927. His previous project on public education in Chengdu might be the beginning of this interest, for the project started in the city’s first public park. Moreover, the natural scenery Lu observed during his numerous trips on the Jialing River might be another motivation. For centuries, the area along the Jialing River had been famous for its scenery, and travelers recorded their amazement in poems or articles that were later collected in the local

---

<sup>286</sup> Ling and Xiong, *Lu Zuofu Wenji*, 86-155.

<sup>287</sup> Liu, *Lu Zuofu yu minguo xiangcun jianshe yanjiu*, 207-208.

<sup>288</sup> Lu Zuofu, “Sichuan jianglingjiang sanxia de xiangcun yundong,” in Ling and Xiong, eds., *Lu Zuofu wenji*, 355.



gazetteers.<sup>289</sup> Since the environment was considered auspicious, quite a few Buddhist and Daoist temples were built in the region beginning as early as the 5<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>290</sup> With the gift from nature and the long tradition of religious activity, the area was an ideal location for a recreational facility.

In 1927, the exact location of Beibei's first public park was chosen. The monk-manager of the Yunquan Temple (Temple of Hot Spring, est. 423 CE) agreed to open its adjacent land to the public and allow the XFJ Administration to begin beautifying the landscape. Initially, the work the XFJ Administration could do was rather limited due to the lack of funds. Once again, Lu turned to Sichuan militarists and gentry for sponsorship. In the name of the militarists and provincial administrators, the XFJ Administration published a statement declaring that the park "upon completion, will be a place for students to visit, for patients to recover from their illness, for writers and artists to compose new projects...."<sup>291</sup> The statement also listed details of the park's construction. The temple provided a few rooms that would be converted into hotels to provide lodges for visitors. Two sport courts (possibly for tennis or basketball) would be built. There would also be a public bath house where visitors could enjoy the therapeutic hot spring, which was said to have healing power on a number of illnesses, such as skin or joint problems. In addition to these facilities, the donated funds would also be spent on trees, grassland, pavilions, a swimming pool, and gardens.<sup>292</sup> Because of the scale of the project, the construction continued for more than a decade and was interrupted in the late 1930s due to the Anti-Japanese War.

---

<sup>289</sup> Zhang , *Minguo hechuan xianzhi*, 436-438, 591.

<sup>290</sup> *Beibei Quzhi*, 521.

<sup>291</sup> Ling and Xiong, *Lu Zuofu wenji*, 51-54

<sup>292</sup> *Ibid.*.

Nonetheless, it was one of the landmark and tourist attractions in the JLJXSX area in the years prior to 1949.<sup>293</sup>

In 1931, following the founding of the Beibei Museum, the XFJ Administration formed a plan to build another park on the land that surrounded the museum. The second park, named “People’s Park,” was very much like a replica of Lu Zuofu’s earlier reform project in Chengdu. The park was located at the center of the Beibei Township and was more accessible than Wenquan Park; therefore, the XFJ Administration added a few more facilities with educational functions. In addition to the museum, a zoo and an exercise field was added so that the local residents would have the opportunity to appreciate exotic animals and enjoy space for athletic activities. The space in the People’s Park, at times, was also used as a stage for theater performance or motion pictures.<sup>294</sup> All of these spaces were designed for popular education.

The beautification of the landscape, first conducted in the parks, was eventually expanded to the space outside of the parks. However, the problem of funds limited the administration’s project scope to only the Beibei Township, where the XFJ office was located. The Beibei Township in the late 1930s had around 500 households and 1,900 residents. For centuries, the expansion of the town was restricted for it was surrounded by small steams connected to the Jialing River. During monsoon season, the pouring rain often caused floods in town and disrupted transportation into and out of the town. Since there was no space for expansion, houses, temples, and shrines were built on plots that were more likely to escape the flood. Without clear architecture regulations, as in almost every Chinese town and city in the early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, the town only had two major roads and a few narrow lanes that could barely allow small carriages to

---

<sup>293</sup> BBWS, vol. 3, 155.

<sup>294</sup> Ibid., 156.

pass. The landscape in no way matched the notion of modern. In 1928 the XFJ Administration thus began to tear down shrines or pavilions that blocked road traffic. It also expanded the width of the street and tore down the extended roofs of houses along the streets because they blocked much of the light during the day. Ditches were also built to improve the drainage of excessive water during flood season. After the SYQS Administration was established in 1936, it tore down more temples and shrines to build more modern streets. Buildings along the major streets were required to install modern glass windows and apply new paint. The new administration also used local residents as volunteers to fill the small streams of the Jialing River with soil and rocks to expand the town's useable land.<sup>295</sup>

With the expansion of street and town space, projects of beautification followed. The administration placed enormous stress on the naturalistic aesthetic by installing flowers and street trees first around Beibei Township, and later in Huangjue, Eryan, Wenxing, and Chengjiang. The origin of this emphasis on the beauty of the landscape came from Lu's 1930 trip to North China, especially his impression of how the Germans and Japanese maintained and beautified the streets in Qingdao and Dalian.<sup>296</sup> He commented that "the effort of Germans not only transformed Qingdao from a deserted small peninsula to a market-town, but also made it a beautiful market-town surrounded by forest...The colors of red-tile houses and green trees contrast with each other. One can even see their beauty from a far."<sup>297</sup> This experience not only prompted him to plant street trees, but also to preserve the forest in the mountains. Tree planting thus became an annual activity that the administration promoted in the springs. In 1929, the

---

<sup>295</sup> *Beibei quzhi*, 177-178.

<sup>296</sup> Ling and Xiong, *Lu Zuofu wenji*, 106-109.

<sup>297</sup> *Ibid.*

administration even established about 10 plantations to grow saplings that would be used in community beautification and forest preservation projects.<sup>298</sup>

These projects of spatial reconfiguration were only a part of the “being modern” performance that Beibei administrations intended to perform. The performance itself would not be convincing if the behavior of those who participated in it, especially the local population, was not trained according to the standards of a modern citizen. This purpose of modernization projects in Beibei was also made clear by Lu Zuofu, who, in his introductory article of rural reconstruction in Beibei, specifically stated that “[the purpose of rural reconstruction] was to successfully build a social environment which would then encourage the transformation of people’s behavior.”<sup>299</sup> To achieve this goal, the XFJ and SYQS administrations implemented a series of educational projects. Cooperating with Beibei’s library, museum, and science academy, these projects could be roughly divided into those for informal education and those for formal education. The former was carried out mainly through festivals, sports, and entertainments, while the latter was promoted in evening schools, vocational schools, and consulting services.

### **Festivals**

Festivals, as French historian Mona Ozouf describes, were occasions when acceptable behaviors were presented. For this reason, leaders of the French Revolution in 1789 were eager to create a new national festival in which the French people would be re-baptized as citizens of the new French Republic. In other words, festivals gave the participants a new identity and

---

<sup>298</sup> DAGLJ, P1000971.

<sup>299</sup> Ling and Xiong, *Lu Zuofu wenji*, 355.

created a social bond and sense of companionship. Festivals thus were great tools to revive and unite a community or nation, regardless of the class differentiation among its population.<sup>300</sup>

To reform the behavior of the population in a remote community such as the JLJXSX, a festival seemed to be a good start. The local communities there were described as not only backward, but also lifeless by Lu Zuofu. He attributed this condition to the lack of occasions on which the local population could gather together and interact with each other.<sup>301</sup> This description also echoed with Ozouf's comment that "without festival[s]...life would have appeared what it indeed was, 'a shapeless, deathly trunk.'"<sup>302</sup> To correct this situation and revive the community, the XFJ office began to hold festivals in accordance with traditional Chinese holidays in 1927.<sup>303</sup>

The festivals held by the XFJ and SYQS administrations combined old and new. Taking the Summer Festival as an example, held on the 5<sup>th</sup> day of the 5<sup>th</sup> month of the lunar calendar, the Festival was originally a celebration of the Duanwu Festival (or the Dragon Boat Festival), during which the Chinese observed traditional customs, including burning herbs to expel the inauspicious spirits that would bring bad luck and epidemic. Moreover, traditionally, on this day many villages would join together and hold a dragon boat race, which symbolized that the evil spirits were escorted by dragons to leave the human world. Pre-race preparation usually began months in advance as the villagers worked on the boat and training team members. On the day of the boat race, the entire village would gather to cheer for their teams on the riverside. The Duanwu Festival thus was an annual festivity that could bring the entire village together. By

---

<sup>300</sup> Mona Ozouf, *Festivals and the French Revolution*, trans. by Alan Sheridan, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988,) 4, 9.

<sup>301</sup> Ling and Xiong, *Lu Zuofu wenji*, 355.

<sup>302</sup> Ozouf, *Festivals and the French Revolution*, 4.

<sup>303</sup> Shu Jie and Ge Xiangrong, "Yinianlai de beibei minzhong jiaoyu," *Gongzuo Yuekan*, vol 1, no.1 (1936), 26-30.

holding the Summer Festival on a traditional feast day, the XFJ and SYQS administrations could easily attract the attention of the local population for purposes other than celebration.

To attach new meaning and educational purposes to a traditional holiday, the administration added modern-style programs to the Summer Festival. Exhibitions of modern machinery, miniature airplanes and steamships, and trains were held. Drama, in both Chinese and Western styles, were performed on stages in People's Park. Small pamphlets that introduced knowledge of vaccination for smallpox, personal hygiene, and modern etiquette were distributed. Movies that promoted nationalism and patriotic sentiment and understanding of foreign lands were shown after dark. Posters and newspapers that explained domestic and foreign events were also displayed.<sup>304</sup> All of these were designed to silently install an image of being a modern citizen—someone who understood modern technology, was well behaved and dressed according to modern standard, and loved his/her country—in the mind of the visitors of the Festival.

The Summer Festival was also a great tool for the XFJ and SYQS administrations to introduce their operation and plans for reform to the local residents. On this day, the administration opened all of its offices to the public. Each division of the administration assigned an employee to answer questions and present key projects the division was or would be implementing. Even the dormitory and dining hall of the employees were cleaned and visitors were allowed to observe how the employees worked.<sup>305</sup> These displays were the efforts of the administrations to earn the trust from local population and create an image of an authority that worked for the wellbeing of the local community

---

<sup>304</sup> Xue Xi, "Beibei de xiajie," *Gongzuo yuekan*, vol.1, no. 1(1936), 80-86.

<sup>305</sup> Ibid.

The Summer Festival also served as a fair that could stimulate local economy. Small businesses and itinerant hawkers were allowed to set up stalls in areas assigned by the administrations. It was estimated that more than 50,000 visitors attended the Festival. Restaurants, hotels, and cargo laborers (*lifu*) all benefited from this inflow of people. The administration-sponsored Sanxia Textile Factory also used this occasion to display its products and sell its old stock of textile products at a discounted price.<sup>306</sup>

The number of visitors that came to the Festival was a proof of how the administrations could attract attention to the educational messages it tried to deliver by adding new programs to the traditional holidays. As one writer commented, “[the Summer Festival in Beibei] was a great example of how the programs of mass education and rural reconstruction should be implemented on the foundation of the ordinary people’s daily customs.”<sup>307</sup> Any reform project that caused drastic change could easily encounter resistance from the local population. By mixing new meanings with old customs, the Summer Festival and many other traditional Chinese holidays became effective channels to deliver the messages of “being modern.”

### **Sports and entertainment**

The function of sports as a force to formulate identity appears as early as in the Greece and Roman Empire. The Roman horsemen grouped themselves into factions and competed with each other not only in the stadium but also in politics as well. Many countries have their own traditional sports that project the ideal image of its citizens. In Afghanistan, for instance, the traditional game “buzkashi” celebrates not only the equestrian culture of the country but also

---

<sup>306</sup> Ibid, 84-85.

<sup>307</sup> Anonymous, “Beibei de xiajie yundong,” *Gongzuo yuekan*, vol. 1, no. 2 (1936), 41.

expresses the ideal image of male Afghani. In modern Britain, joining a polo club and paying the expensive membership is a reflection of wealth and social status. In short, the promotion and popularity of any sport “assist[s] in the creation of new social identities.”<sup>308</sup>

The quest of a new Chinese identity through the promotion of sports and physical education began in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century when the Qing Dynasty carried out the New Policy Reform. The images of Chinese people’s skinny bodies, pale faces, and weak physical strength were alarms to many reformers that the Chinese race was not able to compete with the strong, healthy Westerners and would eventually face extinction. Many attributed the poor physical condition of the Chinese people to the century-old emphasis on literary education required by the civil service examination and the lack of proper entertainment, which led to the use of opium and prostitution.<sup>309</sup> Sports and physical education were incorporated into the education reform in the hope to correct such situations. When the Qing Dynasty finally fell, the fear of extinction became even more real and the future of the country more tightly entwined with the health of Chinese people. As one writer argued, “Health is the foundation of a man’s life. One can achieve anything with good health...Without good health, one’s spirit will be as weak as a coward. He will not only worry his parents but also will become the burden of the society and nation...A healthy and physically strong population can lift a country’s international status and allow it to do what is best for its people. On the contrary, without a healthy population, a nation will be powerless in the international community and submit itself to all kinds of unequal demands. The outcome of

---

<sup>308</sup> Jeremy MacClancy ed., *Sport, Identity and Ethnicity* (Herndon: Berg, 1995), 1-20.

<sup>309</sup> Hao Gengsheng, “Shiwu nianlai qinghua zhi tiyu,” *Qinghua zhoukan* (1926): 99; Li Yun, “Tiyu yu shehui,” *Tiyu*, no. 10 (1938), 2.



such a nation will be extinction.”<sup>310</sup> Another writer also comments that there are four reasons why physical education should be promoted. He argues:

Saving the country is everyone’s responsibility. There are four reasons why we Chinese should promote physical education to save our country. First, a healthy, strong body is the foundation for any individual to build a career...Second, if everyone is healthy and strong, the country will also become strong. The reason why our nation is weak is due to the century-old emphasis on literary education and neglect of physical education since the Song Dynasty...Third, physical education can inspire team spirit with which our people can unite and work together on projects [to strengthen our country.] Finally, our people have indulged in opium, gambling, and alcohol because there are no healthy entertainment and recreational activities. Such ill habits have endangered the foundation of our country and weaken its strength...Physical education could replace our people’s ill habits. It is indeed the way to save our nation.<sup>311</sup>

These commentaries indicate that a healthy physical condition was attached to the identity of a modern Chinese citizen. As a result of this increase of emphasis given to the physical education, courses were added into the curriculum of primary and secondary schools during the reform of “New Policy.”<sup>312</sup> The education reform in the Republican era continued this change of curriculum in schools.

The motivation of the XFJ and SYQS administrations to promote physical activities echoed this sentiment. When Lu Zuofu arrived in the office in 1927, he was surprised by the poor health of the young soldiers with which he worked. He lamented that there was no proper

---

<sup>310</sup> Yin Hongxun, “Wuoguo tiyu zhi wojian,” *Tiyu*, no 2 (1927), 1.

<sup>311</sup> Wang Zhenting, “Tiyu jiuguo,” *Shishi yuebao*, vol. 9, no. 4 (1933), 221-222.

<sup>312</sup> Paul Bailey, *Reform the People*, 140-141.

entertainment for local residents to spend their free time. Young people would rather spend their free time gambling or using opium than doing sports.<sup>313</sup> To correct this situation, physical activities must be promoted. In the fall of 1928, the XFJ Administration held the very first annual sport meets of the Sichuan Province. This sport meet not only invited schools in counties around the JLJXSX area, but was also opened to individuals who wished to compete. With 38 schools and organizations and more than 1000 participants, the sport meet was the largest athletic event in Sichuan during the Republican era.

In 1929, the XFJ Administration established a part-time school to train physical education instructors. Each village in the JLJXSX area would assign students with at least middle school education for training. Any individual who wished to take the training could also apply for admission. The curriculum included a one-month intensive course on knowledge and management of physical education, rules of sports, and hygiene and emergency care on the sport field. After finishing the one-month intensive course, the students would return to their villages to promote physical education. They would also return to the school once a month for further training. The total length of the training would last one year.<sup>314</sup>

There was no further information or reports on this school in all of the archival sources. It seems to be highly possible that plans for the training school were aborted soon after the administration decided to found it, possibly due to a lack of funding and proper students. All of the villages were expected to pay for lodging, food, and uniforms for their assigned students. Individuals were also expected to pay for their training in the school. Moreover, after the training, the students were very unlikely to receive any material return for their work to promote physical

---

<sup>313</sup> Ling and Xiong, *Lu Zuofu wenji*, 56.

<sup>314</sup> DAGLJ, P1010953.

education in the communities. The XFJ Administration recommended that the village to provide some salary for the instructors, but its recommendation was more likely to be ignored. Under the rule of militarists, the tax burden on the villages hardly left them any extra resources to support the modernization effort. Nevertheless, in spite of its failure to found the school, the XFJ and SYQS administrations continued holding the sport meet annually until the Anti-Japanese War broke out and the retreat of the Nationalist government and refugees from other parts of China affected its operations.

Although the sport meets were opened to any individual who wished to participate in the competition, its major participants were from schools and organizations that came from other counties. To the majority of the local residents in a remote place like Beibei, this annual event was completely foreign. Nonetheless, as the first of its kind in the province, it was a local sensation that caused much excitement in the JLJXSX community. By bringing visitors and students to participate in Western-style games, such as basketball, baseball, soccer, and volleyball, the annual sport meet in the JLJXSX area was presented as a theater performance with all the special athletic rules and postures on a deliberately constructed stage that was called “yundongchang” (athletic field). The field was decorated with colorful flags and big-word posters.<sup>315</sup> While the winners were rewarded, those who lost were also encouraged and praised for their spirit. These acts were meant to display the image of citizens in a modern nation.

Other entertainments programs in Beibei were mainly conducted in Mingzhong Huichang (People’s Hall.) While being named as a hall, the People’s Hall was originally a mobile, temporary space, using the empty field in the park or in front of the temple for movie, broadcasting, or drama. The open, uncovered space made it difficult for the administration to

---

<sup>315</sup> DAGLJ, P1050214

maintain order among the audience or avoid interruption caused by inclement weather. Therefore, in 1934, with a donation from local gentry and using soldiers as the laborers, the administration built a covered stage for the programs and named it People's Hall.<sup>316</sup> During springs and summers, the hall was opened irregularly, but at least once a week, to the public and all programs were free of charge. The programs designed by the administrations provided a variety of choices, including modern performances such as orchestras, movies, and news broadcasting and traditional entertainment such as Chinese operas, story-telling, and martial arts. During the period of the XFJ office, the administration mainly hired actors and musicians to perform for the local communities. Such a process was often costly, and the administration had a hard time controlling the quality of the performances. Therefore, by the time the administration was upgraded to a special district for rural reconstruction in 1936, it attempted to decrease the cost and control the program quality by training its own actors and inviting students from nearby elementary and middle schools to perform monthly.<sup>317</sup>

### **School education**

Before 1928, it was not clear whether modern-style schools existed in the JLJXSX area. Due to their relatively cheaper cost, most parents sent their children to private academies. Not subject to any supervision and regulation, these academies could be run by anyone from a variety of education backgrounds. Their curricula thus presented uneven qualities. While the Qing Dynasty had primary schools installed in every county in the early 19<sup>th</sup> century and the Republican government continued its plan to set up modern schools, by the 1920s, the number of

---

<sup>316</sup> DAGLJ, P1010847.

<sup>317</sup> Luo Zhongdian, Shu Jie, and Ge Xiangrong, "Yinianlai de minjiao yundong," *Beibei yuekan*, vol. 1, no. 9-10 (1937), 68.

modern-style schools was still relatively small compared to the number of private academies. In Hechuan County, for instance, there were about 147 primary schools in the entire county, but more than 700 private academies. There were 14 modern middle schools.<sup>318</sup> Those who were ambitious and open-minded enough often had to leave the county and seek enrollment in cities.

In Lu Zuofu's plan for rural reconstruction, the education of the rural population was a top priority. While the informal education discussed above was conducted to improve the educational level of the rural population, it was the school education—education with properly designed textbooks and curricula and well-trained teachers of modern subjects—that could solve the problems of ignorance and backwardness in the rural communities. Without proper school education, the result of the programs of mass education discussed above could not solve the problem of ignorance in rural communities from its root. Therefore, the XFJ office founded Shiyong Primary School in 1928 and Jianshan Secondary School in 1930. In 1932, the primary school was incorporated with the Jianshan Secondary School so that students could complete the 9-year curriculum in one school.<sup>319</sup>

Because the XFJ office was not a formal administration but only a bureau that oversaw security matters, it had no authority over the private academies; thus, the private academies continued their existence. By 1936, the number of students enrolled in the modern schools was about the same as the students studied in the private academies. When the XFJ office became a special administration for rural reconstruction, it took over management of the 16 primary schools and 2 secondary schools that were previously administered by the county governments. Following the Nanjing Government's policy of mandatory primary education, the SYQS

---

<sup>318</sup> *Hechuan xianzhi*, 588-589, 601.

<sup>319</sup> *Beibei quzhi*, 392, 401.

Administration also increased the number of mandatory primary schools in the villages under its jurisdiction.<sup>320</sup> Moreover, to enforce the mandatory primary education, the administration began to shut down private academies.<sup>321</sup>

Yet, to eliminate the problem of illiteracy, the newly founded primary schools were not enough, for a portion of the adult population in the JLJXSX area had very little or no education. Since there were age limitations for primary school students, these people were not qualified for admission to the newly founded primary schools. To promote literacy among this sector of population, the administration set up part-time schools for mass education. The informal, part-time schools were held during the day and evenings. Anyone who did not finish primary school education could attend the schools. By 1936, when the new Administration of Rural Reconstruction launched its educational reform, the mass education project was also expended. In addition to increasing the number of part-time schools to help those who could not attend the part-time schools, such as handicapped persons, the Administration dispatched teachers into their homes.<sup>322</sup>

Carrying out these projects required a sufficient number of teachers. However, the Administration's budget did not allow it to hire teachers to run the part-time schools or in-house teaching. To solve this problem, the Administration followed the method promoted by the famous educator Tao Xingzhi and utilized the upper classes of primary school students as volunteers.<sup>323</sup> This system was first experimented in one "bao" (10 households) of the JLJXSX

---

<sup>320</sup> Zhao Zhongshu, "Jialingjiang shiyan qushu yinianlai zhi gongzuo," in *Beibei yuekan*, 1, no. 9-10 (1937): 21-22.

<sup>321</sup> DAGLJ, P1010699.

<sup>322</sup> Zhongdian, Jie, and Xiangrong, "Yinianlai de minzhong jiaoyu," 53-67; Jie and Xiangrong, "Yinianlai de mingzhong jiaoyu," 110-112.

<sup>323</sup> Born in 1891, Tao Xingzhi (1891-1946) was one of the first Chinese students admitted to the College of Education at Columbia University. In 1917, he returned to China from New York and devoted himself to the education reform. He criticized education in China for being a privilege for the rich; consequently, he purported that

area in 1936, and because it had advantages such as flexible scheduling and saved financial resources, in 1937, the system was promoted to the entire JLJXSX area, soliciting more than 300 student volunteers.<sup>324</sup>

In addition to the part-time schools that were opened to all who were willing to learn, the administrations also set up two kinds of schools that targeted a specific population. Because of its importance in the transportation network of The Jialing River and the rich coal production nearby, the area attracted a large number of male laborers and sailors. According to a report by Beichuan Railway Company, the majority of this labor force was from nearby counties and provinces. Their presence in the JLJXSX area was often temporary and coincided with the interval between agricultural harvests in their home villages. After the Beichuan Railway was finished in 1934, the convenience and lower cost of railway transportation motivated the coal mining factories to transport the coal to the river harbor on the Jialing River (Bai miaozi, right across the town of Beibei) and then to Chongqing.<sup>325</sup> Accordingly, the number of laborers increased as well.

A large number of unattached, itinerant male laborers posed a potential threat to the local order. The administrations thus attempted to control the threat by issuing name tags to the

---

most of the Chinese population sank in ignorance due to its expensive. He argues that education should be like air — free for anyone to breathe. Only by lowering the cost and expanding the availability of education could the literacy of the Chinese people be promoted. To achieve this goal, he advocated the system of “small teacher.” The concept was that every child in the primary schools should become a small teacher and teach what he learned in school every day to those around him, such as family members and neighbors. Through these small teachers, education could reach every corner of society and, more importantly, small teachers could promote education among women who by the early 20<sup>th</sup> century were still restricted by the boundary between male and female and thus refrained from interaction with male teachers. During the Anti-Japanese War, Tao set up the Yu Cai school in the JLJXSX area. See Sichuansheng Tao Xingzhi Yanjiuhui ed., *Tao Xingzhi Shengping Jiqi Shenghuo Jiaoyu*. (Chengdu: Sichuan jiaoyu cubanshe, 2008). Tao Xingzhi, “Xiaoxiansheng Yu Minzhong Jiaoyu,” in Jiangsu Sheng Tao Xingzhi yanjiuhui, ed., *Tao Xingzhi wenji* (Nanjing: Jiangsu jiaoyu cubanshe, 2008), 565.

<sup>324</sup> Luo, Shu, and Ge, “Yinianlai de minzhong jiaoyu,” 58-60.

<sup>325</sup> Cheng Zongyang, “Sinianlai zhi tianfu meikuang,” *Yi yun yuekan* (1942), 87. In 1927, Lu Zuo and a few investors founded the Beichuan Railway Company and began the construction of the 16.5 KM railroad. The railroad was installed on the northern shore of the lower Jialing River, right across the town of Beibei. The construction was finished in 1934 and solved the transportation problem for the coal factories in that area. See *Beibei quzhi*, 284-285.

laborers. Moreover, since most of the laborers were seasonal workers from outside and were not familiar with the conditions of the JLJXSX communities, the administrations set up special schools to instruct them on operation rules and the fee charges of their work.<sup>326</sup> Basic knowledge of reading and writing was also included in the courses. The administrations also paid special attention to their appearance. Due to the demand of their work and lack of proper lodging, the laborers were often covered in coal and dirt. Their ill appearance and personal hygiene was in sharp contrast to the image of a clean, tidy community that the administrations intended to build through its shows of “being modern.” Therefore, the schools also provided temporary shelter and arranged trips to the Yunquan Park where the laborers could wash themselves in the bath house.<sup>327</sup>

The above discussion on the work of rural reconstruction conducted by the XFJ office and the SYQS Administration covered only part of its extensive projects. By the early 1930s, after a few years of diligent work, the landscape of the JLJXSX area, especially the town of Beibei where the administration office was located, experienced significant changes. Though the restoration of local order had not completely eliminated the bandit problem, it did significantly improve local security. The Minsheng Steamship Company, now the largest Chinese-owned steamship company on the Jialing River and Yangzi River, provided daily service between Chongqing and Beibei. The Beichuan Railway, built right across the town of Beibei on the other side of Jialing River, became the main land route to transport coal to the port where it would then be redistributed to Chongqing. The improved local order and increasing passengers and cargos stimulated the development of the local economy. By the early 1930s, the area along the Jialing

---

<sup>326</sup> DAGLJ, P1040109.

<sup>327</sup> Ibid., P1020999.



River, especially the town of Beibei and Baimiaozi, reported significant expansion of its market size and scope of commercial transactions and an increasing population.<sup>328</sup>

During the period of the XFJ Administration, the work appeared less organized because of the lack of funds and proper administrative authority. Nonetheless, with donations from entrepreneurs and support from the militarists with whom Lu Zuofu had cultivated relationships, the XFJ Security Office was able to not only implemented the above projects, but also to set up a local hospital and establish electricity, tap water, and telephone services. After the XFJ Administration was upgraded to a special district of rural reconstruction, the scope of the work expanded to more than what was discussed in this chapter, for example, agricultural projects that included the promotion of new grain and new breeds of pigs. Co-ops were also organized to help peasants manufacture and sell their products.<sup>329</sup>

It is difficult to evaluate the impact of these projects on the daily life of local population. The historical records, as always, are mute on the perspective of those at the bottom of society. However, such silence by no means implies their indifference to the modernization projects. In fact, on a rare occasion, one visitor chatted with local residents about his thought of the XFJ Administration and its work. The resident and this visitor agreed that the XFJ Administration often punished or detained those who refused to follow the rules it set up in the community.<sup>330</sup> The intention to bring modern convenience seemed of little importance for this resident to evaluate the work of the XFJ Administration. It might also simply mean that the local residents had not felt the benefit of these projects while acutely feeling the discomfort of adjusting their lifestyle to the standards of “being modern.” During Lu Zuofu’s term in office, although the

---

<sup>328</sup> DAGLJ, P1010850

<sup>329</sup> Wu Yuzhang, “Beibei hezuo shiye zhi weilai,” *Sichuan jinji*, vol. 3, no. 3 (1946), 64-68; Zhou Qixun, “Sanxia shiyanqu difang jingji diaocha gaikung,” *Caizheng Jikan*, 121.

<sup>330</sup> Hui Zhen, “Canguan sichuan xiaosan xia shehui shiye riji,” *Luxing zazhi*, vol. 7, no. 3 (1933): 20.

administrations emphasized the importance of local economic development to finance rural reconstruction projects, the local economic growth at the time was limited by various factors and could not become a strong vehicle of modernization. The end result of these modernization projects thus was more like a presentation of what it meant to “be modern” than how it could change community life for the better in a short period of time.

Such “cosmetic modernization,” as termed by Latin America historian E. Bradford Burns, or “exhibitory modernity,” as described by Shao Qing on Nantong, had two layers of meaning in the JLJXSX area.<sup>331</sup> Regardless of whether or not the lives of the general populace experienced changes, the modernization projects in JLJXSX, on the one hand, performed what “being modern” meant to the local population; on the other hand, the administrations presented all of JLJXSX society as a theater of “being modern” performance to the outside world by engaging the local population in these “being modern” projects through festivals, sporting events, and education. From the 1930s, this latter perspective became a valuable asset for the administrations to attract more attention and support to its work. In fact, it was such attention and support from outside that confirmed the area’s fame as being modern.

### **The audience and the validation of “being modern”**

When discussing the case of Nantong, Shao Qing argues that the success of Nantong to build its fame as a “model city” through its “exhibitory modernity” was closely related to the existence of a market that was ready to consume images of the modern.<sup>332</sup> This market refers to a

---

<sup>331</sup> E. Bradford Burns, *The Poverty of Progress: Latin America in the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

<sup>332</sup> Shao, *Culturing Modernity*, 196.

non-local audience that understood the value and purpose of modernization and was willing to spend time and money to consume the products of modernization. In China, especially at the lower Yangzi Delta, after debating and experimenting with what modernization meant for China and how it should be implemented for more than half a century, the image of being modern, as presented by railway traffic, electricity, and telegram services, and Western-style schools, was no longer foreign among the local population, especially educated Chinese in large cities such as Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Nanjing. Therefore, being about 160 km away from Shanghai and part of China's economic center, Nantong lacked no outside audience to which it could introduce its effort at being modern.

Shao's argument, while plausible, omits the contribution the development of modern tourism had made to the publicity of Nantong. According to Madeleine Yue Dong, the lower Yangzi Delta became a destination to which the emerging middle class in Shanghai arranged their weekend getaways. The rise of this tourism had much to do with the emerging tourist service in China as well. In 1926, the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank began to systematically promote modern tourism in China. The bank's travel agency, the China Travel Service, provided travel packages and luggage, ticketing, and traveler's check services to its customers. It also set up hotels in several popular locations, such as Hangzhou and Nanjing. The bank and its travel agency not only promoted short weekend trips, but also provided services for long-distance domestic trips and overseas travels. By the late 1930s, the China Travel Service had expanded its business to Sichuan and set up branches in Chengdu and Chongqing as well.<sup>333</sup>

---

<sup>333</sup> Madeleine Yue Dong, "Shanghai's China Traveler," in Madeleine Yue Dong, Joshua L. Goldstein eds., *Everyday Modernity in China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), 195.

Not mentioned in Dong's study, the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank was not the first and only company to set up travel service in the Sichuan Province. In 1931, with approval from Liu Xiang, the then head of the Administration of Sichuan Waterway Navigation Management, He Beiheng, who succeeded Lu Zuofu to the position in 1930, founded the Sichuan Travel Service.<sup>334</sup> The expansion of travel services in Sichuan had multiple meanings for the "being modern" projects in the JLJXSX area. First of all, the decision of Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank to set up branches in the province and to found the Sichuan Travel Service was another testimony to the overall improvement of local order in the province. Without the comparatively stable social order, travel service in the province would have become a costly business. It was also against this background of improved local order that modernization in the JLJXSX area was made possible. Secondly, coinciding with the emergence of travel services, from the beginning of 1930s, the JLJXSX area saw a significant increase in its visitors, many of which came to see the result of modernization in a remote rural community and enjoy the natural beauty and hot spring in its parks.

By the late 1930s, the number of visitors increased to the point where the SYQS administration set up a special office to provide travel information.<sup>335</sup> This increase of tourists also had much to do with the expansion of the business of the Minsheng Steamship Company, which by the early 1930s, had set up branches in major cities on the Yangzi River, including, Yichang, Hankou, Nanjing, and Shanghai, and used the harbor at Beibei as one of its ship

---

<sup>334</sup> In 1930, The China Travel Service of the Shanghai Commercial and Savings Bank was planning business expansion to Sichuan. As the head of the Waterway Administration, he considered the travel agency to be a great opportunity to provide service to the customers of the steamship business that was under its jurisdiction. Although Liu Xiang initially considered the service not necessary and unprofitable, he was eventually convinced that the travel service could earn him the good reputation of "caring for the people." See Li Bohuai, "Mingguo shiqi de sichuan luxingshe," in *Sichuan Shifan daxue xuebao*, vol. 34, no. 3 (May, 2007): 133-138.

<sup>335</sup> GLJ, *Beibei gaikuang*, 6.

yards.<sup>336</sup> The expansion of the Minsheng Steamship Company and tourism in the province were crucial for the JLJXSX area and its image of “being modern,” for these developments connected the JLJXSX area with an outside audience that could validate its modernization. Those tourists accordingly increased the fame of the JLJXSX community as a modern community by introducing their trips in magazines and newspapers.<sup>337</sup>

Before the Anti-Japanese War, the modernization of the JLJXSX area had earned the local community recognition as a “model village.”<sup>338</sup> Such a reputation reflected that the administrations, through their scripted show of “make-belief” on modernization, received outside validation for the community’s “modern” image. When the war finally forced the Nationalist government to retreat to Chongqing from Nanjing in 1937, the JLJXSX area was chosen by a few renowned institutions, such as the Fudan University and the Jiangsu Medical College, for its reputation and short distance to Chongqing. The inflow of refugees, governmental institutions, schools, and factories to the JLJXSX area further enlarged the scope of its development and continuously enhanced its fame for “being modern.”

---

<sup>336</sup> Ling, *Minsheng gongsi shi*, 54-59.

<sup>337</sup> Examples include: Yang Jianheng, “Zai Beibei Zhao Dao Le Xiwang;” Anonymous, “Manhua Beibei Shiyanguang;” Liu Xinshu, “Beibei Youji;” Zhao Peizhi, “Beibei luxing;” Xuan Shang, “Beibei sanji;” Liu Yun, “Beibei xing;” Sui Shusen, “Beibei zhi dong;” Ping Ou, “Beibei zhi xing;” Xu Shusong, “Beibei xiaojing;” all in CTGMW database. Also see Hui Zhen, “Cangan Sichuan Xiaosan Xia Shehui Shiye Riji.”

<sup>338</sup> Liu Xingshu, “Beibei youji,” in *Sichuan shengli diliu zhongxuexiao xiaowai tongxuehui huikan* (1935), 35

## Ch. 4: The War and Its Impact

Although once considered by China as a remote and inferior country, by the late nineteenth-century, when China was facing internal and external crises of increasing gravity, Japan had raised itself from the status of an isolated land burdened by a series of civil war to a modern nation through the implementation of successful reforms. Being a relative latecomer to international competition over China's resources and territory, Japan made its ambitions clear with the first Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Japan's victory over China secured Japan's claim over not only Korea but also Taiwan. When Japan defeated Russia in 1905 over Manchuria, it acquired international recognition as the most progressive country in Asia and actively participated in "carving up China" with other, Western countries. However, whereas Western countries considered keeping the Chinese sovereignty in the hands of the Chinese as best suited to their interests, Japan dreamed of a great East Asian empire that would make other countries into Japanese colonies. After the fall of the Qing Dynasty in the early twentieth century, when China was engulfed by warlord infighting, Japan speeded up the realization of its ambition by negotiating an unequal treaty with the government of Yuan Shikai in 1915. Taking advantage of China's incompetent government and militarism, by 1931, Japan had attained full control over Manchuria and installed the last emperor of the Qing Dynasty, Puyi, as the head of the Japanese puppet regime, Manchukuo.<sup>339</sup>

During the early 1930s, the Chinese Nationalist government resisted the constant appeals made by the Chinese people to resist Japanese aggression. Instead, it considered the elimination

---

<sup>339</sup> Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search of Modern China* (New York: Norton, 1999), 277–83, 366–74.

of Chinese Communist Party as its first priority.<sup>340</sup> However, in 1936, two generals carried out a coup d'état by kidnapping Jiang Jieshi and forcing him to agree to a ceasefire with the Chinese Communist Party. Jiang also agreed that the Nationalist government should work with the Chinese Communist Party to resist Japanese aggression.<sup>341</sup> On July 7, 1937, the Chinese army in Wanping, a small town fifteen kilometers away from Beijing, was fired upon by the Japanese army, which believed that one of its soldiers had been kidnapped by the Chinese. The Chinese forces fired back, and the Japanese army then bombed the town. Ten days later, the Nationalist government declared full resistance and mobilization against the Japanese invasion.<sup>342</sup> By the end of July, the Japanese army was occupying all the major cities in north China, including Beijing and Tianjin. As the hope of negotiating peace through diplomatic means diminished, the Nationalist government proceeded with preparations for retreat and relocation. In early November 1937, the first group of government officials carrying classified documents and the seal of the state arrived in Chongqing, marking the beginning of the Nationalist government's eight-year rule in the city.<sup>343</sup>

As discussed in the previous chapter, the anti-communist campaigns had compelled Sichuanese militarists to seek assistance from the Nationalist government in 1934 and consequently ended the militarists' political independence and the garrison system in the province. Although critical positions and the heads of administrative agencies were still largely controlled by the military leaders, the Nationalist government exerted its influence over decision

---

<sup>340</sup> For a brief introduction on the history of the Nationalist-Communist relationship since the mid-1910s, see *ibid.*, 314–41. Spence also provides a brief discussion on how the Chinese Communist Party survived, regardless of Jiang Jieshi's military campaigns. See *ibid.*, 392–403.

<sup>341</sup> Because it occurred in Xian, this incident was eventually called the Xian Incident. See *ibid.*, 403–409.

<sup>342</sup> *Ibid.*, 419–421. Also see Li Yun-han, "The Origins of the War: Background of the Luouchiao Incident, July 7, 1937," in Paul K. T. Sih ed., *Nationalist China During the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945* (Hicksville: Exposition Press, 1977.)

<sup>343</sup> Xie Rudi et al., *Chongqing kangzhan wenhuashi* (Beijing: Tuanjie cubanshe, 2005), 35–37.

making by creating institutions such as the Special Inspectorates. Such political penetration paved the way for the relocation of the national capital from Nanjing to Chongqing in 1937. In fact, Jiang Jieshi himself claimed that it was the cooperation with the Sichuanese militarists in 1934 that prompted him and his advisers to formulate the wartime plan for relocation.<sup>344</sup>

On the eve of the anti-Japanese war, politics in the province were practically a wrestling match between Sichuanese militarists, particularly Liu Xiang, and the Nationalist government. Nanjing's goal of strengthening its authority conflicted with the interests of the militarists. Being the most powerful among the Sichuan militarists, Liu Xiang was especially alarmed by the encroachment on his power in the province, as Nanjing pushed for reform. Conflicts inevitably occurred between Nanjing and the provincial government headed by Liu. Although the Nanjing government conducted a series of reforms in the province starting in 1935, it seemed to be unable to finalize a solution to the problem of the Sichuan militarists. Moreover, because of the reluctant cooperation and even resistance on the part of the militarists, the reforms in the province had only limited success. Because the Nanjing government was unable to resolve the militarist dominance and to break the complex codependence between the militarists and various groups of local elites, it had little resources with which to secure its own authority at the level of the local administration, which was largely operated by local elites. As a result, it failed to establish legitimacy and to penetrate local society.<sup>345</sup>

The war provided a unique opportunity for the Nationalist government to accomplish what it had been unable to accomplish in peacetime. Because Japan occupied all the major cities in north China and along the country's eastern coast, the relocation of the government to inland

---

<sup>344</sup> Ibid., 21.

<sup>345</sup> Kapp, *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic*, 121–135.



China was crucial for its leadership in the war and for the country's survival. The Sichuan militarists, led by Liu Xiang, committed their troops to the war, and the joint Sichuan militarist-Nationalist army was designated to enter the battle in October 1937. When the militarists turned their attention to preparations for war, it gave the relocated Nationalist government the opportunity to restructure and directly control the provincial administration. Furthermore, the early death of Liu Xiang, who died in January 1938 due to a longtime stomach illness, and the great losses that the Sichuanese army suffered on the battlefield weakened the overall ability of the Sichuan militarists to compete with the Nationalist government politically.<sup>346</sup>

The impact of the anti-Japanese war on the province, especially on Chongqing, was extensive but has received very little scholarly attention. The decision to make Chongqing the wartime capital was not made in haste. The search for an alternative capital to Nanjing began in 1932, when the Japanese caused the 128 Incident in Shanghai.<sup>347</sup> Nanjing was prone to attack from the Yangzi River because of its location, and this vulnerability alarmed the Nationalist government. The possibility of an extensive war with Japan prompted the government to consider Luoyang, Xian, and Wuhan as substitute capitals.<sup>348</sup> Due to the Nationalist government's lack of authority in southwestern China, the discussion in 1932 did not include Sichuan province. However, the province was included in discussions of a suitable wartime base in the mid-1930s, when the National government assisted the Sichuanese militarists in dealing

---

<sup>346</sup> Qiao and Yang, *Liu Xiang Zhuan*, 274–275.

<sup>347</sup> After Japan set up its puppet regime in Manchuria, the anti-Japanese and anti-foreign feelings among the Chinese accumulated to the point that boycotts and protests erupted in many of China's large cities. On January 28, 1932, the Japanese marines were ordered to secure their boundary in Shanghai. The marines exchanged fire with the Nationalist army. The incident thus was referred to as the "128 Incident" in Chinese. See Spence, *The Search of Modern China*, 371; and Lu Liu, "A Whole Nation Walking: The Great Retreat in the War of Resistance, 1937-1945" Ph.D. diss., University of California, San Diego, 2000, 7.

<sup>348</sup> Lu, "A Whole Nation Walking," 71–95.

with the Chinese Communist.<sup>349</sup> In a public speech given during a visit to Chongqing in March 1935, Jiang Jieshi clearly pointed out that the province, owing to its rich resources, location, and the size of its population, should become the base from which the government could defend the country from foreign intrusion and restore the strength of the nation.<sup>350</sup>

On the eve of anti-Japanese war, Sichuan province was not the only choice for a wartime base, considering the preparations that the Nationalist government had already made in Luoyang, Xian, and Wuhan. Why, then, did the Nationalist government abandon these other cities and announce its evacuation to Chongqing in 1937? Because it was located upstream of the Yangzi River and controlled the water transportation on the Yangzi River, which neighbored Tibet, Chongqing's strategic importance and rich resources had been highly valued for centuries. Additional reasons might have attributed to the government's decision. First of all, Chongqing could defend itself more effectively from enemies that now came not only from the surface but also from the air. The half-year-long fog season would significantly reduce the success of Japanese air raids. The stone caves surrounding the city were also ideal air-raid shelters. The environmental features of the city thus better equipped it to resist modern warfare.<sup>351</sup> Second, the unsuccessful campaigns against the Chinese Communists in northwestern China, which almost cost Jiang Jieshi his life in Xian, might have tarnished the leader's impression of the place. More importantly, because the Nationalist government's campaigns against Chinese Communists were suspended in 1936, Chinese Communists were able to regroup themselves and consolidated their power in northwestern China. Although the CCP and the Nationalists formed a united front during the war, their ideological differences and their hostility and suspicion toward each other

---

<sup>349</sup> Ibid., 97–98.

<sup>350</sup> Jiang Jieshi, "Sichuan yinzuo fuxin minzu zhi genjudi," in Qin Xiaoyi ed., *Zhonghua minguo zhongyao shilian chubian: duiri kangzhan shiqi* (Taipei: Zhongguo guomindang danshi weiyuanhui, 1981,) vol. 3, pp. 329–34.

<sup>351</sup> Lu, "A Whole Nation Walking," 96.

remained intact. For the Nationalist government, fighting a foreign enemy in the house of a domestic enemy would be the worst war strategy. For these reasons, Xian and Luoyang were no longer suitable candidates for China's wartime capital.<sup>352</sup> Finally, since 1935, the Nationalist government had carried out policies intended to terminate the independence of Sichuan. Although the provincial government was still largely controlled by Liu Xiang, its military and economy were more or less integrated into the national system. The Nationalist' effort at centralization in the province before the war provided some primitive base and preparation for its relocation to Chongqing.

The relocation of the government brought to the city of Chongqing not only political institutions, but also a flood of refugees, factories, and educational and cultural enterprises, such as schools and newspapers and magazines.<sup>353</sup> The sudden increase of the population meant a corresponding increase in the demand for housing, food, and even entertainment. Many relocated factories now not only had to continue production for the war but also for internal consumption in a new environment with unfamiliar local customs and wartime regulations. Newspapers and magazines stimulated the circulation of public opinion in a previously isolated region, which posed new challenges for the propaganda control that the government regarded as indispensable for its war effort. Of course, the negative impacts of the war on the province, such as economic depression, a shortage of consumer goods, and the terrors of bombing, should not be overlooked. For the history of Chongqing and Sichuan province, the arrival of these outside elements had

---

<sup>352</sup> Ibid., 102.

<sup>353</sup> Historians have yet to understand the scope of the relocation. For the retreat of many China's higher institutions, see John Israel, *Lianda: A Chinese University in War and Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University, 1996.)

profound and complex meanings. As one historian commented, for the first time in the 5,000-year history of China, the center of the country was moved westward.<sup>354</sup>

The arrival of government institutions, refugees, and industries made Sichuan province, particularly Chongqing, the political, economic, and cultural center of “free China.” Although historians have begun to research the war’s impact on society, many questions remain unanswered. Most of the existing literature focuses on issues such as the sacrifices of Sichuanese soldiers, institutional changes to the government, and wartime policies regarding the economy. Even though these works broaden our understanding of wartime China, the depth of our knowledge is still inadequate, particularly on questions about how society in the area controlled by the Nationalist government responded to and accommodated the changes brought by the war.<sup>355</sup> Simply put, with perhaps the largest movement of the population in Chinese history, the Nationalist-controlled communities could not remain unchanged in terms of land use, local management, and lifestyle.

Being forced to retreat to inland China and abandon its economic centers on the east coast and in the north, the Nationalist government appeared to be extremely fragile in the face of Japanese aggression. Although much had been done to strengthen the Chinese state prior to the war, defeats by the Japanese on the battlefield in north and central China overshadowed the Nationalist government’s state-building efforts in the Nanjing Decade. The war’s destruction of

---

<sup>354</sup> Xie Rudi et al., *Chongqing kangzhan wenhuashi*, 22.

<sup>355</sup> The recent scholarship on China during World War II concentrates on the lower Yangzi Delta, particularly Shanghai, and north China, including Dagfinn Gatu, *Village Chia at War: The Impact of Resistance to Japan, 1937-1945* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005); Stephen R. MacKinnon, Diana Lary, and Ezra F. Vogel, eds., *China at War: Regions of China, 1937-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); David P. Barrett and Larry N. Shyu, eds., *Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945: The Limits of Accommodation* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2001); Parks M. Coble, *Chinese Capitalists in Japan’s New Order: The Occupied Lower Yangzi, 1937-1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); and Christian Henriot and Wen-hsin Yeh, *In the Shadow of the Rising Sun: Shanghai under Japanese Occupation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

the society of “free China” and the need for wartime policies that would achieve victory made the prewar political, economic, and social policies and developments seem irrelevant. For this reason, the anti-Japanese war often serves as a break in studies of modern Chinese history.<sup>356</sup> However, although the war no doubt cost China many resources that otherwise could have been invested in the work of nation-building, it in no way stopped nation-building efforts completely. In fact, during the war, the Nationalist government continuously experimented with reforms that it had carried out before the war.<sup>357</sup>

The history of the JLJXSX area during the anti-Japanese war provides a new perspective on the neglected history of China during the war and the overlooked continuity of China’s nation-building efforts. Because many top-level governmental institutions, such as the Department of Defense, Military Committee, and Staff Corp (both headed by Jiang Jieshi) were relocated to Chongqing, the Jialingjiang Special District of Rural Reconstruction, particularly its center in Beibei Township, was also designated as the location for many government offices of less military importance due to its short distance from Chongqing. Modernization projects, ongoing since the 1920s, had equipped the district with some of the essentials of modern life. By 1937, the district had several banks, post offices, and medical clinics. The Minsheng Steamship Company provided services between the town of Beibei and Chongqing every other day. The transportation service thus enabled local residents to access the city.<sup>358</sup> Moreover, the ten-year tenure of the XFJ administration and the SYQS administration had eliminated banditry and

---

<sup>356</sup> This characteristic can be seen in most of the scholarship on Republican China. See introduction for related bibliography.

<sup>357</sup> Several scholars have attempted to understand China’s nation-building efforts across the divide of the anti-Japanese war. See Lu, “A Whole Nation Walking”; Judd Kinzley, “Crisis and the Development of China’s Southwestern Periphery: The Transformation of Panzhihua,” *Modern China*, vol. 38, no. 5 (September 2012): 559–84; and Morris Bian, *The Making of the State Enterprise System in Modern China: The Dynamic of Institutional Change* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).

<sup>358</sup> Ling, *Minsheng gongsi shi*, 15.

transformed the JLJXSX area into a tourist site and a place suitable for quiet living. For these reasons, many of China's most renowned writers, artists, scholars, and schools chose this once historically insignificant place as their home during the war.<sup>359</sup> Their stay added importance to the community and stimulated its cultural activities. Although the destruction of human life brought about by the war is undeniable, in the case of Beibei, the war did have positive consequences. Because of these consequences, Beibei reached the apogee of its fame during the war and acquired a historical legacy. The remainder of this chapter will discuss this process.

### **The impact of the war: local politics**

Even though the provincial government in Sichuan was reorganized in 1935, the militarists still had a firm grip on politics in the province. The unification of the province with the Nanjing government was thus only nominal. Nanjing's policy of reorganizing the Sichuanese army conflicted with the interest of the militarists. As a result, the military reorganization did not completely eliminate the militarists' control over the province. Instead, it created new opportunities for Liu Xiang to dominate the provincial government at the expense of many of his colleagues.<sup>360</sup> In the end, it was the sentiment of nationalism aroused by the Japanese threat that changed the status quo of the Nationalist government in Sichuan province. Soon after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, many of the Sichuan militarists publicly announced that they would join the battle against the Japanese invasion under the leadership of the Nanjing government.<sup>361</sup> Liu

---

<sup>359</sup> Those who stayed in the JLJXSX area during the war included Lao She, Guo Morou, Yu Youren, Lin Yutang, Tao Xinzhi, and Liang Shiqiu. The relocated Fudan University also brought in a group of professors and students. Li Xuanhua, "Kangzhan shiqi bufen mingren zaibei huodong," *BBWS*, vol. 4 (1992): 399–427.

<sup>360</sup> Kapp, *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic*, 108; Qiao and Yang, *Liu xiang zhuan*, 273–74.

<sup>361</sup> The Sichuanese militarists in fact held the second conference of military reduction on July 9, 1937. Zhou Kaiqing, *Liu xiang xiansheng nianpu*, 146.

Xiang also urged the Nanjing government to relocate to Sichuan and prepared for long-term resistance.<sup>362</sup> During the first two years of the war, more than 200,000 Sichuanese soldiers were sent into battle.<sup>363</sup> Although they fought bravely, these troops were unable to stop the Japanese aggression. By the end of 1938, Japan had occupied all the major cities in the north, and its troops were pushing upstream along the Yangzi River.<sup>364</sup>

The heavy losses suffered by the Sichuanese army weakened the power base of the militarists. Moreover, the early death of Liu Xiang in January 1938 removed the primary obstacle to the Nationalist government's control of the province. After Liu's death, his longtime lieutenant Wang Zanzu was appointed as governor, but Wang lacked the authority to control other militarists, who were increasingly suspicious that he had secretly reached a certain agreement with Jiang Jieshi to weaken their power. The opposition finally forced Wang to resign after only three months in power. Following Wang's resignation, the Nanjing government reasoned that the appointment of another militarist would only result in similar outcome, because it was the militarists' nature to compete with each other for political resources. To avoid such a conflict, which threatened much-needed political stability during the war, Jiang Jieshi appointed himself as governor in September 1939. Despite their reluctance, the Sichuan militarists lacked the resources to compete with Jiang. The outbreak of the anti-Japanese war had increased Jiang's prestige as China's national leader. His status and the importance of maintaining stability

---

<sup>362</sup> Lu, "A Whole Nation Walking," 103.

<sup>363</sup> He Yingqing, "Kangzhan qijian gesheng linian shizheng zhuangding renshu tongjibiao," in *Banlian kangzhan zhi Jingguo* (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1972). For details on the Sichuanese armies during the war, see Ma Xuanwei and Wen Xianmei, *Chuanjun chuchuan kangzhan jishi* (Chengdu: Sichuansheng shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1986).

<sup>364</sup> Xie Benshu and Niu Hongbin, *Jiang Jieshi he xinan difang shilipai* (Henan sheng: Henan renmi chubanshe, 1992), 179–93.

silenced the militarists' objections and paved a new path for the Nationalist government to consolidate its legitimacy in the province.<sup>365</sup>

The relocation of the Nationalist government to Chongqing began in the fall of 1937 and signified that China was prepared to fight in the long term. Yet, to fight a long-term war against a country with a superior military required the full mobilization and commitment of China's resources and manpower. The prerequisite for such a commitment was that the government had to have a clear picture of its population, finance, and social condition. However, the relocated Nationalist government in Chongqing lacked such a picture. Although an administrative reform was attempted in 1935 to tighten the government's control over the county-level administration, it only achieved questionable results due to the fact that its success depended on the cooperation of Liu Xiang and the provincial government with Nanjing.<sup>366</sup> To solve the problem, the Nationalist government attempted another reform at the county level in 1939.<sup>367</sup>

The reform, often called "the new county system" (Xin Xian Zhi), consisted of three major parts. The first part was the reorganization of offices in the county government and the remapping of towns and villages. The county governments in the province were ordered to clearly define the responsibilities of administrative offices. As a result, the number of administrative offices increased, and the size of bureaucracy enlarged. Below the county level, towns and villages replaced the previous militia units as the lowest level of local administration. Their responsibilities were also extended to include the production of household and population records, land registration, and tax collection. Unlike the previous baojia system, in which usually one man was the head of the office, the reform created new administrative positions that were

---

<sup>365</sup> Qiao and Yang, *Liu Xiang zhuan*, 247–52.

<sup>366</sup> Kapp, *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic*, 121–35.

<sup>367</sup> Wang Fei, "Guomin zhengfu xinbianzhi xia de xiangzhen tizhi," master's thesis, Capital Normal University, 2007, 14.



responsible for different duties. Although the baojia system was not completely abolished, it could no longer collect its own taxes or manage matters of local security. The units of bao became communication stations that conveyed policies and messages received from above.<sup>368</sup> In short, the aim of the reform was to extend the reach of the central government by creating new institutions and expanding the size of bureaucracy. The new system would allow the central government to convey its orders to the local level more easily.

The second part of the new reform involved the establishment of local councils at the county level. The establishment of local councils was a major part of the “New Policy” reform in the late Qing Dynasty, and the subsequent Republican government also considered it as a political priority that could fulfill Sun Yet-sen’s idea of “rule by the people.”<sup>369</sup> However, the chaotic political environment in the early Republican years prevented the full realization of this policy. Although the Nationalist government in Nanjing attempted to carry out this policy after the Northern Expedition, it only managed to get very few provinces to set up local councils at the county levels. In 1939, the government ordered the provinces not occupied by the Japanese to set up temporary local councils at the county level. They were temporary because their functions were different from the reform carried out in the Nanjing Decade due to the war. For instance, although the temporary local councils had the right to summon officials and make inquiries regarding policies, the county governments were not obligated to implement the policies decided by the councils. In other words, the war robbed the local councils of the actual power to act as policymakers. The realization of “rule by the people” was postponed during the war. Nonetheless,

---

<sup>368</sup> The baojia system, or “the tens (bao) and hundreds (jia)” was first introduced in the Northern Song Dynasty by Wang Anshi to tighten the control of local society. Ten households was one jia, and ten jia was one bao. See F. W. Mote, *Imperial China, 900-1800* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 140, 355, 918–919.

<sup>369</sup> Sun Yet-sen, “Minquan zhuyi,” in Song Qingling, ed., *Sun Zhongshan xuanji*, vol. 2 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1957).

positively speaking, the reform managed to bring the process of election to rural villages by educating local people to vote for their representatives.<sup>370</sup>

The third goal of the new county system was to reform local finances. During the early Republican years, the county governments basically had no independent systems of finance to deal with local revenues and expenses needed for their daily operation. The county governments mostly acted as stations of tax collection for provincial governments, and there was no law or regulation that defined the structure and sources of local finances. Most counties received revenues from all kinds of local taxes levied through the *baojia* system. To institutionalize local finances, the new reform clearly defined county finances as local and legalized certain taxes, such as a butcher's tax and a license tax, as sources of county revenue. In addition to annual stipends from the central government, incomes from certain public properties and services, such as admission to parks and public transportation, were also categorized as local revenue. Before the above policies were implemented, the county governments were first ordered to investigate their public properties and income and the taxes that they collected locally. The investigation thus provided detailed information on local conditions that was crucial for an effective wartime mobilization.

As the county governments in the Sichuan province underwent reorganization in accordance with the design of the "New County System," the structure of the administration in the gorge area was also altered. In 1942, with permission from the Nationalist government, the provincial government promoted the SYQS administration from a special administration of rural reconstruction to a district that had the same power and status as other county governments. The

---

<sup>370</sup> Wang Shuanjian, "Ershi shiji sishi niandai Sichuan sheng xinxiangzhi yanjiu," master's thesis, Xinan University, 2007, 24.

equal status between the new Beibei district administration (Beibei Guanliju; hereafter GLJ) and other county governments was significant, because the new district administration was then allowed to manage taxes that previously belonged to the county governments, such as land and property taxes.<sup>371</sup> In addition to setting up new offices following the example of the county governments, the new district administration also reorganized its police force. Since 1936, due to the overall improvement of local security and decreasing number of bandit disturbances, the militia force was transformed into a modern-style police that stationed offices in several more populated communities in the area. In 1942, with the reorganization of the GLJ administration, a police bureau was set up, and the total number of police stations and police officers increased more than three times.<sup>372</sup>

The political reorganization also installed local councils in towns and villages. In the area governed by the GLJ administration, three levels of local councils were set up, according to the outline of the New County Reform. In addition to the district councils, townships were also ordered to elect representatives to a township council. Below this level, formal meetings, including those among heads of villages or “bao” and those attended by all villagers, were also held.<sup>373</sup>

In the process of these reforms, as other county governments did, the new GLJ administration brought in more people to staff its enlarged bureaucracy, and elections were held to select council members. However, it should be noted that, although new blood was added, the heads of new offices and many newly elected council members were those who had been actively involved in the administration and local politics of the JLJXSX area in the pre-war years.

---

<sup>371</sup> *Beibei Quzhi*, 328–9.

<sup>372</sup> *Ibid.*, 114.

<sup>373</sup> DAGLJ, p1050991, p1060076, p1060104, p1060115

Lu Ziyong, the head of the administration since 1935, remained at his post, and none of his leading officers in the administration, many of whom had joined the administration in the early days of the gorge security bureau in the late 1930s, were replaced.<sup>374</sup>

The administration, since its founding in 1920, was essentially a political body managed by non-native administrators. From the military lieutenants to the Lu brothers, all were newcomers to this remote area of rampant banditry. Because of factors such as a lack of local talent and consideration of personal connections, the administrators, the Lu brothers especially, brought many outsiders into office. Only a few local gentry, such as the deputy director between 1924 and 1935, Xiong Mingfu, were actively involved in the administration's day-to-day operation. Like other rural regions of China, the JLJXSX area had its own local politics. The infamous secret society, the Gowned Brothers, was well established in the gorge communities. According to a list of names submitted to the provincial government by the GLJ administration in 1943, in each of the five townships governed by the GLJ administration, there were lodges of this secret society. Although the list did not include the names of all members, it did provide some basic information on the heads of the lodges.<sup>375</sup>

The leaders of the Gowned Brother Society all had significant wealth, and most of them had received substantial education and had careers in commerce or mining. In many cases, this society was a dominant player in local politics; however, the story in JLJXSX seemed different.<sup>376</sup> Because of its origin as an external political power, the GLJ administration did not absorb much of the leadership from its early days as a bureau of security management. Consequently, opposition against the administration lingered among these local leaders. In 1940,

---

<sup>374</sup> Ibid..

<sup>375</sup> DAGLJ, pp. 1070503, p. 1070211.

<sup>376</sup> Qu Xueliang, "Dingjiaao de paoge gaikuang," *Bishan wenshi zilian* 4 (1990): 124–128.

a certain head of a Gowned Brother lodge submitted an appeal to the special inspectorate, accusing the administration of corruption.<sup>377</sup>

The New County Reform, with its establishment of councils in towns and villages, provided an alternative channel of political participation for these local leaders in the JLJXSX area. Some leaders of the Gowned Brother Society became members of the local councils.<sup>378</sup> Although, in reality, the reform gave the councils no power to rule over the administration in terms of policy making, through the process of nominations and elections, it gave the local leadership both new social status and an opportunity to position itself in local politics.

It should also be noted that the administrative change of the GLJ administration as discussed above was not only a direct result of top-down reform but also a much-needed response to the rapid changes that were occurring in the gorge society due to the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war. Being only 30 miles away from Chongqing, the environment in the JLJXSX area was deeply affected by the Nationalist government's decision to make Chongqing the wartime capital. Thousands of refugees from the north and east of China fled to southwestern China. It has been estimated that, during the war, the population of Chongqing more than doubled, from around 460,000 to over one million.<sup>379</sup> Along with the population increase in Chongqing, the population of the JLJXSX area, especially of the town of Beibei, where the GLJ administration was located, also increased about three times.<sup>380</sup> To accommodate such a large population, not only did the administration need to be upgraded, but the availability of necessities, such as housing, food, and clothing, also had to be expanded to meet the increasing

---

<sup>377</sup> DAGLJ, p. 1060865.

<sup>378</sup> DAGLJ, p. 1070507, p. 1050989.

<sup>379</sup> Pang Xun et al., *Kanzhan shiqi xinan houfang shehui bianqian yanjiu* (Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 2011), 36.

<sup>380</sup> Ibid., 37.

demand. Cultural activities, such as the publication of newspapers and magazines and musical and theatrical entertainment, flourished accordingly. All these changes resulted in rapid urbanization and had a profound influence on the landscape and society of southwestern China. The rest of this chapter will focus on this process in the JLJXSX area to shed some light on our understanding of society in “free China” during the war.

### **The impact of the war: population increase**

Because of the overall improvement of local conditions that resulted from the security management, the population in the gorge area had shown steady growth. The following chart shows the number of households and the size of the population between 1936 and 1949.<sup>381</sup>

<b>Year</b>	<b>Household</b>	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>Total Population</b>
<b>1936</b>	12671	35460	29624	65284
<b>1937</b>	12868	35785	30479	66264
<b>1938</b>	13123	35822	31421	67243
<b>1939</b>	14422	49686	34437	74123
<b>1940</b>	19771	58602	38747	97397
<b>1941</b>	15564	48762	36581	85343
<b>1942</b>	16299	50626	46918	87544
<b>1943</b>	17181	48112	38046	86158
<b>1944</b>	18163	52170	41115	93285
<b>1945</b>	18229	49850	40367	90217
<b>1946</b>	17899	61618	40177	101795

---

<sup>381</sup> *Beibei quzhi*, 52–53.

<b>1947</b>	19227	55939	41758	97697
<b>1948</b>	19226	56266	41754	98620
<b>1949</b>	21256	61932	45642	107574

According to the chart, from 1936 to 1937, the total population in the gorge area experienced an average increase of 1,000 annually. The driving force behind the increase can be attributed to the administration's efforts to improve local security and implement community reforms. More importantly, the upgrade of the area to a special district of rural reconstruction attracted new residents. Due to these factors, even though the area experienced a serious drought and a famine in 1937, there was still a one-percent increase in the population in that year.<sup>382</sup>

Comparing to the numbers of population prior to 1937, from 1938 local population in the JLJXSX saw more dramatic increase. By 1940, the total population of the JLJXSX area had increased 50 %. There is no data available regarding the composition and arrivals and departures of the local population in the JLJXSX area after 1937. However, the actual increase of the population in the JLJXSX area might be greater than what the above chart suggests. The data for Chongqing and Sichuan province provide a glimpse into the realities of this population increase. During the first three years of the war (1937-1939), Sichuan province sent more than half a million native sons to the battlefield, and it is estimated that a total of over two-and-a-half million Sichuanese males were recruited during the eight-year war.<sup>383</sup> To some extent, this outward movement of the population cancelled the influx of refugees into the province. Before 1940, the total population of the province and of Chongqing did not see significant increases.

<sup>382</sup> It was estimated that about 1,402 people died of famine in March 1937. Ibid., 13–14.

<sup>383</sup> He Yingqin, *Banian kangzhan zhi jingguo*, 234–235. He was the commander of the Chinese army during the anti-Japanese war. Also see Pan Xun et al., *Kanzhan shiqi xinan houfang shehui bianqian yanyiu*, 18.

Such a result must be attributed to the fact that a considerable part of male population of the province left to defend the country.

From 1940 until the war ended in 1945, the population of the JLJXSX area remained somewhere between 85,000 and 110,000. The most drastic change occurred in 1940, when the population of the JLJXSX area increased by about 23,000, an increase of 30 percent. Several factors might have attributed to this population increase. First of all, in 1940, the Statistics Bureau of the Nationalist government conducted a comprehensive demographic census in the JLJXSX area. The bureau applied modern statistical methods and dispatched officers to visit every household and record the actual number of members. Because of this detail-orientated approach, cases of omission could be uncovered, especially in terms of registering the so-called “boat households” that resided on boats and were mobile. Due to its short distance to Chongqing, the JLJXSX area was designated as a site of relocation for many governmental offices and schools from northern and eastern China. The census thus also recorded these newly arrived refugees. Second, this population increase might have been related to the intensifying bombing of Chongqing by the Japanese air force in 1939. The fear of bombing might have driven the urban population of Chongqing to the countryside, where people were less likely to be targeted by Japanese air raids.<sup>384</sup>

The population data also indicates the social development of the JLJXSX area. The Statistics Bureau in 1940 categorized the households in the gorge area into two categories: “general” and “all.” General households referred to those who called the gorge area their home and might have lived there for quite a long time; the “all” category referred to not only the

---

<sup>384</sup> Edna Tow, “The Great Bombing of Chongqing and the Anti-Japanese War, 1937-1945,” in Mark Peattie, Edward J. Drea, and Hans van de Ven, eds., *The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2011).



general households, but also households who existed for professional activities, such as shops, boarding schools, or factories. Thus, residents in the latter category included those who resided in the gorge area mainly for the sake of their professions. The 1940 data show that, in general households, the gender ratio was about 1 to 1.05 (female to male), whereas the ratio in all households was about 1 to 1.51. The difference between these two ratios indicates that, because of the war, the non-resident male population saw a significant increase. The Statistics Bureau compared the above results with data from other Chinese cities and concluded that the gender ratio in the JLJXSX area was similar to that in other cities. This conclusion was significant because it implies that, during the war, the area, to some extent, was experiencing urbanization as more males relocated for employment opportunities.<sup>385</sup>

The density of the population is another indicator of the level of urbanization of the local community. Historically, population density in urban areas has always been much higher than in rural areas or even in the country as a whole. Taking Chongqing and Chengdu as examples, the cities in 1910 had population densities of 222 persons per square kilometer and 373 persons per square kilometer, respectively, which were much higher than the average density of Sichuan province.<sup>386</sup> The population density in the JLJXSX area in the pre-war years was already higher than the average density in the province.<sup>387</sup> The 1936 data reported a population density of 131 persons per square kilometer, about 30 percent more than the average density in the province. By 1940, the density jumped to 194 persons per square kilometer. While the number in 1940 was much affected by the sudden increase of refugees, the 1936 figures should be considered as a result of the overall changes in the economy and society of the JLJXSX area.

---

<sup>385</sup> Guomin zhengfu zhujichu, "Beibei renkouzhi," in CTGMW, 7.

<sup>386</sup> Wei, *Chongqing chengshishi*, 393.

<sup>387</sup> Guomin zhengfu zhujichu, "Beibei renkouzhi," 7.

## **The impact of the war: industry**

The relocation brought about by the anti-Japanese war was not just a movement of people abandoning their homes. Many of them made the decision to move because the institutions, companies, or factories where they worked relocated to Sichuan province as well. At the outset of the war, the Nationalist government made the relocation of industries and factories to southwestern China its top priority. A special committee was set up to assist businesses that were willing to relocate. Because of the long distance from northern and eastern China to the southwestern interior and the associated relocating costs, relocation was carried out in two stages, following the results of battles between the Nationalist army and Japanese closely. The first stage began in 1937, when the destination of the relocation was Wuhan. After the loss of Shanghai and Nanjing to Japan, anticipating the possibility of losing Wuhan, the government soon began to plan to evacuate to Yichang, the last port on the Yangzi River before entering the territory of Sichuan province. By early 1938, the relocating industries, schools, and institutions had all arrived in Yichang, waiting to be transported to Chongqing, from where they might be further relocated to Guizhou and Yunnan.<sup>388</sup>

The trip from Yichang to Chongqing was one of the most dangerous journeys on the Yangzhi River because it passed through the famous “Yangzi Three Gorges.” Moreover, transportation on the upper Yangzhi River was soon to enter the “dry season,” when the decreased water level would cut the capacity of the steamships in half. These natural conditions made the task of relocation unimaginably difficult because the steamships available were already in short supply. To meet the challenge, the government appointed Lu Zuofu as the vice-minister of the Communication Department owing to his leadership in the steamship business and

---

<sup>388</sup> Lu, “A Whole Nation Walking,” 153.

expertise in transportation on the Yangzhi River. Under Lu's command, the Minsheng Steamship Company and another 208 steamships owned by companies retreating from the east coast carried about half a million tons of materials and machinery and one-and-a-half million soldiers and commoners before the dry season on the Yangzi River began. Moreover, private junks rented by the Nationalist government also rescued about 25,000 tons of materials and shipped them to Chongqing.<sup>389</sup>

The Yichang-Chongqing retreat was considered a success and hailed as the "Chinese Dunkirk retreat."<sup>390</sup> Many praised the event for showing what unity and strength the Chinese people could summon during a national crisis. The event thus became a great tool of patriotic propaganda. However, even though the Yichang-Chongqing retreat was considered a war victory, what it managed to rescue was only a tiny portion of China's pre-war industry. Although the Nationalist government convinced many industrialists on the east coast to evacuate their factories through patriotic propaganda, it was unable to provide the support the industrialists needed. Many had to abandon the plan due to the prohibitively expensive moving costs.<sup>391</sup> Moreover, due to concerns about inland China's being a poor economic environment for industrial production, the majority of the industrialists chose to transfer their factories to either foreign concessions or

---

<sup>389</sup> Ibid., 156–9.

<sup>390</sup> Dunkirk is a small coastal town in northern France. After occupying Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium in May 1940, German troops attacked the French-Belgium border. The French and British armies could not withhold the German aggression, and about 400,000 British soldiers were trapped in Dunkirk. The British government dispatched about 850 ships and successfully evacuated these troops in 9 days. Tian Hailan and Zhou Ninghua, *Lu Zuofu he minsheng gongsi* (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin cubanshe, 1998), 213–221.

<sup>391</sup> The Nationalist government initially provided incentives such as monetary compensation to cover the moving expenses, tax relief, and low-interest loans to encourage the evacuation and relocation of industries. However, when war broke out in Shanghai in August 1937, the factories that registered for government assistance were so many that the government had to announce the cessation of compensation for all that were willing to relocate, because the fragile national economy was unable to fund the plan. Instead, only industries that were deemed as crucial to wartime supply, such as heavy machinery, steel, and chemistry, would receive government funds. Consequently, many factories had to abandon their plans for evacuation. See Lu, "A Whole Nation Walking," 142–152; and Pan et al., *Kanzhan shiqi xinan houfang shehui bianqian yanyiu*, 9–11.

to Hong Kong, which they believed would provide much better conditions for wartime production.<sup>392</sup>

The evacuation and relocation of industry ceased in 1940 when the Nationalist government completed its relocation to Chongqing. There are no accurate figures on how many factories relocated to southwestern China, but, according to a government report, about 452 factories had moved to southwestern China by 1940. Of the 452 factories, 223 moved to Chongqing. The city also housed ten arsenal factories operated by the government. Overall, Sichuan province accommodated about 56% of the relocating factories, whereas the rest were scattered in Yunnan, Guizhou, Hunan, Shanxi, and Guangxi.<sup>393</sup>

During the war, the Nationalist government had a special committee—the Resource Committee—to assist the relocated factories in resuming production. The committee especially focused on the industries of heavy machinery and mining and those that were considered as critical to the progress of the war. To maximize production in a new environment with constrained resources, the relocated factories often sought to cooperate with existing factories under the guidance of the committee. The existing industry in Sichuan province also benefited much from such cooperation because the relocated factories brought more advanced technology and new ways of management from the prewar economic center in the lower Yangzi delta. As a result, industry in Sichuan province experienced significant changes when compared to the pre-war years. Changes in the mining and textile industries in the JLJXSX area best illustrated this process. These industries benefited much from Lu Zuofu's position in the Nationalist

---

<sup>392</sup> Lu, "A Whole Nation Walking," 147–9. Lloyd Eastman et al., *The Nationalist Era in China: 1927-1949* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 131.

<sup>393</sup> He Yimin, "Kangzhan shiqi xinan de jingji fazhan yu renkou biandong," in Zhongguo jindaishi xuehui ed., *Qingzhu kangzhan shengli wushi zhounian liangan xueshu yantaohui lunwenji* (Taipei: Lianjing chubanshe, 1995), vol. 2, 861. Zhou Yong, *Chongqing: yige nailu chengshi de jueqi* (Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 1989), 331.

government and the role played by the Minsheng Steamship Company. During the process of evacuation, because the Minsheng Company assisted many factories with relocating their equipment and materials to Chongqing, Lu was able to get in touch with these factories and eventually utilized their resources for the expansion of the coal and textile industries in the JLJXSX area.

In addition to the personal connection of Lu Zuofu and the business of the Minsheng Steamship Company, the policy of the Nationalist government was equally crucial to wartime industrial development in Sichuan. Before discussing the changes in industries in the gorge area, a brief look at the Resource Committee, which was the main governmental institution in charge of the allocation of resources and wartime economic plan, and its predecessor –the Design Committee—is indispensable. The development of the mining and textile industries of the gorge area was a direct result of the decisions made by the above governmental agencies.

### **1. The Design Committee, the Resource Committee, and the China-Peking Syndicate Coal Company**

The history of the Resource Committee began in 1932, when Japan invaded Manchuria and set up the Manchukuo regime. Viewing Japan's action as a sign of its ambition to occupy China in the future, the Nationalist government established the Design Committee of National Defense under the authority of the Staff Corp (henceforth the Design Committee). The main focus of the Design Committee was to plan and develop China's society, industry, and economy to satisfy the needs of war if war broke out between China and Japan. For this purpose, the Design Committee recruited many of China's top experts in the social sciences, economics, and

engineering and technology. Among them was Wong Wenhao, a Belgium-trained geologist. His appointment as the secretary-general of the Design Committee had a profound influence on the founding of the Resource Committee and the development of the mining industry in the JLJXSX area during the war.<sup>394</sup>

Although, in theory, the Design Committee was founded to promote progress in the areas of education and culture, its main achievements were most evident in the fields of science and technology. Under Wong's leadership, the Design Committee embarked on many extensive missions to investigate China's geography, resources, transportation infrastructure, and plans for building modern airports and dams. For the first time in Chinese history, teams of experts were dispatched to remote places, such as the northwestern desert, to investigate projects that included the determining the reserves of petroleum and exploring the possibility of building a dam on the upper Yangzi River (a plan the PRC government finally realized in the 1990s).<sup>395</sup>

In addition to planning and investigation, the Design Committee was particularly active in developing energy industries. Its involvement in the reorganization of the China-Peking Syndicate Coal Company (Zhongfu meikuang) in Henan province best revealed the concerns of the Design Committee with preparing China industrially for a war against Japan. Because of this reorganization, the Design Committee was able to preserve one of the largest coal mining companies in central China and later allowed it to work with the mining industry of the JLJXSX area.

---

<sup>394</sup> Xue Yi, *Guomin zhengfu ziyuan yanjiuhui yanjiu* (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 1989), 56–65.

<sup>395</sup> Ibid., 71.

## **2. The reorganization of the China-Peking Syndicate Coal Company**

The company, as indicated by its full name, was owned and operated jointly by foreigners and Chinese. The British-owned Peking Syndicate Company began to explore the coal in Henan province in 1896. In 1915, it merged with three Chinese-operated companies and founded the China-Peking Syndicate Coal Company. In theory, because of British investment, the company had the advantage of acquiring new and more efficient mining equipment that could boost production. However, the constant intervention from the militarists in terms of personnel decisions, production plans, and taxes; the protests and disturbances from small, privately owned workshops that considered that the existence of the China-Peking Syndicate Company deprived them of their livelihood; and the chaotic politics in the province prevented the China-Peking Syndicate from running its business efficiently. In 1933, the company offered several officials from the Nationalist government concurrent positions in the company with the hope of saving it from bankruptcy. However, the plan failed. In 1934, the British sector of the management of the company and the British ambassador formally requested assistance from Jiang Jieshi. Jiang appointed Wong Wenhao to lead a special team and take over the management of the China-Peking Syndicate Company.<sup>396</sup>

Wong brought in Sun Yueqi, an expert in mining engineering, as his main assistant. Sun graduated from Beijing University and studied mining engineering at both Stanford University and Columbia University from 1929 to 1932.<sup>397</sup> Working together, in two years, they simplified the employment structure by firing redundant personnel and strictly controlling the budget of the company to reduce the unnecessary waste of money and resources. Wong also emphasized the importance of the right to the mine, which should be determined by negotiation between the

---

<sup>396</sup> Ibid., 88–90.

<sup>397</sup> Li Xuanhua, “Meiyou dawang Sun Weiqi yu tianfu meikuang,” *BBWS* 8 (1997), 123.

company and the government. By this logic, he aimed to restrict unauthorized factories from exploiting the coal mines in the area and disturbing the market with low-quality products. With authorization from Jiang, Wong and Sun also reorganized the board of the China-Peking Syndicate Company. The head of the board was no longer chosen by the board members; instead, the appointment was now directly controlled by Jiang's Military Committee. The new head of the board also had the right to appoint the chief manager, who would be in charge of the operation of the business. Jiang Jieshi appointed Wong as the head of the new board, and Wong promoted Sun Weiqi as the chief manager.<sup>398</sup> These personnel appointments strongly shaped the new China-Peking Syndicate Company as a government-operated enterprise, although all its capital, equipment, and profits remained to privately owned. Yet, by controlling the top management, the government could exert more power in decision making and divert its resources to matters it deemed appropriate, as later proved by its relocation to Sichuan province.

The project of the China-Peking Syndicate is an example of how the Design Committee was involved in the practical realization of its vision of industrial development. Yet, despite the Design Committee's claims that its projects were open to public review, much of the work it conducted remained secretive. The secrecy provoked criticism that the Design Committee had actually achieved very little in preparing China for a possible war against Japan. However, this criticism was unjust given that the investigations conducted by the Design Committee from 1932 to early 1935 were the first conducted by a Chinese government in an attempt of understanding the country scientifically. The knowledge provided by these investigations was critical for China's effort to transform itself into a modernized nation. Moreover, the Design Committee, to some extent, also consolidate the legitimacy of the Nationalist government and Jiang Jieshi's

---

<sup>398</sup> Xu Gengsheng, "Zhongfu shihua," Jingji jianshe jikan 3 (1944), 232.



personal power because it recruited many of China's top experts from academia and trained them as techno-bureaucrats.<sup>399</sup>

In the spring of 1935, the Design Committee was reorganized as the Resource Committee and was placed under the direct jurisdiction of the Military Committee, headed by Jiang Jieshi. The reorganization thus allowed Jiang Jieshi to wield more direct control over the committee and the information it possessed. The Resource Committee also enjoyed financial support from the Military Committee, the annual budget of which was not supervised by the Nationalist government. According to He Lian, the intermittent secretary-general of the Resource Committee in 1937, the budget of the Resource Committee was larger than that of many departments in the Nationalist government.<sup>400</sup>

Although it decreased the size of the committee, the reorganization retained most of the experts in their positions. Wong Wenhao continued to work as the secretary-general of the new Resource Committee. Unlike the Design Committee, the tasks of which also included the fields of education and culture, the Resource Committee focused mainly on industry, trade, and the economy. Although investigation was still an important part of its job, the committee was now more actively involved in the practical planning and development of China's heavy industry. It drew up several plans to attract foreign investment (mainly German investment) and develop heavy industry. Under the guidelines for these plans, the Nationalist government signed a special trade treaty with Germany and founded several government-operated factories, including the Central Machinery Factory, the Central Electronics Factory, and the Central Steel Industry.<sup>401</sup> To

---

<sup>399</sup> Xu Yi, *Guomin Zhengfu ziyuan yanjiuhui yanjiu*, 50–54.

<sup>400</sup> *Ibid.*, 135.

<sup>401</sup> *Ibid.*, 157–161.

develop these industries, the Resource Committee also controlled the production and trading of China's rare-earth minerals.<sup>402</sup>

The anti-Japanese war interrupted many of the Resource Committee's plans, including the project to build an aircraft factory.<sup>403</sup> In accordance with the government's preparations for a prolonged war, the Resource Committee became the command center for industrial relocation. Although, initially, the Resource Committee strove to accommodate all industries that were willing to relocate, it was unable to provide enough financial assistance. As a result, the committee gave priority to industries that were deemed critical for meeting the demands of the war, including heavy machinery, chemistry, textile factories for military supply, and the medical industry. The committee would provide funding and assist these industries with transportation and securing new sites for their relocation. Other industries not given such priority had to fund their evacuation themselves.<sup>404</sup>

According to these guidelines, the evacuation of the China-Peking Syndicate Coal Company was one of the major tasks of the committee. Because the Committee appointed its secretary-general, Wong Wenhao, as the head of the board, it had more leverage to convince both Chinese and British investors to evacuate. At the end of 1937, the committee successfully removed most of the equipment to Wuhan and then eventually relocated the company to Beibei. As Japan had taken control over much of China's mining industry in central China by early 1938,

---

<sup>402</sup> Ibid., 171.

<sup>403</sup> Ibid., 165.

<sup>404</sup> Ibid., 194–5. Lu Liu, "A Whole Nation Walking," 147–148.

the China-Peking Syndicate was one of the few pre-war coal companies that later could supply the wartime need for fuel.<sup>405</sup>

### 3. The merger of China-Peking Syndicate and Tianfu Compaines

To make use of the equipment originally belonging to the China-Peking Syndicate Company in Henan province after the evacuation, the Resource Committee had to find a location with not only a rich reserve of coal mines but also some existing infrastructure that could support the transport of production. The JLJXSX area met these qualifications. Historically, the JLJXSX area and the delta of the lower Jialing River possessed one of the richest reserves of coal in Sichuan province. The existing historical records show that, as early as the early Qing dynasty, the area began to produce coal as a household fuel.<sup>406</sup> Some scholars and contemporaries believed that the history of coal mining there could even be traced back to the time before the Ming dynasty.<sup>407</sup> The mining industry was the major factor that attracted the population to this region and grew the local economy. In fact, some towns in the JLJXSX area began their history as mining settlements.<sup>408</sup>

Even though rich in quantity, the mining industry in the JLJXSX area in the early twentieth century was in no way well modernized due to a lack of sufficient capital and modern equipment. Most factories were small and were largely operated as family-owned handicraft shops. Coal products were produced mostly by simple tools and manpower. The lack of modern

---

<sup>405</sup> Before the war, it was estimated that there were more than 900 privately owned coal mines in China. Most of them were located in central and north China. During the war, Nationalist-controlled coal mines were only a small fraction of the pre-war coal industry. Tang Ling, “Kangzhan shiqi de zhongguo meikuang shichang,” *Jindaishi yanjiu* (May 1996), 85–86.

<sup>406</sup> Sun Wueiqi, “Chuanmei Chanxiao zhi huigu yu qianzhan,” *Xinan shiye tongxun*, vol. 2, no. 2 (1944), 41.

<sup>407</sup> Ibid.

<sup>408</sup> Examples include the towns of Huangjue and Chengjiang. Chongqingshi beibeiqu diming xiaozu, ed., *Sichuansheng Chongqingshi Beibeiqu Diminglu*, 14, 23.

machinery and underground facilities that could protect miners thus restricted the depth to which the factories could reach underground for coal.<sup>409</sup> Moreover, the scope of the market for coal was restricted by the lack of modern transportation facilities. The coal was often carried by man and animals to river ports on the Jialing River, from where they would be transported to Chongqing. Before the Minsheng Steamship Company began regular schedules on the Jialing River and before the building of the Beichuan Railway, there was no modern logistic equipment that could carry a large quantity of coal to Chongqing. These poor transportation conditions thus often added significant costs to coal production and increased its price. As a result, ordinary people often found the price of coal less favorable when compared to the cheaper cost of wood. Thus, the coal produced in the JLJXSX area was mainly used by other factories and the salt yards.

In 1934, some progress was made to assist the mining industry. The Beichuan Railway Company, led by Lu Zuofu and funded by the investors of the Minsheng Steamship Company, finished the six-year construction of the first railroad in the JLJXSX area. Built along the north shore of the lower Jialing River, the railroad began at Baimiaozi, which was right across the main river port of Beibei, and ended at Datiankan.<sup>410</sup> As evidenced by its location, the railroad was part of Lu's vision of the importance of developing transportation facilities that could promote economic growth in the JLJXSX area. Running through a major coal mining zone and connecting to the Jialing River, where the Minsheng Steamship Company provided ships to Chongqing daily, the railroad was expected not only to increase profits for Lu's companies but also to stimulate the mining industry on the north shore of the Jialing River, because the railroad would reduce transportation costs significantly.

---

<sup>409</sup> The average underground depth that the small coal factories could reach was about thirty meters. Zhang Boping and Ma Junzhi, "Jialingjian xiayou meitian diaocha baogao," Jingjibu kuangye yanjiusuo ranliao huibao 1 (1939), 3.

<sup>410</sup> Cheng Zongyang, "Sinian lai zhi tianfu meikuang," Yi yun yue kan (1942), 87.

Prior to the beginning of construction, many mining companies along the designated route of the Beichuan Railway were facing bankruptcy. Most reserves of coal close to the surface had been exploited by mining factories. The lack of modern machinery restricted the ability of these factories to reach coal located underground.<sup>411</sup> Moreover, the heavy burden imposed by the high cost of transporting coal ate up the factories' profits. Now, seeing the potential in the railroad, a few factories began to contemplate combining their capital and equipment and expanding the scale of production. In 1933, six factories decided to merge together with new investment from both the Minsheng Steamship Company and the Beichuan Railway and founded the Tianfu Coal Mining Company.<sup>412</sup>

After the merger, the Tianfu Coal Mining Company became the largest coal company in the Jialing delta. To expand production, Lu Zuofu, now the head of the company's board, applied new machinery that could dig deeper into the ground. To avoid the explosions that often resulted from the gas lighting in the mining tunnels, the Tianfu Company used electric lights powered by batteries instead. The company also had a workshop that produced these batteries to reduce the cost of buying batteries from external sources. All these technological improvements and the transportation means provided by the Beichuan Railway and the Minsheng Steamship Company soon increased the production of the Tianfu Company to 18,000 tons of coal per month.<sup>413</sup>

Although the Tianfu Company made progress in terms of mining technology, its production was relatively small when compared to that of other mining companies in north and central China because of a lack of capital. It was estimated that the annual increase in production

---

<sup>411</sup> Wen Jicheng and Zhang Tigong, "Guanliao ziben zhuyi de tianfu meikuang," *Sichuan wenshi ziliao* 9 (1963), 101.

<sup>412</sup> Ibid.

<sup>413</sup> Huang Zisheng and Liu Xuanqing, "Jialingjiang sanxia xangcun shiniandai zhi jingji jianshe," *Beibei yuekan* vol. 1, no. 5 (1937), 27.

of the new Tianfu Company was about 10 percent of the total production of the six factories before the merger. To change this situation, in the fall of 1936, Lu Zuofu dispatched a research team to central China and visited mines in Anhui and Henan. After five months of studying, the conclusion of the research team was that the production of Tianfu would not see significant growth unless the company invested in more modern machinery. Although Lu was a strong advocate of new technology, he could not find the sources of funding needed to modernize the equipment of the Tianfu Company. Without new equipment, the production of the Tianfu Company became stagnant.<sup>414</sup>

In late 1937, Lu was appointed as the vice-minister of the Department of Communications and supervised the evacuation of the population and factories. The position allowed him frequent contact with the Resource Committee of the Nationalist government. In early 1938, the committee had moved the equipment and workers of the China-Peking Syndicate Coal Mining Company from Henan province and was seeking a way to put the equipment and workers to use. Lu saw this situation as a solution to the crisis faced by the Tianfu Company, because both parties could make good use of their resources—the China-Peking Syndicate Company could apply its equipment and technology to assist the Tianfu Company. Thus, with the support of the government, the two companies merged in the summer of 1938. After the merger, the new company, still called Tianfu, became the largest coal company in Sichuan province during the war. The merger also transformed the JLJXSX area into the largest fuel supplier of the relocated factories in the Chongqing area, including the ten government-run arsenals.

---

<sup>414</sup> Li Xuanhua, “Meiyou dawang Sun Weiqi yu tianfu meikuang,” *BBWS* 8, 123–124.

To expand coal production and meet wartime demand, new equipment was not enough. Improvements in other aspects such as transportation and living conditions for workers also had to be made. With the materials from China-Peking Syndicate Company, the new Tianfu Company continuously made improvements to the transportation infrastructure. To increase the capacity of railway transportation, the company replaced the old, narrower tracks of the Beichuan Railway with wider ones. New cable cars were also set up at the end of the railroad to lower the cost of moving coal from the riverbank to the ships by laborers (because the riverbank was about 200 meters above the water level).<sup>415</sup> In 1943, the Minsheng Company also built the first Chinese-made train engine for transporting coal.<sup>416</sup> By then, the production of the new Tianfu Company had increased to about 1,500 tons daily (about 45,000 tons monthly), and its share of the market was almost half of the total sales of coal products traded in Chongqing.<sup>417</sup>

#### **4. The textile industry**

The textile industry in the gorge area provides another example of cooperation between the relocated factories and the existing ones in Sichuan. The textile industry had long been an important part of the rural economy.<sup>418</sup> Because agricultural activities in the gorge area were restricted by its lack of flat land, many households relied on the income generated by this side business. However, prior to the arrival of the XFJ office, this industry existed in the JLJXSX area in the form of small, family-run craft shops. In 1927, as career training and a way to save on military expenses, the gorge security office opened a small textile workshop and used its soldiers as workers. In Lu Zuofu's vision, this factory would not only produce clothing for the soldiers

---

<sup>415</sup> Cheng Zongyang, "Sinian lai zhi tianfu meikuang," 92.

<sup>416</sup> Zhang Taichao, "Kangri zhanzheng shiqi dahoufang de meitan jidi," *BBWS* 4 (1992), 88.

<sup>417</sup> Cheng Zongyang, "Sinian lai zhi tianfu meikuang," 94.

<sup>418</sup> Peng Chaogui and Wang Yan, eds., *Qingdai Sichuan nongcun shehui jingjishi* (Chengdu: Tiandi chubanshe, 2001), 126; Luo Jicheng and Li Beizhe, "Qianchuan gongchang lianhehui jianji," *Chongqing gongshang shiliao* 5 (1986), 80.

but was also the foundation for a modern industry. To realize his vision, Lu continuously purchased modern equipment and sent people to Chongqing and Shanghai to learn the technology associated with dyeing and weaving. By 1929, although still small in scale, the factory could produce more than the soldiers needed and began to sell its products on the market.<sup>419</sup>

In 1930, the factory was separated from the gorge administration. With investment from the Minsheng Steamship Company, Lu Zuofu purchased new machinery and turned the small workshop into the new Sanxia Textile Factory. In addition to turning some trained soldiers into full-time workers, the factory also recruited dozens of orphans and gave them training. These employees were no longer volunteer workers but were paid either monthly or according to the quantity of products they produced. By the end of 1931, the new Sanxia Textile Factory owned about sixty-five weaving machines, and its annual gross income was between 170,000 and 180,000 Chinese dollars. The total capital of the factory at the time increased from 50,000 to about 100,000 Chinese dollars. Prior to the outbreak of the war, the business of the Sanxia Textile Factory experienced steady growth. It continuously improved its equipment, expanded its space, and sent employees to textile factories in Shanghai to study new weaving and dyeing technologies. Its products were sold not only in nearby Hechuan County and Chongqing, but also in Chengdu and other market towns in central Sichuan. From a small workshop to a modern factory, the Sanxia Textile Factory was often hailed as another example of how Lu Zuofu put his vision of “saving China by developing modern industry” into practice.<sup>420</sup>

---

<sup>419</sup>Qian Jingrong and Zhu Jixun, “Jianku chuanye de daming fangzhi ranching,” *Chongqing gongshang shiliao* 5 (1986), 212–213; Chen Shukuan, “Lu Zuofu yu damingchang de chuangan he fazhan,” *BBWS* 3 (1988), 143–144.

<sup>420</sup>Chen Shukuan, “Lu Zuofu yu damingchang de chuangan he fazhan,” 143–147.



During the wartime evacuation, Lu and the Minsheng Steamship Company worked with many companies in the fields of light industry, such as food processing and textile manufacturing. Among them were the Dacheng Textile Company from Jiangsu and the Longchang Dying Factory from Shanghai. The Dacheng Textile Company was founded by Liu Guojun in Changzhou, Jiangsu province, in 1930. In eight years, the company grew by about eight times its original size and had four sites of production, three in Changzhou and one in Hankou. Its products were sold not only in Jiangsu province but also in north and southeast China. When Japan invaded Shanghai in August 1937, Liu Guojun decided to remove the machinery from the three production sites in Changzhou to Sichuan, lest this equipment fall into Japanese hands.<sup>421</sup>

The experience of the Dacheng Company is illustrative of the turmoil experienced by many Chinese private businesses during the evacuation. Unlike mining and other heavy industries that enjoyed strong government support, the majority of Chinese enterprises that decided to relocate received little governmental assistance, aside from obtaining a special passport for the journey. Taking Dacheng as an example, the company relied on some of its workers to disassemble the equipment. However, as the Japanese pushed up the Yangzi River from Shanghai, there was a severe labor shortage in Changzhou. Unable to find enough laborers to carry the equipment to the river port, the company had to abandon the majority of its machinery and raw materials. A lack of manpower thus delayed Dacheng's evacuation. By the time Liu Guojun managed to sail with the equipment, the Japanese army was on its way to Changzhou. En route to Hankou, the steamships carrying the Dacheng equipment encountered three Japanese air raids and lost half of the equipment onboard.<sup>422</sup>

---

<sup>421</sup> Zhu Yixun and Qian Rongjin, "Jianku chuangye de daming fangzhi ranching," *Chongqing gongshang shiliao* 5 (1986), 210.

<sup>422</sup> Ibid., 211.

At Hankou, Liu Guojun arranged the removal of the equipment in the Hankou factory of the Dacheng Company along with what he had managed to save from Changzhou to Sichuan. Unlike government-sponsored evacuations, the Dacheng Company had to compete for space on the ships with thousands of refugees and hundreds of factories waiting at the port of Hankou. Due to the difficulty of finding enough ships to carry all the equipment, Liu decided to remove only that belonging to the Hankou factory and left everything he had brought from Changzhou behind. When Liu finally arrived in Chongqing in the spring of 1938, he had lost three-quarters of his lifetime investment.<sup>423</sup>

At Chongqing, Liu Guojun got in touch with the Longchang Dyeing Factory from Shanghai. Because Liu had been unable to remove the Dacheng Company's dyeing equipment from Changzhou and Hankou, he negotiated with the Longchang Factory to resume production. However, although both sides agreed to cooperate, they lacked the funds to purchase land and build new factory buildings. Eventually, Liu sought out Lu Zuofu and proposed to merge with the Sanxia Textile Company. In February 1939, the new Daming Textile Company was formally founded. Lu Zuofu, as the head of the board of the new Daming Company, secured a loan of 150,000 Chinese dollars from the Nationalist government through his connections with the bureaucracy. Liu Guojun also negotiated loans from the Bank of Shanghai in Chongqing. In addition to these loans, the new company also attracted new investment. These funds thus temporarily solved the issue of cash flow for the Daming Company.<sup>424</sup>

At the time of the merger, Dacheng Company had about 230 Japanese-made weaving machines. The equipment from the old Dacheng Company and Longchang Factory was more

---

<sup>423</sup> Ibid.

<sup>424</sup> Ibid., 215.

advanced than the equipment of the Sanxia Textile Company. The merger thus replaced some of the old equipment of the Sanxia Company. Moreover, because it was originally located in the lower Yangzi delta, where industry had more access to foreign technology and techniques of management, the technology base of both Dacheng and Longchang were superior to that of the Sanxia Company. Therefore, after the merger, the majority of positions in the management and technical offices were staffed with crews from both Dacheng and Longchang.<sup>425</sup>

With advanced equipment and technology, the new Daming Company expanded its production. The dyeing techniques imported from the Longchang Factory improved the quality of the color of its products. “Daming blue,” a blue-colored fabric, became the most popular signature merchandise of the Daming Company. Within two years after the merger, the Daming Textile Company grew into a factory three times larger than the old Sanxia Company and had more than 1,000 employees and produced about 10,000 yards of fabric daily.<sup>426</sup>

The Dacheng Textile Company and the Tianfu Coal Mining Company were only two examples of how the evacuation of factories to southwestern China was a driving force behind the development of existing industries. The evacuation not only brought in private capital and equipment but also capital owned by the so-called “bureaucratic capitalists”—those who had strong ties to the government and used such advantage in their own business. Representatives of such entrepreneurs included T. V. Song and H. H. Kong, who were both in-laws of Jiang Jieshi and economic and financial ministers in the Nationalist government. One important characteristic that separated such capitalists from private industrialists was that the bureaucratic-capitalists at times could access the state funds available for industrial development more easily. During the

---

<sup>425</sup> Ibid., 214.

<sup>426</sup> Ibid., 218.

war, these capitalists continued to enjoy the advantages of their bureaucratic positions and worked with local industries in southwestern China. For instance, as the minister of finance, H. H. Kong assisted another company in the JLJXSX area, the Sancaisheng Coal Mining Company, to secure a loan. The company thus was able to avoid bankruptcy and became the main supplier of coal to Kong's steel factory.<sup>427</sup>

The current scholarship on the wartime Chinese economy (most of which was written by scholars in China) disagrees about the impact that the war had on industry in southwestern China. Some scholars consider the industrial growth during the war as abnormal, arguing that the private industrial sector was in decline while government-run factories experienced significant growth due to their easy access to capital and raw materials.<sup>428</sup> Others consider that the war created a unique environment that allowed certain industries, such as the textile industry, to thrive.<sup>429</sup> Although much work remains to be done on wartime industry in Sichuan Province, the growth that the industry experienced during the war is well documented by the above examples. With the capital and technology that came with the relocation of factories, the industry and commerce of not only the JLJXSX area but also the southwestern provinces experienced significant changes.

### **The impact of the war: housing and land use**

Before the war, because the increase of the population was gradual and steady and related to the improvement of local security, the community was able to accommodate the demand of housing. For those who came to the area for work, factories such as the Sanxia Textile Company

---

<sup>427</sup> Ning Zitun, "Zhongguo xinye gongsi poshi," *Chongqing gongshang shiliao* 5 (1986), 108–33. Huang Mingan, "Sancaisheng meikuang yu Kong xiangxi Lu Zuofu," *Sichuan wenshi ziliao xuanji* 9 (1963), 152–66.

<sup>428</sup> Pan Xun, ed., *Kangzhan shiqi xinan houfang shehui bianqian yanjiu*, 69; Wu Renming, "Kangzhan shiqi dahoufang minying gongye xinshuai ji qi yu zhenfu guanxi shulun," *Jiang han lun tan* (May 2011), 79–84.

<sup>429</sup> Wei, *Chongqing chenshi shi*, 243–6.

and the Tianfu Coal Mining usually provided dormitories for their employees. Tourists attracted by hot springs could easily find lodging in privately run hotels for fair prices. In the files of the administrations prior to the war, we find no records that indicate a shortage of housing.<sup>430</sup>

Accordingly, the sporadic blueprints of urban planning conducted by the XFJ administrations focused mainly on the improvement of basic infrastructures, including widening the streets and setting up sewage systems. Soon after the war, with limited resources, the SYQS administration had begun to draw up plans that aimed to improve the basic facilities of public hygiene and transportation due to the increase of the local population. Plans to erect boundaries between residential and commercial areas were also included to improve the quality of life and achieve more efficient management of local security.<sup>431</sup> All these plans became more urgent when the war forced a large number of refugees and factories to relocate to the JLJXSX area. Demands for housing and for working space for private businesses, schools, governmental agencies, and residential uses increased dramatically. The accommodation of these demands directly influenced the ongoing planning of urban renewal and land use in the JLJXSX area.

Requests for working space and lodging for government agencies and employees and disputes over rent and leasing contracts appeared in the administrative files soon after the war began. The increasing number of disputes over houses and land prompted the SYQS administration to set down regulation as guidelines for real-estate transactions.<sup>432</sup> The situation the JLJXSX community experienced in fact was a new phenomenon in the southwest provinces since 1937. The relocated Nationalist government eventually was pressured to take action. To regulate rents particularly in Chongqing area, the Nationalist government drew up a regulation,

---

<sup>430</sup> See the catalogue of DAGLJ by the Chongqing City Archive.

<sup>431</sup> SYQS, "Beibei shangyequ jiedao zhengli jihua," *Beibei yuekan* vol. 3, no. 8 (1939), 31–37. DAGLJ, juan 282.

<sup>432</sup> DAGLJ, juan 290.

specifying two conditions for rent. If the building was built before 1938, the landlords could only increase the rent by 20 percent; if the building was built after 1938, the rent must not exceed 20 percent of the total value of the land and building. The regulation also attempted to protect tenants by specifying that, in cases when the landlords intended to force the tenants to move out before the end of contract term by refusing to accept rent, a tenant could deposit the rent in a bank account as evidence of fulfilling his obligation as a tenant.<sup>433</sup>

The intention of the above regulation to help refugees settle down was apparent. However, it encountered serious opposition from landlords, especially those whose property was built before 1938. Unlike the rent for buildings built after 1938, rent for these older buildings did not reflect the changes occurring in the wartime real estate market. Increased housing demands and wartime inflation all drove up the rent and value of real estate. The JLJXSX area was not large, and its center, the town of Beibei, where most government agencies and commercial activities were located, was already rather crowded before the war. Even without the war, the increase of the population that the area was experiencing would have naturally increased the value of real estate. Regulating the values of property and rent against market forces still resulted in numerous disputes over rental and sale contracts.<sup>434</sup>

These disputes also once again alarmed the administrations about the overcrowding of Beibei Township, an issue the SYQS administration actually attempted to solve before the war. To accommodate the increasing population, the SYQS administration sought to purchase land north of Beibei Township and resell it for non-commercial use. However, the plan for the “New Village” could not be executed smoothly because of disagreement between landlords and the

---

<sup>433</sup> Ibid., p. 1010098.

<sup>434</sup> In October 1939, the SYQS administration received the new regulation concerning rents and real-estate prices from the Nationalist government in Chongqing. However, requests to mediate rental disputes still arrived in the SYQS office thereafter. DAGLJ, juan 290, juan 974–975.

SYQS administration over the price of the land. Without a publicized system to evaluate the value of real estate, both sides were stuck in an endless cycle of accusing each other of making unfair offers.<sup>435</sup>

After 1937, with the arrival of refugees and relocated government offices and schools, the task of expanding Beibei Township could no longer be postponed. To finalize the purchase and provide clear guidance on real estate values to tenants and landlords, the GLJ administration first proceeded with the evaluation of real estate values. A special committee was set up to do the work. The committee categorized the land of Beibei Township into three grades based on the degree of flatness and the distance to the river port in town. Rents for the land were then regulated accordingly. The committee also set guidelines for rent of buildings and standardized the format and content of leasing contracts.<sup>436</sup> After submitting these decisions to the Nationalist government in Chongqing and receiving its endorsement, the GLJ administration announced that all rental and sale contracts must follow these regulations, starting in January 1940. However, the effect of these regulations on resolving disputes was limited because the committee was only a temporary organization and ceased to work after 1940. The value of land in the gorge area continued to increase. In the town of Beibei, for example, the land value increased ten times between 1939 and 1941, and the Beibei administration continued receiving appeals from local residents, complaining that the value of their land was miscalculated.<sup>437</sup>

Although the endorsement of the Nationalist government of the regulation on rent and land value was unable to assist the GLJ administration in eliminating disputes completely, it did provide the legitimacy and power that the administration needed to finalize the purchase of land

---

<sup>435</sup> DAGLJ, p. 1000328.

<sup>436</sup> DAGLJ, p. 1030844.

<sup>437</sup> DAGLJ, p. 1070302.

for the New Village. The lots of land in the New Village were sold for the prices evaluated by the committee as mentioned above. In addition to government agencies, schools, and non-commercial organizations, the purchases were also opened to the general public. Moreover, the GLJ administration imposed strict supervision over the architecture in the New Village. Blueprints of buildings had to be submitted to the administration for review, and permits for construction would only be granted if the layout and design of the buildings were in tune with the administration's idea of modern architecture. This process was also meant to prevent the construction of private houses from becoming obstacles to the overall urban planning, including plans for an underground sewage system and the width and layout of the streets.<sup>438</sup>

The planning of the New Village unexpectedly redistributed the land into the hands of those who were able and wealthy. The area of the New Village included not only privately owned property but also graveyards and unclaimed land. By law, the GLJ administration had the right to determine the use of these properties, and the cost of cleaning up the unclaimed land and graveyards was paid by the GLJ administration.<sup>439</sup> Although the sale of the lots in the New Village was open to public, those who were able to purchase were often those with certain means, not to mention that the cost of building new houses in an economy much affected by wartime inflation was too high for the ordinary population.<sup>440</sup> As a result, the lots in the New Village were purchased by members of the professional and wealthy classes in the province. The list of purchasers included the province's most successful banker, Kang Xinru, managers and board

---

<sup>438</sup> Ibid., p. 1090747, p. 1090778. Also see SYQS, "Sanxia shiyanqu beibei shiqu jianzhu guize," *Beibei yuekan* vol. 3, no. 8 (1939), 111–23.

<sup>439</sup> DAGLJ, "Beibei xincun," juan 11.

<sup>440</sup> The price for first-grade land in the New Village was 350 Chinese dollars per *mu* (about 7,176 square feet.) DAGLJ, p. 1090750. The monthly salary of an accountant in the SYQS administration in 1938 was about 14 Chinese dollars. DAGLJ, p. 1090720.



members of the Minsheng Company and Daming Textile Company, and representatives of local councils in the JLJXSX area.<sup>441</sup>

The sale of the land in the New Village is not the only example that demonstrates the concentration of land in the hands of the rich. In fact, not long after the beginning of the war, the structure of land ownership in the JLJXSX area began to change. The war gave landlords plenty of opportunities to make profits from the land. However, because the government prohibited any increase of rent that did not follow its wartime regulation, landlords were not able to raise the rent according to the rate of inflation. Small landlords often found that their income from the land, either from renting it out or agricultural activities, was not enough to maintain their livelihood. Because the government did not regulate the sale price for land as it did for rent, many small landlords found it more profitable to sell their land, especially in cases when they were unable to live on the rental income.<sup>442</sup>

The changes in land ownership in the gorge area were in accordance with the trend occurring throughout Sichuan Province during the war. Prior to the war, it was estimated that about 20 percent of the total population in Chongqing owned about 50 percent of the land in the city. The numbers changed dramatically when the war ended. In 1945, about 95 percent of the land in the city was owned by 2 percent of the population. Chengdu experienced a similar change. About 20 percent of its population owned 50 percent of the land prior to the war, and, in 1945, about 80 percent of the land in Chengdu was owned by 8 percent of its population.<sup>443</sup> Regardless of whether these numbers took into account the increase of the population in Sichuan Province

---

<sup>441</sup> DAGLJ, p. 1070382.

<sup>442</sup> Lai Yuanye, *Beibei yidai fanzu dizu zhi yanjiu* (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1977), 33523–33524.

<sup>443</sup> Pan Xun et al., *Kanzhan shiqi xinan houfang shehui bianqian yanyiu*, 46.

during the war, the fact is that more land was now owned by a smaller portion of people. The war thus enlarged the gap between the poor and the rich.

This picture of increasing inequality in land ownership leads to a consideration of the policy of land reform that was an integral part of the Nationalist government's pre-war state-building efforts. During the Nanjing Decade, the Nationalist version of land reform was carried out in Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi.<sup>444</sup> The reform conducted in these provinces did not last long due to a lack of financial assistance. Since 1932, although the importance of land reform in solving China's problems remained on the government's agenda, its priority was placed below that of other issues, particularly the increasing threat from the Chinese Communists. As a result, the program was pushed aside until the anti-Japanese war presented a new opportunity.

### **The nationalist government and land reform**

The imbalanced distribution of land in China was an issue that imperial governments had endeavored to solve.<sup>445</sup> The Nationalist government, before retreating to Sichuan Province, also made a few attempts to equalize land distribution according to Sun Yet-sen's "three people's principles."<sup>446</sup> Leaders of the Nationalist government in 1930s, such as Wang Jinwei, promoted

---

<sup>444</sup> Noel Ray Miner, "Chekiang: The Nationalist's Effort in Agrarian Reform and Construction, 1927-1937" Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 1973.

<sup>445</sup> Zhu Huisen et al, *Tudi gaige shiliao* (Taipei: Guoshiguan, 1988), 1. The Chinese governments had attempted to correct the situation of unequal distribution of land as early as in the Zhou Dynasty.

<sup>446</sup> Zheng Dahua, "Lun minsheng zhuyi de nairong jiqi dangdai yiyi," *Xueshu yanjiu* 7(July 2009), 107-13. In his "Principle of People's Livelihood," Sun proposed the policy of "land to the tillers," which basically meant that peasants should own the land that they cultivated and be free from landlords' exploitation and paying excessive rent. Sun argued that, because peasants would directly enjoy the benefit of their labor, they would be more willing to work harder in the fields, and, consequently, the overall production of China's national economy would increase.

this policy due to a belief in the productivist approach to China's economic problems, whereas Jiang Jieshi considered the policy as a supplemental weapon to eliminate the power of the Chinese Communists in rural areas. Despite their different perceptions of the purpose of this policy, the left and right wings of the Nationalist government both agreed on the importance of carrying it out.<sup>447</sup>

Yet, the realization of “land to the tillers” was a formidable task because, for centuries, the ownership of land in China had been fragmented due to factors such as the equal distribution of inheritance among sons. To maximize the production and support an increasing population, Chinese peasants worked the fields within a complex system of tenancy.<sup>448</sup> These issues made it impossible to realize the policy of “land to the tillers” in a short time. The government thus began with the experiment of rent reduction that would allow the tillers to enjoy more the benefits of their labor. The guidelines for rent reduction were first decided in 1926 and emphasized the standardization of the land tax and a 25-percent reduction of rents on land.<sup>449</sup> After the completion of the Northern Expedition in 1927, some provinces, including Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Fujian, Guangdong, Guandxi, Hubei, Hunan, and Zhejiang, began preparing to

---

For Sun, this policy could revive China's stagnant economy, increase rural production, and provide a surplus for industrialization

<sup>447</sup> Zanasi, *Saving the Nation*, 68–72.

<sup>448</sup> In Zhejiang province, for instance, the contracts of tenancy were often done by oral agreement and did not specify the term of tenancy. A tenant could also sublease the land to other tenants. When negotiating contracts, the tenants and landlords often negotiated terms based on customs, reference, and mutual relationship. In terms of rent payment, the forms of payment were usually agricultural products. However, because the quality of the harvest varied, such an arrangement was not ideal. Tenants and landlords thus would negotiate all kinds of terms on the quality of the harvest. In short, because the terms of the contract were negotiated on a case-by-case basis, the tenancy in Zhejiang showed extreme complexity and little consistency. Chen Shuzhu, *Zhejiangsheng tudi wenti yu erwu jianzu, 1927-1937* (Taipei: Guoshiguan, 1996), 256–359.

<sup>449</sup> Zhu Huisen et al, *Tudi gaige shiliao*, 2.

implement the policy of rent reduction. However, most provinces, except Zhejiang, quit the policy soon after its implementation or while it was still being penned on paper.<sup>450</sup>

Zhejiang province carried out the reform of rent reduction for five years and ended it in 1932. The Nationalist government, although it supported the reform, was not able to provide any financial assistance to the provincial government to compensate landlords and ease their opposition. Moreover, struggles between the left and right wings of the Nationalist government had a negative impact on provincial politics. The governor of Zhejiang province at the time, Zhang Jingjiang, was a member of the privileged class and a strong advocate of Western capitalism. He was sympathetic to the landlords and thought that the reform was causing too much disorder in the province. Zhang thus was in disagreement with the advocates of the reform and left-wing leaders in the central government and local Nationalist party. The leadership of the Nationalist government and the Guomindang party at the time were in unprecedented disarray, which eventually resulted in the expulsion of those who were inclined toward communist ideology or held dual memberships in the Nationalist and Chinese Communist Parties.<sup>451</sup>

---

<sup>450</sup> Chen Shuzhu, *Zhejiangsheng tudi wenti yu erwu jianzu*, 14. Zhejiang province carried out the reform of rent reduction for five years and ended it in 1932. Not much changed regarding the ownership of land and the burden of rent carried by the majority of peasants. The attempt has thus been considered a total failure by historians. There were a few reasons that attributed to this failure. The first had to do with the lack of proper legislation and thorough statistics on land ownership and rent. In a province that was part of China's economic center, the contracts between landlords and tenants had developed into an extreme complex system. Because there was never a law that regulated the contracts between landlords and tenants, the terms of contracts were decided based on the negotiation between the two parties. Tenancy could be permanent, or the tenants could lease out the land to someone else. Rent could be paid in cash, agricultural produce, or a combination of both. The reform started out by lowering the rent that tenants paid to landlords by 25 percent; however, without a detailed survey of contracts and the realities of tenancy in the province, it was difficult to decide who would receive the 25-percent discount, how much would be deducted from the original rent payment, and in what form. Moreover, because the reduction practically meant shrinking landlords' profits from the land, landlords naturally opposed the reform. The reform thus caused serious conflicts between classes of landlords and tenants from the beginning. See Wang Xiaojia, "Cong erwu dao sanqiwu: jindai zhejiang zudian zhidu yu guomindang Zhejiang erwu jianzu zhence de shanbian," *Zhongguo jingjishi yanjiu* 4 (2006): 151–155. Some governmental officials in charge of the reform were also attacked by dissatisfied landlords. Chen Shuzhu, *Zhejiangsheng tudi wenti yu erwu jianzu*, 514–515.

<sup>451</sup> For a brief discussion of the Nationalist left and right wings, see Keith Schoppa, *Revolution and its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History* (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2002), 178–96. For how the

Influenced by the factionalism in the central government, those who felt that they had been treated unjustly during the reform accused their opponents or local officials of being communists, and, as a result, many innocent people were imprisoned. By 1929, many county governments in Zhejiang ceased to carry out the reform because it had caused more disturbance than benefit to local society.<sup>452</sup>

The failure of the land reform also demonstrated the weakness of the Nationalist government in asserting its authority in provincial politics. Although the Northern Expedition was often hailed for successfully unifying China under the rule of the Nationalist government, it did not make much room in local politics for the central government to implement its policies. The anti-Japanese war changed the status quo between the center and the local. To fight the war, the Nationalist government divided China into several war zones and assigned a chief commander to each zone. In some cases, the commander also became the provincial governor.<sup>453</sup> Thus, unlike during the pre-war years, when the Nationalist government had to make compromises with the existing power holders of local politics, it could replace the provincial leader in the name of the war. In short, the war allowed the Nationalist government to militarize provincial politics and subordinated the power holders in local communities directly to the

---

struggle between the left and right wings of the Nationalist Party affected reform in Zhejiang, see Chen Shuzhu, *Zhejiangsheng tudi wenti yu erwu jianzu*, 510–532.

<sup>452</sup> Wang Hequn, “Guomindang paixi douzheng yu Zhejiang erwu jianzu yundong de xinqi,” *Minguo dandan* (February 2002), 59–64.

<sup>453</sup> The best case to describe the effect of such military and civilian appointments on land reform was that of Chen Cheng and wartime land reform in Hubei. From 1940 to the end of the war, Hubei province was part of the sixth war zone, and Chen was its highest commander and the governor of Hubai. In the name of the war, Chen was given unquestionable authority in Hubai province and thus was able to carry out policy favored by the Nationalist government in Chongqing. Fujian province also carried out land reform after its provincial governors and many county magistrates were replaced during the war. How the war changed local politics and consequently resulted in the implementation of the Nationalist government’s pre-war policy is a topic that needs further research. Chen Shuzhu, *Cong jianzu dao fuzhi zhigengnong: kangzhan shiqi zhi zhanhou guomin zhenf de tudigaige* (Taipei: Wenshizhe cubanshe, 2002), 126–133, 193.

government. This change thus enabled the central government to ride over the will of local politics and carry out its policy.

During the war, the issues of land and rural economy in fact became more urgent because China's more prosperous economic centers were under Japanese control. It was now the underdeveloped rural area that was to provide for the war. After losing Wuchang, Hankou, and Hanyang, three important ports on the middle Yangzi River, Jiang Jieshi specifically pointed out that "to win the war, the strength of our country does not come from a few cities, but from the vast rural villages."<sup>454</sup> Yet, the problem of unequal land ownership and tenancy continued as major obstacles to reviving the rural economy. To increase the production of the rural economy and meet the demands of the war, the Nationalist government once again experimented with reform in several designated areas.<sup>455</sup>

### **Land Reform in Beibei**

In 1942, the JLJXSX area and Ba County were formally designated as special districts for land reform. The JLJXSX area was considered as an ideal place for the reform because about 70 percent of the agricultural population worked on land that they did not own. Unlike the previous reforms that focused on rent reduction, this time the reform would experiment with the idea of "land to the tillers" directly. Considering the disorders caused by the reform during the early 1930s, the Nationalist government at this time attempted to play a stronger role in carrying out the policy. Under the assistance of the Chinese Bank of Farmers, the government would first

---

<sup>454</sup> Ibid., 24.

<sup>455</sup> These areas included western Fujian, Hubei, southern Jiangxi, Sichuan (Beibei), and Gansu. See Chen Shuzhu, *Cong jianzu dao fuzhi zhigengnong*.

purchase land directly from landlords and then resell it. The tillers or tenants could then purchase the land with loans from the Chinese Bank of Farmers. Initially, the reform was to be implemented in the whole district of the GLJ administration. However, considering the reform was an experiment and limited resources and funds, it was ultimately decided that the reform would first be carried out in one bao.<sup>456</sup>

The prerequisite for the implementation of the land reform was a detailed survey of the land ownership and values. The GLJ administration invited local gentry and representatives of the Chinese Bank of Farmers to participate in the evaluation process. The land in the designated bao belonged to seventy-nine landlords, most of whom were engaged in professions of commerce or manufacturing or worked as civil servants. They did not work on the land, and few of them resided in the village. About 64 percent of their land was cultivated by tenants. To compensate the landlords as much as possible, the Beibei administration purchased their land for 50 percent more than the average price paid for nearby land sold to a few government agencies.<sup>457</sup> Tenants with good credit received priority to receive loans from the Chinese Bank of Farmers. Because wartime inflation had made predicting farmers' income impossible, instead of a fixed amount of cash, the administration and the Bank of Farmers decided that the loan was to be paid in the form of agricultural produce.<sup>458</sup>

The reform of "land to the tillers" in the JLJXSX area has often been praised as a significant success. From purchase to sale, the GLJ administration finished the task in one year. The process was marked with unusual smoothness, with only a couple of protests from landlords about the terms of sale. The landlords received payment for their land in cash, and the loans lent

---

<sup>456</sup> Fan Keen, ed., "Beibei fuzhi zigengnong shifanqu jishi," CTGMW, 6.

<sup>457</sup> DAGLJ, p. 1070715.

<sup>458</sup> This decision was made due to concerns about wartime inflation. Fan, "Beibei fuzhi zigengnong shifanqu jishi," 11.

to those who purchased the land were paid off completely in three years.<sup>459</sup> This success, while providing invaluable experience, was achieved due to the characteristics of JLJXSX society. First, the land in the gorge area was never fertile enough for agriculture. More than 50 percent of local residents made their living in professions other than agricultural cultivation.<sup>460</sup> Because the land did not generate handsome profits, the landlords' feelings of attachment to the land might not have been as strong, and, as a result, it was easier for them to sell it. Second, because of the small scope of this reform, the GLJ administration and the Chinese Bank of Farmers were able to provide the entire funds in cash, which was preferable to both sellers and buyers. If the reform was to be implemented at the provincial or even national level, it is questionable whether the government could generate enough cash to fund the reform. The landlords might not be as cooperative as in the case of JLJXSX if they were compensated by other forms of payment, such as national bonds, instead of cash.<sup>461</sup>

The gorge JLJXSX was not the only place chosen for land reform. Similar policies of "land to the tillers" or rent reduction were also carried out in Hubei and Gansu during the war. One common result of these reforms was the realization that an extremely large amount of funds was needed if the government was to promote land reform at the national level. Li Jingzhai, the minister of the Department of Land Administration, lamented that it might take the government 500 years to realize the goal of "land to the tillers" nationwide.<sup>462</sup> This statement also highlights our lack of understanding of wartime finance and the relationship between banks and the government during the war. Simply put, the land reform, as important as it was, was not as urgent as supplying soldiers on the battlefield. How was a government burdened by the demands

---

<sup>459</sup> Yang Jixuan, "Kaocha beibei zhengnong shifanqu yihou," *Sichuan jingji*, vol. 3, no. 3 (1946), 26.

<sup>460</sup> Yang Jialuo, "Beibei nongyezhi," *Di li* vol. 5, no. 3-4 (1945), 5.

<sup>461</sup> Yang Jixuan, "Kaocha beibei zhengnong shifanqu yihou," 27.

<sup>462</sup> Chen Shuzhu, *Cong jianzu dao fuzhi zhigengnong*, 121.



of war able to spare the funds? How did the war affect the banking business, and what were the roles played by the banks in terms of supporting the government's wartime policies? All these questions can only be answered by a thorough study of China's wartime finance.

### **Credit Societies**

In addition to the implementation of the "land to the tillers" policy, the GLJ administration also introduced new crops and fertilizers and assisted farmers in organizing cooperatives and credit societies. Once again, these policies, especially the organization of credit societies, were strongly reminiscent of the Nationalist government's pre-war policies. The organization of credit societies was promoted by the Nationalist government's leading economic administrators in the late 1920s, including Jiang Jieshi's brother-in-law, T. V. Song (Song Ziwen). The idea of credit societies could be traced back to the years of the coalition between Wang Jingwei and Jiang Jieshi, the leaders of the Nationalist government's left and right wings, respectively. During the time, Wang Jingwei and his supporters, many of whom were China's leading experts in the fields of economics and science, argued that the revival of the Chinese economy relied on ending urban areas' dependence on foreign investment and goods. Instead, urban entrepreneurs should purchase raw materials from rural areas. Cities should also transfer capital and technology to rural villages to assist production there. The revival of the rural economy would not only increase its production to meet the needs of cities but also increase the purchasing power of peasants for urban products.<sup>463</sup> Credit societies thus played the role of a transmitter of urban capital and technology. Instead of lending money to individual, banks would

---

<sup>463</sup> Zanas, *Saving the Nation*, 143–73.

loan a large sum to credit societies, which would then loan to individual farmers and assist them to withstand crises such as droughts and floods.

In addition to encouraging private banks to participate in loaning to credit societies, the Nationalist government set up the Agricultural Bureau (Nongbenju) as the primary engineer of agricultural finance. With funds from the government and private banks, the Agricultural Bureau established the Cooperative Bank (Hezuo jinku,) which provided loans primarily to agricultural and rural industries. Prior to the war, the Cooperative Bank had seventeen branches in Shangdong, Hebei, Hunan, Anhui, Jiangxi, and Nanjing.<sup>464</sup>

Prior to the war, the XFJ administration in the JLJXSX area set up a small bank, whose clients were mainly the employees of the administration. The bank initially did not provide loan services. In 1931, the bank was reorganized with increasing savings from local residents and began to provide a small amount of loans. A couple of cooperatives were also founded, including those for the mining industry and the wholesale trade of food.<sup>465</sup> Yet, the functions of these organizations were mainly manufacturing, marketing, and providing low-cost daily necessities. Credit societies in the sense of utilizing urban capital to stimulate rural production as discussed above did not exist in the JLJXSX area due to the fact that larger banks in cities, either from Chongqing or from the lower Yangzi delta and the east coast, did not cooperate with the bank in the JLJXSX area.

There were a few reasons that might have attributed to the lack of cooperation between urban banks and the bank in the JLJXSX area. The first is the fact that the distance between Sichuan province and large banks in the lower Yangzi delta and on the east coast was too great.

---

<sup>464</sup> The funds of the Cooperative Bank were provided by the government. Fu Liang and Ci Zihua, "Guomin zhengfu shiqi nongbenju yu xiandai nongye jinrong," *Zhongguo nongshi*, no. 1 (2010), 58–59.

<sup>465</sup> Huang Zishng and Liu Xuanqing, "Jialingjiang sanxia xangcun shinianlai zhi jingji jianshe," 16–17.

Prior to the mid-1930s, the province was pretty isolated and was widely considered as a land of political chaos and military disorder. It would be a great risk for the non-Sichuanese banks to engage in business in an unfamiliar environment. Second, the emergence of cooperatives and credit societies that provided loan services was resulted from the promotion of the Nationalist government in the hope of using urban capital to revitalize the rural economy. Yet, Sichuan province was out of the Nationalist government's reach until 1935. When the Agricultural Bureau and the Cooperative Bank were founded in 1936, they did not set up branches in Sichuan that would engage the province's bankers in the loaning business. Without governmental advocacy and support, low-interest loaning to peasants was in no way a promising business.

The Cooperative Bank set up branches in Sichuan Province only after 1937. Soon after its arrival, the SYQS administration negotiated cooperation between the Bank and a new Beibei credit society. In the beginning, the new credit society did not attract many members, because peasants were suspicious that the society was only another tax collection organization in the name of low-interest loans.<sup>466</sup> Nevertheless, with advertisements and education, the members of the Beibei credit society and the loans it released soared. In 1942, the Beibei credit society had about 3,925 registered members. By 1945, the number of its members had increased almost ten-fold.<sup>467</sup>

---

<sup>466</sup> Zhou Qixun, "Sanxia shiyanqu difang jingji diaocha," CTGMW, 121.

<sup>467</sup> Wu Yuzhang, "Beibei hezuo shiye zhi weilai," *Sichuan jingji* vol. 3, no. 3 (1946), 66.

## Conclusion

In 1940, the renowned Chinese writer Lin Yutang (1895-1976) returned to China from the United States with his wife and three daughters.<sup>468</sup> They spent about two months in the town of Beibei. The oldest girl left a vivid description of how their housemaid in Beibei told her that, because of the war, she was able to meet refugees from all over China and had learned the different dialects, geography, and customs about which she had no way of knowing before.<sup>469</sup> Moreover, because of this influx of non-Sichuanese people, the businesses in town had also learned to satisfy the different tastes of these newcomers. Ice cream and coffee, things that the local residents had never tasted before the war, were imported from Chongqing and sold at ridiculously expensive prices that only the wealthy could afford. Bakeries that had only produced traditional desserts before the war now offered bread and sweet cookies. The girls, being accustomed to the desserts in America, complained that, although the bakeries produced these types of food in large quantities daily, they still could not satisfy the popular demand.<sup>470</sup> New friends, new knowledge, and new food all affirmed that the war was silently changing the life of ordinary people in the JLJXSX area.

It was undeniable that China and its people suffered from enormous losses during the anti-Japanese war. However, aside from destruction, in the JLJXSX area, a place with no significance for the most part of its history, the war stimulated the community to grow to a scale that it had not seen before. The wartime development of the JLJXSX area as discussed in this

---

<sup>468</sup> Lin Yutang was the first Chinese who was twice nominated for the Nobel Prize in literature in the twentieth century. Lin was born in a Chinese Christian family and received his bachelor degree in English from St. John's University in 1912. In 1921, Lin received his master's degree in comparative literature from Harvard University and thereafter returned to China and taught English and literature at several Chinese universities. After 1935, Lin produced several landmark works in the United States, including *My Country and My people* and *The Moment in Peking*. His literary publications covered not only fictional writings but also an English-Chinese dictionary. Many consider him as one of the most important Chinese writers and novelists of the twentieth century.

<sup>469</sup> Lin Rusi, *Zhanshi Chongqing fangguang* (Chongqing: Chongqing cubanshe, 1986), 31–32.

<sup>470</sup> *Ibid.*, 48–49, 91–93.

chapter was not only significant to its local history but also sheds new light on our understanding of whether the war years were relevant to the Nationalist government's state-building efforts. It was true that the Nationalist government had to abandon its pre-war state-building efforts and policies in order to meet the Japanese challenge; yet, to some extent, the war exposed the utmost need for a plan that could utilize the resources in Sichuan province more effectively. Viewed from the case of the JLJXSX area, some policies that the Nationalist government had implemented to meet the challenges of the war represented a strong continuity with the work it had started before 1937. Therefore, instead of viewing the year 1937 as a dividing line for the Nationalist government to consolidate its legitimacy and the Chinese state, the anti-Japanese war should be considered as a new epoch when the Nationalist government was offered opportunities to do what it could not accomplish before.

## Epilogue: The Legacy

On August 15, 1945, Japan declared unconditional surrenders to the Allies Powers and thus ended the eight-year war in China. During the war, about 3.2 million of Chinese soldiers died on the battlefields. More than 18 million civilians lost their life while hundreds of thousands were forced to abandon their home and property. The actual cost of property loss and war expense remains as unsolved historical questions till to this day.<sup>471</sup> Within a year after the surrender of Japan, the Nationalist government returned to the pre-war capital Nanjing. The recovery of China from the war was a formidable task that had to be well planned and begun as soon as possible. However, the unsolved question of the Chinese Communists now posed enormous threat to the Nationalists for during the war, the Chinese Communist consolidated their power again from its base area in Yanan. By 1945, CCP's red army numbered close to 1 million. While both parties began dialogues to bring peace as soon as the anti-Japanese war ended, their ideological difference made any compromise hard to maintain. Following the failure of American mediation, a civil war soon began. By the early spring in 1949, the CCP victory over the Nationalists was only a question of time.<sup>472</sup>

The liberation of the JLJXSX area unfolded in a very smooth manner largely because before 1949 the GLJ administration in fact was rather accommodating for the underground CCP activities. During the war, although the GMD held the "united front" with CCP, it never loosened its tight surveillance on the CCP. After the incident of the New Fourth Army in 1940, CCP activities in Chongqing experienced intensified pressure from the Nationalists.<sup>473</sup> The difficulty

---

<sup>471</sup> He, "Zuozhan yilai linian wojun guanbin shangwang tongjibiao," in He, *Banlian kangzhan zhi jingguo*, 228.

<sup>472</sup> Spence, *The search for Modern China*, 459-466.

<sup>473</sup> During the anti-Japanese war, the survival force of the CCP who were left behind in central China at the time of Long March was reorganized as the New Fourth Army. This Army claimed joint effort with the GMD troops to fight the war; however, in reality, much of its attention was devoted to consolidate its power in central China. The GMD

experienced by the CCP's official newspaper, the Xinhua News, eventually prompted the CCP to set up an underground publishing station in the town of Beibei.<sup>474</sup> Beibei was an ideal location for the new publishing station because of the following reasons. The first one was its short distance to Chongqing which allowed timely exchange of information. Secondly and most importantly, the GLJ administration had been tolerating or even supporting the CCP activities. The atmosphere there was not as anti-communist as it was in the city of Chongqing. The head of the GLJ administration, Lu Ziyong, had close contact with the Chinese communists and even joined the party when he was enrolled in the Whampoa Military Academy in Guangzhou in 1926. Because of such personal experience, Lu Ziyong was sympathetic to socialism and CCP propaganda even though he ceased to be an active member after he returned to JLJXSX in 1927.

475

Considering its location and relation with Chongqing, the fact that JLJXSX became a communist base within the control of the Nationalist government during the war was remarkable. More importantly, it pointed out several features of the Nationalist rule and the nature of the GLJ administration during the war. Despite its effort of stretching its power to the territory over which it previously had no political authority, the Nationalist government did not succeed in subordinating local politics to its will completely. The fact that the CCP was able to consolidate its power in a place which was so close to Chongqing and was temporary home to many governmental institutions demonstrated the limitation of the Nationalist rule during the war. Therefore, although the Nationalist government continued its project of centralization by

---

generals in central China were fully aware of this situation and eventually ordered the Army to move away from their base. The CCP's reluctance led to fighting between both sides. This incident was often considered as evidence of the weak alliance between the CCP and GMD during the war. See Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 436-441.

<sup>474</sup> Tang Huancun ed., *Jialing fengyun: zhonggong chongqingshi beibei wiqu dangshi wenji* (Sichuan: Chongqing chubanshe, 2004,) 140.

<sup>475</sup> Ibid, 106-108, 246-24, 446-453,

implementing political reform such as the New County Reform during the war, the result was limited. Local politics remained in the hands of the old-time administrators and local elites. Yet, the liberation of 1949 would soon change the picture.

In December 1949, the Military Committee of the People's Liberation Army set up a branch in Beibei and began the process of "jieguang", taking control. The committee replaced the GLJ administration as the highest authority in the area. Most staffs of the GLJ administration were dismissed. The CCP cadres became the leaders and were put in charge of taking control over the JLJXSX area. In 1950, the committee furthered assigned new leadership in each town and villages in the JLJXSX area.<sup>476</sup> Since membership in the CCP was a prerequisite for new local leaders, the old leadership was largely replaced. Lu Ziyang was transferred to Chongqing and assigned a new position as the deputy director of the Development Bureau of Chongqing.<sup>477</sup> With Lu Ziyang gone, the modernization projects envisioned and implemented by the administrations since the 1927 were ended. The area under the GLJ jurisdiction became the Beibei district of Chongqing.

The new People's Republic of China not only halted the Lu brothers' work in the JLJXSX area, but also took away their other lifetime investments as well, particularly the Minsheng Steamship Company. In 1949 when it became clear that Jiang Jieshi and the Nationalist government would retreat to Taiwan, Lu Zuofu made the decision to keep the Minsheng Steamship Company in China.<sup>478</sup> According to Lu's son, Lu was full of faith in the new PRC and was eager to contribute to the building of the new nation under the rule of the CCP.

---

<sup>476</sup> Ibid., 10-14.

<sup>477</sup> Ibid., 446.

<sup>478</sup> It was not clear that whether Lu ever considered of moving the Minsheng Steamship Company to Taiwan. Although he visited Taiwan in 1948, he seemed to be only more determined that the Minsheng Company should take Hongkong as its new base to develop marine transportation and attributed to the growth of the new PRC. See Lu Guoji, *Wo de fuqin*, 399.



In 1950, Lu was invited to the first Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and exchanged ideas of new economic policy with Zhou Enlai. With support from the CCP central government, Lu proposed that the Minsheng Steamship Company should be managed by its boards and the government together. The CCP also promised a loan to assist the Minsheng Company recover from the anti-Japanese war. However, in 1951, the CCP launched a series of campaigns that were termed as the "Three Antis" and "Five Antis" to wipe out the capitalist evil and bureaucratic corruption. The targets of these campaigns included the CCP members, bureaucratic officials (many of whom served the GMD government,) and managers in factories. Many Chinese entrepreneurs thus were placed under harsh criticism.<sup>479</sup> The Minsheng Company could not escape from these political movements and Lu personally was under attack by his employees in many of the company meetings. On January 8 1952, he was found dead on his bed after taking a large number of sleeping pills. According to his sons, the accusation of being an evil capitalist was too much a burden to their father who since his youth had remained an extreme frugal life style and devoted all his life to the company and the country.<sup>480</sup> After Lu's death, the Minsheng Company eventually became state-owned in 1955.

The death of Lu Zuofu signaled the end of an era when the JLJXSX area was remembered and praised for its achievement of "being modern." In the next three decades, like thousands of rural communities in China, the JLJXSX area was pulled in the waves of Chinese revolution. In addition to the "Three Antis" and "Five Antis" movements, in January 1951, CCP began land reform in the JLJXSX area and completed the land redistribution in 70 days. Before 1951, it was estimated that about 56.4% of the land in the area was owned by only 5.1% of its

---

<sup>479</sup> The Three-Anti and Five-Anti Campaigns were launched by the PRC in 1952 as ideological purification against non-Communist bourgeois values. Targets of these campaigns included party cadres, government bureaucrats, factory managers, and industrialists. See Schoppa, *Revolution and its Past*, 307. Spence, *The search for modern china*, 507

<sup>480</sup> Lu Guolun, "The Death of Lu Zuofu," *Nanfang Zhoumou*, vol. 1106 (April, 2005.)

total population. The reform confiscated not only the land of the landlords, but also their houses and tools. Following the swift land reform came with the collectivization. By the end of 1955, about 85 % of the households labeled as “agricultural households” worked under the direction of the co-ops.<sup>481</sup>

During the “Great Leap Forward,” six “People’s Communes” were set up in the JLJXSX area. In September, 1958, the Communes mobilized at least 70,000 people to begin the gigantic work of forging steel by human power. From September till the end of the year, it was reported that the Beibei district produced about 1910 tons of steel, a number far below the demand from the party leaders in Chongqing (1500 tons monthly.) Yet, the human sacrifice of the production was tremendous. 2851 people were injured and 35 people died from the accidents and explosion in the steel factories. Classes, particularly in the secondary schools, were suspended so that students and teachers could contribute to the production. By 1959, the production of steel was estimated to cost about 1.9 millions of Chinese dollar in the Beibei district.<sup>482</sup>

The Great Leap Forward also caused almost irreversible damage to the landscape and environment of the Beibei district. Forests in the district, except on the Jinyun Mountain, suffered severe destruction in order to supply for the fuels needed in the steel factories.<sup>483</sup> Trees

---

<sup>481</sup> Unfortunately, I find very little records regarding the changes and reforms during the years between 1951 and 1955. However, considering the fact that the land reform was completed in a little more than 2 months, it is not difficult to imagine the scale of radicalness and bitterness it might resulted in the communities. Beibei quzhi, 238-240. Edward Friedman, Paul G. Pickowicz, and Mark Selden provide vivid description of the land reform process in Wugong, Hebei. Of course, the dynamics in Wugong and villages in the JLJXSX area are in no way identical but their findings in Wugong points out that “Chinese rural dwellers experienced themselves in terms of community and consanguinity as members of lineages, neighborhoods, and villages, not as members of exploited or exploiting classes.” See Friedman, Edward et al., *Chinese Village, Socialist State* (New Haven: Yale University, 1991.) The JLJXSX area was never an agricultural rich place and it is more likely that the residents there identified themselves more in terms of lineages and neighborhoods. The classification of the exploited and exploiting classes might be something the residents in the JLJXSX area never thought about. However, this issue is beyond the scope of this dissertation and will require further research before any conclusion can be made.

<sup>482</sup> Beibei quzhi, 23.

<sup>483</sup> Ibid.

and forests were important legacy left by the pre-1949 administrations in the JLJXSX area. As discussed previously, since the term of Lu Zuofu, the planting of trees was considered indispensable to the beautification of the environment in the JLJXSX area. The administration not only actively promoted tree planting in local communities by setting up tree plantation and holding annual festivals but also prohibited local residents from cutting down tree without approval.<sup>484</sup> The effort resulted in the fame of the JLJXSX area, especially the town of Beibei, as a small, garden-like place that reminded many visitors of what Tao Yuanming described as a utopia.<sup>485</sup> Yet, within a few years since the founding of the People's Republic of China, most trees that were carefully cared for in parks and hills in the Beibei district were all chop in the interest of the stats-sponsored projects.

In terms of the industrial development that Lu Zuofu once considered as the prerequisite to the success of any rural reform projects, the development of industry in the Beibei district during the first three decades of the PRC rule was heavily influenced by the state ideology as well. In the early 1950s, the government took over of many factories that had been relocated to the area during the war and continued their production in accordance to the government's several five-year plans. In addition to the heavy industry, the PRC government also transformed the pre-existing privately owned enterprises in food production, publishing, and handicraft into village owned factories. Because of the top-down production planning and management, the production of these factories were often affected by political events occurring in the country.<sup>486</sup>

---

<sup>484</sup> DAGLJ, p1000982.

<sup>485</sup> Tao Yuanming, a writer in the Eastern Jin Dynasty (317-420) wrote the well-known essay "Peach-Blossom Spring." In the essay he tells a story which goes like this: A fisherman happened to come upon a village called Peach-Blossom Spring. Squeezing through a cave, he found a village, the residents of which were descendants of refugees from the Qin Dynasty. It was a paradise isolated from the outside world, without exploitation or oppression, and everybody living and working in peace and contentment.

<sup>486</sup> Examples included the coal and iron industries. *Beibei quzhi*, 196-228.

The above summary of the development in the Beibei district during the first three decades of the PRC gives a picture that the communities that were once considered as pioneers of rural modernization were made identical (if not downgraded) with thousands of Chinese rural communities. The Beibei district was no more special than any other rural villages in CCP's blueprint of nation-building. What it had achieved during the 1920s and 1930s and its significance in the anti-Japanese war seemed to become fading historical memory that was of little relevance to the country's growth and future.

In late 1970s, the political wind changed and the PRC government, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, adopted a plan of nation-building that was based on the concepts of the "Four Modernizations."<sup>487</sup> While the government claims that in pursuit of economic growth, it will still uphold "the socialism with Chinese characteristic," the astonishing rate of economic growth in China since 1980s suggests that socialist ideology is losing importance to economic prosperity and improvement of material life.<sup>488</sup> Although economic reform has increased Chinese GDP dramatically, it also poses great challenges to the Chinese society and political system. As early as the early 1990s, the negative result of China's fast economic growth began to become apparent. The migration of millions of workers from rural villages to cities demands reform in the system of social welfare that can fix the unequal treatments these migrant workers received in the cities, in terms of housing, child support, and education. The rapid economic growth in the east coastal cities increased the difference in levels of economic development between these cities and their western counterparts. Rural residents also see expanding gap between their

---

<sup>487</sup> Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 618

<sup>488</sup> "Socialism with Chinese Characteristic" is a term with great ambiguity. It practically means Chinese economy should pursue the similar path (but not identical) of the capitalist country while using the economic development to realize the socialist ideal of equality. Some scholars contribute this rhetoric as a combination of Sun Yet-sen's "Three People's Principle" and the communism. Michael R. Godley, "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics: Sun Yet-sen and the International Development of China," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, No. 18 (July 1987,) 109-125.

income and that of the urban residents. In short, the rapid economic growth has resulted in serious social problems.<sup>489</sup>

The acute issues of uneven economic growth between China's eastern coast and the inland province and unequal wealth among rural and urban populations has prompted the PRC government to consider how to promote the economy in the inland provinces and rural villages.<sup>490</sup> These issues also result in discussion among scholars to explore possible solutions. Such discussions have, in turn, stir renewed interests in the history of rural reconstruction movements in 1920s and 1930s. In Sichuan province, such interest has led to the establishment of the Lu Zuofu Research Center in the Southwestern Normal University. With special support from the Minshegn Steamship Company in Hong Kong, the center is dedicated to the studies of Lu and the rural reconstruction movement in the JLJXSX area. From the late 1990s, the center has assisted publication of books and articles discussing Lu's vision and the history of the JLJXSX area. With these publications, the history of the JLJXSX area (or Beibei as it is now called) is retold.

The significance of the history in the JLJXSX area is in fact two folds. The first part is that it provides a model for rural development in present day China. The pre-1949 XFJ, SYQS, and GLJ administrations' emphasis on building transportation infrastructure, developing local industries that utilized the advantage of local resources, and the promotion of education are still quite relevant to the development of Chinese rural villages nowadays. The Mabian Autonomous County of the Yi ethnicity in the south Sichuan serves as a good example. The County is listed as one of the poorest counties that receive special funds annually from the State Council

---

<sup>489</sup> There is a large body of literature that discusses the social problems of the present-day China. For some reference, see Elizabeth Perry and Mark Seldon eds., *Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance*.

<sup>490</sup> Xinhua News, "Guowuyuan guanyu shishi xibu dakaifa ruogan zhence cuoshi de tongzhi," <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channel3/21/20001228/364518.html> (January 2001.)

(Guowuyuan.)<sup>491</sup> However, the enlistment seems to be in contradictory to the rich mineral resources the land there possesses. According to incomplete government investigation, Mabian has 15 minerals among which the phosphate rock has the largest deposit.<sup>492</sup> From 1950s to early 1980s, Mabian did not benefit much from the rich mineral holdings because of the PRC's planned economy. However, from 1995 the county government and the Leshan municipal government invited outside investors to invest in phosphate industry and hydroelectric. Within 10 years, the GDP of the county increased more than 3 times.<sup>493</sup> The production of phosphate mineral increased more than 10 times (from 70,000 tons in 1995 to 11.7 million tons in 2007.)<sup>494</sup>

Although the county experiences astonishing economic growth from 1990s, about 24% of its population is still considered poor. The economic base of the county was so weak that the 10-year astonishing growth is not enough to wipe out poverty.<sup>495</sup> In 2011, Zuo Wenliang, the CCP secretary of the county government commented that to promote economic growth and improvement of life in Mabian, the county government should first speed up the construction of basic transportation infrastructure. The improved transportation infrastructure will connect the remote county with the nearby Leshan city and attract outside investments. Accompanied with the improvement of transportation infrastructures, modern facilities that provide basic necessity, including tap water and electricity, can also be established in every village of the county. Zuo

---

<sup>491</sup> Zuo Wenliang, "Zongshen tuijin mabian fuping kaifa de zhence sikao," Xianyu jingji, Vol 13, No 1 ( March 2011,) 82.

<sup>492</sup> The People's Government of Mabian County, "Mabian yizu zizhixian kuanchan ziyuan," June 2007. <http://www.mabian.gov.cn/FrontPage/HTML/NewsView.asp?ID=1141>

<sup>493</sup> In 1997, the GDP of Mabian is about 2.58 billion. The number increased to 8.9 billion in 2006. Mabian zizhixian renmin zhenfu, "er ling ling liu nian mabian yizu zizhixian zhuyao jingji zhibiao," <http://www.mabian.gov.cn/FrontPage/HTML/NewsView.asp?TName=&ID=24836>. (May 2010.) Chen Yang, "Ziyuan huan shichang kaifang cu kuaiyue: Mabian diqu duiwai kaifang de tansuo yu shijian" Quxian jingji yanjiu (January 2003,) 24-25. Yuan Hongdong, "Kaiming cu fazhan: mabianxian jingji jianshe guankuai," Sichuan dang de jianshe (October 1996,)23.

<sup>494</sup> Liu Zhiyong, "Yi kuangchan ziyuan kaifa wei jichu dui kuangchan zhiyuan maoyi de fenxi yanjiu yi mabian yizu zizhixian weili," Zhongguo shang mao (September 2009,) 236-237.

<sup>495</sup> Zuo Wenliang, Zongshen tuijin mabian fuping kaifa de duice sikao," 82.

also emphasized on the importance of assisting students in the county to finish mandatory education.<sup>496</sup> Zuo's comments are reminiscent of what Lu Zuofu had considered as the priorities of a successful rural reform: transportation, local industry, and education. As one historian comments, the "Beibei model" (as it is now called by many scholars in China to stress its emphasis on transportation and local industry) may prove to be most effective for Chinese rural villages with distinct natural resources.<sup>497</sup>

In addition to the inspiration to the present day rural construction in China, the history of JLJXSX area is also considered as an important legacy for Chongqing's urban planning. The city of Chongqing, since it became a municipality directly controlled by the State Council (Guowuyuan) in 1997, experiences steady growth that has transformed itself into the largest economic center in the southwestern China. Because the old town of the city has limited space for urban expansion, the districts on the northern shore of Yangzi River, including Jiangbei, Yubei, and the Beibei district, experience significant population growth. In 2009, the State Council set down guidelines for the city's planning and expansion. In the documentation titled "A few opinions of State Council on promoting Chongqing's rural-urban reform and development," the State Council states that as the only municipality directly controlled by the Council in the southwestern China, the city of Chongqing should lead the economic growth of the region. The Council also specifically points out that in order to build Chongqing as the economic center on the upper region of the Yangzi River and realize the country's goal of improving the economy in its inland provinces, the city must speed up the development of its northern districts and consider the necessity of setting up a new "Jialing-Yangzi District"

---

<sup>496</sup> Ibid, 83-84.

<sup>497</sup> Wang Jinxia and Zhao Danxin, "Dingxian moshi, beibei moshi: liangzhong butong xiangcun jianshe moshi de qushe," *Journal of Heibei Normal University*, Vol. 28, No.3 (May 2005,) 10-14.

(Liangjiang xinqu.)<sup>498</sup> In 2010, the new “Jialing-Yangzi District” was formally founded and covered the Jiangbei, Yubei, and Beibei districts. According to the recommendation from the State Council, this new district should become the pioneer of reforms that integrate rural and urban areas, the base of industry in southwestern China, the financial center on the upper Yangzi River, and the model of scientific research.<sup>499</sup>

The change of Chongqing’s status brings Beibei back to the spotlight. As the city as a whole is experiencing economic and demographic changes, Beibei district in particular sees an emerging fame of being Chongqing’s “back garden” and “a rural village within a city.”<sup>500</sup> Like during the 1930s, Beibei’s hot spring and natural scenery along the Jialing River and the nearby mountains once again becomes tourist sites.<sup>501</sup> The newly finished highway between the Shapingba district and Beibei shortens the travel from the center of Chongqing to about 30 minutes one way (it was at least 4 hours by steamship on the Jialing River in 1930s.) One can easily arrange a short weekend getaway by getting on the bus or taxi in Friday evening or Saturday morning and return to the city for work on Sunday night.

In addition to the treasures granted by the nature, the history of the area and its transformation from a bandit-raid, lawless place to a rural society famous for its effort of “being modern” and a wartime shelter add some mysteries to its modern landscape. In a few Beibei’s “street garden,” the phoenix trees planted by the XFJ administration in the early 1930s still stand. The sites built by these old, pre-1949 administrations, such as library, parks, museums becomes

---

<sup>498</sup> Guowuyuan, PRC, “Guowuyuan guanyu tuijin chongqingshi tongchou chengxiang gaige he fazhan de ruogan yijian,” [http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2009-02/05/content\\_1222355.htm](http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2009-02/05/content_1222355.htm) (February 2009.)

<sup>499</sup> Hu Hong, “Chongqing liangjiang xinqu gaikuang” [http://www.liangjiang.gov.cn/xqgg/class\\_4\\_1/2012628/2012628214756.htm](http://www.liangjiang.gov.cn/xqgg/class_4_1/2012628/2012628214756.htm) (June 2012.)

<sup>500</sup> These nicknames are seen in many articles on the Beibei District. Examples include Yang yiyi, “Yiju beibei xilie baodao.” You Cheng, “Beibei: Dushi huayuan li de man shenghuo,” *Huanqiu renwen dili* No. 2(January 2012,) 52-55.

<sup>501</sup> Chongqingshi beibeiqu renmin zhenfu, “Wenhua luyou,” [http://bb.cq.gov.cn/Category\\_376/Index.aspx](http://bb.cq.gov.cn/Category_376/Index.aspx)



places where history and stories are retold. In the modern day Beibei library, book collections from the 1920s and 1930s remind readers the administrators' effort of providing intellectual nourishment. Wartime residences for famous people, including Lao She (1899-1966,) Lin Yutang, and Guo Morou (1892-1978) are now historical relics that under the government's protection. With these remains from the past and new visitors from the present, Beibei's old time reputation is revived.<sup>502</sup>

In recent years, the district administration of Beibei is taking advantages of Beibei's rich history and unique natural resources to promote its travel industry and real estate.<sup>503</sup> The administration advertises the "cultural recreation and travel" on its official website where one can browse the brief history of the sites and find travel agency and lodging service.<sup>504</sup> In addition, the administration also emphasizes the high percentage of "green coverage" in the district. It boasts that more than 35% of the district is covered by forests and garden and that the ratio between green land and local residents is about 20 square meters to one resident. Moreover, the administration claims that because of this high percentage of "green covered land," the air quality in the district is superb all year round.<sup>505</sup> The district thus is an ideal choice for modern families that want to enjoy the urban convenience but stay away from the crowded space and air pollution.<sup>506</sup> The modern administration's effort and campaigns in promoting the district's historical legacy and maintaining its natural scenery was rewarded several time by the

---

<sup>502</sup> Chen Gang, "Beibei kangzhan wenhua ziyuan yu wenhua beibei zhanlue," Chongqing shehui kexue, initial issue (January 2004,) 122-126.

<sup>503</sup> In 2011, the Beibei district administration works with the magazine Jinri Chongqing and publish a series of articles to introduce the environment of Beibei district and to promote its real estate. See Yang yiyi, "Yiju beibei xilie baodao," *Jinri Chongqing* (2011.)

<sup>504</sup> Chongqingshi beibeiqu renmin zhenfu, [http://bb.cq.gov.cn/Category\\_376/Index.aspx](http://bb.cq.gov.cn/Category_376/Index.aspx)

<sup>505</sup> Chongqingshi beibeiqu renmin zhenfu, "Huanjing zhiliang," [http://bb.cq.gov.cn/Category\\_279/Index.aspx](http://bb.cq.gov.cn/Category_279/Index.aspx)

<sup>506</sup> Yang yiyi, "Yiju beibei xilie baodao."

Development Department of the PRC central government. The district was listed as “ten greenest cities of China” in 2000 and was rewarded the title of “garden city of the nation” in 2002.<sup>507</sup>

These prizes are in fact only two of the many rewards received by the Beibei district since 2000.<sup>508</sup> As the city of Chongqing is on track of transforming itself into the economic center of the southwestern China, the prizes granted to the Beibei district affirm the modernization path it is taking while participating in the economic plan now begins in Chongqing. The plan of the modern Beibei district—to build the Beibei district as a place of cultural travel and comfortable, modern style living —is identical to what Lu Zuofu had envisioned for the Jialingjiang xiaosaxia almost one hundred years ago: “...the future sanxia should be a beautiful, clean place where people can come to travel and live.”<sup>509</sup> Only this time, because of the legacy left by Lu, his colleagues, and the anti-Japanese war, the administration of the Beibei district does not have to start from scratch.

---

<sup>507</sup> Anonymous, “Guojia yuanlin chengqu: Beibei” Hong yan, No. 3(May 2003.)

<sup>508</sup> Chongqingshi beibeiqu renmin zhenfu, “Huanjing zhiliang.”

<sup>509</sup> Lu Zuofu, “Sichuan Jianglingjiang sanxia de xiangcun yundong,” 353-360.

## Glossary

Ba 巴

Beichuan 北川

Baimiaozi 白廟子

Beibei guanliju 北碚管理局

Bishan 璧山

Chengjiang 澄江

Chuanjiang hangyun guanlichu 川江航運管理處

Chuankang 川康

Chuan Bao 川報

Deng Xihou 鄧錫侯

Ding County 定縣

Dujun 督軍

Duanwu 端午

Eryan 二岩

Guo Morou 郭沫若

Guanxi 關係

Guanyin 觀音

Guowuyuan 國務院

Hankou 漢口

He Beiheng 何北衡

Hechuan 合川

Huangjue 黃桷

Huguang 湖廣

Hu Nanxian 胡南先

Jialingjiang 嘉陵江

Jialingjiang xiaosanxia xiangcun jianshe shiyan qushu 嘉陵江小三峽鄉村建設實驗區署

Jiangbei 江北

Jiang Ba Bi He sixian tezu xiafang tuanlianju 江巴璧合四縣特組峽防團練局

Jinshi 進士

Juxingcheng 聚興誠

Lai Xinhui 賴心輝

Laoer 老二

Liang Shumin 梁漱溟

Liangjiang xinqu 兩江新區

Libi 瀝鼻

Lifu 力夫

Li Jieren 李頡人

Lijin 釐金

Li Shiyong 李時雍

Lin Yutang 林語堂

Liu Chengxun 劉存厚

Liu Wenhui 劉文輝

Liu Xiang 劉湘

Lu Ziying 盧子英

Lu Zufu 盧作孚

Lunli 倫理

Luoyang 洛陽

Maliuping 麻柳坪

Meifong 美丰

Minsheng 民生

Mingzhong huichang 民眾會場

Mozituo 磨子沱

Nongbenju 農本局

Fu River 涪江

Qu River 渠江

Sichuan lujun sucheng xuetang 四川陸軍速  
成學堂

Sun Yueqi 孫越琦

Tian Songyao 田頌堯

Wang Zanxu 王瓚緒

Wang Jinwei 汪精衛

Wenquan 溫泉

Wentang 溫塘

Wenxing 文星

Wong Wenhao 翁文灝

Wuhan 武漢

Xian 西安

Xiangyue 鄉約

Xiaosanxia 小三峽

Yan Yangchu 晏陽初

Yang Angong 楊闇公

Yang Sen 楊森

Yichang 宜昌

Yuan Zhuming 袁祖銘

Yundongchang 運動場

Zhizhi 自治

Zhongfu meikuang 中福煤礦

Zhouping 鄒平

## Bibliography

Abbreviation:

CTGMW—Chongqing tushuguan guancang minguo wenxian

DAGLJ—Beibei guanliju danan (Chongqing: Chongqingshi danganguan)

Beibei yuekan (Monthly journal of Beibei)

Gongzuo yuekan (Monthly work journal)

The List:

Allito, Guy, *The Last Confucian: Liang Shuming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979.)

Anonymous, “Xishu junfa huoping de jiepuo,” Kang Zhen, Vol. 1, No. 33 (1932.)

Anonymous, “Jialingjiang sanxia xiangcun jianshe shiyanqu gaikuang,” Nonglin xinbao, vol. 16, no 26-28 (1939,)

Anonymous, “Jialingjiang sanxia xiangcun jianshe shiyanqu gaikuang,” Nonglin xinbao, Vol. 26-28.

Anonymous, “Guojia yuanlin chengqu: Beibei” Hong yan, No. 3(May 2003.)

Bailey, Paul J. *Reform the People: Changing Attitudes Towards Popular Education in Early Twentieth-Century China* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1990,)

Barnett, Doak, *China on the Eve of Communist Takeover* (New York: Praeger, 1963)

Barrett, David P and Shyu, Larry N., eds, *Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945: the Limits of accommodation* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2002)

*Beibei wenshi ziliao* (Culture and History of Beibei). Chongqing, 1984-

Bedeski, R. E, *State-building in modern China : the Kuomintang in the prewar period* (Berkeley: University of California, 1981.)

Bian, Morris, “Building State Structure: Guomindang Institutional Rationalization during the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945,” Modern China, Vol. 31, No. 1 (January 2005,)

-----, *The Making of the State Enterprise System in Modern China: The Dynamic of Institutional Change* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2005.)

*Bishan wenshi ziliao* (Material on the culture and history of Bishan.) Bishan, 1988-

Bo Zhiyue and Chen Gang, “Bo Xilai and the Chongqing Model,” EAI Background Brief, No. 465 ( July 2009, National University of Singapore.)

- Brandt , Loren and Rawski, Thomas eds., *China's Great Economic Transformation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.)
- Burns, E. Bradord, *The Poverty of Progress: Latin America in the Nineteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980.)
- Carrol, Peter, *Between Heaven and Modernity: Reconstructing Suzhou, 1895-1937* (California: Stanford University Press, 2006.)
- Chan, Anita, Ansley, Clive, Tung, Constantine, and Mackerras , Colin, eds., *Drama in People's Republic of China* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987.)
- Chen Gang, "Beibei kangzhan wenhua ziyuan yu wenhua beibei zhanlue," Chongqing shehui kexue, initial issue (January 2004,) 122-126.
- Chen Shuzhu, *Zhejiangsheng tudi wenti yu erwu jianzu, 1927-1937* (Taipei: Guoshiguan, 1996,)
- Chen Shuzhu, *Cong jianzu dao fuzhi zhigengnong: kangzhan shiqi zhi zhanhou guomin zhenf de tudigaige* (Taipei: Wenshizhe cubanshe, 2002,)
- Chen Xulu, *Jindai zhongguo shehui de xinchen daixie* (Shanghai: Shanghai shehui kexue chubanshe, 2006.)
- Chen Yang, "Ziyuan huan shichang kaifang cu kuaiyue: Mabian diqu duiwai kaifang de tansuo yu shijian" Quxian jingji yanjiu (January 2003,) 24-25.
- Cheng Zongyang, "Sinianlai zhi tianfu meikuang," Yi yun yuekan (1942,)
- Chi Hsi-sheng, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-1928 (Stanford: Stanford University, 1976.)
- Chi Hsi-sheng, *Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse, 1937-1945* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1982.)
- Chongqingshi beibequ difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui, ed., *Chongqingshi Beibei Quzhi* (Chongqing: Kexue jishu wenxian cubanshe, 1984.)
- Chongqingshi beibeiqu diming xiaozu ed., *Sichuansheng Chongqingshi Beibeiqu Diminglu* (Chongqing: Beibei renmin zhenfu, 1986.)
- Chongqingshi beibeiqu renmin zhengfu, "Wenhua luyou," [http://bb.cq.gov.cn/Category\\_376/Index.aspx](http://bb.cq.gov.cn/Category_376/Index.aspx)
- , "Huanjing zhiliang," [http://bb.cq.gov.cn/Category\\_279/Index.aspx](http://bb.cq.gov.cn/Category_279/Index.aspx)
- Chongqing gongshang shiliao* (Historical material on the industry and commerce of Chongqing) Chongqing, 8 vols, 1982-1986.
- Chongqing wenshi ziliao xuanji* (Selective material on the culture and history of Chongqing) Chongqing, 1979-
- Coble, Parks M., *Chinese Capitalists in Japan's New Order, the Occupied Lower Yangzi, 1937-1945* (California: University of California Press, 2003)
- Davis, Susan, *Parades and Power: Street Theatre in Nineteenth-Century Philadelphia* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986.)

- Dong, Madeleine Yue and Goldstein, Joshua L., eds., *Everyday Modernity in China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006.)
- Duara, Prasenji, *Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942* (California: Stanford University, 1988)
- Eastman, Lloyd, *The Abortive Revolution: China Under the Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University, 1990. )
- , et al., *The Nationalist Era in China: 1927-1949* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991)
- Esherick, Joseph ed., *Remaking the Chinese City: Modernity and National Identity, 1900-1950* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000.)
- and Rankin, Mary B. eds., *Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.)
- . Esherick, Joseph W., Pickowica, Paul G., and Walder , Andres G., eds., *The Chinese Cultural Revolution as History* (California: Stanford University Press, 2006)
- Fairbank, John K. et al., *The Cambridge History of China* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1986.)
- Friedman, Edward et al., *Chinese Village, Socialist State* (New Haven: Yale University, 1991.)
- Fu Liang and Ci Zihua, “Guomin zhengfu shiqi nongbenju yu xiandai nongye jinrong,” *Zhongguo nongshi*, No.1 (2010,)
- Gatu, Dagfinn, *Village Chia at War: the Impact of Resistance to Japan, 1937-1945* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005.)
- Geertz, C., *Negara: the Theater State in Nineteenth-Century Bali* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1980.)
- Gillin, Donald, Warlord Yen Hsi-shan in Shanxi Province, 1911-1949 (New Jersey: Princeton University, 1967.)
- Godley, Michael R., “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics: Sun Yet-sen and the International Development of China,” *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, No. 18 (July 1987,) 109-125.
- Guojia tushuguan ed., *Zhonghua shanshuizhi congkan: Shuizhi*, 37 vols. (Reprint Beijing: Xianzhuang shuju, 2004)
- Guowuyuan, PRC, “Guowuyuan guanyu tuijin chongqingshi tongchou chengxiang gaige he fazhan de ruogan yijian,” [http://www.gov.cn/zwggk/2009-02/05/content\\_1222355.htm](http://www.gov.cn/zwggk/2009-02/05/content_1222355.htm) (February 2009.)
- Hayford, Charles W., *To the People: James Yen and Village China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990,)
- Harrison, Henrietta, *The Man Awakened from the Dreams: One Man's Life in a North China Village* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2005.)
- Hechuan wenshi ziliao xuanji* (Material on the culture and history of Hechuan.) Chongqing, 1985-

- He Yimin ed., *Sichuan jinxindai renwuzhuan*, 6 vols. (Chengdu: Sichuan University Press, 1990.)
- He Yingqing, *Banian kangzhan zhi Jingguo* (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1972.)
- Henriot, Christian and Wen-hsin Yeh, *In the Shadow of the Rising Sun: Shanghai under Japanese Occupation* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009.)
- Howard, Joshua, *Workers at War: Labor in China's Arsenal, 1937-1953* (California: Stanford University, 2004)
- Hu Hong, "Chongqing liangjiang xinqi gaikuang"  
 " [http://www.liangjiang.gov.cn/xqgg/class\\_4\\_1/2012628/2012628214756.htm](http://www.liangjiang.gov.cn/xqgg/class_4_1/2012628/2012628214756.htm) (June 2012.)
- Huang Jingwan, "Ershinian jiaoji jinyantan," *Lianyou huabao*, No. 50 (1930); "Wo renshi de pengyou you jishiwan ren," *Nu sheng*, Vol. 3, No. 6 (1933.)
- "Jingqian zizhuan: sanshinian shejiao jinyantan," *Zhongxing zaizhi*, Vol. 1 No. 1 (1939)
- Huang Liren, ed., *Lu Zuofu Shuxinji* (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 2003.)
- Huang, Philip C. C., *The Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China* (California: Stanford University, 1985);
- , *The Peasant Family and Rural Development in the Yangzi Delta* (California: Stanford University, 1990.)
- Hui Zhen, "Canguan Sichuan xiaosan xia shehui shiye riji," *Luxing zazhi*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1933.)
- Hwang Kwang-kuo, "Face and Favor: The Chinese Power Game," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 92, No.4 (January 1987,) 944-974
- Israel, John, *Student Nationalism in China, 1927-1937* (Stanford: Stanford University, 1966.)
- , *Lianda: A Chinese University in War and Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University, 1998.)
- J, Bruce Jacobs, "A Preliminary Model of Particularistic Ties in Chinese Political Alliances: Kan-ching and Kuan-hsi in rural Taiwanese township," *The China Quarterly*, No. 78 (June 1978,)
- Jianbei xianzhi bianzhuan weiyuanhui ed, *Jiangbei xianzhi* (Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 1996.)
- Jiang Hengyuan, *Nongcun gajin de lilun yu shiji* (Shanghai: Shenghuo shudian, 1935.)
- Jiangsu Sheng Tao Xingzhi yanjiuhui, ed, *Tao Xingzhi wenji* (Nanjing: Jiangsu jiaoyu chubanshe, 2008.)
- Jordan, Donald, *The Northern Expedition: China's National Revolution of 1926-1928* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976.)
- Karp, Ivan and Lavine, Steven D. eds., *Exhibiting Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Museum Display* (Washington D. C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1990.)
- Kapp, Robert, *Szechwan and the Chinese Republic: Provincial Militarism and Central Power, 1911-1938* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973.)



- Keating, Pauline, *Two Revolution: Village Reconstruction and the Cooperative Movement in Northern Shaanxi, 1934-1945* (California: Stanford University, 1997.)
- Judd Kinzley, ““Crisis and the Development of China’s Southwestern Periphery: the Transformation of Panzhihua”, *Modern China* 38, no. 5 (Sept. 2012), 559-584
- Kuan Shanji and Yang Guangyan, *Sichuan Junfashi* (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin cubanshe, 1991.)
- Kuhn, Philip., *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796-1864* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980.)
- Kwan, Chak, Ngok, King Lun, and Phillips, David, eds., *Social policy in China: Development and Well-being* (Bristol, UK: Policy, 2008;)
- Lai Yuanye, *Beibei yidai fanzu dizu zhi yanjiu* (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1977.)
- Li Bohuai, “Mingguo shiqi de sichuan luxingshe,” in *Sichuan Shifan Daxue Xuebao*, Vol. 34 No. 3 (May, 2007)
- Li Huaiyin, *Village Governance in North China, 1875-1936* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005.)
- Lin Rusi, *Zhanshi Chongqing fangguang* (Chongqing: Chongqing cubanshe, 1986.)
- Ling Yaolun ed., *Minsheng gongsi shi* (Beijing: Renmin jiaotong chubanshe, 1990.)
- and Xiong Fu, eds., *Lu Zuofu Wenji* (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 1999.)
- Liu, Chonglai, *Lu Zuofu yu minguo xiangcun jianshe yundong* (Beijing: Renmin cubanshe, 2007.)
- Liu Xingshu, “Beibei youji,” in *Sichuan shengli diliu zhongxuexiao xiaowai tongxuehui huikan* (1935),
- Liu Zhiyong, “Yi kuangchan ziyuan kaifa wei jichu dui kuangchan zhiyuan maoyi de fenxi yanjiu yi mabian yizu zizhixian weili,” *Zhongguo shang mao* (September 2009,) 236-237.
- Lo Zhongfu and Li Xuanhua, eds. *Lu Zuofu Wenxuan* (Chongqing: Xinan shifan daxue chubanshe, 1989.)
- Lu Guoji, *Wo de fuqin: Lu Zuofu* (Chengdu: Sichuan renmin cubanshe, 2003.)
- Lu Guolun, “The Death of Lu Zuofu,” *Nanfang Zhoumou*, vol. 1106 (April, 2005.)
- Lu, Hanchao, “Zhongguo chengshishi yanjiu,” *Qinghua daxue xuebao*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (January 2008.)
- Lu Liu, “A Whole Nation Walking: the Great Retreat in the War of Resistance, 1937-1945,” Ph.D Dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 2000
- Ma Xuanwei and Wen Xianmei, *Chuanjun chuchuan kangzhan jishi* (Chengdu: Sichuansheng shehui kexueyuan chubanshe, 1986.)
- MacClancy, Jeremy ed., *Sport, Identity and Ethnicity* (Herndon: Berg, 1995.)
- McIssac, Mary Lee, “The Limits of Chinese Nationalism: Workers in Wartime Chongqing,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1994.

Mabian zizhixian renmin zhenfu, “er ling ling liu nian mabian yizu zizhixian zhuyao jingji zhibiao,” <http://www.mabian.gov.cn/FrontPage/HTML/NewsView.asp?TName=&ID=24836>. (May 2010.)

MacKinnon, Stephen, “The Tragedy of Wuhan, 1938,” *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (October 1996.)

-----, eds, *China at War: Regions of China, 1937-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2007)

Martin, Brian *The Shanghai Green Gang: Politics and Organized Crime, 1919-1937* (California: University of California Press, 1996.)

Mote, F. W. *Imperial China, 900-1800* (Cambridge: Harvard University press, 2003,)

Muir, Edward, *Civic Ritual in Renaissance Venice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

Murphy, Rachel, *How Migrant Labor is Changing Rural China* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002.)

Murray, Dian and Qin Baoqi, *The Origins of the Tiandihui: the Chinese Triad in Legend and History* (California: Stanford University Press, 1994.)

Osborne, Peter, *The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Grade* (New York: Verso, 1995,)

Ozouf, Mona, *Festivals and the French Revolution*, trans. by Alan Sheridan, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988,)

Pang Xun et al, *Kanzhan shiqi xinan houfang shehui bianqian yanjiu* (Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 2011,)

Peattie, Mark. Drea, Edward J., and van de Ven, Hans, eds., *The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2011,)

Peng Chaogui and Wang Yan eds. *Qingdai Sichuan nongcun shehui jingjishi* (Chengdu: Tiandi chubanshe, 2001,)

Pepper, Susan, *Civil War in China: the Political Struggle* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.)

Perry, Elizabeth, *Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845-1945* (California: Stanford University, 1980.)

-----and Seldon , Mark eds., *Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance* (New York: Routledge, 2000.)

Qian Jiaju, “Zhongguo nongcun jianshe zhilu hezai”, *Shenbao yuekan* Vol. 3, No. 10 (1934,)

Qiao Cheng and Yang Xuyun, *Liu Xiang zhuan* (Beijing: Huaxia chubanshe, 1987.)

Qin Xiaoyi ed., *Zhonghua minguo zhongyao shilian chubian: dui kangzhan shiqi, 3 vols* (Taipei: Zhongguo guomindang danshi weiyuanhui, 1981.)

Rankin, Mary, *Elite activism and Political Transformation in China: Zhejiang Province, 1865-1911* (California: Stanford University Press, 1986.)

Reinhardt, Anne, “Navigation Imperialism in China: Steamship, Semicolony, and Nation, 1860-1937,” Ph. D dissertation, Princeton University, 2002.

Reed, Bradly, "Gentry Activism in Nineteenth-Century Sichuan: The Three-Fees Bureau," *Late Imperial China*, Vol. 20, No.2 (1999,) 99-127.

Schechner, Richard, *Performance Studies: An Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2006,)

Scott, James, "Patron-Client Policies and Political Change in Southeast Asia," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 66, No. 1 (March 1972,)

Shao Qin, *Culturing modernity: The Nantong Model, 1890-1930* (California: Stanford University Press, 2004,)

Schoppa, Keith, *Revolution and its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History* (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2002,)

Sichuansheng Tao Xingzhi Yanjiuhui ed, *Tao Xingzhi shengping jiqi shenghuo jiaoyu*. (Chengdu: Sichuan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2008)

Sichuan University ed., *Zhongguo yeshi jicheng* (Chengdu: Bashu shushe, 1993.)

Smith, Paul, *Taxing Heaven's Storehouse: Horses, Bureaucrats, and the Destruction of the Sichuan Tea Industry, 1074-1224* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991.)

Sih, Paul K. T. ed., *Nationalist China During the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945* (Hicksville: Exposition Press, 1977.)

Skinner, William, ed., *The City in Late Imperial China* (California: Stanford University Press, 1977,)

Song Enrong ed, *Yan Yangchu quanji* (Changsha: Hunan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1999,) 3 Vols.

Song Qingling ed., *Sun Zhongshan xuanji*, 2 vols (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1957.)

Song Xuan et al, *Jiangbei Tingzhi*, reprint in *Zhongguo difangzhi jicheng: Sichuan fuxian zhi ji* (Chengdu: Bashu shushe, 1992), vol. 5.

Stapleton, Kristin, *Civilizing Chengdu: Chinese Urban Reform, 1895-1937* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2000)

Spence, Jonanthan, *The Search for Modern China* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999.)  
Sun Chenglie, "Beibei juluozi," *Di li*, Vol.5, No.3-4 (1945)

Sun Zhen, *Bashinian guoshi chuanshi jianwenlu* (Taipei: Sichuan wenxia chubanshe, 1979)

Sun Wueiqi, "Chuanmei Chanxiao zhi huigu yu qianzhan," *Xinan shiye tongxun*, Vol.2, No.2 (1944,)

Tang Huancun ed., *Jialing fengyun: zhonggong chongqingshi beibei wiqu dangshi wenji* (Sichuan: Chongqing chubanshe, 2004,)

Tang Ling, "Kangzhan shiqi de zhongguo meikuang shichang," *Jindaishi yanjiu* (May 1996,)

Tao Yuanming, *Tao Yuanming quanji* (Reprint Shanghai: Zhongyang shudian, 1935.)

Tenorio-Trillo, M., *Mexico at the World's Fairs: Crafting a Modern Nation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.)

The People's Government of Mabian County, "Mabian yizu zizhixian kuanchan ziyuan," June 2007. <http://www.mabian.gov.cn/FrontPage/HTML/NewsView.asp?ID=1141>

Thompson, E. P., "Patrician Society. Plebeian Culture," *Journal of Social History*, Vol. 7 No 4, (Summer, 1974.)

Tōa Dōbunkai Shina Shōbetsu Zenshi Kankōkai, Shinshū Shina shōbetsu zenshi, 9 vols (Tokyo: Tōa Dōbunkai, 1941.)

Tian Hailan and Zhou Ninghua, *Lu Zuofu he minsheng gongsi* (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin cubanshe, 1998.)

Wasserstrom, Jeffrey N. and Perry, Elizabeth J. eds., *Popular Protest & Political Culture in Modern China* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994)

Waldron, Arthur, "China's New Remembering of World War II: The Case of Zhang Zizong," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (October 1996.)

Wang Di, *Kuacui fengbi de shijie: changjiang shangyou quyu shehui yanjiu* (Taipei: Wunan cuban gongsi, 2002.)

Wang Di, *Street Culture in Chengdu: Public Space, Urban Commoners, and Local Politics* (Stanford: Stanford University, 2003.)

-----, Wang Di, "Mysterious Communication: the Secret Language of the Gowned Brotherhood in Nineteenth Century Sichuan," *Late Imperial China*, Vol. 29, No.1 (June 2008,) 77-103.

Wang Fei, "Guomin zhengfu xinxiangzhi xia de xiangzhen tizhi," MA. Thesis, Capital Normal University, 2007.

Wang Hequn, "Guomindang paixi douzheng yu Zhejiang erwu jianzu yundong de xinqi," *Minguo dandan* (Feb 2002.)

Wang Huabing, *Huang Yanpei zhuan* (Jinan: Shangdong wenyi chubanshe, 1992.)

Wang Jinxia and Zhao Danxin, "Dingxian moshi, beibei moshi: liangzhong butong xiangcun jianshe moshi de qushe," *Journal of Hebei Normal University*, Vol. 28, No.3 (May 2005,) 10-14.

Wang Shuanjian, "Ershi shiji sishi niandai Sichuan sheng xinxiangzhi yanjiu," MA thesis, Xinan University, 2007

Wang Xiaojia, "Cong erwu dao sanqiwu: jindai zhejiang zudian zhidu yu guomindang Zhejiang erwu jianzu zhence de shanbian," *Zhongguo jingjishi yanjiu*, Vol.4 (2006.)

Wang Zhenting, "Tiyu Jiuguo," *Shishi yuebao*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (1933.)

Wei Yintao et al., *Jindai Chongqing chengshishi* (Chengdu: Sichuan University Press, 1991.)

Wenshi ziliao gongzuo weiyuanhui, ed., *Chongqing gongshang renwuzhi* (Chongqing: Chongqing cubanshe, 1984.)

Westad, Odd, *Decisive Encounter: the Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950* (Stanford: Stanford University: 2003)

- Wu Bannong, "Lun dingxian zhuyi," in Qian Jiaju ed., *Zhongguo nongcun jingji lunwenji* (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1936,)
- Wu Renming, "Kangzhan shiqi dahoufang minying gongye xinshuai ji qi yu zhenfu guanxi shulun," *Jiang han lun tan* (May 2011,)
- Wu Yuzhang, "Beibei hezuo shiye zhi weilai," *Sichuan jinji*, Vol.3, No. 3 (1946,)
- Wu Xiangxiang, *Yan Yangchu zhuan* (Taipei: Shibao chubanshe, 1981.)
- Xiao Gongquan, *Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1960,)
- Xie Benshu and Niu Hongbin, *Jiang Jieshi he xinan difang shilipai* (Henan sheng: Henan renmi chubanshe, 1992,)
- Xie Rudi et al., *Chongqing kangzhan wenhuashi* (Beijing: Tuanjie cubanshe, 2005,)
- Xinhua News, "Guowuyuan guanyu xibu dakaifa ruogan zhengce cuoshe de tongzhi," <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channel3/21/20001228/364518.html> (January 2001.)
- , "Guowuyuan guanyu shishi xibu dakaifa ruogan zhence cuoshi de tongzhi," <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channel3/21/20001228/364518.html> (January 2011.)
- Xu Gengsheng, "Zhongfu shihua," *Jingji jianshe jikan*, vol. 3 (1944,)
- Xu, Mingtian, *Fushikang zhenxiang* (Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press, 2010.)
- Xue Yi, *Guomin zhengfu ziyuan yanjiuhui yanjiu* (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 1989,)
- Yang Jialuo, "Beibei nongyezhi," *Di li*, Vol. 5, No.3-4 (1945,)
- Yang Jixuan, "Kaocha beibei zhengnong shifanqu yihou," *Sichuan jingji*, Vol.3, No.3 (1946,)
- Yang yiyi, "Yiju beibei xilie baodao," *Jinri Chongqing* (2011.)
- Yin Hongxun, "Wuoguo tiyu zhi wojian," *Tiyu*, No. 2 (1927,)
- You Cheng, "Beibei: Dushi huayuan li de man shenghuo," *Huanqiu renwen dili* No. 2(January 2012,) 52-55.
- Yu Dingbang and Niu Junkai eds, *Chen Xujing Wenji* (Guangzhou: Sun Yet-sen University Press, 2004,)
- Yuan Hongdong, "Kaiming cu fazhan: mabianxian jingji jianshe guankuai," *Sichuan dang de jianshe* (October 1996,)23
- Zanasi, Margherita, *Saving the Nation: Economic Modernity in Republican China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006;)
- Zhang Boping and Ma Junzhi, "Jialingjian xiayou meitian diaocha baogao," *Jingjibu kuangye yanjiusuo ranliao huibao*, Vol.1 (1939,)
- Zhang Jing, *Quanli chongtu yu biange: 1926-1937 nian chongqingshi xiandaihua yanjiu* (Chongqing: Chongqing chubanshe, 2003)
- Zhang Senkai el eds, *Hechuan Xianzhi* (1916) in *Zhongguo difangzhi jicheng: Sichuan fuxan zhiji*, 70 vols. (Reprint, Chengdu: Bashu shushe, 1996,) vol. 43

Zheng Dahua, *Mingguo xiangcun jianshe yundong* (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2000)

-----, Zheng Dahua, “Lun minsheng zhuyi de nairong jiqi dangdai yiyi,” Xueshu yanjiu, Vol. 7(July 2009,)

Zelin, Madeleine, *The Merchants of Zigong: Industrial Entrepreneurship in Early Modern China* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2005,)

Zhongguo jindaishi xuehui, ed., *Qingzhu kangzhan shengli wushi zhounian liangan xueshu yantaohui lunwenji*, 2 vols (Taipei: Lianjing chubanshe, 1995,)

Zhou Kaiqing, *Mingguo Liu Fucheng Xiansheng Nianpu* (Reprint Taipei: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1981,)

Zhou Qixun, “Sanxia shiyanqu difang jingji diaocha gaikung,” *Caizheng jikan*

Zhu Hanguo, *Liang Shuming de xiangcun jianshe yanjiu* (Taiyuan: Shanxi jiaoyu chubanshe, 1996,)

Zhu Huisen et al, *Tudi gaige shiliao* (Taipei: Guoshiguan, 1988,)

Zuo Wenliang, “Zongshen tuijin mabian fuping kaifa de zhence sikao,” Xianyu jingji, Vol 13, No 1 ( March 2011,)